THE LOGICIANS School-Master : OR , A COMMENT VPON RAMVS Logicke .

By Mr. Alexander Richardson sometime of Queenes Colledge in CAMBRIDGE .

LONDON , Printed for Iohn Bellamie , at the three golden Lyons in Cornhill . 1629.

I Suppose I am to dispute with a man , and bee about to lay downe euery thing to his reason : if hee grant that hee haue reason , I need no further proofe of Ens : for if a man haue an eye to see things , there must bee an Ens , which must be the subiect of it ; for else it should bee in vaine : and as our outward eye were in vaine , if there were not some things to bee seene thereby ; so were our inward eye of reason to no purpose , if there were not an ens to be seene . Now I will stand more vpon ens , because I will ground my Rules of Art vpon it , but that Reason is the proper adiunct of ens , wee shall see more plainely hereafter . Yet let vs know in the meane time , that if there be reason , it must either see something or nothing ; now it cannot see nothing but per accidens , because it properly seeth ens , as I see a man not to bee in such a place , because I see him not . True it is , that ens is the subiect of all Arts , but more specially of Logicke , Grammar , and Rhetoricke , as they are generall : for indeed Reason first seeth both it selfe , and the other Arts.

Now hauing found that ens is , it is requisite that wee should know what it is ; and I say ens est quod est . If wee shall looke at the Grammatical notation of ens , it is a participle of the present tense , and therefore is as much as quod est , euen as legens and qui , or quae legis are the same : or as in Greeke 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 verberans , or qui verberat are all one , and that the very particle doth shew . For if it be of the present tense , it is the same with the verbe of the present tense , so that ens and quod est are the same . Againe , if there be ens , as we haue already proued , then vel est quod est , vel non quod est , vel quod non est at neque , non quod est , nec quod non tst , ergo quod est . For when I say non quod est , then I put ens fictum impossibile , ergo this can no way bee ens no not in our phantasie ; when I say quod non est , then I put ens sictum impossible , and to that I giue a quod but non est , so that in the end I say , ens est , quod est , that is ; neither ens fictum possibile , nor ens fictum impossibile ; and therefore if wee will define ens fictum impossibile , it is non quod est , if wee define ens fictum possibile , it is quod non est . Now if neither ens fictum possibile , nor ens fictum impossibile be entia , then ens est quod est . And againe , when I deny non quod est , I deny est , and when I deny quod non est , I deny est , ergo , ens est quod est . Againe , ens and bonum are all one , therefore non ens and malum are all gone , therefore si ens non sit , then it is bonum and malum : ergo ens est quod est .

If ens bee , it must bee either first absolutely which is not from another , or it must be from a first , that is from another , which is not from another : againe contradiction sheweth it , for it is as if I should say , ens is non aliunde or aliunde ; that is , it is of it selfe , or not of it selfe ; and this is contradiction . But obiection may be made , that in the continuall generation of things , one thing is before another , as my father begot me , and another begot my father , and so in infinitum , ergo it is not necessary that ens should bee absolutely first or from a first . Answ. This is nothing , for am I from my father . This then hee was before I was , and I am after him , ergo here is prius and posterius , therefore here cannot bee eternitie , ergo this ens is not eternall . Againe , is not my fathers case as well as mine to bee from another , and so all men till they come to ens primum : Yes , ergo all men are from others , till wee come to this first absolute being , which is not from any other ; for then he should not bee primum : ergo ens est primum , vel à primo .

First if there be ens primum or à primo , there must bee ens primum of necessity , for if there be ens primum , ye grant it me , if there be ens à primo , ye must also grant ens primum , therfore ens primum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 primum , and maximè intelligibile , therefore Atheists are here to be confuted , for they may sooner doubt whether they themselues bee , then whether God bee , for if they bee entia à primo , they must first know him , that is primum , before they can know themselues , for the cause is before the effect . Quod est seipso , it must be being either seipso or aliunde , if aliunde , ne primum , for that from which it is , is prius vnto it , ergo est seipso . Obiect . Bellarmine saith that God is not seipso , neither any creature whatsoeuer , for then he saith , the same thing would be the cause of it selfe , and the effect . Resp. It is a meere sophisme , or rather an Amphibolia of the phrase . For when we say God is seipso , we doe not meane that he hath causes , but we meane priuatiuely that he is not aliunde , and est seipso , and est 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are the same , it is quod est , and so est seipso .

