CONSIDERATIONS
VPON
THE
GREATnesse
of
the
Turkish
Empire
.
Wherein
are
handled
the
manner
how
it
is
become
so
great
,
the
meanes
whereby
it
is
maintained
,
and
how
it
would
be
easie
to
bring
it
to
ruine
.
-
1
The
summe
of
this
discourse
.
-
2
The
diuision
thereof
into
3.
principall
parts
.
-
3
The
argument
of
the
first
booke
.
-
4
Steps
to
the
Turkish
greatnesse
.
FIrst
:
My
purpose
is
to
examine
in
this
treatise
how
the
Empire
of
the
Turke
is
growne
to
that
height
and
greatnesse
.
2
:
And
the
better
to
effect
it
I
will
diuide
the
whole
discourse
into
three
principall
parts
.
The
first
,
what
way
he
hath
taken
to
attaine
to
the
top
of
such
a
raised
greatnesse
as
his
now
is
.
The
second
,
with
what
meanes
and
arre
he
behaueth
and
maintaineth
himselfe
therein
;
and
finally
I
will
declare
how
the
pride
of
this
Tyrant
may
be
abated
;
his
greatnesse
diminished
,
and
his
Empire
ruined
.
3
:
The
subiect
then
of
the
first
booke
shall
be
to
examine
what
haue
beene
his
courses
in
his
conquests
;
and
though
they
haue
beene
without
any
order
,
reason
or
faith
:
yet
will
it
be
no
hard
matter
to
discerne
,
by
the
successe
of
such
counsailes
as
he
hath
put
in
practise
in
his
most
difficult
enterprises
,
the
good
from
the
bad
,
and
also
to
separate
in
the
course
of
his
actions
all
whatsoeuer
hath
beene
profitable
;
from
what
hath
beene
hurtfull
and
ill
vndertaken
:
heerin
imitating
the
Bee
which
from
bitter
herbes
sucks
most
sweete
hony
.
These
are
in
my
opinion
the
steps
and
dessignes
he
hath
followed
to
attaine
to
his
greatnesse
,
wherby
as
by
degrees
he
hath
built
his
strange
fortune
which
makes
vs
at
this
day
so
much
to
feare
him
.
-
1
First
he
hath
applied
himselfe
wholy
to
the
wars
.
-
2
His
war
hath
beene
alwaies
offensiue
.
-
3
He
hath
made
slender
account
of
fortresses
.
-
4
He
hath
fashioned
his
wisdome
to
valour
and
hardnesse
.
-
5
He
hath
maintained
his
great
and
mighty
armies
in
military
discipline
and
policy
.
-
6
He
hath
made
no
reckoning
of
other
forces
then
of
his
owne
.
-
7
He
hath
to
power
ioyned
cunning
and
deceipt
.
-
8
He
hath
beene
serued
by
excellent
Captaines
.
-
9
He
hath
not
made
any
skip
in
his
enterprises
.
-
10
He
hath
not
spent
time
vpon
matters
of
small
importance
.
-
11
He
hath
laid
hold
on
occasions
.
-
12
He
hath
speedily
put
in
execution
his
dessignes
.
-
13
He
hath
gone
in
person
to
the
war
.
-
14
Well
appointed
.
-
15
In
a
fit
season
.
-
16
He
hath
not
diuided
his
forces
.
-
17
He
hath
not
long
continued
war
with
one
alone
.
CHAP.
I.
That
he
hath
applied
his
thoughts
wholly
to
the
wars
.
-
1
Bookes
held
by
the
Gothes
a
let
to
armes
.
-
2
Charles
the
8.
his
expedition
to
Naples
.
-
3
Christians
held
vnfit
for
wars
,
because
so
intent
to
studie
.
-
4
The
Turkes
wholly
addicted
to
the
wars
.
-
5
The
Romans
most
martiall
.
-
6
Barbarous
nations
most
warlike
and
prompt
in
their
attempts
.
-
7
The
Turks
despisers
of
Liberall
arts
.
-
8
They
inuade
Italy
.
-
9
Their
military
vertues
.
-
10
Whether
liberall
artes
disable
their
followers
for
the
wars
.
-
11
The
vse
of
History
and
the
Mathematikes
.
-
12
Letters
and
armes
fitly
maried
together
.
-
13
Learning
and
valour
necessary
in
a
Commander
,
obedience
in
a
Souldier
.
1
AT
the
time
that
the
Gothes
made
a
most
fearefull
sacke
of
Greece
,
and
as
a
violent
streame
ouerflowed
her
fruitfull
plaines
,
ransacking
her
many
cities
and
rich
townes
;
amongst
other
spoiles
there
fel
into
their
hands
a
great
number
of
bookes
of
all
sorts
of
professions
;
wherewith
not
knowing
what
to
doe
,
as
vnprofitable
stuffe
,
they
would
haue
burnt
them
,
if
one
amongst
the
rest
had
not
opposed
himselfe
:
who
stepping
foorth
cried
out
;
it
was
requisite
they
should
carefully
preserue
them
,
and
leaue
(
quoth
he
)
this
poison
amongst
the
Grecians
,
since
in
time
they
will
bereaue
them
of
all
martiall
courage
,
as
ordinarily
they
do
all
such
as
apply
themselues
too
much
to
the
like
learning
and
knowledge
,
making
them
become
tender
,
effeminate
,
and
altogether
vnfit
for
the
vse
of
armes
;
so
as
failing
of
courage
they
will
prooue
more
easily
the
pray
of
our
fortunate
conquest
.
2
When
Charles
the
eight
of
France
with
so
smal
an
army
made
his
way
thorough
Italy
,
3
Heeretofore
and
at
this
day
,
the
Turkes
haue
and
doe
esteeme
the
Christians
of
little
valour
in
martiall
affaires
,
becaus
of
the
varietie
of
Arts
whereunto
they
vsually
addict
themselues
;
and
though
a
man
be
so
smally
durable
as
he
cannot
attaine
to
perfection
in
diuers
sciences
,
nor
so
inable
himselfe
to
the
attention
of
sundry
matters
as
hee
may
game
the
mastery
for
which
he
striueth
;
yet
all
men
will
busie
themselues
about
knowledge
,
and
intermeddle
with
all
Arts
and
practises
,
not
heeding
that
in
stead
of
forwarding
themselues
,
they
recoile
from
that
perfect
knowledge
which
is
requisite
for
them
,
and
so
remaine
vnfurnished
,
or
but
weakely
grounded
in
one
onely
profession
.
4
On
the
contrarie
,
the
Turkes
fashion
their
whole
dessignes
to
the
war
,
and
bend
all
their
thoughts
and
studies
to
the
exercise
of
armes
,
reiecting
all
other
courses
,
and
pleasing
themselues
onely
in
what
may
stand
them
in
stead
for
that
profession
.
5
There
is
nothing
more
true
(
and
we
finde
it
in
histories
)
then
that
the
Romanes
were
most
excellent
Souldiers
,
but
especially
before
they
opened
their
gates
to
Arts
and
Sciences
presented
them
by
the
Greeks
,
and
that
they
gaue
themselues
ouer
to
the
pleasures
of
the
East
.
Then
were
they
at
the
best
for
true
cariage
of
marshall
affaires
when
their
Consuls
scorned
not
to
hold
the
plough
;
when
Physicians
,
Surgeons
,
&
men
of
such
like
profession
were
in
no
credit
amongst
them
.
And
to
say
the
truth
,
we
finde
that
if
afterward
they
did
atchieue
any
worthy
enterprise
,
it
was
not
by
meanes
of
any
valour
which
was
remaining
with
them
,
but
by
the
reputation
&
strength
they
had
formerly
gotten
.
For
proofe
heereof
we
may
plainly
perceiue
that
as
soone
as
they
had
giuen
entertainement
to
forraine
sciences
,
made
tender
by
study
,
they
receiued
notable
and
dishonorable
ouerthrowes
,
as
well
at
the
hands
of
Iugurtha
,
Mithridates
,
the
Cimbrians
,
Numantins
,
Spartans
,
the
Parthians
,
as
of
others
.
6
For
confirmation
whereof
we
obserue
in
ancient
histories
,
that
the
most
warlike
people
,
&
withal
such
as
haue
performed
the
memorablest
acts
,
haue
beene
the
most
grosse
,
rude
and
inured
to
paine
and
hardnesse
,
far
from
all
ciuility
;
free
from
such
delicacy
and
wantonnesse
as
is
corruptly
stept
in
amongst
vs
;
such
as
had
no
learning
or
taste
of
any
knowledge
or
action
which
might
allay
or
neuer
so
litle
shake
their
couragious
resolutions
and
warlike
dessignes
.
Of
this
composition
were
long
since
and
are
at
this
daie
the
Scythians
,
who
sometimes
made
their
worthy
armes
resound
as
far
as
the
most
remote
parts
of
the
East
,
as
far
as
the
Danow
and
the
bankes
of
Nilus
.
It
is
not
long
since
that
they
,
Dijon
,
Nouare
,
Marignan
,
Dreux
,
as
else
where
:
7
Now
the
Turks
aboue
all
nations
haue
euer
profest
to
follow
this
course
of
life
so
barbarous
and
rude
,
and
euen
at
this
day
they
contemne
all
knowledge
and
profession
of
whatsoeuer
arte
,
be
it
neuer
so
noble
or
industrious
;
among
the
rest
they
abhor
painting
and
ingrauing
,
neither
make
they
any
account
of
architecture
:
and
in
very
deede
we
see
that
they
haue
euer
held
it
an
especiall
offence
towards
God
,
to
ingraue
or
paint
him
.
As
for
learning
they
recken
it
as
meere
foolery
:
In
a
word
,
there
are
none
amongst
them
so
slenderly
esteemed
as
men
learned
and
seene
in
any
kinde
of
knowledge
.
In
their
garments
they
affect
not
stuffes
wrought
,
imbroidered
or
curiously
cut
and
fashioned
,
but
such
as
are
whole
and
lasting
;
laces
,
fringes
and
other
ornaments
are
by
them
reiected
:
beaten
and
massie
gold
is
only
in
request
amongst
them
.
In
the
wars
they
seeke
rather
to
appeere
fearce
and
terrible
,
then
gallantly
set
forth
and
apparelled
:
their
whole
delight
is
set
vpon
war
and
armes
;
insomuch
as
it
is
hard
to
finde
any
one
of
them
who
will
not
manifest
by
his
fashion
of
liuing
that
he
is
rather
borne
for
the
wars
then
ought
else
:
so
as
when
there
is
any
leuying
of
Souldiours
,
such
as
are
left
at
home
hold
themselues
highly
iniured
;
so
honorably
doe
they
esteeme
of
the
life
of
a
souldier
.
Whence
it
proceedeth
,
that
they
are
so
feared
in
all
their
attempts
,
either
for
beseeging
,
battering
,
or
forcing
of
places
of
greatest
strength
;
for
skirmishing
on
foote
or
on
horsebacke
,
in
set
battailes
by
sea
or
by
land
,
or
for
fortifying
and
defending
.
8
Whereof
they
gaue
sufficient
proofe
when
hauing
gotten
Ottranto
they
valiantly
made
it
good
against
the
forces
of
all
Italy
;
9
Such
is
their
laborious
vertue
in
the
wars
,
as
there
is
no
place
so
strong
,
or
enterprise
so
difficult
which
will
not
prooue
easie
at
the
enforcing
of
their
powers
.
10
Returning
now
to
that
I
said
concerning
knowledge
:
I
expect
that
some
one
should
say
:
And
what
I
praie
,
is
learning
a
let
to
military
vertue
,
or
a
meanes
to
hinder
a
man
from
becomming
a
perfect
souldier
?
surely
no
:
I
am
of
a
contrary
opinion
,
and
I
ground
it
in
part
vpon
the
experience
of
such
Captaines
as
I
will
heere
reckon
.
Alexander
the
great
and
Caesar
who
were
of
the
principall
most
aduenturous
,
and
politicke
Masters
of
the
wars
were
most
excellently
seene
in
all
sorts
of
knowledge
;
for
my
owne
part
I
hold
it
very
difficult
for
any
without
the
aide
of
Historie
or
the
Mathematiques
,
to
deserue
the
name
of
a
great
Captaine
and
sage
conductor
of
armies
:
11
Since
Historie
by
the
variety
of
examples
both
of
good
and
bad
successe
furnisheth
a
man
with
heedfulnesse
and
discretion
,
with
resolution
and
aduice
in
all
occurrents
,
and
makes
him
more
considerate
in
what
he
vndertaketh
;
like
as
the
Mathematikes
refine
his
knowledge
and
iudgement
,
as
well
in
engines
of
war
as
in
fortifying
.
12
In
conclusion
,
it
is
not
to
be
denied
but
that
learning
is
most
proper
to
mould
and
perfectly
fashion
a
heart
and
courage
borne
and
disposed
to
armes
:
for
this
cause
they
would
in
old
time
,
that
Pallas
armed
should
signifie
vnto
vs
the
marrying
of
letters
with
armes
.
Now
to
come
againe
to
the
Turkes
rudenesse
,
we
shall
finde
(
examining
some
of
their
Princes
)
that
somewhat
must
be
abated
.
Let
vs
consider
what
were
Mahomet
the
2.
and
Selim
and
Soliman
his
sonnes
(
the
most
valiant
Princes
of
the
race
of
the
Ottomans
)
and
we
shall
see
that
they
delighted
in
reading
Histories
,
and
in
studying
the
Mathematikes
:
so
as
though
nature
dispose
a
man
to
hardinesse
and
magnanimitie
,
it
is
sure
that
if
he
be
wholy
vnfurnished
of
artes
and
learning
,
he
will
be
of
a
disposition
doubtfull
,
vnassured
,
vnresolued
and
without
any
true
stomacke
or
valour
;
parts
especially
required
in
a
Souldier
.
This
hath
beene
seene
in
those
of
the
Ottomans
which
wanted
the
vertues
of
the
three
aboue
named
;
and
amongst
others
Baiazet
the
second
and
Corcas
his
sonne
can
witnesse
it
.
These
indeed
had
in
some
measure
the
knowledge
of
good
letters
,
but
these
performed
no
valiant
act
,
because
they
had
not
hearts
and
courages
borne
to
the
wars
.
13
Whence
it
followeth
that
the
study
of
learning
auaileth
much
to
the
forming
of
a
wise
and
discreet
Captaine
,
and
to
helpe
him
to
attaine
to
the
perfection
worthy
his
name
;
nature
withall
disposing
him
to
valour
and
generositie
.
As
for
the
priuat
Souldier
I
hold
that
he
needes
not
know
more
then
to
obey
it
,
not
being
necessary
he
should
be
instructed
in
so
excellent
an
vnderstanding
of
matters
as
the
Commander
,
considering
that
humaine
Sciences
and
the
liberall
arts
in
an
vnsetled
minde
make
it
embrace
ciuility
,
wantonnesse
and
ease
in
stead
of
trauell
;
make
vs
loue
quietnesse
;
feare
death
,
flie
hunger
and
thirst
,
with
other
paines
and
periles
of
the
wars
:
In
sum
,
they
imprint
in
a
man
rather
a
desire
to
husband
his
life
then
to
lauish
it
for
the
glory
and
good
of
his
country
,
and
for
his
particular
honour
:
which
is
more
dangerous
in
a
souldier
then
in
a
man
of
any
other
profession
:
for
this
reason
such
an
one
neede
know
no
more
then
to
obey
,
goe
well
armed
,
and
valiantly
defend
himselfe
against
his
enemy
.
CHAP.
II.
That
he
hath
alwaies
sought
to
make
offensiue
war
.
-
1
Of
offensiue
and
defensiue
war
.
-
2
The
authors
opinion
thereof
.
-
3
Others
opinions
.
-
4
Reasons
in
behalfe
of
the
offensiue
,
and
inconueniences
of
the
defensiue
war.
-
5
Commodities
of
the
offensiue
war
.
-
6
Spoiles
in
our
enemies
or
our
owne
countrie
:
their
difference
.
-
7
Machiauel
confuted
.
-
8
The
chiefe
cause
of
the
Turkish
greatnesse
hath
beene
the
Christians
idlenesse
.
-
9
The
war
vpon
the
Turke
must
be
offensiue
.
-
10
Examples
of
good
successe
in
that
kind
.
1
IT
is
a
doubt
often
disputed
,
and
not
yet
resolued
,
whether
it
be
better
to
assaile
the
enemy
at
his
own
home
,
or
to
attend
till
he
assaile
vs
:
The
Lord
of
Langei
,
Machiauell
,
and
others
of
our
times
haue
discoursed
heereof
to
the
full
.
2
For
my
part
I
am
of
opinion
(
as
also
the
worthiest
captaines
haue
beene
)
that
it
is
alwaies
better
to
assaile
,
then
stay
till
we
be
assailed
:
Alexander
the
Great
,
Hannibal
,
Scipio
,
Caesar
,
and
many
other
Romans
serue
to
approue
it
;
and
all
these
would
haue
laughed
at
such
as
should
haue
otherwise
counselled
them
.
3
Yet
some
there
are
in
our
times
which
haue
endeuored
to
proue
the
contrarie
by
demonstrations
subtill
enough
(
but
vnsound
)
and
to
this
very
purpose
of
the
Turke
,
to
wit
,
that
it
were
better
to
attend
him
then
to
seeke
him
out
vpon
his
owne
dunghill
:
These
are
counsailes
more
curious
then
well
grounded
,
whereof
consequently
ensue
few
effects
of
moment
:
we
may
couple
such
men
with
those
vaunting
Ingenours
or
Artists
,
who
discoursing
vpon
some
worke
of
their
inuention
promise
of
it
wondrous
effects
,
and
set
foorth
some
simple
module
which
serueth
but
for
demonstration
only
;
but
when
it
commeth
(
as
they
say
)
to
the
push
,
and
that
they
must
put
their
instrument
to
his
true
triall
and
vse
,
then
is
it
that
they
are
far
to
seeke
,
and
that
they
confesse
the
difference
betweene
an
essentiall
effect
and
a
superficiall
flourish
,
such
as
their
first
module
afforded
.
Iust
in
this
manner
these
contemplatiue
state-Philosophers
will
attend
the
Turke
at
their
owne
home
,
whom
they
dare
scarce
looke
in
the
face
neither
in
nor
out
of
his
country
.
4
It
is
most
certaine
that
hee
which
assaileth
hath
alwaies
more
resolution
and
courage
then
he
that
attendeth
.
For
he
hath
already
formed
his
determination
and
prouision
when
the
other
goeth
by
heeresaie
and
likelihoods
:
moreouer
in
assailing
,
the
war
is
vndertaken
with
more
aduantage
,
and
commodity
then
otherwise
it
would
be
;
and
he
which
mindeth
to
force
a
country
or
prouince
may
make
his
vse
of
all
such
aduantages
and
commodities
as
he
findeth
may
serue
his
turne
in
the
country
he
intendeth
to
conquer
.
As
among
others
,
if
he
haue
set
on
foote
some
practise
,
or
hatched
some
treason
in
the
minds
of
two
or
three
,
such
of
the
subiects
of
the
prince
he
assaileth
as
he
knoweth
offended
or
malecontent
.
Or
if
he
haue
plotted
some
matter
of
purpose
for
an
vniuersall
rebellion
.
All
which
incountring
with
the
dessignes
of
the
supposed
conquerour
,
he
makes
them
serue
his
turne
with
more
aduantage
in
going
to
seeke
out
the
enemy
;
then
he
should
doe
in
staying
for
him
at
his
owne
home
.
By
these
meanes
Charles
the
eight
King
of
France
found
the
way
open
to
the
conquest
of
Naples
;
5
But
of
all
this
we
may
collect
a
more
sure
proofe
of
my
proposition
then
when
the
enemy
is
at
our
doores
,
and
that
the
astonishment
surpriseth
vs
,
ouerthroweth
and
confoundeth
all
counsaile
and
courage
;
at
such
a
time
vnexpected
disorders
hem
vs
in
on
euery
side
;
necessitie
presseth
vs
;
all
things
become
suspected
and
difficult
,
so
as
most
commonly
we
know
not
to
what
Saint
to
recommend
vs
;
nor
what
course
were
best
to
be
taken
;
for
since
we
must
haue
an
eie
,
misdoubt
,
make
prouisions
in
sundry
places
,
bestowe
garrisons
where
most
need
requireth
;
we
shall
finde
that
applying
remedies
on
the
one
side
our
affaires
will
grow
desperate
on
the
other
.
Moreouer
by
distributing
garrisons
in
this
sort
,
it
must
needs
follow
that
we
so
much
the
more
weaken
the
body
of
our
armie
,
and
that
through
this
constraint
we
quit
the
field
to
the
more
strong
;
which
disaduantage
commonly
drawes
with
it
the
ruine
of
our
whole
estate
.
If
contrariwise
we
will
preserue
all
our
forces
in
one
bodie
,
we
leaue
to
the
assailer
many
passages
and
places
where
he
may
set
downe
and
fortifie
himselfe
there
to
hold
vs
play
and
traine
vs
on
at
his
pleasure
;
but
if
it
should
so
happen
that
the
assailer
were
encountred
by
him
which
attendeth
with
equall
force
,
with
as
braue
a
countenance
,
and
like
courage
,
the
retraict
and
defence
rest
at
his
election
,
so
he
be
a
Captaine
wise
,
and
aduised
,
such
as
was
Solyman
when
he
marched
into
Hungarie
,
and
when
the
Emperour
Charles
the
5.
went
couragiously
to
meet
him
.
6
And
because
the
Disastrous
chance
of
war
may
sometimes
light
vpon
the
assailer
be
he
neuer
so
warie
and
valiant
;
it
is
to
be
presupposed
(
that
being
granted
)
that
he
will
sell
his
skin
at
so
deare
a
rate
,
as
the
forces
of
the
assailed
shall
remaine
thereby
so
disordred
,
as
he
will
not
be
able
to
offend
the
vanquished
,
or
disturbe
his
affaires
,
notwithstanding
that
his
countrey
be
farre
distant
from
the
countrey
assailed
:
this
may
be
seene
by
the
example
of
the
ouerthrow
the
French
receiued
,
and
the
taking
of
their
King
prisoner
before
Pauye
insomuch
as
that
losse
(
besides
that
of
their
Prince
)
did
not
afford
ought
to
the
victorious
whereby
he
might
aduantage
himselfe
vpon
the
kingdome
of
France
.
7
Methinkes
Machiauel
much
abuseth
himselfe
when
he
so
opiniatiuely
mainteineth
,
8
We
will
say
then
that
the
faint-hearted
slacknesse
of
the
Christians
hath
made
way
to
the
Turke
for
the
inlarging
of
his
limits
,
so
as
they
abut
almost
of
all
sides
vpon
Europe
,
and
hath
beene
a
meanes
that
he
can
now
not
only
attend
the
enemie
(
as
Machiauel
saith
)
but
goe
to
rowse
him
at
his
owne
home
.
It
is
the
course
he
hath
obserued
and
taken
;
to
ruine
his
neighbours
round
about
him
,
and
increase
his
power
,
which
he
hath
so
doone
as
he
hath
cleane
bereaued
vs
of
all
stomacke
to
assaile
him
,
yea
or
once
to
dare
to
attempt
it
.
For
though
there
be
Princes
enow
which
hold
it
necessary
for
the
good
of
Christendome
to
set
vpon
him
at
his
home
,
yet
to
this
day
we
see
none
that
will
begin
to
strike
the
first
stroake
,
or
set
first
hand
to
the
breaking
of
this
ice
.
9
But
if
euer
God
gaue
vs
the
courage
vertuously
to
attempt
this
enterprise
in
reuenge
of
the
oppression
and
wrongs
Christendome
hath
endured
at
his
hands
;
we
must
not
thinke
to
vndertake
it
by
other
meanes
then
those
he
hath
himselfe
put
in
practise
against
vs
,
&
that
is
to
seeke
him
out
at
his
owne
home
and
nobly
to
embrace
the
dessignes
himselfe
hath
obserued
;
which
doing
,
and
hauing
God
to
guide
,
we
shall
doubtlesse
obtaine
those
victories
of
him
which
he
hath
had
of
vs
.
Admit
he
haue
beene
for
a
time
our
Schoole-master
,
and
that
we
haue
learned
of
him
to
our
cost
,
it
is
now
high
time
that
wee
shew
how
we
haue
profited
by
his
instructions
,
and
that
we
know
how
to
put
them
in
practise
and
pay
the
interests
of
our
damages
.
10
Now
to
make
it
appeere
that
it
is
not
a
matter
of
that
difficultie
and
danger
that
some
imagine
,
let
vs
note
these
examples
which
are
in
a
maner
familiar
vnto
vs
.
Had
not
Andrew
Dorea
the
courage
with
a
small
number
of
ships
to
enter
into
Greece
where
he
got
Patras
and
Coron
?
Don
Iohn
of
Austria
,
did
he
not
affoord
a
notable
proofe
hereof
in
the
yeare
1571.
when
being
Generall
of
the
league
,
he
sought
the
enemie
out
in
the
inmost
parts
of
the
Leuant
where
he
gaue
him
battaile
with
that
courage
,
that
though
he
were
inrferior
to
him
in
men
&
galleies
,
yet
failed
he
not
(
assisted
by
God
)
to
ouerthrow
the
most
puissant
&
great
armie
that
the
Ottomans
euer
set
foorth
by
sea
against
the
Christians
:
There
is
nothing
the
Turke
so
much
feareth
,
as
to
be
set
vpon
by
the
Christians
,
both
because
he
knowes
they
haue
valor
in
them
,
as
also
for
the
iealousie
he
conceiueth
of
the
great
number
of
them
vnder
his
obedience
:
All
which
would
without
question
rise
in
armes
if
they
might
but
once
see
the
Christians
Coulours
flying
,
and
so
accompanied
,
as
that
they
might
to
some
purpose
make
head
against
the
Ottamans
.
CHAP.
III.
That
he
hath
made
no
account
of
Fortresses
.
-
1
We
must
endeuour
as
well
to
keepe
as
conquer
.
-
2
The
reason
and
vse
of
Colonies
amongst
the
ancient
.
-
3
Their
discommodities
.
-
4
The
causes
of
rebellions
.
-
5
An
other
discommoditie
of
Colonies
.
-
6
The
Portugals
manner
of
planting
Colonies
.
-
7
Their
benefite
.
-
8
Fortresses
the
second
meanes
of
preseruing
an
estate
.
-
9
Their
vse
and
necessitie
.
-
10
Machiauels
vaine
opinion
confuted
.
-
11
Forces
euer
in
readinesse
,
the
third
meanes
of
preseruing
an
Estate
.
-
12
Whether
is
better
to
maintaine
Fortresses
vpon
the
borders
,
or
to
haue
an
armie
euer
ready
.
-
13
How
the
Turks
cuntries
liue
in
peace
by
means
of
the
latter
.
-
14
In
keeping
the
second
meanes
,
in
getting
the
third
is
most
approoued
.
-
15
Whence
the
power
of
the
Turke
doth
grow
.
-
16
Wars
abroad
beget
peace
at
home
.
1
PRinces
generally
striue
by
all
meanes
to
preserue
not
onely
their
own
estates
,
but
such
prouinces
also
as
they
haue
conquered
;
obseruing
what
the
time
,
the
humour
of
the
people
,
and
their
meanes
will
permit
.
But
because
each
one
takes
a
different
course
,
and
of
this
difference
hapneth
both
good
and
euill
,
I
iudge
it
necessarie
to
say
somwhat
thereof
by
way
of
discourse
:
I
will
spare
to
meddle
with
the
forme
each
one
keepeth
in
the
politicke
gouernment
of
his
dominions
or
principalities
;
and
will
draw
my selfe
within
compasse
of
handling
,
in
three
seuerall
points
,
all
that
may
be
said
or
alleaged
vpon
this
subiect
.
First
then
we
will
speake
of
Colonies
,
next
of
Fortresses
,
and
last
of
Armies
,
entertained
for
the
defence
of
the
countrey
.
2
Colonies
haue
beene
one
of
the
meanes
which
the
Ancients
haue
most
ordinarily
obserued
;
and
at
this
day
they
are
practised
to
mainteine
a
subdued
people
vnder
the
obedience
of
a
new
soueraigntie
.
Such
then
as
allowed
of
this
manner
of
preseruing
Estates
,
by
way
of
Colonies
bestowed
the
lands
of
those
they
had
conquered
vpon
their
naturall
subiects
,
equally
distributing
them
according
to
their
merits
;
supposing
that
in
so
doing
,
they
should
sowe
the
countrey
conquered
with
new
men
,
which
might
behaue
themselues
with
a
like
deuotion
and
dutifull
obseruance
towards
them
,
as
vassals
performe
toward
their
Soueraigne
.
3
The
Grecians
vsed
them
first
;
and
then
the
Romanes
:
but
this
manner
of
assurance
is
not
so
commendable
,
as
many
may
suppose
,
insomuch
as
it
draweth
after
it
these
two
dangerous
consequents
.
The
first
is
,
that
when
a
Prince
depriueth
such
of
their
goods
as
are
naturall
owners
thereof
,
to
bestow
them
vpon
his
owne
subiects
,
it
winneth
him
and
his
immortall
hatred
,
accompanied
with
an
euerlasting
thirst
of
reuenge
,
and
of
regaining
their
libertie
,
for
though
such
as
are
so
despoiled
of
their
goods
be
but
few
in
number
in
regard
of
the
Colony
,
yet
it
is
to
be
imagined
that
they
haue
many
kinsfolkes
and
friends
interessed
in
their
miseries
,
and
that
there
need
but
three
or
foure
men
of
resolution
to
draw
all
the
rest
to
a
mutinie
and
reuolt
.
If
this
be
held
a
difficult
matter
,
yet
is
it
a
thing
naturall
to
become
wise
by
anothers
mishaps
,
and
to
feare
and
be
prouident
lest
we
fall
into
the
like
inconuenience
as
our
neighbours
.
The
apprehension
of
which
calamitie
makes
vs
ofttimes
conceiue
worse
of
the
euill
then
it
deserueth
,
especially
when
the
actions
of
the
conquering
prince
are
grounded
rather
vpon
force
then
reason
,
as
ordinarily
they
are
.
4
Most
commonly
the
rebellions
and
insurrections
of
people
and
cities
,
happen
not
so
much
for
the
outrage
done
to
a
whole
communaltie
,
as
for
the
iniuries
particularly
receiued
by
some
of
those
which
haue
reuolted
:
but
howsoeuer
,
such
wounds
alwaies
breed
the
vniuersall
destruction
of
a
common
weale
.
5
The
other
discommodity
which
they
meete
who
will
settle
the
establishment
of
their
fortunes
vpon
the
erections
of
Colonies
is
,
that
in
succession
of
time
those
men
so
remoued
from
their
owne
country
into
another
newly
subdued
,
fashion
themselues
vnto
the
climat
,
humors
,
and
complexions
,
and
to
the
same
minde
of
preseruing
their
estate
,
as
those
amongst
whom
they
are
sent
to
inhabit
.
And
hauing
thither
transported
their
goods
and
begotten
children
,
they
thenceforth
make
more
reckoning
of
the
country
whither
they
are
come
as
Colonies
,
then
of
their
naturall
country
whence
they
were
displaced
:
like
trees
which
planted
in
an
other
soile
change
much
both
of
their
nature
and
taste
.
This
the
more
easily
happeneth
to
Colonies
by
how
much
the
more
remote
they
are
from
their
natiue
place
of
abode
.
For
proofe
,
finde
we
not
that
euen
the
neighbour
Colonies
of
Italy
during
the
time
of
the
second
Punicke
war
would
not
in
any
wise
contribute
to
the
necessities
of
Rome
their
originall
mother
?
6
The
Portugals
obseruing
these
inconueniences
haue
to
assure
the
Indies
,
practised
a
manner
of
Colonies
much
more
sure
,
tolerable
,
and
lesse
enuied
;
which
is
thus
:
They
plant
their
Colonies
not
all
at
once
,
but
few
at
a
time
by
Carauans
or
companies
according
as
neede
requireth
,
to
inhabite
the
countries
by
them
newly
discouered
;
yet
not
throughly
to
people
them
,
but
after
as
they
shall
see
they
thriue
,
and
so
accordingly
they
by
little
and
little
replenish
the
Colonie
.
Goa
is
the
best
prouided
of
all
they
haue
established
,
and
there
they
contract
alliances
with
the
ancient
inhabitants
,
and
take
and
giue
their
daughters
in
mariages
:
by
this
meanes
(
which
is
as
I
haue
said
the
more
plausible
)
they
liue
free
from
violence
,
assured
of
the
good
wils
of
the
first
inhabitants
who
inrich
themselues
greatly
by
their
trafficke
and
commodities
.
In
this
manner
they
multiply
and
are
scarcely
perceiued
how
,
growing
to
such
a
multitude
of
people
as
they
serue
to
inlarge
and
establish
the
name
and
gouernment
of
the
Portugals
.
From
yeare
to
yeare
they
ad
to
this
increase
which
serueth
them
instead
of
a
fortresse
amongst
such
as
they
subdue
,
and
in
such
prouinces
as
they
will
people
and
accustome
to
their
fashions
and
rule
.
7
Time
and
experience
make
it
plainly
appeare
,
that
these
formes
of
Colonies
are
more
tollerable
and
sure
then
any
heeretofore
practised
,
for
in
these
the
naturall
inhabitants
are
so
farre
from
being
thrust
out
of
their
houses
,
as
on
the
contrarie
,
they
are
therein
maintained
and
more
confirmed
in
the
peaceable
inoying
o●
their
goods
.
Moreouer
the
vnion
and
commixture
of
blood
one
with
another
softning
their
naturall
roughnesse
,
retaineth
and
redoubleth
the
affection
as
well
of
the
auncient
inhabitants
,
as
of
those
of
the
Colony
.
The
Spaniards
do
the
like
in
the
West
Indies
that
which
I
finde
most
notable
heerein
,
is
,
that
the
one
and
the
other
rest
not
satisfied
onely
with
establishing
Colonies
,
but
further
they
conuert
and
instruct
the
Indians
in
the
Christian
faith
,
to
Gods
glorie
and
theirs
:
It
is
that
which
the
king
of
Spaine
performeth
and
continueth
by
meanes
of
such
religious
orders
as
he
hath
planted
among
them
:
for
not
being
able
to
store
so
many
and
so
large
countries
as
those
are
with
naturall
Spaniards
and
Portugals
,
they
by
this
conuersion
and
Baptisme
,
make
those
people
become
Portugals
and
Spaniards
.
8
Hauing
discoursed
of
the
forme
of
Colonies
,
and
how
the
conquering
Prince
may
profit
himselfe
by
them
,
it
is
now
time
that
we
come
to
the
second
thing
which
may
afford
assurance
to
an
estate
.
The
meanes
are
many
,
but
the
Christians
most
vsually
make
choise
of
fortifications
,
as
seeming
to
them
most
strong
bridles
to
raine
in
and
curbe
both
the
auncient
and
newly
subdued
prouinces
.
There
they
appoint
their
Magazins
for
munition
and
other
prouision
for
the
wars
;
there
they
bestow
garisons
of
souldiers
for
their
defence
;
some
places
they
fortifie
vpon
the
frontiers
,
where
they
constitute
for
Gouernors
and
officers
,
creatures
of
their
owne
fashioning
,
the
better
to
containe
all
vnder
the
obedience
of
the
victorious
.
9
Yet
is
it
that
which
Machiauell
reproueth
and
reiecteth
as
vnprofitable
:
Francis
Sforce
duke
of
Milan
,
of
the
Emperor
Charles
the
5.
and
of
so
many
other
Princes
and
Captaines
which
haue
woone
reputation
and
renowne
amongst
men
,
are
such
as
who
well
considereth
them
will
laugh
at
the
opinion
of
Machiauel
.
Without
seeking
any
further
,
haue
we
not
the
French
for
example
?
who
made
no
account
of
erecting
cittadels
in
the
I
le
of
Sicily
:
but
after
they
had
conquered
it
,
10
And
though
all
these
examples
are
but
too
sufficient
to
confute
the
opinion
of
Machiauel
,
yet
will
I
bring
him
once
more
vpon
the
stage
,
and
sift
him
a
little
better
:
See
heere
the
substance
of
what
he
saith
:
Either
thou
art
able
(
saith
he
)
to
bring
sufficient
store
of
men
into
the
field
(
in
which
case
fortresses
are
not
any
waies
necessarie
)
or
thou
hast
not
meanes
to
leauie
such
forces
as
are
requisite
to
defend
and
warrant
thy
estate
,
and
then
they
are
vnprofitable
.
Marke
,
I
praie
,
the
wrong
course
he
taketh
,
walking
as
he
doth
in
extreames
,
without
keeping
the
meane
,
most
necessarie
in
these
propositions
:
to
say
the
truth
,
he
is
much
mistaken
;
since
this
matter
as
others
,
should
be
distinguished
by
the
portions
and
qualities
thereof
,
the
better
and
more
easily
to
vnderstand
it
.
In
my
opinion
then
(
which
I
deliuer
not
to
exclude
others
)
we
must
say
thus
:
Either
a
Prince
hath
meanes
to
leuie
men
out
of
hand
by
an
ordinarie
continuance
of
armes
,
or
else
he
must
haue
time
to
doe
it
,
be
it
either
by
leuying
a
sufficient
number
of
his
subiects
trained
vp
to
armes
,
and
by
the
assistance
of
friends
and
associats
,
or
of
neighbours
,
which
in
regard
of
their
particular
interest
,
will
willingly
ioyne
with
him
,
that
he
may
protect
them
from
the
same
iniurie
he
may
himselfe
receiue
.
In
these
two
first
cases
,
Fortresses
would
prooue
more
profitable
then
necessarie
:
or
else
a
Prince
is
of
that
power
as
he
is
able
at
once
to
assemble
so
manie
men
as
he
will
keepe
or
winne
the
field
from
the
enemie
,
or
will
be
able
,
at
least
,
commodiously
to
succour
the
place
besieged
.
In
these
two
respects
,
Cittadels
are
necessarie
though
not
much
profitable
,
because
they
by
their
constant
defence
,
stoppe
and
intertaine
the
enemie
,
affoord
by
such
temporising
,
meanes
and
leasure
to
order
matters
;
for
(
as
the
Venetians
say
)
Chi
ha
tempo
,
ha
vita
,
who
hath
time
,
hath
life
.
