PART
.
1.
OF
THE
NECESSARY
MEANES
to
Establish
an
ESTATE
.
CHAPTER
1.
Of
the
Establishing
and
forme
of
an
Estate
;
and
of
the
diuersity
of
the
gouernments
thereof
.
THe
Considerations
which
may
serue
for
the
mannaging
of
publique
affaires
,
are
of
two
sorts
.
Some
are
drawne
from
generall
Rules
and
Maximes
,
the
which
are
vsually
followed
and
obserued
in
the
gouernment
of
Estates
;
and
the
others
from
Circumstances
,
which
fall
out
in
particular
occurrents
.
For
as
we
may
not
so
relye
vpon
the
first
that
we
not
examine
and
exactly
weigh
the
particularities
of
a
busines
which
may
be
obserued
,
be
it
in
the
Person
which
must
assist
;
or
in
the
causes
,
motiues
,
means
,
place
,
time
,
and
other
circumstances
:
So
we
must
not
tye
our selues
so
confidently
to
these
last
,
as
wee
desist
from
the
first
.
If
necessity
doth
force
vs
sometimes
to
dispe●ce
,
it
must
be
in
such
sort
,
as
we
reserue
a
way
to
returne
againe
,
and
to
repaire
the
businesse
.
Wee
cannot
prescribe
any
thing
certaine
for
these
la●t
circumstances
,
all
in
particulars
which
are
infinite
,
and
depending
principally
vpon
the
sufficiency
and
particular
experience
of
him
which
examines
such
affaires
.
Many
haue
written
others
,
some
of
which
suffring
themselues
to
be
transported
with
curiosity
,
haue
mingled
Doubts
and
Queres
more
fitting
for
a
Schoole
,
then
profitable
to
make
vse
of
.
But
my
designe
in
this
Discourse
is
,
to
gather
from
the
Ancients
and
Moderns
,
(
who
haue
treated
vpon
this
Subiect
)
that
which
I
haue
found
most
fitting
for
vse
and
the
present
Estate
.
The
forme
of
Estates
is
diuers
,
according
to
the
number
;
the
dependants
and
the
right
of
those
which
Command
,
The
first
is
tha●
,
in
the
which
one
command●
alone
without
Companion
,
the
which
wee
call
Principality
.
The
second
is
that
where
the
most
eminent
and
apparent
Men
(
which
make
the
least
part
of
the
Estate
)
haue
the
Soueraignty
,
the
which
we
call
Seignoury
.
The
third
is
that
,
whereas
the
people
,
or
the
greatest
part
of
them
vnder
the
Name
of
people
command
▪
and
this
may
be
called
a
popular
Estate
,
or
a
Common-weale
.
But
euery
forme
of
Estate
is
gouerned
d●uersly
:
so
as
of
Principalities
one
is
called
Royall
,
The
other
is
Seignouriall
,
Caesar
,
Pompey
and
Cr●ssus
,
and
lastly
vnder
the
Triumuirat
.
CHAP.
2.
Of
the
aduantages
and
disaduantages
of
a
Popular
Estate
.
EXperience
hath
taught
vs
,
that
wee
may
subsist
in
all
these
formes
of
Estate
.
But
as
there
is
nothing
permanent
in
this
World
,
through
idlenesse
and
negligence
the
order
is
many
times
corrupted
,
and
the
State
ruined
,
the
which
proceeds
from
the
imperfections
and
defects
which
are
found
in
all
these
Estates
.
Wherefore
he
that
will
settle
an
Estate
,
must
consider
carefully
of
the
aduantages
and
disaduantages
which
are
found
in
either
forme
.
The
aduantages
which
they
giue
to
a
popular
Estate
,
Their
assemblies
are
alwaies
full
of
disorders
,
varieties
and
inconstancy
:
the
ordinary
defects
of
a
multitude
.
Wise
men
dare
not
●peake
,
fearing
the
fury
of
the
people
,
who
alwayes
lay
their
faults
vpon
their
Gouernors
;
and
Fooles
crying
out
loudest
carry
it
.
If
you
do
not
hold
the
people
in
some
feare
of
strangers
,
stirring
vp
some
Warre
against
them
,
they
will
forge
a
Ciuill
;
there
being
neuer
any
quarrell
or
enuy
so
great
,
as
amongst
those
which
are
equall
;
be
it
to
supplant
one
another
;
or
for
that
the
one
cannot
liue
without
the
other
.
The
need
which
they
haue
one
of
another
,
being
the
principall
bond
of
ordinary
friendship
:
and
they
are
inconstant
,
being
of
an
humour
which
cannot
continue
long
in
quiet
;
vnl●sse
there
be
some
number
of
Citizens
,
who
hauing
credit
●nd
agreeing
together
,
stay
the
violence
wherewith
the
people
suffer
themselues
commonly
to
be
transported
.
The
Suisses
,
which
are
gouerned
in
this
forme
o●
Estate
,
CHAP.
3.
Of
the
aduantages
and
disaduantages
of
a
Seignoury
.
THe
Estate
of
many
Lords
,
seemes
to
hold
a
meane
betwixt
a
Principallity
and
a
popular
Estate
,
Yet
experience
hath
taught
vs
,
And
if
they
will
say
that
one
may
supply
the
defect
of
another
,
this
would
be
difficult
among
equals
;
The
voyces
being
numbred
and
not
weighed
:
And
admit
this
might
be
done
,
yet
it
were
not
good
for
the
Councell
,
which
must
consist
of
a
greater
number
th●n
ordinarily
the
Lords
are
.
But
for
the
command
which
de●●nds
vpon
a
resolution
of
diuers
opinions
,
of
men
equal●
in
power
and
credit
,
it
cannot
well
be
but
in
one
head
.
Likewise
in
a
combustion
and
trouble
,
they
haue
found
that
the
Command
of
one
alone
was
necessary
,
and
that
it
was
very
vnsafe
in
a
time
full
of
Iealousies
,
Difficulties
,
and
Distrusts
to
impart
the
gouernment
of
affaires
to
many
.
The
Lacedemonians
vpon
this
occasion
created
their
Armoste
;
The
Thessalians
him
whom
they
called
Ar●hoes
;
The
Mitileniens
their
great
Achimnete
;
At
Rome
they
created
the
Dictator
;
At
Venice
their
great
Prouidator
.
Besides
all
these
inconueniences
,
a
Seignoury
as
well
as
other
formes
of
Estates
,
is
not
onely
exposed
to
strangers
,
but
more
to
the
Enterprises
of
a
multitude
,
whom
they
must
content
or
keepe
them
in
awe
by
force
.
To
content
them
without
yeelding
vnto
them
part
of
the
Estate
,
were
very
difficult
,
and
it
were
impossible
to
admit
them
to
offices
,
without
danger
to
change
the
Seignoury
into
a
popular
Estate
,
as
it
happened
at
Rome
.
To
retaine
them
by
force
,
were
no
safe
thing
:
and
admit
it
might
be
done
,
yet
the
distrust
they
should
haue
of
them
,
would
be
a
cause
that
in
the
least
warre
attempted
against
strangers
,
they
would
make
vse
of
this
occasion
,
to
take
Armes
and
to
shake
off
the
yoake
.
In
this
feare
the
Lords
durst
not
traine
vp
their
Souldiers
to
Armes
;
and
entertaining
strangers
to
mannage
the
the
warre
,
it
is
to
be
feared
they
will
get
credit
among
the
people
.
If
they
giue
the
charge
of
this
conduct
to
one
of
their
Lords
,
vpon
the
fi●st
discontentment
he
shal
haue
against
the
rest
,
or
vpon
the
least
ambition
that
shall
creepe
into
his
braine
,
he
will
dis-vnite
himselfe
from
them
,
and
make
himselfe
the
head
of
a
party
.
So
as
this
kind
of
gouernment
cannot
safely
vndertake
a
War
,
without
danger
of
ruine
.
So
whether
for
the
diuision
which
may
grow
among
them
,
or
for
the
weakenesse
of
power
diuided
among
many
;
or
be
it
for
the
difficulty
to
agree
and
resolue
;
Or
be
it
that
the
Subiects
many
times
know
not
whom
to
obey
;
Or
for
that
affaires
which
ought
to
be
kept
secret
,
are
most
commonly
divulg'd
:
This
kind
of
gouernment
is
none
of
the
safest
.
And
that
which
hath
caused
the
Seignoury
of
Venice
to
continue
so
long
,
CHAP.
4.
Of
the
aduantages
and
disaduantages
of
a
Principality
.
The
second
is
the
danger
of
falling
into
Ciuill
warres
by
the
diuision
of
such
as
aspire
to
the
Crowne
,
especially
if
there
be
a
right
of
election
:
and
in
the
succession
,
if
the
Prince
be
an
Infant
,
there
will
be
a
diuision
for
th●
gouernment
betwixt
the
Mother
and
the
Princes
,
or
b●twixt
the
Princes
themselues
.
So
as
they
haue
beene
often
forced
to
auoid
this
inconuenience
,
to
giue
t●●
breeding
of
the
Child
to
the
Mother
,
and
the
gouernment
of
the
Estate
to
the
nearest
Kinsman
.
And
if
there
be
a
Tutor
,
there
is
danger
lest
he
make
hi●selfe
Maister
of
the
Estate
,
as
hath
beene
often
see●●
among
the
Macedonians
:
If
there
bee
many
,
th●●
are
reduced
to
the
inconueniences
of
many
Lords
.
If
the
Prince
be
young
,
and
freed
from
a
Gouernour
,
young
men
cause
him
to
commit
a
thousand
disorders
,
and
to
reiect
all
sorts
of
good
Councell
:
And
if
he
●●
warlike
,
he
will
hazard
his
Subiects
,
his
Estate
,
a●●
Person
:
If
hee
be
subtill
and
wicked
,
hee
will
sett●●
a
Tyranny
:
If
he
be
cruell
,
he
will
make
a
Butchery
of
his
Subiects
:
If
he
be
luxurious
,
hee
will
troub●●
the
holiest
Marriages
of
his
Estate
,
which
is
a
thing
which
doth
most
passionate
the
people
:
If
he
be
c●uetous
or
prodigall
,
he
will
be
an
exacter
;
and
if
he
be
simple
and
ignorant
,
it
will
be
much
worse
,
suffring
●imselfe
to
be
gouerned
by
men
of
no
merit
,
who
for
their
owne
priuate
interest
and
greatnesse
,
will
attempt
all
manner
of
villanies
vnder
his
authority
.
Yet
not
withstanding
these
inconueniences
,
it
is
most
certaine
,
(
as
hath
beene
sayd
)
that
a
soueraigne
commaund
cannot
subsist
,
(
to
speake
prop●rly
)
but
in
one
person
alone
;
as
they
say
that
many
see
better
then
one
alone
:
But
to
resolue
,
to
conclude
,
and
to
commaund
,
one
will
doe
it
better
then
many
.
As
for
Alliances
of
Princes
,
they
doe
not
alwayes
dye
with
the
Princes
,
there
being
treaties
which
are
made
from
one
Estate
into
another
.
And
in
regard
of
the
Princes
minority
,
when
it
happens
,
the
affaires
are
not
alwayes
found
disposed
to
●nnouation
;
and
according
to
the
occasions
they
may
preuent
the
mischiefes
which
happen
by
this
defect
.
The
other
inconueniences
are
rather
particular
vices
of
the
Prince
,
then
defects
of
the
Gouernment
,
and
vices
dye
with
the
Princes
person
,
but●not
the
vices
and
abuses
of
Lords
in
a
Seignoury
,
nor
of
a
multitude
in
a
popular
Estate
,
for
that
Comminalties
neuer
dye
:
But
contrariwise
as
they
are
perpetuated
by
subrogation
,
so
by
contagion
the
abuses
which
enter
into
these
companies
,
passe
from
one
to
another
.
And
in
regard
of
liberty
,
which
is
the
foundation
of
other
Estates
,
CHAP.
5.
A
consideration
of
the
setling
of
the
forme
of
an
Estate
.
BY
their
defects
and
aduantages
which
are
found
in
these
three
kinds
of
gouernments
,
we
may
afterwards
iudge
(
adding
thereunto
the
consideration
of
the
inclination
of
the
people
)
of
the
particular
manner
of
liuing
,
and
of
the
condition
of
the
people
and
affaires
,
the
which
ought
to
be
setled
rather
in
one
place
then
in
another
.
Among
men
that
are
equall
and
impatient
of
Rule
,
as
your
Sea-faring
men
be
,
and
such
as
dwell
in
Mountaines
and
Forrest
,
by
reason
of
the
austerity
and
roughnesse
of
their
manners
and
liuing
,
a
popular
Estate
would
be
more
proper
then
any
other
.
Themistocles
desiring
to
settle
a
popular
Estate
in
Athens
,
aduanced
Sea-faring
men
,
and
gaue
authority
to
Marriners
.
Cato
sayd
that
the
Macedonians
deserued
to
be
free
,
for
that
they
could
not
be
restrained
vnder
the
rule
of
him
that
would
command
them
.
If
there
be
an
inequality
,
one
part
being
richer
then
the
other
,
and
that
wealth
hath
bred
some
dependance
and
respect
of
the
meaner
sort
towards
the
great
ones
,
a
Seignoury
and
gouernment
of
few
may
be
well
established
amongst
such
men
.
If
in
this
inequality
there
be
a
Diuision
or
Discord
,
some
being
vnwilling
to
yeeld
to
others
;
and
that
there
be
found
some
one
that
hath
more
power
and
credit
,
they
must
of
necessity
settle
a
principality
.
After
a
Battaile
lost
,
or
some
other
disgrace
happened
,
a
people
being
amazed
,
finding
no
Councell
in
themselues
,
they
willingly
referre
the
disposition
of
their
affaires
to
him
or
them
which
promise
to
preserue
them
.
So
as
in
such
an
incounter
it
is
easie
in
steed
of
a
popular
Estate
to
settle
a
Seignoury
or
a
principallity
.
As
contrariwise
,
a
multitude
hauing
had
some
good
successe
,
and
growing
insolent
,
it
fa●s
out
that
making
no
a●compt
of
their
Lords
,
they
change
the
commaund
of
few
into
a
popular
Estate
,
or
into
a
Principallity
,
if
he
by
whose
meanes
,
this
good
Fortune
hath
befalne
them
,
hath
credit
,
conduct
,
and
courage
sufficient
to
make
vse
of
his
good
Fortune
.
I
will
adde
,
that
a
fearefull
and
timerous
people
giuen
to
their
pleasures
,
little
carefull
and
incapable
of
affaires
,
are
better
gouerned
and
more
happily
by
a
Prince
,
then
by
any
other
kind
of
gouernment
.
Where
as
contrarywise
,
a
people
that
is
rough
,
auaritious
,
presumptuous
,
and
hardy
,
do
vnwillingly
yeild
themselues
vnder
a
principallity
,
if
it
be
not
very
moderate
,
or
altogether
warlicke
,
in
the
which
absolute
commaunds
are
supported
by
force
.
It
may
likewise
be
sayd
,
that
a
Principallity
is
maintayned
better
in
a
great
Estate
,
consisting
of
persons
of
diuers
qualities
;
and
a
small
Estate
is
more
fitting
for
a
Seignoury
or
popular
Gouernment
:
for
that
in
a
great
Estate
,
being
necessary
to
trayne
vp
the
Subiects
to
Armes
to
defend
it
,
it
fals
out
vsually
,
that
he
which
is
master
of
the
Forces
,
makes
himselfe
likewise
master
of
the
Estate
;
as
it
hath
hap●ed
at
Rome
,
and
in
many
other
Common-weales
.
Contrariwise
,
a
Prince
in
a
small
Estate
is
many
times
for●ed
to
become
a
Tyrant
;
and
so
much
the
greater
and
s●uerer
Tyrant
,
as
the
extent
of
his
Tyranny
,
that
is
to
say
of
his
Country
,
is
the
lesse
,
hauing
no
meanes
to
draw
from
his
Subiects
(
without
great
oppression
)
so
much
mony
as
he
shall
haue
need
of
for
his
defence
,
to
the
which
all
his
Subiects
would
contribute
willingly
their
persons
and
meanes
,
if
they
were
reduced
to
a
republique
or
popular
Estate
.
CHAP.
6.
Of
the
dependance
of
Estates
one
of
another
.
THe
forme
of
Estates
is
diuers
,
according
to
the
dependance
of
those
which
commaund
.
For
although
we
treate
onely
of
Estates
that
haue
all
soueraignty
ouer
their
Subiects
;
yet
there
are
which
depend
in
some
sort
of
another
,
and
others
which
doe
not
hold
,
as
they
say
,
but
of
God
and
their
Swords
,
hauing
no
dependance
of
any
man
.
As
for
a
Pensioner
,
he
seemes
to
depend
no
more
of
him
that
giues
the
pension
,
nor
to
be
inferiour
to
him
,
then
the
other
is
to
him
.
For
although
he
seemes
inferiour
receiuing
the
pension
,
yet
the
other
in
giuing
it
,
makes
shew
that
h●
hath
neede
of
his
succours
:
And
when
as
H●norius
treated
with
the
Gots
,
and
made
them
his
pensioners
.
Lampadias
opposing
himselfe
,
sayd
,
that
it
was
a
paction
of
Seruitude
,
by
the
which
they
made
the
Emperour
tributary
to
the
Gots
.
Yet
I
hold
that
this
ought
to
be
iudged
by
the
quality
and
power
of
the
Estates
,
and
by
the
particular
con●entions
.
For
the
succours
may
be
so
great
in
regard
of
the
pension
,
as
we
might
easily
discerne
who
had
the
aduantage
in
this
treaty
,
and
in
like
manner
if
there
were
any
necessity
in
the
one
,
to
doe
▪
that
which
they
had
stipulated
from
him
;
and
that
what
they
desired
of
another
,
were
left
to
his
free
will
:
wherevpon
knowledge
of
the
cause
the
first
shall
be
inferiour
to
the
last
.
The
markes
of
Soueraignty
which
remaine
,
CHAP.
7.
Of
the
forme
of
Estates
according
to
the
right
of
those
which
commaund
them
.
THe
forme
of
Estates
is
likewise
diuers
,
in
regard
of
the
right
of
such
as
commaund
:
and
accordingly
their
commaund
is
called
lawfull
or
vnlawfull
,
as
well
i●
a
Principality
,
Seignoury
,
as
a
popular
Gouernment
.
The
lawfull
is
that
which
belongs
vnto
vs
,
be
it
by
the
bounty
of
him
which
hath
power
to
giue
it
,
or
by
a
iust
conquest
,
or
else
that
w●ich
is
defer●●d
by
the
Lawes
,
the
which
hath
eyther
followed
Succession
,
Election
,
or
Lots
.
The
Lot
is
more
proper
for
a
popular
Gouernment
,
for
that
all
things
are
equall
;
and
they
seldome
make
vse
of
it
in
the
Gouernment
of
a
Principallity
or
a
Seig●oury
.
Yet
Saul
was
made
King
by
Lot
:
And
Alexanders
Successours
after
his
death
diuided
his
Empire
by
Lot
.
At
Venice
they
draw
them
by
Lots
which
are
to
choose
the
principall
Magistrates
.
But
such
establishments
are
not
ordinary
.
Succession
and
Election
are
the
most
ordinary
meanes
to
attayne
vnto
a
Principallity
and
Seignoury
,
w●ereof
it
is
necessary
●o
know
the
aduantages
and
inconueniences
,
which
we
may
hope
for
,
or
feare
.
CHAP.
8.
Aduantages
and
disaduantages
of
an
Election
in
a
Principallity
.
THe
Election
in
a
Monarchy
or
Principallity
is
dangerous
,
Besides
this
,
in
the
pursuit
of
the
Election
,
you
see
many
factions
,
whereof
the
least
is
sufficient
to
●uine
the
Estate
:
the
which
not
able
to
be
reconciled
,
they
frame
parties
,
which
delay
the
Election
,
and
continue
the
int●reigne
,
with
the
disorders
which
accompany
it
.
But
if
eyther
party
choose
whom
they
thinke
good
,
then
growes
a
Ciuill
Warre
,
which
continues
long
after
.
This
hath
bin
seene
in
the
Election
of
Popes
and
Emperours
:
and
the
Empire
hath
bin
voyd
eighteene
yeares
,
after
that
William
Earle
of
Holland
had
bin
sl●ine
.
For
although
●hat
Alphonso
the
tenth
King
of
Spaine
were
chosen
,
yet
he
refused
this
quality
,
for
t●e
apparent
danger
,
to
take
the
charge
of
a●
Estate
,
exposed
to
the
will
of
Subiects
,
to
the
enuy
of
Princes
,
and
to
the
violence
of
the
stranger
:
And
in
the
meane
time
the
wicked
exceeded
in
all
villany
.
Moreouer
in
the
Election
,
an
ouerture
being
made
of
many
,
if
they
fall
to
force
,
the
most
cunning
and
rash
would
carry
it
,
and
the
most
vertuous
would
not
hazard
themselues
.
If
they
make
themselues
Competitors
,
and
will
containe
themselues
within
the
ordinary
bounds
,
he
shall
neuer
be
chosen
against
the
hot
pursuit
of
others
,
who
at
need
know
well
how
to
free
themselues
.
And
be
the
Election
made
of
one
of
the
Country
,
or
of
a
stranger
;
yet
there
are
great
inconueniences
of
either
side
.
Among
those
of
the
same
Country
,
there
wil
be
alwaies
icalousie
,
and
the
one
will
neuer
obay
the
other
:
And
although
they
be
not
all
equall
in
Wealth
and
Vertue
:
yet
they
will
still
presume
themselues
to
be
such
.
If
they
make
choyse
of
a
Forraigne
Prince
,
his
manners
being
different
will
not
be
pleasing
:
he
will
aduance
those
of
his
Country
,
in
whom
he
hath
greatest
confidence
.
If
there
fall
vnto
him
another
Kingdome
by
Succession
where
he
may
commaund
more
absolutely
,
he
will
leaue
the
Electife
to
some
Leiutenant
:
Or
if
the
two
Estates
be
neighbours
,
with
the
one
he
will
make
the
other
subiect
.
They
will
alwayes
be
in
distrust
,
that
he
will
aduance
his
Country-men
,
and
depriue
them
of
the
right
of
Election
▪
and
he
on
the
other
side
,
will
grow
iea●ous
of
his
Subiects
,
if
he
hath
that
dessigne
:
and
to
purchase
their
good
wills
,
and
reduce
them
to
what
he
desires
,
he
will
giue
and
ingage
vnto
them
the
demeanes
and
Reuenewes
of
the
Estate
,
as
some
Emperours
and
Popes
haue
done
.
Behold
the
inconueniences
of
an
Election
.
CHAP.
9.
Of
Succession
,
diuersly
practised
in
Successions
.
THe
other
meanes
to
come
vnto
the
Gouernment
of
an
Estate
receiued
by
the
Lawes
,
is
Succession
the
which
is
diuersly
practized
:
For
the
Commaund
is
referred
to
men
and
women
indifferently
:
or
to
men
,
to
the
exclusion
of
women
.
The
Commaund
which
is
referred
inclusiuely
to
men
and
Women
,
hath
for
its
Foundation
the
Law
of
Successions
,
and
the
Equallity
which
is
betwixt
man
and
Woman
;
yet
this
is
also
diuersly
practized
:
For
eyther
the
Commaund
is
deferr'd
to
Women
,
according
to
the
order
and
degrees
of
Proximity
,
obserued
in
ordinary
Successions
:
Or
only
in
defect
of
Males
,
aswell
in
the
direct
as
the
Colaterall
Line
,
vnto
the
fourth
degree
inclusiuely
:
As
it
was
resolued
by
the
Cardinals
for
the
Realme
of
Naples
,
as
it
appeares
in
the
Inuestiture
of
Alphonso
of
Aragon
,
in
the
Yeare
1345.
and
of
Ferdinand
in
the
Yeare
1458
:
And
although
that
this
Succession
of
women
to
the
gouernment
of
Estates
be
receiued
in
a
manner
by
all
the
Estates
of
Christendome
:
Yet
some
haue
reiected
it
;
If
she
marries
a
Stranger
,
he
shal
be
enuied
of
his
neighbours
and
suspected
by
his
Subiects
,
n●ither
can
he
hold
his
life
assured
to
commaund
in
a
strange
Country
,
vnlesse
he
hath
Forces
&
Forts
whereof
he
is
the
master
.
He
will
likewise
commaund
the
Estate
;
and
the
better
to
assure
himselfe
,
he
will
aduance
his
owne
,
and
keep
backet
those
of
the
Cou●try
:
An
insupportable
thing
to
all
Nations
of
the
World
.
These
are
partly
the
Reasons
for
the
which
they
Exclude
Women
from
the
Gouernment
in
some
Estates
.
There
are
also
some
diuersities
in
Estates
,
where
as
the
succession
of
men
to
the
gouernment
is
only
receiued
,
England
,
Scotland
,
Spaine
,
and
Hungary
.
For
the
order
of
Succession
,
some
haue
receiued
none
but
those
that
were
legitimate
;
others
for
want
of
lawfull
i●sue
,
haue
admitted
Bastards
in
the
direct
line
,
to
the
exclusion
of
Colaterals
.
And
for
the
order
of
Succession
amongst
the
Legitimate
,
they
haue
also
found
di●●●●s
opinions
;
aswell
in
the
direct
●ine
,
to
know
if
the
s●nne
of
th●
E●dest
should
succeed
his
Grand-father
to
the
Exclusion
of
his
Vncle
;
as
in
a
Colaterall
Line
,
that
is
to
say
whether
in
the
Succession
of
a
Colaterall
,
very
remote
,
he
which
is
descended
from
the
Eldest
branch
,
ought
to
be
preferred
to
others
which
are
much
neerer
in
degree
.
The
which
Baldus
decided
long
since
,
for
the
Succession
of
this
Realme
,
in
fauour
of
the
Bourbo●s
,
who
represented
the
Eldest
branch
,
tha●
of
Vallois
failing
▪
God
hath
confirmd
it
,
in
blessing
the
Armes
of
K.
Henry
the
4.
with
a
miraculous
prosperity
,
to
attaine
to
this
estate
.
CHAP.
10.
Of
vsurpation
,
or
an
vnlawfull
Command
.
AN
vnlawfull
Commaund
is
called
Vsurpation
,
the
which
is
eyther
made
by
onealone
,
or
by
few
men
,
or
by
the
Faction
of
a
multitude
.
That
which
is
done
by
one
alone
,
is
eyther
practized
vpon
a
Prince
,
or
vpon
a
Seignoury
,
or
against
a
Popular
Estate
:
And
he
which
attempts
is
a
Stranger
or
a
Subiect
.
I
will
not
lay
open
the
manner
of
their
proceedings
,
nor
the
meanes
which
an
Vsurper
should
hold
.
It
is
too
common
a
Science
,
and
too
much
practized
in
these
dayes
,
the
which
deserues
rather
to
be
forgotten
then
taught
,
for
the
miseries
which
it
doth
procure
,
Moreouer
in
a
new
Common-weale
euery
man
contributes
freely
,
and
thinkes
that
what
he
payes
is
for
his
owne
particular
profit
:
Yea
the
greatest
contribute
willingly
,
for
the
desire
they
haue
to
attaine
vnto
some
honour
by
their
contribution
.
Contrariwise
an
Vsurper
hath
difficulty
to
finde
money
to
maintaine
himselfe
,
and
entertaine
his
Estate
,
vnlesse
he
vse
violence
,
which
doub●e●
the
hatred
of
his
Subiects
against
him
.
There
are
an
infinite
number
of
other
difficulties
proceeding
from
the
new
Command
of
a
new
Lord
,
with
whom
the
people
cannot
so
easily
accommodate
themselues
.
So
as
for
the
se●ling
of
this
new
Principality
,
it
is
necessary
that
he
reside
himselfe
vpon
the
place
,
to
the
end
he
may
the
better
see
the
disorders
,
and
preuent
them
speedily
.
For
by
this
meanes
the
Subiects
shall
haue
more
occasion
to
loue
him
,
or
to
feare
him
if
they
doe
ill
;
and
he
that
would
assaile
the
Estate
,
will
resolue
with
more
difficulty
.
The
vsurpations
which
are
made
by
many
,
or
by
the
people
vpon
their
naturall
Prince
,
are
no
lesse
vniust
;
for
that
they
happen
not
most
commonly
,
but
after
the
bad
gouernment
of
the
Prince
.
They
are
in
some
sort
iustis●ed
by
the
iniustice
of
his
actions
.
That
is
likewise
as
vniust
,
which
is
attempted
against
a
Seignoury
by
the
people
,
the
which
most
commonly
growes
from
the
●niury
of
the
Lords
against
their
Subiects
:
who
being
assisted
by
some
one
of
the
Lords
,
who
separates
himselfe
from
the
rest
to
ioyne
with
them
,
preuayling
in
their
Enterprizes
,
they
commonly
change
the
Seignoury
into
a
tyrannous
Principality
.
And
it
is
necessary
that
in
all
these
changes
there
should
be
Iniustice
,
and
likewise
violence
:
vnlesse
the
change
were
made
as
at
Venice
,
the
which
in
the
beginning
was
gouerned
by
the
people
;
and
afterwards
the
gate
being
shut
to
those
which
had
retired
out
of
the
City
,
and
neglected
the
Offices
of
the
Estate
,
vnto
those
which
had
them
,
afterwards
they
made
an
Estate
of
many
Lords
,
without
any
iealousie
or
violence
.
The
same
happens
vsually
in
all
popular
Estates
,
which
insensibly
change
into
a
Seignoury
,
when
as
they
receiue
Strangers
,
and
impart
no
Offices
vnto
them
.
For
these
by
succession
of
time
e●crease
and
multiply
:
and
contrariwise
the
Families
of
he
ancient
Inhabitants
being
onely
imployed
in
the
charges
of
the
Warre
and
State
,
diminish
,
so
as
the
gouernment
is
found
in
the
hands
of
the
smaller
number
.
It
hath
happned
sometimes
,
that
the
greatest
part
of
the
Lords
hauing
beene
defeated
in
Battaile
,
the
people
haue
changed
the
Seignoury
into
a
popular
Estate
:
as
the
Tarrentins
did
,
after
the
Battaile
which
was
giuen
against
the
lapiges
,
in
the
which
in
a
manner
all
the
Nobility
of
Tarrnetum
dyed
.
Finally
it
is
in
him
that
will
giue
a
new
forme
to
an
Estate
,
to
accommodate
himselfe
according
to
the
occurrents
of
affaires
,
and
therein
to
follow
that
whereof
the
people
may
be
most
capeable
.
CHAP.
11.
Of
the
diuersity
which
is
found
among
Subiects
in
an
Estate
.
BVt
this
will
not
be
sufficient
to
giue
forme
to
an
Estate
,
The
first
distinction
of
Subiects
is
,
that
they
are
all
free
or
Bond-men
.
Yet
some
v●der
colour
●f
making
priuate
men
to
be
better
serued
,
and
to
cut
off
the
infinite
number
of
Vagabonds
,
Idle
persons
,
and
Bankrupts
,
who
after
they
haue
consumed
their
estates
,
pay
the
world
with
nothing
;
haue
held
it
fit
to
bring
Bond-men
into
an
Estate
.
But
this
is
so
farre
from
hindring
and
cutting
off
the
number
,
as
it
would
augment
that
of
Theeues
.
For
a
Bond-man
hauing
once
escaped
,
will
be
alwayes
forced
,
(
not
daring
to
shew
himselfe
)
to
retire
among
Theeues
:
and
he
is
no
wife
Politician
that
chaseth
Theeues
out
of
an
Estate
,
but
he
that
keepes
them
from
entring
.
In
regard
of
free
Subiects
,
some
are
priuiledged
,
simple
Subiects
and
bound
to
all
the
Lawes
:
Of
simple
Subiects
,
some
are
Originaries
,
Behold
the
diuersity
of
their
conditions
which
obey
,
diuersifying
the
gouernment
.
But
the
forme
of
the
Estate
may
be
also
considered
by
the
diuision
they
mak●
of
Subiects
,
according
to
the
diuersity
of
their
vocation
or
profession
.
CHAP.
12.
Of
the
diuersity
and
distinction
of
Subiects
,
according
to
their
vocations
and
professions
.
But
among
all
distinctions
those
are
very
considerable
,
which
are
reduced
vnder
certaine
bodies
,
Colledges
,
and
Comminalties
,
whereof
some
are
religious
,
as
Conuents
,
Abbies
,
and
Chapters
:
Others
are
politicall
and
ciuill
,
ordayned
eyther
for
Commerce
,
or
for
the
safety
of
a
Towne
or
Countrey
,
or
for
Councell
and
Iustice
.
Other
Commina●ties
are
composed
of
Trades
and
Artizans
,
diuided
by
Brotherhoods
or
Companies
;
the
which
Numa
brought
first
into
Rome
,
to
quench
the
faction
of
the
Sabins
and
Romans
,
and
to
re-vnite
these
two
people
into
one
,
taking
away
the
first
diuision
by
this
second
Distinction
;
which
being
reduced
into
many
parts
,
mi●gled
one
with
another
,
was
much
lesse
da●gerous
.
And
afterwards
Tarquin
the
proud
,
to
take
away
all
signes
of
this
ancient
Diuision
,
mingled
their
Ensignes
.
The
like
course
hath
bin
followed
to
re-vnite
the
Estate
of
Genoa
,
afflicted
at
one
time
by
many
Diuisions
:
That
is
to
say
,
by
the
Gnelphes
and
Gibelins
;
the
Nobility
and
the
people
;
and
that
of
the
Adornes
and
Fregoses
.
For
to
vnite
the
people
diuided
into
so
many
factions
,
they
made
a
mixture
of
the
one
with
the
other
,
in
making
a
department
of
Twenty
eight
families
,
vnder
the
which
they
reduced
the
rest
;
although
they
carryed
not
the
name
of
the
family
,
neyther
were
formerly
of
the
same
party
.
In
other
Estates
they
haue
diuided
the
people
by
Parishes
or
quarters
:
and
in
other
by
Families
.
The
Subiect
for
settling
of
such
and
the
like
Diuisions
of
the
people
,
For
insome
Estates
the
Soueraigne
cannot
resolue
any
thing
of
importance
,
without
these
Comminalties
,
or
some
of
them
:
as
the
King
of
Poland
without
the
Senate
.
In
others
he
resolues
;
but
his
resolution
must
be
allowed
by
them
,
to
the
end
it
may
be
imbraced
by
the
people
.
In
others
he
resolues
in
certaine
things
in
the
which
the
Comminalties
haue
but
one
voyce
:
as
likewise
in
certaine
things
the
Comminalty
resolue
without
the
Soueraigne
.
But
as
the
Soueraigne
ought
to
establish
this
temper
in
the
Soueraignty
,
CHAP.
13.
Of
Religion
.
Although
a
people
vnable
many
times
to
be
restrayned
but
by
feare
,
yet
there
is
not
any
thing
more
naturall
,
nor
more
iust
,
nor
of
greater
efficacy
in
the
minds
of
men
,
then
that
which
proceeds
from
the
Reuerence
which
we
owe
vnto
God
.
And
whereas
the
feare
of
God
is
wanting
,
of
necessity
the
Estate
must
run
to
iuine
;
or
it
mu●t
be
supported
by
the
feare
of
a
Prince
,
who
supplies
this
defect
:
who
although
he
were
such
a
one
,
(
the
which
is
difficult
)
yet
this
Prince
fayling
,
the
feare
would
likewise
be
wanting
,
and
by
consequence
the
obedience
;
for
for
that
the
Successor
can
seldome
inherite
this
Authority
which
dyes
with
the
person
.
Moreouer
many
things
presenting
themselues
in
an
Estate
,
which
he
must
doe
,
or
hinde●
,
and
which
cannot
be
perswaded
by
any
reasons
which
may
be
alledged
,
men
by
their
insufficiency
not
able
to
satisfie
themselues
;
and
force
on
the
other
side
being
a
dangerous
instrument
handle
,
which
doth
harme
as
soone
as
good
,
the
authority
of
man
being
not
powerfull
enough
,
we
must
of
necessity
haue
recourse
to
the
authority
of
Religion
,
which
amongst
people
fearing
God
hath
no
reply
.
Wherfore
most
men
which
haue
desired
to
effect
some
great
and
extraordinary
matter
▪
haue
made
vse
of
this
meanes
,
as
the
most
powerfull
,
were
it
for
the
setling
of
Estates
,
or
for
the
reformation
.
Which
is
the
reason
that
in
most
part
of
Religions
they
obserue
infinite
acts
of
policy
,
the
which
the
people
would
easily
flight
ouer
,
were
they
not
restrayned
by
the
respect
of
Religion
.
This
care
then
for
the
setling
of
Religion
,
is
one
of
the
chiefe
in
the
Estate
,
for
that
it
ought
to
be
established
with
all
purity
,
and
without
abuses
:
and
where
we
shall
finde
any
brought
in
already
,
we
ought
to
cut
them
off
;
We
will
first
treate
of
the
chiefe
meanes
which
haue
bin
obserued
in
the
setling
of
Religions
.
CHAP.
14.
Of
the
meanes
held
in
the
establishing
of
Religions
.
THe
establishment
of
Religion
is
eyther
made
by
extraordinary
meanes
,
exceeding
the
discourse
of
man
,
or
by
humane
courses
.
The
first
haue
not
bin
imployed
but
to
settle
the
true
Religion
;
and
the
latter
haue
serued
as
well
to
settle
superstition
and
impiety
as
the
truth
.
The
extraordinary
meanes
are
miracles
and
Martirdome
;
As
for
Miracles
,
some
are
reputed
such
,
for
that
they
are
contrary
to
the
common
order
of
Nature
;
and
others
for
that
they
are
against
the
common
opinion
,
who
iudging
one
thing
impossible
or
difficult
,
makes
him
to
seeke
by
prayers
,
vowes
,
and
promises
,
succours
from
aboue
,
the
which
succeeding
according
to
our
desire
,
we
take
the
euent
for
a
testimony
of
his
power
,
whom
as
God
we
haue
innocated
to
our
succours
,
and
begin
to
acknowledge
him
for
such
.
Adad
King
of
the
Azimites
,
a
people
beyond
Aegypt
,
hauing
promised
to
make
himselfe
a
Christian
,
if
he
wone
the
victory
against
the
King
of
the
Homerites
,
who
for
the
most
part
were
Iewes
;
hauing
obtained
it
,
he
sent
to
demand
Bishops
and
Doctors
from
the
Emperour
Iusti
▪
nian
,
to
instruct
him
and
his
people
,
who
sent
him
Marcionarius
from
Alexandria
.
Clouis
after
the
Battaile
wone
against
the
Germans
neare
vnto
Cullen
,
made
himselfe
a
Christian
,
with
the
remainders
of
the
French
,
who
had
not
yet
imbraced
the
Christian
Faith
;
according
to
a
vow
which
he
had
made
before
the
Combat
,
the
which
he
held
very
dangerous
for
him
;
and
thus
he
established
the
Christian
Religion
among
the
French
,
disposed
thereunto
by
this
victory
,
the
which
being
vnexpected
by
them
,
considering
the
great
number
of
their
Enemies
,
they
could
not
attribute
it
but
to
his
power
,
to
whom
their
King
had
made
a
vow
.
CHAP.
15.
Humane
meanes
for
the
setling
of
Religion
.
AS
for
humane
meanes
they
depend
partly
vpon
the
disposition
of
the
people
,
amongst
▪
whom
they
meane
to
settle
Religion
,
and
partly
of
the
quality
of
such
as
desire
to
establish
it
.
For
the
disposition
of
the
people
,
Germans
,
French
,
and
Spaniards
,
call
them
by
this
name
;
although
there
be
not
any
of
these
Nations
that
yeelds
inciuility
or
policy
to
Italy
.
Our
meaning
is
not
to
extend
Barbar
if
me
so
fatre
,
Of
Barbarians
in
Religion
,
There
is
a
Rabby
,
Iesus
Christ
,
the
third
Mahomet
,
and
the
fourth
Manes
:
And
this
man
supposing
two
principles
or
beginnings
,
the
one
good
and
the
other
bad
,
and
attributing
the
superior
part
of
the
World
to
the
good
,
who
can
do
no
Euill
,
and
therefore
ought
not
to
be
prayed
vnto
;
and
the
lower
part
to
the
bad
,
to
whom
they
must
addresse
themselues
to
preserue
them
from
Euill
,
is
held
to
be
the
Author
of
that
abhominable
adoration
of
the
Diuell
,
receiued
in
a
manner
throughout
all
the
Indies
,
where
he
hath
sowed
his
poyson
.
Of
these
foure
beliefes
,
the
Christian
Faith
being
the
only
true
,
we
may
call
the
rest
Barbarous
.
‛
Popians
in
America
,
We
hold
the
habitation
barbarous
,
not
onely
of
those
which
haue
no
certayne
place
of
dwelling
,
By
this
diuersity
of
Barbarisme
,
it
is
easie
to
iudge
that
the
manner
of
proceeding
for
the
setling
of
Religion
,
Then
comming
to
their
superstitions
,
where
they
may
confute
the
absurdities
by
serious
Reasons
,
if
they
be
capeable
;
or
by
iests
and
scoffes
they
shall
make
them
grow
into
contempt
of
their
opinions
,
falling
first
vpon
those
whose
foundation
is
weakest
.
If
there
be
any
thing
good
in
some
point
of
their
opinions
,
or
that
hath
any
conformity
with
the
Religion
they
meane
to
establish
,
o●
i●
indifferent
;
they
need
not
feare
to
alow
of
it
:
contrariwise
this
may
serue
for
the
setling
of
true
Religion
.
S.
Paul
at
Athens
tooke
occasion
to
speak
of
Iesus
Christ
vpon
the
Altar
,
which
was
dedicated
to
the
vnknowne
God
.
The
Apostles
to
gayne
credit
among
the
Pharises
(
who
made
the
greatest
part
of
the
Iewes
)
spake
dayly
of
the
dead
:
the
which
the
Pharises
heard
the
more
willingly
,
for
that
in
the
beleese
of
this
Article
the
Sad●●es
were
opposite
vnto
them
.
It
hath
much
auayled
for
the
setling
of
the
Catholique
Religion
in
America
,
to
finde
amongst
those
Idolaters
certaine
Ceremonies
,
which
in
the
outward
shew
doe
much
resemble
those
of
the
Catholique
.
The
Nu●nes
of
the
Sunne
at
Cusco
,
a
Towne
of
Peru
,
made
certayne
Cakes
of
the
flower
of
Mahis
,
mingled
with
the
blood
of
white
Sheepe
,
which
they
offered
in
Sacrifice
,
and
of
this
Cake
they
gaue
a
peece
to
euery
Stranger
that
was
present
,
who
eate
it
in
signe
of
Alliance
,
Confederation
and
Deuotion
to
the
Inga
;
and
promised
neuer
to
doe
or
say
any
thing
against
the
Sunne
or
the
Inga
:
And
this
solemnity
was
performed
twice
in
the
yeare
,
in
September
and
December
.
Processions
at
Mexico
were
in
vse
:
and
in
Peru
there
were
Priests
,
destinated
to
heare
confessions
after
the
manner
of
penite
tiaries
.
They
counterfeited
the
Mystery
of
the
Trinity
,
worshipping
three
Statues
of
the
Sunne
,
the
one
they
call
,
the
●ather
Sunne
,
the
second
the
Sonne
Sunne
,
and
the
third
the
Brother
Sunne
.
In
like
manner
they
had
three
Images
of
Cu●que
●ig●a
,
which
is
the
God
of
Thunder
,
the
which
they
distinguished
in
like
manner
by
Father
,
Sonne
,
and
Brother
.