If he be seipso , them he is without causes , that that is absolutely first must haue no causes , for then it is not absolutely first , ergo there can bee no scientia of him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , for tunc scire dicimur cum causas scimus . Againe , first if he haue no causes , hee hath no end , ergo hee is not made for an end , ergo there can be no art of him to guide him to an end . So that wee finde in this respect that ens primum cannot bee the subiect of Art ; Euery art is to guide the thing whereof it is an art to it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . Againe , it euery art doth lay forth the causes , effects , subiects and the proper adiuncts of a thing , for if it haue no causes it can haue no qualities , and God hath none of these , ergo hee is not the subiect of Art . Hence againe , as this ens is beyond our reason , so hee is beyond our speech , either Grammar or Rhetoricke , so that concerning this ens primum , whatsoeuer we thinke or speak it is imperfect . Now bring it to our Logicke after another sort , and we shall see this ens to be beyond Art . Our Logick bringeth vs first to a first efficient , & in the resolution of any thing we go so far , as in the end we find a first efficient . Now this first efficient hath nothing before it , ergo that is beyond our reason , therfore what that is wee cannot tell , and therefore if wee shall make him an effect to looke out his causes , we shall not make him first , ergo hee is beyond all art ; then againe there is no art but is an eternall rule in the Idea of God , as a precept of that thing whereof it is an art to guide it to its Eupraxie , therefore if there should be an art of him , there must bee a former ens which must haue the Idea of it , to shew how this ens primum was made , and whereby it must bee gouerned : so that he is not the subiect of our reason ; so that whereas I said before , that ens was the subiect of our reason , here I recall it , and say that primum ens is beyond our Logick : and therfore he being beyond all art , wee will goe them ouer more briefly , till we come to ens à primo . First then , he is without efficient , for he is without causes , ergo hee is vncreated : for the first matter , though it were without matter , and forme , yet it had an efficient , and an end , ergo was created : then againe , he is seipso , ergo he must be vncreated , hence also hee cannot be annihilated , neither generated , nor corrupted : againe , hence he is independens aliunde , and therefore supremum : againe , hence he is without matter : Now if hee bee without matter , therefore he is without genus , ergo is not a species either subalterna , or specialissima . Againe , if hee bee without forme as without genus , then he cannot be defined , ergo he must bee without limitation of essence , ergo without limitation of quantity , ergo without limitation of place , and because he is without beginning from any other thing , therfore he is without any duration , and because hee is without any matter , ergo hee is truely spirituall , for so wee account things spirituall , according to the subtlenes of their matter , but he hath no matter at all : againe he being without matter and forme , ergo can be no membrum , because euery member containeth a portion of matter and forme , neither can he be an integrum , because that consisteth of members , which containe part of matter , and forme . Now in that he is absolutely first , therefore he can be but vnum , for else there should be more : againe if there should bee more then one , then the one would say as well as the other , I am as forward as thee , and so none could be absolutely first . Againe he is no genus , for that is an vniuersall , or Synopsis of many together , whereas he is but one : so that now he is not properly an ens , but an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and aboue our Logicke : againe , in that hee is absolutely first he must needs bee without accidents ( to vse their terme ) without adiuncts , for they are second things arising from their substances , and in absolutè primo ente there must be nothing , but that which is absolutè primum : so that here we see his most simple being , and that he is beyond our Logicke . Now if he be without all potentia , both essentialis , and accidentalis , hee is pure act ; so that this act now of his must needs be his essae , because he is pure act , for if he bee agere , then his esse , and agere are the same : so that if any one doth any thing , as euery ens à primo doth by potentia , it is not pure act : some say the Angels doe agere per essentiam , but it is false , vnlesse they meane that they act first by potentia : now indeed there is nothing , but it doth act per facultatem essentiae . First the forme , that is the beginner of act , and when it acts vpon matter internall , that is habituall , or a faculty , when it acts by the matter vpon some externall obiect , that is an act ; for first there is the essence , the matter , and the forme , them the faculty , the formes act vpon the matter internally ; lastly , the act , which is of the forme , by the matter externally : now these are not in God , but are his very essence . Now we find then , that this primum ens must be actus , & purus actus , because there is no potentia in him at all , ergo it must needs bee , that he is primus actus , ergo optimus actus , for primus actus , and optimus actus are all one : Againe hence it must needes follow , that if there bee any act of other things , it must needs bee from him , and therefore if there be any thing actu it must be from him : so then thus we haue found him absolute in euery thing .

