MACHIAVELS
DISCOURSES
UPON
THE
First
DECADE
OF
T.
LIVIVS
Translated
out
of
Italian
.
The
Preface
.
WHen
I
consider
the
esteem
which
is
made
of
antiquity
,
and
that
many
times
(
letting
pass
further
examples
)
a
small
piece
of
an
ancient
statute
hath
been
bought
at
a
great
rate
,
only
to
have
it
at
hand
,
to
adorn
the
house
withall
,
and
that
thereby
they
may
be
able
to
cause
others
,
who
take
delight
in
the
art
,
to
draw
copies
thereof
,
and
these
likewise
endeavour
,
as
lively
as
they
can
,
to
represent
it
again
in
all
their
works
and
on
the
other
side
seeing
the
most
vertuous
actions
that
histories
relate
us
,
to
have
been
archieved
by
Kingdomes
,
ancient
Common-wealths
,
Kings
Captains
,
Citizens
and
Law-givers
,
and
such
others
who
have
undergone
much
for
their
Countries
good
;
that
these
,
I
say
,
have
been
rather
admired
then
follow'd
,
or
rather
by
every
one
have
been
so
much
avoided
,
that
now
the
very
footsteps
of
that
ancient
vertue
is
utterly
defac'd
,
I
cannot
but
both
marvaile
and
grieve
:
and
the
rather
,
because
I
perceive
,
that
in
matters
of
process
arising
in
a
Commonwealth
among
citizens
,
or
in
criminal
causes
,
recourse
is
alwaies
made
to
those
judgements
and
those
remedies
which
formerly
have
been
ordain'd
and
practis'd
by
the
ancients
;
for
the
civil-lawes
are
nothing
else
,
but
the
opinions
given
by
ancient
Lawyers
,
which
since
having
been
reduc'd
to
a
method
,
todirect
our
Doctors
of
the
Law
now
a
daies
,
in
giving
of
their
judgements
:
yet
for
all
this
in
the
ordering
of
Commonwealths
,
in
the
maintenance
of
States
,
in
the
government
of
Kingdomes
,
in
ordeining
of
military
discipline
,
in
waging
of
war
,
in
giving
judgment
upon
the
subjects
,
in
amplifying
of
the
Empire
,
there
are
neither
Princes
,
nor
Republiques
,
Commanders
,
nor
Citizens
who
ever
seek
after
any
of
these
ancient
patternes
,
which
I
perswade
my self
proceeds
not
so
much
from
that
weakness
,
into
which
the
breeding
and
customes
now
a
daies
have
brought
the
world
,
or
from
that
evill
which
idleness
accompanied
with
ambition
hath
done
to
many
Christian
countries
and
Cities
,
as
from
their
want
of
the
true
knowledge
of
histories
,
in
that
by
reading
them
,
they
conceive
not
that
meaning
nor
relish
that
tastethey
have
in
them
:
whence
it
arises
that
many
who
read
,
take
delight
to
hear
the
variety
of
accidents
,
which
are
frequent
in
them
,
without
further
regard
of
imitating
them
deeming
that
not
only
hard
,
but
unpossible
,
as
if
the
heavens
,
the
sun
,
the
elements
,
and
men
were
alter'd
from
what
they
were
of
old
,
in
the●ir
motion
,
order
and
power
.
Wherefore
being
desirous
to
withdraw
men
from
this
errour
,
I
thought
fit
to
write
upon
these
bookes
of
T
:
Livius
,
which
have
escap'd
the
malice
of
the
times
,
what
I
thought
,
conformable
to
moderne
and
ancient
affaires
,
of
purpose
for
the
better
understanding
of
them
,
that
they
who
shall
well
peruse
these
discourses
of
mine
,
may
there
reap
that
profit
for
which
end
the
knowledg
of
historie
ought
to
be
sought
after
.
And
however
this
be
a
taske
of
great
difficulty
,
yet
by
the
helpe
of
those
who
have
incourag'd
me
to
undergoe
this
burden
,
I
beleeve
I
shall
carry
it
so
far
onwards
,
that
there
shall
be
left
for
him
that
comes
after
me
,
but
very
little
way
to
bring
it
to
a
good
end
.
CHAP.
I.
What
were
in
generall
the
beginnings
of
every
city
,
and
especially
that
of
Rome
.
WHosoever
shall
reade
what
beginning
the
City
of
Rome
had
,
who
were
the
Lawmakers
,
and
how
it
was
founded
,
will
nothing
marvaile
that
so
great
vertue
was
continued
so
many
years
in
the
city
,
and
that
from
thence
afterwards
there
grew
so
mighty
an
Empire
,
to
which
that
Commonwealth
attain'd
.
And
therefore
to
discourse
first
of
her
birth
,
I
say
,
that
all
Cities
were
built
either
by
the
Natives
of
the
place
they
were
built
in
,
or
by
strangers
.
The
first
comes
to
passe
when
the
inhabitants
being
dispers'd
in
many
and
small
numbers
finde
they
cannot
live
safe
,
each
one
not
having
strength
apart
,
as
well
by
reason
of
their
situation
,
as
their
small
number
to
resist
the
violence
of
those
that
would
force
them
;
or
if
they
would
joyn
together
for
their
defence
,
the
enemy
comming
upon
them
,
they
cannot
do
it
in
time
;
and
when
they
should
be
in
one
body
,
they
must
of
necessity
abandon
divers
of
their
retreats
,
&
so
become
a
sudden
prey
to
their
enemies
:
Wherefore
to
escape
these
dangers
,
either
of
themselves
,
or
upon
the
motion
of
some
one
of
authority
among
them
,
they
confine
themselves
to
dwell
together
,
in
a
place
chosen
as
well
for
their
better
commodity
of
living
as
more
facility
of
defence
.
Of
this
sort
among
many
others
were
Athens
&
Venice
.
The
first
under
the
command
of
Theseus
,
was
upon
the
like
occasions
built
by
the
scattered
inhabitants
:
the
other
,
much
people
being
retired
into
certain
little
Ilands
at
the
point
of
the
Adriatique
Sea
(
to
avoid
those
wars
which
then
were
beginning
in
Italy
by
reason
of
those
huge
and
continual
inundations
of
Barbarians
upon
the
declining
of
the
Roman
Empire
)
began
among
themselves
without
the
authority
of
any
particular
Prince
,
to
live
under
those
lawes
they
thought
most
proper
for
their
preservation
:
which
prov'd
luckily
to
them
,
for
the
long
quiet
their
situation
gave
them
,
that
Sea
having
no
outlet
,
and
those
people
which
then
afflicted
Italy
,
not
having
ships
to
annoy
them
,
so
that
every
little
beginning
was
sufficient
to
give
them
that
greatness
they
now
have
.
The
second
sort
is
,
when
a
City
is
built
by
strangers
which
are
either
absolute
of
themselves
,
or
depend
upon
others
,
&
such
are
colonies
which
are
sent
out
either
by
a
Commonwealth
or
Prince
to
disburden
their
Towns
of
inhabitants
,
or
for
the
defence
of
some
country
which
of
late
they
have
gotten
,
and
would
safely
keep
without
much
expence
;
of
which
sort
the
Romans
built
many
througouht
all
their
dominions
;
others
were
built
by
some
Prince
,
not
to
make
his
seate
there
,
but
for
his
glory
;
and
so
was
Alexandria
by
Alexander
:
and
because
these
cities
have
not
their
beginning
free
,
they
seldome
attain
to
that
greatness
,
as
to
be
esteemed
the
head
cities
of
Kingdomes
.
The
like
beginning
had
Florence
(
whither
it
was
built
by
Syllaes
Souldiers
,
or
by
chance
by
the
inhabitants
of
the
mountains
of
Fiesola
;
who
taking
heart
upon
that
long
peace
the
world
enjoyed
under
Octavian
,
came
down
&
dwelt
in
the
plain
upon
the
Arne
)
for
it
was
built
under
the
Romau
government
,
neither
could
it
in
the
beginning
make
greater
increase
,
then
what
the
Princes
favour
allow'd
it
.
The
founders
of
Cities
are
then
said
to
be
absolute
and
free
,
when
any
people
either
led
by
a
Prince
,
or
of
themselves
,
are
forc'd
by
contagion
,
famine
,
or
war
to
abandon
their
native
Soyle
,
and
seek
a
new
dwelling
and
these
are
are
content
to
inhabite
the
Cities
in
the
Country
they
have
conquered
,
as
Moses
did
,
or
build
new
,
as
did
Aeneas
.
In
this
case
appeares
the
ability
of
the
founder
,
and
the
fortune
of
the
City
founded
,
the
which
is
more
or
less
admirable
,
as
he
who
gave
thereto
the
beginning
was
of
greater
or
or
less
abilities
:
which
is
seen
in
two
kindes
;
the
first
in
choyce
of
the
situation
,
the
second
in
making
the
lawes
.
And
because
men
act
some
things
upon
necessity
,
others
by
their
own
election
,
and
the
greater
vertue
is
there
seen
where
election
hath
the
least
power
;
it
is
to
be
consider'd
,
whether
it
were
better
to
chuse
barren
places
to
build
Cities
in
,
to
the
end
men
being
forc'd
to
labor
for
their
sustenance
,
might
live
the
better
in
agreement
,
the
poverty
of
their
Country
giving
less
occasion
of
discord
,
as
it
was
in
Raugia
:
and
in
many
other
Cities
built
in
like
places
,
which
choyce
without
doubt
would
be
wiselier
made
and
more
profitable
,
of
men
were
content
to
live
of
their
own
,
and
not
seek
to
rule
over
others
,
but
seeing
it
not
possible
for
men
to
live
in
security
without
force
,
it
is
necessary
to
avoid
a
barren
soyle
,
and
to
plant
themselves
in
fruitful
places
,
where
they
may
be
enabled
by
the
plenty
of
their
seat
to
enlarge
and
desend
their
territories
against
those
that
would
assault
them
,
and
over-master
all
that
would
oppose
their
greatness
.
