This keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the Early English Books Online Text Creation Partnership. This Phase I text is available for reuse, according to the terms of Creative Commons 0 1.0 Universal . The text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission.
Dr.
Bramhall
Bishop
Thomas
Hobbes
Andrew
Crook
Green
Dragon
St.
Pauls
Church-yard
Necessity
,
Freedom
Luther
,
Calvin
blasphemous
,
atheistical
THe
Question
in
general
is
stated
by
the
himself
,
(
towards
the
end
of
Numb
.
)
in
these
words
Which
though
drawn
up
to
his
advantage
,
with
as
much
caution
as
he
would
do
a
Lease
,
yet
(
excepting
that
which
is
not
intelligible
)
I
am
content
to
admit
.
Not
intelligible
is
,
First
,
that
If
he
mean
,
that
the
conversion
of
a
sinner
is
from
necessity
,
and
praedetermined
,
then
he
is
,
for
so
much
as
the
Question
concerns
Religion
,
of
the
same
mind
that
I
am
,
and
what
he
can
mean
else
by
that
exception
I
cannot
guesse
.
Secondly
,
these
words
are
insignificant
,
unless
he
mean
that
the
events
themselves
should
concurre
to
their
production
:
as
that
fire
doth
not
necessarily
burn
without
the
concurrence
of
burning
,
as
the
words
properly
import
:
or
at
least
without
concurrence
of
the
fuell
.
Those
two
clauses
left
out
,
I
agree
with
him
in
the
state
of
the
Question
as
it
is
put
universally
.
But
when
the
Question
is
put
of
the
necessity
of
any
particular
event
,
as
of
the
or
the
like
,
then
it
is
the
stating
of
that
particular
Question
:
but
it
is
decided
in
the
decision
of
the
Question
universall
.
He
states
the
same
Question
againe
●n
another
place
thus
,
And
I
allow
it
also
for
well
stated
so
.
Again
he
sayes
So
that
the
state
of
the
Question
is
reduced
to
this
,
I
say
there
is
not
,
he
sayes
there
is
.
Again
he
writes
thus
Here
also
the
Question
is
brought
to
this
issue
,
But
for
these
words
I
understand
them
not
Again
,
he
often
useth
such
words
as
these
,
id
est
,
the
Will
willeth
not
Herein
also
lyeth
the
whole
Question
.
If
they
be
true
,
I
;
if
false
,
He
is
in
the
errour
.
Again
,
the
whole
question
is
decided
,
when
this
is
decided
,
Again
,
the
whole
Question
of
is
included
in
this
Again
,
it
is
included
in
this
,
Lastly
,
there
be
two
Questions
;
one
,
Which
is
as
much
as
to
say
,
(
because
Will
is
Appetite
)
it
is
one
Question
,
and
another
In
the
former
I
agree
with
the
In
the
latter
I
dissent
from
him
.
And
therefore
all
the
places
of
Scripture
,
that
he
alleadgeth
to
prove
that
a
man
hath
liberty
to
do
what
he
Will
,
are
impertinent
to
the
Question
.
If
he
has
not
been
able
to
distinguish
between
these
two
Questions
,
he
has
not
done
well
to
meddle
with
either
:
if
he
has
understood
them
,
to
bring
arguments
to
prove
that
a
man
is
free
to
do
if
he
Will
,
is
to
deale
uningenuously
and
fraudulently
with
his
Readers
.
And
thus
much
for
the
State
of
the
Question
.
THe
Arguments
by
which
this
Question
is
disputed
,
are
drawn
from
four
Fountaines
.
From
the
consequent
to
either
opinion
From
the
of
God
.
are
of
two
sorts
are
those
which
are
taken
from
the
holy
Scriptures
.
also
are
of
two
sorts
,
one
,
the
Authorities
of
those
men
that
are
generally
esteemed
to
have
been
learned
,
especially
in
this
Question
,
as
the
Fathers
,
Schoolmen
,
and
old
Philosophers
:
the
other
,
are
the
Uulgar
and
most
commonly
receaved
opinions
in
the
world
.
His
Reasons
and
places
of
Scripture
I
will
answer
the
best
I
am
able
;
but
his
humane
Authorities
I
shall
admit
and
receive
,
as
farre
as
to
Scripture
and
Reason
they
be
consonant
,
and
no
further
.
And
for
the
Arguments
derived
from
the
Attributes
of
God
,
so
farre
forth
as
those
Attributes
are
argumentative
,
that
is
,
so
farre
forth
as
their
significations
be
conceavable
,
I
admit
them
for
Arguments
;
but
where
they
are
given
for
honour
onely
,
and
signifie
nothing
but
an
intention
and
endeavour
to
praise
and
magnifie
as
much
as
we
can
Almighty
God
,
there
I
hold
them
not
for
Arguments
,
but
for
Oblations
;
not
for
the
language
,
but
(
as
the
Scripture
calls
them
)
for
the
calves
of
our
lips
;
which
signifie
not
true
nor
false
,
or
any
opinion
of
our
brain
,
but
the
reverence
and
devotion
of
our
hearts
:
and
therefore
they
are
no
sufficient
praemises
to
inferre
Truth
,
or
convince
Falsehood
.
The
places
of
Scripture
that
make
for
me
are
these
.
First
,
sayeth
to
his
Brethren
that
had
sold
him
,
And
again
verse
And
concerning
God
sayeth
Exod.
And
concerning
King
of
Hesbon
sayeth
Deut.
And
of
that
did
curse
himself
sayeth
disputing
this
very
Question
,
sayeth
,
Job
and
vers
and
verse
and
verse
and
verse
And
of
the
King
of
God
saith
sayth
,
Jer.
And
to
whom
God
sent
as
a
watchman
to
the
house
of
God
saith
thus
Note
here
,
God
layes
the
stumbling
block
,
yet
he
that
falleth
dyeth
in
his
sin
:
which
showes
that
Gods
Justice
in
killing
,
dependeth
not
on
the
sin
onely
.
And
our
Saviour
saith
,
John
And
St.
concerning
the
dilivering
of
Christ
to
the
Jews
saith
thus
,
Acts
And
again
,
those
Christians
to
whom
resorted
,
after
they
were
freed
from
their
troubles
about
the
miracle
of
curing
the
lame
man
,
praysing
God
for
the
same
say
thus
:
And
St.
and
verse
And
again
and
Ephes.
and
Phillip.
To
these
places
may
be
added
all
the
places
that
make
God
the
giver
of
all
Graces
,
that
is
to
say
,
of
all
good
habits
and
inclinations
;
and
all
the
places
wherein
men
are
said
to
be
dead
in
sin
:
for
by
all
these
it
is
manifest
that
although
a
man
may
live
holily
if
he
is
the
work
of
God
,
and
not
eligible
by
man
.
A
second
sort
of
places
there
be
,
that
make
equally
for
the
and
they
be
such
as
say
that
a
man
hath
Election
,
and
may
do
many
things
and
also
he
may
leave
them
undone
;
but
not
that
God
Almighty
naturally
or
supernaturally
worketh
in
us
every
act
of
the
will
,
as
in
my
opinion
;
nor
that
he
worketh
it
not
,
as
in
the
opinion
;
though
he
use
those
places
as
Arguments
on
his
side
.
The
places
are
such
as
these
,
Deut.
and
Eccles●…
and
verse
And
those
places
which
the
and
Josh
And
besides
these
very
many
other
places
to
the
same
effect
.
The
third
sort
of
Texts
are
those
which
seem
to
make
against
me
.
As
,
Esay
And
Jer.
And
Hosea
And
Ecclesiasticus
And
many
other
places
to
the
like
purpose
.
You
see
how
great
the
apparent
contradiction
is
between
the
first
and
the
third
sort
of
Texts
,
which
being
both
Scripture
,
may
and
must
be
reconciled
and
made
to
stand
together
;
which
unless
the
rigor
of
the
letter
be
on
one
or
both
sides
,
with
intelligible
and
reasonable
interpretations
mollified
,
is
impossible
.
The
Schoolmen
to
keep
the
literal
sence
of
the
third
sort
of
Texts
,
interpret
the
first
sort
thus
;
the
words
of
Joseph
,
they
interpret
in
this
as
if
the
were
not
the
This
is
of
whom
and
the
I
would
know
whether
the
did
infallibly
and
inevitably
follow
that
permission
.
If
it
did
,
then
that
was
necessitated
before
hand
by
an
eternal
permission
.
If
it
did
not
,
how
can
there
be
attributed
to
God
a
foreknowledge
of
it
,
when
by
the
it
might
have
been
frustrated
?
I
would
know
also
,
whether
the
were
a
sin
.
If
it
were
,
why
doth
Ought
not
a
man
to
be
grieved
and
angry
with
himself
for
sinning
?
If
it
were
no
sin
,
then
treachery
and
fratricide
is
no
sin
.
Again
,
seeing
the
of
him
consisted
in
these
acts
,
which
are
all
corporeal
motions
,
did
God
they
should
not
be
,
how
then
could
they
be
done
?
Or
doth
he
permit
barely
,
and
neither
corporeal
and
local
motions
?
How
then
is
God
the
first
mover
and
cause
of
all
local
motion
?
Did
he
cause
the
motion
,
and
the
law
against
it
,
but
not
the
irregularity
?
How
can
that
be
,
seeing
the
motion
and
law
being
existent
,
the
contrariety
of
the
motion
and
law
is
necessarily
coexistent
?
So
these
places
they
interpret
thus
But
seeing
that
mans
heare
without
the
grace
of
God
,
is
uninclinable
to
good
,
the
of
the
hardness
of
heart
,
both
in
and
in
is
as
easily
derived
from
Gods
that
is
,
from
his
with-holding
his
grace
,
as
from
his
And
whereas
they
say
,
He
godly
and
free
actions
conditionally
and
consequently
,
that
is
,
if
the
man
them
,
then
God
them
,
elso
not
;
and
not
evil
actions
,
but
them
;
they
ascribe
to
God
nothing
at
all
in
the
causation
of
any
action
either
good
or
bad
.
Now
to
the
third
sort
of
places
,
that
seem
to
contradict
the
former
,
let
us
see
if
they
may
not
be
reconciled
with
a
more
intelligible
and
reasonable
interpretation
,
than
that
wherewith
the
Schoolmen
interpret
the
first
.
It
is
no
extraodinary
kind
of
●anguage
,
to
call
the
Commandements
and
Exhortations
and
other
significations
of
the
by
the
name
of
though
the
be
an
internal
act
of
the
soul
,
and
Commands
are
but
words
and
signes
external
of
that
internal
act
.
So
that
the
and
the
are
diverse
things
;
and
differ
as
the
and
the
And
hence
it
comes
to
passe
,
that
the
Word
and
Commandement
of
God
,
namely
the
holy
Scripture
,
is
usually
called
by
Christians
Gods
Will
,
but
his
revealed
Will
;
acknowledging
the
very
Will
of
God
,
which
they
call
his
Counsell
and
Decree
,
to
be
another
thing
.
For
the
revealed
Will
of
God
to
was
,
that
should
be
sacrificed
;
but
it
was
his
Will
he
should
not
.
And
his
revealed
Will
to
should
be
destroyed
within
forty
dayes
;
but
not
his
Decree
and
Purpose
.
His
Decree
and
Purpose
cannot
be
known
beforehand
,
but
may
afterwards
by
the
Event
;
for
from
the
Event
we
may
inferre
his
Will.
But
his
revealed
Will
,
which
is
his
Word
,
must
be
foreknown
,
because
it
ought
to
be
the
rule
of
our
actions
.
Therefore
where
it
is
said
that
it
is
not
meant
of
his
Will
internal
,
but
of
his
Commandements
or
Will
revealed
;
as
if
it
had
been
said
,
So
where
God
saies
It
is
thus
to
be
understood
,
And
the
like
interpretations
are
to
be
given
to
the
like
places
.
For
it
is
not
christian
to
think
,
if
God
had
the
purpose
to
save
all
men
,
that
any
man
could
be
damned
,
because
it
were
a
sign
of
want
of
power
to
effect
what
he
would
.
So
these
words
,
If
by
them
be
meant
the
Almighty
power
,
might
receave
this
answer
But
when
we
are
to
measure
God
by
his
revealed
Will
,
it
is
as
if
he
had
said
,
God
doth
not
will
and
command
us
to
enquire
what
his
Will
and
Purpose
is
,
and
accordingly
to
do
it
;
for
we
shall
do
that
whether
we
will
or
not
;
but
to
look
into
his
Commandements
,
that
is
,
as
to
the
Jewes
,
the
Law
of
and
as
to
other
People
,
the
Lawes
of
their
Country
.
Or
as
some
English
Translations
have
it
.
Is
literally
true
,
but
maketh
nothing
against
me
;
for
the
man
that
sins
willingly
,
whatsoever
be
the
cause
of
his
Will
,
if
he
be
not
forgiven
,
hath
destroyed
himself
,
as
being
his
own
act
.
Where
it
is
said
These
words
are
by
some
much
insisted
on
,
as
if
they
had
done
it
without
the
Will
of
God
.
For
whatsoever
is
done
comes
into
Gods
mind
,
that
is
,
into
his
knowledge
,
which
implyes
a
certainty
of
the
future
action
,
and
that
certainly
an
antecedent
purpose
of
God
to
bring
it
to
passe
.
It
cannot
therefore
be
meant
God
did
not
will
it
,
but
that
he
had
not
the
will
to
command
it
.
But
by
the
way
it
is
to
be
noted
,
that
when
God
speaks
to
men
concerning
his
Will
and
other
Attributes
,
he
speaks
of
them
as
if
they
were
like
to
those
of
men
,
to
the
end
he
may
be
understood
.
And
therefore
to
the
order
of
his
Work
,
the
World
,
wherein
one
thing
followes
another
so
aptly
as
no
man
could
order
it
by
Designe
,
he
gives
the
name
of
Will
and
Purpose
.
For
that
which
we
call
Designe
,
which
is
reasoning
,
and
thought
after
thought
,
cannot
be
properly
attributed
to
God
,
in
whose
thoughts
there
is
no
But
what
shall
we
answer
to
the
Words
in
Ecclesiasticus
,
If
it
had
not
been
I
should
have
answered
that
Ecclesiasticus
is
Apocrypha
,
and
meerly
humane
authority
.
But
it
is
very
true
,
that
such
words
as
these
are
not
to
be
said
;
first
because
St.
forbids
it
(
saith
he
Yet
true
it
is
,
that
he
did
so
make
him
.
Secondly
,
because
we
ought
to
attribute
nothing
to
God
but
what
we
conceave
to
be
Honourable
,
and
we
judge
nothing
Honourable
but
what
we
count
so
amongst
our selves
;
and
because
accusation
of
man
is
not
Honourable
,
therefore
such
words
are
not
to
be
used
concerning
God
Almighty
.
And
for
the
same
cause
it
is
not
lawful
to
say
that
any
Action
can
be
done
,
which
God
hath
purposed
shall
not
be
done
;
for
it
is
a
token
of
want
of
the
power
to
hinder
it
.
Therefore
neither
of
them
is
to
be
said
,
though
one
of
them
must
needs
be
true
.
Thus
you
see
how
disputing
of
Gods
nature
which
is
incomprehensible
,
driveth
men
upon
one
of
these
two
Rocks
.
And
this
was
the
cause
I
was
unwilling
to
have
my
Answer
to
the
Doctrine
of
Liberty
published
And
thus
much
for
comparison
of
our
two
opinions
with
the
Scriptures
;
which
whether
it
favour
more
his
or
mine
,
I
leave
to
be
judged
by
the
Reader
.
And
now
I
come
to
compare
them
again
by
the
Inconveniences
which
may
be
thought
to
follow
them
.
First
,
the
sayes
,
that
this
very
perswasion
,
that
all
things
come
to
passe
by
is
able
to
overthrow
all
Societies
and
Common-wealths
in
the
World
.
The
Lawes
saith
he
are
unjust
which
prohibit
that
which
a
man
cannot
possibly
shunne
.
Secondly
,
that
it
maketh
superstuous
and
foolish
all
Consultations
,
Arts
,
Armes
,
Books
,
Instruments
,
Teachers
,
and
Medicines
,
and
which
is
worst
,
Piety
and
all
other
Acts
of
Devotion
.
For
if
the
Event
be
necessary
,
it
will
come
to
pass
whatsoever
we
do
,
and
whether
we
sleep
or
wake
.
This
inference
,
if
there
were
not
as
well
a
necessity
of
the
means
as
there
is
of
the
event
,
might
be
allowed
for
true
.
But
according
to
my
opinion
both
the
event
and
means
are
equally
necessitated
.
But
supposing
the
inference
true
,
it
makes
as
much
against
him
that
denies
,
as
against
him
that
holds
this
necessity
.
For
I
believe
the
holds
for
as
certain
a
truth
,
And
then
the
ratiocination
of
the
sick
man
,
is
a
good
ratiocination
.
But
the
holds
,
that
it
is
necessary
he
shall
recover
or
not
recover
.
Therefore
it
followes
from
an
opinion
of
the
as
well
as
from
mine
,
that
Medicine
is
superstuous
.
But
as
Medicine
is
to
Health
,
so
is
Piety
,
Consultation
,
Arts
,
Armes
,
Books
,
Instruments
,
and
Teachers
,
every
one
to
its
several
●nd
.
Out
of
the
opinion
it
followes
as
well
as
from
mine
,
that
Medicine
is
superstuous
to
Health
.
Therefore
from
his
opinion
as
well
as
from
mine
,
it
followeth
,
(
if
such
ratiocination
were
not
unsound
,
)
that
Piety
,
Consultation
,
&c.
are
also
superstuous
to
their
respective
ends
.
And
for
the
superstuity
of
Lawes
,
whatsoever
be
the
truth
of
the
Question
between
us
,
they
are
not
superstuous
,
because
by
the
punnishing
of
one
,
or
of
a
few
unjust
men
,
they
are
the
cause
of
justic
▪
in
a
great
many
.
But
the
greatest
inconvenience
of
all
that
the
pretends
may
be
drawn
from
this
opinion
is
,
It
is
true
,
that
seeing
the
name
of
punnishment
hath
relation
to
the
name
of
Crime
,
there
can
be
no
punishment
but
for
Crimes
that
might
have
been
left
undone
;
but
instead
of
if
he
had
said
may
not
I
say
that
God
may
afflict
and
not
for
sin
?
doth
he
not
afflict
those
Creatures
that
cannot
sin
?
and
sometimes
those
that
can
sin
,
and
yet
not
for
sin
,
as
and
the
Man
in
the
Gospel
that
was
born
blind
,
for
the
manifestation
of
his
power
which
he
hath
over
his
Creature
,
no
less
,
but
more
than
hath
the
Potter
over
his
Clay
,
to
make
of
it
what
he
please
?
But
though
God
have
power
to
afflict
a
man
and
not
for
sin
without
injustice
,
shall
we
think
God
so
cruel
as
to
afflict
a
man
and
not
for
sin
with
extream
and
endlesse
torment
?
Is
it
not
cruelty
?
No
more
than
to
do
the
same
for
sin
,
when
he
that
so
afflicteth
might
without
trouble
have
kept
him
from
sinning
.
But
what
Infallible
evidence
hath
the
that
a
man
shall
be
after
this
life
,
Eternally
in
torments
and
never
die
?
Or
how
is
it
certain
there
is
no
second
death
,
when
the
Scripture
saith
there
is
?
Or
where
doth
the
Scripture
say
that
a
second
death
is
an
endless
life
?
Or
do
the
Doctors
onely
say
it
?
then
perhaps
they
do
but
say
so
,
and
for
reasons
best
known
to
themselves
.
There
is
no
injustice
nor
cruelty
in
him
that
giveth
life
,
to
give
withit
sicknesse
,
pain
,
torments
,
and
death
nor
in
him
that
giveth
life
twice
,
to
give
the
same
miseries
twice
also
.
And
thus
much
in
Answer
to
the
Inconveniences
that
are
pretended
to
follow
the
Doctrine
of
Necessity
.
On
the
other
side
from
this
Position
,
that
a
man
is
free
to
will
,
it
followeth
that
the
Prescience
of
God
is
quite
taken
away
.
For
how
can
it
be
known
before
hand
what
man
shall
have
a
will
to
,
if
that
will
of
his
proceed
not
from
necessary
causes
,
but
that
he
have
in
his
power
to
will
or
not
will
?
So
also
those
things
which
are
called
future
contingents
,
if
they
come
not
to
passe
with
certainty
,
that
is
to
say
,
from
necessary
causes
,
can
never
be
foreknown
;
so
that
Gods
f●reknowing
shall
sometimes
be
of
things
that
shall
not
come
to
passe
,
which
is
as
much
to
say
,
that
his
foreknowledge
is
none
;
which
is
a
great
dishonour
to
the
All-knowing
Power
.
Though
this
be
all
the
Inconvenient
Doctrine
that
followeth
for
as
much
as
I
can
now
remember
;
yet
the
defending
of
this
opinion
hath
drawn
the
Bishop
and
other
Patrons
of
it
into
many
inconvenient
and
absurd
conclusions
,
and
made
them
make
use
of
an
infinite
number
of
Insignificant
words
;
whereof
one
conclusion
is
in
that
God
doth
so
concurre
with
the
Will
of
Man
,
that
which
is
to
subject
not
the
will
of
Man
to
God
,
but
the
will
of
God
to
Man
.
Other
inconvenient
conclusions
I
shall
then
mark
out
,
when
I
come
to
my
observations
upon
the
Bishops
reply
.
And
thus
farre
concerning
the
inconveniences
that
follow
both
Opinions
.
The
Attribute
of
God
which
he
draweth
into
argument
is
his
as
that
God
cannot
be
Just
in
punishing
any
man
for
that
which
he
was
necessitated
to
do
.
To
which
I
have
answered
before
,
as
being
one
of
the
Inconveniences
pretended
to
follow
upon
the
Doctrine
of
Necessity
.
On
the
Contrary
,
from
another
of
Gods
Attributes
,
which
is
his
I
shall
evidently
derive
,
that
all
Actions
whatsoever
,
whether
they
proceed
from
the
will
or
from
fortune
,
were
necessary
from
eternity
.
For
whatsoever
God
Fore-knoweth
shall
come
to
passe
,
cannot
but
come
to
passe
,
that
is
,
it
is
Impossible
it
should
not
come
to
passe
,
or
otherwise
come
to
passe
then
it
was
fore-known
.
But
whatsoever
was
Impossible
should
be
otherwise
,
was
necessary
for
the
definition
of
is
that
which
cannot
possibly
be
otherwise
.
And
whereas
they
that
distinguish
between
Gods
and
his
say
the
Fore-knowledge
maketh
not
the
Necessity
without
the
Decree
;
it
is
little
to
the
purpose
.
It
sufficeth
me
that
whatsoever
was
fore-known
by
God
,
was
necessary
;
but
all
things
were
Fore-known
by
God
;
and
therefore
all
things
were
necessary
.
And
as
for
the
distinction
of
Fore-knowledge
from
Decree
in
God
Almighty
,
I
comprehend
it
not
.
They
are
Acts
coeternall
,
and
therefore
one
.
And
as
for
the
Arguments
drawn
from
naturall
reason
,
they
are
set
down
at
large
in
the
end
of
my
discourse
to
which
the
Bishop
maketh
his
reply
;
which
how
well
he
hath
answered
shall
appear
in
due
time
.
For
the
present
,
the
Actions
which
he
thinketh
proceed
from
liberty
of
will
,
must
either
be
necessitated
,
or
proceed
from
fortune
,
without
any
other
cause
;
for
certainly
to
is
Impossible
without
thinking
on
what
he
willeth
.
But
it
is
in
no
mans
Election
what
he
shall
at
any
named
time
hereafter
think
on
.
And
this
I
take
to
be
enough
to
clear
the
understanding
of
the
Reader
,
that
he
may
be
the
better
able
to
Judge
of
the
Following
Disputation
.
I
find
in
those
that
write
of
this
Argument
(
especially
in
the
Schoolmen
and
their
Followers
)
so
many
words
strangers
to
our
Language
,
and
such
Confusion
and
Inanity
in
the
ranging
of
them
,
as
that
a
mans
mind
in
the
reading
of
them
distinguisheth
nothing
;
And
as
things
were
in
the
beginning
(
before
the
Spirit
of
God
was
moved
upon
the
Abiss
)
that
is
to
say
,
Confusion
and
Emptiness
;
so
are
their
discourses
.
This
is
but
choler
,
such
as
ordinarily
happeneth
unto
them
who
contend
against
greater
difficulties
than
they
expected
.
He
is
here
,
I
think
mistaken
,
for
in
our
verbal
Conference
there
was
not
one
passionate
word
,
nor
any
objecting
of
Blasphemy
or
Atheisme
,
nor
any
other
uncivil
word
,
of
which
in
his
writing
there
are
abundance
.
I
confess
I
am
not
apt
to
admire
every
thing
I
understand
not
▪
nor
yet
to
sleight
it
.
And
though
the
sleight
not
the
School-men
so
much
as
I
do
,
yet
I
dare
say
he
understands
their
writings
as
little
as
I
do
.
For
they
are
in
most
places
unintelligible
.
Mr.
Hobbs
all
controversie
,
concerning
Predestination
,
Election
,
Free-will
,
Grace
,
Merits
,
Reprobation
,
&c.
is
fully
decided
and
cleared
.
Mr.
Hobbs
De
Cive
Mr.
Hobbs
It
is
true
that
it
was
not
my
intention
to
publish
any
thing
in
this
Question
.
And
the
might
have
perceived
by
not
leaving
out
those
four
passages
,
that
it
was
without
my
knowledge
the
Book
was
printed
;
but
it
pleased
him
better
to
take
this
little
advantage
to
accuse
me
of
want
of
ingenuity
.
He
might
have
perceived
also
,
by
the
date
of
my
Letter
,
which
was
written
which
error
could
be
no
advantage
to
me
,
that
I
knew
nothing
of
the
printing
of
it
.
I
confess
,
that
before
I
receaved
the
Reply
,
a
French
Gentleman
of
my
acquaintance
in
knowing
that
I
had
written
something
of
this
subject
,
but
not
understanding
the
language
,
desired
me
to
give
him
leave
to
get
it
interpreted
to
him
by
an
english
young
Man
that
resorted
to
him
;
which
I
yeilded
to
.
But
this
young
Man
taking
his
opportunitie
,
and
being
a
nimble
writer
,
took
a
Copy
of
it
for
himself
,
and
printed
it
here
,
all
but
the
Postcsript
,
without
my
knowledge
,
and
(
as
he
kn●w
)
against
my
will
;
for
which
he
since
hath
askt
me
pardon
.
But
that
the
intended
it
not
for
the
Press
,
is
not
very
probable
,
because
he
saith
he
writ
it
to
the
end
which
end
he
had
not
obtained
by
keeping
it
private
.
Mr.
Hobbs
De
Cive
I
did
indeed
intend
to
have
answered
those
Exceptions
as
finding
them
neither
Political
nor
Theological
,
nor
that
he
alleadged
any
Reasons
,
by
which
they
were
to
be
justified
.
But
shortly
after
intending
to
write
in
English
,
and
publish
my
thoughts
concerning
in
that
Book
which
I
intitled
I
thought
his
objections
would
by
the
clearness
of
my
method
fall
off
without
an
answer
.
Now
this
he
calleth
Words
not
farre
fetcht
,
nor
more
applicable
to
my
than
to
any
other
writing
that
should
offend
him
.
For
allowing
him
the
word
because
it
seems
he
takes
it
for
a
monstrous
great
Fish
,
he
can
neither
say
it
is
for
even
they
that
approve
not
the
Doctrine
allow
the
Method
.
Nor
that
it
is
for
it
is
a
Book
of
no
great
Bulk
.
Nor
for
he
will
find
very
few
Readers
,
that
will
not
think
it
clearer
than
his
Scholastique
And
whereas
he
saith
there
are
two
of
our
own
Church
as
he
hears
say
that
are
answering
it
;
And
that
if
I
desire
it
My
answer
is
,
that
I
desire
not
,
that
he
or
they
should
so
mispend
their
time
;
but
if
they
will
needs
do
it
,
I
can
give
them
a
fit
Title
for
their
Book
,
He
ends
his
Epistle
with
Which
words
are
good
in
themseves
,
but
to
no
purpose
here
;
but
are
a
Buffonly
abusing
of
the
name
of
God
to
Calumny
.
J.
D'●
De
Cive
J.
D
▪
s.
T.
H.
T.
H.
I
had
once
resolved
to
resolve
T.
H
T.
H.
whatsoever
is
,
when
it
is
,
is
necessarily
so
as
it
is
.
T.
H.
that
upon
your
Lorships
desire
and
mine
,
he
was
contented
to
begin
with
this
discourse
of
Liberty
and
Necessity
,
T.
H.
His
deferring
the
reading
of
my
defence
of
necessity
,
he
will
not
(
he
saith
)
should
be
interpreted
for
disrespect
.
T
is
well
;
though
I
cannot
imagine
why
he
should
fear
to
be
thought
to
disrespect
he
saith
It
seems
then
he
acknowledgeth
that
the
will
can
be
diverted
by
business
.
Which
though
said
on
the
is
contrary
I
think
to
the
that
the
Will
is
Free
;
for
free
it
is
not
if
any
thing
but
it self
ca●
divert
it
.
T.
H.
How
so
saith
he
There
is
no
man
doubts
but
a
man
may
deliberate
of
what
himself
shall
do
,
whether
the
thing
be
impossible
or
not
,
in
case
he
know
not
of
the
impossibility
;
though
he
cannot
deliberate
of
what
another
shall
do
to
him
.
Therefore
his
examples
of
the
man
condemned
,
of
the
man
that
breatheth
,
and
of
him
that
groweth
,
(
because
the
Question
is
not
what
they
shall
do
)
but
what
they
shall
suffer
,
are
impertinent
.
This
is
so
evident
,
that
I
wonder
how
he
that
was
before
so
witty
,
as
to
say
,
my
first
words
tript
up
the
●e●les
of
my
cause
,
and
that
having
line
enough
I
would
confute
my self
,
could
presently
be
so
dull
,
as
not
to
see
his
Argument
was
too
weak
to
support
so
triumphant
a
language
.
And
whereas
he
seemeth
to
be
off
ended
with
Paradoxes
,
let
him
thank
the
Schoolmen
whose
senceless
writings
,
have
made
the
greatest
number
of
important
Truths
see●
Paradoxe
.
This
Argument
that
followeth
is
no
better
.
saith
he
If
he
understand
what
it
is
he
knowes
that
it
signifies
no
more
then
(
after
deliberation
)
He
thinks
therefore
is
to
have
dominion
over
his
own
actions
and
actually
to
determine
his
own
Will.
But
no
man
can
determine
his
own
will
;
for
the
will
is
appetite
,
nor
can
a
man
more
determine
his
will
than
any
other
appetite
;
that
is
,
more
than
he
can
determine
when
he
shall
be
hungry
and
when
not
.
When
a
man
is
hungry
,
it
is
in
his
choise
to
eat
or
not
eat
;
this
is
the
liberty
of
the
man
;
But
to
be
hungry
or
not
hungry
(
which
is
that
which
I
hold
to
proceed
from
necessity
)
is
not
in
his
choise
.
Besides
these
words
so
farre
as
they
are
significant
,
make
against
him
.
For
over
whatsoever
things
there
is
dominion
,
those
things
are
not
Free
,
and
therefore
a
mans
actions
are
not
Free
▪
And
if
a
man
determine
himself
,
the
Question
will
still
remain
what
determined
him
to
determine
himself
in
that
manner
.
T.
H.
This
and
that
whic●
followeth
,
is
talking
to
himself
at
randome
,
till
he
come
to
all●adge
that
which
he
calleth
an
old
rule
,
which
is
this
,
If
the
think
that
I
hold
no
other
Necessity
than
that
which
is
expressed
in
that
old
foolish
rule
,
he
neither
understandeth
me
,
nor
what
the
word
signifieth
.
Necessary
is
that
have
no
signification
in
reference
to
time
or
time
but
onely
and
his
signifie
nothing
;
My
is
a
from
all
Eternity
;
and
yet
not
inconsistent
with
true
Liberty
,
which
doth
not
consist
in
determining
it self
,
but
in
doing
what
the
Will
is
determined
unto
.
This
and
this
and
this
and
this
are
confused
and
empty
words
Whether
my
desire
,
and
the
modest
intreaty
were
enough
to
produce
a
in
me
to
write
an
answer
to
his
treatise
,
without
other
concurrent
causes
,
I
am
not
sure
.
Obedience
to
his
did
much
,
&
my
civility
to
the
did
somwhat
,
&
perhaps
there
were
other
imaginations
of
mine
own
,
that
contributed
their
part
.
But
this
I
am
sure
of
,
that
alltogether
they
were
sufficient
to
frame
my
will
thereto
;
and
whatsoever
is
sufficient
to
produce
any
thing
,
produceth
it
as
necessarily
as
the
fire
necessarily
burneth
the
F●wel
that
is
cast
into
it
.
And
though
the
modest
intreaty
had
been
no
part
of
the
cause
of
my
yeilding
to
it
,
yet
certainly
it
would
have
been
cause
enough
to
some
civil
man
,
to
have
requited
me
with
fairer
Language
,
than
he
hath
done
throughout
this
Reply
.
T.
H.
Though
I
were
not
supprised
,
yet
I
do
not
see
the
reason
for
which
,
he
saith
,
he
may
expect
a
more
mature
answer
from
me
;
or
any
further
answer
at
all
.
For
seeing
I
writ
this
at
his
modest
request
,
it
is
no
modest
expectation
to
look
for
as
many
answers
as
he
shall
be
pleased
to
exact
.
It
is
no
great
bragging
,
to
say
I
was
not
supprised
;
for
whosoever
chanceth
to
read
where
he
writeth
of
and
of
the
shall
find
the
greatest
part
,
if
not
all
that
the
hath
urged
in
this
Question
.
But
that
which
the
hath
said
of
the
Reasons
and
Authorities
which
he
saith
(
in
his
Epistle
)
do
offer
themselves
to
serve
in
this
cause
;
and
many
other
passages
of
his
Book
,
I
shall
(
I
think
)
before
I
have
done
with
him
,
make
appear
to
be
very
bragging
,
and
nothing
else
.
And
though
he
say
it
be
his
counsell
that
Sheep
should
show
what
they
eat
,
in
their
Lamb
and
Wool
,
It
is
not
likely
that
should
take
a
metaphor
from
Lamb
and
Wool
;
for
it
could
not
easily
come
into
the
mind
of
men
that
were
not
acquainted
with
the
paying
of
Tithes
.
Or
if
it
had
,
he
would
have
said
Lambs
in
the
Plural
,
as
Lay
men
use
to
speak
.
That
which
followes
of
my
leaving
things
untoucht
,
and
altering
the
state
of
the
Question
;
I
remember
no
such
thing
,
unless
he
require
that
I
should
answer
,
not
to
his
Arguments
onely
,
but
also
to
his
Syllables
.
So
here
the
Praeface
is
an
handsome
one
,
but
it
appears
even
in
this
,
that
he
hath
mistaken
the
Question
.
Necessity
,
Spontaneity
T.
H.
liberty
as
a
River
hath
to
descend
down
the
Channel
T.
H.
casting
Ambs-Ace
T.
H.
T.
H.
T.
H.
Whether
a
man
may
write
if
he
will
,
and
forbear
if
he
will
,
but
whether
the
will
to
write
or
the
will
to
forbear
,
come
upon
him
according
to
his
will
,
or
according
to
any
thing
else
in
his
own
power
.
T.
H.
He
may
write
or
he
may
forbear
,
without
his
will
,
or
without
any
thing
in
his
power
Wilt
thou
be
made
clean
We
have
piped
unto
you
and
y●
have
not
danced
I
would
have
gathered
your
Children
together
,
as
the
Hen
gathereth
her
Chickens
under
her
wings
,
but
ye
would
not
.
T.
H.
Our
will
should
not
be
a
will
at
all
,
if
it
were
not
in
our
power
.
T.
H.
T.
H.
Necessity
,
Spontaneity
I
did
expect
,
that
for
the
knowing
of
the
difference
between
he
would
have
set
down
their
Definitions
.
For
without
these
,
their
difference
cannot
possibly
appear
;
for
how
can
a
man
know
how
things
differ
,
unless
he
first
know
what
they
are
;
which
he
offers
not
to
shew
.
He
tels
us
that
never
;
and
many
other
things
impertinent
to
the
purpose
.
For
which
(
because
of
the
length
)
I
refer
the
Reader
to
the
Place
.
I
note
onely
this
,
that
is
a
word
not
used
in
common
English
;
and
they
that
understand
Latine
,
know
it
means
no
more
,
than
Appetite
,
or
Will
,
and
is
not
found
but
in
living
Creatures
.
And
seeing
he
saith
that
may
stand
together
,
I
may
say
also
,
that
may
stand
together
;
and
then
is
not
the
Will
(
as
he
would
have
it
)
from
Necessitation
.
There
are
many
other
things
in
that
which
followeth
,
which
I
had
rather
the
Reader
would
consider
in
his
own
words
,
to
which
I
referre
him
,
than
that
I
should
give
him
greater
trouble
in
reciting
them
again
.
For
I
do
not
fear
it
will
be
thought
too
hot
for
my
fingers
,
to
shew
the
vanity
of
such
words
as
these
,
nor
understand
I
how
Reason
can
be
the
root
of
true
Liberty
,
if
the
(
as
he
saith
in
the
beginning
)
had
the
liberty
to
write
this
discourse
.
I
understand
how
objects
,
and
the
Conveniences
and
the
Inconveniences
of
them
may
be
represented
to
a
man
,
by
the
help
of
his
sences
but
how
representeth
any
thing
to
the
I
understand
no
more
,
than
the
understands
there
may
be
Liberty
in
Children
,
in
Beasts
,
and
inanimate
Creaturs
.
For
he
seemeth
to
wonder
how
Children
may
be
left
at
Liberty
;
how
Beasts
imprisoned
may
be
set
at
Liberty
;
and
how
a
River
may
have
a
free
course
;
and
saith
,
what
!
will
he
ascribe
Liberty
to
inanimate
Creatures
also
?
And
thus
he
thinks
he
hath
made
it
clear
how
differ
from
●●e
another
.
If
the
Reader
find
it
so
,
I
am
contented
.
might
easily
have
seen
,
that
the
Necessity
I
hold
,
is
the
same
Necessity
that
he
denies
;
namely
a
Necessity
of
things
future
,
that
is
,
an
antecedent
Necessity
derived
from
the
very
beginning
of
time
;
and
that
I
put
Necessity
for
an
Impossibility
of
not
being
,
and
that
Impossibility
as
well
as
Possibility
are
never
truly
said
,
but
of
the
future
.
I
know
as
well
as
he
that
the
cause
when
it
is
adaequate
(
as
he
calleth
it
)
or
entire
(
as
I
call
it
)
is
together
in
time
with
the
effect
.
But
for
all
that
the
Necessity
may
be
and
is
before
the
effect
,
as
much
as
any
Necessity
can
be
.
And
though
he
call
it
a
Necessity
of
supposition
,
it
is
no
more
so
,
than
all
other
Necessity
is
.
The
fire
burneth
neoessarily
;
but
not
without
supposition
,
that
there
is
fewel
put
to
it
.
And
it
burneth
the
fewel
(
when
it
is
put
to
it
)
necessarily
;
but
it
is
by
supposition
,
that
the
ordinary
course
of
nature
is
not
hindred
;
For
the
fire
burnt
not
the
three
Children
in
the
Furnace
.
It
seems
by
this
he
understandeth
not
what
these
words
mean
.
A
little
before
he
wondred
I
should
attribute
to
inanimate
Creatures
,
and
now
he
puts
causes
amongst
those
things
that
operate
By
these
causes
it
seems
be
understandeth
onely
men
,
whereas
I
shewed
before
that
Liberty
is
usually
ascribed
to
whatsoever
Agent
is
not
hindred
.
And
when
a
man
doth
any
thing
Freely
,
there
be
many
other
Agents
immediate
,
that
concur
to
the
effect
he
intendeth
,
which
work
not
Freely
,
but
necessarily
;
as
when
the
man
moveth
the
Sword
the
Sword
woundeth
necessarily
,
nor
can
suspend
or
deny
its
concurrence
;
And
consequently
if
the
man
move
not
himself
,
the
man
cannot
deny
●is
concurrence
.
To
which
he
cannot
reply
,
unless
he
say
a
man
originally
can
move
himself
,
for
which
he
will
be
able
to
find
no
Authority
of
any
that
have
but
tasted
of
the
knowledge
of
motion
.
Then
for
he
understandeth
not
what
it
meaneth
,
for
it
is
all
one
to
say
it
is
and
simply
to
say
it
is
;
saving
that
when
they
say
simply
it
is
,
they
consider
not
how
or
by
what
means
;
but
in
saying
it
is
contingent
they
tell
us
they
know
not
whether
necessarily
or
not
.
But
the
to
be
that
which
is
instead
of
arguing
against
of
the
necessity
of
things
to
come
,
argueth
against
the
Again
he
supposeth
that
Free
and
Contingent
causes
might
have
suspended
or
denied
their
concurrence
.
From
which
it
followeth
that
Free
causes
,
and
Contingent
causes
are
not
causes
of
themselves
,
but
concurrent
with
other
causes
,
and
therefore
can
produce
nothing
but
as
they
are
guided
by
those
causes
with
which
they
concur
;
for
it
is
strange
,
he
should
say
,
they
might
have
concurred
after
another
manner
;
for
I
conceave
not
how
when
this
runneth
one
way
,
and
that
another
,
that
they
can
be
said
to
concur
,
that
is
run
together
,
And
this
his
concurrence
of
causes
contingent
,
maketh
(
he
saith
)
the
cast
of
not
to
have
been
absolutely
necessary
.
Which
cannot
be
conceaved
unless
it
had
hindred
it
;
and
then
it
had
made
some
other
cast
necessary
,
perhaps
which
serveth
me
as
well
.
For
that
which
he
saith
of
and
the
like
accidents
serve
not
to
take
away
the
necessity
of
otherwise
then
by
making
a
necessity
of
or
other
cast
that
shall
be
thrown
.
T.
H.
He
hath
very
little
reason
to
say
this
.
He
requested
me
to
tell
him
my
opinion
in
writing
concerning
Which
I
did
,
and
did
let
him
know
a
man
was
in
those
things
that
were
in
his
power
,
to
but
that
he
was
not
that
is
,
that
his
will
did
not
follow
his
will
,
which
I
expressed
in
these
words
,
He
that
cannot
understand
the
difference
between
is
not
fit
(
as
I
have
said
in
the
Stating
of
the
Question
)
to
hear
this
Controversie
disputed
,
much
less
to
be
a
writer
in
it
.
His
consequence
,
and
his
saying
is
put
here
without
proof
;
nor
is
there
any
considerable
proof
of
it
through
the
whole
Book
●ereafter
offered
.
For
why
;
he
never
before
had
heard
(
I
believe
)
of
any
distinction
between
which
makes
him
also
say
As
if
it
were
not
Freedome
enough
for
a
man
unless
his
a●d
that
his
be
not
the
power
it self
,
but
must
have
another
power
within
it
to
do
all
voluntary
acts
.
It
is
to
this
purpose
,
that
all
those
things
may
be
brought
to
passe
,
which
God
hath
from
Eternity
predetermined
.
It
is
therefore
to
no
purpose
here
to
say
,
that
God
and
Nature
hath
made
nothing
in
vain
.
But
see
what
weak
Arguments
he
brings
next
,
which
though
answered
in
that
which
is
gone
before
,
yet
if
I
answer
not
again
,
he
will
say
they
are
too
hot
for
my
fingers
.
One
is
,
as
if
the
Will
being
necessitated
,
the
were
not
Another
is
,
If
a
man
be
Free
to
Act
,
he
is
much
more
Free
to
Will
;
because
as
if
he
should
say
,
if
I
make
him
angry
,
then
I
am
more
angry
;
because
&c.
The
third
is
and
he
ought
not
to
say
T
is
true
,
it
followeth
that
he
but
it
doth
not
follow
I
ought
to
say
he
unless
he
would
have
me
say
more
than
I
know
,
as
himself
doth
often
in
this
Reply
.
After
his
Arguments
,
come
his
difficult
Questions
.
I
answer
,
Because
we
desire
to
know
,
and
cannot
know
but
by
their
telling
,
nor
then
neither
for
the
most
part
.
I
answer
,
because
thereby
we
think
to
make
them
have
the
Will
they
have
not
.
I
answer
,
because
th'y
please
us
not
.
I
might
ask
him
,
whether
blaming
be
any
thing
else
but
saying
the
thing
blamed
is
ill
or
imperfect
.
May
not
we
say
a
Horse
is
lame
,
though
his
lameness
came
from
necessity
;
or
that
a
man
is
a
fool
or
a
knave
,
if
he
be
so
,
though
he
could
not
help
it
?