Now to returne to the first Syllogisme . If there be reason , there must bee an adaequatum subiectum of it , ergo ens à primo , for we haue heard that ens primum is beyond our reason , so that there must be ens à primo , which is adaequatum subiectum rationi , , and that now is liable to all our Logicke , for it hath causes , effects , subiects , adiuncts , &c. and thus we will goe on , and see all the subiects of the arts in the concretion of ens à primo , which the Philosophers say , cannot bee demonstrated .

That we might dig deepe , and lay our foundation of Arts sure , I haue shewed that there is a being , and that it is double , the one from whom art is , the other in whom it shines , now we heard that ens est quod est , which is nothing but the true notation of ens resolued by Grammar quod est . Now for the continuall succession of things which some dreame of , this it is , if all things bee effects , there must bee so many causes , ergo in the end wee shall come to a first cause , that is not effectum : Further wee heard that ens primum , was quod est seipso , that is without any other : so that in propriety hee is neither essentia , nor ens but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . Hence he neither hath causes , neither is any argument that doth arise from causes , ergo is an indiuiduum , but not a species : hee is without end , ergo he is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : hence he therefore was neuer made , ergo he made all things : hee is without definition , distribution , and properties , because he is without causes , ergo there can be no art of him , but he must bee the Author of art , as wee shall heare hereafter . He is merus actus , because hee is without all potentia , both substantialis , and accidentalis , againe hee is primus actus , ergo optimus actus , ergo whatsoeuer is well done of any thing is first from him , againe he is infinitus actus , ergo able to doe any finite thing , yea , and infinite .

First we proued before , that there is ens à primo , for proprium , & adaequatum subiectum rationis est , at ens à primo est proprium & adaequatum obiectum , rather then subiectum rationis , ergo , Est à primo , that we heard before , for it cannot bee of it selfe , for then it should bee absolutely first , ergo not the subiect of our reason , ergo it is aliunde , ergo it is in the end for him that is not aliunde . Propter primum , euery ens à primo is made , ergo for an end , ergo at last propter primum , as propter finem : Againe optimus actus must doe nothing in vaine . It is a rule of nature in schooles , that God , and nature nihil agunt frustra , which indeed is a generall rule of Logicke applyed to two speciall arts , naturall Philosophie , and Diuinitie . Now then at last wee shall finde euery thing to be made , for that which was neuer made , ergo propter primum ens .

Obiect . But some things might bee made for things at are made .

Answ. I suppose mediately , yet when all things are effects , ergo made for an end , at length wee shall come to an end , that is not an effect , as all creatures are made for man , and man also being made , is therefore for an end , ergo for God : hence therefore we see that ens à prima is propter primum , ergo euery ens à primo hath his vigour , or impulsus from his first efficient whereby it is set forth to his end , so that the Lord hath shot out euery ens à primo as it were an arrow out of his bow to act his end : so that the vigour and impulsus of euery ens à primo , which it receiues from God , is that it may shoot at it end , ex nihilo , because there was onely a first efficient before it , for if it were ex aliquo , then there should be more firsts .

Ob. But how can something be made of nothing .

Ans. God is infinite both à parte aute , and à parte post ; ergo hee can make things of nothing , which haue an infinite distance à parte ante , though not à parte post , for so euery creature is infinite .

