Monitio logica, or, An abstract and translation of Burgersdicius his logick by a gentleman.

BURGERSDICIUS HIS INSTITUTIONS OF LOGICK .

BOOK I.

CHAP. I. Of the Nature and Division of Logick .

Axiome 1. LOGICK is the Art of making of Instruments * * Which Instruments are Definition , Division , Syllogism and Method . , and therewith directing the understanding in the Knowledge of Things .

There is yet an Homonymie , or Ambiguity of meaning , lies hid in this Word Logick ; for it is used either for a natural Faculty of Discourse , as when Persons of little Learning or Understanding are said to use Logick or Discourse , when after their Manner ; they question and maintain Disputes . Or for a Habit obtain'd by frequent Exercises and Rules . Or lastly , for a Systeme of Logical Precepts ; as when one says , The Logick of Aristotle , The Logick of Ramus , &c. Logick in the deliver'd Definition , left any one shou'd mistake , is taken for a Habit , which is as it were the End to which Precepts are design'd .

Ax. 2. Logick of the third and last Acceptation , that is , a System of Logical Precepts , consists of two Parts , Thematick and Organick .

Ax. 3. The first is that which is imploy'd about Theams , and their various Affections , and second Notions , as about the Matter of the Instruments of Logick .

Ax. 4. The other converses about the Organs themselves , with which the Understanding entreats of Themes , and according to its Capacity attains to the Knowledge of them .

CHAP. II. Of Themes Simple and Composed , Vniversal and Singular .

Ax. 1. A Theme is whatsoever may be propos'd to the Understanding to be known .

Ax. 2. Themes are either Simple or Composed .

Ax. 3. Themes Simple are those which are understood without a Composition or Complexion of Notions , as Man , runs , &c.

Ax. 4. Compos'd , such as are understood by two or more Notions , by an Affirmation or Negation join'd together , as Man runs .

A Complexion of Notions is nothing else but an Affirmation or Negation in the Understanding or Speech . And by this means are Themes Simple to be discern'd from Complex , and not by the Multitude or Composition of Words : For a Simple Theme is often express'd by a Compound Word , as Common-Wealth , Goat-Hart , &c. Frequently also by many Words , as , Love of Parents to'ards their Children . Sometimes in one , and that a Simple Word , you have a Theme Complex ; as when I say in Latin , pluit , ningit , itur , statur ; that is , it Rains , it Snows , we go , we stand , &c.

Ax. 5. A Theme Simple is either Universal or Singular .

Ax. 6. A Universal is that which is apt of its own Nature to be predicated of many things , as Man , Horse , Plant , &c.

A Universal is said to be predicated of many things either actually Existing , or at least such as may Exist . So Man was a Universal when Adam only was in being ; because Man was not only apt of its own Nature to be said of Adam , but of all Men that were to be born . So altho' the Sun be really but One , it may yet , that is , the Term Sun , be call'd a Universal , because many Suns may be made of the same Nature with this of ours .

A Universal is said to be of its own Nature apt to be predicated ; lest any one shou'd think Homonymous Words , or Words given to many Singulars of the same Species ; as , When many Men are call'd Peter , to be Universals : For Homonymous , as Homonymous , are predicated of many as to their Names only , not Definitions , or , as to their own Natures .

Ax. 7. The Singular is that which of its own Nature , is apt to be predicated only of One.

Ax. 8. Singulars are also call'd Individuals because not divisible into more of the same Name and Nature : So Plato , altho' he may , be divided into Body and Soul , Head , Belly , Breast , Feet , and his other Members ; yet cannot he be divided into more Plato's .

Ax. 9. Individuals are either Determin'd or Vague ; that is , Uncertain .

Ax. 10. Individuals are determin'd four ways : first , by their Proper Names , as Alexander , Bucephalus , &c. And secondly , by a Common Name taken by way of Excellency , for their Proper ; as Philosopher for Aristotle . Thirdly , by a demonstrative Pronoun , as this Man . Fourthly Periphrasis , as The Apostle of the Gentiles , for St. Paul .

Ax. 11. An Uncertain Undividual is that which is pronounc'd with a particular Pronoun ; as Some Man , a certain Man , &c. by the Greeks 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 .

CHAP. III. Of the Categories in general .

Ax. 1. A Category is a Series of Things gradually dispos'd under the same chief Genus .

A Category is so call'd from the Greek Word 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , that is , to Accuse ; for it was a Word us'd in the Forum , and from thence brought into the Schools , and signifies to say or affirm a Thing of any Body . But the School-men say Praedicate . Farther , a Category either is taken for the Affirmation it self , or for the Series and Disposition of those things which may be affirmed of others under the same Genus . Such a Series Boethius calls a Predicament . We have chosen rather the Greek Word .

Ax. 2. The Categories are Ten , Substance , Quantity , Quality , Relation , Action , Passion , When , Where , Seite , and Habit.

Ax. 3. Of which the one is of Substances , the rest of Accidents . This Number is taken from the diversity of Questions which may be made concerning the first and individual Substances , as appears from the very Appellations of the Categories .

Ax. 4. In these Ten are contain'd all things which can be praedicated of any Subject ; others directly , others indirectly .

Ax. 5. That which directly , requires these Five Conditions .

I. It must be a Finite Being .

By this Condition God is excluded out of the Categories : For altho' God be a Substance , yet is he not put in the Category of Substance ; for those things which are directly plac'd in this Category , not only subsist of themselves , but are subject also to Accidents , as we shall hereafter make appear , which to think of God were impious . Besides , the Genus , properly so call'd , of those things which are directly plac'd in the same Category , must be the same : But neither Substance , nor any thing else , can be the Genus properly so call'd of things Finite and Infinite : God therefore being Infinite cannot be directly contain'd under the Genus of Finite Substances . Yet is he aequivocally revok'd to this Category . For Substance is the Genus aequivocal both of God and Finite Substances .

II. True and Positive . To a true Being first are oppos'd Beings of Reason , as Genus , Species , &c. which are by no means in Categories . 2dly . The fictitious or feign'd , as Chimaera , Centaure , &c. which are referr'd to Categories Hypothetically , or by way of Supposition : For if a Centaure were that which it is feign'd to be , it wou'd really be put in the Category of Substances . 3dly . Appearances , or , as they commonly say , Intentionals , as the Rain-bow , Colours appearing , Species's and Spectres of the Senses and Understanding , and other things whose Essence only consists in their Apparition . These things belong to Categories , because of their Similitude ; for they are the Resemblances of true things . Hither also referr painted Images of true things as they are Images . To Positive Beings are oppos'd Privations ; as Blindness , Darkness , &c. which are reduc'd to Categories by their opposite Habits .

III. Compleat and Perfect . By this Condition are excluded , 1st . The Principles or Beginnings of things , as Unity , Moment , &c. 2dly . All Parts whatsoever . 3dly . Imperfect Beings , and , as they commonly say , in fieri or Action , as an Embrio , Motion , &c. 4thly . Modes and Compliments of other Beings . These are all reduc'd to the Categories by Concomitancy , except Differences , which altho' Parts of Species are said to belong collaterally , because they adhere collaterally or sideways to their Species's .

IV. One by it self . By this Condition are remov'd , 1st . Complex Beings , as A Man Runs . 2dly . Concrete , as White , Just. 3dly . Aggregate , as an Heap , an Army . These are all reduc'd by Accident to the Categories of those things of which they are compos'd .

V. Universal . By this means are rejected , 1st . Transcendents , as , Being , Thing , One , True , Good , which by their Community exceed all the degrees of Categories , and then Singulars , which because naturally they are not praedicated , but subjected only , are not in Categories , but underneath them , as it were a Basis .

Ax. 6. The first and principal Use of Categories is , that things which are of their own Nature , infinite , being reduc'd to certain Forms or Classes , our Mind may survey them at one View or Glimpse , and observe how this or that may be compared with any other thing .

This Use confers much not only to the knowledge of Logick , but of all Philosophy , and other Disciplines .

Ax. 7. Out of this first Use three more do arise . For , First , the Dispositions of things in Categories conferr much to the delivering of the Affections of Simple Themes , and second Notions , which are to be form'd out of the first .

2dly . From the same Disposition it appears , what of its own Nature is fit to be subjected , what praedicated .

3dly . There is no greater Assistance towards defining , dividing , disposing , I may add also Argumentation , than an Order of Categories well dispos'd .

From whence it appears how much they are mistaken who would cut off from Logick this so useful and necessary part ; which Aristotle so much esteem'd , that he wrote a particular Book of it , if yet that Book be Aristotle's ; and has again inculcated it in his Metaphysicks ; and moreover in his Logical Precepts , made mention of it very frequently in the first Book of his Topicks , also Cap. 9. commending it not obscurely for its Utility : The like to which Porphiry has done in his Introduction .

CHAP. IV. Of Substance .

Ax. 1. A Substance is a Being subsisting of it self , and subject to Accidents .

That which in Latin is call'd Substantia , or Substance , is in Greek 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , from the Word signifying To be .

To subsist by it self is nothing else but not to be in any thing as a Subject ; and agrees to all Substances , even to God , but to be subject to Accidents only to Finite ; For God is not subject to Accidents , as I said before .

Ax. 2. Substance is either First or Second .

Ax. 3. The First is a Singular Substance , or that which is not said of a Subject ; as Alexander , Bucephalus .

Ax. 4. The Second a Universal , or that which is said of a Subject ; as , Man , Horse . For Man is said of Alexander and Philip ; and Horse of Bucephalus and Cyllarus .

Ax. 5. The Notes of Substances are six ; First , A Substance is not in a Subject .

Ax. 6. Secondly , Substances are said of others Synonimously .

The first Note agrees to all and only Substances . Enough of which is said in the Definition of Substance . The Second only to the Second Substances . For the First are not said of a Subject ; the Second are said of the First Synonimously , that is , as to Name and Definition .

Ax. 7. Thirdly , A Substance signifies 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , or , this something .

To signifie this Something , is nothing else but to be Something Singular , which may be demonstrated with the Finger . This Note agrees only with the First Substances . For although Second Substances in the Scheme of Category , that is , Figure of Predication , may seem to signifie this Something , yet in truth they signifie 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , that is , What Something ; not indeed of themselves primarily , but upon the account of the Differences of which they are constituted : For Second Substances signifie a Nature affected with a Difference , which is nothing else but some Essential Quality .

Ax. 8. Fourthly , A Substance hath no Contrary .

That is , not by reason of their Substance but Qualities ; as Heat and Cold , Driness and Moisture , Weight and Lightness , &c.

Ax. 9. Fifthly , A Substance receives not more or less .

That is , is not intended or remitted . This is understood of one and the same Substance , which in succession of Time , cannot be made more a Substance in Genus or Species than it was before . So Man and Stone cannot be made more a Substance , or more a Man and Stone than they were before .

Ax. 10. Sixthly , One and the same Numerical Substance receives Contraries .

That is , A Substance , altho' it has receiv'd Contraries , remains still the same Substance as it was before . So cold Water , altho' by a Mutation it becomes hot , yet it is not another Substance , but remains still of the same Nature as it was before .

CHAP. V. Of Quantity .

Ax. 1. AN Accident is a being inherent in a Substance .

That is , so as that it can no ways exist separate from it . Hence follows , that ,

I. An Accident cannot exist without a Subject .

II. Cannot pass from one Subject to another .

III. Cannot inhere in another Accident . Of which more is to be philosophiz'd in the Metaphysicks .

Ax. 2. Quantity is an Accident which hath by it self Part out of Part.

In which three things are attributed to Quantity : 1st . To have Parts ; and therefore God , Angels , Human Souls , Points , Unites , &c. are neither Quantity , nor Parts of Quantity , because not consisting of Parts . 2dly . To have Part out of Part ; that is , to have Parts not in Essence only , but also in Scite and Space different : For there are two kinds of Parts : Some together , and mutually penetrating each the other ; as Matter and Form : Others not , but are different in Scite , as Head , Breast , Body , Limbs , &c. And such as these are requir'd in Quantity . I said Part out of Part , rather than Parts , because Quantity may have but two , as in the Number Two . 3dly . To have Part out of Part by it self . Because a Corporeal Substance , and every Accident inhering in it , hath Part out of Part ; but by reason of Quantity , not by it self : But , Quantity , as Magnitude , and Number , and Time , have Part out of Part , and that by themselves .

Ax. 3. Quantity is either continu'd or discrete .

Ax. 4. Continu'd is that whose Parts are connected together by one common Term.

Ax. 5. Discrete , whose Parts are not connected by one common Term , and is nothing else but Number .

Number uses to be divided into Number numbering , and Number numbred . Number numbering is nothing else but Number in the Abstract , or a Collection of Unities it self , as two , three , &c. Number numbred is only Number in the concrete , or the things that are to be numbred , as Two Men , Three Horses , &c.

Ax. 6. Quantity continu'd , is either Magnitude or Time .

Ax. 7. Magnitude is a Permanent Quantity .

Ax. 8. Time a Fluent .

Ax. 9. It s Term is a Moment , or 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 .

That Quantity is said to be permanent which consists of Parts having a Position amongst themselves , or whose Parts exist together , and of which each may be shewn , where seated , and to which of the other Parts it sticks or coheres . But the Parts of Magnitude exist together , and each of them may be shewn where it is seated , and to which of the other Parts it coheres . But the Parts of Time have no Scite , because they consist in a continual Flux . Nor have the Parts of Number any Position , because they are no where seated , neither do they cohere . Yet the Parts both of Time and Number have an Order amongst themselves , by which some are before others , &c.

Ax. 10. Magnitude is either a Line , or a Superficies , or a Body .

Ax. 11. A Line is a Magnitude one way divisible .

Ax. 12. It s Term is a Point .

Ax. 13. A Superficies is a Magnitude , and two ways divisible .

Ax. 14. It s Term is a Line .

Ax. 15. A Body is a Magnitude three ways divisible .

Ax. 16. It s Term is a Superficies .

Ax. 17. A Term is an Extremity or Bound .

A Line is said to be one way divisible , because it is a meer Length without Breadth or Depth , as an Ell , a Furlong , a Mile . A Superficies two , because Length and Breadth , without Depth ; as an Acre of Land . A Body three ; that is , into Length , Breadth , and Thickness ; as a Cube , a Sphere , &c. For altho' a Body elsewhere signifies a Substance compos'd of Matter and Form , yet in this place it denotes nothing else , but Magnitude or Quantity every way divisible in the Abstract .

Nor are we yet to imagine a Longitude is to be found without Breadth , or a Breadth without Thickness : For these things are not really separate , but distinct only in the Mind .

Ax. 18. To Superficies is reduc'd Place .

Place is the next Superficies of the Body containing , as the next Superficies of the Cask is the place of Wine , &c.

Ax. 19. The Notes of Quantity are these Three : First , Quantity has not its Contrary .

That is , By it self : For if Quantity be said to be contrary to Quantity , it is because of its Quality adjoined ; as when the Winter Season is said to be contrary to the Summer , because of the Cold and Heat .

Ax. 20. Secondly , Quantity receives not more and less .

That is , Is not intended or remitted ; but it is extended and contracted .

Ax. 21. Thirdly , Things are said by Quantity to be equal or unequal .

I. For Equality and Inequality are Relations agreeing to things on the account of Quantity .

II. Hitherto of Quantity , properly so call'd , which , because contain'd in this one Category , is wont to be call'd Praedicamental . There is also another Quantity improperly so call'd , which consists not in the Extension of Parts , but in the Perfection and Vertue of every thing . Hence uses it to be call'd , The Quantity of Perfection , and Quantity of Vertue . For the Essential Perfections of Things and Vertues are compos'd of divers Degrees , as , the Quantity of a Heap or Mole of several Parts . This , because diffus'd almost through all the Categories , uses to be call'd a Transcendental Quantity .

III. To these may be added the Precepts which Aristotle gives us , Book IV. of his Metaphysicks , Cap. 13. Of Quantities , says he , some are by themselves , others by Accident . Those are said to be Quantities by themselves , in whose Definition is put Quantity . And these are either Quantities , 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , that is , according to their Essence , as Line , Superficies , and those other things which we have before-mention'd : Or 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , that is , Affections of those things which may be call'd Quantities according to their Essence , as Multum , Parum , Magnum , Parvum ; that is , Much , Little , Great , Small , &c. And the like if taken 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , that is , absolutely . For if 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , that is , compared one with another , they belong to the Category of Relation .

IV. Quantities by Accident are said two ways , First , those which are said to be Quantities upon the account of the Quantity in which they are , whether extended with the extension of the Subject , as , Whiteness in the Wall ; Or not , as , Musick in a Man . Secondly , Those whose Divisibility arises from the Divisibility of other things , as that of Motion , &c.

CHAP. VI. Of Quality .

Ax. 1. QUality is that Accident by which a Subject is said , and only said to be of what Quality it is .

Ax. 2. The Species's of it are Four : Habit and Disposition , Natural Power and Impotency , Patible Quality and Passion , Form and Figure .

Two Names are attributed to each single Species , to fignifie Qualities diverse rather in Degree or Time , or other Accidental Circumstance , than Species or Essence : For Habit and Disposition , Power and Impotency , differ in Degree : Patible Quality and Passion , in Time : Form and Figure , in Reason or Manner .

Ax. 3. Habit is an adventitious Quality of operating or doing any thing with ease .

Ax. 4. Disposition is an imperfect Habit.

1. § . Habit , in Greek 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , is sometimes taken for whatever form which may be separated from the Subject , as when oppos'd to Privation . So it is taken in the Tenth Chapter of the Book of Categories , and many other places . Sometimes for Cloathing , as Book IV. of the Metaphysicks , Chap. 20. whence also the last Category is call'd the Category of Having . Amongst Physicians it is taken for a Habit of Body , whether Good or Evil. Hence 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , or , a firm Constitution of Body , such as of old the Gladiators and Champions had : And 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , that is , a bad Constitution ; but in this place it is taken for the first Species of Quality which we have defin'd .

2. § . A Habit is said to be an adventitious Quality , because not flowing from the Essence of the Subject , or its Principles , but from elsewhere ; and is either infus'd by God , as Faith , Hope , Charity , Prophecy , Gift of Tongues , &c. or acquir'd by frequent Acts. Acquir'd Habits are either in Body , as , a good Habit of Body acquir'd by Industry ; or in the Mind ; and these either in the Understanding , as Sense , Intelligence , Wisdom , Prudence , and Art ; or in the Appetite , as Vertues and Vices Moral .

3. § . Disposition , in Greek 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , either signifies the Order of that which hath Parts , as in Book IV. of the Metaphysicks , Chap. 19. or any Quality which prepares Matter for the Reception of Substantial Form ; or any Quality of the first Species : In which Sense the Philosopher says , Chap. 8. of the Categories , where he disputes of Quality , Every Habit is a Disposition , but not every Disposition a Habit. Or , Lastly , A Habit beginning and imperfect , which is the signification of this Place .

4. § . A Habit differs from a Disposition , because inhering deeper in the Subject , it becomes more permanent and lasting than it : For a Disposition , as it is soon occasion'd , so it is soon mov'd and chang'd , as Aristotle speaks in the recited Place .

Ax. 5. Natural Power is a Quality not obvious to the Sense by which a Subject of its own Nature is apt to do or bear .

Ax. 6. Impotency is a diminish'd Power .

1. § . Natural Power , in Greek 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , differs from the third Species of Quality , because not obvious to the Senses , as that is . The same differs from Habit , both because it is from Nature , Habit elsewhere , and because it only renders the Subject fit to do or suffer . Whereas Habit also renders a Subject propense , and that to do expeditiously and with facility .

2. § . Natural Power is also divided by Aristotle , Book IV. of his Metaphysicks , Chap. 12. into Active and Passive . Both are defin'd in this manner : Some Power is said to be a Principle of Motion or Mutation in another , as it is another ; some from another as another : That is Active ; This Passive . For Example ; The Power of Generating , moving from Place to Place , Heating , Building , &c. is an Active Power ; But Softness is a Passive Power to Cutting or Section .

3. § . To these may be added a certain mixt Power , which , because a Principle of Mutation in it self , is at the same time Active and Passive ; as , the Intellect , and Will , &c. From this Power flow Actions immanent ; as , to Understand , and Will , &c. From Active , Transient , or passing out .

4. § . Besides which , Natural Power is either , First or Second . The first is that which flows immediately from the Form of the Subject . The Second , a disposition only of the Matter , and Apparatous of the Organs , with which the former exercises its Functions . For Example : The Faculty of Seeing , as it flows from a Sensitive Soul , is the First Power ; but as it consists in the Structure and Temperation of the Eye , it is the Second . The first Power cannot be taken away from any Subject , or diminish'd . The second be both taken away , and diminish'd : When therefore Impotency is said to be diminish'd Power , the second Power is to be understood .

5. § . To the Second Power are to be recall'd all Nature's Gifts , as well those of the Mind ; as Ingenuity , Aptness , Memory ; as those of the Body , as Strength , Hailness of Constitution , &c. Such Gifts as these , if they are very imperfect , as if any one be of a dull Wit , slippery Memory , &c. are said to be Impotences ; if wholly absent , they are not Qualities but Privations meerly .

Ax. 7. Patible Quality is that which effects a Passion in the Sense .

Ax. 8. Which if it soon vanishes , is said to be a Passion .

1. § . Patible Quality , in Greek 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , is not so called because the Subject suffers any thing from it , in which it is , but because it effects a Passion in the Senses .

Hitherto belong the Five proper Objects of the outward Senses , viz. Light , Colour , Sound , Smell , Taste , and the Tactile Qualities , such as the Four First Qualities , viz. Heat , Cold , Moistness , Driness , and those which arise from these , as Gravity , Levity , Rarity , Density , &c. every one of which Qualities affects a particular Sense ; Colour , the Sight ; Sound , the Hearing ; Heat , the Touch , &c. In which they are different from Figure and Form , which effect a Passion in more Senses than one , &c.

2. § . If the Patible Quality soon perish ; as , Paleness from Fear , or Redness from Shame , it is called 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , or Passion , because it comes with a Passion . And so it comes to pass that Regard , being had more to the Passion than to the Quality arising from the Passion , they are not so much said to be Quales , that is , affected so and so with a Quality , as to have suffered something , as Aristotle says , Cap. 13. of the Categories .

Ax. 9. Figure is a Quality arising from a Term of Magnitude .

Ax. 10. Form is a Figure with a Colour .

Form in Greek is term'd 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , Figure 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , Form is either Substantial or Accidental . Substantial Form belongs to the Category of Substance . Accidental Form in general is nothing else but an Accident ; which , like a Form , inheres in its Subject . In this Place every Accidental Form is not understood , but only that which consists about every thing , or which in the Superficies of a Body appears to our Eyes and Touch.

2. § . And altho' Figure and Form are often confounded , yet in this Place they are wont so to be distinguished as that Figure is given to things Mathematical , in which nothing is considered but Magnitude ; Form to things Physical , in which also Colour is considered . To Figure belong Triangle , Circle , Square , Sphaere , Cylinder , and other Appellations of Mathematical Figures and Affections of continued Quantity . To Form , Comliness , Deformity , &c.

Ax. 11. The Notes of Quality are Three : First , Quality has a Contrary .

1. § . So Vertue to Vice , Heat to Cold are Contrary . Contrariety is only found in the First and Third Species , not in the Second and Fourth , unless Fairness and Deformity seem Contraries ; which yet belong to Form .

Ax. 12. Quality admits of more and less .

1. § . That is , is intended and remitted : For one thing is hotter or less hot than another ; colder or less cold : This Note , or Affection of Quality arises either from Contrariety or Disposition of the Matter . Habit and patible Qualities receive more and less from Contrariety . For they are remitted when intermixed with their Contrary , and intended when they are free from it , Light excepted ; which altho' a a Patible Quality , yet is intended or remitted upon the Account of the unequal Disposition of the Subject , because is has not a Contrary . After the same Manner are the natural Powers intended and remitted . To which nothing is contrary with which they can be mixed .

Ax. 13. Things by Quality are said to be like or unlike .

1. § . For Likeness and Unlikeness are Relations agreeable to things by Reason of their Qualities .

CHAP. VII . Of Things related to each other .

Ax. 1. THose things are said to be related , which in Respect of what they are , are said to be others , that is , of others or in any other Manner or Respect are referred to 〈◊〉 .

1. § . This Definition of things related is Extant in the Beginning of the First Chapter of the Categories .

Ax. 2. Relateds are usually divided into Relateds in Respect of their Names , and those in Respect of their Essence .

Ax. 3. Relateds according to their Names are absolute things , which include or connote a Relatition ; and therefore not in Essence but in Name only are referred to something else .

Ax. 4. Relateds according to their Essence , are those things in whom to be , and to have respect to something else , is the same thing ; or whose Essence is wholly placed in the Respect they bear to some other thing .

1. § . Relateds in Respect of their Names , and Relateds in Respect of their Essence , differ not in the Nature of their Relation , but their Names . For the Names which agree to Relateds according to their Names signifie of themselves first , an Absolute thing , and secondly , connote a Relation which is included in that Absolute thing . But to Relateds according to their Essence , are such Names given , which of themselves signifie a Relation , and connote an Absolute thing , which that Relation presupposes , as it were , its Subject . For Example : Knowledge and a thing Knowable , are said to be Relateds according to their Names ; because Science is the Name of a Quality which includes a Respect to the Object knowable , or which may be known . And therefore the whole Essence of Science is not placed in Respect to the Object which may be known : Nay , the Essence of Knowledge or Science is an Absolute Quality , which is yet said to be referred to another ; because it connotes a Relation . But Father and Son are Relateds according to their Essence ; because these Words of themselves first signifie a Relation , or Mutual Respect ; and therefore the whole Essence of the Father as he is Father , is placed in Respect to the Son ; and that of the Son in Respect to his Father . For what is it else to be a Father , but to have a Son , and to be a Son , but to have a Father ?

2. § . From Relateds , according to their Names , little or nothing differ Relateds transcendent , so called , because they surpass or transcend all the Bounds of Categories . For there is nothing to which such Relateds do not agree . So Accident to the Subject , Action to the Object , Part to the whole , and Cause to the Caused , &c.

Ax. 5. Relateds are also divided into Relateds Real , and Relateds Rational .

Ax. 6. Relateds Real are those which of their own Nature , and without the Help of the Mind are referr'd to some other thing .

Ax. 7. Relateds of Reason are such as only by the Operation of the Mind are referred or related to somewhat else .

1. § . For Example : Father , Son ; Husband , and Wife , and other Relateds of that sort are real Relateds ; because the Father's being the Son's Father , and the Husband 's the Wive's Husband , does not depend upon the Cogitation of our Mind . But Right and Left are Relations of Reason ; because that to one standing betwixt two Columns , this should be Right , that Left , rather than the Contrary , is from the Ordination of the Mind . In this Sense to the Heaven also we assign Right and Left , Before and After ; and other Differences of Positions . But that One Hand shou'd be called Right and the other Left , seems not to be attributed to Reason , but Nature . To Relateds of Reason , also , Identity or Sameness is to be referred . For when any thing is so compared with it self , as that it is said to be the same with it self , that one thing is so used by the Understanding as if it were two : Hitherto also refer Beings of Reason , which are mutually referred to each other , as Genus and Species ; Subject and Predicate , &c.

Ax. 8. In every Relation are required Subject and Term.

Ax. 9. That is called the Subject to which the Relation is attributed ; or that which is referred to some other thing .

Ax. 10. That , the Term to which the Subject is referred .

Ax. 11. The Subject is said to be the Relate , and the Term the Correlate , when affected with a Relation , and considered together with it .

Ax. 12. Related and Correlated are mutually referred each to the other ; and that not in one , but a two-fold Relation .

Ax. 13. In which Reciprocation , or mutual Relation , that which is the Subject of one Relation is the Term of the other ; and so on the contrary .

Ax. 14. As also that which is in one Relation the Relate , is in the other the Correlate ; and so on the contrary .

1. § . These things that you may understand , suppose we between the Father and the Son , Two Relations to intercede ; of which the One in which the Father is referred to the Son , is commonly called Paternity ; the Other in which the Son is referred to the Father , Filiation or Son-ship . But Paternity and Filiation are not one , but two Relations diverse from each other ; Because the Father is otherwise related towards the Son than the Son is towards the Father . These Two Relations require two Subjects and two Terms , which are two Men ; as , suppose Philip and Alexander ; Philip is the Subject of Paternity , Alexander the Term. On the other side , Alexander is the Subject of Filiation ; Philip , the Term ; Father is the Relate in Paternity , Son the Correlate . On the other side , Son is the Relate in Filiation , Father the Correlate .

2. § . Father the Subject of Relation is wont vulgarly to be distinguished into Subject of Inhaesion , and Subject of Denomination . But these things have more in them of Subtilty than Truth .

Ax. 15. Some Relations are supposed , supposing the Subject and Term : Others besides these do require a Foundation .

Ax. 16. And a Foundation is that by whose Means the Relation accrews to the Subject .

1. For Example : When an Egg is said to be like an Egg , the Similitude between these two Eggs arises in each as soon as they begin to exist ; nor is there any thing required towards their Relation , besides the Existence of two Eggs. But the Relation of Servant does not presently arise in the Subject so soon as the Term exists ; but it behoves that something else also do intercede upon which this Relation is founded : For a Servant is therefore the Servant of one ; because by him he has been either saved or purchased , &c.

Ax. 17. Relateds are said either to be Synonimous , or of the same Name ; or Heteronymous , viz. of a diverse .

1. § . Relateds Synonymous are usually called Relateds of Aequiparancy ; as , Friend , Rival , &c. Heteronymous of Disquiparancy ; as , Father , Son ; Master , Servant , &c. If the Relation which agrees to Heteronyms has a Name , one of the two is called the Relate , to wit , that from which the Relation has its Name ; the other , the Correlate . If the Relation be without a Name , as when the Buyer is referred to the Seller , the Distinction of Related and Correlated depends only upon our selves ; as also in Synonymous : For there is no reason why the Buyer should be any more called the Related than the Correlated ; or of two Friends , that the One should be so called rather than the other .

Ax. 18. The Notes of Relateds are Five ; and first , Relateds have a Contrary .

1. § . The Relate is not contrary to its Correlate , but one related to another . This Note agrees not with Relateds per se ; that is , by themselves ; but by Virtue of their Foundation or Subject , and therefore not to all : For nothing is contrary to Father or Son , double or half , but to such only which lean on contrary Foundations , or accrue to contrary Subjects : For Friend and Enemy are Contraries ; because the Foundation of Friendship and Enmity , viz. Good Will and Ill Will are Contraries ; so like and unlike , equal and unequal are Contraries , because the things themselves or Subjects are Contraries . For Similitude is between the same Qualities , and Equality between the same Quantities . But Dissimilitude between divers Qualities , and Inequality between divers Quantities .

Ax. 19. Secondly , Relateds receive more and less .

1. § . This Note also agrees to Relateds in Regard of Subject or Foundation , and therefore not to all Relateds . For a Father or a Master is no more a Father or a Master than another ; but to such only as lean upon a mutable Subject or Foundation : For when the Subject or Foundation is varied , the Relation is intended or remitted . For Example : Those things which are unequal , become more or less unequal , when Quantity , which is the Subject of Inequality , is in either of the two more or less . And dissimilar things become more or less dissimilar , when the Quality in either of them is either intended or remitted .

Ax. 20. Thirdly , Relateds are Reciprocated .

1. § . That is , every Related is referred to a Reciprocal Correlate : As , the Master is the Master of the Servant ; and the Servant is the Servant of the Master . The half , the half of the double , and the double the double of the half . But it often happens through want of Words , that this Reciprocation does not appear : For the Head is the Head of something , and the Wing the Wing of something ; and yet to these there wants an answerable Correlate . For Animal cannot be a proper Correlate for Head , because all Animals have not a Head ; nor can Bird be a proper Correlate for Wing ; because even Flies , Wasps , Batts , have Wings and yet are not Birds . It is therefore necessary , says Aristotle upon this Head , to feign Words altho' not so much used ; that therefore the Reciprocation may be made apparent in the aforesaid Relationss , we must say , the Head is the Head of something having an Head , &c. and the Wing the Wing of something having a Wing , &c.

Ax. 21. Fourthly , Relateds are together in Nature .

1. § . That is , as they are related : For altho' Philip be before Alexander , yet is not Philip a Father before Alexander be a Son .

Ax. 22. Fifthly , Relateds are together in Knowledge .

1. § . Because one Related as a Related cannot be known without the other : For altho' he may be known who is the Son , without knowing him who is the Father ; yet can he not be known to be a Son , unless we know him to have a Father ; nor can it be known , whose Son any one is , if we are ignorant who is his Father , &c.

CHAP. VIII . Of Action and Passion .

Ax. 1. ACtion is nothing else but the manner after which we do a thing , or by which we are said to act .

Ax. 2. To Act is to Effect something .

Ax. 3. Passion is nothing else but the manner after which we suffer a thing , or that by which we are said to suffer .

Ax. 4. To suffer is to receive the Effect of the Agent .

1. § . Action and Passion are not so much things as the Way to things , or the Manner after which things are done , and the Flux of that which is said to be done .

Ax. 5. In Actions are to be distinguished Agent , Patient or Subject ; the Term from which , and the Term to which .

1. § . For Example : In the Action of Heating , the Agent is the Fire , or Sun ; the Patient or Subject , the Person who is warmed ; the Term from which , Cold ; the Term to which , Heat : For he who is warmed , is from being cold , made hot ; the Term to which , is always some true thing ; but the Term from which , is sometimes only a true thing , and contrary to the Term to which ; as in Calefaction or Heating : For Cold and Heat are true Qualities , and contrary one to the other : But sometimes that from which is nothing else but a meer Privation of the Term to which ; as when one from unlearned becomes learned : For when nothing is contrary to the Term to which , the Term from which is only privatively opposed to it .

Ax. 6. In every Action are necessarily required , in Agent , a Term from which , and a Term to which .

Ax. 7. And if the Term to which , cannot subsist of its self , then there is also required a Subject or Patient .

Ax. 8. If the Term to which subsist of it self , the Action consists without a Patient .

1. § . For since Action is nothing else but a Flux of the Effect , or the Term to which in fieri , as they say . If the Term to which requires a Subject , as in all Action , except Creation it does , the Action also requires a Subject : For since the Effect of Creation or Term to which is the whole Substance , it follows , that Creation has no Subject or Patient . For Creation is nothing else but the producing of something out of nothing ; that is , out of no Subjected Matter .

Ax. 9. When an Action has a Subject or Patient , it is not in the Agent , but Patient

1. § . For Action ( as we have said ) is a Flux of the Effect , and therefore ought to be in that Subject in which it is effected ; but the Effect is in the Patient , and therefore the Action ought to be in the Patient also .

Ax. 10. Even Action and Passion differ not in the Thing it self , but in Respect only to diverse Things .

1. § . For there is but one Flux of one Effect , which , as it proceeds from the Agent , is said to be Action ; as receiv'd by the Patient , a Passion . For as the Way from Athens to Thebes , and from Thebes to Athens , is one only Way collated to diverse Terms : And as the Rising and Falling of a Mountain or Hill differs only in Respect , so also Action and Passion are in this only Respect different ; one being referred to the Agent , the other to the Patient .

Ax. 11. Of Actions some are Immanent , others Transient .

Ax. 12. An Action immanent is that whose Effect is in the Agent , as to understand , to will .

Ax. 13. Transient , whose Effect is in another thing , as , to burn , to beat .

Ax. 14. In the Action immanent , the Agent and the Patient are the same . In the Transient , different in the thing it self .

Ax. 15. An Action Transient is divided according to the Diversity of its Term to which , into four Species ; the first of which is that of Substance , as Generation , to which is opposed Corruption . The second : Quantity , as Accretion , to which is opposed Diminution . The third , Quality , as Alteration . The fourth , of Place or Ubi , as Local Motion .

1. § . These things are delivered by Aristotle in the 14th Chapter of the Categories , but more fully to be handled in the Physicks .

Ax. 16. Action may also be divided into Univocal and Aequivocal .

Ax. 17. Action Univocal is that by which the Agent produces an Effect of its own Species .

Ax. 18. Action Aequivocal , of a diverse .

1. § . As when a Mouse generates a Mouse ; or Heat , Heat ; the Action is Univocal : But when the Sun generates Mice , or Light , Heat ; the Action is Aequivocal .

Ax. 19. Lastly , Action is divided into Perficient , or Corrupting ; that is , Spoiling .

Ax. 20. Action Perficient is that by which something is effected without the Destruction of any thing .

Ax. 21. Corrupting , that by which something is done , and another thing destroyed .

1. § . For Example : Illumination is an Action Perficient : For when the Air is enlighten'd it is done by Light , Nothing of Form destroyed ; but Generation and Heating are Actions Corrupting : For when an Animal or any such thing is generated , at the same time something else is destroyed ; and he that was hot , becomes so by the Dismission of the Cold. The Cause of this Difference is because Action Perficient is conversant amongst Terms privatively opposed ; corrupting between either Contruries or Disparates .

Ax. 22. The Notes of Action are two : First , Action has a Contrary .

Ax. 23. Secondly , Action receives more or less .

1. § . The Action of Heating is contrary to that of making cold ; and some things heat or cool more , others less : And to heat more in this Place is not to heat more swiftly , but intensly ; that is , to produce a more intense Heat .

Both these Notes belong to Action upon the Account of the Term to which , and therefore neither to all ; but those only whose Terms are contrary and receive Intension and Remission : And therefore to generate , to figure , &c. have no Contrary ; nor are they intended or remitted , because Substance or Figure neither has a Coutrary , or is intended or remitted .

2. § . And all those things which we have said of Action , agree also to Passion . For the Divisions and Notes of both are the same .

CHAP. IX . Of the Four last Categories

Ax. 1. UBi is a Mode after which finite things are said to be somewhere .

1. § . Ubi differs from Place ; in that Place , if strictly taken , agrees only with Bodies : Ubi also with Incorporeal Substances if finite : For Substances Incorporeal are said to be in a Place definitively ; that is , they are so said to be somewhere as not to be elsewhere ; but yet so as they occupy not any Place , or exclude other Substances , whether Corporeal or Incorporeal out of it , which is improperly to be in a Place ; but Corporeal Substances are said to be in a Place circumscriptively ; that is , are said to occupy , and expel other Corporeal Substances out of it ; which is properly to be in a Place . I say , definite , because God , who is Infinite , is not said to be somewhere , but everywhere .

2. § . There is also another difference between Place and Ubi : For Place belongs to the Question in which it is asked , How much a thing is in Quantity ? or how much Room will it take up ? Ubi to the Question in which it 's ask'd , Where , or whence the Thing is ? Whither , or which Way gone ? And those Answers which are made to these Questions ; as , at home , abroad , in the Country , in the Temple , hence , thence , hither , thither , this Way , that Way , &c. are plac'd in this Category .

Ax. 2. When is a Mode , after which finite things are said sometime to be , to have been , or to come .

1. § . Quando , or When , differ from Time strictly and properly so called ; as Ubi from Places For Time strictly taken , agrees only to Things Successive and consisting in a perpetual Motion and Flux of Parts : That is , according to Priomty or Posterinrity . For it is defined a Number of Motion according to First and Last in Book 4. of the Physicks , Cap. 11. But When is also attributed to things moment any and permanent , if finite : For those things which are infinite and eternal , are not said sometime to be , but always .

2. sect ; . Besides , the Words of Time belong to Quantity , and to the Question made by how long ? as , an Hour , a Year , an Age , &c , But the Words which belong to this Category to the Question made by When ; as , to Day , to Morrow , Yesterday , in the Summer , in the Spring , in the Calends , in the Nones , in the Consulship of Manlius , &c.

Ax. 3. Site is the Order of the Parts of the Body amongst themselves .

5. § . For Site belongs only to Bodies : For the Order of the Parts in Time or Number uses not to be called Site : For although Site cannot be changed without Local Motion ; which is a Motion to Where , yet is not Site to be confounded with Ubi , not so much as in Bodies : For the Ubi may be changed , not changing the Site . As when one without any Motion of Parts is carried out of one Place into another .

2. § . Site is either natural , as that of the Arm at the Shoulder-Blade , or of the Hand at the Wrist ; or voluntary ; as , to sit , to stand , to lie , to be prone , supine , &c.

Ax. 4. Habit is a Manner , after which Clothes , or any thing like Clothes , are put about the Body , appended or any other way adjoined to it .

1. § . To this Category belong all those Words which signifie the Conjunction of Clothes , Armour , and such like things with the Body ; as Clothed , Armed , Gowned , Shielded , Speared , Bearded , Strewed , or Covered with Arras , Tapestry , &c. These and the like Words signifie not Clothes or Arms , but the Conjunction of Clothes or Arms with the Body ; which Aristotle signified when in the 4th Book of the Metaph. Cap. 20. he called Habit the Act of him which has , and of that which is had ; and between him which has on the Garment , and the Garment it self , &c. And thus far of the Categories .

CHAP. X. Of the Praedicables in general .

Ax. 1. TReat we now of the Affections of simple Themes , or second Notions , which arise out of the Collation of the first , and things disposed in Categories .

Ax. 2. Those Affections are either simple or conjoyned .

Ax. 3. Simple , which are agreeable to things singly and apart by themselves .

Ax. 4. And are either Praedicables , Whole and Part , Cause and Caused , Subject or Adjunct , &c.

Ax. 5. Conjoyned ; Those that are agreeable to many things conjointly .

Ax. 6. And are either Convenience , Diversity , Opposition , or Order .

Ax. 7. The Predicables are five in Number , viz. Genus , Species , Difference , Property and Accident .

1. § . This Number is gathered thus . Whatever is affirmed of another after the Manner aforesaid , is either contained in the Essence of its Subject or not . That which is contained in the Essence , is either predicated in the Enunciation in which it is said ; what the Subject is ; or in that which it is said , of What Quality or Sort it is . That which is predicated in the Enunciation of which it is said ; What it is ; either expresses the Essence of it imperfectly , and is the Genus ; or fully and perfectly , and is the Species . That which is contained in the Essence , and expresses the Quality , is the Difference . That which is not contained in the Essence of the Subject , is either predicated of it necessarily , and is its Property ; or casually , and is its Accident , &c.

Ax. 8. The Use of Praedicables is either common or proper .

Ax. 9. The common Use is to be serviceable in the Formation of Definitions , Divisions , Syllogisms , and Method .

Ax. 10. The proper Use is double ; first , to declare what in every Category is superiour , what inferiour , what first , what last ; and from thence what of its own Nature is apt to be subjected , what predicated , &c.

Ax. 11. Of this Use are Genus , Species and Difference .

Ax. 12. The second is to shew after what Manner Accidents are predicated of their Substances .

Ax. 13. And of this are Propriety and Accident .

1. § . And therefore they are not to be heard , who deny Propriety and Accident to be of this Place .

CHAP. XI . Of Genus and Species .

Ax. 1. GEnus is that which is predicated of many things , and those different in Species , in the Question in which it is asked , What a thing is ; as , What is a Man or a Beast ? You say an Animal , &c.

1. § . Genus is so called of that Relation or Similitude it has to that Genus or Stock of Ancestry from whence a Generation of Men is descended : For as the Forefathers or Progenitors are the Beginning of their Posterity , and their Posterity again are in some kind of Relation or Kindred to each other , as proceeding from the said Stock : So also Genus is in some Respect the Beginning of its Species , and the Species themselves subject to it , agree so far amongst themselves as they are consonting in the same Genus , &c.

2. § . This Definition of Genus is extant , Book 1. of the Topicks , Cap. 5. and in Porphyrie , Cap 2.

Ax. 2. Species is that which is placed under the Genus , Or that of which the Genu is predicated in the Question in which it is asked What a thing is ; and is so called from that ancient Word Specio . See from whence the Words Aspicio , Respicio , &c. are derived .

Ax. 3. Of Genus's the one is the most general or chief , the other subaltern or middle .

Ax. 4. As also of Species's , the one of them is the most special or lowest , the other Subaltern .

Ax. 5. Genus the most general is that which when a Genus is not a Species ; or , than which there is not a superiour Genus .

Ax. 6. Species , the most special , is that which when a Species is not a Genus , or , than which , there is no other more inferiour Species .

Ax. 7. Those Genus's and Species are said to be Subaltern , which interjected between the Chief Genus and Lowest Species in respect of their Inferiours are said to be Genus's of their Superiours Species .

1. § . But that this Subordination of Genus's and Species may the better be understood , be for our Example , The Category of Substances ; in which Substance it self is the Chief Genus ; Man the lowest Species , or most special . The Interjected between them , viz. between Substance and Man ; such as Animal , Living Creature , Body , &c. are Subaltern : For Animal is the Genus of Man , and Species of living Creature ; and living Creature is the Genus of Animal , and Species of Body : and Body is the Species of Substance and Genus of living Creature , &c.

2. § . Subalterns have two Habitudes or Relations : For they are Genus's and Species with a diverse Respect . The chiefest and lowest have but one Habitude : For the Chief Genus is nothing else but a Genus , and the Lowest Species nothing else but a Species . The Species may indeed be conferred either with the Genus or Individuals : For it is to the Genus subjected , and predicated of the Individuals ; but in both of these Collations it is a Species : For in Respect of the Genus it is called a subjected Species ; or , as they vulgarly say , subjicicible ; and in Respect of the Individuals , a Predicated , or Predicable . And this alone constitutes the Second Predicable ; and is thus by Porphyrie defined .

Ax. 8. A Species is that which is predicated of many different in Number in the Question in which it is asked What a thing is ?

1. § . For when it is asked What is Plato and Socrates ? It is rightly answered , a Man . A Species differs from Individuals ; because it is predicated of many ; Genus's , because of those things which are different in Number . Those things are said to be different in Number , which when of the same Essence , may be numbred as many things ; as the Individuals of the same Species . Species also differs from Difference , Propriety and Accident ; because it is predicated in the Question in which it is asked What a Thing is .

Ax. 9. Genus is also divided into Synonymous or Univocal , and Homonymous or Equivocal .

Ax. 10. Genus Univocal is that which is equally predicated of its Species .

Ax. 11. Equivocal , Unequally .

1. § . To be unequally predicated of its Species is nothing , else but to agree to one Species more ; to another less : Or to one immediately , to the other by some other . And this is when one Species depends upon another . So Ens , if a Genus , is equivocal , because Substance is more so than Accident . Nay , Accident is no being , any farther than as it depends upon Substance . But Animal is an Univocal Genus ; because Man is no more an Animal than a Beast , nor a Beast than a Man .

2. § . A Genus Equivocal is a Genus in an imperfect Manner .

3. § . These are the Precepts usually given in this Place concerning Genus and Species : But because Aristotle in his Topicks delivers many , and those the most profitable Rules , of which some belong to the Business of Syllogism , and the Ratio of finding a Medium , others to the Doctrine of simple Themes : Therefore it will not be besides our Purpose , if out of many we select the Principal of them , which appertain to the Illustration of simple Themes , and insert them in their Places , referring the rest to the Doctrine of Syllogism : And 1st remember that ,

Ax. 12. Species partake of their Genus's , Genus's of their Species's not so .

1. § . 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , that is , Participare , by the Definition of Aristotle in the 4th Book of Topicks , Cap. 1. where this Canon is extant , is nothing else but to receive the Definition of that of which it participates . But the Species receives the Definition of the Genus , but the Genus not that of the Species : For whatsoever is in the Definition of the Genus , Suppose Animal , that is all likewise included in the Definition of the Species , to wit , Man or Beast , but not on the contrary .

