A discovery of D. Iacksons vanitie. Or A perspective glasse, wherby the admirers of D. Iacksons profound discourses, may see the vanitie and weaknesse of them, in sundry passages, and especially so farre as they tende to the undermining of the doctrine hitherto received. Written by William Twisse, Doctor of Divinitie, as they say, from whom the copie came to the presse

SECT. II.

Of the Severall branches of absolute infinity ; or of the infinity of the Divine attributes as they are severally apprehended by us .

CHAP. V.

Of Divine immensity , or of that branch of absolute infinity wherof infinitie in magnitude or space imaginary is the shadowe .

HENCE you drawe us to the speculation of the severall branches of absolute infinity ; and first of Gods immensitie , which you premise unto Gods eternitie ; wherof I muse not a litle : considering that immensitie is an attribute denominating God in respect of creatures ; and is not any otherwise considered by Schole Divines nor by your selfe neyther , but in this respect that he fillethe all places . And therfore before the World was , and before there was any place to fill , he could not be sayde to fill all places . As for eternitie in being without beginninge , that is an absolute attribute , and was ever verified of God . Perhaps you consider immensitie not as it signifieth his filling of all places , but as it signifieth his abilitie to fill all places . Yet this is in reference unto place , and we commonly confound Gods immensitie with his ubiquitie . Much lesse can I approove your Rhetoricke , as when you make infinity of space to be the shadowe of Gods immensitie . First because infinity of space is neyther existent nor possible to be existent , and to my judgement , such a thing seemes not fitt to be a shadow of that which is existent , such as you suppose the immensitie of God to be . Secondly immensitie of space is in respect of that quantity which is called quantitas motis quantitie of extension , and capable of division , but the immensitie of God denominates him , in respect of that quantitie , which is called quantitas virtutis , quantitie of vertue , incapable of extension or division . And therfore the one seemes no way sitt to be the modell of the other . Thirdly shadowes doe many times exactly represent the proportion of the thing shadowed ; and if at some times they are farre lesse , at other times agayne , they are farre greater then the bodies which they represent , as when the day declineth and the shadowes of the evening are stretched foorth , as the Prophet speakethe . And indeede you may well say that Ier. 6 4. immensitie of space is even in this respect a shadowe of Gods immensitie . For immensitie of space is absolutely infinite ; but Gods immensitie as it signisies his existence in all places , ( neyther doe I finde it otherwise considered , eyther by Schoolemen or your selfe ) is absolutely finite : For as much as all places put together are but finite , nor can possibly be any more then finite . But let us consider the particulars of your discourse . You tell us , that our imaginations will hardly suffer infinitie to be severed from time and place . This is a paradoxe to me . I had thought rather , it had bene farre 〈◊〉 for us to imagine time finite , and place finite , then eyther of them infinite . For it is a ruled case , that infinitum qua infinitum non potest cognosci ; Yet you will have it so easy to be imagined , Arist. phys. 1. cont. ●6 . as that you make it a very difficult matter for imagination to apprehend eyther time or place otherwise then infinite . If you had avouched it of time and place indefinite , it had bene lesse distant from the truthe ; yet that allso distant from the truthe . For undoubtedly my imagination may conceave a time definite , as well as indefinite ; As for example , it may as well conceave three yeares space of time , as well as more yeares space of time then three , without de●ing how much : the like may be sayde of place allso . As for infinite time and place , as it is impossible that any such thing should be , so I promise you , I cannot conceave that it should be so easily ( as you suppose ) if possibly imagined . Yet you take upon you to give a reason of so uncouth an assertion . But that proofe is as inconsequent , as your former assertion was insolent . For thoughe sensible thinges cannot easily be separated in our understanding from place and time , yet when herehence you inferre , that place it selfe cannot be separated by the understanding from the immensitie therof , nor time it selfe from the eternitie therof , I finde neyther art in this consequence , nor any tolerable colour or shewe of reason to make it probable . And to the contrary ( as I sayde ) It is a ruled case that infinitum qua infinitum non potest cognosci . And therfore it is so easie a thing to separate infinity from time & place ; as it is impossible , that in the understanding of man it should be con●oyned with them . Yet this is not all the errour of this your discourse . For the Antecedent is utterly untrue : as when you say , that sensible thinges when they are winnowed from the rest into the closet of the understanding , they still reteyne their circumstances of time and place . Wheras to the contrary it is undoubtedly true , that Intelloctus abstrahit ab hic & nunc ; the understanding considereth thinges abstract from time and place ; and so dothe the imagination allso : Only this is the condition of the imagination , in distinction from the understanding , that imaginatio non transcendit continuum : It cannot consider thinges abstract from continuitie , that is from extension of parts : but from time and place it can abstract , how much more from the infinity of each And surely each facultie were a sory winnower , if it could not separate the graynes of naturall thinges , from such grosse hu●kes that in wrappe them . It is true we are apt to imagine a locall distance , beyond the utmost surface of heaven , but it dothe not herehence followe , that we imagine an infinite distance beyond it , but rather indefinite . And therfore we are apt to imagine a distance without the globe of Heaven , because we can imagine the globe of Heaven in as small a proportion as we list , even no bigger then one of the globes in our College Libraries . In like sort we may imagine time before the World ; for who doubtethe , but that it was possible that time should have bene sooner then it wa● & wh●s it is nowe about sixe thousand yeares since the World beganne ; so if it had pleased God , it might have b●ne 1● . thousand . But doe not you inferre herehence , that we doe imagine infinite time preceding the World ; for that is not helde to be possible as finite time is . But it is an easy leape , I confesse , in the ●rrour of a mans imagination to passe from time indefinite , to time infinite , ●nd to take one for the other . To imagine a successive dur●tion of time much longer before the creation of the world , th●n hathe bene the continuance of it since , is one thinge ▪ but to imagine an infinite duration of time before the World , is another thing , and much different , ●ea infinitely different . Looking backe upon this discourse of yours to proove ▪ whether it might admitt any other toler●ble construction ; I conc●ved your meaning might perhap● be this ; not that place and time coulde not be conceaved without the immensitie of the one , and the eternitie of the other ▪ but ●ather that immensitie could not be conceaved without place , nor eternitie without time . But upon serious consideration I do● not finde this latter interpre●tion to be any way congruous unto your text . For you playnly professe , that albeit both reason and faith drives us to confesse both time and place to be finite , yet our imaginations will hardly suffer infinity to be severed from them , which can admitt no other interpr●tation then that whi●h I have impug●ed . That whi●h you talke , of certeyne Schoole braynes pu●ed in passing this unsoundable gulfe , and that so farre as to suspect , that God , who now is in every place of the world created by him , was as truly in these imaginary distances of place and time before the creation was att●mpted ; is nothing but a bundell of mysteries unto me . For I never kn●we any that offered to p●sse that unsoundable gulfe , you sp●ake of , otherwise , then by imagining● ; ●nd how their braynes were p●zled in giving way to this imagination I k●owe not ; much le● doe I understand ▪ how being pu●ed in this imagination , they should herehence grow to suspect , that God was as truly in ●hat imaginary distance of place as in things truly exist●t , and ●ruly distant ●ach from other . And most of all doe I woonder , what you meane to clap the imaginary distance of time ▪ with the imaginary distance of plac● . For thoughe I hav● read of some that discourse of vacuum lo●i , an imaginary distance of place , and maynteyne that God was and is therin ▪ yet I never heard nor read of any man discoursing in like sort of Vacuum temporis , and maynteyninge that God was and is therein . And as touching the question , whether God be i● Vacu● or in that imaginary distance you spe●ke of ; I have read the question proposed by Vasquius , and th● opinion of some Vasq. ●n 〈◊〉 . p. disp. 29. mentioned , who maynteyned that God was in Uac● ; but very fewe ; yet he reckonnethe Cajetan for one ; but whe●ce dothe he fetche this ●pinion of Cajetan ? no● out of his Commentaries upon Aquinas hi● Summes , where is the proper place for a Schooleman to manifest his opinion herabouts ; but out of his Commentaries upon Io●n. 1. v. 12. which makes me suspect the fidelitie of his relation or interpretation of Cajetan . The other which he mentionethe is Major upon the 1. of the sentences and 37. distinction . And sinc● we are fallen upon it ▪ I am willingly to conferre discourse with you herabouts . And first , I say , that Scripture and reason seeme to favour it . For King Solomon professeth 1. Kings 〈◊〉 . that the Heavens of Heavens doe not conteyne the Lord : & likewise Iob saythe of him ▪ that He is higher then the Heaven , Iob. 11. and deeper then Hell ; & certeinly God is able to produce a body without the Heavens , and consequently in Vacuo ; & herupon it seemes to some , that in good reason God should first have a being there , before he produce the any body there . And this is one reason of many , which Brad wardine usethe to proove , that God is in Vacuo : ( for tha● is his opinion ) though Vasquius was not acquainted with him . Now by your leave , I will consider your reasons to the contrary . First you demaund whether this locall distance be created or no● ▪ whether it be something or nothing ? I answeare , that ●rteinly it is not created , as being just nothing yet so as that it is possible a body shoulde be , where before was no body . As for example where now the World is , before the World was , 〈◊〉 no body , yet was it then possible there should be a body , So without the Heavens is no body , yet is it possible that a body shoulde be without the heavens . You proceede sayinge , If it be nothing , then they had an imagination of an infinite space which really was nothing ; and we grant they had . For they helde it only an imaginarie space or distance . Further you inferre ; If really nothing , then it coulde not be truly termed an imaginary space , before the World was created . A manifest inconsequence . For as men may imagine thinges that are not , so such things may be truly termed imaginary things which are not reall . And there is no such difference , as you avouche , betweene these two , To imagine an infinite space , and to say , that There is an imaginary infinite space . For whersoever there is the imagination of an infinite space , there must needes be an infinite space imagined . And therfore as often as there is in man the imagination of an infinite space without the heavens , this is as much as to say , there is an infinite space imagined by man to be without the heavens . But I observe your subtiltie following . Before the heavens , you say , there coulde be no imagination of any such space ; therfore there was no such space imagined . I answeare ; thoughe before the heavens there was no man at all to imagine it , yet neverthelesse was it imaginable , and now you confesse it is so imagined . And not only doe we imagine a Uacuum to have bene before the World was , but even since the World is , to witt , without the Heavens . And taking it aright , is not only nowe so imagined by us , but a truthe that a Uacuum is without the heavens , and was before the world was , where now the world is . For the errour of the imagination is to mistake in the right meaninge of Vacuum . For commonly it is imagined under the notion of a space existent , wheras indeede it is rather the negation of a body existent , joyned with the possibilitie of a body to exist . So without the heavens is no space or body , yet possible is it , that a bodly space shoulde be . Neyther is it required herunto , that it should be created by God ; for only reall things are created by God , but the negation of bodies existent requires no creation , but rather the suspension of creation . You thinke the reality of this imagination to be God , whome the Hebrewes call 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 place ; I rather thinke the realitie of it is a voydenes of a body or bodies with the possibility of existence of a body or bodies . Touching which possibilitie , if it be demaunded in what subject it is ; I remember what answeare Ioannes Grammaticus made to the like question , reported by Averroes on the 12. booke of Aristotles Metaphysicks , namely that it was in God , to witt fundamentally not formally . For I nothing doubt but his meaning was this . In God allone is found an almighty power to make the world out of nothing , whence it followeth , that before the world was , there was a possibilitie that the world should be , and the mere active power of God is sufficient to denominate this possibilitie . A possibilitie physicall or naturall requires a subject to support it , but a possibilitie logicall not so , as being only negatio repugnantie , a want of repugnancy . And if God was able to make a world out of nothing , then surely it was no contradiction , that the world should be , and consequently the world was possible before it was . And yet to drawe a litle nearer unto you in this ; I professe , I finde it more hard to maynteyne , that God i any where as in a place , then to maynteyne that God is in Uacuo . For marke howe Durand distinguishethe ; Place , saythe he , Durand . in 1. dist. 37. p. 1. q. 2. is considered two wayes , eyther as a naturall thing , or as conteyning the thing placed therein . As it is a naturall thinge , God is in every place , but as it conteynethe the thing that is sayde to be therin ; so God is in no place secundum se , in respect of himselfe . For nothing without him is able to conteyne him ; but in respect of his effects , he is in all places ; because he is conteyned of nothing , but rather conteyneth all things , and preservethe them . But in respect of his effects he is every where . For he fillethe every place with his effects ; & in this sense , it is proper to God to be every where . Herupon some may conceave that God may be called 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 place , because he conteynethe all thinges , rather then is conteyned . Yet we knowe that the continency of place is corporall , and ordinarily the place is more base then the things conteyned therein . But Gods continency is merely vertuall and spirituall , and in dignitie infinitely beyoud the most noble creatures . And we have no great cause to doate upon the Rabbines , whose Philosophy was never a whit better then their divinitie . Yet one thing more : The question was whether God might be sayde to be in Uacuo , and your discourse is only to deny , that there is any such infinite space as is imagined , eyther now to be without the heavens , or hertofore to have bene before the world was , but you take no notice of the Arguments made to the contrary , much lesse doe you take any care to answeare any one of them . And yet to my thinking some are shrewde ones , and different courses are taken in answearing them ; which argues that one mans answeare gave litle satisfaction to another . I will therfore take this paynes in part for you , & represent the arguments of Bradwardine , who takes upon Bradward . Summa de causa Dei contra Pelag. lib. 1. cap 5. coroll . 2. him to proove , that God is essentially and presentially every where , not only in the World , and all the parts therof ; but allso without the World , in that Uacuum or site imaginary ; & withall I will make bold to shewe you my judgement of them . His first argument is large ; in effect this : God can moove the World by a direct motion further Eastward , or further Westward . Vpon this supposition he proceedeth thus . Eyther God was here before , whether the World is now mooved or no ; Agayne , eyther God continuethe there from whence the World was mooved , or no. If God was there before his motion thither , and continuethe still where he was before the motion from thence , then it is manifest he was and is in Vacuo . But if from the time that the World mooved from hence , he ceaseth to be here , and upon the Worlds mooving more Eastward , he beginneth to be there , then God changethe his place with the world , ceasinge to be where formerly he was , and beginning to be where formerly he was not ; and consequently God shall be mooved at the motion of the world , as the soule of man is sayde to be mooved , upon the motion of the body . But this seemes very uncouthe to be attributed unto God , thoughe some are content to swallowe it , not satisfyinge themselves in finding out a convenient answeare . Others deny the supposition , to witt , of a direct motion competent to the world . But saith Bradwardine , to deny that God is able thus to moove the world , is to curtll the Allmighty power of God ; and therfore that opinion saythe he , is amongst the Articles which were condemned by Steven Bishop of Paris . Yet of those Articles it was woont to be sayde , non transcendunt Alpes , they doe not climbe over the Alpes ; and we may as well say , they doe not goe a ship board to sayle over our narrowe Seas . In my judgement the supposition is unsound and the contrary rather true , namely that the world cannot be mooved Eastward or Westward ; not thoroughe any impotency in God , who can doe all thinges that imply not contradiction ; but by reason that this is such a thing as implyethe contradiction , if it be well considered , and therfore is impossible . For it supposeth that without the world there is a space , consisting of parts , thorough some parts wherof more or lesse : the world may be mooved . But this is utterly untrue ; for they themselves confesse , that the space they speake of is only imaginary . Nowe herehence it followethe that the motion thorough an imaginary space , must be only an imaginary motion , and no reall motion . Secondly we answeare , supposing the motion true and reall and such a thing possible ; that God is sayde to be in the world not secundum se , but secundum effectus , as before we had out of Durand , because with his effects he filles all thinges , all places . Now though these bodies doe thus moove , & therwithall the effects wherwith he filleth them , yet he himselfe is not mooved ; because himselfe , as himselfe cannot be sayde to be any where , but as in himselfe he was before the world was , so in himselfe he continuethe to be still . His second argument is this : Suppose God create another world without the heaven ; then eyther God is there , where he was not before , and so shall be changed in place ; or if he were there before , then he was in Uacuo . I answeare , that God may be in thinges , wherein he was not before , not because himselfe becommethe otherwise then he was before , but because thinges which before were not , nowe are ; and God with his effects dothe fill all things and all places , as they have their beinge , and ceasethe to fill all thinges , as they cease to have any beinge . In a word God is sayde to coexist , or not coexist with thinges anewe , not that he dothe eyther beginne or cease to coexist with them ; but in respect that they doe eyther beginne or cease to coexist with him . His third argument is , that as many as deny God to exist in Uacuo , must be driven to deny that God could make the world bigger or lesse then it is . But we see no cause , why we should be cast upon any so absurd assertion . We grant that God could and can make a reall and spacious distance beyond the Heavens : but till God doth create such a distance , we deny that there is any such , thoughe we deny not , but man may imagine such . Agayne he say the we must be driven to maynteyne , that God necessarily made the world n the site . A. where now it is , and that before the world was made , there was no other site , but the site A. where now it is . But we say that before the World was , there was no site at all , not only no site different from the site A. but allso not so much as the site A. neyther . And that to imagine any different sites before the world was , is to imagine distance of parts , where neyther any parts were , nor distance ; thoughe such distance of parts be imagied by us , like as Chimeraes are , and such like fictions . Agayne he disputes thus : Except Uacuum be granted to have bene sometimes , the world was everlasting ; I answeare ; Uacuum sometimes was ; but the question betweene us is not about the existence of it ( as such negations and possibilities may be sayde to exist ) but only about the nature of it , to witt wherher it conteyned any distance of parts as it is imagined after the forme of a positive thinge . This we deny , and doe maynteyne that Uacuum is only a voydnes of bodies with possibilitie of existence of bodies , not of existence of bodies therein , as in a space capable of bodies as it is imagined , but simply of their existence . His cheifest argument is this 〈◊〉 when God created the world eyther he was there before he created it or no. If he were there before he created it , then he was in Uacuo . For before the creation was , nothing was without God , but Uacuum . If you say , God was not there before he created the world ; this he saythe is contrary to reason . But to my judgement it is contrary to all reason , to say that the differences of site , as here 〈◊〉 there were extant , before any thing was created . Well he prooves it thus ; for say●●● he , God must first be there , before he workes there . I answere ; Gods workes are of diverse sorts ; there is a worke of creation , a worke of preservation , and a worke of moovinge his creatures agreeably to their natures diverse and sundry wayes , as he thinkes good . Now all other operations of God about his creatures , suppose his being in them , they being allready created , but his creation dothe not , much lesse dothe it suppose his being there as in Uacuo . For to be in Uacuo , is as much as to say to be in nothinge . Which I confesse is true of God taking it as a negative thus , God was not in any thing . The truthe is , all differences of place and site as here , & there , and els where , are not , but by creation . For to say that God is in some site or place , is to say , that some site or place or thing is coexistent with God , which cannot be without creation . That which he addethe herunto is of the same nature , and admitts the same solution , now I proceede along with you .

2. To the Atheists demaund , where God was before the world was ; your answeare is , God was in himselfe . I doe not Mal. 3. 6. mislike it : and so I say , God is in himselfe still . For he is not changed . Only in the creation and preservation of all thinges , virtue did and still dothe flowe out of him allwayes , so that with his sweete influence he fillethe all thinges . To be conteyned in place , is too base a condition for the nature of God , he rather conteynes all thinges . So that even now , God is no where conteyned ; before the world he was no where conteyninge , because there was nothing without to be conteyned and nourished by him . Neyther is it any thing harshe to say , that God was in no place , where there was no place for him , wherein to be . But betweene the question which you propose , and the answere therunto , you doe insperse some strange assertions , affecting curiositie of discourse , more then sobrietie of sense , as when you say ; In respect of eternitie and immensitie , no creature , no positive essence , no numerable part of this Vniverse , is so like unto him , as this negation of all thinges , which we describe by the name of nothing . A string may be strayned so high , as by breakinge to marre all the musicke ; and some witts have affected so highe a streyne of subtiltie of sentence , as that they have degenerated into non-sense . Such is this assertion of yours , wherein you affirme , that no numerable part of this Vniverse ( as much as to say , neyther man nor Angell ; yet was man made after Gods image & likenes ) is so like unto God as nothing . Ou● upon such abominable speeches ; wherby God himselfe who is the breath of , our nosthrills is made , if not just nothinge , yet to come nearest unto nothing . What sport are Atheists like to make with this ? why like Davids foole , say in their hearts , there is no God : when a Christian , and a Divine , and a great writer , whose workes are current , when others are not , is founde to professe , that no creature is so like unto God as nothing . Yet this is not all ; for you say allso , that no positive essence is so like unto God as nothing , as if God himselfe were not so like unto himselfe as nothing is . And indeede we commonly say nullum simile est idem . Yet by your leave the Sonne of God is the image of his Father , and dare you say that he is not so like his Father , as nothing is ! No merveyle if the Spirite of confusion overspreades your discourse like a garment . For what sense , I pray , is there in this speeche of yours as when you say , that this name , nothinge , is the description of the negation of all thinges ; wheras indeede the negation of all thinges , is much fitter to be the description of this name , nothing ; then the name , nothing to be the description of the negation of all thinges . For the description is usually larger then the terme described . The reason you bring to justifie so uncouth a speeche , is as absurd and odious , and false as your former assertion , as when you say , Nothing hathe neyther beginning nor ende of dayes . Fye , fye upon such shamefull assertions , as much remooved from witt as from honestie . Hathe nothing neyther beginning nor end of dayes , which is as much as to say , that the dayes of it are everlastinge ? why I say , It hathe no dayes at all , no being at all , no not so much beinge as propositions attribute unto negations and privations . I say it never had , nor hathe , nor ever shall have any dayes , at all , neyther is i● possible it should have dayes , for as much as it is utterly impossible , that God should not be , or cease to be , who is the sovereigne beinge , and i● whome but erst , you professed that all thinges are , and that in a better manner then they are in themselfes . And shall this name nothing be now so farre advanced , as to be above all positive essences , or parts of this World , in likenes unto God , and that in respect of eternitie , and immensitie ? But what eternitie or immensitie of being is to be found in that which hath no being at all , nor ever had , nor ever shall have , nor can have , no not so much as negations have ? Yet the Heavens have had continuance so long , as not very well knowne to man ; and so have the Angels had , and shall have for ever . The smallest part of this Vniverse , hathe some magnitude ; some parts have quantitatem motis , quantitie of extension , and that all most incredibly great , certeinly incomprehensible by the witt of man , as the Heavens ; other parts have quantitatem virtutis , quantitie of spirituall perfection , as the Angells , and that allso inscrutable by the witt of man . But as for the name nothing , that hathe no magnitude at all , neyther of corporall extension , nor of spirituall perfection , unles you will returne to the imaginary distance of space without the Heavens , which but erst you disputed against . For no immensitie otherwise can be found in this your nothing , which you advance so high as in eternitie and immensitie , to be so like to God , as no creature , no positive essence , no numerable part of this Vniverse more , or so much . If in consideration of the most monstruous incongruitie of your assertion , and that as God hath his beinge necessarily , so it is a thing utterly impossible , that nothing should have any being ; to shift your selfe out of this absurditie , you shall say , that by nothing you understand not the negation or privation of any thinge whatsoever ( which yet was delivered by you without all limitation ) but only the negation and privation of things created : yet herein you shall fall into a newe non-sense . For then your proposition shall runne thus in effect , No creature is so like unto God as no creature , which yet is as untrue as absurd . For surely every creature is more like unto God , then no creature , in as much as it hathe a true beinge , which the negation or privation of a creature hathe not . And yet you consider not that in this sense , nothing , hathe an ende of dayes . For as soone as the World beganne to be , forthwith ceased the being of nothing which went before it . But you proceede to take the word nothing in a more large signification , as when you foorthwith say , The negation of all thinges is more like unto God then any one thinge ; You were as good say , that it is more like unto God , then God himselfe , yea then the Sonne is like unto the Father . What blasphemous conceytes are these , & how fitt for Atheists to make merry withall . And that you may not seeme to runne madde without all reason , you adde a reason unto it , and the reason is this , Because no distinct or proper place of residence can be assigned to nothing , or to the negation of all thinges . A most absurde reason , and only plausible unto them , that have lost their witts , in the wildernes of their confused imaginations as you have done . For in such a sense no place can be assigned to the negation of all thinges , as makes it more base , then the vilest thinge that is , so farre of is it from advancing it to any likenes unto God above such thinges as have being at all . For therfore no proper place can be assigned to God , because he filleth all places , and if there were a thousand Worlds he should fill them all , nor by beinge conteyned in them , but by conteyninge them , yet not locally conteyninge them , but vertually . But therfore no place can be assigned unto the negation of all thinges , because it is uncapable bothe of place and beinge , whether , circumscriptive as bodies are capable of place ; or desinitive , as Angells are sayde to be in place ; or repletive , as God is sayde to be in all places . Nay it is not so much capable of place , as accidents are , which are in places not per se of themselfes , but per accidens , as they affect bodies , which are in place of themselfes . For in very truthe , the negation of all thinges never had , nor hath , nor ever shall or can have , any such existence , as propositions attribute to negations or privations . For it was ever false , & is , and shall be to say , Nihil est ; For as God all wayes is , and that necessarily : so it is impossible , that this proposition shoulde be true Nihil est . Yet that it may in some sort appeare , that this your wilde discourse proceedes from the zeale of the glory of God , that so you may advance him , above that which is most like him , to witt above nothing or above the negation of all thinges , you tell us , that this nothing is most unlike him . Yet this allso is a newe non-sense , namely that , that which is most like unto God , and that for eternitie and immensitie , prime branches of Gods infinity , should be most unlike him ; and herein you manifestly contradict your selfe . For if it be most unlike him , then every thing is more like unto God then it , which before you denyed ; and to the contrary affirmed , that no positive essence , no numerable part of this Vniverse was so like unto God as it , to witt , as nothing . Yet nowe you say even this nothing , is most unlike him : and as it were to endoctrinate our plumbeous cerebrosities , and to supply our insufficiency of proovinge so quaint a point of Metaphysicall untruthe , namely that this name nothing is most unlike unto God , you helpe us in a freindly manner with a reason herof , and that is this , because for soothe nothing is truly , and absolutely no where . But why did you not adde , that as it is no where , in respect of place , so it never was , nor is nor shall be in respect of time ; nor is it possible that it shoulde be , like as it is impossible that God shoulde not be . For nihil esse , est Deum non-esse : to say that nothing is , is to say that God is not , or to deny that God is . But you proceede to exercise your witt in disparaging nothing ; and wheras before you sayde , that it was no where ; next you say , that It is not in it selfe ; as if to be in it selfe , were some kinde of being some where . And you adde as it were a reason herof , when you say , non entis non est actio , non est qualitas , non conditio . But this reason is as good as the rest . For that nothing should be in it selfe , it is not requisite , that it shoulde have eyther action , qualitie , or reall condition . Or if it had eyther of these , it should not be in nothing . And why shoulde you accoumpt it a condition of being , to be in nothing ? You adde that nothing cannot have any right or title to be accoumpted it selfe ; a wonderous strange assertion . For if it be not it selfe , then it is not the same with it selfe ; if it be not the same with it selfe , then it is different from it selfe , & that in somethinge . For if in nothing it be diferent from it selfe , then every way it is all one and the same with it selfe . But if in somethinge you conceave it to be different from it selfe , it behooves you to shewe what that something is , wherein nothing is sayde to be different from it selfe . But if nothing can be alleaged , wherein it differethe from it selfe , then surely it is the same with it selfe , and consequently it hathe good right and title to be it selfe . You proceede in your unprofitable subtilties , and tell us , that we may truly say some objective conceytes are nothing . Yet surely every conceyte is somethinge , but the objects of some conceytes , perhaps your meaning is , are nothing . Now the objects of conceytes are the things conceaved . You might then as well have sayde , that somethinges conceaved are nothinge . And it is a truthe ; for Chimeraes may be conceaved , and Tragolaphoi , and Centaures , and after a sort privations and negations allso , which yet are no reall thinge . But we cannot rightly conceave ( you say ) that nothing shoulde have any degree or kinde of beinge . And I say , that neyther is any such conceyte requisite to maynteyne , that nothing may have just right and title to be termed it selse . And yet by your leave , if it were possible that God should have no beinge , then this proposition Nihilest , were possible to be true , and not otherwise . Now in maynteyninge this proposition you have proceeded so farre , as to affirme that nothing hathe neyther beginninge nor ende of dayes , and that therein it is most unlike unto God in respect of his eternitie . Want of being , you say , is the worst kinde of barrennes . But is it not more sober to affirme , that want of being is no kinde of barrennes at all . For barrennes implyes beinge . And why shoulde you put your selfe to such paynes of phrasifyinge , in proovinge that nothing cannot bring foorth any ranke of being ? since no such thing is needefull to this , to witt , that nothing may have right or title to be termed it selfe ; taking it as an affirmative proposition , wherein nothing is the subject , not as a negative , wherein the word nothing is only a signe of an Vniversall negative . For in this latter acception , it is utterly untrue , seinge every thing may be termed it selfe , as in sayinge a man is a man , and so is a mouse a mouse ; and so the negation of all thinges ( which is your owne description of the word nothing ) is allso , it selfe , to witt , the negation of all thinges . And so it is true to affirme that nihil est nihil .

Thus farre you have discoursed of nothing ; now you come to discourse of something , or rather of God .

And God , you say , cannot be sayde to have being no where , before the World was made , but with this limitation , save in himselfe . But I judge this to be a very improper speeche , as that which supposethe Gods being in himselfe to be a kinde of being somewhere , which in my opinion is untrue .

The truthe is , God is in himselfe , but not as in place . And to be in place , here , or there , or every where , is a denomination too base to be attributed unto God : who as Durand saythe is no where that is in no place secundum se , in respect of his essence , but every where by his effects , as filling all places , all bodies , all Spirits , whether of men or Angells with his effects . You say , he is so in himselfe as that he is more then all thinges . But consider I pray , how is pluralitie a fitt attribute for indivisible unitie ? Yet t is ●ue , he can produce more then all thinges of this world of creatures put together , are . You say he is longer then time ; I had rather say , He is more ancient then dayes ; because he is eternall , & being eternall and all mightie could have made time more ancient then it is . You say , he is greater then place ; It had bene more fitt to say , he is greater then space ; because the greatest place , is but the hollowe superficies of the uppermost heaven , the spacious body wherof is farre greater ; and God greater then it .

Yet is this a very improper speache , because comparisons ought to be of thinges in the same kinde . But Gods greatnes & the worlds greatnes are farre different in kinde ; the greatnes of the world , being quantitas motis , quantitie of extension ; & the greatnes of Gods beinge quantitas virtutis , quantitie of spirituall perfection . Yet in this sense it may passe . He is vertually greater then the space of this world , because he could & can produce a greater space then this . You say he is more infinite then capacity it selfe ; Belike you suppose capacitie to be infinite , in sayinge God is more infinite . But created capacitie cannot be infinite ; thoughe greater , and greater it may be in infinitum , yet still finite ; and this is all the infinity , that we doe or can conceave by succession or addition ; & so Gods power to produce greater neyther doth nor can receave any boundes or limits . And as God is able to enlarge time and place , so is he able to limit it , but by your leave with distinction . It is not possible that time past shoulde be made lesse , then it is . But if I mistake not you overlashe , when you say , that God by his essentiall presence or coexistence is able to limit time and place . For as the limitation of thinges proceedes from Gods will , not from his essentiall presence ; so likewise , it is Gods power that denominates him able to limit all thinges according to the pleasure of his will , and not his essence , or essentiall presence or coexistence . It is true , that nothing could have beginning or continuance of being but by him : and it is true allso , that all other thinges have had beginninge , and still have continuance , and that from him . Though this was no Article of the Peripateticks faithe , yet it is an Article of our Christian faithe . And herehence , to witt , from Gods preserving all thinges , and workinge in all thinges , dothe Aquinas inferre , that God by his essence ( not only by his power ) is in all thinges , because , and that according unto Aristotles doctrine , Movens & motum must be simul . But then agayne you knowe , or may knowe how this inference is impugned by Scotus and his followers . As if this were the Scot. 1. sect. dist. ●7 . qu. 1. propertie of a finite Agent , to worke only on thinges indistant from it . But God beinge an infinite Agent , they conceave it to be his propertie , to be of power to woorke upon that which is distant from him ; if by supposition , it were possible , that God were distant from any thinge , or any thinge from it . And therfore thoughe if he be in all thinges , at the center of their supportance as you phrasifie ; yet this is to be in them only by his power , and operation ; and great Schoolemen have peremptorily denyed , that herehence it can be soundly inferred , that he is in all thinges by his essence . It is untrue that thinges in succession , may be in number infinite . They may by succession be more and more without ende ; but never shall they come to be infinite . Likewise it is impossible that God shoulde be in more thinges then those that are , or may be ; because it is impossible that there shoulde be more thinges , then those that are or may be . And withall I wonder , how you can maynteyne that God is in those thinges that yet have no being , but only may be .

3. You have discoursed so long of infinitie , that your discourse seemes to be transfigured into it . For the sentence , wherwith you beginne this Section , hathe no ende , no way out of it . Had the evaporation of proud phantasticke melancholy , eclipsed the lustre of his glorious presence , in that late prodigious questionists brayne , which would bring us out of the sunshine of the Gospell , into olde Aegyptian darkenes . Here your Reader becomes erect , to understande , what then : But you falling upon givinge a reason of the last clause , by way of parenthesis , utterly forget to make up the sense of your former sentence . This Questionist you speake of , seemes by that which followeth , to be Vorstius . For his opinion is , that of enclosing God in the Heavens , and excluding his essentiall presence from this inferior World , which was ( as you report ) first brought foorthe in Aegypt . So that it seemes , the Aegyptians were long agoe troubled with this disease , arising from the evaporations of proud phantasticke melancholy , as well as Vorstius ; yea and some Nations too . You say indeede it was not propagated to many Nations , therby implyinge , it was propagated unto some . Only fewe Philosophers of the better sort enterteyned it ( as you say ) except Aristotle or the Author of the booke De Mundo . You woulde say , I take it , that no Philosophers of the better sort enterteyned it , except Aristotle &c. as it lyethe , your sentence is incongruous . But herein , you say , Vorstius did dissent from them , in that he helde that God was and is every where by his power and immediate Providence . This errour of his , you censure as exceeding grosse and unsufferable in that he makes Gods infinite power , wisedome , and goodnes in whole sweete harmony , Divine Providence especially consistethe , but as Agents or Ambassadors to his infinite Majestie : as if his infinite Majestie only were full compeere to his essence ; unsitting to be imployed abroade , or to keepe residence any where save in the Court of Heaven . Concerning Vorstius , I professe , I never founde any such sufficiency in him , especially for Metaphysicall discourse , as should make any man zealous of salving his reputation . And that the essence of God should be confined to one place , more then to another , yea to the Court of Heaven , rather then to the basest corner of the earthe , is so absurd to my judgement , that I professe ingenuously , all the reason and witt that I have , is not sufficient to make it good of Angells , as being Spirits abstract from materiall extension . And I will remember how Aquinas So Scotus understands him . 2. dist. 2. q. 6. Durand . in 1. dist. 37. quest. 1. makes Angells to be in place , only in respect of their operation . And places are for the natures of bodies , and not of Spirits : and Durand discoursethe strange things of the nature of Angells , and such things , as I am willingly content they should continue as they doe without the reach of my comprehension . How much more absurd were it to confine the essence of God more to one place , then to another . And indeede , to my judgement , to be in place , is too base a denomination to be attributed unto God . And Durand as allready I have shewed , professethe that God secundum se is in no place , but only secundum effectus , and so every where , for as much as he fillethe all places with his effects . And as God is sayde to have bene in seipso in himselfe , before the World was made , is he not so to be accoumpted still ? according to those verses of course in this argument . Dic ubi tunc esset , cum praeter eum nihil esses : Tunc ubi nunc inse , quoniam sibi sufficit ipse .

And is there not reason for it : For Gods essence hathe no respect to outward thinges , as his power hathe , and his operation hathe . And see , whether by ascribing place to him , you shall not be driven to acknowledge that God is in Uacuo , which opinion but erst you impugned . For suppose many Angells existent in the ayre , ( as some are called Princes of the ayre , ) and so within the hollowe of the moone , and suppose God should annihilate all that body of Element or Elements within the hollowe of the moone , the bodies and spheares of the Heavens only remayninge . It will not followe herehence that the Angells supposed to be within the hollowe of the moone , shall be annihilated , because they being abstract substances , and undependant on any matter , shall exist still , and consequently shall be in Uacuo . For Uacuum is only a voydenes of bodies , not of Spirits . And who doubts , but that God could have created spirituall substances only , and not bodily ; in which case they must be sayde to be in Uacuo , or no where without them . Then agayne suppose these Spirits themselfes within the hollowe of the moone shoulde be annihilated ; yet God shall not cease to be existent there , upon the annihilation of Angells , like as Angells did not cease to exist there , upon the annihilation of bodies : and consequently God himselfe shall exist in Vacuo ; and all this commeth to passe by placing his essence there in distinction from his presence , and from his power . Doe not all confesse that God is no where without himselfe as conteyned , but only as conteyninge ? now to conteyne is the worke of his power , and of his will , & not of his essence , save as his essence , and power , and will are all one realitie in God . And so God may be sayde to be every where , not only three manner of wayes , to witt , by his essence , by his presence , & by his power : but more manner of wayes , to witt , by his knowledge , by his wisedome , by his will , by his goodnes . Yet all these shall be but one way , as all these are but one in God . But yet in proper speeche as Gods essence is no where , but it may content us to say , that God ever was and is in himselfe only : so his goodnes is no where , but in himselfe , his knowledge , wisedome , and understanding no where but in himselfe ; his will & mercy and justice no where but in himselfe ; his power to make , to preserve , to worke no where but in himselfe : but the operations of all these united in himselfe , are every where , and so sayth Durand ; God fillethe all thinges with his sweete influence and effects of his power , wisedome , and goodnes , all which are as it were the Trinitie of his one essence . Thus we may say , his power , and wisedome , and goodnes reachethe unto the earthe , and to every thinge within this canopy , eyther by way of influence naturall , or by way of influence gracious ; like as in the Pallace of the third Heaven , by way of influence glorious . All which are not properly his wisedome , and power , and goodnes , but rather the effects of them ; of them I say , which yet are all one thinge with his essence . But Gods essence is such as implyethe no respect unto outward thinges , as his wisedome , power , and goodnes doe bothe , in the way of mercy , and in the way of judgement .

It implyes contradiction to affirme his power , or wisedome to be more infinite then his essence , if so be we conceave his power , and wisedome to be his essence . And yet to be in many places more then another thing is , is not to make it infinite , because all places put together , are but finite , much lesse to make it more infinite .

Not only some great Schoolemen , as you speake , but all of them for ought I knowe to the contrary , distinguishe of Gods being in all thinges by his essence , by his power , by his prosence ; and so the vulgar verse runnes , Enter , praesenter . Deus est , & ubique potenter ; Allthoughe they take severall courses in the explication of them , as we may reade in Vasquez . Three of which explications , Vasq. in 4. qu 〈◊〉 . art. 3. disp. 30. he takes upon him to confute , to witt , that of Alexander Halensis , as allso the way of Bonaventure , and lastly the way of Durand : & resteth himselfe upon the explication of Aquinas , followed as he saythe by Cajetan , Albertus , Aegidius , Ricardus , Capreolus , & Gabriel , & the exposition there set downe is this . 1. God is in all thinges by his essence , because his substance is not distant from things , but joyned with them , whether in respect of himselfe , or in respect of his operation . 2. By his presence , because he knowes all thinges . 3. By his power , because his power reachethe unto every thinge . Nowe I freely professe , I cannot satisfy my selfe in this distinction . And to my judgement , presence is only in respect of essence , or of that individuall substance whatsoever it be , which is sayde to be present , whether it hathe knowledge or no , what power soever it hath much or litle , & whether it worke or no. Nowe the essence of God is never parted from his knowledge and power . And God indeede cannot be sayde , in proper speeche , to be more distant from one place or thinge , then from any other . But he may be sayde , I confesse , to be in one place more then in another , in as much as he dothe manifest himselfe more in one place , then in another . He is in all places as the Author of nature , & communicating the gifts of nature ; in speciall sort he is sayde to be in his Church as the Author of grace , & communicating the gifts of grace , but in most speciall manner in the third Heaven as the Author of glory , & communicating himselfe in glorious manner unto his Angells and Saints ; all which diversities of being are rather in respect of his power , then of his essence . For how is God sayde to be in any thinge ? as conteyned ? by no meanes , but rather as conteyninge ; which conteyning is a transient operation of God , proceeding from his power , & his will . Thus saythe the Apostle God is not farre from every one of us ; for as much as in him we Act. 17. 27. 28. live , & moove , & have our beinge . And marke but the particulars of explication proposed by Vasquius , according to the best opinion , in his judgment , to witt , according to that of Aquinas . God is in all things by his essence , because his substance is not distant ( & this is most true , I confesse ; for certeinly he is no more distant in place from a mouse , then from an Angell ) but he is joyned with the things themselfes , whether in respect of himselfe , or of his operation .

So then if Gods operation be joyned with the thinges themselves , it suffizeth , ( by this opinion ) to maynteyne , that God is present with them by his essence ; yet if you consider it well , you shall finde , that this is all one with his presence in respect of his power ; for that was expounded thus ; God is in the whole Vniverse , by his power , because his operation reacheth unto every thing . Next , consider , how God is in every thing by his presence . First , to say that God is in every thing by his presence , seemes a very absurde manner of speeche : for it is as much as to say , that God is present in every thing by his presence . Then consider the explication of it . He knowethe all thinges , therfore he is present with all things : Now this seemes very absurd . For we read that God revealed to Elishah , what was done in the King of Arams 2. King . 6. 1● . privy Chamber ; might therfore Elishah justly be sayde to have bene present in the Kings privy Chamber ? We knowe the number of the Starres , what therfore , are we present with them ? God foreknowes things to come , is he therfore present with them allso , which yet are not ? Vasquius himselfe professed before , in confuting the opinion of Durand , that Nothing is sayde to be present with another , unles that other thing were conscious therof , and he prooved it out of the digests , and out of the lawe Coram ; Coram Titio aliquid fecisse jussus non videtur praesente eo fecisse , nisi is intelligat ; & allso out of the 112. epistle of Austin , plane sorsitan satis est , si praesentia hoc loco intelligamus , quae praesto sunt sensibus , sive animi , sive corporis , unde etjam ducto vocabulo . praesentia nominantur . As if praesens were as much as prae sensibus . To this I may adde that of Aeneas in Virgill , when the cloud wherwith his mother Venus had covered him , vanished away , then he breakes out into these wordes Coram , quem quaeritis adsum Troius Aeneas . But now consider , according to this interpretation of the word praesent God shall be sayde to be present with none , but with intelligent creatures : for such alone can knowe him and take notice of him ; and because but fewe of them take notice of him ; therfore he can be sayde to be present , but with a fewe of them allso . Yet Aquinas his explication of Gods beinge in Aquin in 〈◊〉 . qu. 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 . 3. all thinges by his presence , is quite of a contrary nature , to witt , because God knowes them , and not because they knowe or take notice of him . Last of all , to be every where by his power , is sayde to be in this respect , that his operation reacheth to every thinge . Now who seethe not that this presence is rather in respect of his operation , and actuall workinge , then of his power to worke . And if we ascend to the ca●se of his operation , we must ascend not only to the power of God , but even to his wisedome , and goodnes , as which is the cause of his operation , as well as his power . And if we looke for some thing more proper , to admitt this denomination then other , we must take notice of his will , rather then of his power , as which is the most immediate cause of his operation . For infinite power to be able to reache every possible effect , is no more , then to be able to produce it , or being produced to preserve it , or to worke in it , or by it , whatsoever it pleasethe , which is nothing pertinent to the being of it , therein as in a place , which belongs to essence rather then unto power : For when I am sayde to be here and there , the meaning is not , my power is here or there , but my person , which is properly sayde of me , because I am a body , to which kinde or natures , place properly belongethe . But as touchinge the essence of God , that being spirituall & infinite , it is not capable of any place to conteyne it , but rather it conteynes every thinge : in which respect your selfe have allready observed , that by the Hebrewes he is called 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 place it selfe . Nowe Iudge , whether God may be sayde in any congruitie to conteyne bodies by his essence , or Spirits eyther created ; and whether that were not to signify , that bodies and Spirits created , were of the essence of God . Neyther is it proper to say , that God by his essence dothe worke eyther the creation or the conservation of outward things , but rather by his understanding , power , and will . For to worke by essence , is to worke in the way of naturall Agents necessarily , but to worke by wisedome & will , is to worke after the way of free Agents , freely . If God were every where , ( according to the sayinge reported and avouched by you ) before there was any distinction of times ; then surely God allso was every where before there was any distinction of place . For certeinly distinction of time , and distinction of place beganne together . ) And must you not herby be driven to the acknowledgement of a Vacuum before the World was , and that conteyning distinction of parts , in such sort , as to make way for the denominations of here and there , and every where , and that God was therein , and every where therein , before the World was ? which opinion your selfe in this very section have impugned . To discourse of the effects of Gods infinite power , in case his knowledge were not infinite ; or of the effects of his infinite knowledge in case his power were not infinite , I judge to be a very vayne thinge ; because it is impossible that the one shoulde be infinite without the other . For seing many things cannot be brought to passe without knowledge ; like as without knowledge none of such thinges can be brought to passe at all : so likewise , without sufficiency of knowledge , such things coulde not be brought to passe , as require such a proportion of sufficient knowledge to performe them . And if God had but a finite power , he coulde foreknowe no more thinges , then coulde be brought to passe by that finite power . It is true , God is , where any thing is , but howe ? as conteyning it , not as conteyned by it ; but it is untrue , that God is , where any thing may be . For without the Heavens something may be ; but God is not without the Heavens . For without the Heavens is Uacuum ; but God is not in Uacuo , as before your selfe have disputed . And indeede how should he be there seing he coulde neyther be there as conteyninge , nor as conteyned . For that which is nothing , is neyther fitt to conteyne , nor fitt to be conteyned . In fine , I observe , how Gods being in all things you reduce unto two heads ; The one is his creation ; the other , his preservation of them . And so I confesse , God is not distant from any of us ; for as much as we live and moove , and have our beinge in him as the Apostle speakethe .

4. The two wayes as you make them of Gods being every where , as you construe the Prophet Ieremy , are by Piscator conceaved to be but one ; the latter wordes , Can any hide himselfe in secret places , that I shoulde not see him ? being but an explanation of the former , Am I a God at hande , and not a God a farre off . As much as to say , that God seethe as well thinges done in earthe , as thinges done in Heaven . So that in Scripture phrase , thinges done in earthe are called things done a farre of , God speaking herein according to vulgar apprehension . Wheras God is sayde to fill Heaven and Earthe , hence it is that God is sayd to be neyther circumscriptively in place as bodies are , nor definitively as Angells are , but repletively , that is filling all thinges ; but howe ? that is saythe Durand with his effects .

God dothe more then fill Heaven and Earthe . For he hathe made them , and dothe maynteyne them , not only fillethe them with all creatures fitt for them .

Water filles the bucket , and the bucket conteynes the water : But God forbid we should so conceave of the nature of God , as by filling the Heavens and the Earth , to be conteyned in them .

His infinite power and wisedome serves his turne first to make them , afterwards to preserve them , and unto proper & congruous endes to order them , and with his various effects to fill them , but not with his essence , least we should be driven to ascribe extension to his essence , and maynteyne that he was and is in Uacuo as before I have shewed . Vndoubtedly Gods essence is as present with us on earthe , as with the Angells and Saints in Heaven , and no more distant or absent from us , then from them .

But how is God present ? Not as praesensibus Corporis according to Austins exposition of the word praesent ; for God is no sensible thinge , for then he were corporall , and to be praesensibus animi is nothing to the purpose . God dothe coexist with every thing that is . For they doe exist , and God doth exist : But doth God coexist with them in time ? they doe exist in time , that is their measure of duration , but God in eternitie that is the measure of his duration , to witt himselfe .

They doe exist in place , that is the measure of corporall extension ; but doth God exist in place , who hathe no extension ? dothe he not rather exist in his owne immensitie which is all one with himselfe , like as is his eternitie ? In a word , the severall beings of one thing in another are usually comprehended in these verses . Insunt pars , totum , Species , Genus , & calor igni . Rex in Regno , res in sine locoque locatum .

Now see whether any of these are competible unto God . Your selfe have observed and approoved the Hebrewes conceyte in calling him 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 Place . Let this then passe for a peculiar being of God in all his creatures , whether visible or invisible , corporall or spirituall , namely that as he hath made them , so he conteynes them , praeserves them , ordereth them , fillethe them all with his effects , and workes the good pleasure of his owne will in them , and by them . And this his presence , it is impossible he should withdrawe from them , ●ave as he shall be pleased ●o destroy them , and take all beinge from them ; and lastly that his very essence is as indistant from the meanest worme , as from the most glorious Angell . But to talke , of Gods piercing or penetrating all thinges not with his effects only , but with his essence , as the light pierc●th the ayre , I dare not enterteyne any such g●osse conceyte of the most simple and spirituall nature of God , for feare attributinge extension unto his essence , and such as should continue thoughe the World were destroyed , and make roome for the essence of God , to extende it selfe in Uacuo , and the parts therof ( which are merely imaginary ) as well as in the World , and in the parts therof , like as before I have argued . The power of God dothe exercise it selfe , according to the pleasure of his will : And therfore it seemes wonderous strange to me , that you should ascribe power to God , to dispose of his essence , as touching the placinge of it in space locall .

Neyther doe I see cause , why glorious Angells should be required to prepare a place of residence for God , more then bodies inglorious .

God I acknowledge to be as well in the basest worme , as in the most glorious Angell . And so farre foorthe as it beto Gods essence to be every where , I presume no sober Divine will maynteyne , that it is other then a naturall attribute unto God , & not in his power freely to dispose of his essence eyther otherwise , or so .

And therfore when you aske , whether upon the creatinge of a newe Heaven , it is not possible that God should be therin ? I answere ; looke in what sense God is sayde to be any where , in that sense it is impossible that God should not be here . And yet without all change in them , thoughe not without change in things without him , one creature beinge annihilated , and another created a newe . And thoughe Angells be subject to change , yet God is not . But when you shall proove that change is no fruite of impotency , I will reno●nce the Prophet that laythe , The Lord is not changed , and Mal. 3. 6. take you for my Apostle . And surely if not to be changed , were to be impotent ; how impotent must God needes be , Iam. 1. 17. with whome is no variablenes nor shadowe of change ?

5. Gods immensitie is no more subject to his will and power to be streitned , then his eternitie : But as God is not in time , that being a measure only fitt for creatures subject to mutation , but in his owne eternitie , which is all one with himselfe : So neyther is he in place a measure fitt for creatures only subject to extension , but in his owne immensitie , which is all one with himselfe . And as by his eternitie he doth transcendently and supereminently comprehend all times : so by his immensitie dothe he comprehend all places . So that neyther doe we say , that the first could not be , neyther doe we say , that this your second way can be . Only we dare not say , the essence of God dothe pierce all things ; least we should give unto his simple and indivisible nature , some kinde of extension .

And how can you avoyde it , in making the essence or substance of God to pierce all thinges ; how , I say , can you avoyde the maynteyninge of Gods essence to be changeable from place to place , ( upon supposition that the World may moove eyther Eastward , or Westward , farther then it is ) or that his essence is in Uacuo , and that after a manner of extension , as before hathe bene argued . Now you tell us , that mutabilitie is imcompetent with infinitie : yet in the very next section foregoinge , you reckoned it a point of impotency not to be able to change , as Angells doe their mansions , when they mislike them . Of which course of Angells , eyther as touchinge their mistake , or change of mansion I am nothing conscious , as neyther am I of any oracle tending that way .

By your leave ; there is no proportion betweene Gods immensitie in respect of all places filled by him , and the infinity of his nature .

For seing place and created things can be but sinite , his immensitie this way , never extends farther then to the filling of a finite creature . Neyther doe you well to confound distinction with limitation , as if they were all one . For when we distinguishe Gods power , and wisedome , and goodnes , or the Persons in the Trinity , herby we doe neyther limit the nature of God , nor the Persons , nor his attributes .

It is true , that God is the supporter of all thinges , and in this respect , the Apostle acknowledgeth , that He is not farre Act. 17. 27. 28. from any of us , for as much as In him we live , and moove , and have our beinge .

6. You say that God was , when nothing was . A most improvident speeche , and as good as sacke and sugar unto Atheists . For it is as much as to say , that God was nothinge , or that sometimes God was not . But eftsoones you alter this dangerous forme of wordes , and tell us that God was , when nothing was besides himselfe . Without all peradventure , before the creation of the world , there was neyther distinction of time , nor of place . Thoughe you doe not cloathe God with an imaginary space as without him ; yet may you doe as great wrong , to imagine such a space in the nature of God , as it seemes you doe , and that you call immensitie . For you say , such an imaginary space should be a checke to his immensitie , as being a parallel distance locall . So that you seeme manifestly to acknowledge a distance in Gods nature , but you woulde not have it checkt by any parallel distance as immense as himselfe . This imagination is wonderous grosse . Wheras on the contrary , I finde none to conceyte of any immensitie in God , otherwise then as he is sayde to fill all places ; and therfore before places or bodies are existent , only a power and abilitie is in God to fill all places ; & that filling , Durand professethe to be in respect of the effects wrought by him , & wherwith he filles all places , not with his essence piercinge all thinges as you discourse , as if it were as bigge as the World , or as an infinite World : & yet you thinke to charme this extravagant conceyte , with calling it indivisible .

And so the light of the Sunne which filles the world , with manifest extension , is yet indivisible .

Gods essence , you say , conteynes the Heavens . I would , you would consider this phrase well , & what it imports .

If you were askt what the essence of man conteynes , would you say , that it conteynes any thing more then that , which is of the essence of man , as Animal rationale ? Yet without making any bones of scruple in the prosecution of your owne conceytes , you say that the essence of God conteynes the Heavens . May you not as well say , that the essence of God made the Heavens ?

I had thought it had bene a more congruous speeche , to say , that God by his power & will made the Heavens , & so dothe preserve and conteyne them rather then by his essence . For in respect of essence , only such thinges are attributed unto God , as doe necessarily belong unto him ; as for example that he is , eternall , unchangeable , omnipotent , most wise , most good . But no sober man woulde say ( I thinke ) that God is the creator , preserver , conteyner of all thinges by his essence . But these attributes belong unto him by the freedome of his will . I nothing doubt , but that if the World were a thousand times bigger then it is , God should be as intimately coexistent to every part of it , as he now is to any part of this Heaven & Earthe , which we now see . For all thinges that live or moove or have any beinge , doe & must live , & moove , & have their beinge in him . But yet , as it is by his will that he made them , and not by his essence : so it is by his will , and not by his essence , that he dothe preserve them .

You pursue the phrasifying of your owne conceytes according to your owne pleasure : But where doe you finde in Tertullian or Philo the penetration of Gods essence thorough all thinges ? Yet I confesse Anselme saythe , that Natura Dei penetrando cuncta continet ; and whether you tooke it hand over Ansesm . Monolog . cap. 23. head from him I knowe not : You seeme to make Gods essence a space of some spirituall extension ; to which kinde of conceyte our imagination I confesse , is wonderous prone ; as if it did penetrate all thinges as light dothe penetrate the ayre , and so fill all thinges with it selfe , and not only with his multifarious effects as Durand interpreteth it . Nowe this is a dangerous conceyte and obnoxious to a foule errour , and opposite to the simplicitie of Gods nature : which you perceave wel enoughe , and therfore you thinke to checke this errour of conceyte , by saying that he is indivisible , as if wordes would serve the turne to salve Gods pure simplicitie .

Durand I am sure professethe against this penetration which you are so enamoured with . Durand . 1. dist. 37. q. Quando dicimus Deum esse in rebus , non intelligimus eum esse in iis ut partem intrinsecam , vel intrinsecus penetrantem : sed intelligimus eum esse praesentem rei , non solum secundum durationem , quia & quando res sunt , nec secundum contactum corporalem cum non sit corpus nec , virtus in corpore , sed secundum ordinem qui in Spiritibus tenet locum situs in corporibus . In hoc tamen excellit ordo in Spiritibus situm in corporibus ; quia per situm se habet unum corpus ad aliud immediate quoad sui extremum : sed per ordinem se habet Spiritus ad corpus immediate secundum quodlibet sui ; For thus he writes , when we say , that God is in thinges , we doe not understand him to be an intrinsecate part , or that he doth intrinsecatlie penetrate them : but we understand him to be present to the thing , not only according to the duration therof , in being when the things are , not by corporall touch , seing he is not a body , nor any qualitie in a body , but according to order , which in Spirits , is answerable to situation in bodies . Which order in Spirits , excells situation in bodies in this respect ; because by situation one body is with another only as touching the extreame parts therof immediately . But by order a Spirit is immediate to a body in respect of every part therof .

Our imagination , I confesse , is apt to imagine God to be as it were of most subtile quantitie penetrating all . But to conceave so of an Angell is too grosse , how much more of God .

Durand . 1. dist. 37. part. 2. qu. 1. num 17. Differentiae situs non extenduntur ad substantias incorporeas , cujusmodi sunt Angeli . Huic autem contradicit imaginatio , quae non transcendit quantum & continuum , secundum quod formamus nobis de Angelis aliquod Quantum Subtilissimum . Sed in hoc non est rectum credere imaginationi , quia Angeli abstrahunt secundum rem a quanto , sicut a quali : & ideo sicut non sunt albi aut nigri , frigidi , aut calidi , & sic de caeteris qualitaetibus corporalibus : sic non sunt magni vel parvi , quia non sunt quanti , & per consequens hic vel ibi ratione suae essentiae , quia hae sunt proprietates quanti .

The proper differences of corporall thinges saythe Durand are not to be extended to incorporall things , such as Angells are . Imagination contradicteth this , which dothe not transcend quantities , according wherunto we fashion to our selves Angells , as if they were of a most subtile quantitie . But we doe not well to followe imagination in this . For Angells are natures abstract as well from quantitie as from qualitie ; & therfore like as they are not white and black , cold and hott , and so of the rest of corporall qualities : and so they are not great or small , because they have no quantity , & consequently , are not here , or there , in respect of their essence , seing these differences are proper unto quantitie .

But some may say , If Gods essence be not here , where is it then ? I answeare that God is as much here as any where , and when I say God is here and every where , I doe not exclude his essence . For by God I understand his essence . But I deny that he is here or any where els secundum ess●ntiam . as if his essence had any situation here , which kind of being is proper only to bodies , and not to Spirits , and makes Gods nature subject to extension .

We may be bold to say , that Gods essence is indistant from every thing ; For herein we goe along with the Apostle , who sayth , that God is not farre from every one of us . For in him we live & moove & have our beinge . But as for penetration of all things with Gods essence , I leave that phrase to them that like it . As for Gregories trimēbred sentence , one part therof alone is to your purpose , namely when he saythe , that God is intra omnia non ●nclusus . And indeede we all say , that God is so in all thinges as that he rather conteynes them , then is conteyned by them . Now which I pray is the more sober speeche , to say that Gods essence conteynes all thinges , or to say that Gods power & will conteynes all thinges , let every learned and sober Reader judge .

7. Thoughe I deeme it not much woorthe the while to searche after this distinction in Anselme , the place wherof you conceale . Yet I have taken that paynes to the ende I might the better consider in what sense , and upon what grounde of reason he dothe deliver it . And in his Monologion I finde he discoursethe of Gods beinge in time and place . But no such distinction can I finde in him , nor any such assertions as you impute vnto him . In his 19. chap. he disputethe that God is in no place and time . In the 21. How he is in all places , and in no place . In the 22. That It may be better vnderstood that God is sayde to be allwayes then in all time . In the 23. How it may be better vnderstood , that God is sayde to be every where then in all places . But that it is fitter to be sayde of God that he is with place , then in place , I finde no where nor in any place in Anselme . Yet you avouche it as the distinction of Anselme , and as well approoved of good writers , but who they are , you keepe to your selfe . Notwithstanding you tell us , that the resolution of doctrine according to the former distinction , is blameable in two respects . 1. For that it conceales much matter of admiration ( which the description of immensitie used by Barnard and others , dothe promptly suggest . 2. Because it dothe occasion an erroneous imagination of coextension in the divine essence . As touching the first ; I see nothing to the contrary , but that Gods being with every place , dothe every way conteyne the very same matter of admiration , which his being in every place dothe . For the woonderful nature of his immensitie in playne termes is but this , ( thoughe it may be phrasified diverse wayes as it pleasethe the writer ) that he conteynes all thinges and is conteyned in none . Now this may as well be signified , by sayinge God is with every place , as by sayinge God is in every place . For being with a place is indifferent to admitt , such a manner of being with it , as namely by way of conteyning it . But being in a place , dothe rather incline to signify a beinge conteyned by it . Which is opposite to the active conteyning of it . Place say the Durand , may be Durand . 〈◊〉 . dist. 37. q. 2. considered two wayes , eyther as a naturall thing , or as conteyning the thing placed . As it is naturall thinge , so God is in every place ; but as it conteynes the thinge sayde to be in it , so he is in no place . For he conteynes all , and is conteyned of none . As for the imagination of coextension in the divine essence , to my judgement , your opinion in making the divine essence to penetrate all thinges , hathe bene very prone therunto . And howe to be with every thinge , dothe more include a coextension of nature , then to be in every thinge , I cannot possibly conceave . But I pray in what sense of truthe , or truthe of sense , can you averre that every body is with every place ? You may as well avouche that every worme here on earthe is with the Sunne , or with the place of the Sunne . And can the mathematicall dimensions of a bodily substance , be accoumpted the place , of that bodily substance , that you should say , Every bodily substance is with the mathematicall dimensions therof , and that even there where you speake of a substance his being with a place ? And why you should terme them mathematicall dimensions rather then Physicall I knowe not .

You say that Gods being in every place and in every part of every body , so as not to be conteyned in them , dothe exclud all conceyte of coextension . But I see no reason for this assertion : it rather includes an extension of Gods being beyond all thinges , then hinders or excludes the conceyte of coextension with the things that are : especially wheras you maynteyne that God is in all thinges not only as conteyning them ( with cannot be attributed unto God in respect of his essence , as I have shewed , but rather in respect of his power and wil ) but by way of penetration thoroughe all , and that in respect of his essence , ( and not in respect of his power only ) like as light is diffused thoroughe our Hemi spheare ; which similitude I am bolde to adde , because you fayle in affoording us any resemblance to succour our capacitie of apprehension this way . But I dare not adventure vpon such an apprehension , because in my opinion it is too grosse to be attributed to the nature of God . I content my selfe with this , that as God before the world , was in himselfe , so he is in himselfe still according to that old verse , Tunc ubi nunc in se quoniam sibi sufficit ipse .

But then nothing being made , he had nothing to conteyne , & governe , and worke by or in , as nowe he hathe . As touchinge all other manner of being in all thinges , I content my selfe with ignorance . You magnify Trism g●sts definition of Gods immensitie , and much good doe it you . It is suitable with your dicourse . But doe you remember what censure Aristotle passed vpon Empedocles , for this figurative & obscure manner of expressions in Philosophicall discourse ? And indeede when we take paynes in searching out the truthe , why shoulde we encumber our selves with resolving figures into playne speeches , that so we may have somethinge wheron to dispute . Hertofore you tolde us that God was the center of all thinges , and that of supportance : now out of Trismegist you tell us , that God hathe a Center and that every where , but not of supportance passive I thinke , as wherby he shoulde be supported , but of supportance active , wherby he supporteth all thinges . Now herof we can easily finde bothe a center and a circumference . For Gods supporting of the earth , may well be accoumpted the Center , and Gods supporting the heavens may well be accoumpted the Circumference of Gods supportinge the earthe . In as much as there is no divine supporting without it , at least of materiall creatures , but all with it . Thoughe it be true , that God coulde & can make the world much bigger then it is . But Gods will hathe herein circum●scibed himselfe , thus farre to proceede as he dothe , in supporting all thinges & no farther . I doe not like your phrase of inlarging the actuall coexistence of Gods essence . For dare any sober divine say , that Gods actuall existence hathe boundes , and that these boundes may be more or lesse enlarged ? And yet the face I confesse of your discourse , lookes hitherwardes . How then doe you say , that the boundes of Gods coexistence with his creatures are or can be enlarged ? The only way to helpe it , is to say , that Gods existence is never enlarged , but the existence of creatures , by the encreasing of newe , may be enlarged , and consequently Gods coexistence with them may be sayde to be enlarged , not that his existence is more then it was , but that the existence of created substances , is more then it was . And more creatures coexisting with God , then formerly there did , he doth coexist with more then he did . His existence is no greater then it was , nor hathe no larger boundes then it had ; but creatures are supposed to exist by the power of God , more then formerly did exist . And yet the omnipotency of God hathe pitcht a circumference to Gods coexistence with his creatures , and that is the circumference of the world . For without it God seems to have no coexistence with his creatures but all within . And albeit God coulde make the world greater and greater , yet still it shoulde be but finite , & as there should be a circumference of all creatures existing , so likewise of Gods coexisting with them . To say , that God only truly is , is one of the paradoxes . That God alone is id quod est , that is , that whatsoever is attributed unto God , is essentiall to him , not accidentall , I have often read . But that God only , truly is , I never read but in your writings . In him we live , and moove , and have our being saythe Saint Paul : but this by your subtile commentary must be understood with a distinction : In him we live but not truly ; in him we moove but not truly , in him we have our being but not truly . That God conteynes all things , and is not conteyned in any thing , we easily grant . Spheares doe conteyne by way of place ; but I hope , you will not say , that God in such sort conteynes any thinge ; thoughe therfore called by the Hebrewes 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , because he conteynethe all thinges . And yet certeinly , there is no Spheare conteynes so much , but that a square figure may conteyne as much , thoughe not under the same limits . And can any man make doubt , but God coulde make a World of a square figure , that shoulde conteyne as much as this World dothe , thoughe in this case the Circumference of the World shoulde be greater then now it is ? But because that all thinges cannot comprehend God , therfore you say , He is rightly resembled to a spheare , whose Circumference is no where .

A proper resemblance of the nature of God to a thing utterly impossible , and fitt matter for Atheists to make themselfes sport withall , I say impossible more then one way .

For first , it is a thing impossible , that a body should be infinite .

Secondly it is impossible , that a body infinite should be Sphericall . If you aske , of what figure then shoulde it be ? my answeare is , it should be of no figure . For figures are the boundes of quantities ; & it is contradiction to make a boundles quantitie consist of boundes ; or a bounded and figured quantitie without boundes . And yet , if all this were receaved as fitt , and convenient , what shall we gayne therby , when all this while we imagine him to be merely corporall , who indeede is merely spirituall ? For I doe not thinke you looke to finde spheares any other where then among bodies .

We reade and heare of the Spheares of Heaven ; but I never read or heard of the Spheares of Angells or Spirits , as if they might be of a round or square figure as bodies are , much lesse is any such figure fitt to resemble God . Yet upon these conceytes as extraordinary atchievements of yours in the way of Metaphysicall discourse , you proceede in the next place to the solution of certeyne difficulties ; that so Drismagist his definition of Gods immensitie , may finde the more easy admittance , into the Articles of our imagination , if not into the Articles of our Creede . Which yet truly I should not have excepted against , but rather have admitted , if to no other ende , yet to this , even to cutt of curious speculations about the immensitie of God ; had you not so farre magnified it , as if it had bene some Oracle of natures light , and made use of it , not as a Rhetoricall flashe , and diaculation only , but as a serious maxime to rely upon in Philosophicall discourse ; where the best decorum is , to make no use of tropes and figures , but of playne and proper termes , that we may not be to seeke of our owne meaninge .

8. Your former discourse about the Spheare , together with the Center and Circumference ( spoken of ) of Gods immensitie , you perceave is likely to rayse some Spirits ; and therfore aforehand , you shewe a course how to lay them . The first is , How a Center should be conceaved to be every where ? The second How the indivisibility of Gods praesence should be compared to a Center ? To the former , you answeare , that As the Divine essence by reason of absolute insinity hath an absolute necessitie of coexistence , with space or magnitude infinite ; so were it possible there should be ( as some Divines holde it possible there may be ) a magnitude or Spheare actually infinite , this magnitude could have no set point for its center , but of every point designable in it , we might avouche this is the Center : Every point shoulde have the negative properties of a sphericall center , there coulde be no inequalitie betweene the distances of severall parts from the Circumference of that , which is insinite , and hath no boundes of magnitude . So then God by absolute necessitie of nature must coexist with that , which neyther doth exist , nor can exist by the opinion of most . For that an infinite body should exist , is not only by Aristotle and Aquinas prooved , but most generally helde to be impossible . But if such a thing be impossible to exist , it is allso impossible that God should coexist with it ; & consequently most false , is that which you say , namely that by reason of his infinity , it is absolutely necessary , that God should coexist with it .

Now will it not followe herehence , that it is absolutely necessary , that God should not exist at all , and that by reason of his infinity ? For to coexist with that which is impossible to exist , what is it , but not to exist at all ? O' what dangerous consequences doe your wilde assertions goe as it were with childe , withall ; and howe fitt are such lettice for the lipps of Atheists ? marke how Durand discoursethe against this conceyte of yours , as when you say , that by reason of his infinity God must be every where .

Per eandem rationem dicendum est quod non competit Deo esse Durand . 1. dist. 37. p. 1 quest. 1. ubique , ita quod infinitas suae substantiae sit ei , ratio ubique essendi , Si enim competeret Deo esse ubique ratione suae essentiae infinitae hinc competi ei esse necessario ubique , vel in loco infinito , & nullo modo finito , sicut a contrario dicitur de Angelo quod ratione suae essentiae finite convenit ei esse in loco finito , & nullo modo in infinito .

By the same reason we must say , it agreeth not to God to be every were , so as that the infinity of his substance , is unto him the reason of his being every where . For if it belonged to God to be every where in regard of his essence infinite , then necessarily he should be every where , or in an infinite place , and by no meanes in a finite place ; like as on the contrary , it is sayde of an Angell , that in regard of his essence finite , it agreeth to him , to be in a finite place , by no meanes in a place infinite .

Secondly you tell us , that some Divines holde it possible , there may be a magnitude or materiall spheare actually infinite . But you doe not love to betray your Authors .

I have read in a late Spanish Iesuite a discourse to proove Petr. Hurtado de Mendosa . disp. in Vniversam Philosoph . Tract . de Infinito . that infinitum potest dare . But in this he is a meere mountebanke , and affectator of singularities , I have hertofore read allso in Hills Philosophia Lencippaea , Democritica , so bold an assertion as this , That the World is infinite ; Otherwise , sayth he , the effect were not suitable to the cause . For God the Author of the World is infinite . But he was conscious of this his heterodoxy in the opinion of the World , & therfore would professe ( as I have heard ) that if in Oxford he should dispute thus , we in the Vniversitie would cry out for a Limitor , for this Infinitor .

And truly these and such like disputes , I reckon not woorthy to be named the same day , with the demonstrations that are brought to the contrary . And I may take libertie to professe thus much , how that observinge the Iesuite before spoken of , Hurtado di Mendosa by name , to affect subtilties and curiositie of demonstration , in zeale of maynteyning the truth , which as Austin sometimes saydo , A Deo dicitur verum quodcunque dicitur ; I tooke leave of my better studies , destinated to the mayntenance of Gods grace against all Pelagian , Iesuiticall , and Arminian oppositions , and to examine the arguments of Hurtado in that point , and went a large way in the solution of them , & confutation of his insolent assertion , until I thought it highe time to returne to such aliene meditations ; considering it might be a practise of Satan , to cast a ball of provocation in my way , and therby to cause a diversion , from more grave , more seasonable and more profitable contemplations . But yet I professe I never heard or read before of any that maynteyned the possibility of a Spheare to be infinite , as that which implyes a manifest contradiction . For figures beinge the boundes of quantities it shoulde imply a bounded quantitie without boundes . But in the fiction proposed , you say , every point should be the center as pertakinge of the negative properties of a Center : that is , there should be no inequalitie betweene the distances of severall points from the Circumference of that which is infinite as for example . Suppose the world were infinite Eastward , & infinite westward . Nowe consider a direct line passinge over S. Michaels mount to Dover and so forwards Eastward , & in like manner from Dover to Sainct Michaels mount , and so forward , westward . From dover Eastward is infinite , and from Saint Michaels Eastward is but infinite . So then these two are equall that is the part is equall to the whole . For the line from , Dover Eastward is but a part of the line from Saint Michaels Eastward in infinitum . This contradictious absurdity amongst many other , followeth upon supposition of any body or extension infinite . By the way observe a great incongrutie ; thoughe you suppose a spheare infinite , yet you conceave it to have a Circumference . But to have a Circumference is not to be infinite . Touching the second difficultie , to witt , how the indivisibility of Gods presence in every place may be compared to a Center : You say , this comparison is right , in as much as God hath no diversitie of parts . And indeede I finde no small uniformitie , betweene the beginning of this your discourse of Gods immensitie , and the ende of it . For about the beginninge you professed ; that No creature , no positive essence no numerably part of this Vniverse , was so like unto God as notting ; And nowe you say , he is rightly resembled to a point , which every man knowes , is much about the same proportion , & quantitie of just nothing . For immensitie & eternitie no Angell so like unto God as nothing : & agayne for his indivisibilitie , you say he is rightly compared to a point , which is as much as nothing . Of the sobrietie of these your discourses , let the Reader judge . But you thinke to helpe the matter by saying , that His presence agayne is like to magnitude actually infinite , in that it can have no circumference . Now consider I pray , How will you make the Majestie of God amendes , for these your injurious comparisons , to witt , in comparing him , to magnitude actually infinite , which indeede is just nothing ? For in the most generall opinion of Philosophers & Divines , magnitude actually infinite , is a thinge utterly impossible to have any beinge . And marke withall , how you contradict your selfe . For here you suppose , that magnitude infinite can have no circumference ; & but a litle before , your discourse was of an infinite Spheare that had a circumference . At length notwitstanding your ▪ former assertion of justifyinge the comparing of Gods indivisible essence vnto a center , or point of magnitude ; Nowe ▪ you confesse that the indivisibilitie of the one , and indivisibilitie of the other are heterogeneall , and consequently asymetrall , the best Philosophicall truthe I have hitherunto founde in your discourse . But least all this while you should seeme utterly extravagant in your incongruous comparisons of the nature of God to vile thinges , or rather to Nothings ; first you mince this Philosophicall maxime , as when you say , They are of times asymetrall ; and then you corrupt it by interpretation as if asymetrall signified not absolutely incommensurable , but only not exactly commensurable . Wheras in truthe you shall as soone proove the Diameter of a square commensurable to his , side as to proove the indivisible nature of God commensurable to a point of quantitie . Est quoddam indivisibile , saith Durand , quod est aliquid quantitatis ut punctus : Durand . 〈◊〉 . dist. ●7 . quest. 2. Aliud est indivisibile quod est totalitur extra naturam quantitatis , ut Deus . What an absurd thing were it to compare the soule of man to a point in a quantitie ; the soule being so indivisible as to be all in all , & all in every part ; how much more so to compare an Angell , most of all the divine Essence ? And the soule of man is much fitter to represent God by ( man being made after the image of God ) and God is all in all , and all in every part of the world , but not as forma informans , as the soule is , and consequently neyther extended with the extension of the world , nor mooved at the motion of the world ; nor any part therof . Hence you say it is that the most subtile Schoolemen or Metaphysicall Divines as well ancient as moderne , resolve it as a point irresoluble by humane witt ; whether a mathematicall point or center , can be the complete , and definitive place of an Angell , albeit they holde the Angelicall natures to be as truly indivisible , as points or centers are .

I doubt there is litle truthe & sobrietie in all this . If there be , I must confess● I was never acquainted with any of these concealed Schoolemen or Divines eyther ancient , or moderne , at least in these particulars ; For you tell me that , which I never heard or read of before ; yet I have bene acquainted with fopperyes more then enoughe , amongst them , & might have bene with more , if I had any minde thereunto . But for the most part I have ever shunned those trifling subtilties . But consider we the particulars , which here you give us a part . For to make your assertion good , you are to shewe , not only that these Schoolemen you intimate , doe holde the point you speake of irresoluble , but allso that Hence they doe holde it so ; that is , because the indivisibilitie of centers , or points , & of spirituall substances are heterogeneall and asymmetrall , that is , not exactly commensurable .

But let us consider the point it selfe , concerning a Mathematicall point . Now I pray consider this : As Mathematicall quantitie is herein distinct from quantity Physicall , because that is abstract from matter , this is not : so a Mathematicall point , must herein be distinct from a point Physicall , in as much as that is abstract from matter , this is not .

Now quantity , and poincts Mathematicall thus abstract from matter , are but only in imagination . And doe the Scholemen , you speake of , maynteyne it as a point irresoluble , whether an Angell may be defined within a point of imagination only ? what were this , but to have no being at all but in mans imagination ? Wherfore you may be advised , to let the question runne rather of a point physicall , then of a point Mathematicall , unles you looke for some succour , from that rule of course Mathematici abstrahunt , nec mentiuntur .

Yet that woulde proove but a broken toothe and sliding foote , to keepe you from errour in this . But I thinke the Nominalls are those most subtile Schoolemen you speake of ; I envy not the glory which you give them , be it as great as that which Scaliger passethe upon Scot , Occam , and Sincet . The nominalls are much magnified by Hurtado di Mendosa . And I finde in Gabriel Biel such a question as this , Whether an Angell may determine unto himselfe a certeyne quantitie of place , 〈◊〉 . 2. dist. 2. q. 1. in such sort as be cannot coassist unto , or be defined by eyther a greater or a lesser , and the answeare is sayde to be according to Occam in his Quodlibets 1. quest. 4. First that there may be given the greatest place of an Angell , so that he cannot extende himselfe to a greater . Secondly , there cannot be given the least place of an Angell , in such sort that he cannot define himselfe within a lesse . For my part I utterly dislike all these conceytes of an Angells power to extend or confine his owne essence : it seemes so opposite at first sight to a spirituall perfection , and so obnoxius to the imputation of corporall extension unto them . And I manifestly perceave how they puzle themselfes , in labouring to scatter such mists of scruples , as their owne fancyes rayse , and are driven to professe , Nihil in his materiis tam absconditis puto temere asserendum . But Gabriel . 1. dift. 2. q. 3. let every man make his owne bed , and lye as soft as he can , I will not hinder any . But we are not hitherunto come to the point ; you point at ; yet neyther Physicall nor Mathematicall , but that which I meane is your point Philosophicall . ( Pardon me , if I picke up by the way some crumes of merryment to refreshe my Spirite in so unpleasing an argument . ) The reason why the least place , for an Angell to define unto himselfe , cannot be given is , because saythe he , Posset coassistere loco punctuali pro eo quod ipse est indivisibilis .

Now you see we are upon the matter ; and withall quite off from your assertion . For even these Nominalls doe not holde it to be a point irresoluble , as you speake , but resoluble , and they actually resolve it for the affirmative , to witt Gabriel Biel , after Occam . Nowe what will you say if they resolve it for the negative , and so bothe wayes , namely both negatively and affirmatively , ( which you say , they holde for a point irresoluble ) . And indeede they resolve it bothe wayes : for I have not tolde you all ; They interpose a caution , & the caution is this , Si possibilie esset locus indivisibilis : Whence you may easily guesse what their meaninge is ; to witt , that indeede a punctuall and indivisible place cannot be existent , and consequently neyther can an Angell be defined therin , or coasist therto ; there is the resolution negative . But in case such a punctuall place were possible then an Angell might coasist therto ; there have you the resolution affirmative , in both opposite to this assertion of yours .

But who they be you speake of , that holde this point irresoluble , you conceale . And yet it may be , some such there are .

For as Cicero sometimes sayde ; there was nothing so absurde , but had bene delivered by some or other of Philosophers : so the like may be verified of Schoolemen allso : For amongst all kindes of humane writers there may be some vanities more or lesse , and some thinke most amongst Schoolemen ; according to the censure passed upon them , Ab hoc tempore Ioan. Trit . Abbas Sphanheimensis . P. Dialect . Philosophia sacularis sacram Theologiam sua curiositate muliti saedari caepit . From Angells , you proceede to God , and without scruple maynteyne , that he is as properly in every Center as in every place ; and I confesse the reason here added why you may say so , is very sounde , seing we acknowledge him a like incomprehensibly and indivisibly in both . For surely a man may say , that which he dothe acknowledge ; but take no more along with you herein , then are willing to accompany you , & upon good termes .

Now Occam and Biel propose certeyne termes , and they are these , si locus punctualis possibilis esset . But if such a thing be not possible , to say that God is therin , is to say that God is in nothing , and so you returne to your old course of amplifyinge the immensitie , or indivisibilitie of the glorious essence of God that made us . And wheras we are willing to acknowledge that God is in all thinges as conteyninge them ; I doe not finde that a point is of any conteynable nature . As for example , there is punctus lineam terminant ; now suppose God conteynes the line , and conteynes not the point , shall the line herupon be without an ende ? I professe I cannot finde any other thinge in the notion of such a point , but negatio ulteriorie tendentiae , and what neede hathe this of the divine power to conteyne it ? And surely the point which continueth a line , is nothing more then the center of the earthe , and of that you professe in the next chapter and second section , that it is a matter of nothing . The manner of Gods indivisibility we conceave ( say you ) by his coexistence to a Center : his incomprehensiblenes , by his coexistence to all spaces imaginable ; as much as to say . The indivisibility and incomprehensiblenes of God , is best conceaved , when we conceave his coexistence to such thinges as are founde only in imagination , or to thinges that are , but have no realitie in them , Now if God be all in all , and all in every part , is he not better conceaved , by comparison with the soule of man , ( which is made after the image of God ) then by comparison to a base Center , or thinges in imagination only ? especially seing Imaginatio non transcendit continuum . If God were more in a great place then in a lesse ; then it would followe that an Asses head shoulde participate the essentiall presence of the deitie ( I speake in your owne instance and phrase ) in greater measure , then a mans heart dothe . And doe not you affect some popular applause in this discourse of yours , the vulgar sort being apt to conceave the contrary , namely that a mans heart participates the essentiall presence of the deitie in greater measure , then an Asses head : and by the same reason ; they may conceave that a mans head participates the essentiall presence of the deitie in greater measure , then an asses heart , which yet is as contrary to your assertion , as to the truthe . But it is manifest herby , more then enoughe , that your care is not so much for the investigation of truthe , as to give satisfaction unto vulgar conceyte .

9. That Gods immensitie or magnitude , is not like magnitude corporall , as being without all extension of parts , as there is no doubt , so wee neede no great paynes to satisfie reason , how this may be ; especially to every Scholar , that knowes but that receaved ▪ Axiome even amongst naturalists concerning the soule , namely , that she is all in all and all in every part , not only in the least childe newe borne , but in the greatest Anakim that ever was , which in my opinion gives farre better satisfaction , then by multiplyinge bare woordes , as in sayinge God is unitie it selfe , infinity it selfe , immensitie it selfe , perfection it selfe power it selfe , which serve neyther for proofe nor for illustration . But if we goe about to satisfie imagination , we shall never come to an ende . For Imagination transcends not that which is continuall , and hathe extension of parts ; and all your courses of illustration hitherunto have inclined this way . You speake in your owne phrase when you say that all these before mentioned , to witt , unitie , infinitie , immensity , perfection , power are branches of quantitie ; wheras we have more just cause to professe that no quantitie is to be found in God , no more then materiall constitution is to be found in him . We make bolde to attribute unto God quantitatem virtutis , quantitie of vertue and perfection ; but every scholar should knowe that Analogum per se positum stat pro famesiori significato . And yet to speake more properby , the quantity of God , which we call quantitatem virtutis , and the quantity of bodies , which we call quantitatem motis , quantitie of extension , have no proportion at all betweene them ; but the terme of quantitie attributed to both , is merely equivocall . It is true , that if God were not , nothing could be , for as much as all other thinges have their being from him . But it is a very incongruous course , in my judgement , which you take , by multiplyinge of quantitie materiall , to guesse of Gods immensitie . And yet you should have observed a better decorum in your phrase , if insteede of multiplication , you had putin the woord amplification . For immensitie is rather magnitude infinite then multitude . I cannot away with that which you subjoine , that imaginary infinity of succession or extension shoulde be a beame of that stable infinitenes which God possessethe . Hertofore you called it a shadowe , nowe a beame . And is this a proper course , to runne out to the imagination of thinges impossible to represent God by ? For wherto tendeth this , but to conceave him infinite , first by way of extension , which is quite contrary to spirituall perfection , and secondly after such a manner as is utterly impossible to be . Yet such courses , all they must needes take , that seeke out to satisfie imagination . For imaginatio as we commonly say in Schooles non transcendit continuum . You proceede to shewe how Gods immens●ie hathe no diversitie of parts ; and your argument intends to drawe to an inconvenience as many as maynteyne the contrary . But the inconvenience which you inferre depends only upon peradventure thus . A concurrence of all parts in number infinite , would perhaps be impossible ; why then perhaps it would not be impossible ; and what then shall become of your argument . Besides this ; the whole frame of your argument is unsound . For infinite natures , such as man is , there is no necessitie of the concurrence of all parts to the performing of all actions , no nor to the performing of any action . As for example if he gives himselfe to study and meditate , there is no necessary use of other then of the inward faculties of his minde . If he playeth upon the Lute , there is no use of his legges and feete . If he fighteth with his enemies , there is no use of his tongue or teethe , nor so much use of his legges as of his handes , thoughe sometimes one payre of leggs is better then two payre of handes , yet not to fight , but to runne away rather ; thoughe 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , as Demosthenes sometimes sayde , being put to his witts to save the credite of his courage . Indeede if God were not as he is , he coulde not be so omnipotent as he is , we neede no paynes at all to proove this .

10. We are never so safe in matter of divinitie , as when we goe along with scripture , & one place may easily prevent the mistaking of another , if we give our selves to the due consideration of it , and submitt unto those meanes which God hathe appoynted for our edification . And the Scriptures represent his being every where in respect of two thinges . 1. In respect of knowinge all thinges , as Why sayest thou o Iacob Es. 40. 27. 28. and speakest o Israel . My way is hid from the Lord , and my judgement is passed over my God . Knowest thou not , or hast thou not heard , that the everlasting God the Lord hath created the ends of the Earthe , &c. 2. In respect of his power conteyning Psa. 119. 7 8. 9. 10. them , as whither shall I goe from thy Spirite , or whither shall I flee from thy presence ? If I ascend into Heaven thou art there , &c. Let me take the winges of the Morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the Sea , yet thither shall thine hand lead me , and thy right hand hold me .

But to talke of Gods essence penetrating and diffufed , is to vent such phrases , as I dare not adventure on , I have allready tolde you , what I have read to the contrary , in some , naming my Author , as you take libertie to doe the like , without naming of them .

Quando dicimus ( sayth Durand ) Deum esse in rebus , non intelligimus Durand . 1. dist. 37. part. 1. q. 2 eum esse in iis ut partem intrinsecam , vel intrinsecus rem penetrantem , ut magis infra patebit : sed intelligimus eum esse praesentem rei non solum secundum durationem , quia est , quando res sunt nec secundum contactum corporalem , quum non sit corpus nec virtus in corpore , sed secundum ordinem , qui in Spiritibus tenet locum situs in corporibus . In hoc tamen excellit ordo in Spiritibus fitum in corporibus , quia persitum se habet anum corpus ad aliud immendiate , quoad sui extremum : sed per ordinem se habet Spiritus ad corpus immediate secundum quod libet sui : saltem non est hoc dubium de Spiritu increato scilicet de Deo , quicquid sit de aliis : propter quod potest dici esse non solum juxtares , fed in rebus . And Ibid. p. 1. q. 1. agayne in a question following , Per eandem rationem dicendum est quod non competit Deo esse ubique , ita quod infinitas suae substantia sit ei ratio ubique essendi : sed est ubique solum ratione suorum effectuum ( us dictum fuit in praecedente questione . Si enim competeret Deo esse ubique ratione suae essentiae infinitae , tunc competeret ei esse necessariò ubique vel in loco infinito , & nullo modo finito , sicut à contrariò dicitur de Angelo , quod ratione suae essentiae finitae convenit ci esse in loco sinito , & nullo modo infinito . Esse autem ubique non est esse in loco infinito . Ergo infinitas Divinae essentiae non est ipsi ratio essendi ubique , quod tamen assumebat ratio aliorum .

In a word , I have no edge to cast my selfe upon any curious inquisition hereabouts , because errours are dangerous about the nature of God , eyther in denyinge unto him , what is beseeming him , or ascribing such things unto him , as doe unbeseeme him ; which in the Schooles are accoumpted certeyne kindes of blasphemies .

I content my selfe with the simplicitie of Scripture institution ; which professethe , that God filleth Heaven and Earthe , and this undoubtedly is true , as Durand saythe in respect of Gods effects , wherewith he filleth all thinges ; as allso that he knowethe all thinges , that he cannot be any where as conteyned , but is every where as conteyninge , governing , orderinge , working the good pleasure of his will , in and by all thinges .

Now whether God conteynethe all thinges by his penetrative and diffused essence , and not rather by his power and will , let every sober Reader judge .

Before the World was , God was in himselfe , and so he is still ; how his power is extended to the making and conteyninge of his creatures , I easily conceave , but how his essence is extended , I conceave not . I conclude with those old verses . Dic ubi tunc esset , cum praeter eum nihil esset , Tune , ubi nunc , in se , quoniam sibisufficit ipse .

CHAP. VI.

Of Eternity , or of the branch of absolute infinities , whereof Successive Duration of the imaginary infinity of time is the modell .

I See no reason to subscribe unto the proposition wherewith you begin your discourse on this Argument , as touching the exact proportion betweene immensity and eternity . For Gods immensity is that whereby he is ubique or every where , like as by his eternity he is semper or alwayes : But to be every where supposeth the creations , but to be semper alwayes , doth not : For God was alwayes ever before the world : Againe God in proper speech hath true being , and consequently true Duration of Being , which having neyther beginning nor ending is properly eternall . But God in proper speech hath no quantity , and consequently neyther extension , and so in proper speech cannot be coumpted immense , which signifieth extension without beginning and end ; and having no extension at all , being merely spirituall and not materiall . And ere you turne over a new leafe , your self make doubt , whether Time hath the same proportion to eternity , as magnitude created hath to Divine Immensity . In a word , I doe not beleive you are like to find so many nothings to resemble God by in this argument of eternity as you did devise in the other of Immensitie . That saying of Tertullian you mention , is no more appliable to Gods eternity as t is sayd he was to himselfe Time , then to his immensity , as 't is therein sayd he was unto himselfe a World ; And for ought I see , God is so still , and not onely was so before all things ; in as much as he hath no more need of them , then before all things he had . You say we cannot properly say God was in time before the world was made ; I say such a speech in my judgement seemes to be neyther proper nor improper ; but directly false , even as false , as to say God was in place before he made the world : For before the world was made there was neyther time nor place : Nowe he is in neyther as conteyned in them , but only as conteyning both time and place , which before the World , absolutely were not at all , & consequently could not be conteyned by him . I doe not think that Austin himselfe was conscious of any acutenes in inferring that God could not have bene before all times , if he had alwayes bene in time ; for common sense doth justifie , that that legge which was ever in the stockes , was never out of the stockes . But whereas you say , that we believe God to be as truly before all times future , as before all times past , & seeme to affect it as a subtlety of opinion herein .

I willingly professe , that if it be a subtlety , it is of so subtle a sense , as quite passeth mine intelligence : I had thought it might be avouched of every thing that is past , that it is before all times to come : And that all future things are behind the things that are past .

Neyther had I thought any reason needfull to be given of this : because common sense , I think doth justifie it .

Yet you seeme to make this a peculiar propertie of God , that like as he is before all times past , so allso he is before all times to come .

Yet I gesse at your meaning : For we now existent , allbeit we are before the things that are to come , yet it is not necessary , that we should be after them . But God as he is before all , so , if it please him , he may be after all ; For God is that which was , & is , & is to come ; that is , which shall be , and that for ever of himselfe .

Now this phrase ; to be after all , in a sublimate streyne of conceyt attributed unto God , is more truly and perfectly to be accoumpted his being before all , then after all , in your opinion , as it seemes ; like as the Heavens invironning the Earth , though they seeme to sense to be under the Earth , and under our Antipodes , yet indeed they are above them ; So God in being after all things future , is more properly and truly to be accoumpted before them .

This mystery I seeme to find by your subsequentd iscourse and I wonder what you meane to carry your selfe so in the cloudes , when you might have exprest your selfe playnly .

And surely it is no glory to affect a lofty understanding of your owne phrase , above the apprehension of your Reader , when your termes are not sufficient to expresse your meaning . This is to equivocate like the Iesuites . Of that conceyt of yours I will prepāre my selfe to consider against the time , I shall arrive to your more full discourse thereof , in the pa●s subsequent of this Chapter .

In the next place you propose a conclusion which is this . His eternity then is the inexhaustible founteyne or Ocean , from which time or Duration successive doth perpetually flow .

But I can neither justifie this inference , nor the truth of the proposition inferred : For I know not from what premises of yours , it can be inferred .

That , which went immediately before , was this : God is before all times future , as well as all times past ; Now to inferre that God was before all time , therfore all time flowes from his eternity , is no good consequence . You might as well argue thus . God was before all place , therfore all places flowes from Gods eternity . We our selfes are before all times that are to come ; but herehence it followes not , that all times to come flow from our eternity , or from us .

Suppose Angells had bene made before the World , yet would it not thence followe that the World did flow from them .

Now for the proposition it selfe inferred , it is subject to exceptions divers wayes . The phrase , to flow , savoureth of a natural & necessary emanation , & so much the more when it is resembled by the flowing of water from a founteyne . But nothing created doth in such sort flow from God .

Naturall emanations from God are not to be found but in God , and that in respect of the Persons ; the Sonne being naturall and necessarily begotten of the Father , & the H. Ghost naturally and necessarily proceeding both from the Father & the Sonne .

Againe , the water that floweth from the founteyne on from the Ocean , is of the same nature with the founteyne , on with the water of the Ocean , so is not time of the same nature , with eternity from whence , you say , it flowes .

Agayne it is untrue that eternity produceth time or duration of things created : for the duration of them is nothing els , but the continuance of their existence .

Therefore looke what produceth the things themselves , & maynteynes them , being produced , from thence they are to be accoumpted to have their beginning . Now it is the power and will of God , wherby things are created and preserved , & not the eternity of God . By the Word of the Lord were the Heavens made , & all the hoast of them by the breath of his mouth . We no where read , that by the eternitie of God all things were made , Angells and Men , Heaven and Earth .

And so likewise as by his word he made all things , so by the power of his mighty word he supports all things . Heb. 1. And Ioh. 1. therefore all things both touching theyr being and duration , depend upon the mighty word of God : this we have ground for : But that they depend upon his eternity , we have no ground to affirme ; though it is true that both God , and his Word , and Spirit are eternall , otherwise he could not be the Creator of the World . Vpon the back of this , you come in with a new Paradox , namely that From all eternity , there was a possibility for us to be ; as if it were possible for a creature to be from all eternity .

Yet I know some Scholemen have maynteyned it ( as what will not wild witts dare to undertake ) : but doth it therefore become a Divine , to suppose it without all proofe ? I hold it to be impossible , and Durands reasons to the contrary are more pregnant , in my judgement , then any that are brought for it : to witt , that then , yeares and months , dayes and hours should be equall ; for each of them , even yeares , should be infinite , and dayes , and houres , yea and minutes past , should be but infinite ; whence he inferres , that to every minute should be equall to an yeare ; and albeit he invadeth only eternity of things in motion ; yet I see no reason to the contrary , but the argument is appliable as well to all created things , though not subject to motion , though the evidence of deduction is not so manifest as in case of motion .

I know well that Aquinas enterteyned the opinion of this possibility , out of zenle to uphold the creditt of Aristotle in some measure . But then taking upon him to reconcile seeming contradictions in his opuscula , and one of them being this ; If the World were eternall , then the soules of men pa● were infinite , supposing the immortality of them ; according to the opinion of Aristotle : And both Aristor . as well as Aquinas himselfe hold it impossible that there should be infinitum actu eyther in number or in magnitude : Mark how he reconciles this , and what course he takes to prevent an infinite number of soules ; Though the World , and Man ( sayth he ) had bene everlasting , yet the first man might have bene preserved without generation for an infinite space of time , & not begin to generate till about six thousand yeares agoe .

By this let every sober man judg to what shifts this great Schoolman was put to salve this opinion of a possibilitie , of the worlds being eternall from contradiction . To this you adde that in like sort our actuall being or existence whiles it l●steth , is composed of a capacity to be what we are , and of the actuation or filling of this capacity ; you might well say so or in like sort , for there seemes as like truth in this as in the former . Man as he is unum perse is sayd to consist ex potentia et actis , which is as much as to say ex materia et forma rationali ; which Maxim had a capacity of receaving this forme , upon whose conjunction doth arise that compositum , which we call a man , and us it had a power , so an appetite thereunto , all which was conteyned under that principium generationis which is called Privatio , According to that saying Materia appetit formam sicut femina virum . But the particular appetite being satisfied with the forme , it no longer remayneth , nor the capacity to receave it , that time being now past . But rather an appetite there is in the matter to a new forme , by corruption of the present compound , which is the naturall ground of mans mortality . And the generall appetite of matter is never satisfied .

Much lesse is this capacity a part , whereof man doth consist . For every Philosopher knowes that the capacity of the matter belongs to that principium generationis which is called privatio . Now Privatio , though it be principium generationis as well as Materia & forma ; yet is it not principium compositi . Ex tribus principiis Homo generatur ? ex duobus tertiu companitur ? But perhaps you speake not of the capacity of the matter to receave a forme , which is proper only to compound substances ; But of the possibility of Being , before they are , which is extended euen to Angells . But then I say much lesse is the nature of man to be sayd , composed of such a capacity ; for this capacity is not so much as potentia physica , but a onely potentia logica , to witt , negatio repugnantia , as when we say 't was possible the world should be , before it was , for it implyes no contradiction : For Gods almighty power was able to make it out of nothing . So it was possible that Angells should be before they were . In like sort it was possible , that man should be , before he was . But neyther man nor Angells can be sayd to be composed of such a possibility ; or of such a capacity , for that were to say that a reall & positive thing is composed of that which is neyther reall nor positive . And it is impossible that a thing not reall or positive should be a part of that which is reall & positive . But yet , you may say ; All created things consist ex potentia & actu , be they never so simple and uncompound , as the very Angells themselves , God alone is Actus purus voyd of all passive power . But as touching this power by your leave , I take it not to be spoken in respect of the potentiallity going before the Act , which you saye is actuated , but rather in respect of a potentiallity consequent to the Act , or concomitant with it , as we conceave it of such a nature as may cease to be , or be destroyed .

Or last of all , it may proceed in respect of the distinction between essence and existence , which is found in all things beside God himselfe : In which respect they are sayd to consist ex potentia et Actu , which kind of composition , as I remember , is called Metaphysica ; and it extends to all created things in distinction from all other compositions whatsoever , which are peculiar to some more then to others . But in what congruity this capacity may be sayd to be filled , when essence is actuated by existence , I comprehend not . For to be filled , presupposeth the existence of that which is to be filled . And existence seemes rather to conteyne essence , then essence , existence . But most paradoxicall of all is it , that existence should be composed of capacity , and the actuation or filling of it : Whereas existence , in my judgement , is rather the actuation formall of essence , then is composed thereof .

In the next place you tell us , that life ( especially sensitive ) is but the motion or progresse of this capacity towards that which fills it ; or as it were , a continuall sucking in of present existence , or continuation of actuall being , from somewhat preexistent . I think there is a liberall errour in this , and insteed of life sensitive , as I take it , there should be life vegetative . Now this doctrine of yours is wonderous strange . There is a motion & progresse in life vegetative by waye of augmentation , but not by waye of generation .

Neyther hath the existence of any vegetable , much lesse man , any degrees : Neyther is it of the nature of any substantiall forme , much lesse of a soule , least of all of the reasonable foule , to be brought in , much lesse to be sucked in , by degrees .

And if our existence be present , as you call it , how can it be suckt in ? For we suck in that which we have not ; not that which we allready have . Neyther could we have power to suck in ought , much lesse the actuall sucking in of ought , unles allready we had existence : For without existence presupposed there can be no motion . And of degrees of existence , especially of substantiall formes , or of the things compounded of them , I never heard till now : Degrees , or rather a graduall extension of quantity is gotten by that act of vegetation which is called growth or augmentation . So then , not existence , simply , but of quantity rather ; nor the existence of quantity neyther , but a greater extension thereof is sucked-in by things that growe : Neyther is this extension sucked in ; but rather matter of nourishment is suckt in , which by the peculier operation of the soule is first fitted for nourishment divers & sundry wayes , and after that converted into nourishment , & appropriated to each part ; and after that by another peculiar property of the soule , there flowes from it augmentation of quantity ; which is not suckt in from without , but only the materialls of it : This wild phrase and manner of speech of yours , if it proceed , is sufficient to corrupt all Philosophy , & not Divinity only .

The next point , I confesse , is no Paradox , when you saye , Except the vegetables by which our life is continued , had existence before they become our nutriment , they could not possibly nourish us . This , I say , is most true : for if they had not being before , they were just nothing ; and it is impossible that that which is nothing , should nourish any thing .

Naye , if they had not theyr being before , they should have no being at all : for Milk or Bread if it had no being before it nourish us ; surely it hath no being of milk or bread when it doth nourish us , by being converted into flesh and bone ; for then surely , it is neyther milke nor bread . The next assertion is very obscure , if at all it hath any truth in it , as when you say , These vegetables themselves cannot exist , unles they did draw theyr existence or continance of their being , from that which did exist before them , and unto which they doe by motion or continuance oft theyr being approach : For you propose this of life vegetative , which is found in plants as well as men ; and the matter of theyr nourishment is only the moysture or fatues of the earth ; which fatnes of the earth , how it drawes existence or continuance of its being so much as in your sense , I cannot conceave ; sc. Matter of mans nourishment , Honey , and potted butter , and poudred beefe , and bacon , and bisket , how they draw it from that whereunto by motion or continuance of theyr being they approch : Wherein you seeme to have a sublimate conceyte , resolving the continuance of all things into the operation of God : But , by your leave , they doe not draw theyr continuance from God ; God gives it rather , and that by naturall meanes , whereby things are preserved from putrefaction , which is the destruction of theyr being : Which preservation against putrefaction , is either in the nature of the things themselves , which God by an ordinary naturall course hath wrought in them , onby the Art of Men : Which you resolving without more adoe into the operation of God carry your selfe not like unto a Philosopher , but like unto that Grammarian who being demanded by a gardenar what should be the reason , why weeds thrived so fast notwithstanding all his care to weed them out , and pluck them up by the rootes ; when good herbes prospered so slowly notwithstanding all his care , not only to plant them , but being planted to water them , and to manu●e the ground that bare them ; Derived the reason of all this from the providence of God ; Whereat a Philosophes standing by laughed , not that he despised the Providence of God , but because he conceaved there was a more immediate reason thereof , though it also were subordinate to the providence of God , and that was this . As for the weeds that grow of themselfes , the earth is a naturall mother unto them ; but as for the herbes that were planted in her bosome , she was but a step-mother unto them ; & ergo : no merveyle if she mainteyned her owne children , her owne fruits brought forth by her better , then strange children brought unto her to be fostered by her . But be it as you intimate , that all things draw theyr existence and continuation of their being from God ; but how will you unfold that mystery of yours that followes , namely , that by motion or continuation of their being they approach unto God ? For I have read , that the Crow liveth out nine mens lives ( measuring every age to be an 100. yeares ) and that the Hart liveth thrice as many yeares as the Crow ; and that the Raven trebleth the Harts endurance ; whence came that Theophrastus his complaint of natures inequality , that to Harts and Crowes had given so long time of continuance , which was denied unto man : what shall we say therfor that these have approached neerer unto God then Man ? Perhaps you will say , yes , in respect of Gods eternity : Why but herein , your selfe shal be brought to plead against your selfe ; For in the eight sect : of your former chap. discoursing how the center of Gods immensity might be sayed to be every where ; you gave this reason or exemplification of it ; that be supposing a spere infinite , every point is equally removed from the circumference , as put the case , S. Michaells mount should be as neere to the circumference Eastward as Dover , and consequently Dover as far of as S. Michaells mount , though the whole bredth of England lye between them .

And by the same reason the life of a Raven shall be as far of from eternity , as the life of a Hart , and the durance of an Hart as farre from eternity as the Durance of a Crow , though three times as much ; & the durance of a Crow as far of from eternity , as the durance of a Man , though nine tunes as much .

In the next place , as by waye of inference , you adde : So that future times and all things conteyned in time it selfe , presuppose a fountaine of life . I will not trouble my selfe with your inference : What such move you to make choyce of future times to instance in , rather of times in generall , whether future , present , or past ?

I doubt preexistence to future times is in your imagination a very mysterious point ; & such as you are loath your Reader should be acquainted with : For as Aristotle sayeth of Fallacies , 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , to discover them , is to solve them ; so you may feare , the bare discovery of your conceyt may be enough to discredit it . And yet , to shew how well you please your selfe in it , you say that this fountayne of life , presupposed to future times , and all things conteyned in them , is as truly preexistent to their future terminations , as it was to their beginnings .

How will you construe this sentence , and accommodate it to future times , whereupon notwithstanding it proceeds , as well as of things conteyned in time , both touching the terminations of them , which are future , and touching the beginnings of them which are past ? Surely you cannot ; ergo : the latter part of the sentence must be accommodated not to future times wherewith you began this sentence , but to all things conteyned in time it selfe . And these indeed have had beginnings which are past , and we doe expect future terminations or , motions of them , according to the parts of future time , so long as time it selfe shall last .

But what is this strang assertion you are impregnated withall , when you deliver it as a rare and curious conceyt , that things conteyned in time doe suppose a fountaine of life not only to the beginnings of them , but allso to their future terminations and motions . Whereas to my poore conceyt , if a founteyne of life be presupposed to things past , it must be presupposed allso to things to come : And there is no curiosity in this ; the inference rather is most vulgar ; For seing future things are behind things past , quod est prius priori must needs be prius posteriori ; yet , that which is before a former thinge , must needs be before a latter thinge .

Hence you proceede ( whether by following on , or falling of , lett the Reader judge ) to censure that common saying , Tempus edax rerum , as relishing more of poeticall witt , then of Metaphysicall truth . For which kind of censure delivered by you , I find no just reason ; For what ? can no truth satisfie you , but that which is Metaphysicall ? And why you should make such an opposition I know not ; as if what I ever relished not of Metaphysicall truth , were no truth , but rather of Poeticall witt : and whatsoever relished of poeticall witt , did not relish of truth . You maye as well censure Aristotles Physicks , and Ethicks , and Politiques , and Rhetoricks , for surely they doe not relish of Metaphysicall truths ; no nor Euclides Mathematicks ; no nor of Poeticall witt neyther ; belike they are liable to a double censure .

Yet what think you ? cannot Poeticall witt have course in conjunction with truth , as well as in separation from it . Nec fingunt omnia Cretes . No nor Poets neyther . And as for this saying , Tempus edax rerum : I never knew any sober man or other except against the truth of it before : But if you will put a construction upon it at your pleasure , to shew your witt in refuting it ; you shall therein play the part of a Poet rather then the Philosopher ; for some of them have taken a course to shape stories , according to the use they had to make of them , and not to followe the direct truth : and this hath bene sayd to be the difference betweene Sophocles and Euripides : And herein they were like to Mathematicians of whom it is sayd Mathematici abstrahunt nec mentiuntur : And abstracting a line from the matter of it , they may adde to it , or take from it what they list : So you construe this saying , Tempus edax rerum , as if it were delivered in proper speech , and not by a figure ; whereas the meaning is Synecdochicall ; that in course of time things doe consume and wast , not that time it selfe doth wast them ; For time being the duration of things ; how can the duration of a thing consume it selfe ?

Yet is your reason whereby you oppose this common saying very loose , as when you say , If time did devoure things , what could possibly nourish them or continue them from their beginning to theyr end , And that in two respects ; for neyther the saying signifies that time should devoure them , before the time appoynted for the consumption of them : And though time did consume them , yet some thing els might contnue them ; For theyr owne natures wherein God hath made them , are for a time apt to resist that which laboureth to corrupt them . And other meanes also there are for the preservation of them : As man by using meanes for his preservation may hold out longer then he which useth none ; neither did the Authors or approvers of that saying , Tempus edax rerum , ever conceit that any thing should desire the destruction of it selfe , as you are pleased to rove in impugning it : And look in what sense time doth not destroy , but things are destroyed in time ; in the same sense , things temporall have not the continuation of their being from time , but from somewhat els in time ; For when things are preserved , by the witt and industry of man from putrefaction , they doe not receave this preservation of theyrs from time , but from the wit and industry of man : And ergo : as time doth not wast , so neither doth time preserve from wasting .

It is a paradox if not a manifest untruth , rather to say that the motions of things themsselfes , and theyr endeavours , to enjoy or enterteyne time approching is that which doth wast and consume them ; For albeit in man sometimes you find such causes of consumption , yet in all other creatures inferior unto man , as beasts of all sorts , how can you make it good that they out of a desire and endeavour to enterteyne time doe wast themselfes , who know not so much as what time is ? How much lesse will you be able to make it good in vegetables of all sorts , as plants and trees , and in all sorts of mixt bodies ? Nay , how will you make it good in man ? Some die by course of nature , and that eyther through age or sicknes ; when a man of 100. yeares old dieth , what motion or endeavour is there in him to enterteyne that wasted him ? and how will you prove , that had not this motion or endeavour of his bene ( as all endeavours are voluntary and free ) he might have lived longer .

When God sent apestilence among the Israelites , that in the space of 3. dayes swept awaye 70. thousand ; was it a motion of theirs , or an endeavour to enterteyne time , that consumed them ? Nay , when any disease proves mortall , how can it appeare that when one man died of an Ague , another of the Dropsie , another of the squinancy , another of the plurisie , another of the consumption , that all of them died of a certeyn disease , called theyr motions and endeavours to enjoy and enterteyne time approching : A disease , that I think was never knowne to Hipocrates or Galin , or any Physician before or since . I should think the desease of Pastime should wast us more then the desease of enjoying Time . Others come to theyr ends by violent deathes , some in warre , some by course of justice , others by private malice : In all these I find my selfe in the bryers , and cannot possiblie conceive , how mens owne motions and endeavours to enjoy time should wast or consume them : or in case a man makes a waye with himselfe by hanging drowning or poysoning . Not altogeather so wild is that conceyt of yours which followeth , in saying we naturally seeke to catch time . Yet wild enough ; for it is untrue that men catch . Time ; they catch opportunity , which is 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , and not a litle differing from 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 . Now opportunity is only an advantage of doing something conveniently offered to us in the course of Time . As it is good to make hay while the sun shineth , ergo ; I will roundly sett my selfe to the making of Hay , while this opportunity is offered , wherein I catch not time but opportunity ; for the Time were the same in case it rayned , but the opportunity for making of Hay were not the same , because the wether in that case were not the same ; And Hay-making requires fayr wether .

Who they are , who acknowledge no difference between Time and Motion , I know not ; I should think no man so blockish as to confound them , seing motion it selfe may be of more or lesse continuance in respect of Time , as well as any thing els , And in the same Time somethings more or lesse slowly , something more swiftly , some in one kind of motion , some in another : But of divers kinds of time , that should belong to things moved , with divers kinds of motions , I never heard that any Philosopher hath discoursed .

Aristotle I confesse , defines time to be numerus motus secund. prius & posterius ; but this is not to confound time with motion , but rather to distinguish the one from the other : For he g●ves a far other definition of motion it selfe : And albeit the time of every temporall thing be the duration of it , whether it resteth or moveth , yet if the questions be made how long such a thing hath continued , or when such a thing beganne to be , or ceased to be ; We have no better meanes to answere it , then by numbring the revolution of the Sun , if we will shew how many yeares ; or of the Moone , to shew how many moneths ; or of the Diurnall motion of the Heavens , to shew how many dayes agoe such a thing was done , or began , or ceased to be ; or to shew how many dayes , or moneths , or yeares any thing hath continued : & ergo : Aristotle in his Physicks considering time as the measure , in such sort as hath bene expressed , gives a definition suitable , in saying it was numerus motus per prius & posterius . Which definition when your true Philosophie shall mend , we shal be so ingenuous as to give congruous respect unto it .

As you beganne , so you proceed to acquaint us with your subtleties in Philosophie concerning time , Motion ( you say ) in true observation goes one waye , and drives time another way , as the streame which runnes Eastward , turnes the wheele West-ward .

This curiositie is worth the examining , it may minister some merry matter of refreshment unto us , which in my judgement , your reader hath no litle need of to take him of from too sad and serious attention in tracking your obscure phrase , and treading out therhence some morsell of good meaning .

I thinck you speak of motion circular , and that of the heavens , because nothing so fitt to notifie unto us Time , as that , and of such motion you speak as immediately before you have signified : Well then ; The circular motion of the Heavens goeth one waye , and drives Time another waye : Before you told us that Motion notifies Time , here you say , It drives Time ; but how ? Not the same waye , but another waye as the streames which runnes Eastward , drives the wheele West-ward : And which waye . I pray doth Time passe : Eastward of Westward ? As there is a motion of the heavens , that makes the daye , which is from East to west ; so there is a motion of the Sun which makes the yeare , and that motion is from West to East ; doth each motion drive time a different waye or the same waye ? Againe each motion is not onely from East to West , as the first , and from West to East as the second ; but the first is againe from West to East , and the second is againe from East to West ; You have not told us , which waye Time is driven by motion ; and ergo : being to seeke , you drive our inquisitions divers wayes , and perhaps all different from your owne ; And all because you will not acquaint is with the waye you conceave to your selfe , ergo ; you drive us other wayes , as the motion drives time : Let us see whether we can have any help from your comparison .

The streame , you saye , running Eastward drives the wheele West-ward ; Now this seemes to us untrue , & so farre forth as it may be tolerated for true , surely it drivs the wheel no more West-ward then East-ward : First I saye it is not true : For the wheele by the streame is turned neyther East-ward nor West-ward but round ; Now to move Eastward or Westward is to move motu recto a streight motion , but to move round is not to move motu recto , but orbiculari , not by a streight motion , but circular : Yet because circular motions may be sayd to be towards the East or towards the West , & so the motion of the wheele may be ( as you say it is ) Westward ; yet then I say it is no more Westward then Eastward , as it is manifest in all circular motions : And indeed the river moving according to his naturall course drives the wheele before it , but the wheele being round , moves round , not onely Eastward as the river goes , but Westward also ; For to move circularly towards the East in respect of some parts , is to move circularly towards the West also in respect of other parts , not Westward only or principally so as to give the denomination of a motion Westward , rather them of a motion Eastward .

But all this while we have not found which waye Time is driven in your opinion : For sure your meaning is not that time is driven circularly ( though I have observed you to discourse of circular duration . ) And my reason is this : if the motion from East to West should drive Time another waye of motion circular ; then seing that motion which makes the daye is contrary to that motion which constitutes the yeare , it would follow , that the time of the daye should goe a waye quite contrary to the Time of the yeare : And as litle reason to drive time another waye , in respect of direct motion .

For there is no reason whie the waye of Time should be towards the East , rather then towards the West , or contrariwise ; and why rather eyther of these wayes , then towards the North or towards the South .

And no mervayle , seing the way of place is one thing , & the way of time another : For though the streame run directly Eastward , and turne a wheele round ; 't is nothing strang , sith both are bodies apt to moove , and the streame apt to run downward , and a wheele apt to be turned round . But time is not a bodie that it can move ane waie .

And this reflects my thoughes upon the consideration of another incongruity , as when you say , motion goes one way ; you might as well have sayd , motion moves one way ; whereas it is the bodie that moves , & motion is the act of it , but it selfe moves not .

Yet there is a proper way for a body moving , & so for motion . And it may be there is a proper way for time as when that which is to come becomes present time , and present time , becomes past time ; as this yeare the last yeare was to come , now it is present , and after a while it will be past : So all the way of time is this , & shal be , it is , it was : one after another .

And ( by your leaves ) motion drives it no more then rest : If the Heavens should stand still , yet might things continue still the same time that God hath appointed them , as well as in the case of theyr motion .

Neyther is it true , that our actuall existence slides from us with time ; our being still continueth the same , by you leave , and not our capacity of being onely ; For Socrates senex non differt a Socrate puero according to our Vniversity learning , which whether it be true Philosophie or no , let the Reader judge ; I say , he differs not in substance , I doe not say , he differs not in accidents : I doubt not but Socrates was auncienter in his old age , then in his child-hood , and different both in quantity of bodie , and quality of mind ; But I see no reason but his existence was still the same : And as for capacity of being , I see no reason why that should have any place where being allready is : As for substantiall actuation of capacity of Being ( which you make to be continuall ) after a man hath his being I know none ; Neyther am I conscious of any such desire ; and it is strang to me , that you should be more privy to my desires then my selfe . I desire to encrease in knowledge , and to grow in grace and goodnes , and in favour with God and man .

But of any desire of actuation or replenishment ( as you speak ) of the capacity of being , I am nothing conscious to my selfe : Neyther can I acknowledge any new coexistence ( with time approaching in respect of any mutation of my existence , but in regard that times doe change and succeed one another , I may be sayd to coexist anew with them , because they coexist anew with me .

Neyther doe I know any such office of time as you devise to be assigned to it by eternity , as to repayr that ruines which tions present or past , have wrought in our corruptible substance .

No mervayle that you could not brook that time should be accounted edax rerum : For now I perceave you maynteyne time to be reparatrix rerum , yea the curer of diseases ; For to repayre the ruines which motion hath made in our corruptible substances , what is it but to cure deseases ? So that time is a simple of more sovereigne virtue , then I was ware of ; but I know not whether it were ever knowne to Hippocrates or Galen ; I doubt it was not ; And that tempus is edax rerum , hath better authority to confirme it I think , then that it is reparatrix rerum : And consider in reason , time is the duration of things temporall , whence it commeth to passe , that the very ruines themselfes which are wrought in our corruptible substances have theyr time , that is , theyr duration ; so have all deseases : Now lett any sober man judge , whether the duration of such a ruine , such a desease , be fitt to repayre it , fitt to cure it ; What time then shall cure or repayre it ? Take the most sovereigne remedies to repayr such ruines , to cure such deseases , and the duration or time thereof hath no power to repayr or cure it , but the nature of that remedie applied may ; which nature and the application therof , is not time , but the remedie hath a duration , which is the time therof , whether it be applied or no.

As for the motions of the heavens numbred according to preority and posteriority , which in a Physicall consideration is the time of every thing , as the fittest measure to measure out the continuance of all things , as litle power hath that to repayre ruines or cure deseases , more then to make them .

In the next place you draw us to the consideration of Plotinus his excellent observations . I had rather you would acquaint us with some accurate conclusions and demonstrations of his . Yet these observations which you so magnifie in a Platonick , such as they are wee will consider them . The first is that the best of our life , the very being of things generable is but as a continuall draught or receite of being , from the inexhaustible founteyne of life . This is one of his ( so much by you magnified ) observations , and a very proper one . As if a man should say , the very water , be it the best of waters , is but a streame flowing from the fountayne of waters . Is not this an excellent observation , thinck you ? Yet you add some thing of your owne , which partly swerves from truth , and partly marres Plotinus his musick ; For you make the very being of things generable , and the best of our life to be all one ; wheras the wickedest men that are , are the miserablest things that are , are things generable , and have a being as well as the best ; And in the state of our corrupt nature we had a being , & so had Paule when he persecuted the Church of God , and Peter when he denied his Mr. and David when he committed adultery with Bathsheba and caused Vriah to be slayne with the sword of the children of Ammon ; but did this being of theirs , or theyr very being , deserve to be accounted the best of theyr life ? Now whereas you say , Our being is a continuall draught of being from the inexhaustible founteyne of life : I find no mention at all of any fountayne of life in Plotinus , His words as you cite them are , Videtur in rebus generabilibus id potissimum essentia esse , scilicet tractus quidam ab ipso esse , ( this is all he hath concerning the inexhaustible founteyne of life as you paraphrase it ) ex generationis initio , quousque ad temporis extrema perveniat .

And to my understanding his meaning is no other , then that the essence of things generable is as it were esse fluens , like as we say , linea est fluxus puncti in longitudinem . And therupon his first sentence is this , that take away erit from things generable , and forthwith they cease to be : And to things that are not such , if you add erit to them , it shall befall them a sede ipfiue esse labe , to slide from the seate of being ; All which are but odd streynes of expressions of that which to know is worth just nothing , if at all there be any sound truth in theyr subtleties : But hence he concludes indeed that the being of a thing generable is not naturall unto it ; and therefore ( you will say ) he must have it from something , and what can that be , but from the founteyne of life ; as it is well knowne Plato first , and accordingly Platonickes maynteyned , that the world was made by God .

To this I answere , that albeit they attributed the making of the world to God not out of nothing , but out of matter actually preexistent ; yet here Plotinus discourseth , not of the creation whereby the world was made , but of generation , whereby the parts of it were continually meynteyned ; Neyther doth he discourse of the efficiency of the being of things generable , but only of the formality thereof : But if over and above a question were moved as touching the efficiency of being , who can doubt but his answere would be either ascribing this to the individuall generating , and virtus seminalis as his instrument , working to the extracting of forms ex potentia materiae ; or otherwise to the Dator formarum ; in neyther of which should he as an heathen man ascend unto the inexhaustible founteyne of life , whither you would draw him , to make the magnifying of his excellent observations the more specious : But what should Christians expect from the Schollar of Ammonius and Mr. of Dorphity ? Now , whereas he confines this to things generable , doe you magnifie that also ! What think you of Augul●s ? Is not theyr being also a continuall draught or receit of being from the inexhaustible fountayne of life , as well as the being of things generable ?

But proceed we to take notice of the rest of his so excellent observation : Nature ( sayth he ) hastens unto that being which is to come , nor can it rest , seing it drawes or sucks in that being which it hath , by doing now this and now that , being moved as it were in a circle , with the desire of essence , or of being what it is . By this I perceive where you dipt your pen that dropt forth such wild conceits as before in this very section I have encountred with ; to witt , in Plotinus his Philosophy , fitt lettice for such lips as like them . And for the obscurity of conceit , your writings , to my thinking are very like unto his ; and the rather may men be moved to suspect , there are some rare notions in them which they understand not ; Yet by the waye you sometimes insperse such glosses as make Plotinus meaning worse then it is ; as when Plotinus sayth of a thing generable , that movetur in orbem quodam essentiae desiderio , that it is moved round with a certeyne desire of essence ; you render it this with desire of essence or being what is : Now Plotinus sayth , not of any thing that it hath a desire to be what it is , which is very absurd ; for nothing desires what it hath already , but rather what it hath not : So when Plotinus sayth , that esse sibi haurit , it drawes unto it selfe being ; you render it thus , It sucks in what it hath ; whereas indeed it is a thing impossible for any man to suck in that which he hath , but rather he sucks in that which he hath not .

Nor can I approve this saying of Plotinus , that A thing generable hactens to that being which is to come ; which Plotinus seemes to understane only of Time ; Now we rather on the contrary many times complayne that time passeth awaye too fast ; yet againe some there are , I confesse , that think time never passeth awaye fast enough : Both are conscious of times hasting more or lesse ; but neyther are conscious of theyr hastning to Times : And the truth is , the swiftest motion and the slowest motion is in respect of the same time , which indeed in neyther swift nor slow , though motions in time may be swift or slow ; yet the swiftest mover no more hastens to time to come , then the slowest mover , how excellent soever Plotinus observation be in your conceit , yet I grant we may be sayd to hasten to a being which is to come , but this being is alwaye accidental never essentiall : A man may make hast to be rich , and such a one sayth Salomon can not be innocent : A man Pro. 28. 20. may grow in grace and in the knowledge of our Lord Iesu Christ , and to make hast therein is commendable : and so for 2. Pet. 〈◊〉 . 18 everyone to be diligent and quick in the works of his calling : But our essentiall being we hast not unto , it is the same still ; for Socrates being old differs not essentially from himselfe being a child : Indeed we labour for the preservation of our being ; but all our actions tend not hereunto , they tend to the service of God as well as to the service of our selves .

And how in these motions whatsoever we move in orbem , or as it were in a circle I know not ; That quaint conceit I leave to Plotinus till your commentary may unfold the meaning of it .

Now you tell us ( belike in a suitable proportion unto the conceits of Plotinus , or rather in some degree beyond them ) that Nor we men , nor any creatures ( specially generable ) are permitted to draw or suck so much of our proper being from the founteyne of eternity at once , or in any one point of time as we list , and that We have our portions of life or self-fruition distributed peece-meale and sparingly unto us , least too much put into our hands at once might make us prodigall of the whole stock .

It is great pitty the pages of your booke be not stored with the word Mystery ; for they are nothing almost but mysterie ; This is delivered not only of men , but of all creatures generable : Why then , all creatures generable have a list to drawe or sucke more of their proper being from the fountayne of eternity , then they doe or can suck : Surely you charge them with that they are nothing guilty of ; For , not to speake of stones and mettalls nor of vegetables ; How doth it appeare there is any such desire in brute creatures , whether beasts or birds or fishes● that neyther know eternity , nor their owne proper being , nor what it is to suck more of it at once then is fitt .

And as for my selfe amongst reasonables , one though a poore one , having some knowledge both of eternity in the waye of Christian Divinity , and of my proper being in the waye of naturall Philosophy ; yet what it is to suck more of my portion of being at once then God think fitt , I am utterly ignorant , and therefore cannot be conscious to my selfe of any such transgression : Suppose the durance of my being in the appoyntement of God be betwene 50. and 60. yeares , doe I desire or can I desire to enjoy these 60. yeares in the space of 20. or is it possible by the almighty power of God that I should ? I grant the knowledge and goodnes I have arrived unto by Gods grace in the space of 50. yeares , I might have arrived unto in the space of 40. Yet am I not conscious of any desire I had of this : But this is only my accidentall being , and therefore deserveth not simplie to be accompted my proper being .

The like may be as touching the Qualities or Quantitie of my bodie : But my substantiall being , that only deserveth to be accompted simply my Being ; And this I had all at once , as I had my organicall bodie , and soule all at once ; though the continuance of it I had not all at once ; For that was impossible I should have , it being a continuance by way of succession of dayes after dayes &c. And ●f I had had all at once , there had bene no succession ; and therfore , in my judgement , it is absurd to say our portions of life are pece-meale & sparingly distributed unto us , lest too much being put into our hands at once might make us prodigall of the whole stocke . And which implies , that God could , if it had pleased him , have made us enjoy the whole space of our life at once ; For that were to make time past , present and to come , to exist alltogeather , which , I think , every wise man will judge to be impossible : Yet this case being put ; how were it possible to the contrary , but that we must needs spend it all at once ? For like as the space of life of 60. yeares must necessarily be spent in 60. yeares : So if we had all this space togeather in one day , or one yeare , we wust needes spend it togeather in the space of a day , or a yeare : In a word , sith this cannot be true of our essentiall being , which we have all at once undoubtedly ; nor of our accidentall being ; for that cannot be properly accoumpted our being ; it remaynes to be understood onely of the continuance of our being : And to desire to have all this at once , is to desire to have at 7. yeares , as much age as others at 60 : But no man desires this , though lately we heare , that after the surrendring of Rochel , maydens , by reason of the famine there during the Seige , of 16. yeares old were found to looke like women of an 100 yeares old . We rather desire in old-age to be young , like unto Moses who being an 100. and 20. his eye was not dimne , nor his naturall strength abated . Yet your conceit is manifestly impossible ; for it proceeds not of having the qualities of age in youth , but the very continuance , which is as much as to say , at seven yeares of age to be as old as a man of 60. which no man desires , neither is it possible for God to effect .

This piercing of time , or reduction of many yeares into a small space being as utterly impossible as the penetration of dimension in magnitude , if not much more .

Mens stocks may be spent in one yeare upon as much pleasure as another may be taking in seven yeares : but the continuance of space or time to come , can neyther be taken before the time , nor spent .

2. In the next Section you are more popular ; I doe not say more true : For you give me no cause to say so .

For first , in my Judgement , it is a manifest untruth to say , that time is a participation of eternity : For as immensity is to place or magnitude , so is eternity unto time : But place or magnitude is no participation of immensity , therfore allso time is no participation of eternity .

And like as Gods immensity is without extension , & therfore quite of a different nature from magnitudine corporall ; So his eternity is without succession ; and therfore of a quite different nature from duration corporall .

And whereas you say , that He should desine the severall branches of time most exactly , that could number or decipher that severall actuations , draughts , or replenishments , which are derived from the infinite founteyne of life and being , to fill the capacities or satiate the internall desires of things temporall ; Here agayne you slip back to the transcendentall notions , farre above , not only common sense , but all sobriety of conceit .

You tell us of actuations , draughts , and replenishments derived from the founteyne of life to fill capacities , and internall desires ; all which togeather with the severall branches of time you speake of , and theyr references to the actuations after mentioned , are so many hobgoblins unto me : what are the parts of time , I seeme to understand , time past , time present , and time to come , but what the Severall branches are , I know not .

The founteyne of life is it , that which brings natures possible into act of being ? But how hereby he can be sayd to satiate theyr internall desirs , I comprehend not : For while a thing is only possible , ●t neyther hath , nor can enterteyne any desire of being . Perhaps you may say , that when things are , they may desire continuance : And it is the founteyne of life , that as he made all things , so he doth perpetuate them so long as he thinks good . But what mysterie , the deciphering of this actuation or perpetuation doth conteyne , so avaylable to the definition of the severall of time , I therefore know not , because you have not vouchsafed the enucliation hereof unto your Reader .

I find no sense in that which followeth , as when you say the motion of the Heavens is more uniforme then time ( which you call the duration of things temporall ) : For every part of time is still uniforme , and that in such sort as it impossible to be otherwise ; be the motion never so deficient in uniformity . As an houre is still the same , whether motions herein be swift or slow , or both swift and flow ( as such different motions may be in the same time without all question ) and that according to all variety ; yea though one and the same motion , I meane of one and the same subject be partly swifter , partly slower , and that in all variety of degrees .

So is the moneth , so is the yeare most uniforme , taking it to consist of how many dayes and howres soever you will : I grant things in time may dure more or lesse ; but time it selfe admitts no contraction or dilatation ; as for example , a daye cannot be contracted into the space of an houre ; nor an houre cannot be dilated into the space of a day ; but the motion of a day may be contracted and reduced within the space of an houre ; that is , a thing may move as fast in an houre as it doth in a day , I have heard of a Pope , that when his countrey men presuming of his omnipotency , entreated they might have two sommers in a yeare , made answere as Elias did to Elisha , that he had asked a very hard thing ; yet it might be obteyned by them upon a condition : And when they being eager to obteyne what they desired , shewed theyr willingnes to accept of any condition ; Hereupon the Pope told them , that upon condition to accompt 24. monthes to theyr yeare , they should have two sommers every yeare : This was a cunning trick to fill his countrey mens mouthes with empty spoones : He was no more able to gratifie his countrey-men in this , then Mark Anthony was the Athenians , who having imposed a double tribute in one yeare ; was told by an Oratour , that if he could give them two Sommers , and two Springs within the compasse of one yeare , he might exact two revenewes , not otherwise .

I know no such double duration or course of time indented , as you speake of , what if a man be sometimes in health , and sometimes in sicknes ? the condition of his life , and the qualitie thereof it diversified , his duration is not ; as appeates by this : In the same time wherein one it sick , another is not ; one in pleasure , another in payne ; it is manifest , the time may be the same , though the condition much different .

These conceits of yours are so popular , that they crosse withall : In grife or payne to thrust time from us , is but to wish it were shorter then it is ; as it is signified Deut. 28. 67. In the morning , thou shalt say , would God it were evening . and at evening thou shalt say , would God it were morning : And yet the meaning hereof in effect , is but this , to wish that our payne were shorter , then would we not care though the time were longer . And so our joy to be continued , we desire not the moments of our time to be fixed .

Still you confound a mans condition with the time , as if time it selfe were sweet or sowre . Let every sober man judg , whether it be not an absurd conceyt to affirme , that men desire to prolong theyr dayes by living the same time over and over againe . As if we could not have the sam●oy , without living the same time over and over againe : Whereas it is manifest , that in one and the same time , one man may be in case and joy , another in payne and sorrow .

And yet in serrow the fr●ction of our existence is never the lesse perfect , then in times of joy , for joy and sorrow are no parts of existence , for existence is found never a whitt the lesse where joy and sorrow have no place : This you confesse in the next place , where you say ; that the pleasure of borrowed ●ife is to the identity of being but at water to the pipe through which it runnes . yet both serve alike to fill up the matter of your discourse , both the confusson of things different , and the correction of such confusion .

And if the gluts and gushes of pleasure ( as you phrasifie it ) may be at one time much greater then at another , surely they may continue at one time as well as at another , and therefore for the continuance of pleasure , it is not necessary to desire the stay of time , which is a thing impossible : Yet you pleased your selfe not a litle in your former popular discourse of this nature .

The fruition of pleasure may be as intire as our selfes ; and it is no more true , that they are begotten and die in every moment , then it is true of us , that we are begotten & die in every moment : For this scrupulous hicetie ariseth from no other ground , then the being measured with time , theyr duration is partly past , partly future , and but a moment present : And judge whether this conceit of but a moment present , be not a vayne conceit : For I pray , what is that which followes this present moment immediately ? Is it a moment only , or no ? if not a moment onely , what is become of your conceit ? If a moment only , will it not followe , that time consisteth of nothing but moments ? And you may as well say , that magnitude consists of nothing but points , which were indeed , to consist of nothing .

We truly say , this daye is present ; this month is present ; this yeare is present , like as time is sayd to be present , to witt , by way of succession of parts , which parts are not moments succeeding one another , but times Homogeneall , though according to reason divisible in infinitum , as all things continuall are .

3. How the Angells doe accoumpt the continuation of theyr duration , I know not ; but surely we have no better meanes to accoumpt theyr duration past , then by the making of the World , and the number of yearely revolutions of the Heavens , that have bene since . But because we believe , that God could have made Angells , & no visible World ; yea and made the Heavens without moving of them ; in which case yet I doubt not but their duration , & continuance thereof should be knowne to themselfes , but by what meanes I know hor.

