CHAP. I. Of Philosophy . 1 ▪ The Introduction . 2 The Definition of Philosophy explained . 3 Ratiocination of the Mind . 4 Properties what they are . 5 How Properties are known by Generation , & contrarily . 6 The Scope of Philosophy . 7 The Utility of it . 8 The Subject . 9 The Parts of it . 10 The Epilogue .

PHILOSOPHY seems to me to be amongst men now , in the same manner as Corn and Wine are said to have been in the world in ancient time . For from the beginning there were Vines and Ears of Corn growing here and there in the fields ; but no care was taken for the planting and sowing of them . Men lived therefore upon Akorns ; or if any were so bold as to venture upon the eating of those unknown and doubtfull fruits , they did it with danger of their health . In like manner , every man brought Philosophy , that is , Naturall Reason , into the world with him ; for all men can reason to some degree , and concerning some things : but where there is need of a long series of Reasons , there most men wander out of the way , and fall into Error for want of Method , as it were for want of sowing and planting , that is , of improving their Reason . And from hence it comes to passe , that they who content themselves with daily experience , which may be likened to feeding upon Akorns , and either reject , or not much regard Philosophy , are commonly esteemed , and are indeed , men of sounder judgement , then those , who from opinions , though not vulgar , yet full of uncertainty , and carelesly received , do nothing but dispute and wrangle , like men that are not well in their wits . I confesse indeed , that that part of Philophy by which Magnitudes and Figures are computed , is highly improved . But because I have not observed the like advancement in the other parts of it , my purpose is , as far forth as I am able , to lay open the few and first Elements of Philosophy in generall , as so many Seeds , from which pure and true Philosophy may hereafter spring up by little and little .

I am not ignorant how hard a thing it is to weed out of mens mindes such inveterate opinions as have taken root there , and been confirmed in them by the authority of most eloquent Writers ; especially , seeing true ( that is accurate ) Philosophy , professedly rejects not only the paint and false colours of Language , but even the very ornaments and graces of the same ; and the first Grounds of all Science , are not only not beautifull , but poore , aride , and in appearance deformed . Neverthelesse , there being certainly some men , though but few , who are delighted with Truth and strength of Reason in all things , I thought I might do well to take this pains for the sake even of those few . I proceed therefore to the matter , and take my beginning from the very Definition of Philosophy , which is this .

2 PHILOSOPHY is such knowledge of Effects or Appearances , as we acquire by true Ratiocination from the knowledge we have first of their Causes or Generation : And again , of such Causes or Generations as may be from knowing first their Effects .

For the better understanding of which Definition , we must consider ; first , that although Sense and Memory of things , which are common to Man and all living Creatures , be Knowledge , yet because they are given us immediately by Nature , and not gotten by Ratiocination , they are not Philosophy .

Secondly , Seeing Experience is nothing but Memory ; and Prudence , or Prospect into the future time , nothing but Expectation of such things as we have already had experience of , Prudence also is not to be esteemed Philosophy .

By RATIOCINATION , I mean Computation . Now to compute , is either to collect the sum of many things that are added together , or to know what remains when one thing is taken out of another . Ratiocination therefore is the same with Addition and Substraction ; and if any man adde Multiplication and Division , I will not be against it , seeing Multiplication is nothing but Addition of equals one to another , and Division nothing but a Substraction of equals one from another , as often as is possible . So that all Ratiocination is comprehended in these two operations of the minde , Addition and Substraction .

