THE Case of SHIP-MONEY Briefly discoursed ,

GREAT ● Fires happening in Townes or Cities , are sometimes the cause that other contiguous houses are spoyld and demolisht , besides those which the flame it selfe ceazes : So now , in the case of Shipmony , not onely the judgement it selfe which hath beene given against the subject , doth make a great g●p and breach in the rights and Franchises of England , but the arguments and pleadings also , which conduced to that judgement , have extended the mischiefe further , and scarce left anything unviolated . Such strange contradiction there hath beene amongst the pleaders , and dissent amongst the Judges , even in those Lawes which are most fundamentall , that we are lef● in a more confused uncertainty of our highest priviledges , and those customes which are most essentiall to Freedome then we were before . To introduce the legality of the Ship-scot , such a Prerogative hath been maintained , as destroyes all other Law , and is incompatible with popular liberty : and such art hath beene used to deny , traverse , avoid , or frustrate the true force or meaning of all our Lawes and Charters , that if wee grant Ship-money upon these grounds , with Ship-money we grant all besides . To remove therefore this uncertainty , which is the mother of all injustice , confusion , and publike dissention , it is most requisite that this grand Councell and Tres●ault Court ( of which none ought to thinke dishonourably ) would take these Ard●a Regni , these weighty and dangerous difficulties , into serious debate , an solemnly end that strife , which no other place of Judicature can so effectually extinguish .

That the King ought to have aid of his subjects in time of danger , and common aid in case of common danger , is laid down for a ground , and agreed upon by all sides , But about this aid there remain●s much variety and contrariety of opinion amongst the greatest Sages of our Law ; and the principall points therein controverted are these foure : First , by what Law the King may compell aid . Secondly , when it is to bee levied . Thirdly , how it is to be levied . Fourthly , what kinde of aid it must be .

1 Some of the Judges argue from the Law of Nature , that since the King is head , and ●ound to protect , therefore he must have wherewithall to protect : but this proves only that which no man denies . The next Law insisted upon is Prerogative ; but it is not punctually explained what Prerogative , whether the Prerogative naturall of all Kings , or the Prerogative legall of the Kings of England . Some of the Judges urge , that by Law there is naturall allegeance due to the King from the subject ; and it doth not stand with that allygeance that the Princes cannot compell aid , but must require the common consent therein . Others presse , that the Law hath ●etled a property of goods in the subject , and it doth not stand with that property , that the King may demand them without consent . Some take it for granted , that by Royall Prerogative , as it is part of the Lawes of England , the King may charge the Nation without publike consent , and therefore it being part of the Law , it is no invasion upon Law . Others take it for granted , that to levie money without consent is unjust , and that the Kings prerogative cannot extend to any unjust thing : So many contrary points of warre doe our Trumpets sound at once , and in such confusion doe our Judges leave us , whilest either side takes that for granted , which by the other is utterly denied . By these grounds Royall prerogative , and popular liberty may seeme things irreconciliable ; though indeed they are not ; neither doth either side in words affirme so much , though their proofes bee so contradictory . King Charles his maxime is , that the peoples liberty strenghteus the Kings prerogative , and the Kings prerogative is to maintain the peoples liberty ; and by this it seemes that both are compatible , and that prerogative is the more subordinate of the two . The Kings words also since have beene upon another occasion , That he ever intended his people should enjoy property of good● , and liberty of persons , holding no King so great , as he that was King of a rich and free people : and if they had not property of goods , and liberty of persons , they could bee neither rich nor free . Here we see , that the liberty of the subject is a thing which makes a King great ; and that the Kings prerogative hath only for its ends to maintaine the peoples liberty . Wherefore it is manifest , that in nature there is more favour due to the liberty of the subject , then to the Prerogative of the King , since the one is ordained onely for the preservation of the other ; and then to salve these knots , our dispute must be , what prerogative the peoples good and profit will beare , not what liberty the Kings absolutenesse or prorogative may admit● and in this dispute it is more just that we appeale to written Lawes , than to the breasts of Kings themselves . For we know Nationall Lawes are made by consent of Prince and people both , and so cannot bee conceived to be prejudiciall to either side ; but where the meere will of the Prince is Law , or where some few Ministers of his may alleage what they will for Law in his behalfe , no mediocrity or justice is to be expected : we all know that no slave or villaine can be subjected to more miserable bondage than to be left meerly to his Lords absolute discretion ▪ and we all see that the thraldome of such is most grievous , which have no bounds set to their Lord discretion . Let us then see what Fortescue writes , not regard what Court-dependants doe interpret , and his words are , ●ol . 84. cap. 36. Rex Angliae nec per se , nec per suos Ministros Tollagia subsidia , aut quaevis onera alia impo●it l●gis suis , aut leges corum 〈◊〉 , aut nova condit sine concessione vel asse●su totius regni sui in Parliamento suo expresso . These words are full and generall , and plain , and in direct affirmance of the ancient Law and usage of England , and it is not sufficient for the Kings Counsell to say , that these words extend not to Ship-money : for if there were any doubt , the interpretation ought rather to favour liberty than Prerogative .

