Cornelius
Valerius
his
Morall
Description
lately
Englisshed
.
Of
the
ende
and
Partes
of
Morall
Science
.
Cap.
i.
EThica
Philosophia
,
which
in
Latin
is
called
De
Moribus
&
Moralis
,
the
philosophie
of
maniers
&
Morall
,
is
a
meane
to
liue
well
:
either
a
Science
to
iudge
vprightly
of
conditions
,
and
of
the
Actions
and
duties
of
common
lyfe
.
The
Philosophers
onely
imitatyng
the
light
of
Nature
&
Reason
as
their
Guide
,
haue
deliuered
it
vnto
vs
diligently
adorned
:
whose
whole
industrie
especially
either
is
conuersaunt
in
the
boultynge
out
,
and
vnfoulding
the
perplexitie
of
Nature
,
or
els
in
the
Doctrine
of
life
and
condicions
.
Which
beyng
vnderstanded
,
immediatly
wée
shall
dispute
somewhat
more
abundantly
of
Actions
,
by
which
an
entraunce
may
be
made
vnto
that
soueraintie
.
Of
the
end
of
man
,
and
the
Soueraine
good
.
Cap.
ij
.
ONely
men
by
reason
they
are
endewed
with
knowledge
do
not
onely
somwhat
for
som
end
,
but
also
purpose
som
vtmost
marke
of
all
theyr
labours
,
&
hit
most
commodious
for
them selues
:
But
all
other
liuing
creatures
are
caried
to
that
onely
which
is
present
thorough
the
blind
sweigh
of
Nature
.
Because
euery
end
verily
,
if
it
be
to
be
wished
for
of
a
man
,
is
good
the
latter
end
shal
be
the
soueraine
good
,
and
to
be
desired
of
it selfe
,
for
whose
sake
all
things
are
constituted
,
and
through
adeption
of
whiche
men
are
made
Fortunate
and
blessed
:
Yet
what
maner
of
thing
that
is
,
whiche
may
seeme
to
be
accompted
last
and
one
alone
,
eke
the
greatest
good
it
is
doubted
of
philosophers
,
and
a
long
time
inquired
for
in
vayne
,
and
after
sundrye
facions
called
in
Question
:
of
which
som
haue
placed
felicity
in
pleasure
,
others
in
knowledge
,
som
in
honor
others
in
other
matters
.
Plato
more
deuine
then
the
rest
collocated
the
same
in
vsing
the
contemplacion
of
the
chiefest
goodnesse
,
either
of
the
good
Idaea
or
els
of
God
and
heauenly
wisdom
:
Vnto
whom
by
how
much
any
man
may
be
made
more
like
,
by
so
much
he
thought
him
more
happy
,
and
the
rather
a
copartner
of
be
atitude
:
But
this
felicity
not
to
chaunce
in
this
life
,
because
no
man
may
be
said
happy
before
his
dying
day
.
Aristotle
in
his
first
booke
Ad
Nicomachum
,
esteemed
felicitie
to
be
situated
in
a
perfect
action
answerable
to
perfect
vertue
,
that
is
to
wit
whiche
may
be
framed
by
the
rule
of
wisdome
:
because
she
did
appeare
to
transporte
very
commendable
and
suffycient
perfection
to
man
:
Whereas
also
the
Peripatetikes
do
commonstrate
a
blessed
lyfe
to
be
concluded
by
vertue
:
Which
yet
if
it
be
garnyshed
with
the
gooddes
of
body
and
Fortune
,
should
be
moste
blessed
:
for
he
graunted
blessednesse
to
consist
of
a
tryple
sort
of
goods
:
but
in
his
tenth
Booke
he
dyd
suppose
it
to
be
pytched
in
delectation
contemplatiue
:
that
although
that
actiue
felicyty
may
be
referred
to
thys
contemplatiue
,
yet
in
her
proper
kinde
she
may
be
the
finall
end
.
As
who
say
truly
,
that
whiche
is
one
soueraine
good
,
may
be
double
.
Plato
more
better
,
and
more
agreable
vnto
christian
religion
,
&
without
doubt
more
truly
did
define
it
thus
,
that
accordinge
to
his
opinion
also
a
soueraintie
should
be
appoynted
for
vs
very
commodiously
,
The
other
is
yoked
to
the
body
,
as
ap●etite
,
or
desier
,
and
anger
.
The
higher
●s
a
receauer
of
Reason
:
The
lower
is
●gnorant
:
it
is
hir
parte
to
rule
,
and
it
●elonges
vnto
this
to
obey
.
But
this
oftentimes
as
an
Horse
waryng
fierse
,
not
regarding
the
will
of
the
Carter
,
is
whirled
with
a
violent
brayde
vnto
those
thinges
which
him
liketh
,
whether
they
be
honest
or
filthy
,
yeldyng
a
deafe
eare
to
reason
,
and
not
hearyng
the
mynde
and
intelligence
,
whiche
is
a
copartner
of
those
knowledges
,
whiche
by
nature
are
planted
in
vs
,
or
rather
ingendred
of
God
:
and
at
all
times
incourageth
vnto
honest
mattiers
,
whether
they
be
pleasant
,
or
lamentable
.
For
there
is
a
triple
good
:
Honest
,
profitable
,
and
pleasaunt
.
Honest
is
,
which
agreeth
with
the
streight
sentence
of
Reason
:
Profitable
is
,
which
succoureth
nature
and
lyfe
.
Pleasaunt
is
,
which
deliteth
naturall
appetite
,
as
the
drynke
the
thyrsty
.
And
out
of
these
Fountaynes
procede
all
actions
.
It
is
the
duety
of
the
minde
and
Intelligence
to
determyne
:
but
to
the
other
parte
it
belongeth
to
execute
the
commaundement
of
the
minde
,
and
to
labour
.
The
minde
hath
two
principall
Intelligences
entalied
of
nature
:
the
one
of
debatinge
truth
and
falshoode
,
the
other
of
discerning
good
and
euill
.
For
al
men
through
a
certaine
secret
sence
do
discerne
what
thinges
are
iust
,
and
wrongfull
(
so
that
this
light
of
nature
be
not
pesterd
)
for
nature
hath
geuen
to
vs
as
it
were
litle
sparkes
and
seedes
,
and
a
certayne
procliuitie
of
minde
,
and
facultie
to
labour
.
This
affection
doth
stirre
:
Operacion
succeedeth
the
affection
,
and
by
often
operacions
there
is
gotten
a
perfectnes
,
either
of
vertue
,
if
it
be
trayned
vnto
a
●ood
end
,
or
els
of
vice
,
if
vnto
an
euill
.
●nd
this
is
the
grounde
of
all
humaine
●ctions
.
Of
Affections
.
Cap.
iij.
SIth
perdie
euery
fourme
of
vertues
and
vices
doth
spring
as
it
were
out
●f
these
Fountaines
,
hability
,
affection
,
operation
,
and
perfection
:
we
wil
compendiously
manifest
these
:
And
certes
those
few
things
which
are
said
concerning
faculty
shall
suffice
.
And
let
that
difference
be
obserued
betwixt
the
natiue
readines
of
the
minde
,
&
the
braide
or
affection
of
this
procliuity
.
As
choler
doth
moue
the
nature
of
an
ireful
man
,
so
dooth
the
coueting
of
glory
force
the
couetous
of
honour
.
Henceforth
then
we
haue
to
breake
our
minde
of
affections
.
Affection
,
is
a
commocion
of
the
minde
,
disquieting
the
tranquility
therof
,
which
in
Greeke
is
called
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
and
of
Cicero
Perturbatio
,
a
Perturbation
,
and
it
is
defined
,
a
troublesom
and
a
violent
moode
of
the
soule
,
bended
from
reason
,
an
enemye
to
the
minde
,
and
quiet
life
.
The
Stoikes
when
as
they
saw
a
man
to
be
turmoyled
hither
and
thither
with
many
and
wicked
desires
,
and
falsly
supposed
the
very
nature
of
man
to
be
vncorrupted
,
and
not
defloure
,
dthey
gainsaid
affections
to
be
naturall
,
but
graunted
them
to
be
only
opinions
eyther
of
good
or
yll
,
and
in
theyr
kinde
euery
one
to
be
vicious
,
and
to
be
rooted
out
of
the
nature
of
menne
,
from
which
they
would
a
wise
man
to
be
fre
:
yet
they
are
easily
conuicted
of
errour
.
For
first
of
al
that
they
are
Natiue
and
ingendred
,
by
that
it
is
lightly
confirmed
,
because
motions
and
certayne
inclinations
are
ingraffed
in
liuyng
creatures
by
nature
,
as
the
Zeale
of
parentes
towardes
theyr
Children
.
And
who
seeth
not
som
men
to
be
more
enclined
to
anger
or
loue
,
to
ioyfulnesse
or
heauinesse
than
other
som
.
Farthermore
that
all
are
not
faultye
thereby
it
is
apparant
inough
,
by
reason
the
very
law
of
God
geueth
vs
in
charge
to
beare
loue
towarde
him
,
towarde
all
men
,
towardes
our
wife
,
children
,
and
parentes
:
And
enioyneth
vs
mercy
,
hope
,
confidence
,
ioye
,
and
some
other
affections
very
profitable
and
expedient
to
encourage
the
minde
.
For
what
is
more
commodious
for
the
life
of
man
than
the
hope
of
glory
,
and
rewardes
,
and
the
feare
of
rebuke
and
punishments
.
And
so
doubtles
affctions
may
be
handsomly
diuided
that
som
may
be
called
good
by
nature
,
which
agre
with
reason
or
els
with
the
prescript
of
nature
,
as
good
will
,
compassion
.
Some
euill
,
which
do
disagrée
,
as
Hatred
,
Enuy
,
Pride
,
Dispere
.
Som
betwixt
bothe
,
as
anger
,
hope
,
boldnes
,
feare
,
desire
,
loue
,
merinesse
,
sorow
:
which
that
they
may
not
swarue
from
●ertue
,
they
are
to
be
ruled
by
the
bri●ell
of
reason
,
and
to
be
Iudged
by
mediocrity
.
But
neither
is
that
to
be
commended
,
which
som
construed
,
that
affections
are
naturall
,
not
also
voluntary
.
For
whereas
our
will
onely
subiect
to
God
may
apppeare
to
haue
a
free
Originall
to
worke
,
it
is
to
be
thought
,
the
very
redinesse
perdie
vnto
these
or
them
,
and
likewise
the
first
motion
to
be
naturall
;
but
theyr
vexacions
to
be
voluntary
,
and
able
to
be
chastised
by
th'
authority
of
reason
,
lesse
they
should
run
headling
,
and
be
plucked
with
violence
,
eake
inforce
a
man
immediatly
welny
vnwillyng
vnto
naughtinesse
.
Albeit
truly
at
that
time
the
will
coueting
doth
range
at
liberty
,
and
by
some
meanes
may
reteine
it
if
so
she
woulde
inuocate
God
the
helper
.
For
put
case
it
be
feeble
,
yet
there
is
some
libertie
whiche
when
shame
&
feare
are
set
out
to
the
show
may
be
of
power
to
bridle
the
affections
.
And
that
they
can
be
corrected
by
discipline
,
those
wordes
deliuered
of
God
do
manifestlie
denounce
.
Sub
te
erit
appetitus
tuus
,
&
tu
Dominaberis
illi
:
Vnder
thee
shal
be
thine
apetite
,
&
thou
shalt
beare
rule
ouer
it
.
Wheras
also
a
man
consisteth
of
two
partes
,
a
Soule
and
a
bodie
,
and
there
is
a
double
force
of
the
soule
,
one
a
copartner
of
reason
,
the
other
void
:
she
is
stedfast
and
quiet
,
this
wandring
,
and
tormented
with
affections
,
whiche
moste
commonly
doth
disquiet
her
:
where
by
it
insueth
that
a
man
,
if
he
doth
pursue
the
aduise
of
reason
and
intelligence
he
may
want
perturbacion
:
But
if
he
had
rather
to
become
Subiecte
vnto
the
concupiscence
of
the
body
,
he
may
be
diuerslie
prouoked
.
The
Fountaine
then
of
affections
is
that
part
of
the
Soule
voide
of
reason
:
and
that
is
double
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
waryng
angry
,
and
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
very
desirous
of
a
thinge
.
The
which
if
refusinge
the
Empire
and
Yoke
of
the
minde
and
reason
,
it
be
caried
with
his
proper
vehemencie
,
it
is
needefull
that
forthwith
one
or
other
of
the
perturbations
bee
incensed
,
and
plucked
throughe
the
opinion
or
similytude
of
good
or
yll
,
sometimes
bither
and
somtimes
thither
,
eke
nowe
and
then
be
broughte
all
oute
of
frame
with
pleasure
or
luste
,
and
one
while
with
timidity
or
hatred
.
For
vnto
these
twoo
sortes
it
appeareth
that
any
one
of
the
affections
may
be
referred
,
because
all
mocions
proceede
from
a
suspicion
of
good
or
euill
,
whether
it
be
present
,
or
absent
.
Out
of
the
Iudgement
of
good
floweth
pleasure
,
and
out
of
the
conceit
of
euill
commeth
sorow
.
Vnto
pleasure
are
referred
,
loue
,
desire
,
gladnesse
,
whiche
succoure
nature
,
and
among
these
especiallie
ioy
:
Vnto
sorow
appertaine
,
anger
,
hatred
,
feare
,
sadnesse
,
which
discommoditie
Nature
most
painfully
.
The
Harbourough
forsouthe
of
them
all
is
featelie
disposed
in
the
harte
,
to
whom
there
is
a
greate
familyarity
with
will
,
whiche
either
may
couet
,
or
els
eschew
,
if
any
thing
be
obiected
,
whiche
may
seem
either
to
pleasure
,
or
domage
nature
.
Of
Loue
.
Cap.
iiij
.
LOue
is
an
inclination
of
will
,
prone
to
that
which
is
thought
good
.
For
when
as
any
thinge
is
profered
,
which
either
is
good
in
deede
,
or
els
deliteth
with
a
certain
likelyhood
of
good
,
through
that
opinion
,
the
greedy
faculti
of
the
Soule
is
vehemently
inticed
to
enioy
and
possesse
the
same
.
And
of
the
goods
,
which
are
sought
for
of
men
,
we
tolde
that
there
were
three
kindes
:
Honest
,
Profitable
and
Pleasant
,
whiche
commonly
are
coupled
together
,
because
one
thyng
both
may
be
honest
,
and
profitable
,
and
pleasant
:
yet
not
by
and
by
that
which
is
either
profitable
,
or
pleasant
,
is
honest
:
whereas
these
now
and
than
may
appere
to
contende
with
honestie
.
But
for
all
this
nothinge
is
in
deed
either
profitable
,
or
pleasant
,
which
same
is
not
honest
.
Certes
what
is
honest
that
is
onely
required
for
the
proper
behoofe
,
no
consideration
had
neither
of
commoditie
,
nor
of
delectation
.
How
greate
the
power
of
loue
is
,
the
verses
of
Poets
do
beare
witnesse
,
and
wee
deeme
that
there
be
very
few
whiche
can
quite
them selues
cleare
of
all
loue
.
Plato
constituted
a
threefolde
loue
,
the
first
which
embraceth
and
cherisheth
only
Vertue
,
but
this
is
exempted
from
the
number
of
affections
,
he
appeareth
rather
to
be
reckned
among
vertues
,
because
he
vseth
the
iudgement
of
vpright
Reason
:
The
other
filthie
which
cloueth
to
the
pleasure
of
bodie
:
The
thyrde
whiche
mindeth
the
Soule
and
Body
.
Nothyng
is
more
noble
than
the
first
,
nothynge
more
foule
than
the
other
:
The
thyrd
truly
is
a
companion
of
bothe
,
but
yet
he
rometh
abrode
no
lesse
than
the
other
:
By
reason
he
reuerenceth
the
personage
of
the
body
,
and
ardenly
esteemeth
it
.
Vnlesse
wee
repine
this
loue
resortyng
amorously
,
and
strokyng
the
minde
with
sugred
words
and
except
this
loue
sike
soule
brought
vnto
another
bayte
:
Feates
of
Phisick
should
be
practised
in
vayne
,
when
as
now
the
loue
shall
growe
in
vse
,
eake
shal
haue
taken
deeper
rootes
.
Of
Desire
and
Hope
.
Cap.
v.
DEsire
is
a
luste
to
enioye
that
good
,
whiche
as
yet
is
not
presente
:
If
so
that
be
in
place
,
it
is
loued
,
but
if
it
bee
out
of
sight
,
it
is
coueited
.
Out
of
this
Fountain
(
if
the
sentence
of
reason
be
neglected
,
and
the
desire
bee
immoderate
,
and
excéede
the
boundes
and
Limits
of
Nature
who
is
apaid
with
few
thinges
)
many
vices
do
arise
:
as
Niggardlines
,
Ambicion
,
Sensualitie
,
Riot
&
such
other
.
Hope
is
defined
of
Cicero
,
an
expectation
of
good
,
to
whom
dispaire
is
contrarye
,
a
supposed
difficultye
and
mistrust
of
a
good
thinge
to
be
atchiued
,
the
which
shal
be
Recapitulated
heareafter
among
the
fourmes
of
sadnesse
.
It
is
the
guise
of
a
wise
man
,
to
hope
for
those
thinges
,
whiche
he
maye
attaine
,
neither
rashly
to
dispaire
,
whither
he
may
atchiue
through
trauaile
.
And
this
hope
verely
by
which
we
wish
for
good
,
either
trewe
or
shadowed
,
differeth
from
that
whiche
is
tearmed
Theologicall
,
and
it
is
a
vertue
,
eke
is
depainted
to
be
a
waytinge
for
eternall
felicitie
:
Vnto
whom
in
like
case
the
repugnant
vice
is
,
Desperatio
,
despeire
.
Of
Gladnesse
.
Cap.
vi
.
GLadnesse
is
an
affection
which
is
stirred
with
the
opinion
of
some
present
goodnesse
,
wherwith
the
minde
is
delited
.
Cicero
doth
distynguish
Gaudium
and
Laetitiam
,
ioye
and
gladnesse
in
this
wise
,
that
the
minde
should
be
mooued
with
ioy
paciently
,
and
constantly
,
but
with
gladnesse
vainely
and
prodigally
.
With
this
affection
the
Nature
is
merueilously
delighted
,
and
the
hert
enlarged
,
and
as
it
were
embracynge
that
whiche
is
apparant
good
,
doth
stirre
the
minde
sweetly
and
delectably
,
and
faustreth
life
in
the
hert
,
whiche
sorow
the
contrarie
passion
,
doth
oppresse
.
And
this
pleasantnesse
and
delectacion
for
the
amplitude
of
the
good
which
is
propounded
,
may
be
greater
or
lesser
,
and
either
honest
or
filthy
.
It
sha
be
honest
if
it
be
answerable
to
the
meane
of
nature
,
and
vnto
reason
:
what
one
is
gotten
through
the
contemplation
and
studies
of
commendable
thinges
.
But
filthy
if
it
be
immoderate
,
and
dissonant
to
reason
:
what
one
is
receiued
of
corporal
delites
of
peruerse
exercises
,
and
of
yll
will
:
as
if
any
man
should
be
delited
with
another
mans
harme
,
than
which
vice
nothing
ought
to
be
more
abrogate
from
a
man
,
especially
a
Christian
.
Of
Hatred
and
anger
and
like
affections
.
Cap.
vij
.
COntrarye
to
Loue
is
hatred
:
which
is
defined
of
Cicero
,
Ira
inueterata
,
a
longe
festred
Anger
,
that
is
to
wit
of
longe
continuance
.
This
affection
is
ingendred
of
the
discontenting
of
the
minde
,
detestinge
the
harme
which
is
vnderstanded
,
&
damaged
either
with
the
deede
or
sayinge
of
som
man
,
or
deming
him selfe
hurted
:
and
sometimes
abhorring
from
anothers
freendship
through
a
priuy
instinct
of
nature
.
Euen
as
perdie
by
Loue
all
all
men
are
accorded
,
so
by
hatred
they
are
vnyoked
,
than
whiche
nothynge
is
more
pernicious
to
humaine
societie
,
which
also
by
so
much
is
more
irkesom
,
by
how
much
more
secretly
it
inuadeth
.
To
contempne
vices
it
profiteth
but
to
loue
a
man
Christian
charitie
commaundeth
,
and
to
forgeue
him
whiche
offendeth
:
But
to
hate
a
man
for
no
cause
,
is
very
obsurde
,
and
most
dissonant
from
vpright
iudgement
.
Vnto
hatred
are
ascribed
many
affection
whiche
are
to
be
auoyded
of
a
godly
man
:
As
dispight
,
as
anger
,
as
Hostilitie
.
Despight
whereby
any
man
thinketh
another
more
base
then
himselfe
:
Whereas
truly
there
is
no
cause
why
any
one
shoulde
suppose
himselfe
to
be
preferred
before
his
felow
,
by
reason
that
he
cannot
commonstrate
any
thinge
of
himselfe
,
whiche
he
hath
not
receiued
els
where
,
as
it
ought
to
be
most
euident
vnto
the
Christians
by
holy
Scriptures
.
Anger
is
defined
,
a
lust
to
punish
him
who
may
seeme
to
haue
hurted
with
iniury
.
This
affection
appeareth
to
be
mingled
with
sorowe
and
a
greedinesse
of
reuengement
,
which
greeuously
racketh
a
man
,
and
sharpely
kindleth
agaynst
him
,
of
whome
he
is
thought
to
be
displeasured
,
the
moste
troublesome
of
all
the
affections
:
by
which
not
only
the
minde
,
but
also
the
whole
body
is
brought
into
suche
a
perplexitie
that
for
anger
a
man
can
vneth
see
,
and
moderate
his
senses
,
and
scarcely
speake
.
Hereto
doth
Hostilitie
belonge
,
which
is
defined
an
anger
of
punishing
obseruynge
oportunitie
.
And
hither
discorde
the
destruction
of
the
common
weale
,
and
hither
all
hatred
is
referred
.
