THE
Living
Temple
,
OR
,
A
DESIGNED
IMPROVEMENT
Of
that
NOTION
,
THAT
A
GOOD
MAN
IS
THE
TEMPLE
of
GOD.
By
JOHN
HOWE
,
M.
A.
Sometime
Fellow
of
M.
C.
Oxon.
LONDON
:
Printed
for
John
Starkey
at
the
Miter
in
Fleetstreet
,
near
Temple-Bar
,
MDCLXXV
.
this
Discourse
;
that
being
the
Atheism
most
in
fashion
.
Nor
is
any
thing
more
pertinent
to
the
design
of
the
discourse
intended
concerning
Gods
Temple
;
which
importing
worship
to
be
done
to
him
,
requires
first
a
steady
belief
that
he
is
.
And
surely
the
[
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
]
inscribed
of
old
,
as
Plutarch
tells
us
,
on
the
Delphick
Temple
;
signifying
(
as
,
after
divers
other
conjectures
,
be
concludes
it
to
do
)
Thou
dost
exist
,
is
an
inscription
,
much
more
fitly
set
in
view
,
at
our
entrance
into
the
Temple
of
the
Living
God
,
whose
name
is
I
AM.
Amidst
the
pleasant
entertainments
of
which
Temple
(
made
more
intimate
to
you
than
humane
discourse
can
make
it
)
may
you
spend
many
happy
days
in
this
world
,
as
a
preparative
,
and
introduction
to
an
happier
eternity
in
the
other
.
Whereto
he
is
under
many
and
deep
obligations
,
by
any
means
,
to
contribute
to
his
uttermost
,
who
must
(
especially
in
the
offices
relating
to
this
Temple
)
profess
himself
,
My
Honoured
Lord
,
Your
Lordships
most
humbly
Devoted
Servant
John
Howe
.
THE
LIVING
TEMPLE
,
Or
the
Notion
Improved
,
That
a
Good
Man
is
the
Temple
of
God
.
PART
I.
CHAP.
I.
This
Notion
Common
.
Authorities
needless
.
Insignificant
with
the
Atheistical
.
Who
have
made
it
more
necessary
to
defend
Religion
,
and
a
Temple
in
general
than
this
or
that
.
Better
defended
against
them
by
Practice
and
Use
than
Argument
.
Whereof
they
are
uncapable
.
Often
Disputes
of
its
Principles
not
necessary
to
the
Practice
of
Religion
.
Some
consideration
of
those
supposed
in
the
general
Notion
of
a
Temple
,
pertinent
(
however
)
to
this
Discourse
.
IT
is
so
well
known
that
this
Notion
hath
But
as
Authorities
are
,
in
a
plain
case
,
needless
to
unprejudic'd
minds
;
so
will
they
be
useless
to
the
prejudic'd
,
be
the
case
never
so
plain
.
Nor
is
any
prejudice
deeper
,
or
less
vincible
than
that
of
profane
minds
against
Religion
.
With
such
,
it
would
,
in
the
present
argument
,
signifie
little
to
tell
them
what
hath
been
said
or
thought
before
by
any
others
.
Not
because
it
is
their
general
course
to
be
so
very
circumspect
and
wary
,
as
never
to
approve
or
assent
to
any
thing
,
unless
upon
the
clearest
and
most
convincing
demonstration
:
but
from
their
peculiar
dislike
of
those
things
only
,
that
are
of
this
special
import
and
tendency
.
Discourse
to
them
what
you
will
of
a
Temple
,
and
it
will
be
nauseous
and
unsavoury
:
not
as
being
cross
to
their
reason
(
which
they
are
as
little
curious
to
gratifie
as
any
other
sort
of
men
)
but
to
their
ill
humour
,
and
the
disaffected
temper
of
their
mind
;
whence
also
(
though
they
cannot
soon
or
easily
get
that
mastery
over
their
understandings
herein
,
yet
because
they
would
fain
have
it
so
)
they
do
what
they
can
to
believe
Religion
nothing
else
but
the
effect
of
timerous
fancy
,
and
a
Temple
,
consequently
,
one
of
the
most
idle
impertinencies
in
the
world
.
To
these
,
the
discussion
of
the
notion
we
have
proposed
to
consider
,
will
be
thought
a
beating
the
air
,
an
endeavour
to
give
consistency
to
a
shadow
:
And
if
their
reason
and
power
could
as
well
serve
their
purpose
as
their
anger
and
scorn
,
they
would
soon
tear
up
the
holy
ground
on
which
a
Temple
is
set
,
and
wholly
subvert
the
Sacred
Frame
.
I
speak
of
such
as
deny
the
existence
of
the
ever
blessed
Deity
;
or
(
if
they
are
not
arrived
to
that
express
and
formed
mis-belief
)
whose
hearts
are
enclined
,
and
ready
to
determine
,
even
against
their
mis-giving
and
more
suspicious
minds
,
there
is
no
God
.
Who
,
if
they
cannot
as
yet
believe
,
do
wish
there
were
none
:
And
so
strongly
as
in
a
great
degree
to
prepare
them
for
that
belief
.
That
would
fain
banish
him
not
only
out
of
all
their
thoughts
,
but
the
world
too
.
And
to
whom
it
is
so
far
from
being
a
grateful
sound
,
That
the
Tabernacle
of
God
is
with
men
on
earth
,
that
they
grudge
to
allow
him
a
place
in
heaven
.
At
least
if
they
are
willing
to
admit
the
existence
of
any
God
at
all
,
do
say
to
him
,
Depart
from
us
;
and
would
have
him
so
confined
to
heaven
,
that
he
and
they
may
have
nothing
to
do
with
one
another
.
And
do
therefore
rack
their
impious
wits
to
serve
their
hypothesis
either
way
;
that
under
its
protection
they
may
securely
indulge
themselves
in
a
course
upon
which
they
find
the
apprehension
of
a
God
interesting
himself
in
humane
affairs
,
would
have
a
very
unfavourable
and
threatning
aspect
.
They
are
therefore
constrained
to
take
great
pains
with
themselves
,
to
discipline
and
chastise
their
minds
and
understandings
to
that
tameness
and
patience
,
as
contentedly
to
suffer
the
razing
out
of
their
most
natural
impressions
and
sentiments
.
And
they
reckon
they
have
arrived
to
a
very
Heroical
perfection
,
when
they
can
pass
a
scoff
upon
any
thing
that
carries
the
least
signification
with
it
of
the
fear
of
God
;
and
can
be
able
to
laugh
at
the
weak
and
squeamish
folly
of
those
softer
and
effeminate
minds
,
that
will
trouble
themselves
with
any
thoughts
or
cares
how
to
please
and
propitiate
a
Deity
:
And
doubt
not
but
they
have
made
all
safe
,
and
effectually
done
their
business
when
they
have
learned
to
put
the
ignominious
titles
of
frenzy
and
folly
upon
devotion
in
whatsoever
dress
,
or
garb
;
to
cry
canting
to
any
serious
mention
of
the
name
of
God
,
and
break
a
bold
adventurous
jeast
upon
any
the
most
sacred
Mysteries
,
or
decent
and
awful
solemnities
of
Religion
.
These
content
not
themselves
to
encounter
And
they
are
in
reason
and
justice
to
pardon
the
emulation
which
they
provoke
of
vying
with
them
as
to
the
universality
of
their
design
;
and
not
regret
it
if
they
find
there
be
any
that
think
it
their
duty
to
wave
a
while
serving
the
Temple
of
this
or
that
party
,
as
less
considerable
,
to
defend
that
one
wherein
all
men
have
a
common
interest
and
concernment
.
Since
matters
are
brought
to
that
exigency
and
hazard
,
that
it
seems
less
necessary
to
contend
about
this
or
that
mode
of
Religion
,
as
whether
there
ought
to
be
any
at
all
.
What
was
said
of
a
former
age
could
never
better
agree
to
any
than
our
own
,
that
none
was
ever
more
fruitful
of
Religions
and
barren
of
Religion
or
true
Piety
.
It
concerns
us
to
consider
whether
the
fertility
of
those
many
doth
not
as
well
cause
as
accompany
a
barrenness
in
this
one
.
And
(
since
the
iniquity
of
the
world
hath
made
that
too
suitable
,
which
were
otherwise
unseemly
in
it self
,
to
speak
of
a
Temple
as
a
fortified
place
,
whose
own
sacredness
ought
ever
to
have
been
its
sufficient
fortification
)
it
is
time
to
be
aware
,
lest
our
forgetful
heat
and
zeal
in
the
defence
of
this
or
that
out-work
,
do
expose
(
not
to
say
betray
)
the
main
fortress
to
assault
and
danger
.
Whilst
it
hath
long
been
by
this
means
,
a
neglected
forsaken
thing
;
and
is
more
decayed
by
vacancy
and
disuse
,
than
it
could
ever
have
been
by
the
most
forcible
battery
;
so
as
even
to
promise
the
rude
assailant
an
easie
victory
.
Who
fears
to
insult
over
an
empty
dispirited
dead
Religion
!
which
alive
and
shining
in
its
native
glory
(
as
that
Temple
doth
which
is
compacted
of
lively
stones
united
to
the
living
corner
stone
)
bears
with
it
a
magnificence
and
state
that
would
check
a
profane
look
,
and
dazle
the
presumptuous
eye
that
durst
venture
to
glance
at
it
obliquely
,
or
with
disrespect
.
The
Temple
of
the
living
God
,
manifestly
animated
by
his
vital
presence
,
would
not
only
dismay
opposition
,
but
command
Veneration
also
:
and
be
its
own
both
Ornament
and
defence
.
Nor
can
it
be
destitute
of
that
Presence
,
if
we
our selves
render
it
not
inhospitable
,
and
make
not
its
proper
inhabitant
become
a
stranger
at
home
.
If
we
preserve
in
our selves
a
capacity
of
the
Divine
Presence
,
and
keep
the
Temple
of
God
in
a
posture
fit
to
receive
him
;
he
would
then
no
more
forsake
it
,
than
the
soul
,
a
sound
,
and
healthy
body
,
not
violated
in
any
vital
part
:
But
if
he
forsake
it
once
,
it
then
becomes
an
exposed
and
despised
thing
.
And
as
the
most
impotent
inconsiderable
enemy
can
securely
trample
on
the
dead
body
of
the
greatest
Heroe
,
that
alive
carried
awfulness
and
terror
in
his
looks
:
so
is
the
weak
spirited
Atheist
become
as
bold
now
as
he
was
willing
,
before
,
to
make
rude
attempts
upon
the
Temple
of
God
,
when
He
hath
been
provoked
to
leave
it
,
who
is
its
life
,
strength
,
and
glory
.
Therefore
as
they
who
will
not
be
treacherous
to
the
interest
of
God
and
man
,
must
own
And
how
grateful
herein
,
and
meritorious
often
are
the
assistent
railleries
of
servile
(
and
it
may
be
mercenary
)
wits
?
How
highly
shall
he
oblige
them
,
that
can
furnish
out
a
Libel
against
Religion
,
and
help
them
with
more
artificial
spight
to
blaspheme
what
they
cannot
disprove
.
And
now
shall
the
scurrilous
Pasquil
,
and
a
few
Bottles
,
work
a
more
effectual
confutation
of
Religion
,
than
all
the
reason
and
argument
in
the
world
shall
be
able
to
countervail
.
This
proves
too
often
the
unhappy
issue
of
mis-applying
what
is
most
excellent
in
its
own
kind
and
place
to
improper
and
uncapable
Subjects
.
And
who
sees
not
this
to
be
the
case
with
the
modern
Atheist
,
who
hath
been
pursu'd
Men
of
Atheistical
Perswasions
having
abandon'd
their
reason
,
need
what
will
more
powerfully
strike
their
sense
:
Storms
and
Whirlwinds
,
Flames
and
Thunderbolts
;
things
not
so
apt
immediately
to
work
upon
their
understanding
as
their
fear
,
and
that
will
astonish
that
they
may
convince
:
That
the
great
God
make
himself
known
by
the
Judgments
which
he
executes
.
Stripes
are
for
the
back
of
fools
(
as
they
are
justly
stiled
that
say
in
their
hearts
There
is
no
God
:
)
But
if
it
may
be
hoped
any
gentler
method
may
prove
effectual
with
any
of
them
,
we
are
rather
to
expect
the
good
effect
,
from
the
steady
uniform
course
of
their
Actions
and
Conversation
,
who
profess
reverence
and
devotedness
to
an
eternal
Being
:
And
the
correspondence
of
their
way
to
their
avow'd
Principle
,
that
acts
them
on
agreeably
to
it self
,
and
may
also
incur
the
sense
of
the
beholder
,
and
gradually
invite
and
draw
his
observation
;
than
from
the
most
severe
and
necessitating
argumentation
,
that
exacts
a
suddain
assent
.
At
least
in
a
matter
of
so
clear
and
commanding
evidence
,
reasoning
many
times
looks
But
we
have
nothing
so
considerable
objected
against
practical
Religion
as
well
as
to
deserve
the
name
of
a
Sophism
:
(
at
least
no
sophism
so
perplexing
in
the
case
of
Religious
as
of
natural
motion
)
Jeers
and
Sarcasms
are
the
most
weighty
convincing
arguments
.
And
let
the
deplorate
crew
mock
on
:
There
are
those
in
the
world
that
will
think
they
have
,
however
,
reason
enough
to
persist
in
the
way
of
godliness
:
and
that
have
already
laid
the
foundation
of
that
reverence
which
they
bear
to
a
Deity
,
more
strongly
,
than
to
be
shaken
,
and
beaten
off
from
it
by
a
jest
.
And
therefore
will
not
think
it
necessary
to
have
the
Principles
of
their
Religion
vindicated
afresh
every
time
they
are
called
to
the
practice
of
it
.
For
surely
they
would
be
religious
upon
very
uncertain
terms
,
that
will
think
themselves
concern'd
to
suspend
or
discontinue
their
conrse
,
as
oft
as
they
are
encountred
in
it
,
with
a
wry
mouth
,
or
a
distorted
look
;
or
that
are
apt
to
be
put
out
of
conceit
with
their
Religion
by
the
laughter
of
a
fool
:
Or
by
their
cavils
and
taunts
against
the
Rules
and
Principles
of
it
,
whom
only
their
own
sensual
temper
,
and
impatience
of
serious
thoughts
have
made
willing
to
have
them
false
.
That
any
indeed
should
commence
Religious
,
and
persist
with
blind
Zeal
in
this
or
that
discriminating
Profession
without
ever
considering
why
they
should
do
so
;
is
unmanly
and
absurd
:
especially
when
a
gross
ignorance
of
the
true
reasons
and
grounds
of
Religion
shall
be
shadowed
over
with
a
pretended
awe
and
scrupulousness
to
enquire
about
things
so
sacred
.
And
an
inquisitive
temper
shall
have
an
ill
character
put
upon
it
,
as
if
rational
and
profane
were
words
of
the
same
signification
.
Or
as
if
reason
and
judgment
were
utterly
execrated
,
and
an
unaccountable
enthusiastick
fury
baptiz'd
and
hallowed
the
only
Principle
of
Religion
.
But
when
the
matter
hath
undergone
already
a
severe
inquisition
,
and
been
searcht
to
the
bottom
;
principles
havebeen
examined
,
the
strength
and
firmness
hath
been
tried
of
its
deepest
and
most
fundamental
grounds
,
and
an
approving
judgment
been
past
in
the
case
,
and
a
resolutïon
thereupon
taken
up
of
a
suitable
and
correspondent
practice
.
After
all
this
it
were
a
vain
and
unwarrantable
curiosity
,
to
be
perpetually
perplexing
ones
easie
path
,
with
new
and
suspicious
researches
into
the
most
acknowledg'd
things
.
Nor
were
this
course
a
little
prejudicial
to
the
design
and
end
of
Religion
(
if
we
will
allow
it
any
at
all
)
the
refining
of
our
minds
,
and
the
fitting
us
for
an
happy
eternity
:
For
when
shall
that
building
be
finish'd
,
the
foundations
whereof
must
be
every
day
torn
up
anew
,
upon
pretence
of
further
caution
,
and
for
more
diligent
search
?
Or
when
will
he
reach
his
journeys
end
that
is
continually
vex'd
(
and
often
occasion'd
to
go
back
from
whence
he
came
)
by
causless
anxieties
about
his
way
;
and
whether
ever
he
began
a
right
course
yea
or
no
?
Many
go
securely
on
in
a
course
most
ignominiously
wicked
and
vile
,
without
ever
debating
the
matter
with
themselves
,
or
enquiring
if
there
be
any
rational
principle
to
justifie
or
bear
them
out
.
Much
more
may
they
with
a
chearful
confidence
persist
in
their
well-chosen
way
;
that
have
once
setled
their
resolutions
about
it
,
upon
firm
and
assured
grounds
and
principles
,
without
running
over
the
same
course
of
reasonings
with
themselves
,
in
reference
to
each
single
devotional
act
;
or
thinking
it
necessary
every
time
they
are
to
pray
,
to
have
it
prov'd
to
them
there
is
a
God
.
And
because
yet
many
of
these
do
need
excitation
,
and
though
they
are
not
destitute
of
pious
sentiments
and
inclinations
,
and
have
somewhat
in
them
of
the
ancient
foundations
and
frame
of
a
Temple
,
have
yet
by
neglect
suffered
it
to
grow
into
decay
:
It
is
therefore
the
principal
intendment
of
this
discourse
,
not
to
assert
the
Principles
of
Religion
against
those
with
whom
they
have
no
place
,
but
to
propound
what
may
some
way
tend
to
reinforce
and
strengthen
them
where
they
visibly
languish
;
and
awaken
such
as
profess
a
devotedness
to
God
to
the
speedy
and
vigorous
endeavour
of
repairing
the
ruines
of
his
Temple
in
their
own
Breasts
.
That
they
may
thence
hold
forth
a
visible
representation
of
an
in-dwelling
Deity
,
in
effects
and
actions
of
life
worthy
of
such
a
Presence
,
and
render
his
enshrined
glory
transparent
to
the
view
and
conviction
of
the
irreligious
and
profane
.
Which
hath
more
of
hope
in
it
,
and
is
likely
to
be
to
better
purpose
,
than
disputing
with
them
that
more
know
how
to
jest
than
reason
;
and
better
understand
the
relishes
of
meat
and
drink
,
than
the
strength
of
an
argument
.
But
though
it
would
be
both
an
ungrateful
And
there
may
be
also
many
others
of
good
and
pious
inclinations
,
that
have
never
yet
apply'd
themselves
to
consider
the
principal
and
most
fundamental
grounds
of
Religion
,
so
as
to
be
able
to
give
or
discern
any
tolerable
reason
of
them
.
For
either
the
sluggishness
of
their
own
temper
may
have
indisposed
them
to
any
more
painful
and
laborious
exercise
of
their
minds
,
and
made
them
be
content
with
the
easier
course
of
taking
every
thing
upon
trust
,
and
imitating
the
example
of
others
;
or
they
have
been
unhappily
mis-informed
that
it
consists
not
with
the
reverence
due
to
Religion
to
search
into
the
grounds
of
it
.
Yea
and
may
have
laid
this
for
one
of
its
main
grounds
that
no
exercise
of
Reason
may
have
any
place
about
it
.
Or
perhaps
having
never
tried
,
they
apprehend
a
greater
difficulty
in
coming
to
a
clear
and
certain
resolution
herein
,
than
indeed
there
is
.
Now
such
need
to
be
excited
to
set
their
own
thoughts
a
work
this
way
,
and
to
be
assisted
herein
.
They
should
therefore
consider
who
gave
them
the
understandings
which
they
fear
to
use
?
And
can
they
use
them
to
better
purpose
or
with
more
gratitude
to
him
who
made
them
intelligent
,
and
not
brute
Creatures
,
than
in
labouring
to
know
,
that
they
may
also
by
a
reasonable
service
,
worship
and
adore
their
Maker
?
Are
they
not
to
use
their
very
senses
about
the
matters
of
Religion
?
For
the
invisible
things
of
God
,
even
his
eternal
power
and
Godhead
are
clearly
seen
,
&c.
And
their
Faith
comes
by
hearing
.
But
what
?
are
these
more
Sacred
and
Divine
,
and
more
akin
to
Religion
than
their
Reason
and
Judgment
:
Without
which
also
their
sense
can
he
of
no
use
to
them
herein
?
Or
is
it
the
best
way
of
making
use
of
what
God
hath
revealed
of
himself
,
by
whatsoever
means
,
not
to
understand
what
he
hath
revealed
?
It
is
most
true
indeed
,
that
when
we
once
come
clearly
to
be
informed
that
God
hath
revealed
this
on
that
thing
,
we
are
then
readily
to
subject
(
and
not
oppose
)
our
feeble
reasonings
to
his
plain
revelation
.
And
it
were
a
most
insolent
and
uncreaturely
arrogance
,
to
contend
or
not
yield
him
the
cause
,
though
things
have
to
us
seemed
otherwise
.
But
it
were
as
inexcusable
negligence
,
not
to
make
use
of
our
understandings
to
the
best
advantage
;
that
we
may
both
know
that
such
a
Revelation
is
Divine
,
and
what
it
signifies
after
we
know
whence
it
is
.
And
any
one
that
considers
,
will
soon
see
it
were
very
unseasonable
,
at
least
,
to
alledge
the
written
Divine
Revelation
,
as
the
ground
of
his
Religion
,
till
he
have
gone
lower
,
and
foreknown
some
things
(
by
and
by
to
be
insisted
on
)
as
preparatory
and
fundamental
to
the
knowledge
of
this
,
And
because
it
is
obvious
to
suppose
how
great
an
increase
of
strength
and
vigour
,
pious
minds
may
receive
hence
,
how
much
it
may
animate
them
to
the
service
of
the
Temple
,
and
contribute
to
their
more
chearful
progress
in
a
religious
course
:
It
will
therefore
not
be
besides
our
present
purpose
,
but
very
pursuant
to
it
,
to
consider
a
while
,
not
in
the
contentious
way
of
brawling
and
captious
disputation
(
the
noise
whereof
is
as
unsuitable
to
the
Temple
as
that
of
axes
and
hammers
)
but
of
calm
and
sober
discourse
;
the
more
principal
and
lowermost
grounds
upon
which
the
frame
of
Religion
rests
,
and
to
the
supposal
whereof
the
notion
and
use
of
any
such
thing
as
a
Temple
in
the
world
,
do
owe
themselves
.
CHAP.
II.
The
two
more
principal
grounds
which
a
Temple
supposes
.
1.
The
existence
of
God
.
2.
His
Conversableness
with
men
:
Both
argued
from
common
consent
.
The
former
doubtful
if
ever
wholly
deny'd
in
former
days
.
The
latter
also
implied
in
the
known
general
practice
of
some
or
other
Religion
.
Evidenc'd
,
in
that
some
,
no
strangers
to
the
world
,
have
thought
it
the
difference
of
man
.
The
immodesty
and
rashness
of
the
persons
from
whom
any
opposition
can
be
expected
.
These
two
grounds
proposed
to
be
more
strictly
considered
apart
.
And
first
the
existence
of
God
.
Where
first
the
notion
of
God
is
assigned
.
The
parts
whereof
are
proposed
to
be
evinc'd
severally
of
some
existent
Being
.
1.
Eternity
.
2.
Self-origination
.
3.
Independency
.
4.
Necessity
of
existence
.
5.
Self-activity
.
The
impossibility
this
world
should
be
this
necessary
self-active
Being
.
The
inconsistency
of
necessary
alterable
matter
,
more
largely
deduced
in
a
marginal
digression
.
6.
Life
.
7.
Vast
and
mighty
power
.
A
Corollary
.
NOW
the
grounds
more
necessary
to
be
laid
down
,
and
which
are
supposed
-
The
existence
of
God
,
and
-
His
conversableness
with
men
,
For
no
notion
of
a
Temple
can
more
easily
occur
to
any
ones
thoughts
,
or
is
more
agreeable
to
common
acceptation
;
than
that
it
is
an
habitation
wherein
God
is
pleased
to
dwell
among
men
.
Therefore
to
the
designation
and
use
of
it
,
or
(
which
is
all
one
)
to
the
intention
and
exercise
of
Religion
,
the
belief
or
perswasion
is
necessary
of
those
two
things
(
the
same
which
we
find
made
necessary
on
the
same
account
)
That
God
is
,
and
that
he
is
a
rewarder
of
them
that
diligently
seek
him
;
as
will
appear
when
the
manner
and
design
of
that
his
abode
with
men
shall
be
considered
.
These
are
the
grounds
upon
which
the
sacred
frame
of
a
Temple
ought
to
stand
,
and
without
which
it
must
be
acknowledged
an
unsupported
,
airy
fabrick
.
And
since
it
were
vain
to
discourse
what
a
Temple
is
,
or
whereto
the
notion
of
it
may
be
applied
;
unless
it
be
well
resolved
that
there
is
,
or
ought
to
be
any
such
thing
.
The
strength
and
firmness
of
this
its
double
ground
should
be
tried
and
searcht
,
and
of
its
pretensions
thereto
.
And
though
it
be
not
necessary
in
a
matter
that
is
so
plain
,
and
wherein
so
much
is
to
be
First
,
For
the
existence
of
God
,
we
need
not
labour
much
to
shew
how
constantly
and
generally
it
hath
been
acknowledg'd
through
the
whole
world
;
it
being
so
difficult
to
produce
an
uncontroverted
instance
of
any
that
ever
deny'd
it
in
more
ancient
times
.
For
as
for
them
whose
names
have
been
infamous
amongst
men
heretofore
upon
that
account
,
there
De
natura
Deorum
,
lib.
1.
Their
being
inflam'd
with
Anger
,
and
mad
with
Lust
,
their
Wars
,
Fights
,
Wounds
,
their
Hatreds
,
Discords
,
their
Births
and
Deaths
,
&c.
Who
though
he
speak
less
favourably
of
some
[
*
](A44683-e1260-b)
*
Diagoras
and
Theodoras
Cyrenaicus
(
who
as
Diogenes
Laertius
in
Aristip.
reports
)
was
surnamed
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
afterwards
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
.
as
expresly
denying
them
;
yet
the
more
generally
decried
[
†
](A44683-e1330-b)
†
Epicurus
,
whom
also
his
own
Epistle
to
Menaceus
in
Diogen
s
Laertius
acquits
of
Atheism
,
but
not
of
Irreligion
;
as
hereafter
may
be
observed
.
Patron
of
Atheism
(
as
he
hath
been
accounted
)
he
makes
Velleius
highly
vindicate
from
this
imputation
,
and
say
of
him
that
he
was
the
first
that
took
notice
that
even
nature
it self
had
impressed
the
notion
of
God
upon
the
minds
of
all
men
:
who
also
gives
us
these
as
his
words
,
What
Nation
is
there
or
sort
of
men
that
hath
not
without
teaching
,
a
certain
anticipation
of
the
Gods
,
which
he
calls
a
prolepsis
,
a
certain
preventive
,
or
fore-conceived
information
of
a
thing
in
the
mind
,
without
which
nothing
can
be
understood
,
or
sought
,
or
disputed
of
.
Unto
which
purpose
the
same
Author
(
as
is
commonly
observed
)
elsewhere
speaks
;
That
there
is
no
Nation
so
barbarous
,
no
one
of
all
men
so
savage
,
And
whatever
the
apprehensions
of
those
few
(
and
some
others
that
are
wont
to
be
mention'd
under
the
same
vile
character
)
were
in
this
matter
,
yet
so
inconsiderable
hath
the
dissent
been
;
that
,
as
another
most
ingenious
Pagan
Author
writes
,
In
so
great
a
contention
Maxim
.
Tyr.
diss.
1.
and
variety
of
opinions
(
that
is
concerning
what
God
is
)
herein
you
shall
see
the
law
and
reason
of
every
Country
to
be
harmonious
and
one
.
That
there
is
one
God
the
they
will
or
no.
3.
Yea
,
and
That
if
one
travel
the
world
,
[
*
](A44683-e1560-b)
*
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
.
without
Religion
.
4.
And
it
is
no
mean
argument
of
the
So
that
Platonick
Jew
judgeth
in
vocation
of
God
with
hope
towards
him
to
be
,
if
we
Philo.
libr.
de
eo
quod
Deterius
potiori
insid
.
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
p.
180.
will
speak
the
truth
,
the
only
genuine
property
of
Man
,
and
saith
that
only
he
who
is
acted
by
such
an
hope
is
a
man
,
and
he
that
is
destitute
of
this
hope
is
no
man
,
preferring
this
account
to
the
common
definition
(
which
he
says
is
only
of
the
concrete
of
man
)
that
he
is
a
reasonable
and
mortal
living
creature
.
And
yet
he
extends
not
reason
further
,
that
is
,
to
the
inferior
creatures
,
for
he
had
expresly
said
above
That
they
who
have
no
hope
towards
God
,
have
no
part
or
share
in
the
rational
nature
.
And
a
noble
person
of
our
own
says
,
That
Reason
in
his
account
descending
low
among
the
inferiour
creatures
.
But
these
agreeing
more
peculiarly
to
man
,
and
so
universally
that
he
affirms
,
There
is
no
man
well
,
and
entirely
in
his
wits
that
doth
not
worship
some
Deity
.
Who
therefore
accounted
it
a
less
absurdity
to
admit
such
a
thing
as
a
rational
Beast
,
than
an
irreligious
man
.
Now
if
these
have
taken
notice
of
any
instances
that
seem'd
to
claim
an
exemption
from
this
notion
of
Man
;
they
have
rather
thought
fit
to
let
them
pass
as
an
anomalous
sort
of
creatures
,
reducible
to
no
certain
rank
or
order
in
the
Creation
;
than
that
any
should
be
admitted
into
the
account
,
or
be
acknowledged
of
the
Society
of
Men
,
that
were
found
destitute
of
an
inclination
to
worship
the
common
Author
of
our
beings
.
And
according
to
this
opinion
;
By
whatsoever
steps
any
should
advance
in
the
denial
of
a
Deity
;
they
should
proceed
by
the
same
,
to
the
abandoning
their
own
humanity
;
and
by
saying
there
is
no
God
,
should
proclaim
themselves
no
men
.
However
it
discovers
(
which
is
all
that
is
at
present
intended
by
it
)
the
commonness
,
not
to
say
absolute
universality
,
of
Religion
,
in
the
observation
of
these
Persons
,
whom
we
must
suppose
no
strangers
to
the
world
in
their
own
and
former
times
.
And
if
it
afford
any
less
ground
for
such
an
observation
in
our
present
time
,
we
only
see
as
the
world
grows
older
it
grows
worse
,
and
sinks
into
a
deeper
oblivion
of
its
original
,
as
it
recedes
further
from
it
.
And
(
notwithstanding
)
this
so
common
a
consent
is
yet
not
without
its
weight
and
signicancy
to
our
present
purpose
.
If
we
consider
How
impossible
it
is
to
give
or
imagine
any
tolerable
account
of
its
original
,
if
we
do
not
confess
it
natural
,
and
refer
it
to
that
common
Author
of
all
nature
whom
we
are
enquiring
about
:
(
of
which
so
much
is
said
by
[
*
](A44683-e1800-b)
*
See
Cicero
in
sundry
places
.
Grotius
de
veritate
Christianae
Relig.
D●
Pless
.
same
subject
and
title
Calvin
.
Instit.
Episcopius
his
Instu
.
Theol.
who
hath
written
nervously
on
this
subject
,
with
many
more
.
But
especially
Dr.
Stillingfleet
in
his
Orig.
Sac.
divers
others
,
that
nothing
more
needs
here
to
be
said
about
it
.
5.
And
at
least
so
much
is
gained
by
it
to
a
Temple
,
that
unless
some
very
plain
and
ungainsayable
demonstration
be
brought
against
the
grounds
of
it
(
which
will
be
time
enough
to
consider
when
we
see
it
pretended
to
)
no
opposition
,
fit
to
be
regarded
,
can
ever
be
made
to
it
.
That
is
,
none
at
all
can
possibly
be
made
;
but
what
shall
proceed
from
the
most
immodest
and
rash
confidence
,
animated
and
born
up
only
by
a
design
of
being
most
licentiously
wicked
,
and
of
making
the
world
become
so
.
Immodest
confidence
it
must
be
,
for
it
is
not
a
Man
,
or
a
Nation
,
or
an
Age
that
such
have
to
oppose
,
but
Mankind
;
upon
which
they
shall
cast
,
not
some
lighter
reflection
,
but
the
vilest
and
most
opprobrious
contumely
,
and
scorn
that
can
be
imagined
.
That
is
the
imputation
of
so
egregious
folly
and
doatage
,
as
all
this
while
to
have
worshipped
a
shadow
as
the
Author
of
their
being
;
and
a
figment
for
their
common
parent
.
And
this
not
the
ruder
only
,
and
uninquisitive
vulgar
,
but
the
wisest
and
most
considering
persons
in
all
times
.
Surely
less
than
clear
and
pregnant
demonstration
(
at
least
not
wild
incoherent
self-confounding
suppositions
and
surmises
,
of
which
more
hereafter
)
will
ever
be
thought
sufficient
to
justifie
the
boldness
of
an
attempt
that
shall
carry
this
signification
with
it
.
And
it
will
be
a
confidence
equally
rash
as
immodest
.
For
what
can
be
the
undertakers
hope
,
either
of
success
or
reward
?
Do
they
think
it
an
easie
enterprize
?
and
that
a
few
quirks
of
malapert
wit
will
serve
the
turn
to
baffle
the
Deity
into
nothing
?
and
unteach
the
world
Religion
?
and
raze
out
impressions
renew'd
and
transmitted
through
so
many
ages
?
and
perswade
the
race
of
men
to
descend
a
peg
lower
,
and
believe
they
ought
to
live
and
shall
die
like
the
perishing
beast
.
Or
do
they
expect
to
find
men
indifferent
in
a
matter
that
concerns
their
common
Practice
and
Hope
?
and
wherein
their
zeal
hath
been
wont
to
be
such
as
that
it
hath
obtained
to
be
proverbial
,
to
strive
as
for
the
very
Altars
.
And
what
should
their
reward
be
,
when
the
natural
tendency
of
their
undertaking
is
to
exclude
themselves
from
the
expectation
of
any
in
another
world
?
And
what
will
they
expect
in
this
from
them
whose
Temples
and
Altars
they
go
about
to
subvert
?
Besides
,
that
if
they
be
not
hurried
by
a
blind
impetuous
rashness
,
they
would
consider
their
danger
,
and
apprehend
themselves
concern'd
to
strike
very
sure
:
For
if
there
remain
but
the
least
possibility
that
the
matter
is
otherwise
,
and
that
the
being
doth
exist
whose
honour
and
worship
they
contend
against
,
they
must
understand
his
favour
to
be
of
some
concernment
to
them
;
which
they
take
but
an
ill
course
to
entitle
themselves
unto
.
Much
more
have
they
reason
to
be
solicitous
,
when
their
horrid
cause
not
only
wants
evidence
;
nor
hath
hitherto
pretended
to
more
than
a
bare
possibility
of
truth
on
their
side
;
but
hath
so
clear
(
and
as
yet
altogether
unrefuted
)
evidence
lying
against
it
;
that
quite
takes
away
that
very
possibility
,
and
all
ground
for
that
miserable
languishing
hope
,
that
it
could
ever
have
afforded
them
.
Therefore
is
it
left
also
wholly
unimaginable
,
what
principle
can
animate
their
design
,
other
than
a
sensual
humour
,
impatient
of
restraints
,
or
of
any
obligation
to
be
sober
,
just
and
honest
,
beyond
what
their
own
inclination
,
and
(
much
mistaken
)
interest
,
or
conveniency
would
lead
them
to
.
By
all
which
we
have
a
sufficient
measure
of
the
persons
from
whom
any
opposition
unto
Religion
can
be
expected
,
and
how
much
their
authority
,
their
example
or
their
scorn
ought
to
signifie
with
us
.
And
that
a
more
valuable
opposition
can
never
be
made
;
our
experience
,
both
that
hitherto
it
hath
not
been
,
and
that
it
would
have
been
if
it
could
,
might
render
us
tolerably
secure
.
For
surely
it
may
well
be
supposed
,
that
in
a
world
so
many
ages
lost
in
wickedness
,
all
imaginable
trials
would
have
been
made
to
disburthen
it
of
Religion
;
and
somewhat
that
had
been
specious
,
at
least
,
to
that
purpose
,
had
been
hit
upon
;
if
the
matter
had
been
any
way
possible
.
And
the
more
wicked
the
world
hath
been
,
a
so
directly
contrary
,
and
so
continually
assaulted
principle
,
not
yet
vanquished
,
appears
the
more
plainly
invincible
:
And
that
the
assaults
have
been
from
the
lusts
of
men
,
rather
than
their
reason
,
shews
the
more
evidently
,
that
their
reason
hath
only
wanted
a
ground
to
work
upon
;
which
if
it
could
have
been
found
,
their
lusts
had
certainly
prest
it
to
their
service
in
this
warfare
;
and
not
have
endured
rather
,
the
molestation
of
continual
checks
and
rebukes
from
it
.
Nor
need
we
yet
to
let
our
minds
hang
in
suspence
,
or
be
in
a
dubious
expectation
,
that
possibly
some
or
other
great
Wit
may
arise
that
shall
perform
some
great
thing
in
this
matter
,
and
discover
the
groundlesness
and
folly
of
Religion
by
plain
and
undeniable
reasons
,
that
have
not
as
yet
been
thought
on
:
But
betake
our selves
to
a
stricter
and
closer
consideration
of
our
own
grounds
,
which
if
we
can
once
find
to
be
certainly
true
,
we
may
be
sure
they
are
of
eternal
truth
,
and
no
possible
contrivance
or
device
can
ever
make
them
false
.
Having
therefore
seen
what
common
consent
may
contribute
to
the
establishing
of
them
Religion
and
conversation
with
God
:
How
little
soever
any
endeavour
in
this
kind
may
be
apt
to
signifie
with
the
otherwise
minded
.
And
,
first
for
the
existence
of
God
;
that
And
though
we
must
beforehand
professedly
avow
that
we
take
him
to
be
such
a
one
as
we
can
never
comprehend
in
our
thoughts
.
That
this
knowledge
is
too
excellent
for
us
,
or
he
is
more
excellent
than
that
we
can
perfectly
know
him
;
yet
it
will
be
sufficient
to
guide
us
in
our
search
after
his
existence
,
if
we
can
give
such
a
description
,
or
assign
such
certain
characters
of
his
being
as
will
severally
or
together
distinguish
him
from
all
things
else
.
For
then
we
shall
be
able
to
call
him
by
his
own
name
,
and
say
this
is
God
.
Whatever
his
being
may
contain
more
;
or
whatsoever
other
properties
may
belong
to
it
beyond
what
we
can
as
yet
compass
in
our
present
thoughts
of
him
.
And
such
an
account
we
shall
have
an
eternal
uncaused
,
independent
,
necessary
Being
that
hath
active
power
,
life
,
wisdom
,
goodness
,
and
whatsoever
other
supposable
excellency
,
in
the
highest
perfection
originally
,
in
and
of
it self
.
Such
a
Being
we
would
with
common
consent
express
by
the
name
of
God
.
Even
they
that
would
profess
to
deny
or
doubt
of
his
existence
,
yet
must
acknowledge
this
to
be
the
notion
of
that
which
they
deny
or
doubt
of
.
Or
if
they
should
say
this
is
not
it
,
or
(
which
is
all
one
)
that
they
do
not
deny
or
doubt
of
the
existence
of
such
a
Being
as
this
;
they
on
the
other
hand
that
would
argue
for
his
existence
,
may
conclude
the
cause
is
yielded
them
.
This
being
that
which
they
designed
to
contend
for
.
It
must
indeed
be
acknowledg'd
,
that
some
things
belonging
to
the
notion
of
God
might
have
been
more
expresly
named
:
But
it
was
not
necessary
they
should
,
being
sufficiently
included
here
,
as
will
afterwards
appear
.
Nor
perhaps
so
convenient
;
some
things
,
the
express
mention
wherof
is
omitted
,
being
such
as
more
captious
persons
might
be
apt
at
first
to
startle
at
;
which
yet
may
,
possibly
as
they
are
insinuated
under
other
expressions
become
by
degrees
more
inclinable
to
receive
them
afterwards
.
And
however
if
this
be
not
a
full
and
adequate
notion
(
as
who
can
ever
tell
when
we
have
an
express
,
distinct
particular
notion
of
God
,
which
we
are
sure
is
adequate
and
full
?
)
it
may
however
suffice
,
that
it
is
a
true
one
,
as
far
as
it
goes
,
and
such
as
cannot
be
mistaken
for
the
notion
of
any
thing
else
.
And
it
will
be
more
especially
sufficient
to
our
present
purpose
;
if
enough
be
comprehended
in
it
to
recommend
him
to
us
as
a
fit
and
worthy
object
of
Religion
;
and
whereto
a
Templea
ought
to
be
designed
.
As
it
will
appear
there
is
,
when
also
we
shall
have
added
what
is
intended
concerning
his
conversableness
with
men
.
The
ground
whereof
is
also
in
great
part
included
in
this
account
of
him
;
so
that
the
consideration
of
it
cannot
be
wholly
severed
from
that
of
his
existence
:
as
hath
been
intimated
above
.
That
is
,
that
if
such
a
Being
exist
,
unto
which
this
notion
belongs
;
it
will
sufficiently
appear
,
he
is
such
as
that
he
can
converse
with
men
;
though
it
doth
not
thence
certainly
follow
that
he
will
.
For
it
were
a
rash
and
bold
adventure
to
say
he
could
not
be
God
,
if
he
did
not
condescend
to
such
terms
of
reconciliation
and
converse
with
apostate
creatures
.
Whereof
therefore
more
is
to
be
said
than
the
meer
manifesting
his
existence
in
its
own
place
.
And
as
to
this
,
that
we
may
proceed
gradually
,
and
in
the
most
familiar
and
intelligible
way
that
we
can
;
we
may
1.
Be
most
assured
,
that
there
hath
been
somewhat
or
other
from
all
eternity
,
or
that
For
being
sure
that
something
now
is
(
that
you
see
,
for
instance
,
or
are
something
.
)
You
must
then
acknowledge
that
certainly
either
something
always
was
,
and
hath
ever
been
,
or
been
from
all
eternity
;
or
else
you
must
say
,
that
sometime
nothing
was
;
or
that
all
being
once
was
not
.
And
so
,
since
you
find
that
something
now
is
,
that
there
was
a
time
when
any
thing
of
being
did
begin
to
be
,
that
is
,
that
till
that
time
there
was
nothing
;
But
now
at
that
time
somewhat
first
began
to
be
.
For
what
can
be
plainer
than
that
,
if
all
being
sometime
was
not
,
and
now
some
being
is
,
every
thing
of
being
had
a
beginning
?
And
thence
it
would
follow
that
some
being
,
that
is
,
the
first
that
ever
began
to
be
,
did
of
it self
start
up
out
of
nothing
,
or
made
it self
to
be
,
when
before
,
nothing
was
.
But
now
do
you
not
plainly
see
that
it
is
altogether
impossible
any
thing
should
do
so
;
that
is
,
when
it
was
as
yet
nothing
,
and
when
nothing
at
all
as
yet
was
,
that
it
should
make
it self
,
or
come
into
being
of
it self
?
For
sure
,
making
it self
is
doing
something
.
But
can
that
which
is
nothing
do
any
thing
?
unto
all
doing
there
must
be
some
doer
.
Wherefore
a
thing
must
be
before
it
can
do
any
thing
;
and
therefore
it
would
follow
that
it
was
before
it
was
;
or
was
and
was
not
,
was
some
thing
and
nothing
at
the
same
time
.
Yea
,
and
it
was
divers
from
it self
.
For
a
cause
must
be
a
distinct
thing
from
that
which
is
caused
by
it
.
Wherefore
it
is
most
apparent
that
some
being
hath
ever
been
,
or
did
never
begin
to
be
.
Whence
further
,
2.
It
is
also
evident
,
that
some
being
was
uncaused
,
or
was
ever
of
it self
,
without
any
of
it self
,
is
only
to
be
taken
negatively
,
that
is
,
that
it
was
not
of
another
,
not
positively
,
as
if
it
did
sometime
make
it self
.
Or
,
what
there
is
positive
,
signified
by
that
form
of
speech
,
is
only
to
be
taken
thus
,
that
it
was
a
being
of
that
nature
,
as
that
it
was
impossible
it
should
ever
not
have
been
.
Not
that
it
did
ever
of
it self
step
out
of
not
being
into
Being
:
Of
which
more
hereafter
.
3.
And
now
it
is
hence
further
evident
that
some
being
is
independent
upon
any
other
,
It
is
therefore
a
manifest
contradiction
to
say
that
all
being
doth
depend
:
against
which
it
is
no
relief
to
say
,
that
all
beings
do
circularly
depend
on
one
another
.
For
so
,
however
the
whole
circle
or
sphere
of
being
,
should
depend
on
nothing
,
or
one
at
last
depend
on
it self
;
which
negatively
taken
,
as
before
,
is
truc
,
and
the
thing
we
contend
for
;
that
one
,
the
common
support
of
all
the
rest
depends
not
on
any
thing
without
it self
.
Whence
also
it
is
plainly
consequent
.
That
4.
Such
a
Being
is
necessary
,
or
doth
5.
That
this
eternal
,
independent
uncaused
power
of
action
in
and
of
it self
.
For
either
such
a
Being
as
hath
been
already
evinced
is
of
it self
active
or
unactive
,
or
either
hath
the
power
of
action
of
it self
or
not
.
If
we
will
say
the
latter
,
let
it
be
considered
what
we
say
,
and
to
what
purpose
we
say
it
.
First
,
we
are
to
weigh
what
it
is
we
affirm
,
when
we
speak
of
an
eternal
,
uncaused
,
independent
,
necessary
Being
,
that
is
of
it self
totally
unactive
,
or
destitute
of
any
active
power
.
If
we
will
say
there
is
some
such
thing
,
we
will
confess
when
we
have
called
it
something
,
it
is
a
very
silly
,
despicable
,
idle
something
,
and
a
something
,
(
if
we
look
upon
it
alone
)
as
good
as
nothing
.
For
there
is
but
little
odds
between
being
nothing
,
and
being
able
to
do
nothing
.
We
will
again
confess
,
eternity
,
self-origination
,
independency
,
necessity
of
existence
,
to
be
very
great
and
highly
dignifying
Vid.
c.
4.
Sect.
3.
And
with
the
expectation
of
the
same
allowance
which
hath
been
given
to
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
or
other
like
words
.
We
also
take
it
for
granted
(
which
it
may
suffice
to
hint
here
once
for
all
)
that
when
we
use
here
the
word
Self-subsistent
,
it
will
be
understood
we
intend
by
it
(
without
Logical
or
Metaphysical
nicety
)
not
the
meer
exclusion
of
dependence
on
a
subject
,
but
on
a
cause
.
attributes
;
and
that
import
a
most
unconceivable
excellency
.
For
what
higher
glory
can
we
ascribe
to
any
being
,
than
to
acknowledge
it
to
have
been
from
eternity
of
it self
;
without
being
beholden
to
any
other
,
and
to
be
such
as
that
it
can
be
,
and
cannot
but
be
in
the
same
state
,
self-subsisting
,
and
self-sufficient
to
all
eternity
?
And
what
unconceivable
myriads
of
little
sensless
Deities
must
we
upon
that
supposition
admit
(
as
would
appear
if
it
were
fit
to
trouble
the
Reader
with
an
explication
of
the
nature
and
true
notion
of
matter
,
which
the
being
now
supposed
,
must
be
found
to
be
!
)
But
what
can
our
reason
either
direct
,
or
endure
,
that
we
should
so
uncongruously
misplace
so
magnificent
attributes
as
these
?
and
ascribe
the
prime
glory
of
the
most
excellent
Being
,
unto
that
which
is
next
to
nothing
?
What
might
further
be
said
to
demonstrate
the
impossibility
of
a
self-subsisting
,
and
self-original
,
unactive
being
,
will
be
here
unseasonable
,
and
pre-occupying
.
But
if
any
in
the
mean
time
will
be
so
sullen
as
to
say
such
a
thing
,
Let
it
2.
be
considered
to
what
purpose
they
say
it
.
Is
it
to
exclude
a
necessary
self-active
being
?
But
it
can
signifie
nothing
to
that
purpose
.
For
such
a
Being
they
will
be
forced
to
acknowledge
,
let
them
do
what
they
can
(
besides
putting
out
their
own
eyes
)
notwithstanding
.
For
why
will
they
acknowledge
any
necessary
Being
at
all
,
that
was
ever
of
it self
?
Is
it
not
because
they
cannot
otherwise
for
their
hearts
tell
how
it
was
ever
possible
that
any
thing
at
all
could
come
into
being
?
But
finding
that
something
is
,
they
are
compell'd
to
acknowledge
that
something
hath
ever
been
,
necessarily
,
and
of
it self
.
No
other
account
could
be
given
how
other
things
came
to
be
.
But
what
?
doth
it
signifie
any
thing
towards
the
giving
an
account
of
the
original
of
all
other
things
,
to
suppose
only
an
eternal
,
self-subsisting
,
unactive
Being
?
Did
that
cause
other
things
to
be
?
Will
not
their
own
breath
choak
them
if
they
attempt
to
utter
the
self-contradicting
words
,
an
unactive
cause
,
(
i.
e.
Efficient
or
Author
)
of
any
thing
.
And
do
they
not
see
they
are
as
far
from
their
mark
,
or
do
no
more
towards
the
assigning
the
original
of
all
other
things
,
by
supposing
an
eternal
,
unactive
Being
only
,
than
if
they
supposed
none
at
all
.
That
what
can
do
nothing
,
can
no
more
be
the
productive
cause
of
another
,
than
that
which
is
nothing
?
Wherefore
by
the
same
Reason
that
hath
constrained
us
to
acknowledge
an
eternal
,
uncaused
,
independent
,
necessary
Being
,
we
are
also
unavoidably
led
to
acknowledge
this
Being
to
be
self-active
,
or
such
as
hath
the
power
of
action
in
and
of
it self
.
Or
that
there
is
certainly
such
a
Being
,
that
is
the
cause
of
all
the
things
which
our
sense
tells
us
are
besides
existent
in
the
world
.
For
what
else
is
left
us
to
say
or
think
?
will
[
†
](A44683-e2480-b)
†
And
whether
by
the
way
this
will
not
afford
us
(
though
that
be
none
of
our
present
business
)
plain
evidence
that
there
can
be
no
such
thing
as
necessary
alterable
matter
,
may
be
examined
by
such
as
think
fit
to
give
themselves
the
diversion
.
For
let
it
be
considered
,
if
every
part
and
particle
that
makes
up
the
matter
of
this
universe
,
were
it self
a
necessary
being
,
and
of
it self
from
all
eternity
,
it
must
have
not
only
its
simple
being
,
but
its
being
such
or
such
,
of
it self
necessarily
,
or
rather
every
thing
of
it
,
or
any
way
belonging
to
it
,
must
be
its
very
simple
being
it self
.
For
whence
should
it
receive
any
accession
to
it self
when
it
is
supposed
equally
independent
upon
its
fellows
,
as
any
of
them
upon
it
?
Suppose
then
only
their
various
intercurrent
motion
among
themselves
,
requisite
to
prepare
them
to
,
and
unite
them
in
the
composition
of
particular
bodies
,
and
no
other
change
of
any
other
individual
particle
needful
thereto
,
but
only
of
their
figure
,
place
,
and
scituation
,
till
they
shall
come
aptly
to
be
disposed
in
the
now
attempted
composition
.
How
is
even
this
change
possible
)
For
suppose
one
of
these
particles
from
eternity
of
such
or
such
a
figure
,
as
triangular
,
hooked
,
&c.
How
can
it
lose
any
thing
from
it self
,
or
suffer
any
alteration
of
its
figure
which
essentially
and
necessarily
belonged
to
it
from
eternity
?
That
to
which
't
is
necessary
to
be
such
,
't
is
impossible
to
it
not
to
be
such
.
Or
suppose
no
alteration
of
figure
(
which
Epicurus
admits
not
)
were
necessary
;
but
of
situation
and
motion
till
it
become
conveniently
situate
.
Even
this
change
also
will
be
simply
impossible
.
Because
you
can
frame
no
imagination
of
the
existence
of
this
or
that
particle
,
but
you
must
suppose
it
in
some
or
other
ubi
,
or
point
of
space
,
and
if
it
be
necessarily
,
it
is
here
necessarily
;
for
what
is
simply
no
where
is
nothing
.
But
if
it
be
here
necessarily
(
that
is
in
this
or
that
point
of
space
,
for
in
some
or
other
it
must
be
,
and
it
cannot
be
here
and
there
at
once
)
it
must
be
here
eternally
,
and
can
never
not
be
here
.
Therefore
we
can
have
no
notion
of
necessary
alterable
or
movable
matter
,
which
is
not
inconsistent
and
repugnant
to
it self
.
Therefore
also
motion
must
proceed
from
an
immovable
mover
,
as
hath
been
(
though
upon
another
ground
)
concluded
of
old
.
But
how
action
ad
extra
stands
with
the
immutability
of
the
Deity
must
be
fetcht
from
the
consideration
of
other
perfections
belonging
thereto
.
Of
which
Metaphysicians
and
Schoolmen
may
be
consulted
,
discoursing
at
large
:
See
Suarez
:
Ledesma
de
divina
perfectione
,
with
many
more
at
leasure
.
Whatsoever
difficulty
we
may
apprehend
in
this
case
.
Or
if
we
cannot
so
easily
conceive
how
an
eternal
mind
,
foreseeing
perfectly
all
futurity
,
together
with
an
eternal
efficacious
determition
of
will
concerning
the
existence
of
such
and
such
things
to
such
an
instant
or
point
of
time
,
can
suffice
to
their
production
without
a
super-added
efflux
of
power
at
that
instant
:
which
would
seem
to
infer
somewhat
of
mutation
;
yet
as
the
former
of
these
cannot
be
demonstrated
insufficient
(
nor
shall
we
ever
reckon
our selves
pincht
in
this
matter
till
we
see
that
plainly
and
fully
done
.
)
So
they
are
very
obstinately
blind
that
cannot
see
upon
the
addition
of
the
latter
the
vast
difference
of
these
two
cases
,
viz.
the
facile
silent
egress
of
a
sufficient
power
in
pursuance
to
a
calm
,
complacential
,
eternal
purpose
;
for
the
production
of
this
creation
,
by
which
the
Agent
acts
not
upon
it self
,
but
upon
its
own
creature
made
by
its
own
action
;
and
the
eternal
blind
ungovern'd
action
of
matter
upon
it self
,
by
which
it
is
perpetually
changing
it self
,
while
yet
it
is
supposed
necessarily
what
it
was
before
:
And
how
much
more
easily
conceivable
that
is
than
this
.
How
also
liberty
of
action
consists
with
necessity
of
existence
,
divers
have
shewn
:
to
which
purpose
somewhat
not
inconsiderable
may
be
seen
,
Fioin
.
lib.
2.
cap.
12.
de
immortal
&c.
But
in
this
there
can
be
little
pretence
to
imagine
a
difficulty
.
For
our
own
being
,
though
not
simply
,
yet
as
to
us
is
necessary
,
i.
e.
it
is
impos'd
upon
us
;
for
we
come
not
into
being
by
our
own
choice
;
and
yet
are
conscious
to
our selves
of
no
prejudice
hereby
to
our
liberty
of
acting
.
Yea
and
not
only
doth
the
former
consist
with
this
latter
,
but
is
inferr'd
by
it
.
Of
which
see
Gibbeuf
de
libert.
Dei
,
&
creat
.
And
to
say
any
thing
is
changing
from
eternity
,
signifies
it
is
always
undergoing
a
change
which
is
never
past
over
,
that
is
,
that
it
is
eternally
unchang'd
,
and
is
ever
the
same
.
For
the
least
imaginable
degree
of
change
,
is
some
change
.
What
is
in
any
the
least
respect
changed
,
is
not
in
every
respect
the
same
,
suppose
then
any
thing
in
this
present
state
or
posture
,
and
that
it
is
eternally
changing
in
it
;
either
a
new
state
and
posture
is
acquired
,
or
not
.
If
it
be
,
the
former
was
temporary
,
and
hath
an
end
;
and
therefore
the
just
and
adequate
measure
of
it
was
not
eternity
,
which
hath
no
end
;
much
less
of
the
change
of
it
,
or
the
transition
from
the
one
state
to
the
other
.
But
if
no
new
state
or
posture
be
acquired
(
which
any
the
least
gradual
alteration
would
make
)
then
it
is
eternally
unchanged
in
any
the
least
degree
.
Therefore
eternal
changing
is
a
manifest
contradiction
.
But
if
it
be
said
though
eternity
be
not
the
measure
of
one
change
;
it
may
be
of
infinite
changes
endlesly
succeeding
one
another
.
Even
this
also
will
be
found
contradictions
and
impossible
.
For
(
not
to
trouble
the
Reader
with
the
more
intricate
controversie
of
the
possibility
or
impossibility
of
infinite
or
eternal
succession
,
about
which
they
who
have
a
mind
may
consult
others
.
[
*
](A44683-e2640-b)
*
Parker
Tentam.
Physico
.
Theolog.
Derodon
.
Philos.
cont.
Dr.
More
's
Enchirid.
Metaphys
.
If
this
signifie
any
thing
to
the
present
purpose
,
it
must
mean
the
infinite
or
eternal
changes
of
a
necessary
being
.
And
how
these
very
terms
do
clash
with
one
another
,
methinks
any
sound
mind
might
apprehend
at
the
first
mention
of
them
;
And
how
manifestly
repugnant
the
things
are
,
may
be
collected
from
what
hath
been
said
;
and
especially
from
what
was
thought
more
fit
to
be
annexed
in
the
Margin
.
But
now
since
we
find
that
the
present
state
of
things
is
changeable
,
and
actually
changing
,
and
that
what
is
changable
is
not
necessarily
,
and
of
it self
.
And
since
it
is
evident
that
there
is
some
necessary
Being
,
otherwise
nothing
could
ever
have
been
,
and
that
without
action
nothing
could
be
from
it
.
Since
also
all
change
imports
somewhat
of
passion
,
and
all
passion
supposes
action
,
and
all
action
,
active
power
,
and
active
power
an
original
seat
or
subject
,
that
is
self-active
,
or
that
hath
the
power
of
action
in
and
of
it self
.