11
The
third
meanes
for
a
Prince
to
preserue
his
estate
,
is
that
which
those
allow
of
,
who
not
trusting
to
Fortresses
,
and
making
no
account
of
Colonies
,
doe
ordinarily
intertaine
strong
companies
of
horse
and
foote
,
and
in
such
numbers
,
as
they
may
alwaies
containe
their
subiects
in
naturall
obedience
,
hinder
rebellions
,
and
which
most
importeth
,
repell
,
and
oppose
the
enemy
,
and
as
occasion
requireth
,
visit
him
at
his
owne
home
.
In
time
passed
the
Mamelucks
practised
this
forme
of
gouernment
;
12
A
man
may
yet
put
one
doubt
more
of
this
matter
,
the
resolution
whereof
shall
fit
very
well
for
the
course
and
concluding
of
the
discourse
.
That
is
,
which
is
best
either
to
erect
Cittadels
or
alwaies
to
maintaine
a
great
army
.
Experience
(
our
common
Mistres
)
teacheth
vs
that
for
the
conseruation
of
great
Princes
estate
fortresses
are
the
best
;
because
they
doe
not
so
much
incumber
nor
dislike
the
subiect
as
doth
an
army
,
whose
troupes
dispersed
in
diuers
parts
of
the
country
waste
and
disorder
all
:
on
the
other
side
souldiours
shut
vp
in
a
fortresse
are
not
so
insolent
and
licentious
as
those
commonly
are
which
keepe
the
field
,
yea
and
that
oft-times
with
more
hauocke
then
if
the
enemy
himselfe
had
ransaked
and
ouerrun
it
.
The
liberty
which
armies
dispersed
thorowout
an
estate
challenge
and
assume
to
themselues
,
is
such
as
makes
them
forget
all
policy
and
military
discipline
:
the
example
of
the
Milanois
heerein
will
not
be
beside
the
purpose
.
They
neuer
complained
of
the
Garrison
of
the
Castle
,
Ferdinand
Gonzaga
.
13
Whereto
I
know
may
be
replied
,
that
the
Turke
neuerthelesse
peaceably
holdeth
his
estate
after
the
same
manner
we
speake
of
,
his
forces
being
euermore
on
foote
and
in
a
readinesse
:
it
is
true
,
and
so
is
it
that
to
cleere
this
,
two
principall
reasons
may
be
alledged
.
The
one
that
he
hath
depriued
such
his
subiects
as
are
Christians
and
of
a
different
law
,
of
all
vse
of
armes
;
and
that
he
hath
brought
them
to
this
passe
that
they
cannot
vant
to
hold
any
thing
in
propriety
:
which
was
not
practised
towards
the
aboue
mentioned
;
moreouer
all
assemblies
vpon
whatsoeuer
cause
are
expresly
forbidden
them
:
he
keeps
them
vnder
and
makes
no
more
reckning
of
them
then
of
sheepe
pend
vp
in
a
fould
vsing
them
like
brute
beasts
,
not
once
vouchsafing
to
imploy
them
in
the
wars
.
The
other
reason
is
that
they
haue
no
power
of
themselues
to
oppose
the
Turkes
so
mighty
forces
;
and
(
which
is
worst
of
all
)
they
neuer
haue
had
any
forraine
succour
to
incourage
them
to
such
an
enterprise
.
14
I
will
forbeare
to
diue
any
deeper
into
this
subiect
;
me
thinkes
we
may
see
sufficiently
by
this
how
much
more
supportable
are
Cittadels
,
then
armies
ordinarily
intertained
.
But
if
we
speake
of
conquering
,
I
allow
that
armies
are
more
to
be
preferred
before
fortresses
,
considering
that
we
thereby
inioy
meanes
to
embrace
all
occasions
offered
,
and
at
an
instant
to
execute
both
the
will
and
designe
of
a
Prince
so
prouided
.
15.
To
say
the
truth
it
is
that
which
the
Ottamans
haue
practised
,
to
aduance
their
Empire
to
such
greatnesse
as
at
this
day
we
see
it
;
it
is
that
which
hath
heaped
on
them
the
honors
of
so
many
victories
,
and
which
hath
endowed
them
with
authoritie
,
reputation
and
meanes
.
They
haue
alwaies
had
(
as
they
yet
haue
)
their
armies
in
a
readinesse
,
and
haue
fought
with
their
neighbours
in
a
manner
with
as
much
aduantage
as
a
man
armed
against
one
that
is
naked
.
16
Some
I
know
will
maruell
how
such
a
number
of
people
so
armed
,
can
containe
themselues
from
reuolting
.
I
am
of
opinion
,
that
if
they
were
not
ordinarily
imploied
as
they
are
,
in
attempts
of
warre
,
that
in
the
end
their
multitudes
growen
ranke
with
quiet
,
would
easily
be
drawen
to
rebellion
or
mutinies
;
which
the
souldiers
of
Alexander
the
Great
can
witnesse
,
for
whilest
the
enemy
kept
them
in
doings
,
who
were
then
they
more
hardy
and
valerous
?
but
after
their
victories
,
who
more
insolent
and
vnsufferable
?
The
Roman
armies
,
how
fortunate
were
they
whilest
they
had
continuall
warre
,
atchieuing
all
their
interprises
in
a
manner
as
they
could
wish
?
but
after
their
conquest
they
became
so
turbulent
and
vnquiet
,
as
they
assumed
to
themselues
the
authoritie
of
creating
Emperors
,
and
for
the
most
part
so
licentiously
,
as
euery
armie
made
his
particular
choise
,
so
as
there
was
no
remedie
but
to
trie
by
fight
who
should
carie
it
;
which
occasioned
the
ouerthrow
of
the
state
.
The
French
,
haue
they
not
euermore
faithfully
serued
their
king
against
strangers
?
but
so
soone
as
they
had
peace
with
the
English
,
and
after
with
the
Spaniard
,
they
filled
euery
corner
of
their
country
with
sedition
,
sackings
,
cruelties
,
and
slaughters
;
and
that
with
such
obstinate
persisting
,
as
the
contagion
thereof
hath
not
beene
able
for
25.
yeeres
space
to
be
remooued
.
But
that
which
is
most
to
be
lamented
,
is
the
scandall
they
haue
brought
vpon
the
church
.
This
selfe
thing
may
be
appropriated
to
the
Flemings
,
and
the
cause
may
be
imputed
to
idlenesse
,
and
the
exceeding
plentie
wherein
they
liued
.
The
example
of
Bajazet
the
second
shall
serue
to
close
vp
this
discourse
,
for
he
being
giuen
ouer
to
his
ease
;
the
soldiours
,
who
could
not
brooke
such
idlenesse
,
so
awaked
the
courage
of
his
two
sonnes
,
Selim
and
Acomath
,
as
all
the
forces
of
the
Empire
(
which
had
established
the
Turkish
scepter
)
were
diuided
into
two
,
and
it
lacked
not
much
of
being
vtterly
ouerthrowne
,
euery
one
for
his
part
seconding
the
rebellions
of
the
sonnes
against
the
father
.
CHAP.
IIII.
That
he
hath
trained
vp
his
soldiours
to
valour
and
hardinesse
.
-
1
Why
the
armies
of
these
daies
consist
not
of
so
good
souldiers
as
in
former
times
.
-
2
Principall
causes
of
victories
.
-
3
What
care
is
to
be
had
in
leuying
of
good
souldiers
:
and
this
to
be
wrought
by
a
fourefould
meanes
.
-
4
By
election
.
-
5
Exercise
.
-
6
Honors
and
profit
.
-
7
The
Turkes
proceeding
heerein
.
1
IT
is
seldome
seene
that
the
armies
of
these
times
consist
of
good
souldiours
,
for
the
more
we
vary
from
the
course
our
forefathers
tooke
to
bring
them
to
perfection
,
by
so
much
the
more
are
we
depriued
of
that
happinesse
which
were
to
be
desired
and
seriously
sought
after
by
Princes
,
and
those
which
as
Commanders
would
reape
honor
and
profite
by
the
wars
.
2
Victory
(
which
dependeth
of
the
diuine
will
)
deriueth
her
successe
and
principall
ground
from
the
multitude
of
men
,
but
especially
from
the
wisdome
of
the
Commanders
and
from
the
valour
and
generositie
of
the
Souldiour
.
3
It
is
requisite
then
that
we
looke
more
narrowlie
then
we
doe
vnto
their
choice
,
and
that
they
be
such
as
we
may
honour
and
profit
our selues
by
them
:
now
we
must
deliuer
how
we
may
light
vpon
,
or
make
good
and
hardy
souldiours
,
which
is
doone
in
my
opinion
by
a
foure
fold
meanes
,
by
election
,
exercise
,
honor
,
and
profit
.
4
By
election
,
because
all
those
which
we
leuie
for
the
wars
haue
not
that
naturall
inclination
to
valour
and
courage
,
nor
a
constitution
of
bodie
fit
to
indure
the
trauailes
and
dangers
incident
thereunto
.
Moreouer
a
gallant
fashion
and
spirite
are
not
found
in
euery
one
,
much
lesse
a
resolution
to
attend
,
defie
,
and
assaile
the
enemy
;
also
euery
mans
hart
will
not
serue
him
to
enter
the
trenches
,
throw
himselfe
desperatly
into
the
dike
,
scall
the
wals
,
offer
himselfe
valiantly
,
to
make
good
a
breach
in
despite
of
the
Cannon
,
of
stones
,
of
wilde-fire
,
and
of
death
it selfe
:
Their
complexions
perhaps
will
not
brooke
that
they
should
spend
the
whole
day
in
continuall
turmoiles
without
eating
,
and
the
night
without
rest
,
so
as
where
some
make
account
that
Antwerpe
is
able
to
make
30000.
men
,
Venice
40000.
Gant
60000.
Paris
100000.
all
fit
and
able
to
beare
armes
,
me
thinkes
they
should
be
vnderstood
that
they
are
such
as
haue
the
age
required
,
but
not
the
disposition
proper
to
such
a
profession
.
For
proofe
hereof
haue
we
not
of
late
seene
that
the
Prince
of
Parma
hath
ranged
vnder
the
obedience
of
the
King
of
Spaine
euen
with
small
forces
those
of
Gant
&
Antwerp
which
had
formerly
together
with
those
of
the
low
countries
rebelled
against
their
Soueraigne
?
Delectum
agere
vel
habere
to
make
a
choise
.
In
our
times
no
man
hath
beene
more
carefull
and
circumspect
in
the
choise
of
his
souldiours
(
at
the
least
of
the
Captaines
of
Italy
)
then
Cosmo
de
Medici
Duke
of
Florence
;
and
indeede
he
was
prouided
of
the
best
and
most
approued
souldiours
of
his
time
.
5
To
election
we
are
to
adde
exercise
,
6
But
if
the
Generall
be
so
wise
as
to
ioine
to
exercise
profit
and
honor
,
Coronae
Ciuicae
,
Murales
,
&
Nauales
.
7
The
Turkes
,
to
our
confusion
,
are
not
inserior
to
the
Romans
,
be
it
either
for
the
choice
they
make
of
their
souldiours
,
or
for
rewarding
them
.
For
they
chuse
from
among
the
nations
vnder
their
obedience
,
the
most
warlike
,
and
take
of
them
but
the
flower
and
such
as
are
most
proper
for
the
wars
,
sparing
not
afterwards
to
recompence
them
at
the
full
.
It
is
a
thing
incredible
with
what
continuall
excercise
they
inure
their
souldiours
,
in
so
much
that
euen
from
the
cradle
(
if
a
man
may
so
say
)
they
traine
them
vp
vnto
the
wars
.
The
intertainment
the
Turke
giueth
them
is
sufficient
;
but
as
for
the
rewards
,
honours
,
and
commodities
he
shareth
among
them
,
it
is
hardly
to
be
expressed
:
There
is
not
any
Prince
at
this
day
liuing
that
may
in
this
regard
bee
compared
to
him
;
and
which
is
more
,
the
meanest
of
his
souldiers
vpon
his
vertuous
behauiour
in
armes
is
capable
of
attaining
to
the
most
eminent
charges
and
dignities
of
his
estate
,
and
of
inriching
himselfe
with
inestimable
treasure
.
To
confirme
this
,
the
goods
which
Meehmet
Bassa
left
behinde
him
,
(
who
of
a
Christian
Apostate
aspired
to
that
greatnesse
)
were
valued
at
two
Millians
of
Crownes
.
In
a
word
they
are
sure
that
rewarde
waiteth
alwaies
vpon
valour
.
Moreouer
the
prowesse
of
the
priuate
souldiours
cannot
be
smothered
amongst
them
,
it
is
rather
immediatly
discouered
and
notice
taken
thereof
.
Of
all
the
Ottoman
Princes
Mahomet
the
second
was
the
most
bountifull
,
for
he
gaue
beyond
measure
,
so
as
sometime
he
increased
the
souldiours
pay
a
thousand
fould
.
Selim
the
first
did
the
like
;
and
it
is
worth
the
noting
,
that
as
those
two
surpassed
the
residue
in
liberality
,
so
did
they
in
honourable
and
triumphant
victory
.
CHAP.
V.
That
he
hath
maintained
his
Souldiers
in
military
Discipline
.
-
1
A
very
great
army
may
be
easily
ouerthrowne
by
a
meane
army
.
-
2
The
cause
hereof
,
and
benefit
of
the
latter
.
-
3
Care
is
to
be
had
that
an
army
be
not
ouercharged
with
baggage
.
-
4
A
Generall-with
more
ease
may
command
a
meane
,
then
too
great
an
army
.
-
5
Souldiers
are
animated
by
the
perswasion
and
presents
of
their
chiefe
commander
.
-
6
They
are
in
seruice
to
be
well
acquainted
with
one
an
other
.
-
7
The
incumbrance
of
huge
and
ouer
great
Armies
.
-
8
How
it
commeth
to
passe
that
the
Turkes
so
great
numbers
of
men
proue
victorious
.
-
9
Defects
in
Christian
armies
.
-
10
Obedience
of
the
Turkes
.
-
11
Battailes
lost
through
disobedience
of
the
Souldiours
.
-
12
The
military
discipline
of
the
Turkes
notable
.
1
THe
happy
successe
of
battailes
by
those
of
ancient
times
with
such
wisdome
atchiued
,
makes
it
most
apparent
vnto
vs
that
most
commonly
the
meane
armies
haue
ouercome
the
great
.
Alexander
the
Great
,
diuers
Grecian
Captaines
,
amongst
others
Miltiades
and
Themistocles
,
and
among
the
Romans
Lucullus
,
Scylla
,
Pompey
and
Caesar
alwaies
assailed
and
vanquished
the
barbarous
people
rather
with
vnequall
then
equall
numbers
,
if
we
respect
the
multitude
;
but
they
went
far
beyond
them
if
we
consider
their
militarie
vertue
.
In
these
latter
times
the
Commanders
of
the
Emperour
Charles
the
5.
and
of
King
Philip
his
sonne
haue
likewise
gained
the
victory
of
many
armies
greater
then
this
.
2
To
such
as
demaund
the
reason
of
it
,
I
wil
answere
that
it
was
because
the
principall
strength
and
sinew
of
an
army
consisteth
,
in
affection
,
in
military
Discipline
,
and
in
a
well
disposed
order
in
the
day
of
battell
:
without
which
parts
an
army
is
as
fraile
as
glasse
.
A
few
may
be
more
easily
and
orderly
ranged
then
many
.
Vertue
vnited
is
alwaies
more
powerfull
then
separated
and
disiointed
.
Hence
is
it
that
bodies
of
an
indifferent
stature
are
for
the
most
part
more
vigorous
then
such
as
are
ouer
great
and
huge
,
which
the
Poet
(
speaking
of
Fidaeus
)
expresly
signifieth
in
these
words
.
Maior
in
exiguo
regnabat
corpore
virtus
.
Great
vertue
in
a
little
body
raignd
.
And
Virgil
alluding
to
the
Bees
saith
,
Ingentes
animi
angusto
in
corpore
versantur
.
In
slender
bodies
they
haue
mighty
mindes
:
questionlesse
a
meane
army
must
needes
be
more
stable
and
vnited
then
a
great
,
because
multitude
is
naturally
accompanied
with
confusion
,
commonly
waited
vpon
by
disorder
.
3
Moreouer
,
it
is
a
thing
of
high
consideration
to
be
able
to
take
such
order
that
a
campe
be
not
incombred
with
baggage
:
rather
that
it
be
free
and
manageable
,
so
as
it
may
be
euery
where
commodiously
conducted
,
ranged
and
euer
in
a
readinesse
to
gaine
and
make
good
dangerous
&
difficult
straites
and
passages
;
that
it
be
not
tired
and
discouraged
for
the
long
marches
it
must
often
vndertake
;
that
it
doe
not
faint
for
such
accidents
as
diuersly
chance
,
nor
for
any
exploits
or
executions
which
present
themselues
vnexpected
.
All
which
a
meane
campe
will
be
more
proper
to
performe
then
a
great
:
for
it
shall
not
neede
so
great
a
quantity
of
victuals
,
nor
so
great
an
incombrance
of
baggage
or
cariage
as
the
other
.
4
Moreouer
seeing
it
is
more
profitable
and
necessary
that
an
army
be
conducted
&
gouerned
by
one
only
Generall
;
and
that
it
depend
of
no
other
then
him
;
It
will
be
more
easily
effected
in
a
meane
then
a
great
army
,
especially
compounded
of
diuers
nations
.
And
this
dependance
shall
be
better
ordered
if
the
Generall
can
content
himselfe
with
small
store
of
luggage
and
that
well
trussed
vp
.
The
multitude
of
meane
causes
slacketh
alwaies
the
course
of
the
efficient
,
and
keepeth
backe
the
fruite
thereof
.
A
little
army
hath
not
neede
of
so
much
luggage
as
a
great
.
5
And
it
is
much
better
that
the
Captaine
himselfe
know
his
souldiours
and
they
him
;
then
to
rely
vpon
the
credit
and
report
of
such
as
are
vnder
his
charge
;
for
the
souldiour
that
shall
heare
himselfe
named
by
his
Captaine
aduanceth
himselfe
so
much
the
more
,
and
becommeth
more
desirous
of
honor
.
Whereas
if
he
see
himselfe
forgotten
and
vntespected
of
him
which
commandeth
,
he
groweth
distasted
and
out
of
heart
,
and
almost
carelesse
how
matters
haue
their
procedings
.
Who
doubteth
that
the
presence
of
the
Captaine
or
Generall
of
an
army
doth
not
serue
as
a
motiue
to
the
souldiour
to
make
him
diligently
preserue
his
reputation
,
and
to
shunne
the
reproch
of
cowardise
?
which
he
will
not
so
carefully
performe
,
if
he
finde
himselfe
out
of
the
presence
of
his
Commander
,
or
that
his
Commander
make
as
if
he
did
not
see
him
.
6
It
is
good
also
that
the
souldiers
frequent
brotherly
together
,
for
that
assureth
them
more
,
and
maketh
them
trust
to
one
anothers
assistance
in
time
of
the
most
crosse
fortunes
.
All
these
parts
incounter
and
are
intertained
more
easily
in
a
meane
,
then
in
a
great
armie
.
7
Which
is
often
attended
vpon
by
more
inconuenienences
then
the
other
,
as
by
famine
,
plagues
,
contagious
mutinies
and
dissentions
.
There
is
yet
another
dangerous
inconuenience
which
is
most
vsually
the
companion
of
a
multitude
;
that
is
,
that
they
forme
to
themselues
a
confidence
of
their
owne
forces
greater
then
they
ought
:
of
this
confidence
followeth
a
contempt
of
the
aduerse
power
,
of
this
contempt
a
presumption
,
author
of
infinite
mischiefes
.
8
But
how
happeneth
it
then
(
will
some
say
)
that
the
Turkes
haue
euery
where
gained
the
victorie
by
multitude
?
Would
you
know
how
?
Because
they
haue
betimes
trained
vp
and
instructed
their
great
armies
,
to
keepe
so
good
an
order
,
as
well
in
execution
,
iudgement
,
military
discipline
,
readinesse
,
as
disposition
to
armes
,
that
they
are
become
as
tractable
,
and
easie
to
manage
as
ours
though
meane
and
few
in
number
.
9
On
the
other
side
we
haue
suffered
our
armies
to
slide
into
such
insolencie
and
libertie
,
as
we
can
hardly
rule
and
conduct
them
without
so
many
dangers
,
confusions
and
luggage
,
as
it
were
enough
to
trouble
Captaines
of
great
policie
and
experience
;
and
to
say
the
trueth
,
see
wee
not
that
the
Turke
more
easily
furnisheth
an
hundred
thousand
men
with
vittailes
,
then
we
fiftie
thousand
?
for
besides
that
his
souldiers
make
not
,
as
ours
,
any
account
of
the
diuersitie
of
vittailes
,
of
delicacie
or
of
toothsome
morsels
,
they
drinke
no
Wine
nor
Beere
,
which
importeth
the
consideration
of
almost
the
one
halfe
of
our
munition
and
charge
.
10
What
need
I
speake
of
obedience
,
nurse
of
the
order
obserued
amongst
them
?
since
it
was
neuer
seene
that
the
Turkes
euer
lost
battaile
through
disorder
,
much
lesse
left
off
pursuing
any
attempt
for
their
souldiers
mutinies
.
11
Whereas
almost
all
the
battailes
we
haue
bid
them
,
had
not
beene
lost
,
but
by
the
meere
disorder
and
disobedience
of
our
men
.
Whereto
may
we
impute
the
miserable
losse
of
Nicapolie
,
12
So
as
we
must
acknowledge
that
the
Turke
excelleth
vs
both
in
number
of
good
Souldiours
and
in
all
other
military
discipline
:
He
is
followed
with
such
numbers
of
men
as
it
seemeth
he
relieth
wholy
on
their
multitude
,
but
it
is
in
so
good
a
manner
as
if
he
respected
nought
but
order
&
military
discipline
,
parts
(
to
our
dishonor
)
far
from
vs
.
CHAP.
VI.
That
he
hath
made
no
reckning
of
other
forces
then
his
owne
.
-
1
The
wars
are
to
be
maintained
by
our
owne
strength
,
neither
must
we
rely
vpon
forraine
powers
.
-
2
The
good
and
ill
that
resulteth
of
both
these
.
-
3
Conditions
of
confederate
forces
.
-
4
Other
inconueniences
which
arise
from
assistance
of
forraine
powers
.
-
5
Examples
of
Leagues
against
the
Turkes
.
-
6
Their
defects
,
hindrances
of
their
successe
.
-
7
The
Turkes
not
accustomed
to
make
Leagues
with
any
,
but
vsing
their
owne
forces
,
haue
ouerthrowne
many
armies
confederates
.
-
8
With
whom
they
might
well
haue
ioyned
in
league
to
their
aduantage
.
1
ALl
high
enterprises
either
for
preseruation
of
an
estate
,
or
for
denouncing
of
warre
,
haue
beene
ill
plotted
and
as
ill
caried
when
they
haue
relied
vpon
the
assistance
and
fauour
of
a
third
power
,
and
not
of
our
owne
;
seeing
that
from
hopes
and
proiects
so
ill
grounded
we
neuer
come
to
inioy
the
fruits
which
such
a
succour
,
the
desseigne
of
him
that
enterpriseth
,
&
his
extraordinary
preparation
promised
vs
;
rather
they
are
infallibly
attended
on
by
some
lamentable
accident
which
vtterly
ouerthroweth
them
.
2
Since
oftentimes
it
falleth
out
that
the
expectation
of
such
succour
promised
,
serueth
rather
to
slacke
the
course
of
our
endeauours
,
and
lessen
the
preparation
of
the
enterprise
,
then
otherwise
to
forward
or
better
them
;
were
it
not
for
the
confidence
of
such
succour
he
that
attempteth
would
prepare
his
forces
proportionable
to
his
proiect
,
and
not
trust
to
outward
helpes
either
of
friend
or
confederat
.
Who
doubteth
,
when
we
so
repose
our selues
vpon
an
others
forces
,
and
that
he
is
at
charge
for
our
loues
sake
,
that
he
doth
not
make
vs
more
backward
to
prouide
and
disburse
of
oure
owne
store
?
But
this
is
not
all
:
the
worst
is
,
that
while
we
thus
expect
,
time
wasteth
vnprofitably
,
and
occasion
(
which
once
escaped
cannot
be
laid
hold
on
)
is
let
slip
and
lost
without
recouery
:
for
whilst
we
so
attend
our
assistants
our
practises
are
discouered
.
3
And
who
will
beleeue
that
a
friend
or
associat
will
embrace
the
desseign
of
him
he
assisteth
,
or
wish
his
good
fortune
with
such
harty
affection
,
as
he
wil
not
be
ready
vpon
the
least
occasion
he
shall
desire
to
finde
,
to
leaue
him
in
the
lurch
?
And
without
question
this
occasion
will
offer
it selfe
at
any
time
whensoeuer
he
hath
a
purpose
to
dissolue
the
league
and
couenants
agreed
vpon
betweene
them
;
especially
if
he
be
the
stronger
and
more
mighty
,
and
finde
not
himselfe
interessed
in
the
successe
of
the
enterprise
,
for
which
he
tooke
armes
and
became
confederate
.
4
We
may
also
adde
another
defect
and
imperfection
;
&
that
is
,
if
the
succour
we
attend
be
to
be
assembled
from
diuers
places
,
or
,
that
the
windes
(
if
it
be
by
sea
)
or
some
vnlooked
for
accident
(
if
by
land
)
hinder
by
so
many
meanes
the
preparations
for
the
war
and
intended
voiage
,
as
that
the
season
fit
for
execution
escapeth
him
that
enterpriseth
;
so
as
before
he
begin
to
march
or
set
forward
to
the
Rendeuous
his
opportunities
of
attempting
or
atchieuing
any
memorable
act
,
vtterly
faile
him
in
a
matter
which
he
had
before
discreetely
enough
plotted
and
disposed
:
moreouer
he
cannot
beare
swaie
as
master
of
the
confederate
forces
,
insomuch
as
he
which
sendeth
succours
may
vnderhand
deliuer
to
his
Commanders
memorials
and
instructions
more
strict
and
limited
,
then
the
necessitie
of
the
vndertaken
affaire
would
permit
.
Also
the
least
distaste
either
of
the
Prince
which
assisteth
,
or
of
the
Captaine
which
conducteth
such
succours
,
serueth
oft-times
to
dismisse
the
promised
forces
,
deceiue
the
others
expectation
,
and
bring
all
he
vndertaketh
to
nothing
:
So
as
he
remaineth
not
onely
more
weake
by
this
disappointment
,
but
his
owne
forces
also
become
vnprofitable
,
and
consequently
himselfe
exposed
to
all
wrong
and
ruine
:
for
as
if
one
only
wheele
of
a
clocke
be
out
of
temper
,
it
sufficeth
to
disorder
the
whole
motion
;
so
where
the
vndertaker
faileth
but
of
one
part
of
his
promised
troupes
,
the
effects
,
which
in
part
depend
thereon
,
likewise
faile
,
and
the
course
of
his
warlike
designes
remaine
crossed
and
peruerted
.
I
will
not
forget
also
to
say
that
a
campe
consisting
of
such
borrowed
peeces
,
hath
necessarily
need
of
many
heads
to
command
it
,
and
an
armie
compounded
of
so
manie
heads
(
because
of
the
diuersity
of
opinions
and
affections
)
will
most
commonly
haue
the
woorse
when
it
commeth
to
handie
blowes
.
5
We
may
illustrate
these
discommodities
with
examples
that
touch
vs
neere
,
and
are
familiar
vnto
vs
,
and
were
not
long
since
practised
;
for
this
cause
I
will
more
willingly
,
then
otherwise
I
would
,
heere
produce
them
.
In
our
time
we
haue
seene
two
most
memorable
leagues
between
the
Pope
,
the
king
of
Spaine
,
and
the
Venetians
,
consenting
and
vnited
to
vndertake
one
warre
against
the
Turke
:
the
one
was
vnder
Pope
Paul
the
third
,
Don
Iohn
of
Austria
Admirall
of
his
fleete
to
stay
at
Messina
,
because
he
then
doubted
that
the
French
would
assaile
Flanders
,
with
such
forces
as
they
had
that
yeare
rather
suffered
to
take
breath
then
wholy
cased
and
dismissed
:
So
as
the
whole
season
was
spent
vnprofitably
without
attempting
ought
worthy
such
preparation
,
as
the
confederates
had
in
due
time
set
forth
.
This
was
an
occasion
of
excessiue
charge
,
and
that
the
armies
did
not
once
stirre
till
it
was
too
late
,
attending
what
their
neighbours
would
do
,
who
,
as
I
haue
said
,
seemed
to
threaten
the
King
of
Spaine
with
some
attempt
vpon
his
country
of
Flanders
.
In
the
meane
time
the
Venetians
,
tired
with
the
charge
and
trouble
they
were
at
to
no
purpose
,
treated
a
peace
with
the
Turke
.
6
Who
will
make
any
question
now
(
those
things
well
weighed
and
considered
)
that
if
the
leagues
(
both
the
first
and
second
)
had
beene
well
caried
without
these
crossings
,
iealousies
and
suspitions
which
accompanied
them
,
(
though
vainly
and
vpon
no
ground
)
but
that
they
would
haue
brought
foorth
some
woorthie
and
honorable
fruite
,
to
the
glory
and
honour
of
God
,
the
peace
of
his
church
,
the
encrease
and
establishment
of
the
Christian
common-wealth
?
This
may
be
enough
to
prooue
that
forces
compounded
of
diuers
nations
,
depending
of
many
and
different
heads
,
are
in
marching
more
slowe
,
and
at
a
time
of
need
lesse
effectuall
then
others
.
It
may
appeere
to
some
that
I
heereby
inferre
,
that
leagues
betweene
Princes
are
vnprofitable
,
and
therefore
not
to
be
made
:
so
farre
is
it
from
me
to
maintaine
that
opinion
,
as
I
rather
willingly
embrace
the
contrarie
:
but
I
reserue
a
time
to
handle
how
and
in
what
manner
it
would
be
good
to
make
such
a
league
,
(
especially
against
the
Turke
)
when
I
shall
arriue
at
the
place
appointed
for
this
purpose
,
to
the
end
I
may
discourse
of
it
at
full
.
7
The
Ottomans
neuer
made
league
,
either
offensiue
or
defensiue
with
any
:
and
neuer
had
helpe
of
strangers
:
on
the
contrarie
,
they
haue
alwaies
had
to
doe
with
armies
compounded
of
different
nations
confederate
,
and
conducted
by
sundrie
Commanders
,
all
which
(
as
ill
vnited
,
not
vnderstanding
one
another
)
they
haue
euermore
vanquished
.
Moreouer
we
haue
ordinarily
seene
them
more
forward
and
deliuer
about
their
enterprises
being
alone
,
then
accompanied
;
and
consequently
more
vnited
in
their
force
,
more
nimble
in
execution
,
and
(
it
must
needes
follow
)
more
renowned
and
fortunately
victorious
.
8
Yet
they
had
no
lacke
of
whom
where
with
to
practise
their
associations
(
if
they
had
approoued
them
as
good
&
necessarie
)
as
among
other
with
the
Soldan
of
Caito
,
with
the
kings
of
Carmania
and
of
Persia
,
and
with
many
other
great
princes
al
of
their
owne
sect
and
religion
,
who
would
not
(
as
it
is
to
be
supposed
)
haue
set
light
by
their
league
and
amitie
;
especially
then
when
they
saw
them
so
increase
in
power
and
greatnesse
.
But
they
haue
euer
made
verie
slender
account
of
such
practizes
and
confederacies
,
esteeming
them
vnprofitable
for
him
,
who
of
himselfe
hath
a
high
courage
,
and
forces
answerable
wherewithal
to
goe
thorough
with
a
conquest
,
which
they
iudge
will
admit
no
sharing
or
diuision
,
since
the
ambition
of
rule
striues
to
be
alone
and
brookes
no
fellowship
,
no
not
betweene
brothers
;
as
little
betweene
father
and
sonne
.
It
is
true
,
the
Turkes
haue
sometime
taken
to
their
seruice
some
few
troopes
of
Allarbs
paied
as
mercenaries
,
in
like
manner
as
now
a
daies
the
French
entertaine
the
Switzers
and
other
forreigne
nations
;
but
they
neuer
termed
them
,
as
they
now
vse
,
Confederates
or
Associates
,
titles
inuented
purposely
to
giue
colour
and
applause
to
such
leuies
.
CHAP.
VII
.
That
he
hath
to
power
ioyned
cunning
and
deceit
.
-
1
Machiauels
peruerse
opinion
of
not
obseruing
faith
,
reiected
.
-
2
The
ground
of
a
Princes
authoritie
and
estimation
laide
by
the
obseruation
of
his
faith
.
-
3
Confutation
of
Machiauels
opinion
.
-
4
Breach
of
faith
a
heinous
crime
.
-
5
Other
mischiefes
that
spring
out
of
Machiauels
position
.
-
6
To
obserue
faith
is
godly
,
honest
,
and
profitable
.
-
7
What
we
are
to
conceiue
of
the
Turkes
falshood
and
periury
:
MAchiauel
amongst
other
vertues
wherewith
hee
would
adorne
his
imagined
Prince
,
2
To
say
the
trueth
,
no
man
can
with
reason
gainsay
,
renowne
and
a
good
reputation
,
as
well
at
home
as
abroad
,
to
be
the
most
firme
foundation
of
all
principalitie
.
And
what
reputation
can
a
Prince
haue
either
among
his
owne
people
or
strangers
,
if
he
be
noted
for
a
disloyall
,
vnfaithfull
,
and
periurde
person
,
one
that
stands
neither
to
his
word
nor
agreement
?
3
Machiauel
to
conceale
the
fault
he
not
ignorantly
committeth
,
saith
,
that
this
is
sometimes
most
requisite
for
the
good
of
Princes
affaires
,
since
occasion
once
passed
is
irrecouerable
.
What
more
meere
folly
could
he
discouer
to
his
confusion
,
then
in
thus
concluding
,
that
a
Prince
is
not
to
regard
the
bond
of
his
faith
,
if
the
good
of
his
estate
present
an
occasion
to
violate
it
?
Truely
none
at
all
:
neither
were
it
necessarie
according
to
Gods
lawes
,
or
the
carriage
of
humane
affaires
,
that
Christian
Princes
were
of
that
minde
;
for
it
would
prooue
the
direct
course
neuer
to
see
but
fire
and
sword
amongst
vs
.
4
Such
as
are
good
detest
these
opinions
,
5
By
the
same
reason
a
man
may
also
say
that
sometimes
it
is
well
done
to
ransacke
Churches
,
robbe
Altars
,
oppresse
innocents
,
and
succour
the
wicked
:
for
there
is
not
any
vice
so
detestable
,
or
crime
so
hainous
that
sometime
carrieth
not
with
it
a
shew
and
colour
of
good
,
and
proueth
not
profitable
to
him
which
in
due
season
performeth
it
;
were
it
for
nought
else
but
because
he
attaineth
the
effects
of
his
corrupt
will
.
If
that
were
not
,
should
wee
haue
so
many
murtherers
,
falsifiers
,
sacrilegious
persons
and
men
giuen
ouer
to
all
reprochfull
vices
?
if
thereby
they
did
not
reape
some
temporall
commodity
?
6
I
will
yet
adde
further
,
and
maintaine
it
to
the
end
,
that
for
a
man
to
keepe
his
promised
faith
,
and
be
so
accounted
of
by
the
world
,
is
a
worke
of
God
and
without
comparison
much
better
then
to
violate
it
and
embrace
such
a
damnable
opinion
as
that
of
Machiauel
,
yea
though
the
profit
were
immediat
and
such
as
might
afford
wherewithall
to
ballance
his
breach
of
faith
and
promise
:
Not
to
keepe
touch
with
one
is
enough
to
incurre
the
suspition
and
ill
conceit
of
all
;
neither
is
there
any
which
will
not
thinke
he
doth
God
good
seruice
in
performing
the
like
towards
all
such
Princes
as
shall
take
such
courses
;
which
will
yet
farther
administer
matter
for
an
other
repentance
,
to
see
that
when
they
shall
tell
or
meane
truth
no
man
will
beleeue
or
trust
them
.
I
could
illustrate
this
proposition
with
infinite
examples
but
I
will
content
my selfe
with
that
one
of
Duke
Valentine
sonne
of
Pope
Alexander
the
6.
cited
by
Machiauel
,
as
a
perfect
Captaine
;
who
without
respect
of
truth
,
his
oath
,
reuerence
of
religion
,
or
honour
,
which
is
so
charily
to
be
preserued
amongst
men
ordinarily
,
abandoned
himselfe
to
all
disloialty
,
breach
of
faith
,
and
whatsoeuer
other
wicked
and
traiterous
courses
;
so
they
caried
with
them
some
shew
of
present
commodity
.
This
man
during
the
life
of
his
father
went
thorow
with
certaine
his
designes
,
borne
out
rather
by
the
Popes
authority
then
any
fortunate
successe
of
his
mischieuous
attempts
.
After
the
death
of
his
father
it
was
quickly
seene
how
smally
durable
are
all
such
estates
as
are
founded
vpon
deceit
.
7
Some
one
will
tell
me
that
the
Turkes
haue
done
the
like
,
and
haue
vsed
all
sortes
of
cunning
,
deceit
and
trechery
,
towards
their
neighbours
,
and
that
neuerthelesse
they
haue
thriued
by
it
.
It
is
true
,
but
the
causes
are
different
,
and
yet
we
see
that
the
most
disloiall
amongst
them
were
not
the
most
assured
in
the
forces
of
their
trecheries
.
Amurath
the
second
,
Mahymeth
the
second
,
Baiazeth
the
second
,
Selim
the
second
,
were
held
the
most
subtile
Princes
of
their
race
;
but
we
must
grant
that
if
those
their
wicked
procedings
thriued
for
a
time
,
it
was
more
through
the
coldnesse
and
dissentions
of
the
Christians
when
they
should
haue
reuenged
and
repelled
their
iniuries
,
then
that
we
should
therefore
beleeue
that
it
is
well
done
to
proue
periured
and
disloiall
.
Amurath
the
second
made
proofe
of
it
to
his
cost
,
and
hauing
receiued
an
ouerthrow
at
the
handes
of
Ladislaus
King
of
Polonia
,
Lepanto
.
Soliman
that
was
held
the
most
wise
Prince
of
all
the
Ottomans
(
if
wisdome
be
able
to
shine
where
there
is
no
light
of
true
faith
and
Christian
beleefe
)
hauing
vnderstood
at
such
time
as
he
caused
his
army
by
Sea
to
fall
downe
towards
Ottranto
the
yeare
1537.
that
Mercurin
de
Gatinaro
and
the
Citizens
of
Castro
were
made
prisoners
after
they
had
surrendred
the
place
contrary
to
promise
,
hee
foorthwith
commanded
that
they
should
be
released
,
saying
that
disloialtie
to
violate
their
faith
and
word
once
passed
,
was
not
the
meanes
to
win
the
hearts
and
likings
of
strange
nations
.
