AS Prouident Nature hath prescribed certaine ends to all the Creatures of this Vniuerse , whom She hath clothed with certaine qualities and allurements fit to inflame them with their Loue ; So there is not any one in this world but doth endeuor by all meanes to attaine vnto those ends which are propounded . As the Sunne hauing bin placed in the firmament , to contribute to the birth and preseruation of Beasts and Plants ; runnes continually from one Hemisphere to the other , to poure out the beames of his influence and light ouer all . So after his example , there is not any other cause in all this great World , but is carefull to seeke and pursue her end , according to the motions which Nature hath ingrafted . But to make them c●peable , it was necessary that the same Nature which hath prescrib'd them their ends , should also giue them as it were two wings to raise them vp : That is to say , it was needefull she should impart vnto them the knowledge , and ingraf● in them the inclination and desire to pursue them . Desire alone were not sufficient , for that is fashi●ned in the Appetite ; which is a blind power , and requires some light to guide and conduct it in its motions ; Euen as they say the Whale , which hath a weake and heauy sight , hath need of a guide to conduct it through the waues of the Sea , lest that this great and weighty masse which she drawes after her , should strike against some rocke and be crusht in peeces . Neither were knowledge alone sufficient , for that it proceedes from a faculty which being borne to giue light , doth necessarily presuppose another power , which doth receiue the beames of her light , and as we may say , suffers it selfe to be guided by that light . As for example , to cause the King ( being incited by the glory of his Ancestors , or induced by the greatnesse of his courage ) to vndertake the sacke of Constantinople , or to repl●nt the Cross● in Palestina ; it were not sufficient that he knew where Constantinople stood , or in what part of the world Palestina were ; but besides all this it were needfull , that with this knowledge the heat and ardor to carry him to so glorious a Conquest should breede a desire . As in old time to thrust on Alexander to vndertake the voyage of Persia , or of the Indies , it was not onely requisite this Prince should haue some knowledge of that st●tely Empire and of those rich Prouinces ; But it was also necessary his generosity should beget in him a passion and will to conquer them . So as no man imbraceth any designe whatsoeuer , vntill that knowledge be vnited with desire , and desire ioyned vnto knowledge . In this manner then if things knewe their ends and did not desire them , or if they desired them without the knowledge , they could not be drawne to endeuor to get them : For as much as through the want of those helps , they should be in danger to labor in vaine , and to lose all the paines of their pursuites . So as to effect it they had neede of knowledge and desire . The proofes hereof are seene in all the Creatures which make a part of this Vniuersall world . For leauing apart the Angels of heauen , whose actions show sufficiently that their substance is indued with an vnderstanding full of knowledge , and a will capable to frame diuers desires ; if we will fixe our eyes vpon visible nature , we shall find that there is not any Creature , not onely among those that haue life , but euen among those that haue no soules , in the motions and course of whose actions this truth doth not appeare and demonstrate it selfe plainely . It is true , that in things which are insensible and without life , it is not necessary that the knowledge of their ends should remaine in themselues , as the desires and inclinations to attaine vnto them do reside ; but it sufficeth that they bee guided and conducted by a cause conioyned to their actions . And to returne to our last example , as it was necessary ( to draw Alexander to vndertake the voyage of Asia and the Indies ) he should haue knowledge of the Prouinces , yet he might borrow this knowledge from those which had seene them , and obserued them ▪ euen as blind men , who led by their guides go where their affaires do call them ; euen so , although that naturall things which of themselues are not indued with any knowledge , besides the inclination which they haue vnto their end , haue yet some need to know it , to the end they may affect it and seeke it ; yet hauing a desire ▪ it imports not whether the knowledge be precisely in themselues , or that some other cause supplies this defect , and insinuates it selfe into this action to guide it . The reason whereof is , that although they be depriued of knowledge , yet it hinders not the force of their motions ; for that they are vnited to that great intelligence which knoweth all things , and cannot erre in her knowledge , but guides all the naturall causes to their ends by her wise prouidence . But these things haue alwayes neede of knowledge and desire , to put them into action , although that in regard of knowledge it is not absolutely necessary it reside in them , but it sufficeth that it be imparted vnto them by the influence and assistance of a more eminent cause . As for those which haue life , it may be plainly obserued in the course of their liues . But we must remember that the soule being the forme of liuing thinges , and naturall formes hauing this in particular , that the more Noble containes the perfection of that which is lesse Noble , as a quadrangle comprehendes with a certaine eminency , all that enters into the composition of a Triangle ; and as the formes of beasts containe the formes of the Elements ; It followes that there beeing three degrees of Soules ; that is to say , that which giues life , which is the lesse perfect ; that which giues sense ; which is the second ranke , and the Reasonable which is the noblest of all ; this Reasonable soule which is peculiar onely to Man , containes all the powers and perfections of the other , and can effect as much as all the rest together . By reason whereof man hath a Vegetatiue soule , which is common with plants ; he hath the sensitiue , which he hath common with bruit heasts ; But he alone is in possession of the Reasonable soule , whereby he hath nothing common with the rest of the Creatures . After this , either of these soules hath a number of powers befitting the operations which must arise . The powers of the Vegetatiue soule are principally those which nourish , which contribute to the growing and increase , and which serue to Generation : And those haue other powers for instruments to their actions , as the power to draw , the power to retaine , the power to expell the excrements , the power to disgest the nourishment , and others which Philosophers assigne vnto them .