Ax. 13. The Genus is said of the Species Synonymously , not Paronymously , or Denominatively : Also not Homonymously , or by way of Metaphor .

1. § . To be said Synonymously of a thing is nothing else but to be said as to its Name and Definition , as is before said out of Aristotle , Cap. 5. of the Categories . But Genus is said of the Species as to Name and Definition , because participated of its Species . Therefore it is said of Species Synonymously . And this is taught Book 2. of the Topicks , Cap. 2. Nor is the Genus only said Synonymously of the Species , but also in the Question in which it is asked , what the thing is : For all things which are answer'd to the Question , what is it , are predicated Synonymously of the Species , as is aforesaid ; but cannot be rendred to the Question , What is it ? Paronymous those things are called , which are said of another as to Name only , not Definition ; and that not in the Question in which it is asked , what a thing is ; but in which it is asked of what Quality it is ; or in an Oblique Case . From whence follows that , that cannot be the Genus of any thing which is said of it Paronymously . And therefore Whiteness is not the Genus of Snow ; because Snow is not said to be Whiteness , but white . See the 4th Book of the Topicks , Cap. 1. In like manner they are said to be Homonymous , under which also , 〈◊〉 are contained : Or , those , which , as Aristotle speaks , are said by way of Metaphor of many things , as to Name only , and not Definition : And for this Reason cannot be Genus's . So Dog cannot be said to be the common Genus of barking Animal , and a Star ; because an Homonymous Word : Nor can Ardor be said to be the Genus of Love ; because by way of Metaphor Love is said to be the Ardour of Concupiscence . See B. 4. Top. Cap. 3. which brings us to the next Axiom , viz. That ,

Ax. 14. That which is the Cause of a thing , or Part , or Affection , or Subject , that cannot be its Genus .

1. § . This Precept is extant Book 4. Topicks , Cap. 9. and leans upon this Reason ; viz. because these things are all said obliquely , and not in the right Case , or in Quid or What. So Grief , because it is the Cause of Anger cannot be said to be its Genus . In like manner Body cannot be the Genus of Animal , because its Part ; nor Immortality the Genus of Life Eternal , because it is its Affection ; nor Air of Wind , because it is its Subject . For Wind is not Air moved , but the Motion of the Air , or rather , of the Airy Exhalation .

Ax. 15. Genus , and Species , are under the same Genus , and if Accidents , in the same Subject .

1. § . The first Member of this Precept is extant Book 4. of the Topicks , Cap. 1. the other , Cap. 5. Both of which are founded upon this Reason ; because the Genus is contained in the Species . So Will is not the true Reason of Justice ; because a natural Power , when Justice is an Habit. So Science is not the Genus of Moral Virtue ; because in the Intellect when Virtue is in the Appetite .

Ax. 16. The Genus is before its Species , and Species its Individual .

1. § . This Rule is delivered Book 4. of the Topicks , Cap. 2. but it is to be understood as to the Consecution of the Existence : For that Priority has Place here : for supposing the Species , you suppose the Genus ; but not contrariwise . The Species therefore cannot be without its Genus ; but the Genus may be without its Species's ; that is , either of them , but not both together . A Synonymous Genus may be without either of them , but an Aequivocal not ; but only the less principal . For Example ; Animal may be without Man or Beast ; but not Man and Beast : But Ens not without Substance , but only Accident . That therefore is a Genus Synonymous , this Homonymous : As also the Genus is towards its Species , so is the Species towards its Individuals .

Ax. 17. Genus is predicated of more than its Species , and the Species than its Individuals .

Ax. 18. And altho' the Species may be preserved in one Individual , yet cannot the Genus be so , in one Species .

1. § . That the Genus is of greater Latitude than its Species , and the Species than its Individual , and consequently that the Genus is predicated of more than its Species , and the Species than its Individual , follows from the Definitions of them both , and is taught by Aristotle Book 4. of the Topicks , Cap. 1. But that the Species may be concerned in one Individual , when the Genus , not in one Species , is from hence , because the Species is more perfect in its Essence than the Genus , but not the Individual than its Species : For the Species includes its Genus , and besides its Genus an Essential Difference : But the Individual has no Essential Difference added to the Species ; but the Species absolves its whole Essence , there being only Occasion for Accidents , whereby it should be discern'd from other Individuals of the same Species . Since therefore a Species is constituted by a Genus , and an Essential Difference , and every Difference requires a Multitude , it follows that one Species cannot constitute a Genus . But Individuals have no Essential Difference by which to distinguish them amongst themselves : For they agree in their whole Essence , and therefore no more Individuals are required for the constituting of a Species .

CHAP. XII . Of Difference .

Ax. 1. Difference is that by which one thing differs from another .

Ax. 2. And is either Accidental or Essential .

Ax. 3. Accidental is that by which all things differ by Accidents , either from other things , or themselves .

Ax. 4. Essential which being added to the Genus , constitutes the Species , and distinguishes it Essentially from other Species's .

COMMENTARY .

1. § . Difference , in Greek 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , is , with Porphyrie Threefold , Commonly , Properly , and most Properly so said . Difference commonly so said , is that by which a thing differs by a separable Accident ; either from another thing , as when we say , one Man differs from another ; because one sits , the other stands ; one is silent , the other speaks ; or , from it self . So Hector seemed to Aencas when he appeared to him in a Dream , to differ from that Hector who returned clad with the Spoils of Achilles .

Difference properly so called , is that by which one thing differs from another by an inseparable Accident or Propriety ; as , a Crow from a Swan ; because this is white , that black . Both of these Differences are Accidental . The Difference most proper with Porphyrie , is that which we call Essential ; as when a Man because endued with Reason , is said to differ from Brute Beasts .

2. § . Every Difference , says Porphyrie , adjoined to any thing else , makes it to be other than it was ; Accidental , that it be dislike or other ways affected ; Essential , that it be quite different . Whence by the Greeks they are called 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , that is , Specifick .

Ax. 5. The Offices of Essential Difference are Two ; to divide the Genus and constitute the Species .

1. § . As it divides the Genus , it is called divisive ; as it constitutes the Species , constitutive , or completive ; because it compleats the Definition of the Species when it is conjoined to the Genus . Difference therefore Divisive and Constitutive are not two diverse Differences , but Offices of the same Difference . The highest Genus's have no constitutive Difference ; because first and immediately diverse . And the lowest Species's have no divisive ; because Individuals agree in their whole Essence . But Accidental Differences belong to the following Predicables ; only Essential to this Place , and is so defined .

Ax. 6. Difference is that which is predicated Essentially of many things , different , whether in Number or Species , in the Question in which it is asked , Of what Quality a thing is .

1. § . The Differences of the lowest Species's are predicated of many things , different in Number ; as , Rational , Of Plato and Socrates , &c. Those of Species's Subaltern , in Species , as to be endued with Sense of Man and Beast . Difference is said to be predicated in the Question in which it is asked , Of what Quality a thing is ; because it is a certain Quality of the Genus : For Genus being in its own Nature indetermined , is determined , and , as one may say , qualified by Difference : For to one asking , What sort of Animal is Man ? it is aptly answered , a Rational . Difference is said to be Essentially predicated ; because put in the Definition of Species , and predicated Synonymously of it ; that is , as to Name and Definition . And therein is Difference distinguished from Propriety and Accident .

CHAP. XIII . Of Property , and Accident .

Ax. 1. PRoper is that which declares not what a thing is , and yet is only in it , and reciprocated with it .

COMMENTARY .

1. § . A Thing is said by Porphyrie to be proper four Ways : First , that which agrees and convenes to one only Species , and not to all its Individuals : So it agrees to Man to be musical . Secondly , that which convenes to all the Individuals of any one Species , but not to it only ; and so it agrees to Man to be Two-footed . Thirdly , that which agrees to one only Species and all its Individuals , but not always : So it agrees to Man to laugh Fourthly , that which belongs only to one Species and all its Individuals , and always ; and so it agrees to Man to be risible , or a laughing Creature .

2. § . The Fourth of these Properties Porphyrie calls properly proper : For the rest , says he , are only proper in some Respect , and for some time .

3. § . This Definition of Property is extant in the first Book of the Topicks , Cap. 5. Properties , says he , do not declare , What a thing is ; that is , they are not contained in the Essence of the Subject , but follow it , reciprocated with that in which alone they are ; that is , with the first and proximate Subject ; not those contained under that proximate Subject : For of Properties some are of Genus's , others Species's : The Properties of Genus's with Genus's , not Species's ; and those of Species's with Species's , not Individuals , are to be conferred and reciprocated . So to be of Quantity is reciprocated with Natural Body and not the Heaven , or Element , or Stone . And Risibility is to be reciprocated with Man , not Socrates or Plato . When the Property then of the Genus is predicated of the Species ; as , when the Heaven is said to be of Quantity ; or the Property of the Species with the Individual ; as when Plato is said to be risible . The Predication is not of the Accident of the Subject , nor yet the Property : For the Number of Predicable arises from a Comparison of the Predicate with the Proximate Subject . For those compared with the remote are not of this Place ; as have been beforesaid .

Ax. 2. Properties either flow from the Essence of the Subject , or from External Cause .

1. § . Propers either flow immediately from the Essence of the Subject ; as Risibility from the rational Soul , Quantity from the Essence of Natural Bodies : Or , by the Mediation of some other Property . So to be in a Place , flows from the Essence of a Body , by reason of its Quantity : But now an Eclipse , which is the Property of the Moon , flows not from the Essence of the Moon , but from an External Cause , to wit , the Interposition of the Earth between the Sun and the Moon . These are not absolutely proper , but only from Supposition of some External Cause ; which Cause yet being in being , they are no less necessarily in their Subject , than the others .

Ax. 3. Properties which flow from the Essence of the Subject are so necessarily in it that they cannot be separate from it , so much as in Thought .

1. § . So that he would be guilty of a Contradiction that should say or think that the Property was absent from it : For whosoever says or thinks a Body is not Quantity , or that the Fire is not hot , says or thinks as much as if he should say or think , a Body is not a Body , or a Fire a Fire .

Ax. 4. Properties cannot be communicated to Subjects of different Species's .

1. § . Let no body call that a Property , says Aristotle , Book 4. of the Topicks Cap. 5. which may be in another : For since Properties flow from the Essence of the Subject ; if Properties should be communicated , of necessity also the Essence would be communicated : For if Risibility or Rationability could be communicated to an Horse , a Horse would be a Man ; if Quantity to a Spirit , a Spirit would be a Body ; and if to be every where to a Creature , a Creature would be God , &c.

Ax. 5. As Properties which flow from the Essence of the Subject are to their absolute Subjects , so are Properties also which flow from an External Cause , to theirs , the Cause being put .

1. § . So altho' the Moon does not always suffer an Eclipse , yet when the Earth is interposed between the Sun and the Moon , it is as necessary it should suffer an Eclipse , as that a Body should be a Quantity , or that the Fire should be hot , &c.

Ax. 6. An Accident is that which in any One and the same thing may be , and not be .

Ax. 7. Or thus : An Accident is that which is either present or absent , without the Ruine of the Subject .

1. § . That which is present or absent , that is , may be present or absent at divers times without a Contradiction : for one Part of a Contradiction we know destroys another . The Sense therefore of that Axiom is no more than this . An Accident is that which without a Contradiction may be affirmed or denied of its Subject .

Ax. 8. Of Acidents some are separable , some inseparable .

Ax. 9. A Separable is that which may be in Reality separated from its Subject ; as , to stand , to sit .

Ax. 10. An Inseparable that which cannot ; as Blackness from the Crow .

1. § . All Accidents may be separated from their Subject in Thought , without a Contradiction . And herein they differ from Properties which cannot . For he who thinks a Crow not to be black , altho' he thinks false , yet he does not think a Crow not to be a Crow , or any thing from which it may follow a Crow is not a Crow . But he who conceives that the Fire is not hot , conceives that , from whence it must follow , that the Fire is not a Fire , &c.

2 § . That Accident therefore is said to be separable , which in Reality may be separated , and not only thought ; or without which the Subject may naturally exist ; Inseparable not : For God also may separate inseparable Accidents from their Subjects ; because he can do all things , which evert not one another , and imply not a Contradiction .

CHAP. XIV . Of Whole and Part.

Ax. 1. A Whole is that which consists in the Union of many things , or Parts .

Ax. 2. Those things which , united compose or constitute the whole , are called Parts .

COMMENTARY .

1. § . In a Whole therefore there are Parts and a Union of Parts : Wherefore when God is said to be wholly every where , or the Humane Soul is said to be whole in the Whole , and whole in every Part , viz. of the Body . The Word whole is improperly taken , and as they vulgarly say , Negatively . For that God is wholly in all Places and every where , signifies nothing else , but that God is not every where by Parts , but after an indivisible sort a Mannet . So also that the Soul is Whole in the Whole , and Whole in every Part of the Body , is nothing else but that the Soul is not in the Body by Parts , so as that the Parts of the Soul should answer to the Parts of the Body , &c.

Ax. 3. The Whole does not really differ from its Parts , taken all together and united .

1. § . The Whole without all doubt differs from its particular Parts : For the Man is one thing , and the Soul or Body another thing : It differs also from all the Parts taken together and not united : For a Corporeal Substance is different from Matter and Form , as is deliver'd in the Second Book de An. Cap. 2. and the 7th of the Metaphysicks , Cap. 3. Also a Syllable is not the same with the Letters of which it consists , as appears from the 6th Book of the Metaphysicks Cap. 17. Also the Whole is said to be Generated , Spoiled , &c. Which of the Parts cannot be said . The Parts are likewise said to Constitute the Whole ; but the Whole constitutes not it self : But if the Parts are all considered together and united , they are all together the same with the Whole : For nothing can be feigned to be in the Whole but what is in the United Parts : Nor nothing is in the United Parts but what is in the Whole .

Ax. 4. The Parts are by Nature before the Whole , and simply more known : But the Whole is more known to us .

1. § . That which is before in Nature , is simply more known ; that is , is first apprehended in a distinct and perfect Knowledge : For a perfect Knowledge follows the Order of Nature . That which is Posterior in Nature is more known to us ; that is , is first apprehended by a confused and imperfect Knowledge . For the Knowledge of our Understanding is at first confused because it derives its Original from the Senses . The Parts therefore are simply more known than the Whole , and the Whole to us than its Parts ; as is collected from Book 1. of the Metaphysicks , Cap. 1.

Ax. 5. Of Wholes , One is by its self , and the other by Accident .

Ax. 6. A Whole by it self is that , in which the Parts are by themselves .

Ax. 7. A Whole by Accident ; in which by Accident .

1. § . The Parts are said then to be in , of themselves , when either the Whole it self is Essential to the Parts , or the Parts are appertaining to the Essence at least Integrity of the Whole . By Accident when on the Contrary . For Example : Animal is a Whole of its self in Respect to Man and Beast ; because Essential to both : A Whole also of the same Nature in Respect to Body and Soul ; because compos'd of both . But when Men are divided into Freemen and Slaves , Man is then a Whole by Accident ; because to be free or to be in Slavery , agree not to Men by themselves but by Accident , and by Reason of the Condition they have in the City .

Ax. 8. Whole by it self is four-fold ; the one being Universal or Logical , the other Formal or Metaphysical , the third Essential or Physical , the fourth Integral or Mathematical .

1. § . An Universal is nothing more than a Genus in Respect of its Species , or its Species of its Individuals .

Ax. 9. An Universal , says Aristotle , is a certain Whole ; because it comprises many things as Parts . So Animal , as we have said , is a Whole in Respect of Man and Beast ; Man in Respect of Socrates , and Plato and other Men. And because Universal contains not subjected Species's and Individuals in Act ; that is , actually , but Power , it is come to pass that this Whole is called Potential ; whereas the rest of the Species's are called Actual ; because truly containing their Pasts . It is also called Logical , because it is the Office of Logick to dispute of Universals .

Ax. 10. A Formal Whole is nothing else but a Species in Respect of its Genus and Difference by which it is defined .

1. § . So Man is a Whole , and his Parts are Animal and Rational . These Parts are distinguished only by Reason . And therefore a Composition of Genus and Difference is not a true Composition but of Reason : That is , such in which the Mind understands one thing by two Notions ; of which one by the other is determined . This Whole is used to be called Metaphysical , because Metaphysicks are chiefly conversant about those things which are not so much in themselves , as in Reason , different . From whence also its Parts are said to be Formal ; as if one should say , which by Reason only , which they call Formality , are distinguished .

Ax. 11. An Essential Whole is that which consists of Matter and Form .

1. § . Hitherto appertain First and Principally Corporeal Substances : and then by way of Similitude , Accidents in the Concrete , as Just , White , &c. in which the Subject is as it were the Matter , Accident in the Abstract is the Form in which Number , also , are Works performed by Art . Of this Place also are those things in which are distinguished Material and Formal : Or , in which there is something Analogous to Matter and Form . So the Matter of Disciplines , are Precepts , the Form , Method : Of Interpretation , Voice ; the Form , Signification . This whole uses to be call'd Physical ; because Physicks vindicate to themselves the Consideration of those things which consist of Matter and Form ; Vulgarly it 's called Essential .

Ax. 12. An Integral Whole is that which has Part out of Part.

1. § . Now Essential Parts are really different : for Matter is one thing and Form another : But yet one Part is not out of another : For Matter permeates Matter , and informs all its Parts . But Parts Integral because each is endued with his proper Quantity , not only differ in themselves , but also Site , or , at least Order ; So that one is not contained in another . For this it is to have Part out of Part. For Example : The Parts of the Human Body are Head , Breast , Belly , Limbs ; of the which one containeth not another : So the Parts of Number are divers , and one is not contained in another . This Whole is termed Mathematical ; because Quantity is of Mathematical Consideration : Vulgarly , Integral , more properly Integrate .

Ax. 13. An Integral Whole is either Continued or Discrete .

Ax. 14. Both are divided into Homogeneal and Heterogenal ; that is Similar and Dissimilar .

Ax. 15. Homogeneal is that which has Parts of the same Name and Nature .

Ax. 16. Heterogeneal of a Diverse .

1. § . This Distribution of the whole Integral is extant in the First Book of the Hist. An. Cap. 1. and Book 2. Of the Parts of An. Cap. 1. and Book 1. Of the Gener. of An. Cap. 1. For Example : Inanimate Substances , as Water , Wine , Flesh ; also Magnitude , Motion , and Time , are Wholes Homogeneal , Continual : The Bodies of Animate , Heterogeneal Continual : Numbers , as Three , Ten , are Wholes Homogeneal , Discrete . An Army , Church , the World ; Heterogeneal and of the same Denomination .

Ax. 17. A Part Heterogeneal is either Principal or less Principal .

Ax. 18. That 's a Principal , by whose Ablation , or Taking away , the whole is destroyed .

Ax. 19. The less , by whose taking away the Whole is only maimed or mutilated .

1. § . For Example : Hand , Brain , Heart , Liver , are Principal Parts of Man ; because these taken away , of Necessity the Man must die . Foot , Hand , Ear , &c. are less Principal ; because these being taken away , it is not necessary a Man should die .

Ax. 20. A Whole by Accident is chiefly said Four Ways ; and first , of a Cause of divers Effects ; secondly , an Effect of divers Causes ; thirdly , of a Subject of divers Adjuncts ; fourthly , of an Adjunct of divers Subjects .

1. § . First , a Cause of divers Effects : And so a Plant may be said to be a Whole ; because of Plants , some heat , others cool , &c.

Secondly , an Effect of divers Causes ; as , Mice , some of which are said to be generated of the Sun , others , of Mice , &c.

Thirdly , a Subject of divers Adjuncts ; as , Men , some of which are said to be bond , some free ; some good , some bad , &c. An Adjunct of divers Subjects ; as , Diseases , some of which are said to be of the Mind , some the Body ; these again either , of the Brain , Eyes , Lights , &c.

CHAP. XV. Of Cause and Caused in general .

Ax. 1. A Cause is that by the Force of which a thing comes to pass .

COMMENTARY .

1. § . Principle , Element and Cause , are Words that are ally'd in Signification . Principle is either largely taken , or strictly . Largely , it is defined Book 4. Of the Metaphysicks , Cap. 1. to be the First from whence any thing is , or exists , or is known . More strictly Book 4. Of the Physicks , Cap. 5. where Principles are defined to be those things which are neither from one another , nor others , and of , and from which are all things . In this Sense there are only reckon'd Three , viz. Matter , Form , and Privation . The Definition of Element is Extant Book 4. Of the Metaphysicks , Cap. 3. and is thus . An Element is that our of which any thing at the first is compounded , in which it is , and which in its own Species is indivisible into any other Species .

2. § . Cause is here said to be that by which a thing is , that is , which confers somewhat towards the things Existence ; and therefore Privation cannot be a Cause ; because it confers Nothing but only towards its Mutation .

Ax. 2. A Caused is that which is constituted of its Causes .

Ax. 3. The Cause is before it s Caused , both in Nature and Knowledge .

1. § . In Nature , because the Caused depends upon the Cause . Knowledge , that is , simply and distinct Knowledge , which follows the Order of Nature : For to us the Cause is more known than it ; because nearer to the Senses : For from the Senses do we derive all our Sensible Knowledge .

Ax. 4. The Causes are Four , viz. Matter , Form ; Efficient and End .

1. § . This Partition is extant Book 2. Of the Post . Cap. 2. Book 2. Of the Physicks , Cap. 3. and Book 4. Cap. 2. And is built upon the best Reason . For whatever is made , is made by another : For nothing is made by its self . There is therefore an Efficient Cause . Nothing finite can produce any thing out of nothing . There is therefore Matter out of which things are to be made , and Form which is introduc'd upon that Matter , when things are made . Nothing lastly , acts without Design : there is therefore an End for whose sake the Cause Efficient acts .

Ax. 5. The Caused of Matter and Form is call'd the Composed ; of the Efficient , the Effect ; of the End , the Means or Designed : and these differ not in Reality but Reason .

1 § . And since to the Constitution of the Caused , Four Causes concur ) as in all Corporeal things there do ) it ought not to seem strange that one and the same thing should be called Composed , Effect , Means , &c. according as it is compared with divers Causes .

Ax. 6. In every Genus there is a certain Subordination of Causes .

Ax. 7. Subordinate are those that depend one upon another .

1. § . To wit , either as to their Existence , and so the Son upon the Father , the Father upon the Grandfather : or Causality ; and so the Quill upon the Hand in Writing : or both ; and so the Second Causes upon the First ; or Creatures upon God .

Ax. 8. Causes likewise are said either to be Essentially or Accidentally subordinated .

Ax. 9. Essentially are those of which one depends upon another , when , and in as much as it causes .

Ax. 10. Accidentally , Of which one indeed depends upon another , but not when , or in as much as it causes .

1. § . And so a Cause is said to be two Ways subordinated by Accident ; First , when it depends indeed upon a superiour Cause ; but not when that is when it Causes ; and this is Effected , when it depends upon it for Existence , and not Causality . After this manner depends the Father upon his Ancestors in the begetting of his Son , and every near Cause upon the more remote . Secondly , when it also depends upon a Superiour Cause when it causes , or for its Causality ; but not for as much as it causes , or not in the same manner after which it causes . In this manner the Statuary is subordinate to the Heavens in the making of the Statue : For because the Statuary stands in need of the Virtue of the Heavens towards his Work , he may be said to depend upon the Heavens in Respect of his Causality ; but because not as he makes the Statue , but as he lives . He is said to depend upon the Heavens by Accident , and to be Accidentally subordinated to them in the making of the Statue . In the same manner the Horse spurr'd on by his Rider , hurting his Leg , halts . The hurt Leg is the Cause of his Halting , subordinated to the Rader by Accident : For the Leg or Horse is impell'd on by the Rider to Motion , but not to a vitious Motion , &c.

Ax. 11. In such a Subordination there is ever one next Cause , the rest are remote .

Ax. 12. The next Cause is that which immediately constitutes the Caused .

Ax. 13. Remote , that which concurs to the Constitution of the Caused by the Mediation of some other Cause of its own Genus .

1. § . A Cause is said to be next , two Ways , either in its own Genus , or absolutely . That is said to be absolutely next ; which not only immediately , but by its own Existence constitutes the Caused : And so , that it being supposed , it is necessary the Caused be so too . The next Cause in its Genus we have already defined , and have said it immediately concurs towards the Constitution of the Caused ; no other of its own Order coming between . One thing may have many Causes in their own Genus next ; but one only that is absolutely next ; which in Substances is Form , Accidents , Efficient and End . So whereas to Man the Proximate Matter is Humane Body ; Efficient , Father ; End , Well-being ; Form , Rational Soul ; the Rational Soul yet only is the next absolute Cause .

Ax. 14. Lastly , In every Genus there are some Causes Total , some Partial .

Ax. 15. That Cause is total , which in its Species wholly causes the Whole Caused .

Ax. 16. That Partial which joyned with the other Causes of its own Species causes the Caused only in Part.

1. § . In every Genus of Causes there are many Species's of Cause , and those either Subordinate , as Cause First and Second , Next and Remote , Principal and Instrumental , or Coordinate , of which one depends not upon another . A Total Cause is said wholly to constitute the Caused ; because not assisted by other Causes of its own Species . For Example : The Writing depends upon the Quill and the Hand ; but upon both as total Causes : For the Quill is only or wholly the Instrumental , and the Hand the Principal Cause : So likewise when God , the Sun , and Man are said to Generate Man , every one of these Causes is Total : God is the First , the Sun or Heaven is the total Universal , Man the total Second and Particular : But when two Horses draw in a Cart they are said to be partial Causes ; because they are both of the same Species , which brings us to the next Axiom , viz.

Ax. 17. Of One thing there cannot be many total Causes of the same Species ; but there may be many different in Species and Subordinate .

1. § . If many Causes , not Subordinate do concur to the same Caused , of necessity they must be Partial : For the total Cause causes the whole thing : Wherefore if there are many total Causes , either the rest cause Nothing , and so are not Causes ; or else cause again what was caus'd before : But if Causes different in Species , are Subordinate , it may so be , that the same Caused may depend upon many Causes total : So the whole Writing depends on the Hand and the Quill ; and the whole Man upon God , and the Sun , and his Parents .

CHAP. XVI . Of Matter and Form .

Ax. 1. OF the Four Causes Two are Internal , Matter and Form ; and as many External , Efficient and End .

Ax. 2. Those Causes are said to be Internal , which enter the Essence of the Caused , as Parts .

COMMENTARY .

1. § . Altho' Form be far more noble than Matter , and confer more to the Constituting the Caused , yet it is not to be doubted but that Matter also is part of the Essence , and not only a Vehicle or Receiver .

Ax. 3. Matter in Greek 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 is defined to be that out of which inexisting something is made .

1. § . This Definition is extant Book 2. of the Physicks , Cap. 3. and Book 4. of the Metaph. Cap. 2. But it may more Fully and Explicatiously be defined in this Manner . Matter is an Internal Cause of which any thing is made or consists . Why , I add Consists will be sufficiently understood out of the 9th Theoreme . Matter is also defined Book 2. Post . Cap. 11. but more obscurely to be That which , any thing being supposed , of Necessity must be so too .

2. § . Generally Matter is divided into that out of which , in which , and about which : That out of which is that which is properly so called , and we have but now defined ; In which , the Subject ; about which , the Object ; Of which , in their Places .

Ax. 4. The Offices of Matter are two ; to take up Forms and sustain them ; and with the Form to constitute the Composed .

Ax. 5. Matter is either First or Second .

Ax. 6. The first Matter is informed .

Ax. 7. The Second formed .

1. § . Altho' no Matter may exist without Form , yet Because Matter is not altogether nothing , nor the same with Form , why may it not by it self be understood not understanding Form ? And this is the first Matter , which Aristotle Book 1. of the Physicks , Cap. 9. defines in this Manner . That is Matter , says he , which is the first Subject out of which any thing is made : So that it is not in it by Accident ; and if it should be spoiled it would be into that resolved at last . Nor is it yet to be thought that the First and Second Matter are two several Matters . Nay , one and the same Matter , is said to be first and second , as it is this way or that way considered .

Ax. 8. Farther , Matter is either of Natural or Artificial Bodies .

1. § . For Example : Elements are the Matter of Mix'd Bodies ; Seed of Living ; Gold or Silver , of the Cup ; Wood of the Shelf , &c.

Ax. 9. And both of these either of Composition , or Generation .

Ax. 10. The Matter of Composition is that of which a thing consists .

Ax. 11. Of Generation , out of which it is made .

1. § . For Example : The Body is the Matter of Composition in an Animal ; Seed , of Generation . In things of Art the Matter of Generation and Composition is almost the same : as also in Meteors . For a Shelf is made and consists of Wood ; Clouds of Vapours ; Ice of Water , &c. When the Matter of Generation and Composition is divers , that is said to be the remote , this the proximate Matter .

2. § . Now Aristotle divides Matter also , Book 8. of the Met. Cap. 6. into intelligible and sensible : And Intelligible is that when in Accidents or other simple things the Mind distinguishes between Material and Formal . So Letters are said to be the Matter of Words , Words of Speech ; so Precepts of Discipline , Method the Form : After this manner are distinguished Material and Formal in the Subjects of Disciplines . Material is the thing it self which is considered ; Formal the manner of its Confideration : So the Material of Physicks is Natural Body ; Formal , as Natural .

Ax. 12. Form is defin'd to be that which explains What a thing is ; or the Ratio of that by which it is explained , What a thing is ; or , lastly , the Ratio of the Essence .

1. § . Form in the Greek is is term'd 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , or also 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 ; that is , Species , or 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 ; that is , Exemplar ; sometimes also 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 ; that is , according to Hermolaus Barbarus , its perfect Habitude , or the like . These three all conspire in the same thing , and return to this , viz. That Form is the Internal Cause by which a thing is that which it is : For by Matter also it exists ; but by Form it is that which it is ; that is , of this or that Species . For Example : That Man exists , is no less from Matter than Form : But that he is a Man rather than of any other Species of Creatures , is due only to Form .

Ax. 13. The Offices of Form are Two , viz. to inform the Matter , and with such matter to constitute the Composed .

1. § . And these are not so much different in the thing it self as in Reason : For when Matter of it self informed , and determined , receives Form , it is determined with Form to constitute a certain Species of Compositum . Both therefore constitute the Composed ; Matter by receiving Form , and Form by determining or Forming Matter , and that by an Union intervening : For without an Union of Form with Matter , the Composed is not constituted , which brings us to the next Theorem , viz. that ,

Ax. 14. Form is four ways divided , and first into Material and Immaterial .

Ax. 15. Material Form is that which is produced out of the Power of Matter , or which dependeth upon Matter in that . self same Moment and Act , by which it is made .

Ax. 16. Immaterial , which is not produc'd , neither does it depend , &c ,

1. § . To be produc'd out of the Power of Matter , is nothing else but to be produc'd by an Efficient Cause in the Matter ; and so as that the Matter promotes that Action by its Causality . After this Manner are produc'd Material Forms . Forms Immaterial are also produc'd by an Efficient Cause in the Matter ; but the Matter it self does not contribute towards the Action . And this properly is said to create . Material Forms , not only when making , but also when made , depend upon Matter Immaterial , neither . Hence is it that those are Corruptible , these Incorruptible . All Forms of Natural things , the Humane Soul excepted , are Material , which only is Immaterial .

Ax. 17. Secondly , Form is divided into Substantial and Accidental ; of which that Constitutes the Substance , this the Accident in the Concrete .

1. § . For Example : The Substantial Form of a Musician , as he is Man , is the Rational Soul ; Accidental , as he is a Musician , Musick . In the like Manner the Substantial Form of a Statue is , the Form it self abstractedly of the Marble or Brass ; Accidental , as a Statue , the Figure .

Ax. 18. Thirdly , Form is divided into Natural and Artificial .

Ax. 19. Natural is that , which is of Nature , Artificial of Art .

1. § . For Example : The Soul is the Form Natural of every living thing . The Forms of other Natural things want Names , and therefore are to us almost unknown . Figure is the Artificial Form of a Statue , as an Artificial thing ; not as a Natural , to wit , Marble or Brass : For Artificial Forms are Qualities of Natural things , no Formal Causes ; but yet they are the Formal Causes of Artificial things , as Artificial : For Artificials are certain Accidents Concrete with their Substances .

Ax. 20. Fourthly and Lastly . Form is divided into Principal and Disposing .

Ax. 21. The Principal is that which constitutes the Species it self .

Ax. 22. Disponent , which disposes the Matter to an Aptitude for the Reception of the Principal Form .

1. § . The Principal Form is always a Substantial Form , disposing either Accidental or Substantial . Disposition Accidental is required in all things having a Substantial Form ; Substantial in animated only . For Example : When Wood's burnt , it is first made hot and dryed , and after this manner made fit , to receive the Form of Fire . So likewise , when a Statue is made out of a Beam or Timber , it is by degrees to be disposed and form'd into the Figure of a Statue . But when an Animal is to be generated of Seed , this Seed not only by its Qualities , but also Substantial Form is to be disposed and made fit to receive the Soul ; which Form in Respect of the Seed is a Principal , tho' of the Soul , or Animal , a Disposing , &c.

2. § . Form also may be divided into Intelligible and Sensible ; but of this enough has been said already in the Doctrine of Matter .

CHAP. XVII . Of Efficient Cause .

Ax. 1. CAuses External are those which enter not the Essence of the thing , as Efficient and End .

Ax. 2. An Efficient is an External Cause , from which a thing proceeds by a true Causality .

1. § . For a thing may be said to proceed also from the End , but by a Metaphorical , not a true Causality .

Ax. 3. An Efficient is of a very large Extent .

Ax. 4. And is first divided into Active , which , by the Mediation of Action , causes the Effect ; and into that from which a thing immediately flows and proceeds without any Action .

1. § . It sometimes happens that a Cause causes the Effect by the Mediation of some Action which is said to be its Causality in causing . Such a Cause we call Active ; sometimes by its own Existence without any Causality distinct from its Existence ; and this by some is call'd Emanative : Which Word tho' feign'd with Repugnance to the Analogy of the Latin Tongue , yet is it to be used upon this Occasion till a more Convenient can be found out . For Example : The Fire is the Emanative Cause of its own Heat ; but the Active of anothers .

Ax. 5. Secondly , Cause Efficient is divided into Immanent and Transient .

Ax. 6. Immanent is that which produces the Effect in its self .

Ax. 7. Transient , out of it self .

1. § . For Example : When a Workman builds a House , or any one throws a Stone , both these are said to be Transient ; but when our Mind understands or desires any thing , it is said to be the Immanent Cause of those Conceptions or Affections , which in understanding or desiring , it forms .

Ax. 8. The Conditions of the Transient Cause are Two : 1st that it be conjoin'd with the Patient ; and 2dly unlike unto it .

1. § . The first of these is precepted , Book 7. Physicks , Cap. 3. and the other Book 1. of Gener. and Corrup . Cap. 7. An Efficient is said to be two ways joined to the Patient , to wit , either by Existence vulgarly call'd Suppositum , or Virtue . For Example : When Fire burns Wood , it is conjoyn'd to the Wood by its Existence ; when heats the Sitters by , it is not joyn'd to them by its Existence , but Power , or Virtue .

2. § . An Agent likewise is said to be Two Ways unlike the Patient , either as to Species or Degree . In the first manner Hot to Cold ; in the last , that which is more hot to that which is less hot ; or that which is more cold to that which is less cold . Those which neither the one cannot act upon the other , or suffer from it any manner of ways .

Ax. 9. Thirdly , the Efficient is divided into free and necessary .

Ax. 10. A Free is that which Causes Consultedly , or with Design .

Ax. 11. A Necessary , not , but by Necessity of Nature .

1. § . Liberty , in general is a Faculty of doing what one pleases , and therefore he who is absolutely free , is free from all Servitude , Law imposed upon him by others , Coaction and Necessity of Nature . But when the Will is said to be free , and a free Cause opposed to a Necessary , nothing farther is understood by the Name of Liberty , but an Immunity from Coaction , Necessity , and natural Determination . For he who is a Servant or Subject to another's Law , enjoys the Liberty of his own Will , when he judges that he is to live according to the Law or Beck of him with whom he lives . But Natural Necessity and Coaction evert Liberty . Why therefore is not coacted Cause contained in this Division ? Because he who is compell'd , is so compell'd by another , as that he conduces nothing to the Effect himself , and therefore cannot be numbered amongst the Efficients .

2. § . By Natural Necessity we understand not only that by which Inanimate things act , as Plants , but that also by which Brutes and Infants before the Use of Reason . For the Actions of Brutes and Infants proceed almost , in the same manner from Natural Instinct , and Sense ; as do the Actions of Plants from Nature it self . In this Sense are the Parts of the Division immediately opposed ; and in this are contained all the Species's of Causes which follow .

Ax. 12. A free Cause can act , and not act , what , how , and when it pleases .

Ax. 13. A Necessary is determin'd to one certain thing , and acts both when , and as much as it can .

1. § . For Example : For this Cause is one said freely to dispute or write ; because Voluntarily and of ones own Accord one disputes or writes ; and also because one can dispute or not dispute ; and the Disputation begun , can at Will interrupt ; or do any of those things , which are said to be in our own Power . For to these only does the Liberty of the Will extend . Causes necessary are determin'd to one thing ; that is , they can , but cannot but act ; and that only which they do , and nothing else ; and as much as they can : So Fire cannot but heat fit Matter , and heats every thing so much , as that it cannot heat it any more .

Ax. 14. Fourthly , Cause Efficient is divided into Cause by it self , and Cause by Accident .

Ax. 15. Cause by it self is that which as it is such , produces an Effect of its own Council , and agreeable to its Natural Disposition .

Ax. 16. By Accident , which not as such , or else besides its own Council or Natural Propension .

1. § . That a Cause Efficient be a Cause of it self two Conditions , thus , are required . First , that the Effect answer to its Council or Natural Propension ; to its Council if a Free , Propension if a Necessary . The other , that it produce it as such . If either of these are wanting , the Cause is said to be by Accident : If the first , because some Event , or Effect by Accident , coheres with the Effect which is produc'd by the Cause Efficient , by it self . As when one digging up the Earth , finds a Treasure : For to dig the Earth , is the Effect of the Digger by it self , with which Effect , the finding of the Treasure by Accident ; that is , besides the Council of the Digger and Nature of the Digging is joyn'd . So when an Animal begets a Monster , it is the Cause of the Monster by Accident . Because the Generation of the Monster is joyned with that of Nature by Accident , and besides its Scope and Intention ; If the latter , that is , if the latter Qualification be wanting , the Cause is said by Accident ; because the Effect is not ascrib'd to the Cause , but that which happens to it . As when Polyclete , or a Musician is said to be the Cause of a Statue : For neither does Polyclete make the Statue as he is Polyclete , or Musician as he is Musician , but a Statuary : For it is Accidental to the Statuary ; that he is either Polyclete or a Musician . See Book 2. of the Physicks , Cap. 2.

Ax. 17. To cause by Accident are reduc'd Fortune and Chance .

1. § . Videlicet , To the first Species of it which is said to be by reason of its Effect . Fortune in Greek 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , is defin'd by Aristotle , Book 2. of the Physicks , Cap. 5. thus ; It is therefore manifest , that Fortune is a Cause by Accident in those things which are done for the sake of something , and consultedly undertaken . By Themistius in his Periphrase upon this Place , more fully , to be a Cause by Accident of those things which neither necessarily , nor often , but rarely happen ; and in those alone which for the sake of something are consultedly undertaken .

2. § . Now Chance in Creek 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , is a Cause by Accident of those things which rarely happen , and that in all those things which are undertaken for the sake of another , and not only consultedly : For Chance extends farther than Fortune . For whereas both are Causes by Accident , which act for the sake of some End , and are conversant in things rarely happening , Fortune only is placed in those things which act consultedly : Chance also in those which act by Necessity of Nature ; as in Infants , Brutes , Plants , and also inanimate things , in which there is no Place for Fortune . As for Instance , when any one digging , finds a Treasure , we may say , that 't was by Chance or Fortune done : But when a Tile falling from a House shall wound a Passer by , that is , we say , by Chance , not Fortune done . All Fortune therefore is Chance , but not on the contrary ; as is said Book the same , Cap. 6. Altho' these Words are often confounded .

Ax. 18. Fifthly , Cause Efficient is divided into Principal and less Principal .

Ax. 19. A Principal is that which produces the Effect by its own Virtue .

Ax. 20. A Less , which inserves the Principal towards its producing the Effect .

Ax. 21. The Principal Cause , is either equal to , or nobler , never worse than the Effect ; the less Principal as far as it causes , is always worse than or inferiour to the Effect .

1. § . When we compare the Effect with the Cause we are to consider the Cause as it is such ; that is , according to that Virtue by which it causes , when the Virtue of the Cause is such as that it contains in it , whatever is in the Effect , it is said to be a principal Cause . The Effect is said to be contained in the Cause , either formally or eminently . When formally , or the Effect is of the same Nature with the Cause , the Cause is said to be univocal , and is equal to its Effect ; as when Heat begets Heat , or a Mouse a Mouse : When Eminently , or the Cause by a Nobler Sort of Virtue produces the Effect , it is said to be Aequivocal , and is better than its Effect ; as , when Light produces Heat , or the Architect an House ; when neither formally nor eminently , it is said to be less Principal , and that not so much effects as subserves the Principal in producing the Effect .

Ax. 22. The less Principal is subdivided into procatarctical , Proëgumenal , and Instrumental .

Ax. 23. Procatarctical , is that which Extrinsically excites the principal Cause to Action .

Ax. 24. The Proëgumenal , which inwardly disposes , or also excites the principal Cause to Action .

1. The Cause in Greek 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 or Procatarctical , in Latin may be called Incipiens or Inchoans , that is , beginning or inchoating : And is either Object , Occasion , Author , or Merit . So far it may be said to be the Object , as it moves or excites the principal Cause to Action . Occasion is the Conveniency of Time and Place to act in , which it self also has some Force of moving to Action , in as much as it removes Impediments to Action . Author , here is said to be him who proposing Reasons , persuades the principal Cause either to , or from Action : He is also call'd the Moral Cause . Merit or Meritorious Cause is that which moves the Agent to a Requital , and that either in good or evil things . And even all these are without the principal Cause : In which they are distinguished from the Proegumenal , which consists in the principal Cause it self . For Example : If any one walking about in the Night should see many precious things in the open House of his Enemy , from whom just before he had receiv'd an Injury , to be negligently kept , and at the Instigation of another should take them away . The objective Cause of of this would be the Precious Things themselves , exciting the Covetousness of the Thief ; the Occasion , the Darkness of the Night and open House , which in no little Measure further him in his Purpose ; the Author or Moral Cause , he who instigated him ; the Meritorious , the Injury received , for which the Thief comes to be more prone to steal : The Proëgumenal Cause is the proper Avarice of the Thief . Farthermore , Author or Cause Moral , has Place only in voluntary Causes . Object , Occasion , Meritorious and Proëgumental , also in others . Occasion is sometimes taken for Cause Meritorious . As when an Injury committed or done is said to be the Occasion of a Fight , or War , or Slaughter ; and in this Sense if feigned , is call'd by the Greeks 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , and the Latins Pretext . The Proëgumenal either disposes only the principal Cause ; as when the Temperament of the Body is said to be the Cause of Manners ; or , also , moves it and spurs it on : As when Anger is said to be the Cause of Revenge , or Avarice of Theft .

2. § . The Procatarctical and Proëgumenal Causes are of great Use in Physick : For Physicians reduce almost all Diseases to three Causes Procatarctical , Proegumenal and Synectical or Containing . The Procatarctical with them is the External and Evident Cause . The other Two the Internal and hidden Causes . The Proëgumenal the Antecedent . The Containing the 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , or that which is connate with and also exists together with the Disease , and coheres immediately with it ; and this , with us , is the next Cause . For Example : The Procatarctical Cause of the Fever is either Cold , or the Astringent Bathes ; the Proëgumenal , the Skin bound up and Evaporation hindred ; the Containing , the Humour Putrescent and accended .

Ax. 25. The Instrumental Cause is that which subserves the principal Cause in its Effecting .

1. § . All Instruments subserve not the Principal in the like Manner : For there are some Instruments joyn'd to the principal Cause in acting ; and there are some in acting separate from them . Those are Instruments conjoyn'd , of which the principal Cause makes use in the Effection of the thing . And these are either Active as the Heat in the Fire , or Passive , as a Knife , a Sword , &c. Separate Instruments are those which act in the place and stead of the principal Cause . So the Ambassadour is the Instrument of the Prince ; and the Seed seems , to many , the Instrument of Generation , but mistakenly : For separate Instruments have no Place in Naturals , but Morals . And this brings us to the next Maxim , viz.

Ax. 26. The Essence of Instruments consists in their Fitness for Use .

1. § . Instruments , says Aristotle Book 2. of An. Cap. 4. in Offices and Uses , are distinguish'd or convene amongst themselves : For every Instrument is that which it is , because , and so far as it is fit for some certain Use . So an Ax is so far an Ax , as that in the Quality of its Matter and Form , it is fit to cut : And the Eye so far an Eye as it is fit to see with . For the Eye , the Hand , and other Organical Parts of Man or Beast , when dead , are not Eye or Hand , unless Homonymously or ambiguously , that is , doubtfully , as Aristotle says , Book 4. of the Meteors , Cap. 17.

Ax. 27. Sixthly , Cause Efficient is divided into First and Second .

Ax. 28. The First is that which depends upon none .

Ax. 29. The Second , which depends upon the First .

1. § . A Cause is Two Ways said to be First ; to wit , absolutely , or in its own Genus . That is said to be absolutely , on which all things depend ; both when they are Made , Exist , and Operate ; or as they say in Fieri , Esse , and Operation . The Cause absolutely First , is only One , to wit , God . For all things depend on God , both as to their Making , Being and Operating ; according to that of the Apostle St. Paul , Acts 17. In him we live , and move , and have our Being . Furthermore , all things are said to depend upon God as they are made , or in Fieri , as they say , by reason of Creation ; and that either proximately or remotely ; as they are ; or in being , by reason of Conservation , as they operate of his Providence , either ordinarily or extraordinarily , &c.

2. § . That Cause is said to be First in its own Genus , on which the rest of the Causes of the same Genus depend . Such a First Cause is , not only given , in every Genus of Causes , but also in every Subordination . So Adam is the first Cause of Men in his Species ; because begotten of no other Man as the rest were , but immediately created of God : So also the Heaven is the first Cause of Motion , not absolutely , but in the Genus of Natural Causes ; as is collected from the 1st . Book of the Meteors , Cap. 1. In the same manner may the Soul be said to be the first Cause of vital Operations ; and likewise every principal Cause in regard of its Instruments , &c.

Ax. 30. Seventhly , Cause Efficient is divided into Universal and Particular .

Ax. 31. Universal is that which concurrs with other Causes , with the same Efficiency , to the producing of many Effects .

Ax. 32. A Particular only which by its Efficiency produces but one Effect .

