THat man is not made and brought forth into the World , to eat and drinke , and to take his ease , but for some better thing , is acknowledged by all men , who have any thing left in them of men , ( that is , of rationall creatures ; ) and have not wholly degenerated into brutes . But whether Action , or Contemplation , bee the thing , wherein mans chiefest happinesse in this world doth consist , hath beene a question of old , and is yet disputed of on both sides . To omit the ancient Fathers , because our purpose is not to insist long upon this point , ( whose opinion neverthelesse if any desire to know , let him read them upon the words of Christ unto Martha , Luke x. 41 , 42. ) Aristotle and other Philosophers , that are for Contemplation , goe upon this ground : That the neerer every man comes unto God , by way of imitation , ( as farre as by nature he is capable of it : ) the more happy he is : that God doth enjoy himselfe in the fruition and contemplation of his owne goodnesse , infinitnesse , eternitie , and the like ; and not in , or by any thing externall , that he doth cause , or produce without himselfe . On the other side it is alledged , That man , naturally , is animal politicum ; that is , borne and brought forth into the World , not every man for himselfe only , but for the good of others also ; and that it is one of the fundamentall principles of all publike-weales and societies of men , that the publicke is alwayes by every man , to bee preferred before his owne private , whether profit , or happinesse . Both which opinions may easily bee reconciled , if both be acknowledged ( as I thinke they must of necessitie : ) in their severall respects to be true . For certainely , if man bee absolutely and barely by himselfe considered , as a rationall creature , then Contemplation ; if , as naturally sociable , having relation to the World as a Citie , then Action is his end . Action then his end ; yet , even then , not action , without all manner of Contemplation . For as we commonly say of the Sciences , that some are speculative , and some practicall ; so is it of contemplation too : Some contemplation is meerely speculative ; and so it is opposed to Action : some may be termed ( though there may seeme to bee some contradiction in the termes : ) active , or practicall , because it is the ground and foundation of all actions , that tend to happinesse . For they are not all actions in generall , that make men happy ; but such onely , as are good and vertuous . Which are such , and which are contrarie , cannot bee knowne without the knowledge of good and evill . Neither is this knowledge ( in this state of corruption : ) to bee attained unto without much studie and contemplation . And this , all Divines and Philosophers assent unto , that it is not enough , that what wee doe bee laudible of it selfe , and as the Schoole men speake , materially good ; except wee know it to bee so , and doe it upon that ground . Then , and not till then , is our action , as it is ours , truely good and commendable . Hence it is , that in the opinion of Aristotle , ( the great wonder of Nature : ) a learned and well grounded Physician , though missing of his end , is more praise worthy , then an ignorant Empiricke that hath good successe ; because , saith hee , in his Metaphysickes , The one understands what hee doth , and goeth upon warrantable grounds , though the ignorance of some particular outward circumstance may hinder the good event : The other doth hee knoweth not what , nor upon what grounds , but altogether ventureth upon former experiments . Now experience , we know , is the mistris , as of men , so of brutes too : which , though they be irrationall , yet are capable of that knowledge that comes by bare experience ; and cannot therefore be the proper commendation of those creatures , which are naturally rationall . So that what once a grave Senator ( Plin. Sec. in Panegyr , ad Traja : ) spake of one particular vertue , ambitio & jactantia , & effusio , & quidvis potiùs quàm liberalitas est dicenda , cui ratio non constat ; that that liberalitie , that is not grounded upon reason , is rather ambition , vaine glory , profusenesse , or any thing else , what you will , then true liberalitie : is as true of any other particular vertue , and appliable to vertue , in generall ; to wit , That Vertue is not Vertue properly , but as it is the frute and effect , of true knowledge and sound reason . Which also made Aristotle to maintaine in his Ethicks ( Lib. v. cap. 9. ) that justa facere was no very hard thing , and incidentall unto all men ; but justum esse , that is , to doe just actions , upon grounds of reason and no otherwise ; to bee a matter of very great difficultie . For which reason also , Socrates before him maintained , that Truth and Vertue , were but one thing . And truely in the Scriptures , they are often taken for one thing . Hence those phrases , To doe the Truth , To commit a lye , and the like . To which if it bee opposed , that truth and vertue must needs differ as much as the will and the understanding , truth being the proper object of the one , and vertue of the other ; it might easily , according to the authoritie of Aristotle , and other great Philosophers and Schoole men , be replied , That although the will and the understanding be not all one essentially , yet in matter of action , they come all to one ; since that , as they maintaine , voluntas necessariò determinatur ab intellectu , the will of man is wholly ruled and governed , by the motions and prescripts of the understanding . Whence is that of Aristotle in the same Ethicks , lib. vi . that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that it is not possible , that he that is truely wise and prudent , should bee naught or vicious : And that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that no man is evill , but through ignorance of that which is most expedient , which is there and elsewhere at large discussed by him and prooved ; as it is to this day maintained by many accute writers .

