THE
ENGLISH
LAWYER
.
CAP.
I.
FOrasmuch
as
the
Exercise
of
all
such
as
enterprise
the
Profession
,
and
doe
intermeddle
with
the
Knowledge
of
the
Lawes
of
this
Realme
,
consisteth
,
1
,
either
in
the
obtaining
,
study
,
or
specusation
thereof
.
2
,
Or
in
the
practice
,
prosecution
,
or
direction
.
3
,
Or
in
the
full
and
finall
decision
and
determination
of
causes
therein
called
into
question
:
behoovefull
it
were
(
as
mee
seemeth
)
for
such
as
have
already
entertained
a
love
to
that
faculty
,
and
covet
to
contemplate
with
their
inward
eye
the
expresse
and
perfect
Image
of
an
English
Lawyer
,
to
view
each
of
these
in
their
particular
charge
and
duty
,
and
therewithall
to
consider
what
things
were
requisite
,
and
what
course
were
most
convenient
to
be
holden
for
the
better
and
more
full
accomplishment
of
that
which
is
,
and
must
be
expected
.
And
as
the
persons
whom
our
speech
concerneth
,
and
whose
charge
we
have
here
briefely
touched
,
are
three
in
number
,
The
Student
,
the
Practizer
,
and
the
Iudge
:
(
For
as
touching
the
Pronothory
or
Clark
,
and
the
Attorney
,
they
are
rather
Ministers
to
follow
others
,
then
Managers
to
direct
:
)
So
will
the
matters
incident
to
every
of
their
duties
yeeld
us
a
threefold
Treatise
,
and
give
us
large
scope
of
Discourse
in
the
prosecuting
of
such
things
as
are
requisite
and
incident
unto
the
same
.
And
first
as
touching
the
Student
,
&
his
speculative
search
of
our
English
Laws
(
which
is
his
indeavour
and
study
)
as
it
is
in
order
formost
,
and
by
Nature
the
ground
of
the
proceedings
of
both
the
other
,
being
that
indeed
without
the
which
the
rest
cannot
subfist
.
Reason
in
this
point
requireth
,
that
due
consideration
,
and
carefull
forethought
should
be
had
for
the
obtaining
and
triall
of
those
things
which
are
esteemed
as
Viatica
necessaria
,
needfull
implements
behoovefull
in
the
person
of
him
that
shall
undertake
to
deale
therewith
.
Authors
which
have
written
Institutions
for
the
better
information
and
direction
of
the
learner
,
have
required
at
the
hands
of
such
their
Auditors
and
followers
as
were
to
be
instructed
;
these
three
things
,
Nature
,
Arte
,
and
Exercise
or
Vse
,
each
of
which
they
would
so
have
,
&
indeed
so
ought
to
be
linked
to
other
,
that
seldome
hath
bin
found
perfection
in
any
one
person
in
whom
all
these
three
have
not
bin
conjoyn'd
:
For
Nature
(
though
of
her selfe
excellent
)
yet
without
Art
or
Exercise
is
as
the
Gold
in
the
drosse
,
or
as
the
precious
stone
taken
out
of
the
bowels
of
the
earth
,
rude
,
and
unpolished
:
Art
without
Nature
,
bare
,
barren
,
and
defective
(
as
being
indeed
nothing
else
but
an
observation
of
Nature
)
And
both
without
Exercise
,
voide
of
fruit
:
Nature
resembleth
the
soile
;
Arte
or
Method
whereby
wee
are
directed
,
the
Husbandman
;
Precepts
or
Institutions
in
the
Science
which
we
meane
to
professe
,
are
as
the
seeds
,
which
industry
and
exercise
doe
bring
unto
growth
,
ripenes
&
perfection
:
so
that
Sane
Beatus
,
dijsque
acceptus
est
,
cui
Deus
ista
omnia
tribuit
.
But
sithence
that
division
which
consisteth
of
two
parts
is
holden
most
Artficiall
,
all
these
three
(
as
me
seemeth
)
may
aptly
be
drawne
and
reduced
into
two
originall
Branches
.
The
one
concerning
the
Qualities
wherewith
it
is
convenient
our
Student
should
be
adorned
before
his
intended
enterprise
attempted
,
and
with
the
which
he
might
be
ready
furnished
to
set
upon
the
same
.
The
other
discovering
the
manner
,
method
,
and
direction
of
the
course
of
our
study
once
entred
,
the
meanes
of
furtherance
thereof
,
and
how
,
and
in
what
manner
to
hold
on
therein
without
intermission
untill
the
wished
fruit
,
and
expected
end
shall
bee
obtained
.
In
the
former
we
shall
include
Nature
and
such
other
habiliments
as
shall
bee
required
for
the
full
furnishing
and
adorning
thereof
.
In
the
latter
,
Arte
,
Exercise
,
and
other
incidents
and
adherents
unto
the
same
.
Concerning
therefore
the
consideration
of
those
former
qualities
that
are
to
be
before
had
,
and
obtained
,
Philosophers
led
by
the
rule
of
reason
have
distinguished
the
transitory
gifts
that
God
hath
bestowed
on
us
in
this
life
,
to
be
either
Bona
animi
,
bona
corporis
,
or
bona
fortunae
.
Qualities
either
resident
in
us
,
or
externall
benefits
bestowed
upon
us
.
Those
which
are
inherent
in
us
,
concerne
either
our
mindes
or
our
bodies
,
which
good
gifts
of
our
mindes
are
either
Naturall
given
by
God
unto
us
,
without
our
labour
bred
together
with
us
,
and
within
us
from
our
Cradles
,
growing
and
increasing
with
our
age
,
as
first
sharpnesse
,
pregnancy
,
and
dexterity
of
wit
:
Secondly
,
Sound
and
exquisite
memory
:
Thirdly
,
ready
,
copious
,
and
sweet
deliverie
of
our
words
.
Or
gotten
and
gained
by
long
industry
and
travell
,
grown
to
a
perfit
habit
,
either
first
illuminating
our
knowledges
,
as
the
Sciences
Liberall
,
and
other
the
speculative
vertues
of
the
minde
:
Or
else
secondly
directing
our
lives
and
conversations
as
the
vertues
Morall
reposed
in
our
wills
.
CAP.
II.
TO
discourse
therefore
of
these
particulars
(
I
mean
principally
the
gifts
of
the
minde
)
in
such
order
as
is
before
specified
.
The
first
and
chiefest
Naturall
gift
is
sharpnesse
,
and
dexterity
of
wit
,
the
excellency
whereof
surpassing
all
praise
,
needeth
no
commendation
,
being
the
thing
indeed
without
which
nothing
can
be
throughly
fifted
as
it
should
bee
,
or
sufficiently
set
forth
as
it
ought
:
but
to
speake
more
particularly
thereof
,
and
for
the
purpose
in
hand
,
none
can
well
denie
that
doe
consider
the
depth
of
knowledge
reposed
in
the
Lawes
of
this
Realme
:
none
I
say
can
deny
,
which
doe
consider
how
many
cases
of
much
conformity
,
and
resemblance
doe
daily
happen
,
wherein
neverthelesse
dexterity
of
wit
upon
some
circumstance
of
matter
,
espieth
a
difference
:
None
can
deny
,
which
doe
consider
that
many
in
the
Patronage
and
defence
of
causes
,
are
oftentimes
pressed
upon
the
sudden
,
presently
to
reply
to
the
adversaries
unexpected
objections
,
(
which
effect
Promptnesse
and
readinesse
of
wit
onely
worketh
:
)
but
that
the
excellency
and
dexterity
thereof
were
almost
alone
sufficient
to
make
a
ready
and
prest
Lawyer
;
for
it
behooveth
the
Lawyer
with
a
quicke
conceit
to
comprehend
the
cause
of
his
Client
once
opened
,
throughly
to
understand
the
drifts
of
his
Adversaries
reasons
at
the
first
urged
,
readily
both
to
invent
,
and
fitly
to
apply
his
provided
proofes
and
arguments
to
the
point
in
question
:
all
which
are
the
effects
of
an
excellent
wit
,
and
with
the
which
we
doe
so
much
desire
our
learned
Lawyer
should
be
adorned
.
The
consideration
therefore
of
wit
,
or
of
the
light
of
humane
understanding
which
Almighty
God
hath
given
unto
man
,
whereby
hee
excelleth
all
other
living
creatures
,
may
bee
considered
of
us
by
the
view
of
two
severall
faculties
,
or
sundry
operations
of
our
minde
;
the
one
for
distinction
sake
may
bee
called
Apprehension
,
and
the
other
Iudgement
(
not
that
the
minde
is
diverse
,
or
manifold
,
but
that
these
are
the
divers
affections
,
and
proper
passions
of
one
and
the
selfe
same
cause
.
)
The
first
is
the
quick
,
speedy
,
and
lively
vigour
,
the
ready
ability
of
our
understanding
,
and
as
it
were
the
hand
by
which
our
minde
taketh
hold
of
the
knowledge
of
things
proposed
,
being
indeed
the
very
same
the
Latines
call
Ingenij
acumen
.
The
other
(
before
called
Iudgement
)
is
the
faculty
whereby
we
doe
as
it
were
give
sentence
of
the
thing
conceived
,
and
censure
our
owne
understanding
concerning
the
same
.
And
as
unto
the
first
may
be
attributed
(
as
the
true
ensigne
and
peculiar
qualitie
thereof
)
Sharpnesse
;
So
from
the
other
,
which
is
Iudgement
,
in
like
manner
followeth
(
the
proper
qualitie
wherewith
it
is
invested
)
Soundnesse
;
of
which
it
is
evident
(
to
speake
briefly
)
that
the
one
is
the
sharpnes
of
conceit
,
the
other
is
the
soundnesse
of
conceit
;
resembling
and
alluding
to
that
Philosophicall
distinction
,
Intellectus
agens
,
and
intellectus
passibilis
,
scu
possibilis
.
And
as
these
operations
of
the
minde
are
in
duty
severall
;
so
are
they
for
the
most
part
sunderly
and
severally
distributed
by
God
unto
men
;
not
that
the
one
can
be
wholly
,
and
alone
without
the
other
,
but
that
the
excellency
of
the
one
is
seldome
setled
,
and
contained
in
one
person
with
the
excellency
of
the
other
,
whereof
daily
observation
may
yeeld
abundant
examples
.
The
Iudgement
of
Plato
touching
his
two
Disciples
,
Aristotle
and
Theophrastus
,
was
grounded
upon
the
diversitie
of
their
naturall
gifts
,
in
this
respect
the
one
surmounted
in
sharpnesse
of
understanding
,
namely
Aristotle
;
The
other
(
though
that
way
inferiour
)
yet
every
way
comparable
in
sharpnesse
of
Iudgement
.
There
lived
at
one
time
in
the
Common-weale
of
Athens
two
notable
Orators
,
Demosthenes
and
Demades
:
the
one
through
his
care
,
premeditation
,
and
soundnesse
of
Iudgement
,
by
speech
to
please
the
humour
of
the
people
,
was
a
man
renowned
.
The
other
,
namely
Demades
for
his
quicknesse
of
wit
,
and
ready
utterance
upon
the
sudden
,
most
excellent
.
There
were
likewise
wont
to
come
into
the
Counsell
Chamber
of
the
said
City
,
at
one
the
selfe-same
season
,
two
famous
Counfellors
,
Aristides
for
his
sound
counsell
greatly
esteemed
,
and
Themistocles
for
his
sharpe
and
witty
policies
highly
regarded
.
At
one
time
there
were
in
the
field
two
famous
Captaines
,
each
against
other
in
a
quarrell
,
which
concerned
either
the
flourishing
,
or
the
downfall
of
both
their
States
and
Common-weales
,
Hannibal
the
Carthaginian
,
and
Quint
us
Fabius
Maximus
the
Roman
,
in
which
their
conflicts
the
Carthaginian
was
not
more
commended
for
inventing
a
Stratagem
,
wherein
he
excelled
,
then
was
the
Roman
reverenced
for
staid
and
advised
Iudgement
in
preventing
the
same
,
wherein
he
surpassed
:
The
one
of
them
was
not
more
wilely
,
then
the
other
wary
;
But
thus
much
of
the
Heathen
.
In
the
Church
of
God
,
and
as
concerning
the
writings
of
ancient
Latine
Doctors
,
there
is
found
in
the
stile
of
Augustine
an
excellent
and
peculiar
sharpnesse
:
In
the
books
of
Ambrose
&
Ierome
a
plain
,
full
,
and
familiar
soundnesse
,
and
Bernard
addeth
to
both
a
delectable
sweetnesse
.
Among
the
Schoolemen
,
who
racked
reason
as
farre
as
it
would
reach
,
one
man
in
one
age
for
his
sharpnesse
of
wit
was
called
Subtilis
Doctor
;
and
another
neere
the
same
time
for
his
soundnesse
of
Iudgement
,
Doctor
Angelicus
.
But
to
come
to
the
Lawes
of
the
Land
,
and
to
exemplifie
our
discourse
in
our
owne
faculty
(
purposely
refraining
to
speake
or
publish
the
excellent
gifts
of
many
famous
men
now
living
in
this
profession
)
let
us
call
to
our
considerations
two
notable
Ornaments
of
one
Bench
or
Court
,
of
one
time
,
of
reverend
remembrance
,
and
now
both
deceased
,
Sr
Anthony
Browne
,
and
Sr
Iames
Dyer
Knights
:
both
having
beene
Chiefe
in
their
places
of
Iustice
.
In
the
one
did
shine
an
incomparable
sharpnesse
of
wit
,
and
in
the
other
was
found
in
a
manner
an
irrefragrable
soundnesse
of
Iudgement
.
But
to
leave
examples
,
and
to
descend
to
a
subdivision
,
we
are
to
note
,
that
sharpnesse
of
wit
is
againe
observed
by
two
properties
,
that
is
to
say
,
Quicknesse
of
capacity
,
and
readinesse
of
discourse
,
for
Ingenij
acumen
non
solùm
concipit
,
sed
discutit
.
And
yet
these
qualities
are
likewise
by
God
oftentimes
sunderly
disposed
;
for
some
men
there
are
which
can
of
themselves
soone
conceive
any
difficulty
by
others
proposed
in
speech
or
writing
;
but
they
are
not
also
indowed
with
the
narall
gift
of
promptnesse
of
discourse
and
argument
;
And
,
some
others
on
the
contrary
are
excellently
gifted
for
Oratory
or
discussion
,
but
defective
,
and
come
farre
short
of
others
in
the
former
property
,
I
meane
,
in
mentall
conception
.
And
yet
though
a
Student
of
the
Law
bee
by
nature
unfurnished
with
these
gifts
of
the
minde
aforesaid
,
he
must
not
be
disheartened
,
but
rather
incouraged
;
which
incouragement
may
take
good
ground
;
First
,
upon
consideration
with
himselfe
,
that
seldome
is
seene
such
excellency
of
quick
capacity
in
any
one
person
unmated
with
the
blemish
of
ranging
lightnesse
and
instabilitie
:
That
the
more
fertile
the
soyle
is
,
the
more
prone
it
is
to
beare
and
bring
forth
(
without
painefull
manurance
)
unprofitable
,
and
sometime
most
noysome
weeds
;
that
as
waxe
is
apt
to
receive
whatsoever
impression
,
so
is
it
apt
easily
againe
to
loose
it
,
and
to
be
new
framed
into
whatsoever
fashion
;
where
on
the
contrary
part
the
form
which
is
engraven
in
Marble
is
as
hardly
worne
out
as
it
was
with
much
labour
imprinted
:
for
quicke
wits
(
saith
one
)
are
apt
to
take
,
unapt
to
keepe
,
soone
hot
,
soone
cold
,
more
apt
to
enter
speedily
,
then
able
to
pierce
farre
,
like
edges
of
sharpe
tooles
,
soone
turned
;
For
we
may
finde
true
by
experience
,
that
among
a
number
of
quicke
wits
in
youth
,
few
be
found
in
the
end
either
very
fortunate
for
themselves
,
or
very
profitable
to
serve
the
Common-wealth
;
such
was
Hermogenes
the
Rhetoritian
,
who
(
as
it
is
written
)
being
in
manner
a
Child
but
eighteene
yeares
old
,
compiled
an
excellent
Treatise
of
Rhetorique
savouring
more
of
Iudgement
then
is
commonly
found
in
that
age
;
but
afterward
attaining
to
the
yeares
of
28.
hee
became
madd
and
utterly
forgot
all
things
.
Secondly
,
the
mindes
of
Students
are
incouraged
,
and
their
wits
consequetly
increased
,
as
well
by
due
commendation
given
them
for
their
good
endeavour
,
as
also
by
commemoration
of
the
utility
,
profit
,
and
excellency
of
the
things
they
covet
to
obtaine
.
Touching
the
first
of
these
well
saith
Aristotle
,
Adolescentiam
gloriae
studio
duci
.
Wherefore
to
be
short
,
and
to
speake
of
this
in
a
word
,
what
a
spurre
Praise
is
to
pricke
forth
the
minde
in
every
good
attempt
,
is
seene
and
perceived
even
in
bruit
beasts
.
The
Hound
hunteth
best
when
he
is
incouraged
with
the
cry
of
the
Huntsman
;
that
Hauke
is
made
more
eager
to
pursue
her
prey
,
to
whom
the
Faulkner
hath
used
to
impart
some
part
of
the
prey
taken
:
But
what
course
or
tenor
ought
to
bee
holden
herein
,
Plutarch
giveth
good
instruction
:
Cum
exultant
animi
,
reprehensionibus
ad
pudorem
redigantur
;
cum
dejecti
sunt
,
rursus
laudibus
erigantur
.
Touching
the
second
,
which
is
the
commemoration
of
the
thing
coveted
:
true
it
is
,
that
the
consideration
of
the
excellency
thereof
is
a
most
wonderfull
provocation
to
set
forwards
the
due
meanes
with
all
industry
which
serve
for
the
obtaining
of
the
same
,
which
for
as
much
as
in
the
tract
we
have
in
hand
,
is
the
exact
knowledge
of
the
Law
,
a
briefe
narration
of
the
necessity
and
utility
thereof
is
able
sufficiently
to
vanquish
all
tediousnesse
of
study
,
and
all
irksomenesse
to
be
endured
and
borne
in
the
obtaining
thereof
:
So
that
although
(
by
the
way
,
and
nothing
out
of
the
way
)
apt
occasion
be
here
offered
to
speake
in
the
commendation
of
the
Law
,
surpassing
all
praise
that
my
poore
ability
can
bestow
upon
it
,
yet
let
it
suffice
somewhat
to
have
said
herein
,
and
neverthelesse
no
more
than
another
hath
spoken
in
the
like
kinde
many
hundred
yeares
agoe
;
Iurisprudentia
sine
.
controversia
,
&
magna
est
,
&
latè
patet
,
&
ad
multos
pertinet
,
&
summo
in
honore
semper
fuit
,
&
clarissimi
Cives
ei
studio
,
&
semper
praefuerunt
,
&
etiam
hodiè
praesunt
.
CAP.
III.
THe
next
naturall
gift
to
be
considered
of
,
is
Soundnesse
of
Memory
,
which
is
the
receptacle
wherin
is
reposed
and
laid
up
whatsoever
things
the
Vnderstanding
hath
apprehended
and
judged
worthy
of
receipt
or
entertainment
:
for
what
doth
it
profit
with
great
labour
,
dexterity
,
and
industry
to
get
together
,
when
the
thing
gotten
is
not
carefully
kept
and
preserved
,
but
loosely
let
goe
,
or
negligently
lost
?
What
booteth
it
to
reade
much
,
which
is
wearinesse
to
the
flesh
;
to
meditate
often
,
which
is
a
burthen
to
the
minde
;
to
learne
daily
with
encrease
of
knowledge
,
when
as
the
matter
learned
is
to
seeke
,
at
that
time
especially
when
we
have
most
need
of
the
use
therof
?
Memory
therefore
is
the
Chest
of
an
inestimable
treasure
,
given
from
God
for
the
preservation
of
all
kinde
of
knowledge
:
it
is
as
Plutarch
saith
,
the
store-house
of
all
our
understanding
;
and
as
Plato
saith
,
Mater
Musarum
,
the
Mother
of
the
Muses
:
as
Aristotle
saith
,
it
is
the
guide
of
our
experience
,
and
the
ground-worke
of
all
our
wisedome
,
for
that
fore-passed
experiences
called
to
remembrance
doe
ingender
advised
circumspection
,
and
are
able
to
direct
all
our
future
atchievements
through
the
consideration
of
forepassed
events
.
Tully
saith
it
is
Signatarum
rerum
in
mente
vestigium
,
the
character
of
things
imprinted
in
our
minde
.
S.
Augustine
(
as
it
seemeth
)
ravished
with
the
contemplation
of
this
wonderfull
facultie
,
useth
these
words
thereof
,
Omnia
recipit
recolenda
cum
opus
est
,
&
retractanda
grandis
memoriae
recessus
,
ac
nescio
quid
secreti
,
atque
ineffabilis
sinus
ejus
,
cum
omnia
suis
quaeque
foribus
intrant
adeam
,
&
in
eam
reponuntur
:
Memory
is
a
store-house
infinitely
capable
,
and
can
never
be
overfilled
,
wherin
by
the
most
cunning
Work-master
of
Nature
are
hoorded
up
all
kindes
of
acts
and
accidents
that
either
the
outward
senses
have
perceived
,
or
the
inward
understanding
conceived
;
wherein
things
of
like
kinde
and
quality
,
as
in
a
large
treasury
,
are
orderly
composed
and
laid
up
together
by
themselves
in
certaine
,
sure
,
and
seposed
cells
,
from
thence
tob
e
drawne
and
deduced
wheresoever
fit
and
apt
occasion
is
offered
;
which
Art
of
Memory
doth
manifest
by
this
or
the
like
instances
ensuing
:
for
when
wee
doe
call
to
minde
any
one
particular
,
the
same
so
remembred
doth
for
the
most
part
bring
to
light
his
like
,
so
that
wee
doe
remember
the
one
by
the
commemoration
oftentimes
of
the
other
:
of
the
which
one
hath
written
very
well
in
this
manner
;
In
memoriaomnia
ita
collocata
&
ordinata
sunt
,
ut
unumquodque
separatim
,
&
cuncta
confertim
,
&
singula
ordinatim
exposcere
&
digerere
valeamus
.
The
truth
is
,
that
some
things
there
are
which
we
can
remember
casily
and
with
great
facility
,
some
other
things
with
more
difficulty
,
as
hoorded
up
in
the
bottome
of
that
Chest
,
and
doe
require
more
search
(
as
the
rumaging
of
wares
in
the
bulke
of
a
ship
)
to
be
unladen
and
brought
to
light
;
some
things
doe
offer
themselves
,
and
some
other
things
after
long
seeking
are
hardly
found
:
And
thus
much
may
here
suffice
to
have
been
written
concerning
the
effects
of
humane
Memory
.
But
for
the
better
and
deeper
discovery
of
the
nature
thereof
,
(
for
then
we
shall
the
better
addresse
our selves
to
the
use
of
Memory
,
when
we
doe
truly
comprehend
the
kindes
,
causes
,
and
nature
of
the
same
)
we
are
to
conceive
that
the
learned
who
have
written
hereof
have
observed
a
double
faculty
of
Memory
;
the
one
concerning
things
comprehended
by
the
outward
senses
,
and
therefore
called
by
them
Memory
Sensative
:
The
other
concerning
things
conceived
by
the
Vnderstanding
and
Power
of
wit
,
and
therefore
called
Intellective
Memory
.
The
first
,
namely
Sensative
Memory
is
common
to
Man
and
many
other
living
Creatures
,
resulting
from
the
sense
:
Hence
it
is
that
the
Horse
knoweth
and
remembreth
theway
wherein
hee
hath
beene
of
ten
travailed
,
vailed
,
many
times
better
then
his
Rider
;
The
Dog
after
many
yeares
absence
can
call
to
memory
his
Master
,
and
by
fawning
upon
him
renue
his
old
acquaintance
:
The
fowles
of
the
ayre
,
how
farre
so
ever
they
flie
can
readily
returne
to
their
Nests
,
by
Memory
of
the
place
where
their
young
are
reposed
:
The
Bee
can
resort
to
his
owne
Hive
,
and
in
the
Hive
to
his
proper
hole
;
and
the
little
Ant
retire
to
her
Denne
whence
she
first
issued
,
neither
forgoing
nor
forgetting
it
at
her
returne
,
with
innumerable
occurrences
of
like
nature
,
all
which
are
effected
by
the
Art
and
operation
of
Memory
Sensative
.
Memory
Intellective
followeth
the
use
of
reason
and
therefore
is
found
in
no
other
Creature
then
Man
,
which
is
indued
with
the
faculty
of
reason
.
And
whether
,
and
in
what
manner
this
kinde
of
Memory
doth
differ
from
the
Vnderstanding
it selfe
,
I
doe
remit
to
the
Philosophers
,
to
the
contemplation
of
whose
learned
discourses
I
doe
commit
the
curious
desire
of
the
Reader
that
seeketh
farther
satisfaction
herein
.
But
to
proceed
:
as
there
is
a
twofold
Memory
,
Sensative
and
Intellective
,
as
hath
beene
said
,
so
is
there
also
a
double
operation
of
the
Memory
Intellective
:
The
one
is
called
Actus
memorandi
,
the
other
Actus
reminiscendi
.
The
first
of
these
is
the
representation
of
things
past
,
as
if
they
were
still
present
,
representing
the
Image
of
things
forepassed
in
the
same
manner
as
if
they
were
now
actually
&
really
present
.
Actus
reminiscendi
is
as
it
were
akinde
of
discourse
of
Memory
;
for
as
before
was
said
of
understanding
,
that
there
is
one
operation
to
conceive
and
comprehend
,
and
another
operation
to
inferre
,
collect
and
discourse
thereupon
,
and
to
draw
conclusions
from
a
thing
conceived
to
another
thing
concealed
,
and
to
extract
out
of
things
knowne
the
knowledge
of
things
unknowne
,
so
is
it
likewise
in
these
operations
of
Memory
,
the
one
doth
remember
the
other
,
viz.
Actus
reminiscendi
,
out
of
one
thing
remembred
discovereth
another
thing
in
manner
lost
and
forgotten
:
so
that
the
one
draweth
the
other
as
the
severall
linkes
of
a
Chaine
draw
and
depend
one
upon
another
:
Examples
will
make
it
manifest
.
If
a
man
doe
relate
unto
me
a
matter
done
in
time
forepassed
in
his
and
my
presence
,
and
with
our
privities
,
if
I
doe
remember
the
same
,
and
thereby
doe
acknowledge
the
thing
to
be
true
,
for
that
the
same
is
now
represented
unto
me
by
the
Act
of
Memory
,
as
if
it
were
really
present
,
this
is
called
Actus
memorandi
:
But
if
I
have
forgotten
it
,
and
he
bring
me
in
minde
of
it
by
quickning
and
reviving
my
Memory
by
the
circumstances
of
time
,
place
,
company
,
or
such
like
other
occurrences
,
and
by
that
meanes
at
length
I
come
to
repaire
that
decay
of
Memory
,
this
is
called
Actus
reminiscendi
;
so
that
the
last
mentioned
operation
may
aptly
bee
called
the
Discourse
of
Memory
.
The
objects
of
Memory
are
things
passed
,
Objects
of
Memory
.
as
aristotle
recounteth
,
Memoria
est
rerum
praeteritarum
.
And
as
hope
is
of
things
to
come
,
sense
and
understanding
of
things
that
are
present
;
so
Memorie
is
employed
and
worketh
upon
things
past
:
And
thus
much
shortly
by
the
way
of
a
Philosophicall
discourse
(
rudi
Minerva
)
touching
Memorie
.
Nour
that
out
of
these
things
thus
knowne
we
may
make
some
use
for
the
better
establishing
and
encrease
of
the
students
Memory
,
and
to
teach
as
it
were
a
true
Art
Memorative
,
not
out
of
forraigne
precepts
,
or
by
the
helpe
of
Imaginary
places
,
but
out
of
the
nature
of
Memory
it selfe
,
which
may
be
tanquam
vivida
praecepta
;
I
shall
exhibite
to
your
consideration
some
few
remarkeable
circumstances
,
and
so
much
the
rather
,
by
how
much
the
more
this
facultie
(
although
excellent
in
it selfe
)
yet
is
the
sooner
lost
,
and
with
the
losse
thereof
,
it
maketh
all
our
studies
but
lost
labours
.
For
true
it
it
is
,
and
too
true
which
Seneca
affirmeth
,
speaking
of
Memory
,
Res
est
ex
omnibus
partibus
animi
maximè
delicata
,
&
fragilis
,
in
quam
primum
senectus
incurrit
:
The
most
delicate
and
fraile
part
of
our
Minde
,
the
which
old
Age
doth
first
assault
.
And
as
Pliny
saith
,
Nec
quicquam
aquè
fragile
in
hominum
vita
,
morborum
&
casus
injurias
,
atque
etiam
metus
sentiens
;
Nothing
so
fading
in
all
Mans
life
,
subject
to
decay
by
the
injuries
of
sicknesse
,
chances
and
feares
:
therefore
for
the
better
accomplishment
of
our
intended
purposes
;
let
us
first
consider
the
instrument
or
organ
,
which
the
qualities
or
faculties
of
the
mind
or
soule
do
worke
withall
in
this
life
,
which
is
the
body
;
for
the
body
is
vehiculum
animae
,
the
chariot
,
wagon
,
or
ship
of
the
soule
,
if
not
the
sepulchre
thereof
,
as
Plato
affirmed
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
and
the
aptnesse
of
the
instrument
is
a
great
furtherance
to
the
sacility
of
the
workmanship
,
and
to
the
beauty
of
the
worke
.
Mans
body
being
composed
of
elementall
qualities
requireth
in
the
perfection
thereof
a
temperature
of
humors
,
which
also
consisteth
in
the
temperate
disposition
of
heate
and
moisture
,
for
that
in
humido
,
&
calido
consistit
vita
,
and
hereby
it
is
made
a
more
apt
instrument
and
organ
for
the
operation
of
the
powers
of
the
soule
,
and
so
consequently
of
Memorie
,
naturall
moisture
must
not
abound
as
in
children
,
whose
memory
is
therefore
in
tender
yeeres
most
commonly
not
of
the
best
.
And
againe
,
naturall
moisture
must
not
on
the
other
side
be
almost
in
a
manner
exhausted
,
as
in
old
men
,
whose
Memorie
is
therefore
worne
,
but
it
must
hold
the
golden
meane
,
for
fluide
things
are
apt
to
receive
but
cannot
long
retaine
any
impression
,
by
reason
of
overmuch
moisture
,
which
makes
the
impression
loose
,
and
at
length
utterly
lost
;
And
aride
and
drythings
can
receive
no
impression
for
want
of
moisture
,
the
one
receiveth
but
retaineth
not
,
the
other
receiveth
not
at
all
;
wherefore
as
this
golden
meane
must
be
preserved
in
the
temperature
of
moisture
,
so
must
it
bee
held
indifferent
betweene
cold
and
heat
,
nothing
so
hurtfull
to
Memory
as
overmuch
cold
,
nothing
more
harmful
to
Memory
then
overmuch
heate
,
the
which
how
to
mitigate
in
the
disposition
of
the
body
I
leave
to
Physitians
by
medicine
and
diet
;
and
therefore
I
resort
to
precepts
agreeable
and
correspondent
to
the
nature
of
Memory
without
medicine
.
First
therefore
,
whosoever
desireth
to
remember
that
science
,
facultie
or
proposition
which
he
learneth
or
readeth
,
let
him
bee
well
assured
that
he
first
throughly
understand
and
apprehend
the
same
with
some
kinde
of
delight
,
for
no
man
did
ever
remember
that
perfectly
,
which
hee
understood
not
throughly
;
in
as
much
as
the
well
understanding
is
the
Character
,
and
seale
of
the
thing
understood
,
which
the
Memory
receiveth
imprinted
in
her
.
Things
are
then
said
to
bee
throughly
understood
,
when
the
effects
are
known
by
their
cause
,
tùm
enim
scimus
,
cùm
per
causas
cognoscimus
,
as
saith
aristotle
;
or
when
the
cause
is
known
by
the
effects
,
when
the
reasons
thereof
are
throughly
apprehended
,
and
the
consequents
truly
discerned
,
namely
,
when
the
judiciall
part
of
our
understanding
resteth
satisfied
,
and
giveth
a
sentence
within
our selfe
,
that
it
doth
fully
comprehend
.
This
perfect
understanding
must
bee
joyned
(
as
I
said
)
with
delight
,
which
dilateth
the
vitall
spirits
,
and
quickneth
Memory
;
whereas
things
conceived
in
contrary
passions
can
hardly
be
retained
long
through
the
perturbations
occasioned
therby
.
Vnderstanding
with
delight
is
drawne
from
the
excellency
of
the
knowledge
apprchended
,
from
the
rarenesse
,
strangenesse
,
or
else
of
the
good
conformitie
and
coherence
thereof
,
with
other
things
,
or
out
of
a
naturall
inclination
wee
have
thereunto
;
For
it
is
true
,
Quae
magna
aestimamus
magis
memoriae
infigimus
,
therefore
first
covet
to
understand
well
and
with
delight
,
and
you
shall
remember
the
better
.
The
next
precept
is
,
often
to
meditate
upon
the
thing
so
understood
with
a
diligent
disquisition
and
search
through
all
the
parts
thereof
,
for
whatsoever
is
by
perfect
understanding
imprinted
in
the
Memory
,
the
same
is
more
deeply
ingraven
by
meditation
therein
;
and
as
spice
swallowed
doth
neither
give
taste
to
the
tongue
,
nor
heat
to
the
stomacke
,
but
when
it
is
first
broken
and
chewed
in
the
mouth
;
so
,
much
reading
doth
not
increase
learning
except
it
be
whetted
and
sharpned
with
meditation
,
which
is
the
chewing
of
the
cud
after
the
mindes
repast
.
And
hereof
it
is
that
Aristotle
affirmeth
that
meditatio
confirmat
memoriam
,
and
hence
springeth
the
Proverbe
,
that
it
hath
beene
seldome
seene
that
ever
an
old
man
forgot
that
place
where
hee
had
hidden
his
gold
,
for
where
our
treasure
is
,
there
is
our
heart
and
meditation
also
.
The
third
consideration
is
to
use
and
keepe
a
method
,
and
to
analyze
the
matter
with
all
his
parts
and
incidents
which
wee
doe
desire
to
remember
,
a
course
which
notably
establisheth
,
confirmeth
,
and
strengthneth
Memory
.
For
in
as
much
as
Method
consisteth
much
of
division
,
that
saying
is
very
true
which
the
glossE
hath
observed
,
and
Bracton
out
of
the
same
transumed
,
Divisio
sive
partitio
triplicem
operatur
effectum
;
primò
enim
animum
legentis
incitat
,
secundò
mentem
intelligentiae
praeparat
,
&
tertiò
memoriam
artificiosè
reformat
.
The
fourth
consideration
or
precept
is
,
to
eschew
and
avoyd
the
troubling
and
incumbring
the
Minde
at
one
time
with
sundry
different
and
uncohaerent
matters
,
except
it
be
done
with
much
moderation
,
and
at
set
times
and
houres
,
for
recreation
onely
,
and
for
the
reviving
of
our
understanding
with
variety
,
when
it
beginneth
otherwise
to
be
weakned
,
dulled
or
cloyed
:
so
shall
our
Memory
not
bee
pestered
with
manifold
impressions
;
for
when
it
seeketh
to
apprehend
the
one
,
it
often
and
most
commonly
doth
lose
the
other
,
according
to
the
usuall
and
true
saying
,
Plurimis
intentus
minus
est
ad
singula
sensus
.
The
fift
precept
is
daily
to
exercise
memory
,
that
is
,
daily
to
commit
things
to
the
faithfull
custody
of
our
Memory
,
and
after
a
time
passed
,
most
curiously
and
carefully
to
recall
the
same
to
an
account
thereof
,
and
to
render
backe
againe
the
things
so
received
.
And
this
kind
of
exercise
maketh
Memory
very
ready
,
and
doth
much
increase
the
same
;
For
Quintilian
hath
very
well
noted
of
Memory
,
that
Nihil
aequè
augetur
cura
,
vel
negligentia
intercidit
;
Nothing
is
so
much
encreased
by
diligence
and
care
had
thereof
as
Memory
,
and
then
the
same
nothing
sooner
lost
by
negligence
thereof
.
As
touching
a
true
use
hereof
,
we
are
to
consider
a
distinction
of
things
to
bee
remembred
;
for
either
we
doe
desire
to
remember
the
matter
or
substance
onely
which
in
all
kinde
of
learning
is
to
be
observed
,
or
else
we
also
desire
to
commit
to
Memory
the
frame
and
compact
of
the
words
also
,
as
when
we
doe
covet
a
penned
Oration
,
set
Sermon
or
Speech
.
As
touching
the
first
,
as
the
morning
is
a
fit
time
to
study
,
so
is
it
also
to
commit
matters
of
substance
to
Memory
;
for
as
the
Memory
is
said
to
be
Musarum
Mater
,
so
is
Aurora
Musarum
amica
,
for
then
are
our
bodies
discharged
of
all
superfluous
burthens
that
may
hinder
our
studies
and
meditations
,
and
our
spirits
are
more
quicke
after
their
received
rest
.
As
concerning
the
second
,
many
doe
not
unfruitfully
commit
their
penned
orations
,
set
speeches
,
laboured
Sermons
,
and
such
like
which
they
covet
verbally
to
pronounce
,
to
Memory
in
the
evening
,
being
silent
and
quiet
,
and
to
give
it
harbour
and
lodging
with
them
overnight
,
that
they
may
more
readily
recount
the
same
in
the
morning
.
And
thus
much
touching
these
few
,
short
,
easie
and
familiar
precepts
.
and
observations
touching
that
operation
which
we
have
called
Actus
Memorandi
.
Now
as
touching
the
other
called
Actus
reminiscendi
,
the
same
is
incited
by
divers
circumstances
,
as
of
the
place
,
whereof
Aristotle
saith
,
à
locis
videntur
reminisci
aliquando
;
So
likewise
of
the
persons
,
times
,
the
meanner
of
doing
,
or
as
some
other
memorable
accidents
subject
to
the
sense
,
not
ordinary
or
accustomed
,
doe
occasion
:
for
things
strange
and
unfrequented
are
best
held
in
Memory
,
because
they
were
first
received
of
the
Memory
with
admiration
,
as
a
new
welcome
guest
into
an
Inne
or
lodging
,
about
the
entertainment
and
good
usage
of
whom
there
is
ordinarily
most
care
and
industry
bestowed
and
conferred
;
And
therefore
no
doubt
,
and
upon
this
reason
,
those
things
which
children
doe
first
apprehend
with
an
admiration
and
delight
,
they
do
retaine
best
and
hold
when
they
come
to
age
.
To
these
considerations
there
are
those
which
do
adde
the
precepts
of
Art
Memorative
,
so
often
treated
of
by
such
as
have
written
of
Oratory
,
by
appointing
certaine
places
,
conceived
and
imagined
unto
themselves
,
which
being
carefully
disposed
in
convenient
order
,
they
doe
fixe
thereupon
those
things
which
they
would
remember
in
apprehension
,
and
by
consideration
thereof
do
call
to
minde
such
forepassed
matters
in
due
and
direct
order
,
and
so
with
much
facility
doe
and
can
recount
the
same
,
upon
which
places
so
in
their
imagination
fixed
and
apt
for
the
matter
in
hand
,
it
behooveth
that
they
cast
their
carefull
consideration
and
frequent
meditation
.
CAP.
IIII.
THe
third
gift
given
from
God
by
the
course
of
nature
unto
Mankinde
,
wherewith
the
Student
of
the
Lawes
ought
to
be
adorned
,
is
a
prompt
and
ready
delivery
by
way
of
speech
,
of
those
things
which
are
conceived
in
the
minde
,
which
is
as
it
were
the
hand
that
doth
communicate
the
former
gifts
spoken
of
,
and
participate
unto
others
;
and
is
that
which
the
excellent
Romane
Oratour
affirmeth
to
bee
bene
constitutae
Civitatis
quasi
Alumna
quaedam
,
I
meane
not
an
elaborate
curiosity
of
words
,
or
an
affectation
of
phrase
,
which
is
practised
by
none
,
and
wherewith
none
are
mooved
,
but
such
as
are
of
vulgar
judgement
.
But
that
I
meane
which
the
same
Author
commendeth
,
Ea
dicendi
facultas
quae
est
plena
dignitatis
,
grandis
verbis
,
sapiens
sententijs
,
accommodata
causae
,
genere
toto
gravis
:
for
of
him
that
is
adorned
therewith
saith
he
,
hujus
enim
est
in
dando
consilio
de
maximis
rebus
cum
dignitate
explicata
sententia
,
ejusdem
etiam
languentis
populi
incitatio
&
effrenati
moderatio
:
That
kinde
of
eloquence
which
is
full
of
dignity
,
ever
worth
hearing
,
in
speech
pure
without
affectation
,
sententious
and
discreet
,
apt
,
answerable
and
agreeable
to
the
matter
in
hand
,
and
throughout
beautified
with
gravity
:
Of
this
required
quality
let
us
also
consider
some
advertisements
(
as
we
have
done
of
the
former
)
.
Eloquution
doth
consist
of
three
things
,
first
,
Eloquntion
.
of
the
voyce
as
the
instrument
,
2
,
the
words
that
are
the
subject
;
3
,
the
manner
of
doing
,
which
is
the
forme
of
delivery
.
In
the
voyce
are
required
two
principall
qualities
,
soundnesse
and
sweetness
:
this
thing
the
same
Oratour
expresseth
thus
,
Cum
orationis
judicem
vocem
habeamus
,
in
voce
autem
duo
sequamur
,
ut
clara
sit
,
ut
suavis
sit
,
utrumque
omnino
à
natura
petendum
est
,
verum
alterum
exercitatio
augebit
,
alterum
imitatio
praeesse
loquentium
&
leviter
:
litterae
neque
oppressae
sint
ne
aut
obscurum
,
neque
nimium
expressae
ut
putidum
:
In
the
words
two
things
are
required
,
purity
and
propertie
;
First
purity
,
that
is
,
that
neither
the
words
bee
old
or
outworne
,
neither
newfangled
or
affected
,
in
the
which
non
solumrusticam
asperitatèm
,
sed
etiam
peregrinam
insolentiam
fugere
discamus
,
that
we
may
learne
to
eschew
not
onely
forlorne
rusticity
,
but
all
new
affected
outlandish
vanity
.
Secondly
,
property
,
that
is
,
they
are
to
bee
made
apt
for
the
matter
in
hand
,
having
few
translations
,
Metaphors
or
borrowed
speeches
,
but
where
they
are
needfull
and
doe
illustrate
.
In
the
third
,
the
manner
of
composition
of
the
speech
and
delivery
,
there
are
also
two
things
considerable
;
first
,
perpetuity
,
secondly
,
exornation
.
Our
speech
is
made
perspicuous
if
our
words
and
sentences
be
not
doubtfull
in
the
composition
,
if
they
be
free
from
Amphibology
and
ambiguous
reference
,
if
they
be
cleere
of
idle
Tautology
and
vaine
repetition
,
if
our
periods
and
clauses
be
not
over
long
,
nor
interlaced
with
too
many
Parentheses
;
Lastly
,
if
the
copiousnesse
and
superabundance
of
words
unnecessary
hinder
not
the
apprehension
of
the
hearer
,
a
sault
whereinto
many
fall
,
that
neverthelesse
doe
thinke
they
doe
exceeding
well
.
Secondly
,
exornation
is
to
bee
performed
by
amplifications
,
extenuations
,
and
such
other
Rhetoricall
precepts
as
that
Art
teacheth
,
unto
the
which
for
this
point
I
doe
referre
you
;
onely
here
giving
you
this
caution
,
that
the
exornation
exceed
not
the
quality
of
the
cause
,
ne
materiam
superet
opus
,
for
as
it
is
vaine
to
overguilde
excellent
Marble
with
gold
,
so
gold
beseemeth
not
everie
materiall
;
And
many
things
shall
and
must
passe
the
Lawyers
pen
and
speech
,
which
are
facundiae
〈◊〉
capacia
cum
sint
tantum
comenta
doceri
.
And
having
thus
much
said
of
these
three
gifts
which
proceed
from
God
by
the
gift
of
nature
,
I
will
conclude
with
that
saying
of
Tully
which
doth
comprehend
all
three
,
Aniini
&
ingenij
celeres
●idem
motus
esse
debent
,
qui
ad
excogitandum
acuti
,
ad
explicandum
ornandumque
sint
uberes
,
&
ad
memori●●●●r●
&
diuturni
.
CAP.
V.
THus
with
as
convenient
brevitie
and
perspicuity
as
I
could
have
I
declared
those
natural
abilities
that
I
wish
him
that
shall
undertake
the
study
of
the
Law
to
bee
furnished
withall
.
There
doth
now
farther
remaine
a
consideration
of
those
qualities
that
are
acquired
by
industry
,
and
not
ingrafted
by
nature
,
wherewith
it
will
(
doublesse
)
be
behoovfull
also
,
that
our
student
should
be
adorned
,
Those
acquired
qualities
whereof
I
speake
,
are
of
two
sorts
,
some
of
them
perfecting
our
understanding
,
and
inriching
our
knowledge
,
and
others
rectifying
our
wills
,
and
directing
our
behaviours
and
manners
.
Of
the
first
kinde
are
the
Vertues
Intellectuall
.
Of
the
second
sort
are
the
Vertues
Morall
.
First
of
all
therefore
let
us
speake
in
order
of
those
Intellectuall
Vertues
;
And
let
us
a
little
fall
into
dispute
,
whether
any
other
knowledge
bee
needfull
for
a
Lawyer
,
save
onely
that
of
his
selfe
profession
,
I
meane
the
knowledge
of
the
Law
;
And
if
there
be
any
of
those
intellectuall
endowments
necessary
,
Then
,
which
and
how
many
of
them
are
needfull
,
and
in
what
sense
,
measure
and
understanding
they
bee
conceived
and
adjudged
so
to
be
behoovefull
.
Some
men
there
are
which
thinke
that
a
Lawyer
should
not
need
much
to
bee
troubled
with
any
other
learning
then
that
which
is
their
owne
,
Ob.
prima
.
whose
reasons
and
motives
thereunto
,
let
us
propose
and
thorowly
weigh
and
examine
the
same
,
so
that
as
well
such
as
are
of
the
one
part
,
as
of
the
contrary
,
may
be
thereby
the
better
called
into
consideration
.
Their
first
reason
is
drawne
from
experience
;
Ra.
prima
ab
experientia
.
for
it
hath
often
hapned
and
appeared
in
every
age
(
say
they
)
that
there
have
beene
many
excellent
Lawyers
within
this
land
,
of
deepe
judgement
,
great
understanding
,
profound
knowledge
in
their
profession
,
of
ready
and
apt
eloquution
,
and
yet
no
schollers
at
all
;
utterly
ignorant
of
any
other
additionall
erudition
,
then
their
homebred
naturall
gifts
.
These
men
have
beene
famous
in
their
times
,
have
undergone
great
affaires
,
as
well
in
the
Courts
of
our
Soveraignes
,
as
in
the
Tribunalls
,
wherein
they
have
been
worthily
placed
,
and
also
generally
in
the
greatest
businesse
of
the
Kingdome
and
Common
wealth
;
so
that
the
number
of
these
men
from
time
to
time
have
not
beene
few
.
Therefore
if
the
knowledge
of
the
Law
may
be
gotten
without
other
learning
,
what
need
then
to
bestow
time
in
the
obtaining
of
those
Arts
,
when
as
the
Grammer
Schoole
yeeldeth
as
apt
Plants
for
this
profession
,
as
the
Vniversity
.
Secondly
,
Ra.
seenuda
à
subjecto
juris
.
they
say
that
the
knowledge
of
the
Law
is
affirmed
to
be
Rerum
divinarum
humanarumque
Scientia
,
it
dorh
containe
the
knowledge
of
all
divine
&
humane
things
;
&
therfore
he
that
hath
obtained
that
knowledge
,
hath
therein
comprised
,
included
,
and
contained
all
other
knowledges
,
and
need
not
to
busie
himselfe
farther
with
the
search
of
any
other
,
as
having
obtained
the
knowledge
of
the
Law
,
which
is
truly
stiled
The
Science
of
Sciences
;
for
the
knowledge
of
the
Law
is
as
large
,
and
as
ample
as
the
materiall
subject
,
and
the
matters
and
causes
whereof
it
treateth
,
whereof
contention
or
strife
may
grow
,
orupon
which
they
may
bee
grounded
:
for
the
end
and
finall
scope
of
the
Law
is
,
ut
sopiantur
jurgia
;
so
ample
is
this
subject
,
as
all
those
things
whereof
men
may
have
property
or
possession
,
or
whereupon
or
concerning
which
injuries
and
wrongs
may
be
offered
or
inferred
.
Thirdly
,
they
say
that
we
should
consider
,
Ra.
tertia
ducitur
à
diuturnitate
juris
.
that
Ars
est
longa
,
vit
a
brevis
,
the
study
of
the
Law
is
,
multorum
annorum
opus
,
it
is
the
worke
of
many
yeares
,
the
attaining
whereof
will
waste
the
greatest
part
of
the
verdour
and
vigour
of
our
youth
,
and
therefore
the
sooner
we
doe
apply
our selves
unto
the
study
of
the
Law
,
it
will
be
the
better
for
our
ease
;
for
in
a
long
journey
,
hee
that
hath
found
out
the
shortest
way
,
with
much
ease
and
in
lesse
time
commeth
to
his
journeyes
end
.
And
to
conclude
with
the
Orators
words
;
Is
autem
concludatur
in
ijs
quae
sunt
in
usu
Civitatum
vulgari
ac
forensi
,
remotisque
caeteris
studijs
quamvis
ea
sint
ampla
atque
praclara
.
In
hoc
une
opere
(
ut
ita
dicam
)
noctes
atque
dies
urgeatur
,
(
What
hee
saith
of
his
Oratour
,
these
men
apply
to
the
student
of
our
Law
)
Let
therefore
our
student
of
the
Law
be
concluded
and
compassed
within
the
bounds
of
his
owne
profession
,
and
exercised
in
things
of
vulgar
and
ordinary
use
in
civill
causes
,
and
all
other
forraigne
studies
being
relinquished
,
let
him
bee
night
and
day
employed
in
this
sole
worke
.
These
and
the
like
are
the
allegations
and
arguments
of
those
men
that
remove
the
knowledge
of
all
forraigne
Arts
and
Sciences
liberall
from
the
student
of
the
Law
.
But
,
what
of
the
other
part
may
be
said
,
what
reason
may
be
produced
and
verified
,
and
how
these
objections
may
be
answered
,
let
us
observe
;
leaving
all
other
particular
enforcement
to
their
proper
and
peculiar
places
.
First
therefore
,
Resp.
ad
primano
object
.
that
is
very
true
which
hath
beene
affirmed
,
Many
excellent
men
there
have
beene
,
that
by
their
gifts
alone
which
nature
hath
bestowed
upon
them
without
other
addition
of
Art
or
learning
,
have
attained
to
a
profound
and
deepe
knowledge
of
the
Lawes
of
this
land
.
But
to
conclude
thereof
,
that
all
other
men
may
bee
so
exquisite
by
their
example
without
farther
helpe
and
furniture
then
their
owne
,
were
much
like
to
him
that
would
affirme
,
because
some
men
by
their
strength
have
travailed
a
long
journey
on
foot
,
therefore
no
other
man
for
that
purpose
should
need
the
helpe
of
an
horse
;
But
if
those
men
of
such
naturall
vigour
in
their
foot-journey
had
led
(
as
the
Proverbiall
speech
is
)
their
horse
in
their
hand
,
that
is
,
had
beene
assisted
with
the
helps
of
other
learning
,
they
had
beene
much
more
excelsent
,
and
attained
that
knowledge
with
more
facility
and
certainty
,
for
their
gold
oare
comming
out
of
their
naturall
Mine
,
and
of
their
home-brood
,
was
not
sufficiently
cleered
of
his
drosse
;
Their
speeches
have
wanted
perspicuity
and
brevity
,
their
arguments
although
deeply
learned
and
full
of
excellent
matter
,
yet
have
oftentimes
beene
tedious
,
confused
and
perplexed
,
and
their
opinions
wavering
and
unsetled
,
and
could
not
neatly
,
and
expeditely
deliver
themselves
;
because
some
men
are
by
nature
skilfull
Prainters
,
Carvers
,
or
excellent
in
any
manuall
occupation
(
as
some
there
are
)
therefore
none
should
Apprentices
to
those
trades
were
a
wonderfull
absurd
allegation
:
Men
are
musicall
by
nature
,
many
have
good
voyces
which
Art
cannot
yeeld
,
therefore
artificall
Musicke
(
which
is
the
perfection
of
the
naturall
)
should
be
banished
,
were
a
strange
illation
?
Although
a
man
may
goe
alone
,
yet
he
were
unwise
to
refuse
the
helpe
of
a
staffe
where
occasion
required
the
use
,
and
opportunity
offered
it selfe
.
It
hath
beene
said
by
us
in
the
former
part
where
occasion
was
offered
,
that
Art
truly
used
is
the
perfection
of
nature
;
Art
hath
also
naturall
grounds
,
and
was
invented
for
Natures
furtherance
;
For
mans
wisedome
devised
meanes
out
of
frequent
use
and
long
experience
,
to
ripen
natures
operations
,
by
precepts
;
and
precepts
layd
together
have
ingendered
Arts.
Men
naturally
can
number
,
yet
they
have
devised
many
wayes
,
by
cypher
,
by
Counters
,
and
by
other
formes
to
assist
nature
,
and
to
deale
with
sundry
formes
by
the
exercise
of
Arithmeticke
,
the
Art
of
numbring
,
and
to
bring
to
passe
strange
effects
far
beyond
the
ability
,
nay
to
the
marvell
and
astonishment
of
men
onely
holpen
by
the
power
of
nature
.
Surely
sometimes
such
circumstances
have
happened
(
if
not
often
)
to
those
men
of
such
excellent
gifts
naturall
without
other
learning
,
wherein
they
have
for
want
of
good
literature
so
much
beene
mis-led
,
that
they
have
at
unawares
bewrayed
themselves
,
ignorant
even
in
triviall
things
,
and
exposed
themselves
to
no
small
scorne
and
obloquy
.
This
hath
beene
anciently
observed
,
and
is
obvious
every
day
:
but
because
I
will
lance
no
new
sore
,
I
will
set
downe
what
the
Roman
Oratour
observed
,
speaking
of
such
naturall
excellent
men
of
his
time
,
let
mee
therefore
use
his
words
;
Quid
ergo
hoc
fieri
turpius
aut
dici
potest
,
quam
qui
hanc
personam
susceperit
ut
amicorum
controversias
causasque
tueatur
,
laborantibus
succurrat
,
aegris
mediatur
,
afflictos
excitet
,
it
a
labi
,
ut
alijs
miserandus
,
alijs
irridendus
esse
videatur
.
What
can
bee
more
unseemly
either
to
be
done
,
or
to
be
spoken
,
them
that
he
which
sustaineth
&
hath
taken
upon
him
that
person
,
as
to
defend
the
causes
and
controversies
of
his
friends
,
to
succour
the
oppressed
,
to
relieve
the
grieved
,
to
raise
the
afflicted
(
which
are
the
properties
as
well
belonging
to
the
Lawyer
,
as
to
the
Oratour
)
so
much
in
small
and
triviall
things
to
erre
and
be
deceived
,
that
some
should
hold
him
worthy
to
bee
pittied
,
and
others
make
him
the
subject
of
dirision
;
And
hence
is
it
that
in
our
owne
times
so
farre
this
matter
hath
beene
urged
,
that
in
scorne
some
have
called
the
crew
of
unlearned
Lawyers
,
Doctum
quoddam
genus
indoctorum
hominum
:
But
to
returne
that
reproach
from
whence
it
sprang
,
to
the
honour
of
the
study
of
our
Lawes
be
it
spoken
,
that
the
Profession
of
our
Lawes
hath
now
,
and
formerly
hath
had
great
numbers
of
students
that
have
had
as
long
,
and
as
ample
institution
in
those
sciences
called
liberall
,
as
any
of
them
.
And
if
I
might
remember
old
Originalls
from
the
time
of
the
Norman
Conquest
,
untill
the
latter
dayes
of
King
Henry
the
third
,
as
well
the
Iudges
itinerate
through
the
Counties
,
as
those
that
were
sedentarie
in
the
Kings
high
Courts
of
Iustice
(
which
then
for
the
most
part
followed
his
person
)
were
men
excellently
skilled
in
all
generall
good
learning
,
as
doe
witnesse
the
works
of
that
worthy
Iudge
Henry
de
Bracton
,
Henry
de
Bracton
,
Io:
Britton
Bish.
of
Hereford
,
Martin
de
Patchull
Deane
of
Pauls
.
and
Iohn
Britton
sometimes
a
learned
Bishop
of
Hereford
,
skilfull
in
the
Lawes
of
this
Realme
,
who
writ
a
treatise
by
commandement
,
and
writ
of
King
Edward
the
first
,
as
an
Institution
to
the
study
of
the
lawes
of
this
Realme
,
serving
that
time
.
So
also
was
Martyn
de
Patchull
sometimes
Deane
of
Pauls
in
London
,
of
whom
the
said
Bracton
maketh
honourable
mention
,
together
with
divers
other
noted
men
of
rare
learning
,
not
onely
in
the
Lawes
of
this
Realme
,
but
in
all
forraine
knowledge
fit
for
their
places
.
And
these
men
exercised
judiciall
functions
in
the
Temporall
Courts
of
this
Realme
,
whereof
our
records
being
&
vetustatis
&
veritatis
vestigia
,
the
lively
representations
of
time
and
truth
,
and
reputed
the
Treasures
of
the
Kingdome
,
doe
yeeld
plentifull
restimony
.
What
should
I
farther
commemorate
the
names
,
and
revive
the
memories
of
our
worthy
Ancestors
,
Herle
,
Bereford
,
Thorpe
,
Finden
,
Belknapp
tempore
R.
Ed.
3.
Herle
,
Bereford
,
Thorpe
,
Finden
,
Belknap
,
flourishing
in
the
victorious
times
of
King
Edward
the
third
?
Whose
deepe
,
short
,
subtile
,
pithy
and
learned
Law-arguments
;
argue
moreover
thus
much
,
that
they
were
sufficiently
furnished
in
that
Schoole-learning
,
which
in
those
times
was
in
most
esteeme
.
Let
me
not
here
forget
or
passe-over
in
silence
those
excellent
Iudges
in
the
raigne
of
King
Henry
the
sixt
,
Newton
,
Prisott
,
Fortescue
,
Newton
,
Prisot
,
Fortescue
,
tempore
H.
6.
which
man
last
named
,
was
first
Chauncellor
to
the
Prince
,
and
after
chiefe
Iustice
of
the
Kings
Bench
,
and
was
excellently
learned
in
Divinity
,
Philosophy
,
Law
both
Ecclesiasticall
,
and
the
Lawes
of
this
Realme
,
as
the
little
Treatise
written
by
him
in
the
praise
of
our
Lawes
,
in
the
Latine
tongue
,
and
some
other
Manuscripts
I
have
seene
of
his
worke
of
a
higher
subject
,
doe
evidently
declare
.
But
I
will
represse
my selfe
,
resting
in
this
place
upon
that
which
now
is
already
spoken
,
leaving
other
particularities
untill
we
come
to
determine
of
other
peculiar
Sciences
.
To
the
second
objection
it
may
well
bee
affirmed
,
Resp.
ad
sec.
ob
.
that
the
knowledge
of
the
Law
is
truly
stiled
,
Rerum
divinarum
humanarumque
Scientia
;
and
worthily
imputed
to
be
the
Science
of
Sciences
;
and
that
therein
lies
hid
the
knowledge
almost
of
every
other
learned
science
:
But
yet
I
pray
consider
,
that
those
forraine
knowledges
,
are
not
inherent
or
inbred
in
the
Lawes
,
but
rather
as
a
borrowed
light
not
found
there
,
but
brought
thither
,
and
learned
elsewhere
by
them
that
have
adorned
and
polished
the
studies
of
the
Lawes
.
For
since
the
materiall
subject
of
the
Law
is
so
ample
(
as
indeed
it
is
)
containing
all
things
that
may
be
controverted
.
The
study
of
the
Lawes
then
must
of
necessity
stretch
out
her
hand
,
and
crave
to
be
holpen
and
assisted
almost
of
all
other
Sciences
Therefore
this
objection
may
well
bee
inverted
against
them
that
doe
urge
the
same
,
and
proveth
rather
that
the
Professor
of
the
Lawes
should
be
furnished
with
the
knowledge
of
all
good
literature
of
most
of
the
Sciences
liberall
;
for
if
a
man
may
observe
the
use
of
those
sciences
to
lie
hidden
in
the
Law
,
who
then
may
better
use
them
or
observe
them
,
then
he
which
is
already
surnished
with
them
.
And
if
the
knowledge
of
the
Law
,
doe
receive
ornament
by
those
eruditions
(
as
I
think
no
man
can
denie
)
it
shall
be
very
expedient
and
well
befitting
the
student
of
the
Lawes
,
to
have
first
familiarity
and
acquaintance
with
them
,
and
to
bee
instructed
in
the
same
.
But
it
may
bee
objected
,
that
the
Lawyer
shall
not
need
the
knowledge
of
those
Arts
himselfe
,
but
when
opportunity
shall
be
offered
,
and
when
question
shall
arise
,
wherein
the
Lawyer
shall
stand
in
need
of
resolution
of
any
of
those
Sciences
,
he
may
conferre
,
and
bee
informed
by
the
Professors
of
the
same
,
to
his
good
satisfaction
,
although
himselfe
be
not
expert
therein
.
Many
times
there
have
beene
(
and
may
bee
hereafter
)
Appeales
of
Mayme
brought
by
such
parties
as
in
private
fight
and
otherwise
by
violence
have
received
maime
,
that
is
,
mutilation
and
losse
of
a
member
of
his
body
ferviceable
for
offence
or
defence
against
those
parties
that
so
have
hurt
them
,
and
many
times
question
&
debate
ariseth
,
whether
the
hurt
so
received
,
be
to
bee
adjudged
a
Maime
,
yea
or
no
?
So
that
the
Iudges
are
oftentimes
enforced
to
conferre
with
Chyrurgians
for
their
suffrage
and
resolution
;
will
you
therefore
require
your
Iudges
,
Professors
and
students
of
the
Law
to
be
also
Surgeons
,
or
skilfull
in
the
Art
of
Chyrurgery
?
that
were
altogether
uncomely
.
This
objection
is
easily
answered
and
avoyded
,
Resp.
for
first
there
is
a
great
difference
in
this
respect
betweene
manuall
.
Arts
and
occupations
wrought
by
the
dexterity
of
the
hand
,
and
those
that
are
sciences
and
vertues
intellectuall
adorning
the
Minde
,
as
are
the
Liberall
.
The
Lawes
of
this
Realme
doe
appoint
no
other
trial
of
a
Maime
,
Mayme
.
then
the
view
of
the
Iudge
,
for
a
Mayme
is
such
as
for
the
most
part
is
visible
and
subject
unto
sens
;
And
therefore
if
upon
some
doubt
or
occasion
conceived
,
by
reason
of
the
view
,
the
Iudges
doe
desire
the
conference
of
expert
Chyrurgians
for
the
better
satisfaction
of
their
conscience
.
This
is
no
matter
of
necessity
to
import
the
Iudges
,
but
matter
of
discretion
onely
,
in
not
being
too
precipitate
,
but
rather
mature
in
their
judgement
,
as
they
ought
;
and
to
shew
themselves
rather
willing
to
goe
onward
with
others
,
then
to
run
alone
of
themselves
.
And
herein
the
Iudges
are
not
tyed
to
the
opinion
of
the
Chyrurgian
,
otherwise
then
hee
findeth
the
same
to
be
conformable
and
grounded
upon
such
good
and
apparent
reason
as
may
yeeld
full
satisfaction
and
contentment
:
But
when
the
question
shal
be
moved
which
.
shal
require
information
of
any
learned
science
which
is
gotten
by
discourse
of
reason
;
Although
in
those
cases
the
laudable
courses
have
ever
beene
in
our
Courts
of
Iustice
,
to
heare
the
Professors
of
those
sciences
to
dispute
and
debate
the
matter
controverted
before
our
Tribunall
and
judgement
seats
,
yet
no
man
can
deny
,
but
it
is
better
to
draw
one
draught
out
of
the
pure
fountaine
it selfe
,
then
to
quench
out
thirst
out
of
derived
streames
,
for
Dulcius
ex
ipso
fonte
bibuntur
aqua
.
For
in
every
Science
which
doth
depend
upon
discourse
of
reason
,
there
are
many
fundamentall
Maximes
and
Principalls
not
to
bee
changed
in
any
future
resolution
,
but
rather
to
be
received
as
guides
to
direct
,
which
at
the
first
will
seeme
harsh
to
such
as
have
not
beene
inured
unto
them
,
and
therefore
it
were
perillous
to
the
Iudge
and
Professor
of
the
Lawes
,
and
he
shall
not
bee
able
either
to
receive
to
himselfe
,
or
to
give
to
others
satisfaction
,
except
hee
can
by
his
proper
knowledge
discerne
of
the
controversie
.
For
we
surely
know
Non
ex
relatis
aliorum
,
sed
cum
per
causas
cognoscimus
,
and
if
wee
have
knowledge
in
those
sciences
our selves
,
we
shall
the
better
apprehend
and
understand
the
reasons
of
those
matters
so
disclosed
by
debate
:
And
thus
I
leave
the
second
objection
.