It is not sufficient for Judge Iones to say , that it is proprium quarto modo to a King , and an inseparable naturall Prerogative of the Crowne to raise monies without assent , unlesse he first prove that such Prerogative be good and profitable for the people , and such as the people cannot subsist at all without it : nay , such as no Nation can subsist without it . This word Prerogative hath divers acceptions : sometimes it is taken for the altitude of Honour , sometimes for the latitude of Power . So we say the Prerogative of an Emperour is greater than that of a King ; and that of a King greater than that of a Duke , or petty Poten●ate : and yet of Kings we say that the King of Denmark hath not so great a Prerogative as the King of England , nor the King of England as the King of France , &c. For here though their honour and title be the same , yet their power is not . Sometimes Prerogative signifies as much as Soveraignty ; and in this generall consideration wee say , that all supreame Commanders are equall : and that they all have this essential inseparable Prerogative , that their power ought to be ample enough for their perfection , and good of the people , and no ampler : because the supreame of all humane Lawes is salus populi . so this Law all Lawes almost stoope ; God dispences with many of his Lawes , rather than salus populi shall bee endangered ; and that iron-law , which we call necessity itselfe , is but subservient to this Law : for rather then a Nation shall perish , any thing shall be held necessary , and legall by necessity : But to come to the Prerogative of England , and to spe●ke of it in generall , and comparatively ; we say it is a harmonious composure of policie , scarce to be paralleld in all the world , it is neither so boundlesse as to opresse the people in unjust things , nor so strait as to disable the King in just things ; by the true fundamental constitutions of England , the beame hangs even between the King and the Subject : the Kings power doth not tread ●nder foot the peoples liberty , nor the peoples liberty the Kings power . All other Countries almost in Christendome , differ from us in this module of policie : some , but very few , allow a greater spheare of Soveraignty to their Princes ; but for the most part now adayes the world is given to republistes , or to conditionate and restrained forms of government : howsoever we ought not to condemne any Nation as unjust herein , though differing from us ; for though they seem perhaps very unpolitick , yet it is hard to be affirmed that God and Nature ever ordained the same method of rule , or scope of loyality to all States whatsoever : besides , what dislike soever we take at other regiments , yet except it be in very great excesses or defects , we must not thinke change alwayes necessary , since custome in those great and generall points obtains the force of another nature , & nature is not to be changed . Divines of late have beene much to blame here in preaching one universall forme of government , as necessary to all Nations , and that not the moderate & equall neither , but such as ascribes all to Soveraignty , nothing at all to popular liberty : Some Lawyers also and Statesmen have deserved as ill of late , partly by suggesting that our English Laws are too in●urious to our King ; and pa●●ly by informing , that this King is more limited by Law then his Progenitors were , and that till he be as the King of France is , Rex As●●orum , he is but a subject to his subjects , and as a Minor under the command of guardians : bnt what hath ensued out of the Kings jealously of his subject , and overstraining his Prerogative ? nothing but irrepairable losse and mischiefe both to King and Commonwealth : and indeed the often and great infections and insurrections which have hapned of late , almost all over Europe , may suffice to warn all wise Princes , not to over-straine their Prerogatives too high ; not to g●ve eare to such Counsellors as some of out Judges are , who affirme our Kings Prerogative to be in all points unalterable , and by consequence not depending upon Law at all : by another exception of this word Prerogative in England , we mean such Law here establisht , as gives the King such and such preheminences and priviledges before any subject ; such as are not essentiall to royalty , but may bee annulled by the same power by which they were created . That a King shall defend and maintaine his subjectes , is a duty belonging to the Office , not a priviledge belonging to the Crowne of a King ; this obligation nature layes upon him , and no other power can dissolve it . Also that subjects shall afford aid , and joyne with their Princes in common defence , is a duty arising from the allegeance of the people , and not an honor redounding only to the Prince ; natures law hath made this a tie , not to be changed or infringed : for that which is annexed by an eternall superiour power cannot be made severable by a temporall humane power : but that such an Emperour , King or Potentate , shall have such or such aid , and compell it by such or such meanes , at such or such times , as to the particular modes and circumstances of his aid , particular municipall Lawes must direct , and these it would bee as dangerous to alter , as it is absurd to hold unalterable . In a Parlament held by King James , it was debated , whether or no Tenures in Capite , and allowance of Purveyor● might bee repealed and divided from the Crowne , and it was held that by ●o Act or statute they could bee taken away , because they were naturally inherent to the Crowne .

This resolution seemes very strange to me , since the Law of Tenures and Purveyors is not so naturall and essentiall to Monarchy , that it cannot ; or may not subsist without it . For if in other Countries it be held a meere politicall way , perhaps an inconvenient thing , then why may not the Princes Royalty , and the peoples safety 〈◊〉 preserved intire without it in England : And if so , then why shall not the same authority have vigor to rep●ale it , which wanted not vigor to info●● it . I cannot conceive that the Parliament herein reflected upon what was formall in Law to be done , but rather upon what was convenient : such i●signia supremae , Majejestatis as these ; I did not hold it fit to be dismembred from the Crowne in policy , I onely hold it a thing possible in law , nay though the King enjoyes diverse such like prerogatives more , as I. Jones thinkes , then any Prince in Christendome , yet should not I desire or advise to pl●●●ke away one the least Flower out of the Regall Garland , nor would it be ( perhaps ) Profitable for the State , to suffer the least diminution thereof . Wee know also , that in England the Prerogative hath beene bound in many cases , by Statute-law , and restrained of diverse such priviledges , as were not essentiall , but meerely politicall . Nullum tempus occurrit Regi : this was one of the English Royalties , and very beneficiall many wayes , yet wee know this is in diverse cases limited by Act of Parliament , and that very justly , as I. Hutton argues , The great and ancient Tax of Dangelt , it was a Subsidue taken by the Kings of England ▪ for the common defence of the Kingdo●e , yet this was first released by King Stephen , and after abolished for ever by the statutes of Edward the first : and there is no reason why an Act of Parliament should not bee as valid in our case as it was in that . Wherefore it is to be admired , that J. Iones should account this way of a●d by ship-money , or any other , without publike consent , to bee Proprium quarto modo to the Kings of England ▪ and since irrepe●lable , since our Kings have in all ages done such noble acts without it ; and not onely defended , but also enlarged their Dominions . The last kinde of accept●●on of this word Prerogative is improper . Thus to pardon malefactors , to dispence with penall Lawes , to grant Non obstantes , to be free from attainders , to call or discontinue , to prorogue or dissolve Parliaments , &c. are not truly and properly called Prerogatives : these all in some sense may be called Munities , or indemnities belonging to the sacred person of the King , as he is inviolable , and subject to no force & compulsion of any other , And as he is the soule of Law , in whose power alone it is to execute Law , and yet not to be constrained thereto . To grant a pardon for some malefactors for some crimes , may perhaps be as heynous as to commit them ; and that which drawes a guilt upon the King , cannot be said to be his priviledge . If it might be tearmed a Royalty , that the King is not questionable , or punishable , or to be forced to such acts as tend to the obstruction of justice , it might as well be so tearmed in acts tending to the transgression of Law : for in both he is alike free from any coercive or vindicative force . For it is out of necessity , not honour or benefit , that the King hath a freedome from constraint , or restraint in these cases ; and that this freedome is inseparable , because no force can be used but by superiours or equals , and he which hath either superiours or equall , is no King . If a King should shut up the Courts of ordinary Justice , & prohibit all pleadings and proceedings betweene man and man , and refuse to authorize Judges for the determining of suits , hee would bee held to doe a most unkingly thing : and yet this may be as truly called a Prerogative , as to difuse and dissolve Parliaments . But it may be objected , that the King , besides such negative priviledge and freedome from force , hath also a positive and siezing subjects lands , &c. in divers cases , as in making Bulwarks upon any mans land for common defence , &c. To this it may be answered , That to such power the King is not intituled by his Prerogative , nor is it any benefit to him , necessity herein is his only warrant : for either this private inconvenience must happen , or a publike ruine follow ; and in nature the lesse and private evill is to be chosen : and here the party trespassed enjoyes safety by it , and shall after receive satisfaction for his detriment . Were there such apparent unavoidable necessity in the Ship-scop , that either that course must be taken , or the community inevitably pep●rish , or where the King wholly disinteressed in point of profit , or were there hope of restitution , it could not be without consent , and so not against Law . So then , for ought that is yet alleaged , Prerogative , except that which is essentiall to all Kings , without which they cannot bee Kings , is alterable , and it ought to be deducsed out of the written and knowne Lawes of the Kingdome , and Law is not to be inferred out of that ▪ we ought not to presume a Prerogative , & thence conclude it a Law , but we ought not to cite the Law , and thence prove it to be Prerogative . To descend then to our owne Lawes , yet there our Judges vary too . What the Common Law was in this point is doubted by some ▪ and some say if the Common Law did allow the King such a Prerogative , to lay a generall charge without consent , then Statutes cannot alter it .

