SECT.
I.
CAP.
I.
Of
Religion
,
and
the
force
thereof
:
whereupon
,
and
how
it
commeth
to
passe
that
there
be
such
,
and
so
many
,
diuersities
,
and
differences
,
of
Opinions
,
concerning
the
same
.
1
It
may
bee
demanded
wherefore
the
wisest
[
a
](A15753-e11590-b)
a
Licurgus
.
Solon
.
Epaminondas
,
Numa
,
Xenophon
.
Law-giuers
did
euer
conclusionally
determine
,
that
the
care
of
Religion
,
and
all
holy
things
should
belong
vnto
the
Prince
?
WAs
it
because
they
thought
it
fit
,
that
that
which
was
[
b
](A15753-e11630-b)
b
Diogenes
apud
Stobaeum
.
best
,
and
most
worthy
to
bee
had
in
honour
,
should
bee
honoured
of
the
best
,
and
him
who
bare
the
chiefest
rule
in
the
Monarchy
,
or
State
?
Or
was
it
rather
,
because
they
wisely
considered
,
that
[
c
](A15753-e11640-b)
c
Xenophon
Paedia
Cyri.
l.
8.
if
their
Subiects
feared
God
,
they
would
bee
the
more
loath
to
do
any
thing
which
might
redound
to
the
hurt
of
one
another
,
or
attempt
any
thing
against
the
Prince
?
Or
was
it
not
for
these
causes
alone
,
but
rather
likewise
,
[
d
](A15753-e11650-b)
d
Arist.
Rhet.
ad
Alex.
for
the
augmenting
and
enlarging
of
their
Empire
and
Dominions
,
as
though
the
Diuine
Powers
were
more
prone
,
propitious
,
and
fauourable
,
towards
those
that
serue
them
,
then
vnto
any
others
?
Or
to
conclude
,
was
it
for
the
generall
good
of
a
Common-wealth
,
as
a
certaine
[
e
](A15753-e11660-b)
e
Lactantius
de
ira
Cap.
12●
.
Diuine
plainely
protested
,
who
held
that
Religion
,
and
the
Feare
of
God
,
were
the
surest
bands
for
conseruing
of
Humane
Society
?
2
It
may
further
bee
demanded
,
how
farre
a
Prince
ought
to
take
care
of
matters
concerning
Religion
?
OVght
hee
(
as
some
do
thinke
)
to
take
care
for
the
examination
of
the
truth
or
falshood
of
that
Religion
which
hee
professeth
,
and
in
all
Ecclesiasticall
matters
to
take
vpon
him
to
bee
chiefe
Iudge
and
Determiner
of
them
,
according
to
his
owne
municipall
Lawes
?
Or
ought
hee
rather
(
as
others
imagine
)
to
bee
a
defender
onely
of
that
Religion
which
formerly
hath
beene
receiued
,
or
afterwards
is
propounded
or
obtruded
vnto
him
?
[
f
](A15753-e11750-b)
f
The
opinion
of
all
Princes
and
States
not
subiect
to
the
Pope
.
This
latter
may
be
thought
an
vniust
limitation
,
that
any
Prince
,
or
State
,
should
bee
so
curbed
:
and
as
touching
the
former
,
[
g
](A15753-e11760-b)
g
The
opinion
of
the
Church
of
Rome
and
her
adh●rents
.
others
thinke
that
a
Prince
hath
no
free
power
,
or
authority
,
to
constitute
or
determine
Ecclesiasticall
businesse
,
but
that
by
bare
permission
onely
,
hee
may
haue
a
meere
inspection
into
them
:
Which
monstrous
Opinion
,
in
a
Treatise
(
almost
ready
to
come
forth
)
I
haue
resuted
:
Euidently
prouing
that
the
Church
,
being
a
part
of
the
State
,
it
cannot
bee
without
apparant
danger
to
the
same
,
to
admit
of
forraigne
Iurisdiction
in
managing
matters
Ecclesiasticall
,
but
that
such
affaires
ought
alwaies
to
bee
ordered
by
those
who
beare
the
Soueraignety
,
or
some
other
,
by
their
appointment
,
within
the
same
State
.
3
It
may
bee
further
demanded
,
wherefore
the
[
h
](A15753-e11810-b)
h
Liu.
lib.
7.
hist.
Rom.
Romanes
alwaies
confessed
and
acknowledged
that
they
were
more
obliged
and
indebted
to
Numa
then
to
Romulus
.
THis
question
(
Right
Honourable
)
out
of
the
Romanes
owne
History
is
thus
resolued
:
Affirming
that
Romulus
(
though
founder
of
their
Citty
)
left
little
or
nothing
vnto
them
,
but
their
names
to
be
called
Romanes
:
But
Numa
(
being
the
chiefe
bringer
in
of
Religion
)
perpetuated
the
same
,
and
seemed
to
giue
vnto
them
their
very
essence
and
being
,
and
(
as
it
were
)
to
cause
the
prosperous
successe
of
their
State
.
For
Romulus
(
saith
the
History
)
brought
in
the
forme
of
a
Common
wealth
,
which
was
likely
not
to
be
durable
,
but
might
end
with
himselfe
:
But
his
Successor
Numa
,
vpon
the
bringing
in
the
continuall
practise
and
exercise
of
Religion
,
did
in
such
wise
forme
and
frame
the
Common-wealth
,
that
though
himselfe
should
shortly
die
,
yet
there
was
left
an
euident
meane
and
way
to
make
it
durable
for
many
ages
.
4
To
the
same
purpose
it
may
be
demanded
,
wherefore
the
[
i
](A15753-e11940-b)
i
Liu.
lib.
10.
Hist.
Rom.
Romanes
did
make
more
account
of
Religion
then
all
other
Nations
?
WAs
it
because
they
plainely
saw
,
that
the
setling
Religion
in
the
State
,
was
the
firmest
prop
they
could
rely
vpon
,
for
the
vpholding
,
conseruing
,
and
perpetuating
of
their
Common-wealth
,
and
that
it
would
serue
most
fitly
for
the
bringing
in
of
Military
Discipline
,
and
Armes
,
to
which
they
were
most
addicted
,
and
without
which
they
iudged
their
State
could
not
stand
?
Or
was
it
rather
,
for
that
they
vnder
this
pretence
(
as
those
who
knew
how
to
(
make
vse
of
Religion
)
did
practise
it
ore
fortunately
,
and
with
better
successe
then
others
,
to
retaine
and
keepe
those
which
were
good
in
their
allegeance
and
obedience
,
and
to
curbe
and
restraine
those
who
were
ill
disposed
from
committing
euill
,
or
persisting
and
continuing
in
their
lewd
courses
:
as
likewise
to
[
k
](A15753-e11970-b)
k
Liu.
lib.
3.
Circa
legem
Terentillam
.
pacifie
the
seditious
,
[
l
](A15753-e11980-b)
l
Liu.
lib.
3.
circa
creationem
tribulorum
plebis
consulari
dignitate
.
reconcile
such
Subiects
as
were
iustly
offended
and
grieued
,
with
the
Rulers
and
the
gouernment
,
[
m
](A15753-e11990-b)
m
Liu.
lib.
5.
retaine
their
Military
Discipline
,
and
keep
their
Souldiers
in
good
order
,
[
n
](A15753-e12000-b)
n
Liu.
lib.
10.
get
credite
and
authority
to
their
Commanders
:
enterprise
warres
,
and
to
bring
them
to
a
happy
end
?
5
Againe
,
it
may
bee
demanded
to
the
same
purpose
,
wherefore
the
Romanes
,
euen
in
their
greatest
streights
and
difficulties
did
rather
vse
the
pretext
and
colour
of
religion
,
to
expedite
and
helpe
themselues
,
then
any
other
meanes
whatsoeuer
.
WAs
it
because
[
o
](A15753-e12070-b)
o
Francise
.
Guicciardin
.
they
were
perswaded
that
the
Common-people
did
rather
iudge
by
the
shadowes
then
the
substances
of
things
?
Or
was
it
not
for
that
cause
alone
,
but
rather
for
that
they
found
by
experience
,
that
men
are
more
throughly
moued
,
and
thinke
themselues
faster
tyed
vpon
an
[
p
](A15753-e12080-b)
p
Liu.
lib.
3.
oath
taken
(
which
hath
his
dependancie
vpon
Religion
)
then
by
any
Lawes
or
Statutes
whatsoeuer
?
6
It
may
further
bee
demanded
wherefore
in
former
times
men
(
generally
)
were
more
religious
then
they
are
in
these
dayes
?
WAs
it
because
that
in
those
elder
times
there
was
not
that
contempt
of
Religion
,
and
neglect
of
God
&
his
seruice
,
as
is
now
in
these
moderne
dayes
?
Or
was
it
rather
,
because
in
those
more
happy
times
,
it
was
held
altogether
vnlawfull
for
any
man
to
make
what
construction
he
list
of
an
oath
when
hee
had
taken
it
,
and
thereout
to
frame
rules
of
liuing
to
himselfe
,
according
to
his
owne
liking
;
but
to
fashion
his
life
and
manners
rather
to
such
lawes
as
were
giuen
,
and
imposed
vpon
him
to
obserue
?
7
It
may
finally
be
demanded
,
wherefore
(
seeing
there
is
but
one
truth
)
there
are
at
this
day
so
many
and
sundry
opinions
about
Religion
,
euen
among
Christians
themselues
.
IS
it
because
the
Clergie
themselues
in
diuers
poynts
disagree
,
being
distracted
into
factions
,
and
writing
and
disputing
one
against
another
;
which
the
rude
and
ignorant
multitude
once
seeing
,
do
thereby
take
vpon
them
to
dispute
of
Diuinitie
,
to
establish
their
fond
and
foolish
opinions
in
matters
of
Religion
,
which
in
no
wise
belonged
vnto
them
to
meddle
withall
?
Or
may
it
bee
,
for
that
sometime
yong
Schollers
,
either
in
yeares
,
learning
or
discretion
taking
vpon
them
to
preach
,
teach
,
or
write
,
doe
propound
false
or
vnsound
Doctrine
to
the
people
:
whose
corrupt
opinions
once
set
abroach
(
as
though
it
were
a
shame
for
them
to
change
them
vpon
more
mature
deliberation
into
better
)
do
continually
bestirre
themselues
,
and
employ
their
wits
,
rather
to
confirme
,
then
amend
their
errors
?
Or
is
this
the
reason
rather
,
for
that
the
followers
of
any
Sect
whatsoeuer
,
study
to
tread
in
their
first
Teachers
steps
,
and
obserue
such
courses
and
customes
as
formerly
haue
beene
prescribed
vnto
them
?
SECT.
I.
CHAP.
II.
Of
the
best
forme
of
a
Common-wealth
.
1
It
may
bee
demanded
,
wherefore
according
to
many
mens
opinions
,
the
Monarchy
,
or
sole
rule
of
one
,
ought
to
be
preferred
before
other
formes
of
gouernement
?
IS
it
because
that
[
a
](A15753-e12320-b)
a
Cic.
de
legibus
lib.
3.
Iustinus
H●storicus
lib.
1
in
initio
.
Monarchy
is
the
most
ancient
kinde
of
gouernment
,
seeing
that
the
name
of
Monarchy
and
Empire
was
first
in
the
world
?
Or
is
it
because
this
kinde
of
gouernement
best
agreeth
to
[
b
](A15753-e12360-b)
b
Salust
in
Epistolis
.
nature
,
as
is
to
be
seene
by
all
,
or
the
most
of
all
other
creatures
,
in
whom
this
image
and
shadow
of
one
to
rule
ouer
the
rest
may
plainly
appeare
?
Or
is
it
because
it
is
most
agreeable
to
[
c
](A15753-e12370-b)
c
Tacit.
1.
Annal
reason
,
that
the
body
of
an
Empire
being
but
one
,
should
likewise
be
swayed
by
the
discretion
of
one
sole
Ruler
?
Or
is
this
rather
the
reason
,
because
that
neither
in
a
[
d
](A15753-e12380-b)
d
Tacit.
4.
Annal
popular
estate
,
where
many
gouerne
,
nor
in
an
Aristocracie
,
where
a
few
sway
the
scepter
,
there
can
be
possible
any
long
concord
and
agreement
among
them
?
Or
is
it
because
that
both
in
[
e
](A15753-e12400-b)
e
Tacit.
1.
Annal
Liu.
lib.
5.
Democracies
and
Aristocracies
it
hath
bin
euer
obserued
,
euer
great
store
of
good
wits
,
which
may
bee
fitted
and
accomodated
to
all
times
and
occasions
,
better
then
other
formes
of
gouernement
?
Or
might
this
rather
bee
their
reason
,
because
they
obserued
that
this
forme
of
gouernement
was
not
so
subiect
to
[
n
](A15753-e12440-b)
n
Arist.
Polit.
5.
alteration
,
or
to
grow
into
tyranny
?
For
to
speake
as
they
would
haue
the
thing
to
be
,
[
o
](A15753-e12450-b)
o
The
opinion
of
Machiauel
,
lib.
1.
Disputat
.
Cap.
5.
though
these
few
of
the
Clarissimi
who
sway
the
gouernement
,
be
naturally
ambitious
;
notwithstanding
when
they
see
and
consider
that
all
the
authoritie
is
in
their
owne
hands
,
and
by
reason
thereof
that
they
surpasse
and
excell
the
rest
of
their
people
,
they
content
themselues
(
for
the
most
part
)
with
this
prerogatiue
,
and
so
raise
no
tumults
,
or
stirre
vp
any
troubles
whereby
the
Common-wealth
might
bee
vexed
or
disquieted
for
their
ambitious
humors
.
And
thus
(
Right
Honorable
)
you
see
how
that
as
euery
one
most
fancied
and
affected
this
,
or
that
kinde
of
gouernement
:
so
they
yeelded
reasons
for
the
maintaining
of
their
opinions
?
Wherein
(
in
my
conceit
)
they
haue
mist
the
Cushion
,
and
vpon
good
grounds
(
as
I
hope
)
I
may
argue
against
them
all
.
And
thus
for
Argument
sake
I
reason
against
their
Monarchy
.
Euery
Monarch
is
either
tied
to
rule
,
according
to
the
lawes
of
the
kingdome
hee
possesseth
,
or
he
is
not
;
If
he
be
not
bound
,
then
all
men
will
confesse
with
me
,
that
that
Monarchy
may
easily
degenerate
,
and
grow
into
tyranny
.
But
if
the
Monarch
bee
tied
to
obserue
lawes
,
nothing
letteth
(
notwithstanding
)
but
that
forme
of
Common-wealth
may
not
bee
durable
,
especially
when
the
kingdome
commeth
by
succession
.
[
p
](A15753-e12500-b)
p
Dantes
Poeta
Ital●●
.
For
very
seldome
falleth
it
out
,
that
to
a
wise
and
godly
Father
,
a
Sonne
of
that
stampe
,
and
endowed
with
like
vertues
,
should
succeed
.
Now
,
whenas
by
the
peruerse
,
carelesse
,
or
bad
carriage
of
the
Monarch
toward
his
people
,
the
manners
of
his
subiects
are
once
corrupted
,
it
must
of
necessitie
follow
,
that
either
the
lawes
are
of
small
force
,
or
none
at
all
.
And
so
farewell
to
that
forme
of
gouernment
.
Against
their
Democracie
,
I
this
auerre
,
or
(
rather
)
finally
determine
,
That
if
any
good
Councels
or
Decrees
come
from
the
people
,
they
proceed
from
them
rather
by
meere
chance
,
and
accidentally
,
then
for
any
prime
or
principall
intention
of
the
Councellers
.
For
the
people
being
driuen
by
some
extreame
necessity
,
to
runne
such
and
such
courses
,
or
put
in
practise
those
or
these
counsels
,
or
being
furthered
by
some
memorable
accident
falling
out
in
the
nicke
(
as
we
say
)
may
oftentimes
decree
things
well
and
wisely
,
otherwise
it
is
impossible
for
them
so
to
doe
?
For
they
know
not
(
for
the
most
part
)
what
they
would
haue
,
they
aske
what
they
know
not
,
and
when
they
haue
obtained
what
they
asked
,
by
and
by
they
spurne
,
kicke
at
it
,
and
despise
it
:
so
that
the
prouerbe
in
them
,
and
of
them
,
is
true
,
and
euer
will
bee
verified
;
The
people
is
a
beast
of
many
heads
,
wauering
and
enuious
.
So
that
I
may
very
safely
conclude
,
that
this
forme
of
gouernment
is
worst
of
all
.
Against
the
State
Aristocraticall
,
I
this
affirme
,
that
experience
hath
made
it
manifest
to
the
world
,
that
those
,
who
for
a
while
haue
iustly
and
vprightly
gouerned
the
Common-wealth
,
not
long
after
haue
abused
their
power
and
authority
to
the
gathering
of
riches
,
and
getting
possessions
of
lands
into
their
hands
,
insomuch
that
they
haue
growne
ambitious
,
earnestly
thirsting
after
priuate
reuenge
,
and
the
fulfilling
of
their
owne
filthy
lusts
and
appetites
,
as
appeared
plainly
in
the
Aristocracie
of
the
Romanes
,
when
after
they
grew
weary
to
be
gouerned
by
Consuls
,
and
had
set
vp
the
Decemvirate
,
in
the
beginning
of
the
second
yeare
of
their
gouernment
,
they
were
inforced
to
change
that
state
into
a
Democracie
,
because
the
Decemviri
ruled
so
villanously
.
Againe
,
it
is
recorded
by
antiquitie
,
that
the
sonnes
of
vertuous
parents
,
who
were
,
and
did
succeede
in
diuers
gouernements
,
became
extreame
insolent
,
common
letchers
,
and
spend-thrifts
of
those
patrimonies
which
their
carefull
parents
had
left
vnto
them
:
Vpon
which
grounds
I
conclude
,
That
the
Aristocraticall
gouernment
cannot
stand
long
firme
,
and
stable
,
much
lesse
to
bee
permanent
and
durable
.
4
These
things
then
being
,
as
I
haue
said
,
and
considering
that
euery
forme
of
gouernment
is
so
subiect
to
change
&
alteration
,
it
were
welworth
the
labour
to
make
a
true
Disquisition
of
this
nice
point
,
to
wit
,
what
forme
of
gouernment
were
fittest
for
euery
Kingdome
and
Country
,
whereby
the
welfare
thereof
might
bee
procured
and
continued
.
TO
determine
this
question
(
Right
Honourable
)
were
a
very
hard
taske
to
be
vndertaken
and
performed
of
any
man
,
yet
because
I
haue
taken
vpon
to
discourse
of
this
subiect
,
I
will
in
briefe
show
your
Lordship
my
opinion
therein
.
And
first
,
I
am
verily
perswaded
,
that
this
,
or
that
forme
of
gouernement
,
whether
already
established
,
or
to
be
brought
in
,
and
established
,
in
any
Kingdome
or
Country
,
doth
chiefly
depend
vpon
the
nature
and
disposition
of
that
Kingdome
or
Country
,
into
which
it
hath
bene
already
,
or
is
to
be
brought
:
For
it
would
be
a
very
hard
matter
to
bring
a
free
forme
of
gouernment
into
that
Country
,
who
haue
bene
vsed
to
liue
vnder
a
Monarch
,
as
contrariwise
,
to
reduce
that
people
,
to
liue
vnder
the
obedience
and
command
of
one
absolute
Ruler
,
who
haue
vsed
to
liue
free
of
themselues
,
&
to
bee
gouerned
by
their
owne
Lawes
.
The
Easterne
Countries
not
enduring
to
brooke
the
Aristocraticall
or
Democraticall
State
,
were
euer
deuoted
to
liue
vnder
one
sole
Monarch
.