To
the
third
,
Resp
adtertiam
Object
.
last
,
and
maine
objection
,
this
may
be
produced
for
an
answer
,
that
though
true
it
bee
Vita
brevis
est
,
ars
longa
,
our
life
is
short
and
full
of
calamities
,
and
learning
is
a
long
time
in
getting
,
yet
may
wee
not
in
respect
of
short
life
shut
up
all
our
endeavours
for
feare
of
an
end
;
for
therefore
the
Period
of
our
life
is
sealed
up
from
mans
knowledge
,
first
for
that
wee
should
bee
alwayes
ready
when
we
are
called
hence
;
Secondly
,
for
that
the
feare
of
a
knowne
death
should
not
daunt
or
interrupt
our
endeavours
;
Likewise
the
verdure
of
our
yonger
yeares
is
best
imploied
and
spent
in
obtaining
of
those
sciences
,
for
then
are
we
most
apt
thereunto
.
And
as
the
study
and
practice
of
Morall
Philosophy
(
as
Art
doth
witnesse
)
is
not
fittest
for
men
over
yong
;
so
likewise
the
study
of
the
Law
which
hath
his
foundation
in
Morall
Philosophy
(
both
having
one
end
generall
,
namely
,
the
rectifying
of
our
manners
)
doth
require
some
maturity
of
yeeres
,
and
not
to
bee
set
upon
by
infants
in
yeeres
,
judgement
,
and
cariage
.
And
so
likewise
shall
wee
finde
in
a
long
journey
,
that
the
fairest
way
is
better
although
so
me
what
farther
about
,
then
a
shorter
rough
way
,
hard
to
finde
and
difficult
to
keepe
;
and
in
the
end
also
to
answer
that
close
or
upshot
drawn
from
Tullies
Orator
;
I
would
you
should
likewise
remember
for
conclusion
of
this
question
that
which
he
affirmeth
,
Non
enim
Causidicum
nescio
quem
,
nec
proclamatorem
aut
rabulam
hoc
sermone
nostro
conquirimus
,
sed
eum
virum
qui
primùm
sit
ejus
Artis
Antistes
,
&c.
We
seeke
not
hereby
to
institute
I
know
not
what
manner
of
vulgar
professor
of
the
Lawes
,
no
common
blatterer
or
temerist
,
but
that
man
which
may
prove
in
the
end
an
excellent
and
chiefe
Pillar
,
prop
and
Ornament
of
his
profession
.
CAP.
VI.
HAving
hitherunto
proceeded
in
the
generall
,
The
necessity
of
the
Latine
Tongue
in
a
Student
of
the
Law
.
it
shall
bee
now
requisite
to
descend
to
particulars
.
And
fitst
of
all
to
consider
,
whether
the
knowledge
of
the
Latine
Tongue
,
and
the
use
of
Grammar
,
tending
to
the
obtaining
of
the
same
,
be
necessary
for
a
Lawyer
:
not
proposing
it
by
way
of
doubt
,
question
,
or
difficulty
,
that
it
should
need
any
large
dispute
,
but
by
way
of
manifestation
and
disquisition
onely
;
for
there
is
no
man
(
as
I
suppose
)
that
can
or
will
deny
,
but
that
the
knowledge
of
the
Latine
tongue
is
right
necessary
for
our
English
Lawyer
:
which
may
be
,
made
apparent
by
many
evident
and
eminent
arguments
and
allegations
,
easily
to
be
produced
for
that
purpose
.
First
of
all
,
Ra.
prima
.
many
of
our
old
Statutes
,
and
ancient
positive
Lawes
were
written
and
formed
in
the
Latine
tongue
,
and
so
doe
still
rest
and
remaine
in
our
Records
and
Bookes
;
as
that
Act
called
Magna
Charta
,
Magna
Charta
.
The
great
Charter
of
England
,
great
indeed
,
not
in
respect
of
moulde
,
but
matter
,
not
great
in
quantity
,
but
in
weight
and
worth
:
Containing
many
the
fundamentall
points
of
our
Lawes
,
bought
with
the
blood
of
our
Nobility
and
English
Ancestors
,
in
those
troublesome
times
of
King
Iohn
,
and
Henry
his
sonne
.
And
although
many
of
the
Constitutions
contained
in
that
Charter
,
first
introduced
in
part
by
King
Henry
the
first
,
(
then
called
for
his
learning
Henry
le
beu
Clarke
,
Hen.
1.
)
comming
in
and
putting
by
his
elder
brother
Robert
of
Normandy
,
and
as
it
were
by
restitution
and
renovation
of
the
old
Lawes
of
Edward
the
Confessor
King
before
the
Conquest
,
and
in
tract
of
time
sought
to
be
enfringed
,
yet
neverthelesse
not
without
trouble
it
was
afterward
again
both
revived
&
enlarged
first
by
another
Charter
of
King
Iohn
,
and
lastly
by
King
Henry
the
third
his
sonne
in
Parliament
established
,
and
sundry
times
afterwards
by
succeeding
Parliaments
,
also
confirmed
and
commanded
to
be
put
in
due
execution
.
In
like
manner
these
severall
Lawes
of
note
,
Stat.
Marton
20.
H.
3.
Marlebridge
Gloneester
.
as
the
Statute
made
at
Marton
Abbey
in
Surrey
:
That
also
made
at
Marlebridge
,
that
likewise
at
Gloucester
,
and
sundry
others
were
all
originally
framed
in
the
Latine
tongue
in
the
reigne
of
the
said
Henry
the
thrid
:
Also
the
Acts
made
in
the
first
,
Westm.
1.
Westm.
2.
Westm.
3.
certaine
in
the
second
,
and
the
Acts
made
in
the
third
Parliaments
all
holden
at
Westminster
in
the
raigne
of
that
victorious
and
renowued
Prince
King
Edward
after
the
Conquest
surnamed
the
first
,
compiled
by
Parliament
for
the
good
government
of
this
Kingdome
,
were
written
also
in
the
Latine
tongue
.
Secondly
,
Treatises
of
Law
in
the
Latine
Tongue
.
Ra.
Glanvill
.
Ended
his
dayes
at
Ptolomais
in
the
holy
Land
.
many
learned
Writers
have
composed
divers
excellent
Treatises
of
the
Lawes
of
this
Realme
,
in
the
Latine
tongue
,
as
namely
,
that
ancient
Treatise
composed
by
Ranulphus
de
Glanvilla
,
a
learned
Iudge
of
this
Land
,
who
is
said
to
have
gone
in
person
with
King
Richard
the
first
into
the
holy
Land
,
and
to
have
ended
his
dayes
at
Ptolomais
then
called
Acon
or
Acres
a
Maritine
Towne
of
that
Country
.
I
will
here
adjoyne
the
learned
Treatise
(
and
as
the
times
then
stood
)
I
might
well
call
and
affirme
the
eloquent
Treatise
of
the
Common
Lawes
framed
by
Henry
de
Bracton
a
most
learned
Iudge
of
this
Land
,
Hen.
de
Bracton
.
living
in
the
latter
and
of
the
raigne
of
King
Henry
the
third
,
and
in
the
entrance
of
King
Edward
the
first
his
regiment
:
This
Treatise
is
replenished
with
many
excellent
sentences
,
fitly
and
aptly
composed
in
Latine
;
and
by
the
reading
of
this
worthy
worke
,
the
student
shall
truly
understand
not
onely
the
conformity
our
Nationall
Lawes
then
had
with
the
Civill
,
Cannon
,
or
Ecclesiasticall
Lawes
,
but
also
shall
well
perceive
what
the
Common
Law
of
this
our
Countrey
was
before
the
making
of
divers
Statutes
which
have
altered
the
same
,
whereby
great
light
may
bee
had
,
and
a
great
helpe
obtained
for
the
better
understanding
and
true
interpretation
of
the
same
.
Likewise
,
there
is
a
learned
Treatise
composed
by
a
learned
yet
unknowne
Author
whiles
he
was
a
Prisoner
in
the
Fleet
,
and
therefore
the
said
worke
or
tract
is
called
Fleta
,
Fleta
.
in
the
time
as
it
seemeth
of
King
Edward
the
first
,
and
although
there
doe
now
remaine
but
a
few
Manuscript
copies
thereof
,
as
having
beene
never
imprinted
,
yet
is
it
worthy
to
see
the
light
,
and
for
the
furtherance
of
the
studentof
the
Lawes
to
be
divulged
,
and
this
also
was
written
in
the
Latine
tongue
:
I
might
remember
two
Treatises
,
the
greater
,
and
the
lesser
,
gathered
by
Radulphus
de
Hingham
,
Ra.
Hingham
.
sometime
Chiefe
Iustice
of
the
Common
Pleas
,
whose
monument
yet
remaineth
in
the
Cathedrall
Church
,
of
Saint
Paul
in
London
,
and
written
in
Latine
,
but
in
corrupt
language
as
the
times
then
afforded
.
But
passing
over
many
other
in
silence
,
I
will
conclude
with
that
little
Treatise
made
de
laudibus
legum
Angliae
,
in
praise
and
commendations
of
the
Lawes
of
this
Land
by
comparison
with
the
forreigne
Lawes
of
some
other
Countries
devised
and
written
in
the
Latine
tongue
by
that
sincere
and
most
learned
Iudge
,
Sir
Iohn
Fortescue
Knight
,
Io.
Fortescue
.
thereby
to
incite
by
many
arguments
the
Prince
,
sonne
and
heire
to
King
Henry
the
sixt
,
to
the
knowledge
of
the
Lawes
of
this
Country
:
it
seemeth
by
many
passages
of
this
Treatise
,
that
the
same
was
contrived
in
the
Kingdome
of
France
,
during
such
time
as
the
Queene
with
her
said
sonne
the
Prince
remained
there
to
sollicite
ayde
for
her
husband
.
This
Author
at
the
writing
of
this
Treatise
was
as
it
seemeth
Chauncellor
to
the
Prince
,
and
afterward
Chiefe
Iustice
of
the
Kings
Bench
:
This
little
worke
is
well
worthy
the
perusall
,
plentifully
shewing
the
learning
of
the
Author
in
Divinity
,
Philosophy
,
and
other
good
literature
,
besides
the
knowledge
of
the
Lawes
of
this
Realme
,
a
man
I
say
who
for
the
fidelity
he
bare
to
his
Master
,
tasted
of
the
tempest
then
stirred
in
the
end
of
his
time
,
having
had
both
his
rising
and
his
ruine
in
that
fatall
fall
of
his
Lord
.
Thirdly
,
Writs
ought
to
be
framed
in
true
and
congruous
Latine
.
all
the
formes
of
writs
are
and
ought
to
be
framed
in
the
Latine
tongue
,
and
if
they
do
containe
false
Latine
,
they
are
abateable
,
and
to
be
defeited
,
and
the
party
plaintife
who
pursued
the
same
,
shall
bee
driven
to
purchase
a
better
writ
,
and
to
begin
a
new
.
For
the
better
understanding
whereof
,
let
mee
observe
something
of
the
nature
of
Writs
.
A
Writ
is
the
commandement
of
the
King
,
Definition
of
a
Writ
.
formed
in
Latine
,
directed
either
to
some
Minister
of
his
Courts
;
or
sometime
to
the
partie
Defendant
,
at
the
pursuite
of
the
Plaintife
,
for
the
better
administration
of
Iustice
.
This
Description
concerneth
all
manner
of
writs
,
which
as
touching
their
forme
,
are
short
and
briefe
;
and
therfore
in
Latine
are
called
Brevia
,
in
French
Briefes
for
their
shortnesse
in
English
Writs
,
The
Etimologie
.
for
that
they
are
Mandates
in
writing
.
The
latine
Etymology
of
the
name
,
Bracton
yeeldeth
thus
:
Brevia
dicuntur
(
per
modum
Regula
juris
)
quia
rem
quae
est
&
intentionem
Petentis
brevitur
enarrat
:
And
yet
ought
they
not
through
brevity
to
bee
obscure
,
but
cleare
and
in
a
compendious
manner
to
comprehend
the
matter
therein
contayned
:
They
ought
to
be
formed
in
words
,
proper
&
perspicuous
,
free
of
ambiguity
,
no
preposterous
order
,
no
doubtfull
reference
,
no
idle
repetition
,
no
omission
of
needfull
matter
,
and
ought
to
bee
formed
in
apt
,
true
,
and
congruous
Latine
.
Writs
are
in
sundry
manners
divided
,
Division
.
(
1
)
sometime
in
respect
of
their
matter
;
(
2
)
sometime
in
respect
of
their
forme
;
(
3
)
sometime
in
repect
of
the
efficient
cause
;
(
4
)
and
sometime
againe
in
respect
of
their
finall
cause
.
In
respect
of
their
matter
,
all
Writs
are
of
three
kinds
,
that
is
,
(
1
)
Originall
,
(
2
)
Meane
Proces
,
(
3
)
Iudiciall
.
An
Originall
Writ
is
the
Commandement
of
the
King
,
Defin
:
An
originall
Writ
,
quid
?
formed
in
Latine
,
issuing
out
of
the
Chauncery
,
sealed
with
the
great
Seale
of
England
,
contayning
the
cause
of
suite
directed
to
a
Minister
of
the
Court
to
compell
the
defendant
to
appeare
and
answer
at
a
day
prefixed
for
the
returne
thereof
.
The
Originall
Writ
is
the
foundation
of
the
suit
,
Etimology
.
and
therefore
is
called
originall
,
for
that
it
is
the
first
writ
sued
forth
at
the
beginning
of
the
suit
,
to
bring
the
defendant
in
Court
to
answer
.
In
respect
of
their
matter
,
Divisio
in
materiam
&
formam
.
they
are
divided
thus
;
They
are
either
(
1
)
Reall
,
(
2
)
Personall
,
(
3
)
Mixt
,
or
(
4
)
neither
,
as
the
Appeale
.
In
respect
of
their
forme
,
they
are
either
of
a
setled
and
composed
forme
,
and
therefore
called
formata
:
or
without
a
setled
forme
,
but
doe
vary
according
to
the
circumstance
of
the
cause
,
and
called
by
Bracton
,
Brevia
Magistralia
;
the
other
Brevia
de
cursu
.
In
respect
of
their
efficient
cause
all
these
Originall
Writs
doe
issue
,
as
hath
beene
said
,
Cause
efficiens
.
out
of
the
Chancery
,
which
is
the
shop
and
forge
wherein
for
the
most
part
they
are
framed
.
The
Magisteriall
Briefes
,
because
they
vary
with
the
case
,
require
a
Masters
hand
to
compose
them
in
respect
of
skill
.
But
the
other
De
cursu
,
Writs
of
course
,
because
they
have
a
setled
forme
prescribed
in
an
ancient
booke
therefore
called
the
Register
of
Writs
,
and
vary
not
but
in
mutatis
mutandis
:
they
are
written
by
a
society
of
Clarkes
of
the
Chancery
called
therefore
Cursitors
:
Cursitors
,
unde
dicitur
.
But
I
purpose
not
here
to
make
a
full
and
liberall
discourse
of
writs
,
this
alone
may
suffice
in
this
place
,
and
for
the
matter
in
hand
.
Fourthly
,
it
is
manifest
,
that
all
the
returnes
of
Writs
,
all
manner
of
proceedings
,
all
Counts
or
Declarations
of
the
Plaintiffes
or
Demaundants
,
all
Pleas
,
defendes
or
exceptions
of
the
Defendants
or
Tennants
,
either
to
the
Iurisdiction
of
the
Court
,
or
to
abate
the
writ
,
or
in
barre
of
the
Action
all
replications
thereunto
by
the
Plaintife
and
demandant
,
all
rejoynders
or
surrejoynders
,
all
issues
taken
,
all
verdicts
,
demurrers
,
continuances
and
entries
of
the
judgements
of
the
Court
in
sundry
formes
,
according
to
the
severall
nature
of
the
writs
and
actions
in
controversie
:
Likewise
all
the
proceedings
in
criminall
causes
and
Pleas
of
the
Crowne
which
concerne
life
or
member
by
way
of
indictment
or
presentment
,
the
Arraignment
,
Tryall
,
and
Iudgements
thereupon
had
,
are
entred
,
written
,
and
engrossed
in
the
Latine
tongue
;
And
therefore
without
the
knowledge
of
this
language
,
the
student
of
the
Lawes
,
the
Practizer
,
and
the
Iudge
must
of
necessity
walke
thorough
a
vale
of
darknesse
and
palpable
ignorance
in
the
superlative
.
By
this
which
hath
beene
already
affirmed
may
easily
be
conceived
,
that
Grammar
being
the
first
Liberall
Sciences
is
very
behoovfull
&
needfull
for
a
Lawyer
,
as
by
sundry
instances
may
bee
made
manifest
in
every
part
thereof
.
Grammar
hath
beene
divided
into
these
foure
parts
;
Orthographia
,
Etymologia
,
Syntaxis
,
and
Prosodia
.
In
Orthographie
,
Orthogra
.
phia
.
which
concernes
true
writing
,
we
are
taught
that
from
the
knitting
together
of
Letters
are
made
sillables
,
of
sillables
significative
words
.
These
words
are
twofold
,
Primitive
,
which
were
composed
at
the
first
to
denote
and
signifie
this
or
that
thing
,
and
words
derivatives
drawne
from
those
Primitives
,
which
in
writing
ought
to
containe
the
radicall
letters
of
those
Primitives
,
that
thereby
may
be
discovered
and
discerned
i
the
root
and
of
spring
from
whence
they
were
drawne
and
deduced
.
First
therefore
,
as
touching
letters
and
syllables
,
sometime
a
letter
is
omitted
which
maketh
the
word
written
,
no
latine
at
all
,
In
a
Scine
fac
:
the
writ
was
abated
for
want
of
a
letter
,
for
the
writ
was
ex
insinatione
,
24.
E.
3.7
.
which
is
no
latine
,
whereas
it
should
have
beene
ex
insinuatione
.
So
in
a
precipe
quod
reddat
,
the
words
were
precipe
quod
reddat
haeri
;
41.
E.
3.21
.
where
it
wanted
a
syllable
and
should
have
beene
haeredi
,
and
this
writ
was
abated
.
And
sometimes
for
placing
one
letter
for
another
,
as
in
a
writ
of
waste
,
the
same
was
ad
destrictionem
,
whereas
it
should
have
beene
ad
destructionem
.
So
likewise
an
Inditement
of
Burglary
was
avoyded
,
for
that
it
was
Burgaliter
,
Cooke
2
part
.
lib.
3.
whereas
it
should
have
beene
burglariter
,
although
no
perfect
,
yet
allowed
Lawyers
Latine
,
and
an
artificiall
word
,
a
word
of
Art
.
The
second
was
of
Grammar
called
Etimologia
,
Etimologia
.
hath
two
parts
,
for
it
doth
not
onely
concerne
the
derivation
of
words
,
but
also
the
forming
of
words
in
all
the
principle
parts
of
speech
,
as
of
the
Nounes
,
Pronounes
,
Participles
,
in
number
,
case
,
gender
,
termination
,
declination
,
&
such
like
;
but
also
of
verbs
in
declination
,
moode
,
tense
,
number
,
person
,
and
such
like
,
and
in
these
things
also
the
Lawes
of
this
Realme
require
congruity
to
bee
observed
,
according
to
the
rules
of
Grammar
.
The
writ
was
hos
breve
,
where
it
should
have
been
hoc
breve
,
and
therefore
was
abated
,
and
could
not
be
amended
;
one
case
for
another
.
In
a
Precipe
quod
reddat
,
the
writ
was
quas
,
where
it
should
have
beene
quod
,
one
gender
for
another
,
and
therefore
was
abated
.
In
a
writ
of
Iuris
vtrum
,
12.
H.
4.10
.
Fitz
n.
br.
466.
the
writ
was
sit
where
it
should
have
beene
sint
,
one
number
for
another
,
with
divers
others
,
such
like
examples
.
The
third
part
of
Grammer
is
Syntaxis
or
Composition
of
speech
,
Syntaxis
.
and
hath
these
parts
(
1
)
the
conformity
betweene
the
verbe
and
the
casuall
word
;
(
2
)
betwene
the
substantive
and
the
adjective
;
(
3
)
betweene
the
Antecedent
and
the
Relative
which
part
hath
sundry
examples
in
the
Law
,
and
would
be
tedious
to
remember
.
These
things
notwithstanding
,
Ob.
prima
.
there
doe
remaine
certaine
objections
to
be
cleared
;
for
first
it
may
be
objected
that
in
the
Courts
of
Iustice
,
the
Clerks
in
the
entring
and
enrolling
of
their
Records
,
forme
up
their
words
in
a
short
kind
of
writing
by
certaine
abreviations
,
by
which
are
knowne
the
words
intended
;
And
therefore
in
this
course
which
is
most
usuall
there
can
be
but
a
slender
observation
of
true
Orthography
.
To
this
I
answer
,
Resp.
that
among
all
the
Cursitors
and
Prothonotories
,
and
all
other
Clerkes
in
our
Courts
,
there
is
observed
a
briefe
and
short
kind
of
writing
for
the
better
dispatch
of
an
infinite
masse
of
businesse
in
that
kinde
,
and
heape
of
writings
which
they
termly
undergoe
,
yet
the
same
is
not
voluntary
,
or
at
pleasure
,
or
as
every
man
will
or
shall
devise
,
fashion
,
or
frame
unto
himselfe
,
but
such
onely
vulgar
,
and
well
known
both
among
themselves
,
as
all
other
that
intermeddle
therewith
,
which
tract
of
time
hath
made
familiar
from
age
to
age
by
expert
observation
.
4.
H.
6.16
.
And
here
may
I
remember
that
almost
every
of
our
Courts
of
Iustice
hath
his
severall
set
forme
of
handwriting
,
as
the
Chancery
hand
,
conveyed
in
a
faire
forme
of
letter
,
little
inferior
to
the
print
;
and
the
Court
hand
somewhat
distinguished
in
forme
of
letters
from
the
ordinary
secrerary
or
set
hand
used
among
the
vulgar
,
which
our
Auncestors
at
first
invented
,
and
ever
since
to
great
purpose
have
practised
,
thereby
giving
the
greater
impression
,
so
that
it
may
remaine
legible
to
posterity
many
hundred
yeeres
,
as
by
our
ancient
Records
,
and
many
Monuments
of
Antiquity
yet
remaining
of
ancient
occurrences
before
the
Norman
Conquest
is
evidently
declared
.
Secondly
may
be
objected
,
Ob.
seounder
.
that
since
the
time
that
the
Latine
tongue
was
vulgarly
used
among
the
Romans
,
and
other
the
Nations
,
that
they
subdued
to
that
Empire
(
for
they
much
endeavoured
the
propagation
of
their
language
)
sundry
new
things
have
beene
invented
,
whereof
those
ancient
people
had
either
no
intelligence
,
or
no
use
,
and
therefore
where
such
things
doe
occurre
,
there
doe
want
words
proper
and
peculier
in
the
Latine
tongue
to
denote
the
same
,
and
men
must
of
necessity
bee
enforced
either
to
use
barbarous
words
farre
from
the
purity
of
the
Latine
speech
,
or
to
invent
new
to
expresse
their
meaning
.
For
satisfaction
and
full
declaration
whereof
,
Resp.
we
are
to
consider
that
usually
in
course
of
Law
soure
kind
of
words
are
caried
under
the
colour
of
latine
in
Law
proceedings
;
as
first
,
the
true
native
and
proper
latine
word
if
they
bee
found
for
the
present
purpose
,
whereof
our
Iudges
have
ever
beene
carefull
,
Coke
lib.
10.
fol.
133.
as
by
their
sundry
conferences
with
Grammarians
,
and
men
learned
concerning
thetrue
and
naturall
signification
of
Latine
words
almost
every
was
extant
in
our
books
doe
declare
.
Secondly
,
there
are
words
of
Art
in
the
lawes
,
as
in
other
faculties
.
And
thirdly
,
certaine
other
words
drawne
from
the
ancient
Idiome
and
language
of
our
predecessors
,
the
former
Inhabitants
of
this
Land
,
vulgarly
and
sufficiently
knowne
,
which
receiving
latine
formes
passe
in
our
Lawes
,
as
felonia
,
felonice
,
Murdrum
,
Burglaria
,
Warrantia
,
Esnitia
,
pars
mulier
,
pro
sobole
ex
legitima
uxore
nata
,
with
many
others
of
like
derivation
,
as
mesuadgium
for
an
house
,
toftum
for
a
decayed
house
,
gardinum
for
a
garden
,
bruera
for
furse
or
heath
,
maromium
for
timber
,
●●stardus
,
for
nothus
,
a
base
borne
childe
,
and
the
like
.
And
fourthly
,
for
new
invented
things
not
known
to
the
Ancients
,
new
words
likewise
haue
had
their
originall
,
as
Bombardum
or
tormentum
for
a
gunne
,
Pulvis
tormentarius
,
for
gunpowder
,
Stapedia
for
a
stirrop
,
velvettum
for
velvet
,
and
many
of
such
like
making
,
wherunto
for
better
understanding
we
doe
permit
the
English
usuall
words
to
be
adjoyned
in
our
latine
pleadings
.
Lastly
,
Obaertia
.
there
remaineth
this
scruple
,
where
it
hath
beene
affirmed
,
that
there
is
much
respect
had
of
the
true
propriety
of
latine
words
,
it
seemeth
nothing
lesse
,
for
these
for●●s
are
conceived
in
a
base
stile
farre
removed
from
purity
of
speech
so
that
the
professors
of
Law
within
this
land
can
challenge
no
great
commendation
in
this
kinde
.
To
this
is
answered
,
Resp.
that
the
Lawes
of
this
Land
neither
doe
,
nor
desire
to
affect
Eloquence
in
the
Latine
tongue
,
for
wee
have
no
use
of
the
speech
thereof
in
our
arguments
,
for
as
much
as
the
Statute
made
36.
E.
3.
cap.
15.
36.
E.
3
.
1●
.
hath
ordained
that
all
pleadings
,
and
all
arguments
and
disputations
of
Law
should
thenceforth
be
performed
in
the
English
tongue
,
whereas
formerly
as
it
seemeth
it
was
put
in
ure
in
the
French
,
remaining
untill
that
time
,
as
a
badge
of
the
Norman
Captivity
,
whereof
there
is
now
no
use
but
in
the
arraigning
of
an
Assize
,
and
an
Appeale
,
and
such
French
Arguments
as
are
used
for
exercise
in
the
Houses
,
and
Societies
of
Court
and
Chancery
.
Neverthelesse
the
former
usage
hath
still
remained
,
that
is
,
that
all
proceedings
Iudicial
shold
be
entred
and
enrolled
in
the
Latine
tongue
,
so
that
the
Latine
serveth
to
convey
to
posterity
our
Memorialls
and
Records
,
and
not
our
debate
and
speech
:
The
Antiquity
whereof
,
whether
it
first
grew
in
respect
of
the
use
thereof
,
retained
among
all
Nations
subject
to
that
Empire
upon
like
occasion
even
unto
this
day
;
or
whether
for
the
Majestie
of
that
language
wherein
all
Arts
of
literature
are
still
promulged
,
or
whether
it
may
be
reached
unto
the
Romane
Conquest
of
this
Land
,
who
long
held
it
under
their
government
,
and
reduced
many
parts
thereof
into
Provinces
,
endeavouring
(
as
their
manner
was
)
to
propagate
their
language
as
largely
as
their
Empire
;
or
whether
it
happened
in
respect
our
Ancestors
the
Brittons
with
good
affection
embraced
that
language
,
as
Tacitus
reporteth
,
I
doe
surcease
in
this
place
to
determine
.
But
for
farther
satisfaction
in
this
poynt
,
the
Entries
and
enrollments
of
our
Writs
,
Pleas
,
and
all
other
our
Law
proceedings
are
neither
base
,
abject
,
or
horrid
,
as
hath
beene
imported
;
for
our
Originall
Writs
of
set
forme
are
from
ancient
memory
,
have
ever
beene
preserved
in
the
booke
called
the
Register
,
from
the
which
our
Clerkes
may
not
swerve
,
to
avoyd
the
infinite
variety
of
formes
which
might
otherwise
ensue
,
and
were
first
conceived
and
devised
in
as
proper
Latine
,
as
the
times
wherein
they
were
first
invented
,
and
the
matter
it selfe
was
able
to
beare
.
And
as
touching
the
other
mentioned
proceedings
entered
in
the
Latine
tongue
,
although
not
eloquent
,
yet
satis
laudato
forensi
stilo
,
as
in
any
other
Kingdome
perspicuous
and
significant
.
Let
not
the
same
therefore
be
a
blemish
to
our
Lawes
,
which
hath
invaded
almost
all
other
Sciences
;
for
what
horrid
and
incompt
words
hath
Logicke
and
Phiolsophy
endured
,
introduced
by
their
Dunces
devices
,
as
Ens
,
entitas
,
quidditas
,
causalitas
,
with
a
multitude
of
others
impertinent
to
be
remembred
?
with
what
improper
tearmes
and
barbarous
speeches
have
the
Schoolmen
daubed
Divinity
?
What
hath
beene
in
this
kinde
brought
in
upon
the
pure
and
cleare
fountaines
of
the
Digests
of
the
Civill
Lawes
?
which
being
compiled
out
of
sundry
most
excelent
sentences
,
drawne
out
of
the
workes
and
passages
of
the
ancient
Romane
Lawyers
,
doe
retaine
the
same
purity
and
conformity
of
a
cleane
and
neat
stile
,
as
though
all
had
beene
penned
by
one
man
;
and
yet
are
in
a
manner
defiled
by
the
Feudary
Tenurist
writers
of
the
middle
age
in
their
Glosses
and
Commentaries
,
as
those
learned
Lawyers
of
this
latter
age
Alciatus
,
Budaeus
,
Cujacius
,
and
the
rest
have
undergone
an
Herculean
labour
to
clense
the
same
.
But
to
conclude
this
matter
;
the
Students
of
our
Lawes
,
and
the
professors
thereof
may
well
defend
themselves
by
the
testimony
and
authoritie
of
the
best
Writers
in
this
behalfe
:
For
first
of
all
Aristotle
himselfe
giveth
warrant
,
Arist.
in
Catego
.
Relationis
.
Quod
nova
vocabula
sunt
facienda
cùm
ad
res
explicandas
nullae
suppetunt
voces
:
And
herein
they
may
bee
bold
to
stand
to
the
judgement
of
Tully
himselfe
who
affirmeth
,
Omne
quod
de
re
bona
dilucide
dicitur
,
mihi
praeclarè
dici
videtur
:
istiusmodi
autem
res
dicere
ornatè
velle
,
puerile
est
;
planè
autem
&
perspicuè
posse
docti
&
intelligentis
est
viri
.
And
I
know
no
cause
why
wee
may
not
say
the
same
of
our
Lawyer
which
he
affirmeth
in
that
Booke
of
the
Philosopher
,
Philosophum
si
afferat
eloquentiam
non
esse
aspernendum
,
si
non
habeat
non
esse
ab
eo
admodum
flagitandum
,
dum
tamen
complectatur
verbis
quod
vult
,
&
dicat
planè
ut
intelligatur
.
And
so
let
me
say
,
if
our
Lawyer
or
Pronotorie
in
drawing
up
his
pleadings
can
use
a
good
phrase
and
pure
Latine
,
I
will
never
blame
him
,
if
not
,
I
will
not
expect
it
at
his
hands
,
so
that
that
which
he
hath
drawne
bee
congrue
,
plaine
,
famiiar
,
sensible
,
and
easie
to
be
understood
.
Thus
have
wee
produced
two
of
the
best
Authors
for
our
defence
,
the
one
for
wit
and
knowledge
the
worlds
wonder
;
The
other
for
eloquent
and
excellent
speech
in
his
native
language
the
chiefest
ornament
.
It
shall
suffice
to
conclude
with
a
sentence
of
a
Christian
Father
inferiour
in
humane
learning
to
neither
of
them
,
whose
speech
because
it
is
excellently
to
the
purpose
,
I
cannot
let
passe
;
Bonorum
ingeniorum
insignis
est
indoles
,
in
verbis
verum
amare
non
verba
;
Quid
enim
prodest
clavis
aurea
,
si
,
quod
volumus
aperire
,
non
potest
?
aut
quid
obest
lignea
,
si
hoc
potest
?
quando
nihil
quaerimus
nisi
patere
quod
clausum
est
?
It
is
an
excellent
Argument
of
the
best
wits
,
not
to
hunt
compt
and
filed
words
,
but
in
words
to
embrace
the
truth
,
for
what
profiteth
a
Golden
key
,
if
it
cannot
open
,
and
what
hurt
is
it
to
use
a
wodden
key
,
if
it
will
open
,
when
there
is
no
other
end
of
both
,
but
to
open
that
which
was
shut
.
CAP.
VII
.
THe
next
succeeding
Science
Liberall
is
Logicke
,
Logicke
.
and
therefore
order
doth
require
wee
should
here
also
make
inquirie
whether
the
Art
of
Logicke
be
necessary
for
the
attaining
to
the
knowledge
of
the
Law
.
The
question
hath
beene
diversly
debated
by
sundry
of
Aristotles
Interpreters
,
and
such
as
have
written
of
that
Science
both
touching
the
peculiar
instance
or
Hypothesis
;
as
also
more
at
large
in
the
generall
Thesis
,
namely
,
whether
Logicke
bee
necessary
for
the
better
obtaining
of
other
learned
Sciences
.
In
handling
of
this
debate
,
we
will
hold
our
former
proposed
course
,
and
first
of
all
let
us
object
against
the
necessity
thereof
.
Experience
is
a
sure
foundation
:
Ra.
prima
.
many
excellent
Lawyers
both
in
the
civill
Lawes
of
the
Empire
,
the
Cannon
Lawes
of
the
Church
,
and
the
Common
Lawes
of
the
Land
have
not
beene
skilfull
in
Logicke
,
and
therefore
Logicke
is
not
necessary
for
the
knowledge
of
the
Lawes
.
Law
Arguments
are
deduced
more
from
authority
then
reason
,
Ra.
seeunda
.
for
the
English
Lawyer
in
arguments
requireth
most
the
strength
of
Cases
apt
to
the
purpose
,
and
Presidents
of
former
time
,
then
discourse
of
reason
;
and
therefore
Logicke
which
respecteth
onely
the
inference
and
discourse
of
reason
,
is
not
so
needfull
for
a
Lawyer
.
The
Lawes
deale
with
particular
in
stances
,
Ra.
tertia
.
and
individuall
Cases
,
where
the
sundry
circumstances
accompanying
the
fact
,
make
manifest
difference
,
inter
aequum
&
iniquum
;
justum
&
injustum
;
whereas
Logicke
dealeth
not
with
universalities
abstracted
from
the
particulars
,
and
exempt
from
their
circumstances
,
and
therefore
Logicke
not
necessary
for
a
Lawyer
.
A
great
part
of
Logicke
doth
treat
of
Propositions
,
Ra.
quarta
.
and
the
framing
of
Syllogismes
,
but
the
Lawyer
doth
not
argue
syllogistically
,
and
therefore
needeth
no
Logicke
.
Man
is
a
living
creature
,
Ra.
quinta
.
by
nature
reasonable
,
and
can
by
the
gift
of
nature
alone
,
apprehend
,
understand
,
inferre
,
collect
,
discourse
,
reason
,
prove
,
disprove
,
order
,
and
dispose
things
conceived
,
and
truly
judge
of
them
;
and
therfore
where
these
things
are
by
nature
,
what
necessity
is
there
to
learne
them
by
Art
?
for
sicut
pupillae
inest
visus
,
it
a
animae
Intellectus
;
Arist.
1.
Ethic.
cap.
6.
And
againe
the
same
writer
,
homines
à
natura
Dialecticos
&
Rhetoricos
esse
;
Aristot
.
1.
Rhet.
ad
Theodoctum
,
&
1.
Elenchorum
.
Every
faculty
and
discipline
of
it selfe
hath
a
distinct
and
peculiar
manner
of
proceeding
,
and
therefore
a
speciall
Logicke
must
be
framed
for
the
study
of
the
Law
if
any
bee
necessary
at
all
,
for
the
generall
Logicke
will
not
suffice
.
The
full
handling
of
this
question
will
give
occasion
of
a
large
discourse
,
and
incite
us
to
set
out
and
declare
the
principall
parts
of
Logicke
,
and
the
true
use
thereof
in
the
knowledge
of
the
Lawes
;
wherefore
lest
our
speech
thorow
multiplicity
of
matter
might
be
confuse
,
wee
will
hold
this
order
:
First
,
we
shall
endvour
to
produce
the
testimonies
of
most
approved
Authors
of
the
part
affirmative
,
wherein
they
have
delivered
the
necessity
or
profitable
use
of
Logicke
.
Secondly
,
wee
shall
undertake
by
reasons
drawne
from
the
most
parts
of
Logicke
,
to
prove
the
necessity
,
at
lest
the
utility
thereof
.
Thirdly
,
wee
shall
propound
those
places
out
of
our
owne
Bookes
of
the
Common
Lawes
of
this
Land
,
where
the
use
of
Logicke
hath
either
beene
acquired
,
admitted
,
or
practized
.
Then
handling
that
part
of
Logick
which
concerneth
Method
,
wee
will
dispute
whether
the
knowledge
of
the
Law
may
bee
brought
into
a
Method
yea
or
no
?
Then
wee
shall
consider
the
state
of
this
maine
question
according
to
the
different
opinions
of
such
as
have
written
thereof
.
And
lastly
,
Answer
the
arguments
and
objections
at
the
first
proposed
on
the
contrarie
part
.
As
touching
the
first
of
these
;
Ra.
prima
.
although
Logicke
was
not
brought
to
perfection
in
Platoes
time
,
yet
is
the
same
greatly
commended
by
him
in
some
places
of
his
works
,
as
in
Phardro
&
Parminide
.
In
Phaedro
after
some
use
of
Logicall
division
expressed
,
Socrates
falleth
into
a
wonderfull
commendation
of
Logicke
.
Iamblicus
in
his
Epistle
to
Sopratus
affirmeth
,
That
nulla
scientia
Philosophiae
absque
Dialectica
ratione
compararipotest
.
How
necessary
the
use
of
Logicke
is
for
the
obtaining
of
other
knowledges
of
other
sciences
,
is
made
knowne
by
explicating
the
parts
thereof
in
divers
passages
by
Aristotle
himselfe
as
1.
Poster
.
cap.
2.
1.
Topic.
cap.
2.
and
in
Elenchis
sophisticis
,
cap.
3.
and
in
sundry
other
places
of
his
workes
,
and
in
4.
Metaph.
textu
8.
he
sheweth
,
that
the
ancient
Philosophers
fell
into
many
errours
through
the
ignorance
of
Logicke
.
Marcus
Tullius
Cicero
the
great
Romane
Orator
in
many
places
of
his
workes
extolleth
the
necessity
and
use
of
Logicke
.
In
his
Tusculane
Questions
thus
,
That
it
is
the
Art
quae
rem
definit
,
genera
dispertit
,
sequentia
adjungit
,
perfecta
concludi●
,
vera
&
falsa
dijudicat
,
ex
qua
cùm
summa
utilitas
existit
ad
res
ponderandas
,
tum
maxime
ingenua
dilectatio
&
digna
sapientia
:
Logicke
is
an
Art
that
defineth
and
setteth
forth
the
nature
of
things
,
it
divideth
the
generall
into
its
particular
parts
,
it
sheweth
the
necessary
coherence
and
dependancy
of
the
consequent
deduced
from
the
antecedent
,
it
discerneth
betweene
truth
and
falshood
,
out
of
which
ariseth
as
well
an
excellent
profitable
use
in
the
search
of
things
,
as
also
an
ingenuous
delight
a
worthy
wisedome
.
In
his
Booke
de
Finibus
,
he
calleth
Logicke
the
●●le
of
knowledge
,
Quae
quasi
delapsa
de
cal●
sit
ad
cognitionem
omnium
,
ad
quam
omnia
judicia
rerum
dirigantur
:
qua
servata
,
nunquam
ullius
oratione
victi
,
sententia
desistamus
:
A
rule
of
knowledge
I
say
sent
or
slidden
downe
from
heaven
for
the
obtaining
of
the
knowledge
of
all
things
,
by
which
all
judgements
are
directed
,
and
which
rule
being
truely
observed
,
we
can
never
by
whatsoever
powerfull
speech
of
any
,
be
vanquished
or
diverted
from
apprehended
truth
,
and
a
setled
judgement
.
To
the
like
effect
he
affirmeth
by
the
example
of
Servius
Sulpitius
a
famous
Romane
Lawyer
who
was
Iuris
consultorum
eloquentissimus
,
&
eloquentium
Iuris
consultissimus
;
That
Logicke
is
an
Art
Quae
docet
rem
universam
tribuere
,
in
partes
,
latentem
explicare
definiendo
,
obscuram
explanare
interpretando
,
ambiguum
,
primùm
videre
,
deinde
distinguere
,
postremò
habere
regulam
qua
vera
&
falsa
dijudicarentur
,
&
quae
(
quibus
propositis
)
essent
,
quaeque
non
essent
consequentia
.
Hee
saith
,
That
this
Sulpitius
;
Ad
ea
quae
confusè
ab
alijs
aut
responsa
aut
actasunt
,
disertè
&
respondisse
&
egisse
;
quòd
is
ad
juris
civilis
cognitionem
Dialecticam
omnium
artium
maximam
quasi
lucem
attulerat
.
Thus
much
out
of
the
ancient
Heathen
;
Let
us
now
descend
unto
the
Fathers
of
the
Church
:
Origen
in
his
second
Homily
upon
Exodus
hath
these
words
,
Eruditio
ista
(
speaking
of
Logick
)
ad
omnem
pervenit
sensum
,
&
per
eam
quisque
meditatus
&
fotus
,
ad
divinorum
intelligentiam
paratior
venit
.
Clemens
Alexandrinus
thus
,
Dialectica
velut
manuducit
ad
veram
aeternamque
scientiam
,
&
ad
cognitionem
supremae
veritatis
.
Saint
Ierome
thus
;
Verè
quicquid
perversorum
dogmatum
est
,
&
putatur
esse
robustum
in
terrena
sapientia
,
hoc
Dialecticae
arte
subvertitur
,
&
instar
incendij
in
cinerem
favillasque
dissolvitur
.
Saint
Augustine
is
also
evident
in
many
places
as
li.
2.
de
ordine
.
Ad
religionis
Christianae
cognitionem
nemo
aspirare
dehet
sine
Dialectica
.
And
againe
,
lib.
2.
de
Doctrina
Christiana
:
Disputationis
disciplina
,
ad
omnia
genera
quaestionum
,
quae
in
literis
sanctis
sunt
penetranda
&
dissolvenda
plurimum
valet
!
tantùm
ibi
cavendum
est
,
libido
rixandi
,
&
puerilis
quaedam
ostentatio
decipiendi
.
And
in
sundry
other
parts
of
his
works
,
as
lib.
1.
contra
Crescomum
Grammaticum
;
and
lib.
3.
contra
Academ
:
And
he
hath
defined
Logicke
to
be
Ars
artium
,
Scientia
scientiarum
,
qua
aperta
omnes
aliae
aperiuntur
,
&
qua
clausa
,
omnes
aliae
clauduntur
.
By
these
Fathers
of
the
Church
,
it
may
appeare
how
needfull
they
held
Logicke
to
bee
for
the
knowledge
of
Divinity
.
The
Interpretors
of
Aristotle
,
and
the
Writers
of
latter
time
pleno
intonant
ore
.
Avicenna
in
his
Treatise
of
Logicke
,
Cap.
2.
Natura
&
prima
inchoatio
hominis
,
non
fuit
sufficiens
ad
verum
cognoscendum
,
fuit
ergo
opus
aliqua
arte
.
per
quam
,
modum
procedendi
in
cognitione
haberemus
,
ut
tali
modo
perspecto
,
postea
ad
rerum
speculationem
accederemus
,
haec
autem
ars
fuit
Logica
,
seu
Dialectica
,
quae
modum
universalem
tradit
,
rem
quamlibet
speculando
.
Aquinas
saith
it
is
,
Scientia
rationalis
,
actuum
rationis
directiva
.
Albertus
magnus
likewise
:
Logica
est
quae
à
Phantasiis
,
quae
videntur
&
non
sunt
,
liberat
;
errores
damnat
,
falsitates
ostendit
,
&
lumen
rectum
in
omni
opere
contemplationis
praebet
.
I
will
conclude
with
that
which
Barth
.
Kickerman
:
hath
in
Gym
.
Logico
,
lib.
1.
Logicke
saith
he
,
amongst
other
things
promiseth
,
Tria
maxima
bona
,
Veritatem
,
perspicuitatem
,
&
ordinem
,
quibus
nihile
est
in
humanis
rebus
,
aut
sublimius
,
aut
pulchrius
.
But
it
will
here
be
objected
,
Ob.
That
I
have
strayed
from
the
question
,
which
is
,
whether
Logicke
be
necessary
for
the
obtaining
of
the
knowledge
of
the
Law
?
To
the
which
I
answer
;
Resp.
That
otherwise
those
Writers
have
laboured
in
vaine
,
who
have
published
the
Art
of
Logicke
adapted
for
the
Civill
and
Common
Lawes
,
some
in
part
as
the
Topicks
,
or
places
of
invention
legall
;
as
Tullij
Topica
,
ad
Trebatium
a
Romane
Lawyer
:
Claudius
Cantiuncula
,
Nicholaus
Everarde
,
in
their
bookes
intituled
Topica
legalia
,
Hottaman
and
others
.
And
some
others
the
Precepts
of
the
whole
Art
,
as
Christopherus
Hegendorphinus
,
Iohannes
Thomas
Fregius
:
Petrus
Gambraeus
,
and
others
,
as
Apellus
,
Bellonus
,
Oldendorpius
,
Nevisanus
,
Grammara
,
&c.
And
how
the
same
shall
be
needfull
to
the
Common
Law
;
That
which
we
are
further
to
declare
will
better
manifest
.
Concerning
the
Third
proposed
matter
,
These
may
be
the
reasons
following
to
prove
Logicke
necessary
or
at
least
behoovfull
to
the
study
of
the
Law
.
The
Art
of
Logicke
is
the
Art
of
reasoning
,
Ra.
prima
.
Ars
argumentandi
,
as
one
of
the
properties
thereof
,
teaching
to
find
out
truth
by
argument
and
disputation
.
But
the
Common
Law
of
this
Land
(
which
is
often
stiled
in
our
Bookes
by
the
name
of
common
reason
)
is
deduced
from
principles
evident
and
knowne
,
for
the
decision
of
such
things
as
are
drawne
into
doubt
,
and
are
unknowne
.
The
precepts
thereof
are
taught
by
Logicke
in
the
bookes
of
Demonstration
and
Topicke
parts
of
the
Art
of
Logicke
;
and
therefore
is
Logicke
necessary
for
the
obtaining
of
the
knowledge
of
the
Law
,
especially
for
that
all
points
debated
or
controverted
in
our
Law
,
are
either
matters
in
fact
,
and
so
triable
by
a
lury
:
or
doubts
in
law
,
determinable
by
disputation
and
argument
.
Againe
,
Ra.
secunda
.
Logicke
teacheth
a
man
to
collect
the
Axiomes
,
principles
,
grounds
and
rules
observed
in
that
Art
which
he
studieth
,
and
being
so
collected
aptly
to
dispose
the
same
,
which
yeeldeth
diversity
of
matter
,
and
ready
furniture
for
disputation
:
but
those
things
are
very
necessary
to
be
observed
in
the
study
of
the
Law
,
therefore
is
Logicke
a
very
necessary
science
for
the
obtaining
thereof
in
this
respect
.
Our
Lawyer
in
his
Law-arguments
,
Ra.
tertia
.
the
better
to
demonstrate
and
strengthen
his
opinion
is
driven
not
onely
to
define
or
describe
the
thing
disputed
of
,
but
to
divide
the
same
into
parts
,
to
distinguish
the
divers
significations
of
the
words
,
but
also
to
search
and
indigate
the
difference
of
matters
and
cases
proposed
:
all
which
the
Art
of
Logicke
professeth
to
teach
;
and
therefore
Logicke
is
necessary
.
Every
man
in
his
Argument
ought
to
covet
to
bee
understood
of
them
that
heare
him
;
Rae
.
quarta
.
for
to
what
end
else
should
he
speake
.
But
a
man
is
best
understood
when
in
obscure
matter
he
doth
propose
first
,
the
most
generall
propositions
,
of
easie
apprehension
,
and
out
of
them
deduce
others
,
and
so
to
combine
and
knit
all
together
,
as
all
the
parts
in
orderly
disposition
may
cohere
,
of
which
result
those
three
excellent
things
,
Brevity
,
Perspicuity
,
and
Verity
,
all
which
Logicke
promiseth
;
and
therefore
is
Logicke
necessary
.
When
a
doubtfull
question
is
proposed
,
Ra.
quinta
.
the
truth
is
found
out
by
Argument
,
debate
,
and
discourse
of
reason
on
both
parts
,
as
in
all
our
law-arguments
appeateth
;
and
therefore
such
debate
and
conflict
of
reason
is
said
to
be
the
flayle
whereby
the
corne
is
severed
from
the
stubble
,
truth
is
tryed
from
falshood
(
for
there
can
be
but
one
truth
;
)
and
therefore
when
there
is
diversity
of
opinion
,
the
truth
can
rest
onely
but
of
one
part
,
and
the
others
must
bee
deceived
thorow
the
deceipt
of
a
faulty
forme
of
their
manner
of
reasoning
.
But
Logicke
teacheth
a
man
to
know
the
falacies
of
deceiptfull
and
imperfect
Arguments
,
and
to
resolve
them
into
better
formes
,
or
to
disclose
their
imperfection
;
Ergo
,
Every
Artificer
is
made
more
expedite
when
he
is
furnished
with
apt
instruments
prepared
to
his
hand
,
Ra
sixta
.
Sed
sciendi
instrumenta
sunt
formae
discerendi
.
The
Instruments
of
knowledge
are
the
formes
of
discourse
;
therefore
our
understanding
which
is
the
Artificer
,
is
made
more
ready
,
when
it
hath
right
and
fit
grounds
of
argument
reduced
and
prepared
,
which
Logicke
provideth
,
Ergo
;
To
obtaine
the
knowledge
of
any
Science
two
things
are
required
,
Ra.
septima
.
first
,
the
certaine
dependency
and
coherence
of
the
parts
of
the
matter
to
bee
knowne
,
and
secondly
,
the
aptnesse
of
the
instrument
whereby
we
doe
apprehend
and
know
the
same
.
The
first
of
these
doth
result
on
the
necessary
consequence
,
that
is
,
betweene
the
causes
and
their
effects
;
the
latter
dependeth
of
the
knowledge
of
that
discourse
of
reason
and
argument
which
is
used
in
the
apprehension
of
Science
,
and
giveth
satisfaction
and
assurednesse
of
truth
to
the
learner
.
And
these
things
doth
Logicke
minister
unto
us
;
Ergo.
It
is
the
saying
of
Aristotle
,
Ra.
octav
.
Scire
arbitramur
cum
cognoscimus
rem
ex
sua
causa
,
&
quod
alitèr
se
habere
non
potest
.
Then
wee
are
assured
to
know
when
the
effect
is
known
by
his
true
cause
,
whose
consequence
cannot
saile
:
but
these
things
wee
learne
by
those
Arguments
which
we
call
Demonstrations
,
which
Logicke
informeth
us
in
.
And
therfore
Aristotle
truly
observed
,
2.
Metaph.
cap.
3.
Est
impedimentum
ad
scientias
capessandas
non
prius
tenere
modum
sciendi
.
Where
his
Commentator
Averois
,
and
the
most
of
his
Interpreters
doe
understand
per
modum
sciendi
,
the
Art
of
Logicke
.
These
things
considered
and
laid
together
,
it
will
not
be
hard
or
difficult
,
to
answer
the
Reasons
shortly
of
the
opposite
part
.
As
to
the
first
:
Experience
indeed
is
a
sure
soundation
,
Resp.
ad
primam
object
.
and
many
excellent
Lawyers
haue
beene
without
Logicke
:
But
yet
if
Logicke
had
beene
joyned
to
their
Law
,
they
would
have
beene
better
strengthned
in
their
knowledge
,
and
more
perspicuous
in
the
delivery
thereof
.
To
the
second
:
Resp.
ad
sec.
ob
.
Law-arguments
are
often
drawne
out
of
Authorities
:
but
Authorities
prove
two
manner
of
wayes
;
1
,
sometime
directly
,
and
then
is
Authoritie
called
an
inartificiall
Argument
:
2
,
but
most
commonly
,
by
inference
and
consequence
,
which
Logicke
directeth
.
To
the
third
:
Lawes
deale
with
particular
Cases
,
Resp.
ad
t●rtiam
Object
.
Logicke
with
universall
Precepts
.
But
when
particular
Causes
are
brought
to
argument
,
they
are
drawne
to
more
generall
Theses
and
Propositions
.
To
the
fourth
:
Resp.
ad
quar
Object
.
it
is
true
that
the
Lawyer
doth
not
argue
syllogistically
concise
,
and
yet
many
times
with
a
Syllogisme
at
large
.
To
the
fifth
Objection
:
Reason
is
naturall
,
but
yet
it
is
polished
by
Art
,
and
therefore
best
by
the
Art
of
Reason
,
which
is
Logicke
:
It
resteth
now
then
,
Res
.
ad
quint.
object
.
that
wee
examine
Logicke
by
his
parts
,
and
try
the
use
,
utilitie
,
or
necessitie
thereof
by
examples
out
of
our
Lawes
.
Amongst
sundry
definitions
or
descriptions
of
Logicke
,
Logica
quid
?
this
is
one
vulgarly
received
,
Dialectica
est
recte
definiendi
,
dividendi
,
&
argumentandi
ars
:
An
Art
teaching
the
true
meanes
of
right
Definition
,
Division
,
and
Argument
.
Wee
will
distinguish
therefore
these
into
parts
,
and
speake
first
and
formerly
of
Definition
.
But
before
wee
define
what
Definition
is
,
Definitio
quid
?
because
there
is
an
ambiguitie
,
and
duplicitie
of
the
signification
thereof
,
wee
should
first
distinguish
the
same
.
There
is
therefore
Duplex
Definitio
.
1
,
Nominis
:
2
,
Rei
.
Definitio
Nominis
est
qua
vocis
significatio
explicatur
.
The
reason
is
added
;
Sunt
enim
verba
notae
aut
signa
rerum
.
And
this
also
is
twofold
:
The
first
called
commonly
Etimologie
,
of
the
Greeke
words
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
&
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
:
whereby
is
imparted
the
property
,
waight
,
and
signification
,
or
Emphasis
of
the
word
:
and
the
reasons
drawne
therefrom
are
called
in
our
bookes
,
Arguments
,
ex
vi
verbi
.
Thus
Tully
in
his
Topickes
,
and
the
Latines
after
him
,
have
called
Notations
,
a
notatione
;
Or
,
Etimologia
quid
?
Etimologie
est
cum
vox
ex
suae
origine
explicatur
.
The
second
kinde
is
called
Antilexis
;
and
is
cum
vox
ignotior
vel
obscurior
voce
notiore
vel
clariore
idem
significante
declaratur
.
And
of
both
these
we
have
plentifull
examples
.
Etimologies
of
the
first
kinde
,
which
are
most
effectuall
,
are
diversly
deduced
;
sometimes
from
the
matter
,
sometimes
from
the
scope
or
end
,
sometimes
from
the
effect
,
sometimes
from
the
properties
,
sometimes
from
the
object
,
&
sometimes
from
the
opposite
.
From
the
scope
or
end
wee
have
sundry
examples
;
9
&
10.
Eliz
267.
b.
n.
Dyer
.
as
a
Colledge
is
in
Latine
called
Collegium
,
a
cohabitatione
,
&
quia
simul
colliguntur
.
So
likewise
wee
call
him
an
Executor
of
a
last
Will
and
Testament
,
Com.
Pl.
2.280
.
b.
of
executing
and
performing
the
will
of
the
dead
;
not
that
hee
alwayes
doth
so
,
but
that
in
respect
of
his
power
and
duty
he
is
bound
so
to
doe
.
So
a
Iudgement
or
Sentence
of
a
Court
is
called
Iuditium
quasi
Iuris
dictum
,
The
finall
saying
,
Coke
lib.
10.42
.
a.
judgement
and
doome
of
the
Law
.
For
that
every
Iudgement
is
taken
and
received
for
law
,
untill
it
be
reversed
for
error
;
for
that
is
the
scope
and
end
of
the
Law
.
Likewise
a
Preband
is
called
Praebenda
,
Coke
lib.
3.
fo.
75.
a
praebendo
auxilium
&
consilium
Episcopo
:
for
to
that
end
were
Prebends
ordained
in
Cathedrall
Churches
,
that
the
Prebendaries
therof
should
be
Assistants
and
of
Counsell
to
the
Bishop
in
his
Episcopall
function
.
Likewise
saith
Bracton
,
Rex
dicitur
a
regendo
,
Lib.
3.
cap.
9.
Lib.
1.
cap.
8.
Bracton
.
non
a
regnando
.
And
the
French
word
Verdict
used
in
our
Law
for
the
resolution
of
those
that
are
impanelled
to
try
matters
in
fact
,
est
quasi
vere
dictum
,
as
the
saying
of
truth
;
and
so
to
be
received
without
contradiction
untill
it
be
defeated
by
an
attaint
.
Sometimes
Etimologies
are
drawne
from
the
effect
or
operation
:
whereof
Bracton
saith
well
,
Bract.
lib.
3.
cap.
1.
That
an
Action
or
Suit
in
law
may
well
be
called
an
Action
,
quum
agitur
de
injuria
:
for
it
is
a
complaint
of
an
injury
received
.
So
Damnum
,
Coke
li.
10.
ca.
116.117
.
Damage
(
saith
one
)
is
derived
a
demendo
,
cum
diminutione
res
deterior
fit
.
A
Confirmation
is
so
called
,
Littl.
con
.
cas.
520.
as
Littleton
affirmeth
,
&
idem
est
quod
firmum
facere
,
of
the
operation
it
hath
to
make
stable
or
firme
a
former
Grant
.
So
is
a
Surrender
,
14.
H.
7.
Quia
sursum'redditio
,
and
of
the
two
French
words
suise
&
rendre
,
or
yeelding
up
of
an
estate
againe
to
the
Lessor
or
his
assignee
to
the
immediate
Reversion
from
which
it
was
derived
.
To
like
purpose
a
Writ
is
called
in
Latine
Breve
,
and
in
French
a
Briefe
,
Bract.
112.413
.
for
the
brevitie
of
it
,
and
for
that
,
(
as
Bracton
saith
)
rem
quae
est
&
intentionem
petentis
breviter
enarrat
.
So
,
a
Fine
,
whereby
lands
or
inheritances
are
conveyed
in
Courts
of
Record
by
concord
and
agreement
of
the
parties
,
in
respect
of
their
operation
,
scope
,
and
strength
to
make
peace
,
and
settle
the
Inheritance
:
Glanvil
.
Of
which
Glanvil
the
most
ancient
writer
now
extant
of
our
Law
,
giveth
an
intimation
when
hee
writeth
,
Dicitur
talis
concordia
finalis
,
quia
finem
imponit
negotio
,
adeo
ut
neutra
pars
litigantium
ab
eo
poterit
recedere
.
Which
is
also
affirmed
by
the
Statute
of
21.
21.
Ed.
1.
Ed.
1.
de
finibus
levandis
,
where
the
words
are
,
Quia
Fines
in
curia
nostra
levati
,
finem
litibus
debent
imponere
:
&
idco
Fines
dicuntur
maximè
.
So
wee
say
that
the
foundation
of
a
Colledge
,
Coke
li.
10.
fo.
26.
Hospitall
,
or
such
like
is
called
fundatio
,
quasi
fundi
datio
,
vel
fundamenti
locatio
.
Likewise
a
Villeine
,
a
man
of
servile
or
base
degree
is
called
in
our
Law
in
Latine
servus
;
for
as
Bracton
saith
,
dicitur
servus
à
servando
,
non
à
serviendo
,
Bracton
li.
1.
ca.
60.
pa.
3.
antiquitùs
enim
solent
Principes
captivos
vendere
,
&
ideo
eos
servare
&
non
occidere
.
And
in
English
we
call
him
Villeine
à
villa
,
from
a
Country
Farme
,
whereunto
they
were
deputed
to
doe
service
,
as
our
Villeines
regardant
to
Mannors
were
,
as
old
Records
and
Authors
affirme
,
glebae
ascriptitiae
,
tyed
to
the
Turfe
:
Or
rather
of
the
word
vilis
of
his
condition
vile
and
base
.
And
the
woman
Villeine
as
Littleton
saith
,
is
called
a
Neefe
,
quasi
nativa
:
The
making
free
of
both
which
,
or
their
Infranchisment
,
is
called
in
Latine
,
Manumissio
,
à
manu
mittere
,
quod
idem
est
quod
vel
extra
manum
aut
potestatem
ponere
vel
dimittere
;
For
manus
in
the
Law
Metaphorically
signifieth
either
power
or
possession
,
alluding
to
the
old
Ceremonie
used
in
the
infranchisment
of
Bondmen
,
whereof
Isiodorus
speaketh
,
manumitti
servus
dicebatur
,
cum
Dominus
ejus
,
aut
caput
ejusdem
servi
,
aut
aliud
membrum
tenens
,
dicebat
,
Hunc
hominem
liberum
esse
volo
,
&
remittebat
eum
è
manu
.
The
ancient
forme
and
Ceremony
thereof
among
our
Ancestors
the
Saxons
was
in
this
manner
:
Si
quis
velit
servum
suum
liberum
facere
,
Lambert
.
APXAIONOMIA
.
fo.
126.
tradat
eum
vicecomiti
per
manum
dextram
in
pleno
Comitatu
,
&
quietum
illum
clamare
debet
à
jugo
servitutis
suae
per
manumissionem
,
&
ostendat
ei
liber
as
portas
&
vias
,
&
tradat
ei
libera
arma
,
scilicet
lanceam
&
gladium
&
deinde
liber
homo
efficitur
.
So
the
word
Remitter
,
which
is
an
ancient
tearme
of
the
Law
as
Littleton
saith
of
the
word
(
mitter
,
or
rather
of
the
French
word
remitter
to
restore
)
and
importeth
a
restitution
of
possession
unto
a
mans
ancient
right
.
Litt.
li.
3.
cap.
12.
Remitter
.
P.
Com.
139.
ca.
P.
Weston
.
Likewise
Mortmaine
which
is
a
gift
of
Land
of
other
hereditaments
to
a
Corporation
,
which
hath
a
perpetuall
succession
,
and
therefore
never
like
to
returne
to
the
Lord
by
Escheat
or
Donor
by
Reverter
.
And
therefore
as
one
sayth
,
it
seemeth
to
be
taken
into
a
dead
or
dying
mans
hand
which
holdeth
fast
whatsoever
it
claspeth
.
Or
as
the
Frudists
affirme
;
Pol.
Virgil.
lib.
17.
In
mortuam
manum
vocarunt
,
quod
res
sic
datae
tanquam
mortuae
,
usui
illorum
mortalium
in
perpetuum
ademptae
essent
:
or
else
as
another
of
the
contrary
:
Hottomanus
de
verbis
Feudalibus
.
Quia
possessio
quasi
immortalis
est
,
quia
nunquam
heredem
,
vel
successorem
,
vel
possessorem
habere
desinit
.
So
we
call
a
Rent
paid
yeerely
for
Land
or
other
things
Redditus
,
à
reddendo
,
because
it
is
yeerly
yeelded
or
restored
for
the
Lands
,
&c.
Or
rather
as
some
will
à
redeundo
,
because
it
doth
returne
to
the
Lessor
or
Donor
for
the
issues
and
profits
of
the
Land
:
And
in
English
it
is
called
a
Rent
of
the
French
word
Rentor
to
rate
or
Assesse
at
a
price
.
Coke
lib.
10.
f.
28.
a.
As
concerning
these
Derivations
or
Etymologies
drawne
from
the
finall
cause
or
effect
,
I
was
not
minded
curiously
to
distinguish
,
for
that
in
these
things
which
doe
depend
of
humane
Acts
,
wherein
the
finall
cause
and
effect
is
all
one
;
for
that
the
operation
is
attempted
and
atchieved
for
the
effects
sake
.
But
to
proceed
;
Sometimes
also
Etymologies
are
drawne
from
the
forme
or
manner
of
doing
or
working
.
So
we
call
a
Common
,
to
be
a
right
whereby
we
take
some
kinde
of
profit
in
the
land
,
or
soyle
,
or
inheritance
of
another
,
together
in
Common
with
the
Owner
or
others
,
which
Bracton
expresseth
by
way
of
Etymology
thus
:
Bract.
lib.
4.
c.
33.
f.
223.13
.
H.
8.16
.
a.
Comunia
ex
virtute
vocabuli
componitur
ex
una
&
cum
(
&
subintelligitur
alio
)
Quia
comunia
est
in
alieno
&
una
cum
alio
&
in
fundo
proprio
,
quia
nemini
seruit
suus
fundus
proprius
.
Likewise
wee
call
certaine
Lands
Copyholds
of
the
forme
and
manner
of
Tenure
,
because
the
Tennants
thereof
doe
hold
the
same
per
copiam
rotuli
Curiae
Domini
,
they
have
no
other
evidence
or
writing
of
their
Tenure
;
but
the
Copy
of
the
roll
of
the
Lords
Court
.
But
of
these
we
have
said
sufficient
,
let
us
now
speake
of
the
other
kind
which
is
called
Antilexis
,
when
an
obscure
word
is
explained
by
another
more
familiar
or
better
knowne
:
This
is
performed
when
an
English
word
is
expounded
by
a
Latine
word
,
or
in
any
other
language
from
whence
the
word
was
first
derived
.
As
administration
of
goods
of
an
Intestate
is
said
to
bee
ordinatio
seu
dispositio
,
1.