For
there
could
be
no
derivation
of
it
from
that
which
hath
it
not
,
and
no
firstderivation
,
but
from
that
which
hath
it
originally
of
it self
.
And
a
first
derivation
there
must
be
,
since
all
things
that
are
or
ever
have
been
furnisht
with
it
,
and
not
of
themselves
must
either
mediately
or
immediately
have
derived
it
from
that
which
had
it
of
it self
.
It
is
therefore
manifest
,
that
there
is
a
necessary
self-active
Being
,
The
cause
and
Author
of
this
perpetually
variable
state
and
frame
of
things
.
And
hence
,
6.
Since
we
can
frame
no
notion
of
life
which
self-active
power
doth
not
,
at
least
,
comprehend
originally
vital
,
and
the
root
of
all
vitality
,
such
as
hath
life
in
or
of
it self
,
and
from
whence
it
is
propagated
to
every
other
living
thing
.
[
†
](A44683-e2790-b)
†
Which
will
also
prove
it
to
be
a
Spirit
;
unto
which
order
of
Beings
essential
vitality
,
or
that
life
be
essential
to
them
,
seems
as
distinguishing
a
property
between
it
and
a
body
,
as
any
other
we
can
fasten
upon
,
that
is
,
that
though
a
body
may
be
truly
said
to
live
;
yet
it
lives
by
a
life
that
is
accidental
,
and
separable
from
it
.
So
as
that
it
may
cease
to
live
,
and
yet
be
a
body
still
;
whereas
a
Spirit
lives
by
its
own
essence
;
so
that
it
can
no
more
cease
to
live
than
to
be
.
And
as
,
where
that
essence
is
borrowed
and
derived
only
,
as
't
is
with
all
created
Spirits
,
so
its
life
must
needs
be
therewithal
.
So
the
eternal
self-subsisting
Spirit
,
lives
necessarily
,
and
of
it self
,
according
as
,
necessarily
and
of
it self
,
it
is
,
or
hath
its
being
.
Which
is
only
annoted
,
with
a
design
not
to
trouble
this
discourse
with
any
disquisition
concerning
the
nature
and
other
properties
of
a
spiritual
Being
.
Of
which
enough
hath
been
,
with
great
evidence
,
said
,
by
the
incomparable
Dr.
More
.
And
so
as
we
plainly
see
that
this
sensible
world
did
sometime
begin
to
be
,
't
is
also
evident
it
took
its
beginning
from
a
Being
essentially
vital
,
and
active
,
that
had
it self
no
beginning
.
Nor
can
we
make
a
difficulty
to
conclude
that
this
Being
,
(
which
now
we
have
shewn
,
is
active
,
and
all
action
implies
some
power
)
is
7.
Of
vast
and
mighty
Power
(
we
will
not
we
see
not
,
equal
to
this
effect
.
As
when
we
behold
a
great
and
magnificent
fabrick
,
and
entring
in
we
see
not
the
master
or
any
living
thing
(
which
was
Cicero's
Observation
Corollary
.
And
now
from
what
hath
been
hitherto
discoursed
,
it
seems
a
plain
and
necessary
consectary
,
That
this
world
had
a
cause
divers
from
the
matter
whereof
it
is
composed
.
For
otherwise
matter
that
hath
been
more
generally
taken
to
be
of
it self
altogether
unactive
,
must
be
stated
the
only
cause
and
fountain
of
all
the
action
and
motion
that
is
now
to
be
found
in
the
whole
Universe
.
Which
is
a
conceit
wild
and
absurd
enough
;
not
only
as
it
opposes
the
common
judgment
of
such
as
have
with
the
greatest
diligence
enquired
into
things
of
this
nature
,
But
as
being
in
it self
manifestly
impossible
to
be
true
.
As
would
easily
appear
if
it
were
needful
to
press
farther
Dr.
More
's
reasonings
Immortality
of
the
Soul
:
and
Enchirid.
Metaphys
.
to
this
purpose
;
which
he
hath
done
sufficiently
for
himself
.
And
also
that
otherwise
all
the
great
and
undeniable
changes
which
continually
happen
in
it
must
proceed
from
its
own
constant
and
eternal
action
upon
it self
,
while
it
is
yet
feigned
to
be
a
necessary
being
;
with
the
notion
whereof
they
are
notoriously
inconsistent
.
Which
therefore
we
taking
to
be
most
clear
,
may
now
the
more
securely
proceed
to
what
follows
.
CHAP.
III.
Wisdom
asserted
to
belong
to
this
Being
.
The
production
of
this
world
by
a
mighty
Agent
destitute
of
Wisdom
impossible
.
On
consideration
of
,
1.
What
would
be
adverse
to
this
production
.
2.
What
would
be
wanting
some
effects
to
which
a
designing
cause
will
,
on
all
hands
,
be
confessed
necessary
,
as
having
manifest
characters
of
skill
and
design
upon
them
.
Absurd
here
to
except
the
works
of
nature
.
Wherein
at
least
equal
characters
of
Wisdom
and
design
to
be
seen
,
as
in
any
the
most
confessed
pieces
of
Art
,
Instanced
in
the
frame
and
Motion
of
heavenly
bodies
.
A
mean
,
unphilosophical
temper
to
be
more
taken
with
novelties
than
common
things
of
greater
importance
.
Further
instance
in
the
composition
of
the
bodies
of
Animals
.
Two
contrary
causes
of
mens
not
acknowledging
the
Wisdom
of
their
Maker
herein
.
Progress
is
made
from
the
consideration
of
the
parts
and
frame
,
to
powers
and
functions
of
Terrestrial
Creatures
.
Growth
,
Nutrition
,
Propagation
of
kind
.
Spontaneous
motion
,
Sensation
.
The
pretence
considered
,
that
the
bodies
of
Animals
are
machines
.
1.
How
improbable
it
is
.
2.
How
little
to
the
purpose
.
The
powers
of
the
humane
soul.
It
appears
,
notwithstanding
them
,
it
had
a
cause
;
By
them
,
a
wise
and
intelligent
cause
.
It
is
not
matter
.
That
not
capable
of
Reason
.
They
not
here
reflected
on
who
think
reasonable
souls
made
of
refined
matter
by
the
Creator
.
Not
being
matter
,
nor
arising
from
thence
it
must
have
a
Cause
that
is
intelligent
.
9.
Goodness
also
belonging
to
this
Being
.
WE
therefore
add
,
That
this
being
is
of
it self
;
(
which
already
seems
plain
enough
.
)
And
it
do
most
evidently
thence
also
appear
to
have
had
a
cause
foreign
to
,
or
distinct
from
it self
;
though
we
shall
not
therefore
the
more
carelesly
consider
this
subject
;
yet
no
place
of
doubt
seems
to
remain
,
but
that
this
was
an
Intelligent
cause
,
and
that
this
world
was
the
product
of
wisdom
and
counsel
,
and
not
of
meer
power
alone
.
For
what
imagination
can
be
more
grosly
absurd
,
than
to
suppose
this
orderly
frame
of
things
to
have
been
the
result
of
so
mighty
power
,
not
accompanied
or
guided
by
wisdom
and
counsel
?
that
is
(
as
the
case
must
now
unavoidably
be
understood
)
that
there
is
some
being
necessarily
existent
,
of
an
essentially
active
nature
,
of
unconceivably
vast
and
mighty
power
and
vigour
,
destitute
of
all
understanding
and
knowledge
,
and
consequently
of
any
self-moderating-principle
,
but
acting
always
by
the
necessity
of
its
own
nature
,
and
therefore
to
it
s
very
uttermost
,
that
raised
up
all
the
alterable
matter
of
the
universe
(
to
whose
nature
it
is
plainly
repugnant
to
be
of
it self
,
or
exist
necessarily
)
out
of
nothing
;
and
by
the
utmost
exertion
of
that
ungovern'd
power
,
put
all
the
parts
and
particles
of
that
matter
into
a
wild
hurry
of
impetuous
motion
,
by
which
they
have
been
compacted
and
digested
into
particular
beings
in
that
variety
and
order
which
we
now
behold
.
And
surely
to
give
this
account
of
the
worlds
original
,
is
,
as
Cicero
,
speaks
,
not
to
consider
,
but
to
cast
lots
what
to
say
.
And
were
as
mad
a
supposition
,
As
if
one
should
suppose
the
one
and
twenty
Letters
,
formed
(
as
the
same
Author
elsewhere
speaks
)
in
great
numbers
,
of
Gold
,
or
what
you
please
else
,
and
cast
of
any
careless
fashion
together
,
and
that
of
these
loosely
shaken
out
upon
the
ground
,
Ennius
his
Annals
should
result
,
so
as
to
be
distinctly
legible
,
as
now
we
see
them
.
Nay
it
were
the
supposition
of
a
thing
a
thousand
fold
more
manifestly
impossible
.
2.
For
before
we
consider
the
gross
absurdity
of
such
a
supposed
production
,
that
is
,
that
Hereof
make
an
estimate
by
considering
what
is
requisite
to
the
continual
whirling
about
of
such
huge
bulks
as
this
whole
massie
globe
of
earth
(
according
to
some
.
)
Or
,
which
is
much
more
strange
,
the
Sun
(
according
to
others
)
with
that
unconceiveably
swift
motion
which
this
supposition
makes
necessary
,
together
with
the
other
Planets
,
and
the
innumerable
heavenly
Bodies
besides
,
that
are
subject
to
the
laws
of
a
continual
motion
.
Adding
hereto
how
mighty
power
it
is
which
must
be
sufficient
to
all
the
productions
,
motions
,
and
actions
of
all
other
things
.
Again
,
consider
that
all
this
motion
,
and
motive
power
must
have
some
source
and
fountain
diverse
from
the
dull
and
sluggish
matter
moved
thereby
,
unto
which
it
already
hath
appeared
impossible
it
should
originally
and
essentially
belong
.
Next
that
the
mighty
active
being
which
hath
been
proved
necessarily
existent
,
and
whereto
it
must
first
belong
,
if
we
suppose
it
destitute
of
the
self-moderating
principle
of
Wisdom
and
Counsel
,
cannot
but
be
always
exerting
its
motive
power
,
invariably
and
to
the
same
degree
:
that
is
,
to
it
s
very
utmost
,
and
can
never
cease
or
fail
to
do
so
.
For
its
act
knows
no
limit
but
that
of
its
power
(
if
this
can
have
any
)
and
its
power
is
essential
to
it
,
and
its
essence
is
necessary
.
Further
that
the
motion
imprest
upon
the
matter
of
the
universe
must
hereupon
necessarily
have
received
a
continual
increase
,
ever
since
it
came
into
being
.
That
supposing
this
motive
power
to
have
been
exerted
from
eternity
,
it
must
have
been
increased
long
ago
to
an
infinite
excess
.
That
hence
the
coalition
of
the
particles
of
matter
for
the
forming
of
any
thing
had
been
altogether
impossible
.
For
let
us
suppose
this
exerted
motive
power
to
have
been
any
instant
,
but
barely
sufficient
for
such
a
formation
,
because
that
could
not
be
dispatcht
in
an
instant
,
it
would
by
its
continual
momently
increase
,
be
grown
so
over-sufficient
as
in
the
next
instant
to
dissipate
the
particles
,
but
now
beginning
to
unite
.
At
least
it
would
be
most
apparent
,
that
if
ever
such
a
frame
of
things
as
we
now
behold
could
have
been
produc'd
;
that
motive
power
,
increased
to
so
infinite
an
excess
,
must
have
shattered
the
whole
frame
in
pieces
many
an
age
ago
;
or
rather
never
have
permitted
that
such
a
thing
as
we
call
an
age
,
could
possibly
have
been
.
Our
experience
gives
us
not
to
observe
any
so
destructive
or
remarkable
changes
in
the
course
of
nature
.
And
this
(
as
was
long
ago
foretold
)
is
the
great
argument
of
the
Atheistical
scoffers
in
these
latter
days
,
that
things
are
as
they
were
from
the
beginning
of
the
Creation
to
this
day
.
But
let
it
be
soberly
weigh'd
how
it
is
possible
the
general
consistency
which
we
observe
things
are
at
throughout
the
universe
,
and
their
steady
orderly
posture
can
stand
with
this
momently
increase
of
motion
.
And
that
such
an
increase
could
not
(
upon
the
supposition
we
are
now
opposing
)
but
have
been
,
is
most
evident
.
For
,
not
to
insist
that
nothing
of
imprest
motion
is
ever
lost
,
but
only
imparted
to
other
things
(
which
they
that
suppose
it
do
not
therefore
suppose
,
as
if
they
thought
being
once
imprest
it
could
continue
of
it self
,
but
that
there
is
a
constant
equal
supply
from
the
first
mover
)
we
will
admit
that
there
is
a
continual
decrease
or
loss
,
but
never
to
the
degree
of
its
continual
increase
.
For
we
see
when
we
throw
a
stone
out
of
our
hand
,
whatever
of
the
imprest
force
it
do
impart
to
the
air
through
which
it
makes
its
way
,
it
yet
retains
apart
a
considerable
time
,
that
carries
it
all
the
length
of
its
journey
,
and
all
does
not
vanish
and
die
away
on
the
sudden
.
Therefore
when
we
here
consider
the
continual
momently
renewal
of
the
same
force
,
always
necessarily
going
forth
from
the
same
mighty
Agent
without
any
moderation
or
restraint
,
every
following
impetus
doth
so
immediately
overtake
the
former
,
that
whatever
we
can
suppose
lost
,
is
yet
so
abundantly
over-supplyed
,
that
upon
the
whole
it
cannot
fail
to
be
ever
growing
,
and
to
have
grown
to
that
all-destroying
excess
before-mentioned
.
Whence
therefore
that
famed
restorer
,
and
improver
of
some
principles
of
the
ancient
Philosophy
,
hath
seen
a
necessity
to
acknowledge
it
,
as
a
manifest
thing
,
That
God
himself
is
the
universal
and
primary
cause
of
all
the
motions
that
are
in
the
D.
Cartes
Princip.
Philosoph
.
part
2.
world
,
who
in
the
beginning
created
matter
,
together
with
motion
and
rest
;
and
doth
now
by
his
ordinary
concourse
only
,
continue
so
much
of
motion
and
rest
in
it
as
he
first
put
into
it
.
—
For
(
saith
he
)
we
understand
it
as
a
perfection
in
God
,
not
only
that
he
is
unchangeable
in
himself
,
but
that
he
works
after
a
most
constant
and
unchangeable
manner
.
So
that
,
excepting
those
changes
,
which
either
evident
Experience
,
or
Divine
Revelation
renders
certain
,
and
which
we
know
or
believe
to
be
without
change
in
the
Creator
,
we
ought
to
suppose
none
in
his
Works
,
lest
thereby
any
inconstancy
should
be
argued
in
himself
.
Whereupon
he
grounds
the
laws
and
rules
concerning
motion
which
he
afterwards
lays
down
,
whereof
we
referr'd
to
one
a
little
above
.
It
is
therefore
evident
,
that
as
without
the
supposition
of
a
self-active
Being
there
could
be
no
such
thing
as
motion
.
So
without
the
supposition
of
an
Intelligent
Being
(
that
is
,
that
the
same
Being
be
both
self-active
and
intelligent
)
there
could
be
no
regular
motion
,
such
as
is
absolutely
necessary
to
the
forming
and
continuing
of
any
the
compacted
bodily
substances
which
our
eyes
behold
every
day
:
Yea
,
or
of
any
whatsoever
,
suppose
we
their
figures
or
shapes
to
be
as
rude
,
deformed
,
and
useless
,
as
we
can
imagine
;
much
less
such
as
the
exquisite
compositions
,
and
the
exact
order
of
things
in
the
Universe
do
evidently
require
,
and
discover
.
And
if
there
were
no
such
thing
carried
in
this
supposition
,
as
is
positively
adverse
to
the
meer
want
of
what
is
necessary
to
such
a
production
is
enough
to
render
it
impossible
,
and
the
supposition
of
it
absurd
.
For
it
is
not
only
absurd
to
suppose
a
production
,
which
somewhat
shall
certainly
resist
and
hinder
,
but
which
wants
a
cause
to
effect
it
:
And
it
is
not
less
absurd
to
suppose
it
effected
by
a
manifestly
insufficient
and
unproportionable
cause
,
than
by
none
at
all
For
as
nothing
can
be
produced
without
a
cause
,
so
no
cause
can
work
above
or
beyond
its
own
capacity
,
and
natural
aptitude
.
Whatsoever
therefore
is
ascribed
to
any
cause
,
above
and
beyond
its
ability
,
all
that
surplusage
is
ascribed
to
no
cause
at
all
.
And
so
an
effect
,
in
that
part
at
least
,
were
supposed
without
a
cause
.
And
if
then
it
follow
when
an
effect
is
produced
that
it
had
a
cause
;
why
doth
it
not
equally
follow
,
when
an
effect
is
produced
,
having
manifest
characters
of
wisdom
and
design
upon
it
,
that
it
had
a
wise
and
designing
cause
?
If
it
be
said
,
there
be
some
fortuitous
or
casual
(
at
least
undesigned
)
productions
that
look
like
the
effects
of
wisdom
and
contrivance
,
but
indeed
are
not
,
as
the
Birds
so
orderly
and
seasonable
making
their
Nests
,
the
Bees
their
Comb
,
and
the
Spider
its
Web
,
which
are
capable
of
no
design
.
That
exception
needs
to
be
well
proved
before
it
be
admitted
;
and
that
it
be
plainly
demonstrated
both
that
these
creatures
are
not
capable
of
design
;
and
that
there
is
not
an
universal
designing
cause
,
from
whose
directive
as
well
as
operative
influence
no
imaginable
effect
or
event
can
be
exempted
;
(
In
which
case
it
will
no
more
be
necessary
that
every
creature
that
is
observed
steadily
to
work
towards
an
end
should
it self
design
and
know
it
,
than
that
an
Artificers
tools
should
know
what
he
is
doing
with
them
,
but
if
they
do
not
,
't
is
plain
he
must
.
)
And
surely
it
lies
upon
them
who
so
except
,
to
prove
in
this
case
what
they
say
,
and
not
be
so
precarious
as
to
beg
,
or
think
us
so
easie
as
to
grant
so
much
,
only
because
they
have
thought
fit
to
say
it
,
or
would
fain
have
it
so
.
That
is
,
that
this
or
that
strange
event
happened
,
without
any
designing
caus
.
But
however
I
would
demand
of
such
as
make
this
exception
,
whether
they
think
there
universal
Nature
,
if
they
would
be
content
no
longer
to
lurk
in
the
darkness
of
an
obscure
and
uninterpreted
word
,
they
must
confess
is
nothing
else
but
common
Providence
,
that
is
the
universal
power
which
is
every
where
active
in
the
world
,
in
conjunction
with
the
unerring
wisdom
,
which
guides
and
moderates
all
its
exertions
and
operations
;
or
the
wisdom
which
directs
and
governs
that
power
.
Otherwise
when
they
see
cause
to
acknowledge
that
such
an
exact
order
and
disposition
of
parts
,
in
very
neat
and
elegant
compositions
,
doth
plainly
argue
wisdom
and
skill
in
the
contrivance
;
only
they
will
distinguish
and
say
,
it
is
so
in
the
effects
of
art
,
but
not
of
nature
.
What
is
this
but
to
deny
in
particular
what
they
granted
in
general
?
to
make
what
they
have
said
signifie
nothing
,
more
than
if
they
had
said
,
such
exquisite
order
of
parts
is
the
effect
of
wisdom
,
where
it
is
the
effect
of
wisdom
,
but
it
is
not
the
effect
of
wisdom
,
where
it
is
not
the
effect
of
wisdom
?
and
to
trifle
instead
of
giving
a
reason
why
things
are
so
and
so
?
And
whence
take
they
their
advantage
for
this
trifling
,
or
do
hope
to
hide
their
folly
in
it
;
but
that
they
think
while
what
is
meant
by
art
is
known
,
what
is
meant
by
nature
cannot
be
known
?
But
if
it
be
not
known
,
how
can
they
tell
but
their
distinguishing
members
are
co-incident
,
and
run
into
one
?
yea
,
and
if
they
would
allow
the
thing
it self
to
speak
,
and
the
effect
to
confess
,
and
dictate
the
name
of
its
own
cause
;
how
plain
is
it
that
they
do
run
into
one
,
and
that
the
expression
imports
no
impropriety
which
we
somewhere
find
in
Cicero
,
The
art
of
Nature
,
or
rather
that
nature
is
nothing
else
but
Divine
Art
,
at
least
in
as
near
an
analogy
as
there
can
be
,
between
any
things
Divine
and
Humane
?
For
,
that
this
matter
(
even
the
thing
it self
,
waving
for
the
present
the
consideration
of
names
)
may
be
a
little
more
narrowly
discuss'd
,
and
search'd
into
:
Let
some
curious
piece
of
workmanship
be
offered
to
such
a
Sceptick's
view
,
the
making
whereof
he
did
not
see
,
nor
of
any
thing
like
it
,
and
we
will
suppose
him
not
told
that
this
was
made
by
the
hand
of
any
man
,
nor
that
he
hath
any
thing
to
guide
his
judgment
about
the
way
of
its
becoming
what
it
is
;
but
only
his
own
view
of
the
thing
it self
;
and
yet
he
shall
presently
without
hesitation
pronounce
,
This
was
the
effect
of
much
skill
.
I
would
here
enquire
why
do
you
so
pronounce
?
or
what
is
the
reason
of
this
your
judgment
?
surely
he
would
not
say
he
hath
no
reason
at
all
,
for
this
so
confident
,
and
unwavering
determination
.
For
then
he
would
not
be
determined
,
but
speak
by
chance
,
and
be
indifferent
to
say
that
or
any
thing
else
.
Somewhat
or
other
there
must
be
that
when
he
is
askt
,
is
this
the
effect
of
skill
?
shall
so
suddenly
,
and
irresistibly
captivate
him
into
an
assent
that
it
is
,
that
he
cannot
think
otherwise
.
Nay
,
if
a
thousand
men
were
askt
the
same
question
,
they
would
as
undoubtingly
say
the
same
thing
?
and
then
since
there
is
a
reason
for
this
judgment
,
what
can
be
devised
to
be
the
reason
,
but
that
there
are
so
manifest
characters
and
evidences
of
skill
in
the
composure
,
as
are
not
attributeable
to
any
thing
else
?
Now
here
I
would
further
demand
,
is
there
any
thing
in
this
reason
yea
or
no
?
Doth
it
signifie
any
thing
,
or
is
it
of
any
value
to
the
purpose
for
which
it
is
alledg'd
?
surely
it
is
of
very
great
,
in
as
much
as
when
it
is
considered
,
it
leaves
it
not
in
a
mans
power
to
think
any
thing
else
;
and
what
can
be
said
more
potently
and
efficaciously
to
demonstrate
?
But
now
if
this
reason
signifie
any
thing
,
it
signifies
thus
much
;
that
wheresoever
there
are
equal
characters
and
evidences
of
skill
(
at
least
where
there
are
equal
)
a
skilful
Agent
must
be
acknowledged
.
And
so
it
will
(
in
spight
of
cavil
)
conclude
universally
(
and
abstractly
from
what
we
can
suppose
distinctly
signified
by
the
terms
of
Art
and
Nature
)
that
whatsoever
effect
hath
such
or
equal
characters
of
skill
upon
it
,
did
proceed
from
a
skilful
cause
.
That
is
,
that
if
this
effect
be
said
to
be
from
a
skilful
cause
,
as
such
,
(
viz.
as
having
manifest
characters
of
skill
upon
it
)
then
,
every
such
effect
(
viz.
that
hath
equally
manifest
characters
of
skill
upon
it
)
must
be
with
equal
reason
concluded
to
be
from
a
skilful
cause
.
We
will
acknowledge
skill
to
act
,
and
wit
to
contrive
,
very
distinguishable
things
,
and
in
reference
to
some
works
(
as
the
making
some
curious
automaton
or
self-moving
Engine
)
are
commonly
lodg'd
in
divers
subjects
,
that
is
the
contrivance
exercises
the
wit
and
invention
of
one
,
and
the
making
,
the
manual
dexterity
and
skill
of
others
.
But
the
manifest
characters
of
both
will
be
seen
in
the
effect
.
That
is
the
curious
elaborateness
of
each
several
part
shews
the
later
,
and
the
order
and
dependence
of
parts
,
and
their
conspiracy
to
one
common
end
,
the
former
.
Each
betokens
design
(
or
at
least
the
Smith
or
Carpenter
must
be
understood
to
design
his
own
part
,
that
is
,
to
do
,
as
he
was
directed
.
)
Both
together
do
plainly
bespeak
an
Agent
that
knew
what
he
did
.
And
that
the
thing
was
not
done
by
chance
,
or
was
not
the
casual
product
,
of
only
being
busie
at
random
,
or
making
a
careless
stir
without
aiming
at
any
thing
.
And
this
no
man
that
is
in
his
wits
would
upon
sight
of
the
whole
frame
,
more
doubt
to
assent
unto
,
than
that
two
and
two
make
four
.
And
he
would
certainly
be
thought
mad
,
that
should
profess
to
think
that
only
by
some
one
's
making
a
blustering
stir
among
several
small
fragments
of
brass
,
iron
,
and
wood
,
these
parts
happened
to
be
thus
curiously
formed
,
and
came
together
into
this
frame
of
their
own
accord
.
Or
lest
this
should
be
thought
to
intimate
too
rude
a
representation
of
their
conceit
,
who
think
this
world
to
have
fallen
into
this
frame
and
order
wherein
it
is
by
the
agitation
of
the
moving
parts
or
particles
of
matter
without
the
direction
of
a
wise
mover
;
and
that
we
may
also
make
the
case
as
plain
as
is
possible
to
the
most
ordinary
capacity
.
We
will
suppose
(
for
instance
)
that
one
who
had
never
before
seen
a
watch
,
or
any
thing
of
that
sort
,
hath
now
this
little
engine
first
offered
to
his
view
;
can
we
doubt
,
but
he
would
upon
the
meer
sight
of
its
figure
,
structure
,
and
the
very
curious
workmanship
which
we
will
suppose
appearing
in
it
,
presently
acknowledge
the
Artificers
hand
?
But
if
he
were
also
made
to
understand
the
use
and
purpose
for
which
it
serves
;
and
it
were
distinctly
shewn
him
,
how
each
thing
contributes
,
and
all
things
in
this
little
fabrick
,
concur
to
this
purpose
,
the
exact
measuring
and
dividing
of
time
,
by
minutes
,
hours
,
and
months
,
he
would
certainly
both
confess
and
praise
the
great
ingenuity
of
the
first
inventer
.
But
now
if
a
by-stander
,
beholding
him
in
this
admiration
,
would
undertake
to
shew
a
profounder
reach
and
strain
of
wit
,
and
should
say
,
Sir
,
you
are
mistaken
concerning
the
composition
of
this
so
much
admired
piece
;
it
was
not
made
or
designed
by
the
hand
or
skill
of
any
one
;
there
were
only
an
innumerable
company
of
little
atoms
,
or
very
small
bodies
,
much
too
small
to
be
perceived
by
your
sense
,
that
were
busily
frisking
and
plying
to
and
fro
about
the
place
of
its
nativity
;
and
by
a
strange
chance
(
or
a
stranger
fate
,
and
the
necessary
laws
of
that
motion
which
they
were
unavoidably
put
into
,
by
a
certain
boisterous
,
undesigning
mover
)
they
fell
together
into
this
small
bulk
,
so
as
to
compose
it
into
this
very
shape
and
figure
,
and
with
this
same
number
and
order
of
parts
,
which
you
now
behold
.
One
squadron
of
these
busie
particles
(
little
thinking
what
they
were
about
)
agreeing
to
make
up
one
wheel
,
and
another
,
some
other
,
in
that
proportion
which
you
see
.
Others
of
them
also
falling
and
becoming
fixed
in
so
happy
a
posture
and
situation
as
to
describe
the
several
figures
by
which
the
little
moving
fingers
,
point
out
the
hour
of
the
day
,
and
day
of
the
month
.
And
all
conspired
to
fall
together
,
each
into
its
own
place
,
in
so
lucky
a
juncture
,
as
that
the
regular
motion
failed
not
to
ensue
,
which
we
see
is
now
observed
in
it
.
What
man
is
either
so
wise
or
so
foolish
(
for
it
is
hard
to
determine
whether
the
excess
or
defect
should
best
qualifie
him
to
be
of
this
faith
)
as
to
be
capable
of
being
made
believe
this
piece
of
natural
history
?
And
if
one
should
give
this
account
of
the
production
of
such
a
trifle
,
would
he
not
be
thought
in
jest
?
But
if
he
persist
and
solemnly
profess
that
thus
he
takes
it
to
have
been
,
would
he
not
be
thought
in
good
earnest
mad
?
And
let
but
any
sober
reason
judge
whether
we
have
not
unspeakably
more
manifest
madness
to
contend
against
in
such
as
suppose
this
world
,
and
the
bodies
of
living
creatures
to
have
fallen
into
this
frame
and
orderly
disposition
of
parts
wherein
they
are
,
without
the
direction
of
a
wise
and
designing
cause
?
And
whether
there
be
not
an
incomparably
greater
number
of
most
wild
and
arbitrary
suppositions
,
in
their
fiction
,
than
in
this
?
Besides
the
innumerable
supposed
repetitions
of
the
same
strange
chances
all
the
world
over
;
even
as
numberless
,
not
only
as
productions
,
but
as
the
changes
that
continually
happen
to
all
the
things
produced
.
And
if
the
concourse
of
atoms
could
make
this
world
,
why
not
(
for
it
is
but
little
to
mention
such
a
thing
as
this
)
a
Porch
,
or
a
Temple
,
or
an
House
,
or
a
City
,
(
as
Tully
speaks
in
the
before
recited
place
)
which
were
less
operous
and
much
more
easie
performances
?
It
is
not
to
be
supposed
that
all
should
be
But
that
some
in
later
days
whose
more
enlarged
minds
have
by
diligent
search
,
and
artificial
helps
got
clearer
notices
(
even
then
most
of
the
more
learned
of
former
times
)
concerning
the
true
frame
and
vastness
of
the
Universe
,
the
matter
,
nature
,
and
condition
of
the
heavenly
bodies
,
their
situation
,
order
,
and
laws
of
motion
;
and
the
great
probability
of
their
serving
to
nobler
purposes
than
the
greater
part
of
learned
men
have
ever
dreamt
of
before
;
That
I
say
any
of
these
should
have
chosen
it
for
the
employment
of
their
great
intellects
,
to
devise
ways
of
excluding
intellectual
power
from
the
contrivance
of
this
frame
of
things
,
having
so
great
advantages
beyond
the
most
of
mankind
besides
,
to
contemplate
and
adore
the
great
Author
and
Lord
of
all
;
is
one
of
the
greatest
wonders
that
comes
under
our
notice
.
And
might
tempt
even
a
sober
mind
to
prefer
vulgar
and
popular
ignorance
before
their
learned
philosophical
deliration
.
Though
yet
,
indeed
,
not
their
Philosophy
,
by
which
they
would
be
distinguished
from
the
i.
e.
their
labouring
under
the
most
vulgar
and
meanest
diseases
of
the
mind
,
disregard
of
what
is
common
,
and
an
aptness
to
place
more
in
the
strangeness
of
new
,
unexpected
,
and
surprizing
events
,
than
in
things
unspeakably
more
considerable
,
that
are
of
every
days
observation
?
Than
which
nothing
argues
a
more
abject
,
unphilosophical
temper
.
For
let
us
but
suppose
(
what
no
man
can
pretend
is
more
impossible
,
and
what
any
man
must
confess
is
less
considerable
,
than
what
our
eyes
daily
see
)
that
in
some
part
of
the
air
,
near
this
earth
,
and
within
such
limits
as
that
the
whole
Scene
might
be
conveniently
beheld
at
one
view
,
there
should
suddenly
appear
a
little
globe
of
pure
flaming
light
resembling
that
of
the
Sun
,
and
suppose
it
fixt
as
a
center
to
another
body
,
or
moving
about
that
other
,
as
its
centre
(
as
this
or
that
hypothesis
best
pleases
us
)
which
we
could
plainly
perceive
to
be
a
proportionably-little
earth
,
beautified
with
little
Trees
and
Woods
,
flowry
Fields
,
and
flowing
rivulets
;
with
larger
lakes
into
which
these
discharge
themselves
,
And
suppose
we
the
other
Planets
all
of
proportionable
bigness
to
the
narrow
limits
assigned
them
,
placed
at
their
due
distances
,
and
playing
about
this
supposed
earth
or
Sun
,
so
as
to
measure
their
shorter
,
and
soon
absolved
days
,
months
,
and
years
,
or
two
,
twelve
,
or
thirty
years
,
according
to
their
supposed
lesser
circuits
.
Would
they
not
presently
,
and
with
great
amazement
,
confess
an
intelligent
contriver
and
maker
of
this
whole
frame
,
above
a
Posidonius
,
or
any
mortal
?
And
have
we
not
in
the
present
frame
of
things
,
a
demonstration
of
Wisdom
and
Counsel
,
as
far
exceeding
that
which
is
now
supposed
,
as
the
making
some
toy
or
bauble
to
please
a
child
,
is
less
an
argument
of
wisdom
,
than
the
contrivance
of
somewhat
that
is
of
apparent
and
universal
use
?
Or
,
if
we
could
suppose
this
present
state
of
things
to
have
but
newly
begun
,
and
our selves
pre-existent
,
so
that
we
could
take
notice
of
the
very
passing
of
things
out
of
horrid
confusion
into
the
comely
order
they
are
now
in
,
would
not
this
put
the
matter
out
of
doubt
?
(
And
that
this
state
had
once
a
beginning
needs
not
be
proved
over
again
.
)
But
might
,
what
would
yesterday
have
been
the
effect
of
wisdom
,
better
have
been
brought
about
by
chance
five
or
six
thousand
years
,
or
any
longer
time
ago
?
It
speaks
not
want
of
evidence
in
the
thing
,
but
want
of
consideration
,
and
of
exercising
our
understandings
,
if
what
were
new
would
not
only
convince
but
astonish
,
and
what
is
old
,
of
the
same
importance
,
doth
not
so
much
as
convince
.
And
let
them
that
understand
any
thing
of
De
usu
part
.
ex
Lacun.
Epit.
upon
the
mention
of
one
particular
instance
of
our
most
wise
Makers
provident
care
;
Unto
whom
(
saith
he
)
I
compose
these
Commentaries
(
meaning
his
present
work
of
unfolding
the
useful
figuration
of
the
humane
body
)
as
certain
Hymns
(
or
Songs
of
praise
)
esteeming
true
Piety
more
to
consist
in
this
,
that
I
first
may
know
,
and
then
declare
to
others
,
his
Wisdom
,
Power
,
Providence
and
Goodness
,
than
in
sacrificing
to
him
many
Hecatombs
.
—
And
in
the
ignorance
whereof
there
is
greatest
impiety
,
rather
than
in
ababstaining
from
Sacrifice
.
Nor
(
as
he
adds
in
Sub
fin
.
l.
17.
the
close
of
that
excellent
work
)
is
the
most
perfect
natural
Artifice
to
be
seen
in
man
only
,
but
you
may
find
the
like
industrious
design
and
wisdom
of
the
Author
,
in
any
living
creature
which
you
shall
please
to
dissect
.
And
by
how
much
the
less
it
is
,
so
much
the
greater
admiration
shall
it
raise
in
you
,
which
those
Artists
shew
that
describe
some
great
thing
(
contractedly
)
in
a
very
small
space
:
As
that
person
(
saith
he
)
who
lately
engraved
Phaeton
carried
,
in
his
Chariot
,
with
his
four
horses
,
upon
a
little
Ring
.
A
most
incredible
sight
!
But
there
is
nothing
in
matters
of
this
nature
,
more
strange
than
in
the
structure
of
the
leg
of
a
Flea
?
(
How
much
more
might
it
be
said
of
all
its
inward
parts
?
)
Therefore
(
as
he
adds
)
The
greatest
commodity
of
such
a
work
,
accrues
not
to
Physicians
,
but
to
them
who
are
studious
of
nature
,
viz.
the
knowledge
of
our
Makers
perfection
,
and
that
(
as
he
had
said
a
little
above
)
it
establishes
the
principle
of
the
most
perfect
Theology
;
which
Theology
(
saith
he
)
is
much
more
excellent
than
all
Medicine
.
It
were
too
great
an
undertaking
,
and
beyond
the
designed
limits
of
this
discourse
(
though
it
would
be
to
excellent
purpose
,
if
it
could
be
done
without
amusing
terms
,
and
in
that
easie
,
familiar
way
as
to
be
capable
of
common
use
)
to
pursue
,
and
trace
distinctly
the
prints
and
foot-steps
of
the
admirable
Wisdom
,
which
appears
in
the
structure
and
frame
of
this
outer
Temple
.
(
For
even
our
bodies
And
what
if
some
one
pair
or
other
of
these
parts
had
been
universally
wanting
?
The
hands
,
the
feet
,
the
eyes
,
the
ears
.
How
great
a
misery
had
it
inferr'd
upon
mankind
?
and
is
it
only
a
casualty
that
it
is
not
so
?
That
the
back
Bone
is
composed
of
so
many
joynts
(
twenty
four
,
besides
those
of
that
which
is
the
basis
and
sustainer
of
the
whole
)
and
is
not
all
of
a
piece
,
by
which
stooping
,
or
any
motion
of
the
head
or
neck
,
divers
from
that
of
the
whole
body
,
had
been
altogether
impossible
?
That
there
is
such
variety
and
curiosity
in
the
ways
of
joyning
the
bones
together
in
that
and
other
parts
of
the
body
?
That
in
some
parts
they
are
joyned
by
meer
adherence
of
one
to
another
,
on
purpose
to
see
with
,
[
†
](A44683-e3990-b)
†
How
foolish
to
think
that
art
intended
an
end
in
making
a
window
to
see
through
,
and
that
nature
intended
none
in
making
an
eye
to
see
with
;
as
Campanella
in
that
rapturous
discourse
of
his
.
Atheismus
triumphatus
.
and
the
ear
,
upon
the
like
view
,
for
hearing
?
when
so
many
things
must
concur
that
these
actions
might
be
performed
by
these
organs
,
and
are
found
to
do
so
?
Or
who
can
think
that
the
sundry
little
engines
belonging
to
the
eye
were
not
made
with
design
to
move
it
upwards
,
downwards
,
to
this
side
,
or
that
,
or
whirle
it
about
,
as
there
should
be
occasion
;
without
which
instruments
,
and
their
appendages
,
no
such
motion
could
have
been
?
who
,
that
is
not
stupidly
perverse
,
can
think
that
the
sundry
inward
parts
(
which
it
would
require
a
volume
distinctly
to
speak
of
,
and
but
to
mention
them
and
their
uses
would
too
unproportionably
swell
this
part
of
this
Discourse
)
were
not
made
,
purposely
,
by
a
designing
Agent
,
for
the
ends
they
so
aptly
and
constantly
serve
for
;
the
want
of
some
one
among
divers
whereof
,
or
but
a
little
misplacing
,
or
if
things
had
been
but
a
little
otherwise
than
they
are
,
had
inferr'd
an
impossibility
,
that
such
a
creature
as
man
could
have
subsisted
,
or
been
propagated
upon
the
face
of
the
earth
.
As
what
if
there
had
not
been
such
a
receptacle
prepared
as
the
stomach
is
,
and
so
formed
,
and
placed
as
it
is
,
to
receive
and
digest
necessary
nutriment
?
Had
not
the
whole
frame
of
man
We
will
only
before
we
close
this
consideration
,
concerning
the
meer
frame
of
an
humane
body
(
which
hath
been
so
hastily
and
superficially
proposed
)
offer
a
supposition
which
is
no
more
strange
(
excluding
the
vulgar
notion
by
which
nothing
is
strange
,
but
what
is
not
common
)
than
the
thing
it self
as
it
actually
is
,
viz.
That
the
whole
more
external
covering
of
the
body
of
a
man
were
made
,
instead
of
skin
,
and
flesh
,
of
some
very
transparent
substance
,
flexible
,
but
clear
as
very
Crystal
;
through
which
and
the
other
more
inward
(
and
as
transparent
)
integuments
or
unfoldings
,
we
could
plainly
perceive
the
situation
and
order
of
all
the
internal
parts
,
and
how
they
each
of
them
perform
their
distinct
offices
.
If
we
could
discern
the
continual
motion
of
the
blood
,
how
it
is
conveyed
by
its
proper
conduits
from
its
first
source
and
fountain
,
partly
downwards
to
the
lower
intrails
(
if
rather
it
ascend
not
from
thence
,
as
at
least
what
afterwards
becomes
bloud
doth
)
partly
upwards
,
to
its
admirable
elaboratory
,
the
heart
:
where
it
is
refined
and
furnished
with
fresh
vital
spirits
,
and
so
transmitted
thence
by
the
distinct
vessels
prepared
for
this
purpose
;
could
we
perceive
the
curious
contrivance
of
those
little
doors
by
which
it
is
let
in
and
out
,
on
this
side
and
on
that
;
the
order
and
course
of
its
circulation
,
its
most
commodious
distribution
,
by
two
social
chanels
,
or
conduit-pipes
that
every
where
accompany
one
another
throughout
the
body
.
Could
we
discern
the
curious
artifice
of
the
brain
its
ways
of
purgation
;
and
were
it
possible
to
pry
into
the
secret
chambers
&
receptacles
of
the
less
or
more
pure
spirits
there
;
perceive
their
manifold
conveyances
,
and
the
rare
texture
of
that
net
commonly
call'd
the
wonderful
one
.
Could
we
behold
the
veins
,
arteries
,
and
nerves
,
all
of
them
arising
from
their
proper
and
distinct
originals
;
and
their
orderly
dispersion
for
the
most
part
by
pairs
and
conjugations
on
this
side
and
that
,
from
the
middle
of
the
back
,
with
the
curiously
wrought
branches
,
which
supposing
these
to
appear
duly
diversified
,
as
so
many
more
duskish
strokes
in
this
transparent
frame
,
they
would
be
found
to
make
throughout
the
whole
of
it
,
were
every
smaller
fibre
thus
made
at
once
discernable
;
especially
those
innumerable
threds
into
which
the
spinal
marrow
is
distributed
at
the
bottom
of
the
back
:
and
could
we
through
the
same
medium
perceive
those
numerous
little
machines
made
to
serve
unto
voluntary
motions
(
which
in
the
whole
body
are
computed
by
some
to
the
number
how
fearfully
and
wonderfully
am
I
made
?
And
sure
there
is
no
man
sober
,
who
would
not
upon
such
a
sight
pronounce
that
man
mad
that
should
suppose
such
a
production
to
have
been
a
meer
undesigned
casualty
.
At
least
if
there
be
any
thing
in
the
world
,
that
may
be
thought
to
carry
sufficiently
convincing
evidences
in
it
of
its
having
been
made
industriously
,
and
on
purpose
,
not
by
chance
,
would
not
this
composition
,
thus
offered
to
view
,
be
esteemed
to
do
so
much
more
?
Yea
,
and
if
it
it
did
only
bear
upon
it
characters
equally
evidential
of
wisdom
and
design
,
with
what
doth
certainly
so
,
though
in
the
lowest
degree
,
it
were
sufficient
to
evince
our
present
purpose
.
For
if
one
such
instance
as
this
would
bring
the
matter
no
higher
than
to
a
bare
equality
,
that
would
at
least
argue
a
maker
of
man's
body
,
as
wise
,
and
as
properly
designing
as
the
Artificer
of
any
such
slighter
piece
of
workmanship
,
that
may
yet
,
certainly
,
be
concluded
the
effect
of
skill
and
design
.
And
then
enough
might
be
said
from
other
instances
to
manifest
him
unspeakably
superiour
.
And
that
the
matter
would
be
brought
,
at
least
,
to
an
equality
upon
the
supposition
now
made
,
there
can
be
no
doubt
,
if
any
one
be
judge
that
hath
not
abjur'd
his
understanding
and
his
eyes
together
.
And
what
then
,
if
we
Jay
aside
that
supposition
(
which
only
somewhat
gratifies
fancy
and
imagination
)
doth
that
alter
the
case
?
or
is
there
the
less
of
wisdom
and
contrivance
expressed
in
this
work
of
forming
mans
body
,
only
for
that
it
is
not
so
easily
and
suddenly
obvious
to
our
sight
?
Then
we
might
with
the
same
reason
say
concerning
some
curious
piece
of
carved
work
,
that
is
thought
fit
to
be
kept
lock'd
up
in
a
Cabinet
,
when
we
see
it
,
that
there
was
admirable
workmanship
shewn
in
doing
it
;
but
as
soon
as
it
is
again
shut
up
in
its
repository
,
that
there
was
none
at
all
.
Inasmuch
as
we
speak
of
the
objective
characters
of
wisdom
and
design
that
are
in
the
thing
it self
(
though
they
must
some
way
or
other
come
under
our
notice
,
otherwise
we
can
be
capable
of
arguing
nothing
from
them
,
yet
)
since
we
have
sufficient
assurance
,
that
there
really
are
svch
characters
in
the
structure
of
the
body
of
man
,
as
have
been
mentioned
,
and
a
thousand
more
than
have
been
thought
necessary
to
be
mentioned
here
:
It
is
plain
that
the
greater
or
less
facility
of
finding
them
out
;
so
that
we
be
at
a
certainty
that
they
are
,
(
Whether
by
the
slower
and
more
gradual
search
of
our
own
eyes
;
or
by
relying
upon
the
testimony
of
such
as
have
purchased
themselves
that
satisfaction
,
by
their
own
labour
and
diligence
)
is
meerly
accidental
to
the
thing
it self
we
are
discoursing
of
:
And
neither
adds
to
,
nor
detracts
from
the
rational
evidence
of
the
present
argument
.
Or
if
it
do
either
,
the
more
abstruse
paths
of
Divine
Wisdom
in
this
(
as
in
other
things
)
do
rather
recommend
it
the
more
to
our
adoration
and
reverence
,
than
if
every
thing
were
obvious
,
and
lay
open
to
the
first
glance
of
a
more
careless
eye
.
The
things
which
we
are
sure
(
or
may
be
,
if
we
do
not
shut
our
eyes
)
the
wise
Maker
of
this
world
hath
done
,
do
sufficiently
serve
to
assure
us
that
he
could
have
done
this
also
,
that
is
,
have
made
everything
in
the
frame
and
shape
of
our
bodies
conspicuous
in
the
way
but
now
supposed
,
if
he
had
thought
it
fit
.
He
hath
done
greater
things
.
And
since
he
hath
not
thought
that
fit
,
we
may
be
bold
to
say
the
doing
of
it
would
signifie
more
trifling
,
and
less
design
.
It
gives
us
a
more
amiable
and
comely
representation
of
the
Being
we
are
treating
of
,
that
his
works
are
less
for
oftentation
than
use
.
And
that
his
Wisdom
and
other
Attributes
appear
in
them
rather
to
the
instruction
of
sober
,
than
the
gratification
of
vain
minds
.
We
may
therefore
confidently
conclude
that
the
figuration
of
the
humane
body
carries
with
it
,
as
manifest
unquestionable
evidences
of
design
,
as
any
piece
of
humane
artifice
,
that
most
confessedly
in
the
judgment
of
any
man
doth
so
.
And
therefore
,
had
,
as
certainly
,
a
designing
cause
.
We
may
challenge
the
world
to
shew
a
disparity
;
unless
it
be
that
the
advantage
is
unconceivably
great
on
our
side
.
For
would
not
any
one
that
hath
not
abandon'd
at
once
both
his
reason
and
his
modesty
,
be
asham'd
to
confess
and
admire
the
skill
that
is
shewn
in
making
a
Statue
,
or
the
picture
of
a
man
,
that
(
as
one
ingeniously
says
)
is
but
the
shadow
of
his
skin
,
and
deny
the
wisdom
that
It
is
in
the
mean
time
strange
to
consider
from
how
different
and
contrary
causes
it
proceeds
,
Posidonius
,
Regiomontanus
,
and
others
of
this
sort
.
And
now
if
any
should
be
either
so
incurably
We
begin
with
that
of
growth
.
Many
sorts
of
rare
engines
we
acknowledge
contrived
by
the
wit
of
man
,
but
who
hath
ever
made
one
that
could
grow
?
or
that
had
in
it
a
self-improving
power
?
A
tree
,
an
herb
,
a
pile
of
grass
may
upon
this
account
challenge
all
the
world
to
make
such
a
thing
.
That
is
to
implant
the
power
of
growing
into
any
thing
to
which
it
doth
not
natively
belong
,
or
to
make
a
thing
to
which
it
doth
.
By
what
art
would
they
make
a
seed
?
and
which
way
would
they
inspire
it
with
a
seminal
form
?
And
they
that
think
this
whole
globe
of
the
earth
was
compacted
by
the
casual
(
or
fatal
)
coalition
of
particles
of
matter
,
by
what
magick
would
they
conjure
so
many
to
come
together
as
should
make
one
clod
?
we
vainly
hunt
with
a
lingering
mind
after
Miracles
,
if
we
did
not
(
more
vainly
)
mean
by
them
nothing
else
but
novelties
,
we
are
compass'd
about
with
such
.
And
the
greatest
miracle
is
,
that
we
see
them
not
.
You
with
whom
the
daily
productions
of
nature
(
as
you
call
it
)
are
so
cheap
,
see
if
you
can
do
the
like
.
Try
your
skill
upon
a
Rose
.
Yea
,
but
you
must
have
pre-existent
matter
?
But
can
you
ever
prove
the
Maker
of
the
world
had
so
?
or
even
defend
the
possibility
of
uncreated
matter
?
And
suppose
they
had
the
free
grant
of
all
the
matter
between
the
crown
of
their
head
and
the
Moon
,
could
they
tell
what
to
do
with
it
?
or
how
to
manage
it
,
so
as
to
make
it
yield
them
one
single
flower
,
that
they
might
glory
in
as
their
own
production
?
And
what
mortal
man
that
hath
reason
enough
about
him
to
be
serious
,
and
to
think
a
while
,
would
not
even
be
amaz'd
at
the
Miracle
of
Nutrition
?
or
that
there
are
things
in
the
world
capable
of
nourishment
,
or
who
would
attempt
an
imitation
here
?
or
not
despair
to
perform
any
thing
like
it
.
That
is
to
make
any
nourishable
thing
?
Are
we
not
here
infinitely
out-done
?
Do
not
we
see
our selves
compass'd
about
with
wonders
,
and
are
we
not
cur
selves
such
,
in
that
we
see
,
and
are
creatures
from
all
whose
parts
there
is
a
continual
defluxion
,
and
yet
that
receive
a
constant
gradual
supply
and
renovation
by
which
they
are
continued
in
the
same
state
!
As
the
Bush
burning
,
but
not
consumed
.
'T
is
easie
to
give
an
artificial
frame
to
a
thing
that
shall
gradually
decay
and
wast
,
till
it
quite
be
gone
and
disappear
.
You
can
raise
a
structure
of
Snow
that
would
soon
do
that
.
But
can
your
manual
skill
compose
a
thing
that
like
our
bodies
shall
be
continually
melting
away
,
and
be
continually
repaired
through
so
long
a
tract
of
time
?
Nay
,
but
you
can
tell
how
it
is
done
,
you
know
in
what
method
,
and
by
what
instruments
food
is
received
,
concocted
,
separated
,
and
so
much
as
must
serve
for
nourishment
turned
into
chyle
,
and
that
into
bloud
,
first
grosser
,
and
then
more
refined
,
and
that
distributed
into
all
parts
for
this
purpose
.
Yea
,
and
what
then
?
therefore
you
are
as
wise
as
your
Maker
?
could
you
have
made
such
a
thing
as
the
stomach
,
a
liver
,
an
heart
,
a
vein
,
an
artery
?
or
are
you
so
very
sure
what
the
digestive
quality
is
?
or
if
you
are
,
and
know
what
things
best
serve
to
maintain
,
to
repair
,
or
strengthen
it
,
who
implanted
that
quality
?
both
where
it
is
so
immediately
useful
,
or
in
the
other
things
you
would
use
for
the
service
of
that
?
or
how
,
if
such
things
had
not
been
prepared
to
your
hand
,
would
you
have
devised
to
perswade
the
particles
of
matter
into
so
useful
and
happy
a
conjuncture
,
as
that
such
a
quality
might
result
?
or
(
to
speak
more
suteably
to
the
most
)
How
,
if
you
had
not
been
shewn
the
way
,
would
you
have
thought
it
were
to
be
done
,
or
which
way
would
you
have
gone
to
work
,
to
turn
meat
and
drink
into
flesh
and
bloud
?
Nor
is
propagation
of
their
own
kind
by
the
creatures
that
have
that
faculty
implanted
in
them
,
less
admirable
,
or
more
possible
to
be
imitated
by
any
humane
device
.
Such
productions
stay
in
their
first
descent
.
Who
can
by
his
own
contrivance
find
out
a
way
of
making
any
thing
that
can
produce-another
like
it self
.
What
machine
did
ever
man
invent
that
had
this
power
?
And
the
ways
and
means
by
which
it
is
done
,
are
such
(
though
he
that
can
do
all
things
well
knew
how
to
compass
his
ends
by
them
)
as
do
exceed
not
our
understanding
only
,
but
our
wonder
.
And
what
shall
we
say
of
spontaneous
motion
wherewith
we
find
also
creatures
endowed
that
are
so
mean
and
despicable
in
our
eyes
(
as
well
as
our selves
)
that
is
,
that
so
silly
a
thing
as
a
fly
,
a
gnat
,
&c.
should
have
a
power
in
it
to
move
it self
,
or
stop
its
own
motion
,
at
its
own
pleasure
!
How
far
have
all
attempted
imitations
in
this
kind
fallen
short
of
this
perfection
?
and
how
much
more
excellent
a
thing
is
the
smallest
and
most
contemptible
insect
,
than
the
most
admired
machine
we
ever
heard
or
read
of
(
as
Archytas
Tarintinus
his
Dove
so
anciently
celebrated
,
or
more
lately
Regiomontanus
his
Fly
,
or
his
Eagle
,
or
any
the
like
.
)
Not
only
as
having
this
peculiar
power
above
any
thing
of
this
sort
,
but
as
having
the
sundry
other
powers
besides
meeting
in
it
,
whereof
these
are
wholy
destitute
.
And
should
we
go
on
to
instance
further
in
the
several
powers
of
sensation
,
both
external
and
internal
,
the
various
instincts
,
appetitions
,
passions
,
sympathies
,
antipathies
,
the
powers
of
memory
,
and
(
we
might
add
)
of
speech
,
that
we
find
the
inferiour
orders
of
creatures
,
either
necessarily
furnish'd
with
,
or
some
of
them
as
to
this
last
dispos'd
unto
.
How
should
we
even
over-do
the
present
business
?
and
too
needlesly
insult
over
humane
wit
(
which
we
must
suppose
to
have
already
yeilded
the
cause
)
in
challenging
it
to
produce
and
offer
to
view
,
an
hearing
,
seeing-engine
,
that
can
imagine
,
talk
,
is
capable
of
hunger
,
thirst
,
of
desire
,
anger
,
fear
,
grief
,
&c.
as
its
own
creature
,
concerning
which
it
may
glory
and
say
,
I
have
done
this
?
Is
it
so
admirable
a
performance
,
and
so
ungainsayable
an
evidence
of
skill
and
wisdom
,
with
much
labour
and
long
travel
of
mind
,
a
busie
,
restless
,
agitation
of
working
thoughts
,
the
often
renewal
of
frustrated
attempts
,
the
varying
of
defeated
trials
;
this
way
and
that
,
at
length
to
hit
upon
,
and
by
much
pains
,
and
with
a
slow
gradual
progress
,
by
the
use
of
who
can
tell
how
many
sundry
sorts
of
instruments
or
tools
,
managed
by
more
(
possibly
)
than
a
few
hands
,
by
long
hewing
,
hammering
,
turning
,
filing
,
to
compose
one
only
single
machine
of
such
a
frame
and
structure
,
as
that
by
the
frequent
re-inforcement
of
a
skilful
hand
,
it
may
be
capable
of
some
(
and
that
,
otherwise
,
but
a
very
short-liv'd
)
motion
:
And
is
it
no
argument
,
or
effect
of
wisdom
so
easily
and
certainly
,
without
labour
,
error
,
or
disappointment
to
frame
both
so
infinite
a
variety
of
kinds
,
and
so
innumerable
individuals
of
every
such
kind
of
living
creatures
,
that
cannot
only
with
the
greatest
facility
move
themselves
with
so
many
sorts
of
motion
,
downwards
,
upwards
(
many
of
them
)
to
,
and
fro
,
this
way
or
that
,
with
a
progressive
,
or
circular
,
a
swifter
or
a
slower
motion
at
their
own
pleasure
,
but
can
also
grow
,
propagate
,
see
,
hear
,
desire
,
joy
,
&c.
Is
this
no
work
of
wisdom
,
but
only
blind
either
,
fate
or
chance
?
of
how
strangely
perverse
and
odd
a
complexion
is
that
understanding
(
if
yet
it
may
be
called
an
understanding
)
that
can
make
this
judgment
!
And
they
think
they
have
found
out
a
rare
knack
,
and
that
gives
a
great
relief
to
their
But
how
little
cause
there
is
to
hug
or
be
fond
of
this
fansie
would
plainly
appear
,
If
first
,
we
would
allow
our selves
leasure
to
examine
with
how
small
pretence
this
appellation
is
so
placed
,
and
applied
.
And
next
if
it
be
applied
rightly
,
to
how
little
purpose
it
is
alledg'd
,
or
that
it
signifies
nothing
to
the
exclusion
of
divine
wisdom
from
the
formation
of
them
.
And
for
the
first
,
because
we
know
not
a
better
,
let
it
be
considered
how
defective
and
unsatisfying
the
account
is
,
which
the
great
and
(
justly
admired
)
master
in
this
faculty
,
D.
Cartes
de
passionibus
animae
.
part
.
1.
atque
alibi
.
gives
,
how
divers
of
those
things
which
he
would
have
to
be
so
,
are
performed
only
in
the
mechanical
way
.