And
to
the
end
the
riches
of
the
country
occasion
not
too
much
the
ease
of
the
people
,
it
would
be
fit
to
provide
that
the
laws
oblige
them
to
take
these
paines
,
the
situation
doth
not
,
and
to
imitate
those
who
have
liv'd
in
pleasant
and
fruitfull
countries
,
and
apt
to
breed
men
given
to
Luxury
,
loth
to
use
that
industry
vertue
requires
,
and
yet
were
so
wise
as
to
prevent
those
harmes
the
plenty
of
the
soyle
,
and
so
consequently
the
peoples
idleness
might
cause
:
having
impos'd
such
a
necessity
of
labour
upon
those
they
brought
up
to
be
Souldiers
,
as
by
means
of
their
strict
discipline
,
they
far
surpassed
others
who
because
of
their
rough
and
barren
countries
were
borne
fierce
;
such
was
the
Kingdome
of
the
Aegyptians
that
notwithstanding
the
countries
delicacies
,
the
laws
strictness
prevail'd
so
far
,
as
there
were
bred
by
them
many
great
personages
:
and
if
time
had
not
worne
out
their
names
,
it
would
appeare
they
had
deserv'd
as
much
praise
,
as
did
Great
Alexauder
,
and
many
others
whose
memories
stories
continue
fresh
amongst
us
:
and
whosoever
had
considered
the
Soldans
Kingdome
,
and
the
Mamalucks
order
,
with
their
military
discipline
,
before
they
were
ruin'd
by
Selimus
the
great
Turke
,
would
have
seen
in
that
how
the
Souldiers
were
train'd
up
in
continuall
exercises
,
and
therein
have
known
how
much
they
fear'd
that
case
to
which
the
goodness
of
their
Country
invited
them
,
unless
it
had
been
oppos'd
with
severe
lawes
.
I
avow
therefore
the
choyce
better
in
a
fertile
place
,
when
that
good
government
takes
order
for
a
moderate
use
of
the
abundance
.
When
Alexander
the
great
had
a
purpose
to
build
a
City
for
his
glory
,
Dinocrates
the
Architect
came
to
him
and
shewed
him
,
how
it
might
be
built
upon
Mount
Athos
,
which
place
,
besides
that
it
would
be
strong
,
he
could
so
order
,
that
the
City
should
be
made
in
forme
of
a
man
:
which
would
be
a
wonder
worthy
his
greatness
:
and
being
askd
again
by
Alexander
whereupon
the
inhabitants
should
live
,
answerd
he
had
not
well
advis'd
of
that
point
yet
:
whereat
having
laught
,
he
left
the
mountain
alone
,
&
built
Alexandria
so
,
that
people
might
resort
thither
,
as
well
for
the
farness
of
the
soyle
,
as
the
commodity
of
of
the
sea
,
and
the
River
Nilus
.
Whoever
then
shall
examine
the
beginning
of
Rome
,
if
Aeneas
be
taken
for
the
first
founder
,
it
must
be
numberd
among
the
cities
that
were
built
by
strangers
;
If
Romulus
,
among
those
that
were
built
by
the
Natives
;
And
in
what
manner
soever
It
were
,
it
will
appear
it
had
a
beginning
free
of
it self
without
dependence
of
any
;
and
moreover
that
the
Laws
made
by
Romulus
,
Numa
,
and
others
,
kept
it
under
in
an
exact
obedience
(
as
hereafter
shall
be
said
:
)
so
that
neither
the
fruitfulness
of
the
country
,
the
commodity
of
the
Sea
,
the
often
victories
,
nor
the
vastness
of
the
Empire
,
could
in
many
ages
corrupt
it
;
but
maintained
it
so
eminent
for
vertue
,
that
never
any
commonwealth
came
near
it
.
And
because
those
exploits
she
did
,
and
are
recited
by
T.
Livius
,
were
acted
upon
publique
or
private
Counsel
,
and
either
within
or
without
the
city
,
I
will
begin
my
discourse
upon
those
things
passed
within
land
done
upon
publique
advice
,
which
I
shall
think
worthy
of
remarke
,
adding
likewise
all
the
dependences
thereupon
;
with
which
the
first
book
or
first
part
shall
end
.
CHAP.
II.
How
many
kinds
of
Commonwealths
there
are
;
and
what
was
that
of
Rome
.
I
Will
sorbear
to
discourse
of
those
cities
which
have
had
their
beginnings
in
subjection
under
others
,
and
speak
of
such
only
as
were
free
in
their
births
from
forrain
servi●ude
,
having
had
instantly
the
raines
of
their
own
government
in
their
own
hands
,
either
as
a
Commonwealth
,
or
as
a
Principality
which
have
had
.
as
divers
beginnings
,
so
likewise
sundry
lawes
and
ordinances
:
for
some
either
in
their
beginning
,
or
not
long
after
receiv'd
their
laws
from
one
alone
,
and
that
at
once
,
as
the
Spartans
did
theirs
from
Lycurgus
:
others
had
theirs
casually
and
at
several
times
,
and
upon
occasion
,
as
Rome
:
so
that
it
is
a
great
happiness
for
a
Common-wealth
to
light
upon
a
man
of
such
wisdome
so
to
order
the
State
,
as
without
need
of
alteration
it
may
continue
in
security
under
them
:
as
we
see
that
Sparta
kept
the
same
without
change
or
any
dangerous
tumult
above
eight
hundred
years
.
And
on
the
contrary
,
that
City
may
in
some
degree
be
termd
unhappy
,
which
having
not
met
with
a
judicious
founder
,
is
forc'd
to
give
it self
a
new
frame
:
and
of
these
the
more
unlucky
is
that
which
is
the
more
amiss
:
and
such
is
that
which
together
with
all
its
own
new
ordinances
,
hath
much
mistaken
the
right
way
to
perfection
:
for
it
is
almost
impossible
for
those
of
this
degree
to
be
setled
again
by
any
accident
:
those
others
although
their
order
be
not
exact
,
yet
the
beginning
they
have
taken
being
good
,
and
like
enough
to
prove
better
,
have
a
good
possibility
,
as
may
fall
out
,
to
become
perfect
:
but
sure
it
is
,
'
will
never
be
without
danger
:
for
the
multitude
seldome
agrees
to
a
new
law
,
if
it
touch
any
change
of
government
in
the
City
,
unless
the
necessity
of
doing
it
be
shew'd
them
by
some
extremity
,
which
never
coming
without
danger
,
it
is
like
enough
the
Commonwealth
may
be
sooner
ruin●d
,
then
brought
into
good
order
.
Of
which
that
of
Florence
gives
sufficient
proof
,
which
upon
that
accident
of
Arezo
in
the
second
year
was
anew
orderd
,
and
by
that
of
Pirato
in
the
twelfth
inbroyld
again
.
Intending
then
to
treate
what
were
the
ordinances
of
the
City
of
Rome
,
and
the
accidents
that
brought
it
to
perfection
,
I
say
,
that
some
,
who
have
writ
of
Commonwealths
,
will
have
it
that
there
was
one
of
these
three
kinds
of
States
term'd
by
them
a
Principality
,
another
an
Aristocracy
,
and
a
third
a
Popular
government
:
and
that
they
who
lay
the
first
grounds
of
rule
and
order
in
a
City
,
ought
most
to
have
regard
to
some
one
of
these
,
as
it
seems
fittest
to
their
purpose
.
Some
others
(
and
that
following
the
opinion
of
many
more
wise
)
think
that
there
be
six
sorts
of
governments
;
of
which
three
are
bad
in
extremity
,
and
three
good
in
themselves
,
but
so
easie
to
be
corrupted
,
that
even
they
become
pernicious
.
Those
which
are
good
,
are
the
three
aforesaid
;
the
bad
are
the
other
three
which
depend
on
these
,
and
every
one
of
them
in
such
sort
resemble
that
which
it
ap●
preaches
,
that
they
change
suddenly
from
one
into
the
other
:
for
the
Principality
easily
becomes
Tyranny
;
that
of
the
Nobility
falls
into
the
hands
of
some
few
;
and
the
Popular
will
as
easily
become
tumultuous
:
so
that
if
he
that
lays
the
foundation
of
a
Commonwealth
,
ordaines
in
a
City
one
of
these
three
sorts
,
it
is
but
for
a
small
continuance
:
for
it
is
beyond
the
power
of
any
remedy
to
hinder
that
it
slip
not
into
its
contrary
,
for
the
resemblances
which
in
this
case
there
is
between
the
vertue
and
the
vice
.
These
differences
of
governments
grew
by
chance
among
men
;
for
in
the
beginning
of
the
World
,
when
the
inhabitants
were
thin
,
they
were
scatter'd
abroad
for
a
time
like
wild
beasts
;
afterwards
man
kind
increasing
,
they
gather'd
together
,
and
that
they
might
be
able
better
to
defend
themselves
,
they
began
to
cast
their
eyes
upon
him
who
had
the
most
strength
and
courage
among
them
,
and
made
him
their
head
and
obeyed
him
.
Hereupon
began
the
discerning
of
things
good
and
honest
from
bad
and
hurtful
:
for
seeing
that
if
any
one
hurt
his
benefactour
,
it
caused
hatred
and
pitty
among
men
,
blaming
the
ungrateful
,
and
honouring
the
thankful
;
and
thinking
withal
that
the
same
injuries
might
as
well
be
done
to
themselves
;
to
avoid
the
like
evil
,
they
betook
them
to
make
laws
and
to
make
punishments
against
the
offenders
:
Hence
came
the
knowledge
of
justice
,
which
was
the
occasion
that
when
they
were
to
chuse
a
Prince
,
they
sought
not
after
him
that
was
the
lustiest
,
but
the
wisest
and
justest
.
But
afterwards
when
they
had
their
Prince
by
succession
,
and
not
by
election
,
suddenly
the
heirs
began
to
degenerate
from
their
ancestors
;
and
forsaking
vertuous
actions
,
they
thought
that
Princes
had
nothing
to
do
but
to
exceed
others
in
luxurie
and
wantonness
,
and
in
what
belong'd
to
their
pleasure
:
so
that
the
Prince
beginning
to
be
hated
,
and
because
he
was
hated
to
fear
,
and
passing
on
beyond
this
fear
to
hurt
,
hereon
grew
Tyranny
.