Lamberts
Iustice
li.
1.
ca.
17.22
.
b.
Ass.
pla.
6.
P.
6.
Eliz.
Dyer
.
166.
b.
An
Assault
upon
a
mans
person
by
another
,
is
so
called
of
the
Latine
word
assultus
and
doth
import
the
offer
of
any
hurtfull
blow
or
fearfull
speech
.
An
arrest
is
said
to
be
the
restraint
of
a
mans
liberty
by
power
or
colour
of
a
lawfull
Warrant
,
derived
as
some
thinke
from
the
French
word
arrester
to
stay
,
Lamb.
Iustic
.
li.
1.
cap.
16.
or
else
farre
fetched
from
the
Greeke
word
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
a
Decree
or
sentence
of
the
Court.
So
nomen
à
noscendo
,
quia
notitiam
fcit
,
whereupon
saith
Bracton
,
Bract
lib.
4.
ca.
20.
f.
188.
Ideò
imposita
sunt
nomina
ut
demonstrent
voluntatem
dicentis
,
&
utimur
not
is
in
vocis
ministerio
.
So
that
we
may
easily
observe
;
That
many
of
these
of
this
latter
kinde
are
meere
Dorivations
,
17.
E.
4.
so.
2.
as
Contract
à
contrahendo
,
Deodand
,
quasi
Deo
dandum
,
id
est
,
id
est
,
in
eleemosynas
erogandum
,
Divortium
à
divertando
,
Duress
ex
duritia
,
of
straight
imprisonment
or
hard
intreaty
.
Larceny
,
id
est
,
latrocinium
,
homicidium
ab
homine
&
cadio
.
Lamb.
Iust.
Bract.
lib.
3.120
.
b.
Parapherna
,
id
est
,
praeter
dotem
,
and
signifieth
mundum
muliebrem
:
Peace
à
vocabulo
latino
Pax
:
Lamb.
Iustice
,
lib.
1.
cap.
2.
f.
67.
A
Court
of
Pypowder
,
a
Court
belonging
and
incident
to
Markets
and
faires
,
12.
E.
4.9
.
Lamb.
de
curijs
.
to
yeeld
Iustice
to
the
buyers
and
sellers
comming
thither
,
which
because
they
are
most
frequented
in
Summer
,
the
word
was
given
of
the
dusty
feet
of
the
commers
.
A
Presentment
which
is
presented
by
an
Inquest
containing
some
crime
or
neusance
,
wherof
they
had
to
enquire
,
is
derived
of
the
French
word
,
presenter
.
Records
are
so
said
of
the
verbe
Recordor
to
remember
,
Lamb.
Iust.
lib.
1.
ca.
13.
because
they
are
Remembrances
,
&
vetustatis
&
veritatis
vestigia
,
the
lively
representations
both
of
former
time
and
truth
:
Reversion
of
the
word
Reverterr
,
or
as
terra
revertens
.
Coke
lib.
2.
fo.
5.
An
estate
Tayle
,
of
the
French
word
tailer
,
to
docke
,
or
cut
,
limit
or
appoint
in
certainty
,
Littl.
l.
1.
c.
2.
and
many
such
like
,
whereon
I
need
not
to
insist
.
Sometime
the
Derivation
of
the
word
is
deduced
from
some
ancient
word
in
old
time
used
although
now
antiquated
and
growne
out
of
use
,
and
yet
neverthelesse
such
as
giveth
light
to
the
present
knowledge
of
the
word
,
as
Constable
an
ancient
Officer
of
this
Kingdome
,
Lamb.
de
Constables
.
derived
of
two
old
Saxon
words
,
Kinning
which
signifieth
King
,
and
stable
,
stability
,
cyng
.
as
the
stabilitie
of
the
King
and
Kingdom
;
So
the
word
Farme
in
one
signification
importeth
Lands
,
or
other
inheritances
,
holden
for
a
yeerly
rent
,
quasi
feormian
,
Feormian
.
which
is
an
old
Saxon
word
,
signifying
to
feed
,
or
render
victuall
;
for
that
in
ancient
time
they
rendred
victuall
for
the
most
part
,
and
not
money
.
Lambert
in
Archion●mia
So
warrantisure
,
of
the
old
word
which
signifieth
to
defend
or
acquit
,
for
so
saith
Bracton
,
Warrantizare
nihil
aliud
est
quam
defendere
,
Bracton
li.
5.
fo.
350.
b.
Paragraph
.
2.
&
acquietare
tenentem
,
qui
warrentum
vocavit
in
seisina
sua
.
So
Gavellkinde
,
a
custome
whereby
every
sonne
or
heire
male
inheriteth
a
portion
alike
in
his
Ancestors
estate
,
and
is
derived
of
two
old
Saxon
words
gife
eal
cyn
,
that
is
,
given
to
all
the
kinne
;
gife
cal
cyn
.
Quasi
omnibus
cognatione
proximis
data
hereditas
.
So
Guilda
Mercatoria
,
Lam.
Arch.
Coke
li.
10.
fo.
30.
an
ancient
word
found
in
old
Charters
and
monuments
,
and
signifies
contuberrimum
:
or
a
Corporation
of
Merchants
.
So
Steward
derived
of
two
old
words
,
Steed
and
Ward
,
Coke
lib.
9.
fo.
45.
and
is
as
much
to
say
,
as
a
man
appointed
in
my
steed
or
place
.
So
the
word
Wythernam
,
yet
much
in
use
,
drawne
from
two
old
and
ontworne
Saxon
words
Wither
,
pyþorn
;
er
&
Nâm
.
Lam.
Arch.
alterum
,
&
Nam
,
pignus
;
quasi
alter
a
pignoris
oblatio
.
Sometimes
Derivations
are
made
of
some
old
words
,
whereof
the
use
from
which
the
Derivation
was
made
,
is
now
utterly
changed
,
as
socagium
,
id
est
,
servitium
socae
,
id
est
,
carucae
,
for
that
the
word
soca
was
used
for
a
plough
.
But
this
service
was
after
by
generall
consent
of
Lord
and
Tenant
,
redeemed
by
payment
of
a
yeerly
rent
,
and
yet
the
signification
remaining
still
,
as
Land
giuen
to
plough
the
Lords
Land
,
although
the
use
of
that
service
be
abrogated
;
except
upon
Creation
of
the
Tenure
,
it
should
bee
reserved
and
so
renewed
.
So
saith
one
,
the
houses
of
the
devoted
religious
were
called
Monasteria
,
of
the
solitude
or
solitary
life
there
led
,
which
in
latter
dayes
was
nothing
lesse
,
Clandius
Cautiun
.
de
lo.
legal
.
Quia
pleraque
monasterianil
minus
sunt
quaem
solitudines
.
Sundry
other
Derivations
there
are
,
which
are
but
onely
allusions
strained
and
framed
by
the
wit
and
industry
of
man
,
rather
then
from
the
native
signification
of
the
word
,
and
therefore
of
lesse
regard
and
moment
,
as
testamentum
,
quasi
testatio
mentis
,
first
devised
by
Servius
Sulpitius
the
old
Romane
Lawyer
,
Aul.
Gelius
lib.
6.
ca.
12.
and
used
in
our
bookes
,
although
impeached
by
Aulus
Gellius
in
that
age
,
or
shortly
after
as
a
straine
of
wit
,
and
not
out
of
any
true
denomination
of
the
word
.
So
likewise
of
that
straine
is
agreamentum
,
Com.
Fogoss
.
17.
Bract.
lib.
1.
ca.
3.
which
one
would
frame
as
aggregatio
mentium
.
So
aequitas
,
quasi
aequalitas
,
quiae
est
rerum
convenientia
,
qua
in
paribus
causis
paria
desiderat
jura
&
omnia
benè
coaequiperat
.
So
have
they
derived
selony
,
Lambert
.
Coke
l.
4.124
Lam.
Iust.
l
1
ca.
20.
Coke
li.
4.37
.
quasi
felleo
animo
factum
;
so
another
deriveth
Robbery
of
the
word
robe
.
And
another
terra
,
à
terendo
,
quia
vomere
teritur
,
and
many
such
like
,
with
the
which
I
will
not
meddle
.
There
rests
a
few
words
of
the
use
of
these
Etymologres
,
Notations
,
and
allusions
,
and
so
an
end
.
Etymologies
if
they
be
rightly
used
and
frawne
from
the
finall
cause
or
from
the
effect
,
doe
not
onely
yeeld
an
Argument
of
good
consequence
,
but
also
offer
much
illustration
and
delight
;
And
therefore
it
is
well
observed
by
one
,
Clau.
Camiuneula
.
de
loc.
legal
.
That
Etymologia
est
resolutio
vocis
in
verum
&
proprium
effectum
,
&
verbi
veritatem
notificat
,
&
obid
,
eam
Cicero
veriloquium
appellat
:
And
hence
grew
among
the
Graecians
that
usuall
speech
of
the
which
Isiodore
speaketh
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
to
learn
aright
it
is
principally
necessary
to
search
out
the
signification
of
the
word
.
First
therefore
,
we
are
for
the
right
use
of
them
to
observe
;
That
these
derivations
are
not
to
be
observed
in
every
word
;
For
there
are
and
must
be
in
every
language
many
primitives
which
have
their
native
significations
according
to
the
imposers
pleasure
,
for
that
of
the
Poet
is
to
purpose
;
Multarenascentur
,
quae
nunc
cecidere
,
cadentque
Quae
nunc
sunt
in
honore
vocabula
,
si
volet
usus
,
Quem
penes
ar
bitriū
est
,
&
mos
&
norma
loquendi
.
They
are
Derivative
words
which
out
of
compositon
may
beare
interpretations
.
Secondly
,
Arguments
from
Etymology
are
not
to
be
used
at
all
times
and
upon
all
occasions
,
but
rarely
,
and
where
necessity
doth
require
the
same
,
or
delight
,
or
apt
consequence
doth
offer
fit
occasion
;
Clau.
Cant.
and
therefore
saith
one
,
Etymologia
usum
habet
necessarium
,
quoties
interpretatione
res
de
qua
quaeritur
eget
.
Thirdly
,
that
your
allusions
be
such
,
non
abhorrentes
ab
ipso
vocabulo
,
sed
à
sono
vocis
provenientes
:
not
harshly
or
hardly
drawne
or
wrung
out
,
but
answerable
to
the
sound
o
fhte
word
,
and
application
to
the
sense
.
It
is
not
my
purpose
to
set
forth
here
when
arguments
and
reasons
drawne
from
Etymologies
,
doe
hold
their
consequence
,
and
when
not
,
for
therein
the
student
of
the
Law
must
bee
formerly
instructed
by
the
Precepts
of
the
Art
of
Logicke
;
for
this
place
will
not
permit
the
same
,
lest
I
should
treat
of
Arguments
before
I
come
to
Argument
.
But
let
me
not
here
forget
that
Etymologies
are
most
used
by
the
Authors
of
our
Lawes
in
their
Treatises
and
Tracts
which
are
of
Simplicis
Thematis
.
Having
done
with
the
derivation
of
words
,
we
come
now
to
the
explication
of
the
nature
of
the
thing
by
definition
.
Definition
it selfe
is
thus
defined
,
Definitio
quid
?
Definitio
est
oratio
,
quae
quid
sit
,
de
quo
agitur
,
ostendit
brevissime
.
It
is
a
Proposition
which
doth
expresse
the
nature
of
the
thing
shortly
.
Aristo
.
1.
Post
.
2.
Post
.
c.
10.
And
therefore
Aristotle
saith
aptly
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
:
or
as
in
another
place
to
the
like
effect
:
Definitio
est
oratio
,
quae
quid
est
significans
.
And
therefore
it
is
truely
said
of
another
,
That
Fons
totius
explicationis
est
vera
Definitio
;
nullus
enim
rem
melius
noscere
videtur
,
quam
qui
quid
eam
sit
aperte
possit
explicare
.
Kickerns
.
A
true
Definition
is
the
fountaine
of
explication
:
for
no
man
knoweth
any
thing
better
then
he
which
can
aptly
and
briefly
expresse
the
nature
thereof
,
and
what
it
is
.
Of
Definitions
there
by
two
kindes
:
the
one
perfect
and
absolute
;
the
other
lesse
perfect
.
The
perfect
Definition
is
that
which
doth
consist
Ex
proximo
genere
,
&
vera
differentia
;
as
that
whereby
they
doe
define
a
man
to
be
a
liuing
creature
mortall
endued
with
reason
,
the
Genus
whereof
is
a
living
creature
mortall
;
which
our
English
tougue
cannot
well
expresse
in
one
word
,
as
it
is
by
the
Latine
word
Animal
.
But
because
this
word
is
generall
to
many
other
living
creatures
besides
,
endued
with
sense
,
therefore
that
perfect
difference
,
endued
with
reason
,
rationale
,
is
adjoyned
,
whereby
man
is
distinguished
from
all
other
things
.
For
although
Angels
be
indued
with
reason
,
yet
are
they
not
animalia
,
and
there
is
nothing
which
may
be
called
animal
rationale
but
man
alone
.
This
rule
I
here
remember
,
Quod
genus
&
differentia
ex
Pradicamento
sumantur
.
But
these
things
I
leave
to
the
Logicke-schoole
:
And
for
that
our
dull
understanding
can
hardly
discerne
the
true
essentiall
difference
of
things
,
we
are
driven
,
and
especially
in
accidentall
matters
,
to
expresse
by
their
properties
,
parts
,
causes
,
or
accidents
;
which
a
Logicall
writer
hath
well
conceived
in
these
words
,
Cùm
certum
sit
,
hominem
internas
rerum
formas
perfectè
non
cognoscere
,
ideo
loco
differentiarum
seu
formarum
,
propria
accidentia
tanquam
,
scilicet
,
senfibus
viciniora
in
definitione
sumimus
.
Another
in
this
manner
,
Nuuiuorei
majori
laboramus
inopia
quam
differentiarum
.
And
another
,
Laboramus
plerumque
vel
maximè
omnibus
è
rebus
verarum
differentiarum
penuria
,
quaeque
hic
ut
in
rebus
caeteris
pro
veris
habeamus
,
quae
proximè
veris
videntur
accedere
.
Therefore
the
imperfect
Definition
,
which
is
called
a
description
;
is
thus
set
forth
:
Definitio
imperfecta
est
definiti
per
terminos
minus
essentiales
explicatio
.
Of
this
there
are
,
as
some
do
teach
,
these
kindes
;
Causalis
,
Partialis
,
&
Accidentalis
.
Others
somewhat
more
fully
thus
,
Imperfect
à
definitio
sive
descriptio
,
est
principalis
vel
minus
principalis
.
Principalis
,
definitum
explicat
genere
&
accidentibus
,
vel
causis
,
vel
effectibus
proprijs
,
vel
partibus
.
And
therefore
that
which
is
given
of
them
ex
causis
,
is
called
causans
,
and
is
nothing
else
but
Oratio
rei
proprias
causas
manifestans
:
so
that
they
doe
affirme
,
That
such
descriptions
are
causall
,
and
given
per
materiam
&
formam
to
be
essentiall
.
Descriptio
,
or
Definitio
minus
principalis
,
which
is
,
ex
accidentibus
,
and
therefore
called
accidentalis
,
est
definiti
ex
merè
conting
entibus
terminis
,
vel
etiam
externis
explicatio
,
sive
generis
accurata
assignatione
.
And
here
I
thinke
it
not
amisse
to
observe
some
rules
for
good
definition
or
description
.
And
therefore
.
First
,
every
good
definition
or
description
ought
to
containe
two
principall
parts
:
1
,
That
which
is
generall
,
and
therefore
called
Genus
,
wherein
the
thing
defined
hath
communitie
with
other
things
:
And
2
,
that
which
may
more
particularly
expresse
the
nature
thereof
,
to
distinguish
the
thing
defined
from
all
other
things
loco
differentiae
.
And
therefore
saith
Tully
ad
Trebatum
,
Sic
veteres
praecipiunt
,
cum
sumpser
is
ea
quae
sunt
rei
quam
definire
velis
cum
alijs
commania
,
usque
eo
persequi
dum
proprium
efficiatur
,
quod
nullam
in
aliam
rem
transferri
potest
.
Another
setteth
the
same
downe
in
this
manner
:
Primò
quaerendum
est
Genus
,
deinde
dividendum
donec
tandem
veniatur
ad
eam
orationem
quae
cum
definito
convenit
.
Some
men
there
are
,
which
though
they
extoll
the
true
definition
(
where
it
may
be
had
)
before
the
description
,
as
it
deserveth
;
yet
hold
they
the
description
more
familiar
,
and
apter
to
teach
,
then
the
former
,
whereof
Lodovicus
Vives
writeth
thus
;
The
perfect
Definition
(
saith
hee
)
Verior
quidem
est
,
sed
tamen
obscurior
:
hinc
fit
,
ut
essentiales
definitiones
parùm
doceant
mentem
hominis
non
exactè
docti
,
cui
quidem
longè
●tilior
fuerit
descriptio
ab
externis
accidentibus
,
quae
sensu
possint
percipi
.
And
againe
,
essentiales
,
&
exactissimae
definitiones
parùm
nos
docent
,
&
idcirco
apud
authores
bonos
sunt
rarae
.
For
(
saith
one
)
Desinitio
essentiam
,
descriptio
intelligentiam
rei
claudit
.
Authors
have
given
certaine
rules
also
appliable
to
both
these
kindes
,
which
I
may
not
let
passe
:
because
in
this
place
they
stand
(
as
I
conceive
)
to
good
purpose
.
Whereof
the
first
is
thus
:
Removeri
debet
à
definitione
omnis
ambiguitas
,
&
omnis
obscuritas
,
quae
fit
duabus
causis
:
primò
,
ex
translatione
Tropi
,
&
Metaphora
:
secundo
,
ex
insolentia
vocis
,
omnis
vox
inusitata
est
obscura
.
To
this
effect
hath
Aristotle
these
words
,
Oportet
eum
qui
definit
,
maximè
omnium
clarissima
interpretatione
uti
:
siquidem
cognoscendi
&
intelligendi
causa
traditur
.
Wherefore
the
first
rule
as
you
see
,
Arist.
Top.
6.
ca.
1.
ut
clarior
sit
definitio
,
&
debet
dari
per
notiora
:
for
that
Definitio
prolata
sensui
discentis
notior
&
magis
obvia
esse
debet
.
The
second
rule
is
,
That
every
good
Definition
debet
reciprocari
cum
definito
,
it
ought
to
be
reciprocall
and
convertible
with
the
thing
defined
or
described
.
For
the
better
understanding
whereof
,
it
is
to
be
observed
,
that
every
thing
needeth
not
a
definition
or
description
:
for
particular
and
individuall
things
subject
to
sense
,
need
no
definition
or
description
:
for
that
Definitio
debet
esse
de
universalibus
.
9.
Metaph.
ca.
6.
And
hereupon
Aristotle
affirmeth
,
Omne
quod
definitur
est
species
.
And
although
there
be
five
universalities
or
Praedicables
as
they
tearme
them
,
as
Genus
,
Species
,
Differentia
,
Proprium
,
&
Accidens
,
yet
are
there
but
foure
Pradicata
Topica
,
for
species
is
the
thing
defined
,
and
wherein
,
and
whereby
the
rest
are
verified
.
And
againe
,
Definitio
est
de
rebus
compositis
à
natura
&
finitis
.
The
third
rule
is
as
a
consequent
of
the
former
,
Nihil
habeat
superfluum
aut
diminutum
Definitio
:
for
if
the
definition
or
description
be
convertible
,
and
reciprocall
with
the
thing
defined
,
or
described
(
as
it
ought
)
it
cannot
have
either
superfluity
or
defect
;
this
Precept
I
thought
necessary
in
this
place
,
because
the
student
might
be
the
better
enformed
to
frame
his
Definition
or
description
.
Let
me
here
say
a
word
of
the
efficacy
and
use
of
definitions
and
descriptions
;
And
after
shall
I
endeavour
to
yeeld
some
examples
out
of
our
Lawes
:
A
Definition
is
said
to
be
one
of
the
Instruments
of
knowledge
,
and
that
two
manner
of
wayes
;
Primo
in
ordine
ad
definitum
,
whereby
the
thing
defined
or
described
is
knowne
,
not
by
discourse
of
reason
but
in
a
manner
by
contemplation
intuitive
,
resembling
the
Angells
knowledge
;
and
therefore
it
is
said
well
by
a
Writer
,
Definitio
est
intuitiva
cognitio
;
Kickerm
.
Arist.
8.
Topic
.
ca.
3.
And
hence
it
is
that
Aristotle
so
highly
in
many
places
of
his
workes
commendeth
the
same
Difficilis
est
omnis
disputatio
,
nisi
id
de
quo
ea
instituitur
rectè
ab
initio
defineatur
.
And
againe
in
the
same
place
,
Omnis
quaestio
de
qua
disputare
difficile
est
vel
definitionem
requirit
,
vel
distinctionem
nomine
.
And
in
the
fourth
booke
of
his
Physickes
,
Text.
31.
Arist.
setteth
forth
the
effect
of
a
Definition
,
Quod
per
eam
omnia
dubia
solvi
possint
&
debeant
.
Whereupon
one
writer
groweth
so
confident
that
he
thinketh
,
that
out
of
a
full
definition
of
a
Mariage
,
and
of
an
Oath
,
all
controversies
concerning
either
of
them
may
bee
fully
decided
;
these
be
his
words
:
Hujus
utilitatis
duo
exempla
sunt
valdè
conspicua
,
Strigellius
.
unum
in
doctrina
de
conjugio
,
alterum
in
disputatione
de
juramento
,
omnes
quaestiones
de
his
materijs
facilius
&
certius
possunt
explicari
.
And
therefore
Tully
in
his
Offices
would
have
everie
orderly
treatise
à
definitione
proficisci
.
De
officijs
lib.
1.
Secondly
,
a
Definition
is
an
Instrument
of
knowledge
,
In
ordine
ad
demonstrationem
,
ad
sciendam
conclusionem
,
Sungletius
l.
2.
lo.
in
prooem
.
hoc
est
,
ad
proprietatem
demonstrandam
passionem
de
subjecto
.
But
of
this
more
hereafter
,
when
we
shall
speake
of
Arguments
necessary
,
which
are
called
Demonstrations
.
Let
us
now
exemplifie
what
we
have
said
,
by
instances
drawne
out
of
the
Common
Lawes
of
this
Land
.
If
I
would
define
or
describe
a
Feoffment
,
I
must
first
seeke
out
a
Generall
or
Genus
;
Feoffment
,
quid
?
as
thus
,
A
Feoffment
is
a
conveyance
,
but
because
there
be
sundry
other
conveyances
,
I
must
proceed
further
to
distinguish
the
same
from
all
other
conveyances
;
and
therefore
I
adde
and
say
,
A
Feoffment
is
a
conveyance
which
passeth
an
estate
in
Fee-simple
by
Livery
of
Seisin
;
And
hereby
I
have
distinguished
it
from
all
conveyances
of
record
,
and
conveyances
that
inure
by
way
of
grant
;
But
because
likewise
Leases
for
life
are
likewise
passed
by
Livery
of
seisin
;
and
likewise
a
gift
in
Taile
,
passeth
by
Livery
and
seisin
,
I
have
added
the
last
complement
and
full
difference
in
these
words
,
in
fee
simple
.
Wherfore
in
every
feoffment
two
things
are
of
necessary
regard
;
First
,
that
it
is
performed
by
Livery
of
seisin
.
And
secondly
,
that
it
passeth
an
estate
in
Fee
simple
:
for
Lands
given
in
taile
and
executed
by
a
Livery
,
we
doe
not
call
a
Feoffment
,
but
a
gift
in
Tayle
.
If
I
should
define
or
describe
a
fine
,
Fine
,
quid
?
whereby
Lands
,
and
other
hereditaments
are
conveyed
,
I
would
thus
describe
the
same
.
A
fine
is
a
conveyance
of
Record
by
Concord
betweene
the
parties
upon
licence
obtained
in
a
suit
depending
betweene
them
in
the
Kings
Court
of
Common
Pleas.
Where
a
Conveyance
is
the
Generall
or
Genus
,
The
words
(
of
Record
)
make
a
difference
from
other
conveyances
passed
in
the
Country
in
Pais
.
And
because
there
are
also
some
other
Conveyances
of
Record
,
there
is
added
further
the
essentiall
difference
,
which
is
the
forme
of
a
Fine
,
namely
,
the
concord
upon
licence
obtained
;
for
otherwise
such
concord
cannot
be
admitted
in
an
action
depending
between
them
:
for
without
Action
,
there
can
be
no
Fine
,
which
action
or
suit
,
must
concerne
Lands
or
Hereditaments
,
whereof
the
fine
is
levied
,
or
upon
an
action
of
Covenant
to
levie
such
fine
;
And
this
suite
must
be
depending
:
And
next
of
all
is
added
the
Kings
Court
,
for
such
fines
as
by
Custome
may
be
levied
in
Courts
of
ancient
Demesne
,
or
the
like
if
any
be
,
are
not
true
fines
,
but
similitudinary
onely
.
Lastly
is
added
the
Kings
Court
of
Common
Pleas
,
for
that
in
ancient
times
,
before
the
Court
of
Common
Pleas
was
erected
,
fines
were
levied
,
(
as
among
the
old
Records
thereof
appeareth
)
in
any
of
the
Kings
great
Courts
of
Law
;
But
after
the
erection
of
the
said
Court
,
because
fines
are
levied
upon
Original
Writs
that
are
Common
Pleas
,
and
therefore
onely
to
bee
dealt
withall
in
that
Court
,
fines
are
and
ought
to
bee
levied
in
that
Court
onely
.
I
may
describe
a
fine
shorter
thus
out
of
Glanvills
words
;
Finis
est
amicablilis
compositio
&
finalis
Concordia
,
ex
licentia
terminans
loquelas
motos
in
Curia
:
for
his
very
words
are
these
:
Contingit
autem
aliquando
loquelas
motas
in
Curia
Domini
Regis
per
amicablilem
compositionem
&
finalem
Concordiam
terminari
,
sed
ex
licentia
Regis
vel
ejus
Iusticiariorum
.
These
like
Concords
have
beene
in
use
in
the
Civill
Lawes
,
and
are
called
by
them
Transactions
;
whereof
they
say
thus
,
Transactiones
sunt
de
eis
quae
in
controversia
sunt
,
à
lite
futura
aut
pendente
ad
certam
compositionem
reducuntur
,
dando
aliquid
vel
accipiendo
.
Or
shorter
thus
;
Transactio
est
de
re
dubia
&
lite
ancipite
ne
dum
ad
finem
ducta
,
non
gratuita
pactio
.
Where
note
that
it
may
well
be
said
nongratuita
Pactio
,
because
in
the
end
of
the
concord
of
the
fine
,
which
is
the
forme
thereof
,
there
is
contained
a
certaine
summe
o
money
under
this
forme
,
Et
pro
hoc
fine
habendo
,
&c.
I.
S.
the
cognizee
dedit
20.
li.
sterlinguorum
.
So
likewise
there
is
mony
paid
unto
the
King
which
is
called
the
Kings
Silver
,
pro
licentia
concordandi
.
Thus
much
have
I
adde
out
of
the
Civill
Law
,
That
the
Student
might
as
well
in
this
,
as
in
many
other
Titles
of
the
Law
observe
the
great
conformity
that
is
betweene
the
Common
Law
of
the
Land
,
and
the
Civill
Law
of
the
Empire
.
If
I
should
define
Homage
,
I
may
say
,
Homagium
quid
?
That
Homage
is
a
service
corporall
of
most
reverence
done
by
the
Tenant
unto
his
Lord
,
whereby
hee
doth
acknowledge
himselfe
to
become
his
man
,
and
to
doe
him
all
earthly
honor
.
Where
Service
is
the
Genus
,
or
most
generall
word
,
limited
by
the
word
corporall
,
to
distinguish
from
other
services
not
corporal
,
for
,
that
it
is
to
bee
done
by
the
Tenant
himselfe
in
person
and
by
none
other
to
the
Lord
:
All
those
words
that
follow
in
the
said
description
are
added
in
stead
of
the
difference
drawne
from
the
forme
and
manner
of
the
performance
of
the
said
Service
.
Bracton
hath
a
larger
description
hereof
,
taken
from
the
effects
proceeding
on
both
sides
,
thus
;
Homagium
est
Iuris
vinculum
,
quo
quis
tenetur
&
astringitur
ad
warrantizanduns
,
defendendum
,
&
acquietandum
tenentem
suum
in
sesina
sua
,
versus
omnes
per
certum
servitium
in
donatione
nominatum
&
expressum
,
&
etiam
vice
versa
;
Quo
tenens
re
obligatur
&
astringitur
ad
fidem
domino
suo
servandum
,
&
servitium
debitum
faciendum
.
And
after
setteth
downe
the
forme
and
manner
of
doing
thereof
.
The
Feudists
in
the
Civill
Law
,
doe
render
it
shorter
thus
,
Homagium
seu
hominium
(
haec
enim
vox
communior
est
)
est
venerat
io
(
si
vim
verbistrictè
consideramus
)
cùm
se
eo
nomine
hominem
,
id
est
,
Cliente●
ipsius
fore
profitetur
.
if
likewise
I
should
yeeld
a
generall
description
of
an
estate
in
Dower
,
Estate
in
Dower
,
quid
?
which
might
agree
to
all
the
several
kinds
of
Dower
by
Littleton
,
I
would
describe
it
thus
:
An
estate
in
Dower
is
an
estate
of
Freehold
during
the
life
of
a
lawfull
wife
,
appointed
out
of
an
inheritance
whereof
she
is
dowable
,
which
estate
beginneth
upon
and
after
the
death
of
her
husband
for
her
maintenance
.
The
Generall
of
this
description
is
an
estate
of
Freehold
during
the
life
of
a
lawfull
wife
.
There
is
added
,
appointed
,
for
that
an
estate
in
dower
is
appointed
two
manner
of
wayes
;
First
,
either
by
act
of
Law
,
as
a
gife
of
the
Law
upon
a
lawfull
mariage
,
as
is
the
Estate
in
Dower
at
Common
Law
,
of
the
third
part
to
bee
assigned
by
metes
,
and
bounds
by
the
Law
,
and
generall
custome
of
the
Realme
:
Or
else
of
more
,
as
of
the
moity
,
&c.
according
to
the
custome
of
the
particular
palce
.
It
is
said
moreover
,
lawfull
wife
,
for
except
the
wife
be
a
lawfull
wife
,
and
the
mariage
a
lawfull
mariage
,
Dower
cannot
be
had
,
for
the
estate
in
Dower
is
in
regard
of
the
mariage
.
The
second
way
,
That
Dower
is
appointed
,
2.
Way
.
is
by
act
of
the
partie
,
and
that
is
,
either
at
the
mariage
at
the
Church
doore
,
when
they
come
to
be
maried
,
and
therefore
called
Dower
ad
ostium
Ecclesiae
;
or
by
consent
of
the
Father
,
or
other
Ancestor
of
the
husband
,
and
therefore
commonly
called
Dower
ex
assensu
Patris
,
&c.
But
both
these
Dowers
are
almost
worne
out
of
use
.
These
words
(
afterthe
death
of
her
husband
,
for
her
maintenance
,
)
doe
containe
the
sinall
cause
and
purpose
wherefore
it
was
put
in
use
.
Dower
by
the
course
of
the
common
Law
,
which
is
the
most
usuall
kinde
of
Dower
,
may
in
this
manner
be
described
.
An
estate
in
Dower
by
the
course
of
the
Common
Law
,
is
an
estate
of
Freehold
for
the
life
of
a
lawfull
wife
,
of
the
third
part
of
all
those
inheritances
dowable
,
whereof
the
husband
was
feised
of
an
estate
of
inheritance
,
during
the
Coverture
,
given
by
the
Law
to
be
compleat
after
the
death
of
the
husband
,
for
her
maintenance
.
This
description
is
drawne
from
all
the
causes
:
the
Materiall
cause
is
set
forth
unto
us
by
the
persons
;
the
husband
and
wife
,
the
forme
is
the
estate
of
freehold
for
the
life
of
the
lawfull
wife
.
The
efficient
causes
are
,
The
Act
of
the
Law
,
and
likewise
the
seisin
of
the
husband
during
the
Coverture
;
and
lastly
,
to
be
compleat
after
the
death
of
her
husband
;
And
the
finall
cause
in
these
words
,
for
her
maintenance
.
So
that
by
lawfull
mariage
the
estate
in
Dower
hath
commencement
by
the
seisin
of
the
husband
during
the
Coverture
it
hath
his
progression
;
and
by
the
death
of
the
husband
his
consummation
,
and
accomplishment
,
whreeof
ensue
the
three
maine
barres
to
be
pleaded
by
the
Tenant
of
the
land
in
a
writ
of
dower
.
3.
Barres
.
The
first
against
the
mariage
,
ne
vnques
loyalment
accoople
,
which
plea
is
triable
by
the
Ordinary
.
Against
the
Seisin
,
ne
unques
seise
,
&c.
tryable
by
a
Iury.
And
against
the
consummation
,
that
the
husband
is
yet
living
,
which
is
triable
onely
by
proofes
of
witnesses
.
Although
the
Civill
Law
doe
call
that
Portion
which
is
brought
by
the
wife
,
or
given
with
the
wife
in
mariage
(
which
we
commonly
call
the
mariage
portion
)
Dos
,
her
Dower
:
And
they
call
the
estate
in
Dower
,
Donatio
propter
nuptias
,
yet
have
they
this
agreement
or
conformity
,
quod
neuter
sine
matrimonio
esse
potest
.
And
because
wee
have
had
occasion
to
skpeake
of
mariage
,
let
us
here
define
or
describle
the
same
,
Bract.
lib.
4.
f.
298.
b.
Lib.
5.
f.
420.
Bracton
out
of
the
Common
Law
thus
describeth
it
,
Matrimonium
est
conjunctio
viri
&
mulier
is
individuam
vitae
consuetudinem
retinens
.
Britton
thus
:
Matrimonie
est
affemblie
,
de
home
&
de
feme
,
Brittion
246.
a
lour
deux
volunts
,
per
joynture
de
St.
Eglise
,
per
demurrer
ensemble
come
un
chaire
à
touts
lour
vies
sans
espoier
de
departure
.
The
Civill
Law
hath
it
in
this
manner
:
Institu
.
de
Patria
:
Potest
.
Matrimonium
est
divini
&
humani
juris
communicatio
,
inter
virum
&
faemina●●
,
individuam
vitae
consuetudinem
continens
.
The
definition
of
Mariage
which
Strigellius
so
much
commendeth
,
whereby
all
the
difficulties
that
fall
in
debate
concerning
Mariage
,
may
be
(
as
he
thinketh
)
cetermined
,
is
in
this
manner
conceived
.
Conjugium
est
unius
maris
&
unius
foeminae
,
Kickerm
.
legitima
&
indissolubilis
copulatio
,
à
Deo
instituta
in
Paradiso
,
ut
intelligamus
Deum
esse
castum
&
castitatis
amantem
,
ut
ei
in
castitate
serviamus
,
&
ut
hoc
modo
&
non
alitèr
propagetur
genus
humanum
.
A
Rent
may
be
thus
described
:
Rent
.
quid
?
A
rent
is
a
Revenue
issuing
out
of
lands
or
other
manuall
hereditaments
,
and
wherewith
the
same
is
charged
for
a
time
of
continuance
.
So
that
the
genus
is
Revenue
,
and
the
materiall
subject
that
supporteth
the
charge
,
is
manuall
hereditaments
,
as
land
and
such
like
,
for
out
of
no
other
hereditament
can
a
rent
bee
properly
reserved
or
granted
:
and
the
peculiar
difference
is
wherewith
the
same
is
charged
,
for
a
Rent
is
a
charge
,
and
wheresoever
the
land
be
conveyed
,
tranfit
cum
suo
onere
,
it
goeth
with
his
charge
.
So
that
a
certaine
summe
of
money
,
or
other
things
valuable
(
for
a
rent
may
bee
reserved
or
granted
of
other
things
than
money
)
are
the
matter
de
qua
;
Land
,
or
other
manuall
hereditaments
the
matter
ex
qua
,
or
extra
quam
:
The
reservation
or
the
grant
,
the
efficient
cause
:
The
finall
cause
might
also
have
beene
expressed
,
but
when
the
definition
is
otherwise
plaine
,
it
needeth
not
.
The
Civill
Law
by
this
word
Redditus
,
Le.
5.
§.
non
possim
.
ff.
de
rebus
●orum
.
or
Reditus
,
understandeth
generally
Quicquid
ex
re
aliqua
obvenit
aut
redit
.
And
because
a
Rent
service
hath
his
originall
by
way
of
reservation
,
let
us
here
see
what
a
Reservation
is
.
A
Reservation
is
an
agreement
betweene
the
Lord
and
Tenant
,
Reservation
quid
?
or
the
Lessor
and
Lessee
,
that
the
Lord
or
Lessor
shall
receive
at
times
appointed
a
certaine
summe
of
money
or
other
thing
appointed
to
bee
payd
for
the
thing
demised
or
granted
.
Com.
Browning
140.
b.
35.
H.
8.57
.
a
A
Reliefe
,
Reliefe
quid
?
called
in
Latine
Relevium
;
The
Feudists
describe
or
define
thus
:
Relevium
dicitur
honorarium
,
quod
novus
vassallus
Patrono
introitus
causa
largitur
,
quasi
morte
alterius
vassalli
,
vel
alio
quo
casu
feudum
ceciderit
quod
jam
à
novo
sublevetur
,
veteres
introitum
appellabant
.
Of
a
Reliefe
Bracton
hath
these
words
,
Bracton
.
lib.
2
fo.
83.
Oportet
statim
quod
tenementum
,
quod
fuit
in
manibus
antecessorum
,
&
haereditas
quae
jacens
fuit
per
eorum
decessum
relevetur
in
manus
haeredum
,
&
propter
talem
relevationem
facienda
erit
ab
haeredibus
quaedam
praestatio
quae
dicitur
Relevium
.
Out
of
which
words
of
his
,
a
description
of
a
reliefe
may
thus
be
framed
:
Relevium
est
quaedam
Praestatio
,
facta
ab
haeredibus
post
mortem
antecessoris
ad
relevandam
haereditatem
per
eorum
mortem
jacentem
.
Where
he
seemeth
to
use
haereditas
jacens
for
land
,
&c.
descended
to
the
heyre
before
his
entry
,
as
the
Civilians
likewise
take
the
same
.
Iudgement
quid
?
A
Iudgement
is
the
determination
of
a
cause
in
controversie
by
a
person
thereunto
appointed
.
This
Description
is
generall
,
and
comprehendeth
all
manner
of
Iudgements
whatsoever
:
The
Civilians
doe
thus
render
the
same
:
Iudicium
est
actus
legitimus
,
quo
Iudex
de
causa
proposita
cognoscit
,
&
secundum
aequum
&
bonum
pronunciat
.
Wherein
they
note
to
be
three
degrees
:
First
,
the
Cognizance
or
power
to
judge
.
Secondly
,
that
this
Iudgement
bee
publike
or
published
.
Thirdly
,
that
it
bee
just
and
right
.
This
connexion
they
yeeld
to
be
thus
;
Siquidem
in
nullo
controversiarum
genere
prodest
causam
differri
ad
Iudicem
,
nisi
cognoscatur
de
ea
,
sic
nihil
profuerit
esse
cognitum
nisi
pronuncietur
;
denique
,
pronunciatum
inutile
erit
nisi
ex
bono
&
aequo
procedat
.
There
are
sundry
kindes
of
Iudgements
,
sometimes
diversified
in
respect
of
place
,
sometimes
in
respect
of
the
person
that
judgeth
,
sometime
in
respect
of
the
manner
of
proceeding
.
In
respect
of
the
place
,
as
in
a
Court
of
Iustice
,
and
then
every
Iudgement
is
said
to
be
the
Act
of
the
Court
:
sometimes
Iudgement
given
out
of
Court
,
as
upon
the
voluntary
submission
of
the
parties
in
controversie
,
as
an
award
or
arbitriment
:
with
the
descriptions
of
which
I
will
end
this
part
of
our
discourse
touching
Definitions
and
Descriptions
.
An
Arbitriment
,
which
is
also
called
an
award
,
Arbitriment
quid
?
is
a
Iudgement
or
Determination
which
one
or
more
doe
make
at
the
request
of
two
parties
at
the
least
,
for
or
concerning
debt
,
trespasse
,
or
other
controversie
had
betweene
the
said
parties
.
The
Civill
Law
yeeldeth
it
thus
:
Arbitrium
est
arbitri
sententia
,
five
Iudicium
inter
controvertentes
,
privato
concensu
,
non
antem
publica
interveniente
authoritate
.
But
to
the
intent
the
Student
may
know
how
to
collect
a
definition
or
description
of
any
legall
part
or
title
out
of
his
bookes
of
Report
,
I
will
leave
him
here
a
description
of
an
Award
or
Arbitriment
,
where
every
part
is
drawne
and
deduced
out
of
sundry
Law
Cases
here
and
there
seattred
,
which
I
have
gathered
as
sundry
dispersed
stones
into
one
building
.
An
Arbitriment
is
a
Iudgement
,
8.
E.
4.1
.
a.
8.
E.
4.10
.
a.
21.
E.
4.39
.
a.
given
by
such
person
or
persons
as
are
elected
by
the
parties
to
the
controversies
,
9.
E.
4.43
.
b.
16.
E.
4.9
.
a.
for
the
pacifying
of
the
said
controversie
,
8.
E.
4.10
.
a.
19.
H.
6.37
.
b.
Askew
;
according
to
the
comprimise
and
submission
,
19.
E.
4.1
.
a.
and
agreeable
to
reason
and
good
conscience
.
All
which
words
composing
the
said
description
,
are
deduced
and
drawne
out
of
the
bookes
cited
,
and
onely
by
me
laid
together
,
and
what
is
done
here
concerning
an
Arbitriment
(
of
which
hereafter
I
shall
make
a
larger
discourse
)
may
be
likewise
performed
in
sundry
other
Titles
.
There
resteth
an
Objection
to
be
removed
;
Ob.
it
is
said
by
the
ancient
Roman
Lawyer
Iabolenus
,
Omnis
desinitio
in
Iure
Civili
periculosa
est
,
parum
est
enim
ut
non
subverti
possit
:
To
define
in
Law
is
dissicult
,
and
the
sundry
circumstances
of
things
be
so
many
,
and
so
full
of
variety
,
as
the
definition
or
description
is
happily
made
if
it
stand
or
remaine
unimpeached
.
To
this
I
give
answer
,
Resp.
That
all
this
is
in
a
manner
true
;
but
let
us
remember
,
Difficilia
quae
pulchra
,
and
use
so
much
the
more
care
and
diligence
in
the
composition
of
the
same
.
Albeit
the
Interpretors
doe
understand
him
to
meane
by
a
Definition
in
that
place
,
no
other
thing
than
a
Rule
or
Ground
in
Law
,
yet
neverthelesse
both
are
necessarily
attempted
and
performed
sufficiently
:
For
otherwise
the
knowledge
of
the
Law
would
be
but
an
incertaine
,
inconstant
,
and
tumultuary
knowledge
(
if
that
may
be
called
knowledge
at
all
,
but
grounded
upon
wavering
opinions
,
)
but
the
knowledge
of
the
Law
is
not
such
,
as
shall
be
evidently
made
manifest
when
we
come
to
dispute
,
whether
the
Law
may
be
reduced
into
a
method
or
no.
Thus
much
of
Definitions
and
Descriptions
,
there
followeth
in
order
the
consideration
of
Divisions
.
Some
there
are
which
to
avoid
confusion
because
they
conceipt
the
word
Division
to
containe
severall
significations
not
reducible
under
an
univocall
head
,
Divisio
,
quid
they
have
therefore
even
divided
Division
it selfe
,
in
bringing
in
the
consideration
of
the
name
into
his
sundry
significations
,
which
they
call
divisio
nominis
,
and
which
they
describe
thus
:
Divisio
nominis
est
oratio
qua
vox
in
sua
significata
distinguitur
.
But
because
that
were
somewhat
improper
,
and
that
more
fit
place
will
be
found
hereafter
in
the
second
part
of
this
Treatise
to
handle
the
same
,
I
will
deale
onely
with
those
Divisions
that
are
of
the
thing
,
Divisionis
rei
,
Divisions
of
materiall
parts
.
Divisio
rei
,
&
totius
per
partes
resolutio
,
and
it
is
either
Principalis
,
vel
minùs
Principalis
.
Principalis
est
qua
totum
propriè
&
principaliter
dividitur
;
&
est
vel
generis
in
species
,
quae
est
divisio
totius
universalis
,
vel
est
totius
essentialis
,
in
suas
partes
essentiales
,
ut
homo
dividitur
in
corpus
&
animam
;
vel
est
divisio
totius
integralis
,
in
suas
partes
integrales
.
So
that
of
this
kinde
of
division
as
you
see
there
are
three
sorts
.
Divisio
generis
est
qua
genus
dividitur
in
suas
species
:
and
this
kinde
of
division
is
called
of
some
Divisio
totius
subordinantis
.
And
so
Ius
,
as
it
signifieth
the
law
,
is
divided
by
Bracton
in
Publicum
&
Privatum
,
and
of
this
kinde
of
division
we
have
examples
in
the
Law
;
as
Littleton
when
he
divideth
an
estate
of
Inheritance
into
an
estate
of
Fee
Simple
,
and
an
Estate
Tayle
:
when
he
divideth
an
estate
of
Freehold
into
an
estate
of
Inheritance
,
or
an
estate
for
life
:
So
likewise
he
divideth
an
estate
for
life
,
either
for
the
life
of
the
partie
,
Ou
pur
auter
vie
:
an
estate
for
life
of
the
party
is
either
by
act
of
Law
,
as
that
of
Tenant
in
Dower
,
Tenant
by
the
Curtesie
,
and
Tenant
apres
possibility
of
issue
extinct
.
By
act
of
the
party
,
as
the
generall
estate
for
life
,
which
hath
his
originall
by
Demise
and
limitation
of
the
partie
.
Of
this
kinde
of
division
speaketh
Melancton
.
Divisio
,
generis
in
species
est
omnium
praestantissima
&
in
omnibus
artibus
communissima
.
And
here
some
doe
require
Cum
differentiae
exactae
haberi
possint
per
duas
tantùm
dividatur
,
quae
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
dicitur
.
And
of
this
also
they
have
made
these
three
observations
:
-
1.
Placuit
omnem
divisionem
duabus
differentiis
è
diverso
positis
perfici
deberi
.
-
2.
Vt
it
a
repugnent
istae
differentiae
ut
nequaquam
in
idem
convenire
possint
.
-
3.
Postremo
,
ut
quicquid
in
genere
continetur
,
id
totum
differentiae
explicent
.
Of
this
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
so
much
extolled
by
Ramus
,
and
too
curiously
observed
by
his
followers
,
occasion
was
taken
by
Aristotle
out
of
Plato
as
it
seemeth
,
and
appeareth
,
lib.
1.
De
partibus
animalium
,
cap.
2.
&
3.
But
as
touching
the
same
I
am
of
his
minde
which
affirmeth
,
Nobis
sicut
primum
esset
,
&
voto
forsitan
optandum
,
ut
legitimis
duabus
differentiis
dividerimus
;
ita
proximum
erit
ut
quibuscunque
duabus
(
tamen
sin
minus
poterimus
duabus
,
)
at
quot
cunque
poterimus
dividamus
,
dummodo
universam
ejus
quod
dividitur
complectamur
latitudinem
:
And
although
it
be
true
that
Peripatetici
semper
dicotumiam
probarunt
,
tamen
non
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
&
absolutè
,
sed
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
and
therfore
we
may
not
be
tyed
or
restrained
to
make
our
division
alwaies
of
two
parts
;
but
where
that
cannot
conveniently
be
brought
to
passe
,
we
may
divide
into
so
many
parts
as
the
nature
of
the
thing
shall
require
.
And
therefore
Littleton
in
his
division
of
Rents
,
divides
them
into
three
kindes
;
a
Rent
Service
,
a
Rent
Charge
,
a
Rent
Secke
,
which
is
very
good
and
sufficient
.
And
so
of
a
Warranty
,
where
he
divideth
every
Warranty
either
into
a
Lineall
Warranty
,
a
Collaterall
Warranty
,
or
a
Warranty
commencing
by
disseisiin
.
So
likewise
every
estate
in
Dower
is
either
by
the
Law
,
which
is
the
generall
Custome
of
the
Realme
,
and
is
of
the
third
part
;
or
else
by
the
peculiar
custome
of
the
place
,
as
of
the
moity
in
Gavelkinde
,
or
more
or
lesse
as
the
custome
of
the
place
shall
warrant
:
or
else
thirdly
,
by
assignation
of
the
party
,
and
that
is
twofold
,
either
by
the
husband
himselfe
,
ad
ostium
Ecclesiae
,
or
else
by
the
Ancestor
,
as
Ex
assensu
patris
;
or
,
De
la
pluis
beale
,
&c.
So
likewise
we
divide
the
Materiall
Church
or
Temple
,
the
place
appointed
for
divine
Service
into
three
kindes
;
a
Church
Cathedrall
,
which
is
the
seat
of
the
Bishop
,
and
his
Chaire
:
secondly
,
a
Church
Collegiate
or
Conventuall
:
and
thirdly
,
a
Church
Parochiall
.
So
likewise
we
divide
Tithes
in
this
manner
:
all
Tithes
are
either
Pradiall
,
Personall
,
or
Mixt.
So
a
division
of
foure
or
more
parts
is
to
bee
admitted
,
if
the
nature
of
the
thing
divided
doe
so
require
:
as
Littleton
importeth
in
this
division
of
Actions
.
All
Actions
are
either
reall
Actions
,
Personall
actions
or
mixt
actions
;
and
this
Division
is
ordinary
and
almost
every
where
in
our
Bookes
.
Littleton
seemeth
to
adde
a
fourth
member
,
when
he
saith
,
that
when
a
man
releaseth
all
actions
,
Reall
,
Personall
,
and
mixt
,
that
this
is
no
Barre
in
an
Appeale
,
and
yet
a
release
of
all
actions
sufficeth
;
he
intimateth
thereby
that
there
is
an
Action
,
neither
Reall
,
Personall
or
Mixt
,
and
yet
an
Action
,
as
the
Appeale
,
an
Action
of
Reuenge
.
And
herein
I
would
not
wish
;
That
for
Dicotumy
sake
,
the
Student
should
frame
Divisions
of
his
owne
head
,
and
labour
to
reduce
them
ad
btmembrem
Divisionem
,
as
some
have
done
;
But
accept
rather
those
that
are
approved
of
Authors
,
and
generally
received
in
that
Art
.
And
herein
let
me
observe
by
the
way
that
Dicotumia
or
the
twofold
division
,
Si
pariat
multas
subdivisiones
,
intellectui
&
memoriae
aggerendas
est
vitiosa
.
Likewise
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
vbi
alterum
membrum
est
positivum
,
alterum
negativum
,
non
est
bona
.
In
hac
divisionis
specie
observandum
est
,
ne
id
quod
secundum
magis
&
minus
dividitur
,
in
species
dividi
arbitremur
.
And
thus
much
de
divisione
totius
universalis
.
Divisio
totius
essentialis
est
qua
totum
essentiale
in
suas
partes
dividitur
,
ut
in
materiam
&
formam
,
&
dicitur
divisio
totius
coordinati
.
Divisio
totius
integri
est
qua
aliquid
in
sua
membra
,
seu
partes
integrales
dividitur
,
&
dicitur
Partitio
;
Et
est
nihil
aliud
quam
membrorum
quae
ad
integritatem
totius
requiruntur
,
enumeratio
:
As
when
we
doe
divide
a
house
into
the
soyle
whereon
it
standeth
,
and
the
edifice
and
structure
thereof
.
So
the
Author
of
the
Dialogues
betweene
the
Doctor
and
the
Student
divideth
the
Law
in
generall
into
the
Law
of
Nature
,
the
Law
of
Nations
,
the
Law
of
God
,
the
Law
of
particular
Kingdomes
,
as
the
Civill
Law
,
the
Law
of
this
Land
.
So
also
have
the
Civilians
divided
their
law
thus
;
Ius
Civile
est
quod
legibus
Plebiscitis
,
Senatus
consultis
,
Principum
placitis
,
Magistratuum
Edict
is
Responfisque
,
Prudentium
constat
.
So
doe
we
likewise
divide
the
Law
of
England
into
the
Common
Law
,
and
Statute
Law
.
So
we
distinguish
and
divide
a
Mannor
into
Demesnes
and
services
.
And
a
Rectory
into
Glebe
and
Tithes
.
We
are
now
come
to
the
second
Principall
Branch
which
is
of
the
lesse
principall
Divisions
.
Divisio
minus
Principalis
,
est
qua
dividitur
totum
impropriè
dictum
,
ut
1.
Causa
per
suos
effectus
,
2.
Effectus
per
suas
causas
,
3.
Subjectum
per
sua
accidentia
,
4.
Accidentia
per
sua
subjecta
,
5.
accidentia
per
accidentia
,
6.
res
per
sua
objecta
,
adjuncta
,
7.
quando
,
per
circumstantias
loci
,
temporis
.
Wee
often
make
Divisions
in
the
Law
by
the
causes
,
Common
.
as
Bracton
doth
divide
a
Common
thus
by
the
causes
:
First
materiall
,
as
of
those
profits
whereof
Common
may
be
had
;
as
Common
of
Estovers
,
to
burne
in
their
houses
;
Common
of
Pasture
,
for
feed
for
their
Cattle
;
Common
to
digge
in
the
soile
of
another
;
scilicet
,
fodiendo
,
ut
lapides
,
cretam
,
arenam
,
turbam
,
id
est
,
Common
of
Turbary
and
such
like
;
and
likewise
there
is
a
Common
of
fishing
called
Common
of
Piscary
.
In
respect
of
the
forme
and
manner
,
how
a
Common
is
divided
,
thus
;
Every
Common
is
either
,
Common
appendant
,
Common
appertenant
,
Common
per
case
de
vicinage
,
or
Common
in
grosse
.
In
respect
of
the
efficient
cause
,
a
Common
is
divided
thus
,
as
all
Commons
are
either
by
prescription
,
or
else
by
grant
:
Commons
by
prescription
are
such
as
Antiquity
of
time
,
and
long
continuance
have
produced
,
as
Common
Appendant
,
Common
per
case
de
vicinage
.
Commons
that
have
had
their
originall
by
the
grant
of
the
Parties
are
either
so
granted
as
that
the
same
is
restrained
to
the
beasts
pasturing
such
lands
;
And
so
it
may
be
called
a
Common
appertenant
,
although
improperly
by
Grant
;
or
else
a
Common
in
grosse
,
and
that
in
such
liberty
or
manner
of
restraint
of
benefit
as
pleaseth
the
Grantor
to
bestow
.
In
respect
of
the
circumstance
of
time
,
some
Comons
are
for
all
times
of
the
yeere
,
some
others
for
a
certaine
time
onely
.
In
respect
of
the
place
,
some
Commons
are
in
the
Waste
of
the
Lord
,
or
by
especiall
grant
through
all
his
Land
,
or
in
his
severall
,
or
ubicunque
averia
sua
iverint
.
In
Common
of
Pasture
Bracton
considereth
these
things
;
either
the
word
pasture
is
taken
largely
,
de
omni
quod
edi
poterit
,
vel
pasci
,
largè
sumpto
vocabulo
,
ut
si
quis
habeat
in
alicujus
terra
communiam
pasturae
,
scilicet
,
herbagij
,
Pessonij
,
sive
glandis
,
aut
nucum
,
aut
quicquid
suo
nomine
Pessonig
continetur
,
item
foliorum
&
frondium
.
So
I
may
divide
Conditions
annexed
to
Contracts
,
or
to
estates
in
this
manner
.
All
Conditions
are
either
conditions
in
fact
,
Conditions
.
or
in
Law
;
Conditions
in
fact
are
either
expressed
in
words
,
and
so
created
by
words
conditionall
,
or
else
they
are
implyed
,
namely
,
conditions
by
implication
.
Conditions
expressed
are
either
possible
or
impossible
to
be
performed
,
and
then
are
those
conditions
void
in
Law
,
for
,
nemo
tenetur
ad
impossibilia
;
All
possible
conditions
are
such
as
may
be
either
against
the
Law
,
and
that
either
against
the
Common
Law
,
and
then
not
onely
the
Condition
,
but
the
whole
Contract
is
voyd
;
But
if
it
bee
onely
contrary
to
a
Statute
Law
which
may
bee
dispensed
wiathll
,
then
the
Condition
standeth
good
;
and
the
partie
bound
thereby
is
likewise
bound
to
procure
a
dispensation
,
and
make
himselfe
able
to
performe
the
same
.
A
Condition
lawfull
is
either
subsequent
,
or
precedent
;
subsequent
Conditions
annexed
to
estates
,
doe
either
upon
performance
enlarge
the
same
,
or
upon
breach
diminish
or
make
voyd
the
same
.
Conditions
repugant
are
such
as
are
limited
,
repugnant
to
the
premises
,
as
land
given
in
Fee-simple
by
a
common
person
upon
a
condition
that
he
,
nor
his
heires
should
alien
.
This
is
a
repugnant
Condition
to
the
amplenesse
of
the
estate
,
and
therefore
voyd
.
In
like
manner
I
might
divide
a
Custome
by
the
causes
,
Custome
.
as
the
internall
causes
are
the
matter
and
forme
;
The
materiall
parts
may
be
the
persons
whom
the
custome
concerneth
;
The
place
and
proceedings
in
Courts
of
Iustice
;
For
every
Court
of
Iustice
hath
his
Customes
and
courses
of
proceedings
sometime
different
from
others
.
In
respect
of
their
forme
,
they
are
either
generall
throughout
all
the
Realme
,
and
so
doe
they
constitute
that
part
of
the
Common
Law
which
is
grounded
upon
the
generall
Custome
of
the
Realme
.
Or
else
they
are
particular
Customes
to
certaine
places
,
of
the
which
Bracton
saith
thus
;
Habent
Anglici
plurima
de
consuetudine
,
quae
non
habent
ex
lege
,
sicut
in
diversis
Comitatibus
,
Civitatibus
,
Burgis
&
Villis
,
ubi
semper
erit
inquirendum
,
quae
sit
loci
illius
consuetudo
,
&
qualiter
utantur
consuetudine
.
Every
speciall
Custome
,
as
touching
the
forme
thereof
,
because
it
bindeth
as
a
Law
,
and
is
as
a
peculiar
Law
of
the
place
,
hath
two
things
considerable
,
First
,
the
place
;
secondly
,
the
manner
and
use
of
it
.
As
concerning
the
place
,
every
particular
custome
ought
to
bee
bounded
within
the
compasse
of
particular
places
,
as
sometime
through
a
whole
County
or
the
greatest
part
thereof
,
as
Gavell
kinde
in
Kent
:
or
within
a
Citie
,
Borough
or
Towne
,
as
Borough
English
:
For
a
particular
custome
cannot
be
at
large
in
places
uplandish
.
Secondly
,
as
touching
the
forme
and
manner
of
use
of
it
,
it
ought
to
bee
reasonable
and
agreeable
to
common
right
without
absurdity
,
Littl.
l.
c.
14.
E.
3.
f.
Barr.
277.
42.
E.
3.
f.
avowry
66.
14.
H.
4.
f.
avow
.
60.
2.
H.
4.24
.
b.
5.
H.
7.9
.
for
the
which
a
particular
reason
may
bee
yeelded
and
given
.
Hence
ensueth
,
That
it
ought
to
bee
without
prejudice
to
any
,
and
not
to
bee
injust
in
it selfe
,
42.
E.
3.
f.
avow
.
66.
35.
H.
6.29
.
b.
Fitzh
.
Custome
2.
Secondly
,
it
ought
to
be
certaine
,
13.
E.
3.
f.
dum
fuit
infra
aetatem
.
3.
22.
H.
6.46.47
.
Thirdly
,
it
ought
to
be
alleaged
in
the
affirmative
;
for
a
negative
Allegation
is
not
perfect
,
8.
H.
6.4
.
a.
Efficient
causes
of
a
Custome
are
two
;
longe
vi
temporis
usus
,
That
is
,
commencement
without
notice
of
the
originall
when
it
begun
,
which
they
utter
in
these
words
;
Temps
dont
Memorie
ne
court
as
Littleton
speaketh
;
and
secondly
,
continuance
without
notable
interruption
:
8.
H.
6.4
.
b.
22.
E.
4.8
.
b.
35.
H.
6.
f.
Custome
2.
13.
E.
3.
f.
Praescript
,
40.
21.
H.
7.20
.
a.
b.
The
finall
cause
is
the
effect
,
that
it
binds
like
a
Law
,
for
,
in
things
of
this
nature
,
the
finall
cause
and
the
effect
are
all
one
:
hereof
Bracton
speaketh
,
Consuetudo
quando
pro
lege
observatur
in
partibus
ubi
fuerit
more
utentium
approbata
est
vicem
legis
obtinet
.
And
againe
,
Longaevi
temporis
usus
,
non
est
vilis
authoritas
,
Bracton
lib.
1.
cap.
3.
f.
2.
Hence
is
it
said
,
That
a
custome
ought
to
be
compulsary
,
42.
E.
3.
f.
Avow
.
665.
5.
H
7.9
.
I
will
here
adde
something
out
of
the
Civill
and
Cannon
Lawes
touching
a
Custome
,
wherby
the
Student
may
observe
the
conformity
of
both
studies
,
and
conjoyne
them
if
he
list
together
;
that
one
of
them
may
assist
,
give
light
,
and
ornament
unto
the
other
.
First
,
where
it
was
said
,
That
a
Generall
Custome
is
a
parcell
of
the
Lawes
of
the
Realme
;
They
likewise
affirme
,
that
Consuetudo
generalis
facit
jus
commune
;
Clem.
Fin.
de
aetate
&
qualita
:
And
againe
,
Consuetudo
tanti
temporis
cujus
initium
non
continetur
in
hominum
memoria
,
habet
vim
Privilegij
Imperialis
Le:
§
:
ductus
aquae
de
aqua
quotidiana
.
Againe
,
Consuetudo
est
jus
moribus
(
id
est
)
assiduis
actibus
introductum
.
C.
Consue
.
i.
Distinctio
,
voluntas
Populi
rebus
ipsis
&
factis
declarata
.
Tacitus
concensus
omnium
.
Le.
de
quibus
:
ff.
de
legibus
.
Tacita
civium
Conventio
.
Ius
scripto
non
comprehensum
.
For
the
effect
thereof
,
Consuetudo
legem
imitatur
§
ex
non
scriptis
Institutis
,
de
Iure
naturali
gentium
&
Civili
:
Legem
imitari
dixit
,
id
est
,
tantundem
praestare
&
quasi
legem
repraesentare
Aldobe
:
ibid.
Consuetudinis
vero
officium
est
primo
ut
confirmet
,
deinde
ut
interpretetur
scriptam
legem
si
obscura
sit
:
in
Le:
minimè
Paulus
,
&
Calistratus
in
leg
.
de
interpretatione
,
ff.
de
legibus
:
with
divers
like
,
too
long
here
to
make
repetition
.
Sundry
other
examples
of
division
might
bee
produced
out
of
the
Lawes
of
this
Reame
,
which
argue
the
necessary
and
frequent
use
of
Division
;
but
to
omit
them
lest
I
should
bee
too
tedious
,
and
to
leave
the
student
to
his
owne
industrious
Collection
,
I
will
commemorate
and
insert
here
some
few
precepts
to
be
observed
in
the
making
of
an
useful
division
,
and
after
shew
the
benefit
of
this
knowledge
,
and
so
relinquish
the
same
.
The
precepts
therefore
may
bee
drawne
into
two
heads
;
The
first
in
respect
of
the
thing
to
be
divided
,
namely
,
divisum
or
dividendum
;
The
second
in
respect
of
membra
dividentia
the
parts
dividing
.
As
touching
the
things
to
be
divided
,
it
is
to
be
observed
,
that
Division
is
not
alwayes
necessary
;
for
some
things
are
so
entire
as
they
cannot
be
divided
,
as
unitas
,
for
if
it
bee
divided
,
it
is
no
more
unity
,
but
multiplicity
.
So
instance
which
is
neither
time
past
,
nor
time
to
come
,
but
onely
the
moment
of
time
present
,
unto
the
which
the
parts
of
time
past
and
future
,
are
conjoyned
.
Many
things
in
their
nature
are
intire
in
the
consideration
of
our
Lawes
,
for
Entierty
is
that
quod
in
partes
dividi
non
potest
,
I
meane
the
division
of
totius
integralis
,
not
totius
universalis
.
And
therefore
Entierties
are
of
two
kinds
;
First
,
some
are
such
as
by
nature
suffer
no
division
,
as
the
things
before
spoken
of
,
Vnity
,
Instance
,
Corporall
service
,
of
which
it
is
said
,
ea
quae
in
partes
dividi
non
possunt
,
solida
à
singulis
haeredibus
debentur
,
as
fealty
and
such
like
services
,
of
which
neverthelesse
some
certaine
ones
are
appointed
by
Statute
,
2.
E.
2.
f.
avo
.
179.
to
avoyd
trouble
,
to
bee
performed
by
the
eldest
coheire
,
for
the
rest
as
Homage
.
Other
things
are
said
to
bee
entire
,
which
although
they
may
bee
divided
into
parts
by
their
nature
,
that
is
,
their
nature
and
essence
is
not
repugnant
to
a
Division
,
yet
the
Law
will
permit
no
division
of
them
by
the
act
of
the
party
,
although
by
act
in
Law
they
doe
abide
Division
,
and
such
is
a
Rent
Charge
,
a
Warranty
,
a
Condition
,
&c.
As
touching
the
parts
dividing
,
or
membra
dividentia
,
Reg.