Ens à primo must bee both like , and vnlike primum : so the world is one , ergo like God , it is made of many simples , ergo vnlike him : so euery thing is one , ergo like God , but is concretum , ergo is vnlike him : so that euery creature must take a blow of God , as Iacob when he wrestled with the Angel tooke a blow on the hip , though hee ouercame , whereby he was made lame . Againe our Logicke tels vs first of simples , and then of the disposing of them , therefore ens à primo must be concretum of simples , because it must be liable to our reason ; so that as before there was ens , because there was reason , so here this ens , which is the subiect of our reason must be concretum , because I must see it with my eye of Logicke . This concretum is of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the reason of it is this , this ens though it be for God , yet it is mediately for man , as wee may see through all the creatures of God , ergo wee thus conclude , that euery thing was made for man , and man for God ; for wee know that euery thing consists of matter , and forme , and the end of the matter and forme of a thing is to make vp the effect , and thus wee say , euery thing is it owne end . Now then in euery ente à primo , there must be an actus to cary it to man , and an actum , that is , that that is caried , that that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is actus , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the actum , or that which is caried . So wee know that Logicke caries from the thing to man , and speech from man to man , that which he hath to seene with his Logicke . By actus I meane that which doth make the thing actually to bee caried to mine eye : so that it cannot come to me , but actu , by act , and it must bring the actum : now this actus is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; for as colour acts the externall thing to my externall eye , and is about the thing , so this actus doth to my reason , and is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that is , about euery thing , and is an obiect of my eye of reason , though it ariseth from the thing , and flieth about it . Now this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth , concrescere both with it selfe , and with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : so that Logicke is concrescus with Logicke , and with Grammar , and Rhetoricke , &c. And hence it is called commune , because it is concrescens with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and with euery concretion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , So that it is concrescens cum seipso , & cum omnibus alijs concrescentibus . Now that that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , is the Logismos of the thing , or the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of it , and these are the actus of the thing : for I see euery thing by my Logicke , and that sees nothing but arguments , axioms , syllogismes , and method ; ergo , I can see nothing but that that it doth thus dictate to my reason ; ergo , Logicke doth act the actum , or that which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to my reason . Now then there must be reason in euery thing , because I am to see euery thing by my Logicke , which is the rule of reason , ergo all things must be lyable to it , ergo it must apprehend the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in euery thing . Again , there must be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in euery thing , because though all things at the beginning were made for one man , yet by reason of sinne since his fall , one cannot see all things , therefore there must be a carrier from one man to another , that which one man sees with his eye of Logicke , hee may vtter it to another : so that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is actus rei ad hominem , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is actus rei ab homine ad hominem .

Now this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is eyther loquentia or eloquentia : the reason of this distribution is this , wee heard before that speech was a carrier from man to man ; and because things that are reported , are not so easily receiued , as those which are seene by our eye of Logicke , ergo it was requisite that there should not onely be an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , whereby things might be vttered , but also a fine sugering of them with Rhetoricke , for the more easie receiuing of them .

Eloquentia is eyther more fine or more graue ; that is , soluta , or ligata : the reason is this , argumentum is artificiale , or inartificiale : now because speech is an inartificiall argument , and so not easily receiued , therefore Rhetoricke serues to deliuer the matter more soberly and grauely ; and Poetry yet makes it more fine , where all things must be done by measure and sweet sounds .

So that now we see how these generall Arts are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : and that they are not of so great necessitie in respect of the thing , as in regard of vs for our good : for , so as euery thing is made for man , so he must see them for his good , by that rule that they are created .

These now though they be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , because they are circumstantiall , yet they are ab ente primo , because there are causes , effects , subiects , adiuncts , &c. and speech in ente à primo .

Now the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is eyther quantitie or qualitie , the reason is this , euery ens à primo is finite , ergo must needs haue limits of quantitie , if he haue limits of essence .

Quantitie is eyther discreet , or continued , for if euery thing be finite , then it must be discreet , or distinct from any other . Againe , as it is discreet , so it is continued , so farre as the forme extendeth the matter , whereby wee may see how farre it reacheth , and where it reacheth not . Now as there is quantitie , so also there must be qualitie in euery thing , for there is no ens à primo that is pure act , ergo it hath a forme acting vpon a matter , & thence proceed all quantities . Againe , it being made for an end , must therefore act vnto its end .

Qualitas est natura , & bonitas , euery thing hath nature , because it hath a matter and a forme , ergo there is nature in euery thing . And therefore Ramus saith , Forma est praecipua rerum natura : and the Philosophers call forma principium actionis , and materia principium passionis .

Now this ens being of this scantling for quantitie , and of this nature for act , must be good for Gods glory : so that euery thing hath a goodnesse in it . Againe , were all things made for man , and must hee see them with his reason ? Yes : ergo they are good for him : ergo hee must haue a will to imbrace them as bona , as well as an eye of reason to see them as vera , and so man also is made for God , as his will acts goodnes .