3 But how by the Ratiocination of our Minde , we Adde and Substract in our silent thoughts , without the use of words , it will be necessary for me to make intelligible by an example or two . If therefore a man see something a far off and obscurely , although no appellation had yet been given to any thing , he will notwithstanding have the same Idea of that thing , for which now by imposing a name on it , we call it Body . Again , when by comming neerer , he sees the same thing thus and thus , now in one place and now in another , he will have a new Idea thereof , namely that , for which we now call such a thing Animated . Thirdly , when standing neerer he perceives the figure , hears the voice , and sees other things , which are signes of a Rationall minde , he has a third Idea , though it have yet no appellation , namely , that for which we now call any thing Rationall . Lastly , when by looking fully and distinctly upon it he conceaves all that he has seen as one thing , the Idea he has now , is compounded of his former Ideas , which are put together in the Minde , in the same order , in which these three single names Body , Animated , Rationall , are in speech compounded into this one name Body-Animated-Rationall , or Man . In like manner , of the severall conceptions of four sides , equality of sides , and right angles , is compounded the conception of a Square . For the mind may conceive a figure of foure sides without any conception of their equality ; & of that equality without conceiving a right angle ; and may joyne together all these single conceptions into one conception or one Idea of a Square . And thus we see how the Conceptions of the mind are compounded . Again , whosoever sees a man standing neer him , conceives the whole Idea of that man ; and if as he goes away he follow him with his eyes onely , he will lose the Idea of those things which were signes of his being Rationall , whilest neverthelesse the Idea of a Body-Animated remaines still before his eies ; so that the Idea of Rationall is substracted from the whole Idea of Man , that is to say of Body-Animated-Rationall , and there remaines that of Body-Animated ; & a while after at a greater distance the Idea of Animated will be lost , & that of Body only will remain ; so that at last , when nothing at all can be seen , the whole Idea will vanish out of sight . By which examples , I thinke it is manifest enough , what is the internall Ratiocination of the Mind , without words .

We must not therefore thinke that Computation , that is , Ratiocination , has place onely in numbers ; as if man were distinguished from other living Creatures ( which is said to have been the opinion of Pythagoras ) by nothing but the faculty of numbring ; for Magnitude , Body , Motion , Time , Degrees of Quality , Action , Conception , Proportion , Speech and Names ( in which all the kinds of Philosophy consist ) are capable of Addition and Substraction . Now such things as we adde or substract , that is , which we put into an account , we are said to consider , in Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; in which language also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies to Compute , Reason or Reckon .

4 But Effects and the Appearances of things to sense , are faculties or Powers of Bodies , which make us distinguish them from one another ; that is to say , conceive one Body to be equall or unequall , like or unlike to another Body ; as in the example above , when by coming neer enough to any Body , we perceive the Motion and Going of the same , we distinguish it thereby from a Tree , a Column and other fixed Bodies ; and so that motion , or going is the Property thereof , as being proper to living creatures , and a faculty by which they make us distinguish them from other Bodies .

5 How the knowledge of any Effect may be gotten from the knowledge of the Generation thereof , may easily be understood by the example of a Circle : For if there be set before us a plain figure having as neer as may be the figure of a Circle , we cannot possibly perceive by sense whether it be a true Circle or no ; then which neverthelesse nothing is more easie to be known , to him that knowes first the Generation of the propounded figure . For let it be known that the figure was made by the circumduction of a Body whereof one end remained unmoved , and we may reason thus ; a Body carried about , retaining alwayes the same length , applies it selfe first to one Radius , then to another , to a third , a fourth , and successively to all ; and therefore the same length , from the same point , toucheth the circumference in every part thereof ; which is as much to say as all the Radii are equal . We know therefore that from such generation proceeds a figure , from whose one middle point all the extreame points are reached unto by equal Radii . And in like manner , by knowing first what figure is set before us , we may come by Ratiocination to some Generation of the same , though perhaps not that by which it was made , yet that by which it might have been made ; for he that knows that a Circle has the property above declared , will easily know whether a Body carried about , as is said , will generate a Circle or no.

6 The End or Scope of Philosophy , is , that we may make use to our benefit of effects formerly seen ; or that by application of Bodies to one another ; we may produce the like effects of those we conceive in our minde , as far forth as matter , strength & industry will permit , for the commodity of humane life . For he inward glory and triumph of mind that a man may have , for the mastering of some difficult and doutfull matter , or for the discovery of some hidden truth , is not worth so much paines as the study of Philosophy requires ; nor need any man care much to teach another what he knowes himselfe , if he think that will be the onely benefit of his labour . The end of Knowledge is Power ; and the use of Theoremes ( which among Geometricians serve for the finding out of Properties ) is for the construction of Problemes ; and lastly , the scope of all speculation is the performing of some action , or thing to be done .