They
likewise
made
vse
at
Nicaraqua
of
a
Cro●●e
,
which
was
there
worshipped
to
obtaine
Raine
.
Finally
,
these
exteriour
confor●●ties
,
although
applyed
to
a
bad
vse
,
haue
beene
great
preparatiues
to
imp●oy
them
to
better
vse
.
So
must
part
of
those
which
haue
sought
to
settle
some
new
Religion
,
haue
desired
rather
to
borrow
the
name
of
the
establishment
from
the
ancient
,
or
from
the
reformation
,
then
to
terme
themselues
Authors
of
a
new
opinion
;
which
in
a
poynt
importing
the
Saluation
of
Man
,
vnder
this
Name
of
Nouilty
had
beene
suspected
.
And
Mahomet
himselfe
,
although
farre
from
the
beleefe
of
Christians
,
yet
●not
to
discontent
them
,
except
the
principall
poynt
which
is
the
Diuinity
of
IESVS
CHRIST
)
hath
spoken
of
h●m
with
great
Reuerence
:
And
in
regard
of
him
,
he
sayth
,
that
he
was
come
to
reforme
that
which
his
Disciples
had
innouated
in
the
Law
of
IESVS
CHRIST
.
Prophesies
and
predictions
which
may
haue
some
referrence
to
the
setling
of
Religion
,
Heauy
burthens
and
rigours
,
The
Hebrewes
which
wer
in
Aegypt
,
being
miserably
intreated
,
yeelded
easily
to
the
Religion
which
Moses
taught
them
,
vpon
the
promise
he
made
to
lead
them
into
a
Land
abounding
in
all
things
:
although
that
afterwards
forgetting
their
misery
,
they
return'd
somtimes
to
idolatry
.
The
diuersity
of
opinions
in
the
Religion
rece●ned
,
may
open
a
Gate
to
another
which
they
would
establish
;
for
that
from
this
diuersity
growes
incertainty
in
the
mindes
of
men
;
whereby
if
another
be
presented
,
better
accompanied
with
shew
,
it
is
more
easily
receiued
.
Nothing
did
so
much
fauour
the
opinion
of
Mahomet
in
Asia
and
Affricke
,
as
the
diuers
heresies
which
were
then
crept
in●o
●ll
the
Le●ant
:
especially
those
which
concerned
the
Trinity
,
and
the
nature
of
Iesus
Christ
;
as
that
of
N●
Mahomet●●es
,
Nestoriens
,
and
Ariens
,
and
the
do●●ts
which
grew
of
eyther
side
vpon
this
Subiect
:
But
Mahomet
●o
free
himselfe
from
these
,
found
no
shorter
come
,
then
to
deny
the
Deity
of
Iesus
Christ
,
and
by
〈…〉
to
ouerthrow
the
beleefe
of
the
Trinity
:
But
that
which
he●pt
most
to
the
aduancement
of
this
〈◊〉
was
,
that
he
did
accommodate
the
Rule
he
made
for
man●ers
to
s●nsuality
,
o●er-ruling
whatsoeuer
concerned
Christian
or
Iewish
authority
,
and
forbidding
nothing
〈◊〉
that
which
the
Arabians
and
Southerne
people
,
among
whom
he
liued
might
well
forbear●
;
as
Wine
.
Likewise
to
recei●e
all
sorts
of
of
opinions
indifferently
,
Reuolts
and
Ciuill
warre
doe
likewise
dispose
a
people
to
receiue
a
new
Religion
,
An
vnrestrayned
liberty
among
a
people
somewhat
Ciuill
,
and
to
open
a
contempt
of
Religion
,
Persians
.
Ismael
Sophy
setled
that
of
Hally
,
fill'd
with
many
austerities
and
●eremonies
.
And
in
the
Christian
Religion
,
God
hath
from
time
to
time
raised
vp
great
personages
,
to
restore
it
by
the
holinesse
of
their
liues
,
and
their
good
examples
,
It
is
likewise
no
small
aduantage
for
the
aduancement
of
a
Religion
in
a
great
extent
of
Country
,
to
finde
it
revnited
vnder
one
Prince
,
as
the
Christians
did
the
Romane
Empire
:
For
the
Example
of
the
Prince
and
the
chiefe
about
him
,
which
they
may
gaine
,
drawes
all
the
rest
suddainly
after
him
:
Whereas
if
the
Country
were
deuided
into
many
Estates
,
there
would
be
as
much
trouble
in
the
one
as
in
a
great
Empire
.
Moreouer
great
Courts
are
more
Ciuill
,
and
more
diuersified
with
men
of
diuers
sorts
of
Condition
,
of
which
they
may
draw
a
good
number
,
fit
to
receiue
a
new
opinion
.
The
facility
they
haue
had
to
conuert
the
Mexicains
,
and
Peruans
,
reduced
vnder
great
Kings
;
and
the
difficulty
there
is
yet
to
conuert
the
Brasilians
and
Cicimeques
,
which
haue
not
any
,
witnesse
it
sufficiently
.
These
are
the
principal
Encounters
which
may
dispose
a
people
to
receiue
a
new
establishment
.
But
with
this
disposition
the
quality
of
those
which
seeke
to
bring
it
in
,
and
the
course
they
meane
to
obserue
,
must
be
proportionable
.
CHAP.
16.
Of
Parts
necessary
in
those
that
will
bring
in
a
new
Religion
.
MAny
parts
are
necessary
in
such
men
:
but
the
principall
are
authority
and
credit
,
Latine
.
Iagellon
,
great
Duke
of
Lituania
,
hauing
made
himselfe
a
Christian
to
be
King
of
Poland
,
in
the
yeare
1386.
took
such
a
liking
to
this
Religion
,
as
he
himselfe
preached
to
the
Lituanians
to
conuert
them
.
Some
haue
written
,
that
Sicebueles
King
of
the
Visigots
,
conuerted
by
exhortations
fourescore
and
ten
thousand
Iewes
,
for
the
which
in
the
decretales
he
is
called
most
religious
.
We
must
not
doubt
but
the
authority
of
Moses
,
who
was
a
great
Captaine
,
and
had
made
War
long
against
the
Aethiopians
for
the
Kings
of
Aegypt
,
did
assist
him
much
to
free
the
Hebrewes
from
Seruitude
,
and
to
make
them
receiue
the
true
Religion
.
Holinesse
of
life
is
so
corrupt
and
licensious
an
age
,
Ismael
Sophy
was
desirous
in
the
establishing
of
his
opinion
,
to
make
vse
of
this
voyce
:
But
force
and
other
humane
meanes
,
haue
contributed
more
then
his
exteriour
Deuotion
.
They
which
could
not
imitate
his
Sanctity
,
haue
bin
forced
to
purchase
to
themselues
authority
,
to
suppose
Miracles
and
Dreames
,
and
after
the
manner
of
Min●s
,
Sertorius
,
and
other
Law-giuers
of
times
past
,
make
the
World
beleeue
that
they
had
a
particular
communication
with
God
,
as
Mahomet
did
,
who
had
tamed
a
Pygeon
,
the
which
came
picking
in
his
Eare
before
the
people
,
to
the
end
he
might
perswade
them
by
this
shew
,
that
the
Holy
Ghost
changed
into
a
Doue
,
did
suggest
vnto
him
the
fooleries
of
his
Alcoron
.
But
among
the
demonstrations
of
a
holy
life
,
nothing
doth
so
much
draw
the
people
as
austerity
,
to
the
which
the
Commons
will
hardly
beleeue
,
that
any
man
will
submit
himselfe
,
for
ambition
,
vanity
,
or
lying
.
And
yet
●here
haue
bin
Phylosophers
in
times
past
,
which
without
any
deuotion
haue
affected
it
,
to
giue
credit
to
their
opinions
;
and
many
times
the
ambition
of
such
men
is
greater
,
then
of
such
which
openly
contend
for
Crowns
and
Kingdomes
:
The
first
doing
like
men
that
Row
,
which
turne
their
backes
to
the
Ports
where
they
desire
to
arriue
.
As
for
force
,
it
is
of
all
the
meanes
by
the
which
a
man
may
purchase
authority
,
the
most
powerfull
;
the
rest
without
its
assistance
succeeding
seldome
.
Yet
we
haue
found
by
Experience
,
that
it
hath
bin
of
small
vse
in
the
setling
of
Religion
,
if
the
force
hath
not
bin
such
as
it
can
receiue
no
tollerable
opposition
,
and
that
the
minds
of
men
haue
not
bin
formerly
disposed
to
change
:
and
yet
withall
this
,
we
find
not
any
example
,
vnlesse
it
be
in
some
petty
Estates
.
Charlem●ine
,
who
sought
to
imploy
it
agaynst
the
Saxon
,
without
this
preparation
aduanced
little
,
although
he
ioyned
Prudence
with
Instruction
to
force
,
for
the
setling
of
the
Christian
Religion
among
those
people
:
And
after
he
had
attempted
all
meanes
,
for
his
last
remedy
,
he
was
forced
to
transferre
a
great
number
of
them
,
into
Flanders
and
Brab●nt
,
and
to
draw
from
thence
Christians
to
mingle
amongst
the
Idolators
,
which
remained
in
the
Country
,
and
continued
there
long
after
.
The
Turke
●ath
done
the
like
,
hauing
drawne
many
of
his
Religion
which
were
in
Asia
,
to
plant
them
in
Europe
,
and
transported
a
great
number
of
Christians
which
were
in
Europe
into
Asia
.
And
yet
we
see
that
hitherto
the
Turke
hath
wholy
expeld
the
Christian
Religion
out
of
his
Estate
,
although
he
hath
imployed
many
other
meanes
.
Hence
we
may
conclude
,
that
if
with
Force
,
which
receiued
no
opposition
,
he
could
not
preuaile
;
it
is
a
meere
madnesse
for
certaine
men
ignorant
of
the
Affaires
of
the
World
,
to
propound
to
make
vse
of
Force
against
those
,
who
fortified
with
intelligence
among
themselues
,
and
good
Conduct
,
may
not
only
defend
their
opinion
by
Force
;
but
also
indanger
the
sume
of
the
Estate
.
But
reseruing
to
treate
more
particularly
of
this
Question
hereafter
,
I
will
come
to
another
kind
of
Force
or
constraint
,
which
depends
vpon
the
Authority
of
the
Magistrate
,
and
concerne●
the
punishments
and
burthens
,
and
the
exclusion
of
Hereticks
and
Infidels
from
honors
.
As
for
punishments
,
it
workes
no
greater
effect
then
armed
Force
,
which
is
vsually
ioyned
vnto
it
;
and
sometimes
these
punishments
borne
with
Constancy
,
produce
a
contrary
effect
to
that
which
was
expected
;
as
we
will
relate
more
particularly
hereafter
the
Reasons
.
As
for
heauy
burthens
,
although
they
seeme
more
mild
,
yet
we
may
well
feare
the
inconuenience
.
From
the
example
of
Martyrdome
,
which
is
in
punishments
,
if
they
conuert
not
speedily
,
heauy
burthens
ruines
them
by
little
and
little
.
St.
Gregory
writing
to
Bishop
Ianvyer
,
for
the
Conuersion
of
the
Pessants
of
Sardinia
,
aduiseth
him
to
charge
them
with
Taxes
and
Labour
.
In
Spaine
they
haue
done
the
like
with
the
Moores
,
who
not
withstanding
haue
multiplied
.
The
Turke
,
besides
the
exclusion
from
honours
,
which
is
a
meanes
ioyned
to
that
of
heauy
burthens
,
practizeth
the
like
with
the
Christians
,
taking
Tribute
of
their
owne
children
.
Charlamaine
vsed
it
against
the
Hungarians
,
after
that
he
vanquished
them
,
leauing
the
Idolators
nothing
but
their
Liues
,
and
giuing
their
goods
to
such
as
would
become
Christians
.
Sometimes
the
exclusion
from
honours
,
without
any
heany
burthen
,
hath
preuailed
much
for
the
conuersion
of
great
men
,
and
of
a
meane
condition
,
among
a
people
ambitious
of
honour
.
Ingo
Prince
of
the
Vmides
,
receiued
none
to
his
Table
but
such
as
made
profession
of
the
Christian
Religion
,
preferring
the
meanest
before
the
greatest
of
another
Religion
.
In
times
past
they
found
it
not
strange
to
Translate
the
Holy
Scripture
into
the
vulgar
Tongue
.
Netgher
,
a
Religious
man
of
Saint
Gal
,
vnder
the
Abbot
Bernard
,
Translated
the
Psalter
in
the
French
tongue
,
which
was
then
but
rude
.
Alfred
King
of
England
did
the
like
into
his
Language
:
Hestad
,
also
King
of
England
,
caused
the
Holy
and
Sacred
Scriptures
to
be
conuerted
and
turned
into
English
:
And
Beda
,
(
called
the
Venerable
.
)
Translated
the
Gospell
of
Saint
Iohn
into
English
.
In
Preaching
two
things
are
necessary
:
This
meanes
of
Instruction
is
the
mildest
,
and
most
proper
to
attaine
to
the
setling
of
Religion
,
The
opinion
of
Aly
in
the
Law
of
Mahomet
,
which
hath
beene
imbraced
by
the
Persians
,
was
divulged
,
(
as
the
Histories
of
that
Country
relate
)
by
thirty
thousand
slaues
,
which
Tamberlaine
had
giuen
to
Tegel
,
predecessour
to
Ismael
Sophy
,
to
cause
them
to
be
instructed
in
that
beliefe
.
Charlemaine
,
erected
many
Colledges
and
Seminaries
of
piety
among
the
Idollaters
whom
he
had
Conquered
,
and
reta●●ed
twelue
children
of
the
Saxon
Princes
,
as
Hostages
,
to
cause
them
to
be
instructed
in
the
Christian
Religion
.
The
Turke
takes
the
fifth
of
all
the
Christian
children
,
and
causeth
them
to
be
bred
vp
in
the
Law
of
Mahomet
.
The
Xerif
seized
vpon
Morocco
and
Fez
,
hauing
by
Pilgrimage
,
and
the
shew
of
a
holy
life
,
gotten
some
credit
among
the
Moores
:
He
bought
a
thousand
slaues
,
which
he
bred
vp
in
his
opinion
,
grounded
(
as
he
pretended
)
vpon
a
more
pure
interpretation
of
the
Alcoran
:
and
hauing
instructed
many
with
such
Disciples
;
and
his
sonnes
hauing
some
aduantages
agaynst
the
Christians
,
turned
their
Armes
agaynst
the
Kings
of
Fez
and
Morocco
,
Prudence
,
is
next
to
Piety
,
the
principall
part
which
they
should
haue
,
which
vndertake
such
an
enterprize
,
and
so
much
the
more
necessary
,
for
that
many
times
an
indiscreet
zeale
hinders
his
function
,
Ananias
hauing
perswaded
Isates
King
of
the
Adiabones
,
and
his
mother
to
receiue
the
Iewish-Religion
,
held
it
fit
that
he
should
forbeare
to
cause
himselfe
to
be
circumcised
,
vntill
he
had
disposed
his
people
.
But
Eliazar
the
Gallilean
prest
him
to
do
it
,
and
not
to
preferre
the
feare
of
men
to
the
grace
of
God
.
Which
was
the
aduice
of
a
Diuine
more
zealous
then
discreet
;
the
which
although
it
succeeded
well
at
that
time
,
their
spirits
being
better
prepared
then
the
Prince
expected
;
yet
it
were
dangerous
to
follow
it
in
all
Encounters
.
For
the
Apostle
commaunds
that
zeale
should
be
guided
by
Knowledge
.
We
know
in
our
time
,
that
this
rash
zeale
hath
done
more
harme
to
the
Catholicke
Religion
then
good
.
I
doubt
,
whether
to
this
inconsiderate
zeale
we
should
not
attribute
that
opinion
,
After
him
his
Apostles
haue
spoken
of
the
ciuill
Magistrate
with
honour
and
respect
,
commaunding
to
obay
him
;
and
it
cannot
be
found
,
that
by
vertue
of
the
Spirituall
power
,
they
haue
aduised
to
attempt
any
thing
agaynst
the
Magistrate
.
It
is
true
,
that
among
Christians
,
the
Spirituall
power
hath
beene
alwayes
much
respected
;
but
only
when
it
hath
bee●e
practized
in
matters
which
are
meerely
Spirituall
,
the
which
looseth
the
dignity
and
grace
,
which
is
due
vnto
it
,
when
it
deales
in
matters
which
are
temporall
terrien
.
These
be
the
bounds
which
haue
alwayes
beene
set
in
France
,
betwixt
the
Ecclesiasticall
lurisdiction
and
a
Regall
power
:
and
with
this
distinction
the
Christian
Religion
,
hath
beene
preserued
aboue
a
thousand
yeares
in
France
,
without
any
blemish
.
But
inconsideration
or
ambition
,
which
is
vsually
blind
,
hath
proceeded
further
,
to
breed
a
Iealousie
among
all
Christian
Princes
.
For
by
a
consequence
altogether
absurd
and
foolish
,
they
would
make
the
World
beleeue
,
that
the
obedience
of
the
Subiect
towards
his
Prince
,
the
which
being
a
temporall
thing
,
cannot
be
reputed
but
temporall
,
may
be
prohibited
by
the
Spirituall
power
,
the
which
notwithstanding
hath
no
power
nor
Iurisdiction
ouer
temporall
things
.
The
which
is
a
meanes
not
only
to
hinder
,
that
such
Princes
as
are
distracted
from
the
ancient
beleife
;
do
not
re-vnite
themselues
,
seeing
they
cannot
do
it
without
dimunition
of
their
authority
and
power
:
but
also
makes
others
,
which
are
not
yet
separated
(
to
free
themselues
from
this
subiection
)
leaue
it
,
or
fauour
all
which
oppose
themselues
to
this
Doctrine
,
neuer
insisting
vpon
the
errors
,
which
they
may
adde
thereunto
.
There
is
as
little
wisedome
to
●rosse
the
Rules
of
a
receiued
pollicy
,
Peter
Martyre
in
England
,
haue
carried
themselues
more
discreetly
,
hauing
retayned
the
greatest
part
of
the
ceremonies
of
the
Catholicke
Religion
,
approoued
therein
;
then
they
which
haue
made
their
Religion
bald
,
and
destitute
of
all
ornament
;
and
to
make
it
the
more
sauage
,
and
to
seeme
more
different
from
the
common
beleife
,
they
haue
changed
the
names
and
termes
by
an
in●ise●ee●
vanity
.
Behold
part
of
the
principall
considerations
which
they
must
obserue
in
the
setling
of
a
Religion
.
Let
vs
now
see
how
we
are
to
carry
our selues
to
preserue
the
ancient
beleife
;
amidst
the
diuersitie
of
other
Religions
which
are
crept
into
the
Estate
.
CHAP.
17.
That
the
diuersity
of
Religion
is
dangerous
in
an
Estate
:
how
they
ought
to
carry
themselues
to
preserue
the
ancient
Beleife
,
in
the
diuersity
of
Religions
crept
into
the
Estate
.
IN
old
time
the
Kings
of
Aegypt
,
entertayned
this
diuersity
in
Religion
among
their
Subiects
:
Some
worshipping
a
Dogge
,
others
a
Bird
,
and
some
a
Crocadile
with
other
things
according
vnto
their
fancies
:
which
was
a
tyrannicall
practize
;
to
the
end
their
Subiects
might
not
agree
to
controule
and
reforme
their
Actions
.
But
it
is
certayne
that
if
in
the
Concord
of
an
Estate
,
consists
the
good
and
quiet
of
the
Subiects
,
In
the
beginning
such
weeds
are
to
be
pulled
vp
as
soon
as
they
grow
,
the
which
must
be
done
by
secret
Executions
,
and
not
as
they
●aue
vsually
practized
by
publicke
punishments
;
if
it
be
not
of
some
opinion
that
is
very
difficult
to
perswade
:
For
that
the
Example
of
Martyrdome
mooues
many
to
pitty
,
makes
others
obstinate
,
and
drawes
some
to
be
more
curious
to
examine
the
reasons
,
for
the
which
a
new
Preacher
,
who
hath
nothing
in
shew
but
what
is
holy
,
suffers
so
constantly
:
and
few
will
perswade
themselues
,
that
any
man
will
for
so
small
a
matter
loose
his
life
with
so
much
dishonour
;
and
so
by
this
gate
many
enter
into
that
Comminalty
:
so
as
instead
of
retyring
the
people
by
the
example
of
punishments
,
they
inuite
them
:
as
being
certayne
that
the
terrour
thereof
,
workes
a
contrary
effect
in
a
new
opinion
,
which
ha●●
a
shew
of
sanctity
,
and
of
the
truth
and
falshood
whereof
they
may
doubt
,
then
in
other
crimes
,
the
which
are
generally
condemned
in
all
men
.
For
to
search
the
bottome
of
euery
mans
conscience
,
were
to
kindle
a
fire
in
the
Estate
,
add
to
discouer
a
mischiefe
,
which
were
more
expedient
to
hide
,
and
whereof
the
scandall
were
dangerous
.
We
haue
seene
many
Realmes
and
Principallities
preserue
themselues
in
peace
,
All
men
tend
naturally
to
the
contrary
of
that
which
is
desired
of
them
,
I
will
adde
hereunto
,
that
if
they
be
the
weaker
in
number
,
they
will
be
found
in
effect
the
stronger
by
their
vigilancy
and
intelligences
which
they
haue
one
of
another
:
For
that
Vnion
is
most
commonly
stronger
in
a
meane
number
,
then
in
a
greater
;
and
in
an
opinion
receiued
by
their
owne
choice
and
election
,
then
in
that
which
is
receiued
by
custome
,
in
the
which
man
shews
himselfe
vsually
more
negligent
.
Besides
this
,
the
intelligence
is
better
obserued
amongst
man
that
are
assayled
,
or
that
feare
to
be
so
,
by
reason
of
the
necessity
of
the
defence
,
then
among
the
assailians
.
For
to
assayle
proceeding
from
a
free
will
,
they
are
sooner
wearied
then
the
defendants
.
Moreouer
,
there
is
nothing
more
dangerons
for
a
Prince
,
then
to
make
tryall
of
his
forces
against
,
his
Subiects
,
Moreouer
,
it
will
not
be
inconuenient
,
that
a
Prince
which
raignes
in
an
Estate
deuided
in
Religion
,
But
when
he
shall
see
a
Sect
grow
old
,
Mahomet
had
found
a
remedy
to
preserue
his
Religion
But
a
Duke
of
Muscouie
,
to
keep
his
Religion
intire
and
vnfoyled
,
the
which
is
grounded
like
to
●urs
in
the
Administration
of
the
Sacraments
,
and
in
the
Preaching
of
the
Gospell
,
caused
all
the
Homi●ies
and
Sermons
of
the
Holy
Greeke
Fathers
,
to
be
turned
into
his
Language
,
to
be
rep●ated
publickly
in
the
place
of
Preaching
,
and
read
particularly
by
the
Subiects
▪
freeing
himselfe
by
this
meanes
from
the
ignorance
of
the
multitude
,
and
from
the
nouelties
which
Preachers
might
haue
brought
in
,
in
publishing
their
inuentions
and
dreames
;
and
by
this
meanes
confirming
his
Subiects
in
the
beleife
of
those
holy
Fathers
.
Wherefore
the
principall
end
must
be
,
to
keep
the
anc●●nt
Religion
,
to
haue
but
one
,
if
it
may
be
,
to
hi●der
〈◊〉
one
from
taking
footing
in
an
Estate
,
and
in
〈…〉
not
effect
it
without
troubling
the
vniu●rsall
peace
of
the
Subiect
,
we
must
gouerne
our selues
as
I
haue
formerly
spoken
.
Let
vs
come
to
other
disorders
which
commonly
〈◊〉
in
Religion
,
the
which
w●e
must
fore-see
in
its
esta●●●shm●nts
,
to
preuent
them
when
they
shall
happen
.
CHAP.
18.
〈◊〉
disorders
which
happen
in
Religion
:
and
of
the
meanes
to
preuent
them
.
Carelesnesse
regards
chiefly
the
seruice
of
R●ligion
,
The
third
abuse
is
Superstition
,
As
for
the
first
,
which
is
Blasphemy
,
CHAP.
19.
Of
the
setling
of
a
Councell
of
Estate
,
and
of
the
quallities
and
number
of
Councellors
.
THe
forme
of
the
Estate
,
and
Religion
being
established
,
there
followes
the
setling
of
a
Councell
;
The
first
quality
of
a
Councellor
of
Estate
,
is
to
be
old
,
Moreouer
,
age
will
adde
much
more
authority
and
credit
to
the
resolutions
of
a
Councell
,
Wherefore
with
these
ancient
men
that
are
cold
and
slow
,
it
will
bevery
fit
to
mingle
some
of
a
middle
age
,
A
Councellor
of
Estate
must
likewise
be
without
fauour
●o
some
,
Marc.
Anthony
the
Philosopher
and
Emperour
,
ordayned
that
the
Senators
of
Rome
,
which
were
not
Italians
,
should
at
the
least
haue
the
fourth
part
of
their
Estates
in
Italy
,
to
make
them
more
carefull
,
to
thinke
of
the
preseruation
of
the
Prouince
,
where
the
seate
of
the
Empire
remayned
.
And
Pl●●●
writes
that
Traian
the
Emperour
had
formerly
decreed
,
that
such
as
sued
for
any
Benefices
,
should
haue
the
third
part
of
their
Lands
in
Italy
;
not
holding
it
reasonable
,
that
such
men
should
make
vse
of
Rome
and
Italy
,
as
of
a
retreate
,
and
not
as
of
their
Countrey
.
Yet
I
would
not
herein
set
a
generall
Rule
,
there
hauing
bin
many
found
,
who
although
they
had
their
retreate
else-where
then
in
the
Estate
of
the
Prince
whom
they
serued
,
haue
notwithstanding
carryed
themselues
faithfully
,
vpon
hope
that
if
they
should
lose
the
goods
which
they
enioyed
in
the
Estate
,
of
their
Master
,
yet
they
should
alwayes
haue
meanes
to
liue
else-where
.
And
contrariwise
we
haue
seene
some
which
had
not
any
retreat
but
in
the
Estate
of
their
Prince
,
whom
the
good
fortune
of
the
Enemy
hath
made
carefull
to
enter
into
treaty
to
saue
their
Estates
;
the
which
happily
they
would
not
haue
done
,
if
they
had
meanes
to
liue
else-where
.
It
is
likewise
certayne
,
that
in
affaires
where
we
haue
no
interest
,
we
iudge
much
better
,
then
when
as
we
put
our
interest
in
Ballance
with
our
opinions
in
Councell
.
He
that
lookes
ouer
Gamesters
,
and
is
not
possest
neyther
with
the
hope
of
gayne
,
nor
the
feare
of
losse
,
will
giue
a
better
iudgment
of
the
carriage
of
the
game
then
he
that
playe●
:
And
he
that
in
a
Councell
hath
not
any
feare
to
lose
his
Estate
,
and
who
brings
neyther
affection
nor
passion
,
will
alwayes
take
the
most
honourable
party
:
And
he
which
hath
any
interest
preuented
by
his
owne
opinion
and
feare
,
will
willingly
incline
to
that
side
by
the
which
he
thinks
to
saue
himselfe
.
A
Councellor
of
Estate
must
not
be
too
suddaine
and
rash
,
for
that
precipitation
of
its
nature
,
Irresolution
is
another
vice
,
into
the
which
he
must
be
very
careful
not
to
fal
;
for
he
must
resolue
vpon
〈◊〉
party
,
and
forget
all
the
rest
;
lest
that
by
remembring
them
,
he
doth
not
breake
and
dull
the
vigour
of
the
minde
,
necessary
for
the
due
execution
of
great
Enterprizes
,
and
withall
the
constancy
which
he
must
bring
in
matters
that
are
doubtfull
and
difficult
:
neyther
must
he
thinke
that
there
is
lesse
difficulty
in
the
party
which
he
hath
left
,
then
in
that
which
he
hath
chosen
.
Patience
is
another
quality
,
very
necessary
in
a
Councell
of
Estate
,
not
onely
to
endure
opinions
contrary
to
his
owne
,
but
also
to
haue
his
reasons
weighed
,
blamed
,
But
aboue
all
things
it
is
required
to
be
secret
:
It
is
likewise
good
to
charge
Councellors
often
:
Tiberius
,
Nero
,
and
some
other
Emperours
towards
the
Senate
of
Rome
,
making
them
to
forget
by
little
and
little
the
knowledge
of
State
affaires
,
by
the
attribution
of
a
contentious
Iurisdiction
,
which
was
in
the
end
established
by
Adrian
in
this
Senate
,
in
forme
of
an
ordinary
Iurisdiction
.
CHAP.
20
Of
the
plurality
of
Councels
of
Estate
.
Of
the
power
of
Councell
,
and
of
the
order
of
giuing
their
Opinions
.
As
for
that
of
Religion
,
it
should
haue
care
to
maintayne
Religion
in
Reuerence
:
and
if
there
were
many
which
they
were
forced
to
tollerate
,
it
should
serue
to
cause
them
to
liue
in
peace
one
with
another
,
and
to
decide
their
differences
.
That
of
Iustice
should
not
be
imployed
but
to
order
the
differences
of
Iurisdictions
,
and
to
iudge
those
,
whereof
Iustice
should
be
forbidden
to
take
knowledge
.
That
of
Warre
should
serue
to
regulate
the
Souldiers
both
Horse
and
Foot
,
prouiding
for
the
Munitions
,
places
of
strength
,
Ships
of
War
,
Garrisons
,
and
generally
of
all
that
which
may
depend
of
a
Military
order
and
care
.
That
of
Policy
should
order
the
Commerce
and
Trade
with
the
manufactures
,
and
should
make
all
establishments
necessary
,
for
aboundance
,
the
safety
,
the
beautifying
of
Townes
,
the
assurance
of
wayes
,
and
the
commodity
of
Riuers
.
That
of
the
Treasure
should
regulate
the
leuies
of
money
,
the
assignations
,
and
all
that
which
concernes
the
dispensations
of
the
Reuenewes
of
the
Estate
.
Yet
there
being
many
affaires
so
vnited
,
I
know
that
in
an
Estate
,
whereas
all
things
are
ouerruled
by
the
head
of
one
or
two
,
who
desire
to
gouerne
the
Prince
,
he
that
should
attempt
any
thing
for
the
good
of
his
Estate
,
they
would
presently
perswade
him
,
that
these
Councels
would
be
so
many
comptrollers
which
he
should
giue
vnto
himselfe
:
That
he
was
sufficient
to
prouide
for
all
,
and
that
all
must
depend
vpon
his
will
,
and
not
oblige
nor
subiect
himselfe
to
another
mans
Reason
.
But
vnder
pretext
of
maintayning
the
Princes
Authority
,
these
people
seeke
to
continue
their
owne
to
worke
their
ends
,
neuer
representing
the
Princes
affaires
but
by
a
crosse
meanes
,
which
may
serue
their
owne
designes
:
they
ingage
him
many
times
in
Councels
,
which
proue
very
preiudiciall
to
his
honour
,
reputation
,
and
Estate
.
Wherefore
to
take
away
this
superioritie
in
a
Councell
,
and
to
entertaine
an
equallitie
among
Councellors
,
There
is
another
diuersitie
for
the
order
of
opening
,
Which
two
kindes
of
deliuering
their
opinions
may
bee
practized
according
to
the
equallity
,
that
is
among
the
Councellors
.
For
if
they
bee
equall
in
power
,
it
seemes
most
fitting
that
the
most
sufficient
should
deliuer
their
opinions
first
:
Whereas
contrarywise
if
the
Councell
be
mingled
with
great
Lords
,
and
men
of
a
means
condition
;
they
which
haue
least
power
,
must
deliuer
their
opinions
first
;
yet
causing
them
which
haue
only
a
consultatiue
voice
,
to
deliuer
their
censures
first
,
who
prepare
the
way
to
such
as
haue
a
deliberatiue
voice
,
representing
vnto
the
Councell
all
the
reasons
of
either
side
,
and
propounding
their
owne
aduice
:
In
doing
whereof
if
they
erre
,
they
shall
bee
reformed
by
the
others
without
Iealousie
;
for
that
an
ambition
to
speake
,
drawes
after
it
many
times
the
enuy
of
some
,
and
the
iealousie
of
others
.
Augustus
demaunded
their
opinions
without
obseruing
Ranke
,
or
Age
,
to
the
end
that
euery
man
should
be●
attentiue
to
the
propositions
that
were
made
,
and
without
staying
for
the
aduice
of
next
neighbour
,
he
might
be
alwayes
ready
to
deliuer
his
owne
.
I
will
adde
one
thing
,
whereof
we
must
haue
a
speciall
care
in
Councell
,
which
is
to
call
into
the
deliberation
of
some
businesse
of
hazard
,
they
to
whom
we
are
to
giue
the
Execution
.
For
it
seemes
that
calling
t●em
,
it
will
make
them
more
cunning
and
aduised
to
auoyd
the
dangers
which
may
fall
out
in
the
Enterprize
,
the
which
they
meane
to
recommend
vnto
them
.
Yet
it
may
be
of
such
a
nature
,
as
the
difficulties
which
they
shall
●eare
,
wi●l
present
themselues
in
the
Execution
,
may
discourage
them
and
make
them
grow
cold
,
in
danger
to
giue
ouer
the
Enterprize
.
Behold
that
which
ought
to
be
principally
considered
in
those
which
giue
counsell
.
CHAP.
21.
Considerations
for
the
Prince
which
is
to
be
Counsell●d
.
AS
for
him
that
is
to
be
Counselled
,
we
must
consider
his
sufficiency
,
the
manner
of
demaunding
Counsell
,
to
receyue
it
,
examine
it
,
to
resolue
and
Execute
it
.
And
although
it
seemes
that
the
first
haue
not
any
need
to
seeke
the
counsell
of
another
;
yet
aswell
to
free
himselfe
from
presumption
,
as
to
giue
the
more
authority
and
credit
vnto
their
Enterprizes
,
they
must
communicate
them
;
and
confesse
that
Sufficiency
is
neuer
so
great
in
any
one
person
,
but
that
many
may
adde
something
vnto
it
.
And
although
that
this
Sufficiency
be
very
commendable
,
yet
it
is
dangerous
in
a
Prince
,
who
easily
fals
into
presumption
;
and
it
seemes
that
the
docillity
which
is
found
in
others
,
yeilding
an
Eare
to
Counsell
,
is
the
more
safe
.
Yet
if
these
bring
not
Iudgment
to
discerne
good
from
euill
,
this
meane
Sufficiency
would
be
as
dangerous
,
as
if
he
referd
himselfe
wholy
to
the
Counsell
of
others
:
which
is
an
Instrument
,
whereof
they
haue
somtimes
made
vse
to
ruine
many
Estates
;
for
that
where
the
Councell
shall
consist
of
incapable
men
,
aswell
as
the
Prince
;
a
thing
which
vsually
fals
out
,
when
as
the
Counsellors
are
chosen
by
him
,
for
that
euery
man
seekes
his
like
;
and
we
much
acknowledge
some
Sufficiency
to
iudge
of
that
of
another
man
,
to
make
the
Election
:
and
in
this
case
the
Estate
is
the
sooner
drawne
to
its
ruine
,
when
as
the
number
of
Counsellors
is
greatest
.
But
if
they
whom
the
Prince
hath
called
to
his
Councell
,
he
worthy
and
fit
to
support
the
burthen
of
the
Estate
;
&
that
the
Prince
be
not
capable
to
make
choise
of
good
parties
and
occasions
,
and
to
adde
the
conduct
which
shal
be
necessary
in
the
executions
;
this
councel
wil
be
fruitles
to
him
.
Besides
,
the
Counsellors
of
Princes
are
accompanied
with
●ealousie
one
against
another
;
and
tending
all
to
one
end
,
they
fi●de
out
many
times
publique
Councels
,
and
make
them
serue
to
their
owne
priuate
interests
,
striuing
by
many
cunning
practises
,
to
frustrate
the
Designes
,
and
to
hinder
the
increase
of
reputation
one
of
another
.
Whereby
it
happens
,
that
the
Prince
hauing
not
(
for
the
little
sufficiency
that
is
in
him
)
that
authority
among
his
Councellors
which
were
necessary
to
keepe
them
in
awe
,
and
to
hinder
the
course
of
these
Diuisions
;
nor
yet
Iudgement
to
discouer
the
particular
Desig●es
of
euery
one
;
he
remaynes
among
so
many
Councellors
,
rather
confounded
and
irresolute
,
then
counselled
.
Besides
that
in
such
a
Councell
of
Wise
men
,
and
full
of
vallor
,
which
serue
a
Prince
of
little
vnderstanding
,
there
is
neuer
so
much
Friendship
and
Affection
as
were
to
be
desired
in
Cou●cellors
.
For
that
seeing
their
Prince
more
inwardly
then
other
men
,
and
knowing
his
imperfections
and
weaknesse
better
,
the
order
of
Nature
beares
it
,
t●at
in
the
end
they
fall
to
contemne
him
,
the
which
afterwards
doth
easily
turne
to
hatred
;
for
that
the
Minister
which
hath
some
merrit
in
himselfe
,
scornes
to
obey
a
man
incapable
of
his
Greatnesse
,
and
vnworthy
of
his
Fortune
,
long
.
After
hatred
and
contempt
followes
the
infidelity
of
Councellors
;
so
as
the
Prince
must
eyther
be
sold
,
or
turned
vp
and
downe
according
to
the
occasions
of
the
will
of
those
which
shall
be
about
him
,
who
in
their
Councell
will
haue
more
regard
to
their
particular
aduancement
,
then
to
the
greatnesse
of
their
Master
.
A
P●i●ce
then
that
desires
to
raigne
in
his
Estate
,
must
make
himselfe
capable
to
gouerne
,
and
mannage
affaires
:
not
that
I
would
aduise
a
Prince
who
hath
sufficiency
in
himselfe
to
haue
no
man
about
him
to
giue
him
Counsel
;
bu●
rather
I
be●eeue
that
one
of
the
greatest
foundations
of
his
reputation
is
,
when
they
shall
ha●e
an
opinion
that
his
owne
iudgement
and
proper
intelligence
of
affaires
,
is
assisted
by
a
wise
and
faithfull
Councell
;
which
is
the
thing
for
the
which
he
must
most
labour
.
But
this
Councell
how
wise
and
adui●ed
soeuer
,
must
alwayes
be
surmounted
by
the
iudgement
and
capacity
of
the
Prince
,
so
as
they
must
rather
serue
for
an
accessary
;
then
a
principall
in
the
gouernment
of
the
Estate
:
that
in
commaundments
they
acknowledge
themselues
inferiour
to
the
Prince
,
and
not
carry
themselues
as
equals
:
that
in
occasions
and
affaires
of
importance
,
they
may
rather
haue
power
to
alt●r
,
and
to
make
knowne
the
difficulties
and
inconueniences
,
but
not
to
resolue
:
And
in
a
word
,
the
Prince
hath
neede
of
so
much
spirit
,
as
his
Councell
may
assist
him
to
gouerne
,
but
not
teach
him
to
raigne
.
We
will
therefore
conclude
,
that
as
a
Prince
hath
neede
of
himselfe
,
to
maintayne
himselfe
in
life
,
so
harh
he
neede
of
a
good
Councell
,
to
maintayne
the
affaires
of
his
Estate
:
and
as
without
it
he
cannot
be
termed
a
man
,
so
without
Councell
he
cannot
be
held
a
Prince
.
Wherefore
hauing
made
choyce
of
those
which
may
Counsell
him
,
Some
one
would
oblige
the
Prince
to
assist
himselfe
at
all
manner
of
Councels
,
asw●ll
to
take
knowledge
of
all
the
affaires
of
his
Estate
,
as
to
discouer
the
capacity
of
his
Councellors
,
to
hinder
factions
which
grow
in
Councell
,
to
moderate
the
passions
and
iealousies
of
his
Ministers
,
to
giue
more
Authority
to
his
Resolutions
,
and
by
his
presence
to
cause
the
affaires
to
be
treated
of
with
the
respect
and
grauity
that
is
requisite
and
necessary
.
Yet
there
being
many
things
which
are
treated
of
in
the
like
Councels
,
depending
of
Iustice
,
policy
,
or
the
Treasure
;
besides
that
this
would
ouer-burthen
the
Prince
,
in
making
him
to
imploy
the
greatest
part
of
his
time
in
these
affaires
;
he
cannot
do
it
without
abasing
his
Authority
and
Maiesty
too
much
,
by
this
too
frequent
communication
;
and
it
will
suffice
,
that
he
assist
at
most
important
affaires
,
or
at
those
whose
resolution
may
increase
his
Reputation
,
contenting
himselfe
to
prouide
for
that
which
concernes
Peace
or
Warre
,
with
the
saf●ty
a●d
quiet
of
his
Estate
.
An●
to
p●euent
the
inconueniences
which
happen
daily
in
Councels
,
where
the
Prince
doth
not
assist
,
and
to
draw
the
same
aduantages
without
assisting
,
which
he
should
haue
by
his
presence
being
there
,
the
course
obserued
by
the
Grand
Seig●our
is
somewhat
considerable
.
For
in
the
place
where
they
hold
the
Diuan
or
Counsell
,
there
is
a
window
,
by
the
which
(
without
being
seene
)
he
may
heare
all
that
is
spoken
and
past
in
his
Councell
:
So
as
his
Councellors
vncertayne
whether
their
master
heare
them
or
not
,
obserue
the
same
respect
,
the
same
modesty
,
and
t●e
same
manner
of
proceeding
,
which
they
will
do
in
his
presence
:
and
after
they
haue
held
the
counsell
,
they
go
and
make
report
vnto
him
of
what
hath
past
;
the
which
they
dare
not
deliuer
falsly
,
not
knowing
whether
the
Prince
haue
heard
them
.
And
thus
he
is
informed
of
all
that
hath
beene
propoun●ed
in
his
Councell
.
and
heares
himselfe
if
he
will
,
or
by
some
other
,
the
reasons
of
all
sides
;
and
then
after
the
reports
which
is
truly
and
certaynely
made
vnto
him
,
he
presently
resolues
without
any
demunition
of
his
Maiesty
.
The
Prince
hauing
demaunded
the
aduice
of
his
Councellors
,
We
must
therefore
diligently
Examine
,
Afterwards
the
Prince
must
duly
consider
of
the
Execution
of
that
which
they
counsell
him
;
for
the
Councell
being
of
doubtfull
things
,
he
must
aduise
whether
Fortune
may
haue
a
greater
share
,
in
that
which
he
meanes
to
vndertake
,
then
wisdome
:
and
if
he
finds
that
he
hath
more
need
of
Fortune
,
he
must
beware
how
he
imbarque
himselfe
,
especially
if
the
contrary
succeed
to
that
which
he
desires
,
he
incurres
more
losse
,
then
he
can
hope
for
profit
,
succeeding
after
his
desire
.
But
if
necessity
reduceth
him
to
this
poynt
,
that
he
must
eyther
loose
or
hazard
;
it
were
better
to
tempt
Fortune
,
the
which
although
it
did
not
succeed
,
yet
at
the
least
he
should
haue
this
contentment
,
to
haue
done
what
lay
in
him
.
Otherwise
,
he
may
not
lightly
imbarque
himselfe
in
a
dangerous
Enterprize
,
although
that
at
the
first
sight
the
perill
be
not
so
neere
.