Thence
afterwards
grew
those
violences
,
conspiracies
and
treasons
against
Princes
,
which
were
not
undertaken
by
those
that
were
fearful
or
weak
;
but
if
any
surpassed
others
in
courage
,
valour
,
wealth
,
and
birth
,
those
were
the
actors
,
not
being
able
to
indure
the
shameful
life
of
that
Prince
.
The
multitude
then
following
the
authority
of
those
great
ones
,
took
armes
against
the
Prince
;
and
he
being
down
,
they
yeelded
obedience
to
these
as
to
their
deliverers
:
and
they
hating
the
name
of
one
head
alone
,
fram'd
a
government
of
themselves
,
and
in
the
beginning
(
in
regard
of
the
tyranny
past
)
carried
themselves
fairly
according
to
the
laws
they
had
made
,
preferring
the
publique
good
before
their
own
advantage
,
and
in
summe
,
rul'd
and
maintain'd
the
state
with
exceeding
diligence
.
This
government
afterwards
falling
into
the
hands
of
their
children
,
who
never
knew
the
change
of
fortune
,
nor
had
the
experience
of
adversity
,
not
being
content
to
live
in
a
civil
equality
,
but
abandoning
themselves
to
covetousness
,
ambition
,
and
ravishing
of
women
,
so
carried
it
,
that
they
ingross'd
in
the
hands
of
some
few
the
government
that
belong'd
to
the
whole
Nobility
,
without
any
regard
of
the
state
,
in
so
much
that
it
befell
to
them
quickly
as
to
the
Tyrant
.
For
the
multitude
loathing
their
government
,
serv'd
it self
of
any
one
that
had
any
design
against
these
governours
,
and
so
some
there
were
quickly
found
that
made
head
against
them
,
who
with
the
aid
of
the
people
put
them
down
.
And
the
remembrance
of
the
Prince
being
yet
fresh
,
and
of
the
wrongs
they
suffered
under
him
,
having
taken
away
this
government
of
few
,
and
being
unwilling
to
restore
that
of
a
Prince
,
they
chose
the
Popular
,
which
they
so
ordain'd
,
that
neither
a
few
that
were
mighty
,
nor
one
Prince
alone
should
have
any
power
there
.
And
because
all
states
in
the
beginning
are
venerable
,
this
Popular
state
subsisted
a
while
but
not
long
,
especially
when
that
generation
was
out
that
ordain'd
it
:
for
suddenly
they
grew
licentious
,
not
fearing
private
men
,
nor
publick
Ministers
,
so
that
every
one
living
as
he
listed
,
they
daily
did
one
another
divers
outrages
,
and
at
length
wereforc'd
by
necessity
,
or
by
the
perswasion
of
some
good
man
,
for
to
avoid
such
insolency
,
to
change
a
new
into
a
Principality
,
and
so
from
thence
by
degrees
,
they
grew
exorbitant
in
their
behaviour
,
and
upon
the
occasions
aforesaid
:
And
this
is
the
circle
,
in
which
all
states
turning
about
have
been
and
are
governed
:
but
seldome
do
they
returne
into
the
self
same
governments
:
for
hardly
any
Commonwealth
can
be
of
so
long
durance
as
to
undergoe
so
many
changes
,
and
yet
stand
afoot
:
but
rather
it
comes
to
pass
,
the
state
while
it
is
in
tumult
,
counsell
and
force
then
alwaies
failing
,
becomes
subject
to
some
neighbouring
government
which
is
better
order'd
then
it self
:
but
were
it
not
for
this
,
a
state
were
always
capable
of
revolution
into
these
sorts
of
government
:
I
say
then
,
that
all
these
kinds
are
pernicious
for
the
short
continuance
of
the
three
which
are
good
;
and
the
malignity
of
the
other
three
which
are
bad
:
Whereupon
the
sage
Law-givers
having
perceived
this
defect
,
avoiding
each
one
by
it self
,
chose
one
that
might
partake
of
all
,
esteeming
that
more
sound
and
firme
:
for
the
one
guards
the
other
,
being
that
in
one
and
the
same
City
,
there
was
the
Principality
,
Nobility
,
and
Commonalty
as
parts
of
the
governments
.
Among
those
,
who
by
such
like
ordinances
have
deserv'd
most
commendations
,
is
Lycurgus
,
who
made
his
laws
after
such
a
manner
in
Sparta
,
that
giving
the
King
the
Nobility
,
and
the
people
their
shares
,
he
compos'd
a
government
that
lasted
above
eight
hundred
yeares
,
to
his
great
credit
and
that
Cities
quiet
.
The
contrary
befell
Solon
,
who
made
the
laws
in
Athens
,
which
because
it
was
a
popular
state
,
prov'd
but
short
liv'd
,
and
he
before
he
died
saw
the
Tyranny
of
Pisistratus
begun
:
and
though
after
forty
years
his
heires
were
driven
from
thence
,
and
Athens
recover'd
its
liberty
(
because
it
took
again
a
popular
government
according
to
Solons
institutions
)
it
maintain'd
it
not
above
a
hundred
years
,
notwithstanding
that
to
hold
it
,
there
were
many
lawes
made
by
which
the
insolences
of
the
great
men
were
restrain'd
and
the
licentiousness
of
all
in
general
:
which
were
never
provided
for
by
Solon
:
yet
because
he
compounded
not
this
with
the
authority
of
the
Principality
as
also
of
the
Nobility
,
Athens
continu'd
but
a
short
time
in
respect
of
Sparta
.
But
let
us
come
to
Rome
,
which
though
it
had
not
a
Lycurgus
to
put
it
so
in
order
that
it
might
long
subsist
free
,
yet
such
were
the
accidents
that
chanc'd
in
it
,
by
reason
of
the
disunion
of
the
Commonalty
and
the
Senate
,
that
what
their
founder
had
not
provided
for
,
chance
did
:
for
if
Rome
lit
not
upon
the
best
fortune
,
it
lit
upon
the
next
to
the
best
;
for
though
the
first
ordinances
were
defective
,
yet
they
aim'd
not
amiss
at
the
true
perfection
:
because
Romulus
and
all
the
Kings
made
many
and
good
laws
and
these
agreeing
to
the
maintenance
of
liberty
.
But
because
their
design
was
to
lay
the
foundations
of
a
kingdome
,
and
not
of
a
Commonwealth
,
when
the
City
became
free
,
there
wanted
many
things
which
were
fit
to
be
instituted
in
favour
of
liberty
,
but
were
never
ordain'd
by
those
Kings
.
And
albeit
their
Kings
lost
rule
upon
the
occasion
and
by
the
means
alledged
,
yet
they
that
expel'd
them
presently
setting
up
two
Consuls
who
should
stand
in
the
Kings
stead
,
chas'd
out
of
Rome
the
Regal
title
only
,
&
not
the
Regal
power
;
so
that
there
being
in
that
Commonwealth
the
Consuls
and
the
Senate
,
it
was
compos'd
only
of
two
of
these
forenamed
qualities
,
that
is
to
say
,
of
the
Principality
&
Nobility
.
There
remain'd
only
to
give
the
Commonalty
a
place
in
the
government
,
whereupon
the
Roman
Nobility
being
grown
insolent
,
upon
the
occasions
(
which
shall
be
hereafter
told
)
the
people
rose
up
against
them
,
so
that
rather
then
to
lose
all
,
they
were
constrain'd
to
allow
the
people
their
part
;
&
on
the
other
side
,
the
Senate
&
the
Consuls
were
likewise
to
continue
with
so
great
authority
as
they
might
well
maintain
their
degree
in
that
Commonwealth
:
&
so
began
the
creation
of
the
Tribuns
of
the
people
,
after
which
the
state
of
that
Commonwealth
became
more
firme
,
all
the
three
kinds
of
governments
having
their
shares
.
And
fortune
did
so
much
favour
them
,
that
though
they
proceeded
from
the
rule
of
a
King
,
&
of
the
Nobility
,
to
that
of
the
people
,
by
the
same
degrees
,
and
for
the
same
reasons
set
down
before
;
yet
to
give
power
to
the
Nobility
,
they
never
took
away
all
the
authority
from
the
Royalty
;
nor
was
the
power
of
the
Nobility
quite
diminish'd
,
to
give
it
to
the
people
:
but
being
mingled
,
it
made
an
exact
Commonwealth
,
to
which
perfection
it
came
by
the
departing
of
the
Commonalty
from
the
Senate
,
as
it
shall
be
shewed
at
length
in
the
two
next
following
Chapters
.
CHAP.
III.
Vpon
what
occasions
the
Tribuns
of
the
people
were
created
in
Rome
:
whereby
the
Commonwealth
became
more
perfect
.
ACcording
as
it
is
shewed
by
all
those
that
reason
of
civil
government
,
and
so
every
History
is
full
of
examples
to
that
purpose
,
it
is
necessary
that
he
who
frames
a
Common-wealth
,
and
ordaines
Laws
in
it
,
should
presuppose
that
all
men
are
bent
to
mischief
,
and
that
they
have
a
will
to
put
in
practice
the
wickedness
of
their
minds
,
so
oft
as
occasion
shall
serve
:
and
that
when
any
mischief
lies
covert
for
a
time
,
it
proceeds
from
an
occasion
unknown
,
which
is
not
come
to
light
,
because
trial
of
the
contrary
hath
not
yet
been
made
,
but
time
afterwards
discovers
it
,
which
they
say
is
Father
of
the
truth
.
It
seem'd
that
there
was
in
Rome
a
perfect
union
of
the
People
and
Senate
,
when
the
Tarquins
were
banisht
,
and
that
the
Nobility
having
laid
by
their
Pride
,
were
become
of
a
popular
disposition
,
and
supportable
to
every
one
even
of
the
meanest
ranke
.