But not to engage my selfe into these deepe mysteries of profoundest Phylosophy , which may be thought perchance more abstruse then usefull , and admit of variety of opinions ; all that I shall inferre upon these premises , which no man , I thinke , will deny , is but this ; That Truth and Vertue are of such affinitie , that without some more then ordinarie insight ( by vertue of knowledge and contemplation : ) into the one , the other cannot bee practised as it should ; either to afford that inward content and satisfaction to the conscience , which is the best reward of a vertuous life in this World ; or to deserve that commendation from others , ( though this bee least of all to bee stood upon : ) that otherwise would be due unto it .

Now the knowledge of Truth being a matter of such moment to happinesse , as wee have said ; it is much to bee lamented , that the search of it should bee so difficult , as it is : so beset with sundry rubbes and impediments ; so shadowed with many false colours and lineaments , as it is to bee feared , that many men , after no small paines and studie to find out what Truth is ; in stead of finding what might satisfie them concerning the nature of Truth , begin to doubt whether there be any such thing , in rerum natura ; and by consequent , whether any such thing truely and really , as Vertue and Iustice : according to that miserable complaint ( though uttered by him upon another occasion : ) of dying Brutus , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . O wretched vertue ! hitherto have I carefully exercised thee as a thing true and reall ; but now I see , that thou art meere words and wind . And in very truth if a man shall as it were from some higher place , raised with the wings of philosophicall contemplation , as an indifferent judge , or but spectator , take a generall view of the surface of the earth ; diligently observe and looke into the actions and endeavours of mortall men , hee shall cleerely see , that that which all ingenuous men aime at , and most ( even wretched worldlings : ) doe pretend unto , is truth : but that truth so generally professed , both by the one and by the other , for truth , in some , ( whose grosse and earthly temperature is most uncapable of heavenly both thoughts and hopes ▪ ) to bee nothing else , but meere policie , and private secular interests ▪ in many others ( of a purer mould or metall , whose meaning is good and sincere : ) nothing else , in effect , but meere partialitie , prejudice , presumption , resolute obstinacie , and the like ; being all the fruits and effects of either blind ignorance ( the more blind , the more confident , alwaies : ) in too much heate , and eagernesse ; ( the naturall distemper of most men : ) or lastly , ( if not of all these together , yet of some one of them especially : ) of long use and custome . Shewes , and colours , and appearances , and pretences of truth in great store every where ; reall and solid truth , hee shall see but little any where : and that too , in many places , either silenced , or forced by unjust violence into corners .

Vpon one of these impediments , that I have mentioned , I purpose at this time to fixe my contemplation ; being one of the chiefest , ( if I bee not much mistaken my selfe : ) of those many things , that cause truth to bee mistaken by men ; and that is , Custome .

That men both in their actions , and in their judgements , are most swaied by custome , hath beene the observation of many wise men of old , and is most apparant by daily experience , to them that shall observe it with diligence . Non ratione componimur , sed consuetudine , saith Seneca ( Epist. 123 and elsewhere ) speaking of the actions of men . As those things are , which men are used unto , so are their judgements , saith Aristotle in his Metaphysicks , lib. 1. parte 2. c. 3. Rabbi Ben Maimon , ( commonly called Rambam ; the most judicious Rabbin , that ever was known to the Christian World ; ) in his excellent booke , called More Nevokim , having insisted out of Alexander Aphrodisaeus , as he professeth himselfe , of three maine particulars , which usually hinder men from the knowledge of truth ; addes a fourth of his owne observation , as considerable in his judgement , if not more , then any of the former : and that is , saith hee , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , Custome and Education . What word was used by the Author himselfe , I know not . For he wrote this booke in Arabick ; and the Hebrew is but a translation . But the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here used by the Hebrew translator for custome , is very proper in this place ; comming from a simple . Verbe , which , among other things , signifieth , fallere , dolosè agere ; which is the very thing the Author doth here charge custome of . Amant enim homines , ( saith he ; ) naturâ id ad quod sunt assuefacti , & propendent ad illud . And then after some instances taken from daily experience , goes on thus , ( as the late Latin Translator renders him , ) Idem planè accidere solet homini insententiis & opinionibus , quibus innutritus est , ut pro amore illarum , ab illis dimoveri nequeat . Quae causa est , ut homo saepe non possit apprehendere veritatem , quia scilicet illa sequitur , quibus assuefactus est , &c.