CHAP.
VIII
.
That
he
hath
beene
alwaies
serued
in
his
wars
by
good
and
valiant
Captaines
.
-
1
Whether
an
experienced
Commander
and
rawe
Souldiers
:
or
experienced
Souldiers
and
an
vnskilfull
Commander
be
the
better
.
-
2
The
first
best
allowed
and
the
reasons
.
-
3
Examples
heereof
.
1
IT
is
ordinarily
disputed
amongst
Souldiers
and
martiall
men
,
which
is
the
better
,
a
good
Captaine
emploied
about
the
conducting
of
an
armie
consisting
of
raw
Souldiers
,
or
an
armie
of
old
Souldiers
committed
to
the
command
of
a
raw
and
vnexperienced
Captaine
.
2
As
for
me
(
if
my
opinion
may
carie
credit
amongst
so
many
,
sufficient
to
decide
this
question
)
I
hold
it
better
that
a
worthy
and
valiant
Captaine
should
haue
the
charge
of
an
armie
of
vntrained
men
without
experience
,
then
that
an
armie
of
old
Souldiers
trained
and
beaten
to
the
wars
,
should
be
recommended
to
a
Captaine
,
yet
a
nouice
and
vnskild
in
the
profession
of
armes
.
The
reasons
proper
for
the
maintaining
of
this
proposition
are
so
plaine
to
such
as
without
being
obstinate
or
passionate
,
in
behalfe
of
either
party
,
will
entertaine
them
,
as
they
are
not
to
be
gainsaid
:
for
is
it
not
much
more
fit
and
easie
that
a
good
Captaine
make
and
fashion
a
campe
of
rawe
Souldiers
,
then
that
good
and
experienced
Souldiers
prepare
and
fashion
their
Captaine
to
the
conduct
of
an
armie
?
who
can
without
shame
denie
that
an
armie
doth
not
rather
obey
the
voice
and
command
of
their
Captaine
,
then
the
Captaine
of
his
armie
?
3
Now
we
must
come
to
such
examples
as
may
instruct
and
make
cleere
the
truth
of
my
proposition
.
If
we
will
as
we
ought
,
examine
how
many
times
the
Christians
haue
beene
ouerthrowne
by
the
Turkes
,
we
shall
vndoubtedly
finde
,
that
it
hath
euermore
hapned
rather
through
want
of
experience
,
Mahomet
Iahiaoglis
being
Gouernour
vnder
Soliman
of
Belgrad
and
the
frontiers
of
Hungarie
in
the
time
of
king
Iohn
)
the
great
Caziauer
losing
his
courage
,
did
he
not
abandone
to
spoile
,
death
,
and
ruine
a
faire
and
strong
armie
,
which
he
commanded
for
the
Princes
of
Germany
and
Italy
,
some
one
troupe
excepted
,
which
dishonorably
togither
with
him
saued
themselues
by
flight
?
Also
before
this
heauie
losse
,
did
not
Anthony
Grimani
Generall
of
the
Venetian
armie
faile
of
courage
when
with
great
aduantage
he
might
haue
charged
the
Turkes
,
CHAP.
IX
.
That
he
hath
made
no
skippe
in
his
enterprises
.
-
1
Vnited
vertue
strongest
.
-
2
The
strength
of
kingdomes
by
their
situation
.
-
3
What
it
is
to
skippe
in
an
enterprise
.
-
4
Kingdomes
preserued
by
the
coniunction
of
their
subiect
prouinces
.
-
5
Confirmation
of
the
Roman
Empire
.
-
6
The
meanes
of
establishing
an
Empire
by
confederacies
.
-
7
The
French
as
quicke
in
losing
as
in
conquering
countries
.
-
8
We
are
not
to
indeauor
so
much
to
conquer
as
to
keepe
.
-
9
The
Portugals
and
Spaniards
distracted
gouernment
.
-
10
Industrie
of
the
Ottomans
in
conquering
.
-
11
An
admonition
to
Christians
.
-
12
Horror
of
the
Turkes
.
1
NOthing
would
be
so
strong
as
a
poinct
,
if
it
were
to
bee
found
in
nature
;
at
the
least
if
the
rules
of
the
Mathematiques
be
true
as
they
be
held
,
because
being
most
simple
,
it
cannot
be
corrupted
either
by
inward
beginnings
,
or
outward
causes
;
so
is
a
body
more
induring
and
powerfull
,
the
neerer
it
approcheth
to
the
resemblance
of
a
poinct
,
that
is
to
say
,
the
more
it
is
vnited
and
compact
in
it selfe
.
And
in
very
deede
as
nature
vnable
to
bring
to
passe
that
all
the
world
should
be
one
only
body
,
made
it
continued
and
ioining
one
part
vpon
another
;
and
as
to
preserue
this
continuation
,
she
in
all
she
may
opposeth
Vacuum
,
which
is
onely
able
to
corrupt
and
destroy
her
:
2
So
estates
become
more
durable
,
and
of
greater
abilitie
to
maintaine
themselues
when
they
are
(
as
I
may
say
)
sowed
,
linked
,
and
bound
together
,
the
one
helping
to
entertaine
and
preserue
the
other
.
Hence
we
may
gather
that
such
prouinces
as
haue
their
situation
trussed
vp
together
in
a
round
forme
,
are
more
strong
and
mightie
then
such
as
extend
themselues
in
length
:
as
for
example
,
one
may
say
of
France
in
comparison
of
Italy
,
because
this
latter
resembling
a
legge
stretched
out
is
lesse
fit
to
defend
it selfe
then
France
,
which
is
round
,
as
her
prouinces
lie
and
are
situate
:
whereby
she
is
consequently
not
only
more
vnited
in
her
forces
then
Italy
,
but
also
more
nimble
and
able
to
maintaine
herselfe
then
the
other
.
3
Now
let
vs
come
to
our
discourse
and
make
it
appeare
what
it
is
we
vnderstand
by
this
discontinuation
,
and
that
which
we
tearme
to
skip
in
our
enterprises
.
It
is
properly
when
we
regard
not
the
contiguity
(
if
I
may
so
say
)
or
neere
adioyning
of
our
estates
;
and
that
happeneth
as
often
as
we
leaue
an
enimy
behind
vs
,
at
one
side
of
vs
,
or
otherwise
,
in
such
sort
,
as
he
may
crosse
,
cut
off
,
beseege
,
or
inclose
vs
when
we
so
inconsideratly
skip
or
stride
;
we
may
likewise
saie
that
he
truly
skips
who
crosseth
from
one
country
to
another
so
far
distant
,
as
by
that
time
he
hath
finished
his
voiage
,
his
strength
failes
him
and
his
troopes
proue
so
out
of
heart
and
tired
,
as
they
become
vtterly
vnprofitable
.
We
may
alledge
for
example
that
which
befell
the
Emperours
of
Germany
,
the
king
of
France
and
of
England
in
their
voiages
of
the
holy
land
,
for
the
length
of
the
iourny
,
the
far
distance
of
the
country
,
the
diuersity
of
the
Climate
,
the
change
of
the
aire
,
and
many
other
such
like
inconueniences
,
so
tired
and
discouraged
them
by
reason
of
the
trauailes
and
miseries
they
had
suffered
vpon
the
way
,
as
they
could
not
attempt
any
matter
of
importance
,
or
goe
thorow
with
their
enterprise
according
to
their
proiect
:
not
vnlike
a
ball
which
stirreth
not
from
the
place
where
it
is
once
setled
,
through
want
of
that
moouing
power
which
should
tosse
and
raise
it
.
So
if
these
Princes
at
the
first
arriuall
did
affoord
any
proofe
of
their
courage
,
valour
,
and
likelihood
of
good
fortune
;
the
languishing
of
the
principall
motiue
suddenly
made
them
lose
their
aduantages
,
and
reduced
the
whole
to
tearmes
vnwoorthy
the
merit
of
their
holy
intentions
and
trauels
.
4
We
must
then
allow
that
it
is
requisite
for
the
preseruation
of
estates
,
either
that
their
prouinces
touch
and
intertaine
the
one
the
other
,
or
that
their
forces
be
of
ability
to
maintaine
themselues
of
themselues
:
for
this
continuation
hath
of
it selfe
such
force
and
efficacie
for
the
lasting
and
preseruation
of
estates
,
as
we
see
that
common-weales
and
meane
kingdomes
haue
thereby
longer
maintained
themselues
then
great
and
rich
monarchies
.
Wee
may
alledge
for
example
the
common-weales
of
Sparta
and
of
Venice
;
of
the
kingdomes
of
Persia
and
France
,
whose
rule
hath
much
longer
endured
then
that
of
the
Sarazins
,
of
the
Mamelucks
,
or
of
other
more
mighty
Empires
.
The
cause
proceedeth
,
as
I
haue
said
,
of
the
vnion
of
that
entertainment
and
coniunction
of
prouinces
,
abutting
the
one
vpon
the
other
,
which
is
of
such
vertue
and
efficacie
to
giue
strength
and
continuance
to
a
monarchie
,
as
it
almost
exceedeth
conceit
and
imagination
.
5
The
Romans
which
saw
wel
enough
that
the
inlarging
of
their
Empires
limits
,
trained
after
it
a
consequence
of
a
necessary
dispersing
of
their
forces
,
endeuored
by
al
means
possible
to
reunite
this
body
,
augmented
and
made
huge
by
their
aduantageous
conquests
;
reducing
to
their
obedience
and
rule
,
all
they
got
both
by
maintaining
sufficient
forces
vpon
the
frontiers
of
their
Empire
or
garrisons
in
places
of
importance
,
as
also
by
establishing
Colonies
,
and
infranchising
many
strong
townes
,
with
bestowing
on
them
the
like
liberties
as
the
people
of
Rome
enioyed
,
by
them
tearmed
Municipia
.
In
other
places
also
they
instituted
certaine
fraternities
and
assemblies
of
people
,
with
prerogatiues
of
the
Romanes
priuiledges
,
which
they
named
Conuentus
:
Moreouer
,
they
committed
estates
and
intire
kingdoms
to
the
gouernment
of
certaine
Princes
held
and
esteemed
as
friends
of
the
people
of
Rome
.
By
these
meanes
ioyning
them
to
their
loue
as
well
by
gratifying
them
with
their
liberty
and
bounty
,
as
with
other
priuiledges
,
honours
and
dignities
,
whereof
they
did
partake
in
their
towne
as
in
right
of
Citizens
:
They
tearmed
these
townes
and
people
their
confederates
,
and
the
Kings
their
friends
.
As
for
example
in
Africke
they
had
Massinissa
,
and
Iuba
;
in
Asia
,
Eumenes
,
Prusias
and
the
King
of
Egypt
.
In
Europe
those
of
Marseilles
,
Autum
,
Auerg●●●
,
Rennes
and
others
;
making
account
more
to
auaile
themselues
by
such
confederacies
and
amities
then
by
meanes
more
strickt
and
seuere
:
so
then
power
is
established
and
continued
either
by
our
owne
forces
,
or
by
annexing
of
the
forces
of
our
friends
which
serue
vs
as
a
continued
rampart
and
conducteth
vs
out
of
danger
euen
into
the
country
which
we
intend
to
inuade
,
and
that
with
so
much
the
greater
aduantage
,
when
vpon
some
part
it
confineth
with
the
country
of
our
confederates
.
6
But
because
we
are
neuer
able
with
good
assurance
(
especially
Princes
amongst
whom
this
is
a
tickle
point
)
to
maintaine
so
good
intelligence
,
it
is
requisite
if
we
will
make
this
vse
of
an
other
,
to
make
him
confident
either
through
the
hope
of
participation
in
our
conquests
,
or
else
by
intimating
vnto
him
(
if
he
be
our
inferiour
)
an
euident
assurance
in
our
proceedings
,
and
such
a
plainnesse
and
integrity
in
all
our
other
actions
,
as
euen
that
may
rid
him
of
the
distrust
he
might
conceiue
of
being
one
day
praied
vpon
and
brought
vnder
by
that
insolencie
which
accompanieth
the
prosperitie
of
fortune
,
and
may
serue
to
stretch
the
conscience
of
a
conquering
Prince
.
After
we
haue
in
this
manner
framed
an
impression
of
our
integritie
in
the
heart
of
our
neighbour
,
we
may
march
in
his
countrey
as
securely
as
in
our
owne
,
and
rest
assured
that
we
shall
by
him
be
furthered
and
assisted
.
7
The
French
could
neuer
keepe
any
countrey
by
them
conquered
abroad
,
vnlesse
it
were
Piemont
and
Sauoy
:
for
it
one
day
they
had
gained
a
foote
of
land
,
they
were
enforced
to
forgoe
it
the
next
,
no
sooner
winning
it
,
but
they
lost
it
.
8
We
commonly
say
,
that
there
is
no
lesse
vertue
in
him
that
keepeth
them
in
him
that
getteth
.
9
Heere
some
one
will
obiect
that
neuerthelesse
the
dominion
of
the
Portugals
is
of
90.
yeares
continuance
or
thereabout
in
the
Indies
,
so
far
distant
from
the
first
spring
and
originall
.
The
like
appeareth
in
the
gouernment
of
Philip
King
of
Spaine
spread
and
diuided
in
so
many
places
aswell
in
Europe
as
in
India
.
Surely
it
is
not
possible
to
imagine
a
greater
distance
then
from
Lisbon
to
Ormus
,
Goa
,
Malaca
,
and
Ternate
,
so
as
from
Portugale
to
their
farthest
Conquests
,
there
are
no
lesse
then
twentie
thousand
miles
;
and
although
they
endeuour
to
ioyne
these
estates
so
seuered
,
by
the
neerenesse
of
sundry
fortresses
heere
and
there
bestowed
in
the
midway
(
as
Zofala
,
Mohambique
,
Melinde
,
which
belongeth
to
a
certaine
King
their
Ally
,
besides
other
like
meanes
)
yet
all
these
are
but
weake
sinewes
long
to
sustaine
the
vnion
of
so
far
separated
members
.
But
it
is
Gods
pleasure
that
by
how
much
the
foundations
of
this
rule
are
more
feeble
and
subiect
to
be
shaken
,
by
so
much
the
more
we
should
admire
the
omnipotency
of
his
diuine
Maiesty
,
whereby
they
are
maintained
,
fortified
,
and
protected
.
The
dominion
likewise
of
the
King
of
Spaine
is
spread
into
so
many
parts
of
Asia
(
especially
by
meanes
of
annexing
the
crowne
of
Portugale
)
of
Afrike
,
of
Europe
,
and
of
the
new
found
world
,
as
there
appeareth
in
this
preseruation
a
greater
miracle
then
counsail
or
humane
prouidence
,
for
in
very
deed
to
rule
so
many
and
so
seuered
nations
differing
in
religion
,
manners
and
tongues
without
stirring
from
home
,
is
it
not
a
worke
of
heauen
rather
then
of
humane
policy
or
discourse
?
God
therefore
which
hath
of
his
goodnesse
made
him
owner
of
so
many
and
so
goodly
countries
,
hath
not
denied
him
wisedome
and
counsaile
to
know
how
to
order
and
maintaine
them
,
as
he
doth
,
vnder
his
obedience
.
10
The
Ottomans
haue
ordinarily
behaued
themselues
more
iudiciously
in
this
one
part
of
conquering
(
without
inconsiderat
skipping
)
then
in
any
other
of
their
actions
.
For
neither
couetousnesse
of
inriching
or
inlarging
their
estate
,
nor
the
easinesse
of
attempting
,
nor
the
inticements
of
peoples
insurrections
,
nor
the
thirst
of
reuenge
(
which
commonly
makes
Princes
mighty
in
men
and
mony
,
forget
themselues
when
the
maintenance
of
their
authority
&
credit
is
called
in
question
,
especially
perceiuing
the
law
in
their
hands
to
execute
more
readily
then
can
particular
persons
)
nor
any
such
like
motiues
haue
beene
able
,
as
I
said
,
to
induce
the
Turkes
indiscreetly
to
skip
or
to
ingage
themselues
in
any
enterprise
far
from
home
.
Rather
on
the
contrary
they
haue
marched
faire
and
soft
from
country
to
country
,
and
deuoured
(
as
they
continue
still
to
doe
)
all
such
as
confine
and
are
neighbours
vnto
them
.
Hence
hath
growen
the
consequence
of
so
many
happie
victories
,
the
benefite
of
so
great
and
rich
conquests
;
the
course
of
so
easily
preseruing
what
they
haue
gotten
.
11
I
haue
said
that
for
the
most
part
they
haue
not
inconsideratly
skipped
or
strid
in
their
enterprises
,
as
the
Christians
doe
and
haue
done
:
and
as
we
see
,
when
any
of
them
haue
taken
such
waies
to
greatnesse
,
the
fruits
and
effects
haue
not
prooued
answerable
to
their
proiect
and
promised
fortunes
.
This
vnhappinesse
,
common
with
the
error
founded
vpon
the
reasons
formerly
alledged
,
ought
hencefoorth
to
serue
as
an
instruction
to
make
vs
become
more
wise
and
regardfull
then
we
yet
are
,
to
the
end
that
after
we
haue
by
an
holy
and
vniuersall
amendment
appeased
the
wrath
of
God
,
we
may
war
against
them
with
the
same
policies
and
aduantages
as
they
haue
practised
in
raising
themselues
to
our
cost
and
confusion
.
These
examples
also
should
admonish
vs
of
what
is
to
be
feared
,
to
wit
,
least
failing
to
chastice
&
humble
our selues
,
his
diuine
Maiesty
inflict
vpon
vs
a
more
seuere
punishment
,
then
that
we
haue
hitherto
indured
,
and
for
this
cause
open
a
more
large
gate
to
those
infidels
vtterly
to
ruine
and
destroy
vs
.
12
Now
lest
any
one
should
thinke
I
haue
against
reason
held
that
the
Turkes
haue
not
,
as
we
,
forgotten
thus
inconsideratly
to
skip
,
I
will
recite
certaine
examples
to
that
purpose
.
The
first
then
that
did
it
,
was
Mahomet
the
second
,
which
vnfortunatly
attempted
Italy
,
Soliman
performed
the
like
against
the
same
country
,
after
the
interprise
of
Diu
in
the
Indies
,
which
was
vndertaken
the
yeare
1537.
then
that
of
the
yeare
1542.
that
of
Ormus
1552.
and
finally
vpon
good
grounds
the
attempting
of
Malta
which
was
so
valiantly
defended
by
the
Knights
of
the
order
,
as
(
next
the
honour
due
vnto
the
diuine
Maiestie
)
all
those
braue
Gentlemen
,
who
with
their
grand
Master
Parisot
,
made
it
good
against
the
Infidels
,
deserue
to
be
consecrated
to
all
praise
,
and
to
a
most
glorious
and
eternall
memory
.
CHAP.
X.
That
he
hath
not
spent
time
vpon
enterprises
of
small
importance
.
-
1
Get
the
greater
,
the
lesse
will
follow
.
-
2
The
besieging
of
some
small
holde
,
may
be
the
hinderance
of
the
whole
expedition
,
this
exemplified
.
-
3
The
Turkes
discretion
in
their
expeditions
and
sieges
.
-
4
The
best
course
is
,
to
become
masters
of
the
field
.
-
5
Error
in
the
siege
of
Malta
.
1_NAture
as
wise
and
prouident
,
doth
not
busie
her-selfe
about
the
birth
of
euerie
particular
thing
,
but
rather
setteth
her
hand
to
the
generation
of
the
substance
,
which
without
any
further
paine
,
is
afterward
attended
on
by
the
accidents
euery
where
inseparably
accompanying
her
.
In
like
sort
a
good
and
discreet
Captaine
in
the
carriage
of
his
enterprises
,
should
not
aime
at
ought
else
but
to
conquer
the
places
of
importance
;
for
of
their
consequence
other
inferior
parts
of
the
estate
come
tumbling
in
(
as
it
were
)
of
themselues
,
which
as
vnseparable
accidents
or
qualities
,
vndoubtedly
follow
the
first
examples
of
greater
moment
,
whereon
dependeth
and
subsisteth
the
others
being
.
2
We
haue
often
seene
,
that
a
paltrie
Sconce
(
either
because
of
the
naturall
strength
of
the
situation
,
thicknesse
of
the
wall
,
goodnesse
of
the
matter
,
couragious
obstinacy
of
the
defenders
,
or
some
other
accident
not
foreseene
or
dreampt
of
,
hath
stopt
the
proceeding
of
a
royall
armie
,
and
hath
prooued
it selfe
as
able
to
withstand
the
force
thereof
,
as
a
citie
greater
,
richer
,
and
more
peopled
.
And
though
we
become
after
masters
of
such
blocke-houses
and
small
fortes
,
yet
that
is
no
furtherance
to
a
more
important
conquest
;
or
helpe
to
the
enterprise
begun
.
We
finde
written
that
the
Emperour
Maximilian
,
because
he
to
no
purpose
spent
so
much
time
about
Asola
(
which
he
striued
to
subdue
by
the
way
,
for
the
reputation
and
credit
of
the
armie
,
he
conducted
to
Milan
)
inconsiderately
lost
the
occasion
offered
him
to
become
Lord
of
that
Dukedome
;
and
performed
not
any
thing
after
to
the
good
of
his
affaires
.
The
French
also
,
after
they
had
passed
the
Alpes
in
the
time
of
Lewes
the
12.
thriued
not
in
their
attempts
of
the
kingdome
of
Naples
;
hauing
vpon
an
ill
ground
vndertaken
Rocca-Secea
,
where
they
engaged
both
their
honors
and
liues
;
for
hauing
besieged
it
certaine
daies
,
and
giuen
the
assault
in
vaine
,
they
lent
leasure
and
courage
to
the
Spaniards
,
to
bethinke
themselues
:
made
their
powers
lesse
valued
for
so
badde
a
beginning
,
and
discouraged
the
people
for
euer
attempting
any
thing
in
their
behalfe
,
as
no
doubt
they
had
done
if
they
might
haue
seene
a
fortunate
and
better
digested
proceeding
then
theirs
was
,
the
name
of
the
Spaniard
being
then
odious
amongst
them
.
This
fault
made
the
Spaniards
so
bold
as
to
say
,
that
the
rest
of
the
kingdome
was
reserued
for
them
,
and
not
for
the
other
,
who
had
so
ill
husbanded
their
opportunities
.
In
the
yere
1556.
holding
on
the
said
designe
for
the
conquest
of
Naples
,
did
they
not
vainely
spend
time
,
money
,
their
forces
,
and
paines
at
Ciuitella
,
to
the
ruine
of
that
goodly
armie
which
Henry
the
2.
of
France
sent
thither
vnder
the
command
of
the
Duke
of
Guyse
:
who
was
neuerthelesse
a
valiant
and
discreet
Captaine
,
and
who
had
perhaps
done
better
if
his
particular
interest
,
or
the
ouermuch
trust
he
reposed
in
the
Popes
Nephewes
,
had
not
blinded
him
:
Other
reasons
may
be
alleaged
for
the
small
good
this
armie
did
the
king
,
who
had
conceiued
of
it
great
and
honorable
hopes
;
but
I
will
referre
them
to
such
as
write
that
Historie
.
The
Spaniards
also
haue
thrice
attempted
the
I
le
of
Gerbes
,
Don
Iohn
,
made
Ochiallo
Generall
of
the
Turkish
armie
,
retire
to
Modon
,
as
fearing
those
of
whom
he
had
made
triall
the
yeere
before
.
If
they
had
put
him
to
it
as
they
should
haue
done
,
no
doubt
but
they
had
found
him
dismaide
,
and
hardly
bestead
how
to
defend
as
well
the
fortresses
as
his
armie
by
sea
:
for
he
had
not
left
aboue
60.
gallies
,
to
garde
the
hauen
,
and
had
bestowed
the
rest
of
his
forces
one
yeare
.
But
when
he
sawe
they
went
to
besiege
Nauaria
neere
Modon
,
and
that
they
had
no
saying
to
him
at
his
landing
,
as
he
feared
they
would
,
he
tooke
heart
at
grasse
,
and
after
made
a
iest
of
the
designes
of
the
Christians
armie
,
which
he
in
such
sort
held
plaie
and
entertained
,
as
it
performed
nothing
woorthie
such
a
power
assembled
immediately
vpon
the
good
successe
of
a
former
victory
.
3
The
Turkes
in
what
concerneth
the
ordering
,
commoditie
,
and
assurance
,
in
their
enterprises
,
surpasse
(
to
say
the
very
trueth
)
all
other
nations
for
well
managing
of
warlike
affaires
:
for
they
neuer
attempted
place
that
the
designe
thereof
was
not
farre
more
woorth
then
the
paine
they
emploied
about
it
;
or
that
the
enterprise
did
not
deserue
the
like
or
more
expence
:
carying
themselues
thus
,
they
are
by
the
effect
of
their
enterprises
growne
mightie
,
for
force
and
meanes
,
and
haue
opened
the
way
to
the
encrease
of
their
greatnesse
and
successe
of
their
affaires
:
which
in
such
sort
assuring
(
wherein
they
haue
aimed
principally
at
profit
)
they
haue
more
and
more
weakened
our
forces
,
not
without
an
euident
consequence
of
extreame
danger
:
when
they
tooke
in
hand
the
conquest
of
Cypres
,
they
were
wise
enough
not
to
bestow
time
in
taking
Cerynes
a
fortres
almost
impregnable
.
They
foresaw
that
it
was
of
small
moment
,
at
the
least
not
to
import
much
in
that
they
intended
to
compasse
,
but
they
rather
directed
their
course
and
indeuours
against
Nicosia
,
as
against
the
principall
place
of
all
the
Iland
,
whereabouts
they
so
well
imploied
their
paines
as
they
caried
it
.
By
which
conquest
it
was
found
that
Cerynes
soone
followed
,
(
as
of
a
necessary
consequence
)
the
disaster
of
their
capitall
towne
.
4
In
all
the
executions
of
their
hardy
dessignes
they
haue
alwaies
at
the
very
first
beene
Masters
of
the
field
,
which
hath
so
furthered
them
as
thereby
the
strongest
holds
of
the
country
,
which
they
could
not
otherwise
haue
gotten
but
by
force
of
armes
,
haue
beene
surrendred
vp
vnto
them
.
Such
fortresses
being
vnable
long
to
hold
out
when
all
hope
of
succour
is
cast
off
by
the
opposition
of
so
strong
and
mighty
armies
as
theirs
are
.
5
At
the
war
of
Malta
it
seemeth
God
did
dull
them
,
S.
Hermes
because
it
seemed
commodious
to
stop
vp
the
hauen
and
after
to
get
the
suburbs
where
the
knights
made
their
aboade
)
consumed
much
time
about
it
,
and
lost
the
better
part
of
his
best
souldiours
.
In
the
meane
space
the
season
of
the
yeare
spent
so
fast
,
and
the
resolutions
and
valour
of
them
in
the
towne
prooued
such
,
as
in
the
end
he
grew
confounded
,
perceiuing
too
late
how
flenderly
he
had
preuailed
,
and
that
he
must
necessarilie
begin
a
new
with
the
principall
place
,
which
he
should
haue
at
the
first
attempted
,
if
God
(
as
I
said
)
for
the
good
of
Christendome
,
had
not
blinded
him
in
his
enterprise
.
Dorgut
Raiz
Vice-roy
of
Argiers
,
who
was
to
second
this
Basha
in
all
his
warre
,
and
to
whom
he
was
commanded
to
communicate
his
designes
assoone
as
he
should
arriue
,
(
which
he
did
some
few
weekes
after
his
first
setting
downe
and
beginning
to
batter
)
soone
discouered
his
error
,
and
could
vpbraid
him
with
it
,
telling
him
he
shuld
haue
gone
right
on
to
the
fountaine
,
without
stooping
to
the
shallow
streames
.
So
as
after
the
taking
of
S.
Hermes
,
they
did
not
performe
or
attempt
any
matter
of
importance
,
but
as
men
tired
and
discouraged
,
they
trust
vp
bagge
and
baggage
to
be
gone
assoone
as
the
succour
appeared
before
Malta
;
these
leauing
behinde
them
the
memorie
and
testimonie
of
their
shame
,
and
ill
grounded
aduise
,
and
the
knights
of
their
honour
and
valour
.
CHAP.
XI
.
That
he
hath
laid
hold
on
occasions
.
-
1
Occasion
pourtraied
.
-
2
It
is
to
be
obserued
.
-
3
Examples
of
the
Ottomans
diligence
in
laying
hold
on
occasions
offered
by
the
Christians
.
-
4
The
difficulties
of
a
defensiue
and
offensiue
league
.
-
5
The
false
guesse
of
the
selfe-ruine
of
the
Turkish
Empire
.
-
6
The
weaker
Princes
are
easily
subdued
by
the
mightier
.
-
7
Other
occasions
offered
by
the
Christians
to
forward
the
Turkish
greatnesse
.
1
THe
ancient
Romans
signified
vnto
vs
by
the
picture
of
occasion
(
whom
they
adored
as
a
goddesse
,
putting
wings
to
her
feete
,
supported
with
a
bowle
,
behinde
bald
,
and
before
hairie
)
that
we
must
bee
diligent
to
apprehend
her
when
shee
presenteth
her-selfe
,
and
not
in
any
case
to
let
her
slippe
:
considering
that
if
she
once
escape
vs
,
she
leaueth
vs
nought
but
a
vaine
and
vexing
repentance
.
2
And
to
say
the
truth
,
in
all
a
mans
actions
.
There
is
nothing
more
commendable
then
to
be
able
to
make
the
best
vse
of
occasion
and
especially
in
mater
of
war.
In
as
much
as
he
that
knoweth
his
aduantage
,
how
to
take
it
and
to
carry
the
time
before
him
is
furnished
with
the
principall
adorning
vertue
of
a
Captaine
,
occasion
being
no
other
thing
,
then
an
opportunity
that
the
time
more
by
accident
then
prouidence
offereth
vnto
vs
,
for
the
well
performing
of
what
we
haue
in
hand
,
and
for
the
abstaining
and
well
comming
off
from
a
dessine
vnsesonably
attempted
,
as
the
euent
of
the
aboue
mentioned
interprise
may
sufficiently
witnesse
.
This
is
that
these
Infidels
haue
studied
at
such
times
as
God
hath
made
them
his
instruments
to
afflict
and
chastice
vs
,
and
this
is
that
we
ought
to
doe
against
them
,
for
the
glorifying
of
Gods
diuine
Maiesty
,
not
yet
for
ought
I
see
pleased
with
vs
.
In
a
word
all
such
as
haue
inlarged
their
estates
haue
either
inioyed
or
hammered
out
some
notable
occasion
which
they
wisely
laid
hold
on
,
and
haue
consequently
reaped
the
fruites
of
an
vnusuall
aduancement
.
The
Grecian
and
Romane
histories
can
teach
vs
this
,
but
I
omit
them
as
too
far
from
vs
,
to
betake
my selfe
to
such
as
are
more
familiar
and
neere
vnto
vs
.
Pepin
and
Charlemaine
were
by
the
Romish
church
called
into
Italy
:
Queene
Ione
the
second
:
3
The
Ottomans
haue
not
attained
to
the
height
of
so
mightie
an
Empire
but
by
such
occasions
as
we
haue
too
carelesly
,
The
iarres
and
diuisions
of
the
Princes
of
Greece
ministred
the
third
time
an
occasion
to
the
Turkish
thriuing
greatnesse
:
This
mischief
grew
greater
at
such
time
as
some
Potentates
of
Italy
inconsiderately
called
the
Turke
to
their
succour
,
shewing
him
the
way
into
our
seas
farther
then
was
conuenient
.
In
this
regard
our
portes
stood
open
vnto
them
,
they
entred
and
conuersed
with
vs
as
with
friends
and
associats
,
a
thing
most
abhominable
before
God
and
man
,
and
of
most
dangerous
consequence
.
And
to
the
end
I
be
not
held
an
outlasher
,
I
will
reckon
some
of
those
that
haue
so
ouershot
themselues
.
Alfonso
the
second
king
of
Naples
,
Lodouick
Sforsa
duke
of
Milan
,
were
those
that
brought
in
Baiazet
the
second
:
that
against
the
French
,
this
against
the
Venetians
.
Isabell
Queene
of
Hungarie
craued
aide
likewise
of
Soliman
,
The
sixt
occasion
obserued
and
embraced
by
the
Turkes
,
4
Now
to
make
a
defensiue
league
against
the
Turke
is
in
these
daies
a
hard
matter
in
so
much
as
the
princes
of
Christendome
are
so
far
from
one
another
,
and
some
especially
from
the
enemy
,
as
like
men
out
of
danger
they
weigh
it
not
esteeming
themselues
most
assured
:
And
to
vndertake
to
establish
an
offensiue
league
is
no
lesse
difficult
seeing
the
profit
of
their
conquest
cannot
be
drawne
to
a
proportionable
equality
,
it
may
be
also
euery
man
feares
the
greatnesse
of
his
companion
(
although
neuer
so
much
his
partner
for
aide
and
common
association
)
but
aboue
all
he
that
hath
the
most
commodious
hauens
or
his
Prouinces
most
proper
for
the
mannaging
of
the
war
.
Or
else
he
who
can
better
maintaine
his
conquests
would
proue
the
most
suspected
and
maligned
.
These
considerations
hinder
them
from
vniting
and
assembling
themselues
as
they
ought
for
the
common
good
.
5
Moreouer
euery
one
flattereth
himselfe
that
time
and
the
worlds
ordinarie
change
will
breede
ruine
and
alteration
in
the
estate
of
the
Ottomans
,
and
settle
their
affaires
without
being
constrained
to
expose
themselues
to
danger
,
trauell
,
and
charge
.
6
Another
reason
and
inconuenience
may
yet
be
alledged
that
each
of
these
princes
being
weake
in
respect
of
the
other
they
cannot
so
couragiously
resolue
to
vndertake
what
were
profitable
and
necessary
for
them
;
whence
it
groweth
that
the
feeblenesse
of
their
strength
is
yet
made
more
feeble
by
this
irresolution
;
so
as
a
mighty
power
charging
them
they
shal
remain
subiect
to
the
discretion
of
the
indiscreet
enemy
:
by
these
means
the
lords
of
the
seueral
parts
of
Lombardy
became
the
pray
of
the
Venetians
who
subdued
them
with
as
much
facility
as
resolution
;
But
had
the
repulse
when
they
attempted
the
state
of
Milan
,
vtmost
limit
of
their
power
,
dominion
,
and
conquests
.
After
the
same
sort
also
the
French
in
time
past
brought
vnder
all
the
Prouinces
of
Gaull
,
but
when
they
would
enter
the
confines
of
Spain
,
the
opposition
of
that
neighbour-greatnesse
stopped
their
course
and
was
a
rampart
to
defend
them
from
further
proceedings
.
In
the
very
like
manner
the
Turkes
hauing
deuoured
all
the
Princes
of
Greece
,
Macedonia
,
Mathias
Coruin
,
who
found
the
Turkes
play
to
their
cost
.
But
so
soone
as
those
Kings
and
people
did
forgoe
this
first
valour
and
suffered
the
exercise
of
armes
to
degenerat
,
7
The
diuersitie
of
opinions
in
matter
of
religion
,
haue
made
way
to
the
seuenth
occasion
,
Disloyall
and
traiterous
Renegades
or
Apostates
,
But
for
the
ninth
,
The
dessignes
of
the
Princes
of
Europe
,
Ottomans
Amurath
the
first
was
the
most
diligent
to
hunt
after
,
and
embrace
occasions
,
who
(
as
we
haue
already
deliuered
)
sent
his
supplies
to
the
Emperour
of
constantinople
,
CHAP.
XII
.
That
he
hath
behaued
himselfe
with
nimblenesse
and
celeritie
vpon
his
occasions
.
-
1
The
fortune
of
warre
consisteth
not
in
discerning
but
in
the
vse
of
occasion
.
-
2
Celeritie
in
wars
most
expedient
.
-
3
The
Turkes
readinesse
and
wisdome
in
that
kinde
.
-
4
Furtherance
of
this
celeritie
.
-
5
Impediments
of
the
Christians
in
their
expeditions
.
-
6
Treasure
requisite
.
-
7
Exact
obedience
in
Captaines
and
Souldiers
and
an
obseruation
of
militarie
discipline
.
-
8
Strength
and
abilitie
of
men
and
horse
.
-
9
Examples
of
the
Turkes
celerity
.
-
10
In
their
sea-actions
and
their
order
:
-
11
Defects
of
the
Christians
shipping
.
1
BEcause
this
Chapter
,
in
regard
of
the
continuance
of
the
matter
in
handling
,
is
but
as
one
dependencie
and
coniunction
with
the
former
,
we
will
still
make
vse
of
this
word
Occasion
,
heeretofore
discoursed
vpon
,
as
of
a
table
wherein
is
represented
all
whatsoeuer
our
forefathers
haue
conceited
of
it
;
and
what
we
ought
to
admit
thereof
:
following
this
path
we
are
to
remember
that
who
in
time
laieth
not
hold
on
occasion
,
shall
neuer
more
inioy
a
like
time
to
recouer
it
with
the
like
commoditie
of
wel
doing
as
he
once
had
,
if
he
had
knowne
how
to
entertaine
it
as
hee
ought
.
To
discouer
then
the
opportunitie
of
affaires
,
is
not
al
that
is
required
:
2
Celeritie
is
an
especiall
matter
in
all
affaires
of
importance
,
but
aboue
all
in
the
warres
,
wherein
it
is
more
necessarie
then
in
any
our
actions
.
Because
(
as
saide
Selim
the
first
)
the
least
delay
we
therin
vse
,
turneth
to
a
grosse
error
,
especially
since
it
bereaues
vs
of
the
commoditie
and
aduantage
offered
to
put
in
execution
,
what
we
had
wisely
and
with
studie
determined
:
Hannibal
a
woorthy
and
renowned
captaine
,
was
noted
of
slownesse
,
not
in
resoluing
but
in
embracing
his
occasions
of
victory
which
might
haue
assuredly
established
his
affaires
.
That
great
Pompey
was
likewise
subiect
to
the
same
imperfection
,
which
did
vtterly
vndoe
him
.
In
a
word
,
no
motion
wanting
speedinesse
,
can
be
of
much
force
,
or
produce
woorthy
effects
:
Violent
agitations
loose
alike
their
force
with
their
swiftnesse
,
but
such
as
are
naturall
attaine
it
,
and
fortifie
themselues
in
it
.