The Learned doe distinguish of the duration of Angells , from the duration of things materiall ; & so accordingly their measures ; making time to be the measure of the duration of the one ; and even of the other : Yet I have no cause to think that theyr duration is a participation of eternity more then time : And like as theyr magnitude spirituall is no participation of immensity ; so neyther is theyr duration any participation of eternity .

They are creatures as well as we , though no mortall creatures , and have theyr beginning as well as we ; and the time shall come , when we shall be 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 even as the Angells themselfes , and continue as long as they , yet never atteyne to Luk. 20. any eternity of being , though our being shall never have end : But seing both theyrs , and ours had a beginning ; therefore it is impossible that it should ever grow to be eternall .

I see no reason why Angells should not be sayd to watch for opportunities of time as well as we .

The Divell I am sure is still compassing the earth . Iob. 1. & goes about like a roaring Lyon seeking whome he may devoure , and doe they not wayt all opportunities to doe mischiefe ? And why may not Angells as well wayt all opportunities to doe us good , according to the will of theyr and our Heavenly father ? Especially considering they are all ministring Spirits sent forth for the good of them that shall be heires of salvation . Hebr. 1.

But I confesse , how this wayting or expectance of opportunity should be sayd to feed them , I am as much to seek , as to define how it is sayd to feed us ; unles in respect of Hope ; & so I see no reason , but that it may be as well sayd to feed them allso ; for surely theyr owne glorie is not at full , & they wayte for the enjoying of that ; neyther our glorie nor grace is yet at full ; & as they rejoyce at the conversion of a sinner ; how much more will they rejoyce at our salvation ; and why may they not be sayd to wait & hope for that allso , & rejoyce in the hope , as we doe ?

If a desire to continue what they are doth argue , they have not all that in present possession which is allotted to their compleat duration ; then surely they never shall , nor we neyther , no not in the state of glorie , have all in present possession which is allotted to our duration : And what , I pray , is wanting ? You will say the future duration ; but what , I pray , doe we gett by that , when as fast as duration future becomes present , so fast duration present becomes past ? Yet surely by continuing what we are , we loose nothing ; & if by this , that our duration passeth in respect of time , we cannot be sayd to loose any thing ; then surely by this , that duration commeth on as fast , we cannot be sayd to gayne any thing . If indeed we should grow weaker and weaker , and our strength and prosperity should passe with time , then we should be loosers by it , not otherwise ; So if we should grow stronger and stronger , & our strength or prosperity should encrease with time , then we should be gayners by it , and not otherwise .

Now I hope it is without question ; that the glory of Heaven shall not encrease , but be at full , at the very first , and so continue without end . And , in my judgement , it is a very poore conceit , to denie that a man hath his whole life togeather , because the duration of it , is not all at once .

If we had our life by degrees , one part at one time , and another part at another time , this were a manifest imperfection ; but having all of it togeather , to conceave that the duration & continuance hereof longer & longer is an imperfection , is a very wild conceit in my judgement : This were to cast us upon the deniall of Gods continuance ; For like as our time being upon supposition of 60. yeares , if we should have all of it , within an houre , it should end at an houres end ; so likewise , if God should have his continuance all at once , it should end all at once .

But we say , that the Divine essence as it is without beginning , so it is without end : and nothing past with him , nor nothing to come to him , as it is with all creatures , which are subject to motion in some kind or other : if not of corruption , yet of perfection , at least capable of it : if no such thing were , yet as they come from nothing , so they might returne to nothing : But that God , as he gave them theyr being , so he continueth it . As for God he receaveth not his being from anything , no not from himselfe : But is most necessary to exist , and most necessary to continue , without loosing of ought that is in himselfe , no not so much as a thought ; nor receaving any thing into himselfe , no not so much as a new thought , or a new affection : All which , and changes in respect thereof are incident unto Angells , though not so much as unto us ; who allso have materiall motions , as locall , and alteration , & that tending to corruption .

In a word , as mans existence is as it were an accident to his essence ; because the nature of a man is only of it selfe passively possible to exist , and God can give existence to such a nature , or make the humane nature to exist , as he hath done ; so likewise to Angelicall natures , existence is but an accident .

And as existence is an accident to such essences according to our conceit of them ; so is continuance an accident to such existences . In which respect every day and houre , both man and Angell may be sayd to receave a new accident , which before they had not .

But it is quite otherwise with God ; For as his existence is all one with his essence ; ( because it is absolutely impossible his essence should not exist : ) so his continuance is no accident to his existence : because it is necessary that God should be , & so be , as to be without beginning and without end : And therfore though our continuance be new to us , as being an accident unto us , and wrought by motions ; yet Gods continuance is no accident unto him ; For it is impossible , he should not continue , who is of necessary being : But of this , and of the indivisible nature of Gods continuance more hereafter .

I willingly confesse , that because Angells were made of nothing , therefore theyr continuance is meerly at the pleasure of God , and have parts divisible , in regard that God can set an end to them , whensoever it pleaseth him .

But I know no cause to denie , that they enjoy an entire self-fruition ; For though they have not all theyr continuance at once , yet seing theyr continuance is no part of their essence , which is a thing indivisible , I see no reason why they should be denied , entirely to enjoy themselfes .

Man growes to perfection in parts integrall , though not in parts essentiall , which perfection of parts integrall , as it daily groweth , so it makes him daily more fitt to performe the offices of nature , and duties of his calling ; and so may be sayd , not to enjoy himselfe intirely ( according to that perfection ) which belongeth unto him but by degrees : But it is not so with Angells ; yet may they acquire something unto themselfes accidentally , which before they had not .

God can acquire nothing : His duration ( 't is true ) is indivisible ; For there is no prius nor posterius therein ; For he is subject to no kind or manner of motion .

I doe not like the manner of your justifying this indivisibility of Duration in God : as when you say , he cannot gayne ought to day , which yesterday he had not ; or loose to daye , what yesterday he had : For this , in my judgement , is incident to glorified creatures : For shall not the glorious condition of men and Angells be at full without gayning any new or loosing any old ? Yet no doubt , theyr duration notwithstanding shal be divisible ; God is not .

Perhaps you will say , they loose the former dayes existence , and gayne the following dayes existence : And so we doe much more properly in this world , but without impediment to the same-nes of our existence : For to loose the former dayes existence , and gayne the following dayes existence , is but to loose our coexistence with the former day , and gayne a coexistence with the day following : Now this is no impediment to the same-nes of existence in duration ; which I prove thus : It is incident to God , yet is he still the same in duration : And that 't is incident to God , I prove thus ; God himselfe was yesterday coexistent to yesterday , and now he is not ; for if he were , then yesterday should now exist , which is not only untrue , but impossible to be true , for then time past should be present : And the reason why this is no impeachment to the most perfect same●nes in duration is manifest ; for to coexist with some thing yesterday , and not to day , may arise from no variablenes from within , but only from variablenes in something from without : As , namely , therefore God doth not coexist to day , with many things to day , with which he did coexist yesterday , is not because of any change in God , but by reason of change in these outward things , which had a being yesterday , but to day have not .

In that which followes you manifestly betray your cause : For that God hath such fulnes of joy and sweetnes of life , that nothing can be added thereto in joy or sweetnes ; doth no way inferre , that therefore , the duration hereof cannot be added unto him , and the continuance thereof : Your comparison utterly overthrowes you : For as in a bodie infinite , though there cannot be a middle nor extreame ; yet there are parts without parts by waye of extension ; So in infinite life , though it hath , no extremes , as being without beginning and without end , yet this hinders not but that it may have parts going before , and parts comming after by way of succession .

And whereas you say , that Natures capable of these differences have alwayes the one accomplished by the other , is either without sense ; as if you meane it of the parts of time , as if one were accomplished by the other ; For how I pray you , is time past or present accomplished by that which is to come , or that which is present or to come accomplished by that which is past : Or if in respect of natures subject to time , which are perfected by time , or rather in the course of time ; thus , as it is sometimes true , so sometimes it is notoriously false : For as there is a time of growth in perfection , so it is wel knowne that there is a time of diminution , & corruption also ; And , I pray you , how doth a mans dotage accomplish him either in soule or bodie ? And in the Kingdome of Heaven , what accomplishment by time , when our glorious condition shal be as full and perfect at the first , as in the progresse , for what space imaginable soever .

As for this state , 't is well knowne , that as there is a time of repayring and encreasing , so there is a time of impayring and decaying : And though perfection cannot be perfected , yet it may be continued ; so it is in man , so it is in God ; but by necessity of nature continued in God ; by the pleasure of his gracious will continued in the creature : And therefore though his essence being infinite excludes such a continuance as is wrought by reiterated acts ; yet it excludes not such a continuance as is by necessity of nature , but rather includes it , it being of the nature of life infinite to be as with beginning , so also without end : Even created Angells and Saints shall have no want of continuance in the Kingdome of Heaven ; much lesse God the Author of theyr continuance , more then of his owne ; Yet shall he continue and that by necessity of nature , both to the worlds end , and after that without end . Yet nothing in him is to come to him ; nor nothing from without can come to him ; For who should give it him ? But the duration both of men and Angells is maynteyned unto them by the will and pleasure of God : And herein consists the true difference betweene the duration of creatures and the Duration of God ; For as for prius & posterius , past , and to come , this hath his foundation onely in respect of motion , And therefore time is commonly not reputed a fitt measure for the essences of things , but only for individuall substances : and these only generables , not of substances merely spirituall , as you may remember Plotinus hath taught you . What doe you meane by the degrees or acts of life , an infinitie whereof you place in God ? We commonly accoumpt three sorts of life , and no more , to witt , vegetative , sencitive , and rationall ; Of an infinitie I never hard before in this kind : And as for the degrees of these , I doubt not but there may be degrees in any ; as in each kind some may be more quick and vivacious then other . But none of these kinds , much lesse the degrees of them ar found in God formally , but iminently : And as for the plurality in respect of such as are decreed by him , the case is cleare , that they are infinitely farre of from infinitie ; for undoubtedly the things decreed by God are but finite . I doe not agree with you to conceave God to be everlasting in reference to perpetuity of succession ; for that kind of everlastingnes is a parte past : But eternity cheifely consists in being everlasting a parte ante , and before there was any succession at all .

But here , by the waye , you give me an hint of what you make your foundation of many wild discourses ; and for which I have looked all along ; And not till now you have bolted it out , as where you say , Gods interminate existence is present to the whole and every part of succession : which long agoe hath bene discovered to be a very vayne conceit , though embraced by as great a Schoolman as Aquinas himselfe ; who hereupon builds his opinion of the presence of all things in Gods eternity : And his opinion herein is built upon a very plausible comparison , and devised correspondencie between Gods immensity and eternitie , for like as God by virtue of his immensity doth fill all places , and should coexist with every part of magnitude , although , upon supposition , it were infinite : In like sort God by reason of his eternity should fill all times , and coexist with all times , and all things that hereafter shall exist in time .

But the fallacie of this comparison , and the error of this assertion hath now long agoe bene discovered by Ioannes Scotus : It is true indeed , God must needs coexist with all 1. Sect: dist : 79. q. 1. places . and all things in place ; but not untill the place it selfe ▪ and the things therein doe exist : As if the world were twice at bigge as it is , God should coexist in every part of it ; But yet God doth not coexist with any such , because , as yet there is not any such to coexist with him : In like sort God shall coexist with all times , and all things existing in all Times ; but when ? Not till these times and the things therein shal be found to exist : and as they shal be found to exist , so shall God coexist with them : Now all Times , and all things conteyned in all times doe not exist but by waye of succession , ( magnitudes exist otherwise , even all togeather ) and in like sort God shall coexist with them , to witt , by waye of succession : Nor that Gods existence is or shal be by way of succession ; ( for nothing in God is found that succeeds any thing in God ) But because both times , and creatures in times doe exist by way of succession , in respect of whose succession and not of any succession in God , God is denominated , and that properly enough , to coexist with them by way of succession , in as much as they exist , and consequently coexist with him by way of succession : Like as a pole fixed in a river doth coexist with divers parts of the streame by way of succession ; not that any motion or succession is found in the pole , but only in the parts of the streame , that succeed in theyr course one after another : velut unda supervenit und● : And albeit Alvarez hath taken great paynes and shewed great witt in justifying the opinion of Aquinas in this ( yet no otherwise then upon the supposition of the predetermination of Gods will ) and in dissolving the arguments which Scotus brought against it ; and that in such so●t , that in so spinous of matter I have sometimes thought it a matter very difficult to find out a cleare solution of his reasons ; yet ( I thanck God ) as it was the first worke I undertook after I left the university , before ever I thought of dealing with Arminius , so I seeme to have fully satisfied my selfe therein ; and am reasonably persuaded of abilitie to give satisfaction , on that point , to others also .

But to proceed along with you ; In the next place you tell us , that God considered in himself , He is every way indivisibly infinite and interminable ; not only , because he had no beginning , nor shall have ending : Here your attentive reader would expect what is answerable to this not only , and when you come in with but also ; but here he must hold his breath till you have dispatched your parenthesis ; and if he hold his breath till you come to make up this your imperfect sentence , he is likely never to draw it againe : Againe when you say , God is indivisibly infinite and interminable , considered in himselfe ; you leave your Reader to suspect that your opinion is , that God considered not in himselfe , is not indivisibly infinite and interminable , and the meaning thereof I am yet to seeke .

But consider we what you insert in your parenthesis ; For so might time or motion be held interminable , could the heavens have bene created from everlasting : So they might , as much as to say , as well as that of whome but e●st you spake , and that was of none but God : But God , you sayd was indivisibly infinite , and interminable , not terminable : Wherein in making so incongruous a comparison , whether you had forgott your selfe , or streyned to be delivered of some involved conceyt , the congruity whereof must be farre fett , and deare bought , before a man can meet with it , I know not he obvious meaning which your text aymes at , seemes to be this ; God is infinite and interminable , not only , because he is without beginning and without end ; for so the heavens should be infinite and interminable , put case they were created from everlasting , but in an other respect also ; which respect or cause you forgett to expresse , to perfect the sentence of yours , which is otherwise very imperfect ; Yet in this waye of interpretation of your text , there are faults enough ; for to make the heavens like unto God in this , you should putt the case , not only of being created from everlasting ; but also of being to be continued without end , otherwise they cannot be like unto God both as he is without beginning , and also as he is without end : Secondly though the case were thus put , yet is it incongruous enough ; for albeit herein they should be like unto God in being without beginning , and without end : Yet herein they should be nothing like unto God in being indivisibly infinite , and interminable ; whereof notwithstanding proceeds your comparison : we acknowledge a difference in this , & that a mighty one , though the heavens had bene created from everlasting , &c. not because all Gods continuance to come is present , as you devise ; but because Gods duration and continuance is impossible to be devided , the continuance of a creature is not : For God can make the continuance of any creature to cease this daye and houre ; but it is impossible Gods continuance should cease ; for he is of necessary being : As for the conceyt of prius & posterius in Gods duration ; that is a sory conceyt , for that is to be found no where , but where there is some motion or other , spirituall or corporall , eyther in place , or alteration in quality , or augmentation or dimination in quantity , or generation and corruption : And you may remember that your excellent Mr. Plotinus , whome you so much magnifie , confines his discourse of time to things generable , as if he meant the Angells were free from such a division of duration as is made by prius and posterius ; How much more God ? But of such a division as I speake ; the Angells cannot be free from it being creatures ; but only God , who is ens necessarium , of necessary being ; And therefore his continuance or duration is impossible to be divided from his continuance to morrow , because it is absolutely impossible , that it should ever cease : and therfore whensoever time and place , and things conteyned in them shall exist , & as long soever as they shall exist , God must necessarily coexist with them , and it is impossible it should be otherwise : But before time and place had course , though God did exist , yet did he not coexist with them ; So likewise before time to come doth exist , and the things that are to exist therein , it is impossible that God should coexist with them .

But whereas you say in your parenthesis , that had the Heavens bene everlasting , theyr revolutions neverthelesse should have bene truly numerable , and therefore terminable ; It is true , I confesse , of some of them , as 10. 40. 60. 100. 1000. &c. but impossible that all should ; For had the Heavens bene everlasting , their motions undoubtedly had bene innumerable , neyther could we ever come to the first number while we could .

Secondly you say all things conteyned in their circuit should have gotten somewhat which before they had not , and this something , you say is eyther addition of duration , or ( which is all one ) continuance of theyr first existence , or new acts of life , or sence , or reason .

All very odd , and litle or nothing congruous to things gotten by motion , without which nothing at all is gotten : Now every poore Schollar knowes what is gotten by motion ; For if it be motion locall , a new site is gotten ; If alteration , a new quality , if augmentation or diminution , a new quantity ; If generation & corruption , the matter getts a new substantiall forme ; Now where none of these are gotten , there is no addition of any new thing : And it is well knowne , that the Divine Essence is capable of none of these , neyther of new place ; nor new quality , not new quantity , nor new forme substantiall ; Allbeit he continueth for ever , and consequently there can be nether prius nor posterius to be divided in God : But yet because you enterteyne a wild conceit of Gods eternity indivisible ; you would have his duration so , indivisible ; as if both the time past , and the time to come were drawne togeather within an instant : And therefore , you say , that all other things have eyther addition of duration , or continuance of existence , or some new acts of life , or sense , or reason ; the last whereof is only congruous & agreing with the nature of that motion which is called alteration ; as the two last and the first , may have reference allso to generation , or augmentation ; from all which the case is cleere that God is free , notwithstanding that his continuance which is to come be not sayd , to be present , at which wild conceit and the justification thereof you seeme to ayme : But as for the two first , which yet you make to be all one , they have no place of consideration amonge the termes that are acquired by motion : And dare you denie , that God hath continuance of existence or duration ? But you will say no new duration is added unto God : Who sayth it is ! And what new duration is added unto man by his continuance ? God may add something unto him if it please him ; but if he continue him in statu quo , what addition , I pray ? You will say duration : I demand ; whether naturally or supernaturally ? if supernaturally , then God doth a new create it ; But God hath long agoe ceased from creation : againe then not only every day , and houre , but every minute allso , and every part of a minute God should creare a new duration : If naturally , then by motion corporall , or spirituall ; Now I pray devise , if you can , what motion that is whereby duration is procured ; Yet I confesse , thus farre God may be sayd to add duration ; in as much as he will not sett an end to it , though he can .

But as for the duration of God , it is impossible , that should have any end .

But some may say , If Gods future existence be not present , when it is present , something is added to Gods former duration ; As for example , when tomorrow comes God is a daye older , then he was : I answer , nothing growes older by accesse of time , but that which tooke it being eyther with time , or in processe of time ; So did not God .

Secondly , I answer , Gods future existence is nothing els , but his coexistence with time to come , or with things which shall be in time to come ; which is an externall denomination , arising from the futurition of things to come : In any other sense it is false to say that God hath any future existence , or past existence .

But his coexistence with time or things in time may be sayd to be past , or to come , as well as present ; and in this sense is the Scripture phrase to be understood , when it is sayd that God is he which is , which was , and which is to come : That is , when this World , and Angels were fifst made , then he was , that is , he did coexist with them , and so all along unto this day present ; And so shall exist all along with all creatures & times that are to come : Now this existence of God , more properly to be called his coexistence is partly past , partly present , partly to come ; not in respect of Gods existence , ( who hath neyther motion nor shadow of change , & consequently nothing in him is found to be past or to come ) but in respect of the existence of creatures which is partly past , partly present , and partly to come .

Henceforth you acquaint us with certeyne definitions of Eternity ; The first is out of Boetius , which you commend above that which followes out of Aquinas , belike it fitts your turne better in your conceits , then that other of Aquinas ; and therefore deserving well at your hands you bestow upon it that preferment which you think good ; Well let us consider it : Aeternity ( then in Boetius accoumpt ) is the entire or totall possession of interminable life , all at once , or togeather .

The scope you ayme at , is to prove that in Gods eternall being there is no succession ; Et quis Herculem vituperat ? who ever sayd there was ? In man the very life vegetable , sensitive and rationall growes more and more perfect by degrees : No such motion , no not to perfection , is to be found in God ; In Angells there may be a succession of thoughts & of affections : no such succession is to be found in God .

Yet doth he and you allso maynteyne Gods life to be interminable , that is , of such a continuance as is without end , as well as without succession .

But you shall never be able to prove herehence , that Gods existence is present to every part of succession of other things , as namely , both to that which is past , and allso to that which is to come .

Aquinas definition though very artificiall you grant , yet doth not , you say , imprint so lively a character and notion of the everliving God his infinite happines , as the definition givon by Boetius doth : Aeternitas est duratio manens , uniformis , sine principio & fine , mensurâ carens .

This lettice fitts not your lips like to the former ; because , belike you cannot find by this , that time past & future should be present unto God ; as you conceave to find by the former ; but you will never be able to make it good .

4. Yet Plotin is your Oracle in Philosophy beyond all , who gives , as you say , a more deepe apprehension of it in fewer termes , saying Aeternitas est vita infinita , which you render thus , Eternity is infinitie of life : Like as if when man is defined to be a reasonable creature , you should render it thus , A man is the reasonablenes of a creature .

We all grant , nothing in God is past , of that which belongs to God by denomination from within , nothing is to come . Only things without God are such as they may be both past , present , and to come , successively . I doe not mislike that sayinge of Plotius , to witt that when we say God is allwayes , we breede in our mindes a wandring imagination of pluralitie or divisibility of duration . But yet so long as we understand Gods duration though indivisible yet equivalent to divisible succession in things without , there is no errour , in which respect we may justly say with scripture God was , and is , and is to come , in as much as he was coexistent with things past , when they were existent , is coexistent to things present shall be coexistent to thinges to come .

And not to say , as you would have us , that God is now coexistent to things past , and to things to come as well as to things present . There is nothing hitherto alleaged out of Boetius or Plotin , that can justifie this ; no more then in the definition of eternitie made by Aquinas ; yet Aquinas had a conceyte of the existence of all thinges both past and to come in Gods eternitie , not only as they are knowne : For that is to exist rather in Gods knowledge then in his eternitie , and that is esse secundum quid , and in esse cognito only , it is not to exist simplicitur , absolutely . I doe not dislike your notification of eternitie , to be that which allwayes is and cannot cease to be , save that I finde no vertue in the word to be extended to this latter clause ; allthoughe I conceave , that whatsoever allwayes is the same , dothe necessarily imply such a nature , as cannot cease to be .

And therfore the Apostle takes eternall power and Godhead to be termes equivalent . You say that in true Philosophicall contemplation it is not onething truly to be & allwayes to be . There is a typographicall errour in this , if I be not deceaved ; and the sentence should runne thus , It is but one thing truly to be and allwayes to be . This I take to be your meaninge , but I acknowledge no truthe in it . For if this were true , then all creatures should have no true beinge ; for certenly they are not allwayes .

And if they have no true beinge , then they have no being at all , as afterwards yourselfe acknowledge this manner of consequence to be good . And albeit to have a being and to have a true being be all one , yet hence it followes not , that truly to be and allwayes to be is all one . I grant that to be allwayes , without beginninge and without ende , dothe inferre an independent beinge . But even true beings may be dependent ; otherwise the beings of Angells and men made after the image of God were no true beings . For undoubtedly theyr beings are dependent beings .

Another use of the woord allwayes is to note ( as you say , ) the interminable , indistiuguishable , and indivisible power , which needs nothing besides that which it actually & for the present hath . But I see no congruity in the woord alwayes to signify all this . And first I wonder what you meane to leape from Gods life and power ; seing you propose the infinity of each , as severall branches of Gods infinity to be discoursed on a part , Say then it denotes his interminable and indivisible being or duration : yet I cannot like this neyther .

For thoughe the terme allwayes , dothe congruously denote his interminable beinge , to witt , without beginning and without ende : Yet I see not howe it can note his indivisible beinge . I grant this latter may be inferred out of the former , for as much as that which is allwayes , cannot be produced , but must be of necessary beinge and consequently indivisible in such sort , as that the duration of it to day , cannot be divided from the duration therof to morrowe : for then it shoulde cease to be , which is impossible , seinge it is presupposed to be of necessary beinge . We deny not , but God hathe all that belongs to his divine nature ; thoughe not for the reason you give to witt , because he truly is . For that were to inferre , that nothing besides God h●he any true beinge , which were to deny the being of all creatures .

The divine nature conteynes a totalitie of increated entitie ( if a totalitie may be imagined of that which hathe no parts . ) As for created entitie , that is not to be found in God at all but only from God . All creatures may have neede of some thing els then continuance , as namely theyr natures being capable of greater perfection ; then yet they have atteyned unto . As for continuance , they have only thus farre neede therof , because otherwise they shall cease to be ; and so likewise God himself , if he should not continue , he should cease to be . Only here is the difference . The creature may be sayde properly to neede continuance , because he depends upon the free will and pleasure of another , for the obteyning of it , to witt , upon the will of God .

But God depends upon no other for the obteyninge of his continuance ; no nor upon his owne will neyther .

And therfore he cannot be sayde to neede continuance , but rather that he must needes be , because he is not ens contingens , but ens necessarium , of no contingent , but of necessary beinge . By your leave , Eternity conteynes more , then to signify the having of whatsoever is expedient to be had .

For undoubtedly , it signifies allso the continuance of all that without beginninge , and without ende .

But you after your manner , seeme under these ●rmes whatsoever is expedient to be had , to include and comprehend duration future , as if duration future were allready present unto God ; which is a groundles conceyte , arising merely from a superficiall interpretation of the nature of eternitie , which is commonly called an instant of duration .

〈◊〉 It is true , the duration of God is not to come ; For it is present , and incapable of succession as being subject to no manner of mutation .

But there is a duration of time , and of things measured by time to come ; which future duration is no way present to God , in respect of his coexistence with it .

It is most true , and proper enough to say with Scripture phrase , that God is he which was , & is , & is to come : which phrase of specche implyes neyther change , nor succession in God , but only in things without God .

Agayne , wisedome , power , and goodnes are expedient to concurre in the supreame essence : But this eternitie comprehends not , but only the continuance of all these without beginninge , without ende .

That a thing looseth so much of perfection , as it wants of duration , is a wilde assertion ; unles under perfection , you comprehend duration ; and then your proposition is identicall , and no more then to say , that a thing looseth so much of duration , as it wants of duration .

Otherwise I say it is manifestly untrue , not only because Aristotle was bold to say that , Bonum non ideo melius quia diuturnius ; good is not therfore better because the more lasting , or everlasting , but allso , because by the same reason of yours it would followe that a Crowe , an Hart , and a Raven were much more perfect then a Man ; if it be true as some write , that a Crowe lives three times as long as a Man , an Hart three times as long as a Crowe , and a Raven three times as long as an Hart.

Sure we are the least starre hathe continued from the beginninge of the World .

〈◊〉 . I muse not a litle to see Platonicall and Plotinicall Philosophy , so much advanced by an Oxonian : as if Aristotles learning left Logicians perplext in a point of sophistry , and only Plotinicall Philosophy would expedite them . And lookinge backe to what you have discoursed of , out of Plotinus , if so be I might light on that parcell of subtiltie suitable to this ende you speake of , I professe , that as I finde no thing in that which you have alleaged out of Plotinus , that is not vulgar , nothing woorthy of that commendation which you besto we upon him , ( therby reflectinge no small commendation upon your owne peculiar studies in Plotinus : ) so withall , I cannot imagine what piece of witt that is , the ignorance wherof dothe perplexe eyther any other better Logician , or my selfe eyther , in the resolution of that question , which you propose .

Neyther doe you accommodate any sentence of Plotinus herunto , that might serve as a key to open that locke , which as you say , is so hard to be opened , but leave your Reader at randon , to pore after it . But whether it be Plotinus his resolution or your owne , let us consider it .

And first the question proposed is , Whether Socrates in the instant of his dissolution or corruption , be a man or corps , or bothe . To be both ( you say ) implyes contradiction , and yet you say , there is as much reason , that in this instant he should be both as eyther . Thus have we the question and that argued in part . Now followeth your resolution , as it were our of Plotinus , though you alleage no crumme of any sentence of his for it . Now I observe that your solution , thoughe you woulde have it seeme to be but one , yet indeede it is diverse ; the one nothing to the purpose , the other something to the purpose , but utterly overthrowing your former assertion , as when you sayde , There is as much reason he should be both as eyther . The third overthrowinge the very foundation of the question it selfe , in effect professing that it proceedes from a false ground or supposition .

A manifest evidence that you are still to seeke howe to satisfie your selfe herin , or others in this unproffitable speculation .

And if this be to be endoctrinated by Plotinus , make you as much as you will with your knowledge of Plotinus his Philosophy , I shall have no great cause to complayne of my ignorance therin .

Your first resolution is , that he was a man and shall be a corps . This I say , is nothing to the question . For the question proposed is , not what he was , or what he shall be , but what he is in the instant of his dissolution .

In the next place you seeme to speake more to the purpose , when you say that in the instant of his dissolution , he ceaseth to be a man , and beginnes to be a corpse . But even this allso , is not fully to the purpose . For the question is not , what he beginnes to be , or what he ceaseth to be , in that instant , but what he is .

Yet because substantiall formes have no degrees as accidentall formes have , and therfore cease to be , or beginne to be all at once ; therfore I take your answere at the best to be this ; that in the instant of his dissolution , he is a corps , and not a man , which is directly contrary unto that which formerly you affirmed sayinge , There was as much reason why he should in this instant be both , as eyther .

Your third resolution different from both the former is this : that the space of dissolution is not in an instant , as the question supposed , but a space of time consisting of parts , which is not to answeare the question , but utterly to overthrowe it ; and withall it openeth a way to a newe difficulty ; for in this case it may well be demanded , what portion of this divisible time shall be allowed to the being of a man , and what to the being of a corps ; and take heede least you ascribe one instant to the last of the first forme , and another instant to the beginninge of the succeeding of the second forme .

For seing two instants cannot be immediate , it will followe herhence that materia prima , shall some space of time actually exist without any forme .

As for my selfe , I never ●ept upon Plotinus his Parnassus , nor was ever acquainted with his muses . Nay , I have bene so long time departed out of the universitie , and while I was there so long remooved from these kinde of studies , that I may well be sayde to have forgotten Aristole . Nun● mihi sunt oblita sophis●ata . Yet will I adventure to compare the remnants of my old Peripateticke store with your atchievements out of Plotinus .

I say then , the resolution of this question depends upon the resolution of a more generall question .

And that is concerninge the beginninge and ceasing of forme , now the rules therof most receaved as I remember , are these . The formes we speake of are , eyther permanent , or successive . Formes permanent beginne per primum sui esse , by the first instant of theyr beinge ; desi●unt per primum sui non esse , they cease to be , by the first instant of theyr not beinge .

In such sort as to say , that immediately before such an instant they were not , but at such an instant , and in the time following they were . Agayne , touching theyr endinge , you may say , Immediately before such an instant they were ; in and after such an instant , they were not .

As for formes successive , such as are time and motion , they are sayde to beginne per ultimum sui non esse ; by the last instant of theyr not beinge ; and to ende per primum sui non esse , by the first instant of theyr not beinge .

That is , at such an instant motion ( speaking of motion properly as it includes succession ) was not : for it cannot be in an instant but immediately after it was .

Agayne touching the ending of motion we may say , at such an instant motion was not , but immediately before , it was . And accordingly , to the question proposed , I answeare ; Corruption or dissolution is taken eyther in a complicate signification , comprehending the whole alteration that went before the ceasing of the forme , and then all that while , undoubtedly Socrates was a man , and not a carcase .

But if only for the desinency or ceasing of the forme humane . I say , in that instant , wherin he is sayde to desinere or cease ( it being the first instant of his not being , as before hathe bene shewed , to be the manner of desinence or ceasinge of all forms permanent ) he is a corps ; but immediately before he was a man .

In the next place you tell us of Plotins conclusion , namely , That while we seeke to sit that which truly is with any portion of quantity , the life of it being thus divided by us , looseth its indivisible nature .

First , I like not that assertion , whether it be yours alone or derived from Plotin , in sayinge , that God alone truly is .

I well knowe our beinge is of a quite different nature from Gods being : but to deny that we creatures have a true beinge , is as good as to deny that we have any being at all .

Secondly , I knowe no man ; that goethe about to fitt Gods nature , with any proportion of quantitie .

Yet we maynteyne , he was coexistent with all thinges past , is coexistent with all thinges present , shall be coexistent with all thinges that are to come in their order , & that without all , divisibility , or succession in himselfe : his coexistence after the manner forementioned , implying only divisibilitie and succession in the creatures .

Of time , you say , no part truly is but the present .

So then the present time , at least truly is . Yet but a litle before and often hertofore you have professed , that nothing but God truly is .

Now give me leave to maynteyne some paradoxes , as well as you .

I say , all time truly is , and is present , as well as that which you accoumpt to be only present .

For how dothe this present houre exist but by succession of parts .

If you accoumpt nothing present but an instant ; it is well knowne , that an instant deserves no more to be accoumpted time , then a point deserves to be accoumpted magnitude .

But if you speake of time properly , it must have parts , which cannot exist together , but only by succession . As for example , this minute of an houre is present but how ? only as having a part past , and a part to come .

For this only to exist is to exist by way of succession . In like sort this present houre dothe truly exist ; but how 〈◊〉 as havinge a part past , and a part to come .

So this present yeare dothe truly exist , as having a part past , and a part to come .

In like sort the time of the Gospell , accoumpting from the day of Pent●cost , when the H. Ghost came downe upon the Apostles , unto the ende of the World , may as well be sayde truly to exist , namely thus , as having a part past , and a part to come .

So dividing the World into two parts ; The old world , from the beginninge of time by creation unto Noahs flood ; and the newe World , computed from Noahs flood to the ende of the World : I say the time of this World dothe only exist , as havinge a part past and a part to come .

So the time of the whole World from the beginning to the ende , may be sayde truly to exist , to witt , by way of succession of parts , havinge one part past and another to come . For not the least part of time dothe exist otherwise , to witt , by coexistence of parts , but only by succession of parts .

They who made doubt , whether navigators were to be accoumpted amongst the living or amongst the dead , affected more witt then truthe . For if Navigators , undoubtedly , they are livinge and not dead ; Indeede after they have sett foorthe , we are uncerteyne what is become of them : and equally as uncerteyne may we be , what is become of our freindes that are travayled unto China by the way of the Continent . But to make doubt whether time consists rather of being then of not being , is a conceyte litle becomming a Philosopher in my judgement , thoughe it may become such a one as enterteynes a vulgar contemplation of thinges successive , and in motion , whether by Sea or land .

I should thinke that sory imagination , is grounded upon conceavinge that nothing in time is but an instant , which if it were true , woulde inferre that time were nothing but a succession of instants .

But were it so ; yet surely the shortnes of continuance of any thinge , nothinge hinders the true beinge therof , when it is . A childe of a day olde , hath as true being , as Methusalch had , who lived till he was , allmost a thousand .

It seemes the sent of Plotinus his subtilties , hathe perfumed all those that have dwelt under his shadowe ; and therfore no merveyle if Ficinus commenting upon him , savoureth herof allso . He compares , you say liternitie to a center , and time to the points or extreamities of the line in the circumference allwaye moovinge about the Center , so that if it were an eye it might viewe them all at once .

I doubt not , but ere we depart from this chapter , we shall meete with the Circumference of eternitie as well as with the center of it ; but not from Plotinus his text , or Ficinus his Commentaries , but from one that will be bolde to adde a Gemora to theyr Talmud .

For it is fitt the World should profite in subtilties as well as in solid points , and not allwayes to stand at a stay . But a woord of this by the way : Though future times , and future things are all knowne to God , yet not by reason of any existence of theyrs in eternitie , or Gods coexistence with them for the present . For how dothe God at this time coexist with them , which at this time have no existence at all ?

Agayne , God lookes not out of himselfe for the knowledge of any thinge now , more then he did before the World was made .

For surely the making of the World wrought no change in him as touching the manner of his knowledge , with whom there is no variablenes nor shadowe of change . When you take upon you to tell us how Eternitie is indivisible , to witt , by conteyning all the parts or perfections possible of succession in a more eminent manner then can be conteyned in time it selfe . I pray remember , that in like manner you professed , that God did conteyne all entities even the entities of brute beasts ; and you expo●nded it in this sense , because forsoothe he was able to produce them .

And thus we easily grant God conteynes all perfections of successions , in as much as he can produce them . If so be succession may be coumpted a perfection , wherof but erst you made doubt , whether it had any being at all . Yet we doubt not , but God can produce them ; yea so farre forthe as to exceede all that is conteyned in time .

For as much , as he could have made the duration of the World , tenne times more then it is like to be .

I doe not affect to quarrell with Plato his witt ; much good doe you with it , and if you please your selfe with such fancies , as namely that time is a moovable image of that which is unmooveable ; a divisible image of that which is indivisible ; a successive representation of that which is without all succession ; a modell finite , with beginning and ende of that whic● is infinite , without beginning and ende , you shall not displease me .

You have another sophisme or seeming contradiction to unloose or salve by these rarities of curiositie ; and that is , how it may be verified , that Petrus in aeternitate aegrotat , & Petrus in aeternitate non aegrotat . If this were spoken of the same time , you say it were contradiction ; but being spoken of eternitie , you say it is not , and yet you confesse Eternitie is more indivisible , then any time .

Let who will thinke , that you have salved this knott of seeming contradiction , to my understanding you leave it as you finde it . The propositions conteyning a seeming contradiction are bothe absurd .

For Peter cannot be sayde to be sicke in eternitie , as in that which is the measure of duration eythe ▪ of himselfe , or of his siknes , but only in time , with which time , eternitie , I confesse , is coexistent , but when ? not till the time that Peters sicknes dothe exist , nor after it hathe ceased to exist . For coexistence supposethe existence on both sides . And as the existence of the creature is past , present , or to come ; so is Gods coexistence with it , eyther past , present , or to come ; which hathe bothe Scripture & reason to warrant it ; whereas your wilde conceytes are warrantable by neither .

6. Materia prima , is ingenerable and incorruptible not because it is no body , but because it is no compound body . But God is ingenerable and incorruptible , because he is no body at all : Therefore better it is to liken him unto the Angells who are ingenerable and incorruptible , because they are Spirits .

All thinges generable come from matter only as touching their materiall parts , not as touching their formes ; neyther can they be sayde so properly to spring from it , as to be compounded of it . But from God all things spring in the way of an efficient cause , yea the matter it selfe allso , and that out of nothing .

If matter be most unlike him , in wanting the true unitie of entitie , other things belike have this ; And if they have unitie of entitie , it is to be hoped they have true entitie allso , veritie being the propertie of entitie , as well as unitie , and consequently they may be sayde to have a true beinge , which you hertofore , & that very often have made proper and peculiar unto God .

I wonder why you make the Creator and essence it selfe to be termes of equall signification ; wheras God is not the creator of all things by his essence , but by his freewill rather .

Those things which necessarily belong to God , are usually ascribed unto him , by way of essence , but not such things , as contingently denominate him , arisinge from the libertie and freedome of his will .

God , you say , is the incomprehensible perfection of all things ; doe you meane of things create only , or only of things increate , or of bothe ? You cannot meane it of things create : For no create perfection is found in God : Nor of increate ; For no imperfection at all is founde in essence increate .

The Earthe is not unmooveable : some have conceaved it to moove naturally : Vndoubtedly , it may be mooved , otherwise it were not Corpus naturale ; And Earthquakes doe manifest as much .

If it cannot be mooved by the force of Man ( yet by prayer of faith , Mounteynes may be remooved , and cast into the Sea ) , yet it may be mooved questionles by the force of Angells , at least by the power of God .

Neyther is infinite vigour of vitalitie required to an immoveable condition in the opinion of greater Clerkes then our selves , as who thinke all Angells to be no way capable of locall motion .

Yet you talke of a mobilitie of the Deitie ( a prodigious phrase ) thoughe you thinke to charme it , by calling it more then infinite , and calling the motion therof a supermotion ; and this his mobilitie , as well as his immobility formerly spoken of , you make to proceede from the infinite vigour of his vitalitie .

Nor dothe eternitie ( say you ) receave addition from succession infinite ; Belike it receaves succession ( in your opinion ) though no addition therby . For if it receaves no succession at all , what sober man coulde expect , that it should receave addition by it .

At lengthe you come towards that , which I have a long time looked for : Eternitie , you say , is like to a fixed center , because indivisibly immutable , but it is allso as you say , like unto a circle , but you tell us not wherein , nor why .

And as Trismegist did define Gods immensitie , by the similitude of a Spheare , whose Center was every where , but his Circumference no where .

So you will take upon you to define Gods Eternitie , neyther out of Trismegist , nor out of Plotinus , nor out of Ficinus , but out of your owne invention to be a Circular duration , whose instants are allwayes , whose terminations or extreamities never were , never shall be .

We willingly grant , that Gods eternitie is a duration without beginninge , and without ende ; This is nothing strange , nothing remote from vulgar capacitie .

But to say it is a Circular duration , is such an attempt , and so audacious , as I thinke , it never entered into any sober mans brayne eyther sleeping or wakinge , before it was fancyed by your selfe .

Le ts bid farewell to Aristotles Philosophy , and let Platoes Divinitie come in the place of it . Distill Plotinus his Philosophy , and Ficinus Commentaries upon Plotins Enneades throughout , and see whether any such Extract can be made , as this Circular duration you dreame of , and commend to the World as some rare notion .

Of Circular motion I have heard and read ; But of Circular duration never .

Nay thinges that have circular motion , were never affirmed to have Circular duration . For motion may be from space to space in a round figure , returning thither , where it begunne , but duration is neyther round , nor goethe round .

For thoughe the Heavens runne round , yet the time of the Heavens and of the World runnes not round , nor returnes to the period of time from whence it beganne .

Yet is duration successive more fitt to be accoumpted duration Circular , then duration constant , which hathe no parts succeedinge .

I holde it to be a notorious untruthe , to say that eternitie coexists to every parcell of time . For to say it coexists with time to come , is to say , that eternitie existethe , and time to come existethe allso , which latter clause is most false . For if it were present , it were not to come .

No time defines eternitie , we say , but rather eternitie sets 〈◊〉 ende to time .

But we dare not enterteyne so absurd a conceyte as to say , eternitie circumscribs time ; as if time were some lower spheare , and eternitie an upper spheare , and so time should be a circular duration as well as eternitie .

Your next sentence beginnes to open the mystery , as whe● you say , Thoughe the motions of the Heavens should continue without ende , yet every period of time shall fall within eternitie , now totally existent .

I marke your phrase well , as when you say , It shall fall within eternitie , implyinge that eternitie is beyond it , in respect of time to come ; like as it is sayde to be before all time , in respect of time past .

Now to discusse this phrase of yours of falling within eternitie : This phrase ( I say ) here used , is utterly out of his place . For in proper speeche it hathe place only in respect of quantitie continuall , outreaching all other thinges we speake of .

Thus all things in the World besids the uttermost Spheare , fall within the uttermost spheare ; so that the uttermost spheare doth not only extende so farre as they doe , but beyond them .

Now to say that every period of time falls within eternitie , is to suppose , that eternitie extends beyond it so as to exist beyond it ; which is true of all time past . For God did both coexist with it , and dothe continue after it .

And as touching time present , it may be justified in this sense , to fall within eternitie , in respect that Gods continuance is not at an ende with this present , but continueth without ende .

But to imagine that at this present Gods continuance doth actually extende farther then this present , is a most absurde conceyte ; As if forsooth God had not onely an existence present , but allso an existence to come , and that this existence of God to come is present . Whereas neyther of these is true , but each false , and that most absurdly false .

For first God hath no existence to come , for if he had , then he should have also an existence past , and consequently he should be measured with time , and subject unto motion . And whereas the Scriptures doe confesse that God is he which was , and is , and is to come ; this is to be understood of his coexistence and not of his existence ; as much as to say God doth not onely coexist with all things present , but also did coexist , with all things past ; that is to say with every one of them in the time of theyr existence , and also shall coexist , with all things to come , that is to say , with every one of them in the time of they re actuall existence .

Now this coexistence of God with things past , and things to come is not present , onely his coexistence with things present , is present , his coexistence with things past , is past , and in that respect t is sayd he was ; so likewise his coexistence with things to come is to come , and in that respect onely it is sayd that God is to come .

By this we may judge of the proposition following which is this .

God hath bene , is , and ever will be , unto every minute or Scruple of time that hath beene , is , or shall be , alike everlastingly coexistent . If one word had beene left out ( to witt the word everlastingly ) it might have admitted an handsome interpretation , and a sober meaning taken respectively thus , God hath beene coexistent to things that have beene , is coexistent to things that are , shall be coexistent to things that shall be .

But to apply all these differences of time past , present , and to come , to each of the things mentioned , ( as namely to say , that God hath beene , and is , and shall be coexistent to all things that have beene , and is , and shall be , coexistent to all things that shall be ) is most absurde .

For the coexistence of God doth as well implye the exisstence of the things themselfes with which God is sayd to exist , as the existence of God .

And therefore though it be true to say , that God was coexistent with all things past , because there was a time when these things did exist and at the same time undoubtedly God did coexist with them ; yet it is false to say that God doth or shall coexist with things past ; for that saying doth implye , that things past doe now exist ; and also are to come . In like sort though it be true : that God doth now coexist with all things that now are , for as much as both these things doe indeed at this time exist , and God must needs coexist with them as the author and preserver of theyr existence ; yet it is untrue to say that God doth now coexist with time past or to come , and with the things which were or shall be therein , for if this were true ; it would follow that not onely God is now present , but also that time past and time to come , are also present withall things conteyned in them , which every man knows to be most untrue .

Last of all though it be true that God shall coexist with the time to come , and the things therein , because both they shall exist , and consequently God must needs coexist with them , as the author and preserver of them ; yet it is most untrue to say that God shall coexist with time past and present and the things therein , for if this were true it would herence follow that both time past , and present with all things conteyned in them were both to come , which how absurde a speech it is , let every sober man judge .

And yet that this is the meaning appeares by the adding of the word everlastingly , which addition makes the proposition untrue in every member of it , though taken respectively , which otherwise as I have shewed might admitt a tolerable interpretation . For though it be true that God was coexistent with Noahs floud , yet is is un●ue that he was everlastingly coexistent with it .

At the time of Noahs floud God was coexistent with it by vertue of his eternirye , which makes him necessarily to coexist wiih all things when they are , like as by vertue of his immensitie he necessarily filleth all places , as soone as there are any places to fill . But God was not everlastingly coexistent with Noahs floud , for as much as neyther before the time of Noahs floud , was God coexistent with it nor after : For to coexist with Noahs floud doth implye the existence of Noahs floud : But Noahs floud did neyther exist before the time of it nor after .

In like sort to say that God doth now coexist with all things present is true ; but to say he doth everlastingly coexist with this time present , and the things therein is most untrue : For if this were true , then it were as true that he did coexist yesterday , with this day and shall coexist to morrow with this present , which is utterly untrue ; for if it were true , then yesterday and to morrow should be this present day , Nay it would follow that this present day were everlasting ( and not time onely in generall ) if so be God did everlastingly coexist , with it .

Last of all it is true that God shall coexist with the fall of Babylon ; but it is untrue to say that God shall everlastingly coexist with it , for if that were true , then he should coexist with it both before it were , and after it were past , whith is impossible . For it would imply that Babylon should fall , before it shall fall , and after it hath fallen . And all this confusion ariseth from a precipitate and superficiary apprehension of the nature of eternity being commonly accoumpted but an instant , which indeed is a truth , because in the nature of God there is no succession , and that not onely in respect of such motions whereunto bodyes are subject , but in respect of such motions which are incident unto Angells . In regard of which motions the differences of time past , present and to come are attributed unto God , in respect of his coexistence with them , without bringing in such monstrous conceites as are hat●hed in the fancyes of some , though I professe I know not many such , nor never read or heard of the like till now ,

So then the reason why God was coexistent with time past and the things therein ; is coexistent with time present and the things therein , shall be coexistent with time to come and the things therein , is not onely by reason of his owne indivisible , and in erminable unitye ; or rather is not at all by reason of this , for this consideration is rather opposite to the determinations of was , is , and is to come , which you attribute unto God , then any way suitable with it , but rather in regard of his eternitie , in which respect he must necessarily coexist with all times according to they re severall differences ; provided that they have an existence ; for otherwise : how shall God be sayd to coexist with them .

But then agayne I say not onely in respect of eternitie are these denominations given unto God , but also in respect of the acquisition of new successive parts , not in himselfe but in time and things contayned therein . For because God cannot be sayd to coexist with such things that have no existence at all , And all things without God have not they re existence at once but some at one time some at another , hence is coexistence with them attributed unto God , according to differences of time past , present , and to come , not by reason of any succession of parts in God , but onely in respect of succession of parts in time , and motions , in all things without God .

But we shall have a mad World quickly , when men shall take upon them doctórally to dictate conclusions unto others from certayne principles ( as about the eternitie of God , and the indivisible nature therof ) superficiarily apprehended , and never rightly , much lesse sufficiently understood .

What time you have bestowed in the study of these attributes of God I know not ; but as for my selfe I professe I never bestowed any hereabouts as I can remember , but ever contented my selfe with common notions generally received . And whereas I mett sometimes with strange suppositions grounded upon these common notions , I have rather contented my selfe with ignorance how to justifie them , then to thinke it worth the whyle to enter upon the discussion , only in the question about the presence of all things in eternitie maynteyned by Aquinas , I found in Scotus a discovery of that errourous conceite .

And though Alvarez hath laboured to repayre the credit● of Aquinas in that particular and to answer Scot , yet the vanitie of that discourse of his , I have laboured to discover , and therein have reasonably well satisfied my selfe .

Now being cast upon these Meditations , by reason of this your discourse , which in the very Epistle dedicatory manifest your affection towards Arminianisme , which I professe I hate as much , as I love the grace of God , and desire to be zealous in the mayntayning of it to my last gaspe ; I am driven herewithall to take into consideration your Philosophical discourse concerning the essence of God . and his attributes , and finding therein some prodigious assertions by way of deduction from the receaved notions of Gods indivisible and yet eternall being ; out of the Logicall facultie which I brought with me long agoe , out of the Vniversitie , I make bold to observe well the soundnes of such illations , and finding no ground for them , but rather utter disproportion betweene them , and the principles wherehence they are inferred , in the course hereof I become better acquainted with the nature of Gods eternitie then before ; and hope to be better inabled to encounter any unsound assertions , derived therehence and grounded thereupon , then heretofore .

And we are like to be acquainted with your mysteries to the full in the next Section .

7. You suppose duration successively infinite .

In this case 't is true that God cannot be sayd to be after all duration successive . For to be after it , is to be when duration hath an end , but you suppose that such duration shall never have end .

And in this case it can neyther properly nor improperly be sayd , that God is after it . For it is manifest contradiction to say , that hath an end which is supposed to have no end .

You seeme to groane in the delivery of some quaint subtiltie when you write thus : Yet that eternitie now is and ever was a● infinitely preexistent to all ages in succession comming towards us one way ; it is , and was to the Worlds nativitie the other way .

Here you make a full point , whereby it comes to passe , that wanting a principall verbe , the sentence contaynes a manifest non-sense ; & it is the observation of others as well as mine , if divers such non-sensed propositions have dropped from your penne in this discourse , yet your meaning we see plainly in the sentence following , as when you say , This is a point which we must beleive , if we beleive God to be eternall , and know what eternitie is .

So the former speech of yours though imperfect , & indifferently capable of being , pronounced to be a fable as a truth , we perceave to be received by you as a truth , and not so onely but affected allso by you as a truth , whose consideration hath not beene so well taken to heart , by those who have had Gods eternall decrees and the awardes of it most frequently in they re mouthes and pennes ; as it hath beene by your selfe .

Thus you accommodate your selfe to the venting , & your Readers to the expecting of some sublimate and so quintessentiall a conceite , that poore Calvin & Beza , and such like unproficients in Academicall studies , never attayned to the depth of any such speculation .

Once before I observed a certayne gradation tending to this purpose , and that with some wonderment , as when you affirmed in the beginning of this section , that God was as truly before all times future , as before all times past .

As if to be before all times future , were a greater matter then to be before all times past ; whereas I had thought that such poore snakes as my selfe might truly be accoumpted to be before all times future . So in this place it might well make a man wonder what you meane to affirme in solemne manner that God is and ever was as infinitely preexistent to all ages comming towards us , as to the Worlds nativitie .

As if to be preexistent to the times to come , were as greate a matter as to be preexistent to times past , which might seeme to carry no sobriety in the forehead . For ever the meanest worme that creepes upon the Earth , is preexistent to all ages to come , but none is preexistent to all ages past but God himselfe . But there is , no doubt a mysterie in this .

Heretofore I had a sent of it : But now it beginnes to breake forth in greate measure .

For when we say God is preexistent to all ages past , & consequently must needs be preexistent to all ages that are to come , we understand all this but one way according to the course of time from future to the present , from being present to become past , and so that which is first actually existent , is before all that which arrives to actuall existence afterwards . But you tell us of two wayes & that God is preexistent before all ages past one way , & before all ages to come another way , by which other way your meaning seemes to be this , that as God is afore all ages past , so also he is after or behinde all ages to come ; which phrase of speech in saying God is after or behind any thing , because you thinke it too ignoble to be attributed unto God , and perhaps in part to astonish your Readers with some strange language being never acquainted with the like ; This being after all ages you are pleased to instile & call his being before them , but another way or a different way from his beinge , before all ages past .

As if a man should say that the Horse goes before the Cart one way , and the Cart may be sayd to goe before the Horse another way , which later is indeede and in substance of sense no other , then to go after the Horse .

In like sort we may say the calling of the Gentiles is before the calling of the Iewes one way , and the calling of Iewes goes before the calling of the Gontiles another way , to witt as it comes after it .

So the rising & florishing of Antichrist goes before the fall of Antichrist one way , and the fall of Antichrist goeth before the rising and flourishing of Antichrist another way , to wit it followeth after it .

Now if this manner of language doth not goe beyond all Canting , I know not what doth . But take wee your phrase according to this sense , yet there is no truth in this assertion . God indeed was before all ages past , because he was when they had no beginning ; but he shall not be after all ages to come , because he shall not be when all ages have an end .

For according to your owne opinion all ages shall never have end . And for this reason in the very beginning of this section your selfe affirmed , that God could not properly be sayd to be after all times and durations to come . For what ( sayd you ) can be after that which hath no end ? To this I added , this could not be affirmed eyther properly or improperly , because there was no truth in it , as that which implyed a manifest contradiction .

Much lesse properly or truly can it be sayd that God is pre-existent to all ages to come after a different way from that whereby he is sayd to be preexistent to all ages past .

But let us see whether any greater measure of sobriety , can be found in that which followeth .

In the next place you tell us , that As he is no Christian Philosopher , much lesse a true Christian divine , that would deny that whatsoever is by God decreed , was so decreed before all worlds : So he is no Christian Philosopher , much lesse a true Christian divine , that shall referre or retract the tenor of this speech , ( before all worlds ) to that onely which is past before the world beganne , whatsoever can be more properly sayd or conceaved to be past , then to be yet to come , or to be in every moment of time designable can have no propertye of eternitye . So then whosoever shall dare say that it is a more proper speech to affirme , that God did chuse us in Christ before the foundation of the world , then to say that God shall chuse us in Christ after the end of the World , you will be bold to deny him the title both of a Christian Philosopher and of a true Christian divine also .

By the way let me aske you , what that is which you call past before the World was ; for before the World was , nothing at all was but God . Agayne , though we say the decrees of God , were before the world was , yet no divine that I know sayth they were past before the World was ; for the decrees of God are nothing but the Counsayle and will of God , which undoubtedly we say continue the same and ever shall . In the last sentence you teach us that it may stand well enough with eternitie , to be sayd to be past , present , and to come ; so we doe not affirme it to be more properly past , then present or to come . Yet I promise you , I nothing like to say that God is past , I had rather say he was and is , and is to come . As much as to say , God is of necessary being , and still continueth , and it is impossible he should be otherwise , in which respect we may truly and properly say he was coexistent with every thing that is past , ( to witt in the time of its existence , ) is coexistent to every thing present , shall be coexistent to every thing that is to come ( to witt in the time of the existence of each thing ) and all this not by any succession of parts in himselfe , ( as who is subject to no motion ) but by succession of parts in outward things , with which or whom , he is sayd to coexist , his owne existence being perpetuall and invariable .

These your propositions I can finde reason to make them good in some tolerable construction . Yet you adde a reason of it , which should be more evident then the Conclusion , but indeed is farre more obscure , and when the meaning of it is perceived , is found to have most need of reason to proove it , as being in shew contrary to all reason ; yet you content your selfe with dictating it , & thence proceed to a wild goose race of illustration by the heavens that environ both us and the Antipodes ; so to make way for the circular duration which formerly you attributed unto God , by comparing it with the heavens turning round ( upon supposition ) in a moment .

The rationall proposition without reason delivered is this : For that onely is eternall which allwayes is , and so allwayes is , that it hath precedence or preexistence infinite to all successions , which way soever we look upon them or take they re beginninge , whether backwards or forwards : Now this saying of yours is full of incongruities if not rather of foule absurdi its .

For first you suppose the beginning of succession may be taken backwards or forwards ; but how is this possible ? is succession indifferent to beginne backwards or forwards ? Is time indifferent to beginne backwards or forwards ? The first time is the beginning of it , but as for the last of time will any sober man call that the beginning of it , unlesse you make time like to a pudding , where a man may beginne at which end he will . And surely I see no reason but a pudding may be in better sense , acknowledged to have two ends , then time two beginnings , Especially two such beginnings as you ascribe unto it , the one backwards and the other forwards ; for beginne at which end of a pudding , you will , you may be well sayd to goe forwards and not backwards . Agayne suppose your owne phrases be allowed you , and that the end of time may be taken for the beginning , yet where there is no end to be found how will you devise a beginning ? As for example , Time we all know had a beginning but you suppose that time to come shall have no end , for though this world shall have an end , yet men and Angells shall have no end , but live with God for ever .

For the same reason , though God be infinitely prexistent before times past , yet he cannot be sayd no not in your phrase and your meaning , that he is infinitely preexistent to all times to come , the meaning whereof is to continue infinitely longer then all ages to come ; for that were to suppose that God shall be when all ages have runne they re course and are come to an end , which you suppose shall never be . Thus from your Antipodes which you devise in the course of time , I come to the consideration of the Antipodes in respect of place and situation . And hereupon I remember what you delivered in the entrance upon this discourse of eternitie , and it is this ; whatsoever hath , beene or rightly may be conceaved of divine immensitie , will in proportion as well suite unto eternitie , and in like manner whatsoever is incident to space of place , the same in porportion may be verified of space of time . And therefore like as Antipodes are found in place , so in some proportion Antipodes may be found in time . For when you beginne at the ends of time you seeme to turne the heeles of it upwards .

And like as the roundnes of the heavens environing all , salves this and makes it appeare how the heads every where are uppermost howsoever it seemes otherwise to vulgar capacities : so heere you have a devise of a circular duration to salve the turning of times heeles upwards , for by this it appeares that in truth time hath no heeles to turne upwards , but rather wheeles to turne roundwards ; like as eternitie hath a Circular duration , by way of supermotion or a vigorous rest as you phrasifie it .

Well let Lactantius passe with his errour in denying Antipodes , and the vulgar with theyr errour passe , that think the heavens if they be ●ound be under us . Now wee come to the comparison and comparative demonstration , which is this : As the heavens are every way above the earth : so is eternitie every way before all worlds . Suppose there be truth in the parts of this assertion , yet I find no convenience in tho resemblance .

It is true that Tiburne is three square , and a Citizens capp is round , but there is no congruitie in saying that as Tiburne is three square : so a Citizens capp is round . Yet I find as litle accuratenes in the propositions considered by themselfes as in saying the Heavens are every way above the earth , for I know no other wayes of the Heavens being above the whole earth which is round , then by compassing it ; In my judgement it is more proper to say the heavens are every where above the earth ( then every way above it , ) and on every side above the earth , or which way soever we goe , whether East , West , North , or South , we shall still find the Heavens to be above the earth .

So likewise I know but one way how eternitie can be sayd to be before all Worlds , and that is by being before they had beginning . As for that other way which you devise as it were an Antipodes in time as well as in place , namely to be when all Worlds are at end , that is to be after all Worlds rather then before them .

And yet you flatter your selfe in this erroneus conceite , as if it were some exquisite invention , by another fiction , & that is by conceyting eternitie to compasse and inviron time , as the heavens inviron the earth .

Now because the earth is immoveable , but time hath succession of parts ; and the heavens wonderfull nimble in motion , and contrariwise eternitie a constant and permanent instant ; therefore you may doe well to salve the 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 in the Spheare of your discourse to consult with Copernicus about blowing some quicksilver into the dull and sullen earth & set it going round , and on the other side persuade the Heavens to favour themselves and take theyr rest , the modell of eternitie , and time represented by you would be something the more accurate .

Some helpes for this you have , I confesse , of your owne divising , to witt , by supposing the Heavens to move in an instant , leaving it to the Readers judgment whether to accompt that motion a cessation from motion , or a vigorous rest , besides that of the topp & scourge , which we may have time to consider of in due place . But to proceede ; of the beginning of this World past , and the end of it to come , there is no difference betweene us .

To this you adde , that the eye of eternall providence , lookes thorough the World , thorough all the severall ages , successions , or durations in the World , as well from theyr last end , to theyr first beginning , as from theyr first beginning , to theyr last end .

This World as it had a beginning , so it shall have an end . But successive duration even in your opinion , shall have no end .

And therfore you cannot say without contradiction , that God looks thorough the severall ages thereof from theyr last end to theyr beginning .

Yet this last end , you might have called a beginning according to your phrase and tenent , maynteyning God to be before all ages , not onely before ages past one way , but allso before ages to come another way . Agayne , that all things are knowne to him , as well things to come , as things past , or present , is without all question .

This is to be present unto God , in esse cognito . But you have another wilde conceyt of the coexistence , both of things past and of things to come with God , & that for this present , which turne of yours this will nothing serve that God knows all things .

Last of all as touching this manner of knowledge which you attribute unto God , it is nothing decent .

We confusse , we may indifferently consider the course of the World past , eyther from the beginning unto this present day , or from this present day rising upwards unto the beginning of the World ; because our understanding is of such a nature , as to consider things in succession one after another . But Gods understanding , as you well know , is of no such nature , as to consider things one after another ; for so you should maynteyne succession in the nature of God , and consequently subject him unto time .

Agayne , God doth not looke out of himselfe in knowing the course of the World throughout ; for he knew it as well what it might be , and what it should be before the World was made , as now he knowes what it is , yet certainly before the World was , he knew it not by looking without him , for then there was nothing without him to looke into .

And surely since the World was made , the manner of Gods knowledge is nothing altered , for with him is no variablenes nor shadow of change .

Neyther doe I see any reason why the knowledge of God , whereby he knowes all things , should be called the eye of his . Providence : seing Providence beganne with the world , but his knowledge was the same before the world beganne , and by his providence it is more properly sayd , that he governes all things , then that he knowes all thing●s .

Agayne you returne to the devised Circular forme of eternitie ( yet that will not warrant a Circular duration thereof , which was your former sigment ) and tell us that there is no period of time , which is not so environed with eternitie , as the earth or center is with the Heavens ; save onely that the Heavens are finite , and eternitie infinite .

Give me leave to professe the absurditie of this conceyte of yours amongst many others . For what doe you talke of environning that which hath no sides , but onely hath a kind of extension of succession in lenght of parts one after another .

Every period of time hath eternitie before it , and eternitie after it , but this is not sufficient to maynteyne that eternitie environs time as the Heavens environ the earth .

My selfe was borne before many thousands , whom allso I have outlived , but yet I cannot be sayd to environ them as the Heavens environ the earth .

If a Crowe lives many ages of a Man , and an Hart more then the Crowe , and the Raven more then the Hart ; how many thousands have begunne to breath & ceased to breath within the limits of theyr duration ; yet what an absurde thing were it to say , that they environed them all , as the Heavens environ the earth , yet you proceed , sitting upon these addle eggs , to hatch congruous conclusions , you say that in this sense were it possible , the world might have bene created from everlasting , the Eternall , notwithstanding should have bene everlastingly before them . Which as it is most false , so it is most inconsequent . Most false , for like as God cannot be after that which hath no end ( as your selfe before in a manner professed ) and the reason is manifest . Because to be after a thing , as for instance to be after the world , is to be after the world is come to his end , which were untrue if the world had no end .

In like sort to be before the world , is to be while the world had yet no being , which is contrary to the supposition of being everlasting .

Neyther doth it follow , that because God is before every period of time which hath a beginning , therefore he should be before such a time which is supposed to have no beginning .

I grant he should be before it by prioritie of cause , and by prioritie of dignitie , but he should not be before it by priority of duration , which is the onely prioritie whereof this discourse proceedeth .

Yet you will bring a reason to prove the former assertion , and that is this , For that period of motion which must terminate the next Million of yeares shall have coexistens with eternity now existent , whose insinity doth not growe with succession , nor extend it selfe with motion ; but stands immoovable with times present , being eternally before times future , as well in respect of any set draught or point . Whence we imagine time future to come towards us , as in respect of the first revolution of the Heavens when time tooke beginninge .

This reason hath number enough of words ; but let us consider what is the waight of sense it carryeth ; And this is an hard matter to doe by reason of the obscurity that accompanieth it ; one peuliar character of your discourse ; For what doe you meane by the next Million of yeares ? I know not how to accompt them , whether in respect of the time present ; and so they proceede of the next Million that are to come ; or rather of the Million of yeares next past ; For I presume , you meane it not of the first Million of years of the world , in case it were eternall : For if eternall , then it had no beginninge , and consequently as it had no first yeare , so neyther had it any first Million of years . Therefore I understand it of the next Million of years to this present , whether it be the Million next past , or next to come , all is one , and it must be true of both , as well as of either , that they are coexistent with eternity now existent ; and what I pray of all this ? when comes the forme of Syllogisme , whereby to conclude that God is not only before , but everlastingly before that which is without beginninge . And that Gods continuance extends not only beyond , but everlastingly beyond that , which never shall have an end ?

Give me leave to helpe you at a dead lift , thus ; If the next Million of years cominge , are coexistent with God , now existent , then allso the Million of years cominge next to that , shall be coexistent with God now existent : And so all the Millions of years that are to come , are coexistent with God now existent ; But Gods continuance of beinge , doth extend infinitely beyond his now existence : therefore it doth extende infinitely beyond all times to come , though they be without ende ; So on the other side : If the Million of years next past doth coexist with God now existent , then also the Million of years next past to them , doth coexistent with God now existinge , and so by the same reason all the years past doe coexist with God now existent ; But Gods continuance , hath bene infinitely before his now present existence ; therefore allso it hath bene infinitely beyond all the Millions of yeares , though upon supposition they have bene infinite ; This I thinke is the But of argument you shoote at , though you have not expressed so much ; whether because your Logicke served you not , beinge used to a confused manner of dictatinge at pleasure what you thinke good , or because you envied so much your Readers facility in apprehendinge your meaninge .

Thus I have helped you in raisinge a Spirit : Now without your helpe I will assay to lay him agayne .

To the Major ; I grant it in part , namely that there is as much reason why the two next Millions of years , whether you take them of the time past , or of the time to come , should coexist with God now existent , as well as one Million ; but when you proceede and say ; therfore by the same reason all that are to come , and all that are past , are coexistent with God now existent , you make an incredible stride or leape , infinitely greater then the stride , not only of Polyphemus , but of the Colossus at Rhodes too : For a Million and a Million , yea & a third Million , yea and though you make the progression in such sort while you will , still the number is but finite , but to leape herehence to all that are to come , is an infinite leape : For all are infinite both wayes , both as touchinge time past and time to come : in which respect , no progression , from Million to Million , shall ever reach to all , nay it shall never make the number of yeares remaininge , eyther for the time past , or for the time to come , lesse then infinite .

This is the fowle flawe we finde in the major : let us come to the minor which was this ; But Gods existence extends infinitely further , and was infinitely before his now existence . I answeare thus ; By Gods now existence , you understand his existence , eyther in the present instant of time , or in the present instant of eternity ; if of the present instant of time , then the proposition was not true in any one part of it ; For certeinly neyther the Million of yeares next past , nor the Million of yeares next to come , are coexistent with God , now existent in instant of time , both because neyther many years can possibly exist in an instant of time ; nor God himselfe ; but rather his existens is in the instant of eternity , though both he and his eternity be coexistent with every instant of time : Now if it be understood of the instant of eternity , I deny that God was before this instant , or shall continue one ace of duration after it ; And no merveyle , seinge both everlastingnesse for the time past , and everlastingnesse for the time to come , are supposed , to coexist in this instant of eternity ; Yet have I not all this while discovered the vanity of the conceyte , which is as a mist before your eyes : You say , the next Million of years doth coexist with eternity now existent ; I say this is notoriously untrue , whether you take it of years past or of years to come , all is one ; for that which is past , and that which is to come , hath no existence with God now existent : And I proove it thus ; That which hath no existence at all at this present , that cannot be sayd to have any coexistence , but things past and things to come have no existence at all at this present , therefore they cannot be sayd to have any coexistence with God ; Things future shall have coexistence with God , to witt , when the time of theyr actuall existence cometh ; Likewise things past have had theyr coexistence with God , to witt , when the time of theyr actuall existence was .

But neyther things past , nor things to come have any coexistence with God now coexistent , for as much as they have no actuall existence at all , the actuall existence of the one beinge past , and that of the other beinge yet to come .

Neyther doth it follow that because Gods infinity doth not grow by succession , therefore things future are now coexistent with God , but because things present and things future are in succession one unto another , therfore they cannot be sayd eyther future things to be present , or things present to be future .

That reason of yours , ( namely that Gods infinity doth not grow by Succession , carryeth rather some coulour of proofe , why Gods coexistence with his creatures or with time , cannot be sayd past or to come , then why things future shall be sayd , to be coexistent with God in this present ; Yet your selfe use these formes , as to say , God was coexistent with his creatures that are past , shall be coexistent with such things as are to come ; and indeed your reason is too weake to infringe these formes of speeches .

For this coexistence attributed unto God is not in respect of any succession in himselfe , but only in the things without him , which come and goe one after another by succession , & you are in the right , when thereupon you deny all succession in God , because his nature is not subject to any kinde of motion ; God was before the World , and is coexistent with and in the World , and shall be after the World , which beinge after time , you in your language , enstile his beinge before the end of it ; but after another manner , then whereby he is sayd to be before the beginninge of it ; But we must give you leave to be as disertus as you will in Lingua tua ; Nobis non licet esse tam disertis , qui musus colimus severiores ; At partinge you give us another paradox ; when you tell us It is impossible to conceive any duration to be without beginninge or endinge without conceavinge it Circular , or altogeather voyd of succession , on the contrary it is as wonderfull to me , how it should be possible for any man to conceive any duration to be Circular , whether finite or infinite ; For the word Circular is a denomination only of forme , and of such a forme as belongs to magnitudes , that have coexistence of parts extended , and of motion in such a forme : But time is neyther any such magnitude , nor capable of motion ; In a round figure , I confesse , there is no beginninge nor end of magnitude , But of duration , rounde figures have theyr beginninge , as well as squares ; The latter part is as untrue . Some have bene of opinion that the World was everlastinge , and the motions of the Heavens everlastinge , as Aristotle and his followers .

And some greate Schoolemen have thought it possible ; how much more could they immagine it . For surely we may immagine things altogether impossible ; And in the very next lines you confesse , men may immagine so if they list , and over and above you doe them the favour , as to further them in this theyr imagination , to witt by conceitinge the uninterrupted sluxe of an instant ; and why not as well I pray , the uninterrupted motion of the heavens ; and what is this to the everlastingnesse thereof , seinge this hath place in the space of a fewe years ? Neyther doe we finde the Peripateticks needed any such helpes to conceive the everlastingnesse of the world ; In the last place you tell us , the stability of eternity may be best conceived , by the retraction of such a perpetuall fluxe into one instante ; And yet before you told us such at everlastinge fluxe could not be imagined ; sure I am the retraction of it into an instante is utterly impossible ; And be not these proper things to represente Gods eternity by , and fitt for Atheists to make merry with ? That God is everlastinge , I trust we can demonstrate it , and that he is without succession , why shold that seeme hard to conceive , when it is improbable he shold be subject to any motion ?

And now I come to the topp and the scourge whence you derive observations of greate force , If not for composinge some greate controversies amongst learned men , yet for facilitatinge contemplation in one of the greatest difficulties , that Philosophy whether sacred or humane affords to the concerte of the most curious . At my first cominge to the university , it was a greate comforte and incouragement , to me in the studyinge of Predicables to heare a Preacher out of the pulpit deliver that peccata Iuvenum Predicantur in quale ; peccata senum Predicantur in quid . Shortly after in the Divinity Schoole , I heard a divine in the question , whether the pope were Antichrist make use of that axiome 〈◊〉 uni opponitur ; and an other in the pointe of predestination to alleage , that Scibile was prius Scientia : To heare such notions which at that time were familiar unto me , so much dignified as to finde use in the pulpit and in the divinity Schoole , it brought me even in love with such learninge , which before seemed to me but course stuffe in comparison to one of Ciceroes Orations especialy , that conspicuae divina philippica famae volvitur à prima quae proxima , or Aiax Mastigophoros in Sophocles wherwith we were acquainted at winchester .

How much more might a man like topp and scourge the better while he lives , to observe what transcendent use good witts may make of it . And yet by your leave , I finde no such difficulty in conceaving how eternity though Permanent , shall have coexistence with succession or motion .

A Pole fixt in a River hath coexistence with infinite parts of the streame succeedinge one another , without any succession in it selfe .

While I stande still , an army of men may passe by my side , & thereby shall I have coexistence in the same time with every one successively ; But if I be not deceived you would devise , how we may conceive eternity to have coexistens with all parts of motion at once ; for such a madde coexistence you have devised to your selfe , out of a wilde apprehension of the nature of eternity , and you will not be beaten from it . And you may as well beate your brains to devise how all parts of time both past and to come , may coexist in one instant , and but erst you did cast us upon such an imagination , namely of the retraction of a perpetuall fluxe into one durable or permanent instant . I have alredy laboured , veteres avias a pulmone revellere , to scatter these vaine conceyts .

But proceed we alonge with you ; the topp turnes so swiftly somtimes , that he seemes to sleepe ; Indeed we were wont to say that in such a case the topp sleepes ; And in turninge round every bright marke seemes to make a circle ; what of all this ? hence you say it will be no hard supposall to conceyte that a moover of strength and vigoure infinite , shold be able to moove a body in a momente . I doe not denye , but a man may conceite so , as they doe conceyte Chymeras ; and greate divines somtimes are found to enterteyne such conceyts , as are found to be contradictions , such is this : never any question was made of this , rather it hath beene generally received , as a thinge impossible that locall motion should be in an instant ; And the reason of it in this rounde motion whereof you speake , is evident for to be in this instant in the same place what it was immediately before , is rather to rest then moove ; and so the parts of successive motion shold not be contracted into unity as you speake , but rather into nullity .

And you your selfe are in doubte whether it were fitt to call it a cessation from motion or a vigourous rest or supermotion : you may doe well to put it to Plotinus to resolve this , or Ficinus his Commentaries upon his Enneads . I perceave you have very vigourous conceites , which whether I shold so call them , or rather a cessation from all sober conceyte or a superconceyte , let the reader judge . In the meane while that must needs be a proper motion which may be called a cessation from motion , and a rest and that a vigorous one . Yet wonderfull strange is it , that a rest or cessation from motion shold conteyn in it parts of motion successively infinite , and I confesse it were a very hard thinge to determine what to call it ; for it is a certaine kinde of Chimera , that never I thinke was hatched in the conceyte of man or Angell before .

If this were granted you , then you presume the moover wold not moove it more slowly this day or yeare then he shold the former ; But consider I pray , the pointe is not of moovinge it in a day or yeare , but in an instante ; And because two instants cannot come together , therfore for the time betweene while , it must stand still , and because there be infinite instants in every day and houre , it followeth it shold be mooved about infinite times every day and hower ; and infinite times stand still . Take what co●se you will , it must stand still as oft as it mooves , and because betweene every two instants of motion there must be a time of rest , and every one infinitely greater then the instant of motion .

For betweene that which is divisible and that which is indivisible , there is no proportion of greatnesse ; Now this supposition being granted you , ( which you professed to be no hard suppos● ) we shall finde parts successively ●nfinite in one revolution , or revolutions successively infinite in one or the same instante . So like wise E●ope would instruct his Master how to drinke up all the waters in the Sea , provided that first all the Rivers might be stopped , from runninge into the Sea , for it was most unreasonable that as fast as he dranke the water out , the Rivers shold bee suffered to poure water in againe , and that with a longer and a larger spoone then he had need to use that eates with the devill .

And I see no reason but a man might by ocular inspection discover the world which Galileus hath made report of , in the moone , provided that he might have a stayre case sure enough & high enough & all necessary provisions by the way , & at his journyes end also , & safe returne , to quitt Lazarus relations of the dead , with celestiall relations of ●he terra incognita in the moone . And yet I confesse a truth , I doe not finde to what purpose you shold say there be parts successively infinite in one revolution . For in the motion of a snayle this is to be found as well as in the motions of the heavens ; for every thing that is continuall is divisible without end , to w tt into parts proportionall ; as for parts quotall , as namely fifts or thirds , or fowerths , or hundreds , these ever in the motion of the heavens are finite , the other are infinite . Whereupon it is that Aristotle denies there is principium motus , in the seventh of his phisicks , not speakinge of principium externum and effectivum , for so the nature of every thinge is the cause , both of his motion and of rest , but he speakes of principium internum , and of the integrall parts of motion whereof no part can be assigned to be the fist , but that it may be devided in o two parts , whereof the one is before the other ; And in the same sense as there is no first of motion , so there is no last ; for what part soever you take ; it is divisible into two parts , whereof the one is latter then the other .

The like may be sayd of every thinge that is continuall , even of magnitude which is permanent , as well as of time and motion that consist in succession of parts : but then we must know too , that these parts proportionall , are not to be accoumpted actuall , but only potentiall ; And so Aristotle dissolves that Achilles of Zenoes arguments , whereby he wold proove that motion being allowed to be continuall , the swiftest moover shold never overtake the slowest moover , if he were allowed never so litle ground before him because in the time wherin he is to overtake the first space , wherin his fellow moover was before him , that fellow moover will have got some ground more , and while that is in passinge over by the other , he will get some ground more , and so in infinitum● the answere whereunto I never yet found explicated by any .

Hurtado di Mendosa amongst other difficulties , the solution whereof he undertakes , falls upon this also , but most unhappily ; for he gives no satisfaction ; Aristotles answeare unto it , is but this ; partes sunt in toto non actu sed potentia ; it is spoken in reference to parts proportionall ; which answeare of his seemes a mystery , the right explication and accommodation whereof I never could be so happy as to find in any ; but if I be not dereived it conteins an admirable and cleare solution of the difficulty ; but I doe not affect the ostentation of such subtilties .

I know not well how to give accounte for this very diversion from graver studies . To returne I say it is a poore course to lash out unto the supposall of such impossibilities to shew how in one revolution the parts are successively infinite ; whereas this is found in every the meanest motion , which is a true motion and consists in succession ; but in your feigned motion an instante , it is indeede not to be founde , because in an instant there can be no succession .

But further you say , that upon this supposall there shall be revolutions successively infinite in one and the same instant . But how this shall be you have not shewed , although I easyly conceave how it may be prooved upon this supposall , but in a certeyne kinde which I presume you dreame not of .

And it is this ; if it be admitted that a revolution of the heavens may be in an instante , then it is as possible that two revolutions may be in an instant , and in the same instant as well as one , and three as well as two , and three hundred as well as three , yea and looke how many thousand dayes are past , since the World beganne , so many revolutions of the heavens there might have beene in one instant of time . And it is nothinge strange if uno absurdo dato , mille scquantur ; but I doe not find that you once so much as dreame of this ; and what your meaninge is , I find no where explained , much lesse the deduction thereof manifested . Yet as if you had prooved many revolutions , ( upon this supposall ) to bee possible in one and the same instante , you discourse what they are to bee called ; and you will not have them properly to be termed motion , but rather the producte of motions infinitely swifte united or made up into a vigourous permanency ; and herence to serve your turne in the explication of eternity , you adde how shold not duration of one or of all these revolutions be accompted as an instant of time , but a kinde of duration indivisibly permanent . Here is strange language , had not we need of an interpreter , or of some urinator delius to dive into the depth , and sound the bettome if it ? I remember what a freind of mine pleasantly discourst in the university , by occasion of a certeine disputants strange manner of disputation ; I have longed saith he to heare a scholer dispute eagerly , & distinguish and goe one boldly in schoole termes and phrases which himselfe understoode not . And now to my judgement I have lighted on such a one .

But whether you understand your selfe or noe I know not . I doubte I never shall ; yet I will not give over , I will adventure to discusse it , and to shake this rotten stuffe in peices , that at least it may not abuse the readers with suspicion of som rare notions , whome they cannot endoctrinate . First you speake of revolutions plurall yea infinite , how you have come by them I know not , unlesse as capons come by chicken ; you made supposall of a thinge impossible enough , namely of the revolutions of the heavens in one instante of time , but it was only one revolution , and hereupon you steale up many revolations , yea infinite , I know not how , neyther doe you once goe about to explicate how .

Secondly you will not have it called motion , but a product of motions . Had you sayd you wold not have these revolutions called one motion but many , there had bene some sense in the speech , though litle reason .

For you professe these revolutions to be successive , and no where have you in the least manner signified them to be interrupt or discont nuall .

And if you take them as continuall , why should they not be stiled one motion ? But this I thinke is not it , you insist upon ; For you dislike the name of motion it selfe ; you will rather have it called the product of many motions .

Now here I am at fault , in hu●inge after the meaninge of your invention , But yet as Plutarke makes the hounde to discourse in huntinge after an hare , thus ; he went not that way , nor that way , therefore he came this way ; so will not I give over , but inquire which way the hare runs .

Now then this your product of motions is to be understood eyther of a product Physicall , or of a product Mathematicall ; and I explicate my selfe ( as you loue to involve your selfe ) thus .

The product of motion Physicall , is the forme that is acquired by motion ; As for example , in alteration a quality is produced , in augmentation a certeyne measure of quantity ; in locall motion a new place or a new site ; Eyther in respect of the whole as it falls out in all direct motions , or only in respect of the parts , as in all motions Circular ; which new site is sayd to be new in respect of that which immediately went before .

Now in this motion of the Heavens in an instant supposed by you , there is no such product Physicall , for looke what site every part of the Heavens hath immediately before this instant , the same it hath still ; And therfore you call it very significantly ( I confesse ) a vigorous permanency ; which is as much as to say , no motion at all ; Neyther doe I thinke that by the product here spoken of , you meane a product Physicall ; Let us come therefore to consider , whether it may be verified of a product Mathematicall , that is in the Arithmeticall operation of addition : for if two numbers be added togeather , it will produce a totall , and that totall shall be the product .

Now here you speake of revolutions infinite , which beinge added to greater , make a product which you call a vigourous permanency ; which I professe , in my judgement seemes to be delivered with admirable significancy and congruitye .

For if in teachinge my Schollar Arithmaticque I shall exercise him in addition , and bid him write seven Cyphars in a rewe thus 0000000 and then bid him subscribe seven Cyphers under them thus , 0000000 , and then bid him adde one unto the other , and tell me what in the product , & he will tell me that he finds seven Cyphers still , which is as much as just nothinge ; In like sort suppose the Heavens standinge still immediately before this instant , and in this instant to be turned round to the place where it was immediately before , this deserves to be called a vigourous permanency : that is no motion rather then a motion : For to be where a body was immediately before , is the definition of rest , and not competible unto motion .

Nay take such an other revolution , and adde unto the former , this allso beinge rather a vigourous permanency , and so no motion rather then motion , adde no motion , unto no motion , and what will the product be , but a vigorous parmanency ; and so in infinitum , it shall be a vigorous permanency : For no motion added to no motion while you will , the product shall still be no motion ; but a vigourous permanency .

But I see no reason why you should call this vigorous permanency , infinitely swifte .

And yet I confesse by this supposition of yours the Heavens are made to stand still faster , then now they goe or run : allbeit they run so incredibly swift , in the judgement of some ; that they had rather set the earth goinge , and make the Heavens stand still in a vigorous permanency , though in a sense much different from the vigorous permanency you discourse of : And this calleth to my remembrance one of Bastards Epigrams , which he made of himselfe ridinge on Sarisbury plaine : For beinge overtaken by a gentelman well mounted , who desired to have his company ; Bastard Spurs his cutt , the Gentleman reines his geldinge , yet could Bastard keepe no way with him . Whereupon he complains thus , What shold I doe that was bestrided so . His Horse stood still faster then mine could goe .

So the Heavens by your supposall stand still faster then now they goe .

I am not a litle sensible of the construction that some may make of this discourse of mine , as namely a greate deale too light and vayne for a Divine ; especially in a matter of so high a nature , as of the essence of God , and his eternity .

I professe I am often striken with feare of transgression in this kinde : and have often meditated the relinguishinge of it wholy , I take so litle pleasure in these Schole quircks .

Yet another consideration affrights me more then this , and that is lest comming to calculate the Divine attributes by discourse of reason , in following the course of my weake understanding this way ( wherof in this case I am much suspicious ) I shoulde be founde to shape the attributes of God in such a manner , as to attribute that unto God , which dothe not become his Majestie , or deny that unto him , which dothe well become him ; and thus I may fall upon blasphemy before I am awave .

I had rather submitt unto the acknowledgement of attributes divine , by faithe , so farre foorthe as they are revealed unto us in Gods word ; then curiously inquire into the nature of them , by reason , & quaint Scholasticall argumentation .

But agayne , I consider , that it may please God to make use of that illumination as well Philosophicall as Theologicall , which he hathe given me , to cleere some difficult points , concerning the nature of God , & therby to prevent blasphemies each way .

And as , by his grace , I feare to enterteyne any indecent conceyte of the Majestie of God ; so I trust , he will not expose me , to have my feares brought upon me , but rather by exercise perfect those seedes of knowledge of his Divine nature , which have bene sowen in me , bothe by the light of nature , and by the light of grace , and assist me allso even in these discourses , and make them meanes to keepe others from being led away into erroneous opinions & enormous conceytes , concerning his nature , and divine attributes .

And as for the censure of lightnes , and want of gravitie , passable upon this discourse ; let the Reader consider ; we are now upon the By , and in consideration of a Monstrous supposition , and most ridiculous prosecutions therupon , and let him judge how such deserve to be enterteyned .

Agayne when we medle with an obscure , perplexe , and intricate manner of discourse , if matter of refreshing both of mine owne , and of my Readers Spirits be offered , especially in that way of an harshe & unpleasing discourse ; shall I balke it , and in the affectation of a Stoicall gravitie decline the quickninge of mine owne , and of my Readers senses ? It was wont to be sayde Omne tulit punctum , qui miscuit utile dulci ; & agayne Ridentem dicere verum , quis vetap . In a word ; I am at thy judgement Reader , to passe what censure upon me thou pleasest , neyther am I unwilling thou shouldst knowe mine infirmities , as well as my poore sufficiencyes , that knowing me to be fleshe and blood , as well as others , thou mayst receave nothing herein for the Authors sake , but only for the evidence it carryethe with it . And that evidence is the worke of God , thoughe the manner of caryinge it be the worke of Man .

Now it is highe time to confider the other member of this sentence followinge , which is this , So should not the duration of one , or of all these revolutions be accoumpted as an instant or portion of time , but a kinde of duration indivisibly permanent .

Nowe I finde no proportion betweene this and the former member , thoughe they be coupled together with a particle of similitude , So. For if the revolution be as it is supposed by you ; to be in an instant of time , why shoulde not the duration of it also be accoumpted in an instant of time ? So likewise , if you conceave diverse revolutions , yea infinite revolutions , to be in the same instant of time ; what reason is there why theyr duration should not be accoumpted allso , in the same instant of time ? Fof if these infinite revolutions you speake of , have each of them a severall instant , why shoulde not the duration of each be accoumpted in each soverall instant , and the aggregate duration of them all , be reckoned to be , in an aggregation of all the severall instants , in each wherof , one of the former revolutions is founde ?

Secondly , you doe not well to joyne an instant , and a portion of time together , as termes equipollent , because ; no portion of time is an instant , nor is an instant any portion of time ; more then a point is a part of magnitude . For every thinge consistethe of its parts ; but neyther magnitude consists of points , nor points of instants .

Thirdly , much lesse reasen is there , why the duration of one or of all these revolutions , shoulde be coumpted a kinde of Eternitie . First , because there is no kinde of eternitie indivisibly permanent ( such as you here speake of ) but one , and that is the eternitie of God . Secondly , what an absurd thinge is it to say , that the duration of a thinge in an instant of time and no longer , is fitter to be called eternitie then an instant of time . For the revolution you speake of is but for one instant of time . For the justifying wherof I appeale to your owne supposall .

It were no hard supposall to conceyte that a moover of strengthe and vigour infinite , shoulde be able to moove a body in a moment : This cannot be meant of any other moment then of time . For to moove a body in an instant of eternitie , requires not a moover of infinite strengthe ; the meanest motion of the meanest moover , is comprehended ( as you acknowledge ) within the instant of eternitie . Nay all the revolutions you speake of , thoughe successively infinite , are upon your supposition in one and the same instant , which cannot be understood otherwise , then of an instant in time . Now is it fitt , that the duration of such a motion or motions , the beginning and ende wherof are both in a instant of time , shoulde be stiled eternitie ?

And how can that be called permanent , which bothe beginnes and endes in one and the same instant of time ? Or how can that motion be coumpted indivisible , which hathe parts successively infinite as your selfe professe in the sentence immediately before ? If these be sober conceytes , I never knewe , what sobrietie in this kinde meaneth . But let us proceede to the next ; The motion of the eighthe spheare supposed to be such as hathe bene sayde , that is motion infinitely swift , or not divisible by succession ; the Sunne moovinge successively as now it doth should have locall coexistence to every starre in the eighthe spheare , to every point of the eclipticke circle , wherin it mooves , at one and the selfe same instant , or in every least parcell of time . The substance of this hathe reasonable good consequence , from the former supposition of a thinge utterly impossible , and consequently it is not more impossible then the former . Yet by your leave , you erre in many a circumstance .

For first , as touching the mayne intention of this sentence , the Sunne shall not have locall coexistence with every starre or with any starre in the eighthe spheare ; how can it ? there beinge the huge distance of three vast bodies of the Spheares , of three planets betwixt the firmament , and the orbe of the Sunne .

But that upon your former supposition he shall coexist in the same line drawne from the North to the Southe I graunt in Astronomicall computation , and so by the same computation may be sayde to have locall coexistence with it , thoughe not in computation physicall .

Secondly , marke I pray you , what libertie of speeche you take unto your selfe . For that which even now you called a vigorous permanency , in this place you terme it a motion infinitely swift : as if you should say , the motion is so incredidibly swift , that the body indeede stands still and mooves not at all . As much as to say , such a one talkes so fast that he seemes , and that in a vigorous manner to holde his peace .

And indeede I confesse , that sometimes it falleth out , that the faster we ride , the later we come to our journeys ende ; as in case by fast ridinge , our horse playeth the jade , and tyreth under us , and we can hardly make him goe . I had not thought such anomalies and irregularities could have bene devised in the heavens , as namely , that a motion swift , should become a vigorous rest . In my judgement if the motion of such like discourses of yours were converted into a vigorous rest , it would give farre better satisfaction .

Thirdly you will not have this supposed motion to be divisible by succession , yet you doe impute unto it succession . For but erst you affirmed that it had parts successively infinite . Now if it hathe succession , how is it possible , but that it should be divisible into parts succeeding one another ? For like as magnitude havinge extension of parts , must needes be divisible in respect of its extension ; so motion fluent as it hath succession of parts , so it must needes be divisible in respect of this succession .

Yet you suppose the contrary , like unto the Fryar in Chancer , who to shewe his contentednes with a litle , professed that he desired , but of bread a shiver , and of a goose the liver , and of a pigge the head , but that for him , nothing must be dead . So you will have the motion you speake of , to consist of parts succeeding , yet not divisible into parts succeeding . Lastly , your disi●nctive is not good , as when you say , in the false same instant , or in the least parcell of time . For your supposit on is of the revolution of the heavens , not in the least parcell of time at all , but in an instant , which you well knowe is no parcell of time .

Yet I thinke to charme the absurditie of your former supposition , which perhaps makes you weary of it , and something confounded in the prosecution therof , you would fayn turne it into some small parcell of time : but then , all that you builde herupon falls utterly to the ground .

One sentence remayneth to be considered , wherby in prosecuting your former supposition , you desire to lay a ground , for the commodious illustration of Gods eternitie , and that is this : Every starre in the eyghthe spheare should be converted into a permanent circle , and so in one circle there shoulde be circles for number infinite , as many circles as there be points or divisibilities in the eclipticke circle . All this I may be bolde to say is nothing to the purpose , but proceedeth merely from affectation of holdinge your Reader in admiration , at the wonderfull conclusions , which yet being not superficially but exactly considered , conteyne most superficiall conceytes ; the thinges you here deliver , so farre foorthe as they have any truthe , are as well verified in respect of every days motion of the heaven ; yea as well verified in a tennis ball , at every turning round therof .

For looke how many circles are made , upon the eighthe spheares turninge round in a moment ; so many circles are made , by the turning of it rounde in 24. houres , For the body of the heavens is divisible alike , whether it turne round in a day , or in an houre , or in a moment ; savinge that the turning of it round in a moment ; deserves rather to be accoumpted a vigorous rest , and may be called a cessation from motion , as your selfe have professed , and consequently a cessation from making any circles at all .

But howsoever ; I say the body of the heavens is alike divisible and that in infinitum , because it is corpus continuum ; and for the same reason a tennis ball is so too & upon his turning rounde , you may as well imagine infinite circles made by him , according as the points therin are infinite .

Now we come to the application of this fiction ( prosecuted with much varietie , partly of Chimericall , and partly of vulgar inventions ) unto eternitie it selfe , as followeth : Thus in him that is eternall , or being infinite and in eternitie , are actually conteyned durations successively infinite . Thus in him , say you ; and what I pray , may an Atheist reply out of that heart of his wherin he saythe There is no God . For may he not rejoyne in this manner ? And if it be but Thus ; like as the fiction here supposed by you , is of a thing utterly impossible , so you give us libertie to conceave alike of the Eternitie of your God : not to reiterate the varietie of vayne conceytes , which have bloomed from the severall branches of this your discourse in prosecutinge so vile a fiction to represent Gods eternitie therby . Agayne , how dothe God conteyne durations successively infinite ? Not formally , you well knowe , but only eminently , for as much as he can produce them .

But no such thing appeares , nor any modell therof in this your fiction . For this revolution in an instant , conteynes only it selfe formally it conteynes the motion of no other body , neyther formally , nor eminently .

Yet thus , you say , Gods eternall being conteynes durations successively infinite , thoughe there be no more resemblance betweene them , then betweene harpe and harrowe ; a foxe and a ferne bushe , no nor any thing like so much .

Yet you proceede in your accommodation thus : The former supposition admitted , we coulde not say , that the inferior orbes mooving as now they doe , did moove after the eighthe spheare , but that the times of their motions were continually conteyned in it . For the eighthe spheare being mooved in an instant , should loose the divisibilitie of time , and the nature of motion , with all the properties that accompany them , not by defect ( as if it no way comprised them ) but by swallowing up time or duration successively infinite , into an actuall permanency . To this I answeare , first ; The Heavens moovinge as nowe they doe , I cannot subscribe unto you intimatinge that the inferior Orbes doe moove after the eighthe spheare : But rather as in respect of their proper motion they goe against it ( supposing the eighthe spheare to be the uppermost Heaven ) so in respect of Diurnall motion , they moove not after it , but motu raptus are drawne a long with it : this is on the By.

Nowe to the mayne : I deny that upon your supposition , it will followe , that the times of these inferior orbes motions , were eminently conteyned in the motion of the eighthe spheare .

Your contrary affirmation seemes to me wonderous absurde , neyther can I devise any reason for it , or in what sense you take this phrase , to conteyne eminently .

For the common acception of it is this : That conteynes another thinge eminently , which not conteyninge it formally , is able to produce it .

So the Sunne is commonly reputed to conteyne heate eminently , for as much as not being formally hot it selfe , yet is able to produce heate in bodies capable .

So your selfe before have acknowledged all thinges to be in God , not formally ( for he is neyther man nor Angell , much lesse any inferior creature ) , but yet is able to produce all these .

But it is impossible that the motion of the eighthe spheare , supposed to be in an instant , should produce the times of the inferior Orbes motions .

It cannot produce their motions , they mooving as now they doe .

For how should an instantaneous or momentany motion in one body , produce a temporall motion in another body ? Much lesse can it produce the times of their motions . For that is only in the power of God .

He alone that gives existence to any thinge , can give duration and time unto it .

Neyther dothe it conteyne their motions formally . For their motions are supposed to be temporall , that is in time , the motion of the eighthe spheare is supposed to be momentany , that is in an instant .

But a momentany or instantaneous motion cannot formally conteyne a motion that is made in time .

A swifter motion can conteyne a motion lesse swift , because it is bothe so swift , and swifter allso .

And here by accident , and ere I am aware , I have a glimse of your meaninge ; and while I dispute against it , I may seeme to you , to make for it .

For this instantaneous motion is supposed by you , to be infinitely swift , and therfore it may well conteyne the motions of Inferior orbes , which are lesse swift , as mooving rounde no soever then in the space of 24. houres ; wheras the eighthe spheare is supposed to moove round in a moment . I thinke I have sprunge the partridge , now let me see , whether I have not a springe to take him : First then I say , this is not to conteyne eminently , but formally rather .

Secondly I say , this swiftnes of motion which you have invented is too swift , too infinite to serve your turne , to conteyne the revolutions of inferior Orbes . For you have allready professed that it deserves to be called a vigorous rest , and that it may be called a cessation from motion ,

Now let any sober man judge , whether a cessation from motion , whether rest , and permanency , and that a vigorous one be fitt , eminently to conteyne the true mōtions of inferior Orbes , which in the space of 24. houres are turned round . Yet if leave were given you to suppose this allso , namely that a vigorous rest is so infinitely swift , that it might well be sayde eminently to conteyne the motions of inferior Orbes ; yet how woulde it herhence appeare , that it should conteyne the times of them allso ?

Since this vigorous rest which you make to be infinitely swift , is but in an instant , and the motions of inferior Orbes of like quantitie are performed , in no lesse space then 24. houres .

Is an instant of time fitt to conteyne 24 houres ? Yes you may say eminently . For as fluxus puncti in Longitudinem makes a line , so fluxus instantis for a certeyne space of time , makes 24. houres . Any man hathe reason to give me leave , to refreshe my selfe a litle while my witts are dulled about such stuffe as this . But you labour to shewe how the times of the inferior Orbes motions should be eminently conteyned in the eighthe spheare , if it mooved round in an instant . And that by this reason : For say you the eighthe spheare being mooved in an instant , should loose the divisibilititie of time and the nature of motion , not by defect ( as no way comprising them ) but by swallowing up time into an actuall permanency .

T is true , I confesse , that motion , which is made in an instant ; loosethe the divisibilitie of time , that is , is not made in time . For an instant is no part nor parcell of time ; Agayne it is well that you doe so ingenuously confesse , that it looseth the nature of motion , allso , and all the properties that accompany it . For you have allready professed , that it may be called a cessation from motion , and is to be called a vigorous rest or permanency , rather then motion .

All this I doe not dislike . But yet to make way for the conteyninge both of times and motions , you tell us , that all this is not by way of defect , as if it no way comprised them , but by swallowing up time or division successively infinite into an actuall permanency ; which assertion of yours if we should take for a truthe , we should swallowe many a goageon . For first you imply , that what a thing comprisethe not , that it hath not , by way of defect , which is untrue for my hand comprisethe not sixe fingers , ; yet that it is without a fixt finger is not by way of defect . Secondly you give us to understand that a certeyne mutation may loose both the nature of time and motion , and all the properties of them , and yet some way comprise them which is contradictious .

For looke what way it compriseth time or motion , surely that way it hathe it , and dothe not loose it . Thirdly it is an absurde thing to say , that an instant of time swalloweth up time . For to swallowe it up is to conteyne it . But it is impossible that an instant should conteyne the space of any time , as the space of 24. houres . For if it be impossible that an houre should conteyne the space of 24. houres , much more impossible is it , that an instant shoulde .

The motion indeede , which you suppose to be in an instant , conteynes an whole revolution of the eighthe spheare , ( for upon the fiction of this impossibilitie , you are pleased to descant much : ) but surely this supposition of yours , thoughe it be of a thing impossible , yet dothe it not inferre , that this instant shall swallowe up the space of 24. houres , thoughe it swalloweth up the motion , ( as you suppose ) which usually is made in no lesse space then the space of 24. houres .

Last of all consider I pray the sobrietie of this speeche : It swalloweth up motion into an actuall permanency ( as much as to say , into an actuall rest ) and so it comprisethe it , that is , rest conteyneth motion , and that in an instant ; how much more shall the space of 24. houres rest , be sufficient to conteyne a motion infinitely greater , then an instant dothe . As for division successively infinite ( as it were to make your deductions the more admirable to vulgar capacities ) it is a very sory conceyt . For the least time or motion that is , is divisible in infinitum , like as every continuall thing is , though never so small . By this , let the wise Reader judge , of the profitable nature of the improvements you speake of in improving motion infinitely swift into permanency or rest , which is as much as to say , into no motion ; and let him well weighe and consider whether this be not to bring a noble unto nine pence , or rather unto no pence : and by such improovements , when you cast up your reckoninge at the yeares ende , you may put all your gaynes in your eyes , and never hurt your sight .

After this you come in with a newe way of conceavinge the first moovers eternitie , and that is as Mathematicians conceave the nature of a spheare , by imagining it to be produced by the motion of a semicircle upon the Axis . There is such a definition , I confesse , of a spheare , which is defined to be transitus circumferentiae as which transitus I conceave to be emanation rather then motion , like as a line is imagined to be fluxus puncti in longitudinem ; and a superficies is imagined to be fluxus lineae in latitudinem . But all these are very vayne imaginations . For neyther is it possible , that such things should have any fluxe , or if they had , that by theyr fluxe they should make eyther lengthe , or breadthe , or thicknes in such a figure ; but rather a length so made should consist of points , & a breadth so made shoulde consist of lines , and a spheare so made , shoulde consist of semicircles , which is utterly impossible .

And shall we never linne to compare the nature of God to the vayne imaginations of such vayne thinges ? Yet seing you will take your course , we will take libertie to consider it . And thus you proceede , For let the eternall be but thus imagined , to be an intellectuall spheare , capable of momentany motion or revolution throughout this World , and the indivisible coexistence of his infinitie to every part of time and place , will be very conceavable . Very conceavable , you say ; but first let us try , whether this conceyte of yours conteyne any conceavable truthe . For if it dothe not , are we not well advanced to the conceaving of Gods eternitie , by comparing it to such impossibilities ? And first you were as good bid us imagine God to be an intellectuall body , as to be an intellectuall Spheare .

For a Spheare is a body , eyther physicall or mathematicall , that is , a body at least of quantitative dimensions . The world indeede is Sphericall , and God is in every part of it ; but will you therfore conceave the nature of God to be Sphericall allso , and his forme altered , upon the making of the World , from that it was before ?

Remember I pray , God is in the World and in every part of it but how ? as conteyning it , not as being conteyned by it .

Secondly , you will have us imagine God to be capable of momentany motion , or revolution throughout the World ? Now consider I pray , what a congerie of wilde conceytes are involved here . Is a revolution , a motion throughout the world ? Every man knowes a revolution to be a turninge round . The orbes of the heavens have theyr revolutions , but doe they therby moove throughout the World ? or rather keepe theyr places , & each mooveth only about the bodies that are within the compasse therof .

Agayne you knowe momentany motion is a thing imposible . And that which dothe so moove round as you would suppose it , dothe rather rest then moove . For to be in the same place where it was immediately before is the definition of locall rest . And your selfe have confessed it may be called a cessation from motion , and doe affect rather to call it a rest , a permanency , a stabilitie .

If it were a motion , is it fitt to attribute motion unto God ? Is it fitt to maynteyne that God mooves from place to place ? Agayne the motion of an intellectuall nature as intellectuall , is rather the motion of the understanding in knowing things , then motion locall from place to place . And it is true , that all thinges done in time and place are knowne unto God , but without all motion so much as in the understanding . For even in the understanding of God , there is no change , much lesse motion . Lastly by mooving through the World in an instant , he shall be coexistent to every part of place & that in an instant , but how shall we conceave herby , any coexistence of his to every part of time , as well to all parts of time past , and time to come , as to the time present ?

The light of the Sunne is diffused thoroughe all , let us suppose , thoroughe all the world , therfore it shall be coexistent to every place , but not to every part of time , but only to the present . But is it not your meaning that Gods eternitie should be diffused not so much thorough the world ; for that belongs to his immensitie ; but rather thoroughe the time of the world , from the beginning therof , to the ende of all durations successive without ende ( for you doe maynteyne that successive duration shall have no ende ? ) Certeinly this seemes to be your meaninge , and then indeede , it is no hard thing to conceave Gods eternitie to coexist with all parts of time past , present & to come , if so be we conceave it diffused thoroughe them all , as God is coexistent to all parts of this World , if he be diffused thorough them all ( which is your phrase , and not mine , and utterly disclaymed by Durandus . )

But then what Meant you to adde coxistence of place to coexistence of time , which are woonderous different , the one belonging to Gods immensitie , this alone to Gods eternitie .

Secondly , what meant you to call this a motion thoroughe the World , wheras it is rather thorough the duration of the World , or thorough the time of the world , and the parts therof , from the beginning of it to the ende , and infinitely further . For by the World we usually understand a World of place , and not a world of time .

Thirdly , what meant you to call , this motion throughout all times a revolution , doth time runne round , & by fetching a compasse about returne to the beginning of it from whence it first issued ? For this is the nature of revolutions .

Fourthly , what meant you to call it a motion , seing it can neyther be alteration , nor augmentation , nor generation , nor locall motion , thoughe you seeme to devise a motion throughout all time , like unto the locall motion of the eighthe Spheare turning round in a moment . And so you devise as it were a locall motion thoroughe time but it shall be in an instant , to make up a world of woonders , that in an instant a motion may be conceaved thoroughe all time , from the beginning of the World to the ende , and infinitely beyond it in duration . Yet this motion thorough so many thousand yeares while the world lastethe , and millions of yeares after that , shall be in an instant .

Fiftly when , I pray , did this motion beginne ? was it before the world , or with the beginning of the world ? Not before the world : For , as there was then no place for God to penetrate ( as you speake ) and to fill , so there was no time for him to moove thorough by his eternitie . If with the world , then seing this motion is supposed to be in an instant , in the first instant God mooved thorough all time to come .

But how was that possible , seing like as before the World it could not be , because then there was no time ; so in the beginning of the World it could not be , because the time to come as yet was not . If you say , thoughe it were not present , yet it was to come , and therfore God coulde by vertue of his infinite eternitie moove thorough it in an instant , I answeare , that by the same reason , he might as well moove thorough all time before ever the World was . For even then , thoughe there was no time present , yet there was time enoughe to come .

But like as it is absurd to say , that God by his immensitie did fill all places before the world , when as yet there was no place to fill : so it is alike absurd to say , that God by his eternitie did fill all times before the world was , when as yet there was no time to fill . And now I pray , be pleased soberly to consider , what litle neede there is of all this paynes , in streyning our conceytes as it were upon tenter hookes , till they are quite out of joynt : what neede of so many absurd fictions , of so many impossibilities to proove that which is most untrue , and yet confidently supposed by you as a principle out of a superficiall consideration of the nature of Gods eternitie , Namely , that God by vertue of his eternity doth coexist with all times past , present , and to come .

For consider I pray , will you say that God did by vertue of his immensitie coexist with all places before the world was ? No sober man I presume , will say this ; why then should you affirme , that God by vertue of his eternitie did coexist with all times before the world was ? And if the actuall existence of place , be required unto this , that God by vertue of his immensitie should exist with it ; why should not the actuall existence of time as well be required unto this , that God by vertue of his eternitie should coexist therwith ? And if before the world was , God did not coexist with times that were to come ( like as then he did not coexist with place that was to come : ) then surely by the same reason , he shall not at this time present coexist with time that is to come ; and consequently , neyther shall he be sayde to coexist with times that are past , like as if the world were destroyed , he shoulde not be sayde to exist with those places , and bodily spaces , which sometimes were , but in this case now were not .

And therfore we have litle neede to trouble our selfes with any such wilde and monstrous fictions to maynteyne the coexistence of God with every part of time . For as the parts of time shall be found to exist in theyr order , so shall God be truly sayde to coexist with them , and no otherwise , that is , not to coexist with them all at once , but only in succession , not of Gods duration or of any thing in God , but in succession of time , and of the thinges conteyned therin .

Gods duration we acknowledge to be eternall without beginning and without ende , yet indivisible ; for as much as it is no way subject unto motion , no way subject to any variablenes or shadowe of change . For he is of necessary being , and therfore impossible it is , he should not be . Besides , whatsoever he is the same he is essentially , and therfore not subject to any kinde of change , eyther in substance or qualitie , or quantitie or in place .

And as he is the Author of all thinges , so both the motions and rests of all thinges are produced and maynteyned by him , and so may be sayde after an eminent manner to be conteyned in him , and no otherwise . I mislike not Plotins interpretation of Gods totalitie of being , in as much as he is able to produce all kindes of beinge . As for eternitie , I had rather rest vpon Aquinas his definition of it , then on yours . For it hathe no parts formally ; and as for an eminent conteyning of all parts of duration , that is in respect of activitie to produce them . Now time , and the duration therof , together with the duration of thinges therin , is rather produced by the counsayle and will of God , then by his eternitie . And therfore all durations doe flowe rather from Gods will , then from his eternitia . To my understanding a body casteth but one shadowe , and not many ; which casting of a shadowe is no other thing then the hindring of light from the earthe or water , according to the bodies proportion , which therupon are sayde to be shadowed by it . These diverse shadowes , as you call them , how they vanishe in every moment , as you speake , I professe , I know not , sure I am the fishes in the water doe not eate them , if they did , certenly they would be never a whit the fatter by them .

CHAP. VII .

Of the Infinity of divine power .

I Doe not affect to contende with you in point of Rhetoricke , or to call you to an account for stiling Time , a spectator of all thinges . If it be so , it is the more like unto a Philosopher by his account , who comparinge the world unto a market , ranged the people therof into 3. sorts , buyers , sellers , and lookers on , and these were the Philosophers . Only I woulde desier that you woulde give other the like liberty to speake in they re owne phrase , and not to chalenge them for affecting Poeticall witt more then Metaphysicall truthe ; as upon such like termes it was your pleasure to cry downe that common adage Tempus edax rerum . For if you admitt time to be a Spectator , you may by as good Rhetoricke admitt it to be a devourer , according to that of good autoritie Inspexit varias merces oculisque comedit . In like sort studious scholars are accoumpted Helluones librorum , devourers of bookes , though not for the readinge of them only , but for the apprehension of them , and making them they re owne .

So Cassius Severus had devoured Labienus his workes , his orations . For when an edicte came forth from the Emperor , for the burning of all his writings . ( For as he was an admirable Orator , so he was of an high spirite , and as Seneca writes , qui in tantâ pace Pompeianos spiritus nondum deposuerat . ) which edicte when it came to Cassius Severus eares ; why then saythe he , I muste be burnt alive ; for as much as I have learnt them without booke . Yet I coulde be content to allow you any liberty of phrase , so you woulde be pleased to speake to our understanding ; wherof you fayle in your very first sentence , when you tell us , that all thinges wantinge place or time or being , present themselfes anewe in they re proper shape or forme ; for how any thinge can present itselfe , wanting both place , and time , and being allso , it is a riddle unto me .

I guesse your meaninge is , that the being of all thinges is produced in place and time , which before the time of they re production were without both place and time , and beinge ; which as it is a truthe , so it is a moste vulgar truthe , yet obscuerly delivered by you , and to no purpose that I can conceave . But be it so , & that every thinge brought forth on this stage , you speake of , acteth one parte or other for the mayntenance of the whole ; and therfore is of some power ; though in some you thinke it is to be accoumpted strength and power passive rather then active .

And yet you say the very earth , in that it sustaines weights layde upon it , and resisteth contrary impulsions , is perhaps of active force or operation ; As for the power of mooving to the centers that you say is no more passive then active but a meane betwixt bothe . I presume you meane by way of participation , and not by abnegation of the extreames . Yet in my judgement to swey or moove to the center is meerely active , to be sweyed or mooved is merely passive . Yet other properties there are of the earth , though you pretermitt them . For it is commonly sayde , that it covers the errors of Physicians .

And I remember what a Sexton was wont to say , of all his sick neighbours ; that when Physicians have done all they can , yet at lengthe he muste heale them , meaninge by making theyr graves , and with the earth to cover them . I have heard a Mountebanke report , that when a mans legge is stung with a viper , to put that legge into the colde earth is a present remedy .

I have heard allso what use the Irishe sometimes have made of the colde earth , when they have overdrunke themselfes with Vsquobath . Yet me thinks that power of the earth should not be pretermitted which the Holy Ghoste gives unto it , in saying , Let the earth bring forth , &c. But as for the power of assimilating other thinges to themselfes , and of preservinge symbolizinge qualities , that you say is founde in the dullest bodies . The active force and power motive of windes , vapours and exhalations is well knowne , as allso of celestiall bodies especially the Sunne , they re productive operation cannot be unknowne to any . You conclude that all this power is but finite , and that no created thinge is capable of power infinite , which you affirme only with a perhaps , and such cautions are very frequent with you , which in this place I take to be moste needelesse .

Now as time and place were as you sayde shadowes of Gods eternitie and immensitie , So , the power of the creature is a shadowe of Gods infinite power . Yet shadowes we all knowe have proportions to the substances shadowed by them , but betweene finite and infinite we commonly say there is no proportion .

2. God , you say , is more infinite in every kinde , then all the united powers of severall natures , though they were for number infinite and each infinitly operative in its owne kinde . But let us not lye for God , as man doth for man to gratify him . True and naturall beauty needeth no painting : And Gods perfection needeth no Mountebanke like amplifications to sett him forth . The powers of the creatures are not formally in God , but eminently , that is , they are sayd to be in God in as much as he can produce them , and they re effects allso . As for example , though he be not hott , yet can he produce heate in greater measure then fier dothe .

But consider I pray you ; Can God produce a greater heate , then that which is infinite ? or can he produce a greater number then that which is infinite ? It is apparent that he cannot , not by reason of any defecte of power in God , but by reason that a greater then that which is infinite to be produced , is a thing utterly impossible . You are pleased to take notice of a former observation of yours , which was this , That thinges by nature most imperfecte , doe oftentimes best shadowe divine perfection .

You have allready intreated of Gods immensity and eternity ; and therein you have tolde us , that no positive entity , no numerable parte of this vinverse , doth so well represent the immensity and eternity of God , as the negation of all thinges , which we describe by the name of Nothinge . I thinke there never dropt a more vile assertion from the penne of any wise man then this ; yet you desire here agayne to commende it unto the Reader as some quainte observation . But what doe you meane to repeate it under such forme , as by calling it somethinge though imperfect . Is Nothinge , or the negation of all thinges , to be accoumpted somethinge though imperfect ? yet the same observation you will have to have place here allso . As if this which we call nothinge were the most fitt to represent Gods immensity by , yea and his eternity , yea and his infinite power allso .

How neere drawes this to the making of God to consiste of nullities , since you say his naturall properties are best resembled unto nullities ? well , we have heard what that is which best representeth his immensity and eternity , now we are to expecte what that is which best represents his infinite power . And this after a long deduction , you expresse to be the center of the earth , which you say is matter of nothing .

And thus you maintaine a just proportion of discourse concerning Gods attributes ; for still your witt serveth you to resemble them either to Nothinge , or to that which you call matter of ( just ) nothinge . But herein you proceede by degrees . And first you seeme to conceave , that this center of the earth , is in the language of the Holy Ghoste , made to be the foundation of the earth , as in that speeche of the Lord to Iob chap. 38. 4. 5 6. Where wast thou , when I layed the foundation of the earth ? and whereupon are the foundations therof fastned , who hath layde the corner stone therof ? And first you commende the phrase , as surmounting all poeticall decorum , and will have the Majesty therof consiste therin , sufficiently testifying that it was uttered by God himselfe .

Now hertofore , you have made poeticall witt to stande in opposition unto Metaphysicall truth . But of poeticall de corum , especially in this place , like enough you have a better opinion . For my part I am persuaded the Majesty of Gods speeche consists in the power of the Spirite , rather then the Wisdome of the wordes . Paule allso spake by the Spirite of God , and some have observed greate parts in his very language , but see what Castellio a freind to your opinions writes of Bezaas judgement concerning this in the defence of his translations upon the 2. Cor. 11. 6. Paulum ( sayth he of Beza ) & grandiloquentiâ Platoni , & vehementia Demostheni , & Methodo Aristoteli atque Galeno anteponit : in quo mihi videtur Pictores imitari , qui Christi matrem dum honorare volunt , regio vestitu pingunt , & ●idem tamen ita cogente historia praesepe in quo jaceat Christus infans appingunt nobili sane solaecismo . Quid enim mundanis regibus cum praesepibus ? Mariae gloria est paupertas , & pictores eam divitiis exornant . Sic Pauli gloria & gloriatio est Sermonis imperitia .

But lett the Majesty of the speech passe as nothing pertinent to our present purpose , where doe you find the center of the earth to be mentioned or pointed unto in all this ? doth the corner stone there mentioned , signifie so much ? or by the foundation there expressed , muste we necessarily understand the center of the earth ? The Holy Ghoste seemes rather in this inquisition , to have reference to something without the earth that should uphold it or fasten it , and withall signifieth , that no such supporter can be found . Then you proceede to admiration at this that the center shoulde beare up the earth and all thinges theron , which center is no body or substance , no not so much as a meere Angle or corner , nay such as forth with you say is a matter of nothing .

And so in the issue it comes to this , that nothing beares it up , which is true , in the forme of a negative ; but not as an affirmative as if there were any power in the center to beare it up . And why should we conceave that the center of the earth should beare it up , more then the center of a tennis ball beares it up , which allso might be the center of all if it lay in the middle of the earth ? And if any side of the earth were removed from the center to the heavens , it would forthwith appeare that the center of the earth beares not up the rest ; for that which before was the center would now be driven Turrian greate deale higher , and become the outside of the earth . So that the center of the earth will not serve your turne ; will you then runne to the center of vacuum or of the space imagined to contayne the earth ? Yet you distinguish not of centrum Physicum and centrum Mathematicum . For who doubts , but that one side of the earth may be heavier then an other . Againe it was woont to be a received Maxime that Terra non gravitat in loco suo ; and therfore there is no neede of any thing to beare it up . For the middle of the world is the naturall place of the earth , which when it hath gotten , it swayes not , nor propendes not , nor can be swayed to weighe downewards ; which indeede were to weighe upwards which way soever .

And have heavy thinges any neede ( thinke you ) of supportance to keepe them from weighing upwards ? Yet we acknowledge , the whole world and every part of it is from the finger of God . For the very course of nature is the worke of God . That fire doth burne , that the Sunne and starres doe inlighten the earth , that heavy thinges moove downewards , and light thinges upwards , all this I say , we acknowledge to be the worke of God .

And we woonder at the power of God in making all this by his word , and supporting all by his word . But being made and as wonderfully preserved by God , we woonder not at this , that heavy thinges moove downewards , & light things upwards ; or how it comes to passe , that the earth without a supporter continueth where it is , seing if it did not continue where it is , it should moove upwards towards the Heavens lighter then a feather , which is quite contrary to the nature of the earth . We well woonder at the power of God in this , that as he made it by his worde , so with the turninge of an hande he coulde sett an ende unto it , if it pleased him . And therefore to talke of chamberinge up sustentative force ( in the center ) multiplied accordinge to the severall portions or divisibilities of magnitude successively immensurable , to speake in proportion to your owne language , is to affect more Rhetoricall witt then Metaphysicall truthe , in plainer termes , is to multiply woords without sense .

So then to amplifie the infinite power of God , by surpassing the imaginary sustentative force of a center , which as your selfe confesse is a matter of nothinge and consequently the sustentative force of it must be a matter of nothing , is a very poore amplification of the power of God . If the center were able to supporte the earth not where now it is , but in the hollowe of the moone , that were somewhat to magnifie the sustentative power therof . Yet I make no doubte , but God coulde doe so by his power . Which case is of farre greater force for the manifesting of his power , then in bearing up the earth where it is , which indeede being created , and preserved in being , hath no neede of supportar●ō in his owne place , where it can moove no lower ; and if it moove by directe motion , it muste needes moove higher ; which kinde of motion is more proper for a feather than for the heavy earth , whose wombe is impregnated with stones and mettalls .

And therfore you doe well to take this power of God into consideration as namely of his ability to tosse this universe with greater case , then a Gyant doth a tennis ball ( yet I never read or heard before of Gyants playing att tennis ball ) through out the boundlesse courtes of immensitie . By the way your overlash , in talking of the Courts of immensitie , wherin this motion should be . For as for the immensitie of God , that is no fitt space to tosse the world in .

And as for the immensitie corporall , that is a thing utterly impossible ; the motion you devise must needes be in vacuo or not att all . Now the force of the center is no way fitt wherby to illustrate this power of God . For certainly if the earth were placed in the hollowe of the Moone , it together with his center would tumble downe againe ; as little congruous is it ; for the illustration of that power of God , wherby he is able to dissolve Rocks of Adamant with the phillep of his finger , sooner than bubbles of water with the breath of the Canon ; In all which you seeme to affect not Metaphysicall truthe only , but Rhetoricall if not Poeticall florishes allso . We beleeve that God , as by his word he made all thinges out of nothing , so by his word he can returne them into nothing ; this is plaine English neyther hath his power neede of any Pyrgopolinices bombast eloquence to illustrate the Majesty therof or sett it forth .

3. But from the breath of the Canon you fall congruously upon the consideration of the mother of it , which creature is commonly called gunpowder . And here you tell us first that our admiration of Gods active power may be raysed by calculating the imaginary degrees of active powers increase in creatures ; that which followeth divisible as well in quantitie as operation , is of no importance but only to fill up . The Canon sends forthe his bullet with greater violence then the Sacher , like enoughe , and so every Ordinance exceedes other in force of Battery , according to the quantitie of charge , or length of barrell , which I leave to the consideration of the Master of the Ordinance . To this you adde that if the same quantitie of steele or yron , were possible to be as speedily converted into a siery vapor as gunpowder is , the blowe would be 10. times more irresistible then it is . I doe not thinke your meaning is to instruct the would in a new way of making Saltpeter , if it were , Saltpeter men should be your scholars , I would be none of them .

So much Phylosophie I apprehend , that fire is most swifte in mooving upwards , as the Element of earth is most swift in mooving downewards . And like as the contraction of more parts of the earth together makes a bodie the heavier , so likewise the more siery anything is , so much the more swift in motion upwards . But to say that the active force or vigour of motion , allwayes increaseth according to the degrees of celerity which it accumulates , is an idle speech , & as much as to say the more swiftly it mooves , the more vigorously it mooves . It had more shew of congruity to say the more vigorously it is mooved ( to witt in respect of the Agents force that mooves it ) the more swiftly it mooveth .

Now you come to the accommodation of all this , unto the infinite power of God , in this manner , Though the moste active and powerfull essence cannot be encompossed with walls of brasse , nor chambred up in vaults of steele allbeit much wider then the Heavens , yet doth it every where more strictly girde it selfe with strength then the least or weakest body can be girte . For what bonds can we prescribe so strict so close or firme , as is the bond of indivisible unitie , which can not possibly burst , or admitt eruption , wherin notwithstanding infinite power doth as intirely and totally encampe it selfe as in immensitie . How incomparably then doth his active strength exceede all comparison ? What a mad comparison is it in illustrating the infinitie of Gods power to say that God girds himselfe with strength more strictly , then the weakest body can be girt ? Doe weake persons girde themselfes with strength ; or is Gods girdinge of himselfe with strength , like to our girding of our clothes aboute us ? By that which followeth it seemes that you have an allusion to Gods girding of himselfe into a narrowe compasse , like Ladies that affect slender wasts . For to what other purpose doe you tell us that Gods girding is as strict , as is the bond of indivisible unitie .

And before you told us that the greater force ariseth from the contraction of parts . Now hath God any parts to be thus contracted and united , that so his vigour might be greater ? what base comparisons are these , to represent the infinite power of God by them ? Then you roule in your woonted Rhetorick to amplifie the vehemency of his motive power ; in that it cannot be exprest by a motion that should beare levill from the Sunnesetting in the west , to the Moone riseing in the East , which is a very faire marke I confesse ; for the case put , is in plenilunio , when the Moone is att full . Then to cast the fixed starres downe to the center , ( belike you meane one after another , otherwise there would be no roome for them in the center ; ) and hoyse the earth up to the Heavens within the twinkling of an eye , or to send both in a moment beyond the extreamities of this visible world , into the wombe of vacuity whence they issued , would not straine his power motive .

Yet all this you confesse to be lesse then to bring nothing unto something , that is , to take not your words but rather your good meaning , to create out of nothing . Wherby nothing doth not become something , but something hath a being , which before it had not . But here you power out many wilde conceits besides this : first as when you say , Essence swallowes up infinite degrees of succession in a fixed instant . I had thought rather this had bene the property of eternity , not of essence . You might as well say essence swallowes up all places into an indivisible unitie or point . Then how may eternitie be sayde to swallow up that which it doth not contayne ; neyther formally , ( for certeynly there is no formall succession in eternitie ) nor eminently . For to conteyne eminently , is to be able to produce succession ; but it is not Gods eternitie that denominates him able to produce time , or the existence of thinges in time , but his power . So neyther his essence nor his eternitie , swallowes up motion for the same reason .

But as for the swallowing up of motion into a vigorous rest , to witt by mooving the eighth spheare round in a moment ; Of the nakednesse and absurditie , that is shamefull nak●dnesse of such an assertion , we have discoursed enough . Againe , is it not enough for you to maynteyne motion in vacuo ; but you must needes affirme that this visible world issued from the vacuum which now we imagine without the extreamities of it ? where now the world is , was a vacuum before the world was , but yet the world issued not from it , neyther in the kinde of a materiall cause , nor in the kind of a formall cause , nor in the kind of an efficient cause , much lesse did it issue from that vacuum , which you terme without the extreamites of this world . Then againe I know no measure of perfection derived unto the creature from Gods immensitie , but only from the counsayle of his will , by his immensitie he fills all places but distributes not the measure of perfections therby .

When you call Nothinge the mother of Gods creatures , tell mee I pray , did you affect poeticall witt or Metaphysicall truth ? I had thought Nothing had not afforded so much as the matter of any thinge , as the Mother doth the matter ( at least ) of the childe . It is true ; we were not any thing before God made us . And as sure I am that this which we call nothinge , did not contribute any thinge to the creation of men .

The basenes of mans originall is a common place of another nature ; Now your text is the Infinity of Gods power , but you may squander from it as you please . Whatsoever implyes not contradiction , the production therof is within the compasse of Gods power , and whatsoever God can do , he can doe with ease ; His head aked not in the makeing of the World , neyther doth it ake in providing for , and preserving all things . But to talke of the possibilitie of more worlds hand over head , under colour of gratifying God in the amplification of his power , I leave unto them that are not satisfied with the demonstration of his infinite power in this . Yet as touching Gods omnipotency , for the strengthening of our faith , we are promised somethinge hereafter ; as if all hitherto tended to the strengthening of our imagination , by comparing it first to the sustentative force of a center which is a matter of nothing , and then to the force of gunpowder which undoubtedly is a matter of something . Whether we are like to meete with a more wise discourse , concerning Gods infinite Wisedome , if others know , yet I know not .

CHAP. VIII .

Of the Infinitie of divine Wisedome . That it is as impossible for ought to fall out without Gods knowledge , as to have existence without his power or essentiall presence .

1. IN the first Section there is nothing that I mislike : we acknowledge God could not be infinite in power , unles he were infinite in Wisedome allso . And that power ungoverned by Wisedome , would bring forth very enormous effects . But if a duble portion of witt matched with halfe the strength would effecte more then a triple portion of strength with halfe so much witt , surely where the power is equall , & the Wisedome insinitly unequall , there the effects cannot be the like . Yet you have bene bold to affirme in another treatise of yours , not yet extant I confesse , that If a man had the same infinite power that God hath , he might well thinke he coulde dispose thus of thinges as God hath disposed , by the Wisedome which man allready hath .

And you give this reason , for in thinges wee can lay any necessitie upon , wee can tell well enough how to dispose of them to the end which we seeke . As uncouth an assertion as hath passed from the mouth or penne of any man . For we manifestly perceave that the difference of artificiall operations in the World , doth not arise from the difference of mens powers , but merely from the difference of theire skill and Wisedome in severall trades .

2. You doe not well to confounde power with strength ; for strength is only power naturall ; but there is a civill power goeth beyond that . And there is no question to be made , but Wisedome is to be preferred before the strength of the body , by how much the qualities of the minde are to be preferred before the qualities of the body . But where civill power is supreame that ruleth over the wisest Counsaylers . No question God is as infinite in Wisedome as in power . But I take it to be very absurd to say that Gods wisedome is greater then his power . For is it possible that God by his wisedome can thinke of any course fitt to be done for the setting forth of his glory which his power were not able to effect ? and seing you confesse his power to be infinite as well as his wisdome , what should move you to maynteine the one to be greater then the other , I can not devise . Princes have guides to governe them , which yet are not therfore greater than they , but inferior by farre . But in God , his wisedome and power , though different notions , yet the substance of them is all one and precisely one in God . The same is the proportion betweene infinite wisedome and power infinite , as betweene sinite wisedome and power finite . But finite wisedome doth not evacuate finite power ; therfore neyther doth infinite wisdome evacuate the necessitie of infinite power .

But to salve the matter , you adde that it evacuates the necessitie of power distinct from it . T is true indeede , in God , though the notions of wisedome and power are distinct , yet the thinges signified are one essence in God . And looke in what manner soever infinite wisedome doth inferre the indistinction of power with it , after the same manner , doth infinite power inferre the indistinction of wisedome with it . For as much as God is essentially wise and powerfull , and therefore infinite in both , & both indistinct in him , whose essence is most simple and admitts no parts . That wisedome is the father and power the Mother of all Gods workes is such an assertion , that I doe not thinke you can finde any to father it , or mother it but your selfe . Will you not give us leave to accommodate it unto the workes of man and pronounce proportionably that his Wisedome is the Father , and his power the Mother of his actions ? I take it to be absurd to inquire after a Father and Mother of workes , save in case , the workes themselfes doe admitt these different sexes as being male or female ; yet in such a case it hath a Father and Mother only in respect of univocall generations not equivocall .

And as for the proportion to justifie your allegorie , we are content rather to expecte your pleasure to acquainte us with it , then to trouble our witts aboute the deviseing of it . Yet Philo & the Platonicks are a rubbe in your way , who ( as you say ; for I confesse I am not so well seene in them , ) make knowledge the mother of all Gods workes .

To remoove this you acquainte us with your conjecturall dictates . First that t is probable they dreamed of a created knowledge . A most improbable conjecture , that they should conceave , that God brought his works to passe by the knowledg of a creature not by his owne knowledge ; Yet that creature by whose created knowledge God is conjectured to have wrought by , in theire opinion , being one of Gods workes , how coulde that creatures knowledge be possibly accoumpted his mother in creation . Your second conjecture is , that under these termes they covered some transformed notion of the second person in the Trinitie . Such a person more fitt by farre to be the Author of all Gods works in order under God the Father ; But equally improbable it is that this second person in Trinitie should be called by them , The Mother of Gods workes . Rather Sapientia in Latine , and 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 in Greeke being the feminine gender ; in this grammaticall notion they might accoumpt it 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Mother of all thinges created , which yet is more then my learning will encourage me to ascribe unto them . And Christ you deny not to be the wisedome of the Father , but you adde that he is the wisedome personall ; but you speake here not of the wisedome personall , but of the wisedome of the Godhead as it is essentially in the whole Trinitie .

Danaeus upon the 32. distinction of Peter Lumbards first booke of sentences , professeth the Sonne to be called the wisedome of the Father , for as much as he maketh the Father knowne unto us . But though you speake of wisedome as it is essentiall , and not personall ; yet you may remember , that even the essentiall attributes are severally appropriated unto the Person by divines ; and in the course of this appropriation , power is attributed to the Father , Wisedome unto the Sonne , Aquinat . 1. q. 39. art. 8. Durand . 1. dist. 3● . q. 3 and goodnesse unto the Holy Ghost . How suitable this is of makeing wisedome the Father of Gods actions , lett every intelligent Reader judge .

Agayne I finde that Gabriell Vasquius proposeth a question , Whether the power of God doth any manner of way differ In 1. q. 25. art. 1. disp. 111. from Gods knowledge and his will ? And herein recites the opinion of Durand , mainteyning that Gods wisedome and his will , are but the remote causes of divine actions ; and that the power of God is the immediate cause of all . The contrary wherunto he maynteynes , namely that power or execution is needelesly attributed unto God , as distinct from his knowledge and his will ; and this he delivers according to the doctrine of Scotus , Bassolis , Ferrariensis , Caietan , and Aquinas . Neyther of these opinions as I conceave serves your turne in making wisedome the Father , and power the Mother of Gods actions . These flashes of conceyte are farre distante from the conceites of any Schoole divine , that I am acquainted with .

3. Wisedome ( you say ) as all agree , is the excellency of knowledge from which it differs not , save only in the dignitie or usefullnesse of matters known or in the more perfect manner of knowing them . This promiseth no greate depth , yet it passeth my slender capacitie to comprehend your meaning herein , or to make any good sense therof . You have so long inured your selfe to a phrase of speech and expression beyond the capacitie of your Reader ; that I knowe not whether at length you may attaine to such a facultie of speech as may transcende the Authours owne comprehension . Who they are that agree in this , that Wisedome is the excellency of knowledge , I professe I know not .