For
though
his
ingenuity
must
be
acknowledged
in
his
modest
exception
of
some
nobler
operations
belonging
to
our selves
from
coming
under
those
rigid
necessitating
laws
,
yet
certainly
to
the
severe
enquiry
of
one
not
partially
addicted
to
the
sentiments
of
so
great
a
wit
because
they
were
his
,
it
would
appear
there
are
great
defects
,
and
many
things
yet
wanting
,
in
the
account
which
is
given
us
of
some
of
the
meaner
of
those
functions
which
he
would
attribute
only
to
organiz'd
matter
,
or
(
to
use
his
own
expression
)
to
the
conformation
of
the
members
of
the
body
,
and
the
course
of
the
spirits
excited
by
the
heat
of
the
heart
,
&c.
For
howsoever
accurately
he
describes
the
instruments
and
the
way
,
his
account
seems
very
little
satisfying
of
the
principle
,
either
of
spontaneous
motion
,
or
of
sensation
.
As
to
the
former
,
though
it
be
very
apparent
that
the
muscles
seated
in
that
opposite
posture
wherein
they
are
mostly
found
paired
throughout
the
body
,
the
nerves
,
and
the
animal
spirits
in
the
brain
,
and
(
suppose
we
)
that
glandule
seated
in
the
inmost
parts
of
it
,
are
the
instruments
of
the
motion
of
the
limbs
,
and
the
whole
body
;
yet
what
are
all
these
to
the
prime
causation
or
much
more
,
to
the
spontaneity
of
this
motion
?
And
whereas
,
with
us
(
who
are
acknowledged
to
have
such
a
faculty
independent
on
the
body
)
an
act
of
will
doth
so
manifestly
contribute
,
so
that
,
when
we
will
our
body
is
moved
with
so
admirable
facility
,
and
we
feel
not
the
cumbersome
weight
of
an
arm
to
be
lift
up
,
or
of
our
whole
corporeal
bulk
to
be
moved
this
way
or
that
,
by
a
slower
or
swifter
motion
.
Yea
,
and
when
as
also
,
if
we
will
,
we
can
on
the
sudden
in
a
very
instant
start
up
out
of
the
most
composed
sedentary
posture
,
and
put
our selves
,
upon
occasion
,
into
the
most
violent
course
of
motion
or
action
.
But
if
we
have
no
such
will
,
though
we
have
the
same
agile
spirits
about
us
,
we
find
no
difficulty
to
keep
in
a
posture
of
rest
;
and
are
,
for
the
most
part
,
not
sensible
of
any
endeavour
or
urgency
of
those
active
particles
,
as
if
they
were
hardly
to
be
restrained
from
putting
us
into
motion
;
and
against
a
reluctant
act
of
our
will
,
we
are
not
moved
but
with
great
difficulty
to
them
that
will
give
themselves
and
us
the
trouble
.
This
being
,
I
say
,
the
case
with
us
;
and
it
being
also
obvious
to
our
observation
,
that
it
is
so
very
much
alike
in
these
mentioned
respects
,
with
brute
creatures
,
how
unconceivable
is
it
that
the
directive
principle
of
their
motions
and
ours
should
be
so
vastly
,
and
altogether
unlike
?
(
whatsoever
greater
perfection
is
required
with
us
,
as
to
those
more
noble
and
perfect
functions
and
operations
which
are
found
to
belong
to
us
,
)
That
is
,
that
in
us
,
an
act
of
will
should
signifie
so
very
much
,
and
be
for
the
most
part
necessary
to
the
beginning
,
the
continuing
,
the
stopping
,
or
the
varying
of
our
motions
;
and
in
them
,
nothing
like
it
,
nor
any
thing
else
,
besides
only
that
corporal
principle
,
De
Passion
.
part.
1.
art.
8.
which
he
assigns
as
common
to
them
and
us
,
the
continual
heat
in
the
heart
(
which
he
calls
a
sort
of
fire
)
nourished
by
the
bloud
of
the
veins
;
the
instruments
of
motion
,
already
mention'd
,
and
the
various
representations
and
impressions
of
external
objects
as
there
and
elsewhere
he
expresses
himself
!
upon
Princip.
Philosoph
.
Dioptric
.
c.
4.
Disertat
.
de
method
.
which
last
(
though
much
is
undoubtedly
to
be
attributed
to
it
)
that
so
main
a
stress
should
be
laid
as
to
the
diversifying
of
motion
seems
strange
;
when
we
may
observe
so
various
motions
of
some
silly
creatures
,
as
of
a
fly
in
our
window
,
while
we
cannot
perceive
,
and
can
scarce
imagine
any
change
in
external
objects
about
them
:
yea
,
a
swarm
of
flies
,
so
variously
frisking
,
and
plying
to
and
fro
,
some
this
way
,
others
that
;
with
a
thousand
diversities
and
interferings
in
their
motion
:
and
some
resting
while
things
are
in
the
same
state
externally
to
them
all
.
So
that
what
should
cause
or
cease
,
or
so
strangely
vary
such
motions
,
is
,
from
thence
,
or
any
thing
else
he
hath
said
,
left
unimaginable
.
As
it
is
much
more
,
how
,
in
creatures
of
much
strength
,
as
a
Bear
or
a
Lion
,
a
paw
should
be
moved
sometimes
so
gently
,
and
sometimes
with
so
mighty
force
,
only
by
meer
mechanism
,
without
any
directive
principle
that
is
not
altogether
corporal
.
But
most
of
all
how
the
strange
regularity
of
motion
in
some
creatures
,
as
of
the
Spider
in
making
its
web
,
and
the
like
should
be
owing
to
no
other
than
such
causes
as
he
hath
assigned
of
the
motions
in
general
of
brute
creatures
.
And
what
though
some
motions
of
our
own
seem
wholly
involuntary
(
as
that
of
our
eye-lids
,
in
the
case
which
he
supposes
)
doth
it
therefore
follow
De
Pass.
art.
13.
they
must
proceed
from
a
principle
only
corporal
?
as
if
our
soul
had
no
other
act
belonging
to
it
,
but
that
of
willing
?
which
he
doth
not
down-right
say
;
but
that
it
is
its
only
,
or
its
chief
act
;
and
if
it
be
its
chief
act
only
,
what
hinders
but
that
such
a
motion
may
proceed
from
an
act
that
is
not
chief
?
or
that
it
may
have
a
power
that
may
sometimes
step
forth
into
act
(
and
in
greater
matters
than
that
)
without
any
formal
deliberated
command
or
direction
of
our
will
.
So
little
reason
is
there
to
conclude
that
all
our
motions
common
to
us
with
beasts
,
or
even
their
motions
themselves
depend
on
nothing
else
than
But
as
to
the
matter
of
sensation
,
his
account
seems
much
more
defective
and
unintelligible
,
that
is
,
how
it
should
be
performed
(
as
he
supposes
every
thing
common
to
us
with
beasts
may
be
)
without
a
soul.
For
,
admit
that
it
be
(
as
who
doubts
but
it
is
)
by
the
instruments
which
he
assigns
,
we
are
still
to
seek
what
is
the
sentient
,
or
what
useth
these
instruments
,
and
doth
sentire
,
or
exercise
sense
by
them
?
That
is
,
suppose
it
be
performed
in
the
brain
,
and
that
(
as
he
says
)
by
the
help
of
the
nerves
,
Princip.
Philosoph
.
Sect.
189.
which
from
thence
like
small
strings
are
stretcht
forth
unto
all
the
other
members
;
suppose
we
have
the
three
things
to
consider
in
the
nerves
which
he
recites
;
Their
interiour
De
Passion
.
art.
11.
substance
,
which
extends
it self
like
very
slender
threds
from
the
brain
to
the
extremities
of
all
the
other
members
into
which
they
are
knit
.
The
very
thin
little
skins
which
inclose
these
,
and
which
being
continued
with
those
that
inwrap
the
brain
do
compose
the
little
pipes
which
contain
these
threds
;
and
lastly
,
the
animal
spirits
which
are
convey'd
down
from
the
brain
through
these
pipes
.
Yet
which
of
these
is
most
subservient
unto
sense
?
That
he
undertakes
elsewhere
to
declare
,
viz.
that
we
Dioptr.
c.
4.
s.
4
,
5.
are
not
to
think
(
which
we
also
suppose
)
some
nerves
to
serve
for
sense
,
others
for
motion
only
,
as
some
have
thought
,
but
that
the
inclosed
spirits
serve
for
the
motion
of
the
members
,
and
those
little
threds
(
also
inclosed
)
for
sense
.
Are
we
yet
any
nearer
our
purpose
?
Do
these
small
threds
sentire
?
are
these
the
things
that
ultimately
receive
and
discern
the
various
impressions
of
objects
?
And
since
they
are
all
of
one
sort
of
substance
,
how
comes
it
to
pass
that
some
of
them
are
seeing
threds
,
others
hearing
threds
,
others
tasting
,
&c.
Is
it
from
the
divers
and
commodious
figuration
of
the
organs
unto
which
these
descend
from
the
brain
?
But
though
we
acknowledge
and
admire
the
curious
and
exquisite
formation
of
those
organs
,
and
their
most
apt
usefulness
(
as
organs
or
instruments
)
to
the
purposes
for
which
they
are
designed
;
yet
what
do
they
signifie
without
a
proportionably
apt
and
able
agent
to
use
them
,
or
percipient
to
entertain
and
judge
of
the
several
notices
which
by
them
are
only
transmitted
from
external
things
?
That
is
,
suppose
we
a
drop
of
never
so
pure
and
transparent
liquor
,
or
let
it
be
three
,
diversly
tinctured
or
coloured
,
and
(
lest
they
mingle
)
kept
asunder
by
their
distinct
infolding
coats
,
let
these
encompass
one
the
other
,
and
,
together
,
compose
one
little
shining
globe
:
are
we
satisfied
that
now
this
curious
pretty
ball
can
see
?
nay
,
suppose
we
it
never
so
conveniently
situate
,
suppose
we
the
forementioned
strings
fastned
to
it
,
and
these
,
being
hollow
,
well
replenisht
with
as
pure
air
,
or
wind
,
or
gentle
flame
as
you
can
imagine
;
yea
,
and
all
the
before
described
little
threds
to
boot
,
can
it
yet
do
the
feat
?
nay
,
suppose
we
all
things
else
to
concur
,
that
we
can
suppose
,
except
a
living
principle
(
call
that
by
what
name
you
will
)
and
is
it
not
still
as
uncapable
of
the
act
of
seeing
,
as
a
ball
of
clay
,
or
a
pebble
stone
?
or
can
the
substance
of
the
brain
it self
perform
that
or
any
other
act
of
sense
(
for
it
is
superfluous
to
speak
distinctly
of
the
rest
)
any
more
than
the
pulp
of
an
apple
,
or
a
dish
of
curds
?
So
that
trace
this
matter
whither
you
will
within
the
compass
of
your
assigned
limits
,
and
you
are
still
at
the
same
loss
,
range
through
the
whole
body
and
what
can
you
find
but
flesh
,
and
bones
,
marrow
,
and
bloud
,
strings
and
threds
,
humour
and
vapour
;
and
which
of
these
is
capable
of
sense
?
These
are
your
materials
and
such
like
,
order
them
as
you
will
,
put
them
into
what
method
you
can
devise
,
and
except
you
can
make
it
live
,
you
cannot
make
it
so
much
as
feel
,
much
less
perform
all
other
acts
of
sense
besides
,
unto
which
these
tools
alone
seem
as
unproportionable
as
a
plough-share
to
the
most
curious
sculpture
,
or
a
pair
of
tongs
to
the
most
melodious
musick
.
But
how
much
more
unconceivable
it
is
that
the
figuration
and
concurrence
of
the
foremention'd
organs
can
alone
suffice
to
produce
the
several
passions
of
love
,
fear
,
anger
,
&c.
whereof
we
find
so
evident
indications
in
brute
creatures
,
it
is
enough
but
to
hint
.
And
(
but
that
all
persons
do
not
read
the
same
Books
)
it
were
altogether
unnecessary
to
have
said
so
much
;
after
so
plain
demonstration
already
extant
that
matter
,
howsoever
modified
,
is
uncapable
of
sense
.
More
's
Immortality
of
the
Soul
.
Nor
would
it
seem
necessary
to
attempt
any
thing
in
this
kind
,
in
particular
and
direct
opposition
to
the
very
peculiar
sentiments
of
this
most
ingenious
Author
(
as
he
will
undoubtedly
be
reckon'd
in
all
succeeding
time
)
who
when
he
undertakes
to
shew
what
sense
is
,
and
how
it
is
performed
,
makes
it
the
proper
business
of
the
Soul
,
comprehends
it
under
the
name
of
Cogitation
,
naming
himself
a
thinking
Princip.
Phil.
part
:
4.
s.
189.
thing
,
adds
by
way
of
question
,
what
is
that
?
and
answers
,
a
thing
doubting
,
understanding
,
affirming
,
denying
,
willing
,
nilling
,
and
also
imagining
,
and
exercising
sense
,
says
expresly
it
is
evident
to
all
that
it
is
the
Soul
that
exercises
Dioptr.
c.
4.
the
so
much
celebrated
Poet
of
old
.
The
only
wonder
is
that
under
this
general
name
of
Cogitation
he
denies
it
unto
Brutes
;
under
which
name
he
may
be
thought
less
fitly
to
have
included
it
,
than
to
have
affirmed
them
uncapable
of
any
thing
to
which
that
name
ought
to
be
applied
,
as
he
doth
not
only
affirm
,
but
esteems
himself
by
most
firm
reasons
to
have
proved
.
[
*
](A44683-e5170-b)
*
Resp.
sextae
.
Dissert.
De
Method
.
c.
5.
And
yet
that
particular
reason
seems
a
great
deal
more
pious
,
than
it
is
cogent
;
which
he
gives
for
his
chusing
this
particular
way
of
differencing
brutes
from
humane
creatures
,
viz.
lest
any
prejudice
should
be
done
to
the
doctrine
of
the
humane
souls
immortality
:
There
being
nothing
,
as
he
truly
says
,
that
doth
more
easily
turn
off
weak
minds
from
the
path
of
virtue
,
than
if
they
should
think
the
souls
of
brutes
to
be
of
the
same
nature
with
our
own
;
and
therefore
that
nothing
remains
to
be
hoped
or
feared
after
this
life
,
more
by
us
than
by
flies
or
pismires
.
For
,
sure
there
were
other
ways
of
providing
against
that
danger
;
besides
that
of
denying
them
so
much
as
sense
(
other
than
meerly
organical
as
he
somewhere
alleviates
the
harshness
of
that
position
,
but
But
yet
if
we
should
admit
the
propriety
of
this
appellation
,
and
acknowledge
(
the
thing
it self
intended
to
be
signified
by
it
)
that
all
the
powers
belonging
to
meer
brutal
nature
are
purely
mechanical
and
no
more
;
To
what
purpose
is
it
here
alledg'd
?
or
what
can
it
be
understood
to
signifie
?
what
is
lost
from
our
cause
by
it
?
And
what
have
Atheists
whereof
to
glory
?
For
was
the
contrivance
of
these
machines
theirs
?
were
they
the
Authors
of
this
rare
invention
,
or
of
any
thing
like
it
?
or
can
they
shew
any
product
of
humane
device
and
wit
,
that
shall
be
capable
of
vying
with
the
strange
powers
of
those
machines
?
or
can
they
imagine
what
so
highly
exceeds
all
humane
skill
to
have
fallen
by
chance
,
and
without
any
contrivance
or
design
at
all
,
into
a
frame
capable
of
such
powers
and
operations
?
If
they
be
machines
they
are
(
as
that
free-spirited
Author
speaks
)
to
be
considered
as
a
sort
of
machine
made
by
the
hand
of
God
,
which
is
by
infinite
degrees
better
ordered
,
and
Dissert.
de
Method
.
Sect.
5.
hath
in
it
more
admirable
motions
,
than
any
that
could
ever
have
been
formed
by
the
art
of
man
.
Yea
,
and
we
might
add
,
so
little
disadvantage
would
accrue
to
the
present
cause
(
what
ever
might
to
some
other
)
by
this
concession
,
that
rather
(
if
it
were
not
a
wrong
to
the
cause
which
justly
disdains
we
should
alledge
any
thing
false
or
uncertain
for
its
support
)
this
would
add
much
,
we
will
not
say
to
its
victory
,
but
to
its
triumph
,
that
we
did
acknowledge
them
nothing
else
than
meer
mechanical
contrivances
.
For
,
since
they
must
certainly
either
be
such
,
or
have
each
of
them
a
soul
to
animate
and
inable
them
to
their
several
functions
;
it
seems
a
much
more
easie
performance
,
and
is
more
conceivable
,
and
within
the
nearer
reach
of
humane
apprehension
that
they
should
be
furnish'd
with
such
a
one
,
than
be
made
capable
of
so
admirable
operations
without
it
;
and
the
former
(
though
it
were
not
a
surer
)
were
a
more
amazing
,
unsearchable
,
and
less
comprehensible
discovery
of
the
most
transcendent
wisdom
,
than
the
latter
.
But
because
whatsoever
comes
under
the
And
were
it
not
for
the
slothful
neglect
of
the
most
to
study
themselves
;
we
should
not
here
need
to
recount
,
unto
men
,
the
common
and
well-known
abilities
and
excellencies
,
which
peculiarly
belong
to
their
own
nature
;
They
might
take
notice
without
being
told
,
that
first
as
to
their
intellectual
faculty
,
they
have
somewhat
about
them
that
can
think
,
understand
,
frame
notions
of
things
,
that
can
rectifie
or
supply
the
false
or
defective
representations
which
are
made
to
them
by
their
external
senses
,
and
fansies
,
that
can
conceive
of
things
far
above
the
reach
,
and
sphere
of
sense
,
the
moral
good
or
evil
of
actions
or
inclinations
,
what
there
is
in
them
of
rectitude
or
pravity
;
whereby
they
can
animadvert
and
cast
their
eye
inward
upon
themselves
.
Observe
the
good
or
evil
acts
or
inclinations
,
the
knowledge
,
ignorance
,
dulness
,
vigour
,
tranquility
,
trouble
,
and
generally
,
the
perfections
or
imperfections
of
their
own
minds
.
That
can
apprehend
the
general
natures
of
things
,
the
future
existence
of
what
yet
is
not
,
with
the
future
appearance
of
that
to
us
which
as
yet
appears
not
.
Of
which
last
sort
of
power
,
the
confident
assertion
no
man
can
have
a
conception
of
the
Humane
Nature
.
future
,
needs
not
,
against
our
experience
,
make
us
doubt
;
especially
being
inforced
by
no
better
than
that
pleasant
reason
there
subjoyned
,
for
,
the
future
is
not
yet
;
that
is
to
say
,
because
it
is
future
;
and
so
(
which
is
all
this
reason
amounts
to
)
we
cannot
conceive
it
,
because
we
cannot
.
For
though
our
conceptions
of
former
things
guide
us
in
forming
notions
of
what
is
future
,
yet
sure
our
conception
of
any
thing
as
future
,
is
much
another
sort
of
conception
,
from
what
we
have
of
the
same
thing
as
past
,
as
appears
from
its
different
effects
;
for
if
an
object
be
apprehended
good
,
we
conceive
of
it
as
past
with
sorrow
,
as
future
with
hope
and
joy
.
If
evil
,
with
joy
as
past
,
with
fear
and
sorrow
,
as
future
.
And
(
which
above
all
the
rest
discovers
and
magnifies
the
intellectual
power
of
the
humane
soul
)
that
they
can
form
a
conception
(
howsoever
imperfect
)
of
this
absolute
perfect
Being
,
whereof
we
are
discoursing
.
Which
even
they
that
acknowledge
not
its
existence
cannot
deny
,
except
they
will
profess
themselves
blindly
and
at
a
venture
to
deny
they
know
not
what
?
or
what
they
have
not
so
much
as
thought
of
?
They
may
take
notice
of
their
power
of
comparing
things
,
of
discerning
and
making
a
judgment
of
their
agreements
and
disagreements
,
their
proportions
and
disproportions
to
one
another
.
Of
affirming
,
or
denying
this
or
that
concerning
such
or
such
things
;
and
of
pronouncing
with
more
or
less
confidence
concerning
the
truth
or
falshood
of
such
affirmations
or
negations
.
And
moreover
of
their
power
of
arguing
and
inferring
one
thing
from
another
,
so
as
from
one
plain
and
evident
principle
to
draw
forth
a
long
chain
of
consequences
that
may
be
discerned
to
be
linked
therewith
.
They
have
withal
to
consider
the
liberty
and
the
large
capacity
of
the
humane
will
;
which
,
when
it
is
its
self
,
rejects
the
dominion
of
any
other
than
the
supreme
Lord
;
and
refuses
satisfaction
in
any
other
than
the
supreme
and
most
comprehensive
good
.
And
upon
,
even
,
so
hasty
,
and
transient
a
view
,
of
a
thing
furnished
with
such
powers
and
faculties
;
we
have
sufficient
occasion
to
bethink
our selves
;
How
came
such
a
thing
as
this
into
being
?
whence
did
it
spring
,
or
to
what
original
doth
it
owe
it self
?
More
particularly
we
have
here
two
things
to
be
discoursed
:
First
,
that
notwithstanding
so
high
excellencies
,
the
soul
of
man
doth
yet
appear
to
be
a
caused
being
,
that
sometime
had
a
beginning
.
Secondly
,
That
by
them
,
it
is
sufficiently
evident
that
it
owes
it self
to
a
wise
and
intelligent
cause
.
As
to
the
former
of
these
we
need
say
the
less
,
because
that
sort
of
Atheists
with
whom
we
have
chiefly
now
to
do
,
deny
not
humane
souls
to
have
had
a
beginning
,
as
supposing
them
to
be
produced
by
the
bodies
they
animate
by
the
same
generation
,
and
that
such
generation
did
sometimes
begin
.
That
only
rude
and
wildly
moving
matter
was
from
eternity
,
and
that
by
infinite
alterations
and
commixtures
in
that
eternity
,
it
fell
at
last
into
this
orderly
frame
and
state
wherein
things
now
are
,
and
became
prolifick
,
so
as
to
give
beginning
to
the
several
sorts
of
living
things
,
which
do
now
continue
to
propagate
themselves
.
The
mad
folly
of
which
random
fancy
we
have
been
so
largely
contending
against
hitherto
.
The
other
sort
who
were
for
an
eternal
succession
of
generations
have
been
sufficiently
refuted
by
divers
others
,
and
partly
by
what
hath
been
already
said
in
this
discourse
;
and
we
may
further
meet
with
them
ere
it
be
long
.
We
in
the
mean
time
find
not
any
professing
Atheism
to
make
humane
souls
as
such
necessary
and
self-original
beings
.
Yet
it
is
requisite
to
consider
not
only
what
persons
of
Atheistical
perswasions
have
said
,
but
what
also
they
,
possibly
,
may
say
.
And
moreover
some
that
have
been
remote
from
Atheism
have
been
prone
upon
the
contemplation
of
the
excellencies
of
the
humane
soul
to
over-magnifie
,
yea
and
even
no
less
than
deifie
it
.
'T
is
therefore
needful
to
say
somewhat
in
this
matter
.
For
if
nothing
of
direct
and
down-right
Atheism
had
been
:
The
rash
hyperboles
(
as
we
will
charitably
call
them
)
and
unwarrantable
rhetorications
of
these
latter
,
should
they
obtain
to
be
lookt
upon
and
received
as
severe
and
strict
assertions
of
Truth
,
were
equally
destructive
of
Religion
,
as
the
other
more
strangely
bold
and
avowed
opposition
to
it
.
Such
,
I
mean
,
as
have
spoken
of
the
Souls
Sen.
Ep.
92.
Hor.
Serm.
M.
Anton.
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
.
of
men
,
as
parts
of
God
,
one
thing
with
him
;
a
particle
of
Divine
breath
;
an
extract
,
or
derivation
of
himself
.
That
have
not
feared
to
apply
to
them
his
most
peculiar
attributes
,
or
Jamblicb
.
de
vit.
Pythag.
Pla'o
,
who
undertakes
to
prove
the
immortafity
of
the
Soul
by
such
arguments
as
if
they
did
conclude
any
thing
,
would
conclude
it
to
be
God
.
That
it
is
the
fountain
,
the
principie
[
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
]
of
motion
;
and
adds
that
the
principle
is
unbegotten
,
&c.
in
Phaedro
.
Makes
it
the
cause
of
all
things
,
and
the
ruler
of
all
,
De
Leg.
l.
10.
though
his
words
there
seem
meant
of
the
soul
of
the
world
.
Concerning
which
soul
afterwards
enquiring
whether
all
ought
not
to
account
it
God
?
He
answers
,
Yes
certainly
,
except
any
one
be
come
to
extreme
madness
.
And
whether
an
identity
were
not
imagined
of
our
souls
with
that
of
the
world
,
or
with
God
is
too
much
left
in
doubt
;
both
as
to
him
,
and
some
of
his
followers
.
To
say
nothing
of
modern
Enthusiasts
.
say
that
of
them
which
is
most
appropriate
,
and
incommunicably
belonging
to
him
alone
.
Nay
,
to
give
them
his
very
name
,
and
say
in
plain
words
they
were
God
.
Now
it
would
render
a
Temple
alike
insignificant
to
suppose
no
worshipper
,
as
to
suppose
none
who
should
be
worshipped
.
And
what
should
be
the
worshiper
when
our
souls
are
thought
the
same
thing
with
what
should
be
the
object
of
our
worship
?
But
methinks
when
we
consider
their
necessitous
indigent
state
,
their
wants
and
cravings
,
their
pressures
and
groans
,
their
grievances
and
complaints
,
we
should
find
enough
to
convince
us
they
are
not
the
self-originate
or
self-sufficient
being
.
And
might
even
despair
any
thing
should
be
plain
and
easie
to
them
with
whom
it
is
a
difficulty
to
distinguish
themselves
from
God
.
Why
are
they
in
a
state
which
they
dislike
?
wherefore
are
they
not
full
and
satisfied
?
why
do
they
wish
,
and
complain
,
is
this
God-like
?
But
if
any
have
a
doubt
hanging
in
their
minds
concerning
the
unity
of
souls
with
one
another
,
or
with
the
soul
of
the
world
,
let
them
read
what
is
already
extant
.
And
supposing
them
thereupon
,
distinct
Beings
;
Dr.
More
's
Poem
.
Antimonopsuchia
.
His
Immortality
of
the
Soul
.
Mr.
Baxter's
Appendix
to
the
Reasons
of
Christian
Religion
,
&c.
there
needs
no
more
to
prove
them
not
to
be
necessary
,
independent
,
uncaused
ones
,
than
their
subjection
to
so
frequent
changes
;
their
ignorance
,
doubts
,
irresolution
,
and
gradual
progress
to
knowledge
,
certainty
,
and
stability
in
their
purposes
;
their
very
being
united
with
these
bodies
in
which
they
have
been
but
a
little
while
,
as
we
all
know
;
whereby
they
undergo
no
small
change
(
admitting
them
,
to
have
been
,
pre-existent
)
and
wherein
they
experience
so
many
.
Yea
,
whether
those
changes
import
any
immutation
of
their
very
essence
or
no
;
the
repugnancy
being
so
plainly
manifest
of
the
very
terms
,
necessary
and
changeable
.
And
inasmuch
as
it
is
so
evident
that
a
necessary
being
can
receive
no
accession
to
it self
;
than
it
must
always
have
or
keep
it self
,
after
the
same
manner
,
and
in
the
same
state
;
that
if
it
be
necessarily
such
,
or
such
,
(
as
we
cannot
conceive
it
to
be
,
but
we
must
,
in
our
own
thoughts
,
affix
to
it
some
determinate
state
or
other
)
it
must
be
eternally
such
,
and
ever
in
that
particular
unchanged
state
.
Therefore
be
the
perfection
of
our
souls
as
great
as
our
most
certain
knowledge
of
them
can
possibly
allow
us
to
suppose
it
,
't
is
not
yet
so
great
,
but
that
we
must
be
constrained
to
confess
them
no
necessary
self-criginate
Beings
,
and
by
consequence
,
dependent
ones
,
that
owe
themselves
to
some
cause
.
Nor
yet
(
that
we
may
pass
over
to
the
other
so
little
,
as
to
require
less
than
an
intelligent
cause
,
endow'd
with
the
wisdom
which
we
assert
and
challenge
unto
the
truly
necessary
uncaused
Being
.
Which
,
because
he
hath
no
other
rival
or
competitor
for
the
glory
of
this
production
,
than
only
the
fortuitous
jumble
of
the
blindly
moving
particles
of
matter
,
our
enquiry
here
will
only
be
whose
image
the
thing
produced
bears
;
or
which
it
more
resembles
,
stupid
,
sensless
unactive
matter
(
or
at
the
best
only
supposed
moving
,
though
no
man
upon
the
Atheists
terms
,
can
imagine
how
it
came
to
be
so
)
or
the
active
intelligent
Being
,
whom
we
affirm
the
cause
of
all
things
,
and
who
hath
peculiarly
entituled
himself
the
Father
of
Spirits
.
That
is
,
we
are
to
consider
whether
the
powers
and
operations
belonging
to
the
Reasonable
Soul
do
not
plainly
argue
,
1.
That
it
neither
rises
from
nor
is
meer
matter
;
whence
it
will
be
consequent
it
must
have
an
efficient
divers
from
matter
?
2.
That
it
owes
it self
to
an
intelligent
efficient
.
As
to
the
former
,
we
need
not
deal
distinctly
and
severally
concerning
their
original
and
their
nature
.
For
if
they
are
not
meer
matter
,
it
will
be
evident
enough
they
do
not
arise
from
thence
.
So
that
here
all
will
be
summ'd
up
in
this
enquiry
,
whether
Reason
can
agree
to
matter
?
We
shall
therefore
wave
the
consideration
of
their
conceits
,
concerning
the
manner
of
the
first
origination
of
men
,
as
that
their
whole
being
was
only
a
production
of
the
earth
.
Whereof
the
Philosophical
account
deserves
as
much
laughter
,
instead
of
confutation
,
as
any
the
most
fabulously
Poetical
.
That
is
,
how
they
were
formed
(
as
also
the
other
animals
)
in
certain
little
bags
or
wombs
of
the
earth
,
out
of
which
,
when
they
grew
ripe
,
they
broke
forth
,
[
*
](A44683-e6160-b)
*
Gassend
.
Epicur
.
Syntag.
&c.
And
only
consider
what
is
said
of
the
constitution
Epist.
to
Herodot
.
in
Laert.
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
&c.
and
nature
of
the
humane
soul
it self
,
Which
is
said
to
be
compos'd
of
very
well
polish'd
,
the
smoothest
and
the
roundest
atoms
;
and
which
are
of
the
neatest
fashion
,
and
every
way
,
you
must
suppose
,
the
best
condition'd
the
whole
Country
could
afford
;
of
a
more
excellent
make
,
as
there
is
added
,
than
those
of
the
fire
it self
.
And
these
are
the
things
you
must
know
,
which
think
,
study
,
contemplate
,
frame
syllogisms
,
make
Theorems
,
lay
plots
,
contrive
business
,
act
the
Philosopher
,
the
Logician
,
the
Mathematician
,
Statesman
,
and
every
thing
else
(
only
you
may
except
the
Priest
,
for
of
him
there
was
no
need
.
)
This
therefore
is
our
present
theme
,
whether
such
things
as
these
be
capable
of
such
,
or
any
acts
of
reason
yea
or
no
?
And
if
such
a
matter
may
admit
of
serious
discourse
;
in
this
way
it
may
be
convenient
to
proceed
,
viz.
either
any
such
small
particle
,
or
atom
(
for
our
business
is
not
now
with
Des
Cartes
but
Epicurus
)
alone
,
is
rational
,
or
a
good
convenient
number
of
them
assembled
,
and
most
happily
met
together
.
It
is
much
to
be
feared
the
former
way
will
not
do
.
For
we
have
nothing
to
consider
in
any
of
these
atoms
,
in
its
solitary
condition
,
besides
its
magnitude
,
its
figure
,
and
its
weight
,
and
you
may
add
also
its
motion
(
if
you
could
devise
how
it
should
come
by
it
.
)
And
now
because
it
is
not
to
be
thought
that
all
atoms
are
rational
(
for
then
the
stump
of
a
tree
,
or
a
bundle
of
straw
might
serve
to
make
a
soul
of
,
for
ought
we
know
,
as
good
as
the
best
)
it
is
to
be
considered
by
which
of
those
properties
,
an
atom
shall
be
entituled
to
the
priviledge
of
being
rational
,
and
the
rational
atoms
be
distinguished
from
the
rest
.
Is
it
their
peculiar
magnitude
or
size
that
so
far
ennobles
them
?
Epicurus
would
here
have
us
believe
that
the
least
are
the
fittest
for
this
turn
.
Now
if
you
consider
how
little
we
must
suppose
them
generally
to
be
,
according
to
his
account
of
them
;
That
is
,
that
looking
upon
any
of
those
little
motes
a
stream
whereof
you
may
perceive
when
the
Sun
shines
in
at
a
window
,
and
he
doubts
not
but
many
Myriads
of
even
ordinary
atoms
go
to
the
composition
of
any
one
of
these
scarcely
discernable
motes
;
how
sportful
a
contemplation
were
it
,
to
suppose
one
of
those
furnished
with
all
the
powers
,
of
a
reasonable
soul
(
though
its
likely
they
would
not
laugh
at
the
jest
that
think
thousands
of
souls
might
be
conveniently
plac'd
upon
the
point
of
a
needle
.
)
And
yet
,
which
makes
the
matter
more
admirable
,
that
very
few
,
except
they
be
very
carefully
pickt
and
chosen
,
can
be
found
among
those
many
myriads
,
but
will
be
too
big
to
be
capable
of
rationality
.
Here
sure
the
fate
is
very
hard
,
of
those
that
come
nearest
the
size
,
but
only
,
by
a
very
little
too
much
corpulency
,
happen
to
be
excluded
,
as
unworthy
to
be
counted
among
the
rational
atoms
.
But
sure
if
all
sober
reason
be
not
utterly
lost
and
squandered
away
among
these
little
entities
,
it
must
needs
be
judged
altogether
imcomprehensible
,
why
,
if
,
upon
the
account
of
meer
littleness
,
any
atom
should
be
capable
of
reason
,
all
should
not
be
so
.
(
And
then
we
could
not
but
have
a
very
rational
world
.
)
At
least
,
the
difference
,
in
this
point
,
being
so
very
small
among
them
;
and
they
being
all
so
very
little
,
methinks
they
should
all
be
capable
of
some
reason
,
and
have
only
less
or
more
of
it
,
according
as
they
are
bigger
and
less
.
But
there
is
little
doubt
that
single
property
,
of
less
magnitude
,
will
not
be
stood
upon
as
the
characteristical
difference
of
rational
and
irrational
Atoms
;
and
because
their
more
or
less
gravity
is
reckon'd
necessarily
(
and
so
immediately
)
to
depend
on
that
(
for
those
Atoms
cannot
be
thought
porous
,
but
very
closely
compacted
each
one
within
it self
)
this
,
it
is
likely
,
will
as
little
be
depended
on
[
*
](A44683-e6370-b)
*
Where
yet
it
falls
out
somewhat
crosly
that
the
least
(
and
consequently
the
lightest
)
should
be
thought
fitter
to
be
the
matter
of
the
rational
soul
,
because
they
are
aptest
for
motion
,
when
yet
no
other
cause
is
assigned
of
their
motion
besides
their
gravity
,
which
cannot
but
be
more
as
they
are
bigger
(
for
no
doubt
if
you
should
try
them
in
a
pair
of
scales
,
the
biggest
would
be
found
to
outweigh
)
whence
also
it
should
seem
to
follow
,
that
the
heaviest
having
most
in
them
of
that
which
is
the
cause
of
motion
,
should
be
the
most
moveable
,
and
so
by
consequence
the
biggest
.
.
And
so
their
peculiar
figure
must
be
the
more
trusted
to
,
as
the
differencing
thing
.
And
because
there
is
in
this
respect
so
great
a
variety
among
this
little
sort
of
people
,
or
Nation
as
this
Author
somewhere
calls
them
,
whereof
he
gives
so
punctual
an
account
,
[
†
](A44683-e6390-b)
†
That
they
are
round
,
oblong
,
oval
,
plain
,
hooked
,
rough
,
smooth
,
bunch-back'd
,
&c.
as
if
he
had
been
the
Generalissimo
of
all
their
Armies
,
and
were
wont
to
view
them
at
their
Rendzevous
,
to
form
them
into
Regiments
and
Squadrons
,
and
appoint
them
to
the
distinct
services
he
found
them
aptest
for
.
No
doubt
it
was
a
difficulty
to
determine
which
sort
of
figure
was
to
be
pitcht
on
to
make
up
the
rational
regiment
.
But
since
this
power
was
absolute
,
and
there
was
none
to
gain-say
or
contradict
,
the
round
figure
was
judged
best
,
and
most
deserving
this
honour
.
Otherwise
a
reason
might
have
been
asked
(
and
it
might
have
been
a
greater
difficulty
to
have
given
a
good
one
)
why
some
other
figure
might
not
have
done
as
well
;
unless
respect
were
had
to
fellow-Atoms
,
and
that
it
was
thought
,
they
of
this
figure
could
better
associate
for
the
present
purpose
;
and
that
we
shall
consider
of
by
and
by
;
we
now
proceed
on
the
supposition
that
,
possibly
,
a
single
Atom
by
the
advantage
of
this
figure
,
might
be
judg'd
capable
of
this
high
atchievement
.
And
in
that
case
,
it
would
not
be
impertinent
to
enquire
,
whether
if
an
Atom
were
perfectly
round
,
and
so
,
very
rational
;
but
by
an
unexpected
misadventure
,
it
comes
to
have
one
little
corner
somewhere
clapt
on
,
it
be
hereby
quite
spoil'd
of
its
rationality
?
And
again
,
whether
one
that
comes
somewhat
near
that
figure
,
only
it
hath
some
little
protuberancies
upon
it
,
might
not
by
a
little
filing
,
or
the
friendly
rubs
of
other
Atoms
become
rational
?
And
yet
,
now
we
think
on
't
,
of
this
improvement
he
leaves
no
hope
,
because
he
tells
us
,
though
they
have
parts
,
yet
they
are
so
solidly
compacted
that
they
are
by
no
force
capable
of
dissolution
.
And
so
whatever
their
fate
is
in
this
particular
,
they
must
abide
it
without
expectation
of
change
.
And
yet
,
though
we
cannot
really
alter
it
for
the
better
with
any
of
them
,
yet
we
may
think
as
favourably
of
the
matter
as
we
please
;
and
for
any
thing
that
yet
appears
,
whatever
peculiar
claim
the
round
ones
lay
to
rationality
,
we
may
judge
as
well
(
and
shall
not
easily
be
disprov'd
)
of
any
of
the
rest
.
Upon
the
whole
matter
no
one
of
these
properties
hitherto
alone
is
likely
to
make
a
rational
Atom
:
what
they
will
all
do
meeting
together
may
yet
seem
a
doubt
.
That
is
,
supposing
we
could
hit
upon
one
single
Atom
,
that
is
at
once
of
a
very
little
size
,
and
consequently
very
light
and
nimble
,
and
most
perfectly
and
unexceptionably
round
(
and
possibly
there
may
be
found
a
good
many
such
)
will
not
this
do
the
business
?
May
we
not
now
hope
to
have
a
rational
sort
of
people
among
them
,
that
is
,
those
of
the
peculiar
family
or
tribe
?
And
yet
still
the
matter
will
be
found
to
go
very
hard
;
for
if
we
cannot
imagine
or
devise
how
any
one
of
these
properties
should
contribute
anything
(
as
upon
our
utmost
disquisition
we
certainly
cannot
)
towards
the
power
of
reasoning
,
it
is
left
us
altogether
unimaginable
how
all
together
should
make
a
rational
Atom
.
There
is
only
one
relief
remaining
,
that
is
,
what
if
we
add
to
these
other
properties
some
peculiarly-brisk
sort
of
actual
motion
:
For
to
be
barely
movable
will
not
serve
,
inasmuch
as
all
are
so
;
But
will
not
actual
motion
(
added
to
its
being
irreprehensibly
little
,
light
,
and
round
)
especially
if
it
be
a
very
freakish
one
,
and
made
up
of
many
odd
unexpected
windings
and
turns
effect
the
business
?
Possibly
it
might
do
something
to
actual
reasoning
,
supposing
the
power
were
there
before
;
for
who
can
tell
but
the
little
thing
was
faln
asleep
,
and
by
this
means
its
power
might
be
awaken'd
into
some
exercise
?
But
that
it
should
give
the
power
it self
,
is
above
all
comprehension
.
And
there
is
nothing
else
to
give
it
.
These
that
have
been
mentioned
being
all
the
prime
qualities
that
are
assigned
to
Atoms
singly
considered
.
All
other
that
can
be
supposed
,
belonging
to
concrete
bodies
,
that
are
composed
of
many
of
them
meeting
together
.
And
therefore
hither
in
the
next
place
our
enquiry
must
be
directed
,
whether
any
number
of
Atoms
(
definite
or
indefinite
)
being
in
themselves
severally
irrational
,
can
become
rational
by
association
,
or
compose
and
make
up
a
rational
soul
?
Hitherto
it
must
be
acknowledg'd
we
have
not
fought
with
any
adversary
;
not
having
met
with
any
that
have
asserted
the
rationality
of
single
corporeal
Atoms
;
yet
because
we
know
not
what
time
may
produce
,
and
whither
the
distress
and
exigency
of
a
desperate
cause
may
drive
the
maintainers
of
it
;
't
was
not
therefore
fit
to
say
nothing
to
that
(
supposable
or
possible
)
assertion
(
I
mean
possible
to
be
asserted
,
howsoever
impossible
it
is
to
be
true
.
)
Nor
yet
could
it
well
admit
of
any
thing
to
be
said
to
it
,
but
in
that
ludicrous
and
sportful
way
.
If
we
will
suppose
any
to
be
so
foolish
,
they
are
to
be
dealt
with
according
to
their
folly
.
But
now
as
to
this
other
conceit
,
that
Atoms
(
provided
they
be
of
the
right
stamp
or
kind
)
may
,
a
competent
number
of
them
,
assembled
together
,
compose
a
reasonable
soul
is
an
express
Article
of
the
Epicurean
Creed
.
And
therefore
here
we
are
to
deal
more
cautiously
;
not
that
this
is
any
whit
a
wiser
fansie
than
the
other
;
but
that
the
Truth
in
this
matter
is
surer
to
meet
with
opposition
in
the
minds
of
some
persons
already
formed
unto
that
wild
apprehension
and
tinctur'd
with
it
.
Wherefore
such
must
be
desired
to
consider
in
the
first
place
,
if
they
will
be
true
Disciples
of
Epicurus
throughout
,
what
he
affirms
of
all
Atoms
universally
,
that
they
must
be
simple
uncompounded
bodies
(
or
if
you
will
corpuscles
)
not
capable
of
division
or
section
,
by
no
force
dissoluble
,
and
therefore
immutable
,
or
in
themselves
void
of
any
mutation
.
Hereupon
let
it
be
next
considered
,
if
there
were
in
them
(
those
that
are
of
the
right
size
,
shape
,
and
weight
)
severally
,
some
certain
sparks
or
seeds
of
reason
(
that
we
may
make
the
supposition
as
advantagious
as
we
can
)
or
dispositions
thereto
,
yet
how
shall
it
be
possible
to
them
to
communicate
?
or
have
that
communion
with
one
another
,
as
together
,
to
constitute
an
actually
and
completely
rational
,
or
thinking
thing
.
If
every
one
could
bring
somewhat
to
a
common
stock
,
that
might
be
serviceable
to
that
purpose
;
how
shall
each
ones
proportion
or
share
be
imparted
?
They
can
none
of
them
emit
any
thing
,
there
can
possibly
be
no
such
thing
as
an
effluvium
from
any
of
them
,
inasmuch
as
they
are
incapable
of
diminution
;
and
are
themselves
each
of
them
as
little
as
the
least
imaginable
effluvium
that
we
would
suppose
to
proceed
from
this
or
that
particular
Atom
.
They
can
at
the
most
but
touch
one
another
,
penetrate
,
or
get
into
one
another
they
cannot
.
Insomuch
as
if
any
one
have
a
treasure
in
it
,
which
is
in
readiness
for
the
making
up
an
intellective
faculty
or
power
among
them
,
that
should
be
common
to
them
all
;
yet
each
one
remains
so
lockt
up
within
it self
,
and
is
so
reserved
and
incommunicative
,
that
no
other
,
much
less
the
whole
body
of
them
,
can
be
any
jot
the
wiser
.
So
that
this
is
like
to
be
a
very
dull
assembly
.
But
then
,
if
there
be
nothing
of
reason
to
be
communicated
,
we
are
yet
at
a
greater
loss
.
For
,
if
it
be
said
having
nothing
else
to
communicate
,
they
communicate
themselves
,
but
what
is
that
self
?
is
it
a
rational
self
?
or
is
every
single
Atom
,
that
enters
this
composition
,
reason
?
or
is
it
a
principle
of
reason
?
is
it
a
seed
?
or
is
it
a
part
?
is
it
a
thought
?
what
shall
we
suppose
?
or
what
is
there
in
the
properties
assigned
to
this
sort
of
Atoms
that
can
bespeak
it
any
of
these
?
And
if
none
of
these
can
be
supposed
;
what
doth
their
association
signifie
towards
ratiocination
?
They
are
little
,
what
doth
that
contribute
?
therefore
there
may
need
the
more
of
them
to
make
a
good
large
soul
;
but
why
must
a
little
thing
,
devoid
of
reason
,
contribute
more
towards
it
than
another
somewhat
bigger
?
They
are
light
,
doth
that
mend
the
matter
?
they
are
the
sooner
blown
away
,
they
can
the
less
co-here
,
or
keep
together
;
they
are
the
more
easily
capable
of
dissipation
,
the
less
of
keeping
their
places
in
solemn
counsel
.
They
are
round
,
and
exactly
smooth
.
But
why
do
they
the
more
conveniently
associate
upon
that
account
for
this
purpose
?
They
cannot
therefore
come
so
close
together
as
they
might
have
done
,
had
they
been
of
various
figures
.
They
cannot
,
indeed
,
give
or
receive
so
rude
touches
.
This
signifies
somewhat
towards
the
keeping
of
state
,
but
what
doth
it
to
the
exercise
of
reason
?
Their
being
so
perfectly
and
smoothly
round
makes
them
the
more
uncapable
of
keeping
a
steady
station
,
they
are
the
more
in
Janger
of
rolling
away
from
one
another
,
they
can
upon
this
account
lay
no
hold
of
each
other
.
Their
counsels
and
resolves
are
likely
to
be
the
more
lubricous
,
and
liable
to
an
uncertain
volubility
.
It
is
not
to
be
imagined
what
a
collection
of
individuals
only
thus
qualified
can
do
when
they
are
come
together
,
an
assembly
thus
constituted
.
Are
we
hence
to
expect
Oracles
,
philosophical
Determinations
?
Maxims
of
State
?
And
since
they
are
suppos'd
to
be
so
much
alike
,
how
are
the
Mathematical
Atoms
to
be
distinguished
from
the
Moral
?
those
from
the
Political
?
the
Contemplative
from
the
Active
?
or
when
the
assembly
thinks
fit
to
entertain
it self
with
matters
of
this
or
that
kind
,
what
must
be
its
different
composure
or
posture
?
into
what
mold
or
figure
must
it
cast
it self
for
one
purpose
?
and
into
what
for
another
?
It
's
hard
to
imagine
that
these
little
globular
bodies
,
that
we
may
well
suppose
to
be
as
like
as
one
egg
can
be
to
another
,
should
by
the
meer
alteration
of
their
situation
in
respect
of
one
another
(
and
no
alteration
besides
can
be
so
much
as
imagined
among
them
)
make
so
great
a
change
in
the
complexion
of
this
assembly
;
so
that
now
it
shall
be
dispos'd
to
seriousness
,
and
by
some
transposition
of
the
spherical
particles
,
to
mirth
,
now
to
business
,
and
by
and
by
to
pleasure
:
And
seeing
all
humane
souls
are
supposed
made
of
the
same
sort
of
material
,
how
are
the
Atoms
model'd
in
one
man
,
and
how
in
another
?
what
Atoms
are
there
to
dispose
to
this
sect
more
,
and
what
to
another
?
or
if
a
good
reason
can
be
assigned
for
their
difference
,
what
shall
be
given
for
their
agreement
?
Whence
it
is
that
there
are
so
unquestionable
common
notions
every
where
received
?
why
are
not
all
things
transposed
in
some
minds
,
when
such
a
posture
of
the
Atoms
as
might
infer
it
,
is
as
supposable
as
any
other
?
Yea
,
and
since
men
are
found
not
always
to
be
of
one
mind
,
with
themselves
,
it
is
strange
and
incomprehensible
that
such
a
situation
of
these
Atoms
that
constitute
his
soul
should
dispose
him
to
be
of
one
opinion
,
and
another
of
another
.
How
are
they
to
be
rang'd
when
for
the
affirmative
?
how
for
the
negative
?
And
yet
a
great
deal
more
strange
,
that
since
their
situation
is
so
soon
chang'd
,
and
so
continually
changing
(
the
very
substance
of
the
soul
being
supposed
nothing
else
than
a
thing
very
like
,
but
a
little
finer
than
a
busie
and
continually
moving
flame
of
fire
)
any
man
should
ever
continue
to
be
of
the
same
opinion
with
himself
one
quarter
of
an
hour
together
;
that
all
notions
are
not
confounded
and
jumbled
;
that
the
same
thing
is
not
thought
and
unthought
,
resolved
and
unresolved
a
thousand
times
in
a
day
.
That
is
,
if
any
thing
could
be
thought
or
resolved
at
all
.
Or
if
this
were
a
subject
capable
of
framing
or
receiving
any
sort
of
notion
.
But
still
that
is
the
greatest
difficulty
,
how
there
can'be
such
a
thing
as
thinking
,
or
forming
of
notions
.
The
case
is
plain
of
such
notions
as
have
no
relation
to
matter
,
or
dependence
upon
external
sense
(
as
what
doth
that
contribute
to
my
contemplation
of
my
own
mind
,
and
its
acts
and
powers
to
my
animadversion
,
or
knowing
that
I
think
or
will
this
or
that
?
)
But
besides
,
and
more
generally
what
proportion
is
there
between
a
thought
,
and
the
motion
of
an
Atom
?
Will
we
appeal
to
our
faculties
,
to
our
reason
it self
?
and
whither
else
will
we
?
Is
there
any
cognation
or
kindred
between
the
Idaea's
we
have
of
these
things
,
the
casual
agitation
of
a
small
particle
of
matter
(
be
it
as
little
or
as
round
as
we
please
to
imagine
)
and
an
act
of
intellection
or
judgment
?
And
what
if
there
be
divers
of
them
together
?
what
can
they
do
more
towards
the
composing
an
intelligent
thing
,
than
many
ciphers
to
the
Arithmetical
composition
of
a
number
.
It
would
be
as
rational
to
suppose
an
heap
of
dust
by
long
lying
together
might
at
last
become
rational
.
Yes
,
these
are
things
that
have
(
some
way
or
other
)
the
power
of
motion
;
and
what
can
they
effect
by
that
?
they
can
frisk
about
,
and
ply
to
and
fro
,
and
interfere
among
themselves
,
and
hit
,
and
justle
and
tumble
over
one
another
,
and
that
will
contribute
a
great
deal
;
about
as
much
,
we
may
suppose
,
as
the
shaking
of
such
dust
well
in
a
bag
,
by
which
means
it
might
possibly
become
finer
and
smaller
something
;
and
by
continuing
that
action
,
at
length
rational
!
No
;
but
these
Atoms
,
of
which
the
soul
is
made
,
have
a
great
advantage
by
their
being
dispos'd
into
a
so
well-contriv'd
and
fitly-organiz'd
receptacle
as
the
body
is
.
It
is
indeed
true
and
admirable
that
the
body
is
(
as
hath
been
before
observed
)
so
fitly
framed
for
the
purposes
whereto
the
whole
of
it
,
and
its
several
parts
are
designed
.
But
how
unfitly
is
that
commodious
structure
of
it
,
so
much
as
mentioned
by
such
as
will
not
allow
themselves
to
own
and
adore
the
wisdom
and
power
of
its
great
Architect
.
And
what
if
the
composure
of
the
body
be
so
apt
and
useful
,
so
excellent
in
its
own
kind
;
Is
it
so
in
every
kind
,
or
to
all
imaginable
purposes
?
or
what
purpose
can
we
possibly
imagine
more
remote
,
or
foreign
to
the
composition
of
the
body
,
than
that
the
power
of
ratiocination
should
be
derived
thence
?
It
might
as
well
be
said
it
was
so
made
,
to
whirle
about
the
Sun
,
or
to
govern
the
motions
of
the
Moon
and
Stars
;
as
to
confer
the
power
of
reason
,
or
inable
the
soul
to
think
,
to
understand
,
to
deliberate
,
to
will
,
&c.
Yea
,
its
organs
,
some
of
them
,
are
much
more
proportionable
to
those
actions
,
than
any
of
them
unto
these
.
Which
though
a
well
habited
body
(
while
the
soul
remains
in
this
imprison'd
state
)
do
less
hinder
,
yet
how
doth
it
help
?
and
that
it
might
perform
these
acts
without
bodily
organs
,
is
much
more
apprehensible
than
how
they
can
properly
be
said
to
be
performed
by
them
.
And
that
,
though
they
are
done
in
the
body
,
they
would
be
done
much
better
out
of
it
.
But
shall
it
be
granted
that
these
soul-constituting
Atoms
till
they
be
(
or
otherwise
than
as
they
are
)
united
with
a
duly
organiz'd
body
,
are
utterly
destitute
of
any
reasoning
or
intelligent
power
?
or
are
they
,
by
themselves
,
apart
from
this
grosser
body
irrational
?
If
this
be
not
granted
,
the
thing
we
intend
must
be
argued
out
.
Either
then
they
are
,
or
they
are
not
.
If
the
latter
be
said
,
Then
they
have
it
of
themselves
,
without
dependance
on
the
organiz'd
body
;
and
so
we
are
fairly
agreed
to
quit
that
pretence
,
without
more
ado
,
of
their
partaking
reason
from
thence
.
And
are
only
left
to
weigh
over
again
what
hath
been
already
said
to
evince
the
contrary
,
that
is
,
how
manifestly
absurd
it
is
,
to
imagine
that
particles
of
matter
by
their
peculiar
size
,
or
weight
,
or
shape
,
or
motion
,
or
all
of
these
together
,
and
that
whether
single
or
associated
,
should
be
capable
of
reasoning
.
If
the
former
be
the
thing
which
is
resolv'd
to
be
stuck
to
,
that
is
,
that
they
are
of
themselves
irrational
,
but
they
become
reasonable
by
their
being
united
in
such
a
prepared
and
organized
body
.
This
requires
to
be
a
little
further
considered
:
And
to
this
purpose
it
is
necessary
to
obviate
a
pittiful
shift
that
it
is
possible
some
may
think
fit
to
use
for
the
avoiding
the
force
of
this
dilemma
,
and
may
rely
upon
as
a
ground
why
they
may
judge
this
choice
the
more
secure
;
that
is
,
that
they
say
they
are
rational
by
dependance
on
the
body
they
animate
;
because
they
are
only
found
so
united
with
one
another
there
;
that
there
,
they
have
the
first
coalition
;
there
,
they
are
severed
from
such
as
serve
not
this
turn
;
there
,
they
are
pent
in
and
held
together
as
long
as
its
due
temperament
lasts
;
which
when
it
fails
they
are
dissipated
,
and
so
lose
their
great
advantage
for
the
acts
of
reason
which
they
had
in
such
a
body
.
What
pleasure
soever
this
may
yield
,
it
will
soon
appear
it
does
them
little
service
.
For
it
only
implies
that
they
have
their
rationality
of
themselves
,
so
be
it
that
they
were
together
;
and
not
immediately
from
the
body
,
or
any
otherwise
than
that
they
are
somewhat
beholding
to
it
,
for
a
fair
occasion
of
being
together
;
as
if
it
were
else
an
unlawful
assembly
;
or
that
they
knew
not
otherwise
how
to
meet
and
hold
together
.
They
will
not
say
that
the
body
gives
them
being
,
for
they
are
eternal
,
and
self-subsisting
,
as
they
will
have
it
.
Yea
&
of
themselves
(
though
the
case
be
otherwise
with
the
Cartesian
particles
)
undiminishable
as
to
their
size
,
and
,
as
to
their
figure
and
weight
,
unalterable
.
So
that
they
have
neither
their
littleness
,
their
roundness
,
nor
their
lightness
from
the
body
,
but
only
their
so
happy
meeting
.
Admit
this
,
and
only
suppose
them
to
be
met
out
of
the
body
.
And
why
may
not
this
be
thought
supposable
?
If
they
be
not
rational
till
they
be
met
,
they
cannot
have
wit
enough
to
scruple
meeting
,
at
least
,
somewhere
else
than
in
the
body
.
And
who
knows
but
such
a
chance
may
happen
;
As
great
as
this
are
by
these
persons
supposed
to
have
happened
before
the
world
could
have
come
to
this
pass
it
is
now
at
,
who
can
tell
but
such
a
number
of
the
same
sort
of
Atoms
(
it
being
natural
for
things
so
much
of
a
complexion
and
temper
to
associate
and
find
out
another
)
might
ignorantly
,
and
thinking
no
harm
come
together
?
And
having
done
so
,
why
might
they
not
keep
together
?
Do
they
need
to
be
pent
in
?
How
are
they
pent
in
whilst
in
the
body
?
If
they
be
dispos'd
,
they
have
ways
enough
to
get
out
.
And
if
they
must
needs
be
inclin'd
to
scatter
when
the
crasis
of
the
body
fails
,
surely
a
way
might
be
found
to
hem
them
in
,
if
that
be
all
;
at
the
time
of
expiration
more
tightly
and
closely
than
they
could
be
in
the
body
.
And
what
reason
can
be
devised
why
being
become
rational
by
their
having
been
assembled
in
the
body
,
they
may
not
agree
to
hold
together
,
and
do
so
in
spite
of
fate
,
or
maugre
all
ordinary
accidents
,
when
they
find
it
convenient
to
leave
it
.