3
This
is
that
the
Turkes
know
well
enough
how
to
practise
,
fashioning
themselues
to
quicknesse
,
nimblenesse
,
habilitie
,
and
to
a
certaine
store
of
whatsoeuer
may
seeme
necessarie
to
that
purpose
,
so
as
their
promptnesse
and
forecast
hath
neuer
omitted
the
occasions
presented
vnto
them
without
reaping
the
fruites
and
glory
thereof
.
4
But
some
one
will
say
,
that
it
is
requisite
for
the
suddainnesse
of
occasion
that
many
things
relie
in
the
power
of
him
that
will
follow
this
course
.
I
grant
it
,
for
they
indeed
who
will
fitly
make
vse
of
such
aduantage
,
must
be
alwaies
in
armes
,
and
heerein
also
the
Turke
surpasseth
vs
,
for
he
continually
entertaineth
so
many
souldiers
,
as
it
were
hard
to
take
him
vnprouided
,
or
to
finde
him
(
when
need
requireth
)
without
a
mightie
army
,
which
serueth
to
hearten
him
,
and
to
awake
his
courage
:
but
aboue
all
,
he
hath
so
great
a
number
of
horse
ordinarily
in
a
readinesse
,
as
that
is
but
too
sufficient
to
make
him
proudly
humour
his
owne
will
;
so
as
thought
and
execution
are
in
a
manner
one
with
him
.
This
is
yet
farther
accompanied
with
a
powerfull
commoditie
which
addeth
facillititie
to
his
promptnesse
;
and
this
is
,
that
his
horse
and
foot
are
lightly
armed
,
and
without
incombrance
of
luggage
,
so
as
by
this
meanes
he
more
easily
assembleth
his
troups
,
ordreth
them
,
and
conducteth
them
wheresoeuer
he
pleaseth
,
without
distinction
of
time
.
Againe
,
sobrietie
and
sparing
(
familiar
among
his
souldiers
)
make
much
to
the
aduancement
of
his
enterprises
,
contenting
themselues
,
as
they
do
to
drinke
water
and
eat
rice
and
salted
flesh
,
which
they
reduce
into
powder
,
so
as
euery
one
carrieth
with
him
his
prouision
almost
for
a
moneth
,
and
when
that
faileth
,
they
liue
by
the
bloud
of
their
horses
,
which
they
salt
themselues
,
like
as
doe
the
Muscouites
and
Tartars
.
5
On
the
other
side
,
when
our
souldiers
march
,
they
must
haue
such
store
of
munition
follow
them
,
to
their
so
strange
confusion
and
hinderance
,
as
they
are
neuer
able
to
goe
thorow
speedily
with
any
notable
attempt
.
This
bringeth
a
twofold
let
to
their
enterprises
.
The
first
in
their
prouision
,
which
in
the
vnmeasurablenesse
thereof
is
neuer
made
in
due
time
.
The
second
,
in
the
conuoy
thereof
,
neuer
so
well
ordered
as
it
ought
,
whereof
the
euent
of
the
enterprise
of
Exechium
,
is
but
too
true
a
testimonie
,
the
souldiers
then
suffering
more
in
regard
of
the
famine
and
difficultie
of
conueying
victuals
vnto
them
,
Emanuel
Philibert
Duke
of
Sauoy
,
deceassed
,
was
Generall
of
the
armie
in
Flanders
,
he
found
no
difficultie
in
the
wars
more
important
then
the
discommoditie
of
proportioning
and
carriage
of
necessarie
prouision
as
he
had
oftentimes
approoued
.
On
the
contrarie
,
it
may
be
said
to
the
Christians
shame
and
confusion
,
that
neuer
any
of
the
Turkish
armies
were
knowen
,
through
such
default
,
to
suffer
extreamitie
or
to
be
disordered
.
6
Let
vs
now
come
to
the
point
of
sodaine
execution
,
and
to
the
instruments
thereof
,
and
let
vs
dwell
somewhat
thereupon
.
I
finde
the
most
necessarie
and
profitable
is
to
haue
alwaies
store
of
money
in
our
coffers
:
and
that
is
a
hard
matter
,
especially
for
such
as
are
not
prouident
,
and
that
in
all
things
so
pamper
themselues
as
the
Christians
doe
;
but
not
for
the
Turke
,
for
he
hath
(
when
and
what
he
will
)
in
store
to
serue
his
need
for
the
warres
,
and
for
whatsoeuer
belongeth
thereto
.
This
is
the
sinew
of
warre
,
and
the
onely
meanes
to
hasten
forward
occasion
,
and
attaine
(
as
he
doth
)
to
a
happie
end
of
his
enterprises
,
but
at
his
returne
home
,
he
obserueth
a
barbarous
and
insolent
course
of
remboursing
his
charge
:
After
he
hath
performed
what
he
vndertooke
,
he
repaieth
himselfe
by
new
impositions
,
whereto
he
enforceth
his
subiects
to
contribute
:
This
to
him
is
easie
:
but
to
vs
the
most
difficult
materiall
point
is
the
procuring
of
money
:
for
the
greater
part
of
Christian
Princes
are
so
bad
husbands
and
of
so
small
forecaste
,
that
they
haue
scarce
one
crosse
in
store
:
and
are
alwaies
at
the
borrowing
hand
,
or
enforced
to
pawne
their
lands
and
demaines
.
And
though
the
Christians
be
not
so
couetous
as
the
Turkes
,
yet
they
are
of
so
good
a
hold
fast
,
as
no
small
time
will
serue
to
draw
money
from
them
,
so
as
while
that
is
doing
,
occasion
hath
alreadie
turned
her
backe
and
left
vs
nought
,
but
the
shame
and
sorrow
of
our
enterprises
ill
successe
and
effect
.
And
if
it
chance
that
we
hold
on
our
courses
,
it
is
with
such
headlong
rashnesse
and
ill
aduice
in
all
we
doe
,
but
particularly
in
prouiding
of
armes
,
horse
,
munition
,
and
other
necessaries
,
as
all
being
performed
out
of
season
,
there
is
neither
the
forwardnesse
,
the
array
,
the
election
,
the
aboundance
,
the
resolution
,
nor
the
well
disposing
of
matters
which
would
otherwise
haue
beene
,
and
which
we
see
to
be
in
our
aduersaries
.
7
There
is
another
thing
which
addeth
much
assurance
to
the
Turkes
designes
,
and
makes
them
more
easily
to
execute
:
and
this
is
the
incredible
obedience
of
the
Captaines
towards
their
Generall
,
and
of
the
souldiours
towards
their
Captaines
and
such
is
the
loue
amongst
them
as
there
is
no
danger
or
difficulty
(
be
it
neuer
so
great
)
which
they
will
not
easily
ouercome
,
so
willingly
they
performe
what
is
inioyned
them
.
It
was
neuer
heard
that
any
reuolt
or
mutiny
stopt
or
slacked
the
course
of
their
conquest
.
8
They
haue
yet
another
most
considerable
aduantage
and
that
is
the
strong
constitution
of
their
men
,
spirit
and
speed
of
their
horse
.
Where
on
the
contrary
our
forces
dare
scarce
bouge
vnlesse
they
be
backed
and
strengthned
by
forrain
succors
either
Almines
or
Switzers
,
people
faint
and
of
little
courage
vpon
a
sodaine
and
vnexpected
action
,
as
being
framed
of
a
dull
and
slow
mettall
seruing
for
nought
but
to
make
good
the
intire
body
of
a
battaile
,
and
be
vnto
it
as
a
solide
and
vnmoueable
rampart
.
9
There
are
so
many
examples
of
this
aduantageous
celerity
in
their
actions
as
they
are
almost
innumerable
;
but
I
will
only
note
two
or
three
which
may
seeme
in
a
manner
prodigious
so
admirable
hath
beene
their
successe
.
Amurath
the
second
hauing
intelligence
of
the
great
forces
leauied
by
Ladislaus
King
of
Hungary
(
with
whom
he
had
formerly
concluded
a
peace
)
with
an
intent
to
ouerrunne
him
,
Scheder
Bassa
imploied
by
Baiazet
the
second
to
diuert
the
attempt
of
the
Venetians
vpon
Milan
,
10
This
particular
dilligence
of
the
Ottomans
is
not
to
be
limited
all
only
with
their
land
wars
:
they
haue
performed
as
much
by
sea
,
so
vigilant
and
wary
haue
they
shewed
themselues
in
exalting
the
honour
of
their
names
,
and
of
their
great
estate
,
by
them
maintained
euen
vnto
this
day
:
And
since
they
are
so
incredibly
nimble
and
aduised
in
maritine
exploits
,
I
hold
it
not
from
the
purpose
to
touch
briefly
the
order
they
obserue
in
assembling
their
forces
.
They
reiect
the
vessels
and
ships
of
great
burden
as
ouer-heauy
and
vnwealdy
if
the
wind
faile
them
,
rather
hindering
then
furthering
him
that
conducteth
them
.
Their
Gallies
and
Galliots
are
speedy
,
well
manned
and
well
appointed
.
11
Wee
on
the
contrary
drag
with
vs
a
great
number
of
ships
and
Gallions
as
our
best
strength
and
choice
prouision
,
but
they
are
in
proofe
the
cause
of
such
incombrance
to
the
seruice
in
hand
,
as
we
for
the
most
part
waste
the
season
vnprofitably
and
spend
our
opertunities
in
rigging
and
attending
them
;
being
also
oft
times
enforced
to
disorder
our
Gallies
,
to
the
end
these
great
cartes
may
keepe
with
vs
.
Hence
groweth
yet
another
discommodity
,
and
that
is
,
that
hauing
placed
a
kinde
of
hope
in
our
ships
,
we
in
forgoing
them
,
finde
our selues
too
weake
and
failing
of
courage
to
assaile
the
enemy
;
who
is
not
to
be
forced
to
fight
but
when
he
please
,
Don
Iohn
(
who
aboade
still
at
Missina
,
because
of
the
then
beginning
troubles
of
Flanders
)
the
army
of
the
Turk
being
then
commanded
by
Oechially
,
In
regarde
he
had
gotten
the
aduantage
of
them
they
bearing
but
their
mizen
sailes
,
and
knowing
how
dangerous
it
was
for
them
being
ignorant
of
his
designes
,
to
breake
company
:
eight
daies
after
we
comming
neere
together
there
followed
some
light
skirmishes
,
but
so
soone
as
they
perceiued
vs
to
faint
,
as
being
depriued
of
our
ships
,
they
charged
vs
with
the
whole
army
,
in
like
sort
as
when
we
had
them
for
succour
they
retired
.
So
as
it
was
then
found
by
experience
that
the
great
ships
serued
but
to
keepe
vs
from
buckling
with
the
enemy
.
I
haue
made
mention
of
this
incountre
in
my
commentaries
of
the
notable
occurrants
of
these
times
written
in
Latine
,
and
somewhat
more
at
large
then
I
heere
deliuer
,
for
I
was
present
in
the
army
during
all
that
voiage
,
vnder
the
command
of
the
Duke
de
Mayne
.
CHAP.
XIII
.
That
he
hath
gone
himselfe
in
person
to
the
war
.
-
1
A
question
concerning
the
Princes
presence
in
the
wars
:
-
2
The
first
commodity
is
,
if
the
Prince
be
there
in
person
,
it
ads
courage
to
the
souldiour
.
-
3
The
second
is
,
it
causeth
plenty
of
all
things
in
his
army
.
-
4
The
third
,
it
increaseth
the
army
.
-
5
The
fourth
,
it
worketh
facility
and
speede
in
aduice
and
execution
.
-
6
Of
the
power
of
Lieutenant
Generalls
in
the
wars
.
-
7
The
fift
commodity
,
is
the
Princes
authority
and
dignity
.
-
8
The
first
discommodity
growing
from
the
princes
presence
,
is
,
that
thereby
the
enemy
proceedes
more
prouidently
.
-
9
The
second
,
that
his
Commanders
vse
lesse
diligence
in
discharge
of
their
places
.
-
10
The
third
,
is
emulation
of
the
leaders
,
whence
groweth
contention
.
-
11
The
fourth
,
the
emulation
of
the
Lieutenant
generall
toward
the
Prince
.
-
12
Examples
to
this
purpose
pro
and
contra
.
-
13
The
preposition
defined
by
distinction
.
-
14
The
Ottomans
wars
in
their
persons
haue
succeeded
well
.
-
15
Exhortation
to
Christian
princes
to
vndertake
wars
against
the
Turke
.
1
WHether
the
prince
should
in
person
goe
to
the
war
,
or
else
send
his
Lieutenant
,
is
a
question
often
disputed
with
such
reasons
and
earnestnesse
by
sundry
graue
personages
,
as
whatsoeuer
may
be
now
deliuered
to
that
purpose
would
proue
but
an
vnprofitable
repetition
of
what
hath
bene
formerly
digested
by
so
many
rare
spirits
.
This
then
excusing
me
,
I
will
referre
the
deciding
thereof
to
men
of
more
experience
then
my selfe
;
yet
will
I
not
forbeare
by
way
of
discourse
to
deliuer
my
opinion
;
and
cite
such
examples
as
may
helpe
for
the
clearing
of
these
doubts
.
First
then
we
are
to
recken
the
commodities
the
Kings
presence
affoordeth
in
his
armie
,
and
so
in
order
of
the
other
consequences
.
2
Whereof
one
of
the
principall
is
,
that
it
putteth
spirit
and
courage
into
the
souldiers
,
it
so
neerely
presseth
them
as
they
must
of
force
,
as
it
were
,
make
their
valour
appeare
,
especially
when
they
ioine
battell
where
the
Maiestie
and
life
of
the
Prince
,
yea
and
their
owne
too
is
in
hazard
.
Then
is
it
that
the
honest
desire
of
preseruing
their
masters
life
groweth
feruent
in
them
,
and
so
much
the
more
by
how
much
it
is
farre
more
pretious
then
the
life
of
a
captaine
or
generall
,
either
mercenary
or
subiect
which
the
Prince
might
haue
sent
to
command
them
.
This
occasion
more
then
any
other
moueth
them
more
freely
to
hazard
their
liues
and
meanes
for
their
Princes
seruice
,
which
they
would
not
so
couragiously
performe
vnder
any
other
that
should
command
in
his
stead
.
They
likewise
expect
greater
and
more
assured
rewards
from
him
then
from
others
.
3
Againe
,
the
king
is
alwaies
better
followed
;
he
is
attended
on
with
the
consequence
of
farre
greater
prouisions
either
of
victuals
,
munition
,
money
,
or
whatsoeuer
may
be
necessary
for
the
enterprise
,
than
his
lieutenant
,
who
hath
his
power
limited
,
his
allowance
stinted
,
and
cannot
dispose
but
in
part
of
the
credit
and
authority
of
his
master
,
to
whom
he
remaineth
as
countable
.
Moreouer
,
the
subiect
fixeth
his
eies
and
affection
vpon
his
Prince
,
and
lauisheth
his
life
and
meanes
according
as
the
businesse
is
,
Odet
de
Lautrey
his
lieutenant
generall
,
lost
the
Duchy
of
Millan
for
lacke
of
three
hundred
thousand
crownes
that
were
assigned
him
for
his
charges
,
but
were
neuer
deliuered
him
.
Whereupon
the
Switzers
failing
of
their
entertainment
(
whom
he
had
till
then
fed
with
hopes
of
pay
)
he
was
constrained
to
fight
with
such
disaduantage
as
hee
miscaried
,
4
Moreouer
the
great
train
of
Nobility
and
men
of
quality
that
the
Prince
bringeth
with
him
is
a
strengthening
to
his
army
,
and
addeth
to
it
life
and
beauty
,
euery
man
striuing
to
appeare
more
gallant
then
other
;
which
they
would
not
vouchsafe
to
doe
nor
to
subiect
themselues
,
commanded
but
by
an
ordinary
Generall
;
for
there
are
alwaies
about
the
King
,
by
election
or
necessity
,
many
great
personages
equall
in
power
and
dignity
,
and
some
differing
too
in
rancke
and
charge
,
either
as
being
Princes
of
the
bloud
,
or
for
honor
and
authority
woon
by
desert
,
al
which
would
perhaps
doe
little
for
the
Generall
,
but
would
most
willingly
obey
and
expose
all
for
their
King
and
master
to
whom
they
owe
a
duty
both
of
nature
and
benefit
.
These
great
mens
followers
serue
also
to
increase
the
army
.
5
Beside
these
considerations
the
King
bringeth
euermore
with
him
a
resolution
of
his
enterprises
,
wherein
a
Generall
most
commonly
proceedeth
with
a
restraint
and
aduise
,
as
fearing
in
his
too
forward
attempting
,
to
exceed
his
commission
.
In
the
meane
while
,
time
passeth
,
and
occasion
escapeth
,
most
often
to
the
Princes
hinderance
and
blot
to
his
reputation
.
6
In
this
regard
if
the
wisedome
and
loyalty
of
the
Captaine
be
approued
,
Princes
ought
not
too
strictly
to
limit
their
charges
:
but
if
they
doubt
of
them
,
it
is
indiscretion
to
put
them
into
their
hands
,
as
we
may
see
by
these
examples
.
Don
Emanuel
King
of
Portugal
hauing
sent
the
Duke
of
Braganza
General
into
Africke
,
he
fortunately
wan
and
made
sure
for
his
Prince
the
towne
of
Aza
Azamor
:
but
that
performed
hee
would
not
take
Marocco
(
as
at
that
time
he
might
haue
easily
done
)
though
he
were
counselled
thereto
by
the
wisest
and
greatest
of
his
army
,
because
that
(
said
he
)
it
went
beyond
his
Commission
:
Lopez
Zoares
Generall
for
the
same
King
lost
in
like
manner
the
opportunity
to
take
the
city
of
Aden
,
of
especiall
importance
for
the
affaires
of
his
master
(
for
it
standeth
iust
in
the
mouth
of
the
Red
sea
)
though
the
inhabitants
would
haue
deliuered
him
the
keies
.
Insomuch
as
hee
should
haue
taken
vpon
him
(
as
he
said
)
more
then
his
commission
allowed
him
.
The
thing
was
of
that
consequence
as
hee
might
well
haue
forborne
the
obseruation
of
his
fast
,
to
swallow
such
a
morsell
.
Neither
had
the
seruice
beene
one
of
the
least
,
he
could
haue
performed
for
his
master
.
7
In
conclusion
we
are
to
grant
that
the
presence
of
the
king
bringeth
with
it
a
certaine
greatnesse
,
and
more
aweth
the
enimy
then
his
Lieutenant
;
as
it
was
seene
at
the
enterprise
of
Tunise
;
for
Barbarossa
sharply
tooke
vp
and
reproued
those
who
said
that
the
Emperour
Charles
the
fift
was
himselfe
in
person
in
the
Christian
army
,
inferring
heereby
that
he
should
then
haue
his
hands
fuller
then
he
made
account
,
and
that
nothing
could
be
lacking
in
the
enemies
campe
,
when
their
Prince
was
there
present
.
This
is
that
may
be
saide
of
the
good
redoundeth
from
the
presence
of
the
king
in
his
army
.
Let
vs
now
see
what
may
be
alledged
on
the
contrary
.
8
First
it
may
be
said
that
the
King
which
goeth
to
the
wars
in
person
ministreth
greater
occasion
then
he
would
to
his
enemy
to
prouide
himselfe
of
forces
,
meanes
and
friendes
:
and
affordeth
him
matter
also
of
pretending
a
more
glorious
victory
,
with
the
hopes
whereof
and
of
rich
spoiles
,
he
putteth
courage
in
his
men
,
disposing
them
to
attempt
valiantly
all
things
be
they
neuer
so
hazardous
,
so
hartning
them
to
fight
.
9
It
may
be
said
likewise
that
the
presence
of
the
King
maketh
his
Captaines
lesse
heedefull
and
diligent
at
all
occurrants
and
aduantages
,
because
they
in
part
relie
vpon
the
vigilant
eye
of
the
Prince
,
who
is
to
carry
away
the
whole
honour
of
the
enterprise
,
their
valour
remaining
as
dimmed
and
eclipsed
.
This
hapned
at
the
battaile
of
Pauie
.
10
Againe
an
army
where
the
King
is
in
person
,
is
alwaies
replenished
with
Princes
and
great
personages
,
all
which
promising
themselues
great
matters
,
seeke
not
but
to
excel
one
another
in
place
and
command
,
whence
grow
among
them
iealosies
,
enuies
,
and
sundry
differences
breeding
infinite
disorders
,
to
the
ouerthrow
or
hinderance
of
their
Masters
affaires
.
Who
is
not
without
his
part
of
feare
to
discontent
some
in
contenting
others
?
This
plague
of
ambition
,
is
such
as
it
will
sometimes
so
wrest
the
consciences
and
honours
of
these
great
men
,
as
they
will
not
sticke
to
hinder
the
seruice
of
their
Masters
only
to
oppose
the
fortune
and
woorth
of
such
a
one
,
as
they
see
out-strippeth
them
in
preferment
;
yea
oft
times
their
ambition
groweth
so
extreame
,
as
for
despitethey
wil
vtterly
forsake
their
Princes
seruice
:
Their
vertue
and
valour
being
perhaps
in
the
meane
time
not
of
the
meanest
,
and
such
as
if
it
were
well
imploied
would
gaine
honour
and
victory
to
the
army
.
11
There
is
yet
another
discommodity
,
and
that
is
,
that
the
king
carying
with
him
the
party
,
whom
in
his
absence
he
intendeth
to
constitute
his
Lieutenant
,
he
in
the
mean
time
repineth
at
his
Masters
worthy
exploites
,
considering
how
the
honour
should
haue
beene
his
,
if
alone
he
had
the
managing
of
the
army
;
againe
,
knowing
that
all
such
misfortunes
or
discomfitures
,
as
may
befall
,
it
shall
be
attributed
to
the
insufficiencie
of
the
Prince
,
and
not
to
him
,
he
the
lesse
regardeth
it
.
In
a
word
,
the
glory
we
pretend
,
and
the
iealousie
we
haue
of
our
particular
honors
,
are
two
especiall
powers
,
to
shake
and
curbe
generous
spirits
.
The
Emperour
Charles
the
fift
,
had
sufficient
triall
of
it
:
for
some
of
his
Captaines
and
Lieutenants
could
oft
times
with
small
store
of
money
,
and
few
men
,
gaine
triumphant
victories
,
as
well
at
Milan
and
Naples
as
else
where
,
which
perhaps
in
presence
of
the
Emperour
,
would
not
haue
beene
so
fortunately
atchieued
.
Notwithstanding
all
that
hath
beene
said
,
the
question
is
not
yet
fully
determined
,
rather
it
remaineth
diuersly
ballancing
to
and
fro
,
as
appeareth
by
these
and
the
following
examples
.
12
Charles
of
France
,
13
Marke
the
effects
of
successe
and
fortune
so
different
,
as
it
were
a
hard
matter
to
passe
a
sound
and
determined
iudgement
vpon
this
proposition
:
so
as
the
more
I
imagine
by
the
contrarietie
of
these
examples
to
inlighten
it
,
the
more
obscure
me
thinkes
I
make
it
;
the
finall
deciding
thereof
,
may
be
framed
thus
.
The
King
which
vndertaketh
the
conduct
of
an
armie
,
is
either
a
discreet
and
aduised
Captaine
,
or
else
he
is
altogither
vnskilled
in
the
mysterie
of
warre
.
In
this
last
case
I
should
thinke
that
it
were
most
for
his
good
,
to
relie
vpon
an
others
relation
and
execution
,
especially
if
priuie
to
his
owne
imperfections
,
he
want
a
dexteritie
to
make
the
best
vse
of
another
mans
valour
,
wisedome
and
counsaile
.
But
if
so
be
he
be
capable
of
the
gouernment
,
and
conduct
of
an
armie
,
and
that
he
haue
courage
to
execute
,
in
mine
opinion
he
cannot
doe
better
then
to
vndertake
the
warre
and
attempt
himselfe
in
person
:
for
if
in
all
militarie
vertues
he
equall
the
most
valiant
of
his
armie
,
he
will
surpasse
them
in
fortune
,
credit
,
and
authoritie
,
and
in
all
the
other
good
parts
aboue
mentioned
.
Kings
compounded
of
these
excellent
parts
,
alwaies
crowne
their
eminency
with
honourable
triumphes
.
Theodosius
the
Emperour
,
Charles
the
Great
,
and
sundrie
others
can
witnesse
this
sufficiently
;
Lewes
the
12.
of
France
,
hauing
beene
alwaies
conquerour
,
and
neuer
conquered
in
whatsoeuer
he
vndertooke
himselfe
in
person
,
was
put
besides
the
kingdome
of
Naples
,
by
means
of
a
battaile
which
his
captaines
lost
neere
the
riuer
of
Garillion
,
14
The
Turkish
Emperours
who
goe
themselues
to
the
wars
,
haue
tasted
the
sweetnesse
thereof
by
so
many
and
so
notable
victories
,
as
we
are
at
this
day
their
admirers
.
Selim
the
first
was
wont
to
say
that
battailes
gained
in
the
Princes
absence
were
not
to
be
tearmed
accomplished
victories
,
and
we
see
that
they
haue
scarce
euer
enterprised
ought
which
hath
not
taken
effect
in
the
ende
.
Yea
it
hath
beene
obserued
that
when
their
Captaines
haue
beene
ouerthrowne
,
if
they
themselues
went
afterward
in
person
,
they
alwaies
returned
victorious
.
Amurath
the
second
went
himselfe
after
Carambeius
generall
of
his
army
(
who
was
ouerthrowen
by
Ladislaus
King
of
Polonia
)
to
war
vpon
that
Prince
,
Mezat
Bassa
was
imploied
by
Mahomet
the
second
in
the
enterprise
of
Rhodes
,
which
he
shamefully
abandoned
;
but
Soliman
going
himselfe
in
person
,
caried
it
by
plaine
force
,
and
chased
thence
the
Knights
of
Saint
Iohn
of
Ierusalem
,
who
disquieted
his
estate
by
their
ordinary
excursions
in
the
Leuant
.
Calubeius
,
Baiazet
the
second
Commanders
:
Selim
the
first
after
personally
vndertaking
them
,
ouercame
them
,
and
wholy
rooted
out
both
them
and
their
Empire
.
Amurath
the
third
now
raigning
hath
been
so
many
times
beaten
by
Cudabenda
King
of
Persia
in
person
,
and
through
the
vnskilfulnesse
of
his
Commanders
,
that
a
man
may
well
say
that
neuer
any
of
the
race
of
the
Ottomans
receiued
so
notable
ouerthrowes
as
this
hath
:
Whereto
may
be
added
,
15
But
who
will
take
hold
of
such
aduantages
to
doe
good
vpon
him
,
seeing
the
greatest
Princes
of
Christendome
are
turmoiled
in
ciuill
wars
and
troubles
of
their
owne
estates
?
surely
none
:
Nay
rather
he
is
like
to
gather
strength
more
then
euer
,
which
he
would
not
so
easily
doe
,
if
he
were
to
incounter
the
Christians
well
appointed
,
resolute
and
in
a
readinesse
ioyntly
,
and
with
one
consent
to
make
their
benifit
of
so
goodly
an
occasion
.
CHAP.
XIIII
.
That
he
hath
euermore
gone
well
appointed
to
the
wars
.
-
1
That
our
deliberations
may
take
good
effect
,
we
must
proue
all
courses
,
but
vndertake
nothing
rashly
.
-
2
Rather
superfluous
then
but
necessary
prouision
is
to
be
made
of
what
belongeth
to
the
wars
.
-
3
Aduantages
of
errours
committed
in
military
prouision
.
-
4
The
wisdome
of
the
Romaines
and
Turkes
in
their
prouision
.
1
NOthing
can
be
imagined
more
contenting
the
spirit
then
the
happy
successe
of
that
euery
one
vndertaketh
answerable
to
his
condition
:
much
more
a
great
Prince
when
he
hath
resolued
vpon
anie
thing
,
espeically
the
war
,
is
not
to
forget
any
one
thing
of
what
soeuer
may
perfect
his
designe
,
which
he
ought
to
conceale
and
keepe
to
himselfe
all
he
may
.
We
haue
one
notable
example
hereof
yet
fresh
in
memory
,
and
that
is
of
the
Prince
of
Parma
Alexander
Farnese
,
who
for
a
time
had
the
managing
of
the
troubles
and
wars
in
Flanders
,
where
he
almost
neuer
attempted
any
thing
which
according
to
his
intent
,
he
did
not
performe
:
In
very
truth
his
actes
were
such
as
he
deserueth
to
be
reckoned
as
one
of
the
most
iudicious
,
wise
,
and
aduised
Princes
of
our
age
,
particularly
in
this
point
of
making
prouision
of
things
necessary
in
due
season
.
And
to
say
the
truth
,
who
soeuer
disposeth
his
affaires
,
is
euermore
attended
on
rather
by
shame
,
reproch
,
and
repentance
,
then
honour
,
glory
,
and
contentment
:
That
Prince
which
once
loseth
his
reputation
by
this
default
,
hardly
recouereth
it
,
but
remaineth
infamous
;
he
is
lesse
feared
of
his
neighbors
,
and
which
is
more
,
he
himselfe
entreth
into
a
certaine
ill
conceit
,
and
distrust
of
himselfe
,
which
in
such
sort
accompanieth
him
,
as
in
whatsoeuer
he
afterward
a
new
vndertaketh
,
he
resteth
vnassured
,
doubtfull
,
confounded
in
all
his
determinations
,
and
is
vncapable
of
constant
and
resolued
counsaile
,
carying
alwaies
the
repentance
of
his
former
fault
with
a
sorow
which
tormenteth
his
verie
soule
,
so
much
the
more
strangely
,
by
how
much
such
a
Prince
is
the
greater
,
or
is
well
conceited
of
himselfe
.
2
This
is
an
aduertisment
which
should
open
the
eies
of
all
such
not
to
vndertake
any
thing
but
what
is
well
digested
,
and
with
such
order
and
forecast
,
as
there
be
rather
abundance
then
necessity
:
for
when
the
prouision
is
small
and
that
it
neuer
so
little
miscary
,
it
depriueth
the
Prince
,
not
of
courage
but
of
confidence
and
aduice
,
of
whose
lacke
insueth
the
want
of
wherwithall
to
warrant
and
shelter
his
reputation
,
vnlesse
it
be
that
he
will
say
,
I
had
not
thought
,
words
most
dangerous
in
the
wars
where
he
can
erre
but
once
,
and
vnwoorthy
euer
to
proceede
out
of
the
mouth
of
one
wise
and
aduised
,
vnlesse
he
meane
that
the
misse
of
these
two
vertuous
partes
be
to
be
borne
withall
.
3
Prospero
Colonna
a
great
Captaine
proued
this
to
his
cost
at
such
time
as
he
vndertooke
to
assaile
Parma
without
cannon
or
other
munition
of
war
requisite
wherewith
to
take
such
to
taske
as
were
the
French
souldiours
then
in
the
towne
.
And
though
the
Captaine
be
wise
,
yet
if
the
armie
once
discouer
that
their
prouisions
faile
them
,
that
they
be
far
from
succours
,
farre
from
places
of
retrait
:
then
is
it
,
loe
that
they
become
astonished
,
that
feare
and
disobedience
seiseth
them
,
and
that
all
these
meete
in
one
,
make
a
foule
adoe
;
which
the
enemie
perceiuing
(
as
it
is
vnpossible
but
he
should
)
will
if
he
be
wise
,
make
his
benefite
of
our
necessitie
;
which
will
serue
him
as
a
rampart
and
bridge
at
his
pleasure
to
assaile
and
harme
vs
,
but
to
preserue
himselfe
safe
and
vntouched
:
It
is
that
the
Turkes
taught
our
men
at
Exechium
.
4
The
Romans
more
wary
,
neuer
fought
but
in
grosse
and
answerable
to
the
proportion
of
the
enterprise
,
their
armies
were
either
Pretorian
or
Consulary
:
the
Turke
hath
alwaies
sent
to
the
field
mighty
forces
,
and
aduantagioussy
furnished
;
neither
hath
he
euer
quitted
enterprise
for
lacke
of
men
,
munition
,
or
money
.
What
was
his
prouision
of
artillery
at
the
siege
of
Malta
,
but
in
a
manner
infinite
.
For
not
to
reckon
his
other
charge
,
he
there
discharged
threescore
thousand
cannon
shot
.
At
the
siege
of
Nice
,
where
the
French
were
,
Barbarossa
Generall
of
the
Turkish
armie
,
brought
such
store
of
artillerie
,
as
the
French
that
were
at
their
own
doores
had
lacke
of
powder
to
continue
their
portion
of
batterie
which
they
had
vndertaken
;
and
were
constrained
to
borrow
of
the
Turkes
,
to
whom
they
should
rather
haue
lent
;
since
the
enterprise
was
theirs
,
and
they
brought
the
other
thither
.
CHAP.
XV.
He
hath
neuer
fought
out
of
season
.
-
1
Especiall
wisdome
to
be
vsed
in
giuing
battaile
.
-
2
Errors
of
Charles
the
5.
and
other
Christian
Princes
in
their
Sea-fights
.
-
3
The
Turkes
wisedome
in
that
kinde
.
-
4
Sea
actions
vnseasonably
vndertaken
.
-
5
Aduantages
that
the
Turke
hath
in
such
cases
aboue
the
Christians
.
1
EVery
man
is
able
to
resolue
that
he
wil
fight
with
whatsoeuer
force
shall
present
it self
,
2
The
Emperour
Charles
the
fifth
might
make
vs
wise
,
since
hauing
obstinatly
vndertaken
the
seege
of
Metz
our
of
due
season
,
and
without
mature
aduice
;
he
was
constrained
to
rise
from
before
it
with
such
a
disorder
,
shame
,
and
losse
,
as
he
afterwards
hardly
thriued
;
Not
long
before
that
,
for
lacke
of
applying
himselfe
to
the
time
when
he
enterprised
vpon
Algiers
,
how
many
ships
and
men
lost
he
?
so
many
as
it
was
a
long
time
ere
hee
could
recouer
himselfe
,
learning
this
lesson
to
his
cost
,
That
earth
cannot
force
heauen
.
And
though
the
valour
and
policy
of
the
Turke
can
challenge
no
part
in
that
action
,
yet
can
he
make
vse
of
the
Christian
losses
to
his
aduantage
.
Now
if
tempests
and
inconstancy
of
weather
opposed
this
prince
both
at
Algiers
and
Metz
,
they
did
not
lesse
at
such
time
as
he
attempted
the
voiage
of
Tripoli
in
Barbary
:
for
the
contrariety
of
windes
made
him
waste
much
time
at
Saragossa
,
and
after
by
the
like
constraint
and
violence
,
as
much
at
Malta
,
during
which
time
the
most
part
of
his
souldiours
died
,
and
in
the
end
vtterly
despairing
to
reach
Tripoli
in
due
season
,
the
army
aboade
at
Gerbes
,
where
it
was
after
ouerthrowne
as
well
by
tempest
as
by
the
Turkes
,
who
knew
well
enough
how
to
aduantage
themselues
by
this
disorder
.
The
first
yeere
of
the
war
of
Cypres
,
the
armies
of
the
Pope
and
of
the
Venetians
incountred
notable
losses
by
tempest
of
sea
,
euen
in
the
mouthes
of
their
own
hauens
,
and
all
for
too
late
assembling
themselues
.
3
The
Turke
neuer
fought
,
especially
by
sea
,
but
when
the
season
and
opportunity
would
permit
him
.
4
Some
one
that
may
perhaps
long
to
ouerthrow
this
position
will
alledge
that
the
Princes
of
Christendome
haue
neuerthelesse
in
the
winter
attempted
voiages
by
sea
.
It
may
be
,
but
I
should
thinke
it
was
either
in
regard
of
the
hope
they
had
,
not
to
incounter
the
Turke
as
they
might
,
in
the
sommer
,
then
for
any
assurance
they
had
or
might
haue
in
the
well-speeding
of
a
voiage
inconsiderately
attemted
.
5
In
breefe
,
if
we
must
aduenture
beyond
reason
,
it
were
better
we
did
it
fighting
against
the
Turkes
,
then
against
the
windes
,
with
the
Moores
then
with
stormes
and
shipwrackes
.
To
say
the
very
truth
,
our
Princes
of
Christendome
haue
their
forces
and
estates
so
far
separated
one
from
the
other
,
that
before
we
can
reduce
them
to
one
consent
and
body
;
time
and
opportunities
are
fled
.
But
the
Turke
hath
his
powers
so
limited
and
ranged
,
not
depending
but
of
one
only
head
,
as
he
is
alwaies
in
a
readines
to
repell
all
assaults
almost
before
the
threatning
of
them
can
be
with
him
.
In
conclusion
,
if
all
these
reasons
suffice
not
to
cleare
the
proposition
,
yet
should
they
teach
vs
at
the
least
to
proue
wise
,
resolute
&
aduised
hence
forward
not
to
enterprise
ought
so
out
of
season
,
as
that
we
should
be
driuen
to
fight
with
time
rather
then
men
;
they
should
teach
vs
to
gaine
rather
then
to
lose
occasions
;
to
abound
rather
then
want
;
to
seeke
to
be
honoured
and
to
thriue
rather
then
to
receiue
dishonour
and
losse
:
but
the
maine
point
in
all
is
to
haue
God
on
our
side
as
our
chiefe
strength
and
most
assured
conductor
.
CHAP.
XVI
.
That
he
hath
neuer
diuided
his
forces
.
-
1
Wisdome
of
the
Turkes
in
vndertaking
one
,
not
many
wars
at
once
.
-
2
Diuision
of
forces
dangerous
.
-
3
Those
few
good
Commanders
that
are
found
in
a
confused
multitude
are
not
to
be
farre
separated
.
-
4
The
ouerthrow
of
one
army
may
breed
terror
in
the
rest
.
-
5
Prouision
cannot
be
made
at
once
for
many
expeditions
.
1
SVch
hath
beene
the
wisdome
and
foresight
of
the
Ottomans
,
as
they
haue
neuer
almost
had
to
do
with
two
enemies
at
once
.
Contrariwise
they
haue
so
well
ordered
their
enterprises
as
the
finishing
of
one
hath
drawen
on
the
beginning
of
an
other
;
but
when
they
forsooke
this
beaten
and
sure
way
,
2
But
me
thinkes
this
proposition
,
whereby
I
maintaine
that
it
is
not
good
at
once
to
set
a
foote
diuers
enterprises
,
may
be
thus
impugned
.
That
the
successe
of
the
Turkes
death
,
and
the
commotion
it
wrought
amongst
his
people
,
was
cause
that
those
armies
miscaried
,
and
not
the
separation
of
them
and
their
enterprises
.
