THere is nothing in the worlde , which tendeth not to one end or other : yea , euen thinges insensible doe aduance themselues ( as it seemeth ) and make themselues fit for that vse , vnto the which they doe properlie belong : and being applied thereunto , doe shew forth a kind of ioy , and seeme to haue a feeling of the perfection and happines of their estates . Things that haue action in them , mooue of themselues in such sort as we see ; all creatures in generall , and euery one seuerally in his kinde , with great vehemencie & contention , followeth and pursueth after that , for which they are borne & bred , and doe most certainlie reioyce and exult in the fruition of that which they seeke , when they haue found it out . What then ought man to doe , vpon whom nature , besides this inclination and motion which dead things doe partake with him , hath endued with sence , and ouer and besides sence , which is common to him and other creatures , hath giuen the benefit of discourse and reason , to be able to discerne and chuse the best things of all thinges which present themselues vnto his consideration , and that which is most fit and proper to his vse ? May we not safely conclude , that man also hath his ende , as well as all other creatures ; which is set before him as the furthermost marke and butte , whereto all his actions shuld be directed : and sithence that the happines of all things is their perfection , and their perfection the fruition of their end , shall not the happines and felicitie of man consist in the ●ul obtaining and attaining vnto that which is proposed vnto him , and whereunto all his actions are to bee referred ? Now the ende of man and of all his thoughts & meditations is good . And truely , there is not one amongst many , so diuers in nature and condition of life , which desireth not that which is good , and eschueth not that which is euill : and being demanded wherefore hee doth this or that , answereth not , but that he doth it , or thinkes that he doth it for his good and welfare . And albeit in our actions , a man may finde a great manie more bad then good ; yet the generall intention , whereby wee are directed and guided , is to come vnto that which is good . But as it fareth manie times with him which aymeth at a marke , if his sight be hindered , either by some disease of the eye , or fault in the ayre , or if hee take one thing for another , although he desire to hit the marke , so that he couet nothing more , yet it is impossible but he should be wide from it : so likewise wee , because we doe not knowe wherein consisteth our good , but oftentimes take that which is about it , for it ; do therefore in our particular actions take our ayme amisse , and shoot wide from our generall marke and intention .

Good , in good trueth , is not so placed that all the world may see and perceiue it ; nature hath sowed and scattered heere beneath amongst vs certaine weake and feeble sparklinges of that heate , which notwithstanding beeing rightly applied vnto our mindes , are able to kindle a pure light in them , and cause vs to see good , as it is , and not as it seemeth . So then , wee must seeke it , and wee shall finde it ; hauing found it , we must acknowledge it ; acknowledging it , wee cannot choose but loue it ; and louing it , wee shall fasten all our desires thereunto , and enioy it with great happines . For euen as trueth presenting it selfe vnto our vnderstanding , is there entertained with great ioy and contentednes : euen so good offering it selfe vnto our will , is receiued by her with great pleasure , as being her naturall obiect . And therefore , I thinke , that if a man would properly define good , hee must affirme it to bee nothing els , but the essence & vsage of a thing , according vnto his nature . For this same nature is so prudent and prouident a mistresse , that she alwaies disposeth all things vnto their greatest good , and therefore hath giuen them a first motion vnto that which is good , and vnto that ende which they should seeke and search after : in such sort , that he that will followe after it , cannot choose but compasse and obtaine it . Now by the rules of nature , man should be so composed and fashioned , that that which is most excellent in him , should beare rule and commaund , and that reason should ●se all that which is presented vnto her , as best beseemeth her , and shal most serue for her purpose .