I
answer
,
that
it
was
not
because
he
would
know
,
for
he
knew
it
before
;
but
because
he
would
draw
from
him
a
confession
of
his
want
.
I
answer
,
they
could
not
help
it
.
T.
H.
I
answer
,
they
are
to
be
blamed
though
their
Wills
be
not
in
their
own
power
.
Is
not
good
good
,
and
evill
evill
though
they
be
not
in
our
power
?
and
shall
not
I
call
them
so
?
and
is
not
that
Praise
and
Blame
?
But
it
seems
the
not
for
the
dispraise
of
a
thing
,
but
for
a
praetext
and
colour
of
malice
and
revenge
against
him
he
blameth
.
And
where
he
sayes
our
Wills
are
in
our
power
,
he
sees
not
that
he
speaks
absurdly
;
for
he
ought
to
say
,
the
Will
is
the
Power
;
and
through
ignorance
detecteth
the
same
fault
in
who
saith
,
our
Will
should
not
be
a
Will
at
all
,
if
it
were
not
in
our
power
;
that
is
to
say
,
if
it
were
not
in
our
Will.
This
piece
of
Eloquence
is
used
by
in
his
defence
of
to
prove
it
lawful
for
a
man
to
resist
force
with
force
,
or
to
keep
himself
from
killing
;
which
the
thinking
himself
able
to
make
that
which
proves
one
thing
prove
any
thing
,
hath
translated
into
English
,
and
brought
into
this
place
to
prove
Free-will
.
It
is
true
,
very
few
have
learned
from
Tutors
,
that
a
man
is
not
free
to
Will
;
nor
do
they
find
it
much
in
Books
.
That
they
find
in
Books
,
that
which
the
Poets
chant
in
their
Theaters
,
and
the
Shepheards
in
the
Mountains
,
that
which
the
Pastors
teach
in
the
Churches
,
and
the
Doctors
in
the
Vniversities
,
and
that
which
the
common
people
in
the
Markets
,
and
all
mankind
in
the
whole
World
do
assent
unto
,
is
the
same
that
I
assent
unto
,
namely
,
that
a
man
hath
freedome
to
do
if
he
will
;
but
whether
he
hath
freedome
to
Will
,
is
a
Question
which
it
seems
neither
the
nor
they
ever
thought
on
Here
again
he
is
upon
his
arguments
from
Blame
,
which
I
have
answered
before
;
and
we
do
as
much
blame
them
as
we
do
men
;
for
we
say
fire
hath
done
hurt
,
and
the
poyson
hath
killed
a
man
,
as
well
as
we
say
the
man
hath
done
unjustly
;
but
we
do
not
seek
to
be
revenged
of
the
fire
and
of
poyson
,
because
we
cannot
make
them
ask
forgiveness
,
as
we
would
make
men
to
do
when
they
hurt
us
;
so
that
the
blaming
of
the
one
and
the
other
,
that
is
,
the
declaring
of
the
hurt
or
evill
action
done
by
them
,
is
the
same
in
both
;
but
the
malice
of
man
is
onely
against
man
.
He
may
as
well
say
,
no
man
halts
which
cannot
chuse
but
halt
;
or
stumbles
,
that
cannot
chuse
but
stumhl●
.
For
what
is
sin
but
halting
or
stumbling
in
the
way
of
Gods
Commandements
.
This
Question
which
the
stateth
in
this
place
,
I
have
before
set
down
verbatim
and
allowed
:
and
it
is
the
same
with
mine
,
though
he
perceave
it
not
.
But
seeing
I
did
nothing
,
but
at
his
request
set
down
my
opinion
,
there
can
be
no
other
Question
between
us
in
this
controversie
,
but
whether
my
opinion
be
the
truth
or
not
.
That
which
he
sayes
in
the
preface
is
The
first
consequence
I
should
have
granted
him
,
if
he
had
written
it
rationally
and
civilly
;
the
later
I
deny
,
and
have
shown
that
he
ought
to
have
proved
that
a
man
is
Free
to
Wil.
For
that
which
he
sayes
,
any
thing
else
whatsoever
,
would
think
,
if
it
know
it
were
moved
,
and
did
not
know
what
moved
it
.
A
woodden
Top
that
is
lasht
by
the
Boyes
,
and
runs
about
sometimes
to
one
Wall
,
sometimes
to
another
,
somtimes
spinning
,
sometimes
hitting
men
on
the
shins
,
if
it
were
sensible
of
its
own
motion
,
would
think
it
proceeded
from
its
own
Will
,
unless
it
felt
what
lasht
it
.
And
is
a
man
any
wiser
,
when
he
runns
to
one
place
for
a
Benefice
,
to
another
for
a
Bargain
,
and
troubles
the
world
with
writing
errors
,
and
requiring
answers
,
because
he
thinks
he
doth
it
without
other
cause
than
his
own
Will
,
and
seeth
not
what
are
the
lashings
that
cause
his
Will
?
specification
and
exercise
Vir
dolosus
versatur
in
generalibus
Now
being
made
free
from
sin
.
To
let
the
oppressed
go
free
.
In
the
year
of
Jubilee
ye
shall
proclaim
liberty
throughout
the
land
.
The
prince
of
his
people
let
him
go
free
.
T.
H.
he
understands
never
the
more
what
I
mean
by
liberty
,
the
taking
of
the
Question
exercise
onely
exercise
and
specification
jointly
T.
H.
T.
H.
HE
intendeth
here
to
make
good
the
distinctions
of
Liberty
of
and
Liberty
of
Liberty
of
and
Liberty
of
And
he
begins
thus
I
know
not
what
Art
it
is
that
giveth
this
rule
.
I
am
sure
it
is
not
the
Art
of
Reason
which
men
call
Logique
.
For
Reason
teacheth
,
and
the
example
of
those
who
onely
reason
methodically
,
(
which
are
the
Mathematicians
)
that
a
man
when
he
will
demonstrate
the
truth
of
what
he
is
to
say
,
must
in
the
first
place
determine
what
he
will
have
to
be
understood
by
his
words
;
which
determination
is
called
definition
;
whereby
the
significations
of
his
words
are
so
clearly
set
down
,
that
there
can
creep
in
no
ambiguity
.
And
therefore
there
will
be
no
need
of
distinctions
;
and
consequently
his
rule
of
Art
,
is
a
rash
precept
of
some
ignorant
man
▪
whom
he
and
others
have
followed
.
tells
us
that
Liberty
is
sometimes
opposed
to
sin
,
to
oppression
,
to
servitudo
;
which
is
to
tell
us
that
they
whom
he
hath
read
in
this
point
,
are
inconstant
in
the
meaning
of
their
own
words
;
and
therefore
they
are
little
beholding
to
him
.
And
this
diversity
of
significations
he
calls
distinctions
.
Do
men
that
by
the
same
word
in
one
place
mean
one
thing
,
and
in
another
another
,
and
never
tell
us
so
,
distinguish
?
I
think
they
rather
confound
.
And
yet
he
sayes
,
that
T.
H.
Which
definition
of
mine
was
this
,
So
that
in
his
opinion
a
man
shall
sooner
understand
Liberty
by
reading
these
words
,
Rom.
or
these
words
,
Esay
or
by
these
words
,
Levit.
than
by
these
words
of
mine
,
Also
he
will
face
me
down
that
I
understand
what
he
meanes
by
his
distinctions
of
liberty
of
If
he
mean
I
understand
his
meaning
,
in
one
sence
it
is
true
;
for
by
them
he
means
to
shift
off
the
discredit
of
being
able
to
say
nothing
to
the
Question
,
as
they
do
,
that
pretending
to
know
the
cause
of
every
thing
,
give
for
the
cause
of
why
the
Loadstone
draweth
to
it
Iron
,
sympathy
,
&
occult
quality
;
making
turned
now
into
Occult
to
stand
for
thereall
cause
of
that
most
admirable
effect
.
But
that
those
words
signifie
distinction
I
constantly
deny
.
It
is
not
enough
for
a
distinction
to
be
forked
,
it
ought
to
signifie
a
distinct
conception
.
There
,
is
great
difference
between
luade
distinctions
and
cloven
feet
.
This
word
particular
men
is
put
here
in
my
opinion
with
little
judgement
,
especially
by
a
man
that
pretendeth
to
be
learned
.
Does
the
think
that
he
himself
is
,
or
that
there
is
any
Universal
man
?
It
may
be
he
means
a
private
man
.
Does
he
then
think
there
is
any
man
not
private
,
besides
him
that
is
indued
with
Soveraign
power
?
But
it
is
most
likely
he
calls
me
a
particular
man
,
because
I
have
not
had
the
authority
he
has
had
to
teach
what
doctrine
I
think
fit
.
But
now
,
I
am
no
more
Particular
than
he
;
and
may
with
as
good
a
grace
despise
the
Schoolmen
,
and
some
of
the
old
Philosophers
,
as
he
can
despise
me
,
unless
he
can
shew
that
it
is
more
likely
that
he
should
be
better
able
to
look
into
these
Questions
sufficiently
,
which
require
meditation
and
reflection
upon
a
mans
own
thoughts
,
he
that
hath
been
obliged
most
of
his
time
to
preach
unto
the
people
,
and
to
that
end
to
read
those
Authors
that
can
best
furnish
him
with
what
he
has
to
say
,
and
to
study
for
the
rhetorick
of
his
expressions
,
and
of
the
spare
time
(
which
to
a
good
Pastor
is
very
little
)
hath
spent
no
little
part
in
seeking
preferment
,
and
encreasing
of
riches
;
than
I
that
have
done
almost
nothing
else
,
nor
have
had
much
else
to
do
but
to
meditate
upon
this
and
other
natural
Questions
.
It
troubles
him
much
that
I
stile
School-learning
I
do
not
call
all
School-learning
so
,
but
such
as
is
so
,
that
is
,
that
which
they
say
in
defending
of
untruths
,
and
especially
in
the
maintenance
of
Free-will
,
when
they
talk
of
and
the
like
;
Which
though
he
go
over
again
in
this
place
,
endeavouring
to
explain
them
,
are
still
both
here
and
there
but
or
that
(
if
he
like
it
better
)
which
the
Scripture
in
the
first
But
because
he
takes
it
so
hainously
,
that
a
private
man
should
so
hardly
censure
School-Divinity
;
I
would
be
glad
to
know
with
what
patience
he
can
hear
speaking
of
the
same
that
was
the
first
beginner
of
our
deliverance
from
the
servitude
of
the
Romish
Clergy
,
had
these
three
Articles
censured
by
the
University
of
The
first
of
which
was
The
second
is
The
third
is
Moreover
the
same
in
another
place
of
his
works
saith
thus
,
And
of
in
particular
he
saith
,
that
And
of
the
Philosophy
whereof
St.
biddeth
us
beware
,
he
saith
it
is
School-Theology
.
And
a
Divine
once
much
esteemed
in
our
Church
,
saith
of
it
thus
,
These
were
no
raw
Divines
,
such
as
he
saith
preacht
to
their
equally
ignorant
Auditors
.
I
could
ad
to
these
the
slighting
of
School-Divinity
by
and
other
learned
Protestant
Doctors
;
yet
were
they
all
but
private
men
,
who
it
seemes
to
the
had
forgot
themselves
as
well
as
I.
T.
H.
Proofs
of
Liberty
out
of
Scripture
.
Choose
you
this
day
whom
you
will
serve
,
But
I
and
my
house
will
serve
the
Lord
.
I
offer
thee
three
things
,
choose
thee
which
of
them
I
shall
do
.
T.
H.
that
it
is
clearly
prooved
that
there
is
election
in
Man
.
is
necessitated
or
determined
to
what
he
shall
choose
Before
the
Child
shall
know
to
refuse
the
evil
and
choose
the
good
.
T.
H.
T.
H.
Choose
you
this
day
whom
ye
will
serve
:
But
I
and
my
house
will
serve
the
Lord
.
this
day
whom
ye
will
serve
,
whether
the
Gods
whom
your
fathers
served
,
or
the
Gods
of
the
Amorites
.
I
and
my
house
will
seve
the
Lord
.
I
offer
thee
three
things
choose
thee
which
of
them
I
shall
do
.
T.
H.
IN
this
Number
he
hath
brought
three
places
of
Scripture
to
prove
Free-Will
.
The
first
is
,
Which
in
the
Reply
he
endeavoureth
to
make
good
;
but
needed
not
,
seeing
they
prove
nothing
but
that
a
man
is
Free
to
do
if
he
will
,
which
I
deny
not
.
He
ought
to
prove
he
is
Free
to
will
,
which
I
deny
.
His
instances
are
first
the
difference
between
an
Hereditary
Kingdom
,
and
an
Elective
;
and
then
the
difference
between
the
Senior
and
Junior
of
the
Mess
taking
their
commons
;
both
which
prove
the
liberty
of
doing
what
they
will
,
but
not
a
liberty
to
will
;
for
in
the
first
case
the
Electors
are
Free
to
name
whom
they
will
,
but
not
to
Will
;
and
in
the
second
the
Senior
having
an
appetite
,
chooseth
what
he
hath
an
appetite
to
;
but
chooseth
not
his
appetite
.
T.
H.
T.
H.
T.
H.
T.
H.
the
nature
of
election
doth
consist
in
following
our
hopes
and
fears
,
Sanctius
his
animal
mentisque
capacius
altae
.
I
note
here
first
,
that
the
is
mistaken
in
saying
that
I
or
any
other
Patron
of
Necessity
,
are
of
opinion
that
the
Will
followes
alwayes
the
last
judgement
of
right
Reason
.
For
it
followeth
as
well
the
judgement
of
an
erroneous
as
of
a
true
reasoning
;
and
the
truth
in
general
is
that
it
followeth
the
last
opinion
,
of
the
goodness
or
evilness
of
the
object
,
be
the
opinion
true
or
false
.
Secondly
I
note
,
that
in
making
the
understanding
to
be
an
effect
of
the
Will
,
he
thinketh
a
man
may
have
a
will
to
that
which
he
not
so
much
as
thinks
on
.
And
in
saying
,
that
That
he
not
onely
thinketh
the
Will
affecteth
a
particular
good
,
before
the
man
understands
it
to
be
good
,
but
also
he
thinketh
that
these
words
and
these
and
a
great
many
more
that
follow
which
are
not
sense
;
but
meer
confusion
&
emptiness
:
as
for
example
,
is
unintelligible
is
non-sense
.
And
where
he
saith
,
that
he
showeth
so
clearly
that
he
understandeth
nothing
at
all
of
Natural
Philosophy
,
that
I
am
sorry
I
had
the
ill
fortune
to
be
engaged
with
him
in
a
dispute
of
this
kind
.
There
is
nothing
that
the
simplest
Country
Man
could
say
so
absurdly
concerning
the
understanding
,
as
this
of
the
A
Country
Man
will
acknowledge
there
is
judgement
in
Men
,
but
will
as
soon
say
the
judgement
of
the
judgement
,
as
the
judgement
of
the
understanding
.
And
if
had
been
sense
,
he
might
have
made
a
shift
to
put
it
into
English
.
Much
more
followeth
of
this
stuff
.
that
the
nature
of
Election
doth
consist
in
following
our
hopes
and
fears
,
He
might
have
said
,
there
is
not
a
word
of
and
that
it
proceedeth
from
an
affectation
of
truth
,
and
contempt
of
metaphysical
Writers
,
and
a
desire
to
reduce
into
frame
the
Learning
which
they
have
confounded
and
disordered
.
T.
H.
voluntary
praesupposeth
deliberation
that
whatsoever
followeth
the
last
appetite
is
voluntary
,
and
where
there
is
but
one
appetite
,
that
is
the
last
.
no
action
of
a
man
can
be
said
to
be
without
deliberation
,
though
never
so
suddain
.
by
spontaneity
is
meant
,
inconsiderate
proceeding
,
or
else
nothing
is
meant
by
it
,
all
voluntary
actions
which
proceed
not
from
fear
,
are
spontaneous
,
to
give
money
for
Merchandise
T.
H.
a
Child
may
be
so
young
,
as
to
do
what
it
doth
without
all
deliberation
.
spontaneous
ulcers
T.
H.
that
wise
men
may
do
inconsiderate
and
indeliberate
actions
,
That
Fools
,
Children
,
mad
Men
,
and
Beasts
do
deliberate
and
elect
,
Be
not
like
the
Horse
and
Mule
which
have
no
understanding
.
Man
being
in
honour
had
no
understanding
,
but
became
like
unto
the
Beasts
that
perish
.
d●●urres
upon
his
way
He
retires
from
some
strange
figure
which
he
sees
,
and
comes
on
again
to
avoid
the
spur
T.
H.
of
whose
actions
if
I
had
been
a
spectator
,
I
would
have
confessed
,
not
only
Election
,
but
also
Art
,
Prudence
,
Policy
,
very
near
equal
to
that
of
Mankind
,
whose
life
,
as
saith
,
is
civill
minor
in
parvis
T.
H.
It
is
very
possible
I
may
have
mistaken
him
;
for
neither
he
nor
I
understand
him
.
If
they
be
one
,
why
did
he
without
need
bring
in
this
strange
word
Spontaneous
?
Or
rather
,
why
did
the
School
men
bring
it
in
,
if
not
meerly
to
shift
off
the
difficulty
of
maintaining
their
tenet
of
Free-Will
?
Secondly
he
saith
▪
In
his
Reply
Number
2.
he
saith
,
that
for
the
clearing
of
the
Question
,
we
are
to
know
the
difference
between
these
three
,
Necessity
,
Spontaneity
,
and
Liberty
;
and
because
I
thought
he
knew
that
it
could
not
be
cleared
without
under
standing
what
is
Will
,
I
had
reason
to
think
that
Spontaneity
was
his
new
word
for
Will
.
And
presently
after
These
words
Voluntary
and
Spontaneous
so
put
together
,
would
make
any
man
beleeve
Spontaneous
we●e
put
as
▪
explicative
of
Voluntary
;
for
it
is
no
wonder
in
the
eloquence
of
the
School
men
.
Therefore
presently
after
,
these
words
signifie
that
Spontaneity
is
a
conformity
or
likeness
of
the
appetite
to
the
object
;
which
to
me
soundeth
as
if
he
had
said
,
that
the
Appetite
is
like
the
Object
;
which
is
as
proper
as
if
he
had
said
the
Hunger
is
like
the
Meat
.
If
this
be
the
meaning
,
as
it
is
the
meaning
of
the
Words
,
he
is
a
very
fine
Philosopher
.
But
hereafter
I
will
venture
no
more
to
say
his
meaning
is
this
or
that
,
especially
were
he
useth
terms
of
Art
.
Thirdly
he
saith
I
resolve
to
have
no
more
to
do
with
Spontaneity
.
But
I
desire
the
Reader
to
take
notice
,
that
the
common
people
,
on
whose
arbitration
dependeth
the
signification
of
words
in
com●●n
use
,
among
the
Latines
and
Greeks
did
call
all
actions
and
motions
whereof
they
did
perceive
no
cause
,
Spantaneous
,
and
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
:
I
say
,
not
those
actions
which
had
no
causes
,
for
all
actions
have
their
causes
,
but
those
actions
whose
causes
they
did
not
perceive
.
So
that
Spontaneous
as
a
general
name
comprehended
many
actions
and
motions
of
inanimate
creatures
;
as
the
falling
of
heavy
things
downwards
,
which
they
thought
spantaneous
,
and
that
if
they
were
not
hindred
,
they
would
discend
of
their
It
comprehended
also
all
animal
motion
,
as
beginning
from
the
Will
or
Appetite
;
because
the
causes
of
the
Will
and
Appetite
being
not
perceived
,
they
supposed
as
the
doth
that
they
were
the
causes
of
themselves
.
So
that
that
which
in
general
is
called
Spont●neous
,
being
applyed
to
Men
and
Beasts
in
special
,
is
called
Voluntary
.
Yet
the
Will
and
Appetite
,
though
the
very
same
thing
,
use
to
be
distinguished
in
certain
occasions
.
For
in
the
publique
conversation
of
Men
,
where
they
are
to
judge
of
one
anothers
Will
,
and
of
the
regularity
and
irregularity
of
one
anothers
actions
,
not
every
Appetite
,
but
the
last
is
esteemed
in
the
publique
judgement
for
the
Will.
Nor
every
action
proceeding
from
Appetite
,
but
that
onely
to
which
there
had
preceded
or
ought
to
have
preceded
some
deliberation
.
And
this
I
say
is
so
,
when
one
man
is
to
judge
of
anothers
Will
.
For
every
man
in
himself
,
knoweth
that
what
he
desireth
or
hath
an
appetite
to
,
the
same
he
hath
a
will
to
,
though
his
will
may
be
changed
before
he
hath
obteined
his
desire
.
The
understanding
nothing
of
this
,
might
if
it
had
pleased
him
,
have
called
it
But
he
had
rather
pick
out
of
it
some
contradictions
of
my self
.
And
therefore
saith
,
meaning
such
contradictions
It
is
a
contradiction
,
he
saith
,
that
having
said
that
I
say
in
another
place
Not
observing
that
when
the
judgement
whether
the
action
be
voluntary
or
not
,
is
not
in
the
Actor
but
in
the
Judge
,
who
regardeth
not
the
will
of
the
Actor
where
there
is
nothing
to
be
accused
in
the
action
of
deliberate
malice
;
yet
knoweth
that
though
there
be
but
one
appetite
,
the
same
is
truly
will
for
the
time
,
and
the
action
(
if
it
follow
)
a
voluntary
action
.
This
also
he
saith
is
a
contradction
,
that
having
said
,
I
say
afterward
that
Again
he
observes
not
that
the
action
of
a
man
that
is
not
a
child
,
in
publique
judgement
how
rash
,
inconsiderate
,
and
suddain
soever
it
be
,
is
to
be
taken
for
deliberation
,
because
it
is
supposed
,
he
ought
to
have
considered
and
compared
his
intended
action
with
the
Law
;
when
nevertheless
that
suddain
and
indeliberate
action
was
truly
voluntary
.
Another
contradiction
which
he
finds
is
this
,
that
having
undertaken
to
proove
I
say
by
and
by
after
I
yet
see
no
contradiction
here
;
for
a
Child
may
be
so
young
as
that
the
appetite
thereof
is
its
first
appetite
,
but
afterward
and
often
before
it
come
to
have
the
use
of
reason
,
may
elect
one
thing
and
refuse
another
,
and
consider
the
consequences
of
what
it
is
about
to
do
.
And
why
not
as
well
as
Beasts
,
which
never
have
the
use
of
reason
?
for
they
deliberate
as
men
do
.
For
though
men
and
beasts
do
differ
in
many
things
very
much
,
yet
they
differ
not
in
the
nature
of
their
deliberation
.
A
man
can
reckon
by
words
of
general
signification
,
make
propositions
,
and
syllogismes
,
and
compute
in
numbers
,
magnitudes
,
proportions
,
and
other
things
computable
;
which
being
done
by
the
advantage
of
language
,
and
words
of
general
significations
,
a
beast
that
hath
not
language
cannot
do
,
nor
a
man
that
hath
language
,
if
he
misplace
the
words
,
that
are
his
counters
.
From
hence
to
the
end
of
this
Number
,
he
discourseth
again
of
Spontaneity
,
and
how
it
is
in
Children
,
mad
Men
and
Beasts
;
which
as
I
before
resolved
I
will
not
meddle
with
;
let
the
Reader
think
and
judge
of
it
us
he
pleaseth
.
Because
thou
hast
asked
this
thing
,
and
hast
not
asked
for
thy self
long
life
,
neither
hast
asked
riches
for
thy self
,
nor
hast
asked
the
life
of
thine
enemies
,
&c.
After
it
was
sold
,
was
it
not
in
thine
own
power
?
Ananias
,
Acts
5.
4.
After
it
was
sold
,
was
it
not
in
thine
own
power
?
T.
H.
for
the
proving
of
Free-Will
had
alledged
this
text
,
And
another
Acts
Out
of
which
he
inferres
,
there
was
no
necessity
that
should
ask
wisedom
rather
than
long
life
,
nor
that
should
tell
a
lye
concerning
the
price
for
which
he
sold
his
Land
.
And
my
answer
that
they
prove
Election
,
but
disprove
not
the
necessity
of
Election
,
satisfieth
him
not
;
because
saith
he
,
But
how
doth
he
know
(
understanding
power
properly
taken
)
that
had
a
reall
power
to
ask
long
life
?
No
doubt
knew
nothing
to
the
contrary
;
but
yet
it
was
possible
that
God
might
have
hindred
him
.
For
though
God
gave
his
choice
,
that
is
,
the
thing
which
he
should
choose
,
it
doth
not
follow
,
that
he
did
not
also
give
him
the
act
of
Election
.
And
for
the
other
text
,
where
it
is
said
,
that
the
price
of
the
Land
was
in
his
power
,
the
word
Power
signifieth
no
more
than
the
word
Right
,
that
is
,
the
right
to
do
with
his
own
what
he
pleased
,
which
is
not
a
reall
and
natural
power
,
but
a
civil
power
made
by
Covenant
.
And
therefore
the
former
answer
is
sufficient
,
for
that
though
such
places
are
clear
enough
to
prove
Election
,
they
have
no
strength
at
all
to
take
away
Necessity
.
Hast
thou
eaten
of
the
tree
whereof
I
commanded
that
thou
shouldest
not
eat
?
Why
hast
thou
done
this
Why
art
thou
wroth
,
and
why
is
thy
countenance
cast
down
?
And
why
will
ye
dye
,
O
house
of
Israel
?
That
which
he
does
is
made
just
by
his
doing
,
Just
I
say
,
in
him
,
not
alwaies
just
in
us
by
the
example
;
for
a
man
that
shall
command
a
thing
openly
,
and
plot
secretly
the
hinderance
of
the
same
,
if
he
punish
him
whom
he
commanded
so
,
for
not
doing
it
,
is
unjust
:
will
answer
it
when
he
comes
.
argued
thus
Here
putting
together
two
repugnant
suppositions
either
craftily
or
(
be
it
spoken
with
all
due
respect
)
ignorantly
,
he
would
have
men
beleeve
that
I
because
I
hold
Necessity
,
I
deny
Liberty
.
I
hold
as
much
that
there
is
true
Liberty
,
as
he
doth
,
and
more
,
for
I
hold
it
as
from
Necessity
;
and
that
there
must
of
Necessity
be
Liberty
,
but
he
holds
it
not
from
Necessity
,
and
so
makes
it
possible
there
may
be
none
.
His
expostulations
were
,
First
,
These
Arguments
requiring
the
same
answer
which
some
other
do
,
I
thought
fit
to
remit
them
to
their
fellowes
.
But
the
will
not
allow
me
that
.
For
he
saith
,
saith
he
I
am
therefore
to
give
an
account
of
the
meaning
of
the
aforesaid
objnrgations
and
expostulations
;
Not
of
the
end
for
which
God
said
but
how
those
words
may
be
taken
without
repugnance
to
the
doctrine
of
Necessity
.
These
words
that
notwithstanding
God
had
placed
in
the
Garden
a
means
to
keep
him
perpetually
from
dying
in
case
he
should
accommodate
his
Will
to
obedience
of
Gods
commandement
concerning
the
tree
of
knowledg
of
good
and
evil
,
yet
was
not
so
much
master
of
his
own
Will
as
to
do
it
.
Whereby
is
signified
that
a
mortal
man
though
invited
by
the
promise
of
immortality
cannot
govern
his
own
Will
,
though
his
Will
govern
his
Actions
,
which
dependance
of
the
Actions
on
the
Will
,
is
that
which
properly
and
truly
is
called
And
the
like
may
be
said
of
the
words
to
Eve
,
and
of
those
to
Cain
&c.
and
to
Israel
but
the
here
will
say
signifieth
not
but
live
eternally
in
torments
.
For
by
such
interpretations
any
man
may
answer
any
thing
,
and
whereas
he
asketh
,
I
answer
,
no
;
but
he
convinceth
and
instructeth
him
,
that
though
immortality
was
so
easie
to
obtain
,
as
it
might
be
had
for
the
abstinence
from
the
fruit
of
one
onely
tree
;
yet
he
could
not
obtain
it
but
by
pardon
,
and
by
the
sacrafice
of
Jesus
Christ
;
nor
is
there
here
any
punishment
,
but
onely
a
reducing
of
to
their
original
mortality
,
where
death
was
no
punishment
but
a
gift
of
God
.
In
which
mortality
he
lived
neer
a
thousand
years
,
and
had
a
numerous
issue
,
and
lived
without
misery
,
and
I
beleeve
shall
at
the
Resurrection
obtain
the
immortality
which
then
he
lost
.
Nor
in
all
this
,
is
there
any
plotting
secretly
,
or
any
mockery
or
derision
,
which
the
would
make
men
beleeve
there
is
And
whereas
he
saith
,
that
The
Protestant
Docttors
both
of
our
,
and
other
Churches
,
did
use
to
distinguish
between
the
secret
and
revealed
Will
of
God
;
the
former
they
called
which
signifieth
absolutly
his
Will
,
the
other
that
is
,
the
signification
of
his
Will
,
in
the
same
sense
that
I
call
the
one
his
the
other
his
which
may
sometimes
differ
.
For
Gods
was
,
that
he
should
sacrafice
but
his
was
,
that
he
should
not
do
it
.
Gods
denunciation
was
,
that
it
should
be
destroyed
within
forty
daies
,
but
his
was
that
it
should
not
What
damned
Rhetorique
and
subtile
Calumny
is
this
?
God
(
I
said
)
might
command
a
thing
openly
,
and
yet
hinder
the
doing
of
it
,
without
injustice
;
but
if
a
man
should
command
a
thing
to
be
done
,
and
then
plot
secretly
the
hinderance
of
the
same
,
and
punish
for
the
not
doing
of
it
,
it
were
injustice
.
This
is
it
which
the
apprehends
as
an
imputation
of
falshood
to
God
Almighty
.
And
perhaps
if
the
death
of
a
sinner
were
,
as
he
thinks
,
an
eternal
life
in
extream
misery
,
a
man
might
as
far
as
hath
done
,
expostulate
with
God
Almighty
,
not
accusing
him
of
injustice
,
because
whatsoever
he
doth
is
therefore
just
because
done
by
him
;
but
of
little
tenderness
and
love
to
mankind
,
and
this
expostulation
will
be
equally
just
or
injust
,
whether
the
necessity
of
all
things
be
granted
or
denyed
;
for
it
is
manifest
that
God
could
have
made
man
impeccable
,
and
can
now
preserve
him
from
sin
,
or
forgive
him
if
he
please
;
and
therefore
,
if
he
please
not
,
the
expostulation
is
as
reasonable
in
the
cases
of
as
of
T.
H.
the
knowbedge
of
vision
knowledge
of
approbation
a
practical
knowledge
T.
H.
T.
H.
as
the
last
feather
may
be
said
to
break
an
Horses
back
,
when
there
were
somany
laid
on
before
,
that
there
wanted
but
that
to
do
it
.
T.
H.
The
Argument
which
he
sendeth
forth
as
an
Espie
,
is
this
,
which
he
saies
falsly
I
call
a
Concourse
In
answer
whereunto
I
said
,
that
all
the
things
now
existent
,
were
necessary
to
the
production
of
the
effect
to
come
;
that
the
of
God
causeth
nothing
though
the
do
;
that
the
influence
of
the
Stars
is
but
a
small
part
of
that
cause
which
maketh
the
Necessity
;
and
that
this
consequence
was
false
.
But
in
his
words
,
if
these
do
take
away
true
liberty
,
then
before
his
fall
had
no
true
liberty
,
the
consequence
is
good
;
but
then
I
deny
that
Necessity
takes
away
Liberty
;
the
reason
whereof
which
is
this
,
no
iucul●ation
is
sufficient
to
make
the
take
notice
of
,
notwithstanding
he
be
other
where
so
witty
,
and
here
so
crafty
,
as
to
send
out
Arguments
for
spies
.
The
cause
why
I
denied
the
consequence
was
,
that
I
thought
the
force
thereof
consisted
in
this
,
that
Necessity
in
the
opinion
destroyed
Liberty
Here
begins
his
Reply
.
From
which
if
we
take
these
words
,
Which
are
all
Non-sense
,
unworthy
of
a
Man
,
nay
and
if
a
Beast
could
speak
,
unworhthy
of
a
Beast
,
and
can
befal
no
creature
whose
nature
is
not
dep●aved
by
Doctrine
,
nothing
at
all
remaineth
to
be
answered
.
Perhaps
the
word
is
not
to
be
taxed
as
unintelligible
,
But
then
I
may
tax
therein
the
want
of
ingenuity
in
him
that
had
rather
say
,
that
heavenly
Bodies
do
then
that
they
which
he
would
not
confess
,
but
endeavours
to
make
be
taken
for
a
The
rest
of
this
Reply
is
one
of
those
consequences
,
which
I
have
answered
in
the
beginning
,
where
I
compare
the
inconveniences
of
both
opinions
,
that
is
,
which
is
no
stronger
a
consequence
than
if
out
of
this
,
one
should
inferre
,
That
or
that
To
the
end
of
this
Number
there
is
nothing
more
of
argument
.
The
place
is
filled
up
with
wondering
and
railing
.
St.
Paul
,
Rom.
9.
ver
St.
Paul
J.
D.
St.
Paul
J.
D's
St.
Paul
J.
D's
Saint
Paul
.
St.
Paul
,
Rom.
to
be
the
God
of
him
and
of
his
seed
,
looks
another
way
being
not
yet
borne
,
neither
having
done
any
good
or
evil
,
have
I
loved
,
and
have
I
hated
The
elder
shall
serve
the
younger
,
When
the
Lord
saw
that
was
hated
more
than
He
that
loveth
Father
or
Mother
more
than
me
,
is
not
worthy
of
me
.
I
will
have
mercy
on
whom
I
will
have
mercy
,
Friend
I
do
the
no
wrong
,
did
not
I
agree
with
thee
for
a
penny
,
Is
it
not
lawful
for
me
to
do
with
mine
own
as
I
will
?
Is
thy
eye
evil
because
I
am
good
?
The
Scripture
saith
unto
for
this
same
purpose
I
have
raised
the
up
,
that
I
might
shew
my
power
in
thee
.
Egypt
,
that
That
it
might
be
fulfilled
I
have
raised
thee
up
that
I
might
shew
my
power
.
whom
he
will
he
hardneth
for
God
tempteth
no
man
,
but
every
man
is
tempted
when
he
is
drawn
away
of
his
own
lust
and
intised
.
When
▪
saw
that
there
was
respite
,
he
hardned
his
heart
.
saw
,
that
the
Rain
and
the
Hail
,
and
the
Thunders
were
ceased
,
he
sinned
yet
more
,
and
hardned
his
heart
,
he
and
his
servants
.
He
turned
their
hearts
,
so
that
they
hated
his
people
,
and
dealt
subtilly
with
them
:
Harden
not
your
hearts
as
in
the
provocation
,
as
in
the
day
of
temptation
in
the
Wilderness
.
What
if
God
willing
to
shew
his
wrath
and
to
make
his
power
known
indured
with
much
long
suffering
the
vessels
of
wrath
fitted
to
destruction
.
And
that
he
might
make
known
the
riches
of
his
glory
on
the
vessels
of
mercy
,
&c.
God
prepared
them
unto
glory
fitted
to
destruction
St.
Paul
endure
the
vessels
of
wrath
with
much
long
suffering
,
T.
H.
If
doing
willingly
,
and
enduring
,
If
much
long
suffering
,
T.
H.
St.
Paul
About
the
time
of
forty
years
suffered
he
their
manners
in
the
Wilderness
.
Who
in
times
past
suffered
all
Nations
to
walk
in
their
own
wayes
.
T.
H.
The
times
of
this
ignorance
God
winked
at
.
God
is
faithful
,
who
will
not
suffer
you
to
be
tempted
above
that
you
are
able
.
T.
H.
Despisest
thou
the
riches
of
his
goodness
,
and
forbearrance
,
and
long
▪
suffering
,
not
knowing
that
the
goodness
of
God
leadeth
thee
to
repentance
,
but
after
thy
hardness
and
impenitent
heart
treasurest
up
unto
thy
●elf
wrath
against
the
day
of
wrath
,
and
revelation
of
the
righteous
judgement
of
God
.
T.
H
rich
in
goodness
forbeares
sinners
long
bring
men
to
repentance
hardness
of
heart
and
impenitency
righteous
judgement
treasure
up
wrath
unto
themselves
who
continue
patiently
in
well-doing
T.
H.
St.
Paul
St.
Peter
The
long
suffering
of
God
waited
once
in
the
daies
of
Noah
.
Account
that
the
long
suffering
of
the
Lord
is
salvation
.
The
Lord
,
the
Lord
God
,
mercyful
and
gracious
,
long
suffering
,
&c.
T.
H.
John
Baptist
T.
H.
In
him
we
live
,
and
move
,
and
have
our
being
.
T.
H.
T.
H.
T.
H.
Why
doth
he
yet
find
fault
?
who
hath
resisted
his
will
,
St.
Pauls
O
man
who
art
thou
that
repliest
against
God
?
shall
the
thing
formed
say
to
him
that
formed
it
,
why
hast
thou
made
me
thus
?
Hath
not
the
Potter
power
over
his
Clay
,
&c
,
before
they
had
done
either
good
or
evill
,
Esau
have
I
hated
St.
Paul
St.
Paul
T.
H.
May
not
God
do
what
he
will
with
his
own
▪
Matth.
T.
H.
St.
Paul
T.
H.
O
altitudo
T.
H.
What
if
God
willing
to
shew
his
wrath
,
and
to
make
his
power
known
,
endureth
with
much
long
suffering
the
vessels
of
wrath
fitted
to
destruction
.
much
long
suffering
Israel
hath
not
atteined
to
the
Law
of
righteousness
,
wherefore
?
because
they
sought
it
not
by
faith
,
but
as
it
were
by
the
works
of
the
Law
.
the
Israelites
being
ignorant
of
Gods
righteousness
and
going
about
to
establish
their
own
righteousness
,
have
not
submitted
themselves
to
the
righteousness
of
God
.
Because
of
undelief
they
were
broken
off
,
but
thou
standest
by
faith
▪
If
they
abide
not
still
in
unbelief
,
they
shall
be
grafted
in
.
Tim
▪
God
is
not
unrighteous
to
forget
your
work
.
T.
H.
de
Cive
cap.
T.
H.
Job
,
where
wast
thou
when
I
laid
the
foundations
of
the
earth
?
Hast
thou
an
arm
like
God
?
Woe
unto
that
man
by
whom
the
Son
of
Man
is
betrayed
,
It
had
been
good
for
that
man
,
that
he
had
not
been
born
.
Thou
shal●
not
mus●●e
the
mouth
of
the
Oxe
that
treadeth
out
the
corn
.
a
just
man
is
merciful
to
his
Beast
.
T.
H.
the
Will
of
God
is
the
rule
of
Justice
,
that
which
is
done
,
or
said
,
or
thought
contrary
to
the
eternall
Law
.
then
the
will
of
man
is
good
and
just
and
right
,
when
he
wills
that
which
God
would
have
him
to
will
:
Thy
Will
be
done
in
earth
as
it
is
in
heaven
,
T.
H.
T.
H.
T.
H.
T.
H.
had
argued
in
this
manner
To
this
I
answered
,
that
though
God
cannot
sin
,
because
what
he
doth
his
doing
maketh
just
;
and
because
he
is
not
subject
to
anothers
Law
,
and
that
therefore
it
is
blasphemy
to
say
,
that
God
can
sin
,
yet
to
say
that
God
hath
so
ordered
the
world
,
that
sin
may
necessarily
be
committed
is
not
blasphemy
.
And
I
can
also
further
say
,
though
God
be
the
cause
of
all
motion
and
of
all
actions
,
and
therefore
unless
sin
be
no
motion
,
nor
action
,
it
must
derive
a
necessity
from
the
first
mover
;
nevertheless
it
cannot
be
said
that
God
is
the
Author
of
sin
,
because
not
he
that
necessitateth
an
action
,
but
he
that
doth
command
and
warrant
it
,
is
the
Author
.
And
if
God
own
an
action
,
though
otherwise
it
were
sin
,
it
is
now
no
sin
.
The
act
of
the
Israelites
in
robbing
the
Egyptians
of
their
Jewels
,
without
Gods
warrant
,
had
been
theft
.
But
it
was
neither
theft
,
cousonage
,
nor
sin
;
supposing
they
knew
the
warrant
was
from
God
.
The
rest
of
my
answer
to
that
inconvenience
,
was
an
opposing
to
his
inconveniences
,
the
manifest
Texts
of
St.
The
substance
of
his
Reply
to
my
Answer
is
this
.
I
never
said
that
God
denied
his
act
,
but
that
he
may
expostulate
with
men
;
And
this
may
be
(
I
shall
never
say
directly
it
is
)
the
reason
of
that
his
expostulation
,
to
convince
them
,
that
their
wills
were
not
independent
,
but
were
his
meer
gift
;
and
that
to
do
,
or
not
to
do
,
is
not
in
him
that
willeth
,
but
in
God
that
hath
mercy
on
,
or
hardeneth
whom
he
will
.
But
the
to
be
a
of
God
.
Which
is
to
attribute
to
God
in
such
actions
,
no
more
than
he
might
have
attributed
to
any
of
servants
,
the
not
perswading
their
Master
to
let
the
People
goe
.
And
whereas
he
compares
this
to
the
indulgence
of
a
parent
,
that
by
his
patience
incourageth
his
son
to
become
more
rebellious
,
(
which
indulgence
is
a
sin
)
▪
he
maketh
God
to
be
like
a
sinful
man
.
And
indeed
it
seemeth
that
all
they
,
that
hold
this
Freedome
of
the
Will
,
concieve
of
God
no
otherwise
than
the
common
sort
of
Jewes
did
,
that
God
was
like
a
man
,
that
he
had
been
seen
by
and
after
by
the
seventy
Elders
,
Expounding
that
and
other
places
literally
.
Again
he
saith
,
that
God
is
said
to
harden
the
heart
but
not
which
is
the
same
distinction
with
his
first
,
namely
and
with
his
second
and
not
so
that
all
his
three
wayes
,
how
God
hardens
the
heart
of
wicked
meu
,
come
to
this
one
of
which
is
as
much
as
to
say
,
God
sees
,
looks
on
,
and
d●th
nothing
,
nor
ever
did
any
thing
in
the
business
.
Thus
you
see
how
the
Therefore
I
will
leave
the
rest
of
his
●…mentary
upon
to
the
judgement
of
the
Reader
,
to
think
of
the
same
as
he
pleaseth
.
That
he
who
doth
permit
any
thing
to
be
done
,
which
it
is
in
his
power
to
hinder
▪
knowing
that
if
he
do
not
hinder
it
,
it
will
be
done
,
doth
in
some
sort
will
it
,
Whether
it
be
called
it
is
enough
for
the
necessity
of
the
thing
▪
that
the
heart
of
should
be
hardened
,
and
if
God
were
not
willing
to
do
it
,
I
cannot
conceive
how
it
could
be
done
without
him
.
T.
H.
I
had
thought
to
passe
over
this
place
,
because
of
the
non-sense
of
seeing
he
saith
that
God
concurres
to
the
doing
of
evil
,
I
desire
the
Reader
would
take
notice
,
that
if
he
blame
me
for
speaking
of
God
as
of
a
necessitating
cause
,
and
as
it
were
a
principal
Agent
in
the
causing
of
all
Actions
,
he
may
with
as
good
reason
blame
himself
for
making
him
by
an
accessory
to
the
same
,
and
indeed
let
men
hold
what
they
will
contrary
to
the
truth
,
if
they
write
much
,
the
truth
will
fall
into
their
pens
.
But
he
thinks
he
hath
a
similitude
,
which
will
make
this
a
very
clear
business
saith
he
It
seemeth
by
this
similitude
,
he
thinketh
,
that
God
doth
not
Will
that
the
root
of
Hemlock
should
poison
the
man
that
eateth
it
,
but
that
Wheat
should
nonrish
him
be
willeth
Which
is
very
absurd
;
or
else
he
must
confess
that
the
venimous
effects
of
wicked
men
,
are
willed
T.
H.
But
why
am
I
so
mightily
mistaken
?
did
not
God
foreknow
that
in
particular
,
should
be
murthered
by
in
particular
,
and
what
God
foreknoweth
shall
come
to
pass
,
can
that
possibly
not
come
to
pass
?
and
that
which
cannot
possibly
not
come
to
pass
,
doth
not
that
necessarily
come
to
pass
?
and
is
not
all
necessity
from
God
?
I
cannot
see
this
great
mistake
.
saith
he
Very
learnedly
.
As
if
there
were
a
power
,
that
were
not
the
power
to
do
some
particular
act
;
or
a
power
to
kill
,
and
yet
to
kill
no
body
in
particular
.
If
the
power
be
to
kill
,
it
is
to
kill
that
which
shall
be
by
that
power
killed
,
whether
it
be
or
any
other
;
and
the
giving
of
that
power
is
the
application
of
it
to
the
act
;
nor
doth
power
signifie
any
thing
actually
,
but
those
motions
and
present
acts
from
which
the
act
that
is
not
now
,
but
shall
be
hereafter
,
necessarily
proceedeth
.
