TuLLY
'S
OFFICES
.
The
First
Book
.
CHAP.
I.
Cicero
exhorts
his
Son
,
a
young
Student
at
Athens
,
not
to
forget
his
Latin
,
tho'
he
was
in
a
Greek
University
:
but
to
mix
the
Studies
of
both
those
Languages
,
and
also
learn
to
Write
both
as
a
Philosopher
and
an
Orator
.
To
this
purpose
he
advises
him
to
read
his
Works
,
as
having
equally
written
in
each
of
those
kinds
,
which
none
of
the
Grecians
had
ever
done
.
But
he
modestly
adds
,
That
he
thinks
they
could
have
done
it
,
but
that
they
apply'd
themselves
wholly
to
one
of
them
.
Dear
Son
MARCUS
,
THo'
after
a
Year's
Study
under
[
a
](A33176-e11670-b)
a
The
most
noted
Peripatetick
Philosopher
of
that
Age
,
a
familiar
Acquaintance
of
Cicero's
,
and
by
him
often
equall'd
to
the
greatest
of
the
Ancients
.
He
was
of
Mytilene
the
chief
City
in
the
Island
Lesbos
,
and
there
taught
for
some
time
.
Afterwards
heremov'd
to
Athens
,
where
Cicero
among
others
entrusted
his
Son
with
him
.
See
Famil
.
Epist.
Lib.
16.
Epist.
21.
Cratippus
,
and
that
at
such
a
Place
as
[
b
](A33176-e11760-b)
b
The
famousest
City
in
the
World
for
Politeness
and
good
Literature
;
whither
all
the
great
Men
of
Antiquity
resorted
for
Learning
;
where
Plato
,
Aristotle
,
Demosthenes
,
Sophocles
,
and
innumerable
others
the
greatest
Wits
of
the
World
in
old
time
flourish'd
:
therefore
by
our
Author
in
his
first
Book
de
Orat.
ch.
4.
call'd
,
The
Inventress
of
all
Arts.
His
Son
then
being
at
such
a
place
,
and
under
such
a
Master
,
he
expects
he
should
have
made
a
suitable
Improvement
.
Athens
,
you
can't
but
have
abundantly
furnish'd
your self
with
Knowledge
in
the
Doctrins
and
Rules
of
Philosophy
;
having
had
the
Advantage
of
so
eminent
a
Master
to
supply
you
with
Learning
,
and
a
City
that
affords
you
such
excellent
[
c
](A33176-e11810-b)
c
Not
of
Persons
then
living
only
,
but
of
those
also
that
were
dead
and
gone
:
nothing
so
bringing
to
our
remembrance
the
Virtues
and
Learning
of
great
Men
,
as
being
in
the
Places
where
they
once-flourish'd
:
which
is
one
great
Advantage
of
a
Publick
Education
.
Examples
:
Yet
I
should
think
it
convenient
for
you
(
which
is
a
Method
I
took
for
my
own
profit
)
always
to
mingle
some
Latin
with
your
Greek
,
in
the
Study
of
Eloquence
as
well
as
Philosophy
;
that
you
may
be
equally
perfect
in
both
[
d
](A33176-e11820-b)
d
Utriusque
orationis
,
may
mean
either
the
two
Languages
of
Latin
and
Greek
,
or
the
two
kinds
of
Stile
that
are
proper
,
one
for
the
Bar
,
and
the
other
for
Philosophical
Discourses
.
I
have
taken
both
Sences
into
the
Translation
.
those
ways
of
Writing
,
and
make
your self
Master
of
either
Language
.
For
the
furtherance
of
which
,
I
am
apt
to
imagin
,
I
have
done
no
inconsiderable
Service
to
our
Country-men
;
so
that
not
only
those
who
don't
understand
Greek
,
but
even
the
Learned
themselves
will
confess
,
that
,
by
reading
my
Works
,
they
have
mended
their
Stiles
,
and
somewhat
improv'd
their
Reason
and
Judgments
.
Wherefore
I
am
willing
,
't
is
true
,
you
should
learn
of
your
present
Master
,
the
greatest
Philosopher
of
this
Age
,
and
learn
of
him
too
as
long
as
you
desire
it
;
and
so
long
I
think
't
is
your
Duty
to
desire
it
,
as
you
find
your self
sufficiently
benefited
by
it
:
But
withal
,
I
would
have
you
to
read
my
Writings
,
which
very
little
differ
from
those
of
the
Peripateticks
;
for
[
e
](A33176-e11880-b)
e
So
I
understand
the
word
Utrique
to
mean
both
the
Academicks
of
whom
Cicero
,
and
the
Peripateticks
of
whom
Cratippus
was
.
These
two
Sects
at
first
were
almost
one
and
the
same
,
as
appears
from
several
places
of
Cicero
;
[
See
Book
3.
ch.
4.
]
Xenocrates
,
the
chief
Author
of
the
former
,
and
Aristotle
of
the
latter
,
being
each
of
them
Scholars
to
the
incomparable
Plato
,
who
was
Hearer
of
the
wise
Socrates
.
The
Academicks
therefore
and
Peripateticks
were
both
of
them
Followers
not
of
Socrates
only
,
(
for
that
almost
all
the
Philosophers
were
)
[
See
Cic.
de
Orat.
3.
16
,
17.
]
but
of
Plato
too
,
and
so
were
very
nearly
ally'd
to
each
other
.
both
we
and
they
profess
our selves
Followers
,
not
of
Socrates
only
,
but
of
Plato
likewise
.
As
for
the
Matters
contain'd
in
them
,
use
your
own
Judgment
with
Freedom
and
Impartiality
,
for
I
lay
no
manner
of
Restraint
upon
you
:
your
Improvement
in
the
Latin
is
what
I
chiefly
desire
,
which
I
am
confident
must
follow
from
a
careful
Perusal
of
'em
.
Nor
let
any
one
think
that
I
am
Vain
or
Pretending
when
I
speak
thus
:
For
,
allowing
some
others
the
precedence
in
Philosophy
,
should
I
assume
to
my self
what
's
the
Part
of
an
Orator
,
viz.
to
speak
[
f
](A33176-e12040-b)
f
Apte
,
distincte
,
&c.
The
word
Apte
properly
denotes
the
Conformity
of
our
Stile
to
the
Subject
we
are
handling
,
and
is
call'd
by
our
Author
in
other
places
Apte
ad
rerum
dignitatem
dicere
;
and
he
tells
us
,
that
those
Men
may
be
said
to
speak
apte
,
Qui
it
a
moder
antur
Orationem
,
ut
rerum
&
personarum
dignitates
ferunt
,
which
I
think
answers
to
our
English
word
suitably
.
Distincte
refers
to
the
Method
of
a
Discourse
,
and
is
oppos'd
to
Confusedness
:
Ornate
to
the
Figures
and
Ornaments
of
Rhetorick
.
So
that
the
three
words
seem
indifferently
well
to
comprehend
the
whole
Business
of
an
Orator
;
which
is
,
Invenire
praeclare
,
inventa
disponere
,
disposita
exornare
;
To
invent
what
is
suitable
and
proper
for
the
Subject
,
to
put
it
into
a
good
Method
,
and
to
give
it
the
Ornaments
of
Eloquence
,
&c.
suitably
,
methodically
and
handsomely
upon
any
Subject
,
seeing
I
have
spent
my
whole
Life
in
that
Study
,
I
think
't
is
no
more
than
what
I
might
reasonably
and
fairly
lay
claim
to
.
I
can't
but
very
earnestly
desire
you
therefore
,
my
dear
Cicero
,
to
read
my
Books
with
care
and
diligence
;
not
my
Orations
only
,
but
these
Pieces
also
that
concern
Philosophy
,
which
are
now
of
a
bulk
almost
equal
to
them
:
For
tho'
in
the
former
there
is
more
of
the
force
and
power
of
Eloquence
,
yet
is
the
smooth
and
even
Stile
of
the
latter
by
no
means
to
be
neglected
.
And
of
all
the
Grecians
I
find
not
one
,
that
has
employ'd
his
Pen
in
both
these
kinds
;
and
been
at
once
successful
in
the
Language
of
the
Bar
,
and
this
other
more
gentle
and
easie
Stile
of
Philosophical
Discourses
:
Unless
[
g
](A33176-e12180-b)
g
A
Peripatetick
born
at
Phalerum
,
a
small
Town
on
the
Sea-coast
of
Attica
,
from
whence
he
had
his
Name
.
He
was
ten
Years
Governour
of
Athens
,
in
which
time
he
was
honour'd
with
300
Statues
.
Being
afterwards
driven
our
by
Demetrius
Poliorcetes
,
Son
of
Antigonus
,
Alexander
the
Great
's
Captain
,
he
fled
to
Ptolomy
King
of
Aegypt
,
by
whom
he
was
set
over
the
famous
Alexandrian
Library
,
which
contain'd
in
it
(
as
some
write
)
700000
Volumes
.
He
perswaded
that
Prince
to
get
the
Old
Testament
translated
into
Greek
,
which
is
what
we
now
call
the
Translation
of
the
Seventy
.
Most
of
his
Works
are
lost
.
Demetrius
Phalereus
may
be
reckon'd
for
one
,
who
is
subtle
enough
in
his
Disputes
of
Philosophy
,
but
methinks
in
his
Oratory
,
wants
that
Spirit
and
Vehemence
that
is
requisite
;
however
,
has
so
much
of
Sweetness
in
him
,
that
one
might
know
he
had
been
[
h
](A33176-e12290-b)
h
A
noble
Philosopher
of
the
Peripatetick
Sect
,
Scholar
first
of
Plato
,
and
afterwards
of
Aristotle
,
whom
he
succeeded
in
his
School
.
He
was
Son
of
one
Melantes
,
a
Fuller
,
and
born
at
an
obscure
Place
of
the
Isle
Lesbos
,
nam'd
Eresus
,
whence
he
himself
is
call'd
Eresius
.
His
first
Name
was
Tyrtamus
,
that
of
Theophrastus
being
afterwards
given
him
by
Aristotle
for
his
Divine
Eloquence
.
He
was
mightily
admir'd
by
Cicero
,
who
us'd
to
call
him
his
Delight
,
and
is
often
commending
him
for
the
Sweetness
of
his
Stile
.
Several
of
his
Works
are
still
remaining
,
one
of
the
chief
of
which
is
his
Characters
.
Theophrastus's
Scholar
.
Whether
I
have
had
any
better
Success
in
both
these
ways
,
must
be
left
to
the
Judgment
of
others
to
determin
:
I
can
only
say
that
I
have
attempted
'em
both
.
And
't
is
my
Opinion
,
That
if
ever
[
i
](A33176-e12430-b)
i
An
incomparable
Philosopher
,
born
at
Athens
,
who
travell'd
over
great
part
of
the
World
for
Knowledge
;
He
is
often
mention'd
,
and
in
several
places
translated
by
Cicero
,
who
follows
him
very
much
in
his
Philosophical
Writings
.
His
Works
still
remain
,
which
are
so
excellent
,
as
to
have
justly
got
him
the
Name
of
the
Divine
Plato
.
Plato
had
undertaken
to
plead
,
he
'd
have
been
a
most
copious
and
powerful
Orator
;
and
if
[
k
](A33176-e12480-b)
k
The
most
famous
Greek
Orator
that
ever
was
,
Son
of
a
Blacksmith
in
Athens
,
and
Scholar
to
Plato
.
His
Works
are
still
extant
.
See
his
Life
in
Plutarch
.
Demosthenes
had
studied
and
discours'd
of
those
things
,
which
he
learnt
of
Plato
,
he
'd
have
done
it
with
a
great
deal
of
Ornament
and
Majesty
.
The
same
I
think
true
of
[
l
](A33176-e12550-b)
l
Isocrates
was
a
notable
Teacher
of
Rhetorick
,
and
Aristotle
a
most
eminent
Philosopher
in
the
famous
City
of
Athens
:
both
of
them
very
well
known
by
their
Works
,
which
are
still
,
the
greatest
part
of
them
,
remaining
.
Isocrates
and
Aristotle
;
each
of
which
,
pleas'd
with
his
own
way
of
Writing
,
[
m
](A33176-e12610-b)
m
That
is
,
Isocrates
never
try'd
how
he
could
succeed
in
Philosophical
Discourses
,
nor
Aristotle
in
Orations
.
neglected
to
cultivate
and
improve
the
other
.
CHAP.
II.
The
Reasons
why
he
Writes
upon
this
Subject
.
The
general
Use
and
Importance
of
it
.
All
Philosophers
have
handled
it
;
tho'
some
,
by
their
false
Notions
of
Happiness
and
Misery
,
utterly
pervert
it
.
What
Sects
they
are
,
that
have
a
Right
to
lay
down
any
Rules
or
Precepts
concerning
it
.
He
designs
in
this
Work
to
follow
the
Stoicks
principally
.
The
Subject
of
a
Discourse
ought
first
to
be
defin'd
,
before
we
begin
to
say
any
thing
upon
it
.
BUt
having
resolv'd
to
write
some
thing
at
present
,
and
a
great
many
others
hereafter
to
you
,
I
thought
I
could
begin
upon
no
better
Argument
,
than
that
which
is
fittest
for
your
Age
,
and
most
becoming
my
Authority
as
a
Father
:
For
,
of
all
those
useful
and
important
Subjects
,
which
Philosophers
have
handled
so
largely
and
accurately
,
the
Precepts
they
have
deliver'd
about
[
a
](A33176-e12690-b)
a
Officium
in
our
Author
,
which
I
beg
leave
to
render
either
Office
or
Duty
,
signifies
especially
two
things
;
Sometimes
the
Duty
or
Obligation
it self
,
as
when
he
says
,
Peregrini
Officium
est
,
'T
is
the
Duty
of
a
Stranger
,
i.
e.
He
is
oblig'd
to
do
so
,
or
so
,
&c.
At
other
times
,
the
Action
whereby
that
Duty
is
perform'd
,
as
when
he
divides
Officia
,
Virtues
,
into
media
and
perfecta
,
ordinary
and
compleat
ones
:
so
Officia
Justitiae
,
liberalitatis
,
&c.
are
the
Actions
of
those
Virtues
;
which
may
be
worth
observing
thro'
the
whole
Work
.
Offices
or
Duties
,
seem
of
the
largest
extent
and
comprehension
:
For
they
take
in
every
part
of
our
Lives
,
so
that
whatever
we
go
about
,
whether
of
publick
or
private
Affairs
,
whether
at
home
or
abroad
,
whether
consider'd
barely
by
our selves
,
or
as
we
stand
in
relation
to
other
People
,
we
lye
constantly
under
an
Obligation
to
some
Duties
;
and
,
as
all
the
Virtue
and
Credit
of
our
Lives
proceeds
from
the
due
Discharge
of
This
,
so
all
the
Baseness
and
Turpitude
of
'em
results
from
the
Non-observance
of
It.
Now
,
tho'
this
be
a
Subject
which
all
Philosophers
have
busied
themselves
about
,
(
for
,
who
ever
dar'd
to
assume
that
Name
without
laying
down
some
Instructions
about
Duty
?
)
yet
have
some
[
b
](A33176-e12850-b)
b
He
means
chiefly
the
Epicureans
,
who
made
Man's
Happiness
to
consist
in
Pleasure
,
and
his
Misery
in
Pain
,
which
is
indeed
to
subvert
the
very
Foundations
of
Honesty
.
For
seeing
there
is
nothing
that
Men
will
not
do
,
for
the
obtaining
their
chief
Good
,
and
avoiding
the
greatest
Evil
;
it
necessarily
follows
,
that
(
as
long
as
they
act
consistently
with
their
Principles
)
these
Men
will
betray
their
Friends
,
break
their
Oaths
,
or
do
any
thing
in
the
World
,
rather
than
forego
any
Pleasure
,
or
endure
any
Pain
.
Therefore
he
has
reason
to
say
,
They
can
never
do
the
Duties
of
Friendship
,
&c.
For
certainly
,
if
I
count
Pleasure
my
greatest
Good
,
I
shall
rather
part
with
my
Honesty
than
that
;
and
if
I
reckon
Pain
the
greatest
of
Evils
,
I
'll
rather
lose
a
Friend
,
be
Unmerciful
,
or
Unjust
,
than
ever
undergo
it
.
The
same
may
be
said
of
those
that
place
their
Happiness
in
Riches
,
Honours
,
&c.
and
their
Misery
in
the
contrary
.
See
Tusc.
Quest.
2.
6.
Sects
of
'em
given
such
accounts
of
Man's
Happiness
and
Misery
,
as
destroy
the
very
Being
of
Virtue
and
Honesty
.
For
he
that
makes
any
thing
his
chiefest
Good
,
wherein
Justice
or
Virtue
does
not
bear
a
part
,
and
sets
up
Profit
,
not
Honesty
for
the
Measure
of
his
Happiness
;
as
long
as
he
acts
in
conformity
with
his
own
Principles
,
and
is
not
over-rul'd
by
meer
Dictates
of
Reason
and
Humanity
,
can
never
do
the
Offices
of
Friendship
,
Justice
or
Liberality
.
Nor
can
he
be
ever
a
Man
of
Courage
,
who
thinks
that
Pain
is
the
greatest
Evil
;
or
he
of
Temperance
,
who
imagins
Pleasure
to
be
the
Sovereign
Good
.
Which
things
are
all
so
obvious
and
plain
,
that
one
would
think
they
could
never
stand
in
need
of
a
Dispute
:
however
,
I
have
largely
discours'd
upon
them
in
[
c
](A33176-e12900-b)
c
His
Books
De
finibus
Bonorum
&
Malorum
.
another
Work
.
These
Sects
therefore
,
unless
they
are
resolv'd
to
be
inconsistent
with
themselves
,
ought
wholly
to
abstain
from
speaking
any
thing
about
Duties
:
Nor
indeed
can
any
constant
,
unalterable
,
[
d
](A33176-e12920-b)
d
'T
is
a
Stoical
Principle
,
That
the
Happiness
of
Man
consists
in
acting
agreeably
to
his
Nature
;
by
Nature
,
understanding
nothing
else
but
Right
Reason
,
whereby
Man
is
distinguish'd
from
all
other
Creatures
.
By
conjuncta
naturae
,
therefore
in
this
place
,
I
suppose
he
means
,
such
as
are
agreeable
to
the
Dictates
and
Rules
of
Right
Reason
,
i.
e.
Rational
.
rational
Rules
of
them
at
all
be
given
,
unless
it
be
by
those
who
go
upon
this
Principle
,
[
e
](A33176-e12980-b)
e
For
if
any
thing
else
may
be
desir'd
more
than
Virtue
,
I
may
part
with
my
Virtue
for
obtaining
of
it
;
and
by
consequence
can't
observe
any
settled
,
unalterable
Rules
of
Duty
.
That
't
is
Virtue
alone
,
or
at
least
That
chiefly
,
which
ought
to
be
desir'd
for
its
own
sake
.
So
that
only
the
[
f
](A33176-e13010-b)
f
Who
held
that
nothing
was
good
or
desirable
for
its
own
sake
,
but
Virtue
or
Honesty
.
Stoicks
,
[
g
](A33176-e13030-b)
g
Who
deny'd
there
was
any
such
thing
as
Certainty
,
and
were
not
tied
to
any
particular
Opinions
,
but
always
follow'd
what
appear'd
most
probable
;
tho'
generally
inclining
to
the
Peripateticks
.
See
Book
2.
ch.
2.
Book
3.
ch.
4.
Academicks
and
[
h
](A33176-e13080-b)
h
Who
held
that
Virtue
was
the
chief
,
and
abundantly
most
desirable
Good
,
[
See
Book
3.
ch.
3.
]
but
yet
allow'd
the
Name
of
Good
to
some
other
things
,
viz.
Riches
,
Friends
,
Health
,
&c.
which
the
Stoicks
did
not
.
Peripateticks
,
have
a
Right
to
lay
down
any
Rules
upon
this
Subject
:
For
as
to
the
Opinion
of
[
i
](A33176-e13150-b)
i
These
three
Philosophers
were
of
different
Opinions
about
Man's
Happiness
;
Aristo
and
Pyrrho
making
it
consist
in
Virtue
alone
,
with
a
perfect
indifference
as
to
every
thing
else
,
such
as
Health
,
Riches
,
Honours
,
&c.
[
See
Cicer.
de
Fin.
Book
4.
ch.
16.
Acad.
Quest.
Book
4.
ch.
42.
]
Herillus
made
it
to
consist
in
Knowledge
,
with
a
like
indifference
.
Tho'
they
did
disagree
therefore
in
their
Notions
of
Happiness
,
yet
they
were
all
agreed
in
what
Cicero
here
taxes
them
with
,
viz.
taking
away
all
delectus
rerum
,
difference
,
or
power
of
Chusing
,
between
things
:
by
which
means
they
left
no
aditus
(
as
he
speaks
)
ad
inventionem
Officii
,
no
way
of
finding
out
what
is
our
Duty
.
For
how
can
that
Prudence
which
is
seen
in
wisely
chusing
one
thing
before
another
,
have
any
place
,
if
all
things
are
equally
in
themselves
indifferent
?
And
if
there
be
no
difference
between
Sickness
and
Health
,
Riches
and
Poverty
,
and
't
is
as
good
for
a
Man
to
be
in
one
,
as
the
other
of
these
,
this
takes
away
all
obligation
of
assisting
those
,
who
are
in
Sickness
or
Want
;
seeing
,
according
to
this
Opinion
,
they
are
not
any
wise
in
a
worse
condition
,
than
the
Healthy
or
Rich:
and
by
consequence
all
Justice
,
Charity
,
Bounty
,
&c.
must
fall
to
the
Ground
.
This
is
what
Cicero
often
objects
to
them
,
That
they
did
Virtutem
ipsam
,
quam
amplexabantur
,
tollere
;
take
away
and
ruin
,
by
just
consequence
,
that
Virtue
,
in
which
their
Opinion
made
Happiness
to
consist
.
See
Cic.
de
Fin.
Book
2.
ch.
13.
and
several
other
places
.
Aristo
,
Pyrrho
and
Herillus
,
that
has
been
exploded
a
good
while
ago
;
who
might
have
claim'd
a
Priviledge
to
treat
about
Duties
,
as
well
as
the
former
three
,
had
they
but
left
a
possibility
of
Chusing
,
and
allow'd
at
least
so
much
Difference
between
things
,
as
to
put
us
into
a
capacity
of
finding
out
our
Duty
,
and
distinguishing
it
from
that
,
which
is
not
so
.
I
shall
[
k
](A33176-e13430-b)
k
For
being
an
Academick
,
he
was
not
tied
to
any
Set
of
Opinions
,
but
allow'd
to
chuse
that
,
which
he
thought
most
probable
;
whether
Stoick
,
Peripatetick
,
or
any
other
.
follow
therefore
at
this
time
,
and
on
this
Subject
more
especially
the
Stoicks
;
not
as
a
bare
Translator
of
them
,
but
(
according
to
my
usual
Custom
)
shall
take
out
of
their
Stores
so
much
,
and
after
such
a
manner
,
as
in
my
own
Judgment
I
shall
think
most
convenient
.
Seeing
then
the
whole
of
our
following
Discourse
is
design'd
to
be
about
Offices
or
Duties
,
I
think
't
will
be
necessary
for
me
in
the
first
place
,
to
[
l
](A33176-e13460-b)
l
The
word
definire
does
not
necessarily
signifie
to
define
,
in
the
strict
acceptation
of
that
word
;
but
in
a
larger
sence
,
to
set
bounds
to
the
meaning
and
signification
of
any
word
.
determin
and
fix
the
Signification
of
the
word
Office
,
which
I
can't
but
admire
to
find
omitted
by
[
m
](A33176-e13490-b)
m
An
eminent
Stoick
,
Scholar
of
Antipater
Tarsensis
or
Sidonius
.
He
writ
three
Books
concerning
Offices
,
which
Cicero
follows
in
this
Work
.
He
was
a
Rhodian
by
birth
,
and
greatly
admir'd
for
his
Learning
and
Wisdom
by
the
second
Africanus
,
and
the
wise
Laelius
,
&c.
Gicero
often
makes
honourable
mention
of
him
,
calling
him
.
One
of
the
greatest
of
all
the
Stoicks
,
and
worthy
of
that
Familiarity
with
those
two
great
Men.
Panaetius
:
for
every
clear
and
rational
Discourse
upon
any
Subject
,
ought
first
to
begin
with
an
Explication
of
that
Subject
,
that
so
we
may
have
a
distinct
Conception
of
what
we
are
afterwards
to
discourse
about
.
CHAP.
III.
The
whole
Subject
of
Duties
consists
of
two
Parts
.
Ordinary
and
perfect
Duties
,
and
what
they
are
.
Panaetius
made
but
three
general
Heads
of
Deliberation
,
to
which
Cicero
adds
two
more
.
The
general
Method
he
designs
to
take
in
the
whole
Work
.
[
a
](A33176-e13680-b)
a
The
whole
of
Morality
consists
of
two
Parts
;
in
one
of
which
,
't
is
enquir'd
,
What
the
Happiness
or
chief
Good
of
Man
is
:
in
the
second
are
laid
down
some
Rules
of
Action
,
by
living
up
to
which
he
is
to
obtain
that
Happiness
.
Of
the
former
he
has
discours'd
in
his
Books
de
Finibus
:
the
latter
makes
the
Subject
of
his
present
Enquiry
.
THe
whole
subject
of
Duties
then
,
in
its
greatest
Latitude
,
comprehends
under
it
these
two
Parts
:
The
first
is
taken
up
in
explaining
what
is
Good
,
and
what
our
greatest
Good
.
The
second
in
certain
Directions
and
Precepts
,
according
to
which
,
upon
all
occasions
,
't
is
our
Duty
to
govern
our
Lives
and
Actions
.
To
the
first
Part
belong
such
Questions
as
these
,
Wnether
all
Duties
are
perfect
,
or
not
?
And
,
Whether
one
can
be
greater
or
less
than
another
?
With
several
others
to
the
same
purpose
.
Not
but
that
[
b
](A33176-e13750-b)
b
Such
are
the
Actions
of
Justice
,
Temperance
,
&c.
the
performance
of
which
tends
directly
to
Man's
Happiness
,
tho'
they
immediately
relate
to
the
Conduct
of
his
Life
.
the
Duties
of
this
second
Part
,
the
Rules
and
Precepts
of
which
are
laid
down
,
have
some
tendency
and
relation
to
our
chiefest
Good
;
but
only
it
does
not
so
plainly
appear
,
because
they
seem
to
concern
more
immediately
the
Government
of
our
Lives
,
and
Regulation
of
our
Manners
:
and
these
are
they
I
design
to
explain
in
the
following
Treatise
.
There
is
also
another
[
c
](A33176-e13770-b)
c
Philosophers
usually
reckon
three
Degrees
or
States
of
Virtue
;
The
first
utterly
imperfect
,
before
a
Man
has
gotten
an
Habit
of
it
;
which
is
rather
an
Entrance
into
,
than
a
State
of
,
Virtue
,
therefore
not
mentioned
here
by
our
Author
.
The
second
more
perfect
,
when
a
Man
hath
got
a
Habit
of
it
,
but
yet
may
sometimes
fall
into
Vice
;
such
was
the
Virtue
of
Cato
,
Laelius
,
and
other
wise
Men.
The
third
absolutely
perfect
and
compleat
,
by
Aristotle
call'd
Heroick
,
and
by
the
Stoicks
,
The
State
of
Wisdom
:
When
a
Man
has
perfectly
got
the
mastery
of
his
Passions
,
and
with
all
the
Powers
and
Faculties
of
his
Soul
,
from
a
perfect
Habit
of
the
truest
Wisdom
and
Prudence
,
doth
nothing
but
what
is
wholly
agreeable
to
right
Reason
.
An
Office
or
Virtue
of
this
third
kind
the
Stoicks
called
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
;
and
the
Man
that
does
it
a
wise
Man
,
such
a
one
as
(
by
their
own
confession
)
never
was
in
the
World
,
but
only
in
Idea
.
A
Virtue
of
the
second
is
called
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
which
I
have
English'd
Ordinary
,
which
does
not
require
a
perfect
imaginary
Wisdom
,
but
is
such
as
ordinary
Men
are
capable
of
in
the
Affairs
of
Life
.
See
Book
3.
ch.
3
,
4.
Distribution
of
Duties
,
some
of
'em
being
call'd
Middle
or
Ordinary
,
and
others
Perfect
or
Compleat
.
To
the
latter
,
I
think
,
we
may
give
the
name
of
Right
or
Strait
,
which
sort
by
the
Greeks
is
call'd
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
;
as
the
former
ordinary
one
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
.
By
that
which
we
have
call'd
Right
or
Strait
,
as
they
explain
it
,
is
meant
a
Virtue
,
That
is
wholly
Compleat
in
all
its
Parts
,
without
any
manner
of
Flaw
or
Imperfection
;
and
by
that
,
which
we
have
call'd
Ordinary
,
such
a
one
,
as
,
A
fair
and
reasonable
Account
may
be
given
for
the
doing
of
it
.
[
d
](A33176-e14070-b)
d
I
have
enlarg'd
a
little
upon
our
Author
here
,
to
make
his
Sence
more
plain
.
Now
these
fair
and
reasonable
Accounts
are
all
to
be
drawn
from
several
Heads
,
which
are
by
Panaetius
reduc'd
to
three
,
and
may
be
call'd
general
Heads
of
Deliberating
or
Doubting
concerning
any
Action
,
whether
it
should
,
or
should
not
be
done
.
The
first
is
when
't
is
consulted
or
doubted
,
Whether
the
Action
,
that
's
under
Consideration
,
be
Honest
or
Dishonest
;
in
which
Enquiry
Men
are
often
divided
between
several
Opinions
.
The
second
is
,
when
't
is
enquired
and
consulted
,
Whether
the
Action
,
that
's
under
Deliberation
,
will
supply
us
with
the
Pleasures
and
Conveniencies
of
Life
,
furnish
us
with
Plenty
of
outward
things
,
such
as
Riches
,
Honors
,
Power
,
&c.
which
may
put
us
into
a
capacity
of
doing
good
to
our selves
,
and
to
all
those
for
whom
we
are
more
nearly
concern'd
;
all
which
Enquiry
comes
under
the
general
Head
of
[
e
](A33176-e14110-b)
e
He
comprehends
then
under
the
Notion
of
Profit
,
not
only
Riches
and
Honors
,
but
all
the
other
Conveniencies
and
Pleasures
of
Life
;
such
as
Health
,
Strength
,
bodily
Pleasures
,
&c.
And
an
Action
that
will
supply
us
with
any
of
these
,
is
what
he
calls
by
the
name
of
a
profitable
one
.
Profit
.
The
third
Ground
or
Reason
of
Doubting
is
,
When
that
thing
,
which
[
f
](A33176-e14150-b)
f
He
says
seems
to
be
,
because
however
it
may
supply
us
with
the
Conveniencies
of
Life
,
yet
't
is
not
really
,
but
only
seems
to
be
profitable
,
if
it
thwart
Honesty
.
For
Honesty
being
the
greatest
,
if
not
only
Good
,
as
he
before
laid
down
,
whatever
takes
away
our
Honesty
,
must
needs
be
unprofitable
for
us
,
tho'
it
should
supply
us
with
all
the
Pleasures
and
Glories
of
the
World
,
as
he
shews
at
large
in
the
third
Book
.
seems
to
be
profitable
for
us
,
comes
into
competition
with
that
which
is
Honest
:
For
then
our
Interest
drawing
us
one
way
,
and
Honesty
pulling
us
back
another
,
the
wavering
Mind
is
,
as
't
were
,
toru
in
sunder
between
the
two
,
and
is
rack'd
with
doubting
and
anxious
Thoughts
.
There
's
no
greater
fault
in
any
Division
,
than
not
to
take
in
all
the
several
parts
of
the
Matter
to
be
divided
;
and
yet
two
are
omitted
in
the
now
mention'd
one
of
Panaetius
.
For
Men
not
only
consult
and
deliberate
,
whether
such
an
Action
be
Honest
or
Dishonest
;
but
also
,
Of
two
Honests
,
that
are
both
propos'd
to
'em
,
which
is
the
most
so
;
and
,
in
like
manner
,
Of
two
Profitables
,
which
is
the
most
profitable
.
From
whence
it
appears
,
That
what
he
thought
was
contain'd
in
three
,
ought
rather
to
be
divided
into
five
Heads
.
[
g
](A33176-e14200-b)
g
Having
thus
laid
down
his
five
Heads
of
Deliberation
,
he
tells
you
in
what
Method
he
designs
to
discourse
of
'em
.
In
the
first
Book
he
'll
handle
the
two
about
Honesty
:
First
,
Whether
an
Action
be
Honest
or
Dishonest
?
to
ch.
43.
Secondly
,
Of
two
that
are
both
Honest
,
which
is
the
most
so
?
to
the
end
.
In
the
second
Book
he
treats
of
Profitable
,
enquiring
,
First
,
Whether
an
Action
be
Profitable
,
or
not
?
to
ch.
25.
Secondly
,
Of
two
that
are
both
Profitable
,
which
is
the
most
so
?
to
the
end
.
The
whole
Subject
of
the
third
Book
is
the
fifth
Head
,
When
a
seeming
Profit
interferes
with
Honesty
,
how
a
Man
should
do
to
know
what
is
his
Duty
?
I
have
added
something
to
the
Text
here
,
to
make
the
Method
more
plain
.
We
must
then
,
in
the
first
place
,
discourse
about
Honesty
,
and
this
we
shall
do
under
these
two
Enquiries
;
Whether
the
thing
propos'd
be
Honest
or
Dishonest
?
And
,
Of
two
that
are
Honest
,
which
is
the
most
so
?
which
will
make
up
the
Subject
of
our
First
Book
.
We
shall
treat
in
our
Second
of
Profit
or
Interest
under
the
same
Heads
.
And
lastly
,
in
our
Third
,
we
shall
endeavour
to
shew
,
When
a
seeming
Advantage
and
Honesty
come
into
competition
,
how
a
good
Man
should
determin
his
Judgment
.
CHAP.
IV.
The
Excellence
of
the
Nature
of
Man
,
above
that
of
Brutes
.
How
the
several
Virtues
,
Prudence
,
Justice
,
&c.
are
agreeable
to
its
Dictates
,
and
result
from
'em
.
Wherein
Honestum
in
general
consists
.
[
a
](A33176-e14400-b)
a
His
Design
he
has
told
us
is
,
to
treat
of
the
Means
for
attaining
Man's
Happiness
.
Now
the
Happiness
of
any
thing
is
the
highest
Perfection
of
its
Nature
,
which
consists
in
acting
most
agreeably
to
its
Dictates
:
as
that
's
a
perfect
Horse
or
Dog
,
which
does
those
things
best
,
which
are
most
according
to
the
Natures
of
those
Animals
.
The
Duties
therefore
,
of
which
he
is
to
treat
,
since
their
Design
is
to
bring
Men
to
Happiness
,
must
needs
be
such
as
are
perfective
of
,
and
consequently
such
as
are
agreeable
to
,
the
Nature
of
Man
.
And
to
shew
that
they
are
so
,
and
how
they
are
deduc'd
and
deriv'd
from
it
,
't
was
necessary
for
him
in
the
first
place
,
to
shew
wherein
the
Nature
of
Man
consists
,
and
how
it
differs
from
that
of
other
Creatures
;
which
is
therefore
the
Design
of
this
Chapter
.
See
his
de
Fin.
Book
2.
ch.
14.
and
Book
5.
ch.
9
,
10
,
&c.
THe
first
thing
then
to
be
taken
notice
of
is
this
,
That
every
Creature
doth
by
Nature
endeavour
to
preserve
its
own
self
,
its
Life
and
Body
;
and
to
shun
and
avoid
those
things
which
appear
prejudicial
and
hurtful
to
it
;
but
to
seek
and
procure
whatever
is
necessary
for
the
support
of
its
Being
,
and
advancement
of
its
Happiness
,
such
as
Food
,
Shelter
,
and
the
like
.
There
is
likewise
common
to
all
sorts
of
Animals
,
a
Desire
of
Copulation
,
for
the
continuance
and
propagation
of
their
several
Species
;
together
with
a
Love
and
Concern
for
their
young
Ones
.
Now
there
's
this
special
Difference
between
Men
and
Brutes
;
that
the
latter
are
govern'd
by
nothing
but
their
Sences
,
never
look
any
farther
than
just
to
what
strikes
and
affects
'em
at
present
,
and
have
a
very
little
,
if
any
Concern
for
what
is
past
or
to
come
:
But
the
former
are
Creatures
endow'd
with
Reason
,
which
gives
'em
a
power
to
carry
their
Thoughts
to
the
Consequences
of
Things
;
to
discover
Causes
before
they
have
yet
produc'd
their
Effects
;
to
see
the
whole
Progress
,
and
even
the
first
Seeds
,
(
as
it
were
)
and
Appearances
of
'em
;
to
compare
like
Occurrences
with
like
;
and
by
joyning
what
is
past
,
and
what
is
to
come
together
,
to
make
a
just
Estimate
of
the
one
from
the
other
;
whereby
they
are
able
at
once
to
take
a
View
of
their
whole
Lives
,
and
accordingly
make
provision
for
the
Necessities
of
'em
.
[
b
](A33176-e14490-b)
b
How
Justice
,
or
the
Virtues
relating
to
Human
Society
,
such
as
Liberality
,
Good-nature
,
Gratitude
,
&c.
are
agreeable
to
the
Dictates
and
Principles
of
Human
Nature
.
And
the
same
force
of
Reason
makes
all
Men
by
nature
to
Love
one
another
,
and
desire
an
Entercourse
of
Words
and
Actions
.
It
begets
in
'em
likewise
[
c
](A33176-e14520-b)
c
That
is
,
Much
greater
than
that
which
Brutes
have
for
their
young
Ones
:
one
is
the
Effect
of
only
natural
Instinct
,
the
other
of
Reason
together
with
it
:
the
one
lasts
but
a
little
while
,
till
the
Young
is
able
to
shift
for
it self
,
the
other
till
Death
:
the
one
prompts
Brutes
only
to
take
care
of
the
Bodies
of
their
Off-spring
;
the
other
,
Men
to
take
care
of
the
Minds
of
theirs
,
by
instructing
'em
in
Principles
of
Virtue
and
Honesty
,
&c.
a
somewhat
extraordinary
Love
and
Affection
for
their
own
Children
,
and
strongly
enclines
'em
to
frequent
Publick
Meetings
,
and
keep
up
Societies
one
amongst
another
.
For
the
same
Reason
also
they
are
very
industrious
,
to
provide
for
the
Necessaries
and
Conveniencies
of
Life
;
and
that
not
only
for
themselves
in
particular
,
but
for
their
Wives
,
their
Children
,
and
others
,
whom
they
have
a
Kindness
for
,
and
are
oblig'd
to
take
Care
of
;
which
Concern
is
very
proper
to
rouse
up
the
Spirits
,
and
make
'em
more
vigorous
and
active
in
Business
.
[
d
](A33176-e14540-b)
d
Prudence
,
or
the
Virtues
relating
to
Truth
,
such
as
Wisdom
,
Knowledge
,
Plainness
,
&c.
agreeable
to
Nature
.
But
of
all
the
Properties
and
Inclinations
of
Men
,
there
is
none
more
natural
and
peculiar
to
'em
,
than
an
earnest
Desire
and
Search
after
Truth
.
Hence
't
is
our
Minds
are
no
sooner
free
,
from
the
Thoughts
and
Engagements
of
necessary
Business
,
but
we
presently
long
to
be
either
seeing
,
or
hearing
,
or
learning
of
something
;
and
esteem
the
Knowledge
of
things
secret
and
wonderful
,
as
a
necessary
Ingredient
of
a
happy
Life
.
From
whence
it
appears
,
That
nothing
is
more
agreeable
and
suited
to
the
Nature
and
Minds
of
Men
,
than
undisguis'd
Openness
,
Truth
and
Sincerity
.
Next
to
this
Love
and
Affection
for
Truth
[
e
](A33176-e14570-b)
e
How
Fortitude
,
or
Greatness
of
Soul
,
is
agreeable
to
Human
Nature
.
,
there
follows
in
the
Soul
an
impatient
Desire
and
Inclination
to
Rule
;
so
that
whoever
has
the
genuin
Nature
of
a
Man
in
him
,
will
never
endure
to
be
subject
to
another
,
unless
he
be
one
that
instructs
,
or
advises
,
or
is
invested
with
a
just
and
lawful
Authority
,
for
the
Benefit
of
the
Publick
.
From
whence
there
arises
a
Greatness
of
Soul
,
[
f
](A33176-e14600-b)
f
For
this
desire
of
Rule
,
and
being
subject
to
no
body
,
makes
a
Man
scorn
to
be
a
Slave
either
to
his
own
Passions
,
or
Inclinations
;
or
part
with
his
Liberty
to
any
one
else
,
for
the
sake
of
Honors
,
Preferments
,
&c.
See
ch.
20.
which
sets
it
above
all
the
petty
Concerns
,
and
trifling
Enjoyments
of
this
present
World
.
'T
is
another
,
and
that
too
no
mean
Prerogative
of
our
reasonable
Nature
,
[
g
](A33176-e14620-b)
g
Decency
,
Modesty
,
&c.
derived
from
the
Dictates
and
Principles
of
Nature
.
That
Man
alone
can
discern
all
the
Beauties
of
Order
and
Decency
,
and
knows
how
to
govern
his
Words
and
Actions
in
conformity
to
them
.
'T
is
he
alone
,
that
of
all
the
Creatures
,
observes
and
is
pleas'd
with
the
Beauty
,
Gracefulness
and
Symmetry
of
Parts
in
the
Objects
of
Sense
;
which
Nature
and
Reason
observing
in
them
,
from
thence
take
occasion
to
apply
the
same
also
to
those
of
the
Mind
;
and
conclude
that
Beauty
,
Consistency
,
and
Regularity
,
should
be
much
more
kept
up
in
our
Words
and
Actions
;
and
therefore
command
us
,
That
nothing
be
done
that
is
effeminate
or
unbecoming
;
and
,
That
so
strict
a
Guard
be
kept
over
every
Thought
and
Action
,
as
that
no
Lust
or
Filthiness
be
either
conceiv'd
or
practis'd
by
us
.
From
these
Inclinations
and
Instincts
of
Nature
,
arises
and
results
that
[
h
](A33176-e14660-b)
h
Honesty
then
in
general
is
nothing
else
,
but
the
acting
according
to
the
Dictates
and
Inclinations
of
Nature
or
Right
Reason
;
and
consists
of
four
general
Virtues
,
Justice
,
or
the
keeping
up
Society
and
Entercourse
among
Men
;
Prudence
,
or
the
Contemplation
of
Truth
;
Courage
,
or
Greatness
of
Soul
;
and
Temperance
,
or
the
Virtues
of
Decency
,
Modesty
,
&c.
of
each
of
which
he
discourses
afterwards
in
particular
.
Honestum
we
're
seeking
for
;
which
however
little
valu'd
and
esteem'd
it
may
be
,
is
nevertheless
virtuous
and
aimiable
in
it self
;
and
which
we
may
justly
say
,
tho'
't
were
commended
by
no
one
,
is
yet
in
its
own
Nature
truly
Commendable
.
CHAP.
V.
The
admirable
Beauty
of
Honesty
.
Four
general
Heads
of
It
,
from
which
all
the
several
Duties
arise
;
and
what
the
Object
of
each
of
'em
is
,
about
which
't
is
employ'd
.
THus
,
Son
Marcus
,
have
I
giv'n
you
a
rough
Draught
,
and
just
the
Outlines
,
as
it
were
,
of
Honesty
;
which
could
she
be
seen
in
her
full
Beauty
with
mortal
Eye
,
would
make
the
whole
World
(
as
Plato
has
said
)
be
in
love
with
[
a
](A33176-e14840-b)
a
For
what
else
is
it
but
only
Wisdom
,
that
leads
us
to
the
attainment
of
Virtue
and
Honesty
?
Or
rather
indeed
what
else
is
Wisdom
,
but
Virtue
and
Honesty
it self
?
He
therefore
that
can
behold
the
glorious
Beauties
of
Honesty
,
must
needs
fall
in
Love
with
Wisdom
;
which
indeed
is
nothing
but
Honesty
it self
;
it
being
impossible
for
any
One
to
be
Wise
,
that
is
not
at
the
same
time
Virtuous
and
Honest
;
Knavishness
and
Roguery
being
always
the
greatest
Folly
.
Wisdom
.
Now
whatever's
contain'd
under
the
Notion
of
Honesty
,
arises
from
one
of
these
four
Heads
;
First
,
A
sagacious
Enquiry
and
Observation
for
the
finding
out
of
Truth
;
which
may
be
called
by
the
general
name
of
Prudence
.
Secondly
,
A
Care
to
maintain
that
Society
and
mutual
Entercourse
,
which
is
between
Men
;
to
render
to
every
Man
what
is
his
due
;
and
to
stand
to
one's
Words
in
all
Promises
and
Bargains
;
which
we
call
Justice
.
Thirdly
,
The
Greatness
and
unshaken
Resolution
of
a
truely
brave
and
invincible
Mind
;
which
goes
by
the
name
of
Magnanimity
or
Fortitude
.
And
,
Lastly
,
A
Keeping
of
our
Words
and
Actions
within
the
due
Limits
of
Order
and
Decency
;
under
which
are
comprehended
[
b
](A33176-e14900-b)
b
He
doth
not
therefore
restrain
Temperance
,
as
Aristotle
did
,
and
we
in
our
Language
do
,
to
observing
a
Mediocrity
in
Eating
,
&c.
but
makes
it
belong
to
all
the
other
Virtues
,
and
set
'em
their
Bounds
,
which
if
they
pass
they
degenerate
into
Vices
.
'T
is
the
business
of
Prudence
,
for
instance
,
to
Search
out
Truth
;
but
this
may
be
done
intemperately
,
i.
e.
too
much
,
&c.
'T
is
the
Work
of
Temperance
therefore
to
determin
,
how
far
,
and
after
what
manner
,
it
ought
to
be
Sought
for
;
in
which
sence
the
Word
's
to
be
understood
,
as
also
proportionably
its
opposite
Intemperantia
,
in
other
places
of
this
and
other
Authors
:
So
Intemperantia
Pausaniae
,
is
his
Pride
and
Insolence
,
in
Corn.
Nep.
Temperance
and
Moderation
.
Now
every
one
of
these
several
Heads
,
tho'
they
[
c
](A33176-e15000-b)
c
This
is
true
of
the
Virtues
in
the
State
of
Perfection
:
for
he
who
is
virtuous
to
that
degree
,
must
have
a
perfect
Prudence
,
[
See
Note
3.
ch.
3.
]
and
by
consequence
must
act
prudently
,
i.
e.
virtuously
,
as
well
in
one
,
as
another
case
.
As
we
know
whoever
is
Honest
out
of
a
Principle
of
Conscience
,
will
be
Honest
in
every
thing
;
and
won't
think
it
enough
to
be
Just
and
Bountiful
,
but
will
also
be
True
,
Sincere
,
&c.
all
have
a
mutual
Connexion
and
Dependance
on
one
another
,
has
yet
its
particular
Classis
(
as
it
were
)
and
respective
Set
of
Duties
arising
from
it
.
From
that
,
for
example
,
which
is
mention'd
first
,
and
under
which
Prudence
and
Wisdom
are
contain'd
,
arises
the
Duty
of
Seeking
,
Contemplating
and
Finding
out
of
Truth
,
which
is
the
proper
and
peculiar
Business
of
those
Virtues
:
For
't
is
then
,
and
then
alone
,
that
we
justly
esteem
a
Man
prudent
and
wise
,
when
we
find
that
he
's
able
to
see
and
discover
the
Truth
of
things
;
and
of
an
active
,
vigorous
and
piercing
Mind
,
to
give
an
account
of
the
Reasons
of
'em
;
so
that
't
is
Truth
that
is
the
proper
Object
of
both
these
Virtues
,
and
that
about
which
they
are
[
d
](A33176-e15100-b)
d
See
Note
4.
ch.
6.
only
concern'd
.
The
other
three
Heads
more
peculiarly
belong
to
the
active
Life
,
and
their
Business
lies
in
procuring
and
maintaning
what
is
useful
and
necessary
for
the
preservation
of
it
;
as
in
keeping
up
mutual
Love
and
Correspondence
among
Mankind
;
in
an
elevated
greatness
and
strength
of
Mind
;
which
appears
,
as
in
getting
things
profitable
and
pleasant
for
our selves
and
Dependants
;
so
more
especially
in
despising
and
being
above
'em
.
Then
as
for
the
last
,
viz.
Order
,
Uniformity
,
Moderation
and
the
like
,
't
is
plain
they
belong
not
only
[
e
](A33176-e15150-b)
e
Not
but
that
they
are
seen
in
Contemplation
too
;
for
there
is
such
a
thing
as
Moderation
to
be
observ'd
,
even
in
our
Searches
after
Truth
;
but
they
are
seen
more
especially
in
our
outward
Actions
.
to
Contemplation
,
but
have
also
a
respect
to
our
outward
Actions
;
since
from
keeping
of
these
within
the
bounds
and
limits
of
Order
and
Moderation
,
we
are
said
to
observe
what
is
virtuous
and
becoming
.
CHAP.
VI.
Prudence
or
Contemplation
of
Truth
,
the
first
of
the
general
Virtues
,
is
the
nearest
ally'd
to
the
Nature
of
Man
.
Two
Cautions
concerning
it
.
It
ought
to
give
place
to
the
Duties
of
the
Active
Life
.
What
it
ought
especially
to
be
employ'd
about
.
[
a
](A33176-e15220-b)
a
I
have
added
something
to
the
beginning
of
this
Chapter
,
to
make
the
Connexion
with
the
foregoing
plainer
.
HAving
thus
explain'd
how
the
whole
Nature
,
and
Power
of
Honesty
,
is
deduc'd
from
some
one
of
these
four
Parts
,
we
are
now
to
discourse
of
'em
each
in
particular
.
And
,
first
,
Of
Prudence
,
which
is
wholly
taken
up
in
the
knowledge
of
Truth
,
and
has
the
nearest
Affinity
of
any
with
the
reasonable
Nature
of
Man
.
For
how
are
we
all
of
us
drawn
and
entic'd
with
the
Desire
of
Wisdom
?
How
noble
and
glorious
a
thing
do
we
imagin
it
to
excel
in
Knowledge
?
And
how
mean
and
reproachful
do
we
count
it
on
the
other
hand
,
to
slip
,
to
be
in
an
Error
,
to
be
Ignorant
,
or
to
be
impos'd
upon
?
In
gratifying
this
so
natural
and
virtuous
Inclination
in
the
Mind
of
Man
,
there
are
two
grand
Faults
to
be
carefully
avoided
:
The
first
is
an
over-great
Hastiness
and
Rashness
in
giving
up
our
Assent
,
presuming
that
we
know
things
before
we
really
do
so
.
Whoever
desires
(
as
I
am
sure
all
ought
)
to
avoid
this
Error
,
must
in
all
his
Enquiries
allow
himself
time
,
and
diligently
consider
the
Matter
with
himself
,
before
he
proceeds
to
pass
his
Judgment
upon
it
.
The
second
Fault
is
,
That
a
great
many
Men
bestow
abundance
of
Study
,
and
a
world
of
Pains
,
upon
very
difficult
and
obscure
Subjects
;
and
such
as
perhaps
,
when
they
are
found
out
,
are
of
but
very
little
,
or
no
Concernment
.
Would
Men
but
be
careful
to
shun
these
two
Mistakes
,
whatsoever
Study
or
Pains
they
might
spend
upon
virtuous
,
worthy
,
or
profitable
Subjects
,
't
would
not
without
Reason
be
highly
commended
.
Thus
[
b
](A33176-e15260-b)
b
C.
Sulpicius
Gallus
,
Praetor
of
Rome
,
an
U.
C.
581
,
and
the
Year
after
,
Tribune
of
a
Legion
under
P.
Aemilius
,
in
the
Great
Macedonian
War
;
where
,
by
his
Astronomy
,
he
foretold
to
the
Roman
Soldiers
an
Eclipse
of
the
Moon
,
so
that
they
were
not
at
all
disheartned
;
whereas
the
Enemy
,
who
knew
nothing
at
all
of
such
an
Appearance
before-hand
,
were
extreamly
terrify'd
at
it
.
Livy
,
Book
44.
ch.
37.
Plutarch's
Aemilius
.
Cicero
often
mentions
him
.
Caius
Sulpicius
was
heretofore
prais'd
for
his
Skill
in
Astronomy
:
[
c
](A33176-e15390-b)
c
Uncle
to
Pompey
the
Great
;
several
times
mentioned
by
our
Author
,
for
his
great
Skill
in
Geometry
,
Philosophy
,
and
the
Civil
Laws
.
Sext.
Pompeius
,
since
my
memory
,
for
his
in
Geometry
:
Many
have
been
famous
in
the
Study
of
Logick
,
and
more
in
that
of
the
Civil
Laws
:
the
[
d
](A33176-e15420-b)
d
The
immediate
end
of
all
these
Sciences
indeed
is
Truth
,
not
but
that
they
may
any
of
'em
be
applied
to
Action
;
as
Sulpicius's
Astronomy
,
for
example
,
was
.
more
peculiar
Business
,
of
all
which
parts
of
Learning
,
is
the
finding
out
of
Truth
.
No
Man
however
should
be
so
taken
up
in
the
Search
of
Truth
,
as
thereby
to
neglect
the
more
necessary
Duties
of
the
Active
Life
:
For
,
after
all
is
done
,
't
is
Action
only
that
gives
a
true
Value
and
Commendation
to
Virtue
.
Not
that
we
are
able
to
be
always
a
doing
without
intermission
,
but
often
retire
from
Business
to
Study
;
beside
that
the
Mind
,
[
e
](A33176-e15440-b)
e
What
great
Use
might
be
made
of
this
continual
Activity
of
the
Soul
,
if
instead
of
spending
it
(
as
too
many
do
)
upon
frivolous
,
useless
and
wicked
Subjects
,
't
were
constantly
employ'd
upon
some
virtuous
,
useful
or
necessary
Enquiries
?
which
is
in
perpetual
motion
and
agitation
,
of
it self
will
supply
us
with
Study
and
Thinking
,
whether
we
set
our selves
to
it
,
or
not
.
In
a
word
,
The
general
aim
and
design
of
our
Thought
,
and
application
of
Mind
,
[
f
](A33176-e15450-b)
f
This
is
no
more
than
the
ordinary
School-division
of
the
Understanding
into
Practical
and
Speculative
;
The
former
considers
things
in
order
to
Practice
,
as
,
whether
Good
or
Bad
,
Honest
or
Dishonest
,
tending
to
a
happy
or
miserable
Life
:
The
latter
only
in
order
to
Knowledge
,
whether
they
are
True
,
or
not
True
,
without
any
direct
tendency
to
Practice
at
all
.
The
former
is
only
Prudence
,
and
the
latter
Knowledge
:
By
which
it
appears
in
what
Sence
he
takes
the
word
Truth
,
when
he
says
,
'T
is
the
Object
of
this
Virtue
,
viz.
not
only
for
Truth
,
as
opposite
to
Falshood
in
Speculation
;
but
as
comprehending
under
it
that
which
is
truly
Good
and
Honest
,
as
opposite
to
Vice
and
Dishonesty
.
is
either
the
attainment
of
such
things
as
are
Honest
,
and
tend
to
a
virtuous
and
happy
way
of
Life
;
or
else
the
improvement
of
our
Reason
and
Understanding
in
Wisdom
and
Knowledge
.
And
this
may
suffice
for
the
first
of
our
general
Heads
of
Duty
.
CHAP.
VII
.
The
second
general
Virtue
,
which
consists
in
maintaining
of
Human
Society
.
Two
Parts
of
it
,
Justice
and
Liberality
.
The
first
Duty
of
Justice
.
All
things
at
first
common
.
The
Original
of
Property
.
Men
are
born
for
the
Good
,
&c.
of
one
another
:
whence
arises
the
second
Duty
of
Justice
.
Two
sorts
of
Injustice
,
the
one
of
Commission
;
the
other
of
Omission
.
The
Causes
of
the
first
sort
of
Injustice
;
First
,
Fear
:
Secondly
,
Desire
.
OF
the
other
remaining
three
,
[
a
](A33176-e15660-b)
a
Which
may
be
call'd
Justice
in
a
larger
signification
of
that
Word
,
as
it
takes
in
all
the
Duties
Men
owe
to
one
another
,
which
is
the
second
general
Head
he
mention'd
;
and
comprehends
under
it
Justice
strictly
so
call'd
,
and
Liberality
or
Kindness
one
to
another
;
of
which
he
begins
to
treat
,
chap.
14.
that
which
consists
in
upholding
Society
,
and
keeping
up
mutual
Love
and
good
Nature
amongst
Mankind
,
seems
of
the
largest
and
most
diffusive
Extent
.
It
comprehends
under
it
these
two
Parts
:
First
,
Justice
,
which
is
much
the
most
glorious
and
splendid
of
all
Virtues
,
and
alone
entitles
us
to
the
Name
and
Appellation
of
Good
Men.
And
,
Secondly
,
Beneficence
,
which
may
also
be
call'd
either
Bounty
or
Liberality
.
Now
the
first
thing
that
Justice
requires
of
us
is
this
,
That
no
one
should
do
any
Hurt
to
another
,
unless
he
be
necessarily
driven
upon
it
for
his
own
Security
:
[
b
](A33176-e15750-b)
b
The
word
deinde
doth
not
denote
a
second
Duty
of
Justice
,
but
only
the
second
Part
of
the
first
Duty
,
of
,
Doing
no
Wrong
.
The
meaning
is
,
That
of
things
which
are
common
,
he
should
content
himself
with
his
reasonable
Share
:
and
those
which
are
appropriate
to
particular
Persons
,
he
should
suffer
to
remain
in
the
State
they
are
without
disturbance
.
The
word
suus
signifies
here
,
as
in
many
other
places
,
the
same
thing
with
proprius
.
and
whatever
belongs
either
to
all
in
common
,
or
to
particular
Persons
as
their
own
Propriety
,
should
not
be
alter'd
,
but
made
use
of
accordingly
.
Now
no
Man
can
say
that
he
has
any
thing
[
c
](A33176-e15810-b)
c
He
supposes
all
things
at
first
to
have
been
common
,
like
the
Room
in
a
Theatre
,
or
other
such
place
;
and
,
as
in
these
,
he
who
first
gets
a
Place
has
a
Right
to
it
,
and
can't
be
fairly
turn'd
out
of
it
;
so
he
imagins
it
to
have
been
in
old
Time
.
Not
that
the
Seizure
of
it self
gives
a
Right
,
but
the
tacit
Agreement
amongst
Mankind
,
That
what
any
Man
had
first
possess'd
himself
of
,
should
be
his
own
Property
.
See
Grot.
De
Jure
B.
&
P.
Book
2.
ch.
2.
his
own
by
a
Right
of
Nature
;
but
either
by
an
ancient
immemorial
Seizure
,
as
those
who
first
planted
uninhabited
Countries
:
Or
,
secondly
,
by
Conquest
,
as
those
who
have
got
things
by
the
Right
of
the
Sword
;
or
else
by
some
Law
,
Compact
,
Agreement
,
or
Lot
.
'T
is
by
some
of
these
means
,
that
the
People
inhabiting
[
d
](A33176-e15860-b)
d
Cicero
himself
was
born
at
Arpinum
,
a
mean
place
in
Italy
;
hence
,
by
his
Enemies
in
contempt
,
call'd
Arpinas
.
He
had
a
noble
Country-house
at
Tusculum
,
another
Town
not
far
from
Rome
,
whither
he
often
retir'd
,
and
where
he
wrote
five
Books
of
Philosophy
,
thence
call'd
his
Tusculan
Questions
.
He
therefore
uses
the
Examples
of
these
two
Places
,
because
his
Son
was
acquainted
with
'em
.
Arpinum
and
Tusculum
came
to
have
those
Lands
,
which
are
now
call'd
theirs
;
and
[
e
](A33176-e15960-b)
e
Descriptio
,
signifies
a
Draught
of
any
Land
,
or
the
like
,
in
order
to
every
Man
's
having
his
due
Share
:
The
meaning
is
,
that
private
Men
came
to
their
Estates
,
by
the
like
sort
of
Distribution
or
Allotment
,
as
Towns
and
Cities
did
.
the
same
may
be
said
as
to
private
Mens
Estates
.
However
,
since
at
present
,
by
some
of
these
ways
,
each
particular
Man
has
his
personal
Possessions
,
out
of
that
which
by
Nature
was
common
to
all
,
't
is
but
reason
that
each
should
hold
what
is
now
his
own
;
which
if
any
one
endeavour
to
take
away
from
him
,
[
f
](A33176-e15990-b)
f
Quicquid
jure
possidetur
(
says
Quintil.
)
injuria
aufertur
;
Whatever
any
Man
is
in
the
rightful
Possession
of
,
can't
be
taken
from
him
without
Injustice
:
Since
every
one
then
has
a
Right
to
that
,
which
is
now
his
own
,
tho'
't
were
originally
common
,
no
one
without
injuring
him
can
dispossess
him
of
it
again
.
he
directly
breaks
in
upon
common
Justice
,
and
violates
the
Rights
of
Human
Society
.
But
seeing
(
as
is
excellently
said
by
Plato
)
we
are
not
Born
for
our selves
alone
;
but
that
our
native
Country
,
our
Friends
and
Relations
,
have
a
just
Claim
and
Title
to
some
part
of
us
;
and
seeing
whatsoever
is
created
on
Earth
,
was
meerly
design'd
(
as
the
Stoicks
will
have
it
)
for
the
Service
of
Men
;
and
Men
themselves
for
the
Service
,
Good
and
Assistance
of
one
another
:
We
[
g
](A33176-e16040-b)
g
He
now
comes
to
the
second
Duty
of
Justice
,
which
is
,
To
do
all
the
Good
we
can
;
as
the
first
was
,
To
do
no
Wrong
.
certainly
in
this
should
be
Followers
of
Nature
,
and
second
her
Intentions
;
and
by
producing
all
that
lies
within
the
reach
of
our
Power
for
the
general
Interest
,
by
mutually
giving
and
receiving
good
Turns
,
by
our
Knowledge
,
Industry
,
Riches
,
or
other
means
,
should
endeavour
to
keep
up
that
Love
and
Society
,
that
should
be
amongst
Men.
Now
the
great
Foundation
of
Justice
is
[
h
](A33176-e16070-b)
h
Justice
is
the
rendring
to
every
Man
his
due
;
which
no
one
can
do
without
being
true
to
his
Word
,
and
conscientiously
performing
all
Promises
,
Oaths
,
Bargains
,
&c.
For
he
that
Promises
,
&c.
to
another
,
makes
himself
a
Debtor
of
something
to
him
,
which
he
may
demand
as
a
kind
of
Due
.
'T
is
the
business
of
Faithfulness
to
see
this
pay'd
;
so
that
Justice
is
,
as
't
were
,
built
upon
Faithfulness
,
as
its
Basis
and
Foundation
.
Faithfulness
,
which
consists
in
being
constantly
firm
to
your
Word
,
and
a
conscientious
performance
of
all
Compacts
and
Bargains
;
whereupon
for
this
once
,
let
us
venture
to
follow
the
Opinion
of
the
Stoicks
,
those
mighty
Admirers
of
Derivations
,
and
believe
that
Fides
[
Faithfulness
]
is
so
call'd
,
(
tho'
perhaps
it
may
seem
a
little
too
far
fetcht
)
quia
fiat
quod
dictum
est
,
because
what
was
promis'd
is
perform'd
.
The
[
i
](A33176-e16130-b)
i
Having
laid
down
the
two
great
Duties
of
Justice
,
and
the
Foundation
of
it
;
he
now
proceeds
to
its
opposite
Vice
,
Injustice
,
(
of
which
there
are
two
sorts
)
and
the
Causes
of
it
.
Vice
that
is
opposite
to
Justice
is
Injustice
,
of
which
there
are
two
sorts
;
the
first
consists
in
the
actual
doing
an
Injury
to
another
;
the
second
in
tamely
looking
on
while
he
is
Injur'd
,
and
not
helping
and
defending
him
,
tho'
we
are
able
.
For
he
that
injuriously
falls
upon
another
,
whether
prompted
by
Rage
or
other
violent
Passion
,
does
as
't
were
leap
at
the
throat
of
his
Companion
;
and
he
that
refuses
to
help
him
when
Injur'd
,
and
to
ward
off
the
Wrong
,
if
it
lies
in
his
power
,
is
as
plainly
guilty
of
Baseness
and
Injustice
,
as
tho'
he
had
deserted
his
Father
,
his
Friends
,
or
his
native
Country
.
[
k
](A33176-e16170-b)
k
The
Causes
of
the
first
sort
of
Injustice
,
viz.
Of
Commission
:
First
,
Fear
.
Not
but
that
't
is
lawful
,
if
I
see
another
taking
up
a
Sword
,
and
plainly
perceive
he
's
going
to
Stab
me
,
to
Stab
him
before-hand
to
prevent
my
own
Death
,
if
I
can't
possibly
escape
any
other
way
.
But
this
must
be
very
certain
and
apparent
;
a
bare
fear
or
suspicion
that
another
designs
me
an
Injury
,
not
being
a
sufficient
Reason
why
I
should
do
him
one
.
Now
that
former
Injustice
,
which
consists
in
the
wilful
and
actual
Wronging
another
,
has
oftentimes
no
other
cause
but
Fear
;
when
he
,
who
designedly
does
a
Man
an
Injury
,
is
afraid
least
himself
should
be
forc'd
to
undergo
one
,
if
he
does
not
secure
himself
by
doing
it
before-hand
.
But
generally
speaking
,
the
great
source
and
fountain
of
all
such
Injustice
is
[
l
](A33176-e16240-b)
l
A
second
Cause
of
this
Injustice
,
The
satisfying
some
irregular
Desire
;
as
,
First
,
That
of
Money
;
of
which
in
the
next
Chapter
.
the
satisfying
some
irregular
and
exorbitant
Appetite
;
and
in
a
more
especial
manner
,
the
desire
of
Riches
:
of
which
we
shall
therefore
say
something
in
particular
.
CHAP.
VIII
.
The
Desire
of
Riches
,
which
is
one
Cause
of
Injustice
,
whence
it
proceeds
.
'T
is
allowable
enough
so
long
as
it
does
not
draw
Men
to
the
Injuring
of
others
.
The
Desire
of
Honours
,
&c.
another
Cause
of
Injustice
.
It
usually
is
found
in
Men
of
the
greatest
Minds
.
There
's
a
difference
to
be
made
between
those
Injuries
,
that
are
done
hastily
and
in
a
Passion
,
and
those
that
proceed
from
premeditated
Malice
.
RIches
then
are
most
commonly
desir'd
,
either
to
supply
us
with
the
Necessaries
of
Life
,
or
furnish
us
with
the
Pleasures
and
Conveniences
of
it
or
else
,
as
it
often
is
observ'd
to
happen
in
Persons
of
great
and
aspiring
Minds
,
as
a
means
of
obtaining
an
Interest
in
the
Publick
,
and
a
Power
of
Obliging
and
Gratifying
one's
Friends
:
to
which
purpose
was
that
Saying
of
the
late
[
a
](A33176-e16370-b)
a
A
noble
and
wealthy
,
but
very
covetous
Roman
,
twice
Consul
with
Pompey
the
Great
,
whom
Vell.
Patenc
.
calls
Invictum
par
Consulum
.
He
was
made
Proconsul
of
Apulia
,
where
he
quell'd
Spartacus
,
Ring-leader
of
the
Slaves
,
and
put
an
end
to
the
Servile
War
.
At
last
he
,
with
Pompey
,
and
Caesar
,
divided
the
whole
Roman
Empire
between
'em
,
and
made
the
first
Triumvirate
.
Here
the
East
falling
to
his
share
,
he
made
War
upon
the
Parthians
,
out
of
a
Desire
of
Money
;
but
was
conquer'd
and
slain
by
'em
and
had
melted
Gold
poured
down
the
Throat
of
his
dead
Body
.
His
Life
is
writ
by
Plutarch
.
Marcus
Crassus
,
That
whoever
design'd
to
be
a
leading
Man
in
the
Commonwealth
,
ought
never
to
think
he
had
Estate
enough
,
till
he
could
maintain
[
b
](A33176-e16500-b)
b
A
Roman
Army
was
four
Legions
,
each
consisting
of
six
Thousand
Foot
,
and
three
Hundred
Horse
;
two
of
these
Legions
were
given
to
each
Consul
every
Year
.
The
monthly
Pay
of
an
Army
came
to
about
25000
Pounds
:
By
which
it
appears
what
an
Estate
Crassus
desir'd
,
to
keep
'em
a
whole
Year
.
an
Army
with
its
yearly
Revenue
.
Others
take
pleasure
in
Splendor
and
Magnificence
;
in
a
handsom
,
noble
and
plentiful
way
of
Living
;
All
which
things
have
begot
an
insatiable
Greediness
after
Money
,
without
which
they
can
never
be
supported
and
maintain'd
.
Not
but
that
a
moderate
Desire
of
Riches
,
and
bettering
a
Man's
Estate
,
so
long
as
it
abstains
from
oppressing
of
others
,
is
allowable
enough
;
but
a
very
great
care
ought
always
to
be
taken
,
that
we
ben't
drawn
to
any
Injustice
by
it
.
There
's
another
[
c
](A33176-e16530-b)
c
A
second
Desire
,
that
is
very
often
the
Cause
of
Injustice
,
is
,
That
of
Honour
,
Glory
,
&c.
Desire
that
makes
Men
as
apt
to
be
forgetful
of
Justice
,
as
that
after
Ricfies
;
the
Thirst
,
I
mean
,
of
Empire
,
Glory
,
Honours
,
&c.
For
that
Saying
of
[
d
](A33176-e16570-b)
d
A
famous
ancient
Latin
Poet
,
born
at
Rudiae
,
a
Town
in
Calobria
,
thence
by
our
Author
call'd
Rudius
homo
,
in
his
Oration
pro
Archia
.
He
was
very
familiar
with
Africanus
Major
,
the
Wise
Laelius
,
Cato
Censorius
,
&c.
which
last
brought
him
first
to
Rome
.
His
Works
are
lost
,
except
some
Fragments
preserv'd
by
Cicero
,
and
others
.
Ennius
,
There
's
no
inviolable
Faith
or
Friendship
in
the
Matter
of
a
Kingdom
,
tho'
apply'd
by
him
to
that
one
case
only
,
is
yet
full
out
as
true
in
a
great
many
others
;
for
where-ever
the
Subject
of
Contention
is
such
,
as
that
only
one
Party
can
meet
with
Success
,
and
the
rest
must
fall
short
of
what
they
desire
;
things
are
usually
carry'd
to
so
great
a
height
,
as
that
't
is
very
difficult
not
to
break
in
upon
Faith
and
Friendship
.
This
hath
appear'd
but
too
manifestly
of
late
,
in
that
rash
and
most
impudent
Attempt
of
[
e
](A33176-e16680-b)
e
Julius
Caesar
,
who
,
ambitious
of
the
Empire
,
rais'd
a
Civil
War
against
the
Senate
and
Pompey
the
Great
;
whom
he
conquer'd
in
the
Pharsalian
Field
.
See
an
Account
by
himself
in
his
Commentaries
.
Caesar's
;
who
has
broke
thro'
all
those
Ties
and
Obligations
,
that
either
by
Gods
or
Men
could
be
laid
upon
him
;
for
the
compassing
and
getting
of
that
Empire
to
himself
,
which
he
vainly
propos'd
in
his
deprav'd
Imagination
.
But
in
this
case
,
't
is
one
very
great
unhappiness
,
that
the
Thirst
after
Honour
,
Empire
,
Power
&c.
falls
most
upon
Men
of
the
greatest
Souls
,
and
most
exalted
Natures
;
wherefore
the
[
f
](A33176-e16750-b)
f
For
we
should
increase
our
Care
according
to
the
greatness
of
our
Danger
;
and
where
we
are
likely
to
be
most
violently
Assaulted
,
there
we
should
place
the
strongest
Guard
.
greater
care
ought
to
be
taken
,
that
nothing
of
Offence
be
committed
in
this
kind
.
Now
it
makes
a
great
difference
in
all
Acts
of
Injustice
,
whether
they
proceed
from
some
violent
Passion
,
(
which
is
for
the
most
part
of
short
continuance
)
or
are
done
with
Design
and
previous
Deliberation
:
For
those
that
are
the
Effects
of
a
sudden
gust
of
Passion
,
ought
not
to
be
esteem'd
of
so
heinous
a
Nature
,
as
those
that
proceed
from
premeditated
Malice
.
And
this
may
suffice
for
the
first
sort
of
Injustice
,
which
consists
in
The
actual
doing
of
Wrong
;
and
the
Causes
of
it
.
CHAP.
IX
.
Injustice
of
Omission
,
and
the
Caused
of
it
Those
:
are
guilty
of
it
,
who
spend
their
whole
Lives
in
Study
and
Contemplation
;
as
some
Philosophors
have
done
.
Justice
ought
to
proceed
from
Choice
.
Those
who
mind
nothing
but
their
own
Business
are
guilty
of
this
Injustice
.
Self-love
hinders
Men
from
seeing
their
Duty
.
An
excellent
Rule
for
the
avoiding
of
all
Injustice
.
AS
for
the
[
a
](A33176-e16820-b)
a
He
comes
now
to
the
second
sort
of
Injustice
,
that
of
Omission
;
the
Causes
of
which
are
,
first
,
Fear
of
giving
Offence
,
of
Charge
,
&c.
second
,
which
only
consists
in
seeing
another
Injur'd
,
and
being
wanting
to
our
Duty
,
by
not
defending
him
;
the
Causes
of
that
are
wont
to
be
several
.
For
some
are
afraid
of
offending
others
,
or
of
bringing
a
trouble
and
charge
upon
themselves
:
Others
are
negligent
,
idle
,
or
mean-spirited
:
And
a
third
sort
there
is
,
who
are
so
taken
up
with
their
own
Concerns
,
that
they
have
no
time
left
to
regard
the
Oppress'd
,
whom
yet
't
is
their
Duty
to
save
and
protect
.
I
am
therefore
of
Opinion
,
that
Plato's
Consequence
will
hardly
hold
good
,
where
speaking
about
the
Philosophers
,
he
says
,
They
are
wholly
taken
up
in
the
seeking
out
of
Truth
,
and
perfectly
neglect
and
make
light
of
those
things
,
which
the
rest
of
the
World
are
so
eager
after
,
and
so
contend
about
;
and
that
therefore
they
are
just
.
This
,
I
say
,
I
am
afraid
is
a
bad
Consequence
;
for
tho'
,
't
is
true
,
[
b
](A33176-e16910-b)
b
In
Chap.
21.
he
puts
two
Cases
,
wherein
he
thinks
these
Men
may
be
excusable
:
1.
If
their
Genius
lie
very
much
toward
Learning
,
&c.
2.
If
they
are
of
weak
Constitutious
,
so
as
to
be
unable
to
meddle
with
Publick
Affairs
;
as
,
Scipio's
Son
was
.
they
keep
the
first
sort
of
Justice
,
inasmuch
as
they
actually
do
no
Wrong
;
yet
they
run
perfectly
counter
to
the
other
:
for
being
engag'd
in
their
Learning
and
Studies
,
they
abandon
their
Friends
to
be
injur'd
by
others
,
whom
in
Justice
they
ought
to
have
protected
and
defended
.
So
that
't
is
believ'd
,
they
'd
hardly
ever
trouble
'emselves
so
far
,
as
at
all
to
inter-meddle
with
the
Business
of
the
Publick
,
if
it
was
not
altogether
,
as
it
were
,
forc'd
upon
them
.
But
't
were
a
great
deal
better
would
they
do
it
voluntarily
;
for
an
[
c
](A33176-e16950-b)
c
The
Moralists
make
a
distinction
between
doing
an
honest
Action
,
and
doing
it
honestly
,
honestum
and
honeste
agere
.
He
that
pays
another
his
due
,
does
an
honest
Action
;
but
he
does
not
do
honestly
,
if
against
his
Will
,
and
by
compulsion
of
Laws
.
Action
,
tho'
Honest
,
is
not
therefore
truly
virtuous
,
unless
it
be
done
out
of
Choice
,
and
with
a
Good-will
.
There
are
[
d
](A33176-e17010-b)
d
Another
Cause
of
this
sort
of
Injustice
,
a
morose
unsociable
Temper
,
&c.
others
yet
,
who
out
of
a
Desire
of
improving
their
own
Estates
,
or
else
a
morose
and
unsociable
sort
of
Temper
,
cry
,
They
meddle
with
Nobody's
Business
but
their
own
,
that
so
they
may
seem
to
be
Men
of
strict
Honesty
,
and
to
Injure
Nobody
:
and
they
do
indeed
avoid
the
one
sort
of
Injustice
,
but
directly
run
themselves
into
the
other
;
for
they
desert
the
common
Good
and
Society
of
Mankind
,
while
they
bestow
neither
Study
,
Pains
,
nor
Money
toward
the
Preservation
of
it
.
Thus
have
I
laid
down
the
two
sorts
of
Injustice
,
and
pointed
out
to
you
the
Causes
of
each
;
and
have
also
endeavour'd
to
explain
the
true
Nature
and
Extent
of
Justice
;
from
all
which
Account
't
will
be
easie
to
judge
,
unless
we
are
extreamly
fond
of
our
own
Ease
,
what
those
several
Duties
are
,
which
at
several
times
are
required
of
us
.
I
say
,
Unless
we
are
fond
of
our
own
Ease
;
for
the
truth
on
't
is
,
't
is
a
troublesome
thing
to
be
concern'd
in
the
Business
of
other
People
;
however
old
[
e
](A33176-e17060-b)
e
Terence's
Heautontimoroumenos
,
Act.
1.
Sc.
1.
Chremes
expostulating
with
Menedemus
for
working
so
very
hard
,
the
other
asks
him
,
What
he
has
to
do
to
meddle
with
another's
Business
:
to
which
he
answers
,
Homo
sum
,
humani
nihil
〈◊〉
me
alienum
puto
;
I
am
a
Man
,
and
accordingly
ought
to
be
concern'd
in
whatever
relates
to
the
Welfare
of
any
Man
:
Which
good-natur'd
Sentence
,
St
Austin
tells
us
,
was
applauded
by
the
whole
Theatre
.
We
are
all
Fellow-members
,
and
(
as
was
observ'd
,
Chap.
7.
)
born
for
the
Service
,
Good
,
and
Assistance
of
one
another
,
it
being
the
fundamental
Principle
of
the
Law
of
Nature
,
That
every
Man
should
seek
the
Good
and
Welfare
of
the
whole
Society
,
and
every
Member
of
it
,
as
well
as
his
own
private
and
particular
Interest
:
Omnis
homo
est
omni
homini
proximus
,
nec
ulla
cogitanda
est
longinquitas
generis
,
ubi
est
natura
communis
,
says
the
forecited
Father
.
Chremes
in
Terence
thinks
,
That
he
ought
to
be
concern'd
for
the
Good
of
all
Men.
But
be
that
as
it
will
,
forasmuch
as
the
Success
of
our
own
Affairs
,
whether
Good
or
Ill
,
more
nearly
concerns
us
,
and
makes
us
more
sensible
,
than
that
of
another's
;
(
which
appears
to
us
small
,
as
a
thing
at
a
great
distance
)
therefore
we
pass
a
quite
different
Judgment
upon
the
one
and
the
other
.
And
,
upon
this
account
,
't
is
a
very
good
Rule
that
is
given
by
some
Men
,
That
we
should
never
venture
upon
any
Action
,
of
which
we
doubt
whether
't
is
Honest
or
Dishonest
.
For
Honesty
quickly
would
shew
it self
by
its
own
native
Brightness
;
and
the
Doubting
about
it
is
a
plain
Intimation
,
that
at
least
we
suspected
some
Injustice
when
we
did
it
.
CHAP.
X.
Justice
is
alter'd
upon
an
Alteration
of
Circumstances
;
and
what
was
our
Duty
in
one
Case
to
do
,
in
other
Circumstances
't
is
our
Duty
to
avoid
.
Promises
are
not
to
be
stood
to
in
several
Cases
,
as
,
If
they
are
Prejudicial
:
If
made
thro'
Fear
,
&c.
A
close
adhering
to
the
words
of
a
Law
,
or
Bargain
,
is
a
means
of
being
Unjust
;
Craft
in
such
cases
to
be
diligently
avoided
.
BUt
here
't
is
observable
,
[
a
](A33176-e17240-b)
a
Having
given
an
account
of
the
Nature
of
Justice
,
and
Injustice
,
with
the
Causes
of
this
;
he
proceeds
to
shew
,
How
,
in
several
Cases
,
that
which
is
usually
a
part
of
Justice
,
upon
an
alteration
of
Circumstances
,
becomes
the
contrary
.
For
as
a
thing
may
be
pleasing
to
the
Palate
,
or
healthful
to
the
Body
in
some
Circumstances
,
which
is
not
so
absolutely
;
as
a
Cup
of
bad
Water
to
one
in
extream
Thirst
:
So
may
an
Action
,
which
generally
speaking
is
vicious
and
unreasonable
;
as
the
breaking
of
one's
Promise
,
or
the
like
;
in
some
certain
Cases
become
honest
,
and
agreeable
to
Right
Reason
.
That
the
Limits
of
Justice
are
not
so
fixt
,
but
that
they
may
be
alter'd
upon
an
alteration
of
the
Circumstances
;
so
that
what
at
one
time
appears
to
be
the
Duty
of
an
honest
and
good
Man
,
at
another
is
alter'd
and
becomes
the
quite
contrary
:
To
deliver
up
a
Trust
,
for
example
,
or
perform
a
Promise
,
and
other
things
relating
to
Truth
and
Faithfulness
,
are
Duties
which
Justice
it self
will
allow
us
,
in
several
Cases
,
to
[
b
](A33176-e17250-b)
b
The
Word
migrate
signifies
transitively
here
,
as
in
some
other
places
of
this
Author
:
So
migrare
communia
jura
signifies
to
transgress
or
violate
'em
.
neglect
or
omit
:
For
respect
must
be
had
to
those
general
Rules
we
before
laid
down
,
as
the
Ground
and
Foundation
of
all
Justice
,
First
,
That
no
Injury
be
done
to
any
other
.
And
,
Secondly
,
That
we
make
it
our
earnest
Endeavour
to
promote
the
Good
and
Interest
of
all
Mankind
:
So
that
our
Duty
is
not
always
the
same
,
but
various
[
c
](A33176-e17320-b)
c
By
ea
tempora
,
I
suppose
,
he
means
those
Cases
or
Circumstances
;
for
so
he
often
uses
the
Word
in
this
Work
.
He
had
just
been
saying
,
That
nothing
must
be
done
contrary
to
the
two
great
Rules
of
Justice
before
given
:
And
then
he
adds
,
Ea
cum
tempor'd
commutantur
,
that
is
,
When
the
Case
is
such
,
as
that
the
keeping
one's
Promise
,
or
the
like
,
would
be
acting
contrary
to
one
of
those
Rules
,
(
that
is
,
would
be
a
great
Injury
to
him
that
made
it
,
or
him
to
whom
it
was
made
,
as
he
explains
himself
afterwards
;
)
then
our
Duty
is
alter'd
,
and
we
are
bound
not
to
keep
it
;
because
,
if
we
should
,
't
would
be
a
Breach
of
the
fundamental
Rule
of
that
Virtue
.
This
is
the
first
Case
,
wherein
a
Man
is
not
oblig'd
to
be
as
good
as
his
Promise
.
according
to
the
variety
of
Circumstances
.
There
may
be
a
Contract
or
Promise
,
for
instance
,
the
performance
of
which
would
bring
very
great
Damage
,
either
to
the
Person
himself
that
made
it
,
or
the
other
Party
whom
it
was
made
to
.
Thus
,
had
[
d
](A33176-e17370-b)
d
See
chap.
25.
Book
3.
Naptune
not
granted
what
he
promis'd
to
Theseus
,
Theseus
had
not
suffered
the
loss
of
his
Son
Hippolytus
.
For
(
as
the
Story
goes
)
Neptune
having
granted
him
any
three
Wishes
,
for
the
third
,
he
once
in
a
very
great
passion
,
desired
the
Death
of
his
own
Son
;
by
obtaining
of
which
,
he
was
afterwards
brought
into
the
greatest
Afflictions
.
Such
Promises
therefore
are
[
e
](A33176-e17440-b)
e
Because
the
keeping
of
'em
would
be
an
Offence
against
the
first
Rule
of
Justice
,
Not
to
do
any
Wrong
:
and
if
may
be
suppos'd
the
Person
,
to
whom
they
were
made
,
had
he
seen
such
a
Mischief
ensuing
,
would
not
have
demanded
it
.
See
chap.
24
,
25.
Book
3.
not
to
be
kept
,
as
will
but
bring
a
Mischief
on
him
they
were
made
to
;
[
f
](A33176-e17470-b)
f
Because
't
is
presum'd
the
Person
,
who
made
such
a
Promise
,
had
he
thought
of
such
a
Damage
likely
to
come
of
it
,
would
not
have
made
it
.
We
promise
as
Men
,
who
aren't
infallible
,
and
can't
provide
against
every
thing
that
may
happen
;
wherefore
we
are
suppos'd
not
to
promise
any
further
,
than
what
we
now
know
;
and
should
any
extraordinary
thing
happen
in
the
mean
time
,
't
is
to
be
taken
as
a
thing
,
which
we
tacitly
excepted
.
But
here
we
must
proceed
very
warily
and
cautiously
:
this
will
hardly
hold
good
in
the
case
of
a
Promissory
Oath
,
where
God
himself
is
call'd
to
witness
.
See
Grot.
de
Jure
B.
&
P.
Puffendorf
,
&c.
upon
this
whole
Subject
.
no
more
are
those
,
which
tend
to
the
Damage
of
the
Promiser
himself
,
more
than
to
the
Profit
of
him
they
were
promis'd
to
.
Again
,
[
g
](A33176-e17500-b)
g
Another
Case
wherein
a
Man
is
dispenc'd
from
keeping
his
Promise
,
is
,
when
some
greater
Duty
requires
his
Attendance
in
the
mean
time
.
even
Justice
it self
requires
us
to
perform
a
greater
before
a
lesser
Duty
:
You
promise
,
for
example
,
a
Friend
of
yours
,
to
assist
him
in
a
Cause
that
he
has
depending
,
but
your
Son
grows
dangerously
sick
in
the
mean
time
;
here
't
would
be
no
[
h
](A33176-e17510-b)
h
Because
to
take
care
of
a
Son's
Life
,
is
a
greater
Duty
,
than
to
assist
a
Friend
;
and
therefore
ought
to
take
place
before
it
.
breach
of
Duty
in
you
,
if
you
should
not
make
good
what
you
promis'd
to
your
Friend
;
and
he
himself
rather
would
be
much
to
blame
,
should
he
complain
of
being
disappointed
by
you
.
Further
,
[
i
](A33176-e17520-b)
i
Another
Case
wherein
a
Man
is
not
oblig'd
to
perform
his
Promise
,
is
,
when
he
was
forc'd
to
make
it
thro'
Fear
,
or
drawn
to
it
by
some
Deceit
.
See
the
forecited
Authors
.
't
is
plain
to
any
one's
Sence
,
that
such
sort
of
Promises
can
never
be
binding
,
as
are
made
by
People
over-aw'd
by
Fear
,
or
over-reach'd
by
Deceit
;
most
of
which
are
void
by
the
[
k
](A33176-e17540-b)
k
The
Laws
being
deliver'd
only
in
general
Terms
,
and
not
being
able
to
descend
to
all
particular
Cases
,
't
was
in
the
power
of
the
Praetor
,
or
Judge
,
to
supply
that
Defect
by
his
Edicts
and
Authority
.
Praetor's
Edicts
,
and
some
of
'em
even
by
the
Laws
themselves
.
But
another
great
Spring
from
which
Injuries
arise
,
is
some
Quirk
or
Cavil
,
and
an
over-subtle
and
malicious
Interpretation
of
the
Laws
;
from
whence
that
Saying
,
Summum
jus
summa
Injuria
,
The
height
of
Justice
is
the
height
of
Roguery
,
is
now
become
a
daily
and
common
Proverb
among
us
.
There
are
frequent
Examples
of
this
to
be
met
with
in
our
Publick
Transactions
;
as
that
of
Him
,
for
Example
,
who
concluding
a
Truce
with
the
Enemy
for
thirty
Days
,
made
continual
Incursions
into
their
Territory
by
Night
;
because
,
forsooth
,
the
Truce
was
not
made
for
so
many
Nights
,
but
only
so
many
Days
.
Just
such
a
crafty
and
pittiful
Trick
(
if
the
Story
be
true
)
was
that
notable
Cunning
of
Quintus
Fabius
Labeo's
;
(
or
whoever
the
Man
was
,
for
I
have
it
only
by
hear-say
)
who
being
by
the
Senate
appointed
Arbitrator
,
in
a
Difference
between
those
of
[
l
](A33176-e17570-b)
l
Two
Cities
in
Italy
,
about
fourteen
Miles
distant
from
one
another
.
Nola
and
Naples
about
their
Bounds
;
when
he
came
to
the
place
that
was
appointed
for
the
Treaty
,
took
aside
the
Commissioners
of
either
Party
,
and
exhorted
'em
privately
,
Not
to
be
too
eager
and
greedy
in
their
Demands
,
but
rather
to
take
up
and
content
'emselves
with
less
,
than
pretend
to
any
more
than
what
was
honestly
their
Due
.
Both
Parties
did
so
according
to
his
desire
,
so
that
a
good
quantity
of
Ground
was
left
between
them
;
this
he
e'en
goes
and
adjudges
to
the
Romans
,
leaving
that
to
each
Party
,
which
they
'emselves
had
demanded
.
And
is
not
this
now
to
Deceive
and
Cheat
,
rather
than
to
Judge
?
In
all
cases
therefore
such
subtle
kind
of
Tricks
should
be
diligently
avoided
.
CHAP.
XI
.
Justice
to
be
kept
towards
all
sorts
of
Men.
Bounds
to
be
observ'd
in
Punishing
those
that
have
Injur'd
us
.
Laws
of
War
to
be
strictly
observ'd
.
Two
sorts
of
Disputing
,
by
Reason
and
by
the
Sword
:
The
latter
is
allowable
,
when
we
can't
obtain
what
's
our
Right
by
the
former
.
What
ought
to
be
the
End
of
making
War
.
How
it
should
be
carry'd
on
.
The
Strictness
of
the
old
Romans
in
observing
the
Laws
of
War
.
A
Story
of
the
Elder
Cato
to
that
purpose
.
THere
are
certain
[
a
](A33176-e17720-b)
a
After
having
discours'd
of
the
Nature
of
Justice
,
&c.
he
proceeds
to
shew
,
That
we
ought
to
practice
it
towards
all
sorts
of
People
;
as
,
First
,
Even
towards
those
who
have
wrong'd
us
.
Duties
or
Offices
also
,
to
be
strictly
observ'd
,
even
towards
those
that
have
injur'd
us
;
for
we
ought
not
to
go
beyond
such
and
such
Bounds
,
in
exacting
Revenge
and
Punishment
of
another
:
in
which
particular
it
may
perhaps
be
enough
,
to
make
him
that
has
wrong'd
us
repent
of
the
Wrong
done
;
so
that
he
himself
may
abstain
from
the
like
,
and
others
take
warning
from
his
Example
,
for
the
future
.
There
are
certain
peculiar
Laws
of
[
b
](A33176-e17750-b)
b
In
the
second
place
we
ought
to
shew
Justice
to
our
Enemies
:
First
,
By
not
entring
upon
a
War
,
but
upon
very
just
and
good
Grounds
.
Secondly
,
By
carrying
it
on
fairly
,
and
being
ready
to
accept
of
a
reasonable
Peace
.
Thirdly
,
By
shewing
Mercy
to
the
Conquer'd
,
after
we
have
gotten
the
Victory
.
The
Words
therefore
,
Inter
arma
silent
leges
,
must
be
taken
in
a
very
restrain'd
Sence
,
so
as
to
mean
the
Civil
and
Judiciary
Laws
,
not
those
of
Nature
,
and
Justice
towards
Enemies
.
See
Grot.
Prolegom
.
ad
Lib.
de
Jure
B.
&
P.
War
also
,
which
are
of
all
things
most
strictly
to
be
observ'd
in
the
Common-wealth
:
For
there
being
two
sorts
of
Disputing
in
the
World
,
the
one
by
Reason
,
and
the
other
by
open
Force
;
and
the
former
of
these
being
that
which
is
agreeable
to
the
Nature
of
Man
,
and
the
latter
to
that
of
Brutes
;
when
we
can't
obtain
what
is
our
Right
by
the
one
,
we
muste'en
of
necessity
have
recourse
to
the
other
.
'T
is
allowable
therefore
to
undertake
Wars
,
but
it
must
always
be
with
design
of
obtaining
a
secure
Peace
.
And
when
we
have
gotten
the
better
of
our
Enemies
,
we
should
rest
content
with
the
Victory
alone
,
and
shew
our selves
merciful
and
kind
to
'em
afterwards
;
unless
they
are
such
as
have
been
very
Cruel
,
and
committed
inhuman
Barbarities
in
the
War
.
Thus
our
Forefathers
took
into
their
City
the
[
c
](A33176-e17810-b)
c
Several
little
Nations
in
Italy
,
all
conquer'd
by
the
Romans
.
Aequians
,
Volscians
,
Sabines
,
and
others
,
whom
they
had
subdu'd
;
whereas
[
d
](A33176-e17850-b)
d
The
former
a
City
in
Africk
,
the
latter
in
Spain
;
both
taken
by
Scipio
Africanus
the
Younger
.
Carthage
and
Numantia
they
entirely
destroy'd
.
I
could
wish
I
might
not
add
[
e
](A33176-e17910-b)
e
A
famous
and
rich
City
in
Achaia
,
plac'd
exactly
in
that
Neck
of
Land
,
which
separates
Peloponnesus
,
or
the
Morea
,
from
the
rest
of
Greece
.
Hither
St
Paul
writ
two
of
his
Epistles
.
'T
was
taken
by
Mummius
,
the
Roman
Consul
,
and
ras'd
to
the
Ground
,
because
of
some
Affront
the
Corinthians
had
given
to
the
Roman
Ambassadors
.
Corinth
too
;
but
I
believe
they
had
something
in
their
Eye
when
they
did
it
,
and
that
more
especially
the
Situation
of
the
Place
;
which
being
so
very
convenient
as
it
was
,
they
were
afraid
least
it
might
be
,
at
one
time
or
other
,
an
Encouragement
to
a
Revolt
.
In
my
Opinion
't
is
always
our
Duty
,
to
do
what
we
can
for
a
fair
and
safe
Peace
:
in
which
thing
if
People
would
have
[
f
](A33176-e18030-b)
f
In
the
Civil
War
between
Caesar
and
Pompey
,
Cicero
always
labour'd
for
a
Peace
and
Agreement
between
the
Parties
;
but
to
no
purpose
.
hearkned
to
me
,
we
might
at
this
time
have
seen
the
Republick
,
tho'
,
't
is
true
,
I
can't
say
in
a
flourishing
Condition
;
yet
certainly
not
,
as
at
present
we
perceive
it
,
entirely
subverted
and
fal'n
into
Ruins
.
And
as
we
are
bound
to
be
merciful
to
those
we
have
actually
conquer'd
;
so
should
those
also
be
receiv'd
into
Favour
,
who
have
laid
down
their
Arms
,
and
thrown
'emselves
wholly
upon
the
General
's
Mercy
;
and
that
even
tho'
the
Breach
be
made
in
their
City
Walls
.
Our
good
Fore-fathers
were
most
strictly
just
as
to
this
particular
;
the
Custom
of
those
Times
making
him
the
Patron
of
a
conquer'd
City
or
People
,
who
first
receiv'd
'em
into
the
Faith
and
Allegiance
of
the
People
of
Rome
.
In
short
,
The
whole
Right
,
and
all
the
Duties
of
War
are
most
religiously
set
down
in
the
[
g
](A33176-e18080-b)
g
The
Feciales
were
a
sort
of
Priests
or
Heralds
among
the
Romans
,
establish'd
by
Numa
,
whose
Business
it
was
to
determin
all
Cases
about
the
Lawfulness
of
War
;
about
Leagues
,
Ambassadors
,
&c.
They
were
sent
to
demand
Satisfaction
of
the
People
that
had
offended
;
they
denounc'd
or
proclaim'd
Wars
;
and
,
in
short
,
nothing
of
that
nature
could
be
done
without
their
Advice
.
Cicero
gives
us
an
account
of
their
Duties
in
his
De
Leg.
2.
9.
Faederum
,
pacis
,
belli
,
induciarum
judices
Feciales
sunto
,
&c.
Fecial
Laws
;
out
of
which
it
is
manifest
,
that
never
any
War
can
be
justly
undertaken
,
unless
Satisfaction
have
been
first
demanded
,
and
Proclamation
of
it
made
publickly
before-hand
.
Poppilius
was
Commander
in
one
of
the
Provinces
,
and
Cato's
Son
a
young
Soldier
under
him
;
and
Poppilius
thinking
fit
to
disband
one
of
his
Legions
,
it
happen'd
to
be
the
same
in
which
the
young
Man
was
,
who
therefore
was
dismiss'd
among
the
rest
of
the
Soldiers
:
But
having
a
mind
to
see
more
of
the
War
;
he
notwithstanding
this
,
continu'd
still
in
the
Army
.
Hereupon
old
Cato
writes
a
Letter
to
Poppilius
,
and
therein
desires
him
,
That
if
he
suffer'd
his
Son
to
remain
in
the
Army
,
he
would
give
him
his
[
h
](A33176-e18230-b)
h
An
Oath
that
was
given
to
the
Soldiers
,
when
they
went
out
to
War
,
(
call'd
Sacr
amentum
)
by
which
they
were
oblig'd
to
be
faithful
to
their
General
,
&c.
See
the
Form
of
it
in
Livy
.
Military
Oath
again
;
for
as
much
the
former
being
void
by
his
Disbanding
,
he
could
not
any
longer
fight
lawfully
with
an
Enemy
:
So
religiously
careful
they
were
in
those
Days
,
of
doing
nothing
that
's
contrary
to
the
Laws
of
War
.
There
is
extant
still
an
Epistle
of
Cato
the
Father's
to
his
Son
,
in
which
he
tells
him
,
That
he
had
heard
of
his
being
Disbanded
by
the
Consul
,
when
he
was
a
Soldier
in
Macedonia
,
in
the
War
with
[
i
](A33176-e18300-b)
i
The
last
King
of
Macedonia
,
beaten
and
led
in
triumph
by
Paulus
Aemilius
,
the
Roman
Consul
,
about
the
Year
of
Rome
586.
See
Plautarch
's
Life
of
Aemilius
.
Perseus
:
and
therefore
he
advises
him
not
,
by
any
means
to
intermeddle
in
a
Battle
;
because
,
he
says
,
't
is
unlawful
for
one
,
that
is
no
longer
a
Soldier
,
to
engage
with
the
Enemy
.
CHAP.
XII
.
The
Civility
of
the
old
Romans
towards
their
Enemies
,
in
giving
'em
the
mildest
Names
:
Some
Wars
are
only
for
Empire
,
others
for
Safety
:
Difference
of
Conduct
to
be
observ'd
in
each
.
A
noble
and
generous
Saying
of
King
Pyrrhus
.