This
deceit
lay
hid
,
nor
was
the
occasion
thereof
known
as
long
as
the
Tarquins
liv'd
,
of
whom
the
Nobility
being
afraid
,
and
doubting
that
upon
their
ill
treating
of
the
people
,
they
might
side
with
them
,
behav'd
themselves
with
good
respect
towards
them
:
But
no
sooner
were
the
Tarquins
dead
,
and
the
Nobility
delivered
of
that
feare
,
but
they
began
to
spit
against
the
people
the
poison
that
all
this
while
had
lurked
in
their
breasts
,
and
in
all
sorts
possible
to
vex
and
molest
them
:
which
thing
confirmes
what
I
said
before
,
that
men
never
do
good
,
unless
inforc'd
thereto
:
but
where
choice
is
abundant
,
and
liberty
at
pleasure
,
confusion
and
disorder
suddenly
take
place
.
Wherefore
it
is
said
,
that
hunger
and
poverty
make
men
laborious
,
and
Laws
make
them
good
.
But
where
one
thing
alone
by
it self
without
a
Law
does
good
,
there
,
is
no
need
of
the
Law
:
but
when
that
good
custom
failes
,
the
Law
becomes
necessary
forthwith
.
Yet
the
Tarquins
being
foil'd
,
who
with
feare
of
them
kept
the
Nobility
in
awe
,
it
was
fit
to
think
out
a
new
way
which
should
work
the
same
effect
the
Tarquins
did
,
when
they
were
alive
.
And
so
at
length
after
many
broyles
,
tumults
,
and
hazards
of
breaches
between
the
people
and
the
Nobility
,
at
length
for
the
peoples
assurance
,
the
Tribuns
were
created
,
and
they
bore
such
sway
and
had
such
credit
,
that
they
could
alwaies
after
mediate
between
the
people
and
the
Senate
,
and
stop
the
Nobilities
insolency
.
CHAP.
IV.
That
the
disagreement
of
the
People
and
the
Senate
of
Rome
,
made
the
Commonwealth
both
free
and
mighty
.
I
Must
not
fail
to
discourse
upon
these
tumults
,
which
were
in
Rome
from
the
Tarquins
death
till
the
creation
of
the
Tribuns
;
and
afterwards
upon
some
other
things
against
the
opinion
of
many
,
who
say
that
Rome
was
a
very
disorderly
commonwealth
,
and
full
of
such
confusion
,
that
if
good
fortune
and
military
vertue
had
not
supplyed
their
defects
,
it
would
have
been
inferiour
to
any
.
I
cannot
deny
that
fortune
and
warlike
discipline
were
causes
of
the
Roman
Empire
:
but
methinks
they
do
not
consider
,
that
where
good
discipline
is
,
it
is
likely
too
that
there
is
good
order
,
and
seldom
also
happens
it
but
that
there
is
good
fortune
.
But
let
us
come
to
the
other
particulars
of
that
City
.
I
say
that
they
who
condemne
the
troubles
between
the
Nobility
and
the
people
,
to
me
seem
to
blame
those
things
which
were
the
first
occasion
of
Romes
liberty
:
and
that
they
think
more
of
the
stirs
and
noises
which
arose
from
those
tumults
,
then
they
regard
the
good
effects
they
brought
forth
:
and
that
they
consider
not
,
how
there
are
two
severall
humours
in
every
Republique
,
that
of
the
Commons
,
and
the
other
of
the
great-ones
;
and
how
all
the
laws
that
are
made
in
favor
of
liberty
,
spring
first
from
their
disagreement
,
as
easily
we
may
perceive
it
follow'd
in
Rome
.
For
from
the
Tarquins
to
the
Gracchies
more
then
300.
years
,
the
tumults
of
Rome
seldome
times
caus'd
banishment
,
and
very
seldome
blood
:
Insomuch
as
no
man
can
well
deem
these
stirres
hurtful
,
nor
say
the
Commonwealth
was
divided
,
which
in
so
long
a
time
through
her
discord
,
banish'd
not
above
eight
or
ten
Citizens
,
and
put
very
few
to
death
,
nor
yet
condemn'd
many
in
sums
of
money
.
Neither
can
that
be
term'd
with
reason
in
any
sort
a
disorderly
Commonwealth
,
whence
we
have
so
many
rare
examples
of
vertue
:
for
good
examples
proceed
from
good
education
&
a
good
education
from
good
laws
,
&
good
laws
from
those
tumults
which
many
unadvisedly
do
condemn
:
for
whosoever
shall
examin
the
end
thereof
,
shall
not
find
that
they
produc'd
any
banishment
or
violence
in
hinderance
of
the
common
good
,
but
laws
&
ordinances
in
benefit
of
the
publick
liberty
.
And
if
any
man
should
alledge
that
the
means
were
extravagant
,
&
in
a
manner
outragions
.
To
see
the
people
together
cry
out
against
the
Senate
,
and
the
Senate
against
the
people
,
to
run
tumultuously
through
the
streers
,
to
shut
up
their
shops
,
and
the
whole
people
of
Rome
to
quit
the
town
,
all
which
things
fright
even
those
that
read
them
.
I
say
that
every
city
ought
to
have
its
own
waies
whereby
the
people
may
vent
their
ambition
,
&
especially
those
cities
that
in
matters
of
importance
wil
availe
themselves
of
their
people
;
among
which
Rome
had
this
way
,
that
when
the
people
would
have
a
law
made
,
either
they
did
some
of
the
things
forenamed
,
or
refus'd
to
have
their
names
inrolled
for
the
warres
,
so
that
to
quiet
them
,
there
was
a
necessity
in
some
sort
to
give
them
satisfaction
.
And
it
is
but
seldom
seen
,
that
the
desires
of
free
people
tend
to
the
hurt
of
liberty
;
for
they
arise
either
from
their
oppression
,
or
from
their
suspicion
they
are
falling
into
it
.
And
in
case
these
opinions
were
false
,
yet
is
there
a
meanes
to
rectifie
them
,
if
some
discreet
Oratour
in
their
assemblies
perswade
them
of
their
error
;
and
the
people
(
as
Tully
says
)
though
of
themselves
ignorant
,
yet
are
they
of
capacity
to
conceive
the
truth
,
being
told
them
by
any
man
worthy
of
credit
,
and
do
easily
submit
.
Wherefore
we
ought
more
sparingly
to
blame
the
Roman
Government
,
and
consider
the
good
effects
issued
from
that
Commonwealth
,
which
never
proceeded
but
from
good
causes
.
And
for
creating
the
Tribuns
,
they
deserve
exceeding
great
praise
;
for
besides
the
giving
to
the
people
their
share
of
Government
,
they
were
ordain'd
as
guardians
of
the
Roman
liberty
,
as
it
shall
appear
in
the
Chapter
following
.
CHAP.
V.
Whether
the
people
or
the
nebiliry
are
the
better
Guardians
of
liberty
;
and
which
have
greater
occasions
of
being
tzmvltuous
;
either
they
that
strive
to
enlarge
the
state
,
or
they
than
endeavour
but
to
maintain
it
.
THey
who
have
judiciously
laid
the
foundations
of
a
Commonwealth
,
have
,
among
other
principal
things
ordain'd
by
them
,
provided
a
safegard
for
liberty
,
which
as
it
is
rightly
plac'd
,
so
is
it
of
long
or
shorter
durance
.
And
because
in
every
Republick
there
are
the
Nobility
and
the
Commons
,
question
is
made
to
which
of
these
two
more
safely
may
be
intrusted
the
Guard
of
liberty
.
And
among
the
Lacedemonians
,
and
in
our
times
among
the
Venetians
it
hath
been
given
to
the
Nobility
;
but
among
the
Romans
it
was
committed
to
the
peoples
trust
;
and
therefore
is
it
necessary
to
examine
which
of
these
two
Common-wealths
made
the
better
choyce
.
And
if
a
man
list
to
argue
the
case
,
there
want
not
arguments
on
both
parts
:
butif
we
look
to
the
issue
they
had
,
we
should
yeeld
it
to
the
Nobility
,
because
Sparta
and
Venice
enjoy'd
either
of
them
their
freedome
,
longer
then
Rome
.
And
comming
to
argument
I
say
(
first
taking
part
with
the
Romans
)
that
they
ought
rather
to
be
intrusted
as
guardians
of
any
thing
,
who
are
least
desirous
to
usurpe
it
,
&
without
doubt
considering
the
designes
of
the
nobility
&
of
the
people
,
we
must
needs
confess
they
are
very
ambitious
of
rule
,
these
only
desire
not
to
be
oppress'd
,
and
consequently
affect
the
continuance
of
their
freedome
,
having
less
hope
to
usurpe
it
,
then
the
Nobility
;
so●
that
the
people
being
set
as
guardians
of
the
Common
liberty
,
it
is
probable
,
they
are
more
careful
of
it
;
and
being
themselves
out
of
hope
of
it
,
will
never
suffer
that
it
fall
into
others
hands
.