And
therefore
this
Argument
is
much
like
that
,
which
used
heretofore
to
be
brought
for
the
defence
of
the
divine
Right
of
the
to
the
Ordination
of
Ministers
.
They
derive
not
(
say
they
)
the
Right
of
Ordination
from
tho
civill
Soveraign
,
but
from
Christ
immediately
.
And
yet
they
acknowledge
that
it
is
unlawful
for
them
to
Ordain
,
if
the
civil
power
do
forbid
them
.
But
how
have
they
right
to
Ordain
,
when
they
cannot
do
it
lawfully
?
their
answer
is
they
have
the
Right
,
though
they
may
not
exercise
it
;
as
if
the
Right
to
Ordain
,
and
the
Right
to
Exercise
Ordination
were
not
the
same
thing
.
And
as
they
answer
concerning
Right
,
which
is
Legal
Power
,
so
the
answereth
concerning
Natural
Power
,
that
had
a
general
power
to
kill
from
God
,
but
not
a
power
of
applying
this
power
in
special
to
the
killing
of
from
God
,
but
from
his
own
Free-will
;
that
is
be
had
a
power
to
kill
but
not
to
exercise
it
upon
that
is
to
say
,
he
had
a
power
to
kill
him
,
but
not
to
kill
him
;
which
is
absurd
.
T.
H.
I
note
first
that
he
hath
no
reason
to
say
,
the
case
agitated
between
us
,
is
whether
the
cause
why
God
punisheth
one
man
more
than
another
be
his
irresistible
power
,
or
mans
sin
.
The
case
agitated
between
us
is
,
whether
a
man
can
now
choose
what
shall
be
his
anon
,
or
at
any
time
hereafter
.
Again
't
is
not
true
that
he
sayes
't
is
my
opinion
that
the
irresistible
power
of
God
,
is
the
cause
why
he
punisheth
one
more
than
another
.
I
say
onely
that
when
he
doth
so
,
the
irresistible
power
is
enough
to
make
it
not
unjust
.
But
that
the
cause
why
God
punisheth
one
more
than
another
,
is
many
times
the
will
he
hath
to
show
his
power
,
is
affirmed
in
this
place
by
St
Paul
,
&c.
And
by
our
Saviour
in
the
case
of
him
that
was
born
blind
,
where
he
saith
,
And
by
the
expostulation
of
God
with
This
endeavour
of
his
to
bring
the
text
of
St.
to
his
purpose
,
is
not
onely
frustrate
,
but
the
cause
of
many
insignificant
phrases
in
his
discourse
;
as
this
,
which
is
as
good
sense
,
as
if
he
should
say
,
that
it
is
in
his
own
power
,
with
the
concurrence
of
the
Soveraign
Power
of
England
to
be
what
he
will
.
And
this
,
that
For
he
that
can
oblige
,
can
also
when
he
will
release
;
and
he
that
can
release
himself
when
he
will
,
is
not
obliged
.
Besides
this
,
he
is
driven
to
words
ill
becoming
him
that
is
to
speak
of
God
Almighty
,
for
he
makes
him
unable
to
do
that
which
hath
been
within
the
ordinary
Power
of
men
to
do
.
he
saith
which
nevertheless
is
a
thing
ordinarily
done
by
Armies
,
and
which
he
interpreteth
,
as
if
he
could
not
do
it
lawfully
,
one
text
i●
There
is
not
a
word
that
God
could
not
destroy
the
Righteous
with
the
Wicked
.
Onely
saith
(
as
a
man
)
shall
not
the
Judge
of
all
the
earth
do
Right
.
Another
is
Haste
thee
,
escape
thither
Which
is
an
ordinary
phrase
,
in
such
a
case
where
God
had
determined
to
burn
the
City
,
and
save
a
particular
man
,
and
signifieth
not
any
obligation
to
save
more
than
the
rest
.
Likewise
concerning
who
expostulating
with
God
,
was
answered
only
with
the
explication
of
the
infinite
power
of
God
,
the
answereth
,
that
there
is
never
a
word
of
being
punished
without
desert
;
which
answer
is
impertinent
,
for
I
say
not
that
he
was
punished
without
desert
,
but
that
it
was
not
for
his
desert
that
he
was
afflicted
;
for
punished
,
he
was
not
at
all
.
And
concerning
the
blind
Man
who
was
born
blind
that
the
power
of
God
might
be
shown
in
him
;
he
answers
that
it
was
not
a
punishment
,
but
a
blessing
.
I
did
not
say
it
was
a
punishment
;
certainly
it
was
an
affliction
.
How
then
doth
he
call
it
a
blessing
?
reasonably
enough
,
saith
he
This
is
very
well
said
;
for
no
man
doubts
,
but
some
afflictions
may
be
blessings
;
but
I
doubt
whether
the
that
sayes
he
reads
of
some
who
have
put
out
their
bodily
eyes
,
because
they
thought
they
were
an
impediment
to
the
eye
of
the
soul
,
think
that
they
did
well
.
To
that
where
I
say
that
brute
Beasts
are
afflicted
which
cannot
sin
,
he
answereth
,
that
As
if
the
length
or
the
greatness
of
the
pain
,
made
any
difference
in
the
justice
or
injustice
of
the
inflicting
it
.
He
would
make
men
beleeve
,
I
hold
all
things
to
be
just
that
are
done
by
them
,
who
have
power
enough
to
avoid
the
punishment
.
This
is
one
of
his
pretty
little
policies
,
by
which
I
find
him
in
many
occasions
,
to
take
the
measure
of
his
own
wisdom
.
I
said
no
more
but
that
the
Power
which
is
absolutely
irrefistible
makes
him
that
hath
it
above
all
Law
,
so
that
nothing
he
doth
can
be
unjust
.
But
this
Power
can
be
no
other
than
the
Power
divine
.
Therefore
let
him
preach
what
he
will
upon
his
mistaken
text
,
I
shall
leave
it
to
the
Reader
,
to
consider
of
it
without
any
further
answer
.
T.
H.
I
think
there
is
no
man
but
understands
,
no
not
the
himself
,
but
that
where
two
things
are
compared
,
the
similitude
or
dissimilitude
,
regularity
or
irregularity
that
is
between
them
,
is
made
in
and
by
the
making
of
the
things
themselves
that
are
compared
.
The
therefore
that
denies
God
to
be
the
cause
of
the
irregularity
,
denies
him
to
be
the
cause
both
of
the
Law
and
of
the
Action
.
So
that
by
his
doctrine
,
there
shall
be
a
good
Law
whereof
God
shall
be
no
cause
,
and
an
Action
,
that
is
,
a
local
motion
that
shall
depend
upon
another
first
Mover
,
that
is
not
God
.
The
rest
of
this
Number
is
but
railing
.
the
necessity
of
destiny
did
compell
him
to
steal
.
the
same
necessity
of
destiny
compels
me
to
beat
thee
.
T.
H.
T.
H.
An
ill
egg
of
an
ill
bird
?
J.
D.
J.
D.
J.
D.
Velleius
Paterculus
T.
H.
T.
H.
not
the
necessity
,
but
the
will
to
break
the
Law
makes
the
action
unjust
.
the
Law
regardeth
the
will
,
but
not
the
precedent
causes
of
action
.
T.
H.
that
no
Law
can
possibly
be
unjust
de
facto
every
man
makes
by
his
consent
the
Law
which
he
is
bound
to
keep
an
action
forhidden
,
though
it
proceed
from
necessary
causes
,
yet
if
it
were
done
willingly
,
it
may
be
justly
punished
,
A
man
necessitated
to
steal
by
the
strength
of
temptation
,
yet
if
he
steal
willingly
,
is
justly
put
to
death
.
if
it
were
done
willingly
will
be
not
in
his
own
disposition
,
if
his
willing
do
not
come
upon
him
according
to
his
will
,
nor
according
to
any
thing
else
in
his
power
,
Nosignem
habemus
,
spiritus
●●ammam
ciet
,
Nazi
▪
anzen
Mordet
duntaxat
sese
in
fauces
illius
objicientens
,
St.
Austin
Resist
the
Devil
,
and
he
will
flie
from
you
.
to
quench
all
the
fiery
darts
of
the
wicked
,
that
the
Law
is
a
cause
of
justice
,
it
frames
the
wills
of
men
to
justice
,
that
the
punishment
of
one
doth
conduce
to
the
preservation
of
many
.
T.
H.
T.
H.
the
sufferings
imposed
by
the
Law
upon
delinquents
,
respect
not
the
evil
act
past
,
but
the
good
to
come
,
the
putting
of
a
delinquent
to
death
by
the
Magistrate
for
any
crime
whatsoever
,
cannot
be
justified
before
God
,
except
there
be
a
reall
intention
to
benefit
others
by
his
example
.
T.
H.
Men
are
not
punished
●…fore
,
because
their
theft
proceeded
from
election
but
because
it
was
noxious
and
contrary
to
mens
preservation
,
how
it
is
just
to
kill
on
man
to
amend
another
,
if
he
who
killed
did
nothing
but
what
he
was
necessitated
to
do
.
That
where
there
is
no
Law
,
there
no
killing
or
any
thing
else
can
be
unjust
;
that
before
the
constitution
of
Commonwealths
every
man
had
power
to
kill
another
,
if
he
conceived
him
to
be
hurtfull
to
him
;
that
at
the
constitution
of
Commonwealhts
particular
men
lay
down
this
right
in
part
,
and
in
part
reserve
it
to
themselves
,
as
in
case
of
theft
,
or
murther
.
That
the
right
which
the
Commonwealth
hath
to
put
a
malefactor
to
death
is
not
created
by
the
Law
,
but
remaineth
from
the
first
right
of
Nature
,
which
every
man
hath
to
preserve
himself
;
that
the
killing
of
men
in
this
case
is
as
the
killing
of
beasts
in
order
to
our
own
preservation
.
Who
so
sheddeth
mans
blood
,
by
man
shall
his
blood
be
shed
.
for
in
the
image
of
God
made
he
man
.
are
not
superfluous
,
though
all
things
come
to
pass
necessarily
,
because
they
are
the
cause
which
doth
necessitate
the
effect
,
and
the
means
to
bring
it
to
pass
.
T.
H.
as
the
end
is
necessary
,
so
are
the
means
;
And
when
it
is
determined
,
that
one
thing
shall
be
chosen
before
another
,
it
is
determined
also
for
what
cause
it
shall
be
so
chosen
.
T.
H.
my
Argument
is
just
like
this
other
;
If
I
shall
live
till
to
morrow
,
I
shall
live
till
to
morrow
,
though
I
run
my self
through
with
a
sword
to
day
,
which
saith
he
,
is
a
false
consequence
,
and
a
false
proposition
.
things
necessary
may
be
praise-worthy
To
praise
a
thing
is
to
say
it
is
good
.
T.
H.
to
say
a
thing
is
good
,
is
to
say
,
it
is
as
I
would
wish
,
or
as
another
would
wish
,
or
as
the
State
would
have
it
,
or
according
to
the
Law
of
the
Land
,
whether
nothing
that
proceeds
from
necessity
can
please
me
,
Velleius
Paterculus
T.
H.
the
actions
of
brute
beasts
are
all
necessitaeed
and
determined
to
that
one
thing
which
they
shall
do
,
I
have
already
in
the
beginning
,
where
Irecite
the
inconveniences
that
follow
the
doctrine
of
necessity
,
made
clear
,
that
the
same
inconveniences
follow
not
the
doctrine
of
Necessity
any
more
than
they
follow
this
truth
,
which
all
men
must
confess
▪
The
same
also
followeth
upon
this
,
that
in
such
time
and
manner
as
he
hath
foreknown
it
.
It
is
therefore
evident
that
these
inconveniences
are
not
rationally
deduced
from
those
Tenets
.
Again
it
is
a
truth
manifest
to
all
men
,
that
it
is
not
in
a
mans
power
to
day
,
to
choose
what
Will
he
shall
have
to
morrow
,
or
an
hower
,
or
any
time
after
.
Intervening
occasions
,
business
,
(
which
the
calls
trifles
)
Trifles
of
which
the
maketh
here
a
great
business
to
change
the
Will.
No
man
can
say
what
he
will
do
to
morrow
,
unless
he
foreknow
(
which
no
man
can
)
what
shall
happen
before
to
morrow
.
And
this
being
the
substance
of
my
opinion
,
it
must
needs
be
that
when
he
deduceth
from
it
,
that
Counsells
,
Arts
,
Armes
,
Medicines
,
Teachers
,
Praise
,
Prayer
,
and
Piety
,
are
in
vain
,
that
his
deduction
is
false
,
and
his
ratiocination
fallacy
.
And
though
I
need
make
no
other
answer
to
all
that
he
can
object
against
me
,
yet
I
shall
here
mark
out
the
causes
of
his
several
Parologismes
.
he
saith
In
which
words
this
is
one
absurdity
that
for
all
Lawes
are
Divine
or
Civil
,
neither
of
which
can
be
unjust
.
Of
the
first
there
is
no
doubt
.
And
as
for
Civil
Lawes
they
are
made
by
every
man
that
is
subject
to
them
,
because
every
one
of
them
consenteth
to
the
placing
of
the
Legislative
Power
.
Another
is
this
in
the
same
words
,
that
he
supposeth
there
may
be
Lawes
that
are
not
Tyrannical
;
for
if
he
that
maketh
them
have
the
soveraign
Power
,
they
may
be
Regal
,
but
not
Tyrannical
;
if
Tyrant
signifie
not
King
,
as
he
thinks
it
doth
not
.
Another
is
in
the
same
words
,
When
he
sayes
he
understands
not
what
himself
means
.
are
contradictions
onely
,
as
to
be
,
and
not
to
be
,
at
the
same
time
,
which
the
Divines
say
is
not
possible
to
God
.
All
other
things
are
possible
at
least
in
themselves
.
Raising
from
the
dead
,
changing
the
course
of
nature
,
making
of
a
new
Heaven
,
and
a
new
Earth
,
are
things
possible
in
themselves
;
for
there
is
nothing
in
their
nature
able
to
resist
the
Will
of
God
;
and
if
Laws
do
not
prescribe
such
things
,
why
should
I
believe
they
prescribe
other
things
that
are
more
impossible
.
Did
he
ever
readin
of
any
Tyrant
that
made
a
Law
commanding
any
man
to
do
,
and
not
to
do
the
same
Action
,
or
to
be
and
not
to
be
at
the
same
place
,
in
one
and
the
same
moment
of
time
.
But
out
of
the
doctrine
of
Necessity
,
it
followeth
he
sayes
,
that
Here
he
has
left
out
which
is
a
wilfull
Fallacy
He
further
sayes
that
which
is
an
error
that
hath
cost
many
thousands
of
men
their
lives
.
Was
there
ever
King
that
made
a
Law
which
in
right
reason
had
been
better
unmade
?
and
shall
those
Lawes
therefore
not
be
obeyed
?
shall
we
rather
rebell
?
I
think
not
,
though
I
am
not
so
great
a
Divine
as
he
.
I
think
rather
that
the
Reason
of
him
that
hath
the
Soveraign
Authority
,
and
by
whose
Sword
we
look
to
be
protected
,
both
against
war
from
abroad
,
and
injuries
at
home
,
whether
it
be
Right
or
Erronious
in
it
seslf
,
ought
to
stand
for
Right
to
us
that
have
submitted
our selves
thereunto
by
receiving
the
protection
.
But
the
putteth
his
greatest
confidence
in
this
,
that
whether
the
things
be
impossible
in
themselves
,
or
made
impossible
by
some
unseen
accident
,
yet
there
is
no
reason
that
men
should
be
It
seemes
he
taketh
punishment
for
a
kind
of
revenge
,
and
can
never
therefore
agree
with
me
that
take
it
for
nothing
else
but
for
a
correction
,
or
for
an
example
,
which
hath
for
end
the
to
virtue
;
and
that
he
is
no
good
man
,
that
upon
any
provocation
useth
his
power
,
(
though
a
power
lawfully
obtained
)
to
afflict
another
man
without
this
end
,
to
reforme
the
will
of
him
or
others
.
Nor
can
I
comprehend
(
as
having
onely
humane
Idea's
)
that
that
punishment
which
neither
intendeth
the
correction
of
the
offender
,
nor
the
correction
of
others
by
example
,
doth
proceed
from
God
.
Against
this
he
replies
that
the
Law
of
to
drown
the
Male
Children
of
the
and
of
to
worship
the
golden
Image
;
and
of
against
praying
to
any
but
him
in
thirty
dayes
;
and
of
to
destroy
the
and
of
the
to
excommunicate
the
confessors
of
Christ
,
were
all
unjust
Lawes
.
The
Lawes
of
these
Kings
as
they
were
Lawes
have
relation
onely
to
the
men
that
were
their
subjects
;
And
the
making
of
them
,
which
was
the
action
of
every
one
of
those
Kings
,
who
were
subjects
to
another
King
,
namely
to
God
Almighty
,
had
relation
to
the
Law
of
God
.
In
the
first
relation
there
could
be
no
injustice
in
them
;
because
all
Laws
made
by
him
to
whom
the
people
had
given
the
Legislative
Power
,
are
the
Acts
of
every
one
of
that
people
;
and
no
man
can
do
injustice
to
himself
.
But
in
relation
to
God
,
if
God
have
by
a
Law
forbidden
it
,
the
making
of
such
Lawes
is
injustice
.
Which
Law
of
God
was
to
those
Heathen
Princes
no
other
but
that
is
to
say
the
properest
use
of
their
natural
reason
,
for
the
preservation
of
their
subjects
.
If
therefore
those
Lawes
were
ordained
out
of
wantonness
or
cruelty
,
or
envy
,
or
for
the
pleasing
of
a
Favorite
,
or
out
of
any
other
sinister
end
,
as
it
seemes
they
were
,
the
making
of
those
Lawes
was
unjust
.
But
if
in
right
Reason
they
were
necessary
for
the
preservation
of
those
people
of
whom
they
had
undertaken
the
charge
,
then
was
it
not
unjust
.
And
for
the
who
had
the
same
written
Law
of
God
,
that
we
have
,
their
excommunication
of
the
Christians
,
proceeding
(
as
it
did
)
from
envy
,
was
an
Act
of
malicious
injustice
.
If
it
had
proceeded
from
misinterpretation
of
their
own
Scriptures
,
it
had
been
a
sin
of
ignorance
.
Nevertheless
,
as
it
was
a
Law
to
their
subjects
(
in
case
they
had
the
Legislative
Power
,
which
I
doubt
of
)
the
Law
was
not
unjust
.
But
the
making
of
it
was
an
unjust
action
,
of
which
they
were
to
give
account
to
none
but
God
.
I
fear
the
will
think
this
discourse
too
subtile
,
but
the
judgement
is
the
Readers
.
The
reason
why
he
thinketh
this
an
error
,
is
because
the
positive
Law
of
God
conteined
in
the
Bible
is
a
Law
with
out
our
assent
;
the
Law
of
Nature
was
written
in
our
hearts
by
the
finger
of
God
without
our
assent
;
the
Lawes
of
Conquerours
who
come
in
by
the
power
of
the
Sword
were
made
without
our
assent
;
and
so
were
the
Lawes
of
our
Ancestors
which
were
made
before
we
were
born
.
It
is
a
strange
thing
that
he
that
understands
the
non-sense
of
the
Schoolmen
,
should
not
be
able
to
perceave
so
easie
a
truth
as
this
which
he
denieth
.
The
Bible
is
a
Law
.
To
whom
?
To
all
the
World
?
He
knowes
it
is
not
.
How
came
it
then
to
be
a
Law
to
us
?
Did
God
speak
it
to
us
?
Have
we
then
any
other
Warrant
for
it
than
the
Word
of
the
Prophets
?
Have
we
seen
the
miracles
?
Have
we
any
other
assurance
of
their
certainty
than
the
authority
of
the
Church
?
and
is
the
authority
of
the
Church
any
other
than
the
authority
of
the
Commonwealth
,
or
that
of
the
Commonwealth
any
other
than
that
of
the
Head
of
the
Common-wealth
,
or
hath
the
Head
of
the
Commonwealth
any
other
authority
than
that
which
hath
been
given
him
by
the
Members
?
Else
,
why
should
not
the
Bible
be
Canonical
as
well
in
as
in
any
other
place
?
They
that
have
the
Legislative
power
make
nothing
Canon
,
which
they
make
not
Law
,
nor
Law
which
they
make
not
Canon
.
And
because
the
Legislative
power
is
from
the
assent
of
the
subjects
,
the
Bible
is
made
Law
by
the
assent
of
the
subjects
.
It
was
not
the
that
made
the
Scripture
Law
without
his
own
temporal
Dominions
;
nor
is
it
the
Clergy
that
make
it
Law
in
their
Dioceses
and
Rectories
.
Nor
can
it
be
a
Law
of
it self
without
special
and
supernatural
revelation
.
The
thinks
because
the
Bible
is
Law
,
and
he
is
appointed
to
▪
teach
it
to
the
people
in
his
Diocese
,
that
therefore
it
is
Law
to
whom
soever
he
teach
it
;
which
is
somewhat
grosse
,
but
not
so
grosse
as
to
say
that
Conquerors
who
come
in
by
tho
power
of
the
sword
,
make
their
Lawes
also
without
our
assent
.
He
thinks
belike
that
if
a
Conquerour
can
kill
me
if
he
please
,
I
am
presently
obliged
without
more
a
doe
to
obey
all
his
Lawes
.
May
not
I
rather
dye
,
if
I
think
fit
?
The
Conquerour
makes
no
Law
over
the
Conquered
by
vertue
of
his
power
;
but
by
vertue
of
their
assent
that
promised
obedience
for
the
saving
of
their
lives
.
But
how
then
is
the
assent
of
the
Children
obtained
to
the
Laws
of
their
Ancestors
?
This
also
is
from
the
desire
of
preserving
their
lives
,
which
first
the
Parents
might
take
away
,
where
the
Parents
be
free
from
all
subjection
;
and
where
they
are
not
,
there
the
Civil
power
might
do
the
same
,
if
they
doubted
of
their
obedience
.
The
Children
therefore
when
they
be
grown
up
to
strength
enough
to
do
mischeif
,
and
to
judgement
enough
to
know
that
other
men
are
kept
from
doing
mischeif
to
them
,
by
fear
of
the
Sword
that
protecteth
them
,
in
that
very
act
of
receiving
that
protection
,
and
not
renouncing
it
openly
,
do
oblige
themselves
to
obey
the
Lawes
of
their
Protectors
;
to
which
,
inreceaving
such
protection
they
have
assented
.
And
whereas
he
saith
,
the
Law
of
Nature
is
a
Law
without
our
assent
,
it
is
absurd
;
for
the
Law
of
Nature
is
the
Assent
it self
,
that
all
men
give
to
the
means
of
their
own
preservation
.
But
his
cheifest
answer
is
,
that
This
the
also
understandeth
not
,
and
therefore
denies
it
.
He
would
have
the
Judge
condemne
no
man
for
a
crime
if
it
were
necessitated
;
as
if
the
Judge
could
know
what
acts
are
necessary
,
unless
he
knew
all
that
hath
anteceded
,
both
visible
and
invisible
,
and
what
both
every
thing
in
it self
,
and
altogether
can
effect
.
It
is
enough
to
the
Judge
,
that
the
act
he
condemneth
,
be
voluntary
.
The
punishment
whereof
may
,
if
not
capital
,
reforme
the
will
of
the
offender
;
if
capital
,
the
will
of
others
by
example
.
For
heat
in
one
body
,
doth
not
more
create
heat
in
another
,
than
the
terrour
of
an
example
creat●th
fear
in
another
,
who
otherwise
were
inclined
to
commit
injustice
.
Some
few
lines
before
he
hath
said
that
I
built
upon
a
wrong
foundation
,
namely
,
I
had
forgot
to
tell
you
,
that
I
never
said
nor
though
it
.
And
therefore
his
Reply
,
as
to
that
point
is
impertinent
.
Not
many
lines
after
,
for
a
reason
why
a
man
may
not
be
justly
punished
,
when
his
crime
is
voluntary
,
he
offereth
this
,
Whereby
it
appears
he
is
of
opinion
,
that
a
Law
may
be
made
to
command
the
Will.
The
stile
of
a
Law
is
but
no
Law
runs
thus
He
objecteth
further
that
I
hegg
the
question
,
because
no
mans
Will
is
necessitated
.
Wherein
he
mistakes
,
for
I
say
no
more
in
that
place
,
but
that
he
that
doth
evill
willingly
,
whether
he
be
necessarily
willing
,
or
not
necessarily
,
may
be
justly
punished
.
And
upon
this
mistake
he
runneth
over
again
his
former
and
already
answered
non-sense
saying
,
and
again
the
first
motions
are
not
alwayes
in
our
power
.
Which
signifies
nothing
,
and
is
the
same
with
which
is
absurd
;
and
that
either
signifies
nothing
,
or
that
we
have
a
dominion
over
our
Wills
,
or
our
Wills
a
dominion
over
us
,
and
consequently
either
we
or
our
wills
are
not
Free
.
But
I
have
shown
that
all
Lawes
are
just
,
as
Lawes
,
and
therefore
not
to
be
accused
of
injustice
,
by
those
that
owe
subjection
to
them
;
and
a
just
Law
is
alwayes
justly
executed
.
Seeing
then
that
he
confesseth
that
all
that
he
replieth
to
here
is
true
,
it
followeth
that
the
Reply
it self
,
where
it
contradicteth
me
,
is
false
.
This
he
neither
confirmeth
nor
denieth
,
and
yet
forbeareth
not
to
discourse
upon
it
to
little
purpose
;
and
therefore
I
pass
it
over
.
To
all
this
which
hath
been
pressed
before
,
I
have
answered
also
before
,
but
that
he
sayes
I
say
it
is
not
mine
,
but
one
of
his
own
ugly
Phrases
.
And
the
force
it
hath
proceedeth
out
of
an
apprehension
he
hath
,
that
affliction
,
is
not
Gods
correction
,
but
his
revenge
upon
the
Creatures
of
his
own
making
;
and
from
a
reasonning
he
useth
,
not
remembring
that
God
hath
,
or
shall
have
killed
all
the
men
in
the
World
,
both
nocent
and
innocent
.
My
assertion
he
saith
that
where
there
is
no
Law
,
there
no
killing
or
any
thing
else
can
be
unjust
;
that
before
the
constitution
of
Common-wealths
,
every
man
had
power
to
kill
another
,
&c.
and
adds
,
That
To
these
my
words
he
replies
,
It
is
very
likely
to
be
true
,
that
since
the
Creation
there
never
was
a
time
in
which
Mankind
was
totally
without
Society
.
If
a
part
of
it
were
without
Lawes
and
Governours
,
some
other
parts
might
be
Commonwealths
.
He
saw
there
was
Paternal
Government
in
which
he
might
do
easily
,
as
being
no
deep
consideration
.
But
in
those
places
where
there
is
a
Civil
Warre
at
any
time
,
at
the
same
time
there
is
neither
Lawes
nor
Commonwealth
,
nor
Society
;
but
onely
a
temporal
League
;
which
every
discontented
Souldier
may
depart
from
when
he
pleases
,
as
being
entred
into
by
each
man
for
his
private
interest
,
without
any
obligation
of
conscience
.
There
are
therefore
almost
at
all
times
multitudes
of
lawless
men
but
this
was
a
little
too
remote
from
his
understanding
to
perceave
.
Again
,
he
denies
that
ever
there
was
a
time
,
when
one
private
man
might
lawfully
kill
another
for
his
own
preservation
;
and
has
forgotten
that
these
words
of
his
(
Number
Which
are
the
words
of
in
the
defence
of
and
translated
by
the
to
the
defence
of
Free-will
,
were
used
by
to
prove
this
very
thing
,
that
it
is
and
hath
been
alwayes
lawful
for
one
private
man
to
kill
another
for
his
own
preservation
.
But
where
he
saith
it
is
not
lawful
he
should
have
shown
some
particular
case
wherein
it
is
unlawful
.
For
seeing
it
is
a
not
only
I
,
but
many
more
are
apt
to
think
it
is
the
Law
of
Nature
,
and
consequently
Vniversal
and
Eternal
.
And
where
he
saith
,
this
right
of
defence
where
it
is
,
I
also
say
it
is
a
priviledge
which
God
hath
given
them
;
but
we
differ
in
the
manner
how
;
which
to
me
seems
this
,
that
God
doth
not
account
such
killing
sin
.
But
the
it
seems
would
have
it
thus
,
God
sends
a
into
the
Pulpit
to
tell
the
People
it
is
lawful
for
a
man
to
kill
another
man
when
it
is
necessaay
for
the
preservation
of
his
own
life
;
of
which
necessity
,
that
is
,
whether
it
be
or
whether
the
danger
be
shall
be
the
Judge
after
the
man
is
killed
,
as
being
a
case
of
conscience
.
Against
the
resigning
of
this
our
general
power
of
killing
our
enemies
,
he
argues
thus
,
Needs
there
much
acuteness
to
understand
,
what
number
of
men
soever
there
be
,
though
not
united
into
Government
,
that
every
one
of
them
in
particular
having
a
right
to
destroy
whatsoever
he
thinketh
can
annoy
him
,
may
not
resign
the
same
right
,
and
give
it
to
whom
he
please
,
when
he
thinks
it
conducible
to
his
proservation
?
And
yet
it
seemes
he
has
not
understood
it
.
He
takes
it
ill
that
I
compare
the
as
also
a
little
before
,
he
sayes
saith
he
I
pray
,
when
a
Lyon
eats
a
Man
,
and
a
Man
eats
an
Oxe
;
why
is
the
Oxe
more
made
for
the
Man
,
than
the
Man
for
the
Lion
?
Yes
he
saith
,
True
.
But
the
Lion
had
the
liberty
to
eat
the
flesh
of
man
long
before
.
But
he
will
say
no
;
pretending
that
no
man
of
any
Nation
,
or
at
any
time
,
could
lawfully
eat
flesh
,
unless
he
had
this
licence
of
holy
Scripture
,
which
it
was
impossible
for
most
men
to
have
.
But
how
would
he
have
been
offended
,
if
I
had
said
of
man
as
The
truth
is
,
that
man
is
a
Creature
of
greater
power
,
than
other
living
Creatures
are
;
but
his
advantages
do
consist
especially
in
two
things
,
whereof
one
is
the
use
of
speech
by
which
men
communicate
one
with
another
,
and
joine
their
forces
together
,
and
by
which
also
they
Register
their
thoughts
,
that
they
perish
not
,
but
be
reserved
,
and
afterwards
joined
with
other
thoughts
,
to
produce
general
Rules
for
the
direction
of
their
actions
.
There
be
Beasts
that
see
better
,
others
that
hear
better
,
and
others
that
exceed
mankind
in
other
senses
.
Man
excelleth
beasts
onely
in
making
of
Rules
to
himself
,
that
is
to
say
,
in
remembring
,
and
in
reasoning
aright
upon
that
which
he
remembreth
.
They
which
do
so
,
deserve
an
honour
above
brute
beasts
.
But
they
which
mistaking
the
use
of
words
,
deceive
themselves
and
others
,
introducing
errour
,
and
seducing
men
from
the
truth
,
are
so
much
less
to
be
honoured
than
brute
beasts
,
as
error
is
more
vile
than
ignorance
.
So
that
it
is
not
meerly
the
nature
of
man
,
that
makes
him
worthier
than
other
living
Creatures
,
but
the
knowledge
that
he
acquires
by
meditation
,
and
by
the
right
use
of
reason
in
making
good
rules
of
his
future
actions
.
The
other
advantage
a
man
hath
,
is
the
use
of
his
hands
for
the
making
of
those
things
which
are
instrumental
to
his
well-being
.
But
this
advantage
is
not
a
matter
of
so
great
honour
,
but
that
a
man
may
speak
negligently
of
it
without
offence
.
And
for
the
dominion
that
a
man
hath
over
beasts
,
he
saith
I
would
ask
the
in
what
consisteth
the
dominion
of
man
,
over
a
Lion
or
a
Bear
.
Is
it
in
an
obligation
of
promise
,
or
of
debt
?
That
cannot
●e
;
for
they
have
no
sense
of
debt
or
duty
.
And
I
think
he
will
not
say
,
that
they
have
received
a
command
to
obey
him
from
authority
.
It
resteth
therefore
that
the
dominion
of
man
consists
in
this
,
that
men
are
too
hard
for
Lions
and
Bears
,
because
though
a
Lion
or
a
Bear
be
stronger
than
a
man
,
yet
the
strength
,
and
art
,
and
specially
the
Leagu●ing
and
Societies
of
men
,
are
a
greater
power
,
than
the
ungoverned
strength
of
unruly
Beasts
.
In
this
it
is
that
consisteth
this
dominion
of
man
;
and
for
the
same
reason
when
a
hungry
Lion
meeteth
an
unarmed
man
in
a
desert
,
the
Lion
hath
the
dominion
over
the
man
,
if
that
of
man
over
Lions
,
or
over
Sheeep
and
Oxen
,
may
be
called
dominion
▪
which
properly
it
cannot
;
nor
can
it
be
said
that
Sheep
and
Oxen
do
otherwise
obey
us
,
than
they
would
do
a
Lion
.
And
if
we
have
dominion
over
Sheep
and
Oxen
,
we
exercise
it
not
as
dominion
,
but
as
hostility
;
for
we
keep
them
onely
to
labour
,
and
to
be
kill'd
and
devoured
by
us
;
so
that
Lions
and
Bears
would
be
as
good
Maters
to
them
as
we
are
.
By
this
short
passage
of
his
,
concerning
I
have
no
reason
to
expect
a
very
shrewd
answer
from
him
,
to
my
are
not
superfluous
,
though
all
things
come
to
pass
necessarily
,
because
they
are
the
cause
which
doth
necessitate
the
effect
,
and
the
means
to
bring
it
to
pass
.
His
Reply
to
this
is
,
that
he
hath
If
not
Physically
,
how
then
?
As
he
hath
told
us
in
another
place
,
But
what
it
is
to
determine
a
thing
Morally
,
no
man
living
understands
.
I
doubt
not
but
be
had
therefore
the
Will
to
write
this
Reply
I
had
answered
his
Treatise
concerning
true
Liberty
.
My
answer
therefore
was
(
at
least
in
part
)
the
of
his
writing
,
yet
that
is
the
cause
of
the
nimble
local
motion
of
his
fingers
.
Is
not
the
cause
of
local
motion
Physical
?
His
Will
therefore
was
Physically
and
Extrinsecally
,
and
Antecedently
,
and
not
Morally
caused
by
my
writing
.
as
the
end
is
necessary
,
so
are
the
means
.
And
when
it
is
determined
,
that
one
thing
shall
be
chosen
before
another
,
it
is
determined
also
for
what
cause
it
shall
be
so
chosen
.
Is
it
not
enough
that
it
is
truth
?
must
I
put
all
the
truth
I
know
into
two
or
three
lines
?
No.
I
should
have
added
,
that
It
may
be
I
would
have
done
so
,
but
for
shame
.
are
not
words
that
can
be
joined
to
but
to
that
is
to
say
,
to
things
that
moove
,
or
are
moved
.
A
being
that
whose
motion
,
or
action
is
not
hindered
nor
stopt
.
And
a
that
which
is
produced
by
a
Free
Agent
.
A
is
the
same
with
an
simply
.
But
because
men
for
the
most
part
think
those
things
are
produced
without
cause
,
whereof
they
do
not
see
the
cause
,
they
use
to
call
both
the
Agent
and
the
Action
Contingent
,
as
attributing
it
to
fortune
.
And
therefore
when
the
causes
are
Necessary
,
if
they
perceive
not
the
necessity
,
they
call
those
necessary
Agents
and
Actions
,
in
things
that
have
Appetite
,
and
in
things
inanimate
The
rest
of
his
Reply
to
this
point
,
is
very
little
of
it
applied
to
my
answer
.
I
note
onely
that
where
he
sayes
,
but
if
he
would
He
would
fraudulently
insinuate
that
it
is
my
opinion
,
that
a
man
is
not
Whereas
from
the
beginning
I
have
often
declared
that
it
is
none
of
my
opinion
;
and
that
my
opinion
is
only
this
,
that
he
is
not
or
which
is
all
one
,
he
is
not
Master
of
his
future
Will.
After
much
unorderly
discourse
he
comes
in
with
which
is
impertinent
;
seeing
nothing
flows
from
it
more
than
may
be
drawn
from
the
confession
of
an
eternal
Prescience
.
my
Argument
is
no
better
than
this
;
If
I
shall
live
till
to
morrow
,
I
shall
live
till
to
morrow
,
though
I
run
my self
thorow
with
a
sword
to
day
,
which
(
saith
he
)
is
a
false
consequence
,
and
a
false
proposition
.
He
saith
right
.
Let
us
therefore
see
how
it
is
not
like
to
his
;
He
sayes
,
he
sayes
I
cannot
perceive
how
it
is
a
better
consequence
than
the
former
;
for
if
it
be
absolutely
necessary
that
a
man
should
live
till
to
morrow
,
(
and
in
health
,
which
may
also
be
supposed
)
why
should
he
not
(
if
he
have
the
curiosity
)
have
his
head
cut
off
to
try
what
pain
it
is
.
But
the
consequence
is
false
,
for
if
there
be
a
necessity
of
his
living
,
it
is
necessary
also
that
he
shall
not
have
so
foolish
a
curiosity
.
But
he
cannot
yet
distinguish
between
a
seen
and
unseen
necessity
,
and
that
is
the
cause
he
beleeveth
his
consequence
to
be
good
.
Which
he
saies
is
this
The
true
reason
why
we
admonish
men
and
not
children
,
&c.
is
because
admonition
,
is
nothing
else
but
telling
a
man
,
the
good
and
evil
consequences
of
his
actions
.
They
who
have
experience
of
good
and
evill
,
can
better
perceive
the
reasonableness
of
such
admonition
,
than
they
that
have
not
;
and
such
as
have
like
passions
to
those
of
the
Admonitor
,
do
more
easily
conceive
,
that
to
be
good
or
bad
which
the
Admonitor
sayeth
is
so
,
than
they
who
have
great
passions
,
and
such
as
are
contrary
to
his
.
The
first
▪
which
is
want
of
experience
maketh
children
,
and
fools
unapt
,
and
the
second
,
which
is
strength
of
passion
,
maketh
madmen
unwilling
to
receive
admonition
;
for
children
are
ignorant
,
and
mad
men
in
an
errour
concerning
what
is
good
or
evill
for
themselves
.
This
is
not
to
say
children
and
mad
men
want
true
Liberty
,
that
is
,
the
liberty
to
do
as
they
will
,
nor
to
say
that
men
of
judgement
,
or
the
Admonitor
himself
hath
a
dominion
over
his
own
actions
,
more
than
children
or
mad
men
,
(
for
their
actions
are
also
voluntary
)
or
that
when
he
admonisheth
he
hath
alwayes
the
use
of
reason
,
though
he
have
the
use
of
deliberation
,
which
children
,
fools
,
mad
men
,
and
beasts
also
have
.
There
be
therefore
reasons
under
heaven
which
the
knowes
not
of
Whereas
I
had
said
,
that
He
distinguisheth
and
saith
There
hath
been
in
the
Schooles
derived
from
an
old
Proverb
rather
than
an
Axiome
,
From
hence
the
hath
taken
this
notion
of
a
Metaphysical
goodness
,
and
his
doctrine
,
that
whatsoever
hath
a
being
is
good
;
and
by
this
interpreteth
the
words
of
Gen.
But
the
reason
of
those
words
is
that
is
relative
to
those
that
are
pleased
with
it
,
and
not
of
absolute
signification
to
all
men
.
God
therefore
saith
that
all
that
he
had
made
was
very
good
,
because
he
was
pleased
with
the
Creatures
of
his
own
making
.
But
if
all
things
were
absolutely
good
,
we
should
be
all
pleased
with
their
we
are
not
,
when
the
actions
that
depend
upon
their
Being
are
hurtful
to
us
.
And
therefore
,
to
speak
properly
,
nothing
is
good
or
evil
,
but
in
regard
of
the
action
that
proceedeth
from
it
,
and
also
of
the
person
to
whom
it
doth
good
or
hurt
.
Satan
is
evil
to
us
because
he
seeketh
our
destruction
,
but
good
to
God
,
because
he
executeth
his
commandements
.
And
so
his
is
but
an
idle
tearm
,
and
not
the
member
of
a
distinction
.
And
as
for
Natural
goodness
,
and
evilness
,
that
also
is
but
the
goodness
and
evilness
of
Actions
,
as
some
Hearbs
are
good
because
they
nourish
,
others
evil
because
they
poyson
us
;
and
one
Horse
is
good
because
he
is
gentle
strong
,
and
carrieth
a
man
easily
,
another
bad
because
he
resisteth
,
goeth
hard
,
or
otherwise
displeaseth
us
,
and
that
quality
of
gentleness
,
if
there
were
no
more
Lawes
amongst
men
than
there
is
amongst
beasts
,
would
be
as
much
a
moral
good
in
a
horse
or
other
beast
as
in
a
man
.
T
is
the
Law
from
whence
proceeds
the
difference
between
the
Moral
and
the
Natural
goodness
,
so
that
it
is
well
enough
said
by
him
,
that
and
better
said
than
meant
;
for
this
which
is
the
Law
,
is
no
otherwise
certainly
Right
than
by
our
making
it
so
by
our
approbation
of
it
,
and
voluntary
subjection
to
it
.
For
the
Law-makers
are
men
and
may
erre
,
and
think
that
Law
which
they
make
is
for
the
good
of
the
people
sometimes
when
it
is
not
.
And
yet
the
●●●ions
of
subjects
,
if
they
be
conformable
to
the
Law
are
Morally
good
,
and
yet
cease
not
to
be
Naturally
good
,
and
the
praise
of
them
passeth
to
the
Author
of
Nature
,
as
well
as
of
any
other
good
whatsoever
.
From
whence
it
appears
that
Moral
praise
is
not
as
he
sayes
but
from
obedience
to
the
Lawes
,
nor
Moral
dispraise
but
from
disobedience
to
the
Lawes
.
And
for
his
consequence
there
is
neither
truth
in
it
,
nor
argument
offered
for
it
;
for
there
is
nothing
more
necessary
than
the
consequence
of
actions
to
the
And
whereas
I
had
said
,
that
to
say
a
thing
is
good
,
is
to
say
it
is
as
I
,
or
another
would
wish
,
or
as
the
State
would
have
it
,
or
according
to
the
Law
of
the
Land
,
he
answers
,
that
And
his
reason
is
,
because
There
is
no
man
living
that
seeth
all
the
consequences
of
an
action
from
the
beginning
to
the
end
,
whereby
to
weigh
the
whole
sum
of
the
good
,
with
the
whole
sum
of
the
evill
consequents
.
We
choose
no
further
than
we
can
weigh
.
That
is
good
to
every
man
which
is
so
farre
good
as
he
can
see
.
All
the
reall
good
,
which
we
call
honest
and
Morally
vertu●us
,
is
that
which
is
not
repugnant
to
the
Law
,
Civil
or
Natural
;
for
the
Law
is
all
the
right
Reason
we
have
,
and
though
he
,
as
often
as
it
disagreeth
with
his
own
reason
denie
it
,
is
the
infallible
rule
of
Moral
goodness
.
The
reason
whereof
is
this
,
that
because
neither
mine
nor
the
reason
,
is
right
Reason
,
fit
to
be
a
rule
of
our
Moral
actions
,
we
have
therefore
set
up
over
our selves
a
Soveraign
Governour
,
and
agreed
that
his
Lawes
shall
be
unto
us
,
whatsoever
they
be
,
in
the
phace
of
Right
roason
,
to
dictate
to
us
what
is
really
good
;
in
the
same
manner
as
men
in
playing
turn
up
Trump
,
and
as
in
playing
their
game
their
Morality
consisteth
in
not
renouncing
,
so
in
our
civil
conversation
,
our
Morality
is
all
co●●●●ned
in
not
disobeying
of
the
Lawes
.
To
my
question
he
answers
,
yes
.
The
fire
pleaseth
him
when
he
is
cold
,
and
he
sayes
it
is
good
fire
,
but
does
not
praise
it
Morally
.
He
praiseth
(
he
sayes
)
first
the
Creator
of
the
fire
,
and
then
him
who
provided
it
.
He
does
well
;
yet
he
praiseth
the
fire
when
he
saith
it
is
good
,
though
not
Morally
.
He
does
not
say
it
is
a
just
fire
,
or
a
wise
,
or
a
well
manered
fire
obedient
to
the
Lawes
,
but
these
Attributes
it
seems
he
gives
to
God
,
as
if
justice
were
not
of
his
nature
,
but
of
his
manners
.
And
in
praising
Morally
him
that
provided
it
,
he
seemes
to
say
,
he
would
not
say
the
fire
was
good
,
if
he
were
not
Morally
good
that
did
provide
it
.