And
then
upon
these
no-way
impossible
suppositions
(
according
to
their
principles
,
so
far
as
can
be
understood
,
with
whom
we
have
to
do
)
will
they
now
be
rational
out
of
the
body
?
Being
still
endowed
(
as
they
cannot
but
be
)
with
the
same
high
priviledges
of
being
little
,
round
,
and
light
,
and
being
still
also
together
;
and
somewhat
more
,
it
may
be
,
at
liberty
,
to
roll
and
tumble
,
and
mingle
with
one
another
,
than
in
the
body
?
If
it
be
now
affirmed
they
will
in
this
case
be
rational
,
at
least
as
long
as
they
hold
together
,
then
we
are
but
where
we
were
.
And
this
shift
hath
but
diverted
us
a
little
,
but
so
as
it
was
easie
to
bring
the
matter
,
again
,
about
,
to
the
same
point
we
were
at
before
.
Wherefore
the
shelter
of
the
body
being
thus
quite
again
forsaken
,
this
poor
expulsed
crew
,
of
dislodging
Atoms
are
exposed
to
fight
,
in
the
open
air
,
for
their
rationality
,
against
all
that
was
said
before
.
But
if
this
refuge
and
sanctuary
of
the
body
be
not
meerly
pretended
to
,
but
really
and
plainly
trusted
in
and
stuck
to
.
Then
are
we
sincerely
and
honestly
to
consider
what
a
body
so
variously
organiz'd
can
do
,
to
make
such
a
party
of
Atoms
(
that
of
themselves
are
not
so
,
singly
,
nor
together
)
become
rational
.
And
surely
if
the
cause
were
not
saved
before
,
it
is
now
deplorate
and
lost
without
remedy
.
For
what
do
they
find
here
that
can
thus
beyond
all
expectation
improve
them
to
so
high
an
excellency
?
Is
it
flesh
,
or
bloud
,
or
bones
that
puts
this
stamp
upon
them
?
Think
,
what
is
the
substance
of
the
nobler
parts
,
the
liver
,
or
heart
,
or
brain
,
that
they
should
turn
these
,
before
,
rational
Atoms
,
when
they
fall
into
them
,
into
irrational
,
any
more
than
if
they
were
well
soak'd
in
a
quagmire
,
or
did
insinuate
themselves
into
a
piece
of
soft
dough
?
But
here
they
meet
with
a
benign
and
kindly
heat
and
warmth
which
comfortably
fosters
and
cherishes
them
,
till
at
length
it
hath
hatched
them
into
rational
.
But
methinks
they
should
be
warm
enough
of
themselves
,
since
they
are
supposed
so
much
to
resemble
fire
.
And
however
,
wherein
do
we
find
a
flame
of
fire
more
rational
than
a
piece
of
ice
?
Yea
,
but
here
they
find
a
due
temper
of
moisture
as
well
as
heat
.
And
that
surely
doth
not
signifie
much
;
for
if
the
common
maxim
be
true
,
that
the
dry
soul
is
the
wisest
,
they
might
have
been
much
wiser
if
they
had
kept
themselves
out
of
the
body
.
And
since
its
necessary
the
soul
should
consist
of
that
peculiar
sort
of
Atoms
before
describ'd
;
and
the
organical
body
(
which
must
be
said
for
distinction
sake
,
the
soul
being
all
this
while
supposed
a
body
also
)
consists
of
Atoms
too
,
that
are
of
a
much
courser
alloy
,
methinks
a
mixture
should
not
be
necessary
,
but
an
hinderance
and
great
debasement
rather
to
this
rational
composition
,
Besides
that
it
cannot
be
understood
,
if
it
were
necessary
these
Atoms
should
receive
any
tincture
from
the
body
in
order
to
their
being
rational
,
what
they
can
receive
,
or
how
they
can
receive
any
thing
.
They
have
not
pores
that
can
admit
an
adventitious
moisture
though
it
were
of
the
divinest
nectar
,
and
the
body
could
never
so
plentifully
furnish
them
with
it
.
Wherein
then
lies
the
great
advantage
these
Atoms
have
by
being
in
the
body
to
their
commencing
rational
?
If
there
be
such
advantage
,
why
can
it
not
be
understood
?
why
is
it
not
assigned
?
why
should
we
further
spend
our
guesses
what
may
possibly
be
said
?
But
yet
,
may
not
much
be
attributed
to
the
convenient
and
well
fenced
cavity
of
the
brains
receptacle
,
or
the
more
secret
chambers
within
that
?
where
the
studious
Atoms
may
be
very
private
and
free
from
disturbance
?
Yet
sure
it
is
hard
to
say
,
why
they
that
are
wont
to
do
it
here
,
might
not
as
well
philosophize
in
some
well-chosen
cavern
or
hole
of
a
Rock
;
nor
were
it
impossible
to
provide
them
there
,
of
as
soft
a
bed
.
And
yet
would
it
not
be
some
relief
to
speak
of
the
fine
slender
pipes
,
winding
to
and
fro
,
wherein
they
may
be
conveyed
,
so
conveniently
,
from
place
to
place
;
that
if
they
do
not
fall
into
a
reasoning
humour
in
one
place
,
they
may
in
another
?
why
what
can
this
do
?
It
seems
somewhat
like
Balaam's
project
to
get
into
a
vein
of
incantation
by
changing
stations
.
And
transplace
them
as
you
will
,
it
requires
more
magick
than
ever
he
was
master
of
,
to
make
those
innocent
harmless
things
masters
of
reason
.
For
do
but
consider
,
what
if
you
had
a
large
phial
capable
of
as
great
a
quantity
as
you
can
think
needful
,
of
very
fine
particles
,
and
,
replenish'd
with
them
,
closely
stopt
,
and
well
luted
;
suppose
these
as
pure
and
fit
for
the
purpose
as
you
can
imagine
,
only
not
yet
rational
;
will
their
faring
to
and
fro
through
very
close
and
stanch
tubes
from
one
such
receptacle
to
another
,
make
them
at
last
become
so
?
It
seems
then
,
do
what
you
will
with
them
,
toss
and
tumble
them
hither
and
thither
,
rack
them
from
vessel
to
vessel
,
try
what
methods
you
can
devise
of
sublimation
or
improvement
,
every
thing
looks
like
a
vain
and
hopeless
essay
.
For
indeed
,
do
what
you
please
or
can
think
of
,
they
are
such
immutable
entities
,
you
can
never
make
them
less
or
finer
than
they
originally
were
:
And
rational
they
were
not
before
their
meeting
in
the
body
;
wherefore
it
were
a
strange
wonder
if
that
should
so
far
alter
the
case
with
them
,
that
they
should
become
rational
by
it
.
And
now
,
I
must
,
upon
the
whole
profess
no
God
to
worship
,
would
certainly
justifie
as
sharp
ironies
,
as
the
Prophet
Elijah
bestows
upon
them
who
worshipped
Baal
,
instead
of
the
true
God
.
Nor
is
any
thing
here
said
intended
as
a
reflection
on
such
as
being
unfurnished
with
a
natural
capacity
of
matter
;
or
if
they
think
the
acts
and
power
of
reason
in
man
altogether
unnatural
to
him
.
Yet
they
do
in
effect
the
more
befriend
the
cause
we
are
pleading
for
(
as
much
as
it
can
be
befriended
by
a
mis-apprehension
;
which
yet
is
a
thing
of
that
untoward
genius
,
and
doth
so
ill
consort
with
truth
,
that
it
's
never
admitted
as
a
friend
in
any
one
in
respect
,
but
it
repays
it
with
a
mischievous
revenge
in
some
other
,
as
might
many
ways
be
shewn
in
this
instance
,
if
it
were
within
the
compass
of
our
present
design
.
)
It
being
evident
that
if
any
portion
of
matter
shall
indeed
be
certainly
found
the
actual
subject
of
such
powers
,
and
to
have
such
operations
belonging
to
it
,
there
is
the
plainer
and
more
undeniable
necessity
and
demonstration
of
his
power
and
wisdom
,
who
can
make
any
thing
of
any
thing
,
and
who
shall
then
have
done
that
which
is
so
altogether
impossible
,
except
to
him
to
whom
all
things
are
possible
.
There
is
the
more
manifest
need
of
his
hand
to
heighten
dull
matter
to
a
qualifiedness
for
performances
so
much
above
its
nature
;
To
make
the
loose
and
independent
parts
of
so
fluid
matter
cohere
and
hold
together
,
that
,
if
it
were
once
made
capable
of
knowledge
,
and
the
actual
subject
of
it
;
whatsoever
notions
were
imprest
thereon
,
might
not
be
in
a
moment
confounded
and
lost
.
As
indeed
they
could
not
but
be
if
the
particles
of
matter
were
the
immediate
seat
of
reason
;
and
so
steady
a
hand
did
not
hold
them
in
a
setled
composure
,
that
they
be
not
disordered
,
and
men
have
,
thence
,
the
necessity
of
beginning
afresh
to
know
any
thing
every
hour
of
the
day
.
Though
yet
it
seems
a
great
deal
more
reasonable
to
suppose
the
souls
of
men
to
be
of
a
substance
in
it self
more
consistent
;
and
more
agreeable
to
our
experience
,
who
find
a
continual
ebbing
and
flowing
of
spirits
,
without
being
sensible
of
any
so
notable
and
sudden
changes
in
our
knowledge
,
as
we
could
not
but
thereupon
observe
in
our selves
,
if
they
,
or
any
as
fluid
finer
matter
,
were
the
immediate
subjects
of
it
.
It
is
therefore
however
sufficiently
evident
,
and
out
of
question
that
the
humane
soul
(
be
its
own
substance
what
it
will
)
must
have
an
efficient
divers
from
matter
,
which
it
was
our
present
intendment
to
evince
.
And
so
our
way
is
clear
to
proceed
to
.
The
second
enquiry
whether
it
be
not
also
manifest
from
the
powers
and
operations
which
intelligent
efficient
?
That
is
since
we
find
and
are
assured
that
there
is
a
sort
of
Being
in
the
world
(
yea
somewhat
of
our selves
,
and
that
hath
best
right
of
any
thing
else
about
us
to
be
called
our selves
)
that
can
think
,
understand
,
deliberate
,
argue
,
&c.
And
which
we
can
most
certainly
assure
our selves
(
whether
it
were
pre-existent
in
any
former
state
or
no
)
is
not
an
independent
or
uncaused
Being
;
and
hath
therefore
been
the
effect
of
some
cause
,
whether
it
be
not
apparently
the
effect
of
a
wise
Cause
.
And
this
upon
supposition
of
what
hath
been
before
proved
seems
not
liable
to
any
the
least
rational
doubt
.
For
it
is
already
apparent
that
it
is
not
it self
matter
;
and
if
it
were
,
it
is
however
the
more
apparent
,
that
its
cause
is
not
matter
.
Inasmuch
as
if
it
be
it self
matter
,
its
powers
and
operations
are
so
much
above
the
natural
capacity
of
matter
,
as
that
it
must
have
had
a
cause
so
much
more
noble
,
and
of
a
more
perfect
nature
than
that
,
as
to
be
able
to
raise
and
improve
it
beyond
the
natural
capacity
of
matter
:
which
it
was
impossible
for
that
it self
,
to
do
.
Whence
it
is
plain
,
it
must
have
a
cause
divers
from
matter
.
Wherefore
this
its
immaterial
cause
must
either
be
wise
and
intelligent
,
or
not
so
.
But
is
it
possible
any
man
should
ever
be
guilty
of
a
greater
absurdity
than
to
acknowledge
,
some
certain
immaterial
Agent
destitute
of
Wisdom
,
the
only
cause
and
fountain
of
all
that
wisdom
,
that
is
,
or
hath
ever
been
in
the
whole
race
of
mankind
.
That
is
as
much
as
to
say
that
all
the
wisdom
of
mankind
hath
been
caused
without
a
cause
.
For
it
is
the
same
thing
after
we
have
acknowledged
any
thing
to
be
caused
,
to
say
it
was
caused
by
no
cause
,
as
to
say
it
was
caused
by
such
a
cause
as
hath
nothing
of
that
in
it
,
whereof
we
find
somewhat
to
be
in
the
effect
.
Nor
can
it
avail
any
thing
,
to
speak
of
the
disproportion
or
superiour
excellency
in
some
effects
to
their
second
,
or
to
their
only
partial
causes
.
As
that
there
are
sometimes
learned
children
of
unlearned
parents
.
For
who
did
ever
,
in
that
case
,
say
the
parents
were
the
productive
causes
of
that
learning
?
or
of
them
as
they
were
learned
?
Sure
that
learning
comes
from
some
other
cause
.
But
shall
it
then
be
said
the
souls
of
men
have
received
their
being
from
some
such
immaterial
Agent
destitute
of
wisdom
;
and
afterward
their
wisdom
and
intellectual
ability
came
some
other
way
;
by
their
own
observation
,
or
by
institution
and
precept
from
others
?
whence
then
came
their
capacity
of
observing
,
or
of
receiving
such
instruction
?
Can
any
thing
naturally
destitute
even
of
seminal
reason
(
as
we
may
call
it
)
or
of
any
aptitude
or
capacity
tending
thereto
,
ever
be
able
to
make
observations
,
or
receive
instructions
,
whereby
at
length
it
may
become
rational
?
And
is
not
that
capacity
of
the
soul
of
man
a
real
something
?
or
is
there
no
difference
between
being
capable
of
reason
and
uncapable
?
what
then
,
did
this
real
something
proceed
from
nothing
?
or
was
the
soul
it self
caused
,
and
this
its
capacity
uncaused
?
or
was
its
cause
only
capable
of
intellectual
perfection
,
but
not
actually
furnished
therewith
?
But
if
it
were
only
capable
,
surely
its
advantages
for
the
actual
attainment
thereof
have
been
much
greater
than
ours
.
Whence
it
were
strange
if
that
capacity
should
never
have
come
into
act
.
And
more
strange
that
we
should
know
or
have
any
ground
to
pretend
that
it
hath
not
.
But
that
there
was
an
actual
exercise
of
wisdom
in
the
production
of
the
reasonable
soul
is
most
evident
.
For
is
it
a
necessary
being
?
that
we
have
proved
it
is
not
.
It
is
therefore
a
contingent
,
and
its
being
depended
on
a
free
cause
,
into
whose
pleasure
,
only
,
it
was
resolvable
,
that
it
should
be
or
not
be
.
And
which
therefore
had
a
dominion
over
its
own
acts
.
If
this
bespeak
not
an
intelligent
Agent
,
what
doth
?
And
though
this
might
also
be
said
concerning
every
thing
else
which
is
not
necessarily
;
and
so
might
yield
a
more
general
argument
to
evince
a
free
designing
cause
;
yet
it
concludes
with
greater
evidence
concerning
the
reasonable
soul
;
whose
powers
and
operations
it
is
so
manifestly
impossible
should
have
proceeded
from
matter
.
And
therefore
even
that
vain
(
and
refuted
)
pretence
it self
,
that
other
things
might
,
by
the
necessary
laws
of
its
motion
,
become
what
they
are
,
can
have
less
place
here
.
Whence
it
is
more
apparent
that
the
reasonable
soul
must
have
had
a
free
and
intelligent
cause
that
used
liberty
and
counsel
in
determining
that
it
should
be
,
and
especially
that
it
should
be
such
a
sort
of
thing
as
we
find
it
is
.
For
when
we
see
how
aptly
its
powers
and
faculties
serve
for
their
proper
and
peculiar
operations
,
who
that
is
not
besides
himself
can
think
that
such
a
thing
was
made
by
one
that
knew
not
what
he
was
doing
?
or
that
such
powers
were
not
given
on
purpose
for
such
operations
?
And
what
is
the
capacity
but
a
power
that
should
sometime
be
reduced
into
act
,
and
arrive
to
the
exercise
of
reason
it self
?
Now
was
it
possible
any
thing
should
give
that
power
that
had
it
not
any
way
?
that
is
in
the
same
kind
,
or
in
some
more
excellent
and
noble
kind
?
For
we
contend
not
that
this
Agent
whereof
we
speak
is
in
the
strict
and
proper
sense
rational
,
taking
that
term
to
import
an
ability
or
faculty
of
inferring
what
is
less
known
from
what
is
more
.
For
we
suppose
all
things
equally
known
to
him
(
which
so
far
as
is
requisite
to
our
present
design
that
is
the
representing
him
the
proper
object
of
Religion
,
or
of
that
honour
which
the
dedication
of
a
Temple
to
him
imports
,
we
may
in
due
time
come
more
expresly
to
assert
.
)
And
that
the
knowledge
,
which
is
,
with
us
,
the
end
of
reasoning
,
is
in
him
,
in
its
highest
perfection
without
being
at
all
beholden
to
that
means
;
that
all
the
connexion
of
things
with
one
another
lie
open
to
one
comprehensive
view
;
and
are
known
to
be
connected
;
but
not
because
they
are
so
.
We
say
,
is
it
conceivable
that
mans
knowing
power
should
proceed
from
a
cause
that
hath
it
not
,
in
the
same
,
or
this
more
perfect
kind
?
And
may
use
those
words
to
this
purpose
,
not
for
their
authority
(
which
we
expect
not
should
be
here
significant
)
but
the
convincing
evidence
they
carry
with
them
,
He
that
teacheth
man
knowledge
,
shall
not
he
know
?
That
we
may
derive
this
matter
to
an
issue
,
't
is
evident
,
the
soul
of
man
is
not
a
necessary
self-originate
thing
:
And
had
therefore
some
cause
.
We
find
it
to
have
knowledge
,
or
the
power
of
knowing
belonging
to
it
.
Therefore
we
say
,
so
had
its
cause
.
We
rely
not
here
upon
the
credit
of
vulgar
maxims
(
whereof
divers
might
be
mentioned
)
but
the
reason
of
them
;
or
of
the
thing
it self
we
alledge
.
And
do
now
speak
of
the
whole
entire
cause
of
this
being
,
the
humane
soul
,
or
of
whatsoever
is
causal
of
it
;
or
of
any
perfection
naturally
appertaining
to
it
.
It
is
of
an
intelligent
nature
.
Did
this
intelligent
nature
proceed
from
an
unintelligent
,
as
the
whole
and
only
cause
of
it
?
That
were
to
speak
against
our
own
eyes
,
and
most
natural
common
sentiments
.
And
were
the
same
thing
as
to
say
that
something
came
of
nothing
.
For
it
is
all
one
to
say
so
,
and
to
say
that
any
thing
communicated
what
it
had
not
to
communicate
.
Or
(
which
is
alike
madly
absurd
)
to
say
that
the
same
thing
was
such
and
not
such
,
intelligent
and
not
intelligent
,
able
to
communicate
an
intelligent
nature
(
for
sure
what
it
doth
it
is
able
to
do
)
and
not
able
(
for
it
is
not
able
to
communicate
what
it
hath
not
)
at
the
same
time
.
It
is
hardly
here
,
worth
the
while
to
spend
time
in
countermining
that
contemptible
Refuge
(
which
is
as
uncapable
of
offending
us
,
as
of
being
defended
)
that
humane
souls
may
perhaps
only
have
proceeded
in
the
ordinary
course
of
Generation
from
one
another
.
For
that
none
have
ever
said
any
thing
to
that
purpose
,
deserving
a
confutation
except
that
some
sober
and
pious
persons
,
for
the
avoiding
of
some
other
difficulties
,
have
thought
it
more
safe
to
assert
the
traduction
of
humane
souls
;
who
yet
were
far
enough
from
imagining
that
they
could
be
total
,
or
first
causes
to
one
another
:
And
doubted
not
but
they
had
the
constant
necessary
assistance
of
that
same
Being
we
are
pleading
for
,
acting
in
his
own
sphere
as
the
first
cause
in
all
such
(
as
well
as
any
other
)
productions
.
Wherein
they
nothing
oppose
the
main
design
of
this
discourse
.
And
therefore
it
is
not
in
our
way
to
offer
at
any
opposition
unto
them
.
But
if
any
have
a
mind
to
indulge
themselves
the
liberty
of
so
much
dotage
as
to
say
the
souls
of
men
were
first
and
only
causes
to
one
another
.
Either
they
must
suppose
them
to
be
material
beings
.
And
then
we
refer
them
to
what
hath
been
already
said
,
shewing
that
their
powers
and
operations
cannot
belong
to
matter
,
nor
arise
from
it
.
Or
immaterial
,
and
then
,
they
cannot
produce
one
another
in
the
way
of
generation
.
For
of
what
pre-existent
substance
are
they
made
?
Theirs
who
beget
them
?
of
that
they
can
part
with
nothing
,
separability
,
at
least
,
of
parts
being
a
most
confessed
property
of
matter
.
Or
some
other
?
where
will
they
find
that
other
spiritual
subsubstance
,
that
belong'd
not
inseparably
to
some
individual
being
before
.
And
besides
,
if
it
were
pre-existent
,
as
it
must
be
if
a
soul
be
generated
out
of
it
,
then
they
were
not
the
first
and
only
causes
of
this
production
.
And
in
another
way
than
that
of
generation
,
how
will
any
go
about
to
make
a
soul
?
Let
experience
and
the
making
of
trial
convince
the
undertakers
.
By
what
power
,
or
by
what
art
will
they
make
a
reasonable
soul
spring
up
out
of
nothing
?
It
might
be
hoped
that
thus
,
without
disputing
the
possibility
of
an
eternal
successive
production
of
souls
,
this
shift
may
appear
vain
.
But
if
any
will
persist
and
say
that
how
or
in
what
way
soever
they
are
produc'd
;
'T
is
strange
if
they
need
any
nobler
cause
than
themselves
;
for
may
not
any
living
thing
well
enough
be
thought
capable
of
producing
another
of
the
same
kind
?
or
no
more
than
equal
perfection
with
it self
?
To
this
we
say
,
besides
that
no
one
living
thing
is
the
only
cause
of
another
such
.
Yet
if
that
were
admitted
possible
what
will
it
avail
?
For
hath
every
soul
that
hath
ever
existed
or
been
in
being
been
produced
in
this
way
by
another
?
This
it
were
ridiculous
to
say
;
for
if
every
one
were
so
produced
,
there
was
then
some
one
before
every
one
.
Inasmuch
as
that
which
produces
must
surely
have
been
before
that
which
is
produced
by
it
.
But
how
can
every
one
have
one
before
it
?
A
manifest
contradiction
in
the
very
terms
!
For
then
there
will
be
one
without
the
compass
of
every
one
,
And
how
is
it
then
said
to
be
every
one
?
There
is
then
it
seems
one
,
besides
or
more
than
all
.
And
so
all
is
not
all
.
And
if
this
be
thought
a
sophism
,
let
the
matter
be
soberly
considered
thus
.
The
soul
of
man
is
either
a
thing
of
that
nature
universally
(
and
consequently
every
individual
soul
)
as
that
it
doth
exist
of
it self
necessarily
and
independently
,
or
not
?
If
it
be
.
Then
we
have
however
a
wise
intelligent
being
necessarily
existing
.
The
thing
we
have
been
proving
all
this
while
.
Yet
this
concession
we
will
not
accept
,
for
though
it
is
most
certain
there
is
such
a
being
,
we
have
also
proved
the
humane
soul
is
not
it
.
Whence
it
is
evidently
a
dependent
being
in
its
own
nature
that
could
never
have
been
of
it self
,
had
it
not
been
put
into
being
by
somewhat
else
.
And
being
so
in
its
own
nature
,
it
must
be
thus
with
every
one
that
partakes
of
this
nature
.
And
consequently
it
must
be
somewhat
of
another
nature
that
did
put
the
souls
of
men
into
being
.
Otherwise
the
whole
stock
and
lineage
of
humane
souls
is
said
to
have
been
dependent
on
a
productive
cause
,
and
yet
had
nothing
whereon
to
depend
,
And
so
is
both
caused
by
another
,
and
not
caused
.
And
therefore
since
it
is
hereby
evident
it
was
somewhat
else
,
and
of
another
nature
,
than
an
humane
soul
by
which
all
humane
souls
were
produced
into
being
.
We
again
say
,
that
distinct
Being
either
was
a
dependent
caused
Being
,
or
not
.
If
not
,
it
being
proved
that
the
soul
of
man
cannot
but
have
had
an
intelligent
or
wise
cause
,
we
have
now
what
we
seek
.
An
independent
necessary
intelligent
Being
.
If
it
do
depend
,
or
any
will
be
so
idle
to
say
so
.
That
however
will
infallibly
and
very
speedily
lead
us
to
the
same
mark
.
For
though
some
have
been
pleased
to
dream
of
an
infinite
succession
of
individuals
of
this
or
that
kind
;
I
suppose
we
have
no
dream
as
yet
ready
formed
to
come
under
confutation
of
infinite
kinds
or
orders
of
beings
gradually
superiour
,
one
above
another
;
the
inferiour
still
depending
on
the
superiour
,
and
all
upon
nothing
.
And
therefore
I
conceive
we
may
fairly
take
leave
of
this
argument
from
the
humane
soul
,
as
having
gained
from
it
sufficient
evidence
of
the
existence
of
a
necessary
Being
that
is
intelligent
and
designingly
active
,
being
guided
by
wisdom
and
counsel
in
what
it
doth
.
We
might
also
,
if
it
were
needful
further
argue
the
same
thing
from
a
power
or
ability
manifestly
superiour
to
,
and
that
exceeds
the
utmost
perfection
of
humane
nature
,
viz.
that
of
Prophesie
,
or
the
prediction
of
future
contingencies
;
yea
,
and
from
another
that
exceeds
the
whole
sphere
of
all
created
nature
,
and
which
crosses
and
countermands
the
known
and
stated
laws
thereof
,
viz.
that
of
working
miracles
;
both
of
them
exercised
with
manifest
design
;
as
might
evidently
be
made
appear
,
by
manifold
instances
,
to
as
many
,
as
can
believe
any
thing
to
be
true
;
more
than
what
they
have
seen
with
their
own
eyes
.
And
that
do
not
take
present
sense
(
yea
and
their
own
only
)
to
be
the
alone
measure
of
all
reality
.
But
it
is
not
necessary
we
insist
upon
every
thing
that
may
be
said
;
so
that
enough
be
said
to
serve
our
present
purpose
.
And
that
our
purpose
may
yet
be
more
fully
served
;
and
such
a
Being
evidenced
to
exist
as
9.
The
Divine
Goodness
;
for
unto
that
eternal
Being
,
whose
existence
we
have
hitherto
asserted
,
Goodness
also
cannot
but
appertain
together
with
those
his
other
Attributes
we
have
spoken
of
.
It
is
not
needful
here
to
be
curious
about
the
usual
scholastical
notions
of
Goodness
,
or
what
it
imports
,
as
it
is
wont
to
be
attributed
to
Being
in
the
general
,
what
,
as
it
belongs
,
in
a
peculiar
sense
,
to
intellectual
Beings
,
or
what
more
special
import
it
may
have
in
reference
to
this
.
That
which
we
at
present
chiefly
intend
by
it
is
a
propension
to
do
good
with
delight
;
or
most
freely
without
other
inducement
,
than
the
agreeableness
of
it
to
his
nature
who
doth
it
;
and
a
certain
delectation
and
complacency
,
which
,
hence
,
is
taken
in
so
doing
.
The
name
of
Goodness
(
though
thus
it
more
peculiarly
signifie
the
particular
virtue
of
liberality
)
is
of
a
significancy
large
enough
,
even
in
the
moral
acceptation
,
to
comprehend
all
other
perfections
or
vertues
,
that
belong
to
,
or
may
any
way
commend
the
will
of
a
free
Agent
.
These
therefore
we
exclude
not
;
and
particularly
whatsoever
is
wont
to
be
signified
(
as
attributable
unto
God
)
by
the
names
of
Holiness
[
as
a
steady
inclination
unto
what
is
intellectually
pure
,
and
comely
,
with
an
aversion
to
the
contrary
]
Justice
as
that
signifies
[
an
inclination
to
deal
equally
]
which
is
included
in
the
former
,
yet
as
more
expresly
denoting
what
is
more
proper
to
a
Governour
over
others
,
viz.
[
a
resolution
not
to
let
the
transgression
of
laws
made
for
the
preservation
of
common
order
,
pass
without
due
animadversion
and
punishment
:
]
Truth
,
whose
signification
also
may
be
wholly
contained
under
those
former
more
general
terms
,
but
more
directly
contains
[
sincerity
,
unaptness
to
deceive
,
and
constancy
to
ones
word
.
]
For
these
may
properly
be
stiled
good
things
in
a
moral
sense
.
As
many
other
things
might
in
another
notion
of
goodness
,
which
it
belongs
not
to
our
present
design
to
make
mention
of
.
But
these
are
mentioned
as
more
directly
tending
to
represent
to
us
an
amiable
object
of
Religion
.
And
are
referr'd
hither
,
as
they
fitly
enough
may
,
out
of
an
unwillingness
to
multiply
without
necessity
,
particular
heads
or
subjects
of
discourse
.
In
the
mean
time
,
as
was
said
,
what
we
principally
intend
,
is
,
That
the
Being
whose
existence
we
have
been
endeavouring
to
evince
is
good
,
as
that
imports
a
ready
inclination
of
will
to
communicate
unto
others
what
may
be
good
to
them
;
creating
first
its
own
object
,
and
then
issuing
forth
to
it
in
acts
of
free
beneficence
,
sutable
to
the
nature
of
every
thing
created
by
it
.
Which
though
it
be
the
primary
or
first
thing
carried
in
the
notion
of
this
goodness
.
Yet
because
that
inclination
is
not
otherwise
good
,
than
as
it
consists
with
holiness
,
justice
and
Truth
;
These
therefore
may
be
esteemed
secondarily
,
at
least
,
to
belong
to
it
,
as
inseparable
qualifications
thereof
.
Wherefore
it
is
not
a
meerly
natural
,
and
necessary
emanation
we
here
intend
,
that
prevents
any
act
or
exercise
of
counsel
or
design
;
which
would
no
way
consist
with
the
liberty
of
the
Divine
will
:
And
would
make
the
Deity
as
well
a
necessary
Agent
,
as
a
necessary
Being
;
Yea
,
and
would
therefore
make
all
the
creatures
meerly
natural
and
necessary
emanations
;
and
so
destroy
the
distinction
of
necessary
and
contingent
Beings
.
And
,
by
consequence
,
bid
fair
to
the
making
all
things
God
.
It
would
infer
not
only
the
eternity
of
the
world
,
but
would
seem
to
infer
either
the
absolute
infinity
of
it
,
or
the
perfection
of
it
,
and
of
every
creature
in
it
,
to
that
degree
,
as
that
nothing
could
be
more
perfect
in
its
own
kind
than
it
is
;
or
would
infer
the
finiteness
of
the
Divine
Being
.
For
it
would
make
what
he
hath
done
the
adequate
measure
of
what
he
can
do
.
And
would
make
all
his
administrations
necessary
,
yea
,
and
all
the
actions
of
men
,
and
consequently
take
away
all
Law
and
Government
out
of
the
world
,
and
all
measures
of
right
and
wrong
,
and
make
all
punitive
justice
barbarous
cruelty
.
And
consequently
give
us
a
notion
of
goodness
at
length
plainly
inconsistent
with
it self
.
All
this
is
provided
against
by
our
having
first
asserted
the
Wisdom
of
that
Being
,
whereunto
we
also
attribute
goodness
.
Which
guides
all
the
issues
of
it
according
to
those
measures
or
rules
which
the
essential
rectitude
of
the
Divine
will
gives
,
or
rather
is
,
unto
it
.
Whereby
also
a
foundation
is
laid
of
answering
such
cavils
against
the
Divine
Goodness
,
as
they
are
apt
to
raise
to
themselves
,
who
are
wont
to
magnifie
this
attribute
to
the
suppression
of
others
.
Which
is
indeed
,
in
the
end
,
to
magnifie
it
to
nothing
.
And
such
goodness
needs
no
other
demonstration
than
the
visible
instances
and
effects
we
have
of
it
,
in
the
creation
and
conservation
of
this
world
;
and
particularly
,
in
his
large
munificent
bounty
and
kindness
towards
man
,
whereof
his
designing
him
for
his
Temple
,
and
residence
,
will
be
a
full
and
manifest
proof
.
And
of
all
this
,
his
own
self-sufficient
fulness
leaves
it
impossible
to
us
to
imagine
another
reason
,
than
the
delight
he
takes
in
dispensing
his
own
free
and
large
communications
.
Besides
,
that
when
we
see
some
semblances
and
imitations
of
this
goodness
▪
in
the
natures
of
some
men
,
which
we
are
sure
are
not
nothing
,
they
must
needs
proceed
from
something
,
and
have
some
fountain
and
original
,
which
can
be
no
other
than
the
common
cause
and
Author
of
all
things
.
In
whom
,
therefore
,
this
goodness
doth
firstly
and
most
perfectly
reside
.
CHAP.
IV.
Generally
all
supposable
perfection
,
asserted
of
this
Being
,
where
,
First
,
a
Being
absolutely
perfect
,
is
endeavoured
to
be
evinced
from
the
(
already
proved
)
necessary
Being
.
Which
is
shewn
to
import
,
in
the
general
,
The
utmost
fulness
of
Being
.
Also
divers
things
,
in
particular
that
tend
to
evince
that
general
.
As
that
it
is
,
at
the
remotest
distance
from
no
Being
.
Most
purely
actual
.
Most
abstracted
Being
.
The
productive
and
conserving
cause
of
all
things
else
.
Undiminishable
.
Uncapable
of
addition
.
Secondly
,
hence
is
more
expresly
deduced
the
infiniteness
of
this
Being
.
An
enquiry
whether
it
be
possible
the
Creature
can
be
actually
infinite
?
Difficulties
concerning
the
absolute
fulness
,
and
Infiniteness
of
God
considered
.
2.
The
onliness
of
his
Being
.
The
Trinity
not
thereby
excluded
.
SOme
account
hath
been
thus
far
given
of
that
notion
of
this
Being
,
which
was
at
first
laid
down
.
And
more
largely
,
what
hath
been
more
oppos'd
,
by
persons
of
an
atheistical
or
irreligious
temper
.
But
,
because
in
that
forementioned
account
of
God
,
there
was
added
to
the
particulars
there
enumerated
(
out
of
a
just
consciousness
of
humane
inability
to
comprehend
every
thing
that
may
possibly
belong
to
him
)
this
general
suppliment
.
[
That
all
other
supposable
excellencies
whatsoever
do
in
the
highest
perfection
appertain
also
originally
,
unto
this
Being
]
It
is
requisite
that
somewhat
be
said
concerning
this
addition
.
Especially
in
as
much
as
it
comprehends
in
it
,
or
may
infer
,
somethings
(
not
yet
expresly
mentioned
)
which
may
be
thought
necessary
to
the
evincing
the
reasonableness
of
Religion
,
or
our
self-dedication
as
a
Temple
to
him
.
For
instance
,
it
may
possibly
be
alledged
,
that
,
if
it
were
admitted
there
is
somewhat
that
is
eternal
,
uncaused
,
independent
,
necessarily
existent
,
that
is
self-active
,
living
,
powerful
,
wise
,
and
good
.
Yet
all
this
will
not
infer
upon
us
an
universal
obligation
to
Religion
,
unless
it
can
also
be
evinced
.
1.
That
this
Being
is
every
way
sufficient
to
supply
and
satisfie
all
our
real
wants
and
just
desires
.
2.
And
that
this
Being
is
but
one
,
and
so
that
all
be
at
a
certainty
where
their
Religion
ought
to
terminate
.
And
that
the
worship
of
every
Temple
must
concenter
and
meet
in
the
same
object
.
Now
the
eviction
of
an
absolutely
perfect
Being
would
include
each
of
these
;
and
answer
both
the
purposes
which
may
seem
hitherto
not
so
fully
satisfied
.
It
is
therefore
requisite
that
we
endeavour
First
,
to
shew
that
the
Being
hitherto
described
is
absolutely
or
every
way
perfect
.
Secondly
,
To
deduce
,
from
the
same
grounds
,
the
absolute
infinity
,
and
the
unity
(
or
the
onliness
)
thereof
.
And
for
the
former
part
of
this
undertaking
,
absolute
or
universal
perfection
,
cannot
be
pretended
to
have
been
exprest
in
any
or
in
all
the
works
of
God
together
.
Neither
in
number
,
for
ought
we
know
(
for
as
we
cannot
conceive
,
nor
consequently
speak
of
Divine
perfections
,
but
under
the
notion
of
many
,
whatsoever
their
real
identity
may
be
,
so
we
do
not
know
,
but
that
within
the
compass
of
universal
perfection
,
there
may
be
some
particular
ones
of
which
there
is
no
footstep
in
the
creation
,
and
whereof
we
have
never
formed
any
thought
.
)
Nor
(
more
certainly
)
in
degree
;
For
surely
the
world
,
and
the
particular
creatures
in
it
,
are
not
so
perfect
in
correspondence
to
those
attributes
of
its
great
Architect
which
we
have
mentioned
,
viz.
his
Power
,
Wisdom
,
and
Goodness
,
as
he
might
have
made
them
,
if
he
had
pleased
.
And
indeed
,
to
say
the
world
were
absolutely
and
universally
perfect
,
were
to
make
that
God
.
Wherefore
it
must
also
be
acknowledged
that
an
absolutely
perfect
Being
cannot
be
immediately
demonstrated
from
its
effects
,
as
whereto
they
neither
do
,
nor
is
it
within
the
capacity
of
created
nature
that
they
can
,
adequately
,
correspond
.
Whence
therefore
,
all
that
can
be
done
for
the
evincing
of
the
absolute
and
universal
perfection
of
God
,
must
be
in
some
other
way
or
method
of
discourse
.
And
though
it
be
acknowledged
that
it
cannot
be
immediately
evidenced
from
the
Creation
,
yet
it
is
to
be
hoped
that
mediately
it
may
.
For
from
thence
(
as
we
have
seen
)
a
necessary
self-originate
Being
,
such
as
hath
been
described
,
is
with
the
greatest
certainty
to
be
concluded
;
and
,
from
thence
,
if
we
attentively
consider
,
we
shall
be
led
to
an
absolutely
perfect
one
.
That
is
,
since
we
have
the
same
certainty
of
such
a
necessary
self-originate
Being
as
we
have
that
there
is
any
thing
existent
at
all
.
If
we
seriously
weigh
what
kind
of
Being
this
must
needs
be
,
or
what
its
notion
must
import
,
above
what
hath
been
already
evinced
:
We
shall
not
be
found
,
in
this
way
,
much
to
fall
short
of
our
present
aim
(
though
we
have
also
other
evidence
that
may
be
produced
in
its
own
fitter
place
.
)
Here
therefore
let
us
a
while
make
a
stand
,
and
more
distinctly
consider
how
far
we
are
already
advanced
,
that
we
may
,
with
the
better
order
and
advantage
,
make
our
further
progress
.
These
two
things
then
are
already
evident
.
[
First
,
That
there
is
a
necessary
Being
that
hath
been
eternally
of
it self
,
without
dependence
upon
any
thing
,
either
as
a
productive
or
conserving
cause
.
And
of
it self
full
of
activity
and
vital
energy
,
so
as
to
be
a
productive
and
sustaining
cause
to
other
things
.
]
Of
this
any
the
most
confused
and
indistinct
view
of
this
world
,
or
a
meer
taking
notice
,
that
there
is
any
thing
in
Being
,
that
lives
and
moves
,
and
withal
that
alters
and
changes
,
(
which
it
is
impossible
the
necessary
Being
it self
should
do
)
cannot
but
put
us
out
of
doubt
.
Secondly
,
]
That
this
necessary
self-originate
,
vital
,
active
Being
hath
very
vast
Power
,
admirable
Wisdom
,
and
most
free
and
large
goodness
belonging
to
it
.
]
And
of
this
,
our
nearer
and
more
deliberate
view
and
contemplation
of
the
world
do
equally
ascertain
us
.
For
of
these
things
we
find
the
manifest
prints
and
footsteps
in
it
.
Yea
,
we
find
the
(
derived
)
things
themselves
[
Power
,
Wisdom
,
Goodness
]
in
the
creatures
.
And
we
are
most
assured
they
have
not
sprung
from
nothing
;
nor
from
any
thing
that
had
them
not
.
And
that
which
originally
had
them
,
or
was
their
first
fountain
must
have
them
necessarily
,
and
essentially
(
together
with
whatsoever
else
belongs
to
its
Being
)
in
and
of
it self
.
So
that
the
asserting
of
any
other
necessary
being
that
is
in
it self
destitute
of
these
things
,
signifies
no
more
towards
the
giving
any
account
how
these
things
came
to
be
in
the
world
,
than
if
no
Being
,
necessarily
existing
,
were
asserted
at
all
.
We
are
therefore
,
by
the
exigency
of
the
case
it self
,
constrained
to
acknowledge
,
not
only
that
there
is
a
necessary
Being
,
but
that
there
is
such
a
one
,
as
could
be
,
and
was
the
fountain
and
cause
of
all
those
several
kinds
and
degrees
of
being
and
perfection
that
we
take
notice
of
in
the
world
besides
.
Another
sort
of
necessary
Being
should
not
only
be
asserted
to
no
purpose
,
there
being
nothing
to
be
gained
by
it
,
no
imaginable
use
to
be
made
of
it
,
as
a
principle
that
can
serve
any
valuable
end
.
(
For
suppose
such
a
thing
as
necessary
matter
,
it
will
as
hath
been
shewn
be
unalterable
;
and
therefore
another
sort
of
matter
must
be
supposed
besides
it
,
that
may
be
the
matter
of
the
universe
,
raised
up
out
of
nothing
for
that
purpose
,
unto
which
this
so
unwieldy
and
unmanagable
an
entity
can
never
serve
.
)
But
also
it
will
be
impossible
to
be
proved
.
No
man
can
be
taken
with
any
plausible
thew
of
reason
to
make
it
out
.
Yea
,
and
much
may
be
said
(
I
conceive
with
convincing
evidence
)
against
it
.
As
may
perhaps
be
seen
in
the
sequel
of
this
discourse
.
In
the
mean
time
,
that
there
is
,
however
,
a
necessary
Being
,
unto
which
all
the
perfections
,
whereof
we
have
any
foot-steps
or
resemblances
in
the
Creation
,
do
originally
and
essentially
belong
,
is
undeniably
evident
.
Now
,
that
we
may
proceed
,
what
can
felfessentiate
,
underived
,
Power
,
Wisdom
,
Goodness
be
,
but
most
perfect
Power
,
Wisdom
,
Goodness
?
Or
such
as
than
which
there
can
never
be
more
perfect
?
For
,
since
there
can
be
no
Wisdom
,
Power
,
or
Goodness
,
which
is
not
either
original
and
self-essentiate
,
or
derived
and
participated
from
thence
?
Who
sees
not
that
the
former
must
be
the
more
perfect
.
Yea
;
and
that
it
comprehended
all
the
other
(
as
what
was
from
it
)
in
it self
.
And
consequently
that
it
is
simply
the
most
perfect
?
And
the
reason
will
be
the
same
,
concerning
any
other
perfection
,
the
stamps
and
characters
whereof
we
find
signed
upon
the
creatures
.
But
that
the
Being
unto
which
these
belong
is
absolutely
and
universally
perfect
in
every
kind
,
must
be
further
evidenced
by
considering
more
at
large
the
notion
and
import
of
such
a
self-originate
necessary
Being
.
Some
indeed
,
both
more
anciently
,
[
*
](A44683-e8630-b)
*
So
that
whatever
there
is
of
strength
in
that
way
of
arguing
,
the
glory
of
it
cannot
be
without
injury
appropriated
to
the
present
age
,
much
less
to
any
particular
person
therein
:
It
having
,
since
Anselm
,
been
ventilated
by
divers
others
heretofore
D.
Scot.
Dist.
2.
Q.
2.
Th.
Aquin.
P.
1.
Q.
2
art
1.
contra
Gentil
.
l.
1.
c.
10.
Bradwarden
,
l.
1.
c.
1.
And
by
divers
of
late
,
as
is
sufficiently
known
,
some
rejecting
,
others
much
confiding
in
it
,
both
of
these
former
,
and
of
modern
Writers
.
)
and
of
late
have
inverted
this
course
;
and
from
the
supposition
of
absolute
perfection
have
gone
about
to
infer
necessity
of
existence
,
as
being
contained
in
the
Idaea
of
the
former
.
But
of
this
latter
we
are
otherwise
assured
,
upon
clearer
and
less
exceptionable
terms
.
And
being
so
,
are
to
consider
what
improvement
may
be
made
of
it
to
our
present
purpose
.
And
in
the
general
,
this
seems
manifestly
imported
in
the
notion
of
the
necessary
Being
we
have
already
evinced
,
that
it
have
in
it
(
some
way
or
other
,
in
what
way
there
will
be
occasion
to
consider
hereafter
)
the
entire
sum
and
utmost
fulness
of
Being
,
beyond
which
or
without
the
compass
whereof
,
no
perfection
is
conceivable
,
or
indeed
(
which
is
of
the
same
import
)
nothing
.
Let
it
be
observed
that
we
pretend
not
to
argue
this
from
the
bare
terms
necessary
Being
,
only
,
but
from
hence
,
that
it
is
such
,
as
we
have
found
it
.
Though
indeed
,
these
very
terms
import
not
a
little
to
this
purpose
.
For
that
which
is
necessarily
,
of
it self
,
without
being
beholden
to
any
thing
,
seems
as
good
as
all
things
,
and
to
contain
in
it self
an
immense
fulness
;
being
indigent
of
nothing
.
Nor
by
indigence
is
here
meant
cravingness
,
or
a
sense
of
want
only
,
in
opposition
whereto
,
every
good
and
virtuous
man
hath
or
may
attain
,
a
sort
of
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
or
self-fulness
and
be
satisfied
from
himself
(
which
yet
is
a
stamp
of
Divinity
,
and
a
part
of
the
image
of
God
,
or
such
a
participation
of
the
Divine
Nature
,
as
is
agreeable
to
the
state
and
condition
of
a
creature
,
)
But
we
understand
by
it
(
what
is
naturally
before
that
)
want
it self
really
,
and
not
in
opinion
(
as
the
covetous
is
said
to
be
poor
.
)
On
the
other
hand
we
here
intend
not
a
meerly
rational
(
much
less
an
imaginary
)
but
a
real
self-fulness
.
And
so
we
say
,
what
is
of
that
nature
,
that
it
is
,
and
subsists
wholly
,
and
only
of
it self
,
without
depending
on
any
other
,
must
owe
this
absoluteness
,
to
so
peculiar
an
excellency
of
its
own
nature
,
as
we
cannot
well
conceive
to
be
less
,
than
whereby
it
comprehends
in
it self
,
the
most
boundless
and
unlimited
fulness
of
Being
,
life
,
power
,
or
whatsoever
can
be
conceived
under
the
name
of
a
perfection
.
For
taking
notice
of
the
existence
of
any
thing
whatsoever
,
some
reason
must
be
assignable
,
whence
it
is
that
this
particular
Being
doth
exist
?
and
hath
such
and
such
powers
and
properties
belonging
to
it
,
as
do
occur
to
our
notice
therein
?
when
we
can
now
resolve
its
existence
into
some
cause
,
that
put
it
into
Being
,
and
made
it
what
it
is
;
we
cease
so
much
to
admire
the
thing
,
how
excellent
soever
it
be
,
and
turn
our
admiration
upon
its
cause
,
concluding
that
to
have
all
the
perfection
in
it
which
we
discern
in
the
effect
,
whatsoever
unknown
perfection
(
which
we
may
suppose
is
very
great
)
it
may
have
besides
.
And
upon
this
ground
we
are
led
,
when
we
behold
the
manifold
excellencies
that
lie
dispers'd
among
particular
Beings
,
in
this
universe
,
with
the
glory
of
the
whole
,
resulting
thence
,
to
resolve
their
existence
into
a
common
cause
,
which
we
design
by
the
name
of
God
.
And
now
considering
him
as
a
wise
Agent
,
(
which
hath
been
proved
)
and
consequently
a
free
one
,
that
acted
not
from
any
necessity
of
nature
,
but
his
meer
good
pleasure
herein
,
we
will
not
only
conclude
him
to
have
all
that
perfection
and
excellency
in
him
,
which
we
find
him
to
have
display'd
in
so
vast
and
glorious
a
work
;
but
will
readily
believe
him
(
supposing
we
have
admitted
a
conviction
concerning
what
hath
been
discoursed
before
)
to
have
a
most
unconceivable
treasure
of
hidden
excellency
and
perfection
in
him
,
that
is
not
represented
to
our
view
in
this
work
of
his
.
And
account
,
that
,
he
who
could
do
all
this
which
we
see
is
done
,
could
do
unspeakably
more
.
For
though
,
speaking
of
natural
and
necessitated
Agents
,
which
always
act
to
their
uttermost
,
it
would
be
absurd
to
argue
from
their
having
done
some
lesser
thing
,
to
their
power
of
doing
somewhat
that
is
much
greater
.
Yet
as
to
free
Agents
,
that
can
choose
their
own
act
,
and
guide
themselves
by
wisdom
and
judgment
therein
,
the
matter
is
not
so
:
As
when
some
great
Prince
bestows
a
rich
largess
upon
some
mean
person
,
especially
that
deserved
nothing
from
him
,
or
was
recommended
by
nothing
to
his
royal
favour
,
besides
his
poverty
and
misery
;
we
justly
take
it
for
a
very
significant
demonstration
of
that
princely
munificence
,
and
bounty
,
which
would
encline
him
to
do
much
greater
things
,
when
he
should
see
a
proportionable
cause
.
But
now
,
if
taking
notice
of
the
excellencies
that
appear
in
caused
Beings
,
and
enquiring
how
they
come
to
exist
and
be
what
they
are
,
we
resolve
all
into
their
cause
;
which
,
considering
as
perfectly
free
and
arbitrary
in
all
his
communications
;
We
do
thence
rationally
conclude
,
that
if
he
had
thought
fit
,
he
could
have
made
a
much
more
pompous
display
of
himself
;
and
that
there
is
in
him
,
besides
what
appears
,
a
vast
and
most
abundant
store
of
undiscovered
perfection
.
When
next
,
we
turn
our
enquiry
and
contemplation
,
more
entirely
,
upon
the
cause
.
And
bethink
our selves
:
But
how
came
he
to
exist
and
be
what
he
is
?
Finding
this
cannot
be
refunded
upon
any
superiour
cause
;
And
our
utmost
enquiry
can
admit
of
no
other
result
,
but
this
,
that
he
is
of
himself
what
he
is
.
We
will
surely
say
then
,
he
is
all
in
all
.
And
that
perfection
,
which
before
we
judged
vastly
great
,
we
will
now
conclude
alltogether
absolute
,
and
such
beyond
which
no
greater
can
be
thought
.
Adding
I
say
to
what
pre-conceptions
we
had
of
his
greatness
,
from
the
works
which
we
see
have
been
done
by
him
(
for
why
should
we
lose
any
ground
we
might
esteem
our selves
to
have
gain'd
before
?
)
the
consideration
of
of
this
necessary
self-subsistence
:
And
that
no
other
reason
is
assignable
of
his
being
what
he
is
,
but
the
peculiar
and
incommunicable
excellency
of
his
own
nature
.
Whereby
he
was
not
only
able
to
make
such
a
world
,
but
did
possess
eternally
and
invariably
in
himself
all
that
he
is
and
hath
:
We
cannot
conceive
that
all
to
be
less
than
absolutely
universal
,
and
comprehensive
of
whatsoever
can
lie
within
the
whole
compass
of
Being
.
For
when
we
find
that
among
all
other
Beings
(
which
is
most
certainly
true
not
only
of
actual
,
but
all
possible
Beings
also
)
how
perfect
soever
they
are
or
may
be
in
their
own
kinds
;
none
of
them
,
nor
all
of
them
together
,
are
,
erver
can
be
,
of
that
perfection
,
as
to
be
of
themselves
,
without
dependence
on
somewhat
else
,
as
their
productive
,
yea
and
sustaining
cause
;
we
see
,
besides
that
their
cause
hath
all
the
perfection
,
some
way
,
in
it
that
is
to
be
found
in
them
all
:
There
is
also
that
appropriate
perfection
belonging
thereto
,
that
it
could
be
;
and
eternally
is
(
yea
and
could
not
but
be
)
only
of
it self
,
by
the
underived
and
incommunicable
excellency
of
its
own
Being
.
And
surely
,
what
includes
in
it
all
the
perfection
of
all
actual
and
possible
Beings
,
besides
its
own
(
for
there
is
nothing
possible
which
some
cause
,
yea
and
even
this
,
cannot
produce
)
&
unconceivably
more
;
must
needs
be
absolutely
and
every
way
perfect
.
Of
all
which
perfections
this
is
the
radical
one
,
that
belongs
to
this
common
Cause
and
Author
of
all
things
,
that
he
is
necessarily
,
and
only
self-subsisting
.
For
if
this
high
Prerogative
in
point
of
Being
had
been
wanting
,
nothing
at
all
had
ever
been
.
Therefore
we
attribute
to
God
the
greatest
thing
that
can
be
said
or
thought
,
(
and
not
what
is
wholly
divers
from
all
other
perfection
,
but
which
contains
all
others
in
it
)
when
we
affirm
of
him
that
he
is
necessarily
of
himself
.
For
,
though
when
we
have
bewildered
and
lost
our selves
(
as
we
soon
may
)
in
the
contemplation
of
this
amazing
subject
,
we
readily
indulge
our
wearied
minds
the
case
and
liberty
of
resolving
this
high
excellency
of
self
or
necessary
existence
in
a
meer
negation
,
and
say
that
we
mean
by
it
nothing
else
,
than
that
he
was
not
from
another
:
Yet
surely
if
we
would
take
some
pains
with
our selves
,
and
keep
our
slothful
shifting
thoughts
to
some
exercise
in
this
matter
;
though
we
can
never
comprehend
that
vast
fulness
of
perfection
which
is
imported
in
it
(
for
it
were
not
what
we
plead
for
,
if
we
could
comprehend
it
.
)
Yet
we
should
soon
see
and
confess
,
that
it
contains
unspeakably
more
than
a
negation
,
even
some
great
thing
that
is
so
much
beyond
our
thoughts
,
that
we
shall
reckon
we
have
said
but
a
little
in
saying
we
cannot
conceive
it
.
And
that
,
when
we
have
stretcht
our
understandings
to
the
utmost
of
their
line
and
measure
,
though
we
may
suppose
our selves
to
have
conceived
a
great
deal
,
there
is
infinitely
more
that
we
conceive
not
.
Wherefore
that
is
a
sober
and
most
important
truth
which
is
occasionally
drawn
forth
(
as
is
supposed
)
from
the
so
admired
D.
Cartes
,
by
the
urgent
objections
of
this
very
acute
(
friendly
)
adversary
,
That
the
inexhaustible
power
of
God
is
the
reason
for
which
he
needed
no
cause
;
And
that
since
that
unexhausted
power
,
or
the
immensity
of
his
essence
is
most
highly
positive
,
therefore
he
may
be
said
to
be
of
himself
positively
,
i.
e.
not
as
if
he
did
ever
by
any
positive
efficiency
cause
himself
(
which
is
most
manifestly
impossible
)
but
that
the
positive
excellency
of
his
own
being
was
such
,
as
could
never
need
,
nor
admit
of
being
caused
.
And
that
seems
highly
eternal
(
which
is
so
Des
Cartes
,
and
is
opposed
by
his
Antagonist
:
Yet
I
cannot
but
judge
that
the
longer
one
meditates
the
less
he
shall
understand
,
how
any
thing
can
be
limited
ad
intra
or
from
it self
,
&c.
As
the
Author
of
the
Tentam.
Phys.
Theol.
speaks
.
But
that
we
may
entertain
our selves
with
some
more
particular
considerations
of
this
necessary
Being
;
which
may
evince
that
general
assertion
of
its
absolute
plenitude
or
fulness
of
essence
.
It
appears
to
be
such
As
is
,
first
,
at
the
greatest
imaginable
distance
from
non-entity
.
For
what
can
be
at
a
which
is
necessarily
?
which
signifies
as
much
as
whereto
not
to
be
is
utterly
impossible
.
Now
an
utter
impossibility
not
to
be
,
or
the
uttermost
distance
from
no
Being
,
seems
plainly
to
imply
the
absolute
plenitude
of
all
Being
.
And
,
if
here
it
be
said
that
,
to
be
necessarily
,
and
of
it self
,
needs
be
understood
to
import
no
more
than
a
firm
possession
of
that
being
which
a
thing
hath
,
be
it
never
so
scant
or
minute
a
portion
of
being
.
I
answer
,
without
insisting
upon
the
ambiguity
of
the
words
to
be
it
seems
,
indeed
so
;
If
we
measure
the
signification
of
this
expression
by
its
first
and
more
obvious
appearance
.
But
if
you
consider
the
matter
more
narrowly
,
you
will
find
here
is
also
signified
the
nature
and
kind
of
the
Being
possessed
,
as
well
as
the
manner
of
possession
,
viz.
that
it
is
a
Being
of
so
excellent
and
noble
a
kind
,
as
that
it
can
subsist
alone
without
being
beholden
:
which
is
so
great
an
excellency
as
that
it
manifestly
comprehends
all
other
,
or
is
the
foundation
of
all
that
can
be
conceived
besides
.
Which
they
that
fondly
dream
of
necessary
matter
,
not
considering
,
unwarily
make
one
single
atom
a
more
excellent
thing
,
than
the
whole
frame
of
heaven
and
earth
.
That
being
supposed
simply
necessary
,
this
the
meerest
piece
of
hap-hazard
,
the
strangest
chance
imaginable
,
and
beyond
what
any
but
themselves
could
ever
have
imagined
.
And
which
being
considered
,
would
give
us
to
understand
,
that
no
minute
or
finite
being
can
be
necessarily
.
And
hence
we
may
see
what
it
is
to
be
nearer
,
or
at
a
further
distance
from
not-being
.
For
these
things
that
came
contingently
into
being
,
or
at
the
pleasure
of
a
free
cause
,
have
all
but
a
finite
and
limited
being
,
whereof
,
some
,
having
a
smaller
portion
of
being
than
others
,
approach
so
much
the
nearer
to
not-being
.
Proportionably
,
what
hath
its
being
necessarily
and
of
it self
,
is
at
the
farthest
distance
from
no-being
,
as
comprehending
all
being
in
it self
.