And I woonder you proceede to discourse of wisedome without distinction ; seing it may be taken in some sense by Philosophers , in which it is not taken by Canonicall writers . Agayne in some sense it may be taken by Canonicall writers , in which it is not taken by Philosophers . There is a wisedome to salvation which the Scriptures communicate to the meanest of Gods children , which kinde of Wisedome was nothing knowne to Philosophers . And there is a Metaphysicall wisedome in knowing Ens quà ens , where abouts Philosophers did busie theire braynes , which you shall hardly finde notice taken of throughout the Scriptures . Againe wisedome is sometimes taken for that knowledge , that rest in contemplation ; sometimes t is taken for such a knowledge as is not commendable nor right unlesse it be referred to action . Solomons Wisedome it seemes comprehended both . For the Wisedome that he prayed for , was the wisedome of government , which respects action ; but God gave him other wisedome allso . For this is reckoned up as a parte of his wisedome , that he spake of trees , from the Cedar tree that is in Lebanon , even to the hyssope that springth out of the wall , he speake allso of beast and of foules and of creepeing thinges , and of fishes . And in this respecte it seemes , that hee excelled the wisedome of all the Children of the East , and all the wisedome of Aegypt . For of Moses it is sayde that hee was learned in all the wisedome of the Aegyptians . Act. 1. 22. And this wisedome I conceave to have bene in sciences contemplative and not practicall . Yet in Scripture phrase as I guesse , it is most generally taken for wisedome practicall , consisting in knowing how to bring aboute intended ends . And thus you seeme to take it , when you professe that it differs not from knowledge save only in the dignitie or usefullnes of matters knowne ; which is an harshe manner of expression .

But I take your meaninge to be this , that the difference is in the objecte , and that thinges of worth and of use are the speciall object of wisedome . For so a wise man by his wisedome discernes these thinges which are most behoofefull , & advantagious unto him . So then wisedome seemes to be ( in your opinion ) the knowledge of thinges usefull and behoovefull , that is , the discerning of what is best to be done to the compassing of this or that ende . Yet by your leave if the ende be not good , such a wisard in Solomons phrase , shall be accoumpted no better then a foole . And the Holy Ghoste hath discovered unto us both in the olde Testament , that many Are wise to doe evill , but to doe well have no understanding , Ier. 4. 22. and in the new Testament , that the children of this World are wiser in they re generation , then the children of light . And the unjust Steward had a commendable measure of wisedome in this kinde . Luc. 16. 8. But take it at the best ; why should you call this , the excellency of knowledge ? Hath not Aristotle delivered the contrary , and professed that felicity of contemplation is more eminent then the felicity of action ? And I know no reason to forsake him in this . Doe not we beleeve that our happinesse in the Kingdome of Heaven shall consist in the vision of God ? The knowledge of Gods law is knowledge practicall , and is not this farre inferior to the knowledge of God , and of the mysterie of godlines revealed to us in the Gospell ? I confesse the knowledge that we have of God in this life doth conferre to action , but that is not enough to make it practicall ; The knowledge of thinges to be practised and put in execution , that and that alone denominates knowledge practicall . Your laste difference of wisedome from knowledge proposed disjunctively thus , or in the more perfecte manner of knowinge of them , I can hardly make any congruouse sense of .

At first I thought the same difference had bene intended though variously expressed , that the Reader might satisfie himselfe with which expression he pleased ; litle thinkeinge that your selfe who take upon you herein to instructe others , were to seeke , whether wisedome differed from knowledge , in the object knowne , or in the manner of knowinge thinges ; yet upon seconde thoughts this seemes to be your meaninge . But suppose the truth of both concerning wisedome , namely that it knowes thinges of woorth and usefull , and that it knowes them in a perfecte manner ; yet I pray consider , what a mad thing is it to say , that herein it differs from knowledg . Doth the knowledge of thinges usefull differ from knowledge ? well you may say it differs from the knowledge of thinges lesse usefull , or not usefull at all , but surely it differs not from knowledge . So likewise the perfecte manner of knowinge thinges , may be sayd to differ from an imperfecte manner of knowinge them , but surely it differs not from the knowinge of them . For we doe not use to say that the species is contradistinct from the genus , but rather one species from another . I professe I am touched with no small regret to consider how much time I am like to wast in correctinge such anomalies , if your booke should be too frequent in them .

But to proceede , Though no man be wise without much knowledge , yet a man may know many thinges and not be wise . In this likewise I finde so much confusion , that a man may very well be to seeke in what sense to justifie it . I have heard of a sage Counsaylor , that knewe not a letter in his owne Mother tongue . Comineus as I remember was no scholar , & yet a very wise Counsaylour . The Turkes are usually accoumpted as ignorant people as live ; yet no doubte the grand Signior hath a wise counsayle . And wisedome of goverment ( which now a dayes alone is usually accoumpted wisedome ) is many times accompanied with litle learninge .

Achitophell in his time was accoumpted as an Oracle of God , but of his learninge or greate knowledge we reade not . And in my judgement this kinde of wisedome seemes to be rather a naturall gift , then an habite acquired by knowledge . And it seemes to consiste in judginge of moste commodious meanes to compasse endes intended , as in the counsayles of Achitophell unto Absalon , as allso it appeares in Solomons course that he tooke to discerne the true mother of the Child which was in question ; and because they may be crossed if they be knowne , therfore to discerne how courses commodious for the compassing of designes may be closely carried undiscovered ; as the two hundred men that Absolon tooke with him when he wente to Hebron , are sayde to have accompanied 2 Sam. 15. 11. him in the simplicitie of theire hearts knowinge nothinge ; and thus they were engaged in his treason before they were aware . And the same Absolon by his pretence of payinge his vowe at Hebron signified to his Father , prevented jealousie in his Father , and tooke away all suspicion of treason . On the other side , it is a greate pointe of wisedome to discover the reaches of others in theire courses ; as Solomon , discerned the trayterous hearte of Adoniah , by the motion which he made to have Abishag the Shunemite given him to Wife , which Bethsheba perceaved not , and was very willing to gratifie him in the furtherance of his suite .

This was a naturall perspicacy in Solomon ; for at this time he was very younge , and had not as yet sought the Lord for that spirite of wisedome in government , as afterwards he did ; And whereas you say , A man may know many thinges , and not be very wise ; It is a truth , but a very meane truth . For a man may know many things , and yet be a very foole ; and that more wayes then one . For firste few and many are termes of respecte ; and few thinges are many in respecte of fewer . And though a man knowe never so much as these thinges , that nothing at all conduce to wisedome ; what wise man would expecte that he should be any thinge the wiser thereby ? Againe , nothing denominates a man simply wise , but that which makes him a wise man . Now a man may not only knowe many things , but be allso wise in many thinges , and yet not deserve the name of a wise man . He may be a wise painter , a wise graver , wise to worke in handicrafts ( which is accoumpted wisedome , both in the phrase of God , and phrase of Aristotle ) and yet all this while be farre enough from a wise man . For he only is a wise man that knowes how to governe himselfe and provide for himselfe .

Now many times witt , & that in greate measure , in trades , is founde to be in a fooles keepinge . Nay what will you say ; may not a man be wise to doe evill , Ier. 8. 22. wise to satisfie his lust , wise to compasse theire owne wicked endes ; but shall he be accoumpted the wiser man for this ? Hath not Aristotle delivered , that Incontinens non potest esse prudens , An incontinent man can not be a wise man ? Laste of all suppose that a man knowes all that belonges to true wisedome , but will not practise it , like the Athenians , of whome it was sayde , sciunt quae recta sunt sed facere nolunt , shall not such a one be accoumpted one of Solomons fooles in his proverbs ? For are not the Morall vertues and recta ratio knitt together indissolubly ? But come we to the wisedome of God , Knowledge divine , as it comprehends all thinges , the name of wisedome best befits it , not as restrained to this or that particular . And why should it not be accoumpted wisedome , restrained to what perticular you will , seing he undoubtedly knowes every perticular , in most perfect manner ▪ And but erst you professe that wisedome differs from knowledge only in the usefullnes of thinges knowne , or in the more perfect manner of knowing them . The knowledge of God which is of himselfe , is the wisedome of contemplation . His knowledge of other thinges to be produced and ordered by him to the settinge forth of his glory is the wisedome of action .

And the Apostle breakes forth into admiration of the depthe of Gods rich wisedome and knowledge . Piscator thinks that by wisedome and knowledge one thing is meant . I am not of his opinion . The text seemes to me to make against that construction ; For thus it runnes O the depthe of the riches 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 both of the wisedome and knowledg of God . In saying both it plainely intimates that wisedom and knowledge are considered as two , and therfore distinct . I take the meaning to be thus . God by his wisedome discerneth courses most convenient ; but by his knowledge he comprehendeth all , whether convenient or inconvenient . And because a man may be so farre wise as to discerne of courses proposed to the compassing of a certeine ende , which is the most convenient ; Yet because he is not able to invent all courses , he may faile in wisedome , therfore I conceave it is sayde that God is rich both in wisedome and knowledge ; because he doth not only judge what is fittest amongst few or many , but amongst all ; For he knowes all even the most inconvenient and disorderly courses ; but by his wisedome he judgeth of the conveniency of them , and according to his good pleasure useth them . Your reason followes to shew why the name of wisedome best besitts the knowledg of God , and that is ; For though many thinges knowne by him , whilest compared with others more notable , seeme base and contemptible ; yet not the meanest , but may be the object of divine contemplation to a Christian , that considers not the mere matter or forme or physicall properties , but the Creators power or skill manifested in it . You undertooke to prove that Gods knowledge of all thinges might moste fittly be called wisedome ; to which purpose , you should prove , that God may justly be accoumpted wise in knowinge them ; that is , that it might affoorde juste matter of such contemplation unto God , as might justly be called wisedome . But the reason you bringe , medles not at all with the contemplation of God , but with the contemplation of a Christian. For whereas in coherence you should say , it affords matter of wise contemplation unto God ; you tell us t is an object of divine contemplation to a Christian.

And whereas you would not affirme that Gods knowledg , as restrayned to this or that perticular , was to be accoumpted wisedome , but only as it comprehends all thinges ; yet your reason makes shew of provinge what you affirmed , of Gods knowledge restrayned to this or that perticular , and not so only but as restrayned to the meanest perticular ; though it endes ( as I sayde ) not in avouching that such perticulars may be an object of divine contemplation unto God , but only in saying that it may be an object of divine contemplation to a Christian. What incongruities and most unscholasticall solecismes of discourse are these ?

And all this while you confine Gods knowledge to the perticulars of his owne making . But what thinke you of the particulars of mans or the divills making , in the most wicked , and sinfull courses that have beene , are , or shall be in the World .

Are not these allso knowne unto God , and are these likewise matter of diyine contemplation in respect of the Creators power , or skill manifested therin : We acknowledge the wisedome of God to be excellent in the composition of the meanest worme . Of some likewise we see excellent use as of the bee , & silkeworme ; of others we doe not , yet we beleive that his wisedome being infinite , he doth nothing in vaine ; he hath use of every thing , though we know it not . And we take notice of a double knowledge the one called scientia visionis , whereby he knowes all things that are , nor such onely but even all such as have beene , or shall be , the other called scientia simplicis intelligentiae , whereby he knowes all thinges possible so farr forth as they are knowable , and betweene these two knowledges , there is a greate deale of difference , though you seeme to confounde them .

4. By usefull knowledge as I take it , you meane the knowledge of usefull things . Of this you say there are two offices , The one steadfastly to propose a right ende : The other to make , and prosecute a right , choyse of meanes for effecting it . By this it appeares that you speake onely of that kind of wisedome which is referred to action , and whereby agents are accommodated ad●res gerendas . From the consideration of humane wisedomes imperfection , you take a course the better to set forth the perfection of wisedome divine . Humane wisedome ( you say ) is oftimes blinde in both , and usually lame in the latter .

I will endeavour to give some illustration of this . The end , we ayme at , is our good . For Finis . , & bonum convertuntur . Ethic. 1. 1. This good is eyther naturall , or supernaturall , both in respect of power to discerne it , as allso in respect of power to compasse it . The naturall good which every one aimes at , is the preservation of his esse , or naturall being , and the acquiring of his bene esse , or well being naturall . In both these are found errors enough . For though nothing is a more naturall object of mans desires then the preservation of his being , yet sometimes they are found most unnaturally to affect theyr destruction ; sometimes through passion , ( and that in divers kinds ) in wonderfull manner blinding reason , not onely to avoyde shame or rather the suffering of shame , or to avoyde a worse kind of death , but sometimes out of miserablenes , rather then they will part with a litle , they are wilfully set to part with all . 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉

Achitophell whose wisedome was as an oracle of God , went soberly this way , when he saw his counsayle refused : For he went home & set his house in order and hanged himselfe ; it seemes his unsanctified wisedome urged him hereunto . For as it is written of Cesar that he alone came sobrius ad perdendam Rempublicam so Achitophell accessi● sobrius ad perdendum seipsum .

As for the acquiring of well being , this is an end that all affect , but according to theyr severall dispositions . For the good which they affect being bonum conveniens agreing to theyr affections , so it comes to passe , that as men are of different affections , so they propose unto themselfes different endes . The luxurious person setts his witts on worke for compassing the satisfaction of his lust ; the covetous person he affecteth to grow rich ; the ambitious person to grow greate , the vertuous person to be good according to natures direction . And thus 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 Ehit . 3. 5. 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 . Looke how every man is qualified , such is the end he aymes at , but still naturall . But in compassing , there is a great deale of difference ; for some are wise to doe evill as appeares in Absolons carriage of himselfe aspiring to the Kingdome ; as allso in Achitophells counsayles , which if Absolom had followed , it hath gone full ill with David . Nay generally they are found , even naturall men , to be wiser in theyr courses though wicked ( witnesse the un●●st ●teward ) then the children of God are in theyres , though honest , and Christian. The children of this world ( sayth our Saviour ) are wiser in theyr generation , then the children of light . Nay morall Philosophers , in theyr instructions unto vertuous courses , have advised theyr Disciples to set before their eyes the picture of vice , and to perswade them to take but the like course in prosecuting vertue , that the wicked doe in prosecuting vice . Vt jugulent homines surgunt de nocte latrones , Vt teipsum serves non expergisceris ?

A manifest argument of the great corruption of man , whose witt serveth him so well in evill things , so ill in good things . Tho improvement whereof is in no small degree allso imputable unto Satan , who is most forward to impregnate the fancies of men with suggestions unto evill . We have known heavy headed , and dull persons brought up at schoole amongst us , when afterwards they have taken other courses , & given themselfes to Ruffianisme , they have beene acounted amongst the witts of the time . But as for the discerning of true good , that power transcends the region of nature . God must first regenerate us , and translate us into a supernaturall state , before we can discerne the thinges of God , or these thinges that belong unto our owne peace , which when God hath graunted us , then our end is no longer the preservation of our temporall being , but the salvation of our soules in the world to come , and to this purpose to cleave unto God by faith and love usque ad contemptum nostri , even to the contempt of our selfes , as touching this temporall life of ours . And to attaine to this end , we neede no consultatious with flesh , and blood ; God in his word hath chalked out unto us a direct way unto this end , and therfore it is sayd to be a lanterne unto our feete and a light unto our pathes . But whatsoever the end be , you tell us that if it bee much affected , the lesse choyse of meanes is left , the more eagerly we apply our selfes unto their use , and strive as it were to straine out successe , by close embracing them . And for this reason ignorance , or want of reason to forecast variety of meanes , for bringing about our much desired ends , is the mother of selfe will , and impatience . For what is selfe will , if a man should define it , but a stiffe adherence to some one , or few particular means , neyther onely , nor cheifly necessary to the maine point . It seemes you are in a streight , and therfore fetch about for matter , though aliene , and here we have mett with a good phrase , of straininge out successe by close embracing the meanes . Yet even in these unnecessary straines , your discourse is but loose in my judgement . For whether we discerne many meanes , or few meanes , all is one as touching the close pursuing of that which we much affect ; For if many , we will make choice of the fittest in our judgement , and as close embrace them as others doe , that doe not discerne so greate variety .

And as for successe , that is not in our power to be strayned out , as you speake , by close embracing the meanes , Man is a resistible agent , and easily crossed in his courses ; and the ends we ayme at , in reference to our best meanes , are but of a conjecturall nature , and so of uncertayne issue ; Neyther doe I seè any reason to the contrary , but that a man may be as selfe willed in the midst of variety of meanes discerned by him , as of few meanes , and if he be cr●st in them all , much more impatient . For surely the greater variety of meanes is represented , the more the way is open to take hold of that which is neyther onely , nor cheifly necessary , like as where many wayes offer themselfes , a travailer is in most danger to mistake the most direct way . Selfe will I confesse is excercised in adherence to meanes unfitt ; as may be seene in the rude Irish , that will not be brought off from theyr rude courses , they will tye their ploughes or harrowes to theyr horse tayles , say what the English will to persuade them to another course . But it is as well seene in following different endes . Many will not be taken off from theyr uncleane conversation , from their riotous and intemperate courses , they count it pleasure , ( as S. Peeter speakes ) to live deliciously ; these fruites of selfe-will are not in adhering to meanes so much , as in adhering to evill ends . But 2. Pet. 2. you proceede , and tell us in the next place , that Witts conscious of theyr owne weakenes for conqueing what they eagerly desire , presently call in power , wrath or violence as partiall , or mercenary seconds to assist them . Whereas he that out of fertility of invention can furnish himselfe beforehand with store of likely meanes for accomplishing his purpose , cannot much esteeme the losse or miscarriage of some one or two . These may seeme prety contemplations , and as pretily expressed .

But I had little thought that selfe will , and impatience joyned with want of witt , had allso beene joyned with consciousnes of selfe weakenes . For the sluggard though but a foole as Solomon sayth , is as wise in his owne conceit as seven men that can give a reason . And certainly selfe will , and selfe Pro. 26. 16 conceyts are companions inseparable . And therfore such commonly make little question of accomplishing , or as you call it , of conquering theyr desires , by theyr owne courses . And yet if they faile hereof , t is nothing strange , since the best meanes are but likely as your self stile them .

I can as hardly beleeve that fertility of invention is of power to keepe men from impatience . In my opinion patience as all other morall vertues , depends rather upon judgement then invention , though formally it is a quality of the will as all morall vertues are , and not any habitt of the understanding . But suppose he miscarry in all , then a mans patience must needes bidd farewell to invention to support it , and it is high time to relye upon judgement . Yet I trust patience which must have her perfect worke , ( Iam. 〈◊〉 . ) may have course in this case allso ; though it be an hard matter you say to keepe from fowle play , if the game whereat a man shootes be fayre , and good , and most of his stringes allready be broken . It is good they say to have two stringes to a mans bowe . A vertuous man hath more then two , you suppose as much , for you suppose many to be broken yet not all . And surely vertue is not vertue if it keepe not from foule play .

The Stoickes mainteyned that a vertuous man might descend into Phalaris bull , without the interrup●ion of his happines . We Christians are taught , and disciplined to rejoyce even in tribulation , and marke well our bow stringes , because tribulation worketh patience , and patience experience , and experience hope , and hope maketh not ashamed , because the love of God is shed in our hearts by the Holy Ghost that is given unto us . 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 ●m. 5. 4. sayth S. Paule , I am able to endure all thinges by the Phil. 4. 12. power of Christ that enables me , and herupon he exhorts Timothy to be partaker of the affliction of the Gospell , to witt by the 2. Tim. 1. 8 power of God . The power of Christ , and the power of God are two such stringes to our blowe of patience , as can never be broke . We know his grace to be sufficient for us , and when his power is made perfect in our weakenes , we shall 2. Cor. 12. have cause to rejoyce in our infirmities . For when we are weake , then are we strong . In a mans owne strength no man shall be strong . But blessed art thou o people , who art the saved of 1. Sam. 2. 9 the Lord , who is the sheild of thy strength , and the sword of our glory . Deu. 33. 29 He can make us to be as a Gyants sword , and he is a wall of fire round about Ierusalem . All that sight against it , theyr fleshe Zach. 9. 13 shall consume away , though they stand on theyr feete , and theyr eyes Zach. 2. 5. shall consume in theyr holes , and theyr tongues shall consume in their mouthes . But to returne . The contingency of the issue is Zach. 14. 12. within the horizon of our fore sight .

As for horizons of contrivances , let such as fancy them make themselfes merry with them . All this while the matter of your discourse being of Gods infinite wisedome , and to that purpose preluding of the imperfect wisedom of man , I have wondred what you meant to enter upon the consideration of patience ; unlesse it were to prepare your reader therby with a more willing entertaynment of your discourse .

But now I perceive you desire to gratify God with a commendation of his patience , which that it might seeme the more congruous , you pretend that the infinitenes of his wisedome carries him herunto . And this patience consists in bearing with sinners which as you say , every minute of theyr lifes violently thwart , and crosse some particular meanes , ordeyned for his glory and theyr good . Gods patience in forbearing us , and our sinnes in provoking him are greate enough in theyr proper colours , they neede no inconsiderate amplification to bombast them , by saying that every minute of life we violently crosse them . For surely eyther you must suppose man , every minute of his life , to be waking , or els you delivered this as it were slumbering .

But to touch upon something more materiall , I pray remember , that you treate of the wisedome of God , as exercised in intending a right end , and prosecuting a right choyse of meanes for the effecting of it . Now would you be so good as to consider , what is the end that God aymes at in this , and particularly whether it be all one , in bearing thus with all , and that of an ambiguous nature , thus , that in case they doe at length repent , and turne unto God , he may magnify his mercy in theyr salvation ; if still they stand out , and dye in impenitency he may magnify himselfe in theyr just condemnation ? And withall I pray consider , whether this be the course of any wisedom finite or infinite , in God , or man to intend ends after this ambiguous manner . I mention no other end of Gods patience , and long suffering , because I know no other end agreable to your opinion . That which followeth tendes rather to the commendation of the goodnes of Gods will , then the wisedome of his understanding , & therfore so much the more heterogeneall , and extravagant ; as when you say out of the Apostle that He is light and in him is no darknes ; and that He distingvisheth the fruites of light from fruits of darknes before they are , even before he gave them possibility of being . An amplification partly idle , partly unsound . For God must eyther distinguish them before they are , or not at all ; For there is no change in his understanding ; unsound , in saying God gives them possibility of being . The being of things is from the gift of God , but not the possibility of being . But you proceede in the same stringe . As impossible it is for his will to decline from that which he disernes truly good , as for his infinite essence to shrinke in being . God indeede cannot shrinke , for he is indivisible , and you well know what thereupon you have wrought for the amplification of his power in the former chapter . But I would you had told us what is that truly good discerned by God , from which you say his will cannot decline . I cannot be satisfied with your concealments in this particular . What I pray is more truly good then the setting forth of Gods glory eyther in his patience , and long suffering , or in ought else whatsoever ? And is it impossible thinke you for Gods will to decline this ? If so then it were impossible that God should decline the making of the World .

Is not this a faite way to Atheisme ? Many thinges ( you say ) may and every thing that is evill doth fall out against Gods will , but nothing without his knowledge , or besides his expectation . In Scripture phrase we find that many thinges fall out not onely besides , but contrary to Gods expectation as Esa. 5. where God complayneth of the house of Israel , that while he looked for grapes they brought forth wilde grapes . And Arminius urgeth this as if it were spoken in a proper speeche .

By the proposition in this place it must be sayde , that God expects sowre grapes , as well as sweete , for otherwise they shoulde fall out besides his expectation which you here deny . So then God did expect that Shimei should rayle on David , that Absolon should defloure his Fathers Concubines , that Iudas should betray his Master , that David should defile his neighbours wife , and cause hir husband to be slayne by the sword of children of Ammon , and that the Iewes should crucify the Holy Sonne of God . Say allso if you will that God did with patience , and long suffering expect all this . As for the knowledge of God there is no question about that , all confessing that all thinges are knowne to God not onely at theyr falling out , but long before , as David professeth of his thoughts that they were knowne to God a farre-off or long before . Psal. 139. 2. But to say that any thinge falls out against the will of God , I had thought it had beene generally receaved for a notorious untruthe . Aquinas I am sure is flatt against you , where he sayth , Deus neque vult mala fieri , neque vult mala non fieri , sed vult permittere mala fieri , & hoc est bonum . God neyther willeth that evills shall be , nor willeth that evills shall not be , but he will permitt evills to be , & this is good . Part. 1. q. 19. art. 9. Arminius himselfe professeth ●e minimum quidem fieri praeter Dei voluntatem , nempe vel volentem Exam. Praedest . Perk. p. 114. ut fiat , vel volentem non prohibere , sed permittere ut fiat .

You professe that all evill falls out against Gods will , Arminius professeth that nothing falls out besides the will of God , at least willing not to prohibite it , but to permitt it . And no merveyle , for the Apostle hath given us to understand that nothing can resist the will of God . It is true all evill falleth Rom. 9. out against Gods commandement , which usually is called allso the will of God but improperly . For every one knowes that he is well able to sinne , to transgresse , and consequently to resist this will of God .

Further you tell us , that That which in its owne nature ( as being made such by his unalterable decree ) is absolutely contingent , is not casuall in respect of his providence or eternall wisedome . You are at lengh come to the wisedome of God from whence you digressed , but you seeme to bring it in by the eares . For Casuall thinges are such as fall out praeter intentionem , besides intention which is an action of the will not of the understanding where wisedome is stated . And how can those thinges be sayde to fall out , not besides Gods intention , which fall out against his intention , namely against his will , as already you have professed of many thinges ; that they doe fall out against Gods will , though not without his knowledge . I would you had given instance in those absolute contingents which ( as you say ) are made so by Gods unalterable decree . But because you have neglected it , I will doe it for you . Rayne to morrow is a thing contingent , in this sense , it shall rayne , or not rayne . For me to walke abroad or ride foorth to morrow is a thing contingent , that is I shall walke or not walke , ride foerth or not ride . And accordingly in other of your traditionary writings I have reade a discourse of yours touching a certeyne disjunctive decree of God . But I pray be entreated to consider , whether such a contingent before specified , or such a disjunctive proposition be a fitt object of Gods decree . Gods decrees I suppose you will say are all voluntary , and free , he could have eyther not decreed at all what he hath decreed , or decreed theyr contraries . Therefore thinges of theire owne nature impossible to be otherwise , are no fitt object of Gods decrees . Now a disjunctive proposition as above mentioned , is such as it is impossible it should be otherwise . For this disjunctive ( it shall raine , or not rayne ; my walking shall be , or not be ) is of necessary truth , and therfore no more decreable by God to be , then the Godhead it selfe is decreable by him to be .

Agayne may I not be bold to say , that it is too absurde to talke of his unalterable decree , if it proceede by way of distinction , to imply that some of Gods decrees are alterable . All his decrees are more unalterable then the laves of Medes , and Persians ; they are compared to brazen mounteynes Zach. 6. But here followeth a mistery in the next place , and a great mystery : In that he fully comprehendeth the number of all meanes possible , and can mixe the severall possibilities of theyr miscarriage in what degree or proposition he list , he may , & ofttimes doth infallibly forecast the full accomplishment of his proposed ends , by multiplicity of meanes in themselfes not inevitable but contingent . Adde hereunto all that followes in this Section . The absurdities that you mixe in this mysterious sentence of yours I desire , and will endeavour to discover . Here we have three thinges to be considered .

First certeyne ends proposed by God to be accomplished . Secondly meanes appointed for the accomplishinge of these ends . Thirdly Gods forecast of the accomplishment of these ends . Touching the first I desire some instance of those ends you speake of . One instance you give in the sequence of his action , and it is the apprehension of a Traytor which you suppose to be ordeyned by God . Yet is this as absolute a contingent as ought else . And contingents are no otherwise ordeyned by God , then to be contingents . For you have already signified that it is by Gods unalterable decree ; So then God hath decreed them to be contingents . Therfore this action allso to witt the apprehension of a Traytor , God hath ordeyned to be of a contingent nature .

The meaning wherof is no more then this , it may come to passe , it may not come to passe . It shall be , or it shall not be , and accordingly in other treatises of yours you have discoursed of a disjunctive decree of God , so called from the disjunctive object therof , as to say , God hath decreed that such a Traytor eyther shall be apprehended , or shall not be apprehended . Now there is no neede of any meanes to procure the accomplishment of such an ende thus determined . For any man is able to avouch that a Traytor shall be apprehended , or no , and nothing at all to fayle in the truth herof ; much lesse neede is there of such variety of meanes , and those mixed with such possibility of miscarriage , as you treate of , to bring to passe such a decree , such an intention of this . But let the end passe as you have shaped it ; this being of a contingent nature , and yet absolutely intended by God ; for you neyther expresse , nor intimate the signification of any condition , it will hence follow , that any thing of the like nature may be absolutely ordeyned by God notwithstanding the contingency therof . That is , be it never so contingent and free , as the apprehension of a Traytor is a free act of man ( for you doe not suppose him to be apprehended by doggs or catts but by men rather ) yet notwithstanding God is able absolutely to ordeyne that such a thing shall come to passe . Therefore God is as well able to ordeyne that at such a time a man shall beleive , shall repent , yea or doe any thinge though never so free , notwithstanding the contingent nature thereof . Now I can no where find ( though I have perused throughly divers of your treatises ) that you like of this . Yet here ere you are aware ( as it seemes ) you are fallen upon it , and take upon you to acquaint us with mysterious conceits of yours , concerning the meanes whereby God doth inevitably accomplish such ends , you may as well say that God can bring to passe inevitably that man shall beleive and repent though I have founde you elsewhere to abhorre this . To the consideration of which meanes we are now to proceede . Concerning these meanes you give us to understand , 1. that they are many possible , 2. that God comprehendes the number of them all . 3. That he can mixe the severall possibilities of theyr miscarriage , in what degree , or proportion he list . 4. That in themselfes these meanes are not inevitable , but contingent . I nothing doubt , but the same ende God can bring to passe by divers meanes , and that all these meanes are knowne to God but what you meane by mixing theyr severall possibilities of miscariage in what degree he list . I understand not . One kind of meanes is possible to miscarry , so is another , so is every one , for so you acknowledge them all to be in themselves not inevitable , but contingent ; the meaning wherof I conceave to be this , they doe not inevitably , but contingently accomplishe the end proposed , this I take to be the meaning though incongruously delivered . But how can God be sayd to mixe these possibilities , unlesse you meane hereby Gods comprehending of them all , which is a truth . For God comprehends them all in his mind , but without mixing of them . But you seeme to project a farther meaning , by the last wordes as when you say in what degree , and proportion he list . I take the meaning obscurely delivered to be this ; God knowes every degree of theyr possibility to miscarriage , or rather God makes the possibility eyther of each his miscarriage , or of all theyr miscarriage in what degree he list ; yet it seemes you acknowledge no degree of possibility of the miscarriage of them all . For you maynteyne it as a thing necessary , that all shall not miscarry in the wordes immediately following . Have you not such a conceite as his ? God hath ordeyned the apprehension of a Traytor , eyther by this meanes or by that meanes , or by a third meanes or by a fourth ? if it be I would you had spoken out , and told us your minde plainly , yet we may take also that into our consideration in the end . But by the way I see no groundes of these degrees of possibility which you fancy . For all of the meanes being as you confesse contingent , and evitable as you speake , I see no reason , but every one should be equally possible to miscarry . If you had talked of degrees of probability of miscarriage , I should not have excepted against it , but I seeme to have just reason to except against the degrees of possibility .

Let us come to the third , & that is Gods inevitable forecast of the full accomplishment of his proposed ends by this multiplicity of meanes . Now this as it is plaine enough , so it seemes as manifestly to be untrue . For that God should foreknow the issue of thinges by the meanes which have onely a contingent operation , is generally disclayned by School-divines the Iesuites themselves , and Frarius by name in his Opuscula ; as that which would inferre an uncertayne , and not infallible knowledge in God . For as much as nothing can lay a better grounde of certainty , then the nature of it can affoord .

Secondly eyther you suppose that all this multiplicity of meanes you speake of , shall be used or no. If all be not used , then God doth not forecast the full accomplishment of his proposed end by this multiplicity of meanes possible , you speake of , but onely by some of them , namely so many as were used . And indeed it is very strange , that all meanes possible to be used should be used to the accomplishment of every proposed end , or indeede of any proposed end . But if all be used , and all faile save the last , upon what ground can you say that the end proposed must necessarily be accomplished by this last , which is as possible to miscarry as the former ; for you have not signified that God alwayes useth this course , as to use the courses first that are most possible to miscarry , and such as are least possible in the last place ; nay your selfe professe all the meanes to be alike possible , and probable . To this you seeme to answere in the sentence following , that it comes to passe by the rules of eternall wisedome . Namely that if an hundred meanes be appointed for the apprehension of a Traytor , and ninety and nine doe amisse , the hundreth , and last by the rules of eternall wisedome must of necessitie take . But where these rules of eternall wisedome are to be founde , that you doe not tell us , and therefore we take liberty to discourse against it thus ; was it not possible for God to have used this meanes in the first , or second , or third , or middle place , or in the place last save one which he useth in the last ? you have not manifested the least likelihood to deny this . Now if used in the first place , or in the last place save one it might have miscarryed , why not in this , seing the nature of it is not altered but continueth the same still , working onely contingently unto the producing of the end proposed , and not necessarily ? Agayne all other meanes fayling this takes effect ( you say ) by the rules of eternall wisedome . Now I demaunde if none other had beene appointed but this , why could not this alone being used have taken effect by rules of eternall wisedome as well , as now it doth , that is why could not God ordeyn that by this meanes onely used , the effect intended should be brought to passe , as well as by this meanes used after , the use of many other , seeing still the effect coms to passe by his meanes alone and not by any other : For if God can ordeyne that after other meanes have fayled , this meanes alone shall bring about the end intended by God , why could he not as well ordeyne that this meanes alone should doe it , without using of any other meanes before it .

Last of all , what needes Gods forecast runne out to these meanes for a grounde of its certeynty , when God himselfe cannot be ignorant of his owne determinations ? and therfore having ordeyned such an end , as suppose the apprehension of such a Traytour , upon this grounde he may be most certeyne that such a Traytor shall be apprehended . By the way I will take leave to observe some positions that have dropped from your pen in this Section . 1. That God can ordeyne such a thing to come to passe , which is of a contingent nature , as for example the apprehension of a Traytor . 2. That upon such an ordination of God successe to the meanes used hereunto is absolutely necessary , you adde and immutably also , committing a great indecorum therein , immutability being a congruous attribute onely to the ordination of God , and not to the successe of thinges . 3. That meanes of contingent operation onely shall necessarily take effect . 4. This necessity of taking effect is not absolute but gotten merely by casuall miscarriage of the possibilities of the former meanes , so you expresse it , whereas indeede the possibilities miscarry not ; for the meanes are in theyr nature possible , yea and probable too , to produce the end intended as your selfe professe . 5. Though this necessity in the effectuall working of the meanes be not absolute , yet the successe of them is absolutely necessary . I say no more but this , the Theses that Picus Mirandula proposed at Rome were many of them paradoxicall enough but I doe not find that any of these had place amongst them .

5. There is a fallacy ( you say ) though the simplest one that ever was sett to catch any wise man , wherein many excellent witts of these latter ages with some of the former have beene pittifully entangled , you that have discerned the simplicity thereof in all probabilitie , are not like to be entangled therein , for then you were not any wiser then they ; yet it seemes all these excellent witts are but woodcokes in comparison to your selfe ; well let us consider it . The more , wherein it were not possible for any besides themselfes to catch them , they thus ( you say ) frame and sett . Whatsoever God hath decreed must of necessity come to passe ; But God hath decreed every thing that is , therfore every thing that is , comes to passe of necessity . All thinges are necessary at least in respect of Gods decree , The extract or Corollary wherof in briefe is this . It is impossible for ought that is not , to be , for ought that hath beene , not to have beene , for ought that is not , to be , impossible for ought to be hereafter that shall not bee . I promise you , you have engaged your selfe very farr not onely to looke to it that your selfe be not founde to be entangled herein , but for the performance of a very easy , and cleare solution of this which you terme a fallacy , least your selfe be not found as wise as they which were entangled herein . Yet I am not ignorant of such a tricke of witt , as first to cry downe an argument by disgracing it , and powring contempt upon it , & thereupon presuming that any answere shall serve the turne , when the Reader is before hand awed with such a censure as to forfete the reputation of a scholar , and to be Metamorphosed into a woodcocke , if he doe not applaude it , and perswade himselfe to see a cleere solution of the former argument , which is proclaymed base , and sufficient to discreditt all that favour it . Yet some witt is required to catch a woodcocke . But this is so simple a fallacy as the like was never set to catch a wise Man . Now a man would have thought your selfe had beene one of those excellents witts that had beene taken in this snare , if it be a snare ; seing you come but freshly from professing that God decreeth such a contingent , as the apprehension of a Traytour . In which case , it is absolutely necessary that it shall come to passe . Now why may not God as well decree every contingent thinge , for ought the contingency can hinder it . For what is more contingent then the apprehension of a Traytour , yet this you say God may ordeine , and in this case it is absolutely necessary that it shall come to passe . But let us consider what you have to say to it . I hope you will remember your owne interpretation of it , namely that it must necessarily come to passe in respect of Gods decree , and so by your owne profession not onely a contingent thinge , but a free action , may be sayd to come to passe necessarily , to witt in respect of Gods decree , as for example , the apprehension of a Traytor which is as free an action as any , you might have beene pleased to have framed the proposition thus , whatsoever God hath decreed to come to passe , must necessarily come to passe . For you cannot be ignorant that God doth as well decree that some thinges shall not come passe , as that other thinges shall come to passe . As for example Ezek. 20. 31. O house of Israel as I live sayth the Lord God I will not answere you when I am asked 32. Neyther shall that be done that cometh into your minde : for yee say we will be as the heathen and serve wood , and stone , and Esay . 37. 33. Thus sayth the Lord concerning the comming of Assur . He shall not enter into this citty , nor shoote an arrowe there , nor come before it with sheild , nor cast a mounte against it . Now we are ready to attend the discovery of this fallacy , this simple fallacy .

First you tell us of an extract or Corollary hereof thus ; It is impossible for ought that is not to be , &c. Is this the way you take to discover the simplicity of this fallacy ? this savoureth strongly of your fallacious dealing ; in as much as by callecting consequences you labour to discredit the syllogisme , this surely is not to answere it . Besides not one of your consequences are sounde , there is no ingenuity in the collection of them . For the conclusion of the former syllogisme being this therefore , every thing that is comes to passe of necessity , your selfe have acknowledged this necessity to proceede in respect of Gods decree . And therefore what necessitie of thinges soever you doe inferr herence , you must accordingly understand it in respect of Gods decree not otherwise . Now this necessity is but necessity secundum quid not simpliciter as the learned call it , and such as may stand with contingency , and possibility to the contrary . Like as the apprehension of a Traytor is a thinge possible not to be and in its owne nature meerely contingent , but upon supposition that God hath ordeyned that such a Traytor shall be apprehended by certeyne meanes , you professe that the successe of those meanes is absolutely necessary , which is as much as to say that the apprehension of that Traytour upon Gods ordeyning it , is absolutely necessary ; which is more then the divines whom you impugne as overlashing doe use to say , or can in any sobriety of speech be justified . For if it must necessarily come to passe onely upon supposition of Gods decree , then not absolutely but upon supposition .

But consider we your extracts apart ; the first is this . It is impossible for ought that is , not to be ; Now this proposition cannot at all be deduced out of the former syllogisme , or out of any part thereof . It depends manifestly upon another proposition which is not at all mentioned in the former syllogisme and the proposition is this , whatsoever God hath decreed that it shall not be , it is impossible , that should be or come to passe . Now let every sober Reader judge , with what ingenuity you call this first proposition of yours an extract of the former syllogisme , or of the conclusion thereof ; whereas it is nothing necessary that he who affirmes , that All thinges which God hath decreed shall necessarily come to passe , must allso affirme the other , namely that whatsoever God hath not decreed , it is impossible that it should come to passe , wherhence alone is derived the first abstract you speake of . Nay rather if we consider the analogy of propositions aright , we shall find that these propositions are onely proportionall ; Whatsoever God hath decreed to come to passe , the same shall necessarily come to passe ; Whatsoever God hath decreed that it shall not come to passe , it is impossible that it should come to passe . These are suitable indeede , and accordingly we professe that it is impossible that any thinge which is not , because God hath decreed that it shall not be , I say it is impossible that it should be . So likewise as touching the second extract we say that every thing which hath beene , so farre forth as God hath decreed the being thereof , it is impossible not to have beene .

Your third extract is of the same nature with the first , and so admitts the same answere . Well I still attend the discovery of the fallacy ; It may be we shall meete with it in that which followeth , and that is this , But if it bee ( as I suppose ) very consonant to infinite wisedome , altogether consonant to infinite goodnes and to decree contingency as well as necessity a conclusion quite contradictory to that late inferred , will be the onely lawfull issue of the former Maxime or Major proposition matched with a Minor proposition of our owne choosing , &c. Is this to discover the fallacy of the former syllogisme ? Or are you to seeke in the solution of a fallacy ? If it be not concluded in moode and figure , you might have signified so much ; but indeede no exception can that way be taken against it . If any terme had beene aequivocall , the answere had beene by distinction . But no colour of any such just exception ; so that every way the forme is unquestionable . And therefore no exception is here to be taken but against the truth of one of the premises .

And I verily beleive there is one of the premises that disliketh you , though you are ashamed plainly , and directly to manifest so much . For so the answere had beene fayre , and facile by denyinge it , if not the Major because thereof you make use in your owne syllogisme , wherewith you doe as it were requite this , yet at least the Minor which was this , But God hath decreed every thinge that is . For I verely beleeve this is such a dish of lettice as fitts not your lipps . This you say you might have done , but now the liberty hereof is taken from you , and that by your selfe . For although the Pope never bindes his owne handes , yet you have bound your tongue , and sealed up your owne lippes from taking any such exception as this . For you call the syllogisme a fallacy , and that a simple one . Now fallacies are such formes of argumentation , as offend onely in forme of argumentation , which kind of exception is to justify the matter of it , and the truth of the premises , especially whereas you doe not professe that it offendes both in forme , and matter , nor shew any forwardnes to deny either of the propositions . Well we gave you a syllogisme to answere , in steede of answering it , you thinke to make us amends with another syllogisme . I have read that when one presented Augustus with verses looking for a reward , Augustus in steede of a reward gave him verses of his owne making . The Poet hereupon very liberally bestowed a reward upon Augustus . We expected at your handes not another syllogisme , but the answearinge of our owne . But though you fayle to answeare ours , I will not fayle to doe my best in accommodating an answere unto yours . You undertake to inferr the contradictory to our conclusion , which is to outface your opposites , and to cry a syllogisme downe without answearing it .

Yet let us see how well you performe that you undertake . Your syllogisme is this . Whatsoever God hath decreed must of necessity come to passe , but God hath decreed contingency as well as necessity , therefore of necessity there must be contingency . And for the better strengthning of your discourse or argumentation , you make a motion that an additionall to the Maior which is this , Nothinge can come to passe otherwise then God hath decreed it shall or may come to passe . Now the judge , or Chancelour in Logicall Courts to whome such a motion should be made , would cry out shame upon it . For that proposition is an universall affirmative , and you desire that an universall negative should be added to it to make up an entire Maior proposition , which were like a sixt finger upon an hand . And indeed in that case it were neither Categoricall nor Hypotheticall . For though two propositions with a copulative have place in some Hypotheticall syllogismes , yet it is alwayes by way of negation thus , Non & dies est , & nox : sed dies est , ergo non nox , Againe upon a second consideration , the motion would be rejected as being altogether without witt . For as much as the conclusion intended is well enough inferred without it , and this additionall conferres no strength to improve the inference . I appeale to every schollars judgment in this .

Thirdly the proposition it selfe as touching the latter clause of the disjunctive , hath as little witt as the motion made for the admittance of it . As where it is sayd that God hath decreed that thinges may come to passe , you might as well say that God hath decreed that the World may come to passe . For the possibility of the event of thinges is not from Gods decree , but rather from Gods omnipotency . For because he is able to produce every thinge that implyes no contradiction , therfore they are denominated possible .

Lastly this proposition which you crave to be admitted is like a Troian horse , it will doe you more harme then good , as ere we part from this section shall be made manifest . Yet what neede you desire more , your conclusion is granted you , namely that of necessity there must be contingency , supposing Gods decree . For Gods decrees are onely of doing , or suffering some thinges , as it is free for God whether he will doe them , or suffer them , yea or no. And therefore though God had not at all decreed contingency , yet decreing any thinge , of necessity there must be contingency , though he had decreed nothing else , but such thinges as we count most necessary , in the course of nature . But we graunt also that God did decree contingency , and decrees necessity in respect of second causes ; as for example God did decree to make fire of such a nature as to heate or burne necessarily , the Sunne of such a nature as to enlighten the aire necessarily , heavy thinges to move downewards , and light thinges upwardes , and all this necessarily . Necessarily I say in respect of second causes , though this necessity was mere contingency , in respect of the will of God . For he could have chosen whether there should have beene any fire , or world at all , yea and can hinder the fire from burninge if it please him , as he did hinder it from taking hold of the three noble children in the furnace of Babylon . And as God hath decreed many thinges to come to passe necessarily , so hath he decreed many thinges to come to passe contingently , as in course of nature many thinges there are that come to passe contingently by the will of God , and especially the actions of men and Angells .

And as for that additionall of yours which you craved to be admitted , Nothing can come to passe otherwise then God hath decreed , it shall come to passe , we are so farr from disliking it , that we cannot beleive that you doe beleive it , and therefore you have taken a course to confound it , as in due time shall appeare . We willingly professe that all thinges beside God , are created entities , and such as whose being must necessarily depend or God , or have no being at all . And not onely doe we subject res ipsas to the will and decree of God , but allso modos rerum . And these modi rerum are necessity , and contingency .

Nothing ( we say ) comes to passe , but what God hath decreed shall come to passe . Againe nothing comes to passe after any manner whatsoever , but that God hath decreed , it to come to passe after that manner ; whether it come to passe necessarily , God hath decreed it shall come to passe necessarily ; or whether contingently , God hath decreed it shall come to passe contingently . In a word that which you deliver faultringly we say plainly Nothing comes to passe otherwise , then God hath decreed it shall come to passe . So then I say we graunt your conclusion . But how doth it appeare that this conclusion of yours contradicteth our former conclusion which was this , therefore Every thinge comes to passe of necessity . You will say , if every thinge comes to passe of necessity , then nothinge comes to passe contingently . I confesse this consequence is plausible , but to whome ? to none but ignorants . Of which number you are not . For your very conclusion it selfe in the very outward face of it utterly contradicteth this consequence . For is not your conclusion this , therfore of necessity there must be contingency , which manifestly justifieth that necessity and contingency may stand together , and are nothing oppositie . And how , I pray , is this necessity , but in respect of the decree of God ? And did our conclusion proceede in any other sense ? Your selfe have acknowledge that it doth not , though therein somewhat faultring allso , as it is your usuall course , in taking notice of any truth that makes against your tenents . For are not these your wordes in interpreting our conclusion , All thinges are necessary in respect of Gods decree ? Onely you adde at least in this respect as if you would faine drawe it to another meaninge . Now our meaning is plaine . All thinges come not to passe necessarily , nor all things contingently , but some thinges come to passe necessarily as works of nature , some thinges contingently as the actions of men . But by your owne receaved Maxime Nothing can come to passe otherwise then God hath decreed they shall come to passe , therefore God hath decreed that some thinges shall come to passe necessarily , some thinges contingently . But by your owne receaved principle , whatsoever God hath decreed to come to passe , that must of necessity come to passe , therefore of necessity it must come to passe that some thinges shall come to passe necessarily , some thinges contingently . Now give me leave to represent your owne ill carriage , to your owne eyes . The Maior proposition in our syllogisme , and the Maior proposition in your syllogisme are all one as your selfe acknowledge in these wordes , Let the Maior proposition stand as it did before . Now if they be all one why doe you not propose them after one manner ? doe you practise to gull your Reader presuming this legier du maine of yours shall not be discovered ?

The Maior proposition in both is all one I confesse as touching each part , both the midle tearme , and the greater extreame . But when the greater extreame comes to be repeated in the conclusion , it is repeated in a farre different manner in our conclusion then in yours . For in the Maior proposition of each syllogisme it runnes thus , must of necessity come to passe , but in our conclusion it is corrupted thus , must come to passe necessarily . But in your conclusion it is mended thus , of necessitie there must bee contingency ; which is as much as to say , of necessitie it must come to passe . I say in ours it is corrupted ; for whereas in these words must of necessitie come to passe , the word necessity is indifferently to be referred to that which goes before , or that which comes after ; and indeed ought to be referred to that which goes before ; in the conclusion it is put in the last place , so that it cannot bee referred but to the words come to passe . And it is mended in yours , for in the conclusion it is put in the first place of the greater extreame , and so takes away all danger of referring it to the last words , come to passe . As for example , had our conclusion beene shaped like yours as touching the majus extremum which is the same in both , the harshnes of it had beene qualified , thus , ergo all things of necessity must come to passe , which hath a faire , and facile construction thus ; though some things come to passe necessarily , and some things contingently , yet all things as being decreed by God , must of necessity come to passe , both those things that come to passe necessarily , and those things that come to passe contingently . In like sort had your conclusion beene shaped by you as ours is , as touching the greater extreame , as indeed it ought , the greater extreame being all one in both , then your conclusion would have seemed as harsh as ours thus , ergo Contingency must come to passe of necessity or thus some effects shall bee contingent of necessitie , for so runnes the Minor , God hath decreed contingency , or that some effects shall be contingent as well as some are necessary . And as for the consequences which hence you make they are nothinge contradictory to those extracts you made from our conclusion . For all those impossibilities deduced from our conclusion , were onely secundum quid and upon supposition of Gods decree , which kind of impossibilitie is alwaies joyned with a simple and absolute possibilitie to the contrary , secluding Gods decree . For even those things which God decreeth to come to passe contingently as the actions of men , must necessarily by the vertue of Gods decree come to passe , in such a manner as joyned with a possibilitie of not comming to passe , otherwise it were impossible they should come to passe contingently . About which truth , namely that God decreeth some things to come to passe contingently , why doe you faulter in this fowle manner ? If you like it not , why doe you not in plaine termes contest against it , if you doe approve of it , why doe you not plainly professe it , but carry your selfe in the clouds of generalitie and ambiguity ? As first , when you say , God hath decreed contingency , here a man might bee apt to conceave , that you doe beleeve that God hath decreed that some things shall come to passe contingently . Especially if he understand that God decreeth not only necessity , but allso that some thinges shall necessarily come to passe , which may seeme to urge you in like sort to mainteyne that God decreeth contingency , so he should also decree that some things shall come to passe contingently .

Most of all considering what here you seeme to approve of in your additionall , namely that Nothing can come to passe otherwise then God hath decreed . Now the case is cleere that many things come to passe contingently , therfore it followeth that God allso hath decreed , that even those things shall come to passe contingently ; But I have had experience of your opinion to the contrary in another treatise of yours , wherein though you confesse that God hath decreed the necessity of things , & the things themselfes that necessarily come to passe , and graunt that it cannot bee otherwise , yet on the other side though you graunt that God decreeth contingency , yet you deny that God decreeth the thinges themselfes that doe contingently come to passe . A most prodigious opinion , as if God did bring to passe the contingency of a thing ( which is but modus rei , and containes no realitie different from the thing it selfe ) yet doth not bring to passe the thing it selfe ; for if he did he must decree it allso . And as directly opposite to the word of God , plainly testifying a multitude of contingent thinges to have beene decreed by God . The like ambiguitie you content your selfe withall , when you say that God hath decreed that some effects shall be contingent , or as otherwise you expresse it , that some contingent effects shall bee , which seemes manifestly to imply as well the being or existence of them to bee decreed by God as the contingent manner of their being .

Yet I say , in another discourse of yours you fly of from this acknowledgement , but withall deliver your selfe with as much confusion and perturbation , as any adversary could expect in an opposite maintaining erroneous points , and crying downe the truth of God . Thus have I taken paines to answere your syllogisme , but as for the discovery of the fallacy of ours wee have hitherto found nothing tending thereunto : What is to come wee are to expect . Yet hereupon as if you had performed some great service , very gravely and magisterially you tell us , that As ill weeds grow apace , so the late mentioned errour once conceaved , was quickly delivered of a second which derived the infallible certainty of Gods foreknowing things future , from an infallible necessitie ( as they conceaved it ) layd upon them , ( before they had being ) by his immutable decree . But every wise decree presupposeth wisedome , and wisedome essentially includeth knowledge . It seemes you thinke you have sufficiently discharged your selfe of that you undertooke , namely the discovery of the fallacy of our syllogisme , you proceede to the censure of another errour , and that both obscurely and unsoundly expressed . It is about the ground of Gods fore-knowing things to come . Now the opinion you taxe for an errour , is the opinion of those that maintaine that God foreknowes all things to come , by seing the determination of his owne will to the producing of every action . This you expresse after your manner thus , God foreknowes them from an infallible necessitie layd upon them by his immutable decree . I doe not thinke you can produce any Author of this opinion , that expresseth his opinion in this manner . Besides , it is notoriously untrue . For the Authors of this opinion maintayne , that God by his decree , laieth contingency upon some things , as well as necessitie upon others . And that as he will have the fire to burne , the Sunne to enlighten necessarily , so he will have , Angells and men produce their actions contingently and freely . Nay which is more , even they that openly professe , that God doth determine the will of man unto every action as touching the substance of the action ; doe withall maintayne that God determines the will of man and Angells to worke contingently and freely in all their actions , and consequently neither doth hee decree any other wise to determine them , which doctrine maintaynes that Gods will and decree doth lay upon all reasonable creatures a contingent manner of operation rather then any necessity . Yet upon supposition of Gods decree , they maintayne that of necessitie such thinges as God hath decreed shall come to passe , and that after that manner as God hath decreed it to come to passe , that is , either necessarily as all the operations of naturall agents , or contingently and freely , as all the actions of reasonable creatures . But this opinion you dislike , and upon what reason ? Vndoubtedly it seemes they had need bee weighty ones , considering that this question hath beene abundantly canvassed , by the most learned and subtilest among Schoole-divines . And indeed it is one of the first points whereabout I have beene acquainted with Schoole divinity : Scotus proposeth this question , to witt ; Now God doth foreknowe future contingents ; for thus they in their wisedome thought fitt to propose it , to witt , of future contingents in speciall not as you doe , of future thinges in generall . And he proposeth two opinions hereabouts which he impugneth . The first , is the opinion of Bonaventura , who maintayned that God did foreknowe future contingents , by the Ideaes of them in the mind of God . The second is the opinion of Aquinas , who made the ground of Gods foreknowing of future contingents , to bee Their reall existence in eternitie . Both these Scotus impugneth with such excellent arguments to my judgement at that time , and withall so cleare , that as I remember this brought me first in love with Schoole divinity . The third opinion is his owne , which there he maintayneth , & that is this , which you invade , namely , That God knowes all future contingents by knowing his owne will and purpose to produce them . And as touching your objection that God foreknowes the sinnes of men as well as theyr good actions , which yet undoubtedly he did not decree to produce , his answeare is , that this also is foreknown by God in as much as he knowes the determination of his will to produce every sinfull act as touching the substance of it , and to permitt the obliquitie of it . The opinion of Calvin maintayning no other ground of Gods foreknowledge of future contingents but this , & that out of Valla is apt to bee exposed to scorne now adayes , not onely amongst Papists but amongst English Protestants also . But as for Scotus who is knowne to maintayne the same opinion , he is reputed to be of sufficiency to beare the brunt of any adversary that in point of Metaphysicall , and Schoole divinity shall encounter him . Yet consider a little farther . The Thomists and Dominicans who stand much upon the tearmes of defence for the credite and reputation of theyr great Master Aquinas , they are apt enough to meete with Scotus his arguments opposing his opinion in laying the ground of Gods foreknowledge upon the reall existence of all thinges in eternity . But marke how Didacus Alvarer a great Schoole-man carryeth himselfe in this . Aquinas sayth he did never deny Scotus his way of Gods foreknowing future contingents , to witt , by knowing the determination of his owne will . But besides this he devised another , and that was by the reall existence of all future things in eternity . Agayne , in maintaining the opinion of Aquinas concerning the actuall existence of all future thinges in eternity , he first presupposeth the determination of Gods will for the producing of them , and thereupon makes future contingents to have theyr reall existence , & not otherwise . So that for this opinion which you doe very magisterially censure , as an ill weed hath not onely poore Calvin for the patron of it , and Valla alleaged by him ; but Scotus also the Father of the Realls , yea and Didacus Alvarer a Thomist , a sect of Schoole-divines commonly opposite to the Scotists , yet herein professedly concurring with Scotus himselfe , and avouching allso Aquinas himselfe to bee of the same opinion . You had neede therefore looke well to your tackling in opposing such who I tell you never were reputed Babies , but tall fellowes .

But yet I confesse they were but men and may have their matches . But leave your censures , and trust to your sword and dint of arguments , & doe not thinke that words or phrasos or figures ( much lesse imperious censures ) will carry it .

And heere it would bee required , not onely to argue your owne Tenet , but to make answere to theyr Arguments . But you Eagle like and as if they were but flyes keepe your state , and will not fly at such inferiour gaine . Wherein your proselyte shall be little beholding to you , when being possessed with your opinion , hee shall find himselfe left to himselfe to sinke or swimme without any helpe from you to answere theyr arguments , that have maintayned the contrary ; They had neede bee of Chrisippus temper , who was wont to pray his Master to give him principles and let him alone to maintayne them ; Yet it may bee I am deceaved and it was not Chrisippus but Carneades . Yet with one argument you are content to helpe your reader here . Belike it is some cleare demonstration , such as it is , this it is . Every wise decree presupposeth wisedome , and wisedome includeth knowledge , and what of this ? Nay if any man desires to fare better in the endoctrinating himselfe in this point , he must goe to the Cookes , you have no better entertainment for him . A very short dispatche ( in a controversie of great moment ) and a quicke ; Never was Schooleman so simple as to doubt , whether wisedome includeth knowledge or a wise decree presupposeth wisedome ; yet never any one of them was found to discerne any such inference as you imply herhence , as if herhence it did so evidently followe that Gods foreknowing of future thinges doth not depend upon the determination of his will . For you take no paines to cleere this inference . But let us examine this a little . When we say the foreknowledg of future contingents depends upon the determination of Gods will , the meaning is , therefore God foreknowes them because he purposeth to produce them , so farre as they are good , or to permitt them in case they are evill . Now you in opposition to this , tell us , that Gods knowledge goeth before his decree , and because you doe not specify what knowledge , we have reason to expound it of the knowledge spoken of , that is of the knowledge of future contingents . In like sort because you specifie not of what decree you speake , we have reason to understand it of the decree before spoken of , whereupon those divines , whome you impugne , doe ground the foreknowledge of things to come . So then your meaning must be this in opposition to the Tenet which you censure for an errour or weed in opinion . Whereas some thinke that Gods foreknowledge of things to come is grounded upon Gods decree , as if God ergo did foreknow them , because he purposeth to produce them . You are of a contrary opinion , namely , that Gods foreknowledge doth goe before his decree , that is , first God foreknowes thinges to come , and then secondly he purposeth to produce them . For if you meant it of another decree , then that which was spoken of , what an absurd thing is it for you not to specifie it , especially seing you propose this by way of contradiction to the former opinion ? which unlesse it proceedes of the same things is no contradiction . For if I say God doth first decree to produce things , and hereupon he knowes them ; and you shall as it were by way of opposition say ; No this is not so ; but God doth first foresee the actions of men , and thereupon decree to save or damne them , here is no contradiction at all , but an unlearned and foolishe shewe of opposition , without any substance of contradiction . Wherfore if you speake to the purpose in this , and that by way of opposition , your meaning must be this ; God doth not first decree them and afterwards foreknowe them , but rather he first foreknowes them and then decreeth them ; which is as much as to say , that God foreknowing that they will be , doth hereupon decree that they shall be . So that Gods decree of things future contingent proceedeth in this manner , Seing they will be , they shall be . But to consider your reason more closely , Every wise decree ( you say ) presupposeth wisedome . Now this being delivered in opposition to our opinion which maintayne that the foreknowledge of future contingents followeth Gods decree ; and you saying plainly that wisedome rather goeth before Gods decree then followeth after it , ( which indeed is a truth , for God worketh all things according to the counsaile of his will ) this discourse of yours ( I say ) doth imply that this foreknowledge of future contingents , which we make consequent to Gods decree is by us accoumpted the wisedome of God . For otherwise heere againe were no contradiction , though you make shew of contradicting us ; as whereas we say foreknowledge of future things is subsequent to Gods decree , you as it were contradicting us reply , Nay rather Gods wisedome goeth before his decree , otherwise it were no wise decree . So that herein you doe manifestly suppose that we by Gods foreknowledge of future things did understand the wisedome of God . It seemes you conceave it to be so , but as for us we take it to be so foule an absurdity that we desire , though you please your own lipps with such lettice , yet untill you have better ground for it you will not charge it upon us . For even for a man to foreknowe what he meaneth to doe is no part of wisedome . For the ve●yest foole that is may knowe and be privy to what he meaneth to doe . Every man is privy to his owne thoughts and purposes . No man knoweth the things of man but the Spirit of Man . 1. Cor. 2. 8. So then the spirit of man is well enough acquainted with the purposes of man . But the wisedome that directeth the will of God is that which the learned call Scientia simplicis intelligenti● , whereby God knowes what is most fitt to be done for the compassing of his proposed ends , which your selfe confesse to be the part of wisdome in the beginning of the former Section . Where also you made not the least mention of any such part of wisedome as to foreknowe what one meaneth to doe . Now Gods decree of producing future things in theyr season is a decree of the , meanes tending to the end which God h● intended , namely the setting forth of his glory . For God makes all things for himselfe . And this wisedome includeth knowledge , it is Prov. 16. 4 true the knowledge of all meanes whereby his glory may be set forth , and God makes choyce of what he thinkes fitt , and all this knowledge is not the knowledge of what shall be , but onely the knowledge of what may be , or is fi●t to be , which all the learned acknowledge to be scientia simplicis intelligentiae . and they make it distinct from scientia visionis which is the knowledge of what shall be . And these knowledges all acknowledge to be so farre different as that the one to witt scientia simplicis intelligentiae is precedent to Gods decree , the other to witt scientia visionis is subsequent which two knowledges in God , how judiciously and learnedly in the course of your magisteriall censure you are pleased to confound let the Reader judge . But to proceede , hereupon you betake your selfe ●o interrogatories .

The first is , Shall we then graunt that Gods knowledge is antecedent , and his foreknowledge consequent to his decrees ? To this out of that which hath beene formerly delivered may be answered . There is a knowledge goes before Gods will , called scientia simplicis intelligentiae th● knowledge of what may be , or is fitt to be , there is another knowledge called scientia visionis , that is the knowledge of what shall be , and thi● followeth after the will of God ; and I know no tolerable divine that did deny it , untill the opinion of scientia media rose up ; which the Authors themselves confesse to be a new invent●on ; And here as if this opinion were both Law and Gospell unto you , you ●ise up in grave and supercilious manner to censure the contrary .

Now as for the terme of foreknowledge ; I answere the knowledge of what may be , or is fitt to be , goes before the will of God , and so may be called the foreknowledge of God ; but the knowledge that things shall be , though it followeth Gods will , yet may it be called foreknowlege in respect of the event of the things themselves . For the things exist in time , but God did know , that they should be , from all eternitie , like as from all eternitie he did decree the futurition of them . Your second interrogatorie is this , Or shall we say God did inevitably decree the obliquitie of Iewishe blasphemy against his Sonne because he did most certainly foreknowe it ? You never shewed your teeth till now , by this I perceave what you aime at , which hitherto you have beene ashamed to professe in plaine termes , namely , that future contingents which come to passe in the World are not decreed . But what meane you to deny that , in this cunning manner , which you durst not deny openly . For the syllogisme you proposed to answere contained this , in plaine termes in the Minor thus , All things that come to passe are decreed to come to passe : which if you had but in plaine termes denyed , your solution had beene plaine and briefe , whereas you neglecting that course did fetche a great compasse insteed of answering to requite us with another argument whereby to inferre a proposition contradictory to our conclusion .

Secondly though then you might have denyed it , yet now you cannot without contradicting your selfe . For you justified the truth of the premises in that syllogisme , in as much as all the exception you tooke against it was against the form● and not against the matter . For you told us , it was a fallacy , a very simple one . Now every Schollar knowes that where no other exception is taken against a syllogisme , but this , that it is a fallacy , this is as much as to justifie the truth of each proposition contained therein .

Thirdly , I give another reason why you have prejudiced your selfe from denying this . For you have professed that Nothing can come to passe otherwise , then God hath decreed it to come to passe , Iewishe blasphemy against the Sonne of God came to passe contingently and freely , therfore God hath decreed , that that very Iewishe blasphemy against the Sonne of God should come to passe contingently and freely , &c. what followeth hereupon but that therefore God ordeyneth it to come to passe , for to come to passe contingently and freely , is no terminus diminuens of comming to passe . You have nothing at all that I knowe to helpe you at this dead lift , but to fly to the confused manner of expressing that former proposition of yours , whereupon I take advantage , if so be your heart serve you to take hold thereof , whereof I much doubt . For it is true indeed that that proposition was not proposed categorically thus , Nothing shall come to passe otherwise then God hath decreed , it shall come to passe ; whereupon I have taken advantage ag●inst you ; but disjunctively thus Nothing can come to passe otherwise then God hath decreed it shall or may come to passe . If you will helpe your selfe with this disjunctive you may ; but I will be bold to tell you , it is like to prove a shamefull helpe , and such as seemes to be thrust in onely to charme the dangerous issue of it ( whereof it seems you had a glimpse ) if it were left out . For consider , is it a sober speech to say that God hath decreed that things may come to passe ? The possibilitie of thinges is knowne to God before ever his decrees goe forth . He knowes what he is able to bring to passe before he resolves what shall come to passe : And therfore too too absurde it is , to make the possibilitie of any thing the object of Gods decree . Sticke rather to this , and say , that thoughe God did ordaine , the Iewishe blasphemy against his Sonne should come to passe contingently & freely , yet therhence it followes not that he did ordaine it should come to passe : Whereabouts when we knowe your mind è renatâ consilium capiemus , we will thinke of a convenient answere , in the meane time I will proceede . Therefore in the fourthe place why should it seeme so uncouthe that God should decree this very blasphemy , as to be cryed downe at the very hearing of it , especially by Christians who knowe and beleeve the oracles of God , and acknowledge that passage . Act. 4. 27. 28. amongst the rest to be dictated by the Spirit of God wherein the Apostles joyntly professe in theyr meditations unto God in this manner , Doubtlesse against thy holy Sonne Iesus whome thou hast anointed both Herod and Pontius Pilate , with the Gentiles and people of Israel gathered themselves together , to doe whatsoever thy hand and thy counsaile had determined before to be done . Iudas that betrayed him , the High-Priests that hired Iudas to betray him , the witnesse that testified against him , the people that cryed away with him , were of the people of Israell ; The souldiours that scourged him , crowned him with thornes , spate in his face , crucified him , pierced him with a speare & were of the Gentlis , yet all these together with Horod and Pontius Pilate , are avouched by the Holy Ghost to have gathered themselves together to do what God had determined to bee done ; and was there not both Iewish and Gentilish blasphemy against the Sonne of God to be found in all this ? and shall wee feare to professe that they did in all this what God had decreed to be done , when the Holy Ghost professeth that they did what God had determined to be done ? Could you be ignorant of this passage ? and dare you in so apparent termes draw your Reader to contradict it , as some blasphemous assertion , without taking any paines to interpret the place , and so free your selfe from manifest contradiction thereunto , as at first sight is obvious to every Reader , that will but compare this of yours with that of the Acts ? Had you ventured upon an interpretation , I would have taken paines to consider it . I have shaken in peeces the rotten interpretation of Bellarmine and Arminius , different each from other . I would have tryed what I could have performed upon yours also . And throughout the Scriptures we may perceive how jealous God is over the maintaining of his providence throughout , even in the most sinfull things that come to passe , and that in such phrases , which when they are used by us , they are cryed downe for blasph●my ; but in the meane t●me they consider not , that if they be the phrases of the Holy Ghost , ere th●y are aware they are found to charge the Holy Ghost with blasphemy . And the truth being rightly uttered , is farre enough off even from harshnesse also , as well as from errour , yea from harshnesse unto mens affections , though never so corrupt . As for example , what good soever there is found in such actions , wee acknowledge God to be the author of it , but not of the the malice or evill that cleaves to it ; yet that also we say God will have come to pass , but onely by his permission . For , Non aliquid sit nisi volente Deo , Not any thing comes to passe ( saith Austin ) but God willing Enchirid. cap. 95. it ; and he comprehends both good and evill , as appeares by that which followes , vel sinendo vt siat , as in case it be evill , vel ipse faciendo , as in case it be good . But of both these hee pronounceth that not any thing comes to passe but God willing it . The like may bee manifested to have beene acknowledged by Anselmus , Hugo de Sancto Victore , and Bradwardine , yea and our greatest adversaries . For Bellarmine even in the midst of his heat against us , professeth , that Bonum est esse malum , Deo permittente : It is good that there should bee evill by Gods permission : and if it be good , I pray you why is it not lawfull for GOD to will it , see●ng upon the same ground it was affirmed long agoe by St. Austin that God doth Enchirid. cap. 96. will it . But as for Arminius , never any man was knowne to be smitten with the spirit of giddinesse in opposing this truth more then he ; for sometimes he professeth , It was Gods will that Ahab should fill up the measure of his sinnes , and how I pray Exam. praed. Perk. pag. 162. Ibid. pag. 114 , 115. could that be , but by adding sinne unto sinne ? Againe , hee professeth that it was Gods will that the Iewes should proceed so farre as they did proceed in their ignominious handling of Christ ; and every man knowes that they proceeded to a very foule degree of blasphemy and impiety therein . Last of all , it is true that Aquinas and Durandus both oppose this , but herein Aquinas manifestly opposeth Austin , though he names him not . And againe , I desire no better triall of this truth then their oppositions . For if I doe not make it appeare that their arguments are meerly sophisticall , and manifestly unsound , let me be accompted a blasphemer in the maintaining of this Tenet . All which I have already performed , and taken in Valentianus his more copious and frothy exceptions also , but in another language . Lastly , yet were it tolerable if you did onely deny that sinnes of men were decreed by God ; but you will have nothing that comes to passe contingently and freely to be decreed by God ; contingency you say is decreed , but not the things that fall out contingently : whence it followeth that by your opinion , God did decree no mans faith , no mans repentance , no mans obedience , but onely did decree the contingency of this . This is the mysterious iniquity of your doctrine which you conceale , and make choice rather to give instance in sinne and blasphemy , and to represent the harshnesse of maintaining that to be decreed by God , onely that you may the better insinuate the approbation of your unlearned Tenets , into vulgar and popular affections . Yet you give me cause to guesse that you would have your reader beleeve more herein , then you beleeve your selfe . You would have your Reader beleeve that God did not decree the Iewish blasphemy against his Sonne , but your beleefe is onely that God did not decree the obliquity of it , and yet forthwith you doubt whether the obliquity may bee distinguished from the act . Againe , you would have your Reader beleeve that God did not decree the Iewish blasphemy against his Sonne , but your beleefe here expressed is onely this , that God did not inevitably decree the Iewish blasphemy , implying that God did decree it , but not mevitably . And not any of our Divines that I know ever said any more , then that God did decree it .

You adde another absurd errour hereunto concerning Gods decrees ; that forsooth some of them are evitable , some inevitable . Now the meaning of our Divines in saying that God did decree any obliquity , is onely this ; God did decree that such an obliquity should come to passe by his permission , directly answering to the prof●ssing of Austin ; Non aliquid fit nisi Omnipotens fieri velit , vel sinendo ut siat , vel ipse faciendo . Enchirid. cap. 95. It is true , Arminius disputes , and that acutely as hee thinkes , that in some actions the obliquity cannot bee distinguished from the actions themselves . I have dealt with him in this point ; I am ready to deale with you also . But it is enough for you to shew your affection to Armenius his Tenets ; as for your sufficiency to maintaine them , that you doe dispense very sparingly , as if you affected state in this . Further you tell us , to admit your former conclusion , that the aeternall foreknows all things because he decreeth them , or that they are absolutely necessary in respect of his decree , ( the disjunctive here should be a copulative , for that which followeth is not verified of either of them disjunctively , but copulatively of them both , ) were to imprison his infinite wisedome in his selfe-fettered power , to restraine the Aeternall Majestie from using such libertie in his everlasting decrees as some earthly Monarches usurpe in causes temporall or civill . For the Pope never tyes his hand by any grant , which is a fault in him . But in that Holy One the reservation of such libertie is a point of high perfection . A little before you told us very gravely , that weedes grow apace , and the former errour which you minced , as loath to declare your mind thereon plainly , touching Gods decreeing all things , was soone delivered of a second , to wit , the ground of Gods foreknowing things to come to be the determination of his will . You rather thinke , that God foreknowes things to come , before , and without the determination of his will . Whether this opinion of yours bee a tare or good corne , let the Reader judge . And of what nature not a second is , but seconds are , whereof it seemes you are soone delivered , which now we come to examine . To say that God foreknowes all things , because he decreeth them , is ( you say ) to imprison his infinite wisedome in his power . Why it is nothing so : for Gods decree is Gods will , not his power : yet how is Gods wisedome imprisoned in his will , more then his power ? For as God knoweth more things possible to be done , and fit to be done then he doeth , so hee can doe more then he doeth , and therefore his wisedome is no more imprisoned thereby then his power . But besides this , you take your aime quite amisse . For the foreknowledge of what things God will bring to passe , is no part of wisedome . For , for a man to be privie to his owne purposes , is no part of wisedome , for it is incident even to silly creatures . Againe , to know what I meane to doe , what a senselesse thing it is to say that this is to imprison my knowledge ? and as like senselesse a thing it is to say that Gods knowledge or wisedome is imprisoned , by being privie to his owne purposes ? Againe , how is Gods power fettered by his will ? Seeing the power of every creature is to be ordered by his will without fettering of it ? you signifie that his liberty is hereby restrained ; wherein ? in his everlasting decrees . A most senselesse speech . Is it possible that by making an everlasting decree , Gods libertie of making an everlasting decree shall be restrained ? Perhaps you may say , by making it he cannot alter it . I answer , if he should alter it after he hath made it , this decree by way of alteration should not be everlasting : but you suppose the contrary , namely , that Gods decrees are everlasting . Or if God should for a while suspend his decrees , and not make them with the first , how is it possible they could be everlasting ? This savoureth strongly of an affection to maintayne that Gods decrees may be not everlasting with Vorstius , though you are ashamed to professe it , and therfore hand over head you thrust in the denomination of everlasting upon the decrees though quite contrary to your intention . For you would have God still ind●fferent to decree this or that , as the Pope is who by no graunt bindes his hands .

And why so ? is it , that upon emergent occasions , God might decree a newe as he thinkes fitt ? why but consider , all these emergent occasions were from everlasting knowne to God . So that if God at th●s time were indifferent to decree , he would decree no otherwise then he hath from everlasting . For from everlasting he knewe all that now he doth , and at this present his will is no otherwise then from everlasting it was . For with him is no variablenesse nor shaddow of change . Iam. 1. 17.

The wildernes of your inventions , I well perceave , is not at an end . I wonder whither the wantonnes of our witts would bring us in the end . Neither are Gods judgements yet at an end in giving men over to illusions to beleive lyes , and that for not embracing his truth with love . And who can looke for better from them who shamefully oppose the g●ace of God . Is it marva●le if God infatuate them ? . As for the being of things absolutely necessary by reason of Gods decree , this is your language , not ours , in the last period of your former Section . We say , looke what God hath decreed , that of necessitie must come to passe , but how , not alwayes necessarily , but sometimes contingently . Only the workes of nature doe by the decree of God come to passe necessarily ; but as for the actions of men they come to passe by the decree of God contingently and freely . But whether workes of nature , or actions of men , they of necessitie must come to passe , if God hath decreed them , and that after such a manner as God hath decreed them to come to passe , that is , necessary things necessarily , contingent things contingen●ly .

6. As a man or Angell having free power to doe this or that , by producing any thing subject to the freedome of his will , doth therewithall produce contingency without decreeing it , ( for in as much as he workes freely the worke must needes be freely wrought , that is contingently , ) In like so●t God being free to produce any worke without him , upon the producing of such a worke doth produce contingency without decreeing it . For the work cannot be wrought by God but freely , and consequently it must needs come to passe contingently .

To produce this or that , is the object of Gods decree , because he can choose whether he will produce this or tha● ; but to worke contingently is no object of Gods decree ●for it is not in Gods power to choose whether he will worke contingently or necessarily . If he doth worke at all ad extra he must needs worke freely that is contingently . For as it is of the perfection of the divine nature to bee necessarily , so it is the perfection of divine nature to worke not necessarily in the producing of ought without him , but freely & contingently . But the divine nature differeth from the nature Angelicall and humane , that he not only worketh freely , but also is able to create creatures herein like himselfe , that can worke freely as namely Angells and men ; like as he can and hath produced other creatures that worke in all things necessarily .

Agayne , considering that necessitie and contingency are but modi rerum certaine manners of bringing things to passe , & therfore cannot exist without the things themselves wh●ch are sayd to exist and to be brought to passe either necessarily or contingently . Therefore it cannot be sayd that God doth produce the necessitie or contingency of this or that particular , unlesse he produceth the particular it selfe ; neither can he be sayd to decree the contingency or necessity of this or that particular , except he decree the thing it selfe . So that for God to decree the necessitie or contingency of this or that particular , is nothing else then to decree that this particular shall necessarily come to passe , or such a particular shall contingently come to passe .

Neyther is it reasonable to affirme , that God doth decree necessitie or contingency in generall , but not the necessitie of this particular , or the contingency of this particular . For like as generalls cannot exist but in particulars , so neither can generalls be otherwise produced then by producing particulars . So it is impossible that God should decree the producing of generalls otherwise then by producing of particulars . Now there is a contingency taken in another sense , which doth not accompany the existence of any thing but only the essence of it , and denominates it before it doth exist , as when we say raine to morrow is contingent , it is as much as to say it is possible to raine , it is possible not to raine . So touching the actions of men , of any action we may say it is contingent , for as much as it is in the power of man to doe it or no. Now this kind of contingency is not alwayes the object of Gods decree . For in this sense the continuation of the World is a contingent thing ; for it may continue or no. So before the World was made , it was possible to be and not to be , and so the making of it contingent , but not by the decree of God . For nothing is such by the decree of God but it might be altered , for Gods decree is a free act . But it was impossible that the World should not be of a contingent nature , like as it is impossible that God should not have power to make the World , or not to make it according to his will . Nay the very workes of men and Angells in this kind of contingency are not the object of Gods decree ; for in as much as they are sayd to be possible to be or not to be , this is not from the decree of God but rather from the nature of God , as all necessary truthes are derived therefrom .

Neither is it in the power of God to make that the works of men and Angells should not be possible to be or not to be . But if the possibilitie were the object of Gods decree , it might be otherwise . For Gods decree passeth forely upon every thing where upon it passeth , so that if he decree them to be possible , he might have decreed them not to be possible . Yet you seeme to speake of contingents in no other sense then this , as when you say , God hath decreed that some effects shall be contingent , although I confesse it is so obscurely delivered that a man can hardly discerne your meaning . But for farther discourse hereof you put us over to the article of creation . So likewise for the contingency of humane actions as decreed by God ; your confirmation thereof we must expect , when you come to treat of mans fall . This , thus by fetching compasse expressed by you , I doubt will prove no more then this , that God decreed to make man a free agent ; yet you deliver it as if the demonstration hereof did require , and promise some exquisite perfourmance . And I am verily perswaded you have a reach at such a kind of freedome , as to make it good , will surpasse the perfourmance of any Schoole divine that ever was , from the dayes of Anselmus to the dayes wherein we live .

But of the nature of your perfourmances we have had reasonable experience . You may remember what he sayd while he was shearing his hogges , Here is a great deale of cry and a little wooll . In the next place you dictate your parallells Eliam . wherein it seemes you take great pleasure . That Gods wisedome is infinite we nothing doubt ; but to make it consist in knowing what he is able to doe , we take to be a very hungry description of it . For is either man or Angell any thing the wiser for knowing what he is able to doe ? Gods immensitie consists in filling all places which are but finite , neyth●r is it possible they should be infinite , yet beyond things that are , this immensitie is not extended . And you have already denyed precisely that God is in vacuo . But as for Gods eternity that doth not only coexist with all time , but had existen●e before it actually and that without all beginning . In a word Gods immensitie is not in respect of any quantitas molis , quantitie of extension , but only in respect of quantitas virtutis . And what is this different from his infinite power . And indeed God is not in place after the manner of being contained in any thing , but only after the way of containing and supporting all things . And looke by what quantitie he made all things , by the same quantity he supports all things , and that is the quantitie of his power .

A very weake amplification it is in my judgement of Gods incircumscriptible presence , ( which yet is nothing els but his immensitie ) to say it is not circumscribed by the coexistence of his creatures . For coexistence is of no apt nature to circumscribe . For the thing circumscribed coexists with that which circumscribes it , as well as that which circumscribes it , coexists with that which is circumscribed by it .

As for your Mathem●ticall conceyts of center and circumscrence , I have already discovered in their places the vanity of them . To say that eternity is more then commensurable to time , is to graunt that it is commensurable thereunto , which is very absurde . And how is it possible , that should be commensurable to a thing mensurable , which indeed is immensurable as being without beginning and without end . You say it is in all durations ; not as contained in them ( I hope ) if as containing them , this also is untrue . For like as it is not Gods eternity whereby he made the World but by his power , so it is not by his eternity that he maintayneth the duration of it but by his power . What noone tide is we know and acknowledge to be some thing , but as for fluent instants we knowe none . For fluent is as much as succedent ▪ and succession is not but in respect of parts , and an instant hath no parts . Yet if we give way to such imaginations , like as sluxus puncti in Longitudinem is not contayned in the line , but is the line ; so sluxus instantis is not contayned in a set time , but is the very set time it selfe . Nor is it a part of it as noone-tide is of the day ; And a most absurd thing it is to make the duration of the creature in respect of Gods eternitie , to resen●ble the proportion that is betweene the part of time and the whole time , you may say as well the World is contained in Gods immensitie , like as halfe the yard is contayned in the whole yard . Your last position is more sober in all the parts of it then the rest ; the proportion of the least beame of light , to the light of the World may be expressed ; the proportion of things that are , to the things that God is able to produce cannot , the first is finite , this is infinite . Yet by your leave , there is no greater disproportion betweene Gods wisedome manifested and manifestable , then betweene his power manifested and manifestable . In a word , God hath so farre manifested his power and wisedome , that wee plainly discerne both of them to bee infinite ; and doe you thinke God can so manifest either of them , or both of them , that we may discerne them to be more then infinite ? And if his wisedome manifestable doth but so farre exceed his wisedome manifested , as his power man●festable doth exceed that which is already manifested , &c. what meant you to say that Least of all may his infinite wisedome bee comprehended within those effects produced . For if there bee but a pa●ity of proportion , then no disproportion . You proceed to amplifie the wisedome of God above all that can bee gathered by this Vniverse , after your manner .

But I pray consider , was it possible for God to take a more wise and convenient course for the salvation of the world then he hath done ? I am sure Austin flatly denyes it , Aug. de Trinit. lib. 13. cap. 10. Ostendamus non alium modum possibilem Deo desuisse cujus potestati cuncta aequaliter subjacent , sed sanandae nostrae miseriae convenientiorem modum alium non suisse , nec esse oportuisse . I am apt enough to conceive , that God could have made and governed the world after another manner then hee hath done , and that after as wise a manner as hee hath done , but I dare not say that hee could doe it after a wiser manner then he hath done . Many other particulars might bee instanced in , that might stagger the course of your amplifications , which yet sometimes are wondrous vulgar , as when you say , God knowes what might have beene and what may be , as perfectly as he knowes the things that are . Which is as much as to say , God knoweth as well what he can do , as what he doth . Now is this strange in a silly man to know what hee doth , or what he can doe ? And it were a vaine exception to say that God knowes as well things done by others as by himselfe ; seeing not onely their power of doing is from God , but the very doing it selfe is by you acknowledged to be by the concourse of God . As for the manner of Gods concourse , if you conceit it to be upon supposition of Gods foresight of mans endeavour first , you doe not well to propose your errours or any other Iesuiticall paradoxes for principles and grounds to build upon .

7. The incomprehensible wisedome of God doth appeare more you say , in the harmony or mixture of necessity and contingency . And this you say is most conspicuous in moderating the free thoughts of men or Angels , and ordering them to the certaine accomplishment of his glory . In the fou●th Section you told us that the parts of wisedome were two ; the one in intending the right end , the other in ordering right meanes . So then the prescription of right meanes is a part of wisedome , but why it should affect the mixture of necessity with contingency in accomplishing the end intended I see no reason . Nay rather I finde that wisedome alwaies affecteth the most certaine meanes that can bee had for the compassing of the end intended . As for example , all manuall Arts doe expresse their wisedome by meanes used by them which are altogether of necessary operation . In the art of physicke also the meanes used by physitians as all sorts of medicines doe all worke by necessity of nature . In the Art of Oratory , the end is wholly conjecturall , and the meanes they use being arguments of persuasion , there no necessity at all hath place . No where doe I finde that any wisedome affecteth the mixture of necessitie with contingency , as you speake . Come we to the consideration of the wisedome of God . How is Gods wisdome seene in the contexture of a mans body , and every part thereof ? Who knoweth the breeding of young bones ? saith Solomon . I am fearfully and wonderfully made , saith David . Galen in consideration of the body of man anatomized , was driven to acknowledge the Divine providence . Now what mixture of necessity with contingency did God affect in this ? The fashioning of the body in the wombe being meerly an operation of nature , not of any free agent . Yet even this necessary operation of nature is contingent I confesse unto God ; for as much as he could either suspend the course of nature , or after it , or set an end unto it . So on the contrary the most free actions of men doe of necessity come to passe in their kinde and after their manner , as well as workes of nature in their kinde and after their manner . For to abstaine from the breaking of Christs bones was a free action of the Souldiers ; so was Iosiahs action in burning the Priests bones upon the Altar ; so was Cyrus his action in restoring the Iewes unto their country ; so was the crucifying of Christ Iesus , and other foule actions committed against him by Iewes and Gentiles , yet were all these decreed and determined by God , as the Scriptures plainly testifie ; and therefore as your selfe acknowledge , of necessity they come to passe . Yet how God doth moderate the thoughts of men and Angels , you are not over hasty to communicate unto us . Solomon speakes plainly when he saith , The hearts of the Kings are in the hands of God , and he turneth them , &c. and both the preparations of the heart , and Prov. 21. 1 Prov. 16. 1 Prov. 29. 26. answer of the tongue are from the Lord : and that many seeke the face of the Ruler , but every mans judgement commeth of the Lord . But in what sense you say God moderates mens thoughts , and ordaines them for the accomplishment of his glory , you doe not love to discover : and I doubt all this will desinere in piscem in the end , and come to nothing . But although the meanes which man may use may be successively infinite , yet the ends ( you say ) which God doth forecast in their creation shall by any course which they take be inevitablely brought to passe ; what these ends are which God did forecast in their creation , you come very soberly to expresse , or rather leave to the Reader to collect out of these wordes , the award of every thought is determined by Gods eternall decree , that is to bring you to playne termes either Salvation or Damnation . These then are the wayes wherby they shall accomplish Gods glory in the end , what course soever they take ; And herein consists the infinite wisedome of God .

Now let us examine the sobriety of all this . First you told us of courses infinite , by which notwithstanding all they re varieties and inconstancies , Gods ends should be accomplished . Now all these courses in reference unto the issue of damnation or salvation whereby Gods glory shall be ●llostrated , ( wherof you speake as of the end that shall be accomplished . ) I say al these courses in reference hereunto are but two : good , and bad answerablely to Hercules his bivium , and Pythagoras his Y ; according to that of Esay . Say yee surely it shall be well with the just , for they shall eate the fruite of they re workes ; woe be to the wicked , it shall be evill with him , for the reward of his handes shall be given him . Esa. 3. 10. 11.

Secondly , if this be all the fruite of Gods wisdome , wherin doth this exceede the wisedome of every Magistrate ; who ordeynes rewards for the good and punishment , for the wicked ? Agayne what need is there of moderatinge mens thoughts unto this end ; whereas though he never moderates any mans thoughts , yet his wisedome shall appeare never a white the lesse in setting forth his glory in punishing the one and rewarding the other .

Consider yet farther what I pray you , was the end of Iudas , which God did forecast in his creation ? No doubt the setting forth of his owne glory , but I desire to know whether he did intend to set it forth in Iudas his salvation , or damnation . So likewise I desire to know what end God did forecast of Paul the Apostle in his creation ? his glory I doubt not , but whether in his salvation or damnation . It seemes by the genius of your Tenet , that God did neither intend the salvation of the one , nor the damnation of the other in their creation ; but indifferently intended each of them should be saved or damned accordingly as they departed this life , either in impenitency or in repentance . Now if God did not intend the salvation of Paul , nor the condemnation of Iudas at the time of their creation . I pray when did he begin to intend it ? Say what you will , it followeth that these intentions of God were not eternall , and consequently neither the decrees of God are eternall ; yet commonly you professe of Gods decrees that they are eternall and everlasting . Yet here I confesse you may play fast and loose , and say they are eternall so farre forth as they are without end , but they are not eternall so farre forth as to bee without beginning . But what meane you so directly to contradict the word of God , as you doe if this be your opinion ? For the Apostle professeth that mans election was made before the foundation of the world : yea and touching the wicked , King Solomon professeth , that Pro. 16. 4. God made him against the day of evill .

As for the similitude , you use to represent unto us the wisdome of God by comparing of him unto a bird catcher , though you father it upon Austine , yet in this case it is nothing worth . For though it be more then humane after many birds formerly caught to catch them all againe ; yet for God it is nothing , who is everywhere , and in whom every thing hath that being , that life , that motion which they enjoy . The hayres of our head we know are numbred ; and therefore nothing strange that our thoughts should bee , considering that our thoughts shall come into judgement , but our haires shall not . And if wee shall give an account of every idle word , as Mat. 12. 26 our Saviour hath professed unto us , why not as well of every idle thought ? Hee shall make the counsels of the heart manifest , 1 Cor. 4. 5. but that the award of every thought is defined by God , I cannot tell how to beleeve : my reason is , because evill thoughts are not fit to be rewarded ; and as for the evill thoughts of Gods children , shall not they bee pardoned as well as their evill words and outward actions are , to wit , upon their repentance ? For if wee acknowledge our sinnes , God is faithfull and just to forgive us our sinnes , 1 Ioh. 1. 9. And Peter signified as much to Simon Magus conceiving evill thoughts also , when he said unto him , Repent of this thy wickednesse , and pray unto God , that if it bee possible the thought of thine heart might be forgiven thee , Act. 8. 22.

8. Free it was for you to have done something the last yeare , which you did not , and every minute thereof , in case every minute thereof you were waking . For that a man hath free will in his sleepe I never heard . But how thereby the whole frame of your cogitations or actions might have beene altered , is a mystery unto mee . Yet I doubt not but the whole frame of your cogitations and actions this yeare might have beene altered . For actions free and contingent could not justly bee accounted free and contingent , were they not accompanied with a possibility of being otherwise . And God you acknowledge to be the cause of this alteration , and of every thought and deed thus altered . So then if there had beene another course of your thoughts and actions , God had beene the cause of it , and of every thought and deed . What thinke you of that course which hath beene of your thoughts and actions ; is God the true and princ●pall cause of this also , and of every thought and deed of yours this yeare ? I see no reason to the conttary , but it stands you upon to justifie this also , as well as the former ; and as of your selfe , so as concerning the actions of all o●her both men and Angels : and if for one yeare , why not for every yeare from the beginning unto this day ? And so I see no colour of reason why you should not as freely acknowledge that all things are decreed by God ; for if God hath decreed all the thoughts and actions of men , it will bee no hard matter to grant that God hath decreed all things that in their times and seasons doe successively come to passe . And if God be the true and principall cause of them , did hee not decree that he would be the true and principall cause of them ? that is , that he would in due time indeed and principally produce them , not withstanding all the evill that doth accompany them ? For I doe not thinke that you take upon you so much perfection as to avouch that amongst all your thoughts and actions for a yeare together , there was no evill thought , no evill action among them . For if you stand upon it that God cannot be the true and principall cause of any evill thought or action , we must not yeeld unto you that God was the true and principall cause of all the thoughts and actions that were conceived in you , or derived from you that yeare or yeares wherein you were hatching this booke of yours , which I take to be a fardell of erroneous conceits both in Philosophy and Divinity .

Neither if you did maintaine that God is the true and principall cause of every free action , would wee object that then you make Gods will to depend on ours ; for there is no colour for any such objection ; there is colour for the contrary , as namely , if he be the principall cause , then his will doth not depend on mine , but rather mine on his : and consequently our liberty seemes to be infringed by making God the principall cause of all our actions . Yet you take no notice of this objection , ( much lesse take paynes to answere it ) but goe on desperately ( in shewe and that against your owne tenet ) to maintayne , that our will is necessarily subject unto his . But whether you meane in producing thoughts & actions , ( which alone is to the purpose ) or in some other sense and respect you betray not .

Yet by the way what meane you to say that our will is contingently free ; seeing this is as much as to say , it is possible that the will of man should not be free . But you give a reason and it is worthy our consideration if perhaps therby , we may perceyve to what issue of tolerable sense your present discourse may be brought . And the reason is this : For unto every cogitation possible to man or Angell he hath everlastingly decreed a proportionate end : to every antecedent possible , a correspondent consequent , which needes no other cause or meanes to produce it but only the reducing of possibility ( granted by his decree ) into act . For what way soever ( of many equally possible ) mans will doth encline , Gods decree is a like necessary cause of all the good or evill that befalls him for it . I looked for an elucidation of a former assertion or two of yours , namely , that God is the true and principall cause of every action , and deede that hath passed from you this yeere , like as he had beene the cause ( as you say ) of every thought and action that might have passed from you , if the frame of your thoughts and actions had beene altered .

The other assertion was that our will is necessarily subject unto Gods will , which also is delivered in reference to the former assertion . I say I looked for an elucidation of these by this following sentence wherin you pretend to give a reason of the former . But this performes nothing lesse . If you had done something the last yeere which you did not as you might , then the whole frame of your thoughts and actions this yeare had beene altered , and God had beene the cause of this alteration and of every thought and action therin . And the reason is this , For unto every cogitation possible God hath decreed , a determinate end . But I pray you consider , are the thoughts and actions of men this yeare the proportioned end of somethinge that you did the last yeare ? Or are they correspondent consequents to our antecedent actions the last yeare ? Many man the last yeare was an opposite unto goodnes , he is reformed this yeare and become a proselyte . Is grace the proportionate end of the state of sinne ? The last yeare many a man was a formall professour ; this yeare it may be he is turned Papist , or Turke , is this a correspondent consequent to that antecedent ? Yet many continue formall professours still , wi●hout any such alteration ; some have changed theyr formalitie into realitie . It may be some man the last yeare hath satisfied anothers silthy lust , and this yeare is advanced by it .

Call you this a correspondent consequent destined by God ? Some have prospered by impoysoning of others and proceeded in their sinfull courses so much the more , without controll . In a word by the last Clause it appeares that by proportionate end , & correspondent consequents , you meane only the good and evill , that doe befall men according to their former workes , according to that God will rewarde every man according to his workes . But by your leave this hath no proportion to prove that God is the Authour of every thought and action of man this yeare , which you made to be consequent to some thing done the last yeare ; and God to be the true and principall cause of every one of those thoughts , and actions . For what ? Are mens thoughts and actions this yeare , the rewardes and punishments of the same mens actions the other yeare ? What a ridiculous conceyte in this ? Well ; still we holde you engaged to maintayne , that , which you have plainely avouched , namely that God is the true and principall cause of every action , and thought of man for a yeare together , yea and of every thought and action of yours for the yeare past ; which you have delivered without any explication . I have manifested the incongruity of your whole discourse , in generall . In particular consider further : you say that mans will is necessarily subject unto God ; this we understood in respect of operation in proportion to what you delivered in the sentence before going ; but you understand it in respecte of rewardes or punishments succeeding , proportionably unto former actions whether good , or bad . But by your leave it is not mans will , but his person rather that herin is necessarily subject unto God . For no wise man useth to say that mans will is rewarded or punished , but his person rather . Agayne , suppose God decreeth not the actions of men , but the rewards of them , yet you have not explicated how in this case Gods will depends not upon the will of man , the true explication whereof that I know is only this ; that the execution of his will may depend upon mans will to witt in rewarding , or punishing , but not the will of God himselfe : Yet if good or evill actions of men be foreseene by God before he hath decreed either to reward or punish ; neither have you offered to cleare Gods will in this case from dependance upon the will of man , neither are you able to performe it . Agayne it is false to say that God hath decreed a proportionate end to every cogitation possible . For many cogitations are possible which shall never be ; And it is absurde to say God hath decreed an end to that which shall never bee . Agayne by this proportionate end and correspondent consequent , you understand rewardes , or punishments ; But it is false to say that God hath ordayned to every cogitation a reward or punishment . For to the evill thoughts and words , and deeds of Gods children he hath ordayned neither reward nor punishment to befall them , but his purpose is to pardon them .

Agayne punishments for the sinnes of men are many times inflicted by the sinnes of men ; So Sennacherib that blasphemer of the God of Israel , was slayne by the sword of his owne children ; Davids adultery was punished by the fil●hy actions of his owne Sonne Absolon deflouring his fathers Concubines .

If these were proportionate ends to former sinnes , and correspondent consequents , and everlastingly decreed by God , what hindereth but that in your opinion , actions notoriously sinnefull may be sayd to be decreed by God ? You say the producing of these consequents and proportionate ends , needsno other cause or meanes but only the reducing of possibilitie ( granted by his decree ) into acte : Which is plaine gibrish ; you instance in nothing for illustration sake , not as if your discourse were so plaine that it needed it not , but rather it is so unsound , that you might well feare it : And darkenesse is fittest for them that hate the light : I will give instance for you ; Absalons deflouring his fathers Concubines was a disproportionate end , and correspondent consequent to Davids defiling his neighbours wife ; for God punished David hereby ; and Arminius acknowledgeth that this fact of Absolon Inserviit castigand● Exam. praedest . Perk. p. 162. Davidi : Now this fact of Absolon by your doctrine in this place , needed no other cause or meanes to produce it , but onely the reducing of possibilitie ( granted by Gods decree ) into act . Now what possibility doe you meane ? the possibility of Davids defiling Bethsheba ? It is manifestly untrue : first in generall , that to produce a reward , and punishment , no cause is required but the producing of the fact , which is to bee rewarded or punished , Consequents naturall follow I confesse upon antecedents naturall , but it is not so with consequents morall , such as are rewards and punishments . And in particular the case is cleare , that something else was required to Absolons defiling Davids Concubines , then Davids defil●ng of Bethsheba . For both the counsell of Achitophel , and Absolons corruption in yeelding thereto , and the p●nishing hand of God herein , were found in this ; and none of all these was found in Davids sinne .

Or doe you meane this of the possibility of Absolons sinning as he did ? so that to the punishing of David no other thing was required but Absolons reducing his power of defiling his father Concubines into act . Now this I confesse is a truth , but such a truth as might make any wise man ashamed to accommodate himselfe to the grave profession of it , though he did not affect any singularity of conceit therein ▪ For t is as much as to say , that to defile Davids Concubines no other thing was required then to defile them ; for this is to reduce possibility granted ( as you say ) by Gods decree into act , and that is enough . But by your leave , it is not enough to salve your credit , to say that a possibility hereof was granted by Gods decree . For you have plainly professed that God hath decreed not a possibility of a proportionate end , or correspondent consequent to every cogitation , but a proportionate end , and correspondent consequent . And therefore if the defiling of Davids concubines by Absolon , was a proportionate end , or correspondent consequent to Davids former cogitations and actions , then by your doctrine this deiling of Davids concubines by Absolon his sonne , was everlastingly decreed by God , and not the possibility of it . And how absurd a thing it is to say , that God decreed the possibility of any thing , whereas all contingent things are possible in their owne nature without the decree of God , as the whole world was possible , and that not by the decree of God ? But it seemes you have reference to the possibility , not of the punishment , but of the time , for which correspondent punishment is decreed , as appeares by that which followes : as when you say , Did we that which we doe not , but might doe , many things would immediately follow , which now doe not : which though it be granted you , yet herehence it would not follow , that No other cause should be required to the producing of them , then our producing of the antecedent . But by this you justifie that upon Davids adultery , Absolon his defiling Davids concubines ; and upon Sennacheribs blasphemy against the God of Israel ; Ad●amelech and Sharezar his sonnes slaying him with the sword in the Temple of Nisroch his god , did inevitably follow . For these things did befall them , and those things which doe befall you and us doe come to passe , as you professe in the next place , though not as absolutely decreed by God , and in the first place , yet because he decreed them as the inevitable consequents of some things which hee knew he would doe . By all which it cannot be avoided but that Absolon defiling his fathes concubines in speciall , and all the sinnes of man whereby God doth punish former sinnes in generall , are by this your opinion decreed by God as inevitable consequents of some things which God kn●w would be done .

Now let us examine this a little further . You speake indifferently of good and evill that doth befall men ; And these indifferently you prosesse to be ordayned by God upon the foresight of some thing in man ; So then like as the damnation of any man is ordayned by God not absolutely , and in the first place but upon the foresight of some evill thing in the person damned ; so the salvation of any man is not decreed absolutely by God , and in the first place , but upon the fore sight of some good in the person , saved or to be saved , which good must be eyther faith or good workes or both ; or which is worst of all some thing which is lesse evill ( as suppose naturall humilitie ) in the state of nature . Yet you will not seeme to be an abetter of their opinion , that maintayne election to be upon the foresight of faith or workes .

Yet let me have one bout with you more in the point of reprobation also . God foreseeing some evill in man ( say you ) doth purpose to condemne him : Now because like as no evill can exist without Gods permission ; so God could not fo●see evill but upon presupposall of his purpose to permit it , it followeth that the decree to permit sinne , is before the decree of God to damne for sinne , therefore permission of sinne is in Gods intention before damnation , and consequently it must be after it , in execution , as much as to say ; God doth first damne men for sinne , and afterwards permit them to sinne . Hereupon you will refl●ct upon us with an interrogatorie saying ; Will you maintayne that God did first decree to damne men for sinne , and secondly to permit them to sinne ? I answere ; If I did maintayne this , I should looke to be confuted by reason , and not to be cried downe without reason , or contrarie to all reason . Nay I had rather maintayne an harsh opinion according unto reason , then a plausible opinion in contradiction unto manifest reason .

Secondly , I answere by negation ; For I doe not mayntayne either of these to be subordinate unto other in Gods intention , but rather coordinate ; because neither of these thinges decreed is the end of the other , but both joyntly make up an integrall meanes tending to the manifestation of Gods glorie in the way of justice , according to that of Aquinas , who professeth that reprobation includeth the will of God of permitting sinne , and of inferring damnation for sinne . Now let us proceed to that which followes . It is absurde to say we have a possibilitie to doe what we doe not ; but rather you should say we have an abilitie to doe what we doe not . For possibilitie is of a passive signification , not active : And abilitie to obey God , I confesse we had in Adam , and in Adam we have lost it . That which you call the absolute necessitie of Gods decres , is not in respect of Gods act in 〈◊〉 . For his decrees are most free , but in respect of the event ensuing upon supposition of Gods decree . So then thinges freely decreed upon this supposition must necessarily come to passe . Both that which should and that which doth befall us floweth alike ( you say ) from the absolute necessitie of Gods decree . Now because your present discourse is not of Gods power , but of his wisedome that you might not seeme beside the text , you tell us in the close , that herein is seene Gods incomprehensible wisedome , that nothing falls out without the circumference of it ; whereas that all things fall out as God hath decreed , it is rather the fruit of his power then his wisedome . And if you referre it to Gods knowledge , yet it is no parte of God , wisdome . For what wisedome is it to know what he hath decreed , or what he meaneth to bring to passe , whereas any man though simple may know what himselfe meaneth to doe ? But to know what is fitt to be done for the setting forth of his owne glorie , and to directe all things most conventently hereunto , herin consists the wisedome of God . You content not your selfe with ascribing , a Circumference unto Gods wisedome , within which all things fall out , but you call it actuall , also as if there were two sortes of circumferences , the one potentiall , the other actuall .

9. It seemes you doe not please your selfe so well in this Argument of Gods infinite wisedome , as in the former ; neither is it your happines to light upon such quaint straines of invention , and expression here , as in the poinct of Gods immensitie , and eternitie : It may be the matter will not afforde it ; For if it did , why should not you that seeke after it , be acquainted With it as soone as another ? Therefore , I guesse , it is that you break forth into such a profession : the Christian writers are more able and apt both to conceive right , and to speake more consequently to what they rightly conceive concerning other branches of divine absolute infinitenesse , then concerning his infinite knowledge . And because you are bold by a confident supposition to put this out of question , ( whereas yet I know no reason , save that you finde no place in this argument for such Chimaericall fictions as you vented in other points , especially in the point of Gods immensitie and eternitie ) you take upon you to give certaine reasons hereof . Now because to my understanding Gods immensitie and ●ternity are farre more obscure to treat of then Gods wisedome , I am very willing to weigh well the weight of these your reasons . They are in number two . The first is this : All creatures are participant of Gods other attributes besides his wisedome and knowledge ; but of his knowledge and wisedome men and Angels are of all his creatures the onely participants : and those rules are alwaies the most cleare and certaine , and most easily gathered , which are gathered from an uniform idenditie of particulars in variety of subjects : Those universall rules are hardly gathered , or are lesse certaine , which can be experienced onely in some one or sewer subjects . In this argument there is little or nothing sound . For ( as touching the maine ) though creatures inferiour unto man doe not worke by wisedome and knowledge of their owne , yet the wisedome of God appeares no lesse in their workes then in the workes of man , even to the admiration of man himselfe .

What art , what industry is found in the little Bee in the gathering of his waxe , in the fashioning of his combes , in the gathering of honey of divers sorts , every one following and plying his proper and peculiar flowre , and afterwards tempering it , the liquid stuffe brought in their bottles , with the grosser stuffe brought upon their thighes , and bringing it to that perfection which wee see and use both for dainty food , and wholesome physicke : then their government under one King as the Ancients conceived , but indeed under one Queen rather , as later writers even of these dayes have elegantly observed , and the exquisite manner of a common wealth among them . Is not the wisedome of God observable in this ? And as it was said of such as suddenly became Prophets , But who is 1 Sam. 10. 12. their father ? so may we aske concerning these , Who is their father , or who their Schoolemaster that instructed them , and bred them up in this occupation ? I say the wisedome of God doth appeare more in these then in the actions of men . For wee know by what meanes men usually attaine to wisedome , as namely , by instruction and by observation , but no such thing to be found in Bees ; therefore this wonderfull worke being a worke of nature , must necessarily be ascribed to the God of nature . But suppose the wisedome of God were to be observed no where but in the actions of men , is not the world of men sufficient to afford particulars sufficient for induction thereupon to conclude generall rules ?

The wisedome of Arts and liberall professions are growne now adayes to great perfection , and all these what are they but the searching out , and by searching the discoverie of the wisedome of God , even in those creatures which are not participants of the wisedome and knowledge of God ?

The science of Astronomy , how hath it displayed unto the world the wisedome of God in the various motions of the heavens ? and still they are searching , as having not yet attained to the full discovery thereof . So likewise the naturall Philosopher in search●ng out the nature of the whole world ; what is this but an inquirie after the wisedome of God in the whole and parts of this Vniverse ? and albeit still there is enough to be discovered , yet that which is discovered , is it not sufficient to draw us to adore the wisdome of God , and that so much the more , because that though God hath set the Eccles. 3. world in mans heart , yet can hee not finde out the workes that hee hath wrought from the beginning to the end ?

The Physitian , what d●vine wisedome doth he finde in the contexture of the body of man ? Was not Galen hereupon driven to acknowledge a divine providence ? Then in searching after the nature of Herbes and other simples , and considering the power and virtuous operation of them , both of each apart , and of severals together in composition fitting for the cure of every malady and disease of the body of man : what report can they make unto us of the wisedome of God even in those things which are not participants of the wisedome and knowledge of God ? But come wee to Arts manuall , of mans invention , and wherein indeed wee are more apt to derogate from God , then to give him the glory of them ; yet both from the wisedome of man wee may the better ascend to the contemplation of the wisedome of God , and also the wisedome of man is from God , who as we are taught instructeth all , as well the meane husbandman , Esay 28. 26. as the most curious artificer , Exod. 31. In the Turkish History I read of a present sent to the Grand Signiour Achmat that Turkish Emperour ; all the particulars ( save three Birds of Paradise of rare and precious plumes , wonderfull goodly to behold , and valued at 800. pound sterling , ) were handicrafts worke , as namely , two vessels of Cristall , wonderfull rich and beautifull : foure other vessels made of fishes bones , whereas the art seemed miraculous in the graving : forty peeces of cloth of golde of diverse colours ; five peeces of silke ; five of Damaske ; five of silke watered and five plaine ; A staffe of an Elephants tooth graven with admirable industrye ; A Parret set in a cage of Cristall so artificially done as no man could discerne the entrie ; And many faire and rich table clothes of Holland cloth most parte poudred with flowers to the life , and wrought in their lively colours . The which ( it is sayd ) the Sultan did accepte with admiration . The Authour addes in the close : All these thinges shew sufficiently that the Estates from the beginning , or soone after have raysed handy workes as well as trafique and navigation to the highest point of perfection . This calls to my remembrance the rich presents , which the same Estates presented the Lady Elisabeth in her entertainement at the Hage , in her way out of England , unto the Palatinate being most of curious handicraft . First a Carcanet enriched with 36. Diamonds all of facet stones . 2. Two great hanging pearles weighing 35. Carals , and one grayne . 3. A chaine of pearles of 52. peeces , orientall water . 4. A golde needle enriched with a great Diamand , in forme of a table , having 4. Diamants round about , wherof the three out hanging were facet stones . All this layd in a little trunke of cloth of golde , betwixt a perfumed cushion . 5. A great looking glasse inclosed in a silver quilted brimme enriched with faire inlaid workes . 6. Ten peeces of Tapestry of Francis Spierick , whereof two pieces were to be sent after unto her highnes . 7. Six pieces moreover of Tapistry for a Cabinet of the same Master , whereof two were to be sent after to her highnes . 8. Diverse sorts of linnen Damas workes pacted up in cases , rated numero . 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. according to the workes layd in every case . 9. Workes of Spanish waxe made according to the fashion of the East-Indies , whereof were diverse particulars . 1. A cover of a bed standing on 4. pillars not playne but round . 2. A Cupboorde . 3. A Table . 4. Two great trunkes , 5. A middle trunke . 6. Five little trunkes . 7. Two casket standishes . 8. Foure and twenty middle dishes . 9. Nine and twentie little dishes . 10. Twelve fruit dishes . 11. Six Saucers . But come we from the wisedome of Manuall artes , to wisedom morall and politicall . David was wise as an Angell of God . 2. Sam. 14. 17. Yet he feared the wisedome of Achitophell , whose counsell was accounted as an Oracle of God in those dayes . 2. Sam. 16. 23. And David prayed unto God to turne his counsell into foolishnes , and the Lord heard him , and shewed his wonderfull wisedome in making that counsell of Achitophell , ( which had soone dispatched David if it had binne followed ) seeme foolishnes in the judgement of Absolon , by the meanes of Hushai sent only to crosse Achitophel . Yet Solomon was wiser then they both , and it was God that gave him a large hearte , like unto the sand of the Sea shore ; So that his wisedome excelled all the wisedome of the children of the East , and all the wisedome of Aegypt . Wise heades there were , many it seemes in those dayes both in Aegypt , and in the East , yet Salomon was wiser then they all ; And the Queene of the South came from the uttermost part of the earth to heare the wisedome of King Salomon . Since there have binne men famous in this kinde , that have boasted . Consilijs nostris laus est attonsa Laconum .

Tiberius his governments had it binne matched with as much honestie as wisedome it had binne admirable . It was wonte to be sayd that the French got more upon us by parle then by the sword : Yet Henrie the IV , of France was wonte to say , he feared but two men in the World , and that was for their wits ; the one was ( as he called him ) the fox of the mountaynes ; the other was the lacke an apes of the Iles. Yet some say the Spaniards herein outreach the French , and the Italian the Spaniards . And that of all the Italians the Florentines have beene most cunning ; and of all the Florentines the house de Medices . And indeed Laurentius de Medices was accounted the chiefest ballancer of States in his time , if Newes from Parnassus speake true . But the world of men ( as you complaine ) are not sufficient to give presidents of wisedome fit to raise us to the contemplation of the infinite wisedome of God . Yet if you were acquainted with all the wisedome of the world , you might finde matter enough of admiration thereat , and of adoration of the wisedome of God , that goeth infinitely beyond it .

But whereas you say that all creatures are participants of Gods other attributes , in as much as they have some being , some power , some duration , some quantity ; and therefore the knowledge of them conferres something to the knowledge of those attributes of God . Neither the antecedent is true , nor the consequent sound . For what doth the quantity of a gnat confer to the knowledg of Gods immensity ? or what doth the duration of creatures that live but a day or a yeare conferre to the knowledge of Gods eternity ? or the b●ting of a flea , to the discerning of the power of God ? Againe , the antecedent is st●●ke false . No creature that hath quantity is partaker of Gods immensity . For the quantity of a creature is quantitas ●●lis ▪ quantity of extension ; but Gods quantity is quantitas virtutis , quantity of spirituall and immateriall perfection , and it is impossible that one should be a part of the other : nay Gods immensity hath no parts , so neither hath his eternity , nor his almighty power , and therefore no creature can partake of any of these . It is true , God produceth the being , and maintaineth the duration of all things , but it is not by his essence he produceth their being , nor by his eternity he maintaineth their duration , but all is done by the power and counsell of his will .

We come to your second reason ; Why wee cannot conceive and speake so right concerning Gods knowledge , as concerning other attributes , and that is , say you , because we want fit termes to expresse it . But how doe you prove that we have more fit termes to expresse Gods other attributes then this ? you doe not once goe about to prove this ; the instance you give is in the praescience of God , concerning which Gregory makes a question how it can bee attributed unto God ; seeing nothing but future things are said to be foreknowne , and unto God nothing is future , but all things present . And for the same reason Austine ( you say ) would have Gods knowledge of things to come to be termed rather science then praescience , seeing all things are present unto God . Now if this change of termes will serve the turne to avoid incongruity concerning the right apprehension of Gods knowledge , what cause is there to complaine of the unfitnesse of termes , when as with so little adoe the unfitnesse we speake of , may be corrected ? It is like enough upon such conceits as these , some have entertained an opinion that all things are actually existent in eternity , not onely things present , but things past also still are , and things future already are existent in eternity : and you your selfe also have already manifested your approbation of this Tenet in the Chapter of eternity : The more I wonder to reade you except against this doctrine of Gregories and Austines , as neither cleare , nor accurate enough : And here first you tell us that we may not say , nor did Saint Austine , or Saint Gregory thinke that God doth not , or cannot know a distinction between times past , present , or to come . Neither indeed doe I see any colour why any man should entertaine a conceit of any such meaning of Austine or Gregory ; neither doe they denie that God knowes all these thinges and consequently the differences of them , one from another ; Only Gregorie makes a doubte how the knowledge of future thinges in God should be called prescience . And Austine ( as you say ) had rather call it Science . But then you demande how it is sayd by Gregorie that nothing to him is future , nothing past . Your selfe have heretofore layd downe that which may answere this ; as when you sayd all thinges are coexistent in eternitie , but not in time : And therefore God may know thinges to be so differenced in respect of such a course of eternitie . In a word , that God knowes the thinges that are past , present and to come , so called in respect of man who is measured with time , but not so called in respect of God who is measured with eternitie . But though they are alltogether present unto God , yet it followes not herhence that they are all one ( as you inferre ) much lesse that they are so in respect of Gods eternall knowledge , as if Gods knowledge did make them one , which in themselves and in their owne natures are not . As God himselfe , so his knowledg is before all worlds , as worlds doe exist in time . But you may remember what you have formerly maintayned , that both all worlds which have an existence successively in time , and time it selfe is actually existent in eternitie , and so not only present in respect of Gods knowledge of them which ever was , but also in respect of their owne existence ( as you have accoumpted it ) in eternitie , which Aquinas makes the ground of Gods knowledge of them . Then you dispute , and prove that foreknowledge is to be attributed unto God ; because he forknowes them before they are , which is as much as to say , while they are yet to com . To this I answeare out of your owne doctrine thus ; Allbeit Gods knowledge be before them , yet if the same also be to come , and that as much after them as before them , what reason , why it should be called foreknowledge , rather then together knowledge , or after knowledge .

But what knowledge soever we attribute to God , it can no more be sayd to be past , than to come according to your doctrine pag. 77. your wordes are these . Whatsoever can be more properly sayd or conceived to be past than to be yet to come , or to be in every moment of time designable , can have no propertie of eternitie . And in very truth Gods knowledge is not altered , but one and the same knowledge it is which God hath of things without him , before they were , when they are , and after they were . In the things themselves an alteration is found , but not in Gods knowledge of them : And therefore the knowing of all things that are , were , and are to come is commonly called Scientia visionis , in distinction from Scientia simplicis Intelligentiae , wherby God knowes all necessary truthes , and all things possible .

Your conclusion is , that God foreknowes , and Man foreknowes but with a difference , such as , you say , is oftentimes not well expressed by Teachers , nor duely considered by Readers ; the identitie of the word wherby we expresse both Gods foreknowledge , and mans foreknowledge making us apt to confound the different meaning of them . Which confusion of things arising from communion of the same terme , you say is a fertile nursery of many errours in this Argument . And is it not , I pray , as well in other Arguments as in this ? But I beare with you , for if you had professed so much , you had utterly broken the necke of your second Argument . Yet we are like to be beholding to you in good time . For the displanting of these errours . For you promise to endeavour this , and therin to imitate Heralds , who give the same Coate to diverse parties , but alwayes which a difference .

Thùs we have gained a flourish of allusion unto the pracctise of Heralds , and with this Kickeshewes we must be merry till more substantiall provision commeth . As for my opinion , I acknowledge no ex●stence of thinges in eternitie , nor coexistence with eternitie untill the time of their actuall production commeth . And so accordingly theyr coexistence with eternitie first was to come , then is , afterwards is past , and ceaseth to be ; and so accordinglie foreknowledge , coknowledge , and after-knowledge of the same thinges may be attributed to God , all which are externall denominatives attributed unto the knowledge of God , from the various condition of things knowne by him , who lookes not out of himselfe for the knowing of any thing . For how could he , before any thing was ? yet then he knew all things that were to come , as well as now he doth , yet without any change : For with him is no variablenesse , nor shadow of change . Iam. 1.

10. Here you enter upon the explication of the difference betweene mans knowledge and Gods . Our knowledge ( say you ) of things to come is many wayes imperfect ( and foreknowledge onely ) because the duration neither of our knowledge , nor of our selves as yet can reach unto that point of time wherein things so knowne get first existence . No soundnesse of truth in all this .

For first our foreknowledge of things to come , is not foreknowledge onely , save so long as the things themselves are to come ; but when they come , wee know them never a whit the lesse , and after they are gone and past . As the Eclipse of the Sunne and Moone is knowne by us before it comes , when it comes , and after it is past . It is true , before they come , the knowledge of things is onely foreknowledge , and not in man onely , but God also . When they doe coexist with God , then Gods knowledge is no longer foreknowledge , but till they doe coexist with God , his knowledge of them is foreknowledge of them , as well as ours . For it is before them , and onely before them ; for it is neither with them , nor after them . Not with them , for then they should coexist with God , and that from all eternity , which is most untrue . For if they did coexist with God , then they did exist , and that from all eternity , which is most untrue . Much lesse is it after them . For if so , then their coexistence with God were past , but we suppose it to be to come . And impossible it is that the same things should at once bee both past , and also to come . And as for the duration of our knowledge , whereas you say it doth not reach to the things that are to come ; I say neither doth the duration of Gods knowledge reach thither . For if the duration of Gods knowledge did reach unto things to come , then Gods knowledge should in this present coexist with things to come , which is untrue . For if Gods knowledge did coexist with things to come , at this present , then things to come at this present should co●exist with the knowledge of God , and consequently they should exist , that is , they should be present , and not to come . It is no way required to knowledge to coexist with things knowne . In like sort neither doth Gods duration at this present reach unto things to come any more than ours . For if God did at this present coexist with things to come , then at this present things to come should coexist with God ; for coexistence includes existence on both sides . But things to come doe not at this present coexist with God , for if they did coexist , then they should exist , and consequently they should be said to be present , and not to come . And in a word , to maintaine that God coexists with all things to come , is to maintaine by just consequence , that the world did exist from all eternity . It is true , God shall coexist with things to come , because his yeares cannot faile , they endure for ever : but our yeares and dayes are as swift as a post , in comparison . But this makes no difference in the point of foreknowledge . But with such like wilde conceits of yours as touching Gods eternity , we are now reasonably well acquainted , they doe so much the lesse move us , or trouble us . We have continuance of being for a time , God hath continuance of being for ever . God hath the continuance of his being from none , wee have the continuance of our being from God . But as God by continuing doth not get continuance of being , so neither doe we . Onely we have it so , as that God coulds●t an end to it every day and houre ; but it is impossible any end should bee set to the continuance of Gods being , because he is of necessary being . But this is it that deceiveth you ; wee get many things by continuance , as growth and strength of body , encrease of knowledge , and grace , and this maketh you affirme that we get continuance . Whereas indeed we get not continuance , but wee get something else by continuing . Yet wee may continue the same that we were ; sure I am we shall so continue in the world to come .

Sometimes againe we lose by continuance both health and strength , and memory , and so grow towards our graves ; and this is Alteration , so that we are still in motion . But God getts nothing by continuance , for there is no motion , no change in God . And where motion and change is not , there time is not , but either Aevum or Eternitie . It is true , contingent thinges are not foreknowne by us ; and herein is a great difference betweene Gods foreknowledge and ours . But this is a materiall difference only , but now we dispute of the forme of foreknowledge , wherof hitherto you have shewed no sound difference . No question but God precisely knowes future contingents , we doe not ; And it is as true , that this is just nothing to the present purpose . Yet now you are fallen upon it , we must give due regard to your cariage in this . Of the ground of Gods foreknowing future contingents questions , have beene ventilated amongst Schoole-divines for many hundred yeeres continuance .

The most flourishing opinion at this day , and wherein the Sects in other points very opposite of Scotists and Thomists doe agree , is , that God foreknowes them by seeing the determination of his owne will , touching their coming to passe ; this you invade both elswhere and here ; how well and scholastically you have carryed your self herein hertofore we have considered ; now what else you have to vent against this tenent , we are ready to entertaine as it shall deserve .

But in the first place you fall upon it to my judgement very indecently , as when you say : If we shall mould the manner of Gods foreknowglede of things future in our owne conceit or foreknowledge of them , we shall erroneously collect , that seeing we cannot infallibly foreknow future contingents so neither could they be infallibly foreknowne by God , if to him or in respect of his decree they were contingent , and not necessarily predetermined . For first the question only was , whether foreknowledge might be properly attributed unto God in respect of things to come . Now I see no reason but it may , as well as it is attributed unto man ; which question is only about the formall denomination of it , not at all as touching the extent of Gods foreknowledge in comparison unto mans foreknowledge , or in respect of the ground of it .

Secondly , the comparison made by you hath no congruity in the members of it . For the first member is proposed absolutely , the second conditionally ; wheras in reason , either both should be proposed absolutely thus . Seing we cannot infallibly foreknowe future contingents , so neither could they be infallibly foreseene by God : which is so absurd an Argument , that any sober man might be ashamed to obtrude upon any adversary . 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 .

If I would feine , I would feine thinges probable at the least . Or both should runne conditionally , thus : Seeing we cannot infallibly foreknow future contingents , if in respect of our decree they be contingents , and not necessarily determined , so neither can they be infallibly foreknowne by God , if to him , or in respect of his decree they were contingents , and not necessarily predetermined . Yet if the comparison had runne thus , it load bin incongruous inough ; For Mans foreknowledge is not usually accoumpted in respect of thinges determinable by his will , Sometime it may be , as I remember Erastus observes that Bellantius Senensis prophecyed of Savanarola his death , but it was after notice was taken of him at Rome , as of an Heretique . So likewise I have read that the fruites of the Gunpowder Treason was prophecyed of in a certeine Liturgy , then of purpose prescribed for the use of Papists , but it was after those English boute-feux were knowne to have been engaged in that conspiracy .

But usually mans foreknowledge of things to come is accompted in respect of thinges naturall , and such as are out of the power of the determination of his owne will . And as for such thinges as are subject to his will , it is an undoubted truth , that he cannot infallibly foreknowe such thinges upon the knowledge of his purpose to produce them ; and that for two reasons . First , because his will is mutable from within . Secondly , because his power is resistible from without . But give we you leave to proceede .

In the next place you tell us , That some push our pronenesse to this errour forward , by another , not distinguishing betweene contingency and uncertainty ; who argue thus , That which is in it selfe uncertaine , cannot certainly be knowne . Every future contingent is in it selfe uncertaine , Ergo it is not possible that a future contingent should certainly be knowne . Thus another Hare is started by the way , which hindreth the pursuing of our first game , where we might have experience of your performance in opposing the ground of Gods foreknowing future contingents , layd in the determination of his will , whereof God cannot be ignorant . And first you addresse your selfe to the removing of this new rub , by a distinction of a two fold uncertainty , one formally relative , another onely denominative or fundamentall . And , as if these termes needed no explication , you proceed to a resolution thus ; That which is relatively uncertaine , cannot be certainly knowne , for so it should be certaine to him , to whom it is uncertaine : But a future contingent , as it is contingent , doth not necessarily or formally include this relative uncertainty , although it usually be in part the foundation or cofounder of it . By relat●ve uncertainty you understand uncertainty in relation to knowledge , in which sense to be uncertaine , is to be such as whereof there cannot be certaine knowledge . In which sense if the proposition proceeded , it were very idle , and indenticall , as if it were expressed thus ; That which cennot certainly be known , cannot certainly be knowne : And they undoubtedly are very prone to errour , that suffer themselves to be pushed forwards thereinto by such arguments as these , and thus interpreted . But we were wont to distinguish of Certitudo scientiae , & certitudo rei scitae , or scibilis ; and you intimate such a distinction . For the relative uncertainty you speake of is the uncertainty of the knowledge , and the fundamentall uncertainty is the uncertainty of the thing it selfe , and indeed the foundation of the uncertainty of knowledge . Now the argument proceeds manifestly from the one to the other , and the Medius terminus man fests its owne meaning to bee of fundamentall uncertainty , whence it doth infer uncertainty of knowledge , for it proceeds thus : That which is uncertaine in it selfe cannot be certainly knowne . Now that which is uncertaine in it selfe , is not relatively uncertaine , but rather absolutely . For whereas the most certaine thing that is may be relatively uncertaine , that is uncertaine unto some ; yet this shall never be called uncertaine in it selfe .

So then the syllogisme corruptly interpreted by you , and the truth of it obscured by a preposterous distinction , take it in its proper vigour and force , is thus ; That which in it selfe hath no foundation of certainty , cannot bee certainly knowne . But every future contingent hath in it selfe no foundation of certaintie : therefore it cannot certainly be knowne . Therefore if you will answer aright , shew what foundation of certainty is found in future contingents , if you please to deny the Minor ; or if you please to deny the Major , professe your minde plainly , and say , that That which hath no foundation of certainty in it selfe , may neverthelesse be certainly knowne , which indeed is your course . For you professe plainly , that future contingents cannot bee certainly knowne , of a sinite and imperfect knowledge , but they may be knowne by an infinite knowledge ; such as is the knowledge of God .

And thus you might have answered the former syllogisme plainly , without the helpe of your former distinction , in this manner : That which is in it selfe uncertaine , cannot bee certainly knowne . It is true in respect of a finite knowledge , such as is the knowledge of man ; but it is not true in respect of knowledge infinite , such as is the knowledge of God . But whereas you put it indifferent to answer by way of distinction , either of knowledge finite and infinite , or of knowledge fallible and infallible ; herein you are very wide . For a very absurd issue would be of this latter distinction , after this manner : That which is uncertaine in it selfe , cannot be certainly knowne by knowledge fallible , but it may be certainly knowne by knowledge infallible : which were as much as to says It cannot bee certainly knowne by knowledge that may erre in knowing it , but it may bee certainly knowne by knowledge that cannot erre in knowing it . And yet it will not serve your turne neither ; For , though Gods knowledge bee infallible , yet it will not follow that God knowes this infallibility ; because , though he infallibly knowes whatsoever he knowes , yet perhaps this is a thing not knowable at all . for to know that such a thing certainly shall be , which in its owne nature is no more certaine to be than not to be , is not to know , but rather to erre : and so the argument still holds good , ' and no way ' answered by you , but boldly outfaced by a meere begging of that which is in question . Yet nothing possible shall be uncertaine unto God , for he knowes it to bee possible , and that most certainly . But with what colour can you inferre , that because it is possible to be , therefore God most certainly knowes that it shall be ? For , consider , is it not as well possible not to bee ? and may not I by the same liberty of argumentation , which you usurpe unto your selfe , conclude , therefore God most certainely knowes that it shall not bee ? In a word , things must bee to come , before they can be knowne to be to come . But seeing future contingents are in their own nature onely possible , and indifferent to be to come , or not to come ; I pray consider by what activitie or operation , they have passed from the condition of things possible , to the condition of things future ? for if they have not passed into this condition , they are not as yet knowable to be future ; and no infallibility of knowledge can make the knowledge extend to the comprehending of such things as are not knowable . Possible they are , and are most certainly knowne of God that they are possible . But as yet future they are not , ( unlesse by some alteration they have beene translated from the condition of things meerly possible to the condition of things future , which it stands you upon to shew , if you maintaine it , ) therefore as yet they are not knowable to be future .

That which you adde concerning the nature of Gods knowledge , as being without succession , is nothing to the purpose . For though our knowledge be subject to succession , yet this nothing hindreth us from foreknowing things to come , so they be knowable , whether by naturall reason , or by divine revelation . On the other side , though Gods knowledge be not capable of succession , yet things not knowable he cannot knowe ; thinges impossible he cannot know to be possible , and thinges which are only possible , and not future he cannot know to be future . And such a manner of knowledge , is no knowledge indeed , but errour rather .

And as for your termes of interposed , and expiring acts , and interminable knowledge ; well they may serve to conjure your Reader from understanding you , but they have no force either of illustration , or probation of ought . In the close you acquaint us with a * * See Rogers upon the Articles or the Church of England . the 17. Art . new mystery , as if Gods knowledge were like the suspending of a mans judgement , for as much as the act of knowledge in God doth not expire . A vile conceit and ridiculous , were it not concerning the nature of God . For what ? because Gods knowledge and judgement doth not expire , but continueth without alteration , shall he therfore be sayd to suspend his judgement ? Belike Daniel was cast into the Lyons denne not by judgement , but by suspension of judgement ; For the Lawes of the Medes and Persians were unalterable .

So likewise the judgement , and counsaile , and purpose of God , concerning the salvation of his elect , because it continueth without expiration , therfore it is suspended . In the same proportion of pietie you say our ignorance resembles Gods knowledge best , as heretofore you professed , that In respect of immensity and eternity , nothing was so like to God as nothing . But it may be Ioverlash , and upon better consideration , The imperfection of our knowledge or judgement while it is in suspense is rather ignorance , ( you say ) than Errour . And this imperfection taken away it shall better resemble divine knowledge , than our actuall resolutions and determinations doe . But then , I pray , what is this that shall resemble the divine knowledge ? is it our knowledge while it is in suspense ? why , but if I am in suspense , how am I sayd to knowe ? O , but you will have this imperfection taken away , but then I say , if the suspension be taken away , how shall it be in suspense , which you suppose ? Agayne , how can suspension of judgement be taken away , but by resolution this way or that way ? but this you deny to be that which resembles divine knowledge .

The truth is , the sentence is so perplex , that I can divise no issue out of it . Yet I have reason to conceave that your opinion is , that ignorance best resembles the knowledge of God . For the comparison is betweene resolution and the opposite therunto ? and you plainly signifie that the opposite to resolution doth better resemble Gods knowledge , than resolution . Now what is opposite to resolution but suspension of judgement ; and this suspension of judgement you plainly professe is to be called ignorance , rather than errour . Wherfore ignorance consisting in suspension of judgement by your doctrine in this place , doth better resemble the wisedome of God than our actuall resolutions and determinations doe ; yet out actuall resolutions and determinations may be sound both in knowledge naturall , and knowledge Theologicall , wheras ignorance or suspension of judgement is no knowledge at all . Onely wheras you positively affirme , that Without the interposition of some determining or expiring acts there can be no errour , I understand that plainly to be a notorious untruth . For determining or expiring actes are no more required unto errour , than unto truth .

And if a man continue , as many doe , to their lives end in Popery , in Mahumetisme , in Heathenisme , their errours are never a whit the lesse .

It is true indeed that we can understand but one thing at once , and therfore the consideration of one thing must expire before we can passe to the consideration of another . This is the condition of Mans knowledge in generall , not of an erroneous apprehension in speciall .