Some doe not accept against the force of Statute Law , but avoid our particular Statutes by divers severall evasive answers . Some say our Great Charter was but a grant of the King , extorted by force ; some except against the 25. of Ed. 1. because there is sal●o in it : some against the 34. of Ed. ● . as made in the Kings absence ; some object against the 14. of Ed. 3. as if it were temporary , and because it is not particularly re●ited in the Petition of Right : and the common evasion of all beneficiall Statutes , & of the Petition of right , is , that they binde the King from imposing pecuniary charges for the replenishing of his owne coffers , but not from imposing such personall services , as this Ship-scot is , in time of danger and necessity . J. Crawly maintaines this Ship-scot to be good by Prerogative at the Common Law , and not to be altered by Statute . What the Common Law was , this Court can best determine ; but it is obvious to all men , that no Prerogative can be at the Common Law , but it had some beginning , and that must be from either King or Subject , or both : and in this , it is not superiour to our Statute Law , and by consequence not unalterable . The Medes and Persians had a Law , that no Law once past , should ever be repealed ; but doubtlesse this Law being repealed first , all others might after suffer the same alteration , and it is most absurd to think that this Law might not be repealed by the same authority by which it was at first enacted . J. Iones sayes , our Statutes restraine tollages in generall termes , and cites divers cases , that a speciall interest shall not passe from the King , but in speciall terms : but his cases are put of private grantees , over whom the King ought to retai●e a great preheminence : but the Law is , that where the whole state in grantee , that grant shall have the force of a Statute , because it is pro bono publico , and because the whole State is in value and dignity as much to be preferred before the King , as the King is before any private grantee . But J. Iones sayes further , if generall words shall extend to these extraordinary publike levies , then they may as well extend to his ordinary private rights & intradoes , & so cut off Aide pur faire filz Chivalier , &c. The contrary hereof is manifest , for the intent of all our Statutes is to defend the subject against such publike tollages and impositions , as every man is equally liable to , and as are not due in Law otherwise , or recoverable by ordinary action . Now these aids , &c. and the Kings ordinary revenues and services , are not such as are due from every man , but recoverable by ordinary action . Howsoever in all these doubts the Law would now be made cleare , and not onely the vertue of Statutes in generall , but also the true meaning of our particular Charters would be vindicated from these exceptions .

2 I come now to our second difficulty , when a publike charge may be laid . Here the favourers of Ship-money yet agree , that the King may not charge the subject meerly to fill his owne coffers ; or annually , or when he will invade a forraigne enemy , or when Pirates rob , or burn Townes and Burroughs , for these ordinary defence is sufficient : and when there is imminent and eminent danger of publike invasion , we agree that the subject may be charged .

The quaere then is , whether the King bee sole Judge of the danger , and of the remedy , or rather whether he be so sole Judge , that his meere affirmation and notification of a danger foreseene by him at a distance , or pretended onely to be foreseene , shall be so unquestionable that he may charge the Kingdome thereupon at his discretion , though they assent not , nor apprehend the danger as it is forewarned . J. Crooke proves the contrary thus : If danger , sayes he , be far distant , if it be in report only of French Armadoes , and Spanish preparations , &c. though it be certaine , and not pretensive , yet Parliamentary aid may be speedy enough : and if it be imminent , then this way of Ship-scot will not be speedy enough ; for either the design● is really to have new Ships built , and that will require longer time than a Parliament ; or else money onely is aimed at , whereby to arme other Ships , and for this the Law hath provided a more expedite way than by Ship-scot , in case of imminent danger .

If then the King have power to presse all mens persons and Ships , and all are bound exponere se , & sua , and to serve propriis sumpti●us , when imminent danger is , and this defence hath alwayes beene held effectuall enough , it is consequent , that if he be not destitute of competent aid in present distresses , he cannot pretend a greater necessity in dangers more remote , when they are but suspected , or perhaps pretended onely .

My Lord Bramston sayes here , that there is a necessity of preventing a necessity : and that the Sea is part of the Kingdome , and therefore of necessity to be guarded as the Kingdome . The answer is , That the safety of the Kingdome does not necessarily depend upon the Ship-scot , and so this necessity being removed , the necessity grounded upon this , fals off of it selfe . For if the Kingdome may escape ruine at hand when it is a storme , without Ship-money , it may much more escape it afar off being but a cloud . But grant the Sea to be a part of the Kingdome to some purposes , yet how is it a part essentiall , or equally valuable ; or how does it appeare that the fate of the Land depends wholly upon the dominion of the Sea ? France subsists now without the regiment of the Sea , and why may not we as well want the same ? If England quite spend it selfe , and poure out all its treasure to preserve the Seigniory of the Seas , it is not certaine to exceed the Navall force of France , Spaine , Holland , &c. And if it content if selfe with its ancient strength of shipping , it may remaine as safe as it hath formerly done . Nay , I cannot see that either necessity of ruine , or necessity of dishonour can be truly pretended out of this , that France , Spaine , Holland , &c. are too potent at Sea for us .