1. § . Universal Causes are God and the Heavens . God concurrs with particular Causes to all Effects . The Heavens only to them which are Natural and Material . In this Sense Book 2. of the Physicks , Cap. 2. The Sun , and Man , I add God , are said to beget Man : The Sun as an universal : For with the same Efficiency it concurrs to the producing of all things ; Man as a Particular : So , also may a Driver be said to be a Universal , when driving a Team of Horses ; because in the same manner , and with the same Virtue , he drives all his Horses , as well the Sound as the Lame .

Ax. 33. Lastly and Eighthly . Cause Efficient is divided into next and remote .

Ax. 34. The Next , is that which produces the Effect immediately .

Ax. 35. The Remote , which produces the Effect by means of some more neighbouring Cause .

1. § . A Cause Efficient is said to be two ways Next ; to wit , either generally or specially . In general , that Cause is said to be Next , which either by its Existence they commonly say , Suppositum , or Virtue is joyned to the Effect : For such Virtue being an Instrument of the principal Cause , it is deem'd with the Principal to be one only . And therefore when the principal Cause by its Virtue is joyned to the Effect , it is its self esteemed to be joyned to the Effect . Neither is it any matter , whether that Virtue be an Instrument conjoyned or separate . For Example : The Fire is said to be the next Cause of Ustion ; Parents of their Children ; notwithstanding the Fire acts by Mediation of Heat , and the Parents of Seed : For altho' Heat and Seed are Instruments , yet do they not effect by their Intervening ; but that the principal Cause may be said to be next to the Effect , A Cause therefore is said to be remote in this Sense , viz. which neither by its Existence nor Virtue is joyned to the Effect : As when the Grandfather is said to be the Cause of his Son's Son , or Grandson , &c.

2. A Cause Efficient is said to be next in Species which is so joyned by its Existence to its Effect ; as that it is joyned to it without any mediating Virtue . And a next Cause has no Place in Substances , but only Accidents especially proper : For a Substance does not effect a Substance without some mediate or instrumental Virtue . And this is the Cause which is said to be absolutely next ; and that is either Internal or External . Internal is that which is in the Subject of the Accident , of which it is the Cause . So the Soul and every Substantial Form , is said to be the next Cause of its own Proprieties . Hitherto appertaineth the Emanative Cause : Likewise the Continent , or Synectical of the Physicians . External is that which is not in the Subject of that Accident whose Cause it is . And so the Interposition of the Earth , is said to be the next Cause of an Eclipse . But the Use of this Cause in the Definition , and Demonstration of proper Accidents is much the more great .

CHAP. XVIII . Of End .

Ax. 1. ENd is defin'd to be that , for the sake of which a thing is .

1. § . Being that which moves the Efficient to Action by superinducing its Love upon it , and begetting an Appetite on , and Desire of it self .

Ax. 2. End is three ways divided ; and first into that of which , and for which .

Ax. 3. The End of which , is that which the Efficient desires .

Ax. 4. For which , for whose sake , or for which , the Efficient desires such an End .

1. § . As for Instance , The of which , of Medicine is Health ; for which , the Sick .

Ax. 5. Secondly , End is divided into Principal and Secondary .

Ax. 6. The Principal End is that which the Agent first , or also , principally intends .

Ax. 7. The Secondary , which the Agent so intends as that it may enjoy it with the Principal ; or else attain it , if the first and principal End should fail .

1. § . For Example : The principal End of Clothes , is , that our Bodies should be defended against the Inclemency of the Heavens ; the Secondary Conjoyned with that Principal , is that they should adorn it . So the Principal End for which God was pleas'd to manifest himself in the Creation of the World , was , that Man should be endued with the Knowledge of God and Piety : The Secondary and Succedaneous , that he might render them inexcusable , who holding the Truth in Unrighteousness , go on still in Iniquity .

Ax. 8. Thirdly and Lastly , End is divided into Subordinate and Last .

Ax. 9. A Subordinate End is that which is referred to some farther End .

Ax. 10. The Last , to which all other Ends are referred ; that it self to no farther .

1. § . There is often a long Series of Subordinate Ends , in which the Subordinate is a Means in Respect of the Sequent End . For Example : One digging in the Earth , to fetch out Iron : Iron is drawn out , that of it may be made some Instrument , which may be serviceable for our Use : As , suppose a Penknife , or a Lancet ; the Lancet inserves the Physician for the Cutting of the Vein ; the Cutting of the Vein to transmit the Superfluous Blood , or take away the Vitious . The Loss of Blood conduces to the Conservation or Recuperation of Health . Our Health indeed of it self is to be desired ; but referred notwithstanding to this End , that our Actions may be free and Expedite . Actions again are referred either to Pleasure , or Glory , or Honesty , or something else ; in which Subordination of Ends there is no going to Infinity as we have taught before . For otherwise vain and fruitless , would be that Appetition which Nature has planted in all things ; as the Philosopher argues Book 1. of the Ethicks , Cap. 1. There is therefore some chief End in which the Appetite must terminate and acquiesce .

2. § . An End is said to be two ways last ; either in its own Genus or absolutely . That is said to be so in its own Genus , which is the last amongst those Ends which are intended by the same Agent . So in that Series which I have brought , there are many Ends which are last in their own Genus : For to fetch forth Iron is the last End of such who dig in the Mines ; the Penknife of the Smith , Health of the Physician : But there is but one absolutely last , and that is Felicity .

3. § . That End which is subordinated in its own Genus , is referr'd to a farther End by it self : But that which is last , by Accident . For Example : The Smith softens Iron in the Fire , puts it upon the Anvil , strikes it , hammers it , polishes it , whets it , till of it he makes a Lancet . All these by themselves , and in respect of the same Agent , viz. the Smith , are subordinated : For the Lancet is the whole Endeavour of the Smith . But that it should be serviceable to the Physician in letting of Blood is no Care of the Smith's ; and therefore all those things which the Smith does in Order to the making the Lancet , are subordinated to this End of the Pysician's by Accident .

Ax. 11. When the End is good , by how much the farther off it is , by so much the better it must needs be ; the last End therefore must be the best , and the chief Good it self .

1. § . This Theorem is extant Book 1. of the Eth. Cap. 5. That the End is good , is abovesaid ; Otherwise it would not move the Efficient : Nor is it yet sufficient that it be good ; but it ought also to be good of it self ; since the Means are no otherwise good than as they are serviceable to the obtaining of the End ; from whence follows that the End is better than the Means . But the subordinate is a Means in respect of the Sequent , that is , the subordinate End . The last End therefore is something which is best ; because in no respect a means by which it should become worse : Nor is it material whether this End be real or imaginary , as is said Book 4. of the Metaph. Cap. 2. Since the End no otherways moves the Efficient , than as it seems to be good , and so we come to the next Axiom , which is ,

Ax. 12. By how much an End is the last in the Execution , by so much the earlier is it in the Intension . And so on the contrary .

1. § . End also is divided into Internal and External ; but this Division has not Place in all things , but only Faculties and Arts Conjectural , in which that is said to be Internal , which the Artificer attains to as often as he pleases ; External , which he does not always attain to : So the Internal of Oratory is to speak Ornately , and Accommodately to persuade ; the External to persuade .

2. § . The Division of End into End by it self , and End by Accident , as vulgarly understood is not without its Fault : For an End by Accident is not a Final Cause : For a Final Cause is not a Cause any farther than it is intended . But an End by Accident is not intended , but evenes besides the Intention . Wherefore when an End is said to be by Accident , the Event or Effect by Accident is to be understood : For if any one digging in the Field , that he may make it more Fertile , should by Accident find a Treasure , the finding that Treasure will not be the End , but Effect , or Event of it by Accident .

CHAP. XIX . Of Subject and Adjunct .

Ax. 1. A Subject is that to which something is adjoyn'd besides its Essence .

Ax. 2. And an Adjunct that which is adjoyn'd to something besides its Essence .

COMMENTARY .

1. § . We commonly use to distinguish betwixt a Subject of Inhesion and a Subject of Praedication or Denomination . A Subject of Inhesion is nothing else but a Substance in Respect of its Accidents Inherent . So Snow is the Subject of Whiteness which inheres in it . A Subject of Predication or Denomination is either largely or strictly taken : Largely , for any thing , whether Substance or Accident , of which any thing may be said , in any Predication , whether Essential , Accidental , Internal , External , Absolute , or Limited .

2. § . In this Place not only the Subject of Inhesion , but also every Subject of Predication or Denomination , of which any thing may be said in an Accidental Predication , whether External , Internal , Absolute , or Limited , is to be understood . And all these things which may be said in this Manner of any Subject , are to be understood under the Name of Adjuncts .

Ax. 3. Adjuncts may be 3 ways divided ; and first , into Proper and Common .

1. § . Common are nothing else but Accidents that are absolutely so call'd and oppos'd to Proper .

Ax. 4. Secondly , into Absolute and Limited .

Ax. 5. An Absolute is that which simply and absolutely agrees with the Subject .

Ax. 6. A Limited , which in some respect only .

1. § . That is , according to some Part or Nature , or Time , or Place , or Respect . For Example : Mortality is the absolute Adjunct of Man whilst Immortality is the Limited ; because Man is not absolutely Immortal ; but only as to the Soul : So Whiteness is the Limited of an Aethiop ; because he is not absolutely , which is as much as to say totally , but only as to his Teeth , White .

Ax. 7. Thirdly , Adjuncts are divided into Internal and External .

Ax. 8. Adjuncts Internal are those which inhere in the Subject .

Ax. 9. External , which are ordered and disposed Externally about it .

1. § . A Subject receives Adjuncts Internal into its self : As Snow , Whiteness ; the Soul , Science or Knowledge : External to it self ; as the Sight , Colour ; Soldier , Arms , &c. Internal give to the Subject Internal Denomination ; External , External : For when Snow is denominated from its Whiteness ; it is an Interternal Denomination . But when a Soldier is said to be Armed , or the Eye to see any thing , it is an External Denomination . Vulgarly these Denominations are called Intrinsical and Extrinsical .

2. § . Internal Adjuncts are Accidents ; as suppose Quantity , Quality , &c. and their Subject always a Substance ; Adjuncts Externl are either Substances or Accidents : For either a Substance to a Substance , or an Accident to an Accident , or an Accident to Substance , or a Substance to an Accident , may be joyned ; as from what follows , will appear .

Ax. 10. An External Adjunct is either Object , Sign , or Circumstance .

Ax. 11. An Object is that , about which any thing is employ'd in its Operation .

1. § . Object and Subject , in Disciplines are us'd almost without Discrimination .

2. § . In Disciplines Theoretical , one only Object is required ; in Practical , a Two-fold , viz. one of Doctrine , another of Use . The Doctrinal is that which is explained by Definitions and Divisions , throughout the whole Discipline . The Object of Use or Practice is that about which the Exercitation it self , of the Discipline is Conversant : So , in Ethicks or Morals , the Objects of Doctrine are Virtues and Vices ; Practice , the Soul : For this do Ethicks endue with Virtues . In Disciplines Directing , the Object of Practice , is even almost Two-fold ; one which from the Discipline it self is directed : and the other in which is operated that which is directed . So the Object of Logick , we have said to be two-fold . In Arts Mechanical , the Object of Doctrine does not appear ; because acquired by Exercitation only , and not Precepts , or Institution .

Ax. 12. Of Objects , some are by themselves , others by Accident .

Ax. 13. An Object by it self is that which is both objected to the thing as such ; and about which the thing as such is employed .

Ax. 14. That by Accident which not to the thing as such ; or about which the thing as such is not employed &c.

1. § . An Object by it self requires two Conditions the one upon the Account of it self ; the other its Subject to which it is subjected . Upon the Account of it self it is requir'd that it should be subjected to the thing as such : So Good is the Object of the Will , of its self , Evil by Accident : For the Will desires Good in its own Nature ; Evil , not : Nay , Evil is not desired as Evil , but seeming to be good , Book 3. of the Ethicks , Cap. 4. So the Object of the Sight by it self is Colour , by Accident Dias his Son , Book 2. of An. Cap. 6. For Dias's Son is not seen as Dias's Son , but as Coloured : For it is accidental only that that which is Coloured is Dias's Son . The other Condition we said to be required in the Object it self by reason of the Subject is that the thing should be conversant about it , as it self such . For Example : When the Architect builds an House , the Matter out of which it is made is the Architect's Object by it self ; because as such he is conversant about it ; but the same Matter would be the Object of the Musician by Accident , if a Musician should be said to build ; because he builds not as a Musician , but Architect .

Ax. 15. Object by it self is either Proper or Common .

Ax. 16. An Object proper is that which is objected only to one thing .

Ax. 17. Common , to many .

1. § . So Colour is the proper Object of the Sight , Sound of the Hearing , Savour of the Tasting , &c. Magnitude , Number , Figure , Motion , Rest , the common Objects of the Senses ; because every one of them is perceived by many Senses .

Ax. 18. Both are either Mediate or Immediate .

Ax. 19. A Mediate is that which is objected to any one by the Mediation of another .

Az. 20. Immediate , by the Mediation of none .

1. § . So the sensible Qualities are the immediate Objects of the Senses : A Substance invested with those Qualities , the Mediate : And thus much of the Object .

Ax. 21. A Sign is that which offereth it self to the Senses , and that of which it is the Sign to the Understanding .

1. § . The Sign is the Adjunct , the thing signified the Subject . A Sign does these two things : First , offers it self to the Senses , and then moves the Mind that it may consider of the thing that is signify'd .

Ax. 22. Sign is divided many Ways ; and first into Natural and Arbitrary .

Ax. 23. Sign Natural , is that which signifies of its own Nature .

1. § . So the Morning is the Sign of the Sun 's being about the Rise ; the Footstep , of the Foot ; the Image in the Glass , of the Countenance : The Sign Natural belongs almost to the Doctrine of Causes : For every Natural Sign is either the Cause of the thing signified , or the Effect , or else both are the Effects of the same Cause , &c.

Ax. 24. A Sign Arbitrary is that which signifies according to Institution .

1. § . Either Humane , as when the suspended Ivy is a Sign of Wine to be sold ; or Divine , as when the Sacraments are said to be Signs of Divine Grace .

Ax. 25. Secondly , Sign is divided into Formal and Material .

Ax. 26. The Formal is that which represents the thing .

1. § . So a Picture is a Sign of the thing painted ; the Footstep , of the Foot ; Conceptions of things , &c. It is call'd by Aristotle 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , that is , Resemblance , Cap. 2. of the Interp.

Ax. 27. A Material is that which does indicate the thing , indeed , but does not represent it .

1. § . So the Rainbow is a Sign of Rain . Smoak of Flame ; Pale Moon , of Winds ; Red , of fair Weather , &c.

Ax. 28. Thirdly , Signs ate divided into Antecedent , Consequent and Conjoyn'd .

1. § . Antecedent , such as the Morning , of the Rising Sun ; the Coaction of the Clouds , of Rain ; Consequent , as Floating Planks of a Tempest ; Paleness of a Distemper ; Conjoyn'd as an unequal Pulse , of a Fever ; a hairy Skin , of Salacity , &c. Hitherto do also appertain Signs Meteorological , and Physiognunical .

Ax. 29. Fourthly and Lastly , Signs are divided into Necessary and Contingent ; of which those make a certain , and these an uncertain Indication of a thing .

1. § . For Example : The Morning certainly foreshews the Rising of the Sun ; and the unequal Pulse of the Artery certainly shews a Fever : But Paleness is a Sign of Love , and the Coaction of the Clouds , of Rain , but fallacious : For a Sign is fallacious , when it does not necessarily cohere with the Thing ; or is common to many things . Necessary Signs the Greeks call 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , the rest 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , that is , Verisimilous , or Probable . Altho' they seem then , lastly , to be called 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , or probable , when probable Propositions may be drawn from them : As when the Clouds are gathered together it will suddenly Rain , he who is Pale , is in Love , &c.

Ax. 30. A Circumstance is that which is about the thing , adjacent , or apposite to it .

1. § . Hitherto appertain Time , Place , Vestiture , Armature , and other things of that Nature . And thus far of simple Affections .

CHAP. XX. Of Conveniency of Things .

Ax. 1. NOw follow Convenience , Diversity , Opposition and Order ; which we said were Affections conjoyn'd .

Ax. 2. Convenience is that by which many , or as many , are united amongst themselves .

Ax. 3. And is either Real , or of Reason .

Ax. 4. Real Convenience is the Convenience of on-thing with it self .

Ax. 5. Reason of many Things in One Conception .

1. § . This Distribution is by the Philosopher mentioned Book 4. of the Metaph. Cap. 7.

Ax. 6. Convenience is also divided into Simple and Analogical .

Ax. 7. Simple's the Convenience of one thing with another in the same Third .

Ax. 8. Analogical , or Analogy , of many , with many in the same Habitude .

1. § . Analogy , in the Latin Tongue Proportio , is desin'd by Euclid Book 5. Prop. 4. to be a Similitude of Ratio's . A Ratio according to the same Author is a certain mutual Habitude of two Magnitudes of the same Genus with Respect to Quantity . And therefore since a Ratio has two Terms , and Analogy two Ratio's at the least ; it follows , Analogy consists in four Terms at the least ; of which the first has the same respect to the second , as the third has to the fourth ; as may be seen in these Numbers , 4 , 8.6 , 12. For as 4 are in respect of 8 , so 6 are in respect of 12.

2. § . And altho' Mathematicians do usually constitute Analogy in Quantity only , and in the Habitude of the Whole to the Part , or on the contrary ; there is no Cause yet why Analogy may not be attributed to all things in general , which by a mutual Habitude convene amongst themselves , whether it be that of Whole to Part , Cause to Caused , or Subject to Adjunct , or on the contrary , &c. For as 4 and 6 are Analogical Parts , having the Ratio of half to 8 and 12 , so the Sun and Mouse , as most think are Analogical Efficients of those Mice , which are generated of Matter and Seed , &c. and Bone and Root Analogous Means destinated to the Nourishment of Animals and Plants .

Ax. 9. Simple Convenience is either Essential or Accidental . Essential is that which we call Identity .

Ax. 10. Identity is a Unity of Essence .

Ax. 11. Those things , says the Philosopher , are the same , whose Essence is one and the same .

1. § . The first of these Definitions is in Book 4. of the Metaph. Cap. 9. The last in Book the same Cap. 15.

Ax. 12. Identity is either Subordinate or Coordinate .

Ax. 13. The Subordinate is that in which Superiours agree with their Inferiours subordinate to them .

1. § . So Genus with Species's , and Species's with Individuals , Subject to them ; and so on the contrary : And thus Animal and Man , Man and Socrates , Whiteness and Colour are the same ; and so on the contrary .

Ax. 14. Coordinate Identity is either Numerical , Specifical , or Generical .

Ax. 15. Numerical , of one Individual with it self .

Ax. 16. Those things are said to be the same , says the Philosopher , in Number whose Matter is one and the same .

1. § . This Definition is taken out of Book 1. of the Metaph. Cap. 15. where by the Name of Matter the Philosopher understands that Collection of Propriaties which can never be the same in any other . So Peter is said to be the same with himself , not any other .

2. § . Furthermore there are four sorts of Modes , recited by Aristotle in the 1st Book of his Top. Cap. 7. of those things which are the same in Number , viz. 1. Synonymous Words , as Sword and Rapier . 2. Definition , and Defin'd , as Man , and Rational Animal . 3. Subject and its Propriety , as Man and Risible . 4. Subject and its Common Accident , as Socrates and he who disputes in the Academy , when it is certain that Socrates only disputes . To these add a Fifth , out of Book 4. of the Metaph. Cap. 6. where those things are said to be the same in Number , which are continual , whether by Natural or Artificial Continuity , as a Perch , a House , &c.

Ax. 17. Specifical Identity is the Identity of many Individuals under the same Species .

Ax. 18. Those things are the same in Species whose Ratio of Essence is one ; or , which when many differ not in Species ; as , Socrates , and Plato , and Bucephalus , and Hirpinus , Melampus , and Phylax .

Ax. 19. Generical that of many Species's , or Individuals , under the same Genus ,

Ax. 20. Those things are the same in Genus , which are under the same Genus ; that is , either the next ; as Man and Beast , and their Individuals , under Animal ; or remote as Body , and Spirit , and their Species's and Individuals , under Substance , &c.

Ax. 21. Accidental Convenience is either Internal or External ; and Internal is either Parity or Simitude .

Ax. 22. Parity is a Convenience in Quantity : For ,

Ax. 23. Those things are said to be equal , whose Quantity is one , viz. either in Bulk , Virtue or Perfection .

Ax. 24. Similitude is either in Quality or Passion .

Ax. 25. Those things are said to be alike the one to the other , which have suffered the same things , and more of the same things than of others , and whose Quality is one .

1. § . Suffered we say not done , because the Action is not in the Agent but Patient . Whose Quality is one ; that is , either in Degree or Species . Not improperly also may you reduce hitherto Convenience in Site : For an Egg is like unto an Egg , because of its Colour and Figure , &c.

Notes of Similitude are such as these ; like , after the same manner , as , as tho' , alike , after the same sort , not otherwise , not contrariwise , &c. When the Similitude is explained by way of Proposition and Answer or Return , it becomes Analogy .

Ax. 26. External Convenience is a Conveniency in such and such Causes , Effects , Subjects or Adjuncts . External , which appertain not to the Essence .

1. § . So two own Brothers agree in Efficient ; House and Clothes in End : For the End of both , is to repell the Injuries of the Heavens . Hitherto also may be reduc'd those things which agree in Matter ; as Snow and Hail , Wind and Earthquake : For altho' Matter be an Internal Cause , yet it contributes nothing to the Specifical Essence : For those things which agree n● Form , agree in Essence , and so on the contrary . Farther two Artificers agree in Effects ; Virtues and Vices in Subject : For both are in the Mind . The Convenience of things in Adjuncts is various . Convenience in Internal appertains to Parity and Similitude .

Hitherto only , that in Objects , Signs and Circumstances : But if Cause Efficient , or Final , Subject or Adjunct be put into the Essential Definition of things , and then an Agreement be in them , such an Agreement then is not to be esteem'd External , but Essential .

CHAP. XXI . Of Diversity , or Distinction of Things .

Ax. 1. DIversity is that Affection by which Things are distinguished one from the other .

Ax. 2. And is , either Real , Rational , or Modal .

Ax. 3. Real is that by which a thing is distinguished , either from another thing , or from the Negation of it self .

COMMENTARY .

Another , as Peter from Paul , Blackness from Whiteness , &c. Negation of its self ; as Sight from Blindness , Light from Darkness , &c.

Ax. 4. A Diversity of Reason is that by which things are distinguished only in Conceptions .

1. § . Which happens when one and the same thing is not understood by one and the same 〈…〉 The Schoolmen divide it in their manner 〈…〉 ●●●barously , into Distinction of Reason 〈…〉 Reason reasoned : For 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , or Reason is a Common Name , and agrees both to the Understanding and Essence of things , as explain'd in Definition ; Quiddity they commonly call it . The Intellect they call Reason reasoning ; Quiddity , Reason reasoned . And therefore the Distinction of Reason reasoning amongst Scholasticks ; is that which is constituted by the Understanding it self , which is , when one and the same thing is distinguish'd by two or more , and those resembling Conceptions . Reason reasoned when in one and the same thing there is found one and another Quiddity or Definition ; then Effected , when one and the same thing is objected to dissimilous Conceptions . Conceptions are said to be alike ; when they represent one and the same thing after the same manner ; unlike when a Different . For Example : Should any one conceive Peter to be the same with himself , he must of Necessity conceive Peter twice , and likewise after the same Manner : But if any one should conceive Peter to be a Man or an Animal , he must also of Necessity consider him twice , but after another and another manner : For the Conception by which Peter is conceiv'd as Peter , is unlike to that Conception by which the same Peter is conceived as a Man or as an Animal .

2. § . The Distinctions of Reason , reasoning and reasoned may be discerned by this Sign . Those things which are distinguished by Reason reasoning are predicated the one of the other in an Identical Predication : Those by Reason reasoned not predicated , or if they are , their Predication is not Identical .

Ax. 5. Modal Diversity is that by which , Things are distinguish'd by their Modes .

1. § . There is something in things which neither is the thing it self , nor another thing , nor yet nothing : But a certain Medium betwixt them both . And this uses to be called a Mode . For Example : A Degree of Quality is not Quality , nor yet is it wholly nothing but a Mode : And therefore a Quality when intended or remitted does not become another Quality , but a Mode of Quality . And when Quality , or any other thing is chang'd after this Manner , it is said to be distinguished modally from it self . So is Heat in the first Degree from it self in the second and third ; and the Hand unfolded from itself contracted .

Ax. 6. Diversity may also be distributed into that of Essential and Accidental .

Ax. 7. Essential that , by which things are distinguished Essentially .

Ax. 8. And is either Subordinate or Coordinate .

Ax. 9. Subordinate is that by which Superiours disfer from Inferiours subject to them .

1. § . To wit the Genus from its Species's , and Species's from their Individuals subject to them ; and so on the contrary . So Animal differs from Man , Man from Socrates , Colour from Whiteness and contrariwise . This Diversity is , of Reason ; because Subordinates being the same in the thing it self , they must of Necessity be distinguish'd only in Reason .

Ax. 10. Coordinate Diversity is either Numerical , Specifical , or Generical .

Ax. 11. Numerical , is that by which are distinguish'd the Individuals of the same Species ; as Plato and Socrates .

Ax. 12. Specifical , the Species's of the same Genus and their Individuals ; as Man and Beast , Alexander and Bucephalus .

Ax. 13. Generical , by which the Genus's themselves as well the Chief as the Subaltern , and their Species's and Individuals ; as Substance and Quantity , Body and Spirit , Animal and Plant , Socrates and this Pear-Tree .

Ax. 14. The chief Genns's are diverse in their whole Essence whilst the Subaltern in Part only , appearing thus .

1. § . The chief Genus's have no common Genus nor constitutive Differences ; and therefore it follows they must be diverse in their whole Essence . But Subalterns have the same Common Genus , and therefore cannot be in their whole Essence different but in Part only , to wit , their constitutive Differences .

Ax. 15. Accidental Difference is either Interna● or External : Internal is either Imparity or Dissimilitude .

Ax. 16. Imparity is a Diversity in Quantity .

Ax. 17. Those things are said to be Impars of which one is greater or less than another .

1. § . To wit , either in Quantity of Bulk or Perfection , and so Silver and Gold , Gold and Virtues are esteemed to be Impars , in this Verse , Vilius Argentum est Auro , Virtutibus Aurum . i. e. Silver is of less Value than Gold , Gold than Virtues . And Chapter the 7th of St. Matthew , the Body is compared with Raiment , as the greater with the less , and the Fowls of the Air and Lilies of the Field with Man as the less with the greater .

Ax. 18. Dissimilitude is a Diversity either in Quality or Passion .

1. § . In Quality , to wit , either of a diverse Species ; as , White , Red , &c. at least of a diverse Degree ; as , more or less White : For those things which differ not in Species , but Degree , are Part like , Part unlike . Hitherto may be referr'd also Diversity in Site .

Ax. 18. External Difference like that of Conveniency which we have treated of before consists in , such and such Causes , Effects , Subjects and Adjuncts External , which appertain not to the Essence of the thing .

1. § So Mice generated by the Sun out of Putrid Matter , as it is generally believed are distinguished by Efficient from those Mice which are generated of Seed : So the Eye and Ear are distinguished by their Ends. Hitherto also belong those things that differ in Matter , as Statues of Marble and Brass . Those which differ in Form , differ also in Essence . Farther , Water and Fire , differ in Effects . Virtues , Ethical , and Dinoetical in Subject : For those are in the Appetite , these in the Mind or Understanding , which is in the Greek term'd 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 . Diversity of things , in Internal Adjuncts , Belongs to Imparity or Dissimilitude : Hitherto only that that consists in Objects , Signs and Circumstances . If a Cause Efficient , or Final , Subject , or Adjunct , appertain to the Essence , or Definition of a thing , if any Diversity be in them , then it is not to be esteemed an External but Essential : And so we proceed to the next Chapter , viz.

CHAP. XXII . Of Opposition of things .

Ax. 1. OPposition is a Fight , or Battle of things .

Ax. 2. Things are said to fight , which cannot truly be affirm'd , either of each other or the same Third , according to the same , to the same in the same Manner , and in the same time .

COMMENTARY .

1 § . Those things which are by Aristotle call'd 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , are by Cicero called Contraries . We call them Opposed . Of Oppositions , one is in things another in Affirmation and Negation ; that is an Affection of Simple , this of Complex Themes . Of Oppositions of things which is of this Place , Aristotle treats Cap. 10. of the Categories ; of the other in his Book of Interpret . In both , four Conditions are required , which are delivered Cap. 5. of his Book de Soph. Elench . The first is , that it be according to the same , that is , according to the same Part , or Nature . The other is , that it should be to the same , that is , in the same respect . The third , in the same Manner . The fourth in the same time . If with these Conditions Opposites are predicated of each other , the Predication will be false : As , a Man is an Horse , Blindness is the Sight : Or , if both are predicated of any one Third , one of them must be false , as Socrates sees , Socrates is blind : If of one another or any Third they are affirmed truly , of Necessity one of the Conditions must be wanting . For Example : To be David's Lord , and Son , agrees with the same Christ , but not according to the same : For Christ is David's Lord as to his Divine , his Son as to his Humane Nature . So the Number of four is both a Double and a Half ; but not to the same : For it 's the Double of Two , and the Half of Eight . Besides 't is true , both that the World has , and the World has not a Beginning , but not in the same Manner : For the World has a Beginning of Duration , but not of Magnitude , because round . Lastly , it is true , that of old the Miletians were valiant , and of old , the Miletians were not valiant ; but not at the same time .

2. § . But altho' Opposites cannot be predicated of the same , saving these Conditions ; Nothing hinders but that the same may be predicated of things opposed ; as Colour , of Whiteness and Blackness ; Animal , of Beast and Man , &c. and this brings us to the next Considerations , viz. That ,

Ax. 3. Opposites are together in Nature , and That ,

Ax. 4. The Knowledge of them is the same .

1. § . The first of these Axioms is extant Book 6. of the Top. Cap. 4. The latter , Book 1. of the Top. Cap. 14.2 . Cap. 2.6 . Cap. 6. and almost every where . The Meaning of the last , may be two-fold , and first , that both appertain to one Science , as that the same which for Instance treats of Virtue may also treat of Vice ; and of Diseases , also of Health . Secondly that one opposite being known , the other may be known also . 5thly ,

Ax. 5. Opposites plac'd , near to each other , are the more Illustrated .

1. § . This is the same with the old Saying which is deliver'd Book 3. of the Rhetor. Cap. 2. Contraries by Contraries are illustrated ; the Use of which is to be seen Cap. 2. of the Rhet. Where the contrary Affects and Manners of young and old Men are so conferr'd together , that by the mutual Collation of them , they are very much illustrated .

Ax. 6. The Species's of Opposites are five , viz. Disparates , Contraries , Relatively Opposed , Privatively Opposed , and Contradictings ; and we prove it in this Manner , viz.

1. § . An Opposite is either opposed to many or one . Those of which one is opposed to many , are call'd Disparates ; when one to one , the Opposition is , either between Being and no Being , or between Being and Being . Those Opposed as Being and Being , are either Absolute , or Related : Those are said to be Contraries , these Relatively Opposed : Those things that are opposed as Being and no Being , either have the same Subject , or they have not ; Those that have the same Subject , are said to be privatively opposed ; those that have not , to be Contradictings .

2. § . Aristotle makes no mention of Disparates in his Logicks , where he professedly treats of the Species's of Opposites ; but yet he does in the 4th Book of his Metaph. Cap. 10. where he calls them diverse in Species , that is , those things that are affected after a contrary Manner by reason of their Essence : But to proceed ,

Ax. 7. Disparates are those of which one is opposed to many after the same manner .

1. § . So Man and Horse , and White and Blue , are Disparates ; because Man is not only oppos'd to Horse , but also to Dog , Lion , and other Species's of Beasts ; and White not only to Blue , but also to Red , Green , and the other mediate Colours , in the same manner , that is , in the same Genus of Opposition : But now Black and White are not Disparates , notwithstanding they may be opposed not only to Black , but also to the middle Colours : For because White is other ways opposed to Black , than it is to the Middle Colours . So neither Freeman and Servant are Disparates , notwithstanding Servant is not only opposed to Freeman , but also to Master ; because the Genus of Opposition in both is not the same : For Servant and Master are Relatives , whilst Freeman and Servant are Contraries , which leads us to the next Axiom , viz. That ,

Ax. 8. Contraries are two absolute things the farthest distant under the same Genus .

1. § . Aristotle Cap. 6. of the Categ . defines Contraries in this manner , viz. to be those things which are the farthest distant under the same Genus : But that Definition seems to be less full ; because it suits also with Disparates , and those that are Relatively opposed .

2. § . Contraries are two so said , because in this respect they may differ from Disparates which are more than two ; or at least , nothing hinders but that they may be so . Absolute , in that they differ from such as are Relatively opposed . It is added under the same Genus , to wit , either the next , as Whiteness and Blackness , under Colour ; or remote , as Justice and Injustice , under Habit. In that they are distinguished from Contradictings , and those which are privatively opposed .

3. § . Nor does it hinder , which Arisiotle says Cap. 11. of the Categ . that Good and Bad , which are Contraries , are not under the same Genus , but Genus's themselves : For Aristotle seems to say that out of the Pythagorean Opinion , who constituted two Series's or Orders of things , one good , tho other bad , as Aristotle himself testifies , Book 1. of his Metaph. Cap. 5. For since Good and Evil are to be found in all Categories , as Ens , as is taught Book 1. of the Ethicks , Cap. 4. they cannot be chief Genus's . To which I add , that in Metaphysicks , where Good is considered as a common Affection of a thing , Evil is not contrary to it ; but privatively opposed . In Ethicks Good and Evil indeed are Contraries , but contain'd under the same Genus , to wit , either Habit or Moral Action , which Aristotle uses to call Practice or 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 . See Ammonius and Simplicius upon the 11th Cap. of the Categories .

4. § . There is farther added most distant , viz. either as to Form or Place : For so the Philosopher distinguishes Contrariety , Book 5. of the Physicks , Cap. 2. and Book 2. of the Meteors , Cap. 6. as , that one is in Quality , which he calls Contrariety according to Form ; the other in Ubi , or where ; which he calls Contrariety according to Place : Contraries in Quality are Black and White , Virtue and Vice , streight and crooked , Servant and Free . In Place , which in a Sphere or Circle are Diametrically opposed , as the Artick and Antartick Poles , &c. Hitherto also is to be referred Contrariety of Motions , which is situate in the contrary Habitude of Terms : So that the Term to which , of one Motion , is the Term from which , of the other ; and so on the Contrary . Thomas calls it a Contrariety of Access and Recess : So Generation and Corruption , Accretion and Diminution , Calefaction and Frigefaction , Ascent and Descent , are Contraries , &c. And therefore when in the Book of the Categ . the Philosopher includes Contrariety amongst the Qualities , and denies it to have Place in Substance and Quantity , he is to be esteemed to take the Word in a very strict Sense ; and so we proceed to the following Axiom , viz. That ,

Ax. 9. Contraries mutually destroy each other , and the one is always remitted by the Contagion of the other .

1. § . So asserts Aristotle Book 2. of the Heavens , Cap. 3. For Example : When Water is made hot , as much Cold decedes from it as is impress'd upon it of Heat from elsewhere , and if a Contrary , is sometimes intended by a Contrary by Antiparistasis , that happens only by Accident .

Ax. 10. Contraries cannot be together in the same singular Subject .

Ax. 11. They are conversant , yet , about the same , either in Species or Genus .

1. § . These Theorems are deliver'd Cap. 11. of the Categ . and the Sense of them is manifest enough . For Example : The same Person cannot at the same time be just and unjust , sick and in Health , nor any thing even and uneven , cold and hot ; Yet Justice and Injustice are in the Soul of Man : Sickness and Health in the Body of the Animal ; Even and Uneven in Number , and Cold and Heat in the Elementary Body , &c.

Ax. 12. Contraries are either Mediate or Immediate .

Ax. 13. Mediate are those between which a Medium , Partaker of both of them is interjected .

Ax. 14. Immediate , between which nothing of a Medium of that Nature is interjected .

1. § . The Medium consider'd in Opposition to pass by other Acceptations is two-fold ; one of Form , or Participation , the other of Subject or Negation . The Medium of Form , or Participation that is said to be , which is a Partaker of both Extremes : So Warmth is a Medium between Heat and Cold , Red between Black and White . The Medium of the Subject or Negation is said to be that of which both Extremes are denied : So a Spirit is said to be a Medium between hot and cold , great and small . This Division is to be understood of the Medium of Participation : For some Contraries have a Medium of this Nature ; as White and Black , Heat and Cold ; and some not ; as even and uneven , streight and crooked . The Medium of Negation is to be found in all Oppositions excepting Contradictings : Sometimes it also hapens that a Medium of Participation , wanting a proper Word , is signified by the Negation of its Extreme .

2. § . Of Contraries Immediate there is a Necessity that one of them should be in a Capacious Subject . So of Necessity every Number must be even or odd . Of Mediates , no Necessity for either of them ; because the Medium it self may occupy the Subject : For it is not necessary that a Body should be Black or White ; because it may be Red or Green . If yet one of the Mediates be proper and natural to the Subject , that , of Necessity must be in the Subject ; and so 't is necessary that the Fire should be hot , &c.

Ax. 15. Relatively opposed , are those which , that which they are , are said to be of the Opposites , or in any other manner are referred to them .

1. § . Things Related may be consider'd two ways ; either as given to divers things ; and so they constitute each the other : Or , as to the same , and so they mutually destroy each other , and are really Opposites ; especially if of a diverse Name . For Example : Supposing the Father , you must suppose also the Son : But he who is the Father of any Person cannot be also the Son of the same Person , &c. In Relateds of the same Name , the Opposition does not so well appear ; because of the Identity of the Name .

Ax. 16. Privatively opposed are , Habit and its Privation .

1. § . Privation sometimes signifies the Absence of the Form which may be introduc'd upon the Subject : So the Privation of the Soul may be said to be in the Seed ; of Heat , in cold Water : Sometimes the Absence of the Form , which ought to be in the Subject ; that is , a Physical Privation ; and is number'd amongst the Principles of Generation ; this a Logical , and is signified in this Place : But whereas there are many Genus's of things which are to be understood in this Place under the Name of Habit ; to wit , Natural Power , Habit strictly so called , Patible Quality , Form , Operation , Habit in the tenth Category , &c. and that , I say , in a Word , every Accident that may be separated from the Subject ; so also Logical Privation is as various , viz. Privation of natural Power , as Blindness ; of Habit strictly so called as Ignorance ; Patible Quality , as Darkness ; Form , as Deformity ; such as was in the Chaos ; of Operation , as Sleep , Rest ; Habit in the tenth Category , as Nakedness , &c. Sight therefore and Blindness , Knowledge and Ignorance , Light and Darkness , Watchings and Sleep , Motion and Rest , to be cloathed , and to be naked , are privatively opposed , &c.

2. § . Privation and Habit are conversant about the same Subject , which Subject must be capable of a Habit ; that is , such in which a Habit ought to be by Nature , and when it ought to be . Therefore Privation cannot be attributed to any Subject ; but that only , which by its own Nature and the time fixed and appointed by Nature , is apt to receive an opposite Habit. And therefore a Stone cannot be said to be blind ; because by its own Nature it is unapt to see ; nor an Infant newly born to be Toothless ; because it cannot have Teeth from its Nativity , or Birth ; and this brings us to reflect upon the next Axiom , viz. That ,

Ax. 17. From Privation to Habit there can be no Regress .

1. § . In Privation and Habit , says Aristotle , there can be no reciprocal Change amongst themselves : For altho' there may be a Mutation from Habit to Privation , yet from Privation to Habit there cannot be ; but this must be understood of Privation of natural Power , which is the greatest Privation : For the Blind cannot Naturally recover their lost Sight : But from a Privation of those other things recited above , a Regress is frequently given .

Ax. 18. Contradictings are Ens , and non Ens opposed .

1. § . As a Man , not a Man ; White , not White ; to see , and not to see , &c. Contradictings are said to be opposed as Affirmation and Negation ; not that they are Enunciations , but that a Subject being added , they constitute them in Affirmation and Negation , Pugnant or Fighting ; as Socrates is a Man , Socrates is not a Man ; Socrates is White , Socrates is not White , &c. Farther ,

Ax. 19. A Contradiction has no Medium ; that is ,

1. § . Whether of Negation or Participation . : For to Being and no Being , Nothing is in common . Hitherto belongs that Definition of Contradictions , which is extant Book 1. of the Post . viz. That Contradiction is an Opposition , which , by it self wants a Medium , &c.

Ax. 20. A Contradiction is the greatest of Oppositions , and the first and Measure of the rest .

1. § . Greatest , because it wants a Medium : First because it pre-supposes no other : Measures the rest , because the first in every Genus , is always the Measure of the rest . For Example : White and Black , to see and to be blind , are therefore truly Opposites ; because White is not Black , and to see , not to be blind , &c.

2. § . 'T is farther to be noted , that of Contradictions the one may be expressed whilst the other is implied . An Express is then when one of the Extremes is finite , and the other Infinite ; as , Man , not Man . Implyed , when , without a Particle of Negation , the one Extreme is overturned by the other ; Vulgarly called a Contradiction in the Adject , or Opposed in Opposed ; as for Instance , if a Man should sya an Unbloody Sacrifice , one body , as in many Places or every where , &c.

CHAP. XXIII . Of Order , and of that which is said to be first , last , and together with .

Ax. 1. ORder is that , according to which , any thing is said to be before , or after another , or also together with it .

1. § . Of that which is said to be before or after and their Modes Aristotle treats Cap. 12. of the Categories , of those together with Cap. 13.

Ax. 2. First and last things are said to be five Ways , viz. in Time , Nature , Disposition , Dignity , and Cognition .

Ax. 3. And in time , as that according to which a thing is said to be Elder , or of greater Antiquity than another thing .

Ax. 4. Nature two Ways , viz. in Consecution of Existence , and Causality .

1. § . Aristotle indeed affirms that alone to be first in Nature which is first in Causality : But that also seems to be reasonably so call'd which is first in Consecution of Existence , viz.

Ax. 5. That from which Consecution of Existence is not reciprocated . And ,

1. § . This Simplicius interprets in this manner : That , says he , is said to be first , which , another thing being supposed , is it self supposed : But that supposed , that other thing is not supposed . For Example : Supposing the Binary Number , you suppose also Unity ; but supposing Unity , you suppose not the Binary Number ; and supposing Man , you suppose also Animal ; but supposing Animal , you do not suppose also Man : Unity therefore , is before the Binary Number , and Animal before Man : And likewise every Genus before its Species , and Species its Individual , as to Consecution of Existence .

Ax. 6. That which is before in Causality , is that which is reciprocated according to the Consecution of Existence , and is every way the Cause why the other exists .

1. § . So the Sun is before its Light , and Thing Truth of Speech . For altho' the Sun and Light , Thing and Truth of Speech may be reciprocated according to Consecution of Existence , and mutually take away , and suppose each other : Yet the Sun is the Cause of its Light , and the Thing of Verity in Speech : Because as the Thing is , or is not , the Oration is said to be true or false . In this manner , therefore , the Sun is said to be before its Light , and the Thing Verity in Speech .

2. § . That which is before in Causality , or Nature causing , farther , by the Testimony of Aristotle Book 2. of the Parts of An. Cap. 1. is said to be two Ways , viz. either by Nature so generating or intending : That which is first , by Order of Nature generating , that is , which is most simple : As , the Parts the Whole ; Principles and Elements than the things which out of such Principles and Elements are made . Of Nature intending ; that which is the most perfect , and for whose sake and Cause other things were made . As the Whole than its Parts ; that which consists of Principles and Elements than the Principles and Elements themselves , and every End than its Means , &c.

Ax. 7. That is said to be First in Disposition , which is the least distant from the beginning .

1. § . So the Exordium in a Speech , is before its Proposition ; the Proposition , the Narration ; the Narration , the Confirmation ; the Confirmation , the Refutation ; and the Refutation , the Epilogue , &c. And , in every Discipline , that which is first delivered .

Ax. 8. That in Dignity is always first , which is of the more Worth or Value . So the Magistrate is before the Subject ; the Father the Children ; the Master , the Servant ; Gold , Silver ; Virtue , Gold , &c.

Ax. 9. In Cognition , that which is most easily known .

1. § . Of this Mode no Mention is made by Aristotle in this Place : But in Book 4. of the Metaph Cap. 11. and Book 6. of the Top. Cap. 4. he does mention it : Where that which is first in Cognitions , he calls more known ; or rather , that I may so say , more noscible . A Thing is so said , two Ways , viz. either simply , or in regard of us . That is said to be so simply , which is so according to Reason , and them in whom Reason is rightly disposed . To us which as to the Senses and vulgarly . Those things , therefore , are said to be simply more known which , by their own Natures , are first ; as Universals , Singulars , or less Universals : Parts than their Whole ; Principles , than those things which are made of such Principles : But to us , which are Posterior in Nature , and more Neighbouring upon the Senses . Farther , those things which are simply so , are more known according to a distinct and perfect Knowledge : For a distinct and perfect Knowledge follows the Order of Nature and lies in them which are endued with a well-disposed Mind : But those things which to us , are according to a confused and imperfect Knowledge , which takes its Original from the Senses , &c.

Ax. 10. Things also are said to be together as many Ways as first : But Two are more used than the rest , and those are Time and Nature .

Ax. 11. Those things are said to be together , in time which exist at the same time , and that may be said ,

1. § . Two Ways , viz. Simply or according to something . Those things are said to be together simply , which take their Originals together at the same time , as Equals . Some respect , of which the one begins before the other ends : As such as live at the same time , or are Contemporaries . So Aristotle and Plato are said to be Contemporaries , altho' Plato was born before him , and died before him .

Ax. 12. Together in Nature also , Things may be said two Ways , viz. some simply or absolutely ; and others according to something , or in some respect , And ,

Ax. 13. Such things are said to be so absolutely , which are reciprocated indeed according to Consecution of Existence ; but yet , not so as that the one should be the Cause why the other exists .

1. § . So the Relate and Correlate are said to be together in Nature , and two Effects depending upon the same next Cause . As , to be risible , and capable of Disciplines , in Man .

Ax. 14. Those things are said to be together according to something , or with respect to some third , which are opposed under the same Genus , in Division each to the other .

1. § . So Man and Beast are said to be together , nor simply , and of themselves , but in respect of Animal : For Animal is predicated of both together , and not first of the one , and then of the other . In which the Synonymous Genus is distinguished from the Homonymous ; because this is not predicated together of its Species's ; but first of one , and then of the other . And thus far of Affections of simple Theme , as well the simple as the conjoyned .

CHAP. XXIV . Of Interpretation in general , and of Noun and Verb.

Ax. 1. INterpretation is an Articulate Voice , signifying the Conceptions of the Mind according to Institution .

1. § . Of Voices , the one is Articulate whilst the other not . That we call . Articulate which consists of so many Syllables , or Letters , as so many Joynts : So that it may be written , as , Man , Animal , &c. Inarticulate , which consists not of Syllables and Letters , as the other , and may not be written , as Lowing , Whynnying , Weeping and Laughing , &c. According to Institution , that is , the Arbitrary Use of Men , which use the same Society , in whose Power it is , to give Force and Law to Speech . Or Interpretation might have been defin'd in this Manner , viz. Interpretation is a Symbol consisting of an Articulate Voice , signifying the Conception of the Mind according to Institution , Which brings us to the next Observation .