For
besides
the
danger
that
euery
bad
resolution
carries
with
it
,
it
drawes
after
it
likewise
to
maintayne
it
,
an
infinite
number
of
such
like
,
for
that
things
cannot
remayne
alone
,
but
are
bound
one
vnto
another
,
and
inchayned
together
.
Wherefore
we
may
not
haue
so
much
respect
vnto
the
present
,
as
we
forget
the
future
.
For
althoug●
that
the
accidents
of
Fortune
are
in
such
variety
,
and
so
frequent
,
as
they
may
hinder
vs
from
a
certayne
fore-sight
of
the
future
:
and
that
to
haue
regard
to
an
imaginary
feare
of
a
thing
which
may
be
or
not
be
,
it
seemes
that
this
were
to
imbrace
the
shaddow
,
and
to
leaue
the
body
or
substance
.
Yet
the
greatest
part
of
Errours
which
are
committed
in
deliberations
proceeds
from
this
,
that
men
suffer
themselues
too
much
to
be
carried
away
with
the
affect●on
of
the
present
;
the
which
how
little
soeuer
it
be
assisted
by
Fortune
,
it
seemes
that
it
hath
alwayes
greater
force
and
vigour
,
then
the
strongest
respect
we
can
imagine
of
the
future
.
Wherefore
he
must
shew
himselfe
very
stayed
in
such
affections
,
and
as
for
the
affection
of
the
present
,
he
may
not
forget
the
consideration
of
the
future
:
but
he
must
accustome
himselfe
to
set
that
which
is
to
come
before
his
Eyes
,
with
such
a
resentment
and
apprehension
,
as
if
he
saw
it
or
touch
it
.
So
he
may
not
for
a
feare
a
farre
off
,
forbeare
to
remedy
a
present
mischiefe
.
He
may
not
likewise
suffer
himselfe
to
be
carried
away
by
any
Example
that
is
alledged
,
if
all
the
particularities
do
not
concurre
.
For
although
that
these
comparisons
may
ioyne
at
some
corner
,
and
that
all
things
hold
by
some
similitude
or
likenesse
:
yet
there
are
very
few
Examples
which
do
not
hault
:
And
the
relation
which
is
drawne
from
Experience
,
is
many
times
defectiue
and
imperfect
,
if
it
be
not
assisted
by
discourse
and
Reason
.
Then
hee
must
examine
the
quality
of
the
person
which
giues
the
aduice
,
especially
his
interest
,
and
aboue
all
things
he
must
refuse
to
counsell
a
flatterer
,
and
inuite
him
that
counsels
,
to
speake
freely
and
with
courage
.
If
for
the
respect
of
the
greatnesse
of
the
Prince
who
is
counselled
,
it
be
necessary
to
flatter
him
;
But
the
manner
whereby
most
Princes
liue
at
this
day
,
few
men
are
found
that
will
practise
this
Trade
,
being
the
office
of
true
Friendship
towards
the
Soueraigne
,
in
a
rough
and
dangerous
tryall
;
So
as
they
must
not
onely
haue
much
affection
and
freedome
,
but
also
courage
.
Flattery
is
far
more
safe
;
for
that
by
pleasing
,
it
seemes
they
draw
nearer
vnto
Friendship
:
and
for
that
it
is
more
agreeable
to
him
whom
they
flatter
,
it
is
also
more
easie
for
him
to
practise
that
meanes
to
flatter
.
Contrariwise
Truth
and
Liberty
,
as
if
they
approached
neare
to
contempt
,
cannot
be
so
safely
practised
with
a
Prince
.
If
then
the
Prince
will
assure
himselfe
on
that
side
,
he
must
encourage
one
or
two
of
those
which
approach
nearest
vnto
him
,
and
whom
he
knowes
to
be
best
affected
,
and
freest
from
contempt
of
him
,
Wee
reade
in
the
Turkes
Historie
,
that
a
Bassa
called
by
his
Master
to
the
gouernment
of
the
Estate
,
This
may
be
practi●ed
by
the
Prince
;
but
yet
hee
may
not
forbeare
to
make
choise
of
a
good
Councell
,
to
examine
the
propositions
of
that
which
by
this
meanes
they
haue
discouered
,
to
bee
desired
of
the
people
.
In
this
manner
it
shall
bee
easie
for
a
Prince
to
resolue
,
bee
it
that
hee
take
the
aduice
of
euery
one
secretly
and
apart
;
or
being
assembled
,
hee
cause
them
to
deliuer
their
opinions
openly
,
to
the
end
that
by
the
communication
of
their
aduisoes
,
the
resolution
may
bee
more
easie
to
take
,
either
in
following
the
greatest
number
of
voyces
,
or
in
making
choice
of
his
opinion
that
seemes
the
best
;
and
the
resolution
taken
,
the
execution
must
follow
with
all
possible
speede
;
Celeritie
making
all
things
easie
,
as
well
for
that
of
it selfe
,
it
is
actiue
and
full
of
vigour
,
as
for
that
it
giues
no
leisure
to
crosse
a
businesse
in
the
execution
,
before
they
can
oppose
it
.
CHAP.
22.
Of
the
forme
of
Commanding
.
THe
fourth
establishment
to
bee
made
in
an
Estate
,
is
the
forme
of
Commanding
,
in
the
which
wee
must
consider
two
things
;
the
power
of
the
Commander
,
and
the
iustice
of
the
commandement
.
The
power
of
him
which
commands
is
either
soueraigne
or
inferiour
.
The
law
is
as
it
were
a
pledge
and
a
generall
safetie
,
which
Princes
giue
vnto
their
subiects
,
The
Lawes
are
of
diuers
sorts
,
CHAP.
23.
What
we
are
to
to
a●oyde
in
the
establishing
of
L●wes
.
AMong
other
things
we
must
haue
a
speciall
care
not
to
establish
any
Lawes
but
such
as
are
very
necessary
.
The
other
cause
,
from
whence
the
multitude
of
Lawes
do
vsually
proceed
,
is
the
bad
inclination
of
the
Prince
,
who
hauing
an
intent
to
domineere
ouer
the
Magistrates
&
publick
,
in
his
particular
appetites
and
affayres
,
makes
what
Lawes
he
can
to
offend
in
particular
,
eyther
those
whom
he
feares
or
such
as
he
hates
:
or
of
that
,
from
whence
he
thinkes
he
may
draw
some
profit
for
his
owne
particular
.
I
come
vnto
the
obseruation
of
Lawes
,
without
the
which
,
the
establishment
were
fruitlesse
.
To
this
obseruation
two
things
are
necessary
:
the
example
of
great
men
,
and
of
those
which
commaund
;
and
Seuerity
.
For
as
the
Lawes
prescribe
vnto
Subiects
the
rule
of
well
liuing
,
As
the
example
of
the
Prince
serues
to
inuite
men
to
doe
well
,
For
this
effect
pardons
must
not
be
too
frequent
,
but
for
a
Subiect
that
is
full
of
merit
,
CHAP.
24.
Of
the
Princes
particular
Commaunds
.
AS
for
the
particular
Commaunds
which
are
made
vpon
occasions
which
happen
dayly
,
the
forme
is
in
a
manner
equall
:
for
that
it
ought
to
be
constant
in
that
which
they
haue
first
vndertaken
to
establish
,
and
not
to
change
vpon
euery
difficulty
which
may
happen
,
but
contrariwise
they
should
striue
to
surmount
al●
the
crosses
which
may
present
themselues
.
This
forme
of
Commaund
shal
be
like
vnto
the
other
accompanied
with
seuerity
,
being
needfull
to
p●euent
disobedience
in
small
matters
:
for
that
this
vice
like
vnto
others
,
growes
by
degrees
.
But
aboue
all
,
hee
which
commaunds
,
must
deale
in
such
sort
,
as
the
Soueraigne
commaund
may
depend
wholy
on
him
,
and
be
tyed
to
his
Person
:
not
that
the
Prince
should
therefore
draw
vnto
himselfe
all
the
gouernment
,
and
the
whole
mann●ging
of
th●
Estate
:
for
besides
that
he
should
find
himselfe
●uer-bu●thened
,
and
that
in
the
multitude
of
aff●ires
th●re
will
be
many
ill
cared
for
,
and
worse
executed
,
●e
should
cha●ge
his
Principality
with
euny
;
and
his
subiects
seeing
themselues
depriued
of
the
administration
of
Offices
,
would
grow
cold
in
the
affections
which
they
ought
to
beare
him
.
But
the
Soueraigne
authority
ought
not
to
be
imparted
to
any
one
,
nor
the
distribution
of
Recompences
and
Offices
,
nor
the
absolute
command
of
forces
;
least
that
he
to
whom
the
Prince
hath
giuen
this
power
changing
his
affection
and
will
,
shou●d
take
occasion
to
a●tempt
against
the
Estate
,
hauing
the
commodity
●f
such
an
aduantage
:
whereof
there
are
but
too
many
examples
Histories
.
We
haue
treated
of
the
Commandments
of
a
Soueraigne
power
:
Let
vs
now
obserue
the
forme
of
their
Commaund
,
whose
power
is
inferiour
,
and
to
whom
the
charges
of
the
Estate
are
distributed
,
to
haue
care
and
to
watch
ouer
that
part
of
the
Estate
which
is
committed
vnto
them
.
CHAP.
25.
Of
Magistrates
.
IT
being
necessary
that
of
all
the
parts
of
an
Estate
,
there
should
not
any
remayne
without
gouernment
;
one
alone
being
vnable
to
imbrace
all
;
being
likewise
vnfit
,
that
the
Soueraigne
should
be
troubled
in
matters
which
may
be
done
better
by
those
which
are
inferiour
vnto
him
:
it
hath
beene
held
necessary
to
giue
order
,
that
this
supreme
authority
,
yet
without
suffring
any
demuniti●n
,
should
be
dispersed
into
many
parts
;
and
that
power
should
be
giuen
to
a
certayne
number
of
men
,
to
hea●e
,
ordayne
,
or
prouide
particularly
,
for
affaires
of
least
importance
,
and
the
which
are
all
so
many
branches
of
the
Soueraignty
,
out
of
which
they
grow
,
and
are
supported
as
by
their
stemme
,
and
by
the
which
reciprocally
the
Soueraignty
beings
forth
flowers
,
leaues
,
and
fruits
.
The
distinction
of
these
inferiour
powers
is
diuers
,
And
as
euery
one
of
their
parts
is
subdiuided
into
many
others
;
so
according
to
these
subdiuisions
,
the
charges
are
in
themselues
distinguished
into
functions
:
and
in
this
diuersity
there
are
some
which
haue
power
to
command
,
proceeding
from
the
sole
authority
of
the
Prince
,
or
from
that
of
the
Lawes
,
the
which
haue
attributed
this
power
to
the
Office
.
Others
are
erected
for
the
seruice
of
the
Estate
;
Others
for
the
execution
of
commandments
.
Some
hauing
distinguished
publique
Offices
,
a●cording
vnto
honour
,
iurisdiction
,
and
command
.
For
some
are
without
honour
,
iurisdiction
,
or
command
;
and
in
this
ranke
they
place
all
those
which
are
destinated
for
the
seruice
or
execution
of
the
superiours
commandments
,
as
Registers
,
Notaries
,
Cryers
,
Sergeants
,
Trumpets
▪
and
such
like
.
Others
are
with
honour
,
yet
without
power
to
command
or
to
iudge
;
as
Embassadours
,
Councells
,
and
Secretaries
of
Estate
,
Receiuers
of
the
Treasure
,
and
most
part
of
the
Officers
of
the
Princes
trayne
.
Others
haue
honour
and
iurisdiction
,
but
no
power
to
command
,
as
Prelates
.
Others
haue
honour
and
power
to
command
,
but
no
iurisdiction
,
as
the
Consuls
in
old
time
at
Rome
,
and
at
this
present
the
gouernours
of
Prouinces
,
and
the
Kings
Procurators
.
Others
haue
honour
,
iurisdiction
,
and
power
to
command
,
and
these
are
properly
called
Magistrates
.
CHAP.
26.
Of
the
differences
betwixt
Officers
and
Commissaries
.
IT
were
a
fruitlesse
thing
to
busie
my selfe
here
,
to
Discourse
particularly
of
the
duties
and
power
attributed
to
euery
publique
office
:
For
that
it
is
diuersly
practized
,
not
only
in
seuerall
estates
,
but
also
in
the
same
Estate
,
as
it
is
held
most
expedient
for
the
publique
good
,
to
increase
the
power
of
the
one
,
and
to
diminish
that
of
another
.
And
relating
only
that
which
is
most
generally
obserued
,
I
will
content
my selfe
to
adde
vnto
these
former
distinctions
one
ot●er
,
which
is
drawn
from
the
forme
in
the
which
a
power
is
giuen
to
those
which
are
imployed
in
publique
charges
.
For
charges
are
gi●en
eyther
by
Office
or
by
the
way
●f
Commission
:
If
in
an
Office
,
There
are
foure
things
to
be
considered
in
a
Commission
:
The
person
from
whence
it
proceeds
;
From
the
consideration
of
that
which
I
haue
said
wee
may
gather
,
It
remaines
now
to
know
when
the
Commission
expires
.
It
ceaseth
,
if
he
which
granted
it
comes
to
die
:
CHAP.
27.
Considerations
vpon
the
Establishment
of
Officers
and
Magistrates
.
THese
distinctions
knowne
,
many
other
poynts
are
to
be
considered
in
the
Establishment
of
those
,
to
whom
this
power
of
Commaund
vnder
the
Soueraigne
,
or
to
mannage
other
affaires
concerning
the
Estate
is
attributed
,
be
it
by
Office
or
Commission
;
but
principally
we
must
consider
the
number
of
those
that
are
to
be
imployed
:
The
authority
of
him
which
hath
established
and
imployed
them
;
the
qualities
of
those
whom
they
put
into
offices
;
the
forme
of
proceeding
in
these
Establishments
;
the
time
they
ought
to
remayne
in
Authority
;
and
finally
the
duty
of
principall
Magistrates
,
aswell
towards
the
Soueraigne
and
the
Lawes
,
as
to
other
Magistrates
that
are
equall
or
inferiour
,
and
towards
particular
persons
.
Mor●ouer
the
ordinary
i●conueniences
,
as
sicknes●e
or
other
naturall
hinderances
,
befalling
a
Minister
,
if
he
be
alone
,
his
charge
(
which
it
may
be
is
necessary
for
the
publique
)
will
remay●e
in
suspence
and
without
exercise
,
and
the
publique
affayres
by
this
meanes
delayed
,
not
without
preiudice
to
the
Estate
.
As
for
the
plurality
of
Officers
,
which
growes
from
the
plurality
of
Charges
,
the
charges
being
distinguished
one
from
another
,
so
as
they
cannot
be
confounded
;
so
as
this
plurality
is
so
farre
from
being
hurtfull
or
preiudiciall
vnto
the
Estate
,
as
it
is
profitable
.
By
this
meanes
no
part
of
the
Estate
is
neglected
:
you
content
and
pacifi●
the
ambition
of
many
,
who
liuing
priuately
in
idlenesse
,
would
seeke
to
imploy
themselues
in
some
innouation
:
and
you
bind
them
to
the
preseruation
of
the
Estate
,
for
that
they
would
feare
that
an
alteration
would
change
the
order
,
and
by
consequence
impayre
their
authority
.
But
as
in
this
diuersity
of
charges
,
This
meanes
likewise
will
serue
to
make
the
greatest
affect
and
seeke
the
meanest
Offices
,
making
them
know
that
they
cannot
come
to
the
greatest
before
they
passe
through
the
others
;
and
there
will
alwayes
remayne
a
place
for
the
Princes
fauour
,
making
choyse
of
one
among
many
which
are
in
the
same
charge
,
to
rayse
him
vnto
a
greater
dignity
,
and
this
order
may
also
serue
to
cause
the
affayres
to
be
mannaged
with
more
Integrity
.
For
they
which
desire
to
aduance
themselues
,
will
feare
that
doing
otherwise
they
shal
be
reiected
when
they
desire
to
rise
.
In
like
manner
the
Capacity
wil
be
greater
in
such
,
as
shal
be
ad●anced
to
more
eminent
charges
.
For
that
hauing
past
through
many
degrees
,
they
will
haue
more
knowledge
,
both
of
the
affayres
and
of
the
manner
how
to
mannage
them
.
CHAP.
28.
Of
the
creation
and
nomination
of
Magistrates
,
and
Officers
.
THE
Magistrate
or
Officers
,
euen
the
principall
ought
to
be
made
by
the
Soueraigne
,
And
we
must
not
wonder
if
they
be
ill
serued
,
although
their
intent
be
good
;
nor
if
the
Lawes
be
so
ill
executed
:
For
that
hauing
no
will
to
take
the
Paines
,
to
search
out
and
examine
the
merite
of
their
principall
subiects
;
they
cannot
dispose
of
Offices
proportionably
to
their
Natures
and
capacities
.
For
besides
that
there
is
a
difference
,
For
although
that
affaires
ought
to
be
mannaged
by
discretion
,
and
not
by
inclination
:
yet
it
behoues
the
wisdome
of
the
Prince
,
to
know
that
most
part
of
the
affaires
of
this
world
are
gouerned
more
by
inclination
then
otherwise
.
Wherefore
he
must
cunningly
make
vse
of
this
defect
.
For
Nature
hath
giuen
to
euery
mans
condition
some
good
thing
in
exchange
of
some
defect
which
is
found
in
him
:
if
it
hath
giuen
to
some
one
a
flownesse
to
begin
,
it
hath
likewise
imparted
an
obstinacy
to
continue
and
finish
the
worke
,
ballancing
his
negligence
with
pers●uerance
.
To
those
which
by
Nature
shal
be
suddaine
and
hasty
,
and
who
in
regard
of
their
impatiency
,
striue
to
doe
things
out
of
season
;
she
hath
giuen
hardinesse
,
by
the
meanes
whereof
they
haue
effected
great
matters
.
These
Defects
being
common
among
men
,
the
Prince
shall
accommodate
himselfe
,
and
distribute
the
charges
according
to
euery
mans
humour
and
inclination
;
and
to
treate
a
businesse
,
it
shall
suffice
to
informe
him
whom
he
meanes
to
imploy
,
of
the
grounds
and
substance
of
the
businesse
,
and
to
leaue
the
rest
to
him
to
mannage
according
to
his
naturall
inclination
,
be
it
graue
,
modest
,
seuere
,
or
otherwise
:
for
that
they
may
vse
diuers
meanes
tending
to
the
same
end
;
and
if
it
be
forced
,
the
businesse
wil
not
succeed
.
But
in
making
choyce
,
he
must
consider
,
that
the
humour
and
sufficiency
may
be
proportionable
to
the
businesse
,
and
to
the
humour
of
those
with
whom
he
is
to
treate
.
The
same
must
be
obserued
for
all
those
whom
they
imploy
in
charges
and
publique
affaires
.
And
although
it
were
to
be
desired
that
in
the
mannaging
of
affaires
,
They
which
are
of
a
meane
vnderstanding
,
support
the
accidents
which
happen
more
easily
;
and
when
as
they
finde
themselues
in
an
Estate
well
ordred
,
and
gouerned
by
good
lawes
,
they
maintaine
themselues
long
.
Such
men
most
commonly
are
inclined
to
Fleagme
.
And
if
by
a
breeding
contrary
to
their
nature
,
they
haue
not
beene
stirred
vp
to
ambition
,
they
obey
more
willingly
then
the
rest
;
for
that
their
humour
being
grosse
,
the
impression
which
nature
hath
bred
,
is
more
firme
,
and
the
desires
and
appetites
stronger
.
But
to
make
the
choyce
of
Officers
easily
,
This
shall
suffice
for
the
principall
qualities
of
Magistrates
and
Officers
.
Let
vs
now
come
to
the
forme
of
making
them
.
CHAP.
29.
Of
the
forme
and
manner
to
Create
and
make
Magistrates
and
Officers
:
And
of
the
time
of
their
Charges
.
THey
are
made
either
by
election
or
by
lot
,
In
this
difference
it
is
to
be
obserued
,
that
the
discontent
of
those
which
are
not
chosen
is
the
lesse
,
when
the
Lot
proceeds
the
choyce
,
then
when
the
choyce
goes
before
the
Lot
.
Wherefore
in
places
whereas
hatred
is
irreconcilliable
,
it
were
better
to
make
vse
of
this
last
kind
,
then
of
the
first
.
Let
vs
now
see
what
time
Officers
ought
to
remaine
in
the
exercise
of
their
charges
.
This
is
diuersly
obserued
.
In
some
Estates
they
continue
them
during
life
:
In
others
they
are
limmited
to
a
certaine
time
.
They
which
haue
beene
of
opinion
to
make
Officers
temporary
,
They
which
would
perpetuate
them
,
And
as
from
new
seruants
growes
the
enuie
of
Families
,
so
from
new
Magistrates
proceeds
the
fall
of
Estates
,
which
bring
new
Councells
,
new
designes
,
new
Lawes
,
new
Customes
,
new
Edicts
,
new
kinds
of
liuing
,
and
new
Iudgements
.
Tiberius
to
withdraw
the
greate
men
of
Rome
from
the
knowledge
of
publique
affaires
,
and
to
assure
those
the
more
whom
he
imployed
in
Offices
,
hee
continued
them
during
life
.
Wherefore
to
auoid
the
greatest
part
of
the
inconueniences
which
are
found
in
either
party
;
you
must
consider
the
forme
of
the
Estate
,
and
the
humour
of
the
subiects
.
Popular
Estates
are
maintained
by
the
continuall
change
of
Magistrates
,
In
Principallities
it
is
not
needfull
to
teach
Subiects
to
Command
,
but
to
obay
.
And
being
necessary
to
retayne
them
in
their
duties
,
they
cannot
assure
themselues
but
of
few
to
maintayne
the
rest
.
This
course
is
obserued
by
the
Pope
and
the
Seignoury
of
Venice
.
Kings
who
haue
but
one
sort
of
people
to
imploy
in
gouernments
,
make
vse
of
other
meanes
,
But
forasmuch
as
the
Prince
ought
to
be
Master
,
But
for
that
in
doing
this
altogether
,
they
which
would
desire
to
continue
in
their
charges
,
It
auayles
not
to
say
,
that
to
facilitate
the
obedience
of
Subiects
,
they
haue
beene
forced
to
take
this
course
;
the
Subiect
obeying
more
willingly
one
of
his
Prouince
,
who
hee
thinkes
would
haue
the
same
affection
like
himselfe
for
that
which
concernes
the
good
thereof
,
the
which
a
Stranger
and
vnknown
vnto
him
would
not
doe
,
whom
he
imagines
to
be
vnlike
in
humour
and
will
.
For
this
were
to
make
the
Prince
subiect
to
his
Officer
,
and
to
make
the
obedience
of
the
people
depend
more
on
the
credit
which
the
Officer
hath
,
then
of
the
Authority
which
the
Prince
ought
to
haue
ouer
his
Subiects
,
who
obey
not
the
Prince
,
but
so
farre
forth
as
it
shall
please
the
Officer
;
and
the
Officer
losing
his
credit
,
the
Prince
shall
be
no
more
obeyed
.
But
if
in
a
new
Estate
to
settle
himselfe
,
it
is
very
fitting
to
make
vse
of
those
which
haue
most
credit
with
his
Subiects
,
the
Princes
authority
hauing
not
yet
taken
roote
in
their
minds
;
but
I
will
not
thereby
inferre
that
he
must
continue
it
:
but
contrariwise
this
authority
being
acknowledged
,
to
settle
it
absolutely
,
the
obedience
must
immediately
depend
,
and
they
must
obey
the
Officer
so
farre
forth
as
he
hath
authority
from
the
Prince
,
and
not
for
the
particular
credit
he
hath
among
the
people
.
CHAP.
30.
Of
the
duty
of
the
principall
Officers
and
Magistrates
.
AS
for
the
support
of
the
body
,
it
is
not
sufficient
that
the
Head
be
in
good
Estate
,
but
the
other
members
in
like
manner
must
doe
their
function
:
So
in
an
Estate
,
it
is
not
sufficient
for
the
Prince
to
doe
his
Duty
,
but
the
Officers
,
and
especially
the
principall
Magistrates
of
the
Estate
,
should
likewise
doe
theirs
.
But
I
should
be
tedious
,
if
I
would
relate
here
all
the
whole
Duty
of
euery
Officer
:
onely
I
will
deliuer
in
generall
termes
that
which
concernes
the
Duty
of
such
as
haue
Iurisdiction
and
command
together
,
or
the
one
and
the
other
diuided
;
as
those
which
are
more
considerable
and
worthy
of
obseruation
in
the
mannaging
of
the
Estate
.
Their
Duty
is
considered
in
foure
diuers
Subiects
:
eyther
towards
the
Lawes
,
or
towards
the
Soueraignes
Commandments
;
As
for
those
which
are
already
receiued
,
they
must
cause
them
to
be
strictly
obserued
,
and
restore
the
old
abolished
for
want
of
vse
,
before
they
put
them
in
execution
:
otherwise
it
would
be
a
very
vniust
thing
,
and
resenting
tyranny
,
after
they
had
for
a
long
season
contemned
an
Ordinance
,
to
proceed
suddainly
against
those
who
hauing
not
obserued
it
,
had
made
a
breach
:
The
common
errour
being
not
onely
excusable
,
but
also
held
for
a
Law
,
if
the
Law
of
Nature
doth
not
resist
.
But
for
that
the
Lawes
are
not
sufficient
to
gouerne
an
Estate
,
for
that
they
ordayne
onely
in
generall
,
the
Law-giuer
,
or
Prince
being
vnable
to
fore-see
an
infinite
number
of
particularities
which
happen
in
affaires
:
For
this
cause
the
Magistrate
is
established
,
to
examine
the
particularities
,
and
to
accommodate
the
Law
thereunto
by
a
iust
and
vpright
interpretation
;
the
which
is
taken
eyther
from
the
words
of
the
Law
,
or
from
the
intention
of
him
that
made
it
,
or
by
the
induction
or
conclusion
which
may
bee
drawne
from
it
.
In
regard
of
the
words
of
the
Law
,
If
there
bee
found
a
double
interpretation
,
taken
from
the
propriety
of
words
,
and
the
common
vse
of
speaking
;
they
shall
follow
the
mildest
;
and
if
the
words
bee
obscure
,
they
must
haue
recourse
to
custome
,
and
to
that
which
is
practised
in
that
regard
.
But
if
the
interpretation
be
notwithstanding
doubtfull
,
they
must
follow
that
which
shal
be
most
proper
for
the
matter
,
to
the
which
it
must
be
referr'd
.
And
if
notwithstanding
all
this
they
cannot
draw
any
interpretation
suitable
to
the
businesse
,
or
to
reason
;
he
must
cause
it
to
be
interpreted
by
those
who
haue
made
the
Law
;
or
cause
a
declaration
to
be
made
by
the
Soueraigne
.
Thus
the
Magistrate
must
carry
himselfe
in
the
interpretation
of
the
words
of
the
Law
.
But
to
seeke
out
the
reason
of
the
Law
,
we
must
consider
,
whether
it
be
exprest
by
the
Law
it selfe
,
or
gathered
by
the
Interpreters
;
and
to
draw
from
thence
the
condition
of
things
whereof
the
Law
speakes
,
or
if
it
be
vncertayne
.
For
if
it
be
exprest
by
the
Law
,
eyther
the
Law
is
formall
in
the
case
that
it
is
in
question
,
and
then
without
doubt
the
Law
must
be
followed
;
Or
if
it
be
not
altogether
formall
,
you
must
consider
whether
there
be
not
some
contrary
Circumstances
which
hinder
the
reason
of
the
Law
,
that
it
takes
not
place
in
the
businesse
that
is
in
questi●n
:
And
they
shall
doe
the
like
,
if
the
reason
be
not
exprest
in
the
Law
,
of
the
execution
whereof
they
treate
,
but
in
another
fact
vpon
another
subiect
.
But
if
the
reason
be
gathered
from
Interpreters
,
you
must
see
if
they
can
yeeld
no
better
:
And
then
you
must
follow
it
,
restrayning
it
;
if
it
be
particular
,
and
extending
it
if
it
be
generall
.
But
if
it
be
doubtfull
,
and
ordaynes
generally
,
you
may
not
in
this
doubt
in
any
sort
restrayne
the
effect
of
the
Law
,
vnlesse
it
be
in
things
that
are
odious
and
hurtfull
:
And
whereas
the
Law
shall
bee
limited
in
certaine
cases
,
they
must
not
easily
extend
it
to
others
vpon
pretext
of
equitie
,
vnlesse
there
were
an
Identite
of
reasons
,
especially
in
things
which
concerne
the
rigour
of
the
Law
,
whereas
the
case
not
exprest
is
held
for
omitted
.
But
in
such
occurrents
,
they
shall
gouerne
themselues
according
to
the
common
Law
,
to
the
which
all
the
Ordinances
,
if
it
may
bee
,
must
bee
referred
;
to
the
end
that
in
all
the
Lawes
of
the
estate
,
vniformitie
may
bee
obserued
,
and
naturall
equitie
followed
,
whereby
all
the
actions
of
men
should
bee
gouerned
,
and
regulated
.
Wherefore
the
case
not
being
expressed
in
the
Law
,
Wherefore
to
recollect
my selfe
,
When
as
vse
and
examples
faile
,
they
shall
choose
the
opinion
which
shall
approach
neerer
to
naturall
equitie
then
to
rigour
;
and
that
which
shall
bee
more
conformable
to
the
intention
of
the
Law
,
then
that
which
shall
be
drawne
from
the
subtile
interpretation
of
words
:
And
that
which
shall
bee
taken
from
the
true
Interpretation
of
words
,
then
from
similitudes
and
coniectures
:
For
that
all
similitudes
halt
;
and
coniectures
neuer
conclude
directly
:
Or
from
that
which
shall
bee
receiued
,
or
most
conformable
to
that
which
the
ancients
haue
held
,
for
that
we
may
not
slightly
leaue
the
opinion
of
the
ancient
.
But
when
wee
cannot
iudge
which
opinion
is
the
most
iust
,
wee
must
consider
which
is
the
safest
,
and
that
which
is
approued
by
most
men
,
and
by
the
wisest
,
more
sortable
to
the
businesse
that
is
in
question
,
and
which
hath
in
it
lesse
inconuenience
.
Behold
how
the
Magistrate
ought
to
carry
himselfe
,
in
the
interpretation
of
the
Lawes
.
As
for
other
persons
whom
the
ordinance
may
bind
,
they
must
distinguish
whether
they
bee
named
in
the
ordinance
by
their
names
,
or
specified
by
their
quallitie
and
condition
,
or
if
there
be
no
designation
.
The
name
or
the
condition
being
specified
,
the
ordinance
doth
not
extend
to
those
which
are
of
another
name
,
and
another
qualitie
.
But
if
there
be
no
qualitie
specified
,
the
ordinance
bindes
not
only
all
those
which
gaue
consent
to
the
publication
,
but
also
such
as
remaine
in
the
place
where
it
is
obserued
,
were
they
strangers
:
whence
this
distinction
proceeds
,
that
in
things
that
are
personall
,
proceeding
from
contracts
,
solemnities
,
and
acts
of
voluntary
Iurisdiction
;
they
must
follow
that
which
is
obserued
in
the
place
of
their
abiding
,
but
in
that
which
is
of
the
realitie
of
things
;
they
shal
be
bound
to
that
which
is
receiued
in
the
place
where
the
thing
is
scituated
.
Ordinances
are
in
force
,
The
second
point
necessary
to
authorise
a
custome
,
is
the
reiteration
of
many
the
like
acts
;
not
so
much
to
endure
a
plurality
of
examples
,
as
a
consent
of
opinion
,
by
the
frequency
of
these
acts
;
and
by
this
consent
two
Acts
suffice
to
confirme
a
custome
.
The
third
and
last
thing
required
for
the
approbation
of
a
custome
,
is
the
time
of
tenne
yeares
at
the
least
;
some
hold
thirty
yeares
that
the
consent
in
this
manner
of
liuing
should
continue
:
And
that
Custome
shal
be
of
the
more
authority
when
it
is
fortified
by
the
longer
prescription
of
time
.
CHAP.
31
Of
the
duty
of
the
Magistrate
towards
his
Soueraigne
.
THe
Duty
of
the
Magistrate
towards
his
Soueraign●
,
consists
in
the
respect
and
obedience
he
owes
,
For
eyther
the
commandment
consists
in
the
knowledge
of
the
Cause
,
There
are
some
which
proceeded
farther
,
and
hold
,
that
if
the
Prince
commandes
the
Magistrate
to
excuse
some
wicked
acte
to
his
subiects
,
it
were
better
to
obey
,
and
thereby
to
couer
and
bury
the
remembrance
of
a
wickednesse
already
done
;
then
by
refusing
to
irritate
and
incense
him
to
doe
worse
,
The
Magistrate
is
not
allowed
to
leaue
his
Office
,
rather
than
to
publish
the
vniust
will
of
the
Soueraigne
,
for
that
it
would
bee
a
dangerous
ouerture
to
all
the
subiects
,
to
refuse
and
reiect
the
edicts
and
will
of
the
Prince
,
if
euery
man
in
his
charge
might
leaue
the
Estate
in
danger
,
and
expose
it
to
a
storme
,
like
vnto
a
Ship
without
a
helme
,
vnder
colour
of
an
opinion
of
Iustice
,
which
it
may
bee
would
bee
affected
by
some
fantastique
braine
,
without
reason
,
but
to
crosse
a
contrary
opinion
.
Wherefore
in
all
Councels
,
they
hold
this
rule
,
to
make
the
Councellors
range
themselues
to
the
two
greatest
opinions
.
For
although
it
seemes
strange
,
to
force
the
conscience
of
those
,
to
whose
Wisedome
and
Religion
they
haue
referred
a
businesse
,
to
be
examined
,
and
to
giue
their
aduice
:
yet
for
that
the
varietie
of
opinions
might
hinder
the
conclusion
,
it
hath
bin
held
most
reasonable
,
yea
necessary
,
to
vse
it
in
this
manner
:
The
rule
of
wise
men
which
cannot
faile
,
is
,
that
of
two
vniust
things
they
follow
that
which
is
most
iust
,
and
of
two
inconueniences
to
auoid
the
greater
:
Otherwise
there
would
neuer
bee
an
end
of
humane
actions
.
If
the
command
be
so
vniust
,
as
without
wronging
their
conscience
,
they
cannot
passe
it
;
some
Magistrates
to
auoid
the
disobedience
,
and
not
to
charge
their
consciences
in
verifying
it
,
haue
incerted
;
by
the
expresse
commaundement
of
the
Prince
,
many
times
re●terated
.
The
manner
of
verifying
the
Edicts
,
It
remaines
now
to
know
,
how
an
Officer
ought
to
carry
himselfe
in
executing
a
command
,
if
there
comes
vnto
him
a
reuocation
,
the
businesse
being
begun
.
Some
hold
opinion
,
CHAP.
32.
Of
the
duty
of
Magistrates
one
towards
another
.
THe
duty
of
Magistrates
,
and
the
manner
of
proceeding
which
they
ought
to
hold
one
towards
another
,
is
regulated
according
to
the
power
which
they
haue
,
whereof
in
most
Estates
they
make
three
degrees
.
The
highest
is
of
those
,
who
in
some
part
of
the
Estate
,
haue
power
to
determine
without
appeale
.
The
dutie
of
a
Superiour
or
principall
Magistrate
is
,
And
as
in
the
power
of
the
Prince
,
the
power
of
Magistrates
is
held
in
suspence
;
so
in
the
presence
of
superior
Magistrates
,
But
that
which
hath
bin
spoken
of
the
power
of
Superior
Magistrates
ouer
their
inferiors
,
must
be
vnderstood
in
their
territorie
,
their
seats
,
and
in
the
limits
of
their
Iurisdiction
,
out
of
which
they
are
but
priuate
men
,
without
power
or
command
.
Magistrates
which
are
equall
in
power
,
or
haue
no
dependance
one
of
another
,
And
in
regard
of
the
sentence
giuen
by
the
Officer
of
a
Forraine
Prince
,
But
a●t●ough
the
Magistrate
may
not
command
his
Equals
,
But
Colledges
hauing
no
superiority
one
ouer
another
,
they
cannot
haue
any
command
,
CHAP.
33.
Of
the
duty
of
Magistrates
to
priuate
Persons
.
THe
duty
of
Officers
or
Magistrates
,
As
for
iniuries
which
priuate
men
doe
vnto
Magistrates
,
it
is
certaine
that
the
Magistrate
being
wronged
hee
cannot
be
Iudge
in
his
owne
cause
;
As
for
obedience
,
it
seemes
requisite
,
Wherefore
to
collect
in
few
words
that
which
concernes
the
duty
of
Magistrates
,
CHAP.
34.
Of
the
Iustice
of
Commanding
.
AS
the
forme
of
commanding
is
diuers
,
so
is
the
Diuersity
of
power
,
which
according
vnto
Iustice
,
obserues
diuers
Rules
to
make
the
commandments
iust
.
For
in
certayne
things
according
to
an
Arithmeticall
proportion
,
it
makes
all
the
Subiects
equall
:
But
in
the
imposition
of
charges
which
are
burthensome
,
and
necessary
for
the
support
of
the
Estate
,
There
●i
be
n●●esse
inc●nuenience
,
if
they
suffered
the
will
of
the
P●i●ce
or
Magistrate
to
wander
vncertainly
,
In
the
distribution
of
Offices
and
dignities
,
an
equallity
cannot
be
obserued
,
Yet
in
this
Subiect
we
haue
a
regard
to
merite
,
which
is
the
bond
,
which
may
make
the
poore
and
Country-man
equall
,
to
the
rich
and
Noble
,
being
without
merite
.
And
therefore
they
must
accordi●g
to
●ue●y
mans
desarts
,
g●ue
the
purse
to
the
most
Loyall
:
Armes
to
the
most
Va●liant
:
Iustice
to
the
Honestest
:
Censure
to
the
most
Entire
:
Toyle
to
the
strongest
;
the
Gouernment
to
wisest
;
and
the
Prelateship
to
the
most
deuout
:
notwithstanding
preferring
in
the
equality
of
merite
,
such
as
are
best
qua●lified
to
them
that
are
lesse
.
We
may
say
asmuch
of
Rewards
and
Punishments
,
weighing
not
only
the
merite
of
the
Fact
,
CHAP.
35.
Of
the
Establishing
of
the
forces
of
an
Estate
.
THe
order
which
ought
to
bee
entertained
in
the
setling
of
the
forces
,
being
more
Military
then
pollitique
,
shall
bee
treated
here
succinctly
.
The
forces
whereof
wee
meane
to
speake
,
are
those
by
the
which
wee
may
repulse
the
attempts
of
our
enemies
;
the
which
if
the
Estate
bee
Maritiue
,
would
be
of
two
sorts
,
to
the
end
wee
may
resist
both
by
Sea
and
Land
.
The
prouision
of
armes
and
ships
,
But
Wisedome
preuents
these
inconueniences
,
the
which
wee
must
imploy
to
keepe
these
aduantages
,
and
to
make
vse
of
them
before
the
enemy
comes
to
seaze
of
them
:
And
if
hee
doth
seaze
of
them
,
wee
may
not
therefore
conclude
,
that
the
prouision
ought
not
to
haue
beene
made
;
but
that
it
is
his
fault
that
hath
made
it
,
not
to
bee
able
to
keepe
it
.
It
is
certaine
,
that
a
Sword
or
a
Knife
would
cut
him
that
knowes
not
how
to
handleit
,
but
wee
may
not
therefore
say
,
that
wee
must
neither
make
Sword
nor
Knife
.
So
in
all
sorts
of
parties
,
there
are
inconueniences
:
But
those
which
by
foresight
may
be
preuented
,
should
not
hinder
vs
from
doing
that
,
which
may
otherwise
serue
vs
.
Vnder
the
name
of
Armes
wee
doe
not
onely
apprehend
that
which
serues
a
Man
to
couer
him
,
No
sayth
he
,
but
I
arme
my selfe
that
I
may
not
feare
.
As
for
offensiue
Armes
,
they
must
be
light
,
to
the
end
they
may
not
tyre
or
weary
those
that
vse
them
,
Vitelosi
Vrsi●o
,
with
pikes
a
foote
and
a
halfe
longer
then
those
which
the
Souldiers
of
Pope
Alexander
the
sixt
carried
,
wonne
the
battaile
ag●inst
them
betwixt
Sarra
and
Bassan
.
Others
haue
better
allowed
of
short
Armes
,
being
of
better
vse
in
a
strait
or
a
throng
;
as
Cyrus
and
the
Lacedemonians
.
Besides
this
,
there
are
two
sorts
of
offensiue
armes
:
There
is
another
quality
,
which
some
haue
desi●ed
in
Armes
,
that
they
should
be
faire
,
gilt
,
and
enricht
,
so
as
they
may
be
pleasing
vnto
the
Eye
,
thinking
that
this
giues
courage
to
the
Souldiers
;
the
which
Xenopho●
and
Caesar
haue
allowed
.
Others
holding
that
this
was
of
no
vse
,
but
to
kindle
the
auarice
and
courage
of
the
enemy
,
haue
thought
it
better
to
haue
the
armes
without
any
ornament
and
bare
,
as
those
which
strike
more
terrour
.
To
resolue
the
most
expedient
in
this
quality
and
contrariety
,
we
must
know
those
whom
we
meane
to
arme
,
CHAP.
36.
Of
Fortresses
,
and
of
their
profit
for
the
preseruation
of
an
Estate
.
FOrtresses
doe
also
make
a
part
of
the
force
of
an
Estate
:
and
they
which
haue
beene
of
Opinion
,
that
they
should
not
build
any
,
haue
beene
confuted
both
by
reason
and
vse
:
so
as
there
haue
beene
few
found
,
vnlesse
they
were
some
petty
popular
Estate
,
that
will
follow
their
Councell
.
The
Grecians
and
Romans
who
had
lesse
neede
during
their
Empires
,
then
any
other
Estate
,
for
that
all
submitted
themselues
vnder
their
yoke
,
entertayned
Cittadels
at
Corinth
,
Tarentum
,
and
Rhegium
:
And
if
the
Capitoll
had
not
beene
strong
,
the
Empire
of
Rome
had
beene
smothered
in
the
Cradle
by
the
Gaules
.
The
Estates
in
which
are
no
strong
places
,
are
conquered
by
one
Battaile
.
England
hath
testified
it
;
and
the
Persian
,
relying
onely
in
the
great
number
of
his
Men
,
hath
lost
in
one
battaile
a
great
extent
of
his
Countrey
,
the
which
the
Turke
hath
since
preserued
by
Forts
.
For
although
that
Fortresses
alone
cannot
much
assist
an
Estate
,
yet
being
seconded
by
Armes
,
they
make
it
invincible
;
and
there
being
no
Armies
on
foote
,
they
giue
you
leasure
to
raise
them
,
and
after
a
Route
,
to
Rally
your
Men
together
to
●enew
the
Warre
.
Yet
this
is
not
to
say
,
that
the
estate
which
hath
most
sorts
is
the
strongest
:
For
it
is
impossible
to
guard
many
w●ll
;
and
some
being
ill
guarded
,
they
proue
more
preiudiciall
to
the
Estate
,
then
profitable
for
the
defence
.
It
must
therefore
haue
few
,
but
well
furnished
with
Men
,
Victuals
,
and
Munition
of
Wa●re
.
They
must
likewise
bee
in
a
necessary
situation
or
at
least
profitable
.