Neither is there want of many plausible pretences to make this power , or tyranny rather ( as Saint Chrysostome doth usually stile it : ) of custome , to seeme as reasonable , as it is generall . For first , Naturalists tell us , that , Consuetudo tanquam altera natura ; so Aristotle : and Gallen , elegantly , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , Custome is an adscititious Nature . Both Civilians and Canonists tell us , not onely that consuetudo optima legis interpres , ( that is much that it should be so : ) but plainly , that consuetudo derogat legi , abrogat legem ; yea some of them , that , consuetudo , illicita , licita facit . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , was the resolution of the Councell of Nice in matters of the Church ; and to enquire of the former age , and , to stand upon the wayes , and there to looke for the good old wayes , is the way that the Prophet doth teach us both to truth and righteousnesse ; to wit , to consult with Antiquitie ; which is nothing else , but a continued custome ; as custome is nothing else , but actus saepius multiplicati ; as it is defined by Lawyers and Schoole-men . Besides , Philosophers tell us , that , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; that which is in being , and that wee call Truth , are all one . And what is custome , but that which is in being ? And if any , to shew a difference , shall adde , that Truth is that , which is , hath beene , and shall bee ; which is as much , as to say , that it is eternall ; wise Salomon seemes to say as much of custome , when intreating of the varietie of mens labours and actions , hee useth these words , The thing that hath beene , is that which shall bee ; and that which is done , is that which shall be done ; and there is no new thing under the Sunne . Is there any thing whereof it may he said , See this is new ? It hath beene already of old times which was before us . So another , a King too , and as wise a King ( of a heathen ) as Salomon , He ( saith he ) that seeth the things that are now , hath seene all that either was ever , or ever shall bee . For all things are of one kind , and all like one unto another . And in another place , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , What ever it bee that is now done here , is the same that hath alwayes beene , and ever shall be , and is now done in all places : which is spoken by him , as appeares there , not of things naturall , ( lest any man should mistake . ) but of mens actions and fashions . Anto. vi . 34.x.12 .

To these things if any shall reply , that consuetudo , quae non est rationabilis , is not properly consuetudo , but corruptela ; and no wonder , if consuetudo rationabilis , bee granted to be aequivalent to reason , right , or truth : This , if it bee well considered , will rather puzzle the more , then satisfie . For the Custome of men , which they live and are guided by , being different according to differences of places and nations ; yea so changeable and variable ; ( I speake it of Customes , in point of right and Iustice , as well as of others : ) in the same place , as wee see they are in all places : if it shall bee said of all such generally , as of particulars it is commonly by them that are used unto them , that they are rationabiles ; will it not hence necessarily follow , that what is right in one place , is in another wrong : what at one time is reason and Truth ; at another time is both false and absurd ? And what is this , but to make Truth changeable , Protheus like ; and appliable to all times and places ? That is , in effect , to say with Archilaus , that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that nothing is right or wrong , but by custome and the ordinances of men onely : or with Epicurus , that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that righteousnesse of its selfe is nothing , but that whatsoever is expedient for the present , as long as it is expedient , it is just ; and no longer just , then it is expedient .