Well then , the good & happines of man , consisteth in the right vse of reason● and what is that but vertue , which is nothing els but a constant disposition of will , to followe that which is honest and conuenient . There is no man , as I suppose , but wil auouch this to be good : but yet for all that , there wil bee a great many found out , which will affirme , that herein onely consisteth not mans good & happines , but that hee must haue a sound and well disposed bodie , and a hundred more commodities , without the which it is not possible for mans life to be , much lesse to be happie and ●ortunate . But if our position which we haue set downe vnto you at the first bee true , ( as true it is ) that the end of euery thing is his good , and his good is his end , and that these two are so reciprocable and conuertible the one with the other , that the one cannot bee without the other , then may we not iustly say , that health , or riches , are mans good , seeing that they are not his end which he regardeth . For hee cannot possesse or vse them , but to some other end . And so too , that the greatest part of his time , whilest hee enioyeth them , he cannot ioy in them , but is with them vnfortunate and vnhappie : vnlesse peraduenture some man will saye , that they are happie , which make their riches & health serue them ( as they doe full many in the world ) to nourish their vices , and cherish them vp in their wicked passions and affections . But happily will some man say , they doe serue , as meanes and instruments disposed vnto the attainment of this good , without the which it is not possible that a man should get it , and therefore by a necessarie consequent they are to be accounted necessarie , to the obtayning thereof , and therefore good . Truely it is a harsh and improper kinde of speech , to call that good , which serues to the procurement and obtaining of that which is good ; or that which is the subiect and matter of good . For vertue , which we haue proued before to be the true good , is of such a nature , that she can make her benefit indifferently of things contrary in nature , she profiteth and helpeth her selfe as wel by pouerti● as by riches , by sicknes as by health . For wee doe as much commend him that can patiently endure his pouertie , and constantly beare his griefes or disease , as we doe him that liberallie bestoweth his goods , and being in health , honestly laboureth in his vocation . So that if you wil needs call riches good , because they serue to the obtaining and getting of vertue , why may you not as well call pouertie by the same name , seeing that it serues to the selfe same vse , and that more profitablie also ? Now to call things so contrary and repugnant , as riches & pouertie are , by the same name , hath not so much as any shew or apparance of any trueth . Wherefore , let all these things remaine indifferent , as being made good or euil , by the mind of man which knoweth how to vse them rightly , which if he want , yet will he not want the meanes of attayning vnto his ende , which is to be fashioned and framed rightly according vnto reason , and to make vse and benefit of all things which shall happen whatsoeuer , & consequently to purchase his chiefe good and felicitie .

If wee will truly know wherein consisteth this good , let vs consider within our selues what that is which seekes it : for it must needs be the good of that part● Nothing seeks after that which is anothers , vnles it bee coupled and ioyned with his owne . Now then there is no doubt but that the beginning and first motion of all our actions commeth from the vnderstanding and will , and therefore the good which we seeke after , must needs be the perfection , rest and contentment of the same . But if wee place riches and health in this account , and esteeme them for things good , and by a consequent repute all things contrary vnto them euil ; what doe we els , but tes●ifie vnto all men , that there is no true felicitie in this world , and that our minds are here held in perpetuall torment ? For a man must needes haue death and griefe continuallie before his eyes , both which are esteemed euils , and whereof one is oftentimes present with him , the other neuer ●easeth to threaten and menace him . If then they be things euill , the feare of them is iust , & if he be alwaies in feare , how can hee bee at any time happie ? Let vs therefore confesse , that either man hath no good ordained and prepared for him in this world , which he may compasse and attaine vnto , or els acknowledge , that this good doth wholly and entirely consist in vertue . For it must needs be that the end of euery thing should be proportionable vnto the strength and nature of the thing it selfe : for other wise , if the end were vnpossible to be atchieued , in stead of being mans good , it would turne to be mans further torment . And so he should nothing but labour and trauaile in vaine , as the daughters of Danaus are sayd to doe in hell , striuing to fill certaine bottomles vessels with water , which can hold no water at all . Againe , if there bee no Science nor Arte in the world , which hath not one end or other limited her , which they may come vnto by keeping of certaine precepts and rules ; what shall we thinke that nature , the mother of Arts and Sciences , hath proposed vnto man ( which is her chiefe worke ) an end , which it is vnpossible for him to come vnto , because it is out of his power ?