Ax. 2. That Interpretation must be perspicuous , that is , distinct , proper , and used .

Ax. 3. Interpretation is either Word or Speech . And so we proceed to the twenty fifth Chapter . viz. that of Etymologies and Conjugates .

1. § . Speech is either perfect or imperfect . Perfect is that that absolves the Sentence ; an Imperfect is not .

CHAP. XXV . Of Etymology and Conjugates .

Ax. 1. IN Dictions are first to be consider'd their Etymology and Conjugation , and then Synonymy , and Homonymy , and Acception Words , which the Schoolmen call Supposition .

Ax. 2. Etymology is the Reason of a Words Signification declar'd out of the Original .

COMMENTARY .

1. § . Which much assists our Minds in the Search after the Knowledge of Things : For whilst you see ( says the Learned Isiodore ) from whence the Word is derived , you the sooner understand the Force of that thing which you wou'd look into .

Ax. 3. Etymologies are taken either from the Causes , Effects , Proprieties , Objects , and other Adjuncts , and Effect an Understanding of these .

1. § . So 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , Letter is said from 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , that is , write : Because Letters are made by Writing : And Man in the Hebrew , Adam , from the Verb Adam ; that is , look red , from whence also Adamah , that is , red Earth , of which Colour the Earth uses to be when till'd ; because Man was created out of the Earth . So Consul from consulendo , that is , Counselling : Angelus ab 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , that is , Nuncio , or declare are so called ; because the End and Effect of the one is to consult the Republick , and of the other to declare the Commands of God to Men. So 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , Temperance , says Aristotle , Book 1. of the Eth. Cap. 5. is so said , as tho' 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , that is , it preserved Prudence . For it is the Property of that Virtue , so to moderate the Mind both in Grief and Pleasure , as that the Judgment may not be depraved about Practical Things . Arithmetick is so call'd from Number ; because it is conversant about Numbers , &c.

Ax. 4. Conjugates are those which joyned in Affinity of Word and Signification , differ yet in Termination .

1. § . As Justice , just , justly , &c. Those that differ not in Termination ; as Grammatica , the Art of Grammar , and Grammatica , a Woman , are not Conjugates , but Homonyms : And these are perfect Conjugates . There are also others , which convene in Word and not Signification ; as Ebrius , Ebriosus , Somnus , Somnolentus , &c. For neither is every one a Drunkard that is drunken ; nor is he at all times Drunken that is a Drunkard . These , with Grammarians may be Conjugates ; but by Logicians they are rejected . Others , lastly , there are which agree in Signification , not Word ; as , Virtue and Honesty , &c. which altho' properly , they are not Conjugates ; yet in Logick they have the Force of Conjugates , &c.

Ax. 3. Conjugation consists in a Primitive Paronymous , or Denominated Word and Case .

Ax. 6. A Primitive is an Abstracted Word not Denominated from any other .

1. § . In Discerning of the Primitive or the Abstracted from the Derivative Word , the Paucity or Multitude of Syllables , is not in this Place to be regarded as by Grammarians , but only the Nature of things . For Example : Justice is by Grammarians deriv'd from Just ; Because this is a Dissyllable , that a Monosyllable . But by Logicians Just is deriv'd from Justice ; because that is a Concrete , this an Abstract Word , and therefore the more simple .

Ax. 7. A Paronymous is a Concrete Word , and so deriv'd from the Primitive , as that it differs only from it in Termination .

1. § . Hitherto belong all Concrete Words ; not only those derived from Accidents , as , Quantus , Quantity , Good from Goodness , White , Whiteness , &c. But also those which are deriv'd from Substances ; as , Clothed , Cloth , Armed , Arms , &c. And these , says the Philosopher , Cap. 5. of the Categories , are predicated of the Subject Paronymously , that is , as to Name only , not Definition : Those which according to Name and Definition , are by Aristotle in the same Place , said to be Synonymously predicated . And so we come to define Cases .

Ax. 8. Viz. thus , That they are Adverbs which are deduc'd from a Noun , or Verb of their own Conjugation .

1. § . As Benè from Bonus , that is , well from Good ; Wisely from sapio or sapere , that is , to be wise , &c. And in this Acceptation Aristotle takes the Word when he treats of Conjugates , Book 1. Top , Cap. 15. lib. 2. Cap. 9. lib. 6. Cap. 10. Otherwise Case with Aristotle , signifies a Certain Inflection or Termination of a Word different from its Original , as Musa , from Musae , &c. and so he takes it Cap. 2. of the Interp. as well as elsewhere .

CHAP. XXVI . Of Synonyms , Homonyms , and various Acceptations of Words : And first ,

Ax. 1. THose Words are said to be Synonymous which signifie things whose Ratio of Essence accommodated to a common Name , is the same .

Ax. 2. Homonymous , Diverse .

COMMENTARY .

1. § . Synonyma's , in Latin , Univocals , are with Grammarians , Words of the same Signification , as Ensis , Gladius , Sword , Rapier , &c. By Logicians Synonyms are either strictly taken , or largely . Synonyms strictly . are said to be those cap. 6. of the Categories , which are , with the same Reason Essentially said of many things ; or , as to Name and Definition ; as , when Animal is said both of Man and Beast . The Larger is , when all those are call'd Synonyms which are not Homonyms ; which is the Acceptation of this Place .

2. § . The Name only is said to be common to Homonyms , not that Accidents of Names , such as Genus , Declination , Conjugation , Spirit , Quantity , Accident , &c. should be excluded : For if these were not the same , neither would the Name so be , but that the Ratio of Essence only ; that is , that which is explained in the Definition : Nor is it yet sufficient in Homonyms that the Ratio of Essence be diverse but also , it is necessary that they be diverse , as to the Common Name , or as they convene in that Common Name . For Example : Animal is a Common Name to Man and Beast , and yet not an Homonym : For altho' one is the Definition of Man , another of Beast , as they differ in Names , yet convene they in one Definition , which answers to the Common Name of Animal , and that is enough to hinder it here from being an Homonym ; But if Animal be referr'd to a living Animal and a Painted , 't is an Homonym ; because no Definition is in common to a Living Animal and a Painted , that is accommodated to the common Name of Animal . And so we come to the third Axiom which shews us ,

Ax. 3. Viz. That Homonymy , is either Casual , or Designed .

Ax. 4. By Casuality then it is said to be when the same Word is imposed upon divers things without Reason .

Ax. 5. Design when the same Word is used for certain Cause or Reason .

Ax. 8. And this reason is either in things , or in us .

Ax. 7. Things either Trope , or unequal Attribution ; by reason of Trope or Figure , Words are said to be Homonymous when they are deflected ,

Ax. 8. As sometimes they are from their proper Significations to some other ; because of that mutual Habitude or Relation , which things may have each to the other , whether simple or Analogical . And these are large in their Extent , as Trope .

Ax. 9. Reason of unequal Attribution , viz. that those signifie that common Nature which is unequally communicated to its subjected Species's .

Ax. 10. By Reason of us , the Homonymy is when for the sake of the Memory of any Person near and dear to us , or some Illustrious Person in Hopes of Similitude , or the like , we impose such and such Names upon our Children and Friends .

Ax. 11. Of these the farthest distant from Synonyms , that is , such as we have in the Beginning of this Chapter defined , are Homonyms by Chance , and those whose Reason or Homonymy is in us : More nearly , the Tropicks , and first the Analogous : Nearest of all , those that are Ambiguous by reason of Unequal Attribution , &c.

1. § . Now the general Cause of Homonymy , or Ambiguity is the Infinite Multitude of things and Paucity of Words : For by reason of that much greater Paucity of Words than Things , of Necessity one Word must be applied to signifie many things . But the Cause why this Word or that Word is Homonymous is either none , as in Homonymy by Chance : Or if there be any which may move a wise Man to make use of the same Word to signifie many things it is either the Change of the Word , from its proper Signification , as in the Tropicks ; or unequal Attribution as in them , which convene not equally to Inferiours ; or Conservation of some ones Memory , or the Hope of Similitude , or Example . For Instance ; the Word Jus in Latin signifies both Broth and that which is oppos'd to Injustice , the Homony my is by Chance : For there is no Reason why this Name should be impos'd upon things , having no Affinity at all amongst themselves .

2 § . What , and how many sold Trope is , is to be known from the Rhetoricians : But Trope causes Homonomy , because a Sentence pronounc'd in Tropical Words , may be ambiguous and sallacious , ; as , when the Word fox is put for a Guil●ful Person ; Pastor , for a Minister of the Church ; Soul for Man ; Author for the Work , &c. For it 's uncertain whether a Man may use these in their Proper , or their translated Signification . Homonyms by unequal Attribution are , For Example ; such as these , viz. En● or Being , in Respect of Subfrance and Accident : Syllogism in respect of Syllogism strictly so call'd , and other Syllogisms , which 〈◊〉 are wont to be called Syllogisms ; and so the Term Sanum in Latin is given to Animal , Medicine and Urine , &c.

3 § . And even all these have their Causes of Ambiguity in Things . Others also there are , which we have said , have their Causes of Ambiguity in us , and our Will ; as when we give the Name of the Parent to the Child , for the Conservation of his Memory , or some Pious and Learned Person , hoping that ours may be excited by his Example to become like unto him . These Ammonius in his Commentary on the Book of the Categ . calls Memoriae , and the others Spei gratia .

4. § . But that the Homonomy of Words may be so much the better understood , which is in the first Place to be regarded in Disputations , we may take Notice of some Canons or Criterions which Aristotle delivers Book 1. Top. Cap. 15. Of which we shall here repeat the Chief . All those Words in the first Place fall under the Title of Homonymous , to which many are Contraries ; as that of the Latin Word Grave , to which Leve and Acutum . Secondly , Those which have sometimes a Contrary , sometimes not ; as the Word 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , to love , unto which sometimes 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , or hate , and sometimes nothing , as when signifying to wont . Thirdly , Those which have sometimes a Medium , sometimes not : So the Words Candid and F●●●●d , that is in English , White and dark Brown : For when Discourse is of Colour , the Pale and other Middles are interjected between them : But when of Voice said to be Candid or Fuscid , that is , Clear or Hoarse , then nothing . Fourthly , Those are said to be Homonymous to which something is opposed that is Ambiguous : So Acute is an Homonym , because Obtuse : For both an Ax is said to be Obtuse , and the Voice and the Wit. So also the Word Flock , and therefore likewise Pasior . And so in other Genus's of Oppositions , excepting Disparates . Fifthly those whose Conjugates jugates are Homonyms ; and so because the Latin Word Sanus is an Homonym , so also must the Word Sanitas be . Sixthly , Those which signifie Things of divers Kinds , and so Good ; because to be found in all Categories : So also , the Greek Word 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , because it signifies as well an Ass as a Milstone . Seventhly , Those which are attributed to such things as are not such as that they may be compared , and the one be said to be more such , or as much such as the other , and therefore Candid ; because attributed both to the Voice and a Garment . When a Voice can be said to be neither more nor less so than a Garment . Eighthly , Those Words which signifie the Differences of Genus's that are not Subaltern : As Acute , that is , the Difference both of Voice and Magnitude . Ninthly , Those which have diverse Differences , as the Word Jus in Latin : For others are the Differences of that from which the Lawyers are called Jurisconsulti , and Others , that which may be drank . Tenthly , and Lastly , Those which signifie sometimes a Species , and sometimes a Difference , as the Word Candor , which signifies a Species of Colour , and a Difference of Voice , &c.

Ax. 12. The diverse Acceptions of Words , which the Schoolmen call Suppositions , Effect no Homonymy .

Ax. 13. Words are either taken Materially or Formally .

Ax. 14. They are said to be taken Materially when for themselves .

Ax. 15. Formally , when for the Things by them signified .

1. § . For Example : When I say Animal is a Word of Three Syllables of the Neuter Gender and the Third Declension , the Word Homo is a Word of Two Syllables of the Common Gender : The Words Homo and Animal are Materially taken , that is , by and for themselves , not otherwise , than as if they signify'd nothing at all . But when I say Man is an Animal , the Words Man and Animal are formally taken , that is , for those things which they signifie according to Institution .

Ax. 16. Formal Acception , when of singular Words , is but of One Mode ; but when of Universal , it is either Simple or Concrete ; and

Ax. 17. Simple , then when a Universal is taken for the Common Nature Abstractedly from Inferiours .

Ax. 18. Concrete , when in Inferiours .

1. § . For Example : When I say Animal is the Genus of Man , the Word Animal is taken simply for the Nature of Animal Abstractedly considered , as in the Notion of the Mind or Understanding it is prescinded from Inferiours . But when I say Man is an Animal , the Word Animal is taken in the Concrete , viz. as it exists in Humane Species . This Concrete Acception is , by the Schoolmen termed Personal , who dispute very largely of Acceptions , or , as they speak , Suppositions . From whence we have selected these few things ; which , for the great Use they have in Disputations , could not well , and without Damage , have been omitted . The rest of them seem only to be calculated for Pomp and Ostentation . And thus much may suffice for Theme Simple , its Categories , Affections and Interpretation .

CHAP. XXVII . Of Vtterance or Enunciation in General , and that which is Simple , and Composed , in Special .

Ax. 1. NOw follows Complex Theme and its Interpretation , which is called Enunciation .

COMMENTARY .

1. § . An Enunciation in Greek is stiled 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , from the Verb 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , which is to shew or exhibit : It is also called Proposition ; notwithstanding Proposition seems to be different from it if not in the thing it self , at least in Reason and Use : For Proposition that is call'd , which in Syllogism is pretended to be Conclusion , from the Verb Praetendo or Praetexo ; but an Enunciation is considerd of it self , and without Respect to Syllogism . Besides , a Proposition seems also to be in the Mind , but Enunciation is in the Words only , and brought forth in the Speech , &c. But to proceed to define it .

Ax. 2. An Enunciation is an Oration , Form of Speech or Declaration , in which somewhat true or false is pronounc'd of another .

1. § . Verity is either of Simple Theme or Complex ; and as to Simple Theme , says the Philosopher , So much every thing has of Truth , as it has of Existence . That of Complex is not in Things , but the Judgment of the Mind or Speech . The Judgment of the Mind is said to be true when it composes those things which are really conjoyn'd , or divides those things which are really diverse . An Oration then also when it convenes with things , and also when it agrees with the Judgment of the Mind , altho' it may differ from things . A Convenience of Speech with things is call'd a Logical , the Judgment of the Mind an Aethical Truth .

Ax. 3. In Enunciation are to be consider'd , first its Species's , and then Affections .

Ax. 4. It s Species's are , first Simple and composed , and then Pure and Modal .

Ax. 5. Simple Enunciation is that which cannot be resolved into more .

Ax. 6. Composed , consisting of many Enunciations among themselves coupled together : For ,

1. § . Whether the Enunciation be Simple or Composed , is best to be understood from the Verbal Copula . For that which has but one , is a Simple ; as Man is an Animal : That which more , whether Express'd or Imply'd , composed ; As , Et prodesse voiunt & delectare Poetae . That is , The Design of Poets is both to profit and delight us . Unà Eurusque Notusque ruunt . That is , At once the East and South Wind blow . As much as if one had said ; The East-Wind rages , and the South-Wind rages , &c. Neither is it sufficient to constitute a Composed Enunciation that it have many Verbal Copula's , but this also is necessary , that the Simple Enunciations of which it consists be coupled amongst themselves ; that is , either by a Grammatical Conjunction ; as , if there be a God , there is no Fortune ; or it is Day , or it is Night , &c. or else by a Relation of Parts ; as , whilst you are happy , you shall number many Friends , &c.

Ax. 7. Simple Enunciation consisteth of a Subject and a Predicate .

Ax. 8. A Subject's that to which something in a simple Enunciation is attributed .

Ax. 9. A Predicate , that which is Attributed ; and ,

Ax. 10. Consists in the Copula , and the Thing Copulated .

1. § . For Example : In this Enunciation , Man is an Animal , Man is the Subject , Animal the Predicate ; and Is , the Verbal Copula ; which is sometimes diverse from the Thing Coupled ; as in the Instance given ; and then the Enunciation is call'd a Trinary Enunciation ; sometimes included in the same Verb , with the Thing Coupled , as Socrates disputes ; and then the Enunciation is term'd a Binary Enunciation . When the Verb Substantive Is constitutes a Binary Enunciation , 't is said to be of the second , when a Trinary of the Third Adject .

Ax. 11. Subject and Predicate , not by their Site , but the Sense of the Enunciation are to be discerned .

1. § . As in this Enunciation , Nobilitas sola est atque unica Virtus , That is , Nobility is the sole and only Virtue . Nobility is the Predicate , and Virtue is the Subject : Which is to be gather'd only from the Sense and Nature of Things .

Ax. 12. Composed Enuciation is Five-fold , viz. Copulative , Hypothetical , Disjunctive , Adversative and Relative .

Ax. 13. Copulative , whose Parts are connected together by a Copulative Particle .

1. § . Such as , and , also , nor , neither , &c. As for Instance ; the Sentence but now recited , viz. At once the East and South-Winds blew , and SouthWest big with Storms , &c. And this ,

Abraham believed in God , and it was imputed to him for Righteousness , &c.

Ax. 14. Hypothetical , that whose Parts are connected together by that Conjunction Conditional If.

1. § . As if there be no Prudence in the King , there is no Quiet in the People , &c. The first Part of which is call'd the Antecedent ; the last , the Consequent . In the Connexion of which consisteth the Truth , and and not in the Truth either of the one or the other . For Example ; Tho' it be not true that an Ass has Wings , or that he can fly ; yet this is true , that if he does fly , he has Wings , &c.

Ax. 15. If the Condition be possible , then the Enunciation will be aequipollent to a Categorical , or one that is simply and without Condition denying : For ,

1. § . When God says to Abraham , If the Dust of the Earth may be numbred , then shall thy Seed be numbred : Is n't it as much as if he should say , The Posterity of Abraham should be so numerous , as that it shou'd not be numbered ? And the Lawyers tell us that this Formula of Promising , viz. I 'll give thee my Daughter , if thou canst touch Heaven , or the like , does not oblige , because it 's like to Negation , or a negative Form .

Ax. 16. An Enunciation Disjunctive is that whose Parts are connected together by a Disj●●ctive Conjunction .

1. § . Such as either , or , &c. as , Or we shall be justified by Faith , or by good Works . Either it is Day , or it is Night , &c.

Ax. 17. These Parts must be immediately Opposed .

1. § . For if not Opposed , the Enunciation becomes nugatory ; as , either he is a Man or an Animal . If not immediately , false ; as , or it is Peace , or it is War : For there may be a Truce , &c. Sometimes a Mediate by its own Nature , has the Force of an Immediate , by Reason of some Compact , or Proposition going before ; as when Leander in Ovid says , Aut mihi continget felix , audacia salvo , Aut Mors solliciti finis amoris erit . i. e. Or happy to me , shall this Boldness prove If safe , or else it ends my anxious Love . For he might neither have died nor have enjoyed his Love : But one of them was to be ; because before decreed .

Ax. 18. An Enunciation Adversative , that whose Parts are connected together by Conjunctions Adversative .

1. § . Such as these , viz. altho' , yet , notwithstanding , not this , but that , but , &c. as altho' God be Omnipotent , yet cannot he lye .

Ulysses was not Handsome , but yet he was Eloquent .

It is difficult I confess , but that Virtue enclines to hard things .

Ax. 19. An Enunciation Relative is that whose Parts are connected together by Relation ,

1. § . And that is shewn by Nouns , Pronouns , Adverbs , and the other Parts of Speech , denoting Comparison ; as , thus : Such as the Magistrate is , such is the People . That which is not Composed , is Immortal : Where the Carcass is , thither will the Eagles be gathered together : Whilst I live , I hope , &c.

CHAP. XXVIII . Of Enunciation Pure and Modal .

Ax. 1. A Pure Enunciation is that in which it is not express'd how the Parts cohere .

Ax. 2. Modal , in which it is .

COMMENTARY .

1. § . For Instance : This Enunciation , Man is an Animal , or , Man is not a Stone , is Pure ; because it not only declares the Predicate Animal to convene with Man , and Stone to disagree ; but also without Expressing the Manner how . But these Enunciations , viz. It is necessary that Man should be an Animal ; or impossible he should be a Stone , are Modal ; because they not only denounce the Predicate to agree or disagree with the Subject , but also declare the Manner how they both agree and disagree , &c.

Ax. 3. The Modes are four , viz. Necessary , Impossible , Possible , Contingent .

1. § . Now of Modes some are Material , and others Formal . The Material Modes affect the Matter of the Enunciation , viz. either Subject or Predicate . For Example : In this Enunciation , A good Shepherd lays down his Life for his Sheep . The Word Bonus or Good , is the Mode of the Subject . In this , A Rhetorician speaks Ornately and Copiously . The Adverbs Ornately , and Copiously , are the Modes of the Predicate . The Formal affect , the Form , or Disposition of the Enunciation . And these , it is we have said to be four , viz. Necessary , Impossible , Possible , Contingent . To which also some add True and False , but very unskilfully : For True and False affect not Affirmation or Negation : For he that says it is true , a Man is an Animal ; or it is false , he is a Stone , says no more than if he should say , a Man is an Animal , or that a Man is not a Stone , &c.

Ax. 4. Modal Enunciation consists of a Dictum and Mood : The Dictum of which is as it were the Subject , and the Mood the Predicate : And this Modal Enunciation

1. § . Is either , Adverbially express'd , as , when I say , Man is necessarily an Animal ; or Nominally , as , when I say , it is necessary that Man should be an Animal , &c. When Adverbially , it differs not in Specie , from a Pure : When Nominally , it makes up a new Species , or Form of Enunciation , in which the Dictum is , as it were the Subject , and the Mode the Predicate . The Dictum in this is an Oration , consisting of the Case of a Noun and Verb of the Infinitive Mood ; as , here , it is necessary that God be good● That is , Deum ●esse bonum ; the Dictum is , that God be good ; the Mode , Necessary . That the Mode is the Predicate ; or as the Predicate in a Modal Enunciation , is to be collected from the Copula : For the Copula is one Part of the Predicate ; and therefore that is the Predicate to which the Copula coheres ; But the Copula coheres with the Mode . And therefore the Mode must either be or have the Ratio of the Predicate , &c. The same is evident in a Mutation of a Modal Enunciation into a Pure . For this Enunciation , It is necessary the Fire should be hot , is converted into a Pure , in this Manner , viz. To the Fire Heat is necessary . By which it appears that the Mode Necessary was the Predicate in that Enunciation .

Ax. 5. To this sort of Enunciation are revok'd all Enunciations Exclusive , Exceptive and Restrictive .

1. § . An Exclusive is that in which an Exclusive Particle ; such as only , or the like , is added to the Subject or the Predicate : As , The Elect only shall be saved : The Devils act only evilly . Exceptive , in which an Exceptive ; as , besides , but , except , or the like : As , All Men were swept away in the Flood , but Noah and his Family . Restrictive , in which a Restrictive ; as , so far as , in respect of , &c. As Man feels so far as he is an Animal : Christ is every where in respect to h●● Divine Nature . Such Enunciations as these in a Syllogism , are to be chang'd and expounded by some clearer Form of Speech . And hence they are called by the Schoolmen , Exponible or Expoundible . And thus far of Species's and Enunciations .

CHAP. XXIX . Of Enunciations Vniversal Particular , Indefinite and Singular .

Ax. 1. AFfections of Enunciations are either Absolute , or Related .

Ax. 2. Absolure , are Quantity and Quality .

Ax. 3. In Respect to Quantity an Enunciation is divided into Universal , Particular , Indefinite , and Singular .

Ax. 4. A Universal is that in which the Universal Subject is taken Universally ; which then happens , when to the Universal is added a Note of Universality , as , every one , none , &c.

Ax. 5. Particular , in which the Subject is taken particularly , that is , when to the Universal is added a Note of an uncertain Party , or Particularity ; as this , some one , some body . &c.

Ax. 6. An Indefinite is that whose Universal Subject is not defined by any Note of Quantity .

Ax. 7. A Singular is that whose Subject is singular , &c.

COMMENTARY .

1. § . In an Enunciation a Two-fold Quantity is to be cosider'd , viz. One of the Subject which is Number , and the other of the Predicate , which is Time , Place or Mood : The Quantity of Number is indicated by these Notes , viz. all , every one , whosoever , every body , as many as , no one , no body , also , some , some body , the most , not one , some few , not every body , &c. Of which , those affect the Universal , these the particular Enunciation ; that of Place by these , viz. every where , in all Places , none , no where , somewhere , &c. Of Time , these , viz. whensoever , at all times , no time , some time , mostly , &c. Of Mode , these , viz. how , after what manner soever , &c. And altho' the Quantity of the Predicate be often in the same Place in those Modes or Forms of Argumentation termed Syllogisms with that of Number , yet is not that here to be considered . This Fourfold Division , viz. of Universal , Particular , Indefinite , and Singalar , as abo●e not trising from the Quantity of the Subject , but that of the Predicate , &c.

Now the Syncategoremes or consignificative Terms , that is , those that signifie nothing of themselves but when join'd to other Words , as , every one , all , all that , &c. are taken , either Collectively or Distributively . Collectively , when the Predicate can neither be said of the Species's , nor the Individuals of its Subject , as under ; as in these Enunciations all the Planets are Seven , all the Parts are the same with the Whole , &c. Distributively , when the Predicate may also be attributed to them that are contained in the Subject ; And if only to the Species's , then they are said to be taken Distributively , into the Genera Singuiorum , that is , into the Genus's of Singulars ; As , all living Creatures were said to be in the Ark of Noah . Christ healed every Disease ; that is , all Genus's or rather Species's of Diseases , and all Genus's or rather Species's of living Creatures were in Noah's Ark : But if also to the singular Individuals , then they are also distributed into the Singula Generum , that is , the Singulars of the Genus's ; as here in thisEnunciation , viz. Every Man is an Animal , &c. When they are taken Distributively into the Singulars of the Genus's , then is the Enunciation said to be simply Universal , when into the Genus's of Singulars , then only in some Respect , or secundum quid . When Collectively , they seem to make up an Indefinite Enunciation ; and the Reason of it , is this : When the Word All , or Every one , is taken Distributively , it is no other than a Syncategoreme or Consignificative Term ; But when Collectively , a Part of the Subject , &c. which brings us to the next Axiom , viz. this , That

Ax. 8. A Note of Universality is not to be added to the Predicate .

1 § . So Aristotle teaches , Cap. 3. of the Interp. And the Reason of it is this , viz. because it denotes the Quantity of Number , which is , the Quantity of the Subject , as we have said before , and not Predicate . And therefore is it truly said , that every Man is an Animal ; but not on the other side , that Man is every Animal , &c. But yet if the Term All coheres not immediately with the Predicate , as sometimes is does not , but some other Word which circumscribes and determines it , the Enunciation may not be false ; as , God willeth that all Men should be saved . Christ cured every Disease , &c. For here the Predicate is not Men , Diseases ; But Willeth , Cured ; that is , willeth that all Men should , &c. cured every , &c. and so we proceed to the next Chapter , viz. that ,

CHAP. XXX . Of Enunciation Affirming , Denying , Finite and Infinite , and

Ax. 1. IN Regard of Quality , it is , that an Enunciation is divided in this manner ; and first , into Affirming and Denying , and then True and False .

Ax. 2. Affirming is that which conjoyns , Denying , that divides the Parts .

Ax. 3. Affirming is that which conjoyns , Denying , that divides the Parts .

COMMENTARY .

1. § . For Example : Enunciations Affirming are such as these , viz. Every thing that lives is nourish'd . If there be a God , then the World is rul'd by a Providence . It is necessary that the Fire should be hot . Whose Negatives are these : Every Living Creature is not nourished . If there be a God , the World is yet not rul'd by a Providence . It is not necessary the Fire should be hot , &c.

Ax. 4. Both these , that is , both Negative and Affirmative Propositions are divided into Finite and Infinite .

Ax. 5. Finite , is that which consists either of a Subject or Predicate Finite .

Ax. 6. Infinite , which either of one or both Infinite .

1. § . Finite are such as these , viz. Every body is in a Place . None can be at the same time in two Places . Infinite these ; as , A Nonentity is excluded from Categories . Some Man is not Unlearned . Some , tho' not so Rich , are not so Sordid , &c.

I omit the 7th and 8th Rules , here about the Note of Negation in a simple Enunciation ; because I think 'em not so true in the English as they are in the Latin .

Ax. 9. A Compos'd Enunciation is then esteem'd to be Denying , when the Negation coheres with the Ligament by which the simple Enunciations are ty'd together .

1. § . As thus , we may take an Example out of every Species : As , Socrates was both a Wise Man and an Honest . If you become Surety , you must be a Debtor : Either it is Peace , or it is War . Such as the Father is , such is the Son , &c. These are thus denyed ; Socrates was not both a Wise Man and an Honest . If you become Surety , you will not yet become a Debtor . It is not either Peace or War . Such as the Father is , such need not be the Son , &c. But it is to be observed that Adversative Enunciations do not receive Affirmation or Negation on the Account of their Vinculum or Ligament , but only their singular Parts ; as this , He is not learned but honest : For this Enunciation is so to be denyed , viz. He is learned , but he is not honest , &c.

Ax. 10. Exclusive and Restrictive Enunciations , are then said to be Negatives , when a Note of Negation is placed , before the Exclusive Particles .

1. § . As , Man is not alone an Animal ; Cicero was not only an Orator : Christ is not as to his Humane Nature everywhere , &c. And this brings us to the next Axiom , viz. That .

Ax. 11. Affirmation is before Negation and more known , &c.

1. § . Before it must be , because to be , is before not to be : More known , because a Negative Enunciation becomes Known by an Affirmative : For I therefore know a Man not to be a Stone , because I know him to be another thing from a Stone , &c.

CHAP. XXXI . Of Enunciation True and False , Necessary and Contingent , and their Degrees .

Ax. 1. A True Enunciation is that which conjoyns those things which are of their own Nature conjoyn'd , or divides those things which are of their own Nature divided .

Ax. 2. A False , that conjoyns those things which are divided as before , or divides those things which are conjoyn'd .

COMMENTARY .

1. § . But in this Place is to be understood not Ethical , but Logical Falshood and Truth , which we have said to be the Convenience and Discrepance of the Speech , with those things that are signified in Affirming or Denying . A true Enunciation conjoyns those things which are conjoyned ; that is , declares those things to be which are ; as , that Man is an Animal , or the like ; or divides those things which are divided ; that is , declares those things to be which are not ; as , Man is not a Beast , &c. A False joyns those that are to be divided ; that is , Enounces those things to be which are not ; as . Man is a Stone ; or divides those things which are to be conjoyned , that is , Enounces those things not to be which are ; as that a Plant does not live , &c.

Ax. 3. An Enunciation true , is either Necessary or Contingent .

Ax. 4. A Necessary is that which cannot ,

Ax. 5. Contingent , which may be false .

1. § . That is said to be Necessary in the General , which cannot but be , or be otherwise than it is : Contingent , which may . To be Necessary may be said of a Thing two Ways , viz. either Absolutely , or Secundum quid , or in some Respect . Absolutely , that which without a Centradiction , cannot be said not to be , or to be otherwise than it is ; according to something ; which some Condition supposed , indeed , or respect , is Necessary ; but that Condition or Respect being taken away , or altered , without such Contradiction , may be said not to be , or to be otherwise than it is . Both these , together with Contingency , are considered either in Existence , Causes , or Enunciation . And that alone is of this Place : Which is no other than an Indissoluble Connection of Parts ; whilst Contingency is a Dissoluble and Mutable . For Example : This Enunciation , Man is an Animal , is a Necessary ; because it cannot be otherwise , but that a Man must be an Animal . And this Necessity is absolute . This Enunciation also ; A Crow is black is necessary , but not absolutely , but according to some Respect ; because altho' Naturally a Crow cannot be otherwise than black , yet by the Supernatural Power of God it may . But this Enunciation , Crassus is rich , is Contingent ; because it may so be , that Crassus may not be rich .

Ax. 6. Necessity of Enunciation is distinguished by three Degrees . The first of these is of every one : the Second by it self : The Third universally first .

Ax. 7. That of every one , is that in which the Predicate agrees with every Subject and always .

1. § . These two Conditions are always necessary : For Example : This Enunciation , Man is just , is not of every one ; because to be just does not agree with every Man : Neither this ; A living Creature grows ; because it does not always grow : But this , A Crow is black , is of every one ; because every Crow is black , and that always .

Ax. 8. An Enunciation by it self is only that whose Subject and Predicate are cohering together by an Essential Tye.

Ax. 9. And is either of the First or Second Mood .

Ax. 10. And the First is when the Predicate is contained in the Definition of the Subject .

Ax 11. The other , when the Subject in the Definition of the Predicate .

Ax. 12. To which is opposed Enunciation by Accident .

Ax. 13. That is , that in which neither the Predicate is contained in the Definition of the Subject , nor the Subject in the Definition of the Predicate .

1. § . To the First Mood , viz. that by it self , belong Five Genus's of Enunciations ; First , when the next Genus is predicated of the Species ; as , Man is an Animal . Secondly , the Remote ; as , Man is a Substance : Thirdly , the next Difference ; as , Man is Rational : Fourthly , the Remote ; as , Man has the Faculty of Feeling : Fifthly , and Lastly , the Definition of the Defined ; as , Man is a Rational Animal . To the Second belong those Enunciations in which the Proprieties are Predicated of their Subject , and that either singly and separately , as , Man is Risible ; or Two Disjunctively , as , Number is either even or odd . But this Enunciation a Crow is black ; altho' nec ssary , yet is it by Accident ; because neither the Crow in the Mention of Blackness , nor Blackness in the Mention of the Crow , is defined .

Ax. 14. The Enunciation Universally first , is only that in which the Predicate agrees or convenes with the Subject , as it is its self that which it is .

Ax. 15. And , therefore , consists of Reciprocal Terms .

1. § . For Example : This Enunciation , Man is Risible , is from hence known to be Universally first ; because it may be said that Man as Man is Risible ; and also that all Men and only Men are Risible , &c.

Ax. 16. Of these Degrees , the Second includes the First , and the Third the Second , viz. of those having an Universal Subject , but not on the contrary .

Ax. 17. Of Enunciations Contingent , some are for the most Part true , some seldom , some of a doubtful Nature ; that is , now true , now false .

1. § . As for Example : For the most Part , it is true , that Parents love their Children ; seldom , that a Man is born with two Heads : Of a Doubtful Nature , viz. now true , now false ; that a Player at Dice wins , &c. Now

Ax. 18. A false Enunciation is , either Possible or Impossible .

Ax. 19. Possible , that when false , may be true

Ax. 20. Impossible , which , when false , cannot be true .

1. § . A thing is said to be impossible also two Ways ; to wit , either Absolutely or according to something . An Absolute is that which implies a Contradiction ; as , that a Man should be a Stone . According to something , which when not , may be done indeed by God , but not natural Causes ; as , for the Sun to stand still ; the Fire not to burn ; a Virgin to bring forth : So likewise a thing may be said possible two Ways . For one thing it is to be possible to God ; another , to Natural Causes : And this in Reality differs not from that which is Contingent , but only in Reason : For that is said to be possible , which is not , but can be . Contingent , which is and yet may not be : And this of Absolute Affections .

Notes and Observations Extracted from the Learned Heereboord , and apply'd as proper to the End of this Chapter .

1. A Predicate is said to agree with the Subject , as , the Subject is that which it is , when there is nothing else in the Subject to which it can first be attributed ; as of these two Enunciations ; Man is Sensible , Man is Risible . The former is not Universally first ; because to be Sensible , does not convene to Man as he is Man , but as he is an Animal , to which in the first Place it is to be attributed ; but to be Risible , convenes to him as Man ; because to none it is to be Attributed before Man .

2. Terms are said to be Reciprocal , when there may be a Conversion of the Predicate into the Place of the Subject , and so on the contrary , that is , when one may be put into the Place of the other . As for Instance , as one may say , every Man is Risible , so one may say that every Risible is Man . But altho' one may say every Man is Sensible , yet cannot one say that every Sensible is Man , and so in other Instances : And that we may fully know , when an Enunciation is Universally first , it is to be observed that when the Predicate may be said of the Subject with these Particles , viz. quà , quatenus , quia , that is as , so as , because , &c. that is , when with the Predicate , either any Causal or Reduplicative Particle may be used , the Enunciation is always Universally first ; as Man as , and because he is Man , is Risible , &c. When otherwise the Enunciation must be of some other Degree .

3. Of the Degrees of Necessity the second includes the First , and the Third the Second , not Reciprocally . For Instance : Every Man is Risible , is an Enunciation Universally first ; because consisting of Reciprocal Terms : Of it self , and of the second Mood , because the Subject and the Predicate cohere together in a Reciprocal Tye , and the Subject is contain'd in the Definition of the Predicate : Also of every one , because every Man is Risible and always . But when I say a Man is Two-footed , it is also of every one , but not of it self ; because neither Man is contain'd in the Definition of the Two-footed , nor Two-footed in the Definition of Man ; much less to it Universally first , because it consisteth not of Reciprocal Terms : And so we come to the 32d Chapter . viz. That

CHAP. XXXII . Of Conversion , Aequipollence , and Subalternation of Enunciations .

Ax. 1. THose Affections are said to be Related , which agree to Enunciations amongst themselves Compared .

Ax. 2. And these are four , viz. Conversion , Aequipollence , Subalternation and Opposition . And ,

Ax. 3. Conversion is the Transposition saving the Truth of the Predicate into the Place of the Subject ; and the Subject into the Place of the Predicate .

COMMENTARY .

1. § . In which Action the Truth must be saved , because the Conversion is to follow from the Converted . Now this Related Affection of

Ax. 4. Conversion may be divided into Simple , that which is by Accident , and that which is by Contraposition .

Ax. 5. Simple's that in which the Quantity and Quality of the Enunciation are preserved .

Ax. 6. And has Place in the Universal Denying , and Particular Affirming : As ,

1. § . No Man is a Beast ; and therefore no Beast is a Man : Some Man is white ; and therefore something white is a Man , &c.

Ax. 7. By Accident , that in which the Quality being preserv'd , the Quantity is diminished .

Ax. 8. And takes Place in the Universal Affirming .

1 § . Quantity diminish'd , that is , the Universal is chang'd into a Particular ; as , Every Plant lives ; and therefore something which lives is a Plant , &c.

Ax. 9. Contraposition , that in which in Place of the Subject and the Predicate is put the Contradiction of them both .

Ax. 10. And has , Place in the Universal Affirming .

1 § . As every Mortal is generated ; and therefore that which is not Generated , is not Mortal , &c.

Ax. 11. The particular Denying is not ordinarily converted .

1. § . For it does not follow , that because some Animal is not a Man , that therefore some Man should not be an Animal , &c. And if a particular Denying be at any time converted ; as , some Man is not white , and therefore something white not Man : It is fortuitous , and to be imputed to the Matter : As also that , sometimes a Universal Affirming may be converted , saving the Quantity , to wit , when consisting of Reciprocal Terms : As , every Man is a Rational Animal , and therefore every Rational Animal is a Man , &c.

Ax. 12. But it must be observed in Conversion of Enunciations , that the whole Predicate must be changed into Place of the Subject . And likewise whole Subject into the Predicates , or else the Place of the Conversion may be fallacious .

1. § . For Example : This Enunciation , Some Church is in the City , must not be converted into this ; Some City is in the Church ; but this , Something which is in the City is a Church ; because the Predicate of the Enunciation to be converted , is not City , but , to be in it . In like manner , the Predicate of this Enunciation , Every old Man was a Boy 's , not only Boy , but was a Boy . And therefore not to be converted into this , viz. Some Boy was an old Man ; but this , viz. some one who was a Boy , is an Old Man , &c.

2. § . Now the Conversion of Modals is by means of the Dictum , the Mode still remaining Enunciations necessary are converted as pure : Universals denying , and Particulars affirming , simply . Universals affirming either by Accident , or Contraposition ; as , It is necessary that every Man should be an Animal ; and therefore that some , that is , that some Animal should be a Man ; or it is necessary , that that which is not an Animal , should not be a Man , &c.

3 § . One thing is here to be observ'd , that those Enunciations which have the Mode Necessary , be necessary of themselves : For if they have not this Necessity , the Conversion will be false : As , it is necessary , that every old Man should have been a Boy , and therefore that some one that was a Boy should be an old Man . Every learned Person should have been taught , and therefore that some one who has been taught should be learned , &c. Such Conversions as these do not cohere ; Because that an old Man should have been a Boy , or a learned Man taught , is not necessary of its self , or absolutely , but only of every one , because by the Supernatural Power of God it might have been otherwise , &c. Conversion of Modals in the other Moods can not be prescrib'd by any certain Rules : For those things that Aristotle says in the first Book of Prior. Cap. 3. have more in them of Difficulty than Use .

As to the Aequipollency or like Value of Enunciations in Sense , which differ in Words , which the Author says something of , I thought it of little Significancy to be mentioned here ; and therefore I pass'd it by as well that of those differing in Site of the Negative-Particle only , as Mood . The Rules about one and the other being no great Matter ; and for that Aequipollencies of this Nature , may easily be discern'd without Rule .

Ax. 13. By Subalternation we express our Meaning when we would signifie that one Enunciation is subordinated to another , and does necessarily follow from it , but not on the contrary , as Particulars and Singulars from Universals , to which they are indispensably and necessarily subordinate .

1. § . For if every Man is Mortal , then also this or that Man must be sure to be Mortal : And if none , then this or that Man to be sure , is not so , &c.

2. § . In Modals , Subalternation is considered , not only in reference to the Dictum , but to the Mood . Also Subalternation of Dictum is the same in Modals as it is in the Pure : And the Modes of Possible and Contingent , are Subalternated to those of Necessary and Impossible . For Necessary includes the Adverb always ; whilst Impossible , never : Which denote a Universality of Time . Contingent and Possible , sometimes , which is a Note of Particularity of Time . And hence come we to the 33 Chapter , viz. That

CHAP. XXXIII . Of Opposition of Enunciations .

Ax. 1. OPposition of Enunciations , is either in - Truth or Appearance . And

Ax 2. A True Opposition is a Fight of Enunciations in Affirming and Denying . Now

Ax. 3. Enunciations are said to fight , in which the same , of the same , according to the same , to the same , in the same manner and time , is Affirmed and Denyed .

Ax. 4. True Opposition afore-mentioned is either Contrariety or Contradiction .

Ax. 5. Contrariety that which is between Two Universals .

Ax. 6. Of which both may not be together true , altho' false they may .

1 § . For Example ; both these Enunciations , Every Man is just ; no Man is just , are false . But neither these nor any other Contraries can be together true ; because those things which are both at the same time true , are not truly opposed .

Ax. 7. A Contradiction is an Opposition between one Universal and a Particular ; or two Singulars .

Ax. 8. Of which the one is always true , and the other false .

1. § . As , Every Man is just , every Man not just ; no Man is just , some Man is ; Aristides is just , Aristides not just , &c. Of these the one is true , and the other false ; and so in other Instances of the like Nature , the same . In Singulars of future Contingents , indeed , it appears not to Man , which of the two is true , which false : But yet this is evident , that both cannot be together true , nor both false . For Example : One of these is true , that a Player at Dice will win or lose ; but whether , cannot by Man be defined , tho' before God it be certain and determined .

Ax. 9. An Opposition appearing is either Subcontrariety or Indefinite Opposition .

Ax. 10. Subcontrariety is between two Particulars ; Opposition Indefinite between two Infinites .

Ax. 11. Both of which may be together true , but not false .

1 § . Subcontraries are , Some Man is just , some Man is not just : Of these both are true : For Aristides was just , Verres not just ; but not false : For if Subcontraties might be together false , then Contraries might be together true ; because Contraries , the Negation added , or taken away , contradict Subcontraries . Indefinite Oppositions are much the same with Contradictings , For the one is always true , the other false . But this proceeds not from the Form of the Opposition , but the particular Condition of the Matter .

2 § . Subcontraries are said to be in Appearance oppos'd not Truth , both because they may be together true ; as also , because they have not the same Subject : For when I say some Man is just , some Man not just , I understand not in both the same Person ; or if I do , it will be a Contradiction of Singulars . After the same Manner , is the Ratio of Indefinitely opposed .

Ax. 12. Contradiction in Modals consists in the Affirmation and Negation of the Mood in the same Dictum .

As it is necessary Man should be an Animal ; not necessary Man should be an Animal . So are Impossible , not Impossible ; Contingent not Contingent , opposed .

Ax. 13. Contrariety of them consists Part in the Dictum , Part in the Mode .

Ax. 14. By reason of the Dictum , those Enunciations are contrary ; both which have the Mode Necessary or Impossible ; if in one the Dictum be affirmed , the other denyed .

1 § . As it is necessary Man should be an Animal , it is necessary Man should not be an Animal ; impossible Man should be a Stone , impossible Man should not be a Stone , &c.

Ax. 15. By reason of Mode , two , the one of which has the Mode necessary , the other impossible ; if the Dictum of both be of the same Quality .

1. § . As , it is necessary Man should be an Animal , impossible he should be so .

Ax. 16. Subcontraries are two , having the Mode Possible or Contingent , if in one the Dictum be affirmed , the other denyed .

1 § . As , It is possible , or may happen that one Playing at Dice , may win ; it is possible , or may happen , that one playing at Dice may not win , &c.

Ax. 17. Now Enunciations that are Exclusive and Restrictive , receive Contradiction from a Negation added to the Exclusive or Restrictive Particles .

1. § . As only Faith justifies , Faith only does not justifie ; or , Man is Mortal as to his Soul ; Man is Mortal , but not as to his Soul , &c.

Ax. 18. Contradiction of Composed is plac'd in that Negation , which appertains to the Connection of the Consequent with the Antecedent .

1. § . And therefore this , viz. if he is not miserable , he is yet vain , and of a lying Tongue , is thus everted by Virgil , Book 2. of Aenaeids . Nec si miserum fortuna Sinonem , &c. That is , Nor yet , if hard Fortune has made him miserable , has she also made him a Lyer too . Which you may thus resolve : Nor if Sinon be made miserable , is he also vain , and of a lying Tongue , &c. And so of all other the like .

But that the Aequipollency , Subalternation , and Opposition of Enunciations may the better appear , behold a Diagram in which they may be seen at one View .

DIAGRAM .

Aequipollents

A - It is impossible to be .

MA - It may happen to be .

BI - It is not impossible to be .

MUS. - It is not necessary not to be .

Subcontraries .

Aequipollents .

E - It is possible not to be .

DEN - It may happen not to be .

TU - It 's not impossible not to be .

LI. - It 's not necessary it shou'd be .

Subalterns .

Contradictions

Subalterns .

Aequipollents .

PUR - It is not impossible it should not be .

PU - It cannot happen not to be .

RE - It is impossible not to be .

A. - It is necessary it should be .

Contraries .

Aequipollents .

I - It is not possible to be .

LI - It cannot happen to be .

A - It is impossible to be .

CE - It is necessary it should not be .