7 But what the Utility of Philosophy is , especially of Natural Philosophy and Geometry , will be best understood by reckoning up the chief commodities of which mankind is capable ; and by comparing the manner of life of such as enjoy them , with that of others which want the same . Now the greatest commodities of mankind are the Arts , namely of measuring Matter and Motion ; of moving ponderous Bodies ; of Architecture ; of Navigation ; of making instruments for all uses ; of calculating the Coelestiall Motions , the Aspects of the Stars , and the parts of Time ; of Geography , &c. By which Sciences , how great benefits men receive , is more easily understood then expressed . These benefits are enjoyed by almost all the people of Europe , by most of those of Asia , and by some of Africa ; but the Americans , and they that live neer the Poles do totally want them . But why ? Have they sharper wits then these ? Have not all men one kinde of soule , and the same faculties of mind ? What then makes this difference , except Philosophy ? Philosophy therefore is the cause of all these benefits . But the Utility of Morall and Civil Philosophy is to be estimated not so much by the commodities we have by knowing these Sciences , as by the calamities we receive from not knowing them . Now all such calamities as may be avoided by humane industry arise from warre , but chiefly from Civil warre ; for from this proceed Slaughter , Solitude , and the want of all things . But the cause of warre is not that men are willing to have it ; for the Will has nothing for Object but Good , at least that which seemeth good . Nor is it from this , that men know not that the effects of war are evil ; for who is there that thinks not poverty and losse of life to be great evils ? The cause therefore of Civill warre , is that men know not the causes neither of Warre nor Peace , there being but few in the world that have learned those duties which unite and keep men in peace , that is to say , that have learned the rules of civill life sufficiently . Now the knowledge of these rules is Morall Philosophy . But why have they not learned them , unlesse for this reason that none hitherto have taught them in a clear and exact method ? For what shall we say ? Could the ancient Masters of Greece , Egypt , Rome , and others perswade the unskillfull multitude to their innumerable opinions concerning the nature of their Gods , which they themselves knew not whether they were true or false , and which were indeed manifestly false & absurd ; & could they not perswade the same multitude to civill duty , if they themselves had understood it ? Or shall those few writings of Geometricians which are extant , be thought sufficient for the taking away of all controversy in the matters they treat of , and shall those innumerable and huge Volumes of Ethicks be thought unsufficient , if what they teach had been certain and well demonstrated ? What then can be imagined to be the cause that the writings of those men have increased science , and the writings of these have increased nothing but words , saving that the former were written by men that knew , and the later by such as knew not the doctrine they taught onely for ostentation of their wit and eloquence ? Neverthelesse , I deny not but the reading of some such books is very delightfull ; for they are most eloquently written , and containe many cleer , wholsome and choice sentences ; which yet are not universally true , though by them universally pronounced . From whence it comes to passe , that the circumstances of times , places and persons being changed , they are no lesse frequently made use of to confirme wicked men in their purposes , then to make them understand the precepts of Civill duties . Now that which is chiefly wanting in them , is a true and certaine rule of our actions , by which we might know whether that we undertake be just or unjust . For it is to no purpose to be bidden in every thing to do Right , before there be a certain Rule and measure of Right established ; which no man hitherto hath established . Seeing therefore from the not knowing of Civill duties , that is , from the want of Morall science proceed Civill warres , and the greatest calamities of mankind , we may very well attribute to such science the production of the contrary commodities . And thus much is sufficient , to say nothing of the prayses and other contentment proceeding from Philosophy , to let you see the Utility of the same in every kinde thereof .

8 The Subject of Philosophy , or the matter it treats of , is every Body of which we can conceive any generation , and which we may by any consideration thereof compare with other Bodies ; or which is capable of composition and resolution ; that is to say , every Body , of whose Generation or Properties we can have any knowledge .. And this may be deduced from the Definition of Philosophy , whose profession it is to search out the Properties of Bodies from their Generation , or their Generation from their Properties ; and therefore where there is no Generation nor Property , there is no Philosophy . Therefore it excludes Theology , I meane the doctrine of God , Eternal , Ingenerable , Incomprehensible , and in whom there is nothing neither to divide nor compound , nor any Generation to be conceived .

It excludes the doctrine of Angels ; and all such things as are thought to be neither Bodies , nor properties of Bodies ; there being in them no place neither for composition , nor division , nor any capacity of more and lesse ; that is to say , no place for Ratiocination .

It excludes History , as well Naturall as Politicall , though most usefull ( nay necessary ) to Philosophy ; because such Knowledge is but Experience , or Authority , and not Ratiocination .

It excludes all such Knowledge as is acquired by Divine Inspiration , or Revelation , as not derived to us by Reason , but by Divine grace in an instant , and as it were by some sense supernaturall .