Besides
this
,
And
although
that
the
situation
of
a
place
be
strong
for
defence
;
and
such
in
some
part
as
they
hold
it
inaccessable
;
yet
they
may
not
forbeare
to
adde
what
they
can
to
make
it
stronger
:
For
wee
haue
seene
that
many
places
haue
beene
taken
,
by
those
parts
which
they
had
neglected
to
fortifie
,
for
that
they
held
them
inaccessable
.
So
Carthage
was
taken
by
Scipio
towards
the
Poole
.
Antiochu●
the
great
,
tooke
Sardis
,
by
that
part
which
was
the
strongest
,
where
he
found
there
was
not
any
Sentinel
,
s●ing
birds
to
build
their
nests
there
without
any
disturbance
.
CHAP.
37.
Of
the
Warre-like
Discipline
.
THe
third
part
of
the
force
of
an
Estate
,
consists
in
the
warlike
discipline
,
that
is
to
say
,
in
Souldiers
of
good
experience
and
well
disciplined
.
And
herein
wee
must
obserue
that
the
force
doth
not
alwayes
consist
in
the
number
,
but
in
the
resolution
of
the
Souldier
,
and
in
the
experience
or
conduct
of
the
Commander
.
In
all
the
battells
which
haue
bin
giuen
,
it
is
obserued
,
that
few
men
haue
fought
;
and
those
few
,
according
to
the
resistance
that
was
made
,
haue
won
or
lost
the
battell
;
and
as
the
kinds
of
armes
make
the
Souldier
stronger
or
more
feeble
,
so
they
haue
demanded
what
force
is
most
beneficiall
;
eyther
that
on
Horsebacke
or
on
Foote
.
Polybius
sayth
,
Those
Nations
which
haue
made
vse
of
Horsemen
only
,
haue
sometimes
gotten
great
Victories
;
as
the
Partbyans
haue
done
:
But
when
they
were
to
besiege
or
defend
a
place
,
they
aduanced
little
.
Also
those
people
which
put
all
their
forces
in
horsmen
,
do●
it
,
for
that
they
cannot
keepe
their
rancks
and
order
which
is
ne●essary
for
Footmen
.
And
to
recompence
this
defect
,
they
make
vse
of
the
violence
of
Horse
in
a
Combate
,
and
of
their
swiftnesse
,
and
readinesse
in
Enterprizes
of
War
,
which
are
executed
more
speedily
with
Horse
then
Foot
,
who
march
heauily
.
But
the
better
is
,
I
haue
said
formerly
that
the
force
did
not
consist
in
the
number
,
but
in
the
bounty
and
courage
of
the
souldiers
;
yet
for
that
they
are
not
all
borne
such
,
wee
must
chooseas
neare
as
we
can
,
those
which
promise
so
much
;
and
by
Discipline
make
them
such
,
and
indeauour
to
instruct
and
trayne
vp
others
.
Besides
this
,
the
stranger
fights
more
for
gaine
and
his
owne
priuate
interest
,
then
for
any
good
will
hee
beares
him
.
As
gaine
drawes
him
,
the
same
gaine
may
diuert
him
,
and
draw
him
to
the
Enemy
.
The
Celtiberians
subborned
first
by
the
Romans
,
abandoned
the
Carthaginians
;
and
afterwards
corrupted
by
the
Carthaginians
,
left
the
Romans
.
Imploying
none
but
Strangers
,
the
Enemy
not
able
to
hinder
the
leuie
,
may
slacke
and
stay
it
in
the
greatest
necessity
of
the
Prince
:
The
which
hath
fallen
out
too
often
in
Suisser-land
,
to
the
preiudice
of
France
.
And
the
Enemy
inuading
the
Nation
,
from
whence
you
draw
your
Souldiers
,
many
times
in
your
greatest
necessity
,
these
Strangers
are
forced
to
abandon
you
,
to
goe
and
serue
their
Country
;
as
the
Grisons
did
,
who
were
in
the
seruice
of
King
Francis
,
when
as
Iean
Iaques
do
Medices
inuaded
their
Country
.
Finally
,
the
treason
the
Mutiny
,
ruine
,
and
as
I
haue
sayd
,
the
vsurpation
of
an
Estate
is
more
to
be
feared
by
the
succours
of
Strangers
,
then
we
can
expect
any
aduantage
.
Adde
to
all
these
considerations
,
that
they
are
in
fight
,
their
Companies
ill
filled
,
fearefull
,
rude
,
and
oppressors
of
the
Subiects
;
to
the
great
charge
of
the
Prince
,
consuming
in
the
Leuie
,
and
before
they
can
ioyne
with
vs
,
much
time
and
much
money
.
But
I
doe
not
hereby
inferre
that
we
should
altogether
reiect
Strangers
:
For
they
may
serue
with
our
owne
Souldiers
;
whom
by
this
means
we
shall
spare
,
and
vppon
whom
we
may
settle
our
chiefe
force
;
and
not
as
some
Estates
doe
,
cause
them
to
vndergoe
all
the
toyle
,
expose
them
to
assaults
,
and
to
all
dangerous
exploits
,
and
dispence
with
the
Strangers
.
CHAP.
38.
Of
the
number
of
Souldiers
in
their
ordinary
trained
Bands
.
IT
rests
to
know
what
number
of
Souldiersought
to
be
entertained
in
an
Estate
.
This
cannot
be
truely
regulated
.
For
we
must
haue
regard
to
that
which
the
Estate
may
beare
,
and
to
his
forces
that
may
assaile
vs
.
Onely
I
will
say
,
Returning
then
to
the
first
,
they
must
not
be
in
great
numbers
;
but
the
number
must
be
such
,
as
they
may
resist
,
as
well
to
auoyde
the
charge
of
their
entertaynment
,
This
were
,
some
one
would
say
,
to
make
too
many
Souldiers
in
an
Estate
,
which
might
fau●●ur
a
●euolt
.
But
being
disarmed
and
reduced
into
small
t●oupes
,
CHAP.
39.
Of
the
forme
how
to
make
leuies
es
Souldiers
:
Of
the
Place
,
Age
,
Stature
,
&
Vocation
.
The
same
inconu●nie●ce
of
a
mutiny
happens
,
when
to
a
troupe
consisting
of
o●d
Souldiers
,
Wherefore
it
seemes
more
safe
,
that
euery
Captaine
make
choyce
of
those
whom
he
is
to
command
.
And
,
although
wee
may
finde
good
Souldiers
euery
where
;
yet
it
seemes
that
not
onely
the
ordinary
,
As
for
the
Age
,
they
must
choose
them
young
,
CHAP.
40.
Of
the
forces
at
Sea
.
THe
like
shall
be
also
followed
in
the
forces
at
Sea
;
In
the
which
besides
the
order
they
must
obserue
for
the
building
of
ships
,
they
must
also
haue
a
care
to
prouide
a
good
number
of
Pilots
and
Marriners
;
and
for
the
Gallies
,
to
furnish
and
exercise
their
Rowers
,
whether
they
consist
of
Galley-slaues
or
voluntaries
.
For
the
which
they
must
prouide
in
good
time
to
accustome
the
Slaues
to
doe
their
duties
,
and
to
make
the
Souldier
get
firme
footing
at
Sea
.
These
forces
at
Sea
are
so
necessary
in
an
Estate
that
is
Maritine
,
as
without
them
the
Prince
cannot
be
termed
strong
nor
powerfull
.
For
besides
that
in
a
short
time
they
may
seaze
vpon
his
Ports
,
before
he
shall
haue
any
aduice
of
the
Enterprize
;
and
these
being
seazed
,
this
Port
being
hard
to
stop
vp
the
Enemy
will
keepe
it
long
:
He
must
make
an
accompt
not
to
recouer
any
thing
by
the
Commerce
at
Sea
,
but
from
the
hands
of
his
Neighbours
,
who
will
prescribe
him
a
Law
,
and
intreate
his
Merchants
ill
.
Let
vs
now
come
to
that
which
is
necessary
for
the
setling
of
the
Re●enewes
of
the
Estate
.
CHAP.
41.
Of
the
Riches
of
an
Estate
.
EVery
one
agrees
that
to
make
an
Estate
powerfull
,
it
must
be
rich
;
The
Lacedemonians
in
their
pouerty
,
The
Venetians
and
Genois
,
although
poore
in
the
beginning
,
haue
sometimes
held
a
part
of
Greece
;
The
Romans
themselues
in
their
pouerty
,
had
no
other
aduantage
;
Wherefore
besides
the
aboundance
of
all
things
fit
for
the
life
and
seruice
of
Man
;
CHAP.
42.
Of
the
causes
of
the
abundance
of
the
wealth
of
an
Estate
:
That
is
to
say
Tillag●
:
Manufactures
and
Commerce
with
Strangers
.
ABoundance
in
an
Estate
proceeds
from
three
necessary
things
:
As
this
point
is
the
fountaine
of
all
the
riches
of
the
world
,
Some
one
it
may
be
of
little
Iudgement
will
say
,
that
this
care
is
vnworthy
of
a
Prince
and
of
the
publique
.
But
to
this
wee
may
answere
,
that
all
Princes
haue
not
so
held
it
,
Some
one
,
to
the
end
they
may
banish
idlenesse
,
which
is
at
this
present
in
Monasteries
,
(
many
persons
vnfit
for
contemplation
and
study
being
therein
,
and
many
against
their
will
)
haue
propounded
to
restore
the
ancient
Monastique
discipline
,
which
was
to
imploy
in
certaine
workes
and
manuall
Arts
,
at
houers
of
leasure
:
those
that
were
not
fit
for
study
and
preaching
.
The
which
did
also
multiply
manufactures
.
Others
haue
likewise
beene
of
opinion
,
to
bind
the
Masters
,
who
serue
themselues
with
young
Boyes
to
cause
them
to
passe
a
certaine
Age
in
learning
of
a
Trade
:
And
so
by
these
meanes
an
Estate
in
lesse
then
twenty
yeares
,
would
bee
furnished
with
more
workemen
then
were
needfull
.
The
Comme●ce
and
Trafique
which
is
made
with
the
stranger
,
The
Marchandize
which
we
ought
to
ca●ry
to
strangers
,
The
transport
of
Gold
and
Siluer
is
likewise
forbidden
in
all
Estates
;
And
in
this
last
case
many
haue
held
,
that
the
safety
which
might
be
added
,
was
,
to
allow
of
the
transport
of
Gold
and
Siluer
,
in
giuing
caution
to
bring
backe
within
a
certaine
time
the
quantity
in
Marchandizes
,
for
the
which
the
transport
hath
beene
allowed
,
the
publique
hauing
no
interest
therein
;
presupposing
the
necessity
of
this
Marchandize
,
and
that
it
cannot
bee
recouered
by
exchange
from
another
.
Behold
the
things
which
wee
ought
not
to
carry
to
strangers
,
by
the
which
it
is
easie
to
iudge
of
those
,
which
we
ought
to
desire
they
should
bring
vnto
vs
.
For
if
we
retaine
those
things
for
the
liberty
which
may
come
vnto
vs
,
by
the
same
reason
,
if
wee
want
them
,
wee
must
seeke
the
meanes
to
draw
them
from
our
Neighbours
.
And
in
regard
of
Gold
and
Siluer
,
CHAP.
41.
Of
the
facillitie
of
Commerce
.
AS
for
the
facillitie
and
ease
of
Commerce
,
it
depends
of
many
things
,
for
the
which
it
is
needfull
to
prouide
:
And
first
for
the
commoditie
of
the
carriage
of
Merchandizes
by
Water
▪
Land
,
Cart
,
or
otherwise
;
To
Establish
such
Lawes
for
affaires
,
For
in
regard
of
the
Coine
,
if
they
will
not
diuide
the
marke
of
Siluer
into
eight
thousand
peeces
,
as
they
haue
sometimes
done
in
Lorraine
,
for
the
Angeuines
,
which
Rene
Duke
of
Aniou
and
Lorraine
caused
to
bee
coined
,
whereof
the
two
hundred
were
worth
but
sixe
pence
,
and
forty
a
souse
of
base
French
Money
;
they
may
reduce
them
to
a
third
part
thereof
,
to
make
the
peeces
more
solide
;
which
may
bee
stampt
with
a
bodkin
;
making
no
vse
of
the
Copper
,
whose
price
is
vnequall
and
variable
in
all
Countries
,
and
moreouer
is
subiect
to
rust
.
Contratiwise
the
price
of
gold
&
siluer
,
Grecians
,
Latins
,
Hebrewes
,
Persians
and
Egyptians
,
in
old
time
did
:
It
would
be
a
hard
thing
to
be
deceiued
.
There
is
another
thing
,
the
which
doth
greatly
decay
trading
,
In
truth
wee
must
confesse
,
that
there
are
certaine
affaires
which
should
be
left
to
the
poore
and
common
people
,
Venetians
,
Portugalls
,
Spaniards
,
and
Hollanders
haue
made
it
knowne
vnto
vs
.
These
last
being
lesse
rich
then
the
others
,
East
Indies
.
but
not
lesse
couragious
and
hardie
,
haue
setled
an
order
for
the
continuance
of
this
commerce
to
the
East
Indies
,
which
deserues
to
be
knowne
,
which
is
,
that
after
they
haue
found
by
many
voyages
,
which
some
priuate
Men
haue
made
,
that
they
ruined
one
another
by
this
concurrence
;
they
aduised
in
the
yeere
1602.
to
craue
leaue
of
the
generall
Estates
,
to
traffique
into
those
parts
before
all
others
,
during
the
space
of
one
and
twenty
yeeres
.
The
which
was
granted
them
,
in
regard
of
fiue
and
twenty
thousand
Florins
,
which
they
promised
to
pay
vnto
the
Estate
during
the
first
tenne
yeeres
.
Thus
reduced
all
into
one
Company
,
Amsterdam
had
a
Moietie
,
Middleburg
in
Zeland
a
fourth
part
;
Delphe
,
Rotterdam
,
Horne
,
and
Enehusen
had
either
of
them
a
sixth
parth
:
And
the
whole
stocke
of
this
vnion
amounted
to
sixe
Million
of
Liuers
,
or
six
hundred
thousand
pounds
sterling
.
For
the
direction
of
this
trade
,
and
the
interest
of
the
Associats
,
they
haue
established
in
either
of
these
Townes
a
certaine
number
of
Administratours
:
At
Amsterdam
twenty
,
at
Miadleburg
twelue
,
and
in
either
of
the
rest
s●auen
.
And
if
any
one
dies
,
the
Chamber
of
the
place
names
three
,
of
which
either
the
Estates
generall
,
or
the
Magistrate
of
the
Towne
chooseth
one
.
These
Chambers
,
choose
seuenteene
among
the
administratours
:
that
is
to
say
,
Amsterdam
eight
,
Midleburg
foure
,
Delphe
,
and
Rotterdam
two
,
Horne
and
Enchusen
two
;
and
the
seuenteenth
is
chosen
alternatiuely
,
sometimes
at
Middleburg
,
and
sometimes
at
North
Holland
:
The
which
are
called
together
to
resolue
ioyntly
,
of
how
many
Ships
,
and
with
what
Equipage
and
furniture
,
they
shall
make
the
fleete
which
they
meane
to
send
,
and
to
what
Fort
or
Coast
they
should
goe
.
This
assembly
is
held
six
yeeres
together
at
Amsterdam
,
and
afterwards
two
yeeres
at
Middleburg
,
and
then
againe
at
Amsterdam
.
By
the
conditions
of
the
accord
,
the
Ships
must
returne
to
the
same
Port
from
which
they
parted
;
and
the
spices
which
are
left
at
Middleburg
,
and
other
Chambers
,
is
distributed
amongst
them
by
the
waight
of
Amsterdam
;
and
the
Chamber
which
hath
sold
her
spices
,
may
buy
from
other
Chambers
.
By
this
order
they
haue
hither
to
continued
this
Commerce
with
reputation
,
not
as
simple
Merchants
onely
;
Sian
,
Quadaen
,
Patam
,
Iohor
,
the
Heire
of
Malaca
,
Bornean
,
Achim
,
Sinnatra
,
Baretan
,
Iocotra
,
and
other
Kings
of
Iatta
.
They
haue
made
themselues
absolute
Maisters
of
the
Iland
of
Amboyne
,
where
they
haue
setled
a
president
which
gouerns
in
their
name
.
At
Banda
they
haue
a
Fort
for
a
retreate
,
where
they
must
deliuer
them
the
Spices
at
a
certayne
price
.
In
Ternate
they
haue
another
,
a
Mile
distant
from
that
of
the
Portugals
.
At
Magnien●
they
haue
three
:
At
Motire
one
:
At
Gilolo
they
haue
taken
that
which
the
Portugels
had
built
.
From
this
example
we
will
conclude
,
Thus
diuiding
the
Trade
according
to
the
Coast
and
places
where
it
is
made
,
they
may
make
diuers
Companies
;
that
is
to
say
,
one
for
the
Trade
of
Ginnee
;
Another
for
the
Leuant
by
the
Mediterranean
Sea
;
One
for
the
East
Indies
;
Another
for
the
West
Indies
beyond
the
line
;
Another
for
that
on
this
side
the
line
;
And
one
for
England
,
Noruage
,
Sweden
,
and
other
Northerne
Countries
:
forbidding
them
to
attempt
one
vpo●
another
,
and
to
all
other
priuate
Subiects
which
shall
not
be
of
the
company
,
to
negotiate
in
those
places
vpon
great
pen●lties
.
CHAP.
44.
Of
Parsimony
or
sparing
,
As
for
the
common
and
priuate
buildings
,
they
may
without
this
great
expence
prouide
in
building
for
the
ornament
of
the
publique
,
From
this
policy
there
redounds
vnto
them
another
aduantage
,
which
is
,
that
the
workemen
by
the
establishing
of
this
order
,
being
aduertised
of
the
forme
how
they
are
to
make
the
Doores
and
other
parts
which
must
answere
vpon
the
Streete
;
they
haue
them
ready
long
before
:
So
as
priuate
men
that
will
build
,
they
haue
presently
raised
their
houses
,
which
are
for
the
most
part
of
bricke
,
finding
that
little
stone
that
shall
be
necessary
ready
cut
.
It
is
therefore
easie
to
cut
off
this
excesse
,
and
to
prouide
for
the
ornament
of
Town●s
,
in
restrayning
euery
man
in
his
buildings
according
to
his
meanes
,
that
the
front
may
be
answerable
to
the
nearest
houses
,
if
there
be
obserued
in
them
any
proportion
or
pleasing
prospectiue
:
Making
the
publique
places
spacious
,
the
Streets
large
,
straight
,
and
long
;
yet
in
such
sort
as
neither
the
great
heate
,
nor
cold
may
annoy
passengers
:
for
therein
chiefly
consists
the
beauty
of
a
Towne
.
The
excesse
of
moueables
,
Apparrell
,
and
other
Ornaments
of
the
person
,
must
in
like
manner
be
cut
off
;
That
excesse
which
consists
in
a
great
traine
of
attendants
,
is
excused
vpon
two
considerations
:
But
as
the
ordinance
is
more
easie
to
execute
in
a
Towne
,
then
in
a
Princes
Court
,
whore
,
for
that
the
discommodities
are
greater
,
they
haue
need
to
be
serued
by
a
greater
number
,
and
must
likewise
satisfie
the
vanitie
of
the
Court
:
The
Italians
and
Spaniards
,
who
are
in
this
regard
good
husbands
,
seeing
themselues
forced
to
this
traine
for
a
time
,
make
vse
of
Men
whom
they
retaine
with
them
,
for
daily
wages
;
and
knowing
how
much
they
are
to
giue
them
by
the
day
,
they
are
not
tied
to
seede
them
,
nor
to
keepe
open
house
for
them
,
as
they
doe
in
France
and
Germany
:
And
going
from
Court
,
this
troope
is
dismist
,
there
remaining
none
but
the
ordinary
traine
;
and
thus
they
satisfie
vanitie
and
good
husbandrie
altogether
.
I
confesse
that
this
point
would
bee
hard
to
reforme
in
France
,
euery
Man
des●●ing
to
eate
his
meanes
in
good
Companie
.
Yet
there
might
be
some
course
taken
that
might
diminish
their
disorder
.
The
excesse
of
Banquets
and
Feasts
,
is
that
which
is
most
esteemed
,
In
regard
of
Playes
,
those
of
hazard
are
forbidden
in
all
Estates
:
But
the
defences
are
so
ill
obserued
,
These
two
foundations
being
laid
,
of
the
abundance
of
all
things
necessary
,
and
of
the
parcimony
of
Subiects
,
wee
must
now
speake
of
the
setling
of
the
Finances
,
or
ordinary
Reuenewes
,
the
which
haue
beene
diuers
according
to
the
diuersitie
of
Estates
.
CHAP.
45.
Of
the
Establishment
of
the
Finances
,
or
ordinary
Reuenewes
of
an
Estate
.
MAny
haue
Established
the
principall
reuenew
of
an
Estate
,
or
publique
demesus
,
which
is
the
most
honest
,
This
Establishment
is
hard
to
make●
vnlesse
it
be
by
the
meanes
of
a
full
and
absolute
conquest
,
by
the
which
it
is
lawfull
for
the
Victor
to
prescribe
what
Law
hee
pleaseth
to
the
vanquished
;
but
being
once
made
,
hee
must
bee
maintained
without
any
alienation
;
But
likewise
an
ingagement
and
no
alienation
,
The
second
meanes
,
which
they
make
vse
of
to
raise
a
stocke
of
Treasure
,
are
the
entries
,
Some
likewise
haue
esteemed
Tributes
,
Gifts
,
The
fourth
meanes
is
in
trafique
which
they
may
make
in
the
name
of
the
publique
or
Prince
.
In
trueth
this
mischeife
is
lesse
then
it
was
,
seeing
the
publique
profits
something
thereby
;
but
yet
not
withstanding
it
is
euill
,
and
most
preiuditiall
to
the
Estate
:
For
the
which
there
is
more
remedy
,
but
to
quicken
the
vigilancie
of
the
Prince
,
or
of
those
which
haue
charge
of
the
publique
,
to
make
choyce
of
those
which
are
to
bee
aduanced
:
being
more
fit
(
for
the
Officers
)
to
leaue
vnto
them
the
choyce
and
the
Election
,
to
the
end
that
gratifying
him
whom
they
hold
most
fit
to
serue
,
hee
should
be
more
bound
vnto
them
,
and
shew
himselfe
more
ob●dient
then
he
would
be
,
if
he
had
obtained
it
by
his
owne
merrit
,
or
for
money
.
But
for
that
it
is
impossible
that
the
choyce
could
bee
made
in
the
confusion
of
so
many
Competitors
,
which
might
pretend
to
one
Office
:
the
Princes
seeming
to
haue
some
excuse
therein
,
the
meanes
aboue
propounded
might
serue
for
a
Remedy
,
Establishing
many
degrees
in
the
Offices
of
euery
profession
,
aswell
in
Armes
,
Iustice
,
the
Treasure
;
as
Religion
;
and
prescribing
a
certaiue
time
,
that
euery
one
ought
to
remaine
in
euery
degree
,
before
hee
can
pretend
to
mount
higher
;
For
that
it
would
be
more
easie
for
the
Prince
,
to
choose
out
of
the
number
of
those
which
had
serued
their
time
,
him
whom
he
pleaseth
,
to
aduance
him
to
the
next
degree
,
there
being
some
place
voyd
;
then
it
is
after
the
manner
they
now
liue
.
And
for
all
this
they
should
cut
off
nothing
of
the
Princes
fauour
.
The
Prince
should
bee
better
serued
,
not
only
with
more
affection
and
fidelity
;
but
also
with
more
diligence
and
sufficiency
.
For
the
Officers
comming
to
the
highest
and
supreame
degrees
,
they
would
be
much
more
capable
,
as
hath
beene
sayd
;
And
euery
Man
desireing
to
make
himselfe
knowne
to
his
Prince
,
to
bee
preferred
before
his
Companion
,
would
serue
with
enuy
,
and
indeauour
to
make
himselfe
to
bee
obserued
by
some
seruice
.
Whereas
the
Officer
in
this
venallity
,
hauing
no
other
hope
to
aduance
himselfe
then
by
his
purse
,
seekes
what
he
can
to
profit
,
be
it
by
right
or
wrong
,
to
haue
meanes
to
purchase
some
greater
Office
,
wherein
hee
may
benefit
himselfe
better
.
But
wee
will
leaue
this
reformation
to
another
time
,
when
they
shall
be
more
capable
.
CHAP.
46.
Of
Subsedies
,
of
Extraordinary
Leuies
,
Imports
,
and
Loane●
.
THe
fist
meanes
to
make
a
stocke
for
the
Treasure
,
is
taken
wholy
from
the
subiects
;
whom
they
haue
shorne
after
diuers
manners
in
many
Estates
,
and
in
some
they
haue
flead
them
.
This
meanes
cannot
bee
excused
but
vpon
necessity
:
But
if
it
bee
necessary
it
is
likewise
iust
;
the
safetie
of
the
people
and
the
preseruation
of
the
Estate
being
the
Supreame
Law
.
To
dispute
which
is
the
most
iust
of
all
these
formes
of
Leuies
,
were
vnprofitable
.
For
this
Establishment
hath
not
beene
made
according
to
the
rules
of
Iudgement
;
but
according
to
the
facility
and
disposition
which
they
haue
found
in
people
,
to
receiue
one
forme
more
th●n
another
.
Yet
if
any
ought
to
enioy
an
exemption
,
it
seemes
that
Gentlemen
,
In
regard
of
Clergie
men
,
the
respect
and
reuerence
of
Religion
hath
held
them
long
exempt
:
But
in
the
end
in
those
places
especially
,
whereas
the
Subsedies
are
personall
,
Iustice
hath
wrested
out
of
their
hands
,
some
succours
for
the
publique
,
whereof
they
make
a
great
part
;
which
succours
,
although
they
be
not
called
Subsedy
,
but
a
chautatiue
graunt
;
Yet
vnder●
a
milder
name
it
hath
the
same
effect
.
As
for
others
,
some
haue
beene
exempted
,
partly
to
preserue
the
respect
due
vnto
the
Offices
which
they
hold
of
the
Prince
;
and
partly
to
authorize
and
maintaine
the
Leuies
,
and
to
punish
the
disobediences
.
Others
haue
beene
exempt
,
for
the
feare
of
some
sedition
and
Rebellion
,
and
for
the
good
of
peace
onely
:
So
as
they
vse
the
like
pollicy
with
them
,
as
they
doe
with
the
Clergie
;
and
draw
Succours
from
them
vnder
the
Names
of
Loanes
and
borrowing
.
As
for
the
place
where
the
Subsedy
is
to
bee
leuied
,
eyther
at
the
Mans
dwelling
house
,
These
difficulties
are
found
in
the
laying
of
the
Subsedy
,
as
well
in
regard
of
the
exemptions
pretended
by
many
conditions
of
men
,
Yet
some
which
disalow
of
this
diuersity
of
poling
and
tributes
in
an
Estate
,
holding
a
Subsedy
the
most
iust
,
if
it
were
well
ordered
,
To
say
that
this
expedient
is
more
proper
for
a
Common-weale
,
Seruius
Tulliu●
;
and
continued
vnder
all
the
Emperours
which
sought
to
gouerne
iustly
.
To
say
likewise
,
But
in
recompence
of
these
imaginary
inconueniences
,
This
facility
of
extraordinary
leuies
is
the
fourth
point
;
which
may
cause
an
Estate
to
be
held
rich
.
T●is
numbring
of
their
goods
being
vnable
to
be
brought
in
,
to
equall
euery
man
in
such
sort
of
contributions
,
they
must
haue
a
recourse
to
other
meanes
,
the
most
iust
and
plausible
that
can
be
deuised
,
according
to
the
quality
of
Estates
,
and
the
condition
of
times
,
the
which
being
vnable
to
set
downe
now
in
particular
,
it
shall
suffice
to
say
gene●all
,
that
the
imposition
which
extends
it selfe
vniuersally
o●e●
all
the
Subiects
,
of
what
condition
soeuer
they
be
,
is
the
most
gentle
,
the
most
profitable
,
and
the
most
iust
:
For
that
euery
man
paying
,
euery
man
payes
the
lesse
,
then
if
it
were
leuied
of
a
lesse
number
;
and
yet
it
is
farre
greater
;
wherein
it
is
more
profitable
to
the
Estate
:
And
it
is
more
iust
,
for
that
euery
man
hauing
an
interest
in
the
preseruation
of
the
Estate
,
euery
one
is
likewise
bound
to
contribute
.
But
the
principall
part
of
Iustice
would
be●
if
it
be
proportioned
and
layd
equally
among
them
that
contribute
,
according
to
the
proportion
of
euery
mans
estate
;
If
the
leuy
be
made
without
rigorous
executions
,
especially
against
the
person
.
The
contrary
whereof
doth
vsually
happen
vpon
leuie
of
the
Subsedies
,
the
which
being
imposed
vpon
view
of
the
Countrey
,
as
they
say
,
and
without
any
certaine
ground
,
the
goods
of
euery
man
being
vnknowne
to
direct
them
,
and
leuying
it
vpon
the
poorest
,
they
cause
them
many
times
to
dye
in
Prison
,
which
is
a
pouerty
resenting
Barbarisme
:
Or
to
get
some
delay
of
payment
,
the
poore
man
must
satisfie
the
Auarice
of
Receiuers
,
and
Sergeants
,
which
ruine
him
by
such
concussions
,
the
which
many
times
exceede
the
principall
of
the
Subsedy
.
But
if
some
considerations
be
iust
,
to
exempt
certayne
conditions
of
persons
,
In
Scotland
Malcolana
hauing
sold
all
the
Kings
Demesus
,
the
Estates
of
the
Countrey
agreed
,
that
the
Fees
changing
hand
,
should
pay
vnto
the
King
a
certaine
right
of
redemption
.
Impositions
likewise
and
customes
may
bee
iustly
CHAP.
47.
Of
the
mannaging
and
good
husbandry
of
the
Treasure
:
That
is
to
say
,
of
the
ordring
of
the
expences
,
and
the
cutting
it
off
.
THe
ground
of
the
Finances
being
found
,
we
must
order
the
mannaging
,
which
consists
in
two
principall
points
.
The
one
concernes
the
husbanding
of
it
,
the
other
the
quality
of
the
persons
which
are
to
be
admitted
to
this
mannaging
.
The
husbanding
hath
two
parts
,
that
is
to
say
,
the
order
and
gouerning
of
the
expences
,
or
if
it
exceeds
the
receipt
,
the
cutting
off
part
of
the
charges
.
Touching
the
order
of
the
expence
,
if
in
all
things
that
which
concernes
God
,
is
to
be
preferred
,
The
second
Chapter
of
the
expence
must
be
the
freeing
of
the
charges
of
the
Estate
,
The
Prince
may
likewise
recompence
his
seruants
,
to
the
discharge
of
his
Treasure
,
in
procuring
eyther
for
them
or
theirs
,
marriages
and
alliances
of
aduantage
;
Not
thereby
to
force
his
Subiects
,
for
that
were
tiranny
:
But
he
that
sees
himselfe
debarred
of
the
Princes
fauour
,
is
glad
sometimes
to
approach
by
the
meanes
of
the
alliance
of
one
,
that
is
in
grace
with
his
Master
,
though
otherwise
inferiour
in
meanes
,
and
family
;
Especially
when
the
inequallity
is
not
such
,
as
hee
may
receiue
some
dishonor
by
the
alliance
.
Knowing
then
how
to
husband
these
kind
of
recompences
,
the
greatest
part
of
great
seruices
will
be
rewarded
;
and
recompences
of
small
seruices
will
be
of
so
little
moment
,
as
they
will
not
greatly
charge
the
Treasure
.
After
recompences
follow
gifts
,
the
which
must
not
be
done
at
pleasure
:
[
*
](A09487-e15810-b)
*
Election
of
publike
houses
and
Seminaries
for
instruction
of
youth
,
aswell
in
the
liberall
Arts
as
Mecha●●ck
.
The
expence
which
followes
,
is
that
which
hath
beene
propounded
by
some
,
for
the
breeding
vp
and
instructing
of
youth
,
to
that
whereunto
they
shall
be
found
fit
,
(
especially
the
poore
)
as
we
haue
formerly
sayd
,
by
the
Erecting
of
publique
houses
,
for
manuall
Arts
,
and
all
sorts
of
manufactures
:
Whereunto
may
bee
added
the
building
of
Seminaries
for
piety
,
and
the
study
of
Diuinity
,
After
all
these
expences
,
come
those
which
may
serue
eyther
for
the
commodity
,
Behold
the
principall
husbandry
which
consists
in
the
order
of
the
expence
.
CHAP.
48.
Of
those
which
ought
to
be
imployed
in
the
gouernment
of
the
Treasure
.
AS
for
the
quallity
of
those
to
whom
the
mannaging
of
the
Treasure
ought
to
be
committed
,
There
is
besides
this
an
ordinary
fault
which
is
committed
in
this
subiect
in
many
Estates
,
which
is
,
that
they
make
a
trade
of
it
apart
,
and
profession
of
the
managing
of
the
Princes
purse
.
So
as
he
that
enters
into
it
,
instructs
himselfe
as
to
an
Art
to
do
his
owne
businesse
;
the
which
he
cannot
doe
but
with
the
preiudice
of
the
publique
:
Thus
the
elder
they
grow
,
the
more
learned
they
are
,
that
is
to
say
preiudiciall
to
the
Estate
.
I
doe
much
commend
that
ancient
custome
of
the
Romans
,
To
say
that
a
long
experience
is
necessary
in
these
places
,
to
mannage
them
well
,
Some
to
make
accomptants
more
diligent
to
make
their
receipts
,
and
to
hinder
them
that
they
may
not
maliciously
(
as
it
often
happens
)
make
reprizes
,
As
for
those
which
ought
to
heare
and
examine
the
accompts
,
besides
the
choyce
that
they
are
to
make
,
of
the
honestest
men
for
this
●ffect
;
it
is
necessary
to
bind
them
,
to
iudges
accordi●g
to
certain●
formes
and
orders
,
which
haue
beene
held
fit
to
hinder
the
abus●s
which
accomptants
,
or
themselues
might
commit
:
And
especially
to
draw
particular
Notes
of
the
distribution
of
the
Treasure
,
which
they
shall
enjoyne
the
accomptant
to
verifie
,
vpon
those
of
the
receipt
and
expence
,
without
any
meanes
of
dispencing
,
for
any
occasion
whatsoeuer
;
but
afterwards
he
may
addresse
himselfe
vnto
the
Prince
,
if
there
bee
any
reason
to
●ase
him
.
But
as
the
Prince
is
not
alwayes
at
leasure
,
CHAP.
49.
Of
the
Exchequer
or
sparing
of
Treasure
.
Yet
custome
is
contrary
,
as
also
reason
,
if
we
had
the
consideration
of
heaping
vp
of
Treasure
:
For
that
to
gather
toget●er
money
when
as
necessity
doth
presse
,
that
were
too
late
:
For
that
the
bruit
of
Armes
,
causing
traffique
to
●●ase
,
Tillage
,
and
the
gathering
in
of
fruits
,
the
customes
and
imposts
by
co●s●quence
would
decay
;
and
the
Sub●ect●
(
imp●uerished
by
the
lodging
of
souldiers
,
●●d
the
holding
of
the
Fields
)
will
be
vnable
to
p●y
.
But
there
must
be
two
considerations
added
for
the
gathering
in
of
Treasure
.
But
in
this
case
there
is
another
Remedy
,
of
which
we
haue
formerly
made
mention
▪
which
is
,
that
af●er
nec●ssary
charges
are
payed
,
But
men
haue
beene
much
troubled
for
the
guard
of
Treasures
of
Gold
and
Siluer
.
Wherefore
as
it
is
most
fitting
,
that
few
men
should
know
what
is
layd
vp
in
the
Treasure
,
least
that
being
too
much
,
it
should
prouoke
some
through
Enuy
to
se●ke
to
get
it
;
or
being
too
lit●le
,
it
should
make
vs
to
bee
contemned
of
our
Enemies
:
So
many
haue
held
it
fit
▪
to
ordaine
not
to
touch
the
Treasure
,
but
in
the
great
necessity
of
the
Prince
and
State
,
and
by
the
Councell
of
the
Magistrates
,
of
greatest
autority
.
CHAP.
50.
Of
treaties
in
generall
,
be
it
for
the
enter-view
and
parley
of
Princes
,
or
by
their
Deputies
and
Emb●ssadours
.
EStates
are
like
vnto
buildings
raised
high
,
This
Care
consists
in
three
principall
points
.
The
first
is
in
the
ouerture
,
which
is
made
to
treate
,
it
many
times
happening
,
Creal
Carragio
,
to
condole
in
their
Masters
names
for
the
death
of
Marquesse
of
Montferrat
,
made
an
ouerture
for
the
treaty
of
peace
,
betwixt
Charles
the
eight
and
Lewis
Sforse
.
King
Ferdinand
of
Aragon
hath
imployed
Monkes
to
that
effect
,
Religion
giuing
a
free
accesse
to
those
of
this
condition
,
and
liberty
to
speake
and
propound
what
they
will
.
The
Ouerture
to
enter
into
treaty
being
made
,
the
Princes
resolue
to
parley
themselues
,
to
the
end
the
treaty
may
be
more
secret
;
or
they
depute
Embassadours
to
that
effect
.
Many
haue
not
allowed
of
this
Enter-view
of
Princes
,
although
they
were
Friends
:
Philip
de
Comiues
,
obserues
many
examples
of
the
meeting
of
Princes
,
who
being
fo●merly
good
Friends
,
haue
become
●nemies
after
this
Enter-view
.
Yet
I
hold
that
in
such
affaires
we
cannot
prescribe
a
certaine
and
g●nerall
Rule
;
Histories
teaching
vs
,
that
other
Princes
haue
parled
;
and
yet
no
hatred
hath
ensued
:
So
this
depends
rather
of
the
Estate
of
affaires
,
and
of
the
conformity
and
diuersity
of
humours
,
and
manner
of
li●i●g
,
of
the
Princes
and
their
people
,
then
of
the
E●t●r-view
.
That
of
Lewis
the
twelfth
of
France
,
and
of
Ferdinand
of
Aragon
at
Sauonne
,
past
fairely
:
As
also
that
of
the
Emperour
Charles
the
fift
,
with
Pope
Clement
the
seuenth
at
Bolonia
;
and
that
of
the
same
Pope
with
Francis
the
first
.
But
it
shall
be
discretion
in
a
Prince
,
before
he
comes
to
that
,
to
consider
,
if
at
this
parley
there
may
not
someth●ng
fall
out
that
may
breed
iealousie
or
enuie
against
him
,
or
that
may
draw
him
into
contempt
of
him
with
whom
hee
t●eat●s
.
The
Emperour
Maximilian
the
first
,
hauing
appointed
a
place
and
Day
to
parley
with
King
Lewis
the
twelfth
,
came
to
the
assignation
.
But
fearing
that
he
should
not
appeare
so
well
accompanied
as
Lewis
the
twelfth
,
whose
trayne
was
in
better
order
then
the
Germans
,
he
anoyded
this
Enter-view
,
which
might
haue
bred
some
contempt
of
him
and
his
with
the
French
;
and
sought
a
pretext
before
he
parted
,
or
the
King
arriued
,
excusing
himselfe
vpon
the
Warre
which
the
Venetians
made
in
Friuly
,
whether
it
was
necessary
for
him
to
transport
himselfe
speedily
.
The
place
of
parley
is
likewise
v●ry
considerable
,
as
well
for
the
safety
,
as
for
the
honour
which
he
receiues
,
whom
they
goe
to
finde
in
his
owne
Pallace
.
The
consideration
of
the
safety
is
commonly
the
principall
.
And
the
distrust
which
King
Francis
the
first
had
,
Tann●quin
Du
Cha●tel
:
which
was
the
cause
that
this
manner
of
parling
was
obserued
betweene
King
Edward
of
England
and
Lewis
the
Eleuenth
.
But
Lewis
Sforse
hauing
demanded
to
haue
the
same
▪
forme
obserued
and
kept
,
being
to
parley
with
Charles
the
Eighth
in
his
returne
from
Naples
,
they
refused
him
,
as
to
one
who
ought
not
to
treate
with
the
King
as
an
Equall
,
to
whose
fidelity
hee
did
wrong
,
to
demand
such
assurances
.
Yet
this
hath
no
certaine
Rules
:
But
they
goue●ne
themselues
in
such
things
according
to
the
confidence
which
they
may
take
one
of
another
.
The
ordinary
course
is
to
choose
for
these
Enter-viewes
,
eyther
a
neuterall
place
belonging
to
some
common
Friend
;
or
a
place
vpon
the
frontire
,
or
an
Iland
;
to
regulate
the
number
of
those
which
shall
accompany
the
Princes
:
And
if
the
iealousie
bee
great
,
they
may
specifie
the
Armes
,
which
euery
one
may
carry
in
these
Enter-viewes
.
But
if
of
two
Princes
,
the
one
goes
home
vnto
the
other
,
he
is
bound
to
doe
him
the
houour
of
his
House
:
And
if
the
Prince
be
inferiour
vnto
him
,
hee
must
send
forth
the
Chiefe
of
his
Court
to
receiue
him
:
But
if
he
be
his
equall
in
quality
,
as
being
both
Kings
,
although
there
be
some
debate
betwixt
them
for
precedence
,
if
he
come
first
to
the
place
where
the
treaty
is
to
bee
●ade
,
hee
must
goe
himselfe
.
In
the
Enter
view
which
was
betwixt
King
Lewis
the
twelfth
and
Ferdinand
of
Aragon
at
Sauona
,
which
then
belonged
vnto
the
Fren●h
King
,
Lewis
the
twelfth
at
the
approach
of
Ferdinands
Galley
,
(
before
he
could
land
)
entred
into
it
,
accompanied
onely
with
his
Guard
;
to
●estifie
his
confidence
,
and
thereby
to
assure
King
●erdinand
of
that
which
hee
should
finde
in
h●m
:
And
at
their
going
to
land
,
King
Lewis
left
the
right
hand
to
Ferdinand
,
who
lodged
in
the
Castle
,
as
the
most
honourable
place
;
and
himselfe
went
to
the
Bi●●●ppricke
.
When
two
Pri●ces
vnequall
in
quality
,
parley
,
some
hold
that
it
is
for
the
inferiour
to
come
first
vnto
the
p●ace
of
meeting
,
It
is
presumed
that
two
Princes
doe
not
meete
for
small
matters
,
If
they
hold
it
fit
to
treate
by
Deputies
and
Embassadors
,
as
it
is
the
ordinary
,
Alberto
Pio
,
Embassador
for
France
with
Pope
Iulio
the
second
,
Alberto
Pio
enioyed
.
I
haue
sayd
of
a
meane
condition
,
Andrew
Gr●tty
then
Prisoner
to
the
King
.
Lewis
Sforse
,
nor
the
Pope
,
did
euer
know
what
had
beene
treated
,
vntill
the
Army
was
ready
to
march
.
The
treaty
of
the
same
French
King
,
which
Ferdinand
King
of
Spaine
,
was
no
lesse
secret
,
to
breake
the
League
betwixt
Spaine
and
England
,
the
King
of
England
hauing
sent
a
Herrald
to
the
King
of
Spaine
,
to
summon
him
to
performe
their
League
,
who
arriued
at
the
same
time
when
as
the
peace
betwixt
France
and
Spaine
was
proclaymed
.
Pope
Lee
the
tenth
.
Hauing
made
a
League
with
the
Emperour
and
the
King
of
Spaine
,
treated
with
Lewis
the
twelfth
,
not
by
a
Publique
instrument
,
but
by
a
scedule
vnder
his
owne
hand
,
to
the
end
the
businesse
might
bee
carried
more
secretly
,
and
that
hee
might
assure
himselfe
of
all
sides
.