Now for the order of these , actus is before actum : for the one is actio , the other is passio , and actio is before passio , and is more excellent then it . Againe , actus doth concrescere with it selfe , and with the actum that is in the thing : ergo , actus is more generall ; ergo is before actum .

Againe , because wee doe not giue names to things but with reason from some argument of Logicke in the thing : and againe , because there must be an actus from the thing to man , before there can be an actus from man to man , therefore the Logismes in the thing must be before the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in it ; ergo Logicke is the most generall , and first in order of all arts .

Of those things that are acta , quantitie is first , because it ariseth nexly from the matter , and forme of a thing : for first of all the matter , and forme limit the thing , when they are put together , before they act any thing , and afterward they act one vpon the other . Now qualitie , that is the act of the forme vpon the matter ; ergo , it is after quantitie , but before goodnesse , because that is the end of natures act . For seeing quantitie ariseth immediately from the matter and forme of a thing , and nature from the act of the forme vpon the matter : therefore goodnesse must be the last , as being the end of all the former : and thus did the Lord make all things , first making the causes effects of things , then imposing speech on them , then number , then measuring them by Geometrie , how farre their magnitude should reach , and where it should not reach , before it should act . Now this act of Nature was to goe no further vpon externall obiects , but onely be acted by the forme vpon the matter ; whereas the morall act of goodnes was to goe further , for that is for God . Againe , Nature is the next inmost thing to quantitie , and Goodnes is last . And thus haue we seene all that is in ente à primo , which is the ground of all Arts.

Now wee are come to Arts , and first wee are to beginne with Encuclopaidia , and the definition of it . First for the name , it is Orbis ille , & Circulus Artium . The reason of it indeed is as much as Arts quite through , as wee vse to say when there are many poore folke to bee serued , though they stand in a long row , Haue you serued them round ? But there is a further reason of it , A circle wee know is a round line , whose beginning and end meet together in a common point ; therefore this learning in a Circle must be shewed to haue a common point , and that wee shall easily finde . The proper subiect of Art is Ens à primo , because we heard , that was made for an end . Now then from whence Ens à primo had his beginning , from thence must Ars haue his beginning : But from Ens primum it had his beginning , ergo . Againe , as Ens à primo hath for his beginning Ens primum , so it must haue Ens primum for his last end , because Ens primum is not made for any end , but is the last end of all things it selfe , ergo hee must also be the last end of Arte : Then here wee finde , as Ens primum is the beginning of Art , so also hee is the end of Art ; because he is the beginning , and end of those things that are the subiects of arts ; therefore there is one common point wherein they begin and end : ergo hauing the same beginning and end , here is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . Now howsoeuer the phrase may seeme otherwise , as wee heard before , yet here wee see the wisedome of God in this name , though the Graecians did not know the reason of it when they gaue it . Now the Scripture seemeth to witnesse this truth . For the Lord saith , I am the beginning and the end : that is , of things . And againe , I am Alpha and Omega : these belong to Grammar , ergo to Art , ergo hee is both the beginning and end of things , and the Alpha and Omega of the Arts.

That this wisedome is round , we may also see in regard of the subiect ; for the World is round , and that is the subiect of Art : ergo Art is so , for Art is an adiunct to it , and euery adiunct takes figure of his subiect . Againe , if we will take Art for Knowledge , Knowledge is in a mans head , and that is round , so Encuclopaidia is euery way in circulo : and thus wee see the reason , why this name should bee giuen to a Chaine , whose linkes are the Arts. Now if Ens primum be the cause of entia à primo , then he hath the Idea of them in him : for he made them by counsell , and not by necessity ; for then he should haue needed them , and they haue a parelion of that wisedome that is in his Idea . Again , it must needs be that this wisedome is his , because hee gouernes them by the rules of Art , for so euery rule of Art is a Statute-law of God , by which hee made the things , and whereby hee gouernes the things , whose art it is . Now seeing it is so , therefore this Law hath God for the author , and looke what Idea was in the making of the thing , the same Idea is in the gouerning of it : for if the Lord should make it by one rule , and gouerne it by another , it would not serue the turne to guide the thing to the eupraxie , whereunto it was made . So that hence it followes , that euery rule of Art is eternall . Againe our rule of Logicke tells vs , that euery rule of Art is most true , and therefore is from God . For so euery rule is true , as it answers to that Idea that is in him : and is most iust , most wise ; ergo is from God , who is most true , most iust , and most wise . Now it is in God as in the fountaine , & it is in the creature too , but there it is by a refraction : for this wisedome comming to the creature , according as the creature is , such is the Arts order and course . So that if ens à primo be diuided into parts , this wisedome also will be diuided into parts : and as in a Looking-glasse that is broken , looke how many peeces it is broken into , so many images shall you see : So for the Arts , looke into how many parts the thing is diuided , into so many parts will the Art be distributed .

