FIrst , if every particular man , or bodie generable , have precedent causes of their beings ; their whole generations must of necessity have some cause : otherwise all should not be of one kinde or nature . Now this progresse from effects unto their causes , or betwixt causes subordinate , cannot be infinite : but as all progressive motion supposeth some rest or stay , whence it proceedeth , so must this progresse , whereof I speake , take beginning from some cause , which hath no cause of its being . And this is that incomprehensible Essence , which wee seeke .

2 But whereunto shall wee liken him ? Things compared alwayes agree in some one kind , or have ( at least ) a common measure . Is then this cause of causes contained in any predicamentall ranck of being ? Or can our conceipt of any thing therein contained , be truly fitted unto him ? Or may his infinite and incomprehensible nature be rightly moulded within the circumference of mans shallow braine ? One thing it is to represent the infinite Essence , another to illustrate this truth , that he cannot be represented . Though nothing can exactly resemble him , yet some things there be which better notifie how farre he is beyond all resemblance or comparison , then others can doe . By variety of such resemblances as his works afford , may our admiration of his incomprehensiblenesse bee raised higher and higher , and with our admiration thus raised , will our longing after his presence still be enlarged . The nature of things finite and limited , no Philosopher can so exactly expresse , as Painters may their outward lineaments . But as some sensible objects , besides their proper shape or character , imprint a kinde of dislike or pleasance in creatures sensitive : so have our purest and most exact conceipts intellectuall certaine symptomaticall impressions annexed , which inwardly affect us ; though we cannot outwardly so expresse them , as they may imprint the like affection in others . Hence it is that the more right resemblances we make to our selves of any thing , the greater will be the symptomaticall impression of the latent truth ; some part or shadow whereof appeareth in every thing , whereto it can truly be compared . And though we cannot in this life come to a cleare view of that nature , which we most desire to see ; yet is it a worke worthy our paines , to erect our thoughts , by varietie of resemblances ( made with due observance of decorum ) unto an horizon more ample then ordinary ; in whose skirts or edges , wee may behold some scattered rayes of that glorious light , which is utterly set unto men , whose thoughts soare not without the circumference of this visible world ; for all we see with ou● bodily eyes , is but an hemisphere of midnight darknesse , to the habitation of Saints , and seat o● blisse .

VNto every Student that with observance ordinary will survey any Philosophicall tract of causes , 1 two maine springs or fountaines doe in a manner discover themselves : which were they as well opened and drawne , as some others of lesse consequence are , wee might baptize most Atheists in the one , and confirme good Christians in the other . The naturall current of the one directly caries us to an independant cause ; from whose illimited essence and nature , the later affords us an ocular or visible derivation of those generall attributes , whereof faith infused giveth us the true taste and relish . The former wee may draw to this head , [ Whatsoever hath limits or bounds of being , hath some distinct cause or author of being . ] As impossible it is , any thing should take limits of being , as beginning of being from it selfe . For beginning of being is one especiall limit of being .

2 This Maxime is simply convertible , [ Whatsoever hath cause of being hath also limits of being . ] because it hath beginning of being : for [ Omnis causa est principium , & omne causatum est principiatum , ] Every cause is the active beginning or beginner of being , and an active beginning essentially includes a beginning passive , as fashionable to it , as the marke or impression is to the stampe . Or in plainer English , thus ; Where there is a beginning or beginner , there is somewhat begunne . Where the cause is prae●xistent in time , the distinction or limits of things caused or begun , are as easily seene as the divers surfaces of bodies severed in place . But where the cause hath onely precedence of nature and not of time , ( as it falleth out in things caused by concomitance or resultance , ) the limits or confines of their being seeme confounded , or as hardly distinguishable as the divers surfaces of two bodies glued together . Yet as wee rightly gather that if the bodies be of severall kindes , each hath its proper surface , though the point of distinction bee invisible to our eyes : so whatsoever we conceive to have dependance upon another , wee necessarily conceive it to have proper limits of being , or at least a distinct beginning of being from the other , though as it were ingrafted in it . But whether we conceive effects and causes distinctly as they are in nature , or in grosse , so long as wee acknowledge them ( this or that way conceived ) to be finite and limited , wee must acknowledge some cause of their limitation , which ( as we suppose ) cannot be distinct from the cause of their being .