Or
,
to
borrow
the
expressions
,
of
an
elegant
Writer
,
translated
into
our
own
Language
,
We
have
much
more
non-essence
than
essence
;
If
we
have
the
essence
of
a
who
is
what
he
is
comprehendeth
all
possible
essences
.
Nor
is
this
precariously
spoken
,
or
,
as
what
may
be
hoped
to
be
granted
upon
courtesie
.
But
let
the
matter
be
rigidly
examined
and
discussed
,
and
the
certain
truth
of
it
will
most
evidently
appear
.
For
if
any
thing
be
,
in
this
sense
,
remoter
than
other
from
no-Being
,
it
must
either
be
,
what
is
necessarily
of
it self
,
or
what
is
contingently
at
the
pleasure
of
the
other
.
But
since
nothing
is
,
besides
that
self-originate
necessary
Being
,
but
what
was
from
it
;
and
nothing
from
it
but
what
was
within
its
productive
power
;
it
's
plain
all
that
,
with
its
own
Being
,
was
contained
in
it
.
And
therefore
,
even
in
that
sense
,
it
is
at
the
greatest
distance
from
no-Being
;
as
comprehending
the
utmost
fulness
of
Being
in
it self
,
and
consequently
absolute
perfection
.
Which
will
yet
further
appear
,
in
what
follows
.
We
therefore
add
,
That
necessary
Being
is
most
unmixed
or
purest
Being
.
Without
allay
.
That
is
pure
which
is
full
of
it self
.
Purity
is
not
here
meant
in
a
corporeal
sense
(
which
few
will
think
)
nor
in
the
moral
;
but
as
with
Metaphysicians
it
signifies
simplicity
of
essence
.
And
in
its
present
use
is
more
especially
intended
to
signifie
that
simplicity
which
is
opposed
to
the
composition
of
act
,
and
possibility
.
We
say
then
that
necessary
Being
imports
purest
actuality
.
Which
is
the
ultimate
and
highest
perfection
of
Being
.
For
it
signifies
no
remaining
possibility
,
yet
unreplete
,
or
not
fill'd
up
,
and
consequently
the
fullest
exuberancy
and
entire
confluence
of
all
Being
,
as
in
its
fountain
and
original
scurce
.
We
need
not
here
look
further
to
evince
this
than
the
native
import
of
the
very
terms
themselves
;
necessity
and
possibility
;
the
latter
whereof
is
not
so
fitly
said
to
be
excluded
the
former
(
as
contingency
is
)
but
to
be
swallowed
up
of
it
;
as
fulness
takes
up
all
the
space
which
were
otherwise
nothing
but
vacuity
or
emptiness
.
It
is
plain
then
that
necessary
Being
,
ingrosses
all
possible
Being
,
both
that
is
,
and
(
for
the
same
reason
)
that
ever
was
so
.
For
nothing
can
be
or
ever
was
in
possibility
to
come
into
Being
,
but
what
either
must
spring
,
or
hath
sprung
,
from
the
necessary
self-subsisting
Being
.
So
that
unto
all
that
vast
possibility
,
a
proportionable
actuality
of
this
Being
must
be
understood
to
correspond
.
Else
the
other
were
not
possible
.
For
nothing
is
possible
to
be
produced
which
is
not
within
the
actual
productive
power
of
the
necessary
Being
.
I
say
within
its
actual
productive
power
,
for
if
its
power
for
such
production
were
not
already
actual
,
it
could
never
become
so
,
and
so
were
none
at
all
.
Inasmuch
as
necessary
being
can
never
alter
,
and
consequently
can
never
come
actually
to
be
,
what
it
,
already
,
is
not
(
upon
which
account
it
is
truly
said
,
In
aeternis
posse
&
esse
sunt
idem
.
)
Wherefore
in
it
,
is
nothing
else
but
pure
actuality
,
as
profound
and
vast
,
as
is
the
utmost
possibility
of
all
created
or
producible
Being
,
i.
e.
It
can
be
nothing
other
than
it
is
,
but
can
do
all
things
(
of
which
more
hereafter
.
)
It
therefore
stands
oppos'd
not
only
(
more
directly
)
to
impossibility
of
Being
(
which
is
the
most
proper
notion
of
no-Being
)
but
some
way
,
even
to
possibility
also
;
That
is
the
possibility
of
being
any
thing
but
what
it
is
;
as
being
every
way
compleat
,
and
perfectly
full
already
.
Again
we
might
further
add
,
that
it
is
the
most
abstracted
Being
,
or
is
Being
in
the
very
have
essence
,
as
to
be
it
;
and
exist
separately
by
it self
;
not
as
limited
to
this
or
that
thing
.
Whence
it
is
,
in
it self
universal
essence
,
containing
therefore
(
not
formally
,
but
eminently
)
the
being
of
all
things
in
perfect
simplicity
.
Whence
all
its
own
attributes
are
capable
of
being
affirmed
of
it
in
the
abstract
,
[
*
](A44683-e9810-b)
*
To
which
purpose
we
may
take
notice
of
the
words
of
one
,
not
the
less
worthy
to
be
named
,
for
not
being
reckoned
of
that
forementioned
order
.
Si
enim
denominative
de
eo
quippiam
praedicaretur
abstractum
esset
tum
aliud
ab
ipso
,
tum
ipso
prius
.
Quod
same
impium
est
quare
neque
ens
est
led
essentia
,
neque
bonus
sed
bonitas
est
.
Jul.
Scal.
Exerc.
365.
that
it
is
Wisdom
,
Power
,
Goodness
,
and
not
only
hath
these
,
and
that
,
upon
this
account
,
that
it
is
a
Being
which
is
necessarily
and
of
it self
.
For
that
which
is
necessarily
and
of
it self
,
is
not
whatsoever
it
is
by
the
accession
of
any
thing
to
it self
;
whereof
necessary
Being
is
uncapable
.
But
by
its
own
simple
and
unvariable
essence
.
Other
Being
is
upon
such
terms
powerful
,
wise
,
yea
,
and
existent
,
as
that
it
may
cease
to
be
so
.
Whereas
to
necessary
Being
it
is
manifestly
repugnant
and
impossible
either
simply
not
to
be
,
or
to
be
any
thing
else
,
but
what
and
as
it
is
.
And
though
other
things
may
have
properties
belonging
to
their
essence
not
separable
from
it
,
yet
they
are
not
their
very
essence
it self
:
And
,
whereas
they
are
in
a
possibility
to
loose
their
very
existence
,
the
knot
and
ligament
of
whatsoever
is
most
intimate
to
their
actual
being
,
all
then
falls
from
them
together
:
Here
essence
,
properties
,
and
existence
are
all
one
simple
thing
that
can
never
cease
,
decay
,
or
change
,
because
the
whole
being
is
necessary
.
Now
,
all
this
being
supposed
,
of
the
force
of
that
form
of
speech
,
when
we
affirm
any
thing
in
the
abstract
of
another
,
we
may
admit
the
common
sense
of
men
to
be
the
interpreter
.
For
every
body
can
tell
(
though
they
do
not
know
the
meaning
of
the
word
abstract
)
what
we
intend
when
we
use
that
phrase
or
manner
of
speaking
.
As
when
we
say
,
by
way
of
hyperbolical
commendation
,
such
a
man
is
not
only
learned
,
but
learning
it self
;
or
he
not
only
hath
much
of
Virtue
,
Justice
,
and
Goodness
in
him
,
but
he
is
Virtue
,
Justice
,
and
Goodness
it self
(
as
was
once
said
of
an
excellent
Pagan
Virtuoso
,
that
I
may
borrow
leave
to
use
that
word
in
the
moral
sense
)
every
one
knows
the
phrase
intends
the
appropriating
all
Learning
,
Virtue
,
Justice
,
Goodness
to
such
a
one
.
Which
,
because
they
know
unappropriable
to
any
man
,
they
easily
understand
it
to
be
,
in
such
a
case
,
a
rhetorical
strain
,
and
form
of
speech
.
And
yet
could
not
know
that
,
if
also
they
did
not
understand
its
proper
and
native
import
.
And
so
it
may
as
well
be
understood
what
is
meant
by
saying
of
God
,
he
is
being
it self
.
With
which
sense
may
be
reconciled
that
of
(
the
so
named
Dionysius
the
Areopagite
;
[
†
](A44683-e9900-b)
†
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
.
De
Divinis
Homi
Co.
5.
That
God
is
not
so
properly
said
to
be
of
,
or
be
in
,
or
to
have
(
or
partake
)
of
Being
as
that
it
is
of
him
,
&c.
Inasmuch
as
he
is
the
pre-existent
Being
to
all
Being
,
i.
e.
If
we
understand
him
to
mean
all
besides
his
own
.
In
which
sense
taking
Being
,
for
that
which
is
communicated
and
imparted
,
He
may
truly
be
said
(
as
this
Author
and
the
Platonists
generally
speak
)
[
*
](A44683-e9980-b)
*
Proclus
in
Plat.
Theol.
l.
2.
c.
4.
to
be
super-essential
or
super-substantial
.
But
how
fitly
being
is
taken
in
that
restrained
sense
we
may
say
more
hereafter
.
In
the
mean
time
,
what
hath
been
said
concerning
this
abstractedness
of
the
necessary
Being
,
hath
in
it
some
things
so
unintelligible
,
and
is
accompanied
with
so
great
(
unmentioned
)
difficulties
(
which
it
would
give
us
,
perhaps
,
more
labour
than
profit
to
discuss
)
and
the
absolute
perfection
of
God
appears
so
evidenceable
otherwise
,
by
what
hath
been
and
may
be
further
said
,
that
we
are
no
way
concern'd
to
lay
the
stress
of
the
cause
on
this
matter
only
.
Moreover
,
necessary
Being
is
the
cause
and
author
of
all
Being
besides
.
Whatsoever
is
not
Nor
is
it
an
exception
worth
the
mentioning
,
that
there
may
be
a
conception
of
possible
being
or
perfection
,
which
the
necessary
being
hath
not
caused
.
For
it
is
,
manifestly
,
as
well
the
possible
cause
of
all
possible
Being
and
perfection
,
as
the
actual
cause
of
what
is
actual
.
And
what
it
is
possible
to
it
to
produce
it
hath
within
its
productive
power
,
as
hath
been
said
before
.
And
,
if
the
matter
did
require
it
,
we
might
say
further
,
that
the
same
necessary
Being
,
which
hath
been
the
productive
cause
,
is
,
also
the
continual
root
and
basis
of
all
Being
,
which
is
not
necessary
.
For
what
is
of
it self
and
cannot
,
by
the
special
priviledge
of
its
own
Being
,
but
be
,
needs
nothing
to
sustain
it
,
or
needs
not
trust
to
any
thing
besides
its
own
eternal
stability
.
But
what
is
not
so
seems
to
need
a
continual
reproduction
every
moment
,
and
to
be
no
more
capable
of
continuing
in
Being
by
it self
,
than
it
was
by
it self
of
coming
into
Being
.
For
(
as
is
frequently
alledged
by
that
so
often
mentioned
Author
)
since
there
is
no
connexion
betwixt
the
present
and
future
time
,
but
what
is
easily
capable
of
rupture
,
it
is
no
way
consequent
that
,
because
I
am
now
,
I
shall
therefore
be
the
next
moment
further
than
as
the
free
Author
of
my
Being
shall
be
pleased
to
continue
his
own
most
arbitrary
influence
for
my
support
.
This
seems
highly
probable
to
be
true
,
whether
that
reason
signifie
any
thing
or
nothing
.
And
that
thence
also
continual
conservation
differs
not
from
creation
.
Which
,
whether
(
as
is
said
by
the
same
Author
)
it
be
one
of
the
things
that
are
manifest
by
natural
light
;
or
whether
a
positive
act
be
needless
to
the
annihilation
of
created
things
;
but
only
the
withholding
of
influence
,
let
them
examine
that
apprehend
the
cause
to
need
it
.
And
if
upon
enquiry
they
judge
it
at
least
evidenceable
by
natural
light
to
be
so
,
(
as
I
doubt
not
they
will
)
they
will
have
this
further
ground
upon
which
thus
to
reason
,
That
,
inasmuch
as
the
necessary
Being
subsists
wholly
by
it self
,
and
is
that
whereon
all
other
doth
totally
depend
.
It
hereupon
follows
,
that
it
must
,
some
way
,
contain
in
it self
all
Being
.
We
may
yet
further
add
,
That
the
necessary
Being
we
have
evinced
,
though
it
have
caused
,
and
do
continually
sustain
all
things
,
yet
doth
not
,
it self
,
in
the
mean
time
suffer
any
diminution
.
It
is
not
possible
,
nor
consistent
with
the
very
terms
necessary
Being
that
it
can
.
'T
is
true
,
that
if
such
a
thing
as
a
necessary
Atom
were
admitted
,
that
would
be
also
undiminishable
(
it
were
not
else
an
atom
.
)
But
as
nothing
then
can
flow
from
it
(
as
from
a
perfect
parvitude
nothing
can
)
so
it
can
effect
nothing
.
(
And
the
reason
is
the
same
of
many
as
of
one
.
)
Nor
would
undiminishableness
,
upon
such
terms
,
signifie
any
thing
to
the
magnifying
the
value
of
such
a
trifle
.
But
this
is
none
of
the
present
case
.
For
our
eyes
tell
us
here
is
a
world
in
being
,
which
we
are
sure
is
not
it self
necessarily
;
and
was
therefore
made
by
him
that
is
.
And
that
,
without
mutation
or
change
in
him
;
against
which
the
very
notion
of
a
necessary
Being
is
most
irreconciliably
reluctant
;
and
therefore
Plotinus
Enn.
6.
l.
9.
c.
9.
without
diminution
,
which
cannot
be
conceived
without
change
.
Wherefore
how
inexhaustible
a
fountain
of
life
,
being
,
and
all
perfection
have
we
here
represented
to
our
thoughts
!
from
whence
this
vast
Universe
is
sprung
,
and
is
continually
springing
,
and
that
in
the
mean
time
,
receiving
no
recruits
or
foreign
supplies
,
yet
suffers
no
impairment
or
lessening
of
it self
!
What
is
this
but
absolute
all-fulness
!
And
it
is
so
far
from
arguing
any
deficiency
or
mutability
,
in
his
nature
,
that
there
is
this
continual
issue
of
power
and
virtue
from
him
,
that
it
demonstrates
its
high
excellency
that
this
can
be
without
decay
or
mutation
.
For
of
all
this
,
we
are
as
certain
as
we
can
be
of
any
thing
:
That
many
things
are
not
necessarily
,
That
the
Being
must
be
necessary
from
whence
all
things
else
proceed
,
and
that
with
necessary
Being
change
is
inconsistent
.
It
is
therefore
unreasonable
to
entertain
any
doubt
that
things
are
so
,
which
most
evidently
appear
to
be
so
;
only
because
it
is
beyond
our
measure
and
compass
to
apprehend
,
how
they
are
so
.
And
it
would
be
to
doubt
(
against
our
own
eyes
)
whether
there
be
any
such
thing
as
motion
in
the
world
,
or
composition
of
bodies
,
because
we
cannot
give
a
clear
account
(
so
as
to
avoid
all
difficulties
,
and
the
entanglement
of
the
common
sophisms
about
them
)
how
these
things
are
performed
.
In
the
present
case
,
we
have
no
difficulty
but
what
is
to
be
resolved
into
the
perfection
of
the
Divine
Nature
,
and
the
imperfection
of
our
own
.
And
how
easily
conceivable
is
it
,
that
somewhat
may
be
more
perfect
than
that
we
can
conceive
it
.
If
we
cannot
conceive
the
manner
of
Gods
causation
of
things
,
or
the
nature
of
his
causative
influence
,
it
only
shews
their
high
excellency
,
and
gives
us
the
more
ground
(
since
this
is
that
into
which
both
his
own
revelation
and
the
reason
of
things
most
naturally
lead
us
to
resolve
all
)
to
admire
the
mighty
efficacy
of
his
all-creating
and
all-sustaining
Will
and
Word
;
that
in
that
easie
unexpensive
way
by
his
meer
fiat
,
so
great
things
should
be
performed
.
We
only
say
further
,
That
this
necessary
Being
nothing
can
be
added
;
so
as
that
it
should
be
really
greater
,
or
better
,
or
more
perfect
than
it
was
before
.
And
this
not
only
signifies
that
nothing
can
be
joyned
to
it
,
so
as
to
become
a
part
of
it
,
(
which
necessary
Being
,
by
its
natural
immutability
manifestly
refuses
.
)
But
we
also
intend
by
it
,
that
all
things
else
,
with
it
,
contain
not
more
of
real
perfection
than
it
doth
alone
.
Which
(
though
it
carries
a
difficulty
with
it
that
we
intend
not
wholly
to
overlook
when
it
shall
be
seasonable
to
consider
it
)
is
a
most
apparent
and
demonstrable
truth
.
For
it
is
plain
that
all
being
and
perfection
which
is
not
necessary
,
proceeds
from
that
which
is
,
as
the
cause
of
it
.
And
that
no
cause
could
communicate
any
thing
to
another
which
it
had
not
some
way
in
it self
.
Wherefore
it
is
manifestly
consequent
that
all
other
being
was
wholly
before
comprehended
in
that
which
is
necessary
,
as
having
been
wholly
produced
by
it
.
And
what
is
wholly
comprehended
of
another
(
i.
e.
within
its
productive
power
)
before
it
be
produced
,
can
be
no
real
addition
to
it
,
when
it
is
.
Now
what
can
be
supposed
to
import
fulness
of
Being
and
perfection
,
more
than
this
[
impossibility
of
addition
]
or
that
there
can
be
nothing
greater
or
more
perfect
?
And
now
these
considerations
are
mentioned
without
solicitude
,
whether
they
be
so
many
exactly
distinct
heads
.
For
admit
that
they
be
not
all
distinct
,
but
some
are
involved
with
others
of
them
;
yet
the
same
truth
may
more
powerfully
strike
some
understandings
in
one
form
of
representation
,
others
in
another
.
And
it
suffices
,
that
(
though
not
severally
)
they
do
together
plainly
evidence
,
that
the
necessary
Being
includes
the
absolute
entire
fulness
of
all
Being
and
perfection
actual
and
possible
within
it self
.
Having
therefore
thus
dispatcht
that
former
part
of
this
undertaking
;
the
eviction
of
an
every
way
perfect
Being
,
we
shall
now
need
to
labour
little
in
the
other
,
viz.
Secondly
,
the
more
express
deduction
of
the
infiniteness
and
onliness
thereof
.
For
as
to
the
former
of
these
it
is
in
effect
the
same
thing
that
hath
been
already
proved
.
Since
to
the
fullest
notion
infiniteness
,
absolute
perfection
seems
every
way
most
fully
to
correspond
.
For
absolute
perfection
includes
all
conceivable
perfection
,
leaves
nothing
excluded
.
And
what
doth
most
simple
infiniteness
import
,
but
to
have
nothing
for
a
boundary
,
or
(
which
is
the
same
)
not
to
be
bounded
at
all
?
We
intend
not
now
,
principally
,
infiniteness
extrinsically
considered
,
with
respect
to
time
and
place
,
as
to
be
eternal
and
immense
do
import
:
But
intrinsically
,
as
importing
bottomless
profundity
of
essence
,
and
the
full
confluence
of
all
kinds
and
degrees
of
perfection
without
bound
or
limit
.
This
is
the
same
with
absoute
perfection
Which
yet
,
if
any
should
suspect
not
to
be
so
,
They
might
,
however
,
easily
and
expresly
prove
it
of
the
necessary
Being
upon
the
same
grounds
that
have
been
already
alledged
for
proof
of
that
.
As
that
the
necessary
Being
hath
actuality
answerable
to
the
utmost
possibility
of
the
creature
;
That
it
is
the
only
root
and
cause
of
all
other
Being
.
The
actual
cause
of
whatsoever
is
actually
;
The
possible
cause
of
whatsoever
is
possible
to
be
.
Which
is
most
apparently
true
.
And
hath
been
evidenced
to
be
so
,
by
what
hath
been
said
,
so
lately
,
as
that
it
needs
not
be
repeated
.
That
is
,
in
short
,
that
nothing
,
that
is
not
necessarily
,
and
of
it self
,
could
ever
have
been
or
can
be
,
but
as
it
hath
been
,
or
shall
be
put
into
Being
by
that
which
is
necessarily
and
of
it self
.
So
that
this
is
as
apparent
as
that
any
thing
is
,
or
can
be
.
But
now
let
sober
reason
judge
,
whether
there
can
be
any
bounds
or
limits
set
to
the
possibility
of
producible
Being
,
either
in
respect
of
kinds
,
numbers
,
or
degrees
of
perfection
?
Who
can
say
or
think
,
when
there
can
be
so
many
sorts
of
creatures
produced
(
or
at
least
individuals
of
those
sorts
)
that
there
can
be
no
more
?
Or
that
any
creature
is
so
perfect
as
that
none
can
be
made
more
perfect
?
which
indeed
to
suppose
were
to
suppose
an
actual
infiniteness
in
the
creature
.
And
then
it
being
,
however
,
still
,
but
somewhat
that
is
created
or
made
,
how
can
its
Maker
but
be
infinite
?
For
surely
no
body
will
be
so
absurd
as
to
imagine
an
infinite
effect
of
a
finite
cause
.
Either
therefore
the
creature
is
(
or
sometime
may
be
actually
made
)
so
perfect
that
it
cannot
be
more
perfect
,
or
not
.
If
not
,
we
have
our
purpose
;
that
there
is
an
infinite
possibility
on
the
part
of
the
creature
always
unreplete
;
and
,
consequently
,
a
proportionable
infinite
actuality
of
power
on
the
Creators
part
.
Infinite
power
,
I
say
,
otherwise
there
were
not
that
(
acknowledged
)
infinite
possibility
of
producible
being
.
For
nothing
is
producible
that
no
power
can
produce
.
And
I
say
infinite
actual
power
,
because
the
Creator
being
what
he
is
necessarily
,
what
power
he
hath
not
actually
,
he
can
never
have
,
as
was
argued
before
.
But
if
it
be
said
,
the
creature
either
is
,
or
may
sometime
be
,
actually
so
perfect
as
that
it
cannot
be
more
perfect
.
That
,
as
was
said
,
will
suppose
it
actually
infinite
,
and
therefore
much
more
that
its
cause
is
so
.
And
therefore
in
this
way
our
present
purpose
would
be
gained
also
.
But
we
have
no
mind
to
gain
it
this
latter
way
,
as
we
have
no
need
.
'T
is
in
it self
plain
to
any
one
that
considers
that
this
possibility
on
the
creatures
part
can
never
actually
be
filled
up
;
That
it
is
a
bottomless
abyss
,
in
which
our
thoughts
may
still
gradually
go
down
deeper
and
deeper
without
end
:
that
is
,
that
still
more
might
be
produced
,
or
more
perfect
creatures
,
and
still
more
,
everlastingly
without
any
bound
,
which
sufficiently
infers
what
we
aim
at
,
that
the
Creators
actual
power
is
proportionable
.
And
indeed
the
supposition
of
the
former
can
neither
consist
with
the
Creators
perfection
,
nor
with
the
imperfection
of
the
creature
,
it
would
infer
that
the
Creators
productive
power
might
be
exhausted
,
that
he
could
do
no
more
,
and
so
place
an
actual
boundary
to
him
and
make
him
finite
.
It
were
to
make
the
creature
actually
full
of
being
,
that
it
could
receive
no
more
,
and
so
would
make
that
infinite
.
But
it
may
be
said
,
since
all
power
is
in
order
to
act
,
and
the
very
notion
of
possibility
imports
that
such
a
thing
,
of
which
it
is
said
,
may
some
time
be
actual
;
it
seems
very
unreasonable
to
say
that
the
infinite
power
of
a
cause
cannot
produce
an
infinite
effect
.
Or
that
infinite
possibility
can
never
become
infinite
actuality
.
For
that
were
to
say
and
unsay
the
same
thing
of
the
same
.
To
affirm
omnipotency
and
impotency
of
the
same
cause
,
possibility
and
impossibility
of
the
same
effect
.
How
urgent
soever
this
difficulty
may
seem
,
there
needs
nothing
but
patience
and
attentive
consideration
to
disintangle
our selves
,
and
get
through
it
.
For
if
we
will
but
allow
our
selves
the
leasure
to
consider
,
we
shall
find
that
[
power
]
and
[
possibility
]
must
here
be
taken
not
simply
and
abstractly
,
but
as
each
of
them
is
in
conjunction
with
[
infinite
.
]
And
what
is
[
infinite
,
]
but
[
that
which
can
never
be
travell'd
through
]
or
whereof
no
end
can
be
ever
arriv'd
unto
?
Now
suppose
infinite
power
had
produced
all
that
it
could
produce
,
there
were
an
end
of
it
,
(
i.
e.
it
had
found
limits
and
a
boundary
beyond
which
it
could
not
go
.
)
If
infinite
possibility
were
filled
up
there
were
an
end
of
that
also
,
and
so
neither
were
infinite
.
It
may
then
be
further
urged
that
there
is
therefore
no
such
thing
as
infinite
power
or
possibility
.
For
how
is
that
cause
said
to
have
infinite
power
,
which
can
never
produce
its
proportionable
effect
,
or
that
effect
have
infinite
possibility
,
which
can
never
be
produced
.
It
would
follow
then
that
power
and
possibility
which
are
said
to
be
infinite
,
are
neither
power
nor
possibility
;
and
that
infinite
must
be
rejected
as
a
notion
either
repugnant
to
it self
or
to
any
thing
unto
which
we
shall
go
about
to
affix
it
.
I
answer
,
it
only
follows
,
They
are
neither
power
or
possibility
,
whereof
there
is
any
bound
or
end
;
or
that
can
ever
be
gone
through
.
And
how
absurd
is
it
that
they
shall
be
said
(
as
they
cannot
but
be
)
to
be
both
very
vast
,
if
they
were
finite
;
and
none
at
all
,
for
no
other
reason
but
their
being
infinite
!
And
for
the
pretended
repugnancy
of
the
very
notion
of
infinite
,
it
is
plain
,
that
,
though
it
cannot
be
,
to
us
,
distinctly
comprehensible
,
yet
it
is
no
more
repugnant
,
than
the
notion
of
finiteness
.
Nor
when
we
have
conceived
of
power
in
the
general
,
and
in
our
own
thoughts
set
bounds
to
it
,
and
made
it
finite
,
is
it
a
greater
difficulty
,
(
nay
,
they
that
try
will
find
it
much
easier
)
again
to
think
away
these
bounds
,
and
make
it
infinite
.
And
let
them
that
judge
the
notion
of
infiniteness
inconsistent
,
therefore
reject
it
if
they
can
.
They
will
feel
it
re-imposing
it self
upon
them
,
whether
they
will
or
no
,
and
sticking
as
close
to
their
minds
as
their
very
thinking
power
it self
.
And
who
was
,
therefore
ever
heard
of
,
that
did
not
acknowledge
some
or
other
infinite
?
Even
the
Epicureans
themselves
though
they
confined
their
Gods
,
they
did
not
the
universe
.
Which
,
also
,
though
some
Peripatetique
Atheists
made
finite
in
respect
of
place
,
yet
in
duration
they
made
it
infinite
.
Though
the
notion
of
an
eternal
world
is
incumbred
with
such
absurdities
and
impossibilities
,
as
whereof
there
is
not
the
least
shadow
in
that
of
an
every
way
infinite
Deity
.
Briefly
,
it
consists
not
with
the
nature
of
a
contingent
being
to
be
infinite
.
For
what
is
upon
such
terms
,
only
,
in
being
,
is
reducible
to
nothing
,
at
the
will
and
pleasure
of
its
maker
;
but
't
is
a
manifest
repugnancy
,
that
what
is
at
the
utmost
distance
from
nothing
(
as
infinite
fulness
of
being
cannot
but
be
)
should
be
reducible
thither
.
Therefore
actual
infinity
cannot
but
be
the
peculiar
priviledge
of
that
which
is
necessarily
.
Yet
may
we
not
say
,
that
it
is
not
within
the
compass
of
infinite
power
to
make
a
creature
that
may
be
infinite
.
For
it
argues
not
want
of
power
that
this
is
never
to
be
done
,
but
a
still
infinitely
abounding
surplufage
of
it
,
that
can
never
be
drained
,
or
drawn
dry
.
Nor
,
that
the
thing
it self
is
simply
impossible
.
It
may
be
(
as
is
compendiously
exprest
by
that
most
succinct
and
polite
Writer
D.
Boyle
)
in
fieri
,
not
in
facto
esse
.
That
is
,
it
might
Contemplat
.
Metaphys
.
be
a
thing
always
in
doing
,
but
never
done
.
Because
it
belongs
to
the
infinite
perfection
of
God
,
that
his
power
be
never
actually
exhausted
;
and
to
the
infinite
imperfection
of
the
creature
,
that
its
possibility
or
capacity
be
never
filled
up
.
To
the
necessary
self-subsisting
being
to
be
always
full
and
communicative
,
to
the
communicated
contingent
Being
,
to
be
ever
empty
and
craving
.
One
may
be
said
to
have
that
,
some
way
,
in
his
power
,
not
only
which
he
can
do
presently
,
all
at
once
,
but
which
he
can
do
by
degrees
,
and
supposing
he
have
sufficient
time
.
So
a
man
may
be
reckoned
able
to
do
that
,
as
the
uttermost
adequate
effect
of
his
wohle
power
,
which
it
is
only
possible
to
him
to
have
effected
with
the
expiration
of
his
lifes-time
.
Gods
measure
is
eternity
.
What
if
we
say
then
,
this
is
a
work
possible
to
be
accomplished
,
even
as
the
ultimate
proportionable
issue
of
Divine
Power
(
if
it
were
his
will
,
upon
which
all
contingent
being
depends
,
that
the
creature
should
be
ever
growing
in
the
mean
while
)
at
the
expiration
of
eternity
?
If
,
then
,
you
be
good
at
suppositions
,
suppose
that
expired
,
and
this
work
finished
both
together
.
Wherefore
if
you
ask
,
why
can
the
work
of
making
created
being
infinite
never
be
done
?
The
answer
will
be
,
because
eternity
(
in
every
imaginable
instant
whereof
the
inexhaustible
power
of
God
can
if
he
will
be
still
adding
either
more
creatures
or
more
perfection
to
a
creature
)
can
never
be
at
an
end
.
We
might
further
argue
the
Infinity
of
the
necessary
Being
from
what
hath
been
said
of
its
undiminishableness
by
all
its
vast
communications
.
It
s
impossibility
to
receive
any
accession
simple
infiniteness
,
in
those
very
terms
,
is
,
in
that
respect
,
the
more
requisite
as
it
is
a
form
of
expression
more
known
and
usual
.
There
are
yet
some
remaining
difficulties
in
the
matter
we
have
been
discoursing
of
;
It
may
possibly
be
here
said
in
short
;
But
what
have
we
all
this
while
been
doing
?
we
have
been
labouring
to
prove
that
necessary
Being
comprehends
the
absolute
fulness
of
all
Being
:
And
what
doth
this
signifie
,
but
that
all
being
is
necessary
?
That
God
is
all
things
,
and
so
that
every
thing
is
God
.
That
we
hereby
confound
the
being
of
a
man
,
yea
,
of
a
stone
,
or
whatever
we
can
think
of
with
one
another
,
and
all
with
the
Being
of
God
.
And
again
,
how
is
it
possible
there
should
be
an
infinite
self-subsisting
Being
.
For
then
how
can
there
be
any
finite
?
since
such
infinite
Being
includes
all
Being
,
and
there
can
be
nothing
beyond
all
.
Here
therefore
it
is
requisite
,
having
hitherto
only
asserted
and
endeavoured
to
evince
that
some
way
necessary
Being
doth
include
all
being
,
to
shew
in
what
way
.
And
it
is
plain
it
doth
not
include
all
in
the
same
way
.
It
doth
not
so
include
that
which
is
created
by
it
,
and
depends
on
it
,
as
it
doth
its
own
,
which
is
uncreated
and
independent
.
The
one
it
includes
as
its
own
or
rather
as
it self
,
the
other
,
as
what
it
is
,
and
ever
was
,
within
its
power
to
produce
.
If
any
better
like
the
terms
formally
and
virtually
they
may
serve
themselves
of
them
at
their
own
pleasure
,
which
yet
,
as
to
many
,
will
but
more
darkly
speak
the
same
sense
.
We
must
here
know
,
the
productive
power
of
God
terminates
not
upon
himself
,
as
if
he
were
by
it
capable
of
adding
any
thing
to
his
own
appropriate
Being
;
which
is
(
as
hath
been
evinced
already
)
infinitely
full
and
incapable
of
addition
,
and
is
therefore
all
pure
act
:
But
on
the
creature
,
where
there
is
still
a
perpetual
possibility
never
filled
up
;
because
Divine
power
can
never
be
exhausted
.
And
thus
all
that
of
Being
is
virtually
in
him
,
which
,
either
having
produced
,
he
doth
totally
sustain
,
or
,
not
being
produced
,
he
can
produce
.
Whereupon
it
is
easie
to
understand
how
necessary
being
may
comprehend
all
Being
and
yet
all
being
not
be
necessary
.
It
comprehends
all
Being
besides
what
it self
is
,
as
having
had
within
the
compass
of
its
productive
power
whatsoever
hath
actually
sprung
from
it
,
and
having
within
the
compass
of
the
same
power
whatsoever
is
still
possible
to
be
produced
.
Which
no
more
confounds
such
produced
or
producible
Being
with
that
necessary
being
which
is
its
cause
,
than
it
confounds
all
the
effects
of
humane
power
with
one
another
,
and
with
the
being
of
a
man
,
to
say
that
he
virtually
comprehended
them
(
so
far
as
they
were
producible
by
him
)
within
his
power
.
And
is
no
wiser
an
inference
from
the
former
,
than
it
would
be
from
this
latter
,
that
an
house
,
a
book
,
and
a
child
are
the
same
thing
with
one
another
,
and
with
the
person
that
produced
them
,
because
so
far
as
they
were
produced
by
him
,
he
had
it
in
his
power
to
produce
them
.
And
that
the
effects
of
Divine
power
are
produced
thereby
totally
,
whereas
those
of
humane
power
are
produced
by
it
but
in
part
only
,
doth
,
as
to
the
strength
and
reasonableness
of
the
argument
,
nothing
alter
the
case
.
And
as
to
the
next
,
that
infinite
being
should
seem
to
exclude
all
finite
.
I
confess
that
such
as
are
so
disposed
might
here
even
wrangle
continually
,
as
they
might
do
about
any
thing
,
in
which
infiniteness
is
concern'd
:
And
yet
therein
shew
themselves
(
as
Seneca
I
remember
speaks
in
another
case
)
not
a
whit
the
more
learned
,
but
the
more
troublesom
.
But
if
one
would
make
short
work
of
it
,
and
barely
deny
that
infinite
being
excludes
finite
(
as
Scotus
doth
little
else
;
[
*
](A44683-e11260-b)
*
Distinct.
2.
Q.
2.
Q.
1.
besides
denying
the
consequence
of
the
argument
by
which
it
was
before
inforced
,
viz.
[
that
an
infinite
body
would
exclude
a
finite
;
for
where
should
the
finite
be
when
the
infinite
should
fill
up
all
space
?
And
therefore
by
parity
of
reasons
,
why
should
not
infinite
being
exclude
finite
?
]
shewing
the
disparity
of
the
two
cases
)
it
would
perhaps
give
them
some
trouble
also
to
prove
it
.
For
which
way
would
they
go
to
work
?
Infinite
self-subsisting
Being
includes
all
Being
,
very
true
,
and
therefore
we
say
it
includes
finite
.
And
what
then
?
doth
it
because
it
includes
it
,
therefore
exclude
it
?
And
let
the
matter
be
soberly
considered
,
somewhat
of
finite
being
and
power
we
say
(
and
apprehend
no
knot
or
difficulty
in
the
matter
)
can
extend
so
far
as
to
produce
some
proportionable
effect
,
or
can
do
such
and
such
things
.
And
what
,
doth
it
seem
likely
then
that
infinite
being
and
power
can
therefore
do
just
nothing
?
Is
it
not
a
reason
of
mighty
force
,
and
confoundingly
demonstrative
,
that
an
Agent
can
do
nothing
,
or
cannot
possibly
produce
any
the
least
thing
,
only
because
he
is
of
infinite
power
?
For
if
there
be
a
simple
inconsistency
,
between
an
infinite
Being
and
a
finite
,
that
will
be
the
case
;
that
,
because
the
former
is
infinite
,
therefore
it
can
produce
nothing
.
For
what
it
should
produce
cannot
consist
with
it
(
i.
e.
even
not
being
finite
;
and
then
certainly
if
we
could
suppose
the
effect
infinite
,
much
less
.
)
But
what
,
therefore
,
is
power
the
less
for
being
infinite
?
or
can
infinite
power
,
even
because
it
is
infinite
,
do
nothing
?
what
can
be
said
or
thought
more
absurd
or
void
of
sense
?
Or
shall
it
be
said
that
the
infiniteness
of
power
is
no
hinderance
but
the
infiniteness
of
Being
?
But
how
wild
an
imagination
were
that
of
a
finite
being
that
were
of
infinite
power
?
And
besides
,
is
that
power
somewhat
or
nothing
?
surely
it
will
not
be
said
it
is
nothing
.
Then
it
is
some
Being
.
And
if
some
power
be
some
being
,
what
then
is
infinite
power
,
is
not
that
infinite
being
?
And
now
therefore
if
this
infinite
can
produce
any
thing
,
which
it
were
a
strange
madness
to
deny
,
it
can
at
least
produce
some
finite
thing
.
Wherefore
there
is
no
inconsistency
between
the
infinite
and
finite
beings
?
unless
we
say
the
effect
produced
even
by
being
produced
must
destroy
,
or
(
even
infinitely
)
impair
its
cause
,
so
as
to
make
it
cease
at
least
to
be
infinite
.
But
that
also
cannot
possibly
be
said
of
that
which
is
infinite
and
necessary
,
which
,
as
hath
been
shewn
,
cannot
,
by
whatsoever
productions
,
suffer
any
diminution
or
decay
.
If
here
it
be
further
urged
.
But
here
is
an
infinite
being
now
supposed
,
let
next
be
supposed
the
production
of
a
finite
.
This
is
not
the
same
with
the
other
;
for
surely
infinite
and
finite
are
distinguishable
enough
,
and
do
even
infinitely
differ
.
This
finite
is
either
something
or
nothing
;
nothing
it
cannot
be
said
;
for
it
was
supposed
a
Being
,
and
produced
;
but
the
production
of
nothing
is
no
production
.
It
is
somewhat
then
;
here
is
therefore
an
infinite
Being
,
and
a
finite
now
besides
.
The
infinite
it
was
said
cannot
be
diminished
;
the
finite
,
a
real
something
is
added
.
Is
there
therefore
nothing
more
of
existent
Being
than
there
was
before
this
production
?
It
is
answered
,
nothing
more
than
virtually
was
before
;
for
when
we
suppose
an
infinite
Being
,
and
afterwards
a
finite
.
This
finite
is
not
to
be
lookt
upon
as
emerging
or
springing
up
of
it self
out
of
nothing
,
or
as
proceeding
from
some
third
thing
as
its
cause
,
but
as
produced
by
that
infinite
,
or
springing
out
of
that
,
which
it
could
not
do
,
but
as
being
before
virtually
contained
in
it
.
For
the
infinite
produces
nothing
,
which
it
could
not
produce
.
And
what
it
could
produce
was
before
contained
in
it
as
in
the
power
of
its
cause
.
And
to
any
one
that
attends
and
is
not
disposed
to
be
quarrelsome
,
this
is
as
plain
,
and
easie
to
be
understood
,
as
how
any
finite
thing
may
produce
another
,
or
rather
more
plain
and
easie
,
because
a
finite
Agent
doth
not
entirely
contain
its
effect
within
it self
,
or
in
its
own
power
,
as
an
infinite
doth
.
If
yet
it
be
again
said
,
that
which
is
limited
is
not
infinite
,
but
suppose
any
finite
thing
produced
into
being
after
a
pre-existent
infinite
,
this
infinite
becomes
now
limited
;
for
the
being
of
the
finite
is
not
that
of
the
infinite
,
each
hath
its
own
distinct
Being
.
And
it
cannot
be
said
of
the
one
,
it
is
the
other
;
therefore
each
is
limited
to
it self
.
I
answer
,
that
which
was
infinite
becomes
not
hereby
less
than
it
was
;
for
it
hath
produced
nothing
but
what
was
before
virtually
contained
in
it
,
and
still
is
(
for
it
still
totally
sustains
the
other
.
)
But
whatsoever
it
actually
doth
,
it
can
do
,
or
hath
within
its
power
:
therefore
if
it
were
infinite
before
,
and
is
not
now
become
less
,
it
is
still
infinite
.
Whefore
the
true
reason
why
the
position
of
a
finite
thing
after
a
supposed
all-comprehending
infinite
doth
no
way
intrench
upon
or
detract
from
the
others
all-comprehensive
infinity
,
is
,
that
it
was
formerly
contained
,
and
still
is
,
within
the
virtue
and
power
of
the
other
.
It
is
true
,
that
if
we
should
suppose
any
thing
besides
that
supposed
infinite
to
be
of
it self
that
would
infer
a
limitation
of
the
former
.
Infer
,
I
say
,
not
cause
it
,
that
is
,
it
would
not
make
it
cease
to
be
all-comprehendingly
infinite
,
but
it
would
argue
it
not
to
have
been
so
before
;
and
that
the
supposition
of
its
infinity
was
a
false
supposition
,
because
it
would
then
appear
,
that
the
former
did
not
comprehend
all
being
any
way
in
it self
.
Somewhat
being
now
found
to
be
in
Being
,
which
hath
no
dependence
thereon
:
whence
it
would
be
evident
neither
can
be
so
.
Of
which
some
good
use
may
be
made
to
a
further
purpose
by
and
by
.
Here
only
we
may
by
the
way
annex
,
as
a
just
corollary
from
the
foregoing
discourse
,
that
as
the
supposition
of
necessary
self-subsisting
matter
was
before
shewn
to
be
a
vain
,
it
now
also
appears
plainly
to
be
altogether
an
impossible
supposition
.
For
since
the
necessary
self-subsisting
Being
,
is
infinite
,
and
all-comprehensive
;
and
if
matter
were
supposed
necessary
,
we
must
have
another
necessary
being
to
form
the
world
inasmuch
as
matter
is
not
self-active
,
much
less
intelligent
(
as
it
hath
both
been
proved
it
cannot
be
,
and
that
the
Former
of
this
world
must
be
.
)
It
is
therefore
out
of
question
,
that
because
both
cannot
be
all-comprehensive
,
they
cannot
both
be
necessary
;
Nor
can
the
vastly
different
kinds
or
natures
of
these
things
salve
the
business
;
for
be
they
of
what
kinds
they
will
,
they
are
still
Beings
.
Besides
,
if
matter
were
necessary
,
and
self-subsisting
,
every
particle
of
it
must
be
so
.
And
then
we
shall
have
not
only
two
,
but
an
infinite
number
of
such
infinites
,
and
all
of
the
same
kind
.
But
Being
only
of
this
or
that
sort
(
as
is
apparent
where
more
sorts
do
exist
than
one
)
could
not
be
simply
infinite
,
except
as
the
other
depends
thereon
;
and
as
this
one
is
radically
comprehensive
of
all
the
rest
,
that
can
come
under
the
general
and
most
common
notion
of
Being
.
For
that
there
is
some
general
notion
,
wherein
all
being
agrees
,
and
by
which
it
differs
from
no
being
,
is
,
I
think
,
little
to
be
doubted
;
how
unequally
soever
,
and
dependently
,
the
one
upon
the
other
,
the
distinct
sorts
do
partake
therein
.
Whereupon
the
expressions
[
super-essential
]
and
others
like
it
,
spoken
of
God
,
must
be
understood
,
as
rhetorical
strains
,
importing
more
reverence
,
than
rigid
truth
.
Except
by
essence
(
as
was
formerly
said
)
only
that
which
is
created
be
meant
.
And
that
only
a
purer
and
more
noble
kind
of
essence
were
intended
to
be
asserted
to
him
,
[
*
](A44683-e11460-b)
*
And
we
must
suppose
somewhat
agreeable
to
this
to
be
,
Plottinus
his
meaning
when
he
denies
knowledge
to
be
in
God
,
and
yet
also
denies
that
there
is
in
him
any
ignorance
,
that
is
that
he
means
his
intelligence
is
of
an
infinitely
distinct
and
more
excellent
sort
from
that
which
he
causes
in
us
,
as
appears
by
his
annexed
reason
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
Enn.
6.
l.
9.
c.
6.
which
yet
seems
also
unwarrantable
and
injuririous
that
a
word
of
that
import
should
be
so
misapplied
and
transferr'd
from
the
substance
,
to
signifie
nothing
but
the
shadow
,
rather
,
of
Being
.
And
that
they
who
would
seem
zealously
concern'd
to
appropriate
all
Being
unto
God
,
should
,
in
the
height
of
their
transport
,
so
far
forget
themselves
,
as
to
set
him
above
all
being
,
and
so
deny
him
any
at
all
.
For
surely
that
which
simply
is
above
all
being
is
no
being
.
And
as
to
the
unity
or
onliness
rather
of
this
absolute
perfection
thereof
.
For
though
some
do
toil
themselves
much
about
this
matter
;
and
others
plainly
conclude
that
it
is
not
to
be
proved
at
all
in
a
rational
way
,
but
only
by
divine
revelation
.
Yet
I
conceive
,
they
that
follow
the
method
(
having
proved
some
necessary
self-subsisting
being
,
the
root
and
original
spring
of
all
Being
and
perfection
actual
and
possible
;
which
is
as
plain
as
any
thing
can
be
)
of
deducing
from
thence
the
absolute
all
comprehending
perfection
of
such
necessary
being
will
find
their
work
as
good
as
done
.
For
nothing
seems
more
evident
than
that
there
cannot
be
two
(
much
less
more
)
such
Beings
.
Inasmuch
as
one
comprehends
in
it self
all
being
and
perfection
;
for
there
can
be
but
one
all
,
without
which
is
nothing
.
So
that
,
one
such
being
supposed
,
another
can
have
nothing
remaining
to
it
.
Yea
so
far
is
it
therefore
,
if
we
suppose
one
infinite
and
absolutely
perfect
being
,
that
there
can
be
another
independent
thereon
(
and
of
a
depending
infinity
we
need
not
say
more
than
we
have
,
which
if
any
such
could
be
,
cannot
possibly
be
a
distinct
God
)
that
there
cannot
be
the
minutest
finite
thing
imaginable
,
which
that
supposed
infinity
doth
not
comprehend
,
or
that
can
stand
apart
from
it
,
on
any
distinct
basis
of
its
own
.
And
that
this
matter
may
be
left
,
as
plain
as
we
can
make
it
;
supposing
it
already
most
evident
.
That
there
is
actually
existing
an
absolute
entire
fulness
of
Wisdom
,
Power
,
so
of
all
other
perfection
.
That
absolute
entire
fulness
of
perfection
is
infinite
.
That
this
infinite
perfection
must
have
its
primary
seat
somewhere
.
That
its
primary
original
seat
can
be
no
where
but
in
necessary
self-subsisting
Being
.
We
hereupon
add
,
that
if
we
suppose
multitude
,
or
any
plurality
,
of
necessary
self-originate
Beings
concurring
to
make
up
the
seat
or
subject
of
this
infinite
perfection
.
Each
one
must
either
be
of
finite
,
and
partial
perfection
;
or
infinite
,
and
absolute
.
Not
infinite
and
absolute
;
because
one
self-originate
infinitely
and
absolutely
perfect
being
,
will
necessarily
comprehend
all
perfection
and
leave
nothing
to
the
rest
.
Not
finite
,
because
many
finites
can
never
make
one
infinite
;
much
less
can
many
broken
parcels
or
fragments
of
perfection
,
ever
make
infinite
and
absolute
perfection
:
Even
though
their
number
(
if
that
were
possible
)
were
infinite
.
For
the
perfection
of
unity
,
would
still
be
wanting
,
and
their
communication
and
concurrence
to
any
work
(
even
such
as
we
see
is
done
)
be
infinitely
imperfect
,
and
impossible
.
We
might
,
more
at
large
,
and
with
a
(
much
more
pompous
)
number
and
apparatus
of
arguments
,
have
shewn
,
that
there
can
be
no
more
Gods
than
one
.
But
to
such
as
had
rather
be
informed
than
bewildered
and
lost
,
clear
proof
that
is
shorter
and
more
comprehensive
,
will
be
more
grateful
.
Nor
doth
this
proof
of
the
uniting
of
the
God-head
any
way
impugn
the
Trinity
,
which
is
by
Christians
believed
therein
(
and
whereof
some
Heathens
,
as
is
known
,
have
not
been
wholly
without
some
apprehension
,
however
they
came
by
it
)
or
exclude
a
sufficient
uncreated
ground
of
Trinal
distinction
.
As
would
be
seen
if
that
great
difference
of
Beings
necessary
and
contingent
,
be
well
stated
;
and
what
is
by
eternal
necessary
emanation
of
the
Divine
Nature
,
be
duly
distinguished
from
the
arbitrary
products
of
the
Divine
Will
.
And
the
matter
be
throughly
examined
,
whether
,
herein
,
be
not
a
sufficient
distinction
of
that
which
is
increated
,
and
that
which
is
created
.
In
this
way
it
is
possible
it
might
be
cleared
,
how
a
Trinity
in
the
God-head
may
be
very
consistently
with
the
unity
thereof
.
But
that
it
is
,
we
cannot
know
,
but
by
his
telling
us
so
.
It
being
among
the
many
things
of
God
which
are
not
to
be
known
,
but
by
the
Spirit
of
God
revealing
and
testifying
them
,
in
and
according
to
the
holy
Scriptures
.
As
the
things
of
a
man
are
not
known
but
by
the
spirit
of
a
man
.
And
what
further
evidence
we
may
justly
and
reasonably
take
from
those
Scriptures
,
even
in
reference
to
some
of
the
things
hitherto
discoursed
,
may
be
hereafter
shewn
.
CHAP.
V.
Demands
in
reference
to
what
hath
been
hitherto
discoursed
,
with
some
reasonings
thereupon
:
1.
Is
is
possible
,
that
,
upon
supposition
of
This
Beings
existence
,
it
may
be
,
in
any
way
sutable
to
our
present
state
,
made
known
to
us
that
it
doth
exist
?
Proved
1.
That
it
may
.
2.
That
,
since
any
other
fit
way
,
that
can
be
thought
on
,
is
as
much
liable
to
exception
as
that
we
have
already
:
This
must
be
,
therefore
,
sufficient
.
Strong
Impressions
.
Glorious
Apparitions
.
Terrible
Voices
.
Surprising
Transformations
.
If
these
necessary
.
Is
it
needful
they
be
universal
?
Frequent
?
If
not
,
more
rare
things
of
this
sort
not
wanting
.
2
Demand
.
Can
Subjects
,
remote
from
their
Prince
,
sufficiently
be
assured
of
his
existence
?
3
Demand
.
Can
we
be
sure
there
are
men
on
earth
?
AND
if
any
should
in
the
mean
time
,
still
remain
either
doubtful
,
or
apt
to
First
,
Do
they
believe
,
upon
supposition
of
the
existence
of
such
a
Being
,
that
it
is
possible
it
may
be
made
known
to
us
,
in
our
present
state
and
circumstances
,
by
means
not
unsutable
thereto
,
or
inconvenient
to
the
order
and
government
of
the
world
,
that
it
doth
exist
?
It
were
strange
to
say
or
suppose
,
that
a
Being
of
so
high
perfection
as
this
we
have
hitherto
given
an
account
of
,
if
he
is
,
cannot
in
any
fit
way
make
it
known
that
he
is
,
to
an
intelligent
and
apprehensive
sort
of
creatures
.
If
,
indeed
,
he
is
;
and
be
the
common
cause
,
Author
and
Lord
of
us
and
all
things
(
which
we
do
now
but
suppose
.
And
we
may
defie
cavil
to
alledge
any
thing
that
is
so
much
as
colourable
against
the
possibility
of
the
supposition
)
surely
he
hath
done
greater
things
than
the
making
of
it
known
that
he
is
.
It
is
no
unapprehensible
thing
.
There
hath
been
no
inconsistent
notion
hitherto
given
of
him
.
Nothing
said
concerning
him
;
but
will
well
admit
that
it
is
possible
such
a
Being
may
be
now
existant
.
Yea
we
not
only
can
conceive
,
but
we
actually
have
(
and
cannot
but
have
)
some
conception
,
of
the
several
attributes
we
have
ascribed
to
him
;
so
as
to
apply
them
(
severally
)
to
somewhat
else
,
if
we
will
not
apply
them
(
joyntly
)
to
him
.
We
cannot
but
admit
there
is
some
eternal
necessary
Being
;
somewhat
that
is
of
it self
,
active
;
somewhat
that
is
powerful
,
wise
,
and
good
.
And
these
notions
have
in
them
no
repugnancy
to
one
another
;
wherefore
it
is
not
impossible
they
may
meet
and
agree
together
in
full
perfection
to
one
and
the
same
existent
Being
.
And
hence
it
is
manifestly
no
unapprehensible
thing
,
that
such
a
Being
doth
exist
.
Now
supposing
,
that
it
doth
exist
,
and
hath
been
to
us
the
cause
and
Author
of
our
Being
;
hath
given
us
the
reasonable
,
intelligent
nature
which
we
find
our selves
possessors
of
;
and
that
very
power
whereby
we
apprehend
the
existence
of
such
a
Being
as
he
is
to
be
possible
(
all
which
we
for
the
present
do
still
but
suppose
)
while
also
his
actual
existence
is
not
unapprehensible
,
were
it
not
the
greatest
madness
imaginable
to
say
,
that
if
he
do
exist
,
he
cannot
also
make
our
apprehensive
nature
understand
this
apprehensible
thing
that
he
doth
exist
?
We
will
therefore
take
it
for
granted
,
and
as
a
thing
which
no
man
well
in
his
wits
will
deny
,
that
upon
supposition
such
a
Being
,
the
Cause
and
Author
of
all
things
do
exist
,
he
might
,
in
some
convenient
way
or
other
,
with
sufficient
evidence
,
make
it
known
to
such
creatures
as
we
,
so
as
to
beget
in
us
a
rational
certainty
that
he
doth
exist
.
Upon
which
presumed
ground
we
will
only
reason
thus
or
assume
to
it
;
That
there
is
no
possible
,
and
fit
way
of
doing
it
;
which
is
not
liable
to
as
much
exception
,
as
the
evidence
we
already
have
.
Whence
it
will
be
consequent
,
that
if
the
thing
be
possible
to
be
fitly
done
,
it
is
done
already
.
That
is
,
that
if
we
can
apprehend
,
how
it
may
be
possible
such
a
Being
,
actually
existent
,
might
give
us
that
evidence
of
his
existence
that
should
be
sutable
to
our
present
state
,
and
sufficient
to
out-weigh
all
objections
to
the
contrary
(
without
which
it
were
not
rationally
sufficient
.
)
And
that
we
can
apprehend
no
possible
way
of
doing
this
,
which
will
not
be
liable
to
the
same
or
equal
objections
as
may
be
made
against
the
present
means
we
have
for
the
begetting
of
this
certainty
in
us
,
then
we
have
already
sufficient
evidence
of
this
Beings
existence
.
That
is
such
as
ought
to
prevail
against
all
objections
,
and
obtain
our
assent
that
it
doth
exist
.
Here
it
is
only
needful
to
be
considered
what
ways
can
be
thought
of
,
which
we
will
say
might
assure
us
in
this
matter
,
that
we
already
have
not
.
And
what
might
be
objected
against
them
,
equally
,
as
against
the
means
we
now
have
.
Will
we
say
such
a
Being
,
if
he
did
actually
We
will
not
insist
,
what
there
is
of
this
already
.
Let
them
consider
who
gainsay
,
what
they
can
find
of
it
in
their
own
minds
.
And
whether
they
are
not
engaged
by
their
Atheistical
inclinations
in
a
contention
against
themselves
,
and
their
more
natural
sentiments
:
From
which
they
find
it
a
matter
of
no
small
difficulty
to
be
delivered
?
It
was
not
for
nothing
,
that
even
Epicurus
himself
calls
this
of
an
existing
Diety
,
a
Proleptical
Notion
.
But
you
may
say
,
the
impression
might
have
been
simply
universal
,
and
so
irresistable
,
as
to
prevent
or
overbear
all
doubt
or
inclination
to
doubt
.
And
,
first
,
for
the
universality
of
it
,
why
may
we
not
suppose
it
already
sufficiently
universal
?
As
hath
been
heretofore
alledged
.
With
what
confidence
can
the
few
dissenting
Atheists
,
that
have
professed
to
be
of
another
perswasion
,
put
that
value
upon
themselves
,
as
to
reckon
their
dissent
considerable
enough
to
implede
the
universality
of
this
impression
.
Or
what
doth
it
signifie
more
to
that
purpose
,
than
some
few
instances
may
do
,
of
persons
so
stupidly
foolish
as
to
give
much
less
discovery
of
any
rational
faculty
,
than
some
beasts
,
to
the
impugning
the
universal
rationality
of
mankind
?
Besides
that
,
your
contrary
profession
is
no
sufficient
argument
of
your
contrary
perswasion
,
much
less
,
that
you
never
had
any
stamp
or
impression
of
a
Deity
upon
your
minds
,
or
that
you
have
quite
raz'd
it
out
.
It
is
much
to
be
suspected
that
you
hold
not
your
contrary
perswasion
,
with
that
unshaken
confidence
,
and
freedom
from
all
fearful
and
suspicious
mis-givings
,
as
that
you
have
much
more
reason
to
brag
of
your
dis-belief
for
the
strength
,
than
you
have
for
the
goodness
of
it
.
And
that
you
have
those
qualmish
fits
,
which
bewray
the
impression
(
at
least
to
your
own
notice
and
reflection
,
if
you
would
but
allow
your selves
the
liberty
of
so
much
converse
with
your selves
)
that
you
will
not
confess
,
and
yet
cannot
utterly
deface
.