It excludes , not onely all Doctrines which are false , but such also as are not well grounded ; for whatsoever we know by right Ratiocination , can neither be false nor doubtfull ; and therefore Astrology , as it is now held forth , and all such Divinations rather then sciences , are excluded .

Lastly , the doctrine of Gods Worship is excluded from Philosophy , as being not to be known by naturall reason , but by the authority of the Church ; and as being the object of Faith , and not of Knowledge .

9 The principall parts of Philosophy are two . For two chief kinds of Bodies , and very different from one another , offer themselves to such as search after their Generation & Properties ; One whereof being the worke of Nature , is called a Naturall Body ; the other is called a Commonwealth , and is made by the wills and agreement of men . And from these spring the two parts of Philosophy called Naturall and Civill . But seeing that for the knowledge of the Properties of a Common-wealth , it is necessary first to know the Dispositions , Affections and Manners of men , Civill Philosophy is againe commonly divided into two parts ; whereof one which treats of mens Dispositions and Manners is called Ethicks , and the other which takes cognisance of their Civil Duties is caled Politicks or simply Civill Philosophy . In the first place therefore ( after I have set downe such Premisses as appertaine to the nature of Philosophy in general ) I will discourse of Bodies Naturall ; in the second , of the Dispositions and Manners of men ; and in the third , of the Civill Duties of Subjects .

10 To conclude , seeing there may be many who will not like this my Definition of Philosophy , and will say that from the liberty which a man may take of so defining as seemes best to himselfe , he may conclude any thing from any thing ( though I thinke it no hard matter to demonstrate , that this Definition of mine agrees with the sense of all men ; ) yet lest in this point there should be any cause of dispute betwixt me and them , I here undertake no more then to deliver the Elements of that Science , by which the Effects of any thing may be found out from the known Generation of the same , or contrarily the Generation from the Effects ; to the end that they who search after other Philosophy , may be admonished to seeke it from other Principles .

CHAP. II. Of Names . 1 The necessity of sensible Moniments or Marks for the help of Memory , A Marke defined . 2 The necessity of Marks for the signification of the conceptions of the Mind . 3 Names supply both those necessities . 4 The Definition of a Name . 5 Names are Signes not of Things , but of our Cogitations . 6 What it is we give Names to . 7 Names Positive and Negative . 8 Contradictory Names . 9 A Common Name . 10 Names of the first and second Intention . 11 Universall , Particular , Individuall , and Indefinite Names . 12 Names Univocall and Equivocal . 13 Absolute and Relative Names . 14 Simple and Compounded Names . 15 A Praedicament described . 16 Some things to be noted concerning Praedicaments .

1 HOw unconstant and fading mens thoughts are , and how much the recovery of them depends upon chance , there is none but knows by infallible experience in himself . For no man is able to remember Quantities without sensible and present Measures , nor Colours without sensible and present Patterns , nor Number without the Names of Numbers disposed in order and learned by heart . So that whatsoever a man has put together in his mind by ratiocination without such helps , will presently slip from him , and not be revocable but by beginning his ratiocination anew . From which it followes , that for the acquiring of Philosophy some sensible Moniments are necessary , by which our past thoughts may be not onely reduced , but also registred every one in its own order . These Moniments I call MARKS , namely , sensible things taken at pleasure , that by the sense of them such thoughts may be recalled to our mind , as are like those thoughts for which we [ took them . ]

2 Again , though some one man , of how excellent a wit soever , should spend all his time , partly in reasoning and partly in inventing Marks for the help of his memory , and advancing himself in learning ; who sees not , that the benefit he reapes to himselfe will not be much , and to others none at all ? For unlesse he communicate his notes with others , his science will perish with him . But if the same notes be made common to many , and so one mans inventions be taught to others , sciences will thereby be encreased to the generall good of mankind . It is therefore necessary for the acquiring of Philosophy that there be certain Signes , by which what one man finds out may be manifested and made known to others . Now those things we call SIGNES , are the Antecedents of their Consequents , and the Consequents of their Antecedents , as often as we observe them to go before or follow after in the same manner . For example , a thick Cloud is a Signe of Rain to follow ; and Rain a Signe , that a Cloud has gone before , for this reason onely , that we seldom see Clouds without the Consequence of Rain , nor Rain at any time but when a Cloud has gone before . And of Signs some are Naturall , whereof I have already given an example ; others are Arbitrary , namely , those we make choice of at our own pleasure ; as a bush hung up , signifies that Wine is to be sold there ; a stone set in the ground , signifies the bound of a field ; and words so and so connected , signifie the Cogitations and Motions of our Minde . The difference therefore betwixt Markes and Signes is this , that we make those for our own use , but these for the use of others .