11. What you discourse of knowledge conjecturall which man may have of things contingent , cannot have of things casuall , I leave it as I find it , I come to the cause why we cannot foreknow future contingents , and this you say is because our essence , and knowledge are but finite ; so that things contingent are not so conteined in us , that if we could perfectly know our selfes we might perfectly know them ; Thus you are content to dictate at pleasure , without affoording one mite of reason , for the establishing of your proselytes faith in this . As finite as our knowledge is , we know contingents to be contingents . But to know that a thing meerly contingent which denomination includes only a possibilitie of comming to passe , or not comming to passe , I say to know that such a thing shall come to passe , exceedes the reach of knowledge infinite . For infinite knowledge doth extend no farther than to things knowable . But , for a contingent , which both in his owne nature , and from without doth yet continue indifferent to be or not to be , is not a thing , at all knowable , that it shall come to passe . For it must be a thing future , before it can be knowne to be future . But the contingents , you speake of , are supposed both in their owne nature to be only possible , that is indifferent to be or not be , and as yet determined by no outward agent to be . In which case they still continue under the condition of thinges n●eerly possible . And so farre they are knowable , and no farther . And accordingly so farre they are ind●ed knowne by God , by that knowledge which is commonly called Scientia simplicis intelligentiae . But the knowledge of thigs future is called Scientia visionis . And thinges meerly possible , till some determination doth come unto them from wihout , are not as yet future , and consequently cannot be knowne , to be future , yet notwithstanding you are bold to say , that In the divine essence , all reall effects , all events possible , whether necessary , casuall or contingent , are eminently conteined ; The perfect knowledge of his owne essence , necessarily includes the perfect knowledge , not only of all thinges , that have been , are , or shall bee , but of all things that might have beene , or possibly may bee . A most rid●culous amplification ? For it is as much , as to say , that God knowes not only all contingent truthes , but all necessary truthes also . As if it were a harder matter to know thinges necessary , than to know things contingent . Whereas it is in the power of the Creature to know things necessary , and perhaps all things that are of necessary truth ; but to knowe those things whose existence is only of a contingent nature , that belongs only unto God .

Now what is possible , and what is not , we have a generall rule to know that , as namely , whatsoever implieth no contradiction is possible , that which doth imply contradiction is impossible . And were it a sober speech for a divine to affirme ; that God not only knows all things that have been , are or shall be , but also he knowes what implies contradiction , & what doth not ? you seeme to fumble here at the novel doctrine of the Iesuites concerning Gods foreknowledge of future contingents conditionate ; and you doe but fumble at it .

Secondly you say that in the divine essence all reall effects are conteined eminently ; Now hertofore you told us , that For all things to be in God , is no more than that he alone can produce them . Ch. 4. num. 2. If this be your meaning in this place , as it seemes , when you say they are in him eminently , for so we say that heate is in the Sunne eminently , for as much as he doth produce heate in bodies capable ; Then , I say , we deny not but all reall effects are in God .

But how doth this agree with your tenet , seing herhence it followes that God can produce any act of Mans freewill , any casuall thinge and if he can so doe , what hind●h but that he could from everlasting decree to produce them ? Yet not alone as formerly you have interpreted what it is for things to be in God . For it is impossible that God should produce the act of mans will without man . For if without man , then it is not the act of mans will , which is an immanente act of the will .

Thirdly , it is false to say that the perfect knowledge of Gods essence , necessarily includes the perfect knowledge of all thinges that have beene , are , or shall bee . It includes I confesse the knowledge of all necessary truthes , and of all thinges possible ; but as for the knowledge of contingent truthes , and of these to come , it includes not that ; unlesse under the essence of God , you comprehende the will of God . And so to distinguish as to say that all necessary truthes God knoweth by necessity of nature , but all contingent truthes he knoweth by the determination of his owne will ; which indeed is a truth , but flatt opposite to your opinion . But that thinges contingent cannot be knowne to be future , but upon the determination of Gods will , I prove thus . Things cannot be knowne to be future untill they are future ; ( for to apprehend or conceive things to be future , when they are not future , is not to know , but to erre , ) but contingent things , and onely possible to be or not to be , doe not become future till the determination of Gods will hath made them future . Therefore contingent things cannot be knowne to be future but upon the determination of God will .

The minor I prove thus : Of their owne nature they are not future , but onely possible ; and they cannot passe from the condition of things meerly possible , to the condition of things future , without a cause from without . And no cause of this translation can be devised , but the will of God . Which I prove thus . If some other cause , then either without God , or within God ; not without God , for these things were future from everlasting ; but from everlasting there was no cause at all existent without God ; Therefore the cause hereof , if any where to be found , must be found within God . Wee say it is his will ; which if you deny , you must shew what else can be the cause : you commonly flee to Gods knowledge , and the infinity thereof , but in vaine , for already they are supposed to bee future before God knoweth them . And indeed it belongs to knowledge to know all things that are to come , not to make them to be to come .

Fourthly , it is possible that Antichrist shall fall in the yeare 1630 , it is possible that he should fall the yeare before , it is possible he should fal the yeare after : it was possible he should have fallen ten yeares agoe ; it is possible hee should fall ten yeares hence : all these being reall effects possible , must by your doctrine be found eminently in the divine essence , and God knowing his divine essence , must know them all , and not onely that they are possible , but that they shall all come to passe : For in this sense you speake of Gods knowledge of future contingents , namely , of knowing that they shall come to passe , and when they shall come to passe .

Againe , set we the fall of Antichrist at an hundred different points of time , whereof let us suppose one to bee true , and the other false ; yet all in their owne nature alike possible : why should the fall of Antichrist in the true point of time bee included in Gods essence more then the other , all being alike possible ; and that very instante wherein the fall of Antichrist shall be , it being as possible that it should not be , and that possibility also being included in the essence of God , as well as any other ? Perhaps you will say that this being a truth is included in the essence of God , and not the others , being untruths . But then I demand how this became to be a truth , that Antichrist should fall at such a time , rather then at another , it being as possible to fall out at any other time as at this , and as possible not to fall out at this time as at any other , and all these possibilities equally included in the essence of God I say againe , how came this to be a truth , answer mee , not of its owne nature , for the contrary hereunto is supposed on both sides , namely , that of his owne nature it was onely possible : therefore you must assigne some cause from without ; and because you like not to acknowledg the determination of Gods will to be the cause hereof , you must alledge some other cause . I see you usually flye to the infinitie of Gods knowledge , but in vaine ; for Gods knowledge is to know truths , and not to make them .

Lastly , by this doctrine of yours it will follow that God knew the world would be made , before ever God determined to make●● , to wit , by vertue of his infinite knowledge . Now what a faire way this openeth unto Atheisme , let the wise and learned Reader judge indifferently . Heretofore I confesse you seemed to maintaine the existence of all things from everlasting in eternity ; which if it were true , then this might minister an apparent ground of Gods knowledge of all things , be they never so contingent , for as much as they are supposed to exist before him . But here you have assigned nothing for the ground hereof hitherunto , but onely the infinity of Gods knowledge . But in the next sentence I thinke you cast about for this also . As Balaam did many wayes to serve his turne in the course of his divinations ; and all is fish that comes to your net ; so it may serve your turne to oppose in this question , the determination of Gods will . Well , thus it is : For as Gods essence is present in every place as it were an ubiquitarie center , ( for indeed if a body were infinite , everywhere might be imagined a center : and you doe much affect to compare the nature of God to impossibilities , and sometimes preferre him so farre , as to compare him to just nothing , ) so is his eternity or infinite duration coexistent to every part of succession , and yet withall is round about . Hee it is that drives things future upon us , being from eternity as well beyond as on this side of them . Wee have beene acquainted with these absurd paradoxes of yors heretofore , so that now wee cease to admire them . But first we do deny the comparative coherence So , which hath force of an argument by way of comparison : but it hath no force here , because there is no proportion betwixt the things compared . Gods presence is in every place , no marvell ; for all places doe ex●st together . And so if all times did exist together , God eternity should coexist with all times : But it is impossible that all times should exist together , because time consists in succession of parts : But as one time and the things therein shall exist after another , so God shall coexist with them . So then Gods presence is in every place , and Gods eternity coexists with every time , and that indivisibly : but with a great difference : for God all at once coexists with everie place , but not all at once doth he coexist with every time , but successively ; for as much as time doth not otherwise exist then successively . Nay the comparison is flat against you . For like as God not onely coexisteth at this present with everie place that is existent , but shall coexist with a world tenne times as big , whensoever by the will of God such a world shall have existence , but for the present coexisteth onely with the places that are : In like sort God for the present coexisteth only with time present , and with al things in time present , but shall by vertue of eternity coexist also with all times to come , and all things therein tenne times longer then the world shall last , if so be that by the will of God the world should last ten times longer then it shall : but for the present he doth coexist onely with the time present , and the things contained therein .

Yet this a●seth not from any divisible succession in God , in whom as there is no shaddow of change , so there can be no succession ; but only from the divisible succession of thinges without God , both time and motion , & things subject thereunto , with all which God doth and still shall coexist in theire courses of succession , without succession in himselfe ; Like unto a Pole fixed in a river that coexisteth with severall parts of water succeeding one another it selfe being unmoveable . Now that God doth not coexist at once by vertue of his eternity with all parts of time and the things therin , I demonstrate thus . If God at this time present did coexist with all parts of time , then all parts of time should at this present coexist with God , both time past and time to come ; And by the same reason , before ever the World was , you might say that the whole course of time did coexist with God , And if coexist , then surely it did exist ; and so time had an eternall existence as well as Gods eternity it selfe . It is true some have conceited that eternity doth ambire tempus , but only in this sence , that as it was before it , so it is after it ; If they had sayd so it shall be after it , it were tolerable . For we beleive the World shall have an end . But I never yet heard or read of any but your selfe that made eternity to be round about it , so to make way for your circular duration : For in this sence time shall not only have two ends but two sides also , or rather neither end nor side as if it were rounde as a tennis ball .

In the prosecution of the same w●ld phrase , you tell us that God , by vertue of his eternity , is as well beyond all thing●s to come , as on this side of them . Belike as the Heavens are on either side of the earth , so eternity is on either side of time . And indeed if the parts of time were coexistent as the parts of heaven and earth are , it were to the purpose ; but the succession of time in the parts therof marres the play and discovers the wildnesse of this fiction . That which we call beyond in space of place applied to time is rather longe before then longe after ; & the reason is , because to be beyond , doth suppose existence either being as in place , or having bene as in time . But as for things that are to come herafter , they neither have existence at this present , nor ever had . But let it be applied as you will , so you speake plainely , that so we may encounter men and not shadowes . Say that God is after all things to come ; I say this is false , and thus I prove it . To be after another is to suppose the existence of that other thing precedent . But things to come have not yet had ●hiero existence , therfore God cannot be sayd to be after them . It is true to say that God shall be after all things to come in this World , for as much as after they are come and gone , Gods existence shall continue .

It is true as you say , Though God should create other creatures without the circumference of this World , they should be all within his presence . In like sorte though the World should last ten times longer then God hath appointed it , yet should God by vertue of his eternitie coexist with it : Herein the comparison holds with good congruity . But like as Gods presence is not with a greater circumference till such a circumference doth actually exist ; in like sorte Gods duration doth not coexist with any duration to come , untill it existeth . And in each case it is true that he gaines not any new existence , but only takes a denomination of coexistence with them ; But not untill they doe exist ; for till they exist they cannot be sayd to have any existence with him , which before they had not . And this your selfe make the ground of denomination of Gods coexistence with them . We doe not only acknowledge that things when they come to passe , doe fall within the Spheare of Gods actuall knowledge , but also before they come to passe , we say , they are knowne to God , and the precise time when every thing shall come to passe . I have already shewed the absurdity of that conceit of yours of environing succession . Now I say it is directly false to say that Gods knowledge is coexistent to every successive act . And the reason is not farre off but at hand . For if God or his knowledge were coexistent to every successive act then every successive act were also coexistent to Gods knowledge and to God himselfe ; and if coexistent , then existent ; and so both time past and time to come and all things in them should at this present be existent . And but erst your selfe professed that God takes the denomination of coexistence with his creatures upon their existence in him , which before they had not : which is manifestly contradictious to those wilde assertions which you have so often scattered , namely , that God is coexistent with every successive act , and with all times .

Likewise in the next sentence you acknowledge that the creature gets coexistence with eternity anew ; therefore it had not alwaies coexistence with it , nor it with the creature : Gods knowledge is still the same , and therefore not so much as in this respect is there any motion or change in God ; and consequently no succession , though the things that are known may succeed in their coexistence to one another , and consequently in their coexistence with God .

The Scripture without distinction professeth that God both is , and was , and is to come : which yet is not to signifie any priority or posteriority in him in respect of any things succeeding in him , but onely in respect of things succeeding without him . For as much as the things that are past did coexist with God at the time of their being , and things long before them also were not before God . In like sort things to come , whensoever they come shall finde God coexistent with them , and whensoever they vanish , shall leave Gods existence still continuing the same behinde them . It is true , Gods knowledge may bee said to containe our knowledge , in as much as he knowes all that we know , and much more : but it is absurd to say that his knowledge resembles ours ; for there is no likenesse betweene them .

But whereas you touch by the way that things to come to us are onely to come , thereby you imply one of your well known paradoxes , that things to come are not onely to come unto God ; the meaning is , that they are not onely to come to him , but present to him also . It is enough for you to dictate mysteries . By the same proportion of truth , things past , which are onely past to us , are not so onely to him , but unto him they are not onely past , but present also ; this is good hobgoblin stuffe , whether you count it Philosophy or Divinity . In the next place you tell us that For us to apprehend a thing past as contingent , is not impossible . About the coherence I will not question you ; you take libertie to discourse at pleasure . In the very next page you say that it is in our power to make a thing necessary to morrow , which is truly contingent this day . As I take it , it proceeds in congruity to that Maxime , Quicquid est quando est necesse est esse . And therefore if once I doe that which is in my power to doe , when I once have done it , it is necessary , whereas before it was contingent . 〈◊〉 on the contrary you will have it not impossible to apprehend a thing as contingent after it is done and past , whereas this was wont to bee held impossible to God himselfe to make undone that which was already done . In a word it is held flat contradiction . For to be contingent is to be indifferent to be or not to be . But that which is , neither is nor possibly can be indifferent to be or not to be . Yet herehence it followeth not , that it came to passe necessarily there is no colour for any such inference . For what ? doth nothing come to passe but necessarily ? but whether it comes to passe necessarily or contingently , being once come to passe the contingencie of it is at an end , and past irrecoverably . For it is no longer indifferent to be or not to be . And your caution is very idle that you put in , lest upon the passing of a contingent thing we should conceive it to come to passe necessarily . Yet notwithstanding that which comes to passe contingently in respect of the manner of existence , may of necessity come to passe upon supposition of Gods decree , as the calling of the Iewes , the destruction of Antichrist which we looke for . So the restoring of the Iewes out of the captivity of Babylon , the burning of the Prophets bones upon the Altar by Iosiah , the killing of Sennacherib by his owne children , the taking of Zedechiah and carrying him into Babylon , yet so as he could never see it , for his eyes should be pulled out first .

Againe , though they come to passe contingently , yet why should you deny , or would not have us conceive that they fal out certainly ? though uncertainly to man , yet undoubtedly whatsoever comes to passe , comes to passe most certainly unto God : yet no doubt but the production of it was contingent , yea and sometimes casuall in respect of second causes . The event is not necessary in respect of the manner of producing it . But being produced , now it must needs be produced , and it is impossible it should be otherwise .

Neither doth our knowledge of any thing change the nature of it . Neither is our knowledge necessary ( though you say so ) of things past or present but merely contingent in the generation therof also ; Though as of all other contingents , so of our knowledge also , it is true that when once it is , it is imimpossible it should not be , or not have bene at all . In a word upon the existence therof , the indifferency therof , to be or not be , is utterly vanished . But herhence to inferre the like , not of Gods foreknowledge only but of his decrees also , is a very wilde inference . Yet we willingly grant that Gods knowledge of things doth no way alier the nature of them , or of the manner of their ex●stence . No nor his decree neither . For though he decreed to make the World , yet the World we say came to passe never a whit the lesle contingently . And though God hath decreed the fall of Antichrist , and that Babylon shall be burnt with fire : yet these shall come to passe never a whit the lesse contingently . For God decrees not onely res ipsas , but modus rerum , to witt that some things shall come to passe necessarily , and somethings contingently . And so the effectuall will of God in Aquinas his judgement is the rate of all contingency . But yet notwithstanding even from the foreknowledge of God there riseth a necessitie of consequence as thus : If God foreknowes such a thing shall come to passe , then it is necessary it shall come to passe , though perhaps he knowes it shall come to passe not necessarily but contingently . How much more doth such a necessitie arise from the decree of God as thus . If God hath decreed the World should have an end , it is necessary the World should have an end , yet not necessarily but contingently . For as God did worke freely in making the World , so shall he worke as freely in setting an end unto it . So farre are we from saying that Gods decrees take away contingency from any thing , as that rather we averre that it doth maintayne it .

And you shewe either a great deale of ignorance in not understanding aright your adversaries tenets which you impugne , or that which is a great deale worse in dissembling and corrupting it . But I beare with you , it may be you fashion it in such a kinde as may best give way to some conceytes of yours , and very fewe arguments . Yet by your leave the more infallible any knowledge is , either of God , Angell or man , the more fitt it shall be to found a necessitie of consequence thereupon thus ; It is infallibly foreknowne , ergo it is necessary that it should be . Here followeth another extravagant of yours , for insteede of opposing that opinion which maintaynes the ground of Gods foreknowledge of future contingents to be the determination of his will , you leave that and oppose the derivaiton of Gods infallibilitie from the absolute necessitie of the event . An opinion that I never knewe any man patronize ; but it seemes you would draw their opinion unto this , who maintayne that God foreknowes all things by seeing the determination of his owne will concerning the futurition of them . Now , I pray you , of those that take this course who ever sayd that the events decreed by God were of absolute necessitie ? Yourselfe I have observed to professe , that upon Gods decree touching the futurition of a contingent thing , as namely , the apprehension of a Traytour , the successe of the meanes tending thereunto is absolutely necessary as in this very chapter in the end of the first Section . But never was I acquainted with any of our divines that sayd so much . We professe that the producing of contingents is absolutely contingent , only this contingent production they holde to be necessary upon supposition of the will of God . And Durand wondereth that any should conceive things to fall out necessarily in respect of the will of God , whereas on the contrary he conceaves it to be a cleare thing , that not only contingent thinges but even necessary th●nges also ( as we call them ) doe come to passe , all contingently in respect of the will of God .

They that ground Gods foreknowledge of future contingents upon things without God , doe usually ground it not upon any absolute necessity of the events themselves , as upon the causes producing them , which though they worke contingently and not necessarily , yet this they th●nke nothing hindreth the infallibility of God knowledge , because hee is able to comprehend all failings possible , and to discerne in what case they take place , and in what not ; which in effect is to rest upon the condition of Gods knowledge in it selfe , as you here doe : and because it is infinite therehence to conclude that it is infallible . An invention of late yeares , and brought in by the Iesuits , together with their doctrine concerning scientia media .

For whereas before there was onely a double knowledge found in God , the one antecedent to his will which they called scientia simplicis intelligentiae , whereby hee understood his owne essence , and therewithall all necessary truths , and all things possible ; the other subsequent to the will of God , which they called scientia visionis , and hereby he knoweth all things past , present , and to come , all which they acknowledge to be dependant upon the will of God ; the Iesuits have of late yeares devised a middle knowledge betweene th●se two , and it consists in know●ng not things necessary , nor th●ngs contingent , that have beene , are , or shall be , but in knowing what would be in such or such a case ; as for example , what a man in such a case , thus or thus moved and induced unto good or evill , would doe or not doe

And the ground hereof they make the infinitie of Gods knowledge , as I remember Vasquius expresly professeth so much , and so ( as well they may ) make this infinitie of Gods knowledge the ground of knowing all future contingents . For although Suarez takes upon him to confute Palatius , who as he hath maintained that God knowes future contingents De absol . scientia fut . conting . l. 1 c. 5. by reason of the efficacy of his knowledge , yet judge I pray , whether himselfe differ from him when he come to prove his owne opinion , which is this : In Deo sola essentia ejus est sufficiens ratio cujuscunque cognitionis possibilis , cum in virtute & efficacitate Ibid. c. 8. intelligendi sit simpliciter infinita . In God his essence alone is a sufficient cause of all knowledge possible , considering that virtue and efficacy of knowing it is simply infinite . So Vasquez ; Deus , quae sua est infinitas , efficacitate sui intellectus omnia intelligibilia intellectu suo penetrat : and againe , Quia divinus intellectus infinitae virtutis est , quicquid intelligibile est necessario debet amplecti & intelligere . Nam si aliquid ab ipso infinito intellectu non posset intelligi , à quo alio posset ? And indeed were future contingents intellig●ble , there were no further question to be made , but that his knowledge were sufficient to comprehend them . But it is apparent that no such contingent is knowable as a thing to come , more th●n as a thing not to come in its owne nature , and consequently God can no more know that it is to come , then that it is not to come ; unlesse that which in its owne nature is onely possible be determined this way or that way , and consequently made future or not future .

This objection Suarez foreseeth and proposeth : Sicut divina Lib. de scien fut . conting . potentia non potest facere id quod de se non est factibile , ita nec scientia divina scire potest id quod ex se scibile non est , neque certum judicium ferre de eo quod in se omnino incertum est : Nam neque scientia potest ferri extra objectum suum , neque potest suo modo non commensurari illi in certitudine , & infallibilitate , quia requirit adaequationem . And to this purpose he alledgeth Thomas , saying ; Scientiam non posse esse necessariam , nisi objectum sub aliqua ratione qua attingitur , necessitatem habeat . Et hoc modo dici potest requiri ex parte objecti certitudinem objectivam , id est , talem modum veritatis , quae apta sit , ut certum & infallibile judicium feratur , quod sane habet omnis veritas hoc ipso quod determinata est . In which latter words he gives in briefe a better and fairer answer , then in the whole distinction following , if he be able to make good what he saith . For indeed every truth determinate is a sufficient object of knowledge .

But I would know of him or you , how comes it to bee true that such a contingent shall exist , whereas in his owne nature it is onely possible to exist , and indifferent as well not to exist as to exist . As for example , how is it true that to morrow it shall rayne , rather then that to morrowe it shall not rayne , seeing in it selfe it is no more inclinable to the one then to the other . If the one were true and the other false , then there were no question , but God should knowe the one to be true and the other to be false . But seeing there is no reason given by Suarez , why the one should be true rather then the other ; there is no reason why one should be knowne of God to be true more then the other . And therefore Suarez layeth for a ground that future contingents have from all eternitie a determinate truth , but shewes not how they come to have their truthe ; nor how thinges merely possible in themselvs come to be future , which as it is apparent , could not possibly be without a cause . But had he gone about this worke , which indeede was most necessary , the truth would soone have appeared in his colours . For it will soone be found that nothing could be the cause hereof but the will of God . Which was the opinion as he professeth both of Ricardus , and of Scotus , and in effect of Cajetan and of many of the Thomist ; and that Alexander of Hales favoureth it .

Neither could he be ignorant that Alvarez maintaynes it to have bene the opin●on of Aquinas also . To the same opinion Durand not only inclines as Vasqu us writes in 1. disp. 65. cap. 1. but to it only adheres as the same Vasquius notes in the sa●e disputation , cap. 2. Durands words are playne ; Not only Gods prescience of a thing to come is joyned with his will to have t● come , in 1. dist. 35. q 3. num. 25. Deum prescire , A fore , coexigit . Deum velle , A fore . But also that his prescience is built hereupon ibidem dist. 39. q. 1. num. 10. in these words . Repraesentatur res fore vel non fore per essentiam divinam , non ut est solum essentia virtualiter rem omnem continens , sed ut est volens rem possibilem sore , & quia libere vult rem fore . And Vasquius himselfe not only acknowledgeth that from the decree of Gods will may sufficiently be gathered the certeintie of knowledge which God hath of future contingents , in 1. disp. 65. cap. 4. but also proposing the same objection that Suarez doth above mentioned , answeareth it not as Suarez doth by saying , Things contingent have a determinate truth , as touching their being for the the time to come , whereof we nothing doubt , but shewes whence they have it , which point Suarez declined wholy tanquam praecipitium as a break-necke to his owne opinion .

But Vasquius deales more plainly , and professeth that future things of merely possible become future by vertue of the decree of God . Observandum est ( sayth he ) futurum ita esse objectum scientiae Dei infallibilis eo ipso quod re ipsa futurum In 1. dist. 65. cap. 4. num. 22. est , ut tamen nostro modo intelligendi supponat decretum Dei , tan quam causam ante quam nihil intelligitur vere esse futurum . And agayne , Quia nulla res ex se futura est , sed ex voluntate & omnipotentia Dei , ideo antequam intelligantur futura , supponitur Dei voluntas ut causa illius non quidem durationis ordine sed rationis , & num. 23. Sicut creatura nondum possibilis est , donec Deus intelligatur esse , qui est primum omnium ens , sic etiam creatura nondum est futura donec decretum voluntatis esse intelligatur , ex quo ut ex causa futura est . Thus Vusquius mainteyning the infinity of Gods knowledge to be the ground of his knowledge of future contingents , as well as you doe , yet doth not make use of this his opinion to oppose the forgoing of the determination of Gods will as you doe . Yet what have you conferred to the overthrowe of that opinion which you impugne , that deserves to be named the same day with the least part of the meanest of those that have mainteyned it . You only shewe your teethe , and proceede confidently in dictating what pleaseth you without any evidence of reason to confirme what you so boldly propos● . I long to come to an end of this .

In the next place you give some reason for your assertion . As when you say , We are able by Gods permission to lay a necessitie upon contingents and so to foreknowe them , yet our knowledge still is but finite . Hence you seeme willing to inferre that therefore God seeing his knowledge is infinite is able to know future contingents without laying any necessitie upon them , by the determination of his will . I am very glad to heare you reason , because it is so rare with you herein like to Hector Naevianus , Qui Philosophari volebat sed paucis .

Henry the seventh of England was wont to say he desired to look his dangers in the face : so I desire to know what my opposite hath to say against the truth I defend . I have beene so long exercised in these points , and encountred such champions , that I have no cause to feare your colours , nor powder and shot neither : wherefore in the first place I answer , that the difference betweene knowledge finite and infinite doth not require that infinite knowledge should extend so farre as to know things unknowable , for that were to extend beyond his object . But rather herein they differ , of things knowable , finite knowledge takes notice onely of some ; infinite knowledge comprehends all . Now things contingent till they are determined to come to passe , or not to come to passe , are not knowable that they shall come to passe , nor are knowable that they shall not come to passe ; and consequently cannot be knowne that they shall come to passe , or knowne that they shall not come to passe .

For if the understanding of man doth apprehend a thing as future which is not future , herein he cannot be said to know but to erre rather . Now that which in its owne nature is onely possible , cannot passe from this condition into the condition of a thing future , without some cause . Now you have shewed no cause of this alteration , nor you list not to inquire into it , it is too hot for your fingers . For by inquirie it would be found that no cause hereof can be assigned , but onely the will of God .

Secondly , I deny that God by determining things contingent , and in their nature meerly possible , making them future , doth lay any necessity upon them , but rather decreeth a contingent manner of production unto them , answerable unto their natures . For as hee decreeth that necessary things shall come to passe necessarily , so hee decreeth that contingent things shall come to passe contingently .

Thirdly , as touching your antecedent , I desire to know what things contingent those are , whereupon we can lay any necessity , whereby to foretell them , for it passeth my imagination to divine . This may well goe for your owne . I have been acquainted with many disputants in this argument , I never met with any argument of any kinne to this . Certainly there is some exquisite curiosity in it . For you suppose men may doubt of this , and therefore you undertake to prove it : but when ? In your treatise of the divine providence , that I heare is newly printed , we shall heare of it belike ere long , in case you doe not forget what you promised : and the reason why I may doubt hereof is this ; In the end of the fifth Section of this Chapter you told us that you were anon to intimate , that the reservation of such liberty unto God himselse , ( as never to passe any decree whereby to binde his owne hands ) is a point of high perfection . Now this anon of yours is yet to come , for hitherto since we parted from that section wee have received no intimation hereof . But be it , that you will bee as good as your word , what is that which you undertake to demonstrate ? That some events which are to day truly contingent , may by our industrie become to morrow truly necessary . But this needs no demonstration . For whatsoever I doe , by doing it , I make that necessarie , which before was contingent . For every Sophister knowes out of Aristotle , and out of common sense also , that Omne quod est quando est necesse est esse . But this is nothing to your purpose . For you speake of such a necessity laid upon contingents , as whereby we might foreknow them . But by doing things I cannot fo●●know them ; for knowledge of things upon the doing of them , is rather after-knowledge then fore knowledge .

And therefore though heretofore I thought of no other meaning of these words of yours then this , yet now by pondering better upon it I conceive you have a farther reach , and that of a mysterious nature : for as much as you are loath to utter it , and give an instance of that which you deliver . Yet why should you be loath to utter that which you presume no intelligent Christian will deny ? This makes me looke back againe upon your words , to try whether I can start the mysterie . And hereupon I discover other mysteries , though not the maine ; as when you say , We are able ( after this necessity layd upon them by our selves ) infallibly to foreknow and foretell . Now this speech is mysterious and imperfect : for you doe not tell us what we may foreknowe and foretell whether it be the things themselves whereupon we have layd the necessitie spoken of , or rather some thinges els ; but neither of these thinges doe you acquaint us with here . For if you had I should make no question , but if we might foreknowe them , whatsoever they be , we might without any more adoe foretell them , if we were not tonguetied .

Now no necessitie can we lay upon any thing but by doing it , and such a thing cannot be sayd hereupon to beforeknowne , therfore undoubtedly your meaning is , that by doing something before contingent , and therby laying a necessitie upon , it we may foreknowe another thing . Now this may prove nothing to your present purpose ; and yourselfe in this argumentation quite besides the cushion . For Gods foreknowledge which you impugne is the foreknowledge of a thing contingent , by willing it .

But this foreknowledge of man , shall be the foreknowledge of one thing by willing and doing of another ; now these are no more suitable then the hares head and the goose gibletts . And to proceede a litle further in my conjectures , because your concealments put me to it , I say your concealment is most unseasonable . For as much as you conceale that whereupon your argument depends , like unto a Physitian that giving a Medicine to his patient , he should tell him there is one necessary ingredient more belonging to it , and he must suspend the taking of it , untill he goeth to the East-Indies to ferche it . In which case his patient may have his greene cap on his head before he returne .

Suppose faith and repentance be those contingent things upon which I may lay a necessitie by beleiving and repenting ; will you say hereupon I may foretell my salvation ? If this be it , this againe is nothing to the purpose in a second respect . For the assurance of my salvation is not so much built upon my faith and repentance , as upon my perseverance in faithe and repentance unto the end . And I cannot hereupon foreknowe or foretell my salvation untill I am dead , which is not to foreknowe it , much lesse to foretell it .

Agayne my assurance of salvation depends not so much upon my faithe and repentance , and perseverance in both , as upon the revelation that God hath made , that as many as finally believe and repent shall be saved ; and also that if once I believe and repent truly I shall continue therein to the end ; which I have cause to doubt whether you believe . Agayne doe you thinke indeede , that it is by Gods permission only that men doe believe and repent ? and doe you thinke good to deny that God doth effectually worke them unto faith and repentance ? You must needes take this course . For if God be indeede the Authour of faith & repentance , them he did decree to give men faith & repentance , & so contingents should be decreed by God , and God should foreknowe them by seeing the purpose of his owne will to bestowe them .

Thus I have ventured to boult out the mysteries which you conceale . If I have missed of the marke , I will aime at it no more and give it over with a mysterium quaere , as Schoolemen sometimes when they have hunted themselves out of breathe they have ended their discourse with a Responsionem quaere . Yet we have not finished this Section . The very next sentence is a Crevecoeur unto me , I can make no sense of it : Succession is a scroule ( as we imagine it ) containing severall columnes of contingency or indifferent possibilities , of which only so many or so much of any as in revolution of time take inke and are unfolded become visible to men and Angells . Alas , what disaster hath befallen me , that I should divert from other studies wherein I fought the Lords battayles against forren enemies , and encountred with errours plainly sett forthe nothing involved with affected phrases , or streynes of expression in farre fetcht Metaphors , but strengthned with such armes as witt could afford without Rhetoricall painting , their manner of fight well knowne unto me , and in confuting whereof I profited myselfe and gained increase of knowledge and of abilitie in mainteining the truthe of God . And now to be cast upon such discourses the opening of the meaning , whereof in one sentence sometimes costs me more paines then the answering of their best argument , and all this without any profit redounding unto my selfe , my time wasted , my knowledge no whit bettered : well , jacta est alea , we must proceed , and since our hand is put to this plo●gh , though oftentimes I looke backe , and come to a parle about not intermission only but interruption also , yet I must not breake off . Succession is as much as time , and this you compare to a scroule containing possibilities . Out upon the shallownesse of my wits , that can comprehend no analogie in this comparison . For though all changeable things are said to bee in time , yet nothing like unto writing which is in a scroule , as in the subject of it . For time is rather an antecedent to things durable , then things durable an antecedent to time . But to say that time contains possibilities , is a wilder speech then the former . For before ever any time was , possibilities were as many as now , and more also . For the world was possible , and every part of it , and every thing that since hath beene , or shall be , even before the world was , was possible like as the world was . Aga●ne , the duration of possibilties hath no succession ; for if it had , then time should have beene before the world was .

By unfolding of these possibilities , I thinke you intend the bringing of them into act , and this is to take ink , as you phrasifie it . Now I had thought the scroule had contained onely those things that are written in it , and so the things brought forth in it , and not those things that are not written , and so accordingly neither time is to be accounted to containe possibilities . Yet all things that are brought forth , surely are not visible to men , howsoever they are to Angels . So that when the painting with a great deale of intention of spirit and consideration , is washed off , the face of the sentence is but this . In time many things before possible are brought forth into act : what is mine understanding the better for this , or my readers either ?

Then you returne to your former mad paradoxes , and tell us againe , ( to inure us to your bugbeares , that hereafter wee might be the lesse affrighted with them , ) that the Almightie lookes on all things as well from that end of time which is to come , as from that which is past ; and that his infinite and eternall wisedome doth not only encompasse all things that come to pass , as the circumference doth the center , but penetrates the whole scroule of succession from end to end , more clearely then the Sunnes brightnesse doth the perspicuous ayre . To this I answer , that it is indifferent unto man in the course of his knowledge , to take notice of things that have beene either from the beginning of the world to Noahs flood , or from Noahs flood to the beginning of the world . So likewise it is indifferent unto us to take notice of things done from this day upwards to the beginning of the world , or from the beginning of the world to this day .

As for things to come they are unknowne unto us . But if they were knowne unto us , as by revelation they may , it were as easie for us to take notice of them successively from the end of the world , rising upwards unto this day , or proceeding from this day unto the end of the world . As for notice of them all at once , it is impossible to be taken by us , our nature disposeth us to understand things onely successively one after another . Now it is without question that all things are knowne to God that have beene from the beginning of the world unto this day , and that shall bee from this day to the end of the world . And therefore if God were to take notice of them , and that in a successive manner as we doe , it were indifferent for him to take into consideration first the things that have been the first yeare of this world , then those things that came to passe the next yeare , and so forwards unto this present yeare , and so successively to take notice of what shall be the next yeare , and so onwards unto the end of the world . Or otherwise he might begin to take notice of those things that shall come to passe the last yeare of the world , then what shall come to passe the yeare before it , and so upwards unto this yeare , and thence proceed to consider what hath beene the last yeare , and so upwards unto the first yeare of the world .

But albeit this kind of successive consideration be incident unto man , yet it is not so with God . He hath from everlasting knowne what from the beginning of the world unto the end should come to passe , and that not successively but all at once . For his whole knowledge and every part of it is everlasting . And therefore it is absurd to say that God knowes things from the beginning of the world unto the end , unlesse in this sence , God knowes all things , which things come to passe from the beginning of the World unto the end , thereby denoting the succession of things in the World , not in the knowledge of God . But much more absurd is it to say that God knowes all things from the end of the World to the beginning of it : because this speech can admitt no tolerable congruity of explication , like the former , namely by applying it , not to any succession in the knowledge of God , but to the succession of things in the World . For albeit that we may well say that things doe succeed in course from the beginning of the World to the end ; yet it were absurd to say that things doe succeed in course from the end of the World to the beginning . You may as well say , A mans life hath continued not only from the beginning to the end , but also from the end unto the beginning , which is as much as to turn a mans heeles upwards , and place them where the head should be .

As for Gods incompassing of time as the circumference doth the center ( wherunto you may adde the circular duration formerly spoken of ) and the penetrating of the whole scroll of succession from end to end , wherein you so much please your selfe as in rare notions , I take them to be no better then sicke mens dreames : we have nauseated enough upon them , you needed not to have repeated them , yet you will have these conceyts of yours to be receyved for precious truths , as Mountebanks commend their oyles and balmes , and not so only , but to be as cleere as the Sunne also . It is well that paper blusheth not . Every man seeth how the brightnes of the Sunne doth pierce the ayre , doth every man acknowledge God to incompasse time by his eternitie ? Sure I am Durand censures this conceit as absurd . Yet I deny not but that others might doate upon it as well as your selfe , taking it upon trust without examination .

And the corruptnes of mans mind may appeare in this very vanity , that he pleaseth himselfe many times in such notions as he understands not . Againe , doth every man that cleerly sees how the same peirceth the ayre , as cleerly see how Gods eternitie doth penetrate all time both all that is past and that which is to come , in such sort as indivisibly ( for eternitie is indivisible ) to coexist with it ? For hitherto tends the reach of your me●ning . A most absurd conceyte . For therhence it would follow that all parts of time past , and all parts of time to come doe coexist together at this present ; For if eternity doth now coexist with them , then at this present they must needs coexist with it , and consequently they must exist at this present , ( otherwise how could they coexist ) whence it followeth that both time past should be present , and also time to come , As absurd and voyd of all reason is that speeche of yours , when you say that Gods finger hath drawne columus of possibilities . God knowes things possible , I confesse , but his finger hath not drawne these possibilities , no more than he hath drawne himselfe and his owne omnipotent nature . For nothing is required to the denomination of the possibilitie of any thing , but this , that God is armed with allmightie power , whereby he is able to bring it to passe . Now amongst possible things some are brought forth immediately by God , some by second causes , whether by God or by second causes , they are all knowne to God , and who doubts now adayes of this ? yet this is the whole contents of your last sentence , which you have commended unto us so embroydered with art , and with the needle worke of quilting eloquence , as if you travayled in childbirth to be delivered of words and phrases , which many times vent untruthes , commonly deliver but vulgar sence , and sometimes end in no sence . Yet when a man or oxe or asse brings forth any thing that is possible ; you say it is like the embroyderer who fills the drawers obscure patterne with conspicuous branches of silke , gold , or silver , which yet notwithstanding is fulfilled in bringing forth that which is accoumpted the eigth deadly sinne among the Irishe ; were ever quaint terms and silken similitudes worse bestowed ? by the way forgetting that the Embroiderer himselfe is a second cause in bringing forth things possible into act , as well as a boy doth in playing at Top and scourge . And you may as well compare the Embroiderer to a boy playing at Top and scourge , as a boy playing at top and scourge to an Embroiderer . Turpe est difficiles habere nugas : If any man prove an ounce the wiser for this , he may soone prove as wise as Pauls steeple . I remember in the beginning you called this discourse of yours a paradise of contemplation , and I confesse I finde many flowres of Rhetoricke growing therein , and especially pre●ty similitudes , but by applying them they are utterly cast away , for commonly they serve either for the illustration of untruths , or very vulgar truths . And great pitty but they should finde a place among the toyes in London .

12. In the last place for a congruous explication of Austines and Gregories meaning , in passages before mentioned , you commend unto us certaine observations as necessary extracts of what hath hitherto beene delivered . This necessity I presume was no impeachment to the liberty of your will in broaching them , for my part I see no necessity at all of them , nor of this whole discourse of yours . In like sort as little necessary it was that my braines should be surbeaten so often in hunting after the involved sense of many sentences , thorow the thickets of wilde phrases and figures , and affected obscure expressions .

As touching the perfection of Gods knowledge uncapable of addition , therein we argue with you . Your next position is worthy of consideration ; As Gods knowledge doth not make things to be , so neither doth the immutable or absolute certainty of his knowledge make things so knowne by him to be immutable , or absolutely necessarie either in themselves , or in respect of his eternall knowledge . To this I answer , first to the first member of your sentence , that great Divines from Austines daies to these daies have maintained that the knowledge of God is the cause of things . And the reason they give is th●s ; because the knowledge of God is scientia artificis , the knowledge of a crafts-master . Now the case is cleare , that craftsmasters by their knowledge doe worke and cause things . Yet I am content to helpe you with a distinction , if you will be pleased to accept of it . That the knowledge of God which is the knowledge of an artificer , is the scientia simplicis intelligentiae , whereby hee knowes all things possible , and how to order all things most conveniently to their ends . But the knowledge you speak of here proceeds of scientia visionis , wherby God ever knew what should come to passe : and this knowledge indeed is not the cause of things . But as for the later member of this your sentence , it might have been● so carried as to give your selfe satisfaction ( if I be not deceived ) and us also : as thus , So the certainty of Gods knowledge doth not make things certaine ; or if you would adde the word necessarie we could have bo● with it , though it marreth the proport●on ; which precisely is this , As knowledge doth not make things to be , so certaine knowledge doth not make things certainly to be . But you leaving out the word certainly , take away all evidence of proportion . Belike you would acknowledge that certaine knowledge doth make things certainly to be . But I doe not like the proposition , and the genius of your argument drawn from proportion , if it hath any force any way , hath force against it .

Now if I doe not acknowledge that certaine knowledge makes things certainly to bee , much lesse would I acknowledge that it makes things necessarily to be . There is so manifest reason against it , considering that all those things that fall our contingently , are as certainly knowne to God , as those things that come to passe certainly . Yet you ( as ●imorous men never thinke themselves sure enough , ) are not content with this , but clogge your inference with other needlesse circumstances , as in saying , absolutely necessary , and that not in respect of themselves , but of Gods knowledge also : whereas without these the comparison was incongruous enough . And these circumstances I say are needlesse , because I would grant what you desire without these . But by your addition of these I perceive your meaning : for hereby you imply that it is necessary that things knowne by God shall come to passe : for though knowledge doth not make them to be , much lesse to be necessary , yet upon supposition of Gods knowledge , it followeth necessarily by way of argument , that such things as God foreknows shall come to passe . This is of an undoubted truth , which kind of necessitie is not any necessitie of being in the things themselves , but only of externall denomination upon supposition of Gods foreknowledge . And you doe in vaine seeme to strive against this ; For can you deny this argument ? God foreknowes that Antichrist shall be destroyed ; therefore it is necessary that Antichrist shall be destroyed according to the time foreseene by God , neither will it herhence followe , that therefore it is absolutely necessary that Antichrist should be destroyed , as you very weakly suppose . For necessitie upon supposition onely , commonly called necessitie of consequence was never yet taken for absolute necessitie by any that I knowe . I medle not with the terme immutable , because it is nothinge congruous in the application . For applyed to Gods knowledge , it signifieth that knowledge which havinge being cannot be altered , but applyed in this sense to the event that commeth to passe is untrue . For no event , especially contingent , after it comes to passe is immutable . If applyed to the manner of comming to passe , yet it is not congruous . For God knowing that it shall come to passe in a mutable manner ( that is in a contingent manner , for if that be not your meaning , I know not what is ) the immutability of Gods knowledge doth rather confirme the contingency of the event , then diminish it .

Yet you suppose some would inferre the contrary : but I assure you I am none of them , and that for the reason before mentioned . Yet still it holds good , that if God foreseeth such a thing shall come to passe ; It followeth of necessity that the same thing shall come to passe , albeit not necessarily but contingently ; when you say , Gods knowledge of things mutable ( that is of the futurition of contingents ; give me leave to construe you so , that I may fayrely understand you ) is absolutely necessary , all Schoolemen I thinke that ever write are directly against you . And for good reason ; for like as it was not at all necessary that such a course of contingent things should be in the world as now is , so neither was it necessary , much lesse absolutely necessary , that God should know this course ; for if he had ordeyned another course of things ( as it was very possible ) then he had also knowne another course . But your meaning though incommodiously expressed I conceyve to be this : Vpon supposition that thing should come to passe , it was necessary that God should know those things . For it is impossible that he should be ignorant of any thing that is to come : And this is a truth . But you have marred it by adding the word , absolutely . For to be necessary in the sense before mentioned , is to be necessary upon supposition only and not absolutely . Thus you see I would fayne have healed the incongruity of your position , but it will not be healed .

Agayne you tell us , that It is most true which S. Gregory sayth that things future doe not come upon God , as they doe upon us , that things present doe not passe from him or by him , as they doe from us . That which you take to be most true , I take to be most false , in the sense wherin you deliver it . For like as they passe from us by ceasing to coexist with us , so they passe also from God as ceasing to coexist with him . And as they come upon us by beginning anew to coexist with us , so they come upon God also , as beginning anew to coexist with him . The conforming of space of time , with space of place , doth abuse your understanding , and cast you into errour ere you are aware , though you will not be perswaded of it . In space of place it is true things both comming towards us yet doe not come towards God ; and passing by us and from us , yet doe not passe by God or from God .

The reason whereof is , because God doth coexist with all places , and filleth all but man doth not . And no marveile . For all places doe actually exist , and God existing too , they are truly sayd to coexist together .

But as for all the parts of time they doe not exist together , and therefore consequently cannot bee said to coexist with God , neither God at once to coexist with them . But as they doe exist by succession one after another , so is God said to coexist with them , not by reason of any succession in God , but onely in the creature , and as wee lose our coexistence with creatures that cease to be , so doth God . For coexistence is an externall denomination attributed unto God from the existence of the creatures . In which sence he is said to be He that was , and is , and is to come ; to wit , in respect of his coexistence which was with things that are past , and which is with things that are present , and which shall bee with things that are to come , to w●t , when they are come .

But besides this succession in man of coexistence with other creatures , there is also a succession in man which is not in God . For he groweth or diminisheth in the quantity of his body , he is changed and altered to and fro in the qualities both of body and soule . In body sometimes hot , sometimes cold , sometime faire , sometimes foule . In soule he hath for a while a growth in knowledge , afterward hee 〈◊〉 and decayeth in knowledge . As for the duration of his essence , that is without succession , as the Angels are . And to continue the same as God doth , is not to gaine ought , but to keep that which he hath . God is alwayes ; so are Angels since the time they have beene . The manner of Gods duration is indivisible ; such also is reputed the duration of Angels ; whom Schoolemen acknowledge , not to be measured by time , but by Aevum as touching their substance ; onely as touching their thoughts , whereof there may be a succession , they have invented a discreet time to be the measure thereof . God loseth no existence by antiquity : man neither loseth nor gets existence by continuance . For how should the continuation of existence be the losing of it ? and how can hee get that which he hath already ? Accidents are gotten and lost , I confesse , nothing so in God . Thus your fancies cast about to gaine some confirmation of your former erroneous conceit , of Gods coexistence with all parts of time ; but nothing serves your turne . If by continuance alone we did gaine any thing , which before we had not , God himselfe should gaine something which before he had not . For without doubt hee hath continuance . Times passing ( you say ) exonerate themselves into the Ocean of his infinite duration without inlarging it ; Times comming incessantlie flowe from it without diminution of it . No doubt you please your selfe in these expressions : To me they are worse then Empedocles his Androprora were to Aristotle . There is no canting like unto this . The waters that run into the Sea , are a part of the Sea ; thence they came , and thither they returne , as Salomon telleth us . And therefore no marvell Eccles. 1● if the Sea neither is diminished by their egresse , nor by their regresse enlarged . No creatures duration is a part of Gods duration , as the rivers are part of the sea . And how doth our duration flow from Gods , but as an efficient cause , and that equivocall , that is wholly different ? but water doth not come from the Sea , as from an efficient , much lesse equivocall , but as a part from the whole . Neither indeed doth our duration proceed from Gods duration , but from his will . For our duration is our existence continued , and this from the will of God . For he worketh all things according to the Eph. 1. 12. counsell of his will .

Thus we can devise how our duration comes from God , though farre different from the flowing of the water from the Sea : but how our durations doe exonerate themselves into God , or into his duration , it surpasseth the sphere of my imagination to devise . I doe not thinke Paracelsus was ever able to interprete this . Yet some say he heard the devill reade a lecture through a grate in the Vniversity of Toledo . Yet you have not done traversing your ground . Times future ( you say ) are said to come upon us , or to meet us , because our duration or existence cannot reach to future things whilest they are future . Your figure Catachresis when will it be at an end ? when we talke of reaching , we suppose the thing to have existence whereat we reach , but time future as yet exists not . Yet you thinke God doth reach it by coexistence with it . Yet I marke of late you forbeare th●s phrase . Is it not because it doth manifestly discover the errour of your conceit ? For to coexist with things future , doth imply that things future coexist , and consequently exist , and so they are present , and not future . The very Angells are not of so long standing to day as they shall be to morrow . This I confesse is something , but I would gladlie know what inference you make herehence .

Angells have had a beginning ; God hath not : if God had a beginning , as Angells have had , every day he should be of longer duration then he was the former , yet without any change , and consequently without succession . But will you inferre herehence , therfore God hath coexistence with things future ? A consequence of no coulour of probability ; and the consequent in it selfe implying manifest contradiction as before I have shewed . Till future things exist , we have no coexistence with them ; nor God neither . For if God did coexist with them , they should coexist with God , & consequently exist , and so cease to be future , and forthwith become present . Yet you labour to prove the contrary ; and so you may , and sweate too , and be never a whit the nearer to that you seeke for . God is every way before time , ( you say ) that is , not onely before it , as we accompt ( he is before that which is to come and so are we also , but he was before all Worlds ) but after it and behind it also . For that which we accompt after or behind time , you call before it ; that so with the better grace you may attribute it unto God . But we like plaine fellowes , love to speake plainlie , and to call a spade a spade . And in the like language we deny that God is after time to come , and prove it thus . To be in duration after any thing is to be while that other thing is past , or at least , the first ex●stence of it ; but God in this sence cannot be sayd to be after time to come , because time to come is neither yet past nor yet existent . Yet at length when divinations will not serve your turne , you thinke to have gotten a text of Scripture for it . Gods duration you say is Yesterday , to day to morrowe and the same for ever . It is well you did not quote Scripture , least so your penne might have bene censured as Corruptor stilus for putting into the text to morrowe , and that in small letters suitable with the former . Perhaps you may say , why may he not be as well sayd to be to morrowe , as to be Yesterday . I grant the proportion of truth in both ; but where doe you find it , to be sayd of God that He is yesterday . Take heed of adulter sensus which may be as bad as Corruptor stilus . Not in the Hebrewes where it is onely sayd that Christ is the same yesterday , and to day and for ever . Not that he is Yesterday , nor that he is To morrow ; but rather to the contrary thus , He was , he is , and he is to come : But still the same in opposition to alteration , more wayes then you have expressed ; nor to alteration onely , but to all possibilitie of alteration . For he is of necessary being . T is false to say , that In his duration all thinges are . It beeing neither true formally as it is manifest ( for time is no part of eternity ) nor eminently . For it is nor Gods eternity that produceth things , or maintayneth the duration of things , but the will of God armed with power and wisedom to doe every thing . At first sight , I thought to have made no exception , against the last sentence ; but upon second thoughts two members of the three seeme to be as faultie as any . For things future have no being at all in esse reali , as touching reall being , they are in esse cognito and esse volito , knowne by God and decreed to come to passe in due time . So likewise things past have no being at all , only they are knowne of , and were decreed by God , to be in such a time as now is past . And how can they be sayd to be in God ? Not formally as is manifest ; nor eminently , for he cannot produce things past . For that were to make them not to be past . Yet you end in a truth , that Thinges present cannot subsist without him . I would you had both begun , and continued so . Yet this you corrupt with a needlsse amplification , That presence cannot subsist without him , which being but a relation requires no distinct operation , to susteyne it , distinct from that which susteyneth the foundation .

In the end of the fifth Section you promised to intimate a certaine point of high perfection in God consisting in the reservation of his libertie ; but since that time we never heard of it more .

CHAP. IX .

Of Divine Immutability .

IN the first place you tell us that some Schoolemen mould immutability in the same conceit with eternity , and that others make that the off-spring of this ; but you conceale your Authors . I see no reason for either , but manifest reason I have against the first . For if the conceit of eternity were one and the same with the conceit of immutability , then no man could conceive a thing to bee eternall , but forthwith he must conceive it to be immutable . But this is most untrue . For Aristotle conceived the heavens and elements to be eternall both waies , without beginning , and without end ; yet did not conceive them to be immutable , for as much as hee acknowledged them to be all under motion ; and the elements also , as touching their parts subject to corruption . Plato though he maintained the world to have had a beginning , yet hee acknowledged it to be eternall one way , that is , without end , yet did not conceive it to be immutable . The first matter was generally held to be eternall both wayes , yet none maintained it to be immutable . And no marvell . For mutation comprehends all kinde of motion , and consequently immutability excludes all possibility of motion , but eternity signifieth only continuance for ever .

Now like as continuance for seven yeares , or an hundred yeares , &c. doth not require that the same thing should bee without all change for seven yeares or an hundred yeares , &c. much lesse doth it include the notion of immutability for such a space of yeares in the conceit thereof : so neither doth continuance for ever include the notion of being without all change for ever in the conceit thereof .

Adam was made immortall , and so had continued if he had not sinned , yet should he not have been free from all change . The Angels are eternall ; that is , such as shall continue for ever , and so were made , yet neither are they now , nor were they made immutable . Indeed there are divers kindes of motions , some are in qualitie , called alterations ; some in quantitie , called augmentation and diminution ; some in place , called locall motion ; some in substance , as generation and corruption . Immutability in this last kinde commeth nearest to the conceit of eternity , yet there is a difference . For eternity signifieth onely an everlasting continuance which may be joyned with a possibility of not-continuance , as in Angels , and the soules of men , and our bodies also in the world to come ; but immutability cannot bee joyned with such a possibility ; therefore the conceit of eternity and the conceit of immutabilitie are much different . And for the same reason immutability cannot be the off-spring of eternity , rather eternity is the off-spring of immutability . I thinke both immediately flow from the manner of his being , which is necessarie . The like judgement may be made of that you avouch in the next place , to wit , That the true explication of the former containes the truth of this . If by the former you meane eternity , as I thinke you doe , ( though some while I referred it to your discourse immediately preceding of Gods infinite wisedome , which you chiefly place in foreknowing all things , which is a good reason of the unchangeable nature of his will . ) In my judgement immutability rather confirmes eternity , then eternity confirmes immutabilitie : and the knowledge of Gods eternity is the off-spring of the knowledge of his immutability , rather then on the contrary ; and that for the reasons before given , to wit , because immutability inferres eternity , eternity doth not inferre immutability .

2. That God is unchangeable I nothing doubt , but in my judgement you doe not well to prove it from the infinitenesse of his essence ; First because this consequent carryeth no evidence with it . That nothing can bee added to that which is infinite carryeth some evidence , but that nothing can be diminished from it , doth not . Some have maintayned that God can make an infinite magnitude , and a number infinite as Hurtado di Mendosa disputes . Secondly your argumentation is rather à Posteriori then à Priori . For if by essence infinite you understand infinite in duration , which is as much as eternity , I have already shewed that immutability better inferres eternity then eternity doth inferre immutability . But as for the necessitie of Gods being that doth manifestly and à Priori inferre his eternall being , and that it is impossible he should cease to be . And Bradwardine maintaynes that this attribute of God ens necessarium is the first attribute , as whence all other perfections are manifestly derived . For that a lesse perfect nature should have a necessitie of being , and a more perfect nature should have a contingent being is most absurd and impossible . For so that which is more perfect should have his dependance of being from that which is lesse perfect . Wherefore seeing God is of necessary being , it followeth manifestly that he must be most perfect . Yet I have cause to doubt of your sinceritie in affirming , that To infinite perfection nothing can accrewe . It is well knowne what conceyt Vorstius intertayned hereabouts , as namely that Gods decrees are not everlasting ; in which case some new act of will doth accrew to God , which before was not found in him . And I fear you will be found to be of the same opinion . And I pray what meant you in the former chapter and 5. Section to maintayne that it is a point of high perfection for God , to reserve his libertie , and what libertie is this but of decreeing ? Yet in the same Section you stile Gods decrees everlasting . But that denomination comes in against the hayre , as if it were only to choak your reader and h●nder him from laying that to your charge which this reservation of libertie , ( which you attribute to God , as a point of high perfection ) doth manifestly import .

When you say , that From infinite perfection nothing can fall but must fall into God , or into infinite perfection seeing that he is in being infinite , in such a conceyt streyned so high , that it breakes into non-sence and flat contradiction . For if it fall from him , it falls not into him ; ●f into him , it falls not from him . In like sort in saying that God is indivisibly and totally in every space that can be imagined , you contradict that which formerly you have delivered in the chapter of Gods immensitie . For hence it followeth that God is in vacuo which you in plaine tearmes denyed there .

3. In the next place you propose a difficultie , and that is this : How Gods will or counsell should be eternally immutable , and yet everlastingly free . And in stead of answer you tell us , You see not what appearance of difficultie can present it selfe , at least to such as beare the two former principles before mentioned levell in their mindes and thoughts . So then two principles will serve the turne to cleare all this , provided that we keepe them levell in our mindes and thoughts : otherwise woe bee to the funambulus if he swerve never so little awry . Now these principles you say are first , That God is absolutely infinite in being , the other , That he is absolutely perfect according to all the branches of being or perfection by us conceivable or more then all these , perfection it selfe . If you will believe me , I assure you , I doe believe all this , and yet I am as farre to seeke for clearing of the former difficultie as ever . If the reason be because I doe not keepe them so levill in my minde and thought as I should , I assure you , I would willingly helpe this also if I knew how . I would doe any thing for a quiet life , and to cleare such a difficultie as this which in my opinion is a wondrous one , if rightly understood . But I much doubt whether every one that proposeth it , rightly understandeth it .

For I have found by experience that many talke of the libertie of Gods will in proportion to our libertie ; Now our libertie consisteth in an indifferency of intertayning different acts of will . But we shall fowly erre if we intertaine any such conceyt of the libertie of Gods will . For the act of Gods will being all one with Gods will , and Gods will being his essence , and his essence being one most simple act , it was ever impossible that there should be any thing found in God which now is not , or that any thing should not be found in God which now is . You will say then was it not possible that other things might have bene decreed by God then are ? Yes undoubtedly even Iudas might have bene an elect , and Paul a reprobate . Yet other things thus decreed should not have beene decreed by any other act in God then now is in God , for the reason above specified , and that for ought I know so received by Schoole Divines , as denyed by none . And this is a mystery I confesse , wherein we must content our selves with the 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , & leave to inquire how this may be ; for we are uncapable of that . Onely we can prove that the course of things that now is , in whole and part hath no necessary derivation from God , but meerly contingent , and accordingly proceeded from the free will of God , yet everlastingly determining this course of things that now we see ; and having everlastingly determined it , this will of God concerning this course of things , hath everlastingly continued immutable unto this day , and so shall for ever .

As for your principles how they conferre to the clearing of this , I perswade my selfe you are not able to manifest . And what need , I pray , of making a difference betweene these principles which seeme to be all one ; and your selfe have coupled them tog●ther , as all one in the former section , and in that argument of yours whereby you proved the immutability of God . Yet these principles must bee helpt with another supposition , that so they may doe the deed ; that is , That absolute contingency , or possibilities aequipendent betwixt many effects , may as truly be the object of Gods eternall decree , as necessity in other workes of nature .

Which supposition to raise your readers thoughts to an admiration of the momentous nature thereof , you say , You have often promised , and once for all by Gods assistance shall undoubtedly prove : wheras you might well spare your paines in this , no man being so simple as to question it , were it not that you do intoxicate your readers thoughts in the delivering of it with wilde phrases , in calling the contingency of things possibilities aequipendent . enough to slagger a man at the very noise of such cracking of thornes . Wee maintaine that God decreeth not onely contingency , but things contingent ; as namely Cyrus Es. 45. 13. his restoring of the Iewes , and giving them liberty to returne to their owne country : the burning of the Prophets bones 1 King . 13 2. Act 4. 28. by Iosiah upon the Altar ; yea and the crucifying of Christ Iesus , the Apostles with one voice directly expressing so much , Act. 4. And such decrees of God though free , continue immutable , and that from everlasting , as indeed being from everlasting . And wee say there is no reason why God should alter what he hath decreed , considering that he knoweth no more now then he did from everlasting .

In that which followeth we agree with you , that immutabilitie is a perfection , & mutability an imperfection ; likewise that to worke freely is a perfection , to worke necessarily is an imperfection ; and where both immutability and freedome of operation meet , the perfection of that nature is so much the greater . But this I finde not so scholastically expressed , when you say , That if man were as immortall as the heavens are , hee would be more perfect then they can be . This I say wants much of accuratenesse . For the heavens are not immortall . Aristotle conceived them to be incorruptible , but not immortall . For like as in case they were corruptible , yet could they not bee counted mortall , because they have no life to lose ; so though they be granted to be incorruptible , yet could they not thereupon be accounted immortall , and that for the same reason , because they have not life , which alone makes a thing capable of the denomination of immortall , and for want of life , the meanest of creatures having life doe in excellency surpasse the heavens .

And if Aristotle had lived in our dayes to bee acquainted with such Astronomicall observations as we are , of so many Comets and blazing Starres in the celestiall Region , not only above the Moone , but even in the firmament it selfe , and that of long continuance , and at length wasted and consumed ; it is more then probable that his opinion concerning the incorruptibility of the heavens would have beene changed , considering his apologies and excuses in his bookes De Caelo , that the bodie of the heavens being so farre remote , and little certaine experience ( whereupon all natuall reason is grounded ) to be had of such things as might discover the nature thereof : therefore his discourse thereof whatsoever to bee taken in the better part , and extraordinary performances thereabouts not to be expected from a naturall Philosopher . And concluding his discourse concerning the incorruptibilitie of the heavens , he professeth that all experience did justifie his opinion in that point , for as much as there was never knowne any alteration there . So then , had he knowne of any alterations there , this might justly have altered the case with Aristotle , and that no alteration was then knowne , was to be attributed to the weake nature of Astronomicall observations in those dayes , whereabouts he was to depend upon the credit of others in their professions , being no Astronomer himselfe . In the next place you tell us , that Though freedome in it selfe be a great perfection , yet to be free to doe evill is a branch of imperfection , which springs from the mutability of the creatures freedome . This deserves well the scanning . Adam in his innocency was free to doe evill was he not ? Yet was he made very good , and after the image of God , and no sinne had yet estranged him from the life of God , and therefore his state and condition deserved to be accounted a state of perfection rather then of imperfection . Although I deny not but there be greater perfections then this of Adam .

As the perfection of God is above the perfection of any , of all creatures . The perfection of Angells is above the perfection of man . The perfection of men in the state of glory above the perfection of man in the state of innocency . Yet I see no cause why Adams state in creation should be counted a state of imperfection , rather then of perfection . And for ought I see , freedom unto evill is no more favouring of imperfection then freedome unto good , considering that they both make but one morall freedome . For to be morally free to doe good quoad exercitium is to be free to choose whether a man will doe good or no , and quoad specificationem , is to be free to choose whether he will doe good or evill . So to be morally free to evill quoad exercitium is to be free to choose whether he will doe evill or no ; quoad specificationem is to be free to choose whether he will doe evill or good . This discourse of mine hath proceeded according to your owne phrase , that speaks of freedom unto evill , but to speak in mine owne phrase , I should not hastily speake of any freedome of the will of man to evill . You may say as well that the will of man in th● use of the eye is free to behold either colours or sounds which he will , or in the use of the eare is free to judge of sounds or colours as he will . There is a Common sence within , I confesse , whereby the will is able to judge of these , but by the eye or eare she cannot .

The reason is , no facultie extends beyond his object . Within the compasse of his owne object it may be extended to any kind or particular , but it reacheth not beyond his object ; Now the object of the eye is onely colour , and the object of the eare is onely sound . And a man may looke upon what colours he will of many , that are presented unto him , so by the eare take notice of any sounds that are , but neither the eye can behold that which is not coloured , nor the eare appr●hend ought that is not of the nature of sound . In like so● the will within the compasse of her owne object , may settle upon what she will , but beyond her object she cannot extend .

Now the object of the will is good not evill , and therefore she is of free choyce to settle upon what good she will , but not upon evill . But here some may say how then can any evill be committed ? I answere two wayes : First by errour of judgment . For it is the nature of the will to follow the judgement of the understanding , therefore it is called a reasonable appetite . Secondly , by preferring a lesse good before a greater , as in making choice of doing something because it is profitable , or pleasureable , or some way or other advantageous for the present , notwithstanding that it is dishonest , and such as will bring a farre greater dammage unto us for the time to come . Or thus ; because we make choice of something as before mentioned notwithstanding a superiour authority hath forbidden it ; both because an evill inclination maks us preferre things presently pleasing and profitable , and withall prowd that we cannot endure to be in subjection to lawfull authority , such as undoubtedlie is the authority of God .

Hence it comes to passe , that we are sayd also to be free to good or evill , which we may call a morall liberty in distinction from the former , which is liberty naturall , and consisteth in being indifferent to doe ought that lyes in our power to be done , provided that it may seeme convenient to be done . As for that morall liberty , it scarce ever was to bee found in the world . For it consisteth in an indifferent inclination neither vicious nor virtuous . Now where was ever such a disposition to be found ? Not in man before his fall . For hee was created good and holy , and inclined onely to delight in that which was truly good and pleasing in the sight of God . Some will say , then how could he sinne ? I answer , his sinne was the actuating of his naturall indifferency to the doing of any naturall thing . As to eate an Apple , or not eate it , or to eate this or that , a thing meerelie indifferent , had not God forbidded it , and in this case restrayned his libertie : which prohibition of Gods , he hearkening too much to the tentations of Satan , by the ministery of Eve , who before had tasted of the forbidden fruit , without any dammage discernable , and upon her commendation of it inconsiderately transgressed . Since the fall of Adam a vitious inclination hath possessed all , which even in the regenerate continueth in part , though a supernaturall vertuous or religious inclination hath possessed them , whereby it comes to passe that both carnall things are pleasing to them as they are flesh , and the will of God is pleasing unto them according to the spirit .

Still the naturall liberty continueth in all , to doe any naturall thing , whether commanded or forbidden of God . For even in the regenerate there is a power to doe any naturall thing , though God hath forbidden it , and too great a propension to the doing of it , ( and that because God hath forbidden it ) in respect of the flesh . And in the unregenerate a power also to doe any naturall thing which God hath commanded , and an affectation to doe it also because God hath commanded it ; but in the way of hypocrisie to further their owne carnall ends and courses , yet have they no religious inclination to honour God . How freedome to evill is said by you to spring from the mutability of the creatures freedome , I doe not yet understand .

First , what meane you by the creatures freedome ▪ Do you meane it of his freedome to good , or freedome to evill , or such freedome as is neither to good nor evill ? I thinke your meaning is of the creatures freedom to good .

Secondly , what meane you by the change of this freedome of the creature ? If you speake of the creatures freedome unto good , how is it changed ? or into what is it changed ? here is nothing to answer , but by saying , that his freedome unto good is changed into a freedome unto evill . Which if it bee your meaning , it was verie absurd to say , that his freedome to evill did spring from his change into freedome unto evill . For thus the selfe same thing shall bee both before and after it selfe . Yet you say not , I confesse , that this freedome to evill springs from the mutation of the creatures freedome , but from the mutability ; that is , from the possibility of change . But that is as absurd . For change cannot be said to spring from a possibility of change , but rather from the agent that changeth . Why did you not say plainly , it sprang from the will of man disobeying his Creator ? I see a reason of this . First because freedome to evill doth rather goe before disobedience then follow after it . Why but then if this state of imperfection came not from the creatures delinquency , whence came it ? The truth is , not freedome to doe evill , but bondage unto sinn proceeded from the prevarication of the creature against God his Maker . And this is a state of great imperfection indeed , or rather of great misery , as whereby all mankinde are borne children of wrath , and such as deserve to be made the generation of Gods curse . And are you pleased to mince it thus , calling it onely a freedome to doe evill , whereas if yet we are onely free to doe evill , it must needs follow that wee are free also not to doe it ; yea and free also to doe good , which freedom is now adaies found in none but those whom the Sonne hath freed , according to that of our Saviour , If the Sonne hath made you free , then are you free indeed . Ioh. 〈◊〉 .

But let us proceed with you . It was , I doubt not , the will and pleasure of God to make his creatures mutable before they be immutably happy . But hence it followeth not , that this mutability was necessarily prerequired . For how can that be said to bee necessarily , which depended meerely upon the free will and pleasure of God , without specification of so much as a congruous end intended by God , upon supposition whereof , this mutability of the creature might be said to be necessarily pre-required before their happinesse ? Now what kinne this is to the immutability of God , or to the reconciling thereof to his freedome , let the Reader judge . As also of the sobriety of that which followeth ; God in that he is absolutely perfect is essentially immutable , essentially free and immutably happy , because infinitely good . Then followes the order of immutability and freedome ; that the ground of this , this the perfection of that . Yet many creatures are free without any such growne as immutability , and where the one is wanting , the other cannot be the perfection thereof . And if we speake of immutabilitie in respect of second causes , is it not in the power of God to make the heavens , the Sunne , Moone and Starres immutabl● which notwithstanding should not be any free agents . And undoubtedly , the immutability of Gods will rather supposeth the freedome thereof , then is presupposed by it . But these are matters of no great moment , that which followeth is of more , though you doe but touche , and away , like the dogge at the River Nilus , who feares the Crocodile , and it may be herein you feare some bug-beare also . Freedome it selfe ( you say ) were no absolute perfection unlesse it were immutably wedded unto goodnesse . Gods freedom then , you will have wedded unto goodnesse . In what sence is this delivered ? I am of opinion that whatsoever God doth , it is impossible it should be otherwise then good . For it is impossible that God should transgresse ; As who hath no superior to give lawes to him , but rather his will gives lawes to all , yet in giving lawes to others he gives none to himselfe .

And if his will were a law unto himselfe , it were impossible he should transgresse it in doing ought . For as much as whatsoever he doth , he doth according to the counsayle of his owne will . But you I doubt have some other sence which Aephe . 1. 11 I will labour to start out if I can . You signify his freedome must be wedded to goodnes . When a man is wedded to his wife , he is restrayned from all others , and must keep himselfe only unto her .

So belike amongst diverse things whereunto Gods power doth extend , his freedome must not extend to all , but be confined to that which is good . As if there were some rules of good and evill prescribed unto God , and he were confined to the one , and restrayned from the other . This is Arminius his language , upon which occasion , I have bene bold to encounter their 〈◊〉 in two digressions , who maintayne that there is a justice tha● doth oblige the will of God . If you would deale plainly in setting downe your opinion , and Scholastically , in taking paynes to dispute for it , and not in some sory manner to begge the question , I should be ready with the help of God to enter into the lists in this point with you also .

And at this time , had you named any thing that God cannot doe in the way of justice , which otherwise he hath power to doe , I would have taken the paines , not to consider it only , but to confute it . For I hold that tenent not farre from blasphemy . And I doe well observe that in expressing this your opinion , you doe not signify that Gods freedome must be wedded to his goodnesse , but that freedome must be wedded to goodnesse . And indeed the freedome of men and Angells is to be limited by the lawes of God , who is their Creator , and may and doth give lawes unto them . But as for any law of obedience that God is bound unto , I know none , no not to his owne goodnesse as being neither bound to manifest it nor to communicate it : but by necessity of nature he loves it , that is , himselfe , and by necessity of nature whatsoever he doth , he must doe for himselfe , and for the setting foorth of his owne glory , as he shall thinke good , and not to any other end .

He that is the supreame efficient , must necessarily be the supreame end of all things . So from him and by him , and for Rom. 11. 36. him are all thinges . Much lesse is he bound to the rules of any goodnesse or justice without him . But it may be of this we shall heare more from you hereafter .

In the next place you returne to shew , how immutability and freedome may stand together ; and in stead of proving it you tell us , that we may easily conceive it , provided that they be rightly joyned or sorted . And hereupon you take occasion to discourse somewhat at large of the ill sorting of them , and that in such a kind as none would ever prove so mad as to sort them so ; ( yet that serves for matter of your discourse , ) but as touching the right sorting of them , I doubt we shall never heare of in such a manner as you promise , to wit , that our conceits shall easily comprehend it , no more then wee have heard of that reservation of libertie which you promised to intimate as a point of very high perfection in God .

Well , the ill sorting of them seemes to bee the conceiving of God to be freely immutable , and that you say implieth contradiction , if not unto the nature of immutability , yet unto the nature of absolute perfection , or to our true conceit of infinite being . I know no congruity of this discourse of yours . For freedome is onely in resp●ct of operation , not in respect of being . For freedome supposeth being according to the kinde and nature of the thing which is said to bee free . It were a very absurd thing to discourse that man is not freely a man , or that he were not freely reasonable . And no lesse absurd is it to tell us that God is not freely immutable . You might as well tell us that God is not freely God . And yet if we list to walke along with you in the like vanity of discourse , we might maintaine that God is freely immutable , freely of absolute perfection , freely of infinite perfection , if you take freedome in opposition to coaction . For God is not immutable by coaction , nor of absolute perfection by coaction , nor of infinite being by coaction . And to be that which a man is freely , is better then to be that which he is by coaction .

To be freely immutable in your sense , is not a branch of imperfection , but rather of impossibility . For it is neither possible to the Creator , nor possible to the creature . But imperfections imply a possibility , rather then include any impossibility . But suppose there were any such freedome in God , yet it followeth not , that it should put all those perfections which are contained in his nature upon the hazard . For how improbable were it , that God by his will should choose to be imperfect rather then perfect ? Possible indeed it were upon this supposition , but yet in respect of his wisedome and goodnesse , ●t were as good as impossible hee should will any such thing , though he were free to will it . But God by necessitie of nature is immutable , and impossible it is he should be otherwise ; & in this nature of his the will of God delghteth . And accord●ngly we may judg of the nature of these your extravagant suppositions : yet by your leave , mutability is not alwaies charged with possibility of doing amisse , but onely in creatures reasonable , yet is mutability found as well in creatures unreasonable , yea and without sense and life also , as in creatures reasonable . But to proceed : as it is impossible God should be freely immutable , so is it impossible he should be mutably free .

But why you should account it the period of perfection I know no reason , more then to be immutably wise , immutably powerfull , immutably good . Neither doe I like your inference herehence , namely that therefore God is unchangeable in freedome , as in power , wisedome , or goodnesse ; like as because God is immutably wise , and powerfull , and good , it is no good consequence to say therefore he is as unchangeable in wisedome , power , and goodnesse , as he is in freedome . The consequents , that is , the propositions themselves I approve , but I cannot approve your deduction of the one from the other . Now because God is immutably free , therefore hee was , and is , and shall be eternally free , to exercise his power , and to communicate his goodnesse . All this we grant , and by all which you seeme to goe a birding , and if your tackling hold , you are like to catch something ere long ; and if I mistake not , the next sentence discovereth the mystery you hawked after so long : Free it is ( you say ) for him from everlasting to everlasting omnipoten●ly to decree as well a mutability in the actions of some things created , as a necessity or immutability in the course or operation of nature inanimate . In which words by that time I come to the end of transcribing of them , I finde more then at first blush I dreamed of . For that which you hunt after as now I perceive , is a soryconceit , and such as being granted you , will yeeld your cause as much support as a bulrush ; what need you thus travell to be delivered of such a principle as no man thinkes worth the asking . Onely you carrie it in such a phrase of obscurity , as if you desired your reader to conceive it to be some great mystery , whereas if ●t were plainly delivered , and that in a sober sense , it is no more then this , God hath decreed that some things shall worke contingently and freely , as namely , men and Angels ; like as hee hath decreed that other things , to wit , naturall agents , shall worke necessarily .

And can you tell who is ignorant of this ? or can you shew that ever any was found to call this into question amongst Christians ? All Naturalists acknowledge this difference betweene naturall agents and voluntary agents ; and no Christian denieth but all this proceeds from Gods inward decree , and outward operation accord●ng to this decree . But what if you have a further ayme then this , and the obscurity of your expression in this particular serves onely to amuse your reader in that which is of no worth , that so in the meane time his intention may oversl●p the observation of foule things broached by you in a few words ? For consider I pray , would you have your reader swallow sucha goageon as this , that God is at this time free to decree this ? Why doe you not say as well that God is at this time free to decree the salvation or dammation of any man ? For why should not one decree of God be temporary as well as another ? and how contradictious is this to your owne often profession of Gods everlasting decrees , and also to your present doctrine of Gods immutabilitie ? For if he be now free to decree this or that , then may some decree of God begin to be , which before was not , and consequently there shall bee a change in God . For as much as some act shall be found in God which before was not . And if Gods decrees be everlasting , and yet to this day he continueth free to reverse these decrees , then is God free to change . Perhaps you will say , Gods liberty is eternall , ( for otherwise I know not to what purpose you discourse here of Gods eternall liberty . ) I answer , God is still and ever shall be free , but in respect of what ? In respect of those things that are possible and indifferent to be done by him or no. But that Gods eternal decrees should be at this time indifferent to bee made by him or no , is a thing utterly impossible . God alone cannot doe this , as Philosophers were wont to say , to make that which is done to be undone , it being a thing implying manifest contradiction .

Againe , the libertie of God is not like unto the liberty of his creatures , whether Angels or men , which yet notwithstanding you very confidently confound , manifesting no sense of so uncouth an assertion . Liberty in the creature is unto different acts of will , as either to will this , or to will that ; but no such libertie is to be found in God . It was and is impossible there should bee any other act in God then there is , because God is a simple act , and that act is his very essence , and as his essence cannot , nor could not bee otherwise then it is , so neither could any other act of will be in him then there is . Gods liberty is only to different objects , not to different acts , though you passe over this without any distinction .

Againe , in the sentence going before you told us , God was free to exercise his power , and to communicate his goodnesse ; which is most true : but when in the next place you tell us he is free to decree , this is nothing answerable to the former . For to decree is no exerc●se of his power , nor communication of his goodnesse . For if it were , then seeing his decrees have beene free from everlasting , from everlasting there should be an exercise of his power , and communication of his goodnesse . Which is as much as to say that the world was everlasting .

Your next sentence is as wilde as the former , or rather more , not to speake of the coherence of them . For it seemes you have no more care of that , then as if you were dictating proverbs . That the course of mans life , or the finall doome awarded to every man ( though that must be awarded to all according to the diversity of their courses ) should be immutable , because they are foreset by an immutable omnipotent decree hath no more colour of truth , then to say the omnipotent creator must needes be blacke , because he made the crowes and Ebony black , &c. And this comparison you enlarge with multiplicity of instances , as the course of your stile is to exuberate in matters of no moment . You might as well have sayed that there is no colour of truth , why God that made a crowe should be a crowe , or that made the swanne should be a swanne . And indeed there is no colour of truth in this . For indeed a painter makes a fayre picture , but it no way followeth herehence that he should be a fayre picture , or so much as fayre .

And though a pewterer makes a chamber-pot , yet no colour of truth , that he should be therefore a chamber pott , or that because a Chimny-sweeper makes a clean chimny , therfore himselfe should be a cleane chimny . Never was any knowne to be so absurde , as to devise any such inferences . Like as I think never any before your selfe was knowne to affirme , that there was as litle colour of truth in collecting , that things decreed by God should be immutable , because his decree is immutable . For I pray , what proportion doe you find in these ? the efficient cause that is aequivocall , is not of the same nature with the effect produced , therefore the thing decreed is not immutable , by reason of the immutability of the decree whereby it is decreed .

Let every Reader judge whether there be so much likenesse betweene these , as betweene a foxe and a Fearne-bush . Yet you give no reason but the bare proportion it selfe to beare it out . Now the former inference which you denye , is drawne from the cause to the effect , the later inference which you denye is drawne from the effect to the cause . Yet these inferences you make proportionable . If you would make them suitable , after some such manner as this , it should proceed . God makes crowes black ; herhence it followeth not that God himselfe is black , so God decreed to damne Iuda● herehence it followeth no● , and what I pray ? I am ashamed t● follow the proportion of your inference least so I should utter that which in modestie is not fit , or thus . God makes Iudas his damnation immutable ; herhence it followeth not that God is immutable , or to helpe you with a proportioned case fitter for your turne . God makes Iudas his damnation mutable , herehence it followeth not that God or his decree is mutable .

This I say better serves your turne , but this is not the inference whereupon you passe your denyall , but rather quite cam as we say ; Gods decree is immutable ; herhence it followeth not that Iudas his damnation , though foreset by God is immutable . Yet as for that inference proposed , which I sayd was more fitter for your turne , who ever sayd that God decreed Iudas his damnation to be mutable , or the damnation of reprobates to be mutable ? Who ever sayd that God decreed the salvation of Peter or Paul , or of any one of Gods elect to be mutable ?

And indeed , it were very absurd to say so : For the mutability of a thing supposeth the being of a thing . Now hath God ordained that the salvation of Gods elect , after they have obtayned it , or the damnation of the reprobates after they suffer it , shall be mutable ? Hath he not rather ordained the contrary both as touch●ng his elect , that they shall ever be with the Lord , Thess. 4. Marc. 9. 44. and as touching the reprobate that their Worme shall never dye , and their fire never be extinguished ? Yet I confesse either is simply mutable , in respect that God hath power to alter it . But this kind of mutability is not the object of Gods decree . For God doth not decreec to take unto himselfe power to doe this or that . Yet it is true , that by vertue of Gods decree some things come to passe contingently , and some things necessarily . But this is onely in respect of the agency of second causes , some of them being made by God , agents naturall working necessarily , some agents rationall and free , working contingently and freely : Not in respect of Gods owne agency , for whatsoever God doth work outwardly , that must needs come to passe contingently or freely : for it is not in the power of God to worke necessarily ; it is the perfection of God unalterable , to be necessarily , to worke freely . Now the doome of any man is the work of God , and so is the condemnation both of men and Angels , and not the worke of second causes : and therefore the contingent being thereof is not the object of Gods decree . God doth not decree , that to fall out contingently , much lesse doth he decree that after it is , it shall be mutable : speake your minde plainly , and tell us whether the damnation of Iudas , or of the Angels that fell , or of any reprobate that is departed this life is mutable . I presume you dare not affirme this : and what is the reason ? not because God wants power to alter , but because his will is that it shall not be otherwise , and his will can neither bee changed from within , nor resisted from without , because it is omnipotent . In this case therefore this consequence is good : God hath decreed the damnation of Iudas , and his decree is immutable , and omnipotent , therefore the damnation of Iudas is immutable , to wit , supposing the foresaid decree of God .

Now consider wee the damnation of wicked men not yet departed this life ; hath God decreed it , or no ? if no , then his decrees are not everlasting , the contrary whereunto you have hitherto professed in words , though I feare your meaning is otherwise .

Againe , if God hath not yet decreed it , then hereafter he shall decree it , ( for he must first will their damnation before he damnes them ) and consequently there shall be a change in God , and something found in him which before was not , contrary to that which you have delivered in this Chapter , sect. 2. in these words , Vnto infinite perfection what can accrew ? If then God hath decreed it , and this decree or will of God cannot be changed , for you confesse it is immutable , nor can be resisted , for you confesse it is omnipotent ; will it not necessarily follow herehence , that the damnation of such wicked men yet surviving is immutable ? This I speake in your phrase , but in mine owne phrase I say onely that herehence it necessarily followeth , that all such shall bee damned , which necessity is meerly upon supposition of Gods decree : and therefore not necessity simply so called , but onely secundum quid , and upon supposition ,

So likewise concerning the salvation of Gods Elect , who are yet surviving , if God hath decreed it , seeing his will is both unchangeable , and unresistible , their salvation must needs bee immutable , to speake in your phrase , but to speake in mine owne phrase , it necessarily followeth herehence that they shall be saved .

There is to way to help this , but by maintaining that Gods decrees are not absolute but conditionall ; but it seemes you dare not venture upon this assertion in plaine termes , though the face of your tenet bespeakes such a course : And in another Treatise of yours you talked of a certaine disjunctive decree of God . It were a commendable thing in you to deliver your selfe plainly of your meaning ; for otherwise you will be guilty of something else besides a corrupt judgement . And indeed if you would deale plainly , and maintaine that God hath decreed salvation or damnation to none absolutely , but to all conditionally , and withall by sound arguments confirme it , there should be no further question ; we would willingly subscribe that no mans salvation should come to passe immutably , as you speake , or necessarily , as we speake ; no not so much as in respect of Gods decree ; if so be God hath decreed salvation to no man absolutely , but conditionally ; and that in such sort as that he may bee either saved or damned as he will . But then withall you must maintaine that God hath decreed to give no man faith and repentance more then another ; but left it indifferently to their free wills whether they will beleeve and repent or no.

For albeit God hath ordained salvation to befall men upon ther finall perseverance in faith and repentance ; yet if God hath withall decreed to give some men faith and repentance , and finall perseverance therein , and deny all this unto others ; herehence it will follow that God in effect hath ordained some men absolutely unto salvation , and not other ; and it will necessarily follow herehence , that as many as to whom God hath decreed to give faith and repentance , and perseveran●e , they shall be saved ; and as necessarily , that all others shall not be saved to whom God hath decreed the deniall of the like grace , unlesse you will say that though God doth not give any such grace , yet they may beleeve and repent if they will , and therein persevere unto the end : I see no reason to the contrary , but this must be upon your opinion , as before hath beene specified , albeit you are not very forward in plaine termes to expresse as much . And in this place you scatter somthing that seemes to me directly contrary hereunto .

For consider , though Gods decree concerning the doome of every man be immutable , yet you deny that hethence it followes , their doome shall be immutable . Now this of a conditionall decree is evidently untrue , as I presume will appeare of it selfe . For if God hath no other decree concerning Peters doome then this ; If thou beleevest , thou shalt be saved , if not , thou shalt be damned ; the case is cleare that this doome is immutable , not salvation absolutely nor damnation absolutely , but either salvation or damnation disjunctively as elsewhere I have found you to discourse of a disjunctive decree of God . Therefore seeing you speake of such a doome which you deny to be immutable , it followeth that you cannot understand it of a disjunctive doome , as salvation , or damnation ; but you must needs understand it of a single doome by it self● , as the salvation of Peter by it selfe , or the damnation of Iudas by it selfe .

And withall you doe acknowledge this doome to be forset by the decree of God , which is as much as to acknowledge that it is decreed by God . Now I say if it be decreed by God , seeing his decrees cannot be changed , no● his omnipotent will resisted , it must necessarily follow that every one so destinated to salvation shall be saved , every one so destinated to damnation shall be damned . The best helpe you have against this , and whereupon this discourse of yours doth most runne , is , that the object of Gods decree is contingency , or mutability , ( for so you are pleased to confound things that differ . ) But you are nothing wary to keepe your selfe from contradicting your selfe . For when you say that God decreeth contingency , you doe withall deny that God doth decre● the thing contingent ; as you have expresly professed in your treatise upon Ier. 26. Did not Hezechiah feare before the Lord , &c. And withall to make your meaning the more plaine , you have professed that albeit God doth not decree necessity , but withall decrecing the things that come to passe necessarily ; yet in decreeing contingency , you deny that he decreeth withall the things contingent .

But in this place you have plainly signified that the doome it selfe of every man is foreset by the immutable decree of God , and not onely the contingency of it ; And no mervayle , For albeit as touching the actions of men , ther may be some colour for the exempting of them from being the objects of Gods decrees , yet the doomes of men being the actions of God himselfe , there is no colour at all for the exempting of them from being the object of Gods decrees . And therefore this distinction of Gods decreeing contingency , or mutability , but not the things contingent themselves , will nothing avayle you in this place . For you plainly professe that the doome of every one is forset by the decree of God : and it is impossible it should be otherwise . For God could not execute it , unlesse he did will it . He cannot execute the salvation of Peter , unles he did first will it , nor the damnation of Iudas except he did first will it , and his will was everlasting , otherwise there should be a change in God .

And seeing his will can neither change , nor be resisted , therefore it necessarily followeth , that whose salvation he did from everlasting will or decree , they must be saved , and whose damnation he did from everlasting will or decree , they must be damned . And thus much as touching the doome of every man foreset by Gods decree . You adde unto this , The course of every mans life , and affirme , that it also is foreset by Gods decree ; And this course of every mans life you understand in respect of good and evill morall , as appeares by this , that you proportion mens doomes unto the courses of their lives : which can beare no other interpretation then in respect of mens good and evill actions .

●w at the first I wondred what you meant to bring so unequall heyfers to plow under the same yoke , considering that the courses of mens lifes in this sense are the actions or workes of men ; but the doomes of men according to their courses of life , are the actions or workes of God , much more have I cause to wonder to reade you professing them all indifferently to be foreset by the decree of God . For as for the good , yea the most gracious actions of men , according to your opinion , they are not foreset by the decree of God . For your profession is ( and that as of some singular subtilty and invention ) that God decreeth contingency , but not the things contingent ; whence it followeth , that as touching the most gracious actions of men , even faith and repentance ( they being onely contingent things ) that God decreeth them not , but only the contingency of them . How much lesse fit is it for you ( according to the tenour of your opinion ) to joyne all the courses of mens lives , even the evill courses as well as good with the doomes proportionall , and to consider them as fore-set by an immutable and omnipotent decree of God , as here you doe ▪ Yet I see how some one in your behalfe might plead for you , namely , that this is delivered by you onely by way of ●upposition , not positively affirmed ; but I see no likelihood that you would plead thus for your selfe , but rather give your self to the emasculating of Gods decree by some frivolous distinctions . For you acknowledge Gods concourse to every action .

And in the preface you make shew not so much of excepting against the doctrine of Gods decreeing all things , as against the manner of decreeing them . And when you speake of the worst courses of mens lives , as of Iewish blasphemy against the Sonne of God , and amplifie the hainousnesse of their opinion , that maintaine it to have been decreed by God , you rather except against the manner of decreeing it , to wit , ineritably , and that as touching the obliquity of it onely , then simply against the decreeing of it . Yo●r words a●e these , ch. 1. sect. 15. Shall we say God did inevitably decree the obliquity of Iewish blasphemy ? Which cautions whereunto they tend I know not , unlesse to make some declination from ma●fest contradiction to the words of the Holy Ghost , Act. 4. 28. delivered with one mouth by the Apostles in their meditation unto God , saying , Uerily against thy holy Sonne Jesus both Herod and Pontius Pilate with the Gentiles and people of Israel , are gathered together to doe what thy hand and thy counsell had determined before to be done . And indeed it is nothing but ignorance , or wilfulnes in some , and trafty perverting the state of the truth in others , that makes those things seeme harsh , which yet notwithstanding their harshnes , are manifestly commended to us in the word of God . For what harshnes I pray is in this : God determined that all the evill that was done to Christ should be done by his permission ? And none give better evidence unto this truth ere they are aware , then they that with might and mayne oppose it , as Arminius , who professeth that the Iewes proceeded so farre in their ignominious handling of Christ , as God would have them , and this he delivers without all temperament .

And Bellarmine prof●sseth , that it is good that evill should be by Gods permission . And yet herein we say no more then Austin professed 1200. yeares agoe , saying , Non aliquid sit nisi quod omnipotens fieri velit , velsinendo ut siat , vel ipse faciendo . Enchirid. cap. 95. And your selfe in this place joyne the doome of every man with the course of every mans life in good or evill , and suppose them to beforeset by the immutable and omnipotent decree of God . Wherefore it is not for your positive dictates and wild resemblances without all proportion that we doe beleeve God to be eternally and immutably free ; yet wee doe beleeve he is so , not to decree a new , ( for Gods decrees are eternall , not temporary ) but to doe any thing that is possible to be done , and to bring forth some creatures , agents naturall to worke necessarily , others , agents rationall to worke contingently and freely . As for the resemblance of Gods freedome and immutability , your talke of it is like your other discourses ; For what resemblance doe you find of Gods freedome in the mutability of the elements , in the generation and corruption of mixt bodyes ? The best resemblance of Gods ●reedome is in the freedome of creatures rationall , which are to be found as well in the superior , as in this inferior World . And why should any mutability be a resemblance of Gods freedome , who is immutabile throughout ? And as for the resemblance of his immutability in the Heavens , to make that good you had need devise a quintessence first , and deny all those apparances of comets , breeding and wasting in the Heavens , even in the firmament , the acknowledgement whereof is now commonly receaved by frequent observations .

Sure I am the Prophet plainly professeth of the heavens , that they all wax old as doth a garment , and as a vesture God shall change them , and they shall be changed , but God is the same , and his yeares fayle not . You may doe well to deny the Heavens motion also , & so you may the better free them from all change , for as I take it , all motion is mutation , though all mutation be not motion . That God is both immutable , and irresistible our opinions manifest , so doe not yours , but dangerously prejudice them both . But I knowe no reason why his irresistiblenes should flow from his immutability . For if his immutability be conceaved as free from al possibility of change from within , there is no coherence at all betweene this and his irresistiblenes , which is in respect of agents from without . The essence of spirits is immutable from within , and so were the Heavens , if a simple essence , or quintessence as some call it ; but hence it followeth not that any of these are irresistible from without . But if immutability be spoken of in respect of freedome from all change as from without , in as much as no outward thing is able to worke any change in the nature of God , then it is onely immutability passive , but irresistibility in God is in respect of his power active , able to bow and breake all things without resistance , so that in this sense also there is no coherence betweene these two attributes , as if one could be sayd to flow from an other .

To the preventing of wise contrivances is required not onely wisedome to discover them , and meanes to prevent them , but also power for the execution of this prevention . And that Gods contrivances are not prevented , it is a worke of his power , as well as of his wisedome .

As for the rule of Gods decree , I know no goodnes of God to be the rule thereof , but that goodnes wherby he is inclyned to the setting forth of his owne glory , for He hath made all thinges for himselfe . Prov. 1. 16. 4. And seeing All thinges are from him and by him . Rom. 11. ver. last . There is great reason why all things should be for him also , even referred to his glory as to the end . What other goodnes you dreame of , as the rule of Gods decrees , I know not , neither doe the Scriptures teach any other , but it is generally your course to dictate much , and to prove wonderous litle ; Whether your ability that way be the more in store and reserved for some speciall subject to shew it selfe therein , I know not .

CHAP. X.

Of the eternall and Immutable decree .

VPon this you enter with a fayre promise of betteringe or rectifying our apprehensions of Gods absolute and omnipotent decree . I hope we shall never be unwillinge to learne of any , much lesse of your selfe . For why should we not affect to have our apprehensions if they swerve from the the truthe to be rectifyed , and though in good propension thereunto , yet to have them bettered . For though good be good , yet better is better , especially in so preciou● a point of divinity as about the decree of God . Most of all if it be true ( as you say ) that in all ages it hath beene most difficult , and is so common in this , that no divine can adventure upon any other service profitable , but he must eyther enforce his passage thorough it , or come so high , as to doe homage to it . As for the difficulty you speake of , as you give me no edge to imbrace it , so I professe I have no edge to oppose it . But as touchinge the commons thereof in such sort as in all profitable services to the Church , we must be driven to take notice of it , and that with appropriation to this age above all ages that went before possesseth me with admiration . For what reason can be devised why divines and fathers in former ages could handle diverse worthy points of divinity without touching upon Gods decree , and our divines in this age can not ? I doubt your care in this sentence was to vent more phrases then truthes . Three attributes you give us of Gods decree , namely , that it is immutable . 2. Irresistible . 3. Eternall . But the first of these you choake with strange cautions , a manifest signe that you have some stitch or spleene against this attribute . The first proviso is , if we take it in the abstract ; and you give no instance to explaine your meaning . I had thought this word , the decree of God had beene an abstract , and of abstract signification alone , and not indifferent to signification abstract & concrete also . Decretum , I confesse in the Latine is indifferent to signifie either in the abstract Gods decree , or in the concrete a thing decreed . But Gods decree in the English admitteth of no such equivocation , but is of abstract signification onely and not concrete .

Your other caution by way of exegeris and interpretation of the former is no lesse strange , as when you say , Or as it is in God , implying that Gods decree may be taken two wayes , either as it is in God , and so it is immutable , or as it is out of God , and so it is not immutable . Now I doe not find it possible that Gods decree can be any where but in God , it being an action immanent , or intramanent , not passing forth of God , but abyding within him , such as are all actions called elicite both in men and Angels , as the actions of their understanding , and the acts of their wills . Yet ( you say ) it is not agreed upon by all , either what a decree is or what to be eternall ; at least the most part doe not perfectly beare in minde the true importances of an eternall decree . With these differences which you intimate , I never was acquainted , but am ready to be , as soone as you shall enforme me of them . I had thought no man had doubted what Gods decree is , as namely his purpose or resolution of will that something shall be brought foorth in time , either immediately by himselfe , or by second causes and the agency of his creatures .

And as for eternity , I had thought that all had agreed in this , that to be eternall is to be either without beginning or without end , or both ; and as applyed to Gods decree , it signifieth the being of it without beginning . But it may be you travell in childbirth to be delivered of some subtilties , which you call here the importances of an eternall decree . We are ready to entertaine them as soone as they come to light , with such consideration as becomes our poore abilities , in Philosophicall or Theologicall speculations .

First you tell us that to this purpose your former speculations concerning eternity of Gods infinite wisedome , have beene premised ; that is to prepare for the delivery of the child : you fore saw belike you were like to have an hard labour of it , an hard bargaine . Yet if a manchilde prove to bee borne , this hardnesse may well be endured , and will soone be forgotten . By the way it seemes the importances you speake of doe concerne as well the wisedome of Gods decree ; as the eternity thereof ; and therefore it is that you have premised the speculations of Gods infinite wisedome , as well as of his eternitie . And all to prevent a mischiefe , to wit , lest by the incogitant use of these and the like Scripture phrases ( God fore-knowes , or hath decreed all things from eternity ) that slumber might creepe upon the unvigilant and unattentive reader , with whose dreames many deceived have spoken of Gods decree or predetermination of things to come , as of acts already irrevocably finished and accomplished ; and by a consequent errour , resolve that it is as impossible for any thing to be otherwise then it is , wil be , or hath been , as it is to recall that again which is already past . The child is born , but a monster , rather then a perfect child . For the doctrine you propose savoureth strongt ly of making Gods decrees to be of a revocable nature . Well , let us consider it peece meale . First , the proposition , then the consequent deduced therfrom . You are jealous over your reader , & that for his good as you pretend ; & that is , lest Scripture phrases should cary him too far through incogitancy , and unvigilancy , and unattentivenes , wherupon a slumber may overtake him , & he may dream of Gods decree , as of an act already irrevocably finished & accomplished . Well then to conceive of Gods decree as of an act already finished or accomplished , is but a dreame as you censure it . And dreames have great liberty to erre from truth . Let us scanne this a little . First , doth it like you to affirme that Gods decrees are finished and accomplished , provided that they be of a revocable nature , and may bee altered ? If this please you , what need you except against the conceiving of Gods decree as an act past or finished ? For though it be past and finished , yet if it bee of a revocable nature it will serve your turne well enough . But if you deny it , positively and simply to be finished , what meant you to put in irrevocably , which manifestly implyes an acknowledgement of the finishing of Gods decree , though not irrevocably , but so as it may be revoked .

Againe , as touching the word accomplished , that is very ambiguous . For like as Gods promises which are not eternall but in time , and the significations of Gods decrees may justly be said not to be accomplished untill they be fulfilled ; in like sort Gods decrees may be said in a good sense not to bee accomplished untill they be executed by performing that which God hath decreed . But you speake of the finishing of Gods decree actu interno , not actu externo . For you oppose them that maintaine that Gods decrees of things to come are already ( that is , before the things decreed doe come to passe ) finished . Now never any man was knowne to dreame waking any such dreame , as to thinke or affirme that Gods decrees were finished actu externo , that is in plaine termes executed before the things decreed were brought to passe .

Now le ts examine your opinion cleared from ambiguities . I say the decrees of God were finished actu interno before the World was made ; And I prove it thus . Every decree is finished actu interno when it is made and hath existence . But the decrees of God were made and had theire existence before the World was ( otherwise they should not be eternall ) therefore the decrees of God are not onely already finished but were finished before the World was made . And the Major I farther prove thus . If before the World things were decreed by God , then also before the World , Gods decrees were made and had existence , but before the World many things were decreed by God , therefore before the World , Gods decrees were made and had existence .

Agayne I prove that Gods decrees are already finished actu interno . Every thing that hath intire and full existence is to be accompted finished , but Gods decrees already have their entire and full existence , even as God himselfe , and so had before the World was ; therefore Gods decrees are already finished and so were before the World was .

Thirdly if Gods decrees be yet unfinished I demaund when they shall be finished or whether they shall for ever continue unfinished . If for ever they shall continue unfinished ; then Gods executions of his decrees shall be finished before his decrees are ; for they eternally shall be finished , these upon supposition never shall . If one day Gods decrees shall be finished then either before the execution of them , or with the execution of them , or after the execution . If before the execution of them , then either for a certaine space of time before the execution of them , or from eternity before them . If for a certaine space before , name that space , and give a reason why such a space of time , rather then a greater or a lesser .

Secondly shew what hath accrewed to Gods decrees whereby after a certeyne space of time they are sayd to be finished , for want whereof they could not be sayd to be finished before .

Thirdly it is manifest , this cannot holde , as touchinge the decree of creation . For as much as there was no space of time before the execution of that decree . And therfore if that decree were finished at all before the execution of it , it was finished from everlasting before it . And if that decree were finished before the World was made , then also all the decrees of God were finished before the World was made . For all Gods decrees are alike everlasting as your selfe ( I thinke ) will not denye . And here you propose not , this doctrine of any decree of God in speciall , but of his decrees in generall , implying thereby that it is as true of one as of another , and consequently if it holds not in any one , it fayles in all . If Gods decrees are finished from everlasting before the execution of them , this is flatly contradictory to your assertion : But if you thinke to say that Gods decrees are not finished actu interne untill they are executed actu externo ; then they had not their full and entire existence till the execution of them ; and consequently they are temporall , not eternall ; and though man finisheth his decrees before hee executes them , yet God doth not .

Secondly , if nothing doth accrew to the constitution of Gods eternall decrees by the execution of them more then before ; then Gods decrees cannot bee said to have their full and entire constitution more at the time of execution then before . But nothing doth accrew hereby to the constitution of Gods decree . For the execution is temporall , the decree eternall , but that which is temporall cannot belong to the constitution of that which is eternall .

If they bee not finished till after the execution , then God shall be said to execute things before hee hath fully decreed them . Adde unto this what Mr. Rogers writes in his Analysis of the Articles of the Church of England , printed by authority , and dedicated to D. Bamcroft Archiep. of Canterbury , upon the 17. Article , propos . 2. Those wrangling Sophisters then are deceived , who because God is not included within the compasse of any time , but hath all things to come , as present continually before his eyes ; doe say that God he did not in the time or age past onely , but still in the present time likewise , doth predestinate . Thus I have considered your uncouth assertion , now I come to the consequence you draw herehence ; and that is this , It is as impossible for any thing to be otherwise then it is , will be , or hath beene , as it is to recall that againe which is already past . But I say this consequence is unsound , and I prove it thus : To recall that againe which is past , is absolutely impossible , as implying manifest contradiction ; but the impossibility of a thing to be otherwise then God hath decreed it , is meerly secundum quid , & exsuppositione . And dare you deny that Gods decrees had existence at the very beginning of the world ; and is not that time long since past , though Gods decrees continue like as God himselfe , for his will is unchangeable as well as his nature ? And supposing things to be decreed by God to come to passe , dare you deny but it necessarily followeth herehence , that they shall come to passe ? Yet I confesse that of this consequence of yours there is some colour , but that which followeth is as wilde as ever entred into a sicke mans braine to conceive : as when you say , to make Gods decrees already finished , is to involve , That God by his eternall and powerfull decree , did set the course of nature a going with an irresistible and irretractable swinge , and since onely lookes upon it with an awfull eye , as masters sometimes watch their servants , whether they goe the way they are commanded . Thus it pleaseth you confidently to dictate , and positively without all reason , that which hath neither truth nor colour of truth , as it may bee made manifest in each member .

For as touching the first member ; God doth not onely set the course of nature going , but continueth it going , and that not onely in working necessarily , but also contingently and freely , which manner of working is alwaies joyned with a possiblity of the contrary , and that not onely by way of resistance , but even of naturall propension also , as appeares manifestly in all free agents , whether Angels or men .

In a word , both course of nature , and course of free will is not irresistible , as appeares by the issue . For the most determinate course of nature hath beene resisted , for the Sunne Ios. 10. 12. 13. 2 King . 20. 10. 11. Ioh. 3. 13. Exod. 14. and Moone hath sometimes stood still ; nay sometimes the Sunne hath gone backeward , and that tenne degrees in the Diall of Ahaz ; the river Iordan hath stood still , and the red Sea hath beene divided ; and the fire it selfe hath beene restrained from burning the three noble children cast into the Dan. 3. fierie furnace . Onely upon supposition of the will of God , it necessarily followeth that the course of nature shall have its course , or be restrained from having his course without resistance . For who hath resisted the will of God ? Rom. 9. 19

As touching the second member , how absurd is it to inferr that God onely lookes upon the course of nature , if the will of God concerning it be already finished . Whereas Gods will is for the continuance of the course of nature , either with disturbance or without disturbance , not of it selfe , but by the assistance , influence , and operation of God . For in him all things live , and move , and have their being . Pater meus usque Act. 17. Ioh. 5. 17. hodie operatur , & ego operor , saith our Saviour . So farre are we from denying that there is as much use of power and wisdome infinite in the mannaging of it , as in the making of it . What odde conceits possessed you to shape so absurd a consequence from this assertion , that the decrees of God are already finished , that is , that already they have their existence ? In the next line you discover the originall of this absurd fancy of yours , when you say , And as he ceaseth not to worke , so doth he never cease to decree . By this I perceive , you would faine have your reader confound Gods working with his deeteeing , as you doe .

Indeede if we had sayde that Gods works are already finished ; it would followe that he should be a spectator only and not a worker for the time to come . But we say no such thing , we say that his decrees are finished and that from everlasting , we doe not say his workes are finished . Though you are pleased to confound these to make unto you matter of extravagant discourse , yet I pray give us leave to distinguish them : Yet here you seeme to give a reason why God doth never cease to decree , and that drawne out of the Ephes. 1. 11. He worketh all thinges accordinge to the counsayle of his will : when I consider that which went immediately before , I thought you had hereby gone about to prove , that God ceaseth not still to decree , which is as much as to make decrees ; But when I looke upon the collection you make herhence , I finde you have no such meaning : For your inference is onely this : So that albeit the counsayle of his will by which he worketh , be eternall ; yet all things are not yet wrought by it . Now of this no man maketh any question .

But the question in present is not whether Gods works be already finished , but whether his decrees be already finished . We say they are and were from everlasting , because from everlasting they did exist . You say they are not , but as God doth not cease to work , so he doth not cease to decree . Which in my judgement is a strange assertion , and the comparison is without all proportion ; For Gods works are temporall , and God brings forth new works one after another dayly . But Gods decrees are eternall and therefore cannot he be sayd to bring forth newe decrees dayly one after another .

And though all his workes he brings forth according to the counsayle of his will , yet both this counsayle and this will of his is eternall . Here you propose a question , shall we say then , he hath not decreed whatsoever doth or shall befall us ? And you answere it affirmatively in a certaine sense which is this , He doth not now first beginne to decree them . Now I appeale to every judicious Reader to determine , whether this interpretation of yours be not plainly contradictious to the manifest meaninge of that assertion which you interprete . For if God doth not new beginne to decree those things that befall us , doth it not manifestly follow here hence that he hath already decreed them , rather then that he hath not decreed them already ? We willingly grant that Gods decrees have no end but continue the same still , but you would have us thinke that they are still in making .

As God himselfe was from everlasting and still continueth unto everlastinge , in like sort Gods decree or will was from everlasting , and the same will of his continueth still without any alteration or shadowe of change . But albeit Gods will continueth the same without change and end , yet I finde no example to justify this phrase of yours , in saying God now decreeth the thinges that befall us ; and you may as well say that God shall decree the things that doe befall us ; and that by the same reason ; for his decree hath no end . And is it a sober speech thinke you to affirme , that God doth now decree the creation of the World , or the fall of Angells , or the turning of Adam out of Paradise , or Noahs flood , or the burning of Sodome and Gomorrah with fire and brimstone ? You say it is much safer to thinke on Gods decree as present to the whole course of our life , then as it was before the World : for so we shall thinke of them as of acts past and finished , more irrevocable then the lawes of the Medes and Persians . Well then you deny not that these decrees were before the World , if this be as much as to be now past and finished , then also it is true , that they are acts past and finished ; which you denye ; If to be before the world be not to be past and finished , then to thinke of them as they were before the World , is not to thinke of them as acts past & finished , which yet you say it is , but without al reason in this case . And I pray what think you ? are Gods decrees , which you dare not to deny to have had their existence before the world , of a revocable nature ? Certainely they are no more alterable then that which is past irrevocable . But like as God cannot be sayd to be past , though he was before the World : Because he still continueth and shall continue for ever : So the decrees of God cannot be sayd to be past , though they were before the World ; because the same will whereby he decreed all things , doth continue without all change and shall continue for ever , though the thinges decreed and willed by him doe change from thinges to come to things present , from thinges present to things past . But the lawes of men suppose liberty in the makers while they are in making , which they utterly take from them being enacted . Very well observed , and therefore let us think it fit to mainteyne that Gods decrees are still in making , and none of them made , no not the decree of creation , nor of redemption , nor of sanctification , of al the holy Patriarchs & Prophets that ever were ; lest otherwise we should spoile God of his liberty . By the same reason let us maintain that God is a doing stil , but never doth any thing , lest after he hath done it he have no longer any libertie to doe it or leave it undone . These conceites have as much wisedome as sobriety in them , being equally removed from both . For what sober man would make doubt but that Methusaleh was as free and had as greate liberty of will the last yeare of his age as he was or had when he was but 10. yeares old , notwithstanding many thinges had beene done by him in the space of 900. yeares , which to doe or not to doe in the last yeare of his age was not a thinge indifferent unto him . And were it not a madde thing to affirme that the longer a man lives the more he loseth of his liberty ? or that the more idlely a man liveth , the more liberty he keepes in store , and the more painfull hee is , the more his liberty perisheth ?

2. Gods decrees are infinitely more unalterable then the lawes of the Medes and Persians . For God cannot change , man can change . Gods will cannot bee resisted , the will of man may be resisted , even the will of the greatest Princes , by God himselfe , by his Angels , by men , by forreine enemies , by their owne subjects . The evils which by decrees are made either evitable or inevitable , are either evils of sinne , or evills of punishment ; you will not say evils of sinne . For you acknowledge no such evils to be objects of Gods decrees . If evils of punishment , it is false to say that Gods decrees doe not make them as inevitable as the decrees of men . For no decrees of men doe make evils of men inevitable , but upon supposition of transgression .

Now it is of an undoubted truth , that punishment designed by the decrees of God , is infinitely more inevitable by transgressors then punishment designed by the decree of men . For many malefactors escape the hands of men , but it is impossible they should escape the hands of God . Of the wicked in respect of the certainty of Gods judgements to overtake them , it is said , that sudden destruction shall come upon them as travaile upon a woman with childe , and they shall not escape . 1 Thess. 5. 3. You are besides the truth when you say that wisedome hath just warrant to make decrees for men ; this belongs to power and authority , not to wisedome .

The subject many times may be wiser then the Prince ; yet hath he not therefore any authority over his Prince , to make lawes to binde him , but rather the Prince though inferiour in wisedome , hath power over him . But the wiser men are , the fitter they are to governe , and the more willingly and joyfully should others submit unto them , supposing the wisedome of the governour to be bound to aime at the good of the subject . But no such obligation is found in God , who as he is the Creator of all , so he made all things for himselfe . And good reason that seeing all things are from him , therefore all things should be for him . Qui dedit esse , quo sine essent habuit potestatem . Aug. de praed. & gra . When you say that too strict obligement unto lawes positive or decrees unalterable , deprives both law-givers and others of their native libertie and opportunity of doing good , I finde nothing sound in all this . For you confound the libertie of nature , which is equally common to all , with liberty of condition , which is greater by farre in one then in another . Secondly , you range God the supreme Law-giver , with other law-givers which have onely power deputed unto them ; no obligement unto lawes doth deprive any man of liberty naturall . For whatsoever is forbidden any man , yet is hee never a whit the lesse naturally free to the doing of it then before , though in case he transgresse , he is subject to censure and punishment . And of this naturall libertie you speake of hitherunto , as being most proper for the nature of decrees , that is , liberty from coaction and naturall necessitation , though now you divert from this unto civill liberty , which is onely liberty from subjection .

As touching the lawes of men , it is fit there should be a Court of Chancery for mitigation , because men cannot foresee all cases that may fall out , and by too strict observation of lawes , summum jus may prove summa injuria . But this cannot without great absurdity be applyed unto the decrees of God , who from everlasting was ignorant of nothing , but foresaw all things that were to come . And by the way , what doe you manifest hereby , but a strange fancy , that in some respects it were fit Gods decrees should be alterable , lest otherwise hee might be deprived of liberty , in taking opportunity of doing good : implying withall , that God in course of time takes notice of something , whereof from everlasting hee was not conscious . And though the Pope in reserving to himselfe power and liberty to send them forth or call them in againe , doth take upon him more authority then is fit , because hee hath neither wisedome nor integrity answerable to so great authority : yet seeing God wants neither wisedome nor integrity , it seemes fit in your judgement ( as may appeare by the tenour of this sentence ) that he should make decrees , and recall them at his pleasure . And so though at the first entrance upon this discourse , and since also you professed that Gods decrees were unalterable ; yet here you plainly signifie that Gods wisedome and integrity may well beare him out in exercising such authority as the Pope usurpes , to wit in making grants at pleasure , and at pleasure to revoke them . Which I confesse the Pope doth with a great deale more ease , then he doth draw in the same breath , which once hee hath breathed out ; which if he doth , yet certainly it is more then it is in his power to doe at his pleasure , unlesse hee hath some extraordinary device that I know not of . I doubt your mysteries are not yet full ; you seeme to commend the condition of mutability , as a condition befitting the wisedome and integrity of God ; it remaines that you doe as much disgrace immutability and count it an impotent condition , that so with the better grace you may reject it , as unbeseeming the nature of God . In the next sentence you utterly forsake your text , and whereas in congruity to the precedent discourse you should shew how alteration of decrees is no signe of a fickle disposition , you nothing to the purpose tell us that the alteration of awards is no signe of a fickle disposition . For by the same decree may different awards be executed , without any revocation or alteration of the decree . It was long agoe the saying of Gregory , that Deus mutat sententiam , consilium nunquam . But by the way you signifie that the former practice of Popes in making Greg. in Iob. l. 16. cap. 6. grants and recalling of them , is no signe of mutability . A manifest untruth . Nay your selfe laboured to justifie such a change , as to make grants and to revoke them as an apparant change : but you justified it by the opportunity to doe the greater good thereby , provided that wisedome and integrity bee answerable . So that though it be no vicious change as you would have it , yet : apparantly there is a change . But : the administration sometimes of rewards , sometimes of punishments doth argue I confesse no mutability in decrees . One and the selfe same lawes of men doe cause the different administration of rewards and punishments to divers persons , yea and to the selfe same persons at different times , without all colour of change in the lawes themselves .

Of the coherence of that which followeth with that which went before , I will not enquire , for what doe I know whether you purpose to write quodlibets . But in my judgement you doe not give a right reason why it is fitter to be grounded by lawes then by the wils of men . For the corruption of man disables him as well from the making of good lawes , as from governing well by will and pleasure . But if men are to chuse , the reason in my opinion why they will chuse to be governed by lawes , is because by lawes they may aforehand know what shall be the execution of justice , and accordingly judge thereof , and if they like and approve it , they may the better submit unto it . But if executions proceed according to the will of a Prince absolute , they cannot judge of executions before they come , because they know them not , they being left to the pleasure of men , and after they are brought forth it is too late to remedy them , if they prove evill . And the incorruptest and wisest man that ever was is fitter to give lawes and to execute just●ce thereby , then to bee trusted with execution of justice according unto pleasure ; because such men come indifferent to the making of lawes , which may bee particularly interested in the manner of execution . For executions are only in particular cases , which particular cases may in speciall cencerne them that have the execution of justice . As for example , the malefactor may be a friend to the Magistrate himselfe , or a brother , or neare of k●nne , which is a shrewd tentation to provoke him ( though otherwise vncorrupt and fit enough to mak : generall lawes ) in this particular case to strain a good conscience , and by partialitie to corrupt the course of justice .

Secondly , in case government is by succession ; lawes are most necessary , because the most wise and uncorrupt Prince is not sure to beget one like to himselfe , or if hee should yet is it not in his power to leave it unto him at such a time as by ripenes of age and experience he shall be fit for government : and by experience wee finde that many times good government in the father doth degenerate into tyrannie in the sonne . And it is true that good Princes as true fathers of their countrie and people , have sometimes remitted off their absolutenesse , the better to enjoy the heartes of their subjects ( which is the best maintenance of perpetuity ) then by force to compell them . Yet by your leave every Act , wherunto princes passe their consent doth not restraine them of their former liberty , or abate something of their present greatnes . For unto all acts of Parliament the King consents ; yet in consenting to give him 5. Subsidies in a yeare , or restoring and confirming unto him the customes called runnage and poundage , I doe not find that hereby he either remitts of his former liberty , or abates any thing of his present greatnes .

It is true the lawes of men can have no greater perfection then men that make them ; and therfore they are sayd non cavere de particularibus ; for it is impossible that they should comprehend all occurrences , yet in this case there is an helpe in Christian states having a court of chancery established for the remedying of such inconveniences ; without so much as taking any notice of the Pope , as the Chancelor of Christendome . For if S. Peter himselfe were alive and Bishop of Rome , yet what should he have to doe with governing of States ? Our Saviour would not meddle with dividing of inheritances , and professed his Kingdom was not of this world , & Peter is commanded out of his love to his Master to feede his sheepe , not with any civill coerc●tive power and authority to governe them . Yet Popes have layd title I confesse to both swordes : but the unfittest that ever were to manage either , such abominable abuses and corruptions have beene found amongst them in the managing of both , as I think are without example .

But that rule of the Canonists , Papa ●nquam sibi ligdt manus doth much inamour you , and greate zeale ●oth inflame you to applye it unto God , to free him from impotent immutability , as hereafter you call it , and that his decrees may not oblige him , and indeed they doe not ; for how can he be sayd to be tyed or restrayned that is confined to nothing against his will , but to every thing according to his will ? But to free God from an impotent immutabilitie , you would have his decrees , not alterable , ( for you dare not professe so much ) but something els , I know not what , which you call reservation of liberty , and to be still as it were in making decrees , but not having decreed any thinge till the time of execution or afterward : mysterious inventions of your owne braine , which if perhaps you seeme to understand your selfe , I assure you I doe not : but hence it is that you discourse so much of the Pope in this .

3. In this Section , you beginne with telling us that God passeth no act to the prejudice of his absolute and eternall power of jurisdiction . This is a truth and will nothing serve the turne of your reaches . By the way you deliver unto us the object of Gods foreknowledge , and that you say is whatsoever will be ; and the object of Gods decree , and that you say is whatsoever may be , which later is a most absurd position . Looke we upon the decrees of men the wisest of men , were they ever knowne to decree that a thing may be done ? But rather supposing many things may be done they make choyse to decree the doing of such courses , as seeme most convenient . Things are possible without any reference to the decrees of God , but only in reference to his power . That is possible unto God which God can doe , or which he hath power to cause , that it be brought to passe . As for example , before the World was made it was possible that the World should be made , was this by vertue of Gods decree ? Did God decree it to be possible ? If he did , seeing his decrees are free it followeth that he might have chosen whether the World should have been p●ssible or no.

Againe , was not the creation of the World , is not the end of the World decreed by God , the rewarding of the godly & the punishing of the wicked , are they not decreed by God ? What moves you then to make only things possible the object of Gods decree , and the things that will or shall be onely the object of his foreknowledge ? This witt of yours is able to make us a newe World of Divinity and Ph●losophy both , if it be let alone to runne a wilde goose race at pleasure . Well , God passeth no act to the prejudice of his absolute and eternall power of jurisdiction . What of this ? In the next place , you tell us that , what grant or promise soever he makes cannot binde the exercise of his everlasting libertie for a moment of time : they last no longer then Durante bene placito : seeing gracious equitie , and only it , is his everlasting pleasure . Be it so that gracious equity is his everlasting pleasure ; and will it not follow herehence that seeing all his promises doe proceed from his gracious equitie , and this you say is his everlasting pleasure , and his grants and promises must last you confesse during his good pleasure , is not this enough to assure us that whatsoever grants and promises God doth make , they doe so farre bind God to performance , that we may assure our selves they shall stand good for ever and never be reversed ? Onely you discourse that they shall last no longer . And what sober man would expect or desire that they should last longer then for eternity ? Or what wisedome is found in such discourse as laboureth to prove that Gods grant , shall last no longer then during pleasure , and withall confesseth that his pleasure is everlasting . But no promise you say , bindes the exercise of his everlasting libertie for a moment of time : It is fit to consider this . To my judgement Gods promises binde him as much , as our promises bind us ; the force of which obligation is not to bind our liberty , but to keepe our honestie : For what promise soever he makes , he is still free naturally whether he will performe what he hath promised or no ; but if he breaks his promise he shall be unt●ue . In like sort God if he should doe otherwise then he hath promised , he should be untrue , though never a whit the lesse free . And in doing what he hath promised he is both true and never a whit the lesse free .

For even men doe freely keep their promises though not alwayes willingly , because when they promised they might be of one judgement and disposition , and when they come to performance they may be of another . But all such change and alteration is not to be found in God . Every honest Magistrate is free to recompence every man according to his evill wayes ; for it becomes him not to make any such promise that whatsoever he committs , he will not punish him . And looke what a good Magistrate resolves upon , when facts are committed eyther good or evill ; the like may God decree from everlasting . For no Mag●strate knowes so well what man hath committed , as God from everlasting knows what he will commit . And more then that , God knowes how to keepe man from evill courses , or to expose him to evill courses , by having mercy on whom he will , and hardening whom he will ; which power and wisedome is not incident to a creature . Besides all this , a Magistrate is bound by duty , to recompence every man according to his works . But God is not bound by any such duty , to any such course . He can pardon one and p●nish another ; have mercy on one and deale severely with another . Of many men taken in the same transgression he can give repentance to some , deny repentance unto others . And if he hath made any such promise as this . If his children Psal. 49. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. forsake my lawe and walke not in my judgements , if they break my statutes and keep not my commandements ; then will I visite their transgressions with the rodd and their iniquity with strokes , yet my loving kindnes will I not take from him , neither will I falsify my truth ; they to whome such promises are made , may be assured hereby that God is bound to perform as much , bound I say by morall obligation in such sort , as it is impossible he should doe otherwise , yet shall he perform it never a whit the lesse freely ; First in respect that he doth it not by coaction and necessitation , and because he is as well pleased still to doe it as to promise it . For as much as looke of what judgement and disposition he was when he promised , of the same he is when he makes it good ; and consequently performes it as willingly as he made it .

It is not alwayes so with man in the execution of his promises . If Gods one and indivisibly everlasting decree without any variety or shadow of change fitts all the changes , severall dispositions and contingent actions of men and Angells , as exactly as if he did conceive and shape a new Law for every one of them ; what mooved you heretofore to professe that the reservation of libertie , and that to make grants and to revoke them , is a point of so high perfection , as that you would faine bestow it upon the nature of God ? What meane you here to professe that God ceaseth not to decree , which to my understanding sounds as if the meaning were , that God is still in making of new decrees . Gods decrees continue I confesse as God himselfe continueth , and more unalterable then lawes of Medes and Persians . But neither could they bee said in this respect not to cease to make lawes , so neither can God bee said not to cease to make decrees . For like as while lawes are in making , they are not yet made ; so to intimate that Gods decrees are in making ( as you doe while you say God ceaseth not to decree ) is to imply that Gods decrees are not yet made ; which you doe more plainly signifie in the words following , when you say , They are conceived and brought forth as well befitting them as the skinne doth the body , which nature hath enwraped in it . Wherby you manifestly profess that Gods decrees are brought forth in time , not onely the executions of them , and thus howsoever you flatter your readers eare with bestowing on Gods decrees the title of everlasting , yet you plainly declare your minde that they are brought forth in time , together with the execution of them .

And hereto properly tends that reservation of libertie which you magnified as an high perfection , and the power of the Popes to make grants and revoke them , as a power onely fit for God . And to this purpose you seeme to discourse of eternall liberty , making use thereof to draw his decrees to a temporall condition , lest if they were eternall , they should deprive God of liberty . Let every indifferent reader judge whether this bee not the language of your heart , disclosed by the tenour of your discourses , howsoever you stile Gods decrees eternall ; herein like unto boat-men , that looke one way and row another .

Besides , by this discourse of yours you seeme to acknowledge no other●d crees of God then in rewarding them according to their workes ; for hitherto tends the congruity of Gods decrees , which after your manner you amplifie as no lesse congr●ous to the actions of men , then the skinne to the body . A very good resemblance by the way , that as the skin doth befit the body , so Gods recompences doe befit mens workes . Yet this you apply most incongruously to Gods decrees ( for thereof runnes your discourse ) and not to the executions of them , and withall as touching the actions of men , though never so gracious , though actions of faith , love , repentance , these I say are not objects of Gods decrees in your Divinity ; but onely the rewards of them . No not Cyrus his Es. 45. 13. 1 King . 13. 2. Gen. 15. 14 Ex. 3. 20. restoring of the Iewes , nor Iosiahs burning of the Prophets bones upon the Altar , nor the children of Israels comming out of Aegypt , nor Pharaohs dimission of them ; and infinite the like , God decreed none of these by your doctrine . He decreed onely the contingency of these actions , not the actions themselves .

Which doctrine of yours you are not willing to take notice of , when in the next words according to your course of argumentation , you tell us , No man living ( as you take it ) will avouch any absolute necessity from all eternity , that God should inevitably decree the deposition of Elies line from the priesthood , or his two sonnes destructions by the Philistims . For here you seeme to imply a grant that God decreed it , but not inevitably , and that upon his decree there followed a necessity of his deposition , but not absolute . Now it is well knowne that Solomon deposed Elies house in Abiathar freely , and the Philistims by free actions of theirs were the death of Elies sonnes . And therefore if God decreed them , the very free actions of men are the objects of Gods decrees ; and consequently no action by the freedome thereof is any way hindred from being the object of Gods decrees . All which is directly contrary to your opinion , who maintaine contingency to bee the object of Gods decree , and not the thing contingent , as you have plainly exprest and professed in another Treatise ; and but erst you made the decrees of God to be brought forth suitable to the actions of men , as if the actions of men were no objects at all of Gods decrees .

Againe , is it a sober distinction which here you imply , as if the decrees of God were some evitable , some inevitable ; well it may be accommodated to the executions of Gods decrees , but most absurdly to Gods decrees , which being everlasting as you confesse , were before any thing could have existence to avoid them . Yet we plainly professe that God decreeth some things to come to passe necessarily as workes of natu●e , some things contingently as the actions of men . Againe , some things to come to passe inevitably , as the end of the world , some things to come to passe evitably , as the judgments of God , which may bee avoided by repentance . But you desiring to speake home , tell us that no man will avouch that it was necessary that God should decree the deposition of Elies house . Indeed decrees are free , or else they are no decrees . Neither the making of the world , nor the ending of the world was necessarily decreed by God , but freely . Yet you come very soberly to this asseveration , and adde very cautiously ( I take it ) implying this ●o bee your opinion , not daring too confidently to avouch it to be the opinion of others . And as if you were fearfull lest you should deliver something unawares that might lie open to exception , you propose it of absolute necessity ; and so you think That no man living ( whether of them that be dead any have thought otherwise , that matters not ) will avouch that from all eternity there was an absolute necessity that God should inevitably decree the deposition of Elies line . So that though a man should say that it was necessary that God should decree such a deposition , yet if hee doth not say that it was absolutely necessarie ; or if hee doth say it was absolutely necessary that God should decree it ; yet if hee doth not say that this was so from all eternitie , or though he should say this also , yet he shall not contradict you , provided he do not say that God did inevitably decree it .

And surely I cannot but commend your wary proceeding in this , and if you had used the like warinesse in everie sentence , he had need rise betime that would goe beyond you in this k●nde of warinesse and circumspection ; yet to make all sure , you give a reason of it , saying , For this were to bereave him of his absolute and eternall liberty . And herein you say verie true , for if it were absolutelie necessarie for him to decree this , surelie it were not absolutelie free for him whether to decree it o● no.

Yet I finde some in opinon have transgressed in this later , but never any in the former . For Aristotle a great Philosopher hath denied God to be a free agent , and conceived him to be a necessary agent , yet never beleeved that it was necessarie for him to decree the deposition of Elies house , or ought else . And therefore you doe not well to prove a more plaine thing by that which is lesse manifest . We have as good stuffe in the next . To say that before Elies dayes God past any act that could constraine his eternall libertie of honouring Elies family , as well as any others , were impiety , because it chargeth the Almighty with impotent immutability . Herehence are certaine Aphorismes to be selected , worthy our consideration . 1. God is not to be charged with any thing that is impotent ; but there is a kinde of immutability that is impotent ; therefore God is not to be charged with such an immutability . Now to att●bute unto God ●hat which doth not become him , is a kinde of blasphemy . The contrad●ctorie hereunto doth become God , and must be attributed unto him , to wit , immutability . For mutab●lity and immutability are termes contradictorie ; and it is one of the most generall principles that are , that one of two contradictorie termes may be attributed to any thing , therefore if it be blasphemy to say God is immutable , it is no blasphemy to say that God in some cases at least is mutable . And in haec Amph●arae sub terram abd●tae ? Old Prophet Ma●achy dost thou heare this , that hast instructed us this to be the voice of God , I the Lord am not changed ? And thou Iames the Apostle , Mal. 3 6. ●ac . 1. 17. how hast thou deceived us in ll● , that with God there is no variablenesse nor shadow of change ? Yet now we are taught that it is no l●le then blasphemy to say that God is altogether immutable , yea it is to ascribe impotencie unto him . Hee must be mutable that he may be potent .

Well , let us consider wherein this impotent immutability doth consist , to wit , in not being able to reverse his owne act : so then potent mutability consists in being able to reverse his owne act . Here by the way it is acknowledged that Gods decrees are acts past , otherwise in doing contrary thereto there were no colour of mutability . Yet hitherunto it hath beene denyed , that Gods decrees were acts past . And by not passing of them there was conceited a reservation of liberty . For so you thought better to discourse , then at the first to professe any revocable nature of Gods decrees . But now that conceyte not fadging , and your selfe as it seemes not throughly satisfied , you plainely breake forth , and adventure to mainteyne that notwithstanding Gods decrees are acts past , yet he can change them , and thus farre he is mutable , and to say that God is immutable herein , is to charge him with impotency .

From the first I looked for this , and at length the partridge is sprunge . But you will say , otherwise his liberty is restrayned . I answere , this is a vayne fiction , proceeding from the vayne consideration of mans infirmities , and attributing them unto God . For man after he hath promised a thing , afterwards would fayne break his promise , either because he made it improvidently , or because he is of a fickle disposition ; and therfore in performing his promise he doth it in a sort against his will . But no such improvidence is found in God , no such fickle disposition is incident to him . And therefore his will being the same still and that for good cause , his liberty is the same still . For liberty extends no farther then to doe what we can or will .

Now though God can doe otherwise absolutely , yet he will not doe otherwise ; and supposing that he hath decreed to doe this it is impossible that he should doe otherwise . For God cannot change his will , for as much as all change of will in the creature , proceeds from such imperfections as are not incident to the nature of God , as namely , improvidence , or forgetfullnes , or sicklenes or the like , and yet doe not we say that the deposition of Elies race , or the death of his Sonnes were absolutely necessary .

But God had ordained them to come to passe contingently that is with a possibility to the contrary , and upon supposition not only of their miscarriage , but also of the will of God thus to punish their miscarriage . If you rest your selfe upon such a decree of God , They that dishonour me them will J●dishonour 1. Sam. 2. 30. what need you trouble the World with such distastfull speculations , as to affirme that to say God is immutable , is to charge him with impotency ? But this is an indefinite proposition , and if this be all the decree you acknowledge in God , you must deny that the will of God to depose Elies line in particular from the Preisthood , was eternall , and affirme thus it had its beginning by way of reservation of liberty , but not to doe it untill Ely had dishonoured God . And such proposition as these undoubtedly are the best grounds for these your extravagant speculations ; and these doe farre better suite with your first course , namely as touching reservation of liberty , and suspension of resolution , then with revocation of his decrees considered as acts past .

But the common and generall opinion of making Gods decrees eternall made you to shuffle in that a long time ; and at length plainely to fall fowle upon the liberty to revoke them lest otherwise , Gods liberty should be restrayned . Of Cicero Austin sayth , that dum homines fecit liberos , fecit sacrilegos . And you to make God free make him immutable ; and think to helpe it by giving us to understand that some kind of mutability is potent , like as there is an immutability which is impotent as you conceave .

4. In conclusion you tell us , that to think of Gods eternall decree without admiration voyd of danger ; we must conceive it as the immediate axis or center , upon which every successive or contingent act revolves . And I professe I cannot think on this which you deliver without admiration . And the object of my admiration is , upon what axis or center your witt did revolve when you pleased your selfe with this resemblance . Yet I think there is no great danger in your meaning to make a man an hereticke . For it had neede be understood first . And he deserves to be one of your worthiest disciples that understands you in this . For like as he was a worthy Scholar that bid his Master give him positions and let him alone to prove them ; so no l●sse worthy a Scholar is he also , that gives his Master leave to speake what gibrish he will , yet nothing doubts of understanding him ; In this Section hereafter you say that Gods eternall decree is coexistent to each humane thought or action : But in what sense it is , your axis or center whereupon every contingent act doth revolve , you no where explane that I know . As how every act ( many of them being instantaneall ) hath a revolution , or how the whole body of contingent actions being drawne into one by aggregation may be sayd to turne round . As if time from the beginning of the World unto this day did turne , and the change of things to come into thinges present , & of things present into things to come , were a sphericall change ; or lastly how Gods decree is the center hereof , and yet coexist with every part of the circumference ; These are mysteries I confesse which we cannot think upon without admiration , yet no other danger herein doe I finde in hast , besides the wasting of precious time in the consideration of so wilde and extravagant speculations . Yet one word more of this before we part . Every contingent act revolves you say upon the axis of Gods decree .