On
the
other
side
,
no
forme
of
gouernment
would
please
the
Athenians
and
Heluetians
(
whom
at
this
day
wee
call
Switzers
)
but
a
Democracy
:
None
the
Lacedaemonians
but
an
Aristocracy
.
The
Syracusians
affected
a
tyranicall
forme
of
gouernement
:
Neither
could
any
of
these
people
euer
bee
perswaded
to
forsake
that
forme
of
gouernment
which
they
had
once
chosen
:
Nay
,
which
is
more
,
they
did
with
such
deadly
and
implacable
hatred
,
prosecute
all
those
who
erected
,
or
set
vp
any
other
kinds
of
Policies
to
bee
gouerned
,
and
to
gouerne
by
,
that
wheresoeuer
,
and
whensoeuer
,
they
became
Conquerours
,
they
altered
and
abrogated
,
that
forme
of
Gouernement
,
and
brought
in
their
owne
forme
.
Secondly
,
I
vtterly
deny
all
right
formes
of
Common-wealthes
,
as
the
Monarchy
,
Aristocracy
,
and
Democracy
,
to
bee
absolute
and
perfect
:
much
lesse
do
I
hold
that
any
goodnesse
can
be
in
a
Tyranie
,
Oligarchy
,
or
Ochlocracy
;
For
these
last
related
,
by
reason
of
the
multitude
of
euils
which
accompany
them
,
are
of
,
and
in
themselues
alwaies
euill
,
the
Magistrates
neuer
regarding
the
common-good
but
their
owne
ends
:
The
former
likewise
,
although
in
themselues
they
are
good
(
for
that
in
all
of
them
,
the
chiefe
good
of
the
Common-wealth
,
or
State
,
either
is
,
or
ought
to
be
sought
)
yet
accidentally
,
they
many
times
become
euill
;
as
well
for
that
they
last
not
long
,
as
that
they
so
easily
degenerate
.
To
conclude
therefore
,
I
hold
that
forme
of
Common-wealth
to
bee
best
,
which
is
compounded
of
the
temper
of
all
these
,
or
at
leastwise
is
so
mixed
of
a
Monarchy
and
Aristocracy
,
that
one
(
indeed
)
for
the
Maiesty
of
the
State
should
bee
the
chiefe
Commander
,
but
his
power
should
be
gouerned
,
and
his
Councels
ordered
by
the
decrees
and
wisedome
of
the
Senate
:
For
by
this
meanes
,
the
Prince
should
retaine
his
splendor
and
dignity
,
the
Senate
their
power
and
authority
,
and
the
people
their
lawfull
liberty
.
SECT.
I.
CHAP.
III.
Of
the
Prince
,
Court
,
and
Courtiers
,
&c.
1
It
may
bee
demanded
why
priuate
men
,
can
neuer
well
and
rightly
iudge
of
the
affaires
of
Princes
?
IS
it
because
they
exactly
[
a
](A15753-e12980-b)
a
Guicchardine
.
know
not
the
matters
of
State
,
the
ends
of
Princes
,
or
how
farre
this
,
or
that
businesse
,
effected
,
or
neglected
,
doth
concerne
them
?
Or
may
this
rather
bee
the
reason
that
[
b
](A15753-e12990-b)
b
Idem
.
forasmuch
as
the
counsels
,
purposes
,
and
designes
of
Princes
,
differ
so
farre
from
the
drifts
and
courses
of
priuate
men
,
it
is
impossible
that
the
selfe-same
proiects
should
be
auaileable
to
them
both
?
For
it
(
most
what
)
so
falleth
out
,
that
although
matters
of
State
,
determinations
of
businesses
,
and
the
commodities
or
discommodities
which
may
be
expected
to
arise
thereof
,
should
be
knowne
as
well
to
priuate
men
,
as
to
Princes
themselues
,
their
applications
,
censures
,
and
iudgements
,
notwithstanding
touching
the
premisses
,
would
be
diuers
,
as
their
first
ends
and
intentions
were
,
which
they
had
propounded
to
themselues
.
2
In
the
next
place
it
may
bee
demanded
,
wherefore
,
as
wee
commonly
reade
in
Histories
,
as
out
of
Tacitus
and
others
,
that
that
man
,
whose
aide
and
helpe
a
Prince
hath
made
vse
of
bring
him
to
the
Crowne
,
within
a
while
after
is
neither
liked
nor
loued
of
that
Prince
,
but
either
is
fed
with
the
smoake
of
innouation
,
or
made
shorter
by
the
head
?
IS
it
because
that
some
Princes
being
naturally
suspicious
,
do
esteeme
the
faith
of
those
to
be
fickle
to
them
,
which
they
haue
proued
to
haue
beene
to
the
damage
of
others
?
Or
is
not
that
the
reason
,
but
this
rather
,
that
the
very
sight
of
them
whose
helpe
they
haue
vsed
to
their
rising
,
groweth
idious
vnto
them
,
for
that
it
seemeth
to
vp-braide
them
with
the
basenesse
of
their
former
meane
fortunes
?
Or
may
it
not
be
so
neither
,
but
for
that
it
is
[
c
](A15753-e13060-b)
c
Philipus
Cominaeus
.
grieuous
vnto
some
Princes
to
remember
that
they
owe
any
thing
,
or
that
they
are
any
waies
beholding
to
their
Subiects
?
3
It
may
further
bee
demanded
,
how
that
Prince
,
who
hath
bereaued
another
of
his
Kingdome
,
might
behaue
himselfe
to
enioy
his
new-got
Empire
with
safety
?
SShall
hee
effect
this
,
if
hee
[
d
](A15753-e13130-b)
d
This
was
the
errour
of
Seruius
Tullius
King
of
the
Romanes
,
whom
Tarquinius
Superbus
slew
.
affect
him
whom
he
hath
so
spoyled
,
with
new
fauours
and
benefites
,
endeuouring
thereby
to
reconcile
him
,
and
binde
him
fast
vnto
him
?
But
it
is
to
bee
feared
,
that
old
iniuries
will
hardly
bee
forgotten
,
by
collating
and
bestowing
of
new
benefites
vpon
the
wronged
,
especially
if
the
greatnesse
of
the
iniuries
,
exceede
the
rate
of
the
benefites
,
as
it
falleth
out
commonly
in
the
case
of
Kingdomes
.
Or
shall
he
bring
this
about
the
rather
,
if
he
[
e
](A15753-e13160-b)
e
This
was
the
practise
of
Selimus
,
the
Turkish
Emperor
,
who
being
but
a
yonger
brother
,
poysoned
Baiazet
his
father
,
made
away
Corcut
and
Acomat
his
two
brethren
,
&c.
So
dealt
Rich.
the
3.
with
his
two
nephewes
the
sonnes
of
Edward
the
4.
with
the
Duke
of
Buckingham
likewise
,
and
others
.
murther
,
and
kill
,
all
those
whom
he
imagineth
to
stand
in
his
way
,
or
whom
hee
standeth
in
doubt
of
,
least
in
time
they
may
become
his
enemies
?
But
if
he
take
these
courses
,
he
must
needs
fall
into
some
great
mischiefe
;
for
he
shall
ingulfe
himselfe
in
the
vast
Ocean
of
the
peoples
hatred
,
and
thereby
weaken
his
owne
power
against
the
time
he
should
haue
most
occasion
to
vse
it
.
4
It
may
further
bee
demanded
,
why
it
so
much
importeth
Princes
,
and
great
men
,
to
be
cautelous
that
they
do
not
iniury
,
or
reproach
any
man
?
IS
it
for
that
hee
who
is
wronged
of
those
who
are
in
[
f
](A15753-e13290-b)
f
Philipus
Cominaeus
.
eminent
place
,
and
authority
,
perceiuing
himselfe
to
bee
daily
and
hourely
shot
at
,
and
noted
for
the
same
,
grieueth
the
more
therat
,
and
so
sets
vp
his
rest
to
take
a
sharp
reuenge
?
Or
ought
they
to
be
cautelous
for
this
cause
likewise
,
[
g
](A15753-e13300-b)
g
Cominaeus
.
least
if
the
wronged
hauing
formerly
retained
vnto
them
,
or
made
any
dependency
vpon
them
,
shold
vpon
any
trust
committed
vnto
him
,
pay
them
home
,
in
neglecting
,
or
vtterly
ouerthrowing
their
chiefest
businesses
?
5
It
may
further
be
demanded
,
why
it
greatly
importeth
a
Prince
,
to
bee
Vertuous
,
Honourable
of
his
word
,
iust
,
and
of
good
Example
among
all
men
,
as
well
Forreigners
,
as
Domestiques
?
IS
it
for
that
he
may
be
thought
vnfit
[
h
](A15753-e13360-b)
h
Xenophon
in
Paedia
Cyri.
to
gouern
,
who
is
not
better
euery
way
then
those
who
are
to
bee
gouerned
?
Or
is
it
not
for
that
cause
onely
,
but
for
that
[
i
](A15753-e13370-b)
i
Sen.
1.
de
Clementia
.
his
good
name
and
fame
likewise
at
home
,
and
abroad
is
greatly
blemished
and
stained
,
if
the
course
of
his
life
and
dealings
bee
not
currant
?
Or
ought
hee
to
bee
such
an
one
for
the
better
stablishing
of
his
Kingdome
also
?
[
k
](A15753-e13380-b)
k
Sen.
Thiest
.
For
where
there
is
no
shame
,
care
of
doing
of
Iustice
,
Sanctity
,
Piety
,
&
keeping
of
promise
,
thatkingdom
must
needs
bee
vnstable
,
and
the
State
tottering
.
6
It
may
be
the
same
purpose
further
demanded
,
why
a
Prince
ought
to
be
iust
,
to
make
speciall
reckoning
of
the
administration
thereof
equally
to
his
Subiects
,
ey
,
to
do
iustice
vpon
himselfe
,
if
hee
desire
to
be
held
for
a
good
Prince
?
IS
it
for
that
[
l
](A15753-e13450-b)
l
Plato
in
Polit.
a
Lawlesse
Principallity
,
and
loose
gouernement
is
yrksome
to
euery
one
(
especially
of
the
better
sort
)
so
that
they
do
not
delight
,
or
haue
any
desire
to
liue
vnder
it
?
Or
is
it
for
that
the
constant
and
strict
obseruation
,
and
administration
of
Iustice
,
doth
stablish
and
strengthen
a
Kingdome
,
as
the
[
m
](A15753-e13460-b)
m
Cic.
Parad.
Oratour
well
perceiued
,
who
said
that
Iustice
and
Equity
were
the
true
conseruators
of
Common-wealthes
and
Cities
?
Or
is
it
not
onely
for
that
iustice
doth
stablish
a
Kingdome
,
but
for
that
it
doth
truely
make
a
kingdome
to
be
a
Kingdome
,
giuing
vnto
it
his
very
essence
and
being
,
whereby
it
is
,
that
which
it
is
?
For
take
away
Iustice
,
and
what
are
Kingdomes
but
great
Robberies
?
as
well
said
the
[
n
](A15753-e13470-b)
n
August
.
de
Ciuil
.
Dei
lib.
4.
learned
Diuine
.
8
It
may
further
be
demanded
,
why
many
Princes
are
very
fearefull
,
suspicious
,
and
iealous
of
their
estates
?
IS
it
because
that
[
o
](A15753-e13530-b)
o
Attius
.
Kingdomes
are
commonly
subiect
to
treacheries
?
Or
is
this
rather
the
reason
,
for
that
the
[
p
](A15753-e13540-b)
p
Sen.
Oedip.
nature
of
most
Princes
is
prone
to
feare
,
and
be
iealous
of
their
Estates
?
as
well
said
the
Poet
,
[
q
](A15753-e13550-b)
q
Sen.
in
Agam.
Kingdomes
and
Mariages
brooke
no
riuals
.
9
It
may
further
bee
demanded
,
wherefore
all
credit
,
countenance
,
honors
,
and
authority
in
Court
,
are
for
the
most
part
slippery
,
and
not
to
be
trusted
vnto
?
HAppeneth
it
thus
by
reason
of
the
Fates
vncertainty
(
as
it
pleaseth
the
[
r
](A15753-e13610-b)
r
Tacit.
3.
Annalium
.
Historian
to
set
downe
)
who
auerreth
,
that
Court-fauours
,
euen
by
decree
of
the
destinies
,
are
not
alwaies
lasting
?
Or
might
this
rather
be
the
reason
,
for
that
[
s
](A15753-e13620-b)
s
Tacit.
17.
Annalium
.
Courtiers
credites
are
(
commonly
)
vpheld
by
others
,
and
not
by
their
owne
strengths
?
Or
not
so
neither
,
but
for
that
these
things
thus
fall
out
through
the
fault
of
the
Princes
,
their
Maisters
,
whom
they
serue
,
whose
wils
and
pleasures
as
they
are
[
t
](A15753-e13630-b)
t
Salust
.
Iugurth
.
vehement
for
the
time
,
so
they
are
very
changeable
,
and
oftentimes
contrary
to
themselues
?
10
Seeing
that
the
[
u
](A15753-e13680-b)
u
Sen.
in
Hippolito
.
Court
is
so
slippery
a
place
,
that
a
man
shall
hardly
get
fast
footing
:
It
may
fitly
bee
demanded
,
by
what
Compasse
a
Courtier
should
saile
,
that
hee
may
bee
without
all
danger
of
shipwracke
,
whereby
either
his
life
may
bee
hazarded
,
his
goods
diminished
,
or
his
honour
blemished
?
SHall
he
attaine
vnto
those
ends
,
if
he
show
himselfe
dutifull
,
obsequious
,
and
respectiue
of
his
Prince
,
as
it
pleased
the
[
x
](A15753-e13710-b)
x
Tacit.
1.
Annal.
Historian
to
affirme
?
For
by
how
much
the
seruant
in
the
iudgement
of
his
Maister
,
shall
bee
held
more
desirous
and
ready
to
please
him
,
then
another
shall
;
by
so
much
the
more
hee
shall
bee
aduanced
to
honours
and
riches
?
Or
may
hee
compasse
his
desires
the
better
,
if
he
be
[
y
](A15753-e13720-b)
y
The
saying
of
Constantine
the
Great
.
seruiceable
likewise
,
and
not
like
the
moathes
,
and
caterpillars
of
the
Court
?
Or
may
hee
rather
further
his
intents
,
if
he
be
bold
spirited
also
?
For
shamefastnesse
is
an
ill
seruitour
in
a
Princes
Palace
,
as
well
said
the
[
z
](A15753-e13740-b)
z
Sen.
in
Hippol.
Poet.
Or
shall
he
be
cautelous
likewise
,
taking
heed
that
whatsoeuer
he
well
doth
or
performeth
,
he
do
it
as
[
a
](A15753-e13750-b)
a
Velleius
.
11.
though
he
seemed
not
to
do
it
,
and
without
boasting
or
bragging
?
Or
(
to
auoid
enuy
)
shall
he
learne
to
[
b
](A15753-e13760-b)
b
Tacit.
16.
Annal.
dissemble
,
cloake
,
and
obscure
his
owne
vertues
,
and
proper
gifts
?
Or
shall
hee
,
being
any
wayes
aduanced
by
his
Princes
fauours
,
like
the
Moone
,
[
c
](A15753-e13770-b)
c
Tacit
in
Agric
acknowledge
(
oftentimes
)
that
he
hath
receiued
all
the
light
of
his
glory
,
and
grace
of
his
rising
,
from
that
Sunne
his
maister
?
Or
shall
hee
striue
and
endeuour
to
become
very
[
d
](A15753-e13780-b)
d
Sen.
11.
de
ira
.
patient
,
and
[
e
](A15753-e13790-b)
e
Sen.
Hippolit
.
extreame
wary
likewise
?
He
must
be
very
patient
,
that
he
may
beare
iniuries
the
better
,
&
not
flie
out
,
or
run
into
passion
vpon
euery
crosse
he
shall
meet
withall
,
or
such
distastes
as
shall
be
giuen
him
.
He
must
bee
cautelous
,
least
he
be
taken
in
the
traps
of
his
fained
friends
,
or
secret
,
or
open
professed
enemies
.
11
It
may
further
be
demanded
,
why
it
is
better
to
liue
with
,
and
serue
a
prudent
and
wise
Prince
,
then
a
foolish
?
IS
it
because
that
a
[
f
](A15753-e13850-b)
f
Philip.
Cominaeus
.
lib.
4.
foolish
Prince
being
(
for
the
most
part
)
very
suspitious
,
thinketh
that
euery
of
his
seruants
goeth
about
to
deceiue
him
,
which
to
an
Honest
minde
must
needes
be
a
great
errosiue
?
Or
is
it
for
that
a
[
g
](A15753-e13870-b)
g
Idem
ibidem
.
foolish
Prince
not
vnderstanding
his
owne
affaires
,
cannot
make
difference
of
good
seruice
from
bad
,
whereupon
it
commeth
to
passe
,
that
his
loue
is
turned
into
hatred
,
and
his
hatred
into
loue
in
a
moment
?
Or
is
it
not
for
these
reasons
onely
,
but
for
this
likewise
,
that
[
h
](A15753-e13880-b)
h
Phil.
Com.
lib.
4.
those
seruants
which
liue
vnder
a
wise
Prince
,
haue
moe
meanes
affoorded
them
to
retaine
their
maisters
fauour
,
if
they
once
haue
had
it
,
or
to
recouer
it
if
they
haue
lost
it
,
then
it
is
possible
they
can
haue
,
who
liue
vnder
an
Ideot
,
or
foolish
Prince
?
For
no
man
almost
dealeth
in
any
thing
with
the
Prince
himselfe
,
but
with
his
[
i
](A15753-e13890-b)
i
This
was
wel
seene
in
the
Duke
of
little
Brittaine
,
who
vsed
onely
Peter
Landoys
.
seruants
,
whom
he
changeth
as
often
as
he
putteth
on
a
cleane
shirt
.
12
To
the
same
purpose
it
may
further
be
demanded
wherefore
(
notwithstanding
)
many
Courtiers
haue
rather
chosen
to
liue
in
the
Courts
of
some
great
Prince
,
though
a
foole
,
then
in
the
Palace
of
a
lesse
potent
Prince
,
though
neuer
so
wise
.
IS
it
because
that
[
k
](A15753-e13970-b)
k
Lucas
de
Penna
.
it
is
true
libertie
(
as
some
suppose
)
to
liue
vnder
the
command
of
a
potent
Prince
?
Or
is
it
rather
,
as
others
affirme
,
for
that
[
l
](A15753-e13980-b)
l
Egisippus
cum
alijs
,
vt
refert
Guic.
the
seruitors
seruices
are
graced
and
beautified
by
the
greatnesse
and
super-eminent
dignitie
of
their
maisters
?
13
Seeing
that
none
are
borne
Artists
it
may
be
demanded
,
what
manner
of
Courtier
is
to
be
deemed
and
esteemed
to
be
the
better
Crafts-maister
in
managing
affaires
of
State
?
IS
he
the
man
who
is
[
m
](A15753-e14040-b)
m
Guicchard
.
furnished
with
the
knowledge
of
diuers
tongues
,
well
seene
in
Histories
of
the
lawes
of
his
owne
and
other
Countries
,
that
is
religious
,
hath
a
quicke
wit
,
a
ripe
iudgement
,
a
fluent
tongue
,
a
graue
stile
,
&
is
an
excellent
pen-man
?
Or
is
he
rather
to
be
so
accounted
,
who
is
[
n
](A15753-e14050-b)
n
Guic.
&
Tacit
3.
Annal.
smooth-tongued
;
gorgeously
apparrelled
,
a
great
feast-maker
,
an
artificiall
cosouner
,
a
deepe
dissembler
,
a
whoore-maister
,
tale-bearer
,
flatterer
,
a
priuy-whisperer
,
and
one
that
is
giuen
to
all
kinde
of
villanie
?