To
that
which
I
had
answered
concerning
reward
and
punishment
,
he
hath
replied
(
he
sayes
)
sufficiently
before
,
and
that
that
which
he
discoursenh
here
,
is
not
only
to
answer
me
,
but
also
to
satisfie
himself
,
and
saith
,
For
my
part
I
am
too
dull
to
perveave
the
difference
between
those
rewards
used
to
brute
beasts
,
and
those
that
are
used
to
men
.
If
they
be
not
properly
called
rewards
and
punishments
let
him
give
them
their
proper
name
.
It
may
be
he
will
say
he
has
done
it
in
calling
them
yet
for
any
thing
that
can
be
understood
thereby
,
he
might
have
called
them
if
he
had
pleased
.
He
adds
further
,
that
whereas
he
had
said
,
that
the
action
of
Bees
and
Spiders
were
done
without
consultation
,
by
meer
instinct
of
nature
,
and
by
a
determination
of
their
fancies
,
I
missaleadge
him
,
and
say
he
made
their
individuall
Actions
necessary
.
I
have
onely
this
to
answer
that
seeing
he
sayes
,
that
by
instinct
of
nature
their
fancies
were
determined
to
special
kinds
of
works
,
I
might
justly
inferre
they
were
determined
every
one
of
them
to
some
work
,
and
every
work
is
an
individual
action
,
for
in
the
general
is
no
work
.
But
these
their
individual
actions
he
saith
which
is
no
good
consequence
:
for
if
he
mean
by
that
which
has
no
cause
,
he
speaketh
not
as
a
Christian
,
but
maketh
a
Deity
of
Fortune
,
which
I
verily
think
he
doth
not
.
But
if
he
mean
by
it
,
that
whereof
he
knoweth
not
the
cause
,
the
consequence
is
naught
.
The
means
whereby
Setting-dogs
,
and
Coy-ducks
,
and
Parats
are
taught
to
do
what
they
do
,
Does
not
the
know
that
the
Belly
hath
taught
Poets
,
and
Historians
,
and
Divines
,
and
Philosophers
.
and
Artificers
their
several
Arts
,
as
well
as
Parrats
?
Do
not
men
do
their
duty
with
regard
to
their
backs
▪
to
their
necks
,
and
to
their
morsells
,
as
well
as
Setting-dogs
,
Coy-ducks
and
Parrats
?
Why
then
are
these
things
to
us
the
substance
,
and
to
them
but
the
of
rewards
or
punishments
If
the
had
considered
the
cogitations
of
his
own
mind
,
not
then
when
he
disputeth
,
but
then
when
he
followed
those
businesses
which
he
calleth
trifles
,
he
would
have
found
them
the
very
same
which
he
here
mentioneth
,
saving
instead
of
because
he
is
exempt
from
that
he
is
to
put
in
For
setting
aside
the
discourse
of
the
tongue
,
in
words
of
general
signification
,
the
Idea's
of
our
minds
are
the
same
with
those
of
other
living
creatures
,
created
from
Visible
,
Audible
,
and
other
sensible
objects
to
the
eyes
and
other
Organs
of
sence
,
as
theirs
are
.
For
as
the
objects
of
sense
are
all
individual
,
that
is
singular
,
so
are
all
the
fancies
proceeding
from
their
operations
;
and
men
reason
not
but
in
words
of
universal
signification
uttered
,
or
tacitely
thought
on
.
But
perhaps
he
thinketh
remembrance
of
words
to
be
the
Idea's
of
those
things
which
the
words
signifie
;
and
that
all
fancies
are
not
effected
by
the
operation
of
Objects
upon
the
Organs
of
our
senses
.
But
to
rectifie
him
in
those
points
is
greater
labour
unless
he
had
better
principles
than
I
am
willing
or
have
at
this
tim●
leasure
to
undergo
.
Lastly
,
whereas
he
sayes
,
if
their
That
s
true
.
For
it
is
Fear
and
Hope
that
makes
them
necessarily
what
they
are
.
Father
,
if
it
be
thy
will
,
let
this
cup
pass
,
&c.
T.
H.
Magnos
facile
laudamus
,
bonos
lubenter
.
It
is
a
glad
returning
into
the
right
way
,
after
the
grief
of
being
out
of
the
way
.
Be
zealous
and
repent
,
behold
I
stand
at
the
dore
,
and
knock
.
If
any
man
hear
my
voice
,
and
open
the
dore
,
I
will
come
into
him
.
glad
returning
into
the
right
way
.
after
the
grief
,
&c.
New
obedience
act
of
Religion
by
which
we
desire
of
God
something
which
we
have
not
,
and
hope
that
we
shall
obtain
it
by
him
▪
T.
H.
is
not
a
cause
,
nor
a
meanes
of
Gods
blessing
,
but
onely
a
signification
that
we
expest
it
from
him
.
God
will
not
give
his
blessings
,
but
to
those
who
pray
,
Whatsoever
ye
shall
ask
the
Father
in
my
Name
,
he
will
give
it
you
,
Ask
and
it
shall
be
given
you
,
seek
and
ye
shall
find
,
knock
and
it
shall
be
opened
unto
you
,
St.
Paul
helped
by
their
prayers
the
gift
was
bestowed
upon
him
by
their
means
,
St.
James
The
effectual
fervent
prayer
of
a
righteous
man
availeth
much
.
Gods
Will
is
unchangeable
Non
tellus
cymbam
tellurem
cymbareliquit
That
God
doth
not
bless
us
,
execpt
we
pray
,
is
a
motive
to
prayer
.
Prayer
is
the
gift
of
God
,
no
less
than
the
blessing
which
we
pray
for
,
and
conteined
in
the
same
decrree
with
the
blessing
.
Come
thou
good
and
faithfull
servant
,
thou
hast
been
faithful
in
little
,
I
will
make
the
ruler
over
much
.
in
our
prayers
we
are
bou●d
,
to
submit
our
Wills
to
Gods
Will
,
It
is
a
promise
of
great
exactness
,
and
like
to
that
which
is
in
his
Epistle
to
the
Reader
,
Which
promises
were
both
needless
and
made
out
of
gallantry
;
and
therefore
he
is
the
less
pardonable
in
case
they
be
not
very
rigidly
observed
.
I
would
therefore
have
the
Reader
to
consider
,
whether
these
words
of
mine
,
which
seem
at
least
to
imply
that
our
prayers
cannot
change
the
Will
of
God
,
nor
divert
him
from
his
eternal
decree
,
have
been
weighed
by
him
to
a
grain
according
to
his
promise
.
Nor
hath
he
kept
his
other
promise
any
better
;
For
replying
to
these
word●
of
mine
,
He
saith
This
passage
is
added
to
that
which
passed
between
us
upon
this
subject
.
For
it
is
not
in
the
Copy
which
I
have
had
by
me
(
as
himself
confesseth
)
these
eight
years
.
Nor
is
it
in
the
Body
of
the
Copy
he
sent
to
the
Presse
,
but
onely
in
the
margent
,
that
is
to
say
,
added
out
of
anger
against
me
,
whom
he
would
have
men
think
to
be
one
of
the
bold-faced
Athiests
of
this
Age.
In
the
rest
of
this
Reply
he
endeavoureth
to
prove
,
that
it
followeth
from
my
opinion
,
that
there
is
no
use
of
Piety
.
My
opinion
is
no
more
than
this
that
a
man
cannot
so
determine
to
day
,
the
will
which
he
shall
have
to
the
doing
of
any
action
to
morrow
,
as
that
it
may
not
be
changed
by
some
external
accident
or
other
,
as
there
shall
appear
more
or
less
advantage
to
make
him
persevere
in
the
Will
to
the
same
action
,
or
to
Will
it
no
more
.
When
a
man
intendeth
to
pay
a
debt
at
a
certain
time
,
if
he
see
that
the
deteining
of
the
money
for
a
little
longer
may
advantage
himself
,
and
●eth
no
other
disadvantage
equivalent
likely
to
follow
upon
the
detention
,
hath
his
will
changed
by
the
advantage
,
and
therefore
had
not
determined
his
Will
himself
;
but
when
he
foreseeth
discredit
or
perhaps
imprisonment
,
then
his
Will
remaineth
the
same
,
and
is
determined
by
the
thoughts
he
hath
of
his
Creditor
,
who
is
therefore
an
external
cause
of
the
determination
of
the
debtors
Will
.
This
is
so
evident
to
all
men
living
,
though
they
never
studied
School-Divinity
,
that
it
will
be
very
strange
if
he
draw
from
it
the
great
impiety
he
pretends
to
do
.
Again
my
opinion
is
only
this
,
that
whatsoever
God
foreknowes
shall
come
to
pass
,
it
cannot
possibly
be
that
that
shall
not
come
to
pass
.
But
that
which
cannot
possibly
not
come
to
pass
,
that
is
said
by
all
men
to
come
to
pass
necessarily
;
therefore
all
events
that
God
foreknowes
shal
come
to
pass
,
shall
come
to
pass
necessarily
.
If
therefore
the
draw
Impiety
from
this
,
he
falleth
into
the
Impiety
of
denying
Gods
Prescience
.
Let
us
see
now
how
he
reasoneth
.
I
said
that
two
things
concurr'd
to
one
,
to
esteem
his
power
as
highly
as
is
possible
.
The
other
,
that
we
signifie
that
estimation
by
our
words
and
actions
,
that
is
to
say
,
that
we
worship
him
;
This
later
part
of
Piety
he
leaveth
out
;
and
then
it
is
much
more
easie
to
conclude
as
he
doth
,
that
the
Devils
may
have
inward
Piety
.
But
neither
so
doth
the
Conclusion
follow
;
For
Goodness
is
one
of
Gods
Powers
,
(
namely
that
Power
by
which
he
worketh
in
men
,
the
Hope
they
have
in
him
)
and
is
relative
;
and
therefore
unless
the
Devil
think
that
God
will
be
good
to
him
,
he
cannot
esteem
him
for
his
Goodness
.
It
does
not
therefore
follow
from
any
opinion
of
mine
,
that
the
Devil
may
have
as
much
inward
Piety
as
a
Christian.
But
how
does
the
know
how
the
Devils
esteem
Gods
Power
?
and
what
Devils
does
he
mean
?
there
are
in
the
Scripture
two
sorts
of
things
,
which
are
in
English
translated
Devils
,
one
is
,
that
which
is
called
which
signifies
in
English
an
and
a
Destroyer
of
the
Church
of
God
.
In
which
sense
,
the
Devils
are
but
wicked
men
.
How
then
is
he
sure
that
they
esteem
Gods
Power
to
be
infinite
?
for
trembling
inferrs
no
more
than
that
they
apprehend
it
to
be
greater
than
their
own
.
The
other
sort
of
Devils
are
called
in
the
Scripture
which
are
the
faigned
Gods
of
the
Heathen
,
and
are
neither
bodies
nor
spiritual
substances
,
but
meer
fancies
,
and
fictions
of
terrified
hearts
,
faigned
by
the
Greeks
and
other
Heathen
People
,
and
which
St.
for
an
Idol
saith
he
is
Nothing
.
Does
the
mean
that
these
Nothings
esteem
Gods
Power
,
to
be
infinite
and
tremble
?
there
is
nothing
that
has
a
real
being
,
but
God
and
the
World
,
and
the
parts
of
the
World
;
nor
has
any
thing
a
faigned
being
but
the
fictions
of
mens
braines
.
The
World
and
the
parts
thereof
are
corporeal
,
indued
with
the
dimensions
of
Quantity
,
and
with
Figure
.
I
should
be
glad
to
know
in
what
Classis
of
Entities
,
(
which
is
a
word
that
Schoolmen
use
)
the
●anketh
these
Devils
that
so
much
esteem
Gods
Power
and
yet
not
love
him
,
nor
hope
in
him
;
if
he
place
them
not
in
the
rank
of
those
men
,
who
are
enemies
to
the
People
of
God
,
as
the
Jewes
did
.
He
speaketh
of
Gods
Goodness
,
and
Mercy
,
as
if
they
were
no
part
of
his
Power
.
Is
not
Goodness
in
him
that
is
good
the
Power
to
make
himself
beloved
,
and
is
not
Mercy
Goodness
?
are
not
therefore
these
Attributes
contained
in
the
Attribute
of
his
Omnipotence
.
And
Justice
in
God
,
is
it
any
thing
else
but
the
Power
he
hath
,
and
exerciseth
in
distributing
blessings
and
afflictions
?
Justice
is
not
in
God
as
in
man
,
the
observation
of
the
Lawes
made
by
his
superiours
.
Nor
is
Wisedom
in
God
a
logicall
examination
of
the
means
by
the
end
,
as
it
is
in
men
;
but
an
incomprehensible
Attribute
given
to
an
incomprehensible
nature
,
for
to
honour
him
.
It
is
the
that
erres
,
in
thinking
nothing
to
be
Power
,
but
Riches
,
and
High
place
,
wherein
to
dominere
and
please
himself
,
and
vex
those
that
submit
not
to
his
opinions
.
If
the
opinion
of
absolute
necessity
do
all
this
,
then
the
opinion
of
Gods
Prescience
does
the
same
;
for
God
foreknoweth
nothing
that
can
possibly
not
come
to
pass
;
but
that
which
cannot
possibly
not
come
to
pass
,
cometh
to
pass
of
necessity
.
But
how
doth
necessity
destroy
the
Truth
of
God
by
commanding
and
hindering
what
he
commandeth
?
Truth
consisteth
in
Affirmation
and
Negation
,
not
in
commanding
and
hindering
;
it
does
not
therefore
follow
if
all
things
be
necessary
that
come
to
pass
,
that
therefore
God
hath
spoken
an
untruth
;
Nor
that
he
professesseth
one
thing
and
intendeth
another
.
The
Scripture
which
is
his
word
,
is
not
the
profession
of
what
he
intendeth
,
but
an
indication
of
what
those
men
shall
necessarily
intend
,
whom
he
hath
chosen
to
salvation
,
and
whom
he
hath
determined
to
destruction
.
But
on
the
other
side
,
from
the
Negation
of
necessity
,
there
followeth
necessarily
the
Negation
of
Gods
Prescience
;
which
is
in
the
if
not
ignorance
)
impiety
.
Or
cannot
imagine
when
living
creatures
of
all
sorts
are
often
in
torments
,
as
well
as
men
,
that
God
can
be
displeased
with
it
,
without
whose
will
they
neither
are
nor
could
be
at
all
tormented
.
Nor
yet
is
he
delighted
with
it
;
but
health
▪
sickness
,
●ase
,
torments
,
life
and
death
are
without
all
passion
in
him
dispenced
by
him
,
and
he
putteth
an
end
to
them
then
when
they
end
,
and
a
beginning
when
they
begin
,
according
to
his
eternal
purpose
,
which
cannot
be
resisted
.
That
the
necessity
argueth
a
delight
of
God
in
the
torments
of
his
creatures
,
is
even
as
true
as
that
it
was
pitty
and
commiseration
in
the
doggs
,
that
made
them
lick
the
sores
of
Or
how
doth
the
opinion
of
necessity
If
all
afflictions
be
punishments
,
for
whose
act
are
all
other
Creatures
punished
which
cannot
sin
?
Why
may
not
God
make
the
affliction
both
of
those
men
that
he
hath
elected
,
and
also
of
those
whom
he
hath
reprobated
,
the
necessary
causes
of
the
conversion
of
those
he
hath
elected
;
their
own
afflictions
serving
therein
as
chastisements
,
and
the
afflictions
of
the
rest
,
as
examples
?
But
he
may
perhaps
think
it
no
injustice
to
punish
the
creatures
that
cannot
sin
,
with
temporary
punishments
,
when
nevertheless
it
would
be
injustice
to
torment
the
same
creatures
eternally
.
This
may
be
somewhat
to
Meekness
and
Cruelty
,
but
nothing
at
all
to
Justice
and
Injustice
:
For
in
punishing
the
innocent
the
injustice
is
equall
,
though
the
punishments
be
unequal
.
And
what
cruelty
can
be
greaner
than
that
which
may
be
inferred
from
this
opinion
of
the
that
God
doth
torment
eternally
,
and
with
the
extreamest
degree
of
torment
,
all
those
men
which
have
sinned
,
that
is
to
say
,
all
mankind
from
the
creation
to
the
end
of
the
world
,
which
have
not
believed
in
Jesus
Christ
,
whereof
very
few
in
respect
of
the
multitude
of
others
have
so
much
as
heard
of
his
name
,
and
this
,
when
Faith
in
Christ
is
the
gift
of
God
himself
,
and
the
hearts
of
all
men
in
his
hands
to
frame
them
to
the
belief
of
whatsoever
he
will
have
them
to
believe
?
He
hath
no
reason
therefore
for
his
part
to
tax
any
opinion
,
for
ascribing
to
God
either
cruelty
or
injustice
.
Or
how
doth
it
First
,
he
seemeth
not
to
understand
what
signifies
.
Author
is
he
which
owneth
an
Action
,
or
giveth
a
warrant
to
do
it
.
Doe
I
say
that
any
man
hath
in
the
Scripture
,
(
which
is
all
the
warrant
we
have
from
God
for
any
Action
whatsoever
)
a
Warrant
to
commit
Theft
,
Murder
,
or
any
other
sin
?
Does
the
opinion
of
necessity
inferre
,
that
there
is
such
a
warrant
in
the
Scripture
?
Perhaps
he
will
say
no
,
but
that
this
opinion
makes
him
the
cause
of
sin
.
But
does
not
the
think
him
the
cause
of
all
Actions
?
And
are
not
sins
of
commission
Actions
?
Is
Murder
no
Action
?
And
does
not
God
himself
say
And
was
not
murder
one
of
those
evils
?
whether
it
were
or
not
,
I
say
no
more
but
that
God
is
the
cause
(
not
the
Author
)
of
all
Actions
and
Motions
.
Whether
sin
be
the
Action
,
or
the
Defect
,
or
the
Irregularity
▪
I
mean
not
to
dispute
.
Nevertheless
I
am
of
opinion
,
that
the
distinction
of
and
signifies
nothing
signifie
(
as
it
did
when
it
came
first
in
use
)
a
King
,
t
is
no
dishonour
to
beleeve
that
God
is
a
greater
Tyrant
than
ever
was
in
the
world
;
for
he
is
the
King
of
all
Kings
,
Emperours
and
Common-Wealths
.
But
if
we
take
the
word
(
as
it
is
now
used
)
to
signifie
those
Kings
onely
,
which
they
that
call
them
Tyrants
are
displeased
with
;
that
is
,
that
Govern
not
as
they
would
have
them
,
the
is
nearer
the
calling
him
a
Tyrant
than
I
am
,
making
that
to
be
Tyranny
,
which
is
but
the
exercise
of
an
absolute
Power
;
For
he
holdeth
(
though
he
see
it
not
)
by
consequence
,
in
withdrawing
the
Will
of
man
from
Gods
dominion
,
that
every
man
is
a
King
of
himself
.
And
if
a
man
cannot
praise
God
for
his
Goodness
,
who
creates
millions
to
burn
eternally
without
their
fault
;
how
can
the
praise
God
for
his
Goodness
,
who
thinks
he
hath
created
millions
of
millions
to
burn
eternally
,
when
he
could
have
kept
them
so
easily
from
committing
any
fault
?
And
to
his
I
answer
that
those
men
who
so
beleeve
have
Faith
in
Jesus
Christ
,
or
they
have
not
Faith
in
him
,
If
they
have
,
then
shall
they
by
that
faith
hear
the
Word
of
God
with
that
reverence
and
devotion
,
and
faith
which
is
requisite
to
salvation
.
And
for
them
that
hath
no
faith
,
I
do
not
think
he
asketh
how
they
shall
hear
th●
Word
of
God
with
that
reverence
,
and
devotion
,
and
faith
which
is
requisite
,
for
he
knowes
they
shall
not
till
such
time
as
God
shall
have
given
them
faith
.
Also
he
mistakes
if
he
think
that
I
or
any
other
Christian
beleeve
,
that
God
intendeth
by
hardening
any
mans
heart
,
to
make
that
man
inexcusable
,
but
to
make
his
Elect
the
more
careful
.
Likewise
to
his
question
I
answer
as
before
if
he
be
of
Gods
Elect
;
if
not
,
he
shall
not
receave
the
Sacrament
with
comfort
.
I
may
answer
also
that
the
Faithful
man
shall
receave
the
Sacrament
with
comfort
by
the
same
way
that
the
receaveth
it
with
comfort
.
For
he
also
beleeveth
that
many
millions
are
excluded
from
the
benefit
of
Christs
Passion
,
(
whether
positively
or
not
positively
is
nothing
to
the
purpose
,
nor
doth
positively
signifie
any
thing
in
this
place
)
and
that
so
long
before
they
had
either
done
good
or
evil
,
as
it
was
known
to
God
before
they
were
born
that
they
were
so
excluded
To
his
I
answer
that
he
that
eateth
and
drinketh
unworthily
,
does
not
beleeve
that
God
necessitates
him
to
Eat
and
Drink
unworthily
,
because
he
would
damn
him
;
for
neither
does
he
think
he
Eats
and
Drinks
unworthily
,
nor
that
God
intends
to
damn
him
for
he
beleeveth
no
such
damnation
,
nor
intendeth
any
preparation
.
The
beleef
of
damnation
is
an
Article
of
Christian
faith
;
so
is
also
preparation
to
the
Sacrament
.
T
is
therefore
a
vain
question
,
how
he
thaet
hath
no
faith
shall
prepare
himself
with
care
and
conscience
to
the
receiving
of
the
Sacrament
.
But
to
the
question
how
they
shall
prepare
themselves
that
shall
at
all
prepare
themselves
;
I
answer
it
shall
be
by
Faith
,
when
God
shall
give
it
them
.
To
his
I
answer
,
that
if
he
make
a
vow
it
is
a
Free
vow
,
(
or
else
it
is
no
vow
)
and
yet
he
may
know
when
he
hath
made
that
vow
,
(
though
not
before
)
that
it
was
extrinsecally
nocessitated
,
for
the
necessity
of
vowing
before
he
vowed
,
hindered
not
the
Vow
,
but
made
it
Lastly
,
to
I
answer
,
though
he
think
himself
necessitated
to
what
he
shall
do
,
yet
if
he
do
not
think
himself
necessitated
,
and
wound
up
to
impenitence
,
there
will
follow
upon
his
opinion
of
necessity
no
impedment
to
his
repentance
.
The
disputeth
not
against
me
,
but
against
sombody
that
holds
a
man
may
repent
,
that
beleeves
at
the
same
time
he
cannot
repent
.
It
is
a
glad
returning
into
the
right
way
,
after
the
grief
of
being
out
of
the
way
.
I
could
never
be
of
opinion
that
Christian
repentance
could
be
ascribed
to
them
,
that
had
as
yet
no
intention
to
forsake
their
sins
and
to
lead
a
new
life
.
He
that
grieves
for
the
evil
that
hath
happened
to
him
for
his
sins
,
but
hath
not
a
resolution
to
obey
Gods
Commandements
better
for
the
time
to
come
,
grieveth
for
his
sufferings
but
not
for
his
doings
,
which
no
Divine
I
think
will
call
Christian
Repentance
;
but
he
that
resolveth
upon
ameudment
of
life
,
knoweth
that
there
is
forgiveness
for
him
in
Christ
Jesus
,
whereof
a
Christian
cannot
possibly
be
but
glad
.
Before
this
gladness
there
was
a
grief
preparative
to
Repentance
,
but
the
Repentance
it self
was
not
Christian
Repentance
till
this
Conversion
,
till
this
glad
Conversion
.
Therefore
I
see
no
reason
why
it
should
amaze
him
to
find
gladness
to
be
the
first
word
in
the
description
of
Repentance
,
saving
that
the
light
amazeth
such
as
have
been
long
in
darkness
.
And
for
the
they
were
never
parts
of
Repentance
perf●cted
,
but
signes
of
the
beginning
of
it
.
They
are
external
things
;
Repentance
is
internal
.
This
Doctrine
pertaineth
to
the
establishing
of
Romish
Penance
,
and
being
found
to
conduce
to
the
power
of
the
Clergy
,
was
by
them
wished
to
be
restored
.
This
is
ill
argued
,
for
why
is
it
Gods
Repentance
,
when
he
gives
man
Repentance
,
more
than
it
is
Gods
Faith
,
when
he
gives
man
Faith
.
But
he
labours
to
bring
in
a
concurrence
of
Mans
Will
with
Gods
Will
;
and
a
power
in
God
to
give
Repentance
,
if
man
will
take
it
;
but
not
the
Power
to
make
him
take
it
.
This
concurrence
he
thinks
is
proved
by
Revel.
Here
is
nothing
of
concurrence
,
nor
of
any
thing
eqvivalent
to
it
,
nor
mention
at
all
of
the
Will
or
Purpose
,
but
of
the
calling
,
or
voice
by
the
Minister
.
And
as
God
giveth
to
the
Minister
a
Power
of
perswading
;
so
he
giveth
also
many
times
a
concurrence
of
the
Auditor
with
the
Minister
in
being
perswaded
.
Here
is
therefore
somewhat
equivalent
to
a
concurrence
with
the
Minister
,
that
is
,
of
man
with
man
,
but
nothing
of
the
concurrence
of
man
,
(
whose
Will
God
frameth
as
he
pleaseth
,
)
with
God
that
frameth
it
.
And
I
wonder
how
any
man
can
conceive
,
when
God
giveth
a
man
a
Will
to
do
any
thing
whatsoever
,
how
that
Will
when
it
is
not
,
can
concurre
with
Gods
Will
to
make
it selfe
be
.
The
next
thing
he
excepteth
against
is
this
,
that
I
hold
.
First
instead
of
my
words
he
hath
put
There
is
much
difference
between
my
words
and
his
in
the
sense
and
meaning
,
for
in
the
one
there
is
honour
ascrihed
to
God
,
and
humility
in
him
that
prayeth
;
but
in
the
other
presumption
in
him
that
prayeth
,
and
a
detraction
from
the
honour
of
God
.
When
I
say
I
take
in
one
and
the
same
sense
,
affirming
that
God
is
not
moved
by
any
thing
that
we
do
,
but
has
alwaies
one
and
the
same
eternal
purpose
,
to
do
the
same
things
that
from
eternity
he
hath
foreknown
shall
be
done
;
and
me
thinks
there
can
be
no
doubt
made
thereof
.
But
the
That
St
and
that
and
James
In
which
places
the
words
do
not
signifie
any
causation
;
for
no
man
nor
creature
living
can
work
any
effect
upon
God
,
in
whom
there
is
nothing
,
that
hath
not
been
in
him
eternally
heretofore
,
nor
that
shall
not
be
in
him
eternally
hereafter
;
but
do
signifie
the
order
in
which
God
hath
placed
mens
prayers
,
and
his
own
blessings
.
And
not
much
after
the
himself
saith
Therefore
it
is
no
cause
of
Gods
Will
,
in
giving
us
his
blessings
,
but
is
properly
a
signe
,
not
a
procuration
of
his
favour
.
The
next
thing
he
replieth
to
is
,
that
I
make
prayer
to
be
a
kind
of
thanksgiving
,
to
which
he
replies
,
Why
so
?
Does
not
a
Beggar
move
a
man
by
his
prayer
,
and
sometime
worketh
in
him
a
compassion
not
without
pain
,
and
as
the
Scripture
calls
it
,
a
yerning
of
the
Bowels
,
which
is
not
so
in
God
when
we
pray
to
him
.
Our
prayer
to
God
is
a
duty
;
it
is
not
so
to
man
.
Therefore
though
our
prayers
to
man
be
distinguished
from
our
thanks
,
it
is
not
necessary
it
should
be
so
in
our
prayers
and
thanks
to
God
Almighty
.
To
the
rest
of
his
Reply
in
this
Number
there
needs
no
further
Answer
he
who
maketh
all
things
,
doth
not
make
them
necessary
.
in
adjecto
Italian
,
Spanish
such
Agents
as
work
we
know
not
how
.
IN
this
Number
he
would
prove
that
there
must
be
Free
Agents
,
and
Contingent
Agents
,
as
well
as
Necessary
Agents
,
from
the
Order
,
Beauty
,
and
Perfection
of
the
World
.
I
that
thought
that
the
Order
,
Beauty
,
and
Perfection
of
the
World
required
that
which
was
in
the
World
,
and
not
that
which
the
had
need
of
for
his
Argument
,
could
see
no
force
of
consequence
to
inferre
that
which
he
calls
Free
and
Contingent
.
That
which
is
in
the
World
is
the
Order
,
Beauty
,
and
Perfection
which
God
hath
given
the
World
;
and
yet
there
are
no
Agents
in
the
World
,
but
such
as
work
a
seen
Necessity
,
or
an
unseen
Necessity
;
and
when
they
work
an
unseen
Necessity
in
creatures
inanimate
,
then
are
those
creatures
said
to
be
wrought
upon
Contingently
,
and
to
work
Contingently
.
And
when
the
Necessity
unseen
is
of
the
actions
of
men
,
then
it
is
commonly
called
Free
,
and
might
be
so
in
other
living
creatures
;
for
Free
and
Voluntary
are
the
same
thing
.
But
the
in
his
Reply
hath
insisted
most
upon
this
,
that
I
make
it
a
contradiction
to
say
that
and
wonders
how
a
Contradiction
can
be
in
one
Proposition
,
and
yet
within
two
or
three
lines
after
found
it
might
be
;
and
therefore
to
clear
the
matter
he
sayes
that
such
is
not
but
a
which
nevertheless
is
the
same
kind
of
Necessity
which
he
attributeth
to
the
burning
of
the
fire
,
where
there
is
a
necessity
that
the
thing
thrown
into
it
shall
be
burned
,
though
yet
it
be
but
burning
,
or
but
departing
from
the
hand
that
throwes
it
in
;
and
therefore
the
Necessity
is
Antecedent
.
The
like
is
in
making
a
Garment
;
the
Necessity
begins
from
the
first
motion
towards
it
,
which
is
from
Eternity
,
though
the
and
the
are
equally
unsensible
of
it
.
If
they
saw
the
whole
order
and
conjunction
of
Causes
,
they
would
say
it
were
as
Necessary
as
any
thing
else
can
possibly
be
;
and
therefore
God
that
sees
that
order
and
conjunction
,
knowes
it
is
necessary
.
The
rest
of
his
Reply
is
to
argue
a
contradiction
in
me
;
for
he
sayes
.
It
is
true
,
that
I
say
some
are
Free
Agents
,
and
some
Contingent
;
nevertheless
they
may
be
all
necessary
For
according
to
the
significations
of
the
words
Necessary
,
Free
,
and
Contingent
,
the
distinction
is
no
more
but
this
;
of
Necessary
Agents
,
some
are
Necessary
,
and
some
are
Agents
;
and
of
Agents
,
some
are
living
creatures
,
and
some
are
inanimate
;
which
words
are
improper
,
but
the
meaning
of
them
is
this
;
men
call
necessary
Agents
such
as
they
know
to
be
necessary
,
and
contingent
Agents
such
inanimate
things
as
they
know
not
whether
they
work
necessarily
or
no
,
and
by
free
Agents
,
men
whom
they
know
not
whether
they
work
necessarily
or
no.
All
which
confusion
ariseth
from
that
presumptuous
men
take
for
granted
,
that
that
whith
they
The
reason
is
because
it
would
follow
that
many
necessary
Actions
should
be
contingent
,
and
many
contingent
Actions
necessary
.
But
that
which
followeth
from
it
really
is
no
more
but
this
:
That
many
necessary
Actions
would
be
such
as
we
know
not
to
be
necessary
,
and
many
Actions
which
we
know
not
to
be
necessary
,
may
yet
be
necessary
,
which
is
a
truth
.
But
the
defineth
Contingents
thus
By
which
definition
Contingent
is
nothing
,
or
it
is
the
same
that
I
say
it
is
.
For
,
there
is
nothing
can
be
done
and
not
be
done
,
nothing
can
happen
and
not
happen
by
reason
of
the
Indetermination
or
accidental
concurrence
of
the
causes
.
It
may
be
done
or
not
done
for
ought
he
knowes
,
and
happen
or
not
happen
for
any
determination
he
perceaveth
;
and
that
is
my
definition
.
But
that
the
indetermination
can
make
it
happen
or
not
happen
,
is
absurd
;
for
indetermination
maketh
it
equally
to
happen
or
not
to
happen
;
and
therefore
both
;
which
is
a
contradiction
.
Therefore
indetermination
doth
nothing
,
and
whatsoever
causes
do
,
is
necessary
.
T.
H.
T.
H.
That
the
nature
of
sin
consisteth
in
this
,
that
the
action
proceede
from
our
will
,
and
be
against
the
Law
Judge
looks
at
no
hig●er
cause
,
then
the
will
of
the
doer
,
O
Israel
,
thy
destruction
is
from
thy self
,
but
in
me
is
thy
help
WHereas
he
had
in
his
first
discourse
made
this
consequence
,
I
denied
that
consequence
.
It
is
true
,
he
who
taketh
away
the
Liberty
of
doing
,
according
to
the
will
,
taketh
away
the
nature
of
sin
;
but
he
that
denieth
the
Liberty
to
Will
,
does
not
so
.
But
he
supposing
I
understood
him
not
,
will
needs
reduce
his
argument
into
form
,
in
this
manner
.
(
a
This
is
granted
This
I
deny
,
He
proves
it
thus
,
He
might
as
well
have
concluded
whatsoever
man
hath
been
made
by
God
is
a
good
,
and
just
man
.
He
observeth
not
that
sin
is
not
a
thing
really
made
.
Those
things
which
at
first
were
actions
were
not
th●n
sins
,
though
actions
of
the
same
nature
with
those
,
which
were
afterwards
sins
;
nor
was
then
the
will
to
any
thing
a
sin
,
though
it
were
a
will
to
the
same
thing
,
which
in
willing
now
we
should
sin
.
Actions
became
sins
,
then
first
,
when
the
commandement
came
:
for
as
St.
Paul
saith
,
and
sin
being
but
there
can
be
no
action
made
sin
but
by
the
Law
.
Therefore
this
opinion
though
it
derive
actions
essentially
from
God
,
it
derives
not
sins
essentially
from
him
,
but
relatively
,
and
by
the
Commandement
.
And
consequently
the
opinion
of
necessity
,
taketh
not
away
the
nature
of
sin
,
but
necessitateth
that
action
which
the
Law
hath
made
sin
.
And
whereas
I
said
the
nature
of
sin
consisteth
in
this
,
that
he
alloweth
it
for
true
;
and
therefore
he
must
allow
also
,
that
the
formal
reason
of
sin
lieth
not
in
the
Liberty
or
necessity
of
willing
,
but
in
the
will
it self
(
necessary
,
or
unnecessary
)
in
relation
to
the
Law
.
And
whereas
he
limits
this
truth
which
he
allowed
,
to
this
,
that
the
and
the
will
it
serves
to
no
purpose
;
for
I
have
shown
before
,
that
no
Law
can
be
unjust
.
And
it
seemeth
to
me
,
that
a
rationall
Will
,
if
it
be
not
meant
of
a
Will
after
deliberation
,
whether
he
that
deliberateth
reasoneth
aright
or
not
,
signifieth
nothing
.
A
rational
man
is
rightly
said
,
but
a
in
other
sense
,
then
I
have
mentioned
,
is
insignificant
.
He
mistakes
me
in
this
.
For
I
say
not
the
Law
injoyns
things
impossible
in
themselves
,
for
so
I
should
say
it
injoyned
contradictories
.
But
I
say
the
Law
sometimes
(
the
Law-makers
not
knowing
the
secret
necessities
of
things
to
come
)
injoynes
things
made
impossible
by
secret
and
extrinsicall
causes
from
all
eternity
.
From
this
h●s
error
he
infers
,
that
the
Laws
must
be
unjust
and
Tyrannical
,
and
the
transgression
of
them
no
sin
.
But
he
who
holds
that
Laws
can
be
unjust
and
Tyrannical
,
will
easily
find
pretence
enough
under
any
Government
in
the
World
to
deny
obedience
to
the
Laws
,
unlesse
they
be
such
as
he
himself
maketh
,
or
adviseth
to
be
made
.
He
says
also
,
that
I
suppose
the
will
is
inevitably
determined
by
special
influence
from
the
first
cause
.
It
is
true
,
saving
that
senselesse
word
which
I
never
used
.
But
his
consequence
,
is
not
true
;
for
it
may
be
the
Will
both
of
the
one
and
of
the
other
,
and
yet
not
by
concurrence
,
as
in
a
league
,
but
by
subjection
of
the
will
of
man
,
to
the
Will
of
God
.
(
c
A
Judge
is
to
judge
of
voluntary
crimes
.
He
has
no
commission
to
look
into
the
secret
causes
that
make
it
voluntary
.
An
because
the
Bishop
had
said
,
the
Law
cannot
justly
punish
a
crime
that
proceedeth
from
necessity
,
it
was
no
impertinent
answer
to
say
▪
And
even
this
▪
as
h●
sayeth
,
is
enough
to
proove
,
that
To
which
I
answer
,
that
it
proves
indeed
,
that
the
Malefactor
had
Liberty
to
have
kept
the
Law
if
h●
would
;
but
it
proveth
not
,
that
he
had
the
Liberty
to
have
a
Will
to
keep
the
Law
.
Nor
doth
it
prove
that
the
Will
of
the
Doer
d●d
determine
it self
freely
;
for
nothing
can
prove
non-sence
.
But
here
you
see
what
the
Bishop
p●●sueth
in
this
whole
Reply
,
namely
,
to
prove
,
that
a
man
hath
Liberty
to
do
if
he
will
,
which
I
deny
not
;
and
thinks
when
he
hath
done
that
,
he
hath
proved
a
man
hath
Liberty
to
Will
,
which
he
calles
the
Wills
determining
of
it self
freely
.
And
whereas
he
adds
,
It
is
answer
enough
to
say
,
he
is
bound
to
look
at
no
more
then
hee
thinks
he
can
see
.
He
had
no
sooner
said
this
,
but
finding
his
error
,
he
retracteth
it
,
and
confesseth
that
Which
is
all
that
I
intended
by
sufficiency
of
the
cause
.
But
whether
every
suff●●●●nt
cause
be
a
necessary
cause
or
not
,
he
meaneth
to
examine
in
Numb
.
In
the
meane
time
,
he
saith
onely
,
that
and
leaves
out
necessity
,
as
if
it
came
from
neither
.
I
must
note
also
,
that
where
he
says
,
I
understand
not
whether
by
nature
,
he
meane
the
Author
of
Nature
,
(
in
which
meaning
it
derogates
from
God
)
or
nature
it self
,
as
the
Universal
work
of
God
,
and
then
it
is
absurd
;
for
the
universe
as
one
aggregate
of
things
natural
,
hath
no
intention
.
His
Doctrine
that
followeth
,
concerning
the
generation
of
Monsters
,
is
not
worth
consideration
;
therefore
I
leave
it
wholy
to
the
Judgement
of
the
Reader
.
(
e
T
is
plaine
(
to
let
passe
that
he
puts
Punishment
,
where
I
put
Affliction
,
making
a
true
sentence
false
)
that
if
a
man
do
this
he
shall
live
,
and
he
may
do
this
if
he
will
.
In
this
the
Bishop
and
I
disagree
not
.
This
therefore
is
not
the
question
;
but
whether
the
will
to
do
this
,
or
not
to
do
this
,
be
in
a
mans
own
Election
.
Whereas
he
adds
He
had
forgot
for
a
while
,
that
both
good
and
evil
men
are
by
the
Will
of
God
all
mortall
;
but
presently
corrects
himself
,
and
says
,
that
is
to
say
,
eternal
life
,
but
in
torments
.
To
which
I
have
answered
once
before
in
this
Book
,
and
spoken
much
more
amply
in
another
Book
,
to
which
the
Bishop
hath
inclination
to
make
an
answer
,
as
appeareth
by
his
Epistle
to
the
Reader
.
That
which
followeth
to
the
end
of
this
number
,
hath
been
urged
and
answered
already
divers
times
;
I
therefore
passe
it
over
.
Destiny
is
the
necessity
of
all
things
,
and
actions
,
depending
upon
the
disposition
of
Jupiter
,
&c.
Ultra
fato
constituta
tempora
T.
H.
T
H.
they
may
be
t●o
kinds
of
doctrine
.
T.
H.
de
const.
l
T.
H.
Whatsoever
I
dispute
here
,
I
submit
to
the
judgment
of
the
wise
,
and
being
admonished
,
I
will
convert
it
.
One
may
convince
me
of
error
,
but
not
of
obstinacy
.
T.
H.
he
hath
not
sucked
his
answer
from
any
Sect
manifest
truths
the
first
cause
is
a
necessary
cause
of
all
effects
,
Jordan
,
Luk.
T.
H.
T.
H.
Qui
pauca
considerat
,
facile
pronuntiat
.
THE
Bishop
supposing
I
had
taken
my
opinion
from
the
Authority
of
the
Stoick
Philosophers
,
not
from
my
own
Meditation
,
falleth
into
dispute
against
the
Stoicks
,
whereof
I
might
if
▪
I
pleas'd
take
no
notice
but
passe
over
to
Number
But
that
he
may
know
I
have
considered
their
doctrine
concerning
Fate
,
I
think
fit
to
say
thus
much
,
that
their
error
consisteth
not
in
the
but
in
faigning
of
a
false
God
.
When
therefore
they
say
,
They
say
no
more
but
that
is
the
If
they
had
said
it
had
been
the
Word
of
the
true
God
,
I
should
not
have
perceived
any
thing
in
it
to
contradict
;
because
I
hold
as
most
Christians
do
,
that
the
whole
world
was
made
,
and
is
now
Governed
by
the
Word
of
God
,
which
bringeth
a
necessity
of
all
things
and
actions
to
depend
upon
the
divine
disposition
.
Nor
do
I
see
cause
to
find
fault
with
that
,
(
as
he
does
)
which
is
said
by
Fate
is
a
(
as
he
thinks
I
do
now
)
And
the
reason
why
he
was
cautelous
,
was
because
being
a
member
of
the
Romish
Church
,
he
had
little
confidence
in
the
judgment
,
and
lenity
of
the
Romish
Clergie
;
and
not
because
he
thought
he
had
over-shot
himself
.
I
answer
,
that
distinction
he
alledgeth
not
to
bee
mine
,
but
the
Stoicks
;
and
therefore
I
had
no
reason
to
take
notice
of
it
,
for
he
disputeth
not
against
me
but
others
.
And
whereas
he
says
,
it
concerned
me
to
make
that
answer
which
he
hath
set
down
in
the
words
following
,
I
cannot
conceive
how
it
concerneth
me
,
(
whatsoever
it
may
do
somebody
else
)
to
so●a●
absurdly
.
I
said
that
the
first
cause
is
a
necessary
cause
of
all
the
effects
that
are
next
,
and
immediate
to
it
;
which
can
not
be
doubted
,
and
though
he
deny
it
▪
he
does
not
disprove
it
.
For
when
he
says
,
He
says
rashly
,
and
untruly
.
Rashly
,
because
there
is
nothing
without
God
,
who
is
and
untruly
because
whatsoever
God
foreknew
from
eternity
,
he
willed
from
eternity
,
and
therefore
necessarily
.
But
against
this
he
argueth
thus
.
In
things
inanimate
,
the
action
is
alwaies
according
to
the
extent
of
its
power
;
not
taking
in
the
Power
of
Willing
because
they
have
it
not
.
But
in
those
things
that
have
Wil●
,
the
action
is
according
to
the
w●ole
Power
,
wi●●
and
all
It
is
true
that
God
doth
not
all
things
that
he
can
do
if
he
will
,
but
that
he
can
that
which
he
hath
not
from
all
eternity
,
I
deny
;
unlesse
that
he
can
not
only
but
also
which
all
Divines
say
,
is
immutable
;
and
then
they
must
needs
be
necessary
effects
,
that
proceed
from
God
.
And
his
Texts
,
make
nothing
against
the
necessity
of
those
actions
which
from
the
first
cause
proceed
the
will
is
free
T.
H.
T.
H.
a
man
is
then
onely
said
to
be
compelled
when
fear
makes
him
willing
to
an
action
.
Another
shall
guide
thee
,
and
carry
thee
whither
thou
wouldst
not
.
T.
H.
Israel
,
Numb
He
spake
not
of
himself
T.
H.
One
heat
,
saith
he
,
may
be
more
intensive
than
another
,
but
not
one
liberty
than
another
.
He
that
can
do
what
he
will
,
hath
all
liberty
,
and
he
that
cannot
do
what
he
will
,
hath
no
liberty
.
Doctors
of
the
Church
,
who
by
this
means
tyrannized
over
the
understandings
of
other
men
.
T.
H.
T.
H.
T.
H.
De
Cive
cap.
consult
with
the
Ecclesiasticall
Doctors
,
to
whom
Gods
blessing
is
derived
by
imposition
of
hands
,
so
as
not
to
be
deceived
in
necessary
truths
,
to
whom
our
Saviour
hath
promised
infallibility
.