ANd
here
I
can't
but
observe
moreover
,
That
he
who
is
properly
call'd
Perduellis
,
[
a
stubborn
Enemy
]
had
by
our
Ancestors
the
name
of
Hostis
giv'n
him
;
the
gentleness
of
the
Word
somewhat
lessening
the
foulness
and
odium
of
the
Thing
:
for
Hostis
[
an
Enemy
]
among
them
signify'd
the
same
thing
,
that
Peregrinus
[
a
Stranger
]
does
now
amongst
us
;
as
appears
from
the
[
a
](A33176-e18500-b)
a
The
Body
of
the
ancient
Roman
Laws
,
which
were
gather'd
from
the
wisest
Laws
of
all
the
Grecians
,
by
the
Decemviri
created
for
that
purpose
,
about
the
Year
of
Rome
301.
See
the
History
of
'em
in
Livy
,
Book
3.
chap.
33
,
34.
where
he
calls
'em
the
fons
omnis
publici
,
privatique
Juris
;
and
our
Author
in
his
first
Book
de
Orat.
prefers
'em
for
Wisdom
before
whole
Libraries
of
Philosophers
.
Laws
of
the
XII
Tables
,
and
therein
such
sort
of
Expressions
as
these
,
[
b
](A33176-e18580-b)
b
These
are
the
Words
of
two
Laws
,
taken
out
of
the
XII
Tables
;
See
Charondas
de
Leg.
XII
Tab.
The
Meaning
of
the
first
,
is
,
That
whoever
has
got
any
Business
at
Law
with
a
Stranger
,
shall
appoint
a
Day
for
the
Decision
of
it
before-hand
,
that
so
he
may
have
time
to
make
his
Appearance
.
Of
the
second
,
Tho'a
Stranger
had
possess'd
a
Man's
Estate
never
so
long
,
he
should
have
no
Title
to
it
by
way
of
Prescription
;
but
the
rightful
Owner
,
after
never
so
many
Years
,
should
have
Authority
and
Power
to
demand
it
of
him
again
.
Status
dies
cum
hoste
;
and
,
Adversus
hostem
aeterna
auctoritas
.
What
greater
Courtesie
could
be
shewn
than
this
,
to
call
even
an
Enemy
by
only
the
softest
and
most
obliging
Names
?
Tho'
the
Word
is
now
alter'd
,
I
confess
,
from
that
mild
to
an
harsher
Sence
,
Custom
having
chang'd
it
from
what
it
first
properly
signified
,
a
Stranger
,
to
denote
such
a
one
as
bears
Arms
against
us
.
We
have
told
you
[
c
](A33176-e18660-b)
c
In
the
foregoing
Chapter
.
already
what
previous
Causes
and
Conditions
there
should
be
,
before
any
War
can
be
lawful
and
just
;
the
same
are
requir'd
even
in
those
Wars
also
,
which
are
undertaken
meerly
for
Glory
and
Empire
:
But
then
all
Contests
of
this
latter
sort
,
should
be
carried
on
with
less
Heat
and
Animosities
;
for
as
in
the
Differences
that
happen
among
Citizens
,
we
make
a
distinction
between
a
violent
Enemy
,
and
a
generous
Rival
;
(
in
one
case
nothing
but
a
Title
of
Honour
,
in
the
other
our
Lives
and
Reputations
being
concern'd
)
so
did
our
Ancestors
do
in
their
Wars
.
That
which
they
waged
with
the
[
d
](A33176-e18670-b)
d
A
barbarous
and
savage
Nothern
People
,
who
made
an
Inroad
into
Italy
,
and
put
the
Roman
State
into
a
very
great
Fear
;
but
at
last
were
routed
by
Marius
and
Catulus
.
See
Plut.
Life
of
Marius
.
Cimbers
and
[
e
](A33176-e18740-b)
e
A
valiant
and
hardy
People
,
who
from
that
part
of
Gaul
which
was
call'd
Celtick
,
near
the
River
Ligeris
,
went
into
Spain
,
and
there
settled
upon
the
River
Iberus
;
whence
call'd
Celtiberi
.
Numantia
was
their
capital
City
.
Celtibers
,
was
manag'd
as
with
hateful
and
implacable
Enemies
;
the
Question
then
being
,
not
whether
of
the
two
should
remain
a
Conquerour
,
but
whether
should
remain
a
People
at
all
:
Whereas
those
with
the
Latins
,
Carthaginians
;
[
f
](A33176-e18830-b)
f
A
King
of
Epirus
,
who
made
War
upon
the
Romans
,
and
routed
'em
several
times
,
for
the
sake
of
the
Tarentines
,
who
call'd
him
to
their
Assistance
.
His
Life
is
writ
by
Plut.
Pyrrhus
,
&c.
were
only
Quarrels
about
Honour
and
Dominion
.
The
Carthaginians
were
perfidious
and
treacherous
;
Hannibal
their
great
Commander
Cruel
;
but
all
the
rest
more
Faithful
and
Merciful
.
That
Speech
of
Pyrrhus
is
indeed
very
extraordinary
upon
restoring
the
Captives
,
when
he
says
,
[
g
](A33176-e18940-b)
g
This
is
quoted
out
of
the
Poet
Ennius
.
I
neither
Gold
of
you
nor
Price
demand
:
Nor
will
I
chaffer
,
but
fight
out
the
War
:
Let
Steel
,
not
Gold
to
each
their
Fate
decide
.
Whether
to
you
,
or
me
Dame
Fortune
will
The
Vict'ry
grant
;
or
what
the
Chance
of
War
,
Shall
Courage
try
.
And
this
I
add
withal
,
That
freely
I
their
Liberties
restore
To
these
brave
Men
,
whose
Lives
the
War
has
spar'd
.
Freely
I
give
;
do
you
as
freely
take
,
I'
th'
name
of
th'
mighty
Gods
.
A
truly
Royal
and
Princely
Saying
,
and
worthy
of
the
glorious
Family
of
the
[
h
](A33176-e19210-b)
h
The
Descendants
of
Aeacus
,
one
of
the
Judges
of
the
Dead
;
whom
the
Poets
make
Son
of
Jupiter
,
and
Father
of
Peleus
,
who
was
Father
of
Achilles
;
from
whom
this
Pyrrhus
of
Epirus
was
deriv'd
.
Aeacidae
.
CHAP.
XIII
.
Particular
Persons
bound
in
Justice
to
keep
the
Promises
made
to
an
Enemy
.
The
Example
of
Regulus
.
The
Story
of
ten
who
did
the
contrary
:
How
punish'd
by
the
Romans
;
particularly
one
,
who
thought
to
have
escap'd
by
a
Quirk
.
A
noble
Instance
of
the
Roman
Justice
to
King
Pyrrhus
.
Justice
to
be
kept
towards
the
meanest
Slaves
.
Two
Ways
whereby
Injuries
are
done
,
Fraud
and
Force
.
Fraud
the
more
odious
.
To
be
a
Rogue
under
the
Mask
of
Honesty
,
the
greatest
of
Villanies
.
'T
Is
also
the
Duty
of
[
a
](A33176-e19410-b)
a
Thus
far
in
general
of
publick
Justice
to
an
Enemy
:
He
now
proceeds
to
say
,
That
Justice
obliges
particular
Persons
too
,
if
at
any
time
they
have
made
any
Promises
to
their
Enemies
,
afterwards
to
perform
'em
faithfully
.
particular
Persons
,
if
at
any
time
,
forc'd
by
the
necessity
of
their
Circumstances
,
they
have
made
any
Promise
or
Oath
to
an
Enemy
;
afterwards
to
see
that
they
perform
it
faithfully
.
Thus
[
b
](A33176-e19420-b)
b
See
Book
3.
ch.
27.
Regulus
was
taken
in
the
first
Punick
War
by
the
Carthaginians
,
and
sent
by
them
to
Rome
,
about
an
Exchange
of
Prisoners
,
upon
solemn
Oath
given
that
he
would
return
to
'em
again
:
as
soon
then
as
he
was
come
to
Rome
,
he
first
advis'd
the
Senate
against
making
such
a
Change
,
and
when
he
had
done
it
(
tho'
beg'd
on
to
stay
by
his
Friends
and
Relations
)
rather
return'd
to
a
certain
Punishment
,
than
his
Oath
should
be
broken
,
tho'
made
to
an
Enemy
.
But
Hannibal
in
the
second
Carthaginian
War
,
after
our
fatal
Defeat
at
[
c
](A33176-e19520-b)
c
A
little
Village
in
Apulia
,
where
the
Romans
,
under
the
Conduct
of
Paulus
and
Varro
,
were
Overthrown
by
Hawnibal
,
the
Carthaginian
General
.
Cannae
,
sent
ten
to
Rome
under
the
same
Obligation
of
returning
again
,
unless
by
their
Interest
they
could
prevail
with
the
Senate
to
redeem
their
Prisoners
;
who
were
all
by
the
Censors
depriv'd
of
their
Priviledges
as
Free-men
,
and
ty'd
to
pay
such
and
such
Duties
to
the
Publick
as
long
as
they
liv'd
,
for
not
being
true
to
their
Oaths
and
Obligations
.
There
was
one
of
'em
thought
by
a
Trick
to
have
eluded
the
force
of
his
Oath
,
but
was
nevertheless
punish'd
for
all
that
:
His
Shift
was
this
;
Hannibal
had
let
'em
depart
his
Camp
upon
the
Condition
afore-mention'd
;
when
therefore
they
had
gotten
a
little
way
out
of
it
,
what
does
he
do
but
come
back
to
it
again
,
under
colour
of
having
forgot
to
take
something
(
I
know
not
what
)
with
him
:
And
then
away
he
goes
out
again
,
discharg'd
(
as
he
thought
)
from
his
Obligation
of
Returning
.
And
so
,
't
is
very
true
,
he
was
in
Word
,
but
not
in
Reality
;
for
in
all
such
Oaths
we
aren't
to
attend
to
the
meer
Form
of
Words
,
but
the
true
Design
and
Intention
of
'em
.
But
the
greatest
Example
of
Justice
to
an
Enemy
,
was
shewn
by
our
Ancestors
towards
King
Pyrrhus
:
[
d
](A33176-e19630-b)
d
See
Ch.
4.
and
22.
of
Book
3.
There
came
a
Deserter
out
of
Pyrrhus's
Camp
,
and
offer'd
the
Senate
to
dispatch
him
with
Poyson
;
which
they
and
Fabricius
were
so
far
from
accepting
of
,
that
they
gave
him
up
again
as
a
Traitor
to
his
Master
.
Thus
we
may
see
,
that
they
would
not
allow
of
any
unjust
way
of
Dealing
,
tho
for
the
Death
of
a
powerful
and
invading
Adversary
:
And
so
much
for
the
Duties
required
in
War
.
There
is
one
part
of
[
e
](A33176-e19690-b)
e
He
has
shewen
there
are
Rules
of
Justice
to
be
observ'd
,
towards
those
that
have
injur'd
us
,
and
our
very
Enemies
:
Here
he
proceeds
to
a
third
sort
of
People
they
are
to
be
observ'd
towards
,
viz.
Slaves
.
Justice
remaining
behind
,
and
which
ought
by
no
means
to
be
forgotten
by
us
;
I
mean
that
towards
the
lowest
and
meanest
sort
of
People
:
And
these
are
more
especially
those
we
call
our
Slaves
;
in
relation
to
whom
,
't
is
a
very
good
Rule
that
is
given
by
some
Men
,
That
we
should
use
'em
no
otherwise
than
we
do
our
Day-labourers
,
Make
'em
first
do
their
Work
,
and
then
pay
'em
honestly
what
they
have
earn'd
.
In
fine
,
To
close
up
this
Discourse
of
Justice
,
There
are
two
Ways
or
Methods
,
whereby
one
Man
may
Injure
or
Oppress
another
;
the
one
is
Eraud
and
Subtlety
,
the
other
open
Force
and
Violence
;
the
former
of
which
is
held
the
part
of
a
Fox
,
and
the
latter
of
a
Lyon
:
Both
of
'em
certainly
very
unworthy
of
a
reasonable
Creature
;
tho'
Fraud
,
I
think
,
is
the
more
odious
of
the
two
.
But
of
all
Injustice
,
theirs
is
certainly
of
the
deepest
Dye
;
who
make
it
their
Business
to
appear
honest
Men
,
even
whilst
they
are
practising
the
greatest
of
Villanies
.
CHAP.
XIV
.
Of
Liberality
,
the
second
part
of
general
Justice
.
Three
Cautions
to
be
observ'd
concerning
it
.
'T
is
not
Liberality
,
to
bestow
upon
one
,
what
is
wrongfully
taken
from
another
;
nor
what
ought
to
have
rather
been
given
to
our
Relations
;
nor
to
give
out
of
Vain-glory
.
Bounty
should
be
proportion'd
to
the
Merit
of
the
Receiver
,
which
is
of
several
sorts
.
WE
have
now
gone
thro'
with
the
Subject
of
Justice
,
it
[
a
](A33176-e19790-b)
a
In
Chap.
7.
he
divided
Justice
,
taken
in
its
largest
Extent
,
into
Justice
strictly
so
call'd
,
and
Liberality
:
Having
now
finish'd
his
Discourse
upon
the
former
of
these
,
he
proceeds
to
the
latter
in
this
Chapter
,
about
which
he
first
lays
down
three
Cautions
.
remains
in
the
next
place
(
to
go
on
according
to
our
Method
propos'd
)
that
we
say
something
likewise
of
Bounty
and
Liberality
,
than
which
there
is
nothing
more
nearly
ally'd
to
the
Nature
of
Man
.
But
then
we
must
observe
these
following
Cautions
:
First
,
That
we
take
care
in
all
Acts
of
Bounty
,
that
they
ben't
[
b
](A33176-e19830-b)
b
As
those
who
lend
or
give
Money
to
young
Spendthrifts
,
to
help
'em
forward
and
encourage
'em
in
their
ill
Courses
,
or
the
like
;
which
is
really
a
very
great
Injury
to
'em
.
prejudicial
to
those
we
would
oblige
by
'em
,
nor
to
any
other
Body
.
Secondly
,
That
we
don
't
in
our
Bounty
and
Liberality
go
beyond
our
Estates
.
And
,
Thirdly
,
That
we
duely
proportion
our
Kindness
,
according
to
every
Man's
Merit
and
Deserts
.
[
c
](A33176-e19860-b)
c
Having
laid
down
his
three
Cautions
,
he
proceeds
in
order
to
say
something
upon
each
of
'em
.
I
take
the
Id
enim
therefore
to
referr
to
his
first
Caution
,
That
our
Bounty
ben't
really
a
Prejudice
to
any
one
;
for
to
do
no
Wrong
he
laid
down
before
,
[
chap.
7.
and
10.
]
as
the
first
fundamental
Principle
of
Justice
.
His
Caution
was
,
that
our
Bounty
should
not
be
Hurtful
,
and
here
he
gives
his
Reason
for
it
,
Id
enim
,
&c.
i.
e.
For
not
to
Hurt
or
Injure
any
body
is
the
first
and
fundamental
Rule
of
Justice
,
which
Justice
ought
to
be
the
Measure
of
Bounty
;
nothing
being
Liberal
(
as
he
afterwards
observes
)
but
what
is
agreeable
to
the
Rules
of
Justice
.
And
first
of
the
former
,
which
is
grounded
upon
the
great
and
fundamental
Principle
of
all
Justice
,
to
which
this
Duty
in
all
its
particular
Instances
should
be
referr'd
.
For
he
who
pretending
to
do
one
a
Kindness
,
does
that
which
is
really
a
Prejudice
to
him
,
is
indeed
so
far
from
being
Kind
and
Obliging
,
as
that
he
ought
to
be
counted
a
most
pernicious
Flatterer
:
and
to
do
any
manner
of
Injury
to
one
,
that
you
may
shew
your
Generosity
and
Bounty
to
another
,
is
just
one
and
the
same
sort
of
Roguery
and
Injustice
,
as
to
Enrich
your self
by
the
Spoils
of
your
Neighbour
.
Yet
this
is
the
Fault
of
a
great
many
People
,
and
especially
those
who
are
desirous
of
Glory
,
to
take
away
from
some
that
which
justly
belongs
to
'em
,
that
so
they
may
have
to
bestow
upon
others
;
and
they
're
apt
to
think
'emselves
extreamly
bountiful
,
if
they
Enrich
their
Adherents
by
any
manner
of
means
.
But
this
is
so
far
from
being
a
Duty
of
Liberality
,
that
nothing
in
the
World
can
be
more
contrary
to
it
.
It
ought
to
be
therefore
our
first
care
in
Giving
,
That
what
we
bestow
be
a
real
Advantage
and
Kindness
to
our
Friend
,
and
no
ways
an
Injury
to
any
third
Person
.
That
Action
therefore
of
[
d
](A33176-e19950-b)
d
The
first
after
he
had
conquer'd
Pompey
the
Great
;
and
the
second
after
he
had
conquer'd
Marius
in
their
Civil
Wars
.
Caesar
and
Sylla's
,
in
taking
away
Estates
from
the
rightful
Proprietors
,
and
giving
'em
to
others
who
had
nothing
to
do
with
'em
,
ought
by
no
means
to
be
accounted
Liberal
;
for
nothing
can
ever
be
truly
such
,
that
is
not
at
the
same
time
Just
and
Honest.
A
[
e
](A33176-e20000-b)
e
Here
he
comes
to
his
second
Rule
to
be
observ'd
in
Giving
.
second
Caution
to
be
observ'd
was
this
,
That
our
Bounty
ben't
suffer'd
to
exceed
our
Abilities
;
for
they
who
give
more
than
their
Estates
will
allow
of
,
are
,
in
the
first
place
,
[
f
](A33176-e20030-b)
f
For
't
is
our
Duty
in
the
first
place
to
provide
for
our
Relations
,
and
those
who
more
immediately
depend
upon
us
.
See
the
latter
end
of
Chap.
17.
injurious
to
their
own
Relations
,
by
spending
that
Wealth
upon
other
People
,
which
should
rather
have
been
given
,
or
left
to
them
.
Beside
that
this
over-great
Bounty
in
Giving
,
is
usually
accompany'd
with
an
answerable
Desire
and
Greediness
of
Getting
;
which
often
proceeds
even
to
down-right
Oppression
,
that
so
Men
may
have
wherewithal
to
supply
this
extravagant
Humor
.
One
may
also
observe
in
a
great
many
People
,
that
they
take
a
sort
of
Pride
in
being
counted
Magnificent
,
and
give
very
plentifully
,
not
from
any
generous
Principle
in
their
Natures
,
but
only
to
appear
Great
in
the
Eye
of
the
World
;
so
that
all
their
Bounty
is
resolv'd
into
nothing
but
meer
Outside
and
Pretence
,
and
is
nearer
of
kin
to
Vanity
and
Folly
,
that
't
is
to
either
Liberality
or
Honesty
.
[
g
](A33176-e20050-b)
g
The
third
Caution
to
be
observ'd
in
Giving
,
The
Merits
,
&c.
These
are
to
be
judg'd
of
from
four
Heads
,
which
he
treats
of
in
order
.
The
third
Caution
was
,
That
our
Bounty
should
be
proportion'd
to
the
Merits
of
the
Receiver
:
In
judging
of
which
,
we
are
first
to
consider
the
Man's
Honesty
or
Manners
;
secondly
,
the
Good-will
he
bears
towards
us
;
thirdly
,
the
nearness
of
Relation
,
or
Society
that
is
between
us
;
and
,
lastly
,
the
Benefits
we
have
formerly
receiv'd
from
him
.
'T
is
desirable
that
all
these
Inducements
might
concur
in
the
same
Person
;
but
when
they
do
not
,
we
should
bestow
our
Kindness
more
especially
on
him
,
in
whom
we
find
the
most
,
and
weightiest
of
'em
.
CHAP.
XV.
Honesty
,
the
first
sort
of
Merit
.
We
aren't
to
expect
we
shall
find
perfectly
good
Men.
Modesty
,
Temperance
,
&c.
more
especially
to
be
regarded
.
How
we
should
judge
of
Men's
Good-will
towards
us
.
Gratitude
a
most
necessary
Duty
:
We
should
imitate
fruitful
Fields
,
by
returning
more
than
we
have
receiv'd
.
How
to
judge
of
the
Value
of
any
Kindness
:
Those
to
be
least
esteem'd
that
are
done
rashly
and
inconsiderately
.
We
should
do
most
for
those
that
stand
in
greatest
need
,
if
they
are
otherwise
deserving
.
[
a
](A33176-e20200-b)
a
The
first
thing
we
are
to
judge
a
Man's
Merits
by
,
is
his
Honesty
or
good
Manners
;
in
which
particular
we
aren't
to
stay
,
till
we
find
perfectly
Good
,
or
Wise
Men.
NOw
seeing
we
don't
live
amongst
such
as
,
are
perfectly
and
fully
Wise
,
but
such
as
are
thought
to
have
done
very
well
,
if
they
are
but
,
as
't
were
,
the
rough
Draughts
of
Virtue
;
we
ought
to
consider
,
I
think
,
in
the
first
place
,
That
no
one
should
wholly
be
neglected
in
this
case
,
in
whom
there
appears
any
shadow
or
resemblance
of
real
Honesty
;
but
that
those
Men
ought
to
be
principally
regarded
,
who
excel
in
the
quiet
and
more
peaceable
Virtues
of
Modesty
,
Temperance
,
and
especially
this
[
b
](A33176-e20240-b)
b
From
Chap.
7.
He
takes
Justice
here
,
as
in
several
other
places
,
in
the
larger
Sence
,
as
it
contains
Liberality
,
Gratitude
,
&c.
Justice
,
of
which
I
have
now
been
discoursing
a
great
while
.
[
c
](A33176-e20260-b)
c
This
he
gives
as
a
Reason
of
what
he
just
now
said
,
That
Modesty
,
&c.
should
be
most
regarded
.
For
most
times
Greatness
of
Spirit
and
Courage
,
unless
it
be
in
those
who
are
perfectly
Wise
and
Virtuous
,
is
something
too
hot
and
apt
to
boil
over
;
the
others
are
the
Virtues
,
which
seem
more
peculiarly
to
constitute
a
Good
Man
.
And
so
much
for
the
first
sort
of
Merit
to
be
consider'd
,
viz.
The
Manners
or
Honesty
of
the
Person
we
would
be
Kind
to
.
The
[
d
](A33176-e20300-b)
d
Here
he
proceeds
to
the
second
of
his
four
Grounds
of
Merit
,
The
Good-will
,
&c.
second
was
,
The
Good-will
which
he
bears
towards
us
;
as
to
which
it
should
always
be
our
principal
care
,
to
do
most
for
him
,
by
whom
we
are
most
belov'd
:
Now
in
judging
of
the
Good-will
that
any
one
bears
us
,
we
are
not
to
consider
(
like
Boys
and
Children
)
any
sudden
flashes
and
heats
of
Passion
,
but
rather
a
constant
and
well-setled
Affection
.
But
if
a
Man
,
[
e
](A33176-e20340-b)
e
This
is
the
fourth
thing
to
be
consider'd
in
judging
of
a
Man's
Merits
,
The
Benefits
,
&c.
He
discourses
of
this
in
the
third
place
,
because
(
I
suppose
)
the
next
will
take
up
so
much
room
,
that
if
this
had
come
after
it
,
't
would
have
look'd
too
far
distant
from
the
other
two
foregoing
.
in
the
next
place
,
has
done
us
any
real
Service
,
so
that
our
part
is
to
make
a
Requital
,
and
not
first
to
lay
an
Obligation
upon
him
,
't
is
then
our
Duty
to
take
some
greater
care
;
for
of
all
the
Virtues
,
there
's
none
we
are
more
necessarily
oblig'd
to
,
than
Gratitude
.
If
then
,
according
to
[
f
](A33176-e20380-b)
f
An
ancient
Greek
Poet
,
born
at
Ascra
,
a
Town
in
Baeotia
,
thence
call'd
Ascraeus
Senex
.
Some
think
he
was
older
than
Homer
,
tho'
Paterculus
makes
him
a
Hundred
and
twenty
Years
younger
.
His
Works
are
still
extant
.
Hesiod's
Rule
,
even
that
which
was
nothing
but
barely
lent
us
,
is
,
if
possible
,
to
be
return'd
back
with
Interest
again
;
what
abundant
Returns
should
we
make
to
those
,
by
whom
we
have
been
freely
and
generously
Oblig'd
?
What
less
can
we
do
than
be
like
fruitful
Fields
,
which
produce
,
beyond
comparison
more
than
was
thrown
into
'em
?
And
if
we
do
Services
even
to
those
Men
,
from
whom
we
hope
afterwards
to
receive
any
Favours
;
ought
we
not
much
more
to
do
the
same
to
those
,
from
whose
forward
Kindness
we
have
already
receiv'd
'em
?
For
the
Virtue
of
Liberality
containing
under
it
these
two
Parts
;
in
the
first
place
,
The
doing
a
Kindness
to
any
one
;
and
,
secondly
,
The
requiting
it
when
done
to
us
;
whether
we
'll
perform
the
former
or
not
,
is
altogether
left
to
our
own
Choice
;
but
every
Good
[
g
](A33176-e20480-b)
g
Every
Good
Man
's
oblig'd
to
be
Charitable
too
,
according
to
his
Abilities
,
as
well
as
Grateful
:
but
with
this
difference
,
That
he
can
choose
whether
he
'll
bestow
his
Kindnesses
upon
this
,
or
that
,
or
t'other
Person
;
but
he
's
bound
to
return
'em
to
those
very
Men
,
by
whom
he
was
oblig'd
.
Man
's
oblig'd
to
the
latter
,
when
e're
he
can
do
it
[
h
](A33176-e20530-b)
h
Otherwise
not
:
nothing
being
Liberal
in
this
sence
of
the
Word
,
as
it
comprehends
Gratitude
,
that
is
not
Just.
without
Injustice
.
But
then
we
're
to
make
a
distinction
between
Benefits
,
and
are
there
bound
to
make
the
most
ample
Returns
,
where
the
Obligations
we
have
receiv'd
are
the
greatest
.
And
to
judge
of
the
Merits
of
any
Kindness
,
we
are
chiefly
to
consider
in
what
manner
it
was
done
;
as
whether
freely
,
considerately
and
from
a
Principle
of
Good-nature
.
For
several
People
do
many
things
Rashly
,
.
and
with
a
blind
sort
of
Impulse
;
throwing
away
their
Favours
upon
all
without
distinction
;
being
hurried
about
,
as
it
were
with
a
Tempest
,
by
every
mad
and
frolicksome
Humour
,
and
every
sudden
or
impetuous
Passion
.
A
Benefit
therefore
,
when
receiv'd
from
such
a
one
,
is
not
to
be
esteem'd
of
an
equal
Value
,
with
those
that
proceed
from
a
setled
Judgment
and
due
Consideration
.
But
our
principal
Duty
both
in
doing
of
Kindnesses
and
making
Requitals
,
is
,
To
do
most
for
those
that
stand
in
greatest
need
of
it
,
supposing
all
Circumstances
else
to
be
equal
:
the
contrary
to
which
appears
plainly
in
the
Practice
and
Actions
of
the
most
part
of
Men
;
for
,
People
choose
to
bestow
their
Favours
,
upon
those
from
whom
they
expect
to
receive
the
most
Benefits
,
tho'
the
Persons
perhaps
don
't
at
all
stand
in
need
of
'em
.
CHAP.
XVI
.
We
should
be
most
ready
to
give
to
those
,
who
are
most
nearly
ally'd
to
us
.
The
first
sort
of
Alliance
is
that
between
all
Men
in
general
.
The
Bond
of
it
,
and
Duties
resulting
from
it
.
We
're
bound
to
do
for
any
Man
what
will
be
a
Kindness
to
him
,
and
no
Prejudice
to
our selves
;
but
with
this
Caution
,
That
we
don't
thereby
make
our selves
unable
to
assist
those
,
who
are
more
nearly
ally'd
to
us
.
THe
[
a
](A33176-e20610-b)
a
He
now
proceeds
to
the
fourth
,
but
third
plac'd
[
See
ch.
14.
]
Ground
of
a
Man's
Meriting
of
us
,
The
Nearness
,
&c.
I
have
added
some
Words
to
the
beginning
of
the
Chapter
,
to
make
the
Connexion
with
that
foregoing
appear
the
better
.
fourth
Inducement
remaining
to
be
spoke
to
,
is
,
The
nearness
of
Relation
,
or
Society
that
is
amongst
Men
;
for
the
maintenance
of
which
,
we
can't
do
better
,
than
to
give
most
to
those
,
that
stand
nearest
related
to
us
.
But
that
we
may
consider
,
with
greater
distinctness
,
the
natural
Principles
of
Human
Society
,
we
shall
here
trace
it
down
from
the
Fountain
head
.
The
first
thing
then
to
be
taken
notice
of
is
this
,
[
b
](A33176-e20650-b)
b
The
first
and
most
comprehensive
Society
,
is
that
,
which
is
between
all
Men
,
consider'd
barely
as
they
are
Men
:
By
which
we
are
oblig'd
to
all
those
things
,
which
we
call
Acts
of
meer
Humanity
;
such
as
doing
good
to
another
,
when
't
will
be
no
prejudice
to
our selves
,
which
by
the
Moralists
are
call'd
,
Res
innoxiae
utilitatis
,
of
which
he
gives
several
Instances
in
this
Chapter
.
That
there
is
such
a
thing
as
a
Fellowship
or
Society
between
all
Men
in
general
:
The
Bond
or
Cement
that
holds
this
together
,
is
Reason
and
Discourse
,
which
by
Teaching
,
Learning
,
Communicating
one
with
another
,
&c.
easily
make
Men
agree
together
,
and
unite
'em
all
in
one
natural
sort
of
Conjunction
and
Community
.
Nor
does
any
thing
set
us
at
a
greater
distance
from
the
Nature
of
Beasts
:
for
we
oftentimes
talk
of
the
Courage
of
them
,
such
as
Lyons
and
Horses
;
but
never
a
word
of
their
Equity
,
Justice
or
Goodness
;
And
why
is
this
;
but
[
c
](A33176-e20720-b)
c
Reason
and
Discourse
are
the
Bonds
of
Society
:
where
they
are
wanting
therefore
,
there
can
be
no
Society
,
and
by
consequence
no
Justice
,
Equity
,
&c.
which
are
the
Virtues
that
consist
in
preserving
Society
.
because
they
are
destitute
of
Reason
and
Discourse
?
This
is
then
the
largest
and
most
comprehensive
of
all
Societies
,
being
made
up
of
Men
consider'd
barely
as
such
,
and
so
taking
in
even
the
whole
Race
and
Kind
of
'em
one
with
another
:
the
[
d
](A33176-e20740-b)
d
The
Duties
incumbent
on
us
by
virtue
of
this
Society
are
,
First
,
To
let
every
one
have
a
share
in
those
things
,
which
by
Nature
are
common
;
and
what
these
are
,
he
tells
us
immediately
.
Secondly
,
Not
to
break
in
upon
another's
Property
.
Thirdly
,
In
those
things
which
are
made
our
own
,
and
become
a
Property
,
to
be
communicative
,
&c.
What
he
means
by
E
quibus
ipsis
,
&c.
I
confess
I
don
't
very
well
understand
,
neither
do
any
of
the
Commentators
tell
me
;
but
I
take
the
meaning
of
it
to
be
,
as
I
have
translated
it
:
so
that
quibus
should
relate
to
quae
descripta
sunt
legibus
,
the
things
that
are
every
one
's
own
by
Laws
:
Concerning
which
his
first
Rule
was
,
That
we
should
not
break
in
upon
another's
Right
;
and
then
as
to
all
other
cases
about
'em
,
he
only
puts
us
in
mind
of
the
Greek
Proverb
;
the
meaning
of
which
is
,
That
we
should
all
count
our selves
Friends
to
one
another
,
and
practice
accordingly
.
Duties
of
which
are
,
To
let
every
one
have
a
share
in
those
things
,
which
by
Nature
were
produc'd
for
the
common
Advantage
and
Benefit
of
all
;
To
let
what
's
already
determin'd
by
Laws
,
and
civil
Constitutions
,
remain
as
it
is
,
without
breaking
in
upon
any
Man
's
Right
;
as
to
which
things
however
we
should
remember
a
Rule
,
which
is
now
among
the
Greeks
become
an
usual
Proverb
,
All
things
in
common
amongst
Friends
.
But
perhaps
you
may
ask
,
what
kind
of
things
we
suppose
them
to
be
,
which
ought
to
be
common
to
all
Mankind
:
Ennius
has
given
us
one
Instance
of
'em
,
which
may
easily
be
apply'd
to
a
great
many
others
:
He
who
directs
the
wandring
Traveller
,
Doth
,
as
't
were
,
light
another's
Torch
by
his
own
;
Which
gives
him
ne're
the
less
of
Light
,
for
that
It
gave
another
.
By
this
one
Case
he
sufficiently
teaches
us
,
That
whatever
Kindness
can
be
done
for
another
,
without
any
Damage
or
Loss
to
our selves
,
't
is
our
Duty
to
do
it
,
tho'
to
never
so
much
a
Stranger
.
From
hence
have
arisen
those
general
Maxims
and
Principles
of
Humanity
,
Not
to
deny
one
a
little
Running-water
;
or
,
The
lighting
his
Fire
by
ours
,
if
he
has
occasion
:
To
give
the
best
Counsel
we
are
able
to
one
who
is
in
Doubt
or
Distress
;
which
are
things
that
do
Good
to
the
Person
that
receives
them
,
and
are
no
Loss
or
Trouble
to
him
that
confers
them
.
Such
things
therefore
,
being
by
Nature
common
,
should
accordingly
be
kept
open
for
the
free
use
of
all
Men
:
And
of
those
which
are
our
own
we
should
always
be
giving
something
,
that
may
contribute
to
the
Benefit
and
Welfare
of
the
whole
.
[
e
](A33176-e20970-b)
e
He
puts
in
a
necessary
Caution
about
Giving
,
and
letting
our
Things
be
in
common
;
which
he
would
have
us
carry
no
further
than
Ennius's
Rule
prescribes
;
that
is
,
We
should
not
be
so
Communicative
and
Open-hearted
to
all
in
general
,
as
to
impoverish
our selves
,
and
put
it
out
of
our
Power
to
assist
those
,
who
are
more
nearly
ally'd
to
us
.
We
must
light
indeed
another's
Candle
by
ours
,
but
not
so
as
to
lose
our
own
Light
by
it
.
Here
we
must
proceed
by
the
Measures
of
Prudence
and
Charity
.
But
because
the
Revenues
of
Particulars
are
small
,
and
there
are
infinite
numbers
of
those
that
Want
,
therefore
is
[
f
](A33176-e20990-b)
f
Viz.
That
of
always
Giving
something
out
of
what
is
our
own
,
for
the
general
Benefit
.
this
universal
Bounty
to
be
kept
within
the
Limits
prescrib'd
by
Ennius
,
It
gives
him
ne'r
the
less
of
Light
;
that
so
we
may
have
it
within
our
Power
,
to
be
Liberal
to
those
that
are
more
nearly
ally'd
to
us
.
CHAP.
XVII
.
Several
other
Degrees
of
Relation
,
less
extensive
than
that
mention'd
in
the
former
Chapter
.
That
of
Friendship
the
most
closely
knit
.
The
Ground
and
Foundation
of
true
Friendship
.
The
Relation
arising
from
doing
Kindnesses
to
one
another
.
The
Love
a
Man
has
for
his
Native
Country
swallows
up
all
other
Loves
whatever
.
Which
of
the
several
Relatives
we
ought
to
prefer
,
in
our
Liberality
and
doing
Kindnesses
.
A
Description
of
Friendship
;
and
of
all
Friendships
,
which
is
most
pleasant
.
[
a
](A33176-e21080-b)
a
He
now
proceeds
to
reckon
up
the
several
Degrees
of
Nearness
or
Relation
among
Men
;
that
so
we
may
know
to
whom
we
are
oblig'd
to
be
most
Liberal
,
upon
this
last
account
of
Merit
,
viz.
Nearness
of
Relation
.
BUt
there
are
several
Degrees
of
Society
and
Fellowship
amongst
Mankind
;
for
to
take
now
our
leave
of
that
general
and
universal
one
already
mention'd
,
there
's
a
nearer
among
those
who
are
all
of
the
same
Country
,
Nation
or
Language
;
than
which
,
nothing
more
knits
and
unites
Men
to
one
another
.
There
is
a
closer
yet
among
those
,
who
are
all
of
the
same
City
;
for
a
great
many
things
are
in
common
to
Fellow-citizens
,
such
as
Markets
,
Temples
,
Walks
,
Ways
,
Laws
,
Privileges
,
Courts
of
Justice
,
Freedom
of
Votes
,
besides
common
Meetings
and
Familiarities
,
and
abundance
of
Business
and
Entercourse
with
one
another
.
But
there
's
a
stricter
Bond
of
Alliance
still
,
between
those
who
belong
to
the
same
Family
,
as
taking
into
it
but
a
very
small
part
of
that
vast
and
immense
one
of
all
Mankind
.
For
there
being
by
Nature
implanted
in
all
things
a
certain
Desire
of
Begetting
their
Like
,
the
closest
and
nearest
of
all
Societies
is
between
Man
and
Wife
;
then
follows
that
between
them
and
their
Children
▪
and
afterwards
that
of
the
whole
Family
,
who
inhabit
together
,
and
have
all
things
in
common
;
which
is
,
as
it
were
,
the
first
beginning
of
a
City
,
and
Ground
or
Seed-plot
of
a
whole
Common-wealth
.
Next
to
this
comes
the
Bond
of
Relation
between
Brothers
;
as
also
between
first
and
second
Cosins
;
who
growing
too
numerous
to
live
in
the
same
House
,
are
sent
out
to
others
,
as
it
were
into
new
Colonies
.
Next
after
this
follow
Marriages
and
Alliances
,
and
so
a
new
Stock
of
Relations
that
way
;
from
whence
comes
a
new
Propagation
and
Off-spring
,
which
serves
to
give
rise
,
as
was
said
,
to
Commonwealths
.
Now
that
nearness
of
Blood
,
and
the
natural
Love
which
arises
from
it
,
can't
but
endear
Men
to
one
another
,
is
past
all
doubt
;
't
is
a
very
great
matter
to
have
the
same
[
b
](A33176-e21120-b)
b
The
Images
,
&c.
of
their
Ancestors
,
which
were
kept
for
the
Honour
of
all
the
Family
,
into
how
many
Branches
soever
divided
.
Relicks
and
Monuments
of
our
Ancestors
;
to
make
use
of
the
same
[
c
](A33176-e21140-b)
c
Private
Sacrifices
or
Ceremonies
belonging
to
such
or
such
Families
in
particular
,
which
the
Publick
in
general
was
no
ways
concern'd
in
:
Cui
praeter
cognatos
&
affines
nemo
interponebatur
,
says
Valer.
Max.
Book
2.
ch.
1.
And
Livy
speaks
of
a
Statum
Genti
Fabiae
Sacrificium
,
a
solemn
Sacrifice
belonging
to
the
Fabian
Family
,
Book
5.
ch.
46.
religious
Ceremonies
,
and
be
laid
after
death
in
the
same
place
of
Burial
:
But
of
all
the
Societies
and
Unions
amongst
Men
,
there
is
none
more
excellent
or
more
closely
knit
,
than
when
such
as
are
Men
of
real
Virtue
and
Honesty
,
from
a
certain
agreement
and
likeness
of
their
Manners
,
contract
a
Familiarity
and
Friendship
one
with
another
.
For
Virtue
and
Goodness
(
as
we
often
observe
)
of
necessity
moves
us
where-ever
we
see
it
;
and
makes
us
all
have
a
Love
and
Respect
for
that
Person
,
in
whom
we
discover
it
.
And
as
every
Virtue
thus
wins
upon
our
Hearts
,
and
even
forces
us
to
Love
those
we
take
to
possess
it
;
so
more
especially
do
Justice
and
Beneficence
.
But
when
[
d
](A33176-e21220-b)
d
Every
Man
has
a
Kindness
for
himself
,
and
is
in
some
measure
pleas'd
with
his
own
Qualities
and
Way
of
Living
;
when
therefore
he
sees
another
with
the
same
Qualities
,
and
that
follows
after
the
same
Way
of
Life
,
he
presently
conceives
him
as
it
were
another
self
,
and
is
accordingly
pleas'd
with
him
too
;
which
seems
to
be
the
Reason
why
Like
(
as
we
say
)
loves
to
join
with
Like
.
When
several
therefore
have
the
same
Virtues
and
Perfections
in
'em
,
every
one
is
pleas'd
with
all
the
rest
,
as
with
himself
,
and
they
all
become
(
as
it
were
)
one
and
the
same
Person
,
which
is
what
Pythagoras
thought
the
Perfection
of
Friendship
.
See
Aristot.
Eth.
Nichom
.
Book
8.
ch.
4.
from
which
this
seems
to
have
been
taken
.
several
Persons
are
all
like
one
another
in
Honesty
and
good
Manners
,
then
no
Society
can
ever
be
more
loving
,
or
more
closely
united
.
For
where
there
are
many
of
the
same
Humour
,
and
same
Inclinations
;
every
one
sees
,
in
some
measure
,
his
own
self
,
and
is
accordingly
delighted
,
in
the
Person
of
another
;
and
that
's
brought
about
,
which
Pythagoras
thought
the
Perfection
of
all
Friendship
,
That
a
great
many
Severals
are
made
into
One.
There
's
another
remarkable
Fellowship
or
Community
,
arising
from
an
Entercourse
of
doing
and
receiving
Benefits
;
which
while
't
is
kept
up
by
a
mutual
Gratitude
and
Kindness
of
all
the
Parties
,
can't
but
occasion
a
firm
and
very
lasting
Agreement
between
'em
.
But
when
we
have
gone
over
all
the
Relations
that
are
in
the
World
,
and
thro'ly
consider'd
the
Nature
of
each
,
we
shall
find
that
there
's
no
one
of
greater
Obligation
,
no
one
that
's
dearer
and
nearer
to
us
,
than
that
which
we
all
of
us
bear
to
the
Publick
.
We
have
a
tender
Concern
and
Regard
for
our
Parents
,
for
our
Children
,
our
Kindred
and
Acquaintance
;
but
the
Love
which
we
have
for
our
Native
Country
swallows
up
all
other
Loves
whatever
;
for
which
there
is
no
honest
Man
but
would
Die
,
if
by
his
Death
he
could
do
it
any
necessary
Service
.
How
detestable
[
e
](A33176-e21340-b)
e
For
the
greater
Obligation
they
had
to
their
Country
,
the
greater
their
Wickedness
was
in
Destroying
it
.
then
must
the
Wickedness
and
Barbarity
of
those
People
be
,
who
have
mangled
and
rent
this
their
Native
Country
by
all
manner
of
Villanies
;
and
[
f
](A33176-e21350-b)
f
He
means
Julius
Caesar.
have
made
it
their
Business
(
nay
,
and
[
g
](A33176-e21370-b)
g
Marck
Anthony
and
his
Adherents
.
still
do
so
)
to
bring
it
to
Ruine
and
utter
Desolation
?
[
h
](A33176-e21390-b)
h
Having
thus
laid
down
the
several
Relations
,
that
we
have
in
the
World
,
he
proceeds
to
shew
how
we
should
carry
our selves
in
'em
;
by
giving
the
Preference
to
our
Country
,
&c.
Now
if
there
should
happen
any
Contest
or
Competition
between
these
Relations
,
which
of
'em
should
have
the
greatest
share
of
our
Duty
;
we
should
pay
the
first
Regard
to
our
[
i
](A33176-e21410-b)
i
Before
even
our
Parents
;
for
the
Welfare
of
these
is
contain'd
in
,
and
depends
upon
that
of
our
Country
;
which
should
it
be
ruin'd
,
our
Parents
and
every
thing
else
must
of
course
follow
after
it
.
Country
and
Parents
,
from
whom
we
have
receiv'd
the
most
endearing
Obligations
;
the
next
to
our
Children
and
Family
,
who
all
have
their
Eyes
upon
us
alone
,
and
have
no
Body
else
they
can
depend
upon
;
next
in
order
to
these
come
our
Kindred
and
Relations
,
whose
Fortune
is
generally
the
same
with
our
own
.
To
each
of
these
therefore
,
whom
I
have
just
now
mention'd
,
we
most
of
all
owe
what
is
necessary
for
their
subsistence
:
But
then
,
as
for
Living
and
Eating
together
,
for
mutual
Advising
,
Discourse
,
Exhortation
,
Comforting
,
and
sometimes
(
if
occasion
serves
)
[
k
](A33176-e21430-b)
k
Solomon
therefore
incomparably
well
,
Prov.
27.
v.
6.
calls
Rebukes
,
The
Wounds
of
a
Friend
;
which
he
says
are
faithful
;
while
the
Kisses
of
an
Enemy
are
full
of
deceit
.
Rebuking
,
Friendship
is
the
properest
Soil
for
them
;
and
of
all
kinds
of
Friendship
,
there
is
none
so
pleasant
,
as
that
which
is
cemented
by
a
Likeness
of
Manners
.
CHAP.
XVIII
.
In
Liberality
the
Necessity
of
the
Person
is
especially
to
be
consider'd
.
Some
Kindnesses
due
to
some
Relatives
more
than
to
others
.
Rules
signifie
but
little
of
themselves
,
unless
they
are
confirm'd
by
Practice
and
Exercise
.
Greatness
of
Soul
,
the
third
general
Virtue
,
most
glorious
and
splendid
of
'em
all
.
Is
most
of
all
prais'd
,
and
its
contrary
disprais'd
among
Men.
[
a
](A33176-e21550-b)
a
He
has
shewn
toward
whom
and
how
we
ought
chiefly
to
exercise
our
Liberality
;
but
because
particular
Circumstances
may
make
some
alteration
,
he
gives
us
a
Rule
or
two
for
our
Direction
about
them
.
BUt
in
all
these
Duties
of
Beneficence
and
Liberality
,
one
principal
thing
to
be
taken
notice
of
is
,
What
Necessity
the
Person
we
would
be
Kind
to
lies
under
,
and
what
he
is
able
or
not
able
to
do
,
without
our
Assistance
:
So
that
in
some
cases
,
the
present
Posture
and
Circumstances
of
a
Man's
Condition
,
ought
more
to
prevail
with
us
,
than
the
Degrees
of
Relation
.
Again
,
There
are
certain
particular
Offices
,
which
are
more
peculiarly
owing
to
some
one
sort
of
Relatives
,
than
they
are
to
another
:
In
the
Business
(
for
Example
)
of
getting
in
his
Corn
,
't
is
our
Duty
rather
to
assist
a
[
b
](A33176-e21560-b)
b
Because
getting
in
of
Corn
is
a
thing
that
more
peculiarly
seems
to
be
a
part
of
Neighbourhood
;
and
has
nothing
to
do
with
Friendship
and
Kindred
,
&c.
next
Neghbour
,
than
either
a
Brother
or
familiar
Friend
:
but
if
the
Business
be
a
Case
at
Law
,
then
a
Kinsman
or
Friend
must
rather
be
defended
,
than
only
a
next
Neighbour
.
These
things
therefore
,
and
such
like
Circumstances
,
should
be
well
consider'd
,
in
the
Practice
and
Exercise
of
every
Virtue
;
and
our
Minds
should
be
brought
to
a
kind
of
Acquaintance
and
Familiarity
with
them
;
that
so
we
may
be
quick
at
the
Accounts
of
our
Duty
,
and
able
by
casting
up
all
things
together
,
to
see
at
last
what
the
Remainder
is
,
and
know
what
we
owe
to
the
several
sorts
and
conditions
of
Men.
For
as
a
General
,
Orator
or
Physician
,
however
well
skill'd
in
the
Rules
of
his
Art
,
can
never
be
perfect
without
the
assistance
of
Practice
and
Experience
;
just
so
it
is
in
the
Case
now
before
us
:
Many
have
laid
down
the
Rules
and
Precepts
of
Virtue
and
Good-living
;
(
as
I
my self
am
doing
at
this
very
time
)
but
there
's
moreover
requir'd
to
a
due
degree
of
Height
and
Perfection
in
it
,
that
one
accustom
himself
to
the
Exercise
of
'em
.
And
thus
have
I
shewn
how
Virtue
and
Honesty
(
from
which
all
our
Duty
does
immediately
flow
)
are
deduc'd
from
those
things
,
which
concern
the
Society
and
Good
of
Mankind
;
which
was
the
second
General
I
propos'd
to
discourse
of
.
[
c
](A33176-e21620-b)
c
Having
finish'd
his
Discourse
about
Justice
,
the
second
;
he
goes
on
to
Fortitude
,
Magnanimity
,
or
Greatness
of
Soul
;
the
third
of
his
general
Heads
of
Virtue
;
Of
which
he
observes
in
the
first
place
,
That
't
is
more
glorious
and
splendid
in
the
account
of
the
World
,
than
any
of
the
rest
.
It
is
to
be
observ'd
,
that
whereas
there
were
laid
down
four
general
Heads
,
from
which
all
Virtue
and
Honesty
is
deriv'd
;
whatever
proceeds
from
a
brave
and
exalted
Mind
,
that
's
rais'd
above
Fortune
,
and
all
the
little
Chances
and
Accidents
of
the
World
,
is
usually
made
most
account
of
amongst
Men.
Hence
in
Reproaches
we
find
there
's
nothing
more
common
,
than
such
things
as
these
:
For
shame
!
young
Men
,
and
yet
have
Womens
Hearts
!
While
this
brave
Woman
plays
the
Man
—
Or
something
like
this
,
Dear
[
d
](A33176-e21700-b)
d
Salmacis
was
the
Name
of
a
Nymph
,
presiding
over
a
Stream
,
which
was
said
to
soften
and
effeminate
those
,
that
wash'd
in
it
.
[
See
the
fourth
Book
of
Ovid
's
Metamorph.
]
These
Words
are
spoken
by
way
of
Reproach
to
some
Coward
,
and
mean
no
more
,
Than
that
he
's
for
no
Spoils
but
only
those
of
Women
,
that
cost
no
Wounds
,
&c.
Salmacis
give
Spoils
,
that
cost
no
Sweat
or
[
Blood
!
Whereas
on
the
contrary
in
Praises
or
Panegyricks
,
those
things
that
are
done
with
a
bravery
of
Mind
,
and
have
something
of
extraordinary
Courage
in
'em
,
(
I
know
not
how
)
we
commend
in
a
nobler
and
loftier
Strain
,
than
we
do
any
thing
else
.
Hence
[
e
](A33176-e21760-b)
e
Places
where
the
Grecians
,
with
a
great
deal
of
Courage
,
conquer'd
mighty
Armies
of
the
Persians
.
See
Corn.
Nepos
's
Miltiades
.
Plutarch
's
Themistocles
and
Aristides
.
Marathon
,
Salamis
,
Plateae
,
&c.
are
so
common
a
Field
for
all
the
Rhetoricians
:
Hence
our
[
f
](A33176-e21830-b)
f
The
Names
of
several
extraordinary
Romans
,
who
by
their
Courage
contributed
much
to
the
Raising
of
that
Empire
:
and
therefore
were
very
much
applauded
by
Posterity
.
Cocles
;
hence
the
Decii
,
the
Scipio's
,
Marcellus
,
and
a
great
many
others
;
and
especially
the
People
of
Rome
it self
is
particularly
famous
for
Greatness
of
Courage
.
But
the
Value
that
is
set
upon
Military
Glory
appears
from
this
,
that
almost
all
Statues
are
done
in
the
Habit
and
Garb
of
a
Soldier
.
CHAP.
XIX
.
Courage
is
not
truely
a
Virtue
,
unless
it
be
accompany'd
with
Justice
,
Truth
,
&c.
An
excellent
Definition
of
it
giv'n
by
the
Stoicks
.
An
admirable
Saying
of
Plato
to
the
same
purpose
.
Men
of
great
Souls
are
apt
to
be
Ungovernable
and
Ambitious
;
which
prompts
'em
to
Injustice
.
A
Man
of
a
truly
noble
Spirit
never
Injures
another
,
but
Protects
from
Injuries
;
scorns
Applause
,
and
the
Voice
of
the
ignorant
Multitude
.
BUt
that
sort
of
[
a
](A33176-e21980-b)
a
Fighting
stoutly
,
and
undergoing
Dangers
,
is
not
enough
to
give
a
Man
the
Name
and
Reputation
of
Valour
,
unless
he
do
it
in
a
good
Cause
,
by
fair
means
,
&c.
Courage
which
is
seen
in
the
Dangers
and
Fatigues
of
War
,
unless
a
Man
be
govern'd
by
the
Rules
of
Justice
,
and
fight
for
the
Safety
and
Good
of
the
Publick
,
and
not
for
particular
Ends
of
his
own
,
is
altogether
blamable
;
and
so
far
from
being
a
part
of
true
Virtue
,
that
't
is
indeed
a
piece
of
the
most
barbarous
Inhumanity
.
Fortitude
therefore
is
very
well
defin'd
by
the
Stoick
Philosophers
,
when
they
call
it
,
[
b
](A33176-e22000-b)
b
'T
is
not
true
Courage
therefore
to
be
bold
in
Sinning
;
nor
is
a
sign
of
a
faint-hearted
Spirit
,
to
be
afraid
of
committing
what
indeed
is
a
Fault
:
There
are
some
things
(
as
Aristotle
well
observes
)
which
a
Man
of
true
Courage
ought
to
fear
,
and
't
is
a
shame
for
him
not
so
do
it
.
'T
were
well
if
this
could
be
consider'd
by
some
Men
,
who
think
it
a
brave
and
heroick
piece
of
Greatness
,
to
live
in
open
Defiance
of
the
Laws
,
and
let
the
World
see
they
arn't
afraid
of
the
Gallows
:
who
defie
Heaven
out
of
a
meer
Bravado
,
and
affront
the
Almighty
,
that
they
mayn't
seem
such
Cowards
as
to
be
afraid
of
Hell
.
The
truth
on
't
is
,
there
's
hardly
any
thing
occasions
more
Evil
in
the
World
,
than
Men's
having
false
Notions
of
this
Virtue
;
and
would
they
but
take
this
Definition
along
with
'em
,
they
would
not
talk
so
much
of
being
Couragious
in
Wickedness
,
nor
call
others
,
Men
of
low
,
mean
and
pitiful
Souls
for
being
afraid
of
Sinning
.
A
Virtue
contending
for
Justice
and
Honesty
.
No
man
therefore
by
Baseness
and
Treachery
has
ever
got
the
Name
and
Reputation
of
true
Courage
;
for
nothing
can
ever
be
Virtuous
or
Credible
,
that
is
not
Just.
To
which
purpose
,
that
of
Plato
was
admirably
well
said
,
As
that
sort
of
Knowledge
,
which
is
not
directed
by
the
Rules
of
Justice
,
ought
rather
to
have
the
Name
of
Design
and
Subtilty
,
than
Wisdom
and
Prudence
;
just
so
that
bold
and
adventurous
Mind
,
which
is
hurried
by
the
Stream
of
its
own
Passions
,
and
not
for
the
Good
and
Advantage
of
the
Publick
,
should
rather
have
the
Name
of
Fool-hardy
and
Daring
,
than
Valiant
and
Couragious
.
The
first
thing
therefore
I
'd
have
in
a
truely
couragious
Man
,
is
,
[
c
](A33176-e22130-b)
c
These
Words
must
be
taken
in
a
limited
Sence
,
not
as
tho'
Cunning
and
Stratagem
were
unlawful
,
but
only
as
exclusive
of
Perfidiousness
and
Treachery
.
That
he
be
a
Follower
of
Goodness
and
fair
Dealing
,
of
Truth
and
Sincerity
;
which
are
principal
and
constituent
parts
of
Justice
.
But
here
't
is
one
very
unhappy
thing
,
that
most
times
these
great
and
exalted
Minds
are
naturally
ungovernable
and
desirous
of
Rule
:
So
that
what
Plato
observ'd
of
the
Spartans
,
That
all
their
Customs
had
no
other
Aim
,
but
to
get
the
Superiority
,
may
fitly
enough
be
apply'd
to
these
Persons
:
for
the
more
any
Man
has
of
this
Greatness
of
Soul
,
the
more
eager
he
is
of
being
a
Sharer
in
the
Government
,
or
rather
of
obtaining
it
wholly
to
himself
:
And
't
is
no
easie
matter
to
be
fair
and
equitable
in
all
one's
Actions
,
(
which
is
the
proper
and
peculiar
Office
of
Justice
)
while
one
is
endeavouring
to
make
himself
uppermost
.
From
hence
it
comes
to
pass
,
that
they
'll
never
be
conquer'd
in
any
Debates
,
or
over-rul'd
by
the
Laws
and
Constitutions
of
the
Publick
;
but
make
it
their
business
by
Factions
and
Bribery
to
get
a
strong
Party
and
Interest
in
the
Republick
;
and
rather
choose
to
be
Uppermost
by
Force
and
Injustice
,
than
Equal
to
others
by
fair
and
upright
Dealing
.
But
the
difficulty
of
it
can
only
serve
to
make
it
more
Honourable
,
[
d
](A33176-e22160-b)
d
I
have
added
these
Words
to
my
Author
,
because
the
Sence
seems
plainly
to
require
'em
,
or
something
like
'em
.
He
had
just
been
saying
,
That
Men
of
great
Souls
are
naturally
apt
to
run
into
Jnjustice
,
for
the
raising
of
their
Fortunes
;
and
that
't
is
very
difficult
for
'em
not
to
do
so
:
But
fearing
lest
this
should
be
urg'd
as
an
Excuse
for
'em
,
he
takes
care
to
prevent
it
by
saying
,
That
the
Difficulty
of
it
enhances
the
Credit
;
and
then
adds
,
Nullum
est
enim
,
&c.
which
words
seem
to
give
a
Reason
why
the
Difficulty
of
adhering
to
Justice
in
this
case
,
will
by
no
means
serve
to
excuse
Injustice
:
For
,
says
he
,
no
sort
of
Case
,
&c.
but
never
its
contrary
more
Excusable
:
For
no
sort
of
Case
or
Circumstance
whatever
,
can
excuse
any
Man
for
being
guilty
of
Injustice
.
Those
are
therefore
your
truly
brave
and
couragious
Men
,
not
who
Rob
,
Plunder
and
Injure
others
,
but
those
who
Secure
and
Protect
'em
from
Injuries
.
But
that
Greatness
of
Mind
,
which
is
truly
such
,
and
under
the
direction
of
Wisdom
and
Prudence
,
makes
that
Honour
and
Credit
,
which
we
naturally
desire
,
not
consist
in
the
outward
imaginary
Applause
,
but
in
the
real
intrinsick
Goodness
of
its
Actions
;
and
is
not
so
eager
of
appearing
to
be
greater
and
better
than
others
,
as
of
really
being
so
.
For
he
that
is
so
mean
as
to
depend
upon
the
giddy
and
ignorant
Multitude
,
ought
never
to
be
accounted
of
a
truly
great
and
exalted
Spirit
:
Besides
that
,
there
's
nothing
so
easily
draws
Men
to
Acts
of
Injustice
,
as
a
Loftiness
of
Mind
,
when
joyn'd
with
this
foolish
Desire
of
Applause
.
[
e
](A33176-e22240-b)
e
That
is
,
He
that
has
gotten
this
Loftiness
of
Mind
,
is
in
very
great
danger
of
being
desirous
of
Applause
,
(
very
few
being
otherwise
)
and
by
consequence
,
of
falling
into
Injustice
:
and
therefore
he
ought
to
be
the
more
careful
as
to
this
particular
.
This
is
indeed
a
very
dangerous
Place
,
and
requires
our
greatest
Concern
and
Watchfulness
;
because
you
shall
hardly
find
any
Man
,
that
,
when
he
has
gone
thro'
Labours
and
Difficulties
,
does
not
expect
this
Honour
and
Applause
,
as
a
kind
of
Reward
for
his
Courage
and
Atchievements
.
CHAP.
XX.
Wherein
true
Greatness
of
Soul
consists
.
An
excellent
Description
of
it
.
'T
is
an
Enemy
to
Covetousness
,
to
the
Desire
of
Applause
,
and
of
Power
.
Produces
a
calm
and
unpassionate
Mind
.
The
Desire
of
this
Calm
and
Tranqullity
of
Mind
,
has
made
some
Men
retire
,
and
separate
'emselves
from
publick
Business
.
In
what
a
perfect
Freedom
consists
.
NOw
all
true
Courage
and
Greatness
of
Mind
[
a
](A33176-e22300-b)
a
Having
shewn
in
the
former
Chapter
what
the
Requisites
of
true
Courage
are
,
viz.
Justice
,
Truth
,
&c.
that
't
is
opposite
to
Ambition
,
Vain-glory
and
Ungovernableness
,
&c.
he
goes
on
now
to
shew
wherein
it
consists
,
and
what
those
things
are
,
which
't
is
concern'd
about
.
is
more
especially
seen
in
these
two
things
:
The
first
is
a
generous
Contempt
or
Disregard
of
all
[
b
](A33176-e22350-b)
b
Such
are
Riches
,
Honours
,
Commands
,
&c.
which
't
is
the
part
of
the
greatest
Soul
not
to
be
a
Slave
to
.
We
call
a
Soul
either
great
or
little
,
according
to
the
things
which
we
find
it
affected
with
;
there
being
always
a
proportion
between
the
Faculties
and
the
Object
.
Thus
Children
that
have
gotten
but
little
Souls
,
are
concern'd
about
little
and
trivial
Objects
;
which
afterward
,
as
their
Faculties
enlarge
,
they
come
to
leave
off
and
despise
by
degrees
.
He
therefore
is
a
Man
of
true
Fortitude
and
Greatness
of
Soul
,
who
is
concern'd
about
none
but
the
greatest
Objects
,
viz.
Virtue
and
Vice
,
Happiness
and
Misery
:
who
is
above
all
lesser
Concerns
in
the
World
,
such
as
Pleasure
or
Pain
,
Riches
or
Poverty
,
&c.
and
never
suffers
himself
so
much
to
regard
'em
,
as
either
to
be
puft
up
at
the
one
,
or
dejected
at
the
other
.
Hence
he
is
never
disquieted
either
with
fears
of
Evil
,
hopes
of
Good
,
or
any
other
Passion
;
but
however
the
World
goes
,
can
always
keep
an
even
Temper
of
Soul
.
From
hence
result
Uniformity
and
Consistency
or
Regularity
in
his
Life
,
&c.
outward
Goods
,
proceeding
from
an
Opinion
,
That
't
is
unworthy
of
a
Man
to
admire
,
or
wish
for
,
or
endeavour
after
any
thing
,
unless
it
be
that
which
is
Honest
and
Becoming
;
to
make
himself
subject
to
any
one's
Will
;
to
be
a
Slave
to
his
own
irregular
Passions
;
or
any
ways
depend
upon
the
Capricio's
of
Fortune
.
When
he
has
gotten
such
a
Temper
of
Mind
as
I
have
now
been
describing
,
then
the
second
thing
is
,
That
he
[
c
](A33176-e22480-b)
c
This
is
not
necessary
to
all
Fortitude
;
for
if
it
were
,
then
those
Men
who
live
a
Life
of
Retirement
,
could
never
be
said
to
have
that
Virtue
:
which
yet
he
affirms
afterwards
.
perform
such
Actions
as
are
glorious
and
profitable
,
but
withal
very
full
both
of
Labour
and
Difficulty
;
and
extreamly
dangerous
to
his
Life
it self
,
as
well
as
to
those
things
that
are
requisite
for
its
Preservation
.
Now
[
d
](A33176-e22490-b)
d
'T
is
the
doing
of
great
and
profitable
Actions
,
that
makes
a
Man
glorious
and
splendid
and
useful
to
his
Country
:
but
't
is
that
firm
Temper
and
Resolution
of
Mind
,
which
is
the
cause
that
makes
him
venture
to
do
such
Actions
;
which
he
therefore
calls
the
causa
&
ratio
efficiens
magnos
viros
,
which
has
something
more
in
it
than
Ground-work
and
Foundation
.
all
the
Lustre
and
Dignity
of
these
two
parts
,
nay
and
I
add
all
their
Usefulness
too
,
is
lodg'd
only
in
the
latter
;
but
the
Ground-work
,
as
't
were
,
and
Foundation
of
all
true
Greatness
,
is
laid
in
the
former
.
For
in
that
are
contain'd
those
generous
Principles
which
exalt
Mens
Minds
,
and
raise
'em
to
a
Contempt
of
all
worldly
things
.
But
that
former
it self
is
made
up
of
two
parts
,
The
first
is
an
Opinion
that
nothing
is
truely
and
really
Good
,
but
only
what
is
Honest
:
The
second
a
Freedom
from
all
sort
of
Passion
or
Disturbance
of
Mind
.
For
what
can
more
discover
a
Man
of
a
brave
and
heroick
Spirit
,
than
to
make
no
account
in
the
World
of
those
things
,
which
seem
so
glorious
and
dazling
to
the
generality
of
Mankind
;
but
wholly
to
despise
'em
,
not
from
any
vain
and
fantastick
Humour
,
but
from
solid
and
firm
Principles
of
Reason
and
Judgment
?
Or
what
can
more
shew
a
robust
Mind
and
unshaken
Constancy
,
than
to
bear
those
heavy
and
numerous
Calamities
,
which
are
incident
to
Mankind
in
this
Life
,
with
such
a
firm
Temper
and
Fixedness
of
Soul
,
as
never
to
offend
against
Nature
and
Right
Reason
,
or
do
any
thing
that
's
unworthy
the
Dignity
and
Character
of
a
Wise
Man
?
Now
't
would
not
at
all
be
consistent
or
agreeable
,
that
he
who
bore
up
so
couragiously
against
Fear
,
should
be
afterwards
unable
to
resist
Desire
;
or
that
he
who
could
never
be
conquer'd
by
Pain
,
should
suffer
himself
to
be
captivated
by
Pleasure
.
These
things
therefore
should
well
be
consider'd
,
and
of
all
[
e
](A33176-e22610-b)
e
Since
Fortitude
in
great
measure
consists
in
a
freedom
from
the
Passions
,
of
which
Desire
is
one
;
from
hence
it
follows
,
that
whoever
is
taken
with
an
over-great
Desire
of
any
thing
,
offends
against
this
Virtue
.
For
this
reason
he
advises
here
against
the
Desire
of
Money
,
Honour
,
&c.
as
Vices
opposite
to
Greatness
of
Soul
.
He
brought
'em
in
before
Chap.
8.
as
Causes
of
Positive
Injustice
.
Desires
,
that
of
Money
should
be
avoided
;
for
nothing's
a
greater
Sign
of
a
narrow
,
mean
and
sordid
Spirit
,
than
to
dote
upon
Riches
;
nor
is
any
thing
on
the
contrary
more
Creditable
and
Magnificent
,
than
to
contemn
Wealth
,
if
you
have
it
not
;
and
if
you
have
it
,
to
lay
it
out
freely
in
Acts
of
Bounty
and
Liberality
.
The
Desire
of
Glory
(
as
I
before
observ'd
)
ought
also
to
be
avoided
:
for
it
[
f
](A33176-e22660-b)
f
For
who
are
greater
Slaves
than
those
who
stand
for
Places
?
Or
what
Servant
more
depends
upon
the
Beck
of
his
Master
,
than
the
ambitious
Man
upon
the
Humour
and
Good-will
of
the
Multitude
?
robs
a
Man
wholly
of
his
Freedom
and
Liberty
,
which
generous
Spirits
ought
of
all
things
in
the
World
to
maintain
and
defend
.
Neither
ought
Places
of
Power
to
be
sought
after
;
but
at
some
times
rather
to
be
refus'd
when
offer'd
,
at
others
,
be
laid
down
if
they
can
conveniently
.
We
should
free
our selves
,
in
short
,
from
all
vehement
Passions
and
Disorders
of
Mind
,
not
only
those
of
Desire
and
Fear
,
but
also
of
Sorrow
,
of
Joy
and
Anger
;
that
so
the
State
of
the
Mind
may
be
calm
and
undisturb'd
,
which
will
make
the
whole
Life
become
graceful
and
[
g
](A33176-e22720-b)
g
By
Constantia
here
,
as
in
most
other
places
,
he
does
not
mean
that
,
which
we
commonly
call
Constancy
;
but
that
which
the
Poets
call
Consistency
in
a
Character
,
i.
e.
an
Uniformity
or
Agreement
between
all
the
Parts
of
it
,
so
that
one
doth
not
thwart
and
contradict
another
:
which
can
never
proceed
from
any
thing
else
,
but
a
perpetual
Subjection
of
the
Passions
and
Appetites
to
the
Commands
of
Reason
.
For
the
Passions
are
irregular
and
inconsistent
with
one
another
;
sometimes
up
and
sometimes
down
;
sometimes
hurrying
a
Man
this
way
,
other
times
that
.
See
Note
2.
on
Chap.
29.
uniform
.
Now
there
both
are
and
have
been
many
,
who
to
gain
this
Repose
of
which
I
am
speaking
,
[
h
](A33176-e22810-b)
h
'T
was
before
observ'd
,
That
this
Virtue
consists
chiefly
in
Freedom
from
the
Disorders
of
Mind
,
&c.
This
leads
him
to
discourse
of
the
several
Ways
Men
have
taken
for
the
obtaining
this
Repose
;
which
are
two
,
1st
,
A
retir'd
and
private
Way
of
Living
.
2dly
,
A
Greatness
of
Power
and
Authority
.
The
former
is
either
of
Philosophers
or
private
Gentlemen
;
and
this
last
is
either
of
War
or
Peace
.
So
that
according
to
our
Author's
Sence
,
we
may
make
four
sorts
of
Fortitude
,
or
rather
four
ways
of
Life
in
which
this
Virtue
appears
.
The
first
we
may
call
Contemplative
or
Monastick
,
which
consists
in
Contemplation
,
and
a
bare
Conquest
of
the
Passions
.
The
second
Rustick
,
in
managing
one's
private
Estate
well
.
The
third
Civil
,
in
wisely
and
prudently
Governing
the
State
.
And
the
fourth
Martial
,
in
Fighting
bravely
and
well-carrying
on
the
Business
of
War
.
He
gives
Rules
about
each
of
'em
in
the
following
Discourse
.
have
betaken
'emselves
to
a
Life
of
Retirement
,
and
wholly
withdrawn
from
all
Business
of
the
Publick
.
Among
these
the
noblest
and
most
eminent
of
the
Philosophers
;
and
some
Men
of
rigid
and
severe
Lives
,
who
misliking
the
Manners
of
the
People
or
Governours
,
have
gone
and
withdrawn
'emselves
into
the
Country
,
pleas'd
with
the
Management
of
their
private
Fortunes
.
These
Men
propos'd
the
same
End
to
themselves
that
Kings
and
Princes
do
,
viz.
The
Living
so
as
to
Want
for
nothing
,
to
be
under
the
Power
and
Controul
of
none
,
but
to
enjoy
a
full
and
perfect
Freedom
;
which
consists
in
living
so
,
as
one's
[
i
](A33176-e22940-b)
i
These
words
must
be
taken
in
a
limited
Sence
;
not
as
tho'
by
Pleases
were
meant
what
our
Passions
or
Fancy
may
suggest
,
but
what
our
Nature
or
Reason
commands
.
We
ought
to
be
Govern'd
and
Rul'd
by
this
,
and
not
by
our
Lusts
and
sensual
Appeties
;
true
Freedom
consisting
,
not
in
our
being
exempt
from
Law
,
but
in
our
being
a
Law
to
our
own
selves
;
as
a
great
Author
speaks
.
self
best
pleases
.
CHAP.
XXI
.
Those
who
live
a
Publick
and
a
Private
Life
aim
both
at
Freedom
.
Their
Lives
compar'd
:
the
former
more
useful
,
the
latter
more
safe
.
In
what
Cases
a
Man
may
be
excus'd
from
serving
the
Publick
.
Those
ought
to
serve
it
who
are
qualify'd
for
the
Service
.
Greatness
of
Soul
more
necessary
for
those
in
a
publick
,
than
retir'd
Life
.
Two
or
three
Rules
to
be
obser'd
before
a
Man
enters
upon
Business
.
THis
then
being
the
common
Design
and
End
of
'em
both
,
those
who
're
ambitious
of
Power
and
Authority
,
think
to
obtain
it
by
enlarging
their
Fortunes
and
Interests
in
the
World
;
but
these
whom
I
have
mention'd
as
Men
of
Repose
,
by
contenting
themselves
with
their
own
Condition
,
tho'
but
humble
and
mean
.
In
which
they
are
neither
of
'em
wholly
in
the
wrong
;
but
the
Life
of
the
latter
,
I
mean
the
retir'd
,
is
both
easier
and
safer
,
and
begets
less
of
Trouble
and
Disturbance
to
others
;
whereas
that
of
the
former
,
who
give
'emselves
up
to
Affairs
of
State
,
and
the
Management
of
great
and
important
Concerns
,
is
more
adapted
to
the
Benefit
and
Good
of
Mankind
,
and
the
getting
of
Credit
and
Reputation
in
the
World
.
[
a
](A33176-e23030-b)
a
Having
said
there
are
two
kinds
of
Life
,
viz.
Publick
and
Private
,
wherein
Men
endeavour
to
arrive
at
this
Virtue
,
and
compar'd
'em
one
with
another
;
he
shews
that
all
are
oblig'd
to
the
former
,
as
more
useful
to
Mankind
;
except
in
some
cases
mention'd
.
Those
People
therefore
are
perhaps
excusable
,
who
being
of
Parts
and
Capacities
for
Learning
,
give
'emselves
wholly
to
the
Study
of
it
,
and
never
at
all
meddle
with
Publick
Business
:
and
so
are
those
also
,
who
being
disabled
by
Sickness
and
Infirmities
,
or
on
any
other
good
and
allowable
Account
,
have
separated
'emselves
from
the
Administration
of
Affairs
,
leaving
the
Power
and
Reputation
of
it
in
the
hands
of
others
.
But
as
for
those
People
,
who
have
none
of
these
Reasons
,
and
pretend
to
despise
those
Commands
and
Honours
,
which
most
Men
admire
;
I
am
so
far
from
thinking
it
a
Virtue
in
'em
,
that
I
rather
esteem
it
a
very
great
Fault
:
Thus
far
,
't
is
true
,
one
can
hardly
condemn
them
,
in
that
they
despise
,
and
make
little
account
of
Glory
and
Applause
;
but
their
true
Reason
seems
to
be
rather
this
,
That
they
don't
care
to
suffer
the
Labour
and
Fatigue
of
'em
,
and
are
afraid
of
encountring
with
Rubs
and
Repulses
,
as
things
that
are
attended
with
some
Shame
and
Dishonour
.
[
b
](A33176-e23060-b)
b
This
he
adds
as
a
Reason
of
the
Words
immediately
foregoing
:
He
had
just
been
saying
,
That
retir'd
Men
did
well
in
despising
and
neglecting
Places
of
Honour
;
but
that
withal
they
were
afraid
of
Shame
and
Disgrace
,
which
a
Man
of
a
great
Soul
ought
not
to
be
.
This
might
seem
odd
,
That
one
who
despis'd
Honour
,
should
yet
be
afraid
of
a
little
Disgrace
;
to
confirm
it
therefore
,
he
presently
adds
,
For
you
shall
,
&c.
For
you
shall
often
find
there
's
a
great
many
Men
,
who
are
very
inconsistent
with
'emselves
in
things
of
a
contrary
Nature
:
as
for
Pleasure
,
they
despise
it
with
all
the
Severity
of
a
Stoick
;
but
yet
are
so
effeminate
,
as
not
to
be
able
to
bear
the
least
Trouble
;
are
mighty
Contemners
of
Fame
and
Applause
;
but
extreamly
concern'd
at
any
thing
of
Disgrace
:
[
c
](A33176-e23130-b)
c
Viz.
For
a
Man
to
despise
Pleasure
,
and
yet
not
be
able
to
bear
Pain
;
or
to
contemn
Applause
,
and
yet
be
afraid
of
being
a
little
Ill-spoken
of
.
which
are
things
that
don't
very
well
agree
together
.
Those
People
then
,
whom
Nature
has
endow'd
with
Abilities
for
that
purpose
,
[
d
](A33176-e23150-b)
d
Gentlemen
therefore
,
and
others
,
who
have
Parts
and
Abilities
for
that
purpose
,
should
not
think
they
are
born
for
themselves
alone
,
but
to
serve
their
Country
,
Friends
,
&c.
See
chap.
7.
should
forthwith
endeavour
to
procure
'emselves
Places
,
and
manage
the
Business
of
the
Commonwealth
:
Otherwise
how
should
the
City
be
well
govern'd
,
or
the
Greatness
of
their
Endowments
be
made
known
to
the
World
?
[
e
](A33176-e23170-b)
e
Having
said
that
all
,
who
are
qualify'd
for
it
,
should
serve
their
Country
,
and
endeavour
after
the
publick
sort
of
Fortitude
;
he
lays
down
some
Rules
in
common
for
all
those
,
who
take
upon
'em
any
publick
Trust
,
whether
Civil
or
Military
;
such
as
are
,
To
be
free
from
Passion
,
to
see
that
what
they
undertake
be
Honest
,
&c.
But
that
Greatness
of
Soul
,
and
Contempt
of
all
Human
things
,
(
which
we
have
often
mention'd
)
together
with
that
Calmness
and
Serenity
of
Mind
,
is
requisite
in
those
of
a
publick
Station
,
as
much
,
if
not
more
than
't
is
in
Philosophers
,
if
ever
they
hope
to
be
free
from
Anxieties
,
and
arrive
at
any
Steadiness
or
Uniformity
in
their
Lives
.
Now
these
things
are
easier
to
Philosophers
,
than
to
them
;
for
as
much
as
their
Lives
,
being
led
in
private
,
require
for
their
support
a
less
number
of
things
,
and
have
fewer
within
the
power
and
reach
of
Fortune
:
and
if
any
ill
Accident
should
befal
'em
,
't
is
impossible
their
Sufferings
can
be
very
considerable
.
Those
Men
therefore
that
are
in
Publick
Stations
,
[
f
](A33176-e23210-b)
f
Our
Passions
are
apt
to
rise
in
proportion
to
their
Objects
:
Philosophers
therefore
,
and
those
who
live
quiet
and
retir'd
Lives
,
having
very
little
Business
or
Concern
in
the
World
,
can
have
nothing
so
great
,
as
very
mightily
to
move
either
their
Hopes
or
their
Fears
,
&c.
But
your
Men
of
Business
,
being
concern'd
in
the
Affairs
of
a
Kingdom
or
State
,
must
needs
be
more
liable
to
the
Insults
of
these
Passions
.
having
things
of
more
weight
and
importance
to
be
taken
care
of
,
must
in
reason
be
suppos'd
to
lye
much
more
open
to
the
Assaults
of
the
Passions
,
than
those
who
spend
their
Days
in
Privacy
and
Retirement
.
Upon
which
account
they
should
take
the
more
care
,
to
fortifie
themselves
with
this
Greatness
of
Spirit
,
and
to
free
their
Minds
from
the
grievous
Torments
and
Disturbances
of
'em
.
But
he
who
takes
upon
him
a
Publick
Trust
,
should
not
only
look
that
the
Business
be
Honest
,
but
that
he
himself
be
qualified
for
the
Management
of
it
.
In
considering
of
which
there
's
a
double
Extream
to
be
carefully
avoided
,
That
he
neither
Despair
thro'
a
mean
Cowheartedness
;
nor
yet
be
over
Confident
thro'
Eagerness
of
Desire
.
And
lastly
,
in
whatever
he
sets
about
,
let
all
things
be
diligently
and
carefully
put
in
order
,
before
he
goes
on
to
the
execution
of
it
.
CHAP.
XXII
.
'T
is
no
less
great
and
commendable
to
Manage
Affairs
of
Peace
,
than
of
War
.
Several
Examples
to
prove
this
.
Arms
useless
abroad
,
without
Civil
Prudence
at
home
.
Cicero
's
eminent
Services
to
the
Republick
:
A
Saying
of
Pompey
the
Great
's
to
him
upon
that
Subject
.
BUt
seeing
most
People
are
apt
to
imagin
,
that
't
is
greater
and
more
glorious
to
Manage
Affairs
of
War
,
than
Peace
;
[
a
](A33176-e23310-b)
a
Before
he
lays
down
any
particular
Rules
about
the
several
sorts
of
Fortitude
,
he
compares
the
Civil
and
Military
together
,
and
gives
the
Preference
to
the
former
.
I
shall
endeavour
to
lessen
this
general
Opinion
.
For
the
Greatness
of
that
Glory
,
which
is
given
to
Warriors
,
has
made
many
People
,
for
no
other
reason
,
desirous
of
Quarrels
;
especially
Men
of
the
greatest
Parts
and
most
aspiring
Minds
;
particularly
if
they
are
qualify'd
for
a
Soldier
's
Life
,
and
their
Disposition
carry
'em
to
the
Profession
of
Arms.
But
if
we
would
make
a
just
Estimate
of
the
case
,
we
should
find
both
greater
and
more
glorious
Actions
done
by
Wisdom
at
home
,
than
by
Arms
abroad
.
For
what
tho'
[
b
](A33176-e23340-b)
b
A
famous
Athenian
General
,
by
whose
Prudence
and
Conduct
especially
,
the
Greeks
conquer'd
Xerxes
in
that
great
Battle
at
the
Island
Salamis
.
See
his
Life
in
Plut.
and
Corn.
Nep.
Themistocles
be
deservedly
Commended
,
and
his
Name
more
Illustrious
than
that
of
[
c
](A33176-e23410-b)
c
An
eminent
Philosopher
and
Lawgiver
of
the
Athenians
,
one
of
the
seven
Wise
Men
of
Greece
,
who
is
suppos'd
by
some
to
have
first
instituted
their
great
Council
of
Areopagus
.
His
Life
is
written
by
Plut.
Aristotle
indeed
,
and
some
others
,
tell
us
,
That
he
did
not
first
set
on
foot
,
but
only
confirm'd
the
Council
of
Areopagus
,
whereas
he
abolish'd
most
other
things
in
the
former
Constitution
.
For
which
reason
Langius
will
have
Cicero
mean
by
the
Word
instituit
here
,
no
more
than
stabilivit
or
confirmavit
,
confirm'd
or
establish'd
.
Solon
?
And
tho'
Salamis
be
brought
for
the
proof
of
a
Victory
,
which
is
far
to
be
prefer'd
to
the
Wisdom
of
Solon
,
in
constituting
and
setling
the
Senate
of
Areopagus
?
Yet
in
truth
ought
this
to
be
judg'd
no
less
great
and
extraodinary
than
that
:
for
Themistocles's
Victory
was
only
a
Kindness
to
the
Common-wealth
once
;
but
Solon's
Counsel
will
be
so
for
ever
:
Seeing
't
is
by
this
that
the
Laws
of
the
Athenians
,
and
Constitutions
of
their
Ancestors
are
kept
up
and
maintain'd
.
Beside
,
Themistocles
can
name
nothing
in
the
World
,
wherein
he
assisted
the
Areopagus
:
but
Solon
on
his
part
may
truly
say
,
That
he
,
by
his
Wisdom
,
was
assisting
to
Themistocles
;
for
the
War
was
carried
on
by
the
Directions
of
that
Senate
,
which
he
by
his
Prudence
at
first
appointed
.
The
same
may
be
said
of
[
d
](A33176-e23660-b)
d
Two
famous
Spartan
Generals
,
who
got
several
Victories
over
the
Athenians
and
Persians
,
and
made
Lacedaemox
the
Empress
of
all
Greece
.
See
their
Lives
in
Corn.
Nep.
Pausanias
and
Lysander
;
for
tho'
by
their
Valour
they
are
thought
to
have
enlarg'd
the
Dominion
of
the
Spartans
,
yet
't
is
by
no
means
at
all
to
be
compar'd
with
the
Laws
and
Discipline
of
the
wise
[
e
](A33176-e23750-b)
e
A
Noble
and
most
Wise
Lawgiver
of
the
Spartans
,
who
,
as
long
as
they
liv'd
up
to
his
Discipline
,
were
one
of
the
bravest
Nations
in
the
World
.
His
Life
is
at
large
in
Plut.
Lycurgus
:
beside
that
to
nothing
but
these
Laws
,
and
this
Discipline
,
they
ow'd
all
the
Courage
and
Obedience
of
their
Armies
.
I
,
for
my
own
part
,
was
always
of
Opinion
,
That
[
f
](A33176-e23790-b)
f
An
excellent
Roman
,
Cos.
about
the
Year
of
Rome
632
,
and
afterwards
Censor
,
about
the
time
that
Cicero
was
Born
.
He
was
Father
of
that
Scaurus
,
whose
magnificent
Aedileship
he
mentions
afterwards
.
He
was
of
great
Credit
and
Authority
in
the
Senate-house
,
and
is
commonly
call'd
,
Princeps
Scuatus
,
commended
by
all
for
his
Gravity
,
Abstinence
,
&c.
Marcus
Scaurus
,
when
I
was
a
Boy
,
was
by
no
means
inferior
to
[
g
](A33176-e23870-b)
g
One
who
tho'
of
mean
Parentage
,
yet
by
his
Valour
and
Courage
rais'd
himself
to
be
seven
times
made
Cos.
of
Rome
.
His
Life
is
in
Plut.
Caius
Marius
;
nor
[
h
](A33176-e23900-b)
h
There
were
two
of
that
Name
,
Father
and
Son
,
very
particularly
Famous
,
and
often
mention'd
by
our
Author
,
for
their
Learning
,
Wisdom
,
Eloquence
,
&c.
See
his
De
Oratore
,
Brutus
,
&c.
The
Father
was
Cos.
with
Marius
,
An.
U.
C.
651
;
and
the
Year
after
being
Proconsul
,
shar'd
with
him
in
the
Victory
over
the
Cimbri
.
At
last
he
was
kill'd
by
his
cruel
Orders
in
the
Year
666
;
Cicero
being
but
twenty
Years
old
:
So
that
he
must
here
mean
the
Son
,
who
was
Heir
to
his
Father's
Virtues
,
Cos.
with
Lepidus
,
An.
675.
Our
Author
in
his
Brutus
,
ranks
him
in
praesidiis
reip
.
among
those
who
by
their
Wisdom
supported
the
State
.
Quintus
Catulus
,
since
I
meddled
with
the
Republick
,
to
[
i
](A33176-e24000-b)
i
Pompey
the
Great
,
who
held
the
Civil
War
against
Caesar
,
and
was
beaten
by
him
.
All
the
Historians
are
full
of
him
.
Cneus
Pompeius
;
for
Armies
can
signifie
but
little
abroad
,
unless
there
be
Counsel
and
wise
Management
at
home
.
Neither
was
the
Rasing
and
Destroying
of
Numantia
,
by
that
incomparable
Person
,
and
brave
Commander
the
Second
Africanus
,
a
greater
and
more
signal
piece
of
Service
to
the
Republick
,
than
the
Murther
of
Tiberius
Gracchus
by
[
k
](A33176-e24070-b)
k
P.
Scipio
Nasica
,
Grandson
of
him
,
who
by
the
Senate
was
judg'd
to
be
the
honestest
Man
in
Rome
;
who
while
Gracchus
was
persuading
his
pernicious
Laws
,
and
the
Consul
slack
in
endeavouring
to
suppress
him
,
rose
up
in
the
Senate
,
and
bid
all
those
who
were
for
the
Good
of
the
Republick
follow
him
:
which
several
doing
,
they
went
and
kill'd
Gracchus
presently
.
Nasica
,
tho'
a
meer
private
Citizen
at
the
same
time
.
'T
is
true
,
this
Action
had
something
of
the
Soldier
in
it
,
as
being
done
by
Force
and
down-right
Violence
,
and
so
does
not
wholly
come
under
the
Notion
of
Civil
Concerns
:
however
,
I
have
brought
it
as
an
Instance
of
these
,
because
't
was
effected
by
this
Civil
sort
of
Prudence
,
and
without
the
Assistance
of
a
Military
Power
.
I
can't
but
therefore
still
extreamly
approve
of
that
Saying
of
mine
,
which
I
'm
told
some
malicious
and
envious
Fellows
most
mightily
carp
at
,
Let
warlike
Arms
give
place
to
th'
peaceful
Gown
,
And
to
the
Statesman's
Praise
the
Victor
yeild
his
Crown
.
For
not
to
say
any
thing
of
other
People
,
when
I
my
own
self
sat
at
the
Helm
of
the
Government
,
did
not
Arms
then
give
place
to
the
Gown
?
[
l
](A33176-e24180-b)
l
By
the
Conspiracy
of
L.
Cataline
,
a
Noble
and
Valiant
,
but
Wicked
and
Debauch'd
Roman
,
who
,
together
with
some
others
that
were
like
himself
,
form'd
most
pernicious
Designs
against
the
Empire
;
which
were
defeated
and
brought
to
nought
by
the
Vigilance
and
excellent
Conduct
of
Cicero
then
Consul
.
For
which
extraordinary
Service
,
he
was
by
common
Vote
styl'd
,
Father
of
his
Country
,
an
Honour
which
he
's
frequently
boasting
of
in
his
Writings
.
See
the
whole
History
at
large
in
Sallust
.
Never
was
the
State
in
more
imminent
Danger
,
and
yet
never
were
things
better
and
more
happily
quieted
.
Thus
by
my
Prudence
and
careful
Management
,
the
most
impudent
and
audacious
of
all
the
Citizens
let
,
as
't
were
,
their
Arms
fall
out
of
their
Hands
.
What
Action
then
was
there
ever
perform'd
in
War
like
this
?
Or
where
's
the
Triumph
that
can
be
compar'd
to
it
?
For
I
think
I
may
venture
a
little
to
boast
before
you
,
Son
Mark
,
whose
Happiness
it
is
to
succeed
in
the
Glory
,
and
whose
Duty
to
imitate
the
Excellence
of
my
Actions
:
This
I
am
sure
of
,
even
Pompey
himself
(
a
Man
the
most
famous
for
Martial
Atchievements
)
did
me
that
Justice
in
the
hearing
of
several
,
as
to
say
,
That
his
returning
home
with
his
third
Triumph
,
had
been
to
but
little
or
no
purpose
,
unless
my
Endeavours
and
Services
to
the
Republick
had
preserv'd
the
City
for
him
to
Triumph
in
.
I
conclude
therefore
,
from
what
has
been
observ'd
,
That
that
sort
of
Courage
which
is
seen
in
the
Management
of
Civil
Affairs
,
is
no
less
deserving
than
that
which
consists
in
the
Business
of
Fighting
;
and
the
former
requires
more
Pains
and
Application
to
be
perfect
in
it
,
than
the
latter
doth
.
CHAP.
XXIII
.
The
Body
ought
to
be
so
far
taken
Care
of
,
as
that
it
may
be
able
to
bear
Fatigues
.
But
't
is
the
Mind
that
truly
makes
Great
Men.
War
should
be
undertaken
only
for
the
sake
of
Peace
.
The
Difference
between
a
Great
Soul
and
a
Great
Understanding
;
and
the
Duties
of
each
.
Fighting
one
of
the
least
parts
of
Courage
.
NOw
't
is
certain
that
Virtue
,
which
consists
in
Greatness
and
Elevation
of
Soul
,
and
makes
up
the
Subject
of
our
present
Enquiry
,
is
obtain'd
by
the
Strength
of
the
Mind
,
not
the
Body
.
However
the
Body
ought
not
to
be
neglected
;
but
by
Exercise
brought
to
such
a
Frame
and
Condition
,
as
that
it
may
obey
the
Prescriptions
of
the
Mind
,
in
performing
that
Business
and
bearing
those
Fatigues
,
which
are
requir'd
of
it
.
But
still
the
Nature
of
the
Virtue
we
are
seeking
for
,
consists
in
due
care
and
application
of
Mind
;
in
which
particular
,
the
Publick
receives
as
much
Benefit
from
Gowns-men
,
who
manage
and
take
care
of
its
Civil
Concerns
;
as
it
doth
from
Soldiers
,
who
are
Generals
of
its
Armies
.
For
they
by
their
Prudence
have
often
either
hindred
the
breaking
out
of
Wars
,
or
else
have
occasion'd
their
speedy
Conclusion
;
and
sometimes
too
have
been
the
cause
of
their
being
Undertaken
:
as
the
third
with
Carthage
was
entred
into
upon
the
Advice
of
[
a
](A33176-e24360-b)
a
The
Elder
Cato
,
who
was
Sirnam'd
Censorius
,
from
his
Severity
when
Censor
.
He
was
always
persuading
the
Romans
to
Destroy
Carthage
,
which
they
did
under
the
Conduct
of
the
Younger
Scipio
;
but
not
till
two
or
three
Years
after
his
Death
.
Cato
,
whose
Credit
and
Authority
prevail'd
in
that
Case
,
even
after
he
was
dead
.
Wisdom
therefore
,
and
Skill
in
determining
Civil
Affairs
,
is
more
to
be
desir'd
than
Courage
in
Fighting
:
But
then
we
must
always
be
careful
in
this
Case
,
that
our
Design
be
not
the
avoiding
of
War
,
but
the
being
more
useful
and
serviceable
to
the
Publick
.
[
b
](A33176-e24430-b)
b
Having
determin'd
the
Question
,
Whether
Civil
or
Military
Conduct
be
better
;
he
now
proceeds
to
give
some
Directions
about
the
latter
;
That
we
should
never
undertake
War
but
for
the
sake
of
Peace
:
Not
be
cast
down
at
Misfortunes
,
&c.
to
the
end
of
the
next
Chapter
.
And
as
for
War
,
it
should
never
be
undertaken
with
any
other
Aim
,
but
only
that
of
obtaining
an
honourable
Peace
.
'T
is
the
part
of
a
brave
and
unshaken
Spirit
,
not
to
be
disturb'd
under
any
Misfortune
,
or
suffer
it self
in
disorder
and
tumult
to
be
thrown
off
the
Saddle
(
as
we
usually
speak
;
)
but
always
to
keep
such
a
Presence
of
Mind
,
as
to
be
able
to
consult
upon
every
Occasion
,
and
be
hurry'd
on
to
nothing
,
but
what
is
agreeable
to
Reason
and
Discretion
.
And
as
this
is
the
part
of
an
exalted
Spirit
,
so
is
what
follows
of
an
elevated
Understanding
;
to
discover
Effects
even
while
they
are
yet
in
the
Wombs
of
their
Causes
,
and
consider
before-hand
whatever
may
happen
on
either
side
,
and
accordingly
what
's
to
be
done
when
it
does
happen
;
that
so
he
may
never
be
taken
unawares
,
and
brought
to
that
lamentable
shift
of
crying
out
,
I
never
once
thought
of
it
.
These
are
the
Duties
,
as
of
a
truly
Courageous
and
Lofty
,
so
of
a
Wise
and
Judicious
Mind
;
but
rashly
to
run
and
lay
about
one
in
Battel
,
and
come
to
Wounds
and
down-right
Blows
with
an
Enemy
,
is
but
a
savage
and
brutish
kind
of
Business
:
However
,
Necessity
so
requiring
,
a
Man
should
Fight
,
and
choose
rather
to
part
with
his
Life
than
his
Liberty
,
or
be
guilty
of
any
base
or
dishonourable
Action
.
CHAP.
XXIV
.
The
Duty
of
a
truly
Couragious
Man
,
after
he
has
conquer'd
his
Enemies
.
Cool
and
Deliberate
Counsels
to
be
prefer'd
before
Heat
and
Boldness
.
Nothing
more
foolish
,
than
to
expose
one's
self
to
unnecessary
Dangers
.
'T
is
a
Duty
rather
to
expose
one's
self
,
than
the
Publick
Affairs
.
They
are
to
blame
,
who
rather
venture
the
loss
of
their
Armies
,
than
their
own
Reputation
.
The
Folly
of
Callicratidas
and
Cleombrotus
in
this
.
The
Wisdom
of
Fabius
Maximus
in
doing
the
contrary
.
Men
should
speak
what
they
think
for
the
Good
of
the
Publick
,
without
regarding
what
Offence
it
may
give
to
others
.
IN
the
Business
of
[
a
](A33176-e24580-b)
a
Having
shewn
in
the
former
Chapter
what
should
be
the
Motive
of
,
and
how
a
Couragious
Man
should
carry
himself
in
War
:
In
this
he
lays
down
some
Rules
for
his
Carriage
after
he
has
gotten
the
Victory
,
viz.
To
shew
nothing
of
Passion
,
Cruelty
,
&c.
Razing
and
Plundring
Cities
,
there
ought
to
be
taken
a
very
especial
Care
,
that
nothing
of
Rashness
or
Cruelty
be
shewn
;
and
all
true
Greatness
of
Spirit
obliges
us
,
having
first
consider'd
things
calmly
and
maturely
,
to
Pardon
the
Multitude
,
and
Punish
those
only
that
were
principally
Faulty
;
and
in
every
State
and
Condition
of
Fortune
,
to
observe
the
just
Medium
of
Virtue
and
Honesty
.
For
as
we
've
already
observ'd
of
some
,
that
they
count
it
more
noble
to
manage
Affairs
of
War
,
than
of
Peace
;
so
you
shall
find
there
are
a
great
many
others
,
who
imagine
,
that
hot
and
adventurous
Undertakings
have
something
that
's
greater
and
more
glorious
in
'em
,
than
wisely
cool
and
deliberate
Counsels
.
Now
as
no
Man
ought
,
by
too
warily
avoiding
of
Dangers
and
Labours
,
to
get
himself
the
name
of
a
Faint-heart
and
Coward
;
so
,
on
the
other
hand
,
Care
should
be
taken
,
that
we
thrust
not
our selves
into
Hazards
and
Difficulties
,
where
there
's
no
manner
of
occasion
for
it
;
than
which
there
is
no
greater
Folly
upon
Earth
.
'T
is
a
Duty
therefore
,
in
Attempts
of
any
Danger
,
to
imitate
the
Practice
of
skilful
Physicians
,
who
always
to
light
and
inconsiderable
Diseases
,
apply
none
but
easie
and
gentle
Remedies
;
but
in
desperate
Cases
are
forc'd
to
have
recourse
to
desperate
Cures
.
'T
is
a
madness
therefore
,
while
all
things
are
calm
and
in
a
peaceful
State
,
to
desire
a
Storm
;
but
to
keep
off
the
Mischiefs
of
it
when
it
does
happen
,
is
the
part
of
a
Wise
and
a
Prudent
Man
;
and
so
much
the
more
,
if
the
Good
to
be
obtain'd
by
getting
well
rid
of
it
,
out-balance
the
Evils
you
may
be
brought
into
by
the
Attempt
.
[
b
](A33176-e24660-b)
b
He
has
done
with
those
Rules
,
which
concern
a
Man's
Carriage
in
Wars
and
Dangers
;
but
because
there
are
several
sorts
of
Dangers
,
he
proceeds
to
shew
,
which
a
Man
should
rather
chuse
.
When
Fabius
,
for
instance
,
was
Roman
General
;
should
he
Fight
with
Hannibal
,
the
whole
Republick
;
should
he
not
,
his
own
Reputation
was
in
danger
.
'T
was
then
his
Duty
rather
to
hazard
the
latter
,
than
the
former
.
The
Danger
of
some
Actions
only
relates
to
the
Person
that
undertakes
'em
,
but
that
of
others
to
the
whole
Republick
:
And
again
,
A
Man's
Life
is
endanger'd
in
some
,
in
others
his
Reputation
and
the
Good-will
of
his
Citizens
.
'T
is
our
Duty
then
,
[
c
](A33176-e24740-b)
c
Viz.
When
the
Danger
on
one
hand
concerns
the
State
,
on
the
other
only
the
Person
himself
.
in
the
former
Case
,
more
willingly
to
expose
and
endanger
our selves
,
than
the
whole
State
;
and
[
d
](A33176-e24780-b)
d
Viz.
When
on
either
side
the
General
only
is
endanger'd
,
in
his
Life
,
Reputation
,
&c.
in
the
latter
,
to
fight
for
our
Glory
and
Reputation
,
more
readily
than
any
other
Conveniencies
whatever
.