14
It
may
further
be
demanded
,
what
might
bee
the
best
meanes
wherby
Princes
may
free
themselues
,
from
being
abused
by
flatterie
?
MAy
they
effect
this
if
they
beware
and
take
heed
that
they
[
o
](A15753-e14110-b)
o
Tholoz
.
de
Repub.
lib.
22.
cap.
8
grow
not
into
contempt
with
their
people
?
Or
shall
they
bring
their
purpose
better
about
,
if
they
sit
often
in
counsell
,
and
touching
those
things
which
they
propound
to
be
consulted
vpon
,
doe
shew
themselues
[
p
](A15753-e14120-b)
p
Plut.
Apotheg
.
patient
in
hearing
the
truth
,
that
their
people
may
vnderstand
that
they
will
not
be
offended
,
if
they
freely
speake
their
mindes
,
and
confidently
deliuer
that
which
is
true
?
Or
may
this
likewise
further
their
intents
,
if
vpon
the
[
q
](A15753-e14130-b)
q
Machiauel
his
doctrine
in
his
Prince
.
Cap.
23.
perceiuing
and
finding
out
of
some
or
other
,
who
for
some
sinister
respects
(
though
towards
themselues
)
haue
held
their
peace
,
or
forborne
to
speake
the
truth
,
they
do
either
shew
themselues
to
be
greatly
offended
with
them
,
or
seuerely
punish
them
?
SECT.
I.
CHAP.
IIII.
Of
a
Kingdome
:
How
it
may
be
got
,
how
kept
,
how
it
may
be
increased
,
how
it
may
be
made
lasting
or
durable
:
And
lastly
,
how
it
may
bee
lost
,
or
ouer-throwne
by
hatred
,
contempt
,
&c.
1
It
may
be
demanded
,
by
what
wayes
and
meanes
any
Principalitie
may
be
gotten
,
or
conquered
.
IS
it
to
be
atchieued
by
[
a
](A15753-e14250-b)
a
Quintus
Curtius
.
lib.
6.
forraigne
Armes
,
as
it
happened
to
Alexander
,
when
hee
had
ouer-throwne
Darius
at
Arbella
?
For
after
that
victory
,
he
neuer
vsed
in
the
full
conquest
of
Asia
,
or
other
kingdomes
,
any
other
but
forraigne
forces
,
for
the
most
part
.
Or
is
it
rather
to
be
gotten
by
an
home-bred
Army
,
seconded
by
the
vertue
and
the
manhood
of
the
Leaders
,
and
Captaines
,
as
it
fell
to
the
lot
of
[
b
](A15753-e14300-b)
b
Xenophon
.
Cyrus
,
Romulus
,
and
Theseus
?
Or
may
it
bee
attained
by
forraigne
force
also
,
seconded
by
Fortunes
fauours
,
as
it
happened
to
Francis
Sfortia
,
and
Borgia
Caesar
?
Or
may
it
bee
gotten
by
the
putting
in
practise
of
some
notorious
and
desperate
designe
,
as
it
happened
to
Agathocles
?
Or
may
it
be
compassed
by
the
fauour
of
the
Citizens
,
as
Nabides
got
his
dominion
?
2
In
the
next
place
it
may
bee
demanded
,
how
any
Principality
being
once
gotten
,
may
be
safely
kept
.
MAy
this
be
effected
if
the
Prince
proue
industrious
,
and
accomodate
himselfe
to
make
and
take
aduantage
of
such
accidents
and
occasions
as
time
will
continually
affoord
him
,
and
in
all
other
things
to
imitate
and
follow
the
steps
of
his
Auncestors
?
Or
may
it
be
effected
,
if
he
neuer
giue
any
offence
to
those
,
whose
helpe
he
vsed
in
getting
his
dominion
,
but
satisfie
them
according
to
their
desires
and
hopes
(
if
it
be
possible
)
as
they
haue
conceiued
of
their
owne
worths
?
Or
may
he
this
way
rather
attaine
therunto
,
if
finding
treason
intended
against
him
,
he
should
most
seuerely
punish
it
,
for
terrour
to
the
rest
?
Or
may
it
this
way
be
effected
,
if
vpon
the
obtaining
of
his
dominion
,
he
[
c
](A15753-e14430-b)
c
The
barbarous
and
inhumane
practise
of
the
Turkes
at
euery
change
of
Prince
.
destroy
all
the
bloud
Royall
,
issues
and
allies
,
of
the
former
Prince
,
and
then
obserue
the
Countrey
customes
without
changing
their
lawes
?
Or
may
this
rather
bee
effected
,
if
hee
that
hath
once
gotten
the
soueraignty
,
remoue
his
seat
thither
,
and
make
his
continuall
residence
in
his
new
dominion
?
Or
may
this
yet
rather
bee
effected
,
if
the
Prince
send
Colonies
into
his
new-gotten
kingdome
,
or
maintaine
garrisons
both
of
horse
and
foote
,
in
the
frontier
townes
?
Or
may
hee
better
bring
this
to
passe
,
if
(
after
conquest
made
)
dealing
courteously
with
them
,
hee
retire
himselfe
,
and
accept
of
an
annuall
pension
,
in
the
name
of
a
tribute
,
leauing
onely
some
small
company
behinde
him
,
rather
to
nourish
and
encrease
his
subiects
good
opinion
of
him
,
then
for
any
other
end
or
purpose
?
or
may
he
effect
this
the
better
,
if
he
altogether
should
change
their
lawes
and
customes
,
and
translate
them
to
other
remote
places
in
the
same
kingdome
,
then
those
which
before
they
inhabited
?
or
may
this
rather
be
the
way
to
purchase
the
fauour
and
good
opinion
of
the
Senators
,
or
commons
,
hauing
them
alwayes
addicted
to
his
fortunes
,
taking
vpon
him
valiantly
and
couragiously
to
defend
those
of
his
partie
,
against
the
other
faction
?
or
were
not
this
the
better
course
,
to
stand
vpon
his
owne
guard
,
hauing
an
army
euer
in
a
readinesse
to
chasten
his
subiects
if
they
should
rebel
?
Or
finally
,
what
if
the
[
d
](A15753-e14440-b)
d
This
did
Craesus
among
the
Lidians
,
as
Polib
.
reporteth
.
Conquerour
should
dispoyle
the
conquered
of
their
weapons
,
and
other
meanes
of
defence
or
offence
?
3
It
may
further
be
demanded
,
how
a
new
got
Kingdome
may
be
enlarged
?
SHall
this
be
attained
vnto
,
if
the
[
e
](A15753-e14530-b)
e
This
was
the
practise
of
the
Romans
in
sending
their
Pretors
.
Conquerour
shew
himselfe
milde
&
gentle
to
his
new
subiects
,
thereby
to
allure
the
hearts
of
the
neighbour
borderers
,
to
take
a
liking
of
his
manner
of
gouernment
?
Or
may
it
rather
be
effected
,
if
[
f
](A15753-e14560-b)
f
This
fell
out
in
the
Macedunian
Monarchie
.
a
great
many
of
wise
and
warlike
Princes
do
stil
succeed
one
another
in
the
selfe-same
gouernement
?
Or
may
this
be
better
done
,
if
the
conqueror
haue
a
great
care
that
Military
discipline
be
alwaies
vsed
within
his
territories
?
Or
should
he
rather
go
this
way
to
worke
,
to
[
g
](A15753-e14590-b)
g
This
&
such
like
practises
were
the
Romanes
.
demolish
the
walles
of
the
neighbour
Cities
,
and
cause
the
inhabitants
to
remoue
their
dwellings
into
his
territories
?
Or
shall
he
friendly
inuite
all
strangers
to
come
into
his
dominions
,
giuing
them
letters
of
safe
conduct
,
and
securing
them
of
their
dwelling
safely
vnder
his
protection
?
Or
shall
he
combine
with
diuers
neighbouring
Cities
,
ioyning
themselues
with
them
as
associats
,
so
as
the
name
of
the
Empire
and
gouernment
,
as
likewise
the
authoritie
of
leuying
of
warre
,
may
euer
remaine
with
him
,
and
bee
proper
vnto
him
?
Or
shall
he
make
those
whom
hee
hath
conquered
to
[
h
](A15753-e14610-b)
h
Thus
dealt
the
Spartans
,
Venetians
and
Florentius
with
them
whom
they
conquered
.
become
vassals
and
slaues
vnto
him
?
Or
might
this
be
effected
,
if
certaine
Cities
making
[
i
](A15753-e14640-b)
i
The
practise
of
the
Switzers
at
this
day
.
league
among
themselues
,
that
they
will
all
be
gouerned
,
and
with
equall
dignities
,
and
respect
,
should
draw
in
other
Cities
to
affect
that
kind
of
gouernment
,
and
so
to
ioyne
in
the
same
league
and
amitie
with
them
?
4
It
may
further
be
demanded
,
which
might
bee
the
best
way
to
make
a
state
durable
and
lasting
?
SHall
this
be
brought
to
passe
,
if
by
lawes
it
bee
prouided
for
,
vnder
paine
Capitall
,
that
[
k
](A15753-e14710-b)
k
All
these
things
were
fore-seene
by
Lycurgus
,
the
Laced
.
emonian
Law-giuer
.
no
man
should
affect
the
Gouernement
?
Or
may
it
better
bee
effected
,
if
the
Prince
being
strong
of
himselfe
,
shall
yet
giue
testimony
to
his
neighbour
Princes
,
that
hee
is
not
ambitious
,
nor
seeketh
by
leuying
of
Armes
,
to
enlarge
his
Dominions
to
any
of
their
detriments
?
Or
shall
hee
doe
it
yet
the
better
,
if
by
idlenesse
,
and
vaine
pleasures
hee
suffer
not
the
mindes
of
his
subiects
to
bee
corrupted
,
or
that
they
should
grow
too
much
effeminate
?
5
Considering
that
Kingdomes
are
strengthened
as
well
by
awfull
Armes
,
as
bright
shining
Vertue
,
it
may
bee
demanded
,
by
what
kinde
of
force
a
Kingdome
may
best
bee
preserued
,
and
made
durable
.
SHall
it
bee
made
firme
and
stable
by
hauing
an
Armie
euer
in
a
readinesse
,
rather
to
offend
then
defend
,
according
to
the
counsell
of
the
Emperour
Seuerus
;
which
he
gaue
to
his
sons
,
[
l
](A15753-e14810-b)
l
Sic
habetur
apud
Dionem
in
vita
eius
.
Agree
among
your selues
,
enrich
the
Souldier
,
and
contemne
all
others
?
Or
shall
this
bee
the
better
way
to
make
it
stable
,
if
the
Prince
[
m
](A15753-e14840-b)
m
So
did
the
Florentines
to
keepe
Pisa
and
Francis
Sforeia
to
conserue
Millaine
,
but
not
to
much
purpose
.
build
many
Forts
,
Towers
,
Citadels
,
Sconces
,
&c.
within
his
Territories
?
6
Seeing
that
hatred
once
conceiued
against
a
Prince
by
his
subiects
,
is
the
next
way
to
bereaue
him
of
his
Crowne
,
it
may
bee
demanded
,
how
the
Prince
may
run
into
such
hatred
,
and
what
meanes
hee
might
best
vse
to
auoid
it
?
MAy
hee
runne
into
this
hatred
by
his
owne
[
n
](A15753-e14950-b)
n
Mach.
de
Repub.
lib.
2.
boundlesse
ambition
,
seeking
to
bring
into
bondage
,
and
the
great
desires
of
his
Cittizens
to
continue
free
?
Or
may
hee
come
hated
of
his
Subiects
,
by
reason
of
[
o
](A15753-e14960-b)
o
Mach.
de
Repub.
lib.
3.
cap.
6.
the
iniuries
hee
hath
offered
them
,
either
in
seeking
their
liues
,
touching
their
honours
,
or
preying
vpon
them
for
their
riches
?
Or
rather
may
it
this
way
come
to
passe
that
hee
be
hated
,
for
that
he
hath
[
p
](A15753-e14970-b)
p
Cic.
Phillip.
2.
giuen
cause
to
the
Subiects
to
feare
him
,
least
he
do
them
a
mischiefe
?
For
,
to
feare
,
desire
of
reuenge
is
a
perpetuall
companion
.
And
this
prouerbe
is
most
true
,
whom
a
man
feareth
,
him
hee
hateth
;
whom
he
hateth
,
he
would
gladly
bee
rid
of
?
Or
may
this
bee
the
reason
hee
runneth
into
such
hatred
,
for
that
hee
is
[
q
](A15753-e14980-b)
q
Tholoz
.
de
Repub.
lib.
22.
vitious
;
as
cruell
,
couetous
,
sacriligious
,
&c.
7
It
may
bee
further
demanded
,
how
the
inflicting
of
seuere
punishments
vpon
offenders
,
may
bee
freed
from
hatred
?
SHall
the
Prince
free
himselfe
there-from
,
if
hee
bee
[
r
](A15753-e15040-b)
r
Sen.
de
Clem.
slow
to
punish
delinquents
,
and
thereby
giue
testimony
to
the
world
,
that
his
intent
is
rather
to
heale
,
and
bind
vp
a
soare
,
then
to
launch
and
make
it
bleed
by
the
arme
of
Iustice
?
Or
shall
hee
this
way
free
himselfe
,
if
hee
neuer
punish
,
but
[
s
](A15753-e15050-b)
s
Sen.
de
Clem.
when
the
safety
of
the
Common
wealth
calleth
vpon
him
so
to
do
,
or
at
least
his
Subiects
be
so
perswaded
?
Or
shall
hee
this
way
rather
bee
freed
,
if
hee
[
t
](A15753-e15060-b)
t
Cic.
2.
de
Offic.
neuer
exact
to
take
punishment
of
delinquents
in
an
angry
moode
?
Or
may
he
this
way
auoide
his
Subiects
hatred
,
if
hee
[
u
](A15753-e15070-b)
u
Sen.
1.
de
Clem.
shew
no●
any
signes
of
reioycing
,
when
hee
inflicteth
punishment
vpon
offendours
,
as
though
he
thirsted
after
bloud
,
or
were
delighted
with
the
shedding
of
it
?
Or
rather
may
this
be
his
way
,
that
when
many
haue
offended
,
hee
do
not
[
x
](A15753-e15080-b)
x
Tacit.
Agric.
now
and
then
call
them
to
account
,
as
hee
listeth
,
holding
them
in
a
perpetuall
feare
,
but
take
his
aduantage
against
all
,
and
punish
all
forthwith
?
Or
rather
by
this
way
may
he
be
freed
therefrom
,
by
not
deuising
any
new
kind
of
punishments
,
but
inflicting
those
which
haue
beene
in
vse
,
according
to
old
and
ancient
custome
of
the
Country
?
Or
may
he
this
way
likewise
free
himselfe
,
if
hee
be
very
sparing
in
punishing
of
delinquents
,
and
when
he
doth
it
,
hee
might
bee
thought
to
command
it
to
bee
inflicted
against
his
will
,
but
neuer
to
bee
a
spectator
thereof
?
Or
finally
,
may
hee
thus
free
himselfe
there-from
,
if
to
please
his
subiects
,
hee
diuert
the
force
of
his
fury
another
way
,
[
y
](A15753-e15090-b)
y
Tacit.
13.
Annal.
causing
such
as
haue
beene
his
counsellours
,
and
perswaders
to
wrong
the
Common-wealth
,
to
taste
the
cup
of
his
choler
,
by
inflicting
seuere
punishments
vpon
them
,
or
deliuering
them
into
the
peoples
hands
to
be
tormented
?
8
It
may
further
be
demanded
how
a
Prince
may
free
himselfe
of
that
hatred
which
hee
hath
purchased
,
by
vexing
his
Subiects
with
Impositions
,
Taxes
,
Tallages
,
&c.
which
are
commonly
grieuous
to
them
to
beare
?
MAy
this
be
done
if
the
Prince
perswade
the
people
[
z
](A15753-e15150-b)
z
Tacit.
13.
Annal.
that
if
they
will
liue
in
peace
and
out
of
danger
,
that
it
is
altogether
necessary
they
indure
such
impositions
,
which
if
they
should
not
,
it
were
impossible
for
them
to
liue
in
safety
,
or
the
State
to
bee
durable
?
For
[
a
](A15753-e15160-b)
a
Tacit.
4.
hist.
peace
is
not
purchased
but
by
Armes
,
nor
Armes
maintained
but
by
Souldiers
well
paid
,
nor
can
the
Souldier
be
paid
without
leuying
of
Subsidies
?
Or
shall
the
Prince
free
himselfe
,
if
hee
command
the
gatherers
of
such
Impositions
,
that
they
[
b
](A15753-e15170-b)
b
Idem
.
Ibid.
neither
by
force
,
nor
fraude
,
exact
more
of
the
Subiect
,
then
anciently
hath
beene
accustomed
to
be
paid
?
Or
shall
hee
rather
this
way
auoide
their
hatred
,
if
sparingly
,
as
iust
occasion
inforceth
him
,
hee
impend
and
lay
out
such
treasure
,
as
hath
beene
leuied
by
Subsidies
,
that
his
Subiects
may
see
and
perceiue
,
that
hee
is
but
a
Steward
,
for
the
good
of
the
Common-wealth
,
and
no
riotous
spender
,
or
exhauster
of
the
treasure
so
gathered
:
or
that
he
hath
any
desire
to
conuert
any
of
it
,
to
his
owne
vse
,
or
ends
?
Or
shall
hee
thus
rather
free
himselfe
,
by
taking
of
a
course
,
that
[
c
](A15753-e15180-b)
c
Plin.
Paneg.
iust
and
vniforme
contribution
be
made
according
to
euery
mans
ability
,
neuer
by
fauour
sparing
one
man
,
that
the
burthen
may
lye
the
heauier
vpon
another
mans
shoulders
?
9
It
may
further
be
demanded
,
how
,
and
by
what
meanes
,
a
great
and
potent
Subiect
,
may
auoide
and
shunne
,
the
hatred
of
his
Prince
?
MAy
this
be
effected
,
if
this
great
Noble
man
make
himselfe
first
odious
to
the
people
?
Or
shall
hee
better
effect
it
,
if
hee
shew
himselfe
very
dutifull
and
obsequious
to
his
Prince
,
praising
all
his
good
deeds
,
and
sayings
,
and
craftily
dissembling
whatsoeuer
is
bad
in
him
?
Or
shall
hee
attaine
therevnto
,
if
hee
[
d
](A15753-e15240-b)
d
This
was
the
practise
of
Antipater
,
one
of
Alexanders
Captaines
,
as
Q.
Curt.
reporteth
.
neuer
proiect
to
make
himselfe
great
,
strengthen
himselfe
with
friends
,
or
seeke
to
bee
maister
of
greater
riches
,
then
is
conuenient
for
his
estate
?
Or
if
fortune
haue
east
all
these
things
vpon
him
,
that
hee
acknowledge
continually
,
that
hee
hath
receiued
,
gained
,
and
gotten
them
,
by
the
grace
and
fauour
of
his
Prince
,
whose
they
are
,
whensoeuer
he
shall
please
to
make
vse
of
them
?
Or
shall
hee
this
way
auoide
his
Princes
displeasure
,
if
he
haue
a
speciall
care
to
[
e
](A15753-e15280-b)
e
This
was
the
practise
of
Ioab
,
Dauids
Generall
.
attempt
or
do
nothing
,
without
consulting
with
,
or
obtaining
the
consent
of
his
Prince
,
though
otherwise
hee
were
assured
that
hee
could
preuaile
in
his
attempts
,
and
that
it
would
turne
to
the
good
of
his
Country
?