Will ( as we say ) is that which seeketh after our good : now a ruled and well gouerned will neuer coueteth ( as indeede it ought not to doe ) but that which she may , and which it is in her power to procure , she busieth not her selfe about hauing of that which it is not in her power to haue when she will ; as health , riches , and honors . For if our good did consist and depend of them , wee should not neede to imploy reason or will to the procurement of them , but we might as well compasse them by prayers & wishes : for it is a thing which is subiect vnto a thousand casualties , which cannot bee pr●●ented or fores●ene , as not being in our hands to dispose of them as we list , but subiect vnto the rule of Fortune their good Ladie and mistris . What shew or probabilitie of reason is there I pray you in this , that Nature should so create man , the perfection of all other creatures , that his good , which is his perfection , should depend not onely vpon other matters , but vpon so many things , that a man hath no hope to haue them all fauourable vnto him ; but that he shuld here bene●th with Tantalus , lye miserabli● thirsting and crying after water . Nay doubtles , Nature doth offer you so much to the getting of this good , as a minde well disposed and fit to vse any thing which shall be layd before it , and to passe ouer those things which doe farre passe his reach and capacitie . Will you then rather choose to runne vnto Fortune , and waite at her deceitfull handes for that good , which you may giue vnto your selfe and if you will ? For this is a diuine and inuiolable lawe , which hath been made since the beginning of the world , that if we will haue any good , we must purchase and get it our selues , by our owne labour and industrie . For nature hath prouided a rich store-house of all good things , and inclosed it in our minds : let vs then but stretch forth the hands of our will , and we shall take as much as we will . For if the will of man bee well guided and ordered , it will turne all things to her good , as M●das turned all things that he touched into golde . There is no accident so grieuous , which can befall a man either in bodie or riches , whence a man may not reap some rest and comfort of minde : so that if we can here rest & content our selues , wee haue alreadie found out our end . For though we should remit so much of the seueritie of this sect , as to confesse that the bodie or goods , which are but instruments of mans life , were a part of mans substance , and might by their qualitie alter the qualitie of the soule ; yet may wee not auouch this for good , that losse ●ither in goods or bod●e , is able to hinder the felicitie and happines of man , if his minde enioy quiet rest and content .

In things which are compounded of many partes , the most noble part giueth both name and lawes vnto the rest , and they take their denomination from her : what doubt then can there bee , but that man should bee wholly happie , if his minde enioyeth his happines . And so wee say , that a Common-wealth is happie after a great victorie , although there bee many citizens lost , because the happinesse thereof is measured by the person of the Prince , or els of the state , to the good and seruice of whom all the rest must be obedient . Hence is it that particular men doe euen glorie in their wounds , doe euen bragge and boast of them , if they haue receiued them in the defence of either Prince or countrie . Shall we than assigne vnto the bodie any other motion or desire then that , by the which it referreth all things that come vnto him , vnto the ioy and happines of the mind ? shall we , I say bee so foolish as to linke and knit the soule so fast vnto the bodie , that the good thereof should remaine as a slaue within his members , and so farre foorth depend on them , that accordingly as the bodie should be well or ill disposed , the mind should be altered , and accounted either happie or vnhappie ? Truly , if so bee that nature would haue had mans happines and perfection to haue depended on his bodie , or consisted in his goods , she would haue giuen vnto all men like bodies , and like measure and quantitie of goods : for so she should not haue been partiall● but equall vnto all , and so haue passed from the generall vnto euery particular of that kinde . But on the contrary side , she hauing made all men of very diuers natures and conditions , both in respect of their bodies , as also in regarde of their goods , hath notwithstanding graunted vnto all men like power and abilitie of wel vsing their bodies or riches of what sort soeuer they bee , in such sort , that the action of the minde may bee as honorable and glorious in one sort as in another : yea , the excellencie thereof doth appeare & shine foorth more gloriously , and merit more praise then , when being destitute of meanes and instruments , he commeth of himself vnto his wished end . For so in my opinion , wee are to iudge him to bee the skilfuller pilot in a shippe , which can in a great tempest , amidst the raging flouds , guide an old sea-beaten ship full of holes , whose sayles are rent , and ropes broken ; then hee which can tell how to gouerne a new ship well rigged and furnished with all necessaries , hauing winde at wil , and seas fauourable . Therefore we will heere conclude this poynt thus : Seeing that the happines of man doth lye in procuring of his good , and that his good is to li●e according vnto nature ; and to liue according vnto nature , is not to bee troubled with any passions or perturbations of the minde , but so to behaue himself , happen what happen may , as that he do not exceed patience , or passe the bounds of reason ; that if wee will bee truelie happie , we must purge our minds of all manner of passions , & learne how to be affected in minde towards all things which shall happen .

