A COMBAT , is a single fight of one man against another , for trial of truth , either els of diuers men , as two , foure , sixe , tenne , or more , equallie and indifferentlie agreed vppon , to fight on horsbacke or foot without aduantage , in number of persons , or disequalitie of weapons .

These kind of fights seeme to be first vsed of great Princes , who desiring to end publique Contention and warre , did mutuallie consent to determine the same by their owne priuate vertue and aduenture of life , as did Golias and Dauid , the Horatij and Curiatij , with diuers other , who fighting onlie in person , for the publique cause , therby saued the effusion of much bloud , and the liues of many most worthie Captaines and valiant Soldiers . And albeit the cause and occasion of these Combats , was publique respect , yet each particular Gentleman or other person professing Honor and Armes , ought sufficientlie bee moued therevnto for defence of his owne particular reputation ; which respect , and haplie also some publique occasion , mooued the Combat of Aeneas with Turnus , of Menelaus with Alexander , of Pulfius with Varenus , of Robert Mountfort , with Henrie Earle of Essex in England : yea , Kings and Princes haue of late time done the like , as Charles the third , King of France , with the King of Hungarie , Alfonso King of Spaine , with Richard Earle of of Cornwall , and King Alfonso with King Ranier .

These particular fights were first vsed among the people called Lombardes , as appeareth by the lawes written by Aliprandus one of the Kings that gouerned that Nation : yet true it is , that the Combats of those People , and in that Age , were tried with no other weapons but onelie certeine shields and staues of wood , vnlesse it were for cause of infidelitie . Neither seemeth it that the chiefe occasion of their fight was respect of Honor , nor that the vanquished should become dishonored , or Prisoner vnto the vanquisher , as since hath been vsed .

FIrst is to bee considered , that all Iniuries are either by words or by deeds , and that in euerie Iniurie by words , the Iniurer ought bee the Challenger : but in an Iniurie by deedes , the Iniured ought to challenge , as for example , Simon saith to Austen , thou art a Traitor . Austen answereth , Thou liest : then doth it behooue Simon to mainteine his words , and consequentlie to challenge Austen to the Combat .

An Iniurie by deedes is thus . Simon giueth a hurt , a cut , or other violence vnto Austen ; whereat offended , he saith , Thou hast done me offence , violence , iniurie , or such like speach . Simon answereth , Thou liest . Then behoueth it that Austen do challenge Simon , and force him by fight to mainteine the hurt he offred . Wherfore as a rule or maxime in matter of Honor , it is speciallie to be noted , that whosoeuer is truelie and lawfullie belied , must of force become Challenger to mainteine that he spake or did , and wherevppon the Lie is giuen him .

And although some men , rather to shewe the dexteritie of their wits , than the valour of their mindes , will at such occasion vse many superfluous words , whereby further speach of offence doth followe , and so take opportunitie to giue the Lie vnto whom the hurt by hand was giuen ; yet the true and precise reason of Honor is , that he who gaue the blowe & hurt , should without further dispute be challenged , vnlesse he denie the doing thereof with offer of satisfaction . Thus appeareth brieflie , that whosoeuer is lawfullie belied , ought by Armes to challenge , mainteine , and proue that which he affirmed or did , in preiudice of the honor or person of the Iniured .

BVt for the more plaine conceiuing of the nature and diuersitie of Lies , wee will particularlie discourse thereof , and shewe how many sorts of them be , how they are to bee giuen , and in what sort they are to be answered . It is therefore to be knowne that of Lies , some be Conditionall , and some be Certeine : and of both them , some be Generall and some Speciall . To these may bee also added one third kind , which we will call Vaine Lies .

WE call those Lies certeine , which are giuen vpon words spoken and affirmed ; as if I should say or write vnto another man , Thou hast spoken in preiudice of mine honor , honestie and credite , and therefore doest lie . This may be called a Lie certeine , because I stand certeinlie assured that such a man hath spoken euill of me : yet true it is , that because I doo not in these words particularlie expresse the matter or speach whervpon I giue the Lie , therefore it shall be reputed a Lie generall , and consequently of no force : For indeed no Lie is lawfull , vnlesse the matter and words wherevpon it is giuen bee plainlie and expreslie repeated . Therefore the Lies which are giuen vppon certeine and apparant words , are they which in truth do bind the partie belied vnto proofe , vnlesse he can denie to haue spoken that wherevpon the Lie is giuen him , and the fourme thereof is thus . Harman , thou hast said that at the Battaile of Montcontour I abandoned mine Ensigne , and cowardly ranne away : wherevnto I answere , Thou hast lied . By this apparant and particular expression of that was said , the Lie giuen is made Speciall , and consequentlie lawfull .