Or
shall
hee
this
way
shunne
it
,
if
being
for
a
certaine
time
made
Deputy
,
Lieutenant
General
,
or
raised
and
euected
to
any
other
speciall
place
and
dignity
,
he
[
f
](A15753-e15300-b)
f
The
praictse
of
Antipater
and
Lucius
Lucullus
.
forth-with
at
the
end
,
and
expiration
of
his
time
resigne
his
office
to
his
Princes
hands
,
and
in
no
wise
seeme
to
be
desirous
that
it
be
prolonged
,
or
continued
vnto
him
,
least
hee
should
seeme
to
be
sick
of
the
swelling
humours
of
Ambition
?
Or
may
hee
this
way
auoide
it
,
if
hauing
wonne
,
and
prouing
victor
in
diuers
battels
,
hee
impute
the
glory
of
his
Conquests
to
the
good
fortune
of
his
Prince
,
desiring
that
the
victorious
Army
may
now
bee
led
by
some
other
,
whom
the
Prince
shall
thinke
good
of
,
and
retiring
,
put
himselfe
into
his
Princes
protection
,
carrying
himselfe
in
a
moderate
fashion
,
as
free
from
pride
and
ambition
?
By
this
onely
meanes
a
great
Generall
,
though
suspected
and
feared
of
his
Prince
,
may
so
mollifie
and
lenifie
his
minde
,
that
hee
shall
haue
no
cause
to
thinke
ill
of
him
,
but
shall
make
to
himselfe
great
and
apparant
reasons
to
reward
him
for
his
good
seruices
.
10
It
may
further
bee
demanded
,
why
euery
Kingdome
is
so
fickle
and
vnstable
?
IS
it
because
that
euery
[
g
](A15753-e15390-b)
g
Sen.
Oedip.
Idem
.
etiam
Ep.
xcij.
Principality
is
the
obiect
of
Fortune
,
who
can
neuer
be
daunted
,
but
challengeth
the
like
priuiledge
against
Empires
,
as
Emperours
.
Or
may
this
bee
the
reason
rather
,
because
it
is
exposed
to
such
,
and
so
many
hatreds
,
as
the
Tragicall
[
h
](A15753-e15400-b)
h
Senec.
Theb.
Poet
sung
,
The
Maker
of
the
world
coupled
these
two
together
;
Hatred
and
a
Kingdome
.
Or
may
this
be
the
cause
,
for
that
it
is
subiect
to
so
many
[
h
](A15753-e15420-b)
h
Attius
.
treasons
,
treacheries
,
&c.
for
there
bee
very
many
in
a
Kingdome
which
bee
naught
and
vnfaithfull
,
few
good
?
11
To
the
same
purpose
it
may
bee
demanded
,
why
among
the
Grecians
and
Romanes
,
[
i
](A15753-e15480-b)
i
Senec.
Theb.
a
Kingdom
was
so
hatefull
for
the
most
part
?
DId
this
come
to
passe
by
reason
of
the
[
k
](A15753-e15510-b)
k
Idem
Agam.
manners
,
and
crooked
dispositions
of
their
Princes
,
who
being
(
for
the
most
part
)
licentiously
giuen
,
thought
it
was
a
great
pledge
of
their
Kingdome
,
and
badge
of
their
Royaltie
,
that
it
was
lawfull
for
them
to
do
that
which
no
body
else
might
?
Or
being
selfe-wild
,
or
proud
,
[
l
](A15753-e15520-b)
l
Idem
in
Hippolito
.
accounted
it
no
lesse
dishonour
vnto
them
,
to
be
drawne
to
yeeld
to
any
thing
(
though
neuer
so
iust
)
against
their
wils
,
then
to
be
vanquished
in
battell
?
Or
is
not
the
fault
so
much
in
the
dispositions
&
wils
of
kings
,
as
in
the
harsh
[
m
](A15753-e15530-b)
m
Solust
.
ad
Caesarem
.
natures
of
the
Subiects
,
being
stubborne
,
refractary
,
and
hardly
wonne
to
yeeld
due
obedience
?
For
no
man
willingly
,
would
draw
in
another
mans
yoake
.
12
Seeing
that
authority
is
as
it
were
the
[
n
](A15753-e15580-b)
n
Cicero
pro
Cluent
.
spirit
by
which
euery
Common-wealth
is
gouerned
,
being
flatly
opposed
to
contempt
,
which
may
bee
called
the
[
o
](A15753-e15600-b)
o
Arist.
5.
Posit
.
bane
and
destruction
of
all
Kingdomes
,
it
may
be
demanded
,
how
a
Prince
may
behaue
himselfe
,
that
hee
neither
fall
into
contempt
amongst
his
owne
Subiects
,
or
forraigne
States
?
SHall
he
effect
this
,
if
the
[
p
](A15753-e15630-b)
p
Tacit.
11.
hist.
fashion
of
his
gouernement
proue
not
too
remisse
,
and
gentle
,
whereby
he
may
be
thought
to
be
negligent
in
ordering
affaires
of
State
?
Or
shall
hee
performe
it
the
rather
,
if
hee
[
q
](A15753-e15640-b)
q
Idem
Ibidem
.
shew
no
leuity
in
the
forme
of
his
gouernment
,
but
constantly
gouerne
,
according
to
the
Lawes
and
Decrees
of
the
Common-wealth
?
Or
shall
he
effect
this
likewise
,
if
he
shew
himselfe
firme
in
his
purposes
,
constant
in
his
promises
,
and
that
hee
hath
no
[
r
](A15753-e15650-b)
r
Idem
Ibidem
.
notable
touch
of
mutability
in
his
disposition
?
Or
shall
hee
bring
this
to
passe
,
if
(
curiously
)
pondering
things
past
,
expending
,
and
well
weighing
things
present
,
and
prouidently
fore-seeing
things
to
come
,
hee
doe
timously
consult
,
and
determine
,
to
bestow
honours
on
[
s
](A15753-e15660-b)
s
Idem
Ibidem
.
such
men
,
as
for
their
worth
haue
deserued
;
not
vpon
euery
fawning
and
obsequious
fauourite
,
or
such
as
can
purchase
them
with
money
?
Or
may
hee
doe
this
the
better
,
if
Fortune
proue
a
mother
vnto
him
,
and
not
a
step-dame
?
Or
shall
he
finally
effect
this
likewise
,
if
he
first
[
t
](A15753-e15670-b)
t
Tacit.
15.
Annal.
represse
his
owne
lusts
,
and
inordinate
affections
,
giuing
thereby
his
Subiects
examples
to
follow
him
in
the
like
,
and
causing
Forreigners
to
admire
him
therefore
?
13
It
may
be
further
demanded
how
an
Empire
,
or
Kingdome
may
be
finally
lost
?
COmmeth
it
thus
to
passe
,
by
a
kind
of
a
[
u
](A15753-e15730-b)
u
Tholoz
.
lib.
22
de
repub.
fatall
necessity
,
when
this
or
that
State
hath
come
a
Councellour
to
a
Prince
to
be
skilfull
of
the
customes
of
other
nations
,
and
to
be
a
stranger
in
his
owne
Common-wealth
:
or
shall
he
compasse
this
the
better
if
he
make
choyce
of
[
e
](A15753-e15780-b)
e
Salust
.
Catil
.
graue
and
auncient
men
,
as
also
of
such
as
haue
[
f
](A15753-e15790-b)
f
Idem
in
frag
.
beene
tossed
and
tried
with
the
variety
of
Fortune
,
hauing
therby
learned
to
carry
themselues
both
in
weale
&
woe
?
Or
lastly
,
shall
the
Prince
neuer
admit
of
any
for
his
Councellours
,
but
such
as
[
g
](A15753-e15800-b)
g
Plin.
Paneg.
generally
are
accounted
wise
and
vertuous
?
For
particular
men
may
deceiue
and
bee
deceiued
,
but
no
one
man
can
deceiue
all
men
,
neither
hath
any
man
bene
deceiued
of
all
men
.
2
Againe
it
may
further
be
demanded
,
how
a
Prince
may
behaue
himselfe
in
his
Consultations
,
that
he
may
grow
wise
thereby
,
and
so
be
accounted
?
SHall
hee
effect
this
,
if
hauing
wise
Councellours
to
aduise
him
,
hee
apt
and
accomodate
himselfe
to
follow
their
directions
,
and
what
they
haue
maturely
deliberated
and
concluded
vpon
,
hee
forth
with
put
in
practise
and
execution
?
Or
shall
hee
better
effect
this
,
if
sitting
in
Councell
himselfe
,
he
propound
,
and
heare
them
with
patience
and
discretion
debate
the
matter
,
and
[
h
](A15753-e15860-b)
h
Capitolinus
de
Marco
Antonio
.
neuer
seeme
to
be
angry
,
or
striue
to
maister
and
ouerrule
their
opinions
,
though
they
determine
cleane
contrarie
to
his
owne
humours
,
minde
and
desire
?
Or
shall
he
rather
bring
this
to
passe
,
if
being
able
to
[
i
](A15753-e15870-b)
i
Vigetius
lib.
3.
containe
himselfe
,
and
keepe
close
his
owne
Councels
and
intentions
,
he
doe
(
indeede
)
propound
what
ought
to
bee
done
to
all
,
or
the
most
of
his
Counsell
to
consider
of
;
but
what
he
will
doe
,
to
communicate
it
with
very
few
,
or
rather
none
,
but
aduise
onely
with
himselfe
?
Or
shal
he
rather
performe
this
,
if
he
grant
free
liberty
of
speach
,
neither
doe
too
much
affect
those
[
k
](A15753-e15880-b)
k
Quint.
Curt.
lib.
8.
soft
and
silken
words
of
the
Court
,
which
his
flatterers
will
be
ready
to
claw
him
withall
;
knowing
that
they
will
please
his
humours
?
Or
finally
shall
hee
effect
this
,
if
with
indifferencie
,
and
all
alike
equality
,
he
heare
euery
mans
opinion
,
neuer
[
l
](A15753-e15890-b)
l
Thucid.
lib
3.
rewarding
any
councelling
well
,
least
for
the
hope
of
gaine
,
they
might
vpon
sinister
respects
(
at
any
time
)
decline
from
the
right
,
nor
[
m
](A15753-e15900-b)
m
Quint.
Curt.
lib.
3.
punish
any
(
though
they
should
counsell
ill
(
so
they
do
it
not
of
maliciousnesse
)
for
so
he
shall
euer
want
Councellours
,
if
it
be
dangerous
to
giue
counsell
?
3
It
may
further
be
demanded
,
why
it
is
so
exceeding
auaileable
to
a
Prince
,
to
haue
his
counsels
and
determinations
kept
secret
?
IS
it
because
that
if
they
were
[
n
](A15753-e15960-b)
n
Guicchardine
knowne
,
they
might
be
preuented
and
hindered
?
Or
is
it
for
this
respect
rather
,
because
his
honour
and
estimation
both
at
home
and
abroad
,
is
thereby
much
increased
and
augmented
?
Or
not
so
much
for
the
former
reasons
neither
,
but
for
that
if
his
determinations
were
once
knowne
,
[
o
](A15753-e15970-b)
o
Idem
.
many
men
pricked
forward
with
enuy
,
would
detract
from
his
wisedome
,
blaming
him
that
hee
put
not
his
intentions
sooner
in
execution
,
though
hee
could
not
(
happily
)
finde
fit
opportunity
seruing
thereunto
?
4
It
may
further
bee
demanded
,
what
course
a
Prince
might
best
take
,
that
hee
might
not
erre
in
his
Consultations
?
SHall
he
performe
this
,
if
hee
fully
vnderstand
the
[
p
](A15753-e16030-b)
p
Tholoz
.
lib.
24.
nature
of
the
businesse
,
which
is
to
be
deliberated
vpon
?
Or
shall
he
do
it
the
better
,
if
vnderstanding
the
matter
,
whereof
to
consult
,
hee
[
q
](A15753-e16040-b)
q
Guicchardine
constantly
determine
with
himselfe
rather
to
respect
(
cautelously
)
the
extreames
,
and
finall
ends
of
businesses
,
then
to
regard
middle
courses
,
much
lesse
to
run
them
?
Or
shall
hee
also
effect
this
,
if
hee
obserue
and
marke
how
[
r
](A15753-e16050-b)
r
Idem
.
wisely
and
prudently
his
aduersarie
(
if
any
he
haue
)
behaueth
himselfe
in
those
things
,
which
concerne
his
honour
,
profit
or
safety
?
Or
shall
he
rather
accommodate
and
apply
his
counsels
to
the
nature
,
manners
and
condition
of
his
aduersarie
,
and
by
that
meanes
learne
out
and
expiscate
what
might
be
likely
that
he
will
attempt
against
him
?
Or
shall
hee
compasse
these
things
the
better
,
if
in
all
his
counsels
and
deliberations
concerning
the
Common-wealth
,
he
rather
propound
to
himselfe
how
the
honor
,
dignitie
and
splendor
thereof
may
bee
augmented
,
then
what
profit
might
thereby
redound
vnto
it
?
5
It
may
further
be
demanded
,
what
is
chiefly
required
of
Senators
,
that
they
may
giue
wholesome
counsell
.
MAy
they
effect
this
,
if
they
be
[
s
](A15753-e16110-b)
s
Plin.
Panet
.
men
fearing
God
,
making
his
plaine
&
euen
lawes
the
strict
and
straight
rule
of
their
consulations
?
For
seeing
it
is
[
t
](A15753-e16120-b)
t
Tholoz
.
lib.
●4
.
God
alone
,
which
sustaineth
and
vpholdeth
Common-wealths
,
it
were
very
fit
that
he
should
be
made
the
chiefe
head
,
and
director
of
the
counsels
thereof
.
Or
may
they
do
it
the
better
,
if
standing
for
the
[
u
](A15753-e16130-b)
u
Tacit●●
.
Hist.
libertie
of
themselues
,
and
the
Common-wealth
,
they
do
stoutly
and
couragiously
,
not
faintly
and
fearefully
pronounce
and
deliuer
their
mindes
and
opinions
,
least
they
might
rather
be
thought
to
runne
with
the
Fortune
of
the
Prince
,
then
with
him
,
or
the
good
of
the
Common-wealth
?
Or
may
they
also
effect
this
,
if
they
shew
themselues
[
x
](A15753-e16140-b)
x
Tacit.
3.
Hist.
modest
,
and
of
a
quiet
disposition
?
Or
may
they
likewise
effect
it
the
better
,
if
they
can
[
y
](A15753-e16150-b)
y
Quint.
Curt.
lib.
4.
keepe
their
owne
counsels
?
For
it
is
very
certaine
that
no
great
matter
can
be
looked
for
at
his
hands
,
who
will
vent
what
hee
should
hold
in
?
Or
finally
,
may
this
better
be
performed
,
if
choyce
be
made
of
such
Councellors
which
haue
[
z
](A15753-e16160-b)
z
Tholoz
.
lib.
24.
de
repub.
no
particular
interest
in
those
things
which
are
to
be
consulted
vpon
?
For
no
man
in
his
owne
cause
,
can
speake
,
thinke
,
or
iudge
vprightly
,
because
euery
man
therin
will
be
partiall
.
6
Considering
that
middle
courses
(
for
the
most
part
)
proue
vnfortunate
,
it
may
be
demanded
why
notwithstanding
the
running
of
a
middle
course
being
propounded
by
some
one
or
other
in
publike
deliberations
,
it
is
(
most
what
)
embraced
,
followed
,
and
put
in
execution
?
COmmeth
it
to
passe
through
the
ill
[
a
](A15753-e16230-b)
a
Fran.
Guich
.
disposition
and
worse
affection
of
some
addicted
to
faction
and
opposition
,
who
perceiuing
that
their
owne
conceits
cannot
passe
currant
,
had
rather
giue
way
to
,
and
allow
of
that
which
is
worse
,
not
extreame
(
least
hee
should
seeme
to
oppose
)
but
different
in
a
lesse
distance
,
that
thereby
they
may
seeme
to
haue
(
in
part
)
assented
?
Or
is
it
not
for
this
reason
alone
,
but
for
that
likewise
the
other
aduisers
,
[
b
](A15753-e16250-b)
b
Idem
.
least
they
should
displease
some
prime-man
,
who
hath
propounded
a
middle
course
of
proceedings
,
will
likewise
run
along
with
him
,
and
approue
of
his
deuise
?
Or
rather
is
this
the
reason
why
such
middle
courses
are
by
some
no
sooner
propounded
then
approued
,
because
(
for
the
most
part
)
prouident
and
wary
,
especially
auncient
and
aged
Statists
,
do
approue
of
that
course
which
they
imagine
to
bee
least
violent
and
dangerous
,
and
incline
to
the
meane
,
as
being
the
sweeter
and
more
passable
without
noyse
or
Nuissance
.
7
Seeing
that
the
close
minds
,
wils
and
ends
of
Councellours
be
strange
,
diuers
,
and
for
sinister
respects
,
priuately
kept
to
themselues
,
for
(
oftentimes
)
vpon
pounding
of
matters
to
bee
consulted
vpon
,
[
c
](A15753-e16310-b)
c
This
was
the
practise
of
Torlton
Archbishop
of
Canterbury
,
against
Edward
the
second
,
by
whose
aduice
his
son
was
sent
into
France
,
who
ioyning
with
his
mother
&
Mortimer
,
became
the
head
and
Captaine
of
the
Rebels
against
his
owne
father
.
one
thing
is
spoken
,
another
thought
and
meant
,
whereby
the
mindes
and
opinions
(
onely
)
of
others
may
be
discouered
;
it
may
here
be
demanded
,
how
a
Prince
may
iudge
whether
his
Councellours
aduise
him
well
or
no
?
SHall
hee
know
this
by
the
[
d
](A15753-e16390-b)
d
Mach.
in
Prin.
disposition
of
the
Councellor
?
For
he
that
more
respecteth
himselfe
then
his
Prince
,
&
in
the
carriage
of
any
matter
regards
his
owne
priuate
more
then
the
good
of
the
Common-wealth
,
as
long
as
hee
beareth
this
minde
,
he
can
neuer
proue
a
faithfull
Councellour
,
nor
one
whom
the
Prince
or
State
may
trust
or
rely
vpon
.
Or
shall
hee
vnderstand
this
by
the
[
e
](A15753-e16400-b)
e
Tholoz
.
lib.
24.
frequent
vse
&
experience
he
hath
had
of
his
Councellours
in
the
like
businesses
falling
out
ill
,
or
well
?
Or
shall
he
rather
come
to
the
knowledge
hereof
by
making
an
[
f
](A15753-e16410-b)
f
Idem
ibidem
.
exact
:
search
and
disposition
how
matters
are
carried
and
disposed
of
within
his
owne
territories
?
Or
shall
he
rather
come
to
this
knowledge
by
the
frequent
reading
of
Histories
?
or
by
the
apprehending
or
comprehending
of
these
two
Principles
,
What
is
Profitable
,
What
is
Honest
.
Which
two
indeed
are
the
bounds
and
grounds
of
truth
,
and
of
that
worthy
wisedome
and
iudgement
which
ought
to
be
in
a
Senator
.
SECT.
I.
CHAP.
VII
.
Of
Wits
,
Manners
,
and
Dispositions
:
of
diuers
Cities
,
Countries
,
and
Nations
,
as
well
free
as
seruile
.
1
It
may
bee
demanded
what
kind
of
wits
,
may
bee
termed
the
best
wits
.
MAy
such
bee
counted
for
the
best
,
which
are
[
a
](A15753-e16840-b)
a
Guicch
.
more
stirring
,
sharpe
,
and
acute
,
fiery
and
subtile
,
then
ordinary
?
But
these
noble
and
excellent
wits
(
for
the
most
part
)
do
proue
very
crosse
,
and
are
oftentimes
the
cause
of
much
disquietnesse
,
turmoile
,
and
trouble
to
him
who
is
indued
therewith
.