Now there is nothing which can so soone set vs in this way , and learne vs how to obtaine the right course of ordering our affections , mindes and wils according vnto reason , as Wisedome , which is ( in my simple opinion ) both the beginning and end of all vertues . For causing vs to haue an exact and true knowledge of the condition and qualitie of things which come into our considerations & viewes , she teacheth and telleth vs what is according vnto nature , and what not , and like wise what is to be desired and followed , or shunned and auoyded . She remoues al false opinions out of our heads which trouble our braines , makes our affections kind and naturall , and finally vpon her waite all other vertues , as being their mother , nurse , and keeper . O how happie would mans life bee , if it were alwayes led and guided by her direction ? But alas , as this vertue is most faire and excellent , so she is most rare and hard to be found : for she is so hidden in the bottome of our mindes , as the veynes of gold lye secret in the bowels of the earth , and are found but in few places . This is ( as I bele●ue ) that great , stately , and impenetrable buckler which Vulcan forged for Achilles , wherein were ingrauen heauen & earth , the sea , clowdes , starres , lightnings , cities , weapons , assemblies of people , and combats : and in a word , there was nothing in the world which was not there to bee seene : signifying vnto vs by that deuice , that wisedome & the true knowledge of things , doth better preserue the minde of man from danger , then the buckler or helmet doth keep the bodie from wounds . But as Achilles went to schoole vnto Chiron to learne the vse of that buckler : so we must go to schoole to Philosophy , to know the right vse of wisedoome . And if wee will hearken vnto her , she will tell vs , that wisedome hath two properties and vses , the one to prick vs forward to that which is good , the other to pull vs backe from following that which is euil . Now because when we come vnto Philosophie , we doe not bring with vs a mind pure and neat , but alreadie distempered , euilly disposed , and possessed with filthie humours , and such as are incident vnto the common sort of people ; because , I say , wee come vnto her as vnto a skilfull leach or cunning phisition : therefore if we will bee cured , wee must doe as surgeons doe which haue to doe with sores and wounds , who before they apply any medicine or salue to cure them , doe first draw out all the bad humours and dead flesh : and so must we also in like manner begin first of all to purge our minds of all such passions as doe arise in them , and with the smoke of them darken and obscure the eye of reason : for otherwise precepts of manners and wholesome instructions would profite our soules as little , as plentie of meate doth a corrupted bodie , which the more you feede the more you offend .

Now to know what these passions are , you must vnderstande , that we doe terme them a viol●nt or vehement motion of the soule in the sensitiue part , which is caused in the following or eschuing of that which seemeth to be either good or euill . For albeit there be but one soule in euery one of vs , which is the cause of life , & fountaine of all our actions , and is all in all , and all in ●uery part : yet there bee many faculties in the soule , which it is straunge to see , how diuers , yea how contrari● they be many times one towards another , according vnto the diuersitie of instruments and vessels where it is kept , and varietie of obiects which are offered vnto her . In one place she causeth vegetation , in another motion , in another sence , in another desire or appetite , in another imagination , in another remembrance , in another reason and discourse : euen as the Sunne , which though he bee all in his owne essence , yet diuiding and parting his beames in diuers places , he bringeth heat to one place , and light to another , softeneth waxe and hardens clay , scattereth the clowds , and drieth vp standing pooles and lakes . And when the parts where the soule lieth inclosed , doc retaine and vse her but in a proportion of their capacities , and as farr● foorth as it is necessarie for their conuenient vse , then she bringeth foorth gentle , sweet , and orderly effects : but contrariwise , if her parts doe take mor● heate and motion then is requisite and conuenient , you shall haue cleane contrary operations , & such as will proue very hurtful and preiudiciall vnto the soule : and right so for all the world fareth it with the Sunne , who as long as his beames do wanderabroad , according vnto their naturall and wonted libertie , doe gently and moderatly heate the earth : but if they be gathered and knit together in the hollow of a burning Christall , they doe burne and ●●nsume that , which they were wont before to cherish and quicken . Now it hath pleased nature to grant vnto sence this power and strength which commeth from the soule , to applie it selfe vnto things , and extract their formes , and afterwards either to choose or refuse them , as they shall best please or displease him , and agree or disagree with his nature . And this is done for two reasons : one , because they should be in stead of sentinels vnto the bodie still watching and warding for his good : the other , which is a principall cause indeede , because they should bee messengers and vantcouriers from the soueraigne and chiefest part of the soule , and also serue for ministers and instruments of bettering our discourse and reason . But as she hath alotted them this power and authoritie : so she doth most straitly will and command them to content themselues with their office , which is to call to mind things past , & thereupon to aduise themselues what is best to be done : not presuming or daring to disquiet the higher and stronger faculties , or breede any further vprore or confusion . For so it falleth out many times in an armie , that the watch because they know not the purpose of the Generall , whose direction they should follow , may be deceiued , and take the enemie comming vnto them disguised , for friends , and their friends which come in good will to succour and relieue them for enemies : and euen so the sences , because they cannot throughly conceiue and comprehend thinges appertaining vnto reason , as being aboue their reach , are beguiled with shew and appearance of thinges , and doe oft times iudge that for a friend vnto vs , which is our greatest aduersarie . And so whilest they presently rush forward without staying , or looking for any commandement from reason , they prouoke and stir vp that part of the soule where concupiscence and anger dooth lodge , whereby springeth such a ●umult & hurly burly in the mind , that reason during this furie can not bee heard , nor vnderstanding o●eied , no more than lawes or Magistrates are regarded in a state rent and torne with euill dissention . But in this trouble , the passions which doe waxe most mutinous and troublesome vnto the quiet rest of the spirit , doe first arise in the appetible or concupiscible parte , that is to say , in that place where the soule doth exe●cise this facultie of desiring or reiecting things presented vnto her , as being things proper or contrary vnto her welfare and preseruation . So then , their first moouing and springing is vpon a shew and apparance or imagination of some good or euill . Now if it be of some present good , which she doth alreadie begin to possesse , wee call this motion by the name of ple●sure : but if it bee of some good ●o come , which is as yet farre estranged from vs , we call it desire : ●f it be of a present euill , the inco●uenience and griefe whereof we doe alreadie feele , being moued and incensed against another , we call it hatred or horror : and being moued within our selues , discontentednes , which if it happen vpon occasion of any thing which concernes vs , we call it sorrow : if by reason of another mans euill , pitie : if by occasion of an apparant good where wee pretend a part , ielousie : if otherwise , enuie . Againe , to fall backe vnto the second part of our second generall diuision : if it be of some after ensuing euill , it is rightly termed by the name of feare .