I
confesse
as
I
ought
,
that
whatsoeuer
betideth
vs
,
necessarily
hapneth
by
way
of
a
first
or
exciting
cause
.
But
to
come
to
the
ground
of
our
principall
matter
;
without
farther
subti●●tsing
this
discourse
,
it
is
easily
seene
how
hard
it
is
for
a
prince
to
prouide
sufficiently
at
one
time
for
sundry
enterprises
,
at
the
least
vpon
a
sound
foundation
thereby
to
reape
honorable
fruites
:
since
all
diuision
of
forces
bringeth
with
it
a
debility
,
and
becommeth
rather
a
subiect
of
iniurie
then
to
be
able
to
iniure
others
,
to
be
beaten
then
to
beat
,
to
be
others
pray
rather
then
to
pray
vpon
others
:
for
as
a
body
diuided
by
parcells
is
not
of
that
weight
taking
it
seuerally
,
as
when
it
is
reduced
to
the
first
vnitie
:
In
like
sort
the
forces
of
a
prince
,
when
they
are
diuided
and
disunited
haue
not
that
vertue
and
subsistance
as
they
would
haue
in
their
vnitie
and
well-ordered
consunction
:
for
proofe
,
who
considereth
that
Mahomet
had
three
hundred
thousand
men
,
will
say
that
the
vnitie
of
such
force
was
inuincible
;
but
diuided
it
proued
not
so
(
though
indeed
each
of
these
powers
by
it self
(
at
the
least
in
regard
of
the
Christians
)
was
a
most
mightie
army
,
had
it
had
proportion
squared
to
what
it
would
attempt
)
and
if
this
masse
of
300000.
souldiours
had
marched
in
one
intire
body
it
had
beene
easie
for
them
to
haue
attained
their
purpose
,
one
seconding
another
as
he
might
haue
done
with
that
of
Rhodes
,
Patros
,
and
Ottranto
,
which
he
had
in
this
case
vndoubtedly
conquered
.
3
An
other
reason
may
be
yet
alledged
,
and
that
is
,
that
it
is
hard
to
finde
such
Captaines
as
are
fit
for
the
conduct
of
armies
;
that
in
these
great
assemblies
of
forces
there
are
few
resolute
souldiours
;
and
that
they
which
are
such
being
once
by
their
diuision
(
as
a
man
may
say
)
diminished
,
it
is
a
kinde
of
gelding
the
army
of
those
which
may
serue
by
their
example
to
assure
and
incourage
the
other
confused
multitude
.
4
Moreouer
when
we
vndertake
three
enterprises
at
once
(
as
Mahomet
,
who
serueth
to
this
purpose
did
)
if
it
happen
but
one
of
them
to
faile
,
the
newes
of
their
misaduenture
,
maketh
the
rest
(
vndoubtedly
depending
the
one
vpon
the
other
)
to
faile
of
resolution
.
5
Again
,
as
we
haue
before
deliuered
,
it
is
necessary
that
the
war
be
vndertaken
in
grosse
,
and
that
assay
be
made
of
our
forces
as
soone
as
may
be
,
that
we
may
not
be
driuen
long
to
entertaine
a
great
army
(
which
for
delay
of
execution
doth
oft
times
disband
,
breake
vp
and
ouerthrow
it selfe
with
it selfe
,
but
especially
with
answerable
prouisions
the
better
to
inioy
great
happinesse
with
smal
charge
;
which
will
neuer
befall
him
that
diuideth
his
forces
and
at
once
attempteth
in
diuers
places
.
We
will
then
conclude
that
the
Ottomans
for
the
most
part
haue
not
had
but
one
enterprise
in
hand
at
once
,
and
that
to
atchieue
it
they
haue
so
well
prouided
for
it
,
as
the
victory
hath
remained
on
their
side
.
CHAP.
XVII
.
That
he
hath
not
long
held
warre
with
one
alone
.
-
1
Why
the
Turkes
haue
not
continued
war
with
one
alone
.
-
2
A
long
war
addeth
courage
and
experience
to
the
enemy
.
-
3
It
moueth
neighbours
out
of
the
feare
of
their
owne
like
misery
to
aide
the
oppressed
.
-
4
The
Turkes
manuer
of
shifting
his
wars
,
and
making
peace
at
his
pleasure
.
1
WHat
more
assured
testimony
can
wee
haue
of
a
continued
wisdome
,
or
to
say
better
of
a
well
caried
subtilty
amongst
the
Ottomans
,
then
in
that
they
haue
alwaies
come
off
well
in
concluding
their
wars
,
2
The
first
is
the
feare
they
haue
euer
had
lest
they
might
make
good
souldiours
of
those
against
whom
they
should
wilfully
maintaine
a
lingering
war
.
A
thing
ill
practised
by
the
Spaniards
in
Flanders
and
the
low-countries
;
for
continuing
war
many
yeres
together
against
them
,
they
haue
acquainted
that
people
(
before
soft
and
effeminate
)
with
the
fearfull
clashe
of
their
armes
,
they
haue
so
encouraged
and
imboldened
them
,
as
at
this
day
there
are
few
nations
more
industrious
about
their
fortifications
,
or
more
resolute
in
the
field
.
3
The
other
occasion
which
hath
withheld
the
Turke
from
making
war
long
time
together
vpon
one
people
,
is
,
in
mine
opinion
the
feare
he
hath
to
incite
their
neighbour
Princes
to
take
armes
against
him
.
For
if
the
compassion
&
fire
which
burneth
our
neighbours
house
doc
not
mooue
vs
,
the
feare
of
the
like
to
light
on
vs
will
make
vs
bestirre
our selues
.
4
The
Turke
then
following
these
steps
one
while
assaileth
the
Venetians
,
despoiling
them
now
of
a
Prouince
,
then
of
a
good
towne
or
place
of
strength
.
And
hauing
there
made
vp
his
mouth
he
praieth
next
vpon
the
Hungarians
,
doubting
lest
he
might
pull
vpon
his
necke
a
generall
league
of
the
other
of
Italy
.
He
euermore
pretendeth
in
shew
that
hee
will
attempt
no
further
:
rather
that
hee
meaneth
to
plant
the
vtmost
of
his
limits
at
the
place
by
him
last
conquered
:
In
the
meane
time
he
forgetteth
not
to
be
watchfull
where
he
may
sease
himselfe
of
some
other
place
of
more
importance
,
more
easily
to
incroch
vpon
vs
.
After
he
hath
gotten
from
the
Hungarians
some
peece
of
their
country
,
he
retireth
himselfe
before
their
neighbours
be
assembled
,
or
that
they
haue
meanes
couragiously
to
reuenge
themselues
of
their
iniuries
.
In
conclusion
he
so
well
behaueth
himselfe
as
he
hath
neuer
suffered
vs
to
fasten
vpon
him
whatsoeuer
wars
he
hath
made
vpon
vs
,
and
he
hath
alwaies
so
timely
made
his
retraite
,
as
he
hath
not
enforced
the
neighbours
of
the
country
assailed
to
ioyne
and
be
in
league
together
;
he
in
the
meane
time
resting
vpon
his
aduantages
of
hauing
a
great
number
of
souldiours
well
trained
and
entertained
in
continuall
wars
whereby
they
become
more
experienced
in
all
occurrents
,
then
ours
;
by
these
meanes
attaining
to
the
triumphes
of
so
many
crownes
and
estates
.
The
end
of
the
first
booke
.
THE
SECOND
BOOKE
.
CHAP.
I.
Of
Religion
.
-
1
Religion
the
principall
bridle
of
the
subiects
.
-
2
Excellencie
of
the
Christian
religion
.
-
3
The
vainnesse
and
abhomination
of
the
Mahometan
religion
.
-
4
Disputation
of
religion
forbidden
amongst
the
Turkes
.
-
5
The
great
Turkes
example
is
a
confirmation
of
his
religion
.
-
6
So
are
the
calamities
of
the
Christians
,
and
of
others
different
from
them
in
opinions
.
IN
like
sort
as
by
the
disposing
of
what
hath
beene
before
handled
we
haue
made
it
apparent
by
what
wayes
&
meanes
the
Turke
is
become
great
;
so
are
we
now
to
deliuer
the
manner
how
he
holdeth
,
and
maintaineth
what
he
hath
already
gotten
.
1
All
such
as
haue
gone
about
to
lay
the
foundation
of
souerantie
haue
begun
with
religion
,
as
that
wherof
princes
must
necessarily
make
vse
,
to
containe
their
people
in
obedience
and
worship
of
one
God
true
or
false
;
if
this
were
not
,
it
were
impossible
they
should
acknowledge
one
Soueraigne
in
earth
▪
were
they
without
the
feare
&
knowledge
of
one
Supreame
in
heauen
:
We
might
alleage
ancient
histories
whereby
it
would
appeare
that
all
such
as
haue
gone
about
the
establishment
of
a
monarchy
,
haue
had
an
especiall
care
to
grounde
it
on
the
pretence
of
religion
,
by
whose
mysterie
and
ceremonies
they
helde
in
those
whom
they
sought
to
range
to
their
lawes
,
by
this
scruple
making
them
more
tractable
and
pliant
to
receiue
instruction
;
Numa
Pompilius
,
Lycurgus
,
Sertorius
,
and
others
are
sufficient
proofes
,
whose
credit
grew
from
the
communication
they
gaue
out
they
had
with
som
Diuinity
;
others
that
could
not
hit
of
the
way
to
frame
a
new
religion
fortified
themselues
neuerthelesse
with
a
pretence
of
it
,
in
reforming
the
old
,
as
did
not
long
since
Ismael
King
of
Persia
and
his
Coosine
Harduellas
,
who
performed
great
matters
in
the
partes
of
Asia
by
introducing
a
new
superstition
of
religion
.
2
But
to
the
purpose
,
we
must
auow
that
as
there
is
no
religion
more
true
,
so
is
there
none
more
fauorable
to
Princes
then
the
Christian
,
for
the
quiet
and
preseruation
of
their
estate
and
minde
.
In
somuch
as
this
by
way
of
conscience
subiecteth
to
the
king
&
all
other
superiours
(
howsoeuer
peruerse
and
vitious
)
the
heart
,
the
person
,
&
goods
of
the
subiect
;
what
greater
reason
or
instrument
of
state
can
we
meete
with
then
that
which
bringeth
the
people
vnder
a
full
and
perfect
obedience
?
If
our
Sauiour
Christ
submitted
himselfe
to
the
law
of
the
Emperour
and
paid
taxe
and
custom
for
himselfe
and
Saint
Peter
,
who
will
doubt
that
his
disciples
are
not
to
doe
the
like
as
true
obseruers
of
his
precepts
?
I
remember
a
discourse
written
by
the
Iesuites
of
a
certaine
Prince
of
a
country
newly
dscouered
in
India
,
who
as
one
very
politicke
and
wise
perceiming
the
simplicity
and
purity
of
the
Christian
doctrine
,
though
himselfe
were
an
Idolater
,
permitted
that
his
subiects
should
be
baptized
,
cathechized
and
instructed
in
our
faith
;
and
was
present
at
their
baptisme
;
furthering
to
his
power
all
the
actions
of
the
Iesuites
;
because
(
said
he
)
I
am
assured
if
these
men
obserue
their
law
as
they
are
bound
,
they
will
faile
neither
of
loialty
nor
obedience
,
and
will
pay
me
my
tributes
and
reuenues
without
fraude
or
contradiction
.
3
Let
vs
now
enter
into
the
principall
matter
of
the
subiect
which
we
haue
vndertaken
to
handle
.
The
law
of
Mahomet
is
full
fraught
with
fables
and
grosse
absurdities
,
and
so
far
from
reason
to
maintaine
them
,
as
it
would
be
an
easie
matter
by
way
of
some
holy
manifestation
of
their
errors
to
alter
the
estate
&
gouernment
of
the
Turkish
Empire
.
What
more
strange
impertinency
can
there
be
then
that
of
their
Alcaron
?
It
is
impossible
to
deuise
more
absurdities
,
dreames
and
cousenings
,
then
those
their
law
giuer
Mahomet
hath
introduced
:
but
he
perceiuing
well
enough
that
the
foundation
of
his
falfe
doctrine
was
such
as
it
would
be
easie
to
ouerthrow
it
;
knew
cunningly
how
manie
ways
to
remedie
it
.
First
he
framed
all
the
precepts
of
his
law
according
to
naturall
sense
,
and
made
them
sutable
to
the
course
of
things
base
and
earthly
,
therby
to
make
their
obseruation
so
much
the
more
pleasing
and
easie
to
be
admitted
and
maintained
,
as
being
founded
vpon
the
pleasures
of
the
flesh
and
the
world
;
he
could
neuer
better
charm
the
reason
and
lull
asleepe
the
spirite
of
that
dull
and
wholly
illiterate
nation
,
then
to
tie
them
to
the
performance
of
a
law
altogether
sensuall
.
4
The
other
meanes
he
held
to
make
his
law
lasting
,
was
the
expresse
forbidding
to
enter
into
disputation
about
any
one
point
of
it
,
vnlesse
it
were
with
the
edge
of
the
sword
:
In
regard
whereof
he
tearmed
it
,
the
law
of
the
sword
.
Thus
the
Prince
of
the
Turke
who
hath
in
his
hand
the
sword
&
force
,
is
also
consequently
the
Arbitrator
&
Iudge
of
the
doubts
and
controuersies
which
arise
in
his
law
,
and
determineth
them
as
he
seeth
good
,
so
as
he
is
wise
enough
to
suffer
any
newe
opinion
to
take
footing
.
For
as
soone
as
that
hapneth
he
turneth
his
sword
against
the
authours
thereof
,
and
that
with
such
rigour
and
cruelty
as
he
vtterly
rooteth
them
out
not
leauing
so
much
as
a
seed
or
any
parcell
of
them
.
The
troubles
and
dissentions
which
heresies
haue
brought
in
amongst
the
Christians
serue
him
for
examples
,
he
seeth
such
histories
daily
verified
;
he
is
very
well
informed
of
them
,
and
turneth
them
to
the
best
vse
beyond
the
experience
his
predecessors
haue
had
of
such
fruites
as
spring
from
a
new
interpretation
of
their
law
.
Harduclles
in
a
very
small
space
wan
such
credit
amongst
that
barbarous
people
,
that
by
means
of
a
certaine
new
interpretation
of
the
points
of
their
sect
,
he
busied
all
Asia
,
where
he
sowed
so
many
troubles
,
as
he
well
neere
indangered
the
whole
estate
of
Baiazet
the
second
.
5
But
that
which
maketh
the
law
of
this
cursed
race
more
durable
is
,
that
the
Emperour
himselfe
obserueth
it
with
that
deuotion
,
honoreth
it
with
that
reuerence
,
embraceth
it
with
that
religion
,
and
preserueth
it
in
that
credit
and
authority
;
as
it
is
hard
to
imagine
a
man
more
deuout
and
affected
towards
it
.
6
Againe
,
the
misery
and
vexations
that
the
Turks
(
depriued
of
all
other
light
but
that
their
mother
sense
affordeth
them
)
beholde
other
nations
dispersed
thorow
their
dominions
and
of
a
contrary
beleefe
to
indure
,
wholy
weddeth
their
dull
soules
to
this
false
doctrine
:
neither
is
there
that
misery
which
that
vile
Mahometane
race
make
not
all
those
to
suffer
who
embrace
not
their
religion
,
but
aboue
all
the
Christians
.
CHAP.
II.
Of
the
direct
dependency
of
the
Turkes
subiects
vpon
their
Soueraigne
.
-
1
Subiects
must
haue
their
eies
chiefly
vpon
their
Soueraigne
.
-
2
Tyrants
strength
and
guard
of
strangers
.
-
3
The
absolute
authority
of
the
Ottomans
.
-
4
The
Princes
seuour
,
the
subiects
safetie
.
-
5
His
subiects
exact
obedience
and
the
cause
thereof
.
-
6
Rebllions
whence
procceding
.
1
THe
best
cement
that
can
be
made
to
giue
long
continuance
to
an
estate
,
is
to
worke
so
,
as
that
the
subiects
,
of
whatsoeuer
qualitie
or
condition
they
be
,
may
haue
alwaies
neede
of
him
that
is
their
Commander
,
to
the
end
they
may
immediatly
depend
vpon
him
and
reuerence
him
:
but
because
it
is
hard
to
bring
all
the
world
to
this
passe
,
especially
in
a
great
monarchy
:
those
at
the
least
are
to
be
drawen
to
it
,
as
far
foorth
as
is
possible
,
who
should
be
the
sinewes
and
supporters
of
the
Princes
power
.
2
This
moued
such
Tyrants
as
durst
not
assure
themselues
of
such
people
as
they
had
subdued
,
to
haue
about
them
Captaines
,
Souldiours
,
and
seruants
which
were
strangers
and
had
neither
kinsfolkes
,
nor
friendes
in
that
country
,
but
relied
absolutely
vpon
them
.
This
heeretofore
was
the
maner
of
the
Soldans
of
Egypt
;
and
though
they
be
courses
so
violent
,
barbarous
and
vnworthy
of
Christian
Princes
,
as
they
should
neuer
be
set
before
them
,
yet
may
they
somewaies
aduantage
them
in
the
consideration
of
their
ends
and
aime
of
their
intentions
,
applying
them
and
appropriating
them
so
far
forth
as
Christian
policy
and
the
interest
of
faith
may
permit
.
3
Now
then
we
will
deliuer
what
vse
the
Turke
in
these
times
makes
of
them
.
He
to
establish
his
Empire
and
amplifie
his
greatnesse
and
authority
,
intitleth
himselfe
not
only
Prince
and
Monarch
of
his
estates
,
but
Lord
also
and
peaceable
Master
of
the
persons
,
habilities
,
goods
,
houses
,
and
possessions
of
his
vastals
;
neither
is
there
inheritance
or
succession
so
assured
,
be
it
neuer
so
lawfull
,
but
it
dependeth
of
the
disposition
and
free
wil
of
the
Turke
,
so
as
if
any
aske
of
his
subiects
whose
house
it
is
wherein
he
dwelleth
,
and
to
whom
belongeth
the
land
he
tilleth
,
he
makes
no
other
answeare
,
but
that
they
are
the
great
Turks
his
Master
;
moreouer
they
all
tearme
themselues
slaues
of
their
Prince
:
whence
followeth
that
they
can
not
any
waie
maintaine
the
quiet
possession
of
their
goods
,
nor
account
of
any
thing
as
of
their
owne
but
by
his
especiall
fauour
.
Much
more
if
they
aime
at
raising
themselues
to
any
eminent
place
of
honour
they
are
to
beg
it
of
the
magnificence
and
pleasure
of
their
Prince
;
meanes
which
serue
to
curbe
those
barbarous
people
,
yet
to
be
reiected
of
Christians
and
abhorred
of
lawfull
Princes
,
who
receiue
and
hold
their
monarchies
of
the
hand
of
God
.
There
are
more
honest
precepts
to
be
giuen
,
whereby
they
may
purchase
and
preserue
the
loue
and
obedience
of
their
people
,
without
vsing
such
cruelties
and
tyrannies
.
But
because
the
argument
propounded
requireth
that
I
relate
the
meanes
this
barbarons
race
hath
obserued
to
become
great
,
and
that
I
am
fallen
into
that
matter
,
I
will
continue
it
:
yet
not
as
approuing
any
such
course
,
or
as
indeuoring
to
set
them
downe
,
by
them
to
forme
a
receiuable
example
,
or
to
induce
Christian
Princes
to
make
them
their
paterne
of
gouerning
their
estates
.
4
By
this
former
discourse
then
we
haue
deliuered
how
the
Turkes
subiects
haue
neede
of
him
,
some
to
preserue
what
they
haue
gotten
,
others
to
attaine
to
dignities
and
places
of
honour
.
And
in
a
word
,
their
being
and
life
depending
indifferently
vpon
the
Prince
,
their
principall
care
is
to
winne
his
fauour
.
5
Thi●
dependency
fortifieth
it selfe
&
increaseth
by
the
obedience
and
gouernment
of
great
personages
,
imploied
by
the
Turke
in
his
seruice
,
and
fashioned
by
himselfe
to
this
end
,
who
are
from
their
infancy
brought
vp
at
the
Princes
charge
,
and
instructed
euery
one
according
as
hee
is
naturally
inclined
either
in
the
excercises
of
armes
or
any
other
laborious
trade
,
so
as
such
not
knowing
other
father
or
benefactor
then
their
soueraigne
(
from
whom
they
receiue
both
goods
and
honours
)
:
neuer
thinke
of
kindred
or
friends
,
neither
haue
they
any
touch
of
bloud
or
naturall
alliance
,
dedicating
their
body
,
minde
and
whole
deuotion
to
the
only
goood
of
their
masters
affaires
,
whose
creatures
they
acknowledge
themselues
to
be
,
to
whatsoeuer
degree
of
honour
they
be
preferred
:
neither
is
it
in
their
power
to
amasse
other
wealth
then
that
which
is
rawght
them
by
the
hands
of
the
great
Turke
.
To
make
it
more
plaine
to
the
Reader
who
these
are
;
they
are
the
Spachi
,
Spachioglani
and
Ianizzars
;
in
these
consisteth
the
strength
and
guard
of
the
Turkish
Empire
.
I
hold
it
not
amisse
to
discouer
in
a
word
(
as
by
the
way
)
what
is
the
forme
and
condition
of
these
bandes
and
companies
:
so
to
deliuer
a
more
cleare
vnderstanding
of
their
manner
and
power
.
The
Spachi
and
Spachioglani
are
horse
men
,
whereof
there
are
a
thousand
in
number
,
which
march
at
the
right
hand
of
their
Lord
.
The
Selactari
or
Soluptari
,
are
other
thousand
horse
,
which
accompany
the
great
Turke
on
the
left
hand
,
when
he
marcheth
,
as
the
Spaihioglani
on
the
right
;
of
these
two
companies
are
chosen
the
Gouernours
of
Prouinces
,
and
vpon
these
according
to
their
merit
,
the
Turke
bestoweth
his
daughters
in
mariage
.
The
Vlufezgi
are
other
thousand
which
march
after
the
aboue
named
,
who
in
part
are
called
out
of
the
bands
of
Ianizzars
,
as
men
noted
for
their
especiall
valour
:
or
they
are
such
as
haue
beene
slaues
,
and
for
their
notable
seruice
performed
toward
their
masters
,
or
for
hauing
saued
the
life
of
some
Bassa
or
Beglerbee
in
the
wars
,
attaine
to
this
degree
of
being
one
of
the
Turkes
garde
.
The
Charipies
are
of
like
number
as
the
Vlufezgi
,
and
march
after
them
.
The
Ianizzars
follow
after
,
who
are
foote
,
and
appointed
for
the
guard
of
the
Turke
:
These
at
their
first
institution
were
few
in
number
,
but
now
they
amount
to
4000
:
In
these
two
sorts
of
foote
and
horse
,
consisteth
the
strength
of
the
Turke
,
being
as
the
seminarie
of
the
Sangiaks
,
Bassas
,
and
Lisirs
.
This
great
number
we
speake
of
,
giue
no
armes
or
any
other
marke
of
hereditary
gentry
,
being
in
such
sort
ordained
as
they
cannot
attribute
to
themselues
any
thing
in
particular
,
nor
attaine
to
any
preheminence
,
but
such
as
by
their
vertue
they
may
inuite
their
Prince
to
bestow
vpon
them
.
It
is
the
onely
meanes
whereby
the
Turke
gaineth
all
the
obedience
and
loialtie
he
can
wish
;
obedience
in
regard
they
are
(
as
I
haue
said
)
trained
vp
vnto
it
from
their
infancie
,
which
in
them
turneth
to
a
naturall
habite
,
placing
the
fruit
of
their
labours
in
the
assurance
of
such
a
seruitude
:
Loyaltie
,
in
as
much
as
they
expect
from
him
their
whole
aduancement
,
and
acknowledge
to
receiue
more
benefits
of
him
then
of
any
other
Prince
;
neither
hath
it
beene
knowne
that
they
euer
committed
treason
of
importance
,
vnlesse
it
were
the
reuolt
of
Gazeles
at
Damasco
,
Acomat
Bassa
at
Cairo
,
6
To
shew
by
what
meanes
the
Turke
maintaineth
this
dependencie
,
let
me
say
that
all
dependency
of
the
subiect
vpon
his
Master
and
Soueraigne
,
may
receiue
an
alteration
either
by
-
force
-
furie
-
of
the
people
:
-
authoritie
,
of
some
great
man
of
the
country
.
by
the
support
of
a
for●en
Prince
.
Matters
thus
disposed
(
not
to
enquire
nicely
after
al
sorts
of
inconueniences
)
it
resteth
that
we
see
how
he
remedieth
these
kinde
of
accidents
,
and
preuenteth
the
causes
of
such
like
infirmities
as
these
,
which
in
time
might
weaken
and
ruine
his
Empire
:
let
vs
begin
then
with
the
strength
of
the
people
.
CHAP.
III.
How
he
hath
depriued
his
Subiects
of
strength
.
-
1
Wherein
consisteth
the
strength
of
an
estate
.
-
2
The
Turkish
Empire
maintained
by
the
vse
of
armes
,
as
that
of
the
Romans
.
-
3
Tithing
of
Christian
children
by
the
Turkes
.
-
4
The
manner
of
their
education
:
and
the
commodity
accreweth
thereby
to
the
Turkes
.
-
5
Great
assemblies
amongst
them
forbidden
.
1
THe
strength
of
an
Estate
consisteth
in
the
valour
of
the
Nobilitie
,
loue
and
faithfulnesse
of
the
Subiect
,
reputation
of
armes
,
multitude
of
Souldiers
,
and
commodities
of
horse
,
which
may
bee
therein
bred
or
nourished
.
2
The
Turke
then
which
would
attaine
to
this
poinct
,
onely
by
armes
,
horse
,
and
Souldiers
,
obserueth
euermore
this
rule
:
He
taketh
away
all
vse
of
armes
from
such
Prouinces
as
he
hath
newly
reduced
to
his
obedience
,
he
forbiddeth
them
the
commoditie
of
horses
fit
for
the
war
,
&
endeuoureth
all
he
may
to
choake
in
them
the
springing
vp
of
men
proper
for
the
exercises
of
arms
;
and
hath
an
ere
that
in
all
his
dominions
,
not
any
man
haue
in
his
house
weapons
for
the
warre
,
no
not
so
much
as
a
knife
,
vnlesse
without
a
point
;
Moreouer
,
he
alloweth
not
any
Iewe
or
Christian
to
haue
or
keepe
any
horse
,
imitating
heerein
the
manner
of
the
Romanes
,
who
obserued
both
the
one
and
the
other
,
especially
at
the
surprises
and
surrenders
of
townes
;
The
principall
conditions
were
alwaies
,
that
they
should
forgoe
their
weapons
,
their
horses
,
and
deliuer
hostages
:
hence
is
it
that
we
reade
so
often
in
Caesar
,
Arma
proferri
,
iumenta
produci
,
obsides
dari
iubet
.
Heereby
depriuing
the
subdued
people
of
all
meanes
to
vndertake
or
maintaine
a
rebellion
.
Againe
,
Hostages
gaue
them
a
future
assurance
of
the
fidelitie
and
obedience
of
their
subiects
:
for
amongst
such
as
they
admitted
,
the
chiefe
of
the
Counsaile
and
such
as
were
valiant
men
at
armes
,
were
the
first
mentioned
:
but
aboue
all
,
those
of
whom
they
might
conceiue
any
doubt
or
suspition
.
We
reade
that
Caesar
hauing
taken
Auxerra
(
which
was
not
one
of
the
greatest
not
best
peopled
townes
of
France
)
drew
thence
sixe
hundred
Hostages
:
So
as
it
is
to
be
thought
,
that
the
rest
after
such
an
abatement
,
could
not
be
of
any
great
courage
or
strength
to
reuolt
.
3
The
Turke
without
troubling
himselfe
with
the
care
how
to
traine
after
him
an
vnprofitable
multitude
of
Hostages
,
in
an
instant
riddeth
his
subiects
hands
of
their
best
forces
,
and
strangely
armeth
and
fortifieth
himselfe
with
themselues
,
against
themselues
;
and
heerein
he
thus
proceedeth
.
He
maintaineth
in
pay
about
two
hundred
Commissaries
,
who
as
Superintendents
trauell
vp
and
downe
all
the
countries
of
his
obedience
,
to
see
and
ouersee
all
that
is
saide
and
done
by
the
Christians
.
These
men
goe
throughout
Grecia
,
Wallachia
and
Bosnia
,
and
extort
by
way
of
tenthes
,
the
children
from
the
bosomes
of
their
fathers
and
mothers
,
according
as
they
esteeme
them
fit
and
likely
to
be
fashioned
to
the
wars
.
4
These
children
thus
culled
&
assembled
from
al
cuntries
of
his
obedience
are
after
sent
to
Constantinople
and
distributed
amongst
the
Merchants
,
and
Citizens
by
name
,
and
inroulement
;
to
the
ende
they
may
be
there
instructed
in
the
lawe
of
Mahomet
,
and
taught
the
Turkish
tongue
:
After
(
when
they
come
to
the
age
to
beare
armes
)
to
be
of
the
number
of
Ianizzars
.
For
during
their
youth
they
are
trained
vp
to
all
such
military
exercises
as
may
put
valour
in
them
,
and
make
them
souldiours
;
and
this
by
particular
Masters
appointed
to
teach
them
to
shoote
,
wrastle
,
leape
,
vault
,
and
so
to
harden
their
bodies
as
the
tranailes
of
the
wars
may
be
after
held
but
as
pleasures
and
naturall
actions
.
Thus
the
Turke
by
this
tithing
of
Children
assureth
himselfe
of
his
people
in
a
two-folde
manner
;
in
despoiling
as
he
doth
the
Prouinces
of
the
flower
of
their
martiall
men
;
and
applying
them
to
his
owne
strengthning
both
at
home
and
abroade
.
5
Hereunto
he
addeth
the
expresse
forbidding
his
subiects
all
assemblies
,
or
building
of
any
strong
houses
,
which
may
stead
them
in
time
of
sedition
or
tumult
,
neither
are
they
allowed
the
vse
of
bels
,
by
whose
sound
they
might
call
themselues
together
to
the
execution
of
some
plotted
reuolt
,
or
mutiny
.
In
a
word
,
they
are
naked
of
all
meanes
,
to
fortifie
,
to
arme
,
to
assemble
themselues
or
to
become
any
waies
;
fit
for
the
wars
;
no
other
subiect
is
left
them
to
worke
vpon
but
the
tillage
of
the
land
,
whereto
,
as
to
al
other
mechanical
artes
,
they
apply
themselues
;
so
becomming
base
,
abiect
,
and
vnapt
for
the
wars
.
CHAP.
IIII.
The
causes
that
may
moue
a
people
to
fury
.
-
1
Despaire
armeth
the
weake
.
-
2
How
to
auoid
tumults
and
ciuill
commotions
.
-
3
Feare
amongst
subiects
is
vpheld
by
Iustice
,
and
plentie
of
thinges
necessary
.
-
4
Praise
of
peace
and
Iustice
.
-
5
Execution
of
Iustice
amongst
the
Turkes
pleasing
and
tollerable
,
though
vniust
.
-
6
An
exhortation
to
Christian
Princes
to
administer
Iustice
.
IT
hath
oft
hapned
,
and
in
our
times
we
haue
had
triall
of
it
,
that
the
people
,
though
vnarmed
,
haue
in
their
despaire
and
fury
disquieted
a
whole
estate
,
and
brought
the
common-weale
into
an
exceeding
distresse
and
perplexity
.
Furor
arma
ministrat
(
saith
Virgil
)
Iamque
faces
&
sax
a
volant
.
We
haue
the
testimony
of
the
Romans
time
,
in
those
ciuill
wars
which
hapned
in
Italy
&
in
Sicily
,
&
of
the
mischiefes
which
followed
those
rebellions
;
as
much
hath
beene
seene
to
happen
in
these
times
in
the
I
le
of
S.
Domingo
about
the
change
of
gouernment
introduced
vpon
those
conquered
people
,
forced
to
subiect
themselues
to
a
new
kinde
of
seruitude
.
In
very
deede
that
people
is
not
weakely
armed
which
hath
a
heart
,
a
good
spirite
,
and
a
nimble
hand
.
2
This
is
the
cause
why
the
Turke
to
preuent
these
popular
commotions
,
hath
depriued
the
people
of
all
sorts
of
armes
,
to
the
end
they
may
forget
both
the
vse
and
courage
to
handle
them
,
and
that
they
may
not
by
them
take
occasion
to
mutiny
.
Now
to
prouide
that
so
barbarous
a
yoake
driue
them
not
to
despaire
,
he
maintaineth
a
general
peace
and
tranquillity
throughout
his
estate
:
he
hath
a
care
that
iustice
be
equally
distributed
:
that
they
haue
plenty
of
victuals
,
and
all
other
vsuall
commodities
,
the
better
to
lull
asleepe
their
fury
.
3
By
these
meanes
euery
one
maketh
the
best
of
his
fortune
and
liueth
quietly
at
home
,
embracing
that
naturall
desire
of
holding
his
owne
,
which
to
performe
euery
man
emploieth
whatsoeuer
may
proceed
out
of
himself
:
moreouer
this
quiet
and
ease
of
minde
doth
so
soften
men
,
as
they
rest
free
from
the
thought
of
plotting
or
vndertaking
sturs
and
rebellions
:
Iustice
,
quiet
,
and
plenty
,
are
three
things
which
haue
for
their
opposites
,
the
violence
of
soldiours
in
time
of
war
,
the
corruption
of
Iudges
in
time
of
peace
,
and
scartsiy
and
famine
in
both
.
The
iniustice
,
the
abuse
,
and
auarice
of
officers
and
magistrates
,
are
those
which
procure
the
subuersion
and
vnauoidable
ruine
of
a
country
.
I
could
adde
to
this
discourse
many
examples
&
domesticall
proofes
,
but
not
to
enter
into
too
deepe
a
sea
I
will
spare
them
,
and
will
content
my selfe
to
say
only
that
all
those
of
ancient
times
,
and
such
as
haue
had
any
touch
of
a
good
minde
(
either
Christians
or
infidels
)
haue
euermore
confessed
that
the
sincere
execution
of
iustice
is
the
strongest
piller
of
all
well
ordered
estates
,
as
on
the
contrary
iniustice
is
the
ouerthrow
,
not
alone
of
men
and
countries
,
but
of
beasts
also
.
To
returne
to
our
matter
,
it
is
sure
that
when
the
common
subiect
hath
wherewith
to
nourish
,
cloath
,
and
handsomely
accommodate
himselfe
and
family
;
when
in
the
middest
of
armes
he
is
safe
in
his
owne
home
;
when
he
standeth
not
in
feare
of
forged
crimes
,
or
bribery
of
Iudges
;
then
is
it
that
he
falleth
asleepe
in
securitie
,
and
careth
not
but
to
entertaine
that
tranquillitie
,
reiecting
all
thought
of
rebellions
.
This
is
it
which
the
Turke
(
who
warreth
continually
with
his
neighbours
)
putteth
in
practise
to
maintaine
peace
throughout
his
dominions
,
and
to
be
beloued
and
faithfully
serued
of
his
subiects
,
whom
he
tieth
to
him
with
those
strong
bands
,
which
are
to
say
the
truth
(
besides
Iustice
and
tranquillitie
)
most
proper
for
preseruation
.
A
great
helpe
heereunto
is
his
continuall
imploying
his
Captaines
and
Souldiers
in
the
wars
,
especially
out
of
his
owne
countrey
,
and
to
the
spoile
of
his
enemies
.
5
Peace
is
the
horne
and
true
mother
of
abundance
:
Then
is
it
that
euery
man
tilleth
his
land
without
disturbance
,
and
quietly
inioyeth
and
encreaseth
his
owne
store
,
since
as
the
Poet
saith
,
Pax
arua
colit
:
Iustice
Queene
of
vertues
,
is
that
which
serueth
as
the
base
and
most
sure
foundation
to
peace
,
which
could
not
otherwise
subsist
,
nor
the
lawes
likewise
;
then
is
it
that
they
gaine
strength
and
vigour
.
5
And
though
the
forme
of
the
Turkish
Iustice
be
not
without
much
vanitie
and
oppression
,
and
though
all
matters
be
determined
amongst
them
by
way
of
witnesses
,
who
are
alike
bought
and
sold
;
and
that
iudgements
passe
as
gold
and
siluer
is
stirring
:
yet
the
quicke
dispatch
they
receiue
,
maketh
them
forget
this
inconuenience
;
and
though
the
sentence
of
such
Iudges
be
often
pronounced
against
all
order
of
Iustice
;
yet
is
there
thus
much
good
gotten
by
it
;
that
men
consume
not
themselues
bodie
and
goods
in
pleading
and
trotting
after
Lawyers
and
Atturnies
,
which
haue
their
consciences
as
large
as
the
other
,
who
are
bought
more
deerely
:
besides
the
delay
,
vexation
and
vncertainety
of
the
iudgement
.
And
though
the
sentence
of
such
men
be
much
displeasing
,
yet
the
people
haue
this
to
comfort
them
,
that
they
many
times
see
them
endure
most
notable
and
exemplary
punishment
:
for
the
Turke
sometimes
vpon
the
least
complaint
brought
against
them
,
putteth
them
to
death
,
be
they
neuer
so
great
personages
,
as
well
to
inrich
himselfe
with
their
spoiles
,
as
to
manifest
himselfe
to
be
a
Prince
most
respectiue
of
iustice
and
equity
,
and
to
giue
also
a
manner
of
satisfaction
to
his
subiects
so
oppressed
as
Selim
,
left
that
example
of
Bostand
Bassa
.
6
Hence
Christian
Princes
are
to
fetch
an
aduertisment
how
to
be
more
carefull
then
they
are
in
making
their
ministers
obserue
a
more
vpright
and
speedy
distribution
of
iustice
amongst
their
subiects
:
not
vpon
the
grounds
and
intents
of
this
barbarous
Turke
;
but
rather
because
they
are
one
day
to
render
an
account
before
God
,
who
to
this
ende
established
them
in
place
aboue
others
.
Questionlesse
the
long
delaying
of
suites
is
the
most
damnable
plague
to
be
found
at
this
day
in
all
estates
:
The
abuses
committed
otherwise
by
the
ministers
of
Princes
are
more
to
lerable
then
these
;
where
the
whole
is
in
question
.
For
this
cause
Princes
ought
to
looke
more
neerely
to
this
then
to
any
other
thing
.
CHAP.
V.