In which are to be observed four Classes of Enunciations ; and in each of them , four Enunciations , according to the four Modes . First , The Enunciations of the same Class are Aequipollents . Secondly , The Enunciations of the First , are subordinated to those of the Fourth ; and those of the Second to those of the Third . Thirdly , the Enunciations of the First and Third , as also the Second and Fourth , are contradictory to each other . Fourthly , those of the Third and Fourth are Contraries , by reason either of their Dictum or Mood . Fifthly , the Enunciations of the First and Second , are Subcontraries . Sixthly , The Vowels of the Words which are prefix'd to each Class , denote the Quality of the Dictum and Mood ; as ,

AEIU

Denotes

The Dictum and Mood to be affirm'd . The Dictum to be deny'd and Mood affirm'd . The Dictum to be affirm'd , and Mood deny'd . The Dictum and the Mood both to be deny'd .

And thus far of the Thematick Part , which was in the first Place to be handl'd : Now follow Definition , Division , Syllogism , and Method ; of which in the second Part we are to entreat .

The End of the First Book .

Logical Institutions . BOOK II.

CHAP. I. Of Definition in General , and Definition Nominal .

Axiom 1. A Definition is said to be an Oration , viz. Internal or External , that is , either in the Mind , or brought forth in Words , declaring what that is which is sought .

1. § . Which consisteth in two Words at the least : And therefore an Explication of one Name by another more known , as if one should call a Rapier a Sword , cannot properly be call'd a Definition , but yet it must be referr'd to Definition , as we shall afterwards make appear . The Reason why Definition must be a Speech is plainly this : Such is the Imbecillity of our Minds , that by one Conception we cannot easily attain to the Essence of a thing . That Definition therefore might occur , that is , accommodate it self to this Imbecillity , it distributes the thing into Parts , viz. Genus , and Difference , or the like , and so delivers it to be understood by the Mind by many Conceptions , calling each Part by its Name .

Ax. 4. Now of Definitions , the one is of the Name and the other of the thing .

Ax. 5. Definition of the Name is that which declares , what that is which is said ; or what is signified by the Name .

Ax. 6. And that either by Etymology , or a Conjugate , or a Synonymous Word . So that

1. § . Nominal Definition appears to be threefold , viz. that which is according to Etymology , and so declares the Signification of the Name out of the Original . As , a Triangle is that which has three Angles ; Philosophy is the Love of Wisdom , &c. Or , Secondly , according to Conjugation ; and declares the Name by a Conjugate Word ; as , Quality is that by which Things are said to be of what Quality they are . Or , Thirdly and Lastly , According to Word ; as , when an obscure one is declared by one , or more , more known ; as , a handsome Thing is one that is decent and honest , &c. For altho' when one Word is explained by another , it is improperly enough said to be a Definition , because such Explication is not 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , or an Oration as we have observ'd above , yet must such an Explication be referr'd to Definition , as Aristotle says Book 1. Top. Cap. 5. And so we proceed to the next Chapter , viz. That .

CHAP. II. Of Perfect Definition .

Ax. 1. NOw Definition of the Thing is that which explains what the Thing it self is .

Ax. 2. And is either Perfect or Imperfect .

Ax. 3. A Perfect , that which perfectly explains the Essence of the Thing by its Essential Attributes .

Ax. 4. Imperfect , not , at least not Perfectly .

Ax. 5. The Laws of Perfect are principally Six , and the first is that the Definition be short .

1. § . Now Definitions are said to be short when there is nothing less , nor more in 'em than there ought to be . Now that there may be something more , may chiefly happen three Ways ; and first , when a Tautology is committed ; which is not only then when the same thing is repeated by a Synonymous Word ; as if a Man should be defin'd to be a Rational Animal , and endu'd with the Power of Understanding ; which is the same thing in other Words ; but also , when that is put into the Definition of the Species which ought to have been put into the Definition of the Genus : As if Blindness should be defin'd to be a Privation of the Sight , which naturally ought to have in-been : For those Words which naturally ought to have in-been , are Redundant , and included in the Word Privation it self : That , Secondly , is otiosè , or unnecessary in a Definition which distinguishes not the Defined from any other thing , as Transcendents ; As if Virtue should be defin'd to be that for which a Man should be accounted Honest , &c. In this manner yet , are chief Genus's to be defin'd . In the third Place , that is said to be otiosè in a Definition , which being taken away , the Definition would nevertheless be proper , and explain the Nature of the Thing ; as if a Man should say of a Man , that he was a Rational Animal capable of Disciplines : For al tho' that of Capable of Disciplines should be withdrawn , yet the rest of the Definition would be proper to explain the Essence of Man , &c.

Ax. 6. Secondly , Definitions ought to be Perspicuous .

1. § . The Perspicuity of Definitions , says the Prince of Philosophers , ought to be such as that it may presently appear what that is which is taught : Nay , that from it , that of the Thing contrary also may be collected . All those things therefore are to be avoided , which may any ways beget Obscurity ; as , Unusualness , Ambiguity , Metaphor , &c. But if there be none proper , or else if any Word be more used in the Metaphorical than it is in the Proper Signification , nothing hinders but that we may adhibit a Metaphorical Word in a Definition . And therefore when Logick is defin'd to be an Art of Disputing well , expressing by the Word Disserendi , signifying properly something else ; that Definition is improperly rejected for the Metaphor ; because the Word Disserendi is much seldomer used in its proper Signification , which is to distribute or disperse , than in the Metaphorical ; tho' something else possibly there may be , which may be reprehended in that Definition .

Ax. 7. Thirdly , Definitions ought to be Reciprocal with the Defined .

1. § . That is , whatever is contain'd in the Defined ought also so to be in the Definition ; and so on the contrary . Wherefore when the Lawyers define natural Right to be that which Nature has taught all living Things , the Definition is too lax : For Right consists only amongst Men , and appertaineth not to Brutes . On the other side , when Logick is defined to be an Art of Disputing or Arguing well , the Definition is too streight : For Logick is not only a disputing or Art of Disputing , but also Defining , Dividing and Ordering well , which are not sufficiently contained under that Notion of Disputing .

Ax. 8. Fourthly , Definitions are to be affirmed .

1. § . For that Negative Definitions do not so much explain what a Thing is , as what it is not : Wherefore Aristotle having propos'd two Definitions of Accident , Book 1. Top. Cap. 5. preferrs the latter before the former , because conceiv'd by Negation . Often yet are we forc'd thro' the Inopy of Words , or Imbecillity of our Understanding , or Imperfections of things , to make use of Negative Definitions ; as , when we define an Angel to be a Finite Substance , void of Body , a Beast , an Irrational Animal ; Blindness a Privation of Sight . But then they are Imperfect Definitions .

Ax. 9. Fifthly , Definitions ought to be propos'd without Copulation or Conjunction of Parts .

1. § . For a Definition is the Explication of one Essence , and therefore it ought to be one and that a simple Oration ; But Copulative and Disjunctive Particles connect many together . For Example : A Man is not to be defin'd a Terrestrial Animal and two-footed , but a Terrestrial two-footed Animal ; as is collected Cap. 5. of the Interpret . and Cap. 4. Book 2. of the Post . After the same manner Number is not to be defin'd , a Multitude even or uneven : For this is its Division , but a Collection of Unites . But such Definitions as these are frequently to be dispens'd with , not because perfect , but because there are no perfecter : as when Book 2. of the Phys. Nature is defin'd to be the Principle and Cause of Motion and Quiet ; and Enunciation Cap. 4. of the Book of Interp. an Oration pronouncing true or false .

Ax. 10. Sixthly , Definitions are to consist of Prior Attributes , and simply more known , and also Indemonstrable .

1 § . This Canon does the Philosopher explain and confirm in the 6th Book of the Top. Cap. 4. to this Effect . Definition is given us , says he , that we may know : But we know not from every thing or all : but from those that are Prior and more known . Now then since Definition may consist either of them , which are to us more known , or simply : We ought rather to endeavour that the latter may be made known by the former , and simply more known than on the contrary ; because this manner of Defining is the most accommodate to Science . But yet amongst those who are incapable of such Definitions it may be necessary , it may be , to make Definitions of those that are more known to us , rather than those that are more known in themselves . But such Definitions declare not the Essence of a thing , and therefore are imperfect ; unless the same thing happen to be more known to us , and more known in it self . But neither must a perfect Definition consist only of those that are more known , but also Indemonstrable : For Definition is the Principle of Demonstration , as is said Book 1. of the Soul , Cap. 1. and Book 1. Post . Cap. 1. It is taught that the Principles of Demonstration are immediate ; which , certainly could not be , if their Parts were to be demonstrated by former Causes .

Ax. 11. A perfect Definition consists of the next Genus and Specifick Difference .

1. § . This Canon is precepted Book 6. Top. Cap. 1. But yet if the next Genus want a Name , there is added in its Place a Remote with a Difference to limit it , and make it a next Genus . So when an Animal is desin'd to be a Living , Feeling , Corporeal Substance ; Living Corporeal Substance is put in place or lieu of a next Genus , and the specifick Difference is Feeling .

Ax. 12. The Difference of Substances , if not without , is always taken from their Form ; but if without , or that Form be unknown , Propriety is added in the stead of Form .

1. § . So when Man is defined to be a Rational Animal , the Difference is taken from his Form , which is a Rational Soul . But because incorporeal Substances have none , and the Specificks of Corporeal , even lye hid ; because of themselves they incurr not our Senses in the Place of Form , some Property must be taken ; as , An Angel is an Incorporeal Substance , a Dog a Barking-Beast , &c.

Ax. 13. The Differences of Accidents are not taken from their Form or Essence , but their respect to their Subject , Object , Cause Efficient or Final , or somewhat else not contain'd in the Essence .

1. § . Which is the Cause , or Reason why Aristotle Book 6. of the Metaph. Cap. 5. says , that Substances are simply and primarily defin'd ; Accidents secondarily only , or according to something ; and that the Definitions of Accidents are Orations through Additions , because those things that are added to their Genus in their Definitions are without their Essence ; and almost of another Category .

Ax. 14. Proprieties are defin'd by Genus , Subject and next Cause ; and that either Efficient , Final or both .

1. § . And first , Efficient , as an Eclipse of the Moon is a Defect of Light in it by Reason of the Earth's being Diametrically interposed between the Sun and it : Thunder is the Noise of a broken Cloud by reason of the Fire 's being oppress'd ; and so 2dly Final ; as , Sense is a Natural Faculty in an Animal , for the End of Judging betwixt Singulars : The Appetite for the gaining of what is good to its self , and avoiding what is Evil ; or both , as the Act of Respiration is a Reciprocal Attraction and Expulsion of the Air by the Lungs , for the Refreshment of the Heart , &c. The Subject now 's sometimes in a Definition of Proprieties unmentioned ; because it is contained either in the Genus or next Cause : As , the Memory is an internal Sense , conserving of the Images of things known . Here the Subject of Memory is not express'd , to wit , Animal , because contain'd in the Word Sense , and express'd in the Definition of that . So also Risibility is a nanural Faculty of Laughing , arising from a Rational Animal . I say not of Man , because sufficiently understood , when I say arising from a Rational Animal , &c.

Ax. 15. Accidents improper , besides the Genus , take to themselves in Definition , in the Place of Difference , either Subject or Object , Cause Efficient or Final , or something that is made out of these , But ,

1. § . The manner of defining of these is scarcely to be contained within any certain Rules : For , some are defined by Genus and Subject , as , Simity is the Crookedness of the Nose . Some Genus and Object as , Physick is the Science of Natural Body . And after this manner Theoretical Sciences ; and some again by Genus and End ; as , Grammar is the Art of speaking well : Also Genus , End and Object ; as , Logick is an Art of making of Instruments , and therewith directing the Understanding in the Knowledge of Things ; or Liberality is a Virtue observing a Mediocrity in giving and receiving of Moneys , &c. After this manner Arts and Habits Moral . Some lastly , by Genus and Cause Efficient ; as , Whiteness is a Colour arising from a Predomination of Clear . Sound , a Patible Quality arising from a Stroke of the Air between two Bodies collided , or hit one against another . And after this manner all Patible Qualities , if not proper , of other Genus's of Accidents there can scarce be given any certain Rules ; but each how they are to be desin'd , Use and Examples of approved Authors must teach ; which for this End the Studious of Logick ought to collect together .

Ax. 16. The Parts of Definition are always so to be plac'd , as that the Genus may precede the Difference ; and every Word following may limit its foregoing .

1. § . So teaches Aristotle Book 2. Post . Cap. 13. For Example : An Animal is not to be defined a Feeling Animate ; but an Animate Feeling Body ; &c and so we come to Imperfect Definition .

CHAP. III. Of Imperfect Definition .

Ax. 1. IMperfect Definition is properly a Description , and that is either Necessary or Arbitrary .

Ax. 2. Necessary , viz. when the Defined is either not capable of a perfect Definition , or else through the Imbecillity of our Minds we cannot attain to a perfect Definition of it ; or , lastly , when there are wanting fit Words required for an Accurate Definition .

Ax. 3. Of the first Sort are first , Infinite Things , and Secondly , those which have not a true Essence : Thirdly , a Perfect one , and Fourthly , one by it self : Fifthly , and lastly , those which are not placed immediately under some Genus .

COMMENTARY .

1. § . And 1st Infinite things , as God , having not a true Essence ; as , Beings of Reason . Things feigned , Images of Things , Privations . Not a Perfect ; as , Parts , Principles of Things , Things in doing or Imperfect . Not one by themselves ; as , Concretes , Aggregates , Complex . Not under one Genus ; as , Transcendents , Supreme Genus's . At least , not immediately ; as , Individuals : For these are contained immediately under Species , and by Mediation of that under Genus .

Ax. 4. By reason of the Imbecillity of our Minds or Understanding , Substances Incorporereal , and most of the most special Species's of Corporeal Substances .

1. § . For Genus's and Species's Subaltern may be defin'd any way ; as , an Animal is a living feeling Body , &c. In the Definition of Corporeal Substances of the lowest Species in the Place of Essential Difference , there uses to be added Propriety , as we observ'd a little before . The Proprieties of Incorporeal are , likewise unknown to us : Yet Man although he is the lowest Species , is rightly enough defin'd a Rational Animal .

Ax. 5. When a fit or proper Word is wanting there are to be two or more joyned together by a Grammatical Conjunction . But ,

1. § . Such Definitions as these sin against the 5th . Law of Defining , propos'd in the 9th . Theoreme of the former Chapter ; to which I refer you .

Ax. 6. Imperfect Definition Arbitrary , is , when declining or rejecting a Perfect Definition , we draw the thing in gross ; either for Delectations sake , or that we may attemper our Definition to the Capacities of others .

Ax. 7. Of Imperfect , there are several Species's , of which those approach nearest to the Perfect Desinition , which agree most with the Laws of Definition , which we have but now before proposed .

Ax. 8. The principal Species's of them are these : First , when a proper Accident is defin'd only by an External Cause .

1. § . As , an Eclipse is an Interposition of the Earth between the Sun and the Moon : Death is an Extinction of the Vital Heat . This is called a Definition Causal or 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , as in the Greek , Book 2. Post . Cap. 10.

Ax. 9. Secondly , by Genus and Subject not mentioning the Cause .

1. § . As , an Eclipse is a Defect of Light in the Moon , Death is the Exit of the Living ; and by this the Causal Definition is effected , a Perfect Definition of a proper Accident ; as , an Eclipse is a Defect of Light in the Moon , by reason of the Earth's Interposition Diametrically betwixt the Sun and the Moon ; Death is the Interritus of the Living , by reason of the Extinction of the Vital Heat , &c.

Ax. 10. The third Species of Imperfect Definition is that which consists of Genus , and of one or more Proprieties .

1. § . As , a Dog is a barking Beast ; Man is a Risible Animal ; a Loadstone that which draws Iron . And in this manner are defined Substances , whose Essential Differences are concealed from us , as is beforesaid .

Ax. 11. The fourth is that which consisteth in an Enumeration of Parts or Species's .

1. § . As Logick is an Art of Defining , Dividing , Arguing , and Ordering well ; The Roman Civil Law is that which consists of Laws , Acts of Senate , Judgments , Authorities of Lawyers , Usages ; Lastly , and Equality ; as Cicero says in his Topicks .

Ax. 12. The Fifth is that which consists of a Removement of its Opposite ; as that of Horace , viz. Virtus est Vitium fugere . — Et Sapientia prima est Stultitiâ caruisse . i. e. Virtue is to fly Vice , and the first Degree of Wisdom is to be void of Folly .

Ax. 13. The Sixth , when the Relate is defined by the Correlate , without Mention of the Genus and Foundation .

1. § . As , he is a Master that has a Servant , a Father that has Children , Teacher , or Master , that has Disciples .

Ax. 14. The Seventh , which consists of a Coacervation , or heaping up of Circumstances , and common Adjuncts .

1. § . And this properly is a Description ; altho' Use has now obtain'd , that every Imperfect Definition be call'd a Description . For Example : Man is a two-footed Animal , uncover'd with Hair , or Feathers , of an erect Countenance , and endued with Hands : Which Formula of Definition is used by Historians and Poets in the Description of Persons , Facts , Places , and the like singular things .

2. § . Boethius adds other Species's of this Imperfect Definition ; as is First , Definition by way of Metaphor , As when Youth is defined to be the Flower of Age , Age the Winter of Life , Sleep to be the Image of Death , &c. Secondly , by way of Praise or Dispraise ; to which belong Elogies , which are attributed to things , either by way of Praise or Dispraise ; as when History is by Cicero Book 2. of his Orat. describ'd to be the Witness of Time , the Light of Truth , the life of Memory , the Mistress of Life and the Messenger of Antiquity . Or when Philosophy is describ'd by Plato , to be a Similitude with God as much as in Man lies . Pleasure the Food of Evils , Anger a short Madness or voluntary Distraction . Thirdly , by way of Periphrasis ; as Homer is the Writer of the Trojan War . Fourthly , Difference , as Hatred is that which is more lasting than Anger . Fifthly , Example , or Instance ; as an Animal is a Man , a Horse , &c. Sixthly , what it wants of its Genus ; as , a Deunx is a Roman Pound wanting an Ounce , &c. But yet all these are such as hardly if at all merit the Name of Definition .

CHAP. IV. Of the Manner of Investigation or Quaest of Definition .

Ax. 1. DEfinitions are collected from Division or Induction , or Demonstration or Etymology , or Derivation , or , Lastly , from the Definition of the Contrary .

COMMENTARY .

1. § . And by way of Division thus , when Division being made of the chief Genus , and Subordinate Species's under which the Defined is contained , as far as the Defined it self , all the Essential Attributes are collected , out of which its Definition is to be framed . After this manner let us search for the Definition of Man . Man is a Substance ; but because an Angel is also a Substance ; That it may appear how Man differs from an Angel , Substance ought to be divided into Corporeal and Incorporeal . A Man is a Body , an Angel without a Body : But a Stone also is a Body : That therefore a Man may be distinguished from a Stone , divide Bodily or Corporeal Substance into Animate and Inanimate , that is , with or without a Soul . Man is a Corporeal Substance Animate , Stone Inanimate . But Plants are also Animate : Let us divide therefore again Corporal Substance Animate into Feeling and void of Feeling . Man feels , a Plant not : But a Horse also feels , and likewise other Beasts . Divide we therefore Animate Corporal Feeling Substance into Rational and Irrational . Here therefore are we to stand , since it appears that every , and only Man is Rational . From hence therefore may be collected this Definition , viz. That Man is a Corporeal Substance , Living , Feeling Rational ; or lest in Definition of the Species be put the Definition of the Genus ; a Rational Animal . This Method Aristotle delivers Book 2. Post . Cap. 13. and there advises in this Series of Division , no Essential Difference be pass'd by : I add also that no Accidental must be adhibited .

2. § . By Induction thus , viz. when the Essential Attributes of them contain'd under the Defined being compared together , rejecting those that appear proper to the Singulars , the Definition is confected of the rest , which are common to all . Seek we thus the Definition of Animal . Under Animal are contain'd Man , Horse , Lion , &c. The Essential Attributes of these , are Corporeal Substance , Living , Feeling : These are common to all . The Property of Man is to be Rational : Irrational is common to the Horse and Lion . The Property of a Horse is to whinny ; Lion to roar : That therefore you may find the Definition of Animal ; Rational , Irrational , Whinnying , Roaring , are to be rejected , as being too streight . From the rest such a Definition as this will arise , viz. That an Animal is a Living , Feeling , Corporeal Substance , &c. This Method Aristotle delivers in the Place now last cited .

3. § . Demonstration is hereafter to be treated of .

4. § . As for Etymology , it often supplies the Place of the Difference of Things , which with the Genus may Constitute a Definition . So because Arithmetick is so said , 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , that is , from Number , it 's collected that Arithmetick is the Science of Numbers : And Physick , 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , that is , Nature , it 's collected that Physick is the Natural Science , or Science of Nature , &c.

5. § . From Derivation a Definition is collected , when from the Definition of one Conjugate the Definition of another is collected ; as the Definition of Prudence from that of a prudent Man .

6. § . From the Definition of one Contrary also , may be collected that of another : For of Contraries , the Science is the same . And , therefore , when Aristotle Book 3. Cap. 1. had defin'd an unvoluntary Thing to be that which is either done by Force or Ignorance , and affirmed that to be done by Force whose Principle is External , and such , as that he contributes nothing to it , who does or suffers it . He thence collects , that a voluntary Thing is that whose Principle is in him who acts and is not ignorant of the Circumstances of the Fact , &c. Hence then proceed we to the Consideration of the next to be considered , viz. Division , its Laws and Species's , which will be the Subject of the next Chapter .

CHAP. V. Of Division , its Laws and Species's .

Ax. 1. OF Division , one is of the Name , or Nominal , the other of the Thing .

Ax. 2. Division of the Name is an Enunciation of the Significations of an Homonymous or Doubtful Word , or Sentences of an ambiguous or doubtful Speech .

COMMENTARY .

1. § . As if any one should recite the Significations of these Latin Words , Jus , Canis , Malum , &c. or distinguish in this Oration , Aio te Aeacide Romanos vincere posse . That is , I say , you Aeacides can conquer the Romans . This properly indeed is not so much Division as Enunci●●●●● , and is more frequently call'd Distinction than Division .

Ax. 3. And is to be adhibited in the Beginning of a Disputation

1. § . So that the Disputation may seem to be instituted against the Thing , not Words : For it may happen , says Aristotle , that the Answerer may not direct his Thoughts the same way with him that interrogates , when any thing is ambiguous in a Speech , Book 1. Top. Cap. 8.

Ax. 4. Now Division of the Thing which is properly said to Be a Division , is an Explication of the Whole by its Parts .

Ax. 5. And is either by its self , or by Accident .

Ax. 6. Division by it self , is that by which is divided a Whole into its Parts , which are in it , of , or by themselves .

Ax. 7. Accident by Accident .

1. § . For Example ; when Animal is divided into Man and Beast , or into Body and Soul , the Division is a Division by it self ; because Man and Beast are by themselves contained under Animal ; and Animal is of it self composed of Body and Mind . But when Men are divided into Freemen and Slaves , good and bad , the Division is by Accident ; because here , not Men of themselves are divided , but the States and Conditions of Men or other Accidents which happen to them .

Ax. 8. Division of it self again is Four-fold ; One of the Universal Whole , or Genus into Species's ; Another of the Formal , or defin'd into its Parts defining , as Genus and Difference ; Another of the Essential or Composed into its Composing , as Matter and Form ; Another lastly , of the Integrate into its Integrating ; and this by a peculiar Name is called Partition .

1. § . For Example ; When Animal is divided into Man and Beast , or Element into Fire , Air , Water and Earth ; or Moral Vertue into Justice , Fortitude and Temperance , &c. the Division is of the Universal , or Genus into Species's . When the Definition of Man is resolved into its Parts ; or when Animal and Rational are said to be Parts of Man , or of the Definition of Human Essence , the Division is said to be of the Whole Defined or Formal . When Man into a Body and Rational Soul , the Division is a Division of the whole Composed or Essential , &c. And hitherto are to be referred all Distinctions of Things into Material and Formal ; as when the Material of a Word is said to be Voice , Formal , Signification . Lastly when Man or Human Body is divided into its three Regions and Limbs ; or the Year into 12 Months ; a Kingdom into its Provinces ; greater into less ; or Logick into Thematical and Organical : It is a Definition of the Integrate , or Mathematical , and is called Partition .

Ax. 9. Division by Accident is Four-fold , to wit , either of a Cause by its Effects , or an Effect by its Causes , to wit , Material , Efficient or Final ; or a Subject by its Adjuncts ; or an Adjunct by its Subjects , &c.

1. § . Of Cause by its Effects ; as Plants , others heat , others cool : Syllogisms , others effect Faith , others Opinion , others Science . Effect by its Causes , and 1st . Efficient ; as of Testimonies , others Divine , others Humane : By Cause Material ; as of Statues , others are Marble , others Brass : Of Living things , others are of Seed , others Putrid Matter , &c. Cause Final ; as of Men , others voluptuous , others studious of Money ; others speculative , others ready for Action , &c. Cause Formal , that is , Division by Cause Formal is a Division by it self . Division by it self , also is when a proper Accident is divided by its next Cause Efficient or Final : So Diseases or Distampers do differ in Species which have a diverse next Cause or Synectical , or Containing , as a Fever and a Pleurisie , &c. of Subject and Adjuncts ; as of Men , some are Bond , some Free , some are Learned , some Unlearned Sounds , some are Grave , some Acute : Numbers , some are Even , some Odd : Charity , one towards God , the other towards ones Neighbour : Flowers , some Spring , others Summer : Animals , some Land , others Water , others both . But Division of Subject by Adjuncts is often a Division by it self ; As th' External Sense is Conversant either about Colour , Sound , or Smell , or Taste , or the Tactile Qualities . Lastly , Adjunct by Subjects ; as , Vices , some are of the Mind , some Body ; Virtues , some of the Understanding , some Appetite , &c.

Ax. 10. The Principal Laws of Division in general , are seven ; and first , the Parts of it ought to consent or agree in the whole

1. § . And therefore Vitious is the Division of Men into living and dead , real and painted ; because dead and painted Men are not Men , unless aequivocally . So Vicious is the Division of Animals into Mortal , and Immortal ; because no Animal is Immortal , &c.

Ax. 11. Secondly The Parts ought amongst themselves to be opposed .

1. § . Vicious therefore , that Division when either the Parts are not different , as when Pleasure is divided into Delectation and Joy , or when one Part is contain'd in the other : As if Animal should be divided into Mortal and Rational , &c. and that Division is the best , which consists of Parts affirmed ; but oftentimes by reason of the Imbecillity of our Minds , and Want of Words , we are forc'd to divide by Privation ; as when the Body is divided into Animate and Inanimate , &c.

Ax. 12. Thirdly , In Division are to be taken the next and immediate Parts .

1. § . For Instance , A living Creature must not immediately be divided into Plant , Man and Beast ; but first into Animal and Plant , and then Animal into Man and Beast , and so on . See Book 2. Post . Cap. 13.

Ax. 13. Fourthly , The singular Parts must contain less than the whole .

1. § . For the Whole is greater than its Part , and therefore , if one Part should be equal to the Whole , the other would be superfluous , and therefore would not differ from the other ; or else would not consent with the whole .

Ax. 14. Fifthly , The Parts together , must contain neither more nor less than the Whole .

1. § . If more , there must be something in the Division which is superfluous and dissentaneous to the Whole ; if less , the Division would be maimed ; as if you should divide Rites and Customs into Pious and Impious . For in this Division are omitted Rites of a middle Nature : as , by the Sound of a Bell to call People to Church , &c.

Ax. 15. Sixthly , Division ought to consist of the fewest Parts the Nature of the Thing will bear , and if it may be conveniently of two .

1. § . For by how much the Parts are the fewer in Number , by so much are they the more manifestly oppos'd , and better contain'd by the Memory . Not always , yet is to be affected a Bimembrous Division : For often the Nature of the Dividend refuses a Dichotomy , or Bimembrous Division . The Division of Whole , Defin'd and Compos'd , must always be bimember'd . Division of Genus , the fewer the better ; but it cannot always consist of two . And in that of whole Integral and by Accident to seek always for Dichotomy , is a sort of accurate Vanity .

Ax. 16. Seventhly , a Mean is to be put to dividing lest the Number of Subdivisions encrease too much .

1. § . The same Fault , says Seneca , Ep. 89 , has an Excess of Division as none ; for that is like unto confus'd which is cut even to Powder . And thus much of Definition and Division : Now follows Syllogism .

CHAP. VI. Of the Definition of Syllogism , and its Parts .

Ax. 1. A Syllogism is a Speech in which something being suppos'd , something different from that suppos'd , by Reason of the Suppos'd , does of Necessity follow .

COMMENTARY .

1. § . So that to Syllogise is to collect , that is , conclude , or from some certain Propositions to draw up the Summ of an Argument or Proof .

2. § . The Genus of Syllogism is Speech , viz. principally Internal ; because , without External , a Syllogism may consist , viz. in the Mind .

3. § . By something diverse from the Supposed , is to be understood , the Conclusion . Yet ,

4. § . When the Conclusion is said necessarily to follow , we are not to understand it of the Necessity of the Conclusion it self , viz. that of the Consequent but Consequence : For that of the Consequent or Conclusion it self , has Place only in Demonstration of the Consequence in every well-form'd Syllogism : For this being taken away , a Syllogism , will be no Syllogism but a Paralogism .

5. § . Lastly , By reason of the Premisses , that is , the Premisses , must be so very clear , that to the Necessity of such a Sequel , nothing out of the Syllogism need to be sought for . For Example : If it be true that every thing be good , that is , according to Nature , and that all Pleasure is according to Nature , it must necessarily follow , that all Pleasure is good , and that by Force of the Terms that are contain'd in the two Premisses without the Help of any other , &c. Now ,

Ax. 2. A Syllogism is either absolutely considered , that is , in it self , or with respect to those diverse Effects which it produces , by reason of the Diversity of the Conditions of its Matter .

Ax. 3. And the first Tract will consist of three Members , viz. first of Genesis , or the manner of making a Syllogism ; secondly , finding out a Medium ; and thirdly , of the Division of Syllogism , and of the various Species's of such Argumentations .

Ax. 4. And the first of these will be understood by the Explication of the Matter , as well remote as proximate , and the Form . Now ,

Ax. 5. The remote Matter of Syllogism are three Terms , to wit , two Extremes , major and minor , that is , Subject and Predicate , and one Middle , which is the Argument fetch'd from without to prove the Question .

1. § . The Parts of the Question and the Middle , by which we mean the Medium , are thus called , not because of their Site , but Office .

2. § . Secondly , now the Argument must be but One ; because that which unites , ought it self to be but One. And if two in one Syllogism , a third would be wanted , by which to find out the Convenience or Inconvenience of those two : As , when the Equality or Inequality of two Magnitudes are explorated or tryed by two diverse Measures , there will be Occasion for a Third , by which to find out the Equality or Inequality , even of those two .

Ax. 6. The Proximate Matter are only three Propositions , which are made out of these Terms Combin'd together , of which the two first ,

Ax. 7. Antecede and infer , and the third follows and is inferr'd .

Ax. 8. The first is term'd Proposition or Major Proposition ; the second , Assumption , or Minor ; and the third , Collection , Conclusion or Commplexion .

1. § . The first Proposition is call'd Proposition ; because first propos'd , or prepos'd to the rest of the Propositions : The same Major , because compos'd of the Major Term , and Medium ; as the second Minor , because of the Minor and Medium . The third Conclusion , because it collects together the Parts of the Question which were separated in the Premisses , and joyns them .

2. § . Of this two-fold Matter , a Syllogism may be made or compos'd in this manner . In the first Place some Question is to be sought for : As for Instance ; Is Logick an Art ? This Question contains two Parts , the Subject Logick , and Predicate Art . To the Proof of Logick's being an Art , let us take some Argument , or Medium , and let that be Habit Effective . Let this Argument in the first Place be joyn'd to the Predicate of the Question , which is Art , and then the Major is made , which is , every Habit effective is an Art : And then with the Subject , and then the Minor , viz. Logick is a Habit Effective : From whence unavoidably will follow this Conclusion , viz. that Logick is an Art , &c. And thus much of the Matter , as well remote as proximate .

Ax. 9. The Syllogistick Form is only an apt Disposition of the three Propositions for the necessary Collection of a Conclusion from the Premisses .

Ax. 10. Which Aptitude or Disposition consisteth in Figure and Mode .

Ax. 11. A Figure is a legitimate Disposition of the Medium with the Parts of the Question .

Ax. 12. A Mode is a legitimate Determination of the Propositions according to Quantity and Quality .

1. § . For the Conclusion follows not from any Premisses at least , not necessarily , but only those that are affected with a certain Quantity , and after a certain Law and Manner are affirmed and denyed .

Ax. 13. Of Modes in Syllogism , some are direct , others inverse , and indirect .

Ax. 14. Direct , those in which the Major Extreme is collected of the Minor : as in this , Every Man is an Animal . Socrates is a Man . And therefore Socrates is an Animal , &c.

Ax. 15. Invers'd on the contrary those in which the Minor from the Major : as here , Every Man is an Animal . No Stone is a Man . Some Animal therefore is not a Stone . But of these Sorts of Modes there is but little or no Use .

Ax. 16. The Direct are either Universal or Singular .

Ax. 17. Universal are those in which either both , or One of the Premisses are Universal , as here .

Every Animal lives . Every Man is an Animal . And therefore every Man lives , &c. Or , Every Man is a Rational Animal . Socrates is a Man . And therefore Socrates is a Rational Animal , &c.

Ax. 18. Those Singular , in which both Singular : as here .

Judas was a Wicked Man . Judas was an Apostle . Some Apostle therefore was a Wicked Man , &c.

But such Argumentations as these Aristotle has not vouchsafed to call Syllogisms , but only Expositions or Exhibitions ; because they expound the Necessity of the Sequel in Syllogisms of the third Figure , and exhibit it to the Senses . By the Peripateticks , his Followers , they are call'd Expositories , and by Ramus , proper , others singular Syllogisms : But now of the three Figures in Syllogism with the Modes Universal and Singular which belong to them .

CHAP. VII . Of the three Figures of Syllogism and their Modes .

Ax. 1. THE Figures of Syllogism are three , because so many Ways may the Argument be dispos'd with the Parts of the Question ,

Ax. 2. The first of which is , that in which the Argument is subjected to the Major , and predicated of the Minor Term : As for Instance , Every Animal feels : Every Man is an Animal : And therefore every Man feels .

In which the last Extreme or Subject is plainly Man the first or Predicate feels ; Medium , Animal . Where Man is contain'd under Animal , and Animal that which feels . Let us see another Argumentation , viz. This.

No Animal is a Stone : Every Man is an Animal : And therefore no Man is a Stone .

Here the Minor indeed is contain'd in the middle ; For Man is an Animal ; but the Middle not in the Predicate : For Man is not a Stone , &c.

Ax. 3. Now the second Figure or Fashion of Argumentation is that in which the Argument is predicated of both Extremes .

Every Animal feels : No Plant feels : And therefore no Plant is an Animal .

In which the Term Feels which is the Medium is predicated of one affirmatively , the other Negatively ; and so both .

Ax. 4. The third is , that in which the Argument is the Subject of both Extremes : as , Every Animal feels : Every Animal lives : Something therefore , that lives , or is living , feels .

In which we see the Argument Animal is subjected both to Feels and Lives , they being both said of it , &c.

There are not wanting those that conceive the Medium may be dispos'd in a fourth Manner , with the Parts of the Question ; and so that there is a fourth Figure , in which the Argument may be predicated of the greater Extreme , and subjected to the less : For Example : Every Man is an Animal : Every Animal feels : Something therefore that feels is a Man . In which we see the Term Animal is said of Man , and the Term Feels , of it , which is the lesser Extreme : But such Syllogisms as these , conclude indirectly in the first Figure . For of the two Extreme Terms , that is to be esteem'd the Major which is predicated of the Medium , that the lesser which is subject to it . If both are subjected , as in the second , or both predicated as in the third , then that is to be adjudged Major which is the first , and that Minor which is the last conjoyn'd with the Medium . Of the Propositions , that the Major in which the Major ; that the Minor in which the Minor is conjoin'd with the Medium : And the Conclusion is so to be inferr'd as that the Major Term be the Predicate , and Minor the Subject of it ; for if otherwise the Conclusion will be indirect . For Example : In the Syllogism of the fourth Figure above : Animal is the middle Term , Feels , therefore must be the Major , because predicated of Animal ; and Men the Minor , because Subject ; From whence follows that this Proposition , Every Animal feels ; is the Major Proposition , because therein the Major Term is joyn'd to the Medium , and this , Every Man is an Animal ; Minor , because therein the Medium is joyned with the Minor : And consequently this the Conclusion , viz. Every Man therefore feels ; Not this , viz. Something which feels is Man : For when the Minor Term is collected from the Major , the Syllogism is Indirect , &c.

Ax. 5. Now the Modes , viz. Universal , certainly and directly concluding , are fourteen : Four in the first Figure , viz. Barbara , Celarent , Darii , Ferio ; as many in the second . Cesare , Camestres , Festino , Baroco ; and six in the third , viz. Darapti , Felapton , Disamis , Datisi , Bocardo , Ferison .

1. § . All which for the sake of Memory are contain'd in these four Versicles , such as they could be render'd from the Latin .

Barbara , Celarent , are of the First , also Darii Ferio . Cesare Camestres , of the second ; likewise Festino , Baroco . The Third Darapti claims and its Felapton , And with them , Disamis , Datisi , Bocardo , Ferison .

Ax. 6. Of which Words , each Syllable is to be prefix'd to each Proposition ; to shew its Quantity and Qualities by its Vowels :

Ax. 7. The Vowels are Four . viz. A , E , I , O. Whereof A , denotes a Universal Affirming ; E , a Universal Denying ; I , a Particular Affirming ; and O , a Particular Denying .

1. § . All which are likewise particularly Express'd in this Couplet , viz.

A asserts , E denys , but generally both : I asserts , O denys , but specially both .

Ax. 1. Now Indefinite Propositions are all here taken for Particulars , as also Singulars , if adjoin'd in the same Syllogism , to a Proposition Universal or Particular ; For if alone , they constitute Singular Syllogisms , or Expository .

Ax. 9. Of which in each Figure there are two ; of which those of the first and second are less Natural ; because a Singular is Naturally affirmed of no other .

1. § . Examples of the Universal Moods certainly and directly , concluding in the first Figure , are such as these , viz. Barbara . Every Animal feels ; Every Man is an Animal : Every Man therefore feels . Celarent . No Animal is a Stone ; Every Man is an Animal : No Man threfore is a Stone . Darii . Every Colour is visible ; Some Quality is a Colour : Some Quality therefore is visible . Ferio . No Virtue is an Extreme ; Some Habit is a Virtue : Some Habit therefore is not an Extreme .

2. § . Of the Singulars in this Figure , the one affirms , the other denies . For Example : The Messiah was to be crucified ; Jesus Christ is the Messiah : Therefore Jesus Christ was to be crucified . Aristotle was not an Athenian ; The Master of Alexander was Aristotle : The Master of Alexander therefore was not an Athenian .

3. § . Examples of the Universal certainly and directly concluding in the second Figure , are such as these ; Cesare . No rich Man is in Want : Every Covetous Man is in Want : No Covetous Man therefore is Rich. Camestres . Every Animal is mortal ; No Angel is mortal : No Angel therefore is an Animal . Festino . No Animal is a Plant ; Something living is a Plant : Something living therefore is not an Animal . Baroco . Every Man is an Animal ; Some Rational Substance is not an Animal : Some Rational Substance therefore is not a Man .

4. § . The singular Modes of the second Figure conclude both Negatively . For Example : Plato was not a Stagyrite ; Aristotle was a Stagyrite : Aristotle therefore was not Plato . Aristotle was a Stagyrite ; Plato was not a Stagyrite : Plato therefore was not Aristotle .

5. § . Examples of Universals certainly and directly concluding in the third Figure , are such as these , viz. Darapti . Every Virtue is hard to attain to ; Every Virtue is honest : Something therefore honest is hard to attain to . Felapton . No Stone lives ; Every Stone is naturally mov'd to its own Place : Something therefore which is naturally mov'd to its own Place , does not live . Disamis . Some Man raves , or is mad ; Every Man is a Rational Animal : Some Rational Animal therefore raves or is mad . Datisi . Every Covetous Man is in want ; Some Covetous Man has Riches or Wealth : Some one therefore who has Riches or Wealth , is in want . Bocardo . Some Body is not Corruptible ; Every body consists of Matter and Form : Something therefore which consists of Matter and Form is not Corruptible . Ferison . No Virtue brings forth Misery ; Some Virtue is painful : Something therefore which is painful brings not forth Misery

6. § . Of the Singular Moods in the third Figure , the one also affirms , and the other denies . For Example : Judas was wicked ; Judas was an Apostle : Some Apostle therefore was wicked . Socrates was not a wicked Man : Socrates was a Heathen : Some Heathen therefore was not a wicked Man .

7. § . And these are the direct Modes , the Use of which is much the greatest in Disputation : To which Aristotle has also added some Inverted , which from a Major affirming Universal or Particular , and Minor Denying , conclude a Particular Negation of the Minor Term. As , Every Man is an Animal ; No Horse is a Man : Some Animal therefore is not a Horse . Some Animal is a Man ; No Plant is an Animal : Some Man therefore is not a Plant , &c.

But these , together with the Ways of Conversion and Transposition , as being useful to very few , are better sought for out of the Institutions : And so we proceed to the 8th Chapter , viz. that of the Rules , Laws and Proprieties of Syllogisms , as far as sutes to our Purpose .

CHAP. VIII . Of the Laws , Rules and Proprieties of Syllogisms .

Ax. 1. THE Necessity of Consecution , which we call'd the Soul of Syllogism , leans upon certain Foundations and Rules ; so certain and known that they cannot be deny'd by any one .

Ax. 2. Universal Syllogisms affirming depend on the Rule or Dictum de omni , that is , all , which is this : Whatsoever is predicated Universally of any Universal ; That is also predicated of all that are contain'd under that Universal .

COMMENTARY .

For Example ; To live , is said universally of Animal ; as , every Animal lives : And Man is contained under Animal ; as , every Man is an Animal : And therefore to live , may also be affirmed of Man ; as , every Man lives , &c. And this is the Syllogism affirming in the first Figure .

Ax. 3. Syllogisms universal denying lean upon the Rule of None , which is this : Whatsoever is universally denyed of any Universal , is also denyed of all which contain'd under that Universal .

1. § . For Example ; Deny we Stone of Animal ; as no Animal is a Stone : Now Man is contained under Animal : For every Man is an Animal ; and therefore Stone must also be denyed of Man : For no Man is a Stone ; and this is a Syllogism denying in the first Figure . As necessary therefore as it is for Leyden to be in the Low-Countries , or Belgium , when it appears that Holland is in the Low-Countries , or Belgium , and that Leyden is in Holland , or that Leyden is not in England ; since Belgium is not in England , and Leyden is in Belgium : So necessary is it that the Conclusion should follow from well and lawfully disposed Premisses . Which will be more easily understood if the Dictum of All and None be Paraphrastically propounded and accommodated to Syllogisms in this manner , viz. Whatsoever Predicate is universally affirmed or Denyed of any Medium , that also is affirmed or denyed of that Subject , which is contained under that Medium , wherein there are three distinct Parts , of which the first represents the Major , second the Conclusion , and third the Minor .

Ax. 4. Singular Syllogisms depend upon this Maxim , whatever things agree in one single Third : Those also agree amongst themselves ; and those of which one agrees to any single Third , the other not : Those also agree not amongst themselves .

1. § . As for Instance ; If two Trees are equal to the same Measure , it is rightly collected , that those Trees are equal also amongst themselves : So also if it may be truly affirmed of David that he was a Prophet and a Manslayer , it follows that some Prophet was a Manslayer , and that in such a Syllogism as this . David was a Manslayer : David was a Prophet : Some Prophet therefore was a Manslayer , &c. On the other side , whereas of two Beams , if one of them be agreeable to a certain Measure , the other not , it follows that they must be unequal amongst themselves : So also if it convene to Judas , that he was an Apostle , and not faithful to his Lord : It follows also that some Apostle was not faithful to his Lord ; and that in such a Syllogism as this . Judas was not faithful to his Lord ; Judas was an Apostle : Some Apostle therefore was not faithful to his Lord . If there be two , of which neither agrees to any one Third ; it is uncertain whether they agree amongst themselves or not .

Ax. 5. Those Syllogisms which are agreeable to these Rules , are true Syllogisms , which dissent from them Paralogisms , or Vitious Syllogisms : But ,

Ax. 6. That the more easily true Syllogisms may be discern'd from Paralogisms , some Laws are to be observ'd , of which some are common to all ; others peculiar to each Figure .

Ax. 7. The Common Laws are seven ; and first , in a Syllogism there must be no more or less than three Terms .

1. § . This Law is prescribed Book 1. Prior. Cap. 25. and is thus prov'd : A Question has but two Terms , viz. Major and Minor , or Subject and Predicate : The Medium or Argument is taken from without ; and that ought to be but one ; as we have shewn , Cap. 6. of this Book . Tho'

2. § . It often happens that there are four Terms in a Syllogism when there seems to be but three ; and that chiefly for three Causes : And first , because some Word or Sentence in the Syllogism is doubtful ; as in this Syllogism , That which wants Beginning and End , is Eternal ; The World wants Beginning and End ; Therefore the World is Eternal . There are four Terms , because Beginning and End in the Major , are to be understood of Duration , in the Minor of Magnitude .

3. § . Secondly , because Concretes are confounded with Abstracts , or Abstracts with Concretes , as in this Syllogism : Whiteness is a Quality ; Snow is white : Therefore Snow is a Quality .

4. § . Thirdly , because the Cases are chang'd in the Nouns , or Tenses in the Verbs ; as in these Examples : All Servants are their own Masters ; That is , Servants of their own Masters : Davus is a Servant : Therefore Davus is his own Master . No Boy ever lived long ; Nestor was a Boy : Therefore Nestor did not live long . But if the same Mutation of Case or Time that is made in the Premisses , be made also in the Conclusion , it maketh not a Fourth Term : As appears from these Examples .

All Servants are of their Masters ; Davus is a Servant : Therefore Davus is of his Master , that is , belonging to him . No Boy lived long ; Nestor was a Boy : Therefore Nestor as a Boy , did not live long .

Ax. 8. The second Law is , that there should be no more nor less in the Conclusion than there was in the Premisses .

1. § . That is , The Extremes which were with the Medium disposed in the Premisses , should be so posited in the Conclusion as they were in the Premisses , without any either Addition or Detraction : For if any thing be either added or withdrawn , there will be four Terms , as appears from the following Examples . Those which please God are happy ; All those which are faithful please God : All those which are faithful therefore are happy and are afflicted with no Calamities . All repenting Sinners are admitted into Favour ; Some Men are not admitted into Favour : Some Men therefore are not Sinners . For both Syllogisms are Vitious : the first , because there is more ; and the second , because less in the Conclusion than there was in the Premisses .

Ax. 9. The third is , the Medium must not enter the Conclusion .