The
Spirits
of
the
Prophets
are
subject
to
the
Prophets
,
(
a
the
Will
is
Free
I
never
said
the
Will
is
but
do
agree
with
the
rest
of
the
World
in
granting
that
it
is
It
is
an
absurd
speech
to
say
it
is
compelled
,
but
not
to
say
it
is
necessitated
,
or
a
necessary
effect
of
some
cause
.
When
the
fire
heateth
,
it
doth
not
compell
heate
;
so
likewise
when
some
cause
maketh
the
Will
to
any
thing
,
it
doth
not
compell
it
.
Many
things
may
compel
a
man
to
do
an
Action
in
producing
the
Will
;
but
that
is
not
a
compelling
of
the
but
of
the
That
which
I
call
necessitation
,
is
the
effecting
and
creating
of
that
Will
which
was
not
before
,
not
a
compelling
of
a
Will
already
existent
.
The
necessitation
or
Creation
of
the
Will
,
is
the
same
thing
with
the
compulsion
of
the
man
,
saving
that
we
commonly
use
the
word
compulsion
,
in
those
Actions
which
proceed
from
terrour
.
And
therefore
this
distinction
,
is
of
no
use
;
and
that
raving
which
followeth
immediately
after
it
,
is
nothing
to
the
question
,
though
it
be
to
the
question
,
(
b
I
never
said
nor
doubted
,
but
such
actions
were
both
Voluntary
and
free
;
For
he
that
doth
any
thing
for
fear
,
though
he
say
truely
,
he
was
compelled
to
it
,
yet
we
deny
not
that
he
had
Election
to
do
or
not
to
do
,
and
consequently
that
he
was
a
Voluntary
and
free
Agent
.
But
this
hinders
not
but
that
the
terrour
might
be
a
necessary
cause
of
his
Election
,
of
that
which
otherwise
he
would
not
have
Elected
,
unlesse
some
other
potent
cause
made
it
necessary
he
should
elect
the
contrary
.
And
there
fore
in
the
same
ship
,
in
the
same
storm
,
one
man
may
be
necessitated
to
throw
his
goods
over-board
,
and
another
man
to
keep
them
within
the
Ship
;
and
the
same
m●n
in
a
like
storm
be
otherwise
advised
;
if
all
the
causes
be
not
like
.
But
that
as
the
Bishops
says
,
that
close
might
choose
I
cannot
conceive
,
unlesse
a
man
can
choose
or
be
all
at
once
(
c
T.
H.
a
man
is
then
only
said
to
be
compelled
,
when
●ear
makes
him
willing
to
an
Action
.
When
I
said
fear
,
I
think
no
m●n
can
●oubt
,
but
the
fear
of
force
was
understood
.
I
cannot
se●
therfore
what
quarrel
he
could
justly
take
at
saying
,
that
,
a
man
is
compelled
by
●ar
,
onely
;
unlesse
he
think
it
may
be
called
compulsion
when
●
man
by
force
,
seizing
on
another
mans
limbs
,
moveth
them
▪
as
himself
,
not
as
the
other
man
pleaseth
,
but
this
is
not
the
meaning
of
compulsion
.
Neither
is
the
Action
so
done
,
the
Action
of
him
that
suffereth
,
but
of
him
that
useth
the
force
.
But
this
(
as
if
it
were
a
question
of
the
propriety
of
the
English
tongue
)
the
Bishop
denies
,
and
sayes
,
when
a
man
is
moved
by
fear
,
it
is
said
he
is
compelled
.
But
when
a
man
is
moved
by
an
external
cause
,
the
Will
resisting
as
much
as
it
can
,
then
he
says
,
he
is
said
to
be
compelled
;
as
in
a
Rape
,
or
when
a
Christian
is
drawn
or
carryed
by
violence
to
the
idols
Temple
.
Insomuch
as
by
this
distinction
it
were
very
proper
English
to
say
,
that
a
stone
were
compelled
when
it
is
thrown
,
or
a
man
,
when
he
is
carried
in
a
Cart.
For
my
part
I
understand
compulsion
to
be
used
rightly
of
living
creatures
onely
,
which
are
moved
onely
by
their
own
animal
motion
,
in
such
manner
as
they
would
not
be
moved
without
the
fear
.
But
of
this
dispute
the
English
and
Well-bred
Reader
,
is
the
proper
Judge
.
(
d
Is
it
impossible
for
the
Bishop
to
remember
the
question
,
which
is
Did
I
ever
say
that
no
Actions
of
a
man
are
free
?
On
the
contrary
I
say
,
that
al
his
Voluntary
Actions
are
Free
,
even
those
also
to
which
he
is
compelled
by
fear
.
But
it
does
not
therefore
follow
,
but
that
the
Will
,
from
whence
those
Actions
and
their
Election
proceed
,
may
have
necessary
causes
;
against
which
he
hath
never
yet
said
any
thing
.
That
which
followeth
immediately
,
is
not
offered
as
a
proof
,
but
as
explication
how
the
passions
of
a
man
surprise
him
;
therefore
I
let
it
passe
,
noting
onely
that
he
expound
th●
(
which
I
understood
not
before
)
by
the
word
Antipathy
.
(
e
When
the
necessity
is
of
the
former
kind
of
supposition
then
,
(
he
says
)
Freedom
may
consist
with
this
necessity
.
In
the
latter
sense
hat
it
cannot
.
And
to
use
his
own
instances
,
to
vow
continence
in
a
Romish
Priest
,
upon
supposition
that
he
is
a
Romish
Priest
,
is
a
necessary
Act
;
because
it
was
in
his
power
to
be
a
Priest
or
not
.
On
the
other
side
supposing
a
man
having
a
natural
Antipathy
against
a
Cat
;
because
this
Antipathy
is
not
in
the
power
of
the
party
affected
,
therefore
the
running
away
from
the
Cat
is
no
Free
act
.
I
deny
not
but
that
it
is
a
Free
act
of
the
Romish
Priest
to
vow
continence
,
no●
upon
the
supposition
that
he
was
a
Romish
Priest
,
but
because
he
had
not
done
it
,
unlesse
he
would
;
if
he
had
not
been
a
Romish
Priest
,
it
had
been
all
one
to
the
Freedom
of
his
Act.
Nor
is
his
Priesthood
any
thing
to
the
Necessitie
of
his
vow
,
saving
that
if
he
would
not
have
vowed
he
should
not
have
been
made
a
Priest
.
There
was
an
antecedent
necessity
in
the
causes
extrinsecal
;
first
that
he
should
have
the
Wil
to
be
a
Priest
,
and
then
consequently
that
he
should
have
the
Wil
to
vow
.
Against
this
he
alledgeth
nothing
.
Then
for
his
Cat
,
the
mans
running
from
it
is
a
Free
Act
,
as
being
voluntary
,
and
arising
from
a
false
apprehension
(
which
neverthelesse
he
cannot
help
)
of
some
hurt
or
other
the
Cat
may
do
him
.
And
therefore
the
Act
is
as
free
as
the
Act
of
him
that
throweth
his
goods
into
the
Sea
.
So
likewise
the
Act
of
in
blessing
his
sons
,
and
the
Act
of
in
blessing
are
equally
Free
,
and
equally
voluntary
▪
yet
equally
determined
by
God
,
who
is
the
Author
of
all
blessings
,
and
framed
the
will
of
both
of
them
to
blesse
,
and
whose
Will
(
as
St.
saith
)
cannot
be
resisted
.
Therefore
both
their
Actions
were
necessitated
equally
;
and
(
because
they
were
Voluntary
)
equally
Free
.
As
for
his
prophecy
which
the
Text
saith
,
He
spake
not
of
himself
,
it
was
necessary
;
first
,
because
it
was
by
the
supernatural
gift
of
God
to
the
High-priests
as
soveraigns
of
the
Common-wealth
of
the
Jews
,
to
speak
to
the
people
as
from
the
mouth
of
God
,
that
is
to
say
,
to
prophesie
;
and
secondly
,
whensoever
he
did
speak
not
as
from
God
,
but
as
from
himself
,
it
was
neverthelesse
necessary
he
should
do
so
,
not
that
he
might
not
have
been
silent
if
he
would
,
but
because
his
will
to
speak
was
antecedently
determined
to
what
he
should
speak
from
all
Aeternity
;
which
he
hath
yet
brought
no
argument
to
contradict
.
He
approveth
my
modesty
in
suspending
my
judgement
concerning
the
manner
how
the
good
Angells
do
work
,
Necessarily
,
or
Freely
,
because
I
find
it
not
set
down
in
the
Articles
of
our
Faith
,
nor
in
the
decrees
of
our
Church
▪
But
he
useth
not
the
same
modesty
himself
.
For
whereas
he
can
apprehend
neither
the
Nature
of
God
,
nor
of
Angels
;
nor
conceive
what
kind
of
thing
it
is
,
which
in
them
he
calleth
Will
,
he
neverthelesse
takes
upon
him
to
attribute
to
them
,
and
to
deny
them
to
grant
them
a
Liberty
then
we
have
,
but
not
a
using
not
incongruously
in
the
incomprehensibility
of
the
subject
●●comprehensible
terms
,
as
&
degrees
of
intention
in
Liberty
,
as
if
one
liberty
,
like
heat
,
might
be
more
intensive
then
another
.
It
is
true
that
there
is
greater
liberty
in
a
large
then
in
a
strait
prison
,
but
one
of
those
Liberties
is
not
more
intense
then
the
other
.
(
f
He
that
can
do
what
he
Will
,
hath
all
Liberty
;
and
he
that
cannot
do
what
he
Will
,
hath
no
Liberty
.
'T
is
one
thing
to
say
,
a
man
hath
Liberty
to
do
what
he
will
,
and
another
thing
to
say
he
hath
power
to
do
what
he
Will
.
A
man
that
is
bound
would
say
readily
he
hath
not
the
Liberty
to
walk
,
but
he
will
not
say
he
wants
the
Power
.
But
the
sick
man
will
say
he
wants
the
Power
to
walk
▪
but
not
the
Liberty
.
This
is
as
I
conceive
to
speak
the
English
tongue
;
and
consequently
an
English
man
will
not
say
the
Liberty
to
do
what
he
Will
,
but
the
Power
to
do
what
he
Will
,
is
Omnipotence
.
And
therefore
either
I
or
the
Bishop
understand
not
English
.
Whereas
he
adds
that
I
mistake
the
meaning
of
the
word
,
Liberty
of
specification
,
I
am
sure
that
in
that
way
wherein
I
expound
them
,
there
is
no
absurdity
.
But
if
he
say
I
understand
not
what
the
Schoolmen
mean
by
it
,
I
will
not
contend
with
him
;
for
I
think
they
know
not
what
they
mean
themselves
.
(
g
That
he
may
know
I
am
no
enemy
to
intelligible
distinctions
,
I
also
will
use
a
distinction
in
the
defence
of
my self
against
this
his
accusation
.
I
say
therefore
that
some
distinctions
are
and
some
are
Against
those
that
are
I
do
,
and
may
inveigh
.
But
against
those
that
are
I
do
not
inveigh
.
Likewise
some
Doctors
of
the
Church
(
as
and
their
imitators
)
to
breed
in
men
such
opinions
as
the
Church
of
thought
sutable
to
their
interest
▪
did
●rite
such
things
,
as
neither
other
men
nor
themselves
understood
.
These
I
confesse
I
have
a
little
sleighted
.
Other
Docters
of
the
Church
(
as
and
others
)
that
did
write
their
sense
clearly
,
I
never
sleighted
,
but
alwayes
very
much
reverenced
,
and
admired
▪
Wherein
then
lieth
my
presumption
?
if
it
be
because
I
am
a
private
man
,
let
the
Bishop
also
take
heed
he
contradict
not
some
of
those
whom
the
World
worthily
esteemes
,
least
he
also
(
for
he
is
a
private
man
)
be
taxed
of
presumption
(
h
T.
H.
I
confesse
that
among
the
Logicians
,
are
termes
of
Art
▪
But
if
the
Bishop
thing
that
Fallacies
of
be
terms
of
Art
,
I
am
not
of
his
opinion
.
For
these
are
no
more
terms
of
Art
in
Logick
▪
then
&c.
in
the
Mathematicks
and
the
rest
that
follow
are
terms
of
Art
invented
for
the
easier
Apprehension
of
youngmen
,
and
are
by
youngmen
understood
.
But
the
terms
of
the
School
with
which
I
have
found
fault
,
have
been
invented
to
blind
the
understanding
,
and
cannot
be
understood
by
those
,
that
intend
to
learn
Divinity
.
And
to
his
question
whether
the
Moral
Philosopher
must
quit
his
means
and
extreams
,
I
answer
,
that
though
they
are
not
terms
of
Art
,
he
ought
to
quite
them
,
when
they
cannot
be
understood
,
and
when
they
can
,
to
use
them
rightly
.
And
therefore
though
be
terms
intelligible
,
yet
I
would
have
them
quit
the
placing
of
vertue
in
the
one
,
and
of
vice
in
the
other
.
But
for
his
liberty
his
necessity
(
if
any
moral
Philosopher
ever
used
them
)
then
away
with
them
,
they
serve
for
nothing
but
to
seduce
young
Students
.
In
like
manner
let
the
natural
Philosopher
no
more
mention
his
his
Temperament
He
may
keep
his
but
his
Sympathies
and
Antipathies
,
his
Antiperistasis
and
the
like
,
names
of
excuses
,
rather
then
of
causes
▪
I
would
have
him
●●ing
away
.
And
for
the
Astrologer
(
unlesse
he
means
Astronomer
)
I
would
have
him
throw
away
his
whole
trade
;
but
if
he
mean
Astronomer
,
then
the
terms
of
Artique
,
Antartique
,
Aequator
,
Zodiack
,
Zenith
,
Meridian
,
Horizon
,
Zones
,
&c.
are
no
more
terms
of
Art
in
Astronomy
,
then
a
or
a
in
the
Art
of
a
Carpenter
.
He
cites
no
terms
of
Art
for
Geometry
,
I
was
afraid
he
would
have
put
or
perhaps
for
terms
of
Art
.
So
that
now
I
know
not
what
be
those
terms
he
thinks
I
would
cast
away
in
Geometry
.
And
lastly
for
his
Metaphysician
,
I
would
have
him
quit
both
his
terms
and
his
Profession
,
as
being
saith
in
the
beginning
of
the
life
of
the
Great
)
not
at
all
profitable
to
learning
,
but
made
onely
for
an
essay
,
to
the
learner
and
the
Divine
to
use
no
word
in
preaching
,
but
such
as
his
Auditors
,
nor
in
writing
,
but
such
as
a
common
Reader
may
understand
;
And
all
this
not
for
the
pleasing
of
my
Palate
,
but
for
the
promotion
of
truth
.
(i)
T.
H.
De
Cive
,
Cap.
a
seditious
opinion
to
teach
that
the
knowledge
of
good
and
evill
belongs
to
private
persons
.
in
questions
of
Faith
,
the
civill
Magistrates
ought
to
consult
with
the
Ecclesiastical
Doctors
,
to
whom
Gods
blessing
is
derived
by
imposition
of
hands
,
so
as
not
to
be
deceived
in
necessary
truths
,
&c.
He
thinks
he
hath
a
great
advantage
against
me
from
my
own
words
in
my
Book
which
he
would
not
have
thought
if
he
had
understood
them
.
The
knowledge
of
good
and
evill
,
is
Iudicature
,
which
in
Latin
is
Every
private
man
may
do
his
best
to
attain
a
knowledge
of
what
is
good
and
evill
in
the
action
he
is
to
do
;
but
to
judge
of
what
is
good
and
evill
in
others
belongs
not
to
him
,
but
to
those
whom
the
Soveraign
Power
appointeth
thereunto
.
But
the
Bishop
not
understanding
,
or
forgetting
that
is
to
judg
,
as
did
of
Gods
commandement
,
hath
cited
this
place
to
little
purpose
.
And
for
the
infallibility
of
the
Ecclesiastical
Doctors
by
me
attributed
to
them
,
it
is
not
that
they
cannot
be
deceaved
,
but
that
a
subject
cannot
he
deceived
in
obeying
them
when
they
are
our
lawfully
constituted
Doctors
.
For
the
supreme
Ecclesiastical
Doctor
is
he
that
hath
the
supreme
Power
;
and
in
obeying
him
no
subject
can
be
deceived
;
because
thy
are
by
God
himself
commanded
to
obey
him
.
And
what
the
Ecclesiastical
Doctors
lawfully
constituted
do
tell
us
to
be
necessary
in
point
of
Religion
,
the
same
is
told
us
by
the
Soveraign
Power
.
And
therefore
,
though
we
may
be
deceaved
by
them
in
the
beleef
of
an
opinion
,
we
can
not
be
deceived
by
them
in
the
duty
of
our
Actions
.
And
this
is
all
that
I
ascribe
to
the
Ecclesiastical
Doctors
.
If
they
think
it
too
much
,
let
them
take
upon
them
lesse
.
Too
little
they
cannot
say
it
is
,
who
take
it
,
as
it
is
,
for
a
Burthen
.
And
for
them
who
seek
it
as
a
wordly
preferment
,
it
is
too
much
.
I
take
(
he
says
)
too
much
upon
me
.
Why
so
?
Because
This
is
it
that
he
finds
fault
with
in
me
,
when
he
says
I
am
a
private
man
,
that
is
to
say
no
Prophet
,
that
is
to
say
no
Bishop
.
By
which
it
is
manifest
that
the
Bishop
subject●th
not
his
Spirit
but
to
the
Convocation
of
Bishops
,
I
admit
that
every
man
eught
to
subject
his
Spirit
to
the
Prophets
.
But
a
Prophet
is
he
that
speaketh
unto
us
from
God
;
which
I
acknowledgement
to
do
,
but
him
that
hath
due
Authority
so
to
do
.
And
no
man
hath
due
Authority
so
to
do
immediately
,
but
be
that
hath
the
supream
Authority
of
the
Commonwealth
;
nor
mediately
but
they
that
speak
such
things
to
the
people
,
as
●e
that
hath
the
Supream
Authority
alloweth
of
.
And
as
it
is
truth
in
this
sense
,
that
So
it
is
also
true
,
that
we
ought
not
Therefore
,
I
that
am
a
private
man
may
examine
the
Prophets
;
which
to
do
I
have
no
other
means
but
to
examine
whether
their
Doctrine
,
be
agreeable
to
the
Law
;
which
theirs
is
not
,
who
divide
the
Common
Wealth
into
two
Common-Wealths
,
Civil
and
Ecclesiastical
.
haec
quidem
vis
est
rippeth
up
the
bottome
of
the
question
,
answered
already
(
a
Election
is
not
opposite
to
either
,
he
,
who
submits
to
his
enemy
for
fear
of
death
,
chooseth
to
submit
.
(
b
(
c
a
man
forced
to
prison
,
that
he
may
choose
whether
he
will
be
haled
thither
upon
the
ground
,
or
walk
upon
his
feet
(
d
other
passions
do
necessitate
as
much
as
fear
fear
not
them
who
kill
the
body
,
but
fear
him
who
is
able
to
cast
both
body
and
soul
into
hell
▪
but
unto
the
Damsel
thou
shalt
do
nothing
,
there
is
in
her
no
fault
worthy
of
death
.
Tamars
T.
H.
T.
H.
T.
H.
Every
man
is
tempted
when
he
is
drawn
away
of
his
own
lust
and
entised
.
T.
H.
motives
to
do
,
&
the
motives
to
forbear
,
T.
H.
the
ignorance
of
the
true
causes
,
and
their
power
is
the
reason
,
why
we
ascribe
the
effect
to
liberty
;
but
when
we
seriously
consider
the
causes
of
things
,
we
acknowledge
a
necessity
.
the
will
doth
choose
of
necessity
,
as
well
as
the
fire
burns
of
neoessity
.
T.
H.
Concerning
the
Gods
,
I
have
nothing
to
say
,
whether
they
be
,
or
they
be
not
T.
H.
a
praemonere
It
attributes
command
,
and
subjection
to
the
faculties
of
the
soul
▪
as
if
they
made
a
Common-wealth
or
family
among
themselves
,
and
could
speak
one
to
another
,
(o)
They
who
invented
this
tearm
of
understood
not
any
thing
what
it
signified
.
mentall
tearms
vocal
tearms
as
it
is
absurdly
said
,
that
to
dance
is
an
act
allured
,
or
drawn
by
fair
means
out
of
the
ability
to
dance
;
So
it
is
absurdly
said
,
that
to
will
or
choose
,
is
an
act
drawn
out
of
the
power
to
will
.
(
●lic●tur
compelling
of
a
voluntary
action
are
all
one
(
p
Might
it
not
have
been
as
easily
said
in
English
,
a
voluntary
action
.
The
sum
of
distinction
is
that
a
voluntary
act
may
be
done
on
compulsion
that
is
to
say
,
by
●oul
means
.
But
to
will
that
,
or
any
act
cannot
be
but
by
allurement
or
fair
means
.
(
q
(
a
If
that
which
I
have
told
him
again
be
false
,
why
shews
he
not
why
it
is
false
?
Here
is
not
one
word
of
Argument
against
it
.
To
say
I
might
have
said
as
well
that
a
stone
thrown
upwards
moves
naturally
is
no
refutation
,
but
a
deniall
.
I
will
not
dispute
with
him
whether
a
stone
thrown
up
move
naturally
,
or
not
.
I
shall
onely
say
to
those
Readers
,
whose
Judgements
are
not
defaced
with
the
abuse
of
Words
,
that
as
a
stone
moveth
not
upwards
of
it self
,
but
by
the
P●●●er
of
the
Exernal
Agent
,
who
giveth
it
a
beginning
of
that
motion
;
So
also
when
the
stone
falleth
,
it
is
moved
downward
by
the
Power
of
some
other
Agent
,
which
(
though
it
be
imper●eptible
to
the
eye
)
is
not
imperceptible
to
reason
.
But
because
this
is
not
proper
discourse
for
the
Bishop
,
and
because
I
have
else
where
discoursed
thereof
expressly
,
I
shall
say
nothing
of
it
h●re
.
And
whereas
he
says
It
may
parhap●
be
●rue
,
and
I
think
it
is
;
but
here
it
not
onely
inferreth
nothing
,
but
was
also
needlesse
,
and
therefore
in
a
publick
writing
is
an
undecent
instance
,
though
sometimes
not
unnecessary
in
a
Spirituall
Court.
In
the
next
place
he
wonders
how
that
is
to
say
,
how
a
man
is
made
to
will
,
and
yet
Free
to
do
what
he
will
.
I●
he
had
said
he
wondered
how
a
man
can
●e
compelled
to
●ill
,
and
yet
be
Free
to
do
that
which
he
would
have
done
,
if
●e
had
not
been
compelled
,
it
had
been
somewhat
;
as
it
is
it
is
nothing
;
again
he
says
,
All
which
is
true
▪
But
when
he
says
be
doth
not
insinuate
For
that
would
pre●udice
him
hereafter
in
case
he
should
have
need
of
quarter
.
But
how
this
maketh
for
him
,
or
against
me
,
I
perceive
not
.
(
saith
he
I
say
the
same
,
The
Wil
cannot
be
compelled
;
but
the
man
may
be
,
and
〈◊〉
then
compelled
when
his
Wil
is
changed
by
the
fear
o●
force
,
punishment
,
or
other
hurt
from
God
or
man
.
And
when
h●s
Wil
is
changed
,
there
is
a
new
Wil
formed
,
(
Whether
it
be
by
God
or
by
man
,
▪
and
that
necessarily
;
and
consequently
the
Actions
that
flow
from
that
Wil
are
both
volunt●ry
Free
,
and
●ecessary
,
notwithstanding
that
he
was
compelled
to
do
them
.
Which
maketh
not
for
the
Bishop
but
for
me
.
(
b
▪
That
some
Actions
are
partly
voluntary
partly
involuntary
,
is
not
a
new
,
but
a
false
opinion
.
For
one
and
the
same
Action
can
never
be
both
voluntary
and
involuntary
.
If
therefore
the
parts
of
an
Action
,
be
Actions
,
be
says
no
more
but
that
some
Actions
are
volun●●●●
some
involuntary
;
or
that
one
multitude
of
Actions
may
be
〈◊〉
voluntary
,
partly
involuntary
.
But
that
one
Action
should
be
partly
voluntary
partly
involuntary
is
absurd
;
And
it
is
the
absurdity
of
those
Authors
which
he
unwarily
gave
credit
to
.
But
to
say
is
to
say
,
that
the
throwing
of
a
mans
goods
into
the
Sea
,
supposing
he
had
not
been
in
a
storm
,
had
been
an
involuntary
Action
;
which
is
also
an
absurdity
;
for
he
would
not
have
done
it
,
and
therefore
it
had
been
no
Action
at
all
,
And
this
absurdity
it
his
own
.
(
c
a
man
forced
to
prison
,
that
he
may
choose
whether
he
will
be
h●●ed
thither
upon
the
ground
,
or
walk
upon
his
fe●t
,
It
is
enough
for
the
use
I
make
of
that
instance
,
that
when
a
man
in
the
necessity
of
going
to
Prison
,
though
he
cannot
elect
nor
deliberate
of
being
Prisoner
in
the
Jail
,
may
neverthelesse
deliberate
sometimes
,
whether
he
shall
walk
,
or
be
haled
thither
.
(
d
other
passions
do
necessitate
as
much
as
fear
.
First
,
he
says
,
I
erre
in
this
that
I
say
,
that
fear
determins
the
rational
Wil
naturally
and
necessarily
.
And
first
,
I
answer
,
that
I
never
used
that
term
of
rational
Wil.
There
is
nothing
rational
but
God
,
Angels
,
and
men
.
The
Wil
is
none
of
these
.
I
would
not
have
excepted
against
this
expression
,
but
that
every
where
he
speaketh
of
the
Will
and
other
faculties
as
of
men
,
or
Spirits
in
mens
bellies
.
Secondly
,
he
offereth
nothing
to
prove
the
contrary
.
For
that
which
followeth
I
grant
him
that
the
greatest
of
five
(
or
of
fifteen
for
he
had
no
more
reason
for
five
then
fifteen
)
terrible
things
doth
not
alwayes
necessitate
a
man
to
do
a
dishonest
Action
,
and
that
the
fear
of
the
fiery
Furnace
could
not
compel
the
three
Children
,
nor
the
Lions
to
omit
their
duty
;
for
somewhat
else
(
namely
their
confidence
in
God
)
did
necessitate
them
to
do
their
duty
.
is
w●ll
said
,
and
according
to
the
Text
he
citeth
.
And
proveth
strongly
that
fear
of
the
greater
evil
may
necessitate
in
a
man
,
a
courage
to
endure
the
lesser
evil
.
(
e
Excuse
me
,
O
Emperor
thou
threatnest
men
with
Prison
,
but
God
threatens
me
with
Hel.
]
This
Sentence
,
and
that
which
he
saith
that
neither
the
civil
Judg
,
is
the
proper
Judge
,
nor
the
Law
of
the
Land
is
the
proper
Rule
of
sin
,
&
divers
other
sayings
of
his
to
the
same
effect
,
make
it
impossible
for
any
Nation
in
the
World
to
preserve
themselves
from
civil
Wars
.
For
all
men
living
equally
acknowledging
that
the
High
and
Omnipotent
God
is
to
be
obey'd
before
the
greatest
Emperours
;
every
one
may
pretend
the
commandement
of
God
to
Justifie
his
disobedience
.
And
if
one
man
pretendeth
that
God
commands
one
thing
,
and
another
man
that
he
commands
the
contrary
,
what
equity
is
there
to
allow
the
pretence
of
one
,
more
then
of
another
?
Or
what
peace
can
there
be
if
they
be
all
allowed
a
like
?
There
will
therefore
necessarily
arise
discord
and
civil
War
,
unlesse
there
be
a
Judge
agreed
upon
with
Authority
given
to
him
by
every
one
of
them
,
to
show
them
,
and
interpr●t
to
them
the
Word
of
God
,
which
Interpretor
is
alwayes
the
Emperour
,
King
,
or
other
Soverain
person
,
who
therefore
ought
to
be
obeyed
.
But
the
Bishop
thinks
that
to
shew
us
and
interpret
to
us
the
Word
of
God
,
belongeth
to
the
Clergy
,
wherein
I
cannot
consent
unto
him
;
Excuse
me
,
O
Bishop
,
you
threaten
me
with
that
you
cannot
do
,
but
the
Emperour
threateneth
me
with
death
,
and
is
able
to
do
what
he
threateneth
.
(
f
I
know
not
to
what
point
of
my
answer
,
this
Reply
of
his
is
to
be
applyed
.
I
had
said
It
seems
that
he
calleth
Force
;
but
I
call
it
a
fear
of
force
,
or
of
dammage
to
be
done
by
force
,
by
which
fear
a
mans
will
is
framed
to
somewhat
,
to
which
he
had
no
will
before
.
Force
taketh
away
the
sin
,
because
the
Action
is
not
his
that
is
forced
,
but
his
that
forceth
.
It
is
not
alwayes
so
in
Compulsion
,
because
in
this
case
a
man
electeth
the
under
the
notion
of
But
his
instances
of
the
betrothed
Damsel
that
was
forced
,
and
of
may
for
any
thing
there
appeareth
in
the
Text
,
be
Instances
of
Compulsion
,
and
yet
the
Damsel
and
be
both
innocent
.
In
that
which
immediately
followeth
concernin●
how
far
fear
may
extenuate
a
sin
,
there
is
nothing
to
be
answered
.
I
preceive
in
it
,
he
hath
some
glimmering
of
the
truth
,
but
not
of
the
grounds
thereof
.
It
is
true
,
that
Just
●ear
dispenceth
not
with
the
precepts
of
God
or
Nature
;
for
they
are
not
dispensable
;
but
it
extenuateth
the
fault
,
not
by
di●●inishing
any
thing
in
the
Action
,
but
by
being
no
transgressi●n
.
For
if
the
fear
be
allowed
the
Action
it
produceth
is
allowed
also
.
Nor
doth
it
disp
use
in
any
case
with
the
Law
positive
,
but
by
making
the
Action
it self
Lawful
,
for
th●
breaking
of
a
Law
is
alwayes
sin
;
and
it
is
certain
that
men
are
obliged
to
the
observation
of
all
positive
Precepts
,
though
with
the
losse
of
their
lives
,
unlesse
the
right
that
a
man
hath
to
preserve
himself
,
make
it
,
in
case
of
a
just
Fear
,
to
be
n●
Law
.
he
says
'T
is
very
true
,
but
this
has
nothing
to
do
with
Compulsion
.
And
the
cause
why
it
was
no
sin
,
was
this
;
they
were
ready
to
ob●y
it
,
wh●nsoever
God
should
give
them
leasure
and
rest
from
travel
;
whereby
they
might
be
cured
,
or
at
least
when
God
,
that
daily
spake
to
their
Conducter
in
the
Desert
,
should
appoint
him
to
renew
that
Sacrament
.
(
g
The
case
is
this
;
a
Servant
,
is
robbed
of
his
Masters
money
by
the
Highway
,
but
is
acquit
because
he
was
forced
.
Another
Servant
spends
his
Masters
money
in
a
Tavern
.
Why
is
he
not
acquited
also
seeing
he
was
necessitated
?
(
h●
saith
he
admit
of
this
excuse
?
I
answer
no
:
But
I
would
do
that
to
him
,
which
should
necessitate
him
to
behave
himself
better
anoth●r
time
,
or
at
least
necessitate
another
to
behave
himself
better
,
by
his
example
.
(
h
the
motives
to
do
,
an●
the
m●tives
to
forbear
,
&c.
]
May
not
great
things
be
produced
by
second
causes
as
well
as
little
?
And
a
Foot-ball
as
well
as
a
Tennis-ball
?
But
the
Bishop
can
never
be
driven
from
this
,
that
the
Will
hath
power
to
move
it self
,
but
says
t
is
all
one
to
say
,
that
and
that
He
adds
,
that
I
say
indeed
the
effect
is
not
produced
before
the
last
dictate
of
the
understanding
;
but
I
say
not
that
the
necessity
was
not
before
;
he
knows
I
say
it
is
from
eternity
.
When
a
Cannon
is
planted
against
a
Wall
,
though
the
battery
be
not
made
till
the
bullet
arrive
,
yet
the
necessity
was
present
all
the
while
the
bullet
was
going
to
it
,
if
the
Wall
stood
still
;
and
if
it
●li●t
away
,
the
hitting
of
somewhat
else
was
necessary
,
and
that
antecedently
.
(
i
Yes
,
wh●n
the
Agent
is
d●termined
by
himself
,
then
the
effect
is
determined
likewise
in
its
cause
,
and
so
any
thing
else
is
what
he
will
have
it
.
But
nothing
is
determined
by
it self
,
nor
is
there
any
man
in
the
World
that
h●th
any
Conception
answerable
to
those
Words
.
But
(
he
says
This
also
is
insignificant
,
for
all
Motion
is
Natural
or
Supernatural
.
Moral
motion
is
a
meer
Word
,
without
any
Imagination
of
the
mind
correspondent
to
it
.
I
have
heard
men
talk
of
a
Motion
in
a
Court
of
Justice
;
perhaps
this
is
it
which
he
means
by
Moral
Motion
.
But
certainly
when
the
tongue
of
the
Judg
,
and
the
hands
of
the
Clerks
are
thereby
mov●d
,
the
Motion
is
Natural
,
and
proceed
from
natural
causes
,
which
causes
also
,
were
Natural
Motions
of
the
tongue
of
the
Advocate
.
And
whereas
he
adds
,
that
if
this
were
true
then
it
hath
been
sufficiently
answered
before
that
therefore
they
are
not
vain
,
because
by
them
is
produced
the
effect
.
I
must
also
note
that
oftentimes
in
citing
my
opinion
,
he
puts
●n
instead
of
mine
,
those
terms
of
his
own
,
which
upon
all
occasions
I
complain
of
for
absurdity
;
as
here
he
makes
me
to
say
,
that
which
I
did
never
say
,
(
k
the
ignorance
of
the
true
causes
,
and
their
Power
,
is
the
reason
why
we
ascribe
the
effect
●o
Liberty
;
but
when
we
seriously
consider
the
causes
of
things
,
we
acknowledge
a
necessity
.
I●●
▪
understand
the
Authors
which
he
readeth
upon
this
point
no
better
,
then
he
understands
what
I
have
here
written
,
it
is
no
wonder
he
understandeth
not
the
truth
of
the
question
.
I
said
not
,
that
says
the
Bishop
Is
there
any
doubt
if
a
man
could
foreknow
,
as
God
foreknows
that
which
is
hereafter
to
come
to
passe
,
but
that
he
would
also
see
and
know
she
causes
which
shall
bring
it
to
passe
,
and
how
they
work
,
and
make
the
effect
necessary
;
for
necessary
it
is
whatsoever
God
foreknoweth
.
But
we
that
foresee
them
not
,
may
consider
as
much
as
w●
will
,
and
understand
as
clearly
as
we
will
,
but
are
never
the
neerer
to
the
knowledge
of
their
necessity
;
and
that
I
said
was
the
cause
why
we
impute
those
events
to
Liberty
,
and
not
to
causes
.
(
l
the
Wil
doth
chose
of
necessity
,
as
well
as
the
fire
burns
of
necessity
.
in
actu
primo
,
&c.
Here
again
he
makes
me
speak
non
sense
;
I
said
he
says
,
I
say
And
why
,
but
because
he
thinks
I
ought
to
speak
as
he
does
,
and
say
,
as
he
does
here
,
that
No
,
Election
is
the
Act
of
a
man
,
as
power
to
Elect
is
the
power
of
a
man
.
Election
and
Wil
are
all
one
Act
of
a
man
,
and
the
power
to
Elect
,
and
the
power
to
Wil
one
and
the
same
power
of
a
man
.
But
the
Bishop
is
confounded
by
the
use
of
calling
by
the
name
of
Wil
,
the
power
of
willing
in
the
future
,
as
they
also
were
confounded
that
first
brought
in
this
senselesse
term
of
My
meaning
is
,
that
the
Election
I
shall
have
of
any
thing
hereafter
,
is
now
as
necessary
,
as
that
the
fire
that
now
is
,
and
continueth
,
shall
burn
any
combustible
matter
thrown
into
it
hereafter
.
Or
to
use
his
own
terms
,
the
Wil
hath
no
more
power
to
suspend
its
Willing
,
then
the
burning
of
the
fire
to
suspend
its
burning
.
Or
rather
more
properly
,
the
man
hath
no
more
power
to
suspend
his
Will
,
then
the
fire
,
to
suspend
his
burning
;
Which
is
contrary
to
that
,
which
he
would
have
,
namely
,
that
a
man
should
have
power
to
refuse
what
he
Wils
,
and
to
suspend
his
own
appetite
▪
for
to
refuse
what
one
willeth
implyeth
a
contradiction
;
the
which
also
is
made
much
more
absurd
by
his
expression
;
for
he
saith
,
the
Will
hath
power
to
refuse
what
it
Wils
,
and
to
suspend
its
own
Appetite
,
whereas
is
the
same
thing
.
He
adds
that
T.
H.
He
doth
not
sufficiently
understand
what
I
imagine
.
For
I
imagine
,
that
of
the
fire
which
shall
burn
five
hundred
years
hence
,
I
may
truly
say
now
,
it
shall
burn
necessarily
;
and
of
that
which
shall
not
burn
then
,
(
for
fire
may
sometimes
not
burn
the
combustible
matter
thrown
into
it
,
as
in
the
case
of
the
three
Children
)
that
it
is
necessary
it
shall
not
burn
.
(
m
To
this
I
say
nothing
but
that
I
understand
not
how
a
cause
can
be
necessary
,
and
the
Effect
not
be
necessarily
produced
.
(
n
By
this
second
reason
,
which
he
says
is
new
and
demonstrates
,
&c.
I
cannot
find
what
reason
he
means
;
for
there
are
but
two
,
whereof
the
later
is
in
these
Words
Imperatus
,
&c.
Actus
Elicitus
,
&c.
But
I
doubt
whether
this
be
it
he
means
or
no.
For
this
being
the
resolution
of
the
Schools
,
is
not
new
;
and
being
a
distinction
onely
,
is
no
demonstration
;
though
●erhaps
he
may
use
the
word
demonstration
,
as
every
unlearned
man
now
a
days
does
,
to
signifie
any
Argument
of
his
own
.
As
for
the
distinction
it self
,
because
the
terms
are
Latine
,
and
never
used
by
any
Author
of
the
Latine
tongue
,
to
shew
their
impertinence
,
I
expounded
them
in
English
,
and
left
them
to
the
Readers
judgement
,
to
find
the
absurdity
of
them
himself
.
And
the
Bishop
in
this
part
of
his
Reply
,
indeavours
to
defend
them
.
And
first
he
calls
it
a
Trivial
and
Grammatical
objection
,
to
say
they
are
Is
there
any
thing
lesse
be
seeming
a
or
a
then
to
speak
where
the
truth
is
in
question
.
Perhaps
it
may
be
tollerable
in
one
that
Divineth
,
but
not
in
him
that
pretendeth
to
demonstrate
.
It
is
not
that
giveth
Words
their
Authority
,
but
the
generality
of
them
who
acknowledge
,
that
they
understand
them
.
though
their
signification
be
changed
,
yet
they
are
understood
;
and
so
are
the
names
of
the
Days
.
And
when
English
Rea●ers
not
engaged
in
School
Divinity
shall
find
as
intelligible
as
those
,
I
will
confesse
I
had
no
reason
to
find
fault
.
But
my
braving
against
that
famous
,
and
most
necessary
distinction
,
between
the
Elicite
and
Imperate
Acts
of
the
Wil
,
he
says
was
onely
to
hide
from
the
eyes
of
the
Reader
a
tergiversation
in
not
answering
this
Argument
of
his
This
Argument
is
not
to
be
found
in
this
to
which
I
here
answered
;
nor
had
I
ever
said
that
the
Wil
was
compelled
.
But
he
taking
all
necessitation
for
Compulsion
,
doth
now
in
this
place
from
necessitation
simply
,
bring
in
this
Inference
concerning
the
cause
of
evill
,
and
thinks
he
shall
force
me
to
say
,
that
God
is
the
cause
of
sin
.
I
shall
say
onely
what
is
said
in
the
Scripture
,
I
shall
say
what
saith
to
I
shall
say
that
that
is
true
,
which
the
Prophet
David
saith
,
David
.
But
that
which
God
himself
saith
of
himself
,
The
King
hearkned
not
to
the
people
,
for
the
cause
was
from
the
Lord
,
I
will
not
say
,
least
the
Bishop
exclaim
against
me
,
but
leave
it
to
be
interpreted
by
those
that
have
authority
to
interpret
the
Scriptures
.
I
say
further
,
that
to
cause
sin
is
not
always
sin
,
nor
can
be
sin
in
him
that
is
not
subject
to
some
higher
Power
;
but
to
use
so
unseemly
a
Phrase
as
to
say
that
God
is
the
cause
of
sin
,
because
it
soundeth
so
like
to
saying
that
God
sinneth
,
I
can
never
be
forced
by
so
weak
an
argument
as
this
of
his
.
that
is
in
plain
English
says
Tract
.
Theol.
cap.
Calvin
.
Inst.
Cap.
in
his
And
the
of
Dort
.
I
could
add
more
.
For
all
the
famous
Doctors
of
the
Reformed
Churches
,
and
with
them
St.
Augustine
are
of
the
same
opinion
.
None
of
these
denied
that
God
is
the
cause
of
al
Motion
&
Action
,
or
that
God
is
the
cause
of
al
Laws
;
and
yet
they
were
never
forced
to
say
that
God
is
the
cause
of
sin
.
They
who
invented
this
term
of
Actus
Imperatus
understood
not
any
thing
what
it
signified
In
this
place
the
Bishop
hath
discovered
the
ground
of
all
his
errors
in
Philosophy
,
which
is
this
,
that
he
thinketh
,
when
he
repeateth
the
words
of
a
proposition
in
his
mind
,
that
is
,
when
he
fancieth
the
words
without
speaking
them
,
that
then
hee
conceiveth
the
things
which
the
words
signifie
,
and
this
is
the
most
general
cause
of
false
opinions
.
For
men
can
never
be
deceived
in
the
conceptions
of
things
,
though
they
may
,
and
are
most
often
deceived
by
giving
unto
them
wrong
terms
or
appellations
,
different
from
those
which
are
commonly
used
,
and
constituted
to
signifie
their
conceptions
.
And
therefore
they
that
study
to
attain
the
certain
knowledge
of
truth
,
do
use
to
set
down
before
hand
all
the
terms
they
are
to
expresse
themselves
by
,
and
declare
in
what
sense
they
shall
use
them
constantly
.
And
by
this
means
,
the
Reader
having
an
Idea
of
every
thing
there
named
,
cannot
conceive
amisse
.
But
when
a
man
from
the
hearing
of
a
word
hath
no
Idea
of
the
thing
signified
,
but
onely
of
the
sound
,
and
of
the
Letters
whereof
the
word
is
made
(
which
is
that
he
here
calleth
it
is
impossible
he
should
conceive
aright
,
or
bring
forth
any
thing
but
absurdity
;
as
he
doth
here
,
when
he
says
,
that
when
delivered
his
commands
to
his
Son
,
by
he
did
it
by
As
if
to
strick
off
the
head
of
a
Poppy
were
Mental
term
.
It
is
the
sound
and
the
Letters
that
maketh
him
think
somewhat
.
And
it
is
the
same
that
makes
him
say
(
for
think
it
he
cannot
)
that
to
Wil
,
or
choose
,
is
drawn
,
or
allured
,
or
fetch
't
out
of
the
power
to
Wil.
For
drawing
cannot
be
imagined
but
of
bodys
;
and
therefore
to
Will
,
to
speak
,
to
write
,
to
dance
,
to
leape
,
or
any
way
to
be
moved
,
cannot
be
said
intelligibly
to
be
much
lesse
to
be
drawn
out
of
a
Power
,
that
is
to
say
,
out
of
an
ability
;
for
whatsoever
is
drawn
out
,
is
drawn
out
of
one
place
into
another
.
He
that
can
discourse
in
this
manner
in
Philosophy
,
cannot
probably
be
thought
able
to
discourse
rationally
in
any
thing
.
(
p
Might
it
not
have
been
as
easily
said
in
English
,
a
voluntary
Action
?
He
says
,
that
is
when
I
say
when
a
man
opens
and
shuts
his
eyes
according
to
his
Wil
,
that
it
is
a
voluntary
Action
;
and
I
believe
we
mean
one
and
the
same
thing
.
Whether
of
us
speak
more
properly
,
or
more
truly
,
let
the
Reader
Judge
.
(
q
T.
H.
great
paradox
of
his
own
that
there
is
hardly
any
one
action
to
the
causing
of
which
concurres
not
whatsoever
is
Prester
John
THere
is
not
much
in
this
part
of
his
Reply
,
that
needeth
Animadversion
.