On
the
other
side
,
he
that
argues
for
the
Spartan
and
Venetian
customes
,
sayes
,
that
they
who
intrust
it
with
them
that
are
powerful
,
doe
two
good
things
at
once
;
the
one
,
that
they
rather
give
a
satisfaction
to
their
ambition
,
that
having
a
greater
part
in
the
Common-wealth
,
by
holding
this
staffe
in
their
hand
they
have
greater
reason
to
be
contented
:
the
other
is
,
that
they
free
the
peoples
unquiet
minds
from
such
a
kinde
of
authority
which
is
the
occasion
of
infinite
discords
and
offences
in
the
Commonwealth
,
and
like
enough
to
bring
the
Nobility
to
some
desperation
,
which
in
time
may
do
much
mischief
:
and
they
give
us
Rome
it self
for
an
example
hereof
,
that
when
the
Tribuns
of
the
people
had
this
authority
in
their
hands
,
they
were
not
content
to
have
one
Consul
to
be
a
Plebeyan
,
but
would
have
both
,
and
thereupon
they
would
have
the
Censor
and
the
Pretour
,
and
all
other
dignities
in
the
rule
of
the
City
:
nor
was
this
enough
,
but
led
on
still
with
the
same
rage
,
they
began
in
after
times
to
adore
those
men
whom
they
saw
fit
to
curbe
the
Nobility
,
whereupon
grew
the
power
of
Marius
and
the
ruine
of
Rome
:
and
,
truly
whosoever
should
sift
this
matter
throughly
,
the
one
and
the
other
,
would
much
doubt
which
he
should
make
choyce
of
for
the
guardians
of
liberty
,
not
knowing
which
sort
of
men
is
more
hurtsull
in
a
Commonwealth
,
either
that
which
desires
to
gain
the
honour
it
hath
not
,
or
the
other
which
endeavours
to
maintain
what
they
have
already
got
;
and
at
last
,
whosoever
shall
examin
the
whole
throughly
,
will
make
this
conclusion
;
Either
you
reason
of
a
Republick
that
aymes
at
such
a
dominion
as
Rome
had
,
or
of
one
which
seeks
no
farther
then
her
own
preservation
.
In
the
fir●
case
,
it
is
best
to
doe
as
Rome
did
,
and
follow
her
footsteps
.
In
the
second
,
he
may
follow
Venice
and
Sparta
for
those
occasions
,
as
it
shall
be
said
in
the
Chapter
following
.
But
to
return
to
the
point
,
what
kind
of
men
are
the
more
hurtful
in
a
Republick
?
either
they
that
would
enlarge
the
State
,
or
those
that
are
wary
not
to
lose
what
they
have
already
gotten
;
I
say
that
Marcus
Menenius
being
made
Dictatour
,
and
Marcus
Follius
General
of
the
horse
,
both
Plebeyans
,
to
inquire
after
certain
conspiracies
,
which
were
made
in
Capua
against
Rome
,
authority
was
also
given
from
the
people
to
find
out
those
that
in
Rome
by
ambition
or
any
extraordinary
way
did
strive
to
gain
the
Consu●ship
,
and
the
other
great
honours
of
the
City
;
whereupon
the
Nobility
thinking
this
authority
granted
to
the
Dictatour
as
against
them
,
they
reported
all
about
Rome
that
they
were
not
the
Nobles
that
ambituously
sought
after
dignities
by
unlawful
means
,
but
the
Plebeyans
who
not
confident
of
their
births
nor
worths
,
sought
by
extravagant
wayes
to
attain
to
those
degrees
,
and
particularly
accused
the
Dictatonr
;
and
so
powerfull
was
the
accusation
,
that
Menenius
in
a
publick
assembly
,
where
he
complain'd
of
the
calumnies
the
Nobility
had
laid
on
him
,
quit
the
Dictatourship
,
and
submitted
himself
to
the
tryal
,
which
was
made
before
the
People
,
and
after
his
cause
was
heard
,
he
was
absolved
:
where
it
was
argued
,
whether
savour'd
more
of
ambition
,
either
he
that
would
maintain
,
or
he
that
would
gain
;
for
the
one
and
the
other
appetite
may
occasion
very
great
tumults
.
Yet
notwithstanding
most
commonly
are
they
caus'd
by
him
who
already
hath
the
possession
,
because
the
feare
of
losing
doth
breed
in
them
the
same
desires
which
are
in
those
who
aime
at
conquest
:
because
men
think
they
hold
not
surely
what
they
have
,
unless
they
make
a
new
addition
of
somewhat
else
;
and
besides
this
,
the
larger
territories
they
are
Master
of
,
the
greater
force
and
power
they
are
able
to
imploy
in
bringing
their
designs
to
effect
;
and
this
also
may
we
adde
,
that
their
unlimited
and
ambitious
behaviours
kindle
in
the
breasts
of
those
that
have
not
,
a
desire
to
have
,
or
to
be
reveng'd
on
those
that
despoyle
them
,
or
else
to
become
Lords
themselves
of
that
wealth
and
those
honours
,
which
they
see
others
use
ill
.
CHAP.
VI.
Whether
in
Rome
there
could
have
been
●uch
a
State
founded
,
as
would
quite
ha●●
taken
away
the
hatreds
between
the
People
and
the
Senate
.
WEE
have
discours'd
upon
the
effects
,
which
the
differences
,
betwixt
the
People
and
the
Senate
,
made
.
Now
they
continuing
till
the
Gracchies
,
where
they
occasion'd
the
ruine
of
the
common
liberty
,
some
man
would
wish
,
that
Rome
could
have
atchieved
these
glorious
acts
she
did
,
without
those
jarres
in
her
.
Yet
it
seems
worthy
the
consideration
,
to
see
,
if
it
were
possible
,
so
to
frame
a
State
in
Rome
,
as
could
void
all
differences●
;
and
if
a
man
would
examin
this
,
he
should
have
recourse
to
those
Republiques
,
which
,
without
so
many
fallings
out
and
bickerings
,
have
been
long
free
,
and
see
,
what
kind
of
State
theirs
was
,
and
whether
Rome
were
capable
of
it
.
An
example
among
the
ancients
is
Sparta
,
among
the
modernes
Venice
,
both
by
me
formerly
named
.
Sparta
made
it self
a
King
with
a
little
Senate
to
govern
it
.
Venice
divided
not
the
government
with
the
names
,
but
in
one
general
tearm
,
all
those
that
had
a
hand
in
it
were
call'd
Gentlemen
,
which
chance
rather
cast
on
them
,
then
the
deliberation
of
their
founder
:
for
many
inhabitants
being
met
together
upon
those
rocks
,
where
now
stands
that
City
upon
the
occasions
foretold
,
when
they
were
grown
to
such
a
number
,
that
for
them
to
live
together
it
was
necessary
for
them
to
ordain
Lawes
they
appointed
a
forme
of
government
,
and
meeting
also
together
in
Counsel
to
advise
touching
the
City
,
when
they
found
themselves
of
sufficient
number
to
make
up
a
body
politick
,
they
excluded
all
others
who
afterwards
in
process
of
time
should
come
to
dwell
there
,
from
all
power
in
State
affaires
.
And
in
success
of
time
,
finding
there
were
many
inhabitants
in
the
place
out
of
the
Government
,
to
give
them
reputation
that
govern'd
,
they
call'd
them
Gentlemen
,
and
the
others
Plebeyans
.
So
that
this
order
might
well
be
begun
and
continued
without
the
dislike
of
any
:
for
when
it
was
first
made
,
every
one
that
dwelt
at
Venice
,
did
equally
partake
of
the
Government
,
so
that
none
could
complain
:
they
,
who
afterwards
came
to
inhabit
there
,
finding
the
State
setled
and
limited
,
had
neither
occasion
nor
meanes
to
make
any
tumult
:
there
was
no
occasion
,
because
nothing
was
taken
from
them
:
and
the
meanes
they
had
not
,
because
they
that
govern'd
kept
them
in
subjection
,
nor
trusted
them
so
far
with
any
imployment
that
they
could
take
authority
upon
them
.
Add
hereunto
,
that
they
who
afterwards
came
to
inhabit
Venice
,
were
not
many
,
nor
of
so
great
a
number
,
that
there
was
disproportion
between
the
Governors
and
those
that
were
governed
;
for
the
number
of
the
Gentlemen
was
either
equal
to
them
,
or
greater
then
they
were
:
so
that
for
these
reasons
Venice
could
well
begin
such
a
State
and
maintain
it
in
unity
.
Sparta
,
as
I
said
,
was
govern'd
by
a
King
and
a
strict
Senate
,
and
might
well
maintain
it self
so
a
long
time
;
because
there
being
in
Sparta
but
few
inhabitants
,
and
they
having
seis'd
upon
the
Government
in
prevention
of
those
that
should
afterwards
come
to
inhabit
there
,
and
with
reputation
living
in
observance
of
Lycurgus
Lawes
,
took
away
quite
all
occasion
of
discord
,
so
that
they
might
easily
continue
together
in
a
long
agreement
;
for
Lycurgus
by
his
Laws
ordain'd
in
Sparta
more
equality
of
estates
,
and
less
of
dignities
;
for
here
poverty
was
to
all
alike
;
and
the
Plebeyans
less
ambitious
:
for
the
Magistracies
of
the
City
were
communicable
only
to
some
few
Citizens
,
and
were
held
apart
from
the
People
,
neither
did
the
Nobility
ever
with
their
harsh
usage
make
them
covetous
of
them
.
This
eame
from
the
Spartan
Kings
,
who
being
plac'd
in
that
Principality
,
and
set
in
the
midst
of
that
Nobility
,
had
no
surer
means
to
maintain
their
dignity
stedfast
,
then
to
defend
the
People
from
injurious
oppressions
:
which
made
the
People
,
that
it
neither
feared
nor
affected
the
Government
,
and
not
having
the
rule
nor
fearing
it
,
the
contention
they
might
have
with
the
Nobility
was
quite
avoided
,
and
all
occasion
of
tumults
:
and
in
this
sort
they
might
live
in
peace
a
long
time
.
But
two
principal
things
caus'd
this
agreement
;
because
the
inhabitants
of
Sparta
were
few
,
and
therefore
might
be
govern'd
by
few
:
the
other
,
because
not
accepting
of
strangers
into
their
Republick
,
they
had
not
occasion
,
either
of
being
corrupted
,
or
making
great
increase
,
so
as
to
become
insupportable
to
those
few
that
govern'd
them
.
Wherefore
considering
these
things
,
it
appears
;
that
the
founders
of
Rome
were
to
have
us'd
one
of
these
two
expedients
,
if
they
desir'd
to
maintain
it
quicker
,
like
one
of
these
Commonwealths
we
have
spoken
of
:
either
not
to
imploy
the
common
people
in
War
,
as
the
Venetians
;
or
not
admit
strangers
into
the
City
,
as
the
Spartans
:
both
of
which
they
did
,
which
gave
the
people
force
and
increase
,
and
sundry
occasions
of
tumults
.