Or
may
those
rather
bee
taken
for
the
best
,
which
though
[
b
](A15753-e16850-b)
b
Idem
.
more
blunt
,
yet
are
more
certaine
and
lasting
,
and
(
for
the
most
part
)
are
more
fortunate
then
the
other
.
2
It
may
further
be
demanded
,
why
in
one
and
the
selfe-same
Citie
,
there
may
be
found
many
distinct
families
,
whose
manners
and
conditions
are
particular
to
themselues
;
as
wee
read
amongst
the
Romanes
,
that
the
Manlij
were
euer
sterne
and
seuere
,
the
Publicolae
courteous
and
gentle
,
the
Appij
proud
and
ambitious
,
&c.
COmmeth
this
to
passe
,
by
reason
of
the
diuersity
of
their
temperatures
?
But
that
(
as
it
may
bee
thought
)
might
be
changed
and
altred
,
by
the
variety
of
Marriages
.
Or
may
this
rather
be
the
cause
,
for
that
euery
Family
hath
a
peculiar
manner
of
bringing
vp
their
children
?
for
this
commonly
holdeth
true
,
[
c
](A15753-e16950-b)
c
Mach.
Disput.
de
Repub.
lib.
3.
cap.
46.
whatsoeuer
manners
and
opinions
,
are
instilled
into
the
minds
of
youth
in
their
infancy
,
they
will
hardly
or
neuer
bee
remoued
,
but
continue
with
them
euen
to
their
old
age
.
3
It
may
bee
further
demanded
,
why
[
d
](A15753-e17000-b)
d
Liu.
in
his
bookes
affirmeth
this
of
the
Frenchmen
.
diuers
Nations
,
at
the
first
assault
,
or
onset
giuen
,
seeme
to
bee
magnanimious
,
and
very
fierce
and
forward
to
the
battell
,
but
within
a
while
after
doe
grow
very
fearefull
,
and
turne
Cowards
?
MAy
the
cause
consist
in
any
peculiar
affect
in
their
natures
?
But
it
is
possible
that
[
e
](A15753-e17050-b)
e
Mach.
disput.
Cap.
36.
nature
from
day
to
day
,
may
bee
corrected
and
amended
?
Or
might
this
rather
bee
the
reason
,
that
such
Nations
being
[
f
](A15753-e17060-b)
f
Idem
Ibidem
.
without
order
or
exercise
of
Military
Discipline
,
are
not
enabled
with
such
ordinary
manhood
,
as
may
establish
their
hearts
and
mindes
,
making
them
to
conceiue
an
assured
hope
of
victory
,
and
therefore
if
they
be
not
vanquishers
in
the
first
assault
,
they
straight
waies
quit
the
field
?
And
this
(
vnder
correction
)
I
take
to
be
the
true
reason
of
their
fearefulnesse
and
running
away
.
4
It
may
further
bee
demanded
,
wherefore
diuers
men
(
euen
lewd
persons
)
hauing
many
times
occasions
offered
them
,
to
commit
some
memorable
and
notable
villany
,
notwithstanding
(
for
the
most
part
)
they
dare
not
attempt
it
,
or
put
it
in
practise
,
and
execution
?
IS
it
for
that
they
are
afraid
least
they
should
[
g
](A15753-e17120-b)
g
Mach.
disp.
lib.
●
.
cap.
27.
incurre
the
note
of
infamy
?
But
the
greatnesse
of
the
thing
,
might
(
happily
)
couer
the
badnesse
of
the
fact
,
and
likewise
protect
the
party
from
danger
.
Or
do
they
abstaine
from
perpetrating
and
committing
such
horrtble
villany
,
by
reason
of
their
[
h
](A15753-e17130-b)
h
Idem
Ibidem
.
owne
in-bred
goodnesse
,
or
nice
touch
of
their
conscience
?
But
such
godly
and
holy
motions
do
neuer
enter
into
the
hearts
of
such
lewd
lossels
.
Or
may
this
rather
bee
the
reason
,
for
that
by
nature
,
it
is
not
affoorded
to
the
most
men
,
to
be
[
i
](A15753-e17140-b)
i
Idem
Ibidem
.
absolutely
euill
,
or
perfectly
good
?
5
It
may
further
be
demanded
,
why
there
should
bee
such
,
and
so
great
difficulty
,
in
chaunging
or
amending
old
customes
,
though
most
men
(
conuicted
secretly
in
their
consciences
by
euident
truth
)
should
confesse
they
were
altogether
vnprofitable
,
and
dangerous
to
the
Common-wealth
to
continue
them
?
MAy
this
bee
the
reason
,
for
that
although
some
good
Citizens
,
or
Patriots
,
foreseeing
the
danger
,
do
perswade
the
change
thereof
,
yet
they
should
not
be
able
fully
to
turne
the
peoples
mindes
,
by
reason
of
others
oppositions
?
Or
may
this
rather
be
the
cause
,
for
that
most
men
stand
so
affected
,
and
affectionated
,
to
their
auncient
course
of
liuing
,
that
they
would
not
willingly
depart
there-from
?
Or
may
this
bee
the
reason
of
the
difficulty
of
amending
euill
customes
,
for
that
there
is
euer
a
want
of
proportionable
meanes
agreeable
to
the
Lawes
,
to
bring
that
businesse
about
,
so
that
they
must
bee
driuen
to
flie
to
new
courses
altogether
,
which
seldome
proue
fortunate
?
Or
may
this
rather
bee
the
reason
,
for
that
if
some
few
,
or
any
one
man
,
should
go
about
to
change
the
forme
of
gouernement
,
it
should
bee
necessary
for
him
,
first
by
force
to
inuade
the
State
,
and
then
to
seize
the
liberties
thereof
into
his
hands
,
which
might
bee
thought
not
to
bee
the
part
of
a
good
man
,
and
therefore
hee
will
rather
desist
from
his
purpose
,
then
do
his
Cittizens
so
much
good
?
Or
may
this
bee
a
further
reason
,
for
that
the
most
men
are
perswaded
,
that
there
can
scarcely
be
that
man
found
,
who
hauing
once
brought
a
State
vnder
subiection
,
by
ill
meanes
,
would
afterwards
vse
that
power
and
authority
which
hee
had
so
ill
gotten
,
to
the
benefite
and
good
of
the
people
?
SECT.
I.
CHAP.
VIII
.
Of
Benefites
,
and
when
to
bee
bestowed
:
Of
Ingratitude
,
and
how
a
friend
may
be
purchased
that
a
man
may
trust
vnto
.
1
It
may
bee
demanded
when
Benefites
are
to
bee
bestowed
vpon
a
man
?
ARE
they
to
bee
collated
vpon
him
[
a
](A15753-e17290-b)
a
Mach.
d●sp
.
lib.
primo
,
cap.
23.
iust
at
that
time
,
when
the
bestower
of
them
is
compelled
so
to
doe
,
as
needing
the
present
help
of
such
a
man
,
or
for
some
priuate
end
to
himselfe
best
knowne
?
But
this
manner
of
giuing
should
seeme
to
be
very
extrauagant
,
and
distastefull
,
to
the
receiuer
,
as
thinking
that
they
were
collated
vpon
him
by
reason
of
the
parties
necessity
,
which
once
serued
,
he
would
neuer
conferre
more
vpon
him
.
Or
are
they
not
so
to
bee
collated
vpon
any
man
,
but
[
b
](A15753-e17300-b)
b
Idem
Ibidem
.
timously
rather
,
before
hee
which
may
haue
need
of
them
,
shall
haue
occasion
to
vse
them
,
or
the
Collator
thereof
the
person
?
2
It
may
further
be
demanded
,
wherefore
they
who
haue
[
c
](A15753-e17350-b)
c
As
Charond
as
amongst
the
AEginensians
,
The
mistocles
amongst
the
Athenians
;
Camillus
,
Scipio
,
&c.
among
the
Romans
,
were
imprisoned
,
banished
,
or
put
to
death
.
best
deserued
of
a
Common-wealth
are
(
oftentimes
)
worst
recompenced
and
requited
?
IS
this
the
reason
,
for
that
[
d
](A15753-e17410-b)
d
Pindarus
.
there
is
nothing
lesse
lasting
then
the
very
name
of
a
Benefite
?
Or
is
this
rather
the
cause
,
for
that
it
is
[
c
](A15753-e17420-b)
c
This
was
proper
to
the
Athenians
and
Lacedaemonians
.
appropriate
and
peculiar
to
certaine
Common-wealths
,
so
to
enuy
those
which
excell
in
vertue
and
goodnesse
,
as
they
themselues
being
not
able
to
follow
and
imitate
them
therein
,
seeke
to
spoile
them
of
their
gouernement
and
Empire
?
Or
may
this
rather
be
the
reason
,
that
some
[
f
](A15753-e17450-b)
f
Philip.
Comin
.
standing
too
much
vpon
their
owne
merites
,
haue
borne
themselues
too
proudly
against
tje
State
,
or
their
owne
society
?
Or
might
this
likewise
bee
the
cause
,
for
that
those
,
who
either
by
their
rare
exploits
,
or
cunning
ambition
,
creepe
into
the
fauour
of
the
people
at
home
,
and
hunt
after
renowne
and
admiration
abroad
,
may
seeme
to
dimme
the
glory
of
their
Princes
,
who
greatly
desire
to
be
accounted
well-deseruing
of
their
owne
people
,
as
those
to
whom
it
more
properly
belongeth
,
and
therefore
they
must
needs
oppose
such
,
and
grow
in
distaste
of
them
?
Or
is
it
for
that
all
men
generally
by
their
owne
corrupt
nature
,
are
lesse
prone
,
prompt
,
and
ready
to
requite
a
good
turne
,
then
to
reuenge
an
iniury
?
Or
may
this
rather
bee
the
reason
for
that
the
Prince
,
or
[
g
](A15753-e17460-b)
g
Vpon
this
very
conceite
the
Venetians
put
to
death
Lauderanus
,
because
hee
pacified
a
commotion
by
his
owne
authority
;
as
Petrus
Bem
bus
reporteth
in
his
Venetian
History
.
State
,
groweth
into
suspicion
of
such
kinde
of
men
,
least
they
should
affect
innouation
,
or
seeke
to
tyrannise
?
3
It
may
further
bee
demanded
,
why
kindnesses
,
and
good
will
,
are
oftentimes
requited
with
ingratitude
,
and
vnthankfulnesse
?
IS
it
because
that
he
which
neither
can
,
nor
hath
any
desire
to
remunerate
him
,
to
whom
hee
is
so
much
indebted
,
will
either
forget
them
,
or
perswade
himselfe
,
and
the
world
,
that
no
such
kindnesses
were
offered
vnto
him
,
or
receiued
by
him
?
Or
may
this
be
the
reason
,
that
those
men
,
who
haue
beene
(
as
it
were
)
driuen
,
and
by
fatall
necessity
compelled
to
receiue
kindnesse
of
other
men
,
should
afterwards
grow
ashamed
of
it
,
that
they
should
bee
thought
to
haue
had
neede
of
such
meanes
?
4
Seeing
that
no
man
can
deny
,
but
that
the
vse
of
friends
is
such
,
and
so
great
,
that
many
times
a
man
may
bee
driuen
to
relye
his
whole
estate
thereupon
;
It
may
bee
demanded
,
how
a
man
may
bee
ascertained
,
that
hee
hath
purchased
a
true
friend
?
SHall
hee
giue
confidence
to
him
,
whom
hee
hath
[
h
](A15753-e17610-b)
h
Guicchardine
.
bound
by
grace
and
benefites
?
Or
shall
hee
trust
him
,
who
hath
any
waies
neede
of
his
helpe
?
Or
shall
hee
rather
repose
his
confidence
in
him
who
is
bound
[
i
](A15753-e17620-b)
i
Pindarus
.
vnto
him
,
by
hauing
equall
profite
and
share
in
any
businesse
,
which
they
shall
ioyntly
attempt
and
obtaine
?
SECT.
I.
CHAP.
IX
.
Of
Estimation
and
Credit
,
of
Authoritie
,
publique
and
priuate
,
Seueritie
,
strictnesse
of
Gouernment
,
Constancie
,
Pietie
,
and
Prouidence
.
1
Seing
Authoritie
is
the
prop
of
kingdomes
,
and
that
it
is
of
the
most
men
confessed
,
that
the
maiesty
of
an
Empire
consisteth
in
the
splendor
,
grace
,
and
defence
thereof
:
it
may
bee
demanded
,
how
a
Prince
might
beget
such
a
reuerent
opinion
of
himselfe
amongst
his
subiects
,
&
forreigners
likewise
,
whereby
he
might
become
both
admired
and
feared
?
SHall
he
effect
this
,
if
he
institute
such
a
forme
of
gouernment
,
which
is
[
a
](A15753-e17720-b)
a
Cicero
pro
milone
.
seuere
,
constant
,
and
strict
,
bearing
an
hard
ouer
those
whom
he
ruleth
?
Or
shall
he
attaine
therunto
the
better
,
if
hauing
[
b
](A15753-e17730-b)
b
Mach.
Prin.
&
Tholoz
.
home-bred
strength
&
forces
,
he
continually
keepe
them
about
him
,
and
haue
them
in
a
readinesse
?
Or
if
he
be
destitute
of
such
forces
,
doe
straight
wayes
take
a
course
to
prouide
them
else-where
?
Or
shall
he
compasse
this
the
rather
,
if
he
excell
other
Princes
in
the
[
c
](A15753-e17740-b)
c
Claudian
.
3.
integrity
and
soundnesse
of
his
manners
,
fashions
,
and
good
conditions
?
Or
shall
he
yet
the
better
effect
this
,
if
hee
delight
still
[
d
](A15753-e17750-b)
d
So
Ferdinand
King
of
Spain
,
and
Henry
the
5.
King
of
England
,
grew
famous
.
to
be
in
action
,
and
grow
famous
for
well
performing
of
what
hee
vndertaketh
?
Or
shall
he
likewise
obtaine
his
purpose
,
if
in
cases
of
difference
betwixt
Princes
,
he
[
e
](A15753-e17800-b)
e
Mach.
Prin.
Cap.
21.
cut
off
all
respects
of
Newtrality
,
and
declare
himselfe
for
one
of
them
?
Or
shall
he
this
way
come
to
his
ends
,
if
he
giue
this
testimony
to
the
world
,
that
hee
is
a
louer
of
vertue
,
honouring
all
excellent
men
,
of
what
sort
and
Art
soeuer
?
Or
finally
,
shall
he
this
way
compasse
his
desires
,
if
hee
giue
incouragement
and
hope
to
his
subiects
whom
hee
gouerneth
,
that
they
shall
liue
quietly
vnder
his
protection
,
and
peaceably
go
about
their
affaires
and
businesses
,
in
what
kinde
soeuer
they
shall
traffique
or
deale
?
2
It
may
further
be
demanded
,
wherefore
it
concerneth
a
Prince
so
deeply
to
be
highly
esteemed
both
at
home
and
abroade
?
IS
it
for
that
[
f
](A15753-e17870-b)
f
Fran.
Guicch
.
estimation
and
authority
once
lost
(
which
may
easily
be
done
)
can
hardly
or
neuer
be
recouered
againe
?
Or
is
it
for
that
[
g
](A15753-e17880-b)
g
Idem
.
estimation
and
authority
in
martiall
affaires
,
is
of
so
great
consequence
,
that
the
effecting
of
any
businesse
of
import
,
doth
wholly
seeme
to
depend
thereupon
?
Or
may
it
be
for
this
reason
rather
,
that
it
shall
be
much
more
difficult
for
him
whose
credit
and
estimation
beginneth
to
decay
to
defend
himselfe
and
his
estate
from
the
least
dangers
,
then
for
him
who
keepeth
vp
his
estimation
,
and
hath
it
imprinted
in
the
hearts
of
his
subiects
or
souldiers
,
to
effect
great
matters
,
though
his
meanes
be
weaker
?
Or
may
it
be
for
this
reason
likewise
,
for
that
it
sometimes
importeth
a
Prince
to
set
his
authority
vpon
the
tentors
,
and
stretch
it
beyond
his
ability
for
the
effecting
and
performing
of
some
great
enterprise
?
Now
a
Prince
shall
neuer
bring
this
to
passe
,
vnlesse
his
subiects
and
souldiers
be
perswaded
,
that
his
power
,
authority
,
and
estimation
,
is
greater
then
(
indeed
)
it
is
;
but
if
they
be
thereof
once
perswaded
,
he
shall
haue
that
done
readily
,
freely
,
and
of
their
owne
accords
,
which
otherwise
he
should
neuer
haue
had
granted
,
much
lesse
extorted
from
them
against
their
wils
.
3
It
may
further
be
demanded
,
how
a
Prince
may
compasse
it
to
be
feared
of
his
subiects
,
and
withall
get
himselfe
great
reputation
thereby
?
SHall
he
doe
this
,
if
he
vse
them
[
h
](A15753-e17940-b)
h
Fran.
Guich
.
rigorously
,
and
oftentimes
inflict
seuere
punishments
vpon
them
?
For
they
will
easily
be
brought
to
stand
in
feare
of
him
,
whom
they
know
both
can
and
will
correct
them
,
and
bring
them
into
order
,
especially
if
they
perceiue
him
by
his
naturall
inclination
,
to
be
thereunto
addicted
.
Or
shall
hee
finally
effect
this
the
rather
,
if
he
neuer
vse
a
stronger
[
i
](A15753-e17950-b)
i
Guicchardine
.
medicine
,
then
the
nature
of
the
disease
,
or
strength
of
his
sicke
subiects
are
able
to
beare
?
4
It
may
further
bee
demanded
,
how
a
subiect
may
gaine
himselfe
reputation
with
the
common
people
?
SHall
he
doe
this
,
if
he
be
[
k
](A15753-e18010-b)
k
Mach.
disp.
cap.
34.
descended
of
noble
Auncestors
,
who
haue
approued
themselues
braue
and
excellent
men
in
the
carriage
of
themselues
,
and
managing
of
great
actions
?
Or
shall
he
do
this
the
rather
,
if
he
betake
himselfe
to
a
wise
and
well
setled
course
of
life
,
conuersing
with
none
(
as
neere
as
he
can
)
but
with
excellent
men
,
and
such
are
vertuous
?
Or
shall
he
yet
effect
this
the
better
,
if
in
his
younger
yeares
he
shall
performe
any
thing
,
either
publickly
or
priuately
,
which
in
it selfe
is
memorable
,
and
withall
is
honest
?
Or
shall
he
attaine
thereunto
likewise
,
if
being
trusted
with
the
[
l
](A15753-e18020-b)
l
Mach.
Prin.
cap.
21.
managing
of
publique
affaires
of
his
Countrey
,
he
discharge
himselfe
well
thereof
,
hauing
rather
an
eye
that
his
actions
may
redound
to
the
good
of
the
common-wealth
,
then
to
his
owne
or
other
mens
priuate
,
how
neere
or
deere
soeuer
they
may
be
vnto
him
,
or
himselfe
to
himselfe
?
6
It
may
further
be
demanded
,
wherefore
the
Romans
thought
it
necessary
,
that
their
Generals
of
the
field
managing
Armes
amongst
forraigne
Nations
,
should
haue
free
libertie
to
dispose
of
those
affaires
according
to
their
owne
best
liking
.
WAs
it
for
that
the
[
m
](A15753-e18090-b)
m
Mach.
disp.
lib.
2.
Cap.
33.
Senate
did
well
vnderstand
,
that
if
they
commanded
their
Generals
should
attempt
nothing
without
their
directions
,
aduice
and
priuities
,
it
would
be
the
next
way
to
make
them
loose
,
idle
,
and
lesse
circumspect
in
exercising
their
charge
and
office
?