Iracundia
doth
differ
from
Ira
,
because
Iracundia
is
a
natiue
faculty
,
by
which
any
man
is
made
prone
to
anger
But
Ira
is
a
commocion
of
this
vertue
,
and
a
rage
bended
from
reason
:
Wherby
now
and
than
the
minde
is
so
turmoyled
,
that
the
angrie
man
doth
very
litle
disagree
from
the
Frantike
.
And
truly
it
may
be
verified
of
Horace
,
Ira
fu●or
breuis
,
anger
is
a
shorte
furie
:
and
of
Ennius
,
Insaniae
principium
,
the
originall
of
Madnesse
.
The
bloud
is
incensed
with
this
passyon
,
and
waxeth
hotte
in
the
bodie
,
and
the
Spirites
sodenly
disquieted
doo
so
trouble
a
man
,
and
cause
him
so
vnagreable
to
him selfe
,
that
he
is
sayd
to
be
out
of
his
Wittes
,
neither
to
become
his
owne
man
before
that
the
hot
brayned
moode
shall
asswage
,
and
the
vehemencie
relinquisht
.
But
not
euery
anger
is
lyke
contentious
:
for
one
is
easier
,
eake
sooner
prouoked
,
and
haleth
a
man
vnwares
,
but
abideth
not
longe
:
Another
is
more
gentell
truly
,
yet
more
bitter
,
and
of
greater
induraunce
,
and
cleuyng
to
hatred
,
and
seekyng
auengement
.
Neither
ought
euery
anger
appere
vicious
,
sithe
in
sacred
Scriptures
wee
may
reade
in
this
wise
:
Irascimini
,
&
nollite
peccare
:
Become
you
angrie
and
sinne
not
.
Neither
vncommodiously
of
Aristotle
the
mediocritie
of
anger
betwixt
excesse
and
defect
is
renowned
,
and
moderate
anger
linked
as
a
companion
of
worthy
prowesse
vnto
fortitude
,
which
the
auncient
Academikes
(
Cicero
bearing
record
)
reported
to
be
as
it
weare
the
Whetstone
of
valiaunt
courage
,
that
is
to
witte
,
the
assistaunte
:
which
Seneca
geueth
in
precept
to
vse
,
not
as
a
Capitain
but
as
a
souldiar
.
We
must
then
be
agréeued
with
vngodlinesse
,
wronge
,
and
other
vices
:
and
our
mind
must
be
aduaunced
when
nede
is
,
when
time
and
place
do
require
,
but
rest
raigned
,
if
no
such
occasion
be
ministred
of
anger
.
And
by
how
much
more
greeuously
the
minde
is
solicitated
,
by
so
much
more
painfully
we
shall
brydle
Choler
,
wee
shall
maister
the
brayde
,
and
with
all
meane
and
might
shall
oppresse
it
forthwith
the
dominion
of
reason
reuoked
,
and
that
dismounted
which
kendled
the
wrath
,
we
shall
extinguish
the
feruency
,
or
els
the
punishment
differred
till
another
season
,
we
shall
extenuate
the
passion
.
Of
Sadnesse
.
Cap.
viij
.
SAdnesse
,
or
heauinesse
,
is
a
perturbacion
,
drawinge
together
&
oppressynge
the
minde
,
which
is
defined
of
Cicero
,
a
freshe
opinion
of
present
euill
,
wherupon
it
may
seem
leifull
the
mind
to
be
enlarged
,
and
contracted
.
And
after
a
bréefer
way
.
Heauinesse
is
a
shrincking
of
the
minde
reason
repining
.
This
taketh
beginninge
through
the
contemplacion
of
som
euil
,
or
els
through
the
wante
of
some
good
thing
.
From
this
Fountaine
proceede
sundry
passions
which
Cicero
numbreth
in
the
end
of
the
third
booke
of
Tusculans
Questions
,
and
in
the
fourth
,
when
as
he
had
constituted
foure
sortes
of
perturbacions
,
&
had
explaned
them
,
he
recompteth
them
beyng
reckned
in
these
words
:
But
vnto
ech
disturbance
more
partes
of
the
same
secte
are
adiected
,
as
vnto
sadnesse
,
enuy
,
emulation
,
backbiting
,
compassion
(
but
this
we
suppose
to
be
a
good
affection
,
not
a
greef
of
the
mind
)
vexacion
,
wailing
,
sorow
,
infelicity
,
wofulnesse
,
lamentacion
,
pensiuenesse
,
disquietnesse
,
affliction
,
dispeire
,
of
which
belowe
we
shall
debate
,
and
if
any
moe
be
of
the
same
stocke
.
Hitherto
Cicero
,
whom
reade
you
your selfe
defining
euery
of
the
fourmes
.
As
euery
pleasure
is
not
saide
to
be
vicyous
,
so
neither
euery
sadnesse
.
And
as
it
is
a
laudable
thinge
to
triumphe
at
vertue
:
so
to
be
sorrowfull
for
vice
,
to
restreigne
the
minde
immoderatly
deliting
,
is
profitable
:
neither
semeth
it
an
vnhoneste
thing
measurably
to
bewaile
our
wiues
children
,
or
Parentes
.
Of
Feare
.
Cap.
ix
.
FEare
is
a
wayting
of
euill
,
either
a
carefull
remembraunce
of
pensiuenesse
about
to
ensew
,
as
Cicero
recordeth
,
and
it
is
repugnant
to
hope
.
Feare
is
ingendred
of
the
haling
togeather
of
the
hart
throughe
an
opinion
of
imminent
perill
.
Moderate
feare
is
profitable
,
assenting
to
the
counsaile
of
reason
:
But
the
vnmeasurable
or
ouer
small
is
discommended
.
Som
are
more
timorous
,
some
more
bolde
,
which
the
Phisicions
déeme
to
be
attributed
to
the
Complexion
of
body
:
but
yet
in
this
place
their
Iudgemente
is
of
no
simple
importaunce
,
by
which
timidity
either
is
increased
,
or
diminished
.
This
perturbacion
doth
very
sore
disprofite
Nature
,
and
cheefely
so
tormenteth
a
man
●n
sodaine
cases
,
that
who
is
horribly
●stonished
may
appeare
no
lesse
to
fall
●t
of
his
right
wittes
,
than
he
which
is
●reeuously
displeased
.
Vnder
feare
be
many
fourmes
comprehended
,
of
which
all
there
is
one
cause
;
the
ende
perdie
and
opinion
of
euil
is
diuerse
:
Slouth
,
terrour
,
shame
,
feare
,
quaking
,
dismaiyng
,
trouble
,
dreade
,
whose
definitions
you
shall
eftsones
finde
with
Cicero
in
the
same
fourthe
booke
of
Tusculans
questions
.
To
these
béen
adioyned
flatterie
,
whiche
also
is
termed
Timorous
inticement
:
Suspicion
a
feare
through
a
consideracion
of
mischiefe
at
hande
:
dispeyre
a
low
abashement
of
the
minde
:
Pensiuenesse
a
prickinge
care
through
the
expectation
of
euill
,
and
some
other
mo
fourmes
.
Cicero
hath
descriued
shame
,
and
hath
not
defined
it
.
The
definicion
may
be
absolued
,
that
shame
may
be
a
feare
of
dishonesty
,
whome
blushing
doth
follow
,
wherof
hereafter
we
will
debate
more
at
large
in
Chapiter
of
Sober
moode
.
Of
Boldnesse
.
Cap.
x.
BOldenesse
is
gaged
against
feare
,
that
we
may
in
this
place
vnderstand
a
moderate
vertu
of
aduenturing
and
a
confidence
of
the
mind
,
&
a
certain
mediocrity
betwixt
to
much
and
to
litle
either
betweene
timiditie
and
vnmeasurable
hope
,
by
which
any
one
neither
dreadyng
mischief
like
to
chaunce
,
nor
present
,
doth
aduenturously
icoperde
his
ioynctes
.
This
is
engendred
otherwise
than
feare
,
through
the
extending
of
the
harte
,
the
Spirites
augmenting
the
heat
therof
:
through
whose
force
by
reason
that
the
mind
is
gouerned
more
often
than
by
reason
and
counsell
,
the
appellacion
of
boldnes
is
welme
taken
in
the
worse
parte
.
It
is
disagreeable
vnto
true
Fortitude
,
which
when
as
prudently
the
daunger
is
throughly
examined
aduentureth
the
same
with
a
manly
courage
.
And
doubtlesse
hetherto
of
affections
:
whose
moderation
is
verye
requisite
for
such
as
contende
to
the
wished
end
by
vertues
,
that
also
we
may
enioye
a
certaine
tranquilitye
of
minde
in
the
Earth
which
in
Greeke
is
called
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
whiche
Democritus
defined
the
bound
of
good
thinges
,
and
the
●igure
and
semblaunce
of
that
vnfained
Beatitude
to
come
:
The
which
without
the
benefite
of
Christ
,
who
only
is
of
power
to
appease
the
moodes
of
men
through
the
confidence
of
life
which
shall
happen
,
no
wight
at
any
season
hath
obteined
.
Of
Vertue
and
her
diuision
and
Originall
.
Cap.
xi
.
VNto
the
ende
purposed
in
the
beginning
all
the
actions
of
menne
are
directed
:
to
the
whiche
they
aspire
vertue
beinge
the
guide
,
which
very
breefely
may
be
defined
.
A
perfection
by
which
the
will
is
pricked
to
do
agreably
to
right
reason
.
For
vnder
the
appellacion
of
right
reason
we
vnderstand
the
law
of
Nature
,
and
the
knowledges
of
those
thinges
which
are
ingendred
with
vs
,
and
ingraffed
from
aboue
in
our
minds
,
that
we
may
iustly
determine
of
things
good
and
bad
,
honest
and
filthy
:
as
,
that
God
is
to
bée
worshipped
,
that
no
man
is
to
be
hurted
,
and
such
like
,
the
whiche
shall
gaily
be
called
the
Squire
of
vertue
,
vnto
whiche
the
operation
of
the
whole
life
may
be
directed
:
with
whom
lesse
it
doth
consente
it
can
not
be
nominated
a
vertue
.
Vertue
is
defined
of
Saint
Augustine
,
Ars
bene
re●●eque
viuendi
:
A
science
to
liue
well
and
perfectly
.
Of
Cicero
it
is
termed
somtimes
Recta
ratio
,
a
right
reason
,
sometimes
Animi
Habitus
,
a
custome
of
the
minde
,
aunswerable
vnto
humane
nature
,
meane
,
and
reason
:
sometimes
Affectio
animi
constans
conueniensque
a
stedfast
and
a
conuenient
affection
,
of
the
mind
,
makinge
them
commendable
in
whome
it
persisteth
.
But
of
Aristotle
it
is
defined
Habitus
animi
iudicio
susceptus
in
mediocritate
positus
,
A
custome
of
the
minde
enterprised
through
reason
situated
in
mediocritie
.
In
these
definitions
this
worde
Constans
expoundeth
what
manner
of
thinge
Habitus
is
,
that
wee
vnderstand
him
to
be
procured
through
vse
,
and
exercise
.
That
it
is
saide
,
Ratione
susceptus
,
enterprised
,
or
receiued
through
reason
,
that
is
to
wit
through
election
or
aduise
:
that
signifieth
that
the
operation
of
vertue
is
voluntarie
.
That
it
is
called
Habitus
animi
,
a
custom
of
the
minde
,
that
doth
commonstrate
the
habitacle
of
vertue
.
That
it
is
,
in
mediocritate
positus
,
placed
in
a
competent
degree
,
that
is
expressed
in
these
wordes
of
Horace
.
¶
Vertue
is
a
meane
in
middes
degree
Closde
in
both
sides
as
thou
mayst
see
.
That
we
may
conceiue
all
vertues
to
be
made
moderated
by
a
certaine
measurable
rate
,
which
should
be
approued
of
wise
persons
,
and
skilfull
in
many
cases
,
and
good
.
But
when
we
affirme
that
the
operacion
of
vertue
is
voluntary
,
either
taken
in
hande
through
a
frée
Iudgement
:
that
is
to
be
considered
,
that
we
being
furthered
by
the
secret
benefite
of
God
,
and
succoure
of
the
holy
Ghoste
,
withoute
whom
wée
are
of
strength
to
worke
nothing
,
obaying
the
right
sentence
of
the
minde
,
indeuoring
with
voluntarie
will
,
may
procure
the
perfection
of
vertue
through
diligence
and
frequent
vse
.
For
these
be
the
two
principall
efficient
causes
of
vertue
,
a
minde
iudgyng
rightly
,
and
a
will
obeiyng
him
which
iudgeth
and
commaundeth
not
amisse
:
Whiche
yet
are
very
much
succoured
through
learnynge
,
the
which
may
make
brightsom
the
vnderstandynge
of
those
sentences
,
who
are
within
vs
by
nature
,
and
the
light
geuen
of
God
oftentimes
obscured
throughe
wonderfull
darkenesse
,
as
the
booke
of
holy
Scripture
conteining
the
.x.
Commaundementes
,
and
through
an
encouragyng
of
natiue
procliuitie
,
&
through
Discipline
or
obseruacion
of
manners
,
and
peinfulnesse
in
gouernynge
operacions
,
as
the
shunning
of
Idlenesse
,
and
of
these
thinges
which
minister
an
occasion
of
offending
.
Plato
writeth
in
his
booke
Meno
,
vertue
to
be
geuen
of
God
,
not
to
be
ingendred
in
vs
of
nature
(
as
the
Stoikes
would
)
neither
to
consist
only
by
practise
,
as
the
Peripatetikes
reported
.
Certes
it
is
to
bee
thought
that
true
vertues
do
not
chaunce
vnlesse
through
a
celestiall
benefite
:
Touchynge
viciousnesse
there
is
no
doubte
that
it
is
voluntarie
.
Very
aptly
then
it
seemeth
to
be
graunted
that
humaine
operations
are
without
compulsion
and
that
all
vertues
and
vices
are
voluntary
.
For
what
is
done
by
coaction
,
that
meriteth
neither
prayse
,
nor
disprayse
:
but
is
esteemed
worthy
of
forgeuenesse
.
Vertue
is
sundred
of
others
into
two
partes
:
Iustice
&
Fortitude
,
and
of
others
into
un
Prudence
Iustice
,
Fortitude
,
and
Temperaunce
.
Some
suppose
vertue
,
as
the
whole
to
consist
of
members
,
whiche
beynge
applied
to
sundry
actions
,
may
be
of
efficacie
to
constitute
diuers
fourmes
,
whereas
of
all
,
one
perfect
vertue
may
be
absolued
:
neither
is
there
any
one
of
them
foure
vertues
whiche
may
want
the
felowship
of
the
residew
.
Aristotle
in
only
prudencie
supporteth
all
vertues
to
be
knitted
together
.
Wee
approuynge
the
diuision
of
olde
Philosophers
,
will
distribute
vertue
into
them
foure
braunces
,
whiche
euen
now
wee
haue
placed
:
of
whom
the
first
doth
gouerne
the
intelligence
,
the
rest
the
wil
:
to
which
may
be
annected
whatsoeuer
vertue
els
where
may
be
traced
out
.
And
first
and
formost
we
will
minister
talke
of
Prudencie
,
in
whose
rehersall
also
Domestical
and
Politique
affaires
shall
compendiouslye
be
remembred
,
which
hereafter
(
if
we
shal
thinke
good
)
shall
be
debated
more
at
large
.
Plato
of
these
foure
vertues
,
doth
name
some
perfecte
,
who
haue
fired
there
restynge
places
in
the
minde
:
of
whiche
suche
is
the
societie
emonge
them
,
that
one
being
taken
away
,
all
do
fall
vnto
corruption
:
but
some
vnperfecte
,
of
which
certaine
,
others
being
exempted
,
notwithstandinge
maye
bee
able
to
remaine
.
Ther
is
an
other
particion
of
Vertues
,
by
which
they
are
diuided
,
into
politike
,
Purgatory
,
and
of
the
soule
clensed
,
and
into
them
as
are
like
Paternes
,
and
examples
:
which
Macrobius
dooth
copiously
depainte
in
the
eight
Chapiter
of
his
former
booke
of
Commentaries
on
the
dreame
of
Scipio
.
The
firste
Salomon
teacheth
in
his
Prouerbs
,
the
others
wee
reade
in
Ecclesiastes
,
the
third
in
the
Ballets
,
the
fourth
in
God
.
The
politique
do
rule
humayn
life
,
eke
maintayne
the
outward
society
of
life
:
The
Purgatory
doo
scoure
the
spots
of
the
soules
,
and
do
contend
vnto
victory
.
But
the
vertues
of
the
soule
clensed
are
collocated
in
him
,
which
(
the
vices
now
quite
troden
vnder
foote
)
doth
constantly
perseuer
in
the
loue
of
vertues
:
which
S.
Augustine
,
when
as
he
confirmed
the
other
three
,
did
not
alow
.
They
are
commonly
termed
Exemplares
paterus
and
examples
,
which
are
as
it
were
Ideae
(
as
the
Greekes
do
call
them
)
or
els
fourms
and
figures
in
the
diuine
mind
,
sith
God
is
the
counterpaine
of
all
good
thinges
.
Vertue
is
defined
of
Cicero
,
as
it
is
declared
,
somtimes
Recta
racio
a
right
reason
,
somtimes
Natura
in
se
perfecta
,
&
ad
sumum
perducta
,
a
nature
sounde
in
it selfe
,
and
brought
vnto
the
vtmost
:
Otherwhiles
Rationis
perfectio
,
a
perfection
of
reason
,
which
definition
Seneca
imitatinge
,
doth●
recorde
:
Vertue
is
none
other
than
an
vpright
reason
,
vnto
which
as
a
rule
all
the
doinges
of
life
are
directed
.
And
feately
euery
Originall
of
vertue
proceedeth
from
perfect
reason
,
neither
is
vertue
any
other
thing
,
then
(
as
Cicero
minionly
descriueth
)
a
right
affection
of
the
minde
,
from
whom
as
it
were
from
som
Fountaine
all
vndefyled
operations
,
which
are
nominated
dewties
,
do
proceede
,
of
which
Cicero
hath
excellently
written
.
And
thus
I
suppose
it
bee
vnderstanded
(
because
manie
haue
affirmed
that
ther
is
one
onely
vertue
)
that
perdie
there
is
one
office
either
an
action
appointed
to
euery
man
of
vprighte
reason
,
which
(
accordinge
to
the
multiplicity
of
the
mater
which
it
handleth
,
inclined
to
sundrie
affayres
,
)
may
procreat
these
foure
vertues
,
which
we
haue
remembred
aboue
.
For
ther
is
in
very
déede
,
onely
one
perfect
affection
of
the
minde
,
the
mother
of
all
vertues
:
whose
chaungeable
appellations
bee
,
Prudence
,
Iustice
,
Fortitude
,
Temperaunce
,
of
whiche
wee
will
reason
in
order
:
if
first
wee
shall
géeue
this
in
Lesson
,
not
onely
these
whiche
are
called
the
giftes
of
the
holy
Ghoste
,
but
likewise
all
true
vertues
(
as
Plato
deuoutely
supposed
in
that
Dialogue
which
I
haue
recited
afore
)
to
chaunce
vnto
vs
by
no
meanes
,
vnles
by
an
heauenly
benefite
:
vndoubtedly
if
we
embrace
the
goodnesses
of
God
,
and
labour
to
attaine
to
the
ende
,
hee
beinge
oure
guide
.
Of
Prudencie
.
Cap.
xij
.
PRudencie
,
as
it
weare
the
Maistresse
and
iudge
of
other
vertues
,
of
which
none
can
be
destitute
,
is
fitly
placed
in
the
first
degree
,
as
the
Capitaine
of
operacions
,
and
the
science
of
liuing
:
which
is
defined
of
Cicero
,
the
experience
of
desiring
,
and
eschewinge
thinges
:
that
is
to
wit
a
right
affection
of
the
minde
,
by
which
it
is
perceiued
what
is
to
be
done
or
shunned
in
humayn
actions
.
Of
Cornificius
in
bookes
of
Rhetorik
vnto
Herennius
,
it
is
termed
Calliditas
a
s●ines
,
which
through
a
certaine
reason
maye
obtaine
a
choise
both
of
good
and
badde
,
because
all
the
facultie
of
wisdom
is
ap●rooued
in
the
election
of
good
and
euill
●●ings
,
&
of
them
as
be
neither
good
nor
●●●ll
.
He
vnderstandeth
a
wilynesse
,
not
〈◊〉
vicious
,
who
oft
times
boroweth
〈◊〉
same
appellacion
,
but
that
subtility
●ch
priuyly
vndermineth
with
a
cer●ne
honest
,
and
profitable
dissimula●n
.
Vnto
the
which
,
craftie
sayinges
,
●d
deceiptfull
doynges
,
which
in
war●
are
called
Stratagemes
,
are
refer●
Of
the
same
writer
also
prudencie
●ermed
Multarum
rerum
memoria
,
〈◊〉
memory
of
many
matters
,
and
the
〈◊〉
of
plentifull
affaires
.
Although
per●●isdom
as
other
vertues
,
is
conuer●nte
in
humaine
actions
.
Notwith●nding
especially
trouth
is
Subiecte
●erto
,
as
the
mattier
,
which
it
hand●h
.
And
certes
the
inquisicion
and
●arche
of
soothe
,
seemeth
to
be
peculiar
〈◊〉
man
.
Vnto
the
out
finding
of
veritie
●ue
vertues
comprehended
vnder
In●elligence
are
adioygned
of
Aristotle
:
Science
,
Arte
,
Prudence
,
Sapience
,
vnderstanding
of
which
,
Science
,
Sapience
and
vnderstandynge
require
a
a
definite
knowledge
,
cake
an
absolute
vertue
:
Art
and
prudencie
a
probable
one
.