The
same
Pope
treated
afterwards
secretly
with
the
King
of
Spaine
,
for
the
defence
of
Italy
:
Yet
meaning
to
entertaine
King
Francis
the
first
,
to
slacken
the
preparations
continued
to
treate
with
him
,
sometimes
demanding
one
thing
and
sometimes
another
,
to
the
end
that
the
one
being
denied
him
,
hee
might
haue
a
Subiect
to
breake
when
hee
should
see
his
time
;
and
to
make
the
French
King
beleeue
,
that
necessity
more
then
his
owne
free
will
,
had
induced
him
to
treate
with
the
Spaniard
,
with
whom
hee
had
long
before
made
a
secret
treaty
.
And
distrusting
that
the
King
would
not
yeild
to
that
which
hee
should
demand
,
hee
made
dluers
ambiguous
and
irresolute
answers
.
The
same
Pope
made
another
secret
League
,
with
the
Emperour
Charles
the
fift
against
King
Francis
the
first
,
and
when
he
was
forced
to
declare
himselfe
,
made
shew
to
treate
a
new
with
the
Embassadour
of
Spaine
.
It
is
one
of
the
ordinary
policies
among
Princes
,
and
wherewith
the
best
aduised
doe
sometimes
suffer
themselues
to
bee
abused
,
The
Spaniards
,
to
interrupt
the
League
which
was
ready
to
bee
made
,
betwixt
the
Princes
of
Italy
and
Pope
Clements
the
seauenth
,
after
the
battaile
of
Pauia
,
propounded
vnto
the
sayd
Pope
to
treate
an
accord
.
The
which
not
onely
hindred
the
League
,
and
stayed
the
preparations
of
Warre
which
he
might
make
;
but
also
caused
him
to
discharge
the
troupes
which
he
had
drawne
vnto
him
for
his
safety
.
Hugo
de
Moncada
,
made
other
prepositions
of
an
accord
to
the
same
Pope
,
to
make
him
the
more
negligent
to
thinke
of
his
defence
.
Bourb●n
,
leader
of
the
Emperours
troupes
,
entertained
the
Pope
with
an
accord
,
whilst
the
Army
marched
towards
Rome
.
The
Goufalonier
of
Florence
,
to
keepe
Pope
Clement
from
attempting
any
thing
openly
against
the
Citty
,
entertained
him
with
hope
of
some
secr●t
pra●●ises
.
The
Spaniard
(
who
in
matter
of
State
make
no
great
difficulty
to
breake
their
faith
,
)
doe
more
vsually
practise
this
pollicie
then
any
other
Nation
.
Alexander
the
sixt
,
(
as
Guichardin
saith
,
)
to
busie
his
enemies
excused
those
things
that
he
could
not
deny
,
and
deuised
those
were
doubtfull
,
pacifiyng
some
with
promises
and
good
lookes
,
and
assuring
others
by
diuers
meanes
,
treating
with
them
a
part
,
to
the
end
hee
might
breed
a
iealousiy
among
them
,
and
disvnite
them
.
Gonsalue
in
the
treaty
which
hee
made
with
the
Duke
of
Calabria
,
sware
vpon
the
holy
Host
,
that
hee
would
send
him
into
France
to
his
Father
Fredericke
.
But
the
interest
of
State
preuailed
more
with
him
,
then
the
opinion
of
Men
,
or
the
feare
of
God
;
so
as
he
sent
them
into
Spaine
.
Hee
makes
the
like
reckoning
of
the
faith
which
hee
had
giuen
to
Duke
Valentine
by
his
safe
conduct
;
Notwithstanding
the
which
hee
sent
him
Prisoner
into
Spaine
;
But
Ferdinand
of
Aragon
his
Master
sent
him
backe
.
For
hauing
sent
Phillip
Arch-Duke
of
Austria
into
France
to
treate
an
agreement
vpon
the
difference
,
for
the
diuision
made
of
the
Realme
of
Naples
,
betwixt
him
and
King
Lewis
the
twelfth
,
in
regard
of
the
limits
and
bounds
:
Notwithstanding
that
the
sayd
treaty
had
beene
sworne
by
the
French
King
on
the
one
side
,
and
the
sayd
Arch-Duke
on
the
other
,
as
procurator
for
the
Kings
of
Spaine
,
And
that
they
themselues
had
likewise
sworne
,
vpon
the
holy
Euangelist
,
and
the
Crucifix
to
confirme
whatsoeuer
he
should
doe
;
yet
vnder
diuers
precepts
,
forbare
to
ratifie
it
,
to
the
end
that
the
longer
the
French
King
should
remaine
in
this
su
pence
,
the
longer
hee
would
stay
to
make
his
preparations
to
succour
his
Men
:
who
for
want
of
releife
,
hauing
bin
forced
to
abandon
the
countrey
,
the
said
Kings
of
Spaine
,
Notwithstanding
their
solemne
Oath
,
would
heare
no
more
speech
of
ratifying
the
treaty
made
by
his
Sonne
in
law
.
From
all
these
examples
we
may
gather
,
that
during
a
treaty
,
wee
must
watch
more
carefully
,
and
make
our selues
the
stronger
,
not
onely
to
frustrate
our
Enemies
of
all
hope
to
surprize
vs
,
but
to
the
end
that
the
consideration
of
our
forces
may
make
vs
obtaine
conditions
of
more
aduantage
:
And
wee
must
not
hold
a
treaty
firme
and
concluded
,
vnlesse
it
be
ratified
by
the
Prince
with
whom
we
treate
;
especially
if
the
treaty
be
made
with
a
Prince
whom
they
detayne
Prisoner
.
But
the
question
is
,
The
Deputies
being
assembled
,
The
seates
being
resolued
,
the
Deputies
are
to
see
the
Commissions
of
eyther
side
,
and
to
consider
of
them
:
As
for
the
clauses
of
treaties
,
there
can
be
nothing
certaine
prescribed
,
But
the
principall
considerations
we
must
haue
,
are
not
to
vse
,
nor
to
speake
for
a
person
which
is
odious
to
them
with
whom
we
treate
;
not
to
yeeld
to
the
first
demaunds
though
iust
,
but
to
resist
them
stoutly
:
And
yet
if
the
danger
be
emment
,
wee
must
not
study
so
much
to
Negotiate
with
aduantage
,
as
to
prouide
for
safety
:
And
especially
to
haue
a
care
,
The
same
Spaniards
deceiued
the
French
in
the
treaty
for
the
diuision
of
the
Realme
of
Naples
,
betwixt
King
Lewis
the
twelfth
of
France
and
Ferdinand
of
Aragon
,
vpon
the
equiuocation
of
the
denomination
of
the
Prouinces
,
made
diuersly
and
in
diuers
times
;
the
French
thinking
the
confines
should
be
regulated
according
to
the
ancient
denomination
,
and
the
Spaniards
according
to
the
new
,
which
they
caused
to
be
exprest
in
the
treaty
:
They
which
treated
on
the
French
party
,
neuer
considering
,
that
in
the
diuersitie
of
Names
,
they
are
gouerned
according
to
the
pr●sent
vse
.
The
protection
taken
by
King
Lewis
the
twelfth
,
of
Bentineth
,
with
Bolonia
,
vpon
condition
he
should
not
preiudice
the
rites
of
the
Church
,
the
which
was
interpreted
with
no
better
faith
.
For
whilest
the
King
was
an
enemy
to
the
Pope
,
hee
interpreted
the
rites
of
the
Church
,
for
that
which
the
Church
enioyed
when
hee
tooke
the
protection
:
And
afterwards
being
vnited
to
the
Pope
,
hee
restrained
this
protection
to
the
person
and
goods
of
Bentineth
.
CHAP.
51.
Of
treaties
of
Peace
and
Truce
.
THe
treaties
which
they
make
with
Neighbours
,
are
either
with
enemies
,
or
with
friends
;
or
with
persons
which
desire
to
continue
Neuters
with
vs
,
Don
Hugo
de
Moncada
,
Embassadour
to
the
Emperour
.
Sometimes
a
generall
truce
holds
the
place
of
a
peace
,
as
that
of
a
hundred
yeares
,
betwixt
the
Acarnaues
,
and
the
Ambracoltes
;
and
that
betwixt
Castille
and
Portugall
:
And
these
are
commonly
made
betwixt
Princes
that
are
equall
in
power
,
and
will
not
quit
any
thing
of
their
rights
by
a
peace
;
and
yet
desire
to
liue
quietly
in
the
Estate
wherein
they
are
,
satisfying
by
this
meanes
the
point
of
honour
.
Such
treaties
are
many
times
lesse
Subiect
to
rupture
,
A
truce
is
likewise
made
to
aduance
a
peace
and
to
treate
it
.
CHAP.
52.
Of
treaties
of
Alliance
.
THe
treaties
which
are
made
with
our
neighbours
as
friends
,
are
treaties
of
Alliance
,
equall
or
vnequall
:
the
equall
is
eyther
of
simple
freindship
only
,
for
the
entertainement
of
traffique
,
or
for
ayde
and
succour
,
that
of
succours
is
for
the
defensiue
or
offensiue
,
and
sometimes
for
both
together
with
or
against
all
men
,
or
against
certaine
Princes
and
Estates
,
and
their
All●●nces
are
contracted
,
either
from
Estate
to
Estate
,
and
for
the
preseruation
of
the
Estates
one
of
another
;
in
which
case
by
the
death
of
the
Prince
they
may
not
be
interrupted
:
or
else
they
are
contracted
betwixt
Prince
and
Prince
;
and
then
,
after
the
death
of
one
of
the
Princes
,
they
must
enter
into
a
new
treaty
to
continue
it
,
if
there
be
not
a
certaine
time
prescribed
by
the
treatie
,
to
the
which
the
alliance
must
continue
after
the
death
of
the
Prince
,
or
else
they
are
made
from
an
Estate
and
Prince
to
an
Estate
,
and
from
an
Estate
to
a
Prince
;
where
after
the
death
of
the
Prince
,
it
is
necessary
,
if
not
of
a
new
treaty
,
at
the
least
of
some
confirmation
of
the
precedents
:
Sometimes
Alliances
are
contracted
for
an
Enterprize
,
and
for
one
effect
only
,
in
the
which
the
Allies
are
inter●ssed
,
and
it
may
bee
called
by
the
name
of
a
league
.
These
leagues
are
commonly
defensiue
,
But
besides
the
pretext
,
there
are
many
things
to
bee
considered
in
the
treaty
of
a
league
that
is
to
say
,
the
cause
why
they
ioyne
in
league
,
belt
for
offence
or
defence
:
The
particular
interest
of
euery
one
of
the
Leaguers
,
and
his
intention
which
seekes
to
vnite
himselfe
:
With
what
Princes
or
Estates
they
make
it
their
courage
,
constancy
,
faith
,
and
meanes
;
the
commodities
of
their
Estates
to
assist
the
League
:
and
how
they
shall
hinder
those
which
present
themselues
to
enter
,
which
are
not
fit
for
our
Designe
:
against
whom
it
is
made
.
If
hee
be
a
powerfull
Prince
of
himselfe
,
assisted
by
Friends
,
hauing
●acility
to
inuade
the
confederates
,
eyther
by
himselfe
,
or
by
the
meanes
of
his
Friends
,
and
his
courage
,
when
they
are
to
make
the
League
,
and
how
they
may
excuse
it
,
and
whether
the
time
of
the
League
be
precisely
limited
to
a
certaine
number
of
yeares
,
or
whilst
the
Enterprize
shall
last
.
The
contribution
of
Allies
how
it
should
be
ordered
,
as
well
in
the
leuy
of
Souldiers
,
as
in
munitions
of
Warre
and
Victuals
,
who
must
first
ratifie
the
treaty
among
the
confederates
,
if
there
be
many
heads
,
or
one
alone
,
for
the
execution
and
ordinary
causes
of
the
Common-weale
of
the
League
.
The
ordinary
causes
for
the
which
they
make
a
league
,
are
eyther
to
facilitate
a
conquest
;
A
defensiue
League
which
hath
no
other
benefit
but
a
n●cessary
def●nce
,
and
in
the
which
meane
Estates
are
in
a
man●er
equally
in●eressed
,
last
vsually
longer
then
an
offensiue
L●agu●
,
which
is
voluntary
,
and
from
the
which
eyther
of
the
Co●se●era●es
will
easily
part
when
hee
hath
no
more
interest
.
So
as
in
ballancing
the
interest
of
the
one
and
the
other
,
he
that
shall
finde
himselfe
accompanied
with
distrust
,
and
an
opinion
to
bee
irreconciliable
to
the
common
Enemy
,
would
proue
the
most
firme
in
the
League
.
But
with
all
this
we
must
consider
the
wisdome
,
courage
,
and
meanes
of
him
with
home
we
ioyne
in
League
.
But
the
commodity
or
discommodity
of
Estates
neare
or
farre
off
,
is
very
considerable
,
as
well
in
regard
of
those
which
vnite
themselues
,
as
of
those
against
whom
they
make
the
League
.
And
vpon
this
consideration
all
the
Leagues
which
they
haue
propounded
in
Christendome
against
the
Turke
,
haue
gone
to
smoake
:
The
danger
of
the
Turke
being
held
by
Christian
Princes
vncertayne
and
farre
off
,
and
regarding
more
the
Estates
of
some
,
then
of
others
:
Being
vnable
but
with
much
time
and
labour
to
possesse
their
minds
with
this
necessary
ardor
to
attempt
against
him
.
By
the
like
reason
a
League
with
the
Turke
is
of
small
profit
to
a
Christian
Prince
,
who
hath
his
Estate
remote
from
him
,
vnlesse
it
be
for
the
trade
of
the
Subiect
;
as
well
for
the
great
distance
,
as
for
that
the
manner
of
liuing
of
the
one
differs
so
much
from
that
of
the
other
,
as
there
can
grow
no
confidence
betwixt
them
.
But
if
some
one
seekes
vnto
vs
to
bee
receiued
into
our
league
,
whom
wee
hold
not
fit
for
our
designe
;
they
may
propound
such
hard
conditions
vnto
him
,
as
hee
would
lose
his
desire
.
In
like
sort
,
if
we
be
sought
vnto
to
enter
,
eyther
wee
excuse
our selues
vpon
the
feare
of
some
Enemy
,
against
whom
we
must
reserue
our
forees
;
as
the
Venetians
did
for
feare
of
the
Turke
,
when
as
they
were
sought
vnto
by
Charles
the
Eight
,
or
else
wee
will
demand
conditions
of
such
aduantage
for
our selues
,
as
hee
which
seekes
vnto
vs
may
not
yeeld
vnto
.
To
say
when
we
are
to
make
a
League
,
it
cannot
be
precisely
done
▪
this
depending
vpon
the
condition
of
affaires
:
Contribution
is
one
of
the
points
of
a
League
most
diffi●ult
to
regulate
.
In
the
League
which
was
made
betwixt
the
Emperour
Charles
the
fist
,
Pope
Clement
the
seauenth
with
the
other
Princes
of
Italy
(
except
the
Venetians
)
for
the
defence
of
Italy
against
the
French
King
,
the
Emperour
was
to
contribute
monethly
thirty
thousand
Duckets
;
the
Pope
with
the
Florentins
twenty
thousand
;
the
Duke
of
●illan
fifty
thousand
;
Ferrara
ten
thousand
;
Genoua
sixe
thousand
;
Sienna
two
thousand
;
and
Luques
a
thousand
;
And
it
was
concluded
,
that
besides
this
,
there
should
be
a
stocke
of
the
like
summe
,
which
might
not
be
imployed
vntill
they
saw
the
preparatiues
made
to
inuade
Italy
.
In
the
League
of
the
Citties
of
Greece
against
the
Persians
,
the
contribution
whereof
Aristides
made
the
taxe
,
mounted
to
eight
hundred
thousand
Tallents
.
In
the
league
which
some
Citties
of
Greece
made
with
the
Lacedemonians
against
Athenians
,
the
contribution
came
yearely
to
a
thousand
Tallents
:
And
the
order
for
the
l●uy
of
souldiers
was
,
that
two
lightly
Armed
should
passe
for
a
Man
Armed
at
all
peeces
;
and
foure
Men
Armed
at
all
pe●ces
for
a
Horse-man
.
The
contribution
concluded
in
money
,
there
are
difficulties
sometimes
found
,
The
contribution
being
setled
by
the
confederates
they
must
name
a
head
of
the
League
,
if
they
will
not
assaile
the
enemy
but
of
one
side
:
If
of
diuers
,
they
must
name
many
.
And
herein
they
doe
many
times
find
themselues
troubled
for
that
the
most
powerfull
of
the
confederates
,
desires
commonly
to
haue
it
referred
to
him
,
or
to
some
one
of
his
,
who
gouerns
the
conduct
of
the
Warre
,
according
to
his
Maisters
affaires
,
and
not
those
of
the
other
Allies
.
The
other
head
of
the
League
of
the
Princes
of
Italy
,
with
King
Francis
the
first
,
would
not
assaile
Millan
after
the
taking
of
Pauia
,
for
feare
that
Millan
being
taken
with
the
Duke
,
and
the
Venetians
,
assured
from
the
Imperialists
,
they
should
retire
from
the
League
,
or
contribute
more
neg●igently
:
And
therefore
he
tooke
a
pretext
to
goe
and
free
the
Pope
who
was
a
Prisoner
.
Antonio
De
Leua
,
in
the
League
which
was
made
by
all
the
Princes
of
Italy
,
except
the
Venetians
,
with
Charles
the
fift
against
the
French
,
was
made
generall
,
with
charge
to
stay
in
the
Dutchy
of
Millan
,
which
depended
of
the
Emperour
.
A
League
concluded
by
the
Deputies
of
the
confederates
,
there
sometimes
falls
out
a
difficulty
,
That
kind
of
League
which
is
made
for
an
enterprize
,
Another
defect
is
,
that
to
the
greatest
part
of
their
Assemblies
and
Dyettes
,
they
send
men
new
in
affaires
,
fearing
to
giue
authority
to
any
one
among
them
aboue
the
rest
.
So
as
most
part
of
those
which
come
to
these
assemblies
,
hauing
little
or
no
knowledge
of
affaires
,
their
opinions
are
to
make
report
to
their
Superiours
,
and
not
to
resolue
any
thing
;
this
power
being
seldome
giuen
them
.
Hence
grow
many
delayes
,
which
in
certaine
encounters
may
bee
very
preiudiciall
to
the
Estate
.
There
is
another
ordinary
defect
among
them
,
that
they
seldome
agree
vppon
the
somme
of
the
contributions
necessary
for
their
defence
,
nor
of
the
keeping
of
the
common
Treasure
:
So
as
when
there
happens
any
need
,
they
find
themselues
troubled
to
prouide
in
time
.
But
behold
how
Princes
allied
,
They
may
aide
particular
Allies
,
and
common
Allies
,
if
they
be
wronged
by
one
of
the
Allies
.
An
vnequall
alliance
is
that
,
which
is
contracted
betwixt
Princes
or
Estates
,
vnequall
in
honour
or
in
power
,
Wee
haue
formerly
sayd
,
that
a
pension
differs
from
tribute
.
For
tribute
is
payd
by
the
Subiect
,
or
by
him
who
to
enioy
his
liberty
,
The
true
protection
is
that
,
whereas
one
takes
vpon
him
the
defence
of
another
freely
without
reward
.
By
the
Law
of
protection
,
hee
that
is
protected
,
owes
all
respect
and
honour
to
his
protector
:
CHAP.
53.
Of
the
differences
which
happen
betwixt
Allies
and
Neighbours
:
and
of
the
decision
thereof
.
ANd
for
that
the
Alliances
not
onely
of
protection
,
but
also
those
which
are
equall
,
made
it
with
more
powerfull
Estates
,
draw
after
them
the
subiection
of
the
weaker
;
And
that
there
may
betwixt
Equals
(
be
it
vpon
this
Subiect
or
some
other
)
happen
many
differences
,
which
may
breed
occasion
of
breach
:
they
must
in
treating
prouide
for
the
safety
and
the
decision
of
differences
.
Some
haue
assured
themselues
of
the
mutuall
faith
simply
,
the
which
at
this
day
is
but
weake
in
many
.
Others
haue
demanded
hostages
:
the
which
ought
to
be
of
such
consideration
,
as
the
Prince
or
Estate
which
giues
them
,
may
not
bee
long
depriued
of
them
,
without
preiudice
by
their
absence
.
King
Francis
the
first
,
being
freed
from
Prison
,
and
after
many
inhumanities
shewed
him
by
Charles
the
fift
,
who
let
him
goe
not
through
courtesie
,
but
for
feare
of
the
League
of
Italy
;
yeilded
to
giue
his
children
in
hostage
,
hoping
hee
might
recouer
them
,
either
by
accord
,
or
by
some
other
meanes
,
the
delay
of
the
recouery
being
the
lesse
troublesome
vnto
him
,
for
that
they
were
in
their
courage
:
And
so
being
at
his
choyce
either
to
giue
his
children
,
or
twelue
of
of
his
principall
Men
of
his
Realme
,
he
desired
rather
to
giue
his
children
,
whom
he
might
spare
,
then
the
others
,
which
were
more
necessary
for
his
seruice
and
enterprizes
.
Sometimes
they
demand
hostages
of
eyther
part
,
when
as
eyther
of
them
that
treates
,
It
hath
happened
that
without
any
precedent
treaty
,
But
the
greatest
security
,
And
to
preuent
that
the
alliance
or
protection
change
not
into
Subiection
,
we
must
be
very
carefull
not
to
receiue
a
Garrisson
,
from
the
allie
or
protector
stronger
then
our
owne
;
and
much
lesse
to
make
him
Maister
of
our
Forts
,
or
to
make
him
Guardion
and
depositary
of
the
Treasure
of
all
the
alliance
;
as
the
Grecians
did
the
Athenians
,
who
consented
,
the
money
which
should
be
euery
yeare
leuied
of
the
Generall
,
should
be
put
in
Appollos
Temple
,
and
afterwards
carried
to
Athens
,
there
to
be
kept
.
So
as
the
Athenians
,
being
seazed
of
their
Allies
purse
,
they
made
themselues
protectors
,
and
of
protectors
Mai●ers
;
And
so
they
not
onely
became
Maisters
of
the
Treasure
,
but
they
caused
the
appellations
of
all
the
other
Citties
to
come
before
them
,
at
whose
charge
they
trayned
vp
their
Cittizens
and
made
them
Souldiers
.
They
haue
likewise
vsually
had
recourse
vnto
compromise
,
In
this
compromise
made
in
the
person
of
the
Emperour
Charles
the
fift
,
for
the
difference
which
was
betwixt
the
Pope
and
the
Duke
of
Ferrara
,
as
well
for
the
right
as
for
the
fact
,
the
Emperour
promised
the
Pope
,
not
to
pronounce
vnlesse
he
were
prest
by
him
;
and
to
the
Duke
of
Ferrara
,
that
finding
that
he
had
right
to
Modena
and
Reggium
,
he
would
giue
sentence
;
and
that
finding
otherwise
,
hee
would
suffer
the
time
of
the
compromise
to
expi●e
.
And
for
assurance
it
was
agreed
,
that
the
Duke
should
deliuer
Modena
into
the
Emperours
hands
,
as
sequestred
.
Afterwards
Iudgment
to
the
benefit
of
the
Duke
,
whereof
the
Pope
complayned
much
,
for
that
the
Emperour
had
not
proceeded
according
to
his
secret
promise
:
But
the
Emperour
excused
himselfe
vpon
the
pursuit
which
his
Nuntio
had
made
vnto
him
to
pronounce
.
They
seldome
compromit
vpon
the
possessory
:
And
as
peace
is
generally
to
be
desired
,
yet
if
there
be
betwixt
Neighbours
some
Subiect
which
trouble
their
intelligence
,
The
cause
wherein
we
must
labour
effectually
to
reconcile
our
Neighbours
,
is
,
when
wee
haue
need
to
be
succoured
by
them
.
So
Lewis
the
eleuenth
treated
a
peace
betwixt
Sigismond
of
Austria
,
and
the
Suisses
,
to
vse
their
s●ruice
against
the
Duke
of
Burgundy
:
And
Lewis
Sforse
dealt
in
the
accord
betwixt
Maximillian
and
the
same
Suisses
,
to
bee
succoured
by
them
.
But
let
vs
return●
to
treaties
.
CHAP.
54.
Of
the
breach
of
Treaties
:
and
of
the
constancy
and
assurance
of
the
word
of
a
Prince
,
in
the
Treaties
.
TO
the
end
we
enter
not
into
the
rupture
for
a
small
business●
,
And
although
that
the
breach
of
faith
bee
to
much
practised
in
such
affaires
,
CHAP.
55.
Of
Treaties
of
Neutrality
.
LEt
vs
come
to
Treaties
of
Neutrality
,
the
which
seemes
naturall
to
Princes
,
who
neither
loue
nor
hate
anything
absolutely
;
but
gouerne
themselues
in
their
Friendships
according
to
their
interests
.
And
in
effect
Reason
of
State
is
no
other
thing
but
Reason
of
interest
.
Neutrality
may
be
of
two
sorts
.
The
aduantages
of
Neutrality
are
,
But
in
a
weake
Prince
,
what
part
soeuer
hee
takes
,
it
will
be
hurtfull
vnto
him
;
especially
if
he
be
in
the
middest
of
two
more
powerfull
Estates
then
himselfe
.
But
if
the
Neuter
be
prest
by
necessity
to
declare
himselfe
,
But
power
is
considered
in
this
subiect
diuersly
:
Eyther
absolute
or
conditionall
;
Absolute
power
is
that
which
wee
measure
by
the
concurrence
of
the
greatnesse
of
Forces
,
Treasure
:
Munitions
,
and
other
Millitary
preparations
.
A
conditionall
power
is
that
,
the
which
although
it
be
lesse
then
an
absolut
,
yet
it
is
more
fit
to
succour
vs
,
or
to
doe
vs
harme
.
In
this
the
Neighbourhood
is
of
very
great
consideration
;
for
that
a
Neighbour
Prince
of
meane
forces
,
may
more
easily
or
sooner
hurt
or
succour
vs
,
then
a
great
Prince
which
lies
farre
off
.
Neere
succours
are
alwayes
sooner
ready
and
with
lesse
charge
:
For
wee
may
discharge
a
part
when
as
time
and
occasions
shall
serue
:
If
he
be
remote
,
he
arriues
too
late
after
the
occasions
to
defend
vs
,
and
too
soone
to
oppresse
vs
.
The
greatest
part
perish
by
the
way
;
and
when
he
is
arriued
he
hath
more
need
of
rest
then
to
battaile
;
and
being
vnable
to
send
them
backe
so
farre
,
we
must
still
beare
the
charge
and
oppression
.
Hi●ron
King
of
Syracuza
,
could
well
obserue
these
considerations
,
the
Carthaginians
being
Maisters
of
a
part
of
Sicily
,
he
allied
himselfe
with
them
against
the
Romans
:
But
the
Romans
being
growne
the
stronger
in
the
Countrey
,
he
fell
to
their
side
,
and
continued
the
Warre
with
them
against
the
Carthaginians
,
who
were
then
more
remote
from
the
Iland
then
the
Roman
〈◊〉
●ter
we
haue
made
consideration
of
the
force
,
wee
must
likewise
consider
of
the
courage
and
constancy
of
the
Prince
,
with
whom
we
are
to
ioyne
.
But
if
hee
be
light
and
hath
no
stay
,
how
powerfull
soeuer
he
be
,
it
is
dangerous
to
engage
himselfe
with
him
:
But
if
with
these
aduantages
hee
knowes
how
to
prosecute
his
designes
with
resolution
,
they
may
boldly
ingage
themselues
with
him
.
CHAP.
56.
Considerations
for
a
Prince
that
will
liue
in
good
intelligence
with
his
Neighbours
.
THe
Prince
that
would
liue
in
good
termes
with
his
Neighbours
,
must
first
consider
what
Treaty
and
Capitulation
he
hath
with
him
,
and
gouerne
himselfe
accordingly
,
alwayes
shewing
himselfe
a
Louer
of
Peace
and
Concord
;
desirous
to
liue
in
Amity
,
and
a
great
obseruer
of
Treaties
;
not
enduring
that
any
breach
should
be
made
,
how
small
soeuer
;
aad
being
done
to
cause
it
to
be
repaired
.
If
any
difficult
thing
be
required
of
him
,
he
shall
neyther
grant
it
,
If
the
Prince
treating
with
his
Neighbours
,
hath
need
to
demand
or
vse
any
thing
from
them
,
Cosmo
De
Medicis
,
not
to
oppose
himselfe
agaynst
Iohn
of
Anio●
;
notwithstanding
that
the
Pope
and
Duke
of
Millan
were
in
League
with
Ferdinand
King
of
Naples
,
against
whom
Iohn
of
Aniou
made
Warre
.
We
must
not
lightly
beleeue
that
which
Princes
say
,
He
must
consider
of
the
meanes
how
he
may
with
dexterity
nourish
the
distrusts
and
iealousies
which
are
,
The
Emperour
Charles
the
fift
,
aduertised
of
the
League
which
was
made
against
him
,
would
not
dismisse
the
Embassadours
of
France
,
England
,
and
Venice
,
vntill
his
owne
were
in
safety
▪
But
hee
set
Guards
vpon
them
of
France
,
Venice
,
and
Florence
,
causing
them
to
bee
conducted
thirty
Miles
from
his
Court
,
with
a
prohibition
not
to
speake
vnto
them
,
nor
for
them
to
Write
:
To
him
of
Millan
as
his
Subiect
,
hee
was
enioyned
not
to
part
from
Court
;
And
as
for
him
of
England
,
there
was
no
alteration
.
Let
vs
come
to
the
third
point
.
CHAP.
57.
Of
the
charge
of
an
Embassadour
or
Agent
.
AN
Embassadour
and
Agent
is
the
same
thing
,
if
we
consider
onely
the
function
of
their
Charges
:
Neyther
the
one
nor
the
other
,
for
that
which
concernes
the
Body
,
As
for
the
profession
whereon
he
ought
to
be
chosen
,
that
depends
of
the
quality
of
the
affaires
whereon
hee
is
to
treate
,
or
of
the
Prince
to
whom
he
is
sent
.
For
if
they
treated
of
meanes
to
make
Warre
,
it
would
be
no
more
proper
to
send
a
Church-man
or
a
Lawyer
,
then
if
they
treated
of
some
right
of
bounds
,
or
made
some
conference
of
Religion
,
to
send
a
man
making
profession
of
Armes
.
For
his
goods
,
an
Embassadour
ought
to
haue
in
a
meane
proportion
.
A
poore
or
needy
man
how
sufficient
soeuer
,
is
nothing
fit
for
charges
of
expence
and
shewe
.
But
of
all
things
they
must
haue
a
care
not
to
send
a
poore
Embassadour
,
after
one
that
was
rich
,
and
who
had
made
an
excesse
of
expence
;
For
the
first
hauing
accustomed
those
of
the
Prouince
to
this
expence
and
charge
,
the
other
comming
after
,
and
not
doing
the
like
,
he
will
bee
much
lesse
honoured
and
respected
;
And
by
consequen●s
doe
his
Maister
lesse
seruice
.
He
must
not
likewise
be
distastfull
to
the
Prince
to
whom
he
is
sent
,
but
rather
they
must
choose
one
that
may
be
pleasing
vnto
him
:
Yet
for
all
this
he
must
not
be
a
subject
,
nor
dependant
,
nor
tyed
by
oath
,
nor
any
other
bond
,
to
him
with
whom
hee
is
to
reside
.
The
example
of
that
which
Duke
Sforse
did
to
the
Esquire
Merueilles
teacheth
vs
,
not
to
choose
another
mans
Subiect
for
this
charge
.
For
the
sufficiency
,
he
must
haue
a
quicke
apprehension
and
naturall
Iudgment
.
He
must
be
practised
in
the
affaires
of
the
world
,
and
especially
in
those
of
his
owne
Countrey
,
and
of
that
where
he
is
Embassadour
.
And
for
that
the
life
of
man
is
too
short
,
to
attend
a
fit
experience
for
the
sufficiency
which
is
necessary
:
hee
ought
to
be
conuersant
with
all
sorts
of
Histories
,
which
hee
ought
to
haue
read
with
iudgment
,
waighing
all
the
Circumstances
of
Actions
which
are
there
represented
:
To
know
the
diuersity
of
the
establishment
of
Estates
,
and
the
reasons
,
if
it
may
bee
,
of
this
diuersity
;
to
vnderstand
the
right
of
limits
,
and
represailes
,
the
genalogies
of
Princes
,
and
the
pretentions
of
Kings
vpon
the
Estates
of
other
men
.
Their
forces
,
means
,
alliances
,
and
manner
of
liuing
,
he
must
likewise
be
resolute
&
couragious
in
that
which
he
hath
wisely
de●iberated
;
but
aboue
all
hee
must
be
secret
in
affaires
of
importance
,
and
discreete
in
his
speech
▪
Hee
must
not
detract
,
nor
speake
euill
,
especially
of
any
Master
,
nor
of
the
Prince
where
hee
remaines
:
Hee
must
speake
freely
of
his
Masters
pretentions
,
if
there
bee
question
to
maintaine
them
.
An
Embassadour
chosen
with
these
qualities
may
serue
worthily
and
profitably
.
Yet
I
will
adde
hereunto
the
manner
,
how
some
of
our
time
haue
held
he
should
gouerne
himselfe
,
but
more
succinctly
.
If
hee
goes
for
some
particular
affaire
,
hee
must
stay
as
little
as
may
be
vpon
the
way
,
as
well
to
preuent
the
aduice
,
which
might
be
giuen
of
the
particular
subiect
of
his
Embassie
;
the
answere
whereof
hee
should
find
ready
,
hauing
by
his
stay
giuen
them
leisure
,
either
to
illude
it
,
or
to
crosse
it
:
As
for
that
according
to
the
quallitie
of
the
businesse
,
hee
might
ariue
so
late
,
as
they
would
mocke
at
him
.
As
Tiberius
did
of
the
Embassadours
which
ariued
to
condole
the
death
of
his
Children
se●uen
Moneths
after
:
And
hee
in
mocking
lamented
the
death
of
Hector
,
who
was
dead
many
hundred
yeeres
before
.
The
same
reason
requires
,
that
they
should
demand
audience
as
soone
as
they
can
,
vnlesse
he
finds
the
Court
in
mourning
,
or
in
open
Warre
,
or
some
other
accident
of
importance
which
serues
for
an
excuse
.
He
shall
from
the
beginning
shew
his
grauitie
,
oftentation
or
pride
in
his
Countenance
or
traine
his
courtesie
and
affability
,
accompanied
with
an
honest
carriage
and
modesty
;
hisexpence
according
to
the
places
where
hee
is
.
The
Northerne
people
desire
a
Table
well
garnished
:
Spaine
,
and
Italy
,
looke
more
to
followers
and
attendants
,
and
to
that
which
serues
for
shew
;
In
the
Leuant
the
greatest
expence
is
in
presents
:
But
aboue
all
hee
must
regulate
his
expences
according
to
his
entertainement
,
and
the
meanes
hee
hath
to
spend
.
For
it
is
vnseemely
to
liue
of
borrowing
in
a
strange
Countrey
.
The
manner
of
treating
is
also
diuers
.
In
Germany
&
Suizerland
,
they
must
haue
more
money
then
words
,
more
good
cheere
there
then
Art
:
In
other
Estates
honor
,
complements
,
and
Orations
,
are
better
receiued
;
and
in
others
the
consideration
of
Religion
hath
more
force
.
An
Embassadour
ought
to
be
wary
,
least
by
too
much
diligence
and
affection
,
he
do
not
augment
the
suspition
,
which
they
may
haue
of
the
sub●ect
of
his
comming
,
and
discouer
it
by
too
much
Art
&
talke
;
all
things
disguised
aff●cted
and
amp●ified
,
naturally
breeds
suspition
.
They
which
demand
succours
doe
many
times
make
their
affaires
so
weake
,
(
thinking
to
moue
pitty
,
)
as
they
are
so
farre
from
mouing
those
,
from
whom
they
craue
succours
,
as
they
make
them
affraid
to
embarque
themselues
with
miserable
persons
.
In
such
occasions
he
must
march
himselfe
discreetly
,
and
waigh
his
words
:
And
the
countenane
in
this
doth
sometime
impart
more
then
the
thing
it selfe
.
Aboue
all
things
hee
must
not
treate
with
any
other
Prince
,
of
that
which
concernes
his
Commission
,
but
with
him
to
whom
he
is
sent
.
This
was
the
answere
of
the
Embassadours
of
Florence
,
to
the
Emperour
Maximillian
,
to
whom
they
had
beene
sent
,
he
hauing
appointed
them
to
conferre
with
the
Duke
of
Millan
,
who
should
giue
them
an
answere
for
him
:
But
they
refused
to
doe
it
,
as
a
thing
exceeding
their
Commission
.
And
although
his
instructions
ought
to
be
as
ample
as
may
be
:
Yet
affaires
being
subiect
to
change
,
in
a
shorter
time
,
then
there
is
betwixt
his
parting
&
arriuall
,
the
Embassadour
must
,
as
they
say
,
make
Warre
by
the
eye
:
as
if
hee
had
beene
commanded
to
vse
mild
words
,
and
yet
finds
it
more
conuenient
to
speake
boldly
or
to
change
,
or
omitt
something
mentioned
in
his
Commission
,
he
must
gouerne
himselfe
with
great
circumspection
.
But
he
may
not
stray
from
his
intention
,
vnlesse
he
see
that
in
leauing
it
,
he
may
preuaile
in
that
which
he
hath
vndertaken
.
If
he
be
constrayned
not
to
doe
some
things
contained
in
his
instructions
,
and
that
the
businesse
is
not
subiect
to
delay
,
hee
shall
import
it
to
two
or
three
of
the
most
vnderstanding
Seruants
,
that
his
Maister
hath
.
(
if
happily
there
be
any
in
the
Countrey
where
he
resides
)
to
the
end
that
the
businesse
succeeding
ill
,
he
may
auoyd
the
reproach
,
to
haue
done
it
alone
and
without
Cou●cell
.
There
are
certaine
things
that
are
subiect
to
disauow
;
as
proud
&
insolent
words
,
which
an
Embassadour
might
haue
vsed
;
or
threats
and
practises
which
he
attempts
in
the
Estate
where
he
resides
,
if
it
be
without
command
:
And
therefore
he
must
containe
hinselfe
,
within
the
termes
of
his
charge
and
the
modestie
that
is
required
.
It
is
fitting
he
should
maintaine
the
Dignity
of
his
Mai●ter
:
But
it
must
be
without
contempt
,
or
offence
to
him
towards
whom
he
issent
,
And
to
the
end
he
may
discouer
all
the
passages
in
an
Estate
,
hee
must
be
frequent
and
daily
in
Court
,
but
when
as
the
Prince
retires
himselfe
priuatly
for
his
pleasures
:
For
then
he
should
make
himselfe
suspect
or
importune
.
And
in
popular
Estates
,
he
must
assist
all
dyets
meetings
and
assemblies
:
Or
if
he
sees
that
this
may
breed
some
contempt
,
hee
should
send
some
one
of
his
.
Besides
money
,
which
discouers
the
secrets
of
Princes
,
the
entertainment
of
his
Table
is
ofsome
force
.
And
although
that
all
the
intelligences
which
come
from
this
sort
of
people
which
follow
Tables
,
be
not
alwaies
current
;
Yet
sometimes
he
shall
meete
with
good
ones
.
Wherefore
he
must
waigh
them
,
and
attend
the
progresse
and
issue
before
hee
Iudge
of
them
;
and
obserue
not
onely
what
is
sayd
,
but
what
is
done
.
He
must
for
this
effect
write
often
,
and
to
many
parts
,
to
the
end
he
may
be
the
better
aduertised
;
and
neuer
respect
the
charge
which
cannot
be
better
imployed
.
He
must
visit
the
principall
Councellors
,
the
Secretaries
of
Estate
,
and
amongst
others
him
,
who
hath
the
diuision
of
Forraigne
affaires
;
he
shall
doe
the
like
to
those
which
are
in
credit
and
fauour
with
the
Prince
,
although
but
of
meane
condition
;
applying
himselfe
in
some
sort
to
the
custome
,
and
manners
of
the
Countrey
,
and
how
others
haue
done
before
him
.
Hee
shall
informe
himselfe
discreetly
of
the
present
Estate
of
the
Court
;
and
how
euery
Man
stands
in
authority
;
wherein
this
authority
consists
,
eyther
in
reputation
and
honour
,
or
in
effect
and
contention
,
euery
one
according
to
his
rancke
and
degree
,
winning
vnto
him
if
he
may
,
the
domestiques
and
fauorities
of
those
which
haue
authority
.
Hauing
newes
from
all
parts
,
he
shall
still
find
occasions
to
discourse
and
parley
with
the
Princes
and
great
men
,
with
pleasing
subiects
,
to
be
merry
with
them
;
or
if
they
be
otherwise
,
and
concerne
them
,
to
condole
,
or
to
aduise
them
to
preuent
it
.
He
must
visite
the
Embassadours
and
Agents
of
other
Princes
and
Common-weales
,
which
reside
in
the
same
Court
;
but
soberly
,
lest
he
giue
them
occasion
of
iealousie
.
Hee
must
be
wary
not
to
discouer
himselfe
wholy
vnto
them
,
whatsouer
they
be
;
but
rather
seeke
to
draw
from
them
,
then
to
leaue
any
thing
of
his
owne
,
to
the
end
he
may
alwayes
be
the
first
to
send
the
aduice
and
pleasing
newes
.
And
if
the
affaires
which
he
pursues
,
succeedes
not
according
to
his
desire
,
hee
shall
make
no
shew
of
it
,
nor
seeme
to
haue
any
distrust
or
bad
opinion
of
the
Prince
and
others
,
with
whom
hee
negotiates
.
When
he
shall
be
intreated
to
doe
them
any
courtesie
,
he
shall
study
to
value
it
at
as
high
a
rate
as
may
be
;
yet
he
must
doe
it
speedily
and
freely
,
letting
them
know
,
that
he
desires
aboue
all
things
to
giue
them
contentment
and
satisfaction
.
He
shall
commend
and
magnifie
the
persons
,
the
meanes
,
the
greatnesse
,
the
Countrey
,
the
Lawes
,
the
manner
of
liuing
,
and
whatsoeuer
concernes
the
Nation
;
yet
with
such
modesty
and
discretion
,
as
there
may
be
no
shew
of
flattery
.
He
shall
likewise
extoll
the
affaires
of
his
Master
with
the
like
modesty
and
dexterity
,
to
the
end
they
may
not
grow
iealous
of
him
.
When
he
shall
finde
some
stop
in
that
which
he
desires
to
doe
,
hee
shall
not
insist
too
eagerly
vpon
it
,
although
he
had
an
apparent
reason
:
But
he
shall
with
dexterity
approue
the
reasons
in
part
,
and
by
other
meanes
seeke
to
attaine
his
Designe
.
When
it
shall
be
needefull
to
doe
or
say
any
thing
contrary
to
their
will
or
liking
,
he
shall
excuse
it
in
such
sort
,
as
they
shall
conceiue
that
it
proceeds
not
from
the
Embassadour
,
but
from
such
as
command
him
,
and
that
hee
is
sor●y
t●
doe
it
,
considering
it
doth
not
please
him
;
yet
●ustifying
the
businesse
by
the
best
reasons
he
may
,
and
giuing
them
some
hope
of
other
things
which
shall
be
pleasing
vnto
them
.