3 Why men in these dayes are not Gyants , why Gyants , in former , were but men , are two Problems which the meere naturalist could easily assoyle by this reason , for substance one and the same . The vigour of causes productive or conservative of vegetables , of man especially , from which he receiveth nutrition and augmentation , is lesse now then it hath beene at least before the Flood ; though but finite and limited , when it was greatest . Why vegetables of greatest vigour , ingrosse not the properties of others lesse vigorous , but rest contented with a greater numericall measure of their owne specificall vertues ; is , by the former reason as plaine . For in that they have not their being from themselves , they can take no more then is given ; nor can the natures whence they are propagated , convey them a better title of being , then themselves have . This as the seale communicates his fashion to the waxe , so doth the limited force or vertue of causes , alwayes imprint bounds and limits upon their effects . If further it be demanded , why the Elements having the opportunity of mutuall vicinity , to wreake their naturall enmities or hostilities , doe not each trespasse more grievously upon other ; as why the restlesse or raging water swallowes not up the dull earth , which cannot flye from any wrong or violence offered ; or why the Heavens , having so great a prerogative by height of place , largenesse of compasse , and indefatigable motion , do not dispossesse the higher Elements of their seat ? The naturalist would plead the warrant of Natures Charter , which had set them their distinct bounds and limits by an everlasting undispensable law . Yet is nature in his language alwaies an internall or essentiall part of some bodies , within which it is necessarily confined . As the nature of the Heavens hath not so much as liberty of egresse into neighbour Elements , nor the proper formes of these , ( upon what exigence or assaults soever made against them in their territories , ) so much as right of removall or flitting into lower Elements . Or , in case it be pretended that these particular natures , have a nature more generall for their president ; yet this , whether one above the rest , or an aggregation onely of all the rest , is still confined to this visible world , and both so hidebound with the utmost sphere , that they cannot grow greater or enlarge their strength . So that nature taken in what sense the Naturalist lists , cannot be said so properly to set bounds or limits to bodies naturall , as to bee bounded or limited in them . Or to speake more properly , Nature her selfe did not make , but is that very domestique law , by which they are bounded , and therefore , in no case , can dispense with it . And in that she is a law , ( for the most part , but not absolutely indispensable ) shee necessarily supposeth a Lawgiver ; who , if he have no Law set him by any superiour ( as we must of necessity come in fine to some one in this kinde supreame ) hee can have no such limits or bounds , as he hath set to nature , and things naturall . He neither is any part of this visible frame , which we see , nor can he be inclosed within the utmost sphere . And thus by following the issue of the former fountaine , we are arived in the latter , which fully discovered , opens it selfe into a boundlesse Ocean . Whatsoever hath no cause of being can have no limits or bounds of being .

4 And Being , may bee limited or illimited two wayes : Either for number of kindes and natures contained in it , or for quantity and intensive perfection of every severall kinde . Of things visible , we see the most perfect are but perfect in some one kinde , they possesse not the entire perfection of others ; and that perfection , whereof they have the just propriety , is not actually infinite , 〈◊〉 finite and limited . Whatsoever thus is , it was as possible for it not to have beene , and is as possible for it not to be , as to be but of this or that kinde , not all that is , or hath being . Even those substances which we call immortall , as the heaven of heavens , with all their inhabitants , be they Angels or Archangels , Principalities or Thrones , enjoy the perpetuall tenour of their actuall existence , not from their essence , but from the decree of their Maker . Manent cuncta non quia aeterna sunt , sed quia defenduntur curâ regentis . Immortalia tutore non egent , haec conservat artifex , fragilitatem materiae vi sua vincens . Seneca Epist. 58. All things continue in being , not because they are eternall , but because they are defended by the providence of their Governour . Things immortall need no guardian or protector . But the maker of all things preserveth these things ( which we see continue in being ) overmatching the frailty of the matter by his power . In this mans philosophy nothing which is made , can be by nature immortall , though many things be perpetually preserved from perishing . Nothing which is immortall , can bee made . He grossely erred , if hee were of the same opinion with some others of the * * Mittamus animum ad illa quae aeterna sunt . Miremur in sublimi volitantes rerum on nium formas ▪ Deumque inter illa versantem , & providentem , quemadmodum quae immortalia facere non potuit , quia materia prohibebat , defendat à morte , ac ratione vitium corporis vincat . Senec. ib. Whether for thus saying hee fall under the censure of Muretus in his annotations upon this place , I refer it to the judicious Reader . Impie stulta veterum opinio , Deum voluisse quidem à primo omnia immortalia facere , sed non potuisse , propter materiae vitium . Quasi non , ut caetera omnia , ita materiam condiderit , ac procrearit Deus . Recte Lacta●●tius , Idem materiae fictor est , q●i & rerum materia constantium . Ancient , that God had a desire to make things immortall , but could not by reason of the frailty or untowardlinesse of the matter . But that things made out of the matter , or made at all , could be immortall by nature , he rightly affirmed . For to be immortall in his language , is to be without beginning , without dependance . And what so is , hath an eternall necessity of existence . Absolute necessity of existence , or impossibility of non-existence , or of not being alwayes what it is , and as it is , implies an absolute necessity of being or of existence infinite ; which cannot reside save only in the totality or absolute fulnesse of all being possible . The greatest fulnesse of finite existence conceiveable , cannot reach beyond al possibility of non-existence , nor can possibility of non-existence , and perpetuall actuall existence , be indissolubly wedded in any finite nature , save only by his infinite power , who essentially is , or whose essence is to exist , or to be the inexhaustible fountaine of all being . The necessary supposall , or acknowledgement of such an infinite or essentially existent power , cannot more strongly or more perspicuously be inferred , than by the reduction of known effects unto their causes , & of these causative entities ( whose number and ranks are finite ) into one prime essence , whence al of them are derived ; it self being underivable from any cause , or essence conceivable . In that this prime essence hath no cause of being , it can have no beginning of being . And yet is beginning of being , the first & prime limit of being , without whose precedence , other bounds or limits of being , cannot follow .