Science
is
defined
,
a
sure
and
an
established
knowledge
and
learninge
of
some
matter
through
the
cause
,
whiche
is
perceaued
withoute
any
ayde
by
naturall
motions
of
the
minde
,
or
els
it
is
atchiued
through
demonstration
of
argumentes
:
and
it
is
of
those
thinges
whiche
may
not
otherwise
exist
,
or
els
be
transfigured
,
as
diuinity
.
Arte
is
said
a
perfection
to
dispatche
those
things
by
reason
which
otherwise
may
be
:
as
all
humaine
craftes
.
Prudency
is
defined
,
A
qualitie
to
perfourme
those
thinges
by
reason
which
are
either
commodious
or
hurtfull
to
man
.
Sapience
verely
,
is
a
most
exquisit
knowledge
of
those
matters
,
whiche
are
able
to
bee
learned
of
man
,
who
compriseth
the
experience
of
diuine
and
human
affaires
.
Vnderstanding
is
called
a
qualitie
,
perceauing
the
principles
,
out
of
which
confirmations
are
deducted
.
Vnto
Prudency
he
annected
Art
,
Science
,
Intelligence
and
Sapience
;
that
althoughe
verely
he
gainesaieth
Vertue
to
be
a
Science
,
yet
he
supposeth
that
shee
is
not
of
power
to
perseuer
without
this
.
For
althoughe
onely
goodnesse
is
purposed
to
vertues
,
and
trouth
vnto
Disciplines
:
yet
wheras
to
the
searche
hereof
a
greedinesse
of
good
is
coupled
.
Science
,
Sapience
,
Art
,
and
Intelligence
,
appere
that
they
may
not
absurdely
be
nominated
vertues
,
if
they
serue
for
the
operations
of
Prudence
,
&
succoure
the
outfindinge
of
that
which
is
good
.
They
ought
not
attende
verelye
to
the
contemplacion
of
causes
only
,
sithens
all
the
commendacion
of
Vertue
consisteth
in
dooinge
,
and
in
gouerning
the
life
vndefiledly
.
Prudency
then
may
take
vnto
her
as
waytynge
mates
,
vnderstanding
,
for
to
know
matters
:
Science
truly
to
conceiue
them
:
Arte
for
the
generall
vse
of
life
:
Sapience
for
the
out
tracting
of
diuers
things
that
by
these
props
she
may
passe
to
the
knowledge
of
trouth
,
and
may
comprehend
the
verie
Soueraine
good
,
and
the
liuely
Fountaine
of
all
wisdome
flowing
with
Heauenly
waters
,
&
rushinge
forth
moste
swiftly
into
eternall
lyfe
.
Now
wheras
vnto
euery
vertu
certain
seats
in
the
soule
,
from
whence
they
issue
,
are
attributed
:
A
place
is
graunted
to
Prudencie
in
the
minde
,
to
the
remnaunt
in
the
will
:
sith
it
belongeth
to
prudencie
to
bolt
out
what
is
honest
,
or
wicked
in
matters
to
be
handled
and
to
debate
of
the
same
with
iustful
sentence
.
Which
thyng
doubtlesse
is
adepted
not
only
by
wit
,
although
sharpe
,
but
by
a
greate
knowledge
of
sundry
matters
.
And
very
pretely
it
is
sayd
,
Longo
prudentia
surgit
ab
vsu
,
Prudence
ariseth
through
longe
practise
:
that
we
vnderstand
the
perfection
of
the
minde
,
whence
creepeth
this
dexteritie
of
triynge
out
the
truth
,
to
be
termed
prudencie
,
who
desireth
a
longe
life
,
and
the
handlynge
,
and
memory
of
diuers
matters
,
and
the
science
of
present
cases
to
leuel
vprightly
the
interchaungeable
operation
of
men
.
Moreouer
it
is
requisite
that
a
prudent
man
be
polished
with
a
certain
natiue
faculty
of
through
seyng
and
adiudgyng
the
trouth
:
by
whiche
he
may
contemplate
thinges
present
,
and
diligently
discusse
them
,
may
call
to
remembrance
matters
past
,
&
may
foresee
sequels
:
through
whiche
he
may
excell
in
takyng
aduise
,
and
in
outfindyng
wittily
:
through
which
he
may
passe
in
perceauyng
clerely
what
is
true
in
ech
matter
,
and
what
is
to
be
attempted
:
through
which
he
may
florish
in
proposinge
sentence
iustfully
,
eake
in
ratifiyng
subtely
and
wisyly
what
is
decent
,
what
filthie
,
what
profitable
.
For
there
are
three
partes
conteined
vnder
wysdome
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
a
facultie
of
ministrynge
holsom
counsell
,
good
aduise
:
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
a
perfect
sight
and
cunnyng
in
finishinge
of
that
whiche
is
excogitated
through
profitable
counsell
:
and
Gnome
,
a
sentence
and
iust
verdit
of
matters
to
bée
perfourmed
,
and
a
stedfastnesse
in
that
which
is
leyfull
.
It
is
the
duty
than
of
a
prudente
wighte
(
that
I
may
driue
my
tale
at
his
marke
in
few
wordes
)
to
remember
those
thinges
which
are
past
,
to
be
skilfull
in
many
matters
,
to
flowe
in
counsell
,
to
be
quicke
witted
,
and
to
Iudge
well
:
and
farthermore
to
leade
not
only
an
vndefiled
conuersacion
,
but
also
,
as
place
and
oportunity
in
this
common
life
shall
craue
,
to
becom
somwhat
more
charie
and
circumspecte
.
And
truly
concerning
the
charge
of
Prudencie
,
who
should
be
kept
in
humain
operacions
,
we
haue
treated
hitherto
.
And
by
reason
the
variety
of
doinges
apperteining
to
men
is
seuored
in
three
sortes
,
that
some
should
be
of
peculiar
persons
,
which
be
Coincident
to
euerie
one
,
and
generall
:
som
Domestical
,
which
serue
to
the
order
of
Family
:
others
ciuill
which
we
muste
put
in
vre
,
for
the
preseruacion
of
the
Publike
fellowship
of
menne
:
a
three
parted
force
of
wisdome
likewise
may
be
gathered
:
the
one
common
to
all
sortes
,
which
is
named
Monastica
solitary
,
the
second
Oeconomica
belongyng
to
householde
:
the
third
Politica
,
which
is
thought
to
be
the
excellentest
of
all
others
,
because
first
and
formost
it
is
busied
in
common
vtilitie
,
vnto
whiche
yet
wee
must
clime
by
degree
.
For
he
shall
not
well
gouerne
either
a
family
or
els
a
weale
publike
,
who
is
not
a
good
man
,
and
informed
with
the
rules
of
condicions
and
fashioned
vnto
euery
vertue
,
and
shall
come
prepared
to
the
common
wealth
,
and
shall
wit
perfectly
to
nurtur
an
householde
.
The
two
latter
of
these
three
members
of
Morall
Philosophie
:
Although
they
be
seuerally
debated
of
Aristotle
,
yet
in
this
place
likewise
,
because
they
are
ruled
of
prudencie
,
which
(
as
Cicero
telleth
in
his
particions
oratoriall
)
in
her
proper
affayres
is
accustomed
to
be
termed
domesticall
,
and
in
common
cases
politike
,
we
shal
descriue
.
Of
Domesticall
goueruernance
.
Cap.
xiij
.
WEe
haue
spoken
of
that
part
of
wisdom
which
is
tried
in
the
operacions
of
euery
man
:
Now
we
muste
intreate
of
that
which
is
comprehended
in
the
houshoulde
duties
whome
the
Greekes
tearme
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
that
is
to
wit
,
consideracion
well
to
trade
the
fa●ily
,
either
which
is
touchinge
the
preseruacion
of
housewifery
affaire
.
This
respect
is
busied
verely
in
the
houshold
,
as
in
the
mattier
which
it
handleth
:
to
whom
that
scope
is
propounded
,
that
it
be
wittelye
gouerned
for
the
worthinesse
of
euery
parson
.
Euery
Family
consisteth
of
two
partes
,
the
man
,
and
the
substaunce
.
The
man
compriseth
the
Husband
,
or
the
Maister
,
the
wife
,
the
Children
,
the
seruauntes
:
But
the
substaunce
conteyneth
the
house
and
worldly
pealthe
.
Let
vs
briefly
reason
of
these
orderly
,
and
let
vs
take
beginning
of
the
dutie
of
the
good
man
of
the
house
,
because
he
is
the
first
Original
of
a
Family
to
be
ordained
.
The
Lorde
of
the
place
then
,
whom
we
vnderstande
by
nature
studious
of
freendship
and
affinity
,
&
getting
children
,
ought
both
to
know
,
and
be
able
to
protecte
the
societie
of
his
wife
and
Children
,
and
gently
and
curteously
to
rule
ouer
his
,
both
Children
and
Seruauntes
:
of
which
they
oftentimes
are
of
a
more
honest
nature
,
these
commonly
of
a
more
vile
.
The
family
now
constituted
,
nourishment
is
to
be
sought
for
,
sustenance
,
apparell
and
harborough
whiche
may
defende
vs
from
stormes
,
and
inrodes
of
Beastes
.
Groundtilthe
,
Huntinge
,
Hawking
,
Fishinge
,
labour
shall
minister
Foode
.
Now
whereas
the
goodman
and
wife
are
the
cheefest
and
effeciente
causes
of
Houshould
,
and
the
Children
,
and
Seruauntes
,
as
it
weare
certaine
Instrumentes
,
and
euerie
one
are
conuersaunt
in
the
house
and
substaunce
as
the
mattier
:
we
in
this
place
first
&
formost
will
vtter
a
few
wordes
of
them
:
and
then
wee
shall
expresse
the
Offices
of
the
persons
a
little
before
nominated
.
Before
all
others
a
mansion
place
is
to
be
sought
for
,
which
the
necessitie
of
life
compelled
men
to
Builde
,
that
they
might
haue
whether
to
trudge
,
as
birdes
into
their
Nestes
,
Beastes
,
into
their
couerts
:
In
the
beginning
houses
were
erected
for
a
seruiceable
vse
,
forth
with
by
littel
and
littel
Ornamentes
approched
therto
.
Especially
a
confideracion
is
to
bee
had
of
the
profite
and
commodity
,
and
next
of
eche
ones
dignitie
.
Ouermuche
coste
and
hurtfull
sumptuousnes
,
it
not
to
be
admitted
in
building
,
and
that
the
house
,
as
he
counseled
,
want
not
ground
.
The
holesomnesse
and
fitnesse
of
place
is
to
be
viewed
,
and
manie
moe
,
which
Victrunius
and
Philosophers
,
who
haue
written
,
de
re
familiari
,
diligently
haue
expressed
.
And
hetherto
recheth
the
discourse
of
the
house
:
henceforth
wee
ought
to
dispute
of
affaires
apperteining
to
Familie
.
That
is
either
naturall
,
and
the
worthieste
,
of
all
:
as
Husbandry
,
Hunting
,
Fishing
,
Or
els
artificious
,
which
considereth
gaine
:
as
traueiles
&
trades
throughe
which
the
liuinge
is
adepted
.
Besides
there
are
others
partly
liberall
,
partely
seruile
,
as
the
crafte
of
Painting
,
as
the
drawinge
of
similitudes
,
as
the
science
of
buildinge
,
which
are
brought
to
perfection
both
by
witte
and
trauaile
.
Of
these
Artes
(
which
are
many
and
chaungeable
,
inuented
for
the
diuers
wantes
of
men
)
the
good
man
of
the
house
ought
to
put
that
in
practise
in
whiche
he
shall
haue
skill
,
and
should
prouide
sustenaunce
honestly
for
him
and
his
without
pillinge
and
pollinge
of
any
man
:
He
ought
to
auoyde
incommodious
and
hatefull
trades
,
and
ought
to
searche
for
the
profitable
.
The
lucre
of
Vsurers
,
and
of
Escheters
,
or
of
such
as
do
selfe
any
maner
of
thing
for
a
forfaiture
is
odious
.
Likewise
the
gaine
of
those
Marchauntes
who
are
enriched
with
forged
tales
is
filthy
,
which
be
the
seruauntes
of
Delyces
.
The
maister
of
the
house
ought
to
preserue
such
things
which
are
gotten
,
&
ought
to
vse
them
temperatly
,
and
ought
to
vnderstande
that
it
is
not
lesser
cunninge
to
saue
them
than
to
procure
them
.
And
these
thinges
haue
wee
compendiously
made
manifest
touchinge
the
house
and
housholde
prouision
:
Now
we
will
pursue
the
charges
or
offices
of
houshold
dwellers
,
and
first
of
the
good
man
,
of
whom
before
we
began
to
treate
of
.
His
cheefeste
regarde
shal
bee
,
to
marry
a
wife
,
which
is
a
companion
and
a
copartner
of
life
and
goods
,
honest
,
prudent
,
welny
as
riche
as
him selfe
,
not
proude
,
nor
more
curious
then
néedeth
,
or
els
waywarde
,
whiche
may
bothe
be
loued
,
and
loue
.
He
shal
intreate
her
no
otherwise
than
him selfe
a
Leagfellow
and
a
partener
as
of
Seruice
and
Domesticall
toyle
,
so
likewise
of
all
casualties
and
affaires
:
And
perdie
he
shall
loue
her
only
ioigned
vnto
him
with
a
bonde
not
able
to
be
dissolued
,
and
as
becommeth
a
free
woman
,
he
shall
not
withhold
her
ouer
rigorously
,
if
so
that
no
iuste
feare
of
Chastity
doth
interrupte
.
Neither
shall
he
handle
her
vnciuily
,
but
honestly
,
godly
,
comely
,
courteously
,
gentelly
,
that
he
remember
how
he
is
a
Christian
man
,
the
head
perdie
of
his
wife
,
but
whome
he
oughte
to
tender
as
the
halfe
part
of
him selfe
,
and
permit
her
also
to
vse
her
certaine
peculier
right
.
He
shall
traine
vp
the
Children
begotten
of
his
wife
diligently
,
he
shall
fashion
them
to
vertue
and
godlinesse
beyng
as
yet
tender
,
and
shal
prouide
them
to
be
instituted
with
holsome
and
expedient
trades
:
he
shal
seeke
his
pelth
by
his
owne
trauell
and
industrie
vertuously
,
and
without
enuie
:
and
he
shal
keepe
a
commendable
trade
of
clodding
substance
,
either
by
makyng
of
Contractes
,
either
by
doyng
of
workes
,
or
els
through
more
honest
and
better
meanes
to
espie
out
riches
and
promocions
(
whiche
are
ver●…
many
)
he
shall
minister
foode
bothe
to
himself
and
his
,
if
necessitie
shall
vrge
him
to
seeke
.
If
so
be
the
wealth
is
not
to
be
gotten
with
paynes
takynge
,
but
is
left
of
the
parentes
,
he
shal
protecte
the
same
hedely
,
&
he
shal
imploy
costes
wisely
and
moderatly
,
an
aduyse
beyng
had
of
the
place
and
condition
,
that
neither
he
may
be
accompted
a
greedy
gut
,
nor
an
outragious
spender
,
and
had
leiffer
at
al
season
both
to
be
recitened
,
and
also
to
be
more
liberal
,
than
couetous
.
If
the
master
hath
seruauntes
,
he
shall
know
to
vse
them
wel
,
and
he
shal
instruct
them
,
and
shal
freendly
intreate
them
.
But
if
they
being
hyred
for
meed
do
faithfully
serue
,
he
shal
consider
their
paynes
,
and
shal
exercise
them
in
conuenient
trauel
,
he
shal
not
fatigate
them
:
and
he
shal
nourish
them
as
it
becommeth
,
he
shal
see
vnto
them
as
the
necessarie
instrumentes
of
the
house
,
and
he
shal
keepe
them
in
awe
,
nor
shal
permit
them
to
be
aduaunced
arrogantly
.
He
shal
pay
them
gentely
their
couenant
at
due
time
.
If
there
shal
be
many
seruantes
,
they
are
to
be
preferre●
either
to
a
more
excellent
or
vyler
office
as
ech
ones
capacitie
requireth
.
The
wyfe
ought
to
respecte
the
house
painefully
and
dayly
,
and
ought
to
be
present
at
domesticall
doynges
,
she
ought
to
marke
the
chayres
of
her
seruantes
:
she
ought
to
reuerence
her
husbande
,
not
curst
and
snappish
,
but
pudique
,
and
she
ought
to
keepe
cleanly
both
her
maydes
and
children
,
and
al
the
rest
pliant
and
peasible
in
their
office
:
She
ought
not
to
be
stately
,
not
sumptuous
,
nor
yet
beastly
,
but
appareled
with
decent
attier
accordyng
to
habilitie
.
Her
chiefest
regard
ought
to
be
in
bringyng
vp
her
children
honestly
.
She
ought
to
deuyse
to
encrease
her
goods
,
&
ought
to
keepe
that
with
sobernesse
,
whiche
is
gotten
with
the
toyle
of
her
husband
.
The
children
ought
to
reuerence
their
parentes
they
ought
to
loue
them
&
(
as
God
him selfe
hath
commaunded
)
they
ought
to
honour
them
,
they
ought
willingly
to
execute
their
commaundements
,
they
ought
to
be
obedient
to
them
in
all
respectes
,
they
ought
likewise
to
obey
their
schole
masters
,
which
are
the
instructours
of
the
minde
,
&
as
it
were
second
parents
,
For
they
both
are
charged
with
one
thing
,
to
trayne
vp
youthe
vertuously
.
They
ought
to
apply
the
studies
appoynted
them
,
they
should
eschew
idlenesse
and
pleasure
before
the
rest
as
pernicious
plagues
:
they
ought
to
reuerence
their
elders
,
and
magistrates
as
well
spirituall
as
temporall
,
and
the
honest
persons
and
discreete
:
But
they
ought
to
esteeme
those
with
a
certayne
principal
good
will
of
whom
both
their
vtteraunce
and
harte
are
decked
with
right
excellent
sciences
vnto
all
humanitie
.
The
seruantes
ought
to
be
obedient
and
faithfull
to
their
maysters
,
herkenyng
to
their
precept
,
and
alwaies
bent
to
finish
their
commaundement
:
they
ought
to
haue
in
reuerence
,
&
loue
their
maisters
as
their
parentes
;
they
ought
to
be
thriftie
,
appayde
with
a
moderate
liuing
,
and
requisite
apparel
,
thei
ought
willyngly
to
enlarge
the
riches
of
their
maysters
,
they
ought
to
steale
nothyng
priuily
:
They
ought
paciently
to
suffer
their
mayster
,
if
he
shal
be
more
curious
than
needeth
;
if
he
shal
be
more
easie
to
please
,
they
may
not
neglecte
him
.
Whether
it
be
leiful
for
Christians
,
to
haue
bondemen
,
and
whether
any
may
be
bondmen
by
nature
(
which
thing
Aristotle
alloweth
)
I
leaue
to
be
discussed
of
others
.
Of
Politike
gouernance
.
Cap.
xiiij
.
EVen
as
a
Family
consisteth
of
particuler
men
,
so
doth
a
City
of
many
Families
,
of
which
presently
we
will
debate
.
In
a
common
weale
wel
to
be
gouerned
,
Prudencie
is
cheefely
tried
,
withoute
which
no
societie
of
man
can
be
ruled
.
Politike
gouernaunce
,
or
els
a
weale
Publike
is
defined
of
Plutarchus
in
his
booke
De
tribus
Reipub.
generibus
,
a
state
and
order
of
a
Citie
,
to
be
obserued
in
ruling
of
matters
.
This
Ciuill
wisdom
prescribeth
the
actions
of
Citizens
:
eke
is
altogether
occupied
in
defendinge
the
societie
of
man
,
as
in
the
matter
which
it
hath
taken
in
hand
to
be
reasoned
vpon
:
and
hath
that
scope
propounded
vnto
her selfe
,
that
the
weale
publik
may
be
discretly
handled
,
and
that
prouision
may
be
made
for
the
sauegard
of
the
inhabitantes
.
Aristotle
gaue
this
difference
betwixt
a
Family
and
a
common
wealth
,
that
in
the
common
wealthe
there
shoulde
be
an
equalitie
of
prerogatiue
,
by
which
the
highest
shoulde
be
valued
with
the
lowe
:
But
in
the
houshold
the
Maister
should
haue
the
Empire
of
a
King
ouer
his
children
and
Seruauntes
,
as
his
Subiectes
amonge
whom
the
like
equality
can
not
be
.
Of
common
weales
sixe
fourmes
are
recited
:
three
good
,
which
the
prince
,
the
Nobilitie
and
the
commens
do
minister
iustfully
,
and
conueniently
for
for
the
general
profite
of
the
whole
Citie
:
and
so
many
wicked
,
which
the
Tiraunte
,
and
the
bande
of
a
fewe
,
and
the
●eane
people
do
gouern
as
their
owne
●st
impelleth
them
,
haling
all
thinges
●o
their
proper
behoofe
.
There
appea●eth
no
Citie
of
any
nation
,
which
may
●ot
be
referred
to
some
of
these
.
That
Common
weale
whiche
consisteth
of
them
three
whiche
are
esteemed
good
,
Cicero
in
his
bookes
De
Repub
:
supposeth
to
be
best
,
by
reason
it
is
more
excelent
,
more
profitable
,
and
of
lenger
perpetuitie
than
the
rest
.
Amonge
the
Romanes
,
after
the
kynges
expelled
out
of
their
Realmes
,
euen
vnto
Iulius
and
Augustus
Respub:
Democratica
,
the
fourme
of
the
common
wealth
where
the
people
had
authoritie
without
any
other
state
seemeth
to
haue
ben
so
tempred
with
a
certaine
moderation
of
the
kyngdome
of
Aristocratia
whiche
is
a
state
of
a
Weale
publike
,
where
many
rule
that
are
moste
worthie
in
vertue
,
and
prowesse
,
that
a
certaine
Princely
maiestie
did
excell
in
the
Consuls
Aristocraria
in
the
senators
,
Democratia
in
the
Tribunes
of
the
common
sorte
,
but
the
cheefest
power
was
in
the
possession
of
the
people
.