1
the
first
rule
is
,
that
Membra
dividentia
conveniunt
cum
toto
&
sunt
toti
adaquata
,
ita
ut
omnia
membra
simul
sumpta
sunt
suo
diviso
aequalia
,
&
quod
nihil
contineatur
sub
diviso
quod
non
sub
aliquo
membro
,
nec
aliquod
membrum
quod
non
sit
sub
diviso
.
The
second
rule
is
,
Reg.
2
Quod
membra
dividentia
sunt
à
se
invicèm
disjuncta
,
diversa
,
contradivisa
&
non
subalterna
,
id
est
,
quod
unum
in
altero
non
contineatur
.
The
third
precept
is
,
Reg.
3
Quod
singula
membra
per
se
sumpta
sunt
inferiora
diviso
,
contained
within
the
amplitude
of
the
thing
divided
,
the
parts
being
taken
singularly
and
alone
.
The
fourth
rule
is
,
Reg.
4
That
the
parts
and
members
dividing
be
proxima
&
immediata
,
next
and
immediate
under
that
which
is
divided
,
and
not
fetched
afarre
off
,
Arist.
2.
Post
.
cap.
5.
&
14.
which
precept
is
taken
out
of
Aristotle
,
2.
Post
.
ca.
5.
&
14.
The
fift
rule
is
,
Reg.
5
that
Divisio
instruatur
membris
quam
per
naturam
fieri
potest
paucissimis
:
The
reason
whereof
is
assigned
thus
,
Cum
divisio
rei
manifestandae
gratia
inventa
sit
,
si
multa
contineret
membra
fastidium
potius
&
obscuritatem
quàm
cognitionem
pararet
.
And
therefore
it
is
Plato
his
Precept
in
his
Politico
,
Non
est
tutum
,
ô
amice
,
in
minutissima
redigere
.
And
therefore
Seneca
said
well
,
Simile
est
confuso
quicquid
in
pulverem
usque
sectum
fuerit
,
nam
ut
maxima
comprehendere
,
ita
in
minima
deducere
difficile
est
.
The
sixt
and
last
precept
is
,
Reg.
6
Quod
membra
dividentia
quendam
ordinem
inter
se
habeant
,
&
quod
divisio
omni
ambiguitate
&
obscuritate
vacet
.
And
thus
much
concerning
the
Precepts
of
artificiall
Division
may
suffice
.
As
touching
the
use
of
Division
,
Plato
in
his
Dialogues
,
Phedrus
and
Sophista
,
falleth
into
a
large
praise
thereof
,
and
in
the
person
of
Socrates
affirmeth
,
Si
nactus
fuerit
Ducem
qui
recte
partiri
sciat
se
ipsius
tanquam
Dei
vestigia
sequuturum
esse
.
Whereof
also
Quintilian
hath
these
words
,
Vt
vascula
or
is
angusti
respuunt
superfluam
humoris
copiam
,
tamen
paulatìm
instillando
replentur
,
sic
distributio
si
in
partes
,
accipiuntur
faciliùs
,
ut
cibus
mansus
,
citiùs
ac
faciliùs
digeritur
.
Boetius
in
his
book
which
he
wrote
de
divisione
,
thus
speaketh
,
Scientia
dividendi
omnibus
studiosis
magnum
fructum
adfert
,
ut
quae
facit
ut
res
clarè
à
nobis
tractari
queat
.
In
a
word
,
the
utilities
thereof
may
be
reduced
thus
,
Arist.
2.
Post
.
Com.
74.
Primò
,
quòd
faciat
ad
rei
cognitionem
distinctam
&
evolatam
:
Secundò
,
quòd
prosit
ad
praedicata
essentialia
vaenanda
,
id
est
,
ad
investigandum
genus
&
differentiam
:
Tertio
,
ad
recte
ordinandas
&
methodice
disponendas
disciplinas
.
Another
hath
these
words
,
Divisio
perfecta
est
principium
intelligendi
&
constituendi
rerum
&
disciplinarum
methodos
.
But
to
leave
these
Philosophers
,
and
to
behold
what
the
Civill
Lawyers
affirme
thereof
,
and
amongst
much
this
may
suffice
,
Per
divisionem
materia
meliùs
intelligitur
&
faciliùs
capitur
:
Le.
1.
juncta
gloss
.
ff.
de
dolo
malo
.
And
againe
,
Est
autem
divisio
innumerabilis
quasi
materiae
brevis
compositio
quae
ad
multa
facit
:
Gloss.
Instit.
oblig
.
§
.
Olim
autem
in
verbo
divisio
.
But
to
let
these
also
to
passe
,
I
will
conclude
with
that
of
Bracton
,
although
mentioned
before
,
Lib.
1.
cap.
1.
Divisio
sive
partitio
animum
legentis
incitat
,
mentem
intelligentiae
praeparat
,
&
memoriam
artificiosè
reformat
.
Thus
having
in
this
manner
ended
with
Definition
or
Description
,
and
with
Division
in
such
a
summary
fashion
as
I
conceived
most
convenient
for
the
capacity
of
the
Student
,
and
especially
how
to
informe
him
to
make
use
of
these
parts
as
well
in
the
study
of
the
Law
,
as
in
any
other
his
studies
,
leaving
the
exact
knowledge
thereof
unto
the
Logicke
Schoole
:
I
thought
it
good
here
to
advertise
you
,
that
there
may
be
neverthelesse
observed
of
this
which
hath
beene
said
concerning
the
premises
,
That
the
knowledge
of
Definition
,
Description
,
and
Division
,
doe
presuppose
the
knowledge
of
the
five
Predicables
handled
by
Porphyries
Institution
to
Aristotles
Organon
,
for
whatsoever
is
properly
defined
,
described
,
or
divided
,
is
species
,
as
hath
beene
already
said
.
And
the
true
parts
of
every
perfect
Definition
are
genus
and
differentia
;
and
of
Description
,
Genus
vel
aliquod
loco
generis
,
Differentia
vel
aliquod
loco
differentiae
,
Proprium
&
Accidens
tanquam
partes
descriptionis
dicuntur
.
Likewise
is
presupposed
the
knowledge
of
the
Antepredicaments
:
for
,
Aequivocum
or
Analogon
denoting
words
of
many
significations
,
cannot
bee
defined
or
described
so
standing
,
but
must
first
be
distinguished
into
their
sundry
significations
,
Vt
certum
sit
id
quod
definiatur
aut
describatur
:
For
nothing
indeed
may
bee
defined
or
described
,
but
that
which
is
univocum
.
Also
by
the
knowledge
had
de
nominativis
,
the
thing
is
knowne
in
concreto
as
well
as
in
abstracto
:
which
is
very
necessary
in
Descriptions
,
and
many
times
in
use
:
As
Littleton
in
the
first
Chapter
of
his
Booke
,
in
his
Treatise
of
Fee
simple
.
But
because
he
writeth
a
booke
of
Tenures
,
which
is
the
chiefe
drift
of
that
booke
,
he
thought
it
better
to
tell
you
who
was
a
Tenant
in
Fee
simple
,
than
to
describe
the
state
alone
;
for
in
so
doing
it
was
more
sutable
and
answerable
to
his
Treatise
in
hand
,
namely
,
of
Tenures
and
their
incidents
rather
to
deale
with
the
Tenant
than
the
estate
,
yet
so
as
that
thereby
the
estate
is
likewise
sufficiently
knowne
.
The
like
he
performed
in
the
rest
of
his
Chapters
,
as
of
Tenant
in
Taile
,
Tenant
in
Dower
,
Tenant
for
Life
,
and
the
rest
.
Also
the
knowledge
of
the
Predicaments
and
Post-predicaments
is
likewise
presupposed
.
And
as
touching
the
Predicaments
it
is
evident
that
the
genus
or
differentia
of
every
thing
defined
,
described
or
divided
,
are
to
be
sought
in
their
proper
and
peculiar
Predicaments
.
As
concerning
the
Post-predicaments
,
how
many
they
are
in
number
,
and
how
many
are
needfull
for
this
knowledge
,
may
well
bee
made
manifest
by
some
examples
,
and
the
use
of
them
in
the
Lawes
.
Aristotle
maketh
foure
kindes
of
Opposites
;
first
,
those
that
are
relativè
opposita
,
as
the
husband
and
the
wife
,
the
father
and
the
sonne
,
the
master
and
the
servant
,
32.
H.
8.3
.
Dyer
.
of
which
consisteth
the
estate
Oeconomicall
of
every
family
and
houshold
.
So
likewise
the
King
and
his
Subjects
,
the
Magistrate
and
the
People
,
4.
El.
2.22.1
.
Dyer
.
of
which
consisteth
the
estate
Politicall
of
the
Kingdome
and
Common-wealth
.
So
also
the
Lord
and
his
Tenant
,
in
whom
anciently
stood
the
strength
of
the
Estate
:
the
Lessor
and
Lessee
,
Grauntor
and
Grauntee
,
Feoffor
and
Feoffee
,
Bargainor
and
Bargainee
,
Conisor
and
Conisee
,
Recoveror
and
Tenont
against
whom
the
recovery
was
had
,
and
such
like
,
in
whom
and
betweene
whom
all
Conveyances
and
Contracts
have
their
being
.
So
likewise
in
suits
reall
the
Demaundant
and
the
Tenant
,
in
suits
personall
and
mixt
the
Plaintife
and
the
Defendant
,
in
an
Assize
the
Plaintife
and
Tenant
;
Actor
and
Reus
in
criminall
causes
:
betweene
which
persons
all
suits
and
proceedings
in
Law
are
determined
.
These
are
all
relativè
opposita
,
and
have
reference
each
to
other
;
as
one
man
cannot
be
properly
Plaintife
and
Defendant
in
one
and
the
selfe
fame
action
;
or
Actor
and
Reus
,
except
in
some
speciall
causes
onely
,
as
where
Interpleader
may
be
admitted
,
as
in
a
Writ
of
Detinue
,
where
Garnishment
is
required
,
3.
H.
6.18
.
20.
H.
6.28
.
20.
H.
6.29
.
22.
H.
6.45
.
a
there
the
Defendant
is
become
Actor
against
the
Garnishee
.
So
in
a
Quare
impedit
,
where
the
Defendant
maketh
Title
to
have
a
Writ
to
the
Bishop
,
the
Defendant
is
become
as
Actor
.
In
a
Replevin
upon
an
Avowry
made
,
3.
H.
6.18
.
a.
22.
H.
6.45
.
a
22.
E.
4
10.
a
the
Avowant
is
become
Actor
.
So
in
a
Quod
ei
deforceat
,
the
Demandant
or
Plaintife
shall
defend
his
estate
against
such
recovery
as
shall
be
pleaded
against
him
and
become
Defendant
,
and
may
vouch
,
Ac
si
esset
tenens
in
priori
brevi
,
by
the
Statute
of
Westm.
2.
Some
resemblance
of
this
is
found
in
the
Civill
Lawes
,
where
it
is
said
,
Actor
in
tribus
istis
judicigs
,
familiae
oriscundae
,
communi
dividendo
,
&
finium
Regundarum
,
intelligitur
,
qui
ad
judicium
provocat
.
Le.
13.14
.
ff.
de
Iudicigs
.
li.
2.
§
3.
&
Lex
.
44.
§
5.
ff.
familiae
hieresus
.
l.
11.
infine
.
ff.
de
Iurisdict
.
Le.
20.
fimium
regundarum
.
Le.
37.
in
fine
.
ff.
de
obligationibus
&
actionibus
.
TRhe
second
kinde
of
opposites
are
those
which
are
contraria
,
as
right
and
wrong
,
ignorance
and
science
;
and
of
these
some
are
without
any
media
,
and
some
have
their
media
;
and
of
those
that
have
their
media
,
Com.
467.
Com.
247.
some
are
by
participation
,
and
some
by
negation
,
which
the
Logick
Schoole
teacheth
more
at
large
.
The
third
kind
of
Opposites
are
those
that
are
privativè
opposita
,
as
light
and
darknesse
,
fight
and
blindnesse
,
which
things
succeed
and
deprive
one
another
,
where
there
is
a
progresse
from
the
habit
to
the
privation
;
but
seldome
or
never
any
returne
from
the
privation
to
the
habit
:
Villeine
and
Free
are
privatives
;
Com.
397.
a.
in
prison
and
at
large
are
privativa
.
The
fourth
and
last
kind
of
Opposites
are
those
which
in
Propositions
and
Clausesare
contradicentia
,
the
one
Affirmative
and
the
other
Negative
;
of
which
expresse
and
full
affirmatives
the
Law
requireth
all
issues
to
be
joyned
tryable
by
Iurors
,
that
they
may
not
bee
inveigled
in
the
tryall
of
matters
in
fact
.
Also
the
Law
of
England
being
more
precise
in
the
forme
of
pleading
than
any
other
forreine
Law
,
to
the
intent
the
issue
and
point
that
commeth
to
be
tryed
in
matters
of
fact
might
be
evident
and
cleare
to
a
Iury
,
doth
require
that
all
affirmative
pleading
in
Barre
or
defence
,
to
make
it
the
more
perspicuous
affirmative
,
should
bee
averred
,
that
is
,
an
offer
made
of
cleere
proofes
.
Of
Negatives
in
the
Law
there
are
two
kindes
,
as
first
,
meere
negations
,
of
which
we
commonly
say
,
Negativum
nihil
implicat
:
and
there
are
also
Propositions
negative
,
which
doe
imply
an
affirmative
,
and
those
we
call
Negative
pregnants
,
which
we
doe
refuse
in
all
issues
of
tryalls
by
Iurors
,
except
in
some
cases
,
where
the
necessity
of
the
cause
doth
require
the
same
.
So
moreover
,
Modi
prioris
and
Modi
simul
,
which
Aristotle
also
handleth
as
Post-predicaments
,
are
worthy
consideration
:
For
the
better
understanding
whereof
,
note
that
Aristotle
affirmeth
that
Prius
quatuor
modis
dicitur
.
Primò
,
id
quod
secundum
tempus
est
prius
,
id
est
,
prius
tempore
:
So
the
law
of
Nature
preceded
the
law
of
Nations
,
and
the
law
of
Nations
preceded
the
law
of
every
peculiar
people
,
and
so
the
Common
Law
of
this
Land
preceded
the
Statute
Law
,
which
as
occasion
was
offered
,
in
every
Kings
reigne
had
his
originall
.
So
in
the
making
of
a
Deed
,
there
is
writing
,
sealing
,
and
delivery
:
the
writing
goeth
before
sealing
,
and
the
sealing
before
delivery
.
Secundò
,
aliquid
est
prius
ordine
Naturae
.
There
are
many
things
which
are
simul
tempore
,
where
neverthelesse
there
is
a
Priority
and
Posteriority
in
Nature
.
As
when
Tenant
for
Life
doth
surrender
to
the
Grauntee
of
the
Reversion
,
not
having
attorned
to
him
before
,
in
respect
of
time
the
included
Attornament
and
Surrender
come
together
,
and
are
wrought
at
one
instant
,
and
yet
the
Attornament
is
first
in
Nature
,
and
precedeth
the
Surrender
:
For
the
Attornement
implyed
doth
first
settle
the
Reversion
in
the
Grauntee
,
before
the
Surrender
can
take
place
.
So
if
Lessee
for
yeares
and
he
in
the
reversion
in
Fee
doe
joyne
in
a
Feoffement
to
a
stranger
,
it
is
first
the
surrender
of
Lessee
for
yeares
,
and
after
the
Feoffement
of
him
in
the
Reversion
in
Nature
and
operation
in
Law
;
and
they
both
are
yet
performed
in
respect
of
time
simul
&
semel
.
If
a
man
by
his
last
Will
and
Testament
in
the
former
part
thereof
,
devise
Lands
deviseable
,
holden
in
Socage
to
I.S.
in
Fee
,
and
afterwards
in
the
latter
part
of
the
same
will
,
deviseth
a
rent
out
of
the
same
land
to
Io:
No
:
in
fee
,
and
dieth
,
by
the
Devisors
death
,
the
whole
Testament
will
take
effect
at
one
time
But
:
the
Law
shall
adjudge
it
first
a
devise
of
the
rent
,
and
after
a
devise
of
the
land
;
for
in
course
of
nature
hee
that
granteth
rent
out
of
land
,
ought
to
bee
owner
of
the
land
,
and
so
devise
the
rent
,
and
not
first
devise
away
the
land
,
and
after
devise
the
rent
;
That
were
no
good
conformity
.
Tertiò
,
secundum
ordinem
Prius
dicitur
;
This
is
priority
according
to
conformity
of
order
;
So
in
every
writ
,
men
are
by
the
rule
of
the
Register
in
their
writs
to
hold
order
in
their
Demands
;
For
preposterous
order
is
disorder
,
and
destroyeth
all
;
for
as
Bracton
saith
,
Bract.
188.35
H.
6.13
.
b.
Bract.
316.
f.
400.
there
ought
to
be
ordinata
dispositio
,
and
this
is
Bonum
ordinis
,
the
good
of
order
;
Ordo
est
cujuslibet
rei
suo
loco
concinna
digestio
.
Fourthly
and
lastly
,
aliquid
dicitur
prius
honore
,
quod
melius
est
&
honorabilius
est
,
id
prius
est
,
and
this
is
called
Prius
dignitate
,
as
a
mesuage
precedeth
in
dignity
land
arable
,
and
land
arable
pasture
;
the
whole
is
more
then
the
parts
,
the
husband
precedeth
the
wife
,
3.
H.
6.33
.
4.
H.
6.3
.
and
so
must
be
placed
in
all
Writs
and
pleadings
.
Aristotle
according
to
the
opinion
of
former
Philosophers
,
having
set
downe
these
foure
kinds
of
Priorities
,
addeth
of
his
owne
invention
a
fift
,
Quae
convertuntur
secundum
essendi
consequentiam
,
&
quod
alteri
quomodo
libet
causa
est
prius
natura
possit
.
But
this
seemeth
to
be
but
a
species
of
Prius
natura
spoken
of
before
.
So
also
is
it
de
modis
simul
,
for
it
appeareth
by
that
which
hath
beene
said
,
that
quaedam
are
simul
tempore
,
quorum
generatio
est
in
eodem
tempore
,
neutrum
enim
eorum
neque
prius
,
neque
posterius
est
tempore
.
Quaedam
sunt
simul
natura
,
as
are
all
Relativa
and
Correlativa
,
all
those
that
are
relativè
opposita
.
Againe
,
they
are
thirdly
also
simul
natura
,
which
are
species
ejusdem
generis
;
But
of
this
I
will
surcease
,
and
speake
onely
of
some
few
things
that
remaine
,
which
further
the
knowledge
of
Definition
and
Division
.
For
as
much
as
Division
is
totius
in
partes
distributio
,
it
shall
bee
necessary
to
consider
the
nature
of
the
whole
,
totum
est
quod
ex
partibus
constat
.
And
some
there
are
which
have
divided
the
consideration
of
the
whole
into
these
parts
;
There
is
totum
universale
,
Coke
lib.
11.50
.
a.
totum
essentiale
,
totum
integrale
,
totum
in
quantitate
,
totumin
modo
,
totum
in
loco
,
totum
in
tempore
.
But
for
these
latter
foure
,
since
they
doe
undergoe
nomen
totius
improperly
,
and
are
used
to
draw
reasons
in
Topicall
inventions
,
and
not
usefull
to
Divisions
,
I
let
them
passe
,
and
shall
therefore
retaine
onely
the
usuall
consideration
of
the
three
former
.
Totum
universale
is
that
quod
in
species
subjectivs
dividi
potest
,
as
when
a
Rent
is
divided
into
a
Rent-service
,
a
rent
Charge
,
and
a
rent
Secke
.
An
estate
of
Inheritance
divided
into
an
estate
of
Fee
simple
,
and
an
estate
in
Taile
so
that
Inheritance
is
totum
universale
.
Totum
essentiale
is
when
the
whole
is
divided
into
the
matter
and
forme
,
Sic
itaque
materia
&
forma
hic
induunt
rationem
partium
;
As
Man
is
divided
into
these
essentiall
parts
,
the
body
and
soule
,
and
of
this
kinde
we
have
no
great
use
in
the
Law
.
The
third
is
totum
integrale
,
whereof
we
have
more
frequent
use
,
when
the
whole
is
divided
into
the
integrall
parts
,
whereof
it
consisteth
as
a
Mannor
into
Demesnes
and
services
;
a
Rectory
is
divided
into
Glebe
and
Tithes
;
a
house
into
soyle
and
structure
as
hath
appeared
before
.
The
Division
of
totum
universale
in
suas
species
is
Logicall
or
Metaphysicall
:
The
Division
of
totum
essentiale
in
suas
partes
essentiales
is
Naturall
;
The
Division
of
totum
integrale
in
suas
partes
is
in
manner
Artificiall
or
Mechanicall
;
And
this
difference
there
is
betweene
totum
essentiale
,
and
totum
integrale
,
ut
si
una
pars
essentialis
desit
,
totum
non
potest
dici
mutilum
sed
planè
abolitum
:
Et
ut
priores
duae
Divisiones
sumuntur
ex
substantia
;
Ita
haec
Divisio
totius
integralis
sumitur
ex
quantitate
:
And
therefore
totum
integrale
is
twofold
,
the
one
I
may
call
totum
integrale
continuum
,
and
the
other
totum
integrale
discretum
,
even
as
quantity
it selfe
is
divided
.
Totum
continuum
est
perfectè
dictum
,
Quia
ex
partibus
substantialibus
&
quantis
per
se
unitis
constat
;
estque
vel
homogeneum
,
vel
heterogeneum
;
homogeneum
est
quod
ex
partibus
idem
nomen
cum
toto
habentibus
constat
,
as
all
parts
of
water
are
water
,
all
parts
of
bone
are
bone
,
all
parts
of
flesh
is
flesh
,
every
yeard
of
a
peece
of
cloth
is
cloth
.
1.
R.
3.
fo.
3.
Heterogeneum
est
quod
constate
ex
partibus
diver
si
nominis
à
toto
,
ut
corpus
humanum
constans
ex
capite
,
thorace
,
corde
,
pedibus
&c.
&
ex
his
partibus
quaedam
sunt
Principales
,
sine
quibus
totum
non
potest
manere
incolume
,
ita
partes
humani
corporis
constituuntur
à
medicis
cerebrum
,
2
R.
3.2
.
b.
cor
&
epur
:
minùs
Principales
quae
abesse
possunt
sine
totius
interitu
,
ut
manus
,
pes
,
&c.
Totum
discretum
est
totum
imperfectè
dictum
,
&
constat
ex
aggregatione
partium
,
vel
substantialium
,
vel
accidentalium
,
ex
qua
aggregatione
non
oritur
totum
per
se
unum
;
ut
in
substantialibus
,
acervus
lapidum
,
grex
ovium
,
&c.
And
of
these
wee
have
some
few
examples
in
the
Law
,
as
the
Cart
and
Oxen
or
Horses
drawing
the
same
,
may
all
bee
distrained
,
and
the
distresse
not
excessive
,
because
they
all
make
but
one
totall
:
8.
H.
4.16
.
Brooke
distr.
55.
And
so
in
a
Deodand
may
all
be
forfeit
,
because
they
make
but
one
totall
,
moving
to
the
death
.
So
likewise
a
Corporation
may
be
called
totum
integrale
discretum
ob
aggregatum
,
quod
ex
mult
is
personis
aggregatis
constat
.
20.
E.
4.3
.
Broo.
distr.
89.12
.
H.
8.13
.
b.
Totum
discretum
accidentale
,
sive
ex
partibus
accidentalibus
constans
,
est
quod
impropriè
&
planè
accidentalitèr
totum
dicitur
;
&
est
cum
1
,
causatum
ex
suis
causis
dividitur
;
2
,
cum
subjectum
per
sua
accidentia
;
3.
cum
accidens
per
sua
subjecta
;
4
,
cum
accidens
per
sua
accidentia
dividitur
.
And
here
I
leave
,
for
I
shun
to
be
over
tedious
or
curious
in
these
things
,
for
that
my
indeavour
is
rather
diligently
to
try
the
use
,
then
curiously
to
enquire
the
Art
.
Because
wee
have
formerly
both
defined
and
divided
by
the
causes
,
it
shall
be
necessary
to
say
something
of
them
.
There
be
foure
causes
of
every
thing
,
the
materiall
,
the
formall
,
and
the
efficient
,
and
fourthly
,
the
finall
cause
,
whereof
two
are
essentiall
as
it
were
,
and
enter
into
the
composition
,
as
the
materiall
and
formall
,
and
the
two
other
are
the
externall
,
the
efficient
,
and
the
finall
cause
.
The
materiall
cause
they
have
divided
into
three
kinds
,
although
improperly
,
yet
for
use
sufficiently
,
Materialis
causa
.
as
materia
ex
qua
,
materia
in
qua
,
and
materia
circa
quam
.
Materia
ex
qua
may
be
thus
defined
,
materia
est
quae
cum
forma
constitutit
rem
,
&
this
regarded
as
well
in
things
substantiall
,
as
accidentall
,
and
then
hath
it
also
two
kinds
,
materia
permanens
,
which
remaineth
in
the
things
constituted
,
as
an
house
made
of
stones
,
timber
,
earth
,
&c.
A
garment
made
of
cloth
,
wollen
,
linnen
or
silke
;
A
Potters
vessell
made
of
earth
,
all
which
as
substances
do
remaine
in
the
thing
composed
.
Or
materia
transiens
,
which
is
changed
in
the
mixture
or
composition
,
as
meale
and
water
are
the
materiall
causes
of
bread
,
but
transient
and
changed
in
the
composition
.
In
accidentall
things
such
as
are
most
Titles
or
matters
of
the
Law
,
there
is
the
like
composition
of
matter
and
forme
,
as
by
example
hereafter
is
many
particular
things
will
bee
made
manifest
,
as
in
all
your
Inheritances
or
hereditaments
,
corporall
compound
.
And
of
this
kinde
of
materiall
cause
,
Materia
ex
qua
,
there
is
another
Division
;
for
it
is
either
materia
remota
or
propinqua
,
remote
,
as
a
garment
of
wollen
cloth
hath
woll
to
be
the
remote
or
mediate
cause
,
and
wollen
cloth
for
the
propinque
and
immediate
cause
.
Materia
in
qua
,
and
materia
circa
quam
,
are
causes
improper
and
seene
in
accidentall
things
;
as
materia
in
qua
est
subjectum
,
and
materia
circa
quam
est
objectum
.
Forme
or
the
formall
cause
is
said
to
be
causa
unde
formatum
pendet
,
Formalis
.
and
is
either
substantiall
,
as
the
soule
of
man
,
whereby
hee
consisteth
,
is
the
forme
of
man
,
for
as
Plato
said
Anima
cujusque
est
quisque
,
and
this
cause
is
thus
described
,
forma
est
quae
dat
esse
rei
,
and
it
is
also
remota
or
propinqua
.
The
accidentall
forme
insubstances
is
the
outer
shape
and
figure
of
things
,
which
for
want
of
the
true
knowledge
of
the
inward
,
wee
be
often
compelled
to
use
.
The
accidentall
forme
in
accidents
is
Essentia
,
as
forma
Reip
:
est
ordo
&
unio
inter
Magistratum
&
subditos
certis
legibus
sancita
,
whereof
result
the
sundry
kindes
of
Common
Wealths
.
There
resteth
the
consideration
of
the
efficient
and
finall
causes
.
Causa
efficiens
est
,
à
qua
primò
incepit
motus
&
operatio
;
of
these
efficient
causes
some
doe
precede
the
worke
,
and
some
doe
effect
the
worke
;
Causes
efficient
which
doe
precede
the
worke
.
are
impulsive
causes
;
the
first
instigation
which
move
the
undertaking
of
the
worke
:
So
Cicero
pro
Milone
,
Maxima
illecebra
peccandi
impunitatis
spes
;
A
great
impulsive
cause
of
offence
is
the
hope
to
escape
unpunished
.
So
Salust
maketh
the
immoderate
desire
of
rule
and
vaine
glory
to
be
oftentimes
the
impulsive
cause
of
warre
,
libidinem
dominandi
causam
belli
habent
,
&
maximam
gloriam
in
maximo
imperio
ponunt
.
These
be
internall
impulsive
causes
;
there
are
also
externall
;
so
liberality
and
beneficence
is
a
great
externall
impulsive
cause
of
benevolence
;
Qui
liberalitate
utuntur
benevolentiam
sibi
conciliant
:
Cic.
lib.
2.
d●
Finibus
.
So
truth
speaking
is
sometimes
an
impulsive
cause
of
hatred
,
flattery
of
friends
,
veritas
odium
parit
,
obsequium
amicos
.
Causes
that
effect
the
worke
,
are
those
that
are
active
to
perfore
the
worke
;
Those
that
are
agents
in
the
worke
are
,
1
,
the
necessary
or
sole
cause
,
2
,
the
sufficient
cause
,
which
also
may
be
sole
,
but
not
of
necessity
required
;
3
,
the
coadjivant
cause
,
and
fourthly
,
the
instrumentall
cause
.
Necessaria
causa
ea
vocatur
à
qua
ita
procedit
effectus
,
ut
non
possit
posita
causa
non
procedere
effectus
,
nec
ab
alia
causa
talis
effectus
possit
provenire
.
So
God
was
the
efficient
cause
,
and
sole
cause
in
creating
of
the
world
;
And
so
the
Sunne
is
the
sole
efficient
necessary
cause
of
the
day
by
his
light
in
our
Hemispher
effecting
the
same
.
The
efficient
cause
which
is
called
the
sufficient
is
that
cause
which
is
able
alone
to
produce
the
work
;
but
it
is
not
the
sole
and
onely
cause
to
produce
that
effect
,
for
that
that
effect
may
as
well
be
produced
by
another
cause
as
sufficient
as
the
former
.
As
fire
is
the
cause
of
heat
,
and
sufficient
alone
to
produce
heat
;
and
yet
heat
doth
not
alwayes
proceed
from
the
fire
,
but
from
the
Sun
,
from
exercise
,
and
sundry
other
meanes
,
so
that
fire
is
not
necessary
and
alone
required
to
bring
forth
heat
.
Coadjuvant
causes
are
those
that
worke
to
the
producing
of
the
effect
,
but
together
with
some
other
cause
,
which
is
more
principall
in
the
operation
;
So
in
the
obtaining
of
a
victorie
by
battell
,
the
Generall
is
not
the
sole
cause
,
but
there
doe
concurre
the
Captaines
,
Centurions
,
Souldiers
,
and
such
like
;
as
Cicero
in
his
Oration
pro
Marcello
,
in
societatem
victoriae
cum
Caesare
venisse
Duces
,
Centuriones
,
Milites
.
So
Afranius
the
Poet
speaketh
of
Wisedome
,
usus
me
genuit
,
Mater
peperit
Memoria
.
The
instrumentall
causes
are
the
instruments
used
in
the
worke
,
Instrumentales
causae
(
saith
one
)
sunt
organa
per
quae
est
efficax
causa
Principalis
,
as
Bookes
are
the
instrumentall
causes
of
learning
&
militum
instrumenta
sunt
arma
,
to
which
may
be
adjoyned
that
cause
which
they
call
causa
sine
qua
non
,
as
Medium
in
visione
.
Causes
that
follow
the
worke
,
are
called
Conservant
causes
,
Polibius
yeeldeth
this
example
,
Duo
sunt
quibus
omnis
Resp:
servatur
,
in
hostes
fortitudo
&
domi
concordia
.
So
in
another
example
,
Seneca
,
Melius
beneficijs
Imperium
custoditur
quam
armis
.
And
of
all
these
efficient
causes
as
touching
the
manenr
of
the
working
,
some
are
causes
mediate
,
or
removed
,
and
some
are
immediate
and
propinque
.
This
may
suffice
briefly
for
the
knowledge
of
the
nature
of
the
efficient
cause
,
if
we
adde
a
word
of
the
accidentall
cause
,
namely
,
an
accident
that
happeneth
not
intended
,
but
casually
intervenient
,
and
yeeldeth
further
ance
to
the
effect
:
Sic
piscatio
fuit
causa
fortuita
,
&
per
accidents
,
piscatoribus
Milesiis
,
qurei
tripodis
inveniendi
.
And
so
Cicero
lib.
3.
de
natura
Deorum
:
Phaedro
Iasoni
profuit
hostis
,
Cic.
l.
3.
de
natura
Deo
rum
.
qui
gladio
quo
eum
petere
volebat
,
vomicamejus
apperuit
,
quam
Medici
sanare
non
poterant
.
And
so
wee
see
that
in
the
Law
a
casuall
chance
is
the
cause
of
the
death
of
man
,
although
perpetrated
by
the
act
of
another
.
There
followeth
the
last
and
finall
cause
,
Finalis
.
and
it
is
that
cause
Cujus
gratia
efficiens
agit
,
and
it
is
the
fruition
of
the
work
,
and
therefore
finis
est
ipse
usus
rei
,
and
oftentimes
differeth
not
from
the
effect
it selfe
,
revera
,
sed
ratione
finis
.
Finis
,
saith
Aristotle
,
esT
primus
in
intentione
,
&
ultimus
in
executione
:
The
first
thing
intended
,
and
the
last
thing
effected
.
The
power
of
the
end
or
finall
cause
is
twofold
,
it
is
first
impulsive
to
the
worke
;
secondly
,
directive
to
the
meanes
,
and
therefore
it
is
often
called
Causa
causarum
.
In
respect
of
his
impulsive
power
it
may
be
one
re
with
the
essicient
,
impulsive
,
inward
cause
;
and
it
is
the
same
which
directeth
the
meanes
,
and
giveth
name
to
the
action
,
as
Bracton
speaketh
;
Intentio
tua
,
&
affectio
tua
nomen
imponit
operi
tuo
.
And
againe
,
Tolle
voluntatem
,
&
omnis
actus
erit
indifferens
.
And
therefore
in
as
much
as
the
finall
cause
directeth
the
meanes
,
Non
faciamus
malum
,
ut
inde
eveniat
bonum
.
Cicero
most
excellently
,
lib.
2.
de
natura
Deorum
,
expresseth
notably
the
finall
causes
of
all
things
:
Omnia
aliorum
sunt
causa
generata
,
ut
fruges
atque
fructus
quos
terra
gignit
,
animant
ium
causa
;
animantes
autem
hominum
,
ut
Equus
vehendi
causa
,
Bos
arandi
,
venandi
&
custodiendi
Canis
,
ipse
autem
Homo
ortus
est
ad
mundum
contemplandum
&
imitandum
.
And
againe
the
same
Author
;
1.
Offic.
Homines
hominum
causa
generati
,
ut
ipsi
inter
se
alij
alijs
prodesse
possint
.
Likewise
the
same
Author
doth
excellently
expresse
the
end
of
government
:
Moderatori
Reip.
beata
Civium
vita
proposita
est
,
ut
ea
nimirum
opibus
firma
,
copijs
locuples
,
gloria
ampla
,
virtute
honesta
sit
.
Of
one
and
the
selfe
same
thing
there
may
be
many
finall
causes
,
Vnde
quidam
sunt
Principales
&
ultimi
,
&
alij
intermedij
,
qui
quodam
modo
ad
ultimum
conducunt
.
Thus
much
may
suffice
in
the
consideration
of
the
causes
,
and
of
these
things
that
have
beene
affirmed
,
The
Student
may
be
instructed
sufficiently
to
undergoe
the
first
Logicall
Exercise
,
whcih
is
Tractatio
simplicis
Thematis
,
and
exercise
of
wonderfull
use
in
the
true
obtaining
of
the
knowledge
〈◊〉
the
Law
,
and
is
able
to
furnish
him
with
copy
of
matter
for
Argument
in
every
Case
,
and
upon
every
sudden
occasion
,
and
wherein
those
things
which
we
have
spoken
of
the
causes
may
be
abundantly
exemplified
.
There
resteth
then
nothing
but
to
shew
the
manner
how
it
may
be
performed
,
and
to
set
foth
some
examples
in
the
Law
of
the
same
:
But
before
I
depart
from
this
discourse
of
the
causes
,
for
the
better
explanation
of
that
which
hath
been
said
touching
the
same
,
we
will
adde
some
examples
and
instances
drawne
out
of
the
Volumes
of
the
Lawes
,
and
out
of
the
Arguments
of
Cases
debated
,
that
thereby
our
Student
may
the
better
understand
the
use
thereof
.
Therefore
first
of
all
touching
that
materiall
cause
,
Ex
qua
res
constituitur
,
wee
may
observe
in
the
Law
,
That
in
things
corporall
compound
this
kinde
of
matter
resulteth
to
be
one
with
the
integrall
parts
;
as
the
matter
whereof
an
house
is
composed
are
these
materialls
of
Stone
,
Timber
,
Earth
,
Lime
,
and
such
like
,
whereof
it
is
framed
,
and
which
are
the
integrall
parts
of
this
whole
.
So
a
Mannor
which
is
Quiddam
totum
compositum
corporale
,
consisteth
of
Demesnes
and
Services
;
A
Mannor
.
and
the
Demesnes
doe
containe
,
land
,
meadowe
,
pasture
,
wood
,
&c.
and
the
services
doe
import
not
onely
the
rent
payable
,
but
the
corporall
service
and
attendancy
of
the
Tenants
thereof
.
So
a
Monastery
,
site
,
house
,
Monastery
.
38.
E.
3.21
.
a
Com.
168.
b.
and
also
the
lands
&
possessions
belonging
thereunto
,
is
included
in
the
generall
name
Monastery
,
because
those
import
the
matter
ex
qua
consistit
.
So
the
matter
of
a
Parke
is
land
inclosed
,
5.
E.
4.28
.
a.
Ardun
.
10.
H.
7.6
.
a.
10
H.
7.30
.
a
and
the
Derre
;
for
the
Deere
are
held
as
parcell
of
the
Parke
.
Of
corporall
things
the
matter
is
also
corporall
and
visible
,
and
are
subject
to
manuall
tradition
and
delivery
;
Rent
.
as
the
matter
of
a
Rent
is
a
summe
of
money
,
or
other
corporall
thing
payable
,
reserved
or
granted
,
as
Rent-Corne
,
and
such
like
.
The
matter
of
Tithes
are
things
annually
produced
by
way
of
increase
.
Tithes
.
The
matter
of
an
Herriot
or
Mortuary
is
the
best
beast
of
the
owner
.
Herriot
.
The
matter
of
a
Corporation
consisteth
in
the
bodies
naturall
of
the
person
or
persons
of
which
it
is
combined
;
Corporation
.
Vide
21.
E.
4
56.
a
63.
a.
68.
a.
who
although
they
be
framed
into
a
politike
consideration
of
perdurance
and
succession
,
yet
is
there
in
that
consideration
a
respect
also
had
of
the
body
naturall
.
Of
things
incorporeall
considered
by
the
Law
,
the
matter
or
materiall
cause
is
that
which
is
put
into
the
definition
loco
generis
,
in
lieu
of
the
generall
:
for
true
it
is
that
Genus
in
desinitione
vel
descriptione
supplet
vicem
materiae
,
differentia
vero
formae
.
So
we
may
say
that
the
materiall
of
a
Fee
Simple
,
Fee
.
and
also
of
an
Estate
Taile
,
is
an
inheritance
,
because
inheritance
is
the
genus
in
the
definition
or
description
of
both
of
them
.
The
matter
of
Homage
is
a
corporall
service
.
Homage
.
Warranty
.
The
matter
of
Warranty
is
a
Covenant
reall
,
whereby
the
party
which
made
it
standeth
bound
to
defend
the
thing
warranted
by
him
,
or
to
yeeld
in
value
.
The
Law
.
The
matter
of
the
Law
of
England
generally
taken
,
ex
qua
constituitur
,
is
the
law
of
Nature
,
the
law
of
God
,
the
generall
Customes
of
the
Realm
,
Maximes
drawne
out
of
the
Law
of
Nature
,
as
the
Principles
of
Reason
,
primarily
or
secondarily
deduced
,
Constitutions
and
Acts
of
Parliament
.
Materia
circa
quam
,
on
which
it
worketh
,
are
lites
&
contentiones
,
casEs
of
debate
daily
comming
into
question
touching
persons
,
possessions
,
and
injuries
done
by
word
or
act
.
In
a
contract
of
Sale
,
Sale
.
the
materiall
causes
are
the
things
sold
,
and
the
price
agreed
upon
;
the
forme
is
the
manner
of
the
contract
,
absolute
or
conditionall
,
perpetuall
or
temporary
;
the
efficient
causes
,
the
parties
contracting
,
the
buyer
and
the
seller
;
the
end
or
finall
cause
is
to
transferre
property
from
the
one
to
the
other
,
to
supply
each
others
indigence
:
the
matter
ex
qua
,
is
either
permament
or
transient
,
as
hath
beene
said
:
The
consideration
whereof
yeeldeth
in
the
Law
this
fruitfull
distinction
:
For
if
a
man
take
wrongfully
the
materiall
which
was
mine
,
and
is
permanent
,
not
adding
any
other
thing
thereunto
,
than
the
forme
onely
by
alteration
thereof
,
such
thing
so
newly
formed
by
an
exterior
forme
,
notwithstanding
still
remaineth
mine
,
(
as
some
have
held
opinion
)
and
may
be
seised
againe
by
me
,
and
I
may
take
it
out
of
his
possession
as
mine
owne
:
But
they
say
,
if
he
adde
some
other
matter
thereunto
,
as
of
another
mans
leather
doth
make
shooes
or
boots
,
or
of
my
cloth
maketh
garments
,
adding
to
the
accomplishment
thereof
of
his
owne
,
he
hath
thereby
altered
the
property
,
so
that
the
first
owner
cannot
seize
the
thing
so
composed
,
but
is
driven
to
his
action
to
recover
his
remedy
;
howbeit
by
the
judgement
of
the
Court
in
a
case
of
that
nature
depending
,
it
hath
beene
determined
that
the
first
owner
might
seize
the
same
,
notwithstanding
such
addition
.
But
if
the
thing
be
transitory
in
his
nature
by
the
change
,
as
if
one
take
my
corne
or
meale
,
and
maketh
therof
bread
,
I
cannot
in
that
case
seize
the
bread
,
because
as
the
Civill
Law
speaketh
,
Haec
species
facta
ex
materia
aliena
,
in
pristinam
formam
reduci
non
potest
,
ergo
ci
à
quo
est
facta
cedit
.
So
some
have
said
,
that
if
a
man
take
my
barly
,
and
make
thereof
malt
,
because
it
is
changed
into
another
nature
the
barly
cannot
be
seised
by
me
.
But
the
sure
Rule
is
,
Regula
.
That
where
the
materiall
wrongfully
taken
away
could
not
at
first
before
any
alteration
be
seised
,
for
that
it
could
not
bee
distinguished
from
other
things
of
that
kinde
,
as
corne
,
money
,
and
such
like
;
there
those
things
cannot
be
scised
by
the
former
owner
,
because
the
property
of
those
things
cannot
be
distinguished
.
For
if
my
money
be
wrongfully
taken
away
,
and
he
that
taketh
it
doe
make
plate
thereof
,
or
doe
convert
my
plate
into
money
,
I
cannot
seize
the
same
,
for
that
money
is
undistinguishable
from
other
money
of
that
coyne
.
If
a
Butcher
take
wrongfully
my
Oxe
,
and
doth
kill
it
,
and
bring
it
into
the
Market
to
bee
sold
,
I
may
not
seize
upon
the
flesh
,
for
it
cannot
bee
knowne
from
others
of
that
kinde
:
12.
H.
8.9
.
b.
10.
a.
Bur
if
it
bee
found
hanging
in
the
skin
,
where
the
marke
may
appeare
,
I
may
seize
the
same
,
although
when
it
was
taken
from
me
it
had
life
,
and
now
is
dead
.
So
if
a
man
cut
downe
my
Tree
,
and
square
it
into
a
beame
of
timber
,
I
may
seize
the
same
,
for
he
hath
neither
altered
the
nature
thereof
,
nor
added
any
thing
but
exterior
forme
thereunto
.
But
if
he
lay
the
beame
of
timber
into
the
building
of
a
house
,
I
may
not
seize
the
same
,
for
being
so
set
it
is
become
parcell
of
the
house
,
and
so
in
supposition
of
Law
after
a
sort
altered
in
his
nature
.
Againe
,
by
consideration
of
the
nature
of
the
matter
or
materiall
causes
of
things
,
the
law
doth
frame
sundry
differences
;
as
if
I
deliver
unto
one
a
piece
of
cloth
of
twenty
yards
together
to
keep
,
and
restore
it
unto
me
when
it
shall
be
demanded
,
and
the
party
will
cut
it
into
severall
yards
and
pieces
of
cloth
,
hee
hath
not
altered
the
matter
thereof
,
nor
diminished
the
quantity
,
and
yet
if
he
tender
the
same
unto
me
I
am
not
bound
to
accept
thereof
,
but
may
recover
my
damages
for
that
wrong
so
offered
unto
me
;
for
although
in
matter
and
substance
it
be
the
same
,
yet
it
is
altered
in
forme
,
and
impaired
in
the
use
.
So
if
he
take
my
piece
of
plate
,
18.
E.
4.23
.
a.
b.
Wrecke
.
and
breake
it
into
pieces
,
&c.
Likewise
the
Statute
made
in
the
time
of
King
Edward
the
first
concerning
Wrecks
,
hath
ordained
that
if
a
Ship
be
wrecked
,
if
any
living
thing
therein
escape
alive
,
it
shall
not
be
adjudged
;
but
that
the
Merchandize
therein
be
viewed
and
preserved
for
the
owner
,
if
he
come
to
challenge
the
same
within
a
yeare
and
a
day
.
But
what
if
in
such
case
the
Merchandize
be
victuall
,
as
fresh
fish
;
or
fruit
,
as
Orenges
and
such
like
,
as
will
not
last
uncorrupt
by
the
space
of
a
yeare
,
if
the
Sherife
in
such
case
should
sell
those
goods
within
the
year
,
and
be
ready
to
yeeld
the
money
to
the
owner
,
hath
he
offended
that
law
?
Certainly
no
:
for
the
consideration
of
the
nature
and
matter
of
those
things
in
such
case
causeth
the
said
law
to
be
interpreted
contrary
to
the
letter
of
the
law
:
For
the
letter
of
the
law
commandeth
a
preservation
,
and
in
this
case
the
Sherife
hath
done
contrary
,
Pl.
Com.
465
466.
a.
for
he
hath
sold
,
and
yet
neverthelesse
hath
justly
executed
that
law
.
Thus
you
see
that
the
consideration
of
the
matter
or
materiall
causes
whereof
the
things
controverted
doe
consist
,
hath
great
use
in
the
decision
of
law
.
Materia
in
qua
is
onely
subjectum
accidentium
,
and
therefore
considerable
in
accidents
onely
,
which
subsist
in
their
proper
subjects
,
as
Knowledge
in
the
Vnderstanding
;
the
Vertues
morall
in
the
Will
of
man
;
health
,
strength
,
and
agility
in
the
Body
:
And
as
Materia
in
qua
is
said
to
be
subjectum
,
so
is
Materia
circa
quam
,
objectum
,
both
which
are
somewhat
improperly
attributed
to
the
materiall
cause
,
and
are
both
so
evident
as
I
passe
them
over
.
In
consideration
of
a
Monastery
,
Monastery
.
the
matter
in
qua
,
or
subject
of
that
Title
,
is
the
persons
whereof
that
Corporation
consisteth
;
as
the
Abbot
and
his
Monkes
,
that
is
,
his
Covent
;
The
Prior
and
his
Cofreers
;
The
matter
circa
quam
is
comprised
in
their
possessions
.
In
an
Arbitrement
(
of
which
I
shall
speake
more
hereafter
)
the
matter
in
qua
are
the
parties
at
strife
,
Arbitrement
.
circa
quam
the
thing
whereof
the
controversie
riseth
,
reall
or
personall
:
The
materiall
cause
ex
qua
is
most
eminent
,
and
most
eminent
to
be
found
in
things
corporeall
,
having
of
themselves
substance
;
and
in
things
incorporate
,
that
which
is
loco
gener
is
in
descriptione
,
in
both
which
as
there
is
genus
propinquum
,
and
genus
remotum
,
so
is
there
materia
remota
,
&
materia
propinqua
.
As
a
Fine
whereby
lands
or
hereditaments
are
conveyed
,
is
said
to
bee
a
concord
,
Fine
.
for
the
entry
thereof
is
,
Est
concordia
talis
;
but
this
is
genus
remotum
,
or
materia
remota
:
for
an
Arbitrement
is
also
a
Concord
,
a
Contract
is
a
Concord
:
but
to
say
it
is
a
concord
of
Record
,
is
to
adde
genus
propinquum
.
And
thus
much
touching
the
materiall
cause
.
As
touching
the
formal
cause
,
The
formall
cause
exemplified
.
it
is
either
as
hath
beene
said
,
substantiall
or
accidentall
:
The
formall
substantiall
cause
in
things
of
life
,
is
that
which
is
the
fountaine
of
life
and
motion
:
In
things
which
are
without
life
,
that
are
simple
and
uncompound
;
it
limiteth
their
bounds
,
and
is
the
cause
of
their
being
:
In
things
that
are
compound
it
is
the
convenient
knitting
and
union
of
the
parts
.
The
formall
cause
entreth
the
definition
or
description
loco
differentiae
,
bringing
and
adding
particularity
unto
the
generall
,
untill
it
doth
fulfill
a
perfect
definition
or
description
,
and
therefore
as
one
saith
well
,
dicitur
forma
à
formando
:
Differentia
verò
quia
differre
facit
.
The
forme
is
said
to
bee
Modus
quidam
materiae
,
quo
sibi
contingat
,
ut
hujus
vel
illius
specieie
capiat
nomen
:
And
forma
dat
esse
rei
,
and
that
esse
is
nothing
else
but
existentia
formae
in
materia
,
eaque
plus
affert
ad
essentiam
rei
quàm
materia
,
est
enim
ipsamet
essentia
aut
certè
praecipua
pars
essentiae
.
In
the
Commentaries
of
Mr.
Plowden
in
the
Lord
Zouches
case
,
Claime
.
a
claime
is
thus
described
;
A
Claime
is
a
Challenge
by
a
man
made
of
the
property
or
ownership
of
a
thing
which
he
hath
not
in
possession
,
but
is
detained
from
him
,
where
the
genus
is
Challenge
,
but
to
expresse
what
manner
of
Challenge
,
there
is
added
this
difference
,
namely
,
of
the
property
and
ownership
of
a
thing
detained
,
which
is
loco
formae
:
So
three
of
the
causes
are
comprehended
in
that
definition
or
descritpion
:
The
materiall
cause
de
qua
,
viz.
a
Challenge
,
circaquam
,
of
things
detained
:
The
formall
cause
the
property
of
ownership
,
the
efficient
cause
by
a
man
wronged
,
onely
there
wanteth
the
finall
cause
which
is
twofold
,
1
,
to
manifest
that
property
,
2
,
to
reduce
the
same
propertie
backe
againe
to
him
for
whom
the
claime
is
made
.
In
28.
Cond
.
of
Oblig
.
H.
8.17
.
a.
Dyer
.
The
Condition
of
an
Obligation
is
thus
described
:
The
Condition
of
an
Obligation
is
an
assent
of
the
obligee
in
defeasance
of
an
obligation
made
for
the
advantage
of
the
obligor
,
where
the
matter
thereof
is
an
assent
,
the
forme
a
defeasance
,
the
efficient
cause
the
obligor
and
obligee
,
the
sinall
cause
the
advantage
of
the
Obligor
.
A
Contract
is
an
agreement
betweene
parties
concerning
goods
or
lands
for
mony
or
other
recompence
,
Contract
.
Dr.
Stu.
c.
24.
fo.
103.
a.
where
the
generall
matter
ex
qua
is
the
agreement
,
which
is
clriesly
respected
in
contracts
:
the
matter
circa
quam
,
Com
Browning
&
Beston
.
141.
a.
concerning
goods
or
lands
:
the
forme
or
difference
,
for
money
or
other
recompence
,
for
that
maketh
it
a
contract
;
for
the
want
of
recompence
causeth
it
to
bee
but
nudum
pactum
,
unde
non
oritur
actio
.
The
causes
efficient
,
Com.
141.
the
parties
contracting
;
The
finall
cause
Bracton
doth
notably
expresse
,
Bract.
lib.
3.8.2
.
f.
100.
Inventae
sunt
hujusmodi
stipulationes
&
obligationes
ad
hoc
,
ut
unusquisque
habeat
,
&
sibi
acquirat
quod
suum
interest
.
In
the
Reports
of
my
Lord
Dyer
,
16.
El.
336.
Consideration
b.
n.
34.
a.
A
Consideration
is
thus
described
;
A
Consideration
is
a
cause
or
occasion
meritorious
requiring
mutuall
recompence
in
fact
or
in
Law
:
where
the
matter
is
an
occasion
meritorious
,
the
forme
mutuall
recompence
,
&c.
not
to
trouble
our selves
over
long
in
this
kinde
.
Secondly
,
in
consideration
of
the
formall
cause
there
is
to
be
observed
,
That
when
division
or
distribution
is
made
ex
causis
,
those
divisions
which
doc
proceed
of
the
formall
cause
are
most
essentiall
,
whereof
I
shall
shew
some
few
instances
or
examples
.
Commons
being
divided
according
to
their
materiall
causes
,
are
either
Commons
of
pasture
,
Commons
.
Commons
Estovers
,
Common
of
Turbary
,
&c.
But
being
divided
according
to
their
formall
causes
;
all
Commons
are
either
Appendant
,
Appurtenant
,
or
in
grosse
.
If
you
distribute
Conditions
according
to
their
materiall
causes
,
Conditions
.
or
things
whereof
they
are
,
then
we
say
they
are
conditions
reall
,
which
are
annexed
to
the
estates
;
There
are
also
conditions
personall
,
annexed
to
personall
contracts
,
as
to
Obligations
of
all
kinds
,
promises
,
covenants
,
and
other
contracts
:
But
being
divided
according
to
their
forme
,
There
we
may
say
,
that
all
conditions
are
either
possible
or
impossible
:
and
impossible
conditions
are
voyd
in
Law
:
All
possible
conditions
are
either
lawfull
or
unlawfull
;
and
unlawfull
conditions
doe
make
the
contract
also
voyd
,
whereas
impossible
conditions
are
onely
voyd
themselves
,
but
the
contract
standeth
single
:
all
lawfull
conditions
are
either
precedent
or
subsequent
,
and
all
those
conditions
which
are
annexed
to
estates
,
are
either
by
way
of
encrease
of
estates
,
or
by
way
of
defeasance
of
estates
.
All
considerations
are
either
executed
with
a
recompence
past
,
Consider
.
or
else
executory
with
a
recompence
after
to
bee
made
and
performed
;
And
this
Division
is
ex
causa
formali
.
In
as
much
as
the
forme
giveth
the
essence
,
it
was
said
of
Vlpian
the
Romane
Lawyer
,
out
of
the
rules
of
Logicke
,
That
mutata
forma
propè
interimitur
substantiarei
:
For
so
in
the
former
examples
wee
see
,
that
if
a
man
take
my
Barley
and
make
Malt
thereof
,
it
cannot
be
seised
by
the
former
Owner
;
and
yet
neither
matter
,
quantity
nor
outward
forme
is
lost
,
but
it
is
become
a
thing
of
another
nature
and
vse
,
because
the
inward
forme
(
to
speake
as
Morall
Philosophers
)
whereof
dependeth
the
use
,
is
changed
;
for
Morall
Philosophy
doth
not
so
curiously
observe
the
naturall
causes
as
Naturall
Philosophy
;
but
according
as
to
the
information
of
manners
:
So
if
a
man
of
any
peece
of
cloth
which
he
had
to
keepe
containing
20.
yards
in
one
whole
peece
,
will
cut
the
same
into
20.
severall
yards
and
peeces
;
The
matter
nor
the
quantity
is
not
changed
,
and
yet
if
hee
will
restore
the
same
peeces
,
it
is
not
lawfull
restitution
,
neither
am
I
bound
to
receive
it
.
If
a
man
possessed
of
20.
packes
of
Wool
,
by
his
last
will
and
Testament
devise
and
bequeath
all
the
said
Wooll
unto
1.
Stile
,
and
after
the
Testator
converteth
the
same
wooll
into
cloth
and
dieth
possessed
of
the
same
cloth
.
1
:
Stile
the
Devisee
of
the
Wooll
shall
not
have
by
Law
the
cloth
made
of
that
Woll
,
for
that
the
forme
of
the
Wooll
is
changed
,
notwithstanding
the
matter
doth
remaine
,
and
it
is
turned
to
a
thing
of
another
nature
;
and
the
making
of
the
said
Wooll
into
cloth
by
the
Testator
himselfe
is
a
countermand
of
the
said
last
will
and
Testament
.
So
it
is
also
of
things
incident
,
as
if
the
principall
thing
whereunto
another
thing
is
incident
,
appendant
or
belonging
,
be
changed
in
nature
,
the
incident
is
lost
and
altered
:
As
if
a
man
have
a
dwelling
house
whereunto
there
is
a
Common
of
Estovers
belonging
(
which
is
wood
for
firing
to
be
burnt
in
that
house
)
if
this
house
by
casualty
of
fire
or
tempest
be
burned
or
blowne
downe
,
or
taken
downe
,
and
a
new
be
built
in
another
place
neere
,
or
in
another
forme
,
the
Common
of
Estovers
is
lost
,
and
not
to
be
used
in
this
new
house
,
for
this
is
not
the
former
house
,
but
another
house
unto
which
the
said
Estovers
cannot
belong
;
but
if
the
said
first
house
were
not
wholly
pulled
downe
but
repaired
,
or
if
another
new
house
be
built
upon
the
same
foundation
,
and
in
the
same
forme
with
the
former
;
The
Common
of
Estovers
remaineth
with
the
new
house
,
for
that
in
judgement
of
Law
is
the
same
house
:
and
such
building
being
upon
the
former
foundation
is
but
a
reparation
.
But
here
a
difference
is
to
be
observed
,
that
if
the
thing
incident
doe
not
belong
to
the
principal
thing
,
as
it
is
in
nature
a
speciall
thing
,
but
in
the
generall
;
then
although
the
said
principall
thing
be
altered
in
specie
,
the
generall
remaining
,
the
thing
incident
shall
remaine
to
such
generall
:
As
if
a
man
have
a
water-corn-mill
,
unto
the
which
hee
hath
a
Mill-leat
or
water-course
belonging
comming
thorough
the
land
of
another
man
unto
the
said
Mill.
Now
if
hee
change
the
nature
of
the
said
Corne-mill
,
unto
a
fulling-mill
,
or
è
converso
,
wherein
both
forme
and
finall
cause
,
namely
the
use
is
altered
;
it
hath
beene
much
disputed
in
our
time
,
whether
the
said
water-course
did
lawfully
belong
unto
the
said
fulling-mill
,
as
it
did
when
it
was
a
Corne-mill
?
for
the
owner
of
the
land
where
thorough
the
said
streame
did
runne
,
and
diverted
the
said
water-course
,
pretending
that
he
might
lawfully
do
the
same
,
for
that
the
owner
of
the
Mill
had
changed
the
nature
of
the
Mill
;
and
the
prescription
to
have
the
sayd
water-course
is
thereby
altered
:
But
it
was
adjudged
that
the
said
water
course
did
still
belong
and
remaine
,
and
so
ought
unto
the
fulling-mill
,
as
it
had
formerly
done
unto
the
Corne-mill
,
for
that
it
did
not
belong
unto
the
Corne-mill
,
as
specially
unto
a
Corne-mill
,
but
it
did
belong
unto
it
generally
as
unto
a
mill
going
or
driven
with
water
,
and
not
otherwise
.
And
thus
much
may
suffice
for
the
consideration
of
the
formall
cause
,
as
it
is
the
essentiall
and
substantiall
cause
.
The
Law
also
considereth
accidentall
formes
,
for
the
Law
prescribeth
a
forme
in
all
abjurations
;
so
likewise
the
Law
prescribeth
a
forme
how
homage
shall
bee
made
by
the
Tenant
unto
the
Lord
:
And
so
likewise
of
Fealty
,
both
which
Littleton
doth
expresse
:
The
Law
prescribeth
the
forme
how
Battaile
in
a
writ
of
right
,
and
in
an
Appeale
shall
be
waged
and
performed
:
So
likewise
the
Ecclesiasticall
Lawes
prescribe
formes
of
Consecrations
of
Churches
,
Chappells
,
&c.
of
Parsons
,
Orders
,
Institutions
,
Inductions
,
and
such
like
.
All
Lawes
doe
retaine
some
formalities
which
may
not
be
altered
,
as
in
the
Common
Lawes
of
this
Realme
,
we
have
our
formes
of
Writs
,
Pleadings
,
Entries
of
judgements
,
and
sundry
other
formes
and
ceremonies
ordayned
,
which
without
great
and
urgent
causes
cannot
be
altered
.
These
outward
formes
are
nothing
else
,
as
one
describeth
,
then
modi
quidam
rebus
agendis
praescripti
,
or
as
another
describeth
,
Ordinatae
series
rem
ad
substantiam
deducentes
:
And
concerning
these
outward
formes
and
solemnities
,
these
rules
are
observed
and
prescribed
;
1
,
formae
praefinitae
omissio
reddit
actum
invallidum
:
Procurator
,
Cod
:
de
Procuratore
.
Le:
diligenter
in
Princip:
ff.
de
mandatis
.
And
againe
,
Qui
formam
praetermittit
jam
aliud
facere
videtur
:
And
thus
much
concerning
the
formall
cause
.
As
touching
the
efficient
cause
;
The
efficient
cause
exemplified
.
the
impulsive
inward
causes
of
all
crimes
are
commonly
these
,
spes
lucri
,
impunitatis
,
vindictae
,
malitiae
,
odij
,
&c.
The
outward
,
the
accessary
before
the
fact
,
which
is
the
abettor
and
instigator
thereunto
.
The
sufficient
and
necessary
cause
of
a
Cortract
is
casent
of
parties
,
Contract
.
for
in
Contracts
the
consent
is
chiefly
to
bee
regarded
,
as
hath
beene
said
.
And
in
Mariage
Consensus
,
Mariage
.
&
non
Concubitus
matrimonium
facit
:
C
:
Nutias
,
de
Regulis
Iuris
.
And
as
Bracton
,
lib.
1.
ca.
5.
ff.
7.
alleageth
,
fit
per
mutuam
utriusque
voluntatem
.
In
the
worke
there
are
both
principall
and
coadjuvant
causes
:
Appropriatō
.
In
an
Appropriation
of
a
Church
the
efficient
causes
are
,
The
Ordinary
,
the
Patron
,
and
the
King
,
and
they
ought
to
agree
in
the
act
,
&
sunt
Actores
hujus
fabulae
:
The
Ordinary
,
inferiour
or
supreme
,
for
hee
is
the
principall
Agent
therein
,
because
he
hath
the
spirituall
jurisdiction
;
And
the
Act
of
the
Appropriation
is
a
thing
spirituall
:
And
the
Ordinary
saith
,
Com.
498.
appropriamus
,
consolidamus
,
&
unimus
,
as
the
principall
Actor
in
the
cause
:
The
Ordinary
may
bee
termed
therefore
the
principall
efficient
cause
,
and
the
other
the
coadjuvant
cause
.
These
the
Pope
in
ancient
times
as
supreme
Ordinary
then
permitted
,
used
to
doe
;
and
these
as
supreme
Ordinary
may
the
King
doe
,
but
alwayes
with
the
consent
of
the
Patrone
,
who
is
a
coadjuvant
efficient
cause
:
the
formall
cause
is
the
consolidation
of
the
Incumbency
and
Patronage
into
one
person
capable
of
spirituall
charge
:
and
the
finall
cause
to
make
a
perpetuall
Incumbency
.
The
efficient
causes
of
an
Acts
of
Parliament
,
Act
of
Parliament
.
are
the
assent
of
the
three
Estates
;
namely
,
first
of
the
King
;
secondly
,
of
the
Lords
Spirituall
and
Temporall
;
and
thirdly
,
of
the
Commons
;
and
each
without
the
other
cannot
perfit
this
worke
;
and
yet
untill
the
Royall
assent
it
is
but
as
an
Embrio
in
ventre
matris
,
4.
H.
7.9
.
b.
Com.
79.
a.
and
by
the
Royall
Assent
comming
last
,
it
taketh
life
and
vigour
.
Writing
,
sealing
,
and
delivery
,
Deed.
Com.
108.
b.
22.
H.
6.45
.
b
1.
H.
6.4
.
b.
2.
E.
4.3
.
b.
are
the
efficient
causes
of
a
Deed
,
all
must
concurre
,
and
each
without
other
is
fruitlesse
;
but
the
complementall
act
which
commeth
last
of
all
is
the
delivery
,
and
thereby
the
Deed
receiveth
his
perfection
.
If
divers
come
together
to
doe
a
murther
,
Murther
.
although
one
alone
doe
give
the
wound
whereby
death
ensueth
,
yet
are
they
all
which
are
present
and
consenting
to
the
act
,
Principals
and
efficient
causes
of
this
murther
;
he
that
striketh
is
the
principall
agent
,
and
the
rest
coadjuvant
:
and
yet
although
one
gave
the
stroke
,
yet
shall
it
be
adjudged
in
law
the
stroke
of
every
of
them
,
given
by
him
which
gave
it
,
as
for
himselfe
,
and
given
of
the
others
by
him
as
their
minister
and
instrument
,
and
yet
all
equall
in
degree
as
principals
,
and
not
accessaries
:
Com.
98.
a.
and
yet
as
you
see
not
equall
in
degree
as
efficient
causes
.