Q. What is the next subiect of Ars in the thing ?

A. The Frame , as the tearme shewes : for so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Greeke signifieth fabrica of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , because it is seene in the frame of the thing : so that the frame of the thing is taught in the Art . So when I say Dialectica est ars bene disserendi , I doe not define Logicke , but I define the frame of reason : so that the parelion is the frame of the thing , and thence are the Arts written , and by the Art wee see the frame : so then Encuclopaidia is the wisedome of God in the thing , ergo the subiect of Encuclopaidia is Ars , that is the Frame of things .

The Chaine Encuclopaidia is not a genus to ars , no more then a Chaine is a genus to the Linkes , but an integrum : for as a Chaine is an integrum , and the Linkes membra ; so Encuclopaidia is an integrum , and the Arts are the members that make vp the whole . Now as the linkes must be linked together , before there be a Chaine : so the Arts must be holden together , before there bee Encuclopaidia : so that euery Art is a linke , and they must be linked together to make vp the whole . Therefore I say , qua continentur , as parts , continentur à toto .

For Arts may be holden together ; for there is that communitie among the Arts , for Ars in genere is genus to them all : Therefore as Tully saith , they haue a certaine common kinred , as being species of one genus : but this holding together is after another manner then linkes in a Chaine ; namely , pro subordinatione finium : Therefore they are not holden together confusedly , and as they come to hand , but euery one must haue his ranke according to the generalitie of the end thereof . So that if wee linke Grammar on the Chaine before Logicke , wee doe not right : and so in like sort for the other Arts.

I say , qua omnes artes , because as a Chaine that hath not all his linkes , is not perfect , because it wants some parts : so the Chaine of Arts will not be perfect , if there be any wanting ; the rule of Logicke teacheth vs so much : for Encuclopaidia is a totum , ergo if any membra be wanting , there will not be a totum made vp . And thus we haue heard the definition of Enculopaidia . Now the subiect of it is Ars , as the notation of it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sheweth : and this wisedome of God is one in him , but is made various in the thing .

First for the word Ars. For the Latine tearme diuers haue diuersly sought for the notation of it . Some say it commeth of arctus a Sinew : some of arx a Tower . Now those that say it comes of arctus a Sinew , giue this reason , Because the sinew is the strongest part in a man : for though the bones be stronger in some respect , yet because they will breake , whereas the sinew will bend , ergo the sinewes are stronger , so the arts in a thing serue to strengthen it for its Eupraxie . If it come of arx a Tower , wee know that it is impregnable for the matter and building , and for the forme also it is excellent , and so the strongest thing in the world : so the Arts are for matter inuincible , for forme most goodly .

Ars in Greeke is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which signifieth Fabrica , of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Fabrico , because it is seene in the frame of the thing . But , as wee heard , the frame of the thing is the subiect of Art : and when I say , Logica est ars bene disserendi , I doe not define Logicke , but the frame of reason , as it hath framed man : so when I say Grammatica est ars bene loquendi , I describe speech as it is to be framed . And therefore when wee call it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , it is a Metonimie of the Subiect for the Adiunct . So that here wee may see , that Art is the wisedome of God , but yet as it is energetick in the thing , so it is called Ars , So that marke this , that Art is the Law of God , whereunto he created things , whereby he gouerneth them , and whereunto they yeeld obedience : for by their obedience wee come to see this frame ; therefore this Art is Gods wisedome , as it is resplendent in the things , which is but as a drop of water to the whole Ocean sea , in respect of the infinite wisedome that is in him . Marke this well , for the Schooles runne into many absurdities , whilest they haue thought that Art is in a mans head , and not in the thing .