If
they
charge
him
to
carry
bad
and
distastefull
words
,
he
shall
doe
better
to
cause
them
to
giue
them
in
writing
,
rather
then
to
pronounce
the
words
.
And
if
he
findes
that
by
one
meanes
he
cannot
obtaine
what
he
desires
,
hee
shall
leaue
the
businesse
for
a
time
,
and
referre
it
to
some
other
occasion
,
which
he
shall
finde
they
desire
of
him
,
or
shall
haue
neede
of
something
;
and
then
with
dexterity
he
shall
renew
his
demand
,
and
so
perswade
them
with
grace
and
mildnesse
.
When
he
i●to
obtaine
any
thing
of
importance
,
he
shall
lose
no
time
to
cause
it
to
be
dispatcht
,
but
shall
sollicite
the
expedition
,
yet
with
mildnesse
and
modesty
:
And
if
it
con●sts
in
a
promise
for
the
future
,
he
shall
cause
them
to
set
it
downe
in
writing
,
and
contrariwise
he
shall
be
carefull
not
to
oblige
himselfe
nor
his
Master
,
but
as
late
as
seldome
as
may
be
.
Intreating
and
contracting
,
he
must
cause
the
treaty
to
be
set
downe
in
plaine
termes
,
not
ambiguous
nor
captious
,
according
to
the
termes
and
clauses
of
precedent
treaties
.
It
is
certaine
that
refusing
flatly
,
or
making
a
business
full
of
difficulties
,
they
offend
him
whom
they
refuse
:
Therefore
an
Embassadour
not
able
to
grant
that
which
they
demand
of
him
,
he
must
eyther
giue
them
other
Counsell
and
direction
,
to
attaine
to
that
which
they
desire
;
or
he
shall
testifie
his
good-will
by
other
gracious
effects
,
and
honest
speeches
which
may
palliate
the
deniall
.
An
honest
man
,
(
such
as
he
ought
to
be
that
executes
this
charge
,
)
must
not
be
found
a
Lyer
,
especially
in
matters
of
importance
;
for
that
there
is
nothing
doth
make
him
lose
his
credit
more
.
He
must
therefore
be
wary
not
to
deliuer
doubtfull
things
for
certaine
,
nor
trust
wholy
to
the
word
and
report
of
others
:
But
hee
must
alledge
his
Authour
,
or
else
say
,
that
he
had
learned
it
from
a
good
place
,
when
he
shall
not
dare
to
name
the
person
.
He
shall
doe
the
like
for
things
which
concerne
his
Master
,
the
which
he
must
deliuer
on
his
behalfe
.
When
they
are
such
as
there
is
no
great
certainty
,
or
else
may
receiue
a
change
,
he
must
deliuer
them
with
all
discretion
and
stayednesse
,
lest
he
be
reproached
that
they
are
circumuented
by
this
meanes
.
And
if
it
should
happen
that
he
could
not
well
excuse
a
contrariety
,
yet
he
must
couer
and
disguise
it
with
some
pretext
,
in
regard
of
his
Master
by
all
meanes
possible
;
and
for
himselfe
likewise
,
purging
and
iustifying
himselfe
,
that
he
had
neuer
any
intent
to
doe
a
bad
office
,
nor
to
make
a
bad
report
,
nor
to
be
authour
and
instrument
of
deceit
.
The
which
must
take
place
,
when
he
is
constrained
either
through
the
necessity
of
affaires
,
or
by
the
commandement
of
his
Master
,
to
deliuer
one
thing
for
another
.
The
which
hee
may
not
doe
often
,
lest
he
lose
all
his
credit
.
But
it
sometimes
falls
out
,
an
Embassadour
lies
without
thinking
of
it
:
For
that
when
one
Prince
meanes
to
deceiue
another
,
he
first
deceiues
the
Embassadour
whom
hee
sends
,
to
the
end
that
deliuering
that
which
he
holds
to
be
his
Masters
intention
,
his
reasons
may
be
more
forcible
,
assuring
that
which
he
speaks
more
boldly
,
hauing
lesse
intention
and
assurance
of
that
which
is
dissembled
.
Wherein
the
Embassadour
is
not
onely
excusable
,
but
worthy
of
pitty
,
in
that
they
are
distrustfull
of
him
,
and
meane
to
make
him
carry
the
Bable
,
and
to
serue
as
an
instrument
of
deceipt
.
Moreouer
he
must
not
rely
too
much
on
those
with
whom
he
negotiates
,
neither
yet
wholly
despaire
for
those
things
which
happen
;
for
that
affaires
change
easily
,
and
affections
likewise
according
to
occurrents
:
And
many
times
that
which
seemed
impossible
at
one
time
,
growes
easie
afterwards
;
and
so
the
contrary
.
But
one
of
the
principall
points
whereof
and
Embassadour
takes
care
,
is
to
maintaine
the
ranke
and
dignitie
of
his
Master
,
especially
with
the
Embassadours
of
other
Princes
.
For
Princes
doe
not
subsist
,
but
by
the
greatnes
and
opinion
they
haue
of
them
:
It
argues
a
contempt
if
their
ranke
be
contested
,
and
an
Embassadour
must
must
rather
loose
himselfe
,
then
quit
any
thing●
:
And
if
the
Prince
with
whom
he
remaines
,
fauours
him
that
makes
the
attempt
,
after
that
he
hath
made
instance
to
be
maintayned
in
his
ranke
,
he
ought
to
retire
.
And
for
this
point
,
it
is
vsually
obserued
in
many
places
among
Embassadours
,
that
they
which
come
first
,
goe
to
visite
those
which
came
last
,
although
that
the
first
commer
goe
before
them
in
ranke
.
As
for
his
Domestickes
,
there
is
no
doubt
but
they
may
be
punished
if
they
doe
ill
.
And
if
they
or
any
other
hauing
sayled
,
retire
into
the
Embassadors
house
,
he
may
be
summoned
to
yeeld
them
,
and
to
suffer
Iustice
to
search
his
house
:
Otherwise
after
this
deniall
the
Iustice
may
doe
it
,
for
that
the
house
of
an
Embassadour
ought
not
to
serue
for
a
retreat
and
Sanctuary
to
the
wicked
.
Yet
this
search
may
not
be
done
by
simple
S●rgeants
,
no
more
then
the
Summons
:
But
it
must
be
executed
by
the
Iudge
of
greatest
Authority
in
the
place
,
accompanied
with
men
of
honour
,
with
excuses
,
intreaties
,
and
courteous
words
,
as
well
to
testifie
the
respect
which
they
beare
to
the
Dignity
of
the
Embassadours
Master
,
as
to
preuent
the
insolency
and
indiscretion
which
doevsually
accompany
Archers
,
Sergeants
,
and
such
other
sorts
of
Ministers
.
But
in
stead
of
punishing
the
Domestickes
of
an
Embassadour
,
after
they
haue
made
their
processe
vnto
condemnation
,
and
caused
the
Ciuill
party
to
be
satisfied
,
some
haue
pardoned
them
in
his
fauour
whose
Subiects
they
are
,
sending
them
backe
with
the
processe
.
Or
if
there
be
no
such
intelligence
betwixt
the
two
Princes
,
as
the
one
will
not
be
beholding
to
his
cópanion
,
they
may
procure
some
common
Ally
vnder-hand
,
to
make
the
demand
:
To
whom
the
Prisoners
being
deliuered
,
he
may
send
them
to
the
Prince
whose
Subiects
they
are
.
Some
Embassadours
haue
perswaded
themselues
,
that
they
had
all
iurisdiction
ouer
their
Domestickes
,
euen
to
put
some
to
death
.
But
this
is
not
grounded
vpon
a
reason
,
if
the
Prince
with
whom
he
resides
doth
not
giue
him
leaue
;
as
they
say
the
Turke
tollerates
it
with
the
Embassadours
of
Christian
Princes
.
Yet
they
may
detaine
those
Prisoners
in
their
house
,
which
practise
against
the
seruice
of
their
Master
,
vntill
they
haue
aduertised
him
,
and
receiue
an
answer
;
prouided
that
they
whom
they
detaine
,
be
not
admitted
as
Embassadours
by
the
Prince
,
or
Estate
where
they
are
:
For
in
that
case
they
are
in
freedome
and
safety
.
Behold
how
Embassadors
ought
to
gouern
themselues
with
strangers
in
a
strang
Country
.
We
must
now
see
being
in
those
charges
,
how
they
ought
to
carry
themselues
to
their
Masters
,
to
whom
they
serue
as
eyes
and
eares
.
It
is
to
no
purpose
to
say
,
that
in
doing
this
,
it
were
to
shew
himselfe
wiser
then
his
Master
;
or
that
he
must
deliuer
all
,
and
conceale
nothing
.
For
that
which
offends
Princes
,
and
inuites
them
to
resentment
,
is
not
so
much
the
offence
in
it selfe
,
as
the
opinion
they
haue
,
that
the
world
knowes
they
haue
beene
wronged
;
and
if
they
doe
not
seeke
some
reuenge
,
they
should
make
a
breach
in
their
reputations
,
and
inuite
others
to
affront
and
contemne
them
.
So
as
the
wrong
being
not
published
and
knowne
to
all
Men
,
and
the
Embassadour
making
it
knowne
that
for
the
good
of
peace
,
he
would
conceale
it
from
his
Master
,
it
doth
no
way
touch
the
reputation
of
the
Prince
,
who
otherwise
being
held
to
be
couragious
,
they
would
alwayes
beleeue
,
that
if
the
report
had
beene
made
vnto
him
,
he
would
not
haue
endured
it
without
reuenge
:
There
are
many
things
which
Princes
are
glad
to
haue
concealed
;
but
those
principally
,
for
the
which
they
cannot
prouide
,
without
greatly
incommadating
their
affaires
,
these
ought
to
be
dissembled
and
concealed
from
them
.
As
for
dispatches
,
He
must
haue
a
care
not
to
write
any
thing
to
his
Master
for
true
,
concerning
those
with
whom
hee
negotiates
,
if
he
hath
no
testimony
by
Letters
,
or
that
he
knoweth
it
from
those
in
whom
his
master
hath
confidence
,
the
which
he
ought
to
name
:
For
that
the
change
which
may
happen
in
a
businesse
,
might
cause
a
reproach
and
bad
conceit
of
the
minister
,
with
his
Master
,
either
of
lightnesse
,
or
of
little
fore-sight
.
He
shall
be
alwayes
esteemed
to
doe
more
then
to
write
,
and
to
giue
them
good
hope
when
he
shall
see
day
,
before
he
giue
them
assurance
and
certainty
of
the
businesse
.
As
for
the
particular
of
the
Embassador
,
as
we
haue
said
before
,
besides
the
Secretary
of
Estate
,
who
is
to
receiue
his
Dispatches
,
he
must
haue
some
one
which
may
giue
him
aduice
of
that
which
passeth
.
He
with
some
other
friends
,
must
doe
him
all
sorts
of
good
offices
,
in
commending
and
praising
his
Seruices
and
dexterity
.
And
the
Embassadour
on
the
other
side
,
shall
labour
to
haue
others
write
;
especially
men
vnknowne
to
commend
his
industry
and
labour
,
absence
causing
a
decay
of
opinion
,
and
makes
them
sometimes
forget
the
worth
of
a
man
,
if
by
these
practises
they
be
not
reuiued
.
THE
COVNSELLOR
OF
ESTATE
.
OR
,
A
COLLECTION
OF
the
greatest
and
most
Remarkable
Considerations
seruing
for
the
Managing
of
Publicke
Affaires
.
PART
.
II.
CONTAYNING
THE
MEANES
how
to
preserue
an
ESTATE
.
CHAPTER
I.
Of
the
parts
and
conditions
in
generall
,
necessary
for
a
Prince
and
Soueraigne
.
HAuing
treated
of
that
which
is
necessary
for
the
setling
of
an
Estate
,
wee
must
consider
of
the
meanes
how
to
preserue
it
.
It
is
not
sufficient
to
build
a
strong
ship
to
make
a
long
and
tedious
Voyage
;
but
we
must
withall
prouide
a
good
Pilot
to
gouerne
it
,
and
to
seeke
meanes
to
calke
it
,
and
trim
it
when
it
takes
water
,
and
to
be
able
to
resist
the
waues
of
the
Sea
,
and
the
violence
of
the
Winds
and
stormes
without
shipwracke
.
CHAP.
2.
Of
the
parts
necessary
for
a
Prince
to
purchase
the
Loue
of
the
People
.
BVt
to
treate
in
generall
of
the
parts
necessary
for
a
Prince
to
purchase
this
good-will
,
wee
will
reduce
them
to
three
,
Mildnesse
,
Bounty
,
and
Iustice
.
From
Mildnesse
growes
the
peace
of
the
Estate
,
the
fidellity
of
the
Subiects
,
and
the
Establishment
of
affaires
,
It
is
a
stupid
bounty
,
and
a
simplicity
without
discretion
,
to
pardon
all
,
and
to
suffer
all
.
The
excesse
of
clemency
,
conuerts
it selfe
into
a
soft
and
effeminate
nature
:
And
if
this
bounty
be
not
mingled
with
rigour
,
and
facility
with
authority
;
it
is
meere
carelesnesse
blamable
in
a
Prince
,
for
that
in
suffering
one
fault
,
it
soone
drawes
after
it
another
.
Clemency
is
comendable
towards
an
Enemy
deiected
and
humbled
:
But
whilest
hee
wauers
and
stands
in
tearmes
against
vs
;
it
is
weakenesse
,
amazement
and
feare
,
not
to
dare
to
resent
it
,
hee
must
therefore
vse
mildnesse
with
discretion
,
yet
in
such
sort
,
as
they
may
alwayes
find
the
Prince
more
inclined
to
mildnesse
then
seuerity
.
CHAP.
3.
Of
the
liberality
of
the
Prince
.
LIberallity
is
of
two
sorts
,
The
Subiects
of
a
Prince
excessiue
in
gifts
,
makes
them
excessiue
in
expences
,
and
importune
in
demands
.
They
gouerne
themselues
not
according
vnto
reason
but
to
custome
:
That
which
is
receiued
is
no
more
accounted
of
:
They
loue
not
liberality
but
for
the
future
.
Wherefore
the
more
a
Prince
doth
exhaust
himselfe
in
giuing
,
the
p●orer
he
growes
in
Friends
;
and
from
excessiue
prodigallity
,
doth
vsually
g●ow
the
pouerty
of
a
Prince
:
From
pouerty
exactions
and
hatred
in
like
manner
.
For
the
number
of
those
from
whom
he
takes
by
exaction
,
being
greater
then
the
Friendship
of
those
to
whom
he
giues
;
the
Prince
is
in
danger
not
to
command
long
.
If
then
he
be
reduced
to
one
of
these
extremities
,
it
were
more
expedient
for
the
Prince
to
bee
poore
and
not
hated
of
his
Subiects
,
then
to
be
hated
and
rich
.
For
although
that
for
a
time
he
may
force
obedience
,
yet
i●
cannot
be
durable
:
And
although
that
he
which
spares
,
seemes
in
outward
shewe
to
doe
good
to
few
,
yet
not
exacting
from
the
Subiect
hee
doth
good
to
all
,
whereas
a
prodigall
Prince
doth
vsually
good
but
to
few
.
We
must
therefore
be
carefull
to
vse
this
vertue
well
,
thereby
to
purchase
loue
.
For
although
that
the
gifts
and
benefits
,
be
in
some
sort
in
the
liberty
and
free-will
of
him
that
giues
:
yet
it
hath
certaine
distinctions
and
lawes
which
restraine
it
,
and
especially
in
that
which
concernes
the
Prince
;
And
as
the
payment
of
a
Bond
ought
to
goe
before
liberality
;
otherwise
it
would
be
iniustice
to
giue
,
at
the
charges
of
those
to
whom
we
are
indebted
:
So
Merit
must
be
recompenced
,
before
we
doe
good
to
him
that
hath
not
deserued
:
And
before
Merits
,
seruices
ought
to
march
;
and
before
seruices
,
debts
and
Bonds
ought
to
be
discharged
.
It
is
the
Law
of
Iustice
,
not
to
doe
wrong
to
one
,
to
gratifie
another
,
The
which
is
very
ill
obserued
by
the
most
part
of
Princes
,
who
therein
follow
the
nature
of
other
Princes
,
which
is
,
rather
to
doe
that
which
proceeds
from
their
owne
will
,
then
what
is
commanded
them
by
Iustice
,
or
that
whereunto
they
are
bound
:
For
that
in
the
first
they
acknowledged
themselues
Superiours
,
and
in
the
second
Inferiours
;
the
recompence
shewing
the
merit
and
vallour
of
him
to
whom
it
is
giuen
.
Wherefore
the
benefit
or
liberality
of
the
Prince
,
proceeds
eyther
from
the
acknowledgment
of
seruice
,
And
it
is
that
whereof
among
priuate
persons
wee
haue
experience
,
that
the
benefit
which
comes
from
a
bond
or
debt
,
is
more
pleasing
then
that
which
comes
vnto
vs
from
the
free-will
of
another
:
For
that
in
this
consists
the
content
of
the
giuer
,
who
chargeth
ys
with
a
bond
which
binds
vs
;
and
which
in
some
doth
rather
ingender
hatred
then
Friendship
;
especially
if
the
benefit
exceeds
all
Satisfaction
.
In
the
oth●r
,
besides
the
pleasure
to
receiue
the
benefit
,
we
receiue
content
to
see
that
we
acknowledge
the
former
good
which
we
haue
done
them
.
And
although
that
they
which
loue
vs
,
deserue
to
be
requited
for
their
good-will
towards
vs
,
as
being
the
principall
part
of
the
benefit
:
Yet
it
deserues
rather
to
be
recompenced
by
a
Prince
,
with
kind
vsage
and
good
words
,
then
by
effects
;
the
which
hee
must
keepe
to
recompence
effects
,
otherwise
his
Reuenewes
would
not
●ustice
.
Yet
if
he
finds
that
some
for
want
of
this
,
withdraw
themselues
from
him
,
although
vniustly
and
with
out
cause
,
it
shall
be
necessary
that
hee
retaine
them
by
the
mildest
meanes
he
can
,
and
rather
in
doing
them
good
,
then
in
●mploying
threats
,
who
according
to
their
naturall
disposition
,
might
be
the
more
incensed
.
The
liberality
which
is
vsed
to
particular
persons
,
to
purchase
re●utation
,
In
their
manner
of
giuing
they
must
ob●erue
three
things
.
The
first
,
The
t●i●d
is
,
to
giue
in
the
view
of
all
men
,
to
purchase
reputation
.
For
although
that
in
a
priuate
lib●tality
this
were
not
commendable
;
yet
this
manner
is
necessary
in
the
Estate
,
where
the
Actions
of
Princes
must
be
apparent
and
visible
,
neyther
must
they
be
vnfruitfull
;
And
it
sufficeth
not
to
doe
a
pleasure
;
but
you
must
make
him
that
receiues
it
,
acknowledge
that
it
is
done
to
such
an
intention
.
As
for
the
measure
of
benefits
,
they
must
be
proportionable
to
the
time
,
and
to
the
persons
,
And
for
that
there
are
more
men
found
which
affect
Riches
,
If
the
liberalities
of
Princes
towards
priuate
persons
,
doth
get
them
good-will
,
not
onely
from
those
which
taste
the
fruite
,
Seeing
then
that
this
liberality
is
fitting
onely
for
the
Prince
,
he
must
practise
it
as
much
as
may
be
,
and
not
suffer
occasion
to
be
lost
.
There
is
another
sort
of
liberality
,
which
the
Prince
may
practise
to
the
benefit
of
the
Publique
,
CHAP.
4.
Of
the
Princes
Iustice
.
IVstice
is
generally
bel●ued
and
desired
:
But
when
they
will
practise
it
ag●●nst
priu●te
persons
,
the
commis●ration
they
hau●
o●
a
con●emned
man
,
or
the
colour
of
some
contrary
reasons
,
ioyned
to
interest
and
obstinacy
,
make
the
rigour
and
seuerity
odious
to
many
.
Wherefore
in
a
manner
in
all
Estates
,
the
exercise
of
Iustice
hath
beene
diuided
into
two
parts
.
That
which
concernes
the
punishment
of
crimes
,
And
particularly
vsury
or
interest
,
The
other
so●t
of
violence
contrary
to
Iustice
,
is
the
oppression
of
the
poore
by
great
Men
,
I
meane
not
for
all
this
to
tye
the
Princes
hands
,
so
as
he
may
not
giue
a
pardon
:
Among
all
the
violences
and
oppressions
which
great
Men
commit
,
the
most
dangerous
to
an
Estate
,
and
which
ought
to
be
lesse
supported
by
the
Prince
,
is
that
which
is
done
against
the
Magistrate
,
The
second
point
wherin
a
Prince
may
shew
his
●ffection
towards
Iustice
,
One
of
the
meanes
to
auoyde
the
euill
,
and
to
pre●erue
the
integrity
of
I●dges
,
is
,
after
that
h●e
hath
made
choise
of
honest
men
,
to
giue
them
meanes
to
enentertaine
themselues
in
seruing
the
Publique
:
To
the
end
he
may
draw
them
from
the
thought
,
which
necessity
might
force
them
to
,
to
gather
goods
by
vnlawfull
meanes
.
Others
haue
held
Officers
in
awe
by
inquieries
made
from
time
to
time
.
But
the
Commissioners
of
these
searches
being
as
well
subiect
to
corruption
as
the
rest
,
this
cou●se
hath
not
beene
long
obserued
.
Moreouer
,
Another
mischiefe
which
is
committed
in
such
compositions
,
is
,
that
by
the
meanes
thereof
the
wicked
remayning
still
in
his
Office
,
vnder
hope
to
be
freed
another
time
at
the
same
rate
,
doe
worse
then
they
did
before
:
And
hee
which
is
an
honest
man
,
seeing
himselfe
compell'd
and
forced
to
pay
a
Fine
for
an
oftence
which
hee
hath
not
committed
,
resolues
to
doe
it
,
as
well
to
re-embource
himselfe
,
as
to
haue
meanes
another
time
to
satisfie
the
auarice
of
the
Authours
of
such
searches
.
Wherefore
they
must
eyther
make
no
enquieries
,
or
else
they
must
finish
them
by
the
course
of
Iustice
.
But
if
in
such
things
the
Prince
will
shew
sauour
,
and
pardon
some
one
mans
life
:
At
the
least
after
hee
is
reprehended
,
he
may
not
suffer
him
to
continue
in
his
place
,
as
wel
to
take
from
him
the
meanes
of
ill
doing
,
as
not
to
make
the
charge
contemptible
,
and
himselfe
●dious
,
in
maintayning
a
person
therein
,
who
hath
beene
held
of
a
bad
life
.
CHAP.
5.
Of
the
administration
of
Iustice
.
IN
the
forme
of
the
administration
of
Iustice
,
In
the
speedy
expedition
,
the
Prince
shall
testifie
his
affection
to
the
good
of
●ustice
,
in
taking
away
the
power
of
Iudges
〈◊〉
p●olong
delayes
,
and
fauour
those
that
fly
from
tryal●
,
i●
shortning
as
much
as
hee
may
,
by
the
adnice
of
the
m●st
iudicious
of
his
Estate
,
the
stile
,
and
forme
of
their
ordinary
proceeding
,
as
well
in
Establishing
Fines
and
Amercements
against
those
that
faile
and
de●ay
,
as
in
diminishing
the
degrees
of
Iuridiction
,
Another
expence
is
for
the
vocations
of
Iudges
,
who
as
we
haue
sayd
,
Another
expence
is
of
Registers
,
Vshers
,
and
such
other
ministers
of
Iustice
,
whose
taxes
they
must
not
onely
Regulate
,
But
the
greatest
and
most
excessiue
expence
,
is
that
of
Solicitors
,
Proctors
,
and
Aduocates
,
which
is
a
very
difficult
thing
to
order
:
And
some
haue
held
,
that
we
must
leaue
this
meanes
to
those
of
this
quality
,
to
inrich
themselues
in
seruing
others
,
there
being
Groomes
as
they
say
of
all
prizes
.
Yet
if
they
cou●d
set
downe
an
order
,
which
might
be
easily
executed
,
it
would
be
a
great
benefit
for
Iustice
:
But
hauing
not
bin
hitherto
found
,
at
the
least
it
would
require
the
fore-●●g
tand
Iustice
of
the
Prince
.
to
prouide
in
such
sort
,
as
poore
Men
desiri●g
to
recouer
their
owne
,
might
be●
freed
from
this
cha●ge
.
For
this
effect
it
hath
bin
sometimes
propounded
,
to
oblige
those
,
which
desire
to
come
in
time
to
great
offices
of
this
profession
,
before
they
should
attaine
vnto
any
,
they
should
vndertake
the
pursuit
of
causes
freely
,
and
that
it
should
not
bee
lawfull
for
them
to
take
any
Fee
;
vpon
paine
of
concussion
,
and
to
be
made
v●capable
euer
to
enter
into
any
office
for
the
future
.
These
being
commonly
Men
of
meanes
,
desirous
to
winne
honor
and
in
an
Age
when
desire
is
most
ardent
:
will
striue
in
Enuy
one
of
another
to
protect
the
poore
,
when
as
for
their
recompence
they
should
propound
vnto
them
,
some
place
being
voyd
of
those
whereunto
they
aspired
,
to
prefer●e
him
which
had
defended
the
greatest
number
.
Besides
the
benefit
which
the
poore
should
reape
,
the
Publique
should
haue
aduantage
;
in
that
they
which
should
enter
into
these
charges
,
had
giuen
some
testimony
of
their
integrity
and
su●ficiency
:
Whereas
the
custome
is
at
this
day
,
to
place
Schollers
comming
from
Schoole
,
in
the
companies
of
Iudges
,
with
little
Learning
and
lesse
experience
,
and
hauing
giuen
no
proo●es
of
their
discretion
.
There
is
another
poynt
wherein
the
Prince
may
likewise
testifie
his
affection
to
the
good
of
Iustice
,
CHAP.
6.
Of
the
Reputation
of
the
Prince
.
And
among
other
meanes
to
get
this
generall
knowledge
,
the
principall
is
to
haue
about
him
a
good
number
of
Men
,
great
in
all
sorts
of
Sciences
,
as
D●uines
,
Phylosophers
,
Mathematitians
,
and
Captaines
,
for
whom
(
be
it
attable
or
else
where
,
)
he
may
in
few
words
learne
that
which
cannot
be
apprehended
in
many
moneths
at
schoole
:
To
giue
them
a
subiect
of
discourse
,
in
walking
,
bee
it
on
foot
or
hors-backe
,
going
a
hunting
,
and
in
all
other
occasions
;
to
keepe
them
prepared
,
so
as
presenting
themselues
before
him
,
they
may
be
ready
to
deliuer
something
that
is
rare
and
excellent
.
Yet
he
must
remember
,
if
he
meanes
to
haue
them
discourse
before
the
world
in
his
presence
,
to
aduertise
them
secretly
sometime
before
,
of
that
which
he
meanes
to
propound
,
to
the
end
they
may
be
prepared
;
for
the
most
sufficient
may
bee
surprized
:
And
not
to
reprehend
him
before
the
world
;
the
which
would
doe
wrong
to
his
reputation
,
and
that
of
the
Prince
would
likewise
suffer
,
for
that
they
would
conceiue
he
had
made
a
bad
choyce
.
Thus
the
Prince
imploying
the
time
onely
,
which
others
spend
in
the
encounters
of
iesters
,
he
will
in
a
short
time
be
as
learned
as
shall
bee
necessary
for
him
.
Alexander
,
Iulius
Caesar
,
Charlemaigne
,
Experience
is
the
Mother
of
Prudence
,
for
that
many
things
seeme
grounded
vpo●
re●son
,
CHAP.
7.
Rules
and
necessary
instructions
for
a
Prince
to
be
held
wise
.
A
Prince
may
easily
iudge
by
himselfe
what
may
be
the
deliberations
of
all
others
of
his
condition
.
Interest
is
the
part
and
reason
which
preuailes
,
and
makes
the
resolutions
,
bend
to
that
side
where
it
shewes
it selfe
:
And
therefore
he
must
neither
trust
to
Friendship
,
alliance
,
league
,
nor
any
other
Bond
,
if
there
be
no
interest
.
A
Prince
must
oppose
himselfe
against
a
mischiefe
in
its
breeding
,
and
resolutely
:
For
that
disorders
grow
,
and
fortifie
the●selues
in
such
manner
with
time
,
as
they
surpasse
our
forces
.
But
when
the
mischiefe
exceeds
the
forces
of
the
Prince
,
then
he
shall
doe
wel
to
deferre
it
,
for
that
with
time
matters
may
change
:
&
he
that
hath
time
,
as
they
say
hath
life
.
Hee
may
not
consent
t●at
they
put
any
thing
in
deliberation
,
which
may
cause
cha●ge
or
innouation
in
the
Estate
:
For
that
the
propositions
which
are
made
in
the
Princes
Councell
,
giue
him
credit
,
how
strange
and
pernicious
soeuer
they
be
It
is
a
signe
that
there
is
some
difficulty
to
discouer
the
good
and
euill
that
is
in
this
subiect
,
seeing
they
bring
it
into
consultation
.
He
must
not
thinke
in
his
resolutions
to
be
able
to
auoide
all
inconueniences
:
For
that
cannot
bee
.
There
is
no
generation
of
things
in
this
world
,
how
good
soeuer
,
but
a
corruption
hath
gone
before
it
.
But
he
must
weigh
the
inconueniences
,
and
choose
the
party
wherein
there
are
least
,
and
most
easie
to
preuent
.
He
may
not
imbrace
many
Enterprizes
at
once
:
For
hee
that
imbraces
too
much
,
gripes
not
fast
:
But
hee
must
assure
his
Estate
before
hee
attempts
a
Warre
of
a
long
continuance
.
Hee
may
not
quarrell
with
one
more
powerfull
then
himselfe
,
but
dissemble
the
iniuries
of
the
mighty
,
and
the
offences
which
cannot
be
punished
.
To
yeeld
somtimes
to
time
,
and
rough
encounters
is
Wisedome
:
And
in
a
strong
storme
to
strike
faile
,
and
to
accommodate
himselfe
●ith
the
strongest
,
yea
with
disaduantage
,
to
preuaile
ouer
the
weaker
.
And
thus
the
Prince
shall
increase
the
courage
of
his
Men
,
and
make
himselfe
fearefull
to
his
Enemies
:
It
being
not
Wisedome
to
commit
himselfe
to
hazard
and
Fortune
,
for
a
light
matter
.
The
Prince
may
not
make
any
suddaine
change
,
for
that
it
cannot
be
done
without
violence
;
and
violence
doth
seldome
producean
effect
that
is
durable
.
Being
ready
for
the
execution
of
an
Enterprize
,
he
may
●ot
deferre
it
,
vnlesse
hee
finds
an
apparrant
danger
in
the
execution
:
For
time
may
breede
more
harme
then
good
.
Hee
must
likewise
preferre
old
things
before
new
,
rest
before
trouble
,
the
ce●taine
before
the
vncertaine
,
and
safety
before
hazard
.
Hee
may
not
breake
nor
attempt
agai●st
powerfull
common-weales
,
vnlesse
it
bee
with
great
aduantage
,
and
in
a
manner
a
certaine
hope
to
preuaile
.
For
the
loue
of
libertie
to
such
as
haue
it
,
is
so
strong
;
as
it
is
a
difficult
thing
,
yea
impossible
to
roote
it
out
:
And
moreouer
the
E●te●prizes
and
designes
of
Princes
,
die
with
them
;
but
the
resolutions
of
such
free
Estates
are
immortall
.
Hee
may
not
likewise
breake
with
the
Church
for
a
small
matter
.
For
that
many
other
Princes
,
who
would
bee
glad
to
worke
their
owne
ends
,
vnder
pretext
of
Religion
,
and
of
succouring
the
Church
,
will
be
glad
to
ioyne
w●th
it
:
And
the
Warres
of
Princes
against
Popes
,
are
of
great
expences
and
little
profit
.
We
haue
spoken
formerly
of
the
election
of
Ministers
;
we
will
adde
here
,
that
he
must
haue
a
●are
they
may
be
equall
to
the
affaires
,
not
superiours
,
nor
inferiours
.
For
that
they
which
esteeme
themselues
capable
of
a
greater
matter
,
then
that
which
is
committed
vnto
them
,
neglect
it
,
and
contemne
it
;
and
they
which
are
vncapable
,
and
cannot
discharge
the
place
,
disgrace
and
are
preiudiciall
to
those
that
imploy
them
.
If
his
Estate
be
great
,
to
discharge
himselfe
of
some
humors
,
hee
may
entertaine
a
Warre
with
some
of
his
Neighbours
:
Yet
hee
may
not
continue
it
so
long
,
as
hee
shall
make
his
Enemy
too
Warrelike
:
But
shall
make
a
peace
with
him
,
although
he
himselfe
were
the
stronger
.
For
by
this
meanes
hee
shall
giue
a
Law
to
the
treaty
,
and
may
preserue
his
aduantages
,
and
then
begin
Warre
with
another
:
He
shall
make
himselfe
powerfull
and
fearefull
to
all
,
being
still
Armed
,
and
hauing
Men
inured
to
Warre
.
This
is
the
Turkes
vse
with
his
Neighbours
,
who
hath
setled
himselfe
in
his
conquests
by
this
meanes
:
It
being
a
great
indiscretion
in
a
Prince
,
to
forbeare
to
make
a
peace
,
vntill
hee
can
make
no
more
resistance
.
For
then
all
the
conditions
are
to
his
disaduantage
:
And
admit
hee
would
not
continue
the
Warre
against
some
one
of
his
Neighbours
;
Yet
hee
may
not
wholely
relinquish
Armes
;
for
that
a
disarmed
peace
is
weake
.
But
he
must
haue
a
speciall
care
not
to
attempt
a
War
against
his
subiects
;
and
if
he
be
prest
to
it
,
let
it
bee
with
great
aduantage
,
and
end
it
speedily
:
For
the
more
the
Warre
continues
,
the
more
his
subiects
are
incensed
and
estranged
from
him
;
so
as
they
can
neither
obey
him
,
nor
afterwards
trust
in
their
Prince
.
Wherefore
he
must
not
oppose
himselfe
directly
against
a
multitude
:
For
admit
hee
should
preuaile
(
the
which
notwiths●anding
would
bee
difficult
)
it
cannot
be
without
losse
of
the
loue
which
they
beare
him
.
But
like
vnto
good
Marriners
,
hee
shall
take
aside
wind
,
when
as
that
in
the
Pope
is
contrary
;
and
shall
make
shew
to
giue
that
,
which
hee
cannot
hinder
nor
take
from
them
.
But
aboue
all
hee
must
bee
warie
in
diuisions
of
his
Estate
,
not
to
r●maine
partiall
;
and
in
the
place
of
Prince
to
make
himselfe
head
of
a
partie
.
The
Enterprizes
wherein
courage
is
necessary
,
must
be
performed
with
Celeritie
,
the
which
will
giue
vs
the
aduantage
which
wee
want
,
and
which
wee
cannot
haue
by
our
owne
forces
.
Celeritie
strikes
suddainely
;
and
against
force
if
wee
haue
time
,
wee
may
fortifie
our selues
with
that
which
is
necessary
to
resist
.
The
one
puts
an
Enemy
in
disorder
,
and
the
other
breaks
him
:
And
it
is
more
easy
to
disorder
him
and
then
breake
him
;
then
to
breake
those
at
the
first
charge
,
that
are
in
order
.
Yet
there
are
certaine
enterprizes
,
in
the
which
wee
must
vse
time
and
patience
,
not
rash
violence
;
for
that
delay
weakens
with
time
and
occasion
;
and
it
is
more
easie
to
weaken
then
quite
ouerthrow
a
businesse
,
then
to
force
it
suddenly
.
Aboue
all
things
the
Prince
must
study
to
know
the
oportunity
of
occasions
,
for
his
enterprizes
and
affayres
;
which
is
no
other
thing
but
an
encounter
of
many
circumstances
,
which
makes
that
easy
which
before
seemed
eifficult
.
Hee
may
not
commit
the
executio●
of
a●
Enterprise
to
him
,
which
is
not
of
aduice
,
it
should
bee
attempted
;
For
that
the
will
cannot
bee
followed
by
the
effect
,
if
the
vnderstanding
doth
not
incline
thereu●to
,
and
serue
him
for
a
guide
:
And
hee
which
hath
not
held
a
busi●esse
easy
before
the
Execution
wi●
find
more
difficulty
in
the
Execution
.
Hee
must
consult
naturally
of
Enterprises
:
But
,
as
I
haue
said
elsewhere
,
hee
must
leaue
the
meanes
of
the
Execution
,
to
the
discretion
of
him
to
whom
hee
commits
it
.
For
the
Execution
depending
for
the
●ost
pa●t
,
vpon
oportunity
and
present
occasions
which
vary
continnally
,
to
limit
it
is
no
other
thing
,
then
to
intangle
the
Minister
,
and
to
spoile
the
businesse
.
A
Prince
must
not
thinke
in
flying
to
preserue
himselfe
in
mischiefe
and
danger
;
but
he
must
oppose
against
it
:
For
that
in
flying
,
he
not
on●ly
followes
,
and
fa●ls
vpon
vs
;
but
witha●l
many
other
da●g●rs
grow
:
Whereas
in
making
head
wee
stay
him
,
and
then
we
repulse
him
in
time
;
and
the
danger
most
commonly
dissolues
to
nothing
.
In
consu●ting
of
an
Enterprize
,
hee
must
auoid
sharpe
Counce●l
and
full
of
subtilty
;
for
they
seldome
succeed
,
and
a
few
crosses
make
them
vnprofitable
:
As
also
those
which
haue
mo●e
shew
and
vanitie
then
a
good
foundation
.
In
the
Estate
hee
must
build
vpon
that
which
is
solid
and
firme
:
As
likewise
hee
m●st
fly
th●se
which
are
full
of
expences
,
and
aboue
his
forces
and
meanes
.
But
hee
must
fo●low
Councell
grounded
in
reason
vpon
safety
,
and
little
subiect
to
be
crost
by
acciden●s
.
Yet
he
that
assailes
,
must
hazard
somet●mes
:
But
when
the
question
is
to
preserue
,
he
must
commit
nothing
to
Fortune
.
Wherefore
slow
Councels
are
more
fitting
for
great
Princes
,
which
haue
more
neede
to
preserue
,
then
to
get
,
and
those
which
are
suddaine
will
bee
more
proper
for
conquerours
.
But
in
doubtfull
occasions
which
are
vrgent
and
precipitate
,
there
is
nothing
worse
then
slow
and
middle
Councels
.
Courage
will
be
alwayes
more
profitable
,
and
lesse
preiudiciall
,
vnlesse
they
be
resolued
wholy
to
yeeld
.
In
affaires
where
the
reasons
are
strong
on
all
parts
,
and
where
it
is
in
a
manner
impossible
to
see
and
choose
that
which
is
most
commodious
and
profitable
,
(
the
which
breeds
in
vs
doubts
and
perplexities
)
the
best
is
to
incline
to
that
party
,
where
there
is
more
honesty
and
Iustice
.
For
although
it
miscarries
;
yet
we
shall
alwayes
haue
a
satisfaction
remaining
in
vs
,
and
a
glory
outwardly
,
and
to
haue
chosen
the
best
:
Besides
,
no
man
knowes
what
might
haue
happened
,
if
wee
had
chosen
t●e
contrary
party
.
Finally
if
wee
doubt
which
is
the
best
,
or
shortest
way
:
Wee
must
hold
the
stra●ghtest
.
We
must
not
in
difficult
affaires
,
diue
into
all
sorts
of
inconueniences
,
not
in
accords
and
treaties
,
trouble
our selues
wi●h
nice
poynts
,
which
grow
vsually
in
treating
:
But
wee
must
looke
to
the
maine
,
and
to
assurances
.
I
m●ght
adde
here●n●o
an
infinite
number
of
other
rules
,
the
which
might
●e●ue
a
Prince
to
make
him
to
be
held
Prudent
in
practising
them
.
Yet
I
doe
not
hold
that
in
matt●r
of
State
,
hee
should
so
tye
himselfe
to
rules
and
maximes
,
as
he
should
not
pe●ze
and
waigh
the
circumsta●ces
,
and
particularities
of
affaires
:
For
hee
may
encounter
with
such
a
circumstance
,
as
he
shall
be
forced
to
take
a
resolution
contrary
to
maximes
.
But
the
greatest
sig●e
of
p●udence
in
a
Prince
,
is
to
be
secret
:
Otherwise
he
should
betray
himselfe
;
and
none
of
his
resol●tio●s
would
succeed
.
CHAP.
8.
Of
Cunning
or
Pollicy
.
ANd
for
that
they
make
two
sorts
of
prudence
;
the
one
which
is
guided
by
the
ordinary
maximes
of
honesty
and
Iusti●e
,
and
the
other
which
consists
mo●e
in
surprizes
and
deceipt
,
which
they
call
cunning
:
Many
haue
doubted
,
whether
it
were
expedient
for
a
Princes
reputa●ion
,
to
make
vse
of
this
last
.
Wherein
I
wi●l
speake
my
opinion
here
;
but
I
will
deliuer
that
of
one
of
our
time
,
who
hath
written
vpon
this
subiect
:
Who
holds
that
Fraud
,
Cunning
and
Deceipt
,
if
they
be
without
vice
or
wickednesse
,
may
bee
allowed
v●to
a
Prince
for
the
Pub●ique
good
,
and
for
his
defence
and
preseruation
;
but
not
to
offend
any
man
.
It
is
his
duty
,
to
procure
the
Publique
good
,
and
the
health
of
the
people
.
●his
is
the
foueraigne
Law
,
by
the
which
the
Prince
ought
to
gouerne
all
his
actio●s
.
Wicked
men
should
haue
too
much
aduantage
,
if
by
cu●ning
they
mig●t
not
repell
their
cunning
.
It
is
law●ul●
to
●●●e●d
a●
Estate
with
the
same
Armes
,
with
the
which
they
a●●aile
it
.
It
is
not
tollerable
to
turne
the
backe
to
honesty
and
●ustice
,
but
sometimes
to
g●e
about
it
and
coast
it
.
But
the
more
distinctly
to
explicate
this
,
we
will
borrow
the
disti●ction
which
he
makes
,
of
diuers
sorts
of
cunning
and
deceipts
:
Some
are
light
;
others
great
;
Amo●g
the
light
,
he
puts
distrust
and
dissimulation
.
Distrust
is
as
necessary
in
a
Prince
,
as
credulity
is
hurtfull
.
So
it
hath
beene
called
the
strength
of
prudence
;
that
is
to
say
,
to
wa●ch
,
to
beleeue
nothing
lightly
,
and
to
haue
an
eye
to
all
things
.
He
must
therefore
trust
few
Men
,
and
●hose
lo●g
knowne
and
often
tryed
.
And
yet
hee
may
not
so
slipp
the
line
in
such
sort
,
as
hee
doth
not
alwayes
hold
it
by
one
end
,
and
haue
an
eye
to
it
:
But
hee
must
couer
and
disguise
his
distrust
,
yea
,
in
di●r●●●i●g
he
must
make
a
shew
to
haue
some
confidence
.
For
open
distrust
offends
,
and
inuites
another
as
well
to
deceiue
vs
,
as
too
much
indiscreet
confidence
.