But
I
must
observe
where
he
saith
.
He
answereth
nothing
at
all
to
me
,
who
attribute
not
the
necessitation
of
the
Will
to
the
Stars
and
Complections
,
but
to
the
aggregate
of
all
things
together
that
are
in
motion
.
I
do
not
say
that
the
Stars
or
Complections
of
themselves
do
incline
men
to
Wil
;
but
when
men
are
inclined
,
I
must
say
that
that
inclination
,
was
necessitated
by
some
causes
or
other
.
a
great
Paradox
of
his
own
;
that
there
is
hardly
any
one
Action
,
to
the
causing
of
which
concurres
not
whatsoever
is
The
Bishop
speaks
often
of
Paradoxes
which
such
scorn
or
detestation
,
that
a
simple
Reader
would
take
a
Paradox
either
for
Felony
,
or
some
other
hainous
crime
,
or
else
for
some
rediculous
turpitude
;
whereas
perhaps
a
Judicious
Reader
knows
what
the
word
signifies
.
And
that
a
Paradox
is
an
opinion
not
yet
generally
received
.
Christian
Religion
was
once
a
Paradox
;
and
a
great
many
other
opinions
which
the
Bishop
now
holdeth
,
were
formerly
Paradoxes
.
Insomuch
as
when
a
man
calleth
an
opinion
Paradox
,
he
doth
not
say
it
is
untrue
,
but
signifieth
his
own
ignorance
;
for
if
he
understood
it
,
he
would
call
it
either
a
truth
or
an
errour
.
He
observes
not
,
that
but
for
Paradoxes
,
we
should
be
now
in
that
savage
ignorance
which
those
men
are
in
▪
that
have
not
,
or
have
not
long
had
Laws
and
Common-wealth
,
from
whence
porceedeth
Science
and
Civility
.
There
was
not
long
since
a
Scholler
,
that
maintained
that
if
the
least
thing
that
had
waight
should
be
laid
down
upon
the
hardest
body
that
could
be
,
supposing
it
an
Anvill
of
Diamant
,
it
would
at
the
first
accesse
make
it
yeeld
.
This
I
thought
,
and
much
more
the
Bishop
would
have
thought
a
Paradox
.
But
when
he
told
me
,
that
either
that
would
do
it
,
or
all
the
waight
of
the
World
would
not
doe
it
,
because
if
the
whole
waight
did
it
,
every
the
least
part
thereof
would
do
its
part
,
I
saw
no
reason
to
dissent
.
In
like
manner
when
I
say
It
seems
to
the
Bishop
a
great
Paradox
;
and
if
I
should
say
that
all
Action
is
the
effect
of
Motion
,
and
that
there
cannot
be
a
Motion
in
one
part
of
the
World
,
but
the
same
must
also
be
communicated
to
all
the
rest
of
the
World
,
he
would
say
that
this
were
no
lesse
a
Paradox
.
But
yet
if
I
should
say
,
that
if
a
lesser
body
,
as
a
concave
Sphere
or
Tun
,
were
filled
with
air
or
other
liquid
matter
,
and
that
any
one
little
particle
thereof
were
moved
,
all
the
rest
would
be
moved
also
,
he
would
conceive
it
to
be
true
,
or
if
not
he
,
a
judicious
reader
would
.
It
is
not
the
greatness
of
the
Tun
that
altereth
the
case
;
and
therefore
the
same
would
be
true
also
,
if
the
whole
World
were
the
Tun
;
for
t
is
the
greatness
of
this
Tun
that
the
Bishop
comprohendeth
not
.
But
the
truth
is
comprehensible
enough
,
and
may
be
said
without
ambition
of
being
the
founder
of
strange
opinions
.
And
though
a
Grave
man
may
smile
at
it
,
he
that
is
both
Grave
and
wise
will
not
.
though
the
power
of
outward
objects
do
proceed
from
our
own
faults
,
if
such
faults
of
ours
proceed
not
from
causes
in
our
own
power
.
but
then
the
contrary
habit
doth
necessitate
the
one
way
,
as
well
as
the
former
habit
did
the
other
way
.
that
we
are
not
mooved
to
prayer
or
any
other
action
but
by
outward
objects
,
as
pions
company
,
godly
Preachers
or
something
equivalent
.
liberty
is
in
no
danger
,
but
to
be
lost
,
but
I
say
,
it
cannot
be
lost
,
therefore
that
it
is
in
no
danger
at
all
.
I
cannot
imagine
how
the
question
,
whether
outward
objects
do
necessitate
,
or
not
necessitate
the
Wil●
,
can
any
●ay
be
referred
to
Moral
Philosophy
.
The
principles
●f
moral
Philosophy
are
the
Laws
,
wherewith
outward
objects
have
little
to
do
,
as
being
for
the
most
part
inanimate
,
&
which
follow
alwayes
the
force
of
nature
without
respect
to
moral
Laws
.
Nor
can
I
conceive
what
purpose
he
had
to
bring
this
into
his
Reply
to
my
answer
,
wherein
I
attribute
nothing
in
the
Action
of
outward
objects
to
Morallity
.
(
b
the
power
of
outward
objects
do
proceed
from
our
own
faults
,
if
such
faults
of
ours
proceed
not
from
causes
in
our
own
power
.
But
how
pr●v●s
he
that
in
truth
they
do
?
saith
he
Very
well
reasoned
.
A
Horse
is
lame
from
a
cause
that
was
not
in
his
power
,
therefore
the
lameness
is
no
fault
in
the
Horse
.
But
his
meaning
is
,
t●s
no
injustice
unlesse
the
causes
were
in
his
own
power
;
as
if
it
were
not
injustice
whatsoever
is
willingly
done
against
the
Law
,
whatsoever
it
be
that
is
the
cause
o●
the
Wil
to
do
it
.
(
c
There
is
no
such
confession
in
my
answer
.
I
said
,
But
I
never
said
that
the
Will
to
Pray
,
Fast
&c.
is
in
our
own
power
.
True
but
then
the
contrary
habit
doth
necessitate
the
on●
way
,
as
well
as
the
former
habit
did
the
other
way
.
Again
he
mistakes
,
for
I
said
that
which
is
not
to
say
that
the
habit
necessitates
but
is
necessitated
But
this
is
Common
with
him
to
make
me
say
that
which
out
of
readin●
,
n●t
out
of
Meditation
he
useth
to
say
hi●●●●
.
B●t
how
doth
it
ap●●ar
,
that
Prayer
and
Fasting
&c.
make
but
a
Proclivity
in
men
to
do
what
they
do
for
if
it
●ere
but
a
Proclivity
,
then
what
they
do
,
they
do
not
.
Therefore
they
either
necessitate
the
Will
,
or
the
Will
followeth
n●t
;
I
contend
for
the
truth
of
this
onely
,
that
when
the
W●ll
followeth
them
they
necessitate
the
will
;
and
when
a
●r●climity
followeth
they
necessitate
the
proclimity
.
But
the
Bishop
thin●s
I
maintain
that
that
also
is
produced
necessiarily
,
which
is
not
produced
at
a●
.
(
d
that
we
are
not
moved
to
Prayer
,
or
any
other
Action
,
but
by
outward
objects
,
as
pio●s
company
,
and
Godly
Preachers
,
or
something
equivalent
The
first
mistake
,
he
urgeth
that
I
call
Preachers
and
company
objects
.
Is
not
the
Preacher
to
the
hearer
the
object
of
his
hearing
?
No
,
perhaps
he
will
say
it
is
the
voyce
which
is
the
object
,
and
that
we
hear
not
the
Preacher
,
but
his
voyce
,
as
before
he
said
the
object
of
sight
,
was
not
the
cause
of
sight
.
I
must
therefore
once
more
make
him
smile
with
a
great
Paradox
which
is
this
,
that
in
all
th●
senses
he
is
the
And
that
it
is
,
when
we
hear
a
Preacher
,
the
Preacher
that
we
hear
,
and
that
his
is
the
same
thing
with
the
and
a
fancy
in
the
hearer
,
though
the
motion
o●
the
Lips
,
and
other
organs
of
spe●ch
be
his
that
speaketh
.
But
of
this
I
have
written
more
largely
in
a
mo●e
proper
place
.
My
second
mistake
,
in
affirming
is
a
mistake
of
his
own
.
For
I
said
not
for
I
alwayes
avoid
attributing
motion
to
any
thing
but
Body
.
The
Will
is
produced
,
generated
,
formed
,
and
created
in
su●h
●ort
as
accidents
are
effected
in
a
corp●real
subject
,
but
moved
it
cannot
be
,
because
it
goeth
not
●rom
place
to
place
.
And
whereas
h●
saith
if
he
had
spoken
properly
as
he
ought
to
do
,
and
said
,
the
Will
is
made
or
created
by
it self
,
he
would
presently
have
acknowledged
that
it
was
impossible
.
So
that
it
is
not
without
cause
men
use
improper
Language
,
when
they
mean
to
keep
their
errours
from
being
detected
.
And
because
nothing
can
move
that
is
not
it self
moved
,
it
is
untruly
said
that
either
the
Will
or
any
thing
else
is
moved
or
that
Acts
or
habits
are
by
God
,
for
is
motion
,
and
nothing
is
moved
but
bodys
.
(
e
By
his
favour
,
though
he
be
answering
now
,
he
was
proving
then
.
And
what
he
answers
now
maketh
nothing
more
toward
a
proof
then
was
before
.
For
these
words
,
are
no
more
,
(
being
reduced
into
proper
terms
)
then
this
,
which
is
Jargon
(
f
Liberty
is
in
no
danger
,
but
to
be
lost
;
but
I
say
it
cannot
be
lost
,
therefore
that
it
is
in
no
danger
at
all
.
It
is
true
that
a
man
hath
more
liberty
one
time
then
another
,
and
in
one
place
then
another
,
which
is
a
difference
of
liberty
〈◊〉
to
the
Body
.
But
as
to
the
liberty
of
doing
what
we
will
,
in
those
things
we
are
able
to
do
,
it
cannot
be
greater
one
time
then
another
.
Consequently
outward
objects
can
〈◊〉
wayes
endanger
liberty
further
then
it
destroyeth
it
.
And
his
answer
that
liberty
is
in
more
danger
to
be
abused
then
lost
,
is
not
to
the
question
,
but
a
meer
shift
to
be
thought
not
silenced
.
And
whereas
he
says
liberty
is
diminished
by
vitious
habits
,
it
cannot
be
understood
otherwise
then
that
vicious
habits
make
a
man
the
lesse
free
to
do
vicious
actions
;
which
I
believe
is
not
his
meaning
.
And
lastly
,
whereas
he
says
that
it
requireth
proof
;
for
for
any
thing
that
I
can
observe
,
mad
men
and
fools
have
the
same
liberty
that
other
men
have
,
in
those
things
that
are
in
their
power
to
do
.
Video
m●liora
proboque
,
Deteriora
sequor
.
Video
Meliora
proboque
,
Deteriora
sequor●
(
a
T.
H.
T.
H.
(
c
whose
will
to
strike
followeth
necessarily
that
thought
he
had
of
the
sequell
of
this
stroke
immediately
before
the
lifting
up
of
his
hand
he
approoved
not
that
which
he
did
and
he
did
that
which
he
hated
,
That
the
sense
of
present
good
is
more
immediate
to
the
action
than
the
foresight
of
evil
consequents
.
a
mans
mourning
more
for
the
loss
of
his
Child
than
for
his
sin
,
makes
nothing
to
the
last
dictate
of
the
understanding
.
sorrow
for
sin
is
not
voluntary
,
and
by
consequence
that
repentance
proceedeth
from
causes
,
T.
H.
Repentance
hath
causes
it
is
not
voluntary
(
a
This
is
the
Bishops
answer
to
the
necessity
inferred
from
that
,
that
the
Wil
necessarily
followeth
the
last
dictate
of
the
understanding
;
which
answer
he
thinks
is
not
sufficiently
taken
away
,
because
the
last
act
of
the
understanding
is
in
time
together
with
the
Wil
it self
,
and
therefore
not
antecedent
.
It
is
true
,
that
the
Wil
is
not
produced
,
but
in
the
same
Instant
with
the
last
dictate
of
the
understanding
;
but
the
necessity
of
the
Wil
,
and
the
necessity
of
the
last
dictate
of
the
understanding
may
have
been
antecedent
.
For
that
last
dictate
of
the
understanding
was
produced
by
causes
antecedent
,
and
was
then
necessary
though
not
yet
produced
;
as
when
a
stone
is
falling
,
the
necessity
of
touching
the
earth
is
antecedent
to
the
touch
it self
.
For
all
motion
through
any
determined
space
,
necessarily
makes
a
motion
through
the
next
space
,
unlesse
it
be
hindered
by
some
contrary
external
motion
,
and
then
the
stop
is
as
necessary
,
as
the
proceeding
would
have
been
.
The
Argument
therefore
from
the
last
dictate
of
the
understanding
sufficiently
inferreth
an
antecedent
necessity
,
as
great
as
the
necessity
that
a
stone
shall
fall
when
it
is
already
falling
.
As
for
his
other
answer
,
he
himself
says
it
is
but
probable
;
but
any
man
that
speaks
not
by
rote
,
but
thinks
of
what
he
says
,
will
presently
find
it
false
;
and
that
it
is
impossible
to
will
any
thing
that
appears
not
first
in
his
understanding
to
be
good
for
him
.
And
whereas
he
says
,
the
Wil
ought
to
follow
the
last
dictate
of
the
understanding
,
unlesse
he
mean
that
the
man
ought
to
follow
it
,
it
is
an
insignificant
speech
(
for
duties
are
the
mans
not
the
Wils
duties
)
and
if
he
means
so
,
then
t
is
false
;
for
a
man
ought
not
to
follow
the
dictate
of
the
understanding
when
it
is
erroneous
.
(
b
There
was
no
need
of
answer
,
for
he
hath
very
often
in
this
discourse
contradicted
it
himself
,
in
that
he
maketh
How
then
can
a
man
leave
that
to
liberty
when
his
Reason
can
give
no
sentence
?
And
for
his
leaving
it
to
chance
,
if
by
chance
he
mean
that
which
hath
no
causes
,
he
destroyeth
Providence
,
and
if
he
mean
that
which
hath
causes
,
but
unknown
to
us
,
he
leaveth
it
to
necessity
.
Besides
,
it
is
false
For
though
in
the
things
to
be
elected
there
may
be
an
exact
equality
,
yet
there
may
be
circumstances
in
him
that
is
to
elect
,
to
make
him
resolve
upon
that
of
the
two
which
he
considereth
for
the
present
,
and
to
break
of
all
further
deliberation
for
this
cause
,
that
he
must
not
(
to
use
his
own
instance
)
by
spending
time
in
vain
apply
neither
of
the
plaisters
,
which
the
Chirurgion
gives
him
,
to
his
wound
.
Another
of
his
reasons
was
,
True
;
But
does
it
therefore
follow
,
a
man
gives
no
sentence
?
The
Wil
therefore
may
follow
the
dictate
of
the
judgment
,
whether
the
man
weigh
,
or
not
weigh
all
that
might
be
weighed
.
His
third
reason
was
,
I
consesse
they
prevail
often
against
which
is
it
he
means
here
But
they
prevail
not
against
the
which
he
knows
is
the
meaning
of
in
this
place
.
And
the
Wil
of
a
passionate
and
peevish
fool
,
doth
no
lesse
follow
the
dictate
of
that
little
understanding
he
hath
,
then
the
Wil
of
the
wisest
man
followeth
his
wisedome
.
(
c
To
me
this
comparison
seemeth
very
proper
,
and
therefore
I
made
no
scruple
,
(
though
not
much
delighted
with
it
,
as
being
no
new
comparison
)
to
use
it
again
when
there
was
need
again
.
For
in
the
examination
of
truth
I
search
rather
for
perspicuity
,
then
elegance
.
But
the
Bishop
with
his
School
terms
is
far
from
perspicuity
.
How
neer
he
is
to
elegence
,
I
shall
not
forget
to
examine
in
due
time
.
But
why
is
this
comparison
improper
?
In
this
comparison
,
the
Objects
,
Means
,
&c.
are
the
weights
,
the
man
is
the
scale
,
the
understanding
of
a
Convenience
,
or
Inconvenience
,
is
the
pressure
of
those
weights
,
which
incline
him
,
now
one
way
,
now
another
,
and
that
inclination
is
the
Wil.
Again
the
Objects
,
Means
,
&c.
are
the
feathers
that
presse
the
Horse
,
the
feeling
of
that
pressure
is
understanding
,
and
his
patience
or
impatience
,
the
Wil
to
bear
them
,
if
not
too
many
,
or
if
too
many
to
lye
down
under
them
.
T
is
therefore
to
little
purpose
that
he
saith
the
understanding
is
not
weighed
.
Secondly
,
he
says
the
comparison
is
improper
,
This
and
that
which
followeth
is
all
non
sense
;
for
no
man
can
understand
that
the
understanding
maketh
any
alteration
in
the
Object
in
nor
that
nor
that
nor
that
signifie
any
thing
.
With
the
rest
of
this
Reply
I
shall
trust
the
Reader
,
and
onely
note
the
last
Words
,
where
he
makes
me
say
,
and
therefore
but
I
said
,
repentance
hath
causes
,
and
that
it
is
not
voluntary
;
he
chops
in
,
and
makes
an
absurd
consequence
,
which
he
would
have
the
Reader
believe
was
mine
,
and
then
c●n●utes
it
with
these
senselesse
words
▪
Can
any
man
but
a
Schoolman
think
the
Wil
is
voluntary
?
But
yet
the
Wil
is
the
cause
of
voluntary
actions
.
St.
Thomas
Aquinas
(
a
York
;
(
b
T.
H.
praises
,
dispraises
,
rewards
,
punishments
,
the
memory
of
good
and
evil
sequels
,
and
events
,
The
memory
of
praises
,
dispraises
,
rewards
,
punishments
,
good
and
evil
sequels
do
make
us
to
elect
what
we
elect
;
but
the
memory
of
these
things
is
from
the
sense
,
and
the
sense
from
the
o●●ration
of
the
external
ob●ects
,
and
the
Agency
of
external
obj●cts
〈…〉
from
God
therefore
all
actions
,
even
of
free
and
vol●nt●ry
Agents
,
are
nec●ss●ry
.
(
d
T.
H.
All
things
are
naked
and
open
to
his
eyes
,
Liberty
and
the
Decrees
of
God
,
are
irrecilable
.
Liberty
and
the
absolute
necessity
of
all
things
are
irreconciliable
.
Necessity
and
Gods
Decrees
are
all
one
.
I
allow
all
men
to
be
of
his
opinion
,
save
onely
those
that
conceive
in
their
minds
a
or
how
eternity
is
an
indivisible
point
,
rather
than
an
everlasting
succession
.
I
never
could
conc●ive
,
saith
he
,
how
eternity
should
be
an
indivisible
point
.
he
understands
as
little
how
it
can
be
true
which
I
say
,
that
God
is
not
just
but
Justice
it self
,
not
eternal
but
Eternity
it self
.
he
understands
not
how
I
conclude
from
hence
,
that
Eternity
is
an
indivisible
point
,
and
not
a
succession
.
how
it
can
be
said
,
that
an
infinite
point
,
wherein
is
no
succession
,
can
comprehend
all
time
which
is
successive
.
He
finds
not
these
phrases
in
the
Scripture
.
Dicitè Io Paean , & Io bis dicite Paean .
This
is
in
Reply
to
those
words
of
mine
,
If
the
French
Treatise
were
according
to
his
mind
,
what
need
was
there
that
the
examination
should
be
written
?
If
it
were
not
to
his
mind
,
it
was
in
confutation
of
him
,
that
is
to
say
,
written
against
the
Author
of
it
,
unlesse
perhaps
the
Bishop
thinks
that
he
writes
not
against
a
man
,
unlesse
he
charge
him
with
blasphemy
and
Atheism
,
as
he
does
me
.
To
this
I
answered
that
it
was
true
,
and
,
as
he
alledged
it
for
a
reason
why
he
should
not
be
of
my
opinion
,
so
I
alledged
it
for
a
reason
why
I
should
not
be
of
his
,
but
now
in
his
Reply
,
he
saith
that
his
opinion
is
But
why
should
he
adhere
to
it
,
unlesse
it
be
manifest
to
himself
?
And
if
it
be
manifest
to
himself
,
why
does
he
deny
that
he
is
able
to
comprehend
it
?
And
if
he
be
not
able
to
comprehend
it
,
how
knows
he
that
it
is
domonstrable
?
Or
why
says
he
that
so
confidently
,
which
he
does
not
know
?
Me
thinks
that
which
I
have
said
,
This
I
say
looketh
somewhat
liker
to
a
demonstration
than
any
thing
that
he
hath
hitherto
brought
to
prove
Free
Wil.
Another
reason
,
why
I
should
be
of
his
opinion
,
is
that
he
is
To
which
I
answer
,
first
,
that
I
am
in
possession
of
a
truth
derived
to
me
from
the
light
of
reason
.
Secondly
,
that
whereas
he
knoweth
not
,
whether
it
be
the
truth
that
he
possesseth
or
not
,
because
he
confesseth
he
knows
not
how
it
can
consist
with
Gods
Prescience
and
Decrees
,
I
have
sufficiently
shewn
that
my
opinion
of
necessity
not
onely
agrees
with
,
but
necessirily
followeth
from
the
eternal
Prescience
and
Decrees
of
God
.
Besides
it
is
an
unhansome
thing
for
a
man
to
derive
his
opinion
concerning
truth
by
succession
from
his
Ancestors
;
For
our
Ancestors
,
the
first
Christians
derived
not
therefore
their
truth
from
the
Gentils
because
they
were
their
Ancestors
.
My
argument
was
thus
Let
the
Bishop
compare
now
his
scurrilous
Argumentation
with
this
of
mine
,
and
tell
me
,
whether
he
that
sleeps
well
,
doth
all
his
life
time
think
no
hurt
.
If
he
had
meant
by
Liberty
,
as
other
men
do
the
Liberty
of
Action
,
that
is
,
of
things
which
are
in
his
power
,
to
doe
which
he
will
,
it
had
been
an
easie
matter
to
reconcile
it
with
the
Prescience
and
Decrees
of
God
;
But
meaning
the
Liberty
of
Wil
,
it
was
impossible
.
So
likewise
if
by
contingency
he
had
meant
simply
it
had
been
reconcilable
with
the
Decrees
of
God
;
but
meaning
it
was
impossible
.
And
therefore
,
though
it
be
true
he
says
,
that
yet
it
was
impossible
to
set
it
down
in
plain
terms
.
Nor
●ought
he
to
charge
me
with
For
the
truth
is
,
I
did
not
understand
them
at
all
,
nor
thought
he
understood
them
himself
;
but
was
willing
to
give
them
the
best
imterpretation
they
would
bear
;
which
he
calls
wresting
them
to
a
wrong
sense
.
And
first
,
I
understood
not
what
he
meant
by
the
Aspect
of
God
.
For
if
he
had
meant
his
foreknowledge
,
(
which
word
he
had
often
used
before
)
what
needed
he
in
this
one
place
onely
to
call
it
Or
what
need
he
here
call
it
his
Or
say
that
all
things
are
open
to
the
eyes
of
God
,
not
which
is
to
expound
in
that
Text
,
Hebr.
not
figuratively
but
littera●ly
,
neverth●l●sse
excluding
which
the
School-men
say
are
the
cause
of
seeing
.
But
it
wat
well
done
to
exclude
such
insignificant
speeches
,
upon
every
occasion
whatsoever
.
And
though
I
do
not
hold
the
foreknowledge
of
God
to
consist
in
yet
I
shall
be
never
driven
to
say
it
is
by
as
long
as
I
know
that
even
a
man
hath
foreknowledge
of
all
those
things
which
he
intendeth
himself
to
do
,
not
by
discourse
but
by
knowing
his
own
purpose
,
saving
that
man
hath
a
superiour
power
over
him
that
can
change
his
purpose
,
which
God
hath
not
.
And
whereas
he
says
,
I
confound
this
Aspect
with
the
Wil
and
Decrees
of
God●
,
●he
〈◊〉
wrongifully
.
For
how
could
I
so
confound
it
,
when
I
understood
not
what
it
meant
?
Liberty
and
the
Decrees
of
God
are
●rreconcileable
;
and
the
reason
why
I
do
so
is
If
Liberty
cannot
stand
with
necessity
,
it
cannot
stand
with
the
Decrees
of
God
;
of
which
Decrees
,
necessity
is
a
Consequent
;
I
needed
not
to
say
,
nor
did
say
,
that
Necessity
and
Gods
Decrees
are
all
one
,
though
if
I
had
said
it
,
it
had
not
been
without
Authority
of
learned
men
,
in
whose
writings
are
often
found
this
sentence
,
Hitherto
true
;
then
he
addeth
,
This
is
false
.
For
nothing
operateth
by
its
own
original
power
,
but
God
himself
:
Man
operateth
not
but
by
special
power
,
(
I
say
special
power
not
special
influence
)
derived
from
God
.
Nor
is
it
by
Gods
permission
onely
as
I
have
often
already
shown
,
and
as
the
Bishop
here
contradicting
his
former
words
confesseth
;
for
signifie
the
same
thing
;
And
that
which
he
says
that
God
is
Jargon
.
For
every
concurrence
is
one
singular
and
individual
concurrence
;
and
nothing
in
the
World
is
general
;
but
the
signification
of
words
and
other
signs
.
I
allow
all
men
to
be
of
his
opinion
▪
save
onely
those
that
conceive
in
their
minds
a
or
how
eternity
is
an
indivisible
point
,
rather
then
an
everlasting
succession
.
Surely
if
the
reason
,
wherefore
my
opinion
is
false
,
proceed
from
this
,
that
I
conceive
not
eternity
to
be
but
an
everlasting
succession
,
I
am
allowed
to
hold
my
opinion
till
I
can
conceive
eternity
otherwise
;
at
least
he
allows
men
not
till
then
to
be
of
his
opinion
for
the
hath
said
As
for
the
many
other
wayes
which
he
says
are
if
they
mean
such
Liberty
and
Contingency
as
the
Bishop
meaneth
,
they
are
proposed
in
vain
;
for
Truth
and
Errour
can
n●ver
be
r●conciled
.
But
saith
he
●e
says
▪
I
know
the
load-stone
hath
no
such
attractive
power
;
and
yet
I
know
that
the
Iron
cometh
to
it
,
or
it
to
the
Iron
;
and
therefore
wonder
not
that
the
Bishop
knoweth
not
how
it
cometh
to
have
that
power
.
In
the
next
place
he
sayeth
I
bring
nothing
to
prove
that
Eternity
is
not
an
indivisible
point
,
but
my
own
incapacity
The
truth
is
,
I
cannot
dispute
neither
for
,
nor
against
(
as
he
can
do
)
the
positions
I
understand
not
.
Nor
do
I
understand
what
der●gation
it
can
be
to
the
Divine
perfection
,
to
attribute
to
it
Potentiality
,
that
is
(
in
English
)
Power
,
and
successive
Duration
;
for
such
Attributes
are
often
given
to
it
in
the
Scripture
.
he
understands
as
little
how
it
can
be
true
which
I
say
,
that
God
is
not
Just
,
but
Justice
it self
,
nor
Eternal
,
but
Eternity
it self
They
are
unseemly
word
to
be
said
of
God
,
(
I
will
not
say
)
blasp●emous
and
ath●istic●l
▪
which
are
the
attributes
he
gives
to
my
opinions
because
I
do
not
think
them
spoken
out
of
an
evil
mind
,
but
out
of
Errour
,
they
are
I
say
unseemly
words
to
be
said
of
God
,
that
he
is
not
just
,
that
he
is
not
Eternal
,
and
(
as
he
also
said
)
that
he
is
not
Wise
,
and
cannot
be
excused
by
any
following
especially
when
the
is
followed
by
that
which
is
n●t
to
be
understood
.
Can
any
man
understand
●ow
Justice
is
just
,
or
Wisdome
Wise
?
and
whereas
Justice
is
an
Accident
,
one
of
the
Moral
vertues
,
and
Wisdome
another
,
how
God
is
an
Accident
or
Moral
vertue
?
T
is
more
then
the
School-men
or
Metaphysicians
can
understand
;
whose
writings
have
troubled
my
head
more
then
they
should
have
done
,
if
I
had
known
that
amongst
so
many
senselesse
disput●s
,
there
had
been
so
f●w
lucide
internall●
.
But
I
have
considered
since
,
where
men
will
undertake
to
reason
out
of
natural
Philosophy
,
of
the
Incomprehensible
Nature
of
God
,
that
it
is
impossible
they
should
sp●ak
intelligibly
,
or
in
other
Language
then
Metaphysique
;
wherein
they
may
contradict
themselves
▪
and
n●t
perceave
it
;
as
he
does
here
,
when
he
says
,
Attributes
are
na●●s
and
therefore
it
is
a
contradiction
,
●o
say
they
are
really
one
and
the
same
with
the
Divine
Essence
.
But
if
he
mean
●h●
Ve●tues
signified
by
the
Attributes
,
as
Justice
,
Wisedome
,
Eternity
,
Divinity
,
&c.
So
also
they
are
Vertues
,
and
not
n●
Vertue
,
(
which
is
still
a
contradiction
,
)
and
we
give
those
Attributes
to
God
,
not
to
shew
that
we
apprehend
how
they
are
in
him
,
but
to
signifie
how
we
think
it
best
to
honour
him
.
In
the
next
place
he
will
help
me
to
understand
(
he
says
)
how
Eternity
is
an
indivisible
point
.
The
Major
is
so
far
from
being
evident
,
that
signi●●eth
nothing
.
The
Minor
,
is
said
by
some
men
,
thought
by
no
man
;
for
whatsoever
is
thought
,
is
understood
;
And
all
that
he
hath
else
where
and
here
dilated
upon
it
,
is
as
perfect
non-sense
,
as
any
man
ever
writ
on
purpose
to
make
merry
with
.
And
so
is
that
whereby
he
answers
to
my
objection
▪
that
a
point
cannot
comprehend
all
time
,
which
is
successive
;
Namely
,
his
distinction
.
That
forma●●y
▪
And
this
It
is
well
that
his
Eternity
is
now
come
from
a
to
be
a
flowing
from
this
day
to
the
next
,
and
so
on
.
This
kind
of
Language
is
never
found
in
the
Scripture
;
No
,
but
the
thing
(
saith
he
)
is
found
there
;
Namely
,
that
God
is
infinite
in
all
his
Attributes
.
I
would
he
could
shew
me
the
place
where
God
is
said
to
be
infinite
in
all
his
Attributes
.
There
be
places
enough
to
shew
that
God
is
infinite
in
Power
▪
in
Wisdome
,
Mercy
,
&c.
but
neither
is
he
said
to
be
infinite
in
Names
,
(
which
is
the
English
of
Attributes
)
nor
th●t
he
is
an
indivisible
Point
,
nor
that
a
Point
doth
comprehend
Time
eminently
,
and
Vertually
;
Nor
that
to
day
all
Eternity
,
is
coexistent
which
to
day
,
&c.
And
thus
much
in
answer
to
his
Reply
upon
my
answer
.
That
which
remaineth
,
is
my
Reply
upon
his
answer
to
my
positive
Doctrine
on
this
subject
.
My
▪
opinion
about
Liberty
and
Necessity
.
T.
H.
a
man
may
▪
have
time
to
deliberate
,
yet
not
deliberate
no
action
of
a
man
,
though
never
so
suddain
,
can
be
said
to
be
▪
without
deliberation
.
the
scope
to
shew
what
is
spontaneous
every
spontaneous
action
is
not
voluntary
,
because
indeliberate
.
Nor
every
voluntary
action
spontaneous
,
if
it
proceed
from
fear
▪
those
actions
,
which
follow
the
last
appetite
,
are
voluntary
,
and
where
there
is
one
onely
appetite
,
that
is
the
last
.
voluntary
presuppaseth
some
precedent
deliberation
and
Meditation
of
what
is
likely
to
follow
,
both
upon
the
doing
and
abstaining
from
the
action
▪
the
absence
of
all
extrinsecal
impediments
to
action
.
him
,
who
hath
not
made
an
end
of
deliberating
,
an
absence
of
outward
impediments
estimative
faculty
understanding
imagination
sensitive
appetite
,
rational
hope
or
fear
,
irrational
possions
inclinations
beginning
of
Being
beginning
of
working
,
Sufficiency
the
action
doth
necessarily
follow
the
thought
,
wherein
actual
deliberati●n
seems
not
necessary
,
because
never
any
thing
appeared
that
could
make
a
man
doubt
of
the
consequence
.
suddain
acts
proceeding
from
violent
passions
,
which
surprise
a
man
,
are
justly
punished
,
T.
H.
(
a
a
man
may
have
time
to
deliberate
,
yet
not
deliberate
.
no
action
of
a
man
,
though
never
so
sudden
,
can
be
said
to
be
without
deliberation
.
He
thinks
he
hath
here
oatcht
me
in
a
contradiction
.
But
he
is
mistaken
;
and
the
cause
is
,
that
he
observed
not
that
there
may
be
a
difference
between
deliberation
,
and
that
which
shall
be
constr●ed
for
deliberation
by
a
Judge
.
For
a
man
may
do
●
rush
ast
suddenly
without
deliberation
;
yet
because
he
ought
to
have
deliberated
,
and
had
time
enough
to
deliberate
whether
the
action
were
Lawful
or
not
,
it
shall
not
be
said
by
the
Judge
that
it
was
without
deliberation
,
who
supposeth
that
after
the
Law
known
,
all
the
time
following
was
time
of
deliberation
.
It
is
therefore
●o
contradiction
to
say
and
that
by
him
that
is
the
Judge
of
vol●ntary
actions
.
(
b
Again
,
where
he
says
wher
as
before
he
had
told
us
that
He
thinks
he
hath
espied
another
contradiction
.
It
is
no
wonder
if
speaking
of
which
signifieth
nothing
else
in
Latin
(
for
English
it
is
not
)
but
that
which
is
done
deliberately
or
indeliberately
without
compulsion
,
I
seem
to
the
Bish●p
who
hath
never
given
any
definition
of
that
word
,
not
to
use
it
as
he
would
have
me
.
And
t
is
easy
for
him
to
give
it
any
signification
he
please
as
the
occasion
shall
serve
,
to
charge
me
with
contradiction
.
In
what
sense
I
have
used
that
word
once
,
in
the
same
I
have
used
it
alwayes
,
calling
that
Spontaneous
which
is
without
co-action
▪
or
compulsion
by
tenrour
.
(
c
those
actions
which
follow
the
last
Appetite
are
Voluntary
,
and
where
there
is
on●
onely
Appetite
that
's
the
last
.
Voluntary
presupposeth
some
precedent
deliberation
and
meditation
of
what
is
likely
to
follow
,
both
upon
the
doing
,
and
abstaining
from
the
Action
.
This
is
a
third
contradiction
he
supposeth
he
hath
found
;
but
is
again
mistaken
.
For
when
men
are
to
judge
of
actions
,
whether
they
be
Voluntary
or
not
,
they
cannot
call
that
action
Voluntary
,
which
followed
not
the
last
Appetite
.
But
the
same
men
,
though
there
were
no
deliberation
shall
judge
there
was
,
because
it
ought
to
have
been
,
and
that
from
the
time
that
the
Law
was
known
to
the
time
of
the
action
it self
.
And
therefore
both
are
true
,
that
Voluntary
may
be
without
,
and
yet
presupposed
in
the
Law
,
not
to
be
without
deliberation
.
(
d
the
absence
of
all
extrinsical
impediments
to
action
.
This
definition
of
Liberty
,
that
he
thinkes
he
hath
sufficiently
confuted
by
asking
whether
the
extrinsecal
causes
which
determine
a
man
not
to
do
an
action
,
be
not
extrinsecal
impediments
to
action
.
It
seems
by
his
question
he
makes
no
doubt
but
they
are
;
but
is
deceived
by
a
too
shallow
consideration
,
of
what
the
word
signi●eth
.
For
signifieth
an
opposition
to
And
therefore
if
a
man
be
necessitated
by
extrinsecal
causes
not
to
endeavour
an
action
,
those
causes
do
●ot
oppose
his
endeavour
to
do
it
,
because
he
has
no
such
endeavour
to
be
opposed
;
and
consequently
extrinsecal
causes
that
take
away
endeavour
,
are
not
to
be
called
impediments
;
nor
can
any
man
be
said
to
be
hundred
from
doing
that
which
he
had
no
purpose
at
all
to
do
.
So
that
this
objection
of
his
proceedeth
onely
from
this
,
that
he
understandeth
not
sufficiently
,
the
English
Tongue
.
From
the
same
proceedeth
also
,
that
he
thinketh
it
a
contradiction
,
to
call
a
Free
Agent
him
and
to
call
liberty
saith
he
Wherein
he
is
deceived
.
For
though
he
may
deliberate
of
that
which
is
impossible
for
him
to
do
,
as
in
the
example
he
alledgeth
of
him
that
deliberateth
,
whether
he
shall
play
at
Tennis
,
not
knowing
that
the
door
of
the
Tennis-Court
in
shut
against
him
;
yet
it
is
no
impediment
to
him
that
the
door
is
shut
,
till
he
have
a
will
to
play
,
which
he
hath
not
till
he
hath
done
deliberating
whether
he
shall
play
or
not
.
That
which
followeth
of
my
confounding
and
the
and
the
and
the
and
a
I
do
not
find
in
any
thing
that
I
have
written
,
any
impropriety
in
the
use
of
these
or
any
other
English
words
;
nor
do
I
doubt
but
an
English
Reader
,
who
hath
not
lost
himself
in
School
Divinity
,
will
very
easily
conceive
what
I
have
said
But
this
I
am
sure
,
that
I
never
confounded
nor
ever
used
these
words
It
is
therefore
impossible
I
should
confound
them
.
But
the
Bishop
is
either
mistaken
,
or
else
he
makes
no
scruple
to
say
that
which
he
knows
to
be
false
,
when
he
thinks
it
will
serve
his
turne
.
(
e
the
action
doth
necessarily
follow
the
thought
,
Thus
far
he
says
is
true
.
But
when
he
calls
sudden
passions
I
cannot
tell
whether
he
says
true
or
not
,
because
I
do
not
understand
him
,
nor
find
how
he
makes
his
meaning
ever
the
clearer
by
his
example
of
a
Cat
and
a
Custard
;
because
I
know
not
what
he
means
by
a
secret
Antipathie
.
For
what
that
Antipathy
is
he
explaineth
not
by
calling
it
secret
,
but
rather
confesseth
he
knows
not
how
to
explain
it
.
And
because
he
saith
it
is
I
expect
he
should
tell
me
also
how
far
it
is
false
.
(
f
because
never
any
thing
appeared
that
could
make
a
man
doubt
of
the
consequence
,
In
this
he
agrees
with
me
.
But
where
he
adds
,
I
do
not
agree
with
him
.
And
for
the
instance
he
bringeth
to
prove
it
,
in
the
man
that
playeth
on
an
i●strument
with
his
hand
it
maketh
nothing
for
him
;
for
it
proveth
onely
that
the
Habit
maketh
the
motion
of
his
hand
,
more
ready
and
quick
;
but
it
proveth
not
that
it
maketh
it
more
voluntary
,
but
rather
lesse
,
because
the
rest
of
the
motions
follow
the
first
,
by
an
easinesse
acquired
from
long
custome
;
in
which
motion
the
Wil
doth
not
accompany
all
the
strokes
of
the
hand
,
but
gives
a
beginning
to
them
onely
in
the
first
.
Here
is
nothing
as
I
expected
of
how
far
that
which
I
had
said
,
namely
,
that
the
action
doth
necessarily
follow
the
thought
,
is
false
,
unlesse
it
be
For
improprieties
of
speech
,
I
will
not
contend
w●th
one
,
that
can
use
and
many
other
phrases
of
the
same
kind
.
But
so
say
that
Free
actions
are
voluntary
;
and
that
the
Wil
,
which
oauseth
a
voluntary
action
is
the
last
appetite
,
and
that
that
appetite
,
was
immediately
followed
by
the
action
;
and
that
no
action
of
a
man
can
be
said
in
the
judgement
of
the
Law
,
to
be
without
deliberation
,
are
no
mistakes
for
any
thing
that
he
hath
proved
to
the
contrary
.
(
g
some
sudden
acts
;
pro●●eceeding
from
violent
passions
,
which
surprise
a
man
are
justly
punished
,
My
reason
was
that
therefore
he
may
be
justly
punished
.
The
Bishop
grants
they
▪
are
justly
punished
,
and
his
reason
is
,
How
a
man
does
deliberate
,
and
yet
not
actually
deliberate
,
I
understand
not
.
If
vertual
deliberation
,
be
not
actual
deliberation
,
it
is
no
deliberation
.
But
he
calleth
vertual
deliberation
,
that
which
ought
to
have
been
,
and
was
not
,
and
says
the
same
that
he
condemnes
in
me
.
And
his
other
reason
,
namely
,
because
it
is
our
fault
that
we
deliberated
not
,
is
the
same
that
I
said
,
that
we
ought
to
have
deliberated
,
and
did
not
.
So
that
his
reprehension
here
,
is
a
reprehension
of
himself
proceeding
from
that
the
custome
of
School
Language
hath
made
him
forget
the
Language
of
his
Country
.
And
to
that
which
he
adds
,
I
have
sufficiently
answered
before
in
divers
places
,
shewing
that
a
fault
▪
may
be
necessary
from
extrinsecal
causes
,
and
yet
voluntary
;
and
that
voluntary
faults
are
justly
punishable
.
(
h
This
instance
because
it
maketh
not
against
any
thing
,
I
have
held
,
and
partly
also
,
because
it
is
a
stinking
passage
,
(
for
surely
if
as
he
that
ascribing
eyes
to
the
understanding
allowes
me
to
say
,
it
hath
a
nose
,
it
stinketh
to
the
nose
of
the
understanding
,
This
sentence
I
passe
over
,
observing
only
▪
the
canting
terms
,
In
the
rest
of
his
answer
to
this
Number
I
find
nothing
alledged
in
confutation
of
any
thing
I
have
said
,
saving
that
his
last
words
are
,
that
But
to
that
I
have
in
the
same
Numb
.
already
answered
.
I
must
not
passe
over
,
that
a
little
before
,
he
hath
these
words
.
The
Bishop
would
make
but
an
ill
Judge
of
innocent
Children
,
(
for
such
are
they
that
for
want
of
age
have
not
use
enough
of
reason
to
abstain
from
killing
.
)
for
the
want
of
reason
proceeding
from
want
of
age
,
does
therefore
take
away
tho
punishment
because
it
taketh
away
the
crime
,
and
makes
them
innocent
.
But
he
introduceth
another
Justice
which
he
calleth
whereas
he
called
the
other
and
by
this
publick
Justice
,
he
saith
the
Child
though
innocent
may
be
put
to
death
.
I
hope
we
shall
never
have
the
administration
of
publick
Justice
,
in
such
hands
as
his
,
or
in
the
hands
of
such
as
shall
take
counsel
from
him
.
But
the
distinction
he
makes
is
not
by
himself
understood
.
There
are
publick
causes
and
private
causes
,
private
are
those
,
where
the
parties
to
the
cause
,
are
both
private
men
.
Publick
are
those
,
where
one
of
the
parties
is
the
Common-wealth
,
or
the
person
that
representeth
it
,
and
the
cause
criminal
.
But
there
is
no
distinction
of
Justice
into
Publick
,
and
Private
.
We
may
reade
of
men
that
having
Soverain
Power
,
did
sometimes
put
an
Innocent
to
death
,
either
upon
a
vow
,
did
,
in
sacrificing
his
Daughter
;
or
when
it
hath
been
thought
fit
,
that
an
innocent
person
should
be
put
to
death
to
save
a
great
number
of
people
.
But
to
put
to
death
a
Child
not
for
reason
of
State
,
which
he
improperly
calls
Publick
Justice
,
but
for
killing
a
man
,
and
at
the
same
time
to
acknowledge
such
killing
to
be
no
crime
,
I
think
was
never
heard
of
.
(
a
Deliberation
is
an
inquiry
made
by
reason
,
whether
this
or
that
definitely
considered
be
a
good
and
fit
means
,
or
indefinitely
what
are
good
and
fit
means
to
be
chosen
for
attaining
some
wished
end
.
(
a
If
the
Bishop
had
observed
what
he
does
himself
,
when
he
Deliberates
,
reasons
,
understands
,
or
imagins
,
he
would
have
known
what
to
make
of
all
that
I
have
said
in
this
Number
.
He
would
have
known
that
consideration
,
understanding
,
reason
,
and
all
the
passions
of
the
mind
;
are
imaginations
.
That
to
consider
a
thing
,
is
to
imagine
it
;
that
to
understand
a
thing
is
to
imagine
it
;
that
to
hope
and
fear
are
to
imagine
the
things
hoped
for
and
feared
.