Yet
the
[
e
](A33176-e24820-b)
e
That
is
,
They
'll
rather
venture
the
Interest
of
the
Republick
,
than
their
own
Honour
;
as
Callicratidas
and
Cleombrotus
did
;
which
is
contrary
to
the
Rule
he
has
just
now
laid
down
.
contrary
to
this
appears
plainly
in
the
Practice
of
a
great
many
Men
,
who
are
willing
to
spend
their
Estates
and
Lives
for
the
good
of
their
Country
;
but
won't
bear
the
least
Diminution
of
their
Honour
,
tho'
the
present
Occasions
of
the
Republick
require
it
.
Thus
Callicratidas
,
Admiral
of
Sparta
,
in
the
Peloponnesian
War
,
after
he
had
done
many
signal
Services
,
at
last
was
the
occasion
of
Ruining
all
;
for
when
he
was
advis'd
to
Retreat
with
his
Navy
from
[
f
](A33176-e24880-b)
f
Two
or
three
little
Islands
adjoyning
to
the
lesser
Asia
,
between
that
and
the
Isle
Lesbos
;
where
the
Athenians
,
under
the
Conduct
of
Thrasibulus
,
gave
a
mighty
Overthrow
to
the
Lacedaemonians
,
who
were
led
by
Callicratidas
;
himself
being
slain
in
the
Action
.
See
Book
15.
of
Diod.
Sicul.
who
says
,
'T
was
the
greatest
Battel
that
ever
was
fought
between
Grecians
.
Arginussae
,
and
not
venture
giving
the
Athenians
Battel
,
he
utterly
refus'd
it
;
and
told
his
Advisers
,
That
if
this
whole
Navy
should
chance
to
be
lost
,
the
Lacedaemonians
could
rig
out
another
;
but
that
he
for
his
part
could
never
fly
,
without
an
irreparable
loss
of
his
Honour
.
And
here
the
Lacedaemonians
had
tho'
a
great
,
yet
a
tolerable
Blow
;
but
that
[
g
](A33176-e25030-b)
g
At
Leuctra
,
a
Town
in
Baeotia
,
where
the
Spartan
Army
,
under
the
Conduct
of
King
Cleombrotus
,
and
Archidamus
,
was
entirely
routed
by
the
famous
Theban
General
Epaminondas
;
Cleombrotus
himself
being
kill'd
in
the
Battel
.
other
was
Mortal
,
and
put
a
full
period
to
the
Spartan
Greatness
,
when
their
Leader
Cleombrotus
,
only
for
fear
of
being
somewhat
Ill-spoken
of
,
unadvisedly
ventur'd
to
fight
Epaminondas
.
How
much
better
did
[
h
](A33176-e25140-b)
h
Fabius
being
made
General
against
Hannibal
,
would
not
come
to
a
Battel
with
him
,
but
endeavour'd
to
weary
him
out
by
Delays
;
for
which
he
was
call'd
Cunctator
,
the
Delayer
.
At
first
he
was
abus'd
and
call'd
Coward
for
this
;
but
afterwards
't
was
found
by
Experience
to
be
the
best
Course
;
and
then
no
one
was
so
much
commended
as
he
.
See
his
Life
in
Plutarch
.
Fabius
Maximus
do
?
Concerning
whom
Ennius
has
these
Words
:
One
Man
our
State
has
sav'd
by
wise
Delays
:
For
he
regarded
not
the
foolish
Prate
Of
idle
People
;
but
the
City's
Good
.
Therefore
his
growing
Fame
now
flourishes
More
,
when
his
Deeds
are
past
.
[
i
](A33176-e25270-b)
i
By
this
Step
he
passes
from
the
Rules
relating
to
Military
Fortitude
,
to
those
which
relate
to
Civil
;
of
which
he
gives
several
:
as
,
First
here
,
To
speak
one's
Mind
freely
,
&c.
Secondly
,
in
the
next
Chapter
,
To
observe
Plato's
two
Rules
,
&c.
The
same
kind
of
Fault
should
also
be
avoided
in
Civil
Administrations
;
for
a
great
many
Men
are
afraid
to
speak
out
what
they
really
think
,
tho'
perhaps
't
is
for
the
best
,
for
fear
it
should
give
any
Offence
to
others
.
CHAP.
XXV
.
Two
Rules
of
Plato
's
to
be
observ'd
by
those
who
Govern
the
State
.
The
Good
of
the
Govern'd
ought
to
be
their
sole
Aim
.
An
excellent
Description
of
a
good
Minister
of
State
.
Ambition
very
destructive
in
a
Government
.
A
good
Saying
of
Plato
's
to
that
purpose
.
Men
should
carry
themselves
civilly
towards
those
,
who
are
of
an
opposite
Party
in
the
State
;
and
not
count
'em
their
Enemies
.
The
Example
of
Scipio
and
Metellus
.
Anger
towards
an
Adversary
no
part
of
Courage
.
Affability
,
&c.
requisite
in
a
Statesman
.
Severity
and
Chastisements
sometimes
necessary
;
and
Rules
to
be
observ'd
about
'em
.
Nothing
can
be
well
done
,
that
's
done
in
a
Passion
,
Rulers
should
be
like
the
Laws
themselves
.
THose
who
design
to
be
Partakers
in
the
Government
should
be
sure
to
remember
these
two
Precepts
of
Plato
:
First
,
To
make
the
Safety
and
Interest
of
their
Citizens
,
the
great
Aim
and
Design
of
all
their
Thoughts
and
Endeavours
;
without
ever
considering
their
own
personal
Advantage
.
And
,
Secondly
,
so
to
take
care
of
the
whole
collective
Body
of
the
Republick
,
as
not
to
serve
the
Interest
of
any
one
Party
,
to
the
Prejudice
or
Neglecting
of
all
the
rest
.
For
the
Government
of
a
State
is
much
like
the
Office
of
a
Guardian
or
Trustee
;
which
should
always
be
manag'd
for
the
good
of
the
Pupil
,
and
not
of
the
Persons
to
whom
he
is
entrusted
.
And
those
Men
,
who
,
whilst
they
take
care
of
one
,
neglect
or
disregard
another
part
of
the
Citizens
,
do
but
occasion
Sedition
and
Discord
,
the
most
destructive
things
in
the
World
to
a
State
:
From
whence
it
comes
to
pass
,
that
,
while
some
take
part
with
the
Popular
Faction
,
and
others
make
their
Court
to
every
Great
One
,
there
's
but
very
few
left
,
who
are
concern'd
for
the
Benefit
and
Good
of
the
whole
.
From
this
Root
have
sprung
many
grievous
Dissentions
amongst
the
Athenians
;
and
not
only
Tumults
,
but
even
deadly
Civil
Wars
in
our
own
Republick
:
things
which
a
worthy
and
truly
brave
Citizen
,
and
one
who
deserves
to
hold
the
Reins
of
the
Govenment
,
will
shun
and
detest
;
and
will
give
himself
so
to
the
Service
of
the
Publick
,
as
to
aim
at
no
Riches
or
Power
for
himself
;
and
will
so
take
care
of
the
whole
Community
,
as
not
to
pass
over
any
one
part
of
it
:
Such
a
one
will
scorn
,
by
the
mean
Arts
of
Calumny
and
a
false
Accusation
,
to
bring
others
into
Hatred
and
Disrepute
with
the
People
;
but
will
always
adhere
to
what
is
Just
and
Honest
,
and
ne'r
be
drawn
from
it
,
whatever
Offence
may
be
taken
by
others
;
nay
,
will
rather
part
with
his
Life
it self
,
than
do
any
thing
that
is
contrary
to
the
Virtues
I
have
mention'd
.
Eager
Ambition
,
and
contending
for
Honours
,
is
,
of
all
things
,
most
ruinous
and
destructive
to
a
State
;
concerning
which
,
Plato
has
said
admirably
well
,
That
for
Men
to
contend
and
fall
out
with
one
another
,
about
which
should
be
Chief
in
the
Management
of
the
State
,
is
just
as
if
the
Ship
's
Crew
should
go
tother
by
the
ears
,
about
who
should
be
Master
or
Pilot
of
the
Vessel
.
And
the
same
Philosopher
has
given
us
this
for
a
Rule
,
That
only
those
Men
should
be
reckon'd
as
Enemies
,
who
have
taken
up
Arms
in
opposition
to
the
Republick
;
not
those
who
would
govern
it
after
their
own
Schemes
.
[
a
](A33176-e25510-b)
a
The
Quarels
between
Citizens
are
of
two
sorts
,
1.
Civil
,
when
each
desires
the
Good
of
the
Publick
,
but
take
several
ways
of
arriving
at
it
;
such
was
this
here
mention'd
.
The
other
Hostile
,
when
one
endeavours
to
Ruine
,
the
other
to
Uphold
the
State
;
such
was
that
between
Cicero
and
Catiline
.
Such
was
the
Dissention
between
[
b
](A33176-e25560-b)
b
P.
Africanus
the
Younger
,
and
that
Metellus
who
was
sirnam'd
Macedonicus
,
from
his
Conquest
of
Macedonia
.
They
always
rivall'd
and
oppos'd
one
another
in
the
Affairs
of
the
Publick
,
but
never
so
,
as
to
become
inveterate
Enemies
.
P.
Africanus
and
Q.
Metellus
,
without
any
great
Bitterness
or
Animosities
between
'em
.
Some
People
think
it
the
part
of
a
brave
and
heroick
Spirit
,
to
shew
heat
of
Anger
and
Passion
against
an
Adversary
;
but
what
they
say
is
by
no
means
to
be
regarded
:
for
it
's
certain
on
the
other
hand
,
nothing's
more
laudable
,
nothing
more
worthy
of
a
great
and
brave
Person
,
than
Clemency
,
Meekness
and
Gentleness
of
Spirit
.
In
Cities
that
are
Free
,
and
where
all
Men
in
common
enjoy
the
same
Privileges
,
Courtesie
and
Affability
,
and
that
which
they
call
altitudo
animi
,
a
calm
and
undisturbed
Temper
of
Mind
,
are
peculiarly
requisite
:
For
to
fret
upon
every
unseasonable
Visit
,
or
at
every
impertinent
and
troublesom
Petitioner
,
makes
a
Man
sowre
and
morose
in
his
Humour
;
which
as
it
brings
no
kind
of
Good
to
himself
,
so
it
gets
him
the
Hatred
and
Ill-will
of
others
.
But
tho'
Meekness
and
Clemency
be
laudable
Virtues
,
yet
no
further
,
than
as
they
leave
room
for
a
just
Severity
,
whenever
the
Occasions
of
the
Publick
require
it
;
without
which
a
City
can
never
be
well
govern'd
.
Now
[
c
](A33176-e25640-b)
c
He
had
been
saying
,
a
Governour
should
be
Meek
and
Courteous
,
but
not
so
as
to
exclude
Severity
,
when
occasion
requires
it
:
This
naturally
brought
him
to
discourse
,
How
Criminals
should
be
punish'd
;
which
he
does
by
laying
down
several
Rules
;
as
,
First
,
That
no
ill
Language
be
given
'em
,
&c.
every
Reproof
and
Chastisement
,
in
the
first
place
,
should
be
always
free
from
contumelious
Language
,
and
not
inflicted
for
the
sake
of
the
Person
chastizing
or
reproving
another
,
but
the
good
and
advantage
of
the
whole
Republick
.
Diligent
care
should
be
taken
,
in
the
next
place
,
that
the
Penalty
be
proportion'd
to
the
nature
of
the
Crime
,
and
that
some
don't
pass
without
ever
being
question'd
,
while
others
are
punish'd
for
the
same
Misdemeanours
.
But
of
all
things
,
Anger
should
be
excluded
in
Punishing
;
for
whoever
comes
to
this
Work
in
a
Passion
,
will
never
observe
that
due
Mediocrity
,
which
equally
abstains
from
too
much
and
too
little
,
so
strictly
requir'd
by
the
[
d
](A33176-e25680-b)
d
The
Peripateticks
hold
,
That
the
Passions
,
viz.
Anger
,
&c.
are
in
'emselves
neither
Good
nor
Bad
,
but
accordingly
as
they
are
made
either
good
,
or
ill
Use
of
;
and
that
they
are
given
us
by
Nature
for
very
good
Ends
and
Purposes
,
if
we
don't
let
'em
get
the
upper-hand
of
our
Reason
,
but
reduce
'em
to
a
certain
Mediocrity
and
Temperament
.
But
the
Stoicks
,
whom
Cicero
follows
in
this
Book
,
said
the
Passions
were
absolutely
in
themselves
evil
,
call'd
'em
Diseases
and
Infirmities
of
the
Mind
;
and
commanded
their
Wise
Man
,
not
to
moderate
,
but
wholly
to
root
out
all
Anger
,
Joy
,
Compassion
,
&c.
Peripatetick
Schools
:
And
they
have
very
good
reason
indeed
to
require
it
;
but
then
I
can't
but
wonder
they
should
commend
Anger
,
and
say
,
Nature
has
giv'n
it
us
to
good
Ends
and
Purposes
:
For
that
in
truth
ought
in
no
case
to
be
allow'd
of
;
and
't
were
heartily
to
be
wish'd
that
the
Governours
of
a
State
,
would
,
in
this
particular
,
be
like
the
Laws
themselves
,
which
punish
Offenders
according
to
Justice
,
without
being
any
ways
guided
by
Passion
.
CHAP.
XXVI
.
Greatness
of
Soul
commands
an
even
Temper
,
free
from
Haughtiness
in
Prosperity
,
and
Dejectedness
in
Adversity
.
Phillip
greater
than
Alexander
,
in
bearing
his
good
Fortune
with
an
even
Mind
.
The
Higher
Men
are
,
the
more
care
they
should
take
of
being
Humble
and
Moderate
.
An
admirable
Saying
of
Scipio
to
this
purpose
.
In
Prosperity
we
should
especially
consult
our
Friends
;
and
have
a
care
of
Flatterers
.
Greatness
of
Soul
seen
often
among
the
Philosophers
,
and
those
who
in
private
manage
their
own
Estates
.
How
an
Estate
should
be
got
,
improv'd
and
us'd
.
ANother
great
Duty
of
[
a
](A33176-e25850-b)
a
The
Rules
which
follow
,
equally
concern
the
Civil
and
Military
sort
of
Fortitude
,
Not
to
be
puft
up
at
the
good
Success
of
our
Affairs
,
or
dejected
at
the
ill
,
&c.
Fortitude
is
,
not
to
be
Haughty
,
Disdainful
and
Arrogant
when
Fortune
favours
us
,
and
all
things
go
forward
according
to
our
Wishes
:
for
it
shews
as
much
Meanness
and
Poorness
of
Spirit
,
to
be
transported
with
good
,
as
it
does
with
ill
Fortune
:
whereas
,
on
the
other
hand
,
nothing's
more
brave
,
than
an
Evenness
of
Temper
in
every
Condition
,
and
(
as
is
reported
of
Socrates
and
Lelius
)
a
constant
retaining
the
same
Air
in
one's
Countenance
,
without
ever
seeming
puff'd
up
or
dejected
.
I
find
that
[
b
](A33176-e25930-b)
b
The
second
of
that
Name
,
Son
of
Amintas
,
whom
he
succeeded
in
the
Throne
.
A
Cunning
,
Valiant
and
Ambitious
Prince
.
He
conquer'd
the
Thebans
,
Athenians
,
and
other
neighbouring
Nations
;
till
at
last
he
was
made
Generalissimo
of
all
the
Grecian
Forces
.
He
laid
the
Foundation
of
that
Empire
,
which
Alexander
the
Great
,
his
Son
,
brought
to
its
Hight
.
See
'em
compar'd
together
in
Justin
,
Book
9.
ch.
8.
Philip
;
the
King
of
Macedonia
,
was
inferiour
to
his
Son
in
the
outward
Glory
and
Splendor
of
his
Atchievements
,
but
very
far
above
him
in
good
Nature
and
Condescension
;
therefore
the
Father
kept
always
the
Character
of
a
Great
Person
,
whereas
the
Son
often
was
[
c
](A33176-e26040-b)
c
As
in
the
Murther
of
his
Friend
Clitus
,
Callisthenes
,
&c.
See
Q.
Curtius
.
guilty
of
base
and
dishonourable
Actions
.
'T
is
a
good
Rule
therefore
,
I
think
,
which
is
given
by
some
Men
,
That
the
higher
our
Station
in
the
World
is
,
the
more
care
we
should
take
of
our
Lives
and
Actions
,
that
they
be
kept
within
the
compass
of
Lowliness
and
Humility
.
Panaetius
tells
us
't
was
an
usual
Saying
with
his
Schollar
and
familiar
Friend
Africanus
,
That
Men
who
give
the
Reins
to
their
vitious
Appetites
,
and
are
high
and
presuming
upon
the
Greatness
of
their
Fortunes
,
should
be
dealt
with
like
Horses
,
when
grown
fierce
and
unruly
by
frequent
Engagements
:
for
as
these
are
deliver'd
to
Breakers
to
tame
and
be
made
fit
for
riding
;
so
those
should
be
brought
within
the
barriers
and
limits
of
Reason
and
Philosophy
,
to
teach
'em
the
Uncertainty
of
all
Human
Things
,
and
the
great
Volubility
and
Changeableness
of
Fortune
.
We
should
also
in
Prosperity
more
especially
make
use
of
the
Counsel
of
our
Friends
,
and
pay
more
Respect
and
Deference
to
their
Advices
,
than
we
were
wont
to
do
.
At
the
same
time
also
we
should
take
a
great
care
,
that
we
don't
give
over-much
ear
to
Flatterers
,
nor
suffer
our selves
to
be
wheedled
and
impos'd
upon
by
their
deceitful
Words
.
For
there
's
nothing
wherein
we
're
more
apt
to
be
mistaken
,
than
in
this
particular
;
every
one
having
such
a
fond
Conceit
and
Opinion
of
himself
,
as
to
think
he
deserves
those
Applauses
which
they
give
him
.
Hence
spring
innumerable
Errors
in
our
Lives
;
whilst
Men
,
puff'd
up
with
a
vain
Imagination
,
and
mistaken
Notions
of
their
own
great
Merit
,
are
expos'd
to
the
Railery
of
all
the
World
besides
.
And
so
much
may
suffice
upon
this
Head
.
From
what
has
been
said
we
may
easily
gather
,
That
those
who
are
over
Affairs
of
the
Publick
,
do
the
greatest
Actions
,
and
such
as
express
the
most
Bravery
of
Mind
;
their
Business
affording
'em
more
Opportunities
,
and
there
being
more
Men
who
are
concern'd
in
this
,
than
in
any
other
Method
of
Living
whatever
.
[
d
](A33176-e26140-b)
d
Having
done
with
the
publick
,
he
comes
now
to
the
private
Fortitude
.
Of
this
he
omits
the
former
Branch
,
viz.
The
Contemplative
,
having
discours'd
of
it
already
in
Chap.
6.
Of
the
latter
,
which
relates
to
private
Gentlemen
,
managing
their
own
Estates
,
he
gives
a
few
Precepts
;
as
,
First
,
That
their
Estate
be
well
gotten
,
&c.
But
after
all
,
we
can't
but
acknowledge
there
are
,
and
have
been
a
great
many
noble
Spirits
,
even
in
a
Life
of
Retirement
and
Privacy
;
who
being
sequestred
from
the
Business
of
the
World
,
have
given
up
'emselves
to
Enquiries
after
Truth
,
and
the
great
Concernment
of
the
Practice
of
Virtue
:
Or
else
leading
a
Life
in
the
middle
,
as
it
were
,
between
the
Statesman
and
Philosopher
,
have
been
delighted
with
the
Management
of
their
own
private
Fortunes
;
not
scraping
up
Money
by
all
manner
of
ways
,
or
hoarding
it
so
as
to
make
no
Body
the
better
for
it
;
but
parting
with
it
freely
for
the
sake
of
their
Friends
,
or
to
serve
the
Republick
,
when
occasion
required
it
.
Now
this
private
Estate
I
would
have
,
in
the
first
place
,
to
be
honestly
come
by
,
not
by
any
base
,
scandalous
or
invidious
way
of
Gaining
:
then
let
it
be
distributed
to
the
Uses
and
Necessities
of
as
many
as
is
possible
,
provided
they
are
worthy
and
deserving
People
;
and
let
it
be
encreas'd
by
such
ordinary
Methods
of
Saving
and
good
Husbandry
,
as
are
agreeable
to
the
Dictates
of
Reason
and
Prudence
:
and
lastly
,
let
none
of
it
be
spent
in
Debauchery
and
luxurious
Living
,
but
in
Acts
of
Munificence
and
Liberality
towards
others
.
Whoever
observes
these
Measures
laid
down
(
let
his
way
of
Life
be
either
publick
or
private
)
may
perform
all
the
Duties
of
Magnanimity
,
Constancy
and
Greatness
of
Soul
,
as
well
as
of
Sincerity
,
Fidelity
,
and
doing
Good
to
Mankind
:
CHAP.
XXVII
.
The
Virtues
contain'd
under
the
fourth
Head
of
Honesty
.
Whatever
is
Honest
,
and
nothing
else
but
that
,
is
becoming
a
Man
;
Honesty
and
Decency
being
really
the
same
thing
,
and
distinguish'd
only
by
an
Act
of
the
Mind
.
Two
sorts
of
Decorum
,
and
what
the
Nature
of
each
of
'em
is
.
WE
are
now
in
the
next
place
to
speak
of
the
fourth
,
and
only
remaining
part
of
Virtue
or
Honesty
,
under
which
are
comprehended
Bashfulness
,
Temperance
,
Modesty
,
Government
of
the
Passions
,
and
the
observing
a
just
Order
as
to
time
and
place
in
our
Words
and
Actions
;
from
all
which
arises
[
a
](A33176-e26330-b)
a
By
these
Words
I
would
express
our
Author
's
quasi
ornatus
quidam
vitae
,
by
which
't
is
likely
he
might
mean
the
same
,
which
the
Greeks
did
by
their
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
or
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
which
Aristotle
comprehends
under
the
Virtue
of
Temperance
.
'T
is
that
which
gives
a
Lustre
and
Ornament
to
Virtue
,
like
the
polishing
of
a
Diamond
,
which
makes
it
more
pleasing
and
valuable
than
when
rugged
,
tho'
then
it
exceeded
all
other
Stones
.
Thus
we
see
some
have
a
way
to
set
off
and
recommend
their
Virtue
;
while
others
by
their
too
great
Severity
and
Rigidness
,
for
want
of
this
ornatus
,
which
he
here
mentions
,
render
both
it
and
themselves
Distastful
.
a
certain
engaging
kind
of
Beauty
and
Gracefulness
,
which
serves
to
set
off
and
adorn
our
Lives
.
Under
this
Head
is
contain'd
that
Becomingness
[
Decorum
,
as
we
call
it
in
Latin
]
which
among
the
Greeks
has
the
name
of
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
;
which
is
in
its
Nature
so
closely
united
and
riveted
to
Honesty
,
that
there
's
no
way
left
of
pulling
'em
a
sunder
:
for
whatever
is
Becoming
is
likewise
Honest
,
and
whatever
is
Honest
is
likewise
Becoming
.
The
Difference
between
'em
is
so
very
small
,
that
we
may
better
conceive
what
it
is
,
than
explain
it
;
for
[
b
](A33176-e26470-b)
b
That
is
,
Honesty
is
as
it
't
were
the
Foundation
of
Decorum
,
which
't
is
built
upon
;
it
being
impossible
for
any
thing
to
become
,
unless
it
be
first
Honest.
I
could
wish
however
our
Author
had
endeavour'd
to
explain
the
Difference
he
understood
between
'em
,
and
not
contented
himself
with
saying
in
general
,
That
it
might
better
be
conceiv'd
than
in
Words
express'd
.
The
Nature
of
Honesty
seems
to
consist
in
the
Conformity
of
our
Actions
to
the
Judgment
of
Right
Reason
,
as
the
Rule
or
Measure
which
a
reasonable
Creature
ought
to
walk
by
:
But
that
of
Decorum
,
in
our
Actions
being
answerable
to
the
Dignity
and
Excellence
of
Human
Nature
,
as
a
Character
which
we
ought
to
live
up
to
in
the
World
.
Now
nothing
can
be
so
,
that
is
not
first
suppos'd
conformable
to
the
Dictates
of
Reason
:
and
whatever
is
conformable
to
the
Judgment
of
Reason
,
must
of
consequence
be
worthy
of
a
Man
.
For
what
can
be
worthy
of
a
reasonable
Creature
,
but
to
live
according
to
that
Reason
which
God
has
giv'n
him
?
From
hence
it
follows
,
that
Decorum
does
as
't
were
result
from
Honestum
,
as
Light
does
from
the
Sun
;
or
(
to
give
our
Author
's
own
Explication
of
it
)
as
Beauty
and
good
Colour
in
the
Face
,
doth
from
a
good
Constituon
of
Body
.
whatever
Becomingness
there
is
in
any
Action
,
it
immediately
arises
from
the
Honesty
of
it
.
From
hence
it
appears
,
that
Becomingness
does
not
peculiarly
belong
to
this
one
part
of
Honesty
,
whereof
we
are
now
undertaking
to
Discourse
;
but
shews
it self
also
in
each
of
the
three
former
.
[
c
](A33176-e26540-b)
c
He
shews
in
particular
,
how
Decorum
is
seen
in
the
three
former
Virtues
,
Prudence
,
Justice
,
Fortitude
.
To
Reason
,
for
instance
,
and
Discourse
according
to
the
Rules
of
Prudence
;
to
go
about
nothing
but
after
due
Consideration
;
and
on
every
occasion
to
be
quick
at
espying
and
defending
the
Truth
,
are
things
that
are
Becoming
:
whereas
to
be
deceiv'd
,
to
be
in
an
Errour
or
Mistake
,
and
to
be
impos'd
upon
,
are
very
Unbecoming
,
as
well
as
to
be
mad
or
beside
one's
self
.
So
again
,
all
Actions
of
Justice
are
Becoming
,
but
those
of
Injustice
are
both
Scandalous
and
Unbecoming
.
The
same
may
be
said
as
to
the
Actions
of
Fortitude
;
whatever
is
done
with
a
manful
Courage
and
bravery
of
Mind
,
as
't
is
worthy
of
,
so
it
becomes
a
Man
;
but
whatever
on
the
other
hand
shews
any
Cowardice
or
Meanness
of
Spirit
,
is
as
contrary
to
Becomingness
,
as
it
is
to
true
Virtue
.
I
conclude
therefore
,
That
the
Decency
whereof
I
am
now
discoursing
,
appertaineth
to
each
of
the
four
parts
of
Honesty
;
and
so
appertaineth
,
as
not
to
stand
in
need
of
any
mighty
reach
of
Understanding
to
perceive
it
;
but
is
easily
discoverable
at
the
first
view
:
for
there
's
something
of
Becoming
contain'd
in
the
very
Notion
and
Idea
of
all
Virtue
,
from
which
't
is
distinguish'd
by
the
Mind
alone
,
and
not
by
the
Nature
of
the
thing
it self
.
Just
as
the
Beauty
and
good
Colour
of
the
Countenance
,
can
never
be
separate
from
the
Health
of
the
Body
;
so
this
Becomingness
,
of
which
we
are
speaking
,
in
it self
is
all
one
,
and
,
as
it
were
,
incorporate
with
Virtue
and
Honesty
;
but
may
be
distinguish'd
from
it
by
Thought
and
Imagination
.
Now
there
are
two
kinds
or
sorts
of
it
;
the
one
[
d
](A33176-e26650-b)
d
This
is
that
we
have
spoken
of
in
the
Note
above
,
which
is
the
immediate
Off-spring
of
,
and
necessarily
results
from
the
Nature
of
Honesty
in
general
.
Universal
,
which
belongs
to
the
Nature
of
Honesty
in
general
;
the
other
particular
and
contain'd
under
this
,
which
belongs
to
the
several
parts
of
it
.
The
former
is
us'd
to
be
thus
defin'd
,
Decorum
or
Becoming
is
that
,
which
is
congruous
or
agreeable
to
[
e
](A33176-e26730-b)
e
That
is
,
His
Reason
;
it
being
impossible
for
any
thing
to
become
a
Man
,
but
that
which
is
agreeable
to
the
Rules
of
Right
Reason
:
and
whatever
is
reasonable
doth
at
the
same
time
become
him
,
in
this
first
and
largest
acceptation
of
the
Word
.
that
excellent
part
of
the
Nature
of
Man
,
by
which
he
is
distinguish'd
from
the
rest
of
the
Creation
.
As
for
the
latter
,
which
is
contain'd
under
this
,
't
is
most
commonly
made
to
consist
in
that
,
which
is
so
agreeable
to
the
Nature
of
Man
,
as
[
f
](A33176-e26760-b)
f
There
are
two
things
then
,
which
constitute
and
make
up
the
Nature
of
this
Decorum
:
1st
,
An
Agreeableness
to
the
Nature
of
Man
;
and
so
far
't
is
the
same
with
the
former
universal
one
:
But
then
it
adds
to
it
,
2dly
,
A
Moderatio
,
&c.
something
that
's
gentile
,
handsom
and
engaging
,
which
may
serve
to
recommend
it
in
the
Eye
of
the
World
.
See
Note
1.
on
this
Chapter
.
withal
to
shew
something
of
Temper
and
Moderation
,
with
a
certain
sweet
Air
of
Gentility
and
good
Manners
.
CHAP.
XXVIII
.
Poetical
Decorum
what
it
is
,
and
how
differing
from
that
we
here
speak
of
.
Nature
has
given
us
a
Character
of
Reason
,
&c.
which
we
ought
to
live
up
to
.
Nature
teaches
us
to
have
a
Respect
for
other
Men.
Proportion
,
Regularity
,
&c.
please
,
where-ever
they
are
found
.
We
ought
to
be
concern'd
about
other
People's
Opinion
of
us
.
How
the
Duties
of
Justice
,
and
those
of
Modesty
,
Decency
,
&c.
differ
.
We
should
live
agreeably
to
Nature
,
which
will
always
lead
us
right
.
Decency
relates
both
to
the
Actions
of
the
Body
and
Mind
.
The
Nature
or
Mind
of
Man
consists
of
Sence
and
Reason
.
The
former
of
these
ought
to
obey
the
latter
.
THat
this
is
so
,
will
more
plainly
appear
,
if
we
consider
that
Decorum
or
Convenience
of
Manners
,
which
the
Poets
aim
at
in
all
their
Writings
;
concerning
which
were
it
anywise
necessary
to
my
present
Purpose
,
I
might
largely
discourse
.
Suffice
it
at
present
for
me
only
to
observe
,
That
the
Poets
are
then
said
to
keep
this
Decorum
,
when
each
of
their
Persons
is
brought
in
saying
and
doing
those
things
,
which
are
suitable
to
the
Character
he
bears
in
the
World
:
Should
[
a
](A33176-e26930-b)
a
Two
of
the
Sons
of
Jupiter
,
suppos'd
to
have
been
very
Just
and
Good
Men
;
therefore
,
after
their
Deaths
,
made
two
of
the
Judges
of
Hell
.
Aeacus
,
for
Example
,
or
Minos
say
[
b
](A33176-e26980-b)
b
A
Verse
out
of
Ennius
,
often
quoted
by
our
Author
.
E'en
let
'em
hate
me
,
whilst
they
dread
me
too
:
Or
,
[
c
](A33176-e27010-b)
c
A
Verse
which
the
Poet
Accius
puts
into
the
Mouth
of
Atreus
,
who
had
kill'd
the
Children
of
his
Brother
Thyestes
,
and
serv'd
'em
up
to
him
at
a
Banquet
.
See
Seneca's
Tragedy
of
Thyestes
.
The
Child
's
entomb'd
in
its
own
Parent
's
Bowels
.
't
would
be
an
Offence
against
the
Rules
of
Decency
;
because
they
pass
in
the
World
for
Men
of
Justice
and
Honesty
:
But
let
the
same
be
said
by
a
cruel
Atreus
,
and
the
whole
Theatre
shall
clap
and
applaud
it
;
because
't
is
a
Saying
very
agreeable
to
his
Character
.
[
d
](A33176-e27090-b)
d
There
's
a
difference
between
the
Poetical
and
Moral
Decorum
:
The
Poet
himself
can
give
such
or
such
a
Character
,
(
a
vicious
one
if
he
pleases
)
and
his
Decorum
consists
in
the
Person
's
speaking
and
doing
what
's
agreeable
to
such
a
Character
.
But
Nature
(
i.
e.
the
God
of
Nature
)
has
given
one
to
every
of
us
,
by
making
us
reasonable
understanding
Creatures
.
As
therefore
a
poetical
Person
must
speak
and
do
what
's
suitable
to
his
Character
;
so
are
we
bound
in
all
our
Thoughts
,
Words
and
Actions
,
to
follow
the
Dictates
of
Understanding
and
Right
Reason
;
in
which
consists
the
Nature
of
universal
Decorum
.
Now
the
Poet
can
judge
what
is
becoming
and
convenient
for
every
Person
,
according
to
the
Character
he
himself
has
fix'd
on
him
;
but
Nature
has
fix'd
one
on
every
one
of
us
,
by
giving
us
that
Nobleness
and
Excellence
of
Being
,
whereby
we
are
set
above
all
other
Creatures
.
The
Poets
then
,
there
being
so
great
a
variety
of
Characters
,
can
see
what
's
becoming
and
convenient
for
all
,
even
the
most
Vitious
:
but
we
have
got
only
one
Character
to
live
up
to
,
I
mean
that
which
is
assign'd
us
by
Nature
herself
;
a
Character
of
Temperance
and
Modesty
,
of
Constancy
and
Moderation
.
And
the
same
Nature
having
also
taught
us
,
That
we
ought
to
be
careful
of
our
Carriage
and
Demeanour
towards
the
rest
of
Men
;
from
hence
it
appears
of
how
large
an
Extent
that
Becomingness
is
,
which
belongs
to
the
Nature
of
[
e
](A33176-e27130-b)
e
Which
consists
in
living
up
to
that
Character
of
Temperance
,
&c.
which
Nature
has
given
us
.
Honesty
in
general
;
and
also
that
other
,
which
is
seen
in
the
Exercise
of
the
[
f
](A33176-e27160-b)
f
Which
consists
in
being
careful
of
our
Carriage
and
Demeanour
towards
the
rest
of
Men
,
which
the
same
Nature
has
taught
us
to
be
;
in
giving
no
Offence
to
any
one
,
&c.
several
kinds
of
it
.
For
,
as
the
Beauty
and
Comliness
of
the
Body
draws
the
Eyes
to
it
by
the
fit
Composure
of
all
its
Members
,
and
pleases
us
only
upon
this
account
,
because
all
its
Parts
correspond
with
a
kind
of
Proportion
and
Harmony
:
So
this
Decorum
,
which
gives
a
sort
of
Lustre
and
Grace
to
our
Lives
,
engages
the
Approbation
and
Esteem
of
all
we
live
with
,
by
that
just
and
due
Order
,
Consistency
,
and
Regularity
,
which
it
keeps
and
maintains
in
our
Words
and
Actions
.
[
g
](A33176-e27190-b)
g
Men
ought
to
frame
and
compose
their
Actions
,
not
according
to
their
own
private
Will
and
Fancy
,
but
according
to
the
Prescriptions
and
Manners
of
those
,
with
whom
they
converse
;
so
far
as
is
innocent
and
not
contrary
to
Virtue
;
to
be
easie
and
compliant
in
Things
indifferent
,
and
by
a
civil
,
gentile
and
affable
Deportment
,
endeavour
to
oblige
and
win
the
Affections
of
all
Men.
And
he
that
will
follow
his
own
Humour
,
without
caring
whether
he
pleases
or
displeases
Men
,
where
he
might
innocently
do
it
,
is
deservedly
censur'd
for
a
proud
,
arrogant
and
unmannerly
Fellow
.
We
ought
to
have
therefore
a
certain
Respect
and
Reverence
for
all
Men
,
and
desire
to
be
approv'd
not
only
by
the
best
,
but
by
all
the
World
:
For
not
to
care
a
farthing
what
't
is
People
think
of
One
,
is
a
sign
not
only
of
Pride
and
Conceitedness
,
but
indeed
of
having
perfectly
abandon'd
all
Modesty
.
[
h
](A33176-e27210-b)
h
Modesty
,
or
the
second
sort
of
Decorum
,
consisting
(
as
is
said
)
in
our
due
Carriage
towards
other
Men
;
and
Justice
also
in
another
manner
doing
the
same
:
he
here
shews
wherein
they
differ
,
and
what
the
distinct
Duties
of
each
.
But
here
we
must
observe
,
there
's
a
great
deal
of
difference
between
that
which
Justice
,
and
that
which
this
Modesty
,
Respect
or
Reverence
demands
,
in
relation
to
other
People
:
'T
is
the
Duty
of
Justice
,
not
to
injure
or
wrong
any
Man
;
of
Respect
or
Reverence
,
not
to
do
any
thing
that
may
offend
or
displease
him
;
wherein
more
especially
the
Nature
of
that
Decorum
we
are
speaking
of
consists
.
These
things
then
being
thus
explain'd
,
I
suppose
it
may
clearly
enough
appear
,
what
that
is
which
we
mean
by
Becoming
.
As
for
the
Duties
prescrib'd
by
it
,
the
first
thing
to
which
it
conducts
us
is
,
To
demean
our selves
suitably
and
agreeably
to
our
Nature
,
and
do
nothing
that
may
any
ways
stain
or
deface
it
:
for
whilst
we
take
this
for
our
Guide
and
Conductress
,
[
i
](A33176-e27240-b)
i
For
Virtue
it self
consists
in
acting
agreeably
to
the
Dictates
of
Nature
,
i.
e.
Reason
:
in
following
her
therefore
we
shall
but
go
in
the
Way
of
Virtue
,
and
consequently
can
never
be
in
the
wrong
.
't
is
impossible
we
should
ever
go
out
of
the
way
;
but
by
her
shall
be
led
thorough
all
the
Paths
of
Wisdom
,
Truth
and
Understanding
;
of
Justice
and
Benificence
toward
the
Society
of
Mankind
;
and
of
true
Magnanimity
and
Greatness
of
Soul
.
But
the
Nature
of
Decency
is
more
peculiarly
seen
in
the
fourth
part
of
Honesty
,
concerning
which
we
are
now
discoursing
;
and
relates
not
only
to
the
Motions
of
the
Body
,
but
more
especially
to
those
of
the
Mind
also
;
each
of
which
are
approv'd
and
becoming
,
when
they
are
such
as
are
suitable
to
Nature
.
[
k
](A33176-e27260-b)
k
Since
Decorum
consists
in
acting
suitably
to
Nature
,
and
we
must
first
know
what
Nature
is
,
before
we
can
tell
what
's
suitable
to
it
;
therefore
he
here
tells
us
wherein
it
consists
.
Now
the
whole
of
the
Nature
or
Mind
of
Man
,
is
made
up
of
only
these
two
Parts
:
The
first
consists
in
the
sensitive
Appetite
,
which
by
the
Greeks
is
call'd
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
by
the
blind
and
extravagant
Impulse
of
which
,
he
is
hurried
and
transported
from
one
thing
to
another
.
The
second
in
Reason
,
which
shews
and
instructs
him
in
the
way
of
his
Duty
,
telling
him
what
he
should
do
,
and
what
not
do
:
From
whence
it
follows
,
That
't
is
Reason
which
ought
to
be
the
governing
Faculty
;
and
the
Appetite
subject
to
the
Commands
of
it
.
CHAP.
XXIX
.
Our
Actions
should
neither
be
Rash
nor
Careless
,
&c.
How
the
Sensitive
Part
should
be
subject
to
the
Reasonable
.
Passion
disorders
the
Body
,
as
well
as
Mind
.
Watchfulness
and
Consideration
necessary
for
the
subduing
of
the
Passions
.
Men
were
not
design'd
by
Nature
for
Jesting
,
&c.
but
serious
Studies
.
Several
sorts
of
Jests
and
Diversions
.
Measures
to
be
observ'd
about
'em
.
EVery
Action
therefore
should
be
free
,
as
from
Precipitancy
and
Rashness
on
the
one
hand
,
so
from
all
Carelesness
and
Negligence
on
the
other
;
nor
should
any
thing
be
done
,
for
which
we
can't
give
a
sufficient
Reason
,
which
is
almost
the
very
Definition
of
Duty
.
In
order
to
this
[
a
](A33176-e27420-b)
a
Since
God
has
endow'd
us
with
the
Faculty
of
Reason
,
to
shew
and
instruct
us
in
the
Way
of
our
Duty
,
What
can
be
more
either
Sinful
or
Unbecoming
,
than
to
stifle
the
Sparks
of
it
by
Negligence
and
Heaviness
?
Or
what
more
unnatural
,
than
to
make
what
should
be
our
Guide
and
Directress
,
become
a
Captive
and
Slave
to
our
irregular
Passions
?
For
God
has
given
us
that
Divine
Faculty
to
no
purpose
,
if
afterwards
we
refuse
to
be
Guided
and
Conducted
by
it
.
The
great
and
fundamental
Duty
therefore
in
this
place
,
is
,
To
do
nothing
but
according
to
the
Directions
of
Reason
,
to
assert
her
Soveraignty
,
and
never
suffer
her
to
be
captivated
by
any
vicious
Principle
or
inordinate
Lust.
the
Passions
must
be
brought
under
the
power
of
Reason
,
so
as
neither
thro'
Hastiness
to
run
before
its
Orders
,
nor
thro'
Coldness
and
Heaviness
to
disregard
'em
when
given
;
but
all
their
Motions
must
be
so
quieted
and
so
restrain'd
,
as
to
bring
no
Uneasiness
or
Disturbance
to
the
Mind
.
And
from
this
calm
and
peaceable
State
of
the
Soul
arises
that
Constancy
and
Moderation
we
have
mention'd
:
For
when
once
the
Passions
grow
unruly
and
extravagant
,
and
refuse
to
be
guided
in
their
Desires
and
Aversions
by
the
Rules
of
Prudence
,
[
b
](A33176-e27430-b)
b
For
nothing
is
so
wild
and
ungovernable
as
the
Passions
,
when
they
've
over-power'd
and
got
the
mastery
of
Reason
.
And
how
then
can
there
be
any
Regularity
,
Temper
or
Decency
in
that
Life
,
which
is
under
the
Government
of
such
blind
,
inconsistent
Masters
?
Distrahuntur
in
contrarias
partes
impotentium
cupiditates
,
(
says
our
Author
in
another
place
)
cum
huic
obsecutus
sis
,
illi
est
repugnandum
.
they
'll
run
without
question
beyond
all
Bounds
and
Measure
;
for
they
abandon
and
cast
off
their
Allegiance
to
Reason
,
which
they
ought
to
obey
by
the
Constitution
of
Nature
.
By
this
means
are
all
things
turn'd
topsie-turvy
,
and
not
the
Mind
only
,
but
even
the
Body
also
,
put
very
much
into
Disorder
and
Confusion
.
Do
but
mark
those
,
who'r
enflam'd
with
a
vehement
Anger
or
Desire
;
who'r
transported
with
Fear
,
or
an
over-great
Joy
;
and
you
'll
see
an
alteration
in
their
Countenances
,
Voices
,
Gestures
,
and
all
their
Actions
;
which
sufficiently
gives
us
to
understand
(
that
we
may
return
again
to
the
Duty
now
before
us
)
how
necessary
't
is
to
restrain
and
give
check
to
the
Movements
of
the
Appetite
,
and
to
be
always
Watchful
and
standing
upon
our
Guard
,
that
so
we
may
neither
be
Careless
and
Inconsiderate
,
nor
do
any
thing
Rashly
and
at
all
Adventures
.
[
c
](A33176-e27530-b)
c
Since
Reason
(
as
was
shewn
)
is
the
governing
Part
of
Man
,
and
he
's
bound
to
act
according
to
its
Precepts
;
certainly
it
must
follow
,
That
to
spend
his
time
in
Idleness
and
Sloth
,
in
foolish
Playing
and
impertinent
Jesting
,
is
contrary
to
his
Duty
,
as
being
unworthy
of
that
excellent
Nature
,
which
God
has
bestow'd
on
him
.
This
brings
him
to
discourse
,
How
far
these
things
are
allowable
.
As
first
,
as
to
the
Measure
of
Jesting
,
it
must
not
be
excessive
:
As
to
the
Matter
,
it
must
not
be
immodest
,
or
abusive
,
&c.
For
Mankind
were
never
design'd
by
Nature
,
meerly
to
sport
and
idle
away
their
Time
;
but
to
follow
after
grave
and
serious
Studies
,
and
Business
of
greater
importance
than
Play
is
.
Not
but
that
Jesting
and
Diversion
are
allowable
,
provided
we
use
'em
but
only
as
Sleep
,
and
other
such
necessary
Refreshments
of
Nature
,
viz.
after
the
discharge
of
our
serious
and
more
important
Duties
.
And
even
then
we
must
see
,
that
our
Jesting
be
neither
excessive
nor
immodest
,
but
such
as
is
handsom
and
becoming
a
Gentleman
.
For
as
Boys
are
allow'd
,
not
all
kinds
of
Sports
,
but
only
such
as
have
nothing
that
is
vicious
or
ill
in
them
;
so
in
this
Jesting
we
should
allow
our selves
nothing
,
but
only
what
is
agreeable
to
Honesty
and
Good-manners
.
We
may
therefore
observe
,
that
Jesting
or
Merriment
is
of
two
sorts
,
the
one
clownish
,
abusive
,
scandalous
and
obscene
;
the
other
handsom
,
gentile
,
ingenious
and
truly
pleasant
.
Of
this
kind
are
several
Instances
to
be
met
with
,
as
in
our
[
d
](A33176-e27610-b)
d
A
famous
Latin
Comedian
,
very
well
known
by
his
Plays
,
which
are
still
extant
.
See
his
Character
in
the
Preface
to
three
of
'em
,
which
are
turn'd
into
English
;
and
the
Commentators
on
Horace
de
Art.
Poet.
v.
270.
Plautus
,
and
the
Old
[
e
](A33176-e27670-b)
e
Old
in
opposition
to
the
New
.
There
were
in
all
three
sorts
of
Comedy
among
the
Athenians
:
The
first
in
the
strictest
sence
Old
,
the
Authors
of
which
took
true
Stories
for
their
Subjects
,
and
expos'd
Men
publickly
by
Name
,
tho'
they
had
otherwise
a
great
deal
of
handsom
Wit
:
This
being
forbid
,
the
middle
Comedy
succeeded
,
wherein
they
still
took
true
Subjects
,
and
expos'd
Men
as
formerly
,
but
under
borrow'd
Names
:
(
these
are
both
of
'em
often
,
and
I
suppose
here
,
comprehended
under
the
name
Old
.
)
This
was
follow'd
by
the
New
,
wherein
they
only
us'd
feign'd
Subjects
,
and
forbore
to
abuse
.
See
Horace
Sat.
4.
Book
1.
and
Art.
Poet.
vers.
281.
and
the
Commentators
upon
him
.
Greek
Comedians
;
so
in
the
Writings
of
the
Socratick
Philosophers
;
to
which
we
may
add
the
ingenious
Sayings
of
several
Men
,
such
as
are
collected
by
the
Senior
Cato
,
and
usually
go
by
the
Name
of
Apothegms
.
There
is
no
great
difficulty
then
to
distinguish
between
a
gentile
and
a
clownish
Jest
;
the
one
,
if
brought
in
at
a
seasonable
time
,
and
when
a
Man's
Mind
's
disengaged
from
Business
,
is
becoming
for
a
Gentleman
;
the
other
,
for
no
Man
at
all
indeed
,
when
base
and
unhandsom
things
are
dress'd
up
in
filthy
and
obscene
Expressions
.
[
f
](A33176-e27860-b)
f
Having
done
with
Jesting
,
he
now
proceeds
to
Plays
and
other
Recreations
;
concerning
which
almost
the
same
Rules
are
to
be
observ'd
:
They
must
not
be
excessive
,
unhandsom
,
&c.
Our
Plays
and
Recreations
must
also
be
kept
within
their
due
Bounds
;
and
care
should
be
taken
that
we
don't
run
out
into
great
Excesses
,
and
suffer
the
Pleasure
,
which
we
take
in
them
,
to
carry
us
into
any
thing
that
's
Base
or
Unbecoming
.
Hunting
,
and
the
Exercises
of
the
[
g
](A33176-e27890-b)
g
A
Field
just
without
Rome
,
where
the
Youth
us'd
to
perform
all
their
Sports
and
Exercises
.
Campus
Martius
,
supply
us
with
Examples
enough
of
creditable
and
manly
Recreations
.
CHAP.
XXX
.
The
Excellence
of
Man's
Nature
above
that
of
Brutes
,
necessary
to
be
consider'd
.
Wherein
it
consists
.
Some
are
really
Beasts
under
the
shape
of
Men.
Sensual
Pleasures
,
Effeminacy
,
&c.
unbecoming
Man's
Nature
.
Beside
Reason
,
which
is
the
common
Nature
of
all
Men
,
each
Man
has
his
particular
Nature
or
Genius
.
The
difference
of
Mens
particular
Natures
or
Dispositions
,
shewn
by
a
large
number
of
Examples
.
BUt
in
all
Enquiries
concerning
what
becomes
us
,
't
is
of
very
great
moment
to
be
[
a
](A33176-e27990-b)
a
To
the
end
that
we
may
perceive
the
Nobleness
and
Excellency
of
the
one
above
the
other
,
and
make
it
our
.
Business
to
live
accordingly
.
This
will
shew
us
(
as
he
goes
on
to
observe
)
how
mean
and
unworthy
an
Employment
it
is
,
for
a
Man
to
wallow
in
Lust
and
Sensuality
;
how
inconsistent
with
his
reasonable
Nature
;
and
how
much
more
agreeable
to
Goats
and
Swine
.
constantly
reflecting
,
How
much
Man's
Nature
excels
that
of
Beasts
and
inferior
Annimals
.
These
have
no
tast
or
relish
for
any
thing
,
but
the
Pleasures
of
the
Body
,
towards
which
they
are
carry'd
with
a
great
deal
of
Eagerness
:
whereas
nothing's
more
agreeable
and
nourishing
,
as
it
were
,
to
the
Mind
of
Man
,
than
Learning
and
Contemplation
.
Hence
he
is
always
a-seeking
or
contriving
of
something
that
's
new
,
and
is
greatly
delighted
with
seeing
and
hearing
,
for
the
increase
of
his
Knowledge
.
And
if
there
is
any
one
too
much
addicted
to
sensual
Pleasures
,
unless
he
's
transform'd
into
a
meer
Brute
;
(
for
some
such
there
are
,
who
are
Men
in
Name
,
and
not
in
Reality
)
but
if
,
I
say
,
any
one
is
too
much
addicted
,
and
suffers
himself
to
be
conquer'd
by
Pleasure
;
yet
,
for
very
shame
,
he
will
hide
and
conceal
his
Propensions
towards
it
,
as
much
as
is
possible
.
And
what
is
this
now
but
[
b
](A33176-e28010-b)
b
For
what
else
should
be
the
reason
,
why
Men
are
asham'd
to
discover
their
Desires
and
Inclinations
for
bodily
Pleasures
,
but
only
a
sort
of
natural
Consciousness
,
that
they
are
not
answerable
to
the
Dignity
of
their
Nature
?
a
plain
Indication
,
That
sensual
Pleasures
are
unbecoming
the
Dignity
of
a
reasonable
Creature
,
and
ought
to
be
despis'd
and
rejected
by
it
?
And
whoever
sets
any
Value
upon
them
,
should
be
sure
to
take
care
,
that
he
keep
within
the
Limits
of
Reason
and
Moderation
?
From
hence
it
follows
,
that
we
should
not
have
any
respect
to
Pleasure
,
but
only
to
the
preservation
of
our
Health
and
Strength
,
in
our
Victuals
,
Cloaths
,
and
other
Conveniencies
belonging
to
the
Body
.
And
does
not
the
Consideration
of
the
same
Dignity
and
Excellence
of
our
Natures
,
plainly
inform
us
,
how
base
and
unworthy
a
thing
it
is
,
to
dissolve
in
Luxury
,
Softness
,
and
Effeminacy
?
And
how
brave
and
becoming
it
is
,
on
the
other
hand
;
for
a
Man
to
lead
a
Life
of
Frugality
and
Temperance
,
of
Strictness
and
Sobriety
?
[
c
](A33176-e28020-b)
c
Having
shewn
what
the
true
Notion
of
Decorum
is
,
and
hinted
at
the
Duties
of
it
,
as
't
is
drawn
from
the
Nature
of
Man
in
general
;
he
now
proceeds
to
a
second
sort
of
it
,
taken
from
each
one
's
particular
Nature
.
We
should
not
only
live
so
,
as
is
Consonant
to
our
general
Character
,
Right
Reason
;
but
every
one
should
endeavour
to
follow
what
's
agreeable
to
his
particular
Inelinations
,
provided
there
's
nothing
in
'em
vicious
or
unreasonable
.
For
nothing
can
ever
be
handsom
or
becoming
,
that
's
contrary
to
the
tendency
of
a
Man
's
own
Genius
;
for
whatever
is
strain'd
and
forc'd
(
as
all
such
things
are
)
must
consequently
be
undecent
.
Here
therefore
he
begins
to
discourse
of
Mens
various
Dispositions
,
&c.
some
are
naturally
Witty
and
Merry
,
others
Grave
and
Serious
,
or
the
like
:
And
't
is
impossible
one
of
these
should
ever
sustain
the
Character
of
the
other
,
but
he
must
come
off
very
aukwardly
and
unhandsomly
.
And
here
we
must
observe
,
that
Nature
has
given
us
,
as
it
were
,
a
double
Part
to
be
acted
in
the
World
:
The
first
is
extended
to
all
Men
in
common
,
forasmuch
as
we
are
all
Partakers
of
Reason
,
and
that
Prerogative
of
our
Nature
,
whereby
we
are
exalted
above
other
Animals
;
't
is
this
that
conducts
us
in
the
finding
out
our
Duty
,
and
from
it
all
Honesty
and
Becomingness
arises
:
The
second
is
appropriate
to
each
in
particular
;
for
as
there
's
a
great
deal
of
difference
in
Bodies
,
(
some
being
nimble
,
and
proper
for
Running
,
others
more
lufty
,
and
fitter
for
Wrestling
;
some
of
a
noble
and
majestick
Air
,
others
of
a
sweet
and
engaging
kind
of
Beauty
;
)
so
there
's
no
less
,
or
rather
a
far
greater
Variety
in
Humours
.
Thus
[
d
](A33176-e28120-b)
d
A
famous
Roman
Orator
,
one
of
the
Interlocutors
in
our
Author
De
Oratore
,
where
may
be
seen
enough
of
his
Character
;
particularly
,
an
admirable
Account
of
his
Death
,
chap.
1.
Book
.
3.
Lucius
Crassus
and
[
e
](A33176-e28180-b)
e
L.
Marcius
Philippus
a
great
Orator
,
and
Cos.
of
Rome
,
An.
Urb.
662.
Our
Author
calls
him
magno
virum
ingenio
,
Book
2.
chap.
17.
and
mentions
him
in
several
places
of
his
Works
.
Lucius
Philippus
were
Men
of
a
great
deal
of
Wit
and
Pleasantry
:
[
f
](A33176-e28230-b)
f
Brother
to
the
Elder
Catulus
,
whom
we
spoke
of
ch.
22.
He
is
often
mention'd
by
our
Author
for
his
Wit
;
particularly
very
much
in
his
De
Oratore
,
and
ch.
37.
of
this
Book
.
Caius
,
the
Son
of
Lucius
Caesar
of
more
than
they
,
and
a
great
deal
more
studied
.
Whereas
the
young
[
g
](A33176-e28300-b)
g
M.
Livius
Drusus
,
an
excellent
young
Roman
Gentleman
,
Tribune
when
Philip
was
Cos.
See
his
Character
and
Death
in
Patercul
.
Book
2.
ch.
13
,
14.
Drusus
and
[
h
](A33176-e28380-b)
h
There
were
several
Noble
Romans
of
that
Name
;
one
M.
Aurelius
Scaurus
was
Cos.
and
slain
by
the
Cimbri
,
when
they
broke
into
Italy
.
'T
is
likely
he
means
here
M.
Aemilius
Scaurus
,
whom
he
mention'd
ch.
22.
Scaurus
at
the
same
time
,
were
Men
of
extraordinary
Gravity
and
Severity
[
i
](A33176-e28450-b)
i
He
was
sirnam'd
the
Wise
,
whom
he
makes
speak
in
his
Book
de
Amicitia
.
Laelius
had
abundance
of
Mirth
and
Gaity
;
his
Familiar
[
k
](A33176-e28490-b)
k
The
Younger
Africanus
.
Scipio
much
more
Ambition
,
and
greater
Austerity
and
Strictness
of
Living
.
Amongst
the
Greeks
,
Socrates
is
said
to
have
been
one
,
that
was
of
a
very
easie
and
facetious
Humour
;
that
always
loved
to
be
Merry
and
Jesting
,
and
was
a
mighty
Artist
at
hiding
his
Meaning
under
witty
Ironies
and
drolling
Expressions
(
which
sort
of
Men
are
by
the
Grecians
call'd
[
l
](A33176-e28540-b)
l
'T
is
plain
,
from
what
he
has
been
saying
,
that
this
Word
is
taken
here
in
a
good
Sence
.
Not
for
those
roguish
Dissemblers
call'd
by
that
Name
,
and
describ'd
by
Theophrastus
in
his
Characters
.
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
;
)
whereas
[
m
](A33176-e28570-b)
m
The
former
a
famous
Athenian
General
and
Statesman
;
of
whom
see
Plut.
and
Thucid.
The
latter
an
eminent
Philosopher
of
the
Isle
Samos
,
Founder
of
the
Pythagorick
Sect.
Pericles
and
Pythagoras
got
'emselves
Credit
,
by
being
of
exactly
the
contrary
Temper
.
Hannibal
among
the
Carthaginian
Generals
,
and
amongst
our
own
Fabius
,
was
Crafty
and
Subtle
;
one
that
knew
how
to
disguise
his
Intentions
and
keep
his
Counsel
;
that
could
make
shew
of
one
thing
,
whilst
he
was
really
designing
another
;
of
exquisite
Skill
for
contriving
of
Stratagems
,
and
preventing
those
laid
by
the
Enemy
against
himself
.
In
this
kind
,
the
Grecians
give
Jason
[
n
](A33176-e28710-b)
n
So
call'd
from
Pherae
,
a
Town
in
Thessaly
,
where
he
Reign'd
.
He
was
one
of
the
greatest
Captains
of
his
Age
,
and
chosen
General
of
all
the
Greeks
to
make
War
upon
the
Persians
.
He
was
Father-in-law
of
that
Alexander
Pheraeus
,
whom
he
mentions
ch.
7.
Book
2.
the
Pheraean
,
and
Themistocles
the
Preference
before
any
others
;
and
there
's
one
thing
of
Solon's
which
shews
he
had
his
share
of
this
Cunning
and
Subtilty
,
[
o
](A33176-e28820-b)
o
The
Athenians
and
Megarans
had
been
at
Wars
a
great
while
for
the
Isle
Salamis
.
At
last
the
former
grew
weary
of
it
,
and
made
a
Law
,
That
whoever
propos'd
fighting
for
it
any
more
,
should
lose
his
Life
.
Solon
once
,
finding
the
Place
might
be
recover'd
,
but
fearing
to
speak
because
of
the
Law
,
feign'd
himself
Mad
,
that
under
that
Disguise
he
might
speak
what
he
would
:
and
coming
into
the
Assembly
in
a
strange
Garb
,
&c.
he
repeated
some
odd
Verses
about
Salamis
;
and
by
degrees
brought
it
about
,
that
the
Athenians
resolv'd
to
try
again
for
the
Isle
,
and
recover'd
it
.
when
he
feigned
himself
Distracted
to
save
his
own
Life
,
and
withal
to
do
a
good
piece
of
Service
to
the
Publick
.
There
are
others
to
be
found
of
just
an
opposite
Humour
,
who
think
it
unlawful
to
do
any
thing
by
Stratagem
and
under-hand
Dealing
,
but
are
all
for
Simplicity
and
Plainness
in
their
Actions
;
Lovers
of
open
and
undisguis'd
Truth
,
but
Haters
of
any
thing
that
looks
like
a
Trick
.
There
are
some
that
will
undergo
any
thing
in
the
World
,
fawn
and
crouch
to
any
manner
of
Person
,
if
they
can
but
obtain
their
own
Ends
and
Designs
by
it
;
as
Marcus
Crassus
we
know
did
to
Sylla
.
Of
which
sort
of
crafty
and
complying
kind
of
People
,
Lysander
the
Lacedaemonian
is
said
to
have
been
Chief
:
whereas
Callicratidas
,
who
was
Admiral
of
the
Navy
next
after
Lysander
,
was
quite
the
contrary
.
Again
,
There
's
as
great
a
variety
in
Men's
Ways
of
Discourse
as
in
their
Humours
and
Complexions
;
some
,
who
are
able
to
speak
very
nobly
,
can
yet
suit
their
Language
to
the
Humours
and
Capacities
of
the
ignorant
Vulgar
;
as
I
remember
Catulus
,
Father
and
Son
,
as
also
Mutius
Mancia
could
do
;
and
I
have
heard
old
People
relate
the
same
of
Scipio
Nasica
:
But
his
Father
,
on
the
contrary
,
he
who
,
by
slaying
Tiberius
Gracchus
,
put
a
full
end
to
his
ruinous
Attempts
,
had
none
of
that
affable
,
familiar
way
of
speaking
.
No
more
had
[
p
](A33176-e29010-b)
p
An
eminent
Philosopher
,
Born
at
Chalecedon
,
Schollar
of
Plato
,
and
Founder
of
the
Academick
Sect.
He
is
frequently
mention'd
by
our
Author
.
Xenecrates
,
the
most
rigid
and
severe
of
all
the
Philosophers
;
and
for
that
very
reason
was
Noted
and
Eminent
.
In
short
,
There
's
almost
an
infinite
number
of
these
different
Natures
and
Characters
in
Men
,
not
one
of
which
is
[
q
](A33176-e29070-b)
q
But
only
if
it
be
apply'd
to
ill
Ends
and
Purposes
.
in
it self
to
be
condemn'd
.
CHAP.
XXXI
.
Every
one
should
follow
his
own
Genius
,
so
far
as
't
is
innocent
.
Uniformity
or
Consistency
most
becoming
a
Man
,
which
can't
be
kept
if
we
run
counter
to
our
own
Natures
.
The
great
force
of
this
Difference
in
Mens
Natures
.
Custom
of
the
Actors
on
the
Stage
.
Several
other
Rules
relating
to
the
same
.
THe
more
easily
then
to
arrive
at
that
Decorum
,
of
which
we
are
speaking
,
let
every
one
stick
to
his
own
peculiar
Character
and
Humour
,
provided
it
has
nothing
that
's
Vicious
in
it
.
I
say
provided
it
has
nothing
that
's
Vicious
in
it
;
for
we
should
always
take
a
particular
care
to
do
nothing
that
is
contrary
to
that
[
a
](A33176-e29150-b)
a
Viz.
Reason
.
See
Note
on
chap.
29.
universal
Character
,
which
Nature
has
imprinted
on
every
one
of
us
:
but
,
saving
the
Reverence
we
owe
to
that
,
then
to
live
according
to
our
own
particular
one
;
so
as
to
follow
after
that
kind
of
Study
,
and
apply
our selves
to
that
course
of
Life
,
which
is
most
suitable
and
agreeable
to
our
own
Inclinations
,
tho'
others
perhaps
may
be
more
useful
and
important
:
For
't
is
in
vain
to
struggle
against
the
Bias
of
your
Nature
;
or
at
first
to
set
upon
that
sort
of
Business
,
which
you
can
never
arrive
at
any
perfection
in
.
From
what
has
been
said
it
more
fully
appears
,
what
that
is
which
we
call
[
b
](A33176-e29200-b)
b
He
means
that
which
results
from
one's
living
up
to
his
particular
Character
;
not
that
general
one
,
of
which
we
have
spoken
before
.
Becoming
;
since
nothing
can
be
such
,
that
is
done
(
as
we
say
)
in
despite
of
Nature
,
i.
e.
contrary
to
the
bent
and
tendency
of
a
Man's
Genius
.
Now
it
's
certain
if
any
thing
in
the
World
is
Becoming
,
't
is
a
constant
Uniformity
in
our
whole
Lives
,
and
particular
Actions
;
[
c
](A33176-e29230-b)
c
Because
't
is
impossible
wholly
to
conquer
our
Nature
and
Inclinations
;
so
that
tho'
we
should
,
by
Custom
to
the
contrary
,
make
shift
to
keep
'em
under
for
some
time
,
yet
they
'll
certainly
break
out
again
,
and
so
spoil
that
Uniformity
which
is
requir'd
in
our
Lives
.
which
't
is
utterly
impossible
we
should
ever
maintain
,
so
long
as
we
run
counter
to
our
own
Inclinations
,
and
foolishly
follow
after
those
of
other
People
:
for
as
we
should
use
our
own
Native
Language
,
which
all
are
suppos'd
to
understand
best
,
and
not
lard
our
Talk
(
as
a
great
many
do
)
with
Expressions
out
of
Greek
,
who
are
therefore
deservedly
laugh'd
at
by
others
:
So
we
should
keep
to
one
constant
Tenour
,
and
regular
Conduct
in
our
Lives
and
Actions
;
so
that
nothing
may
be
in
them
,
which
is
not
well
suited
and
of
a
piece
with
the
rest
.
And
this
difference
in
the
Characters
or
Natures
of
Men
is
of
so
great
moment
,
as
that
in
consequence
of
it
,
one
Man
may
be
oblig'd
to
make
away
with
himself
;
whilst
another
,
tho'
like
him
as
to
all
other
Circumstances
,
may
be
oblig'd
to
the
contrary
.
[
d
](A33176-e29260-b)
d
He
that
was
sirnam'd
Uticensis
,
because
he
chose
rather
to
kill
himself
at
Utica
,
than
yeild
to
the
Power
of
Julius
Caesar.
He
was
Great
Grandson
to
Censorius
.
See
his
Life
in
Plutarch
.
Cato
,
for
instance
,
and
those
[
e
](A33176-e29320-b)
e
Viz.
Lucius
Caesar
,
Considius
,
&c.
See
Comment.
de
Bell.
Afric
.
ch.
11.
who
in
Africk
surrendred
'emselves
to
Caesar
,
were
all
of
'em
under
the
same
Condition
;
and
yet
any
of
the
rest
might
perhaps
have
been
blam'd
for
't
,
had
they
murder'd
themselves
so
as
Cato
did
;
because
they
were
Men
of
less
strictness
in
their
Lives
,
and
less
severity
in
their
Manners
.
But
Cato
was
a
Person
,
whom
Nature
had
endow'd
with
incredible
Firmness
and
Strength
of
Soul
,
which
he
had
augmented
by
perpetual
Constancy
,
and
unalterably
adhering
to
his
once
undertaken
Designs
and
Resolutions
:
[
f
](A33176-e29400-b)
f
This
might
be
true
enough
,
if
to
kill
himself
were
a
lawful
Action
,
and
had
nothing
in
it
that
's
contrary
to
the
Universal
Nature
,
of
which
he
spake
at
the
beginning
of
this
Chapter
.
Cicero
here
supposes
it
lawful
(
tho'
in
other
Places
he
talks
against
it
)
as
following
in
this
Work
especially
the
Stoicks
,
who
held
that
Life
and
Death
were
things
indifferent
in
themselves
,
and
that
in
several
cases
a
Wise
Man
might
,
nay
and
ought
too
,
to
make
away
with
himself
.
Hence
we
hear
'em
so
often
talking
,
of
a
Door
's
being
always
open
to
Liberty
,
whatever
Misfortunes
should
befal
'em
,
&c.
See
Lips
.
Stoick
Philos.
Book
3.
ch.
22.
It
became
his
Character
therefore
to
Die
,
rather
than
to
see
the
Face
of
the
Tyrant
.
How
many
things
did
Ulysses
undergo
in
his
tedious
Wandrings
,
when
he
was
forc'd
to
be
at
the
Pleasure
of
Women
,
(
if
[
g
](A33176-e29500-b)
g
A
notable
Sorceress
,
that
by
her
Enchantments
turn'd
Ulysses's
Men
into
Swine
,
Goats
,
&c.
but
at
last
restor'd
'em
to
their
former
Shape
upon
his
Entreaties
.
See
Homer
's
Odysseis
.
Circe
and
[
h
](A33176-e29560-b)
h
A
Nymph
that
Reign'd
in
the
Isle
Ogygia
,
whither
Ulysses
was
driven
in
his
long
Wandring
,
&c.
She
kept
him
there
seven
Years
.
Calypso
may
be
call'd
Women
)
and
by
fawning
Words
,
and
fair
complaisant
Speeches
,
wheedle
himself
into
the
Favour
of
all
he
met
with
?
How
did
he
bear
the
contemptuous
Usage
of
his
Servants
and
Maids
,
even
in
his
own
Palace
,
that
at
last
he
might
arrive
[
i
](A33176-e29610-b)
i
Viz.
To
kill
those
who
courted
his
Wife
in
his
absence
.
This
he
could
not
have
done
had
he
discover'd
himself
;
therefore
he
came
in
a
Beggar
's
Habit
,
and
was
contemptuously
us'd
by
his
own
Servants
.
at
his
wish'd-for
End
?
Whereas
[
k
](A33176-e29630-b)
k
One
of
Homer's
chief
Heroes
in
the
Trojan
Wars
;
of
a
haughty
and
proud
Spirit
,
that
scorn'd
to
yield
and
give
way
to
any
one
;
and
disdain'd
to
submit
himself
to
any
thing
low
or
mean
.
Ajax
,
according
to
the
Character
we
have
of
him
,
would
rather
have
died
you
a
thousand
Deaths
,
than
ever
have
submitted
to
such
mean
Compliances
.
These
Observations
should
teach
us
all
,
to
look
carefully
every
one
into
himself
,
and
consider
well
what
is
his
peculiar
Genius
,
and
endeavour
to
make
the
best
use
of
it
he
is
able
;
and
not
to
be
foolishly
trying
Experiments
,
to
see
how
he
can
succeed
in
what
's
another
Body's
Talent
:
For
't
is
certain
that
nothing
becomes
a
Man
so
well
,
as
that
which
is
best
suited
to
his
own
Inclinations
.
Every
one
therefore
should
inform
himself
thorowly
which
way
his
Humour
and
Genius
lies
;
and
be
severe
in
examining
what
he
's
well
fitted
,
or
not
fitted
for
;
otherwise
the
Players
may
seem
to
be
wiser
than
we
are
;
for
they
,
when
they
pitch
upon
what
they
'll
Act
,
don't
always
choose
those
Parts
that
are
best
,
but
those
that
are
best
suited
to
their
Humours
and
Abilities
.
They
that
have
the
ablest
Voices
,
for
instance
,
[
l
](A33176-e29670-b)
l
A
Tragedy
of
Euripides
,
or
,
as
some
think
,
Sophocies
,
so
call'd
because
it
treats
of
the
second
Theban
War
,
which
was
manag'd
by
the
Children
of
those
who
dy'd
in
the
first
:
The
Word
in
Greek
signifying
Descendants
or
Children
.
'T
was
translated
into
Latin
by
Accius
.
Epigoni
or
[
m
](A33176-e29760-b)
m
The
Son
of
Medea
,
the
famous
Sorceress
,
who
when
his
Mother
had
fled
away
upon
the
Clouds
,
went
all
about
the
World
to
seek
her
;
which
is
the
Subject
of
this
Tragedy
.
'T
was
written
by
Pacuvius
a
Latin
Poet
,
Nephew
to
Ennius
.
Medus
;
they
that
have
most
Action
,
[
n
](A33176-e29820-b)
n
Sister
of
Antiope
,
Queen
of
the
Amazons
,
taken
Prisoner
by
Hercules
,
but
ransom'd
by
Antiope
with
his
Armour
and
Belt
:
Upon
which
Accius
made
this
Tragedy
.
Menalippa
or
[
o
](A33176-e29890-b)
o
Wife
of
Agamemnon
,
notorious
for
her
living
with
Aegisthus
while
her
Good
Man
was
at
the
Trojan
War
;
and
for
Murthering
him
by
his
help
as
soon
as
he
came
home
.
This
was
one
of
Accius's
Tragedies
.
Clytemnestra
;
Rupilius
,
whom
I
remember
,
always
had
[
p
](A33176-e29950-b)
p
Wife
of
Lycus
,
King
of
Thebes
,
whom
Jupiter
fell
in
Love
with
,
and
begat
on
her
Amphion
and
Zethus
.
Antiopa
,
and
[
q
](A33176-e30020-b)
q
A
famous
Actor
at
Rome
,
of
whom
Cicero
is
said
to
have
learnt
Pronunciation
.
He
was
grave
and
sedate
in
his
Action
,
and
so
unfit
to
represent
the
Violence
and
Transports
of
Ajax
.
Aesop
very
rarely
Ajax
.
And
shall
Actors
observe
this
in
choosing
their
Parts
,
and
Wise
Men
not
do
it
in
choosing
their
Business
and
way
of
Living
in
the
World
?
We
should
therefore
apply
our selves
especially
to
that
,
which
we
find
most
agreeable
to
the
Bent
of
our
Natures
;
but
if
we
should
chance
to
be
driven
upon
any
thing
,
which
is
not
so
proper
for
our
Parts
and
Talents
;
we
should
make
it
our
Business
,
by
Care
and
Application
,
if
not
to
go
thro'
with
it
,
the
most
perfectly
that
is
possible
,
yet
at
least
with
as
few
Faults
as
ever
we
are
able
.
And
let
us
rather
labour
to
avoid
those
Vices
,
which
we
are
naturally
inclin'd
to
,
than
try
to
arrive
at
those
Excellencies
and
Perfections
,
which
we
were
never
made
for
.
CHAP.
XXXII
.
Duties
arising
from
Men's
several
Stations
,
and
Professions
in
the
World
.
They
whose
Fathers
have
been
Famous
,
imitate
their
Virtues
,
or
add
to
'em
.
The
Choice
of
a
Profession
very
difficult
.
Prodicus
's
Story
of
Hercules
.
What
usually
determines
Men
in
their
Choice
of
a
Way
of
Life
.
BUt
beside
those
two
Parts
,
which
I
have
already
mention'd
,
[
a
](A33176-e30160-b)
a
Having
done
with
that
Decorum
,
which
consists
in
acting
according
to
Universal
Nature
,
or
Reason
;
and
the
second
,
according
to
our
own
particular
one
:
He
comes
now
to
a
third
,
which
arises
from
Acting
agreeably
to
our
Place
,
or
Station
in
the
World
.
Now
this
Station
we
may
have
two
ways
,
either
from
Fortune
,
or
our
own
Choice
.
To
be
a
Prince
,
for
instance
,
a
General
,
or
the
like
,
are
things
of
Fortune
:
but
to
be
a
Lawyer
,
a
Philosopher
,
or
Tradesman
,
of
Choice
.
It
always
becomes
us
,
whatever
Character
we
bear
in
the
World
,
whether
of
Prince
or
Peasant
,
Soldier
or
Gownsman
,
to
do
those
things
which
are
suitable
to
such
a
Character
.
there
are
still
two
others
remaining
behind
:
The
one
is
allotted
us
by
Time
and
Chance
:
The
other
we
our selves
choose
voluntarily
to
our selves
.
To
the
first
appertain
one's
being
a
King
,
a
General
,
or
a
Magistrate
;
coming
of
a
great
Family
;
having
Riches
and
Power
,
together
with
the
Contraries
of
all
these
:
which
are
all
of
'em
things
that
depend
upon
Fortune
,
and
alter
according
to
the
difference
of
Times
.
As
for
the
second
,
't
is
altogether
left
to
our
own
Choice
,
what
sort
of
Calling
we
have
a
Mind
to
be
of
:
accordingly
some
chuse
to
study
Philosophy
,
others
the
Civil
Law
,
and
a
third
sort
Eloquence
:
and
of
the
Virtues
themselves
,
some
are
desirous
of
being
Eminent
in
one
kind
,
and
some
in
another
.
[
b
](A33176-e30260-b)
b
The
Decorum
he
's
going
to
speak
of
consisting
in
doing
that
which
is
agreeable
to
one's
Station
and
Way
of
Life
in
the
World
;
this
brings
him
to
discourse
of
the
Methods
People
take
in
chusing
their
Ways
of
Life
;
as
some
endeavour
to
follow
their
Fathers
,
&c.
Now
those
Men
,
whose
Fathers
or
Ancestors
have
been
eminent
in
any
one
kind
,
for
the
most
part
endeavour
to
excel
in
the
same
:
as
[
c
](A33176-e30280-b)
c
Q.
Mutius
Scaevola
,
who
was
Augur
,
and
Son-in-law
to
the
Wise
Laelius
,
whom
he
mentions
at
the
beginning
of
his
Book
de
Amicitia
,
to
whom
his
Father
recommended
him
for
the
Study
of
the
Civil
Law
:
He
was
Cos.
with
L.
Metellus
,
An.
U.
C.
636.
There
was
another
of
this
Name
at
the
same
time
,
who
was
Pontifex
maximus
.
Quintus
the
Son
of
Publius
Mucius
did
in
the
Civil
Law
;
[
d
](A33176-e30360-b)
d
Scipio
Africanus
Minor
,
who
was
Son
of
Paullus
Aemilius
,
but
adopted
by
P.
Scipio
,
the
Son
of
Africanus
Major
.
Africanus
the
Son
of
Paullus
in
Martial
Atchievements
.
And
some
,
not
content
with
the
Glory
of
their
Ancestors
,
have
added
something
else
of
their
own
to
it
:
as
that
Africanus
,
whom
I
just
now
mention'd
;
who
beside
his
great
Fame
for
Military
Exploits
,
made
himself
noted
for
his
Learning
and
Eloquence
.
The
same
did
[
e
](A33176-e30440-b)
e
Two
famous
Athenian
Generals
.
See
the
Lives
of
'em
both
in
Corn.
Nep.
Timotheus
the
Son
of
Conon
,
who
was
equal
to
his
Father
in
the
Glory
of
War
,
and
obtain'd
that
of
Learning
and
Ingenuity
besides
.
But
it
happens
sometimes
,
that
,
omitting
to
tread
in
the
Steps
of
their
Fathers
,
some
take
new
Methods
and
Designs
of
their
own
;
which
,
generally
speaking
,
is
the
case
with
those
,
who
are
born
of
mean
Parents
,
and
propose
to
Rise
,
and
make
their
Fortunes
in
the
World
.
Each
of
these
things
should
be
thro'ly
consider'd
and
revolv'd
in
our
Minds
,
when
e'er
we
deliberate
about
what
will
become
us
.
The
first
thing
then
to
be
determin'd
is
,
what
sort
of
Men
we
design
to
be
,
and
what
course
of
Living
to
take
to
in
the
World
;
which
is
a
case
of
all
others
the
most
hazardous
and
difficult
.
For
when
People
are
young
,
and
consequently
most
foolish
,
they
generally
pitch
upon
that
way
of
Life
,
which
then
best
pleases
their
unexperienc'd
Fancies
;
so
that
they
are
fix'd
and
engag'd
in
a
certain
Course
,
before
they
have
the
Judgment
to
discern
what
is
best
.
[
f
](A33176-e30520-b)
f
Prodicus
was
a
Sophist
in
the
Island
of
Cos
,
one
of
Euripides's
Masters
;
who
in
a
Book
of
his
concerning
Hercules
,
brings
in
this
Story
,
as
Socrates
tells
it
in
Xenophon's
Memorab
.
Book
2.
ch.
1.
therefore
he
calls
him
here
Herculem
Prodicium
.
Prodicus
indeed
(
as
I
find
it
in
Xenophon
)
tells
us
this
Story
concerning
Hercules
;
That
when
he
was
a
Youth
,
(
which
is
the
proper
Season
allotted
by
Nature
for
chusing
a
Way
of
Life
)
he
withdrew
himself
into
a
solitary
Place
,
and
there
having
found
out
a
couple
of
Ways
,
the
one
of
Pleasure
,
and
the
other
of
Virtue
,
he
sat
musing
and
consider'd
a
while
with
himself
,
which
of
these
two
he
had
best
to
follow
:
Such
a
thing
as
this
might
happen
to
Hercules
,
a
Son
of
Jupiter
;
but
't
is
not
for
us
to
expect
the
same
,
who
each
of
us
take
whom
we
please
for
our
Patterns
,
and
suffer
ourselves
to
be
drawn
any
whither
,
according
as
they
lead
us
.
We
have
most
of
us
Principles
instill'd
by
our
Parents
,
and
follow
their
Customs
and
Manners
of
Living
:
others
are
guided
by
popular
Opinion
,
and
like
that
best
,
which
takes
with
the
most
.
However
there
are
some
,
whether
it
be
out
of
mere
good
Fortune
,
or
an
happy
Temper
and
Disposition
of
Soul
;
or
lastly
,
by
the
Care
and
Instuctions
of
their
Parents
,
that
pursue
right
Methods
and
Ways
of
Living
.
CHAP.
XXXIII
.
Few
so
happy
,
as
to
consider
thro'ly
what
Way
of
Life
they
should
choose
.
The
principal
thing
to
be
regarded
in
Choosing
,
is
one
's
own
Genius
:
Next
to
that
one's
Fortune
in
the
World
.
After
a
Man
has
chose
,
he
should
stick
to
his
Choice
,
without
great
Reasons
to
the
contrary
.
How
a
Change
should
be
made
.
Two
Cautions
to
be
observ'd
about
Imitating
our
Ancestors
.
Those
Men
whose
Nature
is
not
capable
of
some
,
should
take
the
more
care
that
they
have
other
Virtues
.
The
best
Inheritance
a
Father
can
leave
his
Son
,
is
the
Fame
of
his
Virtues
.
'T
is
a
mighty
Shame
for
a
Son
to
be
unworthy
of
the
Fame
of
his
Ancestors
.
BUt
those
of
all
are
the
most
difficult
to
be
found
,
who
having
sufficient
natural
Parts
,
or
sufficient
Improvements
of
Learning
and
Education
,
or
both
these
together
,
have
withal
had
due
time
to
consider
with
themselves
,
what
's
the
best
Course
of
Life
they
can
follow
in
the
World
.
[
a
](A33176-e30770-b)
a
Two
things
which
ought
to
be
carefully
consider'd
by
us
in
Choosing
our
Calling
:
First
,
Our
natural
Disposition
and
Capacity
for
it
.
Secondly
,
Our
Fortune
and
outward
Circumstances
in
the
World
.
Now
in
this
Deliberation
,
the
principal
thing
which
we
ought
to
regard
,
is
each
Man
's
peculiar
Nature
and
Genius
.
For
since
the
Decorum
of
each
particular
Action
,
as
before
was
observ'd
,
is
taken
from
the
Disposition
of
the
Person
that
does
it
;
sure
that
Disposition
should
be
carefully
consulted
,
before
we
determine
upon
our
whole
Way
of
Living
;
[
b
](A33176-e30800-b)
b
See
Note
on
ch.
31.
't
is
otherwise
impossible
we
should
keep
a
due
Tenour
and
Consistency
in
our
Lives
,
and
not
sometimes
faulter
in
the
Performance
of
our
Duty
.
But
tho'
Nature
in
this
case
has
much
the
greater
sway
,
yet
Fortune
comes
in
for
a
share
next
after
her
:
both
of
'em
therefore
should
be
duly
consulted
in
making
choice
of
a
Calling
,
but
more
especially
Nature
:
For
Fortune's
unconstant
and
often
changing
,
but
Nature
is
firm
,
and
will
always
abide
by
us
;
so
that
for
the
former
to
oppose
this
latter
,
is
like
a
mortal
Power
's
contending
with
an
immortal
.
[
c
](A33176-e30840-b)
c
After
the
Rules
about
choosing
a
Calling
,
he
proceeds
to
shew
,
what
a
Man
should
do
after
he
has
chosen
:
Should
not
be
eager
to
change
,
&c.
That
Man
then
,
who
has
chose
a
Way
of
Living
that
's
suitable
to
his
[
d
](A33176-e30860-b)
d
His
particular
Nature
or
Genius
.
Nature
,
(
provided
that
Nature
be
no
ways
vitious
)
should
make
it
his
next
care
never
to
alter
it
;
for
nothing's
less
becoming
than
a
Humour
of
Changing
.
But
if
upon
tryal
he
should
find
that
he
was
mistaken
in
the
choice
of
his
Method
,
(
as
't
is
possible
such
a
thing
sometime
may
happen
)
there
's
no
way
left
but
to
unravel
again
what
is
already
done
.
If
the
Times
themselves
favour
the
making
such
a
Change
,
it
may
be
the
more
easily
and
conveniently
done
;
but
if
not
,
it
must
be
brought
about
gradually
and
insensibly
:
according
to
that
Rule
which
is
given
by
Wise
Men
,
When
e'er
you
design
to
break
off
any
Friendship
or
displeasing
Acquaintance
,
you
should
loosen
the
Knot
by
little
and
little
,
and
not
try
to
cut
it
asunder
all
at
once
.
And
when
by
this
means
we
have
chang'd
our
course
of
Life
,
great
care
should
be
taken
that
we
may
seem
to
have
done
it
upon
very
good
Reasons
.
But
having
before
recommended
the
Imitation
of
our
Fathers
and
Ancestors
,
I
must
here
interpose
an
Exception
or
two
:
In
the
first
place
then
,
we
should
take
great
care
,
not
to
follow
'em
in
any
thing
that
is
vitious
or
blamable
.
Nor
,
secondly
,
should
we
attempt
it
,
when
we
find
our
Constitution
wont
carry
us
thro'
with
it
:
Thus
,
for
instance
,
the
Son
of
the
former
Africanus
,
(
who
adopted
this
latter
being
Son
to
Paullus
)
by
reason
of
the
weakness
and
indisposition
of
his
Body
,
could
not
so
well
tread
in
the
steps
of
his
Father
,
as
his
Father
had
done
in
those
of
his
[
e
](A33176-e30910-b)
e
P.
Cornelius
Scipio
,
a
famous
and
valiant
Roman
,
who
,
together
with
his
Brother
,
bravely
defended
Spain
,
while
Hannibal
was
in
Italy
,
routing
the
Carthaginians
in
several
Battles
.
At
last
they
were
both
Slain
,
and
young
Scipio
,
who
was
afterward
first
sirnam'd
Africanus
,
succeeded
'em
.
Grandfather
.
But
then
if
a
Man
be
in
such
a
condition
,
as
that
he
's
unable
to
plead
at
the
Bar
,
to
harangue
the
People
,
or
conduct
an
Army
;
[
f
](A33176-e31000-b)
f
Those
who
,
for
any
of
the
fore-mentioned
Reasons
,
relinquish
the
Publick
,
must
not
think
'emselves
immediately
excus'd
from
serving
it
in
their
proportion
,
and
in
the
way
they
are
able
.
The
most
solitary
Life
should
do
some
Good
,
and
Retirement
should
not
minister
to
Luxury
or
Idleness
,
but
to
Virtue
and
Sobriety
.
Those
that
can't
shew
their
Valour
,
Eloquence
or
Policy
for
the
Publick
,
may
however
their
Modesty
,
Liberality
,
Fidelity
,
&c.
in
Retirement
.
he
should
take
the
more
care
that
he
do
those
things
,
which
are
in
his
Power
;
such
are
the
Duties
of
Justice
and
Fidelity
,
of
Modesty
,
Temperance
and
Liberality
;
the
performance
of
which
may
serve
to
make
amends
for
his
want
of
the
others
.
Now
the
noblest
Inheritance
that
can
be
left
by
a
Father
to
his
Son
,
and
far
exceeding
that
of
Houses
and
Lands
,
is
the
Fame
of
his
Virtues
and
glorious
Actions
:
and
for
a
Son
to
live
fo
as
is
unworthy
of
the
Name
and
Reputation
of
his
Ancestors
,
is
the
basest
and
most
abominable
thing
in
the
World
.
CHAP.
XXXIV
.
The
respective
Duties
belonging
to
each
Age.
Old
Men
should
have
an
Eye
upon
Youth
.
Vice
is
doubly
Evil
in
Old
Men
,
because
of
the
ill
Example
given
to
the
Young
.
The
Duties
of
Magistrates
,
private
Citizens
,
and
Strangers
.
Nothing
more
becoming
in
all
sorts
of
People
,
than
Consistency
and
Regularity
.
ANd
since
each
Age
has
its
respective
Duties
belonging
to
it
,
and
the
same
things
become
not
both
Young
and
Old
,
[
a
](A33176-e31090-b)
a
Another
sort
of
Decorum
consists
in
Acting
agreeably
to
one's
Age
;
in
Youth
's
doing
what
is
proper
for
Youth
,
&c.
I
must
add
something
also
upon
this
Distinction
:
'T
is
required
then
of
the
younger
sort
of
People
,
that
they
pay
due
Reverence
to
those
that
are
Old
,
and
choose
out
the
best
and
most
approved
among
'em
,
by
whose
Counsel
and
Direction
they
may
steer
their
Lives
.
For
indeed
the
Unskilfulness
and
Ignorance
of
Youth
,
does
stand
in
some
need
of
the
Prudence
of
Old
Age
,
to
be
its
Guide
and
Director
.
This
Age
especially
should
be
kept
from
all
loose
and
effeminate
Living
,
and
be
enur'd
to
Labour
,
and
enduring
.
Hardships
both
of
Body
and
Mind
:
that
so
they
may
be
able
to
bear
with
the
Toils
and
Fatigues
of
Business
,
whether
in
Peace
or
War
.
And
if
they
do
at
any
time
slacken
their
Minds
,
and
give
'emselves
up
to
their
Pleasures
and
Refreshments
,
great
care
should
be
taken
that
they
exceed
not
the
Limits
of
Temperance
and
Modesty
:
And
in
order
to
this
,
't
would
be
very
convenient
,
if
some
aged
People
would
keep
a
constant
Eye
upon
their
Sports
and
Recreations
.
[
b
](A33176-e31110-b)
b
So
much
for
the
Duties
of
Youth
;
he
proceeds
now
to
those
of
Old
Men.
As
for
old
Men
,
't
is
their
Duty
to
lessen
the
Labours
of
the
Body
,
and
employ
more
frequently
those
of
the
Mind
;
and
make
it
their
Business
,
by
prudent
and
wise
Counsels
,
to
do
what
Good
they
can
to
the
younger
sort
of
People
,
to
their
Friends
and
Dependants
,
and
more
especially
to
the
Republick
.
And
Old
Men
of
all
things
should
especially
be
careful
,
not
to
languish
out
their
Days
in
unprofitable
Idleness
.
Luxury
and
Riot
is
unbecoming
in
all
,
but
is
perfectly
scandalous
and
intolerable
in
Old
Age
:
but
should
Lust
and
Wantonness
come
into
the
bargain
,
those
who
are
guilty
of
it
are
doubly
faulty
;
For
,
first
,
they
bring
a
Shame
and
Disgrace
upon
themselves
,
and
withal
make
the
young
Men
more
shamelesly
Wicked
.
Beside
these
Duties
already
mention'd
,
it
mayn't
be
amiss
to
say
something
of
those
,
which
peculiarly
belong
either
to
[
c
](A33176-e31120-b)
c
These
he
brings
in
,
as
it
were
,
by
the
Bye
here
:
th●●
they
might
,
I
think
,
have
been
put
under
the
third
sort
●●
Decorum
,
Living
according
to
one's
Station
and
Character
in
the
World
.
See
ch.
32.
Magistrates
,
private
Citizens
,
or
Strangers
.
First
then
a
Magistrate
ought
to
consider
,
that
he
does
in
his
Person
represent
the
whole
City
,
and
accordingly's
bound
to
maintain
the
Credit
and
Dignity
of
it
:
that
he
's
to
preserve
the
Laws
,
and
see
that
all
People
have
their
due
Rights
;
remembring
that
these
things
are
committed
to
his
Trust
,
which
he
's
bound
to
render
up
faithfully
and
honestly
.
'T●
the
Duty
of
those
in
a
private
Capacity
,
to
live
a●
the
rest
of
their
Citizens
do
;
neither
debafing
themselves
below
their
just
Height
,
nor
endeavouring
〈◊〉
raise
'emselves
up
above
it
;
and
to
follow
those
things
which
are
honest
and
peaceable
in
the
Commonwealth
:
these
are
they
,
whom
we
usully
call
and
account
Good
Citizens
.
And
lastly
,
for
Strangers
and
Sojourners
in
a
place
,
't
is
their
Duty
to
follow
their
own
Business
,
and
not
intermeddle
with
any
Body
's
else
;
not
to
take
upon
'em
in
what
no
way
concerns
'em
,
or
be
curious
in
prying
into
the
Secrets
of
a
State
,
which
they
have
nothing
to
do
with
.
By
observing
these
Rules
we
may
,
generally
speaking
,
be
sure
to
find
our
Duty
;
whenever
't
is
enquir'd
what
's
suitable
and
becoming
for
such
a
Person
,
such
a
Time
,
or
such
an
Age
:
I
shall
only
add
,
that
in
all
our
Designs
and
all
our
Undertakings
,
nothing's
more
becoming
than
Constancy
and
Regularity
.
CHAP.
XXXV
.
Decorum
shews
it self
outwardly
in
three
things
.
Rules
of
Modesty
,
taken
from
Nature
in
the
Frame
of
our
Bodies
.
Obscene
Talk
discovers
ill
Inclinations
.
The
false
Reasoning
of
the
Cynicks
,
and
some
Stoicks
upon
this
Subject
.
Rules
of
exterior
Decency
in
our
Carriage
,
Postures
,
&c.
The
great
Care
the
old
Romans
took
of
Modesty
.
BUt
seeing
this
Decorum
,
of
which
we
are
speaking
,
is
seen
more
especially
,
and
discovers
it self
,
in
our
[
a
](A33176-e31320-b)
a
Having
discours'd
of
the
several
sorts
of
Decorum
,
he
proceeds
to
speak
of
the
several
things
,
in
which
it
appears
:
They
are
,
1.
Our
Actions
.
2.
Our
Words
.
And
3.
Our
bodily
Carriage
,
Dress
,
&c.
He
discourses
therefore
of
each
of
these
.
Actions
,
our
Words
,
and
our
Carriage
and
exterior
Ornaments
of
the
Body
;
and
consists
in
one
of
these
three
things
,
[
b
](A33176-e31360-b)
b
What
Formositas
,
Ordo
and
Ornatus
mean
,
in
which
he
makes
Decorum
to
consist
,
is
more
difficult
to
understand
,
than
't
is
to
express
;
and
Commentators
can't
agree
about
it
.
Not
to
trouble
the
Reader
with
their
several
Opinions
;
by
Formositas
(
I
suppose
)
may
be
understood
the
natural
Beauty
of
the
Body
,
and
natural
Clearness
of
the
Voice
;
and
by
Ornatus
the
acquir'd
or
adventitious
;
of
which
't
will
appear
he
discourses
in
the
four
next
Chapters
:
By
Ordo
,
a
due
timing
our
Words
and
Actions
;
of
which
chap.
40.
in
a
certain
kind
of
natural
Beauty
and
Comliness
;
in
Pertinence
and
Well-timing
our
Words
and
Actions
;
and
such
other
kind
of
Ornaments
and
outward
Embellishments
,
as
are
proper
for
the
Business
one
is
going
about
;
(
things
which
't
is
no
easie
matter
to
express
,
but
I
hope
I
am
understood
,
and
that
is
sufficient
;
)
and
seeing
that
[
c
](A33176-e31420-b)
c
See
Note
on
chap.
28.
Care
which
we
ought
to
take
,
of
making
our selves
agreeable
to
those
we
converse
with
,
consists
in
a
due
Regulation
of
[
d
](A33176-e31440-b)
d
Viz.
Our
Words
,
Actions
,
and
Carriage
of
Body
.
these
;
I
shall
proceed
to
discourse
of
'em
each
in
particular
.
[
e
](A33176-e31460-b)
e
He
begins
with
the
last
of
those
three
things
,
in
which
Decorum
shews
it self
,
viz.
Bodily
Carriage
,
Dress
,
&c.
of
which
in
this
and
the
next
Chapter
.
In
the
first
place
then
it
may
be
worth
our
observing
,
how
much
Care
and
Concern
has
been
shewn
by
Nature
,
in
ordering
the
Frame
and
Constitution
of
our
Bodies
:
Those
Parts
,
which
were
handsom
and
agreeable
to
the
sight
,
she
has
plac'd
in
view
;
but
those
which
could
not
be
so
handsomly
shewn
,
and
were
only
given
to
serve
certain
Ends
and
Necessities
of
Nature
,
these
she
has
been
careful
to
conceal
and
cover
.
A
Sence
of
Shame
and
Modesty
in
Men
has
seconded
this
her
Diligence
in
framing
their
Bodies
;
for
all
,
that
aren't
wholly
bereav'd
of
their
Reason
,
keep
those
Parts
hidden
,
which
she
has
conceal'd
;
and
are
always
as
secret
as
they
can
in
those
Actions
,
which
natural
Necessity
forces
'em
upon
:
Neither
do
they
call
by
their
proper
,
and
broad
Names
,
the
Parts
that
are
given
to
serve
such
Necessity
,
nor
the
Uses
of
'em
;
and
Modesty
forbids
us
to
mention
those
things
,
which
may
be
done
very
honestly
,
provided
it
be
in
secret
.
Therefore
the
plain
and
open
[
f
](A33176-e31510-b)
f
Prodit
mores
plerumque
oratio
,
(
says
Quintil.
)
&
animi
secreta
detegit
;
nec
sine
causa
Graeci
prodiderunt
,
Ut
vivat
quemque
ita
etiam
dicere
.
Unwholsom
Waters
argue
the
Fountain
,
from
whence
they
proceed
,
to
be
unwholsom
too
:
and
when
People
can
delight
in
such
fulsom
,
lascivious
,
unbeseeming
Talk
,
't
is
a
certain
sign
their
Inclinations
are
vitious
,
and
their
Hearts
tend
very
much
to
Lewdness
and
Debauchery
;
since
from
the
abundance
of
these
(
as
the
Scripture
assures
us
)
the
Mouth
speaketh
.
Talking
of
those
things
,
as
well
as
the
plain
and
open
Acting
of
'em
,
discovers
immodest
and
wanton
Inclinations
.
The
[
g
](A33176-e31570-b)
g
An
ill-natur'd
Sect
of
Philosophers
,
Followers
of
Antisthenes
,
that
lov'd
to
Talk
and
Act
in
opposition
to
the
rest
of
the
World
;
and
to
be
Snarling
and
Biting
at
every
Body
and
and
every
thing
;
whence
they
had
their
Name
,
the
word
in
Greek
signifying
Dogged
or
Currish
.
These
People
holding
,
that
nothing
is
commendable
but
only
Virtue
,
nor
any
thing
blamable
but
only
Vice
;
and
some
of
the
rigider
Stoicks
with
them
,
cast
off
all
Modesty
and
such
kind
of
things
:
Not
being
asham'd
of
doing
any
thing
in
publik
,
tho'
never
so
Unbecoming
,
nor
speaking
of
it
openly
,
provided
't
were
an
Action
that
was
not
Dishonest
or
Vitious
in
it self
.
But
our
Author
here
advises
us
,
with
very
good
Reason
,
to
disregard
what
they
say
;
and
rather
choose
Nature
for
our
Guide
and
Directress
,
than
any
of
their
vain
and
frivolous
Reasonings
.
For
,
Est
aliquid
quod
non
oportet
,
etiam
si
licet
,
as
he
tells
us
in
another
place
;
some
things
there
are
lawful
enough
in
themselves
,
which
yet
.
Modesty
and
Civility
oblige
us
to
abstain
from
.
Cynicks
therefore
are
wholly
to
be
rejected
,
and
some
of
the
Stoicks
little
better
than
Cynicks
;
who
laugh
at
,
and
blame
us
for
calling
those
things
by
their
proper
Names
,
which
are
really
dishonest
and
scandalous
in
themselves
;
while
we
count
it
a
shame
to
speak
plainly
of
those
,
in
the
doing
of
which
there
's
no
manner
of
Dishonesty
.
