RHetoric and Logic are near of kin the one to the other . For both treat of the same things , which are in a manner known by all Men , and belong to no certain Science . And therefore one way or other all Men participate of both ; seeing that all People by some means or other endeavour to find out and maintain an Argument , or to impeach and defend ; which many do rashly and without Experience , many through Exercise , and several naturally and habitually . Which being either way to be done , it is apparent that there is a way and method to be found out , to which the matter may be reduc'd when both attain their Ends , as well they who proceed according to the dictate of Nature , as they who search into the causes and reasons of what they do ; which all will grant to be the Office of Art . Whoever therefore till this time have compos'd the Art of Eloquencs , have found out but a small part of it ; for when only Art prevails to gain Credit and Belief by Perswasion , other things are only additional ; they make no mention of Enthymemes , which are the Sinews of Perswasion , but make a great pudder about those things which are little to the purpose . For Crimination , Compassion , Anger and those other affections of the Mind are nothing to the business , but only serve to move the Judges . And therefore as it is the custom in many Cities ▪ especially such as are governed by good Laws , if the same were observ'd in Judgments , they would have nothing left for them to say . For so all People partly believe it should be ordain'd by the Law ; partly they retain the same Constitution , to speak nothing from the purpose ; as in the Areop●gus , wherein they did well . For it is no way laudable to pervert a Judg by moving him to Anger , Envy or Pity . Which is no more then if a Man should pretend to make use of a Rule , and be●d it crooked . Besides that whoever sets up a Controver●y , has no more to do then to demonstrate whether the thing is , or i● not ? whether it were or were not done ? Now whether the Act were great or of little Consequence , whether just or unjust , whatever the Legislator has not distinguish'd , that the Judg ought to know , and not to learn from him that propounds the Controversy . Therefore it is convenient that good and wholesome Laws should make a distinction of all those things themselves , and leave as few as possible to the opinion of the Judges . First , because it is more easy to find one , or but a few Prudent Persons that are able to make good Laws , and give true Judgment then many : In the next place , Laws are made by such as take long time to consider . Judgments are suddenly pronounc'd , and therefore it is a difficult thing rightly to dispence what is just and profitable . But this is the chiefest thing of all to be consider'd , that the judgment of the Legislator does not confine it self to Particulars and things Present , but dilates and extends to Universals , and things to come . But the Senator and the Judg determine of things definite and present . Whence it happens that their own affection , or hatred , or private advantage intervening , they make but a negligent enquiry into the Truth ; while their Judgments are sway'd by their own gain or loss . So that as to other things , as already has been said , the least power of determining that may be is to be left to the Judg ; but whether done or not done , whether it be or not be , will come to pass or not , all this of necessity must be submitted to his Determination ; since it is impossible for a Law-giver to make sufficient Provision in such Cases . Which being so , it is apparent that they teach those things that are quite from the purpose , who treat of other things , as what the Proeme , what the Narrative ought to contain , or any one of the other parts . For therein they teach us no more then how to dispose the Mind of the Judg this way or that way . But as to artificial Perswasion they inform us nothing , that is , how a Person may become a good Argumentator . Seeing therefore there is the same Method to be us'd in popular Orations , as in Pleadings at the Bar , and that it is much more noble and of greater use to be a popular Orator , then a litigious brangler about Contracts and private Bargains , they do ill in being so silent as to the former , so voluminous as to the latter , believing it is of less concernment to be extravagant in popular Arguments , and less wile and subtilty in that then in Bar ▪ Pleading , as being more common . For in the former the Judg determins of what in part concerns himself ; so that there is no more requir'd then to demonstrate the thing to be , as the Adviser says . But in causes of Meum and Tu m that will not suffice where it is necessary to take the Ears of the Hearer ; for the Judgment is to be of other Mens concerns ▪ So that while they consider their own profit , and hear with favour , they give themselves up to the Pleader , but make no determination . Therefore in many places the Law forbids digressions from the Matter , and there the Judges exactly observe that Law . But in regard it is manifest that the artificial way relates and consists in Perswasion , and that Perswasion is a kind of Demonstration , ( for then we chiefly believe a thing when we suppose it to be demonstrated , ) and for that Rhetorical Demonstration is Argument ; which if I may so say , is the most powerful way of Perswasion ; and for that Argument is a a certain Syllogism , and seeing all Syllogisms are under the Consideration of Logic , either in whole , or in part ; it is manifest that he who can most readily find out of what , and how a Syllogism is Compos'd , will prove the sharpest Argumentator , especially Understanding in what things Enthymemes are of chiefest use , and how they differ from Logical Syllogisms . For the same Consideration will find out what is true , and what is like to Truth . For Men are sufficiently inclin'd to Truth , and for the most part attain to the Truth . Wherefore he who attains easily to Probability by conjecture , takes the same course to find out the Truth . Why therefore others have been so nice about things which are nothing to the purpose , and why they have made judicial Pleading , the Subject of their Labour is apparent .