Now
a
princely
Monarchy
ratified
by
the
aduice
of
prudente
Peeres
,
and
Sauced
with
vnremoouable
decrées
appeareth
worthelie
to
be
aduaunced
before
al
others
for
commodity
and
quietnesse
especialy
sithens
not
by
election
,
but
throughe
a
certaine
Heauenlie
prouidence
Realmes
are
transported
to
the
Children
of
Kinges
&
Princes
generated
through
the
Lawe
of
bloud
beinge
the
successours
of
their
Parents
,
or
vnto
the
next
of
aliaunce
.
Because
perdy
a
Citie
consisteth
of
the
multitude
of
Cittizens
leadinge
their
liues
vprightly
,
let
vs
manifest
what
ones
they
ought
to
be
.
He
is
to
be
named
a
good
Citizen
of
his
countrie
,
who
being
trimmed
with
ciuill
vertues
,
and
espicially
with
Iustice
and
Fortitude
,
whom
Prudence
,
and
Temperaunce
,
do
moderate
,
may
be
able
to
perfourme
very
well
not
only
Domestical
and
familier
offices
,
but
also
Publike
both
at
home
,
and
in
warre
.
There
is
neede
of
common
Schoolemaisters
bothe
honest
and
lerned
to
declare
vertues
,
through
whose
trauel
Children
gaily
instituted
from
their
youth
,
may
depart
exquisite
in
honesty
and
Godlinesse
,
and
through
the
knowledge
of
most
excellent
matters
,
become
profitable
members
to
their
countrie
.
If
so
be
the
riches
of
the
Parentes
may
not
beare
,
that
their
Children
by
leasure
may
be
enriched
with
liberall
studies
:
the
next
remedie
is
that
they
be
learned
som
kinde
of
occupacion
,
whereby
they
may
get
their
liuing
.
Ydlenesse
and
pleasure
verely
are
diligently
to
be
shunned
of
all
men
:
Alwaies
studie
,
and
an
honeste
and
commodious
exercise
bothe
of
the
minde
and
body
is
to
be
required
.
By
al
meanes
possible
it
is
to
be
laboured
of
all
good
citizens
,
but
principally
of
the
Parents
and
instructours
,
that
by
reason
children
,
and
youthstate
can
easilie
imitate
any
thinge
,
they
may
lighten
them
in
the
purity
of
life
,
and
may
be
a
paterne
of
vertu
to
their
younger
:
Let
euery
occasion
of
trespassyng
,
as
much
as
habilitie
will
geue
leaue
,
be
taken
away
:
Let
the
enticementes
of
concupiscence
and
wantonnesse
be
remoued
:
Let
obedience
be
exhibited
to
the
magistrate
,
if
he
be
good
.
As
to
the
father
of
the
country
,
vnto
whom
authoritie
is
geuen
from
aboue
:
But
if
he
be
ill
,
let
him
pacienly
be
suffered
,
and
without
sedicion
modestly
and
meekely
be
admonished
of
his
duty
.
Let
the
Lawes
be
obserued
:
Let
Religion
cheefely
be
reuerenced
:
Let
peace
and
concord
be
kept
among
the
Citizens
.
Let
euery
cause
of
discord
be
eschewed
.
Let
euery
manne
haue
a
respect
to
his
owne
businesse
:
Neither
let
any
man
giue
him selfe
to
beare
Office
in
the
common
weale
vnlesse
he
be
called
:
Let
rest
alwaies
be
soughte
for
:
Let
pencions
be
paide
:
Let
the
countrey
be
most
deare
to
euery
man
,
for
whom
a
good
Citezen
shall
not
feare
to
die
,
if
neede
shall
require
.
For
the
cheefest
loue
next
vnto
God
is
due
to
the
Countrey
,
and
to
the
Magistrate
:
the
next
to
the
Parentes
and
kinsfulke
,
the
third
to
the
Citizens
linked
or
vnited
together
through
the
commonnesse
of
Lawe
.
Let
Foriners
or
Straungers
peruse
their
businesse
,
nor
let
them
be
ouer
inqisitiue
in
other
mens
affaires
.
Let
them
behaue
them
elues
modestly
.
It
is
the
charge
of
a
magistrate
,
to
gouerne
the
weale
publike
wittily
:
to
vse
them
moderately
and
warily
,
ouer
whom
he
beareth
rule
(
whiche
he
cannot
absolue
,
vnlesse
he
be
of
an
honest
minde
and
good
iudgement
,
as
a
wyse
and
prudent
man
)
to
mainteyne
the
lawes
,
that
they
may
be
obserued
,
to
the
whiche
also
he
himselfe
shall
obey
:
To
behaue
himself
decently
accordyng
to
the
dignitie
of
state
,
which
he
hath
put
on
,
courteously
,
modestly
,
iustly
,
not
filthely
,
not
couetously
,
not
proudely
,
not
waiwardly
,
not
cruelly
:
to
geue
vpright
sentence
to
al
men
:
to
minister
no
rigorousnesse
or
parcialitie
:
to
extende
clemencie
,
sharpenesse
,
and
equitie
in
castigations
and
punishments
:
lesse
he
shuld
chastice
some
more
sharply
,
others
more
softly
which
are
accused
of
one
matter
,
except
any
thyng
interrupt
,
that
may
inforce
him
so
to
worke
agaynst
his
will
:
After
one
fashion
to
care
for
all
the
Citezens
both
riche
and
poore
,
noble
and
base
:
to
thinke
himself
to
be
the
father
of
the
common
wealth
:
to
purney
thinges
behoueable
for
the
Citie
,
as
Corne
,
if
by
chaunce
scarcitie
and
dearth
of
grayne
should
be
feared
,
as
other
thynges
of
whiche
there
shal
be
néede
in
the
extremities
of
the
common
wealth
:
And
then
next
to
haue
an
especiall
regarde
of
the
poore
,
when
as
necessitie
greatly
oppresseth
,
chiefly
a
common
penury
,
what
?
one
is
the
pouertie
of
corne
.
It
shall
be
his
parte
to
intertayne
straungers
,
and
alians
,
and
pilgrimes
freendly
and
fauorably
,
lesse
the
citie
should
be
il
spoken
of
among
foren
Nations
:
To
conclude
,
it
lieth
in
him
to
referre
all
his
cogitations
to
the
sauegard
of
the
common
wealth
:
to
attende
vpon
her
profits
and
vtilities
,
especially
to
cherish
euery
where
the
dignitie
and
reputation
thereof
.
And
because
●ne
cannot
sustaine
all
the
dueties
,
it
is
expedient
that
diuers
magistrates
vndertake
diuers
offices
:
of
which
al
notwithstanding
there
ought
to
be
the
like
studie
,
to
tender
the
profits
of
the
citezens
,
and
more
earnestly
to
seeke
for
the
commoditie
and
safegard
of
them
,
than
their
owne
.
If
so
fortune
serue
that
battell
is
to
be
waged
(
whereas
nothynge
more
pernicious
than
it
can
●e
inspired
of
God
into
the
common
●ealth
.
)
Let
that
of
Terence
be
borne
●way
.
Consilio
omnia
prius
experiri
,
●uain
armis
,
saprentem
decet
.
It
becommeth
a
wyse
man
first
to
assault
all
thinges
with
aduise
,
than
with
dent
of
sworde
.
If
the
daunger
cannot
be
with
holden
which
is
threatned
all
men
,
wee
must
geue
the
onset
prudently
,
and
we
must
repell
it
valiauntly
,
yet
no
battel
is
to
be
enterprised
but
that
whiche
is
iust
:
to
execute
the
which
wel
,
an
ear●…est
preparacion
is
to
be
taken
in
hand
:
stoute
Champions
are
to
be
sought
for
and
skilful
of
Marcial
feates
,
nor
strong
men
only
,
but
also
witty
and
Politike
:
Souldiars
must
be
sought
out
speedely
,
and
a
choise
is
to
be
gathered
of
them
:
Argent
is
to
be
Coyned
,
which
truly
is
termed
Nemus
belli
the
sinew
of
warfare
:
The
Souldiars
are
to
be
kept
in
office
,
vnto
whom
(
that
he
may
appeare
to
●ear
the
maistry
)
wage
is
to
be
attributed
at
due
time
:
And
chary
heede
is
to
be
had
that
they
spoyle
not
them
whom
they
are
hyred
to
protect
:
which
is
sufficiently
and
more
than
inough
experimented
by
the
olde
complaynt
,
bothe
of
countrie
men
and
Citizens
,
what
a
cruell
and
lothsome
a
thynge
it
is
to
the
miserable
comminaltie
.
It
is
not
meete
that
a
Magistrate
be
altogether
rude
and
vnskilful
of
chiualry
.
And
although
at
these
daies
there
is
a
far
contrary
facion
of
waging
Battel
than
in
auncient
times
,
by
reason
of
the
new
inuencion
of
Hellish
fire
,
yet
the
booke
of
Marcial
policy
shal
auaile
very
greatly
,
as
of
Flanius
vegetius
,
Iulius
Frontinus
,
Ali●nus
,
and
such
like
,
throughe
perusing
of
which
a
greate
knowledge
of
warfare
shal
be
procured
:
the
which
is
to
be
confirmed
by
the
experience
of
olde
and
sturdy
Souldiars
which
haue
been
present
at
sundry
Skirmishes
,
and
of
stout
and
Prudente
Capitaines
which
haue
learned
warlike
prowesse
through
long
practise
:
who
would
doubte
it
to
becom
moste
absolute
?
Neither
doth
this
science
appeare
lesse
conducible
to
the
Citie
,
than
Sage
wisdome
,
or
whatsoeuer
crafte
there
is
commodious
for
life
.
For
wheras
ther
be
three
sortes
of
men
in
the
common
wealthe
:
as
officers
,
which
should
rule
wel
and
iustly
:
as
Capitaines
&
Souldioures
which
should
faithfully
and
valiauntly
defend
:
as
artificers
bothe
of
comlie
and
vndecente
disciplines
,
which
should
aide
the
necessary
and
profitable
trades
:
Yet
vnto
al
them
ought
there
to
be
a
like
indeuoure
to
maintaine
the
weale
Publike
with
amiable
agreement
.
And
thus
muche
in
Politike
Prudence
to
be
considered
.
Of
Vices
contrary
to
wisdom
.
Cap.
xv
.
IGnoraunce
is
a
vice
contrary
to
wisdom
,
who
likewise
after
a
contrary
sort
may
be
defined
:
An
vnskilfulnesse
to
discerne
good
and
euill
thinges
,
or
els
to
out
finde
the
truth
,
or
to
determine
what
is
to
be
doone
,
or
what
is
to
be
left
of
.
This
is
a
common
plague
to
all
vices
,
as
prudencie
to
vertues
,
because
no
vertue
can
want
the
aduise
of
wisdom
:
and
euery
vniust
,
and
sluggish
and
vntemperate
person
,
the
same
ought
to
be
called
vnwise
.
The
companions
of
imprudence
be
,
the
errour
of
the
mynde
,
and
temeritie
repugnant
to
perfect
iudgement
:
and
the
foolysh
person
attributeth
much
vnto
Fortune
,
whom
he
reuerenceth
as
a
Goddesse
where
as
he
vseth
not
reason
and
counsell
:
and
yelding
his
good
will
to
affections
doeth
commonly
admit
those
thynges
,
of
which
afterwardes
he
repenteth
:
or
els
contrarywise
through
cowardlynesse
and
negligence
neither
regardeth
his
children
nor
wife
,
and
kepeth
no
instruction
in
his
householde
,
and
no
kinde
of
authoritie
.
If
suche
a
Magistrate
shal
be
in
the
weale
publike
the
wicked
will
suppose
that
a
licence
is
ministred
vnto
them
to
treade
amisse
:
if
there
be
suche
a
Capitayne
the
Souldiours
will
become
dastardes
,
yea
and
they
whom
he
reteyned
valiaunt
,
what
manner
of
felowes
Scipio
Amilianus
founde
before
the
destruction
of
Numantia
,
whom
he
reduced
to
theyr
antique
manlinesse
Marciall
discipline
restored
,
and
ouerslipped
no
occasion
of
any
worthy
feate
to
be
practised
.
Wilinesse
verely
is
a
vice
,
whiche
with
a
certaine
cloke
of
vertu
deludeth
the
vncircumspect
:
which
sith
it
purposeth
not
to
trauell
for
the
truthe
,
it
can
not
be
called
wisdom
,
but
a
suttell
and
a
Foxlike
counterfaiter
of
Prudencie
:
who
yet
somewhiles
is
compted
a
vertue
,
if
it
be
wrested
vnto
a
commodious
ende
.
But
the
partes
and
operations
of
Prudence
beyng
perceiued
,
it
shall
not
be
a
perplexed
businesse
to
vndermine
the
contrarie
:
Notwithstandynge
wee
must
be
very
wary
that
vices
do
not
deceiue
vs
,
whiche
appeare
to
counterfet
vertue
.
Doubtlesse
vertue
her selfe
is
a
mediocritie
welnie
betwixt
two
extremes
,
but
of
whiche
th
one
is
a
manifest
dice
,
and
is
apertly
perceiued
:
as
when
ignorance
is
set
against
wisdom
,
wrong
against
Iustice
,
cowardnesse
agaynst
Fortitude
,
Intemperance
,
agaynst
Temperaunce
,
Couetousnesse
,
against
Liberalitie
.
But
the
other
because
he
is
a
vice
,
cousin
germain
to
Vertue
is
not
so
easely
espied
,
as
when
craftinesse
or
subtiltie
is
gaiged
agaynst
wisedome
,
cruelty
against
Iustice
,
lewdhardinesse
agaynst
manlinesse
,
an
outragiousnesse
in
despising
of
pleasures
agaynst
temperance
,
Prodigalitie
against
liberalitie
,
Obstinacy
agaynst
perseuerance
.
For
as
Ouide
saies
.
And
mischiefes
are
of
kinne
to
good
,
for
vnder
that
deceiptfull
weede
,
Vertue
oftetimes
hath
borne
the
checke
,
for
vices
rootes
who
bringe
the
seede
.
Of
Iustice
.
Cap.
xvi
.
CIcero
calleth
Iustice
Dominam
ommum
&
reginam
virtutum
,
The
Lady
and
Princesse
of
al
vertues
:
and
defines
it
,
a
perfection
of
the
minde
,
whiche
the
common
vtilitie
beyng
maintened
,
yeldeth
to
euery
one
his
statelinesse
:
and
he
calleth
it
,
an
affection
of
the
minde
,
whiche
geueth
to
eche
one
his
due
,
and
defendeth
the
societie
of
humain
felowship
bountifully
and
egally
.
Moreouer
it
is
discribed
of
the
same
author
:
An
euenesse
,
geuynge
euery
one
his
right
accordyng
to
the
dignitie
and
desert
of
euery
person
:
Aristotle
calleth
it
,
an
affection
of
the
minde
,
wherby
men
are
fit
to
worke
iustfully
,
and
by
whiche
both
they
will
and
do
such
thinges
as
be
rightful
:
&
after
the
same
sorte
we
may
manifest
iniustice
,
by
which
men
exercise
wronge
,
and
are
voluntarily
inforced
to
vnlawfull
matters
.
The
Lawiers
terme
it
,
a
constant
and
a
perpetuall
will
ministryng
to
euery
man
his
right
.
For
Iustice
is
conuersant
in
distribution
of
equitie
,
as
in
the
mattier
,
that
the
equalitie
,
whiche
the
law
doth
procreate
,
may
be
preserued
.
There
be
vices
repugnant
to
euery
one
,
to
this
iniustice
,
to
the
other
iniurie
:
To
Fortitude
and
Temperance
more
.
Nothing
is
more
expedient
than
this
vertu
to
mainteyne
the
societie
of
humaine
kinde
,
nothing
more
agreable
to
nature
who
hath
fashioned
vs
vnto
al
humanity
and
natural
beneuolence
.
If
so
be
wee
are
borne
for
this
felowship
(
as
mini-only
Cicero
confirmeth
in
his
first
bake
De
legibus
)
we
must
confesse
that
we
in
like
case
are
ingendred
for
Iustice
with
out
whiche
that
societie
and
felowship
cannot
consiste
:
and
that
the
same
is
naturally
engraffed
in
vs
as
a
Torche
caried
before
one
to
work
rightful
matters
,
&
to
eschew
the
contrarie
,
through
the
opinion
of
vndeceiuable
reason
,
geuen
by
the
consent
and
benefit
of
God
:
whiche
if
it
be
ratified
with
the
vse
of
operation
,
then
at
length
a
custome
&
a
perfection
of
vertue
shal
be
procured
,
wherof
Nature
hath
geuen
as
it
were
litle
sparkes
.
Touchyng
that
which
is
called
in
question
concerning
the
mediocritie
of
Iustice
,
she
is
verely
(
as
Aristotle
deemeth
)
a
meane
:
but
she
is
placed
betwixt
both
extremities
after
another
sorte
than
the
residue
of
the
vertues
Morall
,
who
is
referred
vnto
right
and
euennesse
:
in
preseruacion
of
which
she
is
conuersante
,
euen
as
iniustice
and
iniurie
the
disquieter
of
egall
dealing
and
rightfulnesse
is
busied
in
vnequalitie
.
Of
the
partes
of
Iustice
.
Cap.
xvij
.
THE
partes
of
Iustice
be
two
:
the
one
common
and
vniuersall
,
which
is
occupied
in
preseruacion
of
the
right
of
humane
societie
,
and
it
considereth
a
common
good
,
and
learneth
vs
to
reuerence
right
and
equity
:
the
other
priuate
,
which
is
verified
in
restoring
to
euery
man
what
is
duetiful
.
And
this
is
double
:
One
which
reteineth
equality
in
fourmes
of
choppinge
and
chaunging
together
,
and
in
affaires
,
which
vsually
is
called
Commutatiua
:
Another
which
is
occupied
in
distribution
of
honoures
accordinge
to
ech
mans
worthines
,
which
they
tearme
Distributiuam
.
The
charge
of
common
Iustice
is
to
maintaine
law
,
and
equitie
,
whervpon
he
is
called
a
iust
manne
,
who
sheweth
him selfe
obedient
to
all
customs
.
Law
is
defined
of
Cicero
,
a
reason
engraffed
of
nature
,
whiche
commaundeth
those
thinges
which
are
to
be
taken
in
hand
,
and
forbiddeth
the
contrary
:
And
in
like
sorte
,
a
right
reason
,
and
deriued
from
the
mighte
of
the
Gods
,
charging
such
matters
as
are
honest
,
disanulling
the
contrary
.
Hether
all
decrées
may
be
referred
,
statutes
,
manners
,
ordinaunces
,
expedient
for
the
sauegarde
of
the
weale
publike
in
obseruing
of
which
Iustice
is
tried
,
in
violating
of
which
iniustice
.
Equitie
coupleth
her selfe
to
the
law
,
who
folowinge
the
righte
sentence
of
reason
,
doth
gouerne
the
lawe
written
,
and
as
the
worthiest
interpretoure
of
al
lawes
,
doth
wittily
asswage
rigorous
sharpenesse
according
to
the
place
,
oportunity
,
and
dispositions
of
men
.
That
member
of
priuate
Iustice
which
is
Tituled
,
Distributiua
,
perteaneth
cheefly
vnto
magistrates
:
who
not
only
is
occupied
in
grauntinge
Offices
and
rewardes
,
but
also
in
appointinge
punishments
,
that
with
an
equal
lawe
the
citizens
may
be
ruled
,
both
the
vertuous
beneficed
,
and
the
naughty
corrected
.
This
perdie
is
the
charge
of
a
Magistrate
:
but
the
intelligence
of
this
vertue
is
necessarie
for
all
men
,
that
euery
man
may
vnderstande
his
place
whiche
he
should
keepe
in
the
common
wealth
,
and
the
dutie
whiche
he
should
execute
:
and
should
attribute
and
leaue
vnto
euery
one
bothe
place
and
dutie
,
and
should
knowe
him selfe
,
nor
should
glory
ouer
much
in
his
proper
conceite
.
This
vertue
by
reason
especially
it
studieth
to
succour
equality
,
is
compared
to
Geometricall
proporcion
,
in
which
a
like
consideration
is
had
of
greater
and
lesser
numbers
.
But
that
parcel
which
they
terme
Commutatiuam
is
occupied
in
bargaininges
of
men
,
and
teacheth
to
yéelde
vnto
euery
man
his
owne
,
that
ware
for
ware
,
the
value
for
the
chaffer
be
geeuen
,
perfecte
equality
beinge
kepte
:
and
this
hath
a
care
rather
to
render
home
debte
,
than
to
distribute
promocion
to
the
worthier
:
Wherfore
in
like
case
it
is
clogged
with
Arithmeticall
proporcion
,
because
in
this
the
numbers
,
in
the
other
an
indifferency
of
reason
is
respected
.
This
is
conuersaunt
in
contractes
which
the
Lawyers
do
display
:
the
other
in
Dignities
and
penalties
,
which
are
appointed
of
Magistrates
.
And
hetherto
of
al
kinde
of
Iustice
,
and
her
partes
.
But
because
vnto
these
other
sixe
members
are
subuected
defined
of
Cicero
in
his
bookes
De
Inuentione
:
Religion
,
Pietie
,
Reuerence
,
Trouth
,
Reuenging
,
Thank
:
to
whiche
shal
be
adioyned
liberalitie
,
magnificence
,
frendship
,
and
vices
disagréeable
to
euery
one
:
of
these
also
we
must
expresse
our
opinion
.
These
vertues
by
reason
,
they
consist
through
the
equality
of
reason
,
they
seeme
to
be
adiected
vnto
distributing
Iustice
,
like
as
euerye
varitye
of
bargaines
to
the
exchaunging
.
Of
the
six
partes
of
Iustice
constituted
of
Cicero
,
and
their
vices
,
and
of
som
other
which
be
welnie
of
the
same
nature
.
Cap.
xviij
.
CIcero
in
his
second
booke
De
Inuentione
hath
rehearsed
thrée
partes
of
Iustice
:
the
law
natural
,
vsual
,
and
the
law
leiful
.