A Lie generall may bee in two sorts , in respect of the person , and in respect of the iniurie . The Lie is generall in respect of the Person , when no man to whom it is giuen is named , as thus . Who euer hath said that I haue been a Rebell to my Prince , doth lie . To this manner of Lie no man is bound to make answere , because many may haplie haue so said , and that so being , he that giueth the Lie should be forced to fight with them all , which were inconuenient . For it is vnlawfull vpon one quarrell to fight oftner than once , and vnfit that one man should hazard his reputation vpon the sword of another man . Wherfore to remooue such disorders , it hath been thought good that this kind of Lie should bee vnlawfull , of none effect , and disallowed .

Touching the other Lie which we call general in respect of the iniurie , is thus . Simon , thou hast said euill of me , and spoken words in preiudice of mine honestie , and therefore I say thou liest . This manner of Lie , not being giuen vpon any matter certeine , or words speciallie repeated , is to none effect : and therefore if hee who giueth such a Lie , intendeth to make a iust quarrell , it behoueth him to set downe in writing , the verie words whervpon he giueth the Lie . For besides that , such lies doo not bind the aduerse partie , they are also perilous , and apt to be returned . I say therfore that forsomuch as a Lie generall is of small effect , & therwith fit to bee wrested against the giuer thereof , it ought of all Gentlemen to be vtterlie refrained .

LIes speciall are those which are giuen vnto speciall persons , and vpon expresse and particular matter : as for example , Gregorie , thou hast said that vpon the day of Battaile at Grauling , I abandoned mine Ensigne and charge ; for which saying thou hast lied . This is that Lie which ( as is before said ) I call a Lie certein & lawful ; yet is it to be intended that he who giueth this Lie either by word or writing , ought first to be enformed fullie , and haue sufficient proofe and witnesse of that he saith , so as the same cannot be denied . For wanting due proues , he to whom the Lie was giuen , may answere , that I lie in charging him with such words as he neuer vttered , and in that case it shall behoue me to proue the reproach wherewith I haue charged him : but if hee cannot denie that wherewith he is charged , then must he either mainteine his speach , or confesse the fault .

Here is to be noted , that in such quarells wherein manifest falshood and vntruth appeareth , no Prince ought to permit any Combat : neither ought Gentlemen be ashamed in such cases to refuse the fight ; because it is a thing more honorable for respect of reason to refuse Combat , than performe the same without cause or obligation . Seeing then that this sort of Lie , whereof we presentlie entreate , is onlie true and lawfull ; therefore it behoueth Gentlemen , and all others professing Honor and Armes , therewith to giue repulse vnto such iniuries as are offered : and desiring to shewe the cause of their offence either by word or writing , they must so plainlie and sincerelie set downe the intent thereof , as no part of the affirmation can bee either denied or wrested to other sense than it was vttered or written , whereby afterwards no doubt shall arise , who ought to challenge , and who to defend .

THe simple & ignorant sort of men perswading themselues , that he vnto whom the Lie is giuen , doth thereby lose the election of the weapon ; therefore ignorantlie and foolishlie they giue the Lie , before they either knowe or aske the question wherefore they so doo : as thus . If thou wilt not say I am an honest man , thou liest in thy throate : the follie of which speach doth plainlie appeare . For seeing the Lie is nothing els but an answere , in this the order of nature is changed , & the answere vttered before the question asked . Another sort of ignorant quarrellers are , that will say thus . If any man hath said euill of me , hee hath lied : and if hee will denie to haue so said , hee also lieth . This sillie sort of quarrelling , may likewise be called a Lie foolish and vaine : for hee who shall vse such words , doth thereby take vppon him both to propound and to answere , and consequentlie performe the office aswell of Defender as Challenger .