To
Rob
,
for
Example
,
to
Cheat
and
Whore
,
are
Actions
in
themselves
the
most
shameful
and
scandalous
,
and
yet
it
is
not
counted
immodest
to
name
'em
;
whereas
to
make
one's
self
a
Father
of
Children
,
is
an
Action
that
is
honest
and
creditable
in
it self
,
and
yet
,
forsooth
,
must
not
be
plainly
mention'd
,
for
fear
of
its
giving
Offence
to
chast
Ears
.
This
,
and
much
more
to
the
same
purpose
,
they
commonly
urge
against
Modesty
and
Bashfulness
:
But
let
us
follow
where
Nature
has
shew'd
us
the
way
,
and
whatever
may
offend
either
the
Eyes
or
Ears
,
that
let
us
shun
in
our
Carriage
and
Conversation
.
In
all
our
Postures
and
Gestures
of
Body
,
such
as
standing
,
walking
,
sitting
and
[
h
](A33176-e31730-b)
h
Accubitio
signifies
the
Posture
they
us'd
in
Eating
,
viz.
Leaning
on
one
side
upon
a
Couch
,
which
they
call'd
Lectus
,
set
round
about
their
Tables
.
leaning
;
nay
,
in
our
very
Countenance
,
in
the
cast
of
our
Eyes
,
and
motions
of
our
Hands
,
we
should
be
careful
to
keep
and
observe
what
's
Becoming
:
in
which
there
's
a
double
Extream
to
be
avoided
,
that
of
too
much
Niceness
and
Effeminacy
on
the
one
hand
,
and
that
of
meer
Clownishness
and
want
of
Breeding
on
the
other
.
Nor
let
any
one
imagin
,
That
these
things
do
well
in
an
Actor
or
Orator
;
but
that
we
are
left
free
to
observe
,
or
not
observe
them
.
The
Actors
indeed
have
had
always
so
much
regard
for
Modesty
,
as
that
,
time
out
of
mind
,
it
has
been
their
Custom
,
never
to
appear
upon
the
Stage
in
publick
,
without
something
on
to
conceal
those
Parts
,
which
ought
to
be
kept
secret
;
for
fear
least
their
Cloaths
being
open'd
by
any
Accident
,
something
might
be
seen
,
which
Modesty
bids
'em
hide
.
And
our
common
Custom
forbids
the
Son
,
when
grown
toward
Man's
Estate
,
to
Bathe
with
his
Father
;
and
likewise
the
Son-in-law
with
his
Father-in-law
.
We
should
therefore
take
care
to
be
strict
Observers
of
these
Rules
of
Modesty
,
especially
being
such
as
even
Nature
herself
has
directed
us
to
.
CHAP.
XXXVI
.
Two
sorts
of
Beauty
,
one
proper
for
Men
,
t'other
for
Women
.
Men
should
avoid
Niceness
,
&c.
Nothing
affected
can
Become
.
Rules
about
Cloaths
,
Walking
,
and
outward
Ornaments
.
Outward
Carriage
discovers
the
inward
Dispositions
of
the
Mind
.
More
Care
should
be
taken
to
keep
Decency
in
the
Motions
of
the
Soul
.
How
this
may
be
done
.
Two
sorts
of
Motions
in
the
Soul
,
the
sensitive
Appetite
and
Reason
.
How
each
shou'd
be
manag'd
.
BUt
since
there
are
two
sorts
of
Beauty
in
the
World
,
to
the
one
of
which
belongs
Prettiness
or
Neatness
,
to
the
other
Comliness
and
Majesty
;
the
former
of
these
should
be
left
to
the
Women
,
and
the
latter
only
be
thought
proper
for
the
Men.
From
hence
it
follows
,
that
these
should
avoid
all
unmanlike
Ornaments
and
Niceness
in
their
Habits
,
and
the
same
in
the
Motions
and
Gestures
of
their
Bodies
.
For
all
People
hate
the
[
a
](A33176-e31890-b)
a
Palaestricimotus
.
The
Palaestra
was
a
kind
of
Dancing-school
,
and
Place
of
Exercise
,
where
People
were
taught
to
move
gracefully
and
agreeably
:
whence
the
Word
is
often
oppos'd
to
clownish
Carriage
,
and
,
motus
habens
Palaestram
aliquam
,
is
a
gentile
becoming
Motion
in
our
Author
de
Perfect
.
Orat.
But
sometimes
,
it
seems
,
People
learn't
to
be
affected
and
foppish
in
the
Palaestra
,
as
they
do
now
in
ordinary
Dancing-schools
among
us
.
affected
Motions
and
Carriage
of
those
,
who
would
be
taken
for
Masters
of
a
gentile
Air
;
and
your
Actors
on
the
Stage
have
a
great
many
foolish
impertinent
Gestures
,
which
are
very
displeasing
and
offensive
to
the
Spectators
:
and
in
each
of
these
kinds
what
is
simple
and
unaffected
,
is
always
best
lik'd
of
and
approv'd
by
the
World
.
If
you
would
have
a
true
Comliness
,
you
must
endeavour
to
keep
a
good
Colour
in
your
Face
,
and
the
way
to
do
that
,
is
to
use
frequent
Exercise
.
Nor
do
we
forbid
Men
the
use
of
all
Ornaments
and
Graces
to
recommend
'em
,
but
only
of
those
that
are
too
exquisite
and
affected
:
so
far
they
are
allowable
,
as
they
are
necessary
to
keep
a
Man
from
being
thought
a
Clown
,
and
from
shewing
a
Disrespect
for
the
Persons
he
has
to
do
with
.
And
the
same
Rule
may
serve
very
well
for
our
Cloaths
;
in
which
to
be
moderate
,
as
in
most
other
cases
,
is
certainly
the
best
way
.
We
should
also
avoid
an
effeminate
softness
and
slowness
in
our
Gate
,
like
those
that
are
marching
along
in
Procession
;
and
no
less
an
over-great
hastiness
and
speed
,
which
only
begets
a
deep
panting
and
breathing
,
distorts
the
Face
,
and
perfectly
changes
the
whole
Air
of
the
Countenance
,
which
discovers
a
lightness
and
inconstancy
of
Humour
.
Now
if
the
Motions
of
the
Body
deserve
all
this
Pains
and
Concern
about
'em
;
how
much
Care
should
we
take
[
b
](A33176-e31960-b)
b
If
this
ben't
done
,
the
Motions
of
the
Body
,
however
gentile
and
graceful
they
may
be
,
will
but
make
our
Folly
the
more
remarkable
;
and
such
sort
of
Men
are
well
enough
compar'd
by
one
,
to
an
ill
Piece
of
Painting
,
set
off
and
adorn'd
with
a
beautiful
Frame
.
Those
People
therefore
,
who
spend
so
much
time
in
adorning
their
Outsides
,
would
do
well
to
consider
,
that
they
do
but
make
'emselves
the
more
ridiculous
,
unless
they
take
care
to
make
their
Insides
answerable
.
to
keep
those
of
the
Mind
,
within
the
Limits
prescrib'd
'em
by
Nature
and
Right
Reason
?
which
ne'r
can
be
done
any
other
way
,
than
by
keeping
the
Soul
in
such
an
even
Temper
,
as
not
to
be
concern'd
or
dejected
at
any
thing
;
and
by
a
constant
care
and
application
of
Thought
,
so
as
to
nothing
but
what
is
Honest
and
Becoming
.
Now
the
Motions
of
the
Soul
are
of
two
sorts
,
some
of
'em
proceeding
from
the
Reasonable
or
Thinking
,
others
from
the
Sensitive
and
Passionate
part
:
The
former
is
busied
in
nothing
but
searching
and
finding
out
of
Truth
;
by
the
latter
we
are
push'd
and
driven
forward
to
Action
'T
is
our
Duty
therefore
to
employ
our
Thoughts
about
laudable
Objects
;
and
so
to
reduce
and
over-rule
the
Passions
,
as
that
they
may
ebb
and
flow
in
obedience
to
Reason
.
CHAP.
XXXVII
.
Decorum
shews
it self
in
Speaking
.
Two
sorts
of
Speech
.
There
might
Rules
be
given
about
our
ordinary
Discourse
.
Two
things
requir'd
in
the
Voice
and
Pronunciation
.
How
each
of
'em
may
be
gotten
.
Several
Examples
of
good
Speakers
.
Rules
about
the
Manner
,
Subjects
and
Measure
of
our
common
Talk
.
ANother
[
a
](A33176-e32020-b)
a
He
proceeds
now
to
the
second
of
those
three
things
,
in
which
Decorum
shews
it self
,
viz.
Our
Speech
,
which
he
divides
into
two
sorts
,
&c.
great
Instance
in
which
this
Becomingness
shews
it self
,
is
our
Speech
and
Discourse
.
But
whereas
of
this
there
are
two
sorts
,
the
one
proper
only
for
Argument
and
Contention
,
the
other
for
common
and
ordinary
Talk
;
we
should
make
use
of
that
,
when
we
plead
at
the
Bar
,
or
speak
in
the
Senate
and
Publick
Assemblies
;
of
this
when
we
meet
and
discourse
with
our
Friends
;
when
we
walk
in
any
of
the
publick
Places
;
or
are
sitting
at
Table
,
and
over
a
Glass
of
Wine
.
There
are
Teachers
of
Rhetorick
who
give
Rules
about
the
former
;
but
there
are
no
Rules
to
be
given
about
the
latter
.
Not
but
that
I
think
there
might
some
be
invented
;
but
the
Business
is
,
there
's
no
body
to
be
found
that
would
study
'em
,
if
they
were
;
otherwise
Masters
would
never
be
wanting
,
if
there
were
but
Learners
that
would
study
,
and
employ
'em
.
Hence
we
are
almost
over-run
with
Rhetoricians
;
tho'
no
small
part
of
the
Rules
which
they
give
,
viz.
those
that
concern
either
the
Words
or
the
Sence
,
may
be
very
well
applied
to
our
ordinary
Discourse
.
'T
is
the
[
b
](A33176-e32120-b)
b
The
first
thing
to
be
consider'd
in
Speech
is
the
Voice
,
as
to
the
natural
Tone
or
Accent
of
it
;
which
he
desires
should
be
clear
and
harmonious
;
and
shews
the
great
Usefulness
of
its
being
so
by
Examples
.
Voice
is
that
,
whereby
we
can
Talk
,
and
convey
our
inward
Thoughts
from
one
another
;
in
which
there
are
two
things
chiefly
required
:
First
,
That
it
be
Clear
.
And
,
Secondly
,
Harmonious
.
Each
of
these
must
be
the
Gift
of
Nature
,
and
is
not
attainable
any
other
way
;
but
where
they
are
naturally
,
Practice
and
Exercise
will
encrease
the
one
,
and
Imitation
of
those
,
who
speak
sweetly
and
agreeably
,
better
the
other
.
This
was
the
principal
thing
in
the
[
c
](A33176-e32150-b)
c
See
Note
on
on
ch.
22.
Catuli
,
which
made
'em
be
counted
Men
of
Judgment
and
Learning
:
tho'
they
had
some
Skill
in
the
matter
't
is
true
;
and
so
had
some
others
as
well
as
they
;
but
this
one
thing
recommended
'em
so
much
that
they
were
esteemed
the
most
perfect
Masters
of
the
Roman
Language
.
The
sound
of
their
Voices
was
pleasing
and
harmonious
;
they
neither
slurr'd
over
things
negligently
in
their
Pronunciation
,
nor
yet
were
too
exact
in
expressing
every
Letter
:
the
former
of
which
would
have
made
their
Speech
obscure
,
and
the
latter
affected
.
They
never
spoke
so
as
to
strain
their
Voices
,
but
equally
avoided
the
double
Extream
,
that
of
Faintness
and
Sickliness
(
as
it
were
)
on
the
one
hand
,
and
of
too
much
Loudness
and
Elevation
on
the
other
.
Crassus's
Discourse
was
full
out
as
witty
,
and
not
near
so
barren
as
that
of
the
Catuli
;
yet
these
had
as
great
a
Reputation
as
he
,
upon
the
score
of
good
Speaking
.
Caesar
,
who
was
Brother
to
the
Elder
Catulus
,
was
far
more
facetious
and
witty
than
any
of
'em
;
so
that
in
Court
,
when
before
the
Judges
,
he
'd
do
more
by
his
easie
,
familiar
way
of
Talking
,
than
others
could
do
by
all
the
Powers
of
their
Eloquence
.
Each
of
these
things
should
be
diligently
taken
care
of
,
if
we
desire
to
Act
decently
on
all
Occasions
.
Our
[
c
](A33176-e32230-b)
c
Having
done
with
what
concerns
the
manner
of
Pronunciation
,
and
Regulation
of
the
Voice
;
and
advis'd
against
Affectation
,
Loudness
,
&c.
in
Speaking
:
He
now
proceeds
to
give
some
Rules
about
our
Discourse
,
as
that
it
should
be
Easie
,
not
Tedious
,
&c.
which
relate
,
some
of
'em
to
the
Manner
,
others
to
the
Matter
,
and
others
to
the
Measure
that
should
be
observ'd
in
Talking
;
and
all
deserve
to
be
carefully
consider'd
.
common
Discourse
then
I
'd
have
to
be
such
,
as
that
wherein
the
Followers
of
Socrates
excel
;
easie
and
good-natur'd
,
without
any
stubbornness
or
stiffness
in
Opinion
:
Let
it
be
season'd
with
mirth
and
pleasantness
;
and
not
be
too
tedious
,
pert
,
and
assuming
,
as
tho'
it
had
a
Right
to
the
Attention
of
the
Hearers
,
and
no
body
else
had
any
thing
to
do
with
it
:
but
think
it
reasonable
,
as
in
all
other
cases
,
so
in
this
of
Discourse
,
to
let
every
Man
fairly
take
his
own
turn
.
But
especially
in
the
first
place
it
ought
to
be
consider'd
,
what
is
the
Nature
of
the
Subject
we
are
discoursing
upon
:
if
it
be
serious
,
we
should
handle
it
with
seriousness
;
but
if
it
be
merry
,
with
gaiety
and
briskness
.
But
the
most
important
thing
to
be
taken
care
of
,
is
,
That
our
Talk
don't
discover
any
Viciousness
in
our
Manners
;
which
is
apt
to
appear
by
nothing
so
much
,
as
by
falling
too
foul
upon
those
that
are
absent
,
either
by
turning
'em
into
Ridicule
,
or
misrepresenting
'em
by
malicious
,
reproachful
Language
.
Now
the
Subject
of
Discourse
in
common
Conversation
is
usually
one
of
these
three
things
;
either
our
own
private
Domestick
Concerns
;
or
those
that
relate
to
the
Commonwealth
in
general
;
or
lastly
,
some
matter
of
Study
and
Learning
;
therefore
when
our
Talk
begins
to
ramble
from
these
,
we
should
always
be
careful
to
fetch
it
back
to
'em
again
.
But
whatever
Subjects
present
'emselves
(
for
we
aren't
all
pleas'd
with
the
same
things
,
nor
with
any
thing
equally
at
all
times
;
)
but
whatever
Subject
,
I
say
,
we
are
upon
,
we
should
consider
how
far
our
Discourse
may
be
entertaining
,
and
as
we
could
find
a
time
when
to
begin
,
so
we
should
learn
when
to
make
an
end
.
CHAP.
XXXVIII
.
Discourse
should
be
free
both
from
Passion
,
and
Heaviness
;
and
shew
a
Respect
for
those
we
converse
with
.
Chiding
and
Correction
sometimes
necessary
:
Rules
to
be
observ'd
in
it
.
In
Quarrels
with
Adversaries
we
should
avoid
flying
out
into
Passion
.
To
talk
Great
of
one's
self
very
Unbecoming
.
'T
Is
a
general
Rule
for
the
Conduct
of
our
Lives
,
That
we
make
it
our
Business
to
be
free
from
Passion
;
that
is
,
from
all
violent
Motions
of
the
Soul
,
which
reject
and
cast
off
their
Allegiance
to
Reason
.
This
should
be
apply'd
to
the
Matter
now
before
us
,
and
all
our
Discourse
should
be
Calm
and
Unpassionate
,
without
any
Transports
of
Anger
or
Desire
;
as
also
on
the
other
hand
,
without
Deadness
,
and
Heaviness
,
or
any
such
Vice
:
And
in
every
Company
we
should
carefully
endeavour
,
to
shew
a
sort
of
Kindness
and
Respect
for
those
Persons
,
with
whom
we
converse
.
It
sometimes
comes
to
pass
,
that
[
a
](A33176-e32370-b)
a
He
has
done
with
those
Rules
,
which
concern
the
Government
of
our
Discourse
in
general
:
He
now
proceeds
to
some
particular
Species
of
it
.
The
first
of
these
is
Chiding
or
Correction
,
about
which
he
gives
us
several
good
Directions
;
as
,
That
it
should
not
be
done
Passionately
,
&c.
Chiding
is
necessary
;
in
which
we
may
be
allow'd
a
little
to
raise
our
Voices
,
and
to
use
more
Sharpness
and
Authority
in
our
Expressions
:
However
we
must
be
careful
that
we
do
not
discover
any
Passion
;
but
let
it
rather
be
seen
that
we
come
to
such
Corrections
,
as
Physitians
do
to
cutting
and
scarifying
Wounds
,
but
seldom
,
and
with
a
great
deal
of
Regret
and
Unwillingness
.
And
indeed
we
should
never
come
to
'em
at
all
,
unless
it
be
necessary
,
and
when
no
other
Methods
will
do
any
good
.
And
even
then
,
when
we
're
forc'd
to
't
,
we
must
be
sure
(
as
was
said
)
to
avoid
all
Anger
;
for
whatsoever
is
guided
by
its
Influence
and
Directions
,
can
never
be
done
with
any
Prudence
or
Moderation
.
Our
Rebukes
should
be
generally
mild
and
gentle
;
but
nevertheless
such
,
as
may
carry
some
Weight
and
Authority
along
with
'em
;
observing
a
Mean
betwixt
too
great
Easiness
,
and
breaking
out
into
angry
and
contumelious
Language
.
And
whatsoever
Sharpness
we
may
express
in
our
Reproofs
,
we
should
let
the
Person
so
corrected
know
,
that
we
do
it
altogether
for
his
Good
,
and
not
for
any
Ends
or
Self-designs
.
[
b
](A33176-e32440-b)
b
Another
particular
sort
of
Discourse
,
is
that
which
falls
out
in
Quarrels
betwixt
Opposers
;
in
which
't
is
our
Duty
to
be
calm
and
sedate
,
&c.
In
the
Quarrels
we
have
even
with
our
greatest
Adversaries
,
whatever
dirty
Language
may
be
thrown
at
us
,
't
is
the
best
way
to
keep
our
Minds
calm
and
sedate
,
and
never
let
Anger
break
in
upon
them
:
For
whatever
is
spoken
or
done
in
a
Passion
,
can
neither
be
consistent
with
the
Rules
of
Gravity
,
nor
be
approv'd
of
by
those
who
are
present
in
the
Company
.
Lastly
,
[
c
](A33176-e32470-b)
c
A
third
particular
kind
of
Discourse
,
is
,
Talking
Great
of
one's
self
,
which
is
always
very
ridiculous
and
unbecoming
.
'T
is
a
very
unbecoming
thing
for
a
Man
to
Talk
great
of
himself
in
Discourse
,
and
especially
when
that
which
he
says
is
false
:
which
is
but
to
imitate
Braggadocchio
in
the
Comedy
,
and
make
himself
the
Laughing-stock
and
Jest
of
the
Hearers
.
CHAP.
XXXIX
.
What
sort
of
House
is
fitting
for
a
Person
of
Honour
.
What
should
be
the
End
of
Building
.
The
Examples
of
Octavius
and
Scaurus
.
A
great
House
brings
a
Reproach
on
its
Master
,
if
his
Worth
be
not
answerable
to
it
;
and
if
he
don't
keep
up
the
Laws
of
Hospitality
.
Measures
to
be
observ'd
in
Building
.
Three
Rules
to
be
observ'd
for
the
keeping
a
Decorum
in
our
Actions
.
ANd
since
[
a
](A33176-e32570-b)
a
Another
thing
,
wherein
Decency
shews
it self
pretty
much
,
is
Building
,
which
he
therefore
brings
in
here
as
't
were
by
the
bye
;
in
which
he
would
have
a
Mediocrity
observ'd
.
'T
is
very
becoming
for
a
Person
of
Quality
,
to
have
such
a
House
as
is
suitable
to
his
Quality
;
neither
too
little
,
so
as
not
to
have
room
for
the
Reception
of
Strangers
;
nor
yet
too
extravagantly
great
and
magnificent
.
we
take
in
(
or
desire
at
least
to
take
in
)
all
the
several
Branches
of
Duty
,
we
must
not
forget
to
add
a
word
or
two
,
about
what
sort
of
House
is
becoming
a
Gentleman
,
or
a
Person
of
Honour
.
Now
the
main
End
of
Building
is
Lodging
,
and
the
necessary
Uses
of
an
House
,
and
therefore
the
Draught
,
or
Contrivance
of
it
,
should
be
suited
accordingly
.
But
we
should
not
so
much
regard
bare
Necessities
,
as
not
to
have
an
eye
to
Convenience
and
Magnificence
.
[
b
](A33176-e32600-b)
b
A
famous
and
great
Man
,
(
as
our
Author
in
another
place
calls
him
)
Praetor
and
Admiral
of
the
Roman
Navy
,
in
the
Macedonian
War
with
Perseus
,
when
he
triumph'd
for
a
Sea-Victory
.
Afterwards
he
was
Cos.
about
the
Year
of
Rome
,
588.
Cneius
Octavius
,
the
first
of
that
Family
that
was
ever
Consul
,
built
himself
a
noble
and
magnificent
House
upon
the
Palatin
Hill
,
which
is
said
to
have
gain'd
him
a
great
deal
of
Reputation
;
insomuch
that
the
People
coming
usually
to
see
it
,
the
very
House
was
suppos'd
to
have
gone
a
great
way
toward
advancing
its
Owner
(
tho'
a
kind
of
[
c
](A33176-e32670-b)
c
Not
but
that
the
Family
was
very
ancient
in
Rome
,
even
from
the
times
of
Numa
Pompilius
;
but
none
of
'em
had
ever
been
any
way
noted
,
till
this
Octavius
.
an
Upstart
)
to
the
Dignity
of
Consul
.
This
some
time
after
was
pull'd
down
by
[
d
](A33176-e32710-b)
d
See
Note
on
ch
.
16.
Book
2.
Scaurus
,
that
so
he
might
make
his
own
somewhat
the
bigger
by
it
:
But
whereas
[
e
](A33176-e32750-b)
e
Whom
we
spoke
of
chap.
22.
Octavius
,
by
Building
his
House
,
had
made
himself
Consul
;
this
Man
,
on
the
contrary
,
by
enlarging
of
his
,
(
tho'
the
Son
of
a
great
and
most
eminent
Citizen
)
not
only
caus'd
himself
to
be
put
by
that
Office
,
but
[
f
](A33176-e32790-b)
f
He
was
convicted
of
undue
Ways
of
squezing
Money
out
of
the
Allies
,
and
at
last
forc'd
to
go
away
into
Banishment
.
was
moreover
brought
into
Shame
and
Dishonour
,
and
at
last
utterly
Ruin'd
.
'T
is
well
if
a
Man
can
enhance
that
Credit
and
Reputation
he
has
got
,
by
the
Splendor
of
his
House
;
but
he
must
not
depend
upon
his
House
alone
for
it
:
For
the
Master
ought
to
bring
Honour
to
his
fine
Seat
,
and
not
the
fine
Seat
bring
Honour
to
its
Master
.
But
as
,
in
all
other
cases
,
a
Man
should
not
have
Respect
to
himself
alone
,
but
to
other
People
also
;
so
't
is
in
this
of
a
Noble
Man's
House
,
which
ought
to
be
made
very
large
and
capacious
,
because
he
must
keep
up
the
Laws
of
Hospitality
,
and
entertain
multitudes
of
all
sorts
of
Persons
in
it
.
For
a
fine
and
large
House
that
gives
Entertainment
to
no
body
,
serves
but
to
reproach
and
upbraid
its
Owner
;
and
especially
if
't
were
us'd
to
be
frequently
visited
under
its
former
Master
:
for
't
is
an
odious
thing
to
have
Passengers
cry
,
as
they
go
along
,
Ah!
good
old
House
,
alas
thy
present
Lord
Isn't
like
thy
former
one
!
which
may
[
g
](A33176-e32830-b)
g
He
reflects
upon
some
of
Caesar's
Party
,
who
possess'd
the
Houses
of
Pompey's
Friends
;
and
particularly
Mark
Anthony
,
who
was
got
into
that
,
which
had
formerly
been
Pompey's
own
.
justly
be
said
of
but
too
too
many
in
our
own
Days
.
Care
should
be
taken
,
especially
when
a
Man
Builds
himself
,
that
he
ben't
too
extravagant
in
his
Magnificence
and
Expences
:
which
is
a
very
ill
thing
tho'
it
had
no
other
harm
in
it
,
but
only
that
one
of
giving
a
bad
Example
:
For
most
Men
are
apt
,
more
than
in
any
thing
else
,
to
imitate
the
Great
Ones
as
to
this
Particular
.
Where
,
for
Example
,
shall
we
find
the
Man
,
that
Rivals
the
famous
[
h
](A33176-e32890-b)
h
Lucius
Lucullus
,
a
noble
and
very
wealthy
Roman
,
famous
for
his
Learning
,
Eloquence
,
and
especially
Valour
;
as
well
as
Extravagance
in
Building
,
&c.
See
his
Life
in
Plutarch
.
Lucullus
in
his
Virtues
?
Whereas
how
many
have
done
it
in
the
Stateliness
and
Magnificence
of
his
Country-houses
?
But
there
certainly
ought
to
be
some
Bounds
fix'd
and
prescrib'd
to
these
things
,
and
those
to
be
according
to
the
Rules
of
Moderation
:
But
the
Measure
whereby
we
are
to
judge
of
their
being
Moderate
,
is
their
Subserviency
to
the
Ornaments
and
Conveniencies
of
Life
:
And
so
much
may
suffice
upon
this
Head
.
As
for
our
[
i
](A33176-e32960-b)
i
Having
spoken
of
our
Carriage
of
Body
and
Discourse
;
he
now
proceeds
to
the
third
thing
,
in
which
Decorum
shews
it self
,
viz.
Our
Actions
;
concerning
which
he
gives
us
three
Rules
.
Actions
,
the
way
to
maintain
this
Decorum
in
them
,
is
constantly
to
observe
these
three
following
Precepts
:
First
,
That
we
keep
all
our
Passions
and
Appetites
under
the
Government
and
Direction
of
Reason
,
than
which
there
is
nothing
of
greater
Efficacy
toward
the
constant
Preservation
of
our
Duty
.
Secondly
,
That
we
consider
the
Quality
and
Moment
of
the
thing
,
which
we
go
about
;
that
so
we
may
proportion
our
Endeavours
accordingly
,
and
take
neither
more
nor
less
Pains
about
it
,
than
it
really
deserves
.
And
lastly
,
That
in
all
those
exterior
Circumstances
,
which
are
only
design'd
for
a
gentile
Show
and
Grace
of
the
Action
,
we
should
keep
within
the
Measures
of
Prudence
and
Moderation
.
Now
the
best
Measure
we
can
observe
is
this
,
To
keep
our
Eyes
fix'd
on
those
Rules
of
Decorum
I
've
before
laid
down
,
and
never
to
transgress
'em
.
But
of
these
three
Rules
the
first
is
the
most
important
,
That
the
Sensitive
Part
be
kept
obedient
to
the
Reasonable
.
CHAP.
XL.
Order
to
be
observ'd
in
our
Words
and
Actions
.
Wherein
it
consists
.
The
Duties
arising
from
it
.
An
excellent
Saying
of
Pericles
to
that
purpose
.
Of
how
great
moment
the
due
Timing
a
thing
is
.
We
shou'd
be
particularly
careful
to
avoid
little
Indecencies
.
Harmony
and
Agreement
more
necessary
in
our
Lives
,
than
our
Musick
.
IT
remains
in
the
next
place
that
we
should
speak
of
[
a
](A33176-e33140-b)
a
He
comes
now
to
the
third
of
those
things
,
in
which
he
told
us
[
Chap.
35.
]
Decorum
consists
,
viz.
Order
,
or
the
due
Timing
our
Words
and
Actions
.
that
Order
,
which
is
to
be
observ'd
in
our
Words
and
Actions
;
and
of
the
proper
Seasons
and
Opportunities
of
'em
.
And
here
will
fall
under
our
Consideration
,
that
which
by
the
Greeks
is
call'd
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
;
by
which
I
don't
mean
that
[
b
](A33176-e33200-b)
b
The
Word
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
signifies
two
things
,
either
the
keeping
within
due
Bounds
,
and
so
't
is
oppos'd
to
Extravagance
,
or
living
above
one's
Rank
,
Abilities
,
&c.
or
a
due
Timing
our
Words
,
&c.
and
so
't
is
oppos'd
to
Impertinence
,
Unseasonableness
,
or
the
like
.
'T
is
taken
by
our
Author
here
in
this
last
Sence
.
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
which
by
us
is
most
commonly
render'd
Moderation
,
and
signifies
the
keeping
within
due
Bounds
:
but
that
which
contains
in
the
Notion
of
it
,
The
Preservation
of
Order
.
We
shall
crave
leave
,
however
,
to
call
even
this
latter
by
the
Name
of
Moderation
,
which
is
thus
defin'd
by
the
Stoick
Philosophers
,
Moderation
is
the
Knowledge
of
putting
whatever
we
say
,
or
do
,
in
its
proper
place
.
From
whence
it
appears
,
That
Order
and
the
Well-placing
of
things
are
but
different
Words
to
express
the
same
Notion
,
For
Order
is
defin'd
by
the
same
Sect
of
Men
,
to
be
the
ranging
of
things
in
their
fitting
and
proper
places
.
Now
the
place
of
an
Action
they
tells
us
is
,
The
Season
of
Time
for
doing
it
;
and
by
the
Season
of
Time
they
mean
nothing
else
,
than
that
which
the
Greeks
call
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
and
which
we
express
by
the
word
Occasio
:
So
that
,
in
short
,
by
Moderation
here
(
in
the
Sence
of
the
Word
which
I
have
just
now
given
)
we
mean
no
more
than
the
Knowledge
of
Well-timing
whatever
we
do
.
Prudence
may
be
defin'd
the
same
way
too
,
about
which
we
have
spoken
at
the
entrance
of
this
Work
:
but
now
we
're
discoursing
of
Temperance
,
Moderation
,
and
such
like
Virtues
.
What
the
Duties
of
Prudence
are
,
is
sufficiently
explain'd
in
its
proper
place
;
what
those
of
Modesty
and
such
other
Virtues
,
as
serve
to
recommend
us
to
those
we
converse
with
,
and
make
up
the
Subject
of
our
present
Enquiry
,
remains
now
to
be
consider'd
.
In
the
first
place
then
,
We
ought
to
observe
a
due
Regularity
and
Order
in
our
Actions
,
as
that
the
several
parts
of
our
whole
Lives
,
like
those
of
a
regular
and
coherent
Discourse
,
may
agree
and
be
suitable
one
with
another
.
For
what
is
more
Unseemly
,
and
contrary
to
good
Manners
,
than
when
we
're
engag'd
about
serious
Business
,
to
bring
in
some
pleasant
and
merry
Discourse
,
that
's
proper
for
a
Feast
or
over
a
Glass
of
Wine
?
'T
was
a
very
good
Answer
to
the
present
Purpose
,
which
Pericles
once
gave
to
[
c
](A33176-e33460-b)
c
A
famous
Tragedian
of
Athens
,
whose
Works
are
still
extant
,
and
counted
the
most
perfect
in
their
kind
.
His
being
a
Poet
did
not
hinder
him
from
being
a
good
Soldier
and
a
wise
Statesman
.
He
liv'd
about
the
beginning
of
the
Peloponnesian
War
.
Sophocles
the
Tragedian
:
They
were
both
of
'em
Praetors
of
Athens
together
,
and
meeting
one
Day
about
some
Business
of
their
Office
,
it
happen'd
a
beautiful
Boy
pass'd
by
;
whom
Sophocles
espying
,
Heavens
!
said
he
,
Pericles
,
What
a
delicate
Youth
is
there
!
To
which
he
reply'd
,
A
Magistrate
,
Sophocles
,
should
[
d
](A33176-e33560-b)
d
The
Word
Abstinentes
refers
to
both
Manus
and
Oculi
:
in
the
former
Case
it
signifies
Uncorrupted
,
or
free
from
Bribery
and
receiving
Gifts
;
in
the
latter
Chast
,
or
free
from
all
wanton
and
lascivious
Looks
.
A
Magistrate
ought
to
have
both
.
keep
a
strict
Guard
,
not
over
his
Hands
only
,
but
his
Eyes
too
.
Now
had
Sophocles
happen'd
to
say
the
same
Words
,
at
a
time
when
they
were
choosing
of
Wrestlers
or
Racers
,
such
a
Rebuke
had
been
wholly
undeserved
:
So
much
may
the
Merit
,
or
Demerit
of
an
Action
,
depend
upon
the
Circumstances
of
Time
and
Place
.
Suppose
,
for
Example
,
a
Man
had
some
considerable
Cause
upon
his
Hands
,
or
Business
that
requir'd
attentive
Thinking
:
Could
any
one
blame
him
for
being
very
thoughtful
as
he
walk'd
or
rid
?
But
should
he
shew
himself
so
at
a
Feast
among
Company
,
it
would
be
counted
a
great
piece
of
Rudeness
and
Ill-breeding
,
and
this
for
not
observing
the
Difference
of
Seasons
.
Now
as
for
those
things
,
which
notoriously
offend
against
the
Rules
of
Good
Manners
,
such
as
for
a
Man
to
Sing
openly
in
the
Streets
,
or
any
other
gross
and
apparent
Absurdity
,
these
are
so
easie
to
be
observ'd
by
all
,
that
we
need
give
no
Rules
or
Directions
about
'em
;
but
we
ought
more
especially
to
employ
our
Care
,
in
avoiding
those
little
unheeded
Indecencies
,
which
are
hardly
understood
by
the
generality
of
Mankind
.
And
as
the
least
fault
or
disagreement
in
the
Notes
,
is
immediately
perceiv'd
by
a
skilful
Musician
;
so
we
should
take
all
imaginable
Care
,
that
there
be
no
Disagreement
in
our
Lives
and
Actions
:
and
that
so
much
the
more
,
as
the
Harmony
in
our
Lives
is
of
much
greater
Consequence
,
than
that
in
our
Musick
.
CHAP.
XLI
.
Decency
to
be
kept
even
in
the
least
things
,
as
the
moving
of
the
Eyes
,
&c.
We
should
observe
what
's
unhandsom
in
others
,
and
correct
it
in
our selves
.
We
should
ask
the
Advice
of
experienc'd
Persons
.
Cautions
in
taking
this
Advice
.
We
should
follow
Custom
and
Civil
Constitutions
.
Some
things
allowable
in
some
great
Men
,
which
aren't
so
in
others
.
Nothing
immodest
is
Becoming
.
Some
particular
Duties
to
be
observ'd
by
all
good
Men.
AS
therefore
the
delicate
Ear
of
the
Artist
can
quickly
discover
the
least
fault
in
his
Musick
;
so
would
we
take
as
much
care
in
detecting
and
censuring
our
Vices
,
we
might
from
the
least
and
most
trivial
Matters
,
make
several
Observations
that
would
be
much
to
our
advantage
.
From
the
moving
of
our
Eyes
,
for
Example
;
from
our
way
of
smoothing
or
wrinkling
our
Brows
;
from
the
merry
or
sorrowful
Air
of
our
Countenances
;
from
our
Laughter
,
freedom
or
reservedness
in
Discourse
;
from
the
raising
or
falling
the
Tone
of
our
Voices
,
and
a
great
many
other
such
little
kind
of
Circumstances
,
we
might
easily
judge
what
is
Handsom
and
Becoming
us
,
and
what
is
repugnant
to
the
Rules
of
our
Duty
,
and
to
that
which
our
Nature
or
Character
requires
.
Now
in
this
Particular
't
is
a
very
good
way
,
To
observe
first
in
others
how
each
of
these
suits
,
that
so
we
may
avoid
and
correct
in
our selves
,
whatever
we
see
bad
and
misbecoming
in
them
.
For
,
I
know
not
how
,
we
can
sooner'
spy
Faults
out
in
other
People
,
than
we
can
in
our selves
;
upon
which
account
there
's
no
better
way
to
correct
any
Learner
,
than
for
the
Master
to
mimick
his
Faults
before
him
;
that
so
he
,
perceiving
their
Deformity
in
another
,
may
the
sooner
be
brought
to
amend
'em
in
himself
.
Another
good
way
is
,
Whenever
we
are
in
doubt
and
suspence
about
a
Duty
,
to
go
to
some
learned
or
experienc'd
Person
,
and
ask
his
Advice
upon
the
Matter
in
question
,
before
we
resolve
and
determin
with
our selves
:
Because
,
generally
speaking
,
when
left
to
themselves
,
Men
are
apt
to
be
guided
too
much
by
their
own
Inclinations
and
Natures
.
And
in
asking
this
Advice
we
should
diligently
observe
,
[
a
](A33176-e33730-b)
a
For
Ill-will
,
private
Interest
,
and
a
thousand
the
like
things
,
may
make
People
give
us
Advice
,
which
they
don't
think
best
:
or
blind
'em
and
make
'em
think
that
best
,
which
really
is
not
so
.
not
only
what
every
one
tells
us
in
Words
,
but
what
his
real
inward
Opinion
is
,
and
what
Reasons
and
Grounds
he
may
have
for
such
Opinions
.
For
as
your
Statuaries
,
Painters
and
Poets
,
use
to
set
their
Works
out
to
be
publickly
view'd
;
that
so
they
may
be
able
to
correct
such
Faults
,
as
are
generally
found
by
Spectators
in
'em
:
and
as
they
consider
with
themselves
and
their
Friends
,
what
Oversights
or
Mistakes
they
have
been
guilty
of
in
'em
;
so
should
we
make
use
of
other
People's
Judgments
as
well
as
our
own
,
and
do
or
not
do
,
correct
or
alter
a
great
many
things
upon
their
Advice
.
As
for
those
things
that
are
settled
by
Custom
and
Civil
Constitutions
,
I
shall
give
no
Directions
at
all
concerning
'em
;
for
they
are
sufficient
Directions
of
themselves
:
I
shall
only
observe
,
That
't
is
a
great
Mistake
in
any
one
to
think
,
because
such
Men
as
[
b
](A33176-e33770-b)
b
Several
eminent
Philosophers
have
been
of
that
Name
.
One
Schollar
of
Socrates
,
and
Founder
of
the
Cyrenaick
Sect
:
another
his
Grandson
.
'T
is
uncertain
which
he
means
here
.
Aristippus
,
and
Socrates
,
have
ventur'd
to
say
,
or
do
a
great
many
things
,
which
are
contrary
to
Rule
and
receiv'd
Custom
,
that
therefore
he
may
be
allow'd
the
same
:
For
these
are
Persons
of
extraordinary
Merits
,
and
almost
more
than
Human
Perfections
;
and
on
that
account
might
demand
some
Privileges
,
which
aren't
to
be
granted
to
the
rest
of
the
World
.
But
as
for
the
Practice
and
manner
of
the
Cynicks
,
't
is
wholly
to
be
discarded
;
for
't
is
a
plain
Offence
against
the
Rules
of
Modesty
,
without
which
nothing
can
be
Virtuous
and
Becoming
.
'T
is
our
Duty
to
pay
a
Respect
and
Deference
,
as
to
all
those
that
are
Virtuous
and
Couragious
,
who
design
for
the
Good
and
Advantage
of
the
Republick
,
and
serve
or
have
serv'd
her
in
any
of
her
Interests
;
so
to
those
also
,
who
bear
any
Office
or
Command
in
the
State
.
We
should
pay
in
like
manner
a
peculiar
Regard
and
Reverence
to
old
Age
:
never
resist
any
publick
Magistrate
:
make
a
Distinction
between
Citizens
and
Strangers
;
and
of
Strangers
'emselves
,
between
those
in
a
private
and
publick
Capacity
.
In
fine
,
Not
to
mention
any
more
Particulars
,
we
ought
in
all
cases
both
to
keep
our selves
,
and
endeavour
to
uphold
and
maintain
among
others
,
that
common
Correspondence
and
universal
Society
,
that
's
among
all
Mankind
.
CHAP.
XLII
.
Of
the
several
sorts
of
Trade
which
are
Creditable
,
and
which
not
.
All
those
that
administer
to
Vice
and
Debauchery
,
scandalous
.
Lying
in
Tradesmen
abominable
.
How
far
Merchandise
is
Creditable
,
Husbandry
particularly
commended
.
AS
for
[
a
](A33176-e33900-b)
a
The
last
thing
he
mentions
,
wherein
Decorum
shews
it self
,
is
Trades
and
Callings
;
which
he
divides
into
Gentile
and
Ungentile
,
and
shews
which
are
the
one
and
which
the
other
.
Trades
and
the
Ways
of
getting
Money
,
which
of
'em
are
creditable
,
and
which
otherwise
,
I
have
only
these
very
few
things
to
observe
:
First
,
All
those
are
unworthy
Ways
of
Gaining
,
which
procure
one
a
general
Hatred
and
Ill-will
;
as
that
of
the
Userers
and
Tax-gatherers
,
for
Instance
.
Secondly
,
Those
Arts
are
mean
and
ungentile
,
in
which
a
Man
is
paid
for
his
Work
not
his
Skill
;
for
the
very
receiving
a
Reward
for
one's
Labour
,
is
like
taking
of
Earnest
to
bind
himself
a
Slave
.
Nor
are
they
to
be
esteem'd
as
better
than
mean
and
ordinary
People
,
that
buy
things
up
by
the
lump
of
Merchants
,
to
sell
'em
out
again
by
little
and
little
;
for
what
they
gain
is
but
a
very
poor
Business
,
unless
they
are
guilty
of
abominable
Lying
;
than
which
there
is
nothing
in
the
World
more
scandalous
.
Again
,
All
Handicrafts-Men
have
but
a
mean
sort
of
Calling
,
and
't
is
impossible
that
a
Work-house
should
have
any
thing
that
's
gentile
in
it
.
Further
yet
,
All
those
Trades
are
pitiful
and
low
,
that
Purvey
and
Cater
for
the
satisfying
Mens
Pleasures
;
[
b
](A33176-e33980-b)
b
These
Trades
don't
so
much
cater
for
Pleasures
,
as
serve
the
Necessities
of
Life
:
but
I
suppose
he
brings
'em
in
here
,
because
of
the
great
abuse
of
'em
among
the
Romans
,
where
indeed
their
chief
Business
was
to
serve
Mens
Luxury
.
G●tarius
is
a
Seller
of
Salt-fish
,
as
Piscator
is
of
fresh
.
Fishmongers
,
Butchers
,
Cooks
,
Poulterers
,
&c.
as
Terence
reckons
'em
up
;
to
which
we
may
add
,
if
you
please
,
Perfumers
,
Dancing-masters
,
and
those
who
supply
us
with
Dice
or
Cards
.
But
Arts
that
have
something
of
Knowledge
and
Skill
in
'em
,
or
those
that
are
useful
and
necessary
for
the
Publick
;
such
as
Physick
,
for
Instance
,
or
Architecture
,
or
the
Instruction
and
Education
of
Youth
in
Good-manners
,
these
are
very
creditable
and
commendable
in
those
,
whose
Rank
and
Condition
is
suited
for
such
Employments
.
As
for
Merchandise
,
't
is
sordid
and
mean
,
when
the
Trade
that
is
driven
is
little
and
inconsiderable
:
but
when
it
takes
in
a
great
quantity
of
Business
,
and
bringing
home
Goods
from
every
Country
,
sells
'em
out
again
without
Lying
or
Deceiving
,
we
can
hardly
say
but
that
't
is
creditable
enough
:
Nay
,
't
is
most
certainly
very
commendable
,
when
those
who
're
concern'd
in
it
only
design
(
after
they
are
sated
,
or
rather
consented
,
with
what
they
have
gain'd
)
to
betake
themselves
wholly
from
the
Haven
to
the
Country
,
as
before
they
have
done
from
the
Sea
to
the
Haven
,
and
there
enjoy
quietly
their
private
Possessions
.
But
among
all
the
Methods
of
Enriching
one's
self
,
there
's
no
one
better
;
no
one
more
profitable
,
pleasant
and
agreeable
;
no
one
more
worthy
of
a
Man
and
a
Gentleman
,
than
that
of
Manuring
and
Tilling
the
Ground
:
concerning
which
I
have
spoken
at
large
in
my
Cato
Major
,
from
whence
you
may
borrow
what
's
necessary
to
be
said
upon
this
Subject
.
CHAP.
XLIII
.
The
comparing
of
two
Parts
of
Honesty
one
with
another
.
The
Duties
of
Prudence
or
finding
out
Truth
,
and
those
of
Justice
or
maintaining
Human
Society
compar'd
;
and
the
Preference
given
to
the
latter
.
ANd
thus
[
a
](A33176-e34170-b)
a
He
has
now
done
with
his
four
Heads
of
Honesty
,
Prudence
,
Justice
,
Fortitude
and
Temperance
;
and
shewn
the
Nature
,
and
laid
down
some
Rules
concerning
each
of
'em
;
by
comparing
any
of
our
Actions
with
which
,
we
may
discover
whether
they
are
Honest
or
Dishonest
,
agreeable
or
not
agreeable
to
the
Rules
of
Virtue
;
which
was
the
first
general
Head
of
Deliberation
he
propos'd
to
speak
to
.
[
See
chap.
3.
]
The
second
was
,
Of
two
,
which
are
both
Honest
,
which
is
to
be
preferr'd
?
which
he
now
proceeds
to
.
have
I
finish'd
what
I
had
to
say
upon
the
first
Question
,
and
,
I
think
,
sufficiently
made
it
appear
,
how
the
particular
Instances
of
Duty
are
to
be
drawn
from
the
several
Heads
of
Honesty
.
But
it
often
comes
to
pass
,
that
those
very
things
'emselves
which
are
Honest
,
Rival
as
it
were
,
and
come
into
Competition
with
one
another
,
so
as
to
make
it
be
another
Question
,
Of
two
that
are
Honest
,
which
is
the
most
so
?
which
is
a
Point
not
mention'd
at
all
by
Panaetius
.
For
the
whole
of
Virtue
receiving
its
Rise
from
those
four
Fountains
:
First
,
Prudence
,
or
the
Knowledge
of
Truth
.
Secondly
,
Justice
,
or
or
doing
Good
to
the
Community
and
Society
of
Mankind
.
Thirdly
,
Fortitude
,
or
Greatness
of
Soul
.
And
,
Lastly
,
Temperance
,
or
Moderation
;
it
can't
but
happen
,
that
several
of
these
must
be
compar'd
together
,
before
we
can
be
able
to
satisfie
our selves
,
which
't
is
our
Duty
to
prefer
before
which
.
First
then
,
[
b
](A33176-e34300-b)
b
Of
the
Duties
of
Prudence
and
Justice
,
which
are
both
apparently
good
and
honest
,
the
latter
he
proves
should
take
place
of
the
former
:
i.
e.
Study
and
Contemplation
,
which
are
Actions
of
Prudence
,
ought
to
be
laid
aside
,
if
occasion
so
require
,
for
the
sake
of
doing
Good
to
Mankind
,
which
is
a
part
of
Justice
.
If
the
Duties
of
Justice
,
or
preserving
the
Community
,
and
those
of
Prudence
,
or
the
Knowledge
of
Truth
,
should
come
into
Competition
one
with
another
;
the
former
,
I
think
,
should
take
place
of
the
latter
,
as
being
more
Consonant
to
the
Dictates
of
Nature
,
which
may
easily
be
prov'd
by
this
following
Argument
:
Suppose
a
Wise
Man
to
be
in
such
a
place
,
as
afforded
him
all
the
Conveniencies
of
Life
,
and
all
the
Opportunities
of
Leisure
in
abundance
,
so
that
he
might
Study
and
Contemplate
every
thing
,
that
was
any
ways
worthy
his
Knowledge
or
Contemplation
;
yet
were
he
wholly
depriv'd
of
all
Company
,
and
had
no
body
ever
come
near
him
to
be
seen
,
he
'd
quickly
be
tired
and
grow
weary
of
his
Life
.
Again
,
The
Principal
of
all
the
Virtues
is
that
sort
of
Wisdom
which
the
Greeks
call
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
;
(
for
as
for
that
which
they
call
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
and
we
Prudentia
,
't
is
a
thing
of
a
perfectly
different
Nature
,
as
being
no
more
than
The
Skill
of
discerning
what
't
is
that
we
ought
,
or
ought
not
,
to
do
:
)
but
that
sort
of
Wisdom
which
I
said
was
the
Principal
,
is
,
[
c
](A33176-e34410-b)
c
See
Note
2.
on
chap.
2.
Book
2.
The
Knowledge
of
things
both
Divine
and
Human
;
and
so
comprehends
the
Society
and
Relation
of
Men
with
the
Gods
,
and
with
one
another
.
If
then
this
,
as
most
certainly
't
is
,
be
the
greatest
Virtue
;
it
follows
that
the
Duties
,
which
flow
from
Society
,
must
as
certainly
be
the
greatest
:
For
the
deepest
Knowledge
and
Contemplation
of
Nature
,
is
but
a
very
lame
and
imperfect
Business
,
unless
it
proceed
and
tend
forward
to
Action
:
Now
the
Occasions
wherein
it
can
shew
it self
best
,
consist
in
maintaining
the
Interests
of
Men
,
and
of
consequence
belong
to
the
Society
of
Mankind
:
from
whence
it
follows
,
That
the
Maintaining
of
this
should
in
reason
take
place
before
Learning
and
Knowledge
.
[
d
](A33176-e34490-b)
d
Having
prov'd
his
Assertion
by
Reasons
,
he
proceeds
to
shew
,
That
't
is
what
the
wisest
Men
in
the
World
have
always
thought
.
Nor
is
this
any
more
,
than
what
all
good
Men
shew
they
judge
to
be
true
,
by
their
Actions
and
Practices
:
For
who
's
there
so
wholly
addicted
to
Contemplation
and
the
Study
of
Nature
,
as
that
,
if
his
Country
should
fall
into
Danger
,
while
he
was
in
one
of
his
noblest
Researches
,
he
would
immediately
throw
all
aside
,
and
run
to
its
Relief
with
all
possible
speed
;
nay
,
tho'
he
thought
he
might
number
the
Stars
,
or
take
the
just
Dimensions
of
the
whole
World
?
And
the
same
would
he
do
in
case
of
any
Danger
to
a
Friend
or
a
Parent
.
From
all
which
things
it
undeniably
appears
,
That
the
Duties
of
Knowledge
and
Searching
for
Truth
,
are
oblig'd
to
give
way
to
the
Duties
of
Justice
,
which
consist
in
upholding
Society
among
Men
;
than
which
there
is
nothing
we
should
be
more
concern'd
for
.
CHAP.
XLIV
.
Even
those
,
whose
Business
is
the
Search
after
Truth
,
are
serviceable
to
the
Society
of
Mankind
,
and
how
.
Speaking
well
preferable
to
the
highest
Speculations
,
and
why
.
Man
by
Nature
a
sociable
Creature
.
Knowledge
of
little
Use
,
unless
it
tend
to
Action
,
and
do
some
Good
to
the
World
.
Necessity
not
the
Reason
of
Men's
joyning
into
Societies
.
NAy
those
very
Men
,
who
have
spent
their
whole
Lives
in
Philosophy
and
Learning
,
have
yet
always
endeavour'd
,
as
much
as
they
could
,
to
be
serviceable
to
the
Interest
and
Good
of
Mankind
.
For
many
brave
Men
,
and
very
useful
Members
of
their
several
States
,
have
in
great
part
been
made
such
by
their
Institutions
.
Thus
[
a
](A33176-e34580-b)
a
Whom
he
mention'd
chap.
24.
one
of
the
greatest
Men
of
all
Antiquity
,
for
his
Integrity
,
Learning
,
and
especially
Valour
.
He
beat
the
Lacedaemonians
several
times
,
and
made
Thebes
,
as
long
as
he
liv'd
,
the
chief
City
of
Greece
;
which
before
and
after
him
was
inconsiderable
.
Corn.
Nep.
has
written
his
Life
.
Epaminondas
,
the
famous
Theban
,
was
indebted
for
his
Education
to
[
b
](A33176-e34660-b)
b
He
liv'd
about
the
Year
of
Rome
366.
born
at
Tarentum
,
in
Italy
,
from
whence
he
fled
to
Thebes
,
and
was
entertain'd
by
Epaminondas's
Father
,
where
he
dy'd
.
There
is
still
extant
an
Epistle
of
his
to
Hipparchus
the
Pythagorean
;
and
some
take
him
to
be
the
Author
of
the
Golden
Verses
,
that
go
under
the
Name
of
Pythagoras
.
Lysis
,
the
Pythagorean
:
[
c
](A33176-e34780-b)
c
He
liv'd
in
the
Time
of
,
and
was
near
of
kin
to
,
both
the
Dionysius's
of
Siracuse
,
the
last
of
which
he
expell'd
.
See
Plut.
and
Corn.
Nep.
Dion
of
Siracuse
,
for
his
to
Plato
;
and
the
same
may
be
said
of
a
great
many
others
;
Even
I
my self
,
whatever
Service
I
have
done
the
Republick
(
if
at
least
it
may
be
said
I
have
done
it
any
Service
)
must
wholly
ascribe
it
to
that
Learning
,
and
those
Instructions
I
receiv'd
from
my
Masters
.
Neither
is
their
Teaching
,
and
Instructing
others
,
determin'd
to
the
time
of
their
living
here
;
but
they
continue
to
do
it
even
after
they
are
dead
,
by
the
learned
Discourses
which
they
leave
behind
them
:
For
there
's
no
one
Point
they
have
left
unhandled
,
relating
either
to
the
Laws
,
Customs
,
or
Discipline
of
the
Commonwealth
:
So
that
they
seem
to
have
sacrific'd
their
leisure
and
opportunities
of
Study
,
to
the
Benefit
of
those
who
are
engag'd
in
Business
.
And
thus
we
see
how
those
Men
themselves
,
whose
Lives
have
been
spent
in
the
pursuit
of
Wisdom
,
have
nevertheless
endeavour'd
by
their
Learning
and
Prudence
,
to
be
some
way
profitable
to
the
Community
of
Mankind
.
And
for
this
one
Reason
,
perswasive
Speaking
,
if
joyn'd
with
Prudence
,
is
a
greater
Accomplishment
than
the
acutest
Thinking
,
if
destitute
of
Eloquence
:
for
Thinking
is
terminated
in
it self
alone
,
but
Speaking
reaches
out
to
the
Benefit
of
those
,
with
whom
we
are
joyn'd
in
the
same
Society
.
Now
as
Bees
don't
therefore
unite
themselves
together
,
that
so
they
may
the
better
prepare
their
Combs
;
but
therefore
prepare
their
Combs
,
because
they
do
by
Nature
unite
themselves
together
:
So
Men
,
and
much
more
,
being
Creatures
that
naturally
love
Society
;
in
consequence
of
that
,
seek
how
they
may
find
Methods
of
living
happily
in
it
.
From
hence
it
follows
,
That
the
Knowledge
of
things
,
unless
't
is
accompany'd
with
that
sort
of
Virtue
,
which
consists
in
defending
and
preserving
of
Men
,
i.
e.
in
the
Maintenance
of
Human
Society
,
is
but
a
barren
and
fruitless
Accomplishment
;
and
even
Greatness
of
Soul
,
without
a
regard
to
this
Society
and
Conjunction
,
is
very
little
better
than
Savageness
and
Barbarity
.
Thus
we
may
see
,
that
the
getting
of
Knowledge
is
a
Duty
of
much
less
Concern
and
Moment
,
than
the
preserving
this
Society
and
Union
amongst
Men.
'T
is
a
very
false
Notion
that
hath
been
advanc'd
by
some
People
,
That
Necessity
alone
was
the
Motive
to
this
Society
,
which
we
have
so
often
mention'd
;
and
that
Men
would
never
have
associated
together
,
but
that
they
weren't
able
,
in
a
solitary
Life
,
to
furnish
themselves
with
the
Necessaries
of
Nature
;
and
that
every
great
and
exalted
Genius
,
would
Providence
supply
him
with
Food
and
the
other
Conveniencies
of
Life
,
would
withdraw
from
all
Business
and
Entercourse
with
Men
,
and
give
himself
wholly
to
Study
and
Contemplation
.
This
is
not
so
;
for
he
would
avoid
Solitude
,
endeavour
to
find
a
Companion
in
his
Studies
,
and
always
be
desirous
of
Teaching
and
Learning
,
of
Hearing
and
Speaking
.
From
all
which
things
't
is
abundantly
evident
,
That
the
Duties
belonging
to
Human
Society
,
should
in
reason
take
place
before
those
which
relate
to
unactive
Knowledge
.
CHAP.
XLV
.
The
Duties
of
Maintaining
Society
not
always
preferable
to
those
of
Temperance
,
Modesty
,
&c.
What
Duties
of
Justice
ought
to
take
place
of
Others
.
PErhaps
it
may
be
ask'd
,
[
a
](A33176-e35030-b)
a
Having
determin'd
the
former
Question
in
favour
of
Justice
,
he
now
proposes
a
second
,
Whether
the
Duties
of
Justice
ought
always
to
be
preferr'd
before
those
of
Temperance
?
He
thinks
not
,
and
gives
his
Reasons
.
Whether
the
Duties
of
this
Society
,
which
is
thus
agreeable
to
the
Dictates
and
Principles
of
Nature
,
ought
always
to
be
prefer'd
before
the
Duties
of
Temperance
,
Decency
and
Moderation
?
Indeed
I
think
not
:
For
some
things
there
are
so
highly
scandalous
and
abominably
wicked
,
that
a
wise
Man
would
hardly
be
guilty
of
'em
,
supposing
he
could
bring
Safety
to
his
Country
by
it
.
ᵃ
Pesidonius
has
heap'd
up
a
great
many
Instances
of
things
of
this
nature
;
some
of
which
are
so
very
filthy
,
and
intolerably
obscene
,
that
't
is
a
shame
ev'n
so
much
as
to
repeat
'em
after
him
.
These
then
must
never
be
done
for
one's
Country
;
nor
will
one's
Country
ever
desire
that
they
should
;
for
the
best
on
't
is
,
't
is
impossible
such
a
Conjuncture
should
happen
,
as
that
it
should
be
profitable
for
any
Republick
,
to
have
wise
Men
be
guilty
of
such
abominable
Actions
.
We
may
lay
down
this
then
for
a
certain
Conclusion
,
That
when
several
Duties
come
into
competition
,
those
should
take
place
before
any
others
,
which
relate
to
the
Maintenance
of
Human
Society
.
For
wise
and
considerate
Acting
is
the
End
of
all
Knowledge
and
prudent
Thinking
;
and
[
c
](A33176-e35080-b)
c
According
to
the
Maxim
of
the
Philosophers
,
The
End
is
always
more
valuable
than
that
,
which
is
only
done
for
the
sake
of
the
End
.
by
consequence
that
is
more
valuable
than
this
.
And
so
much
may
suffice
upon
this
Subject
;
for
,
I
think
,
I
have
sufficiently
clear'd
the
way
,
so
that
hereafter
there
will
be
no
difficulty
,
to
know
which
Duties
are
to
be
preferr'd
before
which
.
But
those
very
Duties
which
relate
to
Society
,
are
of
different
Rates
and
Degrees
among
themselves
;
but
't
is
no
hard
matter
to
see
in
what
Order
they
[
b
](A33176-e35120-b)
b
An
eminent
Stoick
,
Schollar
of
Panaetius
;
he
was
born
at
Apamea
,
a
Town
in
Syria
,
but
liv'd
at
Rhodes
,
where
Panaetius
had
been
before
him
.
[
See
chap.
2.
Book
3.
]
He
was
one
of
Cicero's
Masters
,
who
some where
calls
him
,
Vel
omnium
Stoicoram
maximum
.
Pompey
the
Great
,
in
his
return
from
the
Asian
Wars
,
went
to
Rhodes
on
purpose
to
hear
him
.
His
Works
are
lost
.
ought
to
be
perform'd
:
as
in
the
first
place
,
Those
to
the
Immortal
Gods
.
Secondly
,
To
our
Native
Country
.
Thirdly
,
To
our
Parents
;
and
so
on
to
all
others
in
their
respective
places
.
What
has
been
said
in
a
few
Words
on
this
last
Head
,
I
hope
,
is
sufficient
to
make
it
appear
,
that
't
is
usual
for
Men
not
only
to
doubt
,
Whether
such
and
such
an
Action
be
Honest
or
Dishonest
;
but
also
,
Of
two
,
that
are
both
of
'em
Honest
,
which
is
the
most
so
.
This
is
one
of
those
two
Heads
,
which
I
at
first
observ'd
were
omitted
by
Panaetius
:
Let
us
now
pass
on
to
the
remaining
part
of
our
propos'd
Division
.
The
End
of
the
First
Book
.
TULLY
's
OFFICES
.
The
Second
Book
.
CHAP.
I.
What
will
be
the
Subject
of
this
Second
Book
.
He
applies
himself
to
the
Study
of
Philosophy
,
as
his
greatest
Consolation
in
the
midst
of
the
Publick
Calamities
of
his
Country
.
WHat
those
Duties
are
,
Son
Mark
,
which
Honesty
and
Virtue
require
of
us
,
and
how
they
arise
from
their
several
Fountains
,
is
,
I
think
,
plain
enough
from
the
former
Book
.
I
am
now
in
the
next
place
to
speak
of
those
others
,
which
wholly
regard
the
Convenience
of
Life
,
and
are
requisite
for
the
Getting
and
Enjoyment
of
those
things
,
which
serve
for
our
comfortable
Subsistence
here
;
such
as
Interest
,
Riches
,
&c.
And
here
I
told
you
,
the
common
Heads
of
Deliberation
were
,
What
is
Profitable
,
and
what
Unprofitable
?
And
,
Of
several
Profitables
,
which
is
more
,
and
which
most
of
all
such
?
[
a
](A33176-e35460-b)
a
Having
propos'd
the
Subject
,
about
which
he
is
to
treat
in
this
Book
,
he
defers
discoursing
of
it
,
till
he
has
answer'd
two
Objections
made
against
him
,
for
this
sort
of
Writing
.
Concerning
which
I
shall
begin
to
speak
,
after
I
have
premis'd
but
a
Word
or
two
,
in
Vindication
of
my self
,
and
my
present
Undertaking
.
For
tho'
my
Books
have
excited
several
both
to
the
Reading
,
and
even
Writing
of
Philosophy
;
[
b
](A33176-e35470-b)
b
The
first
Objection
against
him
is
,
That
he
spent
too
much
Time
,
and
took
too
much
Pains
,
in
such
a
fruitless
Study
,
as
that
of
Philosophy
.
For
the
Romans
being
a
rough
and
ambitious
People
,
minded
nothing
before
those
Times
,
but
the
Arts
of
War
,
and
encreasing
the
Glory
of
their
Empire
.
As
for
Philosophy
,
&c.
't
was
counted
fit
for
none
almost
but
Pedants
,
and
(
as
they
us'd
to
call
'em
)
the
trifling
,
insignificant
Grecians
.
Tu
regere
imperia
populos
,
&c.
was
their
Maxim
.
yet
I
am
now-and-then
apt
to
be
afraid
,
least
some
,
who
are
otherwise
very
Good
Men
,
should
hate
and
despise
the
very
Name
of
that
Study
;
and
wonder
at
me
,
for
bestowing
such
Portions
of
my
Time
and
Pains
,
in
so
very
fruitless
and
insignificant
a
manner
.
To
whom
I
answer
,
[
c
](A33176-e35520-b)
c
He
excuses
himself
for
spending
his
Time
in
this
idle
manner
,
by
shewing
what
he
had
formerly
done
for
the
sake
of
the
Commonwealth
,
and
how
desirous
he
is
of
doing
the
same
again
,
if
the
Times
would
permit
him
.
That
so
long
as
the
Republick
was
govern'd
by
those
,
to
whose
Care
and
Management
she
had
intrusted
her self
,
I
was
ever
diligent
and
employ'd
all
my
Thoughts
,
for
her
Good
and
Preservation
.
But
when
[
d
](A33176-e35540-b)
d
Julius
Caesar
,
who
having
conquer'd
Pompey
the
Great
,
got
the
whole
Power
of
Rome
into
his
Hands
.
one
Man
had
seiz'd
of
her
wholly
to
himself
,
and
there
was
no
place
left
for
my
Counsel
or
Authority
:
and
when
I
had
lost
those
extraordinary
Persons
,
who
had
been
my
Companions
in
labouring
for
her
Interest
:
I
resolv'd
not
to
sink
into
Anguish
and
Despair
,
which
had
wholly
over-whelm'd
me
,
if
I
had
not
resisted
'em
;
nor
to
follow
such
Pleasures
or
idle
Ways
of
Living
,
as
were
improper
and
unbecoming
a
Man
of
Learning
.
I
could
heartily
wish
,
had
it
so
pleas'd
the
Gods
,
that
the
Republick
had
continu'd
in
its
ancient
Condition
,
and
never
fall'n
into
the
Hands
of
[
e
](A33176-e35590-b)
e
Not
only
Caesar
,
but
Mark
Anthony
and
his
Adherents
;
who
,
after
the
Murder
of
Caesar
,
endeavour'd
to
get
the
sole
Power
to
himself
.
See
his
Life
in
Plut.
those
Men
,
who
aren't
so
much
for
Changing
,
as
Overturning
every
thing
!
I
should
then
,
as
I
did
in
its
flourishing
Circumstances
,
spend
my
Time
rather
in
Business
,
than
Writing
;
and
what
I
did
write
,
would
not
be
things
of
this
Moral
Nature
,
but
my
Publick
Orations
,
as
I
have
often
done
.
But
when
the
poor
State
,
which
had
taken
up
all
my
Care
and
Thoughts
,
and
for
which
I
had
labour'd
with
all
my
Power
,
was
utterly
ruin'd
and
sunk
into
Nothing
,
there
was
quickly
no
room
left
for
such
Orations
,
either
at
the
Bar
,
or
in
the
Senate-house
:
And
my
active
Mind
,
which
had
always
been
employ'd
in
that
kind
of
Studies
,
now
not
being
able
to
lye
wholly
idle
;
I
thought
I
could
not
find
out
a
better
way
to
get
rid
of
those
Troubles
which
oppress'd
my
Mind
,
than
by
returning
again
to
the
Studies
of
Philosophy
.
I
had
spent
a
good
part
of
my
time
in
these
,
whilst
I
was
young
,
for
the
improvement
of
my
Reason
:
But
when
I
came
once
to
be
a
Candidate
for
Places
,
and
devoted
my self
to
the
Service
of
the
Publick
;
I
had
little
time
left
for
Philosophical
Enquiries
;
only
so
much
,
as
could
be
spar'd
from
the
Business
of
my
Friends
and
the
State
;
which
was
wholly
taken
up
in
nothing
but
Reading
,
without
any
Leisure
at
all
for
Writing
.
CHAP.
II.
Some
Advantage
to
be
drawn
out
of
Evils
.
The
Commendation
and
Definitions
of
Wisdom
and
Philosophy
.
'T
is
the
only
way
of
obtaining
Virtue
and
Happiness
.
The
Opinion
of
the
Academicks
,
and
why
they
Dispute
against
every
thing
.
HOwever
then
we
have
this
Advantage
,
in
the
midst
of
all
our
Miseries
and
Calamities
,
that
by
them
we
are
brought
to
the
Writing
of
those
things
,
[
a
](A33176-e35710-b)
a
The
Romans
receiv'd
their
Philosophy
from
the
Greeks
,
and
did
not
begin
to
cultivate
it
to
any
purpose
,
till
Cicero's
time
.
which
were
not
sufficiently
known
amongst
us
,
tho'
nothing
in
the
World
more
deserves
our
Knowledge
.
For
what
is
there
,
O
ye
Gods
!
more
desirable
than
Wisdom
?
What
more
excellent
and
lovely
in
it self
?
What
more
useful
and
becoming
for
a
Man
?
Or
what
more
worthy
of
his
reasonable
Nature
?
Now
those
who
are
busied
in
the
pursuit
of
this
,
are
call'd
Philosophers
;
and
the
Word
Philosophy
signifies
no
more
,
if
you
'd
take
it
literally
,
than
a
certain
Desire
and
Love
for
Wisdom
:
And
Wisdom's
defin'd
by
the
old
Philosophers
,
The
Knowledge
of
things
both
[
b
](A33176-e35780-b)
b
By
Divine
things
they
meant
God
,
and
his
Nature
;
together
with
the
World
and
Bodies
in
it
,
which
are
the
Work
of
God
.
By
things
Human
the
Nature
of
Man
,
both
as
to
his
Body
and
Soul
,
together
with
the
good
or
ill
Use
he
may
make
of
either
;
viz.
Virtue
and
Vice
:
As
also
the
Relation
he
stands
in
toward
God
,
and
other
Men
,
with
the
several
Duties
resulting
from
it
.
See
Lips
.
Stoic
.
Philos.
Book
2.
§.
7.
Divine
and
Humane
,
together
with
the
Causes
upon
which
they
depend
:
the
Study
of
which
whosoever
finds
fault
with
,
I
confess
I
can't
perceive
what
't
is
he
would
commend
.
For
what
Study
is
there
,
that
brings
so
much
Quiet
and
tisfaction
to
the
Mind
,
(
if
these
are
the
things
which
we
long
after
)
as
theirs
who
are
always
a-searching
out
something
,
which
may
contribute
to
the
Welfare
and
Happiness
of
their
Lives
?
Or
if
it
be
Virtue
and
Constancy
that
we
desire
,
either
't
is
this
is
the
Method
of
obtaining
'em
,
or
else
there
is
not
any
to
be
found
in
the
World
.
To
say
there
's
no
Art
of
those
weightier
Concerns
,
when
none
of
the
most
trivial
Matters
is
without
Art
,
becomes
only
those
who
Talk
without
Thinking
,
and
deceive
'emselves
in
their
most
important
Business
:
But
if
there
is
an
Art
of
attaining
Virtue
,
in
what
other
way
we
do
hope
to
find
it
,
if
this
be
forsaken
,
of
which
I
am
now
speaking
.
But
these
things
use
to
be
more
fully
handled
,
when
we
excite
and
persuade
Men
to
cultivate
Philosophy
:
which
I
have
endeavour'd
to
do
in
another
[
c
](A33176-e35900-b)
c
His
Book
entitled
Hortensius
;
because
in
it
he
brought
in
Hortensius
condemning
,
whilst
he
himself
commended
Philosophy
.
'T
is
now
all
lost
except
some
few
Fragments
.
Work
.
My
Design
at
present
was
only
to
shew
,
why
I
particularly
chose
this
Study
,
being
thrust
from
all
Business
and
Concern
in
the
Government
.
[
d
](A33176-e35930-b)
d
He
proceeds
to
the
second
Exception
made
against
him
,
which
is
this
;
Cicero
being
(
as
before
was
observ'd
)
of
the
Academick
Sect
,
who
deny
there
is
any
such
thing
as
Certainty
,
How
(
say
they
)
can
you
pretend
to
give
Rules
of
Duty
,
when
't
is
a
settled
Maxim
of
your
Sects
,
That
nothing
can
be
known
?
Is
not
this
to
contradict
your
own
Principle
?
Or
will
you
say
,
That
you
don't
know
the
Truth
of
your
own
Rules
?
There
are
others
,
and
those
Men
of
no
small
Learning
,
who
object
against
me
,
and
ask
,
If
I
am
not
inconsistent
with
my self
,
who
affirm
that
nothing
at
all
can
be
known
,
and
yet
have
discours'd
upon
several
Subjects
,
and
at
this
very
time
am
laying
down
Rules
and
Directions
about
Duty
:
I
could
wish
these
Persons
had
understood
our
Opinions
a
little
more
throughly
;
[
e
](A33176-e36010-b)
e
He
answers
,
That
he
is
not
one
of
those
,
who
doubt
of
every
thing
,
viz.
the
Scepticks
or
Aporeticks
,
Followers
of
Pyrrho
,
who
held
,
That
all
things
were
equally
probable
,
and
nothing
could
have
so
much
said
for
it
,
but
that
as
much
might
be
said
against
it
,
and
accordingly
doubted
of
every
thing
in
the
World
.
But
Cicero's
of
a
middle
Opinion
between
these
and
the
Dogmaticks
(
who
hold
some
things
to
be
certain
and
others
uncertain
)
and
maintains
that
some
things
are
extreamly
probable
(
tho'
not
absolutely
certain
)
and
others
highly
improbable
;
which
is
the
Opinion
of
the
Academicks
,
as
distinguish'd
from
pure
Scepticks
.
Tho'
therefore
he
won't
say
his
Rules
are
certain
,
yet
he
thinks
'em
so
very
probable
,
as
that
no
wise
Man
can
deny
his
Assent
to
'em
.
for
we
are
not
of
those
,
whose
Minds
are
perpetually
wandring
in
Uncertainties
,
and
have
nothing
whereby
to
determin
their
Assents
;
(
for
what
sort
of
Mind
must
a
Man
needs
have
,
or
rather
what
Life
must
he
needs
lead
,
[
f
](A33176-e36150-b)
f
Which
was
the
Case
of
the
Scepticks
;
For
what
Disputing
can
there
be
with
them
,
who
won't
allow
one
thing
more
probable
than
another
;
when
all
Dispute
must
suppose
that
some
things
are
probable
and
true
,
and
from
them
make
out
the
Matter
in
question
?
Or
what
regular
Conduct
can
he
observe
in
his
Life
,
who
doubts
whether
he
sees
,
hears
,
or
feels
any
thing
,
or
not
?
Therefore
Quintil.
with
very
good
Reason
,
excludes
Pyrrho
from
medling
with
Eloquence
,
Cui
judices
esse
(
says
he
)
apud
quos
verba
faciat
,
&c.
non
liquebit
:
For
he
must
doubt
(
if
he
Act
according
to
his
Principles
)
whether
there
be
any
Judge
for
him
to
speak
to
,
any
Criminal
to
defend
,
&c.
when
he
's
utterly
debar'd
from
all
liberty
of
Disputing
,
and
observing
any
regular
Conduct
in
his
Actions
?
)
nor
yet
of
those
others
,
who
call
some
things
certain
and
others
uncertain
:
but
rejecting
both
these
,
we
say
some
things
are
probable
and
others
improbable
.
Is
there
any
thing
then
that
should
hinder
me
,
from
approving
of
that
,
which
I
think
most
probable
;
and
laying
aside
that
,
which
I
think
the
contrary
?
Or
where
's
the
Inconsistency
,
if
leaving
that
arrogant
Pretence
of
Demonstrating
,
I
am
neither
too
rash
,
nor
presumptuous
in
my
Opinions
,
which
of
all
things
in
the
World
are
the
farthest
from
Wisdom
?
Now
this
is
the
reason
why
we
Academicks
Dispute
against
every
thing
,
because
what
is
probable
could
not
appear
,
without
comparing
the
Arguments
upon
either
side
of
the
Question
.
But
these
things
are
clear'd
,
I
think
,
accurately
enough
,
in
my
Books
entitled
Academical
Questions
.
But
you
,
my
Son
,
are
already
engag'd
in
the
Study
of
[
g
](A33176-e36310-b)
g
The
Peripatetick
,
of
which
Sect
Cratippus
,
his
Son's
Master
,
was
.
a
most
noble
and
ancient
Philosophy
;
and
have
gotten
Cratippus
for
your
Master
and
Instructor
,
who
is
hardly
inferior
to
its
most
glorious
Founders
:
However
,
I
would
have
you
acquainted
with
[
h
](A33176-e36350-b)
h
The
Academick
.
our
Doctrins
,
which
are
very
little
different
from
those
of
your
own
Sect.
But
it
's
high
time
now
to
return
to
our
Purpose
.
[
i
](A33176-e36370-b)
i
See
Book
1.
chap.
1.
CHAP.
III.
The
Knowledge
of
Honesty
is
of
greatest
Moment
.
Profit
and
Honesty
really
the
same
,
and
distinguisht
only
by
an
Act
of
the
Mind
.
The
customary
Opinion
to
the
contrary
very
pernicious
.
The
Division
of
things
that
are
profitable
,
and
hurtful
to
Men.
The
Good
we
receive
from
inanimate
Beings
owing
to
Man's
Industry
.
THere
being
then
,
as
[
a
](A33176-e36450-b)
a
In
Book
1.
at
the
end
of
chap.
3.
was
before
observ'd
,
five
general
Heads
of
Deliberating
and
Consulting
for
the
finding
out
our
Duty
;
two
of
which
relate
to
what
is
Honest
and
Becoming
;
two
to
the
Uses
and
Conveniencies
of
Life
,
such
as
Plenty
,
Power
,
Riches
,
&c.
and
the
fifth
to
the
teaching
us
how
we
ought
to
Choose
,
if
any
of
the
former
should
seem
to
contradict
and
run
counter
to
one
another
:
we
have
gone
thro'
with
that
,
wherein
Honesty
is
the
Question
;
with
which
I
desire
you
'd
be
more
especially
acquainted
.
The
Point
which
now
comes
under
Consideration
,
is
what
usually
goes
by
the
name
of
Profitable
;
[
b
](A33176-e36510-b)
b
Being
to
Discourse
in
this
Book
about
Profit
,
the
first
thing
he
takes
care
of
is
,
to
settle
the
true
Notion
of
Profit
,
and
root
out
of
Mens
Minds
a
pernicious
Errour
,
which
they
have
got
concerning
it
.
He
asserts
therefore
,
and
proves
by
the
Authority
of
the
greatest
Philosophers
,
That
nothing
can
be
Profitable
,
which
is
not
Honest.
See
Book
1.
chap.
3.
Note
ᶠ.
concerning
which
,
Custom
is
mightily
in
the
wrong
,
and
by
little
and
little
has
brought
it
to
such
a
pass
,
as
to
make
a
Distinction
between
Profit
and
Honesty
;
and
settle
it
as
a
constant
and
receiv'd
Maxim
,
That
a
thing
may
be
Honest
without
being
Profitable
;
and
again
may
be
Profitable
without
being
Honest
:
the
most
pernicious
Errour
,
and
most
destructive
of
all
Goodness
,
that
ever
could
have
crept
into
the
Minds
of
Men.
The
greatest
however
,
and
most
eminent
Philosophers
,
have
been
always
so
strict
and
severe
in
their
Writings
,
as
to
make
the
three
Natures
of
Justice
,
Profit
,
and
Honesty
,
be
blended
and
interwoven
together
in
Reality
,
and
distinguishable
only
by
an
Act
of
the
Mind
.
For
whatever
is
Just
,
say
they
,
the
same
is
also
Profitable
;
and
whatever
is
Honest
,
the
same
is
also
Just
;
from
whence
it
follows
,
That
whatever
is
Honest
,
the
same
must
be
also
Profitable
.
Did
People
but
consider
this
Matter
as
they
ought
,
they
would
not
,
as
now
they
commonly
do
,
admire
a
crafty
and
subtle
sort
of
Fellows
,
and
esteem
that
Wisdom
,
which
in
truth
is
Roguery
.
This
Errour
therefore
should
wholly
be
rooted
out
of
the
Minds
of
Men
,
and
all
should
be
taught
,
That
if
ever
they
hope
to
obtain
their
Ends
,
they
should
not
set
about
it
by
the
ways
of
Knavery
and
underhand
Dealings
,
but
by
Justice
and
Integrity
in
their
Designs
and
Actions
.
[
c
](A33176-e36660-b)
c
Having
shewn
,
That
nothing
can
be
Profitable
which
is
not
Honest
;
he
now
enumerates
the
several
sorts
of
things
,
which
may
be
profitable
for
us
;
so
that
,
when
we
know
what
is
Best
,
and
what
is
Worst
for
us
,
we
may
endeavour
to
obtain
the
one
,
and
avoid
the
other
.
Now
all
things
that
tend
to
the
Good
and
Preservation
of
the
Life
of
Man
,
are
either
Inanimate
,
such
as
Gold
,
Silver
,
the
Productions
of
the
Earth
,
and
other
such
like
;
or
Animals
,
which
have
natural
Powers
,
Inclinations
and
Appetites
.
Of
these
some
are
unreasonable
and
others
reasonable
:
The
unreasonable
are
Horses
,
Oxen
,
and
other
sorts
of
Cattel
;
to
which
we
may
add
Bees
,
which
produce
and
make
something
,
that
contributes
to
the
Convenience
of
the
Life
of
Men
:
the
reasonable
are
Gods
and
Men.
The
means
for
procuring
the
Favour
of
the
Gods
,
is
to
live
a
religious
and
holy
Life
:
Next
to
the
Gods
,
there
's
nothing
so
capable
of
contributing
to
the
Happiness
and
Welfare
of
Men
,
as
Men
themselves
.
The
same
Distribution
may
serve
for
those
things
,
which
tend
to
the
Hurt
and
Inconvenience
of
Men.
But
because
't
is
believ'd
,
That
[
d
](A33176-e36730-b)
d
Because
the
Gods
being
by
Nature
good
and
kind
,
if
they
should
harm
Men
,
they
would
act
contrary
to
their
own
Natures
.
See
Lips
.
Phisiolog
.
Stoic
.
Book
1.
chap.
10.
to
hurt
is
incompatible
with
the
Divine
Nature
,
the
Gods
for
that
reason
are
excepted
here
,
so
that
Men
are
suppos'd
,
of
all
things
in
Nature
,
to
do
both
the
most
[
e
](A33176-e36770-b)
e
The
words
,
Et
prodesse
,
not
being
found
in
several
Manuscripts
,
have
been
excluded
the
late
Editions
;
but
(
I
think
)
without
sufficient
Reason
:
For
this
is
not
a
Conclusion
from
the
last
Words
only
,
but
the
whole
Sence
foregoing
;
viz.
That
Men
do
most
Good
,
except
only
the
Gods
;
and
most
Harm
of
all
,
the
Gods
not
doing
any
:
From
whence
it
follows
,
That
Men
do
the
most
Good
,
and
most
Harm
,
taken
both
together
,
of
any
thing
,
to
one
another
.
Beside
the
words
following
begin
to
reckon
up
the
several
Goods
,
which
Men
do
to
one
another
;
which
being
brought
in
with
an
enim
,
for
,
ought
to
be
a
Proof
of
what
immediately
forgoes
,
viz.
That
Men
do
the
greatest
Service
as
well
as
Disservice
,
&c.
Service
and
Disservice
to
one
another
.
For
First
,
[
f
](A33176-e36850-b)
f
Being
to
shew
,
That
Men
do
the
most
Good
to
one
another
;
he
begins
with
inanimate
things
,
and
shews
that
the
Service
we
receive
from
them
is
owing
to
Men.
Those
things
which
are
call'd
Inanimate
,
are
most
of
'em
owing
to
the
Industry
of
Men
;
which
we
neither
could
get
,
if
it
weren't
for
their
Labour
and
Art
in
procuring
'em
;
nor
afterwards
use
without
their
Assistance
.
For
where
should
we
have
such
a
Science
as
Physick
;
as
Navigation
or
Agriculture
?
How
should
we
gather
and
preserve
our
Corn
,
and
the
rest
of
our
Fruits
,
if
it
were
not
for
Men
?
And
then
how
should
those
Commodities
,
which
we
want
,
be
imported
;
or
those
,
with
which
we
abound
,
be
exported
,
if
there
were
not
Men
to
do
each
of
these
Works
?
In
like
manner
,
how
could
Stones
be
fetch'd
out
of
the
Quarries
for
our
necessary
Uses
?
How
could
Iron
,
Brass
,
Gold
and
Silver
,
be
dug
and
drawn
out
from
the
Bowels
of
the
Earth
,
did
not
Men
set
their
Hands
to
work
for
these
Purposes
?
CHAP.
IV.
Other
Conveniencies
from
inanimate
Beings
,
and
unreasonable
Animals
,
receiv'd
by
Mens
Industry
.
The
Advantages
arising
from
Mens
joyning
in
Society
.
SO
Houses
,
which
serve
to
defend
us
from
the
extremities
of
Heat
and
Cold
,
could
neither
at
first
have
been
made
by
Mankind
;
nor
afterwards
,
if
by
Earth-quake
,
Tempest
,
or
length
of
Days
,
they
had
fall'n
to
decay
,
have
been
repair'd
or
rebuilt
;
had
not
Men
,
joyn'd
together
in
one
common
Society
,
learnt
to
beg
Help
and
Assistance
of
one
another
.
To
this
Industry
of
Men
we
are
also
indebted
for
Conveyances
of
Water
,
for
making
new
Channels
and
Arms
to
Rivers
,
and
for
turning
the
Streams
after
such
a
manner
,
as
thereby
to
water
and
fatten
our
Grounds
;
for
throwing
up
Banks
to
defend
us
from
the
Waves
,
and
making
of
new
Harbors
in
convenient
Places
.
From
all
which
Instances
,
and
a
great
many
others
that
might
easily
be
produc'd
,
't
is
abundantly
manifest
,
That
the
Fruits
and
Advantages
reap'd
from
those
things
,
which
are
call'd
Inanimate
,
are
entirely
owing
to
Mens
Labour
and
Industry
.
Secondly
,
[
a
](A33176-e36960-b)
a
Having
shewn
,
That
the
Advantage
they
reap
from
inanimate
Beings
is
owing
to
Men
;
he
proceeds
to
shew
the
same
of
unreasonable
Animals
.
Those
we
receive
from
unreasonable
Animals
,
how
very
little
and
inconsiderable
would
they
be
,
if
they
were
not
augmented
by
the
same
Peoples
Industry
?
For
who
was
it
but
Men
that
first
discover'd
the
Uses
,
to
which
Beasts
in
their
several
kinds
might
be
serviceable
?
And
how
at
this
time
could
we
feed
or
break
them
?
How
could
we
keep
'em
,
and
get
the
most
Profit
and
Advantage
by
'em
,
without
the
Endeavours
and
Assistance
of
the
same
Men
?
'T
is
they
that
destroy
us
those
Creatures
which
are
hurtful
,
and
procure
for
us
those
which
may
be
serviceable
to
us
.
Why
need
I
mention
a
[
b
](A33176-e37000-b)
b
Several
other
things
,
such
as
Arts
and
useful
Inventions
.
Civil
Society
,
&c.
whereby
Men
are
serviceable
and
do
good
to
one
another
.
multitude
of
Arts
,
which
are
absolutely
necessary
to
our
Well-being
here
?
For
what
Help
or
Succour
could
those
that
are
sick
,
or
what
Pleasure
those
that
are
healthy
find
?
How
could
Mankind
be
supply'd
with
Victuals
,
and
other
Conveniencies
or
Comforts
of
Life
;
if
it
weren't
for
that
number
of
Callings
in
the
World
,
which
are
wholly
design'd
to
provide
'em
of
such
things
?
By
which
Men
are
brought
to
live
better
and
more
handsomly
,
and
are
rais'd
to
a
condition
so
far
above
that
of
unreasonable
Animals
.
Again
,
Cities
could
neither
have
been
built
nor
frequented
,
without
a
Community
and
Society
of
Men
:
From
hence
have
arisen
all
Laws
and
Customs
;
the
Bounds
of
Equity
and
Justice
have
been
settled
;
and
a
certain
and
regular
Method
laid
down
for
the
Conduct
of
Mens
Lives
.
This
has
brought
Modesty
into
request
,
and
fill'd
off
the
natural
Roughness
of
Mens
Tempers
;
has
contributed
to
the
greater
Security
of
their
Lives
,
and
establish'd
such
a
Commerce
and
Correspondence
among
'em
,
as
by
mutual
giving
and
receiving
of
Benefits
,
by
bartering
and
changing
one
Commodity
for
another
,
one
Convenience
for
another
,
supplies
'em
to
the
full
with
whatever
they
stand
in
need
of
.
CHAP.
V.
Nothing
extraordinary
either
in
War
,
or
Peace
,
can
be
done
without
the
help
of
Men.
Nothing
the
Cause
of
so
much
Evil
to
Men
,
as
they
themselves
are
to
one
another
.
What
is
the
Office
of
Virtue
.
The
whole
Business
of
it
consists
in
three
things
.
WE
dwell
much
longer
,
than
we
needed
to
do
,
upon
this
Subject
:
For
who
does
not
set
,
which
Panaetius
has
spent
many
Pages
to
make
out
,
that
neither
a
General
in
War
,
nor
a
Statesman
in
Peace
,
could
ever
perform
any
glorious
Exploits
,
or
do
any
notable
Service
to
the
Publick
,
without
the
concurrence
of
other
Mens
Endeavours
?
To
confirm
this
Assertion
,
he
brings
[
a
](A33176-e37110-b)
a
Several
of
the
greatest
Generals
and
Statesmen
amongst
the
Ancients
.
Themistocles
,
Pericles
,
Agesilaus
and
Alexander
;
and
tells
us
,
that
no
one
of
all
these
,
without
the
assistance
of
others
to
support
'em
,
could
ever
have
atchiev'd
such
glorious
Actions
.
What
he
tells
us
is
undoubtedly
true
,
and
such
a
number
of
Witnesses
altogether
superfluous
.
[
b
](A33176-e37140-b)
b
Having
thus
made
it
appear
,
That
Men
do
,
plurimum
pr●desse
,
do
the
greatest
Good
to
one
another
;
[
See
Not.
4.
on
ch.
3.
]
he
is
now
going
to
shew
,
That
they
do
the
greatest
Mischief
too
.
And
as
Men
thus
receive
most
extraordinary
Benefits
,
from
agreeing
and
conspiring
to
lend
mutual
Assistance
;
so
we
shall
find
,
upon
changing
the
Scene
,
that
there
are
no
Misfortunes
or
Calamities
so
great
,
as
those
which
they
bring
upon
one
another
.
[
c
](A33176-e37180-b)
c
Born
at
Messene
,
a
City
in
Sicily
,
Schollar
of
Aristotle
.
He
was
also
an
eminent
Orator
,
and
Geometrician
.
He
left
several
Works
behind
him
,
which
are
all
lost
.
Dicaearchus
,
a
learned
and
eloquent
Peripatetick
,
has
written
a
whole
Book
concerning
the
Destruction
of
Men
;
where
first
having
reckon'd
up
all
other
Causes
of
it
,
such
as
Inundations
,
Pestilences
,
and
Famines
,
and
even
sudden
Incursions
of
furious
wild
Beasts
,
(
by
which
he
assures
us
some
whole
Nations
have
been
devour'd
;
)
and
then
placing
on
the
other
side
Wars
,
Seditions
,
and
such-like
Misfortunes
,
which
Men
were
the
Occasions
of
;
he
endeavours
to
shew
at
the
foot
of
the
Account
,
that
a
great
many
more
have
been
destroy'd
by
these
,
than
by
all
other
Accidents
or
Calamities
whatever
.
This
then
being
indisputably
true
,
That
the
Goods
Men
enjoy
,
and
the
Evils
they
suffer
,
proceed
for
the
most
part
from
Men
themselves
;
I
say
't
is
the
principal
Office
of
Virtue
,
to
procure
the
Good-liking
and
Favour
of
Men
,
and
so
to
engage
their
Endeavours
and
Affections
,
as
to
make
'em
still
ready
to
do
us
any
Kindness
.
'T
is
the
Business
therefore
of
laborious
Callings
,
to
supply
us
with
all
the
Conveniencies
of
Life
,
which
may
be
had
from
the
Use
of
inanimate
Beings
,
and
unreasonable
Animals
:
But
to
gain
the
Affections
of
Men
on
our
side
,
and
beget
in
them
always
a
readiness
and
desire
to
advance
our
Interest
,
is
a
Work
that
requires
the
Wisdom
and
Virtue
of
the
greatest
Men.
[
d
](A33176-e37310-b)
d
He
proves
what
he
just
now
said
,
That
it
requires
Wisdom
,
&c.
For
,
says
he
,
the
whole
Work
and
Exercise
of
Virtue
consists
in
one
of
these
three
things
:
1.
The
Improvement
of
our
Reason
and
Understanding
;
which
is
the
Work
of
Prudence
,
and
the
intellectual
Virtues
.
2.
To
govern
and
restrain
the
Passions
,
and
keep
the
sensual
Appetite
in
subjection
to
Reason
;
which
Temperance
and
the
Moral
Virtues
do
.
3.
To
gain
the
Affections
of
Men
,
so
as
to
make
'em
promote
our
Interest
;
which
any
of
the
former
may
help
to
do
.
Thus
Wisdom
or
Knowledge
,
for
Instance
,
perfect
the
Understanding
,
and
are
proper
to
beget
in
Men
Confidence
or
Reliance
on
us
.
[
See
chap.
9.
]
So
Justice
,
and
Greatness
of
Soul
,
moderate
the
Passions
and
Inclinations
;
and
also
make
Men
love
,
respect
,
and
honour
us
.
See
chap.
9
,
10
,
11
,
&c.
For
the
whole
Work
and
Exercise
of
Virtue
in
general
,
consists
in
some
one
of
these
three
things
:
The
first
is
a
Knowledge
,
in
all
we
undertake
,
of
what
is
agreeable
to
Truth
and
Sincerity
;
what
's
becoming
and
suitable
to
every
one's
Character
;
what
will
be
the
Consequence
of
such
or
such
Actions
;
what
are
the
Materials
out
of
which
things
are
made
,
and
what
the
Causes
that
first
brought
'em
into
Being
.
The
second
,
A
restraining
the
violent
Motions
and
Passions
of
the
Soul
,
which
by
the
Grecians
are
termed
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
;
and
bringing
the
irregular
Inclinations
of
the
Appetite
,
which
by
the
same
are
call'd
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
under
the
Power
and
Government
of
Reason
.
The
third
is
a
Skilfulness
of
Address
in
our
Carriage
,
and
a
winning
Demeanour
toward
the
rest
of
Men
,
with
whom
we
are
joyn'd
in
one
common
Society
;
that
so
by
their
help
we
may
be
supply'd
in
abundance
,
with
all
those
things
which
our
Natures
stand
in
need
of
;
and
by
the
same
may
be
enabled
,
should
any
Injury
be
offer'd
us
,
to
keep
our selves
secure
from
the
Violences
of
it
;
and
not
only
so
,
but
to
revenge
our selves
also
upon
the
guilty
Person
,
and
inflict
such
Punishments
,
as
are
according
to
the
Rules
of
Humanity
and
Justice
.
CHAP.
VI.
How
far
the
Power
of
Fortune
over
Men
reaches
.
The
several
Reasons
why
Men
favour
any
one
;
or
submit
to
his
Authority
.
WHat
[
a
](A33176-e37470-b)
a
Men
doing
us
the
most
Good
and
most
Evil
,
(
as
is
shewn
)
it
follows
that
those
are
the
profitablest
Actions
,
which
engage
Men
to
be
of
our
side
,
and
to
do
all
the
Good
they
can
,
and
keep
from
us
all
the
Evil
:
What
these
are
he
proceeds
now
to
shew
;
only
observing
one
thing
by
the
way
.
Means
should
be
us'd
for
the
gaining
,
and
securing
Men
firm
to
our
Interests
,
we
shall
mention
immediately
;
but
we
have
one
Observation
to
make
before-hand
.
[
b
](A33176-e37480-b)
b
It
might
have
been
objected
,
That
the
good
or
ill
Success
of
our
Actions
depends
upon
Fortune
,
and
not
Men's
Assistance
;
which
therefore
why
should
we
endeavour
to
procure
?
To
obviate
this
he
observes
,
That
the
most
and
greatest
of
what
we
call
fortuitous
Accidents
,
could
never
have
fall'n
out
without
Men's
Assistance
,
notwithstanding
that
usually
they
are
said
to
come
from
Fortune
:
Such
are
Victories
;
Overthrows
,
&c.
There
's
no
one
but
knows
that
the
Power
of
Fortune
is
very
great
,
both
as
to
the
good
,
and
ill
Success
of
our
Actions
:
for
when
she
favours
us
,
we
quickly
arrive
at
our
desired
Haven
;
but
when
she
turns
against
us
,
we
as
quickly
are
Shipwreckt
and
run
A-ground
.
Now
of
those
Events
which
depend
upon
Fortune
,
there
are
some
which
come
to
pass
but
extraordinary
seldom
;
such
as
Storms
,
Tempests
,
Shipwrecks
,
Ruins
,
Fires
,
&c.
which
proceed
from
inanimate
Beings
;
and
from
brutish
Animals
kicks
,
bites
,
pushes
,
&c.
all
which
,
as
I
said
,
do
but
rarely
happen
:
But
the
Overthrows
of
Armies
,
as
of
[
c
](A33176-e37570-b)
c
That
of
Pompey
the
Great
in
the
Pharsalian
Field
;
his
●ldest
Son
's
at
Munda
in
Spain
;
and
Juba
and
Scipio's
in
A●ick
;
all
defeated
by
Caesar.
See
his
Commentaries
.
three
but
a
while
ago
,
and
a
great
many
others
at
several
times
;
the
Deaths
of
Commanders
,
as
lately
of
[
d
](A33176-e37670-b)
d
Viz.
Pompey
the
Great
,
who
after
his
Defeat
at
Pharsalia
,
flying
into
Aegypt
,
was
there
treacherously
Murder'd
:
Princeps
Romani
nominis
,
imperio
arbitrioque
Aegyptii
mancipii
,
jugulatus
est
.
See
Vell.
Paterc
.
Book
2.
chap.
58.
a
great
and
extraordinary
Person
;
the
Hatred
and
Violence
of
the
enrag'd
Multitude
,
and
,
as
a
Consequence
of
that
,
the
Banishments
,
Flights
and
utter
Undoings
of
well-deserving
Citizens
:
as
also
on
the
other
〈◊〉
prosperous
Successes
,
such
as
Honours
,
Commands
,
Victories
,
&c.
tho'
they
are
all
truly
fortuitous
things
,
yet
they
can't
succeed
either
the
one
way
or
t'other
,
without
the
Assistance
and
Endeavours
of
Men.
This
being
noted
,
we
are
now
to
discourse
of
those
Ways
and
Methods
,
whereby
Men
are
drawn
and
enclin'd
to
be
for
us
,
and
to
endeavour
all
they
can
for
our
Interest
and
Advantage
:
Upon
which
if
we
seem
to
dwell
longer
than
we
should
do
,
I
desire
the
Usefulness
of
the
Subject
may
be
consider'd
,
and
then
we
may
possibly
be
thought
too
short
.
[
e
](A33176-e37780-b)
e
He
lays
down
six
things
,
or
Principles
of
Action
in
Men
,
which
make
one
Man
endeavour
to
be
Profitable
to
another
,
as
,
Love
,
Honour
,
&c.
and
shews
which
of
'em
are
convenient
,
and
which
not
;
and
by
what
Virtues
we
may
gain
each
of
'em
.
Whatsoever
then
is
contributed
by
Men
,
toward
any
one's
advancement
in
Riches
,
Honours
,
Power
,
&c.
is
always
done
upon
some
of
these
Motives
:
First
,
That
of
Kindness
,
Benevolence
,
or
Good-will
;
when
for
some
reasons
they
love
any
Person
.
Secondly
,
Honour
or
Admiration
;
when
they
respect
any
one
for
his
Virtues
,
and
think
he
deserves
to
be
highly
promoted
.
Thirdly
,
Confidence
,
Trust
,
or
Reliance
;
when
they
think
they
may
safely
confide
in
a
Man
,
as
one
that
will
certainly
take
care
of
their
Affairs
.
Fourthly
,
Fear
,
when
they
stand
in
any
Aw
of
his
Power
and
Authority
.