3 Words so connected , as that they become signes of our Thoughts , are called SPEECH , of which every part is a Name . But seeing ( as is said ) both Markes and Signes are necessary for the acquiring of Philosophy , ( Marks by which we may remember our own thoughts , and Signes by which we may make our thoughts known to others , ) Names do both these offices ; but they serve for Marks before they be used as Signes . For though a man were alone in the world , they would be usefull to him in helping him to remember ; but to teach others , ( unlesse there were some others to be taught , ) of no use at all . Again , Names ▪ though standing singly by themselves , are Marks , because they serve to recall our own thoughts to mind ; but they cannot be Signes , otherwise then by being disposed and ordered in Speech , as parts of the same . For example , a man may begin with a word , whereby the hearer may frame an Idea of something in his mind , which neverthelesse he cannot conceive to be the Idea which was in the mind of him that spake , but that he would say something which began with that word , though perhaps not as by it selfe , but as part of another word . So that the nature of a name consists principally in this , that it is a Mark ta ken for Memories sake ; but it serves also by accident , to signifie and make known to others what we remember our selves ; and therefore I will define it thus :

4 A NAME is a Word taken at pleasure to serve for a Mark , which may raise in our Mind a thought like to some thought we had before , and which being pronounced to others , may be to them a Sign of what thought the speaker had or had not before in his mind . And it is for brevities sake that I suppose the Originall of Names to be Arbitrary , judging it a thing that maybe assumed as unquestionable . For considering that new Names are daily made , and old ones laid aside ; that diverse Nations use different Names , and how impossible it is either to observe similitude , or make any comparison betwixt a Name and a Thing , how can any man imagine that the Names of Things were imposed from their natures ? For though some Names of living creatures and other things , which our first Parents used , were taught by God himselfe ; yet they were by him arbitrarily imposed , and afterwards both at the Tower of Babel , and since in processe of time , growing every where out of use , are quite forgotten , and in their roomes have succeeded others , invented and received by men at pleasure . Moreover , whatsoever the common use of words be , yet Philosophers , who were to teach their knowledge to others , had alwayes the liberty , and sometimes they both had and will have a necessity , of taking to themselves such Names as they please for the signifying of their meaning , if they would have it understood . Nor had Mathematicians need to aske leave of any but themselves to name the figures they invented Parabolas , Hyperboles , Cissoeides , Quadratrices , &c. or to call one Magnitude A , another B.

5 But seeing Names ordered in speech ( as is defined ) are signes of our Conceptions , it is manifest they are not signes of the Things themselves ; for that the sound of this word Stone should be the signe of a Stone , cannot be understood in any sense but this , that he that heares it , collects that he that pronouunces it thinkes of a Stone . And therefore that disputation , whether Names signifie the Matter or Form , or something compounded of both , and other like subtleties of the Metaphysicks , is kept up by erring men , and such as understand not the words they dispute about .

6 Nor indeed is it at all necessary that every Name should be the Name of some Thing . For as these , a Man , a Tree , a Stone , are the Names of the Things themselves ; so the Images of a Man , of a Tree and of a stone , which are represented to men sleeping , have their Names also , though they be not Things , but onely fictions and Phantasmes of things . For we can remember these ; and therefore it is no lesse necessary that they have Names to mark and signifie them , then the Things themselves . Also this word Future is a Name , but no future thing has yet any being , nor do we know whether that which we call Future , shall ever have a being or no. Neverthelesse , seeing we use in our mind to knit together things Past with those that are Present , the Name Future serves to signifie such knitting together . Moreover , that which neither is , nor has been , nor ever shall or ever can be , has a name , namely , That which neither is , nor has been , &c. Or more briefly this , Impossible . To conclude , this word Nothing , is a name , which yet cannot be the name of any thing . For when ( for example ) we substract 2 and 3 from 5 , and so nothing remaining we would call that substraction to mind , this speech Nothing remains , and in it the word Nothing is not unusefull . And for the same reason we say truly Lesse then Nothing remaines , when we substract More from Lesse ; for the minde feigns such remaines as these for Doctrines sake , and desires as often as is necessary , to call the same to memory . But seeing every name has some relation to that which is named , though that which we name be not alwaies a thing that has a being in Nature , yet it is lawfull for Doctrines sake to apply the word Thing , to whasoever we name ; as if it were all one whether that thing be truly existent or be onely feigned .