Another sort of these Vaine lies are thus offered : Simon meeting with Lewes saith , Draw thy weapon , and I will presentlie prooue thee a Liar and a Varlet : Or if thou wilt not drawe , then art thou a Varlet also . This maner of Lie is without foundation , cause or reason , & therefore meete to be laughed at . Others there are , who being charged to commit dishonest actions , do for the present time depart without making either deniall or answere ; but after hauing assembled a number of friends weaponed with aduantage , saith to him that charged him , Thou liest : which manner of doing is also cowardlie and foolish . For as euerie accusation or imputation ought be done without aduantage , euen so euerie answere without aduantage , ought be vttered . Also euerie Iniurie offered in presence , should likewise in presence be answered : and if in absence any such wrong bee done , in absence an answere may be made . Finallie , vnto matter of iniurie in writing , the answere ought bee framed in writing : yet is it reason , that if a man armed or accompanied doo offer euill speach or violence to him that is vnarmed and alone ; in that case it shall be lawfull to make answere at time more conuenient . But if so be that any man finding and knowing me better armed , accompanied , or prepared than himselfe , will neuertheles offer me iniurie ; in that case it is lawfull for me by words or deedes to repulse the iniurie , and bee reuenged notwithstanding mine aduantage , because it was his follie to offer offence , seeing my strength . But Gentlemen should euer so doo , as the Lie may be no lesse or more honorablie giuen , than the iniurie was offered .

One other aduantage in offering iniurie may be in this sort . If any man shall offer the same in place of priuiledge , or in presence of the Prince ; in that case it hath been thought fit that no Lie or other repulse should be . Neuerthelesse , it seemeth reasonable , that if it pleaseth the Prince to know that I am in his presence or Court iniuried , that it may also please him that I may desend my selfe . Yet true it is , that in such places it becommeth the Iniured to temper his answere , and vse words of reuerence , and the rather if he who offereth the iniurie bee a person of more respect and fauour with the Prince before whom the iniurie was offered , Howsoeuer it be , I take not vpon me to informe what ought in such case to bee done , but tell mine opinion as that which I thinke to bee honorable : whereunto I adde , that wise Princes wil more patientlie indure the repulse , than the offer of Iniurie in their presence .

HEretofore wee haue said , that hee vnto whom the Lie is giuen for a repulse of iniurie , ought be the Challenger : yet for more certeintie of that saying , wee are diligentlie to examine what sort of Lies are lawfull . It is therefore to be vnderstood , that the true and proper nature of the Lie , is to repulse Iniurie , and whensoeuer it worketh not that effect , it becommeth Iniurie , and by another Lie may bee returned . Also it is to bee noted , that in one selfesame quarrell aswell vnto a Deniall as an Affirmation , the Lie may bee giuen . The Lie lawfullie giuen vnto an affirmation is that , whereof we haue before spoken , as thus . One man saith vnto another , He is a Rebell to his Prince : He answereth , Thou liest : and this kind of Lie cannot bee auoyded , because it is giuen for repulse vnto an infamie directly offered . But if I , speaking of other do say , He is an honest man , and one standing by , doth giue mee the Lie : in that case the Lie shall not be reputed a repulse , but an Iniurie ; and it is lawfull for me to say , that gainsaying the commendation I gaue , he lieth ; because he encountereth my affirmation , and seemeth to denie that all men are holden honest , til profe be made of the contrarie . Wherfore it behoueth him that denied the man to bee honest , to prooue such deniall : in the meane time he is burthened and bound to challenge me .

But let vs now speake of Lies giuen vpon the negatiue which are either lawfull , or may lawfullie bee returned : as if any man doth say of me , That in such a seruice of Armes I had not done my duetie , and I should answere with the Lie , that shall be a lawfull answere . Yet if a man shall say , That he hath not failed of fidelitie vnto his Prince , and I say he lieth ; then is it lawful for him to answere , Thou liest in saying I lie , and consequentlie force me to challenge ; because in affirming his owne fidelitie he doth not iniurie to any man : but I denying thereof , doo greatlie wrong him , and therfore reasonablie the Lie to be returned vpon me . Now it resteth to produce some example , how in one selfesame quarrell , both vpon the affirmatiue and negatiue the Lie may be giuen , so as neither the one nor the other partie hath apparant place of repulse , as in this case .

Two Gentlemen being in the field prepared to fight , do there fall into disputation , whether the weapons be lawfull or not : by meane whereof , the day is spent in speach , and nothing done . Herevpon a question grewe whether the weapons were reasonablie refused or not , the one by affirming them to be lawfull , doth burthen the other , and he by denying them to be lawful , doth burthen him ; so as it resteth doubtfull who ought to challenge .

Thus much touching the nature of Lies , how they are to be offered , repulsed , or returned . A matter of some difficultie to be vnderstood , yet necessarie to be knowne of all Gentlemen .