The dominion of the Seas may be considered as a meer right , or as an honour , or as a profit to us . As a right , it is a theame fitter for schollers to whet their wits upon , then for Christians to fight and spill bloud about : and since it doth not manifestly appeare how or when it was first purchased , or by what Law conveyed to us , we take notice of it only as matter of wit and disputation . As it is an honour to be masters of the Sea , and to make others strike saile to us as they passe ; it s a glory fitter for women and children to wonder at , then for States-men to contend about . It may bee compared to a chaplet of flowers , not to a diadem of gold : but as it is a profit to us to fence and inclose the Sea , that our neighbours ●hall not surprise us unawares ; its matter of moment , yet it concernes us but as it doth other Nations : by too insolent contestations hereupon , wee may provoke God , and dishonour our selves : we may more probably incense our friend● , then quell our enemies , we may make the land a slave to the sea , rather than the sea a servant to the land ; but I pray Master Selden to pardon me for this transition , and I returne my matter ▪ if the Kingdome could not possibly subsist without Ship-money in such a danger , yet there is no necessity that the King should be so sole Judge of that danger , as that he may judge therein contrary to the opinion , and perhaps , knowledge of other men . I allow the King to be supreame , and consequently sole Judge in all cases whatsoever , as to the right , and as to the diffusion of Judgement ; but as to the exercise and restraint of judgement , he is not , nor ought not to be accounted sole Judge . In matters of Law the King must create Judges , and sweare them to judge uprightly and impartially , and for the sub●ect against himselfe , if Law so require , yea , though he be of contrary judgement himselfe , and by his Letters sollicite the contrary . The Kings power is as the disgestive faculty in nature , all parts of the body contribute heat to it for their owne benefit , that they may receive backe againe from it a better concocted and prepared supply of nourishment , as it is their office to contribute , so it is the stomacks to distribute .

And questionlesse sole judgement in matters of State , does no otherwise belong to the King , then in matters of Law , or points of Theologie . Besides as sole judgement is here ascr●bed to the King , he may affirme dangers to be foresee●e when he will , and of what nature he will : if ●e say onely , Datum est nobis intelli●i , as he does in his Writ , &c. To his sole indisputable judgement it is left to lay charges as often and as great as ●e pleases . And by this meanes if he regard not his word more than his profit , he may in one yeare draine all the Kingdome of all its treasure , and leave us the most despicable slaves in the whole world .

It is ridiculous also to alleage , as J. Iones does , that it is contrary to presumption of Law to suspect falsity in the King : for if Law presume that the King will not falsly pretend danger to vex his subjects , of his owne meere motion , yet no Law , nor reason , nor policy will presume , that the King may not be induced by mis-information to grieve the people without cause . The Sunne is not more visible than this truth , our best Kings , King Charles , King Iames , Queene Elizabeth , and all the whole ascending line , have done undue illegall things sometimes , contrary to the rights and Franchises of England , being mis-informed , but having consulted with the Judges or States in Parliament , they have all retracted and confessed their error . Nay , there is nothing more knowne , or universally assented to than this , that Kings may be bad ; and it is more probable and naturall , that evill may be expected from good Princes , than good from bad . Wherefore , since it is all one to the State , whether evill proceed from the King mediately or immediately , out of malice or ignorance : and since wee know that of all kinds of government Monarchicall is the worst , when the Scepter is wielded by an unjust and unskillfull Prince , though it be the best , when such Princes as are not seduceable ( a thing most rate ) reigne , it will be great discretion in us not to desert our right in those Lawes which regulate and confine Monarchie , meerly out of Law-presumption ; if we must presume well of our Princes , to what purpose are Lawes made : and if Lawes are frustrate and absurd , where in doe we differ in condition from the most abject of all bond-slaves ?

There is no Tyranny more abhorred than that which hath a controlling power over all Law , and knowes no bounds but its owne will : if this be not the utmost of Tyranny , the Turks are not more servile than we are : and if this be Tyranny , this invention of ship-money makes us as servile as the Turks . We must of necessity admit , that our Princes are not to be mis-led , and then our Lawes are needlesse ; or that they may be misse-led , and then our Lawes are uselesse . For if they will listen to ill councell , they may bee mooved to pretend danger causlesly ; and by this pretence defeate all our lawes and liberties , and those being defeated , what doth the English holde , but at the Kings meere discretion , wherein doth the excell the Captives condition ? if wee shall examine why the Mahometan slaues are more miserably treated , then the Germans , or why the French Pesants are so beggerly , wretched , and bestially used more then the Hollanders , or why the people of Millaine , Naples , Sicily are more oppressed , trampled upon , and inthralled then the Natives of Spayne ? there is no other reason will appeare but that they are subject to more immoderate power , and have lesse benefit of law to releeve them .

In nature there is no reason , why the meanest wretches should not enjoy freedome , and demand justice in as ample measure , as those whom law hath provided for : or why Lords which are above law should bee more cruell then those which are more conditionate : yet wee see it is a fatal kind of necessity onely incident to immoderate power , that it must bee immoderately used : and certainly this was well knowne to our incestors , or else they would not have purchased their charters of freedome with so great an expence of blood as they did , and have endured so much so many yeeres rather then to bee betrayd to immoderate power , and prerogative : let us therefore not bee too carelesse of that , which they were so jealous of , but let us look narrowly into the true consequence of this ship-scot , whatsoever the face of it appeare to bee . It is vaine to stop twenty leakes in a ship , and then to leave one open , or to make lawes for the restraynt of loyalty all other wayes , that it may not overflow the estates of the comminalty at pleasure , and yet to leave one great breach for its irruption .