And
the
law
natural
he
defineth
,
which
opinion
may
not
bring
to
vs
,
but
a
certaine
instruction
naturall
,
wherof
he
numbreth
six
members
,
which
euen
now
I
haue
declared
.
Religion
is
one
,
a
rightfulnesse
towardes
God
,
either
a
piety
wherby
we
adore
him
:
so
called
as
Lactantius
writeth
in
his
fourth
booke
.
A
religando
,
of
sure
binding
,
by
reason
for
this
cause
we
are
engendred
,
that
we
may
exhibite
iust
and
dutifull
seruyces
vnto
God
begetting
vs
,
that
we
shuld
him
onely
acknowledge
,
that
him
we
should
folow
.
We
are
linked
and
fastned
vnto
God
with
this
bonde
of
godlinesse
.
Plutarchus
doth
interpreate
Religion
,
Scientiam
rerum
Dominarum
,
a
science
of
diuine
matters
:
wee
terme
it
Virtutem
a
Vertue
,
by
which
a
iuste
and
a
trewe
worship
is
geuen
to
God
.
The
which
(
as
of
all
vertues
)
so
likewise
we
shal
wel
cal
it
the
ground
,
and
doubtles
the
Parente
and
Mother
of
Iustice
.
Nothinge
is
more
necessary
than
this
vertue
to
preserue
the
common
wealth
and
to
lead
the
life
egally
,
and
without
couine
amonge
the
Citizens
:
sithe
no
strength
may
rather
bannish
men
from
all
vnthriftinesse
,
than
if
they
shal
perceaue
that
theare
is
affliction
prepared
of
God
for
the
transgressoures
,
and
a
path
made
open
vnto
Heauen
and
vnto
●ternal
felicity
for
suche
as
leade
their
●ues
godly
and
iustly
.
There
hath
been
●et
neuer
any
Nation
so
Barbarous
which
hath
not
fauoured
som
Religion
although
it
were
false
,
and
forbidden
from
working
of
iniury
through
the
feare
of
som
God
,
wheras
an
Othe
was
accompted
a
most
streight
band
to
wring
their
faith
together
.
What
is
it
expediente
that
Christians
do
?
to
whome
●aithfulnesse
is
geuen
the
grounde
of
al
●eligion
of
Iesus
Christ
our
Lorde
and
●auiour
,
and
the
holy
Apostles
and
his
●uccessours
,
so
ratified
that
neither
by
any
humayne
force
,
nor
yet
infernall
rage
it
may
be
ouerthrowen
:
I
say
,
what
is
it
meete
for
them
to
doo
,
vnto
whom
leading
their
liues
with
vertue
God
himselfe
hath
proposed
a
sure
hope
of
blisful
and
sempiternal
life
:
through
the
confidence
of
whose
promise
,
what
true
godly
man
for
sanctified
religion
will
stagger
to
lese
his
breathe
,
if
neede
shall
require
?
How
easely
might
all
iniurie
be
put
to
flight
if
that
precept
of
God
our
sauiour
&
maister
were
deeply
grauen
in
all
mens
mindes
.
Quod
tibi
fieri
nolis
,
alteri
nefeceris
,
What
thou
wilt
not
to
be
committed
agaynst
thy selfe
,
thou
shalt
not
do
to
another
.
Which
sentence
wise
felowes
also
dissenting
from
our
religion
haue
so
merueiled
at
,
that
they
esteemed
nothynge
more
diuine
,
that
nothing
coulde
be
deliuered
more
auayleable
to
maynteyne
the
fellowship
of
men
.
Contrarious
to
Religion
is
supersticion
,
a
scrupulositie
of
holinesse
,
which
honoureth
the
Heauenly
power
not
as
it
ought
,
either
a
vaine
and
a
foolish
honour
of
God
:
than
which
vice
impietie
towardes
God
and
the
contempte
of
reuerente
dreade
is
surely
a
more
detestable
mischiefe
:
by
which
all
faith
is
turned
vpside
downe
,
by
which
periury
,
by
which
Sacrilegies
are
established
.
Of
Godlynesse
.
Cap.
xix
.
IN
the
seconde
place
Pietie
is
rehersed
of
Cicero
,
which
although
it
be
defined
some
whiles
of
him
,
a
Iustice
towardes
the
Goddes
that
it
should
be
the
same
whiche
Religion
is
:
yet
most
commonly
it
is
taken
for
Iustice
towardes
our
progenitours
,
or
els
for
a
thankefull
good
wil
towardes
our
Parentes
.
But
in
his
bookes
of
Rhetorike
,
Pietie
is
more
absolutely
defi●ed
,
through
which
duetie
,
and
an
earnest
reuerence
is
geuen
vnto
Aliaunce
,
and
to
them
which
are
well
willinge
to
theyr
countrey
.
And
in
like
sort
in
another
place
.
Pietie
is
,
which
geueth
in
charge
to
obserue
duetie
towardes
our
countrie
,
our
parents
and
others
our
kynsefolke
.
This
laste
vertue
is
well
coupled
to
Religion
,
because
the
cheifest
worship
is
to
be
geuen
to
God
,
the
next
to
the
Parentes
,
and
next
of
kinne
,
and
especially
to
the
countrey
,
whiche
one
,
Cicero
saieth
comprehendeth
all
charitie
.
Impiety
is
a
contrary
vice
to
Godlinesse
,
towards
such
to
whom
beneuolence
and
loue
is
due
.
Against
this
so
detestable
a
wickednesse
,
when
as
yet
the
title
of
murder
was
vnknowen
,
it
was
not
necessary
to
establish
a
lawe
:
but
afterwards
when
they
began
,
who
violatyng
the
law
of
nature
,
and
more
brutish
than
brute
beasts
,
did
murther
&
despoyle
them
of
whom
they
had
receiued
life
,
a
most
rigorous
law
was
ratified
,
of
which
declaration
is
made
in
the
digestes
vnder
the
title
,
Ad
L.
Pompeiam
,
de
patricidus
.
Of
Reuerence
.
Cap.
xx
.
REuerence
is
,
by
which
we
honoure
and
worship
them
who
excel
vs
in
age
,
either
in
wisdome
,
either
in
dignity
,
or
in
any
estimacion
.
For
that
God
him selfe
geueth
in
commaundment
by
the
law
of
nature
,
that
with
due
obeysaunce
and
honoure
we
should
reuerence
our
parentes
and
the
Magistrates
whom
he
woulde
to
rule
ouer
vs
.
This
vertue
of
obedience
is
so
necessary
,
that
withoute
it
neither
a
house
,
neither
a
Citie
,
nor
any
fellowship
can
remaine
.
How
pernicious
the
vice
repugnaunte
to
obedience
is
,
the
gréeuous
ruine
of
the
first
parentes
of
al
mankind
,
which
hath
tormented
euery
mothers
Sonne
,
hath
geuen
a
lesson
to
vs
.
This
enormitye
springeth
of
Pride
,
and
arrogancye
and
of
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
through
which
any
man
by
ouerweening
in
him selfe
to
well
,
and
fauouringe
his
person
,
maketh
him self
another
cousin
to
God
almighty
.
Nothinge
verely
is
more
odious
than
pride
both
to
God
and
men
.
For
at
all
seasons
,
as
the
Latin
Tragical
writer
recordeth
,
Sequitur
superbos
vltor
a
tergo
Deus
,
God
that
taketh
vengeaunce
foloweth
the
lofty
behinde
their
backes
.
The
fal
of
wicked
Angels
whiche
cannot
be
repaired
,
and
than
the
which
none
hath
bin
more
greuous
at
any
time
doth
witnes
the
same
.
Of
Trouth
.
Cap.
xxi
.
TRouth
is
(
saieth
Cicero
)
throughe
whiche
those
thinges
are
sayde
to
be
vnchaunged
whiche
are
,
or
haue
been
,
or
els
are
aboute
to
come
:
Either
a
right
perfection
of
the
minde
wherby
any
man
both
telleth
the
truthe
,
either
in
affyrmyng
,
or
els
in
deniyng
,
and
also
pretendeth
no
subteltie
:
whereof
he
may
be
called
a
true
speaker
.
It
is
a
necessarie
vertue
to
make
bargaynes
,
in
whom
faith
ought
to
beare
rule
,
which
is
defined
,
a
constancie
and
a
soothe
of
sayinges
and
doynges
:
neither
is
truth
any
other
thinge
in
contractes
and
accomptes
,
than
faith
:
whiche
if
it
be
diligently
obserued
,
the
proper
office
of
duetie
shal
be
fulfilled
:
which
is
to
yelde
vnto
euery
man
his
owne
.
A
lie
is
a
vice
contrarie
to
veritie
,
&
in
like
maner
the
malicious
inuencions
of
Sophismes
,
and
all
deceipte
and
dissimulacion
and
counterfaityng
,
and
also
arrogancie
.
A
forged
deuise
is
mischeuous
and
pernicious
vnto
the
common
wealth
for
it
wresteth
a
man
from
God
which
is
true
,
and
the
welspryng
of
al
verity
,
and
purchaseth
him
freendship
with
the
Deuill
,
and
bringeth
euerlastyng
death
to
the
soule
:
and
violateth
humaine
societie
with
a
false
Merchaundise
,
and
incenseth
hatreds
and
discordes
through
a
leasyng
tongue
.
That
bostinge
,
especially
foolish
of
some
that
are
too
glorious
in
their
owne
estate
,
is
irkesome
to
the
learned
.
Certes
an
alteration
to
be
abandoned
.
Clokyng
also
is
vnseemely
for
an
honest
man
,
who
speaketh
no
otherwise
then
he
thinketh
:
he
doth
not
commend
him
in
presence
,
whom
he
disprayseth
in
absence
:
he
counterfaiteth
and
worketh
wilily
not
with
male
ingine
,
but
wittily
,
if
neede
shoulde
enforce
.
Of
Reuengement
.
Cap.
xxij
.
REuengement
is
(
saith
Cicero
)
by
whiche
violence
,
and
iniurie
,
and
whatsoeuer
at
any
time
is
like
to
discommodite
,
may
be
repelled
by
defending
or
auengyng
.
And
it
is
defined
a
taking
of
punishment
,
by
which
we
put
of
from
vs
a
dispight
either
by
shunning
hit
,
or
by
repaying
the
like
.
But
this
latter
definition
for
this
cause
appeareth
to
vs
littel
commodious
,
because
it
conteineth
priuate
reuengement
,
likewise
alowed
of
him
in
his
first
booke
of
Deuties
:
whiche
wee
know
to
be
reproued
not
only
of
Christians
,
but
also
of
prophane
Philosophers
,
and
ignorant
of
our
Religion
,
who
imitatynge
the
rule
of
nature
did
iudge
it
better
to
suffer
,
than
to
commit
iniurie
:
because
that
may
be
done
iustly
,
and
this
cannot
be
accomplished
without
iniustice
,
as
Aristotle
also
learneth
in
his
.v.
booke
of
Ethikes
.
That
likewise
may
be
attributed
to
pacience
,
doubtlesse
an
excellent
vertue
:
this
perdie
to
the
contrarie
vice
.
Neither
truly
ought
any
man
to
thinke
that
any
other
talke
is
ministred
,
than
that
he
may
repel
force
by
force
,
if
it
may
not
be
eschewed
:
and
that
for
to
defend
,
not
to
damage
or
els
to
reuenge
:
for
a
minde
to
discommodite
breaketh
iustice
the
leiful
reuengement
is
committed
of
God
vnto
the
Magistrates
,
which
be
the
ministers
of
lawes
:
but
withholden
from
priuate
persons
,
vnto
whom
no
title
of
punishinge
is
attributed
.
Of
Thanke
.
Cap.
xxiij
.
THanke
whiche
vsually
is
called
gratitudo
,
kindenesse
,
is
(
saieth
Cicero
)
in
whiche
the
memorie
of
the
frendshippes
and
frendly
tournes
of
another
man
,
and
a
good
will
to
repay
another
is
comprehended
.
The
same
man
telleth
:
Thanke
is
which
ought
to
vse
obseruaunce
in
the
remembrance
and
recompence
of
duties
,
and
honours
,
and
frendships
.
It
is
more
compendiously
descriued
,
A
faithful
memory
of
a
thankfull
minde
,
Or
els
a
desier
mindefull
to
doo
one
good
turne
and
pleasure
for
another
:
and
perhaps
it
is
defined
more
fitly
:
by
reason
this
vertue
is
conuersant
in
receauynge
,
rather
than
in
geuynge
.
For
to
geue
,
is
a
pointe
of
liberalitie
:
To
receyue
with
a
good
will
,
and
to
be
willinge
to
repay
,
is
the
propertie
of
thanke
.
It
is
his
parte
to
forget
the
benefit
bestowed
,
nor
to
wayte
for
a
recompence
.
And
to
this
man
it
belongeth
to
remember
hit
,
and
wher
oportunitie
geueth
occasion
with
an
ouerplus
also
,
if
he
may
,
and
he
ought
to
thinke
the
reward
wel
to
be
placed
,
and
to
be
willyng
to
render
the
same
redily
and
yet
to
retayne
a
perpetual
reporte
of
the
pleasure
exhibited
.
On
bothe
the
partes
héede
is
to
be
taken
that
the
thing
which
either
is
geuen
,
or
restored
be
profitable
and
commodious
for
him
to
whom
it
is
geuen
or
restored
,
and
iust
fully
gotten
,
lesse
we
should
be
liberal
and
grateful
on
another
mans
purse
.
The
vice
repugnant
to
kindenesse
is
commonly
termed
ingratitude
:
which
may
be
defined
,
a
forgetfulnesse
of
a
good
turne
receyued
:
and
either
an
vnwillyng
thanke
,
or
none
,
or
els
(
whiche
is
worst
of
all
)
a
displeasure
requited
:
whiche
is
the
cheefest
iniustice
,
than
whiche
nothyng
can
be
more
hateful
to
all
men
.
Of
Compassion
.
Cap.
xxiiij
.
COmpassion
,
a
moste
acceptable
vertue
to
God
,
is
thought
good
aptely
to
be
annected
vnto
these
.
For
as
we
do
owe
Loue
,
truth
and
faith
to
al
men
godlinesse
to
few
,
reuengement
to
such
as
do
wrong
,
kindenesse
to
them
as
deserue
wel
,
so
are
we
bounde
to
shewe
mercie
vnto
them
which
suffer
afflictions
.
I
cal
not
compassion
verily
in
this
place
.
Agritudinem
a
heauinesse
,
or
els
as
Seneca
,
a
vice
of
the
mindes
ouer
muche
fauouringe
wretchednesse
,
but
a
vertue
through
which
the
mind
is
pricked
with
the
miseries
and
calamities
of
another
man
to
succour
the
oppressed
.
Compassion
is
defined
of
Cicero
,
a
greef
through
anothers
aduersity
:
Of
Seneca
in
his
bookes
De
Clemencia
,
a
smart
of
the
minde
,
or
els
a
sorowfulnesse
con●eyued
by
other
mens
harmes
,
whiche
●e
déemeth
to
chance
to
the
vndeseruing
.
●ut
he
indeuoreth
to
prooue
that
this
is
●vice
in
these
wordes
:
Then
the
wise
●an
shal
not
haue
compassion
but
shall
●de
,
but
shall
profite
borne
for
a
com●on
helpe
,
and
a
publike
vtility
,
wher●f
he
shal
reache
a
porcion
vnto
euerye
●ne
.
Yet
we
,
as
it
is
declared
,
do
vn●erstande
compassion
a
vertue
,
vnto
which
Christe
encourageth
vs
after
the
example
of
his
heauenly
father
,
and
his
owne
in
the
.6
.
of
Luke
,
which
can
be
renowned
sufficiently
with
no
praises
at
any
season
:
and
truely
is
highly
commended
to
vs
in
holy
Scriptures
.
For
what
earthly
wight
can
at
the
least
conceyue
in
minde
,
much
lesse
depaint
in
oracion
the
infinite
mercy
of
God
the
father
,
and
Christe
our
Sauiour
?
This
vertue
exalteth
a
manne
to
blessednes
.
Christ
calleth
the
merciful
Beatos
,
blessed
,
because
they
shal
receyue
mercy
,
in
the
.5.9
.
&
.12
.
of
Mathew
,
of
whom
Cap.
25.
six
duties
of
mercy
breefely
are
propounded
.
Of
liberality
,
and
vices
contrary
to
this
,
Auarice
and
Prodigality
.
Cap.
xxv
.
CIcero
in
his
first
booke
of
offices
maketh
liberality
the
other
braunch
of
Iustice
,
the
which
same
he
termeth
both
bountifulnes
,
&
also
benignity
,
the
which
seemeth
not
vnhandesomly
in
this
place
to
bée
annected
to
the
former
parts
of
Iustice
.
For
althoughe
this
vertue
is
placed
in
geuing
,
not
as
they
in
restoring
what
is
due
(
whiche
same
seemeth
to
be
proper
vnto
Iustice
)
yet
because
it
spreadeth
abrode
her selfe
vnto
others
,
as
Iustice
doth
,
eke
considereth
the
vtility
of
men
,
it
shal
be
leiful
to
situate
it
amonge
the
members
of
Iustice
.
Liberality
may
be
defined
,
a
beneficiall
good
will
to
gratify
,
or
els
a
liberal
desire
to
merite
wel
of
som
person
.
This
is
conuersaunte
(
as
Cicero
telleth
)
in
the
vse
of
Money
,
the
which
to
bestowe
honestly
,
and
as
it
oughte
with
a
frée
and
godly
minde
,
is
proper
to
liberality
.
For
firste
of
all
a
franke
consent
of
the
geuer
is
required
,
lesse
throughe
an
opinion
of
profite
the
mind
be
restreigned
from
doing
good
.
Therfore
we
muste
geue
,
by
reason
we
knowe
it
to
be
acceptable
vnto
God
,
waiting
for
no
rewarde
.
We
muste
deale
wittely
when
the
cause
and
time
shall
postulate
,
to
him
on
whom
the
gift
is
worthely
bestowed
,
which
wil
not
abuse
the
same
vnto
destruction
,
either
his
owne
,
or
els
of
others
:
and
we
must
geue
part
of
our
proper
goods
,
not
of
another
mans
.
For
liberality
oughte
to
discommodity
no
man
,
but
profit
them
as
are
worthye
of
a
benefite
:
And
we
must
geue
according
to
the
worthinesse
of
eche
one
,
and
deserte
,
and
rather
to
a
needy
creature
,
than
a
rich
Carle
:
not
as
much
as
perchaunce
thou
wouldest
,
but
so
muche
as
thou
maist
,
least
liberalitie
turne
into
the
vice
of
outragious
spendinge
,
and
thou
afterwardes
beginne
to
want
,
and
be
troblesom
to
thy
friends
:
and
lose
pleasure
,
who
is
the
companion
of
vertue
,
and
contrarywise
reteyne
sorow
the
leaguefellow
of
viciousnes
.
And
albeit
riche
men
can
with
lesse
trauaile
perfourm
the
duty
of
liberality
,
yet
the
lesse
hability
may
also
become
liberall
:
whose
bountious
good
wil
ought
more
to
be
considered
,
than
the
benefite
it selfe
.
Cicero
in
his
second
booke
of
duties
doth
ratify
two
sortes
of
liberality
.
One
through
which
any
man
succoureth
him
who
néedeth
with
Argente
:
The
other
by
which
he
aideth
with
trauel
or
counsel
.
There
be
two
vices
vnlike
to
liberality
,
couetousnes
and
niggardship
,
and
prodigality
and
riotousnes
:
of
which
she
is
the
defecte
of
liberality
,
but
this
the
excesse
,
bexwixt
which
vices
liberalitie
is
situated
.
Auarice
is
defined
,
a
superfluus
gredinesse
of
money
,
which
being
coldded
together
carefully
for
their
auaile
the
vnsaciable
persons
do
pleasure
neither
●hemselues
nor
others
:
which
very
wel
●s
termed
in
the
sanctified
Scriptures
,
Omnium
malorum
radix
,
the
roote
of
al
mischiefes
,
out
of
whiche
,
felonies
,
robberies
,
despoilinges
,
deceipts
,
bewrayinges
,
discords
,
hurly burlyes
do
spring
.
Et
quid
non
mortalia
pectora
cogis
auri
sacrafames
?
and
what
doost
not
thou
detestable
hunger
of
gold
enforce
mennes
harts
to
do
?
The
desire
of
mony
is
vnsaciable
,
and
a
cruell
Dropsy
:
of
whom
the
more
that
the
waters
are
supped
vp
the
more
they
are
thristed
for
,
Nam
crescit
amor
numini
quantum
ipsa
pecunia
crescit
,
for
the
loue
of
money
increaseth
,
as
muche
as
money
her selfe
doth
increase
.
This
bondage
is
altogether
moste
wretched
,
and
most
vile
,
alwaies
carefull
,
at
all
times
fearfull
,
neuer
quiet
,
at
no
time
content
.
Contrary
to
the
vice
of
Auarice
is
excesse
whiche
commonly
they
term
prodigality
:
which
same
likewise
is
a
vice
,
and
resisteth
liberality
.
For
as
the
couetous
man
is
ouer
gredy
in
receyuing
and
reteyning
,
so
contrary
wise
the
prodigall
person
passeth
a
meane
in
geuinge
.
Therfore
prodigality
may
be
defined
,
an
immoderate
largesse
,
and
committed
vpon
no
iust
cause
.
This
perdy
is
vicious
,
yet
may
be
reuoked
more
easely
vnto
liberality
,
than
auarice
:
by
reason
she
is
accustomed
to
profit
others
,
this
no
man
,
and
not
so
much
truely
the
very
posses●our
:
vnto
this
oftimes
youth
is
hurtful
to
the
other
old
age
.
Moderate
expence
in
like
manner
,
as
liberalitie
is
placed
betweene
two
vices
,
vnmeasurable
riot
&
couetousnesse
.