Fifthly
,
Hope
,
when
they
expect
to
get
something
from
him
;
as
when
Princes
or
popular
Men
promise
great
Donations
.
And
,
last
of
all
,
Hire
,
when
they
are
drawn
to
't
by
Money
or
Presents
;
which
is
much
the
most
pitiful
and
sordid
Way
,
as
for
those
on
the
one
hand
that
are
taken
by
it
,
so
likewise
for
those
that
endeavour
to
make
use
of
it
:
For
't
is
never
well
when
People
shall
attempt
to
get
that
by
Money
,
which
ought
to
be
the
Reward
of
Virtue
and
Merit
.
However
seeing
sometimes
one
must
have
recourse
to
this
Method
as
a
Refuge
,
I
shall
give
some
Rules
for
our
Direction
in
the
Use
of
it
;
but
first
speak
of
those
,
that
are
more
nearly
related
to
Virtue
and
Honesty
.
[
f
](A33176-e37910-b)
f
He
brings
in
this
,
because
he
designs
to
Discourse
not
only
about
private
Persons
,
How
they
should
get
others
to
be
serviceable
to
'em
;
but
of
Governours
also
of
a
State
or
Commonwealth
,
How
they
should
do
to
make
their
Subjects
and
Allies
be
firm
to
their
Interests
.
In
much
the
same
manner
,
and
for
several
such
Reasons
,
Men
submit
to
the
Power
and
Authority
of
another
:
Either
because
they
have
a
Kindness
for
him
;
or
have
formerly
receiv'd
some
Obligations
from
him
;
or
respect
him
for
his
Worth
;
or
hope
they
shall
get
something
by
it
;
or
fear
they
shall
be
forc'd
to
it
,
if
they
don't
do
it
voluntarily
;
or
are
drawn
by
fair
Promises
and
large
Donations
;
or
,
lastly
,
(
as
we
see
it
too
often
practis'd
in
our
own
Republick
)
are
downright
hired
to
it
.
CHAP.
VII
.
A
Governour
should
endeavour
to
make
himself
lov'd
,
and
not
fear'd
.
The
Fates
of
several
,
who
have
taken
the
contrary
Method
.
NOw
of
all
[
a
](A33176-e38070-b)
a
He
begins
with
the
first
Ground
of
Mens
being
serviceable
and
obedient
to
us
,
Love
;
to
which
he
adds
its
Opposite
,
Fear
;
and
comparing
'em
one
with
another
,
rejects
the
latter
as
a
very
unsafe
and
inconvenient
one
,
and
magnifies
the
former
.
those
Methods
,
which
tend
to
the
advancement
and
maintenance
of
our
Interest
,
there
is
none
more
proper
and
convenient
than
Love
,
and
none
more
improper
and
inconvenient
than
Fear
.
For
,
as
't
is
very
well
observ'd
by
Ennius
,
Whom
Men
fear
,
they
also
hate
;
and
whom
they
hate
,
they
wish
out
of
the
World
.
But
that
no
force
of
Power
or
Greatness
whatever
,
can
bear
up
long
against
a
Stream
of
publick
Hate
,
if
it
were
not
sufficiently
known
before
,
was
of
late
made
appear
by
an
Instance
of
our
own
.
And
not
the
Murther
of
that
[
b
](A33176-e38130-b)
b
Jul.
Caesar
,
who
was
assassinated
in
the
Senate-house
.
See
Sueton.
and
Plut.
Tyrant
only
,
who
by
force
of
Arms
oppres'd
the
City
,
which
now
most
[
c
](A33176-e38170-b)
c
By
adhering
to
Mark
Anthony
,
and
others
,
who
pretended
to
be
Revengers
of
his
Death
;
endeavouring
to
fire
the
Houses
,
&c.
of
the
Conspirators
,
&c.
See
the
fore-cited
Authors
.
obeys
him
,
when
taken
out
of
the
World
;
but
the
like
untimely
Ends
of
most
other
Tyrants
,
who
have
generally
been
attended
by
the
same
ill
Fate
,
is
a
manifest
Token
that
the
Hatred
of
People
is
able
to
min
the
most
absolute
Authority
:
For
Obedience
proceeding
from
Fear
can't
possibly
be
lasting
;
whereas
that
which
is
the
Effect
of
Love
,
will
be
faithful
for
ever
.
'T
is
well
enough
in
those
,
who
by
open
force
have
reduc'd
any
Nation
,
and
accordingly
Rule
it
with
an
high
Hand
,
if
they
do
sometimes
use
Rigour
and
Severity
,
like
Masters
towards
their
Slaves
,
when
there
's
no
other
way
of
holding
'em
in
Subjection
:
But
for
those
who
are
Magistrates
in
a
free
City
,
to
endeavour
to
make
themselves
fear'd
by
the
People
,
is
one
of
the
maddest
,
and
most
desperate
Attempts
upon
the
face
of
the
Earth
.
For
tho'
a
Man
should
by
his
Power
and
Greatness
oppress
the
Laws
,
and
over-awe
Liberty
by
Terrour
and
Threatnings
,
yet
still
they
will
find
time
to
recover
again
,
first
by
the
private
Resentments
of
the
Citizens
,
and
afterwards
by
their
choosing
in
secret
Consults
,
some
worthier
Person
to
free
'em
from
the
Oppressour
.
And
Liberty
,
after
she
has
been
chain'd
up
a
while
,
is
always
more
Curst
,
and
bites
deeper
,
than
she
would
otherwise
have
done
if
she
had
never
been
restrain'd
.
Let
us
therefore
embrace
and
adhere
to
that
Method
,
which
is
of
the
most
universal
Influence
,
and
serves
not
only
to
secure
us
what
we
have
,
but
moreover
to
enlarge
our
Power
and
Authority
:
That
is
in
short
,
Let
us
rather
endeavour
to
be
Lov'd
than
Fear'd
;
which
is
certainly
the
best
way
to
make
us
successful
as
well
in
our
private
,
as
our
publick
Business
.
For
those
who
desire
to
have
others
be
afraid
of
'em
,
must
needs
be
afraid
of
those
others
in
their
turns
:
What
,
for
Instance
,
shall
we
imagin
of
[
d
](A33176-e38270-b)
d
A
Tyrant
of
Syracuse
,
Son
of
one
Hermocrates
.
He
seiz'd
upon
the
Government
at
twenty
five
Years
old
,
about
the
Year
of
Rome
447.
[
See
our
Author
's
Tuse
.
Quest.
]
His
Son
of
the
same
Name
succeeded
him
in
his
Tyranny
;
but
was
expell'd
for
it
by
Dion
.
See
Plut.
Life
of
Dion
.
the
Elder
Dionysius
?
With
what
eternal
Fears
and
Apprehensions
must
he
needs
be
rack'd
,
when
[
e
](A33176-e38340-b)
e
His
Barber
one
day
happening
to
say
,
That
his
Life
was
in
his
Hands
,
he
caus'd
him
to
be
murder'd
,
and
made
his
Daughters
shave
him
for
some
time
.
But
afterwards
suspecting
even
them
too
,
he
us'd
singing
,
as
the
safest
way
he
could
think
of
.
daring
not
to
venture
his
Throat
to
any
Razor
,
he
was
forc'd
even
to
singe
off
his
Beard
with
Coals
?
Or
what
of
[
f
](A33176-e38370-b)
f
See
chap.
30.
Book
1.
He
by
his
savage
Cruelties
and
Injustice
,
made
all
the
World
hate
him
.
The
Thessalians
beg'd
Aid
of
the
Thebans
against
him
,
who
sent
their
General
Pelopidas
several
times
;
whom
he
by
Treachery
got
into
his
Power
,
and
kept
Prisoner
a
good
while
.
Alexander
,
who
was
sirnam'd
the
Pheraean
?
In
what
Torment
,
think
we
,
must
he
perpetually
live
?
When
(
as
't
is
usually
reported
of
him
)
he
dar'd
not
so
much
as
to
rise
from
Table
,
and
go
to
his
own
Wife
Thebe's
Chamber
,
one
whom
he
lov'd
with
an
entire
Affection
,
without
a
Barbarian
,
and
him
(
as
't
is
said
)
too
a
[
g
](A33176-e38470-b)
g
The
Thracians
were
counted
some
of
the
savagest
Barbarians
,
and
ordinarily
made
use
of
by
Tyrants
in
those
times
,
as
the
fittest
Executioners
of
their
bloody
Designs
.
To
be
mark'd
on
the
Forehead
was
a
token
of
Honor
amongst
them
,
as
it
was
of
Disgrace
and
Slavery
amongst
others
.
But
Cic.
here
seems
to
speak
of
this
Man
,
as
a
Slave
or
Villain
:
't
is
probable
therefore
he
might
be
a
Thracian
Slave
,
and
mark'd
as
such
,
after
he
came
into
Greece
.
branded
Thracian
,
to
lead
the
way
with
his
naked
Sword
?
And
would
always
dispatch
some
of
his
Guards
before
him
,
to
search
all
the
Cloaths
and
Coffers
of
the
Women
,
for
fear
least
any
Weapon
might
be
conceal'd
within
'em
.
O
miserable
and
unhappy
Man
!
who
could
think
a
Barbarian
,
one
that
carried
the
Marks
of
his
Condition
in
his
Forehead
,
would
be
faithfuller
to
him
than
his
own
Wife
.
Neither
,
it
seems
,
was
he
mistaken
in
it
;
for
he
was
afterwards
Murther'd
[
h
](A33176-e38550-b)
h
She
persuading
her
three
Brothers
to
it
,
who
accordingly
flew
him
in
his
Bed
.
See
Plut.
Life
of
Pelopidas
.
by
her
Procurement
,
upon
suspicion
of
having
to
do
with
someother
Woman
.
Nor
indeed
can
any
Authority
,
how
absolute
soever
,
subsist
very
long
when
't
is
thus
generally
fear'd
:
[
i
](A33176-e38580-b)
i
A
noted
Tyrant
of
Agrigentum
in
Sicily
,
Son
of
Laodamas
,
Born
at
Astypalea
,
but
expell'd
his
own
Country
.
He
is
remarkable
for
his
Cruelty
,
particularly
for
a
brazen
Bull
,
in
which
he
us'd
to
torture
those
,
whom
he
had
a
mind
to
get
rid
of
.
He
is
said
however
to
have
lov'd
Learning
and
learned
Men.
There
is
still
extant
a
Book
of
Epistles
under
his
Name
.
Phalaris
himself
,
who
is
particularly
remarkable
for
his
barbarous
Cruelties
,
may
serve
for
a
Witness
to
this
Truth
;
who
was
not
destroy'd
by
domestick
Treacheries
,
like
that
Alexander
,
whom
I
just
now
mention'd
;
nor
yet
by
some
few
Men
conspiring
his
Death
,
like
our
late
Tyrant
;
but
by
a
general
Insurrection
of
all
the
Agrigentines
falling
upon
him
at
once
.
Again
,
Did
not
the
Macedonians
revolt
from
[
k
](A33176-e38680-b)
k
Sirnam'd
Poliorcetes
,
a
King
of
Macedonia
,
Son
of
Antigonus
,
one
of
Alexander
the
Great
's
Captains
.
By
his
Pride
and
Insolence
he
made
the
Macedonians
desert
him
,
and
go
over
to
Pyrrhus
.
See
his
Life
in
Plutarch
.
Demetrius
,
and
all
with
one
consent
march
over
to
Pyrrhus
?
And
when
the
Lacedaemonians
grew
Insolent
and
Tyrannical
,
did
not
their
Allies
upon
a
suddain
forsake
'em
,
and
shew
'emselves
idle
and
unconcern'd
Spectators
of
their
Ruin
at
[
l
](A33176-e38780-b)
l
A
Town
in
Baeotia
,
where
the
Lacedaemonians
were
entirely
routed
by
the
Thebans
,
under
the
Conduct
of
their
brave
Leader
Epaminondas
.
See
chap.
24.
Book
1.
Leuctra
,
without
ever
stirring
one
Foot
to
their
Assistance
?
CHAP.
VIII
.
The
just
and
gentle
Government
of
the
old
Romans
:
When
chang'd
,
and
the
fatal
Consequences
of
that
Change
.
Caesar
and
Sylla
's
unjust
Cruelties
.
One
Cause
of
Civil
Wars
is
Mens
hoping
to
raise
'emselves
by
them
.
All
have
occasion
for
some
Friends
,
tho'
not
for
general
Love
.
I
Much
rather
choose
,
upon
such
a
Subject
,
to
bring
Instances
from
Forreign
,
than
our
own
Nation
.
However
,
I
can't
but
observe
thus
much
,
That
so
long
as
our
Empire
supported
it self
,
not
by
Ways
of
Injustice
and
Violence
,
but
rather
by
Actions
of
Kindness
and
Gentleness
;
Wars
were
undertaken
to
Protect
its
Allies
or
Defend
its
Honour
,
and
accordingly
their
Issues
were
attended
with
Mercy
,
or
at
least
no
more
Rigour
than
was
absolutely
necessary
.
The
Senate
then
was
a
kind
of
Port
or
Refuge
,
for
Princes
and
Nations
to
have
recouse
to
in
their
need
;
and
our
Officers
and
Commanders
made
it
their
greatest
Glory
,
to
Defend
their
Provinces
,
and
Assist
their
Allies
,
with
Justice
and
Fidelity
.
This
City
therefore
was
not
then
the
[
a
](A33176-e38940-b)
a
Patrocinium
verius
quam
imperium
.
'T
was
the
Duty
of
a
Patron
to
Protect
and
Defend
,
not
to
Rule
over
his
Clients
:
and
one
was
never
the
less
free
,
because
he
was
under
the
Patronage
of
another
,
but
only
the
more
safe
,
as
being
protected
by
him
.
In
like
manner
one
Nation
might
be
under
,
and
(
as
't
were
)
the
Client
of
another
,
and
yet
be
a
Free
Nation
for
all
that
.
Whence
there
's
a
difference
in
Roman
Authors
,
betwixt
in
fide
esse
,
and
in
ditione
esse
pop.
Roman
.
The
latter
denoting
a
loss
of
Liberty
;
the
former
only
some
sort
of
Inferiority
and
Homage
.
Empress
,
so
properly
as
the
Protectress
of
all
the
World
.
This
Conduct
and
Method
of
managing
the
State
,
began
by
little
and
little
to
wear
off
before
,
but
utterly
vanish'd
immediately
after
the
Victory
of
[
b
](A33176-e39030-b)
b
Luc.
Sylla
the
Dictator
.
He
took
up
Arms
against
Marius
,
and
defended
the
Cause
of
the
Nobility
against
the
Commons
,
in
a
bloody
Civil
War
:
but
after
his
Victory
was
inhumanly
Cruel
.
See
his
Life
at
large
in
Plut.
Sylla
;
for
People
began
to
think
nothing
could
be
unjust
to
their
Confederates
and
Allies
,
when
once
they
had
seen
so
great
Cruelties
exercis'd
even
upon
their
very
Citizens
.
This
Man
therefore
was
in
a
just
Cause
,
but
which
was
follow'd
by
a
cruel
and
most
unjust
Victory
:
he
having
had
the
Boldness
and
Impudence
to
say
,
when
in
full
Market
he
was
selling
the
Goods
of
some
honest
and
wealthy
Men
,
and
whom
he
himself
knew
to
be
Roman
Citizens
,
That
he
was
going
to
make
sale
of
his
own
Booty
.
But
there
has
come
[
c
](A33176-e39100-b)
c
He
means
Julius
Caesar.
one
after
him
,
whose
Cause
was
impious
,
and
his
Victory
yet
more
scandalous
and
inhuman
:
who
did
not
stop
at
selling
of
private
Mens
Estates
,
but
involv'd
all
our
Countries
and
Provinces
together
in
one
common
Calamity
.
Hence
we
have
seen
,
after
Havock
and
Devastation
made
in
other
Countries
,
as
it
were
by
way
of
Praelude
to
the
Loss
of
our
own
Empire
,
the
City
[
d
](A33176-e39130-b)
d
A
City
in
France
,
which
had
always
taken
part
with
the
Romans
,
in
all
their
Wars
on
that
side
.
But
declaring
for
Pompey
in
the
Civil
War
,
't
was
sack'd
by
Caesar
;
who
carry'd
along
a
Figure
of
it
(
as
was
their
usual
Custom
)
with
him
in
Triumph
.
Marseilles
drawn
along
in
Triumph
;
and
that
very
place
,
without
whose
Assistance
our
former
Generals
never
brought
Triumph
from
beyond
the
Alpes
,
has
now
found
one
that
could
have
so
much
Impudence
,
as
to
Triumph
over
its
own
Destruction
.
I
might
bring
a
great
many
other
Examples
,
of
most
impious
Treatment
that
hath
been
shewn
towards
our
Allies
;
but
this
single
Instance
is
abundantly
sufficient
,
being
one
of
the
basest
that
was
ever
committed
before
the
face
of
the
Sun
.
The
truth
on
't
is
we
have
deserv'd
these
Misfortunes
;
for
if
others
had
not
'scap'd
without
Punishment
for
their
Wickedness
,
this
Man
could
never
have
arriv'd
at
that
Insolence
;
who
tho'
he
has
left
but
few
Heirs
of
his
Estate
,
I
am
afraid
will
have
a
great
many
wicked
ones
of
his
Ambition
.
For
as
long
as
some
dissolute
and
profligate
Fellows
remember
that
[
e
](A33176-e39220-b)
e
When
Lucius
Sylla
sold
the
Goods
of
the
Roman
Citizens
,
whom
he
had
Out-law'd
,
and
caus'd
to
be
Slain
.
former
inhuman
Auction
,
and
are
in
hopes
one
day
of
seeing
the
same
again
,
they
'll
always
be
for
propagating
Civil
Dissentions
.
Thus
Publius
Sylla
,
who
was
so
busie
in
that
mention'd
,
when
his
Kinsman
was
Dictator
,
was
never
contented
till
he
had
manag'd
[
f
](A33176-e39270-b)
f
When
Caesar
sold
the
Goods
of
those
,
who
had
been
of
Pompey's
Party
.
a
worse
and
more
inhuman
Auction
six
and
thirty
Years
after
:
and
[
g
](A33176-e39300-b)
g
One
Cornelius
,
mention'd
by
Salust
in
Lepidus
the
Consul's
Speech
against
Sylla
.
another
,
who
was
Scribe
in
that
former
Dictatorship
,
in
this
latter
was
advanc'd
to
be
Treasurer
of
the
City
.
By
all
which
't
is
easie
enough
to
perceive
,
that
we
are
never
to
hope
we
shall
be
free
from
Civil
Wars
,
when
People
expect
to
make
their
Fortunes
by
'em
.
We
have
therefore
only
the
Walls
of
our
City
remaining
entire
,
and
even
they
,
as
't
were
,
expecting
to
feel
the
Effects
of
their
abominable
Wickedness
;
but
as
for
the
Republick
't
is
absolutely
sunk
into
Ruins
and
Nothing
.
And
all
these
Misfortunes
have
fall'n
upon
us
(
that
I
may
return
to
the
Subject
which
occasion'd
this
Digression
)
by
our
choosing
to
Govern
rather
by
Fear
than
Love
.
What
then
ought
particular
Persons
to
expect
,
when
Tyranny
and
Oppression
could
bring
all
these
Evils
upon
the
whole
Roman
Empire
?
[
h
](A33176-e39410-b)
h
Having
shewn
how
convenient
Love
,
and
how
inconvenient
Fear
is
,
for
the
advancement
of
our
Interest
;
it
remains
that
he
should
shew
how
the
former
may
be
obtain'd
.
To
it
he
joyns
Honour
and
Confidence
;
the
second
and
third
Means
mention'd
Chap.
6.
which
three
together
make
up
true
and
perfect
Glory
.
See
the
next
Chapter
.
This
then
being
so
manifestly
plain
,
That
Love
's
a
most
powerful
Motive
to
Obedience
,
but
Fear
a
most
weak
and
dangerous
one
;
it
follows
in
the
next
place
that
we
should
discourse
of
those
Means
,
whereby
such
a
Love
,
joyn'd
with
Honour
and
Confidence
,
may
most
easily
be
gotten
.
[
i
](A33176-e39520-b)
i
Before
he
enquires
how
this
Love
is
to
be
gotten
,
he
divides
it
(
if
I
may
so
say
)
into
Love
of
Friendship
,
which
consists
in
having
some
few
good
Friends
;
and
this
he
says
all
,
whether
great
or
mean
,
are
almost
equally
concern'd
to
get
;
and
general
Love
,
which
consists
in
the
Kindness
and
general
Good-will
of
all
the
Citizens
;
and
this
is
necessary
but
to
some
few
.
Of
the
former
he
has
spoken
in
his
Laelius
or
of
Friendship
;
and
therefore
passes
it
by
here
.
The
latter
he
gives
some
Rules
about
here
,
as
making
up
,
together
with
Confidence
and
Admiration
,
true
and
perfect
Glory
.
Now
this
is
what
all
Men
don't
equally
stand
in
need
of
;
but
each
should
consider
his
own
way
of
living
,
and
accordingly
judge
what
's
convenientest
for
him
;
whether
to
be
belov'd
by
the
generality
of
Men
,
or
only
by
some
few
and
select
Persons
.
This
however
we
may
lay
down
for
certain
,
as
a
first
and
most
necessary
Rule
in
this
case
,
to
procure
at
least
some
faithful
and
sincere
Friends
,
who
may
have
a
true
Kindness
and
Esteem
for
us
.
[
k
](A33176-e39620-b)
k
That
is
,
Tho'
all
don't
stand
in
need
of
the
general
Love
and
Good-will
of
the
Citizens
,
yet
particular
and
private
Friends
are
as
useful
to
the
Meanest
,
as
to
the
Great
and
more
Powerful
.
As
far
as
this
reaches
,
there
's
very
little
difference
between
even
the
greatest
and
meanest
of
People
,
and
all
sorts
of
'em
are
almost
equally
concern'd
to
endeavour
after
it
.
As
for
Honour
,
Glory
,
and
the
general
Good-will
of
all
the
Citizens
,
these
indeed
are
things
,
which
aren't
alike
useful
and
necessary
for
all
.
However
for
those
that
have
been
able
to
get
'em
,
they
are
very
good
Helps
,
as
for
most
other
Purposes
,
so
for
the
obtaining
of
faithful
Friends
:
But
of
Friendship
I
have
treated
in
another
Work
,
which
is
entitled
Laelius
.
CHAP.
IX
.
What
the
Ingredients
of
true
Glory
are
.
By
what
Means
the
Love
of
the
People
may
be
obtain'd
.
How
Men
may
be
brought
to
place
a
Confidence
in
us
.
Justice
more
powerful
than
Cunning
to
this
End
.
LEt
us
now
proceed
to
discourse
of
Glory
;
tho'
that
too
is
a
Subject
,
upon
which
I
have
[
a
](A33176-e39720-b)
a
They
are
both
lost
.
He
mentions
them
two
or
three
times
in
his
Epistles
to
Atticus
.
two
Books
already
extant
;
however
I
shall
touch
upon
it
here
in
short
,
because
't
is
a
thing
of
such
Weight
and
Moment
toward
the
successful
Management
of
the
most
important
Affairs
.
True
and
perfect
Glory
then
is
always
made
up
of
these
three
Ingredients
:
First
,
The
Love
and
Good-will
of
the
Multitude
.
Secondly
,
Their
Trusting
and
Reliance
upon
a
Man
.
And
,
Lastly
,
Their
Valuing
and
Admiring
him
so
,
as
to
think
him
a
Person
that
really
deserves
Honour
.
The
Means
of
getting
these
three
from
the
Multitude
,
(
to
give
one
short
and
easie
Rule
)
are
very
much
the
same
as
from
particular
Persons
.
However
there
's
another
peculiar
Way
of
approaching
the
People
,
and
gaining
Admittance
into
the
Hearts
and
Affections
of
all
Men
in
general
.
[
b
](A33176-e39770-b)
b
He
Discourses
in
order
of
the
Ways
how
to
obtain
these
three
,
and
first
Love
:
the
Means
of
gaining
which
are
Liberality
,
a
generous
Disposition
,
&c.
Of
those
three
then
,
which
I
just
now
mention'd
,
let
us
first
see
the
Ways
of
obtaining
Love
.
Now
the
Love
of
the
People
is
mov'd
by
nothing
so
much
,
as
by
Bounty
and
doing
Kindnesses
:
Next
they
are
pleas'd
with
an
hearty
Desire
and
Inclination
toward
it
,
tho'
a
Man
have
not
wherewithal
to
exercise
it
.
Thirdly
,
The
very
Name
and
Reputation
of
having
Beneficence
and
Liberality
,
Justice
and
Fidelity
,
with
the
rest
of
those
Virtues
,
which
give
a
kind
of
Smoothness
and
Agreeableness
to
our
Conversation
,
is
of
very
great
Efficacy
in
getting
us
the
Favour
and
Love
of
the
Multitude
:
and
the
reason
of
it
is
,
because
Honesty
and
Decorum
delight
us
of
themselves
,
and
by
their
own
native
Beauties
and
Excellencies
move
,
and
engage
the
Hearts
of
all
Men
:
which
seeing
they
appear
with
more
Lustre
in
the
Virtues
,
which
I
just
now
mention'd
;
it
follows
that
by
Nature
we
must
Love
those
People
,
in
whom
we
suppose
such
Virtues
to
reside
.
And
these
are
the
principal
Causes
of
Men's
Loving
us
:
there
might
,
I
confess
,
be
some
others
given
,
but
not
of
equal
Weight
and
Importance
with
these
.
[
c
](A33176-e39820-b)
c
Secondly
,
How
Men
are
brought
to
confide
and
trust
in
us
,
which
is
the
second
part
of
true
Glory
.
The
two
great
Means
are
Justice
,
and
Prudence
,
or
Knowledge
of
Business
:
of
these
Justice
is
the
chief
.
We
are
to
speak
in
the
next
place
of
their
Trusting
or
Confiding
in
us
;
for
the
compassing
of
which
,
't
is
necessary
we
should
be
suppos'd
to
have
two
Qualifications
,
viz.
Prudence
and
Justice
.
[
d
](A33176-e39910-b)
d
How
Prudence
makes
Men
confide
in
us
.
For
we
trust
those
Men
,
whom
we
believe
,
to
understand
Matters
better
than
we
do
;
to
be
wise
enough
to
see
things
before
they
are
arriv'd
,
and
in
the
Management
of
'em
,
if
any
Danger
should
happen
,
to
be
ready
at
finding
out
Ways
and
Expedients
,
to
disentangle
'emselves
from
the
Perplexities
of
it
:
in
which
Men
imagin
that
all
true
and
profitable
Wisdom
consists
.
[
e
](A33176-e39960-b)
e
How
Justice
makes
Men
confide
in
us
.
But
when
a
Man
is
found
really
Just
and
Faithful
,
that
is
Good
,
we
place
so
much
Trust
and
Confidence
in
such
a
one
,
as
not
to
entertain
any
the
least
suspicion
of
Deceit
or
Injury
.
To
such
a
Man
therefore
we
think
we
may
wisely
,
and
with
a
secure
Confidence
,
entrust
our
Safeties
,
our
Children
and
our
Fortunes
.
Justice
therefore
,
of
these
two
Virtues
,
has
much
the
more
strong
and
effectual
Tendency
,
to
procure
this
Credit
and
Confidence
from
the
People
.
For
that
,
even
without
Wisdom
,
can
go
a
great
way
toward
the
obtaining
of
this
End
;
whereas
Wisdom
,
without
that
,
is
unable
to
do
any
thing
:
For
the
more
Shrew'd
and
Cunning
any
Person
is
,
the
more
he
's
Suspected
and
Hated
by
the
World
,
if
he
ben't
counted
Honest
and
Upright
withal
.
Justice
therefore
,
in
conjunction
with
Wisdom
,
can
make
a
Man
be
trusted
as
far
as
he
pleases
:
Justice
without
the
other
can
do
a
great
deal
;
but
the
other
without
that
is
of
no
Force
at
all
.
CHAP.
X.
Why
he
talks
of
Wisdom
and
Justice
as
separate
from
one
another
,
tho'
really
there
's
a
mutual
Connexion
between
'em
.
What
will
make
Men
admire
any
one
.
The
difference
between
Despising
and
having
an
Ill
Opinion
of
a
Man
.
[
a
](A33176-e40120-b)
a
In
the
former
Chapter
he
mention'd
Prudence
and
Justice
as
separate
from
one
another
,
whereupon
't
is
objected
,
That
he
talks
Unphilosophically
;
all
the
Philosophers
(
and
himself
too
)
having
maintain'd
,
that
the
Virtues
are
all
connected
and
link'd
together
,
and
can't
be
separated
from
one
another
.
This
Objection
,
with
his
Answer
to
it
,
occasions
this
short
Digression
.
See
Note
ᶜ
on
chap.
5.
Book
1.
SOme
Men
perhaps
will
be
ready
to
admire
,
since
't
is
so
generally
agreed
on
by
Philosophers
,
and
has
been
so
often
asserted
by
me
my self
,
That
whoever
has
one
must
have
all
the
Virtues
;
why
I
should
speak
of
'em
separately
now
,
as
tho'
it
were
possible
for
a
Man
to
have
Prudence
,
without
having
Justice
at
the
same
time
.
I
answer
,
That
the
Way
of
Expression
is
highly
different
,
according
to
the
difference
of
the
Subjects
we
are
treating
of
;
whether
they
are
such
as
require
a
Niceness
and
Subtilty
in
handling
,
or
be
suited
to
the
Capacities
of
ordinary
People
.
I
do
but
speak
here
with
the
Vulgar
therefore
,
when
I
call
one
Man
Couragious
,
another
Just
,
and
a
third
Prudent
;
for
in
treating
upon
a
Subject
which
concerns
the
People
,
we
must
make
use
of
common
and
ordinary
Expressions
;
which
is
what
has
been
done
by
Panaetius
himself
—
.
But
to
return
to
our
Purpose
:
[
b
](A33176-e40240-b)
b
He
has
shewn
how
the
two
first
Ingredients
of
true
Glory
,
viz.
the
Love
and
Confidence
of
the
Multitude
,
are
to
be
obtain'd
:
here
he
proceeds
to
the
third
,
Their
Admiring
,
&c.
Of
the
three
Ingredients
,
which
we
said
were
requir'd
to
the
making
up
of
Glory
;
the
third
was
this
,
That
Men
should
Admire
and
Value
us
so
,
as
to
think
we
are
Persons
that
really
deserve
Honour
.
[
c
](A33176-e40290-b)
c
The
Extraordinariness
of
any
thing
,
the
first
Cause
of
Mens
Admiration
.
Now
generally
speaking
they
are
apt
to
Admire
whatever
they
see
Great
,
and
beyond
their
Apprehensions
;
and
likewise
in
particulars
,
if
they
discover
any
Excellency
,
which
they
never
expected
.
They
Admire
those
therefore
,
and
extol
'em
ev'n
to
the
Skies
,
in
whom
(
as
they
think
)
they
have
found
any
rare
and
extraodinary
Qualities
:
But
as
for
those
others
,
who
have
neither
Virtue
,
Spirit
,
nor
Courage
in
them
,
these
Men
they
wholly
despise
and
set
light
by
.
For
they
can't
be
said
to
despise
all
those
,
of
whom
they
entertain
but
an
Ill
Opinion
.
They
're
far
from
thinking
well
of
your
roguish
backbiting
,
cozening
sort
of
Fellows
,
who
are
never
unprepar'd
for
the
doing
Man
an
Injury
:
but
by
no
means
[
d
](A33176-e40340-b)
d
But
rather
are
afraid
of
'em
,
lest
they
should
do
'em
some
Injury
,
or
other
.
despise
'em
for
all
that
;
their
Contempt
(
as
was
said
)
lighting
only
upon
those
,
who
neither
do
Good
to
themselves
,
nor
others
(
as
we
commonly
speak
;
)
that
is
,
who
spend
all
their
Lives
in
meer
Idleness
and
Sloth
,
without
ever
minding
or
taking
care
of
any
thing
.
[
e
](A33176-e40360-b)
e
A
more
particular
Cause
of
Admiration
,
is
extraordinary
Virtue
:
especially
resisting
Pleasure
and
Pain
,
which
most
Men
are
apt
to
be
conquer'd
by
:
which
is
Courage
or
Greatness
of
Soul
.
Those
,
who
are
esteem'd
to
excel
in
Virtue
,
more
especially
draw
Men
to
Wonder
and
Admiration
;
who
keep
themselves
free
,
as
from
all
other
things
that
are
Base
and
Unbecoming
,
so
more
especially
from
those
sorts
of
Vices
,
which
the
rest
of
Mankind
can't
so
easily
stand
against
.
Pleasures
,
for
instance
,
are
very
alluring
.
and
charming
Mistresses
,
which
are
apt
to
ensnare
the
better
part
of
the
Soul
,
and
entice
it
aside
from
the
Paths
of
Virtue
;
and
Pain
on
the
contrary
racks
and
torments
us
,
so
that
the
dread
of
it
carries
most
Men
beyond
the
Bounds
of
Reason
.
Thus
again
,
when
Life
and
Death
,
Riches
and
Poverty
,
are
the
things
in
question
,
there
are
very
few
Men
but
are
wholly
transported
with
desire
of
the
one
,
and
abhorrence
of
the
other
.
When
a
Man
therefore
has
got
such
a
great
and
exalted
Soul
,
as
that
he
can
look
upon
all
these
with
Indifference
;
and
closely
pursues
and
adheres
to
Honesty
,
in
whatever
Shape
she
presents
her self
;
then
't
is
that
Virtue
appears
with
such
a
Brightness
,
as
that
all
the
whole
World
must
admire
her
Beauties
.
CHAP.
XI
.
Justice
,
and
a
Contempt
of
Riches
,
are
especially
Causes
of
Mens
Admiration
.
Justice
alone
procures
all
the
three
things
,
which
make
up
Glory
;
and
how
.
'T
is
a
necessary
Virtue
for
all
sorts
of
People
.
Even
Robbers
and
Pyrates
can't
subsist
without
it
.
Some
Examples
to
this
Purpose
.
SUch
a
Constitution
of
Soul
therefore
,
as
can
make
a
Man
despise
all
[
a
](A33176-e40510-b)
a
Those
mention'd
in
the
last
Chapter
,
Pleasure
and
Pain
,
Riches
and
Poverty
,
&c.
these
Goods
or
Evils
,
begets
him
a
mighty
Esteem
and
Admiration
:
But
especially
Justice
(
which
single
Virtue
serves
to
give
Men
the
Name
and
Denomination
of
Good
)
seems
much
the
most
admirable
to
the
generality
of
People
.
And
not
without
Reason
;
it
being
[
b
](A33176-e40550-b)
b
For
't
is
but
clapping
a
Pistol
,
or
the
like
to
such
a
Man's
Breast
,
and
he
'll
betray
his
Friend
or
Country
,
break
his
Word
,
or
any
thing
in
the
World
,
rather
than
loose
his
belov'd
Life
;
and
consequently
can't
be
resolutely
Just.
impossible
for
any
one
to
be
Just
,
who
is
afraid
at
the
approaches
of
Death
,
of
Pain
,
of
Banishment
or
Poverty
;
or
prefers
[
c
](A33176-e40560-b)
c
Viz.
Life
,
Pleasure
,
Riches
,
&c.
those
things
,
which
are
contrary
to
these
,
before
the
great
Duties
of
Justice
and
Honesty
.
And
more
particularly
yet
,
Men
admire
those
,
whom
they
find
unconcern'd
as
to
the
matter
of
Money
;
and
count
them
try'd
,
as
it
were
like
Gold
in
the
Fire
,
who
have
been
able
to
withstand
the
Temptations
of
it
.
Justice
therefore
of
it self
is
sufficient
to
procure
those
three
things
that
are
requisite
to
Glory
:
In
the
first
place
,
The
Love
and
Good-will
of
the
People
;
because
of
the
[
d
](A33176-e40610-b)
d
He
takes
Justice
in
the
larger
Sence
here
,
so
as
to
comprehend
Bounty
and
Liberality
.
See
Note
ᵃ
on
chap.
7.
Book
1.
Kindnesses
it
shews
to
very
many
.
Secondly
,
Their
Confidence
.
And
Thirdly
,
Their
Admiration
,
both
for
the
same
Reason
,
viz.
Because
it
neglects
and
despises
those
things
,
which
the
rest
of
Men
pursue
with
such
Eagerness
and
Passion
.
[
e
](A33176-e40680-b)
e
Having
shewn
how
necessary
Justice
is
,
for
those
who
live
in
the
Eye
of
the
World
,
and
endeavour
to
get
true
and
perfect
Glory
;
he
's
now
going
to
shew
,
That
't
is
necessary
also
for
all
sorts
of
Men
,
viz.
Those
of
Privacy
and
Retirement
;
those
of
Trade
and
Commerce
in
the
World
;
nay
for
even
Thieves
and
Pirates
.
Now
,
in
my
Opinion
,
not
only
the
being
in
a
publick
Station
,
but
every
Method
of
Living
whatever
,
requires
the
Helps
and
Assistances
of
Men
;
as
for
other
Designs
,
so
particularly
for
this
,
that
we
may
have
some
familiar
Friends
to
converse
with
;
which
't
is
no
easie
matter
for
a
Man
to
obtain
,
without
at
least
the
Shew
and
Reputation
of
Honesty
.
From
hence
it
follows
,
That
't
is
necessary
even
for
those
Men
themselves
,
who
have
withdrawn
from
the
World
,
and
chosen
the
Quiet
and
Retirements
of
the
Country
,
to
be
reputed
at
least
Men
of
Honesty
and
Integrity
:
and
that
so
much
the
more
,
because
otherwise
they
'll
certainly
be
counted
Dishonest
;
and
then
,
having
nothing
of
Guard
or
Defence
,
they
must
needs
be
expos'd
to
perpetual
Injuries
.
The
same
Justice
also
is
necessary
for
those
(
if
ever
they
hope
to
succeed
in
their
Business
)
who
Buy
,
Sell
,
Lett
,
Hire
,
and
are
concern'd
in
the
Commerce
and
Affairs
of
the
World
:
Nay
't
is
a
thing
of
such
powerful
Moment
and
universal
Influence
,
as
that
those
who
live
only
upon
Villanies
and
Wickedness
,
can
never
subsist
without
something
of
Justice
:
For
should
any
Thief
steal
from
another
that
belong'd
to
the
same
Confederacy
,
he
'd
immediately
be
expell'd
,
as
unfit
to
be
a
Member
even
of
a
Society
of
Robbers
;
and
should
the
Leader
himself
not
distribute
their
Booty
,
according
to
the
Measures
of
Justice
and
Honesty
,
he
'd
either
be
murther'd
or
deserted
by
his
Company
:
Nay
't
is
said
that
your
Robbers
have
some
certain
Statutes
,
which
they
are
all
of
'em
bound
to
observe
amongst
themselves
.
[
f
](A33176-e40710-b)
f
A
famous
Greek
Historian
,
born
in
the
Isle
Chios
,
and
Schollar
of
Isocrates
,
who
us'd
to
say
,
That
he
was
forc'd
to
use
a
Spurr
to
Ephorus
,
and
a
Bridle
to
Theopompus
.
He
is
highly
commended
by
several
of
the
Ancients
.
Corn.
Nepos
accuses
him
of
Ill-nature
in
his
Characters
of
Men.
He
left
several
Works
,
which
are
lost
.
Theopompus
tells
us
of
a
certain
Rogue
,
one
[
g
](A33176-e40790-b)
g
He
was
afterwards
conquer'd
by
Phillip
,
Son
of
Amyntas
,
King
of
Macedonia
.
Pyrrhus
the
famous
King
of
Epirus
Married
his
Daughter
.
Bardylis
and
Illyrian
,
that
got
a
great
Power
by
the
fame
of
his
Justice
in
dividing
the
Prey
:
and
[
h
](A33176-e40860-b)
h
A
Man
of
very
great
Cunning
and
Valour
;
he
was
first
a
Huntsman
,
afterwards
a
General
of
a
formidable
Army
.
See
Florus
,
Paterc
.
&c.
Viriatus
the
Lusitanian
,
got
a
much
greater
,
to
whom
even
some
of
our
Armies
and
[
i
](A33176-e40910-b)
i
C.
Plautius
and
M.
Vitellius
,
or
(
as
others
say
)
Claudius
Unimanus
,
the
Praetors
.
At
last
Servilius
Caepio
got
him
treacherously
murther'd
.
Generals
were
forc'd
to
yield
;
till
at
last
he
was
conquer'd
by
that
[
k
](A33176-e40960-b)
k
The
same
,
whom
he
brings
in
speaking
in
his
Book
De
Amicitia
.
Caius
Laelius
,
who
was
sirnam'd
the
Wise
,
in
the
time
of
his
Praetorship
;
who
brought
down
his
Courage
and
Fierceness
so
low
,
as
to
render
the
War
easie
for
those
that
came
after
him
.
If
Justice
then
be
of
so
great
Efficacy
,
as
that
it
can
raise
and
support
even
Pirates
;
of
what
mighty
Force
must
we
suppose
it
to
be
,
in
the
midst
of
Laws
,
and
in
a
well-constituted
Republick
?
CHAP.
XII
.
What
made
Men
at
first
choose
Kings
,
and
make
Laws
.
The
justest
Men
usually
made
Kings
;
and
why
.
How
to
make
use
of
the
Glory
he
hath
been
discoursing
of
.
An
excellent
Rule
of
Socrates
'
s.
Glory
must
be
founded
upon
solid
Virtue
.
Whatever
is
Counterfeit
will
sometime
be
discover'd
.
[
a
](A33176-e41070-b)
a
He
still
goes
on
in
his
Commendation
of
Justice
,
and
tells
us
,
That
Kings
heretofore
were
chosen
according
to
their
Characters
for
Justice
and
Integrity
.
'T
Was
for
the
sake
of
enjoying
the
Benefits
of
this
Justice
(
the
great
Use
of
which
we
have
now
been
discoursing
of
)
that
the
Medes
heretofore
,
as
we
are
told
by
[
b
](A33176-e41100-b)
b
The
first
of
any
great
note
among
the
Greek
Historians
,
very
well
known
by
his
Works
,
which
are
still
extant
in
nine
Books
;
which
for
their
Sweetness
and
Elegance
are
deservedly
call'd
by
the
names
of
the
Nine
Muses
.
Herodotus
,
and
I
am
apt
to
imagin
our
own
Ancestors
too
,
chose
always
the
honestest
Persons
for
their
Kings
.
For
the
poorer
sort
of
People
,
being
oppress'd
by
the
richer
,
had
recourse
to
some
one
of
remakable
Virtue
,
to
save
and
protect
'em
from
Violence
and
Injuries
:
who
constituting
Measures
of
Equity
and
Justice
,
bound
the
greatest
to
observe
'em
as
well
as
the
meanest
.
And
that
which
was
the
reason
for
their
choosing
Kings
,
in
like
manner
put
them
upon
enacting
Laws
:
For
Men
have
always
desired
to
enjoy
such
a
Right
,
as
all
sorts
of
'em
might
have
an
equal
Share
in
(
for
otherwise
indeed
't
would
be
no
Right
at
all
)
which
when
they
could
get
by
the
Justice
and
Honesty
of
some
one
Person
,
they
were
contented
with
him
,
and
never
look'd
any
further
;
but
when
they
could
not
,
they
were
put
upon
a
necessity
of
inventing
Laws
,
which
could
never
be
partial
,
but
use
the
same
Language
to
all
Ranks
and
Conditions
.
'T
is
very
plain
therefore
,
that
those
Men
were
usually
chosen
to
be
Kings
,
who
were
counted
by
the
People
Men
of
Honesty
and
Integrity
:
but
if
they
were
held
Prudent
and
Wise
withal
,
the
People
thought
there
was
nothing
they
might
not
obtain
by
their
Conduct
and
Management
.
By
all
means
therefore
let
us
constantly
follow
,
and
stick
close
to
Justice
;
as
for
its
own
sake
,
(
for
otherwise
indeed
't
will
not
be
properly
Justice
)
so
for
the
increase
of
our
Honour
and
Reputation
.
[
c
](A33176-e41170-b)
c
He
has
shewn
what
these
Virtues
are
,
which
make
the
People
Love
,
&c.
But
as
't
is
not
enough
for
a
Man
to
get
Riches
,
unless
he
knows
how
to
make
use
of
'em
too
:
So
,
after
we
have
gotten
the
Virtues
he
has
mention'd
,
the
next
thing
that
comes
to
be
consider'd
is
,
How
we
should
use
'em
,
so
as
to
be
remarkable
in
the
World
;
and
let
People
see
,
by
our
Pactice
and
Exercise
in
some
sort
of
Life
,
that
we
are
such
Persons
,
as
deserve
their
Love
,
Confidence
and
Admiration
.
For
these
Virtues
themselves
are
only
the
Ground-work
or
Foundations
,
as
it
were
,
of
perfect
Glory
;
and
we
know
Foundations
are
laid
in
the
Earth
,
and
require
something
else
to
be
Built
upon
'em
,
before
they
are
taken
notice
of
in
the
Eye
of
the
World
.
Here
he
puts
in
,
by
way
of
Caution
,
a
Saying
of
Socrates
,
That
we
make
sure
in
the
first
place
,
that
we
really
are
such
,
&c.
Now
as
't
is
not
sufficient
for
a
Man
to
get
Riches
,
unless
he
has
the
Wisdom
to
dispose
of
'em
so
,
as
thereby
to
furnish
out
all
his
Expences
;
not
only
those
of
his
bare
Necessities
,
but
those
of
his
Bounty
and
Liberality
too
:
So
neither
is
it
enough
for
a
Man
to
get
[
d
](A33176-e41240-b)
d
By
Glory
here
he
understands
the
Virtues
of
Justice
,
&c.
which
he
has
just
been
discoursing
of
,
as
the
Foundations
of
true
Glory
.
Glory
,
unless
he
knows
how
to
make
Use
of
it
with
discretion
:
Tho'
what
Socrates
says
is
very
excellent
to
this
purpose
,
That
the
readiest
Way
,
and
,
as
it
were
,
shortest
Cut
,
to
arrive
at
[
e
](A33176-e41290-b)
e
Outward
Glory
,
not
the
Virtues
themselves
.
Glory
,
is
really
to
be
,
what
one
desires
to
be
accounted
.
Those
People
therefore
are
highly
mistaken
,
who
think
of
obtaining
a
solid
Reputation
,
by
vain
Shews
and
hypocritical
Pretences
;
by
compos'd
Countenances
and
studied
Forms
of
Words
:
for
true
Glory
takes
deep
rooting
,
and
grows
and
flourishes
more
and
more
;
but
that
which
is
only
in
Shew
and
meer
Outside
,
quickly
decays
and
withers
like
Flowers
;
nor
can
any
thing
be
lasting
that
is
only
Counterfeit
.
I
might
bring
a
great
many
pregnant
Examples
for
the
proof
of
these
Assertions
;
but
,
for
brevity
sake
,
I
shall
content
my self
with
those
of
but
one
single
Family
.
[
f
](A33176-e41330-b)
f
A
Noble
,
Wise
and
Valiant
Roman
,
who
was
twice
Cof
.
and
as
often
triumph'd
;
and
at
last
was
made
Censor
,
in
which
Office
by
his
Wisdom
and
Prudence
he
sav'd
the
Republick
.
[
See
Cic.
de
Orat.
1.
9.
]
He
marry'd
Cornelia
,
the
Daughter
of
the
Elder
Africanus
,
by
whom
he
had
the
two
Gracchi
.
Tiberius
Gracchus
,
the
Son
of
Publius
,
will
always
be
Prais'd
and
had
in
Admiration
,
as
long
as
there
shall
any
Memorials
remain
of
the
Roman
Atchievements
:
But
his
[
g
](A33176-e41420-b)
g
Tib.
and
Caius
Gracchus
,
two
eloquent
and
ingenious
young
Men
:
but
for
attempting
to
make
Laws
pernicious
to
the
State
,
about
equally
dividing
Lands
,
&c.
they
were
both
Slain
;
the
former
by
Scipio
Nasica
,
and
the
latter
by
Opimius
the
Cos.
See
Paterc
.
Book
2.
ch.
2
,
3
,
6
,
7.
and
their
Lives
in
Plut.
Sons
,
on
the
contrary
,
were
not
in
their
Lives-time
approv'd
of
by
good
Men
;
and
since
their
Decease
have
been
number'd
among
those
,
who
were
justly
Slain
.
CHAP.
XIII
.
What
young
Men
should
do
to
make
'emselves
Known
,
and
taken
Notice
of
in
the
World
.
Courage
in
War
the
first
thing
that
sets
off
young
Men.
Another
,
Temperance
,
Sobriety
,
&c.
Keeping
often
Company
with
Wise
and
Good
Men
another
thing
that
very
much
Recommends
them
.
'T
Is
the
Business
therefore
of
those
,
who
desire
to
get
true
Glory
,
strictly
to
discharge
all
the
Duties
of
Justice
:
what
those
are
we
have
shewn
already
in
the
former
Book
.
I
shall
now
proceed
to
lay
down
some
Directions
,
[
a
](A33176-e41590-b)
a
His
Design
is
to
shew
,
What
Methods
a
young
Man
,
who
is
just
coming
into
the
World
(
supposing
he
has
laid
a
Foundation
of
Virtue
)
had
best
enter
upon
,
that
he
may
make
himself
Known
,
and
taken
Notice
of
among
his
Citizens
,
that
so
his
Virtues
mayn't
lye
hid
and
conceal'd
.
In
order
to
which
he
distinguishes
young
Men
,
into
those
who
are
remarkable
already
upon
their
Ancestors
account
,
&c.
and
those
who
are
unknown
and
obscure
.
They
must
both
take
to
some
honourable
Way
of
Life
,
so
as
to
signalize
their
Valour
,
Honesty
,
&c.
How
a
Man
should
do
to
appear
before
the
World
what
he
is
in
himself
;
tho'
that
of
Socrates
is
certainly
the
wisest
that
can
possibly
be
given
,
To
make
sure
in
the
first
place
,
that
he
really
be
in
himself
,
that
which
he
desires
to
appear
before
the
World
.
For
when
a
young
Gentleman
is
just
come
into
the
Publick
,
and
is
already
known
and
remarkable
in
it
;
either
by
the
Fame
of
his
Father's
Actions
(
which
I
think
,
Son
Marcus
,
may
be
your
Case
;
)
or
by
any
other
Means
or
Accident
whatever
;
the
Eyes
of
all
are
immediately
upon
him
,
and
every
one's
enquiring
after
what
he
does
,
and
how
he
steers
his
Life
;
and
,
as
tho'
he
were
set
in
the
publick
View
,
so
none
of
his
Actions
,
or
so
much
as
his
Words
can
be
long
kept
in
secret
.
But
those
,
who
at
the
beginning
and
entrance
of
their
Lives
,
by
reason
of
their
Meanness
,
are
unknown
to
the
World
;
as
soon
as
ever
they
come
up
to
years
of
Discretion
,
should
set
before
their
Eyes
the
most
honourable
Places
,
and
bend
all
their
Studies
and
honest
Endeavours
toward
the
obtaining
of
'em
:
which
they
ought
to
do
with
so
much
the
more
boldness
,
because
Men
are
so
far
from
envying
Youth
,
that
they
rather
encourage
and
forward
'em
in
their
Progress
.
The
[
b
](A33176-e41680-b)
b
Courage
in
the
Wars
,
the
first
thing
that
makes
a
young
Man
become
Remarkable
.
first
thing
then
,
that
sets
a
young
Man
off
,
and
recommends
him
to
the
Publick
,
is
Courage
and
Bravery
in
Martial
Affairs
;
by
which
a
great
many
amongst
our
Forefathers
,
who
were
scarce
ever
wholly
disengag'd
from
Wars
,
very
nobly
distinguish'd
and
signaliz'd
themselves
.
But
you
,
my
Son
,
have
had
the
misfortune
to
light
upon
the
times
of
a
Civil
War
,
wherein
the
[
c
](A33176-e41690-b)
c
That
of
Julius
Caesar.
one
Party
was
wicked
and
detestable
,
and
the
[
d
](A33176-e41710-b)
d
That
of
Pompey
the
Great
.
other
unfortunate
and
unsuccessful
:
In
which
however
,
when
Pompey
had
giv'n
you
the
Command
of
[
e
](A33176-e41740-b)
e
Each
Body
of
Foot
consisting
of
two
Legions
,
had
two
Troops
of
Horse
to
support
it
,
one
on
the
right
and
t'other
on
the
left
.
Cicero's
Son
commanded
one
of
these
,
being
call'd
Wings
.
one
Wing
,
you
got
much
Praise
from
that
great
Commander
and
all
his
Army
,
by
your
riding
,
darting
and
patiently
abiding
all
the
Fatigues
of
War
.
But
as
for
this
piece
of
your
rising
Glory
,
that
,
and
the
whole
Constitution
of
the
Republick
,
are
both
of
'em
fall'n
to
the
ground
together
.
But
I
never
design'd
so
to
model
this
Discourse
,
as
that
it
should
be
proper
for
none
but
you
;
but
as
that
it
might
be
applicable
to
all
Men
in
general
:
I
shall
go
on
therefore
to
the
remaining
part
of
it
.
As
then
in
all
things
the
Functions
of
the
Soul
are
more
noble
and
excellent
than
those
of
the
Body
;
so
the
Effects
of
our
Reason
and
Understanding
are
greater
,
and
more
powerful
as
to
this
Particular
,
than
those
of
meer
Strength
.
[
f
](A33176-e41780-b)
f
Of
the
Virtues
that
don't
require
Strength
of
Body
,
Temperance
,
&c.
most
recommend
a
young
Man
.
Now
of
these
there
is
none
that
can
more
recommend
and
adorn
a
young
Man
,
than
Temperance
and
Sobriety
,
Duty
and
Respect
to
his
natural
Parents
,
Love
and
Good-nature
towards
his
Friends
and
Relations
.
[
g
](A33176-e41800-b)
g
A
third
thing
that
recommends
young
Men
is
,
keeping
frequent
Company
with
those
that
are
Wise
,
and
Lovers
of
their
Country
.
Another
good
Way
for
young
People
to
get
Known
,
and
have
a
good
Reputation
,
is
often
to
attend
on
some
Great
and
Wise
Men
,
who
are
thought
to
design
for
the
Good
of
the
Publick
:
For
when
they
're
observ'd
to
be
frequently
with
such
,
the
People
are
presently
apt
to
imagin
,
that
they
'll
be
like
those
Men
,
whom
they
choose
for
their
Patterns
Thus
[
h
](A33176-e41810-b)
h
P.
Rutilius
Rufus
,
a
noble
Roman
,
Cos.
together
with
Cn.
Mallius
.
He
was
Schollar
of
Panaetius
,
[
See
Book
3.
chap.
3.
]
a
great
lover
of
Learning
,
and
very
well
skill'd
in
Philosophy
and
the
Civil
Laws
.
Cicero
in
his
first
Book
de
Oratore
calls
him
,
Exemplum
innocentiae
:
and
Vell.
Paterc
.
Book
2.
chap.
13.
Virum
non
sui
tantum
seculi
,
sed
omnis
aevi
optimum
.
However
he
was
accus'd
by
the
Malice
of
some
Men
,
and
condemn'd
of
Extortion
,
and
accordingly
Banish'd
.
Of
which
see
the
fore-cited
places
.
Pub.
Rutilius
,
when
he
was
young
,
had
the
general
Vogue
of
a
very
honest
Man
,
and
an
able
Lawyer
,
because
he
frequented
the
House
of
[
i
](A33176-e41940-b)
i
P.
Mutius
Scaevola
,
a
noble
Roman
,
famous
for
his
Knowledge
of
the
Civil
Laws
,
and
withal
an
eloquent
Speaker
;
therefore
call'd
by
our
Author
,
Jurisperitorum
disertissimus
.
He
was
Cos.
with
Calpurnius
Piso
,
about
the
Year
of
Rome
620
,
when
Tib.
Gracchus
rais'd
his
Sedition
:
and
afterwards
made
Pontifex
maximus
.
Mutius
.
As
for
[
k
](A33176-e42030-b)
k
Lucius
Crassus
,
the
famous
Orator
,
whom
he
mention'd
Book
1.
chap.
30.
Crassus
,
whilst
he
was
very
young
,
he
was
not
beholden
to
any
one
else
,
but
obtain'd
of
himself
everlasting
Honour
,
by
undertaking
that
[
l
](A33176-e42080-b)
l
Of
C.
Carbo
a
very
eloquent
Man
,
who
had
been
Tribune
and
Consul
;
whom
Crassus
,
at
the
Age
of
nineteen
Years
,
(
when
others
begin
but
to
study
Eloquence
)
publickly
accus'd
and
got
condemn'd
,
so
that
he
poyson'd
himself
.
noble
and
glorious
Accusation
:
when
at
that
term
of
Years
,
wherein
others
are
commended
if
they
begin
but
to
Study
and
Exercise
the
Art
;
(
as
we
have
it
recorded
of
the
famous
Demosthenes
)
at
that
Age
,
I
say
,
did
Crassus
make
it
appear
,
that
he
could
perform
that
laudably
in
the
open
Courts
of
Justice
,
which
he
might
without
disparagement
have
been
Studying
at
home
.
CHAP.
XIV
.
Discourse
of
two
sorts
.
Affability
very
powerful
to
obtain
Mens
Love
,
&c.
But
Eloquence
much
more
.
Several
Occasions
of
shewing
a
Man's
Eloquence
.
To
Defend
more
Laudable
than
to
Accuse
;
but
the
latter
in
some
cases
Honourable
enough
.
Several
Examples
of
brave
Accusations
.
'T
is
lawful
in
some
cases
to
Defend
the
really
Guilty
;
but
never
to
Accuse
the
Innocent
.
The
Judges
and
Advocates
Duties
.
Defending
the
Accus'd
,
especially
honourable
,
when
't
is
against
some
powerful
Oppressor
.
BUt
[
a
](A33176-e42210-b)
a
Having
ended
the
last
Chapter
with
Crassus's
Accusation
of
Carbo
,
and
the
Credit
he
got
by
it
:
this
easily
brings
him
to
another
thing
,
that
recommends
young
Men
,
and
makes
'em
be
taken
notice
of
,
viz.
Their
Discourse
.
This
he
divides
into
two
sorts
,
and
speaks
upon
'em
severally
.
of
Speaking
or
Discourse
there
are
two
sorts
;
the
one
proper
only
for
common
Conversation
,
the
other
for
Pleadings
and
Debates
in
the
Publick
.
Of
these
two
the
latter
,
which
is
what
we
call
Eloquence
,
is
apparently
most
powerful
towards
the
procurement
of
Glory
;
[
b
](A33176-e42250-b)
b
Of
the
first
sort
of
Discourse
,
viz.
That
of
common
Conversation
;
and
its
Power
.
but
yet
't
is
unexpressible
of
what
Influence
Courtesie
and
Affability
are
,
in
the
business
of
obtaining
Mens
Love
and
Affections
.
There
are
extant
Letters
of
[
c
](A33176-e42270-b)
c
Son
of
Amyntas
,
Father
of
Alexander
the
Great
.
Philip
to
Alexander
,
[
d
](A33176-e42320-b)
d
A
Soldier
of
Philip's
,
left
Governour
of
Macedonia
by
Alexander
,
when
he
invaded
Persia
:
At
last
he
Poyson'd
Alexander
,
by
his
Son
Cassander's
means
.
See
Quint.
Curtius
.
Antipater
to
Cassander
,
and
[
e
](A33176-e42420-b)
e
A
King
of
Macedonia
,
not
Father
,
but
only
first
Guardian
,
and
afterwards
Father-in-law
to
Philip
,
who
was
Son
of
Demetrius
,
King
of
Macedonia
and
Epirus
.
Antigonus
to
Philip
;
in
which
these
most
Wise
and
Prudent
Princes
(
for
such
we
are
told
they
really
were
)
advise
each
his
Son
to
speak
kindly
to
the
Multitude
,
and
try
to
win
the
Hearts
of
both
them
,
and
the
Soldiers
,
by
gentle
Words
and
familiar
Appellations
.
[
f
](A33176-e42570-b)
f
The
second
sort
of
Discourse
,
viz.
Eloquence
:
of
which
he
speaks
pretty
largely
,
and
gives
some
Rules
about
Accusations
,
relating
to
their
Lawfulness
,
Frequency
,
&c.
But
that
other
Discourse
,
which
is
proper
for
Pleadings
and
Harangues
in
Publick
,
does
oftentimes
more
and
transport
the
whole
Multitude
:
For
when
a
Man
speaks
to
'em
plausibly
and
fluently
,
they
are
presently
rapt
in
a
strange
Admiration
▪
and
can't
but
conclude
,
as
soon
as
ever
they
hear
him
,
that
he
's
wiser
and
more
knowing
than
the
rest
of
Men
are
.
But
if
there
be
Modesty
joyn'd
with
the
Power
and
Weight
of
his
Eloquence
,
there
's
nothing
in
the
World
can
more
raise
their
Admiration
;
and
especially
too
,
if
he
be
a
young
Man
that
speaks
.
Now
the
Subjects
and
Occasions
,
that
stand
in
need
of
Eloquence
,
are
more
than
one
;
and
several
young
Gentlemen
,
in
our
own
Republick
,
have
made
'emselves
eminent
in
several
of
'em
:
some
,
for
Example
,
by
speaking
in
the
Senate-house
,
and
others
by
pleading
in
the
Courts
of
Justice
.
Of
these
Ways
the
latter
is
most
fruitful
of
Admiration
,
the
Duties
of
which
are
only
two
,
Defending
and
Accusing
.
'T
is
much
more
commendable
to
Defend
than
to
Accuse
;
however
this
latter
has
oftentimes
brought
Men
a
considerable
Reputation
.
We
mention'd
the
Example
of
Crassus
but
just
now
,
[
g
](A33176-e42640-b)
g
Grandfather
to
Mark
Anthony
the
Triumvir
;
whom
he
brings
in
speaking
in
his
de
Oratore
;
a
very
eloquent
Person
,
as
appears
from
the
great
Praises
he
there
gives
him
.
He
was
Cos.
and
Censor
,
call'd
by
V.
Patercul
.
Princeps
Civitatis
&
Eloquentiae
.
He
was
afterwards
kill'd
by
the
Command
of
Marius
and
Cinna
.
The
Person
,
by
whose
Accusation
he
gain'd
this
Credit
,
was
Cn.
Papirius
Carbo
.
Marcus
Antonius
,
when
he
was
a
young
Man
,
did
the
same
;
and
nothing
got
[
h
](A33176-e42730-b)
h
One
of
the
Interlocutors
in
his
de
Oratore
,
and
there
commended
for
an
excellent
Speaker
.
He
accus'd
Norbanus
,
whom
Anthony
defended
.
[
See
de
Orat.
2.
28.
]
He
was
Tribune
of
the
People
,
and
joyning
with
Marius
against
Sylla
,
was
slain
by
Sylla's
Order
.
Vell.
Paterc
.
Sulpitius
so
much
Credit
for
his
Eloquence
,
as
his
brave
Accusation
of
Caius
Norbanus
,
a
very
seditious
and
troublesome
Citizen
.
This
nevertheless
must
be
done
but
seldom
,
or
indeed
never
,
unless
it
be
undertaken
on
the
behalf
of
the
Republick
,
as
't
was
by
those
three
whom
I
just
now
mention'd
:
Or
secondly
,
upon
the
account
of
some
Injury
receiv'd
,
as
by
the
two
[
i
](A33176-e42840-b)
i
Lucius
and
Marcus
,
who
accus'd
Servilius
the
Augur
,
because
he
before
had
accus'd
their
Father
.
Luculluses
;
or
else
for
the
sake
of
those
under
our
Protection
,
as
was
formerly
done
by
[
k
](A33176-e42890-b)
k
In
his
Orations
against
Verres
.
my self
for
the
Sicilians
;
and
by
[
l
](A33176-e42920-b)
l
I
have
follow'd
the
Correction
of
Langius
,
Manut.
&c.
who
would
have
it
read
Pro
Sardis
in
or
Contra
Albutium
Julius
.
Vid.
Ed.
Graevii
.
Julius
for
the
Sardians
against
Marcus
Albutius
:
in
like
manner
[
m
](A33176-e43010-b)
m
He
mentions
this
Accusation
in
his
Brutus
,
where
he
says
Fusius
got
a
great
deal
of
Credit
by
it
.
Anthony
the
famous
Orator
defended
Aquilius
,
and
to
move
the
Judges
to
Pity
,
pull'd
open
his
Cloaths
,
and
shew'd
them
his
honourable
Wounds
in
his
Breast
.
Aquilius
was
Cos.
with
Marius
,
An.
Urb.
Cond.
652.
and
accus'd
of
Bribery
or
Extortion
.
Multis
avaritiae
criminibus
,
testimoniisque
convictus
,
Cic.
Orat.
pro
Flac.
Fusius
made
his
Industry
be
taken
notice
of
,
by
his
accusing
of
Aquilius
.
Once
then
or
so
,
't
is
allowable
enough
;
but
by
no
means
often
.
However
,
should
the
Commonwealth
call
a
Man
to
it
,
he
may
do
it
oftner
upon
her
account
;
it
being
no
Disgrace
to
be
often
employ'd
in
taking
Vengeance
on
her
Enemies
.
Yet
,
even
in
this
Case
,
't
is
still
the
best
way
to
be
Moderate
and
Cautious
:
For
he
shews
himself
a
Man
of
a
very
unnatural
and
merciless
Temper
(
or
rather
indeed
not
a
Man
at
all
,
but
a
Savage
Monster
)
who
can
endure
to
make
it
his
Business
and
Employment
,
to
bring
many
People
into
danger
of
their
Lives
:
Beside
that
't
is
dangerous
to
the
Person
himself
too
;
and
not
only
so
,
but
ev'n
scandalous
and
shameful
,
to
get
himself
the
odious
Name
of
An
Accuser
:
which
of
late
was
the
Fortune
[
n
](A33176-e43120-b)
n
He
mentions
both
Father
and
Son
in
his
de
Oratore
,
the
one
for
an
excellent
Lawyer
,
who
wrote
several
Books
;
and
the
Son
for
a
loose
Debauchee
.
And
in
his
Brutus
he
calls
the
Father
an
excellent
Man
,
and
very
skilful
of
the
Law
;
but
the
Son
a
Disgrace
to
his
Family
,
&c.
of
Marcus
Brutus
,
a
Person
that
was
sprung
of
a
noble
Family
,
and
Son
of
that
Brutus
,
who
was
so
particularly
fam'd
for
his
Skill
in
the
Civil
Laws
.
'T
is
another
Rule
of
Duty
more
especially
to
be
taken
notice
of
,
and
which
can't
be
broken
without
manifest
Villany
,
Never
to
bring
an
innocent
Person
into
Danger
.
For
since
kind
Nature
has
given
us
Eloquence
,
to
serve
for
the
Good
and
Preservation
of
all
Men
;
what
can
be
more
,
either
Wicked
,
or
Inhuman
,
than
to
turn
it
to
the
Ruin
and
Destruction
of
the
[
o
](A33176-e43190-b)
o
Viz.
Those
that
are
innocent
.
best
of
'em
?
'T
is
our
Duty
then
,
never
to
accuse
the
Innocent
:
but
we
need
not
,
on
the
other
hand
,
make
any
Conscience
,
of
speaking
sometimes
in
behalf
of
the
Guilty
,
provided
he
ben't
wholly
Villanous
and
Abominable
.
For
this
is
no
more
,
than
what
the
People
desires
,
than
what
Custom
authorizes
,
and
the
common
Bowels
of
Humanity
encline
us
to
.
'T
is
the
Duty
of
a
Judge
,
to
endeavour
after
nothing
but
the
real
Truth
;
but
an
Advocate
sometimes
may
speak
up
for
that
,
which
carries
no
more
than
an
outward
Appearance
of
it
:
Which
,
I
think
,
I
should
hardly
have
ventur'd
to
say
,
(
especially
in
Writing
a
Philosophical
Discourse
)
but
that
I
perceive
't
was
the
Opinion
of
Panetius
,
a
Person
of
as
great
and
considerable
Authority
,
as
any
among
the
Stoicks
.
But
Defending
is
that
,
which
brings
the
largest
Returns
both
of
Glory
and
Interest
;
especially
if
one
happen
to
be
Assistant
to
those
,
who
seem
Injur'd
and
Oppress'd
by
the
Power
of
some
Great
One.
This
was
my
Fortune
,
as
a
great
many
times
,
so
more
especially
in
my
younger
Days
;
when
I
stood
in
Defence
of
Roscius
Amerinus
,
against
all
the
Greatness
and
Authority
of
Sylla
:
and
you
know
the
Oration
,
which
I
then
spoke
,
is
[
p
](A33176-e43280-b)
p
'T
is
the
second
of
his
Orations
as
now
printed
.
at
this
time
extant
.
CHAP.
XV.
Two
sorts
of
Liberality
.
Better
to
help
Men
by
our
Labour
and
Industry
,
than
by
our
Money
.
Phillip's
Reproof
to
his
Son
Alexander
to
this
purpose
.
The
Inconveniencies
of
the
second
sort
of
Liberality
.
Measures
to
be
observed
in
it
.
[
a
](A33176-e43370-b)
a
Chap.
6.
he
laid
down
six
things
,
as
Reasons
or
Motives
of
Mens
being
profitable
to
us
:
Of
these
he
rejected
Fear
,
as
a
very
dangerous
and
inconvenient
one
.
Good-will
,
Honour
or
Admiration
,
and
Confidence
,
all
which
three
go
to
make
up
true
Glory
,
he
hath
already
discours'd
of
,
and
shewn
by
what
Virtues
they
are
to
be
obtain'd
.
There
remain
therefore
only
two
more
,
viz.
Hope
,
when
Princes
,
&c.
promise
great
Donations
;
and
Hire
,
when
Money
is
given
.
Both
these
he
comprehends
here
under
Beneficence
or
Liberality
,
and
shews
what
sort
of
Donations
are
useful
,
and
in
what
Measure
,
and
in
what
particular
Cases
,
&c.
And
first
he
divides
Beneficence
into
two
forts
,
of
which
he
prefers
the
former
for
several
Reasons
.
HAving
given
this
Account
of
the
particular
Duties
,
which
young
Men
must
do
for
the
attainment
of
Glory
;
we
are
next
to
discourse
of
Beneficence
or
Liberality
.
Of
this
there
are
two
sorts
;
the
one
of
which
consists
in
obliging
those
,
who
need
it
by
our
Labour
and
Industry
;
the
other
,
by
our
Money
.
The
latter
of
these
two
is
much
the
more
easie
,
especially
for
those
who
have
plentiful
Fortunes
;
but
the
former
,
on
the
other
hand
,
more
glorious
and
magnificent
,
and
more
suitable
to
the
Character
of
a
brave
and
exalted
Soul
.
For
tho'
there
's
a
Good-will
,
and
generous
Readiness
to
oblige
shewn
in
either
;
yet
in
the
one
Case
we
are
beholden
to
the
Chest
,
in
the
other
to
the
Virtues
and
Abilities
of
the
Person
.
Besides
,
those
sort
of
Kindnesses
,
which
are
done
by
the
Assistance
of
Money
or
the
like
,
within
a
short
space
of
time
,
draw
their
own
Fountain
dry
;
so
that
this
Liberality
doth
,
as
't
were
,
eat
out
its
own
Bowels
,
and
the
more
you
have
formerly
oblig'd
in
this
kind
,
the
fewer
you
'll
be
able
to
oblige
for
the
future
.
But
now
,
on
the
other
hand
,
he
whose
Generosity
shews
it self
in
Labour
,
that
is
,
in
Virtue
and
being
Active
for
another's
good
,
the
more
Men
he
hath
formerly
shewn
himself
kind
to
,
the
more
he
'll
have
ready
to
assist
him
ever
after
:
beside
that
by
the
Custom
of
doing
good
Offices
,
he
gets
a
kind
of
Habit
,
and
grows
much
more
expert
in
the
Art
of
Obliging
.
Philip
the
Father
of
Alexander
the
Great
,
reproves
his
Son
sharply
in
one
of
his
Epistles
,
for
endeavouring
to
purchase
the
Good-will
of
the
Macedonians
,
by
giving
'em
Donations
;
In
the
name
of
Wonder
,
says
he
,
what
reason
could
you
have
,
to
hope
that
those
People
would
ever
be
faithful
to
you
,
whom
you
your self
had
Corrupted
with
Money
?
What!
do
you
design
to
be
thought
not
the
King
,
but
only
the
Steward
and
Purse-bearer
of
the
Macedonians
?
That
Steward
and
Purse-bearer
is
admirably
well
said
;
because
't
is
so
scandalous
a
Business
for
a
Prince
;
and
that
calling
Donations
a
Corrupting
the
People
,
is
better
yet
;
for
those
that
receive
'em
are
perpetually
the
worse
for
it
,
and
only
made
readier
to
expect
the
same
again
.
Philip
writ
this
to
his
Son
alone
,
but
it
may
serve
for
a
Direction
to
all
Men
in
general
I
think
we
may
take
it
for
granted
therefore
,
that
that
sort
of
Bounty
,
which
consists
in
doing
Kindnesses
by
our
Labour
and
Industry
,
is
more
Virtuous
and
Creditable
,
can
oblige
more
People
,
and
has
more
ways
of
doing
it
,
than
that
other
has
.
Not
but
that
sometimes
a
Man
should
give
,
nor
is
this
sort
of
Bounty
to
be
wholly
rejected
;
nay
,
one
ought
oftentimes
to
distribute
some
part
of
one's
Money
to
those
,
who
are
well-deserving
Persons
,
and
stand
in
need
of
such
Assistance
:
But
still
it
must
be
done
with
[
b
](A33176-e43740-b)
b
The
word
Diligentia
in
this
place
properly
signifies
,
the
making
a
Choice
and
Distinction
between
Persons
.
great
Prudence
and
Moderation
.
For
some
Men
have
squandered
away
whole
Estates
by
inconsiderately
Giving
;
which
is
certainly
the
foolishest
thing
in
the
World
;
for
so
a
Man
disables
himself
ever
after
,
from
doing
of
that
,
[
c
](A33176-e43760-b)
c
Viz.
Shewing
his
Bounty
and
Generosity
in
Giving
;
because
he
has
given
away
all
already
.
which
he
takes
most
delight
in
.
But
the
worst
thing
is
this
,
that
Profuseness
in
Giving
is
usually
accompany'd
by
unjust
Ways
of
Getting
:
For
when
by
this
means
Men
have
parted
with
what
's
their
own
,
they
are
forc'd
to
lay
hands
upon
that
which
is
another's
.
And
by
this
means
they
miss
what
is
their
principal
Design
,
viz.
The
obtaining
Men's
Love
,
by
their
Bounty
and
Generosity
;
for
they
get
more
Hatred
from
those
whom
they
Injure
,
than
Good-will
from
those
whom
they
hop'd
to
Oblige
by
it
.
We
ought
not
therefore
so
to
Lock
up
our
Riches
,
as
that
even
Liberality
it self
can't
open
'em
;
nor
so
to
keep
'em
open
,
as
if
they
were
common
to
all
Men
in
general
:
The
best
way
is
,
always
to
observe
a
due
Medium
,
and
give
more
or
less
in
proportion
to
our
Estates
.
In
fine
,
we
'd
do
well
to
remember
a
Saying
,
which
is
now
grown
so
common
as
to
be
a
Proverb
amongst
us
,
Bounty
has
got
no
Bottom
:
For
how
indeed
is
it
possible
,
there
should
ever
be
any
end
on
't
,
when
those
,
who
are
us'd
to
it
,
look
to
receive
again
;
and
others
,
from
seeing
them
,
are
taught
to
expect
the
same
?
CHAP.
XVI
.
Two
sorts
of
Givers
.
How
Liberality
and
Prodigality
differ
.
What
the
chief
Advantage
of
Riches
.
Publick
Shews
to
the
People
very
foolish
.
Several
Examples
of
magnificent
Aediles
among
the
Romans
.
[
a
](A33176-e43900-b)
a
Having
given
his
Reasons
,
why
the
first
sort
of
Beneficence
,
which
consists
in
obliging
Men
by
our
Labour
and
Industry
,
is
preferable
to
the
second
,
which
does
it
by
Money
;
he
begins
in
this
Chap.
to
discourse
of
the
latter
,
and
divides
those
that
use
it
(
the
Largi
as
he
speaks
)
into
two
sorts
,
the
one
Predigal
,
and
the
other
Liberal
,
in
the
proper
and
strict
Sence
of
that
Word
.
He
begins
with
the
first
,
and
discourses
of
it
to
Chap.
18.
where
he
comes
to
the
second
,
the
Liberal
.
OF
those
who
give
largely
,
there
are
two
sorts
,
the
one
of
which
are
Prodigal
,
and
the
other
Liberal
.
The
Prodigal
are
those
who
consume
vast
Sums
in
making
publick
Feasts
,
and
distributing
Portions
of
Meat
to
the
People
:
or
in
providing
Gladiators
to
Fight
with
one
another
;
or
with
wild
Beasts
in
the
Theatres
;
or
in
making
Preparation
for
other
such
Sports
,
and
Recreations
of
the
Multitude
:
things
that
are
forgotten
in
a
very
short
time
,
if
ever
at
all
thought
on
,
after
once
they
are
over
.
But
the
Liberal
are
those
,
who
dispose
of
their
Money
in
Redeeming
poor
Prisoners
;
in
helping
their
Friends
and
Acquaintance
out
of
Debt
;
in
assisting
'em
toward
the
Marrying
their
Daughters
;
or
putting
'em
into
some
Method
of
Making
,
or
Encreasing
their
Fortunes
.
I
admire
therefore
,
what
should
come
into
[
b
](A33176-e44020-b)
b
The
same
that
he
mention'd
Book
1.
ch.
1.
his
Book
here
mention'd
is
now
quite
lost
,
but
't
is
quoted
by
Diogenes
Laertius
.
Theophrastus's
Head
,
who
in
a
Book
of
his
,
which
he
wrote
concerning
Riches
,
amongst
several
noble
and
excellent
things
,
has
been
guilty
of
one
very
greivous
Absurdity
:
for
he
runs
out
mightily
in
Commendation
of
Magnificence
,
and
giving
publick
Shews
or
Donations
to
the
People
;
and
thinks
the
Supplying
of
such
Expences
as
these
,
the
very
principal
Fruit
and
Advantage
of
Riches
:
But
in
my
Opinion
't
is
both
a
much
greater
,
and
more
durable
Advantage
,
to
be
furnish'd
with
Money
for
these
Acts
of
Bounty
,
of
which
I
have
just
now
been
giving
some
Instances
.
But
[
c
](A33176-e44080-b)
c
Nothing
of
this
here
quoted
is
to
be
found
in
any
of
the
Works
of
Aristotle
now
extant
;
which
makes
the
learned
Maretus
think
,
that
it
ought
to
be
read
Aristo
,
who
was
a
Stoick
Philosopher
,
mention'd
by
Seneca
in
his
29th
Epist.
and
who
(
as
we
learn
from
Plutarch
)
wrote
a
Book
upon
the
Subject
of
Riches
.
Aristotle
,
with
much
more
Reason
and
Judgment
,
reproves
us
for
not
being
amaz'd
at
those
Sums
,
which
are
daily
thrown
away
to
Caress
the
People
:
Should
any
one
(
says
he
)
when
a
City
's
besieg'd
and
reduc'd
to
great
Streights
,
give
a
large
Sum
of
Money
for
a
little
Cup
of
Water
;
People
would
wonder
and
admire
at
it
strangely
,
and
hardly
be
persuaded
to
believe
it
at
first
:
but
afterwards
possibly
,
upon
farther
Consideration
,
would
be
ready
to
pardon
it
,
because
't
was
a
Case
of
meer
Exigence
and
Necessity
:
But
yet
we
can
see
,
without
any
thing
of
Admiration
,
those
vast
Charges
and
infinite
Expences
,
which
Men
put
themselves
to
for
no
Reason
in
the
World
;
neither
for
the
Relief
of
any
Want
or
Necessity
,
nor
yet
for
the
Encrease
of
their
Glory
and
Dignity
:
And
that
Pleasure
of
the
Multitude
which
is
principally
aim'd
at
,
is
of
short
Continuance
;
and
only
tickles
and
sooths
up
the
Meanest
of
the
People
,
who
themselves
will
forget
the
Satisfaction
they
receiv'd
,
as
soon
as
ever
the
Shew
and
Recreation's
at
an
end
.
He
adds
moreover
with
a
great
deal
of
Reason
,
That
Children
indeed
and
some
trifling
Women
,
together
with
Slaves
,
and
the
more
servile
Part
of
those
who
are
free
,
might
perhaps
take
a
Pleasure
in
such
foolish
kind
of
Pastimes
:
but
that
Men
of
true
Prudence
,
and
those
who
judge
of
things
by
the
Rules
of
Reason
,
can
by
no
means
either
commend
or
approve
of
'em
.
I
know
't
is
a
Custom
in
our
Republick
,
and
has
been
from
the
time
of
our
good
Fore-fathers
,
to
expect
and
demand
,
even
from
the
soberest
Citizens
,
something
that
is
splendid
and
magnificent
in
their
[
d
](A33176-e44210-b)
d
An
Office
in
Rome
,
which
required
their
taking
care
of
the
publick
Buildings
,
Temples
,
&c.
as
also
the
publick
Games
on
any
solemn
Occasion
,
Plays
,
and
the
like
.
'T
was
usually
counted
the
first
Step
toward
other
Offices
;
into
which
the
People
chose
Men
,
according
to
their
good
or
ill
Behaviour
in
this
.
Hence
they
usually
spar'd
no
Pains
,
Charges
,
&c.
so
as
they
could
but
please
the
Multitude
.
Aedileships
.
Hence
[
e
](A33176-e44270-b)
e
A
noble
Roman
,
sirnam'd
Mucianus
,
because
adopted
into
the
Family
of
the
Crassi
,
from
that
of
the
Mucii
.
He
was
the
first
that
gave
the
People
a
Fight
of
Elephants
in
his
Aedileship
.
He
was
afterwards
Cos.
and
Pontifex
Maximus
.
Publius
Crassus
,
who
was
sirnam'd
The
Wealthy
,
and
really
was
such
,
in
his
Office
of
Aedile
was
very
magnificent
and
noble
in
his
Entertainments
:
and
[
f
](A33176-e44350-b)
f
The
famous
Orator
,
mention'd
before
.
Lucius
Crassus
,
a
little
while
after
,
was
full-out
as
generous
,
tho'
Collegue
of
[
g
](A33176-e44370-b)
g
The
Augur
,
who
married
the
Daughter
of
the
Wise
Laelius
:
mention'd
by
our
Author
in
the
beginning
of
his
De
Amicitia
.
Mucius
the
most
moderate
Man
living
.
Next
after
these
came
[
h
](A33176-e44420-b)
h
Sirnam'd
Pulcher
;
he
first
had
their
Scenes
in
the
Theatre
painted
,
whereas
before
they
were
bare
Boards
.
Caius
Claudius
,
the
Son
of
Appius
;
and
a
great
many
others
,
viz.
the
[
i
](A33176-e44470-b)
i
The
two
Brothers
Luc.
and
Mar.
who
were
both
Aediles
together
,
and
made
the
Scenes
to
turn
round
,
and
so
often
whereas
before
they
were
fixt
and
unalterable
.
Luculli
,
[
k
](A33176-e44510-b)
k
The
famouseft
Roman
Orator
next
to
Cicero
,
and
often
his
Opponent
;
Consul
six
Years
before
him
.
See
his
Death
excellently
lamented
at
the
beginning
of
our
Author
's
Brutus
.
Hortensius
and
[
l
](A33176-e44560-b)
l
D.
Junius
Silanus
,
who
was
Consul
next
after
Cicero
,
with
L.
Licinius
Muraena
.
Silanus
.
But
[
m
](A33176-e44610-b)
m
Sirnam'd
Spinther
,
Cos.
six
Years
after
Cicero
,
whom
he
recall'd
from
his
Banishment
.
To
him
is
written
the
first
Book
of
his
Familiar
Epistles
.
He
was
the
first
that
wore
a
Purple
Gown
double
dy'd
,
and
made
the
Vela
or
Curtains
in
the
Theatre
of
fine
Cypress
Linnen
.
Publius
Lentulus
,
when
I
was
Cos.
exceeded
all
others
that
ever
went
before
him
:
who
was
afterwards
follow'd
and
copy'd
by
[
n
](A33176-e44670-b)
n
He
built
a
noble
Theatre
,
with
vast
Pillars
of
fine
Marble
,
and
was
so
profuse
in
his
Aedileship
,
that
Pliny
says
,
he
utterly
ruin'd
the
Roman
Moderation
,
and
that
Sylla
did
more
Harm
by
encouraging
his
Prodigalities
,
than
he
did
by
all
his
Murders
and
Cruelties
.
Scaurus
.
But
of
all
these
Shews
,
that
have
been
given
to
please
and
entertain
the
People
,
those
of
my
Friend
Pompey
were
the
greatest
and
most
magnificent
,
[
o
](A33176-e44730-b)
o
He
brought
Lyons
,
Panthers
,
and
Elephants
in
vast
numbers
to
Fight
before
the
People
.
exhibited
when
he
was
the
second
time
Consul
.
[
p
](A33176-e44740-b)
p
See
the
latter
end
of
the
next
Chap.
In
all
which
Cases
't
is
easie
to
see
what
is
my
Opinion
.
CHAP.
XVII
.
Expences
to
please
the
People
allowable
in
some
Cases
;
and
what
they
are
.
Some
Examples
of
laudable
ones
.
Upon
what
one
may
best
lay
out
his
Money
in
this
kind
.
NO
Man
however
should
be
so
far
moderate
,
as
to
draw
upon
himself
the
Suspicion
of
Avarice
.
[
a
](A33176-e44800-b)
a
A
Name
of
the
Emilian
Family
.
Mamercus
Aemilius
Lepidus
was
Cos.
with
D.
Brutus
,
An.
U.
C.
676.
'T
is
uncertain
whether
he
be
meant
here
,
or
not
.
Mamercus
,
a
Person
of
very
great
Riches
,
was
put
by
the
Consulship
for
no
other
Reason
,
but
because
he
refus'd
to
be
Aedile
first
.
[
b
](A33176-e44850-b)
b
When
,
and
how
far
such
sorts
of
Giving
are
allowable
.
If
such
things
therefore
are
demanded
by
the
People
,
and
allow'd
of
,
tho'
perhaps
not
desir'd
,
by
good
Men
,
they
must
ev'n
be
perform'd
;
but
so
as
to
keep
within
the
compass
of
your
Estate
,
as
I
my self
did
.
Nay
,
tho'
they
should
not
be
demanded
by
the
People
,
yet
they
might
wisely
enough
be
presented
'em
,
upon
a
Prospect
of
gaining
some
more
considerable
Advantage
by
it
.
Thus
[
c
](A33176-e44880-b)
c
A
Sirname
of
the
Aurelian
Family
.
This
is
Cn.
Aufidius
Orestes
,
so
call'd
because
he
was
adopted
by
Cn.
Aufidius
,
[
Cic.
pro
domo
,
ch.
18.
]
He
was
afterwards
Cos.
with
Corn.
Lentul●●
Sura
,
An.
U.
C.
682.
Orestes
of
late
got
a
great
deal
of
Credit
,
by
Giving
the
People
a
Dinner
in
the
Streets
,
under
the
Notion
of
[
d
](A33176-e44940-b)
d
'T
was
a
Custom
among
the
Romans
,
upon
any
great
Undertaking
,
to
Vow
the
Tenth
of
their
Income
to
some
God
,
to
make
him
prosper
'em
in
their
Undertakings
.
Orestes
,
under
Pretence
of
Paying
this
to
Hercules
,
gave
a
great
deal
of
Victuals
to
all
the
People
in
publick
,
that
so
he
might
gain
their
Favour
.
Paying
his
Tenths
to
Hercules
.
Nor
did
any
one
ever
find
fault
with
M.
Seius
,
for
selling
out
Corn
at
an
easie
Rate
,
in
the
time
of
a
very
great
Dearth
and
Scarcity
:
for
he
got
himself
free
from
a
great
and
inveterate
Hatred
of
the
People
,
by
a
Cost
,
which
(
considering
he
was
at
that
time
Aedile
)
was
neither
dishonest
,
nor
yet
extraordinary
great
:
But
of
all
my
Friend
Milo
got
the
greatest
Honour
,
by
purchasing
Gladiators
for
the
Defence
of
the
Publick
,
which
was
wholly
included
in
my
single
Safety
,
and
thereby
defeating
the
mad
and
pernicious
Attempts
of
[
e
](A33176-e45010-b)
e
Clodius
was
a
vile
and
profligate
Fellow
,
a
great
Enemy
to
Cicero
,
whom
in
his
Tribuneship
he
got
banisht
,
[
See
Cicero
's
Life
in
Plut.
]
but
Milo
,
being
Tribune
the
Year
following
,
endeavour'd
to
bring
back
Cicero
again
.
Clodius
violently
oppos'd
it
;
and
getting
together
some
of
his
own
Gang
,
and
a
parcel
of
Gladiators
,
fell
upon
the
People
as
they
assembled
about
it
,
and
shew
several
.
Milo
,
on
the
other
side
,
bought
Gladiators
to
defend
Cicero
,
and
in
him
(
as
he
says
)
the
Republick
it self
.
This
is
that
Milo
,
who
afterwards
killed
this
Clodius
;
for
which
being
accus'd
,
he
was
defended
by
our
Author
in
that
incomparable
Oration
,
which
is
still
extant
.
Clodius
.
Such
Charges
therefore
are
not
to
be
shun'd
,
when
either
they
are
necessary
or
very
advantagious
:
but
even
when
they
are
so
,
we
must
still
not
exceed
the
due
Limits
of
Mediocrity
.
Luc.
Philippus
,
the
Son
of
Quintus
,
an
extraordinary
ingenious
and
eminent
Man
,
was
wont
,
I
confess
,
to
be
making
his
Brags
,
That
he
got
all
the
Honours
the
Republick
could
give
him
,
without
ever
spending
one
Farthing
that
way
:
[
f
](A33176-e45180-b)
f
An
excellent
Roman
,
Cos.
with
Cn.
Octavius
,
the
Year
of
Rome
677
;
a
good
Man
,
and
a
Lover
of
Virtue
,
as
well
as
Learning
.
He
was
also
a
very
good
Orator
,
and
is
often
mention'd
by
our
Author
.
His
Son
was
that
Curio
,
who
was
Tribune
of
the
People
,
and
the
grand
Incendiary
in
the
Civil
War
between
Caesar
and
Pompey
.
Caius
Curio
us'd
to
say
the
same
:
and
even
I
my self
have
some
reason
to
boast
upon
this
account
:
for
considering
the
Greatness
of
the
Honours
I
got
,
and
that
too
by
every
one
of
the
Votes
,
and
the
very
first
Years
I
was
capable
of
'em
,
(
which
is
more
then
can
be
said
by
any
one
of
those
two
whom
I
just
now
mention'd
)
the
Charge
of
my
Aedileship
was
very
inconsiderable
.
But
the
best
way
of
laying
out
Money
in
this
kind
,
is
to
repair
the
City-walls
,
make
Docks
,
Havens
,
Aquaeducts
and
the
like
;
things
that
may
serve
to
the
general
Use
,
and
Advantage
of
the
Publick
.
For
tho'
things
which
are
present
,
and
given
down
upon
the
nail
,
are
more
acceptable
for
a
Time
;
yet
the
Memory
of
these
will
be
more
lasting
,
and
continu'd
even
down
to
Posterity
.
I
forbear
to
speak
much
against
Theatres
,
Portico's
,
new
Temples
and
the
like
,
out
of
Respect
to
my
old
Friend
Pompey
:
but
I
find
'em
not
approv'd
of
by
the
famousest
Men
;
particularly
not
by
Panaetius
himself
,
whom
I
have
very
much
follow'd
,
but
not
quite
translated
in
this
Work
.
Neither
are
they
lik'd
by
Demetrius
Phalereus
,
who
blames
Pericles
,
one
of
the
greatest
Men
amongst
all
the
Grecians
,
for
squandring
away
such
[
g
](A33176-e45310-b)
g
Above
two
thousand
Talents
:
This
is
that
entrance
to
their
ancient
Tower
call'd
Acropolis
and
(
because
under
the
Protection
of
Pallas
)
Glaucopia
,
so
often
mention'd
by
ancient
Writers
.
It
had
five
noble
Doors
,
was
cover'd
with
curious
white
Stone
,
and
was
five
Years
in
building
.
See
Meurs
.
Cecropia
.
a
vast
Sum
of
Money
,
upon
that
noble
Structure
at
the
entrance
of
the
Acropolis
.
But
I
have
spoken
sufficiently
upon
all
this
Subject
,
in
those
Books
I
have
written
[
h
](A33176-e45360-b)
h
This
Work
was
in
ten
Books
:
but
't
is
now
all
lost
except
some
few
Fragments
,
of
which
Scipio's
Dream
is
much
the
largest
,
as
making
a
good
part
of
the
sixth
Book
.
concerning
the
Republick
.
To
conclude
therefore
,
all
such
Profusions
are
generally
speaking
(
I
think
)
to
be
blam'd
;
but
yet
at
sometimes
,
and
upon
certain
Occasions
,
may
be
rendred
necessary
:
However
even
then
they
must
be
proportion'd
to
one's
Estate
,
and
kept
within
the
Limits
of
Reason
and
Moderation
.
CHAP.
XVIII
.
Liberality
to
be
varied
according
to
the
Variety
of
Circumstances
.
The
Merits
of
the
Receiver
especially
to
be
consider'd
.
What
Acts
of
Bounty
we
should
more
particularly
exercise
.
Measures
to
be
observ'd
in
Receiving
Money
.
'T
is
profitable
sometimes
to
part
with
one's
Right
.
When
a
Man
uses
an
Estate
as
he
ought
.
Hospitality
deservedly
commended
.
IN
that
[
a
](A33176-e45480-b)
a
He
has
done
with
the
first
sort
of
Giving
largely
,
viz.
Prodigality
;
which
he
thinks
generally
blamable
,
but
in
some
Cases
excusable
.
He
comes
now
to
the
Second
,
Liberality
,
which
is
seen
not
only
in
Giving
,
but
in
Receiving
too
.
He
begins
with
Giving
;
concerning
which
his
first
Rule
is
,
That
we
should
consider
the
Circumstances
of
the
Person
we
give
to
.
other
sort
of
Giving
,
which
proceeds
from
Liberality
,
we
should
not
keep
constantly
to
one
certain
Measure
;
but
vary
according
to
the
Variety
of
Circumstances
in
the
Persons
that
receive
.
His
Case
(
for
instance
)
who
struggles
at
present
under
some
pressing
Necessity
,
is
different
from
his
,
who
is
well
enough
to
pass
,
and
only
desires
to
improve
his
Fortune
.
We
should
lend
our
Assistance
in
the
first
place
to
those
,
who
are
under
the
Burden
and
Weight
of
some
Misfortune
;
unless
they
are
such
as
deserve
to
be
miserable
:
We
should
be
ready
however
to
forward
those
likewise
,
who
desire
only
our
Helping-hand
,
not
so
much
to
save
'em
from
being
Unfortunate
,
as
to
raise
'em
to
some
higher
Degrees
of
Fortune
.
[
b
](A33176-e45570-b)
b
Secondly
,
In
Giving
we
should
consider
the
Person
's
Deserts
:
For
Kindnesses
bestow'd
upon
those
,
who
don't
deserve
,
but
will
make
ill
use
of
'em
,
are
indeed
no
Kindnesses
.
We
should
make
honest
Men
the
Objects
of
our
Bounty
in
this
kind
.
But
here
we
must
be
careful
to
acquaint
our selves
thro'ly
with
the
Fitness
of
the
Persons
:
for
that
of
Ennius
is
admirably
well
said
,
I
take
good
Actions
,
when
ill
apply'd
,
to
become
ill
ones
.
Now
that
which
is
given
to
a
truly
honest
and
grateful
Person
,
is
paid
us
in
the
Acknowledgment
he
himself
makes
,
and
in
the
Good-will
that
's
got
by
't
from
the
rest
of
the
World
.
For
nothing's
more
pleasing
to
all
Mankind
,
than
Bounty
bestow'd
without
Rashness
and
Precipitancy
:
and
the
generality
of
Men
praise
it
so
much
the
more
,
because
the
Liberality
of
every
great
Man
,
is
a
common
kind
of
Sanctuary
for
all
that
are
Needy
.
We
should
endeavour
therefore
,
as
far
as
we
are
able
,
to
oblige
many
Men
by
such
Acts
of
Generosity
,
as
may
not
be
forgotten
as
soon
as
ever
they
are
over
;
but
be
remember'd
by
the
Children
and
Posterity
of
the
Receivers
,
in
such
manner
as
to
lay
a
Necessity
upon
'em
of
shewing
their
Gratitude
:
I
say
Necessity
;
for
all
People
hate
one
,
that
takes
no
care
of
being
grateful
to
his
Benefactors
,
and
count
him
that
is
such
Injurious
to
themselves
;
because
he
discourages
Bounty
and
Liberality
,
and
so
is
a
common
Enemy
to
all
the
poorer
Sort.
Besides
,
this
way
of
Giving
,
whereby
Captives
are
ransom'd
,
and
the
meaner
Folk
enrich'd
,
is
useful
and
advantagious
to
the
Publick
it self
;
and
has
frequently
been
practic'd
by
those
of
our
Order
,
as
appears
very
fully
from
the
Oration
of
Crassus
.
That
other
way
therefore
of
expending
Money
,
which
consists
in
making
Shews
for
the
Entertainment
of
the
Vulgar
,
ought
(
I
think
)
by
no
means
to
be
compar'd
with
this
:
The
one
comports
well
with
the
Character
of
a
great
,
and
a
prudent
Person
;
the
other
of
such
as
Cajole
the
People
,
and
look
out
for
Pleasures
to
tickle
the
Fancies
of
the
unstable
Multitude
.
[
c
](A33176-e45650-b)
c
Having
given
some
Rules
for
the
liberal
Man's
direction
in
Giving
or
Spending
;
he
proceeds
in
this
place
to
do
the
same
about
Receiving
;
in
which
he
would
have
him
not
be
too
rigorous
,
but
courteous
,
complying
,
&c.
And
as
't
is
a
Duty
to
be
generous
in
Giving
,
so
is
it
not
to
be
too
rigorous
in
Demanding
;
but
in
every
Transaction
of
Buying
,
Selling
,
Letting
and
Hiring
,
to
behave
our selves
towards
our
Neighbours
and
Chapmen
,
with
all
the
Fairness
and
Courtesie
imaginable
;
to
let
go
something
of
our
strict
and
just
Rights
,
upon
certain
Occasions
;
to
avoid
all
Suits
and
Contentions
at
Law
,
as
far
as
can
reasonably
and
fairly
be
expected
;
perhaps
I
might
add
,
And
even
something
farther
;
for
in
several
Cases
to
deliver
up
one's
Right
,
is
not
only
generous
,
but
[
d
](A33176-e45700-b)
d
'T
is
no
small
part
of
Prudence
,
to
know
when
to
lose
;
it
hapning
sometimes
,
and
upon
some
Occasions
,
that
't
is
the
best
way
to
act
against
one's
present
Interest
,
and
by
omitting
a
less
Advantage
,
to
gain
a
greater
afterwards
.
Pecuniam
in
loco
negligere
,
says
Terence
,
maximum
interdum
est
lucrum
.
advantagious
too
.
However
a
Man
should
have
a
decent
Regard
to
his
Estate
and
Fortune
;
for
't
is
not
over-reputable
to
let
that
be
ruin'd
by
his
Easiness
and
Neglect
;
and
yet
on
the
other
hand
should
carry
himself
so
,
as
to
avoid
all
Suspition
of
a
sordid
,
mean
or
avaritious
Temper
.