1. § . Vitious therefore are those Syllogisms in which either the whole , or Part of the Medium is included in it ; For Example ; Every Horse differs from a Man ; Socrates differs not from a Man ; Therefore Socrates differs not from a Horse . This Syllogism is bad , because the Word Differ is Part of the Medium : For it ought to have been inferred : Therefore Socrates is not a Horse , &c.

Ax. 10. The fourth is , the Extremes are so to be plac'd in the Conclusion as they were before in the Premisses .

1. § . That is , that which is predicated of the Medium in the Premisses , ought to be so in the Conclusion ; and that which is subjected to the Medium in the Premisses , ought to be so in the Conclusion : Or if both Extremes are subjected , or both predicated , that ought to be predicated in the Conclusion , which is conjoyned with the Medium in the Major Proposition ; and that subjected which is conjoyn'd with the Medium in the Minor Proposition ; This Syllogism therefore is Vitious , viz. Every Animal lives ; Every Man is an Animal : Therefore every thing living is Man . For the Inference ought to have been , Therefore every Man lives . For when the Site of the Extremes is otherwise in the Premisses than it is in the Conclusion , the Syllogism either concludes nothing , or indirectly .

Ax. 11. Fifthly , From two Negatives , nothing is concluded . Which Law leans upon this Reason , viz. that the Dictum of all requires both ; and the Dictum of none , one affirmed Proposition . This Syllogism therefore is Vitious No Stone is an Animal ; No Man is a Stone : No Man therefore is an Animal , &c.

2. § . And yet if the Negation be Part of the Argument , a good Syllogism may be made of two Negatives . For this Syllogism , That which does not feel , is not an Animal ; A Plant does not feel : A Plant therefore is not an Animal . does rightly conclude ; because the Particle not , joyned with feel in the Major , did not make a Negation , but only render'd the Medium Infinite , and the same Force it ought to exercise in the Assumption or second Proposition : And therefore tho' the Minor be in Specie denying , yet is it taken for an Affirming , viz. of an infinite Predicate , &c.

Ax. 12. The Sixth is , that from two Particulars nothing is concluded .

1. § . Which depends upon this Reason , viz. that the Dictum of all and none , require either that both , or at least one Proposition be Universal . This Syllogism therefore is vicious . Some Animal is a Man ; Some Animal is a Beast : Some Beast therefore is a Man , &c.

2. § . That from two Singulars something rightly may be concluded , and not from two Particulars , this is the reason ; Uncertain Individuals , which compose particular Propositions , are Ambiguous ; and therefore in Syllogisms that consist of pure Particulars , there are four Terms . But now Determinate Individuals , of which Singulars consist , are not subject to the same Homonymy , or doubtful Signification .

Ax. 13. The seventh is , that the Conclusion shall follow the weaker or deterior Part.

1. § . Wherefore , since a Proposition denying is deterior to an Affirming , and a Particular to an Universal : If either of the Premisses be denying , the Conclusion also must be so . And if either of them be Particular , the Conclusion also must be so : For the Propositions premis'd are the Cause of the Conclusion ; but the Cause cannot be deterior to its Effect ; Wherefore if any Debility adhere to the Premisses , it must necessarily pass into the Conclusion no less than hereditary Diseases do to Posterity . This Rule extends it self also to the Conditions of the Matter ; so that if one of the Premisses be necessary , the other Contingent , the Conclusion also must be Contingent , as is taught Book 1. Prior. Cap. 21. And these Laws are general .

Ax. 14. The special Laws , are these three ; and first , the Major of the first Figure must be always Universal , and the Minor Affirming .

1. § . This Law is collected out of Book 1. Prior. Cap. 4. And , therefore these Syllogisms must be vitious . Some Animal is a Beast ; Every Man is an Animal : Every , or some Man therefore is a Beast . Every Man is an Animal ; No Horse is a Man : Therefore no Horse is an Animal . But yet if the Negation be Part of the Medium , the Syllogism is not vitious , as we said above .

Ax. 15. The second is , that the Major of the second Figure must be always Universal , and one of the Premisses denying .

1. § . And therefore these Syllogisms are vitious . Some Animal is a Man ; No Horse is a Man : Some Horse therefore is not an Animal . Every Man is an Animal ; Every Horse is an Animal : Every Horse therefore is a Man .

Ax. 16. The third is , the Minor of the third Figure must be affirming , and the Conclusion Particular .

1. § . And therefore these Syllogisms are vitious : Every Animal lives ; No Animal is a Plant : Therefore some Plant does not live . Every Man is an Animal ; Every Man lives : Every living thing therefore is an Animal .

Ax. 17. The Proprieties convening to Syllogisms which are fram'd according to these Rules , are two , and the first is , from true Premisses nothing follows but what is true .

1. § . Concerning this Propriety Aristotle teaches Book 2. Prior , Cap. 2. And therefore if from true Premisses follows what is false , it is a Sign that the Form of the Syllogism is Vitious , and that there is a Transgression against some of the above-said Laws ; and therefore this Syllogism , Every Man is an Animal ; Every Horse is an Animal : Every Horse therefore is a Man . Is a Paralogism ; because a false Conclusion is collected from true Premisses ; and that , because both the Premisses are affirming in the second Figure . But now if the Form of the Syllogism be good , nothing hinders that a true Conclusion may be drawn from false Premisses , as in this Syllogism . Every Stone is an Animal ; Every Man is a Stone : Every Man therefore is an Animal . For here the Form is good , and yet both the Premisses apparently false , and Conclusion true ; but this happens by chance . But from true Premisses rightly dispos'd , there never follows any thing which is false .

Ax. 18. The other Propriety is , that from one Syllogism rightly form'd many Conclusions may be drawn , and that either by Conversion of the Conclusion , or by Subalternation .

1. § . This Propriety is given us Cap. 1. of the same Book : For he who has prov'd , that every Man is an Animal , or no Man is a Stone , or some Plants are hurtful , he has by the same Premisses prov'd that some Animal is a Man , no Stone is a Man , and that something noxious is a Plant , because those Conclusions may be converted into these , either by Accident or simply , &c.

2. § . Subalternation or Subsumption , happens under the Subject , or the Medium , or the Predicate . Under the Subject , when one from a Universal Conclusion infers a particular Proposition which is contain'd in it . As if one having prov'd all Sense to arise from a Reception of the Object , should from thence collect , that the Sight also proceeded from the Reception of the Object . Under the Medium , when from a Major Universal of the first or third Figure , a Particular is inferr'd , which is contained in it ; As if any one from this Syllogism , Every Animal is nourished ; Every Man is an Animal : Every Man therefore is nourished . should infer , that a Chameleon was nourished . Under the Predicate , when from a Universal Major of the second Figure a Particular is inferred , which is contained under it ; As , if any one out of this Syllogism , No inanimate Body is nourished ; Every Plant is nourished : No Plant , therefore is inanimate . should infer , no Stones are nourished ; because they are inanimate , &c.

CHAP. IX . Of the Declaration of the Second and Third Figure , by Reduction to the First , and Exposition so far as is necessary for our Purpose .

Ax. 1. THE Syllogisms of the first Figure are more perfect than the rest , for two Reasons ; First , because in that may be concluded all manner of Questions , whether Affirming , Denying , Universal , Particular , ; whereas in the Second only Denying , and in the Third , Particular .

Ax. 2. Secondly , because in that there appears the Necessity of the Syllogistical Sequel , and the Dictum of All and None , which in the rest of the Figures are not so conspicuous , but that they require a Declaration .

Ax. 3. Which Declaration is to be made , two ways , viz. by Reduction to the First and by Exposition .

Ax. 4. Reduction is either ostensive , or else by Way of Impossible .

Ax. 5. Reduction by Impossible is perform'd by one of the Premisses retaining , and the Conclusion's Contradiction being put in Place of the other .

Ax. 6. Ostensive by the Propositions being converted , or also transposed .

Ax. 7. To both which are of Use those Consonants , which are contained in the Names of the Modes , to be farther read of in Logicks ; but too long here to recite .

Ax. 8. By Exposition the Necessity of the Consecution is declared , viz. in the third Figure . When in Place of the Medium Universal , there is taken a singular : As , suppose Aristotle , or some other Person instead of Man . , which is contained under that Universal , by which to collect the same Conclus●●● as ,

1. § . For Example ; a Syllogism in Datisi , viz. Every Man may err ; Some Man is a Philosopher : Some Philosopher therefore may err . If any one should doubt this Illation , one may take a singular Medium : As , suppose Aristotle , or the like instead of Man , and make an Expository Syllogism , with it in this manner , viz. Aristotle might or could err ; Aristotle was a Man : And therefore some Man might or could err . Which Conclusion is therefore the more evident ; because it has a sensible Medium , in which Conform to that most evident Maxim , viz. Whatever things agree in the same singular Third ; they also agree amongst themselves .

2. Syllogisms of the second Figure are not so well declared by Exposition , because the Medium in the Second , ought to be predicated ; but a Singular cannot naturally be predicated , but only subjected . And thus far of the Genesis , or manner of making of Syllogisms .

CHAP. X. Now of finding out a Medium , with Propriety to each Figure and Mode .

Ax. 1. THE Medium may be compared with the Parts of the Question , either as Antecedent , Consequent , or Repugnant .

Ax. 2. The Medium is said to be Antecedent , when in an Affirming Enunciation it is subjected ; Consequent when predicated ; Repugnant , when either subjected or predicated in an Enunciation Denying .

1. § . And hence it will be easie to guess what kind of Medium each Mood and Figure requires : In Barbara and Darii , the Medium is the Antecedent of the Predicate , and Consequent of the Subject : In Celarent , Ferio , Cesare , Festino , repugnant of the Predicate , and Consequent of the Subject : Camestres and Baroco , Consequent of the Predicate , and Repugnant of the Subject : Darapti , Disamis and Datisi Antecedent of Both : In Felapton , Bocardo and Ferison , repugnant of the Predicate , and Antecedent of the Subject . If the Medium be the Consequent of the Predicate , and Antecedent of the Subject , the Syllogism will be indirect in the First , viz. vulgarly the fourth Figure . If repugnant of both a Parallogism , and that of two Negatives ; if of the Predicate Antecedent , and Consequent of the Subject : So , by reason of the Minor denying in the first or third Figure . If lastly , Consequent of both , one of the two Affirmatives in the second Figure .

2 § . All which is taught in these few Words which are contained in this Distich . By Napcas , Nipcis , or Nipis , Repcere Cepres , And Ropcos , Copros , Nosrop , you 'll find every Medium . In which Versicles are to be considered , First , the Vowels A , E , I , O , which denote the Quality and Quantity of the Conclusion according to the accustomed Valuation . And then the Consonants N , C , R , S , P. Of which N denotes the Antecedent , C the Consequent , R the Repugnant , S the Subject , P the Predicare , &c. And therefore if a Universal Conclusion Affirming be to be proved , Napcas will shew by its Consonants N , P , C , S. that a Medium is required , which is Amtecedent of the Predicate and Consequent of the Subject ; and if a Particular Affirming : Nipcis , that there is need of a Medium , that is Antecedent of the Predicate also , and Consequent of the Subject : Nipis Antecedent of both . If a Universal denying , the Word Repcere shews that the Medium ought to be Repugnant of the Predicate and Consequent of the Subject ; and so by the Confonants , minding only what it is they signifie , it will be easie for a Practiser to whom this is principally significant , to determine of the rest .

3. For our Example ; be this vulgar Probleme , Is Pleasure good ? Seek first the Consequences of the Predicate , viz. to be Chosen , Conducible , &c. then the Antecedents , as , Febicity , Sanity , &c. then the Repugnants , at , to be avoided , turpid , &c. Seek also the Consequences of the Subject , as Peaceable , according to Nature . Then the Antecedents , as Pleasure of Musick , &c. Lastly , the Repugnants , as , what is molestous , laborious , &c. Make we now a Universal Conclusion after this manner . All Pleasure is good . This is found only in Napcas , as being the Word which indicates the Medium to he the Antecedent of the Predicate , and Consequent of the Subject . Take we , for Instance the Medium , according to Nature : And the Syllogism will be this in Barbara , Whatever is according to Nature , is good ; but all Pleasure is according to Nature : And therefore all Pleasure is good , &c. If , we were to conclude , Some Pleasure is good , then according to the Word Nipcis , the Antecedent of both of them were to be taken : As , suppose Musical Pleasure , and then the Syllogism would be in Darapti , Disamis , or Datisi : As this ; All Musical Pleasure is good ; All Musical Pleasure is Pleasure : Some Pleasure therefore is good , &c.

But thus much of a Medium , as it has Reference to each Figure and Mode ; in another Capacity , we shall consider it hereafter . We come now to the Species's of Syllogism , and First speak we of Induction , Enthymeme , and Example .

CHAP. XI . Of Induction , Enthymeme , and Example .

Ax. 1. AN Induction is a Syllogism in which one Extreme is concluded by the other of the Medium ; also defined a Progress from Singulars to Universals .

1. § . An Induction is so called , because by those things which are certain , it induces the Mind of the Hearer to believe those that are Uncertain . Now an Induction collects the greatest Extreme , that is , the Predicate of the Medium by the other Extreme , that is , the Subject , and all those things that are like unto it . So in an Induction , for Instance , it 's proved , that Animals void of Bile are long-liv'd ; because a Man , a Horse , an Ass , &c. are long-liv'd .

2. § When an Induction is said to be a Progress from Singulars to Universals , the Words must not be too strictly taken ; For there are two sorts of it , as thus explained , viz. one by which the Genus is collected of the Species's , or Universal of Singulars ; and the other in which the Whole of the Parts . Examples of which are to be met with almost in every good Author . Thus Aristotle Book 8. of his Ethicks , Cap. 1. proves Friendship necessary to Men : To the Rich , because it Exercises their Charity , and conserves a Prosperous Fortune ; Poor , because their Refuge and Supply ; Old Men , that they may be reverenced ; and what cannot by themselves be done by reason of their Infirmities , may be done by others that are their Friends . Youth , for fear they commit Sin ; Vigorous Age , that it may perform famous Enterprises , &c. and this is an Induction of the first kind , and properly a Progression from Singulars to Universals , or at least , less Universals to more . But an Example of the other it would be , if one should prove the Holy Scriptures to be divinely inspired , because the Law , the Prophets , the Gospels , and Writings of the Holy Apostles , &c. are divinely inspir'd ; and this would be but improperly called a Progression from Singulars to Universals ; and so of like Instances .

Ax. 2. That the Induction may be firm , all the Singulars are to be numbered up , that from thence the Universals , or also all the Parts , that from hence the Whole may be concluded .

Ax. 3. Or if this be too troublesome after an Enumeration of several , it may be subjoyn'd that the Ratio of the rest is the same or some such like .

1. § . So Horace intending to prove that no Men were content with their Lots , after he had affirmed that neither Merchant , Knight nor Husbandman , nor Lawyer were content with their Lots , he summs up all in this manner , viz. that Instances of this kind are so numerous , that it would weary even the Talkative Fabius , to recite them , &c.

Ax. 7. An Induction is everted , when an unlike Example can be given , and that is termed an Instance .

1. § . For Example ; If any one should collect that any part of the Body should be cut off if so ill affected , as that there should be no hopes of its Recovery , and there were Danger that the whole should be infected by it , because the Foot , the Hand , the Ear in such a Case is to be cut off , it may be answered , that in the rest of the Parts omitted there is another Ratio : For it would be a Ridiculous thing to cut off the Head for the Preservation of the rest of the Body ; and if mention had been made also of the Head in the Induction , no body would have granted that that Part , tho' evilly affected , should have been cut off . And thus much of Induction or a Syllogism of Induction .

Ax. 8. A Syllogism farther may be divided into Perfect and Imperfect . A Perfect is that in which nothing is wanting .

Ax. 9. An Imperfect , in which there is some Proposition , as the Enthymeme ; or some Part of the Argument , as , Example .

1. § . An Enthymeme , says Aristotle , is an imperfect Syllogism , Example , Induction .

Ax. 10. An Enthymeme is a Syllogism maimed or mutilated , of one Proposition .

Ax. 11. And therefore consists of two , of which the former is called the Antecedent , the latter the Consequent .

Ax. 12. Now if the Subject of the Consequent be put into the Antecedent , the Major is suppress'd ; if the Predicate , the Minor ; whether the one or the other , the Enthymeme may be reduc'd to a Categorical , by adding the Proposition wanting .

Ax. 13. If neither the Subject , nor Predicate of the Consequent , be in the Antecedent , the Major is suppress'd ; and that being added , the Enthymeme is reduc'd to an Hypothetical Syllogism , or Syllogism of Supposition .

1. § . Now this Mode of Arguing or Argumentation , is so call'd from a Greek Word , signifying to think ; because one of the Propositions is express'd and the other not , &c.

Now in this Enthymeme , for Example ,

A Covetous Man wants ; therefore a Covetous Man is not rich ; the Subject of the Consequent , is put into the Antecedent , from whence it is to be collected , that the Major is wanting ; which being added , it will be a full Syllogism in this manner . No Rich Man wants ; Every Covetous Man wants : And therefore no Covetous Man is Rich. But let us fee another : He that sins not , is not the Author of Sin : And therefore God is not the Author of Sin . Here the Predicate of the Consequent is expressed in the Antecedent , and therefore the Minor is wanting ; which being added , it will be such a Syllogism as this : He that does not sin , is not the Author of Sin : God does not sin : And therefore God is not the Author of Sin , &c. Add a Third to these , viz. Virtue makes happy : And therefore Vice miserable . Here neither the Subject nor the Predicate of the Consequent is express'd in the Antecedent : And therefore the Major is wanting , which being added , it will make an Hypothetical Syllogism in this manner , viz. If Virtue makes happy , then Vice makes miserable : But Virtue makes happy : And therefore Vice makes miserable , &c.

Ax. 14. Now an Example is , when one Extreme is shewn to be in the Medium by the Resemblance which it has to the other Extreme .

1. § . That is , when the Major Extreme or the Predicate is collected to be in the Medium by some Example , which is like unto the Third , that is , the Subject . For Example consists in four Terms , out of which are made two Ratiocinations ; one Perfect , in which out of a Universal Major is collected some Particular ; the other Imperfect , in which out of a Particular like to the Subject of the Conclusion brought , is collected a Proposition Universal containing the Similitude of both Particulars , and was the Major of the First Ratiocination . For Example ; Let the greater Extreme be this ; It is Pernicious ; The Medium , To wage War upon our Neighbours ; The Minor , The Athenians wage War upon the Thebans ; The Simile , The Thebans wage War upon the Phocenses , or Citizens of Phoce in Boeotia . Of the which we may make this like Argumentation Exemplary . To wage War upon Neighbburs is pernicious ; but if the Athenians infer or wage War upon the Thebans , they wage War upon Neighbours ; and therefore if the Athenians wage War upon the Thebans it is pernicious . Add we to this Ratiocination some Example ; and by that we may confirm the Major Proposition , viz. that it proved pernicious to the Thebans their waging War with the Phocenses , or Citizens of Phoce : But that was waging War upon Neighbours ; and therefore to wage War upon Neighbours is pernicious . Here now is concluded the Predicate of the Medium by something which is like unto the Subject of the Preceding Syllogism .

2. § . Now indeed an Example does not necessarily conclude ; because it proceeds from a Particular to a Universal : It persuades yet and begets Opinion , and that upon this Foundation , viz. That the like should agree to the like , is meet and reasonable . In fine , it persuades , if examined , that the Medium agrees with the Subject , as here , viz. that for the Athenians to wage War upon the Thebans was for them to wage War upon their Neighbours , and that the Predicate agrees to that which is like unto it , viz. that it was pernicious to the Thebans to wage War upon the Phocenses . &c. And so we come to the Twelfth Chapter , viz. that of ,

CHAP. XII . Of Syllogism Hypothetical , Disjunctive and Relative .

Ax. 1. IN the third Place a Syllogism may be divided into Simple and Composed . A Simple is that which neither consists of Composed Propositions , nor yet can be resolved into more Syllogisms .

Ax. 2. A Composed is that in the which either one or both of the Premisses are composed , or else is made up of more Syllogisms than one .

Ax. 3. That of the first Nature , viz. that in which either one or both of the Premisses are composed , is either Hypothetical , Disjunctive or Relative .

Ax. 4. Hypothetical is that in which either the Major , or Minor , or both , are Hypothetical .

Ax. 5. If only the Major , then the Conclusion is Categorical : But if the Minor , then the Conclusion , of Necessity must be Hypothetical too .

COMMENTARY .

1. § . As every Composed Enunciation is vulgarly called Hypothetical , so is also every Syllogism in which either one or both of its Propositions are so too . But add we now Examples of Hypothetical or Supposition-Syllogisms , as follows , viz.

1. If God is , the World is rul'd by a Providence ; But God is : And Therefore the World is rul'd by a Providence . 2. Whatsoever is nourished , has Heterogeneous Parts ; But if a Stone lives , it is nourished : And therefore if a Stone lives , it has Heterogeneous Parts . 3. If a Man feels , he also lives ; But if a Man be an Animal , he feels : And therefore if a Man be an Animal , be also lives , &c.

Ax. 6. Now of Hypothetical Syllogisms , in which the Major is so , there are two Moods well concluding ; the first from the Position of the Antecedent to the Position of the Consequent ; and the second from the Remotion of the Consequent to the Remotion of the Antecedent .

Ax. 7. And as many Fallacious , viz. the first from the Remotion of the Antecedent to the Remotion of the Consequent ; and the second from the Position of the Consequent , to the Position of the Antecedent , &c.

1. § . Now to Posit , or put the Antecedent or Consequent , is no more than to assume it ; saving its Quality , that is , to affirm the Affirmed , or deny the Denyed . On the contrary to remove , only to assume the Contradiction of them , that is , to affirm the Denyed , or deny the Affirmed Contradictorily , &c. As for Example ; 1. If a Man feels , he is an Animal ; But a Man feels : And therefore he is an Animal . 2. If Stones live , they are nourished ; But Stones are not nourished : And therefore they do not live .

Of these the first proceeds the first way , viz. from a Position of the Antecedent , to a Position of the Consequent ; that is , assumes the Antecedent of the Major Hypothetical and infers from thence its Consequent ; the latter , the other ; that is , from the Remotion of the Consequent to the Remotion of the Antecedent ; that is , assumes the Contradiction of the Consequent , and from thence infers the Contradiction of the Antecedent . But now in Disputations in which we study Brevity , when we would infer the Consequent from the Antecedent ; proposing only the Major , we say , But the Antecedent is true ; and therefore the Consequent : Or if out of the Consequent the Antecedent , the Consequent is false ; and therefore the Antecedent , or the latter is so , and therefore the former , &c. But ,

2. Add we Examples now of Vicious Syllogisms . 1. If a Plant is an Animal , it lives ; But a Plant is not an Animal : And therefore a Plant does not live . 2. If a Plant is an Animal , it lives ; But a Plant lives : And therefore a Plant is an Animal , &c. Now of these the first is Vicious ; because it proceeds from a Remotion of the Antecedent ; and the other , because from a Position of the Consequent .

But this also is Vicious . 3. If every Animal is Rational , then every Beast is Rational . But no Beast is Rational . And therefore no Animal is Rational . Now this is so , not for the Reasons before , but , because the Minor is contrary to the Consequent , and Conclusion to the Antecedent , but not Contradictory . For it ought to have been this ; and therefore some Animal is not Rational , &c. For this it is to remove the Antecedent , as we have said before : The Way of making these Syllogisms Categorical may be better fetch'd from the Original .

Ax. 8. The Disjunctive Syllogism is only that whose Major Proposition is Disjunctive .

Ax. 9. Which if consisting of two Members immediately opposed , may proceed from a Position of one Member to an Eversion of the other , or from an Eversion of one to a Position of the other .

1. § . As for Example ; from this Position , Or it is Day , or it is Night , may be inferred , that it is Day , and therefore not Night ; or it is Night , and therefore not Day ; or it is not Day , and therefore it is night ; or it is not Night , and therefore it is Day , &c.

Ax. 10. Now if the Major Disjunctive have more than two , that is , more than two Members or Parts , the rest taken away , what is left of them is concluded . 1. § . As , it is Winter , or Summer , or Spring , or Autumn . But not Winter , or Autumn , or Summer : And therefore Spring , &c. But if the Members of such a Proposition are not opposed , or not fully numbered up , the Syllogism will then be Vicious ; as this , Either he is a Lawyer , or a Physician , or a Philosopher ; But not a Lawyer or a Physician ; And therefore a Philosopher , &c. In which the Illation's false ; because to be a Lawyer or a Physician , or a Philosopher , are not opposed ; because the same Person may be one as well as the other ; and then the Members are not fully number'd up ; because a Man may be , neither as he who is either unlearned , or a Theologer , or a Philologer , &c.

Ax. 11. Now when it happens that the two , or all the Members being removed , the Whole also is removed ; the Syllogism is then a Syllogism of Enumeration of Parts .

1. § . For Example ; He that does Injury , does it either by Theft , Adultery , or Contumely , or some such Way : But no body steals of his own , commits Adultery upon himself , or casts Reproaches upon himself : And therefore no body does Injury to himself , &c.

Ax. 12. A Syllogism Disjunctive is then made an Hypothetical , when the Major Disjunctive is so .

1. § . For Example ; this Proposition , either it is Day , or it is Night , may be chang'd into an Hypothetical , thus , viz. If it is Day , it is not Night ; or if it is Night , it is not Day , &c.

Ax. 13. A Relative is that whose Major is composed of a Relation of Parts ; as this . There ●where Christ is , there will also the Faithful be ; But Christ is in Heaven : And therefore there also will the Faithful be . Hitherto appertain likewise the Proportional Syllogisms . As for Example this : As two are in Respect of four , so three are in respect of six . But two are in respect of four , as the half is in respect of the whole : And therefore three are in respect of six , as the half is in respect of the whole , And thus far of Syllogisms that consist of Composed Propositions . Now of those that are composed of many Syllogisms .

CHAP. XIII . Of Dilemma , Prosyllogism and Sorites .

Ax. 1. A Syllogism composed of many Syllogisms is either Dilemma , Prosyllogism , or Sorites .

Ax. 2. A Dilemma is an Argumentation of two Members , both which have some Inconvenience belonging to them .

COMMENTARY .

1. § . A Dilemma in Greek 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , is so called because it is as it were , 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , that is , a Syllogism with two Handles , and catching one both ways , that is , binding one up . For Example ; be that of Bias in Gellius's Book 5. Cap. 11 , If a Wife be to be married , she will be either a fair one or a deformed ; if fair , she will be common , if deformed a Loathing , &c.

Ax. 3. Which Argument consists of a Disjunctive Syllogism , in which from the Remotion of the Parts is concluded the Remotion of the Whole ; and two Categorical , by which the Remotion of those Parts is confirmed : As for Example :

1. § . The Dilemma instanced , is thus to be resolved : Viz. if a Wife be to be marry'd , either she will be a fair one , or a deformed ; But neither a fair , nor a deformed . And therefore , a Wife is not to be marry'd . 1. Cat. A Wife that will be common is not to be marry'd ; But a fair one will be so : And therefore a fair one is not to be marry'd . 2. Cat. One again , that will be a Vexation or Loathing , is not to be married : But the deformed will be so : And therefore a deformed is not to be married , &c.

Ax. 4. But a Dilemma will be Inefficacious three manner of Ways : And first , when the Members are not immediately opposed . Secondly , when it 's not attended with sufficient Inconvenience : And thirdly , when with the same Efficacy it may be retorted upon its Author .

1. § . Twofold therefore is the Infirmity of that Dilemma which is brought by Bias against Matrimony : For first , the Members of it are not immediately opposed ; for there is a middle Term betwixt that of too much Fairness , which is expos'd to Peril and its contrary Deformity , by Ennius , termed Stata , or not deformed , and Favorinus , that of a Wife ; and then it does not follow , that a Fair One must be Common , or a Deformed Hateful or Vexatious , &c. An Example also of Retortion is extant in the same Gellius , Book the same , Cap. 10. An Author that we have cited but too much already , and that is this , Eualthus desirous of Eloquence , and the Art of Pleading becomes a Scholar to Protagoras , and pays him down one half of his Reward , promising him the rest when he should first plead a Cause before the J●●dges and overcome . After a long time Protagoras commences a Suit with Eualthus , and thus argues with him . Whether declared for me or thee , says he , thou oughtest to give me my Reward : For if for me the Reward will be due , because of the Sentence , because then I shall overcome ; and if for thee by Agreement , because then thou . To which Eualthus thus , viz. In the first Place , that he might easily obviate that Caption , if he should say nothing himself , but make use of his Council or Attorney But afterwards retorts it in this Manner , viz. whether declared for me or thee , says he , I ought not to render thee the Reward ; For if for me , then nothing will be due , because of the Sentence ; and if for thee , because of the Agreement : Because then thou wilt overcome , &c.

Ax. 5. A Prosyllogism is then when two Syllogisms are so contained in five Propositions , as , that the Conclusion of the First becomes the Major or Minor of the Following , as ,

1. § . For Example , this ; Every living thing is nourished ; But every Plant is a living thing : And therefore every Plant is nourished . But no Stones are nourished : And therefore no Stones are Plants . Or this , Every Antimal feels ; Every Man is an Animal : And therefore every Man feels . But whatever feels is mortal : And therefore every Man is mortal , &c. Of which the last is the Principal , and the First only called in as an Auxiliary for Proof either of the Major , as in the First , or Minor , as in the second Example , &c.

Ax. 6. A Sorites is an Argumentation consisting of many Propositions , and so placed as that the Predicate of the Preceding becomes the Subject of the Following , and the Last Predicate becomes Concluded of the First Subject .

1. § . Now this Argumentation is so called from the Greek Word 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , that is , an Heaping up or Gath ring together of Things : For a Sorites is a certain Heaping up or Coacervation of Propositions . For Example ; that in the Eighth of the Romans , viz. Those whom God has foreknown , he has also predestinated ; whom he has predestinated , he has also called ; whom he has called , he has also justified ; whom he has justified , he has also glorified , &c. From whence collect that , whomhe has foreknown he has also glorify'd , &c.

Ax. 8. Now this sort of Argumentation contains in it , as many Syllogisms as there are Terms between the Subject of the first , and the Predicate of the last Proposition .

1. § . And therefore this of St. Paul will contain three , which may be thus formed , viz. Those whom God has predestinated , he has also called ; but those that he has foreknown , he has also predestinated ; and therefore those that he has foreknown , he has also called . Secondly , Those whom he has called , he has also justified ; But those whom he has predestinated , he has also called ; And therefore those whom he has predestinated , he has also justified . Thirdly , those that he has justified , he has also glorified ; But those that he has called , he has also justified , and therefore those that he has called , he has also glorified , &c.

And so this brings us to the next Chapter , which is that of Syllogism Modal and Indirect , not hitherto entreated of .

CHAP. XIV . Of Syllogism Modal and Indirect .

Ax. 1. IN the fourth Place may Syllogism be divided into Pure and Modal . A Pure is that which consists of Propositions pure .

2. Modal either of one or both Modal .

COMMENTARY .

1. § . Of Modals , there are five Orders ; and the first of them is that which consists of both Propositions of the Mode necessary . As , It is necessary that every Animal should feel ; But it is necessary that every Man should be an Animal : And therefore it is necessary that every Man should feel , &c.

The second of the one Pure , and the other the Mode necessary , as it is necessary every Animal should feel ; But every Man is an Animal : And therefore 't is necessary that every Man should feel , &c.

The Third both of the Mode Contingit ; as it may happen , that every Man may walk ; but it may happen that some Man may be white : And therefore it may happen that something white may walk , &c.

The Fourth of the One Pure , and the other of the Mode Contingit , as did the second of the one Pure , and the other of the Mode Necessary .

The 5th and last , of the One Necessary and the Other of the Mode Contingit ; as , It may happen , that every Animal may sleep : It is necessary that every Man be an Animal : And therefore it may happen that every Man may sleep , &c.

But because the Use of these Sorts of Syllogisms is very little , and Rules for them very hard , it was thought little worth our while to recite them .

Ax. 3. In the fifth Place may Syllogism be divided into that which is direct , and that which is indirect . Now the Direct is that which from the Pronunciated or foregoing collects the Question it self .

Ax. 4. Whilst the Indirect , not , but only somewhat else , from which yet the Probation of the Question , does by virtue of a certain sort of an Agreement arise .

Ax. 5. An Indirect , either is that of 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , that is , bringing one into an Inconvenience ; or else 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , that is , Concluding from a Concession .

Ax. 6. That of bringing one into an Inconvenience , is this : When from the Contradiction of the Question to be prov'd , and another manifest Proposition we conclude somewhat which is manifestly false .

1. § . To declare this by Example , let our Question be , Do Stones live ? You deny that they do . The Adversary , with Cardan , affirms it . Take Cardan's Opinion , and add too , that this Maxim , even in the Adversary's Opinion true : viz. That whatever lives , is nourished , and has Organical Parts ; and then from thence you may thus argue , viz. Whatever lives , is nourished , and has Organical Parts ; But Stones live : And therefore Stones are nourished and have Organical Parts . Now the Conclusion is false most certainly , and even by the Testimony of common Experience : And therefore when from true Premisses nothing can follow but what is true ; Of Necessity one of the Propositions must be false . Now the Major cannot be so , nor does the Adversary fail to grant it ; and if the Minor , which certainly must , then it follows , that the Contradiction of it must be true ; which was the Question to be proved . Now

Ax. 7. This Syllogism 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , or concluding from a Concession , is then , when the Question proposed is transferred on some other , upon this Condition , that that being proved , this also should be esteemed to be so too .

1. § . So Aristotle Cap. 11. of his second Book of the Heavens , proves that all the Stars are round . But because it would be too hard a Task for him to prove that of all in one Ratiocination , he transferrs this Question upon the Moon , and proves her to be so ; and thence inferrs , that they all are so , pre-supposing the same Ratio to be in one , as the other . And that the Moon is so , he collects from her Lights being encreas'd and diminish'd by Sphaerical Degrees , &c.

And thus much in Respect to Absolute Syllogism , and that to be consider'd with Respect to Form . Now follows that which is to be consider'd in Respect to its Matter : And first the Dialectical , of which we shall entreat in the next Chapter .

CHAP. XV. Of Syllogism Dialectical or Probable .

Ax. 1. HAving done with Syllogism in respect of Form , we are now to consider it in respect to its Matter , or some certain Conditions of it ; and in order to the diverse Effects which follow from the diverse Conditions of that Matter .

Ax. 2. And in this respect will Syllogism be divided into true and false ; and true into Dialectical and Apodictical .

COMMENTARY .

1. § . The Parts of the Division will be prov'd thus ; Syllogism leads either to Error , as we shall shew hereafter , or Truth . If to Truth , it either Generates Science or Opinion , or some other Assent , which is not Science . If Science , it is call'd Demonstrative , or Apodictical , as Cap. 2. Soph. Elench . And if Opinion or other Assent besides Science , it is called Dialectical , &c.

Ax. 3. So that a Dialectical Syllogism is nothing more than a Syllogism Generating Opinion , or any other Assent besides Science . Or , as Aristotle explains himself Book 1. of his Top. Cap. 1. arguing out of Probables : And he is thought the best Dialectick who can best defend his own , and dilute or wash away the Opinions of his Adversary , &c.

Ax. 4. And in treating of this sort of Syllogism . we are to consider of Questions , Propositions , and Invention of Arguments .

Ax. 5. And a Question here may be any thing , provided it contradict not Piety , good Manners or common Sense .

1. § . For he that shall call in Question , whether God be to be worshipped , or Parents Honoured , or the Magistrates to be obeyed ; ought rather to be punished than followed with Dialectical Arguments . So he that sha●● doubt whether the Snow be white , is not otherwise to be convinc'd than by the Testimony of his outward Sense ; which he who disbelieves , what is i● that he will believe ? &c.

Ax. 6. So that concerning the Subject of the Dialectical Problemes , we need not much to be sollicitous ; an● their Attributes are either of the first or second Notions ; of which those constitute Real , these Notional Problemes , &c.

Ax. 7. A Real is when the Attribute of th● Question is real ; as , is a Place a Superficies , or so ? A Notional when a Notional ; as , is Superficies the Gonus of Place , or so ? Because Genus is not a true thing but a second Notion , or Logical , and only feign in the Mind , whereas a Superficies is a true thin● and not feign'd in the Mind , &c.

Ax. 8. Real , again are either absolute or compared .

Ax. 9. Absolute , that in which sought whether t●● Attribute agrees to the Subject or no.

Ax. 10. Compared , when two or more Subject being proposed , it is asked , which the Attribute ●●grees or disagrees most to ; or two or more Attributes , whether of them agrees more or most to 〈◊〉 Subject , &c.

1. § . For Example ; When saught whether Glery to be numbered amongst our good things , it is an A●solute Probleme ; when , whether Virtue or Glory a most to be desired ? or Alexander more Valiant or T●●●rate , a Compared .

Ax. 11. Problemes Dialectical , of what kind soeve● may be taken out of all Disciplines whatsoever .

Ax. 12. Propositions Dialectical are to be true ; 〈◊〉 least probable , not Paradoxal ; that is against the common or receiv'd Opinion : For how shall the Respondent grant that which is against the common or r●ceiv'd Opinion ; and which , it may be , he judges to be false ; But let us take some Notes from the Learned Hereboord , and so end this Chapter .

Notes and Observations from the Learned Hereboord having Relation to this Chapter .

1. A Dialectical Syllogism may also thus be defin'd . A Dialectical Syllogism is that which begets Opinion , Human Faith , or Doubt , or any other Assent besides Science or Error , which distinguishes it likewise from the Sophistical Syllogism .

2. A Syllogism Dialectical is also by another Name called Topical , from the Greek Word 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , Place ; in Latin Probabilis , that is , Probable or Contingent ; because tho' it produces a true , yet is it an uncertain and infirm Assent , because its Propositions tho' true , are yet Contingent , as may appear by what is said above .

3. When a Paradox is said to be a Probleme true against the common Opinion , it is not to be understood only of that of the Unlearned or Vulgar , but also of the Multitude of the Lettered , who have taken up with Principles Ancient , and not so well examined , such as that , viz. the Earth moves ; which , tho' it be true , yet may it be so against the common Opinion , and therefore a Paradox .

4. A Term of Art signifies no more than this , viz. a Term proper to every Art . So Metonymy and Synecdoche are Terms of Art , viz. Rhetorical ; Meridian , Horizon , Zodiac Astronomical ; Genus and Species Logical , &c. And this brings us to the next Consideration , viz. that

CHAP. XVI . Of the Invention , or finding out of Dialectical Arguments , or Topical Places and Rules .

Ax. 1. NOW to the Invention or finding out of Probable or Dialectical Arguments belong Place and Rule .

A. 2. A Place is a Seat or certain Common Note , by whose Admonition an Argument is found .

Ax. 3. A Rule a Canon , or Proposition containing the Reason of the Consequence of Dialectical Syllogism , &c.

Ax. 4. The Distribution of the Arguments here to be used , viz. in Dialectical Disputations , is usually into Artificial and Inartificial ; that is , into those of Art , to be drawn from the Consideration of the Parts of the Question , and Testimonies , which are to be found without . Now the first ,

Ax. 5. Are to be used for the Confirming or Refelling of all sorts of Problemes alike ; that is , in the same manner , being no other than Testimonies ; But the Artificial not , but may be said to be of two sorts ; viz. those for the Confirming and Refelling of Notional , and those for Confirming and Refelling of such as we have call'd real Problemes , because concerned about real things .

Ax. 6. Now those of the first kind , viz. for the Confirming and Refelling of Notional Problemes , are always taken from the Nature or Propriety of that Affection or 2d Notion , concerning which it is query'd in the Probleme .

1. § . Which , or else some Canon belonging to it being placed in the Major , an Assumption being made , the controverted Affection is prov'd to be in the Subject ; as because Air is the Subject Matter of Wind , we prove it not to be its Genus ; and because Immortality is the Affection of Life Eternal , we prove it not to be its Genus ; both which Arguments lean upon this Rule , viz. That that which is the Subject or Propriety of a thing , cannot be its Genus , &c. given us Cap. 11. of the first Book . And so Divines make it appear , that good Works are not to be the Cause of our Justification ; because every cause is before its Effect ; But good Works are after our Justification , and therefore not its Cause . And this Argumentation leans upon this Foundation , Theoreme 3. Cap. 15. of the first Book , viz That every Cause is before it s Caused in Nature and Knowledge , &c. Such Syllogisms as these Aristotle calls Book 2. Post . Cap. 8. Syllogisms Logical , that is , Notional ; and the Use of them is very great in all Discipline .

Ax. 9. Arguments of the other sort , viz. for Proving or Refelling of real Problemes , are always taken from the Affections belonging to the Nature of the Subject or Predicate , as from their Places .

Ax. 10. Of which those are the best , which are taken from the Nature of the Predicate ; because not sought whether the Subject be , but Predicate ; or whether the Predicate be in the Subject or not , &c.

1. § . Now for Examples of them both , suppose any one should undertake to prove that a thing was not mutual or reciprocal , because not de meo , tuum , that is , from mine , thine : The Argument wou'd then be taken from the Notation of the Predicate : But if that Logick is an Art directing the Reason , because so call'd from 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , that is , Reason or Speech , from that of the Subject , &c.

The Term Logick being no less the Subject in the last , than the Term Mutual the Predicate in the former Proposition , and so in other Instances of the like Nature : But to proceed ,

Ax. 11. Arguments are either Absolute , or Compared .

Ax. 12. And of the First , some are Consentaneous , others Dissentaneous .

Ax. 13. Arguments Consentaneous are those which agree with some Part of the Question .

Ax. 14. And those are taken either from the Name , or the Thing .

Ax. 15. Of those from the Name there are two Places , viz. Notation and Conjugates .

Ax. 16. From the Thing , Nine , viz. Definition , Genus , Species , Whole , Part , Cause , Caused , Subject and Adjunct ; at least these are the chief , to which all the rest may be referred .

Ax. 17. Now Arguments Dissentaneous are taken from the Opposites , of which there are Five Places , viz. Disparates , Contraries , Relateds , Privatives , and Contradictings .

Ax. 18. Of Arguments Compared , also there are the like Number of Places , viz. Major , Minor , Equal , Like and Unlike .

Ax. 19. Last of all , of Testimonies , some are Divine , some Humane . And now come we to Canons ; and first those which belong to the Places of Consentaneous Arguments , of which we shall entreat in the next Chapter .

CHAP. XVII . Of Canons belonging to Consentaneous Places , or Places from whence Arguments are drawn , agreeing with some Part of the Question .

Ax. 1. AND first of those belonging to the Place of Notation or Etymology ; and this has two Canons , and first , that to which convenes the Etymology , to that also the Name ; and that to which the Etymology , not &c. to that neither the Name .

1. § . So one may conclude , servari fidem , that is , ones Faith is kept ; quia fit quod dictum est ; that is , we have perform'd what was promis'd ; because Fides according to Cicero , seems to signifie as much as if one should say , fit quod dictum est ; that is , what is promised is perform'd , &c. And so one may say that a thing is not mutual ; because not de meo , tuum , that is , from mine , thine , as we have observ'd before .

Ax. 2. The Second is that to which the Name belongs , to that also the Etymology ; but not on the contrary ; that is , he to whom the Name belongs , to him , the Etymology : But to him to whom the Etymology ( unless understood in a thorough Sense ) not always the Name . As for Instance , to take the Authour's Example ; He that is a prudent Man , to be sure , preserves Prudence ; and that in the general or major Part of his Life . But he that preserves Prudence , ( unless in the general or major Part of his Life ) cannot properly be call'd a prudent Man , &c. Uncertain therefore are these Rules , yet less fail they in the Names of Genus's and Species's than they do in those of Individuals .

Ax. 3. The next Place to this is that of Conjugates ; and that has three Canons ; and the first is that to which one Conjugate agrees , to that also the other : And that to which one not , to that neither the other . An Instance of which is ,

1. § . That of Mitio in Terence : viz. Man I am ; and therefore I think nothing Human foreign from me . So in the Joques upon Caesar in Suetonius , it is concluded , Bibulus was not Consul ; because he consulted not the Republick .

The Words are these : Non Bibulo quicquam nuper , sed Caesare factum est : Nam Bibulo fieri Consule nil memini .

That is , Nothing has been done lately by Bibulus , but Caesar : For in the Consulship of Bibulus I remember nothing to have been done .

In the Use of which Canon , this Caution only is to be used , viz. that a Conjugate only in Word , and not Affinity of Nature , be not joyned : For in those of which one signifies a Natural Power or Habit , and the other an Action , the Illation will be very fallacious : For it does not follow he has the Faculty of Seeing ; and therefore he sees or he is drunk , and therefore a Drunkard : Or does just things ; and therefore he is just , &c. so in other the like Cases or Instances

Ax. 4. The Second is , of Conjugates ; Conjugates are Consequent ; That is ,

1. § . As if one should argue in this manner : Logick does those things that are govern'd by Rules of Art ; And therefore Logick is an Art , &c. But here 't is to be heeded , lest from Concretes by Accident predicated of one another , it be collected also , that Abstracts are predicated of one another : For altho' something is sweet , which is White , as suppose Milk , It does not follow that some Sweetness is Whitness , &c.

Ax. 5. The Third is this , viz. that the Conjugates of Contraries , are amongst themselves Contrary .

1. § . As if Health and Sickness are Contraries ; then , to be in Health , and sick , must be Contraries too . And these Rules ( if in this manner limited ) do seldom fail .

Ax. 6. The Place from Definition has these two Canons ; and first that to which agrees the Definition to that also the Defined . And that to which not the Definition , to that neither the Defined .

1. § . As if one should prove that Logick was an Art , because a Habit Effective with true Reason ; or not to be a Science , because not a certain Knowledge of a certain thing by its next Cause , &c.

Ax. 7. Secondly , That which agrees to the Definition , that also agrees to the Defined , and that which not to the Definition , that neither to the Desined : As if one should argue thus ,

1. § . He who , is wont to keep a Mediocrity in all things is happy : A good Man is wont to keep a Mediocrity in all things , and a wicked Man not : And therefore a Good is happy , and a Wicked Man not , &c. But here Heed is to be taken , that that which is said of the Definition as a Definition , be not said of the Defined : As , in this Syllogism , viz. Animal , Rational , are two Words ; Man is an Animal , Rational : And therefore Man is two Words . But in other Cases Canons from Desinition are most certain , provided you take Reciprocate Definitions .

Ax. 8. The Place from the Genus has two Canons ; and the First is that which is Universally Affirmed of the Genus , that is also of the Species , and that which is Universally denyed of the Genus , that also of the Species .

1. § . So you may prove the Sight may err ; because every Sense may err : And Justice not to be by Nature ; because no Virtue is by Nature , &c. But in this Canon it is to be heeded , lest that which is said Accidentally of the Genus , and not according to its Essence , be in another Acceptation taken of the Species ; As if any one should argue in this manner , viz. Animal is a Genus or Trissylable ; Man is an Animal : And therefore Man is a Genus or Trissyllable , &c.

Ax. 9. Secondly , Taking away the Genus , you take away the Species ; or that from which you take away the Genus , you take away also the Species .

1. § . As if to prove that the Sense were not Science . one should say it was not a Habit , because if not a Habit , it cannot be a Science ; since there is no Science but what is a Habit ; that is , but what is comprehended under that Genus , &c. The Canons from hence , observing the Cautions above-given , are always very certain .