Herehence
a
pinch-peny
,
or
els
a
thrifty
felowe
,
neither
is
called
prodigall
,
nor
yet
a
niggard
.
Sauing
is
defyned
,
a
diligent
laying
vp
of
those
thinges
which
are
gotten
,
and
a
guidinge
of
expenses
.
Wherof
there
springes
a
Prouerbe
,
Magnum
Vectigal
parsimonia
,
Sparinge
is
a
greate
reuenew
.
Of
Magnificence
.
Cap.
xxvi
.
MAgnificence
seemeth
to
be
vnited
to
liberalitie
,
which
is
no
other
thyng
,
than
a
certaone
larger
bountuousnesse
,
whiche
is
defined
of
Cicero
,
an
handlyng
or
administration
of
great
&
excellent
mat●ers
with
a
certaine
honourable
,
&
fa●us
intent
:
Herehence
commeth
a
sump●uous
a
notable
man
,
&
he
who
worketh
wounderous
feates
.
This
vertue
is
not
belonging
vnto
poore
men
,
whiche
can
not
performe
mightie
and
miraculous
matters
,
but
vnto
rich
men
,
as
to
kings
and
Princes
:
of
whome
yet
it
is
to
be
taken
heede
of
,
that
they
be
not
incensed
more
through
the
desier
of
vayne
glory
than
vertue
,
neither
principally
regarding
the
good
will
of
God
,
nor
passynge
for
the
commoditie
of
men
,
lesse
they
wade
beyonde
measure
with
their
cost
and
administracion
in
enterprising
gorgious
actes
.
For
also
there
be
two
vices
repugnant
to
this
vertue
,
the
one
which
is
called
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
a
worke
of
a
base
courage
:
and
a
beggerly
magnificence
,
whiche
is
of
kinne
to
auarice
:
the
other
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
that
is
to
wit
an
vnruly
sumptuousnesse
,
&
riot
,
which
accordeth
with
prodigalitie
.
Of
Freendship
.
Cap.
xxvij
.
AMonge
the
parts
of
Iustice
,
Freendship
also
is
to
be
numbred
:
wherof
sith
Aristotle
,
and
after
him
Cicero
copiously
haue
disputed
,
we
will
here
breifly
touche
those
thinges
which
appeare
necessarie
.
Therfore
,
as
Cicero
telleth
,
in
his
first
booke
De
Legibus
,
all
the
force
of
Freendship
is
in
the
agréement
of
willes
,
studies
and
opinions
:
and
in
Laelius
:
Freendship
(
sayth
he
)
is
no
other
thyng
than
a
perfecte
accorde
of
all
diuine
and
humain
affayres
,
with
beneuolence
and
fauour
:
whiche
he
calleth
the
ayde
of
vertues
geuen
of
Nature
,
not
a
companion
of
vices
:
And
the
same
nominated
of
loue
,
and
begunne
of
Natute
her selfe
:
That
wee
may
vnderstande
loue
to
be
naturall
,
by
whiche
men
are
vnited
together
amonge
them
●elues
.
And
because
(
as
also
wee
haue
knowen
by
the
holy
scriptures
,
by
which
the
lawe
of
nature
is
approued
in
this
cause
)
one
man
oweth
good
wil
and
loue
●o
another
,
whereas
also
al
other
liuing
Creatures
may
appeare
to
mayntayne
freendship
in
their
kind
,
or
els
surely
to
preserue
beneuolence
:
it
can
not
bee
●oubted
,
but
that
fréendeship
is
to
be
re●erred
vnto
Iustice
,
which
also
is
verie
●ecessary
for
the
vse
of
life
,
and
conteyneth
the
common
wealth
.
What
beneuolence
doth
differ
from
friendship
.
Aristotle
teacheth
in
the
.v
Chapiter
of
his
.ix.
booke
that
also
we
may
be
vnited
in
good
wil
with
them
,
whom
we
do
not
know
,
and
that
the
same
may
be
secret
,
that
it
cannot
be
freendeship
:
and
that
beneuolence
is
the
Original
and
Fountaine
of
amity
.
By
whose
Sentence
freendship
is
thus
defyned
.
That
it
be
an
euident
beneuolence
.
Freendship
is
double
.
One
true
and
sincere
,
and
proceeding
of
vertue
,
which
is
emonge
good
men
.
The
other
forged
,
and
vulger
which
is
two
folde
,
for
either
it
is
procured
throughe
profit
,
or
els
throughe
good
will
.
The
end
than
of
true
freendship
is
,
Honestie
,
of
the
counterfayted
,
profite
or
pleasure
.
Pleasure
ioigneth
together
children
and
young
folkes
.
Profite
yoketh
together
marchauntes
and
suche
like
:
but
vertue
bindeth
good
men
,
who
be
friendes
indeede
,
and
also
do
persist
after
death
,
but
they
loue
for
a
time
.
True
frendship
than
because
it
ariseth
out
of
vertue
,
can
not
be
emonge
wicked
persones
,
as
betwixt●
theeues
,
robbers
,
spoylers
,
traitours
,
conspiratours
:
albeit
somewhiles
they
may
appeare
fettered
together
with
a
moste
straighte
bonde
,
neither
also
is
it
sure
inoughe
amonge
them
,
who
are
equal
neither
in
maners
,
nor
in
exercise
,
nor
in
wil
nor
in
opinions
,
nor
in
riches
(
althoughe
these
do
not
alwaies
hinder
amity
,
like
as
nether
the
age
)
nor
yet
in
statelines
.
Emong
Princes
and
their
fréends
the
glosing
of
certain
Courtiers
doth
welnie
extinguishe
amitie
,
approuinge
all
matters
of
their
gouernours
,
both
sayings
and
doinges
although
they
be
foolish
,
whiles
they
get
gaine
,
promotion
,
and
fauour
.
The
freendship
then
amonge
equals
is
stronger
,
&
more
sincere
,
vnited
together
through
consent
of
mindes
,
both
willinge
and
nillinge
,
one
thinge
,
whom
also
a
like
study
doth
delite
.
But
this
freendeship
cannot
be
betwixt
many
:
that
narrow
bonde
is
appertaining
to
few
:
what
manner
of
one
wee
reade
to
haue
flourished
emongste
them
,
of
whiche
scarcelye
foure
or
fiue
partes
are
reckened
,
and
perhappes
it
should
be
a
difficult
matter
to
trace
out
more
,
of
whom
truly
it
may
be
verified
Amicus
alter
idem
,
a
fréende
an
other
same
,
or
one
as
like
as
it
were
the
selfe
same
person
,
of
which
two
there
ought
to
be
one
minde
.
Although
verily
good
men
often
times
haue
many
fréendes
,
and
wish
wel
vnto
those
,
of
whom
they
them selues
likewise
are
entirely
beloued
yet
they
communicate
that
cheefest
consent
of
minds
and
good
wils
,
and
studies
onely
with
one
or
two
,
or
els
surely
with
very
few
.
That
true
friendship
is
very
seldome
,
what
one
was
betwixte
those
fewe
copartners
of
vnfained
fréendes
,
and
so
many
times
renowned
.
Because
perdie
fréendship
issueth
of
loue
,
and
the
degrees
of
Loue
are
diuers
,
likewise
more
degrees
of
fréendship
are
to
be
appointed
.
Of
which
the
firste
is
,
of
Parents
,
and
Children
:
the
second
,
of
brothers
and
Kinsfolke
,
the
third
of
beneficial
persons
and
Citizens
:
the
last
of
all
men
.
Yet
somewhiles
that
sincere
friendship
which
is
of
a
fewe
,
doth
farre
exceede
al
the
amities
of
al
men
,
yea
of
the
very
parentes
&
children
,
what
loue
that
was
betwixt
Pylades
and
Orestes
,
D●mon
and
Pythias
:
concernynge
whome
reade
Valerius
Maximus
the
.iiii.
booke
and
vii
.
Chapiter
.
This
true
friendship
surely
is
not
sodainly
made
perfect
,
but
she
hath
her
degrees
:
tyll
at
lengthe
through
longe
vse
of
loue
sittinge
in
the
secret
Cabane
of
the
hart
,
and
through
greate
acquaintaunce
,
and
amiable
fellowshippe
it
be
confirmed
.
Wherfore
they
say
that
he
is
to
be
elected
,
whom
thou
wilt
loue
:
geuing
to
wit
thereby
,
that
we
entertaine
not
any
one
hastily
into
freendship
without
election
,
whom
afterwardes
we
may
forsake
with
like
foolehardines
for
a
trifle
,
lesse
we
apere
rather
with
a
certaine
rage
of
loue
,
then
with
good
aduise
to
haue
ben
broughte
vnto
freendship
.
That
such
a
vice
may
be
eschewed
,
we
oughte
to
be
slowe
to
ioigne
in
amity
,
and
constant
to
reteine
it
.
Therfore
all
these
thinges
are
to
be
taken
heede
of
,
which
are
wont
to
weaken
freendships
:
as
contentions
,
bitter
brawlinges
,
despites
,
waywardnesse
,
wrath
,
enuy
,
emulacion
,
and
such
like
.
But
to
admonish
without
sharpnesse
,
and
to
bee
admonished
,
is
proper
to
friendshippe
.
Neither
truly
is
it
to
be
thought
,
that
those
friendes
any
where
be
found
among
men
,
which
althoughe
there
be
one
like
consente
of
willes
and
studies
for
the
most
part
)
may
not
some
whiles
seme
to
be
put
in
remembraunce
,
if
they
shall
any
whit
offend
:
and
also
it
ought
to
be
denied
these
,
if
they
aske
any
thinge
,
which
can
not
be
accomplished
honestly
and
godly
.
For
honest
matters
are
to
be
requested
of
friendes
,
and
honest
causes
are
to
be
don
for
the
friends
sake
.
Rather
perdy
then
being
desired
we
should
committe
filthy
thinges
,
we
shall
permit
the
friendship
,
which
presentely
ceaseth
to
be
true
,
by
litle
and
litle
throughe
slacknesse
of
vse
to
be
minished
,
and
to
vanish
away
.
For
that
which
is
sodainely
broken
of
,
appeareth
neuer
to
haue
ben
true
.
But
yet
this
same
seperacion
is
to
be
auoyded
as
much
as
may
be
.
For
neither
must
any
man
so
loue
,
as
though
somtimes
he
should
be
at
a
defiaunce
.
Harty
loue
that
whiche
the
sacred
Scriptures
do
approue
,
commendeth
perfecte
friendship
,
by
which
we
are
willed
to
loue
our
neighbour
no
lesse
than
our selues
.
There
ought
then
to
be
an
indifferent
beneuolence
of
eche
others
mind
.
Neither
is
it
to
be
required
,
that
the
one
shoulde
more
fancy
the
other
than
him selfe
.
And
of
frendship
surely
hetherto
.
Enmite
resistethe
this
,
the
moste
greeuous
plague
of
humayn
kinde
,
and
which
maketh
men
worse
then
beasts
,
and
despoileth
them
of
all
humanitie
.
For
a
man
ought
to
be
deare
vnto
a
man
,
sith
he
may
see
beastes
of
one
sort
to
be
coupled
together
amonge
themselues
.
And
as
friendship
maketh
men
courteous
and
gratefull
,
so
doth
hatred
cause
them
cruel
and
odious
:
and
as
she
doth
very
much
recreate
the
sprites
,
so
is
this
not
a
litle
troublesome
bothe
to
her self
,
and
others
,
&
the
cause
of
many
mischiefes
.
Herehence
spryng
slaughters
,
herehence
proceede
Murthers
,
herehence
commeth
all
crueltie
.
For
whom
any
man
hateth
,
he
wisheth
destroyed
,
and
the
caytife
doth
wofully
crucifie
himselfe
through
a
lust
to
reuenge
,
and
a
desier
to
hurt
,
the
mynde
a
tormentour
brandisshynge
a
secret
whip
,
as
Iuuenall
saith
:
where
as
in
holy
Scriptures
it
is
manifest
,
Homicidam
esse
quisquis
fratrem
suum
oderit
:
That
be
is
a
man
killer
,
whosoeuer
shal
hate
his
brother
.
Wherefore
all
enmitie
is
to
be
auoyded
,
cake
diligently
it
is
to
be
taken
heede
,
that
wee
minister
not
a
cause
of
contempt
to
any
man
and
if
an
occasion
be
geuen
,
it
is
to
be
laboured
by
all
possibilitie
that
he
be
reconciled
to
vs
,
who
was
estraunged
or
fallen
from
vs
.
If
so
be
that
by
chaunce
wee
shall
hate
any
one
,
who
may
seeme
to
haue
iniured
vs
,
yet
we
ought
to
beare
in
minde
that
wee
are
Christians
,
that
wee
forgeue
,
and
put
away
anger
and
hatred
,
waytyng
for
the
like
facilitie
of
remission
at
Gods
hand
,
which
so
many
times
wee
haue
experimented
.
No
hostilitie
truly
is
more
greeuous
,
than
battel
:
no
greater
alienation
,
and
seperacion
of
mindes
,
none
more
pernicious
none
more
fierse
,
and
through
whiche
more
may
breake
forth
violently
with
more
bitter
hatreds
into
mutuall
destruction
,
and
so
furiously
somewhiles
may
be
incensed
that
not
only
Citizens
but
also
very
brothers
and
kinsemen
are
brought
in
contencious
turmoyles
among
themselues
,
fighting
for
life
and
death
,
ignorant
of
their
aliaunce
,
inflamed
with
common
madnesse
,
and
now
puttyng
aparte
al
humanitie
clad
them selues
with
the
crueltie
of
beastes
.
And
albeit
battell
of
it selfe
,
neither
ought
properly
to
be
sayde
good
,
nor
euill
,
sith
it
may
iustly
be
vsed
,
and
ought
also
necessarily
to
be
taken
in
hand
somtimes
,
especially
if
it
be
attempted
in
suche
sorte
vpon
lawfull
occasion
,
that
it
be
a
defence
of
Iustice
,
&
be
referred
to
that
parte
whiche
is
termed
Vindicatio
,
reuengement
:
Yet
whereas
the
contention
of
bothe
enemies
may
not
be
a
like
iustfull
,
it
appeareth
not
that
any
battel
can
be
executed
,
vnto
whom
on
the
one
parte
Iniustice
may
not
be
annected
.
Wherefore
it
is
not
to
be
enterprised
rashly
of
potentates
to
whom
the
title
of
Warfare
is
committed
,
nor
yet
,
vnlesse
for
a
right
and
a
necessarie
cause
:
as
if
the
thinges
vniustfully
taken
from
vs
should
be
fetched
agayne
,
if
iniurie
were
to
be
wreaked
,
or
violence
to
be
repressed
:
let
it
be
proclaymed
,
and
let
it
be
referred
vnto
that
ende
,
that
nothyng
els
appeare
to
haue
been
mente
through
battel
,
than
peace
sought
for
,
or
enquired
.
Wee
must
cheifly
beware
,
as
much
as
may
be
,
that
we
wax
not
cruel
toward
innocentes
,
and
the
feble
sorte
,
and
suppliaunt
people
:
that
all
thinges
be
not
wasted
with
sworde
and
fier
:
That
more
damage
be
not
doone
to
our
friendes
,
than
to
our
enemies
:
That
battell
be
not
wittingly
and
greedely
taken
in
hande
,
which
cannot
be
perpetrated
without
crueltie
.
There
be
also
other
vices
contrarie
to
friendship
,
as
testifnesse
of
minde
,
as
Flattery
a
greeuous
pestilence
to
amitie
,
vnmeete
for
a
liberall
disposicion
,
not
muche
hurtfull
and
daungerous
to
the
wary
,
and
to
the
glorious
and
simple
,
because
it
is
a
priuie
enmitie
,
whiche
disprofiteth
with
a
flatteryng
grace
,
seruily
commendinge
him
who
is
present
,
and
wrongfully
carping
and
deridyng
him
which
is
absent
:
whom
Terence
doth
elegantly
&
feately
set
out
in
colours
in
the
seconde
Acte
and
seconde
Scene
in
Eunuchus
.
Vnto
●oth
is
flatterie
alike
miserable
,
both
vnto
him
whiche
speaketh
al
thinges
for
anothers
pleasure
,
&
also
to
him
whiche
admitteth
this
ill
fauored
sugred
spéech
of
one
that
vpholdeth
his
yea
and
nay
in
euery
cause
:
but
that
he
is
a
moste
vile
bondeslaue
,
and
this
a
Nodgecocke
,
who
perceiueth
not
him selfe
to
be
a
laughing
stocke
.
And
of
Iustice
,
and
of
her
braunches
sufficiently
it
is
re●oned
.
Of
Iniustice
.
Cap.
xxviij
.
INiustice
is
contrarie
to
Iustice
,
which
beynge
adioygned
perdy
to
al
the
partes
of
Iustice
,
now
shal
bee
debated
somewhat
more
at
large
As
Iustice
yeldeth
to
euery
man
his
owne
,
so
dothe
Iniustice
hale
vnto
her selfe
,
what
is
due
vnto
others
.
And
as
before
we
haue
diuided
Iustice
,
so
shall
it
be
leifull
,
also
to
seuour
Iniustice
.
First
and
formoste
into
common
and
priuate
,
and
this
into
distributinge
and
chaunging
:
Secondly
,
as
we
haue
tolde
the
partes
of
Iustice
,
religion
,
godlynes
and
others
:
so
may
the
members
of
iniustice
be
repeted
supersticion
,
impiety
,
and
moe
which
briefly
we
haue
descriued
:
Only
in
presence
we
wil
make
manifest
the
percels
and
common
and
priuate
wronge
.
Common
Iniustice
compriseth
two
formes
:
One
which
resisteth
ordinaunce
:
the
other
whiche
repungneth
equitie
:
the
lawes
are
violated
,
when
as
either
through
niggardlines
,
or
the
contempt
of
men
,
or
els
for
som
other
occasion
holsom
decrees
,
and
statutes
are
inuerted
,
or
abrogated
,
or
vnrightfulye
wrested
,
and
weakened
with
counterfet
interpretacions
.
Equity
is
defiled
,
when
as
not
onely
the
wordes
of
law
are
recited
and
writhed
subtilly
,
but
the
vnderstandinge
and
euennesse
the
very
soule
of
the
law
is
neglected
,
and
the
Prouerb
winneth
place
Sumum
ius
,
summa
iniuria
,
extreme
law
,
extreme
wrong
:
as
if
the
Iudges
,
or
Lawyers
shoulde
be
corrupted
with
gifts
,
or
distempered
with
the
affections
of
loue
or
hatred
.
These
matters
also
are
debated
of
Rhetoricians
in
the
Chapiter
De
statu
scripti
et
voluntatis
.
There
are
two
parts
of
priuate
iustice
:
against
whome
likewise
two
maye
be
layde
.
●niustè
distribuens
and
iniustè
commu●ns
,
wrongfully
distributinge
and
vn●ustly
exchaunging
.
Wrongfully
distributing
doth
fauour
the
wicked
,
doth
not
defend
the
good
,
them
she
exalteth
,
these
she
presseth
downe
:
she
preferreth
flatterers
and
lewde
personnes
before
the
simple
and
honest
:
she
more
estéemeth
nobility
and
riches
,
than
vertue
and
sapience
.
Vniustly
exchaunging
doth
not
restore
what
is
due
,
she
deceiueth
them
with
whom
she
ioigneth
in
byinge
,
selling
,
and
in
concluding
other
contractes
especially
in
guage
and
confederacie
:
she
deuiseth
titles
of
possessions
:
she
taketh
pleasure
by
long
practise
in
things
procured
by
couine
:
she
trauaileth
to
●minish
common
and
publike
commo●ies
,
and
out
of
these
to
adde
somwhat
her selfe
:
To
conclude
,
she
leaueth
●t
vnto
euery
man
his
owne
.
Doubt●e
of
all
these
partes
of
Iniustice
Iniurie
is
the
mother
,
which
is
don
,
either
to
the
common
wealth
,
or
els
to
al
men
,
either
in
violatinge
the
lawes
,
or
els
either
in
distributinge
,
or
exchaunginge
vniustly
.
Of
Fortitude
.
Cap.
xxix
.
WE
haue
disputed
of
wisdome
and
Iustice
:
it
ensueth
that
mencion
bee
made
of
Fortitude
.
Fortitude
may
be
defined
.
A
custome
,
or
els
an
affection
of
the
minde
,
whiche
taketh
in
hande
premeditated
daungers
,
and
laboures
,
and
susteineth
what
euer
incommodities
do
chaunce
,
repelling
timidity
and
anger
.
Of
Cicero
it
is
defined
an
affection
of
the
minde
,
pacient
in
aduenturinge
peril
,
and
in
trauell
and
sorow
whose
principall
duties
he
wil
that
there
be
two
,
a
contempte
of
death
and
sorow
:
because
all
valiante
courage
is
tried
,
either
in
wofulnesse
,
or
in
labour
,
or
in
daunger
,
and
in
the
vndertakinge
and
putting
to
flight
of
dreadefull
matters
.
The
Stoikes
define
Fortitude
,
a
vertue
contending
for
equity
.
Chrisippus
an
affection
of
the
minde
,
in
sufferinge
and
susteyning
,
yelding
vnto
extreame
law
without
feare
.
Manly
courage
séemeth
to
bee
ingendred
partely
of
will
,
partly
of
the
faculty
of
the
angry
soule
,
because
the
operacion
of
Fortitude
requireth
some
commocion
hereof
:
who
notwithstanding
her selfe
is
voluntary
and
is
busied
in
the
suffering
of
sorow
,
and
in
aduenturing
of
perilles
:
and
the
will
ought
to
rule
,
but
that
rage
ought
to
be
obeysant
vnto
desire
and
counsell
.
Fortitude
is
conuersant
in
restreining
of
fearefull
matters
,
both
causing
timi●itie
of
som
daunger
aboute
to
hurt
,
and
also
the
expectation
of
perill
,
as
it
were
in
the
matter
wherin
she
is
exercised
,
whether
it
be
in
Marcial
prowes
,
or
els
in
Domestical
troubles
,
that
at
last
she
may
obtaine
that
vtterest
good
:
This
vertu
(
as
likewise
the
residew
)
is
a
mediocrity
betwixte
ouermuch
and
to
litle
that
is
to
witte
,
betweene
timidity
and
boldnesse
,
whiche
vices
after
what
fashion
they
may
be
eschewed
.