Or
was
this
rather
the
reason
,
for
that
they
were
perswaded
,
[
n
](A15753-e18100-b)
n
Idem
Ibidem
.
that
the
fortune
of
the
warres
were
doubtfull
,
and
that
sometimes
suddaine
accidents
might
fall
out
,
which
might
very
much
either
aduance
and
further
their
designes
,
or
greatly
hurt
them
;
which
occasions
(
as
they
rightly
deemed
)
he
onely
could
take
,
vnderstand
,
and
make
aduantage
of
,
who
should
bee
present
when
they
were
offered
?
6
It
may
further
be
demanded
,
how
the
Authoritie
and
estimation
of
a
Prince
may
bee
made
famous
,
if
he
should
carry
a
strict
hand
ouer
his
subiects
,
in
ruling
and
gouerning
them
?
SHould
hee
compasse
his
ends
,
if
hee
alone
should
[
o
](A15753-e18160-b)
o
Tacit.
2.
Annal.
Liu.
etiam
lib.
9.
retaine
and
keepe
all
the
maine
offices
and
businesses
of
the
crowne
in
his
owne
hands
,
so
that
all
men
should
be
enforced
to
looke
vpon
,
and
vnto
him
,
as
of
whom
onely
they
were
to
expect
all
things
which
might
doe
them
good
?
Or
shall
hee
yet
compasse
his
designes
,
if
hee
neuer
prorogue
,
or
continue
any
too
long
in
an
office
,
(
especially
in
militarie
affaires
)
least
his
substitute
growing
too
proud
,
should
work
any
thing
which
might
turne
to
his
preiudice
?
7
It
may
further
be
demanded
,
why
this
or
that
Prince
his
gouernement
is
counted
sharpe
and
seuere
;
when
the
rule
of
others
is
thought
to
bee
very
gentle
and
easie
.
MAy
this
be
the
reason
,
for
that
[
p
](A15753-e18220-b)
p
Mach.
disp.
lib
3.
cap.
22.
some
austere
man
comming
to
the
gouernement
,
doth
wish
,
and
hath
(
as
it
were
)
a
longing
desire
to
haue
all
men
like
himselfe
?
Or
may
this
rather
be
the
reason
,
for
that
such
a
man
comming
to
sway
the
state
,
is
commonly
a
valiant
man
,
and
therefore
commanding
great
and
difficult
enterprises
to
be
vndertaken
by
his
subiects
,
vseth
somtimes
seueritie
,
whereby
those
things
may
be
put
in
execution
,
according
as
they
were
commanded
them
?
8
It
may
further
bee
demanded
,
wherefore
it
should
bee
needfull
that
that
gouernment
should
be
strict
and
seuere
,
which
should
beget
authoritie
and
estimation
to
a
Prince
?
MAy
this
bee
the
reason
,
for
that
Ienitie
(
for
the
most
part
)
causeth
contempt
,
and
that
in
any
corruption
of
manners
it
is
necessary
the
[
q
](A15753-e18280-b)
q
Salust
.
Lepid.
subiect
doe
stand
in
awe
,
or
be
made
to
stand
in
awe
of
his
Prince
?
Or
may
this
rather
bee
the
cause
,
for
that
[
r
](A15753-e18290-b)
r
Cicero
pro
Milone
.
clemencie
and
remissnesse
opens
the
maine
gappe
to
offending
,
when
men
are
perswaded
that
they
shall
scape
vnpunished
?
For
[
s
](A15753-e18300-b)
s
Sen.
1
de
Clem.
who
will
feare
him
who
alwayes
keepeth
his
sword
fast
locked
in
the
feabbard
,
or
for
a
little
[
t
](A15753-e18310-b)
t
Cic.
1.
in
Catil
.
idlenesse
suffereth
the
edge
of
his
authoritie
to
be
blunted
?
Or
may
this
rather
be
the
reason
,
for
that
the
common
people
are
euery
way
better
ordered
,
being
compelled
to
do
their
duties
,
and
by
keeping
them
in
feare
,
then
if
all
the
clemencie
,
courteous
intreatie
,
and
demeanor
of
the
Prince
should
be
affoorded
them
?
9
It
may
further
be
demanded
,
why
the
constant
keeping
of
one
manner
and
forme
of
gouernment
,
must
needes
much
auaile
to
make
a
Prince
much
esteemed
?
MAy
this
bee
the
reason
,
for
that
(
as
all
[
u
](A15753-e18370-b)
u
Tholoz
.
innouation
in
a
State
is
dangerous
)
the
Prince
shall
be
put
in
fault
,
and
greatly
blamed
,
if
vpon
changing
any
thing
in
the
gouernement
,
it
should
not
well
succeed
and
prosper
?
Or
may
this
rather
be
the
reason
,
for
that
[
x
](A15753-e18380-b)
x
Thucid.
lib.
6.
experience
hath
taught
vs
,
that
those
States
and
Common-wealths
are
best
gouerned
,
which
affect
the
least
alteration
of
old
customes
and
manners
,
though
they
be
not
all
of
the
best
?
10
It
may
further
be
demanded
,
why
a
godly
and
Religious
Prince
is
held
in
great
honour
and
estimation
with
the
people
?
IS
it
for
that
[
y
](A15753-e18440-b)
y
Tacit.
2.
Annal
Pietie
and
Godlinesse
euen
of
it selfe
is
venerable
,
making
Princes
to
seeme
like
Gods
among
their
people
?
Or
may
this
rather
be
the
reason
,
for
that
the
people
are
perswaded
that
the
[
z
](A15753-e18470-b)
z
Liuy
in
his
first
book
maketh
mention
,
that
Numa
Pompilius
conferred
mightily
with
the
Nymph
Egeria
&c.
Prince
will
not
attempt
or
goe
about
any
enterprises
,
but
such
wherein
he
shall
bee
seconded
by
the
helpe
of
Heauen
?
SECT.
I.
CHAP.
X.
Of
Glory
and
Renowne
,
the
desire
thereof
profitable
to
the
Common-wealth
:
Of
Power
and
Greatnesse
,
and
the
acquiring
thereof
.
Of
Ambition
and
vnlawfull
desire
of
raigning
:
Of
eminent
Citties
,
and
their
being
free
,
for
the
most
part
,
from
practises
of
Treasons
,
Rebellions
,
Insurrections
,
Mutinie
,
&c.
1
It
may
bee
demanded
,
what
might
bee
the
reason
,
that
the
vehement
desire
and
thirst
after
glory
and
renowne
,
hath
alwaies
beene
praise-worthy
,
and
held
profitable
for
the
Common-wealth
,
whereas
the
least
desire
of
raigning
,
in
any
great
Subiect
,
hath
beene
condemned
on
all
hands
,
and
euer
thought
to
bee
dangerous
and
hurtfull
to
the
State
?
IS
it
because
[
a
](A15753-e18610-b)
a
Fran.
Guicch
.
the
hunting
after
honour
and
renowne
,
eleuateth
and
raiseth
a
mans
thoughts
,
and
exciteth
to
noble
and
generous
actions
?
Whereas
contrary
wise
the
ambitious
,
and
boundlesse
desire
of
ruling
,
prouoketh
a
man
to
propound
to
himselfe
dangerous
courses
,
and
to
runne
them
though
it
be
to
his
owne
vndoing
?
Or
may
it
bee
for
this
reason
likewise
,
for
that
hee
which
is
of
an
[
b
](A15753-e18620-b)
b
Idem
.
ambitious
and
turbulent
spirit
,
regardeth
neither
right
or
wrong
,
of
Soueraigne
or
Subiect
,
but
vpon
the
least
conceit
to
compasse
his
vnlawfull
desires
,
engageth
himselfe
in
factions
,
brawles
,
and
quarrels
,
filling
all
mens
hearts
with
feare
,
and
disturbing
the
quiet
of
the
State
so
farre
,
that
as
much
as
in
him
lyeth
,
he
will
rather
hazard
the
safety
of
it
,
then
desist
from
his
barbarous
enterprise
?
Whereas
hee
who
is
onely
desirous
of
honour
and
renowne
,
neither
feareth
dangers
,
nor
attempteth
or
alloweth
of
any
lewd
courses
,
whereby
hee
,
or
his
,
might
bee
branded
with
the
note
of
infamy
,
or
digrace
?
2
It
may
further
bee
demanded
,
how
[
c
](A15753-e18670-b)
c
Liuy
lib.
2.
Potency
is
the
high-way
to
gaine
authority
.
potency
and
greatnesse
may
bee
acquired
,
whereby
the
authority
of
a
Prince
may
bee
made
more
illustrious
and
resplendant
?
IS
it
to
bee
purchased
with
money
,
to
whom
[
d
](A15753-e18710-b)
d
Arist.
Rhet.
II.
cap.
16.
&
horat.
Serm.
11.
all
things
do
stoope
?
Or
is
it
to
bee
acquired
by
Armes
rather
?
for
this
is
an
infallible
rule
,
that
large
Empire
and
Dominion
,
is
not
gotten
,
kept
,
or
maintained
by
[
e
](A15753-e18720-b)
e
Tacit.
15.
Annal.
idlenesse
,
but
by
the
vse
and
exercise
of
Armes
,
and
Millitary
Discipline
?
Or
is
it
not
gotten
by
these
meanes
alone
,
but
by
[
f
](A15753-e18730-b)
f
Tacit.
11.
Annal.
firme
counsell
,
and
wary
circumspection
also
?
Or
may
it
be
attained
vnto
,
by
making
[
g
](A15753-e18740-b)
g
Arist.
Rhet.
ad
Alex
Cap.
Vltim
.
firme
leagues
,
and
sure
peace
with
forraigne
Princes
?
Or
to
conclude
,
may
it
bee
gotten
by
the
[
h
](A15753-e18750-b)
h
Quint.
Curt.
lib.
8.
benefite
of
fortune
,
who
(
most
what
)
doth
maruailously
fauour
and
aduance
some
speciall
sorts
of
men
?
3
It
may
further
bee
demanded
,
what
might
bee
the
reason
that
those
men
who
are
ambitious
,
and
haue
an
itching
desire
to
bee
inuested
with
the
gouernment
of
States
,
if
they
once
bee
euected
to
some
eminent
place
in
the
Common-wealth
,
[
i
](A15753-e18800-b)
i
So
it
fared
with
Iohn
of
Gaunt
Duke
of
Lancaster
,
and
Thomas
Woodstocke
Duke
of
Glocester
,
protectors
of
Rich.
the
2.
And
with
Rich.
the
3.
protector
of
Edw.
the
5.
&c.
they
are
neuer
contented
,
but
striue
and
endeuour
to
rise
higher
and
higher
,
and
if
once
they
can
surprize
the
State
,
they
wil
rather
die
,
then
come
afterwards
to
leade
a
priuate
life
?
COmmeth
it
thus
to
passe
,
for
that
all
[
k
](A15753-e18910-b)
k
Mach.
disp.
lib.
1.
cap.
37.
men
euen
by
nature
,
are
apt
and
prone
to
desire
great
matters
,
though
they
bee
not
so
fitted
and
accommodated
in
themselues
,
to
obtaine
and
keepe
them
?
Now
where
the
desire
is
more
then
the
ability
to
get
,
the
minde
can
neuer
be
at
quiet
,
or
contented
with
those
things
which
already
it
doth
enioy
.
Or
is
it
for
that
[
l
](A15753-e18920-b)
l
Guicchardinus
.
Ambition
of
it selfe
blindeth
the
eyes
of
men
,
perswading
them
that
their
merites
and
deserts
are
greater
then
(
indeed
)
they
bee
,
and
thereupon
they
affect
and
attempt
strange
matters
,
and
run
head-strong
courses
to
their
owne
destructions
oftentimes
?
Or
may
this
bee
the
reason
,
for
that
hee
who
once
hath
had
his
temples
circled
with
a
Crowne
,
can
neuer
after
brooke
a
priuate
life
,
because
Kings
and
Kingdomes
,
are
euer
to
bee
thought
and
beleeued
to
exceed
proportion
?
4
It
may
further
bee
demanded
,
what
man
may
rightly
be
censured
and
deemed
to
be
ambitious
?
IS
hee
so
to
bee
deemed
and
taken
,
who
vnder
[
m
](A15753-e18980-b)
m
Aul.
Pol.
pretence
of
amplyfying
and
enlarging
the
dignity
Royall
;
will
seeke
to
dominere
ouer
others
,
and
rule
all
things
according
to
his
owne
lusts
?
without
cause
or
reason
,
changing
the
auncient
Officers
(
though
neuer
so
honest
)
at
his
will
and
pleasure
,
and
suffecting
others
into
their
places
,
whom
hee
well
knoweth
to
be
of
his
owne
faction
,
and
(
when
time
shall
serue
)
will
fauour
his
party
?
Or
may
hee
likewise
be
thought
ambitious
who
with
great
[
n
](A15753-e18990-b)
n
Tholoz
.
lib.
22
gifts
,
large
promises
,
and
all
kind
and
friendly
Offices
,
seeketh
to
conciliate
and
get
the
fauour
and
good
will
of
the
people
,
whereby
hee
may
be
one
step
higher
to
his
rising
?
5
It
may
further
bee
demanded
,
why
all
the
Arts
,
cunning
and
practises
,
by
which
ambitious
men
study
to
climbe
to
the
height
of
greatnesse
,
are
kept
so
secret
,
that
they
hardly
or
neuer
burst
out
,
or
come
to
be
knowne
,
till
they
haue
obtained
what
they
sought
for
?
COmmeth
it
so
to
passe
,
for
that
[
o
](A15753-e19050-b)
o
Mach.
disp.
lib.
prim
.
Cap.
46.
men
do
not
by
and
by
(
and
as
it
were
vpon
the
sodaine
)
but
by
degrees
grow
ambitious
;
whose
progresses
being
not
obserued
(
except
of
some
few
)
they
may
more
easily
deceiue
and
blind
mens
eyes
?
Or
may
this
rather
be
the
reason
,
for
that
the
ambitious
do
alwaies
[
p
](A15753-e19060-b)
p
Idem
.
Ibidem
.
vse
some
honest
pretext
whereby
they
may
compasse
their
designes
,
as
though
all
their
actions
did
tend
and
bend
to
these
ends
,
least
the
Common-wealth
(
forsooth
)
or
themselues
should
be
wronged
,
when
the
truth
is
,
that
they
striue
to
get
the
garland
,
that
thereby
they
may
both
oppresse
others
,
and
the
weale
Publick
?
6
It
may
further
be
demanded
,
how
,
and
by
what
safe
meanes
it
may
be
prouided
for
,
that
a
man
shall
not
grow
too
ambitious
and
insolent
in
a
State
,
or
if
hee
should
,
how
his
insolency
may
bee
repressed
,
and
nipt
in
the
head
,
whilst
it
is
yet
in
the
bud
?
MAy
this
bee
effected
,
if
there
should
neuer
way
be
giuen
,
or
meanes
affoorded
,
to
create
or
erect
any
such
office
,
or
eminent
dignity
in
the
Common-wealth
,
out
of
the
which
the
State
might
haue
cause
to
feare
,
least
in
processe
of
time
,
Tyranny
might
take
her
first
rising
,
and
beginning
there-from
?
Or
may
it
rather
thus
bee
compassed
,
if
the
State
take
heed
,
and
with
wary
circumspection
prouide
,
[
q
](A15753-e19120-b)
q
Aristophanes
in
Ranis
.
that
they
neuer
foster
,
cherish
,
orbring
vp
,
any
Lyons
Whelpe
,
much
lesse
the
Lyon
himselfe
,
within
their
Territories
?
Or
may
it
thus
likewise
be
done
,
if
such
wormes
,
and
[
r
](A15753-e19130-b)
r
Tholoz
.
lib.
22.
moaths
,
which
breed
of
too
much
moisture
,
and
are
wont
to
consume
those
things
whereof
they
had
their
beginnings
,
bee
choked
or
shaken
off
,
before
they
come
to
any
great
bignesse
,
or
turne
the
whole
Substance
of
that
they
feed
vpon
,
into
their
owne
?
Or
may
it
thus
likewise
bee
brought
to
passe
,
if
heed
be
taken
,
that
if
by
the
heate
of
the
bosome
of
the
Common-wealth
,
there
bee
hatched
and
nourished
any
dangerous
serpent
,
it
bee
[
s
](A15753-e19140-b)
s
The
errour
of
the
Athenians
and
Florentiues
,
that
they
would
not
doe
after
this
Counsell
.
timously
exposed
to
the
cold
(
which
is
the
onely
way
to
kill
it
)
yet
neuer
suffer
it
to
hisse
other
where
in
a
place
more
commodious
,
least
by
sucking
out
the
poyson
thereof
,
there
might
follow
a
deeper
stinging
?
Or
may
this
also
be
effected
,
if
heed
be
taken
that
the
[
t
](A15753-e19170-b)
t
The
practise
of
Rich.
the
2.
against
the
Duke
of
Hereford
,
and
Tho.
Mowbray
Duke
of
Norfolke
:
For
the
King
feared
Heref.
least
(
hauing
the
loue
of
the
people
)
hee
should
haue
vanquisht
Mowbray
,
and
so
hee
banished
them
both
,
and
least
also
it
might
haue
fallen
out
that
the
Duke
of
Heref.
should
haue
gotten
the
victory
,
&
so
haue
graced
himselfe
.
ambitious
bee
neuer
permitted
to
ingage
himselfe
in
any
publique
businesse
,
especially
neuer
employed
in
Martiall
affaires
,
least
by
the
well
managing
thereof
,
he
draw
vnto
himselfe
credit
and
estimation
with
the
Common-people
,
which
hee
abusing
,
might
afterwards
turne
to
the
hurt
and
dammage
of
the
Weale
Publique
?
Or
may
it
bee
brought
to
passe
by
this
menes
also
,
if
diuers
of
his
[
u
](A15753-e19250-b)
u
Tholoz
.
lib.
22.
owne
ranke
and
quality
do
bandy
with
him
,
and
of
set
purpose
oppose
his
proceedings
,
the
munition
,
and
all
other
warlike
furniture
,
being
(
in
the
meane
time
)
vnder
the
command
of
the
Prince
,
or
Common-wealth
?
Or
may
this
finally
be
effected
,
if
[
x
](A15753-e19260-b)
x
Mach.
dis●
.
lib.
1.
cap.
52.
hinderance
be
giuen
to
his
ambitious
designes
,
by
the
same
waies
,
meanes
,
and
instruments
,
which
he
himselfe
vsed
to
climbe
to
the
top
of
his
desires
?
7
It
may
lastly
be
demanded
,
wherefore
the
more
eminent
Cities
(
as
in
particular
it
may
truely
bee
instanced
in
,
and
of
,
this
Honour
able
Citie
of
[
y
](A15753-e19310-b)
y
So
Iacke
Straw
his
rebellion
begun
in
Kent
,
in
the
time
of
Rich.
the
2.
who
was
flame
by
the
Right
Honourable
William
Walworth
,
in
Smith-field
,
whereby
the
Citie
for
that
honourable
seruice
had
the
Dagger
added
to
their
Armes
.
So
Iacke
Cade
his
conspiracy
and
rebellion
in
Henry
the
6.
his
daies
,
came
from
Kent
likewise
.
So
Kets
conspiracie
came
from
Norfolke
in
the
time
of
Edw.
the
6.
So
the
rebellion
in
the
North
,
was
moued
against
Q
Elizabeth
of
Famous
memory
by
impious
Pius
Quintus
B.
of
Rome
.
So
the
powder-treason
was
plotted
&
contriued
in
our
Soueraigne
Lord
King
Iames
his
London
)
are
generally
free
from
plotting
,
practising
,
or
contriuing
any
treasons
,
rebellions
,
insurrections
,
mutinies
,
&c.
against
the
Prince
,
or
State
:
when
other
more
remote
parts
of
the
Kingdome
,
are
,
and
euer
haue
beene
more
subiect
to
put
in
practise
such
hellish
proiects
?