Ax. 10. The next Place is that of the Species , which has three Canons : First , supposing the Species , you suppose also the Genus ; or that to which the Species is attributed , to that also the Genus , &c.

1. § . And so it may be concluded , that Logick is an Habit , because it is an Art , which is a Species of Habit , &c.

Ax. 11. Secondly , The Species's being all taken away , the Genus is also taken away : or that from which all the Species's are taken away , from that also the Genus .

1. § . As Friendship is not Fortitude , or Temperance , or Justice , or Prudence , &c. And therefore not a Virtue , &c. And such an Argumentation as this is a Syllogism of numeration of Parts .

Ax. 12. Thirdly , That which to all the Species's , that also to the Genus ; and that which to none that neither to the Genus , &c.

1. § . And this Canon is the Foundation of Induction , as well the Affirmed as Denyed ; Of which we have entreated in its proper Place ; to which Recourse may be had , if the Reader shall so think fit , for Examples . Now all the Canons of this Place are very faithful .

Ax. 13. The Place from the whole has two Canons ; and first , the whole being posited , all the Principal Parts are so .

1. § . Or that to which the whole is attributed , to that also all the Principal Parts ; as , to Sempronius there was Maintenance given ; and therefore Clothes , Victuals , and Habitation , &c. I said the the Principal , because the Whole being supposed , that every the least Part that tends to the Integrity , not Essence of it , should be so , is not necessary .

Ax. 14. Secondly , That which agrees to the similar Whole , that also to the Singular Parts of it ; and that which not to such a Whole , that neither to any Part of it . As for Instance ,

1. § . Water by its own Nature is moist , and therefore every Drop of it is moist . The Heaven is not Corruptible ; and therefore not the Stars , &c. Here we are to take heed , lest what is attributed to the Whole as Whole , be not also attributed to the Part. For not because there is Water every where about the Earth , does it follow that every Drop of it is every where about the Earth , &c. Now the Canons of this Place are very Certain .

Ax. 15. The Place from Parts has four Canons : And first , all the Parts being posited and joyned , the Whole must be also posited too : As for Instance ,

1. § . Caesar occupied Belgium , and Aquitaine , and Celtica , and therefore all Gallia : I said united , because positing all the Parts of a Whole , and those Parts not united , the Whole is not yet posited . As for Instance ; a House , which , you know till the Materials are joyned , as well as provided , becomes not a House , &c.

Ax. 16. The Second is taking away the Principal Part , you take away also the Whole . As for Instance ,

1. § . Infants are destitute of the Knowledge , of Christ , and therefore of Faith . I said the Principal Parts , because the Hand taken away , the Man does not die , but becomes only lame : but let it be the Head , or the other Principal Part , and he totally expires , &c.

Ax. 17. Thirdly , That which agrees to all the Parts ; that also to the Whole : And that which to none , that neither to the Whole , &c.

1. § . As for Instance ; the Law , Prophets , Gospels , with the Writings of the Holy Apostles , are all Divinely inspir'd : And therefore the whole Scripture is Divinely inspir'd : The Walls , Columns , Beams , Rafters , Roof of the House , &c. seem not to be old : And therefore the House seems not to be old , &c.

Ax. 19. Fourthly , That which agrees to a similar Part , that also to the Whole ; and that which agrees not to the similar Part , that neither to the Whole .

1. § . As for Instance ; Every Drop of Water is moist : And therefore the Water it self is so . The Stars are incorruptible : And therefore the Heavens , &c. Here one is to take Care , that that which agrees , to the similar Part only by some External Cause , and not the Condition of its proper Nature , be not Concluded of the Whole . For it does not follow from every Drop of Water's being round that the whole Element is so . For besides that no Element , besides the Earth , is of any determinate Figure , even the Rotundity of the Drops does not proceed from the Nature of the Water but the Paucity of their Matter , by which it comes to pass that they cannot flow . In other Cases the Canons of this Place are very certain .

Ax. 19. The Place from the Causes in general has this Canon , viz. that the Cause being Actually put , it is necessary that the Caused should be so too : And so Vice versà .

1. § . The Cause in Act is said to be that which Causes or Exercises its Office and Causality . Now it would imply a Contradiction for one to say , that the Cause causes , and yet that the Caused is not Caused ; as for Example , That the Workmen are Building , and yet that the House is not ; or that the House is a Building , and yet that there are no Workmen , &c.

Ax. 20. The Place from Matter has two Canons ; and first , the Matter being taken away , the Composed , and also its Material Form are so .

1. § . As , if you should prove , where there is no Wood , there can be no Ships ; or because Stones have no Organical Body , neither can they have a Soul . I said Material Form , because Immaterial , such as is the Humane Soul by taking away the Matter , cannot be taken away , &c.

Ax. 21. Secondly , Such as is the Matter , such is also the Composed .

1. § . As the Statue is of Worm-eaten , or rotten Wood ; and therefore it self also is so . This Canon takes Place only in Things made of Art : For in other things it will be fallacious .

Ax. 22. The Place from Form has this Canon , viz. Positing the Form ; the Composed also is posted , and that taken away , the Composed is also taken away .

1. § . As , the Pigmies have a Rational Soul , and therefore they are Men : The Stars have not a Soul ; and therefore they do not live . This Canon is altogether irrefragable , provided the first Part be understood of Material Form : For , positing the Rational Soul , that the Man should be so too , is not necessary : but yet this , viz. That he should be a Man if he has a Rational Soul , is requisite and necessary , &c.

Ax. 23. Place from Efficient has two Canons ; and the first of them is , Such as the Cause is , such is the Effect , &c.

1. § . And thus God is very good ; and therefore his Works are so . This Canon is deceitful , unless cautiously used : For first it sails in Causes that are by Accident . For neither does it follow , that a Son is good , because his Father is so ; nor yet bad : For a Son is not produc'd by his Father as he is good or bad , but as he is a Man , &c.

And so it fails in Equivocal Causes : For it does not follow that the Sun is animated , although it animates the World ; nor that the Whetstone is sharp , although it sharpens Iron . Lastly , in Causes Voluntary , when making use of their utmost Endeavours , they do something which does not correspond to their Skill or Art , As when a Painter paints less elegantly than becomes his Art , &c.

Ax. 24 Secondly , That which is the Cause of the Cause , is also the Cause of the Caused , &c.

1. § . As Virtue is partly from Nature , partly from Institution , partly from Custom : Virtue is the Cause of civil Happiness : And therefore civil Happiness is partly from Nature , partly from Institution , partly from Custom , &c. This Canon has Place only in Causes Subordinate of themselves : For in Causes Subordinate by Accident , it for the most part fails . For it does not follow , because God is the Cause of our Will , and our Will is the Cause of Sin , that therefore God is the Cause of Sin . &c.

Ax. 25. Place from the End has this Canon , viz. That the End being put , there are also put the Means to that End .

1. § . And so Ovid concludes that Man was made with an upright Countenance ; because to contemplate the Heavens ; deeming that to be the End of an upright Figure .

The Words of the sweet Poet are these , Omnia cùm spectent Animalia caetera Terram , Os homini sublime dedit , Caelùmque tueri Jussit ; & erectos ad sydera tollere Vultus . Which admirable Pare-Royal may be rendred in these two sorry Couplets in this manner , And whereas other Animals behold With down-cast Looks this Sublunary Mold ; To Man he gave a stately upright Frame , And bad him view those Heav'ns from whence he came . Which tho' they fail as to their Versifcation , yet may they serve to shew in some measure the Meaning of that memorable Passage of excellent Ovid.

Now the Means are often express'd by a Negation of those things which impede the End : As , the Pupil or Apple of the Eye , is to admit all Colours ; and therefore to be without Colour . The Elect must be saved ; And , therefore , must not Sin unto Death , &c. But now tho' the End being put , it is necessary that the Means should be so ; yet that the End not being put , they should not be so , is not always necessary : For it is not necessary that a Man should be destitute of Books and Masters , because he is not Learned , &c.

Ax. 26. Now the Place from Caused has four Canons : And the first is , the Composed posited , the Matter and Form must be so too : And when that 's taken away , the Material Form also must be taken away .

1. § . And so Plants are living things ; And therefore they must have a Body and Soul : And Stones are not ; And therefore they must not have a Soul . I said Form Material : For that the Composed taken away , the Matter should be so too : Or the Form Immaterial , is not necessary : For it does not follow , that there is no Iron , because no Sword : or that the Soul of Man is not , because he dies , &c.

Ax. 27. Secondly , The Effect being posited , it follows that either there is a Cause Efficient , or else , that there has been one .

1. § . As , there is a Building ; and therefore there is , or was an Architect to build it . Here are the Footsteps ; and therefore this Way , in all likelihood there has passed some Man , &c.

Ax. 28. Thirdly , Such as is the Effect , such is the Cause that produc'd it .

1. § . As , this Picture is fine ; and therefore so must the Artist be that drew it . To this are to be added , the same Limitations which were added to the first of the Place from Cause Efficient , viz the Cautions against Accidentals and Aequivocals , because in these Cases this Rule may fail us .

Ax. 29. Fourthly , The Means taken away , the End must also be so too .

1. § . As , Stones are not nourished ; and therefore they do not live . Many Men the Gospel will not be Preached to ; and therefore many Men by means of the Gospel will not be saved , &c.

Ax. 30. The Place from the Subject has this Canon , viz. that the Subject being posited , the Propriety must also be so too ; and that taken away , the Propriety must also be so too .

1. § . As , Christ is God ; and therefore he has the Power to forgive Sins . The Writings of the Fathers are not the Word of God ; and therefore they are not of Divine Authority , &c. Now these Canons without any Limitation , are certain and firm .

Ax. 31. The Place for Adjuncts is of great Extent , and has under it Proprieties , Objects , Signs and Circumstances . Now ,

Ax. 32. The Place from Proprieties has two Canons ; and first , that to which the Propriety is given , to that also the Subject ; And that to which the Propriety is not given , to that neither the Subject , &c.

1. § . As , Christ is Omniscient ; and therefore he is God . Angels fill up no Place ; and therefore they have not Bodies , &c.

Ax. 33. The Second is , that which is said of the Propriety , may be also said of the Subject : And that which cannot be said of the Propriety , that neither of the Subject , &c.

1. § . As , a Talkative Person is to be avoided ; and therefore a Busie-Body , or one that is inquisitive into other Peoples Matters . A wise Man is not to repose himself upon things of a Fleeting and Transitory Nature ; and therefore not upon Riches or other Earthly Commodities , or Goods , &c.

Ax , 34. The Place from Object in the second Place has this Canon , viz. That that to which the Object is given , to that also the Subject ; and that to which the Object is not , to that neither the Subject , &c.

1. § . As , The Doctrine of fallacious Sophisms directs the Mind towards the Knowledge of things ; and therefore is a Part of Logick . Logick has not things necessary for its Object ; and therefore is not Science , &c. The Arguments of this Place are very firm , if drawn from proper Objects ; but otherwise only Probable : As , if one should say thus ; He talks of Military Affairs ; and therefore he is a Soldier : Of Laws ; and therefore he is a Lawyer . Her Delight is not in Womens Company ; and therefore she is not a Woman , &c.

Ax. 35. Place from Sign has this Canon , viz. Positing the Sign , viz. Antecedent , Consequent , or Conjoyned , the thing signed is also posited ; and that taken away , the thing signed also is taken away .

1. § . As , it is Day ; and therefore the Sun will rise . The Woman longs ; and therefore she has conceiv'd . The Man flyes ; and therefore he is guilty of the discovered Conspiracy . It is not Full-Moon ; and therefore there can be no Eclipse , &c. Now Arguments drawn from this Place also are firm , when the Signs are necessary and proper to the thing signed ; otherwise they are only probable : As , he was not Sempronius 's Enemy ; and therefore he kill'd him not . The Woman does not love the Boy ; and therefore she is not his Mother , &c. And therefore it is that the Philosophers make use of these so much the more sparingly .

Ax. 36. The Place from Circumstance , lastly , has this Canon , viz. positing the Circumstance of the thing you posit the thing it self ; and taking that away , you also take away the thing it self .

1. § . As , he has stolen something out of a sacred Place ; and therefore he is Sacrilegious . The Spring comes on ; and therefore Flowers will be found . He goes covered with a Cowle or Hood , after the manner of the Monks ; and therefore he is a Monk . Christ was to be born in the time of the Jewish Polity , and that at Bethlethem ; which Polity is not now in being , as likewise Bethlehem : And therefore Christ is not now to be born ( as believe the unconverted Jews ) but is so al-already . He is not in Mourning ; and therefore he mourns not , &c. Arguments also from this Place are Part firm , and Part probable ; and Use will be the only means to distinguish betwixt them . And now we come to treat of the Canons belonging to Places Dissentaneous , Compared and Testimonies .

CHAP. XVIII . Of Canons belonging to Places Dissentaneous , Compared , and Testimonies .

Ax. 1. THE Place from Opposites in general has these two Canons : And first that of which one of the Opposites is affirmed , of that the other must be deny'd .

COMMENTARY .

1. § . As , It is a House , and therefore cannot be a Man ; he is sick , and therefore cannot be sound , &c. And here the Laws are to be observed which we have recited Book 1. Cap. 22. concerning Opposition .

Ax. 2. The Second is , The Predicates of Opposites are also opposed .

1. § . As. A just Man is he that keeps the Law ; and therefore an Unjust that transgresses it . But here Care is to be taken , lest their Difference or Affection Generical be predicated : For it does not follow , in that a Man has an Animate Body , that a Beast has an Inanimate ; nor that because Whiteness is visible , Blackness is invisible ; because to be animated , is the Difference Generical of Man , and Visible the Affection of Colour , not Whiteness , &c. But this , viz. that because Whiteness scatters ; therefore Blackness gathers the Sight , is a good Consequence , and does follow , &c.

Ax. 3. The Place from Contraries has three Canons ; First , that which takes up one Contrary that takes up another ; and that which takes not up one that neither another .

1. § . As , Love is in the Concupiscent Appetite ; and therefore Hatred . Right belongs not to Beasts ; and therefore they cannot suffer Injury , &c.

Ax. 4. Secondly , The Causes , Effects and Adjuncts of Contraries are Contraries .

1. § . As , Virtue is from a good ; and therefore Vice from an ill Habit. That makes one happy ; and therefore this miserable . That is to be wished ; and therefore this to be shunned , &c. But here two things are to be avoided . And First , lest we take the Causes or Effects by Accident , instead of those per se : For it does not follow , a good Man loves and defends his ; and therefore a wicked Man hates and deserts his ; Because Love to one's own is not from Virtue , but Nature . Secondly , whose Effects are dependent on the Disposition of the Matter . For by reason of Dissimilitude of Matter , it often happens , that the same Cause produces contrary Effects ; or contrary , like : For Heat hardens Clay and softens Wax ; and Threatnings not rarely produce that in some which in others . Entreaties ; To wit , because the Efficient acts not according to the Measure of its Virtue , but that of the subjected Matter .

Ax. 5. Thirdly , Of Contraries Immediate . Of Necessity one of them must be in the Capacious Subject , and the other not .

1. § . As , Libertus is not a Servant ; and therefore he is free . The Number is not even ; and therefore it is odd . The Canons here , observing the aforesaid Limitations , are firm enough , and especially the Third .

Ax. 6. Place from Relateds has but this Canon , viz. posited one of the Relateds , there is also posited the other : And that taken away , the other also is taken away .

1. § As , he to whom his Father is Master , the same is his Father's Servant . The Confederates of Rome are not their Subjects ; and therefore the Romans are not their Masters , &c. This Canon is most certain .

Ax. 7. The Place from Privatives has this Canon , viz. Of Privatives , The one must of Necessity be in the Capacious Subject , the other not .

1. § . As , he is blind ; and therefore does not see . I , says our Saviour , am the Light of the World ; and therefore whosoever follows me , walketh not in Darkness . The Subject is said to be capable , when so in respect to Nature , and the time set by Nature , &c. This Canon holds firm .

Ax. 8. Place from Contradictings has this one Canon , and that is , one of the Contradictings being placed , the other must be removed ; and so on the contrary

1. § . This Canon is the very Foundation , upon which lean the Principles of all Sciences , and which , whosoever denies , has no Reason , &c.

Ax. 9. That from the Major , has two Rules or Canons ; and the first is , that to which the Major agrees to , that also the Minor .

1. § . As , God gave Life to Man ; and therefore he will give Food : Bodies ; and therefore Raiment , &c.

Ax. 10. The Second , That which convenes not to the Major , that neither to the Minor .

1. § . As , Angels are not pure before God ; and therefore much less Man . A Man , taken by his Enemies cannot make his Will , much less a Traytor , &c.

Ax. 11. Place from the Minor has also two Canons ; and first , that to which the less does not agree , to that neither the greater .

1. § . As , It is not lawful to be angry with ones Brother rashly or without a Cause , much less to kill him .

Ax. 12. Secondly , That which to the Minor , that also to the Major .

1. § . As , An unchaste Look upon a Woman is a Sin ; and therefore Adultery . God gives Food and Raiment to the Beasts ; and therefore how much more to Men ? &c.

Ax. 13. Place from Equal has three Canons ; and first , to Equals equal things agree .

1. § . As , It was lawful for David to eat the Shew-Bread to allay his Hunger ; and therefore for Christ's Disciples to pull the Ears of Corn , and eat them on the Sabbath-Day to satisfie their Hunger .

Ax. 14. Secondly , that to which convenes one Equal , to that also convenes the other ; and that to which one not , to that neither convenes the other .

1. § . As , Christ had the Power of miraculously healing the Paralytick ; and therefore to forgive Sins . A magnanimous Man does not become a hasty Gate ; and therefore not a Speech .

Ax. 15. The third Rule is , That which agrees to one of the Equals , that also to the other ; and that which not to one , that also not to the other , &c.

1. § . As , Orpheus , Pollux , Theseus and Hercules might go to the Infernal World ; and therefore that Benefit seems not to be deny'd to Aeneas , who was not inferiour to them in Nobility of Stock ; About which Aeneas disputes in Virgil in this manner , Si potuit Manes , &c. English'd by Mr. Ogilby in this manner . Could Orpheus make his Bride from Shades retire , With pleasant Notes from his enchanting Lyre ? If Pollux could by an alternate Death His Brother ease , and tread so oft one Path ; Why should I Theseus or Alcides name , And my Progenitors from great Jove came ? &c. Thus also we may argue , Tyrus did not sustain the Force of Alexander ; and therefore Jerusalem had not done it , if Alexander had Besieged that , &c.

2. § . All the Canons from the compared Places have great Probability and are almost certain if the Argument be well compared with the Parts of the Question ; that is , compared with the Subject or Predicate of the Question , and not any thing else which is added in determining the Subject or Predicate : For if this should be done , the Illation would be foolish . As if any one should argue , Luscus can see an Ox a great way off , and therefore a little Bird : And that from this Canon , that to which the greater agrees , to that also the less . The Cause of this Error consists in the evil Comparison : For although the Ox be greater thon the Bird , yet does it require a greater Perspicacity to see a little Bird a great way off than an Ox.

Ax. 16. Places from like and unlike are of no great Use to prove or refel ; but however we will recite their Canons : And so , proceed

1. § . To that of Testimonies : And the first is that to the like the like agree : And the Second , that the like to the unlike do not : As if one should attempt to prove that all things should be common amongst Men ; because so amongst Beasts , one might answer , the Ratio of Men and Beasts is not the same : And therefore that the same things should agree to one as agrees to the other , is not necessary ; because that the like should agree to the unlike is not necessary , &c.

Ax. 17. Now that from Testimonies has ten Canons ; and first that of the Divine is most firm ; and also , of its self most worthy of Belief .

1. § . Under which Notion are contain'd , not only such as proceed from God himself . As , that of this is my Beloved Son , &c. But also , such as are written or said by Men , who it appears were divinely inspired ; such as were the Prophets and Holy Apostles , &c. But at this Day none are to be receiv'd for Divine , but only such as are contained in the Canonical Books of the Holy Scritures .

Ax. 18. Secondly , The next in Degree to that of the Divine is the Testimony of our Senses , as well the External as the Internal ; to which appertains the Testimony of Conscience .

1. § . The Force of Conscience is great , says Cicero for Milo , and that not only in the Judgment ; as , that those should not fear who have committed none Ill : Those again have continually Punishment before their Eyes , that have sinned ; But in the whole Course of our Life , and in all things . For God has implanted in our Natures a certain Force of assenting to some most Universal and known Propositions of Truth , on which lean Arts and Sciences , as well Theoretical as Practical , to wit , such as these , viz. that the Whole is greater than its Part. To God is due Religion ; to Parents , Honour ; to the Magistrate , Obedience , &c. Which he that believes not , seems to have shaken Hands with his Conscience , and bidden adieu to the proper Force of his own Nature .

Secondly , Not less is the Force of the External Senses , whose Judgment , whosoever denies to be true , at the same time taking away the Sciences , and all Assent of the Mind , has brought an Infelicity upon himself , like that of the Scepticks and Academicks .

Ax. 19. No Humane Testimony , in the third Place , as Humane that is , as brought forth by Man , or proceeding meerly from Man , as Man's is of so much Authority , but that it may be questioned , both because it is beyond the Humane Condition , not to err : And because Men are so easily carried away by their Affections through the Force of which they embrace that as a Truth which in their sedate Moods they know even to be false .

Ax. 20. Fourthly , That which leans upon the tacite Consent of all Men is , before others the most likely .

1. § . As , That the Soul of Man is Immortal , and such like , which lean upon no less than the Dictates of every Man 's Natural Reason and Conscience . In this Number yet are not to be reckon'd those old Wives Sayings amongst the Vulgar , viz. such as these , That Swans sing most sweetly when they come to die . Bears bring forth mis-shapen Cubbs , &c. For these no wise Man will give any heed to .

Ax. 21. Fifthly , In a Case where Men disagree in their Testimonies , that which the Most and the Wisest Assert , is the most likely to be true .

Ax. 22. Sixthly , A Skilful Artificer , if an Honest Man , is to be given way to in his own Art .

Ax. 23. Seventhly , If Words are in Dispute , the most used are always the best .

Ax. 24. Eighthly , In Questions of right and wrong of much Moment , are Laws , Edicts , Acts of Parliament , Opinions of wise Men , Customs , Sentences in the like Case , &c.

Ax. 25. Ninthly , In those of Fact 〈◊〉 are of Use Witnesses , Hand-Writings , Confessions , &c.

Ax. 26. Tenthly , A Negative Testimony , in most Cases is not of any Avail at all .

1. § . For it does not follow , because Aristotle or Plato has not said it , that therefore the thing is not so : But if any Proof in Testimony , this follows , viz. That Aristotle , Plato , and other Professors of Wisdom have said it ; and therefore it is so : Or denyed it ; and therefore it is not so , &c. For although a Testimony may not be Negative , yet nothing hinders but that a Negative Conclusion may be proved by a Testimony , &c. The Testimonies of Sacred Writ , also , Negative prove in things necessary to Salvation , whether to be done , or to be believed ; although in the rest they do not , to wit , because all things Necessary to Salvation are in them contained .

And thus much of Canons Absolute . Now come we to those which are Compared , or concerning Comparisons , &c.

CHAP. XIX . Of Canons Compared .

Ax. 1. NOW Canons Compared are either of certain , or else uncertain Place .

Ax. 2. And the first of these are either General or Special : Of which these contain a Comparison in every , those only in one certain Genus .

COMMENTARY .

1. § . For Example ; This Canon , that whose Effect is more such , that it self is more such is of certain Place ; because it expresses the Place , of the Effect , from whence this Argument is taken ; and General , because Adaptible to all things which admit of any kind of Comparison . But now that that which agrees to the better subject , that it self is better , is , indeed of certain Place , because indicating the Argument , was fetch'd from the Place of the Subject : But not General ; because only to be adapted to those things which are compared in Goodness : But this , that which is more lasting , is best , is of uncertain Place , and Special ; because it neither expresses Where the Place of the Argument is : Neither can it be Adapted to all things which are compared amongst themselves , &c.

1. § . Now compared Canons from the Conjugates are these ; and first , that to which one of the Conjugates more agrees , to that also the other ; As , Caesar consulted the Republick more than Bibulus ; and therefore in this respect was more a Consul than he .

Secondly , If one of the Conjugates be better than one , then the other of the Conjugates will be better than the other ; as , if Piety be before Learning , then a Pious Man will be before a Learned Man , &c.

Thirdly , From the Definition , these ; and first , that to which the Definition most agrees , to that also the Defined ; as , if the Definition of Whiteness be a Colour dispersing the Sight , it will follow , that that which is whitest disperses the Sight most , &c. Secondly , That which agrees to the Definition , that also to the Defined ; as , if a Habit recalling the Affectious of the Mind and Actions to Mediocrity , confers more to Felicity than Riches , then Virtue confers more to Felicity than Riches , &c.

So from Genus and Species Fourthly , we have these ; as , first , that which agrees most to the Genus , that also to the Species's ; and that which most to the Species's , that also to the Individuals ; as , if a Substance Immaterial be more perspicacious than a Corporeal , then the Soul of Man separate will be more perspicacious than it is now , when it is in the Body , &c. Secondly , that which is contain'd under the better Genus or Species , that also its self is better ; and so because a living thing is better than a not ; a Fly will be better than the Heavent , &c.

Fifthly , From the Whole and Part we have these ; as , first , if the whole Homogenous , or whole consisting of Parts of the same Name and Nature be more so than such a Whole , then its Part will be more so than such a Part ; and , conrariwise ; as , If Gold be heavier than Brass , then it will follow , that every Part of Gold , observing the same Proportion of Magnitude will be heavier than the like Quantity of Brass , &c. Secondly , that which is absolutely such , or effects any thing as such , its Whole will be more such , and Effect , that any thing else be more such than its Part ; and so , if Rhubarb have a Power of Purging Choler , then a Drachm will have a greater Power than has a Scruple ; because it is but the third Part of a Drachm , &c. Under which general Maxim are contain'd several special ; as , first , many Goods are to be preferr'd before fewer ; and so Virtue with Nobility , is to be preferr'd before Virtue alone . Secondly , that which is Honest , Pleasant and Profitable , will be beyond that which is only Honest , Pleasant , or Profitable . Thirdly , that which encreases or diminishes Good by its Abcess or Access , is better than that which neither encreases nor diminishes Good by its Abcess or Access . Fourthly , by how much more it encreases or diminishes Good by its Absence or Access , by so much is it better than any other thing , than the which it is better in this Respect , &c.

Fifthly , from Matter and Form in the next Place , we have these ; and first , that , whose Matter is more so , that also it self is more so . So because Gold is better and more durable than Stone , it follows , that a Golden Statue is better and more durable than a Stone , one , &c. Secondly , that which has a Nobler Form , that it self is also Nobler . So because the Form of Man is better than that of Beasts ; because this is Immaterial and Immortal , and that Material and Mortal , it follows , that Man is better than Beasts , &c.

Sixthly , From the Cause Efficient these ; and first that which by it self , simply , and by its Nature is such , is more so than that which by Accident is such , or in some respect , or by Participation : And so Meat as Meat is wholesomer than Physick ; because that of it self is so , and this only by Accident ; and Light is more Profitable than Darkness ; because that is useful to all , this only to Thieves , and such as will abscond . Lastly , the Sun is more splendid than the Moon ; because that shines of its own Nature , this only by Participation , &c. Secondly , that which of it self and by its own Nature is more such , that effects more ; and so on the Contrary . So Fire heats more than Water , when it is warm'd , because hotter . So , you know Iron to be heavier than Wood , because it more swiftly descends , &c. This Canon can be used only in Causes of them selves : For in Causes by Accident it fails often . For Iron red-hot , altho' not hotter than Flame , burns yet more vehemently , the Density of its Matter assisting it , and impressing the Heat more strongly upon the Patient ; and so in other Instances of the like Nature . Thirdly , that to which the Cause agrees most , to that also the Effect ; and so on the Contrary . So you may prove Old Men to be more Prudent than Young ; because they have more Experience in Things . Fourthly , that by which any thing is such , that it self also must be more such . And so , because Water grows Warm by Fire , it may be collected , that the Fire is more Hot than it . But this Canon in some Cases will fail us . And first in Causes by Accident and Aequivocal : For it does not follow , that because some one is drunk by Wine , that therefore Wine should be more drunk ; or because the Knife is sharpen'd by the Stone , that therefore the Stone should be sharper than the Knife . Secondly , in Effects , which receive not more or less : As , if you should prove the Father to be more a Man than his Son ; because the Son is so by his Means . Thirdly , those which depend not upon one Cause : For although the Scholar derive his Learning from his Master , yet it does not follow that the Master must be always Learneder than the Scholar : For it may be , that the Scholar may have more Ingeny and Industry than his Master , &c. Fifthly , those whose Operation , Work or Effect , or Use is the best , those things themselves are the best ; and by how much they are the better , by so much are they the better ; And so the Mind than the Sense , because the Operation of this is the better ; and the Architectonical Art than the Shooe-making , because a House is better than a Shooe , and Virtue than Riches ; because the Use of this belongs to the Soul , and of those to the Body , &c.

Ninthly , From the End and Means these : And first that to which more agrees the End , to that more agrees the Means ; and so on the Contrary . So you may prove any one has more Ingeny , Books , Leisure , Industry , because he is more Learned ; or more Learned , because more Ingeny , Leisure , Industry , &c. Secondly , the End is better than its Means ; as Health than Physick . Add to this another ; and that is , That which for its own sake is desirable , is better than that which for another's ; or also that whick for the Sake of Opinion or Ostentation . So you prove that Learning is ●●tter than a Library ; Friends than Riches ; Health than Beauty , &c. Thirdly that which approaches nearer to the End is better than that which is farther off . So the Art of Commanding is better than that of Horsemanship ; because approaching nearer to the Victory . Fourthly , that which is referred to the better End , that it self is the better . So Aristotle makes good , That Wisdom is better than Virtue Moral ; because leading to the speculative Felilicity , which , he says , is so much better than the Practical , by how much Eternal are to be preferred before Perishing Things . Book 10. Ethick . Cap. 5.

Tenthly , From the Subject and Adjunct ; and first , That which is in the Nobler Subject ; that , if good , is better ; and if bad , worser than that which is in an Ignobler . So Virtue is better than Health , and Vices worse than Diseases ; because the Mind is Nobler than the Body . Secondly , that from which the Subject is Denominated Good , is better than that from which not . So a Good that 's Honest , is better than that which is Profitable ; because from that we are named Good , and from this not , &c. Thirdly , of those , both which make the Subject good , that is the best , which affects it with the most Goodness . So Virtues Theological , viz. Faith , Hope and Charity , are to be preferred before Civil . Fourthly , that which is conversant about the best Object , that it self also is the best . So Philosophy is better than Medicine ; because that 's about the Mind , this only the Body . Fifthly , that is best from which follows the greatest Good or least Evil ; and upon this Account it is Cicero prefers Book 1. of his Offices , the Counsel of Solon , by which the Areopagites were set up , before the Victory of Themistocles , at Salamis ; because that but once profited , this would be always profitable to the Common-Wealth , &c.

11. From the Disparates , this , viz. When of Two we deny the One to be in us , that so we may assume to our selves the Other , that we esteem to be best which we would have seem to be in us . So because for the most Part People deny themselves to be Laborious that they might seem Ingenious , it shews that to be Ingenious they esteem better than to be Laborious , &c.

12. From the Contraries , these , viz. First , that which recedes the farther from its Contrary , that is , more so . So that is whiter which has the least Mixture of Blackness . Secondly , that whose Contrary is worst , that it self is best ; and so on the Contrary . As if Improbity be worse than Diseases then Probity must be better than Health . Thirdly , that whose Absence , Decease , or Loss is worse , that it self is best ; and so on the Contrary . As , if the Loss of a good Estimation be worse than that of Money , then a good Estimation is a greater Good than that of Money , &c.

13. From Major , Minor , and Equal , these , viz. First , that which is more so than the greater , that is more so than the less . And Secondly , likewise if the less be more so , then so will the greater . So if Health is a greater Good than Riches , and Virtue be better than Health , then will it also be better than Riches . Thirdly , if one of the Equals be more so , then also will the other be more so . Fourthly , and also that that which is more so than one of the Equals , that also will be more so than the other . For Example ; If of two Weights equal , one be heavier or lighter than a Third , then also the other will be so , or if that third be heavier or lighter than one of them , it will be also heavier or lighter than the other , &c. Fifthly , if one Genus be more so than another , that which is in the most excellent will be more so than that which is in the less . As , if Science be better than Art , then the most Noble Science will be better than the most Noble Art . Sixthly , if an absolute Predicate agree with an absolute Subject of its own Nature , the Increase or Increment of the Predicate will agree with the Increase or Increment of the Subject . As , if what is honest be good , that which is more so will be better , and most , best . I said of its own Nature ; because if the Predicate agree not to the Subject in this manner , the Canon will deceive us : For it does not follow ; because the Exercitation of the Body is good , that therefore the more the better , and most , best ; because Exercitation is not of it self , and in its own Nature good , but so far as it is moderate , &c.

14. From like and unlike , this , viz. that which is most like to that which is such ; or more such , that , also , it self is more such , and so on the Contrary . So Ajax is esteemed to be more valiant than Ulysses ; because more like to Achilles , the most valiant of the Grecians . But here observe that the Similitude be instituted in its proper Genus : For it does not follow if any one be more like to Achilles in Auger , that therefore he should be more valiant ; but only more wrathful , &c.

15. By Testimonies Problemes Comparate are to be confirmed after the same manner as are the Absolute . For as by Aristotle 's Testimony it may be proved , that Covetousness is an Evil , so may it also that it is worse than Prodigality , &c. So that for Canons Comparate here in this Place there is no need , unless perchance for the Discernment of Authority of Testimonies this Canon should be observed , viz. That what God says , is more credible than what Man ; the Wise , than the Vulgar ; more , than few ; Skilful , than Unskilful ; and what any one testifies against himself , than what for himself , &c.

16. And these are the Comparate Canons , which contain the Designation of a certain Place , either Apertly or Hiddenly . In all which the same Limitations are to be understood , which are added to the Absolute Canons to which they answer . For Example ; The first Canon Comparate from the Conjugates , answers to the first Absolute Canon of the same Place , which is this . That to which one of the Conjugates agrees , to that also agrees the other . To this Canon is added this Caution , viz. that there should not be adhibited Conjugates joyned only in Affinity of Word , net Nature . This same Caution is to be added to the Comparate , which was thus declared . That to which agrees one of the Conjugates more , to that also agrees the other : And therefore as it does not follow , that this Man is Drunk ; and therefore a Drunkard ; so neither this , that this Man is more Drunk , and therefore more a Drunkard , &c.

17. There remain of Comparate Canons , which contain no Designation of any certain Place ; of which many are extant Book 3. Top. Of which we have here selected the Principal : As , first , the more lasting and constant Goods are , the more to be chosen ; As , the Goods of the Mind than those of the Body . Secondly , any thing 's then the more to be wish'd for , when more opportune and useful ; As , fear in Youth , Prudence in older Age. Thirdly , that which always or often's of use , is better than that which seldom ; As , Temperance than Fortitude . Fourthly , those things which content one in themselves , are more to be chosen than those which need other things ; As , Abundance of things than Money : For he that abounds in the last , viz. Money may want other things ; But he that abounds in things , cannot want Money , &c. Fifthly , that which is the more splendid , is the more to be wish'd for : So Glory , than Riches . Sixthly , difficult things are better than those that are more facile . And Seventhly , Proper than Common . By Common here is not to be understood Publick , but only those things which many have ; by Proper , which we have alone , or in Common with but very few ; For these are the things which we most love . Eightly , those things which cannot be communicated to others , are more precious than those which can ; As , Knowledge than Riches . Ninthly , things not necessary are to be preferr'd before those that are . So we chuse rather to live Commodiously than to live . Which Canon is is not everted by Cicero , when in his Topicks he says , Things necessary are to be preferr'd before Unnecessary : For by Unnecessary he understands Superfluous . But to Aristotle Unnecessaries signifie no more than those which belong to the bene esse ; Necessaries , the esse . Tenthly , those things which cannot be given by others , are better than those which may ; As , Virtue and Learning than Riches , &c. Eleventhly , that which one would have others leave one ; As , Friends than Wealth : For Friends we would get to our selves ; but Riches we had rather that others should leave us , &c.

18. And these are the Principal Canons by which Problemes compared are to be confirmed ; which were to be drawn either from the Absolute Canons or Aristotle 's three Books of Topicks . In all of which , especially those which contain a Comparison of things in Goodness , this Caution is to be used , viz. That those things which are compared , be in other things equal . For Example ; The more lasting Goods are then to be preferr'd before the less , when in other things they are equal , &c. And thus much of the Dialectical Syllogism .

CHAP. XX. Of Demonstration .

Ax. 1. NOW follows Demonstration , defined 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 ; that is , a Syllogism begetting Knowledge .

COMMENTARY .

1. § . Demonstration , in the Greek 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , is amongst the Geometricians a Delineation of a Diagram , in which they exhibit the Truth of their Propositions to be seen by the Eye . To that is opposed 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 ; that is , a Description or false Delineation . Now these Words , as many others , which are used in the Doctrine of Syllogism , are translated from Geometry into Logick ; and there Demonstration is taken sometimes for any certain and perspicuous Proof ; but here in this Place strictly for Syllogism Scientific , and 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , or false Syllogism ; for Syllogism begetting Error , or the contrary to Science , &c.

2. § . Demonstration's Genus is Syllogism : And herein it agrees with the Dialectical . It s Difference is fetch'd from the End , which is Science . Now the Word Science is either taken largely to signifie any Cognition or true Assent ; or strictly , a firm and infallible one ; or lastly , an Assent of Propositions made known by the Cause or Effect . And that only comes under the Notion of Science , here , which is gotten by the Cause or the Effect ; and is proper to this Place , &c.

Ax. 2. Of Demonstration , one is , Why a thing is , and the other , That a thing is .

Ax. 3. That of Why is that which not only proves the thing is or is not ; but also renders a Reason , why the thing is or is not .

Ax. 4. The Demonstration That , only proves that the thing either is or is not .

1. § . Now this Division is fetch'd from the End : For , whereas Demonstration is a Syllogism Scientific , it altogether follows , that how many-fold Science is , so many must Demonstration be ; But Science , one is Why , and the other That ; and therefore so must Demonstration be . See Cap. 13. Book 1. of the Post .

Science and Demonstration , in short , Why , differ from that of that a thing is , in the Ratio and Quality of the Medium , which in that of Why a thing is , is the next Cause ; that is , such a Cause as that being put , the Propriety must be put also ; and that taken away , the Propriety also must be taken away , when that of the other is not the Cause , but Effect ; at least , not the next , but remote , as will hereafter be made appear , &c.

In the Interim , take we a View of what is necessary to be known before we enter upon this Head .

CHAP. XXI . Of Precognitions , or Things requisite to be known , before we enter upon Demonstration .

Ax. 1. IN every Demonstration , 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , or Why , or Demonstrative Science , three Things are to be considered , viz. Subject , Affection and Cause by which demonstrated , that the Affection is in the Subject , &c.

Ax. 2. Of Subject and Affection is composed the Question : Of Cause with the Affection , First then , Subject Combined , the Premisses or Principles , by which such Question is to be demonstrated .

Ax. 3. And in these , two things are to be considered ; first Precognitions , and then Conditions , which in such a Demonstration are to be observed .

Ax. 4. Of Precognitions , the one is , whether it be ? the other , what that is which is said ? or what signifies the Name ?

Ax. 5. Of the three Terms , it is to be foreknown what signifies the Name ; that is , what the Meaning or Importance of them is . Subject , Cause , also Premisses or Principles , whether they be ? And this of the Affection and Conclusion , is to be demonstrated .

1. § . Of the three Terms , what is the Name ; because otherwise we should dispute concerning things unknown .

2. § . Of Subject and Cause , whether they be ? For when it is uncertain , whether there is any such thing as the Cause , the Argumentation is infirm , and begetteth not Science . When Subject , frivolous and inept : For in vain should we prove , for Instance , that the Pigmies are Chol●rick ; because of their short Stature , unless it appears , that there are Pigmies , &c. Of Premisses or Principles , also that they are true : For otherwise we lay a Foundation of Things that are not known : It remains therefore that of the Affection it should be demonstrated , that it is ; and of the whole Conclusion , consisting of Subject and Affection , that it be true , or that the Affection is in the Subject , &c.

Ax. 6. Of which Precognitions those that are self-evident , that is , so , that no body can be ignorant of them , are only made in the mind ; those not so , but that they may be unknown , are always express'd in the first Entrances of Sciences .

Ax. 7. And if so soon as produc'd , they are believ'd by the Disciple , they may be properly term'd Suppositions ; but if not , and the Disciple be doubtful of them ; or even encline to a contrary Opinion , Postulata , or things to be required or demanded .

1. § . There are some things , says Aristotle , in Sciences , of which no one can be ignorant , and these they call Suppositions , as we said before , or Axioms ; that is , such as carry such a Native Clarity with 'em , as they are worthy of every body to be credited ; some of which one may : But yet , so soon as proposed by a Master , are believed without Proof ; And such as these , are termed Definitions : And some not so immediately ; but delivered Precariously , and by way as it were of Agreement ; because the Probation of them , if any , belongs to the Metaphysicks . And such as these they call Postulata , or things required , or to be demanded , &c.

And so we come to the Conditions which in every Demonstration Why , are to be observed ; and First to those of the Question to be demonstrated , and Medium , which is to be used in Demonstration .

CHAP. XXII . Of the Question to be demonstrated , and Medium which is to be used in Demonstration .

Ax. 1. THE Conditions which are to be observ'd in Demonstration Why , are partly belonging to the Question , partly to the Cause or Medium of Demonstration , and partly to the Premisses or Principles ; of which in the Chapter following .

Ax. 2. Every Question does not admit of a Demonstration Why ; but only that which is true , and has a certain and immutable Cause of its Truth .

Ax. 3. And therefore neither Propositions immediate , nor fortuitous can be demonstrated ; but only proper Accidents .

1. § . Now Propositions immediate cannot ; because they have no Medium , or Cause of their Truth .

1. § . Chance , likewise , cannot ; because they have not any Dependance upon any certain Cause , or Rule ; Accidents therefore , and those proper only can be demonstrated . For Substances have no Cause why they 're in the Subject ; because they are predicated , always as Genus's or Differences . And Accidents improper have no certain and definite Cause . Now whether these Accidents proper flow from the Essence of the Subject , or some External Cause , or whether they be perpetual , or only frequent , it matters not : But this , that they cohere with their Causes so as that they being put , these also be put , and that being taken away , these also may be taken away , is necessary and required . For Instance ; Altho' the Moon be not always deficient , yet , that she is so , when so , may be demonstrated ; because she is always so , when the Earth is Diametrically interpos'd between the Sun and the Moon ; and never so when otherwise , &c. And so much of the Question to be demonstrated .

Ax. 4. Now the Medium of Demonstration must be the next Cause of the Predicate , and that either Efficient or Final ; and if Efficient , either Internal or External .

1. § . Now whereas Cause is said to be two Ways next , that is , either absolutely or in its own Genus : In this Place is to be understood the Absolutely next ; that is , such as that being put , the Effect also must be put ; and that taken away , the Effect also must be taken away . And farther , it is required , that it be also the Cause of the Predicate : For , that it be also of the Subject , is not so necessary ; because it is not enquir'd , whether the Subject be ; for that is pre-supposed ; but whether the Predicate , or in plainer Terms , whether the Predicate be in the Subject or not , &c.

2. § . This next Cause must be either Efficient or Final ; because the Predicate being an Accident , has not Matter or Form , properly so call'd . The Cause Final is adhibited in those things which are done for the sake of another : As , Means , Natural Instruments , &c. Also Actions and Habits , if such are to be demonstrated , and in other Cases the Efficient . It happens sometimes indeed , that the Cause Proximate , viz. the Efficient , is also the Form or Matter of the Subject ; and when it is so , the better : But however they differ not in Specie from the rest . But these things will appear more by Examples , as here ,

1. Every Rational Creature is capable of Science ; Every Man is a Rational Creatur● . Every Man therefore is capable of Science , &c.

In this is the Medium Rational the Cause Efficient Internal of the Predicate , and Form of the Subject . Here ,

2. Every Earthly thing is overwhelm'd , wi●n thrown into the Water : An Ebony-Tree is an Earthly thing : And therefore every Ebony-Tree is overwhelm'd when thrown into the Water .

The Cause Efficient Internal and Matter of the Subject . Here ,

3. Whatever consists of Matter and Form has a Three-fold Dimension ; Every body consists of Matter and Form : And therefore every body has a Three-fold Dimension , &c.

Cause Efficient Internal of the Predicate , and both Form and Matter of the Subject . Here ,

4. That which is endued with a Three-fold Dimension , admits not of another Body's being with it in the same Place . But every body is endued with a Three-fold Dimension : &c.

The Cause Efficient Internal of the Predicate , and the Propriety of the Subject , &c. Here , viz.

5. That which , the Earth being objected , cannot be illustrated by the Rays of the Sun , that suffers an Ecclipse of the Light receiv'd from the Sun ; But the Moon , the Earth being objected , cannot be illustrated with the Rays of the Sun : &c.

The Cause Efficient External of the Predicate . Here ,

6. He who was made for the Contemplation of Celestial Things , ought to be of an upright Countenance ; Man was made for the Contemplation of Celesti-Things : And therefore Man ought to be of an upright Countenance .

The Cause Final , and also that of the Predicate , &c.

3. § . Now sometimes it happens that the same Question may be demonstrated by the Cause Efficient , together with the Final ; and so you may demonstrate that an Animal sleeps , viz. either because the common Sense is sopited or drown'd by Vapours , and the Passage of the External Senses obstructed . And this is from the Efficient ; or else that the Spirits may be refresh'd , and Strength repair'd . And this is from the Final , &c.

4. § . Demonstrations Why , are not only affirmed but also denied . For , as we may demonstrate that a Man is capable of Science , because endu'd with Reason : So also that a Beast is not ; because not , &c. For as an Affirmation is the Cause of an Affirmation , so must a Negation be the Cause of a Negation , &c. See Book 1. Post . Cap. 13.

And so we proceed to the Chapter of the Conditions of the Principles of Demonstration in which we are taught what they ought to to be .

CHAP. XXIII . Of the Conditions of the Principles of Demonstration .

Ax. 1. THE Conditions of the Principles , or Propositions , of Demonstrations Why , are either Absolute or Related .

Ax. 2. Absolute are those which agree to the Propositions in themselves consider'd ; and Related as Compared with the Conclusion .

Ax. 3. The Absolute are these ; and first that the Propositions be necessarily true , and reciprocal . Secondly , Immediate and First ,

COMMENTARY .

True ; because a False cannot be known ; and also necessarily ; because from Propositions not necessary a necessary Conclusion cannot be drawn , unless by Chance or Accident .

2. § . Immediate ; because if not , there would be a Progress to Infinite , which is inconsistent with the Nature of Rnowledge .

Ax. 4. These Two in the Major are required Necessarily ; but that the Minor supposing it be true , should be also Necessary and Immediate , is not absolutely Necessary .