7 The first distinction of Names , is that some are Positive , or Affirmative ; others Negative , which are also called Privative and Indefinite ▪ Positive are such as we impose for the likenesse , Equality or Identity of the things we consider ; Negative for the diversity , Unliknesse , or Inequality of the same . Examples of the former are a Man , a Philosopher ; for a Man denotes any one of a multitude of men , and a Philosopher any one of many Philosophers by reason of their similitude ; Also Socrates is a Positive name , because it signifies alwayes one and the same man . Examples of Negatives are such Positives as have the Negative particle Not added to them , as Not-Man , Not-Philosopher . But Positives were before Negatives ; for otherwise there could have been no use at all of these . For when the name of White was imposed upon certain things , and afterwards upon other things the names of Black , Blew , Transparent , &c. the infinite dissimilitudes of these with White could not be comprehended in any one Name , save that which had in it the Negation of White , that is to say , the Name Not-White , or some other equivalent to it , in which the word White is repeated , such as Unlike to white , &c. And by these Negative ▪ names , we take notice our selves , and signifie to others what we have not thought of .

8 Positive and Negative names are Contradictory to one another , so that they cannot both be the name of the same thing . Besides , of Contradictory names , one is the name of any thing whatsoever ; for whatsoever is , is either Man or Not-man , White or Not-white , and so of the rest . And this is so manifest , that it needs no further proofe or explication ; for they that say the same thing cannot both be , and not be , speak obscurely ; but they that say , Whatsoever is , either is , or is not , speake also absurdly and ridiculously . The certainty of this Axiome , viz. Of two Contradictory Names , one is the Name of any thing whatsoever , the other not , is the originall and foundation of all Ratiocination , that is , of all Philosophy ; and therefore it ought to be so exactly propounded , that it may be of it selfe cleare and perspicuous to all men ; as indeed it is , saving to such , as reading the long discourses made upon this subject by the Writers of Metaphysicks ( which they beleeve to be some egregious learning ) thinke they understand not , when they do .

9 Secondly , of Names , some are Common to many things , as a Man , a Tree ; others Proper to one thing , as he that writ the Iliad , Homer , this man , that man . And a Common name , being the name of many things severally taken , but not collectively of all together ( as Man is not the name of all mankind , but of every one , as of Peter , Iohn , and the rest severally ) is therefore called an Universall name ; and therefore this word Universall is never the name of any thing existent in nature , nor of any Idea or Phantasme formed in the mind , but alwayes the name of some word or name ; so that when a Living creature , a Stone , a Spirit , or any other thing is said to be Universal , it is not to be understood , that any Man , Stone , &c. ever was or can be Universall , but onely that these words , Living creature , Stone , &c. are Universall names , that is , Names common to many things ; and the Conceptions answering them in our minde , are the Images and Phantasmes of severall Living Creatures , or other things . And therfore for the understanding of the extent of an Universal name , we need no other faculty but that of our imagination , by which we remember that such names bring sometimes one thing , sometimes another into our minde . Also of Common Names some are more , some lesse Common . More Common , is that which is the name of more things ; Lesse Common , the name of fewer things . As Living-Creature is more Common then Man , or Horse or Lion , because it comprehends them all ; and therefore a more Common name , in respect of a lesse Common , is called the Genus or a Generall name ; and this in respect of that , the Species , or a Speciall Name .

10 And from hence proceeds the third distinction of Names , which is , that some are called names of the First , others of the Second Intention . Of the first Intention are the names of Things , a Man , Stone , &c. of the second are the names of names and speeches , as Universall , Particular , Genus , Species , Syllogisme , and the like . But it is hard to say why those are called names of the First , and these of the Second Intention , unlesse perhaps it was first intended by us to give names to those things which are of daily use in this life , and afterwards to such things as appertaine to science , that is , that our Second Intention was to give names to Names . But whatsoever the cause hereof may be , yet this is manifest , that Genus , Species , Definition , &c. are names of Words and Names onely ; and therefore to put Genus and Species for Things , and Definition for the nature of any thing , as the Writers of Metaphysicks have done , is not right , seeing they be only significations of what we thinke of the nature of Things .