If
a
man
and
a
woman
be
present
,
Ravishment
.
with
purpose
that
the
man
shall
by
violence
carnally
know
the
body
of
another
woman
there
also
present
,
against
her
will
,
and
the
man
doth
the
fact
in
the
presence
of
the
other
woman
,
she
that
was
so
present
,
as
well
as
the
man
,
shall
be
a
Principall
Ravisher
;
the
one
,
viz.
the
man
,
the
cause
agent
,
and
the
other
coadjuvant
:
and
so
one
woman
may
be
a
principall
to
the
ravishment
of
another
.
Livery
and
seisin
is
the
instrumentall
efficient
cause
of
the
conveyance
of
a
Freehold
estate
in
land
,
Casuall
.
and
sufficient
alone
to
performe
the
same
,
and
yet
is
it
not
the
sole
cause
,
for
it
may
be
conveyed
by
other
meanes
,
as
by
fine
,
bargaine
and
sale
,
by
devise
,
and
otherwise
.
There
is
also
an
efficient
cause
casuall
:
Casuall
.
As
if
a
man
intend
to
doe
an
unlawfull
act
,
and
in
doing
thereof
another
hurt
ensueth
,
not
intended
,
but
by
chance
,
cleane
beyond
all
expectation
or
defire
,
yet
shall
he
be
said
the
author
of
that
act
not
intended
,
so
happening
by
chance
,
that
did
the
first
act
.
This
may
suffice
to
exemplifie
the
cause
efficient
:
The
finall
cause
exemplified
.
There
resteth
the
finall
cause
,
of
the
which
I
will
shew
some
examples
,
as
I
have
done
in
the
rest
.
Many
arguments
are
drawne
from
the
finall
cause
,
and
of
much
use
in
the
law
.
The
end
and
finall
cause
of
the
law
generally
taken
,
as
Bracton
well
affirmeth
,
is
this
,
Finis
legis
est
ut
sopiantur
jurgia
,
&
vitia
propulsentur
,
&
ut
in
regno
conservetur
pax
&
justitia
.
Bracton
li.
2.
cap.
2.
The
finall
cause
of
an
action
is
,
as
likewise
the
same
Bracton
affirmeth
,
Vt
non
liceat
unicuique
se
sine
Iudicio
vindicare
,
&
quod
sibi
ablatum
est
per
Iudicem
reposcat
.
The
finall
cause
why
also
the
same
ought
to
be
by
writ
,
is
,
Quòd
sine
brevi
non
debet
quis
experire
in
Iudicio
,
nec
mutari
potest
petentis
intentio
vel
modus
petendi
.
Brac.
102.
a.
Le.
de
Procura
.
Attorney
.
The
end
why
Attorneyes
are
permitted
in
Court
,
or
a
man
to
answer
by
Baily
in
an
Assize
,
or
to
pursue
or
defend
by
Guardian
,
is
,
Vt
qui
rebus
suis
superesse
vel
nolunt
vel
non
possunt
,
per
alios
possint
vel
agere
vel
convenire
.
The
finall
cause
why
an
Attorney
is
required
to
a
Grant
,
is
that
the
Tenant
may
know
to
whom
he
ought
to
be
attendant
to
pay
his
rent
,
31.
H.
8.
b
Attornem
.
60
2.
E.
6.
d.
Att.
45.
or
to
do
his
service
,
so
that
where
there
is
no
attendancy
required
,
there
needeth
no
attornement
.
The
finall
scope
and
end
of
the
Averment
of
a
Pleading
,
Averment
.
is
to
reduce
matter
traversable
to
a
cleere
and
certain
issue
:
and
therefore
if
the
matter
pleadable
be
not
answerable
or
issuable
,
there
needeth
no
Averment
.
36.
H.
6.17
.
b.
The
finall
cause
why
Wardship
was
ordained
,
Wardship
.
is
,
Vt
qui
per
aetatem
se
ipsos
defendere
nequeant
,
ab
aliis
defendantur
.
§
.
Est
autem
.
Institu
.
de
tutela
.
Agreeably
saith
Bracton
,
Quosdam
oportet
esse
sub
tutela
&
cura
aliorum
;
eò
quòd
se
ipsos
regere
non
norunt
.
The
end
why
writings
were
made
betweene
men
in
their
contracts
,
Bract.
lib.
2.
cap.
16.
b.
Le.
4.
ff.
de
pignatoribus
.
Livery
.
was
as
the
same
Bracton
alledgeth
,
Fiunt
aliquando
donationes
in
scriptis
,
sicut
in
chartis
ob
perpetuam
memoriam
,
propter
brevem
hominum
vitam
,
&
ut
facilius
probari
possit
donatio
.
So
the
cause
why
Livery
and
Seisin
was
ordained
in
the
Law
,
and
first
invented
,
was
because
it
is
a
thing
notorious
,
that
the
people
might
take
knowledge
of
the
passing
of
estate
of
most
accompt
,
and
be
the
more
able
to
try
the
same
when
they
should
happen
to
be
impanneled
on
a
Iury
for
that
purpose
.
It
would
be
over
tedious
to
heape
up
more
examples
,
which
almost
are
evident
in
every
Title
concerning
this
matter
.
As
we
doe
consider
the
end
of
things
at
the
Common
Law
,
so
also
in
Statute
Lawes
the
end
and
scope
that
the
makers
of
such
Lawes
aymed
at
,
is
of
speciall
regard
in
the
interpretation
of
those
Lawes
,
and
often
considered
by
the
Iudges
,
unto
whom
power
of
interpretation
and
exposition
of
those
Lawes
is
given
;
as
upon
perusall
of
sundry
cases
grounded
upon
Statute
learning
will
most
evidently
appeare
.
It
often
happeneth
that
the
finall
causes
of
things
are
more
than
one
,
and
sometimes
many
,
and
some
of
them
subalterne
each
to
other
,
and
sometimes
distinct
,
whereof
ensueth
this
exception
to
the
generall
rule
,
Sublata
causa
tollitur
effectus
:
For
if
there
be
divers
finall
causes
,
although
the
one
be
taken
away
,
yet
the
effect
remaineth
,
if
one
of
the
causes
doe
remaine
:
As
for
example
,
The
finall
causes
of
mariage
are
three
,
Generatio
Prolis
,
Conservatio
Domus
,
Solatio
Vitae
:
and
although
hope
of
issue
be
taken
away
,
Mariage
.
yet
the
mariage
subsisteth
firme
.
The
finall
causes
of
Arbitriments
and
Awards
are
alledged
principally
to
bee
two
;
first
,
Arbitriment
19.
H.
6.37
.
b
Nedham
.
8.
E.
4.10
.
a
Laken
.
8.
E.
4.12
.
a.
Yelverton
.
every
Arbitriment
is
ordained
to
make
a
finall
determination
,
and
to
appease
the
variances
,
strifes
,
and
debates
betweene
the
parties
reforred
unto
them
.
Secondly
,
every
Arbitriment
is
ordained
to
reduce
that
which
was
uncertaine
,
6.
H.
4.6
.
a.
Hanford
.
4.
H.
9.17
.
b.
Weston
.
10.
H.
7.4
.
a.
Ayde
.
17.
E.
3.47
.
a
21.
H.
6.37
.
b
by
the
divers
allegations
of
the
parties
,
to
certainty
:
and
every
of
these
ought
to
concur
in
every
good
award
.
So
likewise
our
Bookes
doe
generally
affirme
,
That
in
Actions
where
Ayde
is
grantable
to
the
Tenant
or
Defendant
,
that
the
same
is
done
for
two
causes
;
the
one
for
feeblenesse
of
estate
of
him
that
prayeth
Ayde
;
secondly
,
for
the
losse
or
detriment
that
may
come
to
him
of
whom
the
Ayd
is
prayed
.
So
the
finall
causes
why
ayd
is
granted
of
the
King
upon
prayer
thereof
,
are
these
,
2.
H.
7.8
.
a.
4.
H.
6.18
.
b.
9.
H.
6.2
.
a.
3.
22.
E.
4.21
.
a
Quisque
auxilium
petit
à
Rege
,
oportes
quod
sit
per
cartam
Regis
,
de
dono
aut
concessione
rei
petitae
,
juxta
effectum
Statuti
de
B●●amis
.
Secundò
,
Vel
aliter
propter
salvationem
reversionis
Regis
,
vel
alicujus
tituli
sui
,
Tertiò
,
Vel
aliter
propter
debilitatem
status
sui
.
Quartò
,
Vel
ubi
Rex
habere
possit
detrimentum
:
And
any
of
these
suffice
to
grant
the
Ayd
.
Confirmation
The
finall
causes
wherefore
a
confirmation
is
behoovfull
,
are
set
out
by
Bracton
to
bee
these
:
Quando
donatio
sit
tantum
bona
pro
tempore
,
Bract.
l.
2.
fol.
58.
&
potest
confirmari
ab
haeredibus
,
vel
alijs
qui
jus
postea
habent
.
Secundo
,
Vel
quando
nunquam
absolutè
fuit
status
bonus
,
sed
talis
qui
potuit
evacuari
.
Tertiò
,
Vel
cum
quis
rem
alienam
dederit
,
confirmatio
requirenda
fuit
veri
Possessoris
seu
Domini
.
There
are
three
finall
causes
of
a
Warranty
of
lands
,
Warranty
.
&c.
First
,
Voucher
to
recover
in
value
,
when
the
Tenant
of
the
Land
is
impleaded
by
a
stranger
:
secondly
,
Rebutter
,
to
represse
the
party
and
his
heyres
that
made
the
Warranty
,
if
they
should
chance
to
sue
:
and
the
third
,
Warrantia
Chartae
,
by
the
Iudgement
;
in
which
Writ
the
lands
shall
be
bound
to
a
Recovery
in
value
,
pro
loco
&
tempore
.
As
it
was
said
at
the
beginning
,
that
the
end
is
alwayes
the
first
thing
in
intention
,
and
the
last
in
execution
,
so
are
there
things
destinated
to
their
end
,
and
once
being
applyed
thereunto
doe
alter
their
nature
and
become
of
another
consideration
:
As
in
a
former
proposed
example
;
If
a
man
cut
downe
my
Timber
Tree
,
and
square
it
of
purpose
to
make
a
beame
for
a
house
,
I
that
am
the
true
owner
may
seize
the
same
,
notwithstanding
it
be
framed
for
the
building
.
But
if
it
bee
laid
in
the
building
,
it
may
not
bee
seized
by
the
owner
,
although
the
building
be
not
perfected
:
for
now
it
becommeth
parcell
of
the
house
or
building
,
as
hath
appeared
in
the
former
example
.
But
if
a
man
prepare
all
materialls
for
building
upon
his
land
,
and
is
ready
to
build
therewith
,
but
dyeth
before
it
be
erected
,
those
materialls
shall
goe
unto
the
Executor
or
Administrator
,
and
not
unto
the
Heyre
,
who
should
have
had
them
had
they
beene
laid
in
the
building
,
because
they
were
destinata
tantum
,
quae
pro
factis
non
habentur
.
The
finall
cause
in
all
humane
actions
is
of
singular
regard
,
for
that
all
things
attempted
by
men
have
their
end
;
and
the
utility
of
the
thing
is
measured
by
the
end
thereof
;
wherefore
it
is
said
well
by
one
,
Vtile
ex
fine
colligimus
;
quicquid
enim
utile
est
,
id
alicujus
rei
consequendae
causa
utile
oportet
esse
.
In
laude
etiam
&
vituperatione
finem
respicimus
,
cum
mult
is
in
rebus
non
tam
referat
quid
facias
,
quam
ob
causam
facias
,
ita
ut
factum
ex
fine
laudetur
vel
vituperetur
,
&
homo
rectè
dicitur
potissimam
causarum
omnium
esse
finem
:
And
whereof
we
say
vulgarly
,
Exitus
acta
probat
,
finis
non
pugna
coronat
.
And
many
times
the
name
and
denomination
of
a
thing
is
drawne
from
the
finall
cause
;
Fine
.
as
a
Fine
used
for
the
assurance
of
land
,
dicitur
finis
,
quia
finem
litibus
imponit
.
Sometimes
the
Lawes
regard
the
beginning
of
anact
,
Origo
rerum
attendenda
est
;
sometimes
the
media
or
meanes
to
attaining
it
;
and
sometimes
the
end
for
which
it
is
atchieved
:
To
enter
into
discourse
whereof
in
this
place
would
be
impertinent
:
and
therefore
by
way
of
Law-examples
thus
much
to
have
said
of
the
causes
shall
suffice
.
And
thus
much
touching
the
reasons
drawne
from
sundry
parts
of
the
Art
of
Logicke
,
proving
the
necessity
,
or
at
least
the
utility
thereof
in
the
studies
of
the
Lawes
of
this
Realme
.
Now
resteth
that
we
propound
some
places
out
of
the
bookes
of
our
Reports
of
our
Common
Law
decisions
and
determinations
of
Cases
,
where
the
use
of
Logicke
hath
either
beene
required
or
admitted
and
practised
.
And
although
this
bee
evident
in
the
most
notable
arguments
at
large
in
the
books
of
the
Law
,
where
sundry
reasons
drawne
from
Logicall
invention
and
Topicke
places
doe
abundantly
appeare
to
every
one
which
will
or
can
observe
the
same
;
yet
in
this
place
I
will
produce
those
instances
wherein
the
same
are
either
named
and
expressed
,
or
admitted
and
apparantly
practised
.
Where
it
is
discoursed
in
the
Reports
of
Sir
Edward
Coke
,
which
Acts
of
Parliament
are
generall
,
which
are
speciall
;
I
finde
observed
these
words
,
Statuta
generalia
,
&
generale
dicitur
à
genere
,
speciale
dicitur
à
specie
;
And
which
are
genus
,
species
,
and
individuum
;
know
ye
that
Spiritualty
is
genus
,
a
Bishopricke
or
Deanary
,
&c.
are
species
,
and
the
Bishopricke
of
Norwich
,
the
Deanary
of
Norwich
,
&c.
are
individua
;
sic
dicta
,
quia
in
partes
dividi
nequeant
:
And
out
of
that
deduceth
hee
to
your
understanding
what
Acts
of
Parliament
are
generall
,
and
which
are
speciall
.
So
there
you
see
two
of
the
most
eminent
Predicables
remembred
,
Genus
&
Species
,
and
unto
them
annexed
the
Individuum
,
whereof
the
Species
is
affirmed
.
In
11.
H.
7.23
.
a.
Debt
per
Obligat
.
An
Action
of
debt
was
brought
upon
an
obligation
,
where
the
obligation
was
endorsed
,
upon
this
condition
,
that
if
the
defendant
did
make
such
estate
to
the
plaintiffe
of
certaine
lands
before
such
a
Feast
,
as
the
counsell
of
the
plaintife
should
advise
,
then
the
Obligation
should
be
voyd
,
the
defendant
pleaded
,
quod
consilium
querentis
,
non
dedit
ei
advisamentum
,
before
the
said
Feast
;
now
whether
this
plea
is
sufficient
or
no
,
or
whether
he
should
say
,
nullum
consilium
dedit
advisamentum
,
or
that
consilium
nullum
dedit
advisamentum
;
for
it
seemed
that
those
words
consilium
non
dedit
advisamentum
,
were
not
generall
enough
,
of
which
opinion
there
was
Bryan
;
so
that
admit
that
the
plaintife
had
foure
men
of
his
counsell
,
and
two
of
them
gave
counsell
,
and
two
of
them
not
;
here
consilium
non
dedit
advisamentum
is
true
,
eò
quod
duo
non
dederunt
,
but
that
nullum
consilium
dedit
advisamentum
,
is
false
apparantly
,
In
that
case
when
two
of
them
had
given
their
advise
;
where
hee
sheweth
that
universalis
negativa
,
and
particularis
negativa
may
stand
together
,
for
proofe
whereof
he
citeth
the
Sophisters
verse
,
Prae
contradic
,
prae
contrar
,
prae
postque
subalter
:
Accidents
may
bee
considered
in
abstracto
,
as
they
are
without
subject
,
Coke
lib.
10.
fo.
31.
and
in
their
owne
nature
of
themselves
;
And
also
they
may
bee
considered
in
concreto
,
as
they
reside
and
subsist
in
their
proper
subject
,
and
these
are
Logicall
tearmes
,
and
yet
used
in
the
Law
.
Although
the
Common
Lawyers
of
this
Realm
using
a
continued
speech
,
&
non
concisis
argumentis
,
yet
doe
they
observe
very
oft
the
formes
of
Arguments
used
in
the
Schooles
,
as
Sillogismes
,
Enthimemes
,
Inductions
,
Examples
,
Sorites
,
Dilemata
,
&c.
as
may
be
proved
by
sundry
instances
:
And
first
of
Sillogismes
.
In
Shellies
case
the
third
point
or
question
of
the
case
on
the
part
of
the
plaintife
,
was
reduced
by
them
that
argued
of
that
side
into
a
Sillogisme
thus
;
That
which
originally
vested
in
the
heyre
and
was
not
in
the
Ancestor
vested
in
the
heire
by
purchase
,
But
the
use
(
spoken
of
in
that
case
)
vested
in
Richard
Shelly
(
who
was
brother
and
heire
and
was
never
vested
in
Edward
Shelly
the
Ancestor
,
Ergo
,
The
use
vested
in
Richard
Shelly
by
purchase
.
A
man
brought
an
action
of
trespasse
against
the
Executors
of
his
Ancestors
,
20.
H.
7.
b.
for
taking
up
and
carying
away
of
a
Fornace
which
was
fixed
and
annexed
to
the
Freehold
with
morter
,
and
it
was
held
by
three
of
the
Iudges
,
Read
,
Fisher
,
and
Kingsmill
,
that
the
Action
would
lye
,
and
that
the
taking
away
thereof
was
wrongfull
,
and
their
reason
is
there
by
the
Reporter
reduced
to
a
Sillogisme
;
in
this
manner
:
Those
things
which
cannot
bee
forfeited
by
Outlawry
in
a
personall
Action
,
Major
.
nor
bee
attached
in
an
Assise
,
nor
distreyned
for
rent
,
those
things
the
Executor
cannot
have
,
But
a
Fornace
fixed
,
Miuor
.
a
table
fixed
in
the
ground
with
poasts
,
or
a
pale
set
in
the
ground
,
or
bedsted
of
timber
fixed
to
the
ground
,
doores
or
windowes
,
or
such
like
fixed
to
the
ground
or
freehold
,
cannot
be
forfeited
,
nor
attached
,
nor
distreyned
;
Ergo
,
The
Executors
shall
not
have
such
things
.
Con
:
Many
reasons
are
proposed
in
the
case
of
the
Postnati
,
and
Arguments
framed
and
composed
Sillogistically
in
Calvins
case
,
as
thus
;
Every
one
that
is
an
Alien
by
birth
,
may
be
or
might
have
been
an
enemy
by
accident
,
but
Calvin
could
never
have
beene
at
any
time
an
enemy
by
any
accident
,
ergo
,
he
cannot
be
an
Alien
by
birth
.
Whosoever
are
borne
under
one
naturall
legiance
,
due
by
the
law
of
nature
to
one
Soveraigne
,
are
naturall
borne
subjects
,
but
Calvin
was
borne
under
one
naturall
legiance
,
and
obedience
due
by
the
law
of
Nature
to
one
Soveraigne
,
Ergo
,
He
is
a
naturall
borne
subject
.
Whosoever
is
borne
under
the
Kings
power
and
protection
is
no
Alien
;
but
Calvin
was
borne
under
the
Kings
power
and
protection
,
Ergo
;
Every
stranger
borne
must
at
the
time
of
his
birth
be
amicus
,
or
inimicus
,
but
Calvin
at
his
birth
could
not
be
inimicus
,
because
he
was
subditus
(
and
amicus
properly
he
cannot
bee
called
,
for
that
is
proper
to
an
Alien
freind
that
is
in
league
;
So
Scotia
where
hee
was
borne
cannot
properly
bee
called
solum
amici
,
Ergo
,
Calvin
is
no
Stranger
borne
.
Whatsoever
is
due
by
the
law
of
Nature
cannot
be
altered
;
but
legiance
and
obedience
of
the
subject
to
the
Soveraigne
is
due
by
the
law
of
nature
,
ergo
,
it
cannot
be
altered
.
Whosoever
at
his
birth
cannot
be
an
Alien
to
the
King
of
England
cannot
be
an
Alien
to
any
of
his
Subjects
of
England
:
But
Calvin
at
his
birth
could
not
bee
an
Alien
to
the
King
of
England
,
Ergo
,
He
could
bee
no
Alien
to
any
of
the
subjects
of
England
.
Coke
li.
7.24
.
b.
25.
a.
And
thus
much
may
suffice
for
example
onely
to
point
out
the
continuall
and
frequent
use
of
Sillogisticall
dispure
in
our
pleadings
and
Law-Arguments
.
I
will
next
proceed
to
treat
of
the
choice
and
election
of
Propositions
and
Principles
;
and
likewise
to
exemplifie
the
same
by
sundry
examples
out
of
the
bookes
of
the
Common
Law
,
whereby
our
Student
may
be
the
better
furnished
and
adapted
with
matter
fit
for
Argumentation
.
Methodus
studendi
.
ARistotle
in
the
first
booke
of
his
Topickes
,
expressing
the
meanes
whereby
in
every
faculty
or
science
intellectuall
resting
upon
discourse
of
reason
,
men
might
abound
in
matter
apt
for
argumentation
,
and
might
be
furnished
with
copie
of
reason
fit
for
the
proofe
or
disproofe
of
things
called
into
debate
,
in
such
the
sciences
by
them
professed
,
expresseth
a
fourefold
observation
.
-
1.
Arist.
Top.
li.
1.
cap
12
,
13
,
14.
Quarum
una
(
as
he
saith
)
est
in
propositionibus
eligendis
.
-
2
Altera
,
in
distinguendo
quot
modis
quicquid
dicatur
.
-
3
Tertia
,
in
differentijs
inveniendis
.
-
4
Quarta
,
in
similitudinis
cognitione
&
scientia
.
All
which
are
notable
instruments
of
knowledge
,
greatly
profitable
,
yea
necessary
for
the
obtaining
of
all
such
sciences
as
doe
depend
upon
reason
:
and
so
consequently
much
availeable
to
to
be
observed
in
the
study
of
the
Lawes
of
this
Land
,
which
are
grounded
upon
the
depth
of
reason
,
and
invested
oftentimes
by
the
name
of
reason
in
our
Reported
Cases
,
and
ruled
Authorities
of
the
same
.
11.
H.
7.24
.
b.
13.
H.
7.23
.
b.
Com.
Colth
.
270.
b.
Com.
Brown
.
140.
b.
27.
H.
8.10
.
a.
Montague
.
Of
which
foure
principles
purposing
(
for
direction
of
study
)
to
say
somewhat
in
order
as
they
are
afore
proposed
,
it
is
to
be
considered
,
that
the
first
of
them
being
propositionum
electio
,
containeth
the
election
,
choice
,
observation
,
and
collection
of
all
received
principles
,
propositions
,
sentences
,
assertions
,
axiomes
,
and
reasons
,
importing
either
certainty
of
truth
,
or
likelihood
of
probabilitie
.
Wherein
first
Aristotle
giveth
precepts
to
collect
them
,
&
then
after
giveth
counsel
so
to
digest
them
,
as
that
they
may
at
all
times
bee
ready
for
our
use
:
Wherefore
hereof
intending
an
ample
discourse
,
it
shall
be
requisite
to
follow
the
ordinary
and
best
method
by
definition
,
division
,
and
the
due
speculation
of
their
causes
,
whereby
may
be
manifested
what
they
are
,
of
how
many
kinds
they
are
,
the
divers
manner
of
collection
of
them
;
and
lastly
,
the
end
,
scope
,
and
use
whereunto
they
tend
,
&
the
profit
ensuing
by
observation
of
them
.
That
first
therefore
the
names
by
which
in
our
Law
they
have
usually
beene
called
might
bee
made
manifest
before
their
nature
be
discovered
;
(
primò
enim
de
nomine
conveniat
)
it
may
with
little
labour
easily
appeare
,
that
sundry
are
the
titles
or
names
given
in
the
Volumes
of
Reports
,
and
other
Writings
of
the
Law
unto
such
propositions
,
as
doe
remaine
as
reasons
of
resolved
cases
.
Sometimes
they
have
beene
called
grounds
;
Grounds
.
So
in
the
30.
H.
8.44
.
Dyer
n.
30.
it
is
said
,
est
une
auter
grounde
in
tenure
in
Chief
.
s.
I
l
do
et
estè
immediate
del
Roy
;
et
il
convient
commencer
,
et
prend
son
original
creation
per
le
Roy
mesme
,
et
per
nul
de
ses
subjects
.
So
likewise
speakes
Rede
.
5.
Hen.
7.23
.
Vide
12.
H.
7.13
a.
Davers
.
Com.
121.
b.
Stamford
.
Maximes
.
b.
Est
bone
Ground
in
Trespas
,
discontinuance
vers
unest
discontinuance
vers
touts
,
with
infinite
such
other
.
Sometimes
they
have
beene
called
Maximes
,
for
so
saith
Fortescue
in
the
34.
Hen.
6.33
.
a.
Est
un
Maxime
en
nostre
Ley
,
Que
in
chescun
action
personal
,
le
Nonsute
del
un
sera
le
Nonsute
de
ambideux
,
fore
prise
in
tiels
cases
que
sont
except
per
statute
.
Likewise
saith
Knightley
,
29.
Hen.
8.38
.
a.
Dyer
numero
51.
Est
une
Maxime
,
Que
un
action
sera
touts
faits
conceive
ou
le
plus
meliour
trial
,
et
notice
del
fait
poit
este
conus
;
et
specialment
lou
de
tort
est
personal
,
with
divers
such
like
.
Sometimes
they
are
called
Principles
,
Principles
.
for
so
in
the
8.
Hen.
7.4
.
a.
it
is
said
,
that
it
is
un
Common
Principle
,
que
Terre
(
s.
Estate
de
frank
tenant
)
ne
passans
Livery
de
seisin
.
Likewise
saith
:
Sanders
in
the
Com.
Colthurets
Case
,
28.
b.
Il
ad
este
tenus
come
Principle
,
Vide
Com.
345.
a.
Que
quand
un
fait
Livery
de
seisin
que
son
Livery
sera
pris
plus
fort
vers
luy
.
Sometimes
they
have
beene
called
Eruditions
.
Eruditions
.
Vide
14.
H.
8
28.
a.
Pollard
24.
H.
8.40
.
Dyer
.
nu.
66.
In
such
sort
saith
Keble
,
in
11.
Hen
7.15
.
a.
Ceo
ad
este
un
erudition
,
Que
le
partie
navera
Capias
ad
satisfaciendum
,
mes
ou
Capias
gist
in
l'original
.
And
some
in
29.
Hen.
8.40
.
a.
Dyer
numero
66.
saith
Iustices
Il
est
une
Common
Erudition
,
3.
E.
4.7
.
a.
Lit.
Vide
33.
H.
6.54
.
a.
44.
E.
3.34
.
b.
Lawes
pofitive
.
Que
in
cel
Countie
lou
le
tort
commence
,
l'action
sera
porte
.
Moreover
,
sometimes
for
their
firmnesse
they
have
beene
called
Lawes
Positive
,
for
so
speaketh
Belknap
,
2.
Rich.
2.
Fitzh
.
Accompt
45.
Il
est
ley
positive
,
Que
home
navera
damages
in
breve
d'accompt
.
Sometimes
they
are
invested
by
the
title
of
Law
it selfe
;
Lawes
.
for
in
such
manner
it
is
said
,
Tempore
Ed.
1.
Fitzh
.
Grant
.
41.
Lex
est
,
cuicunque
aliquis
quid
concedit
,
concedere
videtur
,
&
id
sine
quo
res
esse
non
potuit
.
And
so
Bracton
saith
,
9.
Hen.
6.59
.
b.
Iay
prise
pur
ley
,
Que
si
home
plede
un
plec
&
preigne
un
protestation
;
et
puis
son
plee
est
trove
encounter
luy
,
Vide
9.
H.
4.59
.
b.
Paston
.
il
naver
unque
advantage
de
son
protestation
.
Of
which
manner
speech
there
are
manifold
examples
.
So
that
be
they
named
Grounds
,
Maximes
,
Principles
,
Eruditions
,
Lawes
Positive
,
Lawes
,
Rules
or
Propositions
,
or
by
whatsoever
other
name
they
be
called
,
let
us
now
seek
the
nature
of
them
by
their
Definitions
.
Paulus
the
ancient
Romane
Lawyer
thus
defines
a
Principle
or
Rule
of
Law
:
Li.
1.
F.
de
Reg.
Iuris
.
Regula
Iuris
,
rem
quae
est
,
breviter
enarrat
,
&c.
If
we
doe
respect
the
originall
thereof
together
with
the
effect
it
yeeldeth
;
Com.
Colth
.
27.
Morgan
in
the
Commentaries
of
Plawden
,
thus
defineth
it
:
A
maxime
is
the
foundation
of
Law
,
and
the
conclusion
of
reason
:
for
reason
is
the
efficient
cause
thereof
,
and
Law
is
the
effect
that
floweth
therefrom
.
Such
of
the
Civilians
as
in
the
description
of
a
rule
of
Law
,
doe
onely
respect
the
manner
of
the
collecting
of
them
from
particular
cases
or
circumstances
,
doe
thus
affirme
;
Prateus
de
Reg.
Iuris
.
lib.
6.
Ioach.
Hopp
.
de
Iuris
arte
.
371.
a.
Regula
juris
est
multorum
specialium
per
generalem
conclusionem
brevis
comprehensio
.
Or
as
Ioachimus
Hopperus
in
his
first
booke
De
juris
arte
,
though
disagreeing
in
words
,
yet
one
in
sense
with
the
forme
;
Regulae
juris
sunt
quaedam
conjectiones
tantum
,
&
breviaria
ex
pluribus
speciebus
in
unum
per
commune
aliquod
collecta
.
Another
of
them
,
in
this
manner
;
Sim.
Shard
.
Lexic
.
Iuris
Regul.
Regula
est
sententia
generalis
,
quae
ex
plurium
legum
mente
à
jurisconsultis
notata
atque
animadversa
,
paucis
verbis
summam
carum
consentionem
&
tanquam
harmoniam
complectitur
.
Matth.
Gribaldus
in
his
first
booke
de
ratione
studij
,
Matth.
Gribald
.
l.
1.
c.
7.
de
ratione
studij
Iuris
.
cap.
7.
saith
,
Regulae
juris
nihil
aliud
sunt
quam
breves
&
compendiosae
sententiae
,
ex
pervagatis
definitionibus
perstrictae
,
quo
&
minori
labore
discantur
,
&
saciliùs
diutiusque
memoriâ
teneantur
.
But
binding
our selves
to
no
prescript
rules
of
Art
,
for
the
better
understanding
of
the
same
,
we
may
describe
a
rule
or
ground
of
Law
thus
:
A
Rule
or
Principle
of
the
Law
of
England
,
Definition
.
is
a
Conclusion
either
of
the
Law
of
Nature
,
or
derived
from
some
generall
custome
used
within
the
Realme
,
containing
in
a
short
summe
the
reason
and
direction
of
many
particular
and
speciall
occurrences
.
Notes
collected
out
of
Authors
.
REgula
juris
est
plurium
compendiosa
narratio
,
Paulus
lib.
ff.
de
reg.
Iuris
.
&
quasi
causae
conjectio
.
Nec
absimile
est
quod
Grammatici
dicunt
,
eam
esse
multorum
similium
collectionem
.
In
summa
autem
est
,
Ant.
Masae
de
exercitio
Iurispr
.
lib.
1.
ac
si
quis
,
praedictis
cum
verbis
Archid.
dist.
3.
&
Reg.
conjunctis
,
ita
diceret
,
Quod
Regula
sit
compendiosa
definitio
;
seu
cum
Quintiliano
,
Vniversale
vel
perpetuale
praeceptum
diversarum
rerum
,
quasi
sub
unâ
eademque
causâ
cadentium
universalitatem
complectens
.
Est
Regula
nihil
aliud
quàm
plurium
rerum
&
specierum
in
unam
quasi
summam
conjectio
.
Ioach.
Hopp
.
de
Iuris
arte
.
l.
2.
fo.
469.
a.
As
touching
the
Division
thereof
,
wee
shall
better
observe
how
many
principles
and
grounds
there
be
by
the
due
consideration
of
their
causes
from
whence
they
spring
.
All
causes
of
every
thing
are
either
internall
or
externall
.
Internall
are
,
the
causes
Materiall
,
or
Formall
.
Externall
are
,
the
causes
Efficient
and
Finall
.
De
Causis
.
Non
solum
ea
quae
insita
sunt
causae
dicuntur
,
Arist.
11.
Met.
c.
4.
To.
23.
sed
etiam
ea
quae
extrinsecus
sumuntur
,
ut
id
quod
motum
affert
&
efficiens
est
.
Causarum
quatuor
sunt
genera
.
Arist.
l.
2.
Dem.
c.
11.
To.
11.
Vnum
est
forma
atque
essentia
rei
.
Alterum
est
in
quo
inest
necessitudo
non
absoluta
,
sed
ex
adjunctione
;
si
alia
quaedam
sint
,
haec
esse
necesse
est
.
Tertium
genus
est
id
in
quo
inest
rei
efficiendae
vis
primaria
.
Quartum
est
finis
cujus
causa
aliquid
fit
.
Nam
ad
interrogationem
factam
per
verba
,
Ant.
Masae
de
exercitio
Iurisperitorum
l.
1.
p.
38.
b.
propter
quid
sit
aliquid
,
nihil
aliud
unquam
respondetur
,
quam
aliqua
ex
dictis
quatuor
causis
:
Inter
quas
tamen
,
finis
est
potissima
,
&
quasi
aliarum
causa
:
Materia
enim
non
esset
causa
,
nisi
haberet
formam
;
&
forma
itidem
nisi
ab
agente
introduceretur
;
Agens
quoque
non
ageret
nisi
moveretur
à
fine
;
finis
autem
ipse
immobilis
permanet
:
Est
ergo
primum
movens
,
&
prima
causa
,
&c.
Materiall
cause
.
As
touching
the
Materiall
cause
,
matter
,
or
subject
wherein
these
grounds
are
conversant
,
the
same
are
all
those
things
whereof
debate
may
rise
betweene
parties
judicially
:
which
are
as
well
divine
as
humane
.
Insomuch
as
Iuris
prudentia
,
Bract.
lib.
1.
cap.
4.
§.
4.
or
the
knowledge
of
the
Law
,
is
Divinarum
humarumque
rerum
scientia
.
And
hence
proceedeth
it
,
that
all
Grounds
or
Rules
of
the
Law
of
England
in
respect
of
their
matter
which
they
do
concerne
are
either
such
as
are
not
restrained
to
any
onproper
or
peculiar
title
of
the
Law
,
but
as
occasi
,
on
serveth
,
are
applyable
unto
every
part
,
title
,
or
tractate
of
the
Law
,
as
by
the
view
and
due
consideration
of
examples
following
may
bee
made
manifest
;
All
which
,
being
either
conclusions
of
naturall
Reason
,
or
drawne
and
derived
from
the
same
,
doe
not
onely
serve
as
directions
and
Principles
of
the
Law
,
but
are
likewise
as
Positions
and
Axiomes
to
be
observed
throughout
all
mans
life
and
conversation
;
having
their
originall
from
those
Arts
that
are
necessary
and
behoovfull
for
maintenance
of
humane
society
.
Grounds
borrowed
out
of
Logicke
.
And
first
of
all
concerning
the
Art
of
Logick
;
from
thence
the
learned
of
our
Lawes
have
received
many
principles
,
as
wel
out
of
that
part
which
concerneth
the
Invention
of
Arguments
,
as
of
that
which
teacheth
the
disposing
,
framing
,
and
the
judgement
of
the
same
.
From
the
first
part
these
may
serve
for
example
.
-
Idem
non
potest
esse
agens
&
patiens
.
14
H.
8.31
.
b
28.
H.
8.10
.
b
n.
37.
Dyer
.
Com.
213.
b.
Com.
323.
b.
9
H.
7.24
.
a.
Com.
161.
a.
-
Omne
majus
continet
in
se
suum
minus
.
-
Magis
dignum
trahit
ad
se
minus
dignum
.
-
In
praesentiamajoris
cessat
minus
.
-
Frustra
fit
per
plura
quod
fieri
potest
per
pauciora
?
-
Turpis
est
pars
quae
cum
toto
non
convenit
.
-
With
many
other
such
like
,
&c.
From
the
Iudiciall
parts
of
Logicke
,
these
and
divers
others
.
Qui
negat
confusè
,
negat
confusè
&
distributivè
.
2.
R.
3.7
.
a.
But
how
that
saying
may
be
understood
,
and
in
what
sense
it
may
be
intended
true
,
and
in
what
not
,
peruse
the
case
of
4.
H.
7.8
.
a.
touching
the
travers
of
a
suggestion
of
breach
of
the
peace
:
where
although
the
said
Rule
be
not
mentioned
,
yet
the
meaning
thereof
,
by
the
case
there
debated
is
partly
made
manifest
.
Moreover
,
Brian
borroweth
the
Sophisters
verse
,
and
maketh
it
a
Ground
to
try
whether
an
issue
tendered
be
an
expresse
Negative
or
no
,
in
11.
H.
7.23
.
a.
Prae
contradic
:
post
contra
.
Praepostque
subalter
.
This
likewise
is
derived
thence
,
Negativum
nihil
implicat
.
Out
of
Naturall
Philosophy
,
these
,
with
divers
others
,
are
deducted
,
that
follow
.
-
VIs
unita
fortior
.
Com.
307.
a.
Com.
72.
b.
Com.
268.
a.
Com.
294.
a.
8.
E.
4.10
.
a.
-
Est
naturae
vis
maxima
.
-
Vltra
posse
non
est
esse
.
-
Sublata
causa
tollitur
effectus
.
-
Vltra
scire
non
est
posse
.
With
many
other
of
like
quality
.
Grounds
borrowed
out
of
Morall
Philosophie
;
FRom
whence
,
as
from
a
Fountaine
,
all
Lawes
doe
flow
;
we
doe
observe
these
few
following
for
an
example
;
as
,
-
Qui
sentit
commodum
,
Com.
244.
a.
14.
H.
8.6
.
a.
Com.
501.
a.
13
H.
8.16
.
a
14
H.
8.16
.
a
14.
H.
8.8
.
a.
Com.
160.
b.
Com.
370.
b.
sentire
debet
&
onus
.
-
Volenti
non
fit
injuria
.
-
Sit
utere
tuo
,
ut
alienum
non
laedas
.
-
Fraus
&
dolus
nemini
patrocinatur
.
-
Agentes
&
consentientes
pari
poena
plectuntur
.
-
Summum
Ius
summa
Injuria
.
-
Vix
ulla
lex
fieri
potest
quae
omnibus
commoda
sit
:
sed
si
majori
parti
prospiciat
,
utilis
est
.
-
A
vero
non
delinabit
Iustus
.
Com.
48.
b.
-
Quod
tibi
fieri
non
vis
,
alteri
ne
feceris
.
With
many
more
such
like
.
Grounds
borrowed
out
of
the
Civill
Law
.
OVt
of
the
Civill
Lawes
there
are
also
very
many
Axiomes
and
Rules
,
which
are
likewise
borrowed
and
usually
frequented
in
our
Law
.
For
sith
all
Lawes
are
derived
from
the
law
of
Nature
,
and
doe
concur
and
agree
in
the
principles
of
Nature
and
Reason
:
And
sith
the
Civill
Lawes
,
being
the
Lawes
of
the
Empire
,
doe
bewray
the
great
wisedome
whereby
the
Romane
estate
,
in
the
time
it
most
flourished
,
was
governed
:
Sith
likewise
the
Law
of
this
Land
hath
alwayes
followed
best
and
most
approved
Reason
(
which
is
also
a
type
of
humane
wisdome
)
it
doth
ensue
of
necessity
,
that
great
conformity
must
be
betweene
them
.
Which
conformity
may
be
made
apparant
partly
by
these
(
among
some
thousand
Axioms
and
Conclusions
of
Reason
)
following
.
-
Qui
tacit
conscntire
videtur
.
Com.
357.
b
5.
H.
3.222
.
-
Vigilantibus
&
non
dormientibus
Iura
subveniunt
.
-
Quod
initio
non
valet
,
tractu
temporis
non
convalescit
.
-
Quando
duo
Iura
in
uno
concurrunt
,
Com.
168
a.
aequum
est
ac
si
esset
in
duobus
.
-
In
aequali
jure
,
melior
est
conditio
possidentis
.
Com.
296.
b.
Com.
336.
b.
-
Optima
Legum
Interpres
est
Consuetudo
.
-
Frustra
Legis
auxilium
petet
,
qui
in
Legem
peccat
.
-
Ignorantia
facti
excusat
.
14.
H.
1.27
.
b.
-
Modus
Legem
dat
donationi
.
Com.
251.
a.
Com.
162.
b.
1.
H.
3.33
.
b.
-
Non
est
regula
quin
fallat
.
-
Modus
&
conventio
vincunt
Legem
.
With
others
in
manner
infinite
,
written
and
published
in
the
Latine
tongue
.
In
the
French
also
many
other
grounds
there
are
in
our
Law
,
to
be
found
agreeable
in
sense
and
meaning
to
such
as
are
frequent
and
usuall
in
the
Civill
Lawes
,
L.
verum
§.
tempus
:
ff.
pro
hoc
.
L.
sedes
de
rescript
.
L.
bona
fides
ff.
de
Reg.
Iuris
.
and
there
published
in
the
Latine
tongue
,
whereof
also
these
following
may
serve
for
example
.
-
Nul
prendra
benefit
de
son
tort
demesne
.
-
Nemo
ex
dolo
suo
proprio
relevetur
aut
auxilium
capiet
-
Homo
ne
sera
double
charge
pro
une
mesme
duetie
.
-
Bona
fides
non
patitur
idem
ab
eodem
bis
exigi
.
Auxy
mult
auctorities
&
voies
que
home
ad
a
faire
un
fait
,
auxy
mult
auctorities
&
voies
ad
cesty
a
qui
le
fait
est
fait
a
ceo
dessolver
.
1.
Hen.
7.16
.
a.
Nihil
est
magis
rationi
consentaneum
quam
eodem
modo
unum
quodque
dissolvere
quo
conflatum
est
.
L.
nihil
:
ff.
de
Regul.
Iuris
.
13.
H.
8.16
.
a
in
fine
.
Le
Common
wealth
sera
prefer
devant
private
wealth
.
Vtilitas
publica
privatorum
commodis
ante-ferenda
.
L.
1.
§
.
fin
.
&
cap.
tol
.
Le
ley
in
chescun
act
adrespect
al
comencement
.
Com.
260.
a.
Halls
case
.
Com.
259.
b.
Halls
case
.
Origo
rerum
attendenda
.
Imagination
de
mente
de
faire
tort
,
sans
le
act
fait
,
nest
punishable
in
nostre
Ley.
Affectus
non
punitur
nisi
sequatur
effectus
.
Com.
160.
b.
Throgm
.
case
.
Prateus
lib.
3.
c.
4.
Intent
direct
done
plus
tost
quam
parols
.
Proferentis
intentio
&
voluntas
,
magis
quam
verborum
locutio
examinetur
.
Prat.
lib.
3.
cap.
3.
Quant
divers
choses
sont
fait
a
un
mesme
instant
,
Com.
504.
b.
&
l'un
ne
poet
prender
effect
sans
l'auter
;
le
common
ley
adjudger
ceo
de
preceder
&
ensuer
,
que
aptment
do
et
preceder
&
ensuer
in
feasant
l'entent
des
parties
deprender
effect
.
Vbi
in
Instrumento
reperitur
plures
actus
successive
fuisse
celebratos
,
semper
fingitur
ille
actus
praecessisse
qui
reddit
actum
validum
.
Nicholai
Everard
Topica
Iuris
loco
1.
Non
attento
ordine
verborum
,
talis
ordo
presumitur
qualis
debet
esse
.
With
many
others
to
like
purpose
,
if
place
did
permit
,
or
cause
did
require
to
observe
the
same
:
Yea
many
times
when
as
no
Ground
or
Rule
is
expressed
in
our
Law
,
but
that
we
may
onely
collect
Cases
concurrent
upon
some
Conformity
of
Reason
:
We
shall
find
in
the
Civill
Lawes
a
proposition
or
rule
which
shall
most
aptly
and
most
fitly
expresse
the
same
Reason
in
such
shortnesse
of
speech
,
as
nothing
shall
seeme
more
sufficient
in
that
respect
.
And
unto
the
which
Propositions
such
as
are
or
may
be
framed
by
us
in
the
French
,
cannot
in
excellency
be
worthily
compared
.
Grounds
borrowed
out
of
the
Canon
Law
.
As
touching
the
Canon
Law
.
Forasmuch
as
the
studies
both
of
the
same
and
of
the
Civill
Law
,
are
in
sort
conjoyned
by
the
professors
of
both
,
what
may
be
said
of
the
one
,
in
this
respect
,
may
be
verified
of
the
other
:
Which
as
well
by
veiw
of
the
title
De
Regulis
Iuris
in
Sexto
Decretalium
,
as
also
in
divers
other
titles
of
the
same
Law
,
especially
in
such
as
are
most
usuall
for
matters
of
debate
in
this
Realme
,
as
are
those
of
Excommunication
,
Mariage
,
Divorce
,
Legacies
,
Tythes
,
and
such
like
,
will
at
large
appeare
.
Grounds
derived
from
Vse
,
Custome
,
and
Conversation
of
Men.
Finally
,
many
Grounds
and
Rules
of
the
Lawes
of
this
Realme
are
derived
from
Common
use
,
Custome
,
and
Conversation
among
men
,
Collected
out
of
the
generall
disposition
,
nature
,
and
condition
of
humane
kinde
:
Which
Grounds
are
of
two
natures
;
The
one
observed
out
of
humane
actions
,
the
other
out
of
usuall
and
ordinarie
speech
.
Principia
externa
propriè
vocamus
ea
quae
in
Communi
hominum
vita
versantur
&
ab
experientibus
&
prudentibus
animadvertuntur
.
Ioh.
Hopper
:
de
Iuris
arte
.
Haec
non
tam
ex
ipsa
hominis
natura
quam
foris
advenium
,
debentque
non
ex
mente
hominis
aut
animo
,
sed
ex
Communibus
vitae
moribus
longo
usu
&
tractatione
colligi
.
Ibidem
.
Haec
sunt
igitur
illa
quae
dico
externa
Principia
,
quae
ex
communibus
vitae
usibus
&
moribus
diligenter
in
historia
observatis
decerpuntur
,
quaeque
non
tam
ornine
describi
,
&
Liter
is
mandari
,
quam
longa
tractatione
colligi
,
&
per
manus
tradi
possunt
.
Ibidem
.
Of
the
first
sort
are
these
,
and
such
like
following
.
Home
est
tenus
destre
prochein
a
soy
mesme
.
Com.
545.
a.
Paramour
.
Manxel
.
6.
a.
b.
Com.
261.
a.
Halls
case
.
8.
H.
6.19
.
b.
Per
Martin
.
Le
inclination
de
touts
homes
est
de
faire
ou
parler
choses
pour
leur
gaine
,
&
nient
pour
leur
perde
:
Et
de
ceuxque
violent
gabber
,
de
gabber
pur
advantage
.
Est
le
propertie
de
nature
de
preserver
luy
mesme
.
Quant
home
est
partie
,
il
ne
poet
esse
Iudge
indifferent
a
luy
mesme
.
With
many
other
of
like
qualitie
,
which
the
intendment
of
the
Law
deriveth
and
collecteth
out
of
the
usuall
condition
,
nature
,
and
qualitie
of
things
upon
the
probabilitie
and
likelihood
of
occurrences
often
or
for
the
most
part
hapning
and
falling
out
.
Axiomes
or
Propositions
of
the
second
sort
,
Proverbiall
Grounds
.
Proverbium
vulgò
interpretatur
probatum
verbum
,
cum
dicatur
quasi
Commune
omnium
verbum
.
Proverbia
verò
citata
,
instar
jurium
haberi
traditum
est
.
L.
solent
.
ff.
de
officio
Procurat
.
Sim.
Shardus
Lexicon
Iuris
.
Com.
280.
a.
Com.
173.
a.
Com.
18.
b.
29.
Eliz.
356.
a.
14
H.
8.23
a
are
drawne
from
the
phrase
of
speech
,
and
deduced
from
the
ordinary
manner
of
Conference
by
talk
among
men
most
usuall
in
all
places
,
As
are
the
common
and
ordinarie
Proverbs
and
proverbiall
Assertions
,
and
such
like
;
the
which
,
as
well
by
reason
of
their
ordinary
and
often
use
in
talke
;
as
also
for
their
probabilitie
and
likelihood
of
truth
have
been
sometime
used
as
Axiomes
,
Principles
,
and
Grounds
of
the
Law
;
and
are
to
bee
found
confirmed
with
many
Cases
,
having
beene
used
as
reasons
in
the
same
:
Whereof
these
few
ensuing
may
serve
for
example
.
-
Da
tua
dum
tua
sunt
;
post
mortem
,
tunc
tua
non
sunt
.
-
Qui
ambulat
intenebris
,
nescit
quò
vadit
.
-
Necessitas
non
habet
Legem
.
-
As
good
never
the
whit
,
as
never
the
better
.
-
Let
him
that
is
cold
blow
the
coale
.
-
One
to
beat
the
bush
,
and
another
to
take
the
birds
.
With
many
other
such
like
speeches
,
which
although
they
are
of
small
moment
,
being
every
where
ordinarie
;
yet
neverthelesse
for
the
perspicuity
and
plainness
,
they
have
heretofore
,
at
some
times
,
in
Law
arguments
beene
used
,
and
fitly
applyed
in
debate
of
Cases
(
although
not
ad
probandum
,
yet
ad
illustrandum
)
and
so
likewise
may
at
any
time
hereafter
,
upon
like
occasion
offered
,
without
blame
be
frequented
.
Although
these
generall
Positions
,
Maximes
&
Rules
proposed
,
and
such
like
,
cannot
be
properly
reduced
(
as
aforesaid
)
under
any
one
peculiar
title
of
the
Law
,
extant
in
any
Abridgement
,
Table
,
or
directorie
;
yet
neverthelesse
may
they
be
brought
under
generall
titles
or
common
places
,
to
bee
framed
of
purpose
,
as
hereafter
in
place
more
convenient
shall
be
declared
.
And
thus
much
therefore
of
generall
Grounds
or
Maximes
.
Now
followeth
to
speake
of
such
as
are
to
bee
reduced
under
one
particular
title
,
Maximes
appliable
onely
to
one
title
.
tractate
,
or
matter
of
the
Law
,
serving
to
no
other
use
,
but
onely
doe
concerne
the
said
speciall
matter
,
and
cannot
bee
transferred
thence
,
neither
may
properly
serve
any
other
then
their
native
place
,
unto
the
which
they
are
wholly
and
alonely
to
bee
referred
:
As
for
example
,
Vnder
Grants
these
.
Quando
aliquis
quid
concedit
,
T.
E.
1.
Fitz.
Grants
.
36.
Ass.
p.
3.
&
id
etiam
concedere
videtur
,
sine
quo
res
concessa
esse
non
potest
.
Grant
sera
prise
plus
fort
vers
le
Grauntour
,
&c.
Vnder
Contracts
these
and
such
like
.
Ex
nudo
pacto
non
oritur
actio
.
Com.
5.
a.
Com.
302.
a.
Com.
305.
a.
Com.
321.
a.
Contract
ne
poit
estre
,
17.
Ed.
4.1
.
a.
si
ne
soit
que
chescun
partic
soit
agree
.
Vnder
Prerogative
,
these
and
such
others
.
Nullum
tempus
occurrit
Regi
.
Com.
243.
a.
261.
a.
321.
a.
Le
Roy●●●
auxy
un
Prerogative
en
le
forme
de
brefs
port
per
luy
,
Vide
18.
Ed.
3.2
.
a.
different
de
ceaux
que
common
person
ad
,
&c.
Vnder
Deeds
these
.
Fiunt
aliquando
Donationes
in
scriptis
,
Bract.
li.
2.
c.
16.
f.
33.
b.
14.
H.
8.22
.
b
Brudnel
.
Vid.
Lit.
183
21.
H.
7.37
.
b.
sicut
in
chartis
,
ad
perpetuam
memoriam
,
propter
brevem
hominum
vitam
,
&
ut
faciliùs
probari
possit
Donatio
.
Choses
incident
que
per
lour
mesme
ne
poient
estre
grant
sans
fait
,
uncore
ils
passeront
oue
le
principal
a
qui
sont
incident
sans
fait
.
With
divers
other
in
every
title
of
the
Law
of
like
effect
.
These
speciall
Grounds
are
of
divers
sorts
:
The
divers
kinds
of
Grounds
which
doe
conceme
one
title
.
for
some
concerne
the
very
nature
and
essence
of
the
title
:
some
the
consequents
and
incidents
annexed
thereunto
.
Those
which
doe
concerne
the
nature
of
the
thing
,
doe
flow
from
some
of
the
causes
thereof
,
as
the
Materiall
;
the
Formall
,
the
Efficient
,
or
the
Finall
.
Some
from
the
generall
notion
;
others
from
the
special
difference
;
and
some
doe
proceed
from
the
effect
.
Those
which
doe
proceed
of
the
consequents
,
concerne
either
the
Incidents
inherent
and
inseparable
,
or
the
adjuncts
,
and
such
like
.
Which
grounds
so
drawne
,
if
they
be
orderly
disposed
with
al
their
subdivisions
,
and
particular
Rules
,
and
the
same
furnished
with
apt
cases
,
will
make
a
perfect
and
exact
treatise
of
such
matter
as
concerneth
that
title
,
resembling
those
treatises
compiled
,
by
Littleton
,
Parkins
,
Stanford
,
of
the
Pleas
of
the
Crowne
,
and
others
of
like
forme
.
Arbitrement
.
But
in
this
place
not
intending
to
combine
any
such
Grounds
as
do
concerne
one
title
or
matter
,
or
thereof
to
endeavour
to
draw
a
type
of
any
perfect
treatise
,
it
shall
be
sufficient
at
this
present
,
for
example
onely
,
to
expresse
that
which
is
here
meant
,
by
the
disposing
of
some
few
Grounds
of
the
title
of
Arbitrement
,
according
to
the
observation
above
mentioned
,
that
thereby
might
bee
conceived
,
how
such
like
Grounds
concerning
one
title
or
matter
doe
flow
from
the
causes
and
consequents
of
that
title
,
whereunto
they
are
applied
;
and
that
a
coherency
of
them
might
be
both
found
and
orderly
framed
for
the
more
certaine
obtaining
of
knowledge
in
observing
this
,
or
the
like
course
to
this
hereafter
following
.
First
although
we
find
not
an
Arbitrement
to
be
defined
in
any
report
of
our
Lawes
;
yet
neverthelesse
Rastall
in
the
small
treatise
of
the
Termes
of
the
Law
,
thereof
yeeldeth
this
description
,
Arbitrement
est
un
award
,
Arbitrement
,
quid
?
determination
,
ou
judgement
,
quel
pleusieurs
font
al
request
de
deux
parties
al
meins
,
pur
,
&
sur
ascun
dett
,
trespas
,
ou
auter
controversie
ewe
perenter
les
dits
parties
.
But
more
artificially
it
may
be
described
out
of
the
Civill
Law
thus
:
Arbitrium
est
Arbitri
sententia
sive
Iudicium
inter
controvertentes
;
privato
consensu
,
non
autem
publica
interveniente
authoritate
,
datum
.
Out
of
the
bookes
of
Reports
of
the
Lawes
of
this
Land
this
full
description
may
be
drawne
.
An
Award
is
a
judgement
8.
E.
4.1
.
8.
Ed.
4.10
.
a.
21.
Ed.
4.39
.
a.
given
by
such
person
or
persons
as
are
elected
by
the
parties
unto
the
controversie
,
9.
Ed.
4.43
.
b.
Fairfax
.
16.
Ed.
4.9
.
a.
for
the
ending
and
pacifying
the
said
controversie
.
8.
Ed.
4.10
.
a
19.
Hen.
6.37
.
b.
Askewe
.
according
to
the
comprimise
and
submission
.
19.
Edw.
4.1
.
a.
and
agreeable
to
reason
and
good
conscience
.
19.
Hen.
6.37
.
a.
Touching
the
Etymology
or
notation
of
the
names
thereof
,
it
seemeth
to
be
called
an
Arbitrement
,
The
Etymologie
.
because
the
Iudges
elected
therein
,
may
determine
the
controversie
,
not
according
to
the
Law
,
but
Ex
boni
viri
Arbitrio
.
Or
else
perhaps
because
the
parties
to
the
controversie
have
submitted
themselves
to
the
Iudgement
of
the
Arbitrators
,
not
by
compulsory
meanes
,
and
coertion
of
the
Law
,
but
Ex
libero
Arbritrio
suo
,
of
his
own
accord
.
It
is
called
an
Award
of
the
French
word
Agarder
,
which
signifies
to
decide
or
judge
.
It
is
in
the
Saxon
or
old
English
sometime
called
a
Loveday
,
for
the
quiet
and
tranquility
that
should
ensue
thereof
,
and
for
the
ending
of
the
cause
which
is
wrought
thereby
.
The
Materiall
cause
whereabout
it
is
conversant
,
The
Materiall
cause
.
is
the
controversie
,
which
1
,
First
,
may
be
either
action
,
suit
,
quarrell
,
ordemand
;
and
the
2
Second
that
,
concerning
dutie
or
demand
,
either
personall
,
reall
or
mixt
,
or
every
of
them
.
The
Formall
cause
is
,
the
forme
and
manner
of
the
Award
,
The
formall
cause
.
or
the
yeelding
up
of
their
judgement
,
according
to
reason
,
intent
and
good
meaning
.
The
Immediate
efficient
cause
,
The
efficient
cause
.
is
the
Arbitrator
or
Arbitrators
.
The
Mediate
efficient
cause
,
is
the
comprimise
or
submission
,
and
the
parties
at
variance
,
being
also
parties
to
the
submission
.
Wherefore
for
the
more
brevitie
we
will
discourse
of
every
of
these
last
recited
,
when
we
shall
discover
the
power
of
the
Arbitrator
.
The
finall
cause
,
The
finall
cause
.
is
both
to
appease
1
,
First
,
the
debate
and
variance
so
risen
betweene
the
parties
,
and
compromitted
;
and
also
to
reduce
2
,
Secondly
,
that
which
was
before
uncertain
,
unto
a
certaintie
.
So
that
by
these
you
see
,
that
those
five
things
which
are
found
to
be
incident
to
every
Award
,
viz.
-
1
First
,
matter
de
controversie
.
-
2
Submission
.
-
3
Parties
al
submission
.
-
4
Arbitrators
,
and
-
5
Render
sur
del
Iudgement
,
spoken
of
in
4
Eliz.
Dyer
217.
a.
are
here
reduced
into
a
methodicall
consideration
of
the
causes
of
every
Award
,
seeing
indeed
,
they
and
no
other
are
the
very
causes
of
the
same
.
The
genus
or
generall
notion
of
the
former
description
,
Genus
.
is
,
Differentia
.
that
it
is
a
Iudgement
.
The
speciall
difference
whereby
it
is
distinguished
from
other
Iudgements
,
and
expressed
in
the
said
description
,
is
,
that
it
is
given
by
Iudges
elected
by
the
parties
,
and
not
by
coertion
of
the
Law
.
The
effect
is
,
The
effect
.
when
it
concerneth
any
payment
of
money
,
to
alter
,
change
,
and
make
the
controversie
transire
in
rem
judicatam
,
and
thereupon
to
give
action
for
the
summe
awarded
.
If
it
doe
determine
any
collaterall
or
other
matter
than
payment
of
money
to
bee
made
or
done
,
then
it
is
not
compulsary
to
constraine
the
parties
to
performe
it
;
but
every
of
them
is
restored
to
his
former
action
.
Except
the
compromise
or
submission
be
by
deed
;
and
so
therein
it
resteth
wholly
upon
that
security
by
bond
,
covenant
,
statute
,
or
recognizance
,
by
the
which
the
parties
compromitted
themselves
.
The
Adjunct
,
The
Adiunct
.
is
the
performance
thereof
and
the
manner
how
,
which
whether
the
Award
bee
performed
or
not
,
it
maketh
nothing
to
the
nature
and
substance
of
the
Award
it selfe
.
But
neverthelesse
such
performance
of
the
Award
is
a
requisite
consequent
annexed
to
the
consideration
of
the
nature
of
an
Award
.
These
,
the
generall
causes
of
an
Award
,
thus
considered
;
next
followeth
the
consideration
of
the
grounds
that
flow
from
every
of
them
.
From
the
Materiall
cause
which
is
the
controversie
,
Materiall
cause
.
these
Grounds
or
Rules
are
deduced
.
In
Reall
matters
,
que
concerne
franke
tenement
,
Reall
Matters
Arbitrement
ne
lia
,
le
title
,
ne
done
ceo
.
14.
Henr.
4.19
.
a.
In
matters
of
Realty
,
which
concerne
freehold
,
an
Arbitrement
doth
neither
give
title
,
nor
binde
the
right
.
In
Reall
Actions
,
Reall
Actions
.
Mixt
Actions
.
un
Arbitrement
nest
plee
.
In
Mixt
Actions
,
Arbitrement
nest
plee
:
Si
non
que
le
Comprimise
soit
per
fait
.
19.
Hen.
6.37
.
b.
Newton
.
In
Personall
Actions
sur
personall
torts
,
Personall
Actions
.
Arbitrement
est
plee
,
coment
que
le
submission
ne
soit
per
fait
.
14.
H.
4.24
.
b.
Rauish
gard
.
In
controversie
concernant
le
propertie
de
Reall
chattels
,
Reall
Chattels
un
Arbitrement
transfer
propertie
de
ceo
accordant
al
agard
.
21.
H.
7.29
.
b.
In
Chattels
personall
,
Personall
Chattells
.
Arbitrement
transfer
propertie
.
In
Personall
dutie
grounde
sur
specialtie
,
Personall
dutie
.
Arbitrement
nest
availeable
.
3.
H.
4.1
.
b.
8.
H.
5.3
.
b.
In
Controversie
grounde
sur
matter
de
Record
,
Matters
de
Record
.
Arbitrement
ne
sera
regard
.
6.
H.
4.6
.
a.
8.
Hen.
5.3
.
b.
4.
H.
6.17
.
b.
Arbitrement
do
et
este
de
dutie
nient
certaine
.
Dutie
in
certaine
.
6.
Hen.
4.6
.
a.
2.
Hen.
5.
Fitzh.
23.4
.
Hen.
6.17
.
b.
10
Hen.
7.4
.
a.
Controversie
de
dett
solement
,
ne
poet
este
mise
en
Arbitrement
.
45.
E.
3.16
.
a.
2.
H.
5.
Fitzh
.
Arbitrement
23.8
.
H.
5.3
.
b.
4.
H.
6.17
.
b.
10.
H.
7.4
.
a.
In
Contract
de
dett
oue
auter
chose
mise
en
comprimise
Arbitrement
sera
bone
.
Dett
.
2.
H.
6.
Fitzh
.
Arbitrement
23.4
.
H.
6.17
.
b.
10.
H.
7.4
.
a.
Dett
sur
Contract
sans
specialtie
,
Dett
.
per
le
resolution
de
ascuns
liure
poet
este
mise
en
Arbitrement
.
45.
E.
3.16
.
a.
6.
H.
4.6
.
a.
4.
H.
6.18
.
a.
These
with
divers
other
grounds
,
doe
proceed
,
as
we
have
said
,
from
the
Materiall
Cause
or
controversie
.
There
resteth
now
to
speake
of
such
as
do
proceed
from
the
Formall
Cause
.
Formall
Cause
.
Every
Award
,
as
touching
the
forme
thereof
,
ought
to
have
these
foure
qualities
.
-
1.
First
,
that
it
be
not
a
thing
impossible
to
be
performed
by
the
parties
.
-
2.
Secondly
,
that
it
doe
not
ordaine
matter
unlawfull
to
be
done
.
-
3.
Thirdly
,
that
the
same
Award
agree
with
reason
and
good
meaning
.
-
4.
Fourthly
,
that
it
be
sensible
,
full
,
and
perfect
in
understanding
.
As
touching
the
first
.
1.
Arbitrement
ne
do
et
este
de
chose
ou
matter
impossible
.
Impossible
.
8.
E.
4.1
.
b.
Moyle
.
8.
E.
4.10
.
a.
Yelverton
.
19.
E.
4.1
.
a.
Neele
.
9.
H.
7.16
.
b.
Keble
.
2.
Arbitrement
ne
doit
este
de
chose
encounter
ley
.
Encounter
Ley.
19.
Edw.
4.1
.
a.
Neele
.
21.
Ed.
4.
b.
Bridg.
9.
Hen.
7.16
.
a.
b.
Keble
.
3.
Arbitrement
ne
do
et
estre
unreasonable
.
Vnreasonable
.
46.
E.
3.16
.
a.
43.
E.
3.17
.
b.
2.
H.
5.2
.
a.
17.
E.
4.5
.
b.
9.
H.
7
10.
b.
Keble
.
46.
E.
3.17
.
b.
21.
E.
4.40
.
a.
10.
H.
4.
Fitzh
.
Arbitrement
.
This
Ground
last
remembred
,
being
generall
,
containeth
therein
many
speciall
Rules
under
it
;
whereof
some
doe
follow
.
Arbitrement
do
et
este
tiel
que
les
parties
poient
performer
sans
le
assistance
de
ascunes
auters
queux
ils
ne
poient
compel
a
ceo
faire
&
performer
.
Satisfaction
sans
assistance
des
auters
.
8.
Edw.
4.2
.
a.
Illingworth
.
17.
Edw.
4.15
.
b.
18.
Edw.
4.23
.
a.
Catesby
.
19.
E.
4.1
.
b.
Brian
.