1. § . For the Major is to consist of the Affection , and its next Cause , which are not only Reciprocated amongst themselves ; but also necessarily and immediately cohering : But the Minor of the Affections , Cause and Subject , which it is not necessary should so closely cohere , as that they should constitute a Necessary , Immediate and Reciprocal Proposition ; since of the Affection , not Subject , the Knowledge is required , &c.

2. § . Now the Minor is not necessary , much less Reciprocal , and Universally first , when the Medium of the Demonstration is the Cause Efficient External of the Predicate . For Example ; That which with the Rays of the Sun , the Earth being objected , cannot be illustrated , that suffers a Defect of Light receiv'd from the Sun ; The Moon with the Rays of the Sun , the Earth being objected , cannot be illustrated : And therefore , &c. In this Demonstration the Minor has no Degree of Necessity ; because it is not perpetual . In Demonstrations from Cause Efficient Internal , or Final , indeed , the Minor is always Necessary , but not Reciprocal ; because often , the next and Reciprocal Subject wants a Name . For Example ; Every Plant , whose Humour is apt to congeal at the Foot ; or Stalk of its Leaf is apt to shed its Leaves : But the Humour of the Vine is apt to congeal at the Foot or Stalk of its Leaf : And therefore the Vine is apt to shed its Leaves , &c. In which the Minor is not Reciprocal ; because it happens not only to the Vine , to have its Humour congealed , but to all other Plants to whom it happens to shed their Leaves . But this happens , because there is not a proper Name by which should be signify'd All , and only those Plants to which the Congelation of the Humours and Fall of the Leaf evenes . For the same Reason is it also , that the Conclusion is not Reciprocal . See Book 1. Post . Cap. 5. and Book 2. Cap. 66.

3. § . The Minor is not Immediate also when the next Cause of the Predicate , has any former Cause by which it may be demonstrated For in all Causes which enter Demonstration , there is a certain Series and Subordination ; so that every Posterior is the Effect of the Precedent . As often therefore as any Effect is demonstrated by such a Cause as is the Effect of a former Cause , that Minor must necessarily be Mediate ; and then that Minor is to be resolv'd into that former Cause ; and so on till you come to the First of that Series , which constitutes a Demonstration of both Propositions Immediate : And this Demonstration is the Foundation of all the rest which are of the same Series . And therefore , in searching of Science , we are to proceed from the first Demonstration to the following in Synthetic Order ; and then the Minor Mediate is esteem'd as it were , Immediate ; because now before demonstrated . For a Demonstrated Proposition is no less apt to beget Knowledge than a Proposition Immediate and Indemonstrable . But yet if any one shall happen upon a Demonstration , whose Minor is Mediate , he must proceed in Analytic Order towards the first and Fundamental Demonstration . Nor will he first have attained Science , before he shall have arriv'd at the first Cause : For in this the Mind acquiesces . But let us add Examples , that the Thing may be so much the better understood : That which is endu'd with a Three-fold Dimension , admits not another Body to be with it at the same time , in the same Place : All Bodies are endu'd with a Three-fold Dimension : And therefore , &c. The Minor of this Syllogism may be demonstrated in this manner : That which consists of Matter and Form is endued with a Three-fold Dimension ; Every Body consists of Matter and Form : And therefore every body , &c. Now the Minor of this Syllogism is Immediate as well as the Major ; because to consist of Matter and Form , is the Definition of Body , &c.

4. § . The same Series there is in Demonstration from Cause Final , in which the Subordinate is demonstrated by the farther End until you shall come to the last in every Genus , in which the Mind acquiesces . For Example : An Animal has Lungs that it may breath , breathes that it may refresh the Heart ; the Heart is to be refresh'd to preserve a Temperature of Heat ; a Temperature of Heat is to be kept , that the Life of the Animal may be preserv'd , &c. If these Demonstrations be propos'd in Form , all , excepting the Last , will have a Mediate Minor ; and the Last is the Foundation of all the rest .

5. § . It sometimes happens that Demonstrations from Cause Efficient cannot be resolv'd into Propositions Mediate , unless the Demonstration from Cause Final be commixt with the Demonstrations from Cause Efficient . For Example ; A Man is of a most Acute Touch ; because he is of a very thin Skin ; a thin Skin , because having abundance of Elaborated Animal Spirits ; abundance of those Elaborated Animal Spirits , because having a very large Brain , the Shop or Office of those Elaborated Animal Spirits . Hitherto are they all Causes Efficient . That a Man has a very large Brain , is to be demonstrated from the End , to wit , because he should reason ; that Man should reason again , from Cause Efficient to wit , because he is a Rational Animal . Here now we acquiesce ; because the Minor is the Definition of Man ; and therefore Immediate and Indemonstrable .

Ax , 5. The Conditions of Principles relating to the Conclusion , are Three : And first , that they be the Causes ; Secondly , Prior to , and Thirdly , more known than the Conclusion .

Ax. 6. And these Conditions are required in both Propositions .

1. § . For , as is the Medium of Demonstration 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , with respect to the Question to be demonstrated , so are the Principles or Premisses to the Conclusion . Wherefore as the Medium is the Cause of the Affection , so the Principles are the Cause , not only why the Conclusion is known : For in this Sense the Principles are the Cause even in all Syllogisms ; but also why they are true . And as the Medium is before the Affection , not in time , but Nature ; So also the Principles obtain a Verity , not in Time , but Nature , prior to that of the Conclusion . Lastly , as the Medium is more known than the Affection , not as to us , and in way of confus'd Knowledge , but of Nature and distinct Cognition . So , also , the Principles are more known than the Conclusion . For , because we embrace the Conclusion with a full Assent of the Mind , for the sake of the Principles ; we must assent more to the Principles themselves of Necessity ; because that for the sake of which any thing is such ; that it self is more such ; as Aristotle teaches Book 1. Post . Cap. 2. &c.

Ax. 7. Now when the Principles have all these Conditions , they are proper to the Thing to be demonstrated .

Ax. 8. Principles are said to be proper to the thing to be demonstrated , when they are neither Heterogeneous or Foreign , nor yet Common .

1. § . Now Principles are said to be Heterogeneous then when they are fetch'd from some other Science : As if one for the proving of Physical Questions should make use of Mathematical Principles ; or Geometrical , Arithmetical . But it is not lawful for a Demonstrater to pass from one Science to another ; to wit , because the Medium with the Third , that is , the Subject ; and the First , that is the Predicate with the Medium ought to agree by it self ; as is taught Cap. 6. of the same Book ; which cannot be if the the Conclusion and Principles are not of the same Genus or Subject ; that is , of the same Science . For that is said to be of the same Science , which is of the same Genus or Subject , as appears from Cap. 28. of the same Book .

2. § . If yet one Science be Subalternate to another ; as , Musick to Arithmetick , or Optick to Geometry : The Questions of the Inferiour are to be demonstrated by the Principles of the Superiour Science : Nor is this a passing to another Genus ; because the Subalternated Science has , in some manner the same Subject with the Superiour ; and so they are not to be esteemed divers Sciences . I said in some manner ; because the Subalternated Science considers the Subject of the Superiour with some sensible Quality which yet appertains not to the formal Ratio of the Subject : From whence it is that the Affections of both are diverse , tho' in the rest they consent . So Arithmetick considers Number absolutely ; Musick , which is Subalternated to it , only in ●ound . So Geometry considers Magnitude absolutely : The Optick , or Science discussing the Reasons of Sight , which is subalternate or inferiour to it only in Colour , Light and Shadow . See Cap. 7. of the fore-cited Book .

3. § . The Principles Common are those which may be accommodated to many Sciences . Such Principles as these generate not Science ; because they contain a Medium which coheres not with the Part of the Question by it self , but Accident . But it is then that we know a Thing truly , when we know it so far as it is in the Subject , and that from Principles which are such ; as , it is that which it is ; as Aristotle speaks Cap , 9. of the same Book . But that which we know from common Reasons we know only by Accident , &c. It is not yet to be thought that the Principles of Sciences are Common ; which , when of the Superiour are adhibited to the Inferiour Science ; because the Science Subalternate , as has been said before , is not esteem'd diverse from the Subalternating , &c.

Ax. 9. Now Principles are divided into Axioms and Thesis's .

Ax. 10. And an Axiom is that , the Truth of which knowing only the Signification of the Words , no Person can be ignorant of .

Ax. 11. A Thesis , whose Truth is not known by the meer Signification of the Words only ; but by the Judgment of the Senses , or some other way of Declaration .

Ax. 12. And this is either Definition , or Hypothesis .

Ax. 13. A Definition is an Oration , as we have observed before , in which we declare what a Thing is . An Hypothesis , whether it be in Being , or no , &c.

This Division of the Principles is fetch'd from Book 1. Post . Cap. 2. and 10. Whence Axiom is so call'd , is declar'd Book 1 of the Institutions , Cap. 27. The Word Thesis is sometimes taken for any Proposition , which is proposed Pro and Con to be disputed of , as , Book 8. Top. Cap. 4. and 5. and sometimes for a Sentence Paradoxal of some eminent Philosopher ; as , Book 1. Top. Cap. 1. In Rhetorick it is taken for an infinite Question ; but here , for a kind of Proposition Immediate . Now ,

2. § . Aristotle Cap. 10. of the fore-cited Book defines an Axiom in this manner , viz. to be that which of necessity is true of it self and of the like Necessity must seem so . Of Necessity true , that is , worthy of it self of our Belief , or that that has no Cause of its Truth , by which to be demonstrated . And this is Common to all , as well Thesis's as Axioms .

Adds , of Necessity must seem so ; that is , by a Person of compleat Reason ; It cannot seriously and with the Consent of his Mind be deny'd : For a Person perchance may deny an Axiom rather than confess himself to be overcome ; but no one can be found , who supposing him of a compleat Reason , can deny it in his Soul and Mind . For Example ; such Enunciations as these ; Nothing can , at the same time , be and also not be : The whole is greater than its Part Those things that are equal to the same ; those also will be equal amongst themselves : If from equal things you take away equal , those things which remain will be equal too , &c. The Evidence of which is so great , that knowing only the Signification of the Words by which they are express'd , the Truth of them cannot but be apparent . For he who knows what signifies a Whole , and what a Part , and what to be greater , cannot be ignorant that a Whole is greater than a Part , &c.

3. § . And in this respect differ Axioms from Thesis's : For to the Knowledge of Thesis's , besides the Knowledge of the Signification of Words , is requir'd the Judgment of the Senses , and sometimes the Declaration of a Master . Of Definitions Examples may be taken out of every Discipline : As for Instance ; Physick : As , a Body Natural is that which consists of Matter and Form : Principles are those which are neither made out of themselves nor others , and out of which are made all things : Nature 's the Principle and Cause of Motion and Quiet in that in which it is , first , by its self , and not by Accident , &c. Geometry ; As , that a Point is that which does not consist of Parts : A Line is a Longitude , void of Latitude : A Right Line that which lies equally betwixt its Points , &c. Hypotheses in the first , that there is a Natural Body , a Heaven , a Soul , &c. Arithmetick ; that there is a Unity ; seu non dari maximum Numerum ; that is , that there 's no such thing as the highest Number : Geometry ; that there 's a Line , that from one Point to any other Point a right Line may be drawn , &c. All which are such , as , tho' they want not Demonstration , yet are they such as that out of the Signification of the Words meerly known without the Accession of any thing else , they cannot be known to be true : For altho' any one should know what 's signify'd by the Name Body , yet can he not know by this that every Body consists of Matter and Form : Nay , that there is such a Thing as Natural Body , if not assisted by the Help of his Senses , &c.

4. § . Hence is it that Axioms ought to be held by him that would learn any Science before he comes to his Master . Theses's , not , because these are to be explained in the very Entrances of Sciences . Definitions especially always ; but if known by the Judgment of the Senses , Hypotheses , indeed , need not , &c.

Ax. 14. Now when a Demonstration is Conform to these Laws , it not only proves , that the Affection 's in the Subject , but also explains what that is ; and contains the perfect Definition of it .

1. § . That is , contains all those things that are necessary to it , only in Inverted Order : For a Demonstration is thus proposed , viz. The Earth is interposed between the Sun and the Moon ; and therefore the Moon suffers an Eclipse , or a Defect of Light , viz. receiv'd from the Sun . And a Definition thus , viz. An Eclipse is a Defect of Light in the Moon , receiv'd from the Sun , by Reason of the Earth's Interposition , &c. And this of Demonstration Why. Now come we to that which we call Demonstratin That , of which the next Chapter ; as also of that which the Logicians call a Regress .

CHAP. XXIV . Of Demonstration 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , or That and Regress .

Ax. 1. NOW of Demonstration , That the one is from the Effect , and the other from the remote Cause .

Ax. 2. Of which that collects the Cause from the Effect Sensible ; and this the Effect from the remote Cause .

1. § . For Example ; If any one rising something later than usual , should see the Walls of his Chamber collustrated with the Sun-Beams , and collect from thence that the Sun had been sometime risen ; This would be from the sensible Effect . From the remote Cause , this , viz. Plants have not a Sensitive Soul ; and therefore they don't breath , &c.

Ax. 3. Now that from the Effect may be as well Affirmed as Denyed . The remote Cause always Deny'd and Concluded in the Second Figure in Camestres .

And , therefore , as we collect Plants live , because they grow , and are nourished ; so also may we that Stones do not ; because they neither grow , nor are nourished , &c. And as from an unequal Concitated Pulse of the Arteries we collect that there is a Fever . So also from an equal and sedate , that there is none ; or that there is an Immunity from a Fever , &c. But it does not follow that all Animals breathe , because they have a Sensitive Soul , altho' it does , that no Plant does , because it has not ; because having a Sensitive Soul is not the next Cause of Breathing , &c.

3. § . Now of these two Species's of Demonstration , the first is much nobler than the last ; First , because it has more necessary Propositions , consisting of the same Terms of which does the Demonstration 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 . Secondly , begets Knowledge tho' not simply ; yet such as is in its Genus perfect . For a Cause can no other ways be known but by its Effect . Thirdly , it is framed in the first Figure , and may also be affirmed . Whereas Demonstration from the Cause remote consists of less necessary Propositions , and not immediate ; Neither does it beget Knowledge in its own kind perfect , neither can it be fram'd in the first Figure , &c. Both yet beget such a Knowledge as that we may know whether the thing is or is not , &c.

Ax. 4. As soon then as the Cause is deprehended from the sensible Effect , a Comparison is instituted between that Cause and the Effect . And when the Mind , by its Sagacity , discovers that that Cause is the Cause of that Effect ; then a Regress is made from the Cause to the Effect , by a Demonstration 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , &c.

1. § . Sometimes the Effect is unknown , and the Cause known ; and then , immediately is made use of the Demonstration 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 . Sometimes the Effect's perceiv'd , and Cause unknown ; and then first , the Cause from the Effect , and then the Effect from the Cause is to be demonstrated . And this sort of Demonstration is usually call'd by the Latins , a Regress , in which the Causes are first to be investigated by the Effects ; And then from the true Knowledge of those Causes is to be deriv'd a true and perfect Knowledge of those Effects ; whereby we not only know that the Effects be ( of which our Senses are Judges ) but also why and what they be ; further than which our Minds cannot reach . And thus much may suffice for an Account of true Syllogism .

Notes and Observations from the Learned Heereboord in Relation to this 24th Chapter .

WHEN the Demonstration from the remote Cause is said to be always Negative , by the Ingenious Author it is to be understood with this Restriction , viz. when it is larger than the Effect ; and not reciprocated with it ; as in the Instance which he has given ; which is very true . But sometimes it may happen that the remote Cause may be equal to , and not larger than the Effect , and then it is reciprocated with it ; and may be affirmed ; as in this Instance . Those things which are Animals Vegetative are nourished : Plants are Animals Vegetative ; and therefore they are nourished : Wherein the middle Term is the Remote Cause : For the next is the Nutritive Faculty ; and yet the Syllogism proceeds in the first Figure , and is affirmed ; because the remote Cause is adequate to the Effect ; and reciprocate with it : For whatsoever is nourished , has a Vegetative Soul ; and whatsover is not , has not , &c.

CHAP. XXV . Of Sophism .

Ax. 1. NEXT follows Syllogism 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , or Fallacious , which counterfeiting a Shew of the True , produces Error , or an Ignorance of Depraved Disposition .

COMMENTARY .

1. § . Now Precepts concerning this are very necessary in Logick , for Fear , lest others should impose upon us . For he that is liable to be deceiv'd by another , and is not aware of it , may also be deceiv'd by himself .

2. § . But ( say they who wo'n't admit of the Doctrin of Fallacious Syllogism in Logick ) the Right is the Rule both of it self and the Wrong ; and one Opposite is sufficient to discern the other by . Book 1. An. Cap. 1. Whence they conclude , that the Precepts of true Syllogism are enough to detect the Fallacies of the other by ; And so that this Part of Logick is nothing worth . But it is not so : For the Right is then the Rule of the Wrong , when the wrong , as wrong , is oppos'd to it . And the Knowledge of one Opposite is then sufficient for the Discernment of the other ; when the opposed , as opposed , is composed with it . But now when the Oblique puts on the Form of the Right , or one Opposite that of the other , 't is not every sort of Knowledge of the Right , that does serve to distinguish the Wrong from it ; nor the one Opposite to understand the Difference of the other by . Now a Fallacious Sophism is not only Vicious , but also puts on the Shew of Good : And therefore those Precepts of Syllogism , which we have already laid down , are not sufficient fully to understand the Tricks of Sophisters by . Why ? Because it is not enough to know the Fault of the Fallacious Syllogism ; but over-and-above , we must take off the Appearance of the true , and plainly demonstrate from which Box of Fallacies that Varnish was taken , whereby the Sophister has set off his Vicious Syllogism . And first of those Fallacies which are committed in Word .

CHAP. XXVI . Of Sophisms , or Fallacies in Word .

Ax. 1. SOphisms , or Fallacies are either in Words or Things .

Ax. 2. Of those which are consisting in Words , there are six Places , viz. Homonymy , Amphiboly , Composition , Division , Prosody or Accent , with Figure of Speech .

Ax. 3. A Sophism of Homonymy is that which arises from the Ambiguity of one Word .

Ax. 4. This Sophism is solved by the Distinction of that doubtful Word .

1. § . Now in Syllogism there are three Terms : Wherefore a Fallacy of Homonymy may three ways happen ; And first , when the Medium's ambiguous ; As , the End of a Thing is its Good ; Death is the End of Life : And therefore Death is the Good of it . This Fallacy's solv'd by a Distinction of the Word End . For End in the Major is taken for the Cause End ; in the Minor , the Extremity of a Thing . Secondly , when the Subject is doubtful ; As , Quantity is not a Substance ; A Body a Quantity : And therefore a Body is not a Substance . This Fallacy is solv'd by the Distinction of Body : For in the Minor's understood a Body Mathematical ; in the Conclusion , Physical . In the third Place we lay a Sophism of Homonymy , when the Predicate is ambiguous ; As , That which is round has no Beginning nor End ; The World is round ; and therefore has no Beginning nor End : This Sophism is solved by distinguishing Beginning and End : For in the Major are understood Beginning and End of Magnitude ; in the Conclusion , of Time , &c.

2. Hither may be referr'd those captious Questions , Have you left off to commit Adultery ? Have you found that you never lost ? &c. For whether you affirm or deny , you 'll be catch'd by Homonymy . For if you say you have left off to commit Adultery , you confess that sometimes you have committed it : because we have sometime done that which we cease to do . But if you say you have not , the Sophister will reply then , you still continue in it . In like manner , if you affirm you have that which you have not lost , the Sophister'll reply that then you have Horns ; because you have not lost them : And if the Contrary , you have not Eyes ; because you have not lost them . Wherefore you are to say , that the Word not to leave off is Ambiguous : For when one is said to leave off who has done any thing , and does it no longer , the Word not to leave off may be taken either for not to have done it ; or for persisting still to do it : And therefore he may be said not to have left off both , who never did it , and who still continues in it . Likewise any one may be said not to have lost , both that which he never had , as Horns ; and that which he yet has as his Eyes : For he is said to have lost , who once had a thing , and now has it not , &c. See A. Gel. Lib. 16. Noct. At. C. 2.

Ax. 5. Sophism of Amphiboly's that which arises from the Ambiguous Sense of a Speech whose particular Words have no Homonymy by themselves .

Ax. 6. And this Sophism is solv'd by the Distinction of the Ambiguous Speech .

1. § . The Fallacy of Amphiboly is laid two Ways ; First , when the very Syntax of the Speech is Ambiguous ; as , Quod quisquam vidit , id ipsum vidit , that is , What any one sees , that he would have it self sees . Some one sees a Tree ; and therefore the Tree it self sees . This Fallacy's solv'd by the Distinction of the Ambiguous Speech , viz. id ipsum vidit ; For that it self may be either of the Nominative Case , and then the Major'll be false ; or the Accusative , and then , indeed , the Major'll be true : But yet thence this Conclusion will not follow , viz. And therefore the Tree it self sees ; Because the Syllogism then would have four Terms . Of the same kind likewise is this Catch ; Those qui sunt sui Magistri ; that is , are their own Masters , are at their own Dispose : Servants sunt Magistri sui ; that is , are their own Masters : And therefore Servants are at their own Dipose : For the Ambiguity in the Latin , is in the Words Magistri sui , their Masters ; which in the Major , are of the Plural , and Minor of the Singular Number . The like Ambiguity's in these Enunciations , viz. Socrus oderunt Nurus ; Aio te Aeacida Romanos vincere posse , &c.

2. A Fallacy of Amphiboly's then made when the very kind or Phrase of the Speech begets Ambiguity or Uncertainty of Opinion : As , He that sends a Book into the Light , would have it read of all Men : He that throws it into the Fire , sends it into the Light ; And therefore he that throws it into the Fire , would have it read of all Men. This Fallacy's solv'd by the Distinction of the Phrase , sending into the Light , which in the Major Proposition signifies to Publish , in the Minor to burn . Such is the Caption of those who would infer from hence the Invocation of the Dead ; because the Patriarch Jacob in blessing his Posterity when speaking of Joseph's Children , amongst the rest , says thus , Gen. 48.16 . And my Name shall be call'd upon these Children , and the Name of my Fathers , Abraham and Isaac . For the calling of Jacob's Name upon the Children of Joseph by an Hebrew Idiotism , is no more than the calling them Israelites from the Name of Jacob , &c.

Ax , 7. A Sophism of Composition is that which arises from a Composition of those things which are to be divided .

Ax. 8. Of Division , on the Contrary , from the Division of those things which are to be conjoyned .

Ax. 9. To be solved by a Distinction of the divers Senses which a Speech has according to the different Composition or Division of its Parts .

1. § . Many things when divided , are true , which joyn'd , are false ; As , that One sitting may stand ; Many , on the other hand , true conjoyn'd , which are false divided ; As , All Penitent Sinners shall be sav'd . When the Argument runs from divided to conjoyn'd , there follows a Fallacy of the Composition ; when from conjoyn'd to divided , of the Division . Each of these Fallacies may be committed Eight Ways . First , in Enunciations Modal ; As , 'T is possible for one sitting , to stand . For if the Participle Sitting be joyn'd with the Verb Stand , the Enunciation is false , if joyn'd with the Mode Possible , true . For one sitting , even while he sits , has the Power or Faculty of standing ; but not of standing as long as he sits .

2. Secondly , In Enumerations , whose Parts are conjoyn'd or separated by some Grammatical Conjunction ; As , Every Animal either is Rational or Irrational : But not every Animal is Rational : And therefore every Animal Irrational . Here the Division of the Major causes the Fallacy . For the Major's true , if taken conjoyntly , and as a simple Enunciation whose Attribute Rational or Irrational is taken , as , unum quid , or one something . But if taken dividedly , and as an Enunciation Composed , in this Manner : Every Animal is Rational , or every Animal is Irrational ; apparently false .

3. Thirdly , When in the Major the Note of Quantities taken Collectively or Distributively into the Genus's of the Singulars : It is so used as if it were taken Distributively into the Singulars of those Genus's ; As , All the Planets are Seven : The Sun and Moon are Planets ; And therefore the Sun and Moon are Seven . This Fallacy consists in the Word All , which if Collectively taken , the Major indeed will be true , but the Minor false . For this ought to have been the Minor ; The Sun and Moon are all the Planets . If the Word All is taken Distributively , the Major will be false . Another ; Every Animal was in Noah 's Ark ; Many Animals perish'd in the Flood : Therefore many Animal , perish'd in the Flood , were in Noah 's Ark. This Fallacy also lies in the Word Every , which , if taken of the Singulars of the Genus's the Major will be false ; if of the Genus's of the Singulars , the Minor . For none of the Genus's of those Animals perish'd which are said to have been in Noah 's Ark.

4. Fourthly , when any Word may be conjoyn'd either to the Antecedents or Consequents ; As , that of Menander , Te Servum feci liberum ; that is , I made thee a Servant a Freeman ; which may signifie , I brought thee into Servitude , who wer 't free ; or , I made thee , being a Servant , a Freeman ; that is , Maumised thee , or set the free from Slavery .

5. Fifthly , When a Place is quoted out of any Author , and some Part of it concealed . With this Fallacy the Devil , Matth. 4. attempted to persuade Christ , that he should throw himself down from the Pinacles of the Temple , bringing in a Testimony from David , after this manner ; It is written , says he , He shall give his Angels Charge concerning thee ; and they shall bear thee in their Hands , lest at any time thou dash thy Foot against a Stones But it it is written , he shall give his Angels Charge concerning thee , to keep thee walking in all thy Ways : that is , following the Business of thy Calling , with both Hands shall they bear thee up that thou dash not thy Foot against a Stone , Psalm 92.

6. Sixthly , When a Word is now taken in a Divided ; Now Conjoyned Sense : As , Every Incuria or Neglect , is worthy to be blamed ; The Senate is in Curiâ ; that is , in Court : And therefore the Senate is worthy to be blamed . This Fallacy rather has Place in Speech than Writing .

7. Seventhly , When what 's said of the Parts is concluded of the Whole ; or what of the Whole of the Parts ; as Two and Three , are Even and Odd. Five are Two and Three : Five thertfore are even and odd . This is a Fallacy of Composition . Five are One Number ; Two and Three are Five : Therefore Two and Three are One Number . This is of Division .

8. Eightly , When those things are conjoyned which are severally predicated , or divided , which are joyntly : As , This Dog is a Father : This Dog is thine : And therefore this Dog is thy Father . This is a Fallacy of the Composition . Again , Mycillus is a good Shooemaker ; And therefore Mycillus is a good Man . This is of Division . This Fallacy also may be reduc'd to that of , from a Word simply to one secundum quid , or according to something or its Contrary . For nothing hinders , but that several Causes of Fallacy may concur to the same Catch .

Ax. 10. The Sophism of Accident or Prosody , is that which rises from the Way of Writing or Pronouncing any thing : Either differently writing those things which are Pronounced after the same Manner , or differently pronouncing those which are alike written .

Ax. 11. And this Sophism is solv'd either by shewing that those things which are the same Manner pronounc'd are differently written or differently pronounc'd , which are in the same Manner written .

1. § . The Word Prosody or Accent , here is generally taken for every Variation of the Voice . The Captions of this Place are of two kinds , as appears from the Definitions proposed . Of the First , those in which the Difference of Writings , dissembled by a Similitude of Pronunciation . And that 's done three manner of Ways . For either those Words are pronounced after the same manner , which differ in Letters , or Aspiration , or Notes of the Accents . For Example ; Omnis Equus , every Equus , that is , Horse , is a Beast : Every just Man is Aequus , that is , Righteous ; Therefore every just Man is Beast . This Catch is in the Letter . Moreover , Every Ara , that is , Altar , is in the Temple ; A Stable of Hogs is named Hara , that is , Sty ; And therefore a Stable of Hogs is in the Temple . This consists in the Aspiration ; for in the Greek the Words are written otherwise , both alike . Lastly , If one confound the Verb amare , to love , with the Adverb of that Name , which signifies bitterly , the Caption shall be from the Note of the Accent . These Captions were usual after Aspirations and Notes of Accents began to be written over their Words , But before these Captions belonged to the second Genus .

2. Which are committed two manner of Ways : And first , when we take that in earnest which is Ironically written : Or on the Contrary ; As , If a Servant should think himself commended by his angry Master , writing to him after this manner : Ha , Good Sir , You have taken Care very fairly . Or the like . Secondly , when Words which have their Antepenultima or last Syllable but one , long , should be taken as if short ; As , if any one should confound the Word Leporem , a Hare , with the Word Lepôrem , Facetiousness , &c.

Ax. 12. Sophism from the Figure of Speech , is then , when from the Likeness of Words it is concluded , that they have the same Accidents or Signification .

Ax. 13. This is solved by shewing the Diversity of Accidents or Signification in the Words alike .

1. § . As , If any one should collect Poeta , a Poet , to be of the Feminine Gender ; because Nota is so ; or Glycerium Neuter , because Delirium : Or that Urere to burn , Verberare , to beat ; Movere , to move , are Actions ; And therefore Ardere , Vapulare must be so . Or that Ingratitnde signifies a Quality : And therefore so must Longitude , &c.

2. Hitherto belong the Sophisms in which the Words are ill joyned with the Nouns , Pronouns or , Adverbs of Relation ; What an one , How great , Who , What , When , Where , How many , How often , &c. As , What is bought in the Shambles that is set before you for Supper : Raw Meat is bought in the Shambles : And therefore raw Meat is set before you for Supper . Here the Fallacy lies in that , in the Minor . The Quality is taken with the Substance ; Whereas the Word What does only relate to the Substance of the Thing , and not the Quality . See how many many Fingers again , an Infant has ; so many has an Old Man . An Infant has ten little or small Fingers : And therefore an Gld Man has ten little or small Fingers . This Fallacy consists in that in the Minor , the Continued Quantity's taken with the Discrete . Whereas the Word How many is referred only to the Discrete . Here also What I am , you are not : I am a Man : And therefore you are not . Here the Fallacy is in assuming the Species in the Minor ; whereas What in the Major denotes no more than an Individual , &c.

And so we come to the second sort of Sophisms , which we said were in Things .

CHAP. XXVII . Of Sophisms , or Fallacies in Things .

Ax. 1. OF the Sophisms in Things , there are seven Places , viz. Accident , a Word simply spoken and according to something , Ignorance of the Elench , Consequent , Begging of the Question , Not Cause for the Cause , and manifold Interrogation .

Ax. 2. Accident , is then , when we collect that to agree to the Subject which was said of the Predicate .

Ax. 3. And this is solv'd , by shewing that that which is gathered of the Subject , is only said of the Predicate by Accident ; or that the Predicate it self , is Accidentally said of the Subject .

1. § . And thus a Catch of the Accident is laid for us two manner of Ways ; And first when any thing 's said of the Attribute by Accident , as this ; Man is a Species ; Socrates is a Man : And therefore he 's a Species . This Fallacy consists in this , viz. in that to be a Species is said of Man by Accident ; But To be a Man , of Socrates by himself . The other is , when the Attribute it self , is said of the Subject by Accident ; As here ; The Mouse gnaws Cheese ; Mouse is a Syllable : And therefore a Syllable gnaws Cheese . This Fallacy is , because to gnaw Cheese , is said of the Mouse by it self ; to be a Syllable , by Accident , and Cause of its Name . Both Ways the Fallacy arises , out of the Acceptation of the Word chang'd , or Genus of Supposition , as the Schoolmen call it . For Man in the Major is taken in a Simple ; Minor , a Concrete Acceptation ; and Mouse in the Major , is taken Formally , or for the thing signify'd ; and in the Minor , Materially , or for the Word only .

Ax. 4. That from the Thing simply said , is then , when from something that is simply true , we collect another that is true only in some respect , or according to something . On the Contrary , That , in some Respect , is , then , when from that which is partially true , or , according to some respect , we collect that any thing is simply so .

Ax. 5. This is solv'd by shewing the Difference between that which is spoken simply , and that in some Respect .

1. § . A simply said is that , whose Predicate agrees with the Subject in every Respect , Part , Time and Place without any Limitation . That according to something , in some Respect , Part , Time , Place only , &c. Examples of the first kind are these , viz. The Right-Hand is not to be cut off : And therefore not then , when it is invaded by a Gangrene . The Man is Mortal ; And therefore so as to his Soul . The Pledge ought to be restored to its Owner when he requires it ; And therefore a Sword , altho' he be Mad when he requires it , &c. From that according to some Relation these , viz. Man's Soul is Immortal : And therefore the Man . Wine hurts a Man in a Fever : And therefore in general . Mycillus is a good Shoemaker ; And therefore he is good , &c.

Ax. 6. Sophism from the Ignorance of the Elench , is that , when the Conclusion seems to contratradict the Proof of the Respondent , and yet does not contradict it , by reason of some Condition's being Wanting .

Ax. 7. And this is solved by shewing what Condition is omitted .

1. § . We have Cap. 25. affirmed an Elench to be a Syllogism with a Contradiction , and Cap. 22. of the First Book we entreated of the Conditions of Contradiction . But altho' every Sophism offends by Ignorance of the Elench ( for every Sophism seems to be an Elench , and yet is not so ) yet here that especially is so called in which the Conclusion is opposed to another's Assertion , and yet some Condition or other is wanting that belongs to a legitimate Contradiction . For Example ; If one going about to prove , that Christ was not David 's Lord , should conclude that he was his Son , he mistakes by an Ignorance of the Elench ; that is , an Ignorance of the Case and the true Sense wherein the Respondent were to be taken , and Laws of Opposition : For Lord and Son are Opposites , if they are attribted to any One in the same Respect . But these are not attributed to Christ in the same Respect , but in a Diverse . For he was David's Lord as to his Divine , and Son , as to his Humane Nature , &c.

Ax. 8. Sophism of Consequent is then , when One Enunciation is inferr'd from another , from the which it does not follow .

Ax. 9. And this is solv'd by citing of the Rule against which such Inference does offend .

1. § . There are Four Rules which are to be observed in the Inferring of a Consequent from an Antecedent , of which if we break but One , the Consequent will be Null ; and if such an Inference be admitted , there will be then a Caption or Fallacy of the Consequent . And the first of these is , The Universal Affirming must never be simply converted : And therefore if any Man should conclude thus , viz. Because every Flatterer is Complaisant ; Therefore every Complaisant is a Flatterer ; he would be deceiv'd by a Fallacy of the Consequent . And the second Rule is , that from a Universal Affirming a Universal Denying , can't be concluded otherwise than by Contraposition . And therefore if any one should conclude thus , viz. Whatsoever is begotten , has a Beginning : And therefore whatsoever is not , has not ; as the Humane Soul , the World , &c. One should commit a Fallacy of the Consequent : For thus one should have inferr'd , viz. That that which has not a Beginning is not begotten ; and so it is a Conversion by Contraposition . The Third is , The Minor must not be denyed in the first Figure ; Or , which returns to the same Account , viz. From the Remotion of the Antecedent can't be inferr'd that of the Consequent , as we observ'd Chapter the 12th in that Part relating to Hypothetical Syllogism . The Fourth is , That One of the Premisses must be denyed in the Second Figure ; Or , which is the same thing , the Position of the Antecedent ought not to be concluded from that of the Consequent , as we have observ'd again in the same Chapter ; And therefore these sorts of Syllogisms will be Paralogisms , viz. Every Man is an Animal ; A Horse is not a Man : And therefore not an Animal . Or thus , If a Horse be a Man , he is an Animal : But a Horse is not a Man ; And therefore not an Animal , &c. Likewise Every Flatterer is Complaisant ; Such an One is Complaisant : And therefore such an One is a Flatterer . Or thus , If Crispus be a Flatterer , he is Complaisant ; But he is Complaisant ; And therefore a Flatterer , &c. If any one be deceiv'd by these sorts of Argumentations , either from himself or others ; as it often happens ; he is then deceiv'd by a Fallacy of the Consequent .

2. But because the Fault of a false Consequence is easily discernible , in these sorts of Syllogisms , Sophisters usually conceal it , either by suppressing one of the Premisses ; As , Crispus is Complaisant ; And therefore a Flatterer : Walks by Night ; And therefore a Thief . Or else by Circumlocution ; As , he that says you are an Animal , says true : He that says you are an Ass , says you are an Animal : And therefore he that says you are an Ass , says true . For this Argumentation is just as if one should lay down this Position , viz. You are an Animal : An Ass is an Animal : And therefore you are an Ass . Which is an Argumentation contrary to Rule , Of two Affirmatives in the second Figure .

Ax. 11. Which is solv'd by shewing that the Medium is not diverse from the Question , or at least more known than it .

Ax. 10. The Sophism of Begging the Question , is then , when any thing is proved , either by it self or something that is equally unknown with it self .

1. § . This is call'd a Begging of the Principle because it is , a Begging of that which in the Beginning was sought for . These Sort of Catches may be two ways laid : And First , when the same thing is prov'd by it self . Secondly , when one unknown thing is proved by another that is equally unknown with it self . The same thing is said to be prov'd by it self ; when the Subject or Predicate of the Question , the Name being chang'd , is brought in for a Medium , to prove the Question ; As , if any one should prove the Soul of Man to be ex Traduce , English , of the Seed of the Parent , because begotten by the Seed of the Parent . I say , the Subject or Predicate , changing the Name : For , if the Name were not changed , the Argumentation would be mere Child's Play . And yet for all this , every Argumentation in which the Medium is the same with the Subject or Predicate of the Question is not to be rejected as a Sophism , but only that whose Medium is not only in it self and of its own Nature the same with the Question ; but also as to us ; as , in that which we proposed above . But if the Medium be of its own Nature , the same as the Question , but not also as to us ; or our Manner of Concetpion , the Argumentation is not to be rejected : Unless you can suppose all the Arguments which are fetch'd from Essential Places ; As , Genus , Species , Definition , Whole and Part , to make Captious Argumentations , &c.

2. Secondly , The second Way is when the Medium's as much unknown as the Question it self ; As , if one should prove Vision to be made by Emission , because not by Reception . Now this Sophism tends to this ; Partly , that the Sophister may seem to abound with Arguments ; partly , that changing the Forms of the Words , he may conciliate a Shew of Probability to his Declarations .

Ax. 11. Sophism of not Cause for the Cause is then , when that which is not the Cause , or by Accident is obtruded for the true Cause , and that by it self .

Ax. 12. And this Sophism is solv'd by the Designation of the true Cause upon which the Effect by it self depends .

1. § . The Caption of not Cause for the Cause either lies in a Syllogism that leads to Inconvenience or direct . In a Syllogism that leads to Inconvenience ; when the Falsity of the Conclusion brought , is imputed to one of the Premisses , which is not the Cause of it ; As , if one designing to prove the Humane Soul Mortal , should thus argue : Every Immortal is Eternal ; The Soul of Man is Immortal : And therefore the Soul of Man is Eternal . But this Conclusion is false , and the Occasion of it was in the Minor , which was that the Soul of Man was Immortal ; And therefore Mortal . For this Argumentation is a Sophism of the not Cause for the Cause . For he says , that this Proposition , The Soul is Immortal , is the Cause of a false Conclusion ; when it was that , viz. That every Immortal is Eternal . In a Syllogism direct , when that which is attributed to the Cause by Accident , happens not , but to the Causes by themselves ; As , Religion excites Civil Wars . From the Reading of the Sacred Scriptures spring Hresies . Wine is heady and intoxicates , &c. And therefore Religion , Reading of the Sacred Scriptures , and Wine are not to be tolerated in any Common-Wealth , &c.

Ax. 13. The Sophism of many Interrogations , is then , when two or more Questions are so proposed , as that they shew only but as One.

Ax. 14. And these sorts of Sophisms are brought about two manner of Ways : And first , when two Subjects or two Predicates , or perhaps more , are propounded under so many distinct sort of Names ; as , is the World , Eternal and Perfect , &c. This is a Captious Interrogation : For if you answer Affirmatively , the Sophister will set upon you as if you had grantted that the World was Eternal ; and if otherwise , he excepts against you ; as if you deny'd that the World was perfect . And , secondly , you may make a Fallacy of many Interrogations in one Word ; As , Desistine , &c. Have you left off to commit Adultery ? Have you lost your Horns , &c. But enough of this is said in the Place of Homonymy .

And thus much may suffice for Syllogism . The Last of the Four Instruments is that which now demands our Attendance ; And that is Method . Of which we shall entreat in the following Chapter .

CHAP. XXVIII . Of Method .

Ax. 1. THere remains yet Order or Method to be entreated of ; And that is , an apt Disposition of Things belonging to the same Head ; so as that they may be the best and most easily understood , and the most firmly imprinted upon the Memory .

Ax. 2. For which End , we are ever to set those things before , which conduce to the Knowledge of the Following : At least , are better understood than they .

Ax. 3. Now Method is either Natural or Arbitrary .

Ax. 4. Natural , in which the Order of Nature and Distinct Knowledge of Things is observed .

Ax. 5. In which we must observe in the first Place , that all the Parts are to be Homogeneous : that is , not Impertinent , or Foreign to the Subject .

1. § . By which Means , we not only confirm that Rule , that Disciplines ought not to be mixed : So as in Mathematicks we are not to use Ethical Demonstrations : Or in Ethicks , Mathematical , &c. But this also , viz. That every thing ought to be set in its proper Place ; And so those things which are reciprocated with the Genus to the Genus ; and with the Species to the Species , should be attributed : And that all things be Reciprocal as much as may be .

2. § . And indeed this Rule is to be observ'd in the very Precepts which belong to the Essence of Disciplines ; But yet in the Comments where the Precepts of them are explain'd , and confirm'd , the Observation of it is not so Necessary : For it often happens to the Master teaching Physick , that he is forc'd to fetch from Logick , and Ethicks , Physick . Moreover in Divinity and all other Disciplines , how much of Necessity must they fetch from Philosophy for the explaining their Controversies , which yet becomes no Part at all of those Disciplines ? Which , if that Censurer of Aristotle had better consider'd , he would , without all Question , have judg'd more impartially of the Writings and Method of that admirable Philosopher ; in which he distinguishes not the Precepts from the Comments that are made upon them ; which , in in the first Place he ought to have done .

Ax. 6. Now in Natural Method we are always to proceed from Universals to Particulars , and in that Progress all the Parts are to be connected together by apt Bonds of Transition .

1. § . Which Progress is to be instituted by Division whose Parts are to be joyn'd together by apt Bonds of Transition , which forms how much they help the Memory of the Reader , is almost incredible .

Ax. 7. Method of Nature , in the next Place , is either Total or Partial .

Ax. 8. Total , That in which some whole Science is disposed .

Ax. 9. And this is either Synthetic or Analytic .

Ax. 10. Synthetic is that which proceeds from the most simple Principles , to those things which are compounded of those Principles .

Ax. 11. And so the Speculative Disciplines are to be handled .

Ax. 12. Analytie , That , which beginning from the End proceeds to the next Means ; and so from these to the more Remote , till at last it arrive to the First and mosi Simple .

Ax. 13. And thus are Arts and Disciplines Practical to be entreated of .

1. § . The Disciplines Speculative have no end which is diverse from themselves ; but the very Knowledge of the Things proposed is their End : For in that the Mind acquiesces ; But Arts and Disciplines Practical rest not there , viz. in the Knowledge of the Thingt proposed , but have some farther End , viz. Work , Practice , or Operation that is agreeable to that Knowledge . Whence is it , that the Sciences Theoretical , such as Physicks , Metaphysicks , Mathematicks , &c. are disposed in Synthetick Method , proceeding from the first Principles to those which are formed or made of them ; and that first in the Genus and then in the Species , till at last it is come to the lowest Species of all . But in Arts , such as Grammar , Rhetorick , Logick Medicine , Architecture ; and in practical Disciplines ; such as Ethicks , Politicks , Oeconomicks , &c. We contrariwise proceed from the End to the Means : For that which is first in the doing of things , is always last in the Design or Intention of them : And so on the Contrary . Wherefore since the said Disciplines proceed from the Means to the End in Acting , ( for the Architect first lays his Foundation , then prepares his Timber , Rafters , Beams , &c and of these makes the House , ) Itt follows in the Design that the End has the first Place ; and of the Means , those the next which are last brought to pass . For these Disciplines keep not the Order of Action but Design : For the Design is nothing else but the very Practical Knowledge of Things which are propos'd . And certainly the End in Practical Disciplines has it self no otherwise , i. e. is no otherwise to the Means than are the Hypotheses , or Principles in the Mathematicks to the Conclusions which are gathered from them : As Aristotle says Book 7. Eth. C. 8.

2. In both these we are to observe the Order of Nature : In the Synthetic , that of Nature Generating or Effecting Analytick , that of Intending or Designing . Piccolominy therefore must be under a Mistake , Cap. 21 , Introd. and Part 7. Com. Pot. Where , altho' he confesses that Synthetic Method is fittest for Speculative , and the other for Arts and Practical Disciplines , yet he will needs have it , That all Disciplines will admit both of One and the Other , and Accordingly in his 10 Degrees of Moral Philosophy he has Observed the Synthetic ; but not the most to his Purpose , as Zabarella solidly proves Book 2. of his Apol. Cap. 4. & seq.

3. Galen sets down three sorts of Method ; and explaining two of them , adds a Third , viz. Definition . But it is not necessary ; nay indeed , it cannot be , that any other should be Observed in Science , but the Synthetic and Analytick . For Definition is not so much Method , as an Instrument or Part of it . For all Method takes its Beginning from the Definition of some Whole ; and Dividing goes on to the Parts and Species's of it , which are contained under that Whole . More against Galen concerning this Definitive Method you may see in Zabarella , Book 2. Meth. Cap. 4.

Ax. 14. A Partial Method is then , when some Part of a Discipline is disposed ; or particular Theme severally handled .

1. § . For there 's a two-fold Use or Consideration of Method Partial : For either it may be consider'd as it is , a Part of the Total Method , or as it is a Method of some Theme separately and apart by it self to be handled . As it is a Part of the Whole ; This One thing is to be precepted ( more than what we have already said in the general ) to wit , that it often happens in a Part of a Discipline whose Whole is in Method Synthetical , that the Analytick Order may be kept : And so on 〈◊〉 other Hand , in the Parts of Analytick , that 〈◊〉 Synthetick . As for Instance : Physick is Composed in Synthetick Order , if the Whole be consid●●●d ; And yet in that Part where we entreat of Animate Bodies , a resolutive may well enough be kept , viz. Beginning from the Operations which are the End of the Animated Body : And so going on to the Causes and Principles , which are the Faculties of the Mind , and Temperament and Organical Parts of that Body , &c. In like Manner the Arts of Medicine , Grammar , Logick , if look'd upon in the Whole , are laid down in an Analytick Method ; But in the Parts of them the Synthetick is observed . Physiology , which is a Part of Medicine , is delivered in a Synthetick Order ; and in Grammar we first entreat of Letters , Sylables , then Words , and Lastly , Speech and its Construction .

And so in Logick . First , we treat of Themes Simple , and then Complex ; which , certainly , is 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , that is , to Compose , or Proceed in Composed Order . In so much , yet , as these Arts are begun from the Notion of the End , and so go on to the Means they are said in the Whole , to be disposed in an Analytical Order : As Zabarella has well observed Lib. 2. de Math. Cap. 20. &c. The rest may be sought for out of the Institutions .

Note , the Chapters of Sophisms and Method were principally turn'd by another Hand .

Finis Libri Secundi .