All our Kings hitherto have beene so circumscribed by law , that they could not command the goods of their subjects at pleasure without common consent : but now if the King be but perswaded to pretend danger , hee is uncontroleable Master of all wee have , one datum est intelligi , shal make our English Statutes like the politicke hedge of Go●e●ham , and no better : I doe not say that this King will falsifie , it is enough that wee all , and all that wee have are at his discretion if hee will falsifie ; though vast power bee not abused , yet it is a great mischiefe that it may , and therefore vast power it selfe is justly odious , for divers reasons . First , because it may fall into the hands of ill disposed Princes , such as were K. Iohn , Henry the third , Edward the second , Richard the second . These all in their times made England miserable , and certainely had their power beene more unconsineable they had made it more miserable . The alterations of times doe not depend upon the alteration of the people , but of Princes : when Princes are good it fares wel with the people when bad ill .

Princes often vary , but the people is alwaies the same in all ages , an● capable of smal , or no variations : If Princes would endure to heare this trueth it would bee profitable for them , for flatterers alwaies rayse jealousies against the people ; but the trueth is , the people as the sea , have no turbulent motion of their owne , if Princes like the windes doe not raise them into rage . Secondly , vast power if it finde not bad Princes it often makes Princes bad : It hath often charged Princes , as it did Nero from good to bad , from bad to worse : but Vespasian is the onely noted man which by the Empire was in melius mutatus : daily experience teaches this . Dangelt in England within 20. yeares increased unto a four-fold proportion .

Subsidies were in former times seldome granted , and few at a time , now Parliaments are helde by some to be of no other use then to grant them .

The Fox , in Esop , observed that of all the Beasts which had gone to visite the Lyon , few of their foot-steps were to be seene retrorsum , they were all printed adversum . And we find at this day , that it is farre more easie for a King to gaine undue things from the people , then it is for the people to re-gaine its due from a King : This King hath larger Dominions , and hath raigned yet fewer years , and enjoyed qu●●ter times then Queene Elizabeth : And yet his taxations hath beene farre greater , and his Exploits lesse honourable , and the yet people is still helde in more jealousie .

To deny Shippe-mony which sweeps all , is ●eld and accounted a rejection of naturall Allegiance . I speake not this to render odious the Kings blessed government , God forbid , I hold him one of the mildest , and most gracious of our Kings : And I instance in him the rather , that we may see , what a bewitching thing flattery is , when it touches uppon this string of unlimitable power : if this ambition and desire of vast power were not the most naturall , and forcible of all sinnes , Angels in Heaven , and man in Paradize had not falne by it ; but since it is , Princes themselves ought to be the more cautious and cautilous of it .

Thirdly , vast power if it neither find nor make bad Princes , yet it makes the good governement of good Princes the lesse pleasing , and the lesse effectuall , for the common and publicke good : And therefore it is a rule both in Law , and Policy , and Nature , Non recurrendum est ad extraordinaria , in jis quae fieri possunt perordinaria : All extraordinary aides are horrid to the people , but most especially such as the Ship-scot is , whereby all liberty is over-throwne , and all Law subjected unto the Kings meer discretion .

Queene Elizabeth in eighty eight was victorious without this Taxation , and I am fully perswaded she was therefore Victorious the rather , because she used it not . Her Arte was to account her subjects hearts as her unfailing Exchequer , and to purchase them by doing legall just things , and this Arte never failed nor deceived her , and in that dismall gust of danger , it was good for her and the whole State , both that she did not relye upon forced aides of money , or the Swords of grieved Souldiers ; For this Ship-money , nothing can be pretended but necessity , and certainly necessity is ill pretended ; when the meere doing of the thing , is as dangerous as that for which it is done : did not this Ship-scot over-throw all p●polar Liberty , and so threaten as great a mischiefe as any Conquest can ? And were not the people justly averse from it ? Yet meerly for the peoples 〈◊〉 to it , it is dangerous to be relied upon in case of great danger .

Wee know Nature teacheth us all , Of two Evils to chuse that which wee thinke the least , though it bee not so ; therefore if the people apprehend this Remedy as a Thing worse then the Disease , though they be mistaken therein , yet that very mistake may proove fatall .

The Roman Army beeing harshly treated by the Senators , and their proud Generall , did refuse to charge upon the Enemy , or to resist the charge of the Enemy , they chose rather to be slaughtered by Strangers , then Enthralled by their Country-men . The English also in the late Scotsh invasion , by reason of this and many other causes of Discontent , made so ●aint resistance , that they did almost in a manner Confesse , That they held themselves as miserable already , as the Scots could make them .

Thus wee see there is no necessity of levying Ship-money , there is rather necessity of Repealing it : And we see that presumption of Law doth no●●bet this Necessity , but rather crosse it . And whereas I. Iones further saith , That the Kings Majesty hath no benefit by Ship-money , and therefore presumption is the str●nger , that the King will not take it causelesly . We may answere : the Ship mony is a ●ery great benefit unto the King : For i● not immediatly , yet 〈◊〉 it is become a Revenew , inasmuch as by this 〈◊〉 al other Re●enues of the Crowne , nay ▪ and Tunnage and 〈◊〉 , which were not designed only for ordinary Expences , but for extraordinary imployments , and publicke Charges also , are now become d●scharged of that tie , and the Common-Wealth hath quite lest all its intrest and property in them . In point of benefit therefore it is all one to the Kings Majesty , and in point of burthen , it is all one to the Subject , whether Ship-money be acc●unted of as part of the Kings annuall Rents , or no , since by it his rents are enlarged : And as to the Subject there is no obligation , that this 〈◊〉 shal not hereafter incorporate with the rest of the Kings Majesties Intradoe● , and be swallowed up as Tunnage and Poundage now are . Thus we see what the Necessity is , and presumption of Law , which was so much insisted uppon ; and yet for a further confutation of both , Time , the mother of Truth , hath now given us more light Now that great danger which was pretended so many yeares together for the necessity of raysing so great supplies of treasure , is a small cloud blown over , making it apparant that Kings may bee mis informed ; and by mis information take Mole-hils for Mountaines , and cast heavie burthen● upon their subjects . 3.