So
that
if
the
Roman
State
grew
more
quiet
,
this
inconvenient
follow'd
,
that
it
was
also
weaker
;
because
it
disabled
it self
of
the
means
to
come
to
the
greatness
it
attain'd
.
And
therefore
,
if
Rome
would
take
away
the
occasions
of
disagreements
,
it
took
away
the
means
of
amplifying
the
State
.
And
in
all
humane
affaires
it
is
plain
,
whosoever
does
throughly
examin
it
,
that
upon
the
cutting
off
one
inconvenient
,
another
will
streight
arise
:
therefore
if
thou
wouldst
make
a
numerous
and
a
warlike
people
to
inlarge
far
the
bounds
of
the
Empire
,
thou
mak'st
them
of
such
a
temper
,
that
they
shall
never
be
maneggiable
at
thy
will
;
a●
if
thou
keptst
them
weake
and
disarmed
to
have
them
at
command
:
but
if
they
get
the
rule
into
their
hand
,
thou
shalt
not
be
able
to
bridle
them
;
or
else
become
so
base
,
that
thou
shalt
be
made
a
prey
to
what
enemy
so
e're
assaults
thee
.
And
for
this
cause
in
all
our
deliberations
wee
ought
to
advise
,
where
least
inconvenients
are
,
and
to
take
that
for
the
best
course
:
for
there
is
non●
absolutely
free
from
hazard
and
suspicion
Rome
then
,
like
Sparta
,
could
have
made
〈◊〉
●rince
for
life
,
and
a
small
Senate
,
but
could
nor
then
,
as
shee
,
not
increase
the
number
of
her
Citizens
,
having
a
desire
to
extend
her
dominions
:
which
was
the
cause
that
a
King
for
terme
of
life
,
and
the
little
number
of
Senators
,
touching
their
agreement
,
would
have
nothing
availd
.
Whereupon
if
a
man
were
anew
to
lay
grounds
of
a
Republick
,
he
should
first
resolve
,
whether
hee
would
have
it
extend
its
power
and
rule
,
as
Rome
:
or
confine
it self
to
small
limits
.
In
the
first
case
then
,
hee
must
order
it
,
as
Rome
,
and
give
place
to
tumults
and
general
differences
,
the
best
he
may
;
for
without
great
number
of
men
,
and
those
warlike
,
could
never
any
Commonwealth
increase
,
or
if
it
increase
,
continue
.
In
the
second
case
thou
maist
so
order
it
,
as
Sparta
or
Venice
.
But
by
reason
that
ambition
to
extend
the
dominions
,
is
the
poison
of
such
like
Commonwealths
,
their
founder
ought
,
as
much
as
may
be
,
in
all
those
waies
forbid
them
to
inlarge
themselves
;
for
all
such
gaines
grounded
upon
a
weake
Common-wealth
,
do
quite
ruine
it
,
as
it
befell
Sparta
and
Venice
:
whereof
the
first
,
having
subdued
as
it
were
all
Greece
,
upon
a
very
small
accident
,
discover'd
its
own
weak
foundation
:
for
the
Rebellion
of
Thebes
following
,
caus'd
by
Pelopidas
,
with
other
Cities
imitating
,
utterly
ruin'd
that
Republick
.
In
like
manner
Venice
,
having
possest
her self
of
a
great
part
of
Italy
,
and
the
greatest
not
by
force
,
but
by
mony
,
and
craft
,
when
it
came
to
make
trial
of
its
force
,
lost
all
in
a
day
.
I
should
well
beleeve
,
that
the
way
to
frame
a
Commonwealth
of
long
continuance
,
were
to
order
it
within
as
Sparta
or
Venice
,
to
place
it
in
a
strong
situation
,
and
make
it
of
such
resistance
,
that
no
man
can
hope
to
subdue
it
on
a
sudden
;
and
on
the
otherside
,
that
it
be
not
so
great
,
to
become
a
terror
to
the
neighbors
,
and
so
likely
it
may
long
enjoy
its
State
.
For
upon
two
occasions
ordinarily
men
make
War
against
a
Republick
;
the
one
,
to
become
master
of
it
,
the
other
for
fear
it
become
master
of
them
.
And
this
way
I
have
spoken
of
,
takes
quite
away
these
two
causes
;
for
if
it
be
hard
to
overcome
,
as
I
presuppose
it
,
being
well
furnish'd
for
defence
,
it
will
seldome
,
or
never
chance
that
any
can
make
a
design
to
conquer
it
:
and
if
it
containes
it self
within
its
own
limits
,
and
it
be
manifest
by
experience
,
that
in
it
there
is
no
ambition
,
it
shall
never
come
to
pass
,
that
any
for
feare
interrupt
its
quiet
.
And
this
would
the
rather
be
,
if
in
it
were
made
a
Law
or
order
to
forbid
the
amplifying
of
the
State
.
And
without
doubt
I
beleeve
,
that
the
bringing
of
things
to
consist
in
these
termes
and
in
this
equality
of
temper
,
were
the
true
civil
Government
,
and
the
perfect
quiet
of
a
City
.
But
being
that
all
humane
things
are
in
continual
motion
,
and
nothing
stands
firm
,
they
must
ever
be
rising
or
falling
.
And
to
many
things
that
reason
doth
not
perswade
thee
,
necessity
bindes
thee
;
so
that
having
settled
a
Commonwealth
able
to
maintain
it self
,
not
augmenting
;
and
necessity
should
force
it
to
inlarge
it self
,
it
would
manifestly
loosen
its
own
foundations
,
and
suddenly
bring
it self
to
ruine
.
On
the
otherside
,
if
the
heavens
should
prove
so
favourable
,
as
to
blow
away
all
clouds
and
tempests
of
War
,
thence
would
arise
that
sloth
and
idleness
would
either
divide
them
,
or
make
them
effeminate
.
Which
two
things
together
,
or
either
by
it self
,
would
occasion
their
ruine
And
therefore
,
being
impossible
(
as
I
think
)
to
poise
all
things
so
justly
by
the
balance
,
or
reduce
them
to
this
perfection
of
temper
,
it
is
properest
,
in
founding
the
Republick
,
to
provide
for
the
most
honorable
part
,
and
so
to
order
it
,
that
when
necessity
shall
inforce
its
inlarging
,
it
may
be
able
to
keep
what
it
hath
gotten
.
And
to
return
to
our
first
discourse
,
I
think
it
necessary
to
follow
the
Roman
Ordinances
,
and
not
those
of
other
Common
wealths
;
for
to
find
a
mediocrity
between
the
one
and
the
other
,
I
think
it
not
possible
.
And
those
enmities
,
which
should
grow
betwixt
the
people
and
the
Senate
,
ought
to
be
tolerated
,
taking
them
for
a
necessary
inconvenient
,
to
attain
to
Romes
greatness
.
For
besides
other
reasons
alledged
,
where
the
authority
of
the
Tribunes
is
prov'd
necessary
for
the
preservation
of
liberty
,
it
manifestly
appears
what
great
benefit
they
make
in
Commonwealths
of
the
power
of
accusing
,
which
among
other
things
was
committed
to
the
Tribunes
,
as
in
the
Chapter
following
shall
be
declar'd
.
CHAP.
VII
.
How
useful
accusations
are
in
a
Republike
for
the
maintenance
of
Liberty
.
THere
cannot
be
a
more
profitable
or
necessary
power
given
to
those
that
in
a
city
are
appointed
as
guardians
of
the
liberty
,
then
is
that
of
accusing
the
Citizens
to
the
people
,
or
before
any
Magistrate
,
or
any
councel
,
whensoever
they
offend
in
any
thing
against
the
free
State
.
This
order
workes
two
very
useful
effects
in
a
Republick
.
The
first
is
,
that
the
Citizens
for
feare
of
being
accused
,
attempt
nothing
against
the
State
;
and
in
case
they
do
,
forthwith
without
any
respect
given
them
,
are
suppres'd
.
The
other
is
,
that
it
gives
a
way
to
vent
the
humours
that
grow
in
the
Cities
,
in
any
manner
against
any
Citizens
.
And
when
these
humours
have
not
ordinary
vents
,
they
burst
out
extraordinary
waies
,
and
so
are
the
ruine
of
a
Commonwealth
.
And
there
is
not
any
thing
renders
a
Republick
more
setled
and
stedfast
,
then
to
ordain
it
in
such
a
manner
,
that
the
alteration
of
these
humours
that
stir
it
,
have
some
out-let
,
appointed
by
the
Lawes
;
which
may
be
shew'd
by
divers
examples
,
and
especially
by
that
of
Coriolanus
,
which
Titus
Livius
reports
:
where
he
saies
,
that
the
Nobility
of
Rome
being
angry
with
the
people
,
as
thinking
them
to
have
too
much
Authority
,
by
creation
of
the
Tribunes
,
who
protected
them
;
and
Rome
(
as
some
time
it
chances
)
being
in
great
want
of
provisions
,
and
thereupon
the
Senate
sent
for
Corne
into
Sicily
,
Coriolanus
an
Enemy
of
the
popular
faction
advis'd
,
that
now
the
time
was
come
,
they
had
power
to
chastise
the
people
,
and
to
take
away
that
Authority
which
they
had
laid
hold
on
in
prejudice
of
the
Nobility
,
by
keeping
them
in
hunger
and
want
,
distributing
the
Corn
to
them
.
Which
opinion
of
his
they
hearing
of
,
took
such
distast
against
Coriolanus
,
that
had
not
the
Tribunes
cited
him
to
appear
to
defend
his
cause
,
the
people
had
slain
him
in
a
tumult
as
he
came
out
of
the
Senate
.
Upon
which
accident
,
we
note
that
which
before
was
said
,
how
fit
and
usefull
it
is
,
that
the
Commonwealths
with
their
Lawes
give
meanes
to
vent
the
choler
,
which
the
universality
hath
conceiv'd
against
any
one
Citizen
.
For
when
they
have
not
these
ordinary
meanes
,
they
have
recourse
to
extraordinary
;
and
out
of
question
these
are
of
worse
effect
then
those
.