Now I demaund whether these contingent acts are the objects of Gods decrees or no. If not , what hath Gods decree to doe with them ? or they with the decree of God ? let them rather be thought fitt ( if you please ) to revolve upon the axis of Gods knowledge , and that will be with farre lesse danger unto your tenet . For this revolution of contingent acts upon the axis of Gods decree , doth savour strongly of making them the object of Gods decrees . But this you may remember is directly opposite to your tenent , who mainteyne that God decreeth contingency but not the contingent things themselves .

The next member of the first sentence in this Section had beene very mysticall , had we not beene already reasonably well acquainted with this dialect of yours in the chapter of eternity . And upon my remembrance of that your discourse , I take that , wherein the whole frame of succession and contingency is fully comprehended , to be no other then that precious creature called time , wherein all contingent things come to passe , and so are comprehended therein as in the measure of their existence and duration . For of such a comprehension ( as I take it ) you doe discourse , not of substantiall or integrall comprohension ; For I see no reason why the decree of God should not be the axis of the whole body of contingent things as well as of any particular of them , wheron to revolve . But you make a farre greater quiescent to be the axis of this , by which greater quiescent , I think you meane Gods eternity . For that alone is it , as heretofore you have expounded it , which drawes all the successive parts of motion into an indivisible unity of duration permanent . I am now almost growne as perfect in this canting language as your selfe .

But herein I had neede of your helpe for satisfaction , as touching certaine points . As namely , why time should be accounted by you , an unconstant and moveable sphare . Time I confesse cannot be conceaved without motion , but it is neither motion it selfe nor a thing moveable . Yet in the course of it to my understanding it is most constant ; for things never so different in constancy or inconstancy are still measured with the same time ; as whether motion be uniforme or difforme , swift or slow , the same or different , yet the time wherein motion is , is still the same .

But least of all doe I see any reason , why you should accoumpt time a Sphere . For a sphericall forme is proper unto bodyes , & such bodyes moving round are sayd to move spherically , but of sphericall time I see no congruity . Againe , why should you accoumpt eternity a farre greater quiescent , then the decree of God , you may as well say that eternity is a greater quiescent then God himselfe . Eternity as it is duratio manens , without beginning and without end , so it is of Gods decrees also .

Thirdly it is impossible that all the successive parts of motion should be drawen into an indivisible unity of duration permanent . For motion can neither be made indivisible nor permanent . Well it may cease , but it cannot be drawne into permanency , or indivisibility . Againe , duration permanent of indivisible unity ( if I understand the language aright , ) is eternity . But motion cannot be drawne into eternity , no more then eternity can be drawne into motion . To swallowe up motion into a vigorous rest● understand right well what it is , I am pr●ty well acquainted with this language .

It is for a Sphere of Heaven to turne round in a moment , that is to turne so swiftly , as to stand stocke still . For to be where it was immediately before this instant is to stand still . Yet if such a revolution should be in an instant , then every part of the larger Sphere should have coexistence locall with all and every part of the lower Sphere under it , provided you understand it aright , & so shall every part of the lower sphere have coexistence with all and every part of the Sphere above it , without any paynes more then ordinary . And that whether it move swiftly or slowly ; to witt , in an instant . This is sober discourse , is it not ? For if one body may move twise so fast as another in an instant ; then in halfe an instant it may move as fast as the other in an whole instant .

In the next place you tell us , that Gods foreknowledge is included in the conceyte of his eternall decree . And you speake of the foreknowledge of things contingent . For of no other things but contingent have you spoken in reference to Gods decree ; hence it followeth that contingent things are the object of Gods decree ; and that therefore he foreknows them , because he hath decreed them ; otherwise how could the foreknowledge of such things be included in the conceite of Gods decree ? But that the foreknowledge of such things depends upon Gods decree , is a thing which you impugned in the 8. chap. and 5. Sect. pag. 96. 97. Gods ubiquitary presence you have heretofore compared sometimes to a center , sometimes to a Sphere . And there must be an analogy as here you signify , betweene his decree and his ubiquitary presence , and therefore we must beleive the decree of God to be as the axis or center upon which every contingent act revolves , but you doe not inferre that therefore it must be as a Sphere also ; yet analogy requires this as well as that .

Neither did you tell us that Gods ubiquitary presence was as a center wherupon all things did revolve ; though here you tell us thus much of Gods decree in respect of contingent acts . The profitable nature of this admirable conceyte is ( you say ) to free us from suspicion that his necessary foreknowledge should lay a necessity upon our actions , or take away all possibility of doing , otherwise . Now to prevent this suspition , we have no need of these quaint fictions of yours , as in conceiving Gods decree ( or fore-knowledge rather ) as an axis whereon every contingent act revolves . We say that by vertue and efficacy of Gods decree , not onely some things come to passe necessarily , as the workes of naturall agents : but other things also come to passe contingently , that is , with all possibility of being otherwise , as the free actions of men , onely upon supposition of Gods decree , we say it necessarily followeth that such things how contingent soever , shall come to passe : but how ? not necessarily , but contingently .

In like sort supposing Gods foreknowledge of things to come , ( which foreknowledge of God not onely is to day , but was before the world was made , though it continueth in the notion of foreknowledge till the things are , and afterward also with the notion of knowledge ) it necessarily followeth that all such things shall come to passe ; but how ? not necessarily but contingently : Here followes a list of what you will prove ; when time serves : 1. That the Omnipotent doth eternally decree an absolute contingency in most humane acts . I pray tell me , had not this decree of God existence in the beginning of the world , and before that also ? If it had , what meane you to say he doth decree it , as if this decree of God which yet you call eternall , had not existence till now ? why doe you not or may you not as well say that God doth eternally decree the creating of the world , the turning of man out of Paradise , the drowning of the world in the dayes of Noah ; the destruction of Sodome , and the like , for you have no colour of reason to justifie your phrasiologie herein , but onely this , that though ( Gods ) decrees bee eternall , yet they still continue . Now this is as true of the decree of creation , and the rest above mentioned , as of any other decree . Secondly , what meane you to qualifie your assertion , by saying In most humane acts : as if you durst not avouch it of all ? Are not all humane acts of a contingent nature , and consequently have a contingencie in them ? and why should not their contingency be decreed as well as others ? It may be that herein you have reference to the Iesuits distinction , of future contingents absolutely that shall be , and future contingents conditionall that should be , if and in case some condition were put in esse . But how then will you prove , that the acts of men that shall be , are of a greater number , then those that might or should be , in some case ? For you suppose that this absolute contingency decreed , is in most humane acts . I have a manifest reason to the contrary . For the number of things that might be upon supposition , is farre greater then the number of things that are , have beene , and shall be ; for in case the world had beene made twice bigger then it is , and twice as many men as there are , and should last twice as long , the number of humane acts would be farre greater then these are , wherein God hath decreed an absolute contingency .

Againe , the Iesuits maintaine that God hath not onely decreed contingencie in humane acts , but the humane acts themselves , which you doe not : we maintaine that God decreeth the actions of men themselves , that they shall come to passe contingently and consequently ; decreeth the contingency of them , but not that onely , but the actions themselves . As Pharaohs dimission of the children of Israel , God decreed not onely the contingency of it , but the act it selfe , that it should come to passe in a contingent manner . Iosiahs burning of the Prophets bones upon the Altar , God decreed not onely the contingencie of this act , but the act it selfe , to wit , to come to passe in a contingent manner . So Cyrus his restoring of the Iewes out of captivitie , to their countrie , was an humane contingent act , and God decreed not onely the contingencie hereof , but the act it selfe , to come to passe in a contingent manner .

2. The second Aphorisme is , that Gods eternall decree doth coexist to each humane action throughout the whole succession of time . This we doe not deny , no more then wee denie Gods coexistence with every action : but heretofore you have professed , that God doth at this present coexist with all things , not onely with all things present , but with all things that are to come : and this we denie , because God cannot coexist with that which doth not coexist with him : and therefore seeing things past , and things to come , doe not at all exist at this present , and consequently doe not coexist with God , therefore we professe that God at this present doth not coexist with them .

In the next place you say , that Gods decree doth inspire them with contingency in their choice . It was wont to bee said , that praedestinatio nihil ponit in praedestinato ; rather the execution of his decree doth bring things forth , then his decree ; for his decree was from all eternitie , yet nothing was inspired into man , till the creation , nor into us men , untill we are brought forth , and grow capable of inspirations . When you talke of contingency in our choice , you might have spoken plainly and called it libertie in our choice . But doth God continually inspire this ? It is too absurd : to inspire , is to bring forth something anew : as when God doth inspire good motions into us . You might as well say that God doth continually inspire a reasonable nature into us , as libertie of choice ; more congruous it had beene to say , that God continually preserves it as he doth our natures . For as we are reasonable creatures we have essentially a libertie of choice in all that we doe : and he moves us so , as that we may move our selves more waies then one . But when doth he move us thus ? in the very time of doing ought , or before ? and so doth he move us by perswasion onely , or by mediate operation on the will ? For all this whereabouts alone there is question now adaies amongst Divines , we have nothing but blankes here : you are yet onely upon the promise of performance , and not upon any performance it selfe .

Yet whilst it moves them , it withall inevitably effecteth the proportioned consequents , which were foreordained , to the choices which we make , whether they be good or evill . That is , God doth inevitably decree that they that die in faith and repentance shall be saved , they that die in impenitencie shall be damned . Wherin you nothing doubt to acknowledge an inevitable decree of God , to wit , of an indefinitive nature , thus , Whosoever beleeves shall be saved , whosoever beleeves not , shall be damned . But that these men in particular shall beleeve , and repent , and so be saved ; others shall neither beleeve , nor repent , nor bee saved , you will be wise and wary enough to keepe your selfe from the acknowledgement of any such decree , unlesse it be provided that God be not charged with any such impotent immutabilitie , as not to be able to revoke his decrees . For though the Pope wants wisedome and integrity sufficient to manage such an authority and power as he challengeth to himselfe , as namely , of making grants , and againe revoking them ; yet God doth not .

CHAP. XI .

Of transcendentall goodnesse , and of the infinitie of it in the divine nature .

I Professe I have no desire to oppose ought in this , or in the Chapter following ; yet having begunne this worke of examination it is fit to consider these also , if it be but to take notice of what you deliver , and rightly to understand the meaning thereof .

They which fetch light beyond the Sunne , must bee content with Starre-light ; and they which cannot satisfie themselves with day light , but seeke for starre-light , they are well enough served if they goe to bed darkling . Wee commonly say , Life is sweet , and it is a truth , not because it is a principall stemme of being , in my judgment , ( for reason is a more principall stemme of being then it ) and yet is life as sweet to creatures unreasonable , as to creatures reasonable . And you confesse that the appetite of preservation , of it selfe is naturall unto all ; yet it cannot be denyed but that life is subject to soure things as well as sweet : whereupon some have said , Non est vivere sed valere vita . And 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 . Better eye out then alwais akeing ; and better once dead then alwaies dying . Nay the hope of a better state , without all others consideration , may make this life of ours distastefull unto us , I desire to be dissolved , sayth S. Paule , and to be with Christ , I am not of your opinion , in your construction Phil. 1. 23. of the Maxime , Omne ens qua ens est bonum , as if the meaning were , that it is good it selfe , for that which is good , and that whereunto a thing is good , should be rather different then the same , for the termes of relation , must be distinct . Your instances , are very incongruous , you should say , that poyson is good to it selfe , not to the aspe , for the aspe is a different thing from his owne poyson , and so is the Adders stinge , from the Adder . And as sure I am that even of poyson , good use may be made for the service of man ; And the Scorpion cures the wound , that is made by his owne sting : And even of the Adders sting , God the Creator of it , hath a good use even in stinging , and the heathen Man in this kind observes the providence of God when he sayth : 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 .

If naturall qualities of contrary nature , doe fight for the maintenance of their owne being , it seemes being to them , Dionys. peri ego sive discriptio orbis . is as sweete , as life is to us , though life be a principall stemme of being . How transcendentall goodnes , should be equally communicated by God to all , and not equally participated , by all , I understand not : the contrary seemes true to my opinion , for as much as like as there can be no communication , where there is no participation , so there can be no equall communication , where there is no equall participation ; And though a lesse vessell , may be as full as a greater , yet there is no equall communication of water unto them both , and the comparison is no way congruous , for as much as it is an easy thing , to distinguish betweene the water and the vessell , filled with it , but not so easy to distinguish betweene the thing , and the being of it . Rather thus . God doth sitt every thing with qualities , or parts according to the being thereof , or as it shall require , like as every vessell small and great are filled with water . The being of a fly , of a man , of every thing is good in it selfe , and as it may be , and is referred to the glory of God , for God made all things for himselfe . Prov. 16. 4

But in the things that God hath created , there are degrees of perfection , some creatures have onely being , some being and life also , some adde sense unto them both , some have reason over and above them all . The degree of entitative goodnesse , cannot arise from the specificall nature of it , for so it should arise from it selfe , for the degree of entitative goodnesse in any thing and the specificall nature thereof is all one ; Your other derivation of the degree of entitative goodnesse is as bad or worse , as when you derive it from the degree of their specificall nature : As if the specificall nature of a thing had degrees , which is untrue , as I remember ; Aristotle compares specificall natures or formes of substances to numbers , that admit no intention or remission ; three flyes are as truly three , as three Elephants .

The difference of individualls under the same species , is merely accidentall not essentiall ; Thus , that one is not so happy as another , is an accidentall difference , not entitative or essentiall ; It is true , sensitive appetites cannot be satisfied all at once , yet I have heard of a Ruffian Englishman , that in one night at Venico bestowed five hundred pounds , upon his five senses . It is not the fruition of goodnesse incident to one sense that defeates another for the time , of that it most desires , but rather want fruition thereof by your instances . For if the belly be satisfied , it is free to delight in musick also , if pinshed with hunger not so , yet too much feeding I confesse may bring a man asleepe , and make him unfit for taking any pleasure in the exercise , either of body or minde . On the other side deepe contemplation , as you say pines the body , and is occasion of farre worse accidents also sometimes ; as in Archimedes whole plodding upon his Mathematicall operations , made him neglect the Souldiour that came upon him , and by neglect provoked him to set an immature and bloody end to all his studies , to the great greife of Marcellus the Generall , who had given chardge to the contrary . The gainving of Archimedes safe into his hands , though by his art a most mischievous enemy to him , had been more worth , to an ingenuous Conquerour , then the taking of Syracusa . I have great cause to be sensible , of that of Solomons , of making many books there is no end , for I think if I should live Methusalehs yeares , yet I should not make an end . Much study is a wearinesse unto the fleshe , but by the goodnesse of God I find this wearinesse , with a litle refreshing quickly to vanish , and I returne unto it with as great vivacity of minde and Spirit , as ever I did before . I desire to doe the taske , which God hath appointed for me . And if death prevent me , yet it is good to dy doeing something . I should put it out of doubt that the more knowledge we get , the more is our reasonable desire of knowledge satisfied , yet it is true I confesse the more we encrease in knowledge , the greater is our immediate capacity of knowledge . For the more we know the better is our understanding and judgement , enabled to proceed in knowledge . And this capacity of ours will never be throughly satisfied , till the enjoying of God himselfe , yet I see not how the nature hereof hitherunto can be sayd to hinder the entire possession of our selves , whether contemplation be vaine or not vaine , whether it be used as a pledge of a better life to come or no , I see no reason why it hindreth or furthereth the possession of our selves , though it hinder or further our possessing of God .

Certainly that life to come is no part of our selves , like as eternall death is no part of the damned selves . But eternall life is a condition that God bestowes upon us , and everlasting death is a juste recompence , which God inflicts upon others . Yet in what sense contemplation may be used ( as you say ) as a pledge of a better life to come , I am to seeke . The Spirit of God and the fruits of sanctification , are the pledges and earnest penyes hereof , but contemplations are not ; How Angells are sayd entirely to possesse their angelicall natures , and men not to possesse their natures entirely hath neede of explication . Angells have no bodies , and consequently are not capable of augmentation as we are . In this sense I conceave how we by degrees attaine to a fulnes of age , Angells doc not . There is a growth of our soules in knowledge also , Eph. 4. 13. in grace , 2 Pet. 3. last . This fulnesse of age is not all at once in us ; you suppose it is so in Angels , but without distinction ; for there are Angels of darknesse , as well as Angels of light . What thinke you of Angels of darknesse , doe they entirely possesse their Angelicall nature , or no ? I should think they differ not in nature Angelicall , though their accidentall condition bee much different . As for the elect Angels , doe you thinke they doe already possesse all that may belong unto them , either in respect of knowledge or glory ? It appeares Eph. 3. 10. that the verie Angels themselves doe encrease in knowledge , and that by the Church . It seemes also , that though they are void of sinne , and so void of sorrow , in respect of themselves , yet that all teares are not wiped from their eyes in respect of us ; for if there bee joy in heaven for one sinner that repenteth , what is there in respect of the falls of Gods children ? No question but the nature of man at best is inferiour to the nature of an Angell . And on the other side , as little question is to be made ( I should thinke ) whether man shall not be as happie in his kinde as the elect Angels in their kinde : in the 20. of Luke , our Saviour professeth , that the time shall come when we shall be 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , like unto the Angells .

Gods infinity is nothing pertinent to the comparison of men and Angels , from whom Angels as well as men are infinitely distant , as the creature from the Creator ; yet this infinity of Gods joy is vainly amplified , by saying , he wanteth no moment of time to enlarge or perfect it by continuance , whereas time is no measure suitable with the being of God , no nor with the being of Angels . Yet God hath continuance , it cannot be denied , both without beginning , and in respect of being , without end , which is an essentiall perfection of God , as much as any , as being but the interpretation of his necessary being , whereas all the being of a creature is meerly by the free will of God , and yet continuance to the creature addes no perfection . For will you say that the Angells and Saints of God in heaven doe grow more and more perfect by continuance . In this world for a while we grow more and more perfect by continuance . But then againe it is as true , that by continuance we decay more and more both in body and minde .

Aristotle hath said , that Bonum non ideo melius quia diuturnius . But of the transcendentall goodnesse of God ( you say ) you now intreat not , but of the transcendentall goodnesse of the creature , which you make to consist in doing good to others : and withall you deliver another maxime , namely , that amongst visible creatures , the better every one is in its kinde , or according to its entitative perfection , the more good it doth to others . And I confesse this latter stands in much congruity with the former . But I have already shewed my dislike of the former , and given reason for it , and I see no reason to embrace the latter . A Lyon is the king of beasts , but of more good hee doth to others , then the inferiour beasts whereon he preyeth , I am nothing conscious . An Eagle is the king of birds , yet we commonly say , that a Larke is better then a Kite . What creature more profitable then the Sunne , yet I pray consider , doth not a Mouse , or an Emmet , or a Fly , in entitative perfection go beyond it ? for these are animate , the Sun is not , though God sends him forth as his most conspicuous and goodly messenger every morning like a bridegroom bedeckt with light & comelines , as you are pleased to expatiate or take the aire , & breath your self in a rhetoricall flourish . God himselfe to the contemplation of whom the Sunne you say doth invite us , though from the boundlesse Ocean of his internall joy and happinesse ( as you say ) sweet streames of perpetuall joy and comfort more uncessantly issue , then light from the Sunne , to refresh this vale of misery . Yet I hope you will not say , his entitative goodnes consists in doing good to others .

For before he made the world , he was no lesse good , then since the creation ; and though he had never made it , yet had he continued every way as good as now he is . And in that dispensation of this his goodnesse , which proceeds not from his joy and happinesse , though you say so , but from the counsell and freedome of his will ; though as touching the comforts of this life , God maketh his raine to fall , and Sun to shine as well upon the wicked as upon the righteous ; yet as touching the dispensation of his grace , though he be most good , that way also , yet it is but towards whom he will ; for that Oracle of God , I will have mercy on whom I will ; and againe , He hath mercy on whom he will , and whom he will he hardneth , must sway more with us , then any vaine conceit or imagination of man to the contrary . And why doe you call this world a vale of misery ? is it not in respect of Gods jugements , as well as in respect of sinne ? which judgements of God have their course as well as mercies , how then doth perpetuall joy and comfort more uncessantly issue from him , then light from the Sunne , to refresh this vale of misery ? Surely as the Prophet said , his song should bee of mercy and of judgement : so doth God also sometimes mourne unto us , that we may weepe , as well as at other times draw us to dance after his pipe .

You conclude with telling us the causes why men are not so happy as they might be . The one is , you say , That they doe not beleeve the eternall happinesse of their Creator to bee absolutely infinite , as his other attributes are . The other , That they doe not consider that the absolute infinitie of this his eternall happinesse , is an essentiall cause of goodnesse unto all others , so farre as they are capable of it . As for the first of these , what Heathen Philosopher , that acknowledged the making of the world , that acknowledged a God , did ever doubt of his eternall happinesse , and that as infinite as any other of his attributes . As touching the other , doth not Callimachus acknowledge as much , when he saith , 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 ? Doth not Aristotle acknowledge felicity to be from God ; and did this make them as happy as they might be ? It is true indeed , their goodnesse they conceived to be from themselves . Det vitam det opes , animum mihi ipse parabo .

And doe not you I pray concurre with them in this , even in this place ? For although you carry it in generall termes , when you say , he is the cause of all goodnesse , yet by that which followeth it is manifest that you limit this unto the happy condition that followeth man upon his goodnesse ; as when you say , God is a cause of goodnesse to all that are capable of it , and capable of it all reasonable creatures by creation are , none but themselves can make them uncapable of happinesse . And where is any mention of Christ Iesus in all this ? where any mention of the grace of God for the performing of this , which you make sufficient to bring them unto happinesse ? It is true , God cannot be the author of evil of sin , but God forbid that we should so maintaine God to be no Author of evill , as withall to deny him to be the author of good .

Speake plainly , doe you beleeve that God is the author of faith , that God it is who gives repentance , that workes in us both the will and the deed , according to his good pleasure ? if you beleeve this , then you must beleeve that God did decree to give men faith and repentance . But this is contrary to the articles of your Creed , who professe that God doth decree contingency , but not things contingent . And who doubts but the faith of Peter , and his repentance , the faith of Paul and his repentance , were contingents ? and if God did never decree them , surely he was not the author of them ; for God doth nothing in time , but what he decreed to doe before all time .

And in case you did truly acknowledge God to bee the cause of all goodnesse , we would not quarrell with you about the terme essentiall , which with what learning you deliver , I professe I know not ; but I observe you are very liberall of your words and phrases ; we were never acquainted with any more then foure causes , can you tell us which of them is called by any essentiall , unlesse matter and forme be called essentiall , because they constitute the essence of that , whose matter and forme they are . But I hope you will not say that God , in this sense , is the essentiall cause of all our goodnesse .

CHAP. XII .

Of the infinity and immutability of divine goodnesse , or as it is the patterne of morall goodnesse in the creature .

I doe not like this Title , the disjunctive argueth , that Gods goodnesse communicative as communicative , is the patterne of morall goodnesse in the creature , I know no patterne of morall goodnesse , which we must imitate , but that which is commended unto us in Gods Law , Gods communicative goodnesse was exercised in making of the World , and us ; Is this a fitt patterne for us to imitate ? As touching his providence , whereby he governs the World , we are called by our Saviour , to imitate him in some particulars , as when he suffereth his rayne to fall , and Sunne to shine on the bad , as well as on the good .

But in most particulars we can not , in many we may not imitate him ; He caused two shee beares to come out of the wood , and teare 42. children that mocked Elisha , we must not 2. King . 〈◊〉 . Matth. 5. imitate God in the like , we must still blesse them that curse us , and pray for them , that persecute us .

The sense of imbecillity and indigence in our selves , even in this corrupt state of man , doth only provoke us the more , to shewe pitty unto others , in the time of their calamity according to that of Q. D●do , Non ignara mali miseris succurrere disco : But it doth not breede it , for it is manifest that men litle exercised with the Crosse , or not at all , may shewe more mercy , then such as have beene in great misery themselves . Yet these mercifull natures having tasted of misery themselvs , will be the more provoked to shew compassion unto men in misery .

2. And this is true , not onely in the corrupt state of man , but even in the state of integrity , for is it not sayd of our Saviour , Heb. 2. 18. that being tempted himselfe , he knew how to succour them , that are tempted ? It is now a dayes without question , among divines , that mercy and pitty as they signify passions are not in God , but attributed unto him , per 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 as are the members of our body also . But the will of Psal. 107. 9. Math. 10. 20. succouring creatures in their necessity , may with propriety enough be attributed unto God , for he heareth the cry of Ravens when they call upon him , and not a sparrowe falleth to the ground , without the providence of our heavenly Father , how much more , is his love enlarged towards man , who when they were sinners , sent his Sonne to dy for them , and when they lay weltring in their blood , sayd unto them , live , And washed them with water , yea washed away their blood from Ezek. 16. 6. 9. them , and anoynted them with oyle : Thus God hath a will to succour man in misery , and this will , and grace , and favour of God is in Scripture phrase , called mercy . But he sheweth this mercy on whom he will , and whom he will he hardeneth , I wonder Rom. 9. you should applaud that saying ; Nemo sponte malus , which hath no colour of truth ; Save in respect of originall sinne , traduced to Adams posterity of which originall sinne , the Author of that saying was utterly ignorant ; And you in another sense treading the authors stepps , seeme to mainteyne it , not in respect of any naturall corruption that hath sowred our natures , but in respect , rather of the perfection of our soules , and their native inclination unto good , for externall things , you say , doe so captivate the humane soule , that she cannot doe , as she would , but these strings , being cut , she followeth her native sway : And hereupon you come in with the approbation of this , Nemo sponte malus , manifesting thereby , that you acknowledge the native sway of the soule to be unto good .

But by the way you cast your selfe upon an erroneous assertion , convictable of untruth , by the very light of nature ; as when you say , that externall things doe captivate the soule ; as if the object had power to the will , which is a conceipte contrary to all Philosophy and Divinity . And nothing indeed , but a mans owne corruption is it that captivates him unto evill . For let Ioseph be tempted with a wanton Mistris , yet if lust be mortified within him , her wanton invitation , shall never captivate Ioseph . No nor the ladyes admitted to his presence , could inflame Scipio Adricanus , though a man of warre , with a lustfull appetit . Shewe a Lyon grasse he is nothing affected with it sayth Decumenius , because it is not Decum . upon the parable of the sower that went forth to sow . I am . 1. 14. 2 Tim. 2. last . the dyet of a Lyon , but of an Oxe ; Shew an Oxe flesh , he hath no appetite unto it , for fleshe is no diet for an Oxe , but for a Lyon rather ; every man is tempted , ( sayth S. Iames ) when he is drawne away by his owne concupiscence and entised . And by working upon this concupiscence , it is that the Divell leades men captive , to doe his will , no such matter could he finde in our Saviour .

And so much some conceaved to be signified , when he sayth : The Prince of the World commeth and sindes nought in me : Ioh. 14. 30 Yet cannot the Divell certainly prevaile to every particular , nor to any particular , so as to justifie , that man doth not that evill which he doth sponte ; for even beasts doe sponte whatsoever they doe , and man even the worst of men doth not onely of his owne accord , that which he doth but voluntarily also , yea and freely too ; And yet the Divell is none of those externall things you speake of , with farre more colour of reason did they proceed , who mainteyned , that looke what men did of passion , they did not voluntarily , fetching the restraynt of doeing voluntarily , not from things externall , but internall rather even from the passion themselves , but even this also is learnedly confuted by Aristotle long agoe . Eth. 3.

3. We must with patience expect and wait , till you come to your text , and intreat of the theame proposed , to wit of the infinity and immutability , of divine goodnesse communicative . The first sentence is not well stated ; for Sarah was old stricken in age , and it ceased to be with her after the manner of Women , when hearing from the Lord , something concerning the conceaving of a child by her , she sayd ; After I am waxed old , and my Gen. 18. ●2 Lord also , shall I have lust ? Lust , certeynly may be in old age and not a sinne , lust is one thing , inordinate lust is another thing , and where lust is , why should it seeme a Monster , in corrupte nature , for that lust to be inordinate ? And if a proud man be brought to a beggars condition , why should it seeme monstrous , if his morall condition be not altered , but he continue as proud as ever ? As Plato discerned a proud heart , thorough Antisthenes patcht coate ; And Diogenes might be as proud of his tubbe , as Alexander of his Crowne ; And a man may be as proud of carying a cloake bagge beh●nde him , as Cardinall Camprins , was of his sumpter horse , that followed after him ; for pride though it be more hatefull in one then in another , as the wiseman speaks , yet it disdeyns no condition , but accepteth entertainment in every breast ; how much more in the breasts of Kings , and such may be found even amongst the wandring planets on earth , otherwise called Roagues , and beggars . Certeynly men of a shifting disposition , if they have gotten wealth thereby , it is nothing strange if they continue their trade still , considering that Crescit amor nummi quantum ipsa pecunia crescit : especially if they have prospered well by it . And yet I confesse , men sometimes give over their former trades , as horse leaches leave sucking , when their bodyes are full ; but I doe not think , they can so easely , leave off their manners , neither doe temptations , begett any sinnes , but rather provoke our corruptions , to actuate themselvs ; as a mans corrupted will and affection , to actuate it selfe , and bring forth actuall sinne .

And as the Apostle sayth , Sinne not only provoked by temptation , Rom. 7. 9 ▪ but even taking occasion by the Commandement , doth bring forth in us all manner of concupiscences . It seemes you are a very morall man your selfe , that are so well perswaded of others ▪ but in the meane time , you are little thankfull unto Gods grace ; For this your morality , when you ascribe it to a generall inclination of nature , belike you are loath to be beholding to Gods grace ; for the morality of your nature , I wonder the lesse at the prodigious blindnesse of your minde , mainteyning that he , who hates his brother , desires , to deserve well of him , whereas S. Iohn sayth , that he , who hateth his brother , is a man-slayer , that the avaritious person , desires to be liberall , and the 〈◊〉 Iohn . 3. Hypocrite , desires to be upright , and the unmercifull to be compassionate , the Extortioner or robber to be just , and the Niggard to be bountifull , which is as much as to say , that the hotte fire , desires to be cold as earth , and the cold earth desires to be as hote as fire .

Why doe you not proceed in expressing the good opinion you have of a naturall man , even of the worst of men , and say that they have a desire to repent , to please God , to be holy , to be religious ? Continuance in sinne was wont to bee called altera natura , and secunda natura ; and the Prophet justifieth it , where hee saith , Can a blacke Moore change his skinne , or a Ier. 13. 23. Leopard his spots ? then may ye also doe good , that are accustomed unto evill . The sight of Gods judgements causing feare , may restrain from evill , like as an hedge of thornes , crossing a mans Hos. 2. 6. way , may hinder him from finding his paths : But as for impulsions unto goodnesse , in a man abandoned unto his lusts , and who , as the Apostle speakes , commits sinne with greedinesse , Eph. 4 ▪ ●8 . and is growne to 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , I know none . And Seneca seemes to be your onely Oracle for this ; a proper master for a Christian Divine to rely upon . And yet upon the scanning , Seneca alledged by you in this place , I finde pleades against you , rather then for you , as who plainly professeth , that They who erre in matters of life and manners , are delighted with their errours ; every criminall person is delighted with his crime , one sola●th himselfe in adultery , another delights in over-reaching others , and in theft . He saith , that naughtinesse is afraid of darknesse it selfe , which may restraine from evill , I confesse , but this gives no evidence of any impulsion unto goodnesse , no more then his last conclusion , that naughtinesse may be safe , but never secure . Which conclusion seves you for a passage to the next Section .

4. It is very true , an evill conscience will not suffer a man to be secure ; for if a good conscience be a continuall feast , surely Prov. 15. 15 ▪ an evill conscience holds a man continually upon the racke . Occultum quatiente animo tortore slagellum . The wicked slye when no man pursueth him , saith Solomon ; and , There is no peace , saith Esa. 48 ▪ 22 ▪ the Lord , to the wicked . It was one of the Iudgements God threatned to his owne people , when they persisted in their obstinate courses against him ; namely , that the sound of a leafe Levit. 26. 36. should chase them , and they should flie , no man pursuing them : but this is no evidence of any impulsion unto goodnesse . And when Seneca saith , Even in mindes drencht in the dregs of filthinesse , there remaines still a sense of goodnesse : this is no more then that which the Apostle informeth us of , when he saith , they have a conscience accusing them , by vertue of that law that is Rom. 2. written in their hearts : yet the Apostle doth not extend this to them that are drencht in the dregs of filthinesse . Hee acknowledgeth elsewhere , that some through the course of sinne become past all feeling , and have their conscience seared with an hot iron . And it is a proverbiall speech in the world , Nemo senex metuit Iovem . Yet it is one thing to have a sense of goodnesse by the conviction of their conscience , & a farre Eph. 4. 18. 1 Tim. 4. different thing to have an impulsion unto goodnesse .

Be it that the minde of man in that it is indued with reason , hath the rules of equity imprinted in it , is it not as true , that the rules of iniquitie are imprinted in it also ? doth he not know evill as wel as good ? Nay , hath he not more knowledg of evil then of good , at least as touching the compassing of it ? doth not the Lord complaine of this , where he saith , They are wise to doe evill , but as touching good they have no understanding . If Yer . 4. 22. this were so amongst men brought up in the Church of God , what was the condition of those that were aliens from the common Eph. 2. 12. wealth of Israel , and strangers from the covenants of promise ? especially considering what d●fference the Apostle puts betweene these , when he saith , We Iewes by nature , not sinners of Gal. 2. 15. the Gentiles .

And therefore if it belongs to the mind to seek to instamp her rules upon inferiour faculties , she shall be as forward to stamp rules of iniquity , as rules of equity . And with what congruity I pray you may rules of equity be said to bee stamped upon faculties , that are not intellectuall ? appetites are guided by rules , in their motions , not instamped with them . Rules of knowledge are circumstant to appetites of doing , not inherent in them . And why should not these rules of equity be stamped on the will , as well as on sensuall appetites ? or if it be so , why should you reckon the will an inferiour facultie in comparison to the minde ? whereas indeed the will rules in man as king , the minde is but his privie Councellor .

To quash an exception that might arise against your tenet touching the integrity of nature , as thus , If the minde have such good rules , and withall seekes to instamp them upon inferiour faculties , how comes it to passe that there is so little love of vertue in many ? your answer is , that this proceeds from their disposition , being over-growne with sensuall desires . But by your leave this is a weake reason , for it onely transfers the difficultie , but answers not the doubt ; for still I may demand , how it came to passe that these rules of equity did not prevent the growth of these sensuall desires , and without grace what place is left for any goodnesse in the nature of man ? Philosophers had a love of vertue , but can you shew they had any love of God ? their most vertuous actions in the state of nature , was not Austin bold to call them splendida peccata , Aug. contra Iul. P●lag lib. 4. c. 3. glorious sinnes ? For the discerning of true vertue aright he gives us this rule , Noveris non officiis , sed finibus discernendas esse virtutes . I am sure they were not ordered by Gods word , nor referred to his glory , nor proceeded from acknowledgement that all power of doing good was from God , yet they looked for justification by them : and as for repentance and confession of sinnes , they make that no part of their integritie . So that whether their knowledge were in a mist , or out of a mist , it brought them never a whit the nearer unto God : as the Sunne , whether in a mist or out of a mist , was never knowne to set moist stuffe on fire , but ●st dries it , then fires it . And our Saviour was bold to professe , that Publicanes and Mat. 21. 31 Harlots●ntred into the kingdome of heaven before Scribes and Pharises .

If the notions of the minde be ideall characters , you may , if it please you , bestow the phrase as well on notions of evill , as notions of good ; and if the good have so slippery an impression upon the unse●led affection of youth , it seemes the bad are more permanent ; yet these naturall notions of good are farre distant from true notions of God , or of true goodnesse ; A heart hardned with vast desires , you say , 〈◊〉 hardly cured ; but I pray tell me , when one man transgresser● for an handfull of barly , or a morsell of bread , another saith , Si violandum Ezek. 13. 19. est jus impij causa violandum est , which of these is the greater hardnesse ? yet as a stone by losing somewhat of his substance may take another shape , so you signifie the hardest heart may be wrought into a new frame . I confesse , to make a Camell Marke 10. 25. Gal. 1. 11. goe through the eye of a needle , is not impossible unto God : and what naturall man hath not a body of sinnes to be cut off by spirituall circumcision ? but that this you make to bee a worke of grace , you give not the least intimation : nay you rather imply the contrary , when you say , that if hopes of supplies from internals bee intercepted , a worke that may bee done by course of nature , then you say , the soule thus freed , becomes more fashionable to reason ; a saying that would become Seneca well , that knew no reason but naturall ; but full ill becomming a Christian Divine : let desire be never so vast , as you speake , let seven devils possesse a man , yet the strong man Christ , by the power of his grace is able to cast them out , and make even Ekron become as the Iebusite .

Without grace , will any mans morality commend him in the sight of God ? As Lebanon is turned into Carmell , so Zach. 9. 7. Carmell becomes as the high places of the forest . And most morall men have beene as great enemies to Christianity , as any other ; like as the Scribes and Pharises were greatest enemies unto Christ . Why you should call that a superficiall draught of reason , that endeavoureth to stampe the heart with reall and solid kindnesse . I know no reason ; this in my judgement deserves to be accompted a substantiall operation . And when you tell me that Affability consists in this , you goe about to teach me more then ever I learned out of Aristotle . I had thought affability might have place in all men , as a morall vertue , whether they were enabled to stampe the heart with reall and solid kindnesse yea or no. This affability you grant to Epicures , but not temperance ; yet Epicurus , if my reading deceive me not , was knowne to bee as temperate a man in moderating his appetite , as most that then lived . And that because he made mans happinesse to consist in pleasure , the sense whereof was quickned by temperance , and dulled by intemperance . And therefore little cause there is to charge him with uncharitablenesse to his neighbours or brethren , either in time of plenty , or time of scarcitie . You doe him the greater wrong , to charge him , with sucking in cruelty as wine , and feeding upon the needy as upon delicates : neither will your good phrases make him amends in words for the wrong you doe him in deeds ; as for cutting morsels out of other mens throats ; this is a phrase incongruous for an intemperate mans diet : is fitter for a superstitious Papist , that in case the Priest should vomit the hoast , thinkes the people bound to lick● it up .

The close of this ninth Section complies with the beginning of the first ; betweene which , what suitable matter hath occurred , let the Reader judge . Though indigence be the mother of cruelty , yet herehence it followeth not , that it is not the mother of pitty , for , Rara est concordia fratrum : Cleocles and Polynicas both had one mother , yet there is a great difference in indigence , as the cause of these . Indigence heretofore suffered , is made the cause of pitty ; but indigence in present alone , is the cause of cruelty , and that onely in case it cannot be relieved but by cruelty .

5 Philosopher-like , or rather meere naturalist-like , you make errour of judgement the root of all evill : as the cause of covetousnesse you make to be the opinion of want , either that is for the present , or may be for the time to come . How farre are you different from Aquinas , who maintaines , that our wills are more corrupt , quoad appetitum boni , then our mindes , quoad intellectum veri : yet the Poet seems to have had another conscience in that of his , Video moliora proboque deteriorasequor . Saint Paul , I thinke , was a man regenerate when he made that profession , I see a law in my members rebelling against Rom. 7. the law of my minde , and leading me captive to the law of sinne . It is true , there are bosome sinnes ( as wee call them ) like familiar spirits to particular men , and so they may be dispensed withall in these , they will shew themselves very morrall in other points , and thinke it reason God should be mercifull unto them in breaking one commandment , so they keepe the other nine . Herod heard Iohn Baptist gladly , untill hee toucht upon the keeping of his brother Phillips wife . Iudas was content to follow Christ , so he might b●are the bagge , and so long as hee could make best wages by his service ; but thirty pieces of silver mooved him to give his master the bagge , and to betray him . A man for judgement able to arbitrate and voide of exorbitant affections , which might expose him to partialitie or prejudice , no doubt is the fittest arbitratour . But if you aske me whereto this running discourse tends , I cannot answer you yet , it may bee you may answer your selfe hereafter . Internall moderation mixt with outward competency , is the onely supporter of true constancy . I had thought , integritie had made a man fit for arbitrament , not constancy , for constancy may be in courses unjust as well as just ; I presume , it proceeds from constant integrity , That content is little commendable that depends upon sufficiencie of estate , not onely competent , but more then competent . And to my thinking , even in the course of naturall morality , a vertuous condition should not depend upon outward things ; the exercise of vertue doth , I confesse , but not vertue it selfe . Bias his saying was , Omnia meo mecum porto : but wee are taught of a better Master , that , Godlinesse is great gaine with contentment , 1. Tim. 6. 6. and that the righteous cateth to the contentation of his minde , which is delivered without distinction of poore or rich , like as that which followeth , The belly of the wicked shall want : And that , a dinner of greene herbs , and love with it , is better Prov. 13. 25 Prov. 15. 17 then a stalled oxe with hatred and strife . The meanest Christian hath the love of God with him , who answereth to the joy of his heart ; and the most glorious King that ever was , professeth that , A good conscience is a continuall feast ; and David the father . Pro. 15. 15 a great conquerour , found no blessednesse in any temporall state , but in that which was incident to the meanest of his subjects , saying , Blessed is the man whose iniquitie is forgiven , and whose sinne is covered . Blessed is the man to whom the Psal. 32. 1. Lord imputeth no sinne , and in whose spirit there is no guile . The truth is , if our pretences depend upon outward things , they shall bee as fraile as those are mutable ; and who can give strength to resist the temptations of Satan but God ? As there is no being but from God , so no permanence of being but from God : & till the time of temptation a man is not known ; let the raine fall , and the flouds rise , and the winde beat upon the house , then it will appeare whether it were built upon the rock , or upon the sand . Wee know the Angells fell , wee know Adam fell ; and how vaine a thing is it to discourse of any naturall permanency in vertuous courses amongst naturall men that knew not God . By the way , your phrase of satisfying capacities is incongruous ; of satisfying desires wee usually heare , but of satisfying capacities I never read of but in your discourse . You proceed to discourse unto us of another roote of unconstancy , which you call contingency , which is a terme of art with you and your peculiar dialect : this roote you will have to be , the infinite capacitie of reasonable creatures , conceites or desires , within whose compasse their finite motions may become eccentricke and irregular , as it were a starre fixed in too wide a sphere . And this applyed to the fall of Angels , in whom wee finde a double change or alteration ; the one morall , to wit , a change from the state of integrity wherein they were created , into the state of sinne ; the second naturall , to wit , a change from a blessed state , into a wretched and damned condition ; the first change was their owne worke , as wherein they sinned ; the second , the worke of God whereby they were punished . Their inconstancie in not standing upright , but falling into sinne , is onely pertinent to the present purpose , and to enquire after the root of this , is to enquire after the cause of their fall . Now the cause hereof , as it is plaine , so if we please , we may as plainly expresse it ; for , as for their possibility to fall , that rose from the condition of their natures , being made by God free agents , and so accordingly , a law being given them by God , they might freely obey it , freely disobey it : what need wee straine our wits for obscure expression of so plaine a truth , as by referring it to the infinite capacitie of their conceits or desires , within whose compasse , their finite motions may become eccentricke and irregular ? What need we affect such perturbation of speech , in confounding conceits with desires , and placing finite motions within the compasse of desires , infinitely capacious ; which motions undoubtedly were their desires ( for they sinned questionlesse in desiring somewhat ) and comparing desires to spheres , and againe , desires to starres fixed in spheres , that so the sinne of Angels may be sinely phrasified , and called an excentrical motion ; thus in catching after a phrase , you obscure the sense of a sentence , which when all is well scanned , is but this , the root of the Angels fall was this , that he might commit an irregular motion , which might have beene done , although the capacity of his desire had not beene infinite , that is , though he had not affected the greatnesse of the divine Majesty ; for this I take to be the meaning , and yet this meaning is little congruous . For this infinite capacity you compare to a sphere too wide , and the finite motion you compare to a starre fixed in this sphere , and to it you ascribe the irregular motion , not to the sphere , and that very incongruously too ; for the finite motion of Angels you speake of , was their very sinne ; but the starre sixed in his sphere , is not his irregular motion . If ever Divinity and Philosophy have beene frayed out of their wits , by any mans discourse , it is your discourse that hath done this deed . You suppose the sinne of Angels consisted in affecting Majestie infinite , whereof , you say , he was more uncapable , then a whirrie of an Arposies saile . But how I pray you could such a thing be affected , without errour of judgement ? And was it possible that errour , and so Foule an errour of judgement could be in an Angell before his fall ? Should not so poena be prior culpa ? Hereupon it is that Scotus maintaines , there could be no affecting of any such thing , but onely complacentia simplex therein , not that he did affect it , well knowing it to bee a thing impossible . For my part , I doe as little like that simplex complacentia he speakes of .

No wise man ( in this state of our corruption ) will please himselfe , in conceiting himselfe to be a King , much lesse to be a God , but reckons of such fancies as most vaine and frivolous : let us leave unto Clownes such conceits , O if I were a King I would live like a Lord , I would eate fat beese , and glorry porridge , and have a whip should cry slash . Dic mihi si sieres tu Leo qualis eris . And what devise you should move all the rest of the mutineers to concurre with him in so unreasonable an affectation ? Doe you thinke the chiefe called in Scripture the Devill , did sinne in one thing , to wit , in affecting majestie insinite , and the rest , called his Angels , in another thing , to wit , in standing with him , and standing for him ? I should rather thinke their sin was one and the same : And I make no doubt but their sinne was pride . Sure I am , they were not subject to concupiscence of the flesh , or concupiscence of the eye , but to pride , spirits may bee subject as well as men . But wherein this pride manifested it selfe , that is a great mystery ; but if they did affect divine Majestie , I should thinke it was in a way whereby they were capable of it : and this is now revealed to be by hypostatizing . And there is no question but that God could hypostatize an Angell , and as many as he would , as well as man . But I doe not say that they did affect it ; I have no ground to conceive that any such thing entred into their thoughts . But as God tooke a course to put Adam and Eve to the triall of their obedience , so it is very likely God had a course to put the Angels to the trial of their obedience , which became a scandall to many of them , through pride and disdaine to be in subjection , not that they disdained to be in subjection unto God , but more likely to some inferiour nature , which was to be advanced to the throne of God . For as God made this visible world for the service of man , so God might withal reveale unto them what his purpose was , namely , to advance the nature of man unto his owne throne , so that all the Angels of God must worship him : Th●s I say might bee the rocke of offence to them , of any more fit then this , I cannot conceive .

As touching the roofe of mans unconstancy , you are nothing so curious , as about the Angels . But that curiosity of yours tended not to the discovering of any depth of truth , but meerly to the involving of a plaine truth , by most wilde expressions . The bitter fruit of Adams prevarication we all feele in a generall impotency unto that which is truly good , or to resist temptation unto sinne in a gracious manner . But yet I see no reason but a man may resist many a temptation , without grace , but not in a gracious manner . For what thinke you ? is it necessary that as often as the Devill tempts a man to incontinency , to murther , to theft , he should as often yeeld to the committing of any of these ? It is apparent that many naturall considerations may restraine us : but in a gracious manner , that is , in such a manner as is acceptable unto God , no man can resist any temptation unto sinne , without grace .

That maxime , Mora facilius moventur , hath no proportion in the case whereto you apply it , for it proceeds of the same individuals , such as Adam and his children are not ; yet by Adams yeelding unto sinne , through Satans temptation , all his posterity are made more prone to sinne , then any man in particular is made by the committing of any sinfull act . For a sinfull or vicious act , in ordinary course , hath no more power to habituate a mans inclination unto evill , then a vertuous action hath unto good : but farre greater is mans pronenesse unto sinne , since and through the fall of Adam , then by any vertuous action is our pronenesse unto good .

Touching your close , I say , to seeke our owne welfare with anothers harme , is not to seeke that which is good and right ; yet in some cases another mans harme may be sought , without any transgression . For undoubtedly the Iudge sinneth not in pronouncing the just sentence of condemnation upon a malefactor : no nor the Israelites neither , in robbing the Aegyptians ; nor Abraham , in going about to cut the throat of his owne innocent childe Isaac .

6. In the next place you discourse of the improvement of the force of temptations , which you say is wrought by inequality , partly of our naturall propensions , partly of the meanes which minister their severall contentments or annoyances . Herein you propose a distinction , but I doe not finde you very carefull to follow it , and make it appeare how you accommodate your selfe thereto . Great meanes of annoyances are apt to breed great feares , and feare is a strong passion hindering the course of reason , and of morall duty , according unto reason .

Peters confession of Christ at the very time when , and in the place where Christ was in his enemies hands that sought his death , might have hazarded his life ; and the consideration hereof , being suddenly put unto it , either to confesse him or deny him , surprized him with feare ; this feare exposed him to deny his master . Sir Gervas Elvas moved to give way to the poysoning of Sir Thomas Overbury , saw manifestly , that his refusall would have beene an occasion to bereave him of his Lieutenancy of the Tower , which he had bought with a great summe of money . This temptation prevailed with him : wee commonly say , The greater is the temptation , the lesse is the sin . So where small meanes of contentments are , the greater is the temptation to discontent , and to tast of the bitter fruits thereof . But I doe not finde that the particular instances following , doe any way savour of this member of your distinction . You seeme to keepe your selfe wholly to the prosecuting of inequality of naturall propensions ; yet not that neither with such congruity as might justly be expected . For first you prosecute the inequality of wealth and wit : Wit is a naturall faculty , I confesse , I never heard it called a naturall propension till now . But as for wealth , it is neither propension , nor faculty naturall , nor at all naturall . It is true , I confesse , that some mens wealth gets the start of wit , as he observed , that in a great audience sometimes said unto his auditors , When I behold your wealth , I wonder at your wit ; againe , when I behold your wit , I wonder at your wealth . I confesse willingly , that to abound in wealth , is to abound in temptations unto sinne ; that fulnesse of bread is reckoned among the sins of Sodome , Ezek. 16. Deut. 32. that when Jeshurun waxed fat , he spurned with the heele . But the temptations herehence arising , prevaile onely on them that want wit , is an observation I have not beene acquainted with before , neither am prone to beleeve it . I never read this laid to the charge of Sardanapalus of the Assyrians , or of Xerxes , who ( as I remember ) it was that proposed a reward to him that could invent a new pleasure ; nor to Heliogabalus ; among the Romane Emperours Nero was luxurious enough , I never heard it proceeded from want of wit , for the first quinquennium of his reigne hee manifested himselfe to bee no foole : Hercules servivit Omphale , was it for want of wit ? That the Merchants sonne of whom it is reported , that in one night at Venice he spent sive hundred pounds upon his five senses , had his honesty beene answerable to his wit , he had kept his reputation with the best . And the Gentleman of the house of the Vaineys , that in most luxurious manner wasted his estate and afterwards turned Turke , I never heard defamed for want of wit . Yet we commonly say , many men have good wits , but they are in fooles keeping . And indeed a foole in Solomons computation doth usually stand for a knave . And it is most true , that such are most unwise , as appeares by the issue ; for by such courses they shorten their dayes , and send themselves with precipitation unto their graves , there to grow greene before their heads bee gray ; and after they are gone , their remembrance rots , and they leave a very ill savour behinde them .

But I should thinke , that dull fellowes are neither so inventious of mad courses , nor of so active spirits to prosecute them , as those whom God hath endued with better parts of understanding . I grant men of great wits have not alwaies revenues answerable : But I should thinke it is their pride , rather then their wit , that instigates them to injurious courses . For when men cannot subject their minds unto their fortunes but labour to carve unto themselves fortunes answerable to their mindes , this must needs expose them to lewd courses . Yet a good wit , I confesse , to maintaine a bad cause , may animate some more to molest and vexe , and it is not the greatnes of revenues will free them from such exorbitant courses . Though mens bodies overgrow their soules , yet if they have not a spirit answerable , they will prove but lubbers , though great lubbers , as great as Gog-Magog , whom Corineus met withall at Dover , when that great lubber like a timber log came tumbling topsie turvie , over and over . And it is a common saying , that a short man needs not a stoole to give a great lubber a box in the eare : though he that is weake had neede to be witty , yet it is not alwaies true , or for the most part , that weake persons are wily : and where wilinesse is found , it is a temptation strong enough without weaknesse , to move men to practise unlawfull policy , where grace is wanting . But to say that wilinesse shelters it selfe with craft , is as much as to say , it shelters it selfe with it selfe ; and if the distinction be put betweene the disposition of wilinesse that is within , and wily crafty courses without , well , something else , to wit , mens private reaches and ends may be said to be sheltred hereby , yet wilines cannot . For like as wisdome is not sheltered , but rather discovered & laid open by wise courses , & folly by foolish courses , so also wilines & craftines , by wily and crafty courses . I see no reason to justifie that saying , men love their wits more strongly , when they perceive them set upon that which in it selfe is good . And I give a reason for my negation , though you give none for your affirmation ; for the more convenient the object is unto the appetite , the more strongly doth the appetite affect it ; and the more convenient things are unto us , the more wee love our selves for affecting them . Now it is manifest that luxurious objects are more convenient to a luxurious appetite , then objects temperate ; and avaritious courses more convenient to the appetite of an avaricious person , then courses of liberality ; and generally to all men in the state of corruption , the pleasures of sinne are more gratefull then the pleasure of righteous courses . Nay , a man regenerate may for good reason seeme not to be so strongly caried in his affections unto good , as the wicked are in their affections unto evill ; my reason is , because in the regenerate there dwels a flesh lusting against the Gal. 5. 23. spirit , which remits and qualifies the fervour of his affection unto good : whereas on the contrary , in the wicked there is found no spirit lusting against the flesh , to remit or qualifie the fervour or fury , rather of their affection unto evill ; especially when they are fitted with most convenient objects to allure them .

Againe , to doe good to the poore , is not good in it selfe ( as you suppose , ) we were wont to say in the Vniversity , that Omnis actio est bona aut mala propter circumstantias ; and as I remember , it was a saying of Bernard , that vaine-glory clotheth the poore as well as charity . And how can that bee a good will to the poore , that practiseth to coosen others for the gratifying of the poore ? ●o may hee be said to beare a good will to Paul , that robbeth Peter to pay Paul ; yet that which hee willeth is good to Paul , I confesse , but it is no good will to him that is such a pay master ; neither is it necessary it should proceed from any intention to satisfie Paul ; it may well proceed from other intentions . No man is bound in conscience to hinder any mans welfare , or his owne either , no nor the glory of God by ungodly courses ; no nor doth the obligation rest in generall , but it concludes in speciall , all good courses that lie in his power : so to tender it , a man is bound and not otherwise . You have discoursed of divers enormities , in the close you open the cause of them unto us , and of many other like and that you say is the infinite capacity of finite existence : this you say is the cause , not why such enormities are , but of the possibility of them . Now the possibility of such enormities is all one with the possibility of sin and transgression . Therefore the infinite capacitie of finite existence is the cause why sinne is possible . I thought it had beene satisfaction enough in this point , to conceive , that because wee are in subjection to a Lord , who can give us a law , and are free agents , therefore we may either obey a law given unto us , or transgresse it . And because , looke what is the cause why disobedience is possible , the same is the cause why obedience also is possible . It followeth , that the cause why obedience is possible , must be the infinite capacity of finite existence . And because by finite existence you meane a reasonable creature , your meaning a little more plaine is this , The reason why a man may sinne , or abstaine from sinne , is his infinite capacity . Wee say , it is the libertie of his will , being in subjection to a law which you cannot deny , nor any sober man : herehence it followeth , that this infinite capacitie you cant of , is but the libertie of mans will in subjection to the law of a superiour Lord . For man being free , may overcope , as you speake , that is , to expresse in a small and still voice , without thundring , or fire , or mightie winde , to doe that which he should not . And thus having attained to your plaine meaning , wee bid farewell to your mysticall expressions of so plaine a truth , by comparing this infinite capacity you speake of , to too wide a sphere , and finite motions , to a slarro fixed in that sphere , and thereby exposed to excentricall and irregular motions , which I think neither Copernicus , nor Ticho Brahe , were they alive , could well tell how to expound unto us , or to their selves either . We have enough in finding out the cause why sin is possible , as for the life and improvement of this possibility ( for so you are pleased to bestow the being , and life , and improvement upon it ) by the inequality of internall propensions , never fitly matching outward occurrences , that we reasonably well understand , and have discoursed thereof what wee thought fit , enough , if not more then enough .

7 At length you are come to the house it selfe of your present discourse , according to the title of this Chapter ; hitherto we have beene complementally entertained in the porch . But , in God , you say , there is no place for exorbitancy , hee being an incomprehensible sphere , which hath omnipotency for his axis , ubiquity for its center : if you had added , & nusquam for his circumference , the illustration , according to your former subtleties , had beene more compleat . We say , that God in doing what he will cannot sinne , because hee hath no superiour Lord to give him lawes , to binde him ; his owne wisdome alone can and doth direct him , and it becomes his wisedome to manifest his owne glorious nature ; and therefore whatsoever hee can doe , in case hee doth it , it shall be wisely done , for as much as his power therein is manifested . You had rather fetch the cause hereof from this , that his capacities cannot overcope , though the Angels did . One branch of being in him you say , cannot missway or overtop another : what your meaning is I know not , but looke unto it that you doe not contradict your selfe , in maintaining , that God can doe some things by his omnipotency , which yet cannot be wisely or justly done by him , which is as much as to say , that he can do that which is unjust . And if this bee not to acknowledge in God a possibility to overcope , I doe not know what is . To say that God possesseth all things that possibly he can desire to have , is to say , that hee possesseth nothing ; for it is impossible that God should desire to have any thing , for this implies a want of something belonging to the deitie . It is directly false and foule to say , that God is whatsoever possible can be ; for if it be true , then it ever was true , seeing this proposition depends not upon the revolution of time , and consequently , before the world was , it was true ; wherehence it will follow , that God is an Angell , a man , and every vile thing , as wee account them amongst the creatures : for all these were possible to be before the world was ; neither will it salve this foule sore , to say , that God is a man , or an oxe , infinitely , for he is no bodily substance at all , neither can any bodily substance be infinitely . We say , that God is all things eminently , whereby we meane no more then this , God is the cause of all things ; and better thus in plaine tearmes to expresse our meaning , then by affecting curious straines , and formes of expression to expose religion and the glory of our God to scorn & derision amongst atheists . God is of necessary being , and therefore of himselfe eternall , without beginning , and without end . To perfect himselfe , or to be greater or better then he is , is to suppose that he is imperfect , and not Optimus maximus , which is a thing impossible , and therefore not subject to , nor the object of Almighty power ; nay , it destroyes it , as one part of contradiction destroyes the other : for Almighty power were formally destroyed , if it were imperfect , or lesse then Almighty . Therfore all outward imployments are for the good of his creature , but how ? not as tending to the good of the creature as Gods end , but both his imployments for the creatures good , and the creatures themselves are for God and his glory . Hath not the Apostle expressed thus much , that both from him and for him are all things : and the Prophet also , God hath made all things for himselfe , even the wicked for the day of evill : and Rom. 11. last . Prov. 16. 4 August . de praedest . & gratia . that for good reason , as many hundred yeares ago hath beene acknowledged in these termes , Qui dedit esse , quo sine essent , habui potestatem . If Gods will to have creatures when they were not , was but the influence or working of his essentiall goodnesse , I pray what is his will to destroy them when they are ? The scripture tells us , that God worketh all things according to Eph. 1. 11. the counsel of his owne will ; so he did when he made the world , so he doth when he sets an end to any part of it , so he should if hee should set an end to all , and returne them to the gulfe of nothing from whence they came . It is false to say , that the continuance of being is desired by all , as the stampe of Gods goodnesse : for continuance of being was as much desired by those atheists that denied the creation , as by those Christians that doe believe it . And as for the making of the world , it is in holy Scripture ( the language of God ) attributed to the word of God , to the breath of God , to the wisedome of God , to the power of God , to the counsell of God ; but never , that I know , ascribed to the goodnesse of God . And it had need of explication , to shew how Gods goodnesse is communicated unto all , much more how it is communicated unto a stone ; yet the earth is filled with his goodnesse , in as much as God provides for every thing that which is good for it ; so that whatsoever we partake of for our comfort , wee call it Gods goodnesse , for as much as things which are good to us , are derived to us from God , and therein we have a taste of his goodnesse towards us , in that he doth good unto us . Your last position I have heretofore spoken of , and shewed the incongruity of it . That which is good , and that whereunto it is good , must be different ; but the entitie of any thing is not different from it selfe , and therefore it cannot be good unto it selfe , as you affirme .

8. God is 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 serus irarum , slow to wrath , even against sinners that dishonour him to his face . But to say hee is never swayed to sudden revenge , is a more bold assertion then sound . Did not Zimri and Cosbi perish in their incestuous act , and give up both lust and ghost together , without leisure to enjoy their sinne , much lesse respite for repentance ? Perhaps you will say their persons were formerly forborne , notwithstanding former sinnes , though the vengeance of God cannot be denied to be most sudden . So perished Herod in his pride , and Balthasar in his revellings , and the Israelites in the wildernesse ; while the meat was in their mouthes , and the delicate flesh of Quailes lay betweene their teeth , the heavy wrath of God came upon them , and before they could swallow their sweet morsels , sent them to the graves of lust to bee swallowed by them .

Againe , Sodome and Gomorrah were consumed with fire from heaven ; were not some children in their mothers wombs , some hanging at their mothers breasts , some newly come to the use of reason , all consumed to ashes , and made an example of Gods wrath , and suffered the vengeance of eternall fire , as Inde speaketh ? Here is no forbearance of divers particular persons : so it was in the daies of Noah , so shall it bee at the comming of the Sonne of man ; for while they shall say , peace and safetie , sudden destruction shall come upon them , as sorrow upon 〈◊〉 Thes. 5. 2 a woman in travaile , and they shall not escape .

The difference you make betweene man and God , I like well ; man by forbearance may bereave himselfe of power to execute vengeance , God cannot : and this is a good reason of his forbearance towards the verie reprobates ; but towards his elect , a power exercised in another kind , yet a power too , namely , to sanctifie the consideration of his forbearance , to bring them unto repentance ; as also a power to provide for satisfaction to be made for their sinnes , by the blood of his Sonne . A sentence related out of the booke of Wisedome . ch. 12. 15 , 16 , you say is canonicall , although the Author bee not ; a distinction that I never read nor heard of before . And if the truth of a sentence be sufficient to make it canonical , the canonicall Scriptures shal be multiplied unreasonably , not out of the book of Wisdome only , but out of the rest of the works of Philo the Iew , and Iosephus too , yea and out of Senecaes workes , and Plutarchs morals ; not to speake of Plato , and Aristotle , or your Plotinus . But let us consider this canonicall sentence you speake of and weigh the truth of it in the ballance of the Sanctuarie . I pray , wherein had our Saviour Christ and the Sonne of God deserved to be punished ? And did not God ( thinke you ) thinke it agreeable to his power to condemne him , notwithstanding his innocencie , and his fervent prayers to be delivered from that cup , but with submission to the will of his Father ? I pray consider the martyrdome of Gods Saints , were their punishments according to their deserts ? Nay , what thinke you ? is it not agreeable to Gods power to annihilate the holiest man that ever was ? yet wee doe not say that God condemnes any man , that hath not deserved to be punished , the Sonne of God and our Saviour onely excepted . But the desert of eternall death is not onely in sinne actuall , but in sinne originall also , which Pelagius did not say , Arminius doth not , whether you doe or no , I know not ; the latter clause , which is this , Because thou art the Prince of all , it maketh thee to be gracious to all , makes a shew to plead for universall grace , I cannot tell whether you licke your lips at this ; yet the author of the booke could not be ignorant what a difference , as touching the participation of his grace , God had put betweene the Iewes and the Gentiles , for , He had shewed his word unto Iacob , his statutes and ordinances unto Israel : But hee Psal. 147. 19. had not dealt so with every nation , neither had the Heathen knowledge of his lawes . And the Apostle , who undoubtedly was canonicall , to speake in your owne phrase , hath plainly professed , that God hath mercy on whom he will , and whom he will he hardeneth .

And as for the reason here used , drawne from this , that he is Lord of all , the Apostle himselfe taketh notice of it , but in a different manner , Rom. 10. 12. There is no difference between the Jew and the Grecian , for he that is Lord over all , is rich unto all that call upon him : and who are they that call upon him , but they that beleeve in him ? for it followeth , How can they call upon him in whom they have not beleeved ? Yet like as it is the part of parents , not onely to bring children forth , but after to provide for their bringing up : so God doth not onely make things , but also preserveth them : and for their preservation causeth the Sunne to shine , and his raine to fall , as well on the wicked as on the just ; alwaies provided that even this providence of God is to be dispensed of no other right , but meerly according to the good pleasure of his owne will . For what grace was shewed to infants , either unborne , or hanging at their mothers breasts , which perished in the flood , and in the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah by fire from heaven ? and therefore though there were sixscore thousand persons in Ninivie that could not discerne betweene the right hand and the left , and also much cattell , yet God was not bound to spare them . And can you doubt , but as many as these , if not in Sodome and Gomorra , yet at least , or rather many more , perished in Noahs flood . Yet by the way , this sparing of the Ninivites was but as touching salvation temporall , not spirituall .

You have but trifled a long time , now you beginne to bee serious , yet in little or no congruity to the theame ; you were more then halfe way over this chapter , before you came to intreat of Gods goodnesse , and now you come to inculcate it , not in the infinity or immutability of it , but in the generality of it unto all , as whereby he wils and desires indifferently the salvation of all . This is the voluntas antecedens that so many are enamoured with now adaies , and you as much as any , wherewith we are like to bee acquainted much more in your following chapters . And a chapter you have hereof expresly in your booke of Providence . But first you beat another bush where the bird is not ; onely it seemes to have a reach a farre off to something that is of kinne to it ; you demand , What lord would spoile his proper inheritance ? what Architect would disgrace his owne worke ? implying , that surely , God will not . Now if you had withall told us whom you do oppose in this , and in what particular point , wee might be the bolder to reply in knowing what to answer ; which now wee do not because of your concealements . All creatures are the works of God , which as by generation they are wrought , so by corruption they are defaced : What a beautifull piece of work was Absolom ? What a wise piece of worke was Salomon ? What a strong piece of worke was Samson ? yet these workes of God are all defaced . And the defacing of them is the worke of God undoubtedly , as well as the making of them . And no marvell , for when that worke , for which God hath appointed them , is at an end , to what end should hee continue them , considering that hee made them but for himselfe ? Nay , Kingdomes and Nations God hath raised , and made them glorious ; then againe , those glorious Kingdomes he hath defaced . Perhaps you will say , but the defacing of these is for sinne . Bee it so , yet God could set an end , both to kingdomes and to the whole world , though there were no sinne : for Gods well-being depends not upon his work , the world , as mans well-being depends upon his inheritance , yea , and upon the worke of his owne hands : for the master of it could have no comfortable habitation without an house , and every trades-man lives by his trade , and therefore it stands him upon not to deface his worke when he hath made it . Againe , onely reasonable creatures are capable of sinne , yet all other creatures are the workmanship of God , which he maketh and defaceth at his pleasure , without any prejudice to his wisedome or to his goodnesse . Yet there is another manner of defacing , and that is by damnation ; and herein I know no coulor of inveighing against any man , unlesse it be in the behalfe of infants , as many as perish in originall sinne ; wherein if it please you , or any man else , to shew your teeth , or hornes , wee will be nothing dismaid , by Gods assistance , but ready to encounter you . Yet there is another defacing , and that is by sinne ; so wee say the Devill and his Angels defaced themselves by their free and voluntary rebellion against God : so Adam defaced himselfe , by a voluntary and free action , hearkening to the voice of his wife ; and Eve to the voice of the Serpent ; each voluntarily and freely neglecting to hearken to the voice of God , and to maintaine the consideration thereof alwaies before their eyes . Thus every man , even the unregenerate , yea , and Devils themselves , doe still continue voluntarily and freely to sinne against God : so that this defacing is not the worke of God , but of the creature , it being a thing impossible that God should be the author of sinne , because it is impossible that he should doe any thing that hee ought not , of any thing in other manner then he ought . Againe , it is impossible that hee should omit any thing , or in anyother manner then he ought . And no other meanes can be devised to make any one become the author of sinne . But it is enough for you to propose your interrogatories at pleasure . And in the third place you bring in another interrogatory , different from all the rest , which is more sutable with your tenet ; for the delivery whereof in good time , you seem already to travaile in childebirth , and that is this , Who would leave a good foundation bare or naked , unlesse he be not able to reare it up without injustice . I professe I wondred a long time , to what purpose the last clause of this exception was pulled in by the eares ; for if a man want means to finish an house which he hath begun , though hee would be unjust , yet hath hee no certaintie to enable himselfe for the finishing of that worke hee hath begun . But by comparing it well with the sentence following , I seeme to spring your meaning . The foundation which God hath laid , is the creation of our reasonable natures , the finishing of this worke , is the adding of salvation , or an happy being to this naturall being . Thus to finish the worke in every one , it is the will and pleasure of God , by your profession . This in another Tract of yours , that yet hath not seene the light of the presse , you amplifie , and call it , A most earnest desire in God of the salvation of all , and every one , though he much desire it , is , as here you say , because he cannot do it without injustice . And why so ? Is it because they are sinners ? why , what then shall become of us all , seeing we are all sinners ? There be but two things that might be replyed , the one is , that though all have sinned , yet Christ hath satisfied for the sinnes of his elect , Rom. 8. 33. Who shall lay any thing to the charge of Gods elect , it is God that justifieth , who shall condemne us ? It is Christ which is dead , or rather risen againe , who is also at the right hand of God , and maketh request also for us . But I presume , this kinde of answer is no lettice for your lips , for that were to maintain , that God willeth the salvation of none but of his elect . 2. The other answer is , that though all are sinners , yet all doe not die in impenitencie . To this I reply . 1. That if Christ hath made satisfaction for all their sins , I see no reason why they should not be saved , notwithstanding their impenitencie : for , what justice can require , that damnation should bee suffered for those sinnes for which ful satisfaction is already made . 2. God could give them repentance , if it pleased him , as he gave to Israel , Act. 5. 31. Him hath God lift up with his right hand , to be a Prince and a Saviour , to give repentance unto Israel , and forgivenesse of sinnes . So then , Christ gives not onely forgivenesse of sinnes to them that repent , but hee it is that gives repentance it selfe also : These be no Cabalismes , but the plain testimonie of Gods word . And as to the Iewes , so to the Gentiles also , Act. 11. 19. When they heard this they held their peace , and glorified God , saying , Then hath God also to the Gentiles granted repentance unto life . And accordingly Saint Paul warnes Timothy , to cary himself gently towards them that are without , waiting the time , when God will give them repentance , that they may acknowledge the truth , and come to amendment out of the snare of the Devill , by whom they were led captive to doe his will . By this let every one judge what strength there is in your illation , when you say , Wheresoever God hath laid the one ( to wit naturall being , it is to all that rightly consider his wisedome , truth , and goodnesse , and assured pledge of his will and pleasure , to finish it with the other . Why the truth of God is directly against it , professing , that he hath mercy on whom he will , and heardeneth whom he will : and that the same word of God is , a savour of life unto life , to them that are saved ; hee doth not say , to them that are carefull to prepare themselves , and a savour of death unto death , unto them that perish , and a good savour unto God in both ; he doth not say , to them that do not prepare themselves . And by comparing that place with Act. 13. 48. it appeareth who the saved are , even those whom God hath ordained unto salvation ; for they believed , as there the Apostle professeth , as much as to say , the word preached was a savour of life unto life unto them , and wot you the reason hereof ? Why surely because they were ordained to salvation , like as Act. 2. 47. It is said that , God added to the Church day by day , such as should be saved . You might with as much modesty professe , that in as much as God hath made every man , It is an assured pledge of his will and pleasure , to give every man repentance , before he drops out of the world . Gods gifts are without repentance ; it is true of the gifts of sanctification , but it is as true , that God repented that he made man . That the current of Gods joyfull benificence can admit no intermission , is most untrue , for he dispenseth it freely , so he continueth it as freely ; For he worketh all things according to the counsell of his owne will , that is , nullo necessitatis obsequio , as Ambrose expoundeth it . Nay it doth admit intermission in this world . In the world to come , indeed , it shall admit no intermission , in this it doth , both in respect of blessings temporall , and in respect of motions spirituall . For as touching blessings temporall , God sheweth the back sometimes , and not the face , Ier. 18. 17. And as touching spirituall motions and consolations , what moved the Lord to cry out upon the crosse , My God , my God , why hast thou forsaken me , but the intermission of these ? It is true , sorrow to us hath no other originall then our own sinne , yet no sinne in Christ could be found to bee the originall of his sorrow . And though the woman , by reason of sinne , hath ever since conceived in sorrow , yet bruit beasts conceive in sorrow , notwithstanding that they are incapable of sinne . And albeit God be an ocean of joy yet the dispensation of joy unto creatures , is meerly according to the good pleasure of his will . And though all sorrow proceeds from sinne in the way of a meritorious cause ; yet all sorrow proceeds from God , in the way of an efficient cause . Hee is the great Iudge that inflicteth sorrow on some , as well as hee causeth joy to others .

9. The comparison is most absurd . For illumination proceeds from the Sunne , as from a naturall cause , working by necessity of nature ; but to say that God in such sort doth communicate ought , or send forth any influence ; is more Atheisticall then Christian. The devils belike have seeds of joy and happinesse , wherewith they were sowne in their first creation ; for undoubtedly they were capable of them before their fall , as well as the Angels of light . And all the influence that God sends forth , you say , is apt to cherish the seeds of joy and happinesse ; whence it followeth , that God at this day doth by his influence cherish the seeds of joy and happinesse in the verie Devils . And seeing Gods concurrence to the actions of men and Angels , is a part of that influence that proceeds from God , and one action of the Devils is their assurance that they are damned spirits , without hope of recovery ; in concurring to this assurance , God doth cherish the seeds of joy and happinesse in them . Besides this , with Devils and Men God affordeth his concourse to all their most sinfull actions , this your selfe have often acknowledged , and this concourse of his is a part of his influence , and no influence ( you say ) can proceed from him , but such as is apt to cherish the seeds of joy and happinesse , wherewith their natures were sowne in their creation . Therefore this concourse of God also to their sinfull actions , doth cherish the seeds of joy and happinesse in reprobate men and Angels also .

Now proceed we along with you : God , you say , doth inspire all that are conformable to his will , with desire of doing to others that which he hath done to them . This is a bone very well worth the picking . I am perswaded many a sweet morsell will be found about it . You doe not tell us that God doth inspire any man with a conformity to his will , but as many as are conformable to his will , hee inspires with other good desires ; whence I pray then comes conformity to his will , if not from the inspiration of God ? doe you make conformity to Gods will to bee the inspiration of the flesh ? For I presume you make it not an inspiration of the world , or of the devill . Yet S. Paul saith , that it is God that worketh in us both the will and Phil. 2. 13. the deed , not by any necessary emanation , as light issueth from the Sunne , but according to his owne good pleasure . Againe , this very desire of doing others good , is it not a part of our conformity to the will of God ? Now if God inspire us with one part of conformity to Gods will , why not also with another ? And so why may we not runne over all parts of conformity to the will of God , and finde as good cause to ascribe them all to the inspiration of God , as the cause of them ? The mystery of your meaning in this , the next sentence serves as a key to open , when you say , that such as wilfully strive against the stream of his over-flowing goodnesse , or boisterously counterblast the sweet and placid spirations of celestiall influence , become creators of their owne woe , and raise unto themselves those stormes wherein they perish . So then Gods influence is to all , like as the light of the Sunne ; onely the difference ariseth herehence , that some resist it , others yeeld unto it . As good Arminianisme and Pelagianisme as ever dropt from the mouth or pen of Arminius or Pelagius himselfe . So then it is not God , that ex nolentibus volentes facit , but mans free will . And in spight of St. Paul it shall be volentis & currentis , and not miserentis Dei. For these spirations you speake of , can be no other then exhortations , Rom. 9. whereunto some yeeld , and some resist . And I pray , who deserves to be accounted the author of my faith , the author of my repentance ? he that exhorteth me hereunto , or rather I my selfe , that doe beleeve , and doe repent , though upon anothers exhortations ? For exhortation may thus farre bee performed by a reprobate : for such plead at the day of judgement , Have we not prophesied in thy name ? and S. Paul observed , that some preached Christ not chastly , but upon pretence , Phil. 1. and that with foule intentions , even to adde affliction to Pauls bonds ; yet howsoever he rejoyced in this , that Christ was preached , which hee would never have done , if by their preaching none were likely to be brought over to Christ by faith and repentance .

Againe , to inspire them with good desires , and with conformity to Gods will , this is no other in your language , then to exhort them hereunto . And thus it is that God workes in us both the will and the deed , according to his good pleasure . Now this speech bewrayeth you as much as ever Peters speech bewrayed him ; but with this difference , Peters speech bewrayed him to be a follower of Christ , but your speech bewrayeth you to be a follower of Pelagius , and as like him as if you were spit out of his mouth ; for thus did Pelagius discourse , Operatur Deus in nobis velle quod bonum est , velle quod sanctum est , dum nos terrenis cupiditatibus deditos futurae gloriae Aug. lib. 1. de gratia Dei , contr. Pelag. cap. 10. magnitudine & premiorum pollicitatione succendit , dum revelatione sapientiae , in desiderium Dei stupentem suscitat voluntatem , dum nobis suadet omnem quod bonum est . Now see to what acknowledgement of grace Austin putteth him , if so be he will be a true Christian. Nos eam gratiam volumus , isti aliquando Ibid. cap. 11. fateantur qua futurae gloriae magnitudo non solum promittitur , verumetiam creditur & speratnr , nec solum reveletur sapientia , verumetiam & amatur , nec suadetur solum omne quod bonum est , verumetiam persuadetur . Hanc debet Pelagius gratiam consiteri si vult non mod● videri , sed esse Christianus . Now what followeth upon this your doctrine touching the nature of election , namely , that it must bee upon the foresight of mens obedience to Gods exhortations and perswasions , which here you call placid inspirations . Now because God exhorts us to faith , repentance , and all manner of good workes , the foresight of our obedience hereunto must bee it whereupon our election must depend , and so you are ready to shake hands with the Apostle , not of fellowship , but to bid him adieu , as who plainly professeth , that Election is not of workes , but of God that Rom. 9. calleth us ; and he proves it by this , that before they had done either good or evill , Iacob was elected , and Esau reprobated , which must exclude not only the pre-existence of works , but the pre-consideration of them ; otherwise hee could not therehence conclude that election is not of workes ; and the circumstance of not being as yet borne doth evidently exclude as well faith , as good workes . For a man unborne is as unable to beleeve , as to performe any other worke . And notwithstanding this foule injury , you offer unto God in robbing him so shamefully of the glory of his grace , and absolute prerogative to dispose of his creatures as he thinkes good , in making whom he will vessels of mercy , and whom hee will vessels of wrath , yet you thinke to pacifie him with an hungry , base , and meere verball amplification of the streames of his goodnesse , the issue whereof is to injurie him afresh in like manner , by robbing him , and adorning man with the spoiles of his glory . For increase of joy and happinesse shall be , you say , unto a man from the streames of life , proceeding from God as a fountaine of life , provided that man gives free passage to their current . And what is this current , but Gods spirations formerly mentioned , whereby he exhorts us to profit by the examples of his judgements on others , and also to patience when we are injuried by others . Now if we doe ye●ld to this , and doe profit by the consideration of Gods judgements upon others , and doe patiently beare the wrongs that are done us by others , then increase of joy and happinesse shall be unto us from the fountaine of goodnesse , who as he hath some streames of life , whereby hee exhorts us unto that which is good ; so he hath other streames of life and happinesse , wherewith he rewards us for our obedience : so that whatsoever shew you make of honouring God , the issue is to bestow all the honour upon the obedience of man . So that the amends you make herein for former injuries , is as if a man having given his neighbour a box in the eare , should make shew of making him amends by kinde stroaking of him , and in stead of stroaking him , give him another box in the eare , Thus Ioab tooke Amaza by the beard as though hee would have kissed him , but , indeed , stabd him to the heart . You are willing to make God the author of glory , but by no means can you be brought to acknowledge him the author , but onely the orator of grace : like to the Panims , who were wont to say , Det vitam , det opes , animum mihi ipse parabo . You are given so much to painting , that it is a hard matter to discerne the native countenance of your discourse , the proper face of your meaning . What meane you by the current of life ? Is it a gracious current , or a glorious current ? if gracious , that is the same with spirations before spoken of , and these are exhortations and perswasions . But how I pray do● these when they are refused by some , the more overflow to others ? They that heare the same Sermon , have never a whit the more for others resisting it ; they that heare it not , have no part of it , though all resist it . As for the currrent of glory , how hath any man the more , for that others are wholly deprived of it ? yet it is true , that even the reprobation and damnation of some , tends to the increase of glory to the elect , in contemplation of the mercy of God towards them in comparison of others , and of the sorrowes from which God hath freed them , as both the Apostle signifies , Rom. 9. 22. And is maintained both by Didacus Alvares , and Alphonsus Mendosa . But I doe not finde you have any such meaning . But when you have taken up a metaphor by the end , you play upon it , and make as good musicke with it as pigges doe , in playing upon Organs .

What are the miseries which wicked spirits suffer , are unknowne to us ; we reade that they beleeve and tremble , Iam. 2. that they are kept in chaines to the judgement of the great Iude 6. Mat. 8. 29. day . They aske our Saviour whether he be come to torment them before their time ; they pray him not to send them into the deepe . And therefore a man may very well be ignorant of Luc. 8. 31. any good which their miseries work upon us , seeing that their miseries are so unknowne unto us .

Yet as conceiving your selfe to have beene somewhat free in●venting somewhat , which alas is but a vaine ostentation of some momentous matter , which hath no moment at all in it ; you demand whether God may yet inspire these castawayes with mischievous thoughts , seeing their mischievous thoughts worke for our good . A very vaine objection ; as if the devill and his Angels had need of any prompting unto villany , or as if prompting unto villany were fit to bee called inspiration , which is never used , but either in the way of prophecy , or in the way of some gracious suggestion . Yet as touching any thought or action of Satan , your selfe dare not deny Gods concourse to the substance of the action ; and as for the manner of concourse , we are willing to undergoe with you , or any man else that breathes , any scholasticall discourse or inquisition hereupon : as whether the will of the creature determines the will of his Creator , or whether the will of the Creator determines the will of the creature rather .

As touching the evill it selfe , whether from our opinion can be inferred any more then this , that Gods will is it shall come to passe by his permission ; and whether we cannot shew better reason for this our tenet , then you or any man else for the contrary . As for the intending of the creatures woe and miserie , as occasions or meanes of Gods glory , what sober man can doubt but that God is the efficient cause of their woe and miserie , as it signifies the misery of punishment , and in inflicting punishment on transgressors , undoubtedly hee doth advance the glory of his justice , yea and the glory of his Saints also , who may see in others sufferings , what might have beene their portion , if God had shewed no more grace unto them then unto others , and hereupon have cause to be so much the more ravished with the contemplation of Gods goodnesse toward them . As for the miserie of sinne , be the sinne as great as the crucifying of Christ , God determined it should be done , Act. 4. be it as great as the Kings giving their kingdome to the beast , little lesse then the giving of their kingdomes to the devill , yet God it is that hath put into their hearts to doe his will even in this also : and even this undoubtedly shall redound to the glory of God , and the good of his elect . For Rev. 17. 17 2 Cor. 11. 19. both heresies must be , that they which are approved may bee manifested , and God raiseth tyrants up , to exercise the patience of his children , yea their own sinnes redound to the profit of Gods elect . Utile est superbis in aliquod apertum manifestamque cadere peccatum . But hereupon to make use of that August . de civ . Dei , l. 14. cap. 13. maxime , Gods will is the rule of goodnesse , is most absurd ; for the rule of goodnesse is Gods will of commandement ; but the will of God , that signifieth his determination to have this or that come to passe , is farre different : neither I hope will you make question , in case God willeth any thing to come to passe , whether God doth well in willing it ; though that which hee willeth or determineth bee the crucifying of Christ Iesus .

As for the will of commandement , that is onely the will of God touching what is our duty to doe , or to leave undone , and accordingly called voluntas approbans , for certainly he approves obedience unto his will , in whatsoever he injoyneth us : yet this wide leape hath cast your meditations upon this point , to enquire forsooth whether Gods will bee the rule of goodnesse . But as you have entred upon it without distinction of will and will , so you carrie your selfe therein with miserable confusion .

CHAP. XIII .

In what sense , or how Gods infinite will is said to bee the rule of goodnesse .

THe question was never before ( that I know ) proposed in this manner , viz. of Gods infinite wil , but only of Gods will . The Heathens painted Iustice as an assistant of Iupiter . Anaxarchus to comfort Alexander , cast downe with conscience of his foule fact , inmurthering his deare friend Clitus , deviseth an interpretation of this pageant , sutable and serviceable to the consolation of Alexander ; and that was this , Iupiters actions must alwaies be esteemed just . So saith the great Monarchs who are Gods on earth , their actions must bee accounted just . Anaxarchus is censured by Arrian , and justly , for his grosse flattery in the application of this unto Kings on earth , who , it is well knowne , may degenerate into tyrants . But I hope you will not dislike this interpretation as applied unto God : you will not make question , I trow , whether God be righteous in all his waies , and holy in all his workes , much lesse deny it , although he commanded Abraham to sacrifice his sonne , allowed Samson to sacrifice himselfe , the Israelites to rob the Egyptians ; though he send an evill spirit betweene Abimelech and the men of Shechem ; though hee put a lying spirit in the mouthes of all Ahabs Prophets , to seduce the King , and to perswade him to goe up against Ramoth Gilead , that he may fall there ; though he sends to Pharaoh a commandement to let Israel goe , yet tels Moses hee will harden Pharaohs heart that he shall not let Israel goe ; though that worke of the rending of the ten Tribes from the two , comprehending the defection of people from their lawfull King , he by open protestation takes unto himselfe as his own work ; like as touching the defiling of Davids concubines , he telleth David to his face , that he would doe this openly , saying , I will take thy wives from thee , and give them to thy neighbour , and he shall lye with them in the sight of the Sunne .

2. Your comparison of Gods power with his goodnesse , I doe not much mislike ; onely your comparing of him with Monarchs in goodnesse , is not so fit ; for alas what prerogative have they of goodnesse above other men ? They are to bee borne withall , though they are not so good as others , because they are exposed to greater temptations then others , and the greater is the temptation , the lesse is the sinne . No great commendation to exceed Sardanapalus , or Heliogabalus in goodnesse ; yet wee know there is a great deale of difference betweene the goodnesse of God , and the goodnesse of man in the course thereof : for mans goodnesse in the exercise thereof , is subordinate to a law , and they are bound to exercise it towards all : Gods goodnesse is of no such condition , nothing could binde him to the making of the world , or to the making of any creature at all . They being made , hee exerciseth his goodnes towards whom he will : for though in the course of his naturall providence he causeth his Sun to shine , and his raine to fall both upon the just and unjust ; yet as touching the dispensation of his chiefest blessings , his spirituall blessings in heavenly things , he hath mercy on whom he will , yea and whom he will he hardeneth also . And though ordinarily all Rom. 9. 18 are partakers of his temporall blessings , yet sometimes he puts a great difference even in the communication of them also . Am. 9. 7. I have withheld the raine from you , when there were yet three weekes to the harvest , and caused it to raine upon one Citie , and caused it not to raine upon another Citie ; one piece was rained upon , and the piece whereon it rained not , withered . Some dye in their mothers wombe , some hanging at their mothers breasts , some after a long time are consumed with a lingring death : Rom. 9. 13 In 1. disp. 85. & 8● . In opusc . de instit. commut . sect. 2. num 36. neither is Gods love in Scripture phrase enlarged towards any save towards his elect . Thus Iacob was loved , but Esau hated .

Againe , what justice doe you devise in God towards his creature ? Both Vasquez and Suarez concurre in this , that the justice of God towards man doth alwaies presuppose his will , and God may binde himselfe as he pleaseth by promise . But Gods will ( you say ) is not the rule of goodnesse , because the designes thereof are backt with infinite power . Your theame was to prove , that Gods will is not the rule of goodnesse , when you come to prove it , you prove nothing lesse , but onely that the cause why Gods will is not the rule of goodnesse , is not , for that his designes are backt with infinite power . This is not to disprove Gods will to be the rule of goodnesse , but rather to confirme it , for , in saying that this or that is not the cause why Gods will is the rule of goodnesse , you doe imply , that you maintaine , that his will is the rule of goodnesse , though not for this cause . Perhaps you may say , They which maintaine Gods will to be the rule of Gods goodnesse , doe maintaine it upon no other ground then this , to wit , Because his designes are backt with infinite power .

But had it beene so , you might have fallen directly upon the overthrowing of such a foundation , without carrying it in such a manner as if you would beare the world in hand , that your selfe in some sort hold Gods will to bee the rule of goodnesse , whereas you mean nothing lesse ; and therefore in carying your discourse after this manner , you betray a faint heart in maintaining the maine . Secondly , I say it is incredible that any should maintaine Gods will to bee the rule of goodnesse , for this cause , because his designes are backt with infinite power , as much as to say , because God can doe what hee will . This reason carieth no colour of truth with it ; for there is no reason why amongst men , they that can doe what they will in comparison to other men , should therefore bee honester men then other . But because God hath infinite lawfull power , that extends to every thing that implies no contradiction , hence it followeth , that whatsoever God doth is good ; and whatsoever God can doe , if it were done by him , it should justly be done , otherwise hee should have power to be unjust ; which power ( in this case ) should either be in vain , because it is not possible that ever it should be actuated , or if actuated , God should be unjust . Holinesse ( you say ) doth so rule his power and moderate his will , that the one cannot enjoyne , or the other exact any thing , not most consonant to the eternall or abstract patterns of equitie . You take great liberty of discourse throughout . What I pray , according to our understandings is the subject of Gods holinesse ? is it not his will ? And how can his holinesse worke upon his will ? Doth the heat of fire worke upon the fire ? or the cold of water worke upon the water ? Againe , here wee have power and will distinguished , and the act of injoyning attributed to the one , and exacting to the other . Both are acts of command : now I pray consider , doth Gods power command ? I had thought imperium had beene the proper prerogative of the will , yet both these , by your discourse , are in subjection to the eternall patterns of equity ; and equity before you confounded with justice . Now I know no such justice in God , different from his wisedome . And herein I am of the same minde with Aquinas , Quest. 23. De voluntate Dei , Art. 6. where hee disputeth this question , Utrum justitia in rebus creatis ex simplici divina voluntate dependeat . And there hee professeth , that Primum ex quo pendet ratio omnis justitiae est sapientia divini intellectus qua res constituit in debita proportione , & ad se invicem , & ad suam causam . Now let any man name any thing that God can doe , and then let him answer me whether God bee not as well able by the infinitie of his wisedome to doe it wisely , as by the infinity of his power to doe it at all . And marke what in the same place ( where he seems most to favour your present Tenet ) Aquinas professeth , Quamvis in nobis sit aliud intellectus , & voluntas secundum rem & pro hoc nec idem , est voluntas & rectitudo voluntatis : Deo tamen est idem secundum rein intellectus , & voluntas , & propter hoc est idem rectitudo voluntatis , & ipsa voluntas . Although in us the understanding is one thing , and the will really another thing , whence it is that our will , and the rectitude of our will is not the same , yet seeing that in God , the understanding and the will are really the same , hence it is , that in God his will , and the rectitude of his will are all one . But be it that his will is consonant to the eternall or abstract paternes of equitie , I pray , what more eternall and abstract paterne of equity then this , that it is lawfull for God to make the world , if he will , and not to make it if he will ; yea , and to doe what he will , and leave undone what he will . I hope the will of God revealed , doth as sufficiently warrant all our actions , if things are therefore good because God wils them , as in case because they are good therefore God willeth them . Now the former of these is true , without all question , in most things ; for whether the world had beene made sooner or later , bigger or lesser , more Angels or lesse , more spheres or lesse , whether they had moved this way they doe , or the contrary way ; whether they should have continued longer or shorter time then they shall , all had been received as the good course of Gods providence equally as now it is . But here you passe to a point of a farre different nature ; for it is one thing to enquire whether Gods will be the rule of goodnesse in this sense , whether whatsoever God brings to passe in the world , is therefore good because God hath done it , and a farre different thing to demand , whether Gods will be the rule of goodnesse in this sense , that whatsoever God commands us in his word ( for so I understand you when you speake of Gods revealed will ) it is therefore good because God commandeth it . And I give a manifest reason of this difference , for before the revelation of Gods word , and without that , all men naturally are able to discerne between good and evill , they knew impiety , idolatry , profane swearing , perjury , irreligiousnesse , contempt of government , murder , uncleannesse , gluttony , drunkennesse , theft , oppression , extortion , lying , to be evill , and the contrary to these to be good , by the light of nature , and suggestion of conscience , there being a law of good and evill written in the hearts of all , their conscience bearing witnesse , and their thoughts accusing , or excusing , Rom. 2. 14. 15. And therefore it is false to say , that wee know this or that to be good , because Gods will revealed commends it to be such For undoubtedly , in most points of morality , wee know this to be good , and that to bee evill , without the revealed will of God , and by the very light of nature . Neither doth it follow , that because God willeth nothing but that which is just and good , therefore justice and goodnesse are the objects of his will ; first , because wee have heard out of Aquinas , that Gods wisedome is his justice : secondly , it is absurd to say , that justice , goodnesse , or wisedome are the objects of his will . Againe , if the goodnesse of Gods will consists in willing that which is good and just , to wit , in things that are to be done by man , then the rectitude of Gods will shall accrue to him from without , and shall not bee essentiall unto him , like as the rectitude of mans will , which is disproved by Aquinas in the place before alledged . Whereas you say , unlesse this or that had beene good , God had not willed it , this may admit such an interpretation as nothing serves your turne ; for the wisedome of God may represent this or that to bee good , that is , such as is sit to be done in the way of congruity , so that if it be done it shall be done congruously , yet not to bee good , so as it ought to be done in the way of necessity . Nay , marke what Bradwardine professeth , suppose the wisedome of God shall represent this to be more congruous to be done then that , yet is not God hereby bound to preferre the doing of that before this . Ratio praeponderans est , qua dictat quod melius esset facere hoc quam illud , vel quod melius est , hoc facere Bradward . lib. 1. cap. 22. quam dimittere , & talis ratio non movet , nec concludit voluntati divinae , nec eam determinat ad agendum . Posset enim Deus facere meliora quam facit & multa bona quae non facit . And concludes Homini tutum est semper ut conformet voluntatem suam rationi praeponderanti . Deus autem non potest sequi per omnia rationem praeponderantem , nisi faceret omnia possibilia , & horum quod libet infinitum , quod contradictionem includit . Sufficit igitur sibi in talibus pro ratione , voluntas , vel saltem ratio congruens & concomitans praelaxata . Yet the will of God is alwaies reasonable : but marke what is the ground of this denomination , according to Aquinas , in 1. Quest. 19. Art. 5. Ad. 1. Voluntas Dei rationabilis est , non quod aliquid , sit Deo causa volendi sed in quantum vult unum esse propter aliud . Yet you would make the world beleeve that you fetch your divinitie from the fountaine , they that thinke otherwise never taste it but in trenches , yet where have you hitherto discovered the fountaine from whence you take it ?

3 You proceed to free your tenet from exceptions ; but alas , you propose but one exception , and that a poore one , Seeing no thing can be without Gods will , what can be good before God wills it ? And your answer is by concession , That goodnesse actually existent in the creature , cannot be without some precedent act of Gods will , as much as to say , this exception is nothing to the purpose : and so you undertake to free your Tenet onely from such exceptions as are nothing to the purpose . Now as touching goodnesse actually existent in God himselfe , doth that depend meerly upon the will of God , or at all upon the will of God ? The manifestation of it , or the exercise of it depends meerly upon the will of God , for as much as this is performed onely by outward workes , and God might have chosen whether hee would have made the world , or any part of it , yea , or no. But as for Gods goodnesse , we that tast of divinity but in trenches , acknowledge , that the being thereof is as necessary as the being of God himselfe , and depends not at all upon the liberty of Gods will : There is , you say , a goodnesse objective precedent in order of nature to the act or exercise of Gods will . What I pray ? Is it any such as bindes God to the willing of any outward thing ? take heed what you say , lest you fall into Atheisme by making God a necessary agent , or that he was bound in the way of justice to make the world : whence it followeth , that the world was everlasting . Yet this goodnesse which you make the object of Gods will , savoureth of ditch water rather then of spring water ; for it is brought by you , as that which sheweth Gods will , what is to be done . But every novice knowes , it belongs not to goodnesse to give direction , but to wisedome rather : and therefore Aquinas , as I shewed before , makes that whereupon depends the reason of all justice to be the wisedome of Gods understanding . And I grant willingly , that the direction of wisedome in God precedeth the operation of his will in order of nature , according to that of Aug. alledged by Bradw . out of his answer to the 7. question of Orosius . In Deo praeire voluntas sapientiam non potest , ergo prius est rationabiliter sapere , qaam rationabiliter velle . Yet neither the wisedome of God shall determine his will , unlesse it doth so direct , as to shew that this or that ought to be done ▪ For if it doth onely direct by shewing what is fit to be done , and of many courses which Gods wisedome can devise sit to be taken , if it be left indifferent to Gods will to choose or refuse what hee list , it is apparent , that though before God choose , it was fit to be done , like as many other courses were also , yet no necessity why God should preferre this before an other : sure I am you have proved no such thing hitherunto , neither out of the fountaine , nor out of the trenches . Intellectus divinus ( saith one ) singulos modos operandorum possibiles circa creaturas considerat , & omnes voluntati proponit ut libere quem voluerit exequi eligat , Henrie . quodlib . 8. Quest. 1. Aquinas professeth , that whatsoever God is able to doe , that also hee can wisely doe , in 1. Quest. 25. Art. 5. in Corp. Divina sapientia totum posse potentia comprehendit . And again professeth , that the order of things in the government of this world , doth not adequate the wisedome of God ; as much as to say , hee could have brought forth a world , and the dispensation of his providence in as wise a manner as hee hath shewed in this : his words are these , Ordo divinae sapientiae rebus inditus in quo ratio Aquin. de voluntate Dei . q. 25. 〈◊〉 . 5. justitiae consistit : non adaequat divinam sapientiam . sic , ut divina sapientia limitetur ad hunc ordinem . And he proves it thus , Tota ratio ordinis quem sapiens rebus à se factis imponit à fine sumitur . Quando igitur sinis est proportionatus rebus propter finem factis sapientia facientis limitatur ad aliquem determinatum ordinem . Sed divina bonitas est sinis improportionabiliter excedens res creatas : unde divina sapientia non determinatur ad aliquem ordinem rerum , ita ut non possit alius cursus rerum ess●uere . Scotus in like 1. Dist. 44. 〈◊〉 . unica . sort , Nulla lex est recta nisi quatenus à voluntate divina acceptante statuta . And he gives this instance of his assertion , Omnis peccator finalis , damnabitur : quis autem dubitat Deum de potentia absoluta potuisse peccatorem non damnare , sed annihilare ? See also what Iohn Gerson saith to the same purpose , Deus non ideo vult res ad extra fieri , quia bonae sunt , quemadmodum movetur humana voluntas , ex objectione boni veri , vel apparentis : Est è contra potius , quod ideo res ad extra bonae sunt , quia Deus vult eas tales esse ; adeo quod si vellet eas vel non esse vel aliter esse , id quoque jam bonum esset , propterea benè enuntiavit magnus Ambrosius post Basilium quod voluntas divina naturae primaria lex est . Yet of these you may say that they are but trenches . Although your selfe hath hitherto brought nothing for your assertion , either out of fountaine or trench , save onely out of your owne braine , which may be the fountaine of your invention , and yet inferiour to these trenches . But come we to the fountaine , God is said to worke all things according to the counsell of Eph. 1. 11. Eccles. pol. lib. 1. his owne will . Mr. Hooker passeth his censure upon those Divines that referre all the reason of justice to the will of God . Calvin belike is one of those divines whom hee in his reprehension reacheth at ; who in his Institutions hath these words , Adeo summa est justitiae regula Dei voluntas , ut quicquid vult , eo ipso quod vult , justum habendum . Yet Calvin saith not , that in this respect it is just ; but onely that in this respect it ought to be received as just . But Mr. Hooker , though he acknowledgeth that there is a law of divine actions , yet he professeth that this law is to be resolved into the will of God , which is somewhat more then Calvin professeth , and as much as Perkins Perk. de praedest . mod. & ord. . 2. professeth , when he saith , Nothing is just to God before it be willed by him , hee speakes in respect of things to be done by him , and not of that justice which is called by the Schoolmen , Justitia condecentiae , which dictateth what may conveniently be done . For certainly , if a thing might not conveniently be done , God would never have done it : but he speaks of justitia obligationis , justice that bindes to the doing of it ; and maintains , that nothing bindes God to the doing of it , but onely his owne will and determination . And in this sense have I elsewhere justified Mr. Perkins against Arminius . But as for Calvins saying , when hee professeth , that whatsoever God willeth must bee received of us as just , is a most temperate speech . And to what purpose should we trouble our selves to look any further , and to enquire after the reason of it . Whereas we are given to understand , that of the wisedome and knowledge of God there is such a depth as is unsoundable , O the depth of the riches of the wisedome and knowledge of God ; how unsearchable Rom. 11. 33 are his judgements , and his waies past finding out ? But upon the matter , we may easily perceive how little difference there is betweene Mr. Hooker and others , when hee professeth , that though this counsell of Gods will , according whereunto he worketh all things , doth signifie a law of divine actions , yet withall , such a law as is resolved into the will of God . Againe consider , how is it called the counsell of Gods will ? not of Gods will giving counsell , for that belongs to the understanding ; but of Gods will accepting the counsell proposed ; and if many wise courses are proposed ( as why should wee conceive that Gods infinite wisedome is limited to the devising of one course ) then the will doth freely accept one rather then another . And thus Suarez interpreteth it when ho saith , Non ita operatur Dei voluntas secundum consilium ejus , Suarez . relect . de lib. volunt . divin . disp. 1. ut omnino à consilio determinetur , sed potius ( si ita loqui liceat ) ut ipsa determinat consilium . In like sort Didacus Alvarez , though of a sect much opposite to the Iesuites , yet concurreth with Suarez in this exposition , Hic ut notavit Glossa , prius ponitur Alvar. de auxil lib. 2. disp. 17. consilium , quod pertinet ad intellectum , deinde additur voluntatis suae , Ubi significat quod intellectus divinus , seuscientia ejus , ut determinatur à voluntata est causa rerum . You that pretend to fetch your divinity from the fountaine , have not brought so much for proofe of your assertion as this place cometh unto ; it is enough for you to dictate and say , There is a goodnesse objective , precedent in order of nature to the act or exercise of his will . And yet I willingly confesse , it is so farre good , as that Gods wisedome doth represent it as a thing that decently and conveniently may be done ; but that of necessity it must be done , and that thus divine wisedome represents it , your selfe is so fat●e from proving this , that you doe not so much as take notice of this distinction . You proceed , and tell us positively , that Unto some things considered as possible , this goodnesse objective is so essentially annexed , that if it be his will to give them actuall being , they must of necessity be actually good , nor can he that can do all things , will their contraries . Never , I thinke , was so vulgar an assertion so much honoured , as to be brought in with such state and pompe . As if any Scholler did make question , whether Ens & bonum convertuntur ; or any sober man doubted , whether the works of God must needs be good . Whereas this is utterly beside the question : which is onely this , Whether because God willeth any thing , therefore the doing of it bee just ; or rather because it is just therefore God doth it . So that the question is not , Whether any entity produced by God bee good ; but rather , Whether the producing of it be therefore good , because God willeth it .

Yet your instance is more extravagant then your assertion , as when you adde , God might , had it pleased him , have taken life and existence from all mankinde , when he preserved Noah and his family . But to reserve them men , and no reasonable creatures , was no object of power omnipotent . So God did reserve divers beasts at that time also ; but to reserve them beasts , and not unreasonable creatures , was no object of power omnipotent ; as much as to say , to reserve reasonable creatures , no reasonable creatures , and to reserve unreasonable creatures no unreasonable creatures , was no object of power omnipotent . For certainly God cannot make contradictories to be true : as for the same creature to be both reasonable and unreasonable . And call you this the objective goodnesse of a thing possible ? or is this your definition of goodnesse , to imply no contradiction . Then let evill be goodnesse , and injustice goodnesse , and darknesse light , Belial an honest man . For certainly not one of these apart doth imply any contradiction . Your exposition of this is as bad as any of the rest . When we say things implying contradiction cannot have any being , wee understand it of things containing divers notions , which notions are contradictory one to another : not that they are contradictory to the nature and essentiall goodnesse of God , as you expound it . For that which is continuall , to consist of points indivisible , we hold to be contradictions : so did Aristotle : as also that a body existent should be infinite ; or that motion properly so called should be in an instant . But neither Aristotle , nor any of his Peripatetickes , that I know , did ever maintaine , that the contradiction here spoken of , consisted in this , that the thing stood in contradiction to the nature or essentiall goodnesse of God ; more then in contradiction to the nature and essence of an Angell , or to the nature and essence of a man .

I doe not finde any reason why the making of the world should be esteemed more consonant to the nature of God , then the not making of it . And whatsoever God willeth , if he willeth it freely , he might forbeare the willing of it , and that without sinne . I know nothing that God willeth necessarily but himselfe ; and it is improper enough to say , that Gods nature is consonant to it selfe . But in what sense a sphere of heaven , or a tree , or any vile creature shall bee said to bee consonant to the nature of God , I am content to be ignorant . I know no purity or holinesse without the will of God , as that must be which is the object of it . In a word , is it created purity and holinesse which is the object of the will of God you speake of , or increated ? Increated it cannot be ; for the object of that will of God , whereof we speake , is such as God willeth to have existence : but God doth not will increated holinesse to have existence ; for that were to will himselfe to have existence , seeing increated holinesse must needs bee God himselfe . But to say that God doth will himselfe to have existence , were to imply , that God as yet hath no existence . If created purity and holinesse be the object of Gods will , you speake of , then God cannot but will some created thing to be , therefore he must necessarily create the world .

A little before you told us , that God could not will ought contradictory to his owne nature and essentiall goodnesse , as in this particular ; he cannot will a man to be a man , and yet unreasonable . So then if he will have a man to be , hee must have him to be a reasonable creature : in like sort , if hee will have a beast to be , hee must have him to bee an unreasonable creature .

But what purity and holinesse , or what consonancy to Gods purity and holinesse is to be found in all this , as namely in willing a man to be a reasonable creature , a beast to be a creature unreasonable , seeing now you affirme , that Gods will cannot pitch but upon that which is pure and holy ? If I bee not deceived , you are now passing to another point , and doe beginne to apply the termes of your assertion to Gods will of commanding ; which makes me remember what the Welsh Tayler said to his boy , in making a garment while the owner stood by : for he cried out , Potherion , potherion , which afterwards by inquiry was found to signifie , Wide stitches , wide stitches . At length you come to the fountaine whence you fetch your Divinity , whilst others tast it but in trenches . And you tell us out of the booke of Wisedome , that For as much as God Wisd. 12. 15. is righteous , he ordereth all things righteously , thinking it not agreeable to his power to condemne him that hath not deserved to be punished . God is righteous in keeping his word ; I hope you will not deny it : neither Philo the Iew , nor the author of the booke of Wisedome , doth informe us of any other righteousnesse in God . Sure I am , that both Suarez and Vasquez , other manner of Schollers then Philo ever was , acknowledge no justice in God , in respect of his creatures , but upon supposition of his will . Now God hath promised , that every soule that sinneth , it shall dye , and not that the sonnes Ezek. 〈◊〉 teeth shall be set on edge for the sinnes of the father . And yet I appeale to your owne judgement , whether thus to carrie himselfe be to doe that which is agreeable to his power , or rather that which is agreeable to his righteousnesse . God , you say , loveth truth & sincere dealing , because he himselfe is true & just . Yet when the devill testified of the Apostles saying , These are the servants of the most high God , which shew unto us the waies of everlasting life , though it were a truth which they uttered , yet the comming of it out of such a ones mouth , I thinke was as little liked by God himselfe , as by his Apostle . Amongst the actions of heathen men , truth was found , as well as other vertuous conversation ; yet of their best actions Austin was bold to professe , that they were no better then splendida peccata . Aug. cont. Iulian. Pelag. l. 4. c. 〈◊〉 And he gives this rule for the discerning of true goodnesse , Noveris non ossiciis , sed sinibus discernendas esse virtutes . And as one blemish of their best actions was this , that they were not performed in reference to his glory ; so another very suitable hereunto I take to be this , that they were not performed in obedience to his will . For the horrible sinne of the Iewes in offering their sonnes and daughters unto Moloch , is amplified thus in holy Scripture , Things that never entred into Ier. 7. 38. my heart to command them . And why should God regard that which is not performed in obedience to his will ? Many things may be done , and are done by strangers living in farre Countries , agreeable to the lawes of this Kingdome ; but wee ken them no thankes for this , because they do it not in obedience to the lawes in this kingdome . There is no likenesse between the goodnesse of God , and the morall goodnesse of the creature . For looke what goodnesse is in God , the same is in him necessarily ; it is not so in man .

As for justice , I have often shewed the consent of Suarez and Vasquez , and that opposed by none that I know , that justice in God in respect of the creature , doth alwayes presuppose the will of God . Then as touching the truth of God , it is well knowne that God is a spirit , and hath no tongue to bee the interpeter of his minde , as he hath given unto man ; onely he hath taken up the hearts and tongues of his Prophets and Apostles , to deliver his oracles unto his people . And though God is not bound to reveale himselfe unto any ; yet if it be his pleasure to reveale himselfe , he is not capable of any such inducement , to deliver an untruth , as man is : man may advantage himselfe by untruth , when by other meanes hee cannot : it is not so with God , who needs not untruth . thereby to advantage himselfe . But whereas you say that Gods veracity is coeternall to his essence , in my judgement it is a very wilde phrase . For veracity hath no place where speech is not ; and seeing that God speakes not but by his Ministers , it followeth that before the world was , he never spake at all ; and seeing he could have forborne the making of the world , hee might have never spoken at all ; so farre off from truth is it , that veracity , which supposeth speech , is coeternall to his essence . For if speech be not coeternall to his essence , how can truth of speech , or truth in speech be coeternall to his essence ? Yet veracity taken fundamentally as a disposition in God to deliver truth whensoever he is pleased to cause speech , or to speake by his Ministers , so it is all one with the nature of God , and no marvell if in this sense it bee coeternall to his essence . Intemperancy , and consequently the opposite vertue of temperance and chastity is found onely in bodies , not in spirits ; and as it is no commendation to the nature of an Angell to bee chaste , so neither is it to the nature of God .

You say , God could not give a law for the authorizing of promiscuous or preposterous lust . Yet it is manifest , that promiscuous lust in bruit beasts , in all sorts , hath its course , without any transgression , and it being a course of nature in them , it cannot bee denied to bee a worke of God . And Suarez , though hee takes upon him to maintaine a tenet like unto Suarez de legib. l. 2. cap. 15. yours , namely , that God cannot dispense as touching his morall law ; yet he professeth that God may make it lawfull for one man to have many wives . And I pray you , why may hee not as well make it lawfull for one woman to have many husbands , and what then I pray you will this want of promiscuous and preposterous lust ? It may be plurality of husbands to one wife , may bring a greater inconvenience in the course of nature , as touching the corrupting of conceptions , and hindring the course of generation , then plurality of wives ; but how in morality it should be more intolerable then the other , I know not . And withall we reade of Massalina , that notwithstanding all her luxurious courses this way , yet not onely brought forth children , but also those like unto her husband also ; and being demanded how that came to passe , made this answer , Non nisi pl●na nave vectorem fero . For the brother and sister to know one another carnally , we count it incest ; yet unlesse Adams sonnes had maried with their sisters , it was impossible there should have beene any propagation of mankinde . And in like sort Abraham is supposed to have beene the Vncle of Sarah ; and doe you thinke that holy Patriaroh would have continued in so sinfull a course after his calling , had it beene such that God could not any way have made it lawfull ?

You proceed and tell us , That to legitimate violence , or entitle oppression unto the inheritance bequeathed to conscionable and upright dealing , is without the prerogative of Omnipotencie ; and in stead of giving a reason of your opinion , you expresse it in 〈◊〉 double phrase , as if you would make up in figures , what is wanting in argument ; and say , It cannot be ratisied by any Parliament of the Trinity ; and indeed I read in Virgil of a Parliament sometimes called in heaven by Iupiter : but I doubt you are of Ovids fault , who as Seneca writes knew not when it was well . But you overdoe onely in words , and underdoe in argument : and as if you had not phrasified enough , you further tell us , that The practice or countenancing of these and the like , are evill not in us onely , to whom they are forbidden , but so evill in themselves , that the Almighty could not but forbid and condemn them , as profest enemies to his most sacred Majestie . Thus to phrasifie with you , is to fetch Divinity from the fountaine , and not from the trenches ; though you bring neither evidence of Scripture , nor evidence of reason to justifie it . That which you doe bring such as it is , is rather from reason then from Scripture . And if it be so manifest in reason , as you seeme to signifie , the lesse need I should thinke there was of forbiddng it : yet you say God could not but forbid it . And where I pray must he forbid it , and by what law ? Is it by the law revealed in his word , or by the law of nature ? As for the law revealed in his word , that was communicated onely to the Iewes ; and why God was necessitated to forbid it to one small nation , and not to another , I can devise no reason . The law of nature I confesse is generall , forbidding such things as are knowne to be evill by the light of nature ; but doth it teach that God cannot legitimate any such actions ? Iephte thought otherwise , as appeares by the message hee sent to the King of Ammon , Wilt thou not possesse that which Chemish thy god giveth Iudg. 11. 24 thee to possesse ? So whomsoever the Lord our . God shall drive out from before us , them will we possesse . And it is observable , that whereas in other particulars you have derived the absolute unlawfulnesse of such actions , from the incongruitie of them to the nature of God ; as namely , because he is true , therefore he hateth falshood ; because pure , therefore he hateth lust , ( wheras to touch one thing more by the way that was omitted , it is well knowne that God is as pure from lawfull lust , as from lust unlawfull ) here in this place you make no mention at all of any condition in God , whereunto the practice of violence should bee incongruous , but in place of reason , which you bring not so much as in shew , you make us amends with variety of phrases . Yet what more violent act , then for the father to cut the throat of his most innocent childe ? and you well know , God sent Abraham that holy Patriarch in such an Gen. 22. Heb. 11. errand as this . Samsons faith is commended by S. Paul ; his first rising against the Philistins , was as the subject rising against their Princes , as the men of Iudah signified unto him , saying , Knowest thou not that the Philistins are rulers over us ? and thereupon Iudg. 15. 11. they were content to deliver him into their hands , to manifest themselves to be no confederates with him in this insurrection . Afterwards we reade how he died flaming with desire of revenge upon the Philistins , and that for his two eyes ; Iudg. 16. and to the end he might be revenged on them , was content to be his owne assassinate ; and all this in an holy manner performed , commending himselfe by solemne prayer unto God . For he called unto the Lord , and said , O Lord God remember V. 2● . me , I pray thee , and strengthen me I pray thee onely this once ; O God , that I may bee at once revenged of the Philistins for my two eyes ; and thereupon taking hold of the two pillars of the house , he bowed himselfe , and said , Let me die with the Philistins ; V. 30. and the house fell upon the Lords , and upon all the people that were within : so the dead which he slew at his death , were more then they which he slew in his life . What a strange zeale possessed Phinees , when he ran his javelin thorow Zimri and Cosbi , Numb. 25. 8. thus perishing in their incestuous act , and thus hee as it were sending their soules to hel , as well as their bodies to the grave . Yet God approves of it , and seales hereupon unto him the covenant V. 12 , 13. of the Priesthood . The children of Israel expell the Canaanites , and destroy them without all mercy , having nothing to justifie them in these violent courses , but onely the commandement of God . The Israelites are said to have robbed Exod. 3. 21 , 22. the Egyptians , in borrowing that which they never meant to restore , and the Lord animates them hereunto , and foretels unto Moses that he would cause them to march out of the land laden with the riches of Egypt ; and a great part of this was afterwards consecrated to the service of the Tabernacle .

4. In the next place you tell us after your manner positively , that the infinite goodnesse of Gods Majestie cannot wrest his most holy will from strict observance of such rules of righteousnesse as he sets us to follow ; and this dogmaticall assertion of yours is ushered in with a great deale of state , by a comparison forsooth of the contrary disposition of great men , for whom , to set paternes of the morality which they require in others , is reputed a kinde of pedantisme or mechanicall servitude ; and why mechanicall ? forsooth because it is like the setting of us copies , or songs , or teaching us some honest trade . Yet I can hardly beleeve but that Sardanapalus or Heliogabalus both did thinke it better becomming the Majesty of a Prince to give examples of honest conversation , then to play the Scrivener or the Shomaker . Instruction in morality , or in liberall Arts , may in some things have resemblance to mechanicall instructions ; but is any man so sottish as thereupon to conceive such morall and liberall instruction to be mechanicall ? An Ape may bee like unto a man , Simia quam similis turpissima bestia nobis , yet no foole conceives him to be a man . Neither doe I see any cause to wonder , that they who are willing to give lawes to others , are loath to have any lawes given to curbe them . Well , though the garments of morality be too strait for great ones , yet they are not too strait for God ; he can bee content to put them on , to weare them , and they become him so well , that the infinite greatnesse of his Majestie cannot wrest his most holy will from strict observance of such rules of righteousnesse as he sets us to follow . As I remember in Cyri paedia there is conceived such a good lesson becomming Princes , namely , themselves to observe those lawes which they make for their people . This law you have such a transcendent conceit of , and of the goodnesse of it , that you thinke fit to establsh it in the Common-wealth of the Trinity . God ( say you ) cannot wrest his will . Consider , I pray , whether this be a sober speech . The corruptest man that lives , the devill himselfe cannot wrest his will . First because the will cannot be wrested : lawes may be wrested by violent interpretations ; mens goods may bee wrested from them by violent courses , but I never read nor heard that any mans will may be wrested . For it is a received rule , that , Voluntas non potest cogi . Secondly , because a man cannot wrest anything that he undertakes to wrest , but by his will . Now in what congruitie can the will of any be said to wrest it selfe ? But take we your meaning , that God doth strictly observe the rules of righteousnesse , which he sets us to follow . Now the rules he setteth us to follow , ate partly such as are conteined in the first table , and partly such as are conteined in the second . In the first wee are commanded to love him , to feare him , to put our trust in him . Are these the rules that God himselfe doth so strictly observe ? doth he feare himselfe ? doth he put his trust or confidence in himselfe ? In the second we are commanded to worship him according to his word ; hath God a care to worship himselfe according to his word ? God sometimes doth sweare by himselfe , and I hold it impossible that God should doe any thing in vaine , much more that he should take his owne name in vaine .

But as for the sanctifying of the Sabbath , whereunto wee are bound , I cannot well conceive , how that day , and the sanctification thereof should be observed by God ; unlesse you are of the Iewes opinion , who thinke that God spends some part of the day in reading their Talmud , and some part in lamenting Ierusalem , and the desolation thereof ; and the other part of the day he spends in playing with Leviathan ; and you desire to translate these celestiall devotions to the Sabbath . We are bid to honour our father and mother , God hath none to honour . Wee are forbid to kil any man , yet God did bid Abraham to sacrifice his sonne , and allowed Phinees in slaying Zimri and Cosbi , and exposed his owne innocent Sonne to be crucified , and gives us power over inferiour creatures , as Lords of life and death . God made Adam after his owne image and likenesse ; Adams integrity was the image of his holinesse ; but when man by his fall lost this his holinesse , take heed you avouch not , that hereby he lost the image of God .

Our holinesse consisteth in seeking the glory of God ; and no creature can be so zealous of Gods glory as God is of his owne . But how to expresse our zeale of Gods glory better , then by obedience unto his will , I willingly professe I know not . As likewise what you meane by those ever living examples of goodnesse , which , as you say , God expresseth in his works ; vnlesse it bee in making his sunne to shine , and his raine to fall both upon good and bad . For unto this is the last precept which Matt. 5. 45 you mentioned , referred by our Saviour . And yet I doubt not ( nor you neither ) that God hath contrary waies and courses , as namely , in making us to discerne betweene the righteous and the wicked , betweene him that serveth God , and him that serveth Mal. 3. 18. him not ; and that in respect of demonstration of mercie to the one , and execution of judgement on the other : Behold , my servant shall eate , and ye shall be hungry ; behold , my servants Esa. 65. 13. shall drinke , and yee shall be thirstie : behold , my servants shall rejoyce , and ye shall be ashamed : Behold , my servants shall sing for joy of heart ; but yee shall cry for sorrow of heart , and house for vexation of spirit . Yea , and in making one piece rained upon sometimes , and not another : yet I nothing doubt , but you Amos 4. 7. will acknowledge God to bee as holy in these waies as in any other ; yea , in causing two Beares to come out of the wood , 2 Kings 2. 24 upon Elisha his cursing in the name of the Lord , and teare fourty two children . Yea , in revenging Achans sacriledge , Ios. 7. not onely with his owne death , but with his childrens also ; and in destroying suckling children , and children in the wombe , both in the generall deluge , and in the conflagration of Sodome : and when for the sinne of Saul , hee caused seven of his sonnes to bee delivered into the hands of the Gibeonites , 2 Sam. 21. 8. 9. to bee put to death : for , God is righteous in all his waies , and holy in all his workes . And the equity of Gods courses , Psal , 145. 17. though sometimès discernable by man , as in the case you put out of Ezechiel 18. 25. yet not alwaies so , but that wee are driven sometimes to cry out with the Apostles , Oh the Rom. 11. 33. depth of the riches of the wisedome and knowledge of God , how unsearchable are his judgements , and his waies past finding out ?

5 I confesse , that if to dictate like a positive Theologue be to instruct us , you have thus farre instructed us , That those paternes of holinesse or perfection , which we are bound to imitate in him , are not to be taken from his bare commandement , or revelation of his will , but from the objects of his will revealed , or from the eternall practises which he hath exhibited , as so many expresse and manifest proofes that his will is alwayes holy and just . The paterns of holinesse which wee are bound to imitate , are not to be taken ( you say ) from Gods bare commandement : I finde what you say , but I had rather finde what you prove . When our Saviour exhorteth us to be holy as God is holy , and perfect as God is perfect , he speaketh it with a particular reference to a particular course in Gods providence , taking thereby not an obligation to imitate him , but onely an inducement to bee so much the more forward in doing that which God commands us in loving our enemies . And unlesse wee have a commandement from God for the rule of our obedience , it is nothing safe to imitate God . For what ? shall Magistrates spare malefactors , because God spareth them a long time ? Or because God causeth the children to be put to death sometime for the sinne of the father , shall we do so too ? Or because God makes his sunne to shine as well upon one as upon another , shall we therefore put no difference betweene such as are of the houshold of faith , and others ? Wee may not imitate Elisha in cursing little children that mocked him ; nor the zeale of Phinees in killing Zimri and Cosbi in their lust ; much lesse must wee alwaies imitate God , who hath greater power over mens lives then Elisha , or Phinees had . Yet why you should call the workes of God in the course of his providence eternall practises , I know no reason , or coulour of reason . It may be that in stead of eternall , it should be externall practises . God no doubt is holy in all his waies and workes , but herehence it followeth not , that wee must imitate him in all his courses , but rather wee must have an eye to his commandements . And what , I pray are those perfections whereof our generall duties are the imperfect representations ? Our generall duties are such as these , We must not deale unjustly with any ; we must deale justly with all , or wee must be holy ; Holinesse becomes thine Psal. 93. 5● . house for ever : and in the Priests forehead was wont to bee written , Holinesse unto the Lord . Now , are these the perfections , Ex. 28. 35. wherein God , as you say , is holy and just ? Then t is as if you should say , God is eminently and apparantly holy in the perfection which is called his holinesse . God is eminently and apparantly just , in that perfection which is called his justice . Of all his morall commandements , not one there is , you say , whose sincere practise doth not in part make us truely like him : and we are bound to be conformable to his will revealed , that we may bee conformable to his nature , without conformity whereunto , wee cannot participate of his happinesse , for happinesse is the immediate consequent of his nature . You proceede to cut out work for your Readers , as many as are willing to Try the spirits , and not hand over head to receive all for gold that glisters . That the practise of Gods commandements maketh us like him , is a plausible speech . And it is true in the generall : for as God is wise and holy , so our obedience to his commandements , is that which mades us wise and holy . And as God doth nothing but that which very well becomes him ; so in obeying the will of God , wee shall doe nothing but that which very well becomes us . But as for particular duties , there is little or no correspondency betweene the carriage of superiours and inferiours . Wee have a God to worship by reverence and feare , and by praying unto him ; these are moralities no way incident unto God .

Wee have parents both naturall and spirituall , and masters and magistrates whom we must honour ; God hath none such to honour . Wee by our authoritie may not take away the life of any , be he never so great an offendor ; God may take away the life of any , bee hee never so innocent , without any blemish to his holines . Matrimoniall chastitie is a vertue commendable in a Christian ; but this vertue is of so base a condition , that the divine nature is not capable of it , as who hath no lusts at all to order ; like as on the contrary , the very Devills themselves , being Spirits , are no way obnoxious to unchristitie . The like may bee said of temperance , and intemperancie in the use or abuse of Gods creatures through gluttony and drunkennes . T is theft for us to take any mans goods from him against his will ; it is not so with God , who can send any man as naked out of the world , as hee brought him into the world , without any prejudice to the repuration of his justice . And seeing he is not capable of any manner of concupiscence , either of the eye or of the flesh , ( for hee is a Spirit , Ioh. 4. 24. and not a body or flesh ) nor in the way of pride of life : the contrary conditions cannot be in the way of any commendable vertues attributed unto God . In a word , all the goodnesse that is in God , is essentiall unto him ; our goodnesse , whatsoever we be , is but accidentall unto us : and therefore , 1 Pet. 1. 16 Matt. 5. 48 when we are exhorted to be holy as he is holy , and perfect as God is perfect , it tends onely to this , even to set before us certaine actions of God , as patternes and precedents to imitate him therein ; and that onely so far forth as they are suitable and congruous inducements to the performing of Gods commandements , not to affect any conformity of nature with the deitie . For what conformity can there be betweene the nature of a creature , and the nature of his Creator ? But Saint Peter telleth us , we are made pertakers 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 . 2 Pet. 1. 4. I have observed some to have rendred this passage thus , We are made partakers of a godly nature ; and the godlinesse of our nature undoubtedly consists in obeying the will of God ; according to that of the Apostle , This is the will of God , even your sanctification . And what godlinesse can be greater , 1 Thes. 4. 6 then for a man to obey the will of his Creator ; and that is the will of Gods commandement , though it may fall out to be contrary to Gods purpose . For wee are bound to pray for the life of our parents and princes , though it maybe , God will not have either the one or the other to live . And God commanding Abraham to sacrifice Isaac , he arose early about this businesse , though it appeared afterwards , that Gods purpose was , Isaac should not be sacrificed . But let it be that we are partakers of the divine nature : in this sense I nothing doubt but that it proceedeth in respect of the holy Spirit , wherewith God hath endued us , and which he hath given us Rom. 5. 5 Rom. 8. 11 1 Ioh. 4. 13 to dwell in us ; and whereby God the Father , and God the Sonne are said to dwell in us . But let us proceed inwashing away this painting , which makes errour appeare with a face of truth . We are bound by the law of God , to forgive our enemies , and to pray for them even to the last , as our Saviour did , and Steven did . But is God bound to forgive his enemies , and that alwaies , as we are ? we know he may , and doth sometimes forbeare long ( according to the pleasure of his will ) but , If once he whet his glittering sword , and his hand take Deut. 32. 41 hold of judgement , he will execute vengeance on his enemies , and make his arrows drunke with bloud . Againe , Magistrates must not suffer a witch to live , being once discovered : God knows Exod. 22. 18 them when man doth not , yet suffers them to live as long as he thinkes good , and sometimes very long . Wee are bound to have mercy on all according to our power ; God hath mercy Rom. 9. 18 on whom he will , and hardeneth whom he will . Lastly , wee may not suffer any man to sinne , if it lie in our power to hinder it . But God suffereth all manner of all abominations to be committed before his eies , and in all these hee carrieth himselfe without blemish to his holinesse . Nos cer●è ( saith Austine ) Aug. cont. Iulian. Pelag. lib 5. cap. 4 si cos in quos nobis potestas est , ante oculos nostros perpetrare scelera permittemus , rei tum ipsis erimus : Quam verò innumerabilia ille permittit sieri ante oculos suos , quae utique si voluisset , nullaratione permitteret ; & tamen justus , & bonus est , & quod praebendo patientiam dat locum paenitentiae nolens aliquem perire . That wee are bound to conforme to Gods revealed will , the Scripture teacheth us ; Secret things belong to the Lord our God , but the Deut. 29. 29 things revealed are for us and our children to doe them . But that therefore we must be conformable to his will , that wee may be conformable to his nature the Scripture teacheth not : and therefore give us leave to take this superfoetation of yours to be but a revelation of flesh and bloud . In the book of Iudges Iudg. 13. 17 wee read that Manoah enquired after the name of the Angell Iunius & Pis at . in Iudic. 13 Iudg. 13. 18 1 King . 8. 12. that appeared unto him ; whom good Divines , upon pregnant circumstances , doe collect to have beene the Lord : but he answereth , Why askest thou after my name which is secret ? God verily dwelleth in the darke cloud : and though sometimes againe it is said , that he dwelleth in the light , yet forth with it 1 Tim. 6. 16 is added , that this is such a light that no man can approach unto . As groundlesse is your following dictate , that , without conformitie to his nature , we cannot participate of his holinesse , it being the imodiate consequent of his nature . And what , I pray , will you make gods of us ? or shall our glorification in the kingdome of heaven be a deification ? as it must be if it be a participation of the divine happinesse . But this is an usuall libertie of discourse which you take to your selfe . I hope you will not say , that formall glory which God hath provided for us , shall be a glory increated , though in the way of an efficient cause it shall proceede from the increated glory of God , but created rather .

And all created glory , I hope , bee it never so great , is no part of Gods happinesse , which is , you say , an immediate consequent unto his nature ; wherin notwithstanding I doubt much , you speake as Peter sometimes did , when he spake he knew not what ; as namely , in distinguishing Gods happines from his nature , as an immediate consequent thereof . You doubt of Lactantius his consequence , as neither certaine , nor authentique ; as if it might be authentique , though not certaine in your opinion . Yet you embrace the same consequence applied to another matter that serves your turne , and you swallow it with great facility , it never stickes by the way like a Burre in your throat , as if consequences were but ceremonies , and you the master of them . But you put a difference ; Lactantius his inference is sometimes doubtfull , you say ; but out of all question , yours ( if we may take your word ) is not . But you take too great liberty to your selfe , to put things at your pleasure out of question . We should have a mad Church and a mad world , if you had power to put out of question what you list . But let us consider your inference , God doth bid us unfainedly blesse our persecuoors , therefore he doth unfainedly tender his blessings to such as persecute him in his members . This then belike is that conformity to Gods nature which we must aspire unto . But by your leave I finde no conformity herein . Matt. 5. 44 For first , wee are bid to blesse our persecutors , not to tender our blessings unto them upon condition they will admit them ; but you doe not say , God doth blesse his persecutors ; you onely say , hee doth tender his blessings unto them . Againe , God biddeth us blesse them that persecute us : you doe not say , that God doth blesse , or tender his blessings to them that persecute him , but to them that persecute others , to wit , his members . Thirdly , and chiefly , God bids us to blesse all our persecutors . ; for hee exhorts us to be mercifull unto all , as you confesse in the next words ; but you dare not say , that God doth blesse , or tender his blessings unto all ; but here you lispe , and speake indefinitely , saying , God doth tender his blessings to them that persecute him in his members ; and that , Hee she weth kindnesse to them that are most unkinde . Indeed , he doth so to some , but not unto all , but unto whom he will : for so himselfe professeth unto Moses , I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy , and I will have compassion on whom I will have Exod. 33. 19. compassion . And I pray consider , what blessing hath God tendred Rom. 5. 15 unto the Angels since their fall ? So that albeit Gods charitie towards some infinitely exceeds the charity of man , yet mans duety is to be charitable towards all ; Gods duety is not to be charitable to any , but hee loves whom hee will , and hates whom he will , and that before they are borne , as he loved Iacob and hated Esau. Gods fidelity must needs be greater then mans , as being backt with power to performe that he promiseth , the creature is not : nay , all the power and readinesse that the creature hath to performe fidelity towards God , proceeds meerely from the grace of God .

But to compare the chastitie of Virgins with Gods purity , is most absurd ; neither is there any correspondency in the parts of this comparison , and of the comparison following , as betwixt the drosse and corpulency on the one side , and the sublimated spirits of the same body on the other side : for both the drosse and spirits you speake of are corporeall : no such proportions betweene the chastitie of Virgins , and the purity of God . The children of God , though in a married estate , yet are they Virgins in the sight of God .

As for Virginity corporall , it hath beene found in Heathens , and is wondrous base metall to be compared to the spirituall purity of God , in spight of all preferment you give to the one above the other . That rule , Doe unto every man as we would be done unto , must be rightly applied , otherwise it will be farre from equity . For it becomes not a Magistrate to spare a malefactor , because if himselfe were in the like case of danger and desert , he would be glad to be spared . We must doe that unto others , which in the way of justice , or equity , or charity , we would have done unto our selves .

As for that , Him that honoureth me , I will honour , it is meerly 1 Sam. 2. 3● dependent upon the will of God . For all confesse , that God can annihilate the holiest creature that is , secluding his ordinance to the contrary , and in this case should be nothing guiltie of iniquitie .