But I come now to my third D●fficulty , how a publick charge is to be laid upon the kingdome . The law runs generally , that in England no Tollage or pecuniary charge may bee imposed Forsque per common assent de tout la Realme , or Si non per common consent de Parliement . Some presidents , or matters of fact appeare , wherein some Kings have divers times invaded this right of the subject , but upon conference had with the Iudges , or petition in Parliament , redresse was ever made , and the subjects right re-established . All the colour which can be brought to answer the Law in our case , is , that the words of the law are generall Taxes and Tollages , but doe not by special mention restrain extraordinary impositions , in time of extraordinary danger . But wee know the Petition of Right , 3. Car. is grounded upon former Statutes , and recites divers of them , and is a cleare affirmance of the common right of England ; and yet by that the commissions for Loanes were damned : and it is evident that those Loanes were demanded for the generall defence of the Kingdome in time of imminent danger ; and by the same Statute , not onely Loanes , but all other levies of money upon what pretence of danger soever , Si non per common consent , are condemned as illegall , and contrary to the Lawes and Rights of England . Two things therefore are objected against Parliaments : First , that they are of slow motion , and so most of the Iudges alledge . Secondly , that they may be perverse , and refuse due aid to the King , and so I. Crawley boldly suggests . For answere wee say in generall : First , that it is the wisdome of Kings to bee alwayes vigilant , and to have their eyes so open upon forraigne Princes , and to maintaine such intelligence that no preparation from abroade may surprize them before recourse had to Parliament ; and this is very easie to insular Princes , who have a competent strength of shipping , Secondly , to have alwayes in readinesse against all sudden surprizes , a sufficient store of ammunition and arms both for sea and land-service : and the revenues of the Crowne of England are sufficient for this purpose , and have beene held more then sufficient in former times , when hostility was greater , and the Kingdome smaller . Thirdly , to seeke advise and assistance from Parliaments , frequently in times of quiet , as well as of danger , as well when warre is b●t smoaking , or kindling , as when it is blown into a flame . Before the conquest this was held policie , and since in Edward the thirds time , a statute past to this purpose ; and if parliaments of late bee growne into dislike , it is not because their vertue is decaid , it is because the corruption of the times cannot endure such sharpe remedies . Fourthly , to speake particularly of this case of ship-money , wee say that it is a course more slow then by parliament : there was more expedition used in parliament to supply King Ch●rles , since hee came to the Crowne , then can this way . And wee say moreover , that as the extremity of the Kingdome was when ship-money was demanded , whatsoever was pretended to the contrary , a parliament might have beene timely enough called , and seasonably enough supplied the King . As to the second objection of I. Crawly , too unfit to come out of any honest wise mans mouth , but much more for a Iudges , Iudge Crooke replies , that as there is nullum iniquum in Lege , so neither in parliamento . The three noted factions which are adverse to Parliaments , are the papists , the prelates , and Court parasites ; and these may bee therefore supposed to hate parliaments , because they knowe themselves hatefull to parliaments . It is scarse possible for the King to finde out any other that thinkes ill of Parliaments , or is ill thought of by Parliaments . Of Papists little neede to bee said , their enmity is confest , they have little to pretend for themselves , but that parliaments are growne puritannicall . The prelates thinke themselves not to have jurisdiction and power enough ▪ and they knowe that Parliaments thinke they have too much , and abuse that which they have much more : therefore to uphold themselves , and to crush their ill-willers , they not only tax Parliaments of puritanisme , but all puritans of sedition : as much as in them lies , they wed the King to their quarrell , perswading him that Parliaments out of puritanisme , do not so much aime at the fall of Episcopacie , as Monarchy , and that Episcopacie is the support of Monarchy , so that both must stand and fall together . Howbeit because they cannot upbraide Parliaments of attempting any thing against Monarchy further then to mainetaine due liberty , therefore they preach an unlimitable prerogative , and condemne all law of liberty as injurious to Kings and incompatible with Monarchy . M●n●arring denies Parliamentary power and honour , C●well denies propriety of goods , further then it the Kings discretion , and Harrison accuses Iudge Hutton of delivering law against G●ds Law , in the case of Ship-money . And the common Court doctrine is , that Kings are boundlesse in authority , and that they onely are Cesars friends which justifie that doctrine ; and from this doctrine hath growne all the jealousies of late betweene the King and his best subjects ; and this is that venemous matter which hath laien burning , and ulcerating inwardly in the bowels of the common-wealth so long . The other enemies of Parliaments , are Court dependants , and projectors , which have taken advantage of this unnaturall dissention betwixt the King and his Subjects ; and have found out meanes to live upon the spoile of both , by siding with the King , and beeing instruments to extend his prerogative to the purchasing of preferment to themselves , disaffection to the King , and vexation to the common-wealth . These three factions excepted , and some few Courtiers which are carryed with the current of example , or are left to speake unpleasing trueths , there is scarce any man in all the Kings dominions , which doth not wish for parliaments , as the States best physick , nay almost as its naturall necessary food : but I will instance in three things wherein parliaments excell all other Councells whatsoever .

1. For wisedome , no advice can bee given so prudent , so profound , so universally comprehending , from any other author ; it is truely sayd by Sir Robert Cotten , that all private single persons may deceive and bee deceived ; but all cannot deceive one , nor one all .

That an inconsiderable number of Privadoes should see or knowe more then whole Kingdomes , is incredible : v●x populi was ever reverenced as vox Dei , and Parliaments are infallble , and their acts indisputable to all but Parliaments . It is a just law , that no private man must bee wiser then Law publickly made . Our wis●st Kings in England , have ever most relied upon the wisedome of Parliaments .

Secondly , no advice can bee so faithfull , so loyall , so religious and sincere , as that which proceeds from parliaments , where so many are gathered together for Gods service i● such a devout manner , we cannot but expect that G●d should bee amongst them : and as they have a more especiall blessing promised them ; so their ends cannot bee so sinister : private men may thrive by alterations : and common calamities , but the common body can effect nothing but the common good , because nothing else can bee commodious for them .

Sir Robert Cotton in the life of Henry the third , according to the Court Doctrine at this present , saies , that in Parliament Kings are ever lesse then they should be , and the people more . If this bee spoken of irregular Kings , which will endure to heare of nothing but prerogative government , it may cary some semblance of trueth : but sure i● is , good and wise Kings are ever greatest when they sit immured , as it were , in that honourable Assembly : as the Historie of Queene Elizabeth and many of her progenitors testifies . T is true , K. Henry the third , met with divers oppositions in Parliament : Hee was there upbrayded , and called dilapidator regni ; it was true that hee was ●o , and the most unworthy of rule that ever sate sate in this Throne ; yet those words became not subjects : I doe not just●fie , but in some part extenuate such misdemeanors ; for the chiefe blame of those times is not to bee throwne upon the 〈◊〉 and commons , but upon the King and his out-landi●● parasites . It is without all question also that in those bloudy unjust ●imes , had it not beene for frequent parliaments , and that soveraigne remedy which thereby was applyed to the bleeding wounds of the Kingdome , no other helpe could have stanched them .