Now Rhetoric is therefore useful , because that by Nature those things that are just and true , are much better then their Contraries ; and therefore if Judgments be not properly and conveniently made , there is a necessity of their failing , and being easily refuted ; the consequence of which is nothing but disgrace and reproof . Besides it is not an easy thing to perswade some Men with all our talking , tho' we have never so exquisite a Knowledg of the thing ; ( for the Speech of Instruction is that which proceeds from Knowledg ) which being so difficult , if not Impossible , there is a necessity of procuring the Impressions of Belief and Reason from common things , as we have already said in our Topicks concerning Haranguing to the unskillful Multitude . Nor is it amiss to be able to perswade contraries , as in Syllogisms , not that we ought to perswade those things that are evil , but that we may not be Ignorant how they stand in Competit●on with Truth , and when such Arguments are unjustly made use of by others , that we may be able to refute 'em . Now of all the other Sciences none conclude contraries Syllogistically , except Rhetoric and Logic ; for they both discourse of Contraries ; tho' 't is not so with their Subjects ; but always those things which are naturally best and truest , are much more fit for Argument , and most proper to perswade . Moreover it would be very absurd that it should be a disgrace for the Body not to be able to help it self , yet no shame for a Matis reason to be defective , which is of more use to Man then the defect of his Body . If it should be objected that it might prove of very ill Consequence for a Man to make a bad use of an effectual power of Reason , that certainly is no more then what is common to all things that are accounted good , unless Vertue it self ; but more especially the Fate that attends those things that are most beneficial to Mankind , as Strength , Health , Riches , and Command . For he that makes a just use of these things is commonly a great Benefactor ; but he that abuses those advantages , oft-times becomes a public Pest . Now then that Rhetoric is not under any certain and Determinate kind , but as Logic is , and equally useful , is apparent by what we have said . For perswasion it self is not its Duty , but to see what may be appositely made use of for convincement upon every Subject , as in all other Arts and Sciences ; For it is not the Office of Physic to create Health ; but as far as it is possible to reform an ill habit ; for it is possible to Cure those , that it is impossible to restore to a sane Constitution . In like mannerit is also the part of Rhetoric to consider what is Perswasive and what is probably convincing , as of Logic to discern what is a Syllogism , and what a seeming Syllogism . For a cavilling Disputant , is such not in force of Argument , but in preelection . On the other side , one Man shall be a Rhetorician by vertue of his Knowledg , another by Election . But no Man shall be a good Logician by Pre-election , but by the force of his Arguments . Now therefore as to this same Method it self , we shall endeavour to make out how and by what Principles we may attain to what we have propounded , beginning again with the definition of Rhetoric .

LET Rhetoric therefore be a Power or Faculty , to consider in every Subject what is therein contain'd proper to perswade . For this is the Duty of no other Science . For particucular Arts are both Doctrinal and Perswasive , as to what is their Subject ; as Physic in reference to Health or Sickness ; Geometry in reference to Bodies and their Accidents , and Arithmetic in reference to Numbers , and so of the rest of the Arts and Sciences . But Rhetoric makes it her Business to consider the probability , or truth of the thing propounded whatever it be . And therefore we say it has not any proper and peculiar operation upon any peculiar Genus . Now of Proofs or Convincements , some are without Art , others Artificial . Those I call done without Art , which we never study for ; Artificial , those that are invented by reason and Method ; so that it behoves us of these two sorts , to make use of the one and invent the other . Now of those Proofs which Reason affords us there are three sorts . Some in the Manners of the Speaker ; some in the disposition of the Hearer , some in the Oration it self , by vertue of its Demonstration or Probability of Demonstration . Convincement by manners is when the Oration is so pronounc'd that the Orator may be thought a person worthy to be credited . For we believe the Vertuous more easily and sooner , and barely in all things ; but absolutely in these things where there is not that Certainty , but a suspence of Judgment , and difficulty of Determination , in regard of the various opinions of Men. However this ought to come to pass , out of some respect gain'd by the delivery of the Oration , not out of Partiality , advancing the undeserv'd Credit of any Person . For then like some Rhetoricians , they do not place the probity of the Speaker in his Skill , which they look upon as no way conducing to Convincement , but as if the chief Argument of perswasion lay in the vertue of an Orator .