At length you come to the point , and demand , Whether God doth intend thus well to all ? but because the nearer you come to the light , by a true stating of the question , the more your deviations from the truth are like to be discovered , therefore you forthwith obscure it . For whereas the conformity you spake of before , requires , that as we are bid to be mercifull unto all , so should God be mercifull unto all likewise . And so the question , to come to an issue , should be this , Whether God intends thus well to all , or no ? You decline this ; and wheras the proper place of Gods libertie and cariage of himselfe according to the meere good pleasure of his will , is not in designing destruction or salvation unto whom he will , ( for the case is cleare , that God doth not determine , that destruction or salvation shall befall any , but according unto congruous dispositions preceding , at least in persons of ripe yeares , ) but onely in the dispensation of his grace and mercy , shewing it towards whom he will , and denying it to whom he will ; you againe decline this state of the question , and propose it onely of Gods wishing well to all , or destruction unto some .

Nor doe you content your selfe with this , but as fearing left this state of the question be not safe enough to keepe your shinnes whole , you propose it in a most wilde manner , Whether God doth intend thus well to all , or destruction to some , as it is a meanes of blisse to those whom he loves . You have courage enough to dictate positively , but you manifest a very faint hart when you come to be put to the proofe . What meant you to complicate so many questions into one ? By your tenet God may intend thus well to all as you have spoken , to wit , in intending his blessings , albeit he did will destruction unto some , to wit , for the contempt or refusall of his grace offered . And a great deale of difference there is betweene these two questions , Whether God intends destruction unto any ; and Whether hee intends a mans destruction after this or that manner ; as namely , Whether he intends it as a meanes of blisse to those whom he loves ; and yet on this latter onely you insist . And indeed you might well despaire of getting any credit upon the former points : the case is so cleare , that God in the dispensation of his grace doth not cary himselfe indifferently towards all , but hath mercy on whom he will , and whom he will he hardeneth . As also that in his sentences of condemnation or salvation he carrieth himselfe in due reference unto their former disobedience or obedience , and so accordingly did from everlasting purpose to carry himselfe .

But consider we the third point , the onely field wherein you have an edge to shew your strength . And first I demand , Who ever said that God did intend the destruction of any as it is a meanes of blisse to them whom he loves ? Wee usually professe that God intends to damne no men but for their sins , and that to this end , even to the manifestation of his glory in the way of justice towards them ; but withall we say , that God doth intend also , by the consideration of this their destruction , to illustrate his grace so much the more towards the vessels of mercy , whom he hath prepared unto glory . For when they shall consider not onely their owne salvation , but also the damnation of others , and that God might have made them also vessels of wrath as well as others ; how can it be but that their joy should be the greater upon this ? and if it be so , God must needs have intended it . And this not onely our Divines Rom. 9. 23 Alvar. de auxil . disp. III. have observed out of the Apostle Saint Paul , but even Pontifician Divines also , as Didacus Alvarez , and Alphonsus Mendosa . Mendos . disp. 1. Now let us consider the force of your arietation against this . If so he did , say you , we might be exempt from that negative precept , of not doing evill that good might ensue . We deny this consequence , and as for your reason , it seemes to be this , We may and must imitate our heavenly Father ; and therefore seeing he doth evill that good may come thereof , so may wee doe too . To this I answer , 1. First , that the consequence is nothing true . For God intending the destruction of any , doth not therein doe any evill , no nor intend any evill . For God doth intend onely the destruction of impenitent sinners . But to intend the destruction of impenitent sinners , I hope you will not dare to say that this is evill . Thus may every one see how wide you rove from the marke in your inconsequent consequences . 2. Secondly I answer , it is not lawfull for us to imitate God in all things , as before I have shewed , and gave instance in divers particulars . Now I will adde one more . If we repent , God not onely spares us , but forgives us ; If wee acknowledge our sinnes , he is faithfull and just to forgive us our sins . 1 Ioh. 1. 〈◊〉 . But Magistrates , when a malefactor is arraigned and convicted , and condemned of some capitall crime , though he doth repent , yet may not they spare him . That wherein our Saviour exhorts us to imitate our heavenly Father , and to be perfect as he is perfect , is in a particular case , namely , in loving not Matth. 5. last . onely our friends , but our enemies . For so God not onely loveth his children and his friends , but his enemies also , as appeares in the pardoning of their sins , and changing of their hearts , as many as belong to his election . And it is false to say , that this is the onely reason why wee must love our enemies , and not our friends onely : for the commandement of God is another reason , and a more chiefe reason ; and we may not take inducements from Gods actions to encourage us in the doing of any thing , unlesse in such cases , as when the actions whereabouts we set our selves , are agreeable to the law of God . God determined the crucifying of Christ , but neither Act. 4. 28. Iudas , nor the high Priests , nor Pilate , nor the people of Israel were the more free from sinne for this , while they determined to bring him to his crosse . God turnes not onely 2 Cor. 11. 19. the evils of some to the good of others , but a mans owne sins also to his owne good , according to that of Austin , Utile est superbis in aliquod apertum , manifestumque cadere peccatum . De Civit. Dei l. 14. c. 13.

6. I wonder what glory of God doth appeare in the punishment of the reprobate : not the glory of his mercy certainly ; nor say I the glory of his justice . For vindicative justice , whereof this is spoken , hath onely place in reference unto sinners . It is absurd to say , that Gods dealings throughout are to be imitated by us ; and you have no ground for this but the saying of our Saviour , Matth. 5. 48. which is applyed to a speciall case . And will it follow , that because wee must imitate Gods actions in a speciall case , therefore we must imitate his dealings generally ? To intend evill to some , before they have committed sinne , admits a double interpretation ; either this , to intend that evill shall befall some ; in which sense it is manifest , that God doth intend the evill of punishment to befall none before they have sinned . Or thus , the very intention of evill unto some is not untill sinne bee committed ; in which sense it is notoriously untrue . For sinne is not committed but in time ; but Gods intentions are everlasting . Of intending the destruction of any as meanes of others good , I have already spoken that which is sufficient . Why should your tautologies draw me to the like absurdity ? The last clause is new , and therefore we will consider it . If God did absolutely ordaine some to eternall inevitable misery , for the advancement of his owne glory ; we should not sinne , but rather imitate the perfection of our heavenly Father , in robbing Iudas to pay Paul , &c. Ridetur chorda qui semper oberrat eadem . This argument was in the close of the former section proposed , and the inconsequence thereof discovered . The consequence is this , God did ordaine to punish some , therefore we may rob them ; God did ordaine this to the advancement of his glory ; therefore we may rob , to pay our debts , No proportion is to bee found in any part of this comparison . For if God take away the life of any man , will it follow that therefore we may doe soe also ? It is well known ●od may doe such a thing without all respect to sinne ; but it is not in our lawfull power to doe so , though with respect unto their sinne . And what a senslesse collection is this , that because God may doe this or that to advance his glory , therefore we may doe the like thing for our profit and advantage ? We say , God intends to punish no reprobate , but for his sinne ; yet I hope you will not say , it is in any private mans power to robbe or take any mans goods from him , by reason of his sinne .

Wee are beholden to you for your counsell in the next place , when you teach us to guesse at the perfection of Gods Iustice towards the wicked , and of his bounty towards the godly , by the commendable shadow or imitation of it in earthly gods . A proper course to search out the goodnesse and justice of God , in the courses of heathen men . Yet it is a rule of State , Better a mischiefe then an inconvenience . And by warres is procured peace , but is it without intention of harme to any ? Can warres bee managed without harme ? even as well as the Fryar could bee satisfied with a goose livor , and a pigges head , albeit nothing for him were dead . And in making Sodom and Gomorrah Iude 7. examples of his judgements , did he not intend our good ? and was this without intention of harme to any ? And though they of ripe years amongst them had committed abomination , Ezech. 16. 50. and God tooke them away as hee thought good ; yet what I pray became of infants , some in their mothers wombe , some hanging at their mothers breasts ? And will you challenge God for injustice in this , because we doe not finde the like course in the commendable shadow or imitation of Gods justice in earthly gods , as you are pleased to phrasifie it ? In distribution of rewards upon the obedient , and execution of punishment upon the disobedient , God failes not , as he will manifest at the day of judgement . And as he executes , so he intends to execute , and no otherwise . But God hath a peculiar power , no shadow whereof appeareth in man or Angell ; and that is , of giving grace , of giving repentance : and this he distributes to whom Rom. 9. 18 he will , and denies to whom he will . You are content to leape over this ; and no marvell ; for the grossenesse of your opinion would bee too clearly manifested to the world , if you should deale on this . Yet God , you say , drawes men to repentance by gracious promises of inestimable reward . And where I pray are these herbes of grace known to grow , is it any where but in Gods word ? And was Gods word afforded to all in the daies of the Old Testament ? or is it so in the daies of the New ? And where he doth afford his word , is this all the mercy he shewes , namely , to perswade men to repent ? or is this to give them repentance ? And doth not Gods word manifestly Act. 5 ▪ 31. Act. 11. 18 2 Tim. 2. teach , that repentance is the gift of God ? Againe , doe we maintaine that God damnes any but impenitent sinners ? T is true , we say , if all the world should beleeve and repent , all the world should be saved , notwitstanding all their sinnes , and not Cain onely . What more severe punishment then damnation ? and what precedent loving instructions or good encouragements to doe well , were afforded by God to all those infants , who perish in that sinne which they drew from the loynes of their parents ? And will you challenge God of unnaturalnesse for this ? or will you deny that any infants perish in originall sinne , as Pelagius did ? And what loving instructions doth God minister to those Heathen , who doe not so much as know God , nor ever were acquainted with his word 1 Thess. 4. 6. and Gospell ?

CHAP. XIIII .

Of Gods infinite love to mankinde .

YOur theame runnes in an indefinite current as touching the object of Gods love ; but it appeares by your discourse ensuing , that you have a farther reach , and doe extend this love of God towards all and every one . For by the last clause of the first section it appeares , that you conceive the notion of love infinite to bespeake as much , namely , that therefore it must extend to all and every one . And this reason of yours is soone dispatched , in lesse then two lines ; all the rest of your first section is wide enough from the marke you shoot at , and yet unsound enough in many particulars . First you maintaine that blessing and cursing both cannot proceed out of the mouth of God . Secondly , that God is the author of being to all , and therefore loves all . Thirdly , that in as much as he gives being to all , he loves all . For he hateth nothing that hee hath made . All these I will examine in their order .

Touching the first , you beginne with the authority of St. Iames , Out of the same mouth proceedeth blessing and cursing , my Iam. 3. 10. brethren , these things ought not so to be . And he doth illustrate it with similitudes drawne from naturall things , as from a fountaine that sends not forth at the same place sweet water and bitter : and from trees , which bring forth proper fruit onely , according to their kinde : Can the figtree beare Olive berries , or the Vine figs ? And you seeme to conceive that these reasons of the Apostle , as you call them , ( which indeed are but illustrations ) have more force to prevaile , then the Apostles authority ; for thus you write , If the Apostles authority could not perswade us to beleeve , his reasons would inforce us to grant , that the issues of blessing and cursing from one and tho same mouth are contrary to the course of nature , and argue the nature of man to bee much out of tune . Herein I am not of your minde . I am rather of Abrahams minde . If they will not beleeve Moses and the Prophets , Luc. 16. 3. neither will they beleeve , though a man rise from the dead . And yet a man rising from the dead , were as fit to make faith of the state of the dead ( in my judgement ) as these illustrations ( secluding S. Iames his authority , ) are of force to prove , that it becomes not a man out of the same mouth to send forth blessing and cursing . For fountaines send forth water , and trees bring forth fruit by necessity of nature : But man speakes by freedome of will ; and as a man may be induced to curse , so in case he curseth , and be challenged for it by a brother , hee may answer as David did unto his brethren , And what have I 1 Sam. 17. 19. now done ? is there not a cause ? For if all curses were causelesse , Solomon would never have told us , that The curse which is Pro. 26. 2. causlesse shall not come . I never yet read of any that censured Elisha for cursing the children that mocked him , saying , Come 2 King . 2. 23 , 24. up thou bald head , come up thou bald head ; and indeed it is said , He cursed them in the name of the Lord . And yet this curse of his had a very bloody issue , two Beares comming out of the wood , and tearing forty two of them . And in the booke of Iudges the Angell of the Lord bids the people curse Meroz . Curse ye Meroz , saith the Angell of the Lord ; curse ye bitterly Iudg. 5. 23 the inhabitants of Meroz , because they came not to helpe the Lord , to helpe the Lord against the mighty . And as curses may have their due course , so blessings may bee causelesse . For as for him that blesseth himselfe in his heart , when hee heareth the Deut. 29. 19 , 20. word of Gods curse , saying , I shall have peace though I walke after the stubbornnesse of my heart , herein he doth but adde drunkennesse unto thirst , and the Lord will not bee mercifull to that man . And if some doe sinne in blessing themselves , how much more doe others sinne in blessing idols ? Wee well know that Esa. 66. 3. out of our Saviours mouth came forth cursings sometimes , as well as blessings at other times . For he cursed the figtree , and Matth. 21. 19. anone it withered . And therefore it were fit to distinguish betweene cursings and cursings , yea and betweene blessings and blessings , lest otherwise we confound truth and errour , good and evill .

And to this purpose I thinke fit to distinguish betweene cursing as it signifies onely the pronouncing of a curse ; and cursing , as it signifieth cursed speaking . And S. Iames , as I take it , speakes of cursing as it signifies cursed speaking , and not as it signifies the bare pronunciation of a curse , which may bee done without cursed speaking , and in an holy manner , as when our Saviour cursed the figtree , and Elisha the children that mocked him , moved undoubtedly thereunto extraordinarily by the Spirit of God . Like as when prophane persons blesse themselves , and superstitious persons blesse their idolls , their actions are unholy enough , and doe bring the curse of God upon their persons . For they shall multiply sorrow upon Psal. 16. 4. their heads that runne after other gods . Now S. Iames useth fit similitudes to illustrate this duty of blessed speaking , and to move them to refraine from cursed speaking : considering that Gods Spirit is as a fountaine of holy life in their hearts ; and therefore they should send forth nothing but sweet water , not indifferently either sweet water onely , or bitter water onely , but sweet water , and that onely . And seeing they are trees of righteousnesse , of the Lords planting , that hee may be glorified : Esa. 61. 4 therefore to bring forth nothing but good fruit , but that of divers kindes , like unto that tree of life , that bare twelve manner of Revel. 22. 2. fruits , and gave fruit every moneth .

And yet if sometimes they breake forth into cursed speaking , it is the lesse strong , considering they are in part carnall , Gal. 5. 23 and but in part , spirituall ; and therefore in part out of tune , though nothing like so much as they were in state of nature ; when they sent forth nothing but bitter water , neither blessing their brethren , nor God ; no nor themselves neither . Not one of these instances , say you , but holds as truely in God as in man . He being the tree of life , cannot bring forth death . To cause the vine to bring forth figges , were not so hard a point of husbandry , as to derive cursednesse or misery from the fountaine of blisse . For a spring to send forth water sweet and bitter , fresh and salt , is more competible , then for hatefull and harmefull intentions , to have any issue from pure love . But God is love , yea love is his essence as Creator . Why doe you not speake plainely , and tell us , that out of Gods mouth cannot proceed blessing and cursing ? Yet the Lord protesteth to Abraham , saying , Blessed shall hee be that Gen. 12. 4. I will bless them that blesse thee , and curse them that curse thee . Mal. 2. 2 Levit. 26 Deut. 28 Deut. 30. 19 blesseth thee , and cursed shall he be that curseth thee : And tells the Iewes to their face , that he would curse their blessings . Yea , that he had cursed them already . And equally and indifferently , as God is made the Author of blessing to the obedient , so is he made the Author of a curse to the disobedient : and therefore calls heaven and earth to witnesse , that hee hath set before them , life and death , blessing and cursing . So that death and cursing is indifferently attributed to God , as the Author of them , like as life and blessing ; and both are in due proportion to the behaviour of man , as it is found , either in the way of obedience , or in the way of disobedience . And in this respect perhaps you may say , that man is the cause of cursing , & not God . To this I answer ; 1. By the same reason , man is the cause of blessing suitable to this cursing , and not God . 2. If in this respect , cursing be to be derived from sin , it is onely in the way of a meritorious cause ; so doth not fruit proceed from trees , but onely in the way of an efficient cause . God , and none but God can be the Author , as of happinesse , so of misery , as of eternall life , so also of everlasting death . And as none is truly blessed , but whom God blesseth ; so none is truly accursed , but whom God curseth . Yet no man , I thinke , that hath his wits in his head , will say , that this cursing proceedeth from Gods love , but rather from his hatred . Gods love towards the creature is essentiall , his love to the creature is not so , no more then to be a creator , is of Gods essence . And love is no more of Gods essence as a Creator , then hatred is of Gods essence as a revenger . And the blessing and cursing attributed unto God in the Scriptures before alledged , belong to God onely as a Iudge , to execute the one by way of reward , and the other by way of punishment . Albeit there is another course of Gods blessing and of his cursing , though you love not to distinguish , but to consound rather ; as all that maintaine bad causes , love darknesse rather then light . Ioh. 3. 19.

I come to the second point , wherein you insist , In that he is the Author of being , he is the Author of goodnesse to all things that are . And this is very true ; for , God saw all that he had made , and lo it was very good . And as it is very true , so it is nothing at Gen. 1. 31 all to the purpose . For when we enquire , whether Gods love be extended towards all and every one , wee presuppose their beings in their severall times and generations . And secondly , we speake of a love proper to mankinde , which consisteth not in giving them their being ; for , God hath given being unto Angels , even unto Devils as well as unto men ; and as to men , so to all inferiour creatures , be they never so noysome and offensive unto man . And it is a strange course of yours , to magnifie the love of God to man , in giving him being , which is found in the basest creature that breathes , or breathes not . I have heard a story of a great Prince , when one of the prime subjects of the land , being taken in a foule act of insurrection , and yeelding upon condition to bee brought to speake with that Prince , presuming of ancient favour , whereof hee had tasted in great measure , and which upon his presence might haply revive , he found nothing answerable , but imperious ta●ts rather , and dismission in this manner , Know therefore that we hate thee as we hate a toad . Yet you magnifie the love of God to mankinde in as comfortable manner , when you say that hoe hath given us being , which wee well know God hath given to lyons , rigers , and beasts of prey ; yea , to snakes and adders , to frogges and toads , and fiery serpents .

Herehence you proceed to the third point , and do inferre , That because he hath made us , therefore hee loveth us ; for , He hateth nothing that he hath made , as saith the wise man : and to give the greater credit to the authority alledged by you , you use an introduction of strange state ; for you say , The wiseman saith this of him that is wisest of all , of him that can neither deceive , nor be deceived , that , He hateth nothing that he hath made , But to what purpose tends all this pompe ? Is the sentence any whit of greater authority because it is spoken of him that is wisest of all , and can neither deceive nor be deceived ? May not fooles speake of him , that can neither deceive nor be deceived , as well as wise men , and have their sayings any whit the greater credit and reputation for this ? If the author of that sentence had beene such a one , as neither could deceive nor be dedeceived , then indeed the sentence had beene of greatest authority , and infinitely beyond the authority of Philo the Iew. Or did you presume that your Reader inconsiderately might swallow such a gull , & take the author of it for such a one , as could neither deceive nor be deceived ? If you did , this were very foule play , and no better then a trick of conicatching . Yet we except not against the sentence , but pray you rather to take notice of an answer to this very objection of yours , taken from the same ground , above two hundred yeares ago .

You shall finde it in Aquinas his summes , where his first objection is this ; Videtur quod Deus nullum hominem reprobet . Aquin. 1. 〈◊〉 23. art. 3. Nullus enim reprobat , quem diligit : sed Deus omnem hominem diligit , secundum illud Sap. 11. Diligis omnia quae sunt , & nihil odisti eorum quae secisti . Ergo Deus nullum hominem reprobat . It seemes that God reprobates no man . For , no man reprobates him whom hee loveth . But God loves every man according to that , Wis. 11. Thou lovest all things that are , and hatest nothing that thou hast made . Therefore God reprobateth no man . And the answer hee makes unto this objection followeth in this manner , Adprimum dicendum , quod Deus omnes homines diliget , & etiam omnes creaturas , in quantum omnibus vult aliquod bonum : Ibid. non tamen quodcunque bonum vult omnibus . In quantum igitur quibusdam non vult hoc bonum , quod est vita aeterna , dicitur eos habere odio velreprobare . To the first is to be answered , that God loves all men , yea , and all creatures , for as much as he willeth some good to them all : but yet he willeth not every good to all . There-fore in as much as unto some he willeth not this good , which is life everlasting , he is said to hate them , or to reprobate them . And you might have beene pleased to take notice , not onely of that wise man ( though as wise as Philo ) who speakes herein of him that can neither deceive nor be deceived , but of that wise God , who is wiser then men and Angels , and can neither deceive nor be deceived , and affirmeth openly , that He hath loved Iacob and hated Esau ; as also of the Apostle Saint Paul , who by the infallible direction of Gods Spirit , applies this to the disposition of God towards them before they were borne . And if to inflict the torments of hell upon these , or these for their sinnes be to hate them ; surely to intend to inflict the torments of hell upon them for their sinnes , is to hate them . And seeing God from everlasting intended to doe whatsoever hee doth in time , it followeth , that from everlasting hee did hate them .

Yet this truth you dare secretly to outface , without taking any notice of it . But here you argue ; well , let us consider it ; For men to blesse God and to curse men , doth argue a dissolution of that internall harmony which should be in the humane nature : therfore for God to hate some men , and to love others , would necessarily inferre a greater distraction in the indivisible essence , besides the contradiction which it implies to insinite goodnes . This latter clause is thrust in to make weight , and to turne the scale , but being nothing save meere breath and aire , makes it rather lighter . Like as when the Spaniard to make his state weigh as much as the state of France , and finding that Spaine and other places News from Parnassus . would not serve the turne , clapt in Millane and Naples into the ballance , whereupon it was found well the lighter . Yet I am content to consider that also in its turne . But first of the argument . My answer hereunto is twofold : First , as touching the antecedent ; I say , and have already shewed , that the passage of Iames , whereat you aime , proceeds of cursing , onely Iac. 3. 9. as it signifies cursed speaking , not as it signifies the pronouncing of a curse , which may be in an holy manner , it being cleere , that both God and man ; both God the Father , and God the Sonne , may , and have pronounced curses in an holy manner , without giving evidence of any dissolution of that internall harmony which should be in them ; and yet such a dissolution is to be acknowledged to have its place more or lesse in the best of men in this world , for they have flesh in them Gal. 5. 2● as well as spirit , but neither is nor can be in God . Secondly , I deny the consequence ; for , it doth not follow , that , because it is not lawfull for man to curse , therefore it is not lawfull for God to curse . Are not Devills accursed ? At the day of judgement shall not our Saviour pronounce that sentence on thousands , Go ye cursed into everlasting fire ? And why should this argue any distraction in God , more then in a Iudge that absolveth some , and condemneth others ? So our Saviour at the day of judgement will say unto some , Go yee cursed into Matth. 25. everlasting fire : unto others , Come ye blessed of my Father , receive the kingdome prepared for you from the beginning of the world . If you do not speake of blessing and cursing in the way of execution of judgement and reward , what meane you to walke thus in the cloud of generalities ? If you speake not of execution , but of intention : as God doth execute judgements for sinne , and rewards of obedience ; so doth he from everlasting intend both the one and the other , as it is impossible it should be otherwise . Your selfe acknowledging in words Gods decrees to be eternall . And doth it not become God from everlasting to intend to proceed in the day of judgement , as before spoken of ? As great a divine as you are taken for , I much doubt you little understand the state of the question , wherein you seem to oppose some body , for , I cannot be perswaded you doe wilfully dissemble it . But there is another course of Gods providence in another matter , and farre different from the execution of punishment and reward , maintained by your opposites , and impugned by you : but you are loath to bee seene in your opposition therein , and to have your opinion knowne particularly for feare lest the common voice should cry shame upon you , as upon a profest Arminian , a manifest impugner of the soveraignty of God , in shewing mercy on Rom. 9. 18 whom he will , and denying mercy to whom he will , and so hardening whom he will . Now here you have no comparison to helpe your selfe withall , drawne from the condition of man . For in mans power it is not , either to give grace , or to deny it . But to the contrary wee finde , that Superiours have the dispensation of favours and gratifications in their power , which they enlarge or restraine at their pleasure , and extend to whom they will . How much more shall the Lord of all take liberty unto himselfe , to have mercy on whom hee will have mercy , and to shew compassion on whom hee will shew compassion ; yea , and as to have mercy on whom hee will , so to harden whom he will also ; and that I hope without contradiction to his goodnesse , which you besides the word of God cast in , to outface the proclamation of God himselfe . For as Gods goodnesse did not binde him to make the world ; so neither doth it binde him to save the world . And as when he made the world , he made as many creatures as he thought good ; so in saving the world , he saves as many creatures as he thinkes good , both amongst men and Angels , by giving grace to whom he will , and denying grace to whom he will . When you say , that , To love the worke of his owne hands is more essentiall to him that made all things out of his meere love , then it is unto the fire to burn matter combustible . This speech of yours is a grosse unsavory speech , transforming God into a naturall and necessary agent : for , it is well knowne that the fire burnes naturally and necessarily . And if God doth more essentially love his creatures , then he must naturally and necessarily preserve them in being , and cannot destroy them And because it is out of the same love that you derive the creation of the world , it followeth , that God was necessitated by the necessity of nature to make the world ; and consequently that the world was everlasting without beginning , and so shall continue without end . Behold the flowers that grow in the paradise of your contemplation , fitter for Aristotles Physicks , or Metaphysicks , then for the meditations of a Christian Divine , as being fit onely to make a nosegay for the Devill . The love of God towards himselfe is essentiall , towards his creatures is meerely accidentall . Hee needed not to have made them , neither is it any whit necessary that he should preserve them . And as creation and preservation are attributed of extrinsecall denomination unto God , so is his love towards his creatures also . Neither was it out of love to the creature that he made the world , but out of love to himselfe , as who is the end of all . For , both Salomon professeth , that God Prov. 16. 4 made all things for himselfe : and Saint Paul likewise gives us to understand , that as things are from him , so all things are for him Rom. 11. last . also . But Gods love is infinite , therefore , say you , it extends to all , seeing all are lesse then infinite . A proper argument , and as well suitable unto your text , which undertaketh onely to shew , that Gods love is infinite to mankinde . And this argument proves as well , that it is extended to frogges and toads ; to Angells and Devills , as well as to mankinde . This is onely to professe , that it extends to all . Now this is a very improper interpretarion of infinite love : for lesse love , and lesse liberality , may extend to more then greater love , and greater liberality : for he that gives ten shillings to one person , is more liberall , then that divides five shillings amongst threescore persons , in giving them a peny apiece . Lastly , the fruit of this love can be but being : and is it not a proper commendation of Gods infinite love towards mankinde , to say that he gives being unto all ? And doth Gods love to man appeare more herein , then to the vilest creature that is ?

2 In the next Section you discourse at large after your manner of the amplitude of Gods love in comparison , which is nothing at all to your purpose , whose chiefe aime is to insinuae , that Gods love is alike to all .

Yet having proceeded thus farre , my resolution is to go on , and to consider what you bring . What thinke you of Adams love in the state of innocency , was it perfect , or no ? Though without sinne awhile , yet hee fell into sinne : so did the Angells before him , so should wee , though as perfect as they , if God should not uphold us . Yet our love in greatest perfection could not be so much as a shadow of Gods love , there being no resemblance betweene them : our love being a love of duety , Gods love to us of meere grace and mercy . Besides , betweene the fruits of Gods love to us , and the fruits of our love towards God , no colour of resemblance . Man is bound heartily to desire the good of all ; but God is free , and hath mercy on whom he will , and whom he will he hardeneth . Many widowes were in Israel in the daies of Elias , when Luc. 4. 25. 26. 27. heaven was shut three yeares and six months , and great famine was throughout all the land : But unto none of them was Elias sent , save unto Sarepta a city of Sidone , unto a certaine widow . Also many lepers were in Israel in the dayes of Elesaeus the prophet , yet none of them was made cleane but Naaman the Syrian . And if Gods will had beene to doe the best that might be , hee could have cured no doubt all other lepers as well as Naaman , and succoured other widows as well as the widow of Sarepta . Yet I confesse , Gods good will exceeds ours , not intensively onely , but extensively also : for not a sparrow falleth to the ground Matth. 10. 29. without the providence of our heavenly Father : hee saveth both man and beast , and heareth the young Ravens that call Psal. 36. 6. & 147. 9. & 145. 15. upon him : the eyes of all doe wait upon the Lord , and hee gives them their meat in due season .

And as touching the conferring both of grace and glory , therein hee saveth more then wee know , or are acquainted with . The number of the children of Israel , is as the sand of the sea that cannot bee counted for multitude . As touching Hos. 1. last . temporall blessings , all partake of his goodnesse therein , in their naturall preservation and consolation ; therein wee must imitate him in doing good to all , as it lieth in our power , though chiefly to the houshold of faith , yet not to them onely , Gal 6. 10. Luc. 10. 30. but to others also . But though he causeth his sun to shine , and his raine to fall upon the just and unjust ; yet pronounceth not the sentence of salvation on all promiscuously , whether they be just , or unjust .

And whereas all are equally corrupt in state of nature , yet he doth not equally shew mercy on all , or bestow the meanes of grace on all ; or where he doth bestow these meanes of salvation , he doth not make them effectuall unto us . He blindes the eyes , and hardens the hearts of some , that they should not see with Ioh. 12. 40. their eyes , nor understand with their hearts , and be converted , that he might heale them . Whereby it comes to passe , that the word of God , though it be the savour of life unto life unto some , yet it 2 Cor. 3. is the savour of death unto death unto others ; and the Ministers of God are a good savour unto God in both ; even both in them that are saved , and in them that perish . For God made all Pro. 16. 4. things for himselfe , even the wicked against the day of evill . Mercie , you say , is not restrained from ill deservers in distresse , so long as the exercise of it breeds no harme to such as are more capable of bountifull love and favour .

This is a consideration , which I confesse hath place among men sometimes , and in some cases . Yet hardly can I devise how to suit with a fit instance . For no states ( for ought I find ) doe take notice of any such distinction of times , wherein the exercise of mercy will not breed harme , and wherein it will , but they execute condigne punishment upon malefactors according to the lawes , that all may see , and feare to doe the like ; not be encouraged malorum facta imitari , but rather eorum Deut. 17. 13. exitus perhorrescere . God doth not so . His patience and long suffering is exceeding great ; yet if hee should give every man repentance in his death bed , and save their soules , what one in the world should be the worse for this ? And though the wicked many times spend their daies in mirth , and sodainly Iob 21. 13. goe downe to the grave ; yet by the grace of God we shall be nothing the worse for this , nor provoked hereupon to condemne Psal. 73. 15. the generation of Gods children . Yet what is it that makes one man more capable of bountifull love and favour then another I know not : what makes him more capable of love in the execution of reward , I know ; but what makes him more capable of love in the communication of grace , and in shewing mercy towards him , I know not . Sure I am , that woman who had many sinnes forgiven her , loved so much the more , the ninety nine just persons that thinke they need no repentance , Luc. 7. 47. Luc. 15. 7. like enough love so much the lesse .

It is true , the lawes of States take order for the just execution of punishment upon offenders for the common good ; yet by your leave , Kings on earth , by their absolutenesse doe give pardons to whom they will , respecting more their own pleasure then the common good . And withall I thinke Princes doe lesse offend ( if at all offend ) in refusing to pardon malefactors , then in granting pardons unto them . As for God , to whom you say the execution of justice is unnaturall , he being the Father of mercy ; I pray consider , if God should give repentance to all on their death-beds , and consequently save all , what common good of mankinde would be hindred by this ? And as God is the father of mercy , so is he also the Iudge of all the world , and I conceive the execution of justice punitive to be as naturall to him , as he is Iudge of all the world ; as the Gen. 18. 25 execution of mercy is naturall unto him , as he is the Father of mercy . Yet you seeme to have a place of Scripture to prove a notorious untruth ; as namely , that the execution of justice punitive is unnaturall unto God ; and that is out of Lament. 3. 33. He doth not afflict willingly , nor grieve the children of men . Thus you take Scripture hand over head to serve your turne . But I pray consider , is it possible that God should doe any thing against his will ? men may have reluctations , and conflicts in them , and doe things volentes nolentes ; is such a condition possible to be found in the nature of God ? Yet in this case Aristotle hath defined the action to be simply voluntarie , Eth. 3. and done willingly . If God be represented sometimes unto us as it were fluctuating like men betweene different resolutions of executing either mercy or justice , as in the Prophet , How shall I give thee up Ephraim , how shall I deliver thee Israel ? Hos. 11. 8. how shall I make thee as Admah , how shall I set thee as Zeboim ? mine heart is turned within me , and my repentances are rowled together ; like as he is represented unto us , as well in the shape of the members of our body , as of the passions of our minde ; we have cause rather to take notice hereby of the goodnesse of God in condescending thus far to our infirmities , to make us the better acquainted with him , and the more sensible of his favour , then hereby to take occasion to fashion God like unto our selves , either in body or minde . Yet the meaning of the Prophet is plaine enough , namely , that God comes not to afflict his children , unlesse he be provoked by sinne , and herein he differeth from earthly parents , who sometimes chasten their children for their owne pleasures ; but God as hee doth not , Heb. 12. 10 but in case he is provoked ; so he doth it for our profit , as the Apostle telleth us in the same place . To doe a thing willingly hath the same signification with the Latine phrase , animi causa , that is , when nothing is the cause thereof but a mans owne will , as Causabon observes out of Seneca de beneficiis 4. whose In Characteres Theophrasti , pag. 172. opinion was , Neminem adeo à naturali lege descivisse , & hominem exuisse ut animi causa malus sit .

You further say , that Nothing can provoke good men to execute punitive justice upon offenders , but the good of others , deserving either better , or not so ill , which might grow worse and worse through evill doers impunity . I pray consider , doe parents chastise their children for the good of others , and not for the good of the children themselves ? God himselfe chastiseth his owne children all manner of wayes , and is this for the good of others that deserve better , or not so ill ? and not rather for the good of those his owne children themselves ? No chastising for the present Heb. 12. 11. is joyous , saith the Apostle , but grievous , but afterwards it bringeth forth the quiet fruit of righteousnesse to them that are exercised thereby . Marke I pray , To them that are exercised thereby , he doth not say that this fruit is brought forth to others .

As for the torments in the world to come , who is the better for them , unlesse they tend to the improvement of joy in those blessed ones , while they behold in others that miserie which onely by the grace of God , themselves have escaped . For as for any other welfare of the Saints of God , or any welfare at al of the damned crew , or avoidance of grievances that is procured by the damnation of the wicked , if you know , it is well , but I assure you it is more then I can divine of . Yet doe we not say , that God hath pleasure in the torture either of men or devils , but onely in the demonstration of his owne glorious justice towards them , and in the magnifying of his mercy so much the more toward his Saints .

You say , It goeth against the nature of God to punish the workes of his owne hands . A vile speech , and withall senselesse ; and no marvell if when men prostitute all honesty and the feare of God in opposing manifest truth , they lose their wits also , and fall upon most unsober meditations . For what a vile speech is it to say , that any worke of God goeth against his nature , who as the Apostle professeth , worketh all things according to the counsell of his will . Then againe , what a senselesse speech Eph. 1. 11. is it to insinuate , that it were not so contrary to GODS nature , to deale thus with those creatures which were not the workes of his owne hands ; but being the works of his owne hands , you say , it is against his nature to punish them . A wonderfull assertion , and wherat the most barbarous people might be astonished in the consideration of the impiety , shall I say ? or the insulsity thereof , or both rather , namely , that it should be against Gods nature to punish sinners . For it is well known that God punisheth none other , nor ever did ; Christ Iesus the Sonne of God onely excepted . And what a field have you here to expatiate in if you list to aggravate the unnaturalnesse of any action in God ? And with as little sobriety doe you amplifie that unnaturalnesse in God by the consideration of man especially , as who ( you say ) is more deare to him then any childe is to his Father . So then to punish others , you are willing to grant not to be so unnaturall an action in God , as the punishing of man . And I pray what are those other creatures ? Are they inferiour , as Oxen and Sheepe , and all these never sinned ; yet is it not unnaturall to punish them , if punishment may have place ( as being taken for the afflicting of them ) where there is no sinne . For God gives us leave to weare them out , with plowing , carying , riding , for our necessity , for our d●light ; yea to set one creature upon another , the greyhound upon an hare , upon a deere , the hauke upon a partridge , or phesant , or wilde fowle . No unnaturalnesse doe we exercise in all this , such is the liberty which God hath given unto us . But yet to punish man , though a sinner , ( for he punisheth no other ) this how greatly ( say you ) doth it goe against the nature of God ? It seemes you cannot tell how greatly ; neither can I helpe you herein . For I doe not see how it is against his nature at all . But you seeme to give a reason , in saying that God is loving kindnesse it selfe . But I pray consider , is he not justice it selfe also as well as loving kindnesse ? and is it against the nature of Iustice to punish sinners ? no nor against his loving kindnesse neither . For I hope that no attribute of God is contrary to another , though according to their different notions , some actions are more suitable to the one , then to the other . And why man should have more speciall consideration here then Angels , I know no reason . For if you say that God is the father of man , in as much as he hath created him , by the same reason he may be the father of the ignoblest creature that is . To say that God is the father of man , in as much as hee made him after his owne image , this is no more true of man , then of Angels , even of the very Angels of darknesse . And men also are borne the children of darknesse , and so continue untill the time that God calleth them , and enlightneth them . Or will you say that in speciall sort he is the father of man , by way of redemption ; yet I finde hitherto in your discourse no intimation of this fatherhood . But will you say that all and every one have redemption in Christ through his bloud ? you may as well say , that all and every one have the Eph. 1. 7. Col. 1. 14. remission of their sinnes in Christ thorough his bloud . For this is it which in Scripture phrase is meant by redemption . Arminius who maintaines that Christ dyed for all and every one , professeth plainly , that the immediate effect of Christs passion is but this , that God now may , his Iustice nothing hindring him , give pardon of sinnes and salvation , upon what condition he will . Which upon the matter is all one , as if he should say , that seeing faith and repentance are the conditions whereupon God gives forgivenesse of sinnes , none but such as beleeve and repent doe obtaine the forgivenesse of sinnes , that is , doe obtaine redemption in Christ , through his bloud . Now consider , are not faith and repentance the gifts of God ? It cannot be denied but they are ; the Scriptures evidently Eph. 2. 8. Act. 5. 39. Act. 11 18. 2 Tim. 2. last . give testimony hereunto , namely that faith is the gift of God , that repentance is the gift of God . And doth God give faith and repentance unto all ? All experience of the world doth manifest that he doth not ; no nor so much as the outward meanes unto all , whereby faith and repentance are wrought . I wonder you blush not in setting downe such incongruities ; as first , in saying that God as he is willing to be called the father of the sonnes of men , so he is ready to doe the kinde office of a father unto them : and for proofe hereof alledge that of the Psalmist , As a father pitieth his owne children , so the Lord pitieth them that feare him . In which passage , the fatherly love of God is not extended unto all , but restrained to those that feare him . And yet I pray consider , what father would torment his children with everlasting fire , though never so unnaturall towards him ? or would not keepe him from it , if it lay in his power , without sinning against God ? Yet God torments even those whom you call his children , justly for their sinnes , in the torments of hell fire , that never shall have end . We willingly grant the love of God the Father , and the love of God the Sonne is such a love as passeth knowledge ; but it is enlarged onely towards Eph. 3. 19. Gal. 3. 26. those that are his children by faith in Christ Iesus . This is the filiation alone which the Apostle takes notice of ; you take no notice of this at all . And againe , Because ye are sonnes , God hath sent Gal. 4. 6. the Spirit of his Sonne into your hearts , crying , Abba , Father . Now is this common unto all , as you make Gods fatherhood common unto all ? So saith the Apostle in another place , As many as are led by the Spirit of God , they are the sonnes of God . Rom. 8. 14 Here is a description of that sonneship we have in respect of our heavenly Father . And againe , The Spirit of God witnesseth Rom. 8. 16 with our spirits that we are the sonnes of God . Of these passages I finde no accompt made throughout this whole discourse of yours . And towards these sonnes of God , wee shall willingly give you leave to extend and intend the love of God as much as you thinke fit . But you still continue to extend the fatherhood of God unto all , as it were in despight of all these passages formerly alledged . Where doe you finde throughout the Scriptures , that the title of the sonnes of God is attributed to the uncircumcised , or to the Heathen ? To the contrarie we reade both before the flood , that The sonnes of God saw Gen. 6. 2. the daughters of men that they were faire : where we have a manifest distinction opposite to your confusion : And after ; for this is the message which God sent unto Pharaoh , Israel is my sonne , even my first borne , — and if thou refuse to let him goe , I will Exo. 4. 22. slay thy sonne , even thy first borne . How much more under the Law ? Is Ephraim my deare sonne , or pleasant childe ? yet since I spake unto him , I still remembred him ; therefore my bowels are Ier. 31. 20. troubled for him , I will surely have compassion on him , saith the Lord . Most of all under the Gospell : Behold what love the Fathe , 1 Ioh. 〈◊〉 . 1. hath shewed us , that wee should bee called the sonnes of God . What have you here said of Gods love to man , that may not as well be said of his love to the very Angels of darknesse ? For is it not true in respect of them as well as in respect of us , that having given them being , he doth much more love them , after they are enstamped with his image . For he sowes not wheat to reape tares ; nor did he give life to Angels that he might bring forth death . God gave both man and Angels life for the manifestation of his owne glory ; and for the manifestation of his owne glory doth he punish transgressors amongst men and Angels with everlasting death .

3. You would willingly draw Heathens to the acknowledgement of this fatherhood in God towards all ; though thinking it too narrow to comprehend all references of loving kindnesses betweene him and demy gods , which demy gods you take to be men . I thinke rather they were conceived to be inferiour spirits ; like as Aristotle makes all inferiour intelligences to depend upon the first mover . And what reference of loving kindnesse is comprehended in this , that Iupiter is said to be both male and female , you may at leisure dilate of when you please . Gods affection to his children exceeds the affection of any mother towards the fruit of her wombe . For God was content to purchase his Church with Act. 20. 23 his owne blood . Your next sentence containes meere non sense : I rectifie it thus ; And as if his love could not be sufficiently expressed by these dearest references amongst men , &c. hee hath chosen the most affectionate female , &c. Thus I make sense of it ; but the poorest sense that ever was vented in so grave a matter of discourse . As if the greatnesse of place , or curiosity of education did make mothers so little compassionate towards their children , that God is faine to seeke out for more proper resemblances . Thus you fetch about for matter , as Balaam did for divinations ; as if there were no women in the world , but delicate Ladies , or such nice & curious dames , whose nicenesse hath made them so unnaturall , that our Saviour was driven to compare his tender affection unto the affectionof a hen towards her chicken ; which creature is magnified by you ( to hold up the jest ) for the most affectionate female amongst reasonlesse creatures : implying that reasonable creatures may in tendernesse of affection right well exceed the henne , and so you quite marre your owne play . But where doe you finde ( if a man might be so bold to aske ) that an henne is so superlative a creature in her affection towards her chicken ? I can hardly beleeve that either Aristotle or Pliny hath afforded you any such observation , but rather your comment upon them , or upon the booke of Nature . What ? is an henue more affectionate to her young ones , then a Pelican is to hers , who is said to let her selfe bloud to feed them ? or then a Storke , that hath her name from 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , and in the Hebrew is called 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , which is a word neere of kinne to 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , bowels of compassion , as which indeed are most tender in her . A story whereof we have in the description of the Netherlands : namely , of a Storke , that when the house was on fire where her nest was , kept the fire off from her yong ones with her owne body and wings so long till she was burnt her selfe .

Still you proceede in amplyfying the love of God , nothing to the purpose . For the question is not , how great Gods love is towards those on whom it is placed ; but whether it extend to all or no ? You say , All the sweet fruits and comforts of love , whether of fathers and mothers towards their children , or of husbands towvrd their wives , or of brethren to brethren , sisters to sisters , or of one friend to another ( their sinfulnesse excepted ) are but distillations or infusions of his infinite loue to our nature . We well know , the love of God exceeds all this ; bu● I verily think your penne hath runne riot ere you are aware , and you have written you know not , or you consider not what . For , herehence it followeth , that there is no act so abominable of the will of the creature , but God may infuse it , the sinfulnesse onely thereof excepted ; which yet is a very sory exception . for sinfulnes is not a thing that can be infused by God , Angell , or man . Of old is was determined by Austine , that sinne hath De civit . Dei , lib. 〈◊〉 cap. 7 not causam efficientem , but deficientem onely .

And herein you manifestly contradict your selfe , as who maintaine , that whosoever is the author of the act , must therewithall be the author of the sinnefullnesse thereof , for as much as sinfulnesse doth result ( relative like ) upon position of the foundation . And of this kinde of argument I have found you wondrous confident , in a certain treatise of yours , though a very weake argument , and long agoe proposed and answered by Capreolus , and whose answer thereunto is again rehearsed by Soncinas .

But here I shew onely how you make no bones of contradicting your selfe very handsomely , in saying , God doth infuse an act which is sinfull , though not the sinfulnesse of it . The love of God ( you say ) though infinitely increased in every particular , and afterwards made up in one , could no way equalize Gods love towards every particular soule created by him . Thus you steale up , without all proofe , the extention of Gods love to every particular ; and that in infinite manner . Whereas the Scripture professeth as plainely , that God hath hated Esau , as that he hath loved Jacob. And seeing Gods love can be but infinite towards his elect , and towards his dearest Sonne , and towards himselfe , you make it infinite towards the very reprobates , whether men or devills : for every particular of them hath beene created by him . Is not this good divinity , and very comfortable divinity ? Yet no Arminian will say , that God so loved the Angells that were fallen , that he sent his Sonne to die for them . When you say , The creatures for feare doe not so much good for their little ones as they might ; not so much for the modell of their wit or strength , as God for his part ( though infinite in wisedome and power ) doth for the sonnes of men . As hee said of his Bore that was sent him , Noster te non capit ignis conturbator Aper , so may I say of this your eloquence , that it passeth mine intelligence . I can neither construe your sentence , nor correct it .

To say that the creature cannot doe so much for his young as God doth for the sonnes of men , is so vulgar a trueth , that when you introduce it with such pompe and state , I may well say ' , Tu pulicem Gaure giganta facis : yet the adversative interposed ( Though infinite in wisedome and power ) hath no congruity to this sense neither ; for Gods infinite wisedome and power is no adversative to this I trow , but rather a coroborative thereunto . Bee it that God had done as much as could bee done for his unfruitfull vineyard , what is this to prove , that Gods love extends to all ? whereas the place it selfe doth manifestly restraine this love of God unto his vineyard . Yet what is there mentioned besides the well husbanding of this vineyard ; wherein hee appeales to their consciences , whether a better course could be devised then he had taken for the well husbanding thereof . But I pray consider , doth the worke of grace extend no further then to planting and watering ? Is it not God that gives the increase also ? Is it not in Gods 1 Cor. 3. 6. power to give faith , to give repentance ? you that will have God to infuse that love in carnall men , which is found to be sinfull , and not to infuse the sinfulnesse thereof , cannot indure that God should infuse faith and repentance into the heart of man . But if God can doe this , surely hee can doe more then ought that is expressed in that song of God concerning ●s . 5. 1. &c. his vineyard . Yet it is true , that in the way of outward husbandry , Gods course was without all exception , neither could the wisedome of man devise a better course for God to take , then was that which hee tooke with them . And therefore you have small cause to charge your adversaries with such sorry shifts , so atheisticall , as if wee thought Gods serious protestations deserved no credite with us . These are fictions of course , proceeding from an addle braine , to supply the roome of so and arguments .

And surely , did wee not believe Gods serious protestations , why should wee regard his oath ? For , amongst men , he that is found to bee no man of his word , is usually little regarded for his oath . Gods word , without protestation , is , and ever shall bee through his grace , sufficient ground of our faith in him . Looke you unto it that you hunt not after some other foundation , the tenour of whose discourse in many places , and in this very place , treating of his infinite love to all and every one , runnes in a current of manifest opposition against the word of God : though now and then you have a snatch at it , and away , like the dog at the river Nilus , for feare of the Crocadile ; and content your selfe onely with a superficiall consideration of it , as in this place , like as in the former . For what ? is this spoken indifferently of all ? of the Gentiles as well as of the Iewes ? It is manifestly spoken of the house of Israel , concerning whom the Lord asketh this question , Why will yee die yee house of Israel ? And the whole proceedeth by way of answer to their murmuring against the providence of God , in saying , The fathers have eaten sower grapes , and the childrens teeth are set on edge ; and hereupon God proceedeth to justifie the course of his providence unto their face . Now when God doth not take men upon the hippe , as soone as they have sinned against him , but spares them , and not onely gives them space of repentance , but useth meanes to bring them unto repentance , by sending Prophets unto them to admonish them , to admonish them of their sinnes , and to denounce the judgements of God against them ; is not this a manifest evidence that God is not delighted in their death , but rather in their repentance , although he still reserves libertie to himselfe to bestow the gift of repentance on whom he will ? And therefore all this is only in respect of his church , not in respect of those who are strangers from the common wealth of Israel , and aliens from the covenants of promise . then concerning those within the church , All are not Israel , that are of Israel , Rom. 9. And though the meanes of grace have their course withall , yet God intends to make them effectuall onely with his elect , according to that , As many as Act. 13. 4● Rom. 9. 30 were ordeined to eternall life believed ; and whom he hath predestinated , them hath he called , and justified , and glorified . For as Austine saith , Quantamlibet praebuerit patientiam , nisi Deus dederit . Aug. cont. Iulian. Pelag. lib. 5. cap. 4. Ibid. quis aget poenitentiam : And speaking of the Non pradestinatis . Istorum neminem , saith hee , adducit Deus ad salubrem spiritatemque poenitentiam , qua homo reconciliatur Deo in Christo sive illis ampliorem patientiam , sive non imparem praebeat . Therefore we say , that as concerning the elect , though they sinne , yet God willeth not their death , but willeth their repentance , and their salvation . But as touching others who are mixt amongst them , as tares amongst the wheat , and are partakers of the same meanes of grace and invitations unto repentance ; in as much as he spares them , and giveth them not onely time to repent , but admonisheth them of their sinnes , and affords them the outward meanes of repentance , it is sufficient to justifie , that God doth not willingly bring judgement upon them , neither for their sinnes , because hee comes not hastily thereunto , but upon wilfull despising of the means of grace , used to reclaime them ; like as before I shewed in what sense God is said , not to afflict the sonnes of men willingly . And as for this present place , your selfe elsewhere hath interpreted it thus , I will not the death of an impenitent sinner , but that God wills undoubtedly the death of an impenitent sinner . To quash this construction in this place , you say , this oath of God proceeds as concerning those , who all their life long have hated him . Here I am perswaded wee shall finde no little inconsideratenesse .

To hate God all a mans life time , what is it but to hate him from the first hower of comming to the use of reason , unto the last , even unto the moment of death ? now I pray consider , Will not God the death of such a one as dieth in impenitencie ? The text I confesse runnes thus , I will not the death of him that dieth . But doe you thinke indeed the meaning is , that as for such a man as now dieth , and hath lived all his life time in the hatred of God , God will not the death of such a one ? Like enough you are content your Reader should entertaine such a conceite . But I cannot bee perswaded you take this to be the meaning . The text is manifestly against it ; for it followeth , But rather that he returne and live ; so that it is spoken of a man living , and such as is capable of repentance . And wee know , the whole Chapter is to justifie Gods providence in afflicting men with his judgements : so that to die in this place , is to be under the afflicting hand of God , and so in the way to death and to destruction .

Our living is reputed a continuall dying ; for as much as nature consumeth and wasteth , as the Poet wittily expresseth it ; Childehood ends in youth , And youth in old age dies ; I thought I lived in truth , But now I die , I die ; I see , Each age of death is one degree ▪

Whereupon he concludes his resolution to correct his former phrase of speech , saying , Farewell the doating score Of worlds Arithmaticke : Life , I le trust thee no more ; But henceforth , for thy sake , I le go by deaths new Almanaeke . — For while I sing , A thousand men lie sick , a thousand bells doring .

And would you know what is the difference between me and them ; They are but dead , and I dying .

So that I guesse your meaning according to the articles of your owne creed , is but this ; That Gods love is such to them that all their life past ( not simply all their life , but all their life past ) have hated him , that , He will not their death , but rather that they returne and live . And I grant , that this is true of many in most proper speech , namely , of all the elect of God , though it bee long ere God calleth and converteth some of them . Of others also that live in the Church , I have shewed , how it may have course in the same sense , that God is said , not so much willingly to afflict them for their sinnes , as for refusing to repent and turne unto God after they have sinned .

When you tell us of infinite places more of sacred texts , and those most perspicuous in themselves , and also that , The whole ancient Church , with some small exception , which yet may bee counterpoised , is ready to give joynt verdict for you , it savoureth hotly of Smithfield eloquence ; Pessima quò vendas opus est mangone perito Qui Smithfieldensi polleat eloquio .

Yet it was an old observation , Multa fidem promissa levant cum plenius aequo , Laudat venales qui vult extrudere merces .

If you had some about you to justfie you in cleanly manner by some prety qualification , it had beene absolute . As the Gentleman who professed that he had certaine ponds wherein Carpes were taken as big as that Somer-pole which hee then rode by ; and withall askt his man that rode with him , whether it were not so . Sir , quoth his man , though they were so big , yet I am sure they were nothing like so long : and indeed , the dimension of length is more suitable to the proportion of an Eele , then of a Carpe . As Cicero answered him that told a strange tale concerning the length of certaine Eeles which he had seene : for Tully handsomely to convince him of his vanity , made shew of going beyond him in his owne element of tossing ; and forthwith replied , saying , That is nothing strange , for I know a place where Eeles are taken , of such a length that they use to make their Angling-rods of them . And this assertion of yours may come as heere to the trueth , as an Eele is to an Angling rod .

CHAP. XV.

What the Church of England doth teach concerning the extent of Gods love : Of the distinction of Singula generum , and Genera singulorum . Of the distinction of Voluntas signi , and Voluntas beneplaciti .

WHat you meane by a course of Compromising contentions betweene some other reformed Churches , in certaine points of religion , I know not , neither am I acquainted with any such course . I conceive our Church to be as absolute and entire in maintaining the prerogative , as of Gods grace effectuall to every good action ; so of his soveraignetie in electing whom he will , according to his good pleasure , and passing by others , as any Church in Christendome ; which I do not speake upon , snatching of a clause here and there to be found in the litturgie of our Church , whereunto I shape at pleasure an interpretation as I thinke good ( as your fashion is ) but this I speake upon consideration of that doctrine which is positively set downe in the articles of religion , manifestly containing the profession of the Church of England . Yet you would perswade your Readers , the Church of England concurreth with you , in extending the love of God towards all . But you manifest a faint heart in the maintenance of your cause , by walking in the cloudes of generalities ; as if you feared to come to the light , and had a purpose rather to circumvent your reader then to endoctrinate him . You talke of Gods unspeakable love towards mankinde , but you define not in what kinde , but keepe your selfe a loose off for all advantages .

Wee acknowledge Gods love to all in respect of conferring upon them blessings temporal , and that in an unspeakable manner . But the question onely is , whether God doth bestow , or ever did intend to bestow grace of sanctification upon all , or salvation upon all . If Gods love in these respects , in your opinion doth extend to all , say plainly that God hath elected all with Huberus , and predestinated all . For predestination in Austines divinity is but praeparatio gratiae & gloriae . Now the Church of England , in her publicke and authorized doctrine ; plainly professeth , that God hath predestinated none , but those whom he hath chosen in Christ , as vessells of honour . If you say , that the reason why God did not predestinate all , nor elect all in Christ , proceeds not from the meere pleasure and free disposition of God , but that onely upon the foresight of the obedience of the one , and disobedience of the other he elected those , and reprobated these ( for hereunto the Genius of your Tenent carrieth you , though you are loath in plaine termes to professe as much ) let any man judge whether this bee suitable to the seventeenth Article of religion in our Church , whereupon Rogers in his Analesis thereof published by authority , and dedicated to Archbishop Bancroft , observes in his fifth proposition , that , In Christ Jesus of the meere will and purpose of God , some are elected and not others unto salvation . And he just fieth it by holy Scripture , Rom. 9. 11. that the purpose of God might remaine according to election , not of works , but of him that calleth , Ephes. 1. 5. Who doth predestinate us , according to the good pleasure of his will , 2 Tim. 1. 9. Not according to our workes , but according to his owne purpose and grace , Exod. 33. 19. Rom. 9. 15. I will shew mercy to whom I will shew mercy , Prov. 16. 4. The Lord hath made all things for himselfe , even the wicked against the day of evill , Rom. 9. 21. Hath not the potter power over the clay , to make of the same lumpe one vessell to honour , and another to dishonour .

But consider the Article it selfe , They which are indued with so excellent a benefit ( to wit , as election and predestination is ) are called according to Gods purpose by his spirit , working in due season ; they through grace obey their calling , they be justified freely , they be made sonnes of God by adoption ; they be made like the image of his onely begotten Sonne Jesus Christ , they walke religiously in good workes , and at length by Gods mercy they attaine to everlasting felicity . Whereby it appeares , that election and predestination is made the fountaine and cause of obedience , and perseverance therein even unto everlasting life ; whereas if God did elect and predestinate any man unto salvation upon foresight of obedience and perseverance ; our obedience and perseverance should be the cause of our election and predestination , rather then our election and predestination the cause of our obedience and perseverance .

Againe consider , these alone whom God hath elected in Christ , and predestinated , are noted to bee made in due time the sonnes of God by adoption . But you make all to bee the sonnes of God , and Gods infinite love in unspeakable maner to be enlarged towards all and every one ; even towards them that have hated God all their life .

Lastly , onely the elect are here noted to bee those vessels whom God hath made unto honour ; not that any others are made unto honour : which is nothing answerable to your tenet . But proceed we along with you . You undertake to prove that Gods love is extended to mankinde , which no Christian ever called in question ; but your meaning is , that it extends to all and every one of mankinde , and that so farre forth as to will the salvation of all and every one , as appeares by the sequele , and all this out of the publique and authorized doctrine of our Church . And yet you insist onely upon certaine passages and prayers in the Liturgy of our Church . The Liturgie I hope is not the doctrine of our Church , though it be not contradictory to our doctrine . But therein wee have beene content to conforme unto the practice of the Chuch , so farre forth as it might seeme tolerable , and such as might be performed with a good conscience , which yet if in any particular it be found dissonant from the Articles of Religion , it is rather to receive correction from the Articles , then the Articles to receive correction from the Liturgy .

But consider wee what is that which you plead for your selfe . You enter upon it after your course with great state , discovering unto us a wonderfull providence of God , in drawing those Articles ; for you tell us , that No Nationall Councell , though assembled for that purpose , could fit their doctrine more expresly to meet with all the late restrictions of Gods love , then the Church our Mother , even from the beginning of reformation , hath done , as if she had then foreseene a necessity of declaring her judgement in this point , for preventing schismes or distractions of opinions amongst her sonnes . Here we have a pretty Comedy towards , and you have a poeticall wit for fiction . Had our Church foreseene a necessity of declaring her judgement in this point , where I pray was it fit that she should doe this , but in the Articles of Religion ? But you finde no place where she hath fitted her doctrine to meet with the restrictions of Gods love , but in the Liturgy and Catechisme . Was that think you a fit place to fit her doctrine for the preventing of schismes and distractions in opinion ?

Againe , had she intended to prevent ( as you say ) distractions in opinion about the extension of Gods love , would shee not have done it rather expresly , then onely in such a manner as to leave it to others to draw conseque●s therefrom , for the manifesting of her opinion about the large extent of Gods love to mankinde ? Who would thinke that a sober man should be caried away with such vaine and frivolous presumptions , without all tolerable ground ? But let us come to the particular scanning of the places . All of them , I marke , are onely the expression of prayer for others . Whence it no way followeth , that God will therefore save them , because wee pray for their salvation . The childe prayeth for his father , the father for the childe , the brother for the brother ; but hence it followeth not that God will save them ; though wee are bound to pray for the salvation of one another .

Moses prayed God to wipe him out of the booke of life , rather then to destroy his people in the wildernesse . God had no such resolution , and what sober Divine could doubt , but that Moses knew well that this could not be , yet hee shewes hereby what his desire was , secluding the consideration of Gods will to the contrary , and what he would preferre , ●f hee were left to himselfe , even his owne eternall confusion , rather then the glory of God should bee obscured . And who ever censured this prayer of Moses for sinne ? I am sure God doth not : so S. Paul could wish himselfe separate from Christ for his brethrens sake , which were his kinsmen according to the flesh , Rom. 9. 2. yet he well knew that nothing could separate him from the love of God in Christ . Our Saviour in like sort well knew that the cup must not passe from him , yet neverthelesse he prayed earnestly that that cup might passe , if it were possible , and with finall submission of his will to the will of his Father .

The first place you alledge , is that passage of the Liturgy , where we pray unto God , that it may please him to have mercy upon all men . And for good reason doe we pray so : for is not every one bound to seeke the salvation of all men , as much as lyeth in his power ? did not the Apostles labour for this in their place ? And is not prayer a speciall meanes for this ? We are bound to pray for them that persecute us , wee are bound Mat. 5. 4● . to pray for them that hate us . For what , if God will not save all , and wee know so much , shall that hinder us from doing our duty in seeking by all meanes the salvation of all : specially considering we are not able to put a difference and to discerne who are elect , and who are not . S. Paul , though he saved 1. Cor. 9. 2● . but some , yet would he become all things unto all men that he might save them . Yet he well knew that the word in his mouth was the savour of death unto death unto many ; yea 2. Cor. 2. 10. to Israel in speciall manner , and yet notwithstanding his hearty desire and prayer unto God for Israel wa● , that they might Rom. 11 ▪ 〈◊〉 be saved . And albeit God should save all , and every one that live in some one time or age , yet were this ●o prejudice to the doctrine of election . For the number of Gods chosen , for all this might be but few in comparison to the reprobate : And therefore we see no cause why you should upbraid your opposites , as if they thought this practice of the ancient and moderne Church had need of reformation .

As for the restraint of the universall all men , in the place of Timothy , by S. Austin unto genera singulorum , it is according to the usuall Scripture phrase . For Matth. 3. 5. it is said that There went out unto John the Baptist Jerusalem and all Iudea , and all the region round about Jordan ; what sober Divine doth extend the signification hereof any father then to give to understand , that some from all parts of Iudea , and of the region round about Iordan had resort unto him ? Matth. 4. 23. it is likewise said , that Iesus went about all Galile , teaching in their Synagogues , and preaching the Gospel of the Kingdome , and healing every sicknesse , and every disease among the people ; and that his fame spred throughout all Syria , and they brought unto him all sicke people . Doe you thinke there was not one sicke person left in all Galile and Syria that was not brought unto him ? Act. 10. it is said , that while Peter was in a trance he saw in a vision a vessell let downe from heaven , wherein was 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , every foure-footed beast ; who doubts but that the meaning hereof is no more then this , that of all sorts some , or rather of most sorts some ? 1 Cor. 15. 22. it is said , that in Christ all shall be made alive ; is this true thinke you of all and every one ? All flesh shall see the salvation of God ; what sober man will apply this to all and every man ? Rom. 5. 18. As by the offence of one man the fault came upon all unto condemnation : so by the obedience of one , righteousnesse came upon all men , to the justification of life : will you hereupon extend the benefit of Christs death to the justification of all men unto everlasting life , like as all and every one are fallen into condemnation by the sinne of Adam ? Rom. 7. 8. the Apostle professeth that sinne wrought in him 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , can this possibly bee applyed to every particular concupiscence ?

But by the way , what doe you meane to apply S. Austins restraint to this universall in this place ? whereas Austin applyeth it onely to this universall in the place following , where it is said , that God will have all to be saved . And if no other place did afford us any such restraint of course , yet wee must 〈◊〉 driven so to interpret it in this place , lest otherwise we be cast upon denying the first Article of our Creed . For seeing all are not saved , and the cause thereof is not because God will not save them ; it necessarily followeth , that the cause thereof must be because God cannot save them . And it would have becommed you well to have answered this argument , and not presumed to cary your Reader to the embracing of your construction hand over head , in spight of so manifest a reason to the contrary . Now if you had but accommodated your selfe to make answer hereunto , I doubt not but wee should have had good matter to worke upon ; which I speake upon experience of another discourse of yours that passeth by tradition ; but you were loth to intersert it there ; and made choice rather to pitch upon the universall in the former place ; that so you might be out of danger of that gun-shot that must needs have rung a peale in your eares from this place . Yet in this place alone S. Austine interprets the universall according to the restraint mentioned , and not in the former . And therefore you were content not to quote the place in Austin , but onely to say that it is somewhere ; and indeed so it is ; and that somewhere is in his Enchirid. cap. 103. And in the Chapter immediately going before , he professrth ; Deo procul dubio quàm facile est quod vult facere , tam facile est quod non vult esse non sinere . Hoc nisi credamus periclitatur ipsam nostrae fidei confessionis initium , quo nos in Deum Patrem omnipotentem credere consitemur . Neque enim veraciter ob aliud vocatur omnipotens , nisi quia quicquid vult potest , nec voluntate cujusquam creaturae voluntatis omnipotentis impeditur effectus . That looke how easie it is unto God to doe what he will , so easie is it not to suffer that to bee which hee willeth not . Vnlesse we beleeve this , the very first Article of our Creed will be shaken , whereby we professe to beleeve in God the Father Almighty . For he is not truly called Omnipotent , in any other respect then because he can bring to passe whatsoever he will have to be , neither can the effect of will omnipotent be hindred by the wit of any creature . So that herein we have both the authority of so great a Father , and manifest reason also directly opposite to your discourse . To avoid the brunt whereof , you juggle and consider his restraint there , where he doth not use it .

And here you tell us magnificently , that if any man will lay this restraint upon this place , the scanning of the words following , the fitting of the matter contained in both , with the reason of the exhortation , and other reall circumstances , will shake off this or other like restriction , with greater ease then it can be laid upon it . Here we have a great deale of cry , if the wooll be answerable , wee shall speed a great deale better then he in Aelian that shore his hogs . But the mischiefe is , S. Austin doth use no restraint in this place ; but conceives the Apostles commandement to be this , ut oraretur pro singulis . So that your paines is like to bee well bestowed , in shaking of Austines restriction from this place , whereupon he laid no restriction at all . It seemes you came to this discourse as a man should come to play at putfinger in the darke .

We grant we are to pray for the salvation of no other then whose salvation we are unfainedly to desire , and we are to desire the salvation of every man , of what condition soever , or fort , or nation , provided that wee know him . For doe you thinke it a sober course for me to desire and pray for the salvation of I know not whom ? If so , I see no reason but I may pray also for I know not what . Any malignant and persecuting enemy of mine , I am bound to pray for , and I shall bee sure to take notice of such a one , for I shall bee sure to feele him . And as well for meane persons as for Kings , that I have any thing to doe withall : albeit I may have greater cause to pray for the conversion of Kings then others , and that without accepting of persons : because by the good affection of Kings to Gods Church , the Church of God is like to prosper farre better then by the conversion of meane persons . And the Apostle gives this reason of praying for Kings , that under them we may live a quiet and peaceable life , in all godlinesse and 1 Tim. 2. 2 honestie . And therefore I hope you will beare with mee , if I pray with greater devotion for Gods grace upon the Kings heart , and Gods blessing upon his head , then for meaner persons : because the gracious disposition of a King is of far greater importance for the advancing of Gods glory , in the liberty and prosperity of his Church , then the gracious disposition of meaner persons . And herein I hope I shall not be censured for an accepter of persons , a conceit of yours quite besides the Apostles text you treat of . But yet the Apostle doth not command every congregation to pray for all kings ( wherunto you drive it , devising circumstances to fill the scale . ) For what have I to doe to pray for the king of Bungo , if any such king or kingdome there be ? or for the kings in Terra Australis incognita , discovered by Ferdinand de Quit ? yet his relations are of so little efficacy , that hitherto hee hath made no mens mouthes water after them . It is enough for us to pray for the fulnesse of the Gentiles , that it may come i● , so to make way for the calling of the Iewes . But by vertue of the Apostles exhortation , every Christian congregation is bound to pray for their owne king . Like as Darius , though an heathen Prince , desired the prayers of Gods people that lived under him : Ezr. 6. 10. Let them have to offer sweet odours to the God of heaven , and pray for the Kings life , and for his sonnes . When I pray for the comming in of the fulnesse of the Gentiles , and the calling of the Iewes , I except none ; as likewise when I pray for the ruine of Antichrist , I except none .

I finde , you doe not much satisfie your selfe in the weight of this your discourse , you are still casting about for somewhat more to make up the totall of your account , Wee must desire ( you say ) the spirituall good of all men , not as they fall under our indefinite , but under our universall consideration . So that belike you are still jealous , lest we draw all men to an indefinite and not to an universall consideration . I desire to deale as plainly as you would wish ; name any man throughout the world unto me , try mee whether I will not pray God blesse him , and convert his heart , and save his soule . And yet to my thinking , you should not urge mee to pray for one with whom I have nothing to doe , onely I heare a relation of him , perhaps dwelling in the I le of Iapan . For though I am bound to love my neighbour as my selfe ; and by neighbour I must comprehend a Iew , although my selfe bee a Samaritane , yet this is in case we meet together , and I see him to have need to make use of my charity . Otherwise to my judgement , generall prayers should serve the turne , as I shewed , for the fulnesse of the Gentiles to come in , for the calling of the Iewes , for the ruine of Babylon . Neither doe wee finde any practice of the Saints to the contrary ; and herein I assure you I except none . But because I see you travaile to bee delivered of somewhat , and I take pity of you , tell me I pray , is not your meaning this , that we must pray for all and every one that liveth in the world ? If this be your meaning , and it did not satisfie you to say we must pray for all , or desire the salvation of all ; you do as much as confess hereby , that to pray for al doth not include the praying for every one ; & consequently the Apostle in exhorting to pray for all , doth not exhort to pray for every one . I would I knew once what forme would satisfie you ; for I am apt to entertaine a resolution to gratifie you therein . But to say that we must pray for all , not in an indefinite , but in an universall consideration , if you could make me understand it , I would soone come to capitulation with you . In the meane time , I appeale to your conscience , did you ever pray in this stile , for all , and signifie that your meaning was to pray for them , not in an indefinite , but in an universall consideration ? I professe unto you , if God should leave me unto my selfe and to follow mine owne desires , I should desire not onely that all that now live , but that all that ever lived might have beene converted and saved , yea the Angels that fell might have been kept from sin ; or having sinned might have beene brought to repentance , & saved . I see no cause why I should desire the contrary . But considering the wil of God , wherby the angels that fell are bound in chaines , and kept to the judgement of the great day , I dare not pray for their salvation . And to pray that every one that now lives might be saved , with submission to the will of God , I see no incongruity ; but we have better grounds of faith , and those sufficient to take up our thoughts especially in these daies wherein we live , whereupon to proceed in the ordering of our prayers . And I would be loath you should put upon us any course or forme of prayer for all , which you practise not your selfe . And if I knew your practice in this kinde , I would soone give in mine answer whether I thought good to subscribe to your forme or no.

In the next place you tell us , that the reason why we are bound to desire the spirituall good of all men universally considered , is , because we must be perfect as our heavenly Father is perfect . Here againe you bewray your jealousie of the weaknesse of your owne cause , as when you content not your selfe in saying , we must pray for all men , but adde hereunto , that we must pray for all men universally considered ; the opposite member wherto before you signified to be this , To pray for all men indefinitly considered . Now the Apostle is farre from these scrupulosities . He simply exhorts us to pray for all men ; hee doth not adde as you doe , We must pray for all men universally considered , and not indefinitely . Yet in no other sense you think it will serve your turne .

That reason of yours drawne from the conformity to the courses of our heavenly Father , whereon you so much insist , I have already shewed how little it serves your turne . Now I will shew you how in another respect it is rather repugnant , then consonant to your Tenet . For that example of conformity is onely in an indefinite consideration , thus ; Wee must pray not onely for our friends , and them that love us , but also for them that are our enemies , and hate us , and persecute us ; like as God doth good unto the just and wicked , and not onely to the just and good . To our desires you say wee must adde our endeavours , that saving truth may be imparted to all . It seemes you have not failed herein . Now I would gladly know ▪ what those endeavours of yours have beene hitherto , whereby you have endeavoured , that saving truth may be imparted to the inhabitants of terra Australis incognita , or to the Negroes , or to the Tartarians , yea or the Turkes , Saracens , or Arabians . Hitherto you have seemed to dispute thus : God will have it our duty to pray for the salvation of all : therefore God willeth the salvation of all ; but now you dispute in a quite contrary manner , thus : God wils that all should come to the knowledge of his truth , therefore wee must desire and endeavour that his saving truth may be imparted unto al. The consequence of your former argument is utterly untrue , as I have already shewed ; and as Austin long agoe discoursed , mans will in an holy manner Aug. Enc● cap. 101 , may be contrary to the will of God ; and againe in a most unholy manner may the will of man be concurrent with the will of God . As it is the duty of the childe to pray for the life of the father , though God will have the father to dye , and not live : On the other side , a wicked childe wisheth the death of his father in an ungracious manner , yet it may bee that herein he concurreth with the will of God , supposing ( as it may well be ) that God willeth the death of the father at the same time that the sonne wisheth it .

As for the second argument , we deny therein the antecedent , if you understand it of all and every one . For the case is cleer , that God doth not bring all and every one to the knowledge of his truth ; not because he cannot ; for doubtlesse he could bestow his Gospell upon them that want it , as well as upon us that enjoy it ; therefore the reason must needs be because he will not . As he plainly professeth , he will bring a famine of his word upon a Land , Amos 8. 11. Behold the dayes come , saith the Lord God , that I will send a famine in the land , not a famine of bread , nor a thirst of water , but of hearing the word of the Lord . vers. 12. And they shall wander from sea to sea , and from the North even to the East shall they runne to and fro , to seeke the word of the Lord , and shall not finde it . So the Lord threatens the Church of Ephesus , to remove her candlesticke out of his place , Revel. 2. and long before threatned the Iewes to take his vineyard from them , and let it out to others that Mat. 12. 14 should bring him the fruit thereof in due season . And it is very strange that these and such like judgements should come to passe , and God should not will them . This is the reason whereupon Austin is moved to enquire into a commodious construction of that place , left otherwise we should fall upon a direct contradiction to the prime Article of our Creed ; and therefore after he hath given two constructions of the place , the last whereof is this , which you impugne , but not answer his reasons , which are two ; the one drawne from the analogie of Scripture phrase , as where our Saviour saith unto the Pharises , you tithe Mint , and Rue , and every herbe : which phrase cannot be understood otherwise , then of every kinde of herbe : the other reason is that formerly spoken of ; as if we say , That God willeth such a thing to come to passe , which yet doth not come to passe ; we shall thereby deny Gods omnipotency . Yet see the ingenuity of this worthy father : hee gives any man leave to give any fair construction of the place , provided that God bee not made unable to bring to passe whatsoever hee will have to come to passe . Et quocunque alio modo intelligi potest , dum tamen credero non cogamur aliquid omnipotentem statutum voluisse fieri factumque non esse : qui sine ullis ambagibus si in coelo & in terra ( sicut veritas dicit ) qucunque voluit , fecit , profecto facere noluit quaecunque non fecit . Let it , saith hee , be understood after what other manner soever it may be construed , so that wee be not constrained to maintaine , that the Almighty God would have something come to passe , which notwithstanding comes not to passe . For , without fetching any further compasse ; if he hath done whatsoever hee will both in heaven and in earth , as the truth witnesseth , certainly , hee would not doe whatsoever he hath not done .

2 But you proceed to shew , that both this duty of ours to pray for all sorts , and for every man of what sort soever ; and also that Gods will is , that all without exception should come unto the trueth and be saved , are expresly included in the praiers appointed by the Church of England . And the Collects whence you gather this , are in number three : they are , I take it , all appointed for Good Friday . In the first , wee pray , that God would graciously behold this his family , for ●he which our Lord Iesus Christ was contented to be betraied . Now this family , being the present congregation wherein the prayer is made , it is very strange , that hereby should be signified all sorts of men , and every man , of what sort soever throughout the world . And what expresse signification doe wee finde here , that Gods will is , that all without exception should come unto the trueth and be saved ?

To helpe your argument drawn herehence ; as if you should reason thus , Wee must pray for this family , therefore wee must pray for every one throughout the world . You tell us that , The tenour of this petition , if wee respect onely the forme , is indefinite , not universall : but being in a necessary matter it is equivalent to an universall , as every logician knowes . To which I answer , first , that the tenour of the petition is not indefinite , but definite , ( to follow you in your owne language ) for therein wee pray definitely for that family which is before us . Now that family is a particular family ; and never any Logician was so simple as to thinke it law full to inferre an universall out of a particular . Againe , here is no necessary matter in it . For to use such a forme of prayer is meerly the arbitrary constitution of our Church .

Suppose God had bid us to pray in this forme , to wit , for this family present ; yet this makes not the matter necessary absolutely , but meerely upon supposition of the will of God , and yet in this particular onely . As for example , Our Saviour Ioh. 17. 〈◊〉 . & v. 20 prayed for them that his father gave him , and for all those that should afterward believe through their word , will you inferre herehence , that therefore he was to pray for the world also ? Againe , God hath expresly bidden us to pray for them that 1 Ioh. 5. 16 sinne unto death ; and therefore , unlesse I may be assured , that there is none in the world that sinneth a sinne unto death , I have no reason to pray for all and every one ; though I were bound to doe so , it would nothing pleasure and advantage you . Hitherto I have followed you in your owne most unlogicall discourse , the absurdity whereof , every simple Logician may easily discover .

Where have you beene taught , that petitions indefinite in a necessary matter are universall : we were taught indeed , that propositions indefinite in a necessary matter are as good as universall : but for petitions indefinite to be counted universall in a matter necessary , is one of the absurdest notions that ever I heard to proceede from the mouth of a Logician . You proceede to prove , that the forme of the petition is in the intention of the Church of England to be extended to all and every one of the congregation present . But erst you told us , the matter indeed was universall , but not the forme , which you acknowledged to be indefinite . Now the very forme , you say , is to be universally extended : this is not to extend , but to destroy . But this that you labour for in so uncouth a manner , I never doubted of , namely , that by this family is understood all and every one of the Congregation there present : onely I deny , that herehence it followeth , that our Church bindes us to pray for all and every one throughout the world ; and if it doth , wee must comprehend even those that sinne sinnes unto death , amongst the rest , unlesse wee believe that there are no such sinners in the world : and hee had need bee of a strong faith , and have some extraordinary revelation that believeth that .

So that your second place tending to no other end but to prove that which wee never doubted to be comprehended in the first , wee need not trouble our selves about any answer thereunto ; save onely this , though we are bound to pray , not onely for the congregation present , but for the whole Church and every member of it ; yet there is a great gulfe of separation betweene the Citie of God , and the citie of the Devill ; which makes me remember what Abraham answered Dives , and therefore wee can no way approve this consequence ; We are bound to pray for all Christians , therefore we are bound to pray for all Atheists and heathens . Wee are bound to pray for Christs members , & therefore wee are bound to pray for Antichrist and his members . Therefore you tell us , the third and last prayer will cleerly quit this exception , and free both the foremr petitions from these and the like restrictions .

But in this last clause you overlash miserably ; I see no reason but I may as well say , that the restrictions in the former prayer will quit this latter prayer , for its extension . Certainly two of the three prayers you proposed to evince your Tenent are nothing to the purpose . Herein indeed we pray unto God , to have mercy upon all Jewes , Turkes , and Heriticks ; which in effect is no more then to pray , that the fulnesse of the Gentiles may come in , and thereupon the calling of the Iewes . And whereas you desire to inferre herehence , that it is Gods will , that all these should come to his truth and knowledge , and be saved . As the consequence you shall never bee able to make good , so the consequent is directly contrary to the word of God ; for it is not , nor ever was it the will of God that all this should be done together , but one after another , namely , that the fulnesse of the Gentiles shall come in first , and after that the calling of the Iewes , Rom. 11. Luc. 21. 24. Hence you conclude , That if God will not the death of any Turke , Jew , or Infidell , because of nothing he made them men ; wee may safely conclude that he willeth not the death of any , but the life of all , whom of men or infidels he hath made Christians . In reading your antecedent I wondred at your boldnesse , in supposing that which you are never able to gaine by force of argument ; but when I view your consequence , I wonder what giddinesse possessed you , to take so wilde a course in proving that which no Christian will deny . For your conclusion is , that God willeth not the death of any , but the life of all whom of men or infidels he hath made Christians . Did ever any Christian deny this ? Is this it you are to prove , that God wils the salvation of all Christians ? Have you not rather undertaken to prove that God willeth not the salvation of all sorts of men onely ( which was Austins glosse , and which you set up here as a mark to shoot at , thinking by the power of your discourse to beare downe the authority and learned discourse of that worthy Father hereupon ) but that he willeth the salvation of every man , of every sort throughout the world ? And this you would prove out of the doctrine established in the Church of England , that is , out of their Liturgie : and three prayers therein you insist upon , whereas the two first are apparantly nothing for the purpose ; whereof your selfe seeme to bee sensible enough , and therefore the third place ( Triary like ) was to doe the feat , and to cleare all : and the conclusion herehence definit in piscem : being no more but this , that God willeth the salvation of all men whom he hath vouchsafed to make Christians : which no man denies or cals into question . May I not justly aske , and that with admiration , Quid dignum tanto tulit hic promissor hiatu ? Parturiunt montes nascetur ridiculus mus .

But what should move you to carie your selfe so preposterously , and to balke or blast rather so faire a consequence , and so beneficiall unto your cause , as your antecedent doth bespeake ? For if your antecedent be true , namely , that God willeth not the death of any Turke , Iew , or Infidell , will it not manifestly follow , that God willeth not the death of any Turke , or Iew , or Infidell ? To my thinking it should follow as manifestly , as to say , that if the Sunne shineth it shineth ; though in my poore judgement this is identity rather then consequence or concomitance ; I say , I wonder what moved you to blast this consequence with such a dash of your pen , in the very face of it , and the addition of such a proviso as this , whom of men or infidels he hath made Christians . First , especially considering that no such qualification is in the antecedent ; and it is most unreasonable that any qualification should be foisted into a conclusion that hath no ground in the premisses ; especially it being such a qualification as utterly marres your market , and that at the end of the day , and you have a long time waited for a good penyworth , and now your selfe are the man that cuts your owne throat . Did the conscience of so foule a conclusion as was towards , make you blush to put it in writing ? that cannot be , for you have it full and whole in the antecedent ; though straining to proceed most indecently , it fares with you as it doth with the horse in the Poet : Peccat ad extremum ridendus & ilia ducit . Or by the way did your consequence suggest unto you that the argument drawne from this prayer , proves no more but this , that God will save every Iew , Turke , and Infidell , in case he be first made a Christian ? If so , then the supposed consequence in your antecedent , was made against your conscience ; and therefore by the consequence herehence made , you desired to strangle it , that so the birth of it might bee abortive . Yet because you carie some shew of argumentation in the antecedent , I will not trust to the corruptnesse of your consequent deduced therhence , but I will take the pains to strangle it my selfe , since the presse hath brought it to light : your antecedent is this , If God therefore will not the death of any Jewe , Turke , or Infidel , because of nothing he made them men . Now this includes such an Enthymeme : Of all Turkes , Iewes , and Infidels it is true , that God of nothing hath made them men ; therefore he will not the death of any Iew , Turke , or Infidel . Now I say this consequence is notoriously false , and in stead of your proving it in any manner , I disprove it in this manner . Of all Devils it is as true , that God of nothing made them angels ; shall I herehence inferre , therefore he will not the death of any devill ? So likewise of all cats and dogs , horses and hogs it is as true , that God of nothing made them such as they are ; will it therefore follow , that God willeth not the death of any of them ?

But perhaps some may say , that the Collect implyeth some such argument , for it runneth thus ; Mercifull God , who hast made all men , and hatest nothing that thou hast made , have mercy upon all Jewes . I answer first , here is no such argument implyed , as to inferre that God will not the death of any Iewe , Turke , or Infidell , but onely it implieth a reason why we pray God to have mercy upon all Iewes , Turkes , and Infidels . But albeit we doe thus pray for all , yet it followeth not that God will save every Iew , Turke , and Infidell that liveth , as before I have shewed . For who doubts but the childe is bound to pray for the recovery of his fathers health , being cast downe upon the bed of sicknesse , at what time it may bee , it is Gods will that his father shall not recover , but dye the death . Secondly , the complete reason why we pray for all , signified in this praier , is not this , because God hath made all men , and hateth nothing that he hath made ; for by the same reason we might be urged to pray for devils as well as for men : This is onely a part of the reason , not the whole reason . The whole reason is this , Who hast made all men , and hatest nothing that thou hast made , nor wouldest the death of a sinner , but rather that he should be converted and live . And we finde by manifest experience , that most wicked men are converted , and God hath revealed unto us , that the fulnesse of the Gentiles shall come in , Rom. 11. and that then shall be the calling of the Iewes ; therefore wee pray for the fulnesse of the one , and of the other ; but with submission unto the will of God , as touching the time of this , and the manner how .

Thirdly and lastly ; like as it followeth not , that because we must pray for all men , therefore wee must pray for every man throughout the world ; in like sort it followeth not , that because our Church prescribes us to pray for all Iewes , Turks and Infidels ; therefore it prescribes us to pray for every Iew , Turke , and Infidel throughout the world ; and looke what restraint may be laid upon all men , the very same restraint of interpretation may be laid upon all Jewes , all Turkes , and all Insidels . Yet you keep your course , and tel us that as God made all things without invitation , ( a prettie phrase for them that affect eloquence beyond intelligence ) out of meere love , made nothing hatefull . Apply this I pray to devils , and see whether we have not as good a ground to pray for them as for others . Againe , if sinne hath made them hatefull , is there not sinne enough in the world , in Iewes , Turkes , and Infidels to make them hatefull ? Wherefore though in case they were in the same state wherein God made them , then they should not be hatefull to God , and thereupon be thought fit matter of prayers ; yet seeing they are in the state of sinne , and consequently hatefull to God ; for the same cause , in just proportion of reason , they are no fit matter for our praiers . Though a full measure onely of enmitie against God exempt men from Gods love , yet will you denie that such a full measure is found in many throughout the world ? and will not this be sufficient to forbid our praiers for all and everie one ? Sure I am , if there be anie in the 1 Ioh. 5. 16. world that sin a sinne unto death , we may not pray for such an one .

3. From the authorized devotions in our Church , you proceed to the Catechisme ; and aske what can be more cleare then that , as God the Father doth love all mankinde without exception , so the Sonne of God did redeeme all mankinde , not onely some of all sorts , but all mankinde universally taken . And I thinke indeed that the one is as cleare as the other . Throughout the Scriptures shew me one passage wherein the love of God is expressed to Reprobates . If the Sonne of God did redeeme all and everie one , then all and everie one have redemption in Christ , through his bloud , and consequently the forgivenesse of their sinnes . For in Scripture phrase , remission Eph. 1. 7. Col. 1. 14. 2 Co. 5. 19 of sinnes is that redemption which we have in Christ : so is reconciliation also all one with forgivenesse of sinnes . Sure I am , Christ professeth , Iohn 17. 9. that he would not pray for the world , but for those whom his heavenly Father had given him , and for those that should beleeve through their Ioh. 17. 19. 20. word . And for their sakes did he sanctifie himselfe for whom he prayed ; and to what did he sanctifie himselfe , but unto his death and passion , by the consent of as many Fathers as Maldonate had seene , as the Iesuit himselfe professeth on that 17. of Iohn : and he had seene very many , as there hee signifieth , namely , Chrysostome , Cyril , Austine , Theodorus Mopsuestenus , and Heracleotes , Leontius , Beda , Theophilact , Enthymius , Rupertus .

But to proceed ; out of our Catechisme you alledge , that God the Father made us and all the world ; now the Church our mother hath taught us , that God hateth nothing that hee hath made . The booke of Wisedome saith so indeed ; but because of the little authority that booke hath in matter of faith from God our Father , therefore you charge us with the authority of the Church our Mother . Now you are not ignorant , I suppose , whence the Church our mother taketh this , which hath its course amongst Papists , as well as amongst us . And you know of what authority Aquinas is amongst Papists ; and what interpretation he makes of this place , though received to bee canonicall Scripture amongst them , I have already shewed out of his Summes : God ( saith he ) loves all things , in as much as Aquin. in 1 q. 23. art. 4. he willeth unto them some good or other : but in as much as he willeth not a certaine good to some , to wit , eternall life , he is said to hate them , and reprobate them . And indeed God saveth both man and Psal. 36. 6. beast , as the Psalmist speaketh ; and so he may bee said to love them all ; and so the Apostle acknowledgeth him to bee the Saviour of all men , but especially of them that beleeve . And to professe 1 Tim. 4. 10 ingenuously what I thinke , I see no cause of controversie hereabouts , if so be the question be rightly stated . For when we say , Christ died for mankinde , our meaning is that Christ died for the benefit of mankinde . Now let this benefit bee distinguished and considered apart , and forth with contentious hereabouts will cease . For if this benefit be considered as the remission of sinnes , and the salvation of our soules ; these being benefits obtainable onely upon the condition of faith and repentance : As on the one side no man will affirme that Christ died to this end , namely , to procure forgivenesse of sinne and salvation to all and every one , whether they beleeve or no ; so on the other side , none will deny , but that he dyed to this end , that salvation and remission of sinne should redound to all and every one , in case they should beleeve and repent . For this depends upon the sufficiency of that price , which Christ paid to God his Father for the redemption of the world . But there be other benefits which Christ merited for us also , even the very grace of faith and of repentance . For all Gods promises are Yea and Amen in Christ ; and amongst 1 Co. 1. 20 Deut. 30. 6 Esa. 57. 18. Hos. 14. 5. these promises one is , the circumcision of the heart , the healing of our waies , of our rebellions . These promises doe include the grace of faith and of repentance . Now consider ingenuously , did Christ die to this end , that the grace of faith and repentance should bee bestowed absolutely or conditionally ? Not conditionally , for before the grace of faith and repentance and regeneration comes , there is nothing to bee found in man but workes of nature . Now it is meere Pelagianisme to affirme that God bestoweth grace on man upon the performing of a worke of nature . And the Apostle clearely 2 Tim. 1. 9 Tit. 3. 5. professeth that God doth not call us according to our works . Therefore it remaines , that albeit remission of sinnes and salvation are conferred unto us conditionally , to wit , upon the condition of faith and repentance ; yet the grace of faith and repentance cannot be so conferred : and consequently they must be conferred absolutely . If then Christ died for the purchasing of faith and repentance to all and every one absolutely , it would follow herehence , that all and every one should beleeve and repent . But this being found to bee a notorious untruth , it followeth that Christ died for the purchasing of these graces onely unto some ; and who can those bee , other then the elect of God ? Accordingly as our Saviour professeth , that for those who were Gods , and whom he had given unto Christ , or should in time to come give unto him ( the rest excluded ) for those he sanctified himselfe , that is , offered himselfe upon the Crosse ; which interpretation of Christs sanctifying of himselfe , Maldonate professeth , was received by all the Fathers whom he had seene . In Iohan. 17. 19.

Now to goe along with you . Secondly , we are taught , you say , by the same Catechisme , to beleeve in God , who hath redeemed us and all mankinde . What I pray is this more then to say , He hath redeemed us and all men ? Is all mankinde more then all men ? and in the straining of this phrase we have tried your strength ; and the issue of all was to prove but this , that God willeth not the death of any , but the life of all , whom of men and Infidels he hath made Christians .

By the way I observe an incongruity . Of Infidels wee are made Christians , as whereby we cease any longer to bee Infidels : but I hope of men we are not made Christians so , as to cease any longer to be men . Yet you couple them together under one yoke , though very unequall heyfers : you should have said rather , of meere men we are made Christians . All that are redeemed are unfainedly loved ; but if all mankinde signifie no more then all men ; and all men , no more then all sorts of men , what are you the nearer to that you reach after ? And you know , I suppose , that this was Austins interpretation of that universality ; and hee gives reasons for it ; though you magisterially will have your owne way , in spite of the pie , without answering his reasons .

Againe consider , whether to pay a price which is sufficient for the redemption of all and every one , be not in a faire sense to redeem all & every one . And what one of our Church will maintaine , that any one obtaines actuall redemption by Christ without faith ? especially considering that redemption by the bloud of Christ , and forgivenesse of sins are all one . I would Eph. 1. 7. Col. 1. 14. you would speake plainely , and tell us what is meant by redemption , which , you say , every one hath in Christ , denying that every one hath sanctification . So that whereas the Apostle joynes these two together , where hee saith , Christ is of 1 Cor. 1. 2● God made unto us wisedome , righteousnesse , sanctification and redemption , you divide them , telling us , that Christ is made redemption to all and every one , but not sanctification . And truely I had thought that Christ had deserved the one as well as the other , for all those for whom he died . And it is very strange that God should be said to love them whom he never meanes to sanctifie .

But I pray answer me , Doth he unfainedly love the Devils ? I thinke you will say he doth not ; what reason have you then to say , that hee loveth all men , though you will easily perswade your selfe that the most part of them are reprobates , and whom hee never will bring unto wholesome and spirituall repentance , whereby a man is reconciled unto God in Christ , as Austine writes , lib. 5. cont. Iulian , Pelag. cap , 4. and whether you meane to contradict Austine in this also I know not as yet : yet one word more with you before wee part ; How long doth God continue to love them ? till the measure of their sinne is at full ? t is your owne oracle in the former Section . And then belike hee beginnes and continues to hate them . But I pray consider , how can this change , this alteration stand with the nature of God , that his love , his will to save them should bee changed into hatred , into a purpose to damme them , considering that Gods will is his essence ? And the Lord professeth of himselfe , saying , I the Lord am not changed , and yee sonnes of Iacob are not consumed , Mal. 3. 6. All that are baptized , in your opinion , are not sanctified : yet some others much agreeing with you in other opinions maintaine , that all that are baptized are regenerate , and they alledge a better testimony out of the book of Common prayer , then any you have brought to serve your turne , namely , the profession that is made by the Minister thus , Now this childe is regenerate , and grafted into the body of Christs congregation . Yet that hath beene answered by a Bishop of our Church , and that out of the doctrine of Austine . Yet I grant , baptisme is the seale of redemption , and of forgivenesse of sinnes also , but to whom ? to none but such as believe : for God hath not ordained , that the benefit of Christs bloud shall redound to the redemption and forgivenesse of the sinnes of any man , unlesse hee believeth . For God hath set him forth to be a propitiation Rom. 3. 25 for our sinnes through faith in his bloud . But your inferences you conceive to bee as cleere as christall , so that the consideration of them makes you doubt , whether such amongst us as teach the contrary to these , have at any time subscribed to the booke of Common prayer .

And no question is to be made of your subscription , which deny all them to bee sanctified that are baptized ; though in plaine termes the booke of Common prayer professeth of every baptized childe , that hee is regenerate . And now you have plaide your part so well in working our authorized devotions , as you call them , and Catechisme to serve your turn ; you promise to performe as much touching the book of Homilies ; but wee must expect your performance therein , untill you come to the article concerning Christ : in the meane time you will give us space to breathe , and take notice of your concludent proofe , as you call it , thus . God wills the salvation of all that are saved , and all that are not saved , therefore hee wills the salvation of all and every one . Now the second part of the Antecedent , which alone is called in question , is proved out of that of Ezech , As I live I will not the death of him that dieth .

I had thought you had done with this ; but if it bee your course to tautologize in repeating former arguments , I may take liberty to repeat ( without tautologie ) my former answer .

First therefore , I say , the words as they lye in proper speech are contradictions to your tenent in two respects ; First , because in another discourse of yours , you maintaine , that hee whose death God wills not , is the penitent ; but here you professe , that God willeth not the death of them that are not saved , when they die ; which as as much as to say , that God willeth not the death of impenitent sinners .

Secondly , there is a time you confesse , in the former Section , when God hates sinners , to wit , when the measure of their sinne is full ; and if then he hates them , he may then as well be said to will their death and damnation , as he was said to will their salvation , while he loved them . In the second place , the words as they lye in proper speech , are contradictions to manifest reason ; for , seeing God is he that inflicts death and damnation upon them , hee must needes will their death and damnation , because whatsoever God doth , hee doth it according to the counsell of his owne will , Eph. 1. 11. Secondly , if God doth not will the death which he inflicts , then neither doth he will the punishment that he inflicteth , nor the chastisement that he inflicteth ; and so indeed it is said , Lam. 3. That he doth not punish willingly , nor afflict the children of men ; which cannot bee understood in proper speech ; for then it would follow , that God doth afflict and chastise the children of men against his will . Therefore I say , this must be understood by a figure of speech , to wit , by a metaphor ; and God said not to will or this or that , which hee doth , because in the doing of it hee is similis nolenti ; as first when hee doth it not , according to the Latine phrase , animi causa , for his pleasures sake , but being provoked ; and yet not hastily neither , though provoked , but after long forbearance , and giving time of repentance , upon the despising of this goodnesse of God , as Ezek. 14. 23. They shall comfort you when you see their way , and their enterprises : and ye shall know that I have not done without cause all that I have done in it , saith the Lord God .

Secondly , when God doth chastise , not as parents , for their owne pleasures , but with an eye to the good of those whom hee chastiseth , Rom. 12. 10. According thereto is that of Augustine , Qui trucidat non considerat quemadmodum laniet , Epist. 48. sed qui curat considerat quemadmodum seret .

This is my answer , following the course of your owne reading of the place , whereas Piscator blames the vulgar translation in this place which you follow : for , saith hee , in the Hebrew it is not , I will not the death of a sinner ; but this , I am not delighted in the death of a sinner . But saith he , A man may will that wherein he takes no delight : as a ficke man may will to drinke a bitter potion , wherein he takes no delight . For he may will to take it , not for it selfe , but for something else , to wit , to recover his health . And so God willeth the eternall death of reprobates for his owne glory , to wit , for the manifestation of his just wrath in punishing of their sinnes . And Iunius reades it and translates it in like manner : and with these accordeth our last English translation , As I live , saith the Lord God , I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked , but that the wicked turne from his way , and live , Ezek. 33. 11. And the 18. of Ezekiel doth cleare the meaning of the Holy Ghost , where the same phrase is used , and in the same manner translated by our worthiest Divines , and followed in our last translation , vers. 23. Have I any pleasure at all that the wicked should dye , saith the Lord God , and not that hee should returne from his waies , and live ? and verse 32. I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth , saith the Lord God , wherefore turne your selves and live ye .

Now in this chapter the Lord justifieth himselfe against an imputation of harsh , if not unjust , dealing , as if hee punished the children for the sinnes of their fathers , which in a proverbiall manner was delivered thus ; The fathers have eaten sowre grapes , and the childrens teeth are set on edge ; which might occasion a desperate disposition in them , and provoke them to cast off all care of amending their waies , and turning to God by repentance ; because all was one , whether they repented , or repented not , because the sowre grapes which their fathers had eaten , were enough to set all their teeth on edge : Against this the Lord made a solemne protestation , that all soules were his , even the soules of the children , as well as the soules of the fathers , and that the soule that sinned , that should dye ; and hereupon expostulates with them thus , Have I any pleasure in the death of a sinner , to wit , so as to bring death upon him , notwithstanding his repentance , because forsooth his father had eaten sowre grapes ? No , no ; the Lord hath no delight in their death , but if they returne and live , hee delights in that , and therefore concludes with exhorting them to returne unto the Lord , that they may live .

Now when you forsake the translation of our Church , and slicke unto the Vulgar corrupt translation , to hold up your odde conceits ; doth it become you to make question whether they that oppose you in your extravagant tenents and proofes , have subscribed to the booke of Common Prayer ? Piscator proceedeth further , and saith , that the meaning is not simply , that God delights not in the death of the wicked , but in case he ceaseth not from his iniquity ; as appeares , saith he , by comparing of it with that which goeth before , and with that which commeth after : for otherwise God takes delight in all his workes : like as Lyra upon Ezech. 18. Punitio improbitatis bene est à Deo volita quia justa . In Proverbs 1. 26. thus we reade , I will laugh at your destruction , and mocke when your feare commeth . How are these places to bee reconciled ? Piscator answereth , God is not delighted in the death of man , as it is the destruction of the creature , but is delighted therein , as it is the just punishment of the creature : which is as much as to say , he delights in the execution of his owne Iustice : like as wee reade , Ier. 9. 24. Let him that glorieth glorie in this , that he understandeth and knoweth me . For I am the Lord which shew mercy and judgement , and righteousnesse in the earth : for in these things I delight , saith the Lord .

4. Now as if you had made all sure on your side , partly out of our authorized devotions , wherein you make choice of three prayers ; whereof two are nothing to the purpose , and the third , at your uttermost straining of it , doth but encourage you to conclude finally that God wils not the death , but the life rather of them that of Infidels are made Christians ; and partly out of the Catechisme , where you finde that Christ hath redeemed all mankinde , which hath no coloutable extent further then all men ; and without manifest opposition to Austin , you finde this phrase will not serve your turne ; whom yet you oppose so , as without answering any one of his arguments ; one whereof was drawne from analogie of Scripture phrase , another from manifest reason , professing therewithall that your construction of this place contradicts the prime Article of the Creed .

And last of all , driving the naile of your discourse home , with a concludent proofe depending upon a translation of the text quite different from the most authentique translation of our Church , which yet must be without prejudice to your conformity , having a sound heart of your owne , and therefore some peccadilies may bee well borne withall , and you take liberty to question others your opposites , whether they have subscribed or no to the booke of Common Prayer ; such is the height of your imperious cariage , bearing downe all before you .

Now you come to enquire , By what will God doth will they should be saved that are not saved ; and you demand whether God doth will their salvation by his revealed , and not by his secret will . As if this were our opinion ; whereas neither Calvin embraceth it , nor Beza , nor Piscator , but all concurre upon that interpretation which Austin gave many hundred yeares agoe , and which you impugne ; and how judiciously , we have already considered . Peter Martyr proposeth it amongst divers others , but embraceth it not ; neither doe I know any Divine of ours that embraceth it . Cajetan indeed embraceth it , and Cornelius de Lapide , and Aquinas amongst other interpretations .

As you doubt whether your opposites have subscribed to the booke of Common prayer ; so if you take a liberty to put upon us the opinions and accommodations of distinctions used by Papists , you may in the next place make doubt , whether wee have not subscribed to the Councell of Trent . We plainly deny that God doth will the salvation of any , but of his elect . For to will to save , and decree to save is all one , and election we say is the decree of salvation . And as God hath not elected all unto salvation , nor ordained all unto eternall life , so neither hath he willed to save all . For hence two absurdities doe manifestly follow ; first , that the reason why many are not saved , must bee , because God cannot save them ; which is the argument of S. Austin . Another is , that Gods will shall bee changed : for undoubtedly when God damnes any man , then he will not save him ; and therefore if before he did will to save them , his will is afterwards changed , both by changing his old will , which was everlasting , and by entertaining a new will , which was not everlasting . Hemnigius , a great patron of universall grace , interpreteth the place of S. Paul , 2 Tim. 2. 4. Deus vult omnes homines salvos fieri modo fide oblatam salutem recipere non recusaverint . Neither doe I like Cajetans interpretation after this manner , when he saith , Est sermo devoluntate signi , qua Deus proponit omnibus hominibus praecepta salutis , doctrinamque Euangelij ; and that for two reasons : First , because God doth not propose his Gospel to all : Secondly , if God should propose the Gospell to all , and bid all men to beleeve , this is no certaine signe that God will have them to beleeve , like as it is no certaine signe that God will give them grace to beleeve , without which they cannot beleeve ; for it is manifest that God doth not give the grace of faith and repentance to all that heare the Gospell , nor to a major part of them ; but it is a signe , I confesse , that God will have it our duty to beleeve , by commanding us to beleeve . Gods commandement is usually called his will , and the commandement of God Schoolmen make to be one of the signes of Gods will . So he commanded Abraham to sacrifice his sonne Isaak . This they call voluntas signi , but yet hee was determined that Isaak should not bee sacrificed , as appeared by the event ; this they call voluntas beneplaciti . So he commanded Pharaoh to let Israel goe , this was his voluntas signi ; but yet he told Moses , he would harden Pharoahs heart , that hee should not let Israel goe ; this they call his voluntas beneplaciti ; the end whereof was , that God might have occasion to shew his power , and magnifie himselfe , in his plagues brought upon the Aegyptians , to breake those hearts that would not bend unto him .

So that you are out in the interpretation of voluntas signi , The will of signe , and the will of good pleasure . and beneplaciti , as well as in the accommodation of it , as out of our opinion . God proposeth no signification of his good will to any man , as touching the saving of him , otherwise then by faith and repentance : and plainly protests , that without faith and repentance they shall not be saved .

You would faine have your adversaries grant , that God doth will the salvation of all men by his revealed will , or voluntate signi . Indeed if you may have the fashioning of our opinion , you may soone be victorious , in conquering men of straw in stead of reall opposites . This distinction of yours is absurdly applied to our opinion , in this case ; who deny that God doth at all or any manner of way will the salvation of reprobates . For revealed will , and voluntas signi , is the will of Gods commandement , and the objects of commandements are onely morall duties , and not the rewards of them , such as is salvation . Yet it is truth , that what God is said to will by his will of commandement ( so usually called , though improperly the will of God ) the same at once he doth not will , but rather the contrary sometimes , by his voluntas propositi , will of purpose and decree , which alone is properly to bee accounted the will of God , and which none can resist , Rom. 9. 19. And this we can prove , and have alreaby proved by two instances ; the one as touching the sacrificing of Isaak , commanded to Abraham , but not determined by God that it should be brought to pass ; as also in the letting of Israel goe , commanded unto Pharaoh , yet God resolving for a long time to harden Pharaohs heart , that he should not let them goe .

Neither will it herehence follow , that there are two wills in God , as you most unlearnedly urge ; but that God may command one thing , which yet he is resolved shall not come to passe ; so that the thing commanded may be contrary to the thing determined by God , as when he commanded Abraham to sacrifice Isaak , but withall determined that Isaak should not be sacrificed .

But Gods commandement , though it be usually called his will , yet it is improperly so called ; onely the will of purpose and decree is properly Gods will ; according to that of the Apostle , Rom. 9. 19. Who hath resisted his will ? For the commandement signifieth onely what is our duty to doe , it doth not signifie what God hath determined shall be done . For as for the crucifying of the Sonne of God ; Gods hand and his counsell had determined before that it should bee done , but he commanded none to crucifie him ; but rather commanded all the contrary , namely in forbidding the shedding of innocent bloud . Neither shall there be a contradiction betweene the objects of Gods will which is one , but onely betwixt the objects of his commandement , and the object of his will and determination , as in the instances proposed I have manifested . As for your applications of the distinction of voluntas signi , The will of signification , and the will of resolution . and voluntas beneplaciti , to the salvation of mankinde , I know none of our Divines that embrace it . Wee plainly deny , that God willeth the salvation of any but of his elect . For Gods will we conceive to be all one with his decree , and election we define to be the decree of salvation , or the ordaining of men to everlasting life . So that we may well give you leave to runne riot in your fruitlesse argumentation . You on the contrary doe apparantly maintaine a manifest contradiction betweene the object of Gods will . For seeing God doth damne many , it followeth that he did will to damne many , and that from everlasting , though onely for their sinne : yet these whom from everlasting he did will to damne , you maintaine that out of infinite love he did will to save , till the measure of their sinne was full . So that at once he did will to save , and will to damne the same persons by your opinion ; thus the contradiction fairely and fully lights upon your selfe , which upon a meere fiction of yours , and that contrary to our professed opinion , you charged upon us . Wee grant the will of God is but one , but we say his will properly so called , and his commandement usually called also his will , though improperly , are two distinct things . For by the one he sheweth what is our duty to doe , or to leave undone ; by the other he determineth what shall be done or not done , what shall come to passe , or not come to passe in the world . Of what force and credit your words are , when you talke of manifest contradiction upon our part , let the indifferent consider and judge .

5. But you will seeme to gratifie your opposites , by not carying your selfe so rigorously criticall , as to banish this distinction of voluntas signi and voluntas beneplaciti out of the consines of Divinity . But therewithall you continue your former fiction , in the stating of our opinion , as if we maintained that God did will the salvation of all , by that will which is called voluntas signi , but not by that will which is called voluntas beneplaciti : whereas I know none of our Divines that doe professe their opinion in that manner , but rather they utterly deny in plaine termes , that God doth will the salvation of all . And in my judgement , the application of this distinction in this case , by some that are orthodoxe in the point of Predestination , as namely by Aquinas and Cajetan , is most unseasonable , And therefore we have small cause to feare the imputation you cast upon us , forsooth of canonization of Iesuiticall perjuries , and deification of mentall evasions or reservations ; seeing it is onely grounded upon a meere fiction of yours , fashioning our Tenent at your owne pleasure most unseasonably , and most incongruously , in respect of our opinion , who grammatically and plainly professe , God willeth not the salvation of all men . And yet I am perswaded that in the end this canonization of Jesuiticall perjuries , and deification of mentall evasions or reservations , will justly light upon your selfe , according to the lawes of your owne making ; and the tenour of your consequences , when you come to manifest wherein this distinction of voluntas signi , and voluntas beneplaciti may have place . Yet I purpose to consider well , how you carrie your selfe in this imputation you cast upon us .

You acquaint us with two Iesuiticall equivocations , each consisting in part of a protestation , and in part of a mentall reservation . The first as touching the protestation , is this , I doe not intend the ruine of King or State ; as touching the reservation this , so they will become Roman Catholiques . The second protestation this , J know of no conspiracy against them ; the reservation this , with purpose to reveale it unto them . Now let us see how you make us to deifie these or such like equivocations , upon your fiction of our opinion . You need not trouble your selfe about putting any interrogatory unto God , it is enough to prove that God by our opinion doth make protestations of such intentions , or expresse such speeches with such reservations . God protests , you say , that he would not the death of him that dies ; and we ( you say ) professe this to bee spoken with such a reservation , So he will repent , which J know he cannot doe . A second is this , God doth not will the non-repentance of him that dyeth ; the reservation that wee make , as you say , is this , with purpose to make it knowne to him ; however , according to my secret and reserved will , I have resolved never to grant him the meanes , without which he cannot possibly repent , whereas without repentance he cannot live , but must die . To each of these I answer distinctly , and to every part of each .

First therefore I deny , that God professeth any such thing in the place you beat upon , as that hee will not the death of him that dieth , but onely that he delighteth not , nor hath any pleasure in the death of him that dieth . And not onely Piscator and Iunius doe so interpret the place , but our last , and best , and most authorized English translation doth so render it . And wee cannot but wonder at your inconsideration , if you take no notice of it , or at your boldnesse thus to proceed in despight of it , if you did take notice of it , and yet question your opposites Archdeacon like at least , whether they have subscribed to the booke of Common Prayer .

Secondly , touching the reservation ; I say it is your owne interpretation , as I have read in a manuscript of yours , namely , that he whose death God willeth not , is the penitent sinner . And in the end of the seventh section of this Chapter you professe that God necessarily hates them that have made up the full measure of their iniquity : whence it seemeth that when God saith ( according to your translation ) I will not the death of him that dieth , it is to bee understood with this provision , provided that he fill not up the measure of his iniquity .

Againe , I say this supposition of repentance is no reservation , but plainly signified by the tenour of the Prophets discourse , as appeares manifestly both by the consideration of the 33. chapter in Ezekiel , and especially by comparing of it with the 18. wherein are found the same words , as I have already shewed in the end of the third section . So that we adde not this by way of reservation , as you impute unto us , but make it appeare to be the meaning of the Holy Ghost , by the tenour of the Text : and if Iesuites did in like sort make their meanings cleare unto us , we should never challenge them for equivocation or reservation . We see by this what is the issue of your imputation , which in great pompe you called out deisication of mentall evasions and reservations ; as if you spent your strength in phrasifying . You seemed to bee sensible of your own weaknesse in justifying this your calumniation , and therfore to give weight unto it , you have your additions , without all congruity to the precedent , of Iesuiticall equivocations , whereunto notwithstanding you desired to conforme our tenent ; and rest your selfe wholly upon the odious nature of that conformity , especially as being charged upon God by our opinion , as you manage the matter . But your addition hath no colour of conformity thereunto , but proceeds of it selfe without all respect of proportion . For the Iesuite protesting he intends not the ruine of the King and State , with this reservation , So they become Romane Catholiques ; doth not adde hereunto these words , Which I know they cannot doe ; I do● not doubt but they have a more comfortable opinion of us then so .

Yet when you come to shew how our opinion doth deisie , as you speake , this very Iesuiticall tricke , the greatest strength of your odious expression of our Tenet , consists in such like addition , whereunto not any thing on the Iesuiticall equivocations part is conformable . Doe you see how well you performe the part of a disputant , and that in making good so foule a calumniation as is the deisying of equivocations ? As if you followed the politicians counsell , who bids his disciples bee bold to calumniate ; for as much as though a man might cleare his good name , yet in such a case cicatrix manet calumniae . Fie upon such shamelesse courses . And as for this addition of A scarte remaines . yours , what taile of consequence soever it drawes after it , it is like to fall foule on your part , and not on ours . For you maintaine , that there is a state of man in this life , in respect of a certaine measure of iniquity , wherein it is not possible for him to repent . I know no such state , nor any rule that God hath given to himselfe to confine his grace . Nay to the contrary we reade , that neither continuance in sinne , nor greatnesse of sinne , doth preclude the grace of God ; but that Gods grace as it can , so it doth many times prevaile over both . But you love not to speake distinctly , but to carie your selfe in the clouds of generalities . They that maintaine a weake cause had need play least in sight ; wee say plainly , that God well knowes , no man can repent except he gives the grace of repentance ; the Scriptures in divers places expresly testifying Act. 5. 31. & 11. 18. 2 Tim. 2. last . that repentance is the gift of God , though you love not to heare of that eare , nor are well pleased , as it seemes , with the musique that riseth upon the touching of that string . On the other side , God knowes that every man at any time can repent , if God will be pleased to give him the grace of repentance , yea and that he shall repent also ; the habituall grace serves for the one , and the actuall and effectuall motion of Gods Spirit is requisite to the other .

I come to the second parallell of Iesuiticall equivocation , or rather the deification of it , as you are pleased out of glorious spleene to calumniate your opposites . The protestation is on Gods part , I will not the nonrepentance of him that dieth , the reservation , with purpose to make this part of my will knowne unto him . But where , I pray , doe you finde any such protestation on Gods part ? Ezekiel hath none such . In him it is said , I will not the death of him that dieth . But no where doth he say , I will not the non repentance of him that dieth . This is a tricke of your owne device , as if you followed the counsell of Lysander ; and where the Lyons skinne will not reach , you are content to patch it up with some piece of a Fox skinne . Wee professe in plaine termes , that as God hath mercy on whom he will , so he Rom. 9. 〈◊〉 hardneth whom he will ; and as he will give the grace of repentance unto some , so he will not give the grace of repentance unto others . Notwithstanding that he bid all in the ministery of his word , ( I meane all those that heare it ) To repent and beleeve Mark 1. 〈◊〉 the Gospel . So he did bid the Iewes , and that with great earnestnesse , to keepe the covenant , Deut. 30. 19. I call heaven and earth to record this day against you , that I have set before you life and death , blessing and cursing . therefore chuse life , that both thou and thy seed may live . By loving the Lord thy God , by obeying his voice , and cleaving unto him , for hee is thy life , and the length of thy daies , that thou maiest dwell in the land which the Lord did sweare unto thy fathers . ' Yet I hope you will not say , this could be done without grace , though of the nature of grace , what you thinke , and of the universall extention thereof , I should be very glad to understand , and that therein you would speake your minde plainly .

As for the reservation here , it is most ridiculous , neither is any equivocation of Iesuites , I trow , answerable hereunto : for by reservations , a sense is raised , contradictious to the sense of the protestation ; but by this reservation , no contradiction ariseth to the former as it lieth , but onely it denyeth a certaine purpose to be joyned with it : but , be it that Iesuits allow such artifice , what Divine of ours doth ? Did we say , that God wills not the non repentance of any ; we would say , hee willeth it not , in as much as hee forbiddeth it . And Gods prohibitions and commandements are usually ( though improperly ) called the will of God . And here voluntas signi hath proper place enough .

Like as God commanded Abraham to sacrifice his sonne , yet his determination was , that Isaac should not be sacrificed . Some may have said , that God willeth not the death of him that dyeth , in case he repent . But was ever any heard to affirme , that God wills not the non repentance of him that dieth , to wit , with purpose to make it knowne unto him ? What madnesse possessed you to ascribe so incredible a thing to your opposites , so contrary to the rule of fiction , 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , as Callimachus hath set it downe .

Your addition here likewise , which drawes a long taile after it , hath no conformity to the patterne . And as for the substance of it , as touching Gods resolution , never to grant some repentance , or the meanes of it ( if thereby you meane the Gospel ) we acknowledge it to be truth : for the arme of the Lord is not revealed unto all , neither doth he give repentance , Esa. 53. 1. or faith to all : but hath mercy on some onely , even on whom hee will ; and hardenneth othersome , even whom he will ; that is , denieth them repentance , and consequently , they cannot repent , which interpretation of obduration , your selfe make in the seventh section following : and consequently they cannot live ; this I doubt not but you will acknowledge with us .

And therefore the vanity of your discourse is not at an end , you proceed to talke of Gods oath in giving assurance , that he will not the death of them that are damned ; built meerly upon a translation which you follow , different from the most authorized translation of our Church ; and that contrary to evident reason : for seeing God doth inflict death and damnation upon the impenitent , so hee must needs will it ; for hee doth all things according to the counsell of his owne will , Ephesians 1. 11. And yet according to your reading of it , a good construction may be given without all reservations , as plainly enough deduced out of the word of God it selfe . And what God hath manifested unto us in his word , I hope is not to bee accounted a reservation , but a revelation rather . I am not of your minde to thinke , that the keeping of an oath is a branch of perfection ; or to keepe a mans word either , which yet is a better point of morality , then to keepe an oath .

Such justice is to bee found amongst heathen men ; yet workes of mercy go beyond workes of justice , yet no great perfection neither ; but to be mercifull to our enemies , When Matt. 5. 4● they are hungry to feed them , when they are thirsty to give them drinke : this is the perfection that our Saviour calleth us unto , and sets before our eyes the goodnes of our heavenly Father , in suffering his raine to fall , and his sunne to shine on the bad as well as on the good . And here withall , how well your calumniation hath sped , imputing to us the deification of Iesuiticall equivocations , let the indifferent Reader judge .

6 Here you proceede learnedly to distinguish betweene somethings determined by oath , and somethings else , and in the accomodation of your distinction , you tell us , that Voluntas signi , and beneplaciti , can have no place in things determined by divine oath , but well it may in other things . What is the other member of your distinction opposite to things determined by divine oath , you expresse not , but leave to your reader to conjecture . Now because usually when oathes are spoken of by way of distinction , the opposition is made betweene oathes and bare words , therefore wee conceive your distinction completely delivered to runne thus . Some things are determined by Gods oath ; other things are determined by Gods bare words . Now this distinction I take to be neither accurate according to the forme , nor sound in the matter thereof .

As touching the forme . It is not right to say things are determined either by Gods oath , or by his word , but rather by his will . For determination is the act of Gods will . Words and oathes are but the signification and outward protestation of the determination of his will . Then as for the matter , I see no cause but that by what reason soever the distinction of voluntas signi , and voluntas beneplaciti , hath course in the one , by the same reason it may have course in the other also . For Gods word undoubtedly is as certaine as his oath ; albeit in condescending to our infirmity he is pleased to protest in solemne manner , and by oath , for the strengthning of our faith . We commonly say that an honest mans word is as good as his oath to binde him . Certainly as God cannot breake his oath , so is he 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , a God that cannot lye , and his will Ti● . 1. 2. can neither change from within , nor bee resisted from without .

When you come to explicate your meaning by instance as touching the accommodation of this distinction , we wil perhaps speake more of this . The distinction you say of voluntas signi , and beneplaciti , can have no place in their doctrine who make the bare entity and personall being of men the immediate object of the immutable decree concerning life and death everlasting . It seemes you desire to speake enough , as if you could hardly satisfie your selfe , no marvell if you doe not satisfie your reader . Yet in my judgement it is usuall with you to over-doe . For the distinctions implied by you , of the object of Gods decree mediate or immediate ; and especially of Gods decree mutable or immutable , may soone cast us upon wilde-goose meditations . By the entity or personall being of man , I take your meaning is , ( for you speake in your owne peculiar phrase ) to expresse the pure masse of mankinde . This ( it seemes ) you like not to be made the object of election and reprobation , but rather the corrupt masse of mankinde after Adams fall . Now because there was an election and reprobation of Angels as well as of men , if you can devise how a corrupt masse should be the object of Gods predestination , in the election and reprobation of Angels , you shall performe such a piece of work as never any man adventured on before you .

And as for the distinction of voluntas signi , and voluntas beneplaciti , I am perswaded I shall devise a more commodious place for it , supposing the pure masse to be the object of predestination , then you can upon supposition of the corrupt masse to be the object of predestination . This I presume taking the distinction of voluntas signi , and voluntas beneplaciti in that sense which they take it that have beene the devi●ers of it . But if you shall take liberty unto your selfe , to put what sense upon it you thinke good , and make your owne grounds ; as Aesop advised his master how to make his undertakings good in drinking up all the water in the sea , to wit , alwayes provided that all the rivers that runne into the sea were first stopt . For it were unreasonable that as fast as hee dranke up , the rivers should powre in , and that somewhat faster too . And I performe my undertakings thus . To promise salvation upon obedience , and to command obedience unto all , is in the phrase of Schoolemen to will the salvation of all voluntate signi . But withall to determine , that by his speciall grace heo will keepe some from sinne , and save them , but not others ; is not to will the salvation of those others voluntate beneplaciti , whose salvation he is said to will voluntate signi . So that albeit to will and not to will the salvation of one and the same man voluntate proprie dicta , which alone is voluntas beneplaciti , bee contradictions ; yet to will the salvation of one man voluntate improprie dicta , which is voluntas signi , and not to will it voluntate proprie dicta , which is voluntas beneplaciti , is no more contradictious then to will the sacrificing of Isaak by commanding it , and to nill it by determining the contrary , is contradictious .

Againe , if massa corrupta be the object of predestination , which is the more common opinion of our Divines , this distinction in this sense ( which I take to be the onely true sense of it ) cannot be so well accommodated . For as much as in that case , the onely way left for salvation is faith and repentance ; for performing whereof there is no power in nature , as there was power in nature for the performing of obedience before Adams fall . And you hold it ridiculous to say that God wils the salvation of man so he repent , in case he cannot repent , as but erst you signified .

But let us consider your reason why the distinction foresaid can have no place , if the pure masse be the object of predestination . For ( say you ) the entity or personall being of man is so indivisible , that an universall negation , and a particular affirmation of the same thing ( to wit salvation ) falling upon man as man , or upon the personall being of man , drawes to the strictest kinde of contradiction . All this is but one proposition , but it containes more then one fault . For first you make the affirmation and negation of salvation upon the same men , to follow upon voluntas signi touching their salvation , and voluntas beneplaciti touching their non salvation . Whereas no such thing will follow . For although from voluntas beneplaciti , whereby God doth will the salvation of one man , it followeth , such a one shall be saved ; yet upon the voluntas signi , whereby God doth will their salvation , it shall not follow that such shall be saved : like as from voluntas signi , whereby God did will Abraham to sacrifice his sonne , it did not follow that Isaak should bee sacrified : yet you swallow this consequence without any chawing ; but an Estrich will sooner digest a tenne-peny naile , then any sober and intelligent Scholar wil digest this consequence . If you would deale directly , you should professe , that to will and not to will the salvation of the same man is contradiction ; but that is untrue as well as the former . For unto contradiction is required that it must be , ad idem , secundum idem , eodem modo , & eodem tempore . Now these conditions are not found in this that we speake of . For we doe not say , that God doth will and not will the salvation of the same man , voluntate eodem modo accepta ; for that hee wils the salvation of this man , is onely voluntate signi ; that he doth not will it , is voluntate beneplaciti ; and this will which is called the will of good pleasure , is onely the will of God in proper speech , and that S. Paul speakes of when he saith , Who hath resisted his will ? Rom. 9. 1● the other , to wit , voluntas signi , is improperly ( though usually ) called the will of God . It being indeed nothing else but Gods commandement ; in which sense he willed Abraham to sacrifice his sonne ; yet who doubts but that it was Gods will in proper speech , that Isaak should not be sacrificed . And because you perceived how easily the shew of contradiction might be washed off , if it were proposed in this manner , therfore you made bold upon dame Logicke , and without her leave , and in despight of her , faine a contradiction under another forme by way of consequence , which indeed proves most inconsequent .

Thirdly , you speake in a strange language when you say that the affirmation and negation of salvation falling upon the personall being of men , containes contradiction ; implying that it might fall otherwise then upon the personall being of men , and in that case it would not prove contradictious ; both which are not onely untrue , but absurd also . For the affirmation of the salvation of man cannot fall otherwise then upon the person of man , and consequently upon the personall being of man , whatsoever be the cause of it ; which cause you most preposterously conceive , to give unto man a being different from his personall being , whereupon , and not upon his personall being his salvation should fall .

Againe , no distinction of personall being and other being will serve your turne , to save the affirmation and negation of salvation of one and the same man from contradiction . I say of one and the same man , which is of principall consideration in the course of contradiction , and yet wholly permitted by you in this proposition , though therein you talke of the strictest point of contradiction . Straine your invention while you will , you shall never be able to free these propositions from contradiction ; Peter shall be saved , Peter shall not be saved . But to change the nature of these propositions , and of absolute to make them conditionall thus ; Peter shall be saved if he beleeve and repent : Peter shall not be saved if he beleeve and repent not ; is neither to affirme nor deny the salvation of Peter . For to affirme or deny the salvation of Peter , is categoricall , not hypotheticall . What you want of force of argument , you supply with devotion , as if you came to enchant your reader , and not to informe him ; as when you say , Farre be it from us to thinke that God should sweare to this universall negative , I will not the death of him that dieth ; and yet beleeve withall that he wils the death of some men , that die as they are men , or as they are the sonnes of Adam . This is proposed by way of an holy and confident asseveration ; but consider how sottish it is , and most averse from sobriety .

For first , what if God had not sworne it , but onely said it , had there been the lesse truth in it for this ? Is not Gods word sure enough without an oath ? yet before wee heard , that in things determined by divine oath , the distinction of voluntas signi , and voluntas beneplaciti could have no place .

Secondly , where were your logicall wits , when you said this was an universall negative , I will not the death of a sinner ? I pray examine your rules well , and see whether it bee not a singular ? will you measure the quantity of a proportion by the predicate , and not rather by the subject ? Yet if you should doe so , it would not serve your turne . For both Aristotle of old hath taught us , that it is absurd to put an universall signe to the predicate ; and here is no universality added either to the whole predicate , which is , Nolens mortem peccatoris , nor to any part of it ( which you seeme to confound . ) For he that dyeth , is a terme indefinite . Neither is it in a necessary matter . For the most holy Angell God could turne into nothing , if it pleased him . And in the 18. chapter of Ezekiel it is apparant , that this is restrained to him that repenteth , without any mentall reservation , but by plaine evidence of the Text it selfe .

Thirdly , you harpe upon a false string , and an erroneous translation , as it were in spight of the most authorized translation of our owne Church , and follow the vulgar Latine herein . And withall in opposition to manifest reason to the contrary ; for seeing God doth inflict death and damnation upon every one that dyeth , and is damned ; and he doth all things according to the counsell of his owne will , Eph. 1. 11. it is impossible he should doe any thing and not will it , that he should inflict death on him that dieth , and not will it .

Fourthly , be it as you will have it , that God doth not will the death of him that dieth ; will you herehence inferre that God willeth not the death of him that dyeth as man , or as the son of Adam , implying that notwithstanding hee may will the death of him that dieth in some other respect , without any prejudice to his oath ? what a senselesse collection and interpretation is this ? You may as well say , God willeth the life of him that liveth , ergo , farre be it from us to say that hee willeth not the life of him that liveth , as he is a man , or as he is the son of Adam ; implying that for all this God may be said not to will the life of him that liveth in some other respect . But I say that if God willeth not the death of any man that dieth , ( as you will have it , and to be confirmed also with the Lords oath , ) then in no respect can it be said that hee willeth the death of any man that dieth . For it is both ad idem , death is the same in both ; and it is secundum idem , for we speak of the same man in both ; and it is eodem modo , for we speake of the will of God in the same sense in both ; and it is at the same time , and must be ; for Gods will is everlasting , and therefore willing whatsoever he doth everlastingly , he cannot bee said at any time not to will it . As for the cause of death and damnation willed by God , we maintaine , that God willeth not the death of any man , or the condemnation of any man , but for sinne . But I pray what thinke you of infants perishing in originall sin ? If Goth doth not will their death as the sonnes of Adam , how doth he will it ? Or had you rather shake hands with Arminius in this also , and professe , that no man is damned for originall sinne onely ; but that all the children of Turkes , and Sarazens , and Iewes , and Caniballs that die in their infancie , are saved , and enjoy the joyes of heaven , as well as the children of the faithfull ?

You proceede in your devout asseveration , and will have it to bee farre from us to thinke , that God should by his secret or reserved will recall any part of his will declared by oath . We are so farre from thinking , that God recalls any part of his will declared by oath , that wee doe not believe that hee doth or can recall any part of his will that hee hath declared by his bare word . And wee thinke it equally impossible for God to lye , and to perjure himselfe ; for he is 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 . Neither when hee kept Abraham from sacrificing his sonne Isaac , doe wee say that he recalled any part of his will , which he had formerly declared by his word , although he commanded Abraham to sacrifice his sonne : for Gods will of commandement , signifieth onely what God will have to be our duety to doe , not what hee hath determined to be done : though you confound these usually , and that as wilfully and unlearnedly as Arminius himselfe , because it serves your turne , and advantageth your cause to confound them . But looke you to it how you free your selfe from maintaining , that God doth recall something which hee hath properly willed and determined to be done . For that God willeth the death of no man that dieth , you make to bee the word of God confirmed by oath , and you understand it of Gods will properly so called , and yet you maintaine , that God willeth the death of him that dieth , though not as man , and as the sonne of Adam , yet in some other manner ; which either is flat contradiction , or else God doth recall and change his will .

The last part of your devout asseveration is , Farre be it from us to thinke that God should proclaime an universall pardon to all the sonnes of Adam , under the seale of his oath , and yet exempt many from all possibilitie of receiving any benefit by it . Here you seeme to shew your teeth , but I had rather understand your meaning : for to proclaime pardon to all is ambiguous ; for it may bee done absolutely , as kings on earth grant pardons ; and usually our kings grant pardons at the end and conclusion of parliaments . I doe not thinke this is your meaning ; for then all should be pardoned ; for to proclaime pardon is to signifie his Majesties pleasure that hee doth pardon them . But if conditionally ; it is true , God proclaimes , that whosoever believeth shall be saved , this is a knowne truth , no man takes exception against it . And how doe we exempt any from all possibility of receiving it ? You will say , that this we doe , in exempting many from all possibility of performing the condition , to wit , of believing . I answer , that your owne opinion is to be charged with this , ours is not ; for you maintain that Pharaoh after the seventh wonder , was exempt from all possibility of repentance ; and the like you avouch of all reprobates , and such as have filled up the measure of their sinne , which according to your opinion , may be many yeares before their death : and in the seventh Section following , you expresse it thus , Having their soules betrothed unto wickednesse : such undoubtedly was Ahab , that sold himselfe to worke wickednesse , and many such like .

And in this case you professe in your owne phrase , that the doore of repentance is shut upon them . But wee like not this opinion of yours , wee know no measure of sinne , nor continuance of sinne that doth prescribe unto the grace of God , and forbids the banes of matrimony betwixt him and his Church , but that in a due time the power of Gods grace shall breake through all obstacles , even through the furious idolatry of Manasses , in giving his children unto Devills , and that sealed with bloud , wherewith hee filled Ierusalem from corner to corner ; yea , and through his sorcery and witchcraft also , and through the rage of Saul , persecuting Gods saints , and making havocke of the Church of God . * * When I speak thus , I am to be understood onely of sinnes of course , and ▪ knowne sinnes , secluding the consideration of the sin . against the holy Ghost , which is 〈◊〉 secret . And for as much as wee maintaine it to be possible for every one to believe and repent through Gods grace , it is manifest , that we exempt no man from all possibility of believing and repenting , to wit , in consideration of the power of God . But in consideration of the power of man , wee exempt not many onely , but all and every one , from possibility of beleeving and repenting by power of nature . And dare you avouch the contrary ? It is apparant that whatsoever you thinke , you dare not openly professe thus much . And therefore are content to hide your head , and lurke under generalities . So that the case is cleare , that you doe us wrong in saying wee exempt many from all possibility of repenting : I say it is a notorious slander ; for we exempt men from possibility of repenting onely by power of nature ; and so we exempt not onely many , but all and every one from possibility of repenting . But perhaps you may say , that withall wee maintaine that God doth not purpose to give the grace of faith and repentance unto all , but to deny it unto many , yea unto most ; and upon this supposition we exempt them from all possibility of repenting .

But I pray consider , to exempt some from possibility of repenting upon supposition ; is this to exempt from all possibility without supposition ? For you have delivered this without all supposition . And then the issue is to enquire , whether God hath decreed to give the grace of faith and repentance unto all , or rather to deny it to many , yea to most . And dare you affirme that God hath decreed to give the grace of faith and repentance unto all ? It is apparant you dare not openly professe this , and therefore carie your selfe in the clouds , without any cleare and distinct proposing of your meaning . In S. Pauls daies there was a remnant amongst Israel which are called Gods election , Rom. 11. and these had obtained this grace of faith and repentance , as there the Apostle signifieth , but the rost were hardned . And if God hath purposed to give grace unto all , you may as well say God hath elected all . But Rom. 11. the Holy Ghost witnesseth , that many are called , and but few are chosen . Many I say are called , not all neither , nor the Mat. 20. most part ; as all experience , and the histories of the world doe manifest : and therefore though God proclaimes in his word pardon of sinne to all that beleeve ; yet he doth not proclaimethis unto all .