Mes
si
les
parties
ont
mean
per
le
ley
a
compeller
tiels
estrangers
a
ceo
performer
,
Assistance
des
auters
.
le
Agard
est
assetts
bone
.
17.
E.
4.5
.
b.
Arbitrement
que
le
party
faire
un
judiciall
Act
est
bone
,
coment
que
il
ne
poiet
ceo
performe
sans
assistance
del
Court
.
Iudiciall
Act.
19.
H.
6.38
.
a.
Past
.
Nonsuite
.
19.
E.
4.1
.
b.
Brian
.
fine
.
12.
E.
4.8
.
a.
Retraxit
.
22.
E.
4.38
.
a.
Retraxit
.
5.
H.
7.22
.
a.
b.
Discon
.
&c.
Chascun
Arbitrement
que
ne
import
satisfaction
del
tort
que
est
mise
in
comprimise
,
Satisfaction
.
nest
bone
.
43.
E.
3.28
.
b.
Finchd
.
46.
E.
3.17
.
b.
2.
H.
5.2
.
a.
45.
E.
3.16
.
a.
19.
H.
6.38
.
a.
Past
.
22.
H.
6.39
.
a.
Port.
30.
Hen.
6.
Fitzherbert
Arbitrement
.
27.
9.
E.
4.44
.
a.
Chock
.
9.
H.
7.16
.
b.
12.
H.
7.15
.
a.
This
Ground
is
also
generall
:
Wherefore
it
shall
be
expedient
to
divide
it
by
the
particular
circumstances
of
cases
unto
more
especiall
propositions
,
together
with
their
severall
exceptions
to
be
set
downe
in
manner
following
.
Arbitrement
in
tiel
maner
,
Redeliuerie
des
biens
.
que
pur
ceo
que
un
des
parties
ad
les
chattels
del
auter
,
que
il
eux
redelivera
,
ceo
nest
satisfaction
.
45.
E.
3.16
.
a.
Kirton
.
2.
Hen.
5.2
.
a.
12.
H.
7.15
.
a.
Mes
si
sur
le
delivery
des
biens
,
Redeliuerie
des
biens
.
cesty
a
que
sont
deliver
poet
aver
ascun
benefit
,
per
tiel
delivery
in
satisfaction
del
tort
,
donque
est
le
Arbitrement
bone
.
2.
H.
5.2
.
a.
14.
H.
4.14
.
b.
12.
H.
7.15
.
a.
Parte
del
Chose
.
Arbitrement
que
un
partie
avera
un
partie
del
chose
comprimise
,
&
sur
que
le
controversie
fait
,
&
l'auter
partie
est
void
.
45.
E.
3.16
.
a.
10.
Hen.
4.
Fitzh
.
Arbitrement
19.
Arbitrement
que
le
partie
payera
part
de
sa
dett
,
Part
del
Chose
.
Plus
que
il
doit
.
est
void
.
45.
E.
3.16
.
a.
Arbitrement
sur
matter
de
dett
,
sils
agard
que
le
parties
endebted
payera
plus
que
il
doit
in
recompence
del
dit
dett
ceo
est
void
.
9.
H.
7.16
.
b.
Keble
.
Arbitrement
que
cesty
que
est
suppose
daver
fait
trespas
,
faira
de
ceo
son
Ley
,
&
sur
ceo
sera
discharge
,
Gager
de
Ley
nest
satisfaction
al
auter
,
&
pur
ceo
nest
bone
.
46.
Ed.
3.17
.
b.
Arbitrement
que
in
satisfaction
del
tort
que
les
parties
entermariont
,
ceo
nest
bone
agard
;
car
nest
satisfaction
.
Entermariage
.
9.
E.
4.44
.
a.
Chock
.
Arbitrement
que
un
des
parties
que
est
in
arrerages
in
accompt
accomptera
al
auter
,
ceo
nest
satisfaction
.
Accomptera
30.
H.
6.
Fitzh
.
Arbitrement
27.
Arbitrement
que
les
parties
fera
act
a
tiel
jour
,
Iour
passe
.
&
devant
que
le
agard
est
perfect
,
le
jour
est
passe
tiel
agard
nest
bone
.
8.
E.
4.11
.
a.
8.
E.
4.22
.
a.
Arbitrement
que
refer
le
feasance
del
chose
ou
auter
matter
a
tiel
chose
que
nest
in
Rerum
natura
;
Non
in
Rerum
Natura
.
tiel
arbitrement
est
void
.
21.
E.
4.40
.
a.
9.
Ed.
4.44
.
a.
39.
H.
6.10
.
a.
Having
thus
shewed
the
Circumstances
of
certaine
Arbitrements
,
which
have
beene
taken
to
be
against
reason
,
sounding
to
no
satisfaction
,
and
therefore
voyd
:
Now
resteth
to
be
shewed
certaine
circumstances
,
in
Arbitrements
agreeable
unto
reason
,
and
imparting
satisfaction
,
Reasonable
.
and
therefore
deemed
good
.
Arbitrement
do
et
este
equal
in
respect
d'ambideux
parties
,
Equall
.
&
l'un
come
l'auter
sera
lie
a
ceo
.
7.
H.
6.41
.
a.
Strange
.
19.
H.
6.38
.
a.
Newton
.
20.
H.
6.19
.
a.
Newton
.
39.
H.
6.12
.
a.
Moyle
.
Lou
divers
d'une
parties
&
d'auter
eux
submit
al
agard
,
Enter
ascuns
des
Parties
.
&
le
Arbitrement
est
,
que
l'une
de
l'une
partie
payera
a
un
auter
de
l'auter
partie
tant
,
sans
rien
parler
des
auters
;
ceo
est
bone
agard
,
pur
ceo
que
poet
este
que
le
auters
naveront
cause
daver
ascun
chose
.
22.
E.
4.25
.
b.
Arbitrement
pur
ceo
que
les
torts
fait
per
les
parties
chescun
al
auter
sont
equal
que
ils
seront
quit
chescun
vers
lauter
;
Quitt
.
ceo
est
bone
agard
.
19.
H.
7.37
.
b.
Newton
.
20.
H.
6.19
.
a.
Newton
.
21.
H.
6.
Fitz.
Arbit.
9.
Arbitrement
que
une
des
parties
sera
quit
vers
lauter
,
Quitt
.
&
que
cesty
auter
payera
ou
faira
tant
pur
ceo
que
son
trespas
fut
le
greinder
,
est
bon
agard
.
10.
H.
6.4
.
a.
20.
H.
6.19
.
a.
Newton
.
Arbitrement
que
l'une
done
al
auter
quart
de
vine
,
Petit
Recompence
.
ou
tiel
petit
recompence
pur
satisfaction
del
tort
,
est
bone
agard
,
43.
E.
3.33
.
a.
45.
E.
3.19
.
b
Belknap
.
9.
E
4.44
.
a.
Nedham
.
Si
le
Arbitrement
soit
,
Greinder
value
que
le
tort
.
que
un
des
parties
payera
greinder
sum
in
value
que
le
tort
est
que
il
ad
fait
,
uncore
le
agard
est
bone
,
&
ceo
gist
in
discretion
des
Arbitrators
,
8
,
E
,
4
,
21
,
Chock
.
Arbitrement
,
Release
.
que
chescun
release
al
auter
,
est
bone
,
9
,
E
,
4
,
44
,
b
,
Danby
.
Arbitrement
que
l'une
release
tout
son
droit
in
tiel
terre
,
Release
.
est
bone
satisfaction
:
Si
cesty
a
que
le
release
sera
fait
soit
in
possession
del
terre
,
&c.
Et
ceo
appiert
per
le
agard
,
9
,
E
,
4
,
44
,
b.
21
,
E
,
4
,
40
,
b.
Arbitrement
que
l'une
partie
done
al
auter
tiel
chose
,
Doner
ceo
que
il
nad
.
coment
que
le
partie
nad
tiel
chose
,
uncore
est
le
agardbone
,
&
il
doit
provide
ceo
,
19
,
E
,
4
,
1
,
a
,
Neele
.
9
,
Henr
:
7
,
16
,
a.
Arbitrement
bone
in
part
,
&
void
in
part
,
19
,
E
,
Bone
in
parte
4
,
1
,
a.
Arbitrators
poient
ordaine
act
deste
fait
in
lour
agard
pur
le
melieur
securitie
del
performance
de
ceo
,
Security
del
Agard
.
come
obligation
,
8
,
H
,
6
,
18
,
b
,
Newton
.
19
,
H
,
4
,
1
,
a
,
Chock
.
Chescune
Arbitrement
do
et
este
plaine
&
certaine
en
sence
,
8
,
E
,
4
,
11
,
a
,
Pigot
.
Certaine
.
Arbitrement
est
chose
entier
,
18
,
E
,
4
,
23
,
a
,
Brian
.
Entier
.
Thus
much
touching
the
Matter
and
Forme
of
Arbitrements
and
the
Axiomes
,
Grounds
and
Rules
deduced
from
the
same
:
Wherein
we
have
not
expressed
every
Rule
that
might
be
found
in
the
books
,
or
collected
thence
,
tending
hereunto
:
Neither
are
those
Axiomes
or
Propositions
here
put
downe
,
furnished
with
all
those
cases
that
might
be
thereunto
applyed
:
For
,
not
intending
to
expresse
the
type
of
any
treatise
of
this
title
,
but
onely
a
methodicall
Abstract
or
Directory
,
that
which
is
here
exemplified
in
part
may
be
sufficient
to
expresse
our
meaning
before
declared
.
But
to
proceed
.
The
Efficient
Causes
,
Efficient
Cause
.
and
the
Rules
drawne
from
the
same
come
next
to
consideration
.
The
first
whereof
is
the
Arbitrator
:
Iohannes
Paulus
Lancelottus
.
Arbitrator
quid
.
Of
whom
the
Authour
of
the
Institutions
of
the
Canon
Law
giveth
this
description
:
Arbitri
dicuntur
proprie
,
qui
(
nullam
potestatem
habentes
ex
Lege
,
)
consensu
Litigantium
in
Iudices
eliguntur
:
in
quos
compromittitur
,
ut
eorum
sententiae
stetur
.
Out
of
the
bookes
of
the
Common
law
,
a
description
of
an
Arbitrator
may
be
thus
collected
.
Vne
Arbitratour
est
Iudge
private
,
eslew
per
les
parties
.
9.
Edw.
4.43
.
b.
Fairefax
.
16.
Edw.
4.9
.
a.
Feneux
.
19.
Hen.
6.37
.
b.
Askew
.
pur
appeaser
les
debates
enter
eux
.
8.
Edw.
4.10
.
a.
Billinge
.
Et
de
arbitrate
&
adjudge
selonque
lour
bone
intent
.
19.
H.
6.37
.
a.
Paston
.
Sithence
in
the
Award
it selfe
,
the
Law
requireth
such
qualities
,
there
hath
not
beene
made
many
nor
scarce
any
question
,
who
may
be
an
Arbitrator
,
and
who
not
:
Neither
(
considering
what
hath
beene
said
touching
the
forme
of
an
Award
)
should
it
be
greatly
necessary
.
Therefore
we
wil
proceed
,
respecting
in
the
Arbitrator
these
three
things
.
-
1.
First
his
Ordinance
,
from
whom
it
is
.
-
2.
His
Authority
,
what
it
is
.
-
3.
His
Duty
,
wherein
it
consisteth
.
Touching
his
Ordinance
,
Ordinance
.
hee
is
ordained
by
these
two
things
:
-
1.
First
,
by
the
election
of
the
parties
.
20.
H.
6.41
.
a.
-
2.
By
his
owne
undertaking
of
the
charge
.
8.
E.
4.10
.
a.
Billinge
.
Touching
his
Authority
,
Authoritie
.
what
it
is
.
-
1.
First
it
is
derived
from
the
submission
,
and
extendeth
no
further
.
-
2.
Thereby
hee
is
a
Iudge
betweene
the
parties
.
-
3
,
And
therefore
he
cannot
transferre
his
authority
over
to
any
other
.
Touching
his
Duty
,
it
consisteth
in
these
three
.
Duty
.
-
1
,
First
to
heare
the
griefe
of
the
partie
.
-
2
,
To
judge
according
to
equitie
.
-
3
,
To
notifie
their
Award
.
First
therefore
concerning
the
election
of
the
Arbitrators
by
the
parties
to
the
Controversie
(
which
ought
likewise
to
bee
parties
to
the
Submission
)
there
is
first
of
all
to
be
considered
,
Election
of
the
Arbitratour
.
what
persons
may
by
the
Law
submit
themselves
to
an
award
made
by
others
,
and
what
persons
cannot
.
Queux
persons
poient
eux
submitter
al
agarde
.
Deputy
.
And
therefore
,
Si
l'une
des
parties
submit
luy
a
une
Arbitrement
d'une
parte
,
et
Depute
del
auter
parte
in
nosme
del
dit
auter
party
:
Arbitrement
sur
ceo
fait
per
enter
eux
semble
bon
.
4.
Eliz.
217.
a.
60.
Le
Baron
poet
luy
mesme
submit
al
agard
pur
luy
et
sa
feme
pur
chattels
des
queux
il
ad
le
disposition
in
droit
,
et
per
reason
de
sa
fem
,
et
ceo
Liera
la
feme
.
Baron
&
feme
.
21.
Hen.
7.29
.
b.
Si
enfant
submit
luy
al
une
agard
,
Enfant
.
il
ser
a
lye
de
ceo
performer
cy
bien
come
home
de
plein
age
.
13.
Hen.
4.12
.
a.
10
Hen.
6.14
.
a.
Si
divers
d'une
parte
ont
fait
tort
a
un
auter
,
Ascuns
departies
.
&
cesti
a
qui
le
tort
est
fait
,
et
un
de
les
auters
submit
eux
al
agard
,
de
cest
agard
fait
les
auters
nient
parties
al
submission
averon
advantage
in
extinguishment
del
tort
.
7.
Hen.
4.31
.
b.
20.
H.
6.12
.
a.
20.
H.
6.41
.
a.
Si
divers
del
une
parte
submit
eux
mesmes
al
agard
de
certaine
persons
,
&
divers
del
auter
parte
:
Ioynt
&
severall
.
Les
Arbitratours
ont
power
de
faire
agarde
pur
matters
enter
eux
joyntment
,
&
issint
pur
matter
enter
eux
severalment
,
2.
Rich.
3.18
.
b.
vide
21.
Hen.
7.29
.
b.
Com.
Dalton
.
289.
b.
Si
divers
del
une
parte
&
de
auter
submit
eux
al
agard
del
une
,
Ascunes
des
parties
.
que
fait
agard
perenter
ascunes
d'une
party
,
&
ascunes
del
auter
party
&
nemy
perenter
eux
touts
,
&
ne
parle
rien
en
son
agard
des
auters
,
uncore
tiel
agard
est
bone
,
22.
Edw.
4.25
.
b.
Thus
much
touching
the
parties
that
doe
submit
themselves
unto
an
Award
,
and
which
make
an
election
of
the
Arbitratours
.
vndertaking
the
award
.
Now
followeth
that
somewhat
be
also
said
as
touching
the
undertaking
of
the
charge
of
the
said
Award
.
Si
le
Arbritr
atour
protest
,
Del
parcel
.
que
il
ne
voile
meddle
ave
tout
ceo
que
est
commit
a
luy
,
ou
conteyne
en
le
submission
,
ou
sil
fait
agard
tantum
del
parcel
,
le
agard
est
bone
,
19.
Hen.
6.6
.
b.
39.
Hen.
6.11
.
b.
Prisot
,
cont
.
4.
Eliz.
217.60.7.8
.
Eliz.
243.
b.
52.
Mes
si
le
submission
soit
per
fait
conditionalment
que
le
dit
agard
soit
deliver
devant
tiel
jour
:
Parcel
.
une
Arbitrement
de
parcel
nest
bone
,
4.
Eliz.
217.60.7.8
.
Eliz.
243.
b.
52.
Mes
uncore
,
Parcel
.
si
le
submission
soit
que
ils
estoieront
al
agard
des
Arbitratours
de
tout
le
chose
comprimit
ou
fait
pur
ascun
parcel
de
ceo
:
donque
le
Arbitrement
est
bone
pur
parcel
,
39.
Hen.
6.11
.
b.
And
thus
much
hath
beene
said
of
the
taking
upon
them
of
the
charge
of
the
Arbitrement
.
Now
resteth
it
likewise
to
speake
of
the
Authoritie
of
the
Arbitrators
themselves
:
which
is
,
as
before
is
declared
,
grounded
upon
the
submission
.
The
submission
or
comprimise
therfore
out
of
the
Civill
Law
,
is
thus
defined
;
Compromissum
est
simultanea
illa
partium
promissio
,
Compromise
ou
submission
.
qua
sua
sponte
,
ad
alicujus
boni
viri
Arbitrium
suam
remittunt
controversiam
.
Submissions
are
in
two
manners
,
either
by
writing
,
or
by
word
.
Those
that
are
by
writing
,
are
either
by
obligation
,
or
by
covenant
.
Which
obligation
is
either
of
Record
,
as
a
recognizance
,
or
by
deed
betweene
the
parties
.
And
this
submission
by
writing
,
or
by
word
,
is
either
absolute
,
or
conditionall
,
so
that
the
award
be
delivered
by
a
certaine
day
,
or
such
like
.
Wherefore
in
as
much
as
the
authority
of
the
Arbitrator
is
deduced
from
the
submission
,
it
followeth
that
,
Le
Arbitrement
que
est
fait
de
chose
nient
containe
in
le
submission
,
est
voide
,
Nient
containe
in
submission
.
7.
Hen.
6.40
.
b.
19.
Hen.
6.39
.
b.
Fort.
9.
Ed.
4.44
.
a.
Chock
.
19.
E.
4.1
.
a.
Neele
.
7.8
.
Eliz.
242.
b.
52.
Mes
si
le
submission
est
de
chose
personal
,
Nient
containe
in
le
submission
.
les
Arbitrators
poient
agard
,
que
un
des
parties
fera
act
que
est
de
chose
real
in
satisfaction
der
personal
tort
,
9.
Ed.
4.44
.
a.
Brian
.
Si
le
submission
soit
de
chose
real
,
Real
.
les
Arbitratours
poient
agard
satisfaction
deste
fait
de
chose
personal
,
9.
E.
4.44
.
a.
Brian
.
Si
les
arbitratours
agard
,
Estranger
.
que
un
des
parties
fera
act
al
estranger
,
come
feofment
,
ou
tiels
sembles
,
tel
arbitrement
est
void
,
22.
Hen.
6.46
.
b.
17.
Ed.
4.23
,
a.
Catesby
,
19.
Ed.
4.1
.
b.
Brian
.
5
Hen.
7.22
.
b.
Si
le
submission
soit
d'une
chose
,
Incident
.
le
Arbitrement
poit
esse
fait
de
chose
incident
a
ceo
.
8
Hen.
6.18
.
b.
19.
Ed.
4.1
.
a.
Chock
.
ver
.
9.
Hen.
7.15
.
b.
16.
a.
Vpon
this
authority
given
to
the
Arbitrators
by
the
submission
,
to
deale
in
manner
as
aforesaid
,
in
things
touching
the
same
submission
.
It
ensueth
also
secondarily
,
Iudge
.
that
Le
Arbitrator
est
un
Iudge
perenter
les
parties
,
19.
Hen.
6.37
.
b.
Ascough
,
9.
Ed.
4.43
.
b.
Fair
f.
16.
Ed.
4.9
.
a.
Iency
.
Com.
Fogasta
.
6.
a.
Wherefore
likewise
it
ensueth
that
the
Arbitrator
being
a
Iudge
cannot
transferre
that
his
Iudiciall
authority
to
any
other
.
And
therfore
,
Si
le
Arbitrement
soit
,
Estranger
.
que
les
parties
estoicra
al
arbitrement
d'un
estranger
;
ceo
nest
bone
agard
,
47.
Ed.
3.21
.
a.
Cont.
8.
Ed.
4.10
,
11.
a.
Mes
si
l'estranger
ad
fait
un
Arbitrement
devant
perenter
les
dits
parties
,
Estranger
.
le
Agard
pur
estoier
a
tiel
Arbitrement
del
estranger
est
bone
,
39.
Hen.
6
,
10.
a.
11.
a.
Mes
si
le
Arbitrement
soit
que
les
parties
performera
le
Agard
d'une
auter
devant
fait
perenter
mesmes
les
parties
,
Estranger
.
lou
in
verity
nest
ascun
tel
agard
:
uncore
cest
Arbitrement
est
bone
prima
facie
tanque
soit
monstre
que
nest
tiel
agard
,
39.
Hen.
6.12
.
a.
Prisot
.
Mes
uncore
si
le
Arbitrement
soit
,
Advice
.
que
une
act
limit
per
le
Agard
sera
fait
per
le
advise
&
counseil
d'une
auter
person
;
tiel
Agard
est
bone
,
8.
Ed.
4.11
.
a.
14.
Ed.
4.1
.
a.
Chock
.
Mes
si
le
Agard
soit
,
Advice
.
que
le
act
sera
fait
per
le
Advise
del
Arbitratour
mesme
apres
le
Agard
rendu
sur
tel
Agard
nest
bone
,
19.
Ed.
4.1
.
a.
Chock
.
Si
les
parties
eux
submit
al
Agard
de
certaine
persons
,
Vmpier
.
&
s'ils
ne
poient
agree
,
donque
al
ordinance
d'un
auter
come
umpier
;
si
les
Arbitratours
font
Agard
de
parcel
,
le
umpier
ne
fera
agard
del
auter
parcel
remnant
,
39.
Hen.
6.10
.
a.
b.
Mes
si
le
submission
soit
tiel
que
le
umpier
fera
Agard
del
tout
ou
parte
,
donque
il
poit
faire
Agard
de
cest
parte
,
ovesque
que
les
Arbitrators
navont
meddle
,
39.
Hen.
6.11
.
b.
Prisot
.
Now
as
touching
the
duty
of
the
Arbitratours
.
Duty
.
First
Les
duties
des
parties
est
a
vener
devant
les
Arbitratours
&
monstre
lour
grieves
.
-
1
Et
le
Arbitratour
doit
eux
oir
.
-
2
Et
solonque
ceo
adjudge
,
ou
autermènt
il
nest
bone
Iudge
,
8.
Ed.
4.10
.
a.
Billinge
.
Those
which
affect
the
Method
of
Ramus
(
that
is
,
to
begin
with
the
efficient
cause
,
as
here
,
with
Arbitratour
)
rather
then
that
which
is
usually
prosecuted
by
the
Interpretors
of
Aristotle
(
namely
,
to
begin
first
with
the
matter
and
forme
,
which
we
hitherunto
have
endeavoured
to
follow
)
may
here
adde
to
,
the
second
part
of
the
duty
of
an
Arbitrator
(
that
is
,
to
that
which
hath
beene
here
said
of
this
Iudiciall
Authority
and
Iudgement
)
as
much
as
hath
beene
before
,
first
of
all
,
shewed
by
us
,
touching
the
Materiall
and
Formall
causes
,
and
the
Grounds
and
Rules
incident
thereupon
.
But
neverthelesse
,
to
proceed
with
our
intended
enterprise
;
touching
the
third
part
of
the
dutie
of
an
Arbitrator
,
viz.
the
publishing
or
notifying
of
his
Award
;
It
is
to
be
considered
that
the
publishing
or
notifying
of
an
Award
is
either
provided
for
and
ordained
by
the
submission
it selfe
;
or
else
it
is
left
and
permitted
to
the
discretion
of
the
Arbitrator
.
If
it
be
provided
for
,
by
the
submission
;
for
the
most
part
it
is
in
this
manner
,
that
either
the
same
Award
made
,
be
notified
to
the
parties
,
or
some
of
them
;
&
that
,
either
by
a
certaine
day
or
time
,
or
else
without
limitation
of
any
time
.
As
concerning
therefore
the
delivery
of
the
Award
,
there
is
to
be
noted
;
that
where
such
provision
is
made
of
notification
by
the
submission
,
that
then
;
Arbitrement
nest
Arbitrement
devant
que
il
soit
pronounce
,
Pronounce
.
8.
Ed.
4.21
.
b.
Chock
.
Lou
per
le
submission
est
ordaine
ou
provide
condicionalment
,
que
le
agard
soit
deliver
,
Delivery
de
Agard
.
ceo
nest
ascun
arbitrement
in
ley
devant
que
il
soit
deliver
in
fait
,
8.
Ed.
4.11
Yelverton
.
8.
Ed.
4.21
.
a.
Chock
.
vide
1.
Hen.
7.5
.
a.
37.
Hen.
8.
Browne
,
Conditions
,
46.
Mes
si
le
submission
soit
que
le
agard
sera
delivere
al
parties
,
Delivery
.
&c.
devant
un
jour
hoc
petentibus
,
mes
nul
certaine
jour
limit
quand
doit
este
deliver
,
les
parties
doient
prender
notice
del
agard
a
lour
perill
,
8.
Edw.
4.1
.
b.
21
,
&c.
Si
divers
d'un
partie
&
divers
de
auter
party
submit
eux
al
Arbitrement
de
un
auter
,
Delivery
.
provise
,
que
il
soit
deliver
al
parties
,
ou
a
un
de
eux
:
ne
besoign
al
Arbitrator
a
deliver
ceo
a
ambideux
del
un
partie
ou
〈◊〉
de
chacuns
partie
:
mes
suffist
si
soit
deliver
al
as●●●●●●
dits
parties
,
4.5
.
Eliz.
218.
b.
5.
Si
le
submission
soit
que
le
Arbitrement
sera
deliver
devant
tiel
jour
,
Delivery
.
il
poet
cy
bien
este
deliver
per
parol
come
per
fait
:
si
non
que
le
submission
soit
que
il
sera
per
fait
,
4.5
.
Eliz.
218.
b.
5.
Si
le
submission
soit
que
le
Arbitrement
sera
deliver
ceo
poet
este
fait
in
un
County
,
County
&
lieu
del
delivery
.
Temps
.
&
deliver
in
auter
County
,
5.
Hen.
7.7
.
a.
Si
le
submission
soit
per
fait
,
&
le
temps
pas
in
que
le
Arbitrement
do
et
este
fait
,
les
parties
ne
poient
proroge
le
temps
ouster
pur
faire
le
agard
sans
novel
submission
a
tel
entent
,
49.
Ed.
3.9
.
a.
Mes
si
le
submission
soit
sans
fait
,
Temps
.
les
parties
poient
proroge
le
temps
que
fut
done
pur
faire
le
agard
,
49.
Ed.
3.9
.
Fitzh
.
agard
,
22.
Si
les
Arbitrators
font
lour
agard
perenter
les
parties
un
jour
,
Temps
.
ils
ne
poient
faire
auter
agard
perenter
les
parties
un
auter
jour
,
coment
que
le
temps
don
per
le
submission
ne
soit
expire
,
22.
Hen.
6.52
.
a.
vide
33.
H.
6.28
.
b.
Arbitrement
ne
poet
este
fait
parte
a
un
temps
,
Temps
.
&
parte
al
auter
,
coment
que
soit
deins
le
temps
del
submission
,
39.
H.
6.12
.
a.
Danby
,
8.
Ed.
4.10
.
b.
Fairfax
,
19.
Ed.
4.1
.
a.
Chock
,
vide
3.
Hen.
4.1
.
b.
Mes
les
Arbitrators
poient
Common
enter
eux
mesmes
,
&
agree
sur
un
chose
un
jour
,
Temps
.
&
de
auter
chose
auter
jour
,
&
in
le
fine
faire
une
entire
agard
de
tout
:
Et
ceo
est
bone
,
47.
Edw.
3.21
.
a.
39.
Hen.
6.12
.
a.
Danby
.
Si
Arbitratours
agard
un
chose
de
une
parte
,
Temps
.
&
devant
que
ils
poient
agree
de
lour
agard
del
remnant
,
le
temps
done
per
le
submission
expire
;
tout
lour
agard
est
voide
,
39.
Hen.
6.12
.
a.
Prisot
.
But
if
there
be
by
the
submission
no
order
taken
for
the
Delivery
or
Publication
of
the
Award
;
Then
In
honesty
&
Conscience
le
Arbitratour
est
tenus
de
faire
notice
al
parties
de
ceo
.
vide
8.
Edw.
4.10
.
a.
Billinge
,
Notice
.
vide
8.
Edw.
4.2
.
a.
b.
Markham
.
Mes
in
rigore
Iuris
l'arbitrement
mesme
est
intend
chose
Notorious
,
Notice
.
8.
Ed.
4.1
.
b.
Chock
.
8.
Edw.
4.21
.
b.
Chock
.
Et
pur
ceo
.
Parties
al
Arbitrement
sont
tenus
de
prender
notice
del
agard
a
lour
peril
,
Notice
.
8.
Edw.
4.18.21.18
.
Edw.
4.18
.
a.
1.
Hen.
7.5
.
a.
Coment
que
les
Parties
ne
sont
daver
Notice
done
a
eux
de
L'arbitrement
,
Notice
.
uncore
si
les
Arbitratours
agard
que
un
des
parties
fera
act
que
depend
sur
auter
primes
destre
fait
del
auter
partie
,
de
ceo
il
aver
notice
,
8.
Edw.
4.21
.
b.
20.
Edw.
4.8
.
b.
Sulliard
.
Hitherto
hath
beene
said
of
such
matters
where
the
Arbitrators
have
executed
their
Authoritie
without
controll
of
the
parties
:
But
if
,
before
any
Award
made
,
their
Authority
shall
be
lawfully
countermanded
;
Then
doth
there
remaine
in
this
place
to
be
considered
,
-
1
,
Whether
such
Countermands
be
permitted
by
the
Law
.
-
2
,
And
in
what
Cases
not
.
-
3
,
And
also
in
what
manner
the
same
is
to
be
done
.
Wherefore
Si
le
submission
soit
sans
fait
,
Countermand
.
chescun
des
parties
poit
Countermand
&
discharge
les
Arbitratours
,
49.
Ed.
3.
vide
Fitzherbert
Arbitrement
22.
21.
Hen.
6.30
.
a.
28.
Hen.
6.6
.
b.
5.
Edw.
4.3
.
b.
8.
Edw.
4.10
.
b.
Mes
donque
les
parties
doient
doner
Notice
al
Arbitratours
del
dit
discharge
,
Countermand
.
8.
Edw.
4.10
.
b.
Markham
,
8.
Edw.
4.12
.
a.
Lakyn
.
Mes
si
divers
d'un
part
&
diverse
d'auter
part
eux
submit
al
Arbitrement
sans
fait
,
Countermand
.
un
del
une
parte
ne
poet
discharge
le
Arbitratour
sans
les
auters
son
Compagnons
de
mesme
le
partie
,
28.
Hen.
6.
b.
Mes
si
le
submission
soit
per
fait
un
des
parties
ne
poit
Countremaund
les
Arbitratours
,
Countermand
.
49.
Edw.
3.
Fitzh
.
Arbitrement
22.
nient
in
le
liver
a
large
.
5.
Edw.
4.3
.
b.
8.
Ed.
4.11
.
b.
Pigott
.
Regulae
à
sausa
finali
.
The
last
cause
of
the
foure
before
remembred
being
the
Finall
Cause
(
that
is
)
the
end
and
scope
wherefore
men
doe
submit
themselves
unto
the
Arbitrement
and
Award
of
any
person
,
consisteth
upon
two
things
.
1
Chacun
Arbitrement
est
a
faire
final
determination
&
de
appeaser
le
strifes
,
Final
determination
.
debates
&
variances
enter
les
parties
.
19.
Hen.
6.37
.
b.
Newton
,
8.
Edw.
4.10
.
a.
Lakyn
.
8.
Edw.
4.12
.
b.
Yelverton
.
2
Chacun
Arbitrement
est
a
reducer
chose
incertaine
a
une
certainty
,
A
reducer
incertaintie
al
certaintie
.
&
nemy
a
reducer
un
certainty
in
auter
certainty
,
6.
Hen.
4.6
.
a.
Hankford
.
4.
Hen.
6.17
.
b.
Weston
.
10.
Hen.
7.4
.
a.
Thus
much
hath
beene
sayd
as
touching
the
Causes
.
Now
as
concerning
the
Genus
or
Generall
Notion
:
In
the
former
definition
of
an
Arbitrement
,
It
is
to
be
considered
,
That
Chescun
Arbitrement
est
un
Iudgement
,
Iudgement
.
8.
Ed.
4.1
.
b.
Fairefax
.
8.
Edw.
4.10
.
a.
Ieney
.
21.
Ed.
4.39
.
a.
Vavasour
.
Because
the
speciall
difference
used
in
the
sayd
former
definition
of
an
Award
,
was
this
,
That
it
was
given
by
Iudges
elected
by
the
parties
,
and
not
by
compulsary
Iurisdiction
of
the
Court
,
thereof
ensueth
,
That
Il
est
diversaie
ou
home
est
Iudge
per
authoritie
del
ley
,
Intent
del
Arbitrator
.
&
per
Election
del
partie
mesme
:
Car
Iudge
de
Record
ne
doner
Iudgement
vers
les
parties
,
si
non
que
ils
sont
appells
devant
eux
per
processe
del
ley
:
Mes
autrement
est
dun
Arbitratour
que
est
Iudge
per
enter
les
parties
,
8.
Ed.
4.2
.
a.
Illingsworth
.
Of
this
also
ensueth
,
that
whereas
every
Iudgement
of
Record
shall
be
executed
literally
,
according
to
the
warrant
issuing
out
of
the
Record
,
upon
and
for
the
executing
of
the
said
Iudgment
;
Yet
neverthelesse
.
Chescun
Arbitrement
doit
este
expound
et
intend
accordant
al
intent
des
Arbitratours
,
Intent
.
&
nemy
Literalment
.
17.
Edw.
4.3
.
Brian
.
21.
Edw.
4.39
.
a.
b.
vide
19.
Hen.
6.36
.
b.
Markham
.
Mes
si
l'intent
des
Arbitratours
ne
estoit
ove
la
ley
:
Intent
,
donque
les
parties
ceo
performera
accordant
eux
parolls
in
tiel
sence
que
agree
ove
le
ley
.
21.
Edw.
4.39
.
b.
Fairefax
.
The
Causes
of
an
Arbitrement
being
thus
deciphered
there
followeth
next
the
consideration
of
the
effects
thereof
.
The
Effects
of
an
Arbitrement
are
these
which
doe
ensue
.
Per
Arbitrement
le
Controversie
transit
in
rem
Iudicatam
.
Transition
in
rem
judicatam
.
49.
Edw.
3.3
.
a.
Hanwer
.
20.
Hen.
6.41
.
a.
Paston
.
9.
Edw.
4.51
.
a.
Danby
.
6.
Hen.
11.
b.
Hussey
.
Com.
Fogossa
,
6.
a.
Et
pur
ceo
Lou
le
party
port
action
pur
le
tort
a
luy
fait
,
Iour
de
nint
venus
.
purpay
le
mony
.
est
bone
Plea
que
il
eux
submit
al
Arbitrement
de
tiels
;
qui
agard
que
il
pajera
tant
&c
,
mes
le
jour
de
payment
de
ceo
nest
uncore
venu
,
6.
Hen.
7.11
.
b.
Hussey
.
9.
Edw.
4.51
.
a.
Chock
.
20.
Hen.
6.12
.
b.
Newton
.
20.
Hen.
6.40
.
a.
b.
Paston
.
28.
Hen.
6.12
.
5.
Ed.
4.7
.
a.
Iour
de
payment
.
Mes
si
le
jour
de
payment
soit
passe
,
il
doit
monstre
que
il
tender
les
deniers
al
jour
,
&
que
il
est
uncore
prist
.
8.
Hen.
6.25
.
b.
Martin
.
16.
Edw.
4.8
.
b.
Pigot
.
Vncore
priste
Car
,
Arbitrement
per
que
les
Arbitratours
agard
,
Done
action
.
que
un
des
parties
pajera
money
,
done
action
.
5.
Edw.
4.7
.
a.
Chock
.
16.
Edw.
4.9
.
a.
Pigot
.
17.
Edw.
4.2
.
b.
Townsend
.
17.
Edw.
4.8
.
a.
Pigot
.
Fitzh
.
Natura
brevium
121.
g.
6.
Hen.
7.11
.
b.
Hussey
.
9.
E.
4.51
.
Danby
.
Et
si
les
parties
ne
performe
L'arbitrement
,
Restore
al
primer
action
.
Restore
al
primer
action
.
le
parte
est
restore
a
son
primer
action
,
49.
Ed.
3.3
.
a.
Mes
uncore
est
a
son
Election
de
aver
Briefe
de
debt
sur
le
agard
,
ou
le
primer
Action
,
49.
Ed.
3.3
.
a.
33.
Hen.
6.2
.
b.
Mes
si
le
payment
soit
fait
,
Determine
.
le
primer
tort
est
tout
ousterment
determine
per
le
agard
,
4.
Hen.
6.1
.
a.
8.
Hen.
6.25
.
b.
21.
Hen.
7.28
.
b.
Ex
que
ensuit
auxy
.
Si
les
Arbitratours
agardant
,
Double
Action
.
que
un
des
parties
pajera
tant
des
deniers
,
Et
chescun
de
eux
est
oblige
al
auter
pur
estoier
al
agard
le
party
avera
action
sur
le
agard
,
&
auxy
sur
le
fait
si
agard
ne
soit
performe
.
21.
E.
4.41
.
b.
33.
Hen.
6.2
.
b.
Si
le
submission
soit
par
paroll
,
Collaterall
matter
.
&
Arbitrement
soit
que
un
des
parties
fairont
un
collateral
act
,
auter
que
payment
des
deniers
,
ceo
ne
done
action
,
&
si
ne
soit
execute
in
fait
et
satisfie
,
le
Arbitrement
nad
ascun
effect
;
Et
tel
Arbitrement
ne
determine
le
primer
tort
,
19.
Hen.
6.38
.
a.
Newton
.
20.
Hen.
6.19
.
a.
Markham
.
5.
Edw.
4.7
.
a.
Chock
.
Com.
Fogoss.
11.
b.
Vncore
si
le
submission
soit
per
obligation
,
Collaterall
matter
.
si
un
Collaterall
act
soit
agard
deste
fait
;
si
ceo
ne
soit
performe
,
le
obligation
sera
forfeit
,
9.
Ed.
4.44
.
a.
Thus
much
touching
the
effects
of
an
Award
.
A
Consequent
thereof
is
,
the
Performance
;
wherein
we
are
to
consider
,
That
Les
parties
doient
faire
tout
ceo
que
in
eux
est
a
ceo
performe
,
Performance
.
21.
Ed.
4.39
.
b.
Fairefax
.
Si
per
le
Arbitrement
soit
agard
que
un
act
sera
fait
le
quel
home
poit
performer
,
Assistance
.
in
deux
manners
lun
voy
per
luy
mesme
,
et
per
l'auter
voy
il
doit
aver
l'aide
d'un
auter
person
:
le
party
doit
ceo
performer
per
tel
meane
,
que
il
solement
poit
faire
sans
aid
de
l'auter
,
21.
Ed.
4.40
.
b.
Hussey
.
Arbitrement
ne
doit
este
fait
in
part
,
Parte
.
et
in
part
ne
my
,
6.
Hen.
7.10
.
b.
Mes
coment
que
Arbitrement
ne
poet
este
fait
per
les
Arbitratours
,
Parte
.
part
a
une
temps
,
et
part
a
auter
temps
:
uncore
ceo
poit
este
performe
part
a
un
temps
et
parte
al
auter
,
8.
Ed.
4.10
.
b.
Fairefax
.
Les
parties
averant
reasonable
temps
a
eux
allowe
pur
le
performer
d'un
agard
,
Temps
.
si
nul
temps
soit
limitt
,
20.
Edw.
4.8
.
b.
21.
Ed.
4.41
.
a.
b.
&c.
Si
le
act
que
les
Arbitratours
agard
que
l'un
party
performera
,
Primer
Act.
ne
poit
este
performe
devant
auter
Act
primes
fait
per
l'auter
partie
,
si
cest
partie
ne
fait
le
primer
act
,
l'auter
est
excuse
,
5.
Edw.
4.7
.
a.
Arbitrement
que
l'un
partie
pajera
mony
,
Tout
a
un
temps
.
&
l'auter
fera
Releas
;
ceo
sera
fait
a
un
mesme
temps
,
si
ne
soit
obligation
de
performer
le
Agard
.
21.
H.
7.28
.
b.
Knightly
,
&
Reede
.
Mes
si
soit
Obligation
a
performer
le
agard
,
Chacun
performe
son
parte
.
donque
chacun
doit
performe
son
parte
de
soubs
le
peril
de
L'Obligation
,
21.
Hen.
7.28
.
b.
Reede
.
Si
Obligation
soit
fait
pur
estoier
al
Arbitrement
coment
que
le
Arbitrement
soit
void
in
Ley
,
Voide
award
Quaere
.
uncore
ceo
doit
este
performe
,
auterment
le
Obligation
sera
forfeit
22.
Hen.
6.46
.
b.
Port
,
per
Cur.
Mes
si
action
soit
port
sur
tel
void
Agard
,
Void
agard
.
le
Action
ne
sera
maintaine
,
22.
Hen.
6.46
.
b.
Port.
Si
le
matter
contenus
in
le
agard
,
Averment
.
&
le
matter
contenus
in
le
submission
de
que
les
Arbitratours
doient
agarder
,
differt
in
parolls
,
ou
in
circumstance
,
les
parties
al
Arbitrement
ne
seront
receive
in
sute
sur
ceo
de
avererrer
que
tout
est
une
,
7.8
.
Eliz.
242.
b.
52.
Thus
much
hath
been
spoken
concerning
Arbitrements
,
their
Causes
,
Effects
,
and
Consequents
.
There
resteth
to
accomplish
our
intended
methode
,
that
wee
adde
somewhat
touching
that
wherewith
an
Arbitrement
is
compared
,
matched
and
resembled
in
the
Booke
Cases
.
Wherefore
know
you
that
,
Chacun
Accord
resemble
un
Arbitrement
.
Paria
.
Differentia
.
Vncore
chacun
Accord
doit
este
satisfie
ou
Recompence
;
et
Accord
ne
done
Action
;
lou
del
auter
parte
Arbitrement
pur
que
les
parties
sont
adjudge
de
paier
deniers
,
done
action
;
&
ne
besoigne
deste
plede
,
execute
come
devant
ad
apparus
,
6.
Hen.
7.11
.
b.
5.
Ed.
4.7
.
a.
17.
Ed.
4.2
.
b.
17.
Ed.
4.8
.
a.
Com.
6.
a.
Fogossa
.
And
thus
farre
forth
for
example
sake
,
have
we
set
out
these
Grounds
&
Rules
of
Arbitrements
:
Whereunto
if
there
were
added
,
in
their
due
places
,
the
residue
of
the
Rules
&
grounds
which
may
bee
collected
out
of
the
bookes
of
the
Law
concerning
the
same
,
and
furnishing
both
these
and
them
with
as
many
Cases
as
might
be
applyed
thereunto
;
the
same
Cases
being
put
at
large
under
every
of
their
Rules
,
to
demonstrate
that
in
particular
,
which
the
Rule
includeth
in
generall
,
the
enterprise
would
prove
(
as
I
think
)
some
shew
of
a
Treatise
,
concerning
this
Title
.
Which
being
no
hard
thing
to
accomplish
,
thereby
would
appeare
that
it
were
neither
unpossible
neither
unprofitable
,
nor
altogether
unpleasant
,
to
reduce
every
title
of
the
Law
particularly
to
a
Methode
;
and
so
consequently
,
the
whole
body
thereof
into
a
perfect
shape
,
which
now
seemeth
wholly
without
Conformitie
,
and
altogether
dismembred
.
Wherefore
now
,
as
touching
the
Materiall
Cause
of
Rules
and
Grounds
,
thus
much
said
,
may
suffice
.
Formall
Causes
and
Grounds
of
the
Law
.
THe
divisions
of
grounds
of
the
law
,
as
touching
and
concerning
the
forme
,
are
in
two
sorts
to
be
considered
.
1
,
First
,
the
Coherence
of
the
words
and
the
Matter
.
2
,
Secondly
,
the
manner
of
the
Manifestation
thereof
.
For
the
Coherence
of
the
matter
and
words
,
there
are
to
be
regarded
these
two
qualities
:
-
1.
First
,
Verity
,
and
-
2.
Secondly
,
Amplitude
or
Generality
.
Verity
of
Propositions
or
Grounds
consisteth
of
two
sorts
:
For
they
import
either
a
necessary
or
knowne
truth
which
cannot
be
impugned
:
Or
Contingent
Veritie
or
Probability
,
which
may
sometimes
notwithstanding
their
shew
of
truth
,
be
impeached
of
falshood
,
and
so
be
subject
unto
many
exceptions
.
The
former
of
these
are
called
Primarie
Conclusions
of
Reason
.
And
the
latter
Secondarie
Principles
.
1
,
Those
of
the
first
sort
are
such
generall
assertions
of
the
Law
,
as
are
imprinted
in
the
mind
of
every
Man
,
and
discerned
by
the
light
of
very
Nature
it selfe
:
which
,
as
most
certaine
and
undoubted
,
need
no
confirmation
or
fortification
,
but
of
themselves
are
most
sufficiently
known
to
be
true
and
not
impugnable
:
which
the
Philosophers
doe
call
,
Primae
&
per
se
cognitae
;
Communes
animi
Conceptiones
&
Notitiae
,
familiar
to
the
conceit
of
every
person
.
Notes
Collected
touching
the
Veritie
of
Principles
.
PRincipiorum
,
Arist.
lib.
1.
Dem.
cap.
25
T.
43.
Alia
sunt
necessaria
,
Alia
in
rebus
contingentibus
cernuntur
.
Axioma
verum
,
est
,
quando
pronunciat
vt
Res
est
.
Axioma
verum
est
,
Peter
Ramus
li.
2.
dial
.
c.
3.
aut
-
Contingens
.
-
Necessitans
.
Necessarium
Axioma
,
Peter
Ramus
ibidem
.
Arist.
Top.
lib.
1.
cap.
1.
quando
semper
verum
est
;
nec
falsum
esse
potest
.
Vnde
Aristoteles
,
Vera
quidem
sunt
&
perspicua
ea
,
quae
non
ab
alijs
sed
à
seipsis
sidem
habent
.
De
primis
Principijs
.
PRincipia
nihil
aliud
sunt
quam
Propositiones
immediatae
.
Ego
propria
cujusque
generis
Principia
appello
,
Arist.
lib.
1.
dem
.
cap.
8.
T.
24.
quae
,
quod
sint
,
Demonstratione
probari
non
possunt
:
(
Nam
,
quae
sit
verborum
vis
&
significatio
,
tum
Principiorum
,
tum
eorum
quae
ex
Principijs
efficiuntur
,
intelligendum
est
)
Quod
verò
ipsa
sint
Principia
,
citra
demonstrationem
ponitur
;
Reliqua
autem
Demonstratione
concluduntur
.
Prima
et
principia
pro
eodem
sumo
.
Arist
lib.
1.
dem
.
c.
2.
T.
5
Est
autem
Principium
demonstrationis
Propositio
,
quae
ob
id
immediata
dicitur
,
quoniam
nulla
est
alia
prior
per
quam
ipsa
confirmari
possit
.
Primaria
principia
dicuntur
universalia
quaedam
I●ris
pronunciata
,
Io.
Coras
.
de
Arte
juris
.
lib.
cap.
24.
quae
omnibus
hominibus
ita
sunt
impressa
naturaliter
&
infixa
,
ut
,
velut
indubitata
&
notissima
,
non
alia
egeant
Demonstratione
,
aut
certè
levi
aliqua
probatione
Confirmentur
.
Vnde
et
Communes
animi
Conceptiones
et
Notitiae
appellantur
quod
suapte
vi
&
perspicua
sit
&
evidens
horum
Principiorum
veritas
&
Natura
,
Ibidem
.
quasi
sine
aliqua
Dubitatione
&
Contradictione
veluti
ab
omnibus
Concessa
,
in
disputatione
sumantur
.
Of
which
sort
for
Example
are
some
of
them
before
mentioned
,
and
here
againe
to
be
remembred
in
this
behalfe
,
in
manner
following
.
Volenti
non
fit
injuria
.
Omne
majus
continet
in
se
minus
.
Qui
sentit
Commodum
sentire
debet
&
onus
.
Fraus
&
dolus
nemini
patrocinantur
.
With
infinite
other
in
universall
manner
proposed
,
and
with
not
a
few
in
speciall
set
forth
;
As
in
Grants
,
as
afore
hath
beene
declared
.
Quando
aliquis
quid
concedit
,
&
id
etiam
concedit
sine
quo
res
concessa
esse
non
potest
.
In
Testaments
.
Testamentum
est
morte
confirmatum
.
Com.
Gri●sbr
.
280.
b.
In
Rents
.
Chacun
Rent
est
issuant
hors
de
terre
.
With
exceeding
many
other
of
like
nature
to
be
found
in
every
title
or
tractate
of
the
Law
.
The
manifest
truth
and
great
Reason
of
which
said
Grounds
is
evident
to
every
person
of
any
Iudgement
,
and
need
no
proofe
for
demonstration
and
establishing
of
them
.
2
Secondary
Principles
,
are
certaine
Axiomes
?
Rules
,
and
Grounds
of
the
Law
,
which
are
not
so
well
knowne
by
the
light
of
Nature
,
as
by
other
meanes
:
and
which
although
they
need
no
great
proofe
to
be
confirmed
;
because
they
comprehend
great
probabilitie
;
yet
many
times
are
they
,
at
the
first
shew
,
not
yeelded
unto
without
due
consideration
:
and
are
peculiarly
knowne
,
for
the
most
part
,
to
such
onely
as
professe
the
study
and
speculation
of
Lawes
.
Probable
they
are
said
to
be
,
Probabilia
sunt
quae
probant
,
aut
omnibus
,
aut
plurimis
,
aut
certe
sapientibus
atque
ijs
vel
omnibus
vel
plurimis
vel
ijs
quorum
spectata
est
&
perspecta
sapientia
.
Arist.
Top.
lib.
2.
c.
1.
Doctor
and
Student
l.
1.
c.
5.
f.
10.
a.
because
,
although
the
manifest
truth
of
them
be
unknown
,
yet
neverthelesse
they
appeare
to
many
,
and
especially
to
wise
men
,
to
be
true
.
And
of
this
sort
in
the
Lawes
of
the
Realme
there
are
so
many
found
,
that
some
men
have
affirmed
,
that
all
the
Law
of
the
Realme
is
the
Law
of
Reason
:
because
they
are
derived
out
of
the
generall
Customes
,
and
Maximes
,
or
Principles
of
the
Law
of
Nature
or
Primary
conclusions
.
And
for
the
knowledge
of
these
Propositions
there
is
a
greater
difficulty
;
and
therefore
therein
dependeth
much
the
manner
and
forme
of
Arguments
in
the
Lawes
of
England
.
Notes
collected
touching
the
difference
betweene
Primarie
and
Secondarie
Prinples
.
PRincipia
immediata
quae
in
demonstrationibus
accipiuntur
,
Arist.
l.
1.
c.
2
T.
5.
in
duo
genera
distribui
possunt
.
Vnum
eorum
quae
quanquam
demonstrari
non
possunt
,
non
tamen
it
a
aperta
,
&
per
se
manifesta
sunt
,
ut
necesse
sit
ante
cognita
esse
ei
qui
artem
aliquam
discere
velit
,
quas
nos
Positiones
appellamus
.
Altero
genere
continentur
ea
,
quaeita
sunt
per
se
perspicua
,
ut
non
possint
non
esse
,
omnibus
multò
ante
cognita
,
&
perspecta
quam
quicquam
doceatur
;
quae
Pronunciata
dicuntur
.
To
like
effect
speaketh
Aristotle
in
another
place
,
Ea
pro
initio
&
proposito
sumenda
sunt
.
-
1
Quae
in
omnibus
.
-
2
Vel
certe
in
plurimis
rebus
inesse
videntur
.
The
former
sort
Aristotle
seemeth
to
call
,
as
afore
shewed
,
Pronunciata
,
the
other
Propositiones
.
And
although
in
the
Law
of
the
Realme
,
they
are
indifferently
called
,
without
distinction
,
Rules
,
Principles
,
Grounds
,
Maximes
,
Eruditions
,
and
such
like
:
yet
the
judgement
of
Massaeus
herein
is
worthy
observation
.
Accursius
videtur
non
parum
aberravisse
à
vero
,
Ant.
Massaeus
l.
1.
de
exercitio
Iuris
peritorum
.
cùm
idem
significare
voluerit
Principa
,
Maximas
,
&
Regulas
;
cùm
(
Aristotele
auctore
)
icuiusque
scientiae
principia
sunt
quaedam
propria
,
quae
quod
vera
sint
non
contingit
demonstari
,
&
quae
per
se
,
&
non
per
alia
fidem
habent
,
quoniam
nihil
prius
superiùsque
in
ea
scientia
est
per
quod
confirmari
explicarique
possint
.
Talium
autem
Principiorum
,
nonnulla
sunt
positiones
,
alia
dignitates
,
sic
dictae
,
ob
id
quod
jure
illis
fides
habenda
sit
,
cùm
ea
unusquisque
audita
statim
admittit
:
quale
est
istud
:
Totum
unumquodlibet
majus
est
aliqua
sua
parte
.
Hae
rursus
appellantur
Maximae
,
Propositiones
,
&
Communes
animi
conceptiones
;
quod
multorum
scilicet
intellectu
facile
percipiantur
.
Tales
autem
non
sunt
Regulae
;
quae
licet
sint
universalia
Praecepta
,
indigent
tamen
probatione
,
&
probaripossunt
:
Nec
tamen
auditae
admittuntur
.
He
seemeth
to
attribute
the
name
of
Principles
,
Axiomes
,
and
Maximes
to
the
first
sort
,
and
the
name
of
Rules
to
the
second
.
Of
the
secondary
Principles
or
Rules
there
are
two
kindes
.
Some
deduced
and
drawne
from
the
usuall
and
ordinary
disposition
of
things
(
as
hath
been
before
declared
)
and
by
the
observation
of
humane
nature
dispersed
in
the
minds
of
men
,
collected
by
long
observation
:
Whereof
some
are
altogether
upheld
in
the
Law
upon
common
presumption
,
and
intendment
:
Others
doe
rest
upon
discourse
of
Reason
deducted
in
Argument
.
But
of
the
former
,
some
are
such
,
as
although
they
are
but
probable
,
and
import
no
certaine
truth
,
and
therefore
may
notwithstanding
bee
sometimes
untrue
:
yet
neverthelesse
for
the
great
likelihood
of
them
in
humane
actions
,
and
the
better
to
frame
a
conformitie
,
through
the
whole
body
of
the
Law
,
the
said
Lawes
permit
no
allegation
to
impugne
them
,
or
any
speech
or
averment
to
impeach
their
credit
.
The
first
sort
of
Secondary
Rules
grounded
upon
entendment
.
OThers
there
are
also
that
depend
upon
entendment
:
But
of
the
former
kinde
,
this
is
one
,
grounded
upon
naturall
affection
.
La
ley
ne
voit
presume
que
ascun
voit
lede
son
heire
,
Com.
Sharington
&
Pledal
.
ou
auter
que
est
prochein
de
son
sanck
,
mes
que
il
voit
plus
toft
advance
luy
.
Which
Ground
,
upon
the
presumption
of
naturall
affection
,
is
not
such
,
as
that
it
soundeth
alwaies
true
;
(
for
in
divers
persons
nature
worketh
diversly
)
Wherefore
although
this
assertion
shew
how
every
man
should
be
affected
,
notwithstanding
it
is
no
proofe
that
all
men
are
so
affected
.
And
yet
neverthelesse
this
strong
entendment
of
Law
,
doth
not
permit
any
thing
to
impeach
the
same
;
and
will
not
suffer
any
person
bound
by
collaterall
warranty
(
the
reason
whereof
floweth
herehence
)
to
traverse
such
affection
,
although
there
be
never
so
pregnant
proofe
to
encounter
the
same
.
Notes
touching
the
Definition
,
Division
,
and
necessary
Consequents
of
Secondarie
Principles
.
IVris
Praecepta
secundaria
sunt
certa
quaedam
Axiomata
&
Definitiones
seu
Regulae
,
Iohannes
Corasius
de
juris
arte
cap.
26.
lib.
1.
quae
non
tam
naturâ
quam
civili
aliquâ
ratione
&
authoritate
,
aut
communi
mortalium
usu
per
hominum
animos
diffunduntur
.
Quae
etsi
plerumque
vera
sunt
,
nec
valdè
egeant
demonstratione
;
non
tamen
ita
,
priusquam
pressius
considerentur
ab
illis
cognoscuntur
qui
nostrae
scientiae
dant
operam
.
Quapropter
,
levialiqua
&
verisimili
ratione
,
ut
ijs
assentiantur
,
opus
est
.
See
the
manner
and
meanes
how
they
are
inferred
by
discourse
out
of
the
generall
Customes
or
Principles
of
Reason
,
Doctor
and
Student
l.
1.
c.
5.
fol.
10.
and
the
example
thereof
used
by
the
Author
of
the
Dialogues
of
the
Doctor
and
Student
.
Presumption
or
Entendment
of
Law
,
whereupon
certaine
of
the
secondary
Rules
are
grounded
(
as
before
is
shewed
)
are
in
two
sorts
:
for
species
praesumptionum
sunt
duae
:
una
,
quae
legitimis
probationibus
regulariter
refutari
potest
,
quam
communem
licebit
appellare
:
Ioach.
Hopp
.
de
juris
arte
lib.
2.
fo.
466.
altera
,
quaereprobari
non
potest
,
quae
&
specialis
rectè
fortasse
dicetur
.
Certè
magno
Reip.
bono
constituuntur
hujusmodi
praesumptiones
:
nec
potest
fieri
ut
sine
praesumptionibus
ulla
certa
jura
,
aut
ullae
certae
leges
describantur
.
Ibidem
.
Secondary
Principles
are
grounded
either
upon
Entendment
of
Law
,
of
which
sort
some
are
such
as
doe
admit
of
no
proofe
to
encounter
them
,
and
rest
upon
Entendment
,
but
yet
admit
proofe
to
the
contrary
.
Or
discourse
of
reason
.
So
likewise
the
Law
upon
like
common
presumption
conceived
of
the
acts
and
behaviour
of
men
,
intendeth
this
Principle
.
Nul
home
sans
cause
voile
faire
act
a
prejudice
soy
mesme
.
Com.
Manxel
.
6.
a.
And
hereupon
the
Law
presumeth
that
every
assertion
and
allegation
proceeding
from
any
person
which
soundeth
to
his
prejudice
and
hurt
,
is
so
undoubtedly
true
,
as
that
there
shall
not
be
suffered
any
travers
or
deniall
of
the
same
.
Wherefore
if
in
a
Praecipe
quod
reddat
brought
of
twenty
acres
of
Land
against
one
,
and
he
,
before
the
Statute
of
Conjunctim
feoffatis
,
had
pleaded
Ioyntenancy
with
another
of
deed
;
or
sithence
the
said
Statute
,
if
he
had
pleaded
Ioyntenancy
by
Fine
with
another
;
although
the
Plea
be
utterly
false
,
yet
shall
not
the
demaundant
have
any
answer
or
travers
thereunto
;
because
that
when
the
demandant
by
his
Writ
hath
admitted
him
Tenant
of
the
whole
;
and
hee
saith
that
he
was
Ioyntenant
with
another
;
this
other
,
if
he
be
false
,
may
stop
the
Tenant
by
this
Record
;
To
say
the
contrary
of
his
affirmation
,
and
thereby
may
gaine
the
Moity
of
the
land
,
against
him
that
hath
so
pleaded
:
And
therefore
,
for
that
,
that
men
are
not
wont
to
tel
untruths
in
disadvantage
of
themselves
;
and
that
the
saying
hereof
if
it
were
not
true
,
will
greatly
be
to
the
prejudice
and
hurt
of
him
that
affirmed
it
;
thereupon
the
Law
presumeth
,
that
it
was
true
indeed
;
and
will
in
no
wise
admit
the
travers
against
the
same
;
or
give
the
demaundant
ability
to
impugne
it
;
but
hereupon
presently
,
the
Writ
shall
abate
,
and
no
maintenance
of
the
writ
for
the
cause
aforesaid
,
shall
be
allowed
.
In
like
manner
also
unto
matters
of
Record
the
entendment
of
law
doth
give
an
impeachable
credit
;
And
hereof
also
this
rule
of
Law
is
drawne
.
Matters
de
Record
import
in
eux
(
per
presumption
del
ley
,
Com.
Ludford
.
491.
b.
pur
leur
hautnesse
)
credit
.
And
therefore
none
shall
bee
permitted
to
say
that
the
Kings
Patent
under
the
great
Seale
was
made
or
delivered
at
any
other
time
then
that
wherein
it
beareth
date
;
No
more
then
a
man
may
say
,
That
a
Recognizance
or
Statute
Marchant
or
Staple
,
was
acknowledged
,
or
any
Writ
was
purchased
at
any
other
time
,
then
that
wherein
it
beareth
Date
.
For
an
averment
that
it
was
antedated
,
or
that
it
was
delivered
or
acknowledged
after
the
date
,
is
an
averment
tending
to
the
discredit
of
the
great
Seale
,
or
of
the
Iustice
or
Officer
of
Record
which
recorded
the
Recognizance
,
or
the
Statute
Marchant
,
or
such
like
.
In
the
dealings
and
affaires
of
Men
,
Lambers
Iustice
of
Peace
lib.
1.
cap.
13.
one
Man
may
affirme
a
thing
which
another
may
deny
.
But
if
a
Record
once
say
the
word
,
no
man
shall
be
received
to
aver
;
speake
against
it
;
or
impugne
the
same
.
No
though
such
Record
containe
manifest
and
knowne
falshood
,
tending
to
the
mischiefe
and
overthrow
of
any
person
.
38.
Ass.
21.
And
therefore
whereas
certaine
persons
were
Outlawed
in
the
Kings
bench
,
in
the
time
of
Shard
Iustice
,
and
their
goods
forfeit
,
and
their
names
likewise
certified
into
the
Exchequer
with
an
abstract
of
their
goods
,
It
hapned
so
that
the
name
of
one
(
by
misprision
of
the
Clerke
)
was
,
among
the
rest
certified
likewise
into
the
Exchequer
,
as
outlawed
,
and
that
hee
had
goods
to
the
value
of
sixe
pounds
,
whereas
indeede
the
same
man
was
not
outlawed
.
And
thereupon
a
writ
issued
to
the
Sheriffe
of
that
County
,
where
the
said
good
s
were
supposed
to
be
,
to
seize
the
same
to
the
use
of
the
King
,
who
returned
that
a
Nobleman
had
seized
the
same
goods
;
And
thereupon
issued
forth
another
Writ
out
of
the
Exchequer
,
to
cause
him
to
answer
the
same
goods
so
seized
by
him
,
who
upon
the
Returne
of
the
second
Writ
,
alleaged
,
that
the
partie
whose
goods
he
had
seized
,
was
not
outlawed
:
And
Greene
,
one
of
the
Iustices
of
the
Kings
bench
came
into
the
Exchequer
with
the
person
who
was
supposed
out-lawed
,
and
there
testified
that
hee
was
not
outlawed
;
but
shewed
,
that
that
which
was
certified
,
was
done
altogether
by
the
misprision
of
the
Clerke
:
Where
Skipwith
returned
him
this
answer
;
That
although
all
the
Iustices
would
now
record
the
contrary
,
that
they
could
not
be
permitted
,
nor
any
credit
might
be
given
therunto
,
when
as
there
was
a
Record
extant
,
and
not
Reversed
,
testifying
the
same
Out-lawry
:
yea
,
the
Law
so
mightily
upholdeth
the
intended
Credit
of
a
Record
,
that
it
preferreth
the
same
before
the
oathes
of
men
,
sounding
to
the
contrary
,
and
in
respect
thereof
,
will
not
permit
a
verdit
to
bee
received
,
which
might
impeach
the
same
.
And
therefore
whereas
one
brought
a
Writ
of
waste
,
9.
Hen.
6.56
.
.
b
and
assigned
the
wast
in
divers
particular
things
,
&
moreover
in
a
Messuage
&
Tenements
in
Wood-Church
;
where
among
other
wasts
assigned
,
the
Plaintife
shewed
,
that
the
Defendant
had
done
and
permitted
waste
in
the
Hall
of
the
sayd
Messuage
,
&c.
The
Defendant
pleaded
in
this
Action
,
that
Woodchurch
was
a
Hamlet
of
A.
and
no
Towne
of
it selfe
.
Which
plea
includeth
a
Confession
of
the
waste
to
have
beene
done
in
such
manner
as
was
declared
.
And
upon
this
plea
,
the
parties
were
at
issue
;
with
the
which
the
Iurie
were
charged
:
And
further
it
was
given
them
in
charge
,
that
if
they
found
that
Woodchurch
was
a
Towne
of
it selfe
,
and
no
Hamlet
of
A
:
as
the
Plantife
had
supposed
,
that
then
they
should
assigne
damages
severally
for
every
waste
committed
.
The
Iurie
at
length
found
,
that
Woodchurch
was
a
Hamlet
of
it selfe
,
and
assessed
damages
for
certaine
of
the
particular
wastes
supposed
severally
,
as
they
ought
.
And
as
touching
the
wast
supposed
to
be
done
in
the
said
Hall
,
they
said
there
was
no
such
Messuage
.
The
Iudges
rejected
their
verdit
,
because
it
was
contrary
to
that
which
was
implyed
by
the
Plea
of
the
Defendant
of
Record
:
and
so
inforced
the
Iury
to
give
damages
for
a
wast
:
which
(
indeed
)
was
not
done
contrary
to
the
Conscience
of
the
Iurie
;
notwithstanding
that
some
of
them
made
protestation
,
that
in
so
doing
they
might
bee
perjured
:
Which
wholly
was
done
onely
to
uphold
the
credit
of
the
Record
;
and
that
the
verdit
(
of
Record
)
might
not
be
contrary
to
that
which
was
implyed
by
the
Plea
of
the
parties
.