IS
it
for
that
in
the
more
famous
and
eminent
Cities
(
where
the
Magistrates
are
commonly
more
carefull
and
watchfull
then
other
where
)
the
plotters
of
treasons
and
rebellions
,
cannot
so
conueniently
conueene
and
come
to
together
,
to
consult
about
their
villanies
,
without
being
noted
,
obserued
,
and
espied
,
as
they
may
do
vnder
any
colourable
pretext
,
in
the
Countries
neere
adioyning
,
or
other
remote
parts
from
such
Cities
?
Or
is
it
not
for
this
cause
alone
,
but
for
that
in
such
eminent
Cities
(
and
in
particular
within
this
Citie
of
London
)
the
word
of
God
is
more
plentifully
Preached
,
whereby
the
Citizens
are
better
instructed
in
their
duties
to
God
and
their
Prince
,
then
commonly
they
are
in
all
the
Countrie
besides
?
Or
may
this
bee
a
further
reason
for
the
said
Citie
of
London
in
particular
,
for
that
as
well
the
chiefe
Magistrate
thereof
,
as
other
worthy
SECT.
I.
CHAP.
XI
.
Of
Studies
,
dispositions
,
&
whence
the
diuersitie
thereof
may
proceed
:
Of
Learning
likewise
,
knowledge
of
tongues
and
Histories
,
how
necessary
&
auaileable
they
are
in
generall
,
but
especially
for
a
Prince
,
that
thereby
he
may
more
cleerly
see
,
and
exactly
iudge
of
his
owne
affaires
.
Of
Intelligence
,
and
the
vse
and
benefit
thereof
.
1
It
may
be
demanded
,
whence
the
varieties
of
studies
and
diuersity
of
dispositions
of
men
might
proceed
?
DOth
this
diuersity
happen
by
[
a
](A15753-e19630-b)
a
Fran.
Guicch
.
reason
of
the
varietie
of
times
and
places
?
Or
not
so
neither
,
but
by
the
mutabilitie
of
the
vnstable
multitude
rather
,
of
whom
this
Prouerbe
is
truly
verified
,
So
many
men
,
so
many
mindes
?
Or
falleth
it
out
thus
the
rather
,
by
reason
of
the
[
b
](A15753-e19650-b)
b
Tholozanus
.
difference
of
yeares
,
and
vnlikenesse
of
manners
of
the
inhabitants
of
one
and
the
selfe-same
kingdome
,
the
desires
and
ends
of
the
Nobles
,
Senators
,
and
people
,
being
cleane
contrary
one
to
the
other
?
2
It
may
further
be
demanded
,
wherefore
wise
men
haue
in
all
ages
greatly
indeuoured
to
perswade
all
men
to
get
learning
and
knowledge
before
any
other
thing
?
WAs
it
because
they
plainly
saw
and
perceiued
,
that
it
was
the
best
meanes
[
c
](A15753-e19710-b)
c
Sen.
Epist.
98.
to
purge
and
purifie
the
mindes
of
men
,
whereby
they
might
bee
apted
to
receiue
and
retaine
vertuous
precepts
?
Or
might
this
be
the
reason
,
for
that
they
well
knew
,
that
the
embracing
of
good
letters
was
[
d
](A15753-e19720-b)
d
Quintilian
,
lib.
12.
the
high-way
to
wisedome
,
by
which
the
policie
of
a
State
is
most
aduanced
?
3
It
may
further
be
demanded
,
wherefore
the
knowledge
and
skill
of
languages
is
necessary
and
profitable
for
all
men
,
but
especially
for
a
Prince
and
priuy
Councellour
?
MAy
this
be
the
reason
,
for
that
all
men
are
commonly
well
pleased
to
[
e
](A15753-e19780-b)
e
Guicch
.
vnderstand
,
&
to
be
vnderstood
of
those
with
whom
they
shall
chaunce
to
haue
any
dealing
?
Or
may
this
be
the
cause
,
for
that
a
man
being
skilfull
in
the
tongues
,
can
[
f
](A15753-e19790-b)
f
Cominaeus
.
better
explaine
himselfe
and
his
owne
meaning
,
and
shall
much
better
bee
vnderstood
,
then
if
he
should
deale
by
an
Interpretor
?
Or
may
this
likewise
be
a
maine
reason
,
for
that
many
times
it
falleth
out
,
that
a
priuy
Councellor
is
to
take
notice
of
some
serious
businesses
,
which
mightily
import
the
State
to
know
,
and
bee
secret
in
,
which
things
can
neuer
be
related
,
and
transacted
so
well
,
nor
to
such
good
purpose
,
if
for
want
of
knowledge
of
the
tongues
,
the
Councellor
or
Relator
must
of
necessity
vse
the
helpe
of
some
third
person
?
Or
may
the
knowledge
of
tongues
bee
thought
so
auaileable
to
a
Prince
or
Statesman
,
for
the
entertaining
and
giuing
audience
to
Embassadors
,
hearing
of
their
messages
,
be
they
hostile
or
friendly
,
and
giuing
them
their
dispatches
,
answeres
,
and
dismissions
?
4
It
may
further
bee
demanded
,
wherefore
wise
men
haue
held
the
knowledge
of
Histories
to
be
the
readiest
way
whereby
a
man
may
become
wise
,
calling
[
g
](A15753-e19840-b)
g
Tacit.
4.
Annal.
Cic.
de
Orator
.
Diodorus
Siculus
.
Cominaeus
.
History
the
life
and
soule
of
memory
,
the
light
of
truth
,
director
of
mans
life
,
&
c
?
IS
it
because
that
by
reading
of
Histories
,
a
man
shall
truely
find
[
h
](A15753-e19870-b)
h
Diod.
Sicul.
1.
Bibliorum
.
Vertue
,
to
haue
her
due
praise
,
and
honour
giuen
her
,
as
contrariwise
to
Vice
,
her
due
shame
and
reproofe
?
Or
may
this
bee
the
reason
,
for
that
[
i
](A15753-e19900-b)
i
Plutarchus
.
in
Timol●onte
.
History
is
auialeable
to
instruct
any
priuate
man
(
of
what
degree
soeuer
)
how
to
flame
his
life
,
and
carry
himselfe
with
commendation
in
the
eye
of
the
world
,
when
,
as
in
a
glasse
,
he
shall
see
how
to
beautifie
&
compose
it
,
according
to
the
patterne
of
other
mens
vertues
?
Or
may
this
bee
a
further
reason
,
for
that
thereby
a
man
may
[
k
](A15753-e19910-b)
k
Liuy
lib.
become
a
Statesman
,
and
know
how
to
manage
publique
affaires
,
drawing
his
rules
and
directions
out
of
old
Antiquities
,
and
times
passed
,
as
out
of
a
Store-house
,
and
making
application
thereof
to
the
time
present
?
5
It
may
further
be
demanded
,
what
may
be
the
chiefe
vse
,
benefit
and
end
of
Intelligence
?
MAy
it
be
beneficiall
to
a
Prince
or
State
,
because
he
may
thereby
[
l
](A15753-e19970-b)
l
Fran.
Guicch
.
Aul.
Pol.
distinctly
know
the
condition
and
state
of
all
Countries
,
the
power
and
strength
of
their
Princes
and
Gouernors
,
the
wisedome
and
skilfulnesse
of
their
Senators
,
in
managing
the
affaires
of
State
,
and
the
originals
and
continuance
of
their
families
,
with
many
other
particulars
necessary
to
bee
knowne
to
a
Prince
or
State
,
who
either
hath
,
or
may
haue
dealing
with
other
Nations
?
Or
may
this
rather
be
the
chiefe
vse
&
end
of
Intelligence
,
that
a
Prince
or
wise
Statesman
may
thereby
better
[
m
](A15753-e19980-b)
m
Polib
.
lib.
1.
Pacuvius
&
Guich
.
discouer
the
secret
fraudes
,
and
cunning
practises
of
his
faire
tongued
,
and
smooth-faced
friends
(
but
indeed
his
craftie
and
subtile
aduersaries
)
as
likewise
the
machinations
,
drifts
,
and
intents
of
his
open
enemies
,
whereby
he
may
better
be
enabled
to
explicate
and
winde
himselfe
out
of
dangers
,
or
frustrate
their
intentions
,
by
crossing
and
counter-mining
of
them
?
SECT.
I.
CHAP.
XII
.
Of
peace
,
and
the
conditions
thereof
:
Of
the
State
,
and
affaires
of
Princes
:
Of
Embassages
,
Embassadours
,
and
who
are
fittest
to
vndertake
such
charge
:
what
Arguments
are
most
perswasiue
,
and
of
the
great
vse
of
Eloqence
in
a
States-man
or
Embassadour
.
1
It
may
bee
demanded
,
why
wise-men
haue
alwaies
thought
peace
to
be
expedient
for
both
parties
,
as
well
for
the
victor
,
as
those
who
haue
beene
conquered
?
MIGHT
it
bee
for
this
reason
,
for
that
they
supposed
it
[
a
](A15753-e20080-b)
a
Senec.
Here.
Fur.
impossible
for
the
world
to
continue
,
if
it
should
bee
vexed
with
continuall
wars
?
Or
might
this
rather
be
the
reason
,
for
that
they
truely
iudged
that
the
[
b
](A15753-e20090-b)
b
Idem
Ibidem
,
conquered
must
of
necessity
,
accept
of
what
peace
and
conditions
soeuer
the
Victor
shall
grant
them
?
And
that
they
thought
it
likewise
to
bee
a
[
c
](A15753-e20100-b)
c
Liu.
lib.
30.
comely
and
gracefull
thing
to
the
conquerour
,
to
affoord
them
peace
vpon
reasonable
termes
,
that
all
men
might
take
notice
,
that
hee
knew
how
to
begin
,
and
ingage
himselfe
in
a
iust
warre
,
and
was
able
likewise
to
make
an
end
thereof
?
Or
might
not
this
be
the
onely
reason
,
but
for
that
they
thought
it
[
d
](A15753-e20110-b)
d
Tacit.
Annal.
lib.
12.
profitable
likewise
,
and
safe
for
the
Conquerour
to
lay
downe
his
Armes
,
considering
that
if
hee
should
still
prosecute
the
warres
,
hee
should
reape
nothing
but
wearisomenesse
by
continuing
and
protracting
of
them
,
and
if
hee
should
make
too
much
hast
,
and
as
it
were
inforce
an
end
of
them
,
hee
might
runne
himselfe
into
many
and
[
e
](A15753-e20120-b)
e
Henr.
Ransov
.
de
re
Bellica
.
needlesse
dangers
,
euen
to
the
hazard
of
his
owne
estate
,
which
otherwise
hee
might
easily
haue
auoyded
?
For
Fortune
will
sometimes
play
the
Iade
,
and
the
euent
of
warres
is
vncertaine
?
2
It
may
further
bee
demanded
,
how
a
safe
and
firme
peace
,
may
bee
distinguished
and
knowne
from
that
which
is
vnsure
and
not
to
be
trusted
vnto
?
MAy
this
be
knowne
,
if
the
peace
bee
[
f
](A15753-e20180-b)
f
Liu.
lib.
25.
honest
,
as
putting
an
end
to
the
warres
,
by
giuing
and
accepting
of
tollerable
conditions
?
Or
may
it
this
may
be
knowne
likewise
,
if
it
bee
[
g
](A15753-e20190-b)
g
Tacit.
4.
Hist.
simple
,
plaine
,
and
without
false
colours
or
glosses
,
ambuiguity
of
words
,
or
equiuocations
,
and
not
subiect
to
what
constructions
the
peace-breaker
may
wrest
or
draw
them
?
3
It
may
further
bee
demanded
,
why
that
Prince
who
came
to
his
Kingdome
by
some
of
the
Nobility
,
or
Senate
,
shall
more
hardly
keepe
it
,
then
another
,
who
obtained
the
Crowne
by
the
suffrages
and
assistance
of
the
people
?
IS
it
because
that
[
h
](A15753-e20250-b)
h
Mach.
Prin.
cap.
9.
those
of
the
Nobility
thinke
themselues
to
be
little
inferiour
,
or
rather
equall
with
the
Prince
,
whereupon
hee
cannot
sway
the
Scepter
as
him
listeth
,
but
must
bee
glad
in
the
most
things
to
be
ruled
by
them
?
Or
may
this
rather
bee
the
reason
,
for
that
it
will
bee
thought
the
Prince
will
[
i
](A15753-e20260-b)
i
So
fared
it
with
the
Duke
of
Buckingham
,
in
the
time
of
Richard
the
3.
with
Charles
the
8.
and
Lewis
the
12.
Kings
of
France
,
in
the
losse
of
Millane
,
&c.
as
reporteth
Mach.
Prin.
Cap.
9.
neuer
be
able
sufficiently
to
satisfie
those
Nobles
,
without
the
hurt
and
wronging
of
others
,
which
when
hee
cannot
,
those
very
men
,
by
whose
aide
and
assistance
hee
got
the
Crowne
,
will
bee
the
first
who
will
pull
him
downe
againe
?
Or
may
this
be
the
reason
,
for
that
[
k
](A15753-e20340-b)
k
Idem
Ibidem
.
if
the
Commons
should
make
head
against
the
Prince
,
hee
could
neuer
bee
secured
of
his
safety
,
or
retayning
of
his
Kingdome
,
because
they
would
oppresse
him
with
multitude
,
the
Nobility
being
but
a
handfull
to
them
?
4
It
may
further
be
demanded
,
wherefore
it
so
much
importeth
a
Prince
to
manage
his
Martiall
affaires
in
his
owne
person
,
if
hee
euer
looke
to
grow
famous
by
his
conquests
?
IS
it
because
it
[
1
](A15753-e20400-b)
1
Quint.
Curt.
Mach.
Prin.
So
Alexander
the
Great
,
Ferdinand
King
of
Spaine
,
and
Hen.
the
5.
King
of
Eng.
became
famous
.
so
much
encreaseth
and
augmenteth
his
estimation
,
and
credit
with
forraigne
Princes
abroad
,
and
breedeth
and
begetteth
him
loue
and
authority
among
his
owne
people
at
home
?
Or
may
this
be
the
reason
,
for
that
by
this
meanes
,
all
[
m
](A15753-e20470-b)
m
Mach.
disput.
lib.
1.
cap.
30.
wrangling
occasions
,
and
heart-burnings
are
cut
off
,
whereby
a
Prince
sometimes
proueth
vngratefull
to
men
,
euen
of
the
best
deserts
?
For
when
Princes
present
,
and
behaue
themselues
brauely
in
the
field
,
all
the
honour
and
glory
thereof
(
as
it
pertaineth
)
so
it
redoundeth
vnto
them
:
whereas
otherwise
if
they
were
absent
,
and
committed
the
managing
of
those
affaires
to
their
Generals
,
they
straight
waies
imagine
,
that
if
their
forces
should
preuaile
,
the
glory
of
the
day
should
rest
with
the
Generall
,
who
led
the
Army
,
and
that
themselues
can
neuer
challenge
any
part
of
the
victory
,
gotten
,
vnlesse
they
extinguish
the
merites
of
the
Generall
,
or
himselfe
,
and
by
that
meanes
proue
vniust
and
vngratefull
to
their
seruants
.
5
It
may
further
be
demanded
,
how
a
Courtier
may
come
to
bee
much
imployed
in
his
Princes
affaires
?
MAy
he
effect
this
,
if
he
[
n
](A15753-e20530-b)
n
Guicch
.
should
waite
diligently
,
and
bee
alwaies
in
the
eye
of
the
Prince
?
Or
may
hee
compasse
this
the
rather
,
if
once
imployed
hee
manage
that
affaire
well
?
For
by
this
meanes
,
hee
shall
both
gaine
himselfe
reputation
,
and
bee
thought
fit
and
able
to
deale
in
any
businesse
,
and
be
sure
(
almost
)
neuer
to
be
out
of
action
,
by
reason
of
the
dependencies
which
other
businesses
haue
vpon
those
,
wherein
hee
formerly
hath
beene
employed
.
6
Considering
that
by
well
or
ill
managing
and
handling
of
the
affaires
of
Princes
,
in
negotiating
for
them
with
forreigne
Princes
,
either
great
good
,
or
great
hurt
may
accrew
to
the
Prince
and
State
,
it
may
be
demanded
what
manner
of
men
a
Prince
might
chiefly
imploy
for
Embassadours
to
forreigne
Princes
?
SHall
hee
vse
such
as
are
[
o
](A15753-e20590-b)
o
Comineus
.
skilfull
to
picke
and
gleane
something
out
of
other
mens
employments
,
and
appropriate
it
to
themselues
,
if
there
bee
hope
that
their
credit
and
estimation
,
may
grow
greater
by
it
?
Or
shall
not
a
Prince
trust
to
such
to
negotiate
for
him
,
but
to
those
rather
,
who
are
faithfull
,
carefull
,
meeke
,
and
gentle
,
and
haue
beene
long
practised
and
experienced
in
managing
such
affaires
?
7
It
may
further
be
demanded
,
with
what
tooles
an
Ambassadour
shall
soonest
perswade
a
forreigne
Prince
,
and
draw
him
to
fauour
,
and
further
his
maisters
designes
?
SHall
he
assaile
him
with
[
p
](A15753-e20650-b)
p
Tholoz
.
firme
arguments
and
sound
reasons
?
But
hee
that
is
nice
,
and
hath
a
speciall
opinion
of
his
owne
wisedome
,
will
presently
distast
that
or
any
thing
that
is
solide
.
Or
shall
he
rather
set
vpon
him
with
[
q
](A15753-e20660-b)
q
Fran.
Guicch
.
Cominaeus
.
Mach.
Prin.
representations
of
colours
,
Popularities
,
and
circumstances
?
And
(
to
speake
as
the
truth
is
)
these
are
of
no
lesse
(
if
they
bee
not
of
more
)
force
,
then
firme
and
sound
reasons
:
For
circumstances
,
colours
,
representations
,
and
such
like
stuffe
,
are
of
such
power
and
efficacy
,
that
they
can
giue
life
to
true
and
sound
reasons
,
peruert
the
iudgement
,
if
it
bee
not
stable
and
well
grounded
,
and
quickly
leade
into
errour
.
8
It
may
further
bee
demanded
,
why
eloquence
is
so
necessary
for
a
Councellour
,
or
an
Embassador
?
IS
it
because
that
daily
a
most
it
falleth
out
,
that
a
Prince
hath
occasion
to
send
some
one
or
other
of
his
Councell
to
forreigne
States
,
either
to
perswade
;
to
accuse
,
or
defend
;
to
gratulate
,
or
condole
,
&c.
Now
it
is
both
requisite
,
and
necessary
,
and
commodious
for
a
Prince
to
bee
furnished
with
men
so
qualified
,
with
eloquence
,
vtterance
,
&c.
as
that
they
may
with
credit
to
him
and
his
Court
,
well
discharge
the
place
,
and
person
they
sustaine
;
And
it
should
be
a
great
shame
,
disaduantageous
,
and
dishonourable
to
the
Prince
,
if
for
want
of
such
gifts
,
in
any
whom
hee
should
send
on
such
errands
,
it
should
fall
out
otherwise
.
Or
may
it
rather
be
for
this
cause
;
for
that
in
[
r
](A15753-e20720-b)
r
Quintilian
.
pacifying
such
as
are
seditious
in
the
State
,
and
compounding
the
quarrels
and
differences
of
such
as
are
factious
,
there
is
no
better
meane
to
accord
them
,
then
to
vse
an
eloquent
and
plausible
speech
vnto
them
?
SECT.
I.
CHAP.
XIII
.