For
if
by
an
orderly
course
one
Citizen
be
ssuppres'd
,
although
it
were
wrongfully
done
,
yet
follwes
thereupon
little
or
no
disorder
in
the
Republick
,
because
the
execution
is
done
without
any
private
mans
power
,
or
assistance
of
forrein
forces
,
which
are
those
,
that
take
away
the
common
liberty
;
but
by
the
publick
and
lawful
power
,
which
have
their
particular
bounds
,
nor
any
way
pass
so
far
as
to
endammage
,
the
Commonwealth
.
And
to
confirm
this
opinion
with
examples
,
this
of
Coriolanus
from
the
ancients
shall
suffice
me
;
upon
which
let
every
one
consider
,
what
mischief
thereby
had
faln
on
the
Common-wealth
of
Rome
,
if
in
a
tumult
he
had
been
flain
;
for
thereupon
had
grown
offences
between
particular
men
;
offences
cause
feare
,
feare
seekes
defence
,
for
defence
men
make
partisans
,
and
thus
parties
grow
in
Cities
,
and
from
them
the
ruine
of
Cities
.
But
the
matter
being
order'd
by
publick
authority
,
they
took
away
all
those
mischiefes
which
might
have
happen'd
,
had
it
been
carried
by
private
power
;
we
have
seen
in
our
daies
what
innovations
it
hath
brought
on
the
Florentine
Republick
,
in
that
the
multitude
had
no
legal
meanes
to
vent
their
displeasure
against
a
single
Citizen
:
as
it
befel
in
the
time
of
Franciscus
Valorus
,
who
was
as
it
were
Prince
of
the
City
,
and
being
by
many
thought
ambitious
,
and
a
man
that
by
his
insolent
and
high
stomack
would
not
content
himself
to
live
within
a
civil
Government
,
and
there
being
no
way
in
the
Commonwealth
to
resist
him
,
unless
with
some
faction
opposite
to
his
,
thence
it
came
,
that
he
not
doubting
other
then
some
extraordinary
meanes
,
began
to
seek
favourers
of
his
party
,
to
defend
him
.
On
the
other
side
,
they
that
oppos'd
him
,
having
no
ready
way
to
suppress
him
,
devis'd
some
extraordinary
waies
:
insomuch
as
they
came
at
length
to
fight
,
and
where
(
if
by
an
ordinary
course
he
could
have
been
restrain'd
:
)
his
power
had
sunk
with
his
own
loss
onely
a
now
having
to
use
extraordinary
meanes
in
breaking
it
,
there
ensued
not
only
his
,
but
the
ruine
of
many
other
Noble
Citizens
.
There
might
also
be
alledged
,
to
confirm
our
former
conclusion
,
the
accident
chanc'd
in
Florence
,
upon
the
occasion
of
Peter
Soderinus
,
which
wholly
proceeded
from
the
want
of
meanes
in
that
Republick
,
to
accuse
the
ambition
of
some
powerful
Citizens
;
for
,
it
was
not
enough
to
accuse
a
mighty
man
,
before
eight
Judges
in
a
Commonwealth
.
The
Judges
ought
to
be
in
great
number
;
for
a
few
do
after
the
manner
of
two
or
three
;
so
that
if
such
courses
were
taken
,
either
the
Citizens
would
have
accus'd
him
living
ill
,
and
thereby
,
without
calling
the
Spanish
Army
to
aid
,
would
have
wreak'd
their
anger
on
him
;
or
not
behaving
himself
ill
,
they
durst
not
have
ventur'd
to
seek
his
ruine
,
for
feare
themselves
of
incurring
danger
.
And
so
on
all
sides
had
ceas'd
that
ravenous
cruelty
,
which
was
the
cheif
occasion
of
offence
.
Whereupon
we
may
conclude
this
,
that
so
oft
as
we
see
forrein
forces
call'd
upon
by
any
party
of
Citizens
,
we
may
well
beleeve
that
in
that
City
there
is
lack
of
good
,
Ordinances
:
even
lack
of
that
ordinary
meanes
to
vent
without
extraordinary
waies
the
maligne
humors
which
grow
in
men
;
whereunto
it
is
sufficiently
remedied
,
by
allowing
of
accusations
before
many
Judges
,
and
withall
countenancing
them
.
Which
courses
were
so
well
order'd
in
Rome
,
that
in
so
many
quarrels
between
the
people
and
the
Senate
,
neither
the
one
nor
the
other
,
nor
any
particular
Citizen
ever
intended
to
availe
themselves
by
any
forreign
strength
;
because
they
having
a
remedy
at
home
,
were
not
necessitated
to
go
seek
it
abroad
.
And
though
the
examples
above
written
are
sufficient
to
prove
this
,
yet
I
will
alledg
another
,
related
by
Titus
Livius
in
his
History
:
who
reports
,
that
in
Clusia
,
the
Noblest
City
in
those
daies
in
all
Tuscany
,
by
one
Lucumon
Aruns
was
ravished
,
and
he
,
not
being
able
to
work
his
revenge
by
reason
of
the
ravishers
might
,
went
and
found
out
the
French-men
who
then
raign'd
in
that
place
we
now
call
Lombardy
and
encourag'd
them
to
bring
an
Army
to
Clusia
,
showing
them
that
with
their
gain
they
might
revenge
him
of
the
injury
done
him
:
and
if
Aruns
had
seen
possibility
to
have
been
righted
by
any
means
in
the
City
,
he
never
would
have
inquir'd
after
any
barbarous
power
.
But
as
these
accusations
are
profitable
in
a
Commonwealth
:
so
are
calumnies
unprofitable
and
hurtful
,
as
it
shall
appear
by
our
discourse
in
the
next
Chapter
.
CHAP.
VIII
.
Accusations
are
not
more
beneficial
to
Common-wealths
,
then
Calumnies
pernitious
.
NOtwithstanding
,
that
the
virtue
of
Furius
Camillus
,
after
he
had
freed
the
City
of
Rome
from
the
siege
and
oppression
of
the
Frenchmen
,
had
brought
to
pass
,
that
none
of
the
Citizens
of
Rome
thought
it
took
any
way
from
their
credit
or
degree
,
to
give
him
place
:
yet
Manlius
Capitolinus
could
not
endure
that
so
much
honor
and
renown
should
be
ascribed
to
him
.
Being
of
opinion
,
that
touching
the
safety
of
Rome
,
in
that
he
,
had
defended
the
Capitol
from
the
Enemies
he
deserv'd
as
much
as
Camillus
;
and
in
regard
of
other
warlike
glories
,
he
was
no
way
second
to
him
.
So
that
overburden'd
with
envy
,
nor
being
able
to
take
rest
for
this
mans
honor
,
and
perceiving
he
could
sow
no
discord
among
the
Fathers
,
he
made
his
address
to
the
people
,
scattering
among
them
divers
sinister
opinions
.
And
among
other
things
,
he
said
this
also
,
that
the
treasure
which
was
collected
for
the
Frenchmen
,
and
after
not
given
them
,
was
usurp'd
by
some
private
Citizens
;
and
if
it
were
had
again
,
it
might
be
turn'd
to
the
publick
good
,
easing
the
people
of
their
tributes
,
or
some
private
debts
.
These
words
were
of
force
with
the
people
,
so
that
they
began
to
run
together
,
and
as
they
listed
to
raise
many
tumults
in
the
City
:
Which
thing
much
displeasing
the
Senat
,
and
they
taking
it
for
a
matter
of
great
moment
,
and
dangerous
,
created
a
Dictatour
,
that
he
might
examin
the
case
,
and
bridle
the
violence
of
Manlius
.
Whereupon
the
Dictator
cited
him
,
and
they
met
in
publick
one
against
the
other
,
the
Dictator
environ'd
with
the
Nobility
,
Manlius
with
the
People
,
Manlius
was
demanded
,
who
had
the
treasure
he
spoke
of
,
for
the
Senate
was
as
desirous
to
understand
as
the
people
.
Whereunto
Manlius
answer'd
not
particularly
,
but
as
by
excuses
,
said
there
was
no
need
to
tell
them
what
they
already
knew
,
so
that
the
Dictator
caus'd
him
to
be
put
in
prison
.
Hereupon
may
we
observe
,
how
extreamly
pernicious
and
damageable
are
calumnies
,
as
well
in
free
Cities
,
as
in
any
other
kind
of
Government
;
and
therefore
to
repress
them
ought
not
any
Law
or
Ordinance
be
spar'd
,
that
may
serve
to
the
purpose
.
Neither
can
there
be
found
any
better
expedient
to
extinguish
them
,
then
to
open
many
waies
to
accusations
;
for
as
they
do
much
help
a
Republick
,
so
calumnies
hurt
it
:
and
●on
the
other
part
,
there
is
this
difference
,
that
calumnies
have
no
need
of
Testimonies
,
nor
of
any
particular
incounter
to
prove
them
;
so
that
every
one
may
be
caluminated
,
but
not
accus'd
;
accusations
being
tied
to
certain
particulars
and
circumstances
,
to
udemonstrate
their
truth
.
Men
are
accus'd
before
Magistrates
,
the
People
and
Councells
;
slander'd
they
are
by
calumnies
,
as
well
in
private
as
in
publick
.
And
there
slander
is
most
in
use
,
where
accusations
are
nor
accustomed
,
and
where
the
Cities
are
loth
to
receive
them
.
Therefore
every
founder
of
a
Republick
ought
so
to
order
it
,
that
therein
any
Citizen
may
be
accused
without
feare
or
suspect
.
And
this
done
and
well
observ'd
,
he
ought
sharply
to
punish
the
slanderers
,
who
have
no
reason
to
complain
when
they
are
punish'd
,
there
being
publick
places
to
heare
his
accusations
,
whom
they
in
private
would
have
slandered
.
And
where
this
part
is
not
well
order'd
,
there
alwaies
follows
much
confusion
;
for
calumnies
do
provoke
and
not
chastise
the
Citizens
;
and
those
that
are
provok'd
,
think
to
availe
themselves
rather
by
hating
,
then
fearing
the
things
that
are
said
against
them
.