Even then , when Parliaments were most prevalent , and when they had so much provocation from so variable an uncapable a Prince , they did not seeke to conditionate prerogative , or to depresse Monarchy for the future , though they were a little to injurious to him in person for the present .

Since that time also many Parliaments h●ve had to struggle for due liberty with insolent princes , and have had power to clip the wings of Royalty ; and the custome of all Europe almost besides hath seemed to give such countenance to such attempts ; but the deepe wisedome , & inviolable loyalty of Parliaments to this composure of governement hath bin such , that they never made any invasion upon it . As it was in all former ages , so it now remaines intire with all its glorious ensignes of honour , and all the complements of power ; and may hee be as odious which seekes too alter or diminish Monarchicall governement for the future , as he which seekes to make it infinite , and slanders Parliaments as enemies to it , or endeavors to blow such jealousies into the Kings eares .

3. No advice can bee so sit , so forcible , so effectuall for the publicke welfare , as that which is given in Parliament : if any Cabinet Counsellours could give as wise sincere advice as Parliaments , yet it could not bee so profitable , because the hearts of the people doe not goe along with any other , as with that .

That King which is potent in Parliament , as any good King may , is as it were so inskonsed in the hearts of his subjects , that he is almost beyond the trayns or aimes of treason and rebellion at home , nay forraign hostility cannot pei●ce him , but through the sides of all his people .

It ought to bee noted also , that the English have ever beene the most devoted servants coequall , sweetly-moderate Soveraignty ; so in our English Parliaments , where the Nobility is not too prevalent , as in Denmark , nor the Comminalty , as in the Netherlands , nor the King , as in France , Iustice and policie kisse and embrace more lovingly then elsewhere . And as all the three States have alwayes more harmoniously born their just proportionable parts in England then elsewhere , so now in these times , in these learned , knowing , religious times , we may expect more blessed counsell from Parliaments then ever we received heretofore . May it therefore sinke into the heart of our King to adhere to Parliaments , and to abhorre the grosse delusive suggestions of such as disparage that kinde of Councell . May lie rather con●ide in that Community which can have no other end but their owne happinesse in his greatnesse , thè● in Papists , Prelates , and Projectors , to whom the publick disunion is advantagious . May he affect that gentle Prerogative which stands with the happinesse , freedome , and riches of his people , and 〈◊〉 that terrible Scopter which does as much avert the hearts , as it doth deb●lita●e the hands , and exhaust the purses of his Subjects . May he at last learnd by 〈◊〉 ; that the grievance of all 〈◊〉 , that that mischiefe which makes all mischiefes 〈◊〉 , and almost hopelesse in England at this day , is that Parliaments are clouded , and disused , and suffered to be 〈◊〉 by the ill boding incendi●ries of our State . May it lustly enter into his beleefe , that it is impossible for any Kingdome to deny publicke assent for their 〈…〉 when publicke danger is 〈…〉 , and when it is fairely required , and not by projects extorted : that no Nation can unnaturally seeke its owne 〈…〉 may make their Subjects purses their owne private coffers , if they will demand due things , at due times , and by due meanes .

4. I come now to the last difficulty , about the condition and nature of such aydes as are due by Law from the Subject to the King , Though much have beene argued both at the barre and on the Bench , for the King , that he may raise moneyes from his Subjects , without consent by Law , Prerogative , and necessity . Yet at last , because the Petition of Right absolutely crosses this tenet , it is restored to us backe againe , and yeelded , that the King may not impose a pecuniary charge by way of Tollage , but onely a personall one by way of service . And now all our controversie ends in this , that we must contest , whether the Ship-scot be a ●ecuniary , or a personall charge : For though the intent of the Writ , and the office of the Sh●●iffe be to raise moneyes onely , yet the words of the Writ , and the pretence of State , is to build and prepare Ships of warre . The Kingdome generally takes this to be a 〈◊〉 delusion and imposture , and doubtlesse it is but a pick lock tricke , to overthrow all liberty and propriety of goods , and it is a great shame that so many Judges should be abetters to such fraudulent practice contrived against the State . It is not lawfull for the King to demand moneyes as moneyes , but it is lawfull to demand moneyes under another wrong name , and under this wrong name all former Lawes and Liberties shall be as absolutely cancelled , as if they had beene meere cobwebs , or enacted onely out of meere derision . If former lawes made to guard propriety of goods were just , and grounded upon good reason , why are they by this grosse fallacie , or childish abuse defeated . If they were not just , or reasonable , what needes such a fond subtiltie as this ? why should they not be fairely avoided by Law ? Why were they made at all ? But be this invention what it will , yet we see it is new ; if it be quashed , the State is but where it was , we are still as our Ancestors left us ; and since our preceeding Kings never heretofore put it in use in the most necessitous calamitous times , we may from hence infer●e , that the plea of State necessity falls off of it selfe ; if we admit not of this innovation , then the State suffers not ; but if we admit it , no necessity being of it , we can frame no other reason for our so doing , but that our former franchises and priviledges were unjust , and therefore this way they must be annulled . Some of our Judges doe prove , that if this were a personall service , yet it were void ; and they cite the case of Barges , and Ballingers vessells , built truly for Warre in time of Imminent danger , and yet these charges upon complaint made by the Subject , were revoked , and disclaimed . But here in this case many other enormities and defects in Law Lare , for if ships be intended to be built in Inland Countries , a thing impossible is injoyned ; and if moneyes be aimed at , that very ayme is against Law : and if the Kingdome were to be disfranchised , it were not to be done by all illegall way .

Besides , in the Writ , in the Assessement , in the Sheriffes remedy against Recusants of it , in the execution of Law , by , or after judgment , many inconveniences , errors , and mischiefes arise many wayes : and sure take the whole case as it is , and since the Creation no whole Kingdome was ever cast in such a cause before .

Besides , though the Iudges ought wholly to have be●● themselves upon this , to have proved this a personall service , and no pecuniary charge , they have roved after necessity , presumption of Law , and Prerogative , and fearce said any thing at all hereof .