Horace
expoundeth
in
these
Verses
.
In
neede
appere
stoute
and
stronge
:
be
thou
wise
To
shrinke
in
thy
sayles
beginning
to
rise
.
The
dutie
of
Fortitude
is
double
,
to
aduenture
,
and
to
sustaine
daungers
&
aduersities
with
that
minde
that
it
maye
content
God
,
and
obay
his
commaundements
,
for
whose
sake
all
things
ought
to
be
done
,
and
doubtlesse
to
enter
on
them
,
and
to
abide
them
not
only
couragiously
and
manfully
,
but
also
prudently
is
the
parte
of
a
valiant
man
:
for
neyther
should
he
take
in
hande
any
thynge
vnaduisedly
and
harebraynly
,
and
with
no
consideration
,
lesse
he
may
seem
rather
to
be
allured
with
violent
moode
,
than
with
perfect
reason
.
Vnto
Fortitude
true
and
sincere
,
&
adorned
with
other
vertues
.
Aristotle
hath
annected
in
his
thirde
booke
Ad
Nicomachum
other
fiue
fourmes
not
absolute
,
yet
as
of
kinne
.
The
first
of
Citizens
fighting
for
their
countrie
:
The
seconde
of
Souldiours
who
by
Marciall
policie
do
aduenture
perils
:
the
thirde
of
them
whiche
trust
vnto
experience
:
the
fourthe
of
them
which
trauell
through
an
hope
to
winne
:
the
fifte
of
such
as
haue
al
their
affiaunce
in
Fortune
,
neither
sufficiently
examininge
the
daungers
,
whom
ignorance
causeth
sturdie
.
Verely
it
is
no
lesse
the
parte
of
Fortitude
to
suffer
calamitie
,
to
susteine
iniurie
,
to
bridell
the
moodes
of
minde
with
an
vpright
and
constant
courage
,
than
to
hazarde
the
life
,
to
contempne
death
,
and
doubtlesse
with
harte
and
will
to
die
,
if
so
he
shall
purpose
to
please
God
.
And
because
Fortitude
is
conuersant
either
in
the
receiuyng
of
daungers
,
or
els
in
the
enduring
:
vnto
this
vertue
foure
fourmes
are
subnected
,
Confidence
&
magnaminitie
whiche
perteine
vnto
recei●ing
.
Pacience
and
Perseuerance
who
●e
referred
vnto
enduring
:
The
two
●t
belonge
as
it
were
to
the
first
mo●n
of
Fortitude
,
the
latter
to
the
suf●ance
,
and
stablenesse
and
constancie
of
euils
.
Of
all
these
perfect
manlinesse
doth
consist
.
Of
Confidence
and
Magnanimitie
.
Cap.
xxx
.
COnfidence
(
saith
Cicero
)
is
a
sure
trust
of
minde
:
either
by
which
the
minde
hath
planted
in
her selfe
much
beleif
in
weightie
and
honest
matters
,
with
a
sure
hope
.
And
vnto
this
Boldenesse
appeareth
to
be
of
aliance
,
and
yet
it
is
a
vice
:
sith
it
is
led
not
with
counsell
and
iudgement
,
as
Fortitude
,
vnto
whom
Prudency
is
a
perpetuall
companion
,
but
with
violence
and
temeritie
:
not
taking
sufficient
aduise
,
before
it
geue
the
assaulte
on
daungers
,
whether
it
may
ouercome
:
and
how
it
may
,
and
whether
it
be
honest
to
vndertake
the
same
.
But
confidence
doth
not
aduenture
ieoperdies
stoutely
and
with
a
great
trust
,
vnlesse
diligently
premeditated
afore
.
For
they
are
not
to
be
iudged
stronge
men
who
dare
to
aduenture
lesse
,
but
they
which
commonstrate
a
moderate
vertue
of
minde
,
whom
reason
ought
to
rule
,
and
make
agreeable
to
vertue
.
Contarie
to
confidence
is
mistrust
,
a
lowe
abashmente
of
the
minde
,
the
same
which
dispeire
is
,
which
aboue
we
haue
compendiously
touched
in
the
chapiter
of
desire
and
hope
.
Magnanimity
is
an
amplenesse
of
a
noble
,
and
an
vnconquerable
stomacke
,
and
a
might
and
stoutnesse
to
commit
valiaunt
actes
.
This
supporteth
confidence
,
and
as
an
helper
dothe
fortify
her
being
of
kinne
.
Vnderstand
you
a
noble
corage
,
not
a
proud
,
neither
an
arrogant
,
but
a
modest
,
and
keepinge
vnder
foote
insolencye
,
very
noble
,
and
contemninge
worldely
vanities
.
For
this
vertue
is
principallye
tryed
in
the
contempte
both
of
those
great
matters
whiche
the
gréedy
common
people
hath
in
wonderfull
admiration
:
and
also
in
the
repressing
of
perturbations
,
that
all
ambicion
,
niggardlinesse
,
and
concupiscence
may
be
resisted
with
a
triumphing
courage
,
that
al
aduersities
may
be
constantely
endured
.
Cicero
in
his
firste
booke
of
duties
,
doth
teache
that
there
are
two
partes
of
the
greatnesse
of
courage
;
of
the
whiche
one
is
tried
in
prosperity
,
the
other
in
aduersity
:
because
neither
tribulation
is
of
strength
to
discourage
a
noble
stomack
,
nor
the
riches
of
fortune
of
power
to
make
him
presūtuous
.
Contrary
vnto
Magnanimitie
be
two
vices
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
superfluous
hautines
,
either
a
proud
and
swelling
mind
:
and
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
a
want
or
defect
of
courage
.
In
the
first
vice
is
conteyned
an
auaunting
,
extolling
it selfe
insolentely
and
foolyshly
,
and
a
minde
strouting
out
vnwisely
:
what
one
is
of
Thraso
in
Terence
a
vaine
and
peeuish
personne
,
and
blind
with
ouermuch
loue
of
him selfe
,
than
which
nothing
can
be
excogitated
more
foolish
,
whome
no
good
and
modest
man
may
be
able
to
abide
.
This
sect
of
companions
is
odious
vnto
all
sortes
,
saue
only
vnto
parasites
.
Repugnant
to
this
vice
is
that
other
which
is
called
Demissio
animi
,
lacke
of
corage
,
vsually
tearmed
Pusillanimitas
cowardise
,
that
is
to
say
,
a
foule
and
an
vnseemely
faintnes
of
courage
,
fléeing
imminent
daunger
,
and
vilainously
languishing
in
large
and
wonderful
exploits
,
what
one
hath
béene
of
Effemynate
personnes
,
as
of
Sardanapalus
,
who
verelye
not
resistinge
,
bannished
from
his
Empire
,
concluded
his
owne
destruction
through
a
preuented
despeire
:
as
of
Heliogabalus
,
as
of
others
,
who
beinge
enfeebled
with
pleasures
haue
led
a
slouthfull
and
a
beastly
life
.
To
them
which
wente
afore
may
be
adioyned
,
a
desire
of
good
estimacion
,
of
which
in
like
manner
theare
are
two
vices
:
the
one
inordinate
sute
,
the
other
a
contempt
of
Fame
and
reputacion
.
Of
Pacience
and
Perseueraunce
.
Cap.
xxxi
.
PAcience
Cicero
defineth
,
a
voluntary
,
and
a
longe
permission
of
hard
and
difficulte
matters
for
honesties
sake
or
profite
:
that
is
to
witte
,
a
stable
and
a
constante
sufferaunce
of
humian
thynges
,
through
which
wée
sustaine
what
euer
aduersity
shall
chaunce
vnto
vs
with
a
pacient
minde
.
He
called
it
voluntary
,
because
this
vertue
,
as
also
Magnanimity
,
is
situated
in
will
,
which
that
angry
faculty
of
the
Soule
doth
helpe
.
That
it
is
added
of
him
,
for
honesties
sake
:
hee
propoundeth
the
ende
of
this
vertue
,
which
also
is
apperteining
vnto
all
the
rest
.
For
if
laboures
be
susteyned
not
for
Vertue
,
but
either
by
reason
of
hatred
,
or
riches
,
or
honoures
,
he
termeth
it
an
horrible
asperity
,
which
imitateth
pacience
.
But
of
vs
at
al
seasons
the
marke
is
to
be
appointed
,
that
our
doing
please
God
,
vnto
whom
vertue
is
acceptable
.
The
charge
of
pacience
is
double
:
One
in
abidyng
Iniuries
receiued
:
The
other
in
suffringe
all
casualities
of
Fortune
with
an
vpright
minde
.
Hee
ouercommeth
who
beareth
Iniury
,
by
reason
bothe
he
vanquisheth
him selfe
,
and
his
aduersary
,
sithe
he
repelleth
the
affection
:
Hee
is
broughte
in
bondage
,
who
doth
iniury
,
because
he
yeeldeth
vnto
affections
,
and
is
surmounted
of
anger
and
gréedinesse
.
He
is
iust
,
this
fellowe
vniuste
.
It
is
the
parte
then
of
a
pacient
man
,
both
to
conquere
iniury
by
contemninge
,
and
not
to
take
reuengement
of
it
to
him selfe
,
but
to
commit
it
vnto
God
,
vnto
whom
it
belongeth
to
chastice
Iniquities
,
and
to
receiue
all
chaunce
with
an
egall
minde
,
to
endure
pouerty
,
bannishment
,
barrennes
,
wéeping
,
and
wailing
,
reproche
,
despite
,
seruitude
,
gréeuous
diseases
,
blindnes
,
and
if
any
thing
also
be
more
wretched
;
neuer
to
despeire
,
neuer
to
be
discouraged
through
calamities
.
For
whereas
the
life
of
man
is
ful
of
miseries
,
and
distresses
,
who
had
not
some
whiles
rather
to
leaue
his
life
(
as
,
certaine
cursed
Imphs
&
dastardes
haue
dun
)
eake
at
one
time
to
close
vp
all
his
cares
,
then
alwaies
to
leade
a
peineful
life
:
except
he
being
Haruaised
with
the
brest
plate
of
pacience
,
would
valiauntly
gaineset
a
redy
and
an
vnuincible
courage
to
abide
all
thinges
to
the
ende
,
and
would
recken
any
life
well
to
be
passed
ouer
,
vertue
being
his
guide
?
Som
haue
falsly
supposed
them
to
be
strong
,
who
in
desperate
cases
haue
wilfully
murthered
them selues
,
eschewing
either
beggery
,
or
ignominy
,
or
captiuity
,
or
bondage
,
or
not
sustaining
loue
,
or
els
auoydinge
any
other
calamity
:
whome
Aristotle
more
rightfully
iudged
to
be
nise
and
womannish
:
sithens
it
is
the
guise
of
a
stedfast
and
a
valiaunt
person
to
take
any
Fortune
in
good
worth
:
but
the
property
of
a
timorous
and
a
sluggish
to
mistruste
,
and
to
be
dismaide
with
laboures
,
and
shamefully
to
faint
in
courage
.
Impacience
may
be
saide
a
vice
repugnaunt
to
pacience
,
an
eschewinge
of
an
honest
peine
and
sorrowe
:
whose
nature
it
is
not
a
perplexed
matter
to
vnderstande
by
those
things
which
presently
are
declared
.
There
are
some
vnsufferable
who
feare
trauels
,
others
who
flee
wofullnesse
:
and
thinke
them
intollerable
which
pacience
learneth
to
be
sustained
.
They
do
yeelde
vnto
turmoiles
,
these
are
crucified
with
passions
,
and
cares
,
&
do
abide
iniury
hardly
and
gréeuously
.
There
be
some
likewise
who
are
not
able
moderatly
inough
to
vse
their
prosperity
,
whose
mindes
are
to
much
puffed
vp
with
the
insolencie
of
their
good
estate
:
as
muche
to
be
discommended
as
they
,
because
it
is
a
thing
,
no
lesse
vnséemely
to
be
discomfited
,
then
péeuishly
to
triumphe
.
Perseueraunce
is
defined
of
Cicero
,
a
stable
,
and
a
perpetuall
abode
in
reason
vprightly
examined
.
This
is
a
faithfull
companion
for
pacience
,
and
an
ayde
in
bearing
aduersity
,
and
in
moderatinge
prosperity
with
equalitie
,
and
in
brideling
all
the
surges
of
the
mind
,
and
bringing
them
in
subiection
to
the
discourse
of
reason
.
For
a
puissaunt
stomacke
,
as
he
saieth
,
without
constancie
and
honest
moderacion
of
minde
,
is
nothing
worth
,
waueringe
or
lightnesse
and
an
vnstable
gouerment
of
humaine
affaires
is
a
Vice
contrary
vnto
perseueraunce
:
which
either
for
a
womanlines
of
mind
doth
vnaduisedly
geue
place
vnto
difficulties
,
nor
is
of
efficacie
to
endure
vexacions
:
or
elles
by
reason
of
an
obstinacie
continueth
in
his
opinion
arrogantely
and
stubburnely
,
which
reason
commaundeth
to
chaunge
.
Of
the
Vyces
betweene
which
Fortitude
is
placed
.
Cap.
xxxij
.
FOrtitude
is
the
meane
betwixt
two
vices
,
boldnes
and
timidity
.
Boldnesse
is
an
vnaduised
enterprise
of
perils
,
or
els
a
rashe
confidence
,
by
which
any
man
not
paysing
his
hability
dothe
aduenture
daunger
with
a
blinde
inuasion
,
either
through
the
ignoraunce
of
the
difficulty
,
or
through
the
loftines
of
stomacke
and
desire
of
renowne
,
or
through
dispaire
,
or
els
doutles
through
a
dastardlinesse
and
madnes
ransacking
the
mind
.
This
vice
is
farre
dissonant
from
Fortitude
,
because
it
geueth
not
reason
and
counsell
.
This
also
is
reposed
aboue
among
the
affections
;
by
reason
it
stirreth
vp
the
rage
of
the
minde
to
worke
Hairebrainely
and
aduenturously
.
To
this
mischiefe
the
repugnaunt
vice
is
Timidity
,
through
which
any
one
without
occasion
is
perced
with
terrour
,
and
feared
with
any
creaking
,
and
dreadeth
those
thinges
which
are
valiantly
to
be
enterprised
for
vertue
:
A
dastarde
,
an
effeminate
person
,
and
one
not
able
to
abide
honest
toyle
:
who
whiles
he
is
ouer
carefull
for
his
life
,
he
shunneth
not
shame
,
and
disworshippe
,
which
especially
is
to
be
auoided
.
Of
either
vice
otherwise
it
is
debated
in
the
explicacion
of
affections
,
than
in
this
place
,
in
which
not
the
affection
,
but
a
vicious
property
contrarious
to
manlinesse
is
to
be
vnderstanded
.
Of
Temperaunce
.
Cap.
xxxiii
.
TEmperaunce
is
a
vertue
which
subdueth
plesures
vnto
the
dominion
of
reason
.
The
same
is
defined
of
Cicero
,
a
firme
and
a
temperate
rule
of
reason
ouer
luste
,
and
other
euil
braides
of
the
minde
.
It
is
also
termed
a
moderation
of
desires
,
obedient
to
reason
:
and
in
another
place
,
the
gouernesse
of
all
commocions
,
it
is
conuersaunt
in
refusing
of
pleasures
,
as
the
same
Aucthor
agreeth
with
Plato
and
Aristotle
.
In
Gréeke
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
whiche
our
countryman
calleth
both
Temperaunce
,
and
Modestie
,
and
also
Frugalitie
.
For
it
is
occupied
in
refraynynge
delices
,
and
desiers
,
as
in
the
matter
,
whereof
it
intreateth
:
And
because
some
pleasures
are
naturall
,
and
common
to
all
liuynge
creatures
:
others
consisting
in
opinion
:
and
they
bothe
either
of
the
minde
or
of
the
body
:
of
which
some
are
good
,
whiche
are
referred
vnto
a
good
ende
:
others
vicious
,
whiche
are
directed
to
an
ill
:
this
vertu
is
familiar
with
good
and
honest
men
:
it
absteyneth
from
the
contrarie
:
verely
it
bridleth
al
concupiscencies
with
the
iudgement
of
reason
:
whiche
Seneca
confirmeth
in
these
wordes
:
Temperance
ruleth
pleasures
:
some
it
hateth
and
driueth
away
,
with
others
it
dispenseth
,
&
trayneth
to
an
holsom
fashion
.
By
whiche
wordes
it
is
to
be
vnderstanded
that
this
is
a
vertue
very
well
acquainted
with
Prudencie
.
Sith
than
Temperaunce
is
busied
in
measurynge
of
appetites
,
her
first
charge
is
,
to
contemplate
,
what
the
necessitie
of
nature
may
postulate
for
to
passe
the
life
commodiously
,
that
she
may
satisfie
her
,
who
is
contented
with
few
thynges
,
whereby
the
superfluous
vse
of
thinges
naturall
may
be
eschewed
,
and
may
be
reteined
within
the
bounde
of
Nature
,
The
other
is
,
that
when
as
now
she
●ath
vnquisshed
the
delightes
of
the
bodie
,
she
conquere
also
the
passions
of
the
minde
strugling
agaynst
reason
,
that
she
keepe
vnder
arrogancie
,
that
she
know
her selfe
,
that
she
stifely
repine
sensualitie
,
and
indeuour
by
little
and
little
to
brynge
it
in
seruitude
to
Reason
.
Thrée
partes
are
annected
of
Cicero
vnto
Temperance
:
Continence
,
Clemencie
,
and
Modestie
.
Of
whiche
the
first
doth
gouerne
Lust
through
the
rule
of
Counsell
:
The
other
remitteth
Hatred
:
The
thirde
preserueth
honest
shamefastnesse
,
and
demurenesse
,
without
whiche
nothinge
can
be
accompted
●ight
.
Of
Continence
and
Abstinence
.
Cap.
xxxiiij
.
BEtwixt
Continence
and
abstinence
that
appeareth
properly
to
bee
the
difference
,
that
Continence
doeth
guide
affections
,
and
kepeth
a
meane
in
al
order
of
liuing
and
trimming
,
and
especially
(
as
Cicero
beareth
witnesse
)
in
ouerslippinge
of
pleasures
:
vnto
whom
Incontinence
is
repugnant
.
Abstinence
represseth
the
handes
from
other
mens
goods
,
vnto
whom
Rauenie
is
apposite
.
This
is
in
an
innocent
man
,
the
in
a
temperate
:
Continence
is
defined
of
him
,
a
vertue
by
which
the
greedinesse
is
ruled
through
the
gouerment
of
counsell
.
It
is
contrary
to
desire
,
to
pleasure
,
to
lust
.
For
the
charge
hereof
is
,
to
moderate
all
appetites
,
lust
,
riotte
,
drunkennesse
,
gluttuous
,
deuouringe
of
meates
,
and
to
cause
all
sences
and
delices
obedient
to
reason
.
This
vertu
not
only
maketh
men
commendable
,
&
rulers
of
desires
,
but
also
vncorrupted
,
and
iocant
,
and
also
neate
to
conclude
verye
excellent●
matters
:
But
contrarywise
of
intemperancie
growe
many
kindes
of
diseases
,
the
paunche
burdened
with
ouermuch
meate
and
drinke
,
doth
both
pester
the
minde
and
darken
the
reason
.
But
yet
that
scope
euermore
oughte
to
bee
proposed
vnto
all
men
,
that
they
restraine
them selues
therfore
,
because
they
ought
to
know
by
so
doing
to
please
God
,
whom
they
must
serue
,
not
by
reason
it
aduauntageth
the
healthe
.
For
if
any
man
dothe
auoyde
incontinencie
only
for
health
,
or
els
for
vtilities
sake
,
be
meriteth
not
guardon
:
vnto
continence
may
be
referred
al
those
vertues
,
whatsoeuer
appellation
they
may
haue
,
which
do
moderate
pleasures
,
apparel
,
liuing
,
meate
,
drinke
:
which
make
chaste
modest
,
and
sober
personnes
:
which
bridle
those
abhominable
destructions
,
superfluity
,
vnleyfull
appetite
,
greedynesse
,
drunckennesse
,
and
suche
like
,
throughe
which
voluptuous
,
Lecherous
,
effeminate
gourmanders
,
drunken
men
,
and
worse
than
beasts
are
made
.
Through
Continence
we
come
vnto
the
praise
of
Temperaunce
.
She
is
perdie
rather
an
vnperfecte
vertue
than
an
absolute
,
as
liketh
Aristotle
:
yet
very
necessary
for
the
duty
of
Temperaunce
,
a
vertue
fully
accomplished
.
Celius
Calcaguinus
hath
intituled
in
his
inquisicions
,
that
Aristotle
doth
declare
in
his
Ethikes
,
and
Plutarchus
in
his
Commentarie
of
Morall
Vertu
,
what
difference
there
is
betwixt
the
continent
man
and
vncontynent
,
Temperate
and
vntemperate
.
For
the
Continent
person
contendeth
with
affections
,
and
vanquisheth
them
:
the
vncontinent
perdie
doth
repine
,
but
beyng
ouercommed
doth
lament
.
Contrarywise
the
temperate
hath
no
struglyng
:
but
vseth
appeased
affections
,
as
the
calme
Sea
,
whiche
is
tossed
with
no
wynde
.
But
the
vntemperate
without
resistynge
graunteth
vnto
perturbacions
,
take
professeth
himselfe
willingly
consenting
to
all
delices
.
The
contrary
vice
vnto
Continence
,
is
incontinence
,
spreadyng
abrode
her
braunches
egally
.
She
may
be
defined
,
An
immoderate
desier
of
pleasures
,
which
is
not
gouerned
with
the
Empyre
of
Reason
:
either
it
is
a
superfluous
vse
,
and
repugnant
to
reason
,
of
lust
,
gluttony
,
drunknesse
,
and
other
vnseemely
pleasures
.