The
difference
between
them
is
,
that
when
we
imagine
the
consequence
of
any
thing
,
we
are
said
to
consider
that
thing
;
and
when
we
have
imagined
any
thing
from
a
sign
,
and
especially
from
those
signs
,
we
call
names
,
we
are
said
to
understand
his
meaning
that
maketh
the
sign
;
and
when
we
reason
,
we
imagine
the
consequence
of
affirmations
,
and
negations
joyned
together
;
and
when
we
hope
or
fear
,
we
imagine
things
good
or
hurtful
to
our selves
;
insomuch
as
all
these
are
but
imaginations
,
diversly
named
,
from
different
circumstances
,
as
any
man
may
perceive
as
easily
as
he
can
look
into
his
own
thoughts
.
But
to
him
that
thinketh
not
himself
upon
the
things
where
of
,
but
upon
the
words
where
with
he
speaketh
,
and
taketh
those
words
on
trust
from
pushed
Schoolmen
,
it
is
not
onely
hard
,
but
impossible
to
be
known
.
And
this
is
the
reason
that
maketh
him
say
,
I
make
Deliberation
he
knows
not
what
.
But
how
is
deliberation
defined
by
him
.
It
is
(
saith
he
)
If
it
were
not
his
custome
to
say
,
the
understanding
understandeth
,
the
Wil
willeth
,
and
so
of
the
rest
of
the
faculties
.
I
should
have
believed
that
when
he
says
deliberation
is
an
inquiry
made
by
reason
,
he
meaneth
an
inquiry
made
by
the
man
that
reasoneth
;
for
so
it
will
be
sense
:
But
the
reason
which
a
man
useth
in
deliberation
,
being
the
same
thing
that
is
called
Deliberation
,
his
Definition
,
that
Deliberation
is
an
inquiry
made
by
reason
,
is
no
more
then
if
he
had
said
,
Deliberation
is
an
inquiry
,
made
by
Deliberation
;
a
Definition
good
enough
to
be
made
by
a
School-man
.
Nor
is
the
rest
of
the
Definition
altogether
as
it
should
be
;
for
there
is
no
such
thing
as
an
but
a
man
imagining
first
one
thing
,
then
another
,
considereth
them
successively
and
singly
each
one
,
whether
it
conduceth
to
his
ends
or
not
.
or
a
willing
of
the
end
,
as
it
is
to
be
attain●●
by
certain
means
,
deliberate
chosing
or
refusing
,
of
this
or
that
means
,
or
the
acceptation
of
one
means
before
another
,
where
divers
are
represented
by
the
understanding
.
anteced●n●ous
(
he
might
as
well
have
said
antecedent
)
To
confound
the
faculty
of
the
Wil
with
the
Wil
,
were
to
confound
a
for
the
faculty
of
the
Wil
is
no
Wil
;
the
Act
onely
which
he
calls
is
the
Wil.
As
a
man
that
sle●peth
hath
the
nor
hath
for
that
time
any
so
also
he
hath
the
of
Willing
,
but
nothing
,
nor
hath
for
that
time
any
I
must
therefore
have
departed
very
much
from
my
own
Principles
,
if
I
have
confounded
the
of
the
wi●h
the
He
should
have
done
well
to
have
shown
where
I
confound●d
them
.
It
is
true
,
I
make
the
Wil
to
be
the
last
part
of
Deliberation
.
But
it
is
that
Wil
,
which
maketh
the
Action
voluntar●
;
and
therefore
needs
must
be
the
last
;
But
for
the
preceding
vari●tions
of
the
Wil
,
to
do
and
not
to
do
,
though
they
be
so
many
several
Wills
,
contrary
to
,
and
destroying
one
another
,
they
usually
are
called
And
therefore
they
are
nothing
to
the
Wil
of
which
we
dispute
)
that
maketh
an
Action
voluntary
.
And
though
a
man
have
in
every
long
deliberation
a
great
many
they
use
to
be
called
inclinations
,
and
the
last
on●ly
Wil
which
is
immediately
foll●wed
by
the
voluntary
Action
But
nevertheless
both
he
that
hath
those
intentions
,
and
God
that
s●eth
them
,
reckoneth
them
for
so
many
Wills
.
This
is
no
consequent
to
my
Doctrine
,
for
I
hold
that
they
are
in
the
sight
of
God
,
so
many
consents
so
many
willings
,
which
would
have
been
followed
by
Actions
,
if
the
Actions
had
been
in
their
po●●er
.
It
had
been
fitter
for
a
man
in
whom
is
required
gravity
,
and
sanctity
more
then
ordinary
,
to
have
chosen
some
other
kind
of
instance
.
But
what
meaneth
he
by
Can
there
be
concupiscence
without
consent
?
It
is
the
consent
it self
.
There
may
be
also
a
Lawful
concupiscence
with
consent
.
For
concupiscence
makes
not
the
sin
,
but
the
unlawfulness
of
satisfying
such
concupiscence
;
and
not
the
consent
,
but
the
Wil
and
design
to
prosecute
that
which
a
man
knoweth
to
be
unlawful
.
An
appetite
to
another
mans
bread
is
concupiscence
;
and
though
it
be
with
consent
to
eat
,
t
is
no
sin
;
but
the
design
to
take
it
from
the
other
,
notwithstanding
that
he
may
fail
in
his
design
,
that
's
the
sin
.
And
this
instance
might
have
served
his
turn
,
as
well
as
the
other
;
and
for
consent
(
if
he
had
understood
the
truth
)
he
might
have
p●t
design
.
it
is
all
one
to
say
,
a
man
is
free
,
and
to
say
,
he
hath
not
made
an
end
of
deliberating
.
T.
H.
an
absence
of
extrinsecal
impediments
I
do
indeed
t●ke
all
voluntary
acts
to
be
free
,
and
all
free
acts
to
be
voluntary
,
but
withal
that
all
acts
whether
free
or
voluntary
,
if
they
be
acts
,
were
necessary
before
they
were
acts
.
But
where
is
the
errour
?
saith
he
So
that
my
errour
lies
in
this
that
I
distinguish
not
between
a
rational
Wil
,
and
a
sensitive
appetite
in
the
same
man
.
As
if
the
in
man
or
beast
were
not
the
same
thing
,
or
that
sensual
men
and
beasts
did
not
deliberate
,
and
chuse
one
thing
before
another
,
in
the
same
manner
,
that
wise
men
do
.
Nor
can
it
be
said
of
Wills
,
that
one
is
rational
,
the
other
sensitive
;
but
of
men
.
And
if
it
be
granted
that
deliberation
is
alwayes
(
as
it
is
not
)
there
were
no
cause
to
ca●●
men
rationall
more
then
beasts
.
For
it
is
manifest
by
continual
experience
,
that
beasts
do
Deliberate
.
(
b
is
all
one
to
say
,
a
man
is
free
,
and
to
say
,
he
hath
not
made
an
end
of
deliberating
.
Why
so
(
saith
he
But
this
is
a
false
consequence
;
he
should
have
inferred
thus
,
Which
is
true
,
●nd
yet
neverthelesse
he
is
more
free
.
But
taking
necessity
to
be
inconsistent
with
Liberty
(
which
is
the
question
between
us
)
in
stead
of
he
puts
in
not
free
.
And
therefore
to
say
,
is
no
contradiction
to
absolute
and
antecedent
necessity
.
And
whereas
he
adds
presently
after
,
that
I
ascribe
the
necessitation
of
a
man
in
●ree
acts
to
his
own
deliberation
,
and
in
indeliberate
acts
to
his
last
thoughts
,
he
mistakes
the
matter
;
for
I
ascribe
all
necessity
,
to
the
universal
Series
or
Order
of
causes
,
depending
on
the
first
cause
eternal
.
Which
the
Bishop
underst●ndet●
,
as
if
I
had
said
in
his
Phrase
to
of
extrinsecal
causes
,
that
is
,
understandeth
it
not
at
all
.
(
c
is
an
absence
of
extrinsecal
impe●iment●
,
I
can●ot
perceive
in
these
words
any
more
force
of
inference
,
then
of
so
many
other
words
whatsoever
put
together
at
adventure
.
But
be
his
meaning
what
he
Wil
,
I
say
not
that
deliberation
,
porduceth
any
impediments
,
(
for
there
are
no
impediments
,
but
to
the
Action
,
●hilst
we
are
endeavouring
to
do
it
,
which
is
not
till
we
have
done
deliberating
.
)
But
during
the
Deliberation
,
there
arise
thoughts
in
him
that
deliberateth
,
concerning
the
consequence
of
the
action
whereof
he
deliberateth
,
which
cause
the
action
following
,
which
are
not
impediments
to
that
which
was
not
done
,
but
the
causes
of
that
which
was
done
:
That
which
followeth
in
this
Number
,
is
not
intelligible
,
by
reason
of
the
insignificance
of
these
words
which
are
but
Jargon
,
and
his
non
sense
.
And
this
also
is
unintelli
ible
.
For
how
can
a
man
have
Liberty
to
do
,
or
not
to
do
that
which
is
at
the
same
instant
already
done
.
For
where
he
addeth
it
proves
nothing
,
because
he
had
the
Liberty
to
create
it
,
before
it
was
created
.
Besides
,
it
is
a
p●rphancing
of
the
name
of
God
,
to
make
instances
of
his
incomprehensible
working
,
in
a
question
as
this
is
meerly
natural
.
(
a
the
water
wants
liberty
to
go
over
the
banks
,
because
there
is
an
extrinsecal
impediment
,
But
to
ascend
up
the
channel
it
wants
not
liberty
,
but
power
.
he
who
hath
not
made
an
end
of
deliberating
,
(
a
A
right
d●●nition
is
,
that
which
determineth
the
signification
of
the
word
defined
,
to
the
end
that
in
the
discourse
where
it
is
used
,
the
meaning
of
it
may
be
constant
and
without
equivocation
.
This
is
the
measure
of
a
definition
and
intelligible
to
an
English
Reader
.
But
the
Bishop
that
measures
it
by
the
Genus
and
the
Difference
,
thinks
(
it
seems
)
though
he
write
English
,
he
writes
not
to
an
English
Reader
,
unlesse
he
also
be
a
School-man
.
I
confesse
the
rule
is
good
that
we
ought
to
define
when
it
can
be
done
▪
by
using
first
so●e
more
general
term
,
and
then
by
r●straining
,
the
signification
of
that
general
term
till
it
b●
th●
same
with
that
of
the
word
defin●d
.
And
this
general
term
,
the
Sc●ool
calls
and
the
restraint
This
I
say
is
a
good
rule
where
it
can
be
done
;
for
some
words
are
so
general
that
they
cannot
admit
a
more
general
in
their
definition
.
But
why
,
this
ought
to
be
a
Law
of
definition
,
I
doubt
it
would
trouble
him
to
find
the
reason
;
and
therefore
I
referr
him
,
(
he
shall
give
me
leave
sometimes
to
cite
,
as
well
as
he
)
to
the
Articles
of
the
Chapter
,
of
my
Book
But
it
is
to
little
purpose
that
he
requires
in
a
definition
,
so
exactly
the
Genus
,
and
the
Difference
,
se●ing
he
does
not
know
them
when
they
are
there
.
For
in
this
my
definition
of
Liberty
the
Genus
is
and
the
difference
or
Restricti●n
is
,
that
they
be
The
Bishop
therefore
though
he
talk
of
Genus
and
Difference
▪
understands
not
what
they
are
,
but
requires
the
matter
and
Form
,
of
the
thing
in
the
Definition
Matter
is
body
,
that
is
to
say
corporeal
substance
,
and
subject
to
dimension
,
such
as
are
the
Elements
,
and
the
things
compounded
of
the
Elements
.
But
it
is
impossible
that
Matter
should
be
part
o●
a
Definition
,
whose
parts
are
onely
words
,
or
to
put
the
name
of
Matter
into
the
Definition
of
Liberty
,
which
is
immaterial
.
saith
he
Unlesse
he
mean
by
I
know
not
how
a
Faculty
is
reall
.
If
he
mean
so
,
then
a
very
absence
,
is
as
reall
,
as
a
very
Faculty
.
And
if
the
word
defined
signifie
an
absence
,
or
Negation
,
I
hope
he
would
not
have
me
define
it
,
by
a
presence
,
or
affrmation
.
Such
a
word
is
Liberty
,
for
it
signifieth
Freedome
from
impediments
,
which
is
all
one
with
the
absence
of
impediments
as
I
have
defined
it
.
And
if
this
be
contrary
to
all
the
rules
of
right
reason
,
(
that
is
to
say
of
Logic
)
that
he
hath
learned
,
I
should
advise
him
to
read
some
other
Logic
,
then
he
hath
yet
read
,
or
consider
better
those
he
did
read
,
when
he
was
a
young
man
,
and
could
lesse
understand
them
.
He
adds
that
How
know
he
,
whether
there
be
impediments
to
hinder
it
or
not
?
Certainly
if
a
stone
were
thrown
upwards
,
it
would
either
go
upwards
eternally
,
or
it
must
be
stopped
by
some
outward
impediment
or
it
must
stop
it self
.
He
hath
confessed
that
nothing
can
moove
it self
,
I
doubt
not
therefore
but
he
will
confess
also
that
it
cannot
stop
it self
.
But
stopped
we
see
it
is
;
it
is
therefore
stopped
by
impediments
external
.
He
hath
in
this
part
of
his
Answer
ventured
a
little
too
far
▪
in
speaking
of
Definition
,
and
of
Jmpediments
,
and
Motion
,
and
bew●ayed
too
much
his
ignorance
in
Logick
and
Philosophy
;
and
talketh
so
absurdly
of
the
current
of
Rivers
,
and
of
the
motion
of
the
Seas
,
and
of
the
weight
of
Water
,
that
it
cannot
be
corrected
otherwise
then
by
blotting
it
all
out
.
Nothing
takes
beginning
from
it self
,
but
from
some
Agent
without
it self
,
which
is
not
in
its
own
disposing
,
therefore
,
&c.
concedo
omnia
.
taking
a
beginning
a
beginning
of
being
beginning
of
working
and
acting
a
beginning
of
working
or
mooving
actually
,
ex
concessis
▪
It
is
out
of
controversie
that
of
voluntary
actions
the
will
is
a
necessary
cause
.
it
is
out
of
controversie
,
that
the
will
is
a
necessary
cause
of
voluntary
actions
.
I
Had
said
,
that
nothing
taketh
beginning
from
it self
,
and
that
the
cause
of
the
Will
is
not
the
Will
it self
,
but
something
else
which
it
disp●seth
not
of
.
Answering
to
thi●
he
endeavours
to
she●
us
the
cause
of
the
saith
he
and
for
that
It
is
well
that
he
grants
finite
things
(
as
for
his
participated
,
it
signifies
nothing
here
)
cannot
be
produced
by
themselves
.
For
out
of
this
I
can
conclude
that
the
Act
of
willing
is
not
produced
by
the
faculty
of
willing
.
He
that
hath
the
faculty
of
willing
,
hath
the
faculty
of
willing
something
in
particular
.
And
at
the
same
time
he
hath
the
faculty
of
nilling
the
same
.
If
therefore
the
faculty
of
willing
be
the
cause
he
willeth
any
thing
whatsoever
,
for
the
same
reason
the
faculty
of
nilling
,
will
be
the
cause
at
the
same
time
of
nilling
it
,
and
so
he
shall
will
and
nill
the
same
thing
at
the
same
time
,
which
is
absurd
.
It
seems
the
Bishop
had
forgot
that
are
indifferent
to
contrary
and
contrary
It
is
somewhat
besides
the
Matter
that
d●termineth
it
to
a
certain
form
;
and
somewhat
besides
the
Power
,
that
produceth
a
certain
Act
;
and
thence
it
is
,
that
is
inferred
this
that
he
granteth
,
that
nothing
can
be
produced
by
it self
,
which
neverthelesse
he
presently
contradicteth
,
in
saying
,
that
,
and
that
is
moved
Matter
.
Which
is
as
much
to
say
that
the
Form
moveth
the
Matter
,
or
that
the
stone
moveth
it self
,
which
before
he
denied
.
When
a
stone
ascends
,
the
beginning
of
the
stones
motion
,
was
in
it self
,
that
is
to
say
intrinsecal
,
because
it
is
not
the
stones
motion
,
till
the
store
begins
to
be
moved
;
but
the
motion
that
caused
it
to
begin
to
ascend
,
was
a
precedent
and
extrinsecal
motion
of
the
hand
,
or
other
engine
that
threw
it
upward
.
And
so
when
it
descends
,
the
beginning
of
the
stones
motion
is
in
the
stone
;
but
neverthelesse
,
there
is
a
former
motion
in
the
ambient
Body
,
aire
or
water
,
that
causeth
it
to
descend
.
But
because
no
man
can
see
it
,
most
men
think
there
is
none
;
though
Reason
,
wherewith
the
Bishop
,
(
as
relying
onely
upon
the
Authority
of
Books
)
troubleth
not
himself
,
co●vince
that
there
is
.
It
is
out
of
controversy
,
that
of
voluntary
Actions
,
the
Wil
is
a
necessary
cause
.
The
He
has
reduced
the
Argument
to
non-sense
,
by
saying
necessary
causes
produce
not
necessary
effects
.
For
necessary
effects
,
unlesse
he
mean
such
effects
as
shall
necessarily
be
produced
,
is
insignificant
.
Let
him
consider
therefore
with
what
grace
he
can
say
,
necessary
causes
do
not
alwayes
produce
their
effects
,
except
those
effects
be
also
necessarily
produced
.
But
his
answer
is
chiefly
to
the
Minor
,
and
denies
that
the
Wil
is
not
a
necessary
cause
of
what
it
wills
in
particular
Actions
.
That
it
wills
,
when
it
wills
(
saith
he
)
is
necessary
,
but
that
it
wills
this
or
that
,
is
free
.
Is
it
possible
for
any
man
to
conceive
that
he
that
willeth
can
will
any
thing
but
this
or
that
particular
thing
?
It
is
therefore
manifest
▪
that
either
the
Wil
is
a
necessary
cause
of
this
or
that
or
any
other
particular
Action
,
or
not
the
necessary
cause
of
any
voluntary
Action
at
all
.
For
universal
Actions
there
be
none
.
In
that
which
followeth
,
he
undertaketh
to
make
his
doctrine
more
expressly
understood
by
considering
the
Act
of
the
will
three
ways
.
and
in
For
the
nature
of
the
Act
(
be
saith
)
that
that
in
this
sense
Instead
of
to
make
it
sense
,
read
that
which
the
man
wills
,
and
then
if
the
mans
will
be
as
he
confesseth
a
necessary
cause
of
voluntary
Actions
,
it
is
no
lesse
a
necessary
cause
that
they
are
Actions
,
then
that
they
are
voluntary
.
For
the
Exercise
of
the
Act
,
he
saith
that
This
is
the
old
canting
which
hath
already
been
sufficiently
detected
.
But
to
make
it
somewhat
let
us
reade
it
thus
,
the
man
that
willeth
,
may
either
will
or
suspend
his
will
,
and
thus
it
is
intelligible
but
false
;
for
how
can
he
that
willeth
,
at
the
same
time
suspend
his
will
?
And
for
the
object
he
says
,
that
&c.
His
reason
is
because
he
says
it
was
not
necessary
(
for
example
)
in
choosing
a
Pope
,
to
choose
him
this
or
that
day
,
or
to
chuse
this
or
that
man
.
I
would
be
glad
to
know
by
what
Argument
●e
can
prove
the
Election
not
to
have
been
necessitated
;
For
it
is
not
enough
for
him
to
say
,
I
perceive
no
necessity
in
it
;
nor
to
say
they
might
have
chosen
another
,
because
he
knows
not
whether
they
might
or
not
;
nor
to
say
if
he
had
not
been
freely
elected
,
the
Election
had
been
void
or
none
.
For
though
that
be
true
,
it
does
not
follow
that
the
Election
was
not
necessary
;
for
there
is
no
repugnance
▪
to
necessity
,
either
in
Election
,
or
in
Freedome
.
And
whereas
he
concludeth
,
I
would
have
been
glad
he
had
set
down
what
voluntary
Acts
there
are
,
not
particular
,
which
by
his
restriction
of
voluntary
Acts
he
grants
to
be
necessitated
.
in
sensu-divi'so
IN
this
place
he
disputeth
against
my
definition
of
namely
,
that
cause
I
thought
this
definition
could
have
been
mistiked
by
no
man
that
had
English
enough
,
to
know
that
signifieth
the
same
thing
.
And
no
man
wil
say
that
that
is
to
produce
an
effect
,
to
which
any
thing
is
wanting
needful
to
the
producing
of
it
.
But
the
Bishop
thinks
,
if
he
set
down
what
he
understands
by
sufficient
,
it
would
serve
to
confute
my
definition
.
And
therefore
says
It
seems
the
Bishop
thinks
two
Horses
may
be
sufficient
to
draw
a
Coach
,
though
they
will
not
draw
,
or
though
they
be
lame
,
or
though
they
be
never
put
to
draw
;
and
I
think
they
can
never
produce
the
effect
of
drawing
,
without
those
needful
circumstances
of
being
strong
,
obedient
,
and
having
the
Coach
some
way
or
other
fastened
to
them
.
He
calls
it
a
sufficient
cause
of
drawing
,
that
they
be
Coach
ho●ses
,
though
they
be
lame
,
or
wi●●
not
draw
.
But
I
say
they
are
not
sufficient
absolutely
;
but
conditionally
,
if
they
be
not
lame
,
nor
resty
.
L●t
the
read
r
judge
,
whether
my
sufficient
cause
or
his
may
properly
be
called
cause
enough
.
In
these
few
lines
he
hath
said
the
cause
of
the
generation
of
a
Monster
is
sufficient
to
produce
a
Monster
,
and
that
it
is
insufficient
to
produce
a
Monster
.
How
soo●
may
a
man
forget
his
words
that
doth
n●t
understand
the●●
.
This
term
of
cause
,
which
also
the
School
calls
that
they
may
rime
to
efficient
,
is
not
inte●●e●ible
,
but
a
word
devised
like
Hocus
Pocus
to
juggle
a
difficulty
out
of
sight
.
That
which
is
sufficient
to
produce
a
Monster
;
is
not
therefore
to
be
called
an
insufficient
cause
to
produce
a
m●n
,
no
more
then
that
which
is
sufficient
to
produce
a
man
,
is
to
be
called
an
insufficient
cause
to
produce
a
Monster
.
He
understands
little
,
wh●n
●en
say
,
God
is
sufficient
to
produce
many
worlds
,
if
he
understand
not
the
meaning
to
be
,
that
he
is
sufficient
to
prod●ce
them
if
he
will
.
Without
this
s●pposition
,
a
man
is
not
sufficient
to
produce
any
voluntary
action
,
not
so
much
as
to
walk
,
though
he
be
inh●alth
,
and
at
Liberty
.
The
will
is
as
much
a
sufficient
cause
without
the
strength
to
do
,
as
the
strength
without
the
Wil
▪
To
that
which
he
adds
,
that
my
Definition
is
I
can
make
no
answer
,
because
I
understand
no
more
,
what
he
means
by
then
if
he
had
said
every
sufficient
cause
produceth
its
effect
necessarily
,
Lastly
,
I
hold
what
he
is
able
to
proove
is
something
.
I
hold
that
the
ordinary
definition
of
a
free
Agent
implies
a
contradiction
,
and
is
non-sense
.
ordinary
definition
A
free
Agent
is
that
,
which
when
all
things
are
present
,
that
are
needful
to
produce
the
effect
,
can
nevertheless
not
produce
it
.
all
things
needfull
all
things
requisite
all
things
needful
or
requisite
●
h●ve
prepared
my
dinner
,
my
oxen
and
my
fatlings
are
killed
,
all
things
are
ready
,
come
unto
the
marriage
.
T.
H
in
act●
primo
●o
act
or
not
to
act
,
to
w●rk
or
not
to
work
,
to
produce
or
n●t
to
produce
,
effects
producible
effects
produced
non
▪
sense
THe
question
is
here
whether
these
words
,
as
I
say
it
does
.
To
make
it
appear
no
contradiction
,
he
saith
(
a
all
things
needful
all
things
requisite
as
if
the
Will
were
not
needful
nor
requisite
to
the
producing
of
a
voluntary
Action
.
For
to
the
production
of
any
Act
whatsoever
,
there
is
needful
,
not
onely
those
things
which
proceed
from
the
Agent
,
but
also
those
that
consist
in
the
disposition
of
the
patient
?
And
to
use
his
own
instance
,
it
is
necessary
to
writing
,
not
onely
that
there
be
p●n
,
ink
,
paper
,
&c.
but
also
a
will
to
write
.
He
that
hath
the
former
hath
all
things
requisite
to
write
if
he
will
,
but
not
all
things
necessary
to
writing
.
And
so
in
his
other
instances
,
he
that
hath
men
and
money
,
&c.
(
without
that
which
he
putteth
in
for
a
requisite
)
hath
all
things
requisite
to
make
War
if
he
Will
,
but
not
simply
to
make
War
.
And
he
in
the
Gospel
that
had
prepared
his
Dinner
,
had
all
things
requisite
for
his
guests
if
they
came
,
but
not
all
things
requisite
to
make
them
come
.
And
therefore
is
a
term
ill
defined
by
him
.
(
b
and
these
and
these
are
as
wild
as
ever
were
any
spoken
with
in
the
Walls
of
and
if
Science
,
Conscience
,
Reason
and
Religion
,
teach
us
to
speak
thus
,
they
make
us
mad
.
And
that
which
followeth
is
false
are
the
same
thing
with
It
is
not
the
act
but
the
power
that
hath
reference
to
the
future
,
for
act
and
power
differ
in
nothing
but
in
this
,
that
the
former
,
signifieth
the
time
present
,
the
latter
,
the
time
to
come
.
And
whereas
he
adds
,
that
I
shuffle
out
effects
producible
,
and
thrust
into
their
places
effects
produced
,
I
must
take
it
for
an
untruth
,
till
he
cite
the
place
wherein
I
have
done
so
.
free
Agent
demonstrative
proofs
That
which
a
man
conceives
in
his
mind
,
by
these
words
Spontaneity
▪
Deliberation
,
&c.
that
they
are
.
(
a
(
b
That
matter
of
fact
is
not
verified
by
other
mens
Arguments
,
but
by
every
mans
own
sense
and
memory
,
How
can
it
be
proved
,
that
to
love
a
thing
,
and
to
think
it
good
is
al
one
to
a
man
that
doth
not
mark
his
own
meaning
by
these
words
,
Cos
amoris
amor
.
Love
How
can
it
be
proved
that
eternity
is
not
to
a
man
that
says
these
words
by
custome
,
and
never
considers
how
he
can
conceive
the
thing
it self
in
his
minde
,
(
c
by
these
words
spontaneity
men
do
understand
as
he
conceives
.
considering
of
the
good
and
evil
sequels
of
an
action
to
come
.
T.
H.
will
is
an
act
of
our
deliberation
.
onely
the
last
appetite
is
to
be
called
our
will
.
he
is
a
free
Agent
that
can
do
,
if
he
will
,
and
forbear
if
he
will
.
liberty
in
the
subject
liberty
to
the
object
liberty
from
impediments
liberty
of
the
subject
liberty
towards
the
object
liberty
from
inward
impediments
liberty
from
extrinsecal
impediments
T.
H.
it
is
●ustome
,
or
want
of
ability
,
or
negligence
which
makes
a
m●n
c●nceive
otherwise
,
(
i
How
can
a
man
imagine
any
thing
to
begin
without
a
cause
,
or
if
it
should
begin
without
a
cause
,
why
it
should
begin
at
this
time
rather
than
at
that
time
?
to
be
begin
to
act
(
k
T.
H.
O
what
a
fool
was
I
to
do
thus
and
thus
,
O
that
I
had
been
wise
,
O
that
I
had
not
done
such
an
act
.
O
that
I
had
not
breached
,
O
what
a
fool
was
I
to
grow
old
.
Have
said
in
the
beginning
of
this
Number
,
that
to
define
what
spontan●iry
is
,
what
deliberation
is
,
what
Will
,
Propension
,
Appetite
,
a
free
Agent
,
and
Liberty
is
,
and
to
prove
they
are
well
defined
,
there
can
be
no
other
proof
offered
,
but
every
mans
own
experience
and
memory
of
what
he
meaneth
by
such
words
.
For
definitions
being
the
beginning
of
all
demonstration
,
cannot
themselves
be
demonstrated
,
that
is
,
proved
to
another
man
;
All
that
can
be
done
,
is
either
to
put
him
in
mind
,
what
th●se
words
signifie
commonly
in
the
matter
whereof
they
tre●t
,
or
if
the
words
b●
unusual
to
make
,
the
Definitions
of
them
true
by
mutual
consent
in
their
signification
.
And
though
this
be
manifestly
true
,
yet
there
is
nothing
of
it
amongst
the
School-men
,
whouse
to
argue
▪
not
by
rule
,
but
as
Fencers
teach
to
handle
weapons
,
by
quickness
●n●ly
of
the
hand
and
eye
.
The
Bishop
therefore
boggles
at
this
kind
of
proof
,
and
says
,
(
a
But
what
will
●e
answer
if
I
should
aske
him
how
he
will
judge
o●
the
causes
of
things
,
whereof
he
hat●
no
I●ea
or
concepti●n
in
his
own
●ind
?
It
is
therefore
impossible
to
give
a
true
definition
of
any
word
,
without
the
Idea
,
of
the
thing
which
that
word
signifieth
,
or
not
ac●o●●ing
to
that
Idea
or
conception
.
Here
again
he
discovereth
the
true
cause
,
why
he
and
other
School-men
so
often
speak
absurd●y
.
For
they
speak
without
conception
of
the
things
,
and
by
rote
,
one
receiving
what
he
saith
from
another
by
tradition
,
from
some
pust
〈◊〉
or
Philosopher
,
that
to
decline
a●
difficulty
,
speakes
in
such
manner
,
as
not
to
be
understood
.
And
whereas
he
bidds
us
as●e
an
ordinary
person
,
what
signifieth
,
〈◊〉
dare
Answer
for
that
ordinary
person
,
he
will
tell
us
as
significantly
as
any
Scholler
,
and
say
it
is
towards
Heaven
,
and
as
so●●
as
he
knows
the
earth
is
r●und
makes
no
scruple
to
believe
there
are
Antipodes
,
being
wiser
in
that
point
then
were
those
,
which
he
saith
,
to
have
been
of
more
then
ordinary
capacities
.
Again
,
ordinary
men
understand
not
he
saith
the
words
,
yes
,
but
they
do
just
as
well
as
learned
men
.
When
they
hear
named
an
empty
vessel
,
the
learned
as
well
as
the
unlearned
mean
and
understand
the
same
thing
,
namely
,
that
there
is
nothing
in
it
that
can
be
seen
;
and
whether
it
be
truely
empty
,
the
Plough-man
,
and
the
School
man
know
a
like
.
I
might
give
he
says
an
hundred
such
like
instances
.
That
true
;
a
man
may
give
a
thousand
foolish
and
impertinent
instances
of
men
ignorant
in
such
questions
of
Philosophy
concerning
Emptiness
,
Body
,
Upwards
,
and
Downwards
and
the
like
;
But
the
question
is
not
whether
such
and
such
tenets
be
true
,
but
whether
such
and
such
words
can
be
well
defined
,
without
thinking
upon
the
things
they
signifiet
as
the
Bishop
thinks
they
may
,
when
he
concludeth
with
these
words
(
b
that
matter
of
fact
is
not
verified
by
other
mens
Arguments
,
but
by
every
mans
own
sense
and
memory
,
A
man
is
borne
with
a
capacity
after
due
time
and
experience
to
reason
truely
;
to
which
capacity
of
nature
,
if
there
be
added
no
Discipline
at
all
,
yet
,
as
far
as
he
reasoneth
he
will
reason
truely
,
though
by
a
right
Discipline
,
he
may
reason
truely
in
more
numerous
and
various
matters
.
But
he
that
hath
lighted
on
deceiving
or
deceived
masters
,
that
teach
for
truth
all
that
hath
been
dictated
to
them
by
their
own
interest
,
or
hath
been
cried
up
by
other
such
teachers
before
them
,
have
for
the
most
part
their
natural
reason
as
far
as
concerneth
the
truth
of
Doctrine
quite
defaced
or
very
much
weakened
,
becoming
changelings
through
the
inchantments
of
words
not
understood
.
This
cometh
into
my
mind
from
this
saying
of
the
Bishop
,
that
matter
of
fact
,
is
not
verified
by
sense
and
memory
,
but
by
Arguments
.
How
is
it
possible
that
without
Discipline
a
man
should
come
to
think
that
the
estimony
of
a
witness
,
which
is
the
onely
verifier
of
matter
of
fact
should
consist
,
not
in
sense
and
memory
,
so
as
he
may
say
he
saw
and
remembers
the
thing
done
,
but
in
Arguments
or
S●llegismes
?
Or
how
can
an
unlearn●d
man
be
brought
to
think
the
words
he
speaks
,
ought
to
signifie
,
(
when
he
speaks
sincerely
)
any
thing
else
,
but
that
which
himself
meant
by
them
?
Or
how
can
any
man
without
learning
take
the
question
to
be
a
question
of
fact
?
Nor
do
I
think
that
any
man
is
so
simple
as
●●t
to
find
that
to
be
good
which
he
loveth
,
good
I
say
so
far
forth
,
as
it
maketh
him
to
love
it
;
or
is
there
any
unl●arned
man
,
so
st●pid
as
to
think
Eternity
is
this
present
instant
of
time
standing
still
,
and
the
same
Eternit
to
be
the
very
next
instant
after
,
an
consequently
,
that
there
be
so
many
eternities
●a●
there
can
be
instants
of
time
supposed
?
No
,
there
is
Sc●olastic●
learning
required
in
some
measure
to
make
one
mad
.
(
c
by
these
words
spontaneity
,
&c.
Men
do
understand
as
he
conceives
,
&c.
a
spontaneous
spontaneous
,
&c.
This
I
get
by
striving
to
make
sense
of
that
which
he
strives
to
make
non-sense
.
I
never
thought
the
word
spontaneity
English
.
Yet
because
he
used
it
,
I
made
such
meaning
of
it
as
it
would
bear
,
and
said
And
for
this
my
too
much
officio●snesse
I
r●ceive
the
reward
of
b●ing
thought
by
him
not
to
be
a
rati
nal
man
.
I
know
that
in
the
Latine
of
all
Authors
but
School-men
.
signifies
that
Action
,
whereof
there
is
no
apparent
cause
derived
further
th●n
from
the
Agent
it self
,
and
is
in
all
things
that
have
sense
,
the
same
with
voluntary
whether
deliberated
or
not
d●liberated
.
And
therefore
where
he
distinguished
it
from
voluntary
,
I
thought
he
might
mean
indeliberate
;
but
let
it
signifie
what
it
will
,
provided
it
be
intelligible
,
it
would
make
against
him
.
(
d
the
considoring
of
the
good
●nd
evil
sequells
,
of
an
Action
to
come
If
the
Bi●●ops
words
proceeded
not
from
hearing
and
readi●g
of
others
,
but
from
his
own
thoughts
,
he
could
never
have
reprehended
this
●efinition
of
Deliberation
especia●●y
in
the
manner
he
doth
it
;
for
he
says
it
is
the
consi●●ring
whether
this
or
that
be
a
good
and
fit
means
,
for
obtaining
such
an
end
;
as
if
considering
whether
a
means
be
good
or
not
,
were
n●t
all
●n●
,
with
considering
whether
the
s●quei
of
using
those
means
be
good
or
evil
.
(
e
T.
H.
deliberation
is
an
Act
o●
Fancie
,
I
do
indeed
conceive
that
d●liberation
is
an
Act
of
●ay
more
,
that
also
,
are
A●●s
of
the
Imagination
,
that
is
to
say
,
they
are
I
find
it
so
by
considering
my
own
▪
Ratio●●nation
;
and
he
might
find
it
so
i●
his
,
i●
he
did
consider
his
own
thoughts
,
and
not
speak
as
he
does
by
rote
;
by
rote
I
say
when
he
disputes
;
not
by
rote
,
when
he
is
about
those
tris●●s
,
he
ca●●eth
businesses
;
then
when
he
speaks
he
thinks
of
(
that
is
to
say
he
Imagins
)
his
business
;
but
here
he
thinks
onely
upon
the
words
of
other
men
that
have
gone
before
him
in
th●●
question
,
transcribing
their
conclusions
and
arguments
,
not
his
o●n
thoughts
.
(
f
that
the
Will
is
an
Act
of
our
Deliberation
,
onely
the
last
appetite
,
is
to
be
called
our
Wi●●
.
Though
the
understanding
and
the
Will
were
two
distinct
faculties
,
yet
follow
their
not
that
the
Will
and
the
Deliberation
are
two
distinct
facul●i●s
;
for
the
whole
Deliberation
is
nothing
else
,
but
so
many
Wills
,
alternatively
chang●d
,
according
as
a
man
understandeth
or
fancieth
,
the
good
and
evil
sequels
of
the
thing
concerning
which
he
deliberateth
whether
he
shall
purs●e
it
,
or
of
the
means
wh●ther
they
conduce
or
not
to
that
end
whatsoever
it
be
he
seeketh
to
obtain
.
So
that
in
deliberation
there
be
many
wills
whereof
net
any
is
the
cause
of
a
voluntary
action
but
the
last
,
as
I
have
said
before
answering
this
objection
in
another
place
.
(
g
he
is
a
free
Agent
,
that
can
do
if
he
Will
,
and
forbear
if
he
Will
.
He
has
no
reason
to
wonder
●ow
this
dropped
from
my
Pen.
He
sound
it
in
my
Answer
.
Numb
.
and
has
been
all
his
while
about
to
confute
it
,
so
long
indeed
that
he
had
forget
I
said
it
.
And
now
agai●
brings
another
Argument
to
pr●v●
a
man
is
free
to
Will
,
which
●●th
There
is
no
doubt
a
man
can
Will
one
thing
or
other
,
and
forbear
to
will
it
.
For
men
if
they
be
awake
●re
alwayes
willing
one
thing
or
other
.
But
put
the
case
a
man
h●s
a
Will
today
to
do
a
certain
Action
to
▪
morrow
,
is
he
sure
to
have
the
same
Will
tomorrow
when
he
is
to
do
it
?
Is
he
free
to
day
to
chuse
tomorrows
Will
?
This
is
it
that
s
now
in
question
,
and
this
Argument
maketh
nothing
for
the
assirmative
or
negative
.
(
h
Liberty
in
the
subject
Liberty
to
the
object
Liberty
from
impediments
●iberty
of
the
subject
Liberty
towards
the
object
How
does
it
appear
that
he
who
conceives
Liberty
aright
,
conceives
a
Liberty
in
the
subject
to
Will
or
no●
to
Will
,
unlesse
he
mean
Liberty
to
d●
if
he
Will
,
or
not
to
do
if
he
wi●l
not
,
which
was
never
denied
?
Or
how
does
it
follow
that
a
stone
is
as
free
to
ascend
,
as
desc●nd
,
u●le●●e
he
prove
there
is
no
outward
impe●iment
to
its
ascent
.
Which
cannot
be
proved
;
for
the
contrary
is
true
.
Or
how
proveth
he
,
that
there
is
no
outward
impediment
to
keep
that
point
of
the
Load
stone
which
placeth
it self
toward
the
North
,
from
turning
to
the
South
?
His
ignorance
of
the
causes
external
is
n●t
a
sufficient
argument
that
there
are
none
.
And
whereas
he
saith
,
that
according
to
my
definition
of
Liber●y
,
I
answer
,
that
she
is
not
at
Liberty
to
fly
when
her
wings
are
ty●d
;
but
to
say
,
when
her
wings
are
pl●ckt
,
that
she
wanted
the
Liberty
to
fly
,
were
to
speak
improp●rly
and
absurdly
;
for
in
that
case
,
men
that
speak
English
use
to
say
she
cannot
fly
And
for
his
reprehension
of
my
attributing
Lib●rty
to
I
would
be
glad
to
know
whether
it
be
improper
language
to
say
a
bird
●r
beast
▪
may
be
s●t
at
Liberty
from
the
cage
wherein
they
were
●mprisoned
,
or
to
say
that
a
river
which
was
stopped
,
hath
recovered
its
free
course
,
and
how
it
follows
,
that
a
beast
or
river
recovering
this
freedome
,
must
needs
therefore
(
i
How
can
a
man
imagine
any
thing
to
begin
without
a
cause
;
or
if
it
should
begin
without
a
cause
,
why
it
should
begin
at
this
time
,
rather
then
at
that
time
?
to
be
begin
to
Act
He
granteth
nothing
ca●
without
a
cause
,
&
he
hath
granted
formerly
that
nothing
can
cause
it self
.
And
now
he
saith
it
may
begin
of
it self
.
The
action
therefore
without
any
cause
which
he
said
nothing
could
do
,
contradicting
what
he
had
said
but
in
the
line
before
.
And
●or
that
that
he
saith
,
that
It
hath
b●en
argu●d
before
;
and
all
causes
have
been
proved
,
(
if
entire
and
suffici●nt
causes
)
to
be
n●cessary
,
and
that
which
he
repeat●th
here
,
namely
,
that
and
that
it
has
been
made
appear
sufficiently
before
,
that
it
is
but
Jargon
,
the
words
being
insignificant
,
and
having
nothing
in
the
mind
of
man
naswerable
to
them
.
T.
H.
One
of
his
interrogatories
is
,
this
,
This
question
was
needl●sse
,
because
all
the
way
I
have
granted
him
that
men
have
libe●ty
to
do
many
things
if
they
will
,
which
they
left
und●ne
,
because
they
had
not
the
Will
to
do
them
.
Another
interrogatory
is
this
,
This
question
was
in
vain
,
unlesse
he
think
himself
my
Confessour
.
Another
is
▪
To
this
I
answer
,
no
;
but
to
show
I
have
no
Dominion
over
my
will
,
and
this
also
at
his
request
;
But
all
these
questions
serve
in
this
place
for
nothing
else
,
but
to
deliver
him
of
a
jest
he
was
in
labour
with
all
,
and
therefore
his
last
question
is
,
Subtil
questions
,
and
full
of
Episcopal
gravity
,
I
would
he
had
left
out
charging
me
with
opinions
.
I
should
then
have
pardon●d
him
,
his
calling
me
both
because
I
do
many
things
foolishly
,
and
because
in
this
question
disputed
between
us
,
I
think
he
will
appear
a
greater
fool
then
I.
J.
D.
T
is
necessary
that
to
morrow
it
shall
rain
,
or
not
rain
.
It
shall
rain
,
or
it
shall
not
rain
,
(
a
(
b
Nilus
.
(
c
T.
H.
(
d
one
of
these
Sparrows
doth
not
fall
to
the
ground
without
your
Heavenly
Father
,
the
former
and
the
later
rain
.
the
casting
of
was
necessary
before
it
was
thrown
.
when
it
was
thrown
the
posture
of
the
parties
hand
:
the
measure
of
the
force
applied
by
the
caster
.
the
posture
of
the
Table
before
the
cast
was
thrown
it
could
not
be
necessarily
true
,
except
one
of
the
Members
were
necessarily
true
,
if
neither
the
one
nor
the
other
of
the
Members
be
necessarily
true
,
it
cannot
be
affirmed
that
either
the
one
,
or
the
other
is
true
.
T.
H.
If
I
shall
live
I
shall
eat
,
is
a
necessary
proposition
,
that
is
to
say
,
it
is
necessary
that
that
proposition
should
be
true
whensoever
uttered
.
But
it
is
not
the
necessity
of
the
thing
,
nor
is
it
therefore
necessary
that
the
man
shall
live
,
or
that
the
man
shall
eat
.
T.
H.
I
do
not
use
to
fortifie
my
distinctions
with
such
reasons
.
T.
H.
it
is
not
the
necessity
of
the
thing
I
know
that
either
〈◊〉
will
rain
to
morrow
,
or
that
it
will
not
rain
to
morrow
the
Sun
is
risen
to
morrow
will
be
an
Eclipse
of
the
Moon
.
(
f
●ytyrice
T●patulice
T.
H.
Either
God
did
make
such
a
decree
,
or
he
did
not
make
such
a
decree
.
T.
H.
When
he
shall
have
read
my
Animadversions
upon
that
Answer
of
his
he
will
think
otherwise
whatsoever
he
will
confesse
.
His
first
reason
is
he
saith
He
knows
that
this
part
of
my
discourse
which
beginneth
at
is
no
dispute
with
him
at
all
,
but
a
bare
se●ting
down
of
my
opinion
concerning
the
natural
necessity
of
all
things
;
which
is
opposite
,
not
onely
to
the
Liberty
of
Will
;
but
also
to
all
contingence
that
is
not
necessary
.
And
therefore
these
instances
were
not
impertinent
to
my
purpose
;
and
if
they
be
impertinent
to
his
opinion
of
the
Liberty
of
mans
Will
,
he
does
impertinently
to
meddle
with
them
.