Of
Discord
and
Faction
,
whereof
they
take
their
beginnings
,
and
of
the
nourishing
,
or
not
nourishing
of
them
in
a
Common-wealth
.
1
It
may
bee
demanded
from
whence
discords
and
factions
haue
their
beginnings
?
DOE
they
arise
of
such
[
a
](A15753-e20820-b)
a
Tholoz
.
de
Repub.
lib.
22.
motions
as
are
sodainely
suggested
to
the
people
,
so
that
there
cannot
bee
time
giuen
them
to
thinke
or
consider
what
matter
they
go
about
?
Or
do
they
take
their
beginnings
rather
of
[
b
](A15753-e20830-b)
b
Idem
Ibidem
.
the
priuate
or
open
hatred
of
Familiers
?
Or
may
they
proceed
rather
from
the
roote
of
[
c
](A15753-e20840-b)
c
Senec.
Epist.
74
pride
and
ambition
,
whilst
euery
man
striueth
to
proceed
,
and
go
before
another
,
and
is
alwaies
detracting
from
him
hee
liketh
not
?
Or
may
they
haue
their
beginnings
from
idlenesse
and
loosenesse
of
liuing
,
which
oftentimes
are
wont
to
minister
occasions
of
ciuill
(
or
rather
vnciuill
)
brawles
and
contentions
?
Or
may
they
arise
of
the
[
d
](A15753-e20850-b)
d
Tholoz
.
de
Re
pub
.
lib.
22.
different
mindes
and
dispositions
of
the
people
,
from
the
designes
and
intentions
of
the
Nobility
?
Or
not
so
much
from
thence
neither
,
but
of
the
wauering
mutability
of
the
vnconstant
multitude
also
?
their
years
being
so
diuers
,
and
their
manners
so
vnlike
:
For
it
is
impossible
,
that
where
there
is
such
and
so
great
diuersity
of
yeares
,
and
disparity
of
manners
,
that
the
multitude
or
Commons
altogether
,
should
equally
well
like
of
,
affect
,
and
comport
the
present
State
,
but
contrarywise
disagree
,
grow
factious
,
and
contentious
.
2
It
may
further
bee
demanded
,
whether
it
may
bee
beneficiall
to
a
Prince
or
State
to
nourish
factions
,
or
no
?
IT
were
too
hard
a
taske
for
mee
(
Right
Honourable
)
to
take
vpon
mee
difinitiuely
to
determine
this
question
:
for
I
am
not
ignorant
that
amongst
diuers
men
,
and
those
of
the
wisest
sort
,
this
doubt
hath
beene
canuased
,
and
greatly
controuerted
;
yet
seeing
that
I
am
entred
into
it
,
I
thought
it
not
fit
altogether
to
passe
it
ouer
in
silence
,
without
shewing
your
Honour
my
priuate
opinion
therein
,
which
that
I
may
do
the
better
,
I
will
rip
vp
the
Arguments
on
both
sides
.
That
factions
(
therefore
)
should
bee
nourished
of
a
Prince
or
State
,
many
things
may
induce
and
perswade
thereunto
,
but
especially
these
two
,
Honour
and
Profit
.
For
that
Prince
[
c
](A15753-e20960-b)
c
Mach.
Prin.
cap.
20.
must
needes
bee
honoured
and
feared
,
who
alwaies
hath
an
enemy
at
his
owne
deuotion
,
and
neuer
resisting
his
designes
and
enterprises
:
For
hee
that
can
conquer
when
hee
list
,
is
not
onely
admired
,
but
much
feared
likewise
,
both
at
home
and
abroad
.
For
all
men
with
one
voyce
will
giue
it
out
,
that
hee
got
the
victory
by
his
owne
valour
and
prowesse
:
Which
so
reported
and
beleeued
,
there
is
no
doubt
but
that
hee
shall
bee
much
renowmed
therefore
,
though
he
atchieued
it
otherwise
;
namely
,
by
being
seconded
with
a
potent
faction
,
ioyning
with
him
against
their
owne
Prince
,
or
otherwise
.
Againe
,
that
the
chiefest
and
most
potent
Cities
of
a
Kingdome
,
should
be
brought
vnder
the
Princes
subiection
,
it
were
not
onely
conducible
and
necessary
,
but
also
profitable
,
both
to
him
and
the
common-wealth
.
Now
to
effect
this
,
a
Prince
must
either
vse
force
or
policy
.
If
hee
say
to
compasse
his
designes
by
force
,
hee
must
of
necessity
offer
many
iniuries
to
the
people
,
which
the
more
openly
they
are
done
,
the
more
they
do
prouoke
them
to
mislike
the
Prince
:
For
that
which
the
Law
hath
made
Mine
,
and
Thine
,
if
it
should
be
snatched
away
from
the
Subiect
,
it
would
bee
grieuously
taken
,
and
held
for
no
better
then
an
intollerable
peece
of
iniustice
.
But
when
the
[
f
](A15753-e20970-b)
f
Mach.
dis.
lib.
2.
cap.
25.
Cities
of
themselues
are
become
factious
,
and
the
Citizens
doe
waste
and
cōnsume
themselues
by
quarrels
and
factions
,
the
fault
shall
neuer
bee
laid
on
the
Prince
,
but
on
the
factious
,
and
yet
by
this
meanes
the
Prince
in
effect
,
shall
obtaine
what
hee
desired
.
For
the
Cities
hereby
growing
weake
,
and
wearied
with
continuall
garboiles
,
will
willingly
put
themselues
into
the
Princes
protection
,
and
yeeld
themselues
subiect
to
his
will
.
Further
,
for
a
Prince
to
diuert
the
current
of
the
warres
,
or
any
hostile
inuasions
,
from
his
owne
dores
,
it
is
very
necessary
,
behouefull
and
conuenient
:
Now
it
is
not
incredible
,
that
euer
hee
shall
haue
any
better
way
,
or
meane
to
bring
this
to
passe
,
then
by
[
g
](A15753-e20980-b)
g
Herod
.
lib.
4.
Xenoph.
de
Pedia
Cyri.
lib.
3.
nourishing
factions
,
and
dissentions
in
his
enemies
Countrie
;
for
many
haue
put
this
in
practise
heretofore
,
and
greatly
thriuen
thereby
:
Moreouer
diuers
of
the
wisest
sort
,
haue
thought
it
very
aduantageous
to
the
Prince
,
that
the
[
h
](A15753-e20990-b)
h
Tacit.
Agric.
Subiects
should
neuer
come
altogether
,
to
consult
,
or
agree
altogether
,
vpon
any
thing
which
might
tend
to
their
common
or
particular
safeties
.
To
conclude
,
[
i
](A15753-e21000-b)
i
Tholoz
.
de
Repub.
lib.
23.
that
a
great
Prince
,
or
Monarch
,
may
become
more
wary
of
his
enemy
,
and
better
conserue
his
owne
estate
,
it
hath
beene
thought
fit
,
by
some
of
the
wisest
heads
that
euer
haue
beene
,
that
such
a
Prince
should
neuer
bee
without
an
enemy
,
or
be
a
great
nourisher
of
factions
in
a
forreigne
Land
:
Which
course
,
if
Rome
had
taken
,
and
not
destroyed
Carthage
,
they
should
haue
had
their
braue
spirited
youth
better
trayned
vp
,
practised
,
and
made
ready
in
feates
of
Armes
,
which
might
haue
steeded
the
Common-wealth
for
offence
or
defence
thereof
;
Graue
and
mature
counsell
should
haue
flourished
in
the
Senate
,
the
Citizens
should
not
haue
wasted
themselues
with
ciuill
warres
,
and
so
the
Empire
should
haue
beene
more
durable
and
lasting
.
The
reasons
of
those
who
hold
it
vnprofitable
,
and
euery
way
disaduantageous
to
a
Prince
,
to
nourish
factions
,
are
as
follow
.
It
is
[
k
](A15753-e21030-b)
k
Mach.
lib.
3.
dis.
cap.
37.
impossible
,
say
they
,
by
reason
of
an
inbred
inconstancy
in
the
nature
of
men
,
that
those
factions
,
which
at
this
,
or
that
present
,
depend
vpon
a
Prince
,
should
alwaies
,
and
after
one
and
the
selfe-same
manner
,
bee
so
affected
towards
him
,
for
that
men
being
wauering
,
doe
greatly
desire
sometimes
this
Prince
,
sometimes
that
Prince
,
to
be
their
chiefe
Patron
.
Againe
,
[
l
](A15753-e21040-b)
l
Idem
Ibidem
.
the
nourshing
of
factions
,
by
a
Prince
in
a
forreigne
Land
,
is
oftentimes
the
cause
,
that
by
little
and
little
,
discords
and
ciuill
garboyles
are
brought
into
his
owne
Country
,
which
will
scarcely
be
thought
to
bee
conuenient
.
Further
,
a
great
inconuenience
,
or
rather
an
apparant
losse
might
happen
to
a
Prince
,
who
should
nourish
factions
within
his
owne
Dominions
;
For
[
m
](A15753-e21050-b)
m
Idem
Prin.
cap.
20.
vpon
any
sodaine
inuasion
,
such
Cities
of
his
,
which
should
happen
to
bee
rent
asunder
by
factions
,
must
of
necessity
be
all
lost
:
For
the
[
n
](A15753-e21060-b)
n
Tholoz
.
lib.
de
Repub.
23.
weaker
part
would
rather
submit
,
and
apply
it selfe
to
a
stranger
,
then
yeeld
to
the
aduerse
faction
in
any
thing
.
Moreouer
this
course
of
gouerning
,
by
nourishing
of
factions
,
must
needs
[
o
](A15753-e21070-b)
o
Mach.
Prin.
cap.
20.
argue
the
weakenesse
,
and
imbecility
of
the
Prince
,
both
in
power
and
iudgement
:
For
if
hee
were
strong
and
prudent
,
hee
would
neuer
indure
that
his
Country
should
bee
torne
in
peeces
by
factions
and
contentions
.
To
conclude
,
seeing
that
euery
faction
consisteth
of
few
or
many
,
both
of
these
must
needs
bee
hurtfull
to
the
Common-wealth
:
This
latter
for
that
[
p
](A15753-e21080-b)
p
Liu.
lib.
34.
they
trusting
to
their
owne
strength
,
would
presently
take
Armes
,
and
turne
the
quiet
of
the
State
into
garboiles
:
The
former
likewise
,
though
perhaps
somewhat
more
secretly
and
slowly
,
would
no
lesse
vexe
and
molest
the
Common-wealth
,
by
reason
that
[
q
](A15753-e21090-b)
q
Arist.
5.
Polit.
cap.
4.
factions
of
the
Nobility
are
wont
to
draw
vnto
themselues
all
,
or
the
greatest
part
of
the
Commons
,
to
take
part
with
such
or
such
of
them
,
as
they
most
affect
.
These
things
thus
standing
,
they
conclude
,
that
factions
are
rather
to
bee
extinguished
and
quenched
,
then
nourished
.
For
mine
owne
part
(
Right
Honourable
)
though
I
will
determine
nothing
of
this
matter
,
yet
thus
I
thinke
thereof
.
That
Factions
,
to
the
singular
benefite
of
the
Prince
,
and
Common-wealth
,
may
be
nourished
in
a
forreigne
gouernement
:
and
though
it
were
not
so
conuenient
(
perhaps
)
they
should
bee
set
on
foote
,
and
maintained
at
home
,
yet
at
no
hand
are
they
to
be
neglected
,
especially
in
the
time
of
peace
.
For
seeing
that
there
is
no
Common-wealth
,
which
doth
not
breed
and
bring
forth
,
yea
foster
and
cherish
some
enuy
and
contention
:
these
contentions
may
proue
healthfull
to
the
State
of
a
Common-wealth
,
as
Agues
are
sometime
beneficiall
to
the
state
of
a
mans
body
:
And
it
is
certaine
that
the
Romane
Common-wealth
,
was
neuer
in
better
health
and
safety
,
then
when
the
Tribunes
of
the
People
,
and
the
Patricians
were
at
variance
:
and
the
Lacedaemonian
State
neuer
in
better
state
,
then
when
their
Ephori
,
and
their
Kings
could
not
agree
.
For
by
this
curbing
of
one
another
,
the
publique
Offices
of
a
Common-wealth
were
better
discharged
,
both
at
home
and
abroad
.
SECT.
I.
CHAP.
XIIII
.
Of
Sedition
,
Mutiny
,
and
defection
,
of
the
greatest
part
of
the
people
in
a
State
,
and
of
standing
Newtrall
,
or
part
taking
.
1
It
may
be
demanded
whence
sedition
and
mutining
,
in
,
or
,
against
a
State
taketh
his
beginning
?
MAY
it
arise
and
spring
out
of
the
bitter
[
a
](A15753-e21260-b)
a
Tholoz
.
Aristotle
5.
Pol.
Cap.
3.
roote
of
oppression
,
as
when
men
apprehending
the
remedy
of
present
euils
and
dangers
,
to
bee
the
euils
and
dangers
themselues
,
doe
vpon
a
sodaine
breake
out
,
and
so
take
Armes
?
Or
may
it
proceede
[
b
](A15753-e21270-b)
b
Idem
Ibidem
.
of
feare
as
the
Phylosopher
well
conceited
?
For
feare
may
moue
and
incite
men
,
to
bee
seditious
,
fearing
or
expecting
punishments
to
be
inflicted
vpon
them
,
for
the
wrongs
they
haue
done
,
and
by
this
meanes
running
out
,
they
thinke
(
or
at
least
are
willing
)
to
preuent
them
before
they
can
bee
put
in
execution
.
Or
may
this
proceed
of
too
much
indulgency
,
clemency
,
and
remissnesse
of
the
gouernement
,
together
with
the
superfluity
and
aboundance
of
all
things
,
it
being
rather
the
nature
of
the
people
to
[
c
](A15753-e21280-b)
c
Liuy
lib.
2.
grow
to
bee
Wantons
then
Warriours
?
Or
may
it
come
rather
of
[
d
](A15753-e21290-b)
d
Salust
.
Sugurth
.
penury
,
and
scarcity
of
things
necessary
?
Or
may
it
happen
through
the
[
e
](A15753-e21300-b)
e
Liu.
lib.
38.
pride
and
ambition
of
euill
Gouernours
and
Councellours
?
Or
may
it
rather
arise
of
taking
vp
too
much
mony
at
Vse
,
with
the
which
the
Commons
being
(
as
it
were
)
eaten
vp
,
and
their
states
consumed
,
they
grow
desperate
thereupon
,
and
so
take
Armes
,
thinking
[
f
](A15753-e21310-b)
f
Tacit.
1.
Hist.
themselues
most
safe
when
they
runne
the
most
vncertaine
courses
?
for
worse
then
they
are
,
they
thinke
they
cannot
bee
.
2
It
may
further
bee
demanded
,
whether
,
when
once
sedition
groweth
hot
,
and
commeth
to
Heads
,
it
were
better
to
stand
Newtrall
,
then
to
fall
to
part-taking
?
TOuching
this
Question
(
Right
Honourable
)
vnlesse
that
[
g
](A15753-e21380-b)
g
Solon
.
great
Athenian
Law-giuer
,
had
decreed
and
established
by
Law
,
that
vpon
any
sedition
arising
in
that
State
,
[
h
](A15753-e21400-b)
h
Sic
refert
A.
Gaellius
.
in
Noct.
Attic.
lib.
2.
cap.
12.
he
that
would
not
take
part
with
one
side
,
should
bee
banished
the
Citie
,
and
loose
all
that
euer
hee
possessed
;
I
should
scarce
haue
thought
it
worth
the
looking
into
:
but
after
so
wise
a
man
had
determined
it
,
and
for
that
I
perceiued
others
,
who
thought
themselues
as
wise
,
as
the
said
Law
giuer
,
did
stiffely
stand
against
his
opinion
,
and
vpon
good
grounds
(
as
they
suppose
)
produced
arguments
to
the
contrary
,
I
thought
it
worthy
my
labour
likewise
,
to
put
downe
the
reasons
on
both
sides
,
and
in
conclusion
to
enterpone
mine
own
priuate
opinion
touching
the
premisses
.
Those
therefore
who
stand
on
Solons
side
,
and
allow
and
stand
for
part-taking
doe
thus
argue
:
[
i
](A15753-e21430-b)
i
A.
Gaellius
noct.
Attic.
lib.
2.
cap.
12.
If
the
good
men
,
which
be
in
the
Citie
or
Common-wealth
,
perceiuing
the
Seditious
to
bee
madded
with
fury
,
and
to
grow
to
an
head
,
should
apply
themselues
to
either
part
,
there
is
no
doubt
,
but
that
they
might
bee
a
meanes
to
reduce
them
to
vnity
;
perswading
first
with
their
owne
side
,
how
ill
beseeming
a
thing
it
is
,
for
Citizen
to
striue
with
,
or
take
Armes
against
Citizen
,
and
what
destruction
of
them
and
theirs
may
ensue
,
if
they
suffer
themselues
still
to
be
led
with
passion
,
and
by
that
meanes
mollifying
their
owne
friends
minds
,
they
may
(
happily
)
get
leaue
likewise
to
deale
with
the
other
side
,
in
those
or
such
like
termes
,
and
so
perswade
both
parties
to
lay
downe
their
weapons
.
Againe
,
[
k
](A15753-e21450-b)
k
Phauorinus
Philosophus
.
those
which
take
part
with
neither
side
,
if
the
differences
of
the
factious
should
once
bee
compounded
,
should
smart
for
it
,
being
hated
on
both
sides
,
deemed
as
publique
enemies
,
and
such
as
solaced
themselues
,
and
reioyced
to
see
them
at
those
oddes
,
and
therefore
are
iustly
exposed
to
the
prey
,
and
iniuries
of
either
party
.
Further
,
it
were
very
dangerous
when
the
Citie
or
Common-wealth
is
diuided
into
faction
,
not
to
take
part
with
the
one
or
the
other
side
,
least
a
[
l
](A15753-e21460-b)
l
Iosephus
de
bello
Iudaico
.
third
faction
should
spring
out
of
the
others
,
as
hath
sometimes
beene
read
to
haue
falne
out
in
the
Iewes
Common-wealth
.
But
those
which
stand
for
newtrality
,
think
otherwise
,
and
thus
they
reason
[
m
](A15753-e21470-b)
m
Tacit.
Annal.
Ciuill
Armes
of
themselues
,
can
neither
be
prouided
,
taken
vp
,
or
managed
by
any
good
or
lawfull
meanes
,
and
the
issue
and
end
of
them
commonly
proueth
naught
.
For
the
Leaders
and
Captaines
of
the
seditious
,
vnder
the
pretence
of
seeking
the
good
of
the
Common
wealth
,
do
euery
one
seeke
to
promote
his
owne
ambitious
humours
,
and
so
draw
the
people
to
follow
their
fancies
,
which
no
good
Patriote
ought
to
do
.
Againe
,
it
argueth
great
folly
in
any
,
who
shal
take
either
part
,
and
ioyne
with
the
seditious
:
for
by
that
meanes
they
[
n
](A15753-e21480-b)
n
Salust
.
in
bello
Iug●rthino
.
strengthen
and
encourage
them
,
encrease
their
malice
towards
their
Countrey-men
,
and
fellow-Citizens
of
the
aduerse
partie
,
and
become
partakers
of
their
rebellions
,
madnesse
,
and
folly
.
Touching
mine
owne
priuate
opinion
herein
,
I
think
(
right
Honourable
)
that
newtrality
is
regularly
to
be
auoyded
in
either
Prince
or
Courtier
,
except
in
some
maine
case
,
where
a
man
by
making
shew
to
be
newtrall
,
may
more
handsomly
compouud
and
contriue
his
owne
businesse
,
and
better
promote
,
and
sooner
come
to
his
owne
ends
.