The
common
remedy
applied
by
the
Turke
against
the
force
and
fury
of
the
people
.
-
1
Another
way
of
preuenting
popular
seditions
,
by
hauing
alwaies
bands
of
foote
and
horse
in
a
readinesse
.
-
2
The
Turkes
strength
in
his
court
.
-
3
His
other
strengthes
.
-
4
Inconueniences
that
grew
by
the
Romane
Legions
:
-
5
Preuented
by
the
Turke
.
1
THough
the
meanes
formerly
deliuered
be
sufficient
to
keepe
the
Turkes
subiects
from
rebelling
,
yet
there
are
stronger
by
him
practised
,
wholly
to
preuent
and
extinguish
euen
the
least
sparke
of
sedition
,
and
to
prouide
against
other
like
inconueniences
.
He
maintaineth
a
great
number
of
horse
and
foot
alwaies
armed
,
alwaies
in
pay
,
and
distributed
in
garrisons
thorow
out
his
Empire
,
especially
in
places
most
proper
to
resist
or
assaile
.
These
curbe
the
people
,
and
vpon
the
least
shew
of
rebellion
lay
hands
on
them
,
represse
their
insolency
,
and
suffer
not
the
least
apparance
of
sedition
to
take
roote
,
remouing
the
causes
euen
at
the
first
without
respect
to
any
.
This
is
the
reason
that
there
hath
neuer
beene
knowen
any
popular
rebellion
in
his
estate
.
2
The
port
of
the
great
Turke
,
as
they
tearme
it
(
as
who
would
say
his
courte
and
gard
)
consisteth
chiesely
and
ordinarily
of
foure
thousand
horse
,
distributed
into
foure
companies
,
to
wit
the
Spahioglani
,
who
are
in
al
a
thousand
besides
their
seruants
,
which
march
not
in
their
rancke
but
apart
,
and
of
these
euery
one
hath
seauen
or
eight
.
These
range
themselues
on
the
right
hand
of
their
Lord
wheresoeuer
he
become
;
and
the
Solastri
(
equall
in
place
and
authority
)
on
the
left
.
These
two
sortes
are
accounted
as
children
of
the
great
Turke
,
and
are
nourished
and
brought
vp
in
the
Sarraglio
at
his
charge
(
as
hath
beene
said
)
and
there
trained
vp
in
all
exercises
of
armes
.
After
these
,
march
the
companies
of
the
Vlifezgi
&
Charipici
,
inferiour
to
the
other
in
rancke
and
authority
.
Those
on
the
right
hand
,
these
on
the
left
,
either
consisting
of
a
thousand
horse
.
And
wheresoeuer
the
great
Turke
goe
,
they
neuer
forsake
him
.
These
foure
thousand
horse
together
with
twelue
thousand
Ianizzars
are
the
strength
and
gard
of
the
person
and
port
of
the
Turke
,
with
these
forces
he
is
alwaies
able
to
hold
in
awe
and
subiection
a
city
more
populous
then
Constantinople
,
and
not
stand
in
feare
of
any
attempt
against
his
person
.
3
In
other
places
of
his
Empire
he
bestowes
other
great
numbers
of
the
Ianizzars
to
be
assistant
to
the
Gouernors
and
Bassas
,
besides
the
succours
they
are
to
haue
of
such
horse
and
foote
as
those
are
bound
to
furnish
on
whom
the
Turke
hath
at
other
times
bestowed
such
arable
lands
as
haue
beene
conquered
by
armes
,
whence
he
draweth
one
man
or
more
as
the
necessity
of
his
affaires
requireth
,
and
according
as
is
the
value
of
what
they
possesse
.
These
are
called
Mozzellini
.
Such
as
are
tied
to
this
contribution
may
be
compared
to
the
Feudataries
of
our
Prince
,
towards
whose
seruice
they
are
to
finde
a
light
horse
or
musket
,
and
some
of
them
two
,
more
or
lesse
according
to
the
imperiall
institutions
of
such
fees
and
tenures
as
so
binde
them
.
After
all
those
we
haue
named
,
march
the
Alcanzi
,
or
Aconizij
,
as
a
man
would
say
Aduenturers
,
which
haue
no
wages
,
&
are
appointed
to
march
a
daies
iourny
before
the
campe
,
pilling
,
harrowing
,
and
hauocking
all
before
them
,
whereof
they
are
to
answeare
the
fift
parte
clcere
to
the
great
Turke
:
of
these
there
are
thirty
thousand
,
besides
them
there
are
the
Azapi
(
of
meane
quality
)
but
such
as
serue
his
turne
for
Gally-slaues
,
mariners
and
pioners
to
intrench
,
fill
vp
ditches
,
raise
engines
,
and
perform
other
such
like
seruill
offices
,
their
number
is
40000.
Ouer
and
aboue
these
vnder
two
Beglerbees
or
Lientenants
generall
,
the
one
in
Europe
the
other
in
Asia
;
he
hath
neere
an
hundred
thousand
horse
in
ordinary
intertainment
.
The
Beglerby
of
Grecia
or
Europ
(
which
is
as
much
to
say
as
Prince
of
all
Princes
)
hath
his
place
of
residency
at
Sophia
a
towne
of
Seruia
.
That
of
Asia
abideth
at
Culhea
a
towne
of
Galatia
.
Each
of
these
hath
vnder
his
obedience
many
Sangiacks
(
as
much
as
to
say
sherifes
or
bailifs
)
the
very
children
of
the
great
Turke
which
gouerne
in
the
Prouinces
where
they
command
are
bound
to
obey
them
.
This
great
multitude
of
horsemen
are
so
well
mounted
and
armed
,
as
none
can
chuse
or
wish
a
more
fit
or
direct
meanes
then
their
ordinary
strength
to
hinder
all
popular
reuolts
or
rebellions
,
be
they
neuer
so
great
.
That
which
hapned
to
Gazeles
after
the
death
of
Selim
doth
sufficiently
approue
it
;
4
The
Romans
obserued
this
custome
,
to
distribute
diuers
of
their
legions
about
the
frontiers
of
Germany
alongst
the
Rhene
and
Danowb
,
to
the
same
end
and
purpose
as
the
Turke
entertaineth
his
horse
.
But
it
seemeth
that
he
proceedeth
therein
more
discreetly
then
did
the
Romans
,
for
they
kept
all
their
forces
together
in
one
place
,
and
vnder
one
Generall
,
of
whom
depended
the
absolute
command
of
the
armies
:
whence
it
fell
out
that
to
accommodate
themselues
,
they
ouerthrew
the
houses
of
particular
men
,
ruined
,
and
famished
the
countrey
,
as
well
by
the
hauocke
they
made
(
which
alwaies
attendeth
so
great
a
multitude
)
as
by
their
large
prouisions
most
necessary
for
an
armie
:
The
other
prouinces
farre
distant
were
exempt
from
this
oppression
,
yet
not
from
contribution
,
but
those
which
sustained
the
armie
,
were
so
ouerburdened
,
as
their
miserie
incited
them
to
rebell
,
and
shake
off
their
obedience
.
But
contrariwise
,
the
Turke
which
disperseth
his
horse
and
foote
into
diuers
Prouinces
,
vnder
the
command
of
sixtie
and
six
Sangiacks
,
draweth
not
after
him
such
disorder
or
ill
satisfaction
as
did
the
Romans
.
Their
great
assemblie
in
one
place
was
cause
of
seditions
,
debates
,
mutinies
and
other
mischiefes
,
most
difficult
to
be
preuented
.
They
did
not
perceiue
how
this
manner
of
proceeding
was
a
means
that
the
Souldiers
grew
too
much
to
affect
their
Captaines
,
and
that
the
Captaines
found
themselues
by
them
enabled
to
attempt
(
as
they
often
did
)
many
things
to
the
preiudice
of
the
Empire
.
And
in
very
deed
it
oftentimes
hapned
that
their
armies
made
choice
of
their
General
for
Emperour
,
in
despite
of
the
Senatours
authoritie
;
either
in
regard
of
the
valour
they
knew
to
be
in
them
,
or
of
some
pecuniarie
corrupting
their
affections
,
which
the
Senate
could
not
remedy
:
And
in
trueth
it
was
a
very
easie
matter
for
the
Generall
,
so
farre
from
home
,
and
holding
his
forces
vnited
in
one
body
,
to
practise
the
Colonels
,
and
the
Colonels
to
bargaine
and
buie
the
harts
and
affections
of
the
Souldiers
,
by
them
to
possesse
the
Empire
,
so
as
sometime
the
armie
of
Spaine
chose
their
Generall
Emperour
,
and
at
the
same
time
that
of
Germany
theirs
:
whereof
we
haue
many
examples
,
as
also
of
the
calamities
and
miseries
which
did
thence
accrew
to
the
Estate
and
subiects
.
5
It
is
an
inconuenience
whereto
the
Turke
cannot
be
subiect
;
for
keeping
his
troups
and
armies
so
spread
abroad
and
disperst
,
they
haue
not
the
meanes
to
mutinie
(
especially
being
in
no
place
ouer
strong
)
nor
yet
grow
to
affect
their
Beglerbyes
or
Gouernours
,
whom
they
seldome
see
or
repaire
to
:
much
lesse
can
the
Beglerbee
in
his
owne
behalfe
easily
winne
or
entice
the
hearts
of
the
Sangiacks
,
or
affections
of
the
Souldiers
,
as
he
might
well
doe
if
the
troupes
were
alwais
together
in
time
of
peace
,
and
abroad
in
one
and
the
same
prouince
.
CHAP.
VI.
How
the
Turke
represseth
the
power
of
the
great
men
of
his
estate
.
-
1
The
authoritie
of
a
Prince
(
if
his
vertue
be
not
eminent
aboue
all
the
great
men
of
his
kingdome
)
is
by
their
vertue
obscured
,
whence
groweth
the
diminution
of
the
subiects
obseruance
.
-
2
From
whence
the
authoritie
of
the
Nobilitie
doth
proceed
.
-
3
The
detestable
crueltie
of
the
Turkish
Emperour
against
the
next
of
his
bloud
.
-
4
Vsage
of
great
men
taken
by
the
Turkes
.
-
5
The
vncertaine
fortune
and
estate
of
the
Turkes
officers
.
1
TO
the
end
the
dependencie
and
authoritie
whereof
wee
haue
hitherto
entreated
be
without
alteration
maintained
,
it
is
requisite
that
the
Prince
haue
a
care
,
that
there
be
none
in
his
countrey
who
for
their
greatnesse
may
incourage
the
people
,
and
embolden
them
to
attempt
ought
,
backt
by
their
authoritie
,
countenance
and
conduct
.
2
This
greatnesse
may
grow
from
three
principall
causes
:
either
in
regard
they
are
Princes
of
the
bloud
,
or
for
that
they
are
noted
to
be
nobly
descended
and
rich
,
or
else
for
the
reputation
they
haue
gotten
,
and
a
long
while
preserued
,
either
by
cunning
,
or
by
their
owne
valour
,
and
merit
:
things
that
winne
credit
and
name
amongst
the
common
people
.
Concerning
the
first
cause
,
the
children
,
brethren
,
and
kinsmen
of
the
Turke
,
are
great
by
consanguinitie
.
The
Barons
of
the
country
obtaine
the
second
ranke
,
whereto
the
noblenesse
of
their
family
calleth
them
:
for
the
third
,
such
ministers
and
officers
as
beare
a
stroake
and
swaie
in
matters
of
the
highest
consequence
,
are
accounted
great
.
3
The
Ottaman
Princes
,
of
nature
barbarous
and
cruell
,
ordinarily
shelter
themselues
from
these
inconueniences
,
with
courses
far
from
all
humanity
,
in
as
much
as
without
all
respect
of
Law
,
religion
,
or
other
ciuill
consideration
,
they
vpon
the
least
scruple
that
may
be
,
ridde
their
hands
by
execrable
murthers
,
of
their
neerest
kinsfolkes
and
friends
,
yea
euen
of
their
fathers
and
brethren
,
alone
to
inioy
and
by
their
death
to
assure
to
themselues
the
quiet
possession
of
their
kingdome
.
Selim
the
first
murthered
two
of
his
brethren
,
procured
the
death
of
all
his
nephewes
,
yea
and
of
his
father
also
.
He
would
often
say
that
there
was
nothing
more
sweet
then
to
raigne
out
of
the
suspition
and
shadow
of
his
kindred
;
and
that
he
deserued
pardon
for
what
he
had
committed
,
since
it
was
the
same
play
and
vsage
he
should
haue
receiued
,
if
any
other
but
himselfe
had
attained
to
the
crowne
.
Amurath
the
third
which
now
raigneth
,
made
his
entry
by
the
death
of
his
brother
,
and
searched
the
establishing
of
his
Empire
,
euen
in
the
belly
of
his
mother
,
then
great
with
childe
,
making
for
this
end
,
one
end
of
her
&
what
she
went
withall
:
these
cruelties
are
monstrous
in
the
sight
of
God
and
man
,
and
full
of
horror
and
infamie
:
yet
hath
it
not
beene
knowen
for
all
this
,
that
euer
any
citie
,
any
people
,
or
armie
,
did
reuolt
or
mutine
.
This
inhumanitie
is
amongst
them
growne
to
that
lawfull
and
ordinarie
consequence
,
as
they
vsually
put
it
in
practise
,
without
feare
of
blame
or
reproch
.
The
examples
thereof
are
as
infinite
as
their
memories
,
stinking
and
abhominable
.
In
a
word
,
this
butchering
is
amongst
them
an
hereditary
succession
,
descending
from
one
to
another
,
which
God
would
reuenge
with
our
hands
if
we
would
amend
our
liues
.
4
As
for
the
Barons
and
Lords
of
the
countrey
,
Mahomet
the
first
,
destroied
their
seed
,
expelling
them
out
of
his
estate
,
as
he
did
all
the
originarie
Turkish
Princes
his
allies
;
and
if
by
chance
there
remaine
any
of
the
Ottoman
race
,
he
is
so
kept
downe
,
as
he
traileth
(
as
they
say
)
his
belly
vpon
the
ground
,
liuing
most
poorely
without
all
charge
,
and
manage
of
affaires
:
so
as
neither
valour
nor
riches
can
make
him
appeere
or
shine
in
the
worlds
eie
;
rather
he
remaineth
eclipsed
amongst
the
vulgar
sort
,
without
honour
,
credit
,
or
estimation
.
As
for
the
Princes
and
mightie
men
of
the
countrey
by
them
subdued
,
they
know
well
enough
how
to
ridde
their
hands
of
them
,
in
sort
as
we
haue
before
declared
:
so
as
neuer
Empire
was
raised
,
or
maintained
with
more
execrable
murthers
,
then
this
hath
beene
in
these
daies
;
they
neither
sparing
Princes
of
their
bloud
,
nor
the
chiefe
Potentates
of
their
prouinces
;
for
they
blinde
them
,
if
not
kill
them
.
5
Now
concerning
the
ministers
and
officers
,
who
by
long
managing
of
waightie
affaires
,
haue
attained
to
Honorable
places
,
authority
and
reputation
;
there
is
not
one
,
be
hee
neuer
so
great
,
which
at
the
least
winke
,
wrath
,
and
pleasure
of
his
Lord
,
loseth
not
his
life
immediatly
.
Baiazet
caused
Acomat
Bassa
to
be
put
to
death
,
an
excellent
man
of
armes
and
a
woorthy
Captaine
,
saying
the
too
much
reputation
of
the
seruant
was
a
cause
of
the
too
great
ielousie
of
the
master
.
Selim
likewise
put
many
to
death
,
and
amongst
others
Mustafa
Bassa
,
whom
he
caused
to
be
strangled
at
Prusa
,
and
after
to
be
cast
out
to
the
dogs
.
This
was
his
recompence
for
fauoring
him
in
the
vsurpation
of
the
Empire
against
Baiazet
his
father
then
liuing
,
and
for
making
riddance
of
his
two
brethren
Acomat
and
Corcut.
He
suspected
it
was
he
that
had
reuealed
his
secret
(
as
indeed
he
had
)
to
Aladin
and
Amarath
children
of
his
brother
Acomat
,
because
contrary
to
his
expectation
he
sought
their
death
.
It
is
in
a
manner
an
ordinary
course
with
Princes
that
one
light
offence
obscureth
and
maketh
them
forget
a
thousand
good
seruices
performed
for
the
good
of
their
affaires
.
For
my
part
I
am
of
opinion
that
this
rage
,
and
inhumane
cruelty
familiar
with
the
house
of
the
Ottomans
,
is
but
a
true
and
iust
iudgment
of
God
,
who
will
by
their
parricid
handes
chastice
the
Apostasies
and
wickednesse
of
one
by
another
,
considering
the
greater
part
of
them
are
Christians
who
haue
denied
their
faith
,
and
by
that
miserable
act
climed
vp
to
the
height
of
those
eminent
charges
and
dignities
they
possesse
.
As
not
long
since
his
diuine
Maiestie
permitted
a
poore
simple
souldiour
to
kill
Mahomet
Bassa
,
a
man
most
mighty
in
credit
and
authority
;
but
more
rich
of
power
and
meanes
;
yet
such
a
one
as
had
beene
a
Christian
and
had
taken
vpon
him
the
orders
of
Priesthood
.
CHAP.
VII
.
How
he
confoundeth
the
practises
of
forraine
Princes
his
neighbours
-
1
The
diuorce
of
the
Greeke
church
from
the
Romish
confirmeth
the
Turkish
Empire
.
-
2
What
were
requisite
to
stir
vp
the
Turkish
subiects
to
rebellion
.
-
3
The
Greekes
vtterly
destitute
of
meanes
for
such
proceedings
.
-
4
His
owne
subiects
throughly
curbed
.
1
ONe
of
the
most
assured
meanes
practised
by
the
Turke
,
as
an
infallible
course
of
setling
his
estate
against
the
intelligence
which
his
people
might
hold
with
Christian
princes
,
is
the
diuorce
&
separation
he
maintaineth
betweene
the
Greeke
&
the
Romish
church
,
supposing
while
this
schisme
shall
continue
amongst
them
,
that
they
will
neuer
establish
betweene
them
a
sound
amity
.
This
made
the
conquest
of
Constantinople
easie
vnto
them
;
this
hath
forwarded
the
proceeding
of
his
victories
,
and
as
it
were
,
put
into
his
hands
all
those
rich
and
goodly
Prouinces
,
whereof
he
is
at
this
day
the
peaceable
,
but
Tyrannicall
owner
:
moreouer
he
so
narrowly
obserueth
our
vnhappie
discord
,
as
he
by
a
perpetuall
counsaill
endeuoureth
all
he
can
possibly
,
that
the
Patriarkes
render
no
obedience
to
the
Pope
:
neither
is
it
long
since
Zacharias
,
Patriarcke
of
Constantinople
,
was
like
to
be
staked
for
hauing
admitted
the
new
Callender
and
the
reformation
of
the
course
of
the
yeere
,
made
in
the
time
of
Gregorie
the
13.
2
Now
to
returne
to
the
principall
point
,
it
is
to
be
presupposed
that
the
proiects
and
carriage
of
popular
rebellions
,
cannot
be
vndertaken
without
the
support
and
direction
of
the
mightiest
for
wealth
,
meanes
,
and
authority
,
in
the
country
which
we
would
surprise
;
and
that
Princes
will
not
bouge
to
set
a
foote
these
plots
and
enterprises
,
but
by
offered
occasion
of
some
fortresse
which
importeth
the
assurance
and
consequence
of
the
estate
,
and
may
serue
for
a
refuge
to
recouer
their
decaied
strength
:
or
else
that
their
destigne
relieth
vpon
some
promised
succour
,
or
finally
vpon
the
consideration
that
those
who
inuite
them
to
this
conquest
are
so
strong
within
themselues
,
as
they
may
hope
for
an
honorable
issue
of
their
enterprise
.
3
These
are
all
necessary
particularities
,
but
not
any
of
them
resteth
now
in
the
hands
of
the
Greekes
abased
by
extreame
seruitude
,
and
so
far
from
hauing
any
fortresse
at
their
deuotion
,
as
they
cannot
once
stir
without
being
discouered
;
and
though
they
were
disposed
to
vndertake
,
they
haue
at
their
backe
so
great
a
number
of
men
at
arms
,
as
at
the
least
breath
of
a
rebellion
,
they
would
cut
them
off
before
they
should
haue
meanes
once
to
peepe
forth
of
their
shels
.
4
The
Turke
againe
maketh
them
sure
to
him
so
many
waies
,
though
all
barbarous
and
vnciuill
,
as
he
scarcely
alloweth
his
subiects
leaue
to
draw
their
breath
,
nor
suffreth
his
mighty
men
once
to
hold
vp
their
heades
;
or
forraine
Princes
to
be
able
in
due
time
to
attempt
ought
against
him
.
The
end
of
the
second
Booke
.
THE
THIRD
BOOKE
.
CHAP.
I.
The
causes
of
the
fall
and
ruine
of
estates
.
-
1
Estates
are
subiect
to
change
.
-
2
Some
of
longer
,
some
of
lesse
continuance
.
-
3
Great
,
small
,
and
meane
estates
,
and
their
causes
of
ruine
;
externall
,
internall
,
and
mixt
.
-
4
Lesse
estates
come
to
their
endes
soonest
by
externall
causes
.
-
5
The
great
by
internall
.
-
6
The
meane
more
durable
,
yet
subiect
to
alteration
.
1
THe
order
that
nature
obserueth
in
all
things
created
doth
plainly
enough
teach
vs
that
whatsoeuer
is
borne
passeth
and
hastneth
towards
death
;
and
that
all
things
which
haue
a
beginning
necessarilie
and
interchangably
roule
towards
their
end
.
This
proceedeth
either
of
an
ordinarie
and
naturall
course
,
or
of
the
violence
and
alteration
of
compound
bodies
.
Hence
we
drawe
this
construction
,
that
estates
change
,
monarchies
faile
,
and
the
ruine
of
one
serueth
as
the
raising
to
the
other
.
2
Againe
,
as
of
humaine
bodies
some
are
more
strong
,
vigorous
,
and
of
a
better
composition
then
others
,
and
so
are
of
longer
continuance
;
so
we
see
the
same
difference
in
kingdomes
and
estates
:
in
as
much
as
some
preserue
themselues
longer
,
either
because
by
their
nature
they
are
more
surely
founded
(
as
for
example
the
Signory
of
Nobles
is
more
lasting
then
the
popular
estate
,
and
a
Monarchal
estate
more
then
a
common-weale
,
because
a
Monarchy
keepeth
the
causes
of
corruption
more
aloofe
from
her
;
or
is
policed
with
better
lawes
)
or
because
of
the
situation
which
is
naturally
more
strong
then
the
other
,
as
we
see
at
this
day
in
the
Signorie
of
Venice
.
3
But
because
this
assertion
is
subiect
to
diuers
obiections
,
we
will
diuide
it
only
into
two
propositions
.
First
then
of
principalities
,
some
are
small
,
some
great
,
some
indifferent
,
either
in
regard
of
their
subsistance
or
first
essence
,
or
of
the
comparison
which
may
be
made
betweene
them
and
their
neighbours
:
Secondly
,
the
efficient
causes
of
the
vtter
ruine
of
estates
are
either
inward
,
or
outward
,
or
mixt
:
The
inward
are
to
be
fetched
and
conceiued
in
respect
of
the
negligence
,
ignorance
,
and
riot
of
Princes
which
giue
themselues
ouer
to
all
voluptuousnesse
;
whereto
may
be
added
the
factions
,
secret
practises
,
ambitions
,
and
desperate
humors
of
subiects
,
with
sundrie
other
occasions
,
all
fit
to
bring
estates
to
their
vtter
ruine
.
The
outwad
causes
are
the
stratagemes
,
armes
,
and
force
of
the
enemie
.
The
mixt
are
such
as
participate
of
both
,
as
are
the
rebellions
of
the
people
,
treasons
of
particular
men
,
put
in
execution
by
forraine
ayd
and
force
.
Since
then
it
is
so
that
all
principalities
are
subiect
to
ruine
by
one
of
these
three
causes
;
we
are
now
to
vnfold
what
maladies
may
infect
,
as
well
great
and
indifferent
,
as
small
estates
;
and
draw
all
within
the
compasse
of
inward
,
outward
,
and
mixt
causes
.
Now
like
as
in
naturall
things
naturall
corruption
is
more
tolerable
then
violent
,
so
must
we
consider
whether
the
alteration
and
impairing
of
estates
and
common
weales
chance
by
reason
of
age
,
or
by
the
violence
of
some
not
forseene
cause
.
4
Returning
then
to
our
former
diuision
and
well
examining
it
,
wee
shall
finde
that
small
Estates
come
to
their
ends
rather
by
meanes
of
outward
causes
(
brought
in
by
force
and
violence
)
then
otherwise
:
In
as
much
as
their
power
being
insufficient
to
withstand
their
mighty
neighbours
ambitious
attempts
,
they
are
at
the
first
incounter
ouerset
with
the
storm
of
his
conquests
;
in
this
maner
the
seueral
Signories
of
Lombardy
fel
in
subiection
either
of
the
Duke
of
Milan
,
or
of
the
Venetians
;
the
free
cities
of
Thoscany
became
a
pray
to
the
Duke
of
Florence
:
The
Princes
of
Africke
to
the
King
of
Fez-Marocco
,
and
Algiers
.
5
On
the
contrarie
,
great
Empires
are
vsually
subuerted
by
meanes
of
inward
causes
;
either
by
ease
&
plenty
,
which
customarily
makes
Princes
to
swell
with
insupportable
pride
;
by
voluptuous
riot
(
whereto
people
amidst
their
abundance
are
most
prone
)
or
else
by
insolency
and
presumption
seazing
the
great
ones
of
the
country
when
they
see
themselues
much
followed
and
reuerenced
,
all
fit
inticements
to
dispose
a
hart
(
but
indifferently
generous
)
to
plot
for
his
owne
raising
.
Nec
quenquam
iam
ferre
potest
Caesarue
priorem
,
Pompeiusue
parem
.
Then
is
it
(
as
one
saith
)
that
Caesar
cannot
brooke
a
superior
,
and
that
Pompey
stomaketh
an
equall
.
6
Meane
estates
vndergoe
danger
as
well
as
the
two
former
,
yet
far
lesse
,
since
they
hold
the
meane
as
the
other
the
extreams
,
for
they
are
not
so
vnfurnished
of
strength
,
as
that
it
would
be
easie
for
euery
one
to
inuade
and
oppresse
them
,
neither
are
they
of
that
greatnesse
and
wealth
,
as
to
afforde
matter
to
particular
men
to
grow
mighty
,
or
else
abandon
themselues
immoderatly
to
delights
&
pleasures
,
or
to
transport
themselues
beyond
the
limits
of
reason
.
This
is
it
that
so
long
preserued
the
common
weales
of
Sparta
&
of
Venice
,
which
euermore
respectiuely
intertained
a
meane
and
equality
.
The
mixt
causes
of
the
ruine
of
Estates
are
inward
treacheries
and
outward
force
.
Treason
hatched
within
an
Estate
much
more
indammageth
a
great
then
a
small
or
meane
Empire
.
For
a
monarke
is
not
able
to
turne
his
eie
vpon
euery
corner
of
his
Kingdome
;
and
sturring
spirits
are
fortified
in
their
attempts
either
with
the
hope
of
impunity
(
the
nourse
of
vices
in
all
Estates
and
gouernments
)
or
with
the
opinion
they
haue
conceiued
of
not
being
discouered
till
such
time
as
their
proiects
meete
with
some
good
successe
.
These
things
happen
sooner
,
when
the
Prince
is
far
off
then
at
hand
.
Spaine
can
witnesse
it
,
which
was
so
vnhappily
betraied
by
Count
Iulian
,
CHAP.
II.
From
what
coniectures
the
continuance
of
estates
may
be
gathered
.
-
1
Causes
of
the
change
of
Estates
.
-
2
The
ruine
of
Estates
is
most
answearable
to
their
beginnings
.
-
3
The
rootes
of
common
wealths
how
maintained
.
-
4
Security
especially
to
be
auoided
.
1
I
Will
no
farther
extend
the
discourse
of
the
former
chapter
,
nor
diue
into
the
other
efficient
causes
of
the
ruine
of
estates
:
for
should
I
handle
what
might
be
farther
said
of
this
matter
,
I
should
wander
too
far
from
the
propounded
subiect
,
and
perhaps
racke
the
argument
beyond
his
due
pitch
.
I
will
then
tie
my selfe
only
to
the
coniectures
of
the
continuance
or
fall
of
estates
,
omitting
other
causes
,
as
also
all
that
may
be
referred
to
the
iudgement
of
the
heauens
,
the
influence
of
the
stars
,
and
to
their
vertue
;
sithence
this
knowledge
is
fraught
with
so
many
obscurities
and
contrarieties
in
what
is
written
thereof
,
as
I
will
spare
to
search
too
far
into
it
:
Though
otherwise
we
are
to
imagine
that
nothing
is
made
in
vaine
,
and
that
those
celestiall
bodies
moue
not
by
chance
,
but
rather
by
diuine
order
and
disposition
.
Againe
,
the
errors
of
their
Ephimerides
and
the
different
supputation
of
the
first
masters
of
their
profession
,
make
the
knowledge
to
be
vncertaine
and
their
so
surely
grounded
maximes
to
afford
contrarie
resolutions
.
Let
vs
not
meddle
then
with
the
aspects
of
the
stars
,
or
the
natiuities
of
estates
,
but
regard
and
consider
the
effects
of
what
is
at
our
owne
home
without
taking
so
high
a
flight
.
We
say
then
that
estates
suffer
either
by
the
vnremoueable
ordinance
of
God
,
or
by
the
naturall
course
of
time
,
wherewith
in
time
they
grow
feeble
,
and
change
:
or
else
by
the
wils
of
men
,
so
vnstable
and
light
,
as
they
ordinarily
breede
an
vniuersall
alteration
thorow
out
a
whole
estate
and
common-weale
.
We
will
only
drawe
our
coniectures
from
naturall
causes
(
not
to
meddle
with
the
iudgement
of
the
diuine
Maiesty
or
mans
inconstancy
)
nakedly
and
simply
to
speake
of
them
as
neere
and
familiar
,
to
the
end
we
may
not
enter
into
the
chaos
of
causes
heauenly
and
most
remote
.
2
So
then
we
are
to
thinke
that
the
continuance
of
estates
is
proportioned
to
their
beginning
.
It
is
with
them
as
with
sensible
creatures
,
which
the
more
they
hasten
to
arriue
at
the
perfection
of
their
being
,
the
sooner
also
they
faile
and
die
:
the
contrarie
is
seene
in
those
which
with
a
slow
and
measured
pase
attaine
to
a
more
faire
maturity
and
perfection
:
as
for
example
,
among
beastes
the
horse
,
amongst
trees
the
willow
are
of
no
long
indurance
:
but
those
that
(
as
the
Hart
and
Oliue
)
make
by
degrees
and
slowly
towards
their
ripenes
,
are
likewise
more
lasting
.
We
may
say
the
like
of
Empires
and
Estates
:
for
as
we
see
them
slow
or
swift
in
their
increase
,
so
are
they
more
swift
or
slow
in
their
ruine
.
Haue
not
the
French
more
then
once
conquered
the
duchy
of
Milan
and
the
kingdome
of
Naples
,
and
that
as
a
man
may
say
almost
in
a
moment
?
so
haue
they
many
times
lost
it
and
all
in
a
moment
:
such
conquests
resemble
Torrents
tumbling
downe
the
mountaines
,
which
in
lesse
then
an
hour
,
by
reason
of
the
great
shoutes
of
waters
they
bring
with
them
,
become
fearefull
and
dangerous
;
when
soone
after
in
an
instant
,
we
see
them
fallen
and
shallow
,
so
as
a
childe
may
wade
thorow
them
without
trouble
or
danger
.
Now
not
to
leaue
this
conquest
of
Milan
and
Naples
,
we
must
to
this
purpose
by
examples
contrary
to
the
former
make
good
the
ground
of
our
proposition
:
which
to
performe
,
I
will
set
before
you
the
manner
how
the
Spaniards
conquered
and
held
these
prouinces
.
I
finde
it
hath
been
by
a
long
course
of
time
,
and
infinite
trauaile
accompanied
with
all
the
paines
and
troubles
,
which
those
who
set
vp
their
rest
vpon
a
conquest
and
resolue
to
abide
out
the
wars
,
ordinarily
indure
.
Hence
their
labour
hath
taken
such
roote
,
as
nothing
since
hath
been
able
to
escape
their
hands
,
howsoeuer
they
haue
been
oft
times
galled
and
put
to
their
plunges
.
It
is
requisite
then
that
Empires
haue
their
rootes
to
sustaine
them
,
which
must
be
deepe
and
sound
,
otherwise
it
is
impossible
they
should
long
continue
.
Now
that
they
may
be
such
,
there
is
an
especiall
wisedome
and
many
yeeres
required
.
3
The
true
rootes
of
an
estate
are
the
loue
of
the
people
towards
their
Prince
,
the
sincere
and
holy
distribution
of
Iustice
amongst
the
subiects
;
military
discipline
well
policed
and
obserued
by
the
souldiours
;
honours
,
rewards
,
and
benefits
bestowed
according
to
vertue
and
merit
:
that
great
men
be
not
slightly
set
by
,
abased
or
contemned
:
that
the
common
sort
of
people
be
intertained
with
all
honest
satisfaction
:
necessary
prouisions
for
the
maintenance
of
places
of
strength
;
well
husbanding
of
the
treasure
;
friendly
intelligence
with
neighbour
Princes
;
vncorrupt
election
of
officers
;
modesty
in
their
proceedings
:
these
are
the
very
true
rootes
able
to
fortifie
and
make
monarchies
to
flourish
and
raise
them
to
eternity
:
which
rootes
can
neuer
proue
setled
spring
,
or
send
foorth
worthy
fruit
,
vnlesse
they
be
planted
in
the
soile
of
wisdome
,
aduice
and
industrie
,
and
husbanded
by
the
continuance
of
time
.
4
It
is
often
seene
that
great
Conquests
and
victories
attained
without
losse
or
labour
,
so
blinde
the
Conquerour
,
as
they
make
him
become
like
one
of
those
long
reeds
or
canes
which
carry
outwardly
a
good
apparance
,
but
are
inwardly
hollow
and
of
fraile
substance
.
They
cause
him
to
contemne
his
companions
,
and
those
who
assisted
him
in
obtaining
his
victories
,
but
more
the
subdued
people
,
whence
ordinarily
followeth
,
that
the
higher
is
his
fortune
,
the
neerer
is
his
fall
.
Wee
haue
straied
sufficiently
.
It
is
now
high
time
to
returne
to
our
principall
discourse
:
and
as
we
haue
heretofore
made
it
appeare
that
there
are
three
sorts
of
estates
;
so
wee
are
now
to
vnfold
in
what
ranck
of
the
three
the
Turke
is
to
be
bestowed
.
CHAP.
III.
That
the
monarchy
of
the
Turke
is
comprehended
within
the
number
of
great
estates
.
-
1
The
substance
of
the
ensuing
Chapters
.
-
2
Greatnesse
of
the
Turkish
Empire
.
-
3
Compared
with
the
Romaines
.
-
4
The
marueilous
successe
thereof
inwarre
.
1
From
the
diuision
of
estates
deliuered
by
vs
in
the
former
chapter
,
this
is
to
take
his
foundation
,
and
by
these
causes
wee
are
to
make
choice
of
that
of
the
three
which
is
the
surest
;
by
what
accidents
or
infirmities
both
the
one
and
the
other
may
vndergoe
a
change
,
either
outwardly
or
inwardly
,
and
in
which
rank
of
the
three
wee
are
to
lodge
the
Turke
.
Some
one
perhaps
will
iudge
this
question
superfluous
and
vnprofitable
,
seeing
his
renowne
,
his
conquests
,
and
his
long
rule
doe
but
too
much
teach
vs
what
he
is
:
notwithstanding
all
this
I
should
not
thinke
it
besides
the
purpose
a
little
to
particularize
the
causes
of
his
greatnesse
.
2
The
estate
of
the
Turke
is
held
without
question
to
bee
one
of
the
greatest
and
mightiest
,
as
well
in
regard
of
the
large
circuit
it
containeth
,
as
of
his
power
:
he
is
great
because
of
so
many
Prouinces
reduced
to
his
obedience
;
and
though
he
haue
not
so
great
a
share
in
Europe
as
the
Romaines
sometimes
had
,
he
hath
to
counteruaile
this
,
more
aduantaged
himselfe
in
Asia
and
Africke
:
for
when
the
fortune
of
the
Romaines
was
at
the
greatest
,
and
that
they
had
their
armes
most
at
libertie
,
yet
went
they
not
beyond
Euphrates
:
It
is
very
true
,
that
Traian
went
farther
,
but
all
the
Prouinces
he
subdued
were
soone
abandoned
by
Adrian
his
successor
.
The
Turke
hath
not
done
so
,
for
he
hath
extended
his
dominion
as
far
as
Tigris
;
he
possesseth
all
Mesopotamia
,
or
as
they
terme
it
Diarbecke
.
From
thence
he
reacheth
as
far
as
Balsera
or
the
Gulfe
of
Persia
,
which
the
Romans
neuer
saw
,
and
the
Gulfe
of
Arabia
.
And
to
say
better
,
all
is
his
from
the
red
sea
to
the
Cittie
Aden
,
which
is
in
the
maine
continent
beyond
the
mouth
of
this
sea
,
more
then
an
hundred
and
fiftie
miles
:
he
hath
also
inlarged
his
dominions
toward
the
South
far
beyond
Aegypt
.
In
Africk
all
is
his
,
except
three
places
of
strength
which
the
king
of
Spaine
holdeth
,
Pegnon
de
Veles
,
Oran
,
and
Melila
:
Mauritania
also
is
his
,
only
three
fortresses
excepted
,
which
are
Tanger
,
Arsilla
,
and
Mazagan
,
conquered
by
the
Portugall
:
when
I
name
Africk
,
I
intend
that
country
commonly
termed
Barbary
,
and
not
Ethiopia
.
3
Hauing
now
seene
the
largenes
of
his
dominions
,
we
are
next
to
discourse
of
his
meanes
and
power
.
I
finde
that
he
hath
better
established
the
one
and
the
other
,
then
the
Romans
euer
did
when
they
were
at
their
intirest
greatnes
,
because
in
such
a
most
large
compasse
of
his
country
,
there
is
no
king
or
common
weale
beareth
sway
to
distinguish
his
dominions
:
which
was
otherwise
with
the
Romanes
,
who
had
many
such
wedged
in
,
within
the
continent
of
their
Empire
.