And
yet
for
all
he
pretends
here
,
that
the
question
is
onely
ab
ut
Liberty
of
the
Will.
Yet
in
his
first
discourse
Number
the
16.
he
maintains
that
And
my
purpose
here
is
to
shew
by
those
instances
,
that
those
things
which
we
esteem
most
contingent
are
neverthelesse
necessary
.
Besides
,
the
controversy
is
not
whether
free
actions
,
which
proceed
from
the
Liberty
of
mans
Will
be
necessary
or
not
;
for
I
know
no
action
,
which
proceedeth
from
the
Liberty
of
mans
Will.
But
the
question
is
,
whether
those
actions
which
proceed
from
the
mans
Will
,
be
necessary
.
The
mans
Will
is
something
;
but
the
Liberty
of
his
Will
is
nothing
.
Again
,
the
question
is
not
,
whether
contingent
actions
,
which
proceed
from
the
indetermination
or
contingent
concurrence
of
natural
causes
,
(
for
there
is
nothing
that
can
proceed
from
indetermination
,
)
but
whether
contingent
actions
be
necessary
before
they
be
done
,
or
whether
the
concurrence
of
natural
causes
,
when
they
happen
to
concur
,
were
not
necessitated
so
to
happen
;
or
whether
whatsoever
chanceth
be
not
necessitated
so
to
chance
.
And
that
they
are
so
necessitated
,
I
have
proved
already
with
such
arguments
as
the
Bishop
,
for
ought
I
see
cannot
answer
.
For
to
say
(
as
he
doth
)
that
is
no
proof
.
'T
is
indeed
as
cleer
as
the
Sun
,
that
there
are
free
actions
proceeding
from
Election
;
but
that
there
is
Election
without
any
outward
necessitation
,
is
dark
enough
.
For
proof
of
this
,
he
instanceth
in
a
Tile
that
falling
from
an
house
,
breaks
a
mans
head
,
neither
necessarily
,
nor
freely
,
and
therefore
contingently
.
Not
necessarily
,
(
saith
he
)
he
did
freely
choose
to
go
that
way
without
any
necessitation
.
Which
is
as
much
as
taking
the
question
it self
for
a
proof
.
For
what
is
else
the
question
,
but
whether
a
man
be
necessitated
to
choose
what
he
chooseth
?
Again
(
saith
he
)
it
was
not
Free
,
because
he
did
not
deliberate
whether
his
head
should
be
broken
or
not
;
and
con●ludes
,
This
is
true
and
denied
by
none
;
but
he
should
have
proved
,
that
such
contingent
actions
are
not
antecedently
necessary
by
a
concurrence
of
natural
causes
,
(
though
a
little
before
he
granteth
they
are
.
)
For
whatsoever
is
produced
by
concurrence
of
natural
causes
,
was
antecedently
determined
in
the
cause
of
such
concurrence
,
though
as
he
calls
it
contingent
concurrence
,
not
perceiving
that
and
contingent
concurrence
,
are
all
one
,
and
suppose
a
continued
connection
,
and
succession
of
causes
,
which
make
the
effect
necessarily
future
.
So
that
hitherto
he
hath
proved
no
other
contingence
,
then
that
which
is
necessary
.
It
maketh
nothing
against
the
truth
,
that
he
sees
no
ground
for
it
.
I
have
pointed
out
the
ground
in
my
former
discourse
,
and
am
not
bound
to
find
him
eyes
.
He
himself
immediately
citeth
a
place
of
Scripture
that
proveth
it
,
where
Christ
saith
,
one
of
these
sparrows
doth
not
fall
to
the
ground
,
without
your
heavenly
father
;
which
place
if
there
were
n●
more
,
were
a
sufficient
ground
for
the
assertion
of
t●e
necessity
of
all
those
changes
of
animal
motion
;
in
birds
and
other
living
creatures
,
which
seem
to
us
so
uncertain
.
But
when
a
man
is
dizzy
with
and
the
like
unintelligible
terms
▪
the
ground
goes
from
him
.
By
and
by
after
he
confesseth
that
and
err●
therein
the
other
way
;
for
he
says
in
effect
that
many
things
are
,
which
are
not
;
for
it
is
all
one
to
say
they
are
not
contingent
,
and
they
are
not
.
He
should
have
said
there
be
many
things
,
the
necessity
of
whose
contingence
,
we
cannot
or
do
not
know
.
If
there
be
a
necessary
connection
o●
all
natural
causes
from
the
beginning
,
●hen
there
is
no
doubt
but
●hat
all
things
happen
necessarily
which
is
that
,
that
I
have
all
this
while
maintained
.
But
whether
there
be
or
no
,
he
says
it
requires
a
further
exa●inatio●
.
Hitherto
therefore
;
he
knows
●ot
whether
it
be
true
or
no
,
and
co●sequ●n●l●
all
his
arguments
hitherto
have
been
●f
no
effect
▪
nor
hath
he
shewed
an●
thing
to
prov
(
what
he
purposed
)
that
elective
Actions
are
n●t
necessitated
▪
And
whereas
a
little
before
he
says
,
that
to
my
Arguments
,
to
prove
that
sufficient
causes
are
necessary
,
he
hath
already
answered
,
it
seemeth
he
distrusteth
his
own
answer
,
and
answers
again
to
the
two
instances
of
but
brings
no
other
Argument
to
prove
the
cast
thrown
not
to
be
necessarily
thrown
,
but
this
,
that
he
doe
not
deliberate
whether
he
shall
throw
that
cast
or
not
.
Which
Argument
may
perhaps
prove
that
the
casting
of
it
proceedeth
not
from
free
will
,
but
proves
not
any
thing
against
the
antecedent
,
necessity
of
it
.
And
to
prove
that
it
is
not
necessary
,
that
it
should
rain
or
not
rain
to
morrow
,
after
telling
us
that
the
Aethiopian
rains
cause
the
inundation
of
Nilus
;
that
in
some
Eastern
Countries
they
have
rain
onely
twice
a
year
,
which
the
Scripture
(
he
saith
)
calleth
I
thought
he
had
known
it
by
the
experience
of
some
Travellers
,
but
I
see
he
onely
gathereth
it
from
that
Phrase
in
Scripture
of
I
say
after
he
has
told
us
this
,
to
prove
that
it
is
not
necess●ry
it
should
rain
or
not
rain
to
morrow
,
he
saith
that
By
this
Argument
,
a
man
may
take
the
height
of
the
Bishops
Logick
.
And
again
as
if
nothing
were
necessary
the
necessity
whereof
we
know
not
.
Another
reason
he
saith
,
why
my
instances
are
impertinent
,
is
because
that
is
,
that
the
necessity
is
not
in
the
antecedent
causes
,
and
thereupon
challengeth
me
for
the
credit
of
my
cause
,
to
name
some
reason
,
to
the
cast
Here
again
from
our
ignorance
of
the
particular
causes
that
concurring
make
the
necessity
,
he
inferreth
that
there
was
no
such
necessity
at
all
;
which
indeed
is
that
which
hath
in
all
this
question
deceived
him
and
all
other
men
,
that
attribute
events
to
fortune
.
But
I
suppose
he
will
not
deny
that
event
to
be
necessary
where
all
the
causes
of
the
cast
,
and
their
concurrence
,
and
the
cause
of
that
concurrence
are
foreknown
,
and
might
be
told
him
,
though
I
cannot
tell
him
.
Seeing
therefore
God
foreknows
them
all
,
the
cast
was
necessary
,
▪
and
that
from
antecedent
causes
from
eternity
,
which
is
no
Hypothetical
necessity
.
And
whereas
my
argument
to
prove
,
that
was
herefore
necessary
because
he
answereth
that
What
has
a
conjunct
proposition
to
do
with
this
in
question
,
which
is
disiunctive
?
Or
what
be
the
parts
of
this
proposition
,
It
is
not
made
of
two
propositions
,
as
a
disjunctive
is
;
but
is
one
s●●ple
proposition
,
namely
this
,
the
shining
of
the
Sun
is
day
.
Either
he
has
no
Logick
at
all
,
or
thinks
they
have
no
reason
at
all
that
are
his
readers
.
But
he
has
a
trick
he
saith
to
abate
the
edge
of
the
disjunction
,
by
varying
the
proposition
thus
,
and
yet
saith
he
What
childish
deceit
,
or
childish
ignorance
is
this
,
when
he
is
to
prove
that
neither
of
the
members
is
determinately
true
in
a
disjunctive
proposition
,
to
bring
for
instance
a
proposition
not
disjunctive
?
It
had
been
disjunctive
if
it
had
gone
thus
,
I
know
that
it
will
rain
to
morrow
,
or
I
know
that
it
will
not
rain
to
morrow
;
but
then
he
had
certainly
known
determinately
one
of
the
two
.
(
f
But
it
is
a
senselesse
assertion
(
whatsoever
it
deserve
)
to
say
that
this
proposition
,
it
shall
rain
or
not
rain
is
true
and
neither
of
them
true
and
little
better
as
he
hath
now
qualified
it
,
T.
H.
His
instance
is
I
do
believe
the
Bishop
himself
believeth
that
all
the
Decrees
of
God
have
been
from
all
eternity
,
and
therefore
he
will
not
stand
to
this
that
Gods
Decrees
were
ever
made
;
for
whatsoever
hath
been
made
,
hath
had
a
beginning
.
Besides
Gods
Decree
is
his
Will
;
and
the
Bishop
hath
said
formerly
that
the
Will
of
God
is
God
,
the
Justice
of
God
,
God
,
&c.
If
therefore
God
made
a
Decree
(
according
to
the
Bishops
opinion
)
God
made
himself
.
By
which
we
may
see
what
fine
stuffe
it
is
that
proceedeth
from
disputing
of
Incomprehensibles
.
Again
he
says
,
If
God
had
made
either
causes
or
effects
free
from
necessity
,
he
had
made
the●●
free
from
his
own
Praescience
,
which
had
been
imperfection
.
Perhaps
he
will
say
,
that
in
these
words
of
his
,
I
take
no
notice
of
that
as
being
too
hot
for
my
fingers
.
Therefore
now
I
take
notice
of
it
,
and
say
,
that
it
is
neither
Lati●
,
nor
English
,
nor
Sense
.
T.
H.
That
there
is
no
such
thing
as
an
Agent
,
which
,
when
all
things
requisite
to
action
are
present
,
can
nevertheless
forbear
to
act
If
it
be
an
Agent
it
can
work
can
work
will
work
will
work
I●
it
work
,
there
is
nothing
wanting
of
what
is
requisite
to
produce
the
action
.
And
consequently
the
cause
of
the
action
is
sufficient
.
(b)
And
if
sufficient
,
then
also
necessary
.
(
a
IF
it
be
an
Agent
it
can
work
Here
he
has
gotten
a
just
advantage
,
for
I
should
have
said
,
But
it
is
an
advantage
,
which
profiteth
little
to
his
cause
;
for
if
I
repeate
my
argument
again
in
this
manner
,
his
answer
will
be
nothing
to
the
purpose
.
For
whereas
to
these
words
,
he
answereth
it
is
not
contrary
to
any
thing
that
I
have
said
.
For
I
never
maintained
that
whatsoever
a
man
intendeth
is
necessarily
performed
;
but
this
,
whatsoever
a
man
performeth
i●
necessarily
performed
,
and
what
he
intendeth
,
necessarily
intended
and
that
,
from
causes
antecedent
.
And
therefore
to
say
as
he
doth
,
that
the
cause
is
sufficient
to
do
what
it
doth
,
but
not
alwayes
sufficient
to
do
what
a
man
should
or
would
do
,
is
to
say
the
same
that
I
do
.
For
I
say
not
that
the
cause
that
bringeth
forth
a
Monster
,
is
sufficient
to
bring
forth
a
man
,
but
that
every
cause
is
sufficient
to
produce
onely
the
effect
it
produceth
.
And
if
sufficient
,
then
also
necessary
.
And
if
sufficient
,
then
also
necessary
All
sufficiency
signifieth
no
more
,
when
it
is
attributed
to
God
then
Omnipotence
,
and
Omnipotence
signifieth
no
more
then
the
Power
to
do
all
things
that
he
will
.
But
to
the
production
of
any
thing
that
is
produced
,
the
Will
of
God
is
as
requisite
,
as
the
rest
of
his
Power
and
sufficiency
.
And
consequently
,
his
all
sufficiency
signifieth
not
a
sufficiency
or
Power
to
do
those
thing
he
will
not
.
But
he
will
deal
he
says
so
favourably
with
me
,
as
to
grant
me
all
this
,
which
I
labour
he
saith
so
much
in
vain
to
prove
,
and
adds
▪
If
it
prove
no
more
;
it
proves
no
necessity
at
all
;
for
by
Hypothetical
necessity
he
means
the
necessity
of
this
proposition
,
whereas
necessity
is
onely
said
truely
of
somewhat
in
future
.
For
necessary
is
that
which
cannot
possibly
be
otherwise
,
and
possibility
is
alwayes
understood
of
some
future
time
.
But
seeing
he
granteth
so
favourably
,
that
sufficient
causes
are
necessary
causes
,
I
shall
easily
conclude
from
it
,
that
whatsoever
those
causes
do
cause
,
are
necessary
antecedently
.
For
if
the
necessity
of
the
thing
produced
,
when
produced
,
be
in
the
same
instant
of
time
,
with
the
existence
of
its
immediate
cause
,
then
also
that
immediate
cause
was
in
the
same
instant
with
the
cause
by
which
it
was
immediately
produced
;
the
same
may
be
said
of
the
cause
of
this
cause
,
and
so
backward
eternally
;
from
whence
it
will
follow
that
all
the
connection
of
the
causes
of
any
effect
from
the
beginning
of
the
World
,
were
altogether
existent
in
one
and
the
same
instant
,
and
consequently
all
the
time
from
the
beginning
of
the
World
or
from
Eternity
to
this
day
is
but
one
instant
,
or
a
which
he
knows
,
by
this
time
is
not
so
.
Haeret
lateri
laethal●●
arund●
he
could
add
oth●r
reasons
,
if
he
thought
it
good
Logick
.
T.
H.
fore-knowledge
is
knowledge
,
and
knowledge
depends
on
the
existence
o●
the
things
known
,
and
not
they
on
it
.
Here
he
miss
recites
my
words
,
which
are
But
he
makes
me
say
I
could
add
other
Arguments
;
then
inferrs
▪
that
there
is
no
impediment
in
Logick
,
why
a
man
may
not
presse
his
adversary
with
the
absurdities
that
flow
from
his
opinion
,
because
is
a
good
form
of
reasoning
;
making
no
difference
,
between
which
are
impossibilities
,
and
which
are
not
onely
possible
but
frequent
.
And
though
it
be
a
good
form
of
reasoning
to
argue
from
absurdities
,
yet
it
●
no
good
form
of
reasoning
,
to
argue
from
inconveniences
;
for
inconvenience
may
stand
well
enough
with
truth
.
(
b
If
a
man
have
Liberty
from
necessitation
,
he
may
frustrate
the
Decrees
of
God
,
and
make
his
Praescience
false
.
Here
again
,
he
would
have
me
conceive
eternity
to
be
that
is
an
instant
of
time
,
and
that
instant
of
time
to
be
God
,
which
neither
he
nor
I
can
conceive
,
nor
can
without
impiety
say
,
as
he
doth
here
,
that
the
Decrees
of
God
are
God
;
In
which
consisteth
all
the
rest
of
his
Answer
to
this
Number
,
saving
that
he
putteth
in
sometimes
,
that
which
is
granted
him
;
but
that
any
thing
can
be
foreknown
,
which
shall
not
necessarily
c●me
to
passe
,
which
was
not
granted
,
●e
proveth
no
otherwise
then
by
his
assertion
,
which
is
denyed
him
J.
D.
(
a
Truth
is
Truth
it
was
desired
by
me
(
b
IN
this
place
I
said
nothing
,
but
that
I
would
have
my
to
communicate
it
onely
to
the
Bishop
.
And
in
his
answer
he
says
.
(
a
My
desire
was
it
should
not
be
communicated
by
my
to
●ll
men
indifferently
.
But
I
barred
not
my
sel●
from
showin
it
priv●t●ly
t●
my
friends
;
though
to
publish
it
was
never
my
intention
▪
till
new
provo●ed
by
the
●nciv●l●
tri●nphing
of
the
Bishop
,
in
his
own
errours
to
my
disadvantage
(
b
It
is
confidently
said
but
not
very
pertinently
to
the
h●rt
I
thou●●●
might
proceed
from
a
discourse
of
this
nature
.
For
I
nevrr
thought
it
could
do
hurt
●o
a
rational
man
,
but
onely
to
such
men
as
cannot
reason
in
those
points
which
are
of
difficult
contemplation
;
for
a
rational
man
will
say
with
himself
,
they
whom
God
will
b●ing
to
a
blessed
and
happy
end
,
those
he
will
put
into
an
humble
,
pious
and
Righteous
way
;
and
of
those
whom
he
will
destroy
,
he
will
harden
the
hearts
;
and
thereupon
examining
himself
,
whether
he
be
in
such
a
way
or
not
,
the
examination
it self
would
(
if
elected
)
be
a
necessary
cause
of
working
out
his
salvation
with
fear
and
trembling
.
But
the
men
who
I
thought
might
take
hurt
thereby
,
are
such
as
reason
erroneously
,
saying
with
themselves
,
if
I
shall
be
saved
,
I
shall
be
saved
whether
I
walk
uprightly
or
no
,
and
consequently
thereunto
shall
be
have
themselves
negligently
,
and
pursue
the
pleasant
way
o●
the
sins
they
are
in
love
with
.
Which
inconvenience
is
not
abated
by
this
discourse
of
the
Bishop
,
because
they
understand
not
the
grounds
he
goeth
on
,
of
and
a
great
many
other
such
unintelligible
words
.
on
men
of
wit
and
learning
,
by
constant
use
they
have
their
senses
exercised
to
discern
both
good
and
evill
,
(
a
men
of
wit
and
learning
T.
H.
T.
H.
(
b
(
c
When
they
dispute
of
Gods
actions
Philosophically
,
then
they
consider
them
again
,
as
if
he
had
such
faculties
,
and
in
the
manner
as
we
have
them
.
(
d
(
e
T.
H.
Father
of
all
mercies
,
and
the
God
o●
all
consolation
.
(f)
onely
true
God
Jesus
Christ
Pure
Religion
and
undefiled
before
God
,
and
the
Father
,
is
this
,
to
visite
the
fatherless
and
widowes
in
their
affliction
,
and
to
keep
himself
unspotted
from
the
world
,
S●
.
James
▪
Fear
God
and
ke●p
his
Commandments
,
for
this
〈◊〉
the
whole
duty
of
man
,
Solomon
,
●c●les
T.
H.
True
Religion
consisteth
in
obedience
to
Christs
Lieutenants
,
and
giving
God
such
honou●
both
in
attributes
and
●●●ions
,
〈◊〉
they
in
their
several
Lieutenanc●●●
sha●
ordain
De
Civ
.
c.
Must
we
obey
him
rather
than
God
?
ground
and
pillar
of
Truth
T.
H.
HE
taketh
it
ill
that
I
say
that
Arguments
do
seldome
work
on
men
of
wit
and
learning
,
when
they
have
once
engaged
themselves
in
a
contrary
opinion
Neverthelesse
it
is
not
onely
certain
by
experience
,
but
also
there
is
reason
for
it
,
and
that
grounded
upon
the
natural
disposition
of
mankind
.
For
it
is
natural
to
all
men
to
defend
those
opinions
,
which
they
have
once
publickly
engaged
themselves
to
maintain
,
because
to
have
that
detected
for
errour
,
which
they
have
publickly
maintained
for
truth
,
is
never
without
some
dishonour
more
or
lesse
;
and
to
find
in
themselves
that
they
have
spent
a
great
deal
of
time
and
labour
,
in
deceiving
themselves
,
is
so
uncomfortable
a
thing
,
as
it
is
no
wonder
,
if
they
imploy
their
wit
and
learning
,
if
they
have
any
,
to
make
good
their
errours
.
And
therefore
where
he
saith
,
(
a
And
that
I
confess
the
more
solid
a
mans
wit
is
,
the
better
will
solid
reasons
work
upon
him
.
Bu
if
he
add
to
i●
that
which
he
calls
learning
,
that
is
to
say
,
much
reading
of
other
mens
Doctrines
,
without
weighing
them
with
his
own
thoughts
,
then
their
judgements
become
weaker
,
and
the
ballance
lesse
exact
.
And
whereas
he
saith
,
that
they
whose
Gold
is
true
are
not
afraid
to
have
it
tryed
by
the
touch
,
he
speaketh
as
if
●
had
been
afraid
to
have
my
Doctrine
tryed
by
the
touch
of
men
of
wit
and
learning
;
wherein
he
is
not
much
mistaken
,
meaning
by
men
of
learning
(
as
I
said
before
)
such
as
had
read
other
men
,
but
not
themselves
.
For
by
reading
others
,
men
commonly
obstruct
the
w●y
to
their
own
exact
and
natural
judgement
,
and
use
their
wit
both
to
deceive
themselves
with
Fallac●s
&
●or
quite
those
who
endeavour
(
at
their
own
intreaty
)
to
instruct
them
,
with
revilings
.
(
b
All
this
is
b●t
said
;
and
what
heretofore
hath
been
offered
in
proof
for
it
,
hath
been
sufficiently
refuted
,
and
the
contrary
proved
;
namely
,
that
it
is
an
errour
contrary
to
the
nature
of
the
Will
;
repugnant
to
reason
and
experience
;
repugnant
to
the
Scripture
;
repugnant
to
the
Doctrine
of
St.
and
t
is
p●●ty
that
the
Fathers
and
Dictors
of
the
Church
have
not
followed
St.
therein
;
an
errour
not
maintained
by
the
best
Philosophers
,
(
for
they
are
not
th●
b●st
Philosophers
which
the
Bishop
thinketh
so
)
an
errour
that
ta●●t●
from
God
the
Glory
of
his
Praescience
,
nor
bringeth
to
him
the
glory
of
〈◊〉
other
Attribute
;
an
errour
that
maketh
men
,
by
imagining
they
can
repent
when
they
will
,
neglect
their
duties
,
●n
that
maketh
m●n
●nt●an
ful
for
Gods
graces
,
by
thinking
them
to
proceed
from
the
natural
ability
of
their
own
will
.
(
c
when
they
dispute
of
Gods
Actions
Philosophically
,
then
they
consider
them
again
,
as
if
he
had
such
faculties
,
and
〈◊〉
such
manner
as
we
have
them
.
Me
thinks
he
should
have
known
at
these
years
that
to
dispute
Philosophically
is
to
dispute
by
naturall
reason
,
and
from
principles
evident
by
the
light
of
●…re
,
and
to
dispute
of
the
faculties
and
proprieties
of
the
subject
w●●reo●
they
treat
.
It
is
therefore
unskilfully
said
by
him
,
that
they
who
dispute
Philosophically
of
God
,
ascribe
unto
him
no
proper
faculties
.
If
〈…〉
▪
proper
faculties
,
I
would
fain
know
of
him
what
improper
faculties
▪
he
ascribes
to
God
.
I
guesse
he
will
make
the
understanding
and
the
Will
,
and
his
other
Attributes
to
be
in
God
improper
faculties
▪
because
he
cannot
properly
call
them
faculties
,
that
is
to
say
he
knows
not
how
to
make
it
good
that
they
are
faculties
,
and
yet
he
will
have
these
words
,
to
passe
for
an
Axiome
of
Philosophy
;
And
Whereas
I
had
said
,
we
ought
not
to
dispute
of
Gods
nature
,
and
that
he
is
no
●it
subject
of
our
Philosophy
,
he
den●es
it
not
,
but
says
I
say
it
,
(
d
The
Bishop
will
have
much
a
do
to
make
good
,
that
to
dispute
of
the
nature
of
God
,
is
alone
with
setting
forth
his
Justice
,
and
his
goodness
.
He
taketh
n●
notice
of
these
words
of
mine
,
pi●●s
men
attribute
to
God
.
Almighty
for
honours
sake
,
whatsoever
they
see
is
▪
honourable
in
the
World
;
and
yet
this
is
setting
forth
Gods
Justice
,
Goodness
,
&c.
without
disputing
of
Gods
nature
.
(
e
The
true
Tophet
was
a
place
not
far
from
the
Walls
of
Jerusalem
,
and
consequently
on
the
Earth
;
I
cannot
imagine
what
he
will
say
to
this
in
his
Answer
to
my
Leviathan
,
if
there
he
find
the
same
,
unlesse
he
say
that
in
this
place
by
he
meant
a
not
true
Tophet
.
(
f
saith
our
Saviour
This
which
followeth
to
the
end
of
his
Answer
and
of
the
Book
,
is
a
reprehension
of
me
,
for
saying
that
If
it
be
Lawful
for
Christians
to
institute
amongst
themselves
a
Common
wealth
,
and
Magistrates
,
whereby
they
may
be
able
to
live
in
peace
one
with
another
,
and
unite
themselves
in
defence
against
a
forraign
enemy
,
it
will
certainly
be
necessary
to
make
to
themselves
some
supreme
Judge
in
all
controversies
to
whom
they
ought
all
to
give
obedience
,
and
this
is
no
such
strange
Doctrine
,
nor
so
uncouth
a
Phrase
to
Christian
ears
,
as
the
Bishop
makes
it
,
whatsoever
it
be
to
them
,
that
would
make
themselves
Judges
of
the
supreme
Judge
himself
.
No
,
but
(
saith
he
)
Christ
is
the
supreme
Judge
,
and
we
are
not
to
obey
men
rather
than
God
▪
Is
there
any
Christian
m●n
,
that
do●s
not
acknowledge
that
we
are
to
be
judged
by
Christ
▪
or
that
we
ought
not
to
obey
him
rather
then
any
man
,
that
shall
be
his
Lieutenant
upon
earth
?
The
question
therefore
is
,
not
of
who
is
to
be
obeyed
,
but
of
what
be
his
commands
.
If
the
Scripture
contain
his
commands
,
then
may
every
Christian
know
by
them
what
they
are
;
and
what
has
the
Bishop
to
do
with
what
God
says
to
me
when
I
read
them
,
more
then
I
have
to
do
with
what
God
says
to
him
when
he
reads
them
,
unlesse
he
have
Authority
given
him
by
him
whom
Christ
hath
constituted
his
Lieutenant
?
This
Lieutenant
upon
earth
I
say
is
the
supreme
civill
Magistrate
,
to
whom
belongeth
the
care
and
charge
of
seeing
that
no
Doctrine
may
be
thaught
the
people
,
but
such
as
may
consist
with
the
general
Peace
of
them
all
,
and
with
the
obedience
,
that
is
due
to
the
civil
Soveraign
.
In
whom
would
the
Bishop
have
the
Authority
reside
of
prohibiting
seditious
opinions
,
when
they
are
taught
(
as
they
are
often
)
in
Divinity
Books
,
and
from
the
Pulpit
?
I
could
hardly
guesse
,
but
that
I
remember
that
there
have
been
Books
written
to
intitle
the
Bishops
to
a
underived
from
the
civil
Soveraign
.
But
because
he
maketh
it
so
●aynous
a
matter
,
that
the
supreme
civil
Magistrate
should
be
Christs
Lieutenant
upon
earth
,
let
us
suppose
that
a
Bishop
,
or
a
Synode
of
Bishops
should
be
set
up
(
which
I
hope
never
shall
)
for
our
civil
Soveraign
;
then
that
which
he
objecteth
here
;
I
could
object
in
the
same
words
against
himself
.
For
I
could
say
in
his
o●n
words
,
But
the
Bishop
hath
found
a
more
compendious
way
to
Heaven
,
namely
,
that
true
Religion
consisteth
in
obedience
to
Christs
,
Lieutenants
that
is
(
now
by
supposition
)
to
the
Bishops
;
That
is
to
say
,
that
every
Christian
of
what
nation
soever
,
coming
into
the
Country
which
the
Bishop●
governe
,
should
be
of
their
Religion
.
He
would
make
the
civil
Magistrate
to
be
Christs
Lieutenant
upon
earth
for
matters
of
Religion
,
and
supreme
Judge
in
all
controversies
,
and
say
they
ought
to
be
obeyed
by
al
,
how
strange
soever
and
uncouth
it
seem
to
him
now
,
the
Soveraignity
being
in
others
.
And
I
may
say
to
him
,
what
if
the
Magistrate
himself
,
I
mean
by
supposition
the
Bishops
should
be
wicked
〈…〉
▪
What
if
they
should
command
as
much
contrary
to
the
●…w
of
〈◊〉
o●
nature
as
every
any
Christian
King
did
(
which
is
very
possible
)
must
▪
we
obey
them
rather
then
God
?
Is
the
civill
Magistrate
become
now
the
onely
ground
and
p●●lar
of
truth
?
No.
And
thus
the
Bishop
▪
may
see
,
there
is
〈…〉
difference
between
his
▪
Ode
and
my
●arode
to
it
,
and
that
both
of
them
are
of
equal
force
〈◊〉
conclud
nothin●
.
The
Bishop
knows
that
the
Kings
of
since
the
time
of
have
been
〈…〉
by
〈…〉
Parliament
supream
Governors
o●
the
Church
of
in
〈…〉
both
civil
and
Ecclesiastical
▪
that
is
to
say
〈…〉
matters
both
Ecclesiastical
and
civil
,
an●
consequently
o●
this
Church
,
Supreme
head
on
Earth
,
though
perhaps
he
will
not
allow
that
〈…〉
me
of
H●●d
.
I
should
wonder
therefore
whom
the
Bishop
would
have
to
be
Christs
Lieutenant
here
in
for
matters
of
Religion
▪
if
not
the
supreme
Governor
●nd
Head
of
the
Church
of
〈…〉
Man
or
Women
whosoever
he
be
▪
that
hath
the
Soveraign
Power
but
that
I
know
he
challenges
it
to
the
Bishops
and
thinks
tha●
King
took
the
Ecclesiastical
Power
away
from
the
Pope
,
to
settle
it
not
in
himself
but
them
.
But
he
ought
to
have
known
that
what
〈…〉
,
or
Power
o●
Ordai●ing
〈…〉
,
the
Pop●s
had
here
in
the
time
of
the
Kings
Predecessours
til
the
8.
they
derived
it
all
from
the
Kings
Power
▪
though
they
did
not
acknowledge
it
,
and
the
Kings
connived
at
it
,
either
not
knowing
their
own
right
,
or
not
daring
to
challenge
it
,
til
such
ti●e
as
the
behaviour
of
the
Romane
Clergie
had
undeceived
the
people
which
otherwise
would
have
sided
with
them
.
Nor
was
it
unlawful
for
the
King
to
take
from
them
,
the
Authority
he
had
given
them
,
as
being
Pope
enough
in
his
own
Kingdome
,
without
depending
on
a
forraign
one
,
nor
is
it
to
be
called
Schisme
unlesse
it
be
Schisme
also
in
the
head
of
a
Family
to
discharge
as
often
〈◊〉
he
shall
see
cause
,
the
School-Masters
he
enter
●ineth
to
teach
his
Children
.
If
the
Bishop
and
Dr.
when
they
did
write
in
defence
of
the
Church
of
against
imputation
of
Schisme
,
quitting
their
own
pretences
of
jurisdiction
and
had
gone
upon
these
principles
of
mine
,
they
had
not
been
so
shrewdly
handled
as
they
have
been
by
an
English
Papist
,
that
wrote
against
them
.
And
now
I
have
done
answering
to
his
Arguments
.
I
shall
here
●n
the
end
of
all
taee
that
Liberty
of
censuring
his
while
Book
,
which
he
hath
taken
,
in
the
beginning
,
of
censuring
mine
.
I
have
saith
he
his
answers
,
considered
his
reasons
▪
and
conclude
he
hath
missed
,
and
mi●●aid
the
question
,
that
his
answers
are
evasions
,
that
his
Arguments
are
●aralogismes
,
and
that
the
opinion
of
absolute
and
universal
necessity
is
but
a
〈…〉
some
groundless
,
and
ill
chosen
Principles
.
And
now
it
is
my
turn
to
censure
.
And
first
,
●o●
the
strength
of
his
discourse
,
and
knowledge
of
the
point
in
question
,
I
think
it
much
inferiour
,
to
that
which
might
have
been
written
by
any
man
living
,
that
had
no
other
learning
besides
the
ability
to
wri●e
his
mind
;
but
as
well
perhaps
as
the
same
man
would
have
done
it
if
to
the
ability
of
writing
his
mind
,
he
had
added
the
study
of
School-Divinity
.
Secondly
,
for
the
manners
of
it
(
for
to
a
publick
writing
there
belongeth
good
manners
)
it
consisteth
in
railing
and
exclaiming
and
scurrilous
jesting
,
with
now
and
then
an
unclean
,
and
mean
instance
.
And
lastly
for
his
elocution
,
the
vertue
whereof
lieth
not
in
the
flux
of
words
but
in
perspicuity
,
it
is
the
same
Language
with
that
of
the
Kingdome
of
Darkness
.
One
shall
find
in
it
,
especially
where
●e
should
speak
most
closely
to
the
question
,
such
words
as
these
&
other
like
words
of
non-sense
divided
besides
many
propositions
such
as
th●se
,
I
wonder
how
he
mist
saying
,
The
Understanding
suspendeth
its
own
Act
and
the
same
coexistent
with
to
morrow
,
and
many
other
like
speeches
of
Which
the
truth
can
never
stand
in
need
of
.
Perhaps
the
Bishop
will
say
these
Terms
and
Phrases
are
intelligible
enough
;
for
he
hath
said
in
his
Reply
to
that
his
opinion
is
demonstrable
in
reason
,
though
he
be
not
able
to
comprehend
,
how
i●
consisteth
together
with
Gods
eternal
Prescience
▪
and
though
it
exceed
his
weak
capacitie
,
yet
he
ought
to
adhere
to
that
truth
which
is
manifest
▪
so
that
to
him
,
that
truth
is
manifest
,
●nd
demonstrable
by
reason
,
which
is
beyond
his
capacity
,
so
that
words
beyond
capacity
are
with
him
intelligible
enough
.
But
the
Reader
is
to
be
Judge
of
that
.
I
could
add
many
other
passages
that
discover
both
his
little
Logick
(
as
taking
t●●
insignificant
word
above
recited
for
Terms
of
Art
)
a●d
hi●
no
Philosophy
▪
in
distinguishing
between
moral
and
●●tur●l●
m●tion
▪
and
by
calling
some
motions
Metaphorical
,
and
his
th●r
offers
at
the
causes
of
sight
,
and
of
the
descent
of
heavy
lies
,
and
his
talk
of
the
inclination
of
the
L●ud-stone
,
and
diverse
other
places
of
his
Book
.
But
to
make
an
end
I
shall
briefly
draw
up
the
sum
of
what
we
have
both
said
.
That
which
I
have
maintained
is
,
that
no
man
hath
his
future
will
in
his
own
present
power
.
That
it
may
be
changed
by
others
,
and
by
the
change
of
things
without
him
▪
and
when
it
is
changed
,
it
is
not
changed
,
nor
determined
to
any
thing
by
it self
;
and
that
when
it
is
undetermined
it
is
no
Will
;
because
every
one
that
willeth
willeth
something
in
particular
;
That
deliberation
is
common
to
men
with
beasts
,
as
being
alternate
appetite
,
and
not
ratiocination
,
and
the
last
act
or
appetite
therein
,
and
which
is
immediately
followed
by
the
action
,
the
onely
will
that
can
be
taken
notice
of
by
others
,
and
which
onely
maketh
an
action
in
publick
judgment
voluntary
;
That
to
be
free
is
no
more
then
to
do
if
a
man
will
,
and
if
he
will
to
forbear
,
and
consequently
that
this
freedome
is
the
freedome
of
the
man
and
not
of
the
Will
;
That
the
Will
is
not
free
,
but
subject
to
change
by
the
operation
of
external
causes
;
That
all
external
causes
depend
necessarily
on
the
first
eternal
cause
God
Almighty
▪
who
worketh
in
us
both
to
Will
and
to
do
by
the
mediation
of
second
causes
;
That
seeing
neither
man
nor
any
thing
else
can
work
upon
it self
,
it
is
impossible
that
any
man
in
the
framing
of
his
own
Will
should
concur
with
God
,
either
as
an
Actor
or
as
an
Instrument
;
That
there
is
nothing
brought
to
passe
by
fortune
as
by
a
cause
,
nor
any
thing
without
a
cause
or
concurrence
of
causes
sufficient
to
bring
it
so
to
passe
,
and
that
every
such
cause
,
and
their
concurrence
do
proceed
from
the
providence
,
good
pleasure
,
and
working
of
God
,
and
consequently
though
I
do
with
others
call
many
events
and
say
they
yet
because
they
had
every
of
them
their
several
sufficient
causes
,
and
those
causes
again
their
former
causes
,
I
say
they
necessarily
;
And
though
we
perceive
not
what
they
are
,
yet
there
are
of
the
most
Contingent
events
as
necessary
causes
as
of
those
events
whose
causes
we
perceive
,
or
else
they
could
not
possibly
be
foreknown
,
as
they
are
by
him
that
foreknoweth
all
things
.
On
the
contrary
the
Bishop
maintaineth
;
That
the
Will
is
free
from
necessitation
,
and
in
order
thereto
that
the
Judgment
of
the
understanding
is
not
alwayes
nor
of
such
a
nature
in
it self
as
to
oblige
and
determine
the
Will
to
one
,
though
it
be
true
that
Spontaneity
and
determination
to
one
may
consist
together
;
That
the
Will
determineth
it self
,
and
that
external
things
when
they
change
the
Will
do
work
upon
it
,
not
naturally
but
morally
,
not
by
natural
motion
but
by
moral
and
Metaphorical
motion
;
That
when
the
Will
is
determined
naturally
,
it
is
not
by
Gods
general
influence
,
whereon
depend
all
second
causes
,
but
by
special
influence
,
God
concurring
and
powring
something
into
the
Will
;
That
the
Will
when
it
suspends
not
its
Act
,
makes
the
Act
necessary
,
but
because
it
may
suspend
and
not
assent
it
is
not
absolutely
necessary
;
That
sinful
acts
proceed
not
from
Gods
Will
,
but
are
willed
by
him
by
a
Will
not
an
operative
Will
,
and
hardeneth
the
heart
of
man
by
a
negative
obduration
;
That
mans
Will
is
in
his
own
power
,
but
his
not
in
his
own
power
,
nor
necessary
save
onely
by
a
Hypothetical
necessity
;
That
the
Will
to
change
is
not
always
a
change
of
Wil
;
That
not
all
things
which
are
produced
are
produced
from
but
some
things
from
causes
;
That
if
the
Power
of
the
Will
be
present
then
ther●
is
nothing
wanting
to
the
production
of
the
effect
;
That
a
cause
may
be
sufficient
for
the
production
of
an
effect
though
it
want
something
necessary
to
the
production
thereof
,
because
the
Will
may
be
wanting
;
That
a
necessary
cause
doth
not
alwayes
necessarily
produce
its
effect
,
but
onely
then
when
the
effect
is
necessarily
produced
.
He
proveth
also
,
that
the
Will
is
free
,
by
that
universal
notion
which
the
World
hath
of
election
;
For
when
of
the
six
electors
the
votes
are
divided
equally
,
the
King
of
hath
a
casting
voyce
;
That
the
Prescience
of
God
supposeth
no
necessity
of
the
future
existence
of
the
things
foreknown
,
because
God
is
not
eternal
but
eternity
,
and
eternity
is
as
without
succession
of
time
,
and
therefore
God
foresees
all
things
intuitively
by
the
presentiallity
they
have
in
which
comprehendeth
in
it
all
time
past
,
present
,
and
to
come
,
not
formally
but
eminently
and
vertually
;
That
the
Will
is
free
even
then
when
it
acteth
,
but
that
is
in
a
compounded
,
not
in
a
divided
sense
;
That
to
be
made
,
and
to
be
eternal
,
do
consist
together
because
Gods
Decrees
are
made
and
are
nevertheless
eternal
;
That
the
order
,
beauty
,
and
perfection
of
the
World
doth
require
that
in
the
universe
there
should
be
Agents
of
all
sorts
,
some
necessary
,
some
free
,
some
contingent
;
That
though
it
be
true
that
to
morrow
it
shall
rain
or
not
rain
,
yet
neither
of
them
is
true
That
the
Doctrine
of
necessity
is
a
blasphemous
desperate
and
destructive
doctrin●
;
That
it
were
better
to
be
an
Atheist
that
then
to
hold
it
,
&
he
that
maintaineth
it
is
fitter
to
be
refuted
with
Rodds
then
with
Arguments
[
And
now
whether
this
his
Doctrine
or
mine
be
the
more
intelligible
,
more
rational
,
or
more
co●●ormable
to
Gords
Word
,
I
leave
it
to
the
Judgment
of
the
Reader
.
But
whatsoever
be
the
truth
of
the
disputed
Question
the
Reader
may
peradventure
think
I
have
not
used
the
Bishop
with
that
respect
I
ought
,
or
without
disadvantage
of
my
cause
I
might
have
done
;
for
which
I
am
to
make
a
short
Apologie
.
A
little
before
the
last
Parliament
of
the
●●te
King
,
when
every
man
〈…〉
freely
against
the
then
present
Government
,
I
thought
it
worth
my
study
to
consider
the
grounds
and
consequences
of
such
behaviour
,
and
whether
it
were
conformable
or
contrary
to
reason
and
to
the
Word
of
God
;
and
after
some
time
,
I
did
put
in
order
and
publish
my
thoughts
thereof
,
first
in
Latine
,
and
then
again
the
same
in
English
,
where
I
endeavoured
to
prove
both
by
reason
and
Scripture
,
That
they
who
have
once
submitted
themselves
to
any
Soveraign
Governour
,
either
by
express
acknowledgment
of
his
power
,
or
by
receiving
protection
from
his
Laws
,
are
obliged
to
be
true
and
faithful
to
him
,
and
to
acknowledge
no
other
supreme
power
but
him
in
any
matter
,
or
question
whatsoever
,
either
civill
or
Ecclesiastical
.
In
which
Books
of
mine
I
pursued
my
subject
,
without
taking
notice
of
any
particular
man
that
held
any
opinion
contrary
to
that
which
I
then
writ
;
onely
in
general
I
maintained
that
the
office
of
the
Clergy
in
respect
of
the
supreme
civil
power
,
was
not
Magisterial
,
but
Ministerial
;
and
that
their
teaching
of
the
People
was
founded
up
n●o
other
Authority
then
that
of
the
civil
Soveraign
;
and
all
this
without
any
word
tending
to
the
disgrace
either
of
Episcopacy
or
of
Presbytery
.
Nevertheless
I
find
since
,
that
divers
of
them
,
whereof
th●
Bishop
of
is
one
,
have
taken
offence
especially
at
two
things
,
one
,
that
I
make
the
supremacy
in
matters
of
Religion
to
resid●
in
the
civil
Soveraign
;
the
other
,
that
being
no
Clergy-man
I
deliver
Doctrines
,
and
ground
them
u●on
Words
of
the
Scripture
,
which
Doctrines
they
being
by
profession
Divines
have
never
taught
.
And
in
this
their
displeasure
divers
of
them
in
their
Books
and
Sermons
,
without
answering
any
of
my
Arguments
,
have
not
onely
excl●i●ed
against
my
Doctrine
but
reviled
me
and
endeavoured
to
make
me
hateful
〈…〉
things
,
for
which
(
if
they
kn●w
their
own
and
the
Publick
good
)
they
ought
to
have
given
me
thanks
.
There
is
also
one
of
them
that
taking
offence
at
me
for
blaming
in
part
the
Discipline
instituted
heretofore
,
and
regulated
by
the
Authority
of
the
Pope
in
the
Universities
,
not
onely
ranks
me
amongst
thos●
men
that
would
have
the
Revenue
of
the
Universities
diminished
,
and
sayes
plainly
I
have
no
Religion
,
but
also
thinks
me
so
simple
and
ignorant
of
the
World
,
as
to
believe
that
our
Universities
maintain
Popery
.
And
this
is
the
Author
of
the
Book
called
If
either
of
the
Universities
had
thought
it self
injured
,
I
believe
it
could
have
Authorised
or
appointed
some
member
of
theirs
(
whereof
there
be
many
abler
men
then
he
)
to
have
made
their
vin●ication
.
But
this
Vindex
(
as
little
Doggs
,
to
pl●ase
their
Masters
use
to
bark
,
in
token
of
their
sedulity
,
indifferently
at
strangers
till
they
be
rated
off
)
unprovoked
by
me
,
hath
fallen
upon
me
without
bidding
.
I
have
been
publiquely
injured
by
many
of
whom
I
took
no
notice
,
supposing
that
that
humour
would
spend
it self
,
but
seeing
it
last
,
and
grow
higher
in
this
writing
I
now
answer
,
I
thought
it
necessary
at
last
to
make
of
some
of
them
,
and
first
of
this
Bishop
,
an
Example
.