Again the Auditors believe in respect of themselves , when they find the Impulse of some affection rais'd in their Minds . For we do not give the same Judgments , when we grieve as when we are glad ; when we love as when we hate Concerning whīch things the Writers now adays pretend to give Instructions ; of which Particulars we shall say more , when we come to discourse of the affections .

Convincement by the Orations themselves is when we demonstrate what is true , or what appears to be so , by what is most proper to perswade in every Particular . Seeing then that all Convincements arise from these things , it is apparent that all these three ought to be made use of , to the end we may obtain the faculty of Ratiocination , that we may be able to consider the conditions and vertues which ought to give perfection to Men , and as to the affections , that we may understand what they are , their several sorts , and whence and how they arise , and from all these to make Syllogistical conclusions . So that Rhetoric seems to be a kind of shute growing out of Logic , and the doctrine of Manners , and may therefore justly be said to be Political . Wherefore also Rhetoric seems to Personate Politics ; and they who challenge the knowledg of it , claim that knowledge partly through Ignorance , partly through arrogance , and partly upon other human Reasons ; for it is a kind of Particle and Similitude of Logic , as we have said in the beginning . For neither of both is the Science of any thing determinate , but a certain faculty and ability to invent Arguments . Now as to their effective Power , and how they relate one to another , enough has been said . But as to those things which are said , or appear to be demonstrated , there is one way to do this by Induction , another by Syllogism , or by that which seems to be a Syllogism . For Example is Induction , and an Enthymeme a Syllogism : Now I call an Enthymeme a Rhetorical Syllogism , and Example a Rhetorical Induction ; since all Men prove by Demonstration , producing either Examples or Enthymemes , and little else beside . So that if it be absolutely necessary that he who makes use of a Syllogism or Induction , must demonstrate some thing , or some Person ; which is manifest from our discourse of Analitics , by the same necessity must both those be like to both these . Now what is the difference between Example and an Enthymeme is manifest from the Topics . For there we have formerly spoken of Syllogism and Induction . Since if by many and like Arguments we shew the thing to be so , in the first there is Induction , in the latter Example . But where some things being granted , there are some things else that for their sakes happen to be not granted , in regard such things are either altogether or for the most part , the one is call'd a Syllogism , the other an Enthymeme , and it is apparent that both are to be commended in Rhetoric . For what has been said in the discourse of Method , holds good in these things ; for as some sorts of Rhetoric are exemplary , others Enthymematical ; so some Orators move by Examples , others by Enthymemes . Therefore Orations consisting of Examples are no less perswasive then others ; but Enthymematical Orations more distract the judgment then the former . But we shall enquire afterwards into the causes of either , and how to make use of both ; at present let us examine these very things a little more plainly and distinctly . Seeing then that Perswasion is perswasive to some Body ; and this is immediately perswasive of it self , the other because it seems to be demonstrated by such Arguments ; seeing also that no art inspects into Singulars ; as Physick does not consider what is wholesome for Socrates , or Callias , but what is for every one , which is the true design of Art ; seeing moreover that Singulars are infinite , and not to be comprehended by knowledg ; so neither is Rhetoric to consider what will convince every particular person , as Socrates , or Hippias , but what will convince the Generality , as Logic also does . For Logic also makes use of Syllogism , not from whatever they see ( for some things appear to Madmen ; ) but Logic raises her Syllogism from such things as stand in need of reason ; Rhetoric argues upon those things that fall under Consultation . For it is the duty of Rhetoric to discourse of such things about which we consult , and have no Art to direct us , and among such Auditors that cannot see through multitude of things , nor discourse of things remote ; but we discourse of things that seem possible to be brought about one way or another . For as to such things which it is impossible they should be otherwise , either at present or for the Future , no Man consults , at least upon such a Supposition , in regard there can be no consultation concerning things that can not be otherwise . But we reason and draw our Collections either from what has been Collected by Syllogisms before , or from things confus'd that want the contraction of Syllogism , because they do not seem to be probable . Of which some are of that sort as not easily to be understood by reason of their Prolixity , let the Judg be never so candid ; and other things not convincing , as neither being taken for granted , nor look'd upon as probable . Wherefore there is a necessity to