There
is
not
any
one
of
his
subiects
that
dareth
to
say
that
the
house
wherein
he
dwelleth
,
or
the
land
he
tilleth
,
is
his
owne
.
They
acknowledge
to
hold
all
they
haue
of
him
:
he
ordinarily
intertaineth
diuers
great
and
mighty
armies
both
by
sea
and
by
land
.
So
as
it
must
needes
be
granted
that
he
is
greater
in
his
estates
,
meanes
and
power
,
then
euer
were
the
Romans
,
for
he
so
peaceably
maintaineth
what
he
hath
conquered
,
as
he
can
no
waies
vndergoe
the
troubles
and
wars
which
the
Romans
endured
at
the
hands
of
Mithridate
,
the
Parthians
,
Farnaces
and
others
.
Moreouer
,
next
Europe
the
Gaules
are
not
his
enemies
.
The
Cymbrians
are
his
associats
;
so
as
he
fostereth
such
a
tranquillity
and
obedience
on
all
sides
,
as
he
amasseth
inestimable
treasure
.
4
And
more
,
(
a
thing
worth
the
noting
)
in
three
hundred
yeeres
space
since
he
began
first
to
reigne
,
he
hath
receiued
but
foure
notable
ouerthrowes
(
that
excepted
which
he
receiued
the
yeere
past
neere
Tauris
)
But
the
Romaines
in
lesse
time
receiued
more
and
greater
at
the
only
hands
of
the
Carthaginians
.
In
sum
,
there
is
not
that
nation
in
the
world
which
can
vaunt
of
so
many
victories
in
so
short
a
space
,
or
to
haue
triumphed
of
the
captiuity
or
death
of
so
many
kings
and
great
Princes
,
as
the
great
Turke
;
or
that
haue
with
such
happie
successe
and
discipline
so
soone
raised
so
mightie
an
Empire
as
his
is
at
this
day
.
Is
it
not
a
fearfull
matter
to
heare
it
related
that
Mahomet
the
second
(
an
infidel
)
hath
had
such
fauour
of
the
heauens
,
as
to
haue
beene
able
in
the
space
of
32.
yeeres
raigne
,
to
subdue
two
Empires
,
vsurpe
twelue
kingdomes
,
and
take
by
force
two
hundred
cities
?
That
which
affordeth
the
greatest
cause
of
wonder
,
is
,
that
all
this
hath
succeeded
in
the
very
time
when
the
art
of
military
engines
&
fortifications
were
in
their
perfection
,
and
wherewith
we
might
haue
armed
our selues
to
withstand
him
.
In
conclusion
,
what
shal
we
say
of
Selim
the
first
,
who
in
lesse
then
foure
yeeres
space
vanquished
the
Mamelucks
,
subdued
all
Syria
,
Palestina
,
the
red
sea
,
a
great
part
of
Arabia
and
all
Aegypt
?
These
are
questionlesse
goodly
and
notable
Tropheys
of
the
Turks
greatnesse
,
but
most
dishonorable
and
dangerous
for
all
Christendome
.
CHAP.
IIII.
Whether
the
Empire
of
the
Turke
draw
towards
an
end
.
-
1
The
Ottaman
Empire
leaneth
toward
ruine
.
-
2
The
reasons
are
the
bordering
princes
vpon
the
Turkes
estate
,
and
their
prouiding
for
their
safety
.
-
3
Made
wise
by
others
harmes
they
stand
vpon
their
defensiue
war
.
-
4
They
are
bridled
by
strong
fortresses
.
-
5
Contrary
arguments
.
1
WE
haue
discoursed
as
briefely
as
might
be
of
the
fall
and
ruine
of
estates
,
of
their
efficient
causes
,
and
vpon
what
coniectures
a
man
might
gather
them
.
It
is
now
time
that
we
see
and
examine
in
like
sort
whether
the
empire
of
the
Turke
be
nere
his
end
,
and
abatement
of
his
greatnesse
,
according
as
a
man
may
draw
from
coniectures
it
leaneth
towards
his
declining
;
and
though
the
foundation
heereof
be
built
vpon
reasons
so
cleere
and
euident
as
they
are
not
to
be
contraried
,
yet
will
I
alledge
one
that
carrieth
more
apparence
then
all
the
other
;
and
that
is
,
that
the
greatnesse
of
his
empire
is
at
the
highest
that
it
may
be
by
the
ruine
of
Princes
by
him
expelled
,
vanquished
and
made
away
one
after
an
other
,
whilest
he
hath
in
the
meane
time
triumphed
of
their
estates
and
rich
spoiles
;
but
now
that
he
hath
none
to
oppose
him
with
hopes
of
so
fauourable
issue
as
had
the
other
:
his
ambition
,
heart
,
and
courage
will
grow
idle
and
languish
;
whence
in
time
will
spring
the
ruine
of
his
Empire
;
Is
he
not
already
come
to
that
passe
?
The
Princes
that
confine
vpon
him
,
though
more
weake
then
he
to
bid
him
battaile
,
assaile
,
or
defend
,
haue
neuerthelesse
so
ordered
their
affaires
and
meanes
,
as
they
are
able
at
this
day
to
sheeld
themselues
sufficiently
from
his
attempts
.
2
Amongst
others
the
King
of
Persia
,
doth
he
not
so
ballance
his
power
as
he
hath
giuen
him
many
great
ouerthrowes
,
and
one
lately
(
as
I
haue
said
)
neere
Tauris
?
The
Tartarians
also
hold
him
plaie
and
more
prouoke
him
then
he
them
;
and
of
late
they
got
from
him
Caffa
a
strong
and
wealthy
towne
;
moreouer
whilest
he
was
busied
about
the
wars
of
Persia
the
Georgians
took
and
sacked
Xistis
;
but
they
were
not
able
to
hold
it
;
so
as
the
Turke
hath
repossessed
himself
of
it
.
The
Muscouit
doth
not
only
defend
himselfe
from
the
incursions
of
the
Turks
,
but
he
oft
times
also
skirmisheth
with
them
,
commanding
as
he
doth
aboue
an
hundred
and
fifty
thousand
horse
.
The
King
of
Polonia
likewise
more
mighty
then
the
Muscouit
,
is
so
strong
as
he
will
not
take
wrong
;
but
is
able
rather
at
all
times
to
repell
the
violence
of
his
enemy
.
The
house
of
Austria
together
with
the
aid
of
the
Princes
of
Germanie
,
hath
wherewithall
to
make
their
party
good
and
to
oppose
him
:
the
Venetians
,
vnited
with
Italy
and
Spaine
(
which
in
such
a
case
will
not
abandon
them
)
are
likewise
able
enough
to
defend
themselues
and
hold
their
owne
.
As
for
the
king
of
Spain
,
he
is
so
mighty
by
sea
and
by
land
,
both
of
men
and
mony
,
as
he
dareth
vndertake
himselfe
to
incounter
the
Turke
in
battaile
,
much
more
to
defend
himselfe
if
assaulted
.
The
King
of
Fez
is
not
anie
way
awed
by
him
,
and
is
more
strong
then
he
,
at
the
least
in
Africke
;
which
he
approued
to
the
common
hurt
of
Christendome
by
that
ouerthrow
and
death
of
the
King
Don
Sebastian
of
Portugall
,
where
so
many
Christians
miserably
ended
their
daies
.
The
last
of
those
which
abut
vpon
the
Turke
is
Prester
Iohn
,
who
hath
hitherto
behaued
himselfe
so
honorably
against
him
,
as
he
hath
neuer
shewed
any
token
of
fearing
his
forces
.
So
as
being
now
vnable
by
reason
of
the
concord
&
stout
opposition
of
his
neighbours
,
to
gaine
farther
ground
;
he
must
of
necessity
(
vnlesse
God
in
regard
of
our
sinnes
be
otherwise
pleased
)
begin
to
recoile
;
and
that
greatnesse
which
he
hath
built
vpon
others
ruines
must
decay
and
lessen
;
since
the
matter
which
gaue
the
increase
is
on
his
part
wanting
.
3
There
is
yet
an
other
point
which
fortifieth
this
opinion
,
and
that
is
:
that
all
such
Princes
as
confine
vpon
the
Turke
,
are
by
others
example
made
more
wise
,
aduised
and
considerat
,
then
they
were
before
the
ruine
of
such
as
serued
for
a
pray
to
the
Ottomans
;
whereby
they
will
discreetly
looke
to
themselues
how
they
courageously
hazzard
their
persons
or
estates
at
one
battaile
:
they
will
rather
be
content
to
stand
vpon
their
defence
,
attending
while
time
beget
some
apparent
occasion
,
roundly
and
to
the
purpose
to
set
vpon
him
.
4
Againe
,
there
are
at
this
day
so
many
fortresses
,
so
strong
and
so
well
appointed
,
as
they
are
in
a
manner
impregnable
,
so
as
the
Turke
is
not
like
to
finde
the
way
so
open
as
heeretofore
he
did
to
carry
them
:
but
if
he
should
put
himselfe
vpon
that
hazardous
enterprise
of
forcing
them
one
by
one
,
it
were
as
much
as
to
become
the
author
of
his
owne
ruine
.
5
Neither
ought
any
man
in
opposing
this
,
CHAP.
V.
By
what
kinde
of
causes
the
Empire
of
the
Turkes
might
most
easily
faile
.
-
1
The
power
of
the
Turke
not
to
be
easily
ouerthrowne
by
outward
causes
.
-
2
The
power
of
Princes
&
estates
bordering
vpon
the
Turke
,
as
the
Persians
,
Tartarians
,
Moscouits
,
Polonians
,
Germans
,
Venetians
,
Spaniards
,
&c.
1
AS
wee
haue
at
large
intreated
in
the
chapters
going
before
by
what
causes
all
estates
may
be
brought
to
their
last
end
and
ruine
;
so
are
we
now
to
come
to
that
of
the
Ottomans
,
as
one
of
the
greatest
;
and
examine
by
what
inconueniences
it
may
vndergoe
a
change
.
I
am
of
opinion
that
this
their
so
raised
greatnesse
can
hardly
decay
by
vertue
of
outward
causes
;
seeing
the
Princes
bordering
vpon
their
estate
,
2
This
weakenesse
presupposed
,
it
followeth
that
it
will
proue
a
hard
matter
to
ruine
him
by
forraine
force
,
whose
strength
and
meanes
it
is
requisit
we
examine
to
inlighten
this
opinion
.
First
,
those
that
confine
vpon
the
Turke
next
Africke
,
are
the
King
of
Fez
,
of
Marocco
,
and
Prester
Iohn
:
next
Asia
,
the
Sophi
and
the
Tartarians
:
in
Europe
the
Duke
of
Muscouy
,
the
King
of
Polonia
,
the
Emperour
,
the
Venetians
,
and
the
King
of
Spaine
.
As
for
the
King
of
Fez
he
hath
men
enow
,
but
small
store
of
mony
,
so
as
he
hath
not
the
meanes
or
ability
to
maintaine
a
lasting
war
:
Againe
,
though
I
should
suppose
he
were
able
to
be
at
the
charge
,
yet
I
finde
him
naked
of
other
things
necessarie
to
aduantage
himselfe
vpon
the
Turke
,
such
as
are
places
of
strength
to
forward
his
proceedings
,
and
assure
his
retrait
:
so
as
he
is
like
enough
to
come
short
of
his
aime
:
and
if
he
should
performe
some
worthy
exploit
in
Africk
,
doubtles
the
King
of
Spaine
his
neighbour
would
soone
be
iealous
of
his
good
fortune
.
And
in
very
deede
this
is
not
the
point
,
for
it
is
all
one
with
Christendome
whether
the
King
of
Fez
be
too
strong
for
the
Turke
,
or
the
Turke
for
the
King
of
Fez
,
since
both
are
the
Christians
enemies
.
As
for
Prester
Iohn
,
all
the
world
knoweth
he
hath
enough
to
doe
to
defend
himselfe
against
the
Turkes
forces
;
neither
is
it
long
since
he
wan
from
him
all
the
hauens
he
had
vpon
the
red
sea
,
and
amongst
others
that
of
Archiech
and
Mazzua
:
now
for
the
Sophi
,
if
we
search
their
histories
we
shall
finde
that
the
kings
of
Persia
haue
alwaies
had
the
worse
of
the
Turks
,
&
among
all
other
Mahomet
the
second
ouercame
Vsumcassan
;
CHAP.
VI.
That
it
is
not
an
impossible
thing
for
the
Christians
with
open
force
to
vanquish
the
Turke
.
-
1
The
Turke
is
not
inuincible
.
-
2
Examples
of
their
sundry
ouerthrowes
.
-
3
A
comparison
of
their
good
and
ill
successe
in
battailes
.
All
proofes
that
they
may
be
conquered
.
1
THe
conclusion
of
the
argument
of
the
former
chapter
,
is
,
that
the
Turke
cannot
by
way
of
open
force
receiue
harme
or
ruine
of
importance
;
because
of
the
mighty
power
and
meanes
he
hath
of
his
owne
.
But
heereby
is
not
inferred
that
therefore
Christian
Princes
should
faile
of
courage
or
hope
,
to
goe
thorow
with
their
affaires
to
his
preiudice
;
rather
otherwise
placing
their
confidence
in
the
Almighty
,
they
are
to
hope
better
then
euer
,
for
the
reasons
I
shall
heereafter
alledge
;
by
the
handling
wherof
I
hope
to
proue
that
so
far
is
he
from
being
inuincible
,
as
on
the
contrary
he
may
be
easily
vanquished
as
many
experiences
may
resolue
vs
.
2
We
haue
elsewhere
said
that
Baiazet
the
first
was
ouercome
and
taken
aliue
at
the
battaile
he
fought
at
Mount-Stella
against
the
great
Tamberlain
,
Carambeius
Bassa
of
Amurath
the
second
,
was
discomfited
by
Ladislaus
King
of
Polonia
in
the
valley
of
mount
Hermus
:
Iohn
Huniades
,
which
at
one
time
recouered
from
him
a
part
of
Seruia
and
all
Moldauia
:
but
instead
of
performing
this
he
became
himselfe
prisoner
of
that
King
,
and
had
almost
al
his
army
put
to
the
sword
.
Baiazet
the
second
sent
Calibeius
and
Querscogles
his
sonne
in
law
into
Asia
against
Caitheus
Soldan
of
Aegypt
with
a
great
army
to
reuenge
the
intertainment
the
Soldan
had
giuen
Zizimus
his
brother
,
Don
Iohn
of
Austria
naturall
sone
of
Charles
the
fifth
in
the
yeere
1571.
got
at
Lepanto
that
so
renowned
victory
of
the
army
of
Selim
the
second
;
this
hath
since
made
them
walke
(
as
they
say
)
with
the
bridle
in
their
hands
,
and
confesse
they
had
passed
too
rash
a
iudgment
vpon
the
power
of
the
Christians
either
by
sea
or
by
land
:
I
omit
to
speake
of
the
prowesse
&
noble
acts
of
Scanderbeg
against
the
Turkes
,
and
how
many
times
he
ouerthrew
the
Commanders
of
Amurath
the
second
:
and
valiantly
recouered
Albania
the
place
of
his
birth
whereof
he
and
his
predecessors
had
beene
depriued
by
that
Tyrant
,
neither
will
I
again
cite
the
examples
of
Iohn
Huniades
or
Mathew
Coruin
,
who
in
a
manner
with
a
handfull
of
men
opposed
and
discomfited
the
Turkish
forces
,
nor
of
the
Portugals
,
though
they
haue
at
sundry
times
assailed
the
Turk
neere
the
red
sea
,
barred
him
of
passage
,
and
rid
him
of
the
meanes
of
farther
issuing
out
of
the
mouth
of
that
sea
.
What
should
I
speake
of
the
Tartarians
,
who
but
lately
tooke
from
him
Taurica
Chersones
(
called
at
this
day
Perocopsky
)
if
the
reports
which
come
from
those
partes
be
credible
?
3
Such
as
haue
beene
curious
in
the
search
of
the
Turkish
history
haue
obserued
,
that
in
the
space
of
two
hundred
and
fourescore
yeeres
they
haue
fought
with
their
neighbours
thirty
and
sixe
battailes
,
whereof
they
haue
only
gained
eighteene
and
lost
the
rest
.
These
are
all
signes
and
successes
whereby
a
man
may
conclude
that
they
are
not
inuincible
,
and
that
their
fortune
hath
beene
ballanced
betweene
gaine
&
losse
,
so
as
we
may
beleeue
,
if
God
for
our
offences
did
not
busie
the
forces
of
Christian
Princes
elsewhere
then
against
the
Turke
,
where
he
hath
had
the
ouerthrow
once
,
he
had
had
it
thrice
:
by
all
these
foregoing
examples
we
may
collect
that
this
proud
enemy
hath
not
his
head
so
hard
as
it
may
not
be
broken
,
or
else
sorely
brufed
.
And
though
Christian
Princes
are
not
of
power
sufficient
apart
and
of
themselues
to
take
him
to
taske
,
yet
may
they
doe
it
by
ranging
themselues
to
that
vnion
and
concord
,
as
that
there
be
amongst
them
but
one
common
fortune
.
This
being
granted
(
as
I
presume
it
shall
)
we
are
to
vnfold
how
they
may
purchase
his
ruine
.
CHAP.
VII
.
Why
the
leagues
among
Christian
Princes
are
commonly
of
small
effect
.
-
1
Leagues
are
concluded
for
the
respect
of
honour
and
profit
.
-
2
The
inequality
of
gaine
bringeth
a
difficulty
to
the
conclusion
of
leagues
.
-
3
Christian
Princes
the
farther
they
are
from
the
Turke
,
the
lesse
haue
they
feare
of
dangers
wherewith
other
more
neere
him
are
possessed
.
-
4
No
man
vainely
exposeth
himselfe
to
an
apparant
danger
but
where
an
euident
commodity
inuites
him
.
-
5
While
each
striues
to
protect
his
owne
frontiers
from
the
Turke
,
others
are
neglected
.
-
6
The
inequality
of
aide
begetteth
a
contention
who
shall
command
most
in
the
wars
.
-
7
Remedies
against
such
difficulties
and
calamities
.
1
THere
are
many
respects
and
causes
,
which
customarily
make
the
leagues
of
Christian
Princes
altogether
vneffectuall
,
which
may
appeere
to
some
a
matter
of
hard
disgestion
,
and
for
this
cause
I
hold
it
requisite
particularly
to
cleere
it
.
It
is
a
receiued
maxime
that
all
the
actions
of
Princes
are
vndertaken
for
two
principal
causes
,
honor
and
profit
:
that
the
consideration
of
honor
often
masqueth
vnder
the
pretence
or
good
of
their
affaires
:
we
will
then
only
meddle
with
profit
which
we
may
tearme
interest
.
2
Now
this
interest
(
a
common
maske
for
all
faces
)
cannot
be
a
like
equall
betweene
Christian
Princes
with
one
consent
vndertaking
the
war
against
the
Turke
:
for
they
diuersly
confine
vpon
the
common
enemy
,
and
this
diuersity
breedeth
a
difference
also
betweene
their
resolutions
and
interests
;
and
though
this
be
an
inconuenience
not
in
the
case
in
handling
to
be
contemned
,
yet
the
principall
difficulty
dependeth
not
heerein
:
It
rather
consisteth
wholly
in
the
concord
of
the
treaty
of
the
league
,
and
this
concorde
is
hard
to
be
wrought
for
these
following
reasons
.
3
All
these
Princes
are
not
neighbours
of
the
Turke
in
the
same
equallity
:
some
are
more
strong
then
other
:
this
difference
of
strength
affordeth
to
some
a
commodity
to
defend
themselues
or
offend
him
with
their
owne
forces
:
others
are
weake
,
and
consequently
exposed
to
the
incursions
and
spoiles
of
the
Turke
.
It
is
an
infallible
maxime
,
that
the
farther
Princes
are
from
the
danger
,
the
lesse
forward
are
they
to
stir
,
prepare
for
the
war
,
or
contribute
to
the
charge
or
meanes
requisite
for
the
vndertaking
thereof
with
the
like
feruency
and
affection
as
they
would
if
they
saw
themselues
so
neere
to
the
mischiefe
,
and
that
there
were
apparant
danger
.
4
Againe
,
that
Prince
which
seeth
no
great
profit
or
interest
in
such
an
enterprise
doth
lesse
regard
it
then
he
whom
necessity
inforceth
to
stand
vpon
his
garde
,
and
feare
that
tyrants
inuasion
.
Moreouer
,
if
the
Princes
vnited
to
this
league
and
combination
shall
once
know
that
they
shall
get
little
or
smally
aduantage
their
estate
,
it
is
not
to
be
expected
(
when
they
enter
into
it
)
that
they
will
bring
with
them
that
courage
,
resolution
,
affection
,
and
forwardnesse
as
the
businesse
would
require
.
See
then
how
the
disposition
of
the
interest
makes
the
beginning
difficult
,
the
proceeding
and
issue
vncertaine
,
by
reason
of
the
diuers
alterations
and
varieties
which
accompany
euery
associated
Prince
,
sutable
to
his
passion
or
affection
;
Whereupon
would
vndoubtedly
follow
an
impossibilitie
of
establishing
this
league
,
and
vnion
vpon
so
sure
foundations
,
as
that
the
beginning
may
be
good
,
the
middle
and
end
better
:
since
the
effect
without
vnion
amongst
many
agents
remaineth
euermore
as
nothing
or
nothing
woorth
.
5
We
fall
then
farre
short
of
our
reckoning
,
vnlesse
wee
can
minister
some
remedy
to
the
diuersities
of
this
interest
and
profit
.
This
inconuenience
is
attended
on
,
and
counterpeized
by
an
other
of
as
great
or
greater
consideration
:
And
this
is
the
interest
and
particular
consequence
of
the
neighbourhood
that
euery
one
indifferently
hath
with
the
Turke
;
by
the
which
indifferency
,
each
one
according
as
his
feare
is
,
will
desire
the
warre
may
be
vndertaken
to
his
aduantage
.
As
for
example
,
Spaine
feareth
the
neighbourhood
of
Algiers
;
Venice
of
Albania
:
hence
will
grow
that
the
league
taking
effect
,
the
Venetians
will
striue
that
the
forces
of
the
league
may
be
imployed
in
the
Leuant
,
the
Spaniards
toward
the
South
:
so
as
it
will
not
be
possible
to
manage
the
enterprise
to
both
their
satisfactions
.
6
There
is
yet
another
inconuenience
that
our
Princes
wil
not
be
able
by
an
equall
portion
to
enter
into
the
league
,
inasmuch
as
one
wanteth
meanes
to
contribute
thereto
in
money
more
then
a
sixt
part
,
another
a
fift
part
;
others
that
haue
no
money
,
will
contribute
men
or
ships
;
others
more
mightie
in
both
,
will
vndertake
halfe
or
a
second
.
These
are
all
the
portions
by
whose
assemblie
a
league
may
be
formed
.
Of
their
indifferencie
groweth
yet
another
difficultie
or
inconuenience
(
as
we
list
to
tearme
it
)
and
that
is
,
that
whosoeuer
contributeth
the
halfe
,
would
likewise
haue
in
his
handes
(
as
the
greatest
and
mightiest
)
all
the
power
and
swaie
.
In
which
it
will
follow
,
that
the
other
shall
not
vndertake
or
performe
ought
but
by
his
aduice
,
direction
,
and
assistance
:
If
he
will
make
a
stand
,
they
are
not
to
go
forward
;
if
he
list
to
march
elsewhere
,
then
their
desires
carrie
them
,
they
must
follow
him
:
If
his
affaires
presse
him
to
alter
his
resolution
and
minde
,
and
that
hee
will
retyre
to
his
home
,
they
are
constrained
to
doe
the
like
,
so
as
all
their
charge
,
paines
,
and
holy
intentions
,
are
vtterly
ouerthrowne
,
and
they
oftentimes
rest
exposed
to
the
iniurie
and
reuenge
of
their
dangerous
neighbour
,
against
whom
they
iointly
rose
in
armes
.
7
These
are
,
to
say
the
trueth
,
considerations
and
inconueniences
of
that
value
and
consequence
(
measuring
them
by
their
parts
,
and
not
by
the
whole
)
as
we
must
conclude
that
none
but
God
is
able
to
tune
this
league
to
an
agreeing
harmony
,
which
we
are
most
humbly
to
craue
at
his
Almightie
hands
with
a
strong
faith
,
a
true
amendment
of
life
,
and
a
more
perfect
charitie
then
this
age
affoordeth
.
CHAP.
VIII
.
The
defects
which
may
be
obserued
in
the
leagues
of
the
yeere
1537
:
and
1571.
-
1
The
conditions
,
successe
and
errors
of
the
league
in
anno
1537.
-
2
Of
that
of
1570.
-
3
How
a
league
may
be
established
to
auoide
the
formerly
committed
errors
.
1
COntinuing
the
matter
of
the
former
chapter
,
it
will
not
be
beside
the
purpose
,
by
the
way
to
touch
the
defects
which
were
found
in
two
the
most
memorable
leagues
that
haue
beene
made
in
our
time
betweene
the
Princes
of
Christendome
.
The
first
resolued
vpon
in
the
time
of
Pope
Paul
the
third
,
Andrew
Doria
was
chosen
Generall
of
the
Emperours
army
,
Vincentio
Capelli
of
the
Venetians
,
and
Marco
Grimani
Patriarch
of
Aquileia
of
the
Popes
,
hauing
for
his
Lieutenant
Paul
Iustinian
;
and
for
the
maine
land
seruice
Ferdinand
Gonzaga
was
chosen
Generall
.
Moreouer
it
was
concluded
betweene
the
princes
,
that
whatsoeuer
they
should
get
from
the
Turkes
with
the
forces
of
the
league
either
in
Greece
or
Dalmatia
should
be
left
to
the
Venetians
as
in
recompence
of
their
so
great
expence
and
losse
that
they
should
suffer
by
warring
vpon
the
Turke
.
Soliman
seeing
the
forces
of
the
league
assembled
,
made
hast
to
lanch
his
Gallies
foorth
into
the
maine
.
Such
was
his
diligence
as
they
were
within
a
few
daies
in
a
readinesse
and
went
for
Candy
,
where
they
made
some
hauocke
,
but
of
no
great
moment
.
After
these
roades
Barbarossa
made
a
stay
of
al
the
army
in
the
gulfe
of
Larta
,
there
to
attend
the
Christians
which
came
onward
,
but
so
slowly
as
the
season
passed
without
performing
ought
,
or
without
that
they
once
met
together
,
and
that
which
was
yet
worse
,
our
men
inforced
by
tempest
,
retired
themselues
to
Corfú
whence
they
set
foorth
.
Barbarossa
followed
them
as
far
as
Antipaxo
within
an
hundred
miles
of
Corfú
,
but
perceiuing
them
to
prepare
themselues
to
fight
he
speedily
retired
to
the
gulfe
of
Larta
,
so
as
our
army
was
resolued
for
Dirachium
,
otherwise
called
Drazo
or
la
Velona
,
but
that
being
a
dangerous
harbour
for
the
gallies
,
they
turned
their
force
vpon
Castell
Nouo
which
they
carried
by
assault
:
an
exploit
(
to
say
the
truth
)
of
that
small
importance
(
respecting
their
charge
and
prouision
)
as
it
wan
them
as
much
dishonor
as
profit
,
the
towne
being
won
the
Spaniards
seazed
themselues
of
it
.
The
Venetians
disputed
it
as
a
thing
appertaining
to
them
according
to
the
articles
of
the
league
;
but
it
was
to
small
purpose
,
wherefore
quieting
themselues
since
it
was
not
to
be
remedied
they
tooke
an
occasion
thereupon
to
shift
themselues
of
the
league
.
The
yeere
following
Soliman
recouered
Castle
Nouo
with
the
losse
of
those
Spaniards
which
kept
it
,
who
were
all
put
to
the
sword
,
those
which
escaped
induring
a
most
miserable
seruitude
:
and
though
the
peace
treated
by
the
Venetian
was
somewhat
disaduantageous
,
yet
they
indured
that
more
willingly
,
then
to
be
otherwise
dealt
with
then
was
agreed
vpon
:
other
causes
might
be
alleaged
,
as
the
ceasing
of
trafficke
and
many
other
discommodities
,
besides
the
impouerishing
of
their
Estate
,
all
which
necessarily
attende
the
intertainement
of
armies
.
2
The
last
league
of
the
yeere
1571.
3
It
will
be
now
time
to
deliuer
how
all
these
inconueniences
may
be
stopped
,
and
the
league
become
firme
and
durable
,
without
consideration
of
any
particular
interest
,
to
the
end
that
euery
one
may
voluntarily
in
deuotion
consent
thereto
to
the
glory
of
God
with
a
free
heart
,
and
an
vndaunted
magnanimitie
:
In
which
case
,
the
conditions
being
rather
free
then
forced
on
either
side
,
we
may
reape
thereby
fruits
woorthy
and
honorable
:
These
two
leagues
heeretofore
mentioned
,
hapned
in
a
time
so
dangerous
for
the
Venetians
,
as
it
was
more
then
necessarie
that
the
Christian
Princes
(
though
not
interessed
)
should
vnite
their
forces
to
assist
and
protect
the
other
.
So
the
one
standing
in
the
water
vp
to
the
throat
,
and
incompassed
with
danger
,
and
the
other
on
the
contrary
,
free
from
feare
of
perill
,
they
entred
into
the
couenants
and
conditions
of
the
league
,
not
such
as
they
ought
to
haue
beene
to
make
them
lasting
;
but
such
as
were
presented
to
men
standing
in
neede
of
them
,
who
inforced
by
necessitie
,
might
not
refuse
them
,
to
the
end
to
cleere
themselues
of
a
neere
threatning
mischiefe
.
Leagues
wil
then
be
durable
when
they
shall
be
stablished
at
a
time
when
men
are
free
and
exempt
from
all
constraint
;
and
not
to
attend
as
they
do
,
till
the
Turke
affright
one
of
the
confederates
,
and
that
he
be
alreadie
come
into
the
field
so
strong
both
by
sea
and
land
,
as
the
Venetians
or
some
other
of
the
confederates
are
already
by
him
assailed
.
At
such
a
time
to
seeke
a
remedy
by
their
hastie
assembling
,
is
the
way
to
imprint
a
certaine
feare
in
their
people
;
and
make
them
flocke
together
in
the
fold
as
sheepe
in
presence
of
the
woolfe
.
It
is
requisite
then
that
the
league
be
contracted
at
leisure
,
in
a
time
of
peace
,
and
in
a
season
when
the
associates
may
be
inuited
,
not
by
any
vrgent
danger
,
but
voluntarily
,
and
with
such
an
alacritie
of
heart
,
as
they
may
vnite
their
persons
,
their
meanes
,
their
powers
,
and
their
courages
all
together
to
offend
the
common
enemy
.
CHAP.
IX
.
A
league
which
may
be
treated
without
danger
of
the
former
defects
.
-
1
The
qualities
of
perfect
leagues
.
-
2
The
conditions
of
leagues
,
and
what
each
of
the
confederates
is
to
attempt
vpon
the
enemie
.
-
3
The
commoditie
of
them
so
concluded
.
-
4
Aduise
for
a
generall
contribution
against
priuate
gaine
.
-
5
That
the
danger
we
stande
in
of
the
Turke
,
is
greater
then
many
suppose
,
and
that
therefore
those
that
are
most
remote
,
ought
willingly
to
contribute
.
-
6
What
should
mooue
vs
to
ioyne
in
league
against
the
Turke
.
1
NOw
then
to
reape
the
woorthie
and
honorable
fruits
of
a
holie
league
&
association
,
we
are
to
remooue
the
defects
and
inconueniences
which
haue
made
the
former
leagues
prooue
abortiue
:
And
the
better
to
effect
it
,
it
is
necessary
that
their
treaties
be
voluntarie
:
that
Princes
voluntarily
ioyne
their
powers
&
meanes
to
one
end
,
though
by
different
courses
:
so
as
growing
to
capitulations
,
the
one
doe
not
aduantage
himselfe
vpon
the
straightning
of
the
others
affaires
.
This
is
it
which
equalling
the
conditions
,
will
cause
euery
one
to
partake
in
the
enterprise
,
without
all
suspect
or
particular
iealousie
:
It
is
not
enough
that
the
defects
of
these
leagues
be
discouered
,
if
they
make
vs
not
more
wise
in
the
framing
of
other
to
come
:
to
the
end
we
may
with
all
deuotion
and
sinceritie
builde
them
on
a
strong
and
vnmooueable
foundation
;
and
thus
in
my
opinion
may
be
the
manner
of
our
proceeding
.
2
It
is
not
required
that
to
establish
this
league
and
make
it
fructifie
,
the
confederate
forces
should
assemble
in
one
place
,
but
at
one
time
:
my
meaning
is
,
that
our
Princes
must
bee
readie
to
assaile
the
enemie
at
once
in
diuers
places
,
and
that
euery
one
bende
his
forces
towards
parts
which
are
neerest
to
him
,
so
to
begin
the
warre
to
some
purpose
:
As
for
example
,
the
Spaniards
should
inuade
the
parts
of
Algiers
:
the
Venetians
and
the
Pope
,
of
Albania
:
the
gallies
of
Sauoy
,
Malta
,
and
Florence
,
should
continue
their
ordinarie
courses
against
the
Turke
;
vnlesse
they
would
ioyne
with
the
Venetians
or
the
king
of
Spain
:
the
Polonians
should
set
vpon
Walachia
:
the
Emperour
and
Princes
of
Germany
vpon
Hungary
.
3
Questionlesse
if
each
of
these
did
in
this
manner
assaile
him
,
their
courage
and
force
would
be
the
greater
,
as
would
likewise
be
their
desire
to
persist
in
their
enterprise
,
without
any
respect
of
paines
or
expence
,
hoping
all
would
redound
to
their
honour
,
profit
,
and
particular
securitie
:
which
they
cannot
expect
from
the
other
leagues
,
and
this
is
that
which
hath
in
part
made
them
defectiue
.
The
enemie
that
should
be
so
many
waies
set
vpon
,
would
be
constrained
to
diuide
his
forces
,
which
consequently
would
become
lesse
able
to
protect
him
,
on
all
sides
whersoeuer
he
should
be
assailed
.
First
,
the
gallies
of
Malta
assisted
with
some
other
,
and
scouring
(
as
they
might
)
the
Leuant
seas
,
would
keepe
in
such
awe
those
that
guarde
Alexandria
and
Rhodes
,
as
they
would
not
dare
to
peepe
out
:
Againe
,
if
Spaine
would
inuade
Barbarie
,
the
gallies
of
Algiers
would
be
sure
to
keepe
home
:
so
as
the
strength
of
Venice
ioyned
with
that
of
the
Church
,
would
doe
what
they
list
,
and
would
meete
with
no
encounter
by
sea
which
they
should
not
easily
ouermatch
:
especially
if
at
the
same
time
the
Emperour
and
the
King
of
Polonia
,
would
warre
likewise
vpon
the
Turke
.
We
haue
an
example
of
the
times
which
verifieth
our
position
.
When
Soliman
vndertooke
the
warre
of
Hungary
,
Andrew
Doria
Generall
of
his
galleies
,
with
a
very
small
armie
troubled
all
the
Leuant
,
tooke
by
maine
force
Coron
and
Patras
,
and
harrowed
all
those
seas
without
controule
or
encounter
of
the
enemies
:
whence
followeth
,
that
if
the
Christians
would
as
I
haue
saide
,
at
one
instant
set
vpon
the
Turke
,
they
would
force
him
no
doubt
into
a
narrow
straight
.
4
There
is
one
point
that
would
make
the
enterprise
easie
,
more
forcible
and
lasting
,
but
it
would
hardly
be
disgested
,
and
that
is
to
draw
all
Christian
Princes
which
confine
not
with
the
Turke
,
to
contribute
vnto
it
.
All
these
suppose
themselues
free
from
danger
and
make
no
reckning
of
others
sufferings
,
in
whose
behalfe
they
thinke
they
should
not
contribute
,
as
those
that
were
like
to
haue
but
the
charge
and
the
other
the
profit
.
In
a
word
,
all
catholike
Princes
are
so
wedded
to
this
particular
interest
,
which
is
euer
more
differing
and
vnequall
among
them
(
as
hath
beene
before
alledged
)
as
the
league
would
neuer
be
thorowly
concluded
or
of
long
continuance
,
this
must
of
necessity
be
forgotten
,
and
the
only
desire
of
the
exaltation
of
the
Church
of
God
must
be
that
which
must
range
them
to
the
necessarie
point
,
whereof
they
need
not
trauell
to
seeke
examples
out
of
their
owne
houses
,
which
if
they
would
but
imitate
all
would
succeed
wel
,
to
inuite
them
to
it
I
wil
alledge
one
.
The
principall
aime
of
the
league
set
on
foote
by
Godfrye
of
Buillion
,
5
Leauing
apart
all
these
considerations
let
vs
come
to
the
opinion
that
some
haue
of
their
being
far
from
danger
,
and
we
shall
finde
peraduenture
that
they
are
neerer
thereto
then
they
are
aware
.
When
Amurath
came
first
out
of
Asia
into
Europe
was
not
Hungary
(
which
is
now
subiect
to
the
Turke
)
farther
off
from
the
confines
of
the
Ottomans
Empire
then
are
now
the
countries
of
Saxony
or
of
Bauiers
,
6
Shall
we
then
say
because
we
haue
a
mountaine
before
vs
,
or
a
riuer
betweene
vs
,
or
some
estate
that
seemeth
to
shelter
vs
,
that
therefore
we
should
hold
our selues
happy
and
in
security
,
and
not
be
touched
with
others
danger
and
misery
?
No
surely
.
For
if
we
be
Christians
we
ought
not
only
to
haue
compassion
of
others
calamities
,
but
afforde
them
also
our
good
and
charitable
assistance
:
moreouer
he
that
measureth
future
things
but
by
the
consequence
of
things
present
,
findeth
himselfe
oft
times
beguiled
;
we
are
to
haue
such
prouident
care
of
what
is
present
,
&
to
come
,
that
we
may
leaue
to
ours
the
same
assurance
we
wish
to
our selues
,
to
the
end
to
preserue
them
by
this
prouidence
from
such
danger
as
they
might
incur
after
vs
.