5 If that which Philosophers suppose to be the root of incorruption in the heavens , can brooke no limits of duration , but must bee imagined without end or beginning ; why should it content it selfe with limits of extension ? seeing duration is but a kinde of extension , seeing motion , magnitude , and time , by their rules in other cases , hold exact proportion . Things caused ( as induction manifesteth ) are alwayes limited and moulded in their proper causes . Nor are there two causes ( much lesse two causalities , ) one of their being , another of their limitation or restraint to this or that set kinde of being . For whatsoever gives being to any thing , gives it the beginning of being . As Sophroniscus was the true cause why Socrates was in that age wherein he lived , not before or after ; why he was a man not a beast , an Athenian , not a Barbarian . Quicquid dat formam , dat omnia consequentia formam : whatsoever gives forme of being to any thing , gives all the appurtenances to the forme : is a Physicall Maxime which supposeth another Metaphysicall , Quicquid dat esse , dat proprietates esse : That which gives being unto any thing , gives likewise the properties of such being as it hath . Now limits of being , are essentiall properties of that essence or being , wherin they are found . And distinct bounds or limits are included in the distinct forme of being , which every thing hath from its cause . Actuall essence or existence it selfe , is distributed to every thing that hath cause of being , as it were sealed up in its proper forme or kind of being . It is as possible to put a new fashion upon nothing , as for any thing that is , to take limits or set forme of being from nothing . That which hath nothing to give it being , can have nothing to give it limits or bounds of being . And as no entity can take its being , or beginning of being from it selfe ; so neither can it take bounds or limits from it selfe , but must have them from some other . The prime essence or first cause of all things that are , as it hath no precedent cause of existence , nor can it be cause of existence to it self ; so neither can it have any cause of limits without it selfe , nor can it be any cause of limits to it selfe . It remaines then , that it must bee an essence illimited , and thus to be without bounds or limits , is the formall effect or consequence of being it selfe , or of that which truly is , without any cause precedent to give it being , or make it what it is .

6 So essentially is the conceipt of being without bounds or limits , included in our conceipt of being without cause precedent , that if we should , by way of supposition , give any imaginary entity leave to take beginning or possession of being from it selfe , without the warrant of any cause precedent to appoint or measure it out some distinct portion or forme of being : thus much being once by imagination granted , wee could not ( by any imagination possible ) debarre this entity from absolute necessity of being for ever after whatsoever it listed to be , or from being all things , rather than any one thing .