But
if
in
this
you
had
quite
won
the
day
,
and
were
masters
of
your
design
;
were
it
not
pretty
to
suppose
that
the
common
consent
of
mankind
would
be
a
good
argument
of
the
existence
of
a
Deity
.
If
it
be
so
universal
as
to
include
your
vote
and
suffrage
(
as
no
doubt
it
is
without
you
a
better
than
you
can
answer
)
but
that
when
you
have
made
an
hard
shift
to
withdraw
your
assent
,
you
have
undone
the
Deity
and
Religion
!
Doth
this
cause
stand
and
fall
with
you
?
Unto
which
you
can
contribute
about
as
much
as
the
fly
to
the
triumph
!
was
that
true
before
,
which
now
your
hard-la-boured
dissent
hath
made
false
?
But
if
this
impression
were
simply
universal
,
so
as
also
to
include
you
,
it
matters
not
what
men
would
say
or
object
against
it
;
(
it
is
to
be
supposed
they
would
be
in
no
disposition
to
object
any
thing
.
)
But
what
were
to
be
said
;
or
what
the
case
it self
,
objectively
considered
,
would
admit
.
And
though
it
would
not
(
as
now
it
doth
not
)
admit
of
any
thing
to
be
said
to
any
purpose
;
yet
the
same
thing
were
still
to
be
said
that
you
now
say
.
And
if
we
should
but
again
unsuppose
so
much
of
the
former
supposition
,
as
to
imagine
that
some
few
should
have
made
their
escape
,
and
disburdened
themselves
of
all
apprehensions
of
God
.
Would
they
not
with
the
same
impudence
as
you
now
do
,
say
that
all
Religion
were
nothing
else
but
Enthusiastical
Fanaticism
?
And
that
all
mankind
,
besides
themselves
,
were
enslaved
fools
?
And
for
the
meer
irresistableness
of
this
impression
;
'T
is
true
it
would
take
away
all
disposition
to
oppose
,
but
it
may
be
presumed
this
is
none
of
the
rational
evidence
which
we
suppose
you
to
mean
;
when
you
admit
(
if
you
do
admit
)
that
,
some
way
or
other
,
the
existence
of
such
a
Being
might
be
(
possibly
)
made
so
evident
,
as
to
induce
a
rational
certainty
thereof
.
For
to
believe
such
a
thing
to
be
true
only
upon
a
strong
impulse
(
how
certain
soever
the
thing
be
)
is
not
to
assent
to
it
upon
a
foregoing
reason
.
Nor
can
any
,
in
that
case
,
tell
why
they
believe
it
,
but
that
they
believe
it
.
You
will
not
sure
think
any
thing
the
truer
for
this
,
only
,
that
such
and
such
believe
it
with
a
sturdy
confidence
.
'T
is
true
that
the
universality
and
naturalness
of
such
a
perswasion
,
as
pointing
us
to
a
common
cause
thereof
,
affords
the
matter
of
an
argument
,
or
is
a
medium
not
contemptible
nor
capable
of
answer
,
as
hath
been
said
before
.
But
to
be
irresistibly
captivated
into
an
assent
,
is
no
medium
at
all
;
but
an
immediate
perswasion
of
the
thing
it self
without
a
reason
.
Therefore
must
it
yet
be
demanded
of
Atheistical
persons
,
what
means
,
that
you
yet
How
easie
would
it
be
to
object
that
,
with
much
advantage
,
against
what
any
temporary
apparition
,
be
it
as
glorious
as
you
can
imagine
,
might
seem
to
signifie
to
this
purpose
.
Would
dreadful
loud
voices
proclaiming
him
to
be
of
whose
existence
you
doubt
have
serv'd
the
turn
?
It
is
likely
,
if
your
fear
would
have
permitted
you
to
use
your
wit
,
you
would
have
had
some
subtil
inventions
how
by
some
odd
rancounter
of
angry
atoms
,
the
air
or
clouds
might
become
thus
terribly
vocal
.
And
when
you
know
already
,
that
they
do
sometimes
salute
your
ears
with
very
loud
sounds
(
as
when
it
thunders
)
there
is
little
doubt
,
but
your
great
wit
can
devise
a
way
,
how
possibly
such
sounds
might
become
articulate
.
And
for
the
sense
and
coherent
import
of
what
were
spoken
;
you
that
are
so
good
at
conjecturing
how
things
might
casually
happen
,
would
not
be
long
in
making
a
guess
that
might
serve
that
turn
also
.
Except
you
were
grown
very
dull
and
barren
;
and
that
fancy
that
served
you
to
imagine
how
the
whole
frame
of
the
universe
:
and
the
rare
structure
of
the
bodies
of
animals
,
yea
and
even
the
reasonable
soul
it self
might
be
all
casual
productions
,
cannot
now
devise
how
,
by
chance
,
a
few
words
(
for
you
do
not
say
you
expect
long
orations
)
might
fall
out
to
be
sense
,
though
there
were
no
intelligent
speaker
.
But
would
strange
and
wonderful
effects
that
might
surprise
and
amaze
you
do
the
business
?
we
may
challenge
you
to
try
your
faculty
,
and
stretch
it
to
the
uttermost
;
and
then
tell
us
,
what
imagination
you
have
formed
of
any
thing
more
strange
and
wonderful
,
than
the
already
extant
frame
of
nature
in
the
whole
,
and
the
several
parts
of
it
.
Will
he
that
hath
a
while
considered
the
composition
of
the
world
;
the
exact
and
orderly
motions
of
the
Sun
,
Moon
,
and
Stars
;
the
fabrick
of
his
own
body
,
and
the
powers
of
his
soul
,
expect
yet
a
wonder
to
prove
to
him
there
is
a
God
?
But
if
that
be
the
complexion
of
your
minds
,
that
it
is
not
the
greatness
of
any
work
,
but
the
novelty
and
surprisingness
of
it
,
that
will
convince
you
;
It
is
not
rational
evidence
you
seek
.
Nor
is
it
your
Reason
,
but
your
idle
curiosity
you
would
have
gratified
;
which
deserves
no
more
satisfaction
than
that
fond
wish
,
that
one
might
come
from
the
dead
to
warn
men
on
earth
lest
they
should
come
into
the
place
of
torment
.
And
if
such
means
as
these
that
have
been
mentioned
should
be
thought
necessary
,
I
would
ask
,
are
they
necessary
to
every
individval
person
?
so
as
that
no
man
shall
be
esteemed
to
have
had
sufficient
means
of
conviction
who
hath
not
with
his
own
eyes
beheld
some
such
glorious
apparition
;
or
himself
heard
some
such
terrible
voice
,
or
been
the
immediate
witness
or
subject
of
some
prodigious
wonderful
work
?
Yea
,
or
will
tht
once
seeing
,
hearing
,
or
feeling
them
suffice
?
Is
it
not
necessary
there
should
be
a
frequent
repetition
and
renewal
of
these
amazing
things
,
lest
the
impression
wearing
off
,
there
be
a
relapse
,
and
a
gradual
sliding
into
an
oblivion
and
unapprehensiveness
of
that
Beings
existence
,
whereof
they
had
,
sometime
received
a
conviction
.
Now
if
such
a
continual
iteration
of
these
strange
things
were
thought
necessary
,
would
they
not
hereby
soon
cease
to
be
strange
?
And
then
if
their
strangeness
was
necessary
,
by
that
very
thing
wherein
their
sufficiency
for
conviction
is
said
to
consist
,
they
should
become
useless
.
Or
,
if
by
their
frequent
variations
(
which
it
is
possible
to
suppose
)
a
perpetual
amusement
be
still
kept
up
in
the
minds
of
men
:
and
they
be
always
full
of
consternation
and
wonder
.
Doth
this
temper
so
much
befriend
the
exercise
of
Reason
?
or
contribute
to
the
sober
consideration
of
things
?
As
if
men
could
not
be
rational
without
being
half
mad
.
And
,
indeed
,
they
might
soon
become
altogether
so
,
by
being
,
but
a
while
,
beset
with
objects
so
full
of
terror
,
as
are
,
by
this
supposition
,
made
the
necessary
means
to
convince
them
of
a
Deity
.
[
†
](A44683-e12560-b)
†
Now
were
not
that
a
most
improper
course
and
unsutable
to
the
nature
of
man
that
should
rather
tend
to
destroy
his
reason
or
judgment
than
convince
it
?
And
were
this
a
fit
means
of
ruling
the
world
,
of
preserving
order
among
mankind
?
what
business
could
then
be
followed
?
who
could
intend
the
affairs
of
their
callings
?
who
could
either
be
capable
of
governing
,
or
of
being
governed
while
all
mens
minds
should
be
wholly
taken
up
either
in
the
amazed
view
or
the
suspenceful
expectation
of
nought
else
but
strange
things
?
To
which
purpose
much
hath
been
of
late
,
with
so
excellent
reason
,
discoursed
by
a
worthy
Author
,
that
it
is
Shut
the
windows
that
the
house
may
be
light
.
And
might
learn
to
put
a
sense
,
not
intollerable
,
upon
those
passages
of
some
mystical
Writers
[
*
](A44683-e12600-b)
*
D.
Areop.
l.
de
myster.
Theol.
c.
1.
that
God
is
to
be
seen
in
a
Divine
cloud
or
darkness
,
as
one
[
†
](A44683-e12630-b)
†
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
;
and
with
closed
eyes
,
as
another
[
*
](A44683-e12650-b)
*
Procl
.
in
Plat.
Theol.
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
.
speaks
(
though
what
was
their
very
sense
I
will
not
pretend
to
tell
.
)
Besides
that
,
by
this
means
,
there
would
naturally
ensue
the
continual
excitation
of
so
vexatious
and
enthralling
passions
,
so
servile
and
tormenting
fears
and
amazements
;
as
could
not
but
hold
the
souls
of
men
under
a
constant
and
comfortless
restraint
,
from
any
free
and
ingenuous
access
to
God
,
or
conversation
with
him
.
Wherein
the
very
life
of
Religion
consists
.
And
then
to
what
purpose
doth
the
discovery
and
acknowledgment
of
the
Deity
serve
?
Inasmuch
as
it
is
never
to
be
thought
that
the
existence
of
God
is
a
thing
to
be
known
only
that
it
may
be
known
.
But
that
the
end
it
serves
for
is
Religion
.
A
complacential
and
chearful
adoration
of
him
and
application
of
our selves
with
at
once
both
dutiful
and
pleasant
affections
towards
him
.
That
were
a
strange
means
of
coming
to
know
that
he
is
,
that
should
only
tend
to
destroy
or
hinder
the
very
end
it self
of
that
knowledge
.
Wherefore
all
this
being
considered
,
it
is
likely
it
would
not
be
insisted
upon
as
necessary
to
our
being
perswaded
of
Gods
existence
,
that
he
should
so
multiply
strange
and
astonishing
things
,
as
that
every
man
might
be
a
daily
amazed
beholder
and
witness
of
them
.
And
if
their
frequency
,
and
constant
iteration
be
acknowledged
not
necessary
,
but
shall
wholly
inconvenient
,
more
rare
discoveries
of
him
in
the
very
ways
we
have
been
speaking
of
have
not
been
wanting
.
What
would
we
think
of
such
an
appearance
of
God
as
that
was
upon
Mount
Sinai
?
when
he
came
down
(
or
caused
a
sensible
Glory
to
descend
)
in
the
sight
of
all
that
great
people
!
wherein
the
several
things
concurred
that
were
above-mentioned
!
Let
us
but
suppose
such
an
appearance
in
all
the
concurrent
circumstances
of
it
as
that
is
said
to
have
been
.
That
is
,
we
will
suppose
an
equally
great
assembly
or
multitude
of
people
is
gathered
together
,
and
a
solemn
forewarning
is
given
and
proclaimed
among
them
by
appointed
Heraulds
or
Officers
of
State
,
that
,
on
such
a
prefixed
day
,
now
very
nigh
at
hand
,
the
Divine
Majesty
and
Glory
(
even
his
Glory
set
in
Majesty
)
will
visibly
appear
and
shew
it self
to
them
.
They
are
most
severely
enjoyned
to
prepare
themselves
and
be
in
readiness
against
that
day
.
Great
care
is
taken
to
sanctifie
the
people
,
and
the
place
,
Bounds
are
set
about
the
designed
Theatre
of
this
great
appearance
.
All
are
strictly
required
to
observe
their
due
and
awful
distances
,
and
abstain
from
more
audacious
approaches
and
gazings
;
lest
that
terrible
glory
break
out
upon
them
and
they
perish
.
An
irreverent
or
disrespectful
look
,
they
are
told
,
will
be
mortal
to
them
,
or
a
very
touch
of
any
part
of
this
sacred
inclosure
.
In
the
morning
of
the
appointed
day
,
there
are
thunders
and
lightnings
,
and
a
thick
cloud
upon
the
hallowed
Mount.
The
exceeding
loud
sound
of
Trumpet
proclaims
the
Lords
descent
.
He
descends
in
fire
,
the
flames
whereof
invelope
the
trembling
Mount
(
now
floored
with
a
Saphyr
pavement
clear
as
the
body
of
heaven
.
)
And
ascend
into
the
middle
region
or
(
as
it
is
exprest
)
into
the
midst
or
heart
of
the
heavens
.
The
voice
of
words
(
a
loud
and
dreadful
voice
)
audible
to
all
that
mighty
Assembly
,
in
which
were
600000
men
(
probably
more
than
a
million
of
persons
)
issues
forth
from
amidst
that
terrible
glory
pronouncing
to
them
,
that
I
am
Jehovah
thy
God
.
—
And
thence
proceeding
to
give
them
precepts
,
so
plain
and
clear
,
so
comprehensive
and
full
,
so
unexceptionably
just
and
righteous
,
so
agreeable
to
the
nature
of
man
,
and
subservient
to
his
good
;
that
nothing
could
be
more
worthy
the
great
Creator
,
or
more
aptly
sutable
to
such
a
sort
of
creatures
.
It
is
very
likely
,
indeed
,
that
such
a
demonstration
would
leave
no
spectator
in
doubt
concerning
the
existence
of
God
;
and
would
puzzle
the
Philosophy
of
the
most
sceptical
Atheist
to
give
an
account
,
otherwise
,
of
the
Phaenomenon
.
And
if
such
could
devise
to
say
any
thing
that
should
seem
plausible
to
some
very
easie
half-witted
persons
that
were
not
present
,
they
would
have
an
hard
task
of
it
to
quiet
the
minds
of
those
that
were
;
or
make
them
believe
this
was
nothing
else
but
some
odd
conjuncture
of
certain
fiery
atoms
,
that
by
some
strange
accident
happened
into
this
occursion
and
conflict
with
one
another
;
or
some
illusion
of
phansie
,
by
which
so
great
a
multitude
were
all
at
once
imposed
upon
.
So
as
that
they
only
seemed
to
themselves
to
hear
and
see
what
they
heard
and
saw
not
.
Nor
is
it
likely
they
would
be
very
confident
of
the
truth
of
their
own
conjecture
,
or
be
apt
to
venture
much
upon
it
themselves
,
having
been
the
eye
and
ear-witnesses
of
these
things
.
But
is
it
necessary
this
course
shall
be
taken
to
make
the
world
know
there
is
a
God
?
such
an
appearance
indeed
would
more
powerfully
strike
sense
;
but
unto
sober
and
considerate
Reason
were
it
a
greater
thing
than
the
making
such
a
world
as
this
?
And
the
disposing
this
great
variety
of
particular
Beings
in
it
,
into
so
exact
and
elegant
an
order
?
And
the
sustaining
and
preserving
it
in
the
same
state
through
so
many
ages
?
Let
the
vast
and
unknown
extent
of
the
whole
,
the
admirable
variety
,
the
elegant
shapes
,
the
regular
motions
,
the
excellent
faculties
and
powers
of
that
unconceivable
number
of
creatures
contained
in
it
,
be
considered
.
And
is
there
any
comparison
between
that
temporary
transient
occasional
,
and
this
steady
permanent
and
universal
discovery
of
God
?
Nor
(
supposing
the
truth
of
the
History
)
can
it
be
thought
the
design
of
this
appearance
to
these
Hebrews
was
to
convince
them
of
the
existence
of
a
Deity
to
be
worshipped
;
when
both
they
had
so
convincing
evidence
thereof
many
ways
before
;
and
the
other
Nations
,
that
,
which
they
left
,
and
those
whither
they
went
,
were
not
without
their
Religion
and
worship
,
such
as
it
was
.
But
to
engage
them
by
so
majestick
a
representation
thereof
,
to
a
more
exact
observance
of
his
will
,
now
made
known
.
Though
,
had
there
been
any
doubt
of
the
former
(
as
we
can
hardly
suppose
they
could
,
before
,
have
more
doubted
of
the
being
of
a
God
,
than
that
there
were
men
on
earth
)
this
might
collaterally
and
besides
its
chief
intention
,
be
a
means
to
confirm
them
concerning
that
alse
:
But
that
it
was
necessary
for
that
end
,
we
have
no
pretence
to
imagine
.
The
like
may
be
said
concerning
other
Miracles
heretofore
wrought
,
that
the
intent
of
them
was
to
justifie
the
Divine
Authority
of
him
who
wrought
them
,
to
prove
him
sent
by
God
,
and
so
countenance
the
Doctrine
or
Message
delivered
by
him
.
Not
that
they
tended
(
otherwise
than
on
the
by
)
to
prove
Gods
existence
.
Much
less
was
this
so
amazing
an
appearance
needful
or
intended
for
that
end
,
and
least
of
all
was
it
necessary
,
that
this
should
be
Gods
ordinary
way
of
making
it
known
to
men
that
he
doth
exist
:
So
as
that
for
this
purpose
he
should
often
repeat
so
terrible
representations
of
himself
.
And
how
inconvenient
it
were
to
mortal
men
,
as
well
as
unnecessary
,
the
astonishment
wherewith
it
possessed
that
people
is
an
evidence
.
And
their
passionate
affrighted
wish
thereupon
,
Let
not
God
any
more
speak
to
us
,
lest
we
die
.
They
apprehended
it
impossible
for
them
to
out-live
such
an
other
sight
!
And
if
that
so
amazing
an
appearance
of
the
Divine
Majesty
(
sometime
afforded
)
were
not
necessary
,
but
some
way
,
on
the
by
,
useful
for
the
confirming
that
people
in
the
perswasion
of
Gods
existence
,
why
may
it
not
be
useful
also
for
the
same
purpose
even
now
to
us
?
Is
it
that
we
think
that
can
be
less
true
now
which
was
so
gloriously
evident
to
be
true
four
thousand
years
ago
?
Or
is
it
that
we
can
dis-believe
or
doubt
the
truth
of
the
History
?
what
should
be
the
ground
or
pretence
of
doubt
?
If
it
were
a
fiction
,
it
is
manifest
it
was
feigned
by
some
person
that
had
the
use
of
his
understanding
,
and
was
not
besides
himself
,
as
the
coherence
and
contexture
of
parts
doth
plainly
shew
.
But
would
any
man
not
besides
himself
,
designing
to
gain
credit
to
a
forged
report
of
a
matter
of
fact
ever
say
there
were
600000
persons
present
at
the
doing
of
it
?
.
Would
it
not
rather
have
been
pretended
done
in
a
corner
?
Or
is
it
imaginable
it
should
never
have
met
with
contradiction
?
That
none
of
the
pretended
by-standers
should
disclaim
the
avouchment
of
it
?
and
say
they
knew
of
no
such
matter
?
Especially
if
it
be
considered
that
the
laws
said
to
be
given
at
that
time
;
chiefly
those
which
were
reported
to
have
been
written
in
the
two
Tables
,
were
not
so
favourable
to
vicious
inclinations
,
nor
that
people
so
strict
and
scrupulous
observers
of
them
.
But
that
they
would
have
been
glad
to
have
had
any
thing
to
pretend
against
the
authority
of
the
legislature
,
if
the
case
could
have
admitted
it
.
When
they
discovered
,
in
that
,
and
succeeding
time
,
so
violently
prone
,
and
unretractable
a
propension
to
Idolatry
and
other
wickednesses
directly
against
the
very
letter
of
that
Law
.
How
welcome
and
covetable
a
plea
had
it
been
,
in
their
frequent
and
sometimes
almost
universal
apostasies
,
could
they
have
had
such
a
thing
to
pretend
that
the
Law
it self
that
curbed
them
was
a
cheat
.
But
we
always
find
,
that
though
they
laboured
,
in
some
of
their
degeneracies
,
and
when
they
were
lapsed
into
a
more
corrupted
state
,
to
render
it
more
easie
to
themselves
by
favourable
glosses
and
interpretations
.
Yet
,
even
in
the
most
corrupt
,
they
never
went
about
to
deny
or
implead
its
Divine
original
;
whereof
they
were
ever
so
Religious
asserters
as
no
people
under
heaven
could
be
more
.
And
the
awful
apprehension
whereof
prevailed
so
far
with
them
,
as
that
care
was
taken
(
as
is
notoriously
known
)
by
those
appointed
to
that
charge
that
the
very
letters
should
be
numbred
of
the
sacred
Writings
,
lest
there
should
happen
any
the
minutest
alteration
in
them
.
Much
more
might
be
said
if
it
were
needful
for
the
evincing
the
truth
of
this
particular
piece
of
History
;
and
its
little
to
be
doubted
but
any
man
who
with
sober
and
impartial
reason
considers
the
circumstances
relating
to
it
,
the
easily
evidenceable
antiquity
of
the
Records
whereof
this
is
a
part
.
The
certain
nearness
of
the
time
of
writing
them
to
the
time
when
this
thing
is
said
to
have
been
done
,
the
great
reputation
of
the
Writer
even
among
Pagans
,
the
great
multitude
of
the
alledged
witnesses
and
spectacles
,
the
no-contradiction
ever
heard
of
.
The
universal
consent
and
suffrage
of
that
Nation
through
all
times
to
this
day
,
even
when
their
practice
hath
been
most
contrary
to
the
Laws
then
given
;
the
securely
confident
and
unsuspicious
reference
of
later
pieces
of
sacred
Scripture
thereto
(
even
some
parts
of
the
New
Testament
)
as
a
most
known
and
undoubted
thing
.
The
long
series
and
tract
of
time
through
which
that
people
are
said
to
have
had
extraordinary
and
sensible
indications
of
the
Divine
Presence
,
(
which
if
it
had
been
false
could
not
in
so
long
a
time
but
have
been
evicted
of
falshood
.
)
Their
miraculous
and
wonderful
eduction
out
of
Egypt
not
denied
by
any
,
and
more
obscurely
acknowledged
by
some
Heathen
Writers
,
their
conduct
through
the
Wilderness
,
and
settlement
in
Canaan
;
their
constitution
and
form
of
Polity
known
for
many
Ages
to
have
been
a
Theocracy
;
their
usual
ways
of
consulting
God
upon
all
more
important
occasions
.
Whosoever
I
say
shall
soberly
consider
these
things
(
and
many
more
might
easily
occur
to
such
as
would
think
fit
to
let
their
thoughts
dwell
a
while
upon
this
subject
)
will
,
not
only
,
from
some
of
them
think
it
highly
improbable
,
but
,
from
others
of
them
,
plainly
impossible
that
the
history
of
this
appearance
should
have
been
a
contrived
piece
of
falshood
.
Yea
,
and
though
as
was
said
,
the
view
of
such
a
thing
with
ones
own
eyes
would
make
a
more
powerful
impreson
upon
our
phansie
or
imagination
,
yet
if
we
speak
of
rational
evidence
(
which
is
quite
another
thing
)
of
the
truth
of
a
matter
of
fact
that
were
of
this
astonishing
nature
,
I
should
think
it
were
much
(
at
least
if
I
were
credibly
told
that
so
many
hundred
thousand
persons
saw
it
at
once
,
as
if
I
had
been
the
single
unaccomcompanied
spectator
of
it
my self
.
Not
to
say
that
it
were
apparently
in
some
respect
much
greater
;
could
we
but
obtain
of
our selves
to
distinguish
between
the
pleasing
of
our
curiosity
and
the
satisfying
of
our
reason
.
So
that
,
upon
the
whole
,
I
see
not
why
it
may
not
be
concluded
,
with
the
greatest
confidence
,
that
both
the
(
supposed
)
existence
of
a
Deity
is
possible
to
be
certainly
known
to
men
on
earth
,
in
some
way
that
is
sutable
to
their
present
state
,
that
there
are
no
means
fitter
to
be
ordinary
than
those
we
already
have
,
and
that
more
extraordinary
additional
confirmations
are
partly
therefore
not
necessary
,
and
partly
not
wanting
.
Again
it
may
be
further
demanded
(
as
such
a
one
now
ruling
over
them
?
To
say
no
,
is
to
raze
the
foundation
of
civil
Government
,
and
reduce
it
wholly
to
domestical
,
by
such
a
Ruler
as
may
ever
be
in
present
view
.
Which
yet
is
,
upon
such
terms
,
never
possible
to
be
preserved
also
.
It
is
plain
many
do
firmly
enough
believe
that
there
is
a
King
reigning
over
them
;
who
not
only
never
saw
the
King
,
but
never
saw
the
splendor
of
his
Court
,
the
pomp
of
his
attendance
,
or
it
may
be
,
never
saw
the
man
that
had
seen
the
King
?
And
is
not
all
dutiful
and
loyal
obedience
wont
to
be
challenged
,
and
paid
of
such
as
well
as
his
other
Subjects
.
Or
would
it
be
thought
a
reasonable
excuse
of
disloyalty
,
that
any
such
persons
should
say
they
had
never
seen
the
King
or
his
Court
?
Or
a
reasonable
demand
,
as
the
condition
of
required
subjection
,
that
the
Court
be
kept
sometime
in
their
Village
,
that
they
might
have
the
opportunity
of
beholding
at
least
some
of
the
Insignia
of
Regality
,
or
more
splendid
appearances
of
that
Majesty
which
claims
subjection
from
them
?
much
more
would
it
be
deemed
unreasonable
and
insolent
,
that
every
Subject
should
expect
to
see
the
face
of
the
Prince
every
day
,
otherwise
they
will
not
obey
nor
believe
there
is
any
such
person
.
Whereas
it
hath
been
judged
rather
more
expedient
and
serviceable
to
the
continuing
the
veneration
of
Majesty
(
and
in
a
Monarchy
of
no
mean
reputation
for
wisdom
and
greatness
)
that
the
Prince
did
very
rarely
offer
himself
to
the
view
of
the
people
.
Surely
more
ordinary
and
remote
discoveries
of
an
existing
Prince
and
Ruler
over
them
(
the
effects
of
his
power
,
and
the
influences
of
his
government
)
will
be
reckoned
sufficient
even
as
to
many
parts
of
his
Dominions
,
that
,
possibly
through
many
succeeding
generations
never
had
other
.
And
yet
how
unspeakably
less
sensible
,
less
immediate
,
less
constant
,
less
necessary
,
less
numerous
are
the
effects
and
instances
of
regal
humane
power
,
and
wisdom
than
of
the
Divine
;
which
latter
we
behold
which
way
soever
we
look
,
and
feel
in
every
thing
we
touch
or
have
any
sense
of
,
and
may
reflect
upon
in
our
very
senses
themselves
,
and
in
all
the
parts
and
powers
that
belong
to
us
.
And
so
certainly
that
if
we
would
allow
our selves
the
liberty
of
serious
thoughts
,
we
might
soon
find
it
were
utterly
impossible
such
effects
should
ever
have
been
without
that
only
cause
.
That
without
its
influence
,
it
had
never
been
possible
,
that
we
could
hear
,
or
see
,
or
speak
,
or
think
,
or
live
,
or
be
any
thing
,
nor
that
any
other
thing
could
ever
have
been
,
when
as
the
effects
that
serve
so
justly
to
endear
and
recommend
to
us
civil
Government
(
as
peace
,
safety
,
order
,
quiet
possession
of
our
rights
)
we
cannot
but
know
are
not
inseparably
and
incommunicably
appropriate
or
to
be
attributed
to
the
person
of
this
or
that
particular
and
mortal
Governour
;
but
may
also
proceed
from
another
:
yea
and
the
same
benefits
may
(
for
some
short
time
at
least
)
be
continued
without
any
such
government
at
all
.
Nor
is
this
intended
meerly
as
a
rhetorical
scheme
of
speech
to
beguile
or
amuse
the
unwary
Reader
:
But
,
without
arrogating
any
thing
,
or
attributing
more
to
it
,
than
that
it
is
an
(
altogether
inartificial
and
very
defective
,
but
)
true
and
naked
representation
of
the
very
case
it self
as
it
is
.
'T
is
professedly
propounded
as
having
somewhat
solidly
argumentative
in
it
.
That
is
that
,
(
whereas
there
is
most
confessedly
sufficient
yet
)
there
is
unspeakably
less
evidence
to
most
people
in
the
world
under
civil
government
;
that
there
actually
is
such
a
government
existent
over
them
;
and
that
they
are
under
obligation
to
be
subject
to
it
;
than
there
is
of
the
existence
of
a
Deity
,
and
the
(
consequent
)
reasonableness
of
Religion
.
If
therefore
the
ordinary
effects
and
indications
of
the
former
,
be
sufficient
,
which
have
so
contingent
and
uncertain
a
connexion
with
their
causes
(
while
those
which
are
more
extraordinary
are
so
exceeding
rare
with
the
most
)
why
shall
not
the
more
certain
ordinary
discoveries
of
the
latter
be
judged
sufficient
,
though
the
most
have
not
the
immediate
notice
of
any
such
extraordinary
appearances
as
those
are
which
have
been
before
mentioned
?
Moreover
,
I
yet
demand
further
,
whether
it
may
be
thought
possible
for
any
one
to
have
civil
conversation
is
taken
away
.
And
what
evidence
have
we
of
it
,
whereunto
that
which
we
have
of
the
being
of
God
(
as
the
foundation
of
religious
and
godly
conversation
)
will
not
at
least
be
found
equivalent
?
Will
we
say
that
meer
humane
shape
is
enough
to
prove
such
a
one
a
man
?
A
Philosopher
would
deride
us
,
as
the
Stagyrites
Disciples
are
said
to
have
done
the
Platonick
man
.
But
we
will
not
be
so
nice
.
We
acknowledge
it
is
,
if
no
circumstances
concurr
(
as
suddain
appearing
,
vanishing
,
transformation
or
the
like
)
that
plainly
evince
the
contrary
;
so
far
as
to
infer
upon
us
an
obligation
,
not
to
be
rude
,
and
uncivil
;
that
we
use
no
violence
,
or
carry
our selves
abusively
towards
one
,
that
,
only
thus
,
appears
an
humane
creature
.
Yea
,
and
to
perform
any
duty
of
Justice
or
Charity
towards
him
within
our
power
,
which
we
owe
to
a
man
as
a
man
.
As
suppose
we
see
him
wronged
,
or
in
necessity
,
and
can
presently
right
,
or
relieve
him
;
though
he
do
not
,
or
cannot
represent
to
us
more
of
his
case
,
than
our
own
eyes
inform
us
of
.
And
should
an
act
of
Murther
be
committed
upon
one
whose
true
humanity
was
not
otherwise
evident
,
would
he
not
be
justly
liable
to
the
known
and
common
punishment
of
that
offence
?
Nor
could
he
acquit
himself
of
transgressing
the
laws
of
humanity
,
if
he
should
only
neglect
any
seasonable
act
of
Justice
or
Mercy
towards
him
,
whereof
he
beholds
the
present
occasion
.
But
if
any
one
were
disposed
to
cavil
or
play
the
Sophister
;
how
much
more
might
be
said
,
even
by
infinite
degrees
,
to
oppose
this
single
evidence
of
any
ones
true
humanity
;
than
ever
was
,
or
can
be
brought
against
the
entire
concurrent
evidence
we
have
of
the
existence
of
God
.
It
is
,
here
,
most
manifestly
just
and
equal
thus
to
state
the
case
,
and
compare
the
whole
evidence
we
have
of
the
latter
,
with
that
one
of
the
former
;
Inasmuch
as
that
one
alone
,
is
apparently
enough
to
oblige
us
to
carry
towards
such
a
one
as
a
man
.
And
if
that
alone
be
sufficient
to
oblige
us
to
acts
of
Justice
or
Charity
towards
man
,
he
is
strangely
blind
that
cannot
see
infinitely
more
to
oblige
him
to
acts
of
Piety
towards
God
.
But
if
we
would
take
a
nearer
and
more
strict
view
of
this
parallel
,
we
would
state
the
general
and
more
obvious
aspect
of
this
world
,
on
the
one
hand
,
and
the
external
aspect
and
shape
of
a
man
on
the
other
;
and
should
then
see
the
former
doth
evidence
to
us
an
in-dwelling
Deity
,
diffused
through
the
whole
,
and
actuating
every
part
,
with
incomparably
greater
certainty
,
than
the
latter
doth
an
in-dwelling
reasonable
soul.
In
which
way
we
shall
find
,
what
will
aptly
serve
our
present
purpose
,
though
we
are
far
from
apprehending
any
such
union
of
the
blessed
God
with
this
world
,
as
is
between
the
soul
and
body
of
a
man
.
It
is
manifestly
possible
,
to
our
understandings
,
that
there
may
be
,
and
(
if
any
history
or
testimony
of
others
be
worthy
to
be
believed
)
certain
to
experience
and
sense
,
that
there
,
often
,
hath
been
,
the
appearance
of
humane
shape
,
and
of
agreeable
actions
,
without
a
real
man
.
But
it
is
no
way
possible
such
a
world
as
this
should
have
ever
been
without
God
.
That
there
is
a
world
,
proves
that
eternal
Being
to
exist
whom
we
take
to
be
God
;
suppose
we
it
as
rude
an
heap
as
at
first
it
was
,
or
as
we
can
suppose
it
;
as
external
appearance
represents
to
us
that
creature
which
we
take
to
be
a
man
;
But
that
,
as
a
certain
infallible
discovery
,
necessarily
true
.
This
,
but
as
a
probable
and
conjectural
one
,
and
(
though
highly
probable
)
not
impossible
to
be
false
.
And
if
we
will
yet
descend
to
a
more
particular
enquiry
into
this
matter
,
which
way
will
we
fully
be
ascertain'd
that
this
supposed
man
is
truly
and
really
what
he
seems
to
be
.
This
we
know
not
how
to
go
about
without
recollecting
,
what
is
the
differencing
notion
we
have
of
a
man
that
he
is
(
viz.
)
a
reasonable
living
creature
,
or
a
reasonable
soul
inhabiting
,
and
united
with
a
body
.
And
how
do
we
think
to
descry
that
,
here
,
which
may
answer
this
common
notion
we
have
of
a
man
?
Have
we
any
way
,
besides
that
discovery
,
which
the
acts
and
effects
of
reason
do
make
of
a
rational
or
intelligent
Being
?
We
will
look
more
narrowly
,
i.
e.
unto
somewhat
else
than
his
external
appearance
:
and
observe
the
actions
that
proceed
from
a
more
distinguishing
principle
in
him
;
that
he
reason's
,
discourse's
,
doth
business
,
pursues
designs
;
in
short
he
talks
and
acts
as
a
reasonable
creature
.
And
hence
we
conclude
him
to
be
one
,
or
to
have
a
reasonable
soul
in
him
.
And
have
we
not
the
same
way
of
procedure
in
the
other
case
.
Our
first
view
,
or
taking
notice
of
a
world
,
full
of
life
and
motion
,
assures
us
of
an
eternal
active
Being
,
besides
it
;
which
we
take
to
be
God
,
having
now
before
our
eyes
a
darker
shadow
of
him
;
only
,
as
the
external
bulk
of
the
humane
body
is
only
the
shadow
of
a
man
.
Which
,
when
we
behold
it
stirring
and
moving
,
assures
us
there
is
somewhat
besides
that
grosser
bulk
(
that
of
it self
could
not
so
move
)
which
we
take
to
be
the
soul
of
a
man
.
Yet
as
a
principle
that
can
move
the
body
makes
not
up
the
entire
notion
of
this
soul
;
so
an
eternal
active
Being
,
that
moves
the
matter
of
the
universe
,
makes
not
up
the
full
notion
of
God
.
We
are
thus
far
sure
in
both
cases
,
i.
e.
of
some
mover
distinct
from
what
is
moved
.
But
we
are
not
yet
sure
(
by
what
we
hitherto
see
)
what
the
one
or
the
other
is
.
But
as
,
when
we
have
,
upon
the
first
sight
,
thought
it
was
a
reasonable
soul
that
was
acting
in
the
former
:
or
a
man
(
if
we
will
speak
according
to
their
sense
,
who
make
the
soul
the
man
)
in
order
to
being
sure
(
as
sure
as
the
case
can
admit
)
we
have
no
other
way
,
but
to
consider
what
belongs
,
more
distinguishingly
,
to
the
notion
of
a
man
,
or
of
a
reasonable
soul
;
and
observe
how
actions
and
effects
,
which
we
have
opportunity
to
take
notice
of
,
do
answer
thereto
,
or
serve
to
discover
that
.
So
when
we
would
be
sure
,
what
that
eternal
active
Being
is
(
which
that
it
is
we
are
already
sure
,
and
)
which
we
have
taken
to
be
God
,
That
I
say
we
may
be
sure
of
that
also
,
we
have
the
same
thing
to
do
.
That
is
to
consider
what
more
peculiarly
belongs
to
the
entire
notion
of
God
(
and
would
even
in
the
judgment
of
opposers
be
acknowledged
to
belong
to
it
)
and
see
whether
his
works
more
narrowly
inspected
do
not
bear
as
manifest
correspondency
to
that
notion
of
God
,
as
the
works
and
actions
of
a
man
do
to
the
notion
we
have
of
him
.
And
certainly
,
we
cannot
but
find
they
do
correspond
as
much
.
And
that
upon
a
serious
and
considerate
view
of
the
works
and
appearances
of
God
in
the
world
,
having
diligently
observed
,
and
pondered
the
vastness
and
beauty
of
this
universe
,
the
variety
,
the
multitude
,
the
order
,
the
exquisite
shapes
,
the
numerous
parts
,
the
admirable
and
useful
composure
of
particular
creatures
;
and
,
especially
,
the
constitution
and
powers
of
the
reasonable
soul
of
man
it self
,
we
cannot
,
surely
,
if
we
be
not
under
the
possession
of
a
very
voluntary
and
obstinate
blindness
,
and
the
power
of
a
most
vicious
prejudice
,
but
acknowledge
the
making
sustaining
and
governing
such
a
world
is
as
God-like
,
as
worthy
of
God
,
and
as
much
becoming
him
,
according
to
the
notion
that
hath
been
assigned
of
him
,
as
at
least
,
the
common
actions
of
ordinary
men
are
of
a
man
;
or
evidence
the
doer
of
them
to
be
an
humane
creature
.
Yea
,
and
with
this
advantageous
difference
,
that
the
actions
of
a
man
do
evidence
an
humane
creature
more
uncertainly
,
and
so
as
it
is
possible
the
matter
may
be
otherwise
:
But
these
works
of
God
do
with
so
plain
and
demonstrative
evidence
discover
him
the
Author
of
them
,
that
it
s
altogether
impossible
they
could
ever
otherwise
have
been
done
.
Now
,
therefore
,
if
we
have
as
clear
evidence
of
a
Deity
as
we
can
have
in
a
way
not
unsutable
to
the
nature
and
present
state
of
man
,
and
we
can
have
in
a
sutable
way
that
which
is
sufficient
.
If
we
have
clear
and
more
certain
evidence
of
Gods
government
over
the
world
,
than
most
men
have
or
can
have
of
the
existence
of
their
Secular
Rulers
;
yea
,
more
sure
than
that
there
are
men
on
earth
,
and
that
thence
(
as
far
as
the
existence
of
God
will
make
towards
it
)
there
is
a
less
disputable
ground
for
Religious
than
for
Civil
Conversation
,
we
may
reckon
our selves
competently
well
ascertain'd
,
and
have
no
longer
reason
to
delay
the
Dedication
of
a
Temple
to
him
upon
any
pretence
of
doubt
,
whether
we
have
an
object
of
worship
existing
yea
or
no.
Wherefore
we
may
also
by
the
way
take
notice
how
impudent
a
thing
is
Atheism
,
that
by
the
same
fulsom
and
poisonous
breath
,
whereby
it
would
blast
Religion
,
would
despoil
man
of
his
reason
and
apprehensive
power
,
even
in
reference
to
the
most
apprehensive
thing
,
would
blow
away
the
rights
of
Princes
and
all
foundations
of
Policy
and
Government
,
and
destroy
all
civil
Commerce
and
Conversation
out
of
the
world
,
and
yet
blushes
not
at
the
attempt
of
so
foul
things
.
And
here
it
may
perhaps
prove
worth
our
the
Atheistical
Temper
and
Genius
,
so
as
therein
to
remark
some
few
more
obvious
characters
of
Atheism
it self
.
And
first
such
,
as
have
not
been
themselves
seized
by
the
infatuation
,
cannot
but
judge
it
a
most
unreasonable
thing
,
a
perverse
and
cross-grain'd
humour
,
that
so
odly
writhes
and
warps
the
mind
of
a
man
,
as
that
it
never
makes
any
effort
,
or
offer
at
any
thing
against
the
Deity
,
but
it
therein
doth
(
by
a
certain
sort
of
serpentine
involution
and
retortion
)
seem
to
design
a
quarrel
with
it self
:
That
is
,
with
(
what
one
would
think
should
be
most
intimate
and
natural
to
the
mind
of
man
)
his
very
reasoning
power
,
and
the
operations
thereof
.
So
near
indeeed
was
the
ancient
alliance
between
God
and
man
(
his
own
Son
,
his
likeness
,
and
living
image
)
and
consequently
between
Reason
and
Religion
;
that
no
man
can
ever
be
engaged
in
an
opposition
to
God
and
his
interest
,
but
he
must
be
equally
so
to
himself
and
his
own
.
And
any
one
that
takes
notice
how
the
business
is
carried
by
an
Atheist
,
must
think
in
order
to
his
becoming
one
,
his
first
plot
was
upon
himself
.
To
assassine
his
own
intellectual
faculty
by
a
sturdy
resolution
,
and
violent
imposing
on
himself
not
to
consider
,
or
use
his
thoughts
,
at
least
with
any
indifferency
,
but
with
a
treacherous
pre-determination
to
the
part
resolved
on
beforehand
.
Otherwise
it
is
hard
to
be
imagined
,
how
it
should
ever
have
been
possible
,
that
so
plain
and
evident
proofs
of
a
Deity
,
as
every
where
offer
themselves
unto
observation
;
even
such
as
have
been
here
proposed
(
that
do
even
lie
open
for
the
most
part
to
common
apprehension
,
and
needed
little
search
to
find
them
out
;
so
that
it
was
harder
to
determine
what
not
to
say
than
what
to
say
)
could
be
over-look'd
.
For
what
could
be
more
easie
and
obvious
,
than
,
taking
notice
,
that
there
is
somewhat
in
Being
,
to
conclude
that
somewhat
must
be
of
it self
,
from
whence
,
whatever
is
not
so
,
must
have
sprung
.
That
since
there
is
somewhat
effected
or
made
(
as
is
plain
,
in
that
some
things
are
alterable
,
and
daily
altered
which
nothing
can
be
that
is
of
it self
,
and
therefore
a
necessary
Being
.
)
Those
effects
have
then
had
an
active
being
for
their
cause
.
That
since
these
effects
are
,
partly
,
such
as
bear
the
manifest
characters
of
wisdom
and
design
upon
them
;
and
are
partly
,
themselves
,
wise
and
designing
;
therefore
they
must
have
had
a
wisely
active
and
designing
cause
.
So
much
would
plainly
conclude
the
sum
of
what
we
have
been
pleading
for
;
and
what
can
be
plainer
or
doth
require
a
shorter
turn
of
thoughts
?
At
this
easie
expence
might
any
one
that
had
a
disposition
to
use
his
understanding
to
such
a
purpose
,
save
himself
from
being
an
Atheist
.
And
where
is
the
flaw
?
what
Joynt
is
not
firm
and
strong
in
this
little
frame
of
discourse
?
which
,
yet
,
arrogates
nothing
to
the
contriver
;
for
there
is
nothing
in
it
worthy
to
be
called
contrivance
:
But
things
do
themselves
lie
thus
.
And
what
hath
been
further
said
concerning
the
Perfection
and
Oneness
of
this
Cause
of
all
things
(
though
somewhat
more
remote
from
common
apprehension
)
is
what
is
likely
would
appear
plain
and
natural
to
such
as
would
allow
themselves
the
leasure
to
look
more
narrowly
into
such
things
.
Atheism
,
therefore
,
seems
to
import
a
direct
and
open
hostility
,
against
the
most
native
genuine
and
facile
dictates
of
common
Reason
.
And
being
so
manifest
an
enemy
to
it
,
we
cannot
suppose
it
should
be
at
all
befriended
by
it
.
For
that
will
be
always
true
and
constant
to
it self
.
Whatsoever
false
shews
of
it
a
bad
cause
doth
sometimes
put
on
.
That
having
yet
somewhat
a
more
creditable
name
,
and
being
of
a
little
more
reputation
in
the
world
,
than
plain
downright
madness
and
folly
.
And
it
will
appear
how
little
it
is
befriended
,
by
any
thing
that
can
justly
,
bear
that
name
;
if
we
consider
the
pittiful
shifts
the
Atheist
makes
for
his
forlorn
cause
:
And
what
infirm
tottering
supports
,
the
whole
frame
of
Atheism
rests
upon
.
For
what
is
there
to
be
said
for
their
hypothesis
,
or
against
the
existence
of
God
,
and
the
duness
of
Religion
?
For
there
's
directly
nothing
at
all
.
Only
a
possibility
is
alledged
,
things
might
be
as
they
are
,
though
God
did
not
exist
.
And
if
this
were
barely
possible
,
how
little
doth
that
signifie
?
where
Reason
is
not
injuriously
dealt
with
,
it
is
permitted
the
liberty
of
ballancing
things
equally
,
and
of
considering
which
scale
hath
most
weight
.
And
is
he
not
perfectly
blind
,
that
sees
not
what
violence
is
done
to
free
reason
in
this
matter
?
Are
there
not
thousands
of
things
,
not
altogether
impossible
,
which
yet
he
would
be
concluded
altogether
out
of
his
wits
that
should
profess
to
be
of
the
opinion
they
are
or
were
actually
so
?
And
as
to
the
present
case
,
how
facile
and
unexceptionable
,
how
plain
and
intelligible
is
the
account
that
is
given
of
the
original
of
this
world
,
and
the
things
contained
in
it
,
by
resolving
all
into
a
Deity
,
the
Author
and
maker
of
them
?
when
as
the
wild
,
extravagant
suppositions
of
Atheists
,
if
they
were
admitted
possible
,
are
the
most
unlikely
that
could
be
devised
.
So
that
,
if
there
had
been
any
to
have
laid
wagers
,
when
things
were
taking
their
beginning
;
there
is
no
body
that
would
not
have
ventured
thousands
to
one
that
no
such
frame
of
things
(
no
not
so
much
as
one
single
Mouse
or
Flea
)
would
ever
have
hit
.
And
how
desperate
hazards
the
Atheist
runs
upon
this
meer
supposed
possibility
,
it
will
be
more
in
our
way
to
take
notice
by
and
by
.
But
besides
;
That
pretended
possibility
plainly
appears
none
at
all
.
It
is
impossible
any
thing
should
spring
up
of
it self
out
of
nothing
.
That
any
thing
that
is
alterable
should
have
been
necessarily
of
it self
,
such
as
it
now
is
.
That
what
is
of
it self
unactive
should
be
the
maker
of
other
things
.
That
the
Author
of
all
the
Wisdom
in
the
world
should
be
himself
unwise
.
These
cannot
but
be
judged
most
absolute
impossibilities
to
such
as
do
not
violence
to
their
own
minds
;
or
with
whom
Reason
can
be
allow'd
any
the
least
exercise
.
Wherefore
the
Atheistical
spirit
is
most
grosly
unreasonable
in
withholding
assent
,
where
the
most
ungainsayable
Reason
plainly
exacts
it
.
And
are
not
the
Atheists
Cavils
as
despicably
silly
against
the
Deity
,
and
(
consequently
)
Religion
?
Whosoever
shall
consider
their
exceptions
against
some
things
in
the
notion
of
God
,
eternity
,
infinity
,
&c.
which
themselves
in
the
mean
time
are
forced
to
place
elsewhere
,
will
he
not
see
they
talk
idly
?
And
as
for
such
other
impeachments
of
his
Wisdom
,
Justice
,
and
Goodness
,
as
they
take
their
ground
for
from
the
state
of
affairs
,
in
some
respects
,
in
this
present
world
(
many
of
which
may
be
seen
in
Lucretius
,
and
answered
by
Dr.
More
in
his
Dialogues
.
)
How
inconsiderable
will
they
be
,
to
any
one
that
bethinks
himself
with
how
perfect
and
generous
a
liberty
this
world
was
made
,
by
one
that
needed
it
not
;
who
had
no
design
,
nor
could
have
inclination
,
to
a
fond
self-indulgent
glorying
,
and
vaunting
of
his
own
work
;
who
did
it
with
the
greatest
facility
,
and
by
an
easie
unexpensive
vouchsafement
of
his
good
pleasure
;
not
with
an
operous
curiosity
,
studious
to
approve
it self
to
the
peevish
eye
of
every
froward
Momus
,
or
to
the
nauseous
squeamish
gust
of
every
sensual
Epicure
.
And
to
such
as
shall
not
confine
their
mean
thoughts
to
that
very
clod
or
ball
of
earth
on
which
they
live
.
Which
,
as
it
is
a
very
small
part
,
may
,
for
ought
we
know
,
but
be
the
worst
or
most
abject
part
of
Gods
Creation
,
which
yet
is
full
of
his
Goodness
,
and
hath
most
manifest
prints
of
his
other
excellencies
besides
;
as
hath
been
observed
.
Or
,
that
shall
not
look
upon
the
present
state
of
things
as
the
eternal
state
,
but
upon
this
world
only
as
an
antichamber
to
another
,
which
shall
abide
in
most
unexceptionable
perfection
for
ever
.
How
fond
and
idle
,
I
say
,
will
all
such
cavils
appear
to
one
that
shall
but
thus
use
his
thoughts
,
and
not
think
himself
bound
to
measure
his
conceptions
of
God
,
by
the
uncertain
rash
dictates
of
men
born
in
the
dark
,
and
that
talk
at
random
:
Nor
shall
affix
any
thing
to
him
which
plain
Reason
doth
not
dictate
,
or
which
he
doth
not
manifestly
assume
or
challenge
to
himself
.
But
that
because
a
straw
lies
in
my
way
,
I
would
attempt
to
overturn
heaven
and
earth
,
what
raging
phrensie
is
this
?
Again
it
is
a
base
abject
temper
,
speaks
a
mind
sunk
and
lost
in
carnality
,
and
that
having
dethron'd
and
abjur'd
Reason
,
hath
abandon'd
it self
to
the
hurry
of
vile
appetite
,
and
sold
its
liberty
,
and
sovereignty
,
for
the
insipid
gustless
pleasures
of
sense
:
An
unmanly
thing
.
A
degrading
of
ones
self
.
For
if
there
be
no
God
,
what
am
I
?
A
piece
of
moving
thinking
clay
,
whose
ill
compacted
parts
will
shortly
fly
asunder
,
and
leave
no
other
remains
of
me
,
than
what
shall
become
the
prey
and
the
triumph
of
worms
!
'T
is
a
sad
,
mopish
,
disconsolate
Temper
,
Cuts
off
,
and
quite
banishes
all
manly
rational
joy
.
All
that
might
spring
from
the
contemplation
of
the
Divine
Excellencies
and
Glory
,
shining
in
the
works
of
his
hands
.
Atheism
clothes
the
world
in
black
,
draws
a
dark
and
duskish
cloud
over
all
things
.
Doth
more
to
damp
and
stifle
all
relishes
of
intellectual
pleasure
,
than
it
would
of
sensible
,
to
extinguish
the
Sun
.
What
is
this
world
(
if
we
should
suppose
it
still
to
subsist
)
without
God
?
How
grateful
an
entertainment
is
it
to
a
pious
mind
to
behold
his
glory
stampt
on
every
creature
sparkling
in
every
providence
;
and
by
a
firm
and
rational
Faith
to
believe
(
when
we
cannot
see
)
how
all
events
are
conspiring
to
bring
about
the
most
happy
and
blissful
state
of
things
!
The
Atheist
may
make
the
most
of
this
world
;
he
knows
no
pleasure
,
but
what
can
be
drawn
out
of
its
dry
breasts
,
or
found
in
its
cold
embraces
:
Which
yields
as
little
satisfaction
,
as
he
finds
whose
arms
aiming
to
inclose
a
dear
friend
do
only
clasp
a
stiff
and
clammy
carkass
.
How
uncomfortable
a
thing
is
it
to
him
,
that
having
neither
power
nor
wit
to
order
things
to
his
own
advantage
or
content
,
but
finds
himself
liable
to
continual
disappointments
,
and
the
rencounter
of
many
an
unsuspected
cross
accident
,
hath
none
to
repose
on
that
is
wiser
and
mightier
than
himself
?
But
when
he
finds
he
cannot
command
his
own
affairs
,
to
have
the
settled
apprehension
of
an
Almighty
Ruler
that
can
with
the
greatest
certainty
do
it
for
us
,
the
best
way
;
and
will
,
if
we
trust
him
:
How
satisfying
and
peaceful
a
repose
doth
this
yield
!
And
how
much
the
rather
,
inasmuch
as
that
filial
unsuspicious
confidence
and
trust
,
which
naturally
tends
to
and
begets
that
calm
and
quiet
rest
,
is
the
very
condition
required
on
my
part
;
and
that
the
chief
thing
I
have
to
do
,
to
have
my
affairs
brought
to
a
good
pass
,
is
to
commit
them
to
his
management
.
And
my
only
care
to
be
careful
in
nothing
.
The
Atheist
hath
nothing
to
mitigate
the
greatness
of
this
loss
,
but
that
he
knows
not
what
he
loses
,
which
is
an
allay
that
will
serve
but
a
little
while
.
And
when
the
most
unsupportable
pressing
miseries
befall
him
,
he
must
in
bitter
agonies
groan
out
his
wretched
soul
,
without
hope
;
and
sooner
die
under
his
burthen
,
than
say
,
Where
is
God
my
Maker
?
At
the
best
,
he
exchanges
all
the
pleasure
,
and
composure
of
mind
,
which
certainly
accompanies
a
dutiful
son-like
trust
,
submission
and
resignation
of
our selves
,
and
all
our
concernments
,
to
the
disposal
of
fatherly
wisdom
and
love
,
for
a
sour
and
sullen
succumbency
to
an
irresistable
fate
,
or
hard
necessity
,
against
which
he
sees
it's
vain
to
contend
.
So
that
at
the
best
he
only
not
rages
,
but
tastes
nothing
of
consolation
;
whereof
his
spirit
is
as
uncapable
,
as
his
desperate
affairs
are
of
redress
.
And
if
he
have
arrived
to
that
measure
of
fortitude
,
as
not
to
be
much
discomposed
with
the
lighter
crosses
which
he
meets
with
in
this
short
time
of
life
,
what
a
dreadful
cross
is
it
that
he
must
die
!
How
dismal
a
thing
is
a
certain
never
to
be
avoided
death
!
Against
which
as
Atheism
hath
not
,
surely
,
the
advantage
of
Religion
in
giving
protection
:
So
it
hath
greatly
the
disadvantage
,
in
affording
no
relief
.
What
would
the
joy
be
worth
in
that
hour
,
that
arises
from
the
hope
of
the
glory
to
be
revealed
?
And
is
the
want
of
that
the
total
sum
of
the
Atheists
misery
at
this
hour
?
What
heart
can
conceive
the
horror
of
that
one
thought
if
darted
in
upon
him
at
that
time
(
as
't
is
strange
,
and
more
sad
,
if
it
be
not
)
what
becomes
now
of
me
,
if
there
prove
to
be
a
God!
where
are
my
mighty
demonstrations
upon
which
one
may
venture
?
and
which
may
cut
off
all
fear
and
danger
of
future
calamity
in
this
dark
unknown
state
I
am
going
into
?
shall
I
be
the
next
hour
nothing
or
miserable
?
Or
,
if
I
had
opportunity
,
shall
I
not
have
sufficient
cause
to
proclaim
(
as
[
*
](A44683-e13980-b)
*
Which
story
I
confidently
refer
to
,
being
of
late
date
,
and
having
had
a
certain
and
circumstantial
account
of
it
,
by
one
(
a
very
sober
and
intelligent
person
)
who
had
the
Relation
from
him
to
whom
that
dreadful
warning
was
given
,
by
his
then
lately
deceased
associate
.
But
I
shall
not
by
a
particular
relation
gratifie
the
scorn
of
this
sort
of
men
,
who
taking
advantage
from
the
(
sometimes
deceived
)
credulity
of
well-meaning
people
,
have
but
that
way
of
answering
all
such
things
by
the
one
word
which
served
once
,
so
learnedly
,
to
confute
Bellarmine
.
once
one
of
the
same
fraternity
did
,
by
way
of
warning
,
to
a
surviving
companion
)
—
A
Great
and
a
Terrible
God!
a
Great
and
a
Terrible
God!
A
Great
and
a
Terrible
God!
I
only
add
,
'T
is
a
most
strangely
mysterious
and
unaccountable
Temper
.
Such
as
is
hardly
reducible
to
its
proper
causes
.
So
that
it
would
puzzle
any
mans
enquiry
to
find
out
,
or
even
give
but
probable
conjectures
how
so
odd
and
preternatural
a
disaffection
as
Atheism
should
ever
come
to
have
place
in
an
humane
mind
.
It
must
be
concluded
a
very
complicated
disease
,
and
yet
when
our
thoughts
have
fastned
upon
several
things
that
have
an
aspect
that
way
as
none
of
them
alone
could
infer
it
,
so
it
is
hard
to
imagine
,
how
all
of
them
,
together
,
should
ever
come
to
deprave
reasonable
nature
to
such
a
degree
.
'T
is
,
first
,
most
astonishingly
marvellous
(
though
it
's
apparent
this
distemper
hath
its
rise
from
an
ill
will
)
that
any
man
should
so
much
as
will
,
that
which
the
Atheist
hath
obtained
of
himself
to
believe
,
or
affect
to
be
what
he
is
.