11 Fourthly , some Names are of certaine ▪ and determined , others of uncertaine and undetermined signification . Of determined and certain signification is , first , that name which is giuen to any one thing by it self , and is called an Individuall Name ; as Homer , this tree , that living Creature , &c. Secondly that which has any of these words All , Every , Both , Either , or the like added to it ; and it is therefore called an Universall Name , because it signifies every one of those things to which it is Common ; and of certaine signification for this reason , that he which heares , conceives in his minde the same thing that he which speakes would have him conceive . Of Indefinite signification is , first , that Name which has the word some , or the like added to it , and is called a Particular name ; Secondly a Common Name set by it selfe without any note either of Universality or Particularity , as Man , Stone , and is called an Indefinite Name ; but both Particular and Indefinite names are of uncertaine signification , because the Hearer knowes not what thing it is the Speaker would have him conceive ; and therefore in Speech , Particular and Indefinite names are to be esteemed equivalent to one another . But these words , All , Every , Some , &c. which denote Universality and Particularity , are not Names , but parts onely of Names ; So that Every Man , and That Man which the Hearer conceives in his mind , are all one ; and Some Man , and That Man which the Speaker thought of signifie the same . From whence it is evident , that the use of signes of this kind , is not for a mans own sake , or for his getting of knowledge by his own private meditation ( for every man has his own , Thoughts sufficiently determined without such helpes as these ) but for the sake of others ; that is , for the teaching and signifying of our Conceptions to others ; nor were they invented onely to make us remember , but to make us able to discourse with others .

12 Fifthly , Names are usually distinguished into Univocall , and Equivocall . Univocall are those which in the same train of Discourse signifie alwayes the same thing ; but Equivocall those which meane sometimes one thing , and sometimes another . Thus , the Name Triangle is said to be Univocall , because it is alwayes taken in the same sense ; and Parabola to be Equivocall , for the signification it has sometimes of Allegory or Similitude , and sometimes of a certaine Geometricall figure . Also every Metaphor is by profession Equivocall . But this distinction belongs not so much to Names , as to those that use Names ; for some use them properly and accurately for the finding out of truth ; others draw them from their proper sense , for Ornament , or Deceipt .

13 Sixtly , of Names , some are Absolute , others Relative . Relative are such as are imposed for some Comparison , as Father , Sonne , Cause , Effect , Like , Unlike , Equal , Unequal , Master , Servant , &c. And those that signifie no Comparison at all are Absolute Names . But as it was noted above , that Universality is to be attributed to Words & Names onely , and not to Things ; so the same is to be said of other distinctions of Names ; for no Things are either Univocall or Equivocall , or Relative or Absolute . There is also another distinction of Names into Concrete and Abstract ; but because Abstract Names proceed from Proposition , and can have no place where there is no Affirmation , I shall speake of them hereafter .

14 Lastly there are Simple and Compounded Names . But here it is to be noted , that a name is not taken in Philosophy , as in Grammar , for one single word , but for any number of words put together to signifie one Thing ; for among Philosophers Sentient Animated Body , passes but for one Name , being the Name of every living Creature ; which yet , among Grāmarians is accounted three Names . Also a Simple Name is not here distinguished from a Compounded Name by a Preposition , as in Grammar . But I call a Simple Name , that which in every kind is the most Common or most Universall ; and that a Compounded Name , which by the joyning of another Name to it is made lesse Universall , and signifies that more conceptions then one were in the mind , for which that later Name was added . For example , in the conception of Man ( as is shewn in the former Chap. ) First , he is conceived to be something that has Extension , which is marked by the word Body . Body therefore is a Simple Name , being put for that first single Conception ; Afterwards , upon the sight of such and such motion , another Conception arises for which he is called an Animated Body ; and this I here call a Compounded Name , as I doe also the name Animal , which is equivalent to an Animated Body . And in the same manner an Animated Rational Body , as also a Man , which is equivalent to it , is a more Compounded Name . And by this we see how the Composition of Conceptions in the mind is answerable to the Composition of Names ; for as in the minde one Idea or Phantasme succeeds to another , and to this a third ; so to one Name is added another and another successively , and of them all is made one Compounded Name . Neverthelesse we must not thinke Bodies , which are without the Minde , are compounded in the same manner , namely that there is in Nature a Body , or any other imaginable Thing existent , which at the first has no Magnitude , and then by the addition of Magnitude , comes to have Quantity , and by more or lesse Quantity to have Density or Rarity , and again by the addition of Figure to be Figurate , and after this by the injection of Light or Colour , to become Lucid or Coloured ; though such has been the Philosophy of many .