Of the Heathens , many did hold an uncreated Chaos praeexistent to the frame of this Vniverse : and Philosophers , to this day , maintaine an ingenerable matter , which actually is not any body , but indifferent to be made every body . Let us but suppose ; First the one , or other of them to be as Homogeneall in it selfe , as the ayre or water : Secondly , to be able to actuate , or Proteus-like to transforme it selfe into a better state than now it hath , without the helpe of any agent or efficient ; and then , as it could have no cause , so can there bee no reason given , to restraine it from taking all bodily perfection possible to it selfe . And if it bee true , which some teach , that this prime matter hath neither proper quantity nor quality , what should hinder it to take both without measure , supposing it might bee its one carver of those endowments ? Or imagine there were such a vacuity , where the world now is , as we Christians beleeve there was before it was made , and onely one of Democritus casuall Atoms , or some meere possibility or appetite of the matter , left free , venire in vacuum , to give it selfe full and perfect act without curbe or restraint of any superiour power or sharer to cry halfe mine with it , or make claime to the nature of any actuall entity lost ; it being supposed to be able to take any one nature upon it , what should either hinder or further it , to assume the nature of earth , rather than of water , or of these two , rather than of any other Element , or of any simple bodies , rather than of mixt or compounded substances , or of bodily substances , rather than spirituall , or of all these , rather than of their metaphysicall eminences , and perfections ? Or whilst we imagine it , without cause of existence or beginning , no reason imaginable could confine it to any set place of residence or extension : no cause could bee alledged why it should take possession of the center , rather than of the circumference of this Vniverse , as now it stands , or of both these rather than of the whole sphere , or of the whole sphere rather than of all extensive space imaginable . Only the very supposition of taking beginning though without cause , doth put a limit to its duration ; because this kinde of beginning , being but imaginary , depends upon our imagination , as upon its true cause . And yet even thus considered , me thinks it should extend its existence both waies , and draw a circular duration to the instant where it beginnes . Or ( not imagining the beginning ) let us imagine it only to have true present being without any cause precedent to push it forward , or superiour guide to appoint it a set course ; and it is not within the compasse of imagination , why the duration of it should not reach as farre the one way as the other . as farre beyond all imagination of time past , as of time to come , why it should not comprehend all duration imaginable by way of present possession , or supereminent permanency , without admission of any deflux , division , or succession , for continuation of its existence .

7 If it bee objected , that any thing may follow from supposition or imagination of impossibilities , the reply is easie . The objection is either false , or true in a sense , which no way impeacheth , but rather approves that kinde of arguing . True it is , there is almost nothing in nature so impossible , as it may not be the possible consequent of some impossibility supposed or granted : but of every particular impossibility supposed or imagined , the possible * * Qui scholas regunt , ia id nobis exploratum reliquerunt : tale esse conditionalis propositionis naturam sive conditionem , ut existente falso quod antecedit , & etiam quod subsequitur , possit remanere vera conditionalis . Pasq . c. 1. ad Rom. fol. 65 Though it were impossible for an Angell from heaven to preach any other Gospell than Paul had preached , and impossible likewise for any Angell of heaven to be accursed , yet S. Pauls conditionall proposition was true ; If an Angell from heaven should preach any other Gospell , he should be accursed . In like manner this supposition or conditionall [ If any thing could take beginning from it selfe , it should be infinite ] is true : although both these positions be false ; First , that any thing can take beginning from it self : Secondly , that any thing which hath beginning can be infinite . And this only is absolutely true , That which truly is without all beginning , is absolutely infinite . consequences are not infinite ; neither such nor so many as we list to make them ; they are determinate by nature . Now we cannot conceive it to be in nature more impossible for a meere logical possibility , really and truely to take beginning of actuall being onely from it selfe , then it is for that which is supposed & imagined thus to take beginning , to be restrained either to any determinat kind or part of being , or to bee confined to any set place or residence . Or if any mislike these imaginarie models , let him ( now he hath given us leave to make them , and vouchsafed to looke upon them ) utterly cancell or deface them . The everlasting edifice to whose erection they are destinated , is this ; Such as we cannot conceive that not to be , which we conceive to take beginning of being from it selfe without any cause precedent ; such of necessity must we conceive and beleeve him to bee indeed , who neither tooke beginning from himselfe , nor had it given by any , but is the beginning of being , the sole maker of all things that bee , being himselfe without beginning , without dependance o● any cause , without subordination to any guide , to appoint his kinde , to limit his place , or prescribe his time of being . He is in all these , and whatsoever branch or portion of being imaginable , truely and really infinite , the quintessence or excellency of all perfections ( whether numericall or specifical ) incident to al sorts or degrees of Beings numerable .