See here the first band of these seditious passions , which so much trouble the quiet rest of our soule , which are accompanied with most daungerous effects , and yet nothing like so daungerous as are those which follow after . For why ? these first motions being bred and formed in that part , by meanes of the obiect which presents it selfe , doe passe foorth incontinentlie vnto the irascible part of the mind , that is to say , to the place where the soule seekes al meanes possible of obtayning or auoyding that which seeme●h vnto ●er good or euill . And then , foort●with as a wheele which is alreadie mou●d , being to receiue a fresh motion is carried about with greater swiftnes : so the minde being moo●ed with the first apprehension , hauing a second strength added vnto the former , is whirled about with greater violence then before , and stirres vp more strong and vntameable passions , because they are doubled and coupled with the former , and so being ioyned together , doe stay and strengthen one another with mutuall helpe and consent . For the first passions , which are found of the obiect of some imagined or seeming good , considering with themselues of the meanes how to obtaine and acquire it , do stirre vp in vs either hope or despayre : but those affections which are made of the obiect of some seeming euill , doe bring forth feare and anger : which foure passions are wonderfullie strong and violent , and doe wholly ouerturne the frame of reason which they finde alreadie tottering .

Heere beholde and marke the foure winds ( as I verely suppose ) from whence spring the cruell tempests of our soules . Their den from whence they come , is nothing els ( as hath been alreadie shewed you ) but a false imagination which wee haue , that those things which are presented vnto vs are either good or euill . For by this meanes attributing that qualitie vnto them , which indeede is not in them , wee flye or follow after them with vehemencie : and this is the very originall and spring of these passions . Well then to stoppe this den , assure the rest of our soules , and prouide that they be not otherwise moued then it is meete for them to bee , let vs call to minde that which was proued vnto vs in the very beginning and entrance into this discourse . To wit , that the good of a man , and the perfection of his nature , consisteth in the disposing and fashioning of his will to the right vse of things according vnto reason : and contrariwise , that his euill commeth from a disordered or vnskilfull vsing , or rather abusing of them . For by the first hee shall reape much profite , receiue much content and quietnes , and chance what chance , nay he may set vp his rest , and remain as stable andimmoueable as a rocke in the middest of the sea : by the second , euery small thing that chaunceth will trouble him and turne to his great griefe and disaduantage . Now this disposition of our will lieth whollie in our power , and consequently our good and euill . Wherefore , if at anytime there be presented vnto vs any obiect , to the endethat we may not be troubled at all as with some good or euill which doth follow vs , let vs consider whether the thing which happeneth be in our power or no. If it bee in our power well and good , it may bee good or ill vnto vs . And yet in this case too , wee must not be too passionaetly affected in any sort : for if we can but moderate and guide our willes aright , we shall make it good , and so continue it still . If it be out of our power , then it is neither good nor euill , and consequently wee ought not to seeke or prouide it .