IN such places as publique Combats were permitted by Princes , the custome was that the parties agreed to fight , should challenge one the other , by some instrument in writing , which they commonlie called a Cartel : but that custome being now discontinued , he who challengeth doth send some Letter to that effect , which ought bee framed in briefe termes , and thereby to expresse in short and proper words the effect of the quarrell and iniurie , bee it in words or deeeds . Also to set downe expreslie the particularities of the matter , the persons , the times , & places , which for the true expressing of the cause are required , to the end the aduerse partie may the better determine of his answere . And for that Combat is a kinde of Iudgement , it behoueth no lesse therein , than in ciuill triall that particular prooues & circumstances should be expressed , & that he who challengeth should summon his aduersarie , and he that is Defender produce the Lie .

In this writing it also behooueth to vse al plainnes of words & phrases , leauing aside eloquence and ambiguitie of speach ; for it sufficeth a man being offred any iniurious speach , doo say , Thou liest , without adding any word thereunto . It is also to bee knowne , that the Defender ought haue the election of the place and weapon . For no reason were it that I should both challenge another man , and also appoynt him to fight with what weapon pleaseth me . One thing I thinke good more to aduertise , that it seemeth vnto mee a thing verie honest , and worthie a Gentleman , that all speaches and writings of or to an Enemie , should bee in good and honorable termes ; for thereby the speaker or writer shal honor himselfe , and declare he hath to doo with a person of reputation ; for otherwise he shall disgrace his owne iudgement , in medling with men vnworthie , and such as are vnfit to be regarded .

WE haue alreadie discoursed what Iniurie is , and how the same ought be repulsed : now is to be informed in what cases Princes and supreme Gouernours may graunt or denie the triall of Combat . I say therefore , that the office of euerie Prince moued to graunt Combat , is first to consider the nature and qualitie of the quarrell , to the end he may assuredlie know whether it be of such importance as requireth the triall of the sword , and cannot otherwise be determined . For it is a rule certeine , that euerie question or quarrell that may be decided by ciuil authoritie and prooues , ought not in any wise bee tried in Combat . But for more particular knowledge of this matter , you shall vnderstand , that we call an act done contrarie to reason , Iniurie , or ( as some do terme it ) Offence or Wrong : and the Burthen , is a certeine naturall obligation , whereby a man standeth bound to repulse or mainteine the matter in question . Wherefore , whensoeuer we see a man burthened or charged , it is presentlie and consequentlie looked for , that he ought to be a Challenger . It is also to bee knowne , that otherwhiles one man may doo vnto another such an act as may be both an Iniurie , and a Burthen : so may also an Iniurie bee done without Burthen , and a Burthen without Iniurie .

An Iniurie ioyned with Burthen is thus . If a man shall charge me with an euill fact neuer by me committed , whereby ( contrarie to all reason ) he seeketh my slaunder , hereby he offereth me Iniurie , and the Burthen he laieth vpon me , is , for that I stand bound to repulse and make answere vnto such outragious words , and consequentlie am forced to answere , He lieth , whereby I am disburthened , & lay the burthen on him , by which meane I become discharged of mine obligation , and binde him vnto the proofe and mainteining of his words , which is to mainteine and be a Challenger . And in handling the matter , this is to bee noted , that I onlie doo burthen him without offer of Iniurie , because I make this answere vpon a iust and reasonable cause , onlie with intent to lay the Burthen on him .

An Iniurie without Burthen is in two sorts , viz. in word or in deed , as thus . If one man shall charge another in word , with that which is manifestlie false ; in that case it is not necessarie to make any answere at all , because he who speaketh such words , proueth himselfe an apparant Liar , and therefore not worthie of so much respect as to bee answered ; so are those words Iniurie , but no Burthen . An Iniurie in deedes without Burthen , is , when one man offereth vnto an other violence with aduantage , or in such euill sort , as the fact appeareth to bee done contrarie to honor and reason ; in that case , to what purpose should the Iniured challenge the Iniurer ? seeing the matter to be plaine and apparant . But haplie it may bee said by him that is iniured , Shall I rest without reuenge ? Therevnto may bee answered by Princes , or others hauing authoritie to graunt Combat , that to admit triall by Armes is onlie lawfull for the finding out and iustification of truth ; but the punishment of wilfull acts contrarie to peace , is by ciuill authoritie to be performed . And in mine opinion , whosoeuer receiueth an Iniurie in deedes dishonorablie offered , is thereby neither dishonored nor burthened : and for reuenge of such cowardlie and beastiall offences , it is allowable to vse any aduantage or subtiltie , according to the Italian prouerbe , Ad vna sopercheria , si conuiene vn' altra sopercheria , & ad vn tradimento vn altro tradimento , which is , that one aduantage requireth another , and one treason may be with another acquited .