For
't
is
then
a
Man
uses
his
Money
as
he
ought
to
do
,
when
he
shews
himself
liberal
,
without
ruining
his
Fortune
.
[
e
](A33176-e45740-b)
e
One
particular
sort
of
Bounty
,
which
he
thinks
fit
just
to
bring
in
here
,
is
Hospitality
.
This
he
recommends
as
a
thing
handsom
,
and
becoming
in
any
City
,
and
advantagious
to
get
a
Man
Interest
,
and
make
him
known
among
Strangers
.
Theophrastus
commends
,
and
with
very
good
Reason
,
another
sort
of
Bounty
,
which
we
call
Hospitality
:
For
there
's
nothing
,
in
my
mind
,
more
handsom
and
becoming
,
than
constantly
to
have
the
Houses
of
Noble
Men
open
,
and
ready
to
entertain
all
Strangers
of
Fashion
;
and
't
is
no
small
Credit
and
Reputation
to
the
Publick
,
that
Strangers
ne're
fail
to
meet
with
that
sort
of
Bounty
,
and
Liberality
in
our
City
.
Beside
that
there
's
nothing
can
be
more
useful
for
those
,
who
design
by
honest
Means
to
get
an
Interest
in
the
World
,
than
to
recommend
themselves
to
the
Esteem
and
Good-liking
of
foreign
Nations
,
by
the
help
of
those
People
whom
they
thus
entertain
.
Theophrastus
tells
us
of
[
f
](A33176-e45790-b)
f
The
Son
of
Miltiades
,
a
famous
Athenian
General
,
who
beat
their
Enemies
both
at
Sea
and
Land
the
same
Day
:
He
was
particularly
fam'd
for
his
Bounty
and
Hospitality
.
See
his
Life
in
Plut.
and
Corn.
Nep.
Cimon
the
Athenian
,
that
he
shew'd
his
Hospitality
even
to
all
his
Brethren
of
the
[
g
](A33176-e45860-b)
g
There
were
one
hundred
seventy
four
distinct
Tribes
or
Peoples
in
Attica
,
one
of
which
was
call'd
the
Lacian
,
and
the
Men
who
were
of
it
,
Laciadae
.
Cimon
was
one
of
these
,
and
kept
constantly
open
House
for
all
those
of
his
Tribe
.
See
Meursius
de
Pop.
Attic.
Lacian
Tribe
;
and
not
only
made
it
his
own
constant
Custom
,
but
also
commanded
his
Bayliffs
the
same
,
to
keep
open
House
for
any
one
of
the
Laciadae
,
that
should
pass
that
way
.
CHAP.
XIX
.
The
Liberality
which
consists
in
doing
good
Offices
for
others
:
Two
sorts
of
it
.
What
sorts
of
Study
afford
most
Opportunities
of
it
.
The
Ruin
of
Civil
Law
and
Eloquence
.
All
Men
may
do
Kindnesses
of
this
Nature
if
they
please
.
We
should
be
careful
of
not
Offending
some
,
by
Obliging
others
.
[
a
](A33176-e45980-b)
a
He
begins
here
with
the
second
,
and
as
he
thinks
[
See
Chap.
15.
]
much
better
sort
of
Beneficence
,
which
consists
in
doing
Kindnesses
for
others
by
our
Labour
and
Industry
.
These
Kindnesses
may
be
either
done
to
particular
Persons
,
or
to
the
Republick
in
general
:
and
first
of
the
former
.
I
Come
now
to
speak
of
that
other
sort
of
Bounty
,
which
consists
not
in
Giving
,
but
in
Labouring
for
another's
Good
;
and
extends
it self
as
to
the
Republick
in
general
,
so
to
each
Member
of
the
City
in
particular
.
[
b
](A33176-e46040-b)
b
The
first
thing
that
puts
a
Man
in
a
Capacity
of
serving
a
great
many
People
,
is
the
Civil
Laws
;
the
Knowledge
of
which
he
highly
commends
.
The
Civil
Law
principally
gives
us
Opportunities
of
exercising
this
:
For
there
's
nothing
more
proper
to
get
a
Man
Interest
and
Credit
in
the
World
,
than
the
Managing
the
Law-suits
of
a
great
many
Persons
,
the
assisting
'em
with
his
Advice
,
and
doing
for
'em
all
that
he
can
by
his
Knowledge
,
and
Skill
in
that
Learning
.
And
therefore
I
admire
the
Wisdom
of
our
Ancestors
,
as
for
several
Reasons
,
so
particularly
for
this
,
that
the
Knowledge
and
Interpretation
of
their
excellent
Civil
Law
,
was
counted
a
matter
of
the
highest
Credit
and
Reputation
among
them
.
This
the
greatest
Men
have
kept
constantly
among
themselves
,
till
this
late
sad
Disorder
and
Confusion
of
every
thing
:
But
now
the
Glory
of
this
sort
of
Learning
,
together
with
all
Honours
and
Degrees
of
Dignity
,
is
utterly
ruin'd
and
fall'n
to
just
Nothing
.
And
to
make
the
matter
still
so
much
the
worse
;
all
this
has
happen'd
in
the
Days
of
[
c
](A33176-e46050-b)
c
He
means
Ser.
Sulpitius
,
one
of
the
most
eminent
among
the
Romans
for
his
Skill
in
the
Civil
Laws
.
One
,
who
,
as
he
equall'd
in
Dignity
all
that
have
gone
before
him
,
so
was
he
far
above
'em
in
the
Knowledge
of
the
Laws
.
This
Study
then
is
approv'd
of
by
most
People
,
and
puts
it
in
one's
power
to
assist
a
great
many
and
oblige
them
by
Kindnesses
.
[
d
](A33176-e46080-b)
d
A
second
thing
which
enables
Men
to
assist
others
this
way
,
is
Eloquence
.
There
's
another
sort
of
Knowledge
near
related
to
this
,
the
Art
,
I
mean
,
of
Perswasive
Speaking
,
which
carries
more
Majesty
and
Ornament
along
with
it
,
and
is
more
pleasing
and
lik'd
of
,
by
the
generality
of
Men.
For
what
is
there
in
the
World
more
extraordinary
than
Eloquence
,
whether
we
consider
the
Admiration
of
its
Hearers
,
the
Reliance
of
those
who
stand
in
need
of
its
Assistance
,
or
the
Good-will
procur'd
by
it
from
those
whom
it
defends
?
Our
Ancestors
therefore
held
this
among
the
chief
of
their
Civil
Professions
.
Any
one
then
must
oblige
a
great
many
,
and
have
a
large
number
of
Clients
and
Dependants
,
who
is
able
to
speak
well
,
and
willing
to
take
pains
,
and
(
as
[
e
](A33176-e46090-b)
e
There
was
even
a
Law
among
the
Romans
,
entitul'd
,
Cincia
de
donis
&
muneribus
,
forbidding
to
take
Money
,
&c.
for
Defending
another's
Cause
.
't
was
the
Custom
of
our
good
Fore-fathers
)
is
ready
to
undertake
many
Mens
Causes
,
without
ever
expecting
to
be
rewarded
for
his
Trouble
.
And
here
I
have
a
fair
Opportunity
offer'd
me
,
to
bemoan
the
great
Downfal
,
that
I
mayn't
say
the
utter
Extinction
of
Eloquence
;
but
that
I
am
afraid
I
shall
seem
to
complain
for
my
own
sake
only
.
However
I
can't
but
with
some
Concern
take
notice
,
what
a
great
many
excellent
Orators
we
have
lost
;
how
few
there
are
arising
,
whom
we
can
expect
any
thing
from
;
and
how
much
fewer
who
are
able
to
perform
and
do
any
thing
;
and
for
all
that
,
how
many
,
who
are
brim
full
of
Impudence
and
vain
Presumption
.
[
f
](A33176-e46130-b)
f
A
third
Way
of
doing
People
Kindnesses
is
,
if
we
aren't
our selves
able
to
manage
their
Causes
,
by
recommending
'em
to
the
Judges
,
to
those
that
are
skill'd
in
Law
,
&c.
Now
it
is
not
for
all
,
nor
indeed
very
many
,
to
be
either
skilful
Lawyers
,
or
eloquent
Pleaders
:
However
there
's
no
one
,
if
he
'd
make
it
his
Business
,
but
may
do
friendly
Offices
to
several
People
;
either
by
begging
some
Kindnesses
for
'em
;
or
by
recommending
their
Cases
to
the
Judges
and
Officers
;
or
by
being
Industrious
in
promoting
their
Interests
;
or
lastly
,
by
using
his
Endeavours
with
those
,
who
either
are
able
Lawyers
,
or
eloquent
Orators
:
which
whoever
shall
do
,
will
make
a
great
many
be
beholden
to
him
,
and
get
himself
a
general
Interest
in
the
World
.
[
g
](A33176-e46150-b)
g
He
puts
in
a
Caution
or
two
about
these
Rules
,
viz.
That
whilst
we
oblige
one
,
we
take
care
not
to
disoblige
others
,
&c.
There
is
one
thing
however
I
would
advertise
him
of
,
(
tho'
I
think
't
is
so
obvious
,
that
I
hardly
need
do
it
)
which
is
to
have
a
care
of
offending
some
,
whilst
he
's
endeavouring
to
be
serviceable
to
others
.
For
it
often
comes
to
pass
,
that
such
do
a
Diskindness
,
either
to
those
whom
they
ought
to
have
oblig'd
;
or
to
those
who
are
able
to
make
'em
suffer
for
it
afterwards
:
Which
shews
Carelesness
and
Negligence
,
if
done
undesignedly
;
but
if
designedly
,
Rashness
and
Imprudence
.
And
if
it
should
happen
that
we
are
forc'd
,
tho'
unwillingly
,
to
disoblige
any
Person
,
we
must
endeavour
to
excuse
it
as
well
as
we
are
able
;
by
shewing
the
Necessity
we
lay
under
of
doing
so
,
and
how
't
was
utterly
impossible
for
us
to
avoid
it
:
and
must
be
careful
and
industrious
to
repair
the
Injury
,
by
making
some
reasonable
Amends
for
it
afterwards
.
CHAP.
XX.
Men
are
readier
to
assist
one
that
's
Wealthy
and
Great
than
one
that
is
Poor
and
Honest.
Reasons
why
they
ought
to
do
the
contrary
.
The
Evil
Effects
of
Mens
Love
of
Riches
.
Never
to
do
an
Injury
to
one
,
for
the
sake
of
Obliging
another
.
NOw
[
a
](A33176-e46270-b)
a
Having
shewn
what
those
things
are
,
which
put
us
into
a
Capacity
of
Helping
others
,
viz.
Eloquence
,
Civil
Law
,
&c.
and
lay'd
down
a
Rule
or
two
for
our
Direction
in
doing
it
;
he
proceeds
to
enquire
,
on
whom
we
ought
especially
to
bestow
our
Kindnesses
;
where
he
puts
the
Question
,
Whether
't
is
better
to
assist
a
Rich
and
Great
,
or
a
Poor
and
Honest
Man
?
and
argues
for
the
latter
;
because
a
poor
Man
will
be
more
grateful
,
&c.
whenever
we
do
a
Kindness
or
Friendly
Office
to
another
,
we
usually
regard
one
of
these
two
Things
,
viz.
Either
the
Honesty
,
or
the
Greatness
of
the
Person
.
'T
is
easily
said
,
and
every
one's
ready
enough
to
profess
,
That
in
placing
their
Favours
,
they
have
much
more
Respect
to
the
Merits
of
the
Person
,
than
to
his
Fortune
in
the
World
.
This
is
very
fairly
and
honestly
spoken
:
but
yet
I
'd
be
glad
to
be
shewn
that
Man
,
who
is
more
willing
to
Help
one
that
's
Honest
and
Poor
,
than
to
get
the
Favour
of
one
that
is
Wealthy
and
Powerful
.
For
who
is
not
readiest
to
be
serviceable
to
those
,
from
whom
he
expects
the
most
speedy
Requital
?
But
People
would
do
well
to
consider
more
throughly
the
Natures
of
things
:
For
tho'
a
poor
Man
,
't
is
true
,
can't
make
a
Requital
,
yet
if
he
's
honest
,
he
will
acknowledge
the
Obligation
:
And
't
was
no
unhandsom
Saying
,
whoever
was
the
Author
of
it
,
That
in
Case
of
a
Debt
,
the
Man
who
acknowledges
it
doth
not
thereby
pay
it
;
and
the
Man
who
pays
it
does
no
longer
acknowledge
it
:
But
in
Case
of
an
Obligation
,
both
he
who
returns
it
still
continues
to
acknowledge
it
,
and
he
who
acknowledges
it
thereby
sufficiently
returns
it
.
But
now
those
,
on
the
contrary
,
who
value
themselves
upon
their
Riches
,
Honours
and
flourishing
Condition
,
will
scorn
to
acknowledge
they
're
oblig'd
for
any
Kindness
;
nay
,
will
think
they
vouchsafe
you
a
signal
Favour
,
even
whilst
you
are
doing
'em
some
considerable
Service
;
and
will
always
be
jealous
and
suspicious
over
you
,
as
tho'
you
demanded
and
expected
something
from
'em
:
But
to
have
it
ever
said
they
were
defended
by
you
,
or
to
be
number'd
among
your
Dependants
or
Clients
,
is
as
insupportable
to
'em
as
even
Death
it self
.
Whereas
your
mean
Person
,
when
any
one
does
him
a
friendly
Office
,
considers
't
was
done
out
of
Respect
to
himself
,
and
not
out
of
Regard
to
his
Fortune
or
Condition
;
and
endeavours
to
shew
himself
sensible
of
the
Obligation
,
not
to
him
only
who
has
done
him
the
Kindness
,
but
(
as
standing
in
need
of
some
other
Mens
Assistance
)
to
those
others
also
,
from
whom
he
hopes
for
the
like
.
And
if
he
should
chance
to
do
another
any
Service
,
he
does
not
endeavour
to
cry
up
and
magnifie
it
,
but
rather
to
lessen
it
as
much
as
he
is
able
.
Another
thing
worth
the
considering
is
this
,
That
if
you
defend
one
that
's
wealthy
and
powerful
,
the
Obligation
remains
in
the
Person
himself
,
or
perhaps
just
his
Children
;
but
if
you
protect
one
that
's
needy
and
forsaken
,
provided
withal
he
be
virtuous
and
modest
,
all
the
lower
sort
of
People
immediately
that
aren't
wicked
(
which
is
no
inconsiderable
part
of
the
Multitude
)
will
look
upon
you
as
their
Safe-guard
and
Protection
.
Upon
all
which
Accounts
I
am
wholly
of
Opinion
,
That
a
Kindness
is
better
bestow'd
upon
an
honest
,
than
't
is
upon
a
wealthy
and
fortunate
Person
.
We
should
endeavour
,
't
is
true
,
to
the
utmost
of
our
power
,
to
be
serviceable
to
all
Men
of
whatsoever
Condition
:
But
if
their
should
happen
a
Competition
between
'em
,
I
am
clearly
for
following
Themistocles's
Advice
,
who
being
once
ask'd
,
How
he
'd
Marry
his
Daughter
,
whether
to
one
that
was
Poor
,
but
Honest
;
or
to
one
that
was
Rich
,
but
of
an
ill
Reputation
?
made
Answer
,
I
'd
rather
have
a
Man
without
an
Estate
,
than
have
an
Estate
without
a
Man
.
But
the
mighty
Respect
,
which
is
paid
to
Riches
,
has
wholly
deprav'd
and
corrupted
our
Manners
.
And
yet
what
does
it
signifie
to
any
one
of
us
,
that
such
or
such
a
Person
has
got
a
plentiful
Fortune
?
Perhaps
it
may
be
useful
to
him
that
has
it
;
tho'
not
so
neither
always
:
But
allowing
it
to
be
so
:
Suppose
he
has
got
the
World
more
at
his
Command
;
yet
how
(
I
'd
fain
know
)
is
he
ever
the
honester
for
it
?
[
b
](A33176-e46570-b)
b
He
gives
this
by
way
of
Caution
,
tho'
he
would
not
have
a
Man
assisted
for
being
Rich
,
he
would
not
have
his
Riches
be
an
hindrance
to
him
neither
,
provided
he
be
otherwise
an
honest
and
good
Man
.
But
and
if
a
Man
be
Honest
,
as
well
as
Wealthy
,
tho'
I
would
not
have
him
helpt
for
the
sake
of
his
Riches
,
yet
I
would
not
have
him
hindred
upon
their
account
neither
:
But
in
every
case
have
it
fairly
consider'd
,
not
how
Wealthy
and
Great
,
but
how
Good
and
Deserving
a
Person
he
is
.
[
c
](A33176-e46580-b)
c
The
last
Rule
to
be
observ'd
in
this
sort
of
Liberality
.
I
shall
conclude
this
Head
with
only
one
Rule
more
,
which
is
,
Never
for
the
sake
of
doing
any
one
a
Kindness
,
to
venture
upon
that
which
is
unjust
in
it self
,
or
injurious
to
a
third
Person
.
For
no
Credit
or
Esteem
can
be
solid
and
durable
,
unless
built
upon
the
Foundations
of
Justice
and
Honesty
;
without
which
nothing
can
be
virtuous
or
commendable
.
CHAP.
XXI
.
Two
sorts
of
that
Bounty
,
which
relates
to
the
Publick
.
Nothing
to
be
done
for
the
sake
of
the
Members
in
particular
,
which
may
any
ways
damage
the
Publick
in
general
.
The
first
Duty
of
the
Governours
of
a
State
,
to
secure
each
Particular
in
the
Possession
of
his
own
.
Levelling
all
Estates
very
destructive
.
Why
Men
first
built
Cities
.
Not
to
burden
the
People
with
Taxes
,
a
second
Duty
.
A
third
,
To
furnish
the
People
with
Necessaries
.
Covetousness
in
a
Governour
pernicious
to
any
State
.
The
unhappy
Effects
of
it
in
the
Roman
Empire
.
[
a
](A33176-e46660-b)
a
Chap.
19.
He
divided
that
Beneficence
,
which
consists
in
doing
Kindnesses
by
our
Labour
,
&c.
into
two
Parts
:
He
has
done
with
the
former
,
which
respects
Particulars
,
and
comes
now
to
the
latter
,
which
respects
the
State
in
general
.
This
he
again
divides
into
two
sorts
,
some
terminating
in
the
State
,
consider'd
abstractedly
by
it self
;
others
in
all
the
particular
Members
of
it
.
About
the
latter
he
immediately
gives
us
one
Direction
,
never
to
do
any
thing
for
the
sake
of
Particulars
,
which
may
any
ways
be
prejudicial
to
the
Whole
in
general
.
Under
the
former
he
comprehends
the
Duties
of
those
that
are
Governours
,
and
principal
Magistrates
in
the
Republick
:
concerning
which
he
discourses
very
largely
.
HAving
thus
discours'd
of
the
one
sort
of
Kindnesses
,
which
are
done
to
particular
Members
of
the
City
;
we
are
now
in
the
next
place
to
speak
of
those
others
,
which
are
done
to
them
all
,
and
to
the
Commonwealth
in
general
.
Now
these
again
are
of
two
sorts
,
The
one
more
immediately
relating
to
the
Community
;
the
other
reaching
down
to
each
Member
in
particular
;
which
latter
,
of
the
two
is
more
grateful
and
acceptable
.
We
should
shew
our
Beneficence
,
as
far
as
we
are
able
,
in
both
these
Ways
;
but
especially
in
this
latter
,
which
relates
to
each
one
of
the
particular
Members
:
In
which
however
one
Caution
must
be
observ'd
,
That
nothing
be
done
in
behalf
of
Particulars
,
but
that
which
is
useful
,
or
at
least
not
prejudicial
,
to
the
Commonwealth
in
general
.
[
b
](A33176-e46770-b)
b
See
ch.
12.
of
this
Book
.
C.
Gracchus
,
for
Instance
,
made
a
large
Distribution
of
Corn
to
the
People
;
and
the
Effect
of
it
was
,
that
the
Treasury
was
exhausted
by
it
.
[
c
](A33176-e46810-b)
c
He
was
Tribune
of
the
People
together
with
Tib.
Gracchus
,
and
resisted
him
very
much
,
in
his
pernicious
Attempts
,
and
was
therefore
by
him
depriv'd
of
his
Office
.
What
Action
of
his
our
Author
here
means
is
uncertain
.
Marcus
Octavius
made
one
that
was
moderate
,
which
was
a
Kindness
to
the
Multitude
,
and
no
ways
a
Burthen
or
Grievance
to
the
State
;
and
accordingly
both
the
Publick
,
and
all
the
Members
of
the
City
receiv'd
Benefit
from
it
.
[
d
](A33176-e46840-b)
d
The
first
Duty
of
those
,
who
are
Governours
of
a
State
,
to
keep
every
Man
in
the
peaceful
Possession
of
what
is
his
own
.
But
the
principal
thing
for
a
Governour
to
take
care
of
,
is
,
That
each
Individual
be
kept
in
the
quiet
Possession
of
his
own
,
and
That
private
Men
ben't
[
e
](A33176-e46870-b)
e
Which
would
have
been
done
by
the
two
Gracchi
,
by
their
equal
Distribution
of
Lands
.
dispossessed
of
their
Lands
,
under
a
Pretence
of
taking
Care
of
the
Publick
.
For
Nothing
's
more
destructive
to
the
Peace
of
any
Kingdom
,
than
to
bring
in
a
new
Distribution
of
Estates
,
which
was
attempted
by
[
f
](A33176-e46890-b)
f
Luc.
Marcius
Philippus
,
See
ch.
30.
Book
3.
Philip
,
in
the
Time
of
his
Tribuneship
:
However
he
quickly
gave
over
his
Design
,
and
did
not
persist
stubbornly
in
Defence
of
it
,
as
soon
as
he
found
it
was
so
vigorously
oppos'd
:
But
in
his
publick
Speeches
and
Harangues
to
the
People
,
among
a
great
many
things
to
obtain
their
Favour
,
he
was
heard
to
say
one
of
very
dangerous
Consequence
,
That
the
whole
City
had
not
Two
Thousand
Men
in
it
,
that
were
Masters
of
Estates
:
A
very
pernicious
and
desperate
Saying
,
directly
tending
to
bring
all
things
to
a
Level
;
which
is
the
greatest
Misfortune
that
can
befal
any
People
.
For
to
what
end
were
Cities
and
Commonwealths
establish'd
,
but
that
every
one
might
be
safer
and
securer
,
in
the
Enjoyment
of
his
own
?
For
tho'
Men
by
Nature
are
sociable
Creatures
,
yet
't
was
the
Desire
of
Preserving
what
they
had
,
that
first
put
'em
upon
building
of
Cities
for
a
Refuge
.
[
g
](A33176-e46930-b)
g
A
second
Duty
of
a
good
Governour
,
Not
to
burthen
,
&c.
'T
is
a
Second
Duty
of
the
Governours
of
a
State
,
to
see
that
the
People
ben't
forc'd
to
pay
Taxes
;
as
they
often
were
in
our
Fore-fathers
time
,
partly
because
they
were
always
in
War
,
and
partly
by
reason
of
the
Lowness
of
the
Treasury
.
This
is
an
Inconvenience
,
which
ought
,
as
far
as
possible
,
to
be
provided
against
before-hand
:
But
if
any
State
should
be
under
such
Circumstances
,
as
that
it
must
be
forc'd
to
make
use
of
this
Expedient
,
(
I
say
any
State
,
because
I
'm
unwilling
to
suppose
so
unhappy
a
thing
of
our
own
;
beside
that
I
speak
here
of
all
of
'em
in
general
)
but
if
,
I
say
,
any
State
should
be
brought
to
such
a
Pinch
,
due
Care
must
be
taken
to
let
the
People
know
,
That
't
is
absolutely
necessary
as
Affairs
now
stand
,
and
that
otherwise
they
must
needs
be
inevitably
ruin'd
.
[
h
](A33176-e46990-b)
h
To
provide
Necessaries
for
the
Support
of
the
People
,
a
third
Duty
of
a
Governour
.
Again
,
'T
is
yet
further
requir'd
of
those
Men
,
who
Govern
and
Preside
in
a
Commonwealth
,
to
see
that
it
be
furnish'd
with
all
the
Conveniencies
and
Necessaries
of
Life
.
To
tell
what
these
are
,
and
how
to
be
provided
,
would
be
altogether
needless
in
this
place
,
since
't
is
sufficiently
known
already
;
I
only
thought
fit
just
to
touch
upon
it
by
the
Bye
.
[
i
](A33176-e47020-b)
i
A
fourth
Duty
is
,
To
be
free
from
even
any
Suspicion
of
Avarice
.
But
in
all
kinds
of
Business
,
and
managing
Affairs
of
a
publick
Nature
,
there
's
nothing
more
necessary
,
than
always
to
keep
one's
self
clear
and
untainted
,
so
as
not
to
lye
under
the
least
suspicion
of
Avarice
.
I
could
heartily
wish
,
(
said
[
k
](A33176-e47040-b)
k
He
was
the
Samnite
General
,
when
the
Peace
was
made
with
them
at
the
Passage
of
Caudium
,
to
the
great
Disgrace
and
Shame
of
the
Romans
.
See
Livy
,
Book
9.
chap.
1.
Caius
Pontius
the
Samnite
)
that
Fortune
had
reserv'd
me
to
those
Times
,
and
that
it
had
been
my
fate
to
be
then
born
,
whenever
the
Romans
shall
begin
to
take
Bribes
;
I
should
quickly
have
put
an
end
to
their
flourishing
Empire
.
Truly
he
must
have
waited
a
pretty
many
Ages
;
for
that
's
a
kind
of
Evil
,
which
but
lately
has
begun
to
infest
this
Republick
.
If
Pontius
therefore
were
so
great
a
Man
as
he
pretended
to
be
,
I
am
very
well
satisfy'd
with
his
being
born
when
he
was
;
and
not
in
those
times
,
which
have
lately
happen'd
.
'T
is
not
yet
an
Hundred
and
Ten
Years
ago
,
since
[
l
](A33176-e47140-b)
l
L.
Calpurnius
Piso
,
the
first
of
those
who
were
sirnam'd
Frugi
,
Tribune
of
the
People
when
Censorinus
and
Manilius
were
Consuls
,
about
An.
U.
C.
603
,
Author
of
the
Lex
Calpurnia
de
pecuni●s
repetundis
.
Lucius
Piso
got
a
Law
to
be
enacted
against
the
Corruption
of
Magistrates
,
whereas
there
had
never
been
any
one
before
.
But
since
that
time
there
have
been
so
[
m
](A33176-e47230-b)
m
Junia
,
Servilia
,
Acilia
,
&c.
vide
Calv.
de
Leg.
many
Laws
,
and
still
ev'ry
new
one
more
severe
than
the
former
;
so
many
Persons
accus'd
and
condemn'd
;
such
[
n
](A33176-e47260-b)
n
He
means
that
which
was
call'd
the
Social
War
,
of
which
he
only
brings
one
,
and
that
a
very
remote
Cause
.
Livius
Drusus
,
Tribune
of
the
People
,
amongst
several
Laws
about
the
Freedom
of
all
Italy
,
propos'd
that
all
those
,
who
were
suspected
of
Bribery
,
should
be
made
to
answer
for
it
.
Hereupon
the
Senators
,
who
were
pretty
Guilty
,
misliking
this
one
,
oppos'd
and
hindred
all
his
other
Laws
.
This
made
the
Italian
Nations
,
who
thought
to
have
been
made
Free
of
Rome
,
but
by
this
Means
were
frustrated
,
rise
up
in
Arms
against
the
Romans
,
upon
which
ensued
the
Social
or
Italian
War
;
of
which
see
the
Historians
.
a
War
stirr'd
up
in
the
Bowels
of
Italy
,
by
those
who
were
afraid
of
being
brought
to
Punishment
;
such
shameful
Extortion
and
Pillaging
our
Allies
,
by
those
who
have
defied
all
Laws
and
Courts
of
Justice
;
that
we
're
rather
beholden
to
the
Weakness
of
others
,
than
our
own
Strength
or
Virtues
,
that
we
are
not
utterly
ruin'd
.
CHAP.
XXII
.
Examples
of
Contempt
of
Money
among
the
ancient
Romans
.
The
Danger
,
&c.
of
the
opposite
Vice
.
The
Honour
gotten
by
this
Virtue
.
The
Danger
,
Folly
,
&c.
of
the
Project
of
Levelling
Estates
.
PAnaetius
highly
commends
[
a
](A33176-e47460-b)
a
The
second
Scipio
of
that
Name
,
who
raz'd
Carthage
and
Namantia
;
and
was
Scholar
to
Panaetius
.
Africanus
,
for
his
being
uncorrupt
as
to
the
matter
of
Money
.
'T
is
a
Virtue
that
very
well
deserv'd
his
Commendation
:
but
I
think
there
were
others
in
that
great
Person
,
which
deserv'd
it
much
more
:
to
be
untainted
with
Money
being
not
so
properly
a
Virtue
of
that
Man
,
as
of
those
Times
in
general
.
[
b
](A33176-e47520-b)
b
He
conquer'd
Perseus
King
of
Macedonia
,
and
led
him
in
Triumph
;
thereby
putting
an
End
to
the
second
Macedonian
War
,
and
that
Empire
together
.
See
his
Life
in
Plut.
Paulus
Aemilius
had
all
the
Wealth
of
Macedonia
in
his
Power
,
which
amounted
to
almost
an
infinite
Value
:
so
that
he
brought
such
a
Sum
into
the
Treasury
,
as
that
the
single
Booty
of
that
one
General
superseded
the
Necessity
of
all
Taxes
for
the
future
:
and
yet
he
brought
nothing
into
his
own
House
,
but
the
eternal
Memory
of
his
Name
and
Atchievements
.
[
c
](A33176-e47590-b)
c
The
same
that
was
just
now
mention'd
.
He
was
Son
of
Paullus
,
but
adopted
by
Scipio
.
Africanus
follow'd
the
Example
of
his
Father
,
and
return'd
nothing
richer
from
the
Overthrow
of
Carthage
.
So
Mummius
,
who
was
afterwards
his
Partner
in
the
Censorship
;
did
he
make
himself
ever
a
farthing
the
Wealthier
,
by
razing
[
d
](A33176-e47650-b)
d
Corinth
,
which
was
raz'd
by
Mummius
the
same
Year
that
Carthage
was
by
Scipio
.
See
Paterc
.
Book
1.
chap.
12.
where
the
two
Generals
are
very
handsomly
compar'd
together
.
one
of
the
wealthiest
Cities
in
the
World
?
No
;
he
rather
chose
to
make
Italy
fine
with
the
Spoils
of
his
Enemies
,
than
his
own
House
;
tho'
in
my
Opinion
the
Fineness
of
Italy
reflects
a
bright
Lustre
upon
his
own
House
too
.
There
is
no
Vice
then
(
that
I
may
return
to
the
Subject
,
from
which
I
have
digress'd
)
more
detestable
than
Avarice
;
more
especially
in
Great
Men
,
and
such
as
bear
Sway
in
the
Government
of
a
State
.
For
't
is
not
only
mean
for
a
Man
to
make
a
Prey
and
Advantage
of
the
Commonwealth
,
but
even
impious
and
abominable
.
That
Oracle
therefore
of
the
Pythian
Apollo's
,
That
nothing
but
Avarice
should
be
the
Ruine
of
Sparta
,
doth
not
seem
design'd
for
the
Lacedaemonians
only
,
but
for
every
wealthy
and
flourishing
Nation
.
[
e
](A33176-e47780-b)
e
He
has
told
us
by
Precept
,
and
from
the
Examples
of
the
greatest
Men
,
That
Governours
of
a
State
should
be
free
from
Covetousness
,
and
regardless
of
Money
.
Here
he
adds
,
That
nothing
so
much
recommends
'em
to
the
Good-liking
of
the
People
as
that
Virtue
:
Which
brings
him
to
discourse
of
a
foolish
Method
,
that
some
Men
have
taken
to
this
purpose
,
viz.
A
Design
of
bringing
all
Estates
to
an
Equality
,
and
making
all
Creditors
remit
their
Debts
;
which
he
shews
to
be
unsafe
,
unreasonable
,
&c.
And
as
Avarice
is
thus
very
destructive
to
a
State
;
so
to
appear
Upright
and
Regardless
of
Money
,
is
the
certainest
Method
those
in
Power
can
make
use
of
,
for
procuring
the
Love
and
Good-liking
of
the
People
.
But
those
,
who
,
designing
to
curry
their
Favour
,
attempt
new
Laws
about
the
Levelling
Estates
,
so
as
to
force
the
right
Owners
from
their
lawful
Possessions
;
or
propose
to
make
Creditors
remit
all
the
Debts
,
which
in
Justice
are
due
to
'em
;
[
f
](A33176-e47850-b)
f
First
,
He
shews
't
is
destructive
to
a
State
,
by
ruining
Concord
and
Justice
,
which
are
the
Supports
of
it
.
plainly
undermine
the
two
principal
Pillars
and
Supports
of
the
Government
:
In
the
first
place
,
Concord
and
Unity
among
the
Citizens
,
which
can
never
be
kept
up
,
whilst
some
are
depriv'd
of
what
is
justly
their
Due
,
and
others
discharg'd
from
the
necessity
of
Payment
.
Secondly
,
Justice
,
which
immediately
must
sink
into
Ruins
and
Nothing
,
if
Men
can't
be
secur'd
in
the
Possession
of
what
's
their
own
:
For
that
(
as
we
before
remark
d
)
is
the
chief
End
and
Aim
of
Men's
gathering
into
Societies
,
and
building
of
Cities
,
that
each
one
might
freely
enjoy
what
's
his
Right
,
without
any
danger
or
fear
of
being
depriv'd
on
't
.
[
g
](A33176-e47900-b)
g
Secondly
,
'T
is
foolish
;
for
it
does
not
procure
'em
that
Good-liking
of
the
People
,
which
they
thought
to
get
by
it
.
Beside
this
,
the
Authors
of
these
pernicious
Designs
never
get
that
Good-will
,
which
they
propose
,
from
their
Citizens
:
For
,
as
for
those
Men
,
who
are
Losers
by
the
Bargain
,
't
is
certain
that
they
'll
be
their
Enemies
for
it
;
and
those
,
who
are
Gainers
,
will
besure
to
pretend
that
they
never
desir'd
it
:
especially
in
the
Business
of
having
Debts
forgiven
;
there
ev'ry
one
dissembles
how
glad
he
is
of
it
,
for
fear
it
should
be
thought
that
he
was
not
able
to
pay
'em
.
But
those
Men
,
to
whom
such
Designs
are
prejudicial
,
will
hardly
forget
'em
,
but
shew
a
perpetual
Grudge
and
Resentment
.
And
tho'
the
number
of
those
,
who
are
thus
wickedly
Befriended
,
be
greater
than
of
those
,
who
are
injuriously
Rob'd
;
yet
it
doth
not
follow
,
that
therefore
they
are
more
Powerful
:
for
't
is
not
the
Number
,
but
the
Quality
of
the
Persons
,
that
must
carry
it
in
this
Case
.
[
h
](A33176-e47950-b)
h
Thirdly
,
'T
is
very
unjust
and
unreasonable
.
Besides
,
what
Reason
or
Equity
is
there
,
when
Estates
have
been
held
for
a
great
many
Years
,
or
perhaps
Ages
,
that
the
rightful
Owners
should
be
thrust
out
from
'em
,
and
others
,
that
never
had
any
,
should
come
and
possess
them
?
CHAP.
XXIII
.
Several
Examples
of
the
unhappy
Effects
of
taking
away
Mens
Estates
,
in
order
to
bring
things
to
a
Level
.
The
wise
Conduct
of
Aratus
the
Sicyonian
in
doing
the
contrary
.
What
a
Magistrate's
Duty
in
such
Cases
is
.
FOr
such
kind
of
partial
,
injurious
Proceedings
,
[
a
](A33176-e48050-b)
a
Having
shewn
how
pernicious
,
foolish
,
&c.
these
Designs
are
;
he
gives
here
some
Examples
of
their
unhappy
Effects
;
and
of
the
good
ones
of
the
contrary
Practice
.
the
Spartans
once
banish'd
[
b
](A33176-e48100-b)
b
Not
their
famous
General
Lysander
,
Son
of
Aristarclytus
,
who
beat
the
Athenians
,
&c.
but
another
,
Son
of
one
Olbis
,
made
Ephore
by
King
Agis
,
and
his
Assistant
in
his
Designs
.
Lysander
,
one
of
their
[
c
](A33176-e48170-b)
c
The
Word
signifies
Inspectors
or
Overseers
:
They
were
Officers
among
the
Spartans
,
usually
five
in
number
,
much
like
the
Tribunes
in
Rome
,
who
restrain'd
the
Power
and
Greatness
of
their
Kings
;
so
that
Appeals
were
allow'd
from
the
Kings
to
them
,
as
in
Rome
from
the
Consuls
to
the
Tribunes
.
Ephori
;
and
put
to
Death
[
d
](A33176-e48230-b)
d
The
third
King
of
Sparta
of
that
Name
,
Son
of
Eudamidas
,
and
sixth
in
Descent
from
the
famous
Agesilaus
:
who
for
endeavouring
to
alter
the
then
present
State
of
things
,
and
bring
in
some
obsolete
Laws
of
Lycurgus
,
about
dividing
Lands
into
equal
Portions
,
&c.
was
murder'd
by
the
contrary
Faction
.
See
his
Life
and
Death
in
Plut.
Agis
their
King
for
the
same
Reason
:
an
Action
unheard
of
before
in
that
City
.
This
was
succeeded
by
such
grievous
Contentions
and
Discords
in
the
State
,
as
that
Tyranny
and
Oppression
got
the
upper-hand
amongst
'em
;
the
Nobles
were
banish'd
from
their
Native
Country
;
and
the
best
constituted
Republick
upon
the
face
of
the
Earth
was
utterly
dissolv'd
,
and
brought
into
Confusion
.
Nor
did
this
Mischief
end
with
the
Spartans
only
,
but
,
like
a
Contagion
,
spreading
it self
farther
,
involv'd
all
Greece
in
the
same
Miseries
and
Calamities
.
Pray
what
was
it
ruin'd
our
own
two
Gracchi
,
Sons
of
the
famous
Tiberius
Gracchus
,
and
Grandsons
of
[
e
](A33176-e48350-b)
e
The
Elder
,
whose
Daughter
Cornelia
was
married
to
Sempronius
Gracchus
,
and
had
those
two
Sons
by
him
.
Africanus
,
but
only
these
Controversies
about
Levelling
Estates
?
[
f
](A33176-e48400-b)
f
A
noble
Man
of
Sicyon
,
a
City
in
Peloponnesus
,
Son
of
one
Clinias
:
His
Father
being
kill'd
by
the
treachery
of
Abantidas
,
he
was
forc'd
to
fly
to
Argos
at
six
Years
old
.
Afterwards
,
at
about
the
Age
of
Twenty
,
he
took
the
City
again
by
Surprize
,
made
Nicocles
the
then
Tyrant
fly
,
and
settl'd
Peace
and
Unity
amongst
his
Citizens
.
His
Life
is
written
by
Plut.
Aratus
the
Sicyonian
is
deservedly
commended
as
much
on
the
other
hand
:
He
,
when
his
County
,
for
fifty
Years
together
,
had
been
greatly
oppress'd
and
over-run
by
Tyrants
,
went
secretly
one
Night
from
Argos
to
Sicyon
,
and
made
himself
Master
of
the
City
by
Surpize
;
and
unexpectedly
falling
upon
Nicocles
the
then
Tyrant
,
he
put
him
to
flight
.
This
being
done
,
he
recall'd
six
Hundred
of
the
wealthiest
Citizens
,
who
had
all
been
formerly
banish'd
by
the
Tyrants
,
and
by
this
his
arrival
delivered
the
City
from
Slavery
and
Oppression
.
But
he
afterwards
found
't
would
be
a
great
deal
of
trouble
,
to
settle
the
Business
of
their
Estates
and
Possessions
;
for
he
thought
on
the
one
hand
't
was
very
unreasonable
,
that
those
Men
,
whom
he
had
restor'd
,
should
Want
,
whilst
others
enjoy'd
what
in
Equity
was
theirs
:
and
yet
it
seem'd
hard
on
t'other
side
,
that
Men
should
be
thrust
out
of
those
Possessions
,
which
now
they
had
held
for
these
fifty
Years
:
if
more
especially
't
were
withal
consider'd
,
That
it
could
not
but
happen
in
so
long
a
time
,
that
they
must
have
gone
,
a
great
part
of
'em
,
from
one
to
another
,
either
by
Inheritance
,
Purchase
,
Dowry
,
or
the
like
;
and
therefore
were
possest
by
the
present
Incumbents
,
without
their
having
injur'd
the
rightful
Proprietors
.
Upon
these
Considerations
he
judg'd
it
necessary
,
both
to
bear
with
the
latter
in
the
Enjoyment
of
what
they
had
,
and
yet
to
Satisfie
the
former
,
whom
it
justly
belong'd
to
.
And
finding
a
large
Sum
of
Money
was
requisite
,
to
settle
this
Business
as
it
ought
to
be
;
he
told
'em
he
had
occasions
to
go
to
[
g
](A33176-e48570-b)
g
The
capital
City
of
Aegypt
,
and
Seat
of
their
Kings
,
built
by
Alexander
the
Great
,
in
his
return
from
visiting
the
Temple
of
Jupiter
Hammon
.
Alexandria
,
and
order'd
they
should
not
concern
'emselves
about
it
,
till
his
return
.
He
goes
accordingly
with
all
possible
speed
to
his
old
Friend
[
h
](A33176-e48620-b)
h
Sirnam'd
Philadelphus
,
the
Founder
of
the
famous
Alexandrian
Library
.
He
was
Son
of
that
Ptolomy
,
who
was
Alexander
the
Great
's
Captain
,
and
who
got
Aegypt
to
himself
after
the
Death
of
that
Prince
.
Ptolomy
,
who
at
that
time
was
reigning
in
Alexandria
,
being
second
King
after
the
Founding
of
that
City
.
Having
told
him
his
Design
of
settling
Liberty
in
his
Country
,
and
the
Reasons
that
put
him
upon
undertaking
of
that
Voyage
,
he
quickly
obtain'd
of
that
wealthy
Prince
,
to
supply
him
with
a
quantity
of
Money
for
his
Assistance
.
With
this
he
immediately
returns
to
Sicyon
,
and
choosing
out
fifteen
o'
th'
principal
Citizens
,
to
help
him
with
their
Counsel
upon
this
occasion
;
he
heard
both
the
Causes
of
those
who
possess'd
what
had
belong'd
to
others
,
and
of
those
who
had
lost
what
had
been
formerly
their
own
.
At
last
he
so
manag'd
the
whole
Business
,
as
that
,
the
Estates
being
set
at
their
true
Values
,
[
i
](A33176-e48710-b)
i
Viz.
Of
the
present
Incumbents
,
who
possess'd
those
Lands
,
which
originally
belong'd
to
others
.
some
were
persuaded
to
part
with
what
they
had
,
and
take
an
Equivalent
in
Money
for
it
:
and
[
k
](A33176-e48740-b)
k
Viz.
Of
those
who
had
been
outed
of
their
Lands
by
the
Tyrants
.
others
to
neglect
the
Recovery
of
their
own
,
and
rest
themselves
content
with
being
pay'd
its
full
Value
.
By
this
means
the
Controversie
was
fairly
determin'd
,
and
all
went
Home
satisfy'd
without
Grudging
or
Complaining
.
Here
was
a
great
and
extraordinary
Man
now
!
Here
was
one
,
that
deserv'd
to
have
been
born
in
our
Republick
!
This
is
the
true
way
of
Dealing
with
Citizens
;
and
not
(
as
hath
been
practis'd
amongst
us
[
l
](A33176-e48770-b)
l
First
under
Sylla
the
Dictator
,
and
afterwards
under
Caesar.
twice
)
to
make
sale
of
their
Goods
in
the
publick
Markets
,
and
have
them
cry'd
by
the
Voice
of
the
Common
Cryer
.
But
this
famous
Grecian
(
as
was
the
Duty
of
a
wise
and
extraordinary
Person
)
thought
it
became
him
to
provide
alike
for
all
:
And
indeed
every
Magistrate
,
who
proceeds
upon
Principles
of
Reason
and
Prudence
,
will
always
take
care
not
to
make
any
Difference
between
the
Interests
of
his
People
;
but
will
govern
them
all
by
the
same
Rule
and
Standard
of
Justice
and
Equity
.
Here
's
one
Man
shall
dwell
in
what
belongs
to
another
:
What
Reason
is
there
,
I
beseech
you
,
for
this
;
that
when
I
have
bought
,
built
,
repair'd
,
and
laid
out
a
great
deal
of
Money
,
another
should
come
and
injoy
all
the
Fruits
of
it
,
in
spite
of
my
Teeth
?
Is
not
this
plainly
to
take
away
from
one
that
which
justly
belongs
to
him
,
and
give
to
another
what
he
has
nothing
of
Right
to
?
As
for
the
Project
of
Forgiving
Debts
,
I
can
see
no
Reason
in
the
World
for
it
,
unless
it
be
Reason
,
that
another
should
buy
Land
with
my
Money
,
and
that
he
should
have
the
Land
,
but
I
never
have
my
Money
.
CHAP.
XXIV
.
Care
should
be
taken
to
prevent
Peoples
running
too
much
into
Debt
.
Faith
the
Cement
of
Publick
Society
.
Cicero
's
Conduct
in
his
Consulship
about
the
matter
of
Debts
.
The
Duties
of
a
good
Magistrate
.
How
one's
Health
and
Estate
are
to
be
taken
care
of
.
[
a
](A33176-e48900-b)
a
Since
the
Design
of
making
Creditors
Forgive
all
Debts
,
is
so
very
pernicious
,
&c.
't
is
one
great
Business
of
a
good
Governour
,
to
prevent
Peoples
running
too
much
into
Debt
;
which
may
be
done
several
Ways
.
CAre
ought
therefore
to
be
taken
before-hand
(
which
't
is
easie
to
do
by
a
great
many
ways
)
to
keep
People
from
running
so
much
into
Debt
,
as
may
bring
any
Damage
or
Inconvenience
to
the
Publick
:
and
not
,
when
they
are
in
,
to
make
the
Creditors
lose
what
's
their
own
,
and
let
the
Debtors
gain
what
in
Justice
is
another's
:
For
nothing
so
cements
,
and
holds
together
in
Union
all
the
parts
of
a
Society
,
as
Faith
or
Credit
;
which
can
never
be
kept
up
,
unless
Men
are
under
some
force
and
necessity
of
honestly
Paying
what
they
owe
to
one
another
.
This
Design
of
having
Debtors
excus'd
from
Payment
,
[
b
](A33176-e48930-b)
b
In
the
Conspiracy
of
Catiline
.
See
chap.
22.
Book
1.
was
never
attempted
with
greater
eagerness
,
than
whilst
I
was
Consul
:
Men
of
all
Ranks
and
Degrees
in
the
State
,
took
up
Arms
and
form'd
Camps
for
the
bringing
it
about
;
whose
Endeavours
I
resisted
with
so
much
vigour
,
as
that
the
Republick
was
quickly
deliver'd
from
so
pernicious
an
Evil.
There
never
were
known
greater
Debts
in
the
City
,
nor
ever
more
easily
and
faithfully
paid
:
and
pray
what
was
the
Reason
of
all
this
?
Why
because
when
their
Hopes
of
Defrauding
were
cut
off
,
they
found
'emselves
under
a
Necessity
of
Payment
.
'T
is
true
there
is
[
c
](A33176-e48960-b)
c
He
means
Caesar
,
who
being
over
head
and
ears
in
Debt
,
was
suspected
in
Catiline's
time
,
to
favour
his
wicked
Designs
under-hand
;
and
so
may
be
said
to
have
been
conquer'd
by
Cicero
,
when
he
ruin'd
Catiline
.
one
,
who
has
since
been
a
Conquerer
,
(
tho'
then
he
was
conquer'd
by
my
Vigilance
)
that
has
[
d
](A33176-e49020-b)
d
He
made
the
Creditors
lose
not
all
,
but
only
a
fourth
part
of
their
Due
.
found
out
Means
to
effect
these
Designs
,
at
a
time
when
they
'd
bring
him
[
e
](A33176-e49040-b)
e
Because
he
was
then
got
free
from
Debt
by
other
Ways
;
and
so
had
no
occasion
to
make
use
of
this
,
upon
his
own
Account
.
no
manner
of
Advantage
;
but
such
an
Inclination
had
that
Man
to
Villany
,
that
the
bare
Doing
of
it
was
a
Pleasure
to
him
,
without
any
other
Invitation
in
the
World
.
The
Sum
then
of
what
has
been
said
is
this
,
That
such
as
design
for
the
good
of
the
Republick
,
must
be
sure
to
avoid
this
sort
of
Liberality
,
which
takes
away
from
one
what
it
gives
to
another
;
and
must
constantly
make
it
their
principal
Care
,
to
uphold
each
Member
in
his
proper
Rights
,
according
to
the
Principles
of
Justice
and
Equity
;
so
as
neither
to
suffer
the
poorer
sort
of
People
to
be
wrong'd
or
oppress'd
,
by
reason
of
their
Poverty
;
nor
the
richer
to
be
hindred
from
keeping
or
demanding
what
's
justly
their
own
,
by
the
Envy
of
the
others
:
and
in
fine
must
apply
their
most
earnest
Endeavours
,
whether
in
War
or
Peace
,
to
encrease
the
Power
,
and
enlarge
the
Bounds
and
Revenues
of
the
Republick
.
These
are
the
Duties
and
Exercises
of
great
Men
:
These
are
the
things
which
were
practic'd
by
our
Ancestors
;
and
whoever
goes
on
to
perform
the
same
,
will
not
only
bring
great
Advantage
to
the
Republick
,
but
gain
a
mighty
Interest
and
Reputation
to
himself
.
[
f
](A33176-e49110-b)
f
He
has
now
done
with
his
first
Head
propos'd
in
this
Book
,
viz.
Whether
an
Action
be
profitable
or
not
?
In
which
,
after
having
shewn
,
That
Men
are
able
to
bring
the
most
Profit
to
us
,
he
gives
some
Directions
about
how
we
should
engage
Men
to
be
of
our
side
,
and
so
do
us
all
the
Service
that
lies
in
their
Power
.
He
should
now
proceed
to
the
second
Head
propos'd
to
be
the
Subject
of
this
Book
;
but
because
Antipater
thought
the
former
not
perfect
,
because
two
material
things
were
omitted
in
it
,
viz.
The
Care
of
our
Health
,
and
Estate
;
he
therefore
;
before
he
leaves
this
Head
,
adds
a
word
or
two
about
each
of
these
.
In
these
Rules
of
Duty
relating
to
things
profitable
,
[
g
](A33176-e49160-b)
g
There
were
two
or
three
Stoicks
of
that
Name
;
The
one
of
Tarsus
,
call'd
Tarsensis
,
Scholar
to
Diogenes
Babylonius
,
and
Master
of
Panaetius
.
He
is
mention'd
ch.
12.
of
the
next
Book
.
Another
about
the
same
time
(
or
as
others
think
the
same
Man
by
another
name
)
call'd
Sidonius
,
a
familiar
Acquaintance
of
L.
Crassus
,
an
Historian
and
Poet
,
famous
for
making
Hexameter
Verses
extempore
,
[
See
Cic.
and
Quintil.
]
of
whom
we
have
several
Epigrams
still
extant
in
the
Greek
Anthologia
.
He
's
said
to
have
had
a
Fever
every
Year
on
his
Birth-day
,
of
which
at
last
he
dy'd
.
The
third
a
Tyrian
here
mention'd
,
an
Acquaintance
of
Cicero's
,
and
particularly
familiar
with
Cato
Uticensis
,
whom
he
Instructed
in
Morality
and
Politicks
.
Antipater
the
Tyrian
,
a
Stoick
Philosopher
,
who
lately
dy'd
at
Athens
,
thinks
that
two
things
have
been
omitted
by
Panaetius
:
First
,
The
care
of
getting
or
preserving
one's
Health
.
And
,
Secondly
,
Of
an
Estate
.
I
believe
that
great
Philosopher
might
omit
'em
on
purpose
,
because
they
are
so
easie
and
obvious
to
every
one
:
however
't
is
certain
they
are
both
of
'em
profitable
.
[
h
](A33176-e49400-b)
h
How
the
Health
of
the
Body
is
to
be
maintain'd
.
Now
Health
is
preserv'd
by
considering
the
peculiar
Temper
of
one's
Body
,
and
observing
what
agrees
or
does
not
agree
with
it
;
by
Temperance
and
Moderation
in
Meats
and
Drinks
,
and
other
things
relating
to
the
welfare
of
the
Body
;
by
forbearance
and
abstinence
as
to
the
matter
of
Pleasures
;
and
lastly
,
by
the
Skill
of
Physicians
,
and
the
like
.
[
i
](A33176-e49470-b)
i
How
an
Estate
should
be
gotten
,
kept
,
&c.
An
Estate
should
be
gotten
by
nothing
that
's
any
ways
Scandalous
or
Dishonest
;
preserv'd
by
Diligence
and
prudent
Management
;
and
lastly
,
by
the
same
means
better'd
and
augmented
.
But
this
whole
Subject
is
excellently
handled
by
[
k
](A33176-e49540-b)
k
A
famous
Athenian
,
Son
of
one
Gryllus
,
and
Scholar
of
Socrates
;
a
valiant
and
wise
Captain
,
as
well
as
an
eminent
Philosopher
and
Historian
.
His
Works
are
most
of
'em
extant
to
this
day
:
the
native
Simplicity
,
Purity
,
and
especially
Sweetness
of
which
,
have
justly
got
him
the
name
of
the
Athenian
Bee
.
The
Translation
Cicero
here
mentions
is
lost
,
except
some
Fragments
.
Xenophon
the
Socratick
,
in
his
Book
of
O
Economicks
;
which
I
formerly
translated
from
the
Greek
into
Latin
,
when
much
about
as
old
as
you
are
at
present
.
CHAP.
XXV
.
The
Comparing
of
things
Profitable
one
with
another
.
An
Answer
of
Cato
's
upon
this
Head
.
Who
are
best
able
to
teach
how
to
get
Estates
.
THe
[
a
](A33176-e49720-b)
a
He
comes
now
to
the
second
Head
to
be
treated
on
in
this
Book
,
viz.
Of
two
that
are
Profitable
which
is
most
so
?
Which
he
but
just
touches
upon
,
and
shews
that
't
was
requisite
to
add
this
Head
to
the
three
of
Panaetius
.
fourth
chief
Head
we
propos'd
to
speak
of
,
was
the
Comparing
things
Profitable
one
with
another
;
which
is
oftentimes
necessary
,
however
neglected
or
forgotten
by
Panaetius
.
For
we
use
to
compare
either
the
Goods
of
the
Body
with
those
of
Fortune
;
or
these
back
again
with
those
of
the
Body
;
or
lastly
,
those
both
of
the
one
and
the
other
amongst
'emselves
.
First
,
The
Goods
of
the
Body
are
compar'd
with
those
of
Fortune
,
as
,
'T
is
more
eligible
,
suppose
,
to
be
Healthy
than
Rich.
Secondly
,
These
back
again
with
those
of
the
Body
,
as
,
'T
is
better
to
be
Rich
,
than
of
a
robust
Constitution
.
Thirdly
,
Those
of
the
Body
with
one
another
,
as
Health
is
preferable
to
Pleasure
,
or
Strength
to
Activity
.
And
Lastly
,
Those
of
Fortune
with
one
another
,
as
if
Glory
should
be
preferr'd
before
Riches
,
or
an
Estate
in
the
City
before
another
in
the
Country
.
To
this
latter
sort
of
Comparing
may
be
referr'd
that
Answer
of
the
Senior
Cato's
,
who
being
once
ask'd
,
What
he
conceiv'd
most
Profitable
in
the
Management
of
an
Estate
?
said
,
To
Feed
Cattle
well
.
And
what
the
second
?
To
Feed
Cattle
pretty
well
.
And
what
the
third
?
To
Feed
Cattle
,
tho'
but
ill
.
And
what
the
fourth
?
To
Till
the
Ground
.
And
then
the
Enquirer
proceeding
still
to
ask
,
Pray
what
do
you
think
of
letting
Money
out
to
Usury
?
Pray
what
do
I
think
,
replies
Cato
,
of
killing
a
Man
?
From
what
has
been
said
,
and
a
great
deal
more
,
that
might
easily
be
added
,
't
is
sufficiently
manifest
,
That
Profits
are
often
compar'd
with
one
another
;
and
that
we
had
Reason
sufficient
on
our
side
,
in
making
this
a
fourth
Head
for
the
finding
out
our
Duty
.
But
as
for
the
Business
of
getting
an
Estate
,
and
placing
out
Money
to
the
best
Advantage
,
and
I
wish
I
might
add
of
applying
to
the
best
Uses
,
there
are
certain
[
b
](A33176-e50010-b)
b
So
he
calls
by
way
of
Derision
the
Bankers
,
Changers
,
&c.
who
frequented
the
Janus
,
a
Street
in
Rome
of
that
name
,
very
noted
and
eminent
for
such
sort
of
People
.
The
upper
part
of
it
was
called
Janus
Summus
,
the
middle
Janus
Medius
,
and
the
lower
Janus
Imus
.
honest
Men
who
attend
at
the
Exchange
,
that
can
better
inform
you
than
any
of
the
Philosophers
,
that
dispute
in
the
Schools
.
'T
is
worth
while
however
to
know
these
things
,
because
they
relate
to
the
Business
of
Profit
,
which
has
made
up
the
Subject
of
all
this
Book
.
Let
us
now
pass
on
to
what
remains
behind
.
The
End
of
the
Second
Book
.
TULLY
's
OFFICES
.
The
Third
Book
.
CHAP.
I.
An
excellent
Saying
of
the
Elder
Scipio
Africanus
.
Cicero
betakes
himself
to
a
Life
of
Leisure
and
Retirement
,
the
Republick
being
quite
ruin'd
.
The
Difference
between
his
Retirement
,
and
Africanus
'
s.
Some
Good
to
be
drawn
out
of
Evils
.
[
a
](A33176-e50230-b)
a
Whom
he
spake
of
in
the
last
Chapter
of
the
former
Book
.
CAto
,
Son
Mark
,
who
was
near
of
the
same
Age
with
Publius
Scipio
,
the
first
that
had
the
Sirname
of
[
b
](A33176-e50270-b)
b
Because
he
beat
Hannibal
and
the
Carthaginians
in
Africa
.
He
was
Grandfather
of
the
Younger
Africanus
.
The
Roman
Historians
are
full
of
his
Praises
.
Africanus
giv'n
him
,
tells
us
't
was
an
usual
Saying
of
his
,
That
he
never
was
less
idle
,
than
when
he
was
idle
;
nor
ever
less
alone
,
than
when
he
was
alone
.
A
noble
and
excellent
Sentence
indeed
,
and
worthy
of
so
great
and
so
wise
a
Person
;
by
which
it
appears
,
that
in
the
midst
of
Leisure
he
could
think
of
Business
,
and
was
us'd
when
alone
to
converse
with
his
own
Thoughts
:
so
that
he
never
was
properly
Idle
,
and
needed
no
Company
to
entertain
him
in
his
Solitude
.
The
two
things
therefore
,
which
bring
a
kind
of
Dullness
and
Heaviness
upon
others
,
serv'd
but
to
sharpen
and
invigorate
his
Mind
,
viz.
Solitude
and
Leisure
.
I
wish
I
could
truly
say
the
same
of
my self
!
But
tho'
I
'm
not
able
to
arrive
at
that
inimitable
Temper
of
Soul
,
I
desire
at
least
to
come
as
near
it
as
is
possible
;
and
being
excluded
by
open
Violence
,
and
[
c
](A33176-e50360-b)
c
Those
of
Caesar
first
;
but
after
his
Death
,
of
Mark
Anthony
and
his
Adherents
.
impious
Arms
,
from
having
ought
to
do
with
Affairs
of
the
Senate
,
or
Business
of
the
Bar
,
I
wholly
betake
my self
to
a
Life
of
Retirement
;
and
for
that
very
reason
have
abandon'd
the
City
,
and
am
often
alone
,
only
going
from
one
Seat
to
another
in
the
Country
.
But
alas
!
my
Leisure
is
not
to
be
compar'd
with
that
of
Africanus
,
nor
my
Solitude
with
his
Solitude
!
For
he
was
employ'd
,
at
that
very
time
,
in
Places
of
the
greatest
Reputation
in
the
Publick
;
and
his
Leisure
was
only
a
voluntary
Retirement
,
to
give
himself
Respite
from
Business
for
a
season
;
and
his
Solitude
only
a
kind
of
Port
or
Haven
,
into
whcih
he
withdrew
himself
from
the
Disturbances
of
Company
.
Whereas
my
Leisure
proceeds
not
from
any
desire
of
Respite
,
but
from
a
want
of
Business
to
Employ
my self
about
;
for
what
proper
Work
can
I
find
to
do
,
when
there
's
no
more
[
d
](A33176-e50420-b)
d
The
two
Places
in
which
he
before
us'd
to
shew
himself
.
a
Senate
,
nor
any
Courts
of
Justice
remaining
[
e
](A33176-e50430-b)
e
Because
all
things
were
acted
by
Violence
and
Force
of
Arms.
entire
,
in
which
I
might
honourably
shew
my self
?
Therefore
,
whereas
't
was
my
former
Custom
to
appear
much
in
Publick
,
and
in
the
Eye
of
my
Citizens
;
I
now
on
the
contrary
hide
my self
from
'em
,
to
avoid
the
very
sight
of
such
Packs
of
Villains
,
as
are
every-where
abroad
;
and
as
much
as
is
possible
confine
my self
to
Solitude
.
But
since
this
is
given
us
for
a
Rule
by
the
Learned
,
That
when
several
Evils
are
threatning
us
at
once
,
we
should
not
only
choose
to
undergo
the
least
,
but
extract
some
Advantage
out
of
'em
if
't
is
possible
:
I
therefore
,
in
the
midst
of
all
these
present
Misfortunes
,
gain
the
small
Advantage
of
Quiet
and
Retirement
,
(
tho'
not
such
a
Quiet
as
he
might
have
expected
,
whose
Wisdom
had
formerly
[
f
](A33176-e50480-b)
f
By
freeing
it
from
Catiline's
Conspiracy
.
See
chap.
22.
Book
1.
procur'd
the
Peace
of
the
Publick
)
and
endeavour
not
wholly
to
languish
out
that
Solitude
,
which
not
Choice
,
but
Necessity
has
laid
upon
me
.
Tho'
Africanus
indeed
,
I
my self
must
confess
,
has
got
much
greater
Glory
by
his
Solitude
and
Retirement
:
For
none
of
his
Thoughts
are
committed
to
Writing
,
nor
any
Monuments
remain
of
what
he
did
in
his
Leisure
,
and
when
he
was
alone
;
whereby
we
are
given
to
understand
,
That
he
never
was
idle
,
nor
ever
properly
alone
;
because
he
was
always
employ'd
in
Meditation
,
and
in
searching
out
those
things
,
which
by
Thinking
he
became
Master
of
.
But
I
,
who
han't
got
such
a
strength
of
Genius
,
as
to
be
content
,
when
alone
,
with
the
company
of
my
bare
Thoughts
,
am
forc'd
to
apply
all
my
Studies
and
Endeavours
to
the
drudgery
of
Writing
:
I
have
written
more
therefore
within
a
very
short
time
,
since
the
Ruin
of
the
State
,
than
I
did
for
some
Years
,
while
't
was
in
its
flourishing
Condition
.
CHAP.
II.
The
Subject
of
Duties
the
most
useful
part
of
all
Philosophy
.
An
Exhortation
to
his
Son
to
be
diligent
in
his
Studies
.
The
Subject
of
this
Third
Book
.
Panaetius
neglected
to
treat
of
it
,
tho'
he
did
at
first
design
it
.
A
Saying
of
Rutilius
Rufus
.
NOw
tho'
all
Philosophy
(
my
dear
Cicero
)
be
a
rich
,
as
it
were
,
and
plentiful
Soil
,
which
has
not
any
part
of
it
wast
and
uncultivate
:
yet
there
's
no
place
that
's
more
fruitful
in
it
,
or
from
which
more
Advantage
accrues
to
the
Husbandman
,
than
that
which
is
employ'd
about
Offices
or
Duties
;
from
whence
those
Precepts
and
Directions
are
drawn
,
which
lead
toward
a
steddy
and
virtuous
Way
of
Living
.
Wherefore
tho'
I
doubt
not
but
that
Cratippus
,
the
greatest
Philosopher
of
our
Age
,
is
daily
inculcating
these
things
to
you
,
and
you
are
receiving
them
with
that
Attention
they
deserve
;
yet
I
have
thought
it
not
wholly
unnecessary
,
my self
to
remind
you
of
so
important
a
Matter
;
and
could
wish
that
your
Ears
might
continually
ring
,
as
it
were
,
with
such
Precepts
,
and
not
hear
(
as
far
as
possible
)
any
thing
else
.
And
as
this
is
a
Method
which
is
useful
for
all
Men
,
who
design
to
lead
virtuous
and
creditable
Lives
;
so
for
no
one
living
,
perhaps
,
more
than
your self
.
For
consider
you
're
the
Son
of
an
industrious
Father
,
one
who
has
born
the
greatest
Honours
in
the
Republick
,
and
has
gotten
himself
some
Credit
and
Reputation
in
the
World
;
People
therefore
will
expect
that
you
should
follow
my
Steps
,
and
't
is
your
part
to
see
that
you
answer
their
Expectation
.
Beside
't
is
no
small
thing
you
have
taken
upon
you
,
by
being
at
Athens
,
and
under
the
Great
Cratippus
;
whither
since
you
are
gone
as
it
were
to
a
Staple
and
Mart
of
good
Literature
,
't
will
be
scandalous
for
you
to
return
again
empty
,
and
bring
a
Reproach
both
upon
the
Place
and
your
Master
.
Wherefore
,
dear
Son
,
be
Industrious
and
Diligent
,
and
spare
no
manner
of
Pains
and
Labour
(
if
I
may
call
it
a
Labour
,
and
not
rather
a
Pleasure
,
to
Study
and
Learn
)
that
you
may
make
a
good
Use
of
these
Advantages
before
you
;
and
when
all
things
are
thus
plentifully
supply'd
on
my
part
,
let
it
never
be
said
,
That
you
your self
are
wanting
to
your
own
greatest
Interest
.
But
I
shall
say
no
more
upon
this
at
present
,
having
heretofore
written
again
and
again
to
you
,
by
way
of
Exhortation
.
Let
us
now
proceed
to
the
fifth
and
last
Part
of
our
propos'd
Division
.
[
a
](A33176-e50690-b)
a
After
this
Discourse
and
Advice
to
his
Son
,
he
comes
now
to
his
Subject
,
of
comparing
Profit
and
Honesty
.
But
tells
us
first
,
That
Panaetius
,
tho'
he
propos'd
,
yet
did
not
discourse
upon
this
third
Head
:
Shews
he
design'd
to
have
done
it
,
and
is
large
in
explaining
the
Sence
't
is
to
be
taken
in
.
Panaetius
then
,
who
without
all
controversie
has
written
most
accurately
upon
the
Subject
of
Duties
,
and
whom
in
this
Work
,
with
a
little
Alteration
,
I
have
hitherto
follow'd
,
lays
down
(
as
was
said
)
three
general
Heads
,
which
Men
use
in
Consulting
or
Deliberating
concerning
their
Duty
:
In
the
first
't
is
question'd
,
Whether
the
Action
they
are
going
about
be
Honest
or
Dishonest
.
In
the
second
,
Whether
it
be
Profitable
or
Unprofitable
.
In
the
third
,
How
a
good
Man
ought
to
determin
the
Case
,
if
that
which
seems
Honest
should
come
into
competition
with
that
which
seems
Profitable
.
Of
the
two
former
Heads
he
has
given
us
an
account
in
his
three
first
Books
,
and
therein
has
promis'd
to
go
on
with
the
third
of
'em
;
but
has
fail'd
,
it
should
seem
,
of
being
so
good
as
his
Word
.
Which
I
wonder
at
the
more
upon
this
account
,
because
we
are
told
by
his
Scholar
Possidonius
,
That
he
liv'd
thirty
Years
after
those
Books
were
publish'd
.
And
I
can't
but
admire
at
the
same
Possidonius
,
that
having
an
occasion
,
in
some
of
his
Writings
,
to
discourse
upon
this
Argument
,
he
should
do
no
more
than
just
touch
upon
it
in
short
;
especially
seeing
he
himself
has
observ'd
,
That
in
all
Philosophy
there
's
no
one
Subject
more
necessary
and
important
.
Some
indeed
think
,
whom
I
cannot
agree
with
,
that
Panaetius
did
not
forget
this
Part
,
but
omitted
it
on
purpose
;
and
that
in
plain
truth
,
it
ought
to
be
omitted
,
since
Profit
can
never
be
really
contrary
to
Honesty
.
Whether
it
ought
to
be
omitted
or
not
,
may
perhaps
be
a
Question
;
but
whether
Panaetius
design'd
it
or
no
,
and
afterwards
neglected
it
,
I
think
can
be
none
:
For
a
Writer
certainly
,
that
proposes
three
Heads
,
and
goes
thro'
with
but
two
of
'em
,
must
needs
design
to
discourse
upon
the
third
;
nay
he
tells
us
himself
in
the
close
of
his
third
Book
,
That
he
'd
afterwards
proceed
to
this
remaining
Part.
Beside
we
have
the
Authority
of
Possidonius
to
vouch
it
,
who
in
one
of
his
Letters
has
given
us
a
Saying
of
Rutilius
Rufus
,
who
was
Scholar
to
Panaetius
as
well
as
himself
;
That
as
never
any
Painter
had
been
yet
so
bold
,
as
to
venture
upon
finishing
that
Piece
of
Venus
,
which
[
b
](A33176-e50910-b)
b
One
of
the
famousest
Painters
that
ever
was
,
of
the
Island
Cos
in
the
Aegaean
Sea
,
therefore
by
Ovid
call'd
Artifex
Cous.
He
is
often
mention'd
by
Greek
and
Latin
Writers
,
and
particularly
for
an
admirable
Piece
of
Venus
rising
out
of
the
Sea
.
He
began
a
second
,
which
is
here
mention'd
,
but
did
not
live
to
finish
it
.
Apelles
left
imperfect
at
the
Island
Cos
;
(
the
Beauty
of
the
Face
making
all
Men
despair
,
ever
to
paint
a
Body
that
should
be
answerable
to
it
)
so
the
Excellency
of
that
,
which
Panaetius
had
writ
upon
this
Subject
,
made
others
afraid
of
attempting
to
add
that
which
he
had
omitted
.
CHAP.
III.
Whether
Panaetius
did
well
in
making
this
third
Head
.
Reasons
why
he
did
not
.
The
Danger
of
separating
Profit
from
Honesty
.
What
the
Stoicks
mean
by
Living
according
to
Nature
.
Two
sorts
of
Virtue
,
the
Perfect
and
Ordinary
.
The
former
belongs
to
the
Wise
only
;
the
latter
is
common
to
all
.
The
most
perfect
Virtue
(
as
't
is
counted
by
the
Multitude
)
is
really
imperfect
.
[
a
](A33176-e51140-b)
a
Having
shewn
from
Reason
,
and
the
Authority
of
Possidonius
,
that
Panaetius
design'd
to
have
writ
upon
this
Head
;
he
now
proceeds
to
enquire
,
Whether
he
ought
to
have
done
it
,
or
not
?
THat
Panaetius
therefore
did
think
he
was
obliged
to
Discourse
upon
this
Part
,
is
beyond
all
Question
:
But
whether
he
was
mistaken
in
his
Judgment
or
not
,
when
he
laid
down
this
Head
,
as
the
third
of
deliberating
for
the
finding
out
our
Duty
,
may
perhaps
be
disputed
.
[
b
](A33176-e51200-b)
b
The
Reasons
why
Panaetius
should
not
have
brought
in
this
Enquiry
:
First
,
Honesty
is
the
only
,
or
at
least
much
the
greatest
Good
;
therefore
Profit
should
not
be
made
to
oppose
it
;
nothing
being
comparable
to
the
greatest
Good
.
For
whether
according
to
the
Opinion
of
the
Stoicks
,
we
take
Virtue
or
Honesty
to
be
the
only
Good
;
or
,
according
to
that
of
your
Peripateticks
,
acknowledge
it
so
to
be
the
chiefest
Good
,
as
that
all
things
else
are
just
nothing
against
it
;
't
is
certain
,
upon
either
of
these
Suppositions
,
That
Profit
can't
be
put
in
the
Ballance
against
Honesty
.
We
are
therefore
told
,
That
Socrates
us'd
even
to
curse
those
People
,
who
disjoyn'd
these
things
in
Thought
and
Conception
,
which
are
one
and
the
same
in
Nature
and
Reality
.
And
[
c
](A33176-e51310-b)
c
Secondly
,
The
Stoicks
,
of
whom
Panaetius
was
one
,
hold
that
Profit
and
Honesty
are
really
the
same
thing
;
therefore
he
should
not
have
brought
in
this
Head
,
wherein
they
are
set
in
opposition
to
each
other
.
the
Stoicks
are
so
far
of
his
Opinion
,
as
constantly
to
maintain
,
That
whatever
is
Honest
must
be
also
Profitable
,
and
whatever
is
Profitable
must
be
also
Honest.
'T
is
true
had
Panaetius
been
one
of
those
,
who
assert
that
Virtue
is
therefore
only
desirable
,
because
it
brings
something
of
Profit
along
with
it
;
like
[
d
](A33176-e51370-b)
d
Epicurus
and
his
Disciples
;
and
also
Hieronymus
Rhodius
,
whom
our
Author
often
mentions
in
his
Works
.
He
liv'd
about
the
440th
Year
of
Rome
,
and
had
been
Scholar
to
Aristotle
.
some
,
who
think
nothing
any
further
worth
a-seeking
for
,
than
as
it
begets
Pleasure
,
or
Exemption
from
Pain
;
we
could
then
have
allow'd
him
the
liberty
of
saying
,
That
Profit
is
sometimes
repugnant
to
Honesty
.
But
seeing
he
was
one
of
[
e
](A33176-e51420-b)
e
Viz.
That
of
the
Stoicks
.
a
different
Sect
,
and
thinks
nothing
to
be
Good
except
that
which
is
Honest
;
and
avows
that
whatever
is
contrary
to
Honesty
,
and
appears
to
us
under
the
Notion
of
Profit
,
can
neither
,
if
we
have
it
,
make
Life
ever
the
better
;
nor
,
if
we
have
it
not
,
ever
the
worse
;
he
should
not
,
methinks
,
have
brought
in
such
a
Deliberation
,
wherein
that
,
which
seems
Profitable
,
comes
into
Competition
with
that
,
which
is
Honest.
For
that
,
which
[
f
](A33176-e51500-b)
f
Thirdly
,
The
Stoicks
make
the
whole
Happiness
of
Man
to
consist
in
Living
conformably
to
the
Rules
of
Honesty
;
therefore
Profit
should
never
have
been
brought
in
in
opposition
to
it
.
the
Stoicks
call
their
Sovereign
Good
[
to
live
in
Conformity
with
the
Dictates
of
Nature
]
means
,
I
suppose
,
no
more
than
this
,
That
we
should
always
live
agreeably
to
the
Rules
of
Virtue
;
and
should
use
other
things
,
which
are
suited
and
adapted
to
our
natural
Inclinations
,
no
further
than
Virtue
permits
and
allows
'em
.
Now
this
being
so
,
there
are
several
of
opinion
,
That
this
general
Head
,
wherein
Profit
and
Honesty
are
compar'd
with
one
another
,
was
improperly
brought
in
;
and
that
there
ought
not
to
have
been
given
any
Rules
or
Directions
upon
this
Subject
.
[
g
](A33176-e51550-b)
g
To
what
has
been
objected
it
might
have
been
reply'd
,
That
there
's
a
double
sort
of
Honesty
;
the
one
Perfect
,
and
belonging
to
none
but
a
perfectly
Wise
Man
;
the
other
Middle
,
and
which
ordinary
Men
are
capable
of
:
That
Profit
ought
never
to
be
oppos'd
to
the
former
,
but
perhaps
to
the
latter
imperfectene
it
might
.
Here
he
gives
a
large
account
of
this
Division
of
Honesty
,
[
See
chap.
3.
Book
.
1.
]
and
shews
that
the
Second
,
or
Middle
sort
of
Honesty
,
ought
no
more
to
be
parted
with
for
the
sake
of
any
Profit
,
than
the
first
or
consummate
one
.
Now
your
Perfect
Honesty
,
which
is
truly
and
properly
call'd
by
that
Name
,
is
only
to
be
found
in
your
perfectly
Wise
Men
,
and
can
never
be
possibly
separated
from
Virtue
:
But
those
Men
,
who
have
not
this
Perfect
Wisdom
,
must
by
no
means
pretend
to
such
a
Perfect
Honesty
,
tho'
they
may
have
some
Shadows
and
Resemblances
of
it
.
For
all
those
Duties
,
of
which
we
are
treating
in
these
Books
,
have
the
name
of
Middle
ones
given
'em
by
the
Stoicks
,
which
are
common
indifferently
to
all
Men
in
general
,
and
are
not
confin'd
to
any
particular
number
of
them
.
But
several
get
'em
either
by
the
peculiar
Happiness
of
their
Natures
,
or
by
a
constant
progress
in
Study
and
Learning
.
Whereas
those
others
,
which
they
call
Right
ones
,
are
perfect
and
consummate
,
or
(
as
they
'emselves
express
it
)
have
all
their
Numbers
,
which
none
can
attain
to
,
but
the
perfectly
Wise.
'T
is
true
that
the
Vulgar
,
as
soon
as
they
see
any
Action
of
such
a
nature
,
as
indeed
is
no
more
than
a
Middle
kind
of
Duty
,
are
immediately
thinking
it
a
Perfect
and
Compleat
one
:
[
h
](A33176-e51770-b)
h
Men
judge
of
the
Perfection
or
Imperfection
of
any
thing
,
according
as
it
comes
up
to
,
or
falls
short
of
their
Idea's
.
He
,
whose
Idea
is
short
and
imperfect
,
will
think
a
very
mean
piece
of
Work
to
be
excellent
,
because
he
has
no
Notion
of
any
thing
that
is
more
so
:
But
an
Artist
will
judge
it
(
as
it
really
is
)
ordinary
,
because
his
Conceptions
are
more
refin'd
and
exquisite
.
This
is
the
Reason
why
the
Vulgar
imagin
the
imperfect
Virtues
to
be
Perfect
and
Compleat
;
because
they
fully
answer
their
Idea
of
Perfection
,
which
is
but
an
half
and
inadequate
one
.
It
ought
to
be
read
here
propterea
quod
,
in
the
Latin
;
and
not
proptereaque
as
Graevius
has
it
.
For
the
common
sort
of
People
can't
tell
what
is
Perfect
,
and
by
consequence
don't
know
how
much
any
Virtue
or
Excellency
comes
short
of
it
:
but
finding
it
answer
the
highest
of
their
Conceptions
,
they
imagin
it
wants
nothing
of
being
as
perfect
as
can
be
.
Just
as
it
happens
in
judging
of
Poems
or
Pieces
of
Painting
,
and
other
such
like
;
those
who
aren't
Judges
,
are
generally
pleas'd
with
and
praise
those
things
,
which
by
no
means
deserve
any
Praise
or
Commendation
:
Because
,
I
suppose
,
there
may
be
something
that
's
Good
in
'em
,
which
serves
well
enough
to
take
with
those
that
are
ignorant
,
and
who
han't
so
much
skill
as
to
be
able
to
discover
their
several
Imperfections
:
Therefore
when
they
are
instructed
by
those
who
understand
it
,
they
are
brought
with
no
great
difficulty
to
forsake
their
Opinions
.
CHAP.
IV.
The
greatest
Men
that
have
been
in
the
World
,
were
not
perfectly
Wise.
Profit
ought
not
to
be
compar'd
with
the
Middle
,
any
more
than
with
the
Perfect
Honesty
.
How
Men
come
to
compare
'em
together
,
or
to
doubt
upon
this
Subject
.
This
illustrated
by
an
Example
.
One
certain
Rule
necessary
for
our
Guidance
in
this
case
.
The
Doctrin
of
the
Stoicks
preferable
to
that
of
the
Peripateticks
.
THose
Duties
therefore
,
which
make
up
the
Subject
of
this
Enquiry
,
by
the
Stoicks
are
counted
a
kind
of
second-rate
Honesty
,
which
is
not
confin'd
to
their
Wise
Men
only
,
but
is
common
and
open
to
all
Mankind
:
and
therefore
all
those
,
who
have
any
kind
of
Sence
or
Inclination
for
Virtue
,
are
very
sensibly
touch'd
and
affected
with
it
.
For
you
aren't
to
imagin
,
when
we
call
the
two
[
a
](A33176-e51910-b)
a
Two
famous
Romans
,
Father
and
Son
,
who
both
in
the
time
of
their
Consulships
devoted
'emselves
freely
for
the
Good
of
their
Country
:
The
Father
in
the
War
with
the
Latins
,
about
the
Year
of
Rome
412
;
and
the
Son
in
that
with
the
Samnites
,
about
forty
Years
after
.
See
the
form
of
it
,
Liv.
Book
8.
chap.
9.
Book
10.
chap.
29.
Decii's
or
[
b
](A33176-e52030-b)
b
The
two
Africani
,
mention'd
before
.
Scipio's
Magnanimous
,
and
give
[
c
](A33176-e52060-b)
c
A
noble
and
valiant
Consul
of
Rome
,
General
in
the
War
against
Pyrrhus
and
the
Samnites
:
so
strictly
Just
and
Honest
,
that
tho'
both
Pyrrhus
and
the
Samnites
offer'd
him
Presents
,
he
refus'd
to
accept
them
;
and
yet
so
Poor
,
that
when
he
dy'd
,
he
did
not
leave
enough
behind
him
for
his
Funeral
;
and
his
Daughters
had
Portions
paid
out
of
the
publick
Treasury
.
See
ch.
22.
Fabricius
and
[
d
](A33176-e52140-b)
d
Such
another
at
Athens
,
as
Fabricius
was
at
Rome
.
Themistocles
being
his
Rival
in
the
State
,
got
him
banish'd
by
Ostracism
:
[
See
his
Life
in
Plut.
and
Nepos
.
]
But
Xerxes
afterwards
invading
Greece
,
they
were
glad
to
recal
him
again
to
defend
his
Country
,
which
he
did
very
valiantly
.
At
last
,
after
having
born
the
greatest
Offices
in
the
Republick
,
he
dy'd
as
poor
as
Fabricius
did
,
and
Portions
were
given
to
his
Daughters
by
the
Publick
.
Aristides
the
Appellation
of
Just
,
that
we
set
them
for
Patterns
of
such
Justice
and
Magnanimity
,
as
we
suppose
to
be
in
those
who
are
perfectly
Wise.
For
they
were
none
of
them
Wise
in
that
exalted
Sence
,
which
we
would
here
be
understood
to
mean
by
that
Word
.
Nay
those
who
were
counted
and
sirnam'd
the
Wise
,
such
as
Cato
,
for
Instance
,
and
Laelius
,
and
particularly
the
[
e
](A33176-e52300-b)
e
The
seven
Wise
Men
of
Greece
,
so
much
talkt
of
among
the
Ancients
.
famous
Seven
;
yet
in
Truth
and
Reality
were
not
such
:
but
by
frequently
practising
that
middle
sort
of
Duties
,
had
gotten
a
sort
of
Shew
and
Resemblance
of
true
Wisdom
.
As
no
Profit
therefore
ought
ever
to
be
put
in
opposition
to
that
,
which
is
truely
and
perfectly
Virtuous
and
Honest
;
so
neither
should
any
Interest
,
or
Convenience
of
Life
,
be
set
up
against
that
,
which
is
ordinarily
call'd
so
,
and
which
is
follow'd
by
those
,
who
desire
to
be
counted
Men
of
Honesty
and
Integrity
:
And
we
should
be
as
careful
of
living
up
to
that
Honesty
,
whereof
we
are
capable
;
as
the
perfectly
Wise
are
of
keeping
close
to
that
,
which
is
truly
such
,
and
may
in
strictness
of
Speech
be
call'd
by
that
Name
.
For
whatever
Attainments
we
have
made
in
Virtue
,
they
will
never
stand
us
in
any
mighty
stead
,
if
we
ben't
thus
careful
of
holding
constantly
to
our
Duty
—
.
What
has
hitherto
been
said
can
be
apply'd
to
those
only
,
who
make
Goodness
consist
in
living
according
to
their
Duty
:
But
[
f
](A33176-e52390-b)
f
Viz.
The
Followers
of
Epicurus
and
Hieronymus
Rhodius
.
those
Men
,
who
measure
the
Goodness
of
things
by
some
[
g
](A33176-e52430-b)
g
'T
is
to
be
remembred
,
That
under
the
Notion
of
the
word
Profit
,
he
comprehends
Pleasures
,
Honours
,
&c.
Profit
or
Advantage
they
bring
along
with
them
,
and
who
let
these
prevail
more
with
them
than
Virtue
and
Honesty
;
frequently
in
deliberating
use
to
put
that
,
which
they
take
to
be
Profitable
,
into
the
Ballance
against
Justice
and
Honesty
;
but
good
and
wise
Men
never
offer
to
do
it
.
[
h
](A33176-e52480-b)
h
Having
brought
all
the
Arguments
urg'd
against
Panaetius
,
for
proposing
this
Head
,
he
now
shews
that
they
have
all
mistaken
his
Meaning
;
for
that
he
does
not
say
Profit
may
be
oppos'd
to
Honesty
,
but
only
that
Men
ordinarily
use
to
oppose
it
;
and
explains
what
is
the
true
meaning
of
this
Head
,
and
how
People
come
to
deliberate
upon
it
.
I
'm
therefore
of
opinion
,
when
Panaetius
tells
us
,
That
Men
use
to
deliberate
,
in
considering
which
of
these
two
they
should
chuse
;
that
he
meant
no
more
than
what
his
Words
strictly
signifie
,
viz.
That
they
use
to
do
this
,
and
not
that
really
they
ought
to
do
it
.
For
't
is
infinitely
scandalous
,
not
only
to
prefer
a
pretended
Advantage
before
Duty
and
Conscience
;
but
so
much
as
to
bring
'em
to
the
Contest
and
Competition
,
and
to
doubt
whether
the
one
of
'em
should
be
chosen
before
the
other
.
If
this
be
so
,
you
'll
be
ready
to
ask
me
,
How
then
comes
there
to
be
any
Doubt
at
all
?
And
what
is
it
that
requires
Consideration
upon
this
Subject
?
I
suppose
't
is
this
,
That
it
sometimes
happens
[
i
](A33176-e52590-b)
i
The
Subject
therefore
of
this
Book
is
not
,
When
a
plain
Duty
seems
opposite
to
our
worldly
Interest
,
viz.
Riches
,
Pleasure
,
or
the
like
,
to
deliberate
which
of
those
two
we
should
follow
,
our
Pleasure
(
suppose
)
or
our
Duty
:
the
very
deliberating
in
such
a
case
being
impious
,
as
he
often
says
.
But
the
Design
of
the
Book
is
,
When
an
Action
on
the
one
hand
is
apparently
for
our
worldly
Advantage
;
and
on
the
other
is
somewhat
doubtful
,
whether
consistent
with
our
Duty
or
not
;
then
to
teach
us
how
to
determin
our selves
so
,
as
that
a
seeming
Interest
mayn't
betray
us
into
that
,
which
is
opposite
to
our
real
one
,
i.
e.
our
Duty
and
Honesty
.
He
gives
one
Instance
of
killing
a
Tyrant
,
which
may
easily
be
apply'd
to
a
great
many
other
dubious
Cases
;
in
giving
Directions
about
which
he
continues
to
Chap.
7.
where
he
begins
again
his
former
Discourse
.
See
the
latter
end
of
chap.
6.
Men
are
not
so
very
certain
,
Whether
the
Action
deliberated
upon
be
Honest
,
or
not
Honest
:
For
that
which
is
usually
counted
a
piece
of
Villany
,
is
frequently
chang'd
by
the
Times
or
Circumstances
,
and
is
found
to
be
the
contrary
.
To
lay
down
one
Instance
,
which
may
serve
to
give
some
Light
to
a
great
many
others
:
Pray
what
greater
Wickedness
can
there
be
upon
Earth
(
if
we
speak
in
general
)
than
for
any
one
to
Murder
,
not
only
a
Man
,
but
a
familiar
Friend
?
And
shall
we
therefore
affirm
that
he
's
chargeable
with
a
Crime
,
who
has
murder'd
a
Tyrant
,
tho'
he
were
his
Familiar
?
[
k
](A33176-e52710-b)
k
The
Romans
thought
no
Duties
so
great
,
as
those
that
regarded
the
Maintenance
of
their
Liberty
;
for
the
sake
of
which
they
would
break
thro'
all
other
Obligations
whatever
.
Nay
there
was
a
Law
among
them
,
That
he
who
kill'd
a
Tyrant
should
not
be
question'd
for
it
.
The
People
of
Rome
I
am
sure
won't
say
so
,
who
count
it
one
of
the
gloriousest
Actions
in
the
World
.
You
'll
say
then
,
Does
not
Interst
here
carry
it
against
Honesty
?
No
,
[
l
](A33176-e52750-b)
l
That
is
,
A
Tyrant
is
not
therefore
to
be
kill'd
,
because
't
is
a
profitable
Action
,
tho'
contrary
to
Honesty
:
but
because
't
is
an
Honest
,
as
well
as
a
Profitable
one
.
For
what
can
be
more
honest
or
agreeable
to
Nature
,
than
by
taking
off
one
Man
to
preserve
a
whole
Community
?
but
rather
Honesty
voluntarily
follows
Interest
.
[
m
](A33176-e52760-b)
m
Having
shewn
what
is
the
Subject
of
Deliberation
in
this
Book
,
his
next
Business
is
to
lay
down
some
Method
of
determining
our selves
aright
.
In
order
to
which
he
proposes
a
general
Rule
and
Standard
,
which
is
always
to
be
made
use
of
in
such
occasions
of
Doubt
.
If
therefore
we
would
,
upon
all
Emergencies
,
be
sure
to
determin
our selves
aright
,
when
that
which
we
call
our
Advantage
or
Interest
,
seems
to
be
repugnant
to
that
which
is
Honest
;
we
must
lay
down
some
general
Rule
or
Measure
,
which
if
we
will
make
use
of
in
judging
about
things
,
we
shall
never
be
mistaken
as
to
point
of
Duty
.
Now
this
Measure
I
would
have
to
be
conformable
to
the
Doctrin
and
Principles
of
the
Stoicks
,
which
I
principally
follow
throughout
this
Work
.
For
tho'
I
confess
that
the
ancient
Academicks
,
and
your
Peripateticks
,
[
n
](A33176-e52810-b)
n
See
chap.
1.
Book
1.
which
were
formerly
the
same
,
make
Honesty
far
preferable
to
that
which
seems
one's
Interest
:
yet
[
o
](A33176-e52840-b)
o
Viz.
The
Stoicks
.
those
who
assert
,
That
whatever
is
Honest
must
be
also
Profitable
,
and
Nothing
is
Profitable
but
what
is
Honest
,
talk
much
more
bravely
and
heroically
upon
this
Subject
,
than
[
p
](A33176-e52890-b)
p
Viz.
The
Peripateticks
and
ancient
Academicks
.
those
who
allow
,
That
there
are
some
things
Honest
,
which
are
not
Profitable
;
and
some
things
Profitable
,
which
are
not
Honest.
And
we
have
very
great
Liberty
given
us
by
our
Academy
,
so
as
never
to
be
ty'd
up
to
such
and
such
Tenets
,
but
are
left
free
to
defend
what
we
think
most
probable
.
CHAP.
V.
The
Rule
or
Measure
mention'd
in
the
former
Chapter
.
The
ill
Effects
of
Mens
Injuring
others
for
their
own
Advantage
.
Every
one
allow'd
to
take
Care
of
himself
in
the
first
place
;
but
not
so
as
to
Injure
any
other
,
tho'
to
save
his
own
Life
.
Two
Errors
,
that
occasion
Mens
Acting
contrarywise
,
and
the
Absurdity
of
'em
.
BUt
to
return
to
our
General
Rule
or
Measure
:
[
a
](A33176-e53010-b)
a
For
nothing
being
so
agreeable
to
Nature
as
Conjunction
and
Society
,
that
which
tends
to
the
Ruine
and
Dissolution
of
this
,
must
needs
be
of
all
things
most
contrary
to
Nature
.
Now
the
very
End
and
Design
of
Society
is
the
mutual
Help
and
Assistance
of
each
other
,
without
which
't
is
impossible
it
should
ever
subsist
;
It
a
naturalis
est
societatis
utilitatum
communio
(
says
the
learned
Grotius
)
ut
sine
ea
nequeat
Societas
consistere
.
Those
Men
therefore
,
who
,
instead
of
profiting
,
injure
their
Fellows
,
do
what
directly
tends
to
the
Ruine
of
Society
,
and
consequently
what
of
all
things
is
most
contrary
to
Nature
.
There
's
nothing
upon
Earth
then
so
contrary
to
Nature
,
neither
Death
,
nor
Poverty
,
nor
Pain
,
nor
whatever
other
Evil
can
befal
a
Man
either
in
his
Body
or
Fortune
,
as
to
take
away
any
thing
wrongfully
from
another
,
and
do
one's
self
a
Kindness
by
injuring
one's
Neighbour
.
For
,
in
the
first
place
,
it
ruins
all
manner
of
Society
and
Entercourse
amongst
Men
;
since
't
is
plain
,
that
if
once
Men
arrive
at
such
a
pass
,
as
to
Plunder
and
Injure
the
rest
of
their
Neighbours
,
out
of
hopes
to
procure
some
Advantage
to
themselves
,
there
must
follow
of
course
a
Dissolution
of
that
Society
,
which
of
all
things
in
the
World
is
most
agreeable
to
Nature
.
Should
we
suppose
,
for
Example
,
that
the
bodily
Members
had
,
every
one
of
'em
,
gotten
an
Opinion
,
that
to
draw
to
its
self
all
the
Vigour
of
its
Neighbours
,
would
very
much
serve
to
encrease
its
own
;
't
is
certain
the
whole
Body
must
decay
and
perish
:
And
just
so
,
should
every
one
amongst
us
deprive
other
People
of
their
Profits
and
Advantages
,
and
take
away
all
he
could
get
from
them
,
with
design
of
applying
it
only
to
his
own
Use
;
the
general
Society
and
Fellowship
of
Mankind
must
of
necessity
be
broken
.
For
tho'
't
is
no
more
than
what
Nature
will
allow
of
,
That
each
Man
should
look
after
himself
in
the
first
place
,
and
furnish
himself
with
the
Necessaries
of
Life
,
before
he
takes
care
to
provide
for
other
People
;
yet
the
same
Nature
will
by
no
means
permit
,
that
any
one
should
rise
by
his
thrusting
down
another
,
and
encrease
his
own
Fortune
by
the
Spoils
of
his
Neighbours
.
And
not
only
Nature
,
that
is
the
universal
Law
or
Consent
of
Nations
;
but
particular
Laws
,
by
which
several
Countries
and
Commonwealths
are
govern'd
,
have
commanded
likewise
,
That
no
one
be
suffer'd
to
do
an
Injury
to
another
,
for
the
sake
of
procuring
any
Advantage
to
himself
.
For
the
very
Design
and
End
of
Laws
is
to
keep
up
Agreement
and
Union
amongst
Citizens
;
which
whoever
destroys
is
by
them
punish'd
,
not
with
the
loss
of
his
Goods
alone
,
but
with
Prisons
,
Banishment
,
or
even
Death
it self
.
But
Nature
and
Right
Reason
,
as
being
at
once
both
an
[
b
](A33176-e53050-b)
b
Humane
,
because
consented
to
and
acknowledg'd
by
all
Mankind
,
and
natural
to
them
:
Divine
,
because
whatever
Right
Reason
commands
us
,
God
himself
,
who
has
given
us
that
Reason
,
does
in
effect
command
us
too
.
Human
and
Divine
Law
too
,
command
this
Duty
with
much
greater
Authority
;
and
whoever
obeys
them
(
as
all
Men
must
,
who
propose
to
live
according
to
the
Rules
of
Nature
)
will
never
be
guilty
of
coveting
what
's
another's
,
or
applying
to
his
own
Use
what
had
first
been
injuriously
taken
from
his
Neighbour
.
For
certainly
Greatness
and
Elevation
of
Soul
;
as
also
the
Virtues
of
Courtesie
,
Justice
and
Liberality
,
are
much
more
agreeable
to
Nature
and
Right
Reason
,
than
Pleasure
,
than
Riches
,
than
even
Life
it self
;
to
despise
all
which
,
and
regard
'em
as
just
nothing
,
when
they
come
to
be
compar'd
with
the
Publick
Interest
,
is
the
Duty
of
a
brave
and
exalted
Spirit
:
whereas
to
rob
another
for
one's
own
Advantage
is
(
as
has
been
shewn
)
more
contrary
to
Nature
,
than
Death
,
than
Pain
,
or
any
other
Evil
whatever
of
that
kind
.
Again
,
Those
Men
live
much
more
according
to
Nature
,
who
suffer
perpetual
Troubles
and
Labours
,
for
the
Good
and
Preservation
,
were
it
possible
,
of
all
Men
;
(
like
Hercules
of
old
,
whom
Men
,
as
a
grateful
Requital
for
his
Benefits
,
report
to
be
plac'd
among
the
number
of
the
Gods
)
than
those
who
consume
all
their
Lives
in
Retirement
,
where
they
're
not
only
free
from
Disturbances
and
Vexations
,
but
are
furnished
with
all
the
Pleasures
and
Conveniencies
of
Life
;
and
have
moreover
the
advantages
of
Strength
and
Comliness
superadded
to
them
.
And
accordingly
we
find
it
to
be
so
in
effect
,
that
all
the
most
great
and
extraordinary
Geniuses
,
have
prefer'd
all
the
Troubles
and
Difficulties
of
the
former
,
before
the
Quiet
and
Ease
of
this
latter
way
of
Living
.
From
all
which
laid
together
it
unanswerably
follows
,
That
whoever
lives
agreeably
to
the
Dictates
of
Nature
,
can
never
be
guilty
of
Injuring
another
.
[
c
](A33176-e53110-b)
c
Having
laid
down
his
general
Rule
or
Measure
,
and
prov'd
the
Truth
of
it
from
Reason
,
Laws
,
and
the
Examples
of
the
greatest
Men
;
he
now
shews
the
Absurdity
of
the
two
contrary
Principles
,
which
are
the
Grounds
or
Causes
of
Mens
Injuring
one
another
,
Viz.
Either
they
think
't
is
not
contrary
to
Nature
,
&c.
In
fine
,
He
that
Injures
another
to
do
himself
a
Kindness
,
either
thinks
he
does
nothing
that
's
contrary
to
Nature
;
or
that
the
doing
an
Injury
is
a
less
degree
of
Evil
,
than
Death
,
or
Poverty
,
or
Pain
,
or
loss
of
Children
,
Friends
,
or
Relations
.
If
he
thinks
that
in
Wronging
and
Abusing
of
others
,
he
doth
not
do
any
thing
that
is
contrary
to
Nature
;
't
is
in
vain
to
dispute
any
longer
with
such
a
one
,
who
takes
away
from
Man
the
distinguishing
Part
,
and
very
Characteristick
(
as
it
were
)
of
his
Nature
:
But
if
he
allows
that
't
is
indeed
an
Evil
,
only
thinks
that
some
others
,
such
as
Poverty
,
Pain
,
or
Death
,
may
be
worse
;
he
's
grosly
mistaken
in
being
of
Opinion
,
That
the
Ills
which
touch
nothing
but
the
Body
or
Fortune
,
can
be
greater
than
those
which
affect
the
Soul
.