My Lord Brainston argues very eagerly , that personall services by Sea and Land are due to the King in cases of extremity , and all their records , case , and presidents prove no more , and that men may be arrayed , and ships pressed , and that sumptibus populi ; but there is nothing proved that the meere raising of moneyes in this case , is a personall service . I. Iones indeed argues to this purpose : If the Law intrust the King with so great a power over mens persons , why not over their estates ? There is cleare reason for the contrary : because the King , if he should abuse mens personall aides , could not inrich or profit himselfe thereby , and we know it is gaine and profit , it is Auri sacra fames which hath power over the breasts of men . It is not ordinary for Tyrants to imbattaile hoasts of men , and make them charge upon the Sea-billowes , and then to gather up Cockles and Piwinckle shells in lieu of spoile , as one did once : but the World abounds with stories of such Princes , as have offended in abusing their power over mens estates , and have violated all right divine and humane , to attaine to such a boundlesse power .

Good Kings are sometimes weake in coveting boundlesse power ; some affect rivality with God himselfe in power , and yet places that power in doing evill , not good : for few Kings want power to doe good , and therefore it misbecomes not sometimes good Subjects to be jealous in some things of good Kings . But J. Iones farther sayes , that Ships must be built , and without money that cannot be done : ergo . This necessity hath beene answered , and disproved already : and I now adde , that for the good of the Kingdome there is more necessity that Ship-money be damned then maintained . Such unnaturall slavery seems to mee to be attendant upon this all-devouring project , and such in●amy to our Ancestors , our Lawes , and our selves , nay , and such danger to the King and his posterity , that I cannot imagine how any forraigne conquest should induce any thing more to be detested and abhorred .

Those Kings which have beene most covetous of unconfined immoderate power , have beene the weakest in judgment , and commonly their lives have beene poore and toylsome , and their ends miserable , and violent : so that if Kings did rightly understand their owne good , none would more shunne uncontrollable absolutenesse then themselves .

How is the King of France happy in his great Prerogative ? or in that terrible stile of the King of Asses ? ●ee see that his immoderate power makes him oppresse his poore Pesants , for their condition is most deplorable , and yet set his power aside , and there is no reason why he should not be as a Father to cherish them , as a God to comfort them , not as an enemy to impoverish them , as a tormentor to afflict them .

2. His oppression makes him culpable before God : he must one day render a sad account for all the evill which he hath imposed , for all the good which he hath not procured to them . That the Vicegerent of God should doe the office of a tyrant , will be no light thing one day .

3. His sinne makes him poore : for were his Pesants suffered to get wealth and enjoy it , the whole Land would be his treasury , and that treasury would containe twice as much as now it doth .

4. His poverty makes him impotent , for money being the sinewes of warre , how strong would his joynts be , if all his subjects were abounding in money , as doubtlesse they would , if they wanted not liberty , and propriety ? besides , poverty depresses the spirit of a Nation : and were the King of France , King of an Infantery , as he is onely of a Cavalrie , were he a King of men , as he is onely of beasts , had he a power over hearts as he hath over hands , that Country would be twice as puissant as it is .

5. His impotence , together with all other irregularities , and abuses is like to make his Monarchy the lesse durable . Civill wars have ever hitherto infected and macerated that goodly Countrey , and many times it hath been near it's ruine : it now enjoyes inward peace , but it doth no great exploits abroad , nor is ever likely to doe , unlesse by practising upon the distemper of other Nations : should some other Prince practise in the like manner upon that , and propose liberty to the grieved people , much advantage might be taken : but these avisoes would better proceed from that most heroick , most terrible , most armipatent Churchman , which effects such great wonders here : wee see hence that Princes by some gaine lose , as the whole body pines by the swelling of the spleene : we see that Reh●●oam catcht an immoderate power , as the Dog in the fable at a shadow , but in stead of an uncertain nothing , he let fall and lost a certaine substance ; and yet flatterers have scarce any other bai●e then this shadow of immoderate power , whereby to poison the phantasies of weake humours , undiscerning rash Princes .

My humble motion therefore is : First , that the judgement given in the Chequ●r Chamber for Ship-money , may bee reversed , and damned , as contrary to the right of the Subject .

Secondly , that those Iudges which adhered to equity and integrity in this case , might have some honourable guerdon designed them .

Thirdly , that some dishonourable penalty may bee imposed upon those Iudges which ill advised the King herein , and then argued as Pleaders , not as Iudges ; especially if any shall appeare to have solicited the betraying of the Kingdome .

Fourthly , that the meaning of our Lawes & Charters , may bee fully and expresly declared , and the force and vertue of Statutes and publicke Grants , may be vindicated from all such exceptions and objections as have beene particularly or generally made against them .

Fifthly , that a clearer solution may be given in the foure maine points stirred , how farre prerogative is arbitrary and above Law ; and how farre naturall Allegeance bindes to yeeld to all demands not of Parliament : next , how the King is sole Judge of danger , as that his meere cognizance thereof shall be sufficient , though there be no appearance or probability thereof . Next , how a necessity of publicke ●●ine must be concluded now , if Ship-money be not levied , when no such ruine hath been formerly , when this new plot was not devised . Lastly , how this Ship-scot pretending ships , but intending money , and really raising the same , can be said to be no pecuniary tollage within our Statutes , but a meere personall service .

Sixthly , that any Officers , or Ministers of State , which shall attempt to lay the like taxes hereafter upon the Subject , by vertue of the like void warrants , may be held and taken as Felons , or Traytors , or forcible Intruders .

Seventhly , that something may be inacted against forraigne and domesticall Forces also , if they shall be congregated for the like purposes ; and that the subject may be inabled by some fit and timely remedy to be given against a military kinde of government .

Eighthly , that the due way of publicke defence , in case of imminent and eminent danger , or actuall necessary warre , for the pressing of men , and other charges of warre , such as Cote and Conduct money , and all doubts thereabouts , may be made more certaine and settled for the time to come .

Ninthly , that if the Kings ordinary 〈◊〉 now taken for the Crowne , be not sufficient to maintaine him , as our great Master , some legall order may be taken therefore , and that he may be sensible of his Subjects loyalty , and his Subjects live safe under him , that his enemies may finde him considerable , and his true friends usefull .

FINIS .