By the way I observe , that whereas you say , that God doth proclaime an universall pardon to all the sonnes of Adam under the seale of his oath ; this of Gods oath , which you adde , doth draw us to conceive that the meaning of those words , As I live I will not the death of him that dies , containes this sense in your construction , that God will pardon the sinnes of all , and since these words ( as you understand them ) doe not runne conditionally , but absolutely ; herehence it followeth , that according to your opinion God hath sworne absolutely to pardon the sinnes of all men , the absurdity whereof I leave to everie mans sober consideration .

7. Hitherto you have told us in what matters the distinction of voluntas signi , and voluntas beneplaciti cannot have place . Now you tell us in what matters it may have place , to wit , in matters of threatnings , or of plagues not denounced by oath . And why not I pray in matters of promising , or of rewards not denounced by oath . Now you have already signified , that looke in what matters this distinction may have place , there God may recall by his secret and reserved will , what he hath declared to be his will by bare words . For therefore you professed that this distinction may not be admitted in matters determined by oath , because , Farre be it from us thus to thinke that God should by his secret or reserved will recall any part of his will declared by oath . Let the Reader marke it well , and the force of consequence therehence ; which I doubt not but you approve of , as we shall farther understand in that which followeth . Now we are so farre from maintaining that God can recall any thing , of that which hee hath sworne shall come to passe , that we stand in defiance of any such opinion , as maintaines , that God may choose whether he will be so good as his word , and that he hath liberty to recall ought of that which upon his bare word he hath testified shall come to passe . And it seemes you are ashamed to propose it in these termes , but keepe your selfe in the generall of voluntas signi , and beneplaciti , the meaning whereof every one understands not ; and the best Divines take it in a far different sense from this of yours . And they that doe understand your meaning and explication , yet doe not alwaies consider it , and therefore are the more apt so to be deluded by your generalities .

But proceed we along with you . God by his Prophet Jonas ( you say ) did signisie his will to have Ninevie destroyed at fortie daies end ; this was voluntas signi : and he truly intended what hee signisied , yet was it his voluntas beneplaciti , his good will and pleasure at the very same time that the Ninevites should repent and live . Now I doe observe in all this , you doe not say God recals by his secret will , what he signisied to be his will upon his bare word . Yet the reason why the foresaid distinction might not be admitted in matters determined by Gods oath , you made to be this , because then God should by his secret will recall that which he had declared to bee his will by solemne oath ; permitting that God may have libertie to recall what he hath determined ( as you speake ) by his bare word . But here you forbeare these expressions ; you decline this precipice . And justly . For if it be a part of Gods perfection to keep his oath , as you have said , I see no reason but it should bee a part of greater perfection to be as good as his word . Secondly , I say that if Gods intentions and Gods will be all one ; for you to say that God at the same time did intend and not intend that the Ninivites should be destroyed , is flat contradiction . And you doe as good as say so . For at the same time God did will that they should be destroyed , you say ; and also intended that they should live , which is as much as to say he did intend they should not be destroyed . And I prove it thus : To affirme and deny the same thing of the same subject , at one and the same time , is flat contradiction ; but you herein doe affirme and deny the same thing of the same subject for the same time ; therefore herein you speake flat contradiction . But you pronounce there is no contradiction in this ; yet in clearing your selfe , your cariage in words is very preposterous . For whereas to purge your selfe you should say , there is no contradiction in this speech of yours ; you quite besides the cushion tell us there is no contrariety betweene Gods will declared , which you call voluntas signi , and his good will and pleasure , which you call voluntas beneplaciti ; and forthwith you tell us there is no contradiction in the object of his will , however considered . All which is delivered very fumblingly , and so perplexedly , as nothing answering to those logicall braines and accurate Philosophie , the want whereof elsewhere you pittie in others , but not in your selfe . I say you speake contradiction , in saying that God at the same time both willed that Ninivie should be destroyed , and willed that it should not be destroyed .

As for contradictions in the objects of voluntas signi , and voluntas beneplaciti , we maintaine that such contradiction may have place without any contradiction in the maintainer : As for example ; The object of Gods commandement to Abraham ( which I call , and all Schoolmen with me call voluntatem signi , ) was the sacrificing of Isaak ; but the object of Gods purpose and determination ( which I call , and all Schoolmen with me , voluntatem beneplaciti ) was the not sacrificing of Isaak . Which are termes contradictory . Yet is it no contradiction for me to maintaine that God commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son ; and yet resolved with himselfe that Isaak should not be sacrificed .

Yet we must give you leave to take your course , and consider what a fluttering you keepe to unentangle your selfe of this contradiction , wherein you are not taken as in a snare , but wilfully and with your eies open cast your selfe thereinto , presuming either by the finenesse of your wit to escape , or rather by the perplexity of your discourse so to confound your reader , as not to discover your fumbling to deliver your solfe .

You say the object of Gods will was not one and the same , but much different , in respect of Gods will signified by Jonas , and of his good will and pleasure , which not signified by him was fulfilled . And because you repeat this distinction againe containing the difference betweene voluntas signi , and voluntas beneplaciti , I must needs tell you the exorbitancyie of it . Suppose God had made knowne to Ionas , that he purposed upon this his preaching to give them repentance , to save the Ninivites , had this beene no longer voluntas beneplaciti ? If you thinke so , I thinke you cannot name one Divine in the world that ever was of your opinion in this . If it ceased not to be voluntas beneplaciti for all this , then you see how absurdly you make the difference betweene voluntas signi , and voluntas beneplaciti to consist in this , that voluntas signi is Gods will declared , voluntas beneplaciti is his will concealed .

The resolution at length to free your former assertion from contradiction , is this , One and the same immutable decree of God did from eternity award two doomes much different unito Ninevie , taking it as it stood affected when Ionas threatned destruction unto it , or as it should continue so affected , and taking it as it stood upon the judgement threatned . All the alteration was in Ninevy , none in Gods will and decree ; and Ninevie being altered unto the better , the selfe same rule of justice doth not deale with it after the selse same manner . The summe of all ( were you pleased to speak plainly ) would come to this : When he signified by Ionah to the Ninevites , that Ninevie should be destroyed at forty daies end , the meaning was but this , that in case they continued in their sinnes without repentance they should be destroyed ; but in case they repented they should not be destroyed . I find no fault in this as touching the substance of truth ; but I wonder not a little to see you faile in the accommodation of it , both to the distinction of voluntas signi , and beneplaciti ; as also in the reconciling of your selfe unto your selfe , in respect of what formerly you have delivered concerning the meaning of Ionahs message to the Ninevites . For you doe not tell us which of these doomes is Voluntas signi , and which of the doomes is voluntas beneplaciti : or if both be voluntas signi , ( as indeed they are ) what is left for voluntas beneplaciti to be distinguished from voluntas signi in this place ? It seemes you distribute those doomes , and make one the object of voluntas signi , and the other the object of vol●itas beneplaciti , in which course there 〈◊〉 no sobriety in comparison to your owne dictates . For you make voluntas signi to differ from voluntas beneplaciti in this , that voluntas signi is Gods will declared , voluntas beneplaciti is his will concealed . According to the tenour of which distinction , both these decrees are to be accounted voluntas signi for God hath declared this to be his usuall course ; as namely Jer. 18. 7. I will speake suddenly against a nation or a kingdome to plucke it up , and to root it out , and to destroy it . 8. But if this nation against whom I have pronounced , turne from their wickednesse , I will repent of the plague that I thought to bring upon them : 9. And I will speake suddenly concerning a nation , and concerning a kingdome , to build it up and to plant it : But if it doe evill in my sight , and heare not my voice , I will repent of the good that I thought to doe for them . Neither indeed can you in reason maintaine the one of the doomes to be the object of voluntas signi , and the other the object of voluntas beneplaciti . For if Ionas had delivered his message thus , God seeth in what sinfull courses you are , and hath determined that you continuing in the same your Citie shall be destroyed at fortie dayes end ; they would never have doubted but that the Lords determination was , that upon their humiliation and repentance , and turning from their evill waies , Ninevie should not have beene destroyed ; and so each doome had beene the object of voluntas signi , and nothing ( for ought I can gather out of your discourse ) should remaine to be the object of voluntas beneplaciti .

Againe , this elucidation of the doubt doth contradict your former assertion , when in contradictious manner you affirmed , that God at the same time did both will that Ninevie should be destroyed , and also intend that Ninevie should not be destroyed ; whereas by the interpretation which here you make of Ionahs message to the Ninivites , according to the two doomes by you mentioned , God was so farre from intending both the destruction and the not destruction of Ninevie , as that he intended neither the one nor the other . For to determine to destroy them , in case they continued in their sinnes without repentance , and not otherwise , is to resolve neither one way nor other , but to remaine in suspence , which is a kinde of reservation of liberty ; which heretofore you have so much magnified as a point of very great perfection , and therefore fit to be attributed unto God .

But then I pray consider , did not God from everlasting know whether they would repent or no ? I thinke you doubt not , but that God knew they would repent . And I pray what need was there then of any two such doomes as you have devised , when one would serve the turne , and that absolute , to wit , that God from everlasting determined they should not be destroyed , and thereupon tooke a course whereby they might be brought to repentance .

By the way I am glad to heare you make the repentance of the Ninevites the object of Gods will , which is called , voluntas beneplaciti , which wee take to be all one with Gods decree ; but I have no cause to rejoyce to see you thus contradict your selfe : for you have in divers places maintained , that no contingent thing , especially no act of man is the object of Gods decree : but to the contrary have professed , that God , though he decreed the contingencie of things , yet hee doth not decree the contingent things themselves . You must bee driven to take the same course in respect of Gods promises of blessing , as well as of his threatnings of judgement . But to distinguish herein as you do between Gods word and his oath , is most out of season . For suppose God had sent Ionah with the same message in this manner , say unto them , As I live , saith the Lord , yet fourty dayes and Ninevie shall be destroyed , might it not admit the same justification according to the doomes proposed by you thus , As I live , Ninevie continuing in this sinfull course , wherein I finde it shall be destroyed at fourty dayes end , not otherwise .

Or if God should have beene charged with perjury in saying this , As I live , yet fourty dayes and Ninevie shall bee destroyed ; should hee not as well bee charged with untruth in saying barely thus , Yet fourty dayes & Ninevic shall be destroyed ? Now whereas in the judgement pronounced by Ionah against Ninevic , you never speake of any revoking the judgement threatned , though your tenent carried you ( as there I signified ) so to speake , yet here ( the case as you professe being all one ) you are bold to professe , that God may revoke the blessing promised ( and why ( I pray you ) may hee not revoke his blessing promised upon oath , as well as a blessing promised upon his bare word ? for if he may the one without breaking his word , why may hee not doe the other without breaking his oath . Or if it bee not lawfull for God to break his oath , dare you say it is lawfull for him to breake his word ? Alas , doe your wits carry you ? and whither would you carry us , if wee should suffer our selves to be led by you ? You conclude with a qualification thus , Yet may wee not say , that the death or destruction of any to whom God promiseth life , is so truely the object of his good will and pleasure , as the life and salvation of them is unto whom he threatneth destruction . This you say , but I had rather heare what you prove .

By the will of God , called voluntas beneplaciti , we understand no other thing then Gods decree , or the determination of his will . And hath not God as truely willed the destruction of them that die in sinne , without faith and repentance , as hee wills the salvation of them that die in faith and repentance . It is true , God takes no delight in the destruction of any , considered in it selfe , much lesse in their sinnes , whereby they bring destruction upon themselves ; but God delights both in the faith and repentance of his elect , and in their salvation .

But this signification of good pleasure , is nothing to the purpose in this distinction ; for no Schooleman understands it in this sense . And I well know Arminius , considering the usuall acception of Voluntas beneplaciti , amongst Divines professeth , he had rather call it , Voluntas placiti , then Voluntas beneplaciti . If such lettice like your lips , you may make your selfe merry with them .

A second extent and accommodation of this distinction of Uoluntas signi , and Voluntas beneplaciti , you allow of , applyed to men after they have made up the full measure of their iniquity , and are cut off from all possibilitie of repentance . I had thought no man had filled up the full measure of his sinne untill his , death ; like as on the other side , no man hath fulfilled the measure of his obedience , untill hee hath finished his course , as Revel. 11. 7. When the witnesses had finished their testimonie , the beast that came out of the bottomlesse pit , made warre against them , and slew them . You seeme to speake it of a certaine measure , whereupon the doore of repentance is shut upon them , and thereupon excluded from all possibility of repentance ; as here you say it was with Pharaoh , especially after the 7. plague upon Aegypt ; whereupon you have taken great paines to discourse at large in another Treatise , which I have well considered , and examined your reasons throughout , and that following you 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 ; yet there you confesse that it must have beene so with Pharaoh at Moses first comming unto him , yea and was possible to have beene so , when he was but 3. yeares old . And indeed I doe not see how it can bee avoided , but that as many as depart this life in their infancy are excluded from all possibility of repentance .

But it may be you will apply this only to men of ripe years , but by your leave such Pharaoh was not at three yeares old . And though God willed Pharaoh to let his people goe , and sent Moses and Aaron to him to that purpose ; yet you say , It was no branch of Gods good will and pleasure that Pharaoh should now repent : Rather it was his good will and pleasure to have the heart of Pharaoh hardned : though you restraine this to Pharaohs condition after the seventh plague , for which I see no reason . So that in such a case you will have it lawfull for God by his reserved will , to recall that part of his will which hee hath declared by his word or oath : and therefore as touching your holy asseveration mentioned in the sixth Section , it must be restrained to them that have not yet filled up the measure of their sinne , as Pharaoh had after the seventh plague . For in such a case God may will their death , notwithstanding his oath in shew to the contrary . For his meaning is this , As I live I will not the death of him that dieth , that is , I will not his death as a man , or as the sonne of Adam ; neither doe I herein deifie Iesuiticall equivocations or mentall reservations ; for I take libertie to charge that upon mine adversaries , and therefore you may well think I would not be so simple as to transgresse in the same kind my selfe . And I thinke so too , if God had not confounded your wits , but it is Gods course , and most just , to strike with confusion those that build Babel ; and he makes the Aegyptians to erre in their counsels as a drunken man erreth in his vomite , the issue whereof is to defile himselfe and his owne favourites , even those that sit next unto him .

In the same spirit you professe that God did punish Pharaoh for not letting his people goe ; as though it had beene free and possible for him to repent , though indeed in your opinion it was not . But Pharaohs case was extraordinary , you say , and not to be drawne into example . But by your leave if God did so but once , it is no unjust thing for God to do so oftner ; and therefore pray looke unto it , that whensoever it is your lot to oppose your adversaries in such a point , you doe not lay to their charge that they make God to be unjust , if not for conscience sake of the truth , yet at least for feare of contradicting your selfe .

As for the Apostles intimation ( you touch upon by the way ) that it was an argument of Gods great mercy and long suffering to permit Pharaoh to live any longer upon earth , after he was become a vessell of wrath , destinated to everlasting punishment in hell ; I professe I am not so quicke or accurate as to observe any such intimation of the Apostle . What if you devised this to make good some fictions of yours to that purpose , in another Treatise of yours , which I have already weighed in the ballance , and found them a great deale too light of worth , to move any sober man to concurre with you in opinion thereabouts .

But whatsoever it be that the Apostle intimates , you seeme to expresse strange conceits , when you talke of Gods providence in suffering Pharaoh to live longer on earth , after hee was become a vessell of wrath destinated to everlasting punishment in hell . I had thought every reprobate had beene destinated to everlasting punishment in hell before hee was borne . For Gods destination of them is the ordination of his will ; and that I had thought you had not denied to be everlasting . But you referre it to a certaine time , as in speciall to Pharaoh after the seventh plague ; and in speciall to all after they have filled up a certaine measure of iniquitie ; and shall not men in like sort be destinated to everlasting joies in heaven after they have filled up a certaine measure of obedience ? And so a little after you tell us , that men doe not become reprobates , till a certaine measure of iniquitie bee filled up ; and so in proportion men are not elect till a certaine proportion of obedience bee filled up . Yet the Apostle plainly telleth us , that the elect are elect of God before the foundation of the world , Eph. 1. 4. and consequently so are reprobates reprobated before the foundation of the world : for the word election of some doth connotate the reprobation of others . Yea Iacob was loved of God before he was borne , and was not Esau hated also before he was borne ? Rom. 9. Did God wait till the measure of Esaus sinnes was full , and the measure of Iacobs obedience , before he did elect the one , and reprobate the other ? And if destination unto the punishment of hell , and on the other side destination unto the joyes of heaven , beginne in time after the obedience of some , and disobedience of others , what is the meaning of predestination ? for what is that , but the destination of some to the joyes of heaven , and others to the sorrowes of hell ? No doubt but if you proceed as you beginne , we shall have a world of new Divinity communicated unto us , to endoctrinate us in these latter dayes .

To what end soever God plagued Pharaoh , for not doing that which he could not doe , all possibility of amending being taken from him , this action was just in God , and so is the like , whersoever it be found to proceed from God . And although Pharaoh could not repent without the grace of God , yet I make no doubt but that he could have let Israel goe , notwithstanding his obduration . And it appeares he did let them goe after the ninth plague , which followed sometime after the seventh plague . And so I doubt not but he could have refrained himselfe from pursuing them when hee had once dismissed them . And yet as for not letting Israel goe God brought ten plagues upon Aegypt , so for pursuing after them he drowned Pharaoh and his host in the red Sea .

Now in confidence of your performances in clearing your self from contradictions in one point , you are as adventrous to fal upon another . The Iesuites pretend they can equivocate without lying , and you take upon you to speake contradiction without all contradiction : yet by your leave , if no body else will , I will take care it may not passe without contradiction . There is no contradiction ( you say ) betweene these two propositions ; God from all eternity did will the death of Pharaoh ; God from all eternity did not will the death , but rather the life of Pharaoh . In like sort we may say there is no contradiction between these two propositions , God from all eternity did will the salvation of Judas ; God from all eternity did not will the salvation , but the condemnation of Iudas : and to proceed in the straine of your subtile discourse , I goe along by you step by step . For albeit Iudas continued one and the same man from his birth unto his death , yet did he not all that time continue one and the same object of Gods immutable will and eternall decree . This object did alter as Iudas his dispositions or affections towards God or his neighbour altered . There is no contrariety , much lesse contradiction betweene these , God unfainedly hateth sinners ; God doth not hate , but love the elect , though they be sinners . For here the object of his hatred and love is not the same ; he hates sinners unfainedly as sinners , not having made up the full measure of faith and repentance ; but having made up the full measure of faith and repentance , and good workes , and having their soules betrothed unto holinesse , he loves them . His love of them as elect is no less necessary or usuall , then his hatred of them as sinners . But though he necessarily loves them being once become elect , or having made up the full measure of good workes ; yet was there no necessity laid upon them by his eternall decree to make up such a measure of good works . No ; to this sufficed the liberty of their wils , both to performe such a measure of good works , and to carry themselves like stout champions and patrons of this power of their free wils , and to gratifie the grace of God so far as to admit her activity , both to admonish them aforehand , and upon their propension to that which is good to concur to the performing of it .

He that walkes in the Sunne must needs be coloured , and I have so long beene versed in the contemplation of your argumentive facultie , that I am growne almost as sufficient to plead for the elects electing of themselves , as you to plead for the reprobates reprobation of themselves ; and which of us dischargeth his part best , I leave it to the indifferent reader to consider ; and I doubt not but his sentence will bee this ; Et vitulo tu dignus & hic .

But let us run over the contexture of your discourse once more , and consider it in it selfe . I say there is more sobriety in saying , God from all eternity did not will the salvation of an elect , then that he did from all eternity not will the damnation of a reprobate . For the onely qualification of your saying is this , He did not will the damnation of Pharaoh as a man ; but the qualification of my congruous assertion on the other side is this , God did not will the salvation or life of an elect as a sinner . Now I appeale to any mans judgement whether there be not greater congruitie betweene the termes in my proposition , then betweene the termes in yours . The termes in mine are these , Not will the salvation of an elect as a sinner ; in yours they are these , Not will the death of a reprobate as a man . Seeing it is well knowne , and Arminius confesseth it , that God can turne the holiest creature into nothing , without any shew of repugnance unto his justice , But to will the salvation of a sinner , hath some shew of repugnancy to Gods justice .

But to deale with you closely , and upon a point . I deny that God did ever will the salvation of Pharaoh ; and I prove it by two reasons ; If hee did ever will it , then Gods will is now changed ; for certainly now he doth not will his salvation : But Gods will cannot change , He is without variablenesse or shadow of change . If God would save Pharaoh , and did not , as it appeares he did not , then the reason why Pharaoh was not saved , was because God could not save him . This was Austines discourse long agoe . For a father desiring the saving of his childe , and not performing of it ; who doubts but that the reason is because he cannot . It is enough for us that Pharaoh continued the same man ; for like as of the same man it cannot be verified that both he shall be saved , and shall not be saved ; so neither can it be verified of the same man , that both God will save him , and will not save him . Neither was Pharaoh ever in any other estate , then in the state of damnation .

In like sort the contradiction is evident enough in those propositions which you adde to illustrate the contradictious nature ( as you pretend ) of the former ; as if you should say , Aske my fellow whether I am a thiefe , which is nimis familiaris probatio . As if you should say , I unfainedly love such a man , and yet I hate him ; here is no contradiction : or as if a King should say , I unfainedly love such a one , yet I le hang him ; yet this with more probability may be saved from contradiction .

It is true , wee may parcere personis , & dicere de vitiis , love the man , and hate his qualities , and manifest my love in seeking to redeeme him from his lewd conversations , by prayer unto God , by perswasion towards the man himselfe . But to say I unfainedly love him , and yet I hate him , and thinke to save it from contradiction , by saying I love him as a man , and hate him as a lewd person ; is worse then for Adam to seeke with figge leaves to cover his nakednesse .

To say God loves men as they have not made up the full measure of their iniquity , is manifestly to imply that God loves a reprobate untill hee hath made up the full measure of his iniquity , and that this measure being full , God ceasing to love him , God is changed ; for Gods love is an act in God , and is made to cease after a certaine time by your doctrine , and be turned into hatred . More probable it is to say that God hates all men , ( seeing they are borne and bred in sinne ) untill they are regenerate and grafted into the body of Christ . Yet this is untrue : For Gods love is an everlasting love , as without end , so without beginning .

If you had distinguished of love as Aquinas doth , 1. q. 23. art. 4. and said , that God may be said to love all things that he hath made , in as much as he wisheth some good unto them ; but for as much as he wisheth not unto them a certaine good , to wit , eternall life , therfore he is said not to love but to hate some , your discourse had beene more specious .

Touching a necessity laid upon them by Gods decree to fill up the measure of sinne , Arminius acknowledgeth , Deum voluisse Achabam mensuram scelerum suorum implere , God would that Ahab should make up the full measure of his iniquity ; which is as much as to say that God decreed it ; and the Scripture professeth that both Herod and Pontius Pilate with the Gentiles and people of Israell , were gathered together to doe what Gods hand and his will had determined before to be done ; so then in betraying , condemning , and crucyfying of Christ , they did but that which God determined should come to passe .

And upon supposition that God will expose any man unto temptation , and leave him therein destitute of his grace , all which it is but to harden him ; wee say it is necessary that men shall goe on in sinne without repentance , as your selfe acknowledge was verified of Pharaoh after the seventh plague : onely wee say this is necessity onely secandum quid , and not simpliciter , and hinders not our liberty : for it is necessary that such a thing should come to passe , but not necessarily but contingently and freely , like as upon supposition of Gods decree to make the world ; it is necessary that God should make it , but how ? not necessarily like a naturall agent , but freely , like a voluntary agent .

Yet once again to take a view of your uncouth tenents obscurely delivered , when you say , Pharaoh did not continue one & the same object of Gods decree . It is a very strange speech ; for was not the man Pharaoh the object of Gods decree ? If he was so , & continued the same man , doth it not follow , that he continued the same object of Gods decree ; notwithstanding his person altered much in the space of his life ? You may as well say of one of Gods elect , as of David and Paul , that neither of them continued the same object of Gods decree , if the alteration of their natures made them become different objects of Gods decree . Nay , much more may you say so , because farre greater alterations are found in the elect of God then in the reprobate : for in the elect there is found an alteration from the state of nature , to the state of grace ; no such alteration is found in the reprobate : the reprobate onely growes from bad to worse ; the elect have growne so too before their calling , but by their effectuall calling they are changed , and of the children of this world , they are made the children of God . And after their calling , though after the committing of one sinne , they fall into another , as doe the reprobate ; yet withall againe , they returne unto God by repentance ; no such alteration is found in the reprobates , but still prosiciunt in pejus , they grow worse and worse .

Againe , if because the person of a man altereth , therefore the object of Gods decree altereth , seeing that a mans person altereth not only in the course of manners , but in the course of nature , from childehood to youth , from youth to middle age , from middle age to old age , as also from health to sicknesse , from sicknesse to health , therefore the object of Gods decree in this respect altereth also .

If you say the case is not alike ; I say you might then have prevented this objection by plaine dealing , and told us not onely in what case , but why , in the case you meane , the object of Gods decree altereth : whereas wee are now driven to fish it out as well as wee can , and bring your opinion to light , and set it forth in the proper and distinct lineaments thereof . Now the reason of the difference I conceive to be this , to wit , because God doth not will the death of a man , according to his naturalls , but according to his moralls , and considered in his moralls . As if you should say , God did not will the death of Pharaoh , but of wicked Pharaoh .

But say I , Pharaoh did alwaies continue wicked Pharaoh , from his birth to his death , never altering from wickednesse to goodnesse ; and therefore even in this respect he still continued the same object of Gods decree to damne him . Perhaps you will further say , that Pharaoh , as wicked , was not the object of Gods decree of condemnation , but as having filled up the measure of his iniquity .

But I say againe , from the first time that he thus became the object of Gods decree of condemnation , hee still continued the same : for your selfe confesse , after once they have filled up a certaine measure of iniquity , all possibility of repentance is taken from them . The last refuge for you , is to say , that this speech of yours in denying Pharaoh to continue the same object of Gods decree , is to be understood not in respect of one and the same decree , but in respect of different decrees , thus ; Though Pharaoh were wicked all his life , yet he was not all along the object of Gods decree of condemnation , but untill he had filled the measure of his iniquity , he was the object of Gods decree to save him . For in the consequence you acknowledge , that God doth unfainedly love all men , untill such time as they have filled up the measure of their sinne . And accordingly in another Treatise of yours you acknowledge , that men may change from the state of the elect , to the state of reprobates . And immediately before , you professe that God from all eternity did not will the death , but rather the life of Pharaoh .

This you might have expressed in plaine termes without faultering , but you were loath , as it seemes , to alienate mens mindes with so foule a Tenent , touching the change , not of the object of Gods will and decree onely , but of Gods verie will and decree also ; which manifestly appeares by this opening your Tenent , though in termes you professe Gods will is immutable , and would have your reader conceive , that all the alteration is in the object of Gods will and decree , not in the will and decree of God himselfe .

And over and above herehence it followeth , that if Pharaoh had died before the seventh wonder ( for till then he had not filled up the measure of his sinnes by your opinion ) Pharaoh had beene saved , though he neither had faith nor repentance . For till their soules be betroathed unto wickednesse , God doth not hate them ; this is your dialect : whence it followeth , that either all infants of Turkes and Saracens dying in their infancy are saved , or else all men as soone as they are borne are betrothed unto wickednesse , and consequently all reprobates from their birth unto their death continue the same objects of Gods decree without alteration .

And then againe , I pray consider , if God hates them not , and wils not their damnation , untill by filling up the measure of their sinne they are betroathed unto wickednesse ( as you speake ) then surely hee did not hate them , nor will the condemnation of them in their infancy , much lesse did hee will it before they were borne , much lesse did hee will it before the world was made ; yet you have already plainly professed , that God willed the death of Pharaoh from all eternity ; and if from all eternity , then sure he willed it before the world was made , much more before Pharaoh was borne , much more before Pharaoh had filled up the measure of his iniquity . Yet I confesse that though God from all eternity willed the death of Pharaoh , and consequently before Pharaoh was borne , and much more before he had filled up the measure of his iniquity . Yet God did not will that Pharaoh should be damned before he had filled up the measure of his iniquitie , much lesse that he should be damned in his infancie , much lesse before he was borne , much lesse before the world was . So that these two propositions may well stand together without contradiction , God from all eternity willed that Pharaoh should be damned ; but God did not will that Pharaoh should bee damned from all eternity , or before hee was borne , or in his infancy , or before he had filled up the measure of his sinnes . But the propositions which you take upon you to free from contradiction , are of a farre different nature , and indeed directly contradictious . God did from all eternity will the death of Pharaoh ; God did not from all eternity will the death , but rather willed the life of Pharaoh . And for clearing it , you onely tell us that Pharaoh was not the same object of Gods decree , though he continued the same man . A proposition both very obscure in it selfe , and void of all efficacie to free your selfe from contradiction , neither doe you take any paines to accommodate it , but leaving that as a blanke for your propitious reader to fill up after his owne judgement or affection rather . And the issue of all is , to professe that God did indeede from all etetnity will the life of Pharaoh , and so continued to will it , untill such time as hee had filled up the measure of his sinne ; and that from thenceforth hee hated him , as he doth all reprobates , having once betrothed themselves unto wickednesse : which assertion manifestly betraying your opinion as touching the making of Gods will mutable , your desire to satisfie your reader with calling Gods will immutable , and saying that the object of Gods decree is not still the same : Sed quid ego verb a audiam facta cum vidiam ? You manifestly maintaine , that Gods love and will to save , doth cease upon the filling up the measure of sinne , and betrothing a mans selfe to wickedness , and thereupon and from thenceforth hee hates them , and wills their death and damnation , whereas till that time he willed their life and salvation . These propositions ( God loves all men , God doth not love all men ) I say , are contradictories . All rules of contradiction justifie these to be contradictions .

And your selfe confesse as much in effect ; when going about to cleare them from contradiction , you quite alter the forme of them , by shaping them thus in effect , God loves all men till they have filled up the measure of their sinnes , but when once they have filled up the measure of their sinnes , he loves them not . Now these propositions are quite different from the former , neither doe we charge these with contradiction as wee charged the former . But that wherewith wee charge these is this , they make the will of God mutable , contrary to the expresse testimonie of the holy Ghost , saying , I the Lord am not changed , Mal. 3. 6. And Saint Iames professeth , that with the Lord there is no variableness nor shadow of change , which you perceiving , are loath to speake your minde plainly , but to avoide so grose an untruth , had rather cast your selfe upon a manifest contradiction , in saying , God loves all men , and God loves not all men ; and to free your selfe from contradiction , betray your corrupt opinion another way , in making Gods love to change into hatred after a certaine time , to wit , after the measure of sinne is filled up : and the onely shift you have to charme it , is to confound the difference of time ( which alone avoides the contradiction ) and expressing it thus , God loves all men as men , or as men which have not made up the full measure of iniquity ; but having made up that , or having their soules betrothed to wickednesse , hee hates them .

But this will not serve your turne : for seeing this contradiction of making up the full measure of sinne , did not belong unto man from the beginning , but onely after a certaine space of time ; the difference specified must necessarily resolve it selfe into a meere difference of time , thus God did love them till they had made up the full measure of sinne , but after that he hated them . And this is further proved : For if the difference onely consisted in respect of different considerations at the same time ; then the distinction should have place as well after this full measure of sinne is made up , as before . And so Pharaoh after the filling up of the full measure of sinne , might bee said to be loved of God as a man , and hated as having filled up the measure of sinne : but no where do● you make use of any such distinction . Nay , much more should it have use in this case , and indeed onely in this case : for untill a man hath filled up the measure of his sinne , this distinct consideration hath no place : for a body may bee considered as Ens , or Naturale , or as Quantum , because hee is both Ens and Naturale , and Quantum .

But a man connot be considered at any time as having filled up the measure of his sinne , but onely after that time comes , hee may bee so considered ; for to consider him to bee that which hee is not , is not to consider him what hee is , but to faine him to be what he is not . Againe , when you say , God loves all men as men ; What is the meaning of this ? What do● you denote by this love of God ? For wee commonly say , love is not in God , Quoad affectum , but Quoad effectum ; at least , Quoad affectum , it is nothing at all different from Gods will . Now I desire to know what that thing is which God wills to man as a man , or what is the effect of this love : and I doubt not but when you say , God hates them as having made up the full measure of their sinne : your meaning is , that God wills their damnation , and that for this measure of their sin . In proportion your answer should be this , That God wills the salvation of all men as they are men ; yet here is very great disproportion ; for when you say , God wills the damnation of men having filled up the measure of their sin : I finde herein a manifest difference between the reprobate & the elect as touching the cause of damnation , and that on mans part ; namely , the making up the full measure of their sin , which is found onely in reprobates , not in the elect .

But when you say on the contrary side ; God wills the salvation of all men as they are men , I finde no difference at all betweene the reprobate and the elect as touching the cause of salvation , either on mans part , or on Gods part ; for as touching Gods will , that passeth ( you say ) upon the salvation of all without difference : then on mans part likewise there is no difference at all , if they are considered onely as men ; for the reprobates are men as well as the elect . To help this , you rest not in this consideration of them as men , but adde a clause unto it very inconfiderately as touching the forme , thus , Or at having made up the full measure of their sinne . Now the disjunctive argues that these two considerations are equivalent , which is untrue ; for the first consideration proceeds in abstraction from the second .

But I conceive the weakenesse of your cause urgeth you to take hold of all helpes , and thereupon you confound things that differ ; for in some cases , the first consideration usually hath place ; as when t is said , God hateth nothing that hee hath made : therefore he hateth not man , true , say some , he hateth not man as man : and this distinction seemes plausible to some , and therefore you seemed willing to help your selfe with this by the way , for it might stirre some propitious effection in a pliable reader . But then finding this bed a great deale too short to stretch your selfe thereon , you added by way of disjunctive another consideration , which is this ; As not having made up the full measure of sinne . And because you rest upon it , I thinke good to consider it .

Now against this I have already excepted on the part of reprobates , and in the particular of Pharaoh ; and argued , that then Pharaoh had beene saved , had he died before the seventh wonder ? for , till then in your opinion hee had not made up the full measure of his sinne : yet we doe not finde , that Pharaoh before this time had either faith or repentance .

Now I will propose another exception on the part of Gods elect . Paul never filled up the measure of his sinne , for if he had , then had hee beene a reprobate ; but hee was an elect , therefore if hee had died immediately after the s●oning of Steven , hee had beene saved , though accessary to his death ; For he kept the garments of them that slew him , as himselfe confesseth . In a word , all the elect , though dying before ever they were called unto faith and repentance , should notwithstanding bee saved also .

My third exception is against the disproportion that neverthelesse is found in these propositions ; for when t is said , God wills the damnation of them that have filled up the measure of their sinne , the filling up the measure of sinne , is noted here as the cause of their damnation ; but in saying God willeth the salvation of all , not having filled up the measure of their sinne , the not having filled up the measure of their sinne , cannot be noted as the cause of their salvation . And therefore to mend this foule disproportion , the Genius of your tenet , drives you in conscience to proceede , and professe plainely , that God willeth the salvation of all men that believe and repent : and accordingly God willeth the damnation of all that doe not believe and repent , and such indeed alone are they that fill up the measure of their sinn . Now herein wee agree with you , namely , in justifying the truth of both these propositions .

But like as from the latter it followeth not , that God willeth the damnation of all , but of some onely , namely of those that doe fill up the measure of their sinne , and breake not off their sins by faith and repentance : so from the former it followeth , not that God willeth the salvation of all , but onely that hee willeth the salvation of those that believe and repent . And if you please further to infer that , because perseverance in sinne of infidelitie and impenitencie , as they are the meritorions causes of damnation so they are the meritorious causes of the decree of damnation also : I thinke I may with as good reason take liberty to inferre from the former , that seeing faith and repentance , yea and good workes also are the disposing causes of salvation , therefore they are to bee accounted the disposing causes of the decree of salvation , that is of our election also : And so your opinion shall appeare at full and to life in his proper coulors , not an haires breadth different , either from the Arminian heresie of late , or from the Pelagian heresie of old .

8 The deductions you speake of in my judgement deserve to be called dictates rather then deductions . As for moderne Catechismes , you are not the first that nibble at them : it is a point of imperious learning now a daies from on high to despise such performances . But to speake as a free man , the lesse they shall consort with these your deductions as you call them , the lesse shall they differ from the truth . As for your concurrence with Bishop Hooper in his preface upon the commandements , which you glorie of now a second time : In this place it is hard , if not impossible to discerne by your text what that passage is of Bishop Hoopers , which you rest upon with ostentation of your concurrence with him , as if your opinions were confirmed by his martyrdome . In the close of the second Section of this chapter , you told us , That it was not every degree of mans hatred or enmity unto God , but a full measure of it which utterly exempts man from Gods love ; and withall , that this was observed by Bishop Hooper . But in stead of alledging any passage in him to this purpose , you referred us there to the fourth paragraffe of this chapter , which is this present section .

Yet concerning that sentence , I see a good construction may bee made of it , taking love , quoad effectum ( as usually passions are in such sense attributed unto God , and not quoad affectum ) and the chiefest effect of Gods love is salvation . Now it is most true , that nothing but finall perseverance in sinne doth bereave men of salvation , of glory ; nothing but finall perseverance in sinne , stands in opposition to the possibility of grace succeeding in the same subject . Now albeit in that which followeth it cannot be judged by your text , what you borrow out of Bishop Hooper , and what you doe not . Yet upon consulting Bishop Hoopers Preface unto his exposition of the tenne Commandements , I finde , that both this sentence following , Every man is called in the Scripture wicked and the enemy of God , for the privation and lacke of faith and love that he oweth to God ; and all that followeth hereupon to the end of this eighth Section of yours , is taken out of that Preface of his : and I wonder not a little what you meant , not to discover so much , neither by expresse profession , nor by changing the letter , that thereby at least it might be taken to be another mans discourse , and not your owne .

Well , I am willing to consider what you alledge out of him , and whether his writings bee so consonant as you speake to your deductions . First , you call him , A learned Bishop , and blessed Martyr ; Et quis Herculem vituperat ? You adde , that this exposition of the ten Commandements made by him , Is a fit Catechisme for a Bishop to make . I am perswaded , the whole Church of England hath a reverend opinion of his learning , of his holinesse , of his martyrdome ; and that this Catechisme of his is worthy of a Bishop : but it followeth not herehence , that every Bishop in England doth : neither doe I thinke you your selfe expect they should concurre with him in every opinion of his expressed in this booke .

In his declaration of the ninth Commandement . Fol. 80. he justifieth mendatium ossiciosum , and professeth , that it is required in some cases ; Doe you looke that all the Bishops of England should concurre rather with Bishop Hooper , then with Bishop Austine in this opinion .

Vpon the eighth Commandement , Fol. 74. he complaines , saying , A great pitty it is to see how farre that office of a Bishop is degenerated from the originall in the Scripture , it was not so at the beginning when Bishops were at the best , as the Epistle of Paul to Titus testifieth , that willed him to ordain , in every City of Creet a Bishop : and Fol. 79. ▪ as sharpely as closely censureth the Bishops of his dayes , for arrogating to themselves so much wit as to rule & serve in both states , in the Church and in the Civill policie ; and to the contrary professeth , that one of them is more then any man is able to satisfie ; and that it is not possible that one should doe both well , and that it is a great oversight of the Princes and higher powers of the earth , so to charge them with two burthens , when none of them , as hee saith , is able to beare the least of them both . Doe you expect that all the Bishops in England should bee of his judgement in this ?

On the same commandement , Fol. 73. as touching those who have great Forrests or Parkes of Deere or Conies , which pasture and feed upon their neighbours ground , or Columbaries whereas Doves assemble and haun● , and those feede on the poores corne , hee referres it to the charitie of every man , whether the keeping of such beasts bee not against Gods lawes , and mans lawes , and whether it bee not suffered rather for a few mens pleasures , then for many mens prosit : Doe you thinke that either Church or State are precisely of his opinion , as it is manifested by this ?

Vpon the seventh Commandement , Fol. 69. he maintains , that upon divorse in case of adultery , it is lawfull to marry another ; and not so onely , but that the adulterous partie ought to be put to death : Do you wish that the Church and State of England would bee of the same minde with him in this ?

Vpon the fourth Commandement he avoucheth , that although the ceremony of the Sabbath be taken away , which appertained onely to the common wealth of the Hebrews , yet one day of the weeke to preserve and use the word of God and his Sacraments , is not abrogated : and that therefore in this are two things to bee observed , the one ceremoniall during for the time , the other morall , and never to be abolished as long as the Church of Christ shall continue upon the earth . Againe , This Sunday , saith he , that we observe , is not the commandement of man , as many say , that would under the pretence of this one law , binde the Church of Christ to all other laws that men have ungodly prescribed unto the Church : but it is by expresse words commanded that wee should observe this day ( the Sunday ) for our Sabbath , as the words of Saint Paul declareth , commanding every man to appoint his almes for the poore in Sunday : the text saith , in one of the Sabbath : it is an Hebrew phrase , and it is as much as to say , in the Sunday : as you may read the same manner of speech in Luke and John , of the women that came to the Sepulchre to annoint the dead body of Christ . Luke saith , In one of the Sabbaths early they came to the Sepulchre : and so saith Iohn by the same words , the which was the Sunday , as no man doubteth ; for t is our faith , that Christ roso the third day .

I presume you will not prescribe to all the Bishops and Divines in this kingdome to bee of Bishop Hoopers opinion in this point . Now if in these particulars it bee lawfull to differ from him in opinion , without offence of Church or State ; I hope wee shall have as great liberty to differ from him in other things also upon good ground .

Yet I speake not this , as if I found this godly Bishop to justifie that Tenet of yours , for confirmation whereof you make use of his authority . And that Tenet of yours is this , that there is a certaine time when the wicked have filled up the full measure of their iniquity , though they live many years after ; and such you conceive was the case of Pharaoh after the seventh plague . And that from that time forwards all possibility of amendment is taken from them . And until that time God doth unfainedly love them . But having made up that measure , and so having their soules betrothed unto wickednesse , he hates them . That then they become reprobates , and not till then ; and from thence to their lives end it is not Gods will and pleasure they should repent , but rather that it is Gods good will and pleasure that they should have their hearts hardned . Your words are these in the precedent Section , pag. 180. God loves all men unfainedly as they are men , or a● men which have not made up the full measure of iniquity : but having made up that , or having their soules betrothed unto wickednesse , he hates them . And againe ; He necessarily hates them being once become reprobates , or having made up the full measure of iniquitie . And pag. 179. It was no branch of Gods good will and pleasure that Pharaoh should now repent , or be willing to let Israel goe . Rather it was his good will and pleasure ( specially after the seventh plague ) to have the heart of Pharaoh hardned . And a little after , God plagued Pharaoh for not doing that which now he could not , all possibilitie of amendment being taken from him . My opinion to the contrary is , that no man hath filled up the full measure of his iniquity till death . As touching the possibility of amendment , I acknowledge none in man , without the regenerating grace of God , whereby he gives man repentance . Neither do I know any time in the course of mans life wherin any man is excluded from possibility of repentance by the grace of God . We know God gave the thiefe repentance upon the crosse . Our Saviour gives us to understand , that God calleth some at the very last houre of the day . Paul admonisheth Timothy to carrie himselfe gently towards them that are without ; 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , if so be God at any time may give them repentance , that they may come to amendment , out of the snare of the devill , by whom they are led captive to doe his will . Of old it was wont to be said , Inter pontem & fontem ; and the like is usuall amongst us : Betweene the stirrop and the ground , Mercy I askt , mercy I found .

All this which followeth , and which you have transcribed out of Bishop Hooper , I finde nothing that contradicteth any of these assertions of mine , or that justifieth any of your opposite assertions , not in this which immediately followeth thus ; Every man is in Scripture called wicked , and the enemy of God , for the privation and lacke of faith and love , that hee oweth to God . Et impij vocantur , qui non omnino sunt pij ; that is , They are called wicked , that in all things honour not God , beleeve not in God , and observe not his commandements as they should doe ; which we cannot doe by reason of this naturall infirmity , or hatred of the flesh , as Paul calleth it , against God . In this sense taketh Paul the word wicked . So must we interpret S. Paul , and take his words , or else no man should be damned . In all this I finde nothing to that purpose whereto you alledge it .

Yet by the way , I am not of Master Hoopers opinion , in saying , that They were called wicked ( meaning in holy Scripture ) that in all things honour not God , beleeve not in God , and observe not his commandements as they should , which wee cannot doe by reason of this naturall infirmity , &c. For all this is verified of the very Saints and children of God here on earth ; and I doe not finde that the Saints of God in holy Scripture , by reason of their infirmities , not honouring God , not beleeving in God , not observing his commandements in such measure as they should ( as God knowes , and our consciences well know that in many things we offend all , ) are therefore called wicked . Especially considering that the Greeke word which Master Hooper aimes at , and which hee renders by the word wicked in English , is 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , as appeares by his reference to Rom. 5. 8. In this sense ( saith Bishop Hooper ) taketh Paul this word wicked , when he saith that Christ died for the wicked . Now this state noted by S. Paul in these words , is not the state of grace , but the state of sinne precedent to justification , and the state of enmity against God , as appeares by the two next verses ; Much more being justified by his bloud , we shall be saved by his life . 10. For if when we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of his Sonne , &c. Whereby it is manifest that the state of sinne in which we were when wee were reconciled to God by Christs death , was the state of enmity against God . And indeed otherwise there were no place for reconcilement , which consists in making them friends which before were enemies . Neither doe I know any Divine of master Hoopers opinion , in construing S. Paul in this manner , as if these sinners 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , ( which he cals wicked ) for whom Christ died , were onely such as doe not honour God , beleeve in God , and observe his commandements as they should , which wee know is incident to the very children of God , and to the most righteous Saints that are on the earth , who yet are never accounted in holy Scripture ( for ought I know ) the enemies of God . Yet such are they termed for whom Christ died , and who S. Paul saith are reconciled to God by the death of his Sonne .

I willingly grant that Christ died to procure the salvation of none but such as sooner or later should become the Saints of God , to honour him , beleeve in him , and observe his commandements , though not in such measure as they should , by reason of the flesh which they carie about them , still lusting against the spirit ; and this seemes , by this place , undoubtedly to be the opinion of Bishop Hooper , though he erreth in the interpretation of S. Paul , who in this place considereth not what shall be their condition sooner or later , for whom Christ died , but only sheweth what was their condition when Christ died for them , thereby the more to commend the love of God towards us , who sent his Sonne to die for us , when wee were sinners , and reconciled us to himselfe by the death of his Son , what time we were his enemies . And I am perswaded your selfe are of the same opinion with me in this , though I will not say that the evidence of S. Pauls text seemed so plaine unto you , this very way I have interpreted it , that therefore you concealed S. Pauls passage , mentioned by master Hooper thus , When he saith that Christ died for the wicked ; and in the margent referres us to Rom. 5. 8. all which you have handsomly left out , to what end I know not . But hereby it comes to passe , that the reader may be to seeke of that passage of S. Paul , in case he have no other meanes to judge thereof , then your transcribing it .

As for the reason of Bishop Hooper to justifie this interpretation of S. Pauls text , it is nothing consequent , as when he saith , So we must interpret Saint Pauls words , or else no man should be damned . If S. Paul had said , Christ died for all the wicked , or for all sinners , then indeed we should be driven to seeke out some such interpretation of the word wicked , or sinners , or else none should bee damned . But S. Paul doth not say , Christ died for all that are wicked , or for all sinners , but for us sinners : his words are these , God commendeth his love to us , that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us . Now he writes unto Christians , and for such onely hee died , though they were not Christians when Christ died for them , but rather in the state of enmity against God . And thus to appropriate Christs dying for mankinde , doth manifestly appeare to bee master Hoopers meaning , as before I shewed , albeit he deviates from the right interpretation of S. Pauls Text , in the place mentioned by him .

That which followeth doth in my judgement carie a greater shew of justifying your former assertions , and yet but a shew neither ; as when he saith , Now we know that Paul himselfe , S. Iohn , and Christ damneth the contemners of God , and such as willingly continue in sinne , and will not repent . Those the Scripture excludeth from the generall promise of grace . It may seeme that The contemners of God , and such as willingly continue in sinne and will not repent , in master Hoopers phrase , are the same in your judgement with those , whom you account to have filled up the measure of iniquity . But what ground have you for that ? Master Hooper saith not , that all such whom he accounts contemners of God , and such as willingly continue and sinne , and will not repent , have hereupon filled up the measure of their iniquitie , or that hereupon all possibility of amendment is taken from them ; these are your assertions , they are not master Hoopers . Again , all contemners of God , and such as willingly continue in sinne , and will not repent , master Hooper saith , the Scripture excludes from the generall promise of grace , and this he utters without any distinction , as well he may , to wit for the present , and so long as they continue in this their contempt and hardnesse of hart . For as much as the promise of grace , both for the pardon of sinne , and salvation of our soules , belongs to none but such as breake off their sinfull courses by faith and repentance . But you distinguish betweene such contemners of God , and presumptuous sinners , and tell us that some of them have arived to the full measure of their iniquity , and that there is no possibility of their amendment , such as Pharaoh was after the seventh plague ; others , though contemners of God , &c. yet in this their course of contempt , have not filled up the measure of their iniquity , such as Pharaoh was before the seventh plague , who undoubtedly was a contemner of God before that time , and one that willingly continued in sinne , and would not repent ; and of all such you professe that God doth unfainedly love them .

Now there are no tracks or footsteps of such strange assertions as either of these to be found in Bishop Hooper . Of all contemners of God he professeth according unto Scripture , that they are excluded from all promise of grace , to wit , for the present ; he doth not say , God unfainedly loves any of them : but as for the time to come , he doth not affirme that all possibility of amendment is taken from them . Had hee thought so , then he should acknowledge them to bee in a desperate condition .

But hee is so farre from this , that hee accounts Desperation to bee a principall let and impediment unto godlinesse , chap. 18. fol. 90. The first let , saith hee , or impediment is desperation , when as men thinke they cannot be saved , but are excluded from all mercy ; and a little after , Of the contrary nature ( to presumption ) is desperation , it taketh from God his mercy : For when they offend and continue in sinne , they thinke there is no mercy left for them ; and that as in the next sentence he sheweth , specially because of custome and long continuance in sinne . Then he proceeds , saying , This discourse and progresse in that knowledge of sinne beareth him in hand that it is impossible to returne unto God : This is as much as in your phrase to affirme , that , all possibility of amendment is taken from him .

But , doth Mr. Hooper justifie this ? Nothing lesse , for this is a maine let or impediment to repentance , which he desires to remove out of the way of sinners , and to that hee proceeds in this manner , Moses , saith he , like a good Physitian teacheth a remedie against this dangerous disease , and sheweth the way unto God , declareth that God is full of mercy , and ready to forgive ; and beginneth his oration in this manner , unto such as bee afflicted and oppressed with sinne ; When there commeth upon thee all those things , when God hath afflicted thee for thy sinnes , and thou returnest unto him with all thy heart , he shall deliver thee from captivity , and receive thee to his mercy againe . Of the which text learne this doctrine , that God will alwaies forgive , how many and how horrible soever the sinnes bee , and learne to feare presumption , and to beware of desperation . So that hoe acknowledgeth no just cause of desperation , no not in respect of custome and long continuance in sinne .

The next sentence in Mr. Hooper , transcribed by you in this eighth Section of yours , conteines no more then that which wee all acknowledge . Thou seest , saith he , by the places before rehearsed , that though wee cannot believe in God as undoubtedly as is required , by reason of this our naturall sicknesse and disease ; yet for Christ , sake in the judgement of God , wee are accounted as faithfull believers , for whose sake this naturall disease and sicknesse is pardoned , by what name soever Saint Paul calleth the naturall infirmity and originall sinne in man . This is something concerning the nature of originall sinne , in the opinion of Mr. Hooper ; nothing at all touching a certaine state of sinne , wherein all possibility of amendment is taken from a man , to which purpose Mr. Hooper is alledged by you in this place .

Yet because I doe not know what reaches you have in this also ; I answer , that Mr. Hooper speakes of originall sinne , as it is found in the regenerate , and as it is in them , hee calls it onely , A naturall sicknesse and disease . And indeed , when wee are once regenerate , wee are no longer dead in sinne , no longer estranged from the life of God .

But herehence it followeth not , that Mr. Hooper was of opinion , that originall sinne was even in the unregenerate to bee accounted onely A naturall sicknesse and disease , and not rather a death in sinne ; especially considering that the holy Apostle acknowledgeth , A law in his members rebelling against the law of his minde , and leading him captive to the law of sinne , and calleth it , A body of death , crying out against it , and saying , Who shall deliver me from this body of death ? Rom. 7. 1. The last clause , as I take it , makes more for your present purpose , as when hee saith , And this imperfection and naturall sicknesse taken of Adam , excludeth not the person from the promise of God in Christ , except wee transgresse the limits and bounds of originall sinne by our ! owne folly and malice , and either of a contempt or hate of Gods word , wee fall into sinne , and transforme ourselves into the image of the devill . Then wee exclude by this meanes ourselves from the promises and merits of Christ , who onely received our infirmities and originall disease , and not the contempt of him and his law .

This passage I confesse is somewhat strange , and of my knowledge hath troubled some , conc●iving it as an assertion of yours , and not so much as dreaming that it was delivered by Mr. Hooper . I answer therefore ; First of all , that this serves not your turne for the present , & that in two respects . First , you distinguish the contempt of Godsword , and of his law , according to different degrees ; eithersuch as was in Pharaoh before the seventh plague , or such as was in Pharaoh after the seventh plague . And notwithstanding the former contempt of Gods word and his law , you professe , that God unfainedly loves all such , in whom such a contempt is found , because for sooth as yet they have not filled up the full measure of their contempt : And as for such in whom is found a farther degree of contempt then this , all possibility of amendment is taken from them .

Now Mr. Hooper doth not make any such distinction , much lesse doth hee cast himselfe upon any such uncoth assertions as you deliver hereupon , as before I have shewed . Secondly , your doctrine of filling up the measure of iniquity , proceeds of men in state of nature ; but Mr. Hooper delivers that before rehearsed of men in the state of grace . And in my judgement his meaning is no more then this , that imperfections of faith and holinesse , may and doe still consist with the ●ate of grace in this life ; but contempt or hate of Gods word , and transformation of our selves into the image of the Devill , cannot stand with the state of grace ; not denying but that all contempt and hatred of Gods word , and the fruits of the image of the Devill in us , in case they are broken off , and an end is set unto them by repentance , are borne by Christ upon the Crosse , and satisfaction made for them by the death of Christ , as well as for originall sinne : nor affirming that any man once brought unto the state of grace , doth at any time breake forth so farre , as to contemne or hate Gods word , or to transforme himselfe into the image of the Devill .

But his meaning in my judgement is onely this , that Christ hath made satisfaction for the imperfections of our faith and holinesse , although wee continue therein untill death : but hee hath not made satisfaction for the contempt and hatred of his word , and for our transformation of our selves into the image of the Divell ( as h● calleth it ) in case men doe continue therein unto death .

Imperfections may and shall continue , and still bee pardoned , but contempt must not . This hath seemed to others as well as to my selfe , an harsh sentence , and I have taken some paines to cleare it : but how little it serves your turne , to that purpose whereto you alledge it , is easily discovered .

SECT. III.

That Gods will and pleasure is never frustrated , albeit his unspeakable love take no effect in many to whom it is unfainedly tendered .

CHAP. XVI .

In what sense God may be said to have done all that he could for his vineyard , and for such as perish .

I Have now waded thorow fifteene Chapters of these your Contemplations , and should by this in reason be pretie well acquainted with the manner of your discourse . But I finde my selfe as much pus●ed in searching after the coherence of the parts of the first Section here , as hitherto I have beene in any part of the Treatise . But it may be I doe but labour to gather that which you never strewed , and then no marvell if I labour in vaine .

As in other parts so in this it may be your purpose was to write Quodlibets : well , such as they are , I purpose to consider them as I finde them . To summe up the particulars ; in the first place you discover unto us the causes of conceiving difficulties , and of ignorance in assoiling them , and that is because we extend this Maxime , ( Both parts of contradictories cannot bee true , ) not so farre as we should , and the reason thereof is ( you say ) because we extend our power to the utmost , yea farther then justice or goodnesse can accompany it : To this you adde 〈◊〉 our nature is humourous and inconstant , and therefore nothing can imply any constant contradiction to our nature , and that looke what is constant and still the same , that will at one time or other contradict our humour . And humours , you say , enraged with contradiction arme power against whatsoever contradicts them .

By the way you tell us , that the use of power in creatures sensitive is to satiate their appetite of sense ; in man , to accomplish his will and desire of good . And that being corrupt , his power becomes an under-commander unto his unruly appetites , as in voluptuous men ; and that in men esteemed good , motions of equity are so weake , that men yeeld their consents to such proposals , as were they firme , they would offensively contradict them . And the reason why they yeeld , is lest upstart appetites , which custome countenanceth , should bee enlarged by reluctance : But love , you say , is not alike set on divers objects , but divides itselfe unequally , when it comes to opposition betweene sense & reason ; our selves and friends or common equity : And the inconveniences whereto the world and flesh exposeth us are reducible to two heads , the blinding of the judgement , and consequently the abusing of power and authority .

Then againe you returne to our unconstant humour , and upon the backe of that tell us , that though none doth good , yet we may doe lesse evill then others . And lastly , that they who love equity , are hardly drawn to dispense with injustice ; and at last having sate long , you hatch an excellent Maxime , that where judgement is infallible , and love to justice invincible , there ●s not possible to transgresse in judgement . All which when I compare together , and with your theame proposed , How God may be said to have done all that he could for his vineyard , it cals to my remembrance a certaine mad fellowes discourse , when I was a Scholler at Winchester , that would talke of master Killigree , and Abbey lands , fat venison , and such like uncoherences a long time together .

But let us examine them apart : Both parts of contradiction cannot be true ; and it is as true that both parts of contradiction cannot be false . But whereto this tends , and how pertinent to your purpose in this place , I cannot devise ; Onely you tell us that the not extending of this Maxime so farre as we should , is the cause why wee conceive difficulties in your wilde discourse premised , as also of our ignorance in assoiling them . A strange conceit , and whereof I see no colour of reason , neither do you take any paines to explicate it , by accommodation or instance , but let flie at randome , as if you would imploy your readers in seeking after sense and reason where there is none to be found . And if this were true , your selfe should have assoiled the difficulties conceived in the points proposed , by extending this Maxime to the utmost , to serve your turne ; and shewed , how by not extending it so farre as is meet , difficulties are conceived , and no meanes found to assoile them : but your selfe have taken no such course : And who was ever knowne , not to extend this Maxime to the uttermost ? where can you finde any limitation or confining of it ? what doe you meane to abuse your readers patience with such incredible fictions ?

Againe , herehence it followeth , that whosoever doe extend this maxime so farre as naturally it would reach , they shall not be apt to conceive difficulties in the points proposed , nor be touched with ignorance in assoiling them . For the truth whereof I appeale to every mans conscience that reades your writings : of whom I am perswaded not one of a thousand , if Schollers , doth deny but that this Maxime holds universally ; yet you take upon you to give a reason why we extend it not so farre as naturally it would reach , and that you say is our proneness to extend our owne power to the utmost , even farther then true goodnesse can accompany it . So then the honester men are , the more apt they are to extend this Maxime to the utmost , and consequently lesse apt to conceive difficulties in the points proposed , and lesse ignorant to assoile them : and the reason why men doe conceive difficulties in your writings , or are not able to assoile them , is for want of honestie . And you in the meane time would not be supposed to shew any want either of wit or honestie in your discourses . Well , this article of your naturall Creed is observable , They that doe things unjustifiable , they doe not extend this Maxime ( Both parts of contradiction cannot be true ) so farre as naturally it would reach , which is a mysterie unto me , and whereof I can devise no reason , neither doe you give any . For although our natures are humorous , unconstant , and wee finde contradiction , and are enraged with contradiction , and arme power against that which doth contradict us , yet herehence it followeth not that we limit or restraine the rules of contradiction ; unlesse out of some such curious sophistrie and subtiltie as this , you dispute in this manner ; We oppose them that contradict us , therefore we doe restraine the rules of contradiction : I doubt my reader would scarce thinke me sober , if I should goe about to dissolve this sophistry ; yet the face of your discourse lookes no other way then this . And I confesse the law of God , and rules of good manners shall never faile to contradict him that is of a dishonest disposition . And though passions turne commonly into their contraries , yet notwithstanding all such inconstancy , true morality will alwaies be an opposite to him that is dishonest . But yet I finde no propension herehence to maintain , that both parts of contradiction are true , or both false .

Power , you say , is for the execution of will , and so is wit too , and no marvell if sometimes both of them are in knaves keeping . This is stuffe serving to fill paper . And if S. Paul complained of a law in his members rebelling against the law of his minde , and leading him captive to the law of sinne , no Rom. 7. 23 marvell if naturall men , esteemed good and sober , doe sometimes yeeld to things unfit : but that it is out of such mature deliberation as you speake , to prevent forsooth the enraging of carnall appetites , ( which why you should call upstarts , I know not , unlesse you deny them to bee as old as the fall of Adam ) I see no reason . I give a theefe my purse , lest I should lose my purse , and somewhat else also . But if I give over unto my passions my honesty , to be defiled by them , alas what have we more or greater to lose ? And let them rage while they will , wee can but lose our honesty , therefore in reason we will not stop passions mouth at the first with our honesty , we will rather tugge and pull for it , and keepe more adoe then Michah for his gods ; Yee have taken away my gods , Iud. 18. 24 and the Priest , and goe your waies , and what have I more ? The motions of the flesh must needs offend the spirit , for they are lustings against the spirit . But there is no proportion between Gal. 5. 17 ▪ this contradiction , and that which is betweene paine and pleasure . For paine and pleasure are not felt at once , as this contradiction is .

Love , as not alike set on divers objects , is brought in by way of adversative , whereas the sentence is no other then that which went before , touching the contradiction between carnall desires , and vertuous motions . Yet to betray some quaint straine of learning , by way of parenthesis , you make question whether Love be one simple and indivisible quality , or an aggregation or cluster of divers inclinations rooted in one center : neither doe you determine it , but leave your reader to gaze upon it , as a childe doth upon a cluster of grapes first ripe , and the more like to be first rotten : you might make the same question of hatred also . For Quot modis dicitur unum oppositorum , tot modis dic●tur & alterum . It was wont to be said of love , that it was as the weight of the soule . Anima amore quasi pondere fertur quocunque fertur . But it hath different acceptions . For there is amor amicitiae , and there is amor concupiscentiae . And this amor concupiscentiae is either ordinate or inordinate : ordinate love becomes morall vertue , and inordinate , morall vice . And S. Iohn divides this inordinate concupiscence into three kindes ; concupiscence of the flesh , concupiscence of the eie , 1 Ioh. 2. 〈◊〉 and pride of life . And will you put all these into one cluster , or posie rather , consisting partly of garden flowers , partly of stinking flowers of the field ? The two originals you speak of , if subordinate , they are not two originals , there is but one ; and the love of the world and the flesh carie men on , even in despite of judgement and conscience to the contrary , into manifest impi●ties , iniquities , impurities .

I doe not finde it strange that things seeme not impossible to us , if they are within our power , yet though they be within our power one way , I see no cause but they may seeme unpossible , and be unpossible another way . And bee our variousnesse never so great , yet I see no reason to justifie you in saying , that what cannot be admitted to day , will be allowed of to morrow . For the vicious person , Qui non est hodie cras minus aptus erit , to that which is good . And Absolom two yeares together watched opportunity to revenge himselfe on his brother Amnon , and afterwards continued as setled in his course os aspiring 2 Sam. 13. 22 , 23. to the kingdome : And therefore herein certainly you reckon without your hoast . Yet it is most true , that the better men are , the more hardly are they drawne to unjust courses : this I say is as true , as that all this is nothing to the purpose : yet hereupon you commend unto us by way of consequence , a truth in great state , and scored in the margent as verie remarkable , and yet you call it an experienced truth , That if any mans judgement in matters of equitie and justice were infallible , and his love to justice constant and invincible , it would be unpossible for him to transgresse in judgement ; and indeed if this were not true , both parts of contradiction manifestly should prove true . For t is unpossible to transgresse but either by errour in judgement , or corruption in will : And therefore where judgement is infallible , and will incorruptible , t is not possible for such a one to transgresse . This is as true as one of Euclides elements . But it depends upon such Ifs and Ands , that the world is nothing like to profit either in wit or honestie by this information . Onely in this clause alone I finde some coherence with the former , to wit , with the first sentence of this Section : for that laid downe the thesis , this delivers the selfe same in hypothesis .

The conclusion is , that Gods ideall perfection in integrity and constancie hath no mixture of vice or humerous impotency . And our conceit of this perfection in God , you say , is rectified thus , to wit , by experience of the strength of unconstant humerous desires , & of the faintnesse of our love and equity , as well as by the contrary vertues . Your wit hath plaid his part here , when you strained to derive the rectification of our conceits , touching Gods integrity and constancie , from the contrary disposition in man .

Belike , if Adam had never fallen , our conceits could not have beene so rectified touching Gods integrity and perfection as now they are , neither shall they bee so well rectified in the kingdome of heaven , because there we shall be acquainted with no such humourous inconstancy , or faintnesse of equity in man .

2 In the former Section you complained of not extending the maxime mentioned , so far as naturally it would reach , and you discoursed unto us the dangerous consequence of such an humour , and the cause of it . The consequence was partly aptnesse to conceive difficulties in the points proposed by you , and ignorance to assoile them . The cause was the extending of our owne power too farre . And in this Section you endeavour to rectifie our conceits hereabouts ; now whereas I was intent ( as it is fit every Reader should bee ) to observe what was your drift and scope in all this , in the end of the former Section , you fell upon the rectifying of our conceits touching Gods ideall perfection , in the way of integrity and constancy , as if that were the scope you aimed at : but neither did your discourse in any handsome manner tend thereunto , though finally it lighted thereupon , neither doe I yet perceive whereunto this ideall perfection of God , you speake of , is directed , as being nothing congruous , for ought I discerne , to the point in hand . I rather thinke , that was delivered ( as many other things in that Section ) on the by , and that the immediate end you aime at , is this here mentioned in the beginning of this Section , namely , the rectifying of our conceits , touching the right extending of the aforesaid maxime , which is the principall negative touching contradictories . Both parts of contradiction cannot bee true , ( no , nor false neither ) you had rather expresse it thus , To make both parts of contradiction true ( or false ) is no object of power omnipotent : Now wee seeme to have found the hare againe , at least the tract and sent of the hare , and desire to pursue , without making any fault , as neare as wee can . Now the rule you give us for the right extending of the maxime mentioned , is this , Many effects are very possible to power alone considered , which imply contradiction to some other divine attributes . This passage hath seemed wondrous harsh unto me , and as it were , Iuterpretationem commodam indignata , such as could not admit a commodious interpretation : and the issue of searching into the meaning thereof , is not to justifie it , but rather to discover sundry incongruities involved herein .

In the former Section you complained of men , as extending their owne power too farre , which you conceived to bee the reason why they did not extend the maxime there proposed so farre as naturally it would reach .

But here you admonish us of extending the power of God aright , not considering it at large , but rather as joyned with other attributes of God .

Secondly , you complained , that men did not extend the maxime you speake of so farre as naturally it would reach , and therfore when here you come to give rules for the extending of it aright , every man would imagine that you take a course to enlarge it at full , whereas indeede you take a course to restraine it , for you tell us here , that a thing is not to be accounted possible in reference unto power , but in reference unto other attributes of God also , as love , truth , goodnesse , and justice , which manifestly doth restraine the possibility of any thing , rather then enlarge it .

Thirdly , whereas the effect of power which you treat of in this place , is onely this , To make both parts of contradiction true , when you tell us , that , Many effects which are very possible to power alone considered , do necessarily imply contradiction unto some divine attributes . What doe you but hereby give us to understand , that this effect , to wit , of making both parts of contradiction true , though it bee possible to power alone considered , yet it is not possible in respect of some other attributes divine .

Now I demand in the name of common sense and sobrietie , whether this be a decent thing to say , that to make both parts of contradiction true is possible to power alone considered , whereas indeed it is no more possible , in reference to any power to make both parts of contradiction true , then to make both parts of contradiction false . Neither indeed is it in the power of God , as touching any one part of contradiction , if it be not true , to make it true , or if it be true to make it false . As for example , I am alive ; it is not in the power of God to make it false . Hee may take my life from me , but that is not a course to make that proposition false . For it was true onely for that time when it was pronounced , not for the time to come when my life is taken from mee . So when Socrates is dead this proposition is false , Socrates is alive , neither is it in the power of God to make it true : for though hee can restore life to Socrates , yet thereby he shall not make that proposition true . For that proposition was true for that time only , when it was pronounced , not for the time to come , least of all for that time when God had restored life to Socrates . But you will say , the being of a thing is the cause why a proposition concerning the being of that thing is said to be true , not on the contrary . And God is the cause of the being of things .

This I confesse is a truth in part . God is the cause of the being of things , yet not of all things , but onely of things contingent . God is not the cause of that which hath necessary being , such as he is himselfe . So that these like propositions , God is eternall , omnipotent , omniscient , most simple , &c. no way depend on the execution of God his power , which proceeds alwayes according to the counsell of his owne will . But hereupon depends not the nature of God , nor many other principles containing necessary truth : I grant many things are denominated possible to the humane nature , which are not so in reference to the divine . For the humane nature hath power to transgresse , the divine nature hath not . Yet if you marke it well , this which in this case is called power , will finally be resolved not so much into power , as into impotency : For it is not to be presumed that our Saviour had lesse power then another man , because he could not sinne ; or the Angels since their confirmation , then they had before , or that men in their glorified condition shall be more impotent then before . And indeed confirmation of integrity and innocency , doth not abolish power , but onely rectifie the use of it , and establish that rectitude in the use of power . Yet there is a denomination of power attributed to man , and denyed unto God , as when we say man can transgresse , God cannot : But the ground of this is not the want of power in God , and a surplusage of power in man ; but onely this , that a man is capable of restraint from a superiour power , God is not . For to say , that man can transgresse , is as much as to say , that man can doe that which he is forbidden to doe , or from the doing whereof he is restrained . But this cannot be affirmed of God , as who hath no superior power to restraine him .

Your next sentence is full of non-sense , as when you say , It is more shamefull then impossible for rich men to lye or coozen , or for Magistrates to oppresse and wrong their inferiours ; albeit the ones riches or others power were infinitely encreased , without internall encrease of their fidelity . For the better opening whereof I will resolve it into its parts . And they are two , considered apart without comparison .

The first is this , It is shamefull for rich men to lye and coozen , for Magistrates to oppresse and wrong , albeit the ones riches and the others power were infinitely encreased , without internall encrease of their fidelity . Now I say there is plaine non-sense in this , and that in divers respects .

First in saying it is is shamefull for rich men to lye and coozen , albeit their riches be never so much encreased : for the coherence by vertue of the particle albeit , doth imply , thatit is a shamefull course for them to lye , though never so much provoked thereunto . This I say should be the sense . But your sentence hath a quite contrary sense . For whereas according to the most convenient sense it should run thus ; It is a shamefull course for a man to lie and coozen , though he be never so poore , poverty indeed being usually a provocation unto lying and coozening , as wee reade Prov. 30. 9. you pronounce it in a quite contrary sense thus : It is a shamefull thing for a rich man to lye and coozen , though he be never so rich .

Secondly , your adversative is as unreasonable in respect of the latter part of it , which is this , Albeit he be without encrease of internall fidelity : As much as to say , it is a shamefull thing for a rich man to lye and coozen , though hee be never a whit the more honest for his riches : and t is like unto his speech that said of a swine , It was a creature which though it was polluted yet it was not cleane , as if there were an opposition between being polluted , and being not cleane : so you imply an opposition betweene being never the more honest , and doing that which was shamefull . Whereas indeed he that doth shamefull things , is hoc ipso never a whit the more honest .

The solecisme is the same applyed to the Magistrate , as touching the latter part , not as touching the former ; because their power and authority may seeme to countenance them in dealing more hardly with inferiours , then if they were not in magistracy would seeme fit .

The second part is this ; It is possible for rich men to lye and coozen , though they were rich , and never a whit the more honest . — It is possible for the Magistrate to oppresse and wrong , though they were never so powerfull , and never a whit the more honest . Here the solecisme is alike in both , as touching the latter part . For you imply by the forme of the sentence , that want of honesty were some hindrance to lying and coozening , some hindrance to oppressing and wronging .

But as touching the former part , the solecisme is most foule in the speech concerning the Magistrate , as when you imply , that the great power the Magistrate hath , is an hindrance to his possibility of oppressing and wronging his inferiours , whereas it appeares manifestly , that rather it is a furtherance thereunto .

But it is impossible for God to speake an untruth , or to do wrong . Before , I have shewed , that to have a power to transgresse , is to imply a being in subjection to a superiour power that restraineth him , and consequently such a power is resolved into weaknesse and impotency . In speciall to speake untruth implyeth lesse power then to speake truth ; for to speake truth implyeth knowledge of truth : And to know truth is a thing of more power , then to be ignorant of truth .

But it may be you propose this of lying , which is to speak contrary to a mans knowledge : but this is not power to doe ought : For the speaking of this or that is not the lying : but lying is a denomination of the act of speaking , arising from the contrariety of the speech , to the knowledge or intentions of the mind . So that if he speake the same thing in his dream , or if another delivereth the same words , yet is it no lying . In a word , power to doe ill , or peccabilitas , which is per naturam , doth no more rellish of true power , then impoccabilitas per gratiam doth savour of impotency and weaknesse . But God you say cannot speake untruth . The truth is , God cannot speake at all in proper speech ; for God hath no tongue to be the interpreter of his heart . But God doth inspire his servants with truth , and move them to speake it , or to write it : And it is Aug. Ep. 174. Ille in servis sui loquitur . impossible hee should inspire with falshood ; man himselfe would never speake falshood , but alwayes truth , if hee might advantage himselfe as much with telling truth , as telling untruth . Now though a man sometimes promotes his ends by false courses , yet it is absurd to thinke that God needs false courses to promote his ends , seeing he is almighty .

As for the doing of wrong , it is well knowne , that if hee should command Abraham to sacrifice his sonne , and see him execute it ; or command Sampson to sacrifice himselfe by dying with the Philistins , he shall doe no wrong either to the one or to the other ; or by making Prince Iob as poore as poore Iob , in destroying his substance , his children , and last of all striking his body with a sore boile , yet shall hee not doe any wrong to Iob. Nay were Iob as innocent as Adam was in his creation , or as the elect Angels are now in their confirmation , and should deale so with them as he did with Iob , yet should they have just cause to say as Eli did , He is the Lord , let him doe what seemeth good in his sight . 1 Sam. 3. 1●

Arminius confesseth , that the most innocent creature God Exam. praedest . Perk. p. 107. In 12. q. 87. art. 8. can annihilate without prejudice to his justice , yea to inflict the torments of hell upon such a creature . Medina maintaines , that God as Creator hath such power over his creature , Ex 〈◊〉 omnium Theologorum sententia : yet doe wee distinguish betweene potentia absoluta , and potentia ordinata ; God can doe that by power absolute , which he cannot doe on supposition that he will not doe it : for that were to change , and that were impotency , rather then power . And to speake in proper termes ; It is not fit to say that God cannot doe this because he will not ; for there is no consequence in this , either in respect of God or man : Such a one will not doe this or that ; therefore he cannot doe it .

But supposing Gods will to doe this or that , t is more proper to say , that upon this supposition , it is impossible God should do otherwise , because it is impossible he should change his will . For there are but two causes of the change of the creatures will and resolution , the one ficklenesse of the will , the other improvidence of the understanding , in not foreseeing all that might come to passe . But neither of these is possibly incident unto God . So then if God hath promised ought , t is unpossible that it should not bee performed , or that God should provountrue . If God loves a man , t is as much as to say , he is determined to doc him good , and t is impossible it should be otherwise then he hath determined . But to say that God in point of justice cannot performe that , without performing whereof he shall be untrue , is a paradox of paradoxes . For if in performing it he shall be true , then in not performing of it he shall be untrue . And doth Gods justice binde him to be untrue ? you might as well say , it bindes him to bee unjust .

Againe , if God out of his love hath resolved to doe this or that good unto man ; shall his justice hinder the fulfilling of the counsailes and determinations of his owne will ? This is strange Divinity ; yet you deliver these uncouth assertions like a positive Theologue , without all proofe , as if they caried their evidence in their foreheards . Men are bound by rules of a superiour power to worke after this or that manner ; and therefore it is not lawfull for them to doe many things , from the doing whereof they are restrained by lawfull authority , which commands them . It is not so with God , who doeth what hee will in heaven , and amongst the inhabitants of the earth , and no man can say unto him , What dost thou ? In this sense you thinke you may say that all before Christ were theeves and robbers . And though I thinke this interpretation is very aliene from the true meaning of the Text you point at , yet I Ioh. 10. 8. doubt not but that every one , Christ excepted , hath beene found in sinne , and thereby more or lesse found to play the theefe , and rob God of that glory of obedience which is due unto him .

I doubt not but the Angell of the Lord that discomfited the army of Senacherib , might in like manner have smoakt away the army of the Romanes , yea and God might have done so to , even the one as well as the other , had it pleased him , without any prejudice to his justice . For if it be justly possible to him to pardon our sinnes , t is as justly possible to him to remove his judgements . And both Suarez and Vasquez , though opposite in some specialities about the justice of God , Disput. de just . Dei . In 7. disp. 86. yet concurres in acknowledging that there is no justice in God in reference to his creature , but upon presupposition of his will . T is just with God to approve a mercilesse warre . And t is as just with God to approve a mercifull peace : neither is it disgracefull to God though by his long suffering and patience he gives space for repentance , although his goodnesse were despised unto the end .

As many live prosperously in sinfull courses unto the death and then obtaine 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , an easie departure at last , as Guiccia●dine observes in the particular of Pope Alexander the sixt ; and no marvell : for what is wanting in the condigne vengeance in this life , God can and will supply to the full at the day of judgement . And the reason why God leaves some mens sinnes unrequited in this world , is out of a speciall providence , as Chrysostome hath observed of old , namely to this end , that wee may entertaine some conceite of a resurrection , 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 . And though God doth not afflict them with outward terrours , yet he hath inward terrours enough to exercise the wicked , and to keepe peace as farre from them , as a guilty and tormenting conscience is neare unto them , according to that of Salomon , The wicked flieth when no man pursueth him . The Deere when hee is stricken , albeit Sylvas saltusque peragrat Dictaeos , yet , haeret lateri laetalis arunde . O what an uncomfortable sentence do you edge this Section withall ; as if Gods infinite power could not save them that stubbornly abandon the waies of peace , and wilfully neglect saving health , so often and lovingly tendred unto them ? For consider , did you never abandon the waies of peace , or wilfully neglect saving health , lovingly tendred unto you ? Were you never out of the state of grace ? For Austine hath taught me , that Libertas sine gratia , non est libertas sed Aug. ep. 〈◊〉 contumatia . Or were you converted at the first , or second , or at the third sermon that you heard ? Nay , when Gods children are converted , doe they not too often abandon the waies of peace , and wilfully neglect saving health ? Did not David in the matter of Vriah and Bathsheba ? Did not Salomon in his idolatry ? Did not Manasses in his idolatrous fury , sealing it with bloud ? Saint Paul exhorts Timothy , to carry himselfe 2 Tim. 2. gently towards them without , 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , if at any time God give them repentance , implying manifestly , that God can at any time give repentance to any man if hee will . Neither are wee taught , that God hath denied possibility of renovation Heb. 4. 5. 〈◊〉 by repentance unto any , but such as sinne the sinne against the Holy Ghost .

3 You say , it had beene unjust with God to strike the men of Sodome with blindenesse , before lust had entred their eies . A manifest untruth which yet you deliver , satis magistraliter , as a dictate without any reason to enforce it . In the ninth of Iohn wee read of one that was borne blinde , is it not just with God to deale with any one so as hee dealt with him ? You will not deny I hope this worke to have been the worke of God ; if you should , our Saviour would convict you of errour , when hee saith , that hee was borne blinde , to the Ioh. 9. 3. end the mighty worke of God might bee manifest in the curing of him . And this work to this end could be no others but Gods worke .

I had thought , to have beene borne blinde had beene a judgement , yet you make it to bee a blessing , as whereby the Sodomites had beene guarded from temptations . And indeede , lust usually enters into the heart by the windows of the eyes . Yet the Poet tells us also of one , Qui nunquam visae slagrabat amore p●ellae .

So then it had beene a mercy of God that their eies had beene pulled out of their heads in your divinity . I doe not deny , but the greatest temporall blessings may bee cursed unto Mal. 2. 2. a man by the power of God , and the greatest temporall ●nrses , blessed unto him . But I never heard or read before , that blindenesse should bee considered onely as a mercy , and such a mercy as whereby wee are guarded from temptation . But were a man never so lustfull , yet I thinke in just reason he should rather desire to enjoy his eies then to lose them , that so hee might be partaker of Gods word by private reading , which hath more power to his salvation , then the sight of any Cocatrices to his destruction .

And if Democritus had beene acquainted with this word of God , I doe not believe hee would have pulled out his eyes , in pretence as if they hindred his meditations . Alas , what had the Sodomites beene the better for the blindenesse of their eyes , if God had not corrected the lusts of their hearts ? Especially considering that fancy can supply the want of sight , for the provocation of lust in any degree upon any unknowne object . For a man can fancie him as hee lusteth . Say rather , God could not in justice change their hearts , seeing they had wilfully contemned his goodnesse , and abused his long suffering and loving kindenesse .

Yet this saying of yours should bee farre enough off from truth and sobriety ? Who hath not wilfully contemned his goodnesse , and abused his long suffering ? All out of the state of grace doe so ; for , Libertas sine gratia non est libertas sed contumacia . Aug. Ep. 89. Yea and too often wee doe so in the state of grace also . Then againe , a yeare before , this sinne of the Sodomites was not so obstinate , lesse a yeare before that , and so the farther we descend to times passed , they were lesse and lesse obfirmate . Why did no● God then change their hearts ; or if you wil have this to be a fruit of mercy , why did he not blind their eyes in mercy to keepe them from these temptations ? But you put it out of question , that to have prevented the Sodomites former contempt and abuse of his long suffering and loving kindnesse , did imply contradiction to his goodnesse , and eternall equity . A most unreasonable assertion . For I demand , Hath God prevented your wilfull contempt of his goodnesse , yea or not ? your abusing his long suffering and loving kindnesse , yea or not ? If he hath not prevented it , then either your selfe have prevented it without his grace , or you are guilty or have beene guilty of wilfull contempt of his goodnesse , and abusing his long suffering and loving kindnesse : which if it be so , what would become of you , if God should deale with you according to these immutable and eternall rules , according whereto you professe he deales with all ? I perswade my selfe you have a good opinion of your owne sufficiency to prevent these foule symptomes of humane corruption , otherwise you should make but a bad reckoning .

The reason you give to enforce this assertion , is in part nothing for you , in part against you . For though all his wayes are truth , yet this is nothing for you , unlesse you can prove that in such a state of sinne as the Sodomites , God hath determined to use no effectuall meanes to the curing of them . But how will you prove this ? for hitherto you have not . You might as well say , God could not cure ●he sin of those Iewes , to whom our Saviour said , It shall be easier for Sodome and Gomorrah Mat. 10. 15 in the day of judgement , then for you : If this were granted you , yet herehence it followes onely , that God cannot cure them , because he will not , for hee hath determined the contrary . But you undertake to prove , that God cannot doe it in point of justice , although hee would doe it out of his love to mankinde .

But when you say that all Gods waies are mercie , that is directly rather against you then for you . For mercy doth rather incline to pardon sinne , then not to pardon it : and withall we are given to understand , that as touching the execution hereof , God will have mercy on whom hee will ; and therefore surely he can have mercy on whom he will .

You talke after your fashion of an eternall rule of goodnesse appointing his justice to debarre the fruits of his mercy . But you are a meere talker , and prove nothing . Who is not wilfull in the state of nature in contemning Gods goodnesse ? Yet doth not he by his grace and holy Spirit ex nolentibus volentes facere ? Doth not Austin professe that God hath converted Ep. 107. ad Vital . not onely aversos à vera fide , but adversus verae fidei voluntates also , and bindes it with a Novimus , we know it to have beene so . Was it not so in Saul ? Doth not God professe of his wilfull and stubborne people , that he will rule them with a mightie hand , and make them passe under the rod , and bring them under the bond of his covenant , Ezech. 20. 37. Doth he not call some at the first , some not till the last houre of the day ?

Neither can it be made good by any tolerable colour of reason , that because a creature cannot be impeccabilis from his creation , therefore God cannot cure mens wilfulnesse in the way of his mercy towards them , as you most incoherently discourse , as if you were in potting verses , rather then upon meditating a coherent and methodicall course of argumentation : yet the maxime here mentioned , though brought in with some state of selfe conceit , is very preposterously contrived by you . We commonly say , a reasonable creature cannot be impeccabilis per naturam , uncapable of sinne by nature ; he may be impeccabilis per gratiam , uncapable of sinne by grace , as the elect Angels are , elect men shall be in the state of glory : but of being so some while after the creation , and not immediately from the creation ; of being so absolutely , and of being so not absolutely , I know no sobriety in these conceits , neither doe I thinke you have any authority to countenance them . The Sonne of God I doubt not but you will confesse that hee was impeccabilis from the first : So might Angels have beene , so might men have beene by grace , had it so pleased God to make them ; I see no reason to the contrary ; yet had not this beene absolutely impeccable , but meerly upon the supposition of the will of God . Such is the impeccability of the elect Angels at this present , such shall bee ours in the world to come . God indeed without supposition , & out of his own absolutenesse is no way obnoxious unto sinne : If Angels are , or we at any time shall be free from this obnoxious condition , it is and shall be by the meere will and good pleasure of God ; whereby yet I meane not to exclude all second causes in the way of Gods glorious qualification of our natures : And therefore it is an idle discourse to say that God intended to make us happy after a certaine manner , to wit , by way of reward of our obedience ; therefore he could not make us immutable at first . For thus to discourse , is to professe that God could make them so upon supposition , to wit , upon supposition of such an end as was incompatible with their impeccability . And this is not to prove that God could not make them absolutely impeccable , but to prove that God could not make them impeccable onely upon a certaine supposition . Such is the miserable incongruity of your miscellaneous discourse . If to decline to evill , implyes no contradiction but only to omnipotent being , then seeing neither the elect Angels for the present have , nor the Saints of God for the time to come , shal have any omnipotent being , it followes that to decline from evil is neither contradictorie to the present state of the elect Angels , nor to the future glorified condition of the Saints of God : God is impeccabil●s per naturam , the creatures some are & others shal be impeccabilis per gratiam , & to decline to evill implyeth contradiction to them both . To say that to decline to evill is possible to all creatures , is true onely in men , in the confirmed Angels t is not true . It was once of them also I confesse , but now it is not : It is false for the present of the Saints of God in heaven ; it ever was false of the manhood of Christ , which yet was and is a creature , yet i● Christ as man more like to his Creator , then either Angell or any other Saint of God . If restraint of possibility in man to decline from good to evill , doth cause him not to be truly and inherently good , then either Christ as touching his manhood could have sinned , or else he was never truly and inherently good . Further , if the elect Angels from within few dayes after their creation have continued truly and inherently good , notwithstanding their impeccability , from that time forward , why they should not have beene altogether as truly and inherently good , if their impeccability had begunne a few daies sooner , even with their creation , I see no reason . For did not God make them good , yea truly and inherently good ? Surely he did ; therefore if immediately they had beene impeccable by grace , they had notwithstanding their impeccabilitie continued unto this day truely and inherently good : Gods goodnesse is his happinesse , this happinesse of his being increate , cannot be communicated unto us subjectively , but objectively onely .

Yet there is a goodnesse created , called Gods goodnesse , because it proceeds from God , which is our happinesse of grace , shall be our happinesse of glory , not the foundation of it , but it ; save that the happinesse of grace is the foundation of our happinesse of glory , but to this manner of foundation you seeme to have no reference .

Neither is there any colour of reason to inferre as you do , that therefore Gods justice and loving kindnesse did remove all necessity from mans will , because that had utterly extinguished that goodnesse wherein onely it was possible for the creature to expresse the Creators goodnesse manifested in creation . And you may as well say , that Christ also might have sinned ; for necessity to keepe him from sinne would have utterly extinguished that goodnesse , wherein onely it was possible for his manhood ( being a creature ) to expresse his Creators goodnesse manifested in his creation and assumption into one person with the Sonne of God . Nay the truth is , if from the beginning wee had beene necessarily enclined unto good , wee had more lively expressed Gods goodnesse , then now wee doe being freely good . For God himselfe is good necessarily , not freely .

It is a senslesse speech to say that mans goodnesse expresseth Gods goodnesse communicative : for mans goodnesse is Observe , communicative goodness is here taken for the goodnes of God which is communicable , and opposed to Gods good nesse incommunicable . the very goodnesse communicative of God . For Gods goodnesse communicative is no goodnesse formally in God ; but Gods formall goodnesse is uncreate , and therefore incommunicable unto creatures . Therefore it must be goodnesse create which is Gods goodnesse communicative ; and that is the verie goodnesse of man it selfe . For God is the author of it , in genere causae efficientis . Create in mee a new heart , and renew a right spirit within me . And therefore the distinction of the goodnesse of God communicative , and communicated is very absurd : like as your similitude resembling it to a seale , and the stampe thereof : Onely the Sonne is the image and character of his Father , we are made after the image of God . His Psal. 51. goodnesse increate is that which doth communicate goodnesse unto us in genere causae efficientis . And our goodnesse is the worke of Gods goodnesse . But no more proportion betweene them , then is betweene nature increate , and nature create . But it is your usuall course to affect similitudes contrary to all sobriety .

Yet you have found out a proportion betweene Gods goodnesse and ours : but in as disproportionable a manner as could be invented . For you compare Gods working freely with mans being freely , most incongruously . God communicates his goodnesse freely , that which duly answereth unto this , is mans communicating his goodnesse freely . But seeing Gods being good , is as a being necessarily , if God had made us to bee good necessarily , that is impeccable by his grace , herein had wee better exprest the manner of his goodnesse . And if otherwise we could not be like unto God , it followes that the Angels now for many thousand yeares have not been good like God , because they have beene good by necessity , and not freely . So neither Gods Saints in heaven are good like God , because they are good by necessity , and not freely . T is untrue which you adde , that man could not be confirmed in such goodnesse as hee had , or translated unto everlasting happinesse , but by continuing freely good for some space . For Christ was impeccable from the first moment of his conception , yet this never hindred his confirmation in his goodnesse , or translation to everlasting happinesse . And it is a most absurd conceit to say that impeccability should hinder confirmation in that goodness which man had from the beginning , even from the creation . For if God made him good and withall impeccable , how was it possible he should not be confirmed in that good wherein hee was created ? And yet here you decline to the corrupting of the question , as when you oppose impeccability to the doing of good freely . For I hope your selfe will not deny , but that Christ was impeccable , and that what good soever he did , he did it freely : For like as the wicked , in state of nature , cannot but sinne in generall , that is one way or other ; yet because they are not necessitated to any particular sinne , therefore there is no particular evill that they doe , but they doe it freely : In like sort though Christ could not but doe good in generall , so that whatsoever he did should be good ; yet seeing he was not necessitated to any particular good , therefore what good in particular soever he did , did it freely . So doe the Angels , so shall we in the kingdome of heaven .

Hitherto under colour of consequence , which yet indeed was no tolerable consequence , you did stride very wide from the matter you had in hand , ( to wit , of Gods obligement in justice to make men taste of the fruits of his mercy , after their wilfull contemning of it ) into an aliene matter farre removed , touching impeccability .

Now you seeme to returne to your former discourse , but in such a manner , as if you meant utterly to overthrow it : for here you give us to understand , that so long as man doth lesse evill then he might doe , he may be confirmed in goodnesse , and translated unto happinesse . Now I pray , as bad as the Sodomites were , yet were they not lesse evill then they might be ? For if God had suffered them longer , and left them destitute of his grace , had they not profited in pejus , growing worse and worse ? And yet I confesse hereupon to bee confirmed in no better goodnesse then they had , had not beene much , seeing this their goodnesse had beene never a whit : but you say not onely this , that they that doe lesse evill then they might , may hereupon not onely bee confirmed in that goodnesse which they have ( which may be very farre off from any goodnesse at all ) but also translated to everlasting happinesse . Since mans fall ( you say ) wee are not capable of mercy , but by free abstinence from some evills .

Now I demand whether this free abstinence from some evills , be of grace or no ? If of grace , whether this grace be not a fruite of mercie ? If so , then it appeares that before we abstaine from any evill , wee are capable of mercy , thereby to obtaine grace , to abstaine from evill .

I know no state that makes a man uncapable of mercy in this life , but onely the state of sinning against the holy Ghost . I doe not like your distinction of doing good , and doing it naughtily ; for , whatsoever we doe naughtily , therein we cannot be said to doe good , but evill rather : for therein we sinne , and in sinning wee doe not any good , but evill rather . Yet I confesse , wee may be said to doe good imperfectly , but not naughtily in my judgement . Though we doe both lesse evill , and the good that we doe lesse naughtily then possibly we might doe , God still you say diminisheth the riches of his bounty towards us . I professe at first sight , I tooke this to bee a notorious untruth , but when I considered a claw of your sentence , which is this , lesse evill then possibly we might doe . I reverse my judgement , and finde it to be a most vulgar and despicable conceit , though in the way of truth . For the contrary proposition to your supposition is a thing impossible . For how is it possible that a man can doe at once all the evill that he can doe ? Now if he doth not doe all the evill that possibly hee can doe , there is some comfort in your paramutheticall contemplations , and hee neede not feare lest God proceede to diminish the riches of his bounty towards him . And so might the Sodomites comfort themselves at the worst , for certainly they had not done all the evill that possibly they might doe . Now it was well worth the having , to heare you explaine unto us , what you understand by the influence of Gods gracious providence , which you say God restraines , and by restraining suffers men to fall from one wickednesse to another , suffering the reines of our unruly appetites to bee given into our u●ieldie hands . Here be good phrases , which if you would bee pleased to interpret unto us in plaine termes , I doubt not but wee should finde good matter to worke upon .

But to the comfort of all profane persons bee it spoken , God doth never deal thus with any by your computation , but such as have done as much evill as possibly they can doe . To be capable of well doing is to be capable of Gods mercy , and you have already told us to our comfort , that to do lesse evill then possibly wee can doe , doth make us capable of Gods mercy ; yet here you say , this cannot bee done without Gods love and favour . Now to my judgement , no person is so profane or impious , but that hee doth lesse evill then possibly he might doe ; whence it followeth , that to this state of impiety considered as lesse then possibly might be , he is arived through the love and favour of God . Yet what you meane by the love and favour of God I know not , and throughout I finde cause to doubt , that you meane nothing lesse then to advance the honour of Gods grace , but onely your scope to advance the power of mans free will .

And I wonder you consider not how you enterfare , and crosse your owne shinnes in your discourse , when you conceive the love and favour of God as a meanes to make us capable of the mercy of God ; you might as well say , that the mercy of God makes us capable of his mercy : for love and favour shewed unto him that is in misery , is in the way of mercy . So when you make a great difference betweene withdrawing a mans selfe from the extremities of mischiefe , and the doing of such good as may make a man capable of well doing , you contradict your selfe : for to do lesse evill then possibly might bee , what is it other , then to withdraw from extremities of mischiefe ? yet that is enough to make a man capable of well doing , as you have signified in this very page more then once , as namely , both in the first sentence , and in the third , yet this is wilde enough to say , A man must doe good to make himselfe capable of well doing . By the sentence following it seemes that this good that is to be done to make us capable of well doing , is to repent , and this you say cannot be done without the attractions of infinite love ; yet usually you make a worke of nature to bee a preparation to grace , and sometimes you call that worke of nature humility , sometimes the doing of lesse euill then wee might doe . And what you meane by the attractions of infinite love , I know not , for you make it incident to men without the Church , who are not so much as drawne hereunto by the word , so that , as it seemes , it can be no other then Gods patience in sparing them , and so leading them to repentance , that you meane in this place .

Yet see into what absurdity of conceit you cast your selfe , while you make shew to honour the grace of God ; as namely , when you say , since Adams fall , our love to sinfull pleasures is so strong , that we cannot repent without the infinite attractions of love , implying thereby that before Adams fall , wee could repent without infinite attractions of love . But I pray consider , what need was there of repentance before Adams fall ? Yet such obedience as then was congruous to innocent and und●filed nature , could he performe without speciall grace ? Yes you thinke he could : this is a bit you can swallow easily , and digest with as great facility .

And so belike your opinion is of the Angels , to wit , that the good Angels stood by the meere freedome of their owne wils , having no other adjutorium gratiae then the reprobate Angels had : directly against Austin de Civitate Dei , l. 12. c. 9. You beginne to discover the mystery of your meaning , when you say , that Many whom this infinite love doth daily imbrace , because they apprehend not it , are never brought by the attractions of it , to true repentance . So then the attractions of Gods infinite love are the causa sine qua non , but what is the cause , qua posita ponitur effectus ? O this is our apprehending of it . And I pray what stile doe the learned give to that causa sine qua non ? doe they not commonly account it causam fatuam ? So then you make shew to magnifie the attractions of Gods love , and the efficacy thereof , but t is onely in a fatuous manner , and you make but a fatuous efficacy thereof : but mans will alone , in the apprehending of it , hath the true efficacie of repentance in the course of your Divinity . Now I pray what is this love you speake of , and what manner of attraction is it , and wherin doth it consist ? and how are we said to apprehend it ? and wherein doth that consist ? By the place alledged out of Rom. 2. 4. you signifie that this love of God is no other then that goodnesse whereby he leadeth unto repentance , and that goodnesse there mentioned seemes to bee no other then Gods forbearance and long suffering . Call you this the attractions of his infinite love ? Yet notwithstanding Austin was bold to professe , Quantamlibet praebuerit patientiam nis● Deus dederit quis Cont. Iul. Pelag. l. 5. c. 4. aget poenitentiam ? Though God affords never so much patience , yet who shall repent except God gives repentance ? your present discourse preacheth unto us another doctrine , to this effect ; Quantamlibet praebuerit patientiam nisi homo apprehenderit quis aget poenitentiam ? Though God affords never so much patience , yet who shall repent except he apprehends it ? And I pray what is it to apprehend Gods patience , or his leading of us to repentance by his goodnesse and patience ? Can it be any thing else then the taking of the opportunity offered , and to repent indeed ?

So then your meaning is this in plaine termes , Many whom this infinite love of God doth embrace , ( to wit , in leading them by his goodnesse and patience unto repentance ) yet are never brought by the attraction of it to true repentance , and all because they doe not apprehend it , that is , because they doe not repent .

Is not this issue of your discourse very grave and Theologicall ? yet when you say the reason why by this love they are not brought to repentance , is because they doe not apprehend it , you seeme to imply that they may apprehend it if they will . Yet because the Text alledged by you is expresly against this , therefore you are contont to nicke your former assertion your selfe , with a crosse blow , that so your selfe may have the first credit of contradicting and confuting your selfe , as when you say , of whom speakes he thus , of such onely as truly repent ? A mad question as ever was proposed , as if there were any colour that the Apostle should say of them that repent , that they despise the riches of Gods goodnesse , leading them to repentance ; yet that you may have some matter to worke upon , having erected an enemy of straw , you foile him most valiantly , by answering , Nay , but of them who for hardnesse of heart cannot repent . Not considering how fondly herein you contradict your selfe . Nay by the way I note an aknowledgement of yours , to wit , that a man may despise the goodnesse of God leading him to repentance , though through the hardnesse of his heart he cannot repent at all .

4. You demand in the next place , whether the riches of Gods bountie were fained , or whether hee did onely profer , but not purpose to draw them to repentance which repented not ? I answer , it was not fained , neither doe I finde any thing that he profered at all in this passage of the Apostles . But that this is a meere fiction of yours , ut recto stet fabula talo , and that hee did truly draw them to repentance ; but how ? as by patience and long-suffering he may be said to draw them , and no other goodnesse of God drawing them to repentance is mentioned in this place . Like as opportunity is said to draw and invite men to the doing of something in season .

In like sort the judgements of God invite unto repentance , the mercies of God provoke unto ▪ obedience , to thankfulnesse . But yet Austin was bold to say , Quantamlibet praebuerit Cont. Iul. 〈◊〉 Pelag. l. 5. c. 4. patientiam nisi Deus dederit , quis aget poenitentiam ? So that this is a tacite exhortation and invitation to repentance by Gods workes . And much inferiour to the power of the exhortations of his word : yet God doth exhort by the ministery of his word , many whose hearts notwithstanding he hardneth . As is apparent in sending unto Pharaoh , and commanding him to let Israel goe ; yet withall made knowne to Moses , that hee would harden Pharaohs heart , that hee should not let Israel goe .

And dare you professe this course of his , so plainly testified in holy Scripture , to be no part of Gods protection , no fruit of that wisedome which is from above , but a point of earthly policie devoid of honesty , a meere tricke of worldly wit , to whose practise nothing but weaknesse and impotency to accomplish great designes , can misin●line mans corrupted nature ? And the truth is , in this course of God nothing is profered at all , but onely something suspended , to wit , the execution of just vengeance . In his word something is profered , but what is that ? Not repentance , as you misconceive , that rather is required and commanded onely upon repentance , remission of sinnes , and salvation is profered . And if repentance were profered , I pray upon what termes ? you will say , in case they would apprehend it . This have I already shewed to be all one , as if you should say , In case they did repent ; and of the sobriety hereof let any man judge .

Againe , you professe that this is profered to such men as through the hardnesse of their hearts cannot repent , and judge whether the same incongruities which you charge upon our Tenet , are upon any other ground then this , and while you maintaine this , whether they doe not reflect upon your Tenet also .

Now on the contrary , whereas we object against you , that if God willeth , and so ardently as you speake , that all men should repent and be saved , how comes it to passe that they doe not repent ? Considering that the Apostle professeth that Gods will cannot be resisted , and that it manifestly implies an impotency or weaknesse in God , in not being able to bring to passe what he so ardently desires . Now to the latter objection of these , you answer , by deniall that it implyeth any such impotency in God ; yet Austin long agoe did acknowledge this consequence , Enchirid. 96. Deo quam facile est quod vult facere , tam facile est quod non vult esse non sinere . Hoc nisi credamus , periclitatur , ipsum nostrae fidei confessionis initium , qua consitemur in Deum Patrem omnipotentem credere . Neque veraciter ob aliud vocatur omnipotens , nisi quia quicquid vult potest ; nec voluntate cujusquam creaturae , voluntatis omnipotentis , impeditur effectus . Et cap. 27. In caelo & in terra non quaedam voluit & fecit : quaedam vero voluit & non fecit , sed omnia quaecunque voluit fecit . Et cap. 98. Quis porro tam impii desipiat ut dicat Deum malas hominum voluntates quas voluerit , quando voluerit , ubi voluerit , in bonum non posse convertere .

And whereas you say , that man is not capable of endlesse joyes , unlesse he will be wrought by meere love , without the impulsions of unresistible power to love him , to love God , the same insinite love which drawes him unto repentance in congruity leaving a possibility not to be drawne by it : This is a notorious untruth . For was there any possibility in Christ to sinne , or not to bee drawne to that which was good ? I thinke you will not avouch it : And was he not therefore capable of endlesse joyes ? And if Gods will be unresistible , as the Apostle plainly testifieth , shall not the operation whereby his will is accomplished , bee irresistible ? And shall such a bug-beare deterre us from acknowledging God to be the author of repentance ? and move us to give the glory thereof to the will of man , who through the hardnesse of his heart cannot repent , as the Apostle speaketh .

Againe , the Scripture testifieth that whatsoever God willeth , that he doth both in heaven and earth ; whether it be by power resistible or unresistible is nothing to the purpose . But you maintain , that what God ardently willeth , is not brought to passe , by reason that man willeth not . Neither doe w●e maintaine , that God in working whom hee will unto repentance , doth doe this by bereaving man of power to resist , ( which alone denominates the operation of God irresistible ) but onely by taking away the will of resisting , while ex nolentibus volentes facit . And consequently wee say not , that God takes away all possibility of refusing to be drawne by it . For we maintaine that God brings to passe contingent things contingently , that is , with a possibility to the contrarie ; though supposing Gods wil to the contrary , this possibility shall not be actuated . And so when God workes a man to faith and to repentance , nullum humanum resistit arbitrium , No mans will resists ; and that the grace which God gives , a nullo duro corde respuitur , is refused by no hard heart . So that all this is done without all coaction . For neither can the will be constrained , and God in making men volentes ex nolentibus , cannot without great absurditie be said to constraine them , as you would fain insinuate , having no sound argument for it , but such poore trickes to serve your turne withall .

And when God promiseth to circumcise the hearts of his people , and thereby to make them love the Lord their God with all their heart , and with all their soule , hee doth not say he will constraine them to repent , Deut. 30. 6. So when hee promiseth to take away their stony heart , and give them an heart of flesh , and put his owne Spirit within them , and cause them to walke in his statutes and judgements , and to do them , Ezech. 36. 27. hee doth not signifie that hee will constraine them . For God can change any mans will without constraining . Nay in making them willing , it is contradiction to say he doth constraine them to be willing : for constraint is against the will : but it is impossible a man should bee willing against his will ; yet this you obtrude upon your adversaries , as though they maintained that God by his power did make them repent against their wils .

Neither yet can we like that other extreame which you approve , that men must first be brought to a willingnesse , and then God makes them repent . For to will to repent , is to repent ; for repentance is the very change of the will . Neither can you in any sober manner expound unto us , how God is said to make men repent after they are made willing hereunto . And yet the very will to repent is the worke of God , as who it is that worketh in us both the will and the deed , according to his good pleasure , Philip. 2. 13. not by such attractions onely you speake of , though you are loath to betray your Pelagian Tenet , though you expresse the threatning of judgement and thereby imply what you meane by attraction of love , to wit , the promises of reward .

Now this apparantly is not to worke it : for this is onely suadere , and suadere is not to worke it . And the case is cleere , even by your opinion , that God doth not work it , as oft as he doth exhort unto it , which yet he should , if suadere and hortari thereunto were to worke it . And indeed suadere & hortari ut resipiscamus ; is onely to exhort and perswade , that wee would worke our selves unto repentance : And in this sense to interpret S. Paul , where he saith , God workes in us both the will and the deed , according to his good pleasure , was of old the practise of the Pelagians , as S. Austin hath discovered long agoe , de grat . Christi cont. Pelag. & Calest . cap. 10. For thus Pelagius plaid the commentator upon S. Paul : Operatur in nobis velle quod bonum est , velle quod sanctum est , dum nos terrenis cupiditatibus deditos mutorum more animalium tantummodo praesentia diligentes , futurae gloriae magnitudine & praemiorum pollicitatione succendit ; dum revelatione sapientiae in desiderium sui stupentem suscitat voluntatem ; dum nobis suadet omne quod bonum est . And therefore he urgeth Pelagius to confesse another manner of grace then this , if he will be accompted a Christian : Ibid cap. 11. Nos eam gratiam volumus isti aliquando fateantur , qua futurae gloriae magnitudo non solum promittitur , verumetiam creditur us speratur . Nec solum revelatur sapientia verumetiam & amatur , nec suadetur solum omne quod bonum est , sed & persuadetur : han● debet Pelagius gratiam consiteri , si vult non modo vocari , sed & esse Christianus .

And thus to circumcise our hearts in causing us to love him , and to walke in his wayes , and to keepe his statutes and judgments , and to doe them ; this I hope is not to strangle us , yet here is no violent operation in all this . For , Dum non mod●versas à vera side , sed adversas verae fidei voluntates convertit & ex volentibus nolentes facit : it is so farre from violence , that the will rejoyceth that God hath thus reformed it ; we do but as Scriptures teach , when we make the work of faith a worke of power , 2 Thess. 1. And shall not the raising of men from the dead be a worke of power ? and is not the worke of grace such a worke , Eph. 2. 2 ?

But you doe ill , under colour of magnifying the love of God , to dishonour both his love and his power ; his love , in confining it onely to promises , and threatnings , as if by these operations alone he moved us unto repentance ; his power , in denying that God brings to passe those things which hee desires to bring to passe , and that ardently . And this latter is Austins objection as well as ours ; and hee makes the former to be meere Pelagianisme , as wel'l as we doe .

In the next place you tell us , We are to beleeve that Gods infinite power shall effect all things possible for them that love him ; but constraines no mans will to love him . But doth he make mans will to love him without constraint ? why did you not expresse your minde on this point ? you are willing to acknowledge God to be the author of glory ; but I doe not finde you so ready to acknowledge God to be the author of all goodnesse , the author and finisher of our faith , of our repentance , of our obedience . Did you acknowledge this , there should bee no difference betweene us . For we doe not affirme that he works faith and repentance in us , by way of constraint . And when the Apostle prayeth that God would worke in the Hebrewes , Heb. 13. 21. that which was pleasing in his sight ; you shall never finde in any of our Divines , that the meaning of the Apostles prayer was , that he would constraine them to doe that which is good and acceptable in the sight of God : I know no power in God but infinite , and seeing what worke soever he workes , is by the exercise of his power , it cannot be denied , but that it is the exercise of that power which is infinite .

Againe , is man or Angell able to circumcise our hearts , so as to make us to love the Lord our God with all our hearts ; It is not , as I presume you will confesse ; why then shall not this worke of Gods love in circumcising our hearts , and making us to love him , be accounted a worke of power infinite ? And Austin divers times professeth , that God doth convert our hearts , omnipotenti facilitate , by an almighty facility , and when God regenerates us he quickneth us and raiseth us from death to life , Eph. 2. 2. and is said to transform , us as it were of beasts to make us become men , Esay 9. and how can this be wrought by lesse then power infinite , as when Bernard confesseth of God saying , Bern●n circumcis . Dom. Serm. 2. Numquid non vere admirabilem experti sumus in imitatione utique voluntatum nostrarum . As for Gods power to the immediate parent of our love to God , it is no article of our Creed , but a Deut. 30 , 〈◊〉 tricke of yours to insinuate any thing on your adversaries part that may make your owne cause seeme plausible : wee rather conceive Gods grace and mercy to be the immediate cause of the circumcision of our hearts , whereby wee are brought to love him . Neither doe we say , that he workes in us the love of himselfe immediately , but rather by faith brings us first acquainted with the love of God towards us , according to that of Iohn , 1 Ioh. 3. 19. We love him , because he loved us first ; and to that of S. Paul , The end of the Law is love out of a pure heart and good conscience , and faith unfained , 1 Tim. 1. 5. No other seed of our love to God , doe I acknowledge to be sowne in our soule .

Yet I doubt you referre this to a seed of nature , and not to a seed of grace , though you doe not affect to manifest your meaning so plainly , as it were fit you should . And no marvell . For they which doe evill hate the light . As for constraint ; Ioh. 3. 2● ▪ we hold that infinite power cannot so worke the will : Bodies may be constrained to suffer the execution of mens lusts upon them , and may justly breed loathing in the parties so constrained .

As for the will , that non potest cogi , cannot be constrained : And I wonder you that take notice of so many choice points of philosophy and divinity , whereof others doe not , should not all this while take notice of so popular a Maxime as this : though I confesse your taking notice of it in this place had marred your game ; for the furthering whereof you are content to obtrude upon your adversaries so unreasonable a conceite , as if they maintained , that the will of man may be constrained : yet suppose the will were constrained by God to love him , would this breed in God a loathing of him ? Thus the foule and uncivill resemblance you make transports you . Yet I have read , My soule loathed them , and their soule abhorred mee : but I never heard the contrary , My soule loathed them , Zach. 11. 〈◊〉 and their soule loved mee : for while we abhorre God , as enemies unto him , yet notwithstanding even then hee loved us , Rom. 5. 8. how much more when we love , will he continue to love us , and not turne his love into loathing ; as mens lusts turne into loathing sometimes , as being satisfied , and disdaining to be scorned by them , whose bodies though they could force to be subject to their lusts , yet could not winne their loues .

But God never makes us unwillingly to love him ( it is a thing impossible ) but as Austine saith , Ex nolentibus volentes facit . T is true , God loves a cheerefull giver , but who makes this cheerefulnesse but God ? and whose workes is it fit hee should love but his owne ? Like as it is said of him , that Cor●nat non merit a nostra sed donasua , he crownes not our works , but his owne : And where there is a willing minde , there it is accepted , not according to that which a man hath not , but to that which he hath : but whose worke is this willing minde ? Is it not God that worketh in us both the will and the deede ? And that God doth not wrest any obedience from us , but makes us willing , and ready , and cheerefull in the performing of it , not onely in the way of doing what hee commandeth , but in suffering what hee inflicteth , or permitteth the sins of others to inflict upon us . In so much that the Apostles rejoyced that they were accounted worthy to suffer for the name of Christ . And if a father prevaile to worke his childe to dutifulnesse , though with much a doe , yet in the end masters his stubbornnesse , will hee love his childe , or his obedience , or dutifulnesse the worse for this : yet God more effectually , and with a great deale more case changeth our hearts , even omnipotente facilitate , as Austine speaketh , and shall hee love our obedience , our thankfulnesse , our repentance the lesse for this ?

5 Now wee are like to receive something concerning the maine probleme , to wit , In what sense God may bee said to doe all that he can for his vineyard : All this while you have beene as it were in trimming your instrument , and it seemes not to bee yet in tune : the first musick is so harsh , and without all harmony , I cannot devise a construction thereof to carry any tolerable sense . But the sentence following seemes to bee of the same nature : where you call that Revenue , which before you called Charge very incongruously , as if a mans revenues were a burthen unto him , whereof he did exonorate himselfe . Or if it bee spoken of Bursers accounts in Colledges , the incomes are not to them that are charged , and put to exonerate themselves , but to the Colledges ; this at the best is but a gamboll , le ts come to the naked truth . Though mans love to his dearest friend , bee in respect of Gods love to us , but saint , and his power small , yet because his love to justice is much lesse , he● oft-times effects that for his temporall good , which God , though infinite in power doth not effect for those whom he infinitely loves . I thinke I may bee bold to say that this is infinitely false : God loved Iacob , and hated Esau : now all whom God hates as he hated Esau , he damnes ; and all those whom he loves as hee loved Iacob , he saves ; yet this love was but infinite : and what love of man or Angel , vicious or vertuous , can effect the like ? Yet God blessed both Esau and Ismael with temporall blessings ; and what friend by good courses or lewd courses was able to equall it ? what creature can equall that temporall good that God affords to any reprobate ? for hee gives him his being and all that hee enjoyes ; nay , what man or Angell can doe ought for him , in the effecting whereof , God hath not a greater hand then the man or Angell himselfe ? Yet you suppose that God infinitely loves the very reprobates . It is familiar with you to suppose , that God loved Esau , and that infinitely , of whom the Scripture professeth , that God hated him . Your suppositions are fat and well fed , but your arguments are more leane and ill favoured then the leane kine of Pharaoh .

Yet I will be content to helpe you a little in the way of argument : Gods love , saith Aquinas , is in respect of designing some good to his creature ; now God doth will temporall good to the very reprobates , and that in such a manner as cannot be supplied unto them but by power infinite .

In no other sense doe I finde , that it may bee tollerably avouched , that God loves them infinitely , though you are pleased to suppose it often .

It is untrue , that his grants made to man , must undergoe the examination of justice ; for it is law full for him to doe what hee will with his owne , to bestow being , and gracious being , and consequently glorious being on whom he will ; for both grace and glory is executed on man in the way of mercy , and hee hath mercy on whom hee will . And though he hath revealed unto us by what rules hee will proceede in pronouncing the sentence of salvation , or condemnation , yet hath he revealed unto us no rules , according whereunto hee proceedeth in giving grace unto some , and denying grace unto others . And both Suarez and Vasquez ( though opposite in other points about the justice of God ) concurrently professe , that there is no justice in God towards man , but upon presuposition of his will .

And those unchangeable rules you speake of , for confining God in the execution of his power , according to his gracious will , are like Castles in the aire that have no foundations , and fit for nothing but to discover the new world in the Moone , and to ease the man there of his burthen , that travelled so long with a bush at his backe : God may convert whom hee will , and consequently save whom he will , as the Holy Ghost teacheth us ; this is no fiction , Quis porro , saith Enchirid. cap. 98. Austine , tam impie desipiat ut dicat Deum malas hominum voluntates , quas voluerit , quando voluerit , ubi voluerit , in bonum non posse convertere ? Who doth so impiously doat as to say , that God cannot convert the evill wills of men , whom hee will , when hee will , and where hee will . Yet you say as much as this comes to , when you tell us of unchangeable rules of justice , restraining God from converting and changing the hearts of men , without all feare of imputation , either of dotage or impiety : God you say loves justice more then mankinde : God loves himselfe better then hee loves mankinde , or all his creatures ; for he made all things for himselfe , Prov. 16. 4. But as for any justice in God that limits his will , I know none , neither are you able to prove any as I am verily perswaded . What you have hitherto delivered , I thinke I have not suffered in any materiall part to passe unsaluted , unanswered .

CHAP. XVII .

The truth and ardency of Gods love unto such as perish , justified by our Saviour , and S. Paul .

I Would your propositions were onely paradoxes ; but indeed , we have weighed them in the ballance , and found them plaine untruthes ; yet what those propositions are which you intimate when you say , These are no paradoxes , but plaine truth , I am to seeke ; neither can I tell whereto to referre it , but to a point which you aime at and insinuate rather then expresse , as if you feared plaine dealing most . For , that which you undertooke to shew in the former Chapter , was onely this , In what sense God may bee said to have done all that he could doe for his vineyard : yet your ensuing discourse throughout hath very little correspondency thereunto . But the point you aime at is to perswade , that God doth all that hee could doe for all reprobates , and that hee doth as much for them as for his elect , and the difference betweene the elect and reprobates , ariseth rather from their free wills , then from any different dispensation of Gods providence , in giving that grace unto the one which hee denies unto the other . A most foule opinion , and therefore no marvell if you are content to travaile long in the delivery of such a monster , and seeme to desire that your Readers forwardnesse in understanding your meaning , should deliver you thereof , and if his propitious affections should be as ready to embrace it upon your weake suggestions , the whole businesse shall be very preposterously carried .

Yet unlesse this conceit of yours bee admitted , you tell us , Wee shall hardly finde any true sense or good meaning in Gods protestations of sorrowes for his peoples plagues , or in his expostulations of their unthankefulnesse , or in his kinde invitations of them to repentance which never repent , or in his tender profer of salvation to those that perish .

Whensoever you shall charge us with any of these like places ; if a true sense and good meaning of them shall be found by us , though hardly , without the acknowledgment of your foule Tenets , wee shall not faile to obtaine wherewithall to answer you .

Certainly , sorrow is not incident to God , no not for the plagues of his elect , and therefore cannot be attributed unto him but , per 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , by conformity to the nature of man . Sorrow may be incident unto Christ , for hee was man as well as God ; and so man is subject to the law of God , which commands us to love our neighbour as our selfe , and who is to bee accounted our neighbour , himselfe hath taught us in the parable of a certain man that descended from Ierusalem to Iericho , by the way as he went fell into the hands of thieves ; and a fruit of this love is well knowne to bee compassion , whereby wee rejoyce with them that rejoyce , and weepe with them that weepe ; yea , weepe for them who weepe not for themselves .

And yet it is very strange to inferre , that because Gods sorrows for his peoples plagues , doth inferre that he hath done all that he can for his people , therefore God hath done all that hee can doe for them that perish . Or , because God doth expostulate with his people for their unthankfulnesse , therefore he doth all hee can doe for the salvation not onely of his people , but of them that perish also . But it is true , in the ministery of the word , hee invites them to repentance that doe not repent .

And it is as true , that if this bee required to the doing of all that hee can doe for the salvation of them that perish , then many thousands perish , for whose salvation God doth not all hee can doe . For many thousands have perished that never enjoyed the ministery of the word to bring them to repentance . They indeed that live within the precincts of Gods sanctuary enjoy this benefit , though many thousands of them perish . Neither doth it follow , that because God invites them to repentance , he doth all hee can doe for their salvation : For if it pleased him , hee could not onely invite them to repentance , but give them repentance , 2 Tim. 2. last , and Act. 5. 35. and Act. 11. and the 18. And as Austine saith , Quantamlibot Deus Cont. Iul. Pelag. l. 5. c. 4. praebuerit patientiam , nisi Deus dederit quis aget poenitentiam ; so may I say , Quantumlibet Deus invitaverit ad rescipiscendum nisi Deus dederit quis aget poenitentiam . And as Austine in the same place professeth of such as God hath not predestinate , whether out of the Church or in the Church , Istarum neminem adducit Deus ad salubrem spiritualemque poenitentiam , qua homo reconciliatur Deo in Christo , sive illud ampliorem patientiam , sive non imparem praebeat .

And consequently though hee profereth salvation upon condition of faith and repentance ( for no otherwise doth he profer it to any ) unto some of those that perish ; yet herehence it followeth not , First that hee profereth this unto all that perish ; or secondly , in profering it to any that perish , he doth all that he could doe for the salvation of them that perish , as when he saith , Esa. 65. 2. I have spread out my hands all the day long unto a rebellious people which walke in a way that was not good ; and herehence it followeth not , that hee did all that he could doe for their salvation : For this signifieth onely his invitation of them , and readinesse to imbrace them upon their repentance , and complaint of the hardnesse of their heart in not repenting .

But God could doe more then this , hee could take away their stony heart , and give them an heart of flesh , and put his owne Spirit within them , and cause them towalke in his statutes , and to doe them , Ezech. 36. 27. And therefore it is a very vaine discourse of yours , when you say , The unremovable rules of eternall equity , will not suffer him to stretch out his hand any further then he doth towards the sonnes of men : for it is apparant that he doth stretch them further , to as many as in the course of his loving kindenesse he doth convert ; and thus farre hee doth stretch them out to as many as hee transports into the land of promise , as your selfe confesse .

But whereas you say , The measure of their iniquity being accomplished , is an obstacle to God , as whom his justice in this case will not suffer to stretch them out so farre any longer ; this is one of the articles of your creede , besides all text of Scripture , or Christian reason : for God calls some even at the last hower of the day , as the Gospell preacheth in the parable of the labourers hired into the vineyard , end in the example of the thief upon the crosse , & the example of the Apostle , 2 Tim. 2. sc. 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , if at any time God may give them repentance : and the ancient saying is , inter pontem & fontem . And S. Augustine counts it impietie and madnesse to thinke otherwise , Enchir. 98. Quis porro tam impie desipiat ut dicat Deum malas hominum voluntates quas voluerit , quando voluerit , ubi voluerit , in bonum non posse convertere ? And the order of our Church in visiting the sick doth justifie this , in urging us to visite all , to invite all to repentance , even to the last gaspe . saving that indeede no mans iniquitie is at full till his death , and after death no calling to repentance ; for the wicked imediately upon their death are carried into hell , as Dives was ; and , Ex inferno nulla redemptio , out of hell no redemption . At you say , that with sorrow hee doth withdraw his hands , so you may with as good sobriety say , that with soraow hee doth punish the reprobate men and Angels with eternall fire , and directly contrary to Scripture phrase , Prov. 1. 24. Because I have called and you refused : I have stretched out mine hand and none will regard : 26. I will also laugh at your destruction , and mock when your feare cometh .

As for the love of God in stretching out his hands , I deny it not , because to stretch out his hands in inviting unto repentance , is a speciall favour which God denies to many thousands , and such as whereby many a reprobate may and doth profit , ad exteriorem vitae emendationem quo mitiùs puniantur , to an outward emendation of their lives , that they may be punished more mildly .

But you make this love to reprobates equall to the love of God towards his elect ; for you maintaine , that God doth as much as he can doe for the salvation of the reprobates . And it it apparant , hee doth no more for the salvation of his elect . Now this is an abominable opinion . And the stranger is Gods mercy in electing you ( wherof as I have read in some of your writings you make no doubt ) when you thinke you are not bound to render him more thanks for his goodnesse towards you then a reprobate is : but though yet you do not , you may doe ere you die , and be pulled out of this abominable opinion of yours , as out of the fire with feare . For as Paul was a chosen vessell of God , though for a while hee persecuted the Act. 9. 15 : truth of God , even unto bloud , so may you bee not withstanding your impugning of it , though in a milder manner I confesse : for your impugnation is not like to do any great harme save onely to your selfe .

Our Saviour was the Sonne of man as well as hee was the Sonne of God , and made under the law , and therefore was Gal. 4. 4● bound to bee as compassionate to his people as Ieremy was , Ier. 13. 17. But if you will not heare this , my soule shall weepe in secret for your pride , and mine eye shall weep and drop down tears , because the Lords slock is carried away captive : So our Saviour wept over Ierusalem , saying , Jf thou hadst knowne even then a● the least in this thy day the things which belong unto thy peace , but now they are hid from thine eies . Luk. 19. 42. You aske , whether hee spake this as man , or whether the spirit doth not say the same ? and I aske whether your wits were your own when you made such a question ? Who could weepe and speake but man , and how could man weepe or speake this but as man ? Hath God any heart to be filled with woe , or eies to bee filled with teares ? yet the Spirit moved him to speake this .

So if any Prophet had said it , as hee might have said it , the Spirit of God had moved him hereunto . And when Ieremy said , My soule shall weepe in secret for your pride , and mine eye shall drop downe teares , the Spirit of God moved him to utter this , for , Holy men of God spake as they were moved by the holy Ghost , 2 Pet. 1. 21. The truth is , the words are congruous to him , both as God , and as man , but the sorrow of heart , and teares of eies wherewith it was uttered , are onely agreable to the nature of man .

How doe you prove , that he that spake this , spake nothing but words of Spirit and life ; because our Saviour saith , Ioh. 6. 63 It is the spirit that quickeneth , the flesh profiteth nothing , the words that I speake unto you are spirit and life : will it therefore follow that all that he spake was spirit and life ? Suppose it were so , would it herehence follow , that these words were not spoken by him as man ? Then belike , when he said I thirst , this also being words of Spirit and life ( as it needs must if all that he spake were spirit and life ) hee spake not this as man likewise when hee said , My soule is heavy unto death , and on the crosse , My God my God why hast thou forsaken mee , these words were not his words as hee was man : and though hee spake nothing , but what the Father gave him in commandement to speake , yet herehence it followeth not , that therefore he spake them not as man . For by just proportion of reason , if this were admitted , it would follow , that hee spake nothing as man ; no not that , I have desired to eate this Passeover with you ; nor that , How was it that hee sought after mee , wist hee not that I must goe about my Fathers businesse ? nor that , My Father is greater then I ,

T is true , His bowels of compassion were freely extended towards them in exact conformitie , not so much to the love of God ( as you discourse at pleasure , according to your owne extravagant conceits of the love of God , equally extended to the elect and reprobate ) as to the will of God : for , being made under the law , he was bound to the like compassion & commiseration , as to pray for his persecutors , so to mourne for the judgements of God upon his brethren , according to the flesh : yet one word by the way concerning this , Was the measure of Ierusalems iniquity at this time filled up , or no ? It seemes it should be so in your computation ; for now it s said , The things that belonged unto their peace , were now hid from their eyes ; When should the doore of repentance be shut upon them , if not at such a time , and in such a case as this ? If so , then by your owne doctrine , Gods love ceaseth towards them , as but in the former sentence you signified ; & consequently Christs love and compassion should cease also , if it were but in conformity to Gods love ; but rather it was in conformity to Gods law , as I have shewed ; God the Father having made him in subjection to the law , and consequently was he bound to mourne for them , as well as to pray for them : for he was by vertue of the law to love his neighbour as himselfe . This incongruity ( as it seemes ) of yours you observed , and therefore as I guesse , you added , that his bowels of compassion were restrained also , by the same conformity , and though you tell us , that from different motions and distractions , occasioned from the indissolvable union of his divisible soule ( this is your owne language ) with these two attributes of the indivisible nature ( to wit , love and justice ) his teares were squeized out .

Yet neither doe you tell us how his bowels of compassion were restrained , or wherein ; neither doe you make knowne unto us what these different motions and distractions in our Saviour were : Neither doth the story of the Gospell afford us any discovery of any such different motions & distractions you talke of : But to the end hee continued in his bowells of compassion towards them , as it appeares by his prayers for them upon the crosse : for indeede , his first comming was not Ioh. 12. 47 to condemne the world , but to save the world . But in the old Testament , God himselfe , as God , expresseth his desires of his peoples obedience ; O that my people had hearkened unto me . This you will have to bee understood in proper speech : Piscator by a figure of speech , Talis optatio , saith hee , Deotribuitur per anthropopathiam . Utri creditis . With Piscator concurreth Iunius also . And wee have reason for it , because whatsoever God wills , that brings hee to passe both in heaven and earth ; how Ps. 135. 6. much more what hee desires , and that ardently . Yet you keepe your course contrary to reason and authority , in attributing desires unto God , of such things which never come to passe , which Austine long agoe professed to be all one with the denying of Gods omnipotencie .

And not content with this , you most ridiculously contradict your selfe , and call it also an unquenchable desire , wheras your selfe have often professed , that the filling up the measure of mans iniquity doth quench this desire in God ; thereby making God not onely impotent , but mutable also .

Israel might have truely said , Was there ever any love like unto this love wherewith the Lord embraced mee ? But what Israel ? even the true Israel of God wee say : but the true Israel of God cannot say so , the elect of God cannot say so according to your Tenet , for as much as you make the love of God towards reprobates to bee as great as the love of God towards the elect , yet as if you strained your words , you call it the excessive fervency of his loving kindenesse , to wit , even towards them that perish : and adde by way of Parenthesis , that Gods will is infinite , as if you had a minde to inferre thereby , that his love towards them were infinite .

Now of Gods infinite will I never heard before : his power we say is infinite , because hee can doe every thing that is possible to bee done , his knowledge is infinite because hee knowes all things that may bee knowne , but God doth not will all things that may bee willed by him : Nay , his power receives limitation and restriction by his will , as touching the execution thereof ; for hee doth no more then what hee will . Likewise wee say Gods love is infinite in the way of extention , for it neither had beginning , neither shall it have end . But such is not Gods love towards them that perish , for it ceaseth by your doctrine when the measure of their iniquity is filled up : but such as it is , you say , it layeth no necessity upon their wills . A most ridiculous speech , as much as to say , it doth not make men repent necessarily ; whereas concerning them that perish , it is apparant that it neither makes them repent necessarily ; nor contingently .

And as for the elect , hee gives them repentance , which he doth not to the reprobates ; as Austine long agoe professed , Istorum neminem adducit Deus ad salubrem spiritualemque poenitentiam Cont. Iul. Pelag. l. 5. c. 4. qua homo reconciliatur Deo in Christo , sive illis ampliorem patientiam sive non imparem praebeat . Nyither doe wee say , that to whom God gives repentance , he gives obedience , he makes them to repent necessarily , to obey necessarily , but freely . For it is manifest that grace takes not away the power of disobedience , but onely prevents the act of disobedience , and that not in all particulars neither : for the children of God sinne too often . And as for those which want this grace which God bestowes on his elect , they have not onely liberty left them unto sinne , but also this liberty turnes into wilfulnesse , according to that of Austine , Libertas sine gratia non est libertas sed contumacia , Liberty without grace is not liberty but wilfulnesse . Ep. 89.

But yet wee say upon supposition , that God will give any man repentance and that at such a time . that man shall repent at such a time ; and t is impossible hee should not repent ; yet in repenting hee shall repent freely , and not necessarily Like as God ordaining Christs bones should not be broken , upon this supposition it was impossible it should be otherwise , albeit the soldiers abstained from breaking of his bones , not necessarily , but deliberately and freely . It is true the Lord saith , Open thy mouth wide and I will fill it : but his people would not hearken unto his voice .

And now the question is onely as touching their obedience , whether God did any otherwise will that , then by commanding it in respect of those that perish ; wee say hee did onely command it in respect of such , wee say hee did not resolve to give them repentance , to give them obedience , though he could have done this , and doth doe this unto his elect , making Ezech. 20. 37. them to passe under the rod , and bringing them under the bond of the covenant , not onely seeing their wayes , but healing them also ; Esa. 57. 1● Hos. 14. 5. Mic. 7. 19. Rom. 16. 7 Act. 26. 18 Eph. 2. 2. Psal. 51. healing their rebellions , and subduing their iniquities , and treading Satan under their feet : opening their eies , and bringing them out of darkenesse into light , and from the power of Satan unto God , quickning them when they were dead in trespasses and sinnes , creating a new heart , and renewing a right spirit within them : Doe you but acknowledge this , as you must unlesse you will renounce the Scriptures , and wee will never quarrell with you for saying , God doth all this contingently , and not necessarily .

2 The Apostles move a question to our Saviour concerning him that was borne blinde , Ioh. 9. whether hee had sinned or his fathers , that he was horne blinde , this was in respect of judgement corporall , you apply this to a judgement spirituall ; that judgement was positive to bee bereaved of sight , which in course of nature is otherwise then onely permissive , in suffering them to be such as hee found them . That was spoken in respect of some not common , but extraordinary sinne : for though there bee sinne common unto all , yet this judgement is not ; and therefore they might well thinke , if sinne were the cause , it must bee some extraordinary sinne , but our Saviour signifieth , that it befell him in the course of Gods providence , not so much in respect of sinne , as in respect of a certaine end whereto God had ordained it . But I hope neither the Apostles , nor any sober man would imagine that some extraordinary sinne was required unto this , that God should leave men as hee findes them , without bestowing some supernaturall grace upon them .