Moreover
,
there
is
a
Rule
of
Law
wholly
grounded
upon
Entendment
,
which
is
this
;
Livery
del
fait
sera
intend
in
le
lieu
ou
le
date
fuit
.
The
delivery
of
a
Deede
shall
bee
intended
to
be
where
it
beareth
date
.
Which
Rule
the
Law
upholdeth
for
certaine
truth
,
(
although
in
very
deed
it
may
bee
at
sometimes
untrue
)
And
therefore
will
not
permit
any
proofe
which
may
impeach
the
intended
truth
of
the
said
proposition
.
For
confirmation
whereof
,
a
notable
case
cited
in
the
31.
Hen.
6.
and
by
way
of
Argument
alleadged
in
Fogassa
his
Case
,
31.
H.
6.
Cō
.
Fogassa
.
7.
b.
may
be
produced
;
which
was
in
this
manner
.
An
Action
of
Debt
was
brought
upon
a
Deed
;
The
Defendant
denyed
the
same
;
whereupon
the
parties
were
at
issue
;
and
the
witnesses
produced
to
prove
the
Deed
were
examined
,
where
the
Deed
was
delivered
:
who
answered
:
At
Yorke
;
which
was
in
another
County
then
where
the
said
Deede
bare
Date
;
And
hereupon
the
Defendant
demurred
:
And
after
upon
consideration
,
Iudgement
was
given
against
the
Plaintife
in
overthrow
of
the
Action
founded
upon
that
Deed
;
which
cannot
be
intended
to
be
delivered
else
where
then
at
the
place
where
it
beareth
Date
.
Many
Examples
may
bee
further
produced
to
like
effect
,
to
prove
that
divers
Rules
there
are
received
in
the
Law
which
upon
presumption
and
common
Entendment
,
to
eschew
some
notable
mischiefe
or
inconvenience
,
are
so
holden
for
Truth
,
that
in
no
wise
they
shall
bee
incountred
;
although
indeed
,
as
occasion
may
fall
out
,
they
do
containe
manifest
and
apparent
falshood
.
But
these
already
in
that
respect
alleadged
may
abundantly
suffice
for
example
.
Of
like
nature
also
there
are
in
the
Law
other
kind
of
Rules
or
principles
;
The
second
sort
of
Secondary
rules
grounded
upon
entendment
which
although
,
they
doe
concerne
contingent
matters
;
and
therefore
may
sometimes
be
impeached
,
and
found
untrue
;
Yet
doe
they
cary
a
kind
of
Credit
also
upon
presumption
or
Entendment
of
Law
,
although
not
so
vehement
as
the
former
.
Wherefore
although
the
Law
doth
receive
them
Prima
facie
,
and
at
the
first
shew
,
as
likely
,
and
giveth
credit
unto
the
Assertion
contained
in
them
,
yet
neverthelesse
doth
it
admit
proofe
to
the
contrary
,
and
so
suffereth
such
presumption
or
Entendment
,
which
upholdeth
such
Rules
,
to
bee
impeached
,
and
controlled
by
a
contrarie
tryall
by
pregnant
proofe
,
and
so
doth
permit
any
averment
to
be
made
against
the
same
.
For
Example
:
It
is
a
Rule
in
Law
that
a
Verdict
sera
intenda
touts
foits
vray
tanque
il
est
revers
pur
ceo
que
il
est
issint
trove
per
serement
de
12.
homes
.
20.
H.
7.11
.
b
Coningsby
.
A
verdict
shall
be
intended
alwaies
true
,
till
it
be
reversed
,
for
that
it
is
so
found
by
the
oath
of
twelve
men
.
And
hereupon
it
is
agreed
for
Law
,
5.
H.
7.22
.
b.
That
if
a
Iudgment
be
given
erroniously
,
the
party
grieved
thereby
shall
not
onely
have
his
writ
of
Error
to
redresse
the
same
,
but
also
a
supersedeas
,
to
Countermand
execution
thereupon
.
But
if
Iudgement
be
given
upon
a
verdict
,
although
the
same
verdict
be
untrue
,
and
the
partie
grieved
doe
bring
his
writ
of
Attaint
;
Yet
neverthelesse
he
shall
not
in
that
case
have
a
supersedeas
to
stay
execution
,
for
the
intended
truth
,
which
the
Law
supposeth
in
the
said
verdict
.
And
yet
the
Law
permitteth
the
falshood
in
verdicts
to
be
laid
open
,
&
punisheth
them
with
great
severitie
,
33.
Hen.
8.196
.
Brookes
case
,
4.
Ed.
6.
Com.
49.
If
a
Writ
of
Conspiracie
be
brought
against
one
for
that
hee
gave
evidence
before
the
Iustice
of
Peace
at
their
Sessions
,
20.
H.
7.11
.
b.
Coninsby
.
concerning
the
suspition
of
a
Felony
supposed
to
bee
done
by
the
Plaintife
,
upon
which
Evidence
the
Plaintife
was
indicted
of
the
said
Felonie
;
and
after
found
Not
guilty
by
a
Iury
of
twelve
Men
;
It
is
no
plea
in
this
writ
of
Conspiracie
for
the
Defendant
to
say
,
that
the
Plaintife
was
guilty
of
the
Felony
,
for
that
were
to
encounter
the
verdict
;
which
shal
be
entended
true
.
And
although
the
Law
doe
give
Credit
to
all
verdicts
,
Com.
Wrotsley
.
193.
b.
yet
doth
it
not
foreclose
the
partie
grieved
thereby
,
but
permitteth
him
to
impugne
it
,
and
to
impeach
it
of
falshood
,
if
he
can
,
by
his
writ
of
Attaint
.
Also
there
is
a
Rule
in
the
Law
,
That
Feesimple
ou
auter
estate
certaine
convay
a
un
scra
intend
de
continuer
in
le
person
in
que
il
est
repose
,
touts
foits
durant
mesme
l'estate
.
An
estate
of
inheritance
or
other
estate
certaine
conveyed
to
a
man
,
shal
be
intended
to
continue
in
the
person
wherin
it
was
reposed
alwaies
during
the
continuance
of
the
said
estate
.
Although
this
for
Law
be
Prima
facie
intended
true
;
yet
neverthelesse
thereunto
this
must
be
added
,
viz.
Si
ne
soit
monstre
coment
auterment
ceo
est
divist
.
If
it
be
not
shewed
otherwise
how
it
is
divised
.
By
thus
much
said
,
it
is
sufficiently
made
manifest
,
that
some
propositions
,
Rules
and
Grounds
of
the
Law
are
intended
true
;
but
yet
proofe
is
allowed
to
encounter
the
same
.
So
hitherto
hath
beene
spoken
of
the
Verity
of
Propositions
;
whereof
some
are
indeed
and
nature
manifest
true
,
and
grounded
on
necessary
reason
;
and
other
some
are
true
also
,
but
upon
matter
contingent
.
Contingent
verity
,
was
said
to
be
of
two
kindes
.
The
one
grounded
on
common
Presumption
and
entendment
of
the
Lawes
,
which
likewise
was
subdivided
into
two
branches
.
Some
of
them
such
as
doe
not
admit
any
Contradiction
to
impugne
them
;
For
the
certaine
supposed
truth
(
though
indeed
not
alwaies
found
in
them
,
yet
alwaies
deemed
by
them
)
alloweth
no
controll
;
The
other
sort
of
Rules
resting
upon
Entendment
,
are
such
as
are
Prima
facie
supposed
true
,
but
yet
no
otherwise
supposed
true
then
till
the
contrary
be
proved
,
and
they
impeached
of
falsehood
:
Of
both
which
there
hath
beene
shewed
sufficient
examples
.
Now
therefore
in
order
followeth
the
second
principall
part
of
Contingent
Propositions
or
grounds
framed
upon
observation
of
Nature
,
The
second
principall
kind
of
contingent
Propositions
.
and
disposition
of
things
,
collected
and
drawne
by
discourse
of
Reason
,
because
it
cannot
be
equally
evident
to
every
Mans
capacity
.
And
for
as
much
as
the
said
discourse
and
manner
of
reasoning
,
through
the
weaknesse
of
mans
understanding
,
and
difficultie
of
the
matter
,
may
faile
and
be
oftentimes
deceived
in
some
circumstances
which
may
and
daily
doe
occurre
through
the
variety
of
particular
matter
,
which
againe
(
in
Reason
)
may
offer
a
contrary
resolution
;
Therefore
are
those
Grounds
not
universally
true
,
but
subject
to
many
and
manifold
exceptions
:
And
yet
neverthelesse
true
in
all
such
Cases
as
are
not
comprehended
under
those
Restraints
or
Exceptions
.
Of
which
kinde
we
mentioned
some
in
the
beginning
;
as
namely
;
-
1
,
Sublata
Causa
tollitur
Effectus
.
-
2
,
Qui
tacet
consentire
videtur
.
-
3
,
Quod
initio
non
valet
,
tractu
temporis
non
convalescit
.
-
4
,
Quando
duo
Iura
in
uno
concurrunt
,
aequum
est
●●si
esset
in
diversis
.
Every
of
which
with
many
other
of
the
like
nature
,
though
they
be
of
themselves
,
upon
the
first
view
of
great
Probability
;
yet
neverthelesse
,
being
with
more
earnest
consideration
pondered
,
are
found
not
so
firme
as
they
seem
,
but
are
subject
to
some
controulment
,
and
to
be
impeached
with
sundry
instances
and
exceptions
.
Of
such
like
the
number
is
in
manner
infinite
:
at
the
least
many
thousands
in
our
Law
,
which
are
published
in
the
French
.
Nest
Loial
pur
ascun
de
enter
in
le
terre
del
auter
sans
son
licence
.
12.
H.
8.2
.
b.
Eliot
.
It
is
not
lawful
to
enter
in
another
mans
ground
without
License
.
Discent
de
Estate
d'inheritance
in
terr
,
toll
le
entry
de
cesty
que
droit
ad
.
The
discent
of
an
estate
of
inheritance
in
lands
taketh
away
his
entry
which
hath
right
.
But
these
few
shall
suffiice
in
this
place
for
an
example
.
Wherefore
for
as
much
as
the
minde
of
man
is
beautified
with
two
faculties
or
powers
in
quality
different
,
though
flowing
from
that
which
is
in
nature
indivisible
;
whereof
the
one
we
now
call
for
distinction
sake
(
Capacitie
)
and
the
other
(
Discourse
.
By
the
former
of
which
we
apprehend
,
as
with
the
inward
eye
,
the
naturall
light
and
resplendencie
of
many
Primary
Propositions
,
and
knowne
Notions
;
whose
clearnesse
and
evidence
causeth
every
one
to
yeeld
thereto
their
consent
.
And
by
the
later
we
doe
Collect
,
Reason
,
Argue
,
and
inferre
of
those
former
Notions
and
Resolutions
,
certaine
Secondarie
Propositions
,
descended
and
derived
from
the
first
,
as
branches
from
the
Roote
,
or
Rivers
from
the
Fountaine
;
which
by
how
much
the
more
they
are
drawne
from
their
spring
,
by
so
much
the
more
(
by
reason
of
the
variety
of
interposed
circumstances
)
they
are
oftentimes
obscured
and
made
lesse
cleare
and
evident
.
And
sith
that
every
Science
is
not
of
like
certainty
,
Ethicae
ver●
supponitur
quasi
moralis
scientiae
,
quia
tractat
de
moribus
.
Bracton
l.
1.
c.
2.4
.
b.
Arist.
Ethic.
l.
1.
c.
3.
by
reason
of
the
variable
condition
of
the
subject
whereupon
it
is
imployed
;
so
that
rightly
of
Morall
Philosophy
(
consisting
wholy
of
mans
changeable
and
inconstant
conversation
,
and
from
whence
indeed
,
the
knowledge
of
all
Lawes
are
in
a
generality
derived
,
and
therto
to
bee
referred
)
said
the
Philosopher
Aristotle
right
well
,
in
excuse
of
his
purposed
Method
in
the
delivery
of
the
same
,
That
Doctrina
discernens
honesta
&
turpia
,
tantis
dubitationum
fluctibus
concutitur
,
ut
multis
lege
tantum
&
opinione
,
non
naturâ
,
constitutum
esse
jus
videatur
.
It
followeth
me
thinketh
,
of
necessitie
,
that
it
is
scarcely
possible
to
make
any
secondary
Rule
of
Law
,
but
that
it
shall
faile
in
some
particular
case
:
whence
springeth
this
often
used
assertion
,
Non
est
Regula
quin
fallat
:
And
therefore
the
Ordainers
and
Interpreters
of
Law
,
respect
rather
those
things
which
may
often
happen
;
and
not
every
particular
circumstance
,
for
the
which
though
they
would
,
they
should
not
be
able
by
any
positive
Law
to
make
provision
.
By
reason
whereof
they
doe
permit
the
Rules
,
Axiomes
,
and
Propositions
of
the
common
Law
,
upon
discourse
&
disputation
of
reason
,
to
be
restrained
by
exceptions
;
which
are
grounded
upon
two
causes
.
The
one
is
Equity
:
the
other
is
some
other
Rule
or
Ground
of
Law
,
which
seemeth
to
encounter
the
Ground
or
Rule
proposed
:
wherein
,
for
conformities
sake
,
and
that
no
absurdity
or
contradiction
be
permitted
,
certaine
exceptions
are
framed
,
which
doe
not
onely
knit
and
conjoyne
one
Rule
in
reason
to
another
,
but
by
meanes
of
their
equity
,
temper
the
rigour
of
the
Law
,
which
upon
some
certaine
circumstances
in
every
of
the
said
Rules
might
happen
and
fall
out
:
Bract.
l.
1.
c.
5
Et
omnia
benè
coaequiparat
,
as
saith
Bracton
.
And
therefore
the
Author
of
the
Dialogues
betweene
the
Doctor
and
Student
,
Lib.
1.
ca.
16.
describeth
equity
according
to
this
the
effect
thereof
here
mentioned
:
which
is
,
that
it
is
no
other
thing
,
but
an
exception
of
the
Law
of
God
,
or
of
Reason
from
the
generall
rules
of
the
Law
of
man
,
when
they
by
reason
of
their
generality
,
would
in
any
particular
case
,
judge
against
the
Law
of
God
,
or
the
Law
of
Reason
:
The
which
exception
is
secretly
understood
in
every
generall
Rule
of
every
positive
Law
.
And
a
little
after
,
in
the
same
place
affirmeth
,
That
equity
followeth
the
Law
in
all
particular
cases
,
where
right
and
justice
requireth
,
notwithstanding
that
the
generall
Rule
of
the
Law
be
to
the
contrary
.
And
the
exception
so
framed
upon
any
Rule
or
Ground
to
the
which
it
is
annexed
,
doth
not
impeach
the
credit
of
the
said
Ground
;
but
being
included
therein
,
as
aforesaid
,
Format
Regulam
in
omnibus
casibus
non
exceptis
.
But
lest
some
men
might
thinke
,
L.
quaesit
.
ff.
de
fundo
instructo
.
that
whatsoever
is
spoken
in
the
said
Dialogues
touching
equity
,
might
bee
onely
understood
of
that
equitie
which
either
enlargeth
or
restraineth
Statute
Lawes
,
and
of
which
M.
Plowden
in
his
Appendix
unto
the
Argument
of
the
case
of
Eston
and
Studd
,
in
his
second
Commentaries
so
largely
out
of
Aristotle
,
and
Bracton
discourseth
.
There
followeth
in
the
same
place
of
the
said
Dialogues
,
and
in
the
chapter
next
ensuing
are
proposed
two
Axiomes
,
Grounds
,
or
Rules
,
with
their
exceptions
,
there
put
for
example
,
and
which
doe
tend
to
the
purpose
and
proofe
of
that
whereof
wee
now
speake
.
And
because
that
those
said
Rules
there
mentioned
are
last
of
all
here
for
example
before
proposed
,
it
shall
be
requisite
first
of
all
to
furnish
every
of
them
with
examples
.
But
yet
for
the
better
understanding
of
that
which
is
behoofefull
to
be
knowne
concerning
equity
in
generall
,
we
are
to
note
that
every
Rule
with
his
exceptions
or
(
to
speake
otherwise
in
words
)
every
received
difference
in
the
Law
(
being
indeed
nothing
but
a
Rule
or
Ground
and
his
exceptions
)
doth
either
flow
from
equity
,
or
else
result
of
the
combining
of
two
Rules
together
,
as
before
hath
beene
declared
.
The
use
therfore
of
equity
is
triple
in
our
Law
:
The
triple
use
of
equitie
in
the
Lawes
.
For
-
1
Either
it
keepeth
the
common
Law
in
conformity
by
meanes
here
mentioned
.
-
2
Or
it
expoundeth
the
Statute
Law
.
-
3
Or
thirdly
giveth
remedy
in
the
Court
of
Conscience
in
cases
of
extremity
,
which
otherwise
by
the
Lawes
are
left
unredressed
.
Wherefore
as
all
men
endued
with
the
right
use
of
reason
,
and
conversant
in
the
knowledge
of
any
Law
,
must
of
necessity
confesse
,
that
everie
Law
doth
stand
upon
permanent
Rules
,
as
of
Iron
not
to
be
bent
or
broken
upon
this
or
that
occasion
,
or
to
be
infringed
upon
this
or
that
occurrence
(
for
else
there
need
no
Court
of
Law
,
but
all
should
be
one
with
the
Court
of
Conscience
,
and
have
their
proceedings
framed
according
to
the
Arbitrary
conceipt
of
the
Iudge
.
)
So
likewise
neverthelesse
,
upon
every
circumstance
of
time
,
person
,
place
,
and
the
manner
of
doing
,
there
falleth
out
such
matter
of
equity
,
that
if
Law
should
bee
pursued
according
to
the
setled
Rules
thereof
,
Summum
jus
(
as
Cicero
saith
)
would
prove
Summa
injuria
:
wherefore
Law
without
equity
were
rigour
.
And
yet
againe
,
of
the
other
side
,
if
all
Lawes
should
change
and
be
controlled
as
often
in
every
case
as
equity
would
require
,
then
should
there
be
(
as
aforesaid
)
no
Law
certaine
.
And
therefore
it
standeth
with
good
reason
,
that
the
common
Law
in
some
cases
,
should
allow
and
follow
equity
,
as
farre
forth
as
the
costancy
of
the
Law
would
permit
,
and
for
the
better
conformity
of
one
Rule
thereof
with
another
:
which
common
Law
againe
in
other
cases
should
refuse
equity
for
the
better
avoyding
of
confusion
.
EQuity
therefore
in
all
the
use
thereof
,
and
in
every
of
the
threefold
before
mentioned
observations
hath
a
double
Office
,
Effect
,
or
Function
.
Sometimes
it
doth
amplifie
.
Sometimes
againe
(
when
reason
will
)
it
doth
diminish
or
extenuate
.
A
description
of
the
former
is
that
which
Bracton
yeeldeth
,
Aequitas
est
rerum
convenientia
quae
in
paribus
causis
paria
desiderat
jura
,
&
omnia
bene
coaequiparat
,
&
dicitur
aequitas
quasi
aequalitas
.
Lib.
1.
c.
4.
¶
5.
This
enlargeth
the
common
Law
;
for
it
teacheth
to
proceed
in
the
same
from
one
case
to
another
like
thereunto
;
and
so
to
proceed
,
Com.
467.
that
Si
aliqua
nova
&
inconsueta
emerserint
,
&
quae
priùs
usitata
non
fuerint
in
regno
;
si
tamen
similia
evenerint
,
per
simile
judicentur
;
Bracton
li.
1.
cap.
2.
¶
.
7.
cum
bona
sit
occasio
à
similibus
procedere
ad
similia
.
And
therefore
these
cases
differing
never
so
much
in
circumstance
,
so
that
they
doe
concurre
in
reason
,
should
be
ruled
after
one
and
the
selfe
same
manner
.
For
,
Vbi
est
eadem
ratio
,
idem
jus
statuendum
est
.
But
hereof
we
shall
hereafter
have
more
ample
occasion
to
speake
,
when
we
take
in
hand
the
last
of
Aristotles
before
remembred
observations
;
namely
Similitudinum
collectionem
,
or
cognitionem
.
This
equitie
moreover
in
Statutes
enlargeth
the
letter
to
cases
not
comprehended
within
the
words
;
if
neverthelesse
they
doe
stand
in
equall
mischiefe
.
Lastly
,
in
all
cases
of
mischiefe
,
for
redresse
whereof
Positive
Law
or
ordinary
Rules
of
Law
are
defective
;
equity
extendeth
forth
her
hand
in
the
Court
of
Conscience
to
helpe
therein
the
said
defect
of
the
Lawes
.
The
second
kinde
of
equity
doth
againe
of
the
other
side
restraine
the
ample
or
generall
rules
of
the
common
Lawes
by
ministring
exceptions
,
in
like
manner
as
is
before
remembred
.
And
in
Statute
Law
it
doth
also
limit
the
overlarge
letter
,
drawing
it
wholly
to
,
and
keeping
it
within
the
bounds
of
the
intent
and
meaning
of
the
makers
.
In
the
Court
of
Conscience
it
giveth
likewise
comfort
,
considereth
all
the
circumstances
of
the
fact
,
and
is
as
it
were
tempered
with
the
sweetnesse
of
mercy
,
and
mitigateth
the
rigour
of
the
common
Law
;
and
leaving
the
inflexible
stiffe
Iron
rule
,
taketh
in
hand
the
Leaden
Lesbian
rule
:
which
being
rightly
swayed
in
cases
of
extremity
,
and
therein
,
enjoyning
the
common
Law
of
her
strait
proceeding
,
issueth
this
sentence
full
of
comfort
to
the
afflicted
,
Nullus
recedat
à
Cancellaria
sine
remedio
.
4.
Hen.
7.
Wherefore
if
the
same
equity
bee
used
in
such
cases
only
as
are
of
extremity
(
as
indeed
it
should
)
it
causeth
the
Chancellour
,
into
whose
hand
the
managing
thereof
within
this
Realme
is
committed
to
be
in
high
estimation
of
honour
:
Cicero
in
Orat.
pro
Muraena
.
so
that
In
ejus
sorte
juris
dicendi
gloriam
conciliat
magnitudo
negotij
,
gratiam
aequitatis
largitio
;
in
quâ
sorte
sapiens
Praetor
offensionnem
vitat
aequabilitate
decernendi
;
benevolentiam
adjungit
lenitate
audiendi
.
And
thus
much
by
the
way
hath
beene
spoken
of
equity
,
upon
the
occasion
of
speech
of
exceptions
which
doe
restraine
Rules
and
Axiomes
,
that
the
originall
fountaine
from
whence
such
exceptions
do
spring
,
might
the
better
and
more
manifestly
be
conceived
.
And
therefore
thus
much
thereof
sufficeth
,
reserving
the
rest
to
his
due
and
native
place
.
Now
wee
will
proceed
with
the
first
example
published
in
the
said
Dialogues
of
the
Doctor
and
Student
,
concerning
the
exceptions
attributed
and
annexed
unto
Maximes
,
Rules
,
and
Grounds
.
There
is
(
saith
he
)
a
generall
prohibition
in
the
Lawes
of
England
;
That
It
is
not
lawfull
for
any
man
to
enter
into
possession
or
freehold
of
another
without
authority
of
the
owner
,
or
of
the
Law
.
The
first
Ground
.
This
Ground
may
be
proved
by
many
particular
cases
and
authorities
:
for
the
Law
of
propertie
would
that
every
mans
owne
should
bee
private
and
peculiar
unto
himselfe
;
and
therefore
it
is
said
,
That
Nest
loyal
al
un
de
enter
en
mon
terre
sauns
mon
licence
.
12.
H.
8.2
.
b.
Elliot
.
21.
Hen.
7.27
.
b.
Kingsmel
.
Rede
.
Lou
mes
beasts
sont
damage
fesant
in
auter
terr
,
jeo
ne
puis
enter
pur
eux
enchaser
hors
ains
convient
a
moy
primerment
à
tender
amends
.
If
my
beasts
bee
damage
fesant
in
anothers
ground
,
I
may
not
enter
and
drive
them
out
,
but
I
ought
first
to
tender
an
amends
.
Si
home
ad
merisme
gisant
sur
la
terr
d'un
auter
,
21.
H.
7.13
.
b.
Rede
.
il
ne
poit
justifier
le
entry
in
le
terr
a
veyer
ceo
si
soit
in
bon
plyte
.
If
one
have
his
.
timber
lying
on
anothers
ground
,
he
cannot
justifie
his
entry
to
see
his
timber
in
good
case
.
Si
maison
soit
lease
a
moy
,
13.
H.
7.9
.
b.
&
jeo
mit
mon
biens
en
ceo
,
&
puis
mon
lease
expire
les
dits
biens
estant
in
le
meason
,
nest
loyal
pur
moy
a
ore
pur
enter
en
le
dit
meason
de
eux
prender
.
If
a
house
bee
leased
to
mee
wherein
I
put
my
goods
,
where
they
lye
till
the
lease
be
expired
,
I
cannot
now
enter
into
the
house
to
take
them
.
Si
jeo
mit
mon
chival
in
vostre
stable
&
vous
ne
voiles
ceo
deliver
a
moy
,
14.
H.
8.1
.
b.
Brudnel
.
&
jeo
enter
&
enfrend
vostre
stable
,
jeo
sera
puny
pur
l'entry
,
&
le
enfreinder
del
stable
,
mes
nemy
pur
le
prisel
del
chival
.
If
I
put
my
horse
into
your
stable
,
and
you
will
not
deliver
him
unto
me
;
if
I
enter
and
breake
your
stable
,
I
shall
bee
punished
for
entring
and
breaking
the
stable
,
but
not
for
taking
my
horse
.
Si
jeo
command
un
a
deliver
a
vous
certaine
beasts
que
sont
en
mon
Park
,
18.
E.
4.25
.
a
nest
loyal
pur
vous
de
enter
en
mon
Park
,
&
prender
les
dits
beasts
,
ovesque
cesti
que
jeo
issent
command
per
reason
de
cest
commandement
;
car
vous
purra
assets
bien
eux
receiver
coment
que
vous
demurres
hors
del
Park
.
If
I
command
one
to
deliver
you
certaine
cattell
out
of
my
Park
,
it
is
not
lawfull
for
you
to
enter
into
my
Park
with
him
whom
I
commanded
to
deliver
them
:
for
you
may
receive
them
though
you
stay
without
the
Park
.
Si
jeo
baile
biens
al
home
,
9.
Ed.
4.35
.
a
21.
H.
7.13
.
jeo
ne
puis
justifier
l'entry
en
son
meason
pur
prender
les
biens
,
car
ceo
non
fut
per
nul
tort
que
ils
viendra
la
mes
per
l'act
de
nous
ambideux
.
If
I
deliver
my
goods
unto
a
man
,
I
cannot
justifie
the
entring
into
his
house
to
take
them
,
&c.
Si
le
vicont
ad
fierifacias
pur
levier
deniers
recovers
vers
ascun
,
8.
Ed.
4.4
.
a.
uncore
si
per
force
de
ceo
il
ne
voile
enter
et
debruser
le
meason
de
cesti
vers
que
le
recovery
fuit
,
il
sera
de
ceo
puny
pur
cest
entry
en
trespas
.
If
the
Sherife
hath
a
fierifacias
,
to
Ievie
money
recovered
,
if
by
force
thereof
he
enter
,
and
break
the
house
of
the
debtor
,
he
is
subject
to
an
action
of
trespasse
.
Si
un
Vicar
ad
offrings
in
un
Chapel
de
quel
Chapel
le
franktenement
est
in
moy
;
2.
H.
4.24
.
a.
il
ne
pur
ceo
justifiera
l'entry
et
debruser
de
ma
Chapel
pur
eux
prender
hors
.
If
a
Priest
have
offrings
in
a
Chappell
,
the
freehold
of
which
is
in
me
,
hee
cannot
justifie
the
entry
and
breaking
the
Chappell
to
take
out
his
offrings
.
Si
home
esteant
in
sa
Garren
demesn
springa
un
Feasant
,
38.
E.
3.10
.
l
et
lessa
sa
falcon
vola
a
ceo
que
vola
in
le
Garren
d'un
auter
home
,
&
la
prist
le
Feasant
,
nest
loial
pur
le
owner
del
falcon
,
pur
enter
in
le
auter
Garren
,
&
de
la
emporter
.
If
a
man
spring
a
Pheasant
in
his
owne
Warren
,
and
let
his
falcon
flye
at
her
,
and
she
flyes
into
anothers
Warren
,
and
there
taketh
the
Pheasant
,
he
that
oweth
the
Hawke
cannot
enter
into
the
others
ground
to
take
her
.
Having
proved
the
former
ground
with
these
sufficient
former
authorities
,
let
us
now
descend
unto
the
examination
of
such
exceptions
of
the
said
proposition
,
as
may
exemplifie
our
former
speeches
,
whereof
some
certaine
being
orderly
delivered
and
confirmed
with
some
authorities
of
booke
cases
,
I
hold
it
sufficient
so
to
make
manifest
our
meaning
at
this
present
;
leaving
a
more
exact
consideration
thereof
to
more
fit
place
and
opportunity
.
We
are
therefore
to
conceive
that
there
is
an
infallible
rule
of
Law
,
That
Le
Common
wealth
est
destre
prefer
devan
ascun
private
wealth
.
The
Common
wealth
is
to
be
preferred
before
any
private
wealth
.
By
reason
whereof
lest
contradiction
betweene
the
said
proposed
rule
and
this
now
in
hand
should
ensue
upon
some
circumstance
which
may
fall
out
;
therefore
the
said
last
specified
ground
,
concerning
the
benefit
of
the
Common
wealth
,
doth
minister
an
exception
for
the
better
understanding
of
the
aforesaid
rule
proposed
,
namely
,
That
Home
poit
iustifie
son
entre
en
le
franktenement
ou
sur
le
possession
de
un
auter
si
soit
pur
le
benefit
del
Common
wealth
.
The
first
Exception
.
A
man
may
justifie
his
entry
into
anothers
freehold
,
if
it
be
for
the
good
and
benefit
of
the
Common
wealth
.
And
therefore
these
cases
following
depending
thereupon
are
produced
to
prove
and
manifest
the
same
.
Si
jeo
vien
in
vostre
terre
,
et
occide
un
Fox
,
un
Gray
,
ou
un
Otter
,
pur
cest
entry
jeo
ne
sera
my
puny
,
pur
ceo
que
sont
beasts
encounter
le
Common
profit
.
12.
Hen.
8.10
.
a.
Brooke
.
If
I
come
into
your
ground
to
kill
a
Fox
,
Gray
,
or
Otter
,
for
this
entry
I
shall
not
bee
punished
;
for
they
are
beasts
against
the
common
profit
.
Pur
le
Common
wealth
meason
sera
plucked
down
si
le
prochein
meason
soit
ardent
.
13.
Hen.
8.16
.
b.
Shelley
.
For
the
good
of
the
Common-wealth
an
house
shall
be
pulled
downe
if
the
next
be
fired
.
Et
Suburbes
del
Citie
seront
plucked
downe
in
temps
de
Guerr
,
pur
ceo
que
ceo
est
pur
le
common
wealth
:
8.
Ed.
4.35
.
b
Littleton
.
Et
chose
que
est
pur
le
common
wealth
chascune
poit
faire
sans
aver
action
.
And
the
suburbs
of
a
City
shall
be
razed
in
the
time
of
warre
:
And
that
which
is
for
the
good
and
profit
of
the
Common
wealth
any
man
may
doe
without
danger
of
anothers
action
.
Home
justifiera
son
entry
in
auter
terr
in
temps
de
Guerr
pur
faire
Bulwarke
in
defence
del
Realme
,
21.
H.
7.
b.
Kingsmil
.
Et
ceux
choses
sont
justifiable
&
loial
pur
maintenance
del
Common-wealth
.
A
man
may
justifie
his
going
into
another
mans
ground
in
time
of
warre
to
make
a
Bulwarke
in
defence
of
the
Realme
,
&c.
Pur
felony
,
13.
Ed.
4.9
.
a
ou
pur
suspicion
de
felony
home
poit
debruser
meason
pur
prender
le
felon
,
car
il
est
pur
le
Common-wealth
pur
prender
eux
.
For
felony
or
suspition
thereof
a
man
may
breake
a
house
to
take
the
Felon
;
For
it
is
the
good
of
the
Common-wealth
,
to
have
him
taken
:
With
such
like
.
Moreover
because
there
is
another
Rule
of
Law
,
That
Nul
prendra
benefit
de
son
torts
demesne
.
No
man
shall
take
benefit
of
his
owne
wrong
.
And
sometimes
it
falleth
out
that
men
,
through
malice
to
have
others
in
danger
,
would
not
sticke
to
lay
a
traine
to
intrap
them
,
to
the
intent
,
that
they
might
,
by
some
colour
,
for
their
further
vexation
,
prosecute
sute
against
them
;
To
uphold
the
Conformity
of
Law
:
upon
those
two
grounds
,
that
one
of
them
doe
not
encounter
the
other
,
there
is
a
second
Exception
to
the
former
Rule
namely
,
That
Si
home
soit
le
Cause
pur
que
un
tortious
Entry
est
fait
sur
son
Possession
,
The
second
Exception
.
il
navera
de
ceo
Remedy
:
mes
le
party
que
ad
issent
enter
,
sur
le
matter
disclose
poit
ayd
luy
mesme
&
justify
tiel
Entry
.
If
a
Man
bee
the
cause
that
a
wrongfull
Act
or
Entry
be
made
upon
his
possession
,
he
shall
have
no
remedy
for
it
,
but
the
party
who
hath
entred
may
disclose
the
matter
to
justifie
his
entry
.
Home
ad
un
Molyn
,
9.
Ed.
4.35
.
ab
.
&
l'eaw
courge
per
le
terr
d'une
auter
al
dit
Molyn
,
le
Tenant
del
terre
mise
stakes
deins
le
dit
eaw
sur
que
il
edify
un
meason
,
per
reason
de
quel
l'eaw
ne
poit
vener
cy
bien
al
dit
Molin
come
devant
:
Le
Tenant
del
Molyn
enter
en
la
dit
terre
,
&
enrasa
les
stakes
,
per
que
la
dit
Meison
eschew
:
Et
in
Trespas
pur
entry
en
la
dit
terr
&
enraser
la
meason
;
tout
cest
matter
pur
avoider
le
dit
Nusance
fuit
plede
per
le
defendant
&
tenus
bon
Iustification
.
A
Man
hath
a
Mill
,
and
the
water
running
to
it
commeth
through
anothers
ground
,
and
hee
fastneth
stakes
upon
the
ground
in
the
water
,
and
buildeth
an
house
;
by
reason
whereof
the
water
commeth
not
to
the
Mill
,
as
well
as
in
time
past
,
the
Miller
entreth
unto
the
others
ground
and
breaketh
downe
the
stakes
,
and
thereby
the
house
falleth
;
If
the
other
bring
an
Action
of
trespasse
against
him
,
for
this
,
he
may
shew
that
hee
did
it
,
to
avoyde
wrong
done
to
himselfe
,
and
justifie
the
deed
.
Home
aver
pris
les
beasts
de
I.
S.
&
eux
impound
in
sa
terre
,
&
vint
un
pur
Replevy
mesme
les
beasts
,
20.
Hen.
6.28
.
a.
Et
pur
ceo
que
cest
que
ad
eux
destreine
ne
voilet
suffer
les
beasts
deste
Replevy
,
il
ove
arks
&
sagitts
,
sagitta
al
cesti
que
vint
pur
eux
repleuy-esteant
in
le
port
de
mesme
le
close
,
lou
ils
fuere
impound
,
pur
que
il
pur
doubt
enfreint
le
close
in
auter
lieu
,
&
enchase
hors
les
avers
que
fueront
impound
;
Et
per
cest
entry
et
infriender
del
Close
,
le
Plaintife
port
trespas
,
Et
sur
tout
cest
matter
disclose
ceo
,
semble
bone
Iustification
.
A
man
having
taken
I.
S.
his
goods
,
and
impounded
them
in
his
owne
ground
,
a
Replevin
was
brought
for
those
Cattle
,
and
hee
that
destrained
them
would
not
suffer
any
Replevin
to
be
made
,
but
standing
in
the
gate
of
the
Close
where
the
Cattle
were
impounded
,
shot
at
him
that
came
to
make
the
Replevin
,
whereupon
the
broke
the
Close
in
another
place
,
and
drew
forth
the
said
beasts
:
For
which
breaking
the
Plaintifes
Close
,
he
brought
an
Action
of
trespasse
;
but
upon
this
matter
disclosed
,
it
was
taken
for
a
good
justification
.
In
travers
,
21.
Hen.
6.39
.
b.
le
defendant
dit
,
que
pur
ceo
que
le
Plaintife
violet
aver
le
defendant
in
son
dainger
,
il
commaund
un
son
servant
de
chaser
les
beasts
de
defendant
in
les
blees
del
plaintife
mesme
,
&
le
defendant
cy
hasti
ment
que
il
avoit
notice
de
ceo
,
il
enter
en
le
dit
terre
le
Plaintife
,
9.
Ed.
4.35
.
a
Littleton
.
et
eux
enchase
hors
:
Et
ceo
fuit
tenus
bon
Plea
nient
amountant
al
generall
issue
.
In
an
Action
of
trespasse
,
the
Defendant
said
,
that
because
the
Plaintife
would
have
the
defendant
within
his
danger
,
hee
commanded
one
of
his
servants
to
drive
the
Defendants
beasts
into
the
Plaintifes
Corne
;
And
the
Defendant
assoone
as
he
had
notice
thereof
,
entred
into
the
Plaintifes
Close
,
and
drave
them
out
;
This
was
taken
for
a
good
Plea
,
and
not
amounting
to
the
generall
issue
.
In
travers
pur
entry
in
le
close
,
37.
Hen.
6.37
.
a.b.
&c.
Del
Plaintife
le
defendant
justifiera
,
pur
ceo
que
le
Defendant
fuit
Chivanchant
en
le
roial
chimin
que
gisoit
pres
le
meason
del
Plaintife
,
quand
il
vint
la
encounter
la
dit
mese
,
la
vient
le
Plaintife
ove
Arke
et
sagitts
et
fist
un
assault
sur
le
defendant
,
pur
que
il
avoide
son
Chival
,
&
fua
in
le
dit
mese
,
&
ouster
in
le
dit
close
;
Et
puis
reveint
in
le
dit
chimin
.
Et
ceo
fuit
tenus
bon
Iustification
,
si
il
voile
adde
a
ceo
que
le
Chymin
est
in
mesme
le
ville
que
le
meason
est
,
ou
in
quel
ville
ceo
est
,
&
que
le
huis
del
meale
fut
evert
altemps
:
per
que
le
defendant
issint
dist
accordant
.
In
an
Action
of
Traverse
for
entering
into
the
Plaintifes
close
,
the
Defendant
justified
,
for
that
he
ryding
in
the
Kings
high
way
,
which
lay
neere
to
the
Plaintifes
house
,
the
Plaintife
set
upon
the
Defendant
,
when
hee
came
neere
against
the
Plaintifes
house
,
and
assaulted
him
with
bow
and
Arrowes
;
Whereupon
he
forsooke
his
horse
and
fled
into
the
house
,
and
so
through
it
into
his
Close
,
and
after
returned
into
the
high
way
;
And
this
was
taken
for
a
good
justification
,
if
he
had
shewed
further
that
the
high
way
was
in
the
same
towne
where
the
house
was
,
and
shewed
in
what
towne
the
house
was
,
and
that
the
doore
of
the
house
was
open
,
&c.
Moreover
,
where
there
is
a
ground
or
rule
of
Law
,
as
hath
beene
often
before
remembred
,
That
Quando
aliquis
quid
concedit
,
&
id
concedere
videtur
sine
quo
res
concessa
esse
non
potest
.
Hereof
ensueth
a
third
Exception
to
be
annexed
unto
the
said
former
Ground
:
in
this
manner
,
Si
home
ad
interest
ou
authoritie
derive
de
ascun
person
,
owner
,
&
possessor
del
soile
:
The
third
Exception
.
le
quel
cesty
a
que
le
interest
ou
authority
est
done
,
ne
poit
accomply
sans
Entry
in
la
terr
ou
mease
de
cesti
que
issent
done
la
interest
ou
authority
,
la
son
entry
est
imply
in
la
dit
interest
ou
authority
:
Et
pur
tlel
cause
son
entry
la
sera
justifiable
.
Le
Abbe
de
Hyde
fait
lease
d'un
ferm
rendant
Rent
a
son
Monastery
de
Hyde
,
Com.
Kidn
.
&
Brand.
71.
a.
tandem
le
dit
Monastery
vient
al
mains
le
Roy
,
Hen.
8.
per
le
statute
de
Dissolutions
,
que
puis
ceo
grant
ouster
al
estranger
:
le
lessee
del
dit
ferme
poit
bien
venir
al
dit
Monastery
la
a
tender
la
dit
Rent
,
Et
cesti
que
ad
le
possession
de
ceo
navera
eint
travers
pur
tiel
entry
.
Si
A
:
Com.
Kidw.
&
Brand.
71.
b.
soit
tenus
a
B
:
in
un
obligation
de
20.
l.
pur
pair
a
luy
10.
l.
a
tiel
jour
la
intent
que
nul
lieu
est
expres
pur
le
payment
,
A
:
est
tenus
a
querer
B.
inquocumque
liew
que
il
soit
:
Et
si
B
:
est
in
son
meason
demesne
,
&
vient
a
luy
la
,
&
tender
le
argent
,
il
ne
sera
trespasser
pur
le
vener
la
Mes
sil
ust
este
in
la
meason
de
ascun
auter
home
,
la
il
seroit
trespasser
al
dit
home
:
Mes
in
l'auter
cas
intant
que
il
fut
assentant
que
il
paiera
a
luy
les
dits
deniers
,
&
in
ceo
fut
il
containe
que
il
fut
assentant
que
il
vener
a
luy
pur
ceo
purpose
:
il
ensuitt
ex
consequenti
que
il
ne
puniera
luy
pur
ceo
chose
a
que
luy
mesme
fut
privy
&
agreement
.
Si
jeo
enfeoffe
G.
&
face
litre
d'attorney
a
C.
a
deliver
seisin
a
G
:
18.
E.
4.25
.
b
pur
le
veinder
sur
la
terre
,
et
pur
l'entry
fait
per
G.
de
prender
la
livery
,
G.
ne
sera
punish
in
trespas
;
car
il
est
impossibile
que
il
receivera
livery
si
non
il
entra
in
le
terre
,
et
il
est
imply
in
le
fesance
del
feofment
que
il
viendra
sur
la
terr
de
prender
Livery
.
Si
home
moy
grant
pur
foder
in
son
terre
,
9.
Ed.
4.25
.
a.
&
de
faire
un
trenche
de
tiel
font
ou
spring
jusques
a
mon
place
,
si
puis
le
Pipe
est
estopp
ou
enfreint
issint
que
l'eau
issue
hors
,
13.
H.
8.15
.
b
●●nglefield
.
jeo
ne
poi
foder
in
son
terre
pur
mender
le
Pipe
,
car
ceo
ne
fut
grant
,
a
moy
,
&c.
Mes
cest
opinion
fut
deny
per
tout
le
Court
,
car
fut
dit
,
que
il
poit
enter
&
foder
pur
ceo
mender
,
pur
ceo
que
est
incident
a
tel
grant
a
ceo
discourer
&
d'amender
.
9.
Hen.
6.29
.
b.
In
travers
pur
entry
en
un
meason
le
defendant
dit
que
long
temps
devant
le
trespas
que
A.
fut
seisi
del
dit
meason
in
fee
,
&
que
ceo
est
in
tiel
ville
&
devisable
per
testament
,
per
que
le
dit
A
devise
le
dit
maison
a
un
fem
in
taile
,
&
que
sil
devy
sans
issue
que
son
Executor
ceo
vendroit
,
&
fait
le
defendant
son
Executor
&
devy
,
la
fem
entermary
ove
le
Plaintife
&
puis
devy
sans
issue
,
pur
que
le
defendant
enter
sur
le
poss
:
le
Plaintife
a
voir
,
si
fut
bien
repaire
alintent
de
scavoir
a
quel
value
le
reversion
fut
a
vender
,
&
ceo
fut
tenus
bone
Iustification
.
In
Trespas
pur
Entry
in
meason
&
prisel
del
bient
le
defendant
dit
que
le
Baron
del
Plaintife
fut
possesses
des
dits
biens
&
fuit
seisy
del
dit
meason
in
fee
,
2.
Hen.
6.15
.
b.
16.
a.
et
fait
le
defendant
,
&
auter
ses
Executours
,
et
devy
possesses
des
dits
biens
,
&
le
defendant
vint
al
dit
meason
apres
la
mort
le
Testatour
pur
administer
&
trovant
huys
del
dit
meason
overt
il
enter
&
prist
les
biens
,
et
ceo
fut
tenus
bon
Plee
per
tout
le
Court.
By
reason
also
that
there
is
a
Rule
of
Law
,
That
Le
possession
del
terre
de
chescun
home
est
subject
al
Iurisdiction
del
ley
.
Thereof
also
this
Exception
following
holdeth
likewise
place
in
restraint
of
the
said
former
generall
Rule
or
Ground
,
that
is
to
say
,
Lou
le
ley
done
al
ascun
authority
de
enter
in
auter
ter
ou
sur
le
possession
del
auter
,
il
justifiera
son
entry
.
The
fourth
Exception
.
Si
jeo
suy
seisi
de
terre
in
fee
sur
bon
&
indefesible
title
,
Com.
Manxel
13.
a.
et
un
estranger
demand
cest
terre
per
precipe
vers
an
auter
estranger
,
&
sur
ceo
le
vicount
per
force
del
precipe
vient
sur
la
terre
ove
sommoners
,
&
summon
luy
vers
que
le
precipe
est
port
,
&
puis
le
demandant
recover
vers
luy
per
default
ou
per
issue
try
sur
certaine
point
,
&
perforce
de
Haberi
facias
seisinam
le
vic'
vient
arere
&
mist
cesty
que
ad
recover
in
seisin
;
jeo
ne
puniera
le
vicont
pur
le
primer
vener
,
ne
pur
le
second
vener
in
le
terre
,
pur
ceo
que
le
vicont
ne
fait
riens
mes
execute
le
mandement
le
Roy
come
il
ad
in
charge
,
&
mon
Possession
est
chargeable
a
cest
Iurisdiction
del
Roy
&
ses
ministers
.
Si
home
fait
lease
pur
vie
,
Littleton
Villenage
.
Com.
Manxel
13.
a.
&
un
villeine
purchase
le
reversion
,
semble
a
Litt.
que
le
signior
del
villein
poit
maintenant
vener
al
terre
et
claime
mesme
le
reversion
,
et
per
tel
clayme
le
reversion
est
maintenant
in
luy
,
et
pur
tel
vener
a
le
terr
et
act
fait
il
nest
trespassor
.
Si
villein
purchase
advowson
plen
d'incumbent
,
Com.
Manxl
13.
a.
le
signior
del
villein
poit
vener
al
dit
Esglise
,
et
claime
le
dit
advowson
,
et
pur
ceo
le
Incumbent
ne
punishera
luy
per
tiel
vener
al
dit
Esglise
.
In
Trespas
le
defendant
plede
que
il
fut
seisy
del
meason
et
terre
et
ceo
lease
al
plaintife
pur
terme
de
ans
,
11.
H.
4.75
.
b
et
que
fut
certifie
que
wast
fut
fait
,
et
il
enter
in
le
close
&
meason
pur
viewer
si
wast
fut
fait
,
et
le
huis
del
maison
fuit
overt
,
&
demand
Iudgement
,
et
ceo
fut
tenus
bon
barr
;
a
que
le
Plaintife
replica
que
il
la
demurr
encounter
le
volunt
le
Plaintife
un
jour
et
un
nuict
,
&c.
Hitherunto
have
we
expressed
certaine
exceptions
of
the
fore-specified
Grounds
which
are
derived
from
the
reason
of
some
other
grounds
and
Rules
of
the
Law
,
and
which
reason
would
should
be
added
,
as
restraints
unto
the
said
former
Rule
of
Law
first
remembred
for
conformities
sake
,
and
that
the
Law
no
way
be
impeached
of
contrarieties
.
Now
resteth
also
that
we
deliver
some
few
other
exceptions
unto
the
said
generall
Rule
drawne
likewise
from
the
fountaine
of
equitie
;
which
are
such
as
doe
ensue
.
Sith
it
were
voide
of
all
reason
and
conscience
that
a
man
should
punish
a
wrong
done
unto
him
,
Exceptions
ministred
by
equity
.
by
the
which
he
either
sustaineth
little
or
no
detriment
or
damage
,
or
at
leastwise
more
benefit
then
he
sustaines
prejudice
:
Therefore
this
exception
unto
the
said
generall
Rule
,
is
among
other
likewise
allowed
for
Law
.
That
Lou
le
party
sur
que
possession
home
fait
tortious
entry
,
The
fift
Exception
.
est
plus
benefit
per
tiel
entry
que
prejudice
,
la
home
bien
justifiera
la
dit
tortious
entry
.
Which
the
cases
following
do
likewise
at
large
sufficiently
confirme
.
Si
jeo
suy
in
peril
deste
murder
in
mon
close
,
12.
H.
8.2
.
b.
Pollard
.
ou
in
mon
meason
,
il
est
loial
a
chescun
de
enfrender
mon
meison
ou
close
pur
moy
ayder
,
et
pur
ceo
que
est
pur
mon
benefit
.
Si
jeo
voy
vostre
beasts
demesne
in
vostre
corne
,
13.
H.
8.15
.
b.
Norwich
.
et
jeo
eux
enchase
hors
,
jeo
ne
sera
my
puny
pur
ceo
que
fut
pur
vostre
advantage
,
et
vous
aves
interest
in
les
beasts
.
Mes
si
jeo
chase
les
beasts
d'un
estranger
hors
de
vostre
corne
,
jeo
serra
puny
pur
ceo
;
car
vous
puisses
aver
remepy
pur
ceo
;
scil.
per
distresse
.
Si
jeo
view
le
Chimney
de
mon
voycin
urant
pur
saver
les
choses
que
sont
deins
son
meason
,
21.
H.
7.27
.
b.
Palmes
.
jeo
justifiera
l'entry
in
le
meason
,
&
deprender
les
biens
que
jeo
trover
dedans
pur
eux
saver
.
In
trespas
de
Parco
fracto
,
20.
H.
6.37
.
a
le
defendant
justifie
le
trespas
pur
ceo
que
fut
controversie
perenter
luy
,
&
le
seigneur
de
Huntingdon
Plaintife
pur
le
overture
d'un
gorce
,
et
pur
ceo
que
le
dit
seigneur
fut
in
le
dit
Park
hunting
,
il
enter
pur
les
portes
esteant
overt
a
monstre
a
luy
ses
evidences
concernant
le
dit
gorce
&
ceo
fut
tenus
per
tout
le
Court
bone
Iustification
.
Againe
,
the
like
equity
doth
minister
one
other
exception
of
the
like
quality
;
for
it
were
unconscionable
and
unreasonable
that
a
man
should
be
punished
for
a
wrongfull
entry
,
wheras
he
is
compelled
so
to
do
,
and
cannot
without
his
great
prejudice
eschew
the
same
:
And
therefore
it
is
holden
for
Law
,
That
Si
home
enter
sur
le
possession
de
un
auter
,
The
sixt
Exception
.
leu
il
ne
poit
auterment
faire
sans
son
grand
prejudice
,
ceo
ne
sera
deeme
tiel
entry
de
que
il
sera
puny
.
Si
home
ad
Querck
cressant
in
midds
de
trois
maisons
,
13.
H.
8.16
.
b.
Browne
.
et
il
decoupe
ceo
,
et
le
Querck
eschuet
in
terre
d'un
auter
,
si
il
justify
in
trespas
il
covient
de
alleager
que
il
ne
auterment
puit
faire
.
Home
de
coupa
thornes
que
cresse
in
son
terre
&
ils
eschaont
inter
d'un
auter
,
6.
Ed.
4.7
.
b.
&
il
enter
&
eux
prender
hors
,
sil
ne
poit
in
auter
maner
faire
,
ceo
luy
excusera
.
Si
home
chase
avers
per
le
chymin
,
Doctor
and
Student
.
ver.
10.
Ed.
4.7
.
b
ae
.
Ed.
4.8
.
b.
6.
Ed.
4.7
.
b.
et
les
beasts
happont
de
escaper
in
les
blees
de
son
vicin
,
&
cesty
que
eux
enchase
enter
freshment
in
le
terr
de
eux
enchaser
hors
,
pur
ceo
que
ils
ne
ferront
ascun
damage
,
il
justifiera
tiel
son
entry
in
trespas
.
And
thus
much
hath
beene
said
touching
the
first
Ground
proposed
in
the
said
Dialogues
of
the
said
Doctor
and
Student
,
which
hath
beene
proved
in
particular
with
cases
,
and
thereunto
have
beene
annexed
certaine
exceptions
which
have
likewise
beene
fortified
with
Booke
Cases
,
and
Authorities
,
whereby
the
former
assertions
have
not
onely
beene
exemplified
,
but
also
thereby
it
doth
plainly
appeare
,
That
almost
every
disposition
in
the
Lawes
,
de
qualitate
,
or
de
jure
,
is
in
conference
of
Maximes
,
and
resteth
betweene
the
Rule
and
the
Exception
,
which
is
either
ministred
by
reason
of
equity
,
or
upon
some
other
Rule
or
Axiome
.
So
that
every
difference
shewed
betweene
Cases
,
is
nothing
else
but
the
Rule
and
his
exceptions
;
the
effect
whereof
briefly
is
set
forth
by
Morgan
,
who
saith
:
That
Maximes
ne
doient
este
impugne
,
Com.
Colth
.
27.
a
mes
touts
temps
admit
;
mes
les
maximes
per
reason
poient
este
confer
&
compare
l'un
ove
l'auter
,
coment
que
ils
ne
variont
:
Ou
per
reason
poit
este
discusse
quel
chose
est
plus
prochein
al
Maxime
ou
meane
perenter
les
Maximes
&
quel
nemy
:
mes
le
Maximes
ne
unque
poient
este
impeach
ne
impugne
,
mes
touts
dits
doient
este
observe
&
tenus
come
firme
Principles
de
eux
mesmes
.
For
the
better
understanding
whereof
,
we
may
note
that
all
matters
of
debate
which
may
be
referred
to
the
controversies
or
questions
de
qualitate
or
de
jure
,
as
hath
been
said
,
have
either
commonly
a
Maxime
of
the
one
part
,
&
a
Maxime
of
the
other
;
or
severall
reasons
of
each
part
derived
from
sundry
Maximes
;
or
else
that
there
is
a
Maxime
of
the
one
part
,
and
there
is
equity
and
reason
which
doth
minister
an
exception
to
that
Maxime
or
generall
Rule
:
So
that
all
disceptation
herein
is
,
as
hath
beene
said
,
in
conference
or
comparing
of
Maximes
and
Principles
together
,
discoursing
which
thing
is
directly
under
the
reason
of
the
said
Maxime
;
and
what
matter
or
circumstance
may
make
a
difference
,
and
will
be
by
exception
exempted
from
the
same
;
as
more
at
large
hereafter
in
the
declaration
of
the
use
of
these
Maximes
may
be
made
manifest
and
apparent
.
Now
resteth
moreover
to
prosecute
the
second
Axiome
or
Principle
proposed
in
the
sayd
Dialogues
,
namely
,
that
which
followeth
there
in
the
sevententh
chapter
of
his
first
booke
,
that
is
to
say
:
It
is
not
lawfull
for
any
man
to
enter
upon
a
descent
.
The
second
Ground
.
Which
ground
being
expounded
by
Littleton
in
his
chapter
of
descents
to
extend
onely
to
descents
of
an
estate
of
Inheritance
and
freehold
,
and
not
of
a
reversion
or
remainder
,
all
which
follow
after
in
the
sayd
Chapter
,
are
nothing
but
Cases
of
Exceptions
unto
the
said
Grounds
,
as
it
is
evident
unto
every
one
that
considereth
the
same
,
and
therefore
shall
it
here
bee
needlesse
long
to
insist
thereupon
.
Neverthelesse
it
shall
be
expedient
to
shew
some
exceptions
therunto
,
especially
some
certaine
,
of
such
of
them
as
being
exceptions
unto
the
said
Rule
,
are
againe
restrained
with
other
exceptions
.
Because
there
is
a
Rule
of
Law
,
That
Laches
ou
folly
ne
sera
impute
a
un
enfant
de
luy
prejudice
.
First
exception
Littleton
Garranty
279.
Therefore
lest
contrarietie
might
happen
in
consequence
of
reason
betweene
the
sayd
Rule
of
descents
,
and
this
Rule
last
remembred
:
there
is
ministred
by
the
meanes
of
this
latter
Rule
,
an
exception
unto
the
said
former
ground
,
namely
,
That
If
an
infant
have
right
of
entry
,
Littleton
descents
cas.
402
20.
H.
6.28
.
b
hee
may
enter
upon
a
descent
.
This
exception
,
although
it
doth
import
great
probability
of
truth
,
yet
is
the
same
like
unto
the
Ground
in
this
respect
,
namely
,
that
it
is
also
subject
to
bee
restrayned
with
another
exception
,
viz.
If
an
infant
,
or
such
priviledged
or
excepted
person
have
a
right
of
entry
,
and
a
descent
of
those
lands
is
had
to
one
that
hath
a
more
ancient
right
;
the
party
having
such
ancient
right
shall
be
remitted
:
and
both
the
right
and
entry
of
the
infant
taken
away
.
And
this
exception
ensueth
of
another
general
Rule
of
Law
,
which
is
,
That
An
ancient
right
shall
alwaies
be
preferred
before
another
meane
right
or
title
.
The
said
exception
upon
exception
,
grounded
upon
the
last
remembred
Rule
,
may
bee
plainly
proved
by
this
case
.
If
Tenant
in
Taile
do
discontinue
and
after
do
disseize
his
discontinuee
,
11.
E.
4.1
.
b.
and
during
this
disseisin
the
discontinuee
dyeth
,
his
heire
within
age
;
and
after
the
Tenant
in
Tayle
doth
dye
seised
;
and
this
land
descendeth
unto
the
issue
in
tayle
,
the
heire
of
the
discontinuee
being
still
within
age
;
This
is
a
remitter
,
and
the
entry
of
the
heire
of
the
discontinuee
is
tolled
,
notwithstanding
that
the
Ground
and
Principle
is
,
that
the
laches
of
the
infant
shall
not
prejudice
the
infant
.
And
the
cause
is
the
ancient
right
the
issue
had
.
Moreover
the
former
Generall
Rule
touching
descents
that
toll
entries
,
The
second
exception
.
hath
among
other
,
also
this
exception
.
A
descent
had
during
the
Coverture
,
Litt.
fol.
59.
case
403.
9.
H.
7.24
.
a.
2.
Ed.
4.24
a
7.
Ed.
4.7
.
b.
20.
H.
6
28.
b
shall
not
toll
the
entry
of
the
woman
or
her
heires
after
the
Coverture
dissolved
.
But
because
there
is
a
Generall
Rule
of
Law
,
That
,
None
shall
be
favored
in
any
Act
wherein
folly
may
be
imputed
to
him
.
From
whence
is
derived
also
this
more
speciall
Rule
or
Ground
.
Coverture
shall
not
ayde
a
woman
where
the
taking
of
a
Husband
which
respecteth
not
her
benefit
may
be
imputed
to
her
folly
.
Com.
Zouch
.
366.
a.
42.
E.
3.12
.
b
9.
H.
7.24
.
a.
Hereof
ensueth
this
exception
upon
exception
to
the
said
former
remembred
Rule
,
That
Where
folly
may
be
imputed
to
the
woman
for
taking
of
such
a
Husband
as
will
be
heedless
of
her
benefit
,
42.
E.
3.12
.
b
9.
H.
7.24
.
a.
Litt.
fol.
95.
cas.
404.3.4
.
Ph.
Ma.
144.
n.
57.
there
a
descent
,
during
the
coverture
shall
bind
the
woman
and
her
heires
.
Much
more
might
bee
said
of
like
effect
,
but
this
for
example
sake
shall
suffice
.
Now
resteth
briefly
to
say
something
touching
the
first
proposed
Latine
Rules
:
Com.
72.
b.
Com.
268.
a.
Com.
294.
a.
Of
which
the
former
was
this
,
Sublata
causa
tollitur
effectus
.
This
Rule
is
not
absolutely
true
;
for
the
Philosophers
from
whence
it
is
borrowed
,
doe
understand
it
,
De
causis
internis
,
non
de
externis
.
The
Civill
Lawyers
do
restraine
it
in
this
manner
,
Prataus
.
Haec
autem
Gnosis
sine
Regula
,
de
causa
finali
,
non
de
causa
impulsiva
intelligitur
.
The
common
Law
of
the
Realme
,
thus
;
Sublatâ
unâ
causâ
,
si
alia
remanet
,
non
tollitur
effectus
.
The
second
Rule
;
which
was
this
,
Qui
tacet
,
consentire
videtur
,
is
verified
with
this
exception
.
Si
ad
ejus
commodum
&
utilitatem
spectat
,
Prataeus
l.
7.
c.
3.
fol.
911.
praesens
&
tacens
pro
consentiente
habetur
.
The
third
Rule
was
this
,
Quod
initio
non
valet
,
id
tractu
temporis
non
convalescit
.
Which
Ground
may
be
confirmed
with
many
cases
,
yet
is
the
same
Ground
restrained
with
this
exception
,
because
That
Habet
locum
in
his
tantum
quae
statim
debent
valere
,
Decius
.
&
nullam
suspensionem
habent
.
If
a
man
make
a
lease
for
life
of
land
unto
I.S.
and
after
doth
make
a
lease
for
yeares
unto
I.N.
of
the
same
land
to
beginne
presently
,
37.
Hen.
8.
Brooke
.
Leases
48.
Com.
Smith
&
Stapleton
433.
a.
Com.
Griesbrooke
.
422.
a.
This
lease
being
made
by
word
is
voyd
;
for
the
freehold
in
the
first
lease
is
more
worthy
,
and
by
law
intended
to
be
of
longer
continuance
then
the
terme
in
the
second
lease
:
yet
if
the
first
leasee
die
,
or
surrender
afore
the
second
be
expired
,
the
residue
of
the
terme
is
good
.
If
the
father
devise
his
land
unto
his
daughter
and
Heire
apparant
,
and
after
leaving
his
Wife
encinct
,
5.
Ed.
4.6
.
Per
Billing
quod
fuit
concessum
&
Abridge
per
Fitzh
.
tit
.
Assi
.
27.
or
with
child
with
a
son
,
upon
the
death
of
the
father
this
devise
unto
the
daughter
is
void
for
that
she
is
his
heire
;
but
after
,
when
the
sonne
is
borne
it
is
good
.
The
fourth
Rule
of
the
said
Latine
rules
before
set
downe
,
was
this
,
Quando
duo
jura
in
uno
concurrunt
,
aequum
est
acsi
esset
in
duobus
.
This
Rule
hath
exception
grounded
upon
another
Rule
,
that
is
,
That
Vigilantibus
&
non
dormientibus
jura
subveniunt
.
Com.
375.
b.
Or
to
the
same
effect
;
Vnicuique
sua
mora
nocet
.
And
therefore
In
causes
de
negligence
ou
laches
divers
droits
concurrant
in
un
person
ne
seront
deeme
si
come
ils
fustent
in
divers
persons
.
Com.
Stowell
.
372.
b.
Where
,
if
Tenant
pur
auter
vie
be
,
the
remainder
for
life
over
to
another
,
the
remainder
in
fee
to
the
right
heires
of
the
Tenant
pur
auter
vie
,
If
the
said
Tenant
pur
auter
vie
be
disseised
,
and
the
disseisor
levie
a
fine
with
proclamations
,
and
the
five
y●●●es
doe
passe
,
and
after
Cesti
que
vie
dyeth
;
and
after
also
dyeth
he
in
remainder
for
life
;
he
which
was
Tenant
pur
auter
vie
,
shall
not
have
other
five
yeares
after
the
death
of
the
Tenant
for
life
in
remainder
to
pursue
his
right
for
the
feesimple
.
Vpon
like
reason
,
if
a
Bishop
bee
seised
of
an
Advowson
in
the
right
of
his
Bishopricke
,
and
the
Church
become
voyd
,
and
sixe
moneths
doe
passe
;
the
Bishop
shall
not
have
other
six
moneths
as
Ordinary
,
the
same
Church
being
in
his
Diocesse
,
as
he
should
have
if
the
same
Church
were
of
the
patronage
of
another
person
,
although
he
be
in
one
respect
Patron
,
and
in
another
Ordinary
.
Hitherto
wee
have
entertained
discourse
as
touching
the
verity
of
Axiomes
,
Rules
,
and
Grounds
;
which
,
as
hath
beene
shewed
,
is
either
necessary
or
contingent
.
Contingent
verity
was
divided
into
two
branches
;
the
one
resting
upon
the
entendment
of
Law
;
the
other
being
derived
from
the
disposition
and
nature
of
humane
things
,
by
debate
and
discourse
of
reason
.
Of
the
first
sort
there
are
two
kinds
;
for
some
propositions
there
are
,
although
of
themselves
but
only
probable
,
yet
neverthelesse
are
supposed
of
such
certainty
,
that
no
averment
shall
be
received
to
encounter
the
same
.
Other
some
,
although
they
be
by
the
Law
intended
true
,
Prima
facie
,
yet
neverthelesse
the
same
Law
alloweth
an
averment
,
and
admitteth
proofe
to
impeach
the
same
.