I make no genus of it , for it is genus summum in its kind , as Ens also is .

Ob. But the Schooles say Art is an intellectuall vertue , ergo hath virtus for his genus .

Ans. It is no genus of Art , neither is Ars quatenus it is Art in the thing a vertue ; but as it is scientia in mans head , so indeed it belongs to the Ethickes : for if virtus were a genus to Ars , vertue belongs to Ethickes : and so by this reason , Ethickes should be the most generall Art , and also by that reason Ethickes should be vnder Ethickes : for virtus intellectualis is but a little part of them , therefore this is fallacia accidentis , as they call it .

Againe , to call it an habit as Aristotle saith it is , and as the Schooles make it , that conceit is very simple , for habitus or quantitas habitualis belongeth to Logicke , and is nothing but a speciall kinde of adiunct : therefore Aristotle doth define homo to be genus rationale , whereas wee know genus is but an adiunct animal , which is the genus of homo : so that it is not Art in the thing , but the knowledge he hath of it , which is adioyned to man . Now wee haue heard , that Art is the wisedome of God , in ente à primo , and the frame of the creature is in the antitype of this wisedome , and is a subiect of Art . I say Ars est quae constat , though it be the frame of the thing . Now constare is to stand together in parts .

Q. How come Arts to haue parts , being but that one wisedome in God ?

Ans. Not in regard of God , but in respect of the frame of the thing where wee see it . For euen as Gods Mercy and Iustice are one , but various in respect of the obiect : It is Mercy to him that comes before him in Christ ; it is Iustice to him that appeares before him without Christ : So Art is one in God , but is various in respect of the various worke it hath wrought in the creation of things , and that it acteth in their gouernment to their end . Againe , those parts must constare , for in the frame of the thing the subiects of the Arts doe constare , ergo this wisedome following them must constare in his parts : and as one thing hath his frame , and another his , differing from the other ; hence the precepts of Arts must be various , and must constare one with another ; hence it followes , that in Art wee must haue no rules but those that will constare , and are essentiall to it . So that if wee bring a rule af Grammar into Logicke , or è contrá : or if wee leaue out of Logicke some essentiall rule to it , it will not constare : againe if the rules of Art be disordered , they will not stand together : therfore when I say constare , I say two things , first that euery Art must haue all the rules , that are essentiall to it , and no more : & secondly , that euery precept must be placed in his due order , and rancke . For as a Painter that makes the picture of a man would make it verie deformed , if hee should set the head where the feet should bee , or contra : so were it as absurd for an Artist to disorder his Art .

Euery thing hath his speciall acts before it can work that maine act , for which it was made , as reason must haue two parts , it must see the simple causes , effects , subiects , adiuncts , &c. and Axiomes , Syllogismes , and Method , that it may benè disserere , therefore there are many pettie acts of reason to be performed , which though they all conspire in one maine act , yet are they not one another : and here we see , that as Arts did arise from the frame of the thing : so the precepts of Art are from the Acts of things : so that thus Arts constant praeceptis or regulis , all is one , both are good , & regere is as large as regula , and praeceptum as praecipere . But my reason why I rather chuse praeceptum is this , because regula is tropicall , for it is often taken for a Square or Rular , whereby we rule any thing , and this is a grand Synecdoche . And againe , because the Lord hath created , & gouerneth his creatures by the precepts of arts , as by so many statutes , or Commandements of the things act for his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as at the Creation , when the Lord said , Let there be light , by this rule , as by a Precept did the Lord create light , and also gouerns it . It is a Law as God gouernes reason , speech , quantity , &c. by the rule of Logick , Grammar , Mathematicks ; and euen as a King gouerneth his Dominions by his Lawes : so the Lord gouerneth his Creatures by the rules of Arts : and because the Creation began with Commandements , therefore we still hold it , and they may bee called Lawes , Statutes or Commandements , &c. euen as the Lord calleth his Lawes for man Commandements . Againe I rather call the rules of Arts praecepta , then regulae , because they being shortly deliuered are as so many short directions for the guiding of the thing to the end thereof .