Moreouer , there is a power which is as it were the Queene of all the rest , to whose command and conduct they referre all their actions : And that is the power of the naturall Appetite , the which ( as wee haue sayd ) is one of those two things necessary to accomplish the actions of Nature . According vnto these Lawes we see that the power we call Attractiue , drawes the nourishment vnto her , for that the Naturall Appetite doth presse and command her ; and in like manner the power which they call Expulsiue , doth cast forth and expell those things which the same Natural Appetite doth abhorre ; and so of the other Powers which are ordained to diuerse ends . But for that the Appetite which is blind and voyde of all Knowledge , is not sufficient in Vegetatiue things to exercise their action , but withall it is requisite that they be accompanied with Knowledge ; it therfore happens that the Vegetatiue soule being not so Noble that among all her powers , there is not any one indued with Knowledge : the vniuersall Nature which prouides for all , supplies this defect , and conducts by her Light the inclination of Vegetatiue substances to their ends , and by the same meanes guides all the other powers which follow her motions in their actions . So as Nature knowing the substance fitting and proper for the Nourishment , shewes it and instructs the Naturall Appetite , and ordaines that it shal bee drawne and disgested , and conuerted into Nourishment for the preseruation of the Vegetable Indiuidue ; and the like may bee sayd of the other actions ; wherein doubtlesse liuings things diff●r not much from those that haue no life , And we must not obiect that Plants seeme to bee indued with Knowledge , for that they can distinguish a Iuic● which is proper for them , from that which is pernitious , the which seemes to bee a marke of Knowledge ; for although there were Pilosophers which did a●tribute vnto Plants a feeling of things , which they sayd was lesse pure and lesse actiue then that of Creat●●es : Yet it is most certaine that the Nature of the Vegetatiue soule is too earthly , to bee fit for the functions of the Sences , which require oth●● Organs then those of the Plants . And therefore although they draw vnto them good Iuice , and reiect the bad , it proceeds not from any Knowledge wherewith they are indued , but from their Naturall vertues ▪ and properties , guided by that Soueraigne Intelligence which disperseth her care ouer al the Creatures how base and abiect soeuer : And it is also by her motion that the same Plants fly their Contraries , as the Vine shunnes the Bay tree ; and that they shew such grace & beauty in their workes , as we see in the Spring time ; So as all these things bind vs not to beleeue ▪ that they are indued with Knowledge .

But let vs returne to our discourse , and ( leauing the Vegetatiue soule ) ascend a degree higher , and come to the Sensitiue . This as the more Noble hath in her selfe the possession of Knowledge and hath no need to borrow it , like vnto the Vegetatiue soule , 〈◊〉 things without Life . Moreouer shee hath three kinds of Powers , that is to say , the fa●ulty to know , the faculty to desire and the mouing power . B● the mouing power , I vnder●stand that which executes the motion , from one place to another , as it is commanded and ordained by the faculty where the Desire is framed , after that it is enlightened and guided by Knowledge .

The Knowing powers are of two sorts , that is to say , the Exterior and the Interior . The Exterior are the fiue sences of Nature , as Seeing , Hearing , Smelling , Tasting , & Touching ; the which as messengers 〈◊〉 to the Interior powers indu●d with Knowledge , whatsoe●er we can comprehend and desire . These Exterior powers 〈◊〉 the sences answers in some ●●rt to the bodies of the Vni●erse , whereof they comprehend 〈◊〉 Colours , the Sounds , the ●melles , the Sauors , the Cold , ●●e Heat , and the other naturall qualities wherewith they are clothed . The Interior powers capable of Knowledge are three , whereof the first is the Common sence , the which is called by that name , for that it is as it were the Center , to which doe flow the formes which are sent vnto it from the other sences : So as from the Eyes it receiues the formes of Colours which they haue seene : From the Hearing the formes of Sounds which haue toucht the Eare ; from Smelling the formes of Sauors which it hath sented ; from the Tongue , the forme of Sweetnesse or Bitternesse which it hath tasted ; and from the body the formes o● those things which fall vnder the sence of Touching . And 〈◊〉 not o●ely receiues ▪ the forme● which the other sences send vn●to it , but it also Compares them , Discernes them , and Iudgeth of them ; the which the particular sences cannot do , for that they are limitted and tyed to their particular obiects , and neuer exceed the bounds thereof .

For the Eyes are onely imployed to iudge of the difference of Colours , as betwixt White and Blacke , and neuer seeke to ●eddle with that which concernes the Sound , Smelling , or the other Qualities which haue nothing common with Colours . The Common sence then is necessary to iudge thus generally of all the obiects of the other Sences , that by meanes thereof the Creature may distinguish that which is healthfull from that is hurtfull .