And in despight of sinne , God doth afford this grace to many thousands : for God hath mercy on whom he will ; like as Rom. 9. 18 on the other side , in despight of mens civility , and naturall morality , whom hee will he hardeneth . Yet to the question by you proposed at pleasure you make no answer , but adde hereunto out of Ion. 2. 8. They that follow lying vanities forsake their owne mercies : as if you had a minde to imply , that there is something in man , that makes a difference , why some are suffered to walke in their owne waies , some are not , wherein you doe but corrupt the state of the question after your usuall manner .

For the question is not about the consequent of lying vanities , or not observing them , but about the observing of lying vanities it selfe , or not observing them ; that is , how cometh it to passe that some are suffered to goe on in the course of their lying vanities , some are not , but rather are taken off from those ungodly courses wherein they have beene brought up , as many thousands were taken off thus in the Apostles daies : wee say it is the meere good pleasure of God that puts this difference , having mercy on some , and hardning others ; you take another course , as when you say , in your familiar and soliloquiall meditations with God ; Never hadst thou given them up to their owne hearts lust , to treasure up wrath against the day of wrath , had they not despised the riches of thy bounty : Here you mixe different courses of God together ; for when you talke of giving them over to their owne hearts lusts , ( Which scripture applieth to Gods dealing with his own people Israel , upon the despising of his grace , offered them in his word ) but the rest , as this also , being accomodated unto the heathens , you seeme to referre to the despising of the riches of Gods bounty declared to them in his workes : for as for the riches of Gods bounty declared in his word , the heathen were not pertakers of this , untill the dayes of the Gospell : and whereas by the phrase of speech used , you seeme to have an eye to that of the Apostle , Rom. 2 , 3. 4. the riches of Gods bounty in that place is specified onely to consist in patience and long-suffering : And how did they refuse it , but in refusing to repent ? For the bounty there mentioned is noted to be a bounty leading unto repentance . So that in the issue your meaning comes to this , that God would never have suffered them thus to have walked in their owne wayes , and to treasure up wrath against the day of wrath , if so be they had repented ?

Now the question is , whether they had power to repent or no ; you seeme to imply they had , but you dare not expresse so much , because you see how manifestly contradictious that were to the text it selfe , where it is expresly said , But thou after the hardnesse of thine heart , which cannot repent , treasurest up wrath against the day of wrath . So that you , what by taking up pieces of Scripture at pleasure , and leaving out pieces as you list , make up a patcht coat contrary to the Scripture , which yet you commend unto us as Scripture it selfe ; Nay , what will you say if God did not so much as admonish them to repent ? Doth not the same Apostle plainly signifie so much , Act. 17. 30. where hee saith And God regarded not the time of this ignorance : but now hee admonisheth all men every where to repent . Againe , consider I pray you what is to be accounted the time , when this ceasure deserved to be fastened upon them , namely , of despising the riches of his bounty ? It seemes by your former discourse , it is not till they have filled up the measure of their iniquity ; for till then Gods infinite love was towards them ( according to your opinion ) and hee did not give them over to their owne lests . Now I pray consider , did hee not even afore this time suffer the Gentiles to walk in their own waies , according to the Apostles meaning , Act. 14. 16. although as the same Apostle saith , even at that time , Hee left not himselfe without witnesse , giving them raine and fruitfull seasons , filling 〈◊〉 . 17 their hearts with food and gladnesse .

And this you take hold of in the next place , and tell us , that , these were unquestionable earnests of Gods everlasting love , and to prove it you adde by way of reason , for thou so lovedst the world , still holding up your deyout Soliloquies , as if you would enchant your Readers with an affected straine of devotion , that thou gavest thine onely begotten Sonne , that whosoever believeth in him should not perish .

If this be not like capping of verses , I doe not know what is : for will it follow by any Logicall method , that because the giving of Christ for everlasting life to all that believe in him , is an evidence of Gods love to all ; therefore the giving of raine from heaven , and fruitfull seasons , is an unquestionable earnest of Gods everlasting love to all ? Yet I grant it is an evidence of Gods love as touching the preservation of their state temporall ; but you urge it as an evidence of Gods love , as touching the state of their soules spirituall and eternall : otherwise your discourse were nothing to the purpose . Yet to speake according to the Apostles drift in that place , hee proposeth them not as witnesses of his love , but as of his providence , which wee know extends even to bruit beasts , and to the very lillies of the field . Onely man is capable of deserving this testimony of divine providence , and so accordingly should be moved to seeke the Lord , and to worship him as God , who governes all , and provides for all , and not as a corruptible thing , thus wee interpret the Apostle , Act. 14. 16. according to the Apostle , Act. 17. 27. and Rom. 1. 23. and not at randome as you doe , fashioning his meaning in such a manner as may best accord with your extravagant opinions .

Lastly , who seeth not , that if these be unquestionable earnests of Gods love towards them , then notwithstanding they have filled up the measure of their iniquity , yet Gods love continueth towards them the same still , and therefore cannot be said to give them over to their owne lusts , and to treasure up wrath against the day of wrath . For these and the like temporall blessings they enjoy still , and that in greater measure then is usually the portion of Gods owne deare children . To conclude this , wee make no doubt but that if all and every one should believe in Christ , all and every one should bee saved by Christ .

But the question is , whether God gives faith to all : it is apparant he doth not , but onely to those whom hee hath predestinated , Rom. 8. 30. to those whom hee hath ordained to everlasting life , Act. 13. 45. to such as shall be saved , Act. 2. last . Perhaps your meaning is , that though God doth not give faith to all , but only to some ; the reason is , because some fit themselves for faith , and others doe not . And I verily believe this is your opinion , but it seemes you are ashamed to professe it and speake it out plainly .

Yet the texts mentioned are directly against you , which confine the giving of faith not to mans disposition , but to Gods predestination ; like as those other also , Rom. 9. God hath mercy on whom he will , and whom he will hee hardeneth , and it is not of him that willeth , or of him that runnes , but of God that sheweth mercy : and 2 Tim. 1. 9. the Apostle professeth , that God calleth us , not according to our workes , but according to his owne purpose and grace .

To the prosecuting of every which place , and making it good against any exceptions that you shall bring , I shall be willing to condescend , so long as God affords mee life and opportunity . But as yet you dissemble your Tenet , and play least in sight , and discover your meaning onely by insinuation . I know there is no greater argument of Gods love , then the giving of his Sonne , whence it manifestly followeth , that unlesse Gods love to reprobates bee as great as his love to his elect , Christ was not given to the reprobates ; like as our Saviour signifieth , that , Hee sanctified himselfe unto his death and Ioh. 17. 9. 20. passion ; not for the world , but for those for whom he praied , which were partly those whom God had already giuen him , and partly those who hereafter should believe through their word . Yet I confesse you are audacious enough to resist this argument , and openly to professe , that Gods love to the reprobate is as great as his love to the elect , which no Arminian was ever yet knowne to professe : yet you take upon you to prove , that this love was tendred to all .

A strange phrase , which I thinke was never heard of before , as if love were like an ointment in a box , that might be offered and received if a man would . Of tendering grace I have heard , to wit , the grace of remission of sinnes and salvation upon our beliefe , but of tendring love I never heard .

And of the tendring of this grace in Christ unto all that heare it preached , who ever doubted ? For this is no more then to say , that It is tendred unto all to whom it is tendred . And are you well in your wits to addresse your selfe to the proving of this , with some notable argument , which should be like a thunderbolt , and therefore no great marvell if some great noise preceed it .

But still I perceive your meaning reacheth further then you dare as yet to professe ; for your meaning is to prove , that All that heare the Gospell and doe not believe it , seeing they shall bee guilty of greater sinne , and incurre greater condemnation at the day of judgement , therefore they could believe it if they would . This is the point that sticks in your teeth , and which you dare not openly and plainely professe , as indeed it is manifest Pelagianisme , and which the Arminians dare not at this day openly avouch , but rather professe that no man can believe or repent without grace .

Whereas yet , like as your selfe maintaine , that no man in state of nature can doe otherwise of himselfe then sinne , yet is he justly condemned for sinning , none compelling him : in like sort , no man of himselfe can believe the Gospell , yet hee may be as justly condemned for not believing . For as for that naturall impotency unto that which is good , which is in all derived unto us from our father Adam , that is of it selfe sufficient to condemne us , and therefore most unsufficient to excuse us . And that impotencie being in all alike , the condemnation therefore shall be unto all alike ; but the increase of it by actuall transgressions which are freely committed , is not in all alike : for neither doth inclination naturall , or tentations spirituall , or occasions temporall hinder a mans libertie , in doing or refusing to doe any act ; so likewise neither can it hinder the aggravation of his sinne . But neither can this naturall impotency bee cured in any part but by the grace of God habituall , neither any good act according to this grace habituall he performed without another grace , both prevenient and subsequent actuall . If your minde serves you to deale plainly in opposing ought of this , you shall not want them that will bee ready to enter with you into the lists , and scholastically to encounter you . Yet I confesse the providence of God , especially in ordering and governing the wills of men , is a misterious thing , and the operation and cooperation of his will , with the operation and cooperation of the will of man .

But I am a long time inured unto this , and now I feare no bugbeares , least of all from your selfe , with whom I have beene of old acquainted in our private and familiar discourse on these and such like arguments , and to tell you plainely my opinion , I doubt you have written so much , that you have had time to read but litle . And truly as for my selfe , as I have written little , so also I have not read much . But in these points I have spent not a little time , in searching after truth , and examining arguments .

As for the place of the Apostle , Act. 17. 30. it seemes your meaning is , it pleads for universall grace now after Christs death : yet your selfe immediately before profested , that onely they that heare it and doe not believe , are guilty of greater sinnes ; implying manifestly , that since Christs death all doe not heare it . Yet if you have any other meaning , and will deale roundly in propounding it , I will be ready to consider this or any other place that you shall bee able to produce to what purpose soever , if orthodox in my judgement to subscribe unto it , if otherwise , to doe my best to confute it .

3 In the next place you are so farre from maintaining universall grace , that you undertake to give causes why all men in the world have not heard of this love of God in Christ . But these causes to be assigned by you are put off till hereafter , and that not of certainty neither : you onely say , They may bee assigned . T is your usuall course to feed your Readers with expectation , as it were with empty spoones . If you doe not gull them in putting them off to expectation t is somewhat the better .

The reason you give why many might have heard of Christ , which yet have not heard of him , and might have beene partakers of his death , ( I thinke you meane of the benefit of his death ) which yet have not beene partakers of it , is starke naught . For that evill courses of men cannot hinder them from the participation of Christs death , appeareth by the calling of the Gentiles , and casting off of the Iewes . For were the deeds of Babylon ( thinke you ) better then they of Sion ? Wee Jewes by nature , and not sinners of the Gentiles , saith the Apostle , Gal. 2. 15.

The Apostle in divers places , puts no difference betweene them that are called , and them that are not , as touching their manners before grace , 1 Cor. 6. 11. Eph. 2. 23. Tit. 3. 23. God sindes us weltring in our bloud , when he saith unto us , Live , Ezech. 16. and Saul was taken off from his bloudy courses to be made a member of Christ .

And your doctrine to the contrary tends shamefully to the obscuring and disparaging of Gods grace , and to the advancing of the power of nature , and liberty of will ; the trick of the Pelagians of old , of whom Austine professed thus , Inimici gratiae Dei latent in commendatione naturae , The enemies of Gods grace welter themselves under the commendation of nature . And Austine professeth it to be impiety and madnesse Cont dua● epist. Pelag l. 2. c. 1. Enchir. 9. 8 to deny , that God can convert any mans will , when hee will , and where hee will . And you blush not to professe in another discourse of yours , that humility is the disposition , which prepares us for grace . I doubt you will finde little comfort in such humility , and that at the day of judgement , such humility will be found abominable pride .

What you meane by pledges I know not , you love to walk in cloudes , and in the darke : if you mean the fruits of Gods temporall blessings , how will you prove that these were evidences of that love which God man fested in the death of his Sonne ? And if it were so , then this evidence should be manifested to all of ripe yeares : for all are partakers of Gods temporall providence , even they that have filled up the measure of their iniquity . Yet then you usually professe , God withdrawes his love from them : but how can that bee if hee afford them the unquestionable earnests thereof , as before you called these pledges : whereas in the close you say , that many are not acquainted with this manifestation of Gods love , and that out of meere mercy , it may well passe for one of your paradoxes . I never doubted but that it was a mercy to know Christ , and the love of God to the world in him ; but that it was a mercy to want Christ , I never read nor heard till now . Neither is it necessary that men , though reprobates , should be enraged to evill by the Gospell : for God can make even reprobates to profit by it , ad exteriorem vitae emendationem quà mitius puniantur , To the outward emendation of their lives , to the end their punishment may be the milder . And we finde by experience that all were not enraged against it .

CHAP. XVIII .

Want of consideration , or ignorance of Gods unfained love to such as perish , a principall means or occasion why so many perish .

FRom Gods love to his Vineyard , you have proceeded to discourse of his infinite love towards them that perish ; and because in the issue they are never the better for it : and Solomon saith , that open hatred is better Prov , 27. 5 then secret love , which some understand of fruitlesse love : therefore to salve this inefficatious nature of Gods love as you shape it , ( though yet you count it infinite and ardent , and excessively fervent ) you here take upon you to discover unto us the reason why it proves so inefficacious , and that without prejudice to the love of God ; and that is , you say , on mans part , to wit , Want of consideration , or ignorance of Gods unfained love towards them .

Yet wee doe not say , God is made any looser by the damnation of so many thousands , both men and Angels : for the glory of God is indifferently advanced , as well in the condemnation of them that perish , as in the salvation of his Elect . And the Apostle in this case professeth , saying , 2 Cor. 2. 15. Wee are unto God the sweet savour of Christ in them that are saved , and in them that perish : But you proceede and tell vs , That God hath from eternitie infallibly forecast the entire redemption of his infinite love , which unto us may seeme utterly cast away . And of men , if many die , the fault is their owne , or their instructers .

But by your leave , I see not how Gods infinite love ( if there be any such towards them that perish as you plead there is ) is redeemed from being utterly cast away ; for surely , they that are thus cast away , are never a whit the better for it . God I confesse is never a whit the worse for their damnation : but if Gods love were such towards them that perish as to will their salvation , surely God is much the worse for that in two respects ; First , because his omnipotency is hereby shaken , in as much as that is not brought to passe which he would , and ardently desired ( as you speake ) that it should come to passe . In which case it followeth , that God is not omnipotent ; as Austine long agoe discoursed , and thereupon was driven to give such commodious interpretation of that place ( whereupon you onely insist in your owne sense , notwithstanding the analogie of Scripture phrase is as directly against that construction of the place , which you lay for a ground of your present discourse as for it ) as might not enterfare upon Gods omnipotencie : for by experience wee finde , that whatsoever wee desire to bring to passe , wee alwaies doe bring to passe , if it lies in our power to bring it to passe : and if wee doe not effect it , it is a manifest signe that wee are not able to effect it . Secondly , God is the worse for it in another respect ; for this love and will of God to them that perish , you make to cease , as soone as they have filled up the measure of their iniquity , how much more after the time of their damnation is come ? And this is to make God mutable , and his will and love to bee of a changeable condition . But God is so perfect as to be without Iac. 1. all variablenesse or shadow-of change .

And by the way I observe , you are apt to discourse of Gods infinite love towards them that perish amongst men , but of any such love towards them that perish amongst Angells , nor a word : yet it is as evident , that if any perish amongst Angels , it is meerely their owne faults also : Nay , much more evident is this in the nation of Angells , then in the nation of men . For many thousand infants perish in originall sinne , for no personall originall fault of their owne , but for the transgression of Adam , and in that corruption which is naturally derived unto them from the loynes of Adam , after that by his actuall transgression hee fell into the state of that corruption , which since from him is become hereditarie unto us all . As for that miscarriage which makes all men obnoxious unto the wrath of God , and unto condemnation , wee hold it impossible to be prevented .

For originall sinne and Adams transgression is it , which you well know , cannot be prevented : Onely God may have mercy on whom hee will , even in despight of any actuall miscariage ( which you doat upon as an only hinderer from grace ) like as on the otherside he hardeneth whom hee will , in spite of all civill and morall good carriage found in the best of heathen men .

This I speake according to the doctrine of Saint Paul ; I confesse , I speake it not according to the doctrine of Silius Italicus , nor according to the doctrine of Sozimus , as sound at heart for true heathenisme , as Silius was for his life . And that Sozimus amongst other reproaches he casts upon Christianity , this is one , that wee offer Gods free grace of pardoning all manner of sinnes , to all manner of men that believe in Christ Iesus . And to touch by the way , if it bee the fault , or may be the fault onely of their instructors that many perish , then it is not their owne fault .

Yet certainly it is their owne fault that Angells perish : yet wee see not any paines you take to shew , How God hath infallibly forecast the intire redemption of his infinite love towards Angells that are cast away : belike he never entertained any love towards those Angells at all . But Silius Italicus himselfe , that knew this , and considered this , and preacheth it unto others , what did he fare the better for it , was hee saved by it thinke you ?

Nay , how many thousands knew this amongst heathen men , as well as Silius , that Mite & cognitum est homini Deus , and that he delighted not in the sacrificing of the bloud of men , which yet were never a whit the nearer unto salvation for all this : Much lesse so neare as Abraham , even at that time when he travelled three dayes journey to the sacrificing ofhis sonne Isaac . Yet we confesse , his love is unfainedly extended to all that call him Maker ; for in that hee made them , and a world for them , and by giving raine and fruitfull seasons , doth fill their hearts with food and gladnesse , hee may Act. 14. 16 bee said to love them , but herehence it followeth not , that hee loves them unto salvation .

And yet how many are so far from having their hearts filled with food and gladnesse , that sometimes they perish for want of bread ? But in stead of arguing you turne to prophecying , and tell us , that Had the doctrines which those divine oracles ( God is love and would have all men to be saved ) naturally afford , beene for these forty yeares last past , as generally taught , and their right use continually prest with as great zeale and fervencie as the doctrine and uses of Gods absolute decree , for electing some , and reprobating most in that space have beene ; the plentifull encrease of Gods glory and his peoples comfort throughout this land , might have wrought such astonishment to our adversaries , ●as would have put their mutinous mouthes to silence .

I commend your wit in this ; for I professe of all inartificiall arguments , I never heard any answerable unto this . Now if you had added an artificiall argument , unto this inartificiall which you might have had the hap to have read in Southwell , it had beene most compleat ; and I had not easily devised what could have beene added hereunto . And the argument is this , Suppose God the Father had written this , and that with the pen of his Spirit , dipt in the bloud of his Sonne , would you not then have believed it ? I presume you would , why then believe it now , for the difference is not in substance , but onely circumstance .

It is the onely thing I remember in that booke of Southwell ; and this argument of yours I may perhaps remember when you have forgotten it . But I pray consider , what sect is there in the world that might not use the like ? Perhaps you will say , they might use it , not so truely as you doe . But then I pray consider , what evidence have wee for the truth of it on your part , but your owne confidence , and your bare word expressing it ? And I hope you will give every sect leave to be as confident of the truth of their owne way , as you are of yours ; and as liberall in proving their bare words for it as your selfe .

I have read in Chaucer ( to betray unto you what use I can make of him , as well as you of Silius Italicus ) of somo rime that is called rime dogrell , and if there bee any Logick dogrell , I thinke this is it . But I doe not meane to let your grave discourse passe thus ; those Oracles , God is love , and would have all men to be saved , you suppose doe naturally afford your doctrines , to wit , that Gods infinite love extends to all and every one , as that hee will that all and every one should bee saved .

But no such things doe these oracles afford , either expresly , or by any just consequence . And of the first ( God is love ) it is apparant that it containeth no such thing expresly ; and as for the deducing of any such consequence herehence , your selfe never yet adventured , nor yet doe ; you may as well deduce herehence , that hee will save all Angells , as well as all men , yea the very devills . And as for the second , you think that doth expresly signifie as much ; but that is untrue ; the Scripture phrase doth use that universall signe frequently in another sense , as when it saith of the Pharisees that they did tithe omne olus , which cannot be meant of every herbe in particular , but of every sort of herbe in speciall , as Austine himselfe 1200. years agoe observed . So Peter is said to have seen a vessell let down from heaven , wherein was 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , which cannot be meant of every particular , but only that of every sort , or of most sorts , or of many sorts some one . So it is said , that all Ierusalem and all Iudea went forth to Iohn , the meaning whereof can bee no other then that of all parts of Iudea and of Ierusalem , some went forth unto him .

As for the plentifull encrease of Gods glory and the peoples comfort , which you promise upon the preaching of your doctrine ; this is onely upon your word , which unlesse you take upon you to be a Prophet , and be received also for such a one , is of no force .

But suppose it had beene preached , and not received nor believed by the hearers , I pray what then ? Had the peoples comfort beene any whit the more encreased ? And for you to presume , that upon the preaching of it , it had beene received , is to take upon you too much ; the Gospell it selfe when first preached , the Iewes told S. Paul when hee came to Rome , it was every where spoken against : Yet I confesse , the more erroneous Act. 28. a doctrine is , especially if it be plausible to the judgement of flesh and bloud , the more apt it is to bee entertained by flesh and bloud .

But I pray , what comfort is this you speake of , is it comfort in things spirituall , or comfort in Gods blessings temporall ? I graunt willingly , that the truth of God is more apt to breed comfort spirituall , then errours in matters of faith . Now first you must prove your doctrine to be true , and then wee will nothing doubt but it shall be comfortable . You take too much upon you to prophesie that it shall be comfortable and therehence inferre that it is true . But if you speake of comfort in respect of blessings temporall ; as I guesse by comparing this with what you delivered in the Epistle dedicatory , wee have but your bare word for this also . But suppose it would prove so , shall we from the temporall comforts wee may enjoy , conclude , that therefore our religion is the true religion ?

Alas , what comfort in outward things had christianity in the first three hundred yeares ? why may you not as well conclude , that the Synagogue of Antichrist is the very Church of Christ ; and our Churches which wee call reformed , are no Churches of Christ ; seeing for many yeares God hath humbled us under their hands , and given us over into the Ezech. 2● . 31. hands of beastly men , skilfull to destroy , and still sends serpents and cokatrices amongst us , that will not be charmed ? Ier. 4. 17. Well , this wee see is the comfort you afford us in these heavy times ; you give us to understand that t is Gods just judgement upon us , for preaching so much of Gods absolute decree of electing some , and reprobating most ,

And yet the Lutheran Churches preach as little of this as you doe , and yet wherein have they fared better then their brethren the Calvinists ; witnesse the Marquisate of Baden , the land of Brunswick , the land of Hulst , the land of Pomerania and Meckelburgh . And the whole kingdome of Bohemia , wherein it is well knowne , the Calvinists were but few in comparison to the Lutherans . In the dayes of King Iames , a restraint began of preaching the doctrine of predestination . Did the peoples comforts , or the comforts of this kingdome encrease any whit hereupon ? Within these foure yeares space bookes savouring of Arminianisme , such as youas , have had the presse open unto them with farre greater libertie then their opposites , yet how do the comforts of the people , and of this kingdome encrease ?

Yet this is an old trick of Satan , who is therefore called by one 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , a circkling Dragon : For in Saint Austines dayes , when the Empire began to bee invaded by the Gothes , the cause of this was by the heathens alledged to be the embracing of Christian religion , whereupon it was that Austine was moved to write his two and twenty books of the Citie of God . Why may not wee as well say , that the cause why we taste so little of the grace of God is , because there are so many risen up with might and maine impugning the grace of God . And it is well known , no reformed Churches prosper so well as the Hollanders , though no doubt they have as ranke sinnes to bee found in them as others ; yet this they have to their singular commendation , that they suppressed Arminianisme , that Canker-worme of Gods grace , and of his soveraignety over his creatures , & banished the greatest patrons thereof out of their territories .

This inartificiall argument of yours I thought deserved the canvassing , and therefore I have spent so many lines in discovering the rottennesse of it .

Now to proceed ; you aske , Who would not be willing to be saved , if he were fully perswaded that God did will his salvation in particular ? When we read this , I muse at the contrariant disposition of our adversaries : for , when wee discourse of election absolute , the Arminian party cryeth out against us ; as if hereby wee tooke a course to make men most carelesse of their salvation ; you , though you shake hands with the Arminian party , oppose in a direct contrarious manner , and say , Who would not bee willing to bee saved ( which is as much as to say , Who would not bee carefull of his salvation ) if hee were fully perswaded , that God did will his salvation in particular . Your meaning is , every one would be carefull of it . So then , all that are of your minde , are most carefull of their salvation : so that it is opposite to the Arminian Tenent , to harden himselfe , or humour himselfe in any profane course , or lewde course of life .

All such must needs turne Saints here on earth , which if it were true , t is to be feared they would be accounted Puritans , and then their opinions would bee liked so much the worse for that . Touching Gods protestation that hee will not the death of any , but the repentance of all , we have said enough , and shewed how you vary from the most authenticall translation of our Churches . And it is apparant , that God neither gives repentance nor life to all ; and to say that God wills any thing ( otherwise then by his will of commandement , which is improperly , though usually called his will ) which cometh not to passe , Austine long agoe professed , was as much as to deny God to be omnipotent .

How sorily you have performed the justifying of your doctrine in this particular , by the authoritie of the Church of England , wee have likewise shewed in its proper place . And if it bee true , that if this doctrine of yours were believed , all would unfainedly endeavour with fervent alacrity to bee truly happy , then it must needs bee that like as your selfe doe , so every Arminian doth , unfainedly endeavour with fervent alacrity ( words enough ) to bee truely happy : So that a profane person like Esau , that sold his birthright for a messe of pottage , is not likely to be found amongst the Arminian generation : And I doubt not but a part of your owne unfained endeavours , with fervent alacrity in this kinde , consists in writing such books as these , containing so many blasphemies both against the nature and against the grace of God .

For proofe whereof I appeale to the consideration and judgement of every indifferent Reader , that shall peause the answer of mine thereunto . You tell us , Gods love and goodnesse is so great . that he cannot passe any act , whereby any of his creatures should be debarred , either from being like him in love or goodnesse . Thus you dictate magisterially , more like a Prophet then a Pastor of Gods Church . But though you bring no reason for what you say , I will trie whether I cannot bring something against it .

And because it is proposed of his creatures in generall , I will begin with the Angels . If this be true , then the Devils are not excluded by any act of God from being like him in love and goodnesse . What hinders then , but that they may be like him in love and goodnesse if they will , and that they may will it ? for is not their will as free as mans , in the state of his corruption ? Secondly , God hath decreed , that all that are descended from Adam , shall be born in originall corruption ; also he hath ordained , that many thousands of them shall die in their infancie , as well out of the Church as within the Church . Now let any man judge , whether by vertue of these decrees of God , they bee not utterly excluded from being like unto God in love and goodnesse , after an ordinary manner , whereof alone you speake . Againe , all that shall be damned , God hath ordained unto damnation . Now let any man judge , whether by vertue of this decree , and upon supposition thereof , it is not impossible that such should be saved . Of those who are not predestinated unto life , God brings none unto wholesome and spirituall repentance ; If God brings none of them Aug. cont. Iul. Pelag. lib. 5. c. 4. unto true repentance , then he hath decreed to bring none of them unto true repentance ; and by vertue of this decree they are debarred from being like unto God in love and goodnes , which I prove thus , None can be like unto God in goodnesse without true repentance , and none can repent except God gives repentance : therefore God having decreed not to give them repentance , by vertue of this decree they are debarred from repentance , and consequently , from being like unto God in goodnesse .

You close this Section with an , Alas , the effect whereof is , that by your opposites doctrine , a mispersuasion is wrought in most men of his goodnesse towards them ; and consequently your meaning is , they grow carelesse of their salvation . Because as before we heard from you , carefulnesse of salvation is an herbe that grows onely in the gardens of Arminianisme . And what is this dangerous doctrine ? Surely it is very pretily expressed by you , to wit , in teaching that God doth oftentimes dispose his blessings of this life , not as undoubted pledges of a better . Well then , to say , that God doth dispense his blessings of this life unto Turkes and Sarazens , not as pledges of a better , is in danger to make Christians conceive that God is not good to them .

But perhaps you meane it onely in respect of those who pertake of these blessings . Now I professe I never read any of our divines make use of any such consideration in this argument : you love to shape opposites opinion after your own fancy : And yet the truth is , that according to Scripture evidence , temporall blessings are so farre from being generally the pledges of a better life , as that they are noted out unto us in Scripture to be the character of the wicked , namely , to have their portion in this life . Woe bee to you rich ( saith our Saviour ) Luk. 6. for you have received your consolation . And they are the poore of this world for the most part that God hath chosen . Iac. 2. 5. God hath chosen the poore of this world , rich in faith and heires of salvation . And on the other side , the prosperity of the wicked is such as hath been a scandal to the children of God , as we read Ps. 73. David himself took offence at it , until he went into the sanctuary of God , then he understood their end , vers. 17. Surely ( saith he ) thou hast set them in slipery places , and castest them downe into desolation , how suddenly are they destroyed , perished , and horribly consumed .

So likewise Ieremie desired to dispute with God hereabouts , O Lord ( saith he ) if I despute with thee thou art righteous : Ier. 12. 1● yet let me talke with thee of thy judgements : Wherefore doth the way of the wicked prosper ? why are all they in wealth that rebelliously transgresse , 2. Thou hast planted them , and they have taken roote : they grow and bring forth fruit : Thou art near in their mouthes , and farre from their heart . 3. But thou , O Lord , knowest mee , thou hast seene mee and tried my heart toward thee : pull them out like sheepe for the slaughter , and prepare them for the day of slaughter .

Now to my simple understanding , the Prophet herein discovereth unto us that particular of Gods providence which you impugne ; when hee seeth the prosperity of the wicked , he is scandalized , but when hee seeth that this prosperity of theirs is but like the fatting of sheepe and oxen unto the day of slaughter , he is satisfied . For as Salomon saith , Ease slayeth Prov. 1. 32● the foolish , and the prosperity of fooles destroyeth them . And looke in what sense God doth make mens tables to bee their snares , Psal. 69. 22. may he not , or doth hee not in the same manner make their prosperity be their snares ? how can it bee otherwise if God doth not blesse their prosperity , but rather curse it ?

And is not this in Gods power ? Nay , is it not found to be practised in the course of his providence ? I will send a curse upon you ( saith the Lord ) and will curse your blessings ; yea , I have Mal. 2. 2. cursed them already . And if it bee lawfull for God to make Christ to be a snare , and a rock of offence unto many , how Esa. 〈◊〉 . 14. much more may it well become him to make temporall blessings to be snares unto them , wherein they shall be taken unto destruction ? As S. Peter compares some to bruit beasts , borne to be taken and destroyed , 2 Pet. 2. 12. And that Christ was made by God a snare unto many , you may learne out of your Forerius ( whom I have heard you commend not a little ) upon that in Esau 8. 34. And he shall be as a sanctuary , to wit , unto some , but unto others , a stumbling stone , and a rock to fall upon , and as a snare and a net to the inhabitants of Ierusalem . And old Simeon prophefied as much of him , saying , Behold , this childe is appointed for the fall and rising againe of many in Israel , and for a signe which shall be spoken against , Luk. 2. 34. Even heathen men have observed , that in the course of Gods providence , wicked men are exalted to their greater shame in their ruine . Tolluntur in altum , ut lapsa graviore cadant . And Claudian . if it bee a base minde in any man to bestow guifts on others , hoping thereby for advantage in the way of his commodity : shall it not bee lawfull unto God to give the wicked their hearts desire , which is onely set on temporall prosperity ; and to expose them unto temptation , and abandon them , leaving them destitute of his grace , for the distribution whereof he is bound to none ; to advance his glory in making them examples in the way of his justice , punishing their pride , unthankfulnesse , lusts , and intemperance ?

What can you say to that of Solomon , God hath made all things for himselfe , even the wicked against the day of evill , Pro. 16. 9. and that of the Apostle , Rom. 9. 21. Hath not the potter power of the clay to make of the same lumpe , one vessell to honour , and another unto dishonour ?

But you keepe your course in the way of your owne invention , without reflecting your eyes upon these sacred oracles , as if you meant to broach unto the world a new Law , and a new Gospell . As for the love of the reprobates , God cares not for it . It is in his power alone to worke his love in the hearts of men , by the circumcision of them , Deut. 30. 6. and that he will do in whom he will , for he hath mercy on whom Rom. 9. 1● he will , and whom he will hardeneth .

2 As for sinister respects , they may be found in the creature ; they may be found in man , they cannot be found in God . He must respect , and cannot but respect himselfe , and the manifestation of his owne glory as the supreame end of all . For , as all things are from him , so all things must bee for him , Rom. 11. last . And accordingly , He made all things for himselfe . Prov. 16. 4. And his glory is as well seene in the heardening of whom hee will , as in the comiserating of whom hee will .

And for all the good wit that you and others have learned , to take good turnes , and not to be taken by them ; There is a wisedome of God that will be sure to take them , for whom hee hath laid snares ; and make their wisedome , and cunning , and pride , and insolencie , and wilfulnesse , tend to the praise of his glory , in what kinde soever pleaseth him , either in the way of his justice in their just condemnation , or in the way of his glorious grace , in the pardoning of their sinnes , and saving their soules .

As for your rules of observation , touching the natures of men , I might let them passe : I am no professed student in such like ; yet I finde yours shallow enough . I see no reason but such as are worldly wise may meete with their matches , that may know when to trust them , and when not , and work out their owne advantage either way .

Why mistrust should make an honest man the worse , I know no reason ; as for a knave , whether he mistrusts others or no , what becomes he the better ? A silly conceit it is in my judgement , to thinke that any man should bee moved to justifie an others ill opinion of him , by doing evill , unlesse that evill be pleasing to him , whose good opinion he affects for his owne advantage . For as he that refraineth himselfe from evill , maketh Esa. 59. 15. himselfe sometimes a prey ; so a man must , audire aliquid brevibus Gyaris & carcere dignum si vult esse aliquid . And there never want some knights of the post , and such as will prostitute their conscience to serve any turne for advantage . No faithlesse age can make any good rules of morality out of date of truth , though out of date of practise . Yet I have heard a storie of a French Gentleman in the wars of France , when certaine Freebooters were unawares entred within his house , saved his owne life , and his family from spoiling , by meere confidence , and was bid at parting , to thanke his owne confidence for speeding so well .

It is alwaies true , Ipsa sides habita ( in good ground ) obligat fidem● it is sometimes true , procurat fidem . Themistocles found it true , when hee offered himselfe to the king of the Molossians , who formerly had beene his enemy : and many generous Generalls deale never a whit the worse with them that cast themselves at the foot of their mercy . Yet God is true , and every man a lyar .

Let us be bold to trust in God , and desire to fall into his hands , and keepe us from falling into the hands of men : yet if God calleth us thereunto , to commit our selves unto God , when we doe cast our selves into the hands of men . Because in Gods hands are the hearts of kings , and hee turneth them whither soever it pleaseth him ; certainly , They that put their trust in the Lord shall want no manner of thing that is good , even at such times when Lyons want and suffer hunger . Yet by your leave it is not the nature of God that is the ground of our confidence , but the revealed will of God . For whatsoever Gods nature is , hee workes freely in the communicating of any good thing unto us : but hee hath revealed , that he will never faile them that put their trust in him . And this is that loving kindenesse of God , as much as to say , his loving and gracious will and pleasure revealed to us , which excites the sonnes of men to put their trust under the shadow of his wings . It was improbable that there should bee any motive from the creature , why God should give them a being ; neither was it his love to the creature that moved God to make the creature , as you superficially use to discourse , but meerely the love of himselfe . For he made all things for himselfe . Prov. 16. 4

And the creature before God made him was just nothing , neither was there at that time any distinction betweene King Alexander and his horse Bucephalus . It is a strange conceit to say , that the being of the creature is like unto Gods being , who is the Creator . For what likenesse is there betweene an apple and a nut , between an horne and a bagpipe , an harp and an harrow .

Ens hath no univocation in the comprehending of all created entities , much lesse as by denomination it comprehends both the Creator , and the creature . Certainly all do not love God whom he loves ; for he loved us when we were his enemies , Rom. 5. 8. But if all did so love him , as all shall either sooner or later , it will not follow that all should bee saved . For onely such as Iacob are loved of him in Scripture phrase , and such as Esau are hated rather .

And though you will not bee beaten off from that uncoth assertion , That they whom God wills to be saved are not saved , yet we had rather abhorre so foule a sentence with Austine , as denying Gods omnipotency , then concurre with you in boldnesse to the embracing of it . The apprehension of Gods love to us , is the cause ( morall ) of our love to him : though God it is that by the circumcision of our hearts workes it , Deut. 30. 6. But if lovelinesse in the object be the cause of love ; how dare you professe God loves the reprobate , and that ardently , and with excessive and infinite love . Is there any lovelinesse in them in the state of their corruption , and not rather unlovelinesse throughout ?

Neither will it serve your turne to say , that he loves them as his creatures : For if this be sufficient to qualifie the businesse of the object which hee loves , you may as well say that hee loves frogs and toads ; yea , and the Devills and damned Spirits .

3. I make no question but an unregenerate man may love his friend and companion in evill , as brethren in evill do love one another : and our Saviour hath taught us as much , Matt. 5. 49. If yee love them that love you what reward shall ye have ? doe not the Publicanes even the same ? I never heard nor read before that condemnation was dispensable . The doing of things otherwise unlawfull , in some cases may be dispensed with , but punishment was never knowne to be dispensed with ; it may be remitted , but that is not to dispense with it . I take your meaning and leave your words , you thinke belike that infinite mercy cannot free the world from condemnation . I no way like such extravagant assertions , though frequent in your writings ; as if you would innovate all both naturall reason , and divinity .

I know no sinne which infinite mercy cannot pardon ; neither doe I know any sinne beside the sinne against the Holy Ghost , and finall impenitency , which God will not pardon in his elect . Much lesse is mans dull backwardnesse to love him unpardonable . For though as it seemes you were never conscious of any such dulnesse in your selfe , yet I cannot easily be perswaded untill I finde cause , that any Christian in the world entertaines such a conceite of himselfe , as you doe of your selfe . Be God never so louely , yet if a man know him not , how can hee love him ?

And doe you thinke it is naturall for a man to know God ? Suppose we doe know him to be most wise , most powerfull : yet if he be our enemie , how should this move us to love him , or put our trust in him ? If we know him to love us , and to be our friend , yet are not the best backward enough from loving him , when we are easily drawne to sinne against him ? And are all sinnes of this kinde unpardonable ? what an uncomfortable doctrine is this , and how prone to carry all that believe it into desperation ? God regards not our love unlesse we keep his commandements , Ioh. 14. 5. Againe , what is the love of God ? Is it not to love him above all things ? even above our selves ? as Gerson expresseth it , Amor Dei usque ad contentum sui . Is this naturall ? long agoe Austine hath defined it to bee supernaturall : And if any dull backwardnesse bee found in us to this love of God ; if wee are loath to lose our lives for Christs sake , is this sinne unpardonable ? You are a valliant Champion , I heare you are ready to dye in maintenance of your opinions , but I cannot believe you are any whit the readier for that to die for Christ .

But , alas , what should become of poore Peter , that for feare of some trouble upon confessing himselfe to bee a follower of Christ , denied that he knew him , and that with oath and imprecation ? Yet Christ looked back upon him , ●s before he had praied for him , that his faith might not faile ; and Peter looked back upon himselfe , and went forth and wept bitterly ; and within three daies after the Angells take speciall order , that Peter by name should be acquainted ( with the first ) with the comfortable newes of Christs resurrection from the dead ; that as he died for his sinnes , so hee rose again for his justification . The infinite love of God becomes known only to the regenerate , who take notice of it chiefly , as touching blessings spirituall . As for temporall blessings , Gods love therein to man , how can it be knowne to a man unregenerate , seeing it can bee knowne onely by faith ? Those temporall blessings you speake of in the judgement of flesh and bloud , comming to passe onely by course of nature .

But that his intention in bestowing temporall blessings upon the wicked , is to binde himselfe to instate them in the incomprehensible joyes of endlesse life , which hee never meanes to performe , is one of your incomprehensible paradoxes . To the children of God there is no such obligation : for t is not the blessings , but the sanctified use of them , that is a pledge and assurance to them of the favour of God unto salvation ; and so the sanctified use of Gods temporall curses , are no lesse evident a pledge and assurance to them of the same favour of God : For by chastising divers and sundry waies with crosses and afflictions , hee manifests unto them , that God receives them for his sonnes , and so esteemes of them , and not as bastards , Heb. 12. 8.

I am glad to heare you acknowledge , that , Of all the motions of our hearts and soules God is the sole author and guide . For such acknowledgements are most rare with you ; and which you cannot embrace without manifest contradiction to your selfe , and overthrowing all your discourse touching Gods decree , which as you say , decreeth contingency , but not the contingent things themselves .

But the motions of the soule and heart are contingent things , and these must needes he decreed by God , if they be produced by God : And if God be the author of them , hee must needs produce them . So that the whole tower of your discourse touching Gods decree is suddenly overthrowne by your selfe , and that with the blast of this one sentence . Besides , when you acknowledge God to be the authour of all the motions of our hearts and soules , you therewithall acknowledge him to be the author of evill motions as well as good : For you doe nor say , hee is the author of all good motions , but , of all whose motions ( in reference to our hearts , our soules , our strength ) God is the sole Authour and guide : yet we dare not avouch that God is the Author , much lesse the sole Author of all our motions , without manifold distinctions . And to my thinking , it became you to be very cautulous of such assertions , who are so apt to charge your opposites with making God the Author of sinne .

Of every action of man that is free , wee maintaine man to be the author as well as God ; but man wee make in operation subordinate unto God , the second cause unto the first . This is true as touching actions naturally considered , and as touching good actions , but with a difference ; man in working any naturall action we make him subordinate unto God in respect of influence generall ; in working good actions , wee make him subordinate unto God in respect of influence speciall .

But as touching evill actions there wee make man alone to be the author of them as they are evill , without any subordination unto God in respect of any influence , generall or speciall . And cannot sufficiently wonder what improvidence hath overtaken you , to out-lash in so strange a manner . But even in this we acknowledge a providence of God confounding the wittes and longues of them that build up Babell . I remember what the Prophet saith of the Aegyptians , The Lord Esa. 19. 14 hath mingled among them the spirit of errours : and they have caused Aegypt to erre in every worke thereof , as a drunken man erreth in his vomit : and how is that , but in defiling himselfe ; and that which is before him . o● his owne favourites that sit next unto him . Christs yoake is easie and his burthen light to the regenerate : but is it so unto naturall men ? doe they not account it coards and bands ? Psal. 2. Doth not the Apostle tell us , The affections of the flesh are not subject to the law of God , nor can be ? It seemes you are a very morrall man , you do so willingly Rom. 8. 7. fall upon this theame , of advancing the power of mans naturall morallity . But I remember withall what Austine sometimes said , Malo humilem peccatorem quam superbum innocentem . And arrogancie is a speciall fruit of pride : And you discourse in such sort of the nature of man , as if it had never beene corrupt in Adam .

4 If our love of God be raised from the beliefe of his loving kindenesse to us , then our love to God is not the first conception or plantation of true happinesse , but rather our faith , as the Apostle plainely testifieth , 1 Tim. 1. 5. saying . The end of the law is love , out of a pure heart , and good conscience , and faith unfained . And neither the one nor the other is the worke of nature , but of Grace ; nor the worke of God neither by influence generall and naturall , but by influence speciall and spirituall .

As for the conclusion you deduce herehence , it is well known that life , and sense , and reason we obtaine by course of nature , and naturall generation of naturall and reasonable parents . And to know that God gives all this , and maintaines naturall generation by the counsell of his will , that he it is that fashioneth us in the wombe , is not knowne by light of nature : for the greatest Philosophers knew not this but by light of grace , and so the moanest christian comes acquainted with this mysterie . But herehence to inferre that God hath a purpose to give me with them whatsoever good things my heart , my sense , or reason can desire , is a verie loose inference . God hath no purpose to give his own children whatsoever good thing they doe desire , much lesse what they can desire . Paul desired 2 Cor. 11. and prayed thrise to be delivered from the buffetings of Satan , but God granted it not unto him . Moses desired to go Deut. 3. 25 over Iordan to see the goodly mountain , and Lebanon , but it was denied him . Abraham desired that the blessing might be conferred on Ishmael , but could not obtaine it . And no marveyle . For God knows what is better for us then our selves ; the childe prayeth for his Fathers health sayth Austine , but it is Gods pleasure to take him away by death . God hath not promised to give us all that we desire , much lesse that sense desireth ; but hath promised that all things shall worke together for our good . even povertie as well as riches , sikenesse as Rom. 8. 28 well as health , and adversitie as well as prosperitie . For every creature of God is sanctified unto them that beleive and know 1. Tim. 4. 3 the truth . This is the faith only of a childe of God , who is Rom. 4. 13 the heyre of the World by faith in Christ . But to say of all and every one , hand over head that God hath a purpose to give them all eternall life , is your common errour , that now is like an hereditary sicknesse unto you : driving you to maintayne two foule tenets ; the one , that God is not omnipotent , as purposing to give that which he never performes , a manifest signe that he is not able to performe it ; as Austine many hundred yeares agoe disputed Enchirid 95. Deus noster in caelo sursum , in caelo & in terra omnia quaecunque voluit , fecit . Quod utique non est verum , si aliqua voluit & non fecit , & quod est indignius , ideo non fecit quoniam ne fieret , quod volebat omnipotens , voluntas hominis impedivit . And Enchirid. 96. Deo procul dubio quam facile est quod vult facere , tam facile est quod non vult esse , non sinere . Hoc nisi credamus periclitatur ipsum nostrae fidei confessionis initium qua nos in Deum Patrem omnipotentem credere consitemur . Neque enim veraciter ob aliud vocatur omnipotens , nisi quia quicquid vult potest , nec voluntate cujusquam creaturae , voluntatis omnipotentis impeditur effectus . The other tenet as foule as the former is this , that God changeth . For undoubtedly at this time he hath no purpose to save the Divells and damned soules of men : therfore if ever he had any such purpose it is now changed ; and consequently God is changed himselfe , You have no way to avoyde this , but by saying that Gods purpose you speake of , is not absolute but conditionall as before you upbraided your opposites for maintaining Gods decree of electtion to be absolute . Yet the Arminians at the conference of Hage utterly declined the maintenance of Gods decree of election to be conditionall ,

Yet the shifre will not serve your turne , being too narrow a leafe to cover the shamefull nakednesse of your assertion . For to purpose conditionally is no more a purpose of salvation then of condemnation ; which is no way an evidence of Gods love to any man in particular , the issue wherof is indifferent to be condemnation as well as salvation . But you hitherto in this respect have insisted upon the maintenance of Gods love to all and every one .

The beginning which God found out for mankind was a being indifferent to stand or fall , which indifferency fitted him no more for salvation in case he stood , then for damnation in case he fell ; save that God was withall resolved to provide him of a Saviour upon his fall , that should be as tabula post naufragium , but to whome ? only to these whome he loved as he loved Iacob , not unto those whome he hated as he hated Esau. For as he made all thinges for himselfe , so also he made the wicked against the day of evill , and ever that for himselfe also . Pro. 16. 4 : Why Gods love in respect of creation , should be accoumpted his infinite love , I know no reason , considering , that the meanest creature was partaker of that love as well as man .

And as he gave being unto all things , so he maintaynes being to Divells and damned men and ever will doe . We are knit unto God by faith as well as by love and of the two , faith is the more noble as being the Fountaine and cause of love . If God out of love be sayd to make us what we are ; it may as well be sayd that out of love he made all other creatures what they are . If you reply , that they were made out of his love to us , for as much as they were made for our use and service : In like sort I answeare , that it was out of love to himselfe that he made us , for as much as he made us for his owne use and service ; yea and all things else that were made . For he made all things for himselfe . In like sort if God made us what we are because he was lovinge to us : he made also all creatures what they are because he was loving to them . Yet by your leave , He made all things for himselfe .

And this is the foure and twenty Elders acknowledgment Revela . 4. 11. Thou art worthy o Lord , to receive glory , and honour , and power . For thou hast created all thinges , and for thy wills sake they are and have bin created . You say true , where faith and love is found there is assurance of Gods favour towards us to set both his wisdome & power on worke to make all things worke together for our good , and so to preserve us to his heavenly Kingdome .

But the question is whether this faith and love be the workes of nature , and wherof all are capable by power of nature or whether they are the meere fruites of Gods grace , afforded to some denyed to others according to the good pleasure of his owne will , as who hath mercie on whome hee will and whom he will he hardneth .

CHAP. XIX .

How God of a most lovinge Father becomes a severe and inexorable judge .

NOw because you cannot but perceave how this pincheth sore upon the unchangeable nature of God . Therfore you spend two chapters in the clearinge of this difficulty ; wherin if you satisfie your selfe it is well . As for my part I am so farre from receaving satisfaction that I am utterly to seeke in understandinge the course you take to give satisfaction . Whether anger , hate , or jealosie , have any seate in the omnipotent Majestie is litle to the purpose .

But to shew how God of a most loving Father becomes a severe and inexorable judge , without any change , this alone is to the purpose . For the very manner of proposing it doth imply the ceasing to be a loving Father which he was , but becomes a severe & inexorable judge , which he was not . For to bee a loving Father and a severe judge all at once , is not of a lovinge Father to become a severe judge . And though this were granted you ; yet it is not congruous to your tenet to maintayne that God was an inxorable judge to any , before the measure of his iniquity be full . And as then he first begines to become an inexorable judge , so it is requisite that then he ceaseth to be a loving Father . And albeit you are loath to acknowledge this because it doth so manifestly imply a change in the nature of God ; yet you must be driven hitherto whether you will or no unlesse you maintayne , that still God continueth a most loving Father unto the Divells and ever shall be both unto them and to all damned persons notwithstandinge the wrath of God continue upon them to everlastinge damnation .

And it is a very strange dialect to acknowledge that God is a most loving Father unto damned persons : especially considering that in Scripture phrase we are sayd to be the Sonnes of God by faith in Christ Jesus . Gala. 3. 26. And indeede if you can make good , that to inflict everlastinge damnation , doth consort with infinite mercy ; then you shall obteyne , not that God of a most loving Father doth become an inexorable judge ; but that at once he is both a most loving father and a most inexorable judge also .

As for anger whether it be in God or no , or whether Lactantius hath carryed himselfe well or no in this Argument , it is nothing at all to this present businesse . The question is whether God ardently desiring the salvation of any man doth at length cease to desire it , or whether still he continueth to will and ardently desire a mans salvation notwithstandinge that he purposeth to inflict or actually doth inflict upon him condemnation . For this seemes to be the intended issue of your discourse as when you undertake to illustrate , how extreame severitie may stand with the fervency of fatherly unfeyned love . As much as to say , that God loves the Devills and loves the damned ; and continueth the fervency of fatherly unfeyned love towards them , notwithstanding that he doth inflict everlasting condemnation upon them , and because this love you accoumpt all one with mercy and that it is infinite ; in like sort infinite mercy may consort ( as before you speake ) with extreame severity .

Hence it followeth that all are vessels of merey , the reprobate as well as the elect , only here is the difference , the elect are only vessells of mercy , but the reprobate are both vessells of mercy and vessells of wrath also . Now I demaund what is the fruite of this love , and of this mercy of God towards the damned . Can you devise any fruite of this but the preservation of them in being ? And may you not as well say ; that he loves at this day every creature , in as much as he preserveth them ? And consider I pray doe you call this fatherly love and doe you accoumpt this the fervency of fatherly love ? And doth either Scripture or Eclesiasticall phrase allow you in this ? Yet speake your minde plainly , and say that Gods will to preserve his creatures may stand with extreame severity used towards them , and no man will contend with you at all in this .

But then consider , whether you are well in your witts , when you enter upon the proofe of this as of some rare notion ; when the issue of your meaning falleth upon a most vulgar conceyte and explication . And whether this be to proove that God of a most lovinge Father becomes a severe and inexorable judge , when the only fruit of his love is the holding of his childrens noses unto the grindstone of his wrath , and inplacable displeasure . Yet let us take notice of your illustration .

2. Here wee have a large discourse of Manlius Torquatus and his severe execution upon his owne Sonne , for transgressing the commaundement of his Generall ; therefore Martiall lawe was executed by the father ( being at that time Generall ) upon his owne sonne . But were it all true that you discourse in justifying that fathers severitie upon his child ; Yet you miserably forget your selfe , when you say , That excessive love which he bare unto his person , whilst his hopefull beginnings did seeme to promise an accomplishment of his Martiall vertues , turnes into extreame severity and indignation after hee proves transgressor . For this is not to shew , how extreame severitie may stand with the fervency of fatherly unfeyned love ; but rather to shew how fatherly love ceaseth and severity and indignation comes in the place thereof .

This is rather answerable to the theame proposed how a most loving Father becomes a severe judge , and answerable to the former discourse of Gods withdrawing his goodnesse from those that have once filled up the measure of theire iniquity . But because in this manner it cannot be applyed unto God without acknowledging mutability in the nature of God , as well as in the nature of men : Therefore as I conceave your pretence was to illustrate how extreame severity may stand with the fervency of fatherly love ; though indeede you performe nothing lesse , but rather shew how that fatherly love ceased as being turned into extreame severity and indignation . Yet it seemes you did but forget your selfe in this .

And that your drift was to shew how notwithstanding his love towards his sonne continuing the same , yet in a greater love of Martiall dicipline he caused his head to be striken of . But this also will nothing serve your turne . For notwithstanding this , we see a manifest alteration . For Manlius conceaved not any such indignation against his sonne till now , never entertayned any will to cut him off till the noyse of his transgression came unto his eares . All which cannot bee sayd of God ( as it must be if the case be alike ) without acknowledging as manifest alteration and innovation in the nature of God .

There was a time wherin Manlius desired his sonnes life and prosperitie ; there was a time when he willed and commaunded him to be put to death . It was impossible that both those should be at once in Manlius as implying flat contradiction : Yet you place them both in God eyther at once and so imply contradiction , or successively and so introduce alteration into the nature of God : Manlius his purpose and will was changed upon the fact of his sonne , and his sonne was consumed by it .

But God is the Lord and is not changed , and therfore the Mal. 3. 6. sonnes of Iacob are not consumed . So Selencus never intertayned any thought or purpose of pulling out his sonnes eyes til he was found guiltie of adulterie ; this cannot be sayd of God without subjecting him to variablenesse and somewhat more then shadowe of change . And therefore though Manlius and Selencus be justified in theire courses and God justified in his , as no man makes question , whether God be just in that which he doth : yet this proves not that God is exempt from alteration one way , in making a will to damne a man succeede in God his will to save him ; or your selfe from contradiction another way , in making God at one and the same time both to will a mans salvation , and at the same time to will the same mans condemnation , yea and to inflict it also . And looke by what reason God may at one , and the same time will both the salvation , and condemnation of the same man , by the same reason he may at the same time both damne and save the same man .

For if you say he wills to save him as he is a man , and wills to damne him as he is a sinner ; by the same reason you may say that he can both save him , as he is a man , and damne him as he is a sinner . For the contradiction is as manifest in the one , as in the other : Yet there is a greate deale of difference betweene the course of Manlius Torquatus and the courses of God . For Manlius did not cut of his sonnes heade , but for an actuall and personall transgression of his sonne : but God causeth many thousand Infants to perish in originall sinne , through no actuall and personall transgression of theire owne . What place can you find for that fervency of Gods fatherly love towards them ?

Agayne God hath power in the course of his graciouse providence to keepe men from those transgressions , which make them incurre condemnation .

Now let any man judge whether Manlius would not have kept his sonne from transgression in this kinde if he coulde . Thirdly Manlius was not able to provide that the strictnesse of Military discipline should not be remitted , by relaxation of the punishment of his sonne ; but God is able to procure that no discipline shall bee the more remitted by reason of his shewinge mercy on whome he will . Nay there is mercy with thee sayth the Prophet that thou mayst be feared . Ps. 130. 4.

Lastly Manlius had no power to pardon whome he would without partiality : but God hath power to have mercy on whome he will , yea and to harden whome he will and that without injustice or partiality . Yet I am content to consider the course you take in justifying Manlius .

First you acquaint us with your persuasions and lay them for groundes , a very proper course of argumentation . And these are that few had taken the like care and paines to trains up theire children in the most commendable qualities of that age .

Secondly , that None would have adventured his owne person further to have rescued his sonne from the enimy , or justified him in any honorable quarrell ; and this is very ponderously amplified by comparison with a tender harted Mother whome notwithstanding all her tendernesse , the imbecillity of sexe would not suffer to goe so farre . Spectatum admissi risum teneatis amici ? Most frivolous conjectures and serving to no purpose . For no man doubts but that it might well be , that the love and care of maintayninge Martiall discipline prevayled above the love of his sonne .

I say it might well be so , I doe not say it was so . Now give me leave to say somethinge against Manlius and the like Manliana imperia as you have spent many wastfull lines in pleading for him and them . Consider what Livy observeth hereupon ; in his returne homewards victoriouse , the fathers only went forth to meete him : the youth of Rome both then and ever after hated and abominated him . Before this we reade of Aulus Posthumius a famous dictator , of him Livy writes thus : Egregiae dictaturae tristem memoriam faciunt Livy . dec . 〈◊〉 lib. 4. qui silium ab Aulo Posthumio , qui occasione bene pugnandi captus , injussu discesserit praesidio , victorem securi percussum tradunt , nec libet credere : & argumento est quod imperia Manliana non Posthumiana appellata sint quam qui prior autor tam saevi exempli foret , occupaturus insignem titulum crudelitatis fuerit .

After this L. Papirius Cursor nothing inferiour in care of Martiall discipline to Manlius Torquatus , as whome the Romans had destinated as fit to oppose Alexander the greate , had he invaded Italia , in the like case pardoned Q Fabius , upon the intercession of the people ; who yet was no sonne of Papirius . Consider the case it selfe . No laws of men are so strict but may admit temperantum aliquod , because mans providence is so shallow , as cannot foresee all particular cases . Lex non cavet de particularibus . For a stranger to goe upon the walls of the Towne in some places hath bin Capitall , yet when the enimy hath bin in skalinge the walls , and a stranger seing it hath encouraged himselfe to advance , and beate downe the enimy , this fact of his hath bin deemed rather meritorious of reward then of punishment .

Manlius the young Gentleman was provoked by the proude speeches of Metuis the Captaine of the enimy . To indure his braving , had bin to suffer the reputation of cowardice , and enough to have discouraged his owne troupe & made his enimyes insolent . As Goliahs defying of Israel strooke feare and terrour into the hearts of the Isralites and lifted up the hearts of the Philistins .

Neither doe I comprehende how any ranke was broken or disordered by this single fight or any inconvenience might redound by this fact of his . But the end being victoriouse and all the damage redounding to the disgrace and dishonour of the enimy . I feare something els possessed the carnall heart of Manlius the Father besides care of Martiall discipline . Why might he not disdeyne that the glory of his sonne allready equalling the glory of his father , might shortly blemish it ? at the best a dogged and pertinaciouse adherence to the maintenance of his owne imperiouse course might quench all naturall affection in him . For could no other punishment serve the turne but death ?

And might not discipline be maintayned unlesse in so extraordinary a case , the Consulls sonne trasgressing , were adjudged to the same punishment that the basest cowarde deserved ? Observe what issue the like severity of Papirius had ; and whether it had not bin likely to have marred all , had not hee in time tempered it with mildnesse and gentlenesse . For the enimy understanding of such like strict commaundes , whensoever the Dictator was absent , then would they stirre most , knowing that the Roman Soldiers durst not stirre , yea the Levy . dec. 1 lib. 8. hearts of his owne Soldiers beganne to forsake them , that they had no courage to fight .

Yet consider how Papirius caryed himselfe towards a Captayne of Praeneste ( not his sonne ) and that when he had played the coward . Praenestinus Praetor per timorem segnuis ex subsidijs suos duxerat , in primam aciem , quem cum inambulans ante tabernaculum vocari jussisset , victorem expedire securim jussit . Ad quam vocem examine stante Praenestino . Agedum lictor , excide radicem hanc , inquam , incommodam ambulantibus : perfusumque ultimi supplicij metu , multa dicta , dimisit . By the way I cannot but take notice of an inconsideration if not altogether ridiculous passage of yours , as when you say of this Manlius , that the more desirous he was to make him like himselfe in religiouse observance of Martiall discipline , and practise of justice towards the enimies , the readier he was to doe justice upon him for doeing the contrary . Why was the cutting off of his head a fit course to make him like himselfe in religious observance of Martiall discipline , and practise of justice towards the enimy ? I professe , I see no reason for it , it might rather make him the moro desperate , because now he had no more heads to loose . Yet I confesse he taught him effectually herby never to spare any in the like transgression .

As for the rest , I esteeme it but frothe , I have no cause to trouble my selfe or others with any farther consideration therof .

3. God you say must enjoy libertie or priviledge of loving himselfe best . Your forme in expressing this I doe not so well like : For I had thought this had rather bin a necessity then a liberty ; And privilege is of signification too base to bee applyed unto God . For privileges are granted from superiors to inferiors . But who shall privilege God ? In a worde God loves himselfe only as the end of all other things , and all other thinges which he loves but as meanes tendinge to that end . For he made all things for himselfe ; and of Israel he professeth that he hath formed him also for himselfe . Here you conclude Es. 43. 21 ▪ that he loves equity and justice better then he doth any man ; but what meant you to leave out Mercy ? did that sticke in your teeth , especially considering that forthwith you acknowledge him to be the eternall patterne of mercy as well as of justice ? And if he be equity it selfe , is he not justice it selfe also ? And if he be justice it selfe , is he not mercy it selfe also seing you make him the eternall patterne of the one as well as of the other ? And give that as a reason why he must love justice better then any man ? Yet I no way like your divinity in this . For I doe not acknowledge the nature of God to be the patterne which we must imitate in the first place , but rather the law of God ; and we are to imitate his nature only in those things , the performance wherof is allowable by Gods law , God might allowe the Israelits in robbing the Egyptians , Abraham in sacrificing his sonne , Sampson in sacrificing himselfe ; we may not allowe any in the like : God hath power to expose men unto sinne , to harden mens hearts , we may not take any such courses ; but rather doe all we can to keepe our bretheren from sinne .

Now from your discourse it no more followeth that God cannot be unjustly mercyfull , then that he cannot be unmercifully just , especially towards those whom he loves more dearely then any man doth himselfe as you speake . And if you would be pleased to take notice by the way of the oracles of God , and not follow still the course of your owne inventions you might find that God hath mercy on whome he will , and hardneth whome he will . Yet is not he either unjustly mercyfull in the Rom. 9. 18 one , or unmercyfully just in the other ; Neyther should he be , though the case were altered , and he were mercyfull to those whome now he hardneth , and hardned those whome now he comiserateth satis contraria fata reponens .

But let us goe with you along the coast of Barbarie . Gods love ( you say ) extends it selfe unto our nature so polluted with corruption . It is true and that not only in respect of corruption by sinne orginall but by sinne actuall . For he gave his sonne to dy for us , when we were his enimyes , and when we were dead in sinne and walked after the Prince of the ayre , and fashions Rom. 5. of the world , he quickned us . Ephes. 2. 29. The effects of this love you say are limited towards men by the correspondency , which they hold or loose with that absolute goodnesse , or with those rules of equity , in which his will is to have man made like him . This manner of limitation is unsound , and fowly unsounde ; as that which apparantly excludeth our correspondency to Gods goodnesse , and unto Gods love , out of the number of the effects of Gods love ; as much as to say that faith and repentance , thankfulnesse and obedience are no effects of Gods love , but merely works of nature , as if it were not God that worketh in us both the will & the deede according to his good pleasure . Phil. 2. 13.

As if regeneration were but the imagination of a vayne thing ; For I presume , you will not say , it is in the power of man to regenerate himselfe . And how can it be a work of God if not an effect of his love , and correspondency unto Gods goodnesse you make to prevent the effects of Gods love . Agayne the effects of Gods love the Scripture teacheth us are limited according to the good pleasure of God , both as touching graces of edification ( for he distributes to every one as he will . 1. Cor. 12. ) and as touching the graces of sanctification . For he hath mercy on whome he will . Rom. 9. And according to his purpose and grace he hath saved us and called us not according to our works . 2 Tim. 1. 9. And of his owne will hath he begotten us , &c. There is a condition Iac. 〈◊〉 of morall goodnesse , which God doth accept to reward with glory ; but there is no condition of morall goodnesse which God doth accept to reward with grace : For then grace were of works , and consequently no more grace . And then God should call us accordinge to our works which he expresly denyeth . Tit. 3. 5. and 2 Tim. 1. 9. There is no condition of morall viciousnesse that excludes Gods mercy in calling men unto faith and salvation .

Austine coumpts it impiety and madnesse to thinke otherwise , as I have often alleaged him . Enchirid. 96. He calls some at the first houre of the day , some at the last . And what absurde conceyte is it to require some mitigation of sinne or morall good qualification to make correspondency unto mercy in pardoning sinne and curing it ? As no disease of the body is uncurable by God ; so no disease of the soule or simfull course is unpardonable or uncurable by the mercy of God the Father , the merits of God the sonne . For each are infinite ; but the sinnes of all the world are finite . God himselfe may limite the demonstration and exercise of his mercy as he thinks good . Now as touching the limitation hereof nothing is revealed unto us , but only this , that the sinne against the Holy Ghost shall not be pardoned and cured no small infidelity and impenitency .

All other limitations are merely revelations of flesh and blood , and the inventions of idle Braines ; that impugne the prerogative of Gods grace , and in the place thereof advance the operation of nature , as that which first commends us in some sort unto Gods grace ; you are apt to discourse of Gods inviting men unto God , and of the riches of his bounty that way ; but of Gods working men unto God , and of the riches of his bounty , that may never any Arminian or Pelagian spake lesse then you . Yet the despising of Gods goodnesse shewed eyther in his word or in his works shall indoubtedly increase mens condemnation . But God can breake of these their contemptiouse courses in whome he will , and when he will , and where he will , as Austine professeth with such confidence , as that he censureth him of impiety and dotery whosoever he be that denyeth it .

A silly course it is , to inferre that vicious courses doe exclude men from Gods mercy , because God hates filthinesse or uncleanesse . For God undoubtedly hates all manner of filthinesse and uncleanesse whether the measure of it be filled up or no ; For did he not hate Manasses his idolatry and his bloody courses , and his using them that were given to sorcery and witchcrast ? Yet all this excluded him not from the participation of Gods mercy . And if for this reason , to wit because God hates filthinesse , men are excluded from Gods favour , so as to be uncapable of his mercy ; then every man shoulde be a reprobate and incapable of mercy ; and abandoned as a vessel of wrath unto everlasting condemnation .

And you consider not , that to be uncapable of mercy is to be uncapable of Gods love ; even in your owne discourse ; whence it followeth , that God must after a certayne time cease to love them ; as in reason it should be acknowledged by you , according to the tenour of your opinion ; and that when the doore of repentance is shut upon them , as your selfe have phrasified it , most of all when God condemnes them to everlasting torments in hell fire , he must needs cease to love them . And consequently you must necessarily admit mutability in the nature of God , which is directly contrary to the perfection of God delivered unto us in holy Scripture . I the Lord am not changed and you sonnes of Iacob are not consumed . Mala. 3. 6. And with God is no variablenesse nor shadow of change . Iac. 1. 19. This rocke you have in your eye & labour to keepe your Tenet from dashing it selfe desperately against it . Wherin how well you have carryed your selfe we are to consider in the next place .

CHAP. XX.

Whilst God of a loving Father becomes a severe judge , there is no chang or alteration at all in God , but only in men and in theire actions . Gods will is allwayes fullfilled even in such as goe most against it . How it may stand with the justice of God to punish transgressours temporall with torments everlasting .

THe objection that by your Tenet the nature of God is made subject to change and alteration , your selfe proposed in the former chapter ; but you addresse your selfe to make answere therunto in this yet not without fetching a greate compasse which inclines rather to a worke of circumvention then of satisfaction . Love you say is the Mother of all Gods workes and the fertility of his power and essence ; that is the fruitfull Mother of all things , and the power and essence of God by love becomes the fruitfull Mother of all things . Yet to shew how apt you are to forget your selfe ( which usually falleth out when men discourse quicquid in buccam venerit ) in the 8. chap. and pag. 91. you told us as a quaint conceyte that we may conceave wisedome to be the Father and power the Mother of all Gods works of wonder ; and I thinke you accoumpt few or no works more wonderfull then the creation .

And yet that which you say here , I preferre before that which you had formerly expressed there ; because the love of God hath stricter sociation with the will of God then eyther wisedome or power . But you have not discovered unto us , if love be the Mother what is to be accoumpted the Father . Or if you referre this to the loving will and affection of God , why this should be accoumpted the Mother rather then the Father of the works of God .

Agayne we have earthly parents as Father and Mother , which are indewed with wills and loves and other affections , and it is out of all course to say that theire love or theire will is the Mother of theire children ; especially consideringe that will is found in the Father , as well as in the Mother , yea and love also ; if not in greater measure . But I deny not but that God made the world out of love ; but out of love to whome ? to the creature ? Nothing lesse I should thinke ( as before I have shewed ) but rather out of love to himselfe , as Prov. 16. 4. God made all things for himselfe . And greate reason , God who is the sovereigne Creator of all things , should be the supreame end of all things . But let this passe . Your next sentence is more serious and ponderous , but very preposterous , and unsound . First it containes a generall proposition with the reason of it ; and then a qualification or limitation thereof ( by way of exception ) unto a certayne time . The proposition is this : No part of our nature can be excluded from all fruits of his love . Now the fruits of Gods love you make to be not only grace and glory , but our temporall being also and the preservation therof . For you make creation to be a fruit of Gods love .

Now this proposition so generall to my understanding is utterly untrue . For not only God is not bound to give grace and glory unto any . ( For they are merely gratuita dona , and it is lawfull to doe what he will with his owne , in bestowing it on whome he will , and denyinge it to whome he will . And therefore the Apostle testifieth that He hath mercy on whome he will , and whome he will he hardneth . ) But more then this as God was not bound to create any , so neyther can any thing ( save his owne will ) binde him to preserve any thing in being . But as he deales with other creatures so could he deale with men , even take theire temporall being from them , without any purpose ever to restore it , and not only the being of theire bodyes , but of theire soules also , turning both into nothing . Yet thus could God deale with men and Angells were they never so innocent , never so holy as Arminius confesseth .

But let us consider the reasons wherupon you ground this . Now these are two , the one because God hath created our natures : Now the unsoundnesse of this reason appeares by this , that God hath created other things as well as man ; Yet who will conclude herehence , that God must needes preserve them , and not exclude them from this fruite of his love . Your other reason is because , God cannot change and this is as weake as the former . For like as God though at one time he gives us life , another time takes life from us ; yet all this is done by him without any change in himselfe , like as in course of nature , though he causeth changes and alterations in the seasons of the yeare in the wether , in the heavens , in the earth , in the Sea , in the states and Kingdoms of the World , and in the bodyes of all creatures , yet without any change at all in himselfe ; yea though he set an end to this visible World , this can inferre no variablenesse in God , so if he should take all manner of being from men and Angells , and so exclude them from all fruits of his love : Yet should all this come to passe without any shadow of change in God .

Yet you have a third reason , which is this ; Love is the nature of God as Creator : You could not be ignorant that God did freely create the World , and therfore that it was not naturall to God to create it ; therfore you say that Love is the nature of God as Creator , the sense and meaning whereof I comprehende not . And I have made it already appeare that though God creats a thing , yet is he not therby bound to preserve it any longer then he seeth good ; and what other sense you imply when you say , Love is Gods nature as a Creator , I discerne not . You make creation to be a fruite of Gods love ; it is very incongruous to say that this love of God , wherby he creats any thing belongs unto him as a Creator : But rather creation of things belongs unto him as he loves them . For fitter it is that the effect should be thus modified by the cause , then the cause by the effect in denominating any subject . Who ever sayd that a man was rationalis quatenus risibilis and not rather risibilis quatenus rationalis ?

But let us proceede to the limitation of this your proposition ; and that is this : No part of our nature can be excluded from all fruits of his love , untill the sinister use of that contingency wherwith he indued it , or the improvement of inclinations , naturally bent unto evill come to that hight , as to imply a contradiction for infinite justice or equity to vouchsafe them any favour . First touching your meaning in this , then touching the manner how you expresse this meaning ; your meaning in briefe is this . No part of our nature can be utterly excluded from all fruits of Gods love : untill men have filled up the measure of theire iniquity . Of this your opinion I have spoken often ; I hope it shall be sufficient now to consider the reason whereupon you ground it . And that is this , Such an hight of sinne implyeth a contradiction to infinite justice to vouchsafe them any favour .

Now of this proposition of yours I see no reason . Nay I seeme to observe manifest reason to the contrary . For justice consists in giving to every one his owne ; Now seeing the wages of any sinne is death even everlasting death ; Not to condemne him that hath deserved to be condemned , seemes as contradictory to justice as not to condemne him that is come to an hight of impiety .

And which is more , many thousand infants perish in Originall sinne , and yet we beleive that Manasses who unto Originall sinne added many abominable sinnes , was notwithstanding all this , saved ; and will you say , there was any contradiction unto Gods justice in all this ? And I wonder you so much beate upon the contradiction unto Gods justice and take no notice of Gods mercy , whereas we doe not consider the pardoning of sinnes as an act of Gods justice but rather as an act of his mercy : and without quest on it is not contradiction to Gods mercy to pardon any sinne .

And God is mercyfull as well as just ; and it is very absurd in my judgment to say that God in performing an act of mercy contradicts his justice , as well as to say that in performing an act of justice he contradicts his mercy . And the reason is because it is indifferent to God to exercise eyther his mercy in commiserating whome he will , or his justice in hardening whome he will . And therefore when the Apostle proposeth such an objection , against his former doctrine of election & reprobation as this ; What shall we say then , is there any injustice with God ? He answereth it by this , that God is free and hath a Rom. 9. 14 lawfull power to exercise mercy and compassion on whome he will . God forbid sayth he we should thinke so ; For he sayth to Moses , I will have mercy on him to whome I will shewe mercy , and will have compassion on him , on whome I will have compassion . v. 15.

And yet I pray consider , what colour of contradiction to Gods justice in pardoning the sinnes of them , be they never so many never so fowle ; for whome the sonne of God ( as you say ) hath suffered the sorrowes of death , and therby made full satisfaction for all theire sinnes ; unlesse you will say , that Christ dyed to make satisfaction for originall sinne only and not for sinnes actuall , or for some of theire actuall sinnes and not for all ; to which strange and uncouth opinion : You seeme to incline in the end of your 15. Chapter , where you say , that Christ only receaved our infirmities and originall disease , and not the contempt of him and his law . I have cause to suspect that you concurre with Arminians in maintayning , that all Infants , the very children of Pagans , Turkes and Saracens that perish in theire infancy are saved . For how can it be conceaved that any improvement of evill inclinations is made in them unto such an hight as that it should imply contradiction to Gods justice , to shew them any favour ?

And where such an hight of impiety is not , you professe they cannot be excluded from all fruits of his love . Yet I confesse theire soules have a being and that eternall ; and if this be a fruit of Gods love , then though the hight of impiety be never so greate , yet is no man or devill excluded from this fruite of Gods love : For they shall continue for ever and that to theire everlasting wo. As touching your manner of expressing your meaning , this increase of sinne , you call the sinister use of contingency that God hath bestowed upon them , your meaning must be the sinister use of the liberty of theire wills : which in your phrase is the sinister use of contingency , wherof I am perswaded you can give no example .

And by the way I observe you suppose in every naturall man , a power to use the liberty of his will , eyther will or ill . I had thought and doe still thinke there is no power in carnall man to use theire naturall liberty well , but only to use it either in this or that subject , but so as still the use of it shall be evill . For the affection of the flesh is not subject to the law of God nor can be , sayth the Apostle , and every man is dead in sinne till Rom. 8. 7. God quickneth him . Ephesi. 2. 2. And a dead man can performe no action of life naturall , if dead naturally , no action of life spirituall , if dead spiritually : But whether naturall inclinations unto evill may be thus farre improved in the children , by theire Forefathers on no , ( you say ) is disputable but in another place : that is , it is a disputable question , whether children may not by the sinnes of theire Father be so farre corrupt , that it implyeth contradiction to Gods justice to shew them any favour .

You might as well say it is a disputable question whether there be any God or no ; For that there should be a God , and yet not able to cure the naturall corruption wherein any man is borne is contradiction . And if he were , then sure he were able to shew them no small favour . And as for contradictions to Gods justice , there is so litle colour herof in the saving of Infants , that on the contrary , there is nothing ( the condemnation of the Sonne of God alone excepted ) wherin the justice of God is more obscure , then in the condemnation of Infants . I thinke you have litle minde to come to an accoumpt , how you doe accommodate this your doctrine unto Infants ; yet you must be called hereunto whether you will or no , unlesse you clippe the wings of your generall propositions , as when you say : None can be excluded from the fruits of Gods love untill the improvement of inclinations naturally bent to evill come to that hight of impiety as to imply a contradiction for infinite justice or equity to vouchsafe them any favour . Yet by the way you put in an exception concerning Infants , and that is in case there be a neglect of duties , to be performed to them by theire Elders ; why doe you not speake plainly and say , saving in case they are not baptized ? And what thinke you in this case ? Are they damned ? I cannot beleive you thinke so ; yet the face of your discourse lookes this way . I say I cannot beleive it ; and that for two reasons .

The one is , because the tenour of your tenet caryeth you rather to maintayne with the Arminians , that all children dying in theire Infancy though they dye without the Church , are saved . My second reason is , because herein you should directly contradict the discourse Kinge Iames had with certaine Divines a litle before his death , and his apparent profession to the contrary ; not as his private opinion , but as the opinion generally of our Divines , whome he had learned in his younger dayes to have censured Austine for his opinion to the contrary , as one that was Durus Pater Infantum . Now I am so well perswaded of you , that I thinke you would not willingly enter upon so flat a contradiction to such a discourse of Kinge Iames in the dayes of Kinge Charles , and that so soone after his death .

If you write only concerning men of ripe yeares , you must have a care to limit your propositions accordingly , and not to give them longer wings then is fitt .

In the next place you touch upon a distinction much talked of , and as much advanced by some as cryed downe by others . Yet both Scotus and Durandus give a tolerable , and Aquinas with the Dominicans after him , an orthodoxe interpretation therof , though neyther suitable to the minde of Damascen commonly reputed the Father of it . Yet looke what in this kind is wanting in them is supplyed by Arminiensis , who gives both an orthodoxe construction thereof , and that also in conformity to the opinion of Damascene , of whose text he gives a very sound and orthodoxe interpretation and the more orthodoxe the more opposite to theire constructions , who with greate cry of words draw it to the countenancing of theire Arminian Tenets without cause , Love you say is the fruite of Gods antecedent will , wrath and severity are the proper effects of his consequent will . Fruite and effect you make all one ( as with good reason you may . )

Now what , I pray you , is this effect which you call love ? You seeme to intimate , that they are the effects of creation , as when you say , Every particular faculty of soule or body is a pledge undoubted of Gods love . Yet faculties of soules and bodyes are found in beasts , but Gods antecedent will in Damascene is referred wholly unto men . Neyther doth Damascene at all referre it to the worke of creation ; but makes it to be that wherby God will have all to be saved .

Liberty of will is proper to man in distinction from beasts , but who seeth not that this indifferently makes him obnoxius unto damnation as well as capable of salvation ? Then when you say wrath and severity is the effect of Gods consequent will , what doe you meane by wrath ? Is it eyther a resolution to take vengeance , or the execution of vengeance it selfe ? I think you take it for the execution of vengeance it selfe . Now there is an execution of reward also properly opposite unto this which whether it be the same love you speake of , it became you to expresse so much , or whether you conceave it to be different , yet it were fit you should take notice of it , and acknowledge that this is a fruite of Gods consequent will , as well as wrath ; that as effectually presupposing obedience , as this disobedience : and that love in rewarding is every way as infallibly consequent to the obeying of Gods will revealed , as wrath is of our neglecting and despising it . A full explication of this distinction you promise in good time , how well you performe it we may in good time consider with Gods helpe .

Next you enter upon another forme of the same distinction ( as you pretend ) and you suffer it to fly with one winge ; For you talke of Gods absolute will , ( which you seeme to confound with Gods antecedent will ) but as touching the member congruously opposite , you leave us to seeke for that . But as it is we are to consider it ; Gods absolute will was ( you say ) to have men capable of Heaven and Hell , of joyes and miseryes immortall . This cannot be understoode of Gods consequent will ; for this absolute will is indifferent to end in the bestowing of reward or punishment , and is immediately terminated only in making man capable of eyther ; but his consequent will is not so indifferent . For the only effect thereof you mention to be wrath and severity , and this presupposeth rather then causeth capablenesse .

Neyther can this absolute will be the antecedent will of God according to Damascens meaning . For the antecedent will in Damascene , is only referred to the will of God , wherby he wills mans salvation : but this absolute will is ( you say ) to have men capable of Heaven and Hell . To helpe this you tell us : That this absolute will ( whose possible objects are two ) is in the first place set on mans eternall joy . But you doe not proceede to shew on what it is set in the next place , as if by such like incongrueties you desired rather to confounde your reader , then to satisfie him .

Yet by the tenour of your discourse you leave it to us to guesse , that in the second place to witt upon the dispising of Gods love , it is set upon a mans damnation . So that by this your doctrine , both Gods antecedent will and consequent will is all one , and that is Gods absolute will . But no such thinge is founde in Damascene , from whome such as you are , doe usually take this distinction of will antecedent in God , and will consequent : And indeed you doe well to make one as absolute as another ; for like as wrath , the fruite of this will of God in the second place ( as you imply ) hath not its course but upon presupposition of disobedience ; so in like manner , the proper opposite to wrath on the other side the fruite of this will of God in the first place , hath not its course but upon presupposition of obedience .

And that you may know what this fruite I speake of is ; I say as wrath is taken for the execution of vengeance ; so the proper opposite herunto must be love as it is taken for the execution of reward ; And let any man judge whether this doth not every way presuppose obedience , as well as the other presupposeth disobedience . And thus shall God as truly be sayed absolutely to wish a mans damnation as his salvation , and no more conditionally will the one then the other . And like as if God be absolutely sayd to will a mans salvation , it shall not herhence follow he shall so will it , as to contradict himselfe by frustrating the contrary possibilitie , which unto man he had appointed : so though God be sayd absolutely to will a mans damnation ; yet it will not follow that God doth so will it as to contradict himselfe by frustrating the contrary possibility which unto man he had appointed : Only it is absurd to call this possibility a contrary possibility . It is I confesse a possibility to the contrary , but not a contrary possibility . Like as liberty unto good and liberty unto evill are liberties unto things contrary in the way of manners : but yet they are no contrary liberties ; so the possibilities of obtaining salvation or damnation , which are consequent upon the use of this liberty , though they are possibilities to contrary things , yet are they not contrary possibilities . And as Gods anger signifying the execution of vengeance doth never rise up , but upon the dispising of his love alluringe unto good ; so Gods love signifying the execution of reward , doth never rise up , but upon the embracing of his love alluring unto good .

But if you take Gods wrath for his will to punish . I say that looke by what reason Gods wrath , as it signifies his will to punish , doth not arise in God but upon foresight of mans disobedience ; in like sort the love of God , as it signifieth his will to reward , doth never arise in God but upon foresight of his obedience . And looke in what congruity Gods will to punish for sinne deserves to be called reprobation : in the same measure of congruity Gods will to reward for obedience , is to be called Election , if so be we will make Election and reprobation congruously opposite , as it is fit we should . Neyther can it be avoyded , but that the turning of tender love and compassion into severity and wrath must imply manifestly an extreame change in God . For like as when mans obedience is turned into disobedience , this cannot be without change ; so when Gods fervent love is turned into severe wrath , this cannot be possibly without change . Which I further proove a priori thus , where that which was , ceaseth to be , and that which formerly was not , beginneth to be , there must needs be a chang , and that more wayes then one : But where tender love is turned into severe wrath and that inexorable ( as before you have expressed ) there that which was , ceaseth to be , and that which was not , beginnes to be : therfore there must needs be change , and that more wayes then one , to wit a change from some thing , and a change into another thing .

The minor is prooved ; For if the same tender love did still continue , it could not be sayd to be turned into wrath , but rather it should be sayd to consist with wrath . Likewise wrath formerly was not in God ; for as much as you make it arise out of the ashes of his love despised , wherby that phrase ( the ashes of Gods love ) doth manifestly argue that you will have Gods love as it were consumed to ashes ; therefore it must needs cease towards those that have thus dispised it .

Neither is it true but a bold affirmation without all truth , to say that the changs is wholly seated in mans deviation , which you avouch without any colour of proofe : But I have allready prooved that this Tenet of yours maintaynes a change in God , unavoydable by all the wit of man .

It seemes you would reason thus , the cause why the love of God is turned into wrath , is wholy seated in man ; therefore the change is onely in man . But this is so inconsequent that it seemes common modestie would not suffer you expresly to insist upon it .

Though we sinne , yet can we not make any change in God ; I the Lord am not changed : therfore yee Sonnes of Iacob are not Mala. 3. 6. consumed . To touch this by the way ; Adam I confesse deviated from the good course of obedience , which he might have taken : but I deny that any naturall man hath liberty , to take any good course of obedience , till God hath renewed him ; yet such Pelagian acknowledgements are so frequent in your discourse , that they are found in every hedge .

2. The Sunne indeed never changeth with the Moone , nor without the Moone , saving from place to place , and so he never changeth , one time only excepted in the dayes of Iosuah .

But what meane you to say , that it is one & the same heate , that is with us in the spring time , and with them that travaile in the sandes of Affricke ? Can it be one and the same accident in so not different only but distracted subjects . Yet it is one in kinde but not in degree ; like as grace and glory in the Saints of God is the same kinde though different in degree ; and produced in them all by one and the same love of God , that neyther differs in kinde nor in degree . The same heate of the Sunne enflames matter capable of cumbustion not other matter . So God the same and without all change doth refresh the good , and consume the wicked . We nothing doubt of this ; but then we must not say , his love is turned into wrath . For like as the heate of the Sunne could not be turned into colde without change in the Sunne ; so neyther could Gods love be turned into wrath without alteration in God himselfe : God consumes the wicked , but not by love . God saves his Elect , but not by wrath ; Yet his will is one and the same in both , though the effects be different , and no marvnile ; For his will is free , as wherby he hath mercy on whom he will and whome he will he hardneth ; and as the one tends to the salvation of some , so the other tends to the condemnation of others .

It is true , there is none but hath bin partaker of Gods blessings one way or other . It is true , the measure of his wrath is equall to the riches of his bounty despised thus farre . The more riches of his bounty we dispise , the greater will by the measure of his wrath , of we continue in impenitency . Yet there is a subordinate difference , according as the same riches of Gods bounty , may be in greater measure despised by one then by another . You are pleased needlesly to phrasifie this over and over agayne insteede of affoording better matter to satisfie your reader ; but you are very liberall of words . But by the way you foist in a false dye as thinking , that in the multitude of wordes it might not be perceaved , as truly I was like to have overslipped it . As when you say , the only rule for measuring sinne or transgression right , must be taken from the degrees of mans opposition to Gods delight or pleasure in his salvation . Wherein you manifestly contradict your selfe ; For before you sayd it was to be taken from the degrees of mercy despised ; But now you say it is only to be taken from the degrees of mans despising it . Which indeede is the righter of the two . So then the measure of Iudas his sinne is to be taken from the degrees of his opposition unto grace ; which you in a strange manner expresse by the delight that God doth take in his salvation ; Why what meane you by this ? Is Iudas saved thinke you or shall any reprobate be saved and not damned rather ? what mooved you then to talke of Gods delight in the salvation of them , that are or shall be damned ?

Is it possible that God can take delight in that which never was , nor is , not ever shall be ? You may as well say that God takes delight in a multitude of other worlds of men and Angells , which were and are possible .

Yet as if this conceyte of yours were a principle of credite you tell us demurely , that not a dramme of Gods delight or pleasure can be abated not a scruple of his will , but must be accomplished , to wit of that delight in Iudas his salvation , which you doe very gravely attribute unto God , and so consequently , Gods will you speake of , which must be accomplished , is his will of Iudas his salvation .

And this must be accomplished , & indeede so it had neede , before God can take any delight and pleasure in it . But how or when shall Gods will of Iudas his salvation be accomplished ? Will you give me leave to reade this riddle out of your intimations ? You seeme to mee to imply that this will of God is accomplished in Iudas his damnation . Because looke in what measure of love , God would have saved him , in such a measure of wrath , he doth damne him and so accordingly , looke in what measure , Gods delight would have bin in Iudas his salvation had he bin saved ; in the same measure God doth delight in his damnation he being damned . Vous avez ; thus have you the interpretation of this riddle .

And by the same reason , you may proceede to make other riddles , and aske how is the will of God as touching Peters damnation , and Gods delight and pleasure therin accomplished to every dramme and scruple ; and answere that this is accomplished in his salvation . For looke in what measure God would have delighted in his damnation had he bin damned ; in the same measure God now delights in his salvation , he being saved .

And thus the delight and pleasure that any man takes in his childes salvation may be sayd to be accomplished in the delight and pleasure , which he shall take in his childes condemnation . For the Saints shall judge the World , even the Godly Father joyne with Christ in pronouncing the sentence 2 Cor. 6. of condemnation upon his ungodly Sonne , &c. God delights in our obedience and in our repentance when it is ; but where there is no repentance or obedience how is it probable he or any should delight in that which is not . 1 Sam. 15. 22. Hath the Lord as greate pleasure in burnt-offrings and sacrifices as when the voyce of the Lord is obeyed ? Perhapps you will say , yet his will is that all should repent ; I answere his will commanding , is so to all that heare it ; but his will decreeing is not that all shall repent that are commaunded to repent . For then all should repent : To say , that God will have any thing come to passe which yet never comes to passe , Austine hath long agoe professed to be as good as to deny Gods omnipotency . And whereas repentance is the gift of God , as the Scripture plainly testifieth , it is apparent that God doth not give repentance Act. 11. 1● . 2 Tim. 2. last . unto all , and therefore neyther did he will or determine to give repentance unto all . God is sayd to love persons in as much as he willeth good things unto them . God may be sayd to love things morall as repentance and obedience , in as much as he will reward persons for theire repentance and obedience .

Neyther of these loves is accommodable to punishment , no more then unto reward . Yet looke in what respect God may be sayd to love the one , so may he be sayd to love the other ; And the Apostle professeth of himselfe , and his fellows that they were the good savour of the Lord even in them that perish . And every man knoweth reward to be a fruite of justice 2 Cor. 2● remunerative , as well as punishment is of justice vindicative ; and each presupposeth the will of God , as well one as the other . For God is not bound to punish sinne , he may pardon it . Nay how is he not bound to pardon all sinne , of all men , if so be Christ hath made satisfaction for the sinnes of all ?

And with these Tenets of yours you are growne so farre in love , that because some schoole poynts doe not beare such faire wether towards them as might be wished ; you woulde put the maintayners of them upon some better explication of such Tenets . The Tenet is , that God doth punish sinners in the life to come citra condignum . The Moderne divines ( as it seemes ) by your margent are Calvin & Zanchy that maintayne this ; against whom you oppose Coppenius , a Lutheran I guesse , I doe not thinke he is a Papist . Sure I am , Bradwardine and Gerson maintayne the same ; and as I remenber it is And Aquinas 1. 9. 21. Art. q. ad . 〈◊〉 most generally receaved amongst the Schoolemen . And as for Coppenius his reasons ; when he demaunds whether God doth remit ought for Christs satisfaction or no : I answere it is not for Christs satisfaction ; but merely according to the good pleasure of his owne will .

And when he urgeth that of Iames , Iudgement mercylesse shall be to him that sheweth no mercy : I answere that like as when 2 Tim. 〈◊〉 the Apostle prayeth for Onesiphorus that he may find mercy at that day , his meaning can be no other then this , that his sinnes might be pardoned and his soule saved : so likewise in just proportion they may be sayd to tast of judgement mercylesse , whose sinners are not pardoned and whose soules are not saved . As for your reason it is grounded merely upon a fiction of your owne , that subjecteth the delight of God unto degrees , ( whereas his simplicitie freeth him as well from composition of degrees , as from any other kind of composition , ) as also unto change even there where you undertake to cleere God from change : If Iudas had bin saved and Peter damned , God had still bin the same and no other then now he is , as touching will and delight , and every thinge that is in God . But by the way let me tell you , you corrupt the state of the question in supposing that by this Tenet , which you dislike , the punishment of reprobation is lesse then divine justice exacts . For they maintayne no such thing , but rather the contrary that no degree of punishment is exacted by any justice in God , but left indifferent to the determination of Gods will ; And therefore Bradwardine distinguisseth betweene meritum actuale and meritum potentiale . Meritum actuale is in reference Bradward . lib. cap. 39. pag. 360. to such a degree of punishment or reward , which the will of God hath determined .

But meritum potentiale is in reference to any degree of reward or punishment which God might have determined . And Gerson professeth that when a sinne is committed , it is merely in the good pleasure of God to inflict what kinde or Gers. de vita spiritualli anima lect. 1. Coroll. 8. degree of punishment he will .

2. Your text is to proove that Gods nature admitteth no change , albeit of a loveing Father he becomes a severe judge ; albeit his tender love be turned into wrath . And for proofe of this you thinke it enough to say that the change is in man : and that Gods wrath kindles not but out of the ashes of his love despised . To this you take on an other poynt ( nothing at all to the purpose ) that Gods wrath is in proportion to mens sinnes , neyther lesse nor more ; and this you prosequu●e a whole leafe and more , that what you want of solid answere , you may supply by silling mens eyes with an idle discourse . Well we have considered what your discourse hath bin on the by , touching this , that mens punishments are not lesse then theire deserts . Now let us consider your following extravagancy , in shewing that mens punishments are not more then theire deserts .

And here you tell us that to thinke God should punish sinne , unlesse it were truly against his will , or any sinne more deeply then it is against his will and pleasure is one of those 3. grosse transformations of the divine nature which Saint Austine refutes . For thus to doe , is neyther incident to the divine nature , nor to any other imaginable . I would we were worthy to know 3. things . First who they are whom you oppose in this : Secondly what those 3. so grosse transformations are , which you speake of out of Austine . Thirdly , to what end tends all this , on which you spend so many words .

But to take it as we find it . No Christian I think ever doubted , but that all sinne is 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , a transgression of Gods law , & accordingly contrary to the commaundment of God , which is usually called the will of God . But that any sinne should be committed contrary to the will of God , as it is taken for the decree and determination of God , I had thought no sober man would have affirmed . Austine I am sure plainly professeth that Non aliquid sit nisi omnipotens feri velit , vel sinendo ut fiat vel ipse faciendo . And albeit Aquinas seemes concealedly Enchirid. cap. 95. to oppose Austine in this in q. 9. 19. art. 9. Yet notwithstanding concludeth thus : Deus igitur neque vult mala fieri , neque vult mala non fieri , sed vult permittere mala fieri : Ibid. ad tertium . Yet I willingly graunt that every sinne is against Gods will and pleasure , as it signifieth his pleasure what shall be our dutie to doe ; which is nothing els but his commaundment . And it is as true that herein are no degrees , every sinne is equally against the commaundments of God .

And the will and pleasure of God whereby he will have this or that to be our duty to doe or leave undone , hath no degrees . For Gods simplicity freeth him as well from composition of degrees as from any other composition . But yet some transgressions are greater then others in as much as God may be more or lesse wronged by us , or our selves , or our brethren . It is neyther incident to the divine nature nor to the humane , to punish any more then it is ones will and pleasure to punish . But to a man it is incident to punish for those crimes wherein themselves take delight . For a man may be condemned and punished for adultery by them who are adulterers themselves ; as appeares in those that brought unto our Saviour a Woman taken in adultery . For when our Saviour sayd . Let him that is amoungst you without sinne cast the first stone at her , the text sayth herupon being accused by theire owne conscience , Iohn . 8. they went out one by one beginning at the eldest , even to the last . Iohn . 8. 7. Wherfore you doe overlash in not contenting your selfe to affirme this of the divine nature , but extending it to every nature imaginable .

Agayne , what meane you to call that a way wardnesse of men , whereof you professe the humane nature is uncapable ; as namely to be offended at that which doth not offend them ? What is a wilde manner of discourse , if this be not ? Nothing inferiour in absurdity is that which followeth , as when you say , that To punish any which doe not contradict theire wills , is an injustice scarce incident to the inhabitans of Hell . If the Divills punish any , as you say they doe ; doe they punish them for sins committed in contradiction to theire wills ? And how many Magistrates doe punish even such sinnes , wherof themselves are guilty ? They are bound by law to punish profane swearers , to punish drunckerds ; is it necessary that every such Magistrat should be free from such sinnes themselves ? But the Divills themselves you say doe not vexe the wicked but the Godly ; this being a most absurde conceyte at first sight , you have taken a course to charme the absurdity of it by adding , concerning the wicked . Till Gods justice overtake them ; might you not as well adde concerning the Godly , Till Gods will and pleasure is , and so farre as his pleasure is , the Divill shall vexe them ; as appeares in the example of Iob ? But ordinarily in the course of Gods providence ; who are more vexed by the Divill , the godly or the wicked rather ?

Now because it it apparent that in your opinion the Divill torments infernally the damned and hath no power over the Saints of God ; though they are more prone to vexe the godly then the wicked as you thinke : therefore you put your selfe to devise a reason why the Divills torment the damned , wheras the sinnes of the damned men were committed only in following the will of the Divill too much .

But the reason you give is of the wildest and most contradictious nature that ever any I thinke was heard of . For the reason you give is this : Therfore the Divills cease not to torment them , because they can find no ease in tormenting them : Whereas if they could finde any case in tormenting them , then ( you say ) they would be lesse displeased with them , and consequently torment them lesse ; which if it were true the Divills should be as arrant fooles as ever lived ; as namely in ceasing to doe that , by the doing whereof they should finde ease , by this supposition of yours .

And in the meane time you represent unto as a proper modell of Gods providence , while you conceave , the tormenting of the damned to be put over by God to the will of the Divill ; as if the dispensation of the degrees of punishment , therby to justifie Gods proceeding , were remitted to the discretion and equity of those Angells of darkenesse . And who I pray shall be the dispenser of that punishment , that in justice belongs to the Divills themselves ? Yet as if you had performed some greate exployte against some body , you demaunde bravely ; Whether they did not rather dreame then thinke of God , that some times write , as if it were not as much against Gods will , to have men dye , as it is against mans will to suffer death . In writing this , you thinke , they did rather dreame then thinke on God in writing of the former , sure I am you did if not dreame yet thinke of the Divill .

But which writing yours or theirs , be like unto a sicke mans dreame , let not the indifferent only , but the unindifferent also judge . For you show as litle sobriety in the impugning of these , in theire writing concerning the will of God , then in inventing your former fancies concerning the Divill . Is it not by the will of God appoynted that all must dye ? And is it probable then , it should be against Gods will that any should dye ? O but you speake belike of the second death , I answere ; Is it not as well appoynted by the will of God that all that dye the first death in sinne , shall dye the second death of everlasting sorrow ; as it is appoynted by the will of God that all shall dye the first death ? And will it not by the same reason follow ; that looke in what sense it is impossible that any should dye the first death against the will of God , in the same sence it is impossible that any should dye the second death against the will of God ? and if they suffered death ( as you say ) to this end , that Gods will may be fullfilled in theire suffering ; how is it possible that this theire suffering of death should be against the will of God ? which yet you boldly affirm and that with such confidence as to breake out into a censure of them that thinke the contrary , as if they did rather dreame then thinke the contrary .

And yet when you breake forth in avouching manifest contradiction , would you have your reader conceave your selfe to be in a sober discourse waking ? or in a dreame sleeping ? Yet this is usuall in your writings .

4. The mayne poynt proposed : ( to wit how God without change of a loving Father becomes a severe judge ) you dispatched in a few words saying , the change is wholly in man ; and therin giveing us your word for it ; and afterwards served your selfe with certayne illustrations nothing to the purpose . And to refresh your spirits and get some breath you turned aside , to the consideration of the proportion of mens punishments to theire sinnes ; poynts merely extravagant . And now you take liberty to maintayne your extravagant discourse by inquiring , how it stands with Gods justice to inflict eternall punishments for temporall sinnes . We must be content to follow you in your wilde goose race ; For seeing we are in , we must goe thorough and get out as we can . Yet you acknowledge the doubt proposed nothing pertinent ; but to make matter of farther discourse you tell us , it were pertinent , if the immortall happinesse wherunto the riches of Gods bounty did dayly leade them here on earth , had not farther exceeded the pleasure of this life , then the paynes of Hell doe those grievances which caused them to murmur against theire heavenly Father . You are very bold to acknowledge , God to be the heavenly Father of the reprobates . Whereas the Apostle professeth that we are all the children of God by faith in Christ Iesus . Gal. 3. 25. And if sonnes then heyres even heyrs of God and coheyres with Christ . Rom. 8. Much more bold , if because our Saviour Christ exhorts the Apostles to be like theire heavenly Father , therfore you will acknowledge him the heavenly Father , even of reprobates also .

This is by the way , I come to the maine : and say first ; were it so as you speake , yet this doubt were nothing pertinent to this place , of cleering God from innovation and change of nature , as often as his tender love is turned into feirce wrath . Secondly , your argument contracted being this . Immortall happinesse doth more exceede the pleasures of this life , then the pains of Hell exceede the grievances of this life : therfore it is impertinent to make a doubt how Gods justice doth appeare in inflicting eternall punishment for temporall sinne . I see no just consequence at all in this . I will drawe it to the best forme I can devise , in congruity to your meaning which I desire to picke out as well as I can . And that is this ; Theire obedience should be rewarded with infinite joy : therefore theire obedience may be justly punished with infinite sorrow : and no doubt is to be made hereof . And this I confesse is more suitable , speaking of the protension & duration of each then of theire intension as you doe . For though the joyes of Heaven were never so greate beyond the degree of sorrows of Hell .

Yet if they were not everlasting the comparison would not hold . Because there could be but a finite difference betweene theire intensions ; for joys of man cannot be infinite in degree . But if the one were everlasting the other not ; there should be an infinite difference in this . And albeit the joys of Heaven were but of equall degree , in proportion to the sorrows of bell ; Yet the argument would every whit proceede as well upon supposall of inequality , and that of exuberancy on the part of joyes .

Now I will shew , what exception may be taken against this . First no laws of the World ( the execution whereof are reputed just ) doe or can proceede after any such proportion ? Let a man take a purse upon the high way , or kill a man he shall dye for it ; Let him give tenn times as much to the poore ; let him save ten mens lives , they neyther doe , nor can reward , in proportion to the punishment ; Let the greatest honour or any other kinde of rewards be heaped upon him ; all are inferiour to his life . For all that ever a man hath , he will give for his life .

But then you will say , if it be just with man , to punish with Iob. 1. death ; though they cannot possibly administer rewards in any proportion therunto ; how much more is it just with God , to punish with eternall death , seeing be can and will reward obediency with eternall life ? And I nothing doubt but that it is just ; but the question is wherin consisteth this justice ? For it seemes that justice in this kinde should stand in reference to the worke , and not be measured by any aliene consideration . Especially considering that the question may be revived on the part of the reward . For how stands it with justice to reward with everlasting blisse a temporall obedience , so that still we shall be to seeke of the right measure of justice in this kinde .

Agayne , if a Master shall say unto a servant ; doe such a thing and I will give thee an hundred pound ; it will not herehence follow , that for his disobedience the Master may make him pay an hundred pound . And the reason is because it is manifest , that like as a man may give what he will freely ; so he may reward as liberally as he will . But it is not so manifest that God himselfe mai doe what evill he will unto his creature , and accordingly afflict what punishment he will for the transgression of his creature .

And therefore the reason that you give for justifying God in this is unsound ; and you seeme to be sensible of it , when you desire to helpe your selfe with the consideration of mens multiplyed contempts of grace , all which neverthelesse doe make up but a short continuance in sinne . Besides that , this consideration hath no place in such infants as perish in originall sinne . You cannot find any neglect in them , much lesse often , and yet to say , and barely to say That often and perpetuall neglects turnes slames of eternall love into an eternall consuming fire , is to please your selfe in your own dictates , but to proove nothing . The same song you sing still ; when you tell us , the oftner God pardons a man , the greater is his wrath against impenitency ; save that the prosequution of it is more absurd then the former ; For it hath reference rather to the intention of his wrath , which is greater or lesse according to the qualities of mens sinnes , not to the protension and duration of it , which is equall to all .

But by the way , where I pray doth it appeare , that God doth often pardon the sinnes of reprobates or that he doth at all pardon them ? Doth God pardon any sinnes without repentance ? Or are the reprobates at any time brought by God unto repentance ? I am sure Austine professeth the contrary , where he saith , Istorum neminem adducit Deus ad salubrem spiritualemque Contra. I●lia . Pelag. lib. 5. cap. 4. poenitentiam , qua homo reconciliatur Deo in Christo , sive illis ampliorum patientiam sive non imparem praebeat . But to returne to the poynt ; with farre more reason doe they discourse , that considering the infinite nature of God against whom sinne is committed , doe therhence inferre the desert of infinite punishment , and because a creature being but finite is not capable of infinite punishment in intention , therfore make him liable to infinite punishment in duration . Though I well know also , this is excepted against ; and therfore Miranrandula whom you mention makes choyce to reply on this , that as many as dye in sinne , theire sinnes , being never broken of , continue with them in infinitum , and therfore doe justly expose them to infinite punishment in duration .

Yet I very well consider what just exceptions may be taken against this also , and the lesse we can satisfie our selves in the reason herof , the more cause have we to referre all to the will and pleasure of God ; untill such time as the wonderfull wisedom and congruity of his actions shall be more clearly discovered unto us .

5. As for Lactantius I am not apt to quarrell with him about any incommodious speeches ; but willing to accept any convenient interpretation of them ; In anger , as it is in man , we all know there is something materiall as the kindling of the blood about the heart , and something formall , which is the desire of revenge .

But as diverse other passions doe include imperfection in the very formall part of them , so doth anger , for it supposeth griefe : Yet some passions in the formall part of them imply no imperfection as love and joy . And accordingly the rule that Aquinas gives is this : Cum nihil horum Deo conveniat secundum illud quod est naturale in eis : illaque imperfectionem important ; etiam formaliter Deo convenire non possunt nisi metaphoricè propter similitudinem effectus : Quae autem imperfectionem non important de Deo propriè dicuntur ut Amor & Ga●dium , tamen sine passione , ut dictum est : 1. q. 20. art. 1. ad 2. And in another place , Ira non dicitur in Deo secundom passionem animi , sed secundum judicium justitiae : prout vult vindicta facere de peccato . 12. q. 47. art. 1. ad . 1. God you say is more deeply displeased with sinne then man , as if Gods displeasure and mans differed only in degree , and not rather toto genere .

Neyther are there any degrees of displeasure at all in God properly , but attribuuntur Deo secundum similitudinem effectus , as anger is , when God punisheth ; so he shewes a grenter anger when he punisheth more severely , and a lesse anger , when he punisheth Iesse severely . You make God unchangeable in worde yet not so allwayes neyther , as where you discoursed of an impotent immutability . But if you maintayne that God did for a time will the salvation of any man before he had filled up the measure of his iniquity , and not afterwards : or that his tender love is turned into severe wrath , it cannot be avoyded but you must make change and innovation in the nature of God .

6. It is true that love includes no imperfection in it , as touching the formall part therof , unlesse it be considered as a passion , but anger doth , in as much as it supposeth griefe . But take love as it signifieth a will to doe good , and anger as it signifeth a will to take vengeance on them that doe evill ; and the one is as naturall unto God as the other . The truth is , neither of them naturall , but free ; Gods love to himselfe is : naturall and nessary , but his love to his creatures is not , no more then his mercy , and he hath mercy on whom he will . He is neyther tyed by any naturall inclination to make the World , nor being made , is he bound to maintayne it , but as he made it according to the good pleasure of his will , so he doth maintayne it . Every love of God to his creatures is not suitably opposite to his anger . 〈◊〉 ●he anger of God being the will of punishing , nothinge is congruously opposite herunto but his love , as it signifieth the will of rewarding , and rewarding presupposeth obedience , as well as punishing presupposeth disobedience ; but the will of doing the one or the other presupposeth neither .

You might as well say that justice is not so naturall to God as mercy ; and I wonder at your unreasonable declination of this comparison in this place ; wheras in other places you insist so much on Gods justice , as to take litle or no notice of his mercy . Yet if it be true , as you have hertofore discoursed , that there is a justice before the will of God , by which the will of God is ordered ; how can you make that doctrine conformable unto this ? It is true , God condemnes no man but for sinne ; and it is as true that God rewards no man but for obedience ; only here is the difference . The best obedience of mans is no meritorious cause of his salvation , but only disposing therto : but mans disobedience is not only a disposing cause , but meritorious of his condemnation .

It is untrue that compassion come naturally from God ; it comes freely ●so doth punishment also , not naturally , much lesse unnaturally , but freely : For he could pardon sinne in allof it pleased him , and doth pardon it in all his elect . 〈◊〉 God when he punisheth , relinquisheth the exercise of his mercyfull nature , but undoubtedly he exerciseth his vindicative nature . Now indeede the exercise of his merciful nature is proper to his owne people , as whom he hath made vessells of mercy , and for whom Christ hath made satisfaction upon the crosse .

And therfore when he proceedes to punishment against them , he may be sayd to exercise alienum opus , and is represented unto us loathe to come unto it . How shall I give thee up . Ephraim ? how shall I deliver thee , Israell ? how shall I make thee as ●os . 11. 8. Admah ? how shall I set thee as Zeboim ? Myne heart is turned within me , &c. Gods anger is seene and felt by the effects of it , but to whom ? only to those that know God to be the Author of the things they suffer .

But the Angells and Saints of God doe otherwise see God in the joyes of Heaven . In this world the manifestation of Gods wrath doth not alwayes hide God from men , but rather is many times a meanes to make God known unto them ; yea a better meanes then continuall prosperity , which makes men grow proude and say , Who is the Lord ? If anger and hate are Pro. 30. 9 not in God , but upon supposall of sinne , then they cannot be sayd to be in God , but only by eternall denomination attributed unto him , least otherwise we should introduce a manifest innovation into the nature of God .

And indeede anger sayth Aquinas is often attributed unto God propter similitudinem effectus , and so as often as he punisheth : and not till then is he sayd to be angry . But if you take it for voluntas vindicandi , this must needs be as everlasting as Gods will ; and if you deduce any cause herof from the creature you were as good to derive from the creature the cause of Gods will , which Aquinas professeth never any man was so madde as to doe . And Gods hatred of Esau , is in Scripture v. q. 23. art. 5. made suitable to Gods love of Iacob , and if this love be the will of election , then hatred must be the will of reprobation . And if the everlasting purpose of God to give both grace and glory ; be deservedly accoumpted Gods love , why should not the everlasting purposu of God to deny unto others both grace and glory , be as deservedly accoumpted Gods hatred ? You undertake to shew how , Love and anger being passions or linkt with passions are rightly conceaved to be in God ; but I hope you will not attribute them unto God , either a● passibus , or linkt with passions . For albeit love and joy mans formally be attributed unto God , because they include no imperfection , yet not as passions saith Aquinas in the place lately alleaged out of him .

CHAP. XXI .

How Anger , Love , Compassion , Mercy or other affections are in the divine nature .

II is true some Schoolemen thinke that distributive justice may be properly enough attributed unto God but not commutative ; not because this includes rationem dati & accepti , but rather because it includes , aequalitatem dati & accepti . Yet others are of opinion that justice distributive can be attributed unto God with no greater propriety , then justice commutative : as may be seene in Vasque 1. in 1. part . disput. 86. Likewise I know none , that thinke , mercy is more properly to be attributed unto God then anger . For voluntas vindicandi as properly and formally belongs to God , as voluntas miserandi : that being as easily abstracted from greife , as this from compassion .

As for revenge there is no colour why that should not in greatest propriety be attributed unto God like as also reward . To say that affections or morall qualities may be contayned in the divine essence eminently , is a very poore justification of them to be the attributes of God . For to be eminently in God is no more ( as your selfe heretofore have explicated it chap. 4. sect. 2. ) then God to be the Author of them , and produce them . Now in this sense you may attribute the name of any body or beast unto God , and say God is such , or such a thing is God , to wit eminently . But who can doubt but voluntas miserandi and voluntas vindicandi are in God not eminently but formally . Yet notwithstanding the very will of God is infinitly different from the will of man . No passion , as a passion is in God though that name which signifieth a passion in man , may be truely verified of Gods signifying the nature of God in a certayne reference unto his creatures without all passion .

So there is a will and understanding in God , but nothing like to the will and understanding of man : For will and understanding in man are accidents they are not so in God . Our anger at the best , as being displeased only with such things that displease God , though in some litle thing it be like Gods anger ; yet in many things it is very unlike : For it is a passion in us , not in God , it riseth in us which before was not no such innovation in God . Gods anger is vindicative ours ought not to be so , but only in case we are his ministers . For vengeance is myne I will repay sayth the Lord . I cannot justifie you in so speaking , when you say that mercy is more reall , and truly affectionate in God then his anger ; For taking them sequestred from theire imperfections , each is formally attributed unto God , though not as passions , and not eminently only as you have delivered it .

As for the execution of each more or lesse , that receaveth moderation merely from the pleasure of Gods will . For he hath mercy on whom he will , and whom he will he hardneth ; and farre more hath he made vessels of wrath amongst the nation of men , then vessells of mercy , though it be reputed otherwise amongst the nation of Angelis . Mercy consists in pardoning sinnes , and saving sinners and no passion at all is required unto this in the nature of God , but passion enough , even unto death upon the crosse in the nature of man , & person of the Sonne of God . The better use men have of reason , the lesse are they subject to perturbation , but no whit lesse doe they participate of affection , for vertues are not 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 as Aristotle hath taught us ; but the right ordering of them . Christs soule was heavy unto the death , at the approaching of his passion , and wept often before this ; yet had he never a whit the worse use of reason ; For all this . But no passion at all can be in God ; for passions rise and fall upon new occasion , but no such alteration is incident unto God . I know not what you meane by devouring affections . They may be concealed or restrained not in a vertuous manner , but vitious ; only to keepe the rankor of theire hearts from discovery , 2. Sam. 13. 22. 25. as Absolon a long time sayd nor good nor bad to Amnon after he had defloured his sister Thamar , he was not any whit the more charitable in that , but playd the foxe in waiting opportunity to doe mischeife . Likewise , when Haman saw Ester . 5. 9. 10. Mordecai in the Kings gate that he stood not up nor mooved for him then was hee full of indignation at Mordecai . Neverthelesse Haman refrayned himselfe , though hee had plotted the destruction both of him and all his nation . To say that passions are moderate in matters , which men least affect is as much as to say , that affections are moderate in matters which men least affect . And indeede affections must needes be moderate , when they are least in motion .

But perpetuall minding of a thing should argue strength of passion , in my judgement rather then moderation . To my thinkinge , now you are in a vaine of writing essayes : Yet I find no greate substance of truth in them . How secret cariages can be violently opposed I conceave not ; For if opposed then no longer secret . And the more cunning men are , the more notice ( I should thinke ) they take of violent opposition , unlesse they doe apparently , see such opposites are like to overshoote or come short ; which is a very race case and comes ofter into a schollars fancy then into reall practise . I finde no greate passion in Achitophel ; but rather as Caesar came soberly to the ruinating of his country . So Achitophel proceeded soberly to the destroying of himselfe . To have the mastery of his passions like enough is a greate poynt of pollicy , undoubtedly to have a gracious mastery of them is true Christianity ; not allwayes to restraine them , but even profusely to enlarge them whatsoever the World thinkes of them .

As Moses in the cause of God was mooved so farre as to breake the tables of the law , and calling others unto him to fall upon the massacring of the people , yet this testimony is given of him that , hee was the meekest man on the earth . I doe Num. 12. 3 not dislike your allowance of men to be passionate , in the promoting of Gods glory ; I hope you will give like allowance to men to be passionate in the defence of Gods truth . I have no greate edge to make Christians contend in passion , with worldly men how wise soever .

Yet well I wote , that David ( one of the worthyes of the World amongst Martialists ) his eyes did gushe out with rivers of water , because men kept not the law of the Lord : & holy Psal. 119. 136. 2. Pet. 2. 7 Lot did vexe his heart with the uncleane conversations of the Sodomites . These morall essayes of yours have a foule issue ; as when you inferre , but most inconsequently ( as arguing from the nature of man to the nature of God ) that passions are in God , nor so only , but even such affections as essentially include perturbation ; you were as good plainly professe , that God is not exempt from perturbation .

Neyther is , to be zealous or compassionate , to be like God in wisedom , but rather in affection . Yet zeale and compassion are accidents in man , not in God ; arise in man never without alteration , but no alteration , as your selfe have made shew to maintayne , is incident unto God . Yet I doe easily grant you , that the vehemency of mans passions doth as significantly represent the want of passion in God ; as the swift motions of the Heavens doth represent Gods immutability ; Like unto him that presenting an unsufficient person to his degree , and being demaunded what he meant to prostitute himself to such profanesse ; made answere he might doe it with a safe conscience ; For he undertooke for him , but tam , quam , tam moribus quam doctrina , and he thought him as good one way as the other , though indeede good at neyther .

And now if your selfe be arrived after all this unto a rest ( I doe not say vigorous least that might proove the embleme of greater motion ) from your passion ; I pray consider how these doe agree : First to say that Gods wisedom doth not exempt him from passion ; and then to acknowledge a want of passion in God .

2 : I see no reason why you should complaine of the barrennesse of your imagination , in illustrating the attributes of God ; to my judgement it hath bin more fruitefull then all that ever went before you ; who I dare say were never able to discerne that lively resemblance you speake of betweene the swift motion of the Heavens and the immutability or vigorous rest of God , as also betweene the vehemency ; of mens passions and the vacuity of all passion in God . Your Mathematickes ( though I professe my selfe a very sory scholler in that science ) I doe reasonablely well understand ; as namely that a circular figure is , as it were 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , and of all figures of equall circumference the most capacious , and that all other figures the nearer they draw to a circle , and the more Angles they contayn of equall circumference are the more capacious . I expect your mysterious and profound explication .

3. The Analogy spoken of betweene sides and Angles , as found in circles and other figures doth fitly expresse ( you say ) that analogy which Schole divines assign betweene wisedom , science , love , hatred , goodnesse , desire , as they are found in God and man . Your theame was , how Anger , Love , Compassion , mercy or other affections are in the divine nature : of all these there is but one found in this latter enumeration of yours , and that is love ; and wheras you proposed to speake only of the affection , and to shew how they are in God . Yet here you mention wisedome , science , goodnesse ; which never were accoumpted affections . No name or title of affection can ( you say ) be univocally attributed unto God .

And this is true , and as true of habits and powers of our soules , that they cannot univocally be attributed unto God . For whatsoever is in God is mere essence ; and therfore such titles as signifie accidents in us , cannot denominate God secundum nomen & nominis rationem . But as we love by an act of passion : so God may love by an act , which is his essence . Our wills and understandings are accidents ; yet doth God as truly will and understand as we , by his very essence ; not by any act which is really distinguished from his essence , Gods love , Gods wrath , are merely his will , to doe good or to revenge evill , as they signifie any thing within God . But if they be used as externall denominations , so , when God punisheth us , he is sayd to be angry with us ; when he doth us good , he is sayd to love us .

And in the like sense may every name of any affection , be attributed unto God , provided it doth not essentially imply any imperfection , as feare doth , and desire doth , which cannot be attributed unto God but metaphorically . The fruits of love & compassion proceede from none so freely , so plentiously as from God , and therfore he may justly be sayd to be most loving most compassionate , but to whom he will . In like sort the fruits of wrath and a revenging will , proceede from none more powerfully and more heavenly then from God . Psal. 90. 11. Heb. 10. 13. Who knoweth the power of thy wrath ? Psalm 90. It is a fearefull thing to fall into the hands of God . Therefore may he justly be accoumpted a most severe regenger of iniquity , but on whom he will ; For he can pardon it and cure it in whom he will , these being but the fruites of his mercy and he hath mercy on whom he will . But to say he is wholly love and wholly displeasure , is a wild expression in my conceyte . For to say , that he is wholly love , is as much as to say , that whatsoever he is , is love ; whence it followeth that seeing he is displeasure also , as you say his very displeasure is love ; and consequently by the same reason , his very love is his displeasure .

The truth is , affections in us belong only to the will ; and so translated unto God they should only denominate his will . Now his power , his understanding , his will are very distinct notions ; though in God they are not really distinct : yet so farre distinct as that it seemes absurd to say , that his power is his will , or his wisedom , or that his wisedom is his will or his power , or that his will is eyther his power or wisdom . So you speake truth , we are content , you take what liberty you think good in the illustration of it , and to satisfie your selfe with your illustrations , though your readers you doe not . I finde you are much pleased in the commodious illustration which a circle doth afford you , or which you divise in a circle , which you call the true embleme of eternity .

Some I confesse have professed that eternity doth ambire tempus , but I never observed that they compared it to a circle ; but only I conceave theire meaning was , that at this present it was not only before all time , but after all time . You adde unto this , and will have this comprehension to be circular ; and elswhere have called it a circular duration . Yet as for this conceyte of theirs , Durand hath longe discovered the absurdity therof , & confuted it . And as greate a Mathematician as you are , I doe not like your interpretation of 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , which you render , as if it signified all sides and all angles ; I rather take it to signifie , all angle , all side , as if it were an angle throughout and one side throughout not all sides and angles .

Ant it is apparent the circumference is but one that encloseth this figure , and angles arising from inclination of lines in the circumferenc , there is a perpetuall inclination , not the least part that may be designed and imagined , but hath an inclination of partes . When you say , the sides are angles , and the angles sides if not essentially yet penctratively the fame . You speake gibrish , you may as well say , in any right angled figure , that the angles and sides are penetratively the same ; the sides are lines , and in the predicament of quality the angles , are the beginning of figures , as poynts are of lines , and so in the predicament of quality : of which figures , lines are the determinations and outward limites .

This I speake but upon remembrance of my old philosophy ; and the angles arise from the inclinations of lines one towards another . What liberty you take in saying that a circle is of equall sides and of equall angles , whereas indeede it is but a side , throughout , and an angle throughout , let the reader judge . Yet it contaynes the space of any other figure of equall circumference and somewhat more : and so vertually it may be sayd to conteyne them even theire sides and angles , in as much as it doth conteyne the space of them . So whatsoever the power , habits and affections of men doe signifie ( allwayes provided that you take theire signification as touching the perfections in them severed from theire imperfections ) they are in God , and much more .

And thus touching your theame proposed how Anger , Love , Compassion , Mercy and other affections are in God , your resolution may be this , if you thinke good , that all perfections are conteyned in him , not tanquam trigonum in tetragonon , but tanquam triganon and tetragonon and pentagonon , and all angled figures in circulo ; but then they must be of equall circumference , which limitation hath no place in the comparison betweene God the Creator and his creatures . If your meaning be no other , then that these , which we call passions , are in God eminently the resolution of the question proposed had bin as easy as it is vulgar , for to be in God eminently is by your owne exposition , no more then God to be the Author of them . And no Christian doubts but that as God is the Author of our bodyes and of our soules ; so he is the Author of our naturall affections also .

4. The Diameter I confesse is the measure of a circle ; that being knowne all is easy to be knowne , I meane in the poynt of measure : but as for the proportion , you speake of , betweene that and a man in reference to the World . I leave to every one to judge of that . Who they be that are the Authors of such proportions , I willingly confesse I know not . In these kindes of proportions you are very excellent , although you complaine of the barrenesse of your imagination that way ; as when you tell us , that mans nature uncorrupt did include such an eminent uniformity to all things created as the eye doth unto colours . I professe you stone me with these resemblances of yours , and make me wonder at my dwarfy capacity , that is so overcoped ( to speake in your owne phrase ) with these your tall inventions . For it were strange you should not understand your selfe ; that were like the Nunne at Delphos , to give out oracles to set others on worke to understand , that which shee understood not her selfe .

And first I cannot devise , what that uniformity should be , which you say the eye hath to all colours ; you seeme not to understand it of the morall constitution of the eye ; for that is different as colours are different , but rather of the formall constitution in respect of the discerning faculty it hath . Now the uniformity betweene this is no other then betweene any faculty and his object .

So then the uniformity runnes this way ; like as the eye of man judgeth of all colours ; so man was in his innocency to all things created ; here I was about to adde , for the completing of this sentence , I know not what ; but on a sodayne I remembred what erst you proposed , namely , that man was like the diameter in a circle , the measure of all things . The meaning whereof I conceaved to be this ; as by the knowledge of the diameter the circle is easily knowne : so by the knowledge of man , which conteynes the nature of all things created , the nature of all created things may be knowne . In like sort touching this last uniformity you speake of . Like as the eye judgeth of all colours ; so by the knowledge of man we may judge of all other things created . I neede not trouble my selfe in taking exception against these illustrations ; I doubt not but I shall performe a meritorious worke in gratifying your reader so farre a● to blanch your meaning , and of the congruity or incongruity to leave it unto him to judge . Thus was man the true image of God for his essence ; and in this properly beares a true shadow of the divine prerogative . For like as all perfections are conteyned in God : so all created things are conteyned in the nature of man ; save that they are eminently conteyned in God , in such sort as he is able to produce them ; but so created things are not conteyned in the nature of man : Yet as the eye judgeth of all colours ; so man participates of all other natures , and by the knowledge of him men may judge of them .

If the divine nature conteyned lesse perfections then the perfections of all things , then indeede it were something strange , it should be the measure of all . But seeing perfections in him are infinite , there was no reason , that you should bring mans acknowledgement , that his essence is the measure of all perfections ; with an ( allthough ) in reference to his measurelesse perfection . Yet I professe I am to seeke how to conceave Gods essence to be the measure of created perfections ; seeing mensura & mensuratum ought to be in the same kinde , as it was wont to be sayd . But all this may be helpt with saying he is the measure of them eminently ; and indeed he is the Author of them ; For he made all things in number , weight , and measure .

And indeede ere I was awarre , I find you fall upon this in the very next sentence , where you say . All the conditions or properties of measure assigned by Philosophers are as truly conteyned in the incomprehensible essence , as sides or angles in the circle , but farre more eminently . Vpon this I looke for an enumeration of the conditions and properties of a measure , and the application of them unto God ; and particularly that , that a measure must be that which is better knowne then the thing measured .

And it is of use to bring us acquainted with the things measurable . Now God is not better knowne to us then any other thing . To himselfe I confesse he is as well knowne as ought els . But he hath no neede of any measure , whereby he should arise to the knowledge of any thing ; though in knowing himselfe he knoweth all other things , nor lookes out of himselfe to be acquainted with ought . But you I perceave are willing to ease your selfe of this burthen ; you tell us what a measure he is not , as when you say , the Divine essence is a measure not applyable to measurables , for kind or quantity much different , according to diversities of parts ; as who hath no parts : but insteede of telling us what measure it is , you say that the nature , essence , quality , and quantity of all things are applyed to it , in that they have actuall being .

So that for God to measure all things , belike is as much as to say , God hath created all things . Now if to be created is to be applyed to God ; then to create is to apply . And so Gods creating and application active , in order of nature was before theire creation and application passive . You say it is impossible the Creator should be fitted to any thing created . And is it not I pray alike impossible that the thing created should be fitted to the Creator ? Yet before you sayd that God is a measure not applyed to things created , but wherunto things created are applyed , in as much as they have theire actuall beings . God is immutable and eminently conteyneth all things in his indivisible essence ; but to say that hee eternally and immutably , site all the possible varieties whereof contingency it selfe is capable . I doubt , will proove non sense in every particular . For first contingency is not capable of such variety you speake of : The things contingent themselves are various indeede , but not the contingency of them . Things are very various , but the modi rerum are not . There are but two modi rerum ; the one we call contingency , the other necessity . You may say necessity is capable of variety as well as contingency . And indeede there is farre greater variety of agents necessary , then of agents voluntary .

Agayne what is it to fit varieties , other then to produce them ? For if you meant of fitting them after they were produced , it is like you would have told us , wherunto God doth fit them . Thirdly it is absurd in a Philosophers phrase to say God doth produce varieties ; for variety is no fit object of production , it being a relation , which indeede results upon the producing of the foundation , rather then is produced . But suppose you understand it of the things produced in all possible variety : Yet this is directly untrue . For it is possible for God undoubtedly to produce things in greater variety then he doth .

Neyther is this production eternally wrought , or the things you speake of fitted by God ; for surely this fitting of varieties , as you speake , beganne not till the world beganne . And what you meane in saying that God doth immutablely fit them I well understand not , God I doubt not is immutable , but the things he fits are not , especially contingency , which includes mutability you say God is fitnesse it selfe ; but eyther you consider not , that fitnesse is a word of relation , or if you did , you were to blame in not telling us , in what respect this fitnesse is . With greate pompe of words filling up eleven lines you tell us , that God fitteth all things better by eternall immutable , and incomparable fitnesse , then it could be by any other measure fitted .

And doe you thinke any man doubts whether that fitnesse , which is measured by incomparable fitnesse , should be better then that which is measured and ordered by any inferiour measure of fitnesse ? And what is all this , if we speake plainly , but to say , that rewards of obedience , and punishment of disobedience are so well fitted , as they cannot be amended . And this plain and vulgar truth is expressed in termes as obscure as those Paracelsus was wont to discourse in . Not only rewards and punishments which are cheifly reserved for another world , but every thing in this world we beleive to be so ordered , that the wits of men and Angells were not able to mende it .

But yet whether the infinite wisedom of God might not exceede this , the Schoolemen in theire disputation herupon , as I remember doe generally deny . He is eminently all , in as much as he produceth all ; but you may be pleased to except relations , such as contrariety and equality . For they are not termini producibiles but such as doe usually result upon position of theire foundation . When you say , As of his other attributes one truly and really is an other , so in respect of man his measure is his judgement , &c. You seeme to reckon amongst the attributes of God a strange one , which you call his measure ; and this you say is not only the rule wherby he rewards or punisheth , but the reward and punishment it selfe . Rewarding and punishing are kindes of Gods working . Now if we would know by what rule God works , the Apostle plainly informes us herin , when he sayth , God worketh all things according to the counsaile of his owne will . Ephes. 1. 11. But when you say that his retribution of rewards and punishments is his measure ; I pray of what ? for measure is a terme of respect ; but you speake in a dialect of your owne making ; and if we had a dictionary too of your owne making for the opening of your owne dialect , perhaps we might understand you better then we doe .

There is no composition in God , such as is betweene the subject and the accident , which founds the destinction of abstract and concrete . We admit God to be bounty it selfe , love it selfe , mercy and compassion it selfe , but to whom say you ? only to those who are touched with the sense of theire owne misery ; or only in solliciting men to repentance ? As you would faine steale up your Arminian Tenets and cunningly obtrude them upon the faith of a credulous reader , of a weake reader . We say his mercy and love and bounty cheifly appeares in causing man to be touched with the sense of his owne misery , as also in giveing repentance and not only in solliciting thereunto , not only in being gracious unto them that repent . A greate deale of froth of words you spende , in amplifying the goodnesse of God in rewarding our repentance , when in the meane time you endeavour to drowne all consideration of Gods goodnesse unto sinners , while they lye weltering in theire sins as in theire blood , and draw away the minds of your readers from taking notice therof , as if humility and repentance were a worke of nature , not of grace , a worke of flesh and blood and not of the spirit of God .

And all the way no touch of faith , your discourse savoring of the humour of a naturalist throughout , rather then of a Christian. To them that are sanctified , he is you say felicity and salvation ; but what is he to them that are not sanctified ? belike to them damnation . Yet the holy Apostle hath taught us , that God hath made Christ to be unto us , wisedom , righteousnesse , sanctification , and redemption . 1 Cor. 1. 30. And that God is he that justifieth the ungodly . Rom. 4. Alas , how often hath the best despised his bounty , love , mercy , grace , and salvation ; yet is not he justice , indignation , and severity unto them , but bounty still , love still , mercy , and grace and salvation still , and at length overcomes them , and bringes them from the power of Satan unto God . When for theire wicked covetousnesse he was angry with them , and hath smitten them : he hid himselfe and was angry , yet they went away , & turned after the way of theire owne heartes : Yet after all this , He hath seene theire wayes and hath healed them . Es. 57. 17. 18. Yea he rules them with a mighty hand and outstretched arme , and makes them passe under the rod , and brings them under the band of the covenant . Ezech. 20. 37. He takes away their stony hearts and gives them an heart of flesh , and putteth his owne spirit within them , and causeth them to walke in Ezech. ●6 . 27. his statuts , and keepe his judgements and doe them . I am sory to find so litle evidence throughout your discourse , that your selfe have neede of this .

What did the heathens understand by theire Nemesis ? God ? or a creature ? If God , surely he is not more powerfull then himselfe . If a creature , is it strange that the power of a creature should be inferior to the power the Creator ? When the Apostle sayth , God shall be all in all , he speakes only of his elect , to fill them with the joyes of Heaven , and with God himselfe . Will you take boldnesse to apply this presence of God to the very divills and reprobates ? It is true we looke for the comming of the mighty , God , who shall be glorified in his Saints , & even then shall he shew himselfe from Heaven with his mighty Angells , in slaming fire rendring vengeance to them 2 Thess. 1. that doe not know God , as also unto them which obey not the Gospell of the Lord Iesus Christ : which shall be punished with everlasting perdition from the presence of the Lord and from the glory of his power : When he shall come to be glorified in his Saints , and to be made marveylous in all them that beleive ( and because his servants testimony towards us , was beleived ) in that day . Then shall the Heaven depart away like a scrolle , when it is rolled and every mountayne and yle be mooved out of theire place . And the Kings of the earth , and the greate men , and the rich men , and the cheife Captaines , and the mighty men , and every bond man , and every free man , hide themselves in dennes and among the rockes of the Mountaines ; and say to the Mountaines and to the rockes , fall on us and hide us from the presence of him , that sitteth on the throne , & from the wrath of the Lamb. For the greate day of his wrath is come , and who can stande ? Anno Dom. 1629. Aprilis 30.

FINIS .