CHAP.
VI.
The
Interest
of
Particulars
inseparable
from
that
of
the
whole
Community
.
The
Rule
of
not
Wronging
another
for
our
own
Advantage
,
extends
not
only
to
Relations
,
or
Fellow-Citizens
,
but
to
all
Mankind
.
The
breaking
of
it
,
ruins
all
Justice
,
Liberality
,
&c.
Several
Cases
about
it
,
put
and
resolv'd
.
Tyrants
no
Members
of
Human
Society
.
[
a
](A33176-e53210-b)
a
This
is
a
Conclusion
from
the
foregoing
Discouse
;
seeing
for
one
Man
to
injure
another
is
so
very
pernicious
to
Human
Society
;
it
follows
,
That
no
one
should
do
any
thing
for
his
own
Interest
,
as
distinct
from
that
of
the
whole
Community
.
WE
should
all
of
us
therefore
propose
the
same
End
,
and
every
one
think
his
own
Interest
in
particular
,
to
be
the
same
with
that
of
the
Republick
in
general
:
which
if
each
one
endeavour
to
draw
solely
to
himself
,
all
Union
and
Agreement
amongst
Men
will
be
dissolv'd
.
[
b
](A33176-e53220-b)
b
To
what
he
has
prov'd
in
the
former
Chapter
,
That
the
Injuring
of
others
for
our
own
Advantage
is
the
ruin
of
Society
,
and
consequently
most
unnatural
;
it
might
have
been
answer'd
,
That
this
holds
good
only
as
to
lesser
Societies
,
and
in
respect
of
our
Kin
,
&c.
but
as
for
those
who
are
of
a
different
Tribe
or
Country
,
we
are
under
no
such
Obligation
of
not
Injuring
them
.
He
therefore
here
shews
,
in
answer
to
this
,
the
extent
of
this
Obligation
;
and
proves
that
't
is
not
confin'd
to
those
of
the
same
Family
,
City
,
or
the
like
,
but
equally
comprehends
all
Mankind
;
forasmuch
as
all
are
alike
subject
to
the
same
Law
of
Nature
,
&c.
And
if
Nature
enjoyn
us
,
That
every
Man
should
desire
and
procure
the
Advantage
of
another
,
whoever
he
be
,
tho'
for
no
other
reason
than
because
he
is
a
Man
;
it
necessarily
follows
,
That
all
Men
are
joyn'd
,
by
the
self-same
Nature
,
in
one
common
Interest
:
which
if
it
be
true
,
then
all
Men
are
subject
,
and
live
equally
under
the
same
Law
of
Nature
:
and
if
this
be
true
too
,
then
certainly
they
're
forbid
by
that
same
Law
of
Nature
,
any
ways
to
Injure
or
Wrong
one
another
:
But
the
first
of
these
is
undoubtedly
certain
,
therefore
the
last
must
needs
be
so
likewise
.
For
as
to
what
is
usually
said
by
some
Men
,
That
they
would
not
take
any
thing
away
from
a
Father
,
or
Brother
,
for
their
own
Advantage
;
but
there
is
not
the
same
reason
for
their
ordinary
Citizens
;
't
is
foolish
and
absurd
:
For
they
thrust
'emselves
out
from
partaking
of
any
Priviledges
,
and
from
joyning
in
common
with
the
rest
of
their
Citizens
,
for
the
Publick
Good
:
An
Opinion
that
strikes
at
the
very
Root
and
Foundation
of
all
Civil
Societies
.
Others
there
are
,
who
are
ready
to
confess
,
That
they
ought
to
bear
such
a
Regard
to
Fellow-Citizens
;
but
by
no
means
allow
of
it
in
relation
to
Strangers
:
Now
these
Men
destroy
that
universal
Society
of
all
Mankind
;
which
if
once
taken
away
,
Kindness
,
Liberality
,
Justice
and
Humanity
must
utterly
perish
;
which
excellent
Virtues
whoever
makes
void
,
is
chargeable
with
Impiety
towards
the
immortal
[
c
](A33176-e53350-b)
c
For
tho'
the
Offence
more
immediately
concerns
the
Persons
that
are
injur'd
,
yet
't
is
also
a
Sin
against
God
himself
;
since
't
is
a
Breach
of
his
Laws
and
Commands
.
Gods
:
For
he
breaks
that
Society
,
which
they
have
establish'd
and
settled
amongst
Men
;
the
closest
Cement
or
Bond
of
which
,
is
the
being
of
Opinion
,
That
for
Men
to
Injure
and
Wrong
one
another
for
their
private
Interests
,
is
an
Evil
that
Nature
is
much
more
a
verse
from
,
than
all
those
which
happen
either
to
the
Body
or
Fortune
;
[
d
](A33176-e53380-b)
d
That
is
,
To
take
away
any
thing
from
another
,
which
is
an
Act
of
Injustice
,
is
not
only
a
greater
Evil
than
any
of
Body
or
Fortune
,
but
of
Mind
too
,
(
i.
e.
than
any
other
Vice
)
except
only
those
,
which
are
Offences
against
Justice
as
well
as
it self
.
nay
,
and
I
might
add
to
the
Mind
also
,
provided
only
they
ben't
contrary
to
Justice
;
for
that
one
Virtue
is
as
't
were
,
a
kind
Mistress
and
Queen
of
all
the
rest
.
But
what
?
(
perhaps
some
Men
will
be
apt
to
say
)
if
a
Wise
Man
be
ready
to
perish
for
Hunger
,
must
not
he
take
away
Victuals
from
another
;
tho'
a
perfectly
useless
and
insignificant
Fellow
?
Not
at
all
;
for
Life
it self
is
not
so
dear
to
me
,
as
a
setled
Resolution
of
doing
no
Wrong
for
my
private
Advantage
.
But
suppose
this
good
Man
,
almost
dead
with
Cold
,
should
have
it
in
his
power
to
take
Phalaris's
Cloaths
away
,
one
of
the
most
savage
and
inhuman
of
Tyrants
;
would
not
you
have
him
to
do
it
?
There
's
no
great
difficulty
in
determining
such
Cases
:
For
't
is
certain
if
you
take
away
any
thing
from
another
,
tho'
never
so
useless
and
insignificant
a
Creature
,
for
no
other
End
but
to
Benefit
your self
by
it
;
't
is
an
inhuman
Action
,
and
plainly
contrary
to
the
Laws
of
Nature
:
But
if
you
are
one
,
who
by
Living
will
do
very
great
Service
to
the
Republick
,
or
perhaps
to
the
Society
of
Mankind
in
general
,
and
for
that
only
reason
take
something
from
another
;
't
is
an
Action
that
is
not
to
be
found
much
fault
with
.
But
in
all
other
Cases
,
every
Man
's
bound
to
bear
his
own
Misfortunes
,
rather
than
to
get
quit
of
'em
by
Wronging
his
Neighbour
.
You
'll
say
then
,
Is
not
it
more
contrary
to
Nature
,
To
Covet
or
Seize
what
belongs
to
another
,
than
to
be
in
Sickness
,
or
Want
,
or
any
such
Evil
?
Yes
;
but
withal
't
is
as
contrary
to
Nature
,
to
abandon
all
Care
of
the
publick
Interest
;
for
't
is
a
piece
of
Injustice
:
[
e
](A33176-e53450-b)
e
'T
is
true
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
or
Right
Reason
,
forbid
Men
to
take
away
ought
from
another
,
for
their
own
Advantage
;
for
it
would
be
the
Ruine
and
Dissolution
of
Society
,
which
they
especially
desire
to
maintain
:
But
if
it
should
at
any
time
chance
so
to
happen
,
that
the
doing
of
a
Damage
to
any
third
Person
,
should
be
necessary
to
the
Support
and
Maintenance
of
that
Society
,
then
the
doing
it
is
not
only
allow'd
,
but
commanded
by
the
Law
of
Nature
.
From
whence
it
follows
,
That
an
honest
,
prudent
and
valiant
Person
,
whose
Death
would
bring
a
great
Disadvantage
on
the
Publick
,
may
take
from
an
idle
and
useless
Citizen
,
such
things
as
are
necessary
for
the
Maintenance
of
Life
,
without
any
Offence
against
the
Laws
of
Nature
;
which
aim
at
the
Preservation
and
Interest
of
the
Publick
:
provided
that
he
don't
make
the
Love
of
himself
,
and
Conceit
of
his
own
more
than
ordinary
Merits
,
an
occasion
of
Injuring
and
Oppressing
others
.
For
he
'll
perform
but
the
Duties
which
Justice
require
of
him
,
by
thus
taking
care
to
be
serviceable
to
the
Publick
,
and
upholding
that
(
which
I
am
often
forc'd
to
mention
)
universal
Society
between
all
Mankind
.
As
for
the
Question
propos'd
about
Phalaris
,
't
is
easily
answer'd
:
For
Tyrants
aren't
Members
of
Human
Society
;
but
rather
its
greatest
and
most
pestilent
Enemies
;
nor
is
it
unnatural
,
if
it
lie
in
one's
power
,
to
Rob
that
Man
,
whom
't
is
even
a
Virtue
and
a
Glory
to
Murder
.
And
't
were
heartily
to
be
wish'd
,
That
this
whole
destructive
and
impious
Race
,
were
utterly
banish'd
and
excluded
from
amongst
Men.
Just
as
we
cut
off
those
Members
of
the
Body
,
which
have
got
no
longer
either
Bloud
or
Spirits
in
'em
,
and
serve
but
to
infect
and
corrupt
the
rest
;
so
should
those
Monsters
,
which
under
the
Shape
and
Outside
of
Men
,
conceal
all
the
Savageness
and
Cruelty
of
Beasts
,
be
cut
off
,
as
it
were
,
and
separated
from
the
Body
and
Society
of
Mankind
.
[
f
](A33176-e53520-b)
f
These
Words
shew
what
has
been
the
Drift
and
Design
of
his
Discourse
from
chap.
4.
[
See
there
Noteh.
]
viz.
To
shew
how
we
should
determin
our selves
in
those
particular
Cases
,
where
the
Knowledge
of
our
Duty
depends
so
much
upon
Times
and
Circumstances
;
as
in
the
Instance
there
given
of
Murdering
a
Tyrant
,
tho'
a
familiar
Friend
.
He
now
takes
again
the
Thread
of
his
Discourse
.
Of
much
the
same
Nature
are
all
those
Questions
,
in
which
the
Knowledge
and
Understanding
of
our
Duty
,
depends
upon
the
Knowledge
of
Times
and
Circumstances
.
CHAP.
VII
.
Cicero
will
finish
what
Panaetius
left
imperfect
.
All
his
Decisions
taken
from
this
Principle
,
That
Honesty
alone
,
or
at
least
chiefly
,
is
desireable
for
its
own
sake
.
The
true
Meaning
of
Panaetius
,
in
making
Profit
and
Honesty
be
compar'd
with
one
another
.
I
Believe
then
Panaetius
would
have
discours'd
upon
such
things
as
these
,
but
that
some
Accident
,
or
perhaps
other
Business
,
put
a
stop
to
his
Designs
.
However
there
are
Precepts
enough
laid
down
in
his
former
Books
,
to
resolve
all
Scruples
and
Doubts
concerning
'em
;
from
which
we
may
learn
,
What
that
is
which
is
Wicked
,
and
therefore
to
be
avoided
;
and
what
that
,
which
therefore
is
not
to
be
avoided
,
because
not
at
such
Times
,
and
in
such
Cases
wicked
.
But
since
I
am
going
(
as
it
were
)
to
crown
[
a
](A33176-e53700-b)
a
He
means
Panaetius's
Work
about
Duties
,
which
(
as
before
was
observ'd
)
he
left
imperfect
:
and
Cicero
in
this
Book
designs
to
add
,
what
Panaetius
either
would
not
,
or
for
some
reason
could
not
finish
.
a
Work
,
which
was
left
imperfect
by
the
Author
of
it
,
tho'
wanting
but
little
of
being
brought
to
Perfection
;
I
shall
follow
the
Method
of
the
Geometricians
:
And
as
they
don't
use
to
demonstrate
every
thing
,
but
demand
to
have
some
things
allow'd
'em
before-hand
,
by
the
help
of
which
they
more
easily
explain
and
demonstrate
their
Designs
:
so
I
demand
of
you
,
Son
Mark
,
if
you
can
,
to
grant
me
this
following
Postulatum
,
That
nothing
is
desirable
for
it self
alone
,
but
that
which
is
Honest
:
Or
however
,
if
[
b
](A33176-e53780-b)
b
For
being
a
Peripatetick
he
could
only
allow
that
,
which
immediately
follows
,
That
Honesty
is
much
the
most
desirable
Good
:
not
,
That
't
is
the
only
one
,
which
was
the
Stoick
Opinion
.
Cratippus
won't
permit
you
to
do
that
;
yet
at
least
,
I
am
sure
,
you
must
grant
me
this
which
follows
,
That
Honesty
is
desirable
for
its
own
sake
,
above
all
things
in
the
World
:
Either
of
the
two
is
sufficient
for
my
Purpose
,
and
the
one
is
probable
as
well
as
the
other
,
and
[
c
](A33176-e53860-b)
c
Viz.
Not
the
Opinions
of
Epicurus
,
Hieronymus
Rhodius
,
&c.
nothing
else
beside
them
is
so
upon
this
Subject
.
And
here
in
the
first
place
we
must
do
Right
to
Panaetius
:
who
does
not
say
,
(
as
indeed
he
ought
not
)
That
that
,
which
is
Profitable
,
could
ever
be
contrary
to
that
,
which
is
Honest
;
but
only
that
,
which
has
the
appearance
of
such
.
And
he
often
avows
,
That
nothing
is
Profitable
,
but
that
which
is
Honest
;
and
,
That
whatever
is
Honest
is
at
the
same
time
Profitable
:
and
declares
their
Opinion
,
who
first
made
a
difference
between
those
two
,
to
be
the
greatest
Evil
that
ever
yet
spread
it self
abroad
amongst
Men.
Therefore
when
he
speaks
of
a
Contrariety
between
them
,
he
means
an
appearing
,
and
not
a
real
one
;
which
he
therefore
laid
down
for
one
of
the
Heads
of
his
Discourse
,
not
as
tho'
't
were
lawful
for
Men
ever
to
give
Profit
the
Preference
before
Honesty
;
but
only
that
they
might
be
able
to
determin
themselves
aright
,
if
these
two
at
any
time
should
seem
to
interfere
and
be
inconsistent
with
one
another
.
This
Part
therefore
,
which
he
has
omitted
,
I
shall
now
supply
;
not
with
any
borrow'd
Assistance
from
others
,
but
purely
(
as
we
say
)
by
my
own
Strength
.
For
I
never
had
any
thing
come
to
my
Hands
upon
this
Subject
,
that
I
could
any
ways
approve
of
,
since
the
time
of
Panaetius
.
CHAP.
VIII
.
What
we
ought
to
do
,
when
any
thing
presents
it self
under
the
appearance
of
Profit
.
Proof
that
whatever
is
Profitable
must
also
be
Honest
,
and
whatever
is
Honest
must
also
be
Profitable
.
The
contrary
Opinion
the
great
Source
of
all
Wickedness
.
Infamy
a
certain
Punishment
of
Villany
.
'T
is
a
Wickedness
even
to
deliberate
whether
Profit
should
be
preferr'd
before
Honesty
,
or
not
.
Nothing
to
be
done
out
of
hopes
of
being
conceal'd
.
WHenever
[
a
](A33176-e54050-b)
a
Having
laid
down
his
Postulatum
,
That
Honesty
is
the
only
,
or
at
least
chief
Good
:
He
proceeds
now
to
draw
some
Conclusions
from
it
;
as
first
,
That
however
a
thing
may
carry
the
appearance
of
Profit
along
with
it
,
yet
it
is
to
be
rejected
if
it
have
any
Dishonesty
in
it
:
because
it
would
deprive
us
of
our
Virtue
or
Honesty
,
which
is
our
greatest
,
if
not
sole
Good
;
and
consequently
however
it
may
bring
us
Riches
,
Pleasures
,
&c.
must
be
really
unprofitable
.
For
't
is
impossible
there
should
be
any
Profit
,
where
the
Loss
is
Honesty
.
therefore
any
thing
comes
in
our
View
,
which
carries
the
appearance
of
Profit
along
with
it
,
we
can't
but
immediately
be
somewhat
affected
with
it
:
But
if
,
upon
taking
a
nearer
View
,
we
find
there
is
any
thing
Base
and
Dishonest
,
in
that
which
appear'd
to
be
Profitable
at
first
,
't
is
our
Duty
to
reject
it
:
Which
is
not
to
deprive
us
of
what
is
really
Profitable
,
but
only
to
let
us
understand
,
That
nothing
Dishonest
can
possibly
be
such
.
Now
if
nothing
[
b
](A33176-e54150-b)
b
He
shews
that
,
Whatever
is
truely
Profitable
must
be
Honest
also
;
since
Profit
and
Dishonesty
(
being
one
of
'em
contrary
,
and
the
other
agreeable
to
Nature
)
can
never
meet
both
in
the
same
Action
:
and
therefore
in
rejecting
Pleasures
,
Riches
or
Kingdoms
,
&c.
when
accompany'd
with
Dishonesty
,
we
don't
reject
what
is
really
our
Interest
,
but
only
that
which
appears
to
be
so
.
be
so
contrary
to
Nature
as
Baseness
,
and
nothing
so
agreeable
to
Nature
as
true
Profit
,
(
which
is
certainly
so
;
for
she
always
desires
what
is
Right
,
and
Becoming
,
and
Consistent
with
it self
,
and
abhors
the
contrary
)
then
it
necessarily
follows
,
That
whatever
is
Profitable
can
ne're
have
any
Baseness
,
or
Dishonesty
annex'd
to
it
.
Again
,
[
c
](A33176-e54250-b)
c
Having
shewn
that
,
Whatever
is
Profitable
must
also
be
Honest
;
he
here
shews
back
again
,
That
what
ever
is
Honest
must
also
be
Profitable
;
upon
which
two
Propositions
all
this
Book
is
grounded
.
If
we
were
born
for
Virtue
or
Honesty
,
and
this
be
the
only
desirable
Good
;
(
as
[
d
](A33176-e54290-b)
d
Founder
of
the
Stoick
Sect
;
sirnam'd
Cittieus
,
from
Cittium
,
a
Town
in
Cyprus
,
where
he
was
born
.
Zeno
would
have
it
)
or
at
least
so
much
more
,
so
,
than
ey'ry
thing
else
,
as
to
outweigh
all
that
can
be
put
in
the
Scale
against
it
;
(
which
was
Aristotle's
Opinion
)
it
must
certainly
follow
,
That
Honesty
's
the
only
,
or
however
the
greatest
Good
:
Now
whatever
is
Good
must
certainly
be
Profitable
;
from
whence
it
follows
,
That
whatever
is
Honest
must
also
certainly
be
Profitable
.
'T
is
a
villanous
Error
of
some
naughty
Men
therefore
,
when
any
thing
strikes
'em
with
an
appearance
of
Profit
,
to
seize
it
immediately
and
enjoy
it
as
such
,
without
ever
considering
its
relation
to
Honesty
.
Hence
come
Assassinations
,
Poysonings
,
and
making
of
false
Wills
:
Hence
Stealing
,
Embezling
the
Publick
Monies
,
Plundring
and
Oppressing
both
Citizens
and
Confederates
:
Hence
the
unsufferable
Power
and
Insolence
,
which
some
Men
exercise
,
who
are
grown
too
great
for
the
rest
of
their
Citizens
:
In
fine
,
Hence
Ambition
,
and
the
Desire
of
Rule
,
have
produc'd
their
most
cursed
and
deplorable
Effects
,
even
in
free
Commonwealths
;
than
which
nothing
can
be
thought
of
more
odious
and
detestable
.
For
Men
look
upon
the
fancied
Advantages
of
things
thro'
a
false
Perspective
;
but
as
for
the
Punishment
appendant
to
'em
,
(
I
don't
mean
of
the
Laws
,
which
they
frequently
break
thro'
;
but
of
Baseness
and
Dishonesty
,
which
is
much
the
more
grievous
)
that
,
I
say
,
they
never
so
much
as
think
upon
at
all
.
Such
People
therefore
are
impious
and
abominable
,
and
deserve
to
be
excluded
from
all
Society
,
who
deliberate
with
themselves
,
and
make
it
Matter
of
Doubt
,
Whether
they
should
choose
what
they
see
to
be
Honest
,
or
wilfully
commit
what
they
know
to
be
a
Villany
.
For
the
very
making
a
Question
of
such
a
thing
is
Criminal
,
tho'
one
should
not
proceed
so
far
as
to
Execution
.
Those
things
therefore
ought
not
to
be
deliberated
at
all
upon
,
where
the
very
Deliberation
is
Scandalous
and
Dishonest
.
[
e
](A33176-e54440-b)
e
He
now
proceeds
to
a
second
Conclusion
,
drawn
from
his
general
Principle
laid
down
,
which
is
,
Never
to
venture
upon
any
thing
that
's
Ill
,
out
of
Hopes
of
being
conceal'd
:
For
if
Dishonesty
be
of
it self
the
greatest
Evil
,
't
is
not
the
being
conceal'd
that
can
make
it
otherwise
.
This
he
illustrates
by
an
excellent
Fable
,
taken
out
of
the
second
Book
of
Plato
de
Repub.
toward
the
beginning
.
And
whene're
we
do
deliberate
upon
any
kind
of
Subject
,
we
should
never
do
any
thing
out
of
Hope
,
and
Expectation
,
that
our
Actions
will
be
conceal'd
:
For
we
ought
to
take
this
as
a
constant
Maxim
,
if
we
pretend
to
have
made
any
progress
in
Philosophy
,
That
tho'
we
could
hide
from
the
Eyes
of
all
Men
,
and
even
of
the
Gods
themselves
,
whatever
we
go
about
;
yet
we
should
be
careful
to
abstain
from
the
Vices
of
Covetousness
and
Injustice
,
of
Lasciviousness
and
Incontinency
.
CHAP.
IX
.
He
illustrates
his
Rule
laid
down
in
the
former
Chapter
with
the
Story
of
Gyges
,
taken
out
of
Plato
.
He
shews
himself
a
Villain
,
who
acknowledges
he
would
do
wickedly
,
if
he
could
with
Secrecy
.
TO
this
purpose
Plato
brings
in
that
remarkable
Story
of
[
a
](A33176-e54570-b)
a
He
was
a
Friend
and
Favorite
to
Candaules
,
King
of
Lydia
,
who
having
an
extraordinary
beautiful
Wife
,
was
continually
bragging
of
her
,
and
would
needs
have
Gyges
look
upon
her
naked
.
At
which
the
Queen
was
so
provok'd
,
as
that
she
perswaded
Gyges
to
murder
Candaules
;
which
he
did
,
and
obtain'd
both
his
Wife
and
Kingdom
after
him
.
His
performing
this
with
very
great
Ease
by
the
Wife's
Assistance
,
gave
Plato
occasion
to
invent
this
Fable
.
Gyges
:
A
Gaping
in
the
Earth
being
made
by
reason
of
some
violent
Showers
,
as
the
Story
tells
us
,
Gyges
went
down
into
the
hollow
of
it
,
and
found
there
lying
a
brazen
Horse
,
with
a
Door
in
his
side
.
This
he
open'd
,
and
looking
in
,
discover'd
a
dead
Man's
Body
,
of
an
unusual
bulk
,
with
a
Ring
of
Gold
upon
one
of
its
Fingers
.
This
he
pulls
off
,
and
puts
it
upon
his
own
Finger
;
and
then
coming
up
,
goes
and
joyns
himself
to
the
rest
of
the
Shepherds
;
(
for
he
was
Shepherd
to
the
King
at
that
time
.
)
Here
he
observ'd
,
That
upon
turning
the
Stone
toward
the
Palm
of
his
Hand
,
he
became
invisible
to
every
body
else
,
tho'
others
did
not
become
so
to
him
;
and
that
upon
turning
it
to
its
proper
place
,
he
immediatly
became
visible
again
,
as
before
.
Making
use
therefore
of
this
lucky
Opportunity
,
he
found
out
a
way
to
enjoy
the
Queen
,
and
by
her
assistance
to
Murder
the
King
,
his
Lord
and
Master
,
and
to
make
away
those
,
who
might
prove
any
hindrance
or
stop
to
his
Designs
;
nor
could
any
one
possibly
see
or
discover
him
in
any
of
these
Villanies
;
so
that
he
quickly
,
by
the
help
of
this
Ring
,
from
a
simple
Shepherd
became
King
of
Lydia
.
Now
had
a
truly
Wise
Man
had
the
keeping
of
this
Ring
,
he
would
not
have
thought
himself
ever
the
more
priviledg'd
to
be
guilty
of
any
Action
that
is
wicked
or
detestable
:
For
good
Men
desire
to
be
Virtuous
and
Honest
,
and
not
to
be
Secret
,
that
so
they
may
Sin
without
Danger
.
And
here
some
Philosophers
,
Men
of
more
Honesty
,
than
Acuteness
or
Subtilty
,
cry
out
,
That
this
Story
of
Plato
's
is
a
meer
Fiction
:
As
tho'
he
had
said
either
that
it
really
was
,
or
indeed
could
be
done
.
No
;
the
Meaning
and
Design
of
this
Example
of
Gyges
,
and
the
Ring
,
is
this
:
Suppose
you
could
do
any
dishonest
Action
,
for
the
gratifying
a
lustful
,
covetous
or
ambitious
Desire
,
so
as
that
no
one
living
could
either
know
or
suspect
it
,
but
both
Gods
and
Men
must
be
kept
perfectly
in
Ignorance
;
whether
in
such
case
,
would
you
do
it
,
or
no
?
Ay
,
but
,
say
they
,
this
is
an
impossible
Case
:
tho'
't
is
not
perhaps
so
impossible
neither
:
But
that
which
I
ask
'em
is
,
What
they
would
do
,
supposing
that
possible
,
which
they
deny
now
to
be
so
?
The
manner
of
their
Arguing
is
somewhat
odd
and
illiterate
;
for
they
still
deny
the
Possibility
of
it
,
and
that
they
will
stand
to
;
not
it
seems
,
understanding
what
the
Force
and
true
Import
of
this
Supposition
is
.
For
when
we
put
the
Question
to
'em
,
Whether
they
would
do
such
an
Action
,
or
not
,
supposing
they
could
conceal
it
?
we
don't
ask
'em
,
Whether
they
can
conceal
it
,
or
not
?
but
put
'em
,
as
't
were
,
to
the
Rack
or
Inquisition
;
that
so
,
if
they
say
they
would
gratifie
such
Desires
upon
assurance
of
Impunity
,
we
may
know
'em
to
be
Villains
by
their
own
Confession
:
But
if
they
deny
it
,
they
may
be
forc'd
to
grant
,
that
every
base
and
dishonest
Action
,
is
,
barely
as
such
,
to
be
shun'd
and
detested
.
But
to
return
to
our
Purpose
,
from
which
we
have
digressed
.
CHAP.
X.
Several
Cases
,
wherein
Men
doubt
,
whether
that
which
appears
to
be
Profitable
be
not
Honest.
The
Case
of
Brutus
banishing
Collatinus
;
of
Romulus
murdering
his
Brother
Remus
.
Men
may
do
what
's
for
their
own
Advantage
,
provided
they
do
no
Injury
to
another
.
An
excellent
Saying
of
Chrysippus
to
that
purpose
.
How
far
a
Man
may
honestly
,
and
ought
to
go
,
upon
a
Friend's
Account
:
Illustrated
by
the
Example
of
Damon
and
Pinthias
,
two
loving
Friends
.
[
a
](A33176-e54910-b)
a
He
has
shewn
in
the
two
last
Chapters
,
That
when
an
Action
is
certainly
Dishonest
,
't
is
impious
to
deliberate
whether
we
shall
do
it
,
or
not
;
or
to
hope
for
Secresie
,
that
so
we
might
do
it
without
Danger
;
whatever
seeming
Profit
,
such
as
Kingdoms
,
&c.
it
may
bring
along
with
it
.
He
now
proceeds
to
determin
some
Cases
,
wherein
't
is
doubted
whether
the
Action
be
Honest
,
or
not
.
As
first
,
The
desire
of
Honour
,
Empire
,
&c.
is
apt
to
blind
Peoples
Eyes
,
and
either
make
'em
in
suspence
about
the
Justice
of
an
Action
;
as
in
the
Case
of
Brutus
:
or
even
Act
plainly
contrary
to
Justice
and
Conscience
,
as
Romulus
did
.
THere
frequently
happen
a
great
many
Cases
,
which
disturb
Mens
Minds
,
and
put
'em
into
suspence
,
by
the
shew
of
some
Profit
which
they
seem
to
contain
in
'em
.
Not
when
Men
deliberate
,
Whether
they
should
leave
and
abandon
their
Honesty
,
for
the
sake
of
any
Profit
,
be
it
never
so
great
;
(
for
that
's
a
peice
of
Wickedness
,
as
was
before
observ'd
)
but
,
Whether
that
Action
,
which
appears
to
be
Profitable
,
mayn't
safely
be
done
without
transgressing
against
Honesty
.
It
might
not
seem
honest
in
[
b
](A33176-e55010-b)
b
The
first
Consul
of
Rome
,
after
the
Expulsion
of
King
Tarquinius
Superbus
.
L.
Tarquinius
Collatinus
was
his
Collegue
,
who
had
been
Husband
to
Lucretia
,
and
assisting
to
Brutus
in
Expelling
the
King
.
However
Collatinus
,
upon
the
Senate's
commanding
it
,
was
depriv'd
of
his
Consulship
,
and
expell'd
the
City
by
Brutus
,
only
because
he
was
of
the
Name
and
Family
of
Tarquinius
Superbus
.
See
Livy
,
and
Plutarch
's
Poplicola
.
Brutus
,
for
Example
,
to
depose
Collatinus
his
Brother-Consul
from
his
Office
;
whose
Wisdom
and
Conduct
he
himself
had
made
use
of
in
Expelling
the
Kings
.
But
since
the
chief
Men
in
the
Government
had
so
order'd
,
That
the
Kindred
of
[
c
](A33176-e55130-b)
c
The
last
King
of
the
Romans
,
so
call'd
for
his
Pride
and
Haughtiness
.
He
was
expell'd
his
Kingdom
by
Brutus
,
&c.
and
at
last
dy'd
in
Exile
.
Superbus
,
and
very
Name
of
the
Tarquins
,
should
be
banish'd
the
City
,
and
no
Marks
or
Footsteps
be
suffer'd
to
remain
of
Monarchical
Government
;
't
was
not
only
Profitable
,
thus
to
consult
for
the
Safety
of
his
Country
,
but
so
Honest
too
,
as
that
Collatinus
himself
ought
joyfully
to
have
acquiesc'd
in
it
.
That
which
was
Profitable
therefore
prevail'd
,
because
't
was
Honest
withal
;
which
had
it
not
been
,
it
could
never
have
been
Profitable
.
I
can't
say
the
same
in
relation
to
[
d
](A33176-e55190-b)
d
Romulus
the
Founder
of
Rome
.
The
Historians
generally
tell
us
,
That
as
he
was
building
the
Walls
of
his
City
,
his
Brother
Remus
(
who
himself
was
founding
a
City
just
by
)
came
to
see
his
Work
;
and
leaping
with
Scorn
and
Contempt
over
his
new
Wall
,
was
murder'd
by
Romulus
for
that
Affront
.
But
Cicero
,
it
seems
,
thought
there
was
something
more
in
it
,
viz.
That
he
might
Reign
alone
.
that
King
,
by
whom
this
City
was
first
founded
:
For
a
bare
shew
of
Profit
got
the
better
over
him
,
when
he
imbrew'd
his
Hands
in
the
Blood
of
his
own
Brother
,
because
it
seem'd
more
Profitable
to
Reign
by
himself
,
than
in
Conjunction
with
another
:
He
broke
all
the
Ties
both
of
brotherly
Affection
and
common
Humanity
,
for
the
obtaining
of
an
End
,
which
appear'd
to
be
Profitable
,
and
yet
really
was
not
so
.
He
pretended
however
,
for
a
shew
of
Honesty
,
that
't
was
done
to
revenge
an
Affront
of
his
Brother's
,
who
leapt
with
Contempt
over
his
new-rais'd
Wall
;
a
frivolous
Excuse
,
and
if
true
,
not
sufficient
to
serve
his
turn
:
By
his
Favour
therefore
,
whether
[
e
](A33176-e55260-b)
e
A
Name
given
by
the
Romans
to
Romulus
,
after
he
was
suppos'd
to
be
taken
up
into
Heaven
,
and
enroll'd
in
the
number
of
the
Gods
.
Quirinus
or
Romulus
,
I
can't
but
think
he
did
a
very
ill
Action
.
Not
that
Men
are
bound
to
be
careless
of
their
own
Interests
,
or
to
part
with
that
to
others
,
which
themselves
stand
in
need
of
;
but
ev'ry
one
may
do
what
he
thinks
for
his
own
Advantage
,
provided
it
be
no
Injury
or
Prejudice
to
another
Person
.
[
f
](A33176-e55310-b)
f
A
Stoick
Philosopher
,
one
of
the
chief
Upholders
of
that
Sect
,
Scholar
of
Cleanthes
,
so
famous
for
Logick
as
that
't
was
usually
said
,
If
the
Gods
were
to
make
use
of
Logick
,
't
would
be
that
of
Chrysippus
.
Cicero
often
quotes
him
,
and
says
,
He
was
a
Man
of
a
sharp
Wit
,
and
very
curious
in
all
History
.
He
left
Seven
Hundred
Volumes
,
of
which
Three
Hundred
were
Logick
behind
him
,
which
are
all
lost
.
The
Athenians
had
so
great
a
Value
for
him
,
as
that
they
put
up
his
Statue
in
a
place
of
their
City
call'd
Ceramicus
.
Chrysippus
,
amongst
a
great
many
very
good
Sayings
,
has
this
one
in
particular
:
He
that
's
running
a
Race
ought
to
strive
and
endeavour
,
says
he
,
as
much
as
he
is
able
,
to
get
before
his
Antagonist
;
but
must
not
trip
his
Heels
up
,
or
thrust
him
aside
with
his
Hands
:
So
in
Life
't
is
allowable
,
that
every
one
should
get
what
is
useful
and
convenient
for
his
comfortable
Subsistence
,
but
't
is
not
so
to
take
it
away
from
other
People
.
[
g
](A33176-e55420-b)
g
As
People
may
sometimes
be
drawn
to
do
wickedly
for
the
sake
of
Honour
,
Reigning
alone
,
&c.
so
may
they
also
for
the
sake
of
a
Friend
:
concerning
which
he
gives
one
short
and
excellent
Rule
;
Never
to
prefer
,
&c.
But
't
is
no
no where
more
difficult
to
keep
to
one's
Duty
,
than
in
the
Affair
of
Friendship
:
For
as
not
to
do
every
thing
that
one
handsomly
can
,
for
the
sake
of
a
Friend
;
so
to
do
any
thing
that
's
Base
or
Dishonest
,
are
both
of
'em
equally
contrary
to
one's
Duty
.
But
there
's
one
very
short
and
yet
easie
Rule
,
which
may
serve
to
direct
us
in
all
Cases
of
this
nature
;
and
't
is
this
,
Never
to
prefer
that
which
only
seems
Profitable
,
such
as
Honours
,
Riches
,
Pleasures
,
and
the
like
,
before
a
Kindness
to
a
Friend
:
but
never
to
do
any
thing
for
the
sake
of
a
Friend
,
that
's
an
Injury
to
the
Publick
,
or
a
Breach
of
one's
Oath
,
or
other
solemn
Engagement
:
For
whoever
does
this
,
't
is
impossible
he
should
ever
be
a
good
Man
.
Should
such
a
one
therefore
be
Judge
in
his
Friend's
Case
,
he
would
not
by
any
means
be
biass'd
in
his
Favour
,
but
would
wholly
lay
aside
the
Person
of
a
Friend
,
as
soon
as
he
took
upon
him
that
of
a
Judge
.
Perhaps
he
might
do
so
much
for
Friendship
sake
,
as
to
wish
that
his
Friend
may
have
the
juster
Cause
;
and
allow
him
as
long
time
to
speak
for
himself
,
as
[
h
](A33176-e55470-b)
h
For
there
was
a
Law
amongst
the
Romans
,
allowing
the
Plaintiff
but
so
many
Hours
to
speak
in
;
and
the
Defendant
one
more
.
the
Laws
will
permit
of
:
but
when
he
's
to
give
in
his
Sentence
[
i
](A33176-e55490-b)
i
For
the
Judges
among
the
Romans
were
sworn
always
to
Judge
impartially
.
upon
Oath
,
he
'll
then
remember
that
he
calls
God
to
Witness
,
that
is
,
(
I
conceive
)
his
own
[
k
](A33176-e55510-b)
k
For
the
Soul
or
Conscience
,
according
to
the
Ancients
,
is
nothing
but
a
kind
of
God
in
us
,
and
the
Voice
of
one
is
indeed
the
Voice
of
the
other
.
Hence
Plato
call'd
all
wicked
Men
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
Atheists
,
for
acting
in
opposition
to
their
Reason
and
Conscience
,
that
is
,
to
the
God
dwelling
within
them
.
Soul
and
Conscience
,
the
divinest
thing
that
God
has
granted
to
Man
.
'T
is
a
good
Custom
therefore
we
have
receiv'd
from
our
Ancestors
,
if
we
did
but
observe
it
,
of
Desiring
the
Judge
to
be
as
favourable
to
us
,
as
his
Oath
will
permit
him
.
The
meaning
of
which
Request
is
no
more
than
this
,
That
he
'd
do
so
much
for
us
,
as
I
just
now
said
might
very
honestly
be
done
by
a
Judge
for
his
Friend
.
For
if
Men
were
oblig'd
to
do
every
thing
presently
,
that
their
Friends
should
desire
of
'em
;
such
Agreements
as
these
ought
to
be
counted
not
Friendships
,
but
dangerous
Conspiracies
.
I
speak
here
only
of
the
ordinary
sort
of
Friendships
;
for
[
l
](A33176-e55560-b)
l
Because
Men
of
perfect
Wisdom
will
never
desire
any
thing
,
but
what
is
Honest
and
Reasonable
,
one
of
another
.
in
those
which
are
found
between
perfectly
Wise
Men
,
there
can
be
no
danger
of
any
such
thing
.
[
m
](A33176-e55570-b)
m
A
famous
pair
of
Friends
,
and
often
mention'd
as
such
by
ancient
Writers
.
See
Valer.
Max.
Plutarch
,
&c.
Damon
and
Pinthias
,
two
of
Pythagoras's
Followers
,
were
so
closely
united
to
one
another
in
their
Affections
,
that
when
Dicnysius
the
Sicilian
Tyrant
had
appointed
a
time
wherein
one
of
'em
should
die
,
and
the
Party
condemn'd
had
beg'd
a
few
Days
respite
,
wherein
he
might
provide
for
his
Children
and
Family
,
and
recommend
'em
to
Somebody
,
who
would
take
care
of
'em
after
his
Death
;
the
other
deliver'd
up
himself
in
his
stead
,
voluntarily
to
die
in
the
room
of
his
Friend
,
if
he
did
not
accordingly
make
his
Appearance
.
The
Prisoner
came
back
at
the
Day
appointed
,
in
order
to
his
Execution
:
which
the
Tyrant
perceiving
,
was
so
greatly
amaz'd
at
their
extraordinary
Faithfulness
,
as
to
desire
he
might
be
admitted
a
third
Man
in
their
Friendship
.
In
Friendship
therefore
,
when
that
which
seems
Profitable
comes
into
competition
with
that
which
is
Honest
,
the
latter
should
always
be
preferr'd
before
the
former
:
but
Faith
and
Religion
should
be
preferr'd
before
Friendship
,
whenever
it
demands
any
thing
that
is
not
reconcilable
with
Virtue
and
Honesty
.
Which
one
Rule
,
if
but
carefully
attended
to
,
is
sufficient
for
the
Purpose
we
are
now
upon
;
which
is
to
discover
,
upon
every
occasion
,
what
are
those
Duties
which
Friendship
requires
of
us
.
CHAP.
XI
.
In
the
Management
of
Publick
Affairs
,
the
appearance
of
Profit
makes
Men
relinquish
Honesty
.
Several
Examples
of
it
.
Examples
of
the
contrary
,
when
the
appearance
of
Profit
is
rejected
for
the
sake
of
Honesty
.
[
a
](A33176-e55720-b)
a
Having
shewn
how
far
the
Love
of
Empire
,
Friends
,
&c.
draws
particular
Men
from
their
Duty
:
he
now
goes
to
shew
,
How
whole
Republicks
have
been
drawn
to
what
is
ill
,
by
the
appearance
of
some
pretended
Profit
.
THe
appearance
of
Profit
is
also
an
occasion
,
in
publick
Affairs
,
of
making
false
Steps
,
and
doing
several
things
that
are
contrary
to
Duty
.
Thus
our
Fathers
,
for
Instance
,
did
ill
in
destroying
and
razing
of
Corinth
.
The
Athenians
yet
worse
in
making
an
Order
,
That
the
People
of
[
b
](A33176-e55760-b)
b
A
little
Island
in
the
Sinus
Saronicus
,
almost
over-against
the
Piraeum
,
a
Port
of
Athens
,
somewhat
distant
from
the
City
,
but
joyn'd
to
it
by
a
mighty
Wall
,
built
by
Themistocles
.
Aegina
should
all
have
their
Thumbs
cut
off
,
because
they
were
powerful
with
their
Navies
at
Sea
.
This
,
no
question
,
was
thought
a
profitable
Decree
;
for
Aegina
seem'd
to
threaten
their
Port
Piraeum
,
by
reason
of
its
nearness
:
But
nothing
can
truely
be
Profitable
,
that
's
Cruel
;
for
the
Nature
of
Man
,
which
we
ought
to
follow
as
the
Guide
of
our
Actions
,
of
all
things
in
the
World
is
most
opposite
to
Cruelty
.
Those
do
ill
likewise
,
who
banish
all
Strangers
,
and
forbid
'em
the
City
;
as
[
c
](A33176-e55840-b)
c
M.
Junius
Pennus
,
a
Tribune
of
the
People
about
the
Year
of
Rome
657.
'T
is
quoted
by
some
under
the
Name
of
Lex
Petronia
.
Pennus
did
in
the
preceeding
Age
,
and
[
d
](A33176-e55890-b)
d
C.
Papius
,
Tribune
of
the
People
An.
U.
C.
688
,
two
Years
before
Cicero
was
Consul
.
Papius
but
lately
.
For
tho'
't
is
but
fair
,
that
he
who
's
no
Citizen
should
not
have
the
Priviledges
of
those
who
are
;
(
which
was
made
into
a
[
e
](A33176-e55940-b)
e
In
the
Year
of
Rome
658
,
call'd
,
Lex
Licinia
&
Mucia
.
See
Note
on
chap.
17.
of
this
Book
.
Law
by
two
very
wise
Consuls
,
viz.
Crassus
and
S●aevola
)
yet
wholly
to
exclude
'em
from
having
any
thing
to
do
there
,
[
f
](A33176-e56000-b)
f
This
is
true
,
provided
those
Strangers
live
peceably
under
the
Government
,
and
no
ways
prejudice
or
endanger
the
State
;
for
then
to
let
'em
live
there
is
a
thing
innoxiae
utilitatis
:
Otherwise
there
are
several
Cases
,
wherein
't
is
allowable
to
expel
Strangers
from
a
City
.
is
plainly
against
the
Dictates
and
Laws
of
Humanity
.
And
as
these
things
are
bad
in
the
Government
of
a
State
,
so
nothing's
more
splendid
and
glorious
on
the
other
hand
,
than
for
that
,
which
appears
to
be
the
Interest
of
the
Publick
,
to
be
rejected
in
the
comparison
with
Justice
and
Honesty
.
Our
own
Commonwealth
can
abundantly
supply
us
with
[
g
](A33176-e56020-b)
g
Some
Examples
of
the
contrary
Practice
,
of
those
that
would
not
suffer
a
seeming
Advantage
to
make
them
do
any
thing
contrary
to
their
Duty
.
Examples
of
this
nature
,
as
on
other
occasions
,
so
more
especially
in
the
second
Punick
War
:
when
after
the
loss
of
that
fatal
Day
at
Cannae
,
it
shew'd
more
courage
and
bravery
of
Resolution
,
than
ever
it
had
done
upon
the
greatest
Successes
.
There
was
not
any
sign
of
Faint-heartedness
seen
,
nor
ever
any
mention
of
Peace
once
heard
of
:
so
great
is
the
glory
and
brightness
of
Honesty
,
as
that
it
utterly
overwhelms
the
appearance
of
Interest
.
[
h
](A33176-e56050-b)
h
See
Plutarch
's
Life
of
Themistocles
.
The
Athenians
knowing
they
should
never
be
able
to
resist
the
Persians
,
resolv'd
by
consent
to
abandon
their
City
,
and
carrying
their
Wives
and
their
Children
to
[
i
](A33176-e56100-b)
i
A
City
of
Peloponnesus
,
in
Alliance
with
the
Athenians
.
Troezene
,
to
defend
by
Sea
the
Liberties
of
Greece
:
and
when
one
Cyrsilus
try'd
to
persuade
'em
not
to
leave
their
City
,
but
receive
Xerxes
into
it
,
they
took
him
and
ston'd
him
.
Not
but
that
the
Man
would
have
drawn
'em
to
a
thing
,
which
was
seemingly
Profitable
:
but
that
seeming
Profit
was
really
none
at
all
,
being
contrary
to
Honesty
.
Themistocles
,
[
k
](A33176-e56200-b)
k
At
the
Island
Salamis
,
mention'd
chap.
18.
Book
1.
after
that
notable
Victory
in
the
Persian
War
,
told
all
the
People
in
a
general
Assembly
,
That
he
had
thought
of
a
thing
,
which
might
prove
of
great
Use
and
Advantage
to
the
Publick
,
but
which
't
was
not
convenient
that
every
body
should
know
of
:
whereupon
he
desir'd
they
'd
appoint
him
some
Person
,
to
whom
he
might
safely
communicate
it
in
secret
.
Aristides
was
immediately
appointed
accordingly
:
Themistocles
told
him
,
'T
would
be
no
hard
matter
to
fire
in
private
the
Spartan
Fleet
,
which
was
laid
up
at
[
l
](A33176-e56310-b)
l
A
Port
of
the
Lacedaemonians
,
where
their
Fleet
was
laid
up
after
the
famous
Battel
at
Salamis
.
Gytheum
;
whereby
the
whole
Power
of
that
Republick
must
necessarily
be
ruin'd
.
Aristides
,
as
soon
as
he
knew
the
Business
,
went
back
into
the
Assembly
,
(
which
was
big
with
Expectation
of
what
he
had
to
say
)
and
let
'em
all
know
,
That
Themistocles
's
Counsel
indeed
was
Advantagious
,
but
by
no
means
Honest
or
Creditable
for
the
City
.
The
Athenians
therefore
,
thinking
what
was
Dishonest
not
to
be
truly
Profitable
,
rejected
immediately
the
whole
Proposal
,
without
having
heard
so
much
as
what
it
was
,
upon
nothing
else
but
this
Report
of
Aristides
.
How
much
better
and
more
honestly
did
they
do
,
than
we
;
who
can
suffer
even
Pirates
to
live
free
from
Molestation
,
and
yet
demand
Tribute
of
our
[
m
](A33176-e56390-b)
m
'T
is
probable
he
means
those
of
Marseilles
,
and
King
Deiotarus
;
whom
Caesar
either
depriv'd
of
their
Liberty
,
or
made
pay
great
Sums
of
Money
,
for
taking
part
with
Pompey
in
the
Civil
War
.
Confederates
and
Allies
?
CHAP.
XII
.
The
Opinion
,
that
a
thing
may
be
Profitable
,
tho'
't
is
not
Honest
,
very
pernicious
.
A
Case
put
,
wherein
't
is
doubted
,
Whether
that
,
which
seems
to
be
Profitable
,
be
Honest
or
no.
The
Arguments
on
either
side
,
of
two
Philosophers
,
differing
in
their
Opinions
.
The
Difference
between
to
Conceal
,
and
not
to
Tell.
The
Society
of
Mankind
,
how
far
it
obliges
.
LEt
us
lay
down
this
therefore
as
a
standing
Maxim
,
That
whatever
is
Dishonest
can
never
be
Profitable
:
no
,
not
tho'
we
should
arrive
at
the
full
possession
of
all
those
Advantages
,
which
we
propos'd
to
obtain
by
it
.
Nay
,
this
very
Persuasion
,
That
a
thing
may
be
Profitable
,
tho'
't
is
Base
and
Dishonest
,
is
one
of
the
greatest
Misfortunes
and
Calamities
,
that
could
ever
have
happen'd
to
the
Life
of
Man
.
[
a
](A33176-e56550-b)
a
He
now
proposes
several
particular
Cases
,
wherein
the
Philosophers
themselves
dispute
;
whether
Profit
and
Honesty
be
opposite
,
or
not
.
But
there
often
fall
out
(
as
was
before
observ'd
)
some
peculiar
Cases
,
wherein
that
which
is
Honest
has
a
seeming
Repugnance
with
that
which
is
Profitable
;
so
that
it
requires
some
farther
Consideration
,
to
know
whether
this
Repugnance
be
certain
and
real
,
or
whether
they
mayn't
be
brought
to
a
fair
Agreement
.
To
this
Head
belong
such
Examples
as
these
:
Suppose
we
,
for
Instance
,
an
honest
Merchant
,
when
Corn
was
scarce
and
extreamly
dear
at
Rhodes
,
to
bring
a
large
quantity
thither
from
Alexandria
;
and
withal
to
know
,
That
a
great
many
Ships
,
well
laden
with
Corn
,
were
in
their
way
thither
from
the
same
City
:
Should
he
tell
this
now
to
the
People
of
Rhodes
,
or
say
nothing
of
it
,
but
sell
his
own
Corn
at
the
best
Rates
he
could
?
We
suppose
him
a
Virtuous
and
Honest
Man
,
and
don
't
here
discourse
of
the
Deliberation
of
one
,
that
would
hold
his
peace
if
he
thought
't
were
Dishonest
;
but
of
one
,
that
doubts
whether
it
be
Dishonest
,
or
not
.
In
such
sort
of
Cases
[
b
](A33176-e56600-b)
b
Scholar
of
Zeno
the
Zidonian
,
born
at
Seleucia
a
Town
near
Babylon
,
and
thence
call'd
the
Babylonian
.
He
was
a
wise
Politician
as
well
as
a
Philosopher
;
and
was
sent
by
the
Athenians
,
together
with
Critolaus
and
Carneades
,
to
manage
their
Business
with
the
Roman
Senate
.
Here
he
got
acquainted
with
Africanus
the
Elder
,
the
Wise
Laelius
,
&c.
who
all
delighted
to
hear
his
Lectures
.
See
Cic.
de
Orat.
Book
2.
chap.
37.
Diogenes
the
Babylonian
,
a
Man
of
great
Credit
and
Note
among
the
Stoicks
,
is
of
one
Opinion
;
and
Antipater
his
Scholar
,
an
extraordinary
smart
and
ingenious
Man
,
of
just
the
contrary
.
Antipater
would
have
every
thing
be
plainly
told
,
that
so
the
Buyer
might
be
ignorant
of
nothing
in
what
he
buys
,
that
the
Seller
himself
knows
of
:
Diogenes
thinks
it
enough
in
the
Seller
,
to
tell
the
Faults
of
his
Goods
as
far
as
the
Laws
require
it
;
and
,
as
for
the
rest
,
tho'
to
use
no
Cozening
,
yet
,
since
he
's
come
with
design
to
sell
'em
,
to
get
as
much
Money
for
'em
as
ever
he
can
.
Here
,
may
the
Merchant
say
,
I
have
brought
my
Corn
;
I
have
expos'd
it
to
sale
;
and
sell
it
no
dearer
than
other
People
do
;
(
nay
perhaps
he
'll
say
cheaper
,
there
being
now
a
greater
quantity
,
than
there
was
before
)
and
pray
where
is
now
the
Wrong
I
have
done
to
any
Body
?
Antipater
argues
upon
a
different
Principle
:
What
say
you
,
(
quoth
he
)
are
not
you
oblig'd
to
do
Good
to
Mankind
;
and
be
serviceable
to
the
Society
of
all
Men
in
general
?
[
c
](A33176-e56870-b)
c
See
Book
1.
chap.
7
,
9.
Book
3.
chap.
5
,
6.
Were
not
you
born
under
such
an
Obligation
?
And
had
not
you
such
Principles
ingrafted
into
you
by
Nature
,
which
't
is
always
your
Duty
to
follow
and
obey
,
that
your
single
Interest
should
be
the
same
with
that
of
all
Men
;
and
again
that
of
all
Men
should
be
the
same
with
yours
?
And
will
you
,
this
notwithstanding
,
conceal
from
the
People
what
Plenty
there
is
a-coming
,
the
knowledge
of
which
might
be
of
so
great
Use
and
Advantage
to
'em
?
Diogenes
perhaps
will
reply
upon
him
thus
:
'T
is
one
thing
to
conceal
,
and
another
not
to
tell
;
nor
can
I
be
said
to
conceal
from
you
now
,
tho'
I
don't
tell
you
,
what
the
Nature
and
Essence
of
the
Gods
is
,
and
what
the
Happiness
or
chief
Good
of
Men
;
things
which
't
would
do
one
much
more
Kindness
to
know
,
than
that
Quantities
of
Corn
are
like
to
be
here
shortly
.
But
if
any
thing
be
Profitable
for
you
to
hear
,
't
is
none
of
my
Duty
to
come
and
tell
it
you
immediately
.
Nay
but
you
'll
find
that
it
is
your
Duty
,
(
may
the
other
reply
)
if
you
'll
piease
but
to
remember
,
That
there
's
such
a
kind
of
thing
,
as
a
mutual
Relation
,
and
Society
amongst
all
Men.
Well
,
I
do
remember
it
;
(
may
the
other
reply
again
)
but
,
I
pray
you
,
is
that
Society
of
such
a
Nature
,
as
that
no
Man
,
who
lives
in
it
,
must
have
any
thing
that
's
his
own
?
If
this
be
so
,
then
there
's
no
more
selling
,
but
we
must
e'en
give
every
thing
away
that
we
have
.
CHAP.
XIII
.
Another
Case
put
,
Whether
he
that
sells
a
bad
House
,
be
oblig'd
to
tell
the
Purchaser
't
is
so
?
The
Arguments
pro
and
con
of
Antipater
and
Diogenes
.
Cicero
's
Determination
of
it
,
as
also
of
that
in
the
foregoing
Chapter
.
What
't
is
properly
to
Conceal
.
YOu
plainly
perceive
,
that
't
is
never
once
said
in
all
this
Dispute
,
Tho'
such
a
thing
's
not
Honest
,
yet
I
'll
do
it
because
't
is
Profitable
:
but
the
[
a
](A33176-e57150-b)
a
Diogenes
.
one
side
defends
the
Expediency
of
it
,
no
farther
than
't
is
Honest
;
and
the
[
b
](A33176-e57170-b)
b
Antipater
.
other
denies
that
it
ought
to
be
done
,
because
't
is
not
Honest.
Again
,
Suppose
a
good
Man
were
to
sell
an
House
,
because
of
some
Defects
which
he
himself
knows
of
,
tho'
others
do
not
:
Suppose
it
to
be
unhealthy
,
for
Example
,
but
esteem'd
quite
the
contrary
;
Serpents
to
annoy
all
the
Chambers
of
it
,
but
no
body
to
know
this
;
made
of
bad
Materials
,
and
ready
to
fall
,
but
no
one
to
discern
this
except
the
Owner
only
:
I
demand
,
if
he
sells
this
for
more
than
he
expected
,
and
don
't
tell
the
Buyer
of
these
several
Faults
,
whether
he
don't
act
like
a
Knave
and
a
Villain
?
Yes
undoubtedly
,
answers
Antipater
:
For
what
is
this
better
,
than
not
to
set
a
Man
right
,
when
he
is
out
of
his
Way
,
(
which
at
Athens
was
punish'd
with
publick
[
c
](A33176-e57230-b)
c
A
kind
of
Curse
or
Excommunication
proclaim'd
solemnly
by
the
Priests
.
See
Plut.
and
Corn.
Nep.
Life
of
Alcibiad
.
Execrations
)
thus
to
suffer
the
Buyer
,
as
it
were
,
to
fall
headlong
,
and
run
thro'
a
Mistake
into
very
great
Mischiefs
.
Nay
,
't
is
something
worse
yet
than
not
to
shew
a
Man
his
Way
;
for
't
is
wilfully
and
designedly
to
draw
him
into
Mischief
.
Diogenes
on
the
contrary
vindicates
the
Seller
:
Pray
did
he
force
you
(
says
he
)
to
buy
his
House
,
when
did
he
so
much
as
advise
you
to
it
?
He
set
a
thing
to
sale
,
which
he
did
not
like
;
and
here
you
have
bought
a
thing
,
which
you
did
like
.
For
if
those
Men
,
who
make
it
be
publish'd
to
the
World
,
Here
's
a
very
good
House
,
and
very
well
built
,
to
be
sold
;
are
not
counted
Deceivers
,
tho'
the
House
be
not
good
,
nor
at
all
well
built
;
how
much
less
should
those
who
don't
commend
their
House
at
all
?
For
where-ever
the
Buyer
has
the
free
use
of
his
Judgment
,
what
Fraud
can
there
be
upon
the
Seller's
part
?
[
d
](A33176-e57350-b)
d
When
,
for
Example
,
he
causes
it
to
be
publish'd
,
Here
's
a
very
good
House
to
be
sold
;
he
is
not
bound
to
answer
for
its
Goodness
,
if
it
should
prove
otherwise
.
And
if
a
Man
is
not
bound
to
make
good
all
he
said
,
would
you
have
him
make
good
what
he
did
not
say
?
Beside
;
What
,
I
beseech
you
,
could
be
more
odd
and
foolish
,
than
for
the
Seller
to
tell
the
Faults
of
his
own
Wares
?
Or
what
more
ridiculous
,
than
for
the
Cryer
to
proclaim
by
the
Proprietor's
Order
,
An
infectious
,
pestilential
House
to
be
sold
?
And
thus
you
see
there
are
some
doubtful
Cases
,
in
which
on
the
one
hand
Men
argue
for
Honesty
,
and
on
the
other
are
Advocates
for
Profit
;
so
far
as
to
shew
,
that
't
is
not
only
Honest
to
do
that
which
is
Profitable
,
but
even
Dishonest
to
neglect
and
omit
it
:
And
this
is
that
seeming
Opposition
we
spoke
of
,
which
often
falls
out
between
Profit
and
Honesty
.
[
e
](A33176-e57420-b)
e
Having
propos'd
these
two
Cases
,
he
now
proceeds
to
the
Decision
of
'em
;
and
thinks
the
two
were
bound
to
tell
all
to
the
Purchasers
;
because
such
concealing
is
a
shifting
,
sly
,
deceitful
,
&c.
and
by
consequence
an
unprofitable
Trick
.
But
let
us
now
proceed
to
determin
these
Cases
;
for
we
did
not
propose
'em
for
meer
Question
sake
,
but
that
we
might
give
'em
a
fair
Decision
.
I
am
then
of
Opinion
,
That
the
Corn-Merchant
ought
not
to
have
conceal'd
from
the
Rhodians
,
nor
this
Seller
of
his
House
from
the
Purchasers
of
it
,
the
several
things
that
are
mention'd
in
their
Cases
.
'T
is
true
not
to
tell
a
thing
,
is
not
properly
to
conceal
it
;
but
not
to
tell
that
,
which
People
are
concern'd
to
know
,
meerly
for
the
sake
of
some
Advantage
to
your self
,
I
think
is
:
And
there
's
no
body
but
knows
what
concealing
this
is
,
and
who
they
are
that
make
a
Custom
of
it
:
I
am
sure
not
your
plain
,
sincere
,
ingenuous
,
honest
and
good
sort
of
People
;
but
rather
your
shifting
,
sly
,
cunning
,
deceitful
,
roguish
,
crafty
,
foxish
,
jugling
kind
of
Fellows
.
And
must
it
not
necessarily
be
Unprofitable
for
any
Man
,
to
lye
under
this
,
and
a
much
longer
Catalogue
,
of
such
black
and
most
odious
Names
of
Vices
?
CHAP.
XIV
.
Of
those
,
who
are
so
far
from
telling
the
Faults
of
their
Wares
,
as
that
they
invent
Lies
to
make
'em
appear
the
better
.
An
Example
of
this
kind
.
Aquilius
's
Definition
of
Knavery
,
or
Dolus
malus
.
ANd
[
a
](A33176-e57570-b)
a
Having
shewn
that
those
who
conceal
are
to
blame
;
he
proceeds
to
those
who
invent
plain
Lies
for
the
sake
of
a
little
seeming
Advantage
;
who
must
needs
be
much
more
faulty
.
if
those
Men
are
thus
blamable
,
who
keep
the
Faults
of
their
things
secret
;
what
shall
we
think
of
those
,
who
add
down-right
Lying
to
it
?
C.
Canius
,
a
Roman
Knight
,
one
that
lov'd
to
be
pleasant
,
and
a
pretty
good
Scholar
,
removing
to
[
b
](A33176-e57600-b)
b
The
chief
City
of
the
Island
Sicily
,
a
very
pleasant
and
delightful
place
;
taken
by
the
Romans
under
the
Conduct
of
Marcellus
,
in
the
second
Punick
War
.
Siracuse
for
the
sake
of
Retirement
and
not
of
Employment
,
(
as
he
was
us'd
to
say
)
gave
out
he
had
a
great
mind
to
buy
some
Gardens
,
whither
he
might
invite
his
Friends
and
Acquaintance
,
and
enjoy
their
Conversation
without
being
interrupted
.
This
coming
abroad
,
there
was
one
Pythius
,
a
Goldsmith
or
Banker
at
Siracuse
,
who
told
him
,
Indeed
he
had
no
Gardens
to
sell
,
but
such
as
he
had
were
at
Canius's
Service
,
if
he
pleas'd
to
make
use
of
'em
,
as
much
as
tho'
they
were
his
own
:
And
withal
he
desir'd
him
to
come
next
day
,
and
take
a
Dinner
with
him
there
.
When
Canius
had
promis'd
him
to
come
accordingly
,
what
does
he
do
but
send
immediately
for
some
Fishermen
,
(
having
Interest
enough
,
by
reason
of
his
Calling
,
with
all
sorts
of
People
)
and
desires
'em
the
next
day
to
fish
before
his
Gardens
;
giving
'em
their
Instructions
about
what
he
'd
have
'em
do
.
Canius
came
at
the
time
appointed
,
and
Pythius
had
provided
a
very
splendid
Entertainment
for
him
:
Just
before
the
Garden
,
where
he
could
not
but
take
notice
of
it
,
was
a
company
of
Fisher-boats
;
and
every
one
of
the
Men
in
particular
brought
the
Fish
he
had
caught
,
and
laid
'em
down
before
Pythius
.
How
now
Pythius
!
(
says
Canius
to
him
)
what
all
these
Fish
here
?
All
these
Boats
?
O
lack
,
Sir
,
(
says
t'other
)
that
's
no
great
Wonder
;
all
the
Fish
that
supply
the
City
must
be
taken
here
:
this
is
their
common
Water
;
none
of
these
People
could
ever
live
,
if
it
were
not
for
my
House
.
Canius
immediately
was
all
on
fire
,
and
beg'd
of
Pythius
that
he
would
sell
him
the
Place
.
He
pretended
abundance
of
Unwillingness
at
first
;
but
at
length
(
to
make
short
of
it
)
was
brought
to
a
Compliance
.
Canius
buys
it
,
together
with
all
that
belong'd
to
it
;
and
being
very
Rich
,
and
desirous
of
the
Purchase
,
gives
as
much
for
it
as
Pythius
demanded
.
Security's
given
and
taken
for
the
Money
,
and
the
whole
Bargain
finally
brought
to
a
conclusion
.
The
next
Day
Canius
invites
some
Acquaintance
thither
,
and
he
comes
himself
somewhat
earlier
than
ordinary
;
but
sees
not
one
of
the
Fishermens
Boats
there
.
Hereupon
he
enquires
of
one
of
the
next
Neighbours
,
whether
or
no
that
were
any
Holiday
with
the
Fishermen
;
because
he
saw
none
of
'em
thereabouts
.
Not
that
I
know
of
,
replies
the
other
;
but
they
none
of
'em
ever
use
to
fish
here
,
and
therefore
I
wonder'd
what
the
matter
was
Yesterday
.
This
put
Canius
into
a
lamentable
Fret
;
but
how
could
he
remedy
himself
?
[
c
](A33176-e57830-b)
c
A
noble
and
learned
Roman
,
oftentimes
mention'd
and
commended
by
our
Author
,
whose
Collegue
he
was
in
the
Pretorship
.
He
was
excellently
skill'd
in
the
Civil
Law
,
which
he
learn'd
of
Muc.
Scaevola
,
the
High-Priest
.
There
was
no
Action
against
a
Man
,
it
seems
,
for
this
sort
of
Knavery
before
his
time
.
The
Occasion
of
his
making
these
Formulae
See
in
Valer.
Max.
Book
8.
chap.
2.
For
Aquillius
,
my
Collegue
and
familiar
Friend
,
had
not
then
publish'd
his
Court-forms
about
Knavery
;
upon
which
when
he
was
ask'd
what
he
meant
by
the
word
Knavery
,
he
answer'd
,
[
d
](A33176-e57910-b)
d
These
words
must
be
taken
in
an
ill
Sence
:
For
all
making
Shew
,
&c.
is
not
Knavery
,
but
only
that
which
is
joyn'd
cum
Malitia
,
with
an
ill
Design
of
Cheating
,
&c.
The
making
shew
of
one
thing
,
while
one's
doing
another
:
a
very
perspicuous
and
plain
Definition
▪
as
indeed
he
was
a
Man
very
happy
at
Defining
.
Pythius
then
,
and
all
others
whatever
,
that
make
shew
of
one
thing
,
and
yet
do
the
contrary
,
are
perfidious
,
wicked
and
knavish
Rascals
.
'T
is
impossible
therefore
that
any
of
their
Actions
should
ever
be
Profitable
,
when
they
're
under
the
scandal
of
such
a
number
of
filthy
and
detestable
Vices
.
CHAP.
XV.
All
Hypocrisie
and
Dissimulation
to
be
taken
away
.
Knavery
,
or
Dolus
malus
punish'd
by
the
Roman
Laws
;
and
Judgments
of
Equity
.
A
remarkable
Action
of
Scaevola
'
s.
He
is
not
a
Wise
Man
,
who
is
not
Wise
for
his
own
Advantage
;
in
what
Sence
true
.
A
truly
Good
Man
is
not
content
with
being
as
Just
,
as
the
Laws
require
.
A
Definition
of
such
a
One.
He
's
very
hard
to
be
found
.
IF
then
this
Definition
of
Aquillius
be
good
,
all
Hypocrisie
and
Dissimulation
must
be
banish'd
from
amongst
Men
;
so
that
no
honest
Man
will
be
guilty
of
either
of
'em
,
for
the
sake
of
buying
or
selling
to
his
greater
Advantage
.
[
a
](A33176-e58090-b)
a
He
proceeds
from
Natural
Honesty
,
or
the
Laws
of
Right
Reason
,
to
the
Laws
of
the
City
;
and
shews
that
Knavery
was
punishable
by
those
;
tho'
not
in
all
,
yet
in
several
Cases
.
Nay
this
Knavery
or
Cozenage
has
always
been
punish'd
by
the
Laws
of
the
City
:
witness
the
XII
Tables
about
the
Case
of
Guardianship
;
and
Laetorius's
Law
about
the
Over-reaching
of
Minors
.
Nay
where
there
was
nothing
of
a
Law
against
it
,
't
was
nevertheless
punishable
in
those
Judgments
of
Equity
,
the
Form
of
which
was
,
Ex
fide
bona
agitur
,
That
all
things
be
done
faithfully
and
honestly
.
And
the
same
sort
of
words
are
in
all
other
Judgments
;
as
when
a
Wife
,
for
Example
,
enters
an
Action
for
her
Dowry
,
upon
a
Divorce
from
her
Husband
,
Melius
Aequius
,
That
things
be
settled
better
and
more
equitably
:
when
any
thing
had
been
mortgag'd
and
pawn'd
to
another
,
Ut
inter
bonos
bene
agier
,
That
among
honest
Men
there
be
nothing
done
,
but
only
that
which
is
Honest.
And
could
there
possibly
be
any
Knavery
allow'd
of
in
that
,
where
the
very
Court-form
was
,
Melius
Aequius
,
For
the
better
and
more
equitable
setling
of
things
?
Or
any
thing
done
thro'
Deceit
and
Roguery
,
where
these
words
are
publickly
read
in
Court
,
Inter
bonos
bene
agier
,
That
amongst
honest
Men
there
may
be
nothing
done
,
except
that
which
is
Honest
?
Now
there
's
something
of
this
Knavery
,
as
Aquillus
says
,
in
all
false
Shews
and
hypocritical
Pretences
:
Lying
therefore
should
wholly
be
banish'd
from
all
sorts
of
Business
,
and
Commerce
in
the
World
:
Nor
should
Sellers
bring
People
to
bid
high
for
their
Goods
,
and
enhance
their
Prizes
;
nor
Purchasers
others
to
bid
under-value
,
and
so
beat
'em
down
lower
:
but
each
of
'em
,
if
they
come
to
speak
about
a
Bargain
,
should
say
at
a
word
what
he
'll
give
and
take
.
[
b
](A33176-e58200-b)
b
Mention'd
before
,
chap.
32.
Book
1.
Quintus
Scaevola
,
the
Son
of
Publius
,
going
to
buy
an
Estate
,
desir'd
the
Owner
to
tell
him
at
one
word
,
what
't
was
he
must
have
for
it
:
the
Seller
did
so
;
and
Scaevola
told
him
,
He
thought
't
was
worth
more
than
what
he
had
demanded
for
it
;
and
accordingly
gave
him
a
thousand
Crowns
over
.
Now
there
's
no
one
but
will
grant
this
was
done
like
an
Honest
,
but
they
will
not
allow
't
was
like
a
Prudent
Man
;
any
more
,
than
if
he
had
sold
a
thing
for
less
,
than
he
might
have
had
for
it
.
Here
now
,
you
may
see
,
is
that
pernicious
Opinion
,
thus
to
make
a
Distinction
between
Prudence
and
Honesty
.
Ennius
has
a
Saying
to
this
purpose
,
That
he
would
not
give
a
Farthing
for
a
Prudent
Man
,
that
could
not
be
prudent
for
his
own
Advantage
;
to
which
I
am
ready
to
set
my
Hand
;
if
he
and
I
can
agree
upon
one
and
the
same
Meaning
of
the
word
Advantage
.
I
find
that
[
c
](A33176-e58320-b)
c
Mention'd
again
afterwards
,
chap.
23.
He
flourish'd
about
the
Year
of
Rome
640.
All
his
Works
are
lost
.
Hecaton
,
a
Rhodian
Philosopher
,
and
Scholar
of
Panaetius
,
in
his
Book
about
Offices
,
which
he
wrote
to
[
d
](A33176-e58390-b)
d
A
noble
Roman
,
Grandson
to
Paullus
Aemilius
,
and
Nephew
to
the
Younger
Africanus
;
belov'd
of
Laelius
,
Scaevola
,
and
all
the
great
Men
of
that
time
.
He
was
Hearer
of
the
famous
Panaetius
,
a
Letter
of
whose
to
him
is
mention'd
by
our
Author
;
who
often
commends
him
for
a
Man
of
Wisdom
,
Industry
and
Learning
.
He
was
a
great
Admirer
of
the
Stoick
Philosophy
,
which
lost
him
the
Pretorship
.
See
Orat.
pro
Muraena
,
chap.
63.
Q.
Tubero
,
hath
laid
this
down
as
a
Wise
Man's
Duty
,
First
to
conform
to
the
Laws
,
and
Customs
,
and
Practises
of
his
Country
;
and
,
when
he
hath
done
that
,
to
make
the
best
Improvement
he
can
of
his
Estate
:
since
we
ought
to
seek
Riches
not
only
for
our selves
,
but
our
Children
,
Friends
,
Relations
and
especially
the
Commonwealth
;
whose
publick
Riches
must
principally
consist
in
the
Wealth
and
Stock
of
its
particular
Members
.
This
Man
can
by
no
means
approve
of
that
Action
,
which
I
just
now
mention'd
of
Quintus
Scaevola
;
and
there
's
nothing
,
he
tells
us
,
that
he
'd
scruple
to
do
for
his
own
Advantage
,
if
it
be
but
permitted
and
allow'd
of
by
the
Law
;
[
e
](A33176-e58500-b)
e
For
he
that
has
no
more
regard
to
Honesty
,
than
just
what
the
Laws
of
the
Publick
require
;
and
will
scruple
to
do
nothing
,
so
as
he
can
escape
their
Cognizance
,
can
never
be
an
Honest
and
Good
Man
.
The
Laws
and
Dictates
of
Nature
and
Right
Reason
,
not
only
of
the
City
he
dwells
in
,
ought
to
be
the
Rule
of
an
honest
Man's
Actions
;
these
being
only
a
Shadow
and
faint
Draught
of
that
perfect
Justice
,
to
which
we
are
led
by
the
other
.
See
chap.
17.
for
which
I
think
he
does
not
much
deserve
to
be
thank'd
or
commended
.
If
then
to
make
pretence
of
that
which
never
was
,
and
cunningly
to
dissemble
the
real
Truth
,
be
pieces
of
Knavery
;
there
are
but
very
few
Actions
that
are
altogether
free
from
it
:
And
if
he
alone
be
an
honest
Man
,
Who
does
all
the
Good
he
can
,
and
does
no
Injury
to
any
body
;
't
will
be
no
easie
matter
to
find
one
in
the
World
.
The
Result
of
what
has
been
said
is
this
,
To
be
Knavish
and
Wicked
can
never
be
Profitable
,
because
't
is
attended
with
Baseness
and
[
f
](A33176-e58530-b)
f
He
does
not
mean
that
outward
Dishonour
,
which
Men
draw
upon
themselves
by
their
wicked
Actions
,
when
they
come
to
be
known
;
(
for
that
is
avoided
when
the
Action
is
conceal'd
,
whereas
even
then
't
is
infamous
to
be
Wicked
)
but
he
means
the
inward
Reproach
of
Mens
Consciences
,
and
the
real
Scandal
and
Dishonour
that
it
is
,
for
a
Man
to
do
such
things
as
are
unworthy
of
,
and
disagreeable
to
his
Reason
.
This
follows
every
wicked
Action
,
tho'
kept
never
so
secret
;
and
can't
be
avoided
but
by
living
such
a
Life
,
as
becomes
the
great
Rule
of
our
Actions
,
Reason
.
Dishonour
;
and
it
always
must
be
Profitable
to
be
Virtuous
and
Good
,
because
it
always
is
Honest
and
Creditable
.
CHAP.
XVI
.
The
Care
taken
by
the
Romans
,
to
make
the
Seller
tell
the
Faults
of
the
thing
to
be
sold.
An
Example
or
two
of
Cases
of
this
nature
.
[
a
](A33176-e58630-b)
a
He
proceeds
to
fome
particulae
Cases
,
wherein
Knavery
was
punishable
by
the
Civil
Laws
:
Such
as
are
concealing
the
Faults
of
an
House
,
or
the
like
.
IN
the
Matter
of
buying
and
selling
Estates
,
't
is
provided
amongst
us
by
the
Civil
Constitutions
,
That
he
who
's
the
Seller
should
tell
all
the
Faults
,
that
he
knows
of
,
to
the
Purchaser
.
For
the
XII
Tables
ordering
no
more
than
this
,
That
the
Seller
should
be
bound
to
make
good
those
Faults
,
which
were
expresly
mention'd
by
word
of
Mouth
in
the
Bargain
;
and
which
whoever
deny'd
was
to
pay
double
Damages
:
The
[
b
](A33176-e58640-b)
b
For
tho'
the
XII
Tables
were
the
Ground
and
Foundation
of
the
Roman
Law
;
yet
the
Learned
by
their
Interpretations
,
Inferences
from
'em
,
by
their
Formulae
apply'd
to
particular
Cases
,
or
the
like
;
added
a
great
many
new
things
to
'em
,
which
pass'd
for
a
Rule
in
Judgments
,
as
well
as
the
XII
Tables
.
Lawyers
have
appointed
a
Punishment
for
those
,
who
themselves
don't
discover
the
Defects
of
what
they
sell.
For
they
so
decreed
,
That
if
the
Seller
of
an
Estate
,
when
he
made
the
Bargain
,
did
not
tell
all
the
Faults
in
particular
,
that
he
knew
of
it
;
he
should
afterwards
be
bound
to
make
'em
good
to
the
Purchaser
.
Titus
Claudius
Centumalus
(
to
give
an
Example
)
had
a
House
that
stood
upon
the
Coelian
Hill
,
and
hindred
the
Augurs
as
they
made
their
Observations
from
the
[
c
](A33176-e58690-b)
c
For
making
their
Observations
from
the
flights
of
Birds
,
and
that
many
times
at
a
very
great
distance
,
't
was
necessary
they
should
have
some
high
Place
,
and
that
nothing
should
be
in
the
way
to
hinder
their
Prospect
.
Capitoline
Mount
:
who
therefore
gave
him
orders
to
pull
that
down
,
which
was
such
an
hindrance
to
their
Business
.
Instead
of
this
Claudius
puts
a
Bill
over
the
Door
,
That
the
House
was
to
be
sold
;
and
quickly
put
it
off
,
P.
Calpurnius
Lanarius
being
the
Man
that
bought
it
.
The
Augurs
in
a
short
time
sent
him
the
same
Orders
,
and
he
accordingly
took
care
to
perform
them
.
But
afterwards
coming
to
understand
,
That
Claudius
had
not
set
the
House
to
sale
,
till
after
he
had
been
order'd
by
the
Augurs
to
demolish
it
;
he
brought
in
against
him
an
Action
at
Law
,
To
receive
such
Satisfaction
,
as
in
Conscience
and
Equity
he
was
bound
to
make
him
.
Marcus
Cato
,
the
Father
of
him
that
is
now
living
(
for
as
others
are
distinguish'd
by
the
Names
of
their
Fathers
,
so
he
that
begot
this
incomparable
Person
should
be
nam'd
from
his
Son
)
sat
as
Judge
in
the
Case
;
and
gave
this
Sentence
upon
the
whole
matter
,
That
since
Claudius
knew
this
Inconvenience
before-hand
,
and
did
not
discover
it
when
he
sold
the
Estate
,
he
was
oblig'd
in
Equity
to
make
it
good
to
the
Purchaser
.
He
judg'd
it
therefore
to
be
a
part
of
Honesty
,
That
the
Seller
should
fairly
declare
to
the
Buyer
,
all
the
Faults
which
he
knows
in
the
thing
to
be
sold.
If
then
this
Judgment
were
just
and
equitable
,
neither
the
Merchant
that
brought
the
Corn
,
nor
the
supposed
Seller
of
the
infectious
House
did
well
in
concealing
what
either
of
'em
knew
.
But
all
the
particular
sorts
of
Concealing
could
never
be
taken
notice
of
by
the
Laws
of
the
City
;
however
such
as
could
were
very
carefully
provided
against
.
M.
Marius
Gratidianus
,
a
[
d
](A33176-e58780-b)
d
Son
of
one
M.
Gratidius
of
Arpinum
,
whose
Sister
was
Married
to
Cicero's
Grandfather
,
therefore
he
calls
him
his
Kinsman
.
He
was
adopted
by
M.
Marius
,
Brother
of
him
that
was
seven
times
Consul
.
He
was
afterward
kill'd
by
Sylla's
Order
,
having
been
of
Marius's
Party
against
him
.
Kinsman
of
mine
,
had
sold
an
House
to
Sergius
Orata
,
which
he
had
bought
of
the
same
not
many
Years
before
.
The
House
,
it
seems
,
[
e
](A33176-e58860-b)
e
A
thing
in
Law
is
said
,
Servire
alicui
,
when
some
one
has
a
Right
of
using
it
some
way
,
or
hindring
some
thing
about
it
,
&c.
As
I
may
be
said
to
have
a
Servitus
upon
a
Man's
House
or
Ground
,
when
I
can
of
Right
demand
a
Way
thro'
it
;
or
hinder
from
Building
higher
,
&c.
lest
he
should
hinder
my
Prospect
.
paid
a
Duty
to
Sergius
,
which
Marius
never
once
mention'd
in
the
Bargain
.
The
Business
came
at
last
to
a
Suit
in
Law
,
where
[
f
](A33176-e58930-b)
f
The
two
famous
Orators
mention'd
above
,
and
brought
in
speaking
in
his
de
Oratore
;
where
he
mentions
this
very
Cause
.
Lucius
Crassus
took
part
with
Orata
,
and
[
f
](A33176-e58970-b)
f
The
two
famous
Orators
mention'd
above
,
and
brought
in
speaking
in
his
de
Oratore
;
where
he
mentions
this
very
Cause
.
Anthony
with
Gratidianus
.
Crassus
insisted
very
much
upon
the
Law
,
which
says
,
That
the
Seller
shall
make
good
those
Faults
,
which
he
himself
knew
of
,
and
yet
conceal'd
'em
from
the
Buyer
:
Anthony
on
the
other
side
argu'd
for
Equity
,
That
Sergius
could
not
but
know
that
Incumbrance
,
who
had
sold
the
House
himself
but
a
little
while
before
;
and
therefore
what
need
was
there
of
telling
him
of
it
?
That
he
could
not
complain
of
being
any
ways
trick'd
upon
,
since
he
knew
very
well
the
condition
of
what
he
bought
.
I
have
brought
you
these
Instances
only
to
let
you
see
,
That
these
cunning
sort
of
Men
were
ne're
approv'd
of
by
our
Ancestours
.
CHAP.
XVII
.
The
different
Methods
us'd
by
Law
and
Philosophy
,
for
the
rooting
out
of
Knavery
.
Treachery
to
set
up
Traps
,
tho'
one
don
't
drive
the
Beasts
into
'em
.
How
the
Law
of
Nature
differs
from
the
Civil
.
The
Excellence
of
the
Roman
Civil
Laws
.
The
Extent
of
that
Expression
,
Ex
fide
bona
.
Knavish
Cunning
very
different
from
true
Prudence
.
How
the
Laws
provide
against
Fraud
in
Selling
of
Slaves
.
Nature
forbids
one
Man
to
make
his
Gain
of
another's
Ignorance
.
The
ill
Effects
of
false
Prudence
.
BUt
[
a
](A33176-e59110-b)
a
The
Difference
between
the
Laws
and
Philosophers
,
as
to
taking
away
Wickedness
,
is
cheifly
this
:
That
those
can
restrain
the
outward
Actions
only
,
but
these
inform
the
Mind
and
Understanding
:
those
can
only
punish
the
actual
Crimes
of
Delinquents
,
but
these
by
informing
the
Judgment
,
and
improving
the
Reason
,
take
care
to
prevent
the
Commission
of
'em
;
and
keep
Men
from
Vice
out
of
a
Love
of
Virtue
,
whereas
the
Laws
can
only
terrifie
them
from
it
by
fear
of
Punishment
.
the
Laws
take
one
way
to
root
these
Frauds
out
,
and
Philosophers
another
;
the
former
medling
no
further
with
them
,
than
as
they
break
out
into
open
Acts
,
and
may
(
as
't
were
)
be
laid
hold
on
by
the
Hands
of
Justice
:
the
latter
endeavouring
to
hinder
their
breaking
out
,
and
to
prevent
them
by
Precepts
of
Wisdom
and
Reason
.
Reason
therefore
requires
of
us
,
That
we
do
nothing
Treacherously
,
nothing
Deceitfully
,
nothing
meerly
by
outward
Shews
and
false
Pretences
.
Now
is
it
not
Treachery
to
set
up
a
Trap
,
tho'
one
does
not
raise
and
pursue
the
Beasts
into
it
;
for
the
simple
Creatures
of
themselves
will
run
into
it
,
without
being
driven
?
Just
so
you
offer
an
House
to
be
sold
,
because
of
some
Faults
which
you
know
to
be
in
it
;
and
put
up
your
Bill
,
as
it
were
like
a
Trap
,
in
which
some
unwary
sort
of
Body
will
be
taken
.
I
know
that
,
at
present
,
the
depravation
of
Manners
,
and
prevalence
of
evil
Custom
,
have
made
this
be
counted
neither
Base
nor
Dishonourable
;
and
that
't
is
tolerated
by
the
Laws
and
Constitutions
of
the
Publick
,
but
I
am
sure
't
is
not
tolerated
by
the
Laws
of
Nature
.
For
't
is
to
be
consider'd
(
I
must
repeat
it
again
,
tho'
I
have
already
mention'd
it
a
great
many
times
)
that
there
is
such
a
thing
as
Natural
Society
,
which
comprehends
all
Men
,
and
ties
and
unites
'em
to
one
another
:
There
's
a
nearer
between
those
of
the
same
Nation
;
and
a
nearer
yet
,
between
those
of
the
same
City
.
Therefore
our
Fore-fathers
made
a
distinction
,
between
[
b
](A33176-e59160-b)
b
The
Law
of
Nations
is
nothing
else
,
but
some
Rules
and
Maxims
of
the
Law
of
Nature
,
which
Reason
tells
us
we
ought
to
observe
,
in
our
Actions
and
Entercourse
with
all
Men
whatever
.
This
is
not
so
distinct
from
that
of
particular
Cities
,
as
tho'
this
could
command
any
thing
contrary
to
the
former
.
No
;
the
Laws
of
every
City
must
be
allow'd
by
Reason
,
and
suppose
it
as
their
Foundation
;
but
they
determin
some
things
,
which
Reason
has
left
indifferent
,
and
descend
to
some
Particulars
as
to
Time
,
Place
,
&c.
which
Reason
does
not
meddle
with
.
that
Law
which
is
common
to
Nations
,
and
that
which
belongs
to
each
City
in
particular
.
Whatever
we
are
bound
,
by
the
Civil
Constitutions
,
to
do
to
our
Citizens
;
we
are
[
c
](A33176-e59210-b)
c
Because
the
Civil
may
add
,
tho'
it
can
add
nothing
contrary
,
to
that
of
Nations
.
not
oblig'd
,
by
the
Law
of
Nations
,
to
do
the
same
to
Strangers
:
but
[
d
](A33176-e59230-b)
d
Because
that
of
Nations
is
still
in
force
and
obliges
,
notwithstanding
what
the
Civil
may
have
added
to
it
.
The
building
upon
a
Foundation
does
not
take
away
the
Foundation
it self
.
whatever
we
are
bound
by
this
latter
to
do
to
others
,
the
same
we
ought
to
do
to
our
Citizens
also
:
But
[
e
](A33176-e59270-b)
e
The
Laws
and
particular
States
consider
Men
,
as
now
they
are
in
the
World
,
and
only
regulate
their
outward
Actions
,
so
as
to
preserve
the
Peace
and
Safety
of
the
Publick
:
But
those
of
Nature
or
Right
Reason
,
in
the
Observation
of
which
consists
the
perfectest
Justice
that
Men
are
capable
of
;
considers
Men
as
they
ought
to
be
,
and
commands
all
that
Purity
,
Sincerity
,
&c.
that
becomes
the
Perfection
of
a
Reasonable
Nature
;
which
is
more
than
the
Civil
can
possibly
do
.
The
Nature
of
God
is
the
true
Standard
of
genuin
Right
and
perfect
Justice
:
Right
Reason
,
which
is
taken
from
the
Nature
of
God
,
is
an
original
Piece
;
which
,
tho'
in
no
wise
equal
to
the
living
Standard
,
is
at
least
agreeable
to
it
as
far
as
it
reaches
:
The
Civil
Laws
are
taken
from
Reason
,
and
are
only
a
Copy
and
faint
Representation
of
it
;
however
't
were
to
be
wish'd
that
,
such
as
it
is
,
it
were
carefully
follow'd
.
This
is
the
Sence
,
in
which
I
take
this
place
.
the
Law
,
which
at
present
we
use
amongst
us
,
is
far
from
being
an
original
Piece
,
immediately
taken
from
genuin
Right
and
true
perfect
Justice
;
't
is
only
a
Copy
and
faint
Representation
of
it
.
However
I
could
wish
we
liv'd
up
even
to
this
;
for
't
is
copy'd
at
least
from
some
of
the
best
Originals
,
which
were
drawn
from
the
Truth
and
Nature
of
the
thing
.
For
how
excellent
is
that
Form
in
judicial
Proceedings
,
Uti
ne
,
&c.
That
I
mayn't
be
Defrauded
or
brought
to
an
Inconvenience
,
by
trusting
to
you
,
and
your
Honesty
!
And
how
incomparable
that
other
,
That
Honest
Men
do
nothing
,
but
that
which
is
Honest
and
without
Design
.
But
the
great
Question
is
,
Who
they
are
that
are
Honest
Men
;
and
what
't
is
to
do
nothing
,
but
that
which
is
Honest
!
[
f
](A33176-e59390-b)
f
Of
whom
he
speaks
chap.
1.
of
his
de
Amicitia
,
and
to
whom
he
apply'd
himself
for
Knowledge
in
the
Civil
Laws
,
after
the
Death
of
the
other
Mucius
,
who
was
Augur
.
He
was
Cos.
with
L.
Licinius
Crassus
,
An.
U.
C.
658
,
whom
he
call'd
duo
Sapientissimi
Consules
,
chap.
11.
of
this
Book
.
He
was
afterwards
kill'd
by
Marius's
Order
in
Vesta's
Temple
:
Temperantiae
,
prudentiaeque
specimen
(
says
our
Author
)
ante
simulachrum
Vestae
trucidatus
est
,
&c.
De
Nat.
Deor.
Q.
Scaevola
,
I
remember
,
the
High-Priest
,
was
us'd
to
say
,
That
all
those
Judgments
which
had
Ex
fide
bona
,
Faithfully
and
honestly
,
put
into
their
Forms
,
were
of
marvellous
Force
;
and
that
Faithfully
and
Honestly
were
of
very
large
Extent
,
and
belong'd
not
only
to
Wardships
,
Societies
,
Trusts
and
Commissions
,
but
to
Buyings
,
Sollings
,
Lettings
and
Hirings
,
which
relate
to
the
Society
and
Entercourse
of
Mankind
;
and
that
't
was
the
part
of
an
extraordinary
Judge
,
to
determin
exactly
,
all
these
Cases
,
what
one
Man
ought
to
make
good
to
another
,
upon
only
the
bare
Principles
of
Conscience
and
Honesty
;
especially
seeing
Men
differ
in
their
Judgments
about
the
greatest
part
of
'em
.
All
Craft
therefore
should
utterly
be
banish'd
,
and
that
knavish
sort
of
Cunning
,
which
would
fain
indeed
be
counted
,
but
is
the
farthest
from
Prudence
,
of
any
thing
in
the
World
:
For
Prudence
consists
in
the
making
a
right
Distinction
between
Good
and
Evil
,
but
this
kind
of
Cunning
gives
the
preference
to
Evil
;
if
,
at
least
,
it
be
true
(
as
most
certainly
't
is
)
that
every
thing
is
Evil
,
which
is
contrary
to
Honesty
.
Neither
is
it
only
in
Farms
and
Houses
,
that
the
Laws
of
the
City
,
which
are
copied
from
Nature
,
take
care
to
have
Cheating
and
Knavery
punish'd
;
but
in
Slaves
they
exclude
all
Fraud
in
the
Seller
:
For
he
that
's
presum'd
to
know
what
the
Slave
was
,
if
he
does
not
declare
whether
he
be
Healthy
,
a
Runagate
,
or
apt
to
Steal
,
is
answerable
to
the
Buyer
,
by
an
Order
of
the
Aediles
:
But
this
does
not
hold
in
the
Case
of
[
g
](A33176-e59660-b)
g
Because
he
being
newly
come
to
the
Estate
,
of
which
Slaves
were
a
part
,
is
presum'd
not
to
know
whether
they
are
Healthy
,
&c.
or
not
.
an
Heir
.
From
what
has
been
said
,
it
apparently
follows
,
[
h
](A33176-e59680-b)
h
That
is
,
The
Laws
command
,
that
no
one
should
Enrich
himself
by
Cheating
another
;
and
the
Laws
are
copied
from
Reason
;
whence
it
follows
,
that
Reason
commands
,
&c.
since
Nature
is
the
Fountain
from
whence
Law
is
deriv'd
,
that
't
is
agreeable
to
the
Dictates
and
Rules
of
Nature
,
that
no
one
should
endeavour
to
make
his
own
Advantage
from
the
Ignorance
of
another
.
[
i
](A33176-e59700-b)
i
Having
shewn
by
a
sufficient
number
of
Instances
,
That
none
of
these
Actions
can
be
Profitable
,
which
are
contrary
to
strict
Justice
or
Honesty
:
he
now
goes
on
to
those
Actions
,
which
are
done
under
the
pretence
of
Wisdom
and
Prudence
,
but
indeed
are
quite
contrary
to
it
;
and
shews
these
also
to
be
Unprofitable
.
And
indeed
there
is
no
greater
Mischief
in
the
World
,
than
this
Wisdom
,
falsly
so
nam'd
,
joyn'd
with
Baseness
and
Knavery
.
From
this
have
arisen
innumerable
Cases
,
wherein
Profit
is
set
up
in
opposition
to
Honesty
:
For
where
almost
is
there
a
Man
to
be
found
,
that
would
scruple
to
Injure
and
Wrong
any
other
,
if
he
could
do
it
with
secresie
,
and
without
fear
of
being
punish'd
?
CHAP.
XVIII
.
An
Example
of
a
Wickedness
committed
,
when
there
was
no
Fear
of
Punishment
.
'T
is
a
Wickedness
to
be
a
Receiver
of
ill-gotten
Goods
,
tho'
you
have
no
hand
in
the
getting
'em
.
'T
is
Dishonest
to
get
Estates
by
servile
Flattery
.
Separating
Profit
from
Honesty
the
Cause
of
all
Mischiefs
.
LEt
us
try
,
if
you
please
,
by
some
Examples
of
that
nature
,
wherein
the
common
sort
of
People
,
perhaps
,
think
there
is
no
Crime
:
For
we
don't
speak
here
of
such
as
cut
Throats
,
Poyson
,
make
false
Wills
,
Rob
or
Embezzle
the
publick
Treasures
;
who
aren't
to
be
repress'd
with
nothing
but
Words
and
philosophical
Discourses
,
but
must
be
vex'd
and
wearied
out
with
Chains
and
Imprisonment
:
But
let
us
consider
here
what
is
done
by
those
,
who
pass
in
the
World
for
Men
of
Honesty
and
Integrity
.
A
Will
that
was
forg'd
,
of
one
Minutius
Basilus
,
a
wealthy
Person
,
was
brought
by
some
People
out
of
Greece
into
Italy
;
who
,
to
make
it
the
more
easily
pass
for
good
,
made
[
a
](A33176-e59810-b)
a
Both
mention'd
before
,
ch.
8.
Book
1.
and
ch.
16.
Book
2.
Marcus
Crassus
and
Lucius
Hortensius
,
the
two
greatest
Men
at
that
time
in
the
City
,
Joint-Heirs
with
themselves
:
who
,
tho'
they
suspected
the
whole
to
be
a
Forgery
,
yet
having
nothing
of
hand
in
't
themselves
,
they
made
little
scruple
of
getting
an
Advantage
by
other
Peoples
Villany
.
And
what
then
?
was
that
sufficient
to
excuse
'em
from
Fault
,
That
they
themselves
had
no
hand
in
't
?
Truly
I
am
fully
persuaded
not
;
tho'
I
always
lov'd
[
b
](A33176-e59890-b)
b
Hortensius
.
one
of
'em
while
he
was
alive
,
and
don
't
hate
the
[
c
](A33176-e59910-b)
c
Crassus
,
whom
Cicero
by
no
means
lik'd
,
as
appears
from
the
next
Chapter
,
and
especially
from
his
sixth
Paradox
.
other
since
he
is
dead
and
gone
.
But
when
Basilus
had
desir'd
that
Marcus
Satrius
,
his
Sister's
Son
,
should
bear
his
Name
,
and
had
appointed
him
his
Heir
;
(
I
nominate
him
,
says
he
,
Lord
of
my
Sabine
and
Picenian
Mannors
)
was
it
any
ways
a
just
and
reasonable
Thing
,
and
not
rather
an
eternal
Blot
upon
those
times
,
that
some
principal
Citizens
should
have
a
Man's
Estate
,
and
Satrius
the
Heir
be
put
off
barely
with
his
Name
?
For
if
he
be
unjust
,
that
don't
keep
off
Injuries
from
any
of
his
Neighbours
,
and
defend
and
protect
'em
as
far
as
he
's
able
,
(
as
I
've
shewn
already
in
the
[
d
](A33176-e59990-b)
d
Chap.
7.
first
Book
)
what
sort
of
Man
shall
we
take
him
to
be
,
who
not
only
does
not
keep
off
an
Injury
,
but
rather
on
the
contrary
helps
to
promote
it
?
Nay
I
,
for
my
part
,
am
wholly
of
Opinion
,
That
Estates
which
are
left
Men
by
true
Wills
,
if
gotten
by
knavish
and
servile
Flatteries
,
not
by
a
real
,
but
pretended
Friendship
,
are
Scandalous
and
Dishonest
.
But
in
such
kind
of
Cases
it
often
comes
to
pass
,
that
one
thing
seems
Profitable
,
and
another
Honest
:
undoubtedly
by
a
Mistake
;
for
the
same
[
e
](A33176-e60050-b)
e
Viz.
Nature
or
Right
Reason
,
to
which
whatever
is
contrary
can
neither
be
Honest
nor
Profitable
.
thing
is
the
Measure
both
of
the
one
and
the
other
;
which
whoever
perceives
not
,
will
easily
be
led
into
all
sorts
of
Roguery
.
For
he
that
begins
thus
to
argue
with
himself
,
That
indeed
is
Honest
,
but
this
is
Advantagious
;
impudently
divides
,
by
this
gross
Mistake
,
those
things
which
by
Nature
are
coupled
and
united
:
which
is
the
deadly
Root
,
from
which
all
Frauds
,
Wickednesses
and
Villanies
spring
.
CHAP.
XIX
.
The
Carriage
of
a
truly
Honest
Man
,
when
't
is
in
his
power
to
be
Dishonest
,
so
as
not
to
be
discover'd
.
The
true
Notion
of
a
Good
Man
.
A
Saying
of
Fimbria
's
in
the
Case
of
Lutatius
Pinthia
,
to
this
purpose
.
A
Proverb
borrow'd
from
the
Country
,
shewing
,
That
nothing
Dishonest
how
secret
soever
can
be
Profitable
.
IF
a
Good
Man
therefore
should
have
such
a
power
,
as
that
by
snapping
of
his
Fingers
he
could
slip
his
Name
cunningly
into
rich
Peoples
Wills
,
he
'd
never
make
use
of
it
:
no
,
not
altho'
he
were
fully
assur'd
,
that
no
one
living
could
either
know
or
suspect
it
:
But
give
such
a
power
to
Marcus
Crassus
,
that
by
doing
the
same
thing
he
should
make
himself
Heir
,
where
he
really
was
not
so
,
and
he
'd
[
a
](A33176-e60210-b)
a
Dancing
was
esteem'd
but
a
scandalous
Practice
,
and
unbecoming
a
sober
and
prudent
Person
,
among
the
Romans
:
wherefore
our
Author
tells
us
in
his
Oration
for
Muraena
,
chap.