They
haue
many
times
had
a
desire
to
deceiue
him
,
whom
they
haue
found
fearefull
to
b●e
deceiued
:
And
on
the
other
side
,
an
open
confidence
bindes
some
to
guard
loyalty
.
From
distrust
they
come
to
dissimulation
,
Another
sort
of
deceipt
,
and
ordinary
among
P●inces
,
are
the
practices
and
intelligences
which
they
haue
in
the
Estates
one
of
another
;
There
are
other
kinds
of
proceeding
,
frequent
enough
in
Princes
,
to
preserue
t●emselues
and
their
Estate
f●om
their
E●em●●s
;
the
which
cannot
be
excused
but
by
n●cessity
:
And
the
Prince
which
is
reduced
to
this
point
,
m●st
know
that
it
is
a
misery
for
him
to
●ee
him●elfe
forced
to
leaue
the
ordinary
course
of
Iustice
,
for
the
safety
of
his
Estate
,
and
he
may
not
proceed
but
with
some
feeling
of
griefe
;
but
he
must
carry
●imselfe
therein
like
a
Fath●r
,
when
he
is
forced
to
cauterize
,
or
cu●
off
a
member
of
his
Child
to
saue
●is
life
.
I
will
set
downe
here
some
examples
:
As
to
put
those
secretly
to
death
,
and
without
forme
of
Iustice
,
which
cannot
be
punished
without
trouble
and
danger
to
●he
Estate
.
If
they
deserue
death
,
the
Prince
who
may
dispence
with
the
other
formes
,
may
likewise
dispence
for
the
safety
of
his
Estate
.
To
clip
the
wings
,
and
shorten
the
meanes
of
some
one
which
mutines
and
fortifies
too
much
in
the
Estate
,
and
makes
himselfe
fearefull
before
he
hath
a
commodity
to
attempt
.
T●
diue
by
authority
into
the
purses
of
his
rich
Subiects
,
in
some
necessity
and
pouerty
of
the
Estate
.
To
reuoke
the
priuiledges
giuen
to
some
one
,
or
to
some
Comminalties
,
or
particular
men
,
to
the
preiudice
of
the
Soueraigne
and
the
Estate
.
To
seaze
vpon
some
neighbour
place
,
for
feare
that
another
holding
it
,
he
should
make
Warre
against
vs
and
ruine
vs
.
All
these
things
are
in
themselues
vniust
;
but
this
iniustice
is
ballanced
by
necessity
and
publique
profit
.
Necessity
as
they
say
,
hath
no
Law
:
And
the
Prince
reduced
to
these
termes
,
must
know
not
onely
how
to
command
according
to
the
Lawes
,
but
also
how
to
command
the
Lawes
themselues
.
All
is
,
that
the
Prince
doth
not
forge
this
necessity
and
constraint
himselfe
,
for
to
satisfie
his
conetousnesse
or
ambition
:
For
in
stead
of
p●rchasing
the
reputation
to
be
wise
,
he
will
cause
himselfe
to
bee
esteemed
an
vniust
and
inhumane
Tyrant
.
CHAP.
9.
Of
the
reputation
of
a
Prince
;
and
the
meanes
how
to
get
it
.
VAllour
is
another
part
which
serues
to
reputation
,
and
it
is
of
such
importance
,
And
although
that
va●our
consists
chiefely
in
the
interiour
and
courage
:
Yet
to
maintaine
this
courage
,
he
must
haue
care
of
the
exteriour
.
A
Prince
may
well
be
couragiou●
,
if
hee
be
sickly
and
incommodated
of
his
healt●
,
and
that
as
they
say
,
his
legges
fai●e
him
:
his
cou●age
may
be
commendable
,
but
very
vnprofitable
for
him
and
his
Estate
.
Wherefore
he
must
haue
a
care
of
two
things
.
The
other
care
which
a
Prince
ought
to
haue
,
is
to
entertaine
himselfe
in
health
,
and
to
get
an
able
and
strong
complexio●
.
Sobriety
and
moderation
in
Meats
,
serue
greatly
to
p●ese●ue
●ealth
,
as
g●uttony
and
drunkennes
altereth
much
.
And
from
thence
proceed
indigestions
,
crudities
,
gouts
,
and
a●●
other
diseases
.
Continency
is
likewise
of
great
force
;
there
being
nothing
that
doth
more
weaken
chast
men
,
nor
that
debilitates
the
spirit
and
body
more
,
then
an
excessiue
lasciuiousnesse
.
The
forces
likewise
increase
with
exercise
,
as
that
of
Hunting
,
or
others
which
consume
the
humours
of
the
body
.
And
to
frame
a
strong
and
able
complexion
,
he
must
in
good
time
accustome
himselfe
to
cold
,
heate
,
watching
,
hunger
,
to
water
,
wine
,
and
to
all
courses
of
life
:
The
encounters
being
so
diuers
,
to
the
which
a
Prince
must
accommodate
himselfe
,
that
one
failing
,
sometimes
this
defect
makes
ma●y
things
impossible
vnto
him
.
There
are
yet
many
things
to
bee
done
,
He
may
not
imploy
himselfe
in
things
which
are
vnder
the
dignity
of
a
Prince
;
as
Nero
busied
himselfe
in
Singing
,
to
make
Verses
,
and
to
be
a
good
Coach-man
;
D●mitian
spent
his
time
in
Shooting
and
in
taking
of
Flyes
;
and
Aropas
King
of
the
Macedonians
,
imployed
himselfe
in
making
of
Lanthornes
;
Valentinian
to
make
Images
of
Waxe
;
Rene
Duke
of
Anion
,
and
Earle
of
Prouence
to
paint
,
Chilperic
King
of
France
,
and
Thibant
King
of
Nauarre
,
to
time
;
and
Alphonso
King
of
Cast●lle
in
Astrologie
:
But
he
shall
imploy
himselfe
to
know
his
Estate
,
and
that
which
may
serue
for
the
good
gouernment
.
The
vn●formity
of
life
in
a
Prince
,
and
the
co●stancy
in
his
commands
doth
also
breede
him
reputation
.
He
must
likewise
treat
his
affaires
with
dignity
,
and
not
by
men
which
are
of
a
base
and
vi●d
condition
.
The
basenesse
of
Ministers
doth
vilefie
h●s
affaires
,
and
the
weaknesse
ruins
them
;
and
both
the
one
and
the
other
makes
the
world
beleeue
that
the
Prince
distrusts
great
men
,
or
that
he
feares
to
be
discouered
,
inferiour
in
affaires
,
by
those
which
shall
haue
more
vnderstanding
,
or
that
he
hath
●o
iudgement
in
making
such
a
choice
.
But
he
may
not
suffer
great
talkers
to
approach
neere
vnto
him
,
nor
admit
them
to
his
secret
affaires
,
for
feare
least
they
should
discouer
his
actions
and
designes
,
by
an
itchi●g
desire
which
such
Monckies
haue
commonly
to
babble
.
He
must
not
grow
familiar
with
all
sorts
of
persons
,
nor
shew
himselfe
to
often
but
vpon
great
occasions
,
and
with
a
countenance
and
bel
auiour
full
of
Maiesty
:
And
in
his
extraordinary
ioy
heauinesse
or
choller
,
hee
shall
not
shew
himselfe
at
all
;
but
shall
passe
his
first
motion
in
his
Cabinet
,
and
out
of
the
sight
of
his
followers
:
His
habite
must
be
graue
and
modest
without
extrauagancy
,
he
s●all
auoyd
extremities
in
all
his
courses
,
shewing
himselfe
neither
slow
nor
rash
,
but
he
shall
rather
incline
to
the
first
then
to
the
last
;
for
the
first
hath
a
dependance
of
Prudence
and
●rauity
,
and
the
other
of
lightnesse
and
rashnesse
;
he
must
make
more
accompt
of
truth
then
opinion
,
and
haue
a
care
that
all
that
proceedes
from
him
may
be
great
,
accomplished
,
excellent
and
admirable
,
finally
that
he
doe
lesse
and
doe
it
well
,
that
he
suffer
not
any
disobedience
which
may
be
drawne
into
example
.
That
the
affaires
of
importance
may
depend
vpon
him
alone
,
without
imparting
it
to
any
man
what
fauour
soeuer
he
beare
him
,
as
the
authority
to
make
Lawes
,
to
giue
priuiledges
,
to
make
peace
or
warre
,
to
giue
pardons
,
to
make
choice
of
his
principall
Ministers
,
to
impose
Taxes
,
Subsidies
,
and
other
leuies
of
Money
,
to
fortifie
places
,
to
cast
Orduance
,
to
recompence
others
out
of
his
Treasure
,
to
aduance
to
Dignities
or
such
other
things
as
he
ought
to
reserue
.
By
Mag●ificence
he
may
likewise
get
reputation
,
as
by
the
structure
of
publique
Buildings
,
Pallaces
,
Churches
,
Fountaines
,
Fortifications
of
Townes
and
such
like
places
,
which
redowne
to
the
benefit
of
the
publique
.
Religion
likewise
knowne
to
be
in
a
Prince
,
imports
him
much
for
his
reputation
,
for
shewing
himselfe
to
be
full
of
Piety
,
the
people
will
conceiue
that
he
will
be
likewise
iust
,
and
that
he
will
not
vndertake
any
thing
but
with
the
assistance
of
God
:
Wherefore
it
imports
him
much
to
make
esteeme
of
Church-men
,
which
are
knowne
to
haue
probity
and
sufficiency
in
them
,
to
retaine
some
about
him
,
to
procure
a
good
reformation
in
the
Church
by
mild
and
lawfull
meanes
,
without
Trouble
,
Schisme
,
or
Deuision
,
to
dispose
of
Benefices
to
capable
men
,
to
haue
care
of
the
poore
,
and
finally
to
imploy
himselfe
in
all
workes
of
Piety
.
By
these
last
meanes
a
Prince
may
in
time
of
Peace
maintayne
his
reputation
,
hauing
no
neede
in
time
of
Warre
to
seeke
for
other
particularities
then
his
owne
valour
:
The
which
shewing
it selfe
in
occasions
which
shall
present
themselues
,
will
maintaine
▪
them
alwayes
in
credit
and
reputation
.
But
if
in
the
time
of
Peace
they
desire
something
more
of
him
,
there
being
people
to
whom
he
must
giue
a
subiect
of
discourse
,
and
busie
them
in
the
consideration
of
their
Princes
actions
,
otherwise
they
contemne
them
:
The
Prince
must
imploy
himselfe
sometimes
to
reforme
Iustice
,
sometimes
the
Treasure
,
sometimes
the
discipline
of
Warre
,
and
alwaies
to
make
some
new
Establishment
which
may
serue
the
Estate
.
Augustus
hauing
brought
all
his
affaires
to
an
end
,
and
finding
no
more
subiects
to
entertaine
the
people
of
Rome
with
his
actions
,
he
imployed
himselfe
to
reforme
the
Callander
.
So
in
the
like
encounters
,
the
Prince
must
seeke
all
meanes
to
quicken
his
reputation
in
the
spirits
of
the
subiects
,
and
to
make
them
beleeue
that
he
is
not
idle
,
giuing
them
occasions
to
speake
well
of
him
,
and
hinder
them
from
detracting
and
speaking
ill
.
Hauing
discoursed
of
the
meanes
,
by
the
which
a
Prince
might
get
or
maintaine
his
authority
;
Let
vs
see
the
meanes
and
remedies
,
which
may
bee
found
for
that
which
may
cause
the
ruine
of
the
E●ate
.
To
know
if
the
remedies
bee
proper
,
wee
must
likewise
know
the
disease
.
CHAP.
10.
Of
the
causes
of
the
ruines
of
Estates
:
and
of
the
remedies
which
may
be
found
.
Yet
let
vs
speake
something
of
the
ordinary
meanes
,
by
the
which
wee
may
preuent
a
forraigne
force
.
But
if
the
Prince
be
weaker
then
his
Enemy
which
innades
him
,
he
must
procure
him
some
greater
Enemy
,
or
many
which
may
effect
that
which
he
cannot
doe
alone
.
He
must
likewise
practise
factions
and
diuisions
with
his
Enemy
,
and
get
intelligence
with
some
one
of
his
prime
Councellors
or
great
Men
,
and
with
those
that
haue
most
authority
and
credit
with
his
Enemy
;
to
the
end
they
may
diswade
him
from
this
Warre
,
or
diuert
it
,
or
make
it
vnprofitable
,
in
slackning
the
executions
,
or
giuing
aduice
of
his
designes
,
to
the
end
hee
may
oppose
himselfe
in
time
.
But
if
the
practises
be
such
,
as
they
may
breed
a
feare
in
his
Enemy
of
a
reuolt
,
Treason
,
Sedition
,
or
a
ciuill
war
;
they
will
be
much
better
and
of
greater
force
.
Defensiue
Leagues
with
his
Neighbours
,
or
with
the
Neighbours
of
his
Enemy
,
may
be
of
great
vse
,
who
may
grow
iealous
of
his
power
.
For
the
feare
which
his
Enemy
might
haue
,
that
inuading
one
,
all
the
rest
may
goe
to
Armes
,
would
retaine
him
.
Besides
this
,
the
Prince
must
keepe
good
guards
vpon
all
the
principall
passages
of
his
Estate
,
and
place
strong
Garrissons
in
his
Forts
,
who
may
stay
the
Enemy
,
and
by
a
long
siege
cause
him
to
loose
much
time
,
and
many
men
;
and
by
this
meanes
consume
his
prouisions
,
and
waste
his
Army
,
whereby
he
may
bee
the
better
able
to
encounter
him
;
And
if
he
be
able
to
raise
an
Army
,
he
must
choose
a
strong
place
at
the
entry
of
his
Countrey
,
and
lodge
it
in
such
sort
,
as
he
may
bee
neither
forced
to
fight
nor
to
dislodge
,
to
the
end
he
may
hinder
his
Enemy
from
passing
on
.
But
hauing
neither
forces
'
nor
forts
vppon
the
passage
of
this
quality
;
or
the
Enemies
forces
being
such
,
as
they
are
not
to
bee
stayed
by
this
meanes
:
Some
in
this
case
haue
themselues
wasted
their
owne
Countrey
,
on
that
side
where
the
Enemy
was
to
enter
,
causing
all
to
retire
into
the
heart
of
the
Estate
,
depriuing
him
not
onely
of
all
prouision
of
Victualls
,
but
also
of
other
commodities
,
Mills
,
Ouens
,
Lodgings
,
and
other
imployments
,
whereof
an
Army
is
seldome
wholy
furnished
.
The
first
against
the
Polonians
,
and
the
second
against
the
Turkes
forces
,
haue
assured
their
Countryes
for
a
time
,
in
laying
a
great
part
of
the
confines
waste
.
And
the
Muscouite
being
in
a
Countrey
which
doth
abound
in
Wood
,
shut
himselfe
vp
in
a
short
time
;
So
as
Steuen
King
of
Poland
,
meaning
to
passe
into
Muscouie
,
was
forced
to
spend
much
time
in
cutting
downe
the
Woods
to
make
a
passage
for
his
Army
.
And
although
that
he
which
is
assailed
be
the
weaker
,
yet
there
hath
beene
some
,
which
haue
carried
the
Warre
into
their
Enemies
Countrey
,
to
make
a
diuersion
as
Ag●th●cles
did
,
who
being
besieged
by
the
Carthaginian●
in
Siracusa
,
resolued
to
leaue
a
sufficient
troupe
to
maintaine
the
Siege
,
and
to
imbarke
with
the
rest
,
to
transport
the
Warre
into
Affricke
.
Boniface
,
Earle
of
Corsegus
,
did
the
like
,
in
the
yeare
822.
to
retire
the
Sarasins
out
of
Sicily
.
The
which
succeeded
the
more
happily
,
for
that
the
Carthaginians
,
the
Affricans
,
who
were
the
inuaders
,
hauing
not
fore-seene
this
policy
,
had
not
prouided
for
their
Countries
.
And
it
is
a
generall
rule
,
that
we
must
assaile
an
Enemy
where
he
least
suspects
.
But
if
the
Enemy
be
so
powerfull
,
and
hath
such
an
aduantage
ouer
vs
,
as
there
is
no
meanes
to
resist
him
,
rather
then
to
lose
all
,
it
were
better
to
yeeld
something
:
And
if
he
may
be
freed
for
ready
money
,
in
making
as
they
say
a
Bridge
of
Gold
to
his
Enemy
,
he
shall
escape
good
cheape
.
The
which
hath
beene
happily
practised
by
the
Florentins
,
Venetians
,
and
Genois
,
or
else
he
must
seeke
the
protection
of
some
Prince
that
is
neare
or
farre
off
,
yet
so
as
he
may
be
relieued
in
time
,
or
the
Enemies
Estate
annoy'd
.
So
the
Capouans
finding
themselues
prest
by
the
Samnites
,
put
themselues
vnder
the
protection
of
the
Romans
.
The
Genois
were
sometimes
protected
by
the
French
,
and
sometimes
by
the
Dukes
of
Millan
.
Pope
Iulio
the
second
,
made
vse
of
another
policy
,
to
diuert
the
French
from
the
Siege
of
Ferrara
,
selling
it
to
the
Emperour
,
with
hope
after
the
Warre
to
redeeme
it
againe
for
money
:
So
as
the
French
hauing
no
will
to
breake
with
the
Emperour
,
gaue
ouer
their
Enterprize
.
There
haue
beene
some
Princes
,
who
finding
no
meanes
to
resist
,
haue
made
choice
rather
to
yeeld
to
Fortune
,
and
to
abandon
their
Countrey
,
then
to
see
it
ruined
;
hoping
that
the
affaires
changing
,
their
Subiects
not
wholy
ruined
,
would
cal
them
back
more
willingly
then
if
they
had
bin
chased
away
by
an
open
rebellion
,
or
that
growing
obstinate
to
maintaine
themselues
,
they
had
bin
punished
by
the
Enemy
:
This
succeeded
happily
to
Ferd●nand
of
Aragon
,
chased
from
Naples
by
Charles
the
Eight
:
To
the
Venetians
when
they
abandoned
their
Townes
vpon
the
firme
land
,
to
the
league
of
Cambrag
:
To
the
Duke
of
Vrbin
,
who
seeing
himselfe
▪
vnable
to
make
head
against
Caesar
Borgia
,
abandoned
his
Countrey
,
hauing
first
ruined
all
the
Forts
of
his
Estate
;
hoping
that
being
well
beloued
of
his
Subiects
,
vpon
the
first
alteration
they
will
call
him
backe
,
as
they
did
.
But
for
that
they
seeke
to
surprize
him
whom
they
meane
to
assai'e
by
force
,
and
to
attaine
vnto
it
,
they
deuise
other
pretexts
to
arme
,
to
the
end
they
may
circumuent
their
Neighbour
:
And
in
like
manner
,
when
as
two
powerfull
Neighbours
make
Warre
together
,
and
afterwards
come
to
conclude
a
Peace
,
eyther
of
them
seekes
to
free
himselfe
of
his
Souldiers
,
at
the
cost
of
some
one
of
his
Neighbours
:
The
Prince
which
shall
finde
himselfe
to
haue
such
bad
Neighbours
,
must
presently
arme
,
and
stand
continually
vppon
his
guard
whilest
his
Neighboursare
in
Armes
.
These
are
the
most
generall
and
ordinary
Remedies
against
forraigne
force
,
the
exteriour
cause
of
the
ruine
of
Estates
.
CHAP.
II.
Of
the
interiour
Causes
of
the
ruine
of
Estates
.
THe
interiour
Causes
from
whence
the
ruine
of
an
Estate
may
grow
,
are
of
two
kinds
:
Some
are
neare
,
others
are
remote
.
Among
the
defects
which
may
be
found
in
the
Soueraigne
Person
,
Some
haue
held
it
fit
to
sweeten
the
hatred
of
an
Execution
,
to
punish
the
Minister
which
hath
done
it
,
if
he
be
of
that
quality
that
he
hath
deserued
it
.
Yet
I
hold
this
manner
of
proceeding
vniust
and
tyranuous
;
especially
if
it
tends
to
death
,
whereof
they
ought
not
to
make
so
flight
an
accompt
.
Yet
a
Prince
may
in
necessity
,
hauing
no
other
meanes
to
free
himselfe
from
Enuy
,
chase
him
away
,
laying
the
fault
vpon
him
,
and
making
shew
that
●he
hates
him
for
the
same
Subiect
,
for
the
which
he
is
odious
vnto
the
people
:
But
wholy
to
abandon
,
him
were
basenesse
.
Moreouer
he
must
sweeten
rigorous
Executions
by
benefits
,
yea
,
by
gifts
out
of
the
confiscation
of
the
parties
goods
which
is
executed
,
to
such
as
be
discontented
with
the
Execution
,
to
the
end
it
may
appeare
that
not
couetousnesse
but
only
Iustice
hath
brought
the
Prince
vnto
it
.
To
remedy
the
second
,
Finally
,
he
must
make
it
appeare
by
the
expences
,
that
the
money
is
imployed
for
the
necessity
,
good
,
and
preseruation
of
the
Estate
,
and
not
for
the
Princes
ryot
or
prodigallity
,
to
aduance
men
of
no
worth
,
and
to
satisfie
their
pleasures
.
As
for
the
defects
which
ingender
the
Subiects
contempt
of
their
Prince
,
there
are
diuers
sorts
.
The
principall
remedy
is
,
not
to
shewe
himselfe
vppon
all
occasions
,
whereas
these
defects
may
bee
more
visible
.
Tyberius
finding
himselfe
not
so
affab●e
as
Augustus
,
would
neuer
come
among
the
people
to
Playes
and
Theaters
,
as
Augustus
did
:
but
kept
himselfe
close
and
retired
,
and
neuer
shewed
himselfe
but
in
great
actions
,
for
the
which
he
had
prepared
himselfe
long
before
.
So
the
Prince
must
as
much
as
may
bee
hide
his
imperfections
;
and
not
shewe
himselfe
in
publique
,
but
well
prepared
according
to
his
dignity
,
and
if
it
may
be
,
recompence
the
defect
of
nature
by
some
aduantage
of
the
mind
.
There
are
other
defects
,
which
breed
a
contempt
of
the
Prince
in
the
Subiects
minds
,
These
are
the
defects
which
ingender
hatred
▪
whereof
they
which
procure
contempt
are
most
dangerous
.
For
contempt
giues
courage
to
those
that
desire
to
vndertake
whereas
cruelty
and
a●rice
,
although
they
breed
hatred
;
y●t
such
as
a●e
fearefull
:
And
moreouer
by
cruelty
you
diminish
the
number
of
your
Enemies
,
and
amaze
the
rest
▪
and
by
auarice
and
exactions
you
make
them
v●●ble
.
But
the
most
preiudiciall
defects
are
those
which
breede
hatred
and
contempt
both
together
:
As
lasciuiousnesse
and
d●unkennesse
;
the
one
for
its
beastlinesse
,
and
the
other
for
the
scanda●l
and
trouble
of
Families
,
which
it
doth
vsually
draw
after
it
.
Wherefore
the
Prince
must
not
onely
fly
from
them
,
but
auoide
the
suspicion
.
CHAP.
12.
Of
the
defects
of
Magistrates
,
Officers
,
and
Ministers
to
the
Prince
.
THe
defects
,
abuses
,
and
disorders
of
those
which
haue
any
charge
and
gouernment
in
the
Estate
,
the
which
may
further
its
ruine
,
are
of
two
sorts
.
For
either
these
abuses
proceede
from
corruption
which
is
found
in
particular
persons
,
of
whom
they
haue
made
a
bad
choice
,
or
haue
beene
corrupted
with
time
;
or
else
it
proceeds
from
some
bad
custome
,
the
which
vnder
pretext
of
good
,
and
by
a
bad
interpretation
of
the
Law
,
or
of
an
order
made
in
the
establishment
,
hath
beene
brought
in
.
To
remedy
the
first
,
the
best
course
will
be
,
that
seeing
the
choice
w●s
bad
,
to
make
another
.
But
therein
he
must
vse
his
discretion
:
For
that
all
changes
are
dangerous
,
and
that
sometimes
seeking
to
preuent
a
misch●efe
,
the
remedy
is
found
worse
then
the
disea●e
.
Lewis
the
Eleuenth
meaning
to
reforme
France
,
If
this
corruption
may
be
easily
punished
without
trouble
in
some
of
the
principall
,
and
that
the
example
of
punishment
may
reduce
the
rest
vnto
their
duties
;
he
must
doe
it
with
seuerity
.
But
if
he
cannot
effect
it
,
he
must
draw
those
which
nourish
these
abuses
from
their
acquaintance
and
familiars
;
And
imploy
them
in
some
other
places
with
honest
men
,
who
may
serue
as
comptrolers
and
examples
to
doe
well
,
and
to
keepe
them
in
awe
.
No
man
is
willingly
bad
for
nothing
,
eyther
it
is
to
doe
pleasure
to
some
one
,
from
whom
he
hopes
for
support
;
or
to
reuenge
his
owne
iniuries
,
or
those
of
his
Friends
;
or
for
couetousnesse
,
the
which
he
cannot
well
practise
without
confident
mediators
.
Take
him
therefore
from
his
acquaintance
,
and
out
of
the
hands
of
his
Enemies
;
mantaine
him
against
the
g●eatest
,
to
the
end
hee
may
not
feare
any
future
wrong
:
There
is
no
doubt
that
there
being
no
man
to
whom
he
may
intrust
his
corruptions
,
nor
whom
hee
may
distrust
,
hee
will
bee
indifferent
in
that
regard
,
and
will
haue
no
thought
but
to
doe
well
:
But
retire
him
before
he
may
enter
into
strict
familiarity
with
any
man
.
And
so
of
a
man
how
corrupt
soeuer
,
you
may
make
good
vse
of
him
for
your
seruice
;
if
he
be
not
altogether
impudent
and
depraued
:
In
which
case
being
easie
to
discouer
his
practises
,
it
will
be
as
easie
for
the
Prince
to
cause
him
to
be
punished
.
But
if
the
abuse
be
in
the
bad
administration
of
Lawes
,
Aboue
all
in
a
reformation
you
may
not
make
a
Law
that
looks
too
farre
backward
,
and
makes
vs
enter
into
the
search
of
that
which
is
past
long
since
;
Neither
must
they
establish
an
order
altogether
new
:
But
you
must
gently
and
by
little
and
little
reduce
them
to
their
first
institution
,
and
not
pull
vp
the
Tree
to
plant
another
in
its
place
;
but
set
it
by
.
The
string
which
makes
an
Instrument
out
of
tune
,
must
be
gently
straind
,
vntill
it
be
in
tune
,
and
not
broken
.
We
know
the
defects
and
inconueniences
of
an
ancient
estab●ishment
;
but
we
are
ignorant
of
the
inconueniences
of
a
new
.
But
if
t●e
order
were
so
perue●ted
,
as
it
were
impossible
to
make
vse
of
it
;
yet
in
the
establishment
of
a
new
,
you
must
retaine
the
same
termes
,
names
,
and
qualities
of
the
ancient●
for
that
the
people
feeding
themselues
more
with
the
shew
of
truth
,
the
face
of
antiquity
in
such
establishments
hath
more
authority
with
them
;
and
nouelties
a●e
suspected
vnto
them
,
and
lesse
esteemed
.
But
if
you
cannot
retaine
the
ground
of
this
antiquity
,
you
must
colour
the
innouation
with
the
names
of
the
ancient
establishments
,
to
giue
it
credit
,
and
to
make
the
people
thinke
that
the●e
is
●it●le
alteration
.
An
aduice
which
hath
bin
practised
by
all
such
as
vnder
pretext
of
reformation
haue
sought
to
vsurpe
an
Estate
:
But
this
may
be
more
iustly
put
in
vse
by
a
lawfull
Prince
,
for
the
good
of
his
Subiects
,
and
to
facilitate
the
reformation
which
he
intends
to
make
:
In
the
which
he
hath
great
reason
not
to
ingage
himselfe
,
if
he
doe
not
confidently
beleeue
to
bring
it
to
effect
.
Besides
the
disgrace
which
he
shall
receiue
,
he
should
by
his
weaknesse
countenance
the
mischiefe
,
and
despaire
of
the
remedy
:
Whereof
I
say
that
he
ought
to
make
himselfe
the
stronger
.
The
which
I
meane
not
onely
of
an
armed
force
,
but
also
of
the
inclination
of
the
greatest
part
of
his
Subiects
.
And
if
it
may
be
he
must
so
worke
vnderhand
,
as
he
may
be
required
and
solicited
to
prouide
for
it
;
besides
that
it
will
make
his
designe
easie
,
all
the
honour
will
be
due
to
him
.
And
if
there
be
any
enuy
,
he
may
easily
discharge
himselfe
vpon
those
which
haue
required
him
.
But
if
the
Prince
doubting
the
euent
of
a
necessary
reformation
,
desires
to
make
it
rather
by
some
one
of
his
Ministers
,
then
to
ingage
himselfe
:
In
this
case
some
haue
aduised
rather
to
take
but
one
,
to
whom
he
may
giue
all
authority
,
then
many
.
For
although
it
seemes
more
conuenient
,
that
this
reformation
should
be
countenanced
by
many
,
to
the
end
it
might
carry
the
greater
waight
,
and
be
the
better
receiued
:
yet
the
diuersity
of
opinions
that
is
in
many
heads
diuersly
interessed
,
be
it
for
themselues
,
or
for
their
Friends
and
Kinsfolkes
,
in
this
reformation
;
the
length
there
will
bee
in
making
them
resolue
;
the
difficulty
in
this
plurality
to
make
them
keepe
s●cret
,
many
small
surprises
,
policies
,
and
cunning
,
which
they
must
sometimes
vse
,
to
attaine
vnto
this
good
;
and
in
case
the
businesse
doth
not
suceeed
,
being
more
difficult
to
dismisse
many
,
for
to
free
himselfe
of
the
enuy
and
shame
to
haue
attempted
this
reformation
without
successe
,
then
they
may
doe
in
one
person
:
Wherfore
it
seemes
more
safe
for
the
Prince
to
imploy
but
one
.
But
the
preseruation
of
the
order
established
,
must
be
left
to
the
care
of
many
;
For
that
many
hauing
once
found
the
benefit
,
will
not
willingly
yeild
to
leaue
it
:
And
a
multitude
being
irresolute
among
themselues
,
tend
rather
to
leaue
affaires
in
the
Estate
they
are
in
,
then
to
change
them
,
v●lesse
they
bee
thrust
on
by
some
apparant
profit
,
or
by
some
Man
of
credit
and
authority
.
Hence
it
comes
,
that
the
companies
of
greatest
authority
in
an
Estate
,
oppose
themselues
more
willingly
to
all
innouations
,
how
good
soeuer
;
And
consent
not
to
the
change
of
the
ancient
ordinances
,
although
they
be
accompanied
with
abuses
.
But
for
that
the
same
men
,
which
made
their
profit
of
the
abuse
before
the
reformation
,
continuing
still
in
those
places
where
the
abuse
was
committed
,
will
finde
meanes
sufficient
to
frustrate
●●
:
Some
haue
beene
of
aduice
to
change
them
,
and
to
imploy
them
else
where
:
and
others
to
attribute
the
knowledge
of
the
contrauentions
which
haue
beene
committed
to
the
preiudice
of
this
reformation
,
to
other
Iudges
,
then
those
of
that
body
which
they
meane
to
reforme
.
Yet
therein
they
must
gouerne
themselues
,
according
to
the
facility
or
difficulties
which
are
found
in
such
Establishments
,
These
are
the
principall
considerations
,
which
ought
to
bee
o●serued
in
a
reformation
;
besides
those
which
priuate
occasions
,
and
the
quality
of
disorders
may
breed
in
our
minds
.
Let
vs
now
come
to
the
disorders
which
proced
from
the
Subiects
,
and
may
aduance
the
ruine
of
an
Estate
,
if
they
be
imbraced
by
the
Enemy
.
CHAP.
13.
Of
the
Subiects
defects
in
generall
,
which
cause
the
ruins
of
an
Estates
ALthough
that
naturall
Subiects
owe
all
obedience
to
their
Prince
,
Peace
and
abundance
,
are
the
things
which
should
giue
a
people
the
greatest
subiect
of
content
,
and
containe
them
,
for
that
they
cannot
change
this
condition
without
impayring
.
But
the
one
in
the
end
makes
them
idle
;
and
idlenesse
being
tedious
vnto
them
,
they
imploy
their
spirits
to
thinke
ill
;
and
which
is
worse
,
to
doe
mischeife
.
The
other
makes
them
stately
,
proud
,
and
vntractable
;
who
like
vnto
pampered
Iades
,
kicke
many
times
at
their
Masters
that
haue
fed
them
.
But
in
danger
and
feare
,
they
are
tractable
and
easie
to
mannage
,
louing
after
their
owne
pleasure
,
and
fearing
at
the
discretion
of
another
,
and
neuer
iudging
but
by
passion
.
For
although
▪
that
some
one
haue
done
euill
,
yet
if
the
people
loue
him
,
they
perswade
themselues
that
the
action
had
some
good
ground
:
And
if
they
hate
him
,
although
he
hath
done
well
and
vertuously
,
yet
they
interpret
all
to
a
bad
sence
,
and
attribute
a
good
action
to
a
sinister
intention
,
and
a
bad
dessigne
.
In
all
that
which
they
affect
,
they
looke
rather
to
an
app●rant
profit
,
then
to
that
which
is
iust
and
honourable
;
And
if
in
shewe
there
be
any
thing
to
hazard
,
or
to
loose
,
although
the
end
may
bee
happy
and
successefull
,
yet
they
will
alwayes
be
of
opinion
to
abandon
that
party
.
They
neuer
imbrace
affaires
but
by
the
shewe
,
without
examining
the
importance
,
if
it
be
any
thing
remote
;
They
hate
the
present
affaires
,
as
those
wherof
they
are
most
sensible
;
they
forget
a
mischeife
past
,
although
it
bee
farre
greater
then
the
present
;
They
loue
those
which
are
turbulent
in
their
actions
and
of
suddaine
execution
.
They
vsually
slander
the
actions
of
the
Prince
and
his
Gouernours
,
and
complaine
;
Yet
they
are
easie
to
reduce
,
when
they
see
themselues
forced
to
obey
,
and
that
they
haue
no
head
nor
any
seeds
of
diuision
.
They
hope
more
then
they
ought
,
and
indure
lesse
then
they
should
.
They
attribute
to
want
of
will
and
iudgment
,
that
which
proceeds
from
the
want
of
power
and
meanes
.
They
are
desirous
of
innouations
,
and
easie
to
moue
vpon
the
first
wind
;
Credulous
,
increasing
reports
and
newes
,
and
publishing
vsually
that
which
is
most
forbidden
;
they
follow
the
multitude
,
not
knowing
why
;
full
of
Enuy
,
Suspition
,
and
distrust
:
ingratfull
for
the
benefits
they
haue
receiued
,
and
reuengfull
of
iniuries
,
yea
of
another
mans
;
little
carefull
of
the
Estate
,
and
louing
nothing
but
an
vnrestrayned
liberty
,
whereof
they
are
soone
weary
:
finally
doing
nothing
by
election
,
but
all
by
hazard
.
B●hold
a
part
of
the
blemishes
and
defects
of
a
people
considered
in
generall
:
Whereon
most
part
of
those
which
haue
attempted
against
another
mans
Estate
,
haue
grounded
their
designes
,
making
vse
of
them
by
many
practises
,
according
to
occasion
and
the
condition
of
affaires
.
And
although
there
be
many
among
a
multitude
free
from
these
imperfections
:
yet
being
drawne
together
with
the
rest
,
the
greatest
number
carries
it
,
and
most
commonly
they
houle
(
as
they
say
)
with
the
Wolues
.
One
foole
or
rash
man
is
sufficient
to
stopp
the
mouthes
of
many
wise
,
and
to
make
them
all
loose
the
course
of
reason
.
And
most
commonly
that
which
they
condemne
in
particular
,
being
in
a
throng
,
and
with
the
rest
they
like
of
,
and
allow
;
bee
it
that
wee
are
restrayned
through
feare
to
oppose
our selues
to
the
common
way
,
which
is
vsually
the
worst
,
and
sometimes
composed
of
the
most
fooles
,
the
most
imp●dent
,
and
the
most
mutinous
;
or
be
it
that
by
this
contagion
,
wee
feele
the
like
passions
which
transport
the
rest
,
and
with
the
like
heate
wee
suffer
our selues
to
be
carried
to
the
same
resolutions
.
The
Ancients
finding
all
these
pecant
humours
in
the
peoples
minds
,
to
entertaine
and
busie
them
,
But
sometimes
the
Estate
is
so
composed
as
it
would
bee
dangerous
to
entertaine
a
continuall
Warre
,
eyther
for
that
they
are
weake
of
Men
and
meanes
,
or
for
feare
that
giuing
the
commandement
to
some
one
,
he
should
get
vnto
himselfe
the
authority
of
Armes
.
The
which
cannot
be
but
preiudiciall
in
all
Estates
:
The
Prince
being
vnable
to
bee
still
conductor
of
his
Armies
,
without
hazarding
of
his
person
too
much
,
and
leauing
a
great
part
of
his
Countrey
ill
prouided
for
.
In
a
Common-weale
this
would
be
of
more
dangerous
consequence
;
if
they
doe
not
gouerne
themselues
in
that
respect
like
vnto
the
S●iffes
,
who
desiring
rather
to
make
Warre
for
another
,
then
for
themselues
,
send
forth
their
most
busie
and
turbulent
Men
to
serue
Princes
,
to
purge
the
Countrey
.
Behold
the
most
ordinary
remedies
which
are
practised
,
to
preserue
themselues
from
these
bad
humours
of
the
people
,
considered
in
generall
.
But
there
are
others
which
are
particular
,
according
to
the
diuers
conditions
of
persons
,
whereof
the
people
consists
;
and
others
which
must
bee
practised
with
a
people
Conquered
.
CHAP.
14.
Of
diuers
sorts
of
humours
among
the
Subiects
,
according
to
the
diuersity
of
their
Conditions
.
The
Credit
,
all●ances
,
and
wealth
of
great
Men
,
makes
them
vntractable
,
little
obedient
,
and
sometimes
insupportable
;
and
pride
and
presumption
giues
them
courage
to
vndertake
:
Contrariwise
the
miserable
,
are
easily
moued
to
any
insolencie
.
The
actions
of
great
Men
are
accompanied
with
violence
:
Those
of
the
poore
and
needy
with
fraud
and
malice
.
But
the
meaner
sort
,
hauing
neyther
so
great
meanes
which
might
make
them
grow
proud
,
nor
power
to
attempt
;
Neither
being
in
such
necessity
,
as
they
should
be
thrust
into
extraordinary
actions
,
they
desire
rather
to
preserue
the
certaine
,
then
to
runne
after
the
vncertaine
:
and
so
they
are
neither
transported
with
ambition
,
nor
oppressed
with
necessity
.
Presupposing
then
that
this
sort
of
Men
continue
in
their
dutyes
,
let
vs
examine
the
two
others
.
There
are
seuerall
sorts
of
great
Men
:
Many
Princes
before
they
had
any
subiect
of
suspition
of
an
Enterprize
,
Christendome
is
more
happy
:
For
although
wee
haue
seene
that
Phillip
the
second
King
of
Spaine
hath
bin
forced
to
put
his
Sonne
to
death
,
for
some
iealousie
hee
had
conceiued
of
him
;
yet
this
is
not
ordinary
.
And
the
Kings
entertaine
themselues
with
their
kinsmen
,
making
much
of
them
,
and
intreating
them
courteously
,
yet
not
trusting
them
with
all
their
forces
,
which
may
giue
them
meanes
to
attempt
,
nor
yet
crushing
nor
disgracing
them
,
to
the
end
they
may
not
dispaire
:
And
by
this
honest
and
courteous
course
,
they
take
from
them
both
the
meanes
and
desire
to
doe
euill
.
They
which
are
great
in
meanes
and
Reuenewes
,
are
the
sinewes
and
strength
of
an
Estate
,
whom
they
may
not
in
any
case
ruine
,
as
some
Ministers
of
Tyranny
haue
conceiued
,
but
they
must
bee
preserued
to
maintaine
the
Estate
.
And
those
Estates
where
there
bee
not
any
,
are
exposed
in
Prey
to
the
first
losse
of
a
Battaile
:
For
that
hauing
no
Man
that
hath
credit
to
draw
them
againe
together
,
being
vnfurnished
of
support
and
councell
,
they
presently
resolue
to
yeild
vpon
the
first
amazement
.
The
which
hath
beene
often
seene
in
Aegypt
.
Contrariwise
those
Estates
which
haue
beene
powerfull
in
Nobility
,
although
they
haue
beene
often
ouerthrowne
,
yet
they
haue
easily
recouered
themselues
.
France
and
Persia
,
the
English
and
Spaniards
,
with
those
of
Tartary
and
the
Turkes
,
haue
sometimes
beene
opprest
and
brought
low
:
But
by
the
meanes
of
the
Nobility
,
who
haue
more
courage
and
conduct
to
maintaine
the
Estate
then
the
people
,
they
haue
alwayes
recouered
themselues
.
And
to
say
that
such
kind
of
people
may
trouble
the
Prince
,
this
may
sometimes
happen
,
if
the
Prince
bee
a
Tyrant
,
which
seekes
to
oppresse
them
,
or
wants
councell
&
courag
:
As
they
whom
the
Carliens
,
and
Capets
,
caused
to
retire
from
the
gouernment
of
the
Estate
.
But
neuer
an
able
and
sufficient
Prince
,
who
knew
how
to
make
vse
of
Men
of
this
condition
,
ran
any
bad
fortune
with
them
.
The
meanes
to
make
profitable
vse
of
them
,
is
to
countenance
them
with
Maiestie
,
to
doe
for
them
in
occasions
which
may
be
offered
;
to
imploy
them
neare
his
person
with
honour
and
magnificence
,
rather
then
to
commit
his
forces
and
all
his
authority
into
their
hands
:
And
they
which
shall
be
suspected
of
lightnesse
and
inconstancy
,
to
cause
them
to
be
accompanied
by
men
which
may
watch
and
obserue
their
actions
.
This
is
the
Councell
(
as
they
write
)
which
the
Emperour
Charles
the
fift
gaue
vnto
the
deceased
Philip
King
of
Sp●ine
,
to
imploy
great
men
,
and
to
retaine
them
neare
vnto
his
person
in
the
most
honourable
places
,
and
giue
those
of
Command
to
men
of
a
meaner
condition
:
But
his
Sonne
neglecting
this
aduice
,
in
the
person
of
Don
Iohn
of
Austrea
,
drew
himselfe
into
danger
of
an
inconuenience
.
As
for
the
two
other
sorts
of
great
men
,
they
cannot
be
such
but
by
the
Princes
meanes
.
The
first
is
,
that
he
commit
not
his
forces
and
authority
to
any
that
are
borne
great
;
The
second
meanes
is
,
not
to
continue
great
Charges
,
as
the
gouernments
of
Prouinces
,
of
strong
places
,
and
of
a
great
troupe
of
Souldiers
long
in
one
and
the
same
person
,
to
the
end
hee
may
auoyde
three
inconueniences
.
The
first
,
lest
that
gouernments
by
little
and
little
be
not
made
hereditary
and
patrim●nicall
,
But
if
eyther
by
a
bad
establishment
,
or
some
bad
custome
,
the
Prince
findes
his
Estate
otherwise
disposed
,
he
may
gently
prouide
for
it
,
in
suppressing
and
drawing
to
himselfe
this
great
authority
and
power
;
or
dismembring
it
into
diuers
charges
,
which
may
depend
immediately
of
himselfe
.