And
though
we
should
not
carry
that
regard
of
our
children
and
posterity
,
and
that
the
consequence
of
our
estate
did
not
spur
vs
on
to
such
an
enterprise
,
shall
there
remaine
in
vs
so
little
courage
and
charity
,
loue
and
deuotion
to
the
glory
of
God
,
from
whom
we
haue
our
being
and
of
whom
wee
hold
our
powers
,
as
that
we
should
all
forget
to
husband
his
vineyard
,
and
expell
thence
such
as
intrude
themselues
into
it
and
pollute
it
?
wherefore
serue
all
those
heapes
of
treasure
which
the
Princes
of
Lombardy
amasse
,
one
in
enuy
of
an
other
?
whereupon
will
those
so
mighty
Princes
of
Germany
and
the
Imperiall
townes
spend
their
reuenues
and
incomparable
riches
?
what
occasion
can
all
of
them
finde
more
goodly
then
this
to
attaine
to
an
immortall
glory
?
It
is
then
for
the
inlarging
the
kingdome
of
Christ
that
we
must
imploy
all
we
haue
,
and
for
the
deliuerance
of
those
sacred
places
ouer
which
those
barbarous
infidels
tyrannize
,
to
redeeme
so
many
thousand
of
poore
Christian
slaues
which
suffer
and
grone
vnder
the
yoake
of
that
inraged
dogge
,
to
giue
life
to
an
infinite
number
of
Christians
,
to
reuenge
their
wrongs
,
to
punish
the
iniurires
&
blasphemies
which
that
tyrant
and
his
helhounds
haue
breathed
out
against
the
glory
of
God
,
his
holy
name
and
church
.
And
if
humaine
appetite
must
needs
be
an
actor
in
this
theater
,
it
would
be
an
easie
matter
for
great
Princes
that
send
their
forces
,
to
vrge
this
consideration
in
the
capitulations
,
that
they
should
haue
in
fauour
of
their
contributions
part
of
the
spoiles
and
conquests
that
they
might
happily
obtaine
.
Againe
,
if
the
loue
of
the
seruice
of
God
had
a
working
in
them
,
they
might
vndertake
in
person
the
Generall
conduct
of
the
army
,
or
command
part
of
the
confederat
troupes
.
Godfrey
a
poore
Prince
,
in
comparison
of
those
that
now
sway
Christendome
,
alienated
the
Duchy
of
Bouillion
for
so
godly
a
voyage
.
Stephen
Count
of
Chartres
did
the
like
with
his
estate
,
as
did
also
many
great
men
,
who
had
no
other
motiue
thereunto
then
the
enterprise
of
the
holy
land
.
Charles
the
seuenth
King
of
France
,
did
he
not
succor
the
Emperour
of
Constantinople
with
a
great
number
of
horse
which
he
sent
him
vnder
the
conduct
of
the
greatest
personages
of
his
kingdome
?
And
must
we
sit
idle
with
crossed
armes
whilest
the
cruell
flames
of
this
infidels
tyranny
burne
and
consume
the
houses
of
our
neighbours
?
CHAP.
X.
Wherein
consist
the
greatest
forces
of
the
Turke
.
-
1
Whether
the
Ianizzars
be
the
chiefe
strength
of
the
Turke
.
-
2
That
horse
are
more
necessary
in
the
war
then
foote
.
-
3
The
progresse
of
the
Turke
before
and
after
the
institution
of
the
Ianissars
.
-
4
Victories
gotten
by
the
horse
.
-
5
Ouerthrowes
giuen
by
the
enemies
horse
to
the
Christians
.
-
6
Conclusion
that
horse
in
seruice
excell
foote
.
IT
seemeth
that
the
greatest
part
of
such
as
discourse
of
the
forces
of
the
Turke
attribute
his
chiefe
strength
to
the
band
of
Ianizzars
,
as
the
only
sinew
of
his
power
:
and
amongst
other
reasons
wherewith
they
striue
to
fortify
their
oppinion
,
this
is
one
.
It
hath
hapned
many
times
that
the
army
of
the
Ottomans
hath
beene
so
hardly
laide
to
,
as
the
battaile
hath
been
in
a
manner
lost
,
yet
haue
they
gathered
strength
and
kept
themselues
on
foote
,
yea
they
haue
gotten
the
victory
,
and
all
through
the
vertue
and
valour
of
these
Legionaries
.
2
Machiauel
discourseth
vpon
this
point
,
3
First
no
man
is
ignorant
of
the
great
victories
the
Turk
got
long
time
before
the
institution
of
the
Ianizzars
.
Amurath
the
second
the
yeere
1420.
was
he
that
first
ordained
them
:
yet
Ottoman
had
before
that
taken
Sebasta
(
a
city
of
importance
in
Asia
)
where
he
slew
aboue
an
hundred
thousand
of
his
enemies
.
I
will
then
say
,
that
before
the
institution
and
seminary
of
Ianizzars
,
Iohn
Huniades
,
of
Mathew
Coruin
,
of
the
Mamelucks
,
of
the
great
Scanderbag
,
of
Don
Iohn
of
Austria
,
of
the
Kings
of
Persia
and
others
.
4
The
second
proofe
which
I
will
produce
to
fortifie
the
truth
of
my
proposition
,
is
,
that
all
such
as
haue
had
the
better
hand
of
the
Turkes
,
euer
had
it
by
the
meanes
of
their
horse
,
wherein
they
did
exceed
the
enemy
in
number
and
strength
,
as
we
haue
so
often
saide
of
the
Persians
and
of
the
Mamelucks
.
The
great
Sophi
●●mael
,
had
he
not
vanquished
Selim
the
second
with
the
strength
of
his
horse
,
if
when
he
did
set
vpon
the
rier-ward
,
where
the
Turke
was
in
person
,
the
thunder
of
his
Cannon
had
not
so
affrighted
the
horse
,
as
they
ran
away
with
their
masters
,
to
the
disordering
of
the
whole
armie
?
The
onely
thing
that
ouerthrew
the
fortune
which
the
Persian
had
almost
alreadie
in
his
possession
.
Cudabeuda
King
of
Persia
,
hath
many
times
ouercome
the
Turkish
forces
,
by
the
onely
strength
of
his
horse
,
whereof
he
hath
more
and
is
better
armed
then
the
other
.
The
Hungarians
in
like
sort
haue
many
times
put
the
Turkes
to
the
woorse
by
their
fight
on
horsebacke
.
5
The
third
and
strongest
proofe
of
my
assertion
,
is
,
that
all
the
harmes
we
haue
receiued
of
the
Turke
,
haue
come
by
his
horse
,
as
at
Nicapolis
,
at
Salembezza
,
at
Varna
,
at
the
riuer
of
Moraua
,
at
Exechium
,
at
Buda
and
elsewhere
.
6
And
if
it
euer
hapned
that
the
Ianizzars
recouered
the
battaile
halle
lost
,
it
is
to
be
imputed
to
this
,
that
they
were
reserued
for
the
rierward
;
so
as
it
was
easie
for
fresh
men
to
repell
those
which
were
already
weakned
and
tyred
.
But
I
thinke
no
man
but
will
grant
,
that
if
instead
of
the
Ianizzars
they
had
beene
as
many
horse
,
they
had
performed
as
much
.
As
on
the
contrarie
,
if
the
other
had
kept
in
store
some
fresh
troupes
of
horse
,
as
the
Turkes
,
they
had
dealt
otherwise
with
them
,
and
kept
them
well
enough
from
bereauing
them
of
the
victorie
.
In
conclusion
,
the
horse
are
they
that
defeat
the
enemie
,
and
become
masters
of
the
field
,
that
prepare
the
way
for
the
foote
to
the
beseeging
of
townes
,
and
giue
them
time
and
leisure
to
force
and
take
them
.
CHAP.
XI
.
Where
the
Turke
might
be
most
easily
assailed
to
ouercome
him
either
by
sea
or
by
land
.
-
1
Examples
of
sea
victories
.
-
2
The
goodnesse
of
our
hauens
.
-
3
The
number
of
our
skilfull
mariners
.
-
4
The
Christians
farre
beyond
the
Turkes
in
maritime
matters
.
-
5
The
Turkes
horse
fearefull
to
the
Christians
,
vnprofitable
at
sea
.
-
6
That
the
Turkes
are
easily
to
be
ouerthrowne
at
sea
.
1
THere
were
much
matter
for
doubt
and
disputation
vpon
this
question
,
if
reason
and
experience
did
not
cleere
it
:
for
experience
we
haue
it
fresh
in
many
accidents
;
which
instruct
vs
that
an
attempt
by
sea
,
would
be
lesse
difficult
to
vs
,
and
more
hurtfull
to
the
Turke
,
for
the
reasons
and
examples
which
I
will
deliuer
.
As
often
as
our
forces
haue
to
some
purpose
put
themselues
into
the
Leuant
seas
,
they
haue
beene
euermore
victorious
,
as
at
Metelin
,
at
Cafalonia
,
at
Preuesa
,
at
Scorsolari
.
If
any
one
opposing
me
obiect
the
ouerthrow
of
our
armie
at
Gerbes
,
2
Now
we
must
see
what
reasons
we
haue
in
store
to
prooue
that
we
may
more
easily
assaile
the
Turke
by
sea
then
by
land
.
Among
others
this
may
passe
,
that
our
seas
are
more
frequented
,
and
our
ports
more
rich
and
safe
then
those
of
the
Leuant
.
For
first
(
set
aside
Constantinople
)
there
is
not
thoroughout
their
obedience
,
any
one
Porte
that
may
be
equalled
to
those
of
Venice
,
Lisbone
,
Siuill
,
Antwerp
,
London
,
Amsterdam
,
Lubec
,
or
Danske
,
&c.
and
very
few
also
that
may
be
compared
with
those
of
Naples
,
Genoua
,
Villa-Franca
,
Nessina
,
Palermo
,
Ragusa
,
Marsseilles
,
Tolon
,
Bourdeaux
,
New-Hauen
,
Rochelle
,
and
Rouane
,
&c.
3
It
is
cleere
then
that
we
surmount
the
Turke
not
only
in
numbers
of
Portes
and
good
harbers
for
the
retraict
and
shelter
of
our
armies
,
but
also
in
Mariners
and
men
accustomed
and
experienced
in
both
the
seas
.
Moreouer
,
there
is
not
perhaps
in
the
world
a
coast
that
affoordeth
greater
plentie
of
men
then
that
of
Genoua
,
Dalmatia
,
Sclauonia
,
Venice
,
Candye
.
Againe
,
there
is
not
a
nation
to
be
found
of
more
resolution
or
better
proofe
for
sea
affaires
,
then
are
those
of
Marseilles
.
I
omit
to
speake
of
the
Catalonian
,
the
Portugal
,
the
Biskayan
,
the
English
,
the
Norman
,
the
Hollander
,
and
Zelander
,
all
people
marueilous
skilfull
in
Nauigation
.
4
I
would
willingly
demaund
,
what
it
auaileth
the
Turke
to
possesse
a
large
and
spacious
sea
bordering
country
,
if
it
remaine
vnhabited
;
neither
were
it
enough
if
it
were
:
for
the
exploits
of
maritime
warre
,
it
is
requisite
they
be
valiant
,
resolute
,
and
such
as
can
endure
trauell
and
paine
.
Alongst
all
the
coast
of
Africke
,
the
Turke
hath
not
one
Hauen
of
account
besides
Algies
.
In
all
Egypt
hee
hath
only
Alexandria
,
and
Dalmatia
,
at
the
least
which
are
held
in
any
consideration
.
In
Soria
,
take
away
Saffo
and
Pamphilia
,
those
neere
Tirus
,
Ephesus
,
Cicize
,
and
the
rest
so
celebrated
in
ancient
times
,
remaine
at
this
day
namelesse
,
and
buried
in
their
owne
ruines
.
They
haue
Gallipoli
which
is
of
no
great
traffike
:
they
haue
that
of
Constantinople
,
whereof
they
steade
and
vaunt
themselues
most
of
all
:
Moreouer
,
all
these
Ports
are
not
so
good
or
so
conuenient
as
ours
,
either
if
we
consider
the
forme
,
or
the
commoditie
of
situation
,
nor
so
well
stored
with
artillerie
as
ours
are
.
5
Againe
,
fighting
by
sea
,
wee
shall
not
need
to
feare
their
horse
,
whose
encounter
in
regard
of
their
multitude
cannot
be
but
a
terror
vnto
vs
;
relying
as
they
doe
vpon
them
,
as
the
principall
nerue
of
their
forces
;
but
as
for
foote
,
we
excell
them
in
number
and
valour
:
6
For
conclusion
,
it
is
most
certaine
,
if
we
could
once
depriue
the
Turke
of
the
vse
of
the
sea
,
he
would
be
soone
ouerthrowne
by
land
with
a
sufficient
number
of
gallies
,
which
might
be
maintained
in
the
Archipelago
:
we
should
cut
him
off
from
all
trafficke
with
Egypt
and
Soria
,
as
also
keeping
certaine
gallies
in
the
Straight
and
chanell
,
we
should
hinder
the
commerce
of
Asia
and
Constantinople
,
which
he
could
not
be
long
without
,
so
that
by
continuing
this
manner
of
warring
vpon
him
without
intermission
,
we
should
by
little
and
little
heaue
him
out
of
the
whole
Empire
of
Greece
,
where
there
would
be
enough
to
satiate
the
greedie
ambition
of
the
Christians
.
CHAP.
XII
.
Of
the
inward
causes
whereby
the
Empire
of
the
Turkes
may
come
to
ruine
.
-
1
Of
inward
causes
by
which
an
Estate
may
be
ouerthrowne
.
-
2
The
occasions
of
the
change
of
the
Turkish
Empire
,
are
,
a
defect
that
may
happen
of
the
Ottoman
race
:
-
3
The
hatred
,
contempt
,
and
disobedience
of
the
Turkes
officers
and
seruants
:
-
4
The
discorde
that
may
arise
betweene
his
children
about
the
succession
.
-
5
That
it
is
hard
now
to
stirre
vp
and
maintaine
dissention
amongst
them
.
-
6
Another
occasion
may
be
the
Iannizzers
libertie
and
insolencie
towards
their
master
:
-
7
Another
the
rebellion
and
reuolt
of
his
countries
and
their
Gouernours
.
1
AS
we
haue
before
deliuered
by
what
outward
causes
the
Empire
of
the
Turks
may
soonest
receiue
an
alteration
,
so
we
are
now
to
handle
the
meanes
whereby
he
may
be
inwardly
weakened
,
and
whether
by
the
infirmities
which
are
begotten
in
other
estates
,
that
of
the
Ottomans
may
be
likewise
distempered
and
corrupted
;
of
the
inward
causes
of
this
corruption
,
some
concerne
the
Heads
and
Ministers
,
others
are
deriued
from
among
the
people
.
I
will
then
produce
some
few
examples
noting
the
errors
of
such
as
sway
a
Soueraigne
authority
,
and
so
orderly
come
to
the
other
,
to
collect
thence
what
may
serue
to
procure
the
Turkes
ruine
.
2
That
which
would
fall
most
to
our
purpose
would
be
if
the
great
Turke
should
die
without
heires
of
the
true
line
and
race
of
Ottoman
.
For
in
such
a
case
it
is
likely
the
Beglerbyes
,
Vizirs
,
Bassas
,
Sangiacks
,
and
the
greatest
personages
of
the
Turkish
nation
,
would
each
one
for
himselfe
indeauour
to
possesse
himselfe
of
whatsoeuer
he
could
most
easily
compasse
.
3
The
second
cause
would
be
,
if
in
regard
of
his
cruelty
,
or
negligence
,
the
Prince
should
giue
his
subiects
occasion
to
hate
and
contemne
him
:
but
the
mischiefe
would
proue
yet
greater
if
it
did
arise
from
the
cowardlinesse
or
sloath
of
the
Prince
.
For
his
strength
consisting
wholly
in
the
great
numbers
of
his
souldiours
ordinarily
intertained
,
how
could
he
possibly
containe
such
mighty
armies
in
deuotion
and
quietnesse
;
if
he
did
not
daily
busie
them
in
the
exercise
of
war
?
And
lesse
how
could
so
many
nations
be
held
within
compasse
of
feare
and
obedience
without
the
feare
of
ordinary
armes
?
It
is
not
to
be
doubted
then
if
they
had
a
Prince
who
were
giuen
ouer
to
idlenesse
and
a
loose
life
,
or
that
they
discried
him
to
be
a
coward
&
slothfull
,
but
they
would
be
forward
to
draw
their
swords
against
him
,
and
thence
worke
their
owne
destruction
.
Baiazet
the
second
had
proofe
of
this
,
for
abandoning
himselfe
to
all
pleasures
and
resoluing
vpon
a
priuat
and
retired
course
of
life
,
4
The
third
occasion
might
befall
,
if
there
were
many
brethren
to
debate
the
Empire
after
the
death
of
their
father
,
as
it
hapned
between
Zizimus
,
and
Baiazet
,
sonnes
of
Mahomet
,
and
betwene
Acomat
and
Selim
,
sonnes
of
Baiazet
.
This
Baiazet
was
fauoured
of
the
Ianizzars
against
his
brother
.
Zizimus
was
vpheld
onely
by
the
aid
of
the
Soldan
of
Cairo
,
5
These
domestique
quarrels
cannot
now
become
so
strong
(
especially
such
as
might
happen
betweene
brethren
)
as
then
they
might
,
considering
that
the
Mamelucks
,
who
as
neighbours
might
haue
fomented
and
giuen
intertainment
to
such
differences
,
are
now
extinct
and
their
name
no
more
mentioned
.
They
were
in
their
time
the
only
emulators
of
the
Turkes
glory
:
Rhodes
hath
made
an
exchange
of
her
fortune
,
and
is
now
in
the
power
of
this
tyrant
.
Cypres
beareth
the
like
yoake
.
These
two
Ilands
affoorded
an
especial
commodity
to
sow
dissentions
among
the
Turks
,
to
fauour
and
succour
one
of
the
parties
.
6
The
fourth
cause
would
easily
arise
from
the
presumption
and
head-strong
rashnesse
of
the
Ianizzars
,
likely
enough
to
attempt
and
execute
as
much
as
sometime
did
the
Pretorian
bands
of
the
Romans
,
who
made
slender
account
to
fill
the
Empire
with
slaughters
and
massacres
,
wherein
many
Emperours
ended
their
daies
:
they
electing
others
at
their
pleasures
against
the
authority
of
the
Senat
,
and
the
loue
and
reuerence
they
ought
to
haue
borne
towards
their
country
.
The
like
may
we
hope
or
expect
from
the
Ianizzars
,
that
they
will
one
day
assume
to
themselues
the
same
power
and
learne
to
performe
the
like
,
whereof
they
gaue
an
assaie
at
such
time
as
they
compelled
Baiazet
the
second
to
resigne
the
Empire
to
Selim
his
sonne
.
They
did
almost
the
like
when
Soliman
caused
his
sonne
Mustapha
to
be
murthered
;
for
they
besieged
him
and
inuironed
his
tent
for
certaine
daies
space
,
crying
out
they
would
know
the
cause
of
that
yong
Princes
death
.
In
the
end
by
the
deuise
of
the
Bassa
and
with
stoore
of
coyne
,
he
wan
to
him
foure
thousand
of
them
,
who
disengaged
him
of
the
feare
and
danger
wherein
he
was
plunged
.
7
The
fift
cause
may
be
fetched
from
the
ambition
or
discontent
of
the
great
ones
of
the
countrie
,
or
of
ministers
swaying
the
supreame
authority
&
credit
in
places
of
gouernment
.
Gazeles
gouernour
of
Soria
made
way
for
a
reuolt
of
the
like
quality
,
as
did
also
Acomat
Generall
of
Aegypt
:
Gazeles
,
assisted
by
the
Mamelucks
,
Arabians
and
those
of
Rhodes
,
endeuoured
to
set
himselfe
vp
against
the
great
Turke
:
but
he
was
discouered
by
Cayembeius
whom
he
had
acquainted
with
the
conspiracy
.
This
man
either
for
feare
(
as
looking
into
the
danger
of
the
enterprise
)
or
for
enuy
of
his
companions
greatnesse
,
reuealed
all
to
his
Master
Soliman
,
who
presently
dispatched
against
him
Faratha
Bassa
,
by
whom
he
was
vanquished
in
battaile
.
Acomat
had
not
the
leasure
to
proceed
far
in
his
attempt
,
for
as
he
did
inconsideratly
precipitate
himselfe
into
the
triall
thereof
,
so
was
he
as
speedily
discouered
,
and
in
an
instant
suppressed
and
slaine
,
without
hauing
thriued
ought
in
his
dessignes
.
CHAP.
XIII
.
Of
the
mixt
causes
.
-
1
What
are
the
mixt
causes
.
-
2
How
Estates
are
ouerthrowen
by
mixt
causes
.
1
IN
this
third
booke
we
haue
at
large
discoursed
how
by
inward
and
outward
causes
,
Estates
may
be
indangered
:
now
we
must
speake
of
causes
compounded
,
of
the
one
and
the
other
,
which
,
to
discourse
more
intelligibly
,
we
tearm
mixt
,
which
likewise
are
of
power
of
themselues
to
alter
an
Empire
and
to
bring
it
,
either
by
an
vniuersall
or
a
particular
change
,
to
a
lamentable
ruine
.
These
mixt
causes
then
are
those
whereby
both
the
enemy
abroad
,
and
the
subiect
at
home
may
by
a
common
consent
conspire
against
an
Estate
and
subuert
it
.
2
One
of
the
causes
or
meanes
may
be
a
popular
insurrection
nourished
by
the
enemy
,
or
else
the
conspiracy
of
some
particular
men
set
on
by
forraine
practises
;
or
to
tearme
it
better
,
the
treasons
which
subiects
may
hatch
in
fauour
,
and
by
the
meanes
and
authority
of
their
neighbours
.
This
hapneth
in
a
twofold
manner
,
when
the
subiect
beginneth
and
setteth
on
foote
the
practise
,
or
when
a
stranger
laieth
the
way
open
vnto
them
vnder
some
coulered
pretence
,
or
else
when
some
one
particular
person
or
all
a
whole
communalty
frame
the
occasion
thereof
in
regard
of
some
displeasure
or
oppression
.
Finally
,
this
falleth
out
also
when
the
enemy
abroad
tempereth
with
one
,
two
,
or
three
,
of
the
principall
men
to
reuolt
against
their
prince
and
take
armes
in
hand
to
ouerturne
and
ruine
the
Estate
.
CHAP.
XIIII
.
How
particular
persons
may
be
gained
.
-
1
How
his
people
are
to
be
prouoked
to
rebellion
.
-
2
How
his
great
men
and
chiefe
officers
are
to
be
gained
.
-
3
These
courses
at
the
first
not
succeeding
,
are
to
be
oftner
attempted
.
-
4
Wary
proceeding
is
requisite
,
lest
those
that
manage
the
businesse
incurre
danger
.
-
5
To
whom
such
businesses
are
to
be
committed
.
1
IT
resteth
now
that
we
make
it
appeere
how
such
practises
may
be
set
on
foote
and
cherished
:
we
will
then
beginne
with
the
enterprise
to
bee
plotted
by
some
particular
person
,
by
whose
assistance
it
may
take
effect
.
We
must
presuppose
that
this
person
is
either
priuat
or
publike
,
the
priuat
persons
are
those
which
suffer
themselues
most
often
to
be
corrupted
by
mony
,
and
with
these
there
neede
not
so
many
ceremonies
or
bro●kings
,
but
if
they
be
publike
persons
of
rancke
and
authority
,
either
in
regard
of
the
greatnesse
of
their
family
,
or
managing
of
state
affaires
;
there
is
far
greater
difficulty
in
corrupting
them
then
the
other
:
yet
if
we
may
but
discouer
in
them
the
stinges
of
ambition
and
desire
of
greatnesse
,
and
that
we
propose
to
them
the
assurance
of
speedy
succours
,
for
the
execution
of
the
des●●gne
;
then
is
it
that
we
bring
them
to
dare
any
thing
,
especially
if
they
haue
neuer
so
little
disposition
to
be
reuenged
of
some
receiued
indignity
.
It
is
indeed
a
hard
matter
to
worke
particular
and
priuate
persons
without
great
vncertaineties
and
dangers
.
2
But
if
we
must
haue
to
doe
with
the
great
persons
of
the
Estate
,
we
must
warily
make
choice
of
our
time
,
sound
them
whether
they
be
male
content
or
ill
affected
towards
their
Prince
,
either
in
respect
that
some
one
is
aduanced
to
their
preiudice
,
or
for
some
other
cause
which
may
awake
in
them
a
longing
to
shake
off
their
yoake
and
seaze
themselues
of
the
Estate
.
These
are
the
meanes
and
occasions
,
which
should
be
chosen
and
diligently
husbanded
by
our
Christian
Princes
,
smoothly
and
with
dexterity
to
procure
the
ruine
of
the
common
enemy
;
putting
on
(
as
they
say
)
the
foxes
skin
when
the
lions
is
wanting
.
The
displeasure
and
ielousie
which
Faratha
Bassa
conceiued
against
Hebraim
Bassa
because
he
saw
him
raised
by
Soliman
to
greater
honour
and
estimation
then
himselfe
,
so
depriued
him
of
all
reason
,
as
suffering
the
desire
of
reuenge
by
little
and
little
to
transport
him
,
he
began
to
plot
a
rebellion
,
but
discouered
he
was
forthwith
put
to
death
:
the
selfe
same
occasion
was
the
ouerthrow
of
Pirrus
and
Mustapha
raised
by
Soliman
.
In
our
time
in
the
court
of
Amurath
the
third
now
raigning
,
these
ielousies
and
hart-burnings
haue
beene
great
betweene
Mahomet
and
Mustapha
,
and
since
that
betweene
the
same
Mustapha
and
Cicala
(
who
hath
outstript
him
)
and
all
for
fauour
of
their
Master
.
If
these
humors
and
ill
dispositions
had
beene
well
looked
into
and
wisely
imploied
to
their
best
vse
by
some
great
Prince
of
Christendome
,
they
had
beene
fit
matter
to
haue
bred
a
dissention
and
reuolt
amongst
those
barbarous
people
.
3
Now
though
such
practises
should
not
perhaps
at
the
first
be
of
sufficient
power
to
worke
that
vniuersall
change
which
we
wish
in
that
tyrants
Empire
;
yet
are
we
not
therefore
to
desist
as
men
dismaied
;
remembring
that
most
commonly
the
beginnings
of
innouations
and
commotions
so
extraordinary
,
are
feeble
,
and
that
that
wisdome
sheweth
it selfe
like
it selfe
which
can
so
diligently
suckle
and
nourish
them
as
they
may
attaine
to
a
happy
growth
.
I
am
of
opinion
,
that
when
we
incounter
with
instruments
that
are
not
without
ambition
,
courage
,
and
a
thirst
of
reuenge
;
after
we
haue
felt
and
sounded
them
once
,
twise
,
or
thrise
,
we
shall
in
the
end
make
a
breach
in
their
loyalty
and
obedience
;
especially
if
we
set
before
them
(
be
it
vnder
a
true
or
false
title
)
the
certaintie
of
some
mightie
succour
,
whereof
they
may
see
the
preparatiues
;
for
so
they
will
the
more
couragiously
attempt
against
the
life
and
estate
of
their
Prince
.
4
Moreouer
it
is
not
to
be
forgotten
,
that
when
such
practises
shall
be
discouered
by
the
Turke
,
and
that
he
shal
see
the
Christians
more
diligent
then
hitherto
they
haue
beene
,
to
sound
the
affections
of
his
seruants
and
subiects
:
he
will
thereupon
enter
into
such
a
distrust
of
them
,
as
euen
that
will
make
him
offer
them
some
hard
measure
.
This
distrust
will
be
enough
to
beget
a
thousand
suspitions
and
hard
conceits
in
his
seruants
,
and
subiects
,
either
for
the
managing
of
affaires
,
or
for
the
danger
that
the
opinion
of
loyaltie
incurreth
,
when
it
hath
to
deale
with
such
a
distrustfull
and
suspitious
Prince
,
as
this
would
prooue
:
so
as
by
little
and
little
it
would
worke
vs
out
some
occasion
fitting
our
purpose
,
especially
,
if
whilest
this
practise
were
hatching
,
and
on
foote
,
the
children
of
the
Turke
should
take
armes
one
against
the
other
,
or
that
during
their
fathers
life
,
they
should
dispute
the
possession
of
the
Empire
:
for
the
ice
being
already
broken
,
there
would
be
a
more
easie
passage
and
better
successe
,
then
if
it
had
not
beene
taken
in
hand
at
all
.
5
But
because
an
especiall
iudgement
,
patience
,
and
much
wisedome
are
requisite
in
such
businesses
,
we
must
make
choice
of
men
furnished
with
all
these
parts
,
to
the
end
they
may
wisely
know
when
to
take
their
opportunities
and
times
,
to
sow
these
dissentions
,
and
that
there
be
not
want
of
mony
to
distribute
amongst
this
people
,
which
are
farther
in
loue
therewith
,
then
any
other
nation
the
world
affoordeth
.
CHAP.
XV.
How
the
people
of
the
Turke
may
be
wrought
from
his
obedience
.
-
1
How
the
Turkes
Christian
Subiects
are
to
be
wrought
to
rebellion
.
-
2
A
place
must
be
chosen
for
refuge
of
such
as
rebell
.
-
3
The
vaine
fooleries
of
their
Alkoran
are
to
be
discouered
.
-
4
How
bookes
written
to
that
purpose
may
come
to
his
subiects
hands
.
-
5
How
such
bookes
are
to
be
composed
.
-
6
What
fruites
are
to
be
hoped
from
their
reading
.
-
7
Exhortation
to
the
Ianizzars
.
-
8
The
conclusion
of
this
worke
.
1
THe
Turke
hath
two
sorts
of
people
subiect
to
his
Empire
;
one
followeth
the
sect
of
Mahomet
;
the
other
the
truth
of
the
Gospel
of
Iesus
Christ
.
The
Mahometanes
are
quiet
,
as
those
which
being
of
one
and
the
same
law
,
haue
no
cause
to
make
any
tumult
.
The
Christians
cannot
stirre
,
as
being
ouer
topped
and
awed
by
a
greater
power
then
their
owne
,
which
curbeth
them
so
,
as
there
is
no
better
way
to
moue
them
to
rebel
,
then
to
make
them
handle
(
as
it
were
)
and
see
the
assurance
of
an
approching
succour
,
to
prouide
them
of
armes
and
all
other
furniture
for
the
wars
:
for
otherwise
it
is
impossible
they
should
dare
to
make
the
least
shew
once
to
mooue
,
whilest
they
haue
the
enemie
ouer
them
alwaies
in
a
readinesse
and
armed
,
who
would
in
a
moment
confound
them
,
especially
being
as
they
are
naked
and
vnprouided
of
armes
,
offensiue
or
defensiue
.
Selim
the
second
doubting
the
woorst
,
by
the
counsaile
of
Occhially
,
caused
al
the
Christians
inhabiting
the
sea
coasts
,
to
retire
themselues
farre
vp
into
the
maine
land
,
to
the
end
the
presence
of
the
Christian
forces
should
not
incourage
them
against
him
,
as
it
hapned
at
such
time
as
Andrew
Dorea
atchieued
the
enterprise
of
Patras
and
Coron.
2
If
the
Christians
should
euer
vndertake
the
like
dissigne
they
ought
to
take
especiall
heede
how
they
vnship
their
succours
in
those
parts
of
the
continent
where
the
horse
are
at
hand
,
since
they
were
likely
enough
by
their
strength
to
choake
at
the
first
the
reuolt
of
the
Christians
,
for
so
mighty
are
they
in
horse
,
and
of
such
speed
and
dexterity
,
as
they
would
in
an
instant
beare
downe
before
them
whatsoeuer
should
oppose
them
.
Wherefore
it
would
be
better
to
enter
by
Albania
and
by
places
mountanous
and
of
difficult
accesse
,
where
the
horse
are
not
able
to
serue
,
as
in
the
plaine
.
This
is
as
much
as
we
ment
to
say
of
such
Christians
as
are
vnder
the
Turkes
dominions
,
all
which
I
will
imagine
want
not
will
to
rebell
,
if
the
Princes
of
Christendome
would
furnish
them
of
meanes
.
3
Now
let
vs
see
what
way
were
best
to
be
taken
to
prouoke
the
Mahometans
to
reuolt
,
and
to
fill
their
countries
with
troubles
,
and
ciuill
dissentions
.
If
we
will
but
consider
how
their
religion
is
fraught
with
vntruthes
,
their
Alcoran
abounding
in
follies
,
we
shall
finde
it
easie
to
picke
matter
enough
out
of
it
to
set
them
together
by
the
eares
,
especially
if
wee
doe
but
disperse
among
them
certaine
bookes
fit
to
conuert
them
,
or
make
them
doubt
of
the
foolish
superstitions
they
obserue
,
composing
them
for
Europe
in
the
Sclauonian
tongue
,
and
for
Asia
in
the
Arabian
.
4
But
because
it
would
be
hard
to
conuey
these
bookes
into
the
countries
of
the
Turkes
obedience
but
that
they
would
soone
perceiue
the
deuice
and
speedily
remedy
it
:
It
were
best
beginning
far
off
,
in
the
Indies
and
in
the
parts
of
Asia
and
Africke
held
by
the
Portugales
:
for
because
of
the
trafficke
which
is
great
in
those
parts
many
Turkish
Marchants
and
others
ariue
there
from
all
quarters
.
They
come
to
Mozambique
in
Africke
,
to
Zophala
and
Quiloe
in
Asia
.
They
descend
also
as
low
as
the
Moluccas
,
Cochien
,
Goa
,
Dia
,
Ormus
,
and
sundrie
other
parts
appertaining
to
the
crowne
of
Portugale
.
These
bookes
also
might
be
dispersed
abroad
in
the
countrie
of
the
Gentiles
,
which
are
friends
and
confederates
of
the
Christians
,
as
in
Calicut
,
Zailan
,
Cambeia
,
and
others
;
and
the
like
at
Oran
,
Arzilla
,
and
in
other
parts
of
Arabia
subiect
to
the
crowne
of
Spaine
and
Portugall
,
and
in
all
other
parts
of
Europe
which
border
vpon
the
Turkes
.
5
There
must
be
a
care
had
that
the
title
of
the
booke
be
so
coloured
,
as
it
doe
not
at
the
first
discouer
the
intent
of
the
author
,
but
rather
that
it
intice
them
to
peruse
it
with
a
certaine
curiosity
and
shew
of
pleasantnesse
and
delight
.
It
is
requisite
also
that
the
discourse
be
not
fraught
with
any
disputations
or
subtill
point
against
the
Articles
of
their
beleefe
,
but
that
contrariwise
it
be
full
of
tales
and
matter
fit
to
moue
laughter
;
yet
with
some
well
conueied
passage
which
may
by
the
way
discouer
or
make
them
doubt
of
the
fables
of
their
Alcoran
.
6
The
Turkish
Marchants
or
others
,
into
whose
hands
this
booke
should
light
,
would
confidently
reade
it
in
those
parts
where
the
Turke
is
not
obeied
.
And
though
perhaps
they
durst
not
aduenture
to
carry
it
with
them
,
yet
the
impression
and
substance
of
what
they
had
read
would
remaine
fixt
in
their
mindes
,
so
as
they
would
after
relate
it
as
newes
to
their
friends
and
families
,
in
such
sort
as
it
would
grow
by
little
and
little
to
be
diuulged
thereabout
,
whence
would
spring
a
longing
in
others
which
should
come
and
goe
into
those
countries
to
buy
&
reade
them
:
In
this
manner
the
Alcoran
in
processe
of
time
would
grow
out
of
credit
amongst
them
,
and
those
things
which
with
scruple
and
obseruation
they
collect
thence
,
would
turne
to
a
iest
and
subiect
of
laughter
,
whence
there
could
not
but
insue
some
schisme
and
diuision
amongst
them
,
for
the
most
religious
men
of
their
sect
and
the
most
interested
would
oppose
themselues
wilfully
to
maintaine
it
.
Neither
would
it
make
for
the
purpose
to
make
mention
in
any
sort
of
our
Sauiour
Christ
,
much
lesse
to
let
it
be
knowen
that
the
author
thereof
were
a
Christian
:
for
the
immortall
hatred
they
beare
to
that
name
would
make
it
odious
,
and
would
bring
it
at
the
very
first
to
be
reiected
.
It
should
rather
be
so
contriued
as
if
it
came
from
some
other
of
an
other
sect
,
wherein
a
man
might
borrow
the
hand
of
the
inhabitants
of
Cambaia
,
of
India
,
of
Arabia
,
or
of
Persia
.
In
this
manner
it
would
be
better
welcome
and
would
carrie
with
it
more
estimation
and
authority
.
7
It
were
well
also
if
there
were
framed
and
published
a
remonstrance
to
the
Ianizzars
in
the
Sclauoman
tongue
,
whereby
might
be
signified
vnto
them
their
originall
,
and
howe
in
their
infancy
they
were
cruelly
halled
from
the
bosomes
of
their
Christian
fathers
and
mothers
,
conueyed
into
Turky
,
and
there
nusled
vp
in
the
sect
of
Mahomet
,
not
hauing
iudgement
as
then
to
distinguish
of
good
and
euill
;
that
they
are
the
pillers
to
vphold
this
Tyrant
which
hath
set
his
foote
vpon
the
throat
of
their
fathers
liberty
,
and
which
keepeth
them
as
slaues
vnder
the
yoake
of
a
dishonorable
and
barbarous
seruitude
.
This
would
auaile
much
,
especially
if
there
were
thereto
annexed
an
exhortation
to
take
better
knowledge
of
themselues
,
and
hence
,
forward
like
good
children
to
imbrace
and
free
their
miserable
parents
,
which
daily
lament
them
;
and
aboue
all
to
perswade
them
to
returne
to
the
deare
bosome
of
the
church
wherin
they
were
first
,
regeuerate
and
which
attendeth
with
spread
armes
to
receiue
them
,
entertaine
them
,
and
saue
them
.
8
These
things
well
caried
would
in
the
end
make
the
Turke
so
suspitious
,
and
vntractable
,
as
he
would
offer
occasions
enow
to
his
people
hencefoorth
to
rouse
vp
themselues
,
and
better
aduise
how
to
shake
off
that
cruell
and
vnsupportable
yoake
which
so
mightily
oppresseth
them
,
and
to
fashion
themselues
to
a
more
happy
and
secure
life
for
the
quiet
of
their
consciences
and
saluation
of
their
soules
.
This
is
that
whereof
the
Christians
ought
diligently
to
bethinke
themselues
;
and
not
to
worke
one
an
others
ruine
and
destruction
,
as
they
spare
not
to
doe
against
the
expresse
commandement
of
God
,
which
so
often
recommendeth
vnto
vs
loue
and
charitie
towards
our
neighbours
.
FINIS
.