make use as well of Enthymeme , as Example , to prove things to be so , which may be otherwise ; Example requiring Induction , and Enthymeme Syllogism , and that from but a few or fewer things , then the first Syllogism consists of . For if there be any thing there which is perspicuous , it is not to be mention'd ; for the Auditor supplies that himself . As when a Lacedaemonian has been victor in such a game wherein he won the garland , it suffices to say , he was a Victor at the Olympic Games ; but to say that he was crown'd because he won the Prize at the Olimpic Games is superfluous , there being no Man who is ignorant of the Victors being Crown'd . But because there are few necessary things from whence Rhetorical Syllogisms are drawn , in regard that many things which fall under judgment and deliberation happen to be otherwise , since Men consult and deliberate about what they have to do , not of necessity , but by choice ; therefore common Accidents are collected from common Examples ; necessary things are prov'd and perswaded by necessary Consequences . Whence it is apparent , that of those things from whence Enthymemes are drawn , some are necessary , others such as are so for the most part : For Enthymemes are deduc'd from Probables and Signs : So that of necessity , both of these must be the same to the other . That being probable that for the most part and most usually happensto be ; not simply , as some would have it to be ; but as being that , which in those things that may be otherwise , has the same relation to Probable , as universal to particular . Of Signs there are some that have the same Relation one to another , as singular to Universal ; others , as something Universal to Particular . Of these some are necessary , which are call'd 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; but such , as not necessary , have no name according to this Distinction . I call those necessary , out of which a Syllogism is Compos'd ; which is therefore call'd an Argument . For when they believe there can be no contradiction of the thing Propounded , then they think they have brought a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or Sign that the thing is Demonstrated , Limited , and Determin'd . For Tekmar , and Term or Limit signify both the same thing in the antient Language . Now because of these same Signs , some hold one to another as the singular to the Universal , as if we should say 't is a sign that wise Men are just , because that Socrates being a wise Man was just . This is a Sign ; but such a one as does not always hold good , tho` what was said were Truth , for it cannot be Syllogistically concluded without a Contradiction . But this necessarily follows , such a one is Sick because he has a Fever . Such a one has had a Child , because she has Milk . Which is the only Argument by Signs , when the Sign alone is so true that it cannot be contradicted . The other sort of Signs have the same relation one to another as the whole to the part . As if a Man should say , 't is a sign he has a Fever ; for he breathes short , and yet this may be contradicted , tho' it were true when so said . For it happens that many who are not troubled with Feavers , breath short . And thus far what is probable , what a sign , what an argumentative or conclusive sign , and how they differ one from another . We have also shewn that Example is Induction , and wherein Induction consists . But Induction is neither as the whole to the part , nor the part to the whole , nor as the whole to the whole ; but as the Part to the Part , and as the like to its like , as being both subject to the same Genus , tho' the one is more perspicuous then the other . As for example , Dionysius affected a Tyrannical Government , because he requir'd a Guard . For Pisistratus , who affected the same before him , demanded a Guard , and when it was granted him he became a Tyrant . In like manner Timagenes of Megara ; and whoever were known to have acted in that manner are examples to prove the Intention of Dionysius , while the thing was in Consultation whether to allow him a guard or no , and before they knew the reason why he demanded it . All which Examples fall under the same general Whole , that he who affects Tyrannical Government , first demands a Guard . And thus much to shew from whence seeming Demonstrative Proofs may be drawn .

But there is a great difference between Enthymemes , and besides there are very few that understand the method of Syllogisms in Logic. For some are appropriated to the method of Rhetoric , as others to that of Logic ; some appear in other Arts which are extant , others ●eserv'd for other Arts not invented . Wherefore they lye hid from the Auditors , and they that meddle with 'em more then is fitting , wander from themselves . All which a further Explanation will make more manifest . I say therefore that Logical and Rhetorical Syllogisms are such , to which we ascribe their common places . These are such as are commonly reduc'd under the Heads of Justice , Philosophy , Politics , and many other things specifically ▪ different , as the Topics greater and lesser ; nor is there any restriction from arguing more upon one then another Subject or Topic , be it what it will , or never so specifically different , and these are general Topics .