Besides these and the like arguments , taken from the things themselves , some thing may bee inferred even from the words , whereby those things are usually expressed . For words have usually some foundation in the nature of things , and therefore ( as wisest men , Aristotle and others , have thought : ) in all disputes of the true nature and use of things , much observable . Now in most Languages , right and custome , are expressed by the same words . As for example to instance in the three chiefest ; in Hebrew , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , signifies properly judgement , but it is as often used for custome . So that Interpreters are sometimes put to it , not knowing , or at least not agreeing among themselves , by which of the two it should bee rendred . As for example , Sam. 8.9 . shew them the manner , &c. and v. 11. This will be the manner , &c. In the Hebrew it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which some with the Vulgar and the Septuagint , render jus ; others , as we , rationem ; the manner or custome . The Chaldey paraphrase expresses it by the Greeke word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which is ambiguous both in the Originall Greeke ( the ambiguitie whereof hath caused errors and mistakes of Interpreters not a few in divers ancient Greeke Authors : ) and in the derivative Chaldey , for either right or custome . Hence are varietie of opinions , as amongst the Iewes , so amongst the Christians , about the true meaning . But I meddle not with that . Only this I observe , that Homer upon this very subject , speaking of Kings , useth the very word ( but that the one is Greeke , and the other is Hebrew : ) that Samuel doth ; This also , as ambiguous in the Greeke , as the other is in the Hebrew . His words are Odyss. iv . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . Where the Scholiast hath noted 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . i. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . But Eustathius , Arch-Bishop of Thessalonica , more fully , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . Aemilius Portus translates it , quod tamen Licet divinis Regibus . And certainly in those words of the Poet in another place , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , Gallen did understand by the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , somewhat more , then custome , as should seeme by him in his de Valetudine conservanda , where hee quotes them more then once . Now as in these words , both Hebrew and Greeke , right is taken for custome ; so in the Latin , is custome taken for right , or Law . Witnesse , not onely the word consuetudo , in latter ages , whereof wee shall have occasion to speake more afterwards ; but also mos , of old . So Virgil. Aenid . vi . — pacisque imponere morem , i. Legem pacis , saith Servius . As also in the Civill Law , jus and mos , are often joyned together to expresse right ; though sometimes opposed , I know . Neither are these two Latin words , mos and consuetudo , used in Latin for right and Law onely ; but also for nature her selfe ; custome , as it seemes , pretending as much to nature , as it doth to right . So mos by the best Latin Authors , often ; and so consuetudo , by sacred authors , sometimes . As for example , Gen. 31.35 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which by the Chaldey paraphrase , by the LXX . and the Vulgar , is rendred , consuetudo ; the custome of women . Which word consuetudo , made Augustine the Monke ( a very pardonable mistake in a Monke : ) to thinke worse of women , then they had deserved , imputing that unto them as a fault , or voluntary vice , which is their nature . At least hee was so understood by Saint Gregorie ; who therefore both by many reasons , and divers examples , prooves unto him at large , that that consuetudo mulierum , though called consuetudo , is in very truth , infirmitas naturae ; or naturae superfluitas , rather ; and therefore not culpa , quia naturaliter accidit ; no voluntarie thing in women , but hapning by necessitie of nature , and by consequent , no sinne ; no more then either to eate , and drinke ; or to bee weary , cold ; and the like . Greg. Epist. lib. xii . Ind. vii . Epist. 31. ad August . resp. 10.

By these things that have hitherto been spoken , it should appeare , that custome of it selfe hath no small affinitie with Truth and right : and it is but too apparant , that they are , by most men , taken for one and the same thing ; as hath already beene said .

But on the other side , wee shall find in ancient , both Philosophers and Fathers , as Iustin . Mart. Cyprian , Greg. Nyss . and others , many serious caveats and admonitions to them that seeke the truth , to beware of custome : and to this purpose Tertullian would haue us to remember , that Christ called himselfe veritatem , non consuetudinem : truth , not custome , be it never so generall , or so ancient .

Having therefore oftentimes ( not by way of curiositie , but as one that thinkes himselfe bound , to propose unto himselfe right and reason , to the utmost of his power , in all his actions : ) had occasion to meditate upon those things , viz. of the power , varietie , validitie , of custome in things either naturall , civill , ( for all those have some relation , and mutuall dependance ; neither can throughly bee understood , if separated , ) or Divine : and what in all those is , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ( as an ancient Philosopher speaketh : ) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the speculation of Truth ; I have here put most of those things , that did offer themselves to my consideration , together : perswading my selfe , that if men spent lesse time about particular Questions ; as concerning the right or truth of sundry particulars , in point of either Religion or Philosophy ; and more time in the due and rationall consideration of those generall either helpes , or hinderances , that offer themselves unto men in the search of what is Truth and right ; that there would be , both farre lesse contention , and far more truth in the World , then is at this day . For my part , I shall bee carefull not to vent any new conceits , or opinions of mine owne unto the World . It is too full alreadie of such phantasticks , who both in their lives and in their opinions , affect nothing more then singularitie . Onely what I have met with in best authors concerning this subject , the consideration whereof I thought might bee usefull unto others , I shall here set downe ; and this , rather by way of proposition , then peremptorie determination .