The
commonness
of
this
vile
disposition
of
will
,
doth
but
sorrily
shift
off
the
wonder
,
and
only
with
those
slight
and
trifling
minds
that
have
resigned
the
office
of
judging
things
to
their
(
more
active
)
senses
,
and
have
learned
the
easie
way
of
waving
all
enquiries
about
common
things
,
or
resolving
the
account
into
this
only
,
that
they
are
to
be
seen
every
day
.
But
if
we
allow'd
our selves
to
consider
this
matter
soberly
,
we
would
soon
find
that
howsoever
it
most
plainly
appear
a
very
common
plague
upon
the
spirits
of
men
(
and
universal
till
a
cure
be
wrought
)
to
say
by
way
of
wish
,
No
God
,
or
I
would
there
were
none
:
Yet
by
the
good
leave
of
them
who
would
thus
easily
excuse
the
thing
,
the
commonness
of
this
horrid
evil
doth
so
little
diminish
,
that
it
increases
the
wonder
.
Things
are
more
strange
as
their
causes
are
more
hardly
assignable
.
What
should
the
reason
be
,
that
a
Being
of
so
incomparable
excellency
,
so
amiable
and
alluring
glory
,
purity
,
love
,
and
goodness
is
become
undesirable
and
hateful
to
his
own
creatures
!
That
such
creatures
,
his
more
immediate
peculiar
off-spring
,
stampt
with
his
likeness
,
the
so
vivid
resemblances
of
his
own
spiritual
immortal
nature
,
are
become
so
wickedly
unnatural
towards
their
common
and
most
indulgent
Parent
!
what
to
wish
him
dead
!
to
envie
life
and
being
,
to
him
from
whom
they
have
received
their
own
!
'T
is
strange
as
it
is
without
a
cause
.
But
they
have
offended
him
,
are
in
a
revolt
,
and
sharply
conscious
of
fearful
demerits
.
And
who
would
not
wish
to
live
?
and
to
escape
so
unsupportable
revenge
?
'T
is
still
strange
we
would
ever
offend
such
a
one
!
Wherein
were
his
Laws
unequal
?
his
Government
grievous
?
But
since
we
have
;
this
only
is
pertinent
to
be
said
by
them
that
have
no
hope
of
forgiveness
,
that
are
left
to
despair
of
reconciliation
,
why
do
we
sort
our selves
with
Devils
?
We
profess
not
to
be
such
.
Yea
,
but
we
have
no
hope
to
be
forgiven
the
sin
we
do
not
leave
,
nor
power
to
leave
the
sin
which
now
we
love
.
This
,
instead
of
lessening
,
makes
the
wonder
a
miracle
!
O
wretched
forlorn
creature
!
wouldst
thou
have
God
out
of
being
for
this
?
(
I
speak
to
thee
who
dost
not
yet
profess
to
believe
there
is
no
God
,
but
dost
only
wish
it
.
)
The
sustainer
of
the
world
!
The
common
Basis
of
all
Being
!
dost
thou
know
what
thou
sayest
?
Art
thou
not
wishing
thy self
and
all
things
into
nothing
?
This
,
rather
than
humble
thy self
,
and
beg
forgiveness
?
This
!
rather
than
become
,
again
,
an
holy
,
pure
,
obdeient
creature
,
and
again
,
blessed
in
him
who
first
made
thee
so
!
It
can
never
cease
,
I
say
,
to
be
a
wonder
,
we
never
ought
to
cease
wondering
that
ever
this
befel
the
nature
of
man
,
to
be
prone
to
wish
such
a
thing
that
there
were
no
God!
But
this
is
,
't
is
true
,
the
too
common
case
;
and
if
we
will
only
have
what
is
more
a
rarity
go
for
a
wonder
;
How
amazing
then
is
it
,
that
if
any
man
would
even
never
so
fain
;
he
ever
can
make
himself
believe
there
is
no
God!
and
shape
his
horrid
course
according
to
that
most
horrid
misbelief
!
By
what
fatal
train
of
causes
is
this
ever
brought
to
pass
!
Into
what
can
we
devise
to
resolve
it
?
Why
such
as
have
arrived
to
this
pitch
are
much
addicted
to
the
pleasing
of
their
senses
;
and
this
they
make
their
business
;
so
as
that
,
for
a
long
time
they
have
given
themselves
no
leasure
to
mind
objects
of
another
nature
;
especially
that
should
any
way
tend
to
disturb
them
in
their
easie
course
:
Till
they
are
(
gradually
)
fallen
into
a
forgetful
sleep
,
and
the
images
of
things
are
worn
out
with
them
;
that
had
only
more
slightly
touch'd
their
minds
before
.
And
being
much
used
to
go
by
the
suggestions
of
sense
,
they
believe
not
what
they
neither
see
nor
feel
.
This
is
somewhat
,
but
does
not
reach
the
mark
;
for
there
are
many
very
great
sensualists
(
as
great
as
they
at
least
)
who
never
arrive
hither
,
but
firmly
avow
it
that
they
believe
a
Deity
,
whatsoever
mistaken
notion
they
have
of
him
;
whereupon
they
imagine
to
themselves
impunity
in
their
vicious
course
.
But
these
,
it
may
be
said
,
have
so
disaccustomed
themselves
to
the
exercise
of
their
reason
,
that
they
have
no
disposition
to
use
their
thoughts
about
any
thing
above
the
sphere
of
sense
;
and
have
contracted
so
dull
and
sluggish
a
temper
,
that
they
are
no
fitter
to
mind
or
employ
themselves
in
any
speculations
that
tend
to
beget
in
them
the
knowledge
of
God
,
than
any
man
is
for
discourse
or
business
when
he
is
fast
asleep
.
So
indeed
in
reason
one
would
expect
to
find
it
,
but
the
case
is
so
much
otherwise
,
when
we
consider
particular
instances
,
that
we
are
the
more
perplex'd
and
intangled
in
this
enquiry
,
by
considering
how
agreeable
it
is
that
the
matter
should
be
thus
,
and
observing
that
it
proves
oft-times
not
to
be
so
:
Insomuch
that
reason
and
experience
seem
herein
,
not
to
agree
,
and
hence
we
are
put
again
upon
new
conjectures
what
the
immediate
cause
of
this
strange
malady
should
be
.
For
did
it
proceed
purely
from
a
sluggish
temper
of
mind
,
unapt
to
reasoning
and
discourse
;
the
more
any
were
so
,
the
more
dispos'd
they
should
be
to
Atheism
;
Whereas
,
every
one
knows
that
,
multitudes
of
persons
of
dull
and
slow
minds
to
any
thing
of
ratiocination
would
rather
you
should
burn
their
houses
,
than
tell
them
they
did
not
believe
in
God
;
and
would
presently
tell
you
,
it
were
pitty
he
should
live
,
that
should
but
intimate
a
doubt
whether
there
were
a
God
or
no.
Yea
,
and
many
,
somewhat
more
intelligent
,
yet
in
this
matter
,
are
shie
of
using
their
Reason
,
and
think
it
unsafe
,
if
not
profane
,
to
go
about
to
prove
,
that
there
is
a
God
,
lest
they
should
move
a
doubt
,
or
seem
hereby
to
make
a
question
of
it
.
And
,
in
the
mean
time
,
while
they
offer
not
at
reasoning
,
they
,
more
meanly
,
supply
that
want
,
after
a
sorry
fashion
,
from
their
education
,
the
tradition
of
their
fore-fathers
common
example
,
and
the
universal
profession
and
practice
of
some
Religion
,
round
about
them
;
and
it
may
be
only
take
the
matter
for
granted
,
because
they
never
heard
such
a
thing
was
ever
doubted
of
,
or
called
in
question
in
all
their
lives
.
Whereas
,
on
the
other
hand
,
they
who
incline
to
Atheism
are
,
perhaps
,
some
of
them
the
greatest
pretenders
to
Reason
.
They
rely
little
upon
authority
of
former
times
and
ages
,
upon
vulgar
principles
and
maxims
,
but
are
vogued
great
masters
of
Reason
,
diligent
searchers
into
the
mysteries
of
nature
,
and
can
philosophize
(
as
sufficiently
appears
)
beyond
all
imagination
.
But
't
is
hoped
it
may
be
truly
said
for
the
vindication
of
Philosophy
,
and
them
that
profess
it
,
that
modern
Atheists
have
little
of
that
to
glory
in
,
and
that
their
chief
endowments
are
only
their
skill
to
please
their
senses
,
and
a
faculty
with
a
pittiful
sort
of
drollery
to
tincture
their
cups
,
and
add
a
grace
to
their
(
otherwise
)
dull
and
flat
conversation
.
Yet
all
this
howsoever
being
considered
,
there
is
here
but
little
advance
made
to
the
finding
out
whence
Atheism
should
proceed
:
For
,
that
want
of
reason
should
be
thought
the
cause
,
what
hath
been
already
said
seems
to
forbid
.
That
many
ignorant
persons
seem
possest
with
a
great
awe
of
a
Deity
from
which
divers
more
knowing
have
delivered
themselves
.
And
yet
neither
doth
the
former
signifie
any
thing
(
in
just
interpretation
)
to
the
disrepute
of
Religion
.
For
truth
is
not
the
less
true
,
for
that
some
hold
it
they
know
not
how
or
why
.
Nor
doth
the
latter
make
to
the
reputation
of
Atheism
,
inasmuch
as
men
otherwise
rational
maysometimes
learnedly
dote
.
But
it
confirms
us
that
Atheism
is
a
strange
thing
,
when
its
extraction
and
pedigree
are
so
hardly
found
out
,
and
it
seems
to
be
directly
of
the
lineage
,
neither
of
knowledge
nor
ignorance
,
neither
sound
Reason
nor
perfect
Dotage
.
Nor
doth
it
at
all
urge
to
say
,
and
why
may
we
not
as
well
stand
wondering
whence
the
apprehension
of
a
God
,
and
an
addictedness
to
Religion
should
come
,
when
we
find
them
peculiar
,
neither
to
the
more
knowing
,
nor
the
more
ignorant
.
For
they
are
apparently
and
congruously
enough
to
be
derived
from
somewhat
common
to
them
both
.
The
impression
of
a
Deity
universally
put
upon
the
minds
of
all
men
(
which
Atheists
have
made
a
shift
to
raze
out
or
obliterate
to
that
degree
as
to
render
it
illegible
)
and
that
cultivated
by
the
exercise
of
Reason
,
in
some
,
and
in
others
,
less
capable
of
that
help
,
somewhat
confirmed
by
education
and
the
other
accessaries
mentioned
above
.
Therefore
is
this
matter
still
most
mysteriously
intricate
that
there
should
be
one
temper
and
perswasion
agreeing
to
two
so
vastly
different
sorts
of
persons
,
while
yet
we
are
to
seek
for
a
cause
(
except
what
is
most
tremendous
to
think
of
)
from
whence
it
should
proceed
,
that
is
common
to
them
both
.
And
here
is
in
short
the
sum
of
the
wonder
,
that
any
,
not
appearing
very
grosly
unreasonable
in
other
matters
,
(
which
cannot
be
deny'd
even
of
some
of
the
more
sensual
and
lewder
sort
of
Atheists
)
should
,
in
so
plain
and
important
a
case
,
be
so
,
beyond
all
expression
,
absurd
.
That
they
,
without
scruple
,
are
pleased
to
think
like
other
men
,
in
matters
that
concern
and
relate
to
common
practice
,
and
wherein
they
might
more
colourably
and
with
less
hazard
,
go
out
of
the
common
road
.
And
are
here
only
,
so
dangerously
and
madly
extravagant
.
Theirs
is
therefore
a
particular
madness
,
the
Dementia
quoad
hoc
.
So
much
the
stranger
thing
,
because
they
whom
it
possesses
,
do
only
in
this
one
case
put
off
themselves
,
and
are
like
themselves
,
and
other
men
in
all
things
else
.
If
they
reckon'd
it
a
glory
to
be
singular
they
might
(
as
hath
been
plainly
shewn
)
more
plausibly
profess
it
as
a
principle
,
that
they
are
not
bound
to
believe
the
existence
of
any
secular
Ruler
(
and
consequently
not
be
subject
to
any
)
longer
than
they
see
him
,
and
so
subvert
all
Policy
and
Government
;
or
pretend
an
exemption
from
all
obligation
to
any
act
of
justice
,
or
to
forbear
the
most
injurious
violence
towards
any
man
,
because
they
are
not
infallibly
certain
any
one
they
see
is
an
humane
wight
,
and
so
abjure
all
morality
as
they
already
have
so
great
a
part
;
than
offer
with
so
fearful
hazard
to
assault
the
Deity
(
of
whose
existence
if
they
would
but
think
a
while
,
they
might
be
most
infallibly
assured
,
or
go
about
to
subvert
the
foundations
of
Religion
.
Or
,
if
they
would
get
themselves
glory
by
great
adventures
,
or
show
themselves
brave
men
,
by
expressing
a
fearless
contempt
of
Divine
Power
,
and
Justice
.
This
fortitude
is
not
humane
.
These
are
without
the
compass
of
its
object
.
As
Inundations
,
Arist.
Eth.
l.
3.
Earthquakes
,
&c.
are
said
to
be
,
unto
which
,
that
any
one
should
fearlesly
expose
himself
,
can
bring
no
profit
to
others
,
nor
therefore
glory
to
him
.
In
all
this
harangue
of
discourse
the
design
hath
not
been
to
fix
upon
any
true
cause
of
Atheism
,
but
to
represent
it
a
strange
thing
;
And
an
Atheist
a
Prodigy
,
a
Monster
amongst
mankind
.
A
dreadful
spectacle
,
forsaken
of
the
common
aids
afforded
to
other
men
,
hung
up
in
chains
,
to
warn
others
;
and
let
them
see
what
an
horrid
creature
,
man
may
make
himself
by
voluntary
aversion
from
God
that
made
him
.
In
the
mean
time
they
upon
whom
this
dreadful
plague
is
not
fallen
,
may
plainly
see
before
them
,
the
object
of
that
worship
which
is
imported
by
a
Temple
,
An
existing
Deity
,
a
God
to
be
worshipped
.
Unto
whom
we
shall
yet
see
further
reason
to
design
,
and
consecrate
a
Temple
for
that
end
(
and
even
our selves
to
become
such
)
when
we
have
considered
(
what
comes
next
to
be
spoken
of
)
his
Conversableness
with
men
.
CHAP.
VI.
What
is
intended
by
Gods
conversableness
with
men
,
considered
only
as
fundamental
and
presupposed
to
a
Temple
.
An
account
of
the
Epicurean
Deity
.
It
s
existence
impossible
any
way
to
be
proved
if
it
did
exist
.
Nor
can
be
affirmed
to
any
good
intent
.
That
such
a
Being
is
not
God
.
That
the
absolute
perfection
proved
of
God
represents
him
a
fit
object
of
Religion
.
From
thence
more
particularly
deduced
to
this
purpose
.
His
Omnisciency
,
Omnipotency
,
Unlimited
Goodness
,
Immensity
.
Curcellaeus
's
Arguments
again
this
last
considered
.
NOR
is
the
thing
here
intended
less
necessary
will
not
vouchsafe
to
converse
with
men
;
but
,
that
cannot
admit
it
.
Or
whose
nature
were
altogether
uncapable
of
such
converse
.
For
that
measure
and
latitude
of
sense
must
be
allowed
unto
the
expression
[
conversableness
with
men
]
as
that
it
signifie
both
capacity
and
propension
to
such
converse
.
That
God
is
both
,
by
his
Nature
,
capable
of
it
,
and
hath
a
gracious
inclination
of
will
thereunto
.
Yea
and
we
will
add
(
what
is
also
not
without
the
compass
of
our
present
theam
,
nor
the
import
of
this
word
whereby
we
generally
express
it
)
that
he
is
not
only
inclined
to
converse
with
men
,
but
that
he
actually
doth
it
.
As
we
call
him
a
conversable
person
that
upon
all
befitting
occasions
doth
freely
converse
with
such
as
have
any
concern
with
him
.
It
will
indeed
be
necessary
to
distinguish
Gods
converse
with
men
,
into
,
That
which
he
hath
in
common
with
all
men
:
so
as
to
sustain
them
in
their
beings
,
and
some
way
,
influence
their
actions
(
in
which
kind
he
is
also
conversant
with
all
his
creatures
)
and
That
which
he
more
peculiarly
hath
with
good
men
.
And
,
though
the
consideration
of
the
latter
of
these
will
belong
to
the
discourse
concerning
his
Temple
it self
,
which
he
hath
with
and
in
them
;
yet
it
is
the
former
,
only
,
we
have
now
to
consider
,
as
presupposed
thereto
,
and
as
the
ground
thereof
.
Together
with
his
gracious
propension
to
the
latter
also
.
As
the
great
Apostle
,
in
his
discourse
at
Athens
,
lays
the
same
ground
for
acquaintance
with
God
(
which
he
intimates
should
be
set
afoot
and
continued
in
another
sort
of
Temple
than
is
made
with
hands
)
that
he
hath
given
to
all
breath
,
and
being
,
and
all
things
,
and
that
he
is
near
and
ready
(
whence
they
should
therefore
seek
him
,
if
haply
they
might
feel
after
him
,
and
find
him
out
)
in
order
to
further
converse
.
And
here
,
our
business
will
have
the
less
in
it
of
labour
and
difficulty
;
for
that
we
shall
have
little
else
to
do
,
besides
only
the
applying
of
principles
already
asserted
(
or
possibly
the
more
express
adding
of
some
or
other
that
were
imply'd
in
what
hath
been
said
)
to
this
purpose
.
From
which
principles
it
will
appear
,
that
he
not
only
can
,
but
that
(
in
the
former
sense
)
he
doth
converse
with
men
,
and
is
graciously
inclin'd
thereto
(
in
the
latter
.
)
And
yet
because
the
former
is
more
deeply
fundamental
,
as
whereon
all
depends
,
and
that
the
act
of
it
is
not
deny'd
for
any
other
reason
than
an
imagined
impossibility
;
that
is
,
't
is
not
said
he
doth
not
sustain
and
govern
the
world
,
upon
any
other
pretence
,
but
that
he
cannot
(
as
being
inconsistent
with
his
nature
and
felicity
,
)
This
we
shall
therefore
more
directly
apply
our selves
to
evince
,
That
his
nature
doth
not
disallow
it
,
but
necessarily
includes
an
aptitude
thereto
.
Nor
yet
though
it
may
be
a
less
laborious
work
than
the
former
that
we
have
dispatcht
,
is
it
altogether
needless
to
deal
somewhat
more
expresly
in
this
matter
.
Inasmuch
as
what
opposition
hath
been
made
to
Religion
in
the
world
hath
for
the
most
part
been
more
expresly
directed
against
this
ground
of
it
.
I
say
more
expresly
;
For
indeed
by
plain
and
manifest
consequence
it
impugns
that
also
of
Gods
existence
:
That
is
through
this
,
it
strikes
at
the
other
.
For
surely
(
howsoever
any
may
arbitrarily
,
and
with
what
impropriety
and
latitude
of
speech
they
please
,
bestow
titles
and
elogies
here
or
there
)
That
being
is
not
God
,
that
cannot
converse
with
men
;
supposing
them
such
as
what
purely
and
peculiarly
belongs
to
the
nature
of
man
would
bespeak
them
.
So
that
they
who
have
imagined
such
a
being
,
and
been
pleased
to
call
it
God
,
have
at
once
said
and
unsaid
the
same
thing
.
That
Deity
was
but
a
creature
,
and
that
,
only
,
of
their
own
fancy
;
and
they
have
by
the
same
breath
blown
up
and
blasted
their
own
bubble
,
made
it
seem
something
,
and
signifie
nothing
.
Have
courted
it
into
being
,
and
rioted
it
again
quite
out
of
it
.
In
their
conceit
created
it
a
God
,
in
their
practice
a
meer
nullity
.
And
it
equally
serv'd
their
turn
,
and
as
much
favoured
the
design
of
being
wicked
,
to
acknowledge
only
a
God
they
could
imagine
and
dis-imagine
at
their
own
pleasure
;
as
to
have
acknowledged
none
at
all
.
It
could
do
no
prejudice
to
their
affairs
to
admit
of
this
fictitious
Deity
that
they
could
make
be
what
,
or
where
they
pleased
.
That
should
affect
ease
and
pleasure
,
and
(
lest
his
pleasures
and
theirs
should
interfere
)
that
they
could
confine
to
remote
territories
,
and
oblige
to
keep
at
an
obedient
and
untroublesome
distance
.
Nor
,
though
no
imagination
could
be
more
madly
extravagant
,
than
that
of
a
God
no
way
concerned
in
the
forming
and
governing
of
the
world
;
and
,
notwithstanding
whom
men
might
take
their
liberty
to
do
what
they
listed
;
yet
,
as
hath
been
observed
long
ago
,
that
no
opinion
was
ever
so
monstrously
absurd
,
as
not
to
be
owned
by
some
of
the
Philosophers
)
hath
not
this
wanted
patronage
,
and
even
among
them
who
have
obtained
to
be
esteemed
(
not
to
say
idoliz'd
)
under
that
name
.
Which
would
be
seen
if
it
were
worth
the
while
to
trouble
the
Reader
with
an
account
of
the
Epicurean
Deity
.
As
it
can
only
be
with
this
design
,
that
the
representation
may
render
it
(
as
it
cannot
but
do
)
ridiculous
,
to
sober
men
;
and
discover
to
the
rest
the
vanity
of
their
groundless
,
and
self-contradicting
hope
(
still
too
much
fostered
in
the
breasts
of
not
a
few
)
who
promise
themselves
impunity
in
the
most
licentious
course
of
wickedness
,
upon
the
security
only
of
this
their
own
idle
dream
.
That
is
,
that
if
there
be
a
God
(
which
they
reckon
it
not
so
plausible
flatly
to
deny
)
he
is
a
Being
of
either
so
dull
and
phlegmatick
a
temper
that
he
cannot
be
concerned
in
the
actions
and
affairs
of
men
,
or
so
soft
and
easie
that
he
will
not
.
But
,
because
his
good
will
alone
was
not
so
safely
to
be
rely'd
on
,
it
was
thought
the
securer
way
not
to
let
it
be
in
his
power
,
to
intermeddle
with
their
concernments
.
And
therefore
being
to
frame
their
own
God
to
their
own
turn
.
Thus
the
matter
was
,
of
old
,
contriv'd
.
First
,
great
care
was
taken
that
he
be
set
at
a
distance
remote
enough
;
that
he
be
complemented
out
of
this
world
,
as
a
place
too
mean
for
his
reception
,
and
unworthy
such
a
presence
.
They
being
indeed
unconcerned
where
he
had
his
residence
.
So
it
were
not
too
near
them
.
So
that
a
confinement
of
him
somewhere
Secondly
,
and
then
,
with
the
same
pretence
of
great
observance
and
respect
,
it
is
judg'd
too
great
a
trouble
to
him
,
and
inconsistent
with
the
felicity
of
his
nature
and
being
,
that
he
should
have
given
himself
any
diversion
or
disturbance
,
by
making
the
world
.
From
the
care
and
labour
whereof
he
is
with
all
ceremony
to
be
excused
.
It
being
too
painful
and
laborious
an
undertaking
for
an
immortal
and
an
happy
Being
.
Besides
that
he
was
altogether
Laertius
,
l.
10.
Epist.
Epicur
.
ad
Pyth●ci
—
Quae
molitio
,
quae
ferramenta
,
qui
vectes
,
quae
machinae
,
qui
ministri
tanti
muneris
fuerunt
?
Vell.
apud
Cicer.
de
natura
Deorum
.
destitute
of
instruments
,
and
utensils
requisite
to
so
great
a
performance
.
Whence
also
,
thirdly
,
he
was
with
the
same
even
the
Divine
Nature
it self
,
from
business
.
Though
yet
the
true
ground
and
root
of
this
Epicurean
Faith
doth
,
sometime
more
apparently
discover
it self
;
even
an
impatiency
of
the
Divine
Government
,
and
a
regret
of
that
irksom
bondage
which
the
acknowledgment
of
a
Deity
that
were
to
be
feared
by
men
would
infer
upon
them
.
And
therefore
fourthly
,
he
is
further
expresly
asserted
to
be
such
as
need
not
be
feared
;
as
cares
not
to
be
worshipped
,
as
with
whom
neither
anger
nor
favour
hath
any
place
.
So
that
nothing
more
of
duty
is
owing
to
him
than
a
certain
kind
of
arbitrary
veneration
,
which
we
give
to
any
thing
,
or
person
that
we
apprehend
to
excel
us
,
and
to
be
in
some
respect
better
than
our selves
.
An
observance
meerly
upon
courtesie
.
But
obedience
and
subjection
to
his
Government
,
fear
of
his
displeasure
,
expectation
of
his
favour
and
benefits
have
no
place
left
them
.
We
are
not
obliged
to
worship
him
as
one
with
whom
we
have
any
concern
,
and
do
owe
him
no
more
homage
than
to
the
great
Mogul
,
or
the
Cham
of
Tartary
,
and
indeed
are
less
liable
to
his
severity
,
or
capable
of
his
favours
than
theirs
;
for
of
theirs
we
are
in
some
remote
possibility
,
of
his
in
none
at
all
.
In
one
word
,
all
converse
between
him
and
man
on
his
part
by
providence
,
and
on
ours
by
Religion
,
is
quite
cut
off
.
Which
evidently
appears
(
from
what
hath
been
already
collected
out
of
his
own
words
and
theirs
who
pretended
to
speak
that
so
adored
Authors
mind
and
sense
)
to
be
the
scope
and
sum
of
the
Epicurean
doctrine
in
this
matter
,
and
was
indeed
observed
to
be
so
long
ago
;
by
one
that
we
may
suppose
to
have
had
better
opportunity
and
advantages
to
know
it
,
than
we
:
Who
discoursing
that
a
man
cannot
live
pleasantly
,
according
to
the
principles
of
Epicurus
.
And
that
according
to
his
doctrine
beasts
are
more
happy
than
men
;
plainly
gives
this
reason
why
he
says
so
,
viz.
that
the
Epicureans
took
away
providence
.
And
that
that
we
might
not
fear
him
.
Unto
which
purpose
also
much
more
may
be
seen
in
the
same
Author
elsewhere
,
when
he
more
directly
pleads
(
among
divers
more
philosophical
subjects
)
on
behalf
of
Religion
against
the
Epicurean
Doctrine
which
he
saith
they
leave
to
us
in
word
and
shew
,
but
,
by
their
in
deed
,
as
they
do
na-nature
,
and
the
soul
,
&c.
It
is
then
out
of
question
that
the
Doctrine
of
Epicurus
utterly
takes
away
all
intercourse
between
God
and
man
.
Which
yet
were
little
worth
our
notice
or
consideration
:
nor
would
it
answer
any
valuable
end
or
purpose
to
revive
the
mention
of
such
horrid
opinions
,
or
tell
the
world
what
such
a
one
said
or
thought
two
thousand
years
ago
.
If
their
grave
had
been
faithful
to
its
trust
and
had
retain'd
their
filthy
poisonous
savour
within
its
own
unhallowed
Cell
.
But
since
(
against
what
were
so
much
to
have
been
desired
,
that
their
womb
might
have
been
their
Grave
)
their
Grave
becomes
their
womb
,
where
they
are
conceived
and
formed
anew
,
and
whence
by
a
second
birth
they
spring
forth
afresh
to
the
great
annoyance
of
the
world
,
the
debauching
and
endangering
of
mankind
.
And
that
it
is
necessary
some
remedy
be
endeavoured
of
so
mortal
an
evil
,
it
was
also
convenient
to
run
it
up
to
its
original
.
And
contend
against
it
as
in
its
primitive
state
and
vigour
.
Wherefore
this
being
a
true
(
though
it
be
a
very
short
)
account
of
the
Epicurean
God
;
resulting
all
into
this
shorter
sum
,
That
he
is
altogether
unconversable
with
men
(
and
such
therefore
as
cannot
inhabit
their
Temple
,
and
for
whom
they
can
have
no
obligation
or
rational
design
to
provide
any
)
it
will
be
requisite
in
reference
hereto
,
and
sutable
to
our
present
scope
and
purpose
,
severally
to
evince
these
things
.
1.
That
the
existence
of
such
a
Being
as
this
were
impossible
ever
to
be
proved
unto
men
,
if
it
did
exist
.
2.
That
,
Being
supposed
,
without
any
good
ground
;
't
is
equally
unimaginable
that
the
supposition
of
it
ean
intend
any
valuable
or
good
end
.
3.
That
this
supposed
Being
cannot
be
God
,
and
is
most
abusively
so
called
;
as
hereby
,
the
true
God
,
the
cause
and
author
of
all
things
is
intended
to
be
excluded
.
4.
That
it
belongs
to
,
and
may
be
deduced
from
the
true
notion
of
God
,
which
hath
been
given
(
and
proved
by
parts
of
a
really
existent
Being
)
that
he
is
such
as
can
converse
with
men
.
For
the
first
,
That
there
is
no
way
to
prove
the
existence
of
such
a
Being
,
is
evident
.
For
what
ways
of
proving
it
can
be
thought
of
,
which
the
supposition
it self
doth
not
forbid
,
and
reject
?
Is
it
to
be
proved
by
Revelation
?
But
that
supposes
converse
with
men
,
and
destroys
what
it
should
prove
,
that
such
a
Being
,
having
no
converse
with
men
doth
exist
.
And
where
is
that
Revelation
?
Is
it
written
or
unwritten
?
Or
who
are
its
vouchers
?
Upon
what
authority
doth
it
rest
?
who
was
appointed
to
inform
the
world
in
this
matter
?
was
Epicurus
himself
the
common
Oracle
?
why
did
he
never
tell
men
so
?
did
he
ever
pretend
to
have
seen
any
of
these
his
vogued
Gods
?
No
,
they
are
confessed
not
to
be
liable
to
our
sense
any
more
than
the
Inane
it self
.
And
what
Miracles
did
he
ever
work
to
confirm
the
truth
of
his
Doctrine
in
this
matter
?
which
sure
was
reasonably
to
be
expected
from
one
who
would
gain
credit
to
dictates
so
contrary
to
the
common
sentiments
of
the
rest
of
mankind
;
And
that
were
not
to
be
proved
any
other
way
.
And
what
other
way
can
be
devised
?
can
it
admit
of
rational
demonstration
?
what
shall
be
the
medium
?
shall
it
be
from
the
cause
?
But
what
cause
can
(
or
ever
did
)
he
or
his
followers
assign
of
God
?
Or
from
effects
?
And
what
shall
they
be
?
When
the
matter
of
the
whole
universe
is
supposed
ever
to
have
been
of
it self
,
and
the
particular
frame
of
every
thing
made
thereof
to
have
resulted
only
of
the
casual
coalition
of
the
parts
of
that
matter
?
And
no
real
Being
is
supposed
besides
?
or
shall
it
be
that
their
Idea
which
they
have
of
God
includes
existence
as
so
belonging
to
him
that
he
cannot
but
exist
.
But
by
what
right
do
they
affix
such
an
Idea
to
their
petite
and
fictitious
Deities
?
How
will
they
prove
their
Idea
true
?
or
are
we
bound
to
to
take
their
words
for
it
?
Yea
it
is
easily
proved
false
and
repugnant
to
it self
,
while
they
would
have
that
to
be
necessarily
existent
(
as
they
must
if
they
will
have
it
existent
at
all
)
unto
which
in
the
mean
time
they
deny
the
other
perfections
which
necessary
existence
hath
been
proved
to
include
.
But
how
vain
and
idle
trifling
is
it
,
arbitrarily
,
and
by
a
random
fancy
to
imagine
any
thing
what
we
please
,
and
attributing
of
our
own
special
grace
and
favour
necessary
existence
to
it
,
thence
to
conclude
that
it
doth
exist
,
only
because
we
have
been
pleased
to
make
that
belong
to
the
notion
of
it
?
What
so
odd
and
uncouth
composition
can
we
form
any
conception
of
which
we
may
not
make
exist
at
this
rate
?
But
the
notion
of
God
is
not
arbitrary
,
but
is
natural
,
proleptical
,
and
common
to
men
,
imprest
upon
the
minds
of
all
:
whence
they
say
it
ought
not
to
be
drawn
into
controversie
.
What
?
the
Epicurean
notion
of
him
?
we
shall
enquire
further
into
that
anon
.
And
in
the
mean
time
,
need
not
doubt
to
say
,
any
man
might
,
with
as
good
pretence
,
imagine
the
ridiculous
sort
of
Gods
described
in
Cicero's
Deos
,
Strabones
,
paetulos
,
naevum
habentes
,
Silos
,
Flaccos
,
Frontones
,
Capitones
,
de
Natura
Deorum
,
l.
1.
Ironical
supposition
,
and
affirm
them
to
exist
as
they
those
they
have
thought
fit
to
feign
,
and
would
impose
upon
the
belief
of
men
.
And
when
they
have
fancied
these
to
exist
,
is
not
that
a
mighty
proof
that
they
indeed
do
so
?
But
that
,
which
for
the
present
we
alledge
,
is
,
that
,
supposing
their
notion
were
never
so
absolutely
universal
and
agreeing
with
the
common
sentiments
of
all
other
men
,
they
have
,
yet
,
precluded
themselves
of
any
right
to
argue
,
from
its
commonness
,
to
the
existence
of
the
thing
it self
.
Nor
can
they
,
upon
their
principles
,
form
an
argument
thence
,
that
shall
conclude
or
signifie
any
thing
to
this
purpose
.
None
can
be
drawn
hence
,
that
will
conclude
immediately
,
and
,
it self
,
reach
the
mark
;
without
the
addition
of
some
further
thing
,
which
so
ill
sorts
with
the
rest
of
their
Doctrine
that
it
would
subvert
the
whole
frame
.
That
is
,
it
follows
not
,
that
because
men
generally
hold
that
there
is
a
God
,
that
therefore
there
is
one
,
otherwise
than
as
that
consequence
can
be
justified
by
this
plain
and
irrefragable
proof
.
That
no
reason
can
be
devised
of
so
general
an
agreement
,
or
of
that
so
common
an
impression
upon
the
minds
of
men
,
but
this
only
;
that
it
must
have
proceeded
from
one
common
cause
,
viz.
God
himself
;
who
having
made
man
,
so
prime
a
part
of
his
Creation
,
hath
stampt
with
his
own
signature
this
nobler
piece
of
his
workmanship
;
and
purposely
made
and
fram'd
him
to
the
acknowledgment
and
adoration
of
his
Maker
.
But
how
shall
they
argue
so
,
who
while
they
acknowledge
a
God
,
deny
man
to
be
his
creature
?
and
will
have
him
and
all
things
be
by
chance
,
or
without
dependence
on
any
Maker
?
what
can
an
impression
infer
to
this
purpose
that
comes
no
one
can
tell
whence
or
how
?
But
is
plainly
denied
to
be
from
him
,
whose
being
they
would
argue
from
it
?
The
observation
of
so
common
an
apprehension
in
the
minds
of
men
,
might
(
upon
their
supposition
)
beget
much
wonder
,
but
no
knowledge
;
and
may
perplex
men
much
,
how
such
a
thing
should
come
to
pass
,
without
making
them
any
thing
the
wiser
,
and
would
infer
astonishment
sooner
than
a
good
conclusion
:
or
than
it
would
solidly
prove
any
important
truth
.
And
do
they
think
they
have
salved
the
business
,
and
given
us
a
satisfying
account
of
this
matter
,
by
telling
us
,
this
impression
is
from
nature
(
as
they
speak
.
)
It
were
to
be
wish'd
some
of
them
had
told
us
,
or
could
yet
tell
us
,
what
they
meant
by
nature
.
Is
it
any
intelligent
principle
?
Or
was
it
guided
by
any
such
?
If
yea
,
whence
came
this
impression
,
but
from
God
himself
?
For
surely
an
intelligent
Being
,
that
could
have
this
universal
influence
upon
the
minds
of
all
men
,
is
much
liker
to
be
God
than
the
imaginary
entities
they
talk
of
,
that
are
bodies
and
no
bodies
,
have
bloud
and
no
bloud
,
members
and
no
members
,
are
some
where
,
and
no
where
;
or
if
they
be
any
where
,
are
confined
to
some
certain
places
remote
enough
from
our
world
;
with
the
affairs
whereof
,
or
any
other
,
they
cannot
any
way
concern
themselves
without
quite
undoing
and
spoiling
their
felicity
.
If
they
say
no
,
and
that
nature
which
put
this
stamp
upon
the
minds
of
men
,
is
an
utterly
unintelligent
thing
,
nor
was
ever
governed
by
any
thing
wiser
than
it self
.
Strange
!
that
blind
and
undesigning
nature
,
should
,
without
being
prompted
,
become
thus
ignorantly
officious
to
these
idle
voluptuary
Godlings
;
and
should
so
effectually
take
course
they
might
be
known
to
the
world
,
who
no
way
ever
obliged
it
;
nor
were
ever
like
to
do
!
But
to
regress
a
little
,
fain
I
would
know
what
is
this
thing
they
call
nature
?
Is
it
any
thing
else
than
the
course
and
inclination
of
conspiring
Atoms
,
which
singly
are
not
pretended
to
bear
any
such
impression
;
but
as
they
luckily
club
and
hit
together
in
the
composition
of
an
humane
soul
;
by
the
meerest
and
strangest
chance
that
ever
hapned
?
But
would
we
ever
regard
what
they
say
whom
we
believe
to
speak
by
chance
?
were
it
to
be
supposed
that
characters
and
words
serving
to
make
up
some
proposition
or
other
,
were
by
some
strange
agitation
of
wind
and
waves
imprest
and
figured
on
the
sand
;
would
we
if
we
really
believed
the
matter
came
to
pass
only
by
such
an
odd
casualty
;
think
that
proposition
any
whit
the
truer
for
being
there
,
or
take
this
for
a
demonstration
of
its
truth
,
any
more
than
if
we
had
seen
it
in
a
Ballad
?
Because
men
have
casually
come
to
think
so
,
therefore
there
are
such
beings
(
to
be
called
Gods
)
between
whom
,
and
them
,
there
never
was
,
or
shall
be
any
intercourse
or
mutual
concern
.
It
follows
as
well
as
that
because
the
staff
stands
in
the
corner
,
the
morrow
will
be
a
rainy
day
.
The
dictates
of
nature
are
indeed
most
regardable
things
,
taken
as
expressions
of
his
mind
,
or
emanations
from
him
who
is
the
Author
and
God
of
Nature
.
But
abstracted
from
him
,
they
are
and
signifie
as
much
as
a
beam
cut
off
from
the
body
of
the
Sun
.
Or
a
person
that
pretends
himself
an
Ambassadour
without
credentials
.
Indeed
(
as
is
imported
in
the
words
noted
2.
We
have
also
too
much
reason
to
add
,
That
as
the
supposition
of
such
a
Being
or
sort
of
Beings
can
have
no
sufficient
ground
;
so
it
is
equally
unconceivable
that
it
can
be
intended
for
any
good
end
.
Not
that
we
think
the
last
assertion
a
sufficient
sole
proof
of
this
.
For
we
easily
acknowledge
that
it
is
possible
enough
men
may
harmlesly
and
with
innocent
intentions
attempt
the
building
very
weighty
and
important
Truths
upon
weak
and
insufficient
foundations
.
Hoping
they
have
offered
that
as
a
support
unto
Truth
which
proves
only
an
useless
cumber
.
Nor
were
it
just
to
impute
Treachery
where
there
is
ground
for
the
more
charitable
censure
that
the
misadventure
proceeded
only
from
want
of
judgment
and
shortness
of
discourse
.
But
it
is
neither
needful
,
nor
seemly
,
the
charity
which
can
willingly
wink
,
in
some
cases
,
should
therefore
be
quite
blind
.
Or
that
no
difference
should
be
made
of
well-meant
mistakes
,
and
mischief
thinly
hid
,
and
covered
over
with
specious
pretences
.
And
let
it
be
soberly
considered
,
what
can
the
design
be
,
after
the
cashiering
of
all
solid
grounds
for
the
proving
of
a
Deity
,
at
length
to
acknowledge
it
upon
none
at
all
?
As
if
their
acknowledgment
must
oweit
self
,
not
to
their
reason
,
but
their
courtesie
.
And
when
they
have
done
what
they
can
,
to
make
the
rest
of
men
believe
they
have
no
need
to
own
any
God
at
all
,
and
they
can
tell
how
all
that
concerns
the
making
and
governing
the
world
,
may
well
enough
be
dispatcht
without
any
.
Yet
at
last
they
will
be
so
generous
as
to
be
content
there
shall
be
one
however
.
What
,
I
say
,
can
the
design
of
this
be
,
that
they
who
have
contended
with
all
imaginable
obstinacy
against
the
most
plain
and
convincing
evidences
,
that
do
even
defie
cavil
;
have
quite
fought
themselves
blind
,
and
lost
their
eyes
in
the
encounter
:
so
that
they
are
ready
to
swear
the
Sun
is
a
cold
of
dirt
,
and
noon-day
light
is
to
them
the
very
blackness
of
darkness
.
They
cannot
see
a
Deity
incircling
them
with
the
brightest
beams
and
shining
upon
them
with
the
most
conspicuous
glory
,
through
every
thing
that
occurs
,
and
all
things
that
encompass
them
on
every
side
.
And
yet
when
all
is
done
,
and
their
thunder-struck
eyes
make
them
fancy
they
have
put
out
the
Sun
,
they
have
won
the
day
,
have
cleared
the
field
,
and
are
absolute
victors
;
they
have
vanquished
the
whole
power
of
their
most
dreaded
enemy
,
the
light
that
reveals
God
in
his
works
.
After
all
this
without
any
inducement
at
all
,
and
having
triumpht
over
every
thing
that
look'd
like
an
argument
to
prove
it
.
They
vouchsafe
to
say
however
of
their
own
accord
There
is
a
God
.
Surely
if
this
have
any
design
at
all
,
it
must
be
a
very
bad
one
.
And
see
whither
it
tends
.
They
have
now
a
God
of
their
own
making
.
And
all
the
Being
he
hath
depends
upon
their
grace
and
favour
.
They
are
not
his
creatures
,
but
he
is
theirs
.
A
precarious
Deity
,
that
shall
be
as
long
,
and
what
,
and
where
they
please
to
have
him
.
And
if
he
displease
them
,
they
can
think
him
back
into
nothing
.
Here
seems
the
depth
of
the
design
.
For
see
with
what
cautions
and
limitations
they
admit
him
into
being
.
There
shall
be
a
God
provided
he
be
not
meddlesome
,
nor
concern
himself
in
their
affairs
,
to
the
crossing
of
any
inclinations
or
humours
which
they
are
pleased
shall
command
and
govern
their
lives
.
Being
conscious
that
if
they
admit
of
any
at
all
,
that
shall
have
to
do
with
their
concernments
,
he
cannot
but
be
such
as
the
ways
they
resolve
on
will
displease
.
Their
very
shame
will
not
permit
them
to
call
that
God
,
which
if
he
take
any
cognisance
at
all
of
their
course
will
dislike
it
.
And
herein
that
they
may
be
the
more
secure
,
they
judge
it
the
most
prudent
course
not
to
allow
him
any
part
or
interest
in
the
affairs
of
the
world
at
all
.
Yet
all
this
while
they
court
him
at
a
great
rate
,
and
all
Religion
is
taken
away
,
under
pretence
of
great
piety
:
Worship
they
believe
he
cares
not
for
,
because
he
is
full
and
needs
nothing
.
In
this
world
he
must
not
be
,
for
it
is
a
place
unworthy
of
him
.
He
must
have
had
no
hand
in
framing
.
Nor
can
they
think
it
fit
he
should
have
any
in
the
government
of
it
.
For
it
would
be
a
great
disturbance
to
him
,
and
interrupt
his
pleasures
.
The
same
thing
as
if
certain
licentious
Courtiers
impatient
of
being
governed
should
address
themselves
to
their
Prince
in
such
a
form
of
speech
,
that
it
is
beneath
him
to
receive
any
homage
from
them
,
it
would
too
much
debase
Majesty
,
that
his
Dominions
afford
no
place
fit
for
his
residence
;
and
therefore
it
would
be
convenient
for
him
to
betake
himself
into
some
other
Country
that
hath
better
air
and
accommodation
for
delight
.
That
Diadems
and
Scepters
are
burdensome
things
.
Which
therefore
if
he
will
quit
to
them
,
he
may
wholly
give
up
himself
to
ease
and
pleasure
.
Yea
and
whatsoever
would
any
way
tend
to
evince
his
necessary
existence
,
is
with
the
same
courtship
laid
aside
(
although
if
he
do
not
exist
necessarily
and
of
himself
,
he
cannot
have
any
existence
at
all
:
For
as
they
do
not
allow
him
to
be
the
cause
of
any
thing
,
so
they
assign
nothing
to
be
the
cause
of
him
)
that
is
,
with
pretence
there
is
no
need
it
should
be
demonstrated
,
because
all
men
believe
it
without
a
reason
;
nature
having
imprest
this
belief
upon
the
minds
of
all
;
or
(
which
is
all
one
)
they
having
agreed
to
believe
it
because
they
believe
it
.
But
though
they
have
no
reason
to
believe
a
Deity
,
they
have
a
very
good
one
why
they
would
seem
to
do
so
,
that
they
may
expiate
with
the
people
their
irreligion
by
a
collusive
pretending
against
Atheism
.
And
because
they
think
it
less
plausible
plainly
to
deny
there
is
a
God
,
they
therefore
grant
one
to
please
the
vulgar
,
yet
take
care
it
shall
be
one
as
good
as
none
,
lest
otherwise
they
should
displease
themselves
.
And
so
their
credit
and
their
liberty
are
both
cared
for
together
.
But
this
covering
is
too
short
,
and
the
art
3.
That
the
Being
with
the
pretended
belief
whereof
they
would
mock
the
world
is
no
God
;
and
that
consequently
,
while
they
would
seem
to
acknowledge
a
Deity
they
really
acknowledge
none
at
all
.
Our
contest
hath
not
all
this
while
been
a
strife
about
words
;
or
concerning
the
name
,
but
the
thing
it self
.
And
not
whether
there
be
such
a
thing
in
being
to
which
that
name
may
with
whatsoever
impropriety
be
given
,
but
whether
there
be
such
a
Being
as
whereto
it
properly
belongs
.
Supposing
and
taking
for
granted
,
as
a
matter
out
of
question
,
that
(
even
in
their
own
sense
)
if
such
a
Being
,
as
we
have
described
do
exist
;
it
is
most
properly
God
.
And
that
they
will
not
go
about
to
call
it
,
by
another
name
.
Or
that
they
will
not
pretend
this
name
agrees
to
any
other
thing
so
fitly
as
to
him
.
And
because
we
have
already
proved
this
being
doth
exist
;
and
that
there
can
be
but
one
such
,
it
plainly
follows
theirs
is
in
propriety
of
speech
(
even
though
he
did
exist
)
no
God
.
And
that
,
much
less
,
should
he
appropriate
the
name
,
and
exclude
the
only
true
God
.
For
since
the
high
and
dignifying
elogies
which
they
are
wont
to
bestow
upon
their
feigned
.
Deity
do
plainly
shew
they
would
have
it
thought
they
esteem
him
the
most
excellent
of
all
existent
Beings
;
if
we
have
proved
a
really
existent
Being
to
be
more
excellent
than
he
,
it
is
evident
even
upon
their
own
grounds
that
this
is
God
.
Hither
the
Deity
must
be
deferr'd
.
And
theirs
must
yield
,
and
give
out
.
Inasmuch
as
we
cannot
suppose
them
so
void
of
common
sense
as
to
say
the
less
excellent
Being
is
God
;
and
the
more
excellent
is
no
God
.
But
if
they
should
be
so
,
whereas
the
controversie
is
not
about
the
name
,
we
have
our
main
purpose
in
having
proved
there
is
,
a
being
actually
existent
that
hath
all
the
real
excellencies
which
they
ascribe
to
their
Deities
,
and
infinitely
more
.
And
as
concerning
the
name
,
who
made
them
dictators
to
all
the
world
?
and
the
sole
judges
of
the
propriety
of
words
?
Or
with
what
right
or
pretence
will
they
assume
so
much
to
themselves
?
so
as
against
the
rest
of
the
world
to
name
that
God
,
from
which
they
cut
off
the
principal
perfections
wont
to
be
signified
by
that
name
?
And
if
we
speak
of
such
perfections
as
tend
to
infer
and
establish
Religion
and
Providence
.
Who
but
themselves
did
ever
call
that
God
,
in
the
eminent
sense
that
they
supposed
could
not
hear
prayers
,
and
thereupon
dispense
favours
,
relieve
the
afficted
,
supply
the
indigent
,
and
receive
sutable
acknowledgments
?
They
indeed
(
saith
a
famed
Writer
of
Roman
History
)
that
exercise
themselves
in
the
Atheistical
sorts
of
Philosophy
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
&c.
D.
Halicarnass
.
Ant.
Rom.
l
2.
(
if
we
may
call
that
Philosophy
)
as
they
are
wont
to
jeer
at
all
appearances
of
the
Gods
,
whether
among
the
Greeks
or
the
Barbarians
will
make
themselves
matter
of
laughter
of
our
Histories
,
not
thinking
that
any
God
takes
care
of
any
man
.
—
Let
the
story
he
there
tells
shift
for
it self
,
in
the
mean
time
it
appears
they
escap'd
not
the
infamy
of
Atheists
,
who
(
what
ever
Deities
they
might
imagine
besides
)
did
deny
Gods
presence
and
regard
to
men
.
Which
sort
of
persons
he
elsewhere
often
animadverts
upon
.
But
do
we
need
to
insist
that
all
the
rest
of
the
world
acknowledged
no
Gods
,
whom
they
did
not
also
worship
?
what
meant
their
Temples
,
and
Altars
,
their
Prayers
and
Sacrifices
?
or
did
they
take
him
for
God
,
whom
they
believed
to
take
no
care
of
them
,
or
from
whom
they
expected
no
advantage
?
Even
the
Barbarous
Scythians
themselves
understood
it
most
inseparably
to
belong
to
a
Deity
to
be
beneficent
when
they
upbraidingly
tell
Alexander
,
That
if
he
were
a
God
(
as
they
it
seems
had
Q.
Curtius
.
heard
he
vogued
himself
)
he
should
bestow
benefits
upon
men
,
and
not
take
from
them
what
was
their
own
.
And
by
the
way
it
is
observable
how
contradictious
and
repugnant
,
the
Epicurean
sentiments
are
,
in
this
,
even
to
themselves
:
that
speaking
of
friendship
(
of
which
they
say
many
maxime
cum
princip.
viris
Pbil.
&c.
seem
so
greatly
concern'd
that
their
Gods
be
every
way
most
perfectly
happy
deny
to
them
this
highest
and
most
excellent
part
of
felicity
.
that
a
virtuous
man
may
a
great
deal
more
benefit
the
world
,
than
they
;
and
,
consequently
,
have
more
pure
and
lively
relishes
of
a
genuine
and
refined
pleasure
.
Upon
the
whole
,
it
is
manifest
they
so
maim
the
notion
of
God
,
as
to
make
it
quite
another
thing
.
And
if
they
think
to
wipe
off
any
thing
of
the
foul
and
odious
blot
wherewith
their
avow'd
irreligion
hath
stain'd
their
name
and
memory
,
by
the
acknowledgment
of
such
a
God
:
They
effect
the
like
thing
by
it
,
and
gain
as
much
to
the
reputation
of
their
piety
,
as
he
should
,
of
his
loyalty
,
who
being
accus'd
of
Treason
against
his
Prince
,
shall
think
to
vindicate
himself
,
by
professing
solemnly
to
own
the
King
.
Provided
you
only
mean
by
it
the
King
of
Clubs
;
or
any
such
painted
one
the
pack
affords
.
But
here
it
may
be
demanded
,
is
every
misapprehension
of
God
to
be
understood
as
a
denial
of
his
Being
?
If
so
,
whom
can
we
undertake
to
assoil
of
Atheism
?
or
who
can
certainly
acquit
himself
?
For
how
impossible
is
it
to
be
sure
we
have
no
untrue
conception
of
a
Being
so
infinitely
,
by
our
own
confession
,
above
all
our
thoughts
?
Or
how
is
it
to
be
avoided
,
in
somewhat
or
other
to
think
amiss
of
so
unknown
and
incomprehensibly
excellent
a
Being
?
Either
by
detracting
somewhat
that
belongs
to
it
,
or
attributing
somewhat
that
belongs
not
?
And
since
many
,
we
are
sure
,
have
thought
and
spoken
unworthily
of
God
,
besides
Epicureans
,
are
all
these
to
go
into
the
account
of
Atheists
?
Or
whereas
it
is
commonly
wont
to
be
said
,
whatsoever
is
in
God
,
is
God
:
how
can
they
who
deny
any
thing
of
him
,
which
is
really
in
him
be
excused
of
denying
his
whole
being
?
or
where
will
we
fix
the
bounds
of
our
censure
?
Many
things
should
be
said
(
if
we
will
speak
at
all
)
to
so
manifold
an
enquiry
.
But
it
belongs
not
to
the
design
of
this
discourse
to
examine
and
discuss
all
mens
sentiments
of
God
,
that
have
been
exposed
to
the
view
of
the
world
;
or
arbitrate
among
the
dissenting
parties
.
Much
less
to
explain
or
abet
every
School-maxim
that
hath
reference
to
this
theme
.
The
Authors
or
lovers
whereof
will
be
sufficiently
prompted
by
their
own
Genius
to
do
,
at
least
as
much
as
can
be
requisite
herein
.
But
whatever
the
real
sameness
is
supposed
to
be
,
of
the
things
attributed
to
God
,
it
is
acknowledged
we
cannot
but
conceive
of
them
as
divers
.
And
so
,
that
our
conception
of
any
one
is
not
adequate
to
the
entire
object
(
which
is
confessed
incomprehensible
.
)
Yet
any
one
attribute
gives
a
true
notion
of
the
object
so
far
as
it
reaches
,
though
not
a
full
.
As
I
may
be
said
truly
to
see
a
man
,
when
I
only
see
his
face
,
and
view
not
every
part
and
limb
;
or
to
know
him
,
while
yet
I
have
not
had
opportunity
to
discern
every
quality
in
his
temper
,
and
what
his
dispositions
and
inclinations
in
all
respects
are
.
Moreover
it
's
one
thing
to
deny
any
Divine
perfection
,
another
only
not
to
know
it
.
And
such
meer
nescience
is
so
far
from
being
guilty
of
the
horrid
crime
of
Atheism
,
that
it
's
not
so
much
as
culpable
further
than
as
it
is
obstinately
persisted
in
against
sufficient
evidence
:
for
we
are
not
obliged
to
know
every
thing
,
but
what
is
to
us
knowable
,
and
what
we
are
concerned
to
know
.
Again
(
and
which
is
most
considerable
to
our
purpose
)
we
are
not
concerned
to
know
what
God
is
in
himself
,
otherwise
than
as
we
may
thereby
know
what
he
is
in
relation
to
us
,
viz.
as
he
is
the
Author
of
our
Beings
,
the
governour
of
our
lives
and
actions
,
and
thereupon
the
object
of
our
Religion
.
For
a
religious
respect
unto
him
is
the
very
end
of
that
knowledge
.
Now
,
if
any
other
than
that
sort
of
persons
we
oppose
have
taken
up
apprehensions
of
him
,
not
so
sutable
to
that
end
;
it
were
to
be
wisht
they
saw
it
,
and
would
unthink
all
those
thoughts
?
But
surely
,
they
who
most
professedly
contend
against
the
very
notions
themselves
which
directly
influence
all
our
practice
toward
God
,
so
considered
,
would
suggest
such
as
are
wholly
inconsistent
therewith
,
who
oppose
the
knowledge
of
God
to
the
end
of
that
knowledge
;
and
do
not
meerly
mistake
the
way
to
that
end
,
while
they
are
aiming
at
it
,
but
most
avowedly
resist
and
disclaim
the
end
it self
;
are
to
be
distinguished
from
them
who
professedly
intend
that
same
end
,
only
see
not
wherein
their
misapprehensions
are
prejudicial
and
repugnant
to
it
:
otherwise
are
ready
to
reject
them
.
And
the
former
are
therefore
most
justly
to
be
singled
out
and
designed
the
objects
of
our
directest
opposition
.
Nor
are
they
so
fitly
to
be
opposed
under
any
other
notion
as
that
of
Atheists
.
For
since
our
knowledge
of
God
ought
chiefly
to
respect
him
in
that
forementioned
relative
consideration
,
and
the
enquiry
what
is
God
?
signifies
,
as
it
concerns
us
,
what
is
the
object
of
Religion
?
They
denying
any
such
thing
,
deny
there
is
a
God
.
Nor
do
they
deny
him
in
that
relative
consideration
only
;
but
(
as
every
relation
is
founded
in
somewhat
that
is
absolute
)
the
very
reason
of
their
denying
him
,
so
,
is
that
they
deny
in
him
those
absolute
and
positive
perfections
that
render
him
such
,
as
certain
of
those
do
that
have
been
proved
to
belong
to
him
.
Which
is
that
we
have
next
to
consider
,
viz.
4.
That
it
may
evidently
be
deduced
from
what
hath
been
said
,
tending
to
prove
those
things
of
God
which
are
included
in
the
notion
of
him
,
and
from
that
notion
it self
,
that
he
is
such
as
can
converse
with
men
.
That
is
,
having
proved
[
that
there
is
an
eternal
self-subsisting
independent
necessary
being
of
so
great
activity
,
life
,
power
,
wisdom
,
and
goodness
as
to
have
been
the
maker
of
this
world
]
And
by
this
medium
[
that
we
see
this
world
is
in
being
,
which
otherwise
could
never
have
been
,
much
less
such
as
we
see
it
is
.
]
It
plainly
follows
that
this
great
Creator
can
have
influence
upon
the
Creatures
he
hath
made
in
a
way
sutable
to
their
natures
.
It
follows
I
say
from
the
same
medium
[
the
present
visible
existence
of
this
world
which
could
not
otherwise
be
now
in
being
]
that
he
can
thus
have
influence
upon
his
creatures
:
For
it
is
hence
manifest
that
he
doth
;
they
depend
on
him
;
and
are
sustained
by
him
:
Nor
could
more
subsist
by
themselves
than
they
could
make
themselves
,
or
of
themselves
have
sprung
out
of
nothing
.