15 The Writers of Logique have endeavoured to digest the Names of all the kinds of Things into certaine Scales or Degrees , by the continual subordination of Names lesse Common , to Names more Common . In the Scale of Bodies they put in the first and highest place Body simply , and in the next place under it lesse Common Names , by which it may be more limited and determined , namely Animated and Inanimated , and so on till they come to Individualls . In like manner in the Scale of Quantities they assign the first place to Quantity , and the next to Line , Superficies , and Solid , which are Names of lesse latitude ; and these Orders or Scales of Names they usually call Praedicaments and Categories ; And of this Ordination not onely Positive but Negative Names also are capable ; which may be exemplified by such Formes of the Praedicaments as follow .

The Form of the Praedicament of Body . Not-Body ; or Accident Body Not animated Animated Not Living-Creature Living-Creature Not Man Man Not Peter Peter Both Accident and Body are considered Absolutely as , Quantity , or so much Quality , or such or Comparatively , which is called their Relation The Forme of the Praedicament of Quantity . Quātity Not Continual , as Number , Continuall Of it selfe , as Line Superficies Solid By Accident , as — Time , by Line Motion , by Line and Time Force , by Motion and Solid

Where it is to be noted , that Line , Superficies and Solid may be said to be of such and such Quantity , that is , to be originally and of their own nature capable of Equality and Inequality ; But we cannot say there is either Majority or Minority , or Equality , or indeed any Quantity at all , in Time , without the help of Line and Motion ; nor in Motion , without Line and Time ; nor in Force , otherwise then by Motion and Solid .

The Forme of the Praedicament of Quality . Quality Perceptiō by Sense Primary Seeing Hearing Smelling Tasting Touching Secondary Imagination Affection — Pleasant Unpleasant Sensible Quality By Seeing , as Light and Colour By Hearing , as Sound By Smelling , as Odors By Tasting , as Savours By Touching , as Hardnesse , Heat , Cold , &c. The forme of the Praedicament of Relation . Relation of Magnitudes , as Equality and Inequality Qualities , as Likenesse and Unlikenesse Order Together In Place In Time Not together In Place Former Later In Time Former Later

16 Concerning which Praedicaments it is to be noted in the first place , That as the division is made in the first Praedicament into Contradictory Names , so it might have been done in the rest . For as there , Body is divided into Animated and Not-Animated , so in the second Praedicament Continuall Quantity may be divided into Line and Not-line , and again , Not-line into Superficies and Not-Superficies , and so in the rest ; but it was not necessary .

Secondly , it is to be observed , that of Positive Names the former comprehends the later ; but of Negatives the former is comprehended by the later . For example Living-Creature is the Name of every Man , and therefore it comprehends the Name Man ; but on the contrary Not-Man is the Name of every Thing which is Not-Living-Creature , and therefore the Name Not-Living-Creature which is put first , is comprehended by the later Name Not-Man .

Thirdly , we must take heed we do not thinke , that as Names , so the diversities of Things themselves may be searched out and determined by such Distinctions as these ; or that arguments may be taken from hence ( as some have done ridiculously ) to prove that the kinds of Things are not infinite .

Fourthly , I would not have any man thinke I deliver the Forms above for a true and exact Ordination of Names ; for this cannot be performed as long as Philosophy remains imperfect ; Nor that by placing ( for example ) Light in the Praedicament of Qualities , while another places the same in the Praedicament of Bodies , I pretend that either of us ought for this to be drawn from his opinion ; for this is to be done onely by Arguments and Ratiocination , and not by disposing of words into Classes .

Lastly , I confesse I have not yet seen any great use of the Praedicaments in Philosophy . I beleeve Aristotle when he saw he could not digest the Things themselves into such Orders , might neverthelesse desire out of his owne Authority to reduce Words to such Formes , as I have done ; but I doe it onely for this end , that it may be understood what this Ordination of Words is , and not to have it received or true , till it be demonstrated by good reason to be so .