Particular Topics are such as belong to every Genus and Species of Proposition : as for Example , those are Topics or Propositions belonging to natural Philosophy , from whence no Enthymeme or Syllogism can be drawn that has any relation to Ethics , and others are Propositions proper to Ethics , that have no relation to natural Philosophy ; and so in all other arts and Sciences whatever . But these things will not give a Man to understand any one Genus , as not being fixt to any Subject . But he that can with most Judgment select these Propositions , e're he is aware shall frame a Science distinct from Logic and Rhetoric . For if he happen upon Principles , it is neither Logic nor Rhetoric ; but that Science whose Principles it contains . But most Enthymemes are drawn from those Forms , which are particular and proper ; fewer from those which are common . And therefore the Genus's of Enthymemes are to be distinguish'd , as are also the places from whence they are taken . I call Forms the Propositions proper to every Genus . Places , such as are alike common to all . Now then concerning Forms . But first let us take along with us the Genus's of Rhetoric , that when we have distinguish'd how many they are , we may discourse apart of their Principles and Propositions .

THE forms of Rhetoric are in number three ; for so many sorts of Auditors there are that hear Orations . The Oration it self also consists of three things , the person that speaks , the matter discoursed of , and the Person to whom the address is made , in whom , that is to say the Auditor , the end is included ; for the Auditor is either a Spectator or a Judg , the Judg is either a Judg of things past or to come . The Judg of future things is the Senator ; the Judg of things past , is the determiner of Causes , the Judg of the force of the Oration is the Spectator . So that of necessity there must be three kinds of Rhetorical Ratiocinations or Discourses , Deliberative , or appertaining to the Council-Board , to the Bar , or Judicial , and Demonstrative . As to that which concerns the Council-Board , the one part of it is perswasive , the other diswasive . For always they who privately debate , or publickly harangue , intend one of these two things . Of the Judicial one part is the accusation , the other is the Defence . For they that are in Controversy must do one of these two things , either complain or defend . Of the Demonstrative , the one part is Praise , the other Disgrace . Seasons also are accommodated to every one of these . To the Privy-Counsellor the future , for he consults about what is to come , either to procure or prevent . To the Judg of Controversies the time past ; for all suits relate to what has been done . To the Demonstrative , the present time is most properly allow'd ; for they approve or dislike , as the Instant of Delivery . But they make use of things past and future to the same purpose , calling to mind things past , well or ill alledg'd , and conjecturing of future things whether well or ill judg'd by the Orator .

But in every one of these there is a different End . The end of the Counsellor is either good or bad ; for he that perswades , perswades for the best ; he that diswades , diswades from the worst : to which he adds just and unjust , bravery , and ignominy .

The Judges of Controversies propose also Justice or Injustice ; but they that praise or dislike , chiefly look upon honour or disgrace ; including also those other Ends of Good and Bad , Just and unjust .

And the sign that these are the Ends that every one of the three propose , is this ; for that they never call the rest in question . As for Example , he that is sued at Law , will alledge that he never did the thing , or that he did no harm in doing it ; but will never confess that he did unjustly ; otherwise there would be no need of Determination . In like manner they who consult for the public , grant all the rest ; but that they advise what is hurtful , and dehort from what is for the common good , they will never admit . But whether it is just to enslave their Neighbours , and such as do them no Injury , they never consider . In the same manner they who praise or disproove , never mind whether the Person has acted for the public good or not ; but more often applaud him , because he never minded his own Interest , that he might act like a good Common-wealths Man . For they commend Achilles , because he undertook to assist his Friend Patroclus , tho' he were certain to dye himself , and that his friend should live . For to him such a death was more honourable ; Life only beneficial .