And
if
he
cannot
reduce
the
Gouernours
to
such
termes
as
he
holds
it
fit
for
his
safety
,
some
haue
he●d
opinion
,
that
he
should
strip
them
by
little
and
little
of
his
forces
,
in
prouiding
for
his
places
of
strength
,
and
causing
the
Garrissons
to
be
changed
euery
three
yeares
;
and
in
like
manner
to
haue
the
Gouernor
assisted
by
one
or
two
of
his
chiefe
Councellors
,
without
whose
aduice
he
might
not
resolue
any
thing
:
Thinking
that
by
this
meanes
they
should
not
onely
preuent
the
Gouernours
Enterprizes
,
but
also
make
them
more
carefull
to
doe
that
which
concernes
the
Princes
seruice
,
seeing
their
actions
obserued
.
The
poore
and
needy
are
no
lesse
dangerous
to
the
quiet
of
the
Estate
then
great
men
,
Solon
in
Athens
bound
the
Fathers
to
teach
their
Children
a
Trade
,
vpon
a
penalty
to
be
depriued
of
all
succours
and
respect
which
the
Children
owe
vnto
their
Fathers
.
In
China
the
Children
are
bound
to
follow
their
Fathers
Trade
,
and
for
such
as
had
not
any
,
they
imployed
them
about
their
publique
buildings
;
as
Augustus
and
the
Kings
of
Aegypt
did
.
To
conclude
,
they
must
imploy
such
men
,
and
not
leaue
the
Estate
in
the
hands
of
the
needy
,
and
of
men
which
haue
nothing
to
loose
.
And
thus
much
concerning
the
restraint
of
naturall
Subiects
.
CHAP.
15.
Meanes
to
containe
conquered
Subiects
in
their
duty
.
THe
Subiects
which
haue
bin
conquered
eyther
by
force
,
or
by
treaty
,
are
vsually
more
difficult
to
gouerne
then
the
naturall
.
Wherefore
besides
t●a●
whic●
we
haue
spoken
conce●ning
the
Naturall
,
we
must
ob●erue
with
these
more
discretion
and
precaution
.
The
mea●es
which
we
haue
sayd
are
necessary
for
a
Prince
to
purchase
loue
and
reputation
,
The
Romans
erected
Colledges
and
Seminaries
,
vpon
pretext
to
ciuillize
the
Nations
which
they
conquered
;
but
in
effect
it
was
to
imploy
them
otherwise
then
in
the
Warre
,
an●
to
traine
them
vp
after
the
Romans
manner
.
And
they
which
were
best
conceipted
of
their
intentions
,
sayd
,
that
it
made
a
part
of
the
Seruitude
,
vnder
which
they
reduced
the
Prouinces
which
they
conquered
.
The
Turke
holds
another
course
in
the
b●eeding
vp
of
his
Ianizaries
,
the
which
although
it
seems
violent
,
yet
it
is
grounded
vpon
reason
and
iudgement
.
For
choosing
them
among
the
Christians
Children
,
he
fortifies
his
power
,
in
weakning
his
Subiects
which
are
most
suspected
vnto
him
.
Titus
Linius
sayth
,
there
was
nothing
did
so
much
hinder
the
Cap●uans
from
accommodating
themselues
with
Hannibal
,
then
the
priuate
alliances
they
had
contracted
with
the
Romans
.
The
Romans
also
made
vse
of
another
meanes
,
hauing
interessed
in
the
preseruation
of
their
Estate
,
the
greatest
part
of
the
neighbour
Prouinces
conquered
by
them
,
receiuing
them
into
their
Citty
,
giuing
sometimes
to
priuate
persons
,
and
sometimes
to
a
whole
Prouince
the
right
of
Burgeois●e
,
and
making
them
sharers
in
the
honours
of
the
Citty
.
But
to
reduce
them
wholy
to
the
forme
of
naturall
Subiects
,
But
whatsoeuer
the
Conquerour
be
to
bring
in
newly
among
a
conquered
people
,
be
it
Religion
,
Customes
,
Tributes
,
or
Lawes
:
the
establishments
must
bee
made
whilest
the
amazement
of
the
conquest
last
;
and
that
the
people
are
in
feare
of
worse
.
For
if
you
suffer
them
to
k●ow
themselues
,
and
to
grow
assured
;
besides
the
difficulty
you
shall
finde
to
make
them
taste
these
Innouations
,
it
is
to
be
feared
they
will
make
vse
of
it
for
a
pretext
of
reuolt
.
Yet
if
the
conquest
were
of
so
great
an
extent
,
The
third
consideration
is
,
that
you
must
send
Souldiers
which
haue
beene
accustomed
to
liue
in
discipline
and
order
:
The
which
must
not
be
so
old
,
as
they
cannot
accustome
themselues
to
the
place
where
they
shall
be
planted
;
nor
yet
so
young
,
as
they
shall
be
incapable
of
Discipline
;
but
being
mingled
one
with
another
,
they
may
liue
together
with
some
good
order
and
equality
.
Some
haue
held
that
imbarking
them
in
the
study
of
Sciences
and
Learning
,
it
was
a
good
meanes
to
make
them
desire
rest
.
Yet
in
bringing
in
the
study
of
Sciences
,
you
must
distinguish
them
:
For
those
which
may
serue
for
the
Warre
,
must
in
no
sort
be
imparted
to
the
people
,
nor
those
which
teach
to
command
:
But
onely
such
as
are
fitting
studies
,
as
Diuinity
,
Phisicke
,
Astrology
,
or
such
like
,
the
which
so
entertaine
their
minds
,
as
t●ey
ioy
in
no
other
thing
when
they
know
them
,
and
make
their
spirits
melancholly
,
depriuing
them
of
that
viuacity
which
is
necessary
for
military
actions
.
Some
others
haue
held
that
busying
,
a
riotous
and
contentious
people
in
suits
,
was
necessary
,
not
onely
to
imploy
their
minds
,
but
also
to
giue
them
meanes
to
vomit
out
this
bitternesse
and
bad
humour
,
whereof
euery
one
hath
a
part
,
without
troubling
the
Publique
:
And
in
regard
thereof
they
haue
fill'd
Estates
with
diuers
Offices
,
in
some
sort
to
content
the
most
ambitious
;
and
by
the
iealousie
of
the
maintaining
of
their
authority
,
to
binde
them
to
the
preseruation
of
the
Publique
.
But
in
the
practice
of
all
these
meanes
,
they
must
first
obserue
the
humour
of
the
people
with
whom
you
are
to
deale
;
and
make
vse
of
that
wherunto
you
shall
see
them
inclined
,
and
accommodate
your selfe
accordingly
,
as
occasion
and
time
wil
giue
you
leaue
.
As
for
the
disarming
of
a
conquered
people
of
their
forces
and
meanes
,
they
proceed
after
diuers
manners
.
as
Tacitus
writes
of
Ierusalem
.
There
remaines
the
third
meanes
,
which
is
to
hinder
these
p●ople
from
vniting
themselues
,
Some
haue
of
a
Conquered
Prouince
made
three
or
foure
;
as
the
Romans
did
of
Macedony
,
which
t●ey
deuided
into
foure
,
that
is
to
say
,
Amphipolis
,
S●lorica
,
Pella
,
a●●
P●ll●gonia
.
And
besides
this
Paulus
Aemillius
,
commanded
●he
great
Men
to
passe
into
Italy
with
their
Children
,
and
after
this
diuisi●n
,
the
Prouinces
were
forbidden
to
contract
any
alliances
one
with
another
.
Others
haue
forbidden
a
conquered
people
all
sorts
of
assemblies
,
allowing
them
neyther
publique
Councell
,
nor
Comminalty
,
nor
Brotherhood
;
as
the
Romans
did
at
Capoua
,
leauing
them
no
forme
of
publique
command
.
The
Turkes
in
like
manner
hath
forbidden
Bells
,
not
onely
to
the
Christians
,
but
through
his
whole
Empire
,
fearing
(
as
some
hold
)
that
at
the
sound
thereof
,
the
people
should
gather
together
for
some
designe
then
for
deuotion
.
The
Souldans
of
Egypt
fearing
the
multitude
of
the
Inhabitants
at
Caire
,
crost
the
Citty
in
many
places
with
trenches
,
and
broad
and
deepe
ditches
,
to
take
all
meanes
from
the
people
in
a
Mutinie
to
assemble
suddenly
together
.
But
to
hinder
a
new
conquered
people
,
from
vniting
themselues
with
others
,
besides
these
meanes
they
haue
restrayned
them
from
all
commerce
with
strangers
,
forbidding
them
to
goe
out
of
the
Countrey
without
le●ue
,
as
some
write
of
England
,
Muscouie
,
and
China
,
and
not
suffering
any
strangers
to
enter
without
pasport
,
keeping
guards
and
secret
spies
vpon
the
Ports
and
passages
.
But
if
you
cannot
preuaile
by
these
meanes
,
some
haue
bin
of
opinion
to
transport
them
to
other
places
,
as
they
of
the
mountaines
of
Genoua
,
were
drawne
into
the
plaine
by
the
Romans
.
Aurelian
transplanted
the
Daces
on
this
side
the
Danowe
;
Charlemaigne
the
Saxons
into
Flanders
,
and
the
Turke
many
people
of
Asia
into
Greece
.
These
are
the
meanes
,
whereof
they
haue
made
vse
to
preuent
a
future
mischeife
,
that
is
to
say
,
the
effects
of
th●se
first
causes
of
the
ruine
of
an
Estate
.
But
if
they
haue
beene
forgotten
,
or
proue
too
weake
to
stay
the
Subiects
minds
,
and
to
keepe
them
from
running
to
neerer
courses
to
ruine
the
Estate
:
th●n
you
must
of
necessity
,
vse
remedies
fit
for
euery
one
of
these
causes
,
to
preserue
it
.
CHAP.
16.
Of
the
neerest
causes
of
the
ruine
of
an
Estate
▪
Of
a
Conspiracie
against
the
Princes
person
.
Of
the
Causes
thereof
:
Of
the
meanes
to
auoyd
it
:
Of
the
discouery
and
Punishment
.
In
regard
of
the
first
,
the
causes
which
draw
men
vsually
to
such
wicked
designes
are
these
:
an
iniury
receiued
from
the
Prince
or
a
feare
to
receiue
one
;
the
ambition
of
great
men
and
of
fauourites
,
the
desire
of
liberty
,
and
the
zeale
of
Religion
.
An
Iniury
is
of
three
sorts
,
for
either
it
concerns
life
,
honour
or
goodes
;
and
they
which
haue
beene
thrust
on
through
feare
of
their
liues
,
haue
most
commonly
preuailed
in
their
enterprize
:
for
the
despaire
wherein
they
are
,
makes
them
to
hazard
their
liues
more
freely
,
to
saue
it
by
the
losse
of
the
Princes
,
who
seekes
to
take
away
theirs
,
running
no
worse
fortune
in
this
hazard
then
to
loose
that
which
could
not
otherwise
preserue
:
and
therefore
a
Prince
should
not
reduce
any
man
,
be
he
great
or
small
in
that
extremity
.
And
iniury
done
to
the
honour
is
great
in
a
person
of
courage
,
and
Bodille
testified
it
,
who
flew
Childeric
which
had
caused
him
to
be
whipt
:
But
of
all
iniu●ies
,
that
which
concernes
the
honour
of
Woemen
and
the
Bed
,
is
one
of
the
most
powerfull
in
such
enter●●ises
,
whereof
there
are
many
examples
;
An
iniury
which
concernes
mens
Estates
is
not
so
violent
,
and
few
men
to
recouer
their
goods
,
or
in
reuenge
of
that
which
hath
beene
taken
from
him
,
will
hazard
their
liues
:
and
yet
in
a
great
courage
,
the
reueng
of
any
iniury
whatsoeuer
is
much
to
be
feared
.
As
for
the
ambition
of
great
men
and
fauourites
,
it
doth
produce
more
conspiracies
then
iniuries
,
for
that
the
weake
although
they
haue
receiued
an
iniury
from
the
Prince
,
they
cannot
hurt
him
for
want
of
comodity
and
support
;
But
great
men
who
haue
both
the
one
and
the
other
,
and
ambition
withall
,
which
is
sometimes
no
lesse
violent
then
reuenge
,
giues
them
more
meanes
to
preuaile
in
such
designes
:
yet
there
are
seldome
such
enterprises
,
but
when
as
the
Prince
hath
suffred
some
one
to
grow
to
that
power
,
that
hee
wants
nothing
but
the
Crowne
.
Wherefore
the
first
meanes
to
auoyd
this
danger
,
is
to
humble
such
men
by
degrees
;
as
if
he
cannot
suffer
them
to
liue
without
hazard
to
make
them
away
speedily
:
As
Tiberius
did
of
Scianus
,
the
Second
is
to
appoint
successors
after
him
,
if
he
hath
no
Childeren
:
be
it
by
Adoption
or
Election
,
prouided
alwayes
that
the
Lawes
of
State
allow
it
:
But
these
successors
must
not
be
so
great
and
powerfull
,
as
they
may
haue
a●
will
to
make
the
like
enterprises
,
desiring
rather
to
make
themselues
Maisters
of
the
Estate
,
then
attend
the
succession
;
For
the
which
Augustus
knew
well
how
to
prouide
by
the
Adoption
of
successors
in
many
degrees
,
supporting
and
strengthning
his
Gouerment
euen
by
this
meanes
.
I
am
ashamed
to
put
Religion
in
this
number
,
and
to
make
it
the
cause
of
so
many
wicked
enterprises
,
as
hath
beene
practised
against
Princes
;
there
being
nothing
so
impious
,
nor
so
contrary
to
Religion
,
as
such
Murthers
.
Yet
the
Iewes
Bookes
are
full
of
such
examples
:
And
in
truth
it
is
contrary
to
Religion
,
to
beleeue
that
God
would
punish
wicked
Princes
,
and
free
his
people
by
this
meanes
,
and
that
the
Diuine
iustice
make
vse
of
such
instruments
,
as
Men
doe
of
Hangmen
,
to
execute
his
decrees
:
But
if
for
this
reason
the
end
haue
beene
sometimes
good
,
and
the
euent
to
the
honour
of
God
;
yet
the
action
in
it selfe
is
bad
:
They
be
Rods
,
which
after
the
punishment
are
good
for
nothing
but
the
fire
,
so
the
Iewes
to
hinder
the
consequence
of
such
actions
,
haue
represented
them
as
done
by
the
expresse
commandeme●t
of
God
:
And
yet
certaine
Diuines
,
fuller
of
malice
then
Piety
,
haue
sought
to
draw
consequences
from
thence
:
and
of
a
Religion
full
of
Piety
and
mildnesse
,
haue
made
an
Altar
of
impiety
,
pouring
for
the
bloud
of
Kings
and
Princes
,
vpon
pretext
of
a
contrary
Religion
,
wherein
they
haue
followed
the
proceeding
of
the
old
man
of
the
Mountaine
,
who
bred
vp
many
yong
Men
to
such
enterprizes
,
promising
them
another
life
full
of
vnspeakeable
pleasures
and
ioyes
:
who
being
transported
with
the
hope
thereof
,
exposed
themselues
freely
to
death
:
And
without
any
other
Army
,
his
Estate
(
although
of
a
small
extent
)
kept
all
other
Mo●arches
and
Potentates
in
feare
to
be
murthered
,
forcing
them
to
seeke
his
Friendship
,
and
some
to
pay
him
a
Tribute
to
liue
in
safety
:
So
as
in
the
end
the
Kings
of
Armenia
were
forced
to
roote
out
this
Race
of
Assassins
.
To
preserue
himselfe
from
all
these
sorts
of
vndertakers
,
you
must
vnderstand
,
Wherefore
many
Princes
suffering
all
men
to
approach
neare
vnto
them
,
doe
not
forbeare
to
obserue
such
as
are
vnknowne
vnto
them
:
So
as
he
which
hath
a
will
to
attempt
,
is
easily
discouered
in
lifting
vp
his
Armes
,
or
in
approaching
too
neare
vnto
him
;
and
his
constant
looke
would
be
sufficient
to
make
him
grow
into
distru●●
that
hee
was
discouered
,
and
diuert
him
from
his
Enterprize
.
Other
Princes
hauing
suspition
of
some
,
haue
purposely
cast
forth
word●
of
distrust
,
which
notwithstanding
might
be
interpreted
in
a
double
sence
,
and
speaking
them
they
haue
obserued
the
countenance
of
those
whom
they
distrusted
,
to
the
end
they
might
discouer
their
hearts
.
The
third
errour
is
the
little
discretion
of
him
that
attempts
,
as
he
that
meant
to
kill
Commodus
,
entering
into
the
Ampitheater
;
before
he
gaue
the
blow
began
to
cry
out
,
behold
what
the
Senate
sends
thee
.
For
these
words
aduertized
Commodus
,
and
gaue
his
guard
meanes
to
preuent
him
,
wherefore
Guards
are
necessary
for
a
Prince
,
not
onely
for
a
signe
of
his
greatnesse
,
or
that
being
accompanied
with
force
he
may
haue
the
more
authority
:
But
likewise
to
preserue
him
,
and
to
obserue
the
countenance
of
such
as
approach
neere
vnto
him
.
The
manner
of
passing
before
Princes
,
although
it
seemes
to
be
practised
onely
for
honour
,
yet
it
was
beneficiall
to
Pandolpho
Tyrant
of
Syenna
,
against
whom
Iulio
Belanty
,
his
Sonne
in-lawe
,
had
laid
an
ambush
in
his
house
,
by
the
which
Pandolph●
was
accustomed
to
passe
,
to
goe
and
visite
a
Friend
of
his
which
lay
sicke
;
But
Pandolpho
staying
in
his
lodging
,
to
speake
to
some
one
,
it
gaue
time
to
them
of
his
traine
to
goe
before
;
who
by
this
meanes
without
thinking
of
it
,
discouered
the
Enterprize
:
Whereas
if
after
his
accustomed
manner
,
hee
had
gone
first
,
he
had
beene
in
danger
to
haue
beene
surprized
.
The
fourth
Errour
is
a
false
imagination
,
or
an
accident
not
foreseene
.
They
which
had
resolued
to
kill
Caesar
,
seeing
Popilius
one
of
their
companions
to
discourse
long
with
him
,
they
had
a
conceipt
that
he
spake
of
the
Enterprize
;
which
made
them
resolue
to
aduance
their
designe
,
feareing
that
in
staying
longer
they
should
bee
disco●ered
.
A
word
may
sometimes
diuert
such
Men.
An
accident
not
foreseene
discouered
the
Treason
intended
against
Iames
King
of
great
Brittaine
;
and
a
letter
sent
by
one
to
a
friend
of
his
,
not
to
be
p●e●ent
at
the
assembly
of
the
Estates
,
not
giuing
him
any
other
reason
,
made
them
carefull
to
visite
all
places
about
〈◊〉
House
at
Westmi●ster
,
where
the
Prince
and
Peeres
were
to
assemble
:
Where
in
a
Cellor
vnder
the
great
Hall
,
in
the
which
the
Peeres
were
to
sit
,
(
where
the
King
with
the
Queene
and
their
Children
,
were
to
assist
in
person
)
they
found
a
great
quantity
of
Gun-powder
,
and
Fagots
,
to
blow
vp
the
Chamber
and
the
whole
assembly
.
Some
Princes
haue
gone
priui●y
armed
when
they
went
in
publique
;
as
they
say
,
Cosmo
de
Medicis
did
.
The
Turkish
Princes
after
that
Batazet
had
beene
in
danger
to
be
slaine
by
a
Der●is
,
haue
not
suffered
any
vnknowne
person
to
approach
neare
vnto
them
,
which
is
not
accompanied
by
two
Capigies
,
or
Vshers
,
who
hold
those
that
goe
vnto
him
by
the
Armes
:
And
this
custome
is
practised
with
the
Embassadours
of
Princes
.
There
are
many
other
meanes
which
are
diuersly
practised
,
according
to
the
persons
,
time
,
and
place
.
Yet
the
most
generall
is
,
to
haue
a
good
eye
to
the
Enterprises
which
may
be
attempted
open●y
.
But
that
which
is
most
to
be
feared
in
Princes
,
is
poisoning
:
the
essay
which
is
taken
of
his
Meare
and
Drinke
,
cannot
warrant
a
Prince
.
Some
haue
accustomed
themselues
to
take
Counter-poison
,
as
Mitridates
did
.
But
the
safest
way
is
to
haue
faithfull
and
vigilant
persons
about
him
,
to
haue
a
care
of
it
,
besides
the
ordinary
Officers
,
which
are
appointed
to
prepare
the
Princes
Meate
and
Drinke
:
And
these
must
not
be
knowne
if
it
may
be
,
lest
they
should
corrupt
them
,
as
they
may
doe
the
ordinary
Officers
.
He
must
likewise
haue
confident
persons
,
to
watch
and
obserue
the
actions
of
such
as
they
may
distrust
,
(
which
is
the
third
remedy
to
frustrate
the
effect
of
a
conspiracy
)
And
if
they
be
such
as
they
ought
to
be
,
it
will
be
a
difficult
thing
but
they
will
discouer
what
is
practised
.
Conspiracies
are
discouered
by
two
meanes
;
either
by
the
report
of
another
,
or
by
coniecture
.
Report
proceeds
either
from
the
little
fidelity
,
or
from
the
little
discretion
of
those
to
whom
the
Treason
is
imparted
.
This
little
faith
is
vsually
found
among
men
:
For
such
a
businesse
cannot
be
communicated
but
to
him
that
is
a
deare
friend
to
the
vndertaker
,
or
to
one
that
is
discontented
with
the
Prince
,
against
whom
they
conspire
.
To
find
such
a
Friend
that
will
willingly
expose
his
life
to
an
apparant
danger
,
it
is
very
difficult
:
And
admit
you
finde
him
,
yet
you
cannot
be
assured
of
his
Courage
,
although
you
haue
tryed
him
in
other
affaires
.
Moreouer
to
measure
a
mans
fidelity
in
this
subiect
,
by
the
discontentment
he
hath
of
the
Prince
,
were
great
indiscretion
.
For
the
vndertaker
hauing
discouered
his
intent●ons
to
this
discontented
person
,
he
giues
him
meanes
to
recouer
the
Princes
fauour
.
Wherefore
the
hatred
hee
beares
vnto
the
Prince
,
must
be
exceeding
great
,
or
the
vndertakers
must
haue
much
authority
and
credit
with
him
,
to
make
him
to
keepe
his
Faith
:
For
the
malecontent
desiring
nothing
more
then
the
Princes
grace
and
fauour
,
he
shall
haue
a
good
occasion
to
hope
for
it
by
the
discouery
of
the
enterprize
.
By
the
little
indiscretion
which
is
likewise
in
such
men
,
conspiracies
are
commonly
discouered
,
either
in
speaking
too
much
,
or
before
such
as
he
ought
not
:
like
vnto
Brutus
Sonnes
,
who
hauing
conferrd
with
the
Tarqui●s
Embassadours
before
one
of
their
Seruants
,
they
were
discouered
by
him
,
to
haue
conspired
against
their
Countrey
.
Cataline
acquainted
Fuluia
with
his
designe
,
who
discouered
it
to
Cicero
;
Diuis
discouered
the
Treason
which
he
had
plotted
against
Alexander
,
to
a
yong
youth
named
.
N●●homachus
,
who
reuealed
it
to
C●balinius
,
and
●e
to
Alexander
.
The
Treason
of
Sceninus
against
Nero
,
was
discouered
by
coniecture
;
Sceninus
hauing
the
day
before
the
Execution
of
the
Enterprize
,
made
his
will
and
commanded
Milichus
his
freed
man
to
sharpen
his
Dagger
;
he
enfranchised
all
his
Bond-men
,
and
caused
many
Rowlers
to
be
made
for
the
binding
vp
of
wounds
:
So
as
this
freed
man
doubting
that
these
preparations
were
for
some
such
Enterprize
,
aduertised
Nero
,
who
by
his
meanes
discouered
the
other
conspirators
.
In
like
manner
Spies
prying
vp
and
downe
,
may
by
the
indiscretion
,
lightnesse
,
or
malice
of
another
,
or
by
coniecture
,
haue
some
light
of
that
which
passeth
;
and
they
must
especially
obserue
the
actions
of
discontented
persons
,
and
of
such
as
may
better
their
condition
by
the
Princes
death
.
It
remaines
now
to
know
,
In
the
conspiracy
of
the
two
Legions
(
which
the
Romans
had
left
for
the
guard
of
Capona
against
the
Samnites
)
who
had
resolued
to
sacke
the
Caponans
,
the
Senate
hauing
giuen
charge
to
Rutilius
the
new
Consull
to
preuent
it
;
to
kill
them
asleepe
,
he
caused
and
commaunded
it
to
bee
proclaimed
,
that
the
Senate
had
decreed
they
should
continue
there
still
in
Gar●isson
:
So
as
hoping
they
should
alwayes
haue
time
to
execute
their
designes
,
they
deferr'd
it
.
But
when
they
saw
that
they
separated
them
,
sending
some
one
way
,
some
another
,
they
resolued
to
put
it
in
execution
as
they
did
:
The
which
they
would
not
haue
done
,
i●
after
this
first
policy
they
had
taken
order
to
haue
beene
the
stronger
before
they
had
diuided
them
.
Wherefore
a
Prince
that
wil
haue
time
to
discouer
or
punish
a
Treason
,
hee
must
cause
the
conspirators
to
haue
an
opinion
to
finde
a
more
fit
occasion
to
execute
their
designes
:
And
he
must
not
be
rash
in
such
things
,
if
the
danger
be
not
apparant
in
staying
.
For
the
punishment
is
made
for
two
principall
ends
.
The
first
is
to
free
himselfe
of
such
dangerous
persons
;
and
the
second
to
terrife
others
by
the
example
of
punishment
,
from
attempting
the
like
.
Whereas
by
haste
the
Prince
not
onely
looses
the
fruits
of
the
punishment
;
but
also
he
hazards
his
person
.
And
although
that
punishments
seeme
necessary
;
yet
if
the
subiect
or
the
condition
of
the
businesse
be
such
,
as
mildnesse
and
clemency
may
bring
more
reputation
and
safety
to
the
Prince
,
then
the
impunity
of
the
danger
,
he
shall
doe
well
to
shew
it
in
such
an
action
.
Augustus
pardoned
Cunia
three
times
,
and
by
the
last
assured
his
life
more
then
he
had
done
by
the
punishment
of
all
others
,
whom
he
had
caused
to
be
executed
for
the
like
attempts
.
The
vnexpected
Clemency
of
a
Prince
to
some
one
,
the
which
proceeds
not
from
feare
and
cowardize
,
doth
not
onely
binde
him
to
be
faithfull
,
but
doth
mollisie
the
bit●●rnesse
of
his
Enemy
,
who
grow
the
more
incensed
by
punishments
;
the
which
being
held
vniust
,
by
such
as
hold
the
same
opinion
of
the
Prince
with
the
vndertakers
,
they
thinke
●t
lawfull
to
be
reuenged
,
as
they
would
be
of
an
iniury
or
some
violence
done
to
the
Publique
,
or
to
some
priuate
person
.
CHAP.
17.
Of
the
treason
of
Places
,
Townes
,
and
Armies
,
and
other
forces
of
the
Estate
:
and
of
the
remedies
to
preuent
the
effect
.
BY
the
Treasons
which
are
practised
vpon
strong
places
,
or
vpon
Townes
of
importance
,
or
vpon
Armies
or
principall
forces
,
Estates
are
brought
to
their
ruine
.
The
onely
remedy
is
in
the
fore-sight
,
by
meanes
of
the
choice
which
they
shall
make
of
those
to
whom
they
shall
giue
the
command
:
And
he
must
haue
a
speciall
care
to
choose
men
that
are
not
couetous
,
ambitious
,
cunning
,
or
dissemblers
,
light
,
or
inconstant
;
or
easily
subiect
to
discontentments
;
or
men
that
haue
great
support
and
credit
,
and
are
vndertakers
.
Hauing
thus
prouided
for
the
Election
you
must
not
so
ioyne
the
authority
of
command
with
the
forces
in
one
man
,
as
when
you
would
you
shall
not
be
able
to
sep●rate
them
:
And
not
onely
he
which
hath
the
Authority
,
but
also
they
which
command
the
particular
forces
,
must
depend
immediately
of
the
Prince
,
with
charge
notwithstanding
to
obey
him
,
to
whom
the
Prince
hath
giuen
the
authority
of
command
,
vnlesse
hee
receiue
a
Counter
command
.
And
it
is
of
no
force
to
say
,
that
if
they
which
are
to
depend
not
wholy
vpon
him
that
is
to
command
them
,
he
cannot
answere
for
that
which
they
giue
him
incharge
.
For
if
the
Prince
trusts
him
,
hee
must
likewise
trust
;
and
watching
ouer
the
forces
,
aduertize
him
if
they
doe
not
as
they
ought
,
and
doe
not
obey
that
which
is
commanded
them
according
to
the
duty
of
his
charge
.
Some
in
like
manner
(
as
I
haue
formerly
sayd
)
haue
held
it
fit
,
not
to
continue
great
commands
in
owne
man
,
especially
in
one
place
,
whereby
the
custome
of
obeying
him
,
the
Subiects
may
tie
themselues
too
strictly
to
him
,
and
giue
him
meanes
to
dispose
of
the
Prouince
where
he
commands
.
These
are
the
remedies
to
preuent
the
greatest
treasons
:
For
the
rest
which
are
made
by
intelligences
with
petty
companions
,
as
in
corrupting
a
Centinell
or
a
Corporall
that
shall
be
in
guard
to
seaze
vpon
a
Port
,
they
may
easily
auoide
it
,
in
drawing
the
guards
by
lot
,
and
by
the
care
and
dillig●nce
of
the
Captaines
.
And
if
they
be
aduertized
of
some
practice
which
the
Enemy
makes
with
the
Souldiers
and
Inhabitants
of
a
Towne
,
they
may
cause
some
to
make
shew
to
be
of
the
intelligence
,
who
addressing
themselues
to
those
whom
they
haue
reason
to
distrust
,
they
may
easily
discouer
the
truth
.
CHAP.
18.
Of
Rebellions
,
and
of
the
meanes
to
preuent
them
.
COnspiracies
and
Treasons
are
most
commonly
secret
and
hidden
,
and
are
plotted
by
few
men
,
the
which
makes
them
more
difficult
to
discouer
,
and
more
easie
to
punish
.
Contrariwise
Rebellions
and
Factions
are
made
more
openly
;
but
as
they
cannot
be
attempted
without
great
numbers
,
so
they
are
with
more
difficulty
pacified
and
punished
;
and
doe
more
vsually
draw
after
them
the
ruine
of
the
Estate
then
the
former
.
But
to
know
how
a
Prince
ought
to
gouerne
himselfe
in
a
Rebellion
,
he
must
consider
whether
he
be
stronger
or
weaker
then
the
Rebells
;
and
he
must
hold
himselfe
the
weaker
,
although
they
were
equall
in
forces
;
for
that
he
may
not
hazard
his
authority
vpon
a
doubtfull
euent
,
as
it
is
ordinary
among
equals
.
If
hee
bee
the
stronger
,
hee
must
preuent
it
in
the
beginning
speedily
and
secretly
;
cutting
off
the
Heads
and
chiefe
Commanders
,
before
they
know
they
are
taken
;
and
then
present
himselfe
with
courage
to
suppresse
it
,
to
the
end
he
may
amaze
the
Rebels
:
And
if
he
be
farre
from
the
place
where
the
Rebellion
is
made
,
he
must
approach
;
as
the
Emperour
Charles
the
fift
did
,
who
passed
from
Spaine
into
Flanders
,
to
suppresse
the
rebellion
of
the
Gantois
,
the
which
succeeded
happily
.
For
to
abandon
the
place
where
the
Rebellion
begins
,
or
to
retire
farre
from
it
is
held
a
feare
,
the
which
blemish
and
impaire
the
credit
&
authority
of
the
Prince
,
and
encourage
the
heads
of
the
party
,
and
makes
the
People
more
bold
and
insolent
.
But
if
he
findes
not
himselfe
the
stronger
,
and
to
haue
some
great
aduantage
;
without
retiring
himselfe
too
farre
from
the
place
where
the
Rebellion
is
made
,
he
must
make
shew
to
haue
a
will
to
yeeld
to
that
which
the
people
desire
of
him
,
to
giue
them
time
to
grow
cold
;
especially
if
they
haue
no
Commanders
of
credit
and
authority
.
Sometime
a
small
matter
may
be
able
to
reduce
a
people
to
their
duty
:
And
in
such
Encounters
subtile
and
in
●entiue
spirits
are
fit
,
as
likewise
those
which
are
popular
and
eloquent
,
to
entertaine
and
to
draw
a
mutinous
multitude
to
their
duty
,
by
feare
,
distrust
,
and
hope
.
That
familiar
and
popular
course
which
Menenius
Agrippa
obserued
with
the
people
of
Rome
,
by
a
Comparison
of
the
diuision
of
the
members
from
a
humane
body
,
succeeded
better
to
pacifie
them
,
then
if
hee
had
falne
vpon
more
serious
reasons
.
The
inuention
which
Calaminus
the
Capouan
made
vse
of
,
to
saue
the
Senators
of
Capoua
from
the
hands
of
the
people
,
was
no
lesse
witty
:
For
ioyning
himselfe
to
their
party
,
and
applauding
them
in
all
things
,
seeing
them
resolute
to
put
their
Senators
to
death
,
hee
propounded
vnto
them
that
they
should
begin
first
with
him
that
was
most
odious
vnto
them
,
but
withall
he
let
them
know
that
the
Estate
must
not
remaine
without
gouernment
,
&
that
before
they
put
him
to
death
,
they
must
make
choice
of
some
other
in
his
place
.
So
not
able
to
agree
,
and
passing
from
one
to
another
,
they
found
that
they
whom
they
mean●
to
put
to
death
,
were
much
better
then
the
others
whom
they
intended
to
choose
in
their
p●aces
:
And
to
the
people
were
pacified
.
Sometimes
i●
such
mutinies
and
combustions
,
they
haue
made
vse
of
the
occasion
of
an
Eclipse
,
or
of
some
extraordinary
signe
from
Heauen
,
or
of
some
vnexpected
misfortune
;
where
with
the
people
being
toucht
and
amazed
,
suffer
themselues
to
be
perswaded
to
returne
to
their
duties
.
A
Ma●
of
authority
and
credit
with
the
people
,
may
preuaile
much
in
such
occasions
.
Soderin
Arch-Bishop
of
Florence
,
comming
f●●th
in
publique
with
his
Pontificall
Robes
and
his
Clergie
pacified
the
Florentins
,
who
were
in
combustion
one
against
a●other
.
And
as
in
some
places
Preachers
haue
beene
the
Firebrands
of
sedition
,
and
the
trumpets
of
Warre
,
in
others
they
haue
serued
to
pacifie
them
,
and
they
haue
made
good
vse
of
them
.
But
if
the
people
cannot
be
suddenly
rec●aimed
,
and
that
the
popular
mutinie
passeth
into
Rebellion
and
a
setled
reuolte
:
you
must
then
seeke
to
reduce
them
by
degrees
,
disvniting
them
,
and
gayning
some
of
the
commanders
vnderhand
,
by
promises
and
benefits
;
or
putting
them
in
distrust
of
the
people
,
and
in
iealousie
one
of
another
.
If
nei●her
of
these
remedies
will
preuaile
,
hee
must
yeild
to
that
which
the
people
demand
,
either
in
all
,
or
in
part
:
For
that
loue
and
reputation
being
the
foundation
of
the
Princes
Authority
,
if
the
Prince
in
yeilding
seemes
to
diminish
his
reputation
in
some
sort
,
yet
thereby
hee
shall
preserue
the
affection
of
the
people
,
who
being
pacified
,
he
may
by
other
meanes
recouer
his
reputation
.
And
yet
in
such
occurrents
he
may
so
carry
himselfe
,
and
vse
such
dexterity
,
that
accommodating
himselfe
mildly
to
the
peoples
inclination
,
he
shall
seeme
to
grant
that
willingly
which
they
extort
from
him
by
force
;
being
necessary
that
the
Prince
to
maintaine
his
authority
,
make
shewe
to
will
and
desire
that
which
hee
cannot
hinder
,
and
so
to
apply
his
will
to
his
power
.
And
to
the
end
he
may
make
it
knowne
that
it
is
a
thing
which
he
desires
,
he
must
seeke
to
draw
some
apparant
aduantage
for
his
greatnesse
:
There
being
few
actions
in
the
Estate
,
from
which
the
Pri●ce
either
in
effect
or
in
shew
may
not
draw
some
aduantage
;
although
in
another
thing
he
be
damnified
:
And
it
shall
be
a
part
of
Wisedome
to
shew
himselfe
more
ioyfull
of
the
aduantage
which
he
receiues
,
then
discontented
for
the
disaduantage
which
his
Enemies
sought
to
procure
him
.
The
Turkish
Emperours
although
they
be
powerfull
,
haue
beene
many
times
constrayned
to
yeeld
some
of
their
Ministers
to
the
Ianizaries
to
be
put
to
death
:
The
which
a
well
aduised
Prince
should
neuer
doe
,
if
his
Ministers
had
not
otherwise
highly
offended
;
but
seeing
himselfe
reduced
to
this
extremity
,
he
should
giue
them
meanes
to
escape
,
yet
dissembling
that
it
is
with
his
consent
.
For
besides
that
it
were
a
cruell
Iniustice
,
to
deliuer
an
innocent
man
into
the
hands
of
a
furious
multitude
,
the
shame
will
redowne
vpon
him
,
with
a
disdaine
,
and
a
distrust
of
all
others
,
whom
hee
should
call
to
serue
him
,
who
will
rather
gouerne
themselues
,
according
to
the
will
of
those
which
had
credit
with
the
people
,
then
to
his
desire
.
But
if
the
Ministers
are
found
to
haue
carried
themselues
ill
,
the
Prince
may
take
this
occasion
to
cause
them
to
be
punished
by
Iustice
,
to
pacifie
a
popular
mutinie
:
Although
it
were
more
discreetly
done
to
preuent
it
,
then
to
stay
vntill
hee
were
vrged
to
doe
that
by
force
,
which
for
his
owne
good
he
should
haue
formerly
done
.
CHAP.
19.
Of
Factions
and
of
the
meanes
to
hinder
the
effects
.
THere
remaineth
now
to
speake
of
Factions
,
for
the
last
and
most
ordinary
causes
for
the
ruine
of
Estates
.
They
are
seldome
framed
among
the
people
,
vnlesse
great
men
be
of
the
party
:
For
they
grow
eyther
from
the
priuate
quarrells
of
great
men
,
who
imbarque
the
people
on
their
sides
;
or
from
the
subiect
of
some
reformation
;
or
for
the
gouernment
of
publique
affaires
.
If
they
grow
from
particular
quarells
,
the
Prince
must
speedily
force
them
to
referre
the
cause
to
his
Iudges
,
or
to
Arbitrators
,
without
making
shewe
to
fauour
the
one
more
then
the
other
.
This
was
that
which
King
Francis
the
first
did
,
in
the
suit
depending
betwixt
Madame
Lonyse
his
Mother
and
Charles
Duke
of
Bourbon
,
who
reuolted
vpon
this
subiect
.
But
if
the
controuersie
cannot
be
reconciled
,
for
that
the
proofes
faile
on
the
one
side
,
although
that
by
strong
presumptions
,
the
fact
be
in
some
sort
apparent
;
or
if
it
concernes
the
honour
of
one
of
the
parties
in
the
decision
of
the
business
:
the
Prince
must
separate
them
,
imploying
them
out
of
his
Estate
in
some
honourable
charges
,
the
one
farre
from
the
other
;
And
hee
must
Entertayne
them
thus
diuided
,
vntill
that
eyther
their
credit
bee
diminished
with
the
people
,
or
that
time
hath
made
them
forget
,
or
at
the
least
temper
their
hatred
.
If
(
as
it
happens
often
)
to
the
priuate
quarrells
of
great
Men
,
they
adde
some
publique
pretext
,
as
of
reformation
,
Liberty
or
Religion
:
The
Prince
not
able
to
hinder
the
course
of
these
factions
,
hee
must
ioyne
with
the
stronger
to
ruine
the
weaker
:
Wherein
hauing
once
preuailed
,
he
must
free
himselfe
by
diuers
meanes
(
yet
lawfull
)
of
the
cheife
Commanders
with
whom
hee
had
ioyned
,
eyther
imploying
them
out
of
the
Estate
,
or
causing
them
to
bee
punished
for
their
priuate
offences
.
But
if
the
Prince
comes
not
in
time
to
ruine
the
one
nor
the
other
,
for
that
they
are
equall
,
and
that
his
Counterpease
cannot
waigh
downe
the
ballance
;
hee
must
attend
,
that
by
the
Euent
of
some
misfortune
to
the
one
,
they
may
find
the
weaknesse
of
that
side
,
to
ruine
him
wholy
.
Yet
if
in
this
case
the
heads
of
the
Factions
,
and
not
the
Prince
,
bee
to
reape
the
Honour
and
fruits
of
the
Victory
of
one
of
the
two
partyes
;
the
Prince
shall
doe
more
wisely
to
ballance
the
one
with
the
other
,
and
to
make
himselfe
rather
an
Arbitrator
or
a
Iudge
of
their
pretentions
,
then
a
party
:
For
that
hee
should
make
himselfe
to
those
,
against
whom
hee
should
declare
himselfe
:
and
should
not
thereby
gayne
any
Authority
or
credit
amongst
those
,
whose
party
hee
should
imbrace
,
into
the
which
hee
should
not
be
receiued
by
the
partizans
,
but
to
countenance
their
designes
,
and
not
for
any
affection
they
beare
him
,
hauing
already
ingaged
themselues
to
him
,
who
had
first
aduanced
his
standard
,
and
had
presented
himselfe
vnto
them
to
bee
their
Leader
,
and
to
assist
them
in
their
designes
;
And
they
will
attribute
to
the
credit
of
their
Commander
,
that
which
the
Prince
should
afterwards
doe
for
them
.
The
principall
Remedy
must
bee
vsed
in
the
beginning
:
For
that
when
as
the
parties
are
once
framed
,
the
Prince
must
rather
study
how
hee
may
liue
in
this
corruption
of
State
,
then
to
thinke
of
the
meanes
how
to
take
it
away
.
For
if
eyther
of
the
parties
haue
an
aduantage
,
hee
will
not
abandon
his
Armes
,
vntill
he
haue
ruined
his
opposite
:
wherein
the
Prince
shall
haue
a
double
losse
;
the
one
is
he
shall
lose
a
great
part
of
his
Subiects
;
the
other
is
,
that
the
head
of
the
faction
being
fortified
with
credit
,
he
may
cause
him
to
lose
the
rest
,
and
vsurpe
his
Estate
.
But
if
both
parties
be
equall
,
they
will
containe
themselues
through
the
feare
they
haue
one
of
another
.
And
the
Prince
hath
no
other
remedy
,
then
to
breed
a
iealousie
and
distrust
among
the
Commanders
of
one
and
the
same
party
,
making
many
equall
in
in
honour
and
dignity
,
to
the
end
they
may
not
agree
to
obey
any
other
Head
then
the
Prince
;
or
aduancing
some
of
those
which
obey
the
Heads
of
parties
,
to
greater
dignities
then
their
Generals
,
to
the
end
they
may
disdaine
to
obey
them
.
This
must
be
practised
with
such
as
haue
many
followers
.