And
if
it
were
possible
they
could
,
being
raised
up
into
Being
,
continue
in
Being
of
themselves
:
Yet
since
our
present
question
is
not
concerning
what
they
need
,
but
what
God
can
do
.
And
our
adversaries
in
the
present
cause
,
do
not
(
as
hath
been
noted
)
upon
any
other
pretence
deny
that
he
doth
concern
himself
in
the
affairs
of
the
universe
,
but
that
he
cannot
,
(
that
is
,
that
it
consists
not
with
his
felicity
,
and
he
cannot
,
not
be
happy
.
)
Is
it
not
plain
that
he
can
with
the
same
facility
,
continue
the
influence
which
he
at
first
gave
forth
?
And
with
as
little
prejudice
to
his
felicity
?
For
if
it
be
necessary
to
him
to
be
happy
,
or
impossible
not
to
be
so
;
he
must
be
ever
so
.
His
happiness
was
not
capable
of
being
discontinued
so
long
as
while
he
made
the
world
,
setled
the
several
orders
and
kinds
,
and
formed
the
first
individuals
of
every
kind
of
creatures
.
Therefore
having
done
this
,
and
without
diminution
to
his
happiness
,
was
it
a
more
toilsome
and
less
tollerable
labour
to
keep
things
as
they
were
,
than
to
make
them
so
?
If
it
was
(
which
no
man
that
understands
common
sense
would
say
)
surely
that
blind
thing
which
they
more
blindly
call
nature
(
not
understanding
or
being
able
to
tell
what
they
mean
by
it
)
and
would
have
be
the
only
cause
of
all
things
,
acting
at
first
to
the
uttermost
,
and
having
no
way
to
recruit
its
vigour
and
reinforce
it self
,
its
labour
and
business
being
so
much
increased
,
had
jaded
and
grown
weary
;
had
given
out
,
and
patiently
suffered
all
things
to
dissolve
and
relapse
into
the
old
chaos
long
ago
.
But
if
the
labour
was
not
greater
to
continue
things
in
the
state
wherein
they
were
made
than
to
make
them
,
surely
a
wise
intelligent
Deity
,
which
we
have
proved
made
them
,
could
as
well
sustain
them
being
made
;
as
their
brutal
and
(
as
unintelligible
as
)
unintelligent
nature
do
both
.
So
much
then
of
intercourse
,
God
could
have
with
his
creatures
as
his
continual
communication
of
his
influence
to
be
received
by
them
amounts
to
.
And
then
,
man
,
not
being
excluded
their
number
,
must
share
in
this
possible
priviledge
according
to
the
capacity
of
his
nature
.
And
inasmuch
as
we
have
also
proved
(
more
particularly
)
concerning
man
,
that
he
immediately
owes
the
peculiar
excellencies
of
his
intelligent
nature
,
as
it
's
such
to
God
only
.
It
is
apparently
consequent
,
that
having
formed
this
his
more
excellent
creature
according
to
his
own
more
express
likeness
,
stampt
it
with
the
glorious
characters
of
his
living
image
,
given
it
a
nature
sutable
to
his
own
,
and
thereby
made
it
capable
of
rational
and
intelligent
converse
with
him
.
He
hath
it
ever
in
his
power
to
maintain
a
continual
converse
with
this
creature
,
by
agreeable
communications
.
By
letting
in
upon
it
the
vital
beams
and
influences
of
his
own
light
and
love
,
and
receiving
back
the
return
of
its
grateful
acknowledgements
and
praises
.
Wherein
its
manifest
he
should
do
no
greater
thing
than
he
hath
done
.
For
who
fees
not
that
it
is
a
matter
of
no
greater
difficulto
converse
with
,
than
to
make
a
reasonable
creature
?
Or
who
would
not
be
ashamed
to
deny
that
he
who
hath
been
the
only
Author
of
the
soul
of
man
,
and
of
the
excellent
powers
and
faculties
belonging
to
it
,
can
more
easily
sustain
what
he
hath
made
?
And
converse
with
that
his
creature
sutably
to
the
way
wherein
he
hath
made
it
capable
of
his
converse
?
Whereto
,
the
consideration
being
added
of
his
gracious
nature
(
manifested
in
this
creation
it self
)
it
is
further
evident
,
that
he
is
(
as
things
are
now
ordered
whereof
more
hereafter
)
not
only
able
,
but
apt
and
ready
to
converse
with
men
in
such
a
way
as
shall
tend
to
the
improving
of
their
being
unto
that
blessedness
whereof
he
hath
made
them
naturally
capable
.
If
their
own
voluntary
alienation
and
aversion
to
him
(
yet
not
overcome
)
do
not
obstruct
the
way
of
that
intercourse
.
And
even
this
were
sufficient
to
give
foundation
to
a
Temple
,
and
both
afford
encouragement
and
infer
an
obligation
to
Religion
;
although
no
other
perfection
had
been
or
could
be
demonstrated
of
the
Divine
Being
,
than
what
is
immediately
to
be
collected
from
his
works
,
and
the
things
whereof
he
hath
been
the
sole
and
most
arbitrary
Author
.
For
what
if
no
more
were
possible
to
be
proved
,
have
we
not
,
even
by
thus
much
,
a
representation
of
an
object
sufficiently
worthy
of
our
honiage
and
adoration
?
He
that
could
make
and
sustain
such
a
world
as
this
,
how
unexpressibly
doth
he
surpass
in
greatness
the
most
excellent
of
all
mortal
creatures
!
To
some
or
other
,
of
whom
,
upon
some
(
meerly
accidental
)
dignifying
circumstances
,
we
justly
esteem
our selves
to
owe
a
dutiful
observance
and
subjection
.
If
he
did
not
comprehend
within
his
own
Being
simply
all
perfection
:
If
there
were
many
Gods
,
and
Worlds
besides
;
and
he
only
the
Creator
and
absolute
Lord
of
our
vortex
,
were
not
that
enough
to
entitle
him
to
all
the
obedience
and
service
we
could
give
him
?
and
enable
him
sufficiently
to
reward
it
?
and
render
his
presence
and
cherishing
influences
(
which
he
could
every
where
diffuse
within
this
circle
and
limited
portion
of
the
universe
)
even
infinitely
covetable
and
desirable
to
us
?
Yea
,
if
he
were
only
the
entire
Author
of
our
own
particular
Being
,
how
much
more
is
that
then
the
partial
subordinate
interest
of
an
humane
Parent
?
To
whom
(
as
even
an
Epicurean
would
confess
)
nature
it self
urges
and
exacts
a
duty
.
The
refusal
whereof
,
even
Barbarian
ingenuity
would
abhor
,
yea
and
brutal
instinct
condemn
?
How
much
greater
and
more
absolute
is
the
right
which
the
parentage
of
our
whole
being
challenges
?
If
every
man
were
created
by
a
several
God
,
whose
creative
power
were
confined
to
only
one
such
creature
,
and
each
one
were
the
solitary
product
,
and
the
charge
of
an
appropriate
Deity
;
whose
dominion
the
state
of
things
would
allow
to
be
extended
so
far
,
only
,
and
no
further
,
were
there
therefore
no
place
left
for
Religion
?
Or
no
tie
unto
love
,
reverence
,
obedience
,
and
adoration
,
because
the
Author
of
my
being
comprehended
not
in
himself
all
perfection
?
when
as
yet
he
comprehended
so
much
as
to
be
the
sole
cause
of
all
that
is
in
me
?
And
his
power
over
me
,
and
his
goodness
to
me
,
are
hereby
supposed
the
same
,
which
the
only
one
God
,
truly
hath
and
exerciseth
towards
all
?
If
all
that
I
am
and
have
be
from
him
,
I
cannot
surely
owe
to
him
less
than
all
?
Such
as
have
either
had
,
or
supposed
themselves
to
have
,
their
particular
tutelary
Genii
,
(
of
whom
there
will
be
more
occasion
to
take
notice
hereafter
)
though
they
reckoned
them
but
a
sort
of
deputed
or
vicarious
Deities
,
underlin
Gods
whom
they
never
accounted
the
causes
of
their
being
;
yet
how
have
they
coveted
and
gloried
to
open
their
breasts
,
to
become
their
Temples
,
and
entertain
the
converse
of
those
(
supposed
)
Divine
inhabitants
?
If
they
had
taken
one
of
these
,
to
be
their
alone
Creator
,
how
much
greater
had
their
veneration
and
their
homage
been
?
This
it
may
be
hoped
,
will
be
thought
sufficiently
proved
in
this
discourse
(
at
least
to
have
been
so
by
some
or
other
)
that
we
are
not
of
our selves
;
and
that
our
extraction
is
to
be
fetcht
higher
than
from
matter
,
or
from
only
humane
progenitors
.
Nothing
that
is
terrene
and
mortal
could
be
the
author
of
such
powers
as
we
find
in
our selves
.
We
are
most
certainly
the
off-spring
of
some
or
other
Deity
.
And
he
that
made
us
knows
us
throughly
,
can
apply
himself
inwardly
to
us
,
receive
our
addresses
and
applications
,
our
acknowledgments
and
adoration
.
Whereunto
we
should
have
even
upon
these
terms
great
and
manifest
obligation
,
although
nothing
more
of
the
excellency
and
perfection
of
our
Creator
were
certainly
known
to
us
.
But
it
hath
been
further
shewn
that
the
necessary
being
from
whence
we
sprang
,
is
also
absolutely
and
infinitely
perfect
Being
.
That
necessary
Being
cannot
be
less
perfect
,
than
to
include
the
entire
and
inexhaustible
fulness
of
all
being
and
perfection
.
That
therefore
the
God
to
whom
this
notion
belongs
,
must
,
consequently
,
be
every
way
sufficient
to
all
,
and
be
himself
but
one
.
The
only
source
and
fountain
of
all
life
and
Being
;
the
common
basis
and
support
of
the
universe
;
The
absolute
Lord
of
this
great
Creation
,
and
the
central
object
of
the
common
concurrent
Trust
,
fear
,
love
,
and
other
worship
of
his
Intelligent
and
reasonable
creatures
.
And
therefore
there
remains
no
greater
or
other
difficulty
in
apprehending
how
he
can
,
without
disturbance
to
himself
,
or
interruption
of
his
own
felicity
,
intend
all
the
concernments
of
his
creatures
,
apply
himself
to
them
according
to
their
several
exigencies
,
satisfie
their
desires
and
cravings
,
inspect
and
govern
their
actions
and
affairs
;
than
we
have
to
apprehend
a
Being
absolutely
and
every
way
perfect
.
Whereof
if
we
cannot
have
a
distinct
apprehension
all
at
once
,
i.
e.
though
we
cannot
comprehend
every
particular
perfection
of
God
in
the
same
thought
(
as
our
eye
cannot
behold
at
one
view
every
part
of
an
over-large
object
unto
which
however
,
part
by
part
,
it
may
be
successively
apply'd
)
we
can
yet
in
the
general
apprehend
him
absolutely
perfect
,
;
or
such
to
whom
we
are
sure
no
perfection
is
wanting
.
And
can
successively
contemplate
this
or
that
,
as
we
are
occasionally
led
to
consider
them
:
And
can
answer
to
our selves
difficulties
that
occur
to
us
,
with
this
easie
,
sure
,
and
ever
ready
solution
;
that
he
can
do
all
things
,
That
nothing
is
too
hard
for
him
,
That
he
is
full
,
all-sufficient
,
and
every
way
perfect
.
Whereof
we
are
the
more
confirmed
that
we
find
we
cannot
by
the
utmost
range
of
our
most
enlarged
thoughts
,
ever
reach
any
bound
or
end
of
that
perfection
which
yet
we
must
conclude
is
necessarily
to
be
attributed
to
an
absolutely
perfect
Being
.
And
this
we
have
reason
to
take
for
a
very
sufficient
answer
to
any
doubt
that
can
arise
,
concerning
the
possibility
of
his
converse
with
us
,
unless
we
will
be
so
unreasonable
as
to
pretend
that
what
is
brought
for
solution
hath
greater
difficulty
in
it
than
the
doubt
.
Or
that
because
we
cannot
apprehend
at
once
,
infinite
perfection
,
therefore
it
cannot
be
,
which
were
as
much
as
to
say
,
that
it
cannot
be
because
it
is
infinite
;
for
it
were
not
infinite
if
we
could
distinctly
apprehend
it
.
And
so
were
to
make
it
a
reason
against
it self
,
which
is
most
injuriously
and
with
no
pretence
attempted
,
except
we
could
shew
an
inconsistency
in
the
terms
which
it
is
plain
we
can
never
do
;
and
should
most
idly
attempt
.
And
it
were
to
make
our
present
apprehension
the
measure
of
all
reality
;
against
our
experience
,
which
(
if
our
indulgence
to
that
self-magnifying
conceit
do
not
suspend
our
farther
enquiries
and
researches
)
would
daily
bring
to
our
notice
things
we
had
no
apprehension
of
before
.
It
were
instead
of
that
just
and
laudable
ambition
of
becoming
our selves
like
God
in
his
imitable
perfections
,
to
make
him
like
our selves
.
The
true
model
of
the
Epicurean
Deity
.
Nor
can
any
thing
be
more
easie
than
that
wherein
we
pretend
so
great
a
difficulty
;
that
is
to
apprehend
somewhat
may
be
more
perfect
than
we
can
apprehend
.
What
else
but
proud
ignorance
can
hinder
us
from
seeing
that
the
more
we
know
,
the
more
there
is
that
we
know
not
?
How
often
are
we
out-done
by
creatures
of
our
own
order
in
the
Creation
!
How
many
men
are
there
whom
we
are
daily
constrain'd
to
admire
,
as
unspeakably
excelling
us
,
and
whom
we
cannot
but
acknowledge
to
be
far
more
knowing
,
discerning
,
apprehensive
of
things
,
of
more
composed
minds
,
of
more
penetrating
judgments
,
of
more
quick
and
nimble
wits
,
easily
turning
themselves
to
great
variety
of
objects
and
affairs
without
distraction
and
confusion
,
of
more
equal
and
dispassionate
tempers
,
less
liable
to
commotion
and
disturbance
than
our selves
.
How
absurd
and
sensless
a
pretence
is
it
,
against
the
thing
it self
,
that
we
cannot
apprehend
an
infinite
perfection
in
one
common
fountain
of
all
perfection
;
or
because
we
cannot
go
through
a
multitude
of
businesses
without
distraction
,
that
therefore
he
that
made
us
and
all
things
cannot
.
If
we
would
make
our selves
the
measure
,
't
is
likely
we
should
confess
we
were
out-stript
,
when
we
are
told
that
Julius
Caesar
could
dictate
letters
when
he
was
intent
upon
the
greatest
affairs
to
four
(
and
if
Plin.
Nat.
Hist.
lib.
7.
c.
25.
Id.
l.
7.
c.
24.
vid.
&
Xenoph.
de
Cyr.
Paed.
l.
5.
Who
though
he
expresly
say
not
he
knew
all
the
Souldiers
names
,
but
seems
rather
to
mean
it
of
their
Officers
(
for
saith
he
,
he
reckon'd
it
an
absurd
thing
a
Mechanick
should
know
the
names
of
all
his
Tools
,
&c.
And
a
General
not
know
the
names
of
his
Captains
under
him
,
&c.
)
yet
he
saith
,
the
Souldiers
wonder'd
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
.
he
had
nothing
else
to
divert
him
to
seven
)
Secretaries
at
once
.
That
Cyrus
could
call
by
name
all
the
Souldiers
in
his
numerous
Army
.
With
divers
other
strange
instances
of
like
nature
.
And
since
the
perfections
of
some
so
far
exceed
the
measure
of
the
most
,
why
is
it
then
unconceivable
that
Divine
perfection
should
so
far
surpass
all
,
as
that
God
may
intend
the
affairs
of
the
world
according
to
the
several
exigencies
of
his
creatures
without
any
ungrateful
diversion
to
himself
,
or
diminution
to
his
felicity
?
And
since
they
who
partake
of
some
and
but
a
small
portion
of
perfection
only
;
can
be
concern'd
in
many
affairs
with
little
trouble
,
why
cannot
he
that
comprehends
all
perfection
be
concern'd
in
all
without
any
?
For
though
we
have
in
what
hath
been
last
said
endeavoured
to
represent
it
as
not
so
unapprehensible
as
is
pretended
that
it
may
be
so
,
we
take
it
in
the
mean
time
as
formerly
sufficiently
proved
that
so
it
is
,
That
God
is
a
being
absolutely
perfect
,
or
that
includes
eminently
all
perfection
in
himself
.
Which
general
perfection
of
his
Being
as
it
modifies
all
his
attributes
,
so
we
shall
particularly
take
notice
that
it
doth
so
,
as
to
those
that
have
a
more
direct
influence
upon
,
and
tend
more
fully
to
evince
,
his
conversableness
with
men
.
As
first
:
His
wisdom
or
knowledge
simply
all
things
so
as
wisely
to
consider
them
,
and
resolve
fitly
about
them
,
it
will
be
no
little
difficulty
to
determine
,
which
he
doth
,
and
which
not
;
or
to
be
at
a
certainty
that
this
or
that
concernment
of
theirs
about
which
they
might
addgess
themselves
to
him
be
not
among
the
unknown
things
.
At
least
,
we
shall
the
less
need
to
be
curious
in
distinguishing
,
or
to
consider
what
things
may
be
supposed
rather
than
other
,
to
be
without
the
compass
of
his
knowledge
;
if
it
appear
that
it
universally
encompasses
all
things
.
Or
that
nothing
can
be
without
its
reach
.
And
because
we
suppose
it
,
already
,
out
of
doubt
,
that
the
true
notion
of
God
imports
a
Being
absolutely
or
every
way
perfect
;
nothing
else
can
be
doubted
in
this
matter
,
but
,
whether
the
knowledge
of
all
things
be
a
perfection
?
The
greatest
difficulty
that
hath
troubled
some
in
this
matter
hath
been
,
How
it
is
possible
there
should
be
any
certain
knowledge
of
events
yet
to
come
,
that
depend
upon
a
free
and
self-determining
cause
.
But
methinks
we
should
not
make
a
difficulty
to
acknowledge
that
to
know
these
things
,
imports
greater
perfection
,
than
not
to
know
them
;
and
then
it
would
be
very
unreasonable
,
because
we
cannot
shew
how
this
or
that
thing
was
performed
,
which
manifestly
is
done
;
therefore
to
deny
that
it
is
done
at
all
.
So
far
is
it
that
we
can
with
any
shew
of
reason
conclude
against
any
act
of
God
from
our
ignorance
of
the
manner
of
it
,
that
we
should
reckon
it
very
absurd
to
conclude
so
,
concerning
any
act
of
our
own
,
or
our
ability
thereto
.
What
if
it
were
hitherto
an
unknown
thing
,
and
impossible
to
be
determined
;
how
the
act
of
vision
is
performed
by
us
:
were
it
a
wise
conclusion
,
that
therefore
we
neither
do
nor
can
see
?
r
How
much
more
rash
and
presuming
a
confidence
were
it
to
reason
thus
concerning
the
Divine
acts
and
perfections
!
would
we
not
in
any
such
case
be
determined
rather
by
that
which
is
more
evident
,
than
by
what
is
more
obscure
?
As
in
the
assigned
instance
:
we
should
have
but
these
two
propositions
to
compare
[
that
I
do
(
or
have
such
a
perfection
belonging
to
me
that
I
can
)
see
]
and
[
that
whatsoever
act
I
do
or
can
do
,
I
am
able
to
understand
the
course
and
method
of
natures
operation
therein
.
]
And
thereupon
to
judge
which
of
these
two
is
more
evident
.
Wherein
it
may
be
supposed
there
's
no
man
in
his
wits
to
whom
the
determination
would
not
be
easie
.
Accordingly
in
the
present
case
we
have
only
these
two
assertions
that
can
be
in
competition
in
point
of
evidence
,
between
which
we
are
to
make
a
comparison
and
a
(
consequent
)
judgment
,
viz.
[
whatsoever
perfection
belongs
to
a
Being
absolutely
perfect
,
enabling
it
to
do
this
or
that
,
the
wit
of
man
can
comprehend
the
distinct
way
and
manner
of
doing
it
]
and
[
it
imports
greater
perfection
to
know
all
things
,
than
to
be
ignorant
of
some
]
and
here
surely
whosoever
shall
think
the
determination
difficult
,
accounts
the
wit
of
man
so
exceeding
great
that
he
discovers
his
own
to
be
very
little
.
For
what
can
the
pretence
of
evidence
be
in
the
former
assertion
?
Was
it
necessary
that
he
in
whose
choice
it
was
whether
we
should
ever
know
any
thing
or
no
,
should
make
us
capable
of
knowing
every
thing
belonging
to
his
own
being
?
Or
will
we
adventure
to
be
so
assuming
,
as
while
we
deny
it
to
God
that
he
knows
all
things
,
to
attribute
to
our selves
that
we
do
?
But
if
we
will
think
it
not
altogether
unworthy
of
us
to
be
ignorant
of
some
thing
,
what
is
there
of
which
we
may
with
more
probability
or
with
less
disparagement
be
thought
so
,
than
the
manner
of
Gods
knowing
things
?
And
what
place
is
there
for
complaint
of
inevidence
in
the
latter
?
Is
not
that
knowledge
more
perfect
,
which
so
fully
already
comprehends
all
things
,
as
upon
that
account
to
admit
of
no
increase
;
than
that
which
shall
be
every
day
growing
,
and
have
a
continual
succession
of
new
objects
emerging
and
coming
into
view
,
before
,
altogether
unknown
?
And
will
not
that
be
the
case
if
we
suppose
future
contingencies
to
lie
conceal'd
from
the
penetrating
eye
of
God
?
For
whatsoever
is
future
,
will
some
time
be
present
,
and
then
we
will
allow
such
contingencies
to
be
known
to
him
.
That
is
,
that
God
may
know
them
when
we
our selves
can
!
And
that
nothing
of
that
kind
is
known
to
him
which
is
not
at
least
knowable
some
way
or
other
to
our selves
,
at
least
successively
,
and
one
thing
after
another
.
We
will
perhaps
,
allow
that
prerogative
to
God
in
point
of
this
knowledge
,
that
he
can
know
these
things
,
now
fall'n
out
,
all
at
once
,
we
but
by
degrees
,
while
yet
there
is
not
any
one
that
is
absolutely
unknowable
to
us
.
But
why
should
it
be
thought
unreasonable
to
attribute
an
excellency
to
the
knowledge
of
God
above
ours
,
as
well
in
respect
of
the
manner
of
knowing
,
as
the
multitude
of
objects
,
at
once
,
known
?
we
will
readily
confess
in
some
creatures
an
excelency
of
their
visive
faculty
above
our
own
;
that
they
can
see
things
in
that
darkness
,
wherein
they
are
,
to
us
,
invisible
.
And
will
we
not
allow
that
to
the
eye
of
God
,
which
is
as
a
flame
of
fire
to
be
able
to
penetrate
into
the
abstrusest
darkness
of
futurity
,
though
we
know
not
the
way
how
it
is
done
;
when
yet
we
know
that
whatsoever
belongs
to
the
most
perfect
being
,
must
belong
to
his
?
And
that
knowledge
of
all
things
,
imports
more
perfection
,
than
if
it
were
lessened
by
the
ignorance
of
any
thing
.
Some
who
have
thought
the
certain
foreknowledge
of
future
contingencies
not
attributable
to
God
,
have
reckoned
the
matter
sufficiently
excused
;
by
this
that
it
no
more
detracts
from
the
Divine
omniscience
,
to
state
without
the
object
of
it
,
things
not
possible
,
or
that
imply
a
contradiction
(
as
they
suppose
these
to
do
)
to
be
known
,
than
it
doth
from
his
omnipotency
,
that
it
cannot
do
what
is
impossible
,
or
that
implies
a
contradiction
to
be
done
.
But
against
this
there
seems
to
lie
this
reasonable
exception
,
that
the
two
cases
appear
not
sufficiently
alike
:
Inasmuch
as
the
supposition
of
the
former
will
be
found
not
to
leave
the
blessed
God
equally
entitled
to
omnisciency
,
as
the
latter
to
omnipotency
.
For
[
all
things
]
should
not
be
alike
the
object
of
both
.
And
why
should
not
that
be
understood
to
signifie
the
knowledge
of
simply
all
things
;
as
well
as
this
the
power
of
doing
simply
all
things
?
Or
why
should
all
things
included
in
these
two
words
,
signifie
so
very
diversly
,
that
is
there
properly
all
things
,
here
some
things
only
.
And
why
must
we
so
difference
the
object
of
omnisciency
and
omnipotency
?
as
to
make
that
so
much
narrower
than
this
?
And
then
how
is
it
all
things
,
when
so
great
a
number
of
things
will
be
left
excluded
?
Whereas
from
the
object
of
omnipotency
(
that
we
may
prevent
what
would
be
reply'd
)
there
will
be
no
exclusion
of
any
thing
.
Not
of
the
things
which
are
actually
already
made
;
for
they
are
still
momently
reproduc'd
by
the
same
power
.
Not
of
the
actions
and
effects
of
free
causes
yet
future
;
for
when
they
become
actual
God
doth
certainly
perform
the
part
of
the
first
cause
(
even
by
common
consent
)
in
order
,
to
their
becoming
so
;
which
is
certainly
doing
somewhat
though
all
be
not
agreed
what
that
part
is
.
Therefore
they
are
in
the
mean
time
to
be
esteemed
within
the
object
of
omnipotency
,
or
to
be
of
the
things
which
God
can
do
,
viz.
as
the
first
cause
virtually
including
the
power
of
the
second
.
But
more
strictly
;
all
impossibility
is
either
natural
and
absolute
,
or
moral
and
conditional
.
What
is
absolutely
or
naturally
impossible
,
or
repugnant
in
it self
,
is
not
properly
any
thing
.
Whatsoever
simple
being
not
yet
existent
we
can
form
any
conception
of
is
producible
,
and
so
within
the
compass
of
omnipotency
;
for
there
is
no
repugnancy
in
simplicity
.
That
wherein
therefore
we
place
natural
impossibility
,
is
the
inconsistency
of
being
this
thing
,
whose
notion
is
such
,
and
another
wholly
and
entirely
;
whose
notion
is
divers
,
at
the
same
time
(
that
which
,
more
barbarously
than
insignificantly
,
hath
been
wont
to
be
called
incompossibility
)
But
surely
all
things
are
properly
enough
said
to
be
naturally
possible
to
God
,
while
all
simple
beings
are
producible
by
him
,
of
which
any
notion
can
be
formed
;
yea
and
compounded
so
as
by
their
composition
to
result
into
a
third
thing
.
So
that
it
is
not
an
exception
to
say
that
it
is
naturally
impossible
this
thing
should
be
another
thing
,
and
yet
be
wholly
it self
still
at
once
,
that
it
should
be
and
not
be
,
or
be
without
it self
.
There
is
not
within
the
compass
of
actual
or
conceivable
being
,
such
a
thing
.
Nor
is
it
reasonable
to
except
such
actions
as
are
naturally
possible
to
other
Agents
,
but
not
to
him
;
As
to
walk
,
for
instance
,
or
the
like
.
Inasmuch
as
,
though
the
excellency
of
his
nature
permits
not
they
should
be
done
by
him
;
yet
since
their
power
of
doing
them
proceeds
wholly
from
him
,
he
hath
it
virtually
and
eminently
in
himself
.
As
was
formerly
said
of
the
infiniteness
of
his
Being
.
And
for
moral
impossibility
,
as
to
lye
,
to
do
an
unjust
act
;
That
God
never
does
them
proceeds
not
from
want
of
power
,
but
an
eternal
aversion
of
will
.
It
cannot
be
said
he
is
not
able
to
do
such
a
thing
,
if
he
would
,
but
so
is
his
will
quallified
and
conditioned
,
by
its
own
unchangeable
rectitude
,
that
he
most
certainly
never
will
,
or
such
things
as
are
in
themselves
evil
are
never
done
by
him
,
not
through
the
defect
of
natural
power
,
but
from
the
permanent
stability
and
fulness
of
all
moral
perfection
.
And
it
is
not
without
the
compass
of
absolute
omnipotency
to
do
what
is
but
conditionally
impossible
.
The
absence
of
which
restrictive
condition
,
would
rather
bespeak
impotency
and
imperfection
than
omnipotency
.
Therefore
the
object
of
omnipotence
is
simply
all
things
.
Why
not
of
omniscience
as
well
?
It
may
be
said
[
all
things
]
as
it
signifies
the
object
of
omniscience
is
only
restrained
by
the
act
or
faculty
,
signified
therewith
in
the
same
word
,
so
as
to
denote
the
formal
object
of
that
faculty
or
act
,
viz.
all
knowable
things
.
But
surely
that
act
must
suppose
some
Agent
,
whereto
that
knowable
hath
reference
.
Knowable
?
to
whom
?
to
others
,
or
to
God
himself
?
If
we
say
the
former
,
it
is
indeed
a
great
honour
we
put
upon
God
,
to
say
he
can
know
as
much
as
others
:
if
the
latter
,
we
speak
absurdly
,
and
only
say
he
can
know
all
that
he
can
know
.
It
were
fairer
to
deny
omniscience
than
so
interpret
it
.
But
if
it
be
denied
,
what
shall
the
pretence
be
?
why
,
that
it
implies
a
contradiction
future
contingents
should
be
certainly
known
:
are
uncertain
,
and
nothing
can
be
otherwise
truly
known
than
as
it
is
.
And
it
must
be
acknowledged
that
to
whom
any
thing
is
uncertain
,
it
is
a
contradiction
that
to
him
it
should
be
certainly
known
.
But
that
such
things
are
uncertain
to
God
needs
other
proof
than
I
have
met
with
,
in
what
follows
in
that
cited
Author
or
elsewhere
.
All
which
will
amount
to
no
more
than
this
,
that
such
things
as
we
cannot
tell
how
God
knows
them
,
must
needs
be
unknown
to
him
.
But
since
we
are
sure
many
such
things
have
been
certainly
foretold
by
God
(
and
,
of
them
,
such
as
,
we
may
be
also
sure
,
he
never
intended
to
effect
)
we
have
reason
enough
to
be
confident
that
such
things
are
not
unknowable
to
him
.
And
for
the
manner
of
his
knowing
them
,
it
is
better
to
profess
ignorance
about
it
,
than
attempt
the
explication
thereof
,
either
unintelligibly
,
as
some
have
,
to
no
purpose
,
or
dangerously
and
impiously
,
as
others
have
adventured
to
do
,
to
very
bad
purpose
.
And
it
well
becomes
us
to
suppose
an
infinite
understanding
may
have
ways
of
knowing
things
which
we
know
nothing
of
.
To
my
apprehension
,
that
last
mentioned
Author
doth
,
with
ill
success
,
attempt
an
explication
of
Gods
manner
of
knowing
this
sort
of
things
,
by
the
far
less
intelligible
notion
,
of
the
indivisibility
of
eternity
,
comprehending
(
as
he
says
)
all
the
parts
of
time
,
not
successively
,
but
together
.
And
though
he
truly
say
that
the
Scotists
way
of
expressing
how
future
contingents
are
present
to
God
,
i.
e.
according
to
their
objective
and
intentional
being
,
only
,
affords
us
no
account
why
God
knows
them
,
for
which
cause
he
rejects
it
;
and
follows
that
of
the
Thomists
,
who
will
have
them
to
be
present
according
to
their
real
and
actual
existence
.
I
should
yet
prefer
the
deficiency
of
the
former
way
,
before
the
contradictiousness
and
repugnancy
of
the
latter
;
and
conceive
those
words
in
the
Divine
That
the
whole
evolution
of
times
and
ages
,
is
so
collectedly
,
and
presentifickly
represented
to
God
,
at
once
,
as
if
all
things
and
actions
which
ever
were
,
are
,
or
shall
be
,
were
at
this
very
instant
,
and
so
always
really
present
and
existent
before
him
.
Which
is
no
wonder
,
the
animadversion
and
intellectual
comprehension
of
God
,
being
absolutely
infinite
,
according
to
the
truth
of
his
Idea
:
I
do
therefore
think
that
a
sober
resolution
in
Only
,
as
to
that
instance
of
the
commensurableness
of
the
diagonial
line
of
a
Quadrate
to
one
of
the
sides
;
whereas
,
though
there
are
great
difficulties
on
both
sides
,
viz.
that
these
are
commensurable
,
and
that
they
are
not
;
yet
any
mans
judgment
would
rather
incline
to
the
latter
as
the
easier
part
:
I
should
therefore
also
think
it
more
safe
,
to
make
choice
of
that
,
as
the
parallel
of
the
present
difficulty
.
Upon
the
whole
we
may
conclude
that
the
knowledge
of
God
is
every
way
perfect
;
and
being
so
,
extends
to
all
our
concernments
.
And
that
nothing
remains
,
upon
that
account
to
make
us
decline
applying
our selves
to
Religious
converses
with
him
;
or
deny
him
the
honour
and
entertainment
of
a
Temple
.
For
which
we
shall
yet
see
further
cause
,
when
we
consider
next
,
That
his
power
is
also
omnipotence
.
Which
(
though
the
discourse
of
it
second
cause
might
do
herein
;
being
assisted
by
the
infinite
power
of
the
first
:
It
seems
altogether
unimaginable
,
to
us
,
how
,
though
the
power
of
all
men
were
not
in
one
(
which
we
will
easily
suppose
to
be
a
very
vast
power
)
it
could
,
alone
,
be
sufficient
to
make
the
minutest
atom
arise
into
being
out
of
nothing
.
And
that
all
the
matter
of
the
universe
hath
been
so
produc'd
out
of
nothing
,
it
will
be
no
great
presumption
to
suppose
already
fully
proved
;
in
that
,
though
any
such
thing
as
necessary
matter
were
admitted
,
yet
its
essential
unalterableness
would
render
it
impossible
it
should
be
the
matter
of
the
universe
.
Therefore
when
we
cannot
devise
what
finite
power
can
ever
suffice
(
suppose
we
it
never
so
much
increased
,
but
still
finite
)
to
the
doing
of
that
which
we
are
sure
is
done
,
what
is
left
us
to
suppose
,
but
that
the
power
which
did
it
is
simply
infinite
:
much
more
when
we
consider
,
not
only
that
something
actually
is
produced
out
of
nothing
,
but
do
also
seriously
contemplate
the
nature
of
the
production
.
Which
carries
so
much
of
amazing
wonder
in
it
every
where
,
that
even
the
least
and
most
minute
things
might
serve
for
sufficient
instances
of
the
unlimited
greatness
of
that
power
which
made
them
.
As
would
be
seen
;
if
we
did
industriously
set
our selves
to
compare
the
effects
of
Divine
Power
with
those
of
humane
art
and
skill
.
As
is
the
ingenious
and
pious
observation
of
the
most
worthy
Mr.
Hooke
,
who
upon
his
viewing
with
his
Microscope
That
have
points
many
thousand
times
sharper
:
those
of
the
hairs
of
insects
,
&c.
That
appearing
broad
,
irregular
and
uneven
,
having
marks
upon
it
,
of
the
rudeness
and
bungling
of
art
.
So
unaccurate
(
saith
he
)
is
it
in
all
its
productions
,
even
in
those
that
seem
most
neat
,
that
,
if
examined
truly
with
an
organ
more
acute
than
that
by
which
they
were
made
,
the
more
we
see
of
their
shape
the
less
appearance
will
there
be
of
their
beauty
;
Whereas
in
the
works
of
Nature
the
deepe●
discoveries
shew
us
the
greatest
excellencies
.
An
evident
Argument
that
he
that
was
the
Author
of
these
things
was
no
other
than
omnipotent
,
being
able
to
include
as
great
a
variety
of
parts
in
the
yet
smallest
discernable
point
,
as
in
the
vaster
bodies
(
which
comparatively
are
called
also
points
)
such
as
the
Earth
,
Sun
,
or
Planets
.
And
I
may
add
,
when
those
appear
but
points
,
in
comparison
of
his
so
much
vaster
work
,
how
plainly
doth
that
also
argue
to
us
the
same
thing
?
And
let
us
strictly
consider
the
matter
.
Omnipotency
as
hath
been
said
imports
a
power
of
doing
all
things
possible
to
be
done
,
or
indeed
,
simply
all
things
;
unto
which
passive
power
,
an
active
one
must
necessarily
correspond
.
That
is
,
there
is
nothing
in
it self
possible
to
be
done
,
but
it
is
also
possible
to
some
one
or
other
to
do
it
.
If
we
should
therefore
suppose
God
not
omnipotent
,
it
would
follow
some
one
or
other
were
able
to
do
more
than
God
.
For
though
possibility
do
import
a
non-repugnancy
in
the
thing
to
be
done
;
yet
it
also
connotes
an
ability
in
some
Agent
to
do
it
.
Wherefore
there
is
nothing
possible
which
some
Agent
cannot
do
.
And
if
so
,
that
Agent
must
either
be
God
or
some
other
.
To
say
it
is
God
,
is
what
we
intend
.
That
is
,
there
is
nothing
possible
which
God
cannot
do
.
Or
he
can
do
all
things
.
But
to
say
it
is
some
other
and
not
God
,
were
to
open
the
door
to
the
above-mentioned
horrid
consequence
;
which
no
one
that
acknowledges
a
God
(
and
we
are
not
now
discoursing
with
them
who
simply
deny
his
Being
)
would
not
both
blush
and
tremble
to
avow
.
Some
indeed
have
so
over-done
the
business
here
as
to
deny
any
intrinsecal
possibility
of
any
thing
,
and
say
that
things
are
only
said
to
be
possible
because
God
can
do
them
;
which
is
the
same
thing
as
thus
to
explain
Gods
omnipotency
,
i.
e.
that
he
can
do
all
things
which
he
can
do
.
And
makes
a
Chimaera
no
more
impossible
in
it self
to
be
produced
than
a
not
yet
existent
man
.
And
the
reason
of
the
denial
is
that
what
is
only
possible
is
nothing
;
and
therefore
can
have
nothing
intrinsecal
to
it
.
As
if
it
were
not
sufficient
to
the
intrinsecal
possibility
of
a
thing
,
that
its
Idea
have
no
repugnancy
in
it
.
Yet
entire
and
full
possibility
connotes
a
reference
to
the
productive
power
of
an
Agent
;
so
that
it
is
equally
absurd
to
say
that
things
are
only
possible
,
because
there
is
no
repugnancy
in
their
Idea's
,
as
it
is
to
say
they
are
only
possible
because
some
Agent
can
do
them
.
Inasmuch
as
the
entire
possibility
of
their
existence
imports
both
,
that
there
is
no
repugnancy
in
their
Idea's
(
which
if
there
be
,
they
are
every
way
nothing
,
as
hath
been
said
before
)
and
also
,
that
there
is
a
sufficient
power
to
produce
them
.
Therefore
,
whereas
we
might
believe
him
sufficient
every
way
for
us
,
though
we
did
not
believe
him
simply
omnipotent
;
how
much
more
fully
are
we
assured
when
we
consider
that
he
is
?
Whereof
also
no
place
of
doubt
can
remain
,
this
being
a
most
unquestionable
perfection
,
necessarily
included
,
in
the
notion
of
an
absolutely
perfect
Being
.
But
here
we
need
not
further
insist
,
having
no
peculiar
adversary
(
in
this
matter
singly
)
to
contend
with
,
(
as
indeed
he
would
have
had
an
hard
province
who
should
have
undertaken
to
contend
against
omnipotency
.
)
And
now
joyn
herewith
again
the
boundlessness
of
his
goodness
;
which
upon
the
same
ground
of
his
absolute
perfection
,
must
be
infinite
also
,
(
and
which
it
is
of
equal
concernment
to
us
to
consider
,
that
we
may
understand
he
not
only
can
effectually
provide
about
our
concernments
,
but
is
most
graciously
inclined
so
to
do
.
)
And
then
what
rational
inducement
is
wanting
to
Religion
and
the
Dedication
of
a
Temple
?
If
we
consider
the
joynt
encouragement
that
arises
from
so
unlimited
power
and
goodness
?
or
what
man
would
not
become
entirely
devoted
to
him
,
who
,
by
the
one
of
these
,
we
are
assured
,
can
do
all
things
,
and
by
the
other
,
will
do
what
is
best
.
[
†
](A44683-e18190-b)
†
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
.
Phil.
Jud.
de
Abr.
Nor
therefore
is
there
any
thing
immediately
needful
to
our
present
purpose
,
the
eviction
of
Gods
conversableness
with
men
,
more
than
hath
been
already
said
.
That
is
,
there
is
nothing
else
to
be
thought
on
,
that
hath
any
nearer
influence
thereon
.
The
things
that
can
be
supposed
to
have
such
influence
being
none
else
than
his
Power
,
Knowledge
and
Goodness
,
which
have
been
particularly
evinced
from
the
Creation
of
the
world
,
both
to
have
been
in
some
former
subject
,
and
to
have
all
originally
met
in
a
necessary
being
,
that
alone
could
be
the
Creator
of
it
.
Which
necessary
Being
,
as
it
is
such
,
appearing
,
also
,
to
be
infinite
and
absolutely
perfect
;
the
influence
of
these
cannot
but
the
more
abundantly
appear
to
be
such
as
can
and
may
most
sufficiently
and
fully
correspond
both
in
general
to
the
several
exigencies
of
all
creatures
,
and
more
especially
to
all
the
real
necessities
and
reasonable
desires
of
man
.
So
that
our
main
purpose
seems
already
gained
.
Yet
because
it
may
be
grateful
when
we
are
perswaded
that
things
are
so
,
to
fortifie
(
as
much
as
we
can
)
that
perswasion
.
And
because
our
perswasion
concerning
these
attributes
of
God
will
be
still
liable
to
assault
unless
we
acknowledge
him
every
where
present
.
Nor
can
it
well
be
conceivable
,
otherwise
,
how
the
influence
of
his
knowledge
,
power
,
and
goodness
can
be
so
universal
,
as
will
be
thought
necessary
to
infer
an
universal
obligation
to
Religion
.
It
will
be
therefore
requisite
to
add
somewhat
concerning
his
Omnipresence
,
or
,
because
some
that
love
to
be
very
strictly
critical
will
be
apt
to
think
that
term
restrictive
of
his
presence
to
the
universe
(
as
supposing
to
be
present
is
relative
to
somewhat
,
one
may
be
said
present
unto
,
whereas
they
will
say
without
the
universe
is
nothing
)
we
will
rather
chuse
it
to
call
it
immensity
.
For
though
it
would
sufficiently
answer
our
purpose
that
his
presence
be
universal
to
all
his
creatures
;
yet
even
this
is
to
be
proved
by
such
arguments
as
will
conclude
him
simply
immense
.
Which
therefore
wil
with
the
greater
advantage
infer
the
thing
we
intend
.
This
part
of
Divine
perfection
we
will
acknowledge
to
have
been
impugned
by
some
that
have
professed
much
devotedness
to
a
Deity
and
Religion
;
we
will
therefore
charitably
suppose
that
opposition
to
have
been
joyned
with
inadvertency
of
the
ill
tendency
of
it
,
that
is
,
how
unwarrantably
it
would
maim
the
notion
of
the
former
and
shake
the
foundations
of
the
latter
.
Nor
therefore
ought
that
charity
to
be
any
allay
to
a
just
zeal
for
so
great
concerns
.
It
seems
then
,
first
,
manifestly
repugnant
to
the
notion
of
an
infinitely
perfect
Being
to
suppose
it
less
than
simply
immense
.
For
,
upon
that
supposition
,
it
must
either
be
limited
to
some
certain
place
,
or
excluded
out
of
all
.
The
The
latter
of
these
would
be
most
openly
to
deny
it
;
as
hath
,
with
irrefragable
evidence
,
been
abundantly
manifested
by
the
most
learned
Dr.
More
;
whereto
it
would
be
needless
Enchiridion
Metaphys
.
and
vain
to
attempt
to
add
any
thing
.
Nor
is
that
the
thing
pretended
to
by
the
sort
of
persons
I
now
chiefly
intend
.
And
for
the
former
,
I
would
enquire
;
Is
amplitude
of
essence
no
perfection
?
or
were
the
confining
of
this
Being
to
the
very
minutest
space
we
can
imagine
,
no
detraction
from
the
perfection
of
it
?
what
if
the
amplitude
of
that
glorious
and
ever-blessed
Essence
were
said
to
be
only
of
that
extent
(
may
it
be
spoken
with
all
reverence
,
and
resentment
of
the
unhappy
necessity
we
have
of
making
so
mean
a
supposition
)
as
to
have
been
confined
unto
that
one
Temple
to
which
of
old
he
chose
to
confine
his
more
solemn
Worship
;
that
he
could
be
essentially
present
only
here
at
once
and
no
where
else
,
were
this
no
detraction
?
They
that
think
him
only
to
replenish
and
be
present
by
his
essence
in
the
highest
heaven
(
as
some
are
wont
to
speak
)
would
they
not
confess
it
were
a
meaner
and
much
lower
thought
to
suppose
that
presence
circumscribed
within
the
so
unconceivably
narrower
limits
,
as
the
walls
of
an
house
?
If
they
would
pretend
to
ascribe
to
him
some
perfection
beyond
this
;
by
supposing
his
essential
presence
commensurable
to
the
vaster
territory
of
the
highest
heavens
,
even
by
the
same
supposition
should
they
deny
to
him
greater
perfection
than
they
ascribe
.
For
the
perfection
which
in
this
kind
they
should
ascribe
were
finite
only
,
but
that
which
they
should
deny
were
infinite
.
Again
,
they
will
however
acknowledge
omnipotency
a
perfection
included
in
the
notion
of
an
absolutely
perfect
Being
;
therefore
they
will
grant
,
he
can
create
another
world
(
for
they
do
not
pretend
to
believe
this
infinite
;
and
if
they
did
,
by
their
supposition
,
they
should
give
away
their
cause
)
at
any
the
greatest
distance
we
can
conceive
from
this
:
therefore
so
far
his
power
can
extend
it self
.
But
what
,
his
power
without
his
being
?
what
then
is
his
power
?
something
,
or
nothing
?
nothing
can
do
nothing
;
therefore
not
make
a
world
.
It
is
then
some
Being
,
and
whose
Being
is
it
but
his
own
?
Is
it
a
created
Being
?
That
is
to
suppose
him
first
impotent
,
and
then
to
have
created
omnipoteecy
,
when
he
could
do
nothing
.
Whence
by
the
way
,
we
may
see
to
how
little
purpose
that
distinction
can
be
applyed
in
the
present
case
of
essential
and
virtual
contact
,
where
the
essence
and
virtue
cannot
but
be
the
same
.
But
shall
it
be
said
,
he
must
in
order
to
the
creating
such
another
world
,
locally
move
thither
where
he
designs
it
?
I
ask
then
,
but
can
he
not
at
the
same
time
create
thousands
of
worlds
at
any
distance
from
this
round
about
it
?
No
man
can
imagine
this
to
be
impossible
to
him
that
can
do
all
things
.
Wherefore
of
such
extent
is
his
power
and
consequently
his
Being
.
Will
they
therefore
say
he
can
immensly
if
he
please
diffuse
his
Being
but
he
voluntarily
contracts
it
;
'T
is
answered
that
is
altogether
impossible
to
a
Being
that
is
whatsoever
it
is
by
a
simple
and
absolute
necessity
:
for
whatsoever
it
is
necessarily
it
is
unalterably
and
eternally
,
or
is
pure
act
and
in
a
possibility
to
be
nothing
which
it
already
is
not
.
Therefore
since
God
can
every
where
exert
his
power
,
he
is
necessarily
,
already
,
every
where
.
And
hence
Gods
immensity
is
the
true
reason
of
his
immobility
;
there
being
no
imaginable
space
which
he
doth
not
necessarily
replenish
.
Whence
also
the
supposition
of
his
being
so
confined
(
as
was
said
)
is
immediately
repugnant
to
the
notion
of
a
necessary
Being
,
as
well
as
of
an
absolutely
perfect
,
which
hath
been
argued
from
it
.
We
might
moreover
add
that
,
upon
the
same
supposition
,
God
might
truly
be
said
to
have
made
a
creature
greater
than
himself
(
for
such
this
universe
apparently
were
)
and
that
he
can
make
one
(
as
they
must
confess
who
deny
him
not
to
be
omnipotent
)
most
unconceivably
greater
.
Nothing
therefore
seems
more
manifest
than
that
God
is
immense
;
or
(
as
we
may
express
it
)
extrinsecally
infinite
,
with
respect
to
place
;
as
well
as
intrinsecally
,
in
respect
to
the
plenitude
of
his
being
and
perfection
.
Only
it
may
be
requisite
to
consider
,
briefly
,
what
is
said
against
it
,
by
the
otherwise
minded
,
The
Doctrine
it self
we
may
take
from
him
thus
.
First
(
on
the
negative
part
by
way
of
denial
of
what
we
have
been
hitherto
asserting
)
he
says
,
The
foundation
(
that
is
of
a
distinction
of
Maresius's
to
which
he
is
replying
,
for
so
occasionally
comes
in
the
discourse
)
viz.
the
infinity
of
the
Divine
Essence
,
is
not
so
firm
as
is
commonly
thought
.
And
that
therefore
it
may
be
thought
less
firm
,
he
thinks
fit
to
cast
a
slur
upon
it
,
by
making
it
the
Doctrine
of
the
Stoicks
,
exprest
by
Virgil
,
Jovis
omnia
plena
(
as
if
it
must
needs
be
false
because
Virgil
said
it
,
though
I
could
tell
,
if
it
were
worth
the
while
where
Virgil
speaks
more
agreeably
to
this
sense
than
ours
,
according
to
which
he
might
as
well
have
interpreted
this
passage
as
divers
Texts
of
Scripture
.
And
then
his
Authority
might
have
been
of
some
value
)
And
by
Lucan
,
who
helps
it
seems
to
disgrace
and
spoil
it
,
Jupiter
est
quodcunque
vides
,
quocunque
moveris
(
he
might
if
he
had
a
mind
to
make
it
thought
Paganish
,
have
quoted
a
good
many
more
,
but
then
there
might
have
been
some
danger
it
should
pass
for
a
common
notion
)
.
Next
he
quotes
some
passages
of
Fathers
that
import
dislike
of
it
.
About
which
we
need
not
concern
our selves
.
For
the
question
is
not
what
this
or
that
man
thought
.
And
then
for
the
positive
account
of
his
own
judgment
in
the
case
,
having
recited
divers
Texts
out
of
the
Bible
that
seemed
as
he
apprehended
to
make
against
him
.
He
would
have
us
believe
,
that
these
all
speak
rather
of
Gods
providence
and
power
by
which
he
concerns
himself
in
all
our
works
,
words
,
and
thoughts
,
wheresoever
we
live
,
than
of
the
absolute
infinity
of
his
Essence
.
And
afterwards
,
That
God
is
by
his
Essence
F.
Socin
.
Smalcius
.
And
(
though
not
altogether
so
expresly
as
the
●est
)
Vorstius
,
Creblius
,
&c.
in
the
supreme
heaven
,
where
he
inhabits
the
inaccessible
light
,
but
thence
he
sends
out
from
himself
a
spirit
or
a
certain
force
,
whether
he
pleases
,
by
which
he
is
truly
present
and
works
there
.
But
proceed
we
to
his
Reasons
,
which
he
saith
are
not
to
be
contemned
.
We
shall
therefore
not
contemn
them
so
far
as
not
to
take
notice
of
them
;
which
trouble
also
the
Reader
may
please
to
be
at
;
and
,
afterward
,
do
,
as
he
thinks
fit
.
1.
That
no
difference
can
be
conceived
between
God
and
creatures
,
if
God
as
they
commonly
speak
,
be
,
wholly
,
in
every
point
;
or
do
fill
all
the
points
of
the
universe
with
his
whole
Essence
.
For
so
whatsoever
at
all
is
will
be
God
himself
.
Answ.
And
that
is
most
marvellous
that
the
in-being
of
one
thing
in
another
must
needs
take
away
all
their
difference
,
and
confound
them
each
with
other
:
which
sure
would
much
rather
argue
them
distinct
.
For
certainly
it
cannot
,
without
great
impropriety
,
be
said
that
any
thing
is
in
it self
:
And
is
both
the
container
and
contained
.
How
were
these
thoughts
in
his
mind
?
and
these
very
notions
which
he
opposes
to
each
other
,
so
as
not
to
be
confounded
with
his
mind
,
and
consequently
with
one
another
?
So
that
it
's
a
great
wonder
he
was
not
of
both
opinions
at
once
.
And
how
did
he
think
his
soul
to
be
in
his
body
,
which
,
though
substantially
united
with
it
(
and
that
is
somewhat
more
,
as
we
will
suppose
he
knew
was
commonly
held
,
than
to
be
intimately
present
)
was
not
yet
the
same
thing
.
However
himself
acknowledges
the
power
and
providence
of
God
to
be
every
where
.
And
then
at
least
every
thing
must
it
seems
be
the
very
power
and
providence
of
God
.
But
he
thought
it
may
be
only
of
confuting
the
words
of
Lucan
,
and
chastising
his
poetick
liberty
.
And
if
he
would
have
been
at
the
pains
to
turn
all
their
strains
and
raptures
into
propositions
,
and
so
have
gravely
fallen
to
confuting
them
,
he
might
perhaps
have
found
as
proper
an
exercise
for
his
Logick
as
this
.
As
for
his
talk
of
a
whole
,
whereof
we
acknowledge
no
parts
(
as
if
he
imagined
the
Divine
Essence
to
be
compounded
of
such
,
he
should
have
said
so
and
have
proved
it
)
't
is
an
absurd
scheme
of
speech
which
may
be
left
to
him
,
and
them
that
use
it
to
make
their
best
of
.
2.
No
Idolatry
can
be
committed
if
there
be
not
the
least
point
to
be
found
,
that
is
not
wholly
full
of
whole
God
.
For
whithersoever
worship
shall
be
directed
,
it
shall
be
directed
to
God
himself
,
who
will
be
no
less
there
than
in
heaven
.
Answ.
This
proceeds
upon
the
supposition
that
the
former
would
be
granted
as
soon
as
it
should
be
heard
,
as
a
self-evident
principle
,
that
whatsoever
is
in
another
is
that
in
which
it
is
.
And
so
his
consequence
were
most
undeniable
.
But
though
we
acknowledge
God
to
be
in
every
thing
,
yet
so
to
worship
him
in
any
thing
,
as
if
his
essential
presence
were
confined
thereto
,
while
it
ought
to
be
conceived
of
as
immense
,
this
is
Idolatry
.
And
therefore
they
who
so
conceive
of
it
as
confin'd
(
or
ty'd
in
any
respect
,
wherein
he
hath
not
so
ty'd
it
himself
)
are
concerned
to
beware
of
running
upon
this
rock
.
3.
Nor
can
the
opinion
of
Fanaticks
be
solidly
refuted
,
who
call
themselves
spiritual
,
when
they
determine
God
to
be
all
in
all
.
To
do
not
only
good
but
evil
things
;
because
he
is
to
be
accounted
to
be
essentially
in
all
the
atoms
of
the
world
,
in
whole
;
and
as
a
common
soul
by
which
all
the
parts
of
the
universe
do
act
.
Answ.
We
may
in
time
make
trial
whether
they
can
be
refuted
or
no
;
or
whether
any
solid
ground
will
be
left
for
it
.
At
this
time
it
will
suffice
to
say
,
that
though
he
be
present
every
where
as
a
necessary
Being
,
yet
he
acts
as
a
free
cause
.
And
according
as
his
wisdom
,
his
good
pleasure
,
his
holiness
,
and
justice
do
guide
his
action
.
4.
So
God
will
be
equally
present
with
the
wicked
and
with
the
holy
and
godly
,
with
the
damned
in
Hell
and
Devils
,
as
with
the
blessed
in
Heaven
or
Christ
himself
.
Answ.
So
he
will
in
respect
of
his
essential
presence
.
How
he
is
otherwise
(
distinguishingly
enough
)
present
in
his
Temple
,
we
shall
have
occasion
hereafter
to
shew
.
5.
That
I
say
not
how
shameful
it
is
to
think
that
the
most
pure
and
holy
God
should
be
as
much
in
the
most
nasty
places
as
in
heaven
,
&c.
(
I
forbear
to
recite
the
rest
of
this
uncleanly
argument
,
which
is
strong
in
nothing
but
ill
savour
.
)
But
for
Answ.
How
strange
a
notion
was
this
of
Holiness
,
by
which
it
is
set
in
opposition
to
corporal
filthiness
!
As
if
an
holy
man
should
lose
,
or
very
much
blemish
his
sanctity
,
by
a
casual
fall
into
a
puddle
.
Indeed
if
sense
must
give
us
measures
of
God
,
and
every
thing
must
be
reckoned
an
essence
to
him
that
is
so
to
it
;
we
shall
soon
frame
to
our selves
a
God
altogether
such
a
one
as
our selves
.
The
Epicureans
themselves
would
have
been
ashamed
to
reason
or
conceive
thus
of
God
,
who
tell
us
the
Divine
Being
is
as
little
capable
of
receiving
a
stroke
as
the
Inane
.
And
surely
(
in
proportion
)
of
any
sensible
offence
,
we
might
as
well
suppose
him
in
danger
,
as
Dr.
More
fitly
expresseth
it
,
to
be
We
have
then
enough
to
assure
us
of
Gods
absolute
immensity
and
omnipresence
,
and
nothing
of
that
value
against
it
as
ought
to
shake
our
belief
herein
.
And
surely
the
consideration
of
this
,
added
to
the
other
of
his
perfections
(
and
which
tends
so
directly
to
facilitate
and
strengthen
our
perswasion
concerning
the
rest
)
may
render
us
assuredly
certain
,
that
we
shall
find
him
a
conversable
Being
.
If
we
seriously
apply
our selves
to
converse
with
him
,
and
will
but
allow
him
the
liberty
of
that
Temple
within
us
,
whereof
we
are
hereafter
(
with
his
leave
and
help
)
to
treat
more
distinctly
and
at
large
.
The
end
of
the
First
Part.
Notes, typically marginal, from the original text
Notes for div A44683-e330
Notes for div A44683-e870
Notes for div A44683-e3040
Notes for div A44683-e8040
Notes for div A44683-e11750
Notes for div A44683-e14480