6.
No
body
almost
Dances
,
unless
he
be
Drunk
or
Mad
;
and
calls
it
,
Omnium
vitiorum
extremum
,
A
Vice
that
no
one
would
be
guilty
of
,
'till
he
had
utterly
abandon'd
all
Virtue
;
and
Umbram
luxuriae
that
which
follows
Riot
and
Debauchery
,
as
the
Shadow
does
the
Body
.
The
meaning
therefore
of
this
place
is
,
That
Crassus
would
not
stick
at
the
basest
Actions
,
if
he
could
but
fill
his
Coffers
by
them
.
Dance
,
I
dare
warrant
you
,
publickly
in
the
Market-place
.
But
he
that
is
Honest
,
and
answers
to
our
Notion
of
a
Good
Man
,
will
never
take
any
thing
away
from
another
for
the
enriching
himself
,
and
filling
his
own
Coffers
;
which
whoever
admires
at
,
let
him
e'en
confess
at
the
same
time
,
that
he
does
not
understand
what
a
Good
Man
is
.
For
if
any
one
will
thro'ly
examin
his
own
Thoughts
,
and
clear
up
a
little
his
obscure
Conceptions
,
he
'll
quickly
be
able
to
tell
himself
,
that
a
Good
Man
is
one
,
Who
does
all
the
Good
that
he
can
to
others
,
but
never
any
Harm
;
unless
necessarily
forc'd
upon
't
for
his
own
Security
.
I
desire
to
know
then
;
is
not
that
Man
guilty
of
Harming
another
,
that
outs
the
rightful
Heirs
,
as
it
were
,
by
a
Spell
,
and
procures
himself
to
be
put
into
their
Rooms
?
How
then
!
(
will
some
Men
say
)
what
,
would
not
you
have
People
consult
their
own
Interest
?
Yes
;
but
withal
I
would
have
'em
understand
,
That
nothing
can
be
so
,
that
's
Base
or
Dishonest
:
which
is
a
necessary
Maxim
for
all
those
to
learn
,
who
ever
design
to
be
Good
Men.
I
remember
I
heard
my
own
Father
tell
,
as
long
ago
as
when
I
was
a
Boy
,
That
Fimbria
,
one
who
had
formerly
been
[
b
](A33176-e60330-b)
b
With
C.
Marius
,
An.
Rom.
Cond
.
649
,
when
Cicero
was
but
three
Years
old
.
Consul
,
was
Judge
in
a
case
of
Lutatius
Pinthia's
,
a
Roman
Knight
,
and
a
very
Honest
Man
;
who
,
[
c
](A33176-e60380-b)
c
The
Plaintiff
in
a
Cause
was
to
lay
down
a
Sum
of
Money
,
which
if
his
Case
was
not
just
,
he
was
to
lose
.
The
Defendant
was
to
do
the
same
,
or
give
up
the
Cause
to
the
Plaintiff
.
This
Money
was
call'd
Sponsio
or
Sacramentum
.
See
Val.
Max.
Book
7.
chap.
2.
upon
pain
of
losing
a
certain
Sum
of
Money
,
was
to
prove
himself
to
be
a
Good
Man
.
Hereupon
Fimbria
plainly
told
him
,
that
he
'd
never
pass
Judgment
upon
such
a
matter
;
least
either
,
by
giving
the
Cause
against
him
,
he
should
spoil
the
Credit
of
a
well-approv'd
Citizen
;
or
else
should
be
forc'd
,
by
giving
it
for
him
,
to
pronounce
that
any
one
was
a
Good
Man
:
which
he
could
not
do
,
considering
the
infinite
Virtues
and
Duties
,
that
are
requisite
to
the
completing
any
Person
of
that
Character
.
This
Good
Man
then
,
of
whom
Fimbria
had
a
Notion
,
as
well
as
Socrates
,
will
never
judge
any
thing
Profitable
,
that
's
Dishonest
:
From
whence
it
follows
,
That
such
a
one
will
always
be
so
far
from
doing
,
as
that
he
will
never
so
much
as
think
of
any
thing
,
which
he
's
afraid
should
be
laid
open
to
the
rest
of
the
World
.
And
is
it
not
a
shame
that
Philosophers
should
doubt
of
this
,
when
there
is
not
e'er
a
Peasant
in
the
Country
but
assents
to
it
?
For
from
them
we
have
gotten
that
common
Saying
,
which
is
now
by
long
Usage
become
a
Proverb
among
us
,
which
they
bring
in
to
signifie
the
faithful
Dealing
and
Honesty
of
a
Man
,
He
's
one
(
say
they
)
that
you
may
venture
[
d
](A33176-e60550-b)
d
Micare
signifies
to
hold
up
the
Fingers
;
a
Play
among
the
Romans
,
said
to
be
in
use
to
this
Day
in
Italy
,
wherein
one
holding
up
such
a
number
of
his
Fingers
,
the
other
on
a
sudden
(
or
something
like
it
)
was
to
guess
how
many
they
were
.
'T
was
easie
therefore
to
Cheat
in
the
dark
,
by
holding
up
more
or
fewer
before
the
other
could
be
able
to
see
.
Hence
to
express
a
very
Honest
Man
,
and
one
that
would
scorn
to
Cheat
,
tho'
sure
not
to
be
discover'd
,
they
us'd
this
Proverb
.
See
Erasm.
Adag
.
to
play
with
at
Even
and
Odd
in
the
dark
.
The
meaning
of
which
,
what
can
it
be
but
this
,
That
nothing
can
be
Profitable
,
which
is
not
Honest
and
Becoming
,
tho'
a
Man
could
be
certain
of
being
never
found
out
in
it
?
You
see
then
according
to
this
Proverb
,
that
neither
that
Gyges
,
whom
we
mention'd
above
;
nor
that
other
,
whom
we
just
now
suppos'd
to
have
a
power
,
by
the
snapping
of
his
Fingers
to
become
all
Peoples
Heir
,
can
by
any
means
be
excus'd
.
For
as
that
,
which
is
Scandalous
and
Dishonest
in
it self
,
however
it
may
be
hid
from
the
Eye
of
the
World
,
can
never
be
brought
to
be
Honest
and
Creditable
;
so
also
that
,
which
is
not
Honest
and
Creditable
,
can
never
be
brought
to
be
Profitable
and
Advantagious
;
the
very
[
e
](A33176-e60630-b)
e
That
which
is
not
Honest
is
contrary
to
Reason
;
that
which
is
Profitable
must
be
agreeable
to
Reason
;
otherwise
it
deprives
Men
of
their
Good
,
viz.
Virtue
,
and
consequently
would
be
Unprofitable
.
The
Natures
therefore
of
these
two
being
opposite
,
can
never
let
the
same
Action
be
not
Honest
,
and
yet
Advantagious
.
Nature
of
the
things
resisting
and
opposing
it
.
CHAP.
XX.
Great
Rewards
are
very
apt
to
make
Men
forgetful
of
Honesty
.
Examples
concerning
this
.
An
excellent
Rule
for
our
Direction
in
this
case
.
A
Man
loses
more
by
doing
an
unjust
Action
,
than
ever
he
can
gain
by
it
,
be
the
Reward
what
it
will
.
BUt
[
a
](A33176-e60740-b)
a
He
goes
on
with
his
Examples
of
Craft
,
that
pretends
to
be
true
Prudence
;
and
shews
,
That
tho'
it
gets
Men
Honours
,
&c.
as
it
did
Marius
the
Consulship
;
yet
that
't
is
truly
Unprofitable
.
when
People
expect
great
Advantages
from
their
Roguery
,
't
is
a
mighty
Temptation
for
'em
to
be
guilty
of
it
.
Thus
,
for
Instance
,
when
[
b
](A33176-e60770-b)
b
He
who
afterwards
came
to
be
seven
times
Consul
.
Marius
was
far
from
any
hopes
of
obtaining
the
Consulship
,
and
had
lain
seven
Years
from
the
time
of
his
being
Praetor
,
so
that
no
one
suspected
his
standing
for
that
Honour
;
being
dispatch'd
to
Rome
by
[
c
](A33176-e60800-b)
c
A
noble
,
valiant
and
virtuous
Roman
,
chose
Cos.
in
the
War
of
Jugurtha
King
of
Numidia
,
and
sent
against
him
;
where
by
his
Valour
and
wise
Conduct
he
beat
that
Prince
,
and
might
have
ended
the
War
,
had
not
Marius
supplanted
him
.
However
he
obtain'd
a
Triumph
,
and
the
Sirname
of
Numidicus
.
See
Sallust
.
Jugurth
.
Q.
Metellus
,
whose
Lieutenant
he
was
,
an
extraordinary
Man
,
and
a
brave
Member
of
the
Republick
;
he
accus'd
his
General
to
the
People
of
Rome
for
protracting
the
War
;
and
told
'em
,
That
if
they
would
but
choose
him
Consul
,
they
should
soon
have
Jugurtha
,
either
dead
or
alive
,
deliver'd
into
their
power
.
'T
is
true
by
this
Artifice
he
got
to
be
chosen
Consul
,
but
he
pay'd
for
't
the
price
of
his
Honesty
and
Fidelity
;
who
could
thus
bring
an
useful
and
excellent
Citizen
,
whose
Lieutenant
he
was
,
and
by
whom
he
was
sent
,
into
Hatred
and
Ill-will
by
false
Accusations
?
Nor
did
my
[
d
](A33176-e60900-b)
d
See
chap.
16.
of
this
Book
.
Kinsman
Gratidianus
act
the
part
of
an
Honest
and
Fair-dealing
Man
,
in
the
time
of
his
Praetorship
:
The
Tribunes
of
the
People
held
a
common
Consultation
with
the
Company
of
Praetors
,
about
setling
the
Value
and
Rate
of
Money
;
which
at
those
times
was
grown
to
be
so
very
Unconstant
,
as
that
no
body
could
be
certain
how
much
he
was
Worth
.
They
made
an
Edict
by
common
Consent
,
allowing
an
Action
against
those
who
transgress'd
it
,
and
appointing
a
Penalty
for
those
who
were
convicted
.
This
being
order'd
,
they
agreed
to
meet
again
in
the
Assembly
after
Noon
,
and
all
of
'em
together
tell
the
People
what
they
had
done
.
The
Meeting
broke
up
,
and
the
rest
all
departed
some
one
way
,
and
some
another
:
Marius
only
directly
from
the
Court
went
down
to
the
Assembly
,
and
by
himself
alone
declar'd
that
to
the
People
,
which
all
of
'em
had
agreed
upon
by
general
Consent
.
If
you
ask
now
what
was
the
Event
of
this
;
nothing
in
the
World
could
have
got
him
greater
Honour
;
Statues
erected
for
him
about
the
Streets
;
Frankinsence
and
Tapers
burnt
at
every
one
of
'em
;
and
,
in
short
,
never
was
any
Man
more
ador'd
by
the
Multitude
.
These
are
the
things
,
which
do
sometimes
mislead
Men
in
deliberating
about
their
Duty
;
when
the
Offence
against
Honesty
seems
very
trivial
,
but
the
Advantage
that
's
gain'd
by
it
very
considerable
.
Thus
Marius
thought
it
but
a
little
piece
of
Knavery
,
to
steal
the
Peoples
Love
from
the
Tribunes
and
his
Collegues
;
but
a
mighty
Advantage
to
be
made
Consul
by
it
,
which
was
what
he
at
that
time
propos'd
to
himself
.
But
in
all
these
Cases
there
's
only
one
Rule
,
which
I
desire
you
'd
constantly
take
along
with
you
:
Be
sure
in
the
first
place
,
that
what
you
count
Profitable
be
no
way
Dishonest
;
and
if
it
be
Dishonest
,
then
assure
your self
that
't
is
not
truly
Profitable
.
And
can
we
then
esteem
either
the
one
or
the
other
of
these
Mariuses
Good
Men
?
Consider
a
little
and
examin
your
own
Thoughts
,
that
you
may
see
what
Idea
,
what
Notion
or
Conception
you
have
of
a
Good
Man
.
Is
it
reconcilable
then
with
the
Character
of
such
a
one
,
[
e
](A33176-e60980-b)
e
As
the
former
Marius
did
,
in
accusing
Metellus
.
to
Lie
for
the
sake
of
his
own
Advantage
;
to
Deceive
,
to
raise
false
Reports
and
Misrepresentations
of
others
;
[
f
](A33176-e61010-b)
f
As
his
Kinsman
Gratidianus
did
the
favour
of
the
People
from
the
Tribunes
,
and
his
Collegues
.
to
Seize
that
before-hand
,
which
others
have
a
Right
to
as
well
as
himself
?
Certainly
nothing
less
.
And
is
there
any
thing
then
of
such
excellent
Worth
?
any
Profit
or
Interest
so
very
desirable
,
for
the
gaining
of
which
one
would
forfeit
the
Glory
and
Reputation
of
a
Good
Man
?
Can
that
,
which
we
call
by
the
name
of
Profitable
,
bring
us
any
thing
so
good
as
what
it
takes
away
from
us
,
if
it
spoil
our
being
counted
Men
of
Honesty
and
Integrity
?
if
it
occasion
the
loss
of
our
Justice
and
Faithfulness
;
that
is
,
in
plain
truth
,
if
it
change
us
into
Brutes
?
For
where
's
the
great
difference
between
altering
our
Shapes
and
becoming
real
Beasts
;
and
carrying
the
Nature
and
Fierceness
of
Beasts
,
tho'
under
the
Outsides
and
Figures
of
Men
?
CHAP.
XXI
.
To
do
any
thing
Dishonest
for
the
sake
of
Power
and
Authority
,
not
Profitable
.
A
most
detestable
Maxim
of
Caesar
'
s.
Not
Profitable
to
make
himself
King
in
a
Free
City
.
The
Unhappiness
of
a
Tyrant's
Life
.
AGain
,
[
a
](A33176-e61120-b)
a
In
the
last
Chapter
he
shew'd
,
That
no
Trick
can
be
Profitable
,
if
contrary
to
Honesty
and
true
Prudence
,
tho'
it
should
procure
a
Man
never
so
much
Honour
:
Here
he
shews
the
same
as
to
Power
.
Those
who
contemn
all
Justice
and
Honesty
for
the
sake
of
Power
,
don't
they
do
the
same
thing
that
[
b
](A33176-e61150-b)
b
Pompey
the
Great
,
who
chose
to
be
Caesar's
Son-in-law
,
marrying
his
Daughter
Julia.
a
certain
Man
did
,
when
he
chose
to
be
Son-in-law
to
none
but
one
,
by
whose
daring
Boldness
he
might
encrease
his
own
Authority
?
He
thought
it
a
very
great
Advantage
no
question
,
to
enlarge
his
own
Greatness
,
by
drawing
Hatred
upon
another
;
but
he
never
consider'd
how
great
a
Disservice
he
did
to
his
Country
,
and
how
much
Scandal
and
Discredit
he
brought
upon
himself
.
As
for
the
Father
,
he
had
always
a
couple
of
Greek
Verses
in
his
Mouth
,
taken
out
of
[
c
](A33176-e61200-b)
c
A
famous
Greek
Tragedian
,
Cotemporary
and
Rival
of
Sophocles
;
very
well
known
by
his
Plays
,
which
are
still
(
a
great
many
of
'em
)
extant
.
Euripides's
Tragedy
of
Phaenissae
;
which
I
'll
endeavour
to
translate
as
well
as
I
am
able
,
perhaps
it
may
be
aukwardly
,
but
however
so
as
to
make
their
Sence
appear
,
If
ever
we
may
break
the
Ties
of
Right
,
'T
is
when
a
Kingdom
is
the
glorious
Prize
:
In
other
things
be
strictly
Just
—
'T
was
a
villanous
thing
in
[
d
](A33176-e61290-b)
d
A
King
of
Thebes
,
Brother
to
Polynices
;
who
were
both
of
'em
Sons
of
Oedipus
by
Jocasta
his
own
Mother
.
They
agreed
to
Reign
by
turns
,
and
the
Elder
Eteocles
began
first
,
but
when
his
Year
was
out
,
would
not
resign
to
Polynices
.
Hence
arose
a
War
,
in
which
the
two
Brothers
kill'd
one
another
.
The
Verses
here
quoted
agree
very
well
with
the
Person
of
Eteocles
,
who
for
the
sake
of
Reigning
,
broke
his
Faith
and
Agreement
with
his
Brother
.
Eteocles
,
or
rather
in
Euripides
indeed
,
to
exempt
[
e
](A33176-e61400-b)
e
Viz.
For
the
sake
of
a
Kingdom
.
that
one
Breach
of
Right
from
being
criminal
,
which
is
certainly
of
all
others
the
most
wicked
and
detestable
.
Why
do
we
stop
then
at
Examples
of
lesser
Rogueries
,
such
as
making
one's
self
Heir
by
Cunning
and
Spells
;
Cheats
about
Buying
,
Selling
,
&
c
?
Here
's
[
f
](A33176-e61430-b)
f
Julius
Caesar.
a
Man
for
you
,
that
has
made
no
scruple
of
desiring
to
make
himself
King
of
the
Roman
People
,
and
Lord
and
Governour
of
the
whole
Earth
;
nay
,
and
which
is
worse
,
hath
accomplish'd
his
Desire
.
If
any
Man
call
this
an
honest
Ambition
,
he
must
be
out
of
his
Wits
;
for
he
justifies
the
Subversion
of
our
Laws
and
Liberties
,
and
counts
the
most
base
and
detestable
Oppression
of
'em
,
a
virtuous
,
laudable
and
glorious
Action
:
But
if
any
Man
,
confessing
that
't
is
not
Honest
,
to
get
the
Dominion
in
that
Republick
,
which
has
been
and
ought
to
be
always
free
,
will
yet
say
,
'T
is
Profitable
for
him
that
can
do
it
;
what
Reproofs
shall
I
use
,
or
what
Reproaches
rather
,
to
recal
such
a
one
from
so
dangerous
an
Error
?
Good
Gods
!
Can
it
be
suppos'd
then
ever
to
be
any
Man's
Interest
,
by
the
heinousest
and
most
unnatural
Wickedness
upon
Earth
,
to
ruin
and
destroy
his
own
Native
Country
;
tho'
perhaps
the
Man
,
who
is
guilty
of
it
,
may
afterwards
be
stil'd
by
his
poor
oppress'd
Citizens
,
[
g
](A33176-e61470-b)
g
Caesar
was
call'd
so
,
notwithstanding
his
Oppressions
.
See
Sueton.
chap.
76
,
85.
The
Father
of
it
?
Interest
therefore
should
always
be
measur'd
by
Justice
and
Honesty
,
so
that
these
two
Words
,
tho'
of
different
Sounds
,
should
yet
be
understood
to
mean
one
and
the
same
Thing
.
I
know
the
common
People
are
apt
to
imagin
,
that
nothing
in
the
World
can
be
better
than
to
Govern
;
but
when
I
consider
the
real
Truth
and
Reason
of
the
thing
it self
,
I
find
on
the
contrary
that
nothing
can
be
worse
,
when
People
arrive
at
it
by
unlawful
Means
.
Can
it
possibly
be
Profitable
for
any
Man
then
,
to
live
in
perpetual
Cares
and
Anxieties
?
to
be
Day
and
Night
rack'd
and
tormented
with
Fears
,
in
a
Life
full
of
nothing
but
Treacheries
and
Dangers
?
Many
are
Treacherous
and
Unfaithful
to
Kings
,
says
Accius
,
and
but
few
are
Faithful
.
But
of
what
sort
of
Kings
did
he
speak
this
?
Was
it
not
of
those
,
who
by
lawful
Succession
had
receiv'd
the
Royal
Scepter
from
[
h
](A33176-e61560-b)
h
King
of
Phrygia
,
whom
the
Poets
make
Son
of
Jupiter
,
and
tell
us
he
serv'd
his
Son
Pelops
up
to
Table
to
the
Gods
.
But
they
(
except
Ceres
,
who
eat
a
Shoulder
)
abhorring
the
Banquet
,
restor'd
Pelops
to
Life
,
and
sent
Tantalus
into
Hell
,
where
he
was
tormented
with
Hunger
in
the
midst
of
Plenty
.
Pelops
afterwards
married
Hippodamia
,
Daughter
of
O
Enomaus
,
and
became
King
of
that
part
of
Greece
,
which
afterwards
from
him
was
call'd
Peloponnesus
,
now
Morea
.
His
Descendants
were
Atreus
,
Thyestes
,
Agamemnon
,
&c.
Tantalus
and
Pelops
?
How
many
more
then
must
we
suppose
to
be
unfaithful
to
that
King
,
who
with
an
Army
of
Romans
had
oppress'd
and
enslav'd
the
Roman
People
it self
?
and
had
forc'd
that
City
,
which
was
not
only
Free
,
but
even
Empress
of
the
whole
World
,
to
submit
her
Neck
to
his
tyrannical
Yoke
?
What
Uneasiness
of
Mind
must
such
a
one
,
think
you
,
be
continually
under
?
What
Wounds
and
Twitches
of
Conscience
must
he
needs
feel
?
How
,
in
short
,
can
that
Life
be
an
Advantage
to
any
Man
,
which
has
this
Inconvenience
inseparably
annex'd
to
it
,
that
whoever
is
so
happy
as
to
take
it
away
,
will
obtain
the
greatest
Glory
and
Good-will
from
all
the
World
?
And
if
these
things
,
which
seem
most
of
all
to
be
Profitable
,
yet
are
found
to
be
the
contrary
when
Unworthy
and
Dishonest
;
this
certainly
ought
to
convince
us
all
,
That
nothing
can
be
Profitable
,
which
is
not
Honest.
CHAP.
XXII
.
A
brave
Example
of
the
Romans
preferring
Justice
before
a
seeming
Profit
.
Glory
can
never
be
gotten
by
Wickedness
.
Riches
Unprofitable
,
if
accompany'd
with
Infamy
.
Example
of
Injustice
in
the
Romans
.
How
an
Empire
ought
to
be
supported
.
Cato
too
severe
in
exacting
the
Tributes
.
An
unjust
Saying
of
Curio
'
s.
BUt
this
has
been
determin'd
,
as
at
many
other
times
by
our
wise
Fore-fathers
,
so
[
a
](A33176-e61860-b)
a
See
Book
1.
chap.
12
,
13.
Book
3.
chap.
4.
particularly
by
Fabricius
,
then
a
second
time
Consul
,
and
the
whole
Roman
Senate
,
in
the
War
with
Pyrrhus
.
For
when
Pyrrhus
had
voluntarily
made
War
upon
the
Romans
,
and
the
Contention
was
held
about
Empire
and
Mastery
,
with
a
no
less
powerful
than
generous
Adversary
;
a
Deserter
came
secretly
into
Fabricius's
Camp
,
and
offer'd
,
upon
condition
he
might
be
well
Rewarded
,
to
return
back
again
with
the
same
secresie
that
he
came
,
and
to
Poyson
Pyrrhus
.
But
instead
of
Encouragement
,
Fabricius
order'd
him
to
be
sent
back
to
Pyrrhus
,
and
was
afterwards
commended
by
the
Senate
for
so
doing
.
If
we
look
no
further
now
than
the
outward
appearance
of
what
seems
to
be
Profitable
,
here
's
a
dangerous
War
,
and
a
powerful
Adversary
of
the
growing
Empire
,
might
soon
have
been
remov'd
by
the
single
assistance
of
this
one
Deserter
:
But
then
it
would
have
been
an
eternal
Scandal
,
not
to
mention
the
Villany
and
Wickedness
of
it
,
in
an
honourable
War
,
which
was
manag'd
with
a
fair
and
generous
Enemy
,
not
to
get
the
Victory
by
Virtue
and
Courage
,
but
only
by
base
and
treacherous
Practises
.
Whether
was
more
Profitable
then
for
Fabricius
,
who
was
such
in
this
City
as
Aristides
was
at
Athens
;
or
for
the
Roman
Senate
,
which
never
thought
any
thing
dishonourable
their
Interest
;
to
contend
with
an
Enemy
by
Valour
or
by
Poyson
?
If
Empire
be
desirable
for
the
sake
of
Glory
,
why
is
not
Wickedness
altogether
banish'd
,
in
which
't
is
impossible
there
should
ever
be
any
Glory
?
But
if
we
're
for
Riches
at
any
rate
,
we
'd
do
well
to
consider
,
that
they
can
never
be
Profitable
when
accompany'd
with
Infamy
.
That
Counsel
therefore
of
Lucius
Philippus
,
the
Son
of
Quintus
,
was
far
from
being
Profitable
,
That
those
very
Cities
,
which
Sylla
had
freed
for
a
set
Sum
of
Money
by
the
Senate's
Order
,
should
again
be
brought
under
their
former
Contributions
;
and
yet
not
the
Money
,
which
they
had
pay'd
,
be
return'd
'em
.
This
Advice
of
his
was
follow'd
by
the
Senate
,
to
the
great
Disparagement
and
Shame
of
the
Empire
;
for
even
Pirates
at
this
rate
will
sooner
be
trusted
,
than
the
Roman
Senate
.
Well
,
but
the
publick
Revenues
were
encreas'd
by
it
,
and
therefore
't
was
Profitable
:
Heavens
!
How
long
will
Men
dare
to
call
any
thing
Profitable
,
which
is
not
Honest
!
Can
Hatred
then
and
Infamy
be
Profitable
to
a
State
,
which
ought
to
be
supported
by
Glory
,
and
Credit
,
and
the
Love
of
its
Confederates
!
In
this
particular
I
often
disagreed
from
my
old
Friend
[
b
](A33176-e62110-b)
b
He
that
was
Sirnam'd
Uticensis
,
mention'd
above
.
Cato
;
whom
I
always
thought
to
be
somewhat
too
head-strong
,
in
standing
up
for
the
Interest
of
the
Publick
Treasury
;
and
exacting
the
Tributes
with
so
much
rigour
,
as
not
to
make
any
Allowances
to
the
Farmers
,
and
very
seldom
or
never
grant
any
thing
to
the
Confederates
:
whereas
we
ought
always
to
be
kind
to
the
latter
,
and
to
deal
with
the
former
,
as
we
would
do
with
our
own
Bayliffs
;
and
that
so
much
the
more
,
because
all
the
Safety
and
Welfare
of
the
Republick
depends
upon
the
Agreement
of
[
c
](A33176-e62140-b)
c
The
Senators
and
Equites
:
which
last
were
Farmers
of
the
Publick
Taxes
.
the
several
Orders
in
it
.
Nor
less
Ill
than
Philip's
,
was
the
Counsel
of
[
d
](A33176-e62160-b)
d
Curio
the
Father
.
See
chap.
17.
Book
2.
Curio
;
who
,
in
the
Case
of
the
[
e
](A33176-e62210-b)
e
Who
desir'd
to
be
made
free
of
the
City
of
Rome
,
but
were
denied
.
People
inhabiting
beyond
the
Po
,
tho'
he
confess'd
their
Demands
were
but
just
and
reasonable
,
yet
always
added
,
Vincat
utilitas
;
Every
thing
must
give
way
to
the
Interest
of
the
Publick
.
He
should
rather
have
said
that
they
were
not
just
,
because
not
comporting
with
the
Publick
Interest
;
than
thus
have
declar'd
that
they
did
not
comport
with
it
,
and
at
the
same
time
confess
'em
to
be
just
and
reasonable
.
CHAP.
XXIII
.
Several
Cases
put
by
Hecaton
the
Rhodian
.
Diogenes
and
Antipater
oppose
one
another
.
Whether
bad
Money
receiv'd
for
Good
should
be
put
off
?
[
a
](A33176-e62340-b)
a
One
of
Panaetius's
Scholars
,
mention'd
chap.
15.
HEcaton
proposeth
,
in
his
sixth
Book
of
Offices
,
several
Questions
such
as
these
which
follow
:
Whether
a
Good
Man
,
in
time
of
great
Scarcity
,
may
refuse
to
give
Victuals
to
the
Servants
of
his
own
Family
?
He
discourses
indeed
upon
either
side
the
Question
,
but
at
last
concludes
,
That
he
should
rather
be
guided
by
his
Interest
,
than
Humanity
.
He
demands
again
,
If
a
Merchant
in
a
Storm
be
forc'd
to
throw
his
Goods
over-board
,
whether
of
the
two
should
he
choose
to
cast
away
,
a
very
valuable
Horse
,
or
a
Servant
that
's
good
for
nothing
?
Here
Interest
,
and
the
saving
of
his
Goods
draws
one
way
,
and
compassion
of
Human
Nature
another
.
Should
a
Fool
in
a
Shipwrack
have
gotten
a
Plank
,
may
a
Wise
Man
take
it
away
from
him
if
he
can
?
He
answers
,
No
;
because
it
would
be
plainly
a
piece
of
Injustice
:
But
what
if
the
Owner
of
the
Ship
should
come
?
may
not
he
take
it
away
when
it
properly
belongs
to
him
?
No
,
not
at
all
;
no
more
than
he
may
throw
a
Man
out
of
the
Ship
,
under
the
pretence
that
the
Ship
belongs
to
him
:
For
till
they
are
arriv'd
whither
the
Ship
was
hired
for
,
it
does
not
more
properly
belong
to
the
Owner
,
than
it
does
to
the
Passengers
by
whom
it
was
hired
.
Suppose
two
Men
,
that
are
equally
Wise
,
should
both
of
'em
in
a
Shipwrack
lay
hold
of
the
same
Plank
;
may
either
of
'em
seize
upon
it
forcibly
to
himself
,
or
should
one
of
them
voluntarily
yeild
it
to
the
other
?
Let
one
yield
to
the
other
;
provided
that
other
will
be
more
serviceable
to
the
Publick
,
or
there
is
more
depending
upon
his
Life
and
Preservation
.
But
what
if
these
are
equal
in
either
of
them
?
Why
then
there
's
no
more
to
be
said
about
it
,
but
it
must
e'en
be
let
alone
for
Chance
to
determin
,
as
tho'
they
should
cast
Lots
,
or
[
b
](A33176-e62420-b)
b
What
Micare
,
the
word
here
us'd
,
signifies
.
See
ch.
19.
play
at
Even
and
Odd
for
it
.
What
if
a
Father
should
rifle
Temples
,
and
dig
Passages
under-ground
into
the
Treasury
?
Should
the
Son
discover
him
to
the
Publick
Magistrate
?
No
;
that
were
an
horrid
unnatural
Impiety
:
he
should
rather
on
the
contrary
defend
his
Father
,
if
any
one
else
should
pretend
to
accuse
him
.
But
what
!
ought
not
the
Interest
of
my
Country
to
be
consulted
,
before
that
of
any
one
else
whatsoever
?
Yes
undeniably
;
but
then
it
is
very
much
the
Interest
of
your
Country
,
to
have
Citizens
that
are
dutiful
and
obedient
to
their
Parents
.
But
if
a
Father
should
attempt
to
make
himself
King
,
or
any
ways
endeavour
to
betray
his
Country
;
should
a
Son
in
such
a
case
hold
his
Tongue
and
Conceal
it
?
In
the
first
place
,
let
him
beg
of
his
Father
to
desist
:
if
that
does
no
good
,
let
him
proceed
to
rebuke
and
even
to
threaten
him
about
it
:
but
if
at
last
he
perceive
that
it
directly
tends
to
the
Ruin
of
his
Country
,
he
should
prefer
its
Safety
before
that
of
his
Father
.
Another
of
the
Questions
he
proposes
is
this
,
Suppose
a
Good
Man
to
receive
,
by
an
oversight
,
bad
Money
for
good
,
and
afterwards
come
to
understand
that
't
is
bad
;
may
he
pay
it
for
good
,
if
he
owes
another
any
thing
?
Diogenes
thinks
he
may
,
but
Antipater
not
;
whom
I
rather
assent
to
.
Suppose
a
Man
be
a
selling
a
Vessel
of
Wine
,
which
he
knows
won't
keep
;
is
he
bound
to
tell
of
this
?
Diogenes
thinks
he
's
under
no
such
Obligation
;
Antipater
will
have
it
to
be
every
honest
Man's
Duty
.
These
are
the
things
,
which
whether
they
are
Right
and
one's
Duty
or
not
,
is
often
controverted
amongst
the
Stoicks
.
In
selling
a
Slave
is
one
bound
to
declare
what
his
Faults
are
or
not
?
I
don't
mean
those
,
which
unless
they
are
told
,
the
Law
it self
commands
he
shall
be
return'd
upon
our
Hands
;
but
his
being
a
Liar
,
[
c
](A33176-e62530-b)
c
For
if
he
be
a
down-right
Thief
,
the
Seller's
bound
to
tell
it
by
the
Law
,
otherwise
his
Slave
will
be
turn'd
upon
his
Hands
;
as
appears
from
chap.
18.
a
Filcher
,
a
Player
at
Dice
,
or
a
Drunkard
.
One's
of
Opinion
we
ought
to
declare
'em
,
and
the
other
not
.
Should
an
ignorant
Body
sell
a
quantity
of
Gold
,
and
suppose
it
to
be
Copper
;
is
a
good
Man
oblig'd
now
to
tell
him
that
't
is
Gold
;
or
may
he
buy
for
a
Penny
what
is
worth
a
thousand
Pence
?
'T
is
plain
enough
by
this
time
what
my
Thoughts
are
,
and
wherein
consists
the
Controversie
between
[
d
](A33176-e62550-b)
d
Diogenes
and
Antipater
.
the
foremention'd
Philosophers
.
CHAP.
XXIV
.
Whether
a
Man
's
oblig'd
to
perform
all
his
Promises
,
or
not
;
tho'
at
the
Expence
of
his
Life
or
Reputation
.
Some
Examples
upon
it
.
ARe
we
bound
to
perform
all
those
Promises
and
Bargains
,
which
(
in
the
Praetor's
Language
)
have
neither
Force
nor
Fraud
in
them
?
Here
's
a
Man
,
for
Example
,
that
has
gotten
the
Dropsie
,
and
another
prescribes
him
an
infallible
Cure
for
't
,
upon
Condition
that
he
'll
never
make
use
of
it
again
.
The
Man
recovers
by
its
help
at
present
,
but
falls
again
,
some
time
after
,
into
the
same
Distemper
.
Suppose
now
that
he
,
to
whom
he
made
such
Promise
,
will
by
no
means
allow
him
to
use
the
Cure
again
;
what
would
be
his
Duty
in
such
a
Case
!
Why
,
since
he
,
who
denies
him
the
Request
,
is
Inhuman
,
and
't
is
[
a
](A33176-e62630-b)
a
No
one
's
oblig'd
to
perform
any
Promise
,
when
't
will
but
bring
a
Loss
and
Inconvenience
on
himself
,
and
do
no
Service
to
the
Person
't
was
made
to
.
For
why
should
that
be
demanded
of
me
,
which
can
do
no
body
any
Good
,
but
me
a
great
Diskindness
?
Or
what
reason
is
there
a
thing
should
be
done
,
which
brings
a
great
deal
of
Harm
,
and
no
manner
of
Good
with
it
?
a
thing
that
will
do
him
no
manner
of
Prejudice
,
't
is
the
best
way
to
take
care
of
his
Life
and
Safety
.
A
Good
and
Wise
Man
is
desir'd
by
one
,
who
appoints
him
his
Heir
,
and
leaves
him
by
Will
a
considerable
Estate
,
that
before
he
enters
upon
the
Possession
of
it
,
he
should
Dance
at
Noon-day
in
the
open
Streets
;
and
this
he
accordingly
Promises
to
do
,
because
otherwise
the
Testator
would
not
make
him
his
Heir
:
would
you
have
him
perform
now
what
he
promis'd
,
or
not
?
I
could
wish
that
he
never
had
promis'd
it
at
all
,
which
I
think
would
much
better
have
suited
with
his
Character
:
But
since
he
has
done
it
,
if
he
think
it
dishonourable
to
Dance
so
in
publick
,
the
best
way
will
be
not
to
stand
to
such
a
Promise
,
provided
he
takes
none
of
the
Money
that
was
left
him
.
Unless
the
Money
may
be
turn'd
to
some
very
great
Benefit
and
Advantage
of
the
Publick
;
so
that
't
would
be
no
Disgrace
for
a
Man
[
b
](A33176-e62650-b)
b
For
an
Action
offending
against
outward
Decency
and
Modesty
,
such
as
Dancing
is
,
ought
to
give
place
to
an
Action
of
Justice
;
such
as
is
the
doing
a
real
Kindness
to
the
Publick
.
even
to
Dance
,
when
it
brings
so
much
Good
to
his
Country
along
with
it
.
CHAP.
XXV
.
Several
other
Cases
,
wherein
a
Man
is
not
oblig'd
to
perform
his
Promises
and
Vows
;
nor
to
give
up
a
Trust.
The
Method
he
designs
to
take
in
the
following
part
of
the
Work
.
NEither
is
one
bound
to
perform
those
Promises
,
which
are
hurtful
and
prejudicial
to
the
Persons
they
were
made
to
.
Thus
Father
Phoebus
(
[
a
](A33176-e62720-b)
a
For
he
mention'd
'em
in
Book
1.
and
the
Fable
of
Gyges
in
chap.
9.
of
this
.
that
we
may
return
to
our
Fables
)
promis'd
to
grant
[
b
](A33176-e62760-b)
b
See
Ovid
's
Metamorph.
Book
2.
Phaethon
whatsoever
he
should
desire
;
and
the
mad
young
Fellow
desir'd
to
get
up
into
his
Father's
Chariot
.
'T
was
accordingly
granted
him
;
but
before
he
could
get
to
be
well
setled
in
it
,
he
was
struck
down
with
Lightning
.
How
abundantly
better
had
it
been
,
in
such
a
Case
,
if
the
Father
had
refus'd
to
perform
such
a
Promise
?
The
same
may
be
said
of
another
,
which
[
c
](A33176-e62810-b)
c
Theseus
married
Hippolyte
,
Queen
of
the
Amazons
,
by
whom
he
had
Hippolytus
.
Afterwards
he
married
Phaedra
,
Daughter
to
King
Minos
of
Creet
,
who
fell
in
Love
with
Hippolytus
.
He
neglecting
her
,
she
(
in
Revenge
)
complain'd
to
her
Husband
,
That
he
would
have
lain
with
her
.
Theseus
in
a
rage
desir'd
Neptune
to
destroy
him
,
which
he
did
.
But
the
Truth
afterwards
coming
out
,
Theseus
was
grievously
afflicted
.
Seneca
and
Euripides
have
written
Tragedies
upon
it
.
Theseus
obtain'd
of
Neptune
:
This
God
had
promis'd
to
do
any
three
things
for
him
,
whatever
he
should
request
:
and
he
requested
the
Death
of
his
own
Son
Hippolytus
,
upon
a
false
Suspicion
,
that
he
had
been
naught
with
his
Mother-in-law
.
He
obtain'd
what
he
ask'd
;
which
occasion'd
him
very
much
Sorrow
and
Affliction
.
Again
,
[
d
](A33176-e62980-b)
d
Diana
being
angry
with
Agamemnon
for
having
slain
a
Stag
of
hers
,
kept
the
Grecian
Fleet
,
that
was
going
to
Troy
,
at
Aulis
by
contrary
Winds
.
Agamemnon
to
appease
her
,
vow'd
to
Sacrifice
the
beautifullest
thing
at
that
time
in
his
Dominions
;
which
proving
to
be
his
own
Daughter
,
he
sacrific'd
her
.
Others
say
the
Goddess
put
a
Hart
in
her
stead
,
and
carry'd
her
away
to
be
her
Priestess
at
Taurica
.
See
Eurip
.
Iphigenia
.
Agamemnon
had
vow'd
,
for
a
Sacrifice
to
Diana
,
the
most
beautiful
thing
that
was
born
that
Year
in
his
whole
Dominions
.
To
be
as
good
as
his
Word
,
he
was
forc'd
to
offer
his
Daughter
Iphigenia
,
than
whom
nothing
that
Year
had
been
born
more
beautiful
.
Had
not
it
been
[
e
](A33176-e63090-b)
e
Unlawful
Oaths
,
Vows
or
Promises
are
not
to
be
kept
,
because
no
Man
can
ever
oblige
himself
to
that
,
which
is
contrary
to
a
former
and
superior
Obligation
.
We
are
all
by
God
oblig'd
to
the
Performance
of
such
and
such
Duties
,
therefore
we
can't
be
oblig'd
to
the
contrary
by
an
Act
of
our
own
.
But
here
we
must
distinguish
between
those
which
are
Unlawful
as
to
the
Manner
or
Circumstances
of
them
,
and
those
that
are
Unlawful
as
to
the
Matter
they
are
about
.
The
first
is
by
some
call'd
Jaramentum
illicitum
;
and
the
second
,
De
re
illicita
.
All
hasty
and
rash
Oaths
are
Unlawful
in
the
first
Sence
,
by
which
we
are
oblig'd
for
all
that
;
provided
the
Subject
they
are
about
be
Lawful
.
Then
an
Oath
is
Unlawful
in
the
second
Sence
,
when
a
Man
swears
he
'll
do
any
thing
that
is
wicked
;
which
can't
oblige
him
for
the
Reason
above
given
.
However
he
sins
in
Swearing
such
a
thing
.
better
to
have
broke
his
Promise
,
than
have
done
such
an
horrid
and
unnatural
Action
?
In
some
Cases
then
a
Man
is
not
oblig'd
to
perform
his
Promises
:
no
more
is
he
to
restore
what
was
given
him
in
Trust.
Suppose
,
for
the
purpose
,
a
Man
in
his
Wits
had
entrusted
you
with
his
Sword
,
and
should
demand
it
of
you
again
when
he
's
beside
himself
;
your
Duty
would
be
not
to
give
it
him
again
,
and
if
you
did
,
you
'd
be
guilty
of
a
very
great
Errour
.
Again
,
[
f
](A33176-e63140-b)
f
Oaths
,
&c.
don't
bind
,
when
the
keeping
of
'em
will
hinder
some
greater
Good
,
or
bring
some
great
Evil.
See
Grotius
,
de
Jure
B.
and
P.
Sanderson
de
Oblig
.
Jur.
&c.
should
a
Man
put
a
large
Sum
of
Money
in
your
Hands
,
and
afterwards
raise
a
Rebellion
against
his
Country
;
would
you
deliver
up
your
Trust
,
if
demanded
it
by
him
?
Certainly
no
;
for
this
would
be
to
act
against
the
Publick
Interest
,
which
ought
to
be
preferr'd
before
every
thing
else
.
Thus
a
great
many
things
,
which
are
Honest
of
themselves
,
we
may
see
cease
to
be
so
when
the
Circumstances
alter
:
to
perform
a
Promise
,
for
Instance
,
to
stand
to
an
Agreement
,
or
deliver
up
a
Trust
,
ought
not
to
be
done
when
they
become
Unprofitable
.
This
may
suffice
to
have
been
said
of
those
things
,
which
a
[
g
](A33176-e63190-b)
g
See
Note
ⁱ
on
ch.
17.
pretended
Wisdom
would
fain
count
Profitable
,
tho'
contrary
to
Justice
.
But
having
laid
down
four
general
Heads
in
the
First
Book
,
from
which
all
Offices
or
Duties
are
deriv'd
,
I
shall
discourse
upon
each
of
the
same
in
this
;
and
make
out
,
that
what
's
contrary
to
any
of
those
Virtues
,
is
only
in
shew
,
and
not
really
Profitable
.
Of
Prudence
then
,
which
a
knavish
sort
of
Cunning
endeavours
to
imitate
;
as
also
of
Justice
,
which
is
never
but
Profitable
,
we
have
discours'd
already
.
It
[
h
](A33176-e63260-b)
h
He
has
shewn
that
those
Actions
,
which
may
seem
to
be
just
and
prudent
,
but
really
are
not
so
,
whatever
Advantages
of
Wealth
,
Honours
,
or
the
like
they
bring
along
with
them
,
are
not
truly
Profitable
,
because
contrary
to
those
two
parts
of
Honesty
.
He
now
proceeds
to
shew
the
same
of
the
other
two
remaining
parts
,
viz.
Courage
and
Temperance
,
That
nothing
can
be
Profitable
that
's
contrary
to
either
of
'em
.
And
first
of
Courage
;
see
the
next
Chapter
.
remains
that
we
speak
of
the
other
two
general
Heads
of
Duty
;
the
one
of
which
consists
in
the
Greatness
and
Excellency
of
a
couragious
Soul
;
and
the
other
in
such
a
Regularity
of
our
Actions
,
as
is
conformable
to
the
Precepts
of
Temperance
and
Moderation
.
CHAP.
XXVI
.
That
nothing
can
be
Profitable
,
which
is
contrary
to
the
Virtue
of
Fortitude
,
shewn
from
the
Examples
of
Ulysses
and
Regulus
.
ULysses
thought
't
would
be
Profitable
for
him
,
(
if
what
the
Tragedians
tell
us
be
true
;
for
Homer
,
a
Writer
of
the
greatest
Authority
,
never
once
insinuates
any
such
thing
)
but
the
Writers
of
Tragedy
accuse
Ulysses
,
for
feigning
to
be
Mad
that
he
might
avoid
the
War
;
a
Design
that
was
by
no
means
Honest
and
Creditable
:
Well
,
but
't
was
Profitable
(
will
some
one
say
)
to
stay
and
govern
at
his
own
home
,
and
enjoy
himself
quietly
in
his
Island
[
a
](A33176-e63420-b)
a
An
Isle
in
the
Ionian
Sea
,
now
call'd
Theaca
,
which
Ulysses
was
Prince
of
.
Ithaca
,
together
with
his
Parents
,
his
Wife
and
Son
.
Is
there
any
such
Credit
in
the
daily
Dangers
and
Fatigues
of
War
,
that
you
can
ever
think
comparable
with
living
such
a
Life
of
Tranquility
and
Security
?
Yes
;
I
wholly
despise
and
contemn
your
Security
,
being
fully
persuaded
that
it
can
never
be
Profitable
,
so
long
as
't
is
[
b
](A33176-e63480-b)
b
Because
cowardly
,
and
so
contrary
to
the
Virtue
of
Courage
.
Dishonest
.
Pray
what
would
they
have
said
,
do
you
think
,
of
Ulysses
,
suppose
he
had
continued
in
his
pretended
Madness
?
when
after
his
[
c
](A33176-e63500-b)
c
He
Conquer'd
Rhesus
,
stole
away
the
Palladium
,
&c.
See
Ovid
's
Metamorph.
Book
13.
glorious
Atchievements
in
the
War
,
he
had
yet
these
Reproaches
thrown
upon
him
by
Ajax
,
Tho'
,
you
all
know
,
he
first
propos'd
this
[
d
](A33176-e63610-b)
d
The
Greeks
took
an
Oath
,
at
their
preparing
for
Troy
,
never
to
cease
till
they
were
reveng'd
on
the
Trojans
.
Notwithstanding
which
Ulysses
would
have
escap'd
.
These
Verses
are
taken
out
of
a
Tragedy
of
Pacuvius
,
about
Ajax
and
Ulysses
contending
for
Achilles's
Arms.
The
Person
spoken
of
in
them
is
Ulysses
,
and
the
Speaker
Ajax
.
Oath
,
Yet
he
's
the
only
Man
that
would
have
broke
it
.
He
first
endeavour'd
not
to
join
i'
th'
War
,
Faint-hearted
Coward
!
feigning
to
be
Mad.
And
had
not
prudent
Palamede
found
out
,
By
Cunning
,
this
his
impudent
Deceit
;
The
Villain
,
notwithstanding
all
the
Ties
Of
sacred
Oaths
,
had
certainly
gone
off
.
'T
was
much
better
for
him
to
bear
all
the
Hazards
,
not
of
the
War
only
,
but
of
the
Sea
too
,
(
as
at
last
[
e
](A33176-e63890-b)
e
Wandring
ten
Years
,
after
the
War
was
ended
,
before
he
could
get
home
.
he
did
)
than
not
to
make
one
among
the
rest
of
the
Grecians
,
then
resolving
,
by
Consent
,
upon
a
War
with
[
f
](A33176-e63910-b)
f
So
the
Grecians
call'd
all
other
People
beside
themselves
.
the
Barbarians
.
But
to
remove
the
Scene
from
Foreign
Countries
,
and
fabulous
Relations
,
that
we
may
come
nearer
home
,
and
to
a
thing
that
really
happen'd
:
M.
Atilius
Regulus
,
then
a
second
time
Consul
,
was
surpriz'd
in
Africk
by
[
g
](A33176-e63960-b)
g
Who
was
at
that
time
made
Leader
of
the
Carthaginians
,
and
gave
the
Romans
a
notable
Overthrow
in
the
first
Punick
War
.
See
Polib
.
Book
1.
chap.
32.
Xanthippus
the
Lacedaemonian
,
and
made
a
Prisoner
,
(
[
h
](A33176-e64050-b)
h
A
noble
and
valiant
Carthaginian
,
at
the
latter
end
of
the
first
Punick
War
,
counted
the
greatest
General
of
his
Age
,
who
not
only
defended
,
but
enlarg'd
the
Carthaginian
Empire
.
See
Polybius
and
Corn.
Nepos
.
Amilcar
,
Father
of
Hannibal
being
General
of
the
Carthaginians
)
and
was
sent
by
the
Carthaginians
to
the
Roman
Senate
,
upon
solemn
Oath
given
,
that
,
unless
some
remarkable
Prisoners
were
restor'd
'em
,
he
should
himself
return
back
again
to
Carthage
.
Now
as
soon
as
this
Man
arriv'd
at
Rome
,
he
could
not
but
perceive
what
appear'd
to
be
his
Interest
,
but
withal
was
persuaded
(
as
the
Event
declar'd
)
that
it
only
appear'd
so
.
The
Case
was
thus
:
Here
he
might
have
staid
in
his
Native
Country
,
and
have
liv'd
at
home
quietly
with
his
Wife
and
Children
;
might
have
judg'd
his
Misfortune
,
receiv'd
in
the
War
,
no
more
than
what
all
Men
in
that
State
are
liable
to
;
and
might
still
have
continu'd
in
his
old
Degree
of
Honour
among
those
of
consular
Dignity
.
And
who
can
deny
now
,
(
will
any
one
say
)
that
all
these
things
are
Expedient
and
Profitable
?
Who
do
you
think
?
why
[
i
](A33176-e64220-b)
i
That
is
,
'T
was
not
really
expedient
and
profitable
for
him
to
stay
at
home
,
tho'
it
might
seem
so
;
because
contrary
to
Courage
and
Greatness
of
Soul
.
Greatness
of
Soul
,
and
true
Courage
deny
it
.
Can
you
desire
any
greater
and
more
illustrious
Authorities
?
CHAP.
XXVII
.
What
Courage
and
Greatness
of
Soul
teach
us
.
A
continuation
of
the
Story
of
Regulus
.
THese
are
the
Virtues
,
by
which
we
are
taught
to
be
afraid
of
nothing
,
to
despise
all
the
outward
Concerns
of
Life
,
and
count
nothing
intolerable
that
can
possibly
befal
a
Man
.
Well
,
but
pray
what
did
this
Regulus
do
then
?
He
came
into
the
Senate
,
and
told
'em
what
't
was
he
was
sent
about
,
and
refus'd
to
give
his
own
Vote
in
the
Case
,
forasmuch
as
he
was
not
to
be
counted
a
Senator
,
as
being
by
Oath
under
the
Enemy's
Power
.
And
in
his
Speech
,
which
he
spoke
to
the
Senate
upon
that
Subject
,
(
Fool
that
he
was
,
some
will
be
ready
to
say
,
and
an
Enemy
to
his
own
Interest
!
)
he
told
'em
,
'T
was
best
not
to
give
up
their
Prisoners
;
that
they
were
young
Men
,
and
might
make
able
Leaders
;
but
that
he
,
for
his
part
,
was
grown
almost
useless
,
and
worn
away
with
old
Age.
The
Senate
were
so
far
persuaded
by
his
Speech
,
that
they
resolv'd
the
Prisoners
should
be
detain'd
in
Custody
,
and
he
himself
return'd
back
again
to
Carthage
;
not
all
the
Love
which
he
had
for
his
Country
,
his
Friends
and
Relations
,
being
able
to
detain
him
.
And
tho'
he
knew
well
enough
what
a
barbarous
Enemy
,
and
what
[
a
](A33176-e64380-b)
a
He
was
put
into
a
little
Place
,
stuck
all
about
with
sharp
Points
,
so
that
he
could
neither
lye
down
,
lean
on
one
side
,
nor
stand
upright
:
beside
that
his
Eye-lids
were
cut
off
,
and
the
Sun
let
shine
upon
his
Eyes
,
so
that
he
could
never
sleep
,
&c.
exquisite
Torments
he
was
going
to
return
to
;
yet
he
thought
it
his
Duty
,
whatever
came
of
it
,
not
to
violate
his
Oath
.
I
think
he
was
in
a
better
condition
therefore
,
even
whilst
he
was
murdred
by
being
kept
from
Sleeping
,
than
e're
he
could
have
been
,
had
he
stay'd
at
home
,
and
liv'd
under
the
Scandal
of
being
an
old
Captive
and
a
perjur'd
Nobleman
.
But
was
not
it
very
great
Folly
and
Madness
,
if
he
would
not
persuade
the
Releasing
of
the
Prisoners
,
yet
to
go
and
dissuade
it
as
much
as
he
could
?
Pray
how
Folly
and
Madness
?
What
,
tho'
't
were
conducive
to
the
Good
of
the
Republick
?
or
can
any
thing
be
Profitable
to
a
private
Citizen
,
which
brings
a
Disadvantage
to
the
Commonwealth
in
general
?
CHAP.
XXVIII
.
To
separate
Profit
from
Honesty
,
is
to
pervert
the
first
Principle
of
Nature
.
All
Men
naturally
desirous
of
Profit
.
The
Reasons
given
by
those
,
who
think
Regulus
did
ill
in
returning
.
THose
Men
,
who
separate
Profit
from
Honesty
,
wholly
pervert
the
[
a
](A33176-e64520-b)
a
The
first
Principle
of
Nature
is
,
That
every
one
desire
his
own
Happiness
,
which
is
certainly
his
true
and
greatest
Profit
.
Now
this
consisting
in
Virtue
or
Honesty
,
the
right
use
of
this
Principle
is
,
to
conduct
and
lead
Men
on
in
the
ways
of
Virtue
.
But
those
who
make
Mens
Interest
separate
from
Honesty
,
pervert
this
Principle
,
and
make
it
conduct
Men
to
other
things
instead
of
Honesty
,
viz.
Riches
,
Power
or
the
like
.
first
Principles
of
Nature
:
For
we
all
of
us
naturally
desire
our
Interest
,
toward
which
we
are
carried
with
so
strong
a
Biass
,
as
that
't
is
not
in
our
power
to
turn
the
other
way
.
For
who
is
averse
from
?
or
rather
,
who
does
not
most
eagerly
follow
his
own
Advantage
?
But
since
we
can
find
out
no
real
Advantage
,
except
in
what
's
Honest
,
Becoming
and
Commendable
,
therefore
we
count
these
the
principal
things
;
and
take
the
word
Profit
to
signifie
something
,
which
only
relates
to
our
outward
Necessities
,
and
the
supplying
of
them
;
without
all
that
glorious
and
shining
Excellence
,
which
appears
in
the
Actions
of
Virtue
and
Honesty
.
[
b
](A33176-e64540-b)
b
He
brings
all
the
Arguments
of
those
Men
,
who
would
have
that
Regulus
did
foolishly
in
returning
:
as
,
First
,
That
he
could
not
fear
the
Anger
of
the
Gods
,
if
he
had
staid
at
home
;
for
they
are
never
Angry
.
Secondly
,
If
they
had
been
Angry
,
they
could
not
have
hurt
him
worse
,
than
he
did
himself
by
returning
,
&c.
To
all
which
he
answers
in
the
following
Chapters
.
But
after
all
is
done
,
perhaps
some
Men
will
say
,
pray
what
is
there
in
an
Oath
,
that
he
should
be
afraid
thus
to
break
it
?
What!
was
it
Jupiter's
Anger
that
he
dreaded
?
But
this
is
agreed
on
by
all
Philosophers
;
not
only
those
,
[
c
](A33176-e64620-b)
c
The
Epicureaus
,
who
made
the
Happiness
of
the
Gods
consist
in
Ease
,
and
Freedom
from
Disturbance
;
and
deny'd
a
Providence
.
who
maintain
that
the
Gods
lead
an
idle
Life
,
neither
busying
themselves
,
nor
disturbing
others
;
but
[
d
](A33176-e64640-b)
d
The
Stoicks
,
Academicks
,
&c.
who
held
that
the
Gods
took
care
of
the
World
and
the
Affairs
of
it
:
only
Aristotle
confin'd
his
Providence
to
the
heavenly
Bodies
.
those
who
affirm
they
are
always
busie
,
and
always
doing
something
that
relates
to
the
World
:
in
this
thing
,
I
say
,
they
are
all
agreed
,
That
the
[
e
](A33176-e64680-b)
e
See
Note
on
chap.
3.
Book
2.
The
Deity
't
is
true
is
never
Angry
as
Men
are
,
never
transported
with
violent
Passion
.
But
this
was
not
so
meant
(
by
those
I
mean
who
allow'd
a
Providence
)
as
tho'
the
Gods
were
not
displeas'd
at
Mens
Sins
,
their
Breaches
of
Oaths
,
and
the
like
;
and
did
not
Punish
them
too
as
they
thought
fit
:
But
these
Philosophers
well
understood
,
That
the
Gods
punishing
Offenders
was
not
a
Hurt
,
but
a
real
Good
;
if
not
to
the
punisht
Person
,
yet
at
least
to
the
rest
of
the
World
.
Deity
neither
hurts
,
nor
is
angry
with
any
one
.
But
supposing
the
worst
,
Pray
what
hurt
could
Jupiter's
Vengeance
have
done
Regulus
,
greater
than
what
Regulus
did
to
himself
?
It
could
not
be
any
thing
of
Religion
therefore
,
that
hindred
him
from
following
what
appear'd
to
be
his
Interest
.
Again
,
Was
he
afraid
of
the
Baseness
and
Dishonesty
of
the
Action
?
As
to
that
in
the
first
place
,
Always
of
two
Evils
choose
the
least
:
and
where
was
any
Evil
in
the
Baseness
of
the
thing
,
so
great
as
was
that
of
the
Torments
which
he
endur'd
?
Beside
,
pray
remember
that
Sentence
of
Accius
,
which
however
it
might
be
said
by
an
impious
King
,
is
yet
generally
acknowledg'd
to
be
very
well
said
,
who
when
one
told
him
,
You
have
broken
your
Oath
to
me
:
answer'd
,
[
f
](A33176-e64780-b)
f
The
force
of
this
Argument
is
,
Men
are
not
oblig'd
to
keep
their
Oaths
to
Deceivers
and
treacherous
People
;
and
such
the
Carthaginians
were
;
therefore
Regulus
needed
not
have
kept
his
Oath
to
them
.
I
neither
am
,
nor
have
been
tied
by
Oath
to
any
treacherous
Deceiver
.
Again
they
tell
us
,
That
as
we
affirm
some
things
seem
Profitable
,
which
are
not
so
;
so
they
affirm
some
things
seem
Honest
,
which
are
not
so
:
As
this
,
for
Example
,
of
returning
to
be
tormented
,
rather
than
break
one's
Oath
;
which
is
not
Honest
,
tho'
it
may
seem
to
be
so
;
because
no
Man
's
oblig'd
to
perform
that
Oath
,
which
was
[
g
](A33176-e64900-b)
g
These
Words
contain
two
Arguments
,
which
are
afterwards
distinctly
answer'd
:
First
,
'T
was
made
to
an
Enemy
,
Secondly
,
Extorted
by
Force
.
extorted
from
him
by
the
force
of
his
Enemies
.
And
lastly
they
argue
,
That
whatever
makes
very
much
for
one's
Profit
and
Advantage
,
thereby
becomes
Honest
,
tho'
before
it
did
not
seem
so
.
This
is
what
is
generally
brought
against
Regulus
;
but
let
us
see
and
examin
all
the
parts
of
it
in
order
.
CHAP.
XXIX
.
He
answers
the
first
part
of
the
Arguments
brought
against
Regulus
.
The
Sacredness
of
an
Oath
.
The
Divinity
of
Faith
.
Pain
none
,
or
at
least
not
the
greatest
Evil.
Dishonesty
the
greatest
,
if
not
only
Evil.
Faith
to
be
kept
even
with
those
who
are
Treacherous
.
Oaths
made
to
Enemies
should
be
kept
.
Not
so
those
made
to
Pirates
,
and
why
.
What
't
is
to
Forswear
one's
self
.
The
Form
of
Oaths
among
the
Romans
.
Laws
of
War
to
be
kept
inviolable
.
[
a
](A33176-e65040-b)
a
He
begins
with
answering
the
first
Argument
brought
against
Regulus
;
and
shews
what
is
to
be
regarded
when
People
take
Oaths
.
FIrst
then
they
say
,
He
could
fear
no
Harm
from
the
Anger
of
Jupiter
,
who
neither
can
be
Angry
,
nor
do
Harm
to
any
body
.
This
proves
as
strongly
against
all
Oaths
in
general
,
as
it
does
in
particular
against
this
of
Regulus
.
But
the
thing
to
be
consider'd
in
Peoples
taking
of
Oaths
,
is
not
what
Danger
they
are
in
,
shou'd
they
break
'em
;
but
what
a
sacred
and
powerful
Obligation
is
laid
upon
'em
.
For
every
Oath
is
a
religious
Affirmation
;
and
whatever
is
promis'd
after
such
a
manner
,
as
it
were
calling
God
for
a
Witness
to
your
Words
,
ought
certainly
to
be
perform'd
.
For
now
Faith
and
Justice
require
it
of
us
,
and
not
any
Fear
of
that
Anger
of
the
Gods
,
which
is
not
incident
to
their
Divine
Natures
.
That
Faith
I
mean
,
of
which
Ennius
has
got
these
incomparable
words
:
O
Faith
All-glorious
and
Divine
!
In
lofty
Temples
fit
to
shine
;
Ev'n
[
b
](A33176-e65200-b)
b
Men
and
the
inferiour
Gods
might
swear
by
Jupiter
,
who
was
above
them
;
but
Jupiter
himself
could
swear
by
none
,
but
the
inviolable
Faith
of
his
Word
and
Promises
.
Jove
himself
by
thee
doth
Swear
!
Whosoever
therefore
doth
not
perform
his
Oath
,
affronts
the
[
c
](A33176-e65250-b)
c
The
Heathens
made
Deities
almost
of
every
thing
,
viz.
Faith
,
Concord
,
Luck
,
&c.
Deity
of
that
Divine
Faith
,
which
was
(
as
Cato
in
his
Speech
informs
us
)
set
up
by
our
Fathers
in
the
Capitol
it self
,
even
next
to
the
Statue
of
the
great
God
Jupiter
.
[
d
](A33176-e65300-b)
d
He
comes
to
answer
the
second
Argument
against
Regulus
.
But
,
secondly
,
they
tell
us
,
Supposing
Jupiter
had
been
Angry
with
Regulus
,
he
could
not
have
brought
any
Evil
upon
him
,
greater
than
what
Regulus
brought
upon
himself
.
This
,
I
confess
,
would
be
very
true
,
if
there
was
no
other
Evil
but
only
Pain
:
But
that
is
so
far
from
being
the
greatest
Evil
,
that
,
if
we
may
credit
some
of
the
[
e
](A33176-e65370-b)
e
The
Stoicks
,
who
(
as
was
before
observ'd
)
allow'd
nothing
to
be
Evil
,
but
what
concern'd
the
Soul
and
Conscience
;
calling
the
Calamities
of
the
Body
or
Fortune
,
such
as
Pain
or
Poverty
,
indifferent
things
.
chief
Philosophers
,
it
is
not
so
much
as
any
Evil
at
all
:
Among
whom
,
I
pray
you
,
let
Regulus
be
counted
of
no
small
Authority
;
if
I
may'nt
rather
say
of
the
greatest
and
most
weighty
:
For
what
greater
Testimony
can
any
one
desire
,
than
that
of
a
principal
Man
among
the
Romans
;
who
rather
than
be
wanting
in
any
point
of
his
Duty
,
chose
to
undergo
the
most
exquisite
Torments
?
[
f
](A33176-e65430-b)
f
The
third
Argument
against
him
,
answer'd
.
But
of
two
Evils
,
say
they
,
always
choose
the
least
:
That
is
,
in
plain
words
,
Rather
be
a
Rogue
than
undergo
any
Calamity
.
Can
any
Calamity
then
be
greater
,
than
that
of
Baseness
and
Injustice
?
For
if
even
the
Filth
and
Deformity
of
the
Body
be
loathsome
and
offensive
;
how
much
more
so
must
that
of
the
Mind
needs
be
,
when
't
is
cover'd
and
polluted
with
Shame
and
Dishonesty
?
Those
Philosophers
therefore
,
who
discourse
of
these
things
with
most
Closeness
and
Severity
,
venture
bodly
to
affirm
,
That
nothing
is
Evil
but
only
what
's
Dishonest
:
and
even
those
themselves
,
who
do
it
more
loosly
,
yet
always
acknowledge
,
That
't
is
the
greatest
however
of
all
Evils
.
[
g
](A33176-e65520-b)
g
The
fourth
Argument
,
taken
out
of
Accius's
Tragedy
of
Atreus
,
answer'd
.
That
Saying
of
the
Poet
's
indeed
is
good
,
I
neither
am
,
nor
have
been
tied
by
Oath
to
a
treacherous
Deceiver
;
but
't
is
therefore
so
,
because
when
Atreus
was
brought
upon
the
Stage
,
he
was
to
make
him
speak
that
,
which
was
suitable
to
his
Character
.
But
if
once
they
begin
to
lay
down
this
for
a
Maxim
,
That
Faith
,
when
given
to
those
who
are
trearous
,
is
not
to
be
kept
;
they
had
best
have
a
care
,
that
this
be
not
made
a
Refuge
and
Cover
for
Perjury
.
[
h
](A33176-e65580-b)
h
Answer
to
the
fifth
Argument
,
His
Oaths
being
made
to
an
Enemy
.
As
for
his
Oaths
being
made
to
an
Enemy
;
even
War
it self
has
Laws
that
belong
to
it
;
and
Faith
,
except
in
some
very
few
cases
,
is
always
to
be
kept
even
with
our
greatest
Adversaries
.
For
whatever
you
swear
,
for
Example
,
in
such
a
manner
,
as
that
[
i
](A33176-e65610-b)
i
So
I
understand
the
words
,
Ut
mens
conciperet
,
&c.
not
as
tho'
it
were
Mens
deferentis
;
for
I
am
not
bound
to
perform
whatever
I
Swear
,
according
to
the
Mind
of
him
that
gives
the
Oath
;
for
it
may
be
unlawful
,
or
the
like
.
Beside
't
is
unreasonable
to
interpret
Oaths
,
just
according
to
the
Mind
of
the
Imposer
:
He
may
have
his
private
Meanings
,
&c.
as
well
as
the
Receiver
.
See
upon
this
whole
Subject
Sanderf
.
Grotius
,
&c.
your
Conscience
tells
you
it
ought
to
be
done
,
you
are
bound
most
inviolably
to
perform
it
:
But
where
it
is
otherwise
,
you
don't
lie
under
any
such
Obligation
;
and
are
not
perjur'd
,
tho'
you
should
not
perform
it
.
Suppose
,
for
the
purpose
,
you
had
sworn
to
a
Pirate
,
That
you
would
pay
him
such
a
Sum
,
if
he
'd
spare
your
Life
;
it
would
not
be
Perjury
,
tho'
you
should
not
pay
it
him
.
[
k
](A33176-e65670-b)
k
Grotius
does
not
like
this
Decision
of
Gicero's
:
because
in
an
Oath
we
are
not
only
to
consider
the
Person
's
Right
whom
we
Swear
to
;
but
God
also
,
by
whom
we
Swear
.
'T
is
true
,
the
Pirate
can
demand
nothing
in
this
case
,
but
the
Majesty
of
God
,
by
whom
I
swore
,
lays
an
Obligation
of
Performance
upon
me
.
But
Pufendorf
de
Jur.
N.
&
G.
Book
4.
chap.
2.
§.
9.
seems
rather
to
favour
our
Author's
Opinion
.
For
a
Pirate
is
by
no
means
a
lawful
Adversary
,
but
rather
a
common
Pest
and
Enemy
of
Mankind
;
so
that
no
one
's
oblig'd
to
keep
his
Faith
or
Oath
with
him
.
For
to
Swear
to
a
thing
,
and
yet
not
perform
it
,
is
not
immediately
to
Forswear
one's
self
:
But
then
a
Man
is
properly
said
to
be
Perjur'd
,
when
he
Swears
[
l
](A33176-e65730-b)
l
That
's
the
meaning
of
Ex
Animi
sententia
,
and
not
with
design
of
Obliging
your self
.
Oaths
would
signifie
just
nothing
at
all
,
if
they
oblig'd
no
further
,
than
People
design'd
to
be
oblig'd
by
them
.
'T
was
the
Form
of
Oaths
among
the
Romans
,
Do
you
Swear
such
a
thing
is
so
or
so
,
Ex
Animi
tui
sententia
?
which
words
signifie
either
according
to
your
Mind
,
or
upon
your
Conscience
.
Hence
that
Jest
which
our
Author
quotes
in
his
de
Orat.
Cato
the
Censor
ask'd
a
Man
,
Have
you
a
Wife
or
not
,
Ex
Animi
tui
sententia
?
meaning
,
upon
your
Conscience
or
Oath
:
To
which
he
answers
,
Non
quidem
ex
Animi
mei
sententia
;
meaning
,
Not
according
to
my
Mind
or
Liking
.
upon
his
Conscience
(
as
our
Form
runs
)
to
do
such
and
such
things
,
and
yet
does
not
do
them
.
For
that
of
Euripides
may
be
said
in
[
m
](A33176-e65860-b)
m
When
,
for
Example
,
a
Man
only
reads
or
repeats
the
words
of
an
Oath
,
or
the
like
.
See
Grot.
Book
2.
chap.
13.
§.
2.
some
Cases
to
be
very
good
,
My
Tongue
indeed
Swore
,
but
my
Conscience
did
not
Assent
.
But
had
Regulus
,
in
his
Case
,
done
any
thing
contrary
to
the
Laws
,
and
Conditions
,
that
are
kept
between
Enemies
,
it
had
been
down-right
Perjury
.
For
the
Carthaginians
,
with
whom
he
had
then
to
do
,
were
a
lawful
Adversary
,
between
whom
and
us
there
is
all
[
n
](A33176-e65930-b)
n
See
chap.
11.
Book
1.
the
Fecial
,
and
several
other
Laws
that
are
common
to
Nations
.
For
had
it
been
otherwise
,
't
is
certain
the
Senate
would
never
have
deliver'd
up
some
[
o
](A33176-e65960-b)
o
Generals
,
who
had
made
Leagues
with
the
Enemy
,
without
Power
from
the
Senate
and
People
.
eminent
Persons
in
Chains
to
their
Enemies
.
CHAP.
XXX
.
Examples
of
several
eminent
Romans
given
up
to
the
Enemy
.
Answer
to
the
rest
of
the
Arguments
brought
against
Regulus
.
BUt
they
did
deliver
both
[
a
](A33176-e66050-b)
a
About
the
Year
of
Rome
433
,
Caius
Pontius
,
whom
he
mention'd
chap.
21.
Book
2.
was
then
General
of
the
Samnites
.
See
Livy
,
Book
9.
chap
1.
Lucius
Veturius
and
Sp.
Posthumius
,
in
their
second
Consulships
to
their
Enemies
,
the
Samnites
;
because
,
being
beaten
at
the
Passage
of
Caudium
,
and
the
Legions
being
disarm'd
and
sent
away
with
Disgrace
,
they
had
concluded
a
Peace
of
their
own
Heads
,
without
any
Orders
from
the
Senate
or
People
.
T.
Numicius
and
Q.
Melius
,
who
were
Tribunes
of
the
People
at
the
same
time
,
because
by
their
Authority
the
Peace
was
concluded
,
were
likewise
deliver'd
;
that
so
we
might
be
freed
from
any
Obligation
of
keeping
it
.
And
all
this
was
done
upon
the
Proposal
and
Advice
of
Posthumius
himself
,
who
was
the
Person
deliver'd
.
The
Case
of
[
b
](A33176-e66200-b)
b
C.
Hostilius
Mancinus
,
Cos.
about
the
Year
of
Rome
613
,
who
being
brought
into
very
great
Streights
by
the
Numantines
,
was
forc'd
to
make
a
dishonourable
League
with
them
.
The
Senate
that
they
might
not
be
bound
to
the
League
,
deliver'd
the
Author
of
it
up
to
the
Enemy
.
But
they
refus'd
to
receive
him
,
as
the
Samnites
had
Posthumius
before
.
See
Vell.
Paterc
.
Book
2.
chap.
1.
Mancinus
,
a
great
many
Years
after
,
was
exactly
the
same
;
who
having
,
without
any
Orders
from
the
Senate
,
struck
up
an
Alliance
with
those
of
[
c
](A33176-e66300-b)
c
A
small
Town
in
Spain
,
which
with
a
very
few
Men
held
a
War
against
the
Romans
fourteen
Years
,
and
beat
them
several
times
:
At
last
't
was
raz'd
by
the
Younger
Africanus
.
Numantia
,
was
the
first
Man
that
spoke
for
that
Bill
in
the
Senate-house
,
which
by
L.
Furius
and
Sext.
Atilius
was
carried
to
the
People
;
and
which
they
agreeing
to
,
he
was
deliver'd
to
the
Enemy
.
He
did
more
honestly
than
[
d
](A33176-e66370-b)
d
Cos.
the
Year
before
Mancinus
,
who
made
the
first
shameful
League
with
the
Numantines
;
but
by
his
Interest
and
Entreaties
escap'd
being
deliver'd
up
to
them
.
He
was
the
first
of
the
Pompey's
that
ever
was
Cos.
Sext.
Pompeius
,
who
being
concern'd
in
the
same
sort
of
Crime
,
made
Interest
to
be
excus'd
from
undergoing
the
same
Punishment
;
and
by
that
means
escap'd
it
.
This
Man
now
let
the
Appearance
of
Profit
prevail
over
Honesty
;
but
in
all
the
others
mention'd
,
the
Authority
of
Honesty
easily
carry'd
it
from
the
pretended
Profit
.
[
e
](A33176-e66420-b)
e
He
returns
to
his
Defence
of
Regulus
,
and
answers
the
other
Arguments
urg'd
against
him
.
But
to
go
on
with
Regulus
:
Another
thing
urg'd
by
his
Adversaries
is
this
,
That
he
should
not
have
perform'd
what
was
forcibly
put
upon
him
.
As
tho'
a
Man
of
Courage
could
be
wrought
upon
by
Force
,
But
why
,
say
they
,
did
he
go
at
all
to
the
Senate
,
being
resolv'd
to
disswade
the
Delivery
of
the
Captives
?
This
is
to
blame
him
for
that
,
which
particularly
deserves
Commendation
:
He
would
not
depend
upon
his
own
Judgment
,
but
pleading
for
that
which
he
thought
most
Profitable
,
left
it
to
be
determin'd
by
the
Judgment
of
the
Senate
:
And
had
not
it
been
for
his
Counsel
in
the
Case
,
the
Prisoners
had
surely
been
sent
again
to
Carthage
,
and
he
remain'd
safe
in
his
Native
Country
:
But
this
he
concluded
would
be
a
Prejudice
to
the
Publick
;
and
therefore
esteem'd
it
to
be
no
more
than
his
Duty
,
to
speak
what
he
thought
,
and
endure
what
might
come
of
it
.
Lastly
,
They
add
,
That
whatever
makes
highly
for
one's
Profit
and
Advantage
,
thereby
becomes
Honest.
I
answer
,
That
it
[
f
](A33176-e66500-b)
f
Fieri
signifies
to
be
made
,
and
esse
actually
to
be
:
The
meaning
is
,
That
a
thing
which
is
very
Profitable
may
be
also
Honest
;
but
it
can't
be
made
Honest
by
its
being
Profitable
,
if
it
were
otherwise
Dishonest
.
may
indeed
antecedently
.
be
such
,
but
can
never
thereby
become
such
:
For
nothing
is
Profitable
but
what
is
Honest
;
and
things
don't
become
Honest
by
their
first
being
Profitable
,
but
become
Profitable
by
their
first
being
Honest.
I
conclude
therefore
,
That
of
all
those
great
and
wonderful
Examples
,
which
might
easily
be
brought
upon
this
Subject
,
't
will
be
hard
to
find
any
more
illustrious
and
commendable
,
than
this
of
Regulus
.
CHAP.
XXXI
.
Regulus
's
Returning
to
Carthage
a
Commendation
of
those
Times
.
The
Sacredness
of
an
Oath
,
tho'
extorted
by
Force
,
among
the
ancient
Romans
.
This
illustrated
by
the
Example
of
Pomponius
and
Manlius
.
BUt
the
only
thing
that
deserves
our
Admiration
,
in
all
this
glorious
Conduct
of
Regulus
,
is
his
persuading
the
Senate
not
to
restore
the
Capives
.
As
for
his
returning
again
to
Carthage
,
't
is
true
we
admire
it
in
our
Days
,
but
at
those
times
he
could
not
have
possibly
avoided
it
.
The
Age
,
I
think
,
therefore
should
rather
be
commended
for
that
,
than
the
Man
.
For
there
's
nothing
our
Ancestors
took
greater
care
of
,
than
that
the
Tie
of
an
Oath
should
be
always
held
as
most
Sacred
and
Inviolable
.
This
appears
plainly
from
the
XII
Tables
;
it
appears
from
those
Laws
which
are
call'd
[
a
](A33176-e66720-b)
a
Because
the
Commons
,
thinking
they
were
oppress'd
by
the
Nobles
,
rais'd
a
Sedition
,
and
retiring
to
a
place
call'd
Sacer
mons
,
refus'd
to
return
till
such
and
such
Privileges
were
granted
them
by
the
Senate
.
The
Laws
made
upon
that
occasion
were
call'd
Sacratae
.
See
Livy
Book
2.
chap.
32
,
33.
and
Paul
.
Manut.
de
Leg.
Rom.
pag.
39.
Sacratae
;
it
appears
from
the
strict
Observation
of
Leagues
,
by
which
we
're
oblig'd
to
keep
Faith
even
with
Enemies
;
and
lastly
,
it
appears
from
the
Punishments
and
Penalties
which
have
been
inflicted
by
the
Censors
;
who
in
no
one
thing
have
been
more
severe
,
than
in
punishing
those
,
who
had
transgress'd
their
Oaths
.
M.
Pomponius
,
a
Tribune
of
the
People
,
once
enter'd
an
Action
against
[
b
](A33176-e66810-b)
b
Sirnam'd
Imperiosus
,
a
valiant
and
noble
Roman
;
he
was
chose
Dictator
upon
a
Religious
Account
,
for
driving
a
Nail
into
Jupiter's
Tempel
,
[
Livy
Book
7.
chap.
3.
]
but
a
War
falling
out
in
the
mean
time
,
he
would
have
manag'd
that
too
,
imperiously
forcing
the
Youth
to
take
Arms
;
which
got
him
the
Hatred
of
the
Tribunes
,
and
made
Pomponius
accuse
him
;
about
the
Year
of
Rome
393.
L.
Manlius
,
the
Son
of
Aulus
,
who
had
been
Dictator
,
for
holding
that
Office
somewhat
longer
than
he
should
have
done
.
And
amongst
other
things
brought
in
this
too
against
him
,
That
he
kept
his
Son
Titus
,
who
was
afterwards
Torquatus
,
from
Conversation
with
the
World
,
and
had
strictly
charg'd
him
to
live
solitary
in
the
Country
.
As
soon
as
the
Son
heard
his
Father
was
in
Trouble
about
this
Business
,
he
's
reported
immediately
to
have
set
out
for
Rome
,
and
come
early
in
the
Morning
to
Pomponius's
House
.
Pomponius
was
no
sooner
told
of
his
coming
,
but
he
got
up
immediately
;
and
thinking
the
Youth
,
out
of
Anger
,
had
brought
some
Complaint
against
his
Father
,
commanded
all
others
to
depart
the
Room
,
and
him
alone
to
be
brought
in
to
him
.
As
soon
as
the
young
Man
was
got
into
the
Room
,
he
drew
his
Sword
,
and
swore
he
would
immediately
kill
Pomponius
,
unless
he
'd
promise
him
upon
Oath
,
to
meddle
with
his
Father
no
further
.
Pomponius
,
out
of
sudden
Apprehension
of
the
Danger
,
did
swear
to
him
accordingly
;
and
discharged
his
Father
from
any
more
Trouble
;
having
first
reported
the
Matter
to
the
People
,
and
told
'em
why
he
was
forc'd
to
let
fall
his
Action
.
Thus
strict
and
conscientious
were
People
at
those
times
,
in
observing
their
Oaths
.
And
this
Titus
Manlius
is
that
very
Person
,
who
,
being
afterwards
challenged
by
a
mighty
French
Man
,
[
c
](A33176-e66980-b)
c
The
Year
of
Rome
394
,
T.
Quintius
Pennus
,
being
Dictator
.
Livy
Book
6.
chap.
9
,
10.
kill'd
him
in
a
Duel
by
the
River
[
d
](A33176-e67020-b)
d
A
River
in
Italy
,
that
falls
into
the
Tiber
a
few
Miles
above
Rome
;
whence
't
is
now
call'd
Teverone
,
that
is
,
the
little
Tiber.
Anien
,
and
was
Sirnam'd
Torquatus
from
wearing
a
Chain
,
(
in
Latin
Torquis
)
which
he
took
from
his
Neck
.
The
same
Man
again
,
in
his
third
Consulship
,
put
to
flight
and
defeated
the
Latins
near
[
e
](A33176-e67120-b)
e
Another
River
in
Italy
,
not
far
from
the
foot
of
the
Mountain
Vesuvius
.
Veseris
.
He
was
indeed
a
very
great
and
extraordinary
Person
;
who
as
he
shew'd
his
Love
,
in
this
Case
,
to
his
Father
,
so
he
was
[
f
](A33176-e67160-b)
f
His
Son
fought
a
single
Combat
with
Geminius
Metius
,
a
stout
Latin
,
and
overcame
him
;
but
because
he
did
it
without
Leave
from
him
who
was
General
,
he
commanded
his
Head
to
be
cut
off
,
for
his
Breach
of
Military
Discipline
:
Hence
Manliana
Imperia
,
us'd
to
signifie
any
unnatural
Rigor
and
Barbarity
.
unnaturally
Cruel
to
his
Son
.
CHAP.
XXXII
.
The
Severity
of
the
Romans
against
the
Breakers
of
Oaths
.
The
Example
of
ten
sent
by
Hannibal
to
the
Senate
,
upon
Oath
of
returning
.
Fraud
not
sufficient
to
excuse
a
Perjury
.
A
resolute
Action
of
the
Senate
in
not
redeeming
eight
Thousand
Prisoners
.
The
Conclusion
of
this
Head
.
BUt
as
Regulus
did
well
in
performing
his
Oath
;
so
those
ten
,
who
,
after
the
Battel
at
Cannae
,
were
by
Hannibal
sent
to
the
Roman
Senate
,
upon
Oath
of
returning
to
the
Carthaginian
Camp
,
if
they
could
not
obtain
an
Exchange
of
Prisoners
;
did
ill
if
they
did
not
return
accordingly
:
Concerning
whom
Writers
have
differ'd
in
their
Relations
.
[
a
](A33176-e67330-b)
a
An
eminent
Historian
,
Native
of
Achaia
,
and
Son
of
one
Lycortas
,
a
Prince
of
that
Country
;
but
afterwards
brought
to
Rome
,
where
he
was
admir'd
for
his
Learning
by
all
the
Great
Men
,
Scipio
,
Laelius
,
&c.
He
wrote
in
Greek
a
History
of
the
World
,
containing
forty
Books
;
most
of
which
are
now
lost
.
Polybius
,
an
Author
of
very
good
Credit
,
informs
us
,
Ten
Persons
of
considerable
Quality
were
sent
to
the
Senate
;
and
that
nine
of
'em
honestly
return'd
to
the
Camp
,
not
having
been
able
to
obtain
what
they
went
about
;
but
the
tenth
staid
behind
and
remain'd
at
Rome
.
This
Man
,
as
soon
as
he
was
out
of
the
Camp
,
pretending
he
had
forgot
to
take
something
along
with
him
,
went
back
thither
again
;
as
thinking
his
returning
under
such
a
colour
,
was
a
very
sufficient
Performance
of
his
Oath
.
But
certainly
he
was
mistaken
;
for
Cunning's
so
far
from
excusing
a
Perjury
,
[
b
](A33176-e67400-b)
b
For
all
departure
from
the
Simplicity
of
an
Oath
(
they
are
the
Words
of
a
very
great
Man
)
is
a
Degree
of
Perjury
;
and
a
Man
is
never
a
whit
the
less
Forsworn
,
because
his
Perjury
is
a
little
finer
and
more
artificial
than
ordinary
.
And
tho'
Men
think
by
such
Devices
to
save
themselves
harmless
from
the
Guilt
of
so
great
a
Sin
,
they
do
really
increase
it
,
by
adding
to
their
Iniquity
the
impudent
Folly
of
Mocking
God
,
and
Deceiving
themselves
.
that
it
aggravates
it
rather
,
and
makes
it
the
more
criminal
.
This
therefore
was
no
more
than
a
foolish
piece
of
Craftiness
,
impudently
pretending
to
pass
for
Prudence
:
Whereupon
the
Senate
took
care
to
order
,
that
my
crafty
Gentleman
should
be
sent
back
in
Fetters
again
to
Hannibal
.
But
the
gloriousest
Action
of
the
Senate
was
this
:
Hannibal
had
[
c
](A33176-e67450-b)
c
After
the
Battel
at
Cannae
,
where
Paullus
and
Varro
the
two
Consuls
were
defeated
by
Hannibal
.
eight
Thousand
of
our
Soldiers
his
Prisoners
;
not
such
as
had
either
been
taken
in
Battel
,
or
had
fled
from
any
imminent
Danger
of
their
Lives
;
but
were
left
in
the
Camp
by
Paullus
and
Varro
,
the
then
two
Consuls
.
The
Senate
decreed
that
these
should
not
be
Ransom'd
,
tho'
it
might
have
been
done
with
a
small
Sum
of
Money
;
for
no
other
end
but
to
let
our
Soldiers
see
,
that
either
they
must
resolve
to
Conquer
,
or
Die
.
Upon
the
News
of
which
,
as
the
same
Author
tells
us
,
Hannibal
presently
began
to
be
disheartned
,
when
he
saw
that
the
Senate
,
and
People
of
Rome
,
had
so
great
Resolution
even
in
the
midst
of
their
Misfortunes
.
Thus
,
we
see
,
Honesty
gets
the
better
in
the
comparison
,
against
that
which
has
only
the
Appearance
of
Profit
.
But
[
d
](A33176-e67540-b)
d
A
learned
Roman
,
who
was
Quaestor
and
Tribune
of
the
People
.
He
writ
the
Annals
of
the
Roman
Empire
in
Greek
,
which
are
thought
to
have
been
translated
into
Latin
by
Q.
Claudius
Quadrigarius
,
and
to
be
the
Claudii
Annales
Aciliani
,
quoted
by
Livy
.
Acilius
,
who
has
written
an
History
in
Greek
,
says
,
More
of
'em
return'd
under
this
Pretence
to
the
Camp
,
hoping
by
such
a
Trick
to
get
quit
of
their
Oaths
;
and
that
they
were
all
of
'em
branded
with
Shame
and
Dishonour
by
the
Censors
.
But
let
us
now
put
an
end
to
this
third
Head
;
since
from
what
has
been
said
't
is
apparently
manifest
,
That
whatever
is
contrary
to
the
Virtue
of
Fortitude
;
that
is
to
say
,
whatever
is
done
with
a
timerous
,
mean
,
disheartned
,
abject
Spirit
,
can
never
be
really
and
truly
Profitable
,
because
it
is
wicked
,
disgraceful
and
odious
.
And
such
would
this
Action
of
Regulus
have
been
,
had
he
either
,
in
delivering
his
Sence
about
the
Captives
,
spoke
what
was
for
his
own
,
not
the
Publick
Security
;
or
afterwards
chosen
to
remain
at
home
,
instead
of
returning
to
fulfil
his
Oath
.
CHAP.
XXXIII
.
Nothing
contrary
to
Temperance
,
&c.
can
be
truly
Profitable
.
Who
those
Philosophers
were
,
that
made
Happiness
and
Misery
consist
in
Pleasure
and
Pain
.
This
Opinion
ruins
all
Virtue
,
Prudence
,
Fortitude
,
Temperance
and
Justice
:
However
these
Philosophers
endeavour
to
clear
themselves
of
this
Imputation
;
but
can't
get
well
off
.
Pleasure
opposite
to
Honesty
.
The
Absurdity
of
those
,
who
would
have
made
Happiness
to
consist
in
both
these
.
A
short
Recapitulation
of
this
last
Book
.
How
far
Pleasure
may
be
allow'd
.
A
Conclusion
,
by
way
of
Exhortation
to
his
Son
.
WE
have
now
finish'd
our
third
Head
,
[
a
](A33176-e67730-b)
a
He
has
shewn
that
nothing
can
ever
be
Profitable
,
that
's
contrary
to
three
of
the
general
Virtues
,
Justice
,
Prudence
,
and
Courage
:
It
only
remains
that
he
shew
the
same
of
the
fourth
,
Temperance
;
which
he
endeavours
to
do
in
this
Chapter
.
the
fourth
and
last
remains
only
to
be
spoke
to
,
which
contains
in
it
Decency
,
Modesty
,
Moderation
,
Continence
and
Temperance
.
And
can
any
thing
be
Profitable
,
that
is
opposite
to
a
Train
of
such
excellent
Virtues
?
There
hath
been
however
a
Sect
of
Philosophers
,
Scholars
of
Aristippus
,
who
were
call'd
[
b
](A33176-e67780-b)
b
Because
Aristippus
[
chap.
14.
Book
1.
]
was
born
at
Cyrene
,
a
Town
in
Africk
.
Cyrenaicks
;
and
others
,
who
had
the
Name
of
[
c
](A33176-e67840-b)
c
So
call'd
from
one
Anniceris
,
a
Cyrenian
,
Scholar
of
Paraebates
,
a
Cyrenaick
.
He
corrected
a
little
the
Cyrenaick
Opinions
,
and
therefore
was
call'd
Founder
of
a
new
Sect.
See
Menage
on
Laertius's
Life
of
Aristippus
,
where
he
shews
there
were
two
call'd
Anniceris
:
the
former
Contemporary
with
Plato
,
and
his
Redeemer
when
a
Slave
in
Aegina
;
and
the
latter
of
this
Sect.
Annicerians
given
them
,
that
affirm
all
Good
to
consist
in
Pleasure
,
and
count
Virtue
it self
therefore
only
desirable
,
because
of
some
Pleasure
which
it
brings
along
with
it
.
But
these
being
now
almost
worn
out
of
Date
,
Epicurus
is
mightily
come
into
Vogue
,
the
great
Supporter
,
and
,
as
't
were
,
second
Founder
of
the
same
Opinions
.
With
these
we
must
fight
(
as
they
say
)
with
might
and
main
,
if
ever
we
think
of
supporting
the
Cause
,
and
maintaining
the
Interest
of
Virtue
and
Honesty
.
For
if
what
[
d
](A33176-e67990-b)
d
An
Athenian
,
Scholar
and
most
intimate
Friend
to
Epicurus
;
often
mention'd
by
our
Author
.
Metrodorus
has
written
pass
for
Truth
,
That
whatever
can
truly
be
call'd
our
Profit
,
nay
and
all
the
Welfare
and
Happiness
of
Life
,
consists
in
a
firm
Constitution
of
Body
,
and
a
well-grounded
Hope
of
its
lasting
Continuance
;
it
is
certain
this
Profit
,
nay
this
sovereign
Profit
(
for
such
they
account
it
)
must
sometimes
be
set
in
opposition
to
Honesty
.
[
e
](A33176-e68060-b)
e
He
proceeds
to
shew
,
That
this
Opinion
ruins
all
the
Virtues
;
as
first
,
Prudence
.
For
what
,
in
the
first
place
,
will
be
the
Office
of
Prudence
?
only
to
cater
and
look
about
for
Pleafures
?
How
miserable
a
case
is
that
Virtue
in
,
which
is
thus
made
a
Servant
and
Pander
to
Pleasure
?
But
what
shall
be
her
Business
in
this
Office
?
to
tast
and
distinguish
ingeniously
betwixt
Pleasures
?
Supposing
this
to
be
a
pleasant
Business
,
't
is
certainly
the
most
scandalous
one
that
could
ever
have
been
thought
on
.
Again
,
Can
he
that
makes
Pain
be
the
greatest
Evil
,
have
ever
such
a
Virtue
as
Fortitude
in
him
,
the
very
Nature
of
which
consists
wholly
in
despising
of
Pains
and
Difficulties
?
I
know
Epicurus
upon
several
Occasions
,
and
this
in
particular
,
speaks
very
couragiously
as
to
the
matter
of
Pain
;
but
we
must
not
consider
so
much
what
is
said
,
as
what
ought
to
be
said
by
a
Man
of
his
Principles
,
who
makes
Pleasure
and
Pain
to
be
the
ultimate
Bounds
of
Man's
Happiness
and
Misery
.
So
again
,
if
you
'd
hear
him
about
Continence
and
Temperance
,
he
tells
you
abundance
of
extraordinary
things
in
a
great
many
places
;
but
he
's
gravell'd
(
as
we
speak
)
and
can
never
be
able
to
acquit
himself
handsomly
.
For
with
what
Face
of
Reason
can
he
commend
Temperance
,
who
places
his
Happiness
in
the
Enjoyment
of
Pleasures
?
[
f
](A33176-e68160-b)
f
That
is
Pleasure
(
Epicurus's
Happiness
)
consists
in
indulging
the
sensual
Appetite
;
but
Temperance
consists
in
opposing
this
Appetite
;
therefore
Temperance
and
Pleasure
can
never
agree
;
and
consequently
Epicurus
is
inconsistent
with
himself
,
when
he
commends
Temperance
,
and
yet
makes
Pleasure
his
soveraign
Good
.
when
the
sensual
Appetite
follows
after
Pleasures
,
and
't
is
the
Business
of
Temperance
to
correct
that
Appetite
.
[
g
](A33176-e68200-b)
g
Having
prov'd
that
this
Opinion
ruins
all
the
Virtues
;
he
proceeds
to
shew
,
how
these
endeavour
to
bring
themselves
off
in
each
of
them
.
But
still
they
endeavour
,
in
each
of
these
Virtues
,
to
bring
themselves
off
by
one
little
Shift
or
other
:
Thus
Prudence
is
admitted
,
and
defin'd
to
be
The
Skill
of
supplying
us
with
Pleasures
,
and
defending
us
from
Pains
:
And
they
make
out
Fortitude
as
well
as
they
can
,
by
saying
it
consists
in
despising
Death
and
enduring
Torments
:
They
do
bring
in
a
sort
of
Temperance
too
,
tho'
not
without
a
great
deal
of
Straining
and
Difficulty
;
but
however
they
make
a
shift
,
after
some
fashion
,
by
saying
,
they
count
it
the
greatest
Pleasure
,
if
they
can
but
be
exempt
from
Pain
and
Uneasiness
.
Thus
these
three
Virtues
stand
up
pretty
well
;
but
Justice
,
the
fourth
,
totters
mightily
with
them
,
or
rather
indeed
is
quite
fal'n
to
the
Ground
;
with
all
those
Duties
,
which
relate
to
the
maintenance
of
Human
Society
:
[
h
](A33176-e68260-b)
h
See
Note
on
Book
1.
chap.
2.
For
what
Kindness
,
Liberality
,
Affability
or
Friendship
can
there
be
amongst
those
,
who
desire
these
Virtues
not
purely
for
themselves
,
but
only
in
relation
to
their
Pleasure
or
Advantage
?
To
make
short
then
,
I
shall
only
say
,
that
as
I
have
shewn
before
,
That
nothing
can
be
Profitable
which
is
contrary
to
Honesty
;
so
now
I
do
affirm
,
That
Pleasure
in
general
is
contrary
to
Honesty
.
I
the
more
blame
therefore
[
i
](A33176-e68290-b)
i
Two
Philosophers
often
mention'd
by
our
Author
,
who
made
Happiness
consist
in
Pleasure
and
Honesty
joyn'd
together
.
Dinomachus
and
Callipho
,
who
thought
this
Dispute
might
be
brought
to
an
Issue
,
if
they
joyn'd
both
Pleasure
and
Virtue
together
,
like
a
Man
and
a
Beast
as
it
were
in
the
same
Yoke
.
For
Virtue
can
never
admit
of
this
Conjunction
,
but
abhors
and
disdains
it
;
nor
can
ever
the
soveraign
Good
and
Evil
,
which
must
be
one
single
and
simple
thing
,
be
made
up
and
compounded
of
such
different
Principles
.
But
of
this
,
which
is
a
thing
of
the
greatest
Moment
,
I
have
written
at
large
in
[
k
](A33176-e68320-b)
k
His
Books
De
Finibus
Bonorum
&
Malorum
.
another
Work
:
Let
us
now
return
to
our
present
Subject
:
What
has
been
said
in
this
last
Book
,
I
hope
,
is
enough
to
let
any
one
see
,
How
't
is
his
Duty
to
determin
his
Choice
,
if
that
which
seems
useful
and
expedient
for
him
,
should
come
into
competition
with
that
which
is
Honest.
But
if
it
should
be
said
,
That
even
Pleasure
carries
with
it
the
appearance
of
Profit
;
let
it
also
be
consider'd
,
That
it
never
can
be
brought
to
an
Agreement
with
Honesty
:
For
the
most
that
can
possibly
be
said
for
Pleasure
,
(
that
we
mayn't
seem
wholly
to
exclude
it
)
is
,
That
it
serves
by
way
of
Sauce
,
to
give
a
Relish
to
things
,
but
has
no
true
Profit
or
Advantage
in
it self
.
This
is
the
Present
,
dear
Son
Mark
,
that
your
Father
sends
you
,
and
in
my
Opinion
't
is
a
very
good
one
;
but
that
must
be
judg'd
of
according
to
the
use
you
your self
shall
make
of
it
.
However
entertain
,
among
Cratippus's
Lectures
,
these
three
Books
,
and
shew
them
at
least
the
Civility
due
to
Strangers
.
Had
it
been
my
fortune
to
have
come
to
Athens
(
[
l
](A33176-e68380-b)
l
He
was
on
his
way
thither
;
but
was
sent
home
again
by
some
who
told
him
,
That
his
Presence
would
be
very
advantagious
to
the
Publick
.
See
his
own
Relation
of
it
,
at
the
beginning
of
his
first
Philippick
.
which
had
surely
been
done
,
if
I
had
not
been
recall'd
by
the
Cries
of
my
Country
)
you
might
then
perhaps
sometimes
have
heard
my
Lectures
:
However
since
now
,
in
perusing
these
Sheets
,
you
'll
have
my
Voice
,
as
it
were
,
by
Proxy
;
Pray
bestow
upon
them
as
much
time
as
you
can
,
and
I
am
sure
you
can
as
much
as
you
please
.
When
I
hear
you
take
a
pleasure
in
this
sort
of
Studies
,
't
will
delight
me
to
talk
to
you
(
which
I
hope
may
be
speedily
)
face
to
face
;
or
however
to
write
to
you
,
tho'
at
never
so
great
a
distance
.
In
the
mean
time
Adieu
,
my
dear
Cicero
,
and
assure
your
self
,
that
tho'
no
one
in
the
World
is
more
dear
to
me
than
you
are
,
yet
you
'll
hereafter
be
much
more
so
,
if
I
find
you
take
Delight
in
such
Writings
and
Instructions
.
FINIS
.