Nothynge
is
more
filthy
and
vile
than
this
vice
,
which
maketh
a
man
a
bounde
seruante
,
and
despoyleth
him
of
al
libertie
:
whom
it
deliuereth
in
bondage
to
moste
wanton
rulers
,
as
to
Desiers
,
Lustes
,
Fleshfondynges
,
Wrathe
,
auarice
,
and
suche
other
stewardes
of
reproche
&
deformitie
:
as
elegantly
it
is
disputed
of
Cicero
in
his
first
Paradox
.
Of
Clemencie
.
Cap.
xxxv
.
EVen
as
Continence
is
tried
in
the
restreigninge
and
moderating
of
desiers
,
so
is
Clemencie
in
the
bridlyng
of
an●er
.
For
there
are
two
partes
of
the
Soule
,
as
before
it
is
declared
,
the
desi●ing
,
and
the
angry
:
out
of
which
all
af●ections
do
proceede
:
Clemencie
is
defi●ed
of
Cicero
,
through
which
the
minds
●naduisedly
enforced
to
hate
one
,
are
●epressed
with
gentlenesse
.
Seneca
alledging
sundry
definitions
of
the
same
Vertue
sayeth
,
Clemencie
is
a
temperance
of
the
mind
in
power
to
reuenge
:
either
,
a
gentlenesse
of
the
superiour
towardes
the
inferiour
,
in
ordering
of
punishementes
:
either
,
a
bendinge
of
the
minde
vnto
fauourablenesse
,
in
exaction
of
punishment
.
For
it
is
called
the
same
pleasantnesse
,
or
méekenesse
,
and
Clemencie
,
by
which
the
braide
of
anger
is
repelled
with
reason
,
and
a
modesty
is
shewed
in
reuenginge
,
and
chastising
.
But
wisdom
doth
so
rule
her
,
that
neyther
all
should
be
pardoned
,
nor
any
man
corrected
.
For
both
of
them
rather
doth
answere
vnto
cruelty
,
than
Clemencie
:
yet
notwithstanding
it
is
better
to
offend
in
the
more
fréendly
poynte
,
than
in
the
contrary
:
vnlesse
perhappes
they
who
beare
office
in
the
common
wealth
,
shal
suppose
an
example
néedeful
to
be
practised
on
some
,
whom
Cicero
wisheth
to
be
like
vnto
the
lawes
,
who
are
trained
to
punish
,
not
through
anger
,
but
equitie
.
It
is
the
parte
of
Clemencie
to
searche
out
the
causes
of
fauouring
.
Certes
no
priuate
person
oughte
to
feare
to
bende
him selfe
to
the
more
Courtious
parte
,
nether
ought
to
deuise
at
any
time
how
to
requite
the
Iniury
inferred
to
him
:
but
ought
to
beare
vnder
foote
the
incensinges
of
choler
,
&
ought
to
vnderstande
this
to
be
the
excellentest
victory
of
all
others
,
and
chéefely
conuenient
for
a
Christian
man
.
Cruelty
,
and
fiersnesse
,
or
els
stoutnesse
of
the
minde
in
reuenging
,
and
punishing
,
is
repugnaunte
to
Clemencie
,
whose
companion
is
Brutishnesse
:
that
is
to
wit
a
besticall
hostility
.
Than
which
two
vices
nothing
is
more
diuerse
from
the
nature
of
man
,
vnto
whome
appertaineth
Humanitie
and
Clemencie
:
and
compassion
ioyned
hereto
with
an
amiable
bonde
,
whiche
maketh
menne
gentle
and
courteous
:
than
whiche
no
vertue
may
be
more
acceptable
to
God
,
whose
mercye
is
vnmeasurable
&
vnestimable
.
Softnesse
seemeth
to
be
of
kinne
to
Clemencie
,
but
it
is
a
vice
:
whiche
is
belonginge
to
an
●iotte
,
not
to
a
man
fauourable
.
Of
Modestye
.
Cap.
xxxvi
.
MOdestia
,
Modestie
,
so
called
,
because
it
keepeth
a
certaine
meane
and
moderation
.
Cicero
defineth
it
in
his
second
boke
De
Inuencione
,
throughe
whiche
honest
shame
doth
gette
a
worthie
and
a
stable
authority
,
and
in
his
firste
booke
of
Offices
,
of
all
thinges
whiche
are
done
,
and
which
are
saide
,
an
order
and
a
meane
,
and
a
knowledge
of
an
oportunity
of
fit
seasones
to
accomplish
a
thing
.
The
Stoykes
,
a
Science
of
settinge
those
thinges
whiche
shal
be
done
or
sayde
,
in
their
proper
places
.
The
first
definition
commendeth
vnto
vs
Honest
shamefastnesse
whiche
Cicero
termeth
a
certaine
natural
Timiditie
,
and
a
bashfulnesse
,
whiche
is
a
certayne
reuerende
●eare
towardes
men
:
whose
propertie
●s
to
offende
no
man
:
as
it
belongeth
to
Iustice
,
to
violate
no
man
whiche
is
●efined
of
him
in
Particions
Oratorye
,
the
warde
of
al
vertues
,
eschewing
disworship
,
and
chiefely
séeking
for
praise
.
And
Aristotle
calleth
it
a
feare
of
reproche
&
infamie
.
And
these
definitions
verely
seeme
not
to
declare
one
certain
vertue
shamefastnesse
,
but
a
certaine
generall
vnited
together
with
all
vertues
,
whiche
by
another
appellacion
is
called
Decorum
Comlynesse
.
Shame
is
rehersed
of
vs
among
the
affections
:
where
wee
couet
a
sodayne
commocion
to
be
vnderstanded
,
through
which
any
man
is
troubled
vnwares
:
but
in
this
place
an
affection
limited
to
vertue
,
confirmed
by
vse
,
which
through
the
feare
of
reproche
and
infamy
calleth
vs
backe
from
vices
,
if
we
acknowledge
it
,
not
as
Vertue
her selfe
,
yet
verily
yoked
with
Vertue
.
Diogenes
named
the
rednesse
,
ingendred
of
this
affection
,
Virtutis
colorem
the
coloure
of
Vertue
,
declaringe
that
kinde
of
shame
to
proceede
from
a
good
disposicion
,
which
yet
in
this
place
wee
will
to
be
moderate
:
that
it
bee
a
mediocrity
,
which
is
proper
to
vertues
,
betwixt
ouermuch
shame
and
timiditie
a
counterfayter
of
bashfulnesse
and
impudencie
.
Of
shame
a
shamefaste
or
a
bashful
man
is
called
by
the
title
of
vertue
:
vnto
whom
is
contrarious
an
impudent
,
and
an
vnshamefast
person
.
This
feare
of
dishoneste
matters
is
commendable
,
and
in
the
younger
sorte
it
signifieth
a
towardnesse
of
Vertue
,
&
besides
the
especiall
ornamente
of
women
.
But
Impudency
is
a
detestable
Vice
,
by
whiche
the
comelinesse
,
and
all
the
honesty
of
life
is
neglected
:
and
an
entraunce
vnto
vices
is
opened
,
because
they
are
not
feared
.
The
other
definitions
of
Cicero
,
which
euen
now
wee
haue
putte
,
do
sufficiently
declare
,
what
Modestie
is
:
that
there
be
an
order
,
and
meane
conningly
to
be
obserued
of
those
thinges
which
are
don
,
and
saide
,
wherby
euery
matter
may
bee
excecuted
in
his
proper
place
and
time
,
&
decently
.
For
the
duty
hereof
is
,
so
to
asswage
the
troublesom
moodes
,
that
a
certaine
harmony
of
all
doynges
be
obserued
:
That
nothyng
which
is
foolish
,
&
scarce
séemely
,
either
be
doone
or
sayde
,
that
nothing
be
committed
couetously
through
Enuie
,
Loue
,
Lust
,
Arrogancie
,
Ambicion
,
and
other
vnlawfull
appetites
.
Vnder
Modestie
be
placed
Lowlinesse
of
minde
,
a
desier
to
learne
,
pleasantnesse
,
either
delectablenesse
,
or
ciuilitie
of
talke
,
and
furniture
of
body
.
Lowlinesse
of
minde
,
which
they
call
Humilitie
,
is
the
very
notable
vertue
of
Christian
men
:
by
whiche
any
man
doth
so
presse
downe
the
malipertnesse
of
courage
,
that
by
how
much
the
higher
he
is
,
by
so
muche
the
more
lowly
he
shuld
behaue
himselfe
.
Christe
himself
would
that
we
learne
this
vertue
of
him
,
who
called
himself
meeke
,
and
of
an
humble
and
lowe
spirit
:
that
wee
likewise
accordyng
to
his
example
shoulde
extenuate
our
goods
,
if
there
be
any
:
whereas
wée
can
obtaine
no
good
thyng
,
whiche
is
not
geuen
vs
by
the
will
and
gift
of
God
:
that
there
shoulde
be
no
occasion
to
any
man
of
braggyng
of
himself
,
sith
euery
perfect
gift
commeth
by
inspiration
from
God
the
Father
,
who
lighteneth
the
mindes
of
men
,
through
Iesus
Christe
our
Sauiour
,
through
whome
men
haue
receiued
perfect
wisdom
authorised
by
the
benefite
of
the
holy
ghost
.
Therefore
this
vertue
teacheth
that
especially
,
which
in
times
past
was
said
to
fall
downe
from
Heauen
Nosce
te
ipsum
,
know
thy self
:
that
no
man
perdy
shuld
attribute
ouermuch
to
himself
,
sithens
he
hath
nothyng
,
whiche
he
hath
not
receiued
.
This
also
is
the
charge
of
a
prudent
person
whereby
you
shall
vnderstande
Modestie
and
Temperance
at
al
seasons
to
be
very
straightly
ioyned
to
Prudencie
:
wherof
also
she
is
tearmed
of
the
Greekes
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
as
it
were
the
Fortresse
of
wisdome
.
The
contrary
vice
is
arrogancie
,
throughe
which
any
man
blinded
with
the
loue
of
him selfe
,
faineth
many
notable
thinges
to
bee
in
him
,
which
are
not
in
him
,
and
greater
than
may
be
in
him
:
either
an
insolent
and
vayne
bostinge
,
and
wantynge
the
iudgement
of
the
minde
.
This
vice
of
foolish
persons
by
ouerwéening
in
them selues
to
well
,
is
hatefull
both
to
God
and
men
.
The
other
parte
of
Modestie
is
coupled
to
the
former
with
greate
affinitie
,
the
desier
of
learnyng
,
by
which
any
man
acknowledgyng
his
ignorance
is
holden
with
the
loue
of
Science
,
to
the
procuring
of
whiche
he
frameth
his
minde
.
He
doeth
easely
learne
many
thinges
,
who
is
studious
of
wisdom
,
and
vnderstandeth
that
he
is
ignorant
in
many
matters
:
what
fellowes
were
the
Philosophers
,
whose
whole
life
hath
béen
nothing
els
than
a
certaine
perpetuall
studie
of
knowledge
and
wisdom
.
Contrarie
vnto
these
be
suche
,
who
mought
attayne
to
greate
learning
vnlesse
they
did
suppose
themselues
alreadie
to
haue
stored
their
Pouches
:
the
whiche
chiefly
repugneth
this
vertue
,
whiche
proceedeth
from
Modestie
and
confessyon
of
proper
ignorance
.
This
vertue
is
situated
betwixt
two
vices
,
Curiositie
and
carelesnesse
,
either
negligence
of
learnynge
,
and
knowledge
.
Curiositie
is
a
superfluous
paine
,
or
an
immoderate
greedines
to
know
things
either
pernicious
or
vayne
,
and
littel
auayleable
:
contrarie
to
the
laudable
and
natiue
,
and
vehement
desier
and
indeuour
to
learne
ingendred
in
al
men
naturally
.
For
the
serche
&
inquisicion
of
truthe
is
proper
to
man
.
And
as
ouer
muche
industrious
labour
is
worthely
dispraysed
,
so
is
negligence
,
and
the
contempte
of
Science
,
whiche
is
apperteyninge
to
blockish
and
dull
persons
,
who
appeare
more
like
vnto
bruite
creatures
,
then
to
men
.
The
third
braunche
of
Modestie
is
Merinesse
or
Pleasantnesse
,
and
delectablenesse
,
and
also
Humanitie
,
and
courtesie
of
talke
,
whiche
who
that
shall
vse
prudently
,
he
shal
be
pleasant
to
all
men
,
and
for
that
also
the
better
accepted
.
Merinesse
is
which
ascribeth
a
certaine
meane
to
sportes
and
pastimes
:
and
vseth
these
same
in
time
and
place
with
them
,
vnto
whom
they
are
thankefull
,
to
stur
vp
honest
mirth
,
and
to
wipe
away
the
anguishes
of
the
minde
with
a
certayne
delight
.
This
also
is
a
meane
betwixt
two
vices
,
as
Aristotle
beareth
witnesse
in
his
second
booke
Ad
Nicomachum
,
vnhonest
skoffing
,
and
carterlike
vnsauournesse
.
He
that
keepeth
a
meane
of
pleasantnesse
applied
to
sporte
,
is
reckened
mery
and
ciuill
:
He
that
passeth
degree
,
is
compted
a
rayler
,
what
maner
of
felowes
are
the
Parasites
,
and
stage
Players
,
and
other
light
and
foolish
men
.
But
he
which
altogether
abhorreth
Maygames
is
iudged
beastly
,
and
vplandishe
.
But
wée
must
diligently
take
heede
,
lesse
through
our
bourdyng
wee
offende
any
man
:
that
there
be
not
immoderate
conceites
,
not
filthy
,
not
foolish
.
The
work
of
Apothegmes
collected
of
Erasmus
shall
minister
many
mery
toyes
.
And
as
concernyng
that
pleasantnesse
of
life
whiche
is
remnant
:
who
that
shewes
himself
delectable
in
suche
sorte
,
as
reason
requireth
,
he
is
called
easie
,
gentell
,
courtise
:
and
Facilitie
is
reckened
Mediocritie
.
He
whiche
passeth
the
meane
,
if
he
be
ledde
with
no
occasion
,
is
to
be
compted
ouer
easie
,
and
pliant
:
but
if
for
his
owne
profit
,
he
is
to
be
esteemed
a
flatterer
.
But
he
whiche
altogether
dissenteth
and
departeth
from
meane
and
reason
,
and
sheweth
himselfe
sadde
in
all
respects
,
he
is
to
be
thought
testif
,
and
churlish
,
and
worthie
of
al
mennes
hatred
,
with
that
vncourteise
sadnesse
,
and
rude
grauitie
,
and
vnthankefull
to
wise
men
.
A
certayne
sadde
sagenesse
in
countenance
séemeth
to
be
ingraffed
in
certayne
,
what
one
is
geuen
to
that
Crito
of
Terence
:
which
if
it
be
naturall
,
surely
it
can
neither
be
called
properly
good
,
nor
euill
.
It
shal
be
reckened
good
,
if
it
agree
to
right
reason
.
But
there
is
a
certaine
secte
of
menne
which
cloke
foolishnesse
in
their
face
and
countenaunce
,
and
also
in
their
iesture
,
ietting
and
communication
.
Whose
affectate
grauity
ratified
by
lewd
custom
,
is
wonte
to
appeare
very
foolishe
vnto
witty
men
,
and
more
rightlie
informed
vnto
humanity
.
The
last
member
of
sober
moode
doth
teache
that
the
paumpering
and
apparelling
of
the
carcase
is
to
be
moderated
,
and
seemelinesse
to
be
kepte
in
it
as
in
other
matters
,
lesse
either
ouer
curious
care
and
riotte
,
or
els
carterlye
and
vnnaturall
slouenry
and
vncleanlinesse
be
reproued
.
For
this
vertue
which
consisteth
of
adourning
agreeable
for
the
commodity
of
the
body
,
&
necessity
of
nature
is
a
meane
betwixt
superfluity
and
filth
.
Let
the
apparell
than
be
moderate
,
cleane
,
fit
for
the
body
:
and
conueniente
for
vse
,
not
for
foolishnesse
,
and
rediculous
ostentacion
,
what
one
the
barbarous
and
outlandish
is
wont
to
be
;
let
it
be
applied
to
the
persons
accordyng
to
their
dignitie
and
riches
:
and
to
kinde
,
to
age
,
to
place
,
to
time
,
and
to
honest
custome
.
One
be●eemeth
noble
and
riche
men
,
another
the
base
and
poore
:
one
men
,
another
women
:
one
olde
fathers
,
another
the
galant
youthe
.
Of
Intemperance
and
her
two
partes
.
Cap.
xxxvij
.
INtemperancie
,
is
a
redinesse
conseting
to
desiers
againste
reason
:
which
Cicero
in
his
fourth
boke
Tusculanarum
questionum
doth
define
,
a
swaruing
from
al
vnderstanding
,
and
from
righte
reason
,
so
bended
from
the
●rescript
of
reason
,
that
by
no
meanes
the
appetites
sensual
neither
can
be
ruled
nor
yet
repressed
.
The
parts
of
this
vice
are
two
.
One
which
verily
addicteth
her selfe
vnto
pleasures
:
the
other
which
doth
nothing
at
all
.
Throughe
her
men
do
rush
hedlong
after
the
vsage
of
beasts
into
al
delices
,
the
Empire
of
Reason
throwen
away
.
Through
this
,
by
the
rudenesse
of
minde
some
(
as
it
were
with
a
certaine
abashmente
)
are
made
dull
vnto
all
pastaunces
,
and
also
do
reiect
and
contempne
honest
and
necessary
delighte
without
occasion
.
But
these
I
iudge
a
man
may
séeke
,
and
find
a
fewe
,
which
through
a
certayne
Brutishnesse
would
so
abhorre
all
pastime
,
wherewith
Nature
is
cheefely
delited
,
that
they
may
be
intreated
with
no
delectation
.
The
better
sort
by
a
greate
deale
are
wont
to
go
astray
in
the
other
parte
,
and
to
géeue
to
muche
scope
vnto
pleasure
,
which
temperaunce
doth
bridel
by
the
Squire
of
reason
:
who
being
collocated
betweene
those
two
vices
,
dothe
alwaies
laye
claime
to
that
precious
&
peculier
Mediocritie
of
Vertue
.
Of
the
coniunction
of
Vertues
amonge
them selues
,
the
difference
and
excellencie
.
Cap.
xxxviij
.
ALl
Vertues
,
which
nowe
are
absolute
,
and
brought
vnto
the
perfection
of
reason
,
are
so
connected
together
amonge
them selues
with
a
certayne
mutuall
copulation
,
as
the
members
of
our
bodie
:
they
do
so
agrée
in
amible
concord
as
musical
Harmonie
.
This
is
that
manifold
order
of
Ringes
,
whiche
Plato
writeth
to
be
drawen
vnto
of
the
Lodestone
.
For
you
shal
not
cal
him
perfectly
and
truly
a
prudent
man
,
which
same
is
not
both
iust
,
and
valiaunt
,
and
temperate
:
neither
iust
,
who
wanteth
the
rest
:
nor
valiaunte
,
nor
Temperate
,
who
is
not
●urnished
with
the
felowship
of
the
residue
,
although
he
be
conuersaunt
more
commonly
in
one
Vertue
,
than
in
another
.
But
the
vnperfecte
vertues
are
not
so
yoked
together
that
they
may
make
as
it
weare
a
consente
and
agreement
.
Wee
haue
heard
that
Socrates
was
Temperate
and
Modest
:
yet
that
bourding
whiche
is
sayde
to
haue
béene
peculiar
vnto
him
,
when
as
he
woulde
reprehende
the
vnskilfulnesse
of
others
so
greedely
,
can
not
escape
the
checke
of
arrogancie
.
But
truly
that
great
pacience
and
Temperaunce
of
Iob
published
in
holy
Scriptures
was
most
perfet
of
all
others
.
But
not
so
many
examples
are
alledged
of
this
absolute
Vertue
:
yet
many
maye
be
disclosed
of
the
vnperfect
.
Som
vertues
excell
others
in
excellencie
and
operation
:
as
Prudencie
whose
Harboroughe
is
placed
in
the
minde
,
and
is
occupied
in
the
out
findinge
of
trouthe
,
she
is
preferred
before
Temperaunce
whiche
moderateth
delices
,
and
appoynteth
a
meane
vnto
all
thinges
,
vnto
whom
a
place
is
assigned
in
the
desiringe
facultye
of
the
soule
.
Iustice
passeth
Fortitude
because
she
preserueth
the
equality
of
humayne
society
,
and
hath
no
certaine
habitation
,
but
is
indifferently
spred
abrode
vnto
all
partes
of
the
Soule
:
this
ought
to
be
busied
in
despising
of
perils
,
and
oughte
to
bee
situated
in
the
Vertue
of
the
angrie
Soule
:
what
soeuer
verily
be
subiect
vnto
these
cheefe
Vertues
,
as
they
are
lower
in
order
,
so
be
they
in
statelinesse
,
by
reason
that
some
of
them
are
vnder
others
:
neither
forthwith
should
bee
referred
vnto
the
greateste
good
,
whiche
those
principall
Fountaynes
do
nexte
consider
,
but
euery
one
to
their
proper
beginninges
,
and
shoulde
haue
regard
of
vs
rather
then
of
felicity
:
sith
not
they
of
their
owne
power
,
but
by
those
foure
Capitalles
may
be
straightned
vnto
God
him selfe
,
who
is
the
end
of
all
good
thinges
.
To
this
wished
marke
,
and
eternal
felicitie
we
attaine
,
by
the
operation
of
Vertue
verily
(
as
in
the
beginning
it
is
expressed
)
yet
the
which
God
him selfe
may
make
prosperous
vnto
vs
,
through
his
Clemencie
:
to
whom
be
due
all
praise
,
honoure
and
glory
for
euer
and
euer
.
Amen
.
FINIS
.