From what has been said , it appears therefore necessary to be furnish'd with Propositions in the first place concerning these things . For argumentative Marks , and Probabilities , and Signs are Rhetorical Propositions : Seeing that every Syllogism consists of Propositions , and every Enthymeme is a Syllogism consisting of the foresaid Propositions . But because it is impossible for Impossibilities to be acted , or that they will be acted hereafter , but only things that are possible , or that those things that never were , nor ever will be , should now be done , or ever can be done , it is necessary as well for the Consulter and the Judg , as for him that goes about to demonstrate , to be fur●ish'd with Propositions of Possibility and Impossibility , whether itwere or were not , whether it will be or no. Moreover , seeing that all People who either approve or dislike , perswade or diswade , sue or defend , endeavour to shew not only what has been already said , as what is useful , what is hurtful , what is honest , what disgraceful , what just ; what unjust ; but whether the thing be of great or small moment , either considering useful and hurtful , honest and dishonest , just and unjust in themselves , or by comparing one with another ; it is manifest , that they must be furnish'd with Propositions of great and little , more and less , with respect to Particulars as well as Universals ; as what is more , what less profitable , which the greater , which the lesser Injury or Injustice , and so of other things : And thus much as to those things of which Propositions must be made . Now we must distinguish every one of them apart ; and first to which Deliberation , next to which Demonstration ▪ lastly to which Judgments belong .

FIRST then we are to consider about what things good or hurtful the Politician consults for that he does not deliberate upon all things , but upon what may be , or may not be done , in regard it is in vain to deliberate upon things that are or will be of necessity , or such as it is impossible that they ever will be . Nor yet upon all Accidents neither . For there are some good things which proceeding from Nature and Fortune , happen sometimes to be , sometimes not to be ; upon which it 's not worth while to Deliberate . But we are to consult of those things that may be referr'd to us , whose Original and Cause is within our selves . For we deliberate till we have found whether the things may or may not be done by us . Nevertheless it is not our present Business to enumerate every particular , nor to digest the several subjects of Deliberation into their several Species's and Forms , nor to enquire what may be determin'd concerning 'em according to Truth . For that belongs not to Rhetoric , but to a more prudent and certain Art ; tho' much more then what falls properly under her Consideration , is now adays allow'd her . For what we have already affirm'd is true ; that Rhetoric is compos'd of the Analytic Science , and that part of Politic's which relates to manners , and partly resembles Logic , partly sophistical Oration .

However if any one go about to teach either This or Logic , not as Faculties , but as Sciences , he secretly subverts their Nature , while he dilates them into Sciences of certain Subject Matters , and does not confine them to Oration alone .

But now let us therefore shew what things more properly fall under Political Consideration , and are more proper to be explain'd .

The chiefest things then of which all Men consult , and argue upon in Deliberation are five in number ; of Wealth , of War , of Peace , of the Preservation of the Country , and of what things are exported and imported , and of the making and observance of Laws .

He that consults about the raising of Treasure , ought to understand the Revenues of the Country , and whence they arise , that if there be any deficiency , it may be supplie● ▪ and if it be too small , that it may be augmented ; also that all unnecessary Expences of the City may be cut off ; and all profuseness moderated . For not only addition of Treasure , but frugality in Expences , increase Wealth . And this not only appears from our experience of private affairs ; but there is a necessity for him that wouldspeak to thepurpose concerning these things , to know the Observations of others .

He that consults concerning War and Peace , must understand the Forces of the City , what they are at present , and how powerful they may be ; what sort of Strength there is at present , and what sort of additional Force is to be provided : also what Wars , and in what manner the People have carried on their Wars before . Nor is he only to understand the Concerns of his own Country , as to these Particulars , but to be well inform'd of the State and Condition of his Neighbours , especially of those with whom his Country may have an occasion to enter into a War : and what is the equality , or inequality of Force on bo●h sides , that he may make a Peace with the stronger ; and be at his own Liberty , whether or no to make a War with the weaker : and then again which is the most wealthy Common-weal of the two ; for in that also we may be either Superiour or Inferiour .

Moreover he ought not to be ignorant how the Country may be best preserv'd and defended , nor of the number or quality of the Soldiers , fit to be kept on Foot ; nor of places proper for Garrisons ; which it is impossible to do , without an exact knowledge of the Country ; that if the Garrisons are too weak , they may re-inforc'd ; if superfluous , they may be dismantled , and Garrisons plac'd in more proper places . Also what Expence is necessary to supply the City with Provision , what the Country will afford , and what must be supplied from abroad . What commodities are fit to be imported , what exported , that Leagues may be consider'd accordingly . There being a necessity for a Common-weal to keep fair with two sorts of People , with those that are superiour in Strength , and benefical to it in Commerce .