Those
moreover
which
rest
upon
discourse
,
of
reason
,
are
subiect
to
divers
exceptions
,
the
materiall
cause
whereof
is
,
the
infinite
variety
of
circumstances
that
in
all
humane
actions
doe
happen
.
The
forme
and
nature
of
the
exception
is
perceived
and
knowne
by
this
effect
following
;
in
that
it
restraineth
the
ground
unto
which
it
is
connexed
.
The
efficient
causes
are
two
,
viz.
Equity
or
some
other
Ground
of
the
Law
importing
contrariety
.
And
the
end
thereof
is
conformitie
and
coherency
of
Law
agreeable
unto
Iustice
,
whose
minister
the
Law
is
.
Moreover
as
occasion
hath
beene
offered
in
the
declaration
of
the
causes
from
whom
Exceptions
of
Rules
doe
spring
,
there
hath
beene
shewed
the
use
of
equitie
in
the
common
Law
,
Statute
Law
,
and
Chancery
,
by
the
two
effects
thereof
,
application
and
restraint
;
the
one
enlarging
,
and
the
other
abridging
.
Wherefore
now
resteth
to
speake
of
the
second
principal
part
,
concerning
the
forme
of
Aixomes
,
namely
,
generality
:
The
consideration
whereof
,
bringeth
to
memory
,
that
GOD
in
his
most
excellent
worke
of
the
frame
of
transitorie
things
,
though
hee
hath
furnished
the
world
with
unspeakeable
variety
,
thereby
making
manifest
unto
all
humane
creatures
,
to
their
great
astonishment
,
his
incomprehensible
wisedome
,
his
omnipotent
power
,
and
his
unsearchable
providence
,
yet
being
the
God
of
order
,
not
of
confusion
,
hath
admitted
no
infinitenesse
in
nature
(
howsoever
otherwise
it
seeme
to
our
weak
capacities
)
but
hath
continued
the
innumerable
variety
of
particular
things
under
certaine
specialls
;
those
specialls
under
generalls
;
and
those
generals
againe
under
causes
more
generall
,
linking
and
conjoyning
one
thing
to
another
,
as
by
a
chaine
,
even
untill
wee
ascend
unto
himselfe
,
the
first
,
chiefe
and
principall
cause
of
all
good
things
.
And
this
is
that
which
Plato
out
of
Homer
,
was
wont
to
call
Iupiters
golden
chaine
.
The
eye
whereby
we
doe
see
and
view
,
and
the
inward
hand
whereby
wee
doe
reach
and
apprehend
these
things
,
is
mans
understanding
,
which
is
wholly
imployed
about
universality
as
about
his
proper
object
,
by
meanes
wherof
,
in
all
things
rationall
,
being
discovered
by
the
use
of
reason
,
mans
understanding
for
the
attaining
of
knowledge
proceedeth
from
the
effect
to
the
cause
,
and
againe
from
the
cause
to
the
effect
;
that
is
,
from
the
particular
to
the
speciall
,
and
from
the
special
to
the
generall
;
and
so
to
the
more
generall
,
even
to
a
principall
and
primary
position
or
notion
,
which
needeth
no
further
proofe
,
but
is
of
it selfe
knowne
and
apparant
.
And
so
againe
from
such
chiefe
&
primary
Principles
and
propositions
to
more
speciall
and
peculiar
Assertions
,
descending
even
to
every
particular
matter
.
But
that
,
of
this
which
hath
beene
said
,
some
example
might
be
shewed
,
especially
in
this
matter
,
which
we
now
have
in
hand
,
namely
,
concerning
the
Grounds
&
rules
of
the
Law
of
England
;
let
one
of
the
proposed
grounds
first
before
mentioned
stand
here
for
an
example
,
viz.
Nihil
est
magis
rationi
consentaneum
,
quam
eodem
modo
quodque
dissolvere
quo
constatum
est
.
This
principle
being
a
Rule
of
Reason
contayning
great
probability
,
and
being
of
the
number
of
those
that
before
we
said
to
have
beene
derived
from
the
observation
of
the
nature
of
things
,
which
though
it
bee
subiect
to
manifold
exceptions
,
yet
neverthelesse
as
a
generall
Rule
,
the
same
is
verified
in
many
speciall
Axiomes
;
and
they
againe
diversly
subdivided
into
many
more
peculiar
propositions
;
as
the
example
of
these
following
may
make
manifest
.
-
1
Cesty
que
est
charge
per
Record
doit
luy
discharger
per
Record
.
-
2
Cesty
que
est
charge
per
fait
doit
luy
mesme
discharge
per
fait
,
ou
per
auter
matter
cy
haut
.
-
3
Cesty
que
est
charge
forsque
per
parol
,
poet
este
discharge
per
parol
.
Of
which
generall
Propositions
there
can
bee
made
no
better
reason
then
by
the
commemoration
of
the
said
first
afore
shewed
generall
Rule
.
Moreover
,
the
first
of
the
last
above
remembred
comprehendeth
under
the
generality
thereof
certaine
other
more
speciall
Rules
:
As
In
det
sur
arrerages
de
accompt
que
est
matter
de
Record
,
le
party
doit
discharger
luy
per
matter
cy
haut
,
&
nemy
per
specialty
,
ou
fait
ou
auter
matter
que
nest
cy
haut
.
6.
Hen.
4.6
.
a.
3.
Hen.
4.5
.
a.
11.
Hen.
4.79
.
b.
13.
Hen.
4.1
.
a.
8.
Hen.
5.3
.
b.
3.
Hen.
6.55
.
a.
4.
Hen.
6.17
.
b.
20.
Hen.
6.55
.
b.
In
det
sur
recovery
,
home
ne
sera
discharge
mes
per
matter
cy
haut
:
ou
a
tiel
effect
,
6
,
Hen.
4.6
.
a.
Vnder
the
second
Rule
or
Ground
before
proposed
touching
a
discharge
where
the
party
is
charged
by
matter
of
specialty
;
those
speciall
Rules
following
are
likewise
comprehended
.
In
nul
case
home
ne
poit
avoide
single
obligation
,
sans
auter
specialty
de
auxy
haut
nature
,
1.
Hen.
7.14
.
b.
5.
Hen.
7.33
.
b.
11.
Hen.
7.4
.
b.
Home
que
ad
enfreint
covenant
ne
pledera
matter
in
discharge
de
ceo
sans
fait
,
3.
Hen.
4.1
.
b.
1.
H.
7.14
.
b.
21.
Hen.
6.31
.
a.
Home
ne
discharger
a
luy
mesme
dun
annuity
que
charge
son
person
sans
specialty
,
5.
Hen.
7.33
.
b.
35.
H.
8.51
.
a.
Dyer
.
The
first
rule
of
these
last
remembred
Grounds
,
namely
,
touching
obligations
,
is
againe
divided
into
divers
particulars
;
as
for
example
.
Arbitrement
ne
dischargera
home
de
un
d●ty
due
per
un
obligation
,
8.
H.
7.3
.
b.
6.
H.
4.6
.
a.
Si
le
obligee
deliver
l'obligation
al
obliger
come
acquittance
,
&
puis
ceo
prist
de
luy
,
&
commence
sute
sur
ceo
,
cest
delivery
ne
sera
discharge
del
obligation
,
1
Hen.
7.17
.
a.
33.
Hen.
8.51
.
a.
Dyer
.
22.
H.
652.
b.
The
other
following
concerning
indentures
of
Covenants
,
may
likewise
be
divided
into
other
more
particular
assertions
:
but
to
avoyde
tediousnesse
,
these
already
shewed
abundantly
manifest
our
meaning
,
and
therefore
may
suffice
.
The
use
of
this
kind
of
observation
of
the
generality
of
Rules
and
Propositions
is
manifold
.
The
use
of
generall
Rules
,
and
the
observations
of
their
specialls
.
First
,
things
proposed
in
the
generality
are
best
knowne
and
most
familiar
to
our
conceipt
,
sith
they
be
the
proper
object
of
our
understanding
,
as
before
is
declared
.
Secondly
,
they
doe
better
adhere
and
sticke
in
memory
,
sith
Intellective
memory
is
(
as
the
understanding
is
)
imployed
about
universall
and
generall
things
.
Thirdly
,
universall
Propositions
are
the
precepts
of
Art
,
and
therefore
they
are
called
perpetuall
and
eternall
:
for
no
Art
,
Science
,
Method
,
or
certaine
knowledge
can
or
may
consist
of
particularities
:
for
the
orderly
proceeding
of
every
Art
,
Methodically
handled
,
is
from
the
due
regard
had
of
the
generall
,
to
descend
unto
the
specialls
contained
underneath
the
same
:
wherefore
it
ensueth
hereof
,
that
generall
Propositions
are
the
most
speedy
instruments
of
knowledge
:
for
experience
,
which
wholly
is
gotten
by
the
observation
of
particular
things
(
being
deprived
of
speculation
)
is
slow
,
blinde
,
doubtfull
,
and
deceiveable
,
and
truly
called
the
mistresse
of
fooles
.
IF
perchance
upon
occasion
of
some
former
speeches
here
published
touching
the
universality
of
Grounds
,
there
bee
demanded
this
question
.
Why
the
Lawes
of
England
at
the
first
and
from
time
to
time
,
Question
.
had
not
beene
published
after
this
Method
of
generall
and
speciall
Rules
with
their
exceptions
.
I
answer
thereunto
,
Answer
1
that
many
ancient
writers
attempted
that
kinde
of
writing
,
and
accomplished
the
same
according
to
their
severall
and
sundry
gifts
more
or
lesse
perfect
each
than
other
:
as
by
the
treatises
of
Glanvile
,
Bracton
,
Britton
,
and
others
appeareth
.
Secondly
,
I
say
that
forasmuch
as
dayly
new
questions
came
in
debate
whereof
before
had
bin
no
resolution
,
and
wherein
many
times
the
least
variety
of
circumstances
doth
alter
the
Law
;
therefore
our
Ancestors
thought
it
more
convenient
,
to
be
rather
governed
by
an
unwritten
law
,
not
left
in
any
other
monument
,
than
in
the
mind
of
man
;
and
thence
to
be
deduced
by
deceptation
and
discourse
of
reason
:
and
that
when
occasion
should
be
offered
,
and
not
before
.
Thirdly
,
it
is
more
convenient
and
profitable
to
the
state
of
the
common
wealth
to
frame
Law
upon
deliberation
and
debate
of
reason
,
by
men
skilfull
and
learned
in
that
faculty
,
when
present
occasion
is
offered
to
use
the
same
,
by
a
case
then
falling
out
and
requiring
Iudiciall
determination
:
for
then
is
it
likely
,
with
much
more
care
,
industry
and
diligence
to
bee
looked
unto
;
and
much
more
time
of
deliberation
is
there
taken
for
the
mature
decision
thereof
,
then
otherwise
upon
the
establishing
of
any
positive
Law
,
might
bee
imparted
concerning
the
same
.
Last
of
all
,
sith
all
good
Lawes
require
perspicuity
and
plainnesse
;
and
that
in
generality
,
for
the
most
part
,
lurketh
obscurity
;
therefore
there
is
nothing
of
more
force
and
effect
touching
the
making
and
framing
of
a
good
Law
,
then
the
present
occasion
offered
,
sith
thereby
is
brought
to
light
,
that
which
otherwise
would
not
as
much
(
many
times
)
as
be
thought
upon
,
and
giveth
occasion
to
dispute
that
which
none
would
have
thought
ever
should
have
come
in
question
.
And
therefore
not
without
due
consideration
among
the
Romanes
,
Disputationes
fori
,
and
with
us
Demurrers
have
ever
beene
allowed
as
originals
of
Law
.
As
touching
the
manifestation
of
Rules
,
all
are
affirmative
or
negative
:
wherein
though
the
affirmative
be
,
for
many
causes
,
the
more
worthy
;
yet
such
negation
as
implyeth
affirmation
(
and
therefore
called
pregnant
)
is
not
without
some
use
in
the
setting
downe
and
delivering
of
exceptions
and
generall
Rules
.
And
thus
much
touching
the
forme
of
Rules
,
Grounds
,
and
Axiomes
.
The
efficient
cause
of
Rules
,
Grounds
,
and
Axiomes
is
the
light
of
naturall
reason
tryed
and
sifted
upon
disputation
and
argument
.
And
hence
is
it
,
that
the
Law
(
as
hath
bin
before
declared
)
is
called
reason
;
not
for
that
every
man
can
comprehend
the
same
;
but
it
is
artificiall
reason
;
the
reason
of
such
,
as
by
their
wisedome
,
learning
,
and
long
experience
are
skilfull
in
the
affaires
of
men
,
and
know
what
is
fit
and
convenient
to
bee
held
and
observed
for
the
appeasing
of
controversies
and
debates
among
men
,
still
having
an
eye
and
due
regard
of
justice
,
and
a
consideration
of
the
common
wealth
wherein
they
live
;
for
well
saith
Aristotle
,
Arist.
l.
3.
Pol.
c.
7.
Hoc
quidem
perspicuum
est
,
leges
pro
ratione
Reipub.
esse
scribendas
.
And
of
this
reason
that
we
speake
of
,
Tully
hath
a
notable
saying
.
Cic.
1.
Offic.
Ratio
est
societatis
humanae
vinculum
,
ut
oratio
,
quae
dicendo
,
communicando
,
disceptando
,
judicando
,
conciliat
,
inter
se
homines
conjungit
,
&
retinet
naturali
societate
.
Wherefore
sith
the
Grounds
of
Law
are
the
foundation
of
Law
,
or
at
leastwise
the
Law
it selfe
delivered
in
manner
of
compendious
and
short
sentences
&
propositions
;
that
which
is
the
efficient
cause
of
Law
,
must
likewise
be
the
efficient
cause
of
those
Rules
and
Axiomes
.
Inasmuch
then
as
Primaria
efficiens
causa
juris
,
Iohannes
Corasius
de
arte
juris
lib.
1.
cap.
20.
est
natura
&
ratio
civilis
,
ex
quibus
potissimum
leges
emanant
,
&
veluti
scaturiunt
.
The
same
nature
and
reason
are
likewise
the
principall
and
originall
efficient
cause
of
the
Rules
,
Axiomes
,
Grounds
,
and
Propositions
of
the
Law
;
I
meane
Civilis
ratio
,
that
is
,
reason
respecting
justice
and
the
Common
wealth
.
This
reason
hath
in
the
written
workes
of
the
Lawes
of
this
Land
,
either
been
plainly
published
and
expressed
in
the
bookes
of
Law
,
upon
deceptation
of
cases
in
debate
,
and
left
unto
posterity
,
as
the
Lights
,
Rules
,
and
Directions
,
whereby
the
said
cases
so
called
into
question
,
were
at
the
last
decided
and
determined
.
Or
else
it
is
not
at
all
expresly
published
in
words
,
but
left
neverthelesse
implyed
and
included
in
the
cases
so
decided
,
and
therein
doth
as
it
were
lye
hidden
;
and
yet
neverthelesse
to
bee
easily
,
with
industry
collected
and
inferred
upon
those
Cases
decided
,
and
doth
necessarilie
follow
upon
the
resolution
of
the
same
,
and
being
thence
drawne
,
may
aboundantly
serve
to
infinite
uses
,
in
the
determinating
of
other
doubts
,
which
daily
doe
and
may
come
in
debate
.
Wherefore
sith
in
the
Law
(
as
in
other
sciences
)
all
arguments
and
disputation
doe
either
consist
of
expresse
proofe
and
allegation
of
Authority
(
which
are
called
Inartificiall
Arguments
)
or
else
of
application
and
inference
;
as
well
the
Rules
to
bee
collected
upon
inference
and
application
of
other
Cases
,
are
to
be
regarded
and
to
bee
produced
,
as
those
which
are
direct
authorities
.
And
forasmuch
as
in
very
few
cases
of
doubt
newly
rising
in
debate
,
and
called
into
question
and
controversie
,
expresse
proof
and
pregnant
authority
can
be
found
;
the
Lawyer
is
most
beholding
to
Inference
and
Application
,
wherewith
he
is
instructed
and
taught
,
that
Cases
different
in
circumstance
,
may
be
neverthelesse
compared
each
to
other
in
equality
of
Reason
;
so
that
of
like
Reason
,
like
Law
might
be
framed
.
And
by
how
much
Application
and
Inference
doth
more
depend
upon
wit
and
Art
,
than
the
producing
of
expresse
Authoritie
;
by
so
much
the
more
it
excelleth
the
same
,
sith
the
Allegation
of
expresse
Authority
,
resteth
wholy
upon
Industry
and
Memory
in
publishing
and
noting
that
which
he
findeth
already
framed
to
his
hand
.
Expresse
Rules
,
Axiomes
,
Grounds
and
Positions
of
the
former
sort
are
published
in
the
bookes
of
Law
,
either
in
the
Latine
tongue
,
as
are
the
former
generall
rules
first
mentioned
,
and
also
so
infinite
other
of
that
kinde
;
or
else
in
the
French
;
in
which
tongue
the
Reports
of
forepassed
Cases
are
published
unto
the
use
of
posterity
,
and
wherewith
the
said
booke
of
yeares
and
tearmes
(
almost
in
every
case
therein
found
)
are
fully
furnished
.
So
that
all
,
though
it
shall
bee
needlesse
to
make
manifest
that
by
Example
,
which
of
it selfe
is
evident
;
yet
still
to
pursue
the
former
Method
and
order
hitherunto
observed
,
we
shall
easily
perceive
the
same
in
this
short
case
hereafter
expressed
.
Vn
home
avoit
a
luy
&
ses
heires
le
nomination
del
Clerke
d'un
Esglise
a
un
Abbe
,
&
le
Abbe
doit
presenter
ouster
le
Clerke
nominate
al
ordinary
,
or
é
le
Roy
ayant
les
possessions
del
Abbey
ad
present
son
Clerke
al
dit
Esglise
estant
voide
sans
ascun
nomination
.
Et
le
opinion
del
Court
fut
,
que
le
party
que
averoit
le
nomination
,
avera
Quare
impedit
vers
le
Incumbent
tantum
,
sans
ascun
deste
nosme
Patron
:
Car
le
Roy
ne
poit
este
sue
come
disturber
:
Tamen
fut
dit
que
le
Roy
ne
poit
este
Instrument
al
ascun
home
.
Et
Shelley
dit
que
il
est
Instrument
a
chacun
home
:
Car
per
luy
chacun
Subject
ad
Iustice
a
luy
minister
.
The
Principles
,
Maximes
,
Rules
,
or
Grounds
expressed
in
plaine
words
in
this
case
,
and
which
are
indeede
the
very
reason
of
the
Resolution
therein
taken
are
these
.
-
1
Le
Roy
ne
poit
este
sue
Come
disturber
.
-
2
Lou
le
Roy
present
per
tort
,
Quare
Impedit
sera
port
vers
L'incumbent
sole
sans
ascun
deste
nosme
Patrone
.
-
3
Le
Roy
ne
poit
este
instrument
al
ascun
home
,
si
come
son
servant
.
-
4
Per
le
Roy
chescun
subject
ad
Iustice
a
luy
minister
.
-
5
Le
Roy
est
instrument
a
chacun
home
pur
minister
a
luy
Iustice
.
So
that
the
Reasons
of
every
Resolution
in
any
booke-Case
being
reduced
into
short
Sentences
,
Propositions
or
Summarie
Conclusions
are
the
Grounds
,
Rules
,
and
Principles
that
we
do
meane
and
speake
of
in
this
place
.
Such
Summarie
Conclusions
,
Corolaries
,
Reasons
,
Grounds
,
or
Propositions
therefore
as
afore
declared
,
are
delivered
in
the
bookes
of
Reports
in
two
manners
.
Sometimes
without
any
note
or
marke
that
they
are
Grounds
or
Rules
,
but
onely
as
laid
downe
and
dispersed
in
the
Arguments
and
Resosolutions
as
short
Reasons
of
the
opinion
or
determination
there
expressed
;
as
in
the
last
example
appeareth
.
Sometimes
with
a
note
or
marke
that
they
are
Grounds
,
or
Rules
and
Maximes
,
and
are
expresly
invested
with
such
names
,
as
in
the
entrance
of
this
treatise
hath
appeared
.
And
thus
much
of
the
Grounds
or
Propositions
expressed
in
the
bookes
.
Now
as
touching
the
second
sort
,
which
are
to
be
collected
,
and
inferred
out
of
the
Cases
left
reported
,
we
plainly
may
perceive
the
notable
use
of
such
collection
,
in
reading
advisedly
the
Commentaries
of
Mr.
Plowden
,
or
other
the
best
bookes
of
Reports
;
or
diligently
observing
any
notable
Argument
made
at
this
day
in
any
the
Kings
Courts
in
matter
of
Demurrer
,
where
we
may
not
thinke
that
every
case
cited
or
alleadged
out
of
the
bookes
for
proofe
of
the
Controversie
,
is
therefore
alleadged
because
it
hath
expresse
matter
therein
published
in
plaine
words
,
and
tending
to
the
resolution
of
the
point
in
question
:
but
at
sometimes
,
and
that
most
commonly
,
such
proofe
is
produced
upon
inference
,
and
yet
nevertheless
,
sufficiently
pregnant
to
approve
the
matter
whereunto
it
is
rightly
applyed
:
which
inference
and
application
proceedeth
wholly
upon
collected
Rules
and
Axiomes
included
in
the
resolution
of
those
Cases
produced
,
although
the
same
be
not
expresly
spoken
or
published
therein
.
Wherefore
notwithstanding
the
best
meanes
of
the
collection
of
the
said
Rules
,
depending
only
upon
Meditation
,
and
resting
wholly
upon
the
sagacity
,
wit
,
industry
,
and
judgement
of
the
Student
,
(
because
every
mans
severall
conceit
is
in
it selfe
sundry
)
may
best
be
referred
unto
the
student
himselfe
:
yet
neverthelesse
,
shall
it
not
be
amisse
here
to
manifest
such
direction
therein
as
may
be
observed
with
some
fruit
.
1
First
,
after
the
case
read
,
let
us
consider
with
our selves
,
&
meditate
in
our
minds
,
to
what
severall
purposes
the
same
case
may
bee
applyed
,
and
what
matter
,
or
severall
matters
the
resolution
of
the
said
Case
can
confirme
.
Which
when
wee
have
considered
of
,
it
shall
be
good
for
our
memorie
to
commit
them
to
writing
,
in
manner
,
and
according
to
this
example
following
;
33.
H.
8.48
.
b.
n.
1.
Dyer
.
Fut
move
si
Tenant
in
tayle
d'un
Manour
,
a
que
vilains
sons
regardant
,
en
feoft
un
des
vilains
d'un
acre
per
cel
del
Manor
,
et
devy
,
coment
que
le
Manor
discend
al
issue
in
tayle
,
uncore
il
ne
poit
seiser
son
vilain
tanque
le
acre
soit
recover
.
Vpon
meditation
had
of
this
case
,
what
it
will
prove
,
these
Propositions
or
Rules
following
may
easily
be
collected
.
1
Lou
home
ad
forsque
un
action
al
principal
chose
la
il
naver
benefit
del
accessary
,
tanque
il
ad
per
recovery
continue
le
principal
.
And
because
here
the
whole
principall
is
not
discontinued
,
but
onely
one
Acre
,
thereof
may
be
collected
,
That
2
Regardancy
ou
Apendancy
nest
solement
al
tout
le
Manor
,
mes
chachun
acre
del
demeanes
.
Moreover
,
because
the
principall
in
this
Case
,
viz.
the
acre
discontinued
,
cannot
be
recontinued
without
suit
to
be
attempted
against
the
Villein
,
it
followeth
in
Reason
,
that
he
shall
not
be
infranchised
thereby
:
Whence
also
this
Axiome
is
to
be
confirmed
or
proved
,
That
3.
Necessary
suite
ew
vers
un
villeinper
le
signier
ne
enfranchise
le
villein
.
Hereof
hath
appeared
that
although
none
of
these
Propositions
be
expressed
in
the
resolution
of
the
said
Case
,
in
the
booke
wherein
the
same
is
left
reported
;
yet
neverthelesse
are
they
necessarily
implyed
in
the
resolution
of
the
said
Case
,
as
before
hath
beene
declared
.
But
if
the
Case
so
read
doth
consist
of
many
points
or
severall
questions
sunderly
debated
,
every
of
them
may
likewise
bee
sunderly
and
apart
considered
of
,
according
to
the
manner
before
shewed
.
A
second
meanes
,
by
Inference
to
collect
such
Rules
and
propositions
as
are
before
declared
,
is
by
way
of
Argument
by
Syllogisme
:
For
supposing
the
said
Case
to
be
denyed
to
be
Law
which
we
have
read
;
let
us
endeavour
to
draw
the
immediate
reasons
thereof
into
a
Syllogisme
for
confirmation
of
the
same
.
So
that
thereby
,
forasmuch
as
all
Rules
out
of
the
Law
are
of
two
sorts
,
that
is
,
either
being
the
Reasons
of
the
Case
,
or
the
Case
contracted
shortly
it selfe
,
by
such
manner
of
Argument
,
the
Major
,
and
first
Proposition
of
the
said
syllogisticall
Argument
,
will
bee
the
generall
reason
of
the
said
Case
:
The
Minor
or
second
Proposition
,
will
be
the
particular
reason
:
and
the
Conclusion
will
be
the
contracted
case
it selfe
:
Which
also
will
serve
as
a
secondarie
Rule
to
determine
other
Cases
of
equall
Reason
called
into
controversie
.
For
example
herein
,
wee
will
take
the
opinion
of
Hulls
in
9.
Hen.
4.8
.
a.
in
the
end
of
a
Case
there
argued
,
where
hee
holdeth
for
cleere
Law
,
That
Si
un
home
fait
fine
pur
un
trespas
dont
il
fut
endite
son
boache
sera
estopp
a
dire
que
il
nest
my
culpable
,
9.
H.
4.8
.
a.
sil
soit
eint
implead
apres
.
But
because
the
same
is
denyed
in
Hen.
6.
wee
endeavouring
to
prove
the
same
by
Syllogisme
,
shall
not
onely
confirme
it
,
but
also
exemplifie
our
former
speeches
.
Major
]
Nul
sera
permit
a
denyer
cest
injury
pur
que
il
ad
fait
satisfaction
,
ou
ad
suffer
punishment
.
Minor
]
Mes
cesty
que
ad
fait
fine
pur
un
offence
ad
fait
ascun
satisfaction
&
in
ceo
ad
este
puny
.
Conclusio
]
Il
que
ad
fait
un
fine
pur
une
trespas
ou
auter
offence
sera
estopp
a
ceo
denier
apres
.
Every
of
these
propositions
be
eft-soones
confirmed
not
onely
with
the
Case
before
spoken
(
for
as
they
doe
prove
the
Case
,
being
the
immediate
Reasons
thereof
;
so
are
they
to
be
proved
againe
by
the
Case
as
by
their-effect
)
but
also
with
sundry
other
Authorites
found
in
the
bookes
of
like
effect
.
A
third
observation
of
Propositions
and
Axiomes
may
bee
drawne
from
the
consideration
of
the
Titleing
words
,
or
words
which
doe
yeeld
matter
of
effect
;
whereof
in
the
case
last
remembred
are
such
as
doe
follow
;
namely
;
Fyne
,
Estoppel
,
Enditement
,
Non
culpable
,
Party
,
&c.
And
herein
is
to
be
meditated
and
considered
what
Rules
may
be
derived
and
collected
out
of
the
said
case
,
and
be
referred
to
every
of
the
sayd
Titles
;
as
namely
,
Vnder
Fines
.
1
FIne
fait
pur
un
offence
prove
,
cesty
que
fait
le
fine
voluntarunt
,
deste
culpable
del
dit
offence
.
2
Fine
fait
per
un
offence
causera
cesty
que
fait
le
offence
que
il
ne
ceo
deniera
apres
.
Vnder
Enditement
,
these
.
SI
home
soit
convince
,
d'un
offence
sur
un
Enditement
,
que
est
al
sute
le
Roy
,
il
ne
deniera
le
dit
offence
,
sil
soit
apres
de
ceo
implede
al
sute
del
Party
.
Vnder
Estoppel
,
these
.
HOme
sera
estopp
per
matter
de
Implication
que
imply
le
contrary
de
son
disant
de
Record
.
Vnder
Non
Culpable
,
these
.
NOn
Culpable
ne
sera
plede
per
ascun
lou
per
implication
il
ad
confess
le
cause
del
action
.
Vnder
Party
,
these
.
SI
offence
soit
commit
cy
bien
al
Roy
que
come
al
Party
condemnation
al
sute
d'un
d'eux
,
aydera
l'anter
in
son
sute
.
A
fourth
manner
of
observation
is
to
referre
unto
every
Ground
or
Rule
so
collected
,
a
Rule
,
more
generall
,
so
proceeding
from
the
speciall
Rule
unto
the
generall
Reason
,
and
from
that
generall
Reason
unto
a
more
generall
:
As
out
of
the
sayd
first
Case
may
bee
drawne
this
generall
Rule
.
Home
ne
sera
permit
a
denier
ceo
que
devant
il
ad
confess
per
implication
de
Record
.
9.
H.
4.8
.
a.
Vnder
which
Ground
not
onely
the
first
proposed
Case
of
9.
Hen.
4.8
.
a.
may
bee
comprehended
;
and
divers
others
of
like
effect
and
purpose
,
and
which
doe
concurre
under
the
said
Generall
Rule
;
As
for
example
.
He
which
is
arraigned
,
Stamf.
155.
a
cap.
62.
Stamf.
98.
b.
22.
E.
4.39
b
after
he
hath
pleaded
either
in
Barre
or
in
Abatement
of
the
Appeale
wheron
he
was
arraigned
,
may
plead
over
not
guilty
to
the
felony
:
Except
the
Bar
or
Plea
do
comprehend
such
matter
as
doth
acknowledge
the
felony
;
as
a
Release
or
pardon
.
But
if
he
doe
plead
any
such
Plea
or
Barre
,
viz.
Release
,
or
Pardon
in
in
any
Appeale
or
Enditement
,
he
cannot
plead
over
Not
guilty
to
the
Felony
,
because
thereby
he
confesseth
the
Felony
by
implication
.
If
in
a
Praecipe
,
11.
H.
4.69
a
Culpepper
.
the
Tenant
say
that
he
is
Leassee
for
life
,
and
pray
in
ayde
,
the
demandant
saith
he
hath
fee
,
which
the
Tenant
denyeth
not
,
and
therefore
he
is
owted
of
the
ayde
:
If
after
he
will
say
he
is
Tenant
for
tearme
of
life
,
and
vouch
,
hee
shall
not
be
thereunto
received
.
These
Cases
with
many
other
may
bee
comprehended
under
the
generality
of
the
last
specified
Rule
,
and
are
one
in
Reason
,
not
under
one
immediate
Reason
,
but
under
this
Reason
,
viz.
Home
ne
serra
admitt
a
contradize
ceo
que
il
ad
confess
de
Record
.
Moreover
there
is
another
Case
,
one
in
effect
of
Reason
with
the
former
proposed
Case
,
which
because
it
is
neverthelesse
in
circumstance
more
generall
,
therefore
it
cannot
bee
comprehended
under
the
last
specified
Rule
,
as
namely
.
If
a
man
bee
indicted
of
Travers
,
7.
H.
4.35
.
b.
and
thereupon
be
found
guilty
by
verdict
at
the
suite
of
the
King
;
If
after
,
the
party
against
whom
the
Travers
was
committed
,
bring
an
action
for
the
same
Travers
;
the
other
shall
not
pleade
Not
guiltie
thereunto
.
In
the
former
Grounds
,
and
Cases
thereupon
,
the
partie
was
concluded
by
an
implyed
confession
;
but
in
this
last
Case
,
he
is
convinced
by
an
open
tryall
or
verdict
.
And
whosoever
will
comprehend
both
this
and
the
former
Cases
under
one
Ground
or
Rule
,
must
make
the
same
more
generall
then
the
former
,
in
this
manner
.
Home
ne
serra
permit
a
denier
tiel
offence
de
que
il
poit
este
convince
per
matter
de
Record
.
And
forasmuch
as
a
man
may
be
convinced
of
anoffence
as
well
by
confession
,
as
by
verdict
;
and
that
as
well
by
implicature
confession
,
as
by
expresse
confession
:
Therefore
every
of
the
said
former
Cases
may
bee
concluded
and
comprehended
under
the
amplenesse
of
this
last
remembred
Ground
.
A
speciall
Ground
may
be
reduced
unto
a
rule
or
Proposition
generall
,
by
seeking
the
Genus
or
generall
Notion
of
every
Titeling
word
found
in
the
said
speciall
Ground
,
As
for
example
,
the
said
Proposition
before
remembred
,
and
which
hath
beene
exemplified
with
Cases
,
was
this
.
Home
ne
serra
permit
a
denier
ceo
que
devant
il
ad
Confess
per
implication
de
Record
.
Vpon
the
word
(
denier
)
it
may
be
drawne
more
generall
,
thus
;
Home
ne
sera
permit
de
contrary
son
act
demesne
que
devant
il
ad
conuz
.
A
more
generall
Reason
whereof
may
againe
be
yeelded
,
thus
.
Seroit
inconvenient
que
le
ley
alloweroit
a
dize
,
&
a
dedize
une
mesme
chose
de
Record
.
Vpon
the
word
(
Confession
)
these
Reasons
also
may
bee
assigned
more
generall
than
that
first
ground
.
Confession
de
un
est
le
plus
pregnant
proofe
que
poit
este
encounter
luy
.
A
reason
hereof
:
For
,
Le
Confession
de
chacun
que
concerne
luy
mesme
sera
intend
vray
.
For
,
Nul
convoit
le
offence
melious
que
cesty
que
ad
ceo
commit
&
perpetrat
.
Vpon
the
word
(
Implication
)
these
generall
Rules
may
be
proposed
.
Confession
per
Implication
est
cy
fort
encounter
le
Party
come
Confession
express
.
For
Pregnant
Implication
est
equivalent
al
matter
express
.
Vpon
the
word
(
Record
)
somewhat
likewise
may
be
said
of
like
effect
;
viz.
thus
;
Matter
de
Record
que
est
grounded
sur
le
act
del
Party
mesme
luy
issint
liera
que
il
ne
contra
dira
ceo
apres
.
For
,
Le
credit
d'un
Iudicial
act
ne
sera
impeach
per
ascun
que
est
privy
a
ceo
,
For
,
Matter
de
Record
est
plus
hault
testimony
in
ley
.
Vnder
the
word
(
Fine
)
there
was
mentioned
this
Ground
or
Rule
.
Fine
que
est
fait
pur
un
offence
prove
home
culpable
del
offence
.
Here
hence
these
Propositions
being
more
generall
,
may
be
derived
.
Nul
per
Common
presumption
voit
faire
voluntary
fine
pur
le
offence
de
quel
il
nest
culpable
.
A
reason
whereof
may
be
thus
.
Poena
culpam
implicat
.
And
Le
Consequent
imporia
son
Principal
.
Hereof
you
see
what
abundance
of
Rules
and
Propositions
one
Case
containeth
;
and
that
we
may
descend
from
the
particular
case
,
to
the
speciall
Reason
,
from
that
to
a
more
generall
,
untill
we
finde
out
the
very
primarie
ground
of
naturall
reason
,
from
whence
all
the
other
are
derived
.
Herein
this
Caution
is
to
bee
considered
and
had
in
minde
,
that
in
collection
of
Grounds
and
Principles
out
of
any
proposed
Case
,
the
same
may
be
native
,
&
alwaies
appliable
&
reduceable
to
the
immediate
Reason
of
the
said
Case
,
so
that
in
any
occasion
of
Argument
,
the
same
Case
may
be
a
pregnant
and
efficient
proofe
thereunto
.
Furthermore
collection
of
Propositions
may
bee
drawne
and
reduced
from
all
the
principall
places
of
Logicall
invention
.
-
1
As
from
the
Causes
unto
the
Effect
.
-
2
And
contrariwise
from
the
Effects
unto
their
Causes
.
-
3
So
likewise
from
the
Consequent
unto
the
Antecedent
.
-
4
And
from
the
Antecedent
to
the
Consequent
.
-
5
Moreover
a
Pari
,
as
from
the
Equall
or
like
.
-
6
A
majori
from
the
more
likely
unto
that
which
is
lesse
probable
.
-
7
And
againe
,
from
that
which
is
lesse
Likely
or
Probable
to
that
which
is
more
Probable
.
-
8
Finally
,
from
the
Contrary
to
his
Contrary
:
sith
that
Eadem
est
ratio
&
proportio
Contrariorum
.
THe
reasons
and
causes
wherefore
these
Propositions
,
Rules
,
and
Axioms
(
as
hath
been
declared
first
in
manner
as
aforesaid
)
are
not
onely
to
be
considered
,
observed
and
collected
,
but
alway
to
be
had
,
and
carefully
to
bee
kept
in
memorie
;
and
the
end
and
scope
whereto
they
serve
and
tend
,
will
manifestly
appeare
,
as
well
by
the
observation
of
the
right
use
of
them
,
and
the
manifold
utilitie
and
great
helpe
,
which
riseth
by
the
daily
meditation
therein
,
as
likewise
by
the
consideration
and
amendment
of
some
inconsiderate
abuses
which
have
crept
into
the
daily
handling
of
them
,
both
in
judiciall
places
abroad
,
and
in
private
exercises
at
home
.
The
necessary
use
of
them
therefore
consisteth
in
two
parts
.
1
The
one
serving
to
the
obtaining
of
the
knowledge
of
the
Law
.
2
The
other
in
use
and
practice
of
the
Law
learned
by
these
Propositions
and
Rules
,
reducing
them
,
as
occasion
serveth
,
to
publike
and
private
behoofe
.
The
first
is
Speculative
.
This
last
Practique
.
As
touching
the
first
,
the
profit
hence
springing
may
soone
be
seene
and
discovered
,
if
we
call
to
our
memory
,
that
no
manner
facultie
whatsoever
to
be
learned
by
the
light
of
Reason
,
can
consist
or
be
comprehended
by
the
capacity
of
mans
understanding
,
except
(
as
before
also
in
part
hath
appeared
)
it
be
furnished
with
certaine
Assertions
,
Precepts
,
Rules
,
and
Propositions
,
and
the
same
adorned
with
these
two
qualities
,
Vniversalitie
and
Veritie
.
And
as
none
may
worthily
take
upon
him
the
name
of
a
Divine
,
which
is
ignorant
of
the
Principles
of
his
Science
;
or
any
man
may
well
arrogate
the
title
or
name
of
a
Philosopher
or
Physitian
,
who
knoweth
not
the
severall
Rules
,
whereupon
,
as
upon
sundry
foundations
,
the
said
severall
faculties
are
built
and
erected
;
so
none
may
be
deemed
a
Lawyer
,
or
admitted
,
or
can
give
good
advise
therein
,
which
knoweth
not
the
Precepts
whereon
his
Art
dependeth
;
or
hath
not
read
the
determination
of
former
doubts
left
reported
in
bookes
,
being
the
greatest
part
of
the
written
Law
in
this
Land
;
And
thence
,
not
collected
Conclusions
for
the
decisions
of
present
and
future
controversies
.
Moreover
seeing
the
Law
of
this
Land
is
wholly
Rationall
(
as
hath
been
said
)
wherein
,
as
in
all
other
Sciences
,
the
minde
of
man
holdeth
and
keepeth
the
former
published
proceeding
,
by
apprehension
and
discourse
,
collecting
Primary
and
Secondary
Conclusions
and
Grounds
,
it
cannot
be
otherwise
,
but
that
the
observation
of
these
Primarie
and
Secondarie
Conclusions
,
must
needs
be
the
best
,
most
approved
,
profitable
and
speedie
meane
,
for
the
attaining
of
the
right
,
sound
,
and
infallible
knowledge
of
the
said
Lawes
.
And
if
there
be
any
way
extant
,
or
to
be
found
by
mans
wisedome
,
to
purge
the
English
Lawes
,
from
the
great
Confusions
,
tedious
and
superfluous
iterations
,
with
the
which
the
Reports
are
infested
;
or
quit
it
of
these
manifold
contrarieties
,
wherewith
it
is
so
greatly
overcharged
,
so
that
the
Coherencie
,
constancie
,
and
conformitie
thereof
,
is
almost
utterly
lost
,
and
not
without
some
blemish
and
reproach
of
our
Nation
and
Common-wealth
,
in
manner
cleane
abolished
;
Surely
,
as
to
me
seemeth
,
there
is
likelihood
by
that
way
and
meanes
to
bring
the
same
to
passe
,
or
by
none
.
For
,
by
Rules
and
Exceptions
,
all
Sciences
are
and
have
beene
published
,
put
down
and
delivered
:
out
of
Rules
and
Exceptions
,
a
method
is
framed
,
by
which
meanes
men
may
view
a
perfect
plot
of
the
coherence
of
things
:
Even
as
in
a
large
spred
tree
,
from
the
lowest
root
to
the
highest
branch
;
from
the
most
ample
and
highest
Generall
,
by
many
degrees
of
descent
,
as
in
a
Pedigree
or
Genealogie
,
to
the
lowest
speciall
and
particular
;
which
are
combined
together
as
it
were
in
a
consanguinity
of
blood
and
concordancie
of
nature
.
And
yet
therewithall
perusing
the
particular
differences
and
degrees
of
distinction
betweene
them
,
in
all
the
course
of
humane
studies
,
there
is
none
that
doth
more
commend
unto
your
cogitations
the
wonderfull
force
of
mans
wisedome
,
then
doth
this
discourse
,
which
treateth
of
the
Principles
,
Grounds
,
Rules
and
Originals
of
Law
and
Iustice
,
being
the
chaine
of
humane
society
,
without
the
which
it
cannot
consist
;
and
which
,
besides
the
exceeding
pleasure
that
the
consideration
therof
breedeth
in
the
well-affected
mind
,
is
able
to
bring
us
speedily
to
ripenesse
and
maturitie
in
that
profession
.
For
,
Principium
est
dimidium
totius
,
saith
Aristotle
.
Short
refined
Reasons
of
long
perplexed
cases
,
doe
,
through
their
soundnesse
,
satisfie
our
judgements
,
through
their
brevity
and
shortnesse
,
wonderfully
delight
the
minde
,
through
their
pithinesse
,
they
may
bee
deemed
incomparable
treasures
,
yeelding
a
great
shew
of
wit
,
and
wonderfully
sharpning
our
understanding
,
of
infinite
use
,
in
all
humane
affaires
,
containing
much
worth
in
few
words
,
no
burthen
to
memory
,
but
once
obtained
,
are
ever
retained
.
Sith
all
Sciences
do
tend
to
Verity
(
as
hath
bin
before
often
affirmed
)
which
is
the
object
of
the
intellectuall
part
of
our
minde
;
And
sith
Veritie
and
Truth
cannot
be
obtained
or
found
without
due
knowledge
of
the
causes
;
Tunc
enim
(
as
saith
the
Philosopher
)
unumquodque
scire
arbitramur
,
cum
ejus
causas
&
Principia
cognoscimus
.
And
not
unfitly
said
the
Poet
,
Foelix
qui
potuit
rerum
cognoscere
causas
.
Then
must
the
right
and
due
observation
of
these
and
such
like
principles
containing
the
Causes
of
things
,
be
a
direction
to
conduct
and
lead
us
to
the
knowledge
of
that
faculty
and
science
,
whereof
they
are
Principles
.
For
from
hence
all
artificiall
Demonstrations
are
,
and
have
beene
drawne
and
deduced
.
To
adhere
therfore
and
wholly
to
respect
particular
cases
,
without
any
observation
of
the
generall
Rules
and
Reasons
,
and
to
charge
the
memory
with
infinite
singularities
,
is
utterly
to
confound
the
same
;
a
labour
of
unspeakable
toyle
,
&
wherin
we
shall
never
free
us
from
confusion
;
but
engender
in
our selves
,
that
wrong
opinion
which
many
have
(
amisse
)
entertained
,
that
there
is
nothing
certaine
in
our
Lawes
.
Finally
,
if
the
Law
be
every
mans
inheritance
borne
under
the
same
,
as
notably
(
besides
our
owne
Lawes
)
saith
the
Prince
of
Oratours
,
M.
T.
Cicero
pro
Cecinna
.
Tully
,
Major
haereditas
venit
unicuique
nostrum
à
jure
&
legibus
,
quàm
ab
ijs
à
quibus
illa
bona
relicta
sunt
.
Nam
ut
perveniat
ad
nos
fundus
,
testamento
alicujus
fieri
potest
:
ut
retineamus
quod
nostrum
factum
est
,
sine
jure
civili
fieri
non
potest
.
And
all
mens
inheritance
shall
be
certaine
both
for
the
private
repose
of
the
people
,
and
publike
good
and
quiet
of
the
Common-wealth
.
We
must
needes
thinke
the
Law
of
this
Land
full
of
defect
,
except
we
thinke
and
deeme
it
to
be
(
as
indeed
it
is
)
certaine
.
Who
then
can
,
without
the
consideration
of
these
universall
Maximes
,
Propositions
,
Rules
,
and
Principles
,
wherein
certaintie
is
alone
contained
,
attaine
unto
the
certaine
knowledge
thereof
?
for
as
it
hath
beene
truly
published
;
Principiorum
est
unumquodque
sibi
ipsi
fides
;
Insomuch
that
cum
negantibus
ea
,
non
est
disputandum
,
10.
Eliz.
27
1.
a.
Dyer
,
26.
Hitherto
hath
beene
spoken
what
profit
the
carefull
consideration
and
observation
of
Principles
,
Rules
,
and
Maximes
of
the
Law
of
this
Realme
doth
give
us
,
and
what
assistance
we
may
finde
therein
toward
the
study
and
speculation
of
the
same
.
It
resteth
therefore
now
,
that
somewhat
be
said
of
the
commodity
which
may
come
to
him
,
that
shall
mannage
and
practise
the
same
Lawes
,
and
to
what
use
this
observation
therein
likewise
serveth
.
Two
kindes
of
Arguments
are
noted
by
Morgan
.
Ily
sont
deux
principall
choses
sur
que
Arguments
poient
este
fait
,
s.
nostre
Maximes
,
&
reason
,
Com.
Colthurst
.
le
Mere
de
touts
Leyes
,
&c.
I
thinke
by
the
latter
of
these
,
the
use
of
Argumentation
upon
reasons
drawne
from
the
logicall
place
of
invention
,
are
to
be
understood
;
as
namely
,
to
argue
and
reason
in
cases
of
debate
,
from
the
causes
,
effects
,
parts
,
consequents
,
mischiefes
,
and
inconveniences
,
and
such
like
;
which
aptly
may
bee
called
naturall
reason
,
because
all
Art
therein
observed
,
is
but
the
imitation
of
nature
:
which
kind
or
course
of
Argument
is
much
used
in
ancient
bookes
,
when
as
there
were
fewest
bookes
of
reports
extant
.
But
by
the
former
of
these
two
specified
kindes
of
Arguments
,
is
meant
as
manifestly
appeareth
,
the
helpe
that
Grounds
and
Maximes
do
yeeld
in
that
kinde
.
For
the
understanding
therefore
of
the
right
use
thereof
,
it
behooveth
to
consider
,
that
the
same
wholly
doth
consist
in
the
apt
and
convenient
application
of
the
said
Rules
,
unto
such
particular
cases
daily
falling
in
debate
,
as
may
bee
comprehended
under
the
generality
of
the
same
Rules
,
and
may
in
every
respect
be
rightly
reduced
therunto
;
so
that
the
Rule
might
serve
as
a
well-grounded
reason
of
the
matter
called
in
question
.
To
this
effect
the
Author
of
the
Dialogues
betweene
the
Doctor
and
Student
,
after
he
had
at
large
spoken
of
the
credit
and
supposed
certainty
of
a
Principle
or
Maxime
of
the
Lawes
of
this
Land
,
addeth
further
that
such
Maximes
bee
not
onely
holden
for
Law
,
but
also
other
cases
like
unto
them
,
and
all
things
,
that
necessarily
follow
upon
the
same
,
are
to
be
reduced
to
the
like
Law
.
A
second
use
of
the
observation
of
principles
in
Argumentation
may
be
this
.
We
are
taught
(
as
saith
Aristotle
)
and
as
likewise
hath
afore
beene
remembred
,
by
the
election
of
principles
to
abound
in
matter
sit
for
Argumentation
.
Our
propositions
may
bee
framed
as
parts
of
Syllogismes
,
or
as
antecedent
propositions
of
Enthymemes
,
by
which
forme
of
Arguments
,
this
profit
and
commodity
is
reaped
,
that
he
which
rightly
useth
the
same
,
in
proofe
or
disproofe
of
any
proposed
matter
shall
not
need
to
fall
into
any
unnecessay
and
extravagant
matter
,
or
digresse
from
the
point
that
hee
hath
in
hand
.
For
if
the
parts
of
our
argument
so
to
bee
concluded
,
doe
consist
of
Propositions
which
are
Principles
in
Law
,
and
be
in
due
and
expedient
manner
framed
and
combined
together
,
the
Conclusion
,
which
is
the
point
in
question
,
will
follow
,
either
necessarily
or
probably
,
according
to
the
truth
of
the
said
propositions
,
for
as
we
have
before
shewed
,
that
by
reducing
a
Case
to
a
Syllogisme
,
we
might
finde
some
of
the
principall
reasons
and
propositions
,
whereupon
the
verity
of
the
said
case
,
being
the
conclusion
,
dependeth
;
as
trying
out
the
cause
by
the
effect
:
So
of
the
contrary
part
,
to
frame
the
effect
by
the
cause
;
the
same
propositions
will
,
as
they
confirme
one
case
,
so
likewise
establish
all
other
speciall
cases
,
which
shall
happen
to
concurre
in
equall
and
like
reason
,
or
be
reducible
to
,
or
under
,
the
generalitie
of
the
said
proposition
.
And
although
the
Lawyer
be
not
tyed
to
this
short
course
of
Argument
current
in
schooles
,
yet
in
whatsoever
large
discourse
of
Argument
,
if
this
forme
be
respected
,
though
amplified
and
enlarged
with
Prosyllogismes
,
after
the
manner
of
Rhetoritians
or
Orators
,
it
will
yeeld
the
fruit
afore
remembred
.
There
are
in
our
bookes
extant
of
both
,
as
namely
,
by
Conisby
,
to
prove
that
a
man
might
grant
his
Lease
for
yeares
without
Deed
,
useth
this
plaine
and
expresse
Syllogisme
;
whereof
every
proposition
being
a
Ground
and
Principle
in
the
Law
,
the
Conclusion
necessarily
doth
follow
.
14.
H.
7.3
.
b.
1
Major
]
Chose
que
jeo
poy
prender
in
lease
sans
fait
poiet
passer
hors
de
moy
sans
fait
.
2
Minor
]
Et
un
lease
de
terre
pur
terme
d'anus
est
bon
sans
fait
.
3
Conclusio
]
Ergo
per
mesme
le
reason
il
poit
passer
hors
del
Lessee
,
&
ceo
sans
fait
.
Likewise
a
question
grew
whether
the
heire
or
executor
were
to
have
a
furnace
fixed
unto
the
soile
,
20.
H.
7.13
.
b
or
such
chattels
as
were
annexed
to
the
freehold
after
the
death
of
the
Testator
,
or
no
;
where
the
Reporter
putteth
downe
the
opinion
of
Reede
chiefe
Iustice
,
Fisher
and
Kingsmill
,
that
the
executors
should
not
have
the
same
under
the
frame
of
this
forme
of
Syllogisme
;
whereof
every
proposition
is
a
Rule
of
Law
.
1
Major
]
Ceux
choses
que
ne
poient
este
forfeit
per
utlary
in
personall
action
,
ne
este
attache
in
Assise
ne
distraine
per
le
signior
pur
Rent
,
tiels
choses
executours
naveront
.
2
Minor
]
Mes
un
furnace
ou
table
six
sur
la
terre
,
ou
posses
,
ou
un
pale
,
ou
un
covering
de
un
lict
merisme
,
ou
bord
annex
al
franktenant
,
ou
house
&
fenesters
,
&
auters
tiels
semblables
queux
sont
annex
al
franktenement
,
&
sont
fait
,
pur
un
profit
del
inheritance
,
ne
poient
este
forfeit
per
utlary
,
ne
attach
,
ne
distraine
.
3
Conclusio
]
Ex
consequenti
sequitur
que
executours
naveront
tiels
choses
.
As
touching
the
second
sort
of
Argument
by
Syllogisme
,
in
the
Commentaries
of
Plowden
the
same
is
very
frequent
and
usuall
.
And
herein
to
take
example
out
of
the
first
case
,
because
it
first
commeth
to
memory
;
All
the
said
Argument
of
Griffith
in
the
case
of
Fogossa
,
may
be
reduced
into
this
Syllogisme
set
forth
in
the
entrance
thereof
.
Major
]
Chascun
agreement
covient
este
perfect
,
plein
&
compleite
.
Minor
]
Et
le
evidence
icy
ne
prove
le
agreement
deste
perfect
,
ne
plain
,
ne
compleit
,
mes
plus
toft
un
communication
ou
parlance
que
un
agreement
.
The
conclusion
is
suppressed
,
for
that
it
apparently
followeth
of
the
premises
,
untill
the
end
of
the
argument
;
where
at
last
it
is
expressed
in
this
manner
.
Conclusio
]
Et
issint
le
agreement
est
imperfect
a
doner
action
pur
le
subsedy
per
que
le
agreement
intend
per
le
statute
nest
accomply
.
The
Major
Proposition
is
amplified
with
this
Prosyllogisme
.
Car
agreement
concernant
personall
choses
,
est
un
mutuall
assent
des
parties
,
&
doit
este
execute
ove
un
recompence
,
ou
auterment
doit
este
cy
certaine
&
sufficient
que
doit
doner
actio
,
ou
auter
remedy
pur
recompence
,
&
sil
issent
nest
,
donque
ne
sera
dit
agreement
mes
plus
toft
un
nude
communication
.
And
this
proposition
he
prooveth
by
the
cases
thereafter
by
him
alleadged
.
The
Minor
proposition
of
the
first
Syllogisme
is
there
enlarged
,
where
he
further
addeth
.
Et
issint
in
nostre
case
entant
que
estatute
de
Ann.
1.
Regis
nunc
,
cap.
3.
&c.
untill
the
end
of
the
case
.
The
like
may
bee
observed
in
every
good
and
effectuall
argument
;
but
wee
stand
not
upon
example
.
A
third
profit
may
be
considered
herein
:
for
many
times
it
falleth
out
,
that
we
perceive
a
coherence
and
likenesse
betweene
divers
and
sundry
cases
,
which
therefore
we
know
are
applyable
to
our
purpose
;
and
yet
neverthelesse
,
except
we
draw
the
unity
of
reason
so
found
and
considered
in
the
said
cases
,
unto
a
short
Sentence
,
Ground
,
Rule
or
proposition
,
wherein
they
may
concurre
,
and
doe
agree
;
we
shall
bee
driven
with
long
circumlocution
and
many
words
,
to
make
manifest
our
meaning
in
the
allegation
of
the
same
,
especially
if
the
cases
doe
not
concurre
and
agree
in
one
mediate
reason
or
likenesse
,
but
are
upon
some
conformity
further
off
,
to
be
resembled
each
to
other
.
As
for
example
.
Le
Roy
ne
poit
arrest
un
home
de
suspition
de
treason
ou
felony
,
1
Hen.
7.4
.
b.
luy
mesme
,
come
un
subject
poit
faire
,
pur
ceo
que
si
il
fait
tort
in
ceo
feasant
,
le
party
issint
injury
ne
poit
aver
action
envers
luy
.
Si
home
soit
in
debt
a
un
sur
contract
sans
specialty
;
49.
Ed.
3.5
.
a
50.
Assis
.
p.
1.
9.
Eliz.
262.
si
apnes
cesty
a
que
le
det
est
due
soit
utlage
in
action
personall
,
le
Roy
naver
cest
dett
pur
l'utlary
a
luy
forfeit
,
pur
ceo
que
donque
le
defendant
perderoit
le
benefit
del
ley
gager
que
il
puis
aver
in
sute
de
ceo
commence
vers
luy
per
le
Creditour
.
Coment
que
lestatute
de
W.
2.
cap.
3.
done
resceit
a
cesty
in
le
reversion
generalment
uncore
si
le
tenant
pur
vie
soit
lou
le
Roy
ad
le
reversion
;
25.
Ed.
3.48
.
a.
b.
Com.
Walsingh
.
&
il
estant
implede
fait
default
apres
default
,
le
Roy
ne
sera
receive
come
common
person
seroit
.
Car
,
sur
le
resceit
,
le
demandant
doit
counter
vers
cesty
que
est
receive
,
Mes
issent
ne
poit
ascun
counter
vers
le
Roy
,
ne
luy
suer
,
mes
per
petition
;
Et
pur
ceo
,
si
le
Roy
seroit
resceive
le
breve
,
le
demandant
abateroit
maintenant
,
&
pur
cest
mischiefe
,
al
demandant
le
Roy
ne
sera
resceive
:
mes
son
droit
sera
save
per
auter
meane
.
These
three
cases
greatly
do
differ
both
in
the
circumstance
of
matter
,
and
in
the
immediate
reasons
,
and
yet
neverthelesse
have
some
resemblance
,
and
a
kinde
of
conformity
and
likenesse
,
between
them
each
to
other
.
1
First
they
all
concerne
the
King
.
2
Secondly
the
King
in
every
of
them
is
restrained
from
that
power
or
benefit
that
his
subject
hath
.
For
1
In
the
first
,
he
cannot
arrest
one
as
his
subject
may
.
2
In
the
second
hee
shall
lose
that
debt
which
his
subject
,
in
whose
right
he
claimeth
it
,
should
recover
.
3
In
the
third
he
shall
not
bee
received
where
the
subject
might
.
And
lastly
,
in
every
of
these
cases
,
if
the
King
should
bee
admitted
to
doe
as
a
common
person
might
,
the
subject
in
suit
with
him
should
sustaine
great
prejudice
.
For
1
In
the
first
hee
should
not
bee
permitted
to
punish
the
injury
done
to
his
person
.
2
In
the
second
hee
should
lose
the
benefit
of
waging
his
Law
.
And
3
In
the
third
and
last
have
his
action
debated
without
his
default
.
The
likenesse
of
which
cases
cannot
so
well
be
conceived
without
many
words
,
except
wee
reduce
unto
some
generall
Axiome
the
unity
and
resemblance
of
reason
found
in
them
.
And
therefore
this
proposition
without
more
might
have
sufficed
for
all
.
Where
the
subject
by
reason
of
some
Prerogative
,
that
is
in
the
King
,
should
otherwise
be
put
to
a
prejudice
;
there
the
King
shall
not
be
allowed
that
benefit
which
every
of
his
subjects
by
Law
enjoyeth
.
In
which
generall
Axiome
or
Rule
,
a
generall
reason
of
all
the
said
severall
Cases
doth
equally
concurre
.
By
this
observation
wee
may
reape
likewise
a
fourth
commodity
,
after
this
manner
.
All
the
Reports
do
consist
of
particular
Cases
.
Every
particular
Case
hath
his
severall
Circumstance
.
Circumstances
are
singular
,
and
hardly
retained
in
memorie
.
Bracton
li.
1.
cap.
1.
¶
.
3.
For
,
true
is
that
sentence
,
which
Bracton
hath
borrowed
out
of
the
Civill
Law
,
Omnia
habere
in
memoria
,
&
in
nullo
errare
,
divinum
est
potius
quam
humanum
.
Wherefore
when
the
Case
is
out
of
memory
,
and
the
circumstances
thereof
quite
forgot
,
the
Reason
yet
remaineth
,
and
is
had
in
memory
.
For
,
Memoria
intellectiva
est
universalium
,
ut
est
ipsemet
intellectus
.
It
is
not
the
Case
ruled
this
way
,
nor
that
way
,
but
the
reason
which
maketh
Law
;
Math.
Gribaldus
de
ratione
studij
juris
lib.
1.
cap.
4.
For
,
Non
quid
sit
intelligere
sufficiat
,
sed
cur
sit
diligentius
inquiratur
.
So
that
hee
which
by
observation
of
these
Grounds
&
principles
,
remembreth
but
the
reason
(
as
he
easily
may
)
shall
so
sufficiently
resolve
all
doubts
of
like
degree
,
as
if
he
had
remembred
the
expresse
Cases
from
which
the
same
reason
is
deduced
.
Although
in
argument
,
I
confesse
,
not
only
the
generall
reasons
,
but
likewise
the
speciall
Cases
are
as
proofes
produced
and
alleadged
.
Lastly
,
sith
the
chosen
and
collected
Propositions
and
principles
in
manner
as
aforesaid
,
for
our
better
use
behooveth
to
be
committed
to
writing
;
we
may
easily
without
great
trouble
,
by
disposing
of
them
orderly
,
frame
a
Directory
,
in
manner
either
of
a
methodicall
Treatise
,
or
of
an
Alphabeticall
Table
,
fit
and
convenient
both
for
the
speedy
finding
of
that
we
would
seeke
,
and
the
ready
having
of
that
we
can
wish
for
,
surpassing
the
benefit
of
any
Abridgement
heretofore
extant
.
And
thus
much
touching
the
commodities
growing
by
the
consideration
and
collection
of
Principles
,
Rules
,
Axiomes
,
Grounds
&
Maximes
:
and
of
the
scope
and
end
whereunto
they
tend
in
managing
of
our
Lawes
,
as
well
for
the
behoofe
of
the
Student
,
as
for
the
use
of
the
Practiser
.
And
now
remaineth
that
a
few
words
bee
sayd
to
forewarne
both
,
of
certaine
abuses
ordinarily
bred
herein
.
1
The
first
Abuse
is
,
that
neither
the
Ground
often-times
produced
doth
come
neere
the
Reason
of
the
Case
,
in
question
;
nor
the
Cases
alleadged
to
prove
and
fortifie
that
Ground
,
do
directly
confirme
the
same
.
A
sault
very
usuall
in
publike
exercises
;
and
may
be
redressed
,
if
we
do
call
to
minde
that
any
case
alleadged
ought
not
to
be
wrested
to
prove
the
Rule
or
Ground
alleadged
;
but
the
Rule
,
Ground
or
Principle
ought
to
be
the
very
immediate
or
secondary
reason
of
the
Cases
whence
it
is
drawne
,
and
which
cases
are
brought
to
confirme
the
same
,
in
such
sort
,
that
all
the
Cases
alleadged
doe
concurre
in
equality
of
reason
,
likenesse
,
and
proportion
;
and
in
full
proofe
of
the
Principle
so
produced
.
And
that
the
ground
or
principle
bee
a
reason
of
the
question
in
variance
,
to
subvert
or
confirme
the
same
.
Wherein
also
let
this
be
weighed
,
that
a
few
principles
cannot
sufficiently
serve
to
supply
al
occasions
in
that
behalfe
,
but
the
same
must
be
drawne
and
deduced
of
all
Causes
,
Titles
,
and
matters
in
the
Law
fit
for
argument
and
use
.
2
A
second
principall
oversight
is
this
.
Many
to
prove
their
opinion
in
the
controversie
proposed
,
frame
their
reason
rightly
from
some
notable
Ground
,
and
knowne
principle
or
Rule
,
which
though
it
be
well
applyed
,
yet
not
regarding
the
manifold
Exceptions
whereunto
the
same
Principle
is
subject
,
they
doe
set
it
forth
so
generall
,
that
it
giveth
their
adversary
some
cause
of
challenge
and
cavill
thereunto
,
by
objecting
some
instance
or
cases
upon
exception
of
the
said
Rule
:
and
thereby
doth
not
only
seem
to
enfeeble
the
same
,
in
shewing
the
fallacies
thereof
;
but
sometime
in
shew
,
weakeneth
the
whose
reason
and
argument
grounded
thereupon
.
3
The
third
abuse
of
these
Principles
or
Propositions
,
is
,
in
the
too
much
frequenting
and
often
needlesse
use
of
them
.
For
sometimes
the
obscurity
of
the
cause
,
may
require
some
other
manner
of
argument
,
drawn
from
places
of
invention
,
which
may
content
and
satisfie
the
minde
of
the
hearers
much
better
.
And
sometimes
the
clearnesse
of
the
matter
it selfe
,
needeth
not
such
preparation
of
proofe
and
confirmation
of
those
principles
and
rules
.
For
then
is
the
most
and
best
of
them
,
when
that
both
propositions
and
Cases
to
confirme
the
same
,
have
great
coherence
with
the
question
;
when
both
the
circumstance
of
the
Case
in
question
,
and
the
cause
of
doubt
,
doe
give
occasion
to
use
them
;
so
that
which
thereby
is
affirmed
,
may
rightly
be
reducible
to
the
purpose
.
4
Finālly
,
it
sometimes
falleth
out
to
be
a
fault
overmuch
to
abound
in
well
doing
.
Omne
nimium
vertitur
in
vitium
,
saith
the
Proverbe
;
for
sundry
times
it
happeneth
,
that
it
is
very
convenient
and
direct
to
the
matter
to
make
argument
upon
a
well
applyed
Principle
,
Rule
or
Ground
,
which
by
men
of
great
learning
and
reading
is
sometimes
so
sufficiently
handled
,
with
such
abundance
and
ample
furniture
of
notable
and
direct
Cases
,
that
their
endeavour
herein
deserveth
high
commendations
:
yet
more
convenient
were
it
,
that
their
paines
were
lesse
.
For
to
what
purpose
behooveth
it
,
to
heape
Case
upon
Case
,
as
it
were
one
on
the
neck
of
another
,
Pelion
upon
Ossa
?
whereas
many
probable
reasons
,
though
confirmed
with
few
good
Cases
,
breed
greater
contentation
to
the
hearer
,
by
reason
of
the
severall
proofe
made
thereby
then
many
Cases
.
FINIS
.