This
part
(
as
it
is
said
)
was
well
order'd
at
Rome
,
and
alwaies
ill
in
our
City
of
Florence
.
And
as
at
Rome
this
order
did
much
good
,
so
at
Florence
this
disorder
did
much
harme
:
And
whosoever
reades
the
stories
of
this
City
,
shall
see
,
how
many
slanders
have
from
time
to
time
been
devis'd
against
those
Citizens
,
who
have
been
imployed
in
the
most
important
affairs
of
it
.
Of
one
they
said
,
he
rob'd
the
common
:
Treasury
;
of
another
,
he
fail'd
of
such
an
attempt
,
being
corrupted
;
and
of
a
third
,
he
ran
,
into
this
or
that
inconvenient
through
ambition
.
From
whence
proceeded
,
that
on
every
side
grew
hatred
;
whereupon
came
division
,
from
division
they
came
to
factions
,
from
factions
to
ruine
.
But
had
there
been
a
meanes
in
Florence
to
accuse
the
Citizens
,
and
punish
slanderers
,
that
infinite
number
of
calumnies
,
that
afterward
grew
,
had
never
followed
;
for
those
Citizens
either
condemned
or
assoild
that
they
had
been
,
could
never
have
hurt
the
City
,
and
would
have
been
less
accused
,
then
they
were
slander'd
;
every
one
(
as
I
have
said
)
being
not
so
readily
able
to
accuse
as
to
slander
.
And
among
other
things
,
some
Citizens
have
serv'd
themselves
of
these
calumnies
,
as
steps
and
helps
to
their
ambitious
ends
;
who
having
to
incounter
powerful
men
opposed
themselves
as
they
listed
,
and
left
nothing
undone
to
work
their
intent
;
for
taking
part
with
the
people
,
and
confirming
them
in
their
evil
opinion
,
already
conceived
of
these
,
have
made
the
people
their
own
friends
.
And
though
I
could
bring
examples
enough
,
I
will
be
content
with
this
one
.
The
Florentine
Army
was
in
the
field
at
Lucca
commanded
by
John
Guicchiard
an
able
Captain
.
Either
his
Government
was
so
ill
,
or
the
success
prov'd
so
unlucky
,
that
he
faild
in
taking
the
Town
.
So
that
howsoever
the
case
stood
,
John
was
blam'd
for
it
,
saying
,
he
had
been
bribed
by
the
Luccheses
:
which
slander
being
favour'd
by
his
Enemies
,
brought
John
to
extream
despair
.
And
though
to
justifie
himself
he
offer'd
his
submission
to
trial
and
imprisonment
,
yet
could
he
never
wipe
away
that
blur
,
because
in
that
Commonwealth
there
were
not
the
meanes
to
do
it
,
whereupon
grew
much
distast
between
Johns
friends
,
who
were
the
greater
part
of
the
potent
men
,
and
his
Adversaries
,
who
were
some
that
desir'd
to
make
innovations
in
Florence
.
Which
matter
,
upon
these
and
otherlike
occasions
,
increased
so
,
that
thereupon
ensued
the
ruine
of
that
Republique
.
M.
Capitolinus
therefore
was
a
slanderer
,
and
not
an
accuser
,
and
the
Romans
shewed
directly
in
this
case
,
how
slanderers
ought
to
be
punish'd
.
For
they
ought
to
make
them
become
accusers
:
and
when
the
accusation
proves
true
,
either
reward
them
,
or
at
least
not
punish
them
;
and
when
false
,
punish
them
,
as
Manlius
.
CHAP.
IX
.
How
needful
it
is
,
that
he
who
frames
anew
the
Laws
,
and
laies
new
foundations
of
a
Common
wealth
,
be
alone
without
Companion
or
Competitor
.
ANd
perchance
some
will
think
,
that
I
have
run
too
far
within
the
Roman
History
,
not
having
made
any
mention
yet
,
of
the
founders
of
that
Republick
,
nor
of
the
Laws
which
belong'd
,
either
to
their
Religion
,
or
their
military
discipline
.
And
therefore
not
willing
to
hold
them
longer
in
suspence
,
who
are
desirous
to
understand
somewhat
in
this
case
,
I
say
,
that
many
peradventure
will
think
this
a
matter
of
evil
example
,
that
the
ordainer
of
a
civil
Government
,
as
was
Romulus
,
should
first
Without
question
the
end
was
ambition
,
Royalty
admitting
no
companion
.
Of
whom
to
free
himself
,
it
seems
that
Romulus
stood
not
much
upon
how
lawful
meanes
he
used
,
for
Cain-like
he
slew
his
brother
,
and
consented
to
Titus
Tatius
his
death
,
without
doubt
,
for
venturing
to
take
part
in
the
Authority
.
And
touching
this
,
it
may
be
Machiavel
will
speak
truer
neare
the
latter
end
of
his
18.
Chapt.
Where
hee
saies
,
Because
the
restoring
of
a
City
to
a
civil
and
politick
Government
presupposes
a
good
man
,
and
by
violence
to
become
a
Prince
of
a
Common-wealth
presupposes
an
evil
man
,
for
this
cause
it
shall
very
seldome
come
to
pass
,
that
a
good
man
will
ever
strive
to
make
himself
Prince
by
mischievous
waies
,
although
his
ends
therein
be
all
good
;
nor
will
a
wicked
man
,
by
wicked
meanes
,
attaining
to
be
Prince
do
good
,
nor
ever
comes
it
into
his
heart
to
use
that
Authority
well
,
which
by
evil
meanes
he
came
to
.
And
so
at
the
very
end
of
the
same
18.
Chap.
he
concludes
,
that
though
the
intent
were
not
good
,
there
might
be
a
faire
colour
set
upon
it
by
a
good
success
.
Whereby
our
Polititian
,
however
he
windes
and
turns
,
comes
at
length
to
discover
his
evil
ground
he
took
,
that
Jus
regnandi
gratia
violandum
est
;
aliis
in
rebus
pietatem
colas
,
as
is
that
of
Euripides
.
have
taken
his
brothers
life
from
him
,
and
after
have
consented
to
T.
Tacius
the
Sabines
death
,
chosen
by
him
his
companion
in
the
Kingdom
;
judging
hereby
that
his
own
Citizens
might
by
Authority
taken
from
their
Prince
for
ambition
,
or
desire
to
rule
,
endamage
those
that
should
oppose
their
power
.
Whose
opinion
we
should
acknowledg
true
,
if
we
consider
nor
the
end
which
induc'd
him
to
commit
this
homicide
.
And
we
may
take
this
for
a
general
rule
,
that
never
or
seldom
it
chances
,
that
any
Republick
or
Kingdom
is
from
the
beginning
well
ordein'd
or
throughly
new
reformed
of
its
old
customs
,
unless
the
disposing
of
it
depend
absolutely
upon
the
will
of
one
.
Nay
rather
there
is
a
necessity
of
it
,
that
that
one
be
absolute
,
that
appoints
the
manner
how
,
and
by
whose
understanding
all
such
ordination
is
regulated
.
Wherefore
a
wise
founder
of
a
Republick
,
who
seeks
not
his
own
advantage
,
but
the
publick
good
;
not
to
strengthen
his
own
succession
,
but
seeks
his
Countries
profit
,
ought
indeavor
to
get
the
power
wholly
into
his
own
hands
:
neither
will
any
man
of
good
judgment
ever
blame
any
extraordinary
action
he
shall
put
in
practice
,
for
the
setling
of
a
good
Government
in
a
Kingdom
,
or
framing
sure
foundations
in
a
Commonwealth
.
It
holds
well
together
,
though
the
act
accuse
him
,
that
the
effect
excuse
him
;
and
when
that
is
good
,
as
it
prov'd
to
Romulus
,
it
will
alwaies
excuse
him
;
for
he
that
uses
violence
to
waste
,
is
blameable
,
not
he
that
uses
it
for
redress
and
order
.
And
therefore
ought
he
be
so
wise
and
virtuous
,
that
the
Authority
he
hath
possest
himself
of
,
he
leave
not
to
descend
hereditarily
on
another
.
For
men
being
more
inclined
to
ill
then
good
,
his
successor
may
turne
that
to
ambition
which
he
manag'd
vertuously
.
Besides
this
,
though
one
be
fit
to
ordein
a
thing
,
yet
it
s
not
so
ordein'd
to
last
long
,
when
it
rests
upon
the
shoulders
of
one
man
;
well
may
it
indure
,
being
committed
to
the
care
of
many
,
to
whom
it
belongs
to
maintain
it
.
For
even
so
,
as
many
are
not
proper
for
the
framing
of
one
thing
,
because
all
of
them
hit
not
on
the
true
good
of
it
,
by
reason
of
their
several
opinions
among
them
so
;
after
they
have
known
it
,
neither
agree
they
to
let
it
proceed
to
its
advantage
.
And
that
Romulus
was
one
of
those
,
who
for
the
death
of
his
brother
and
companion
,
might
be
excus'd
:
and
that
what
he
did
was
for
the
common
good
,
and
not
for
his
own
ambition
,
it
appears
,
in
that
he
forth
with
ordain'd
a
Senate
,
with
whom
he
might
take
counsell
,
and
by
their
opinions
be
advis'd
.
And
he
,
who
considers
well
the
Authority
Romulus
reserv'd
himself
,
will
perceive
it
was
no
more
than
to
command
the
Armies
,
when
they
had
resolv'd
on
War
;
and
to
assemble
the
Senate
;
which
was
apparent
afterwards
,
when
Rome
became
free
upon
the
banishment
of
the
Tarquins
:
whereupon
the
Romans
were
never
brought
in
any
new
order
,
unless
that
in
lieu
of
a
King
during
life
,
they
made
two
Consuls
yearly
:
Which
confirms
,
that
all
the
first
ordinances
of
that
City
were
more
agreeable
to
a
civil
and
free
Government
,
then
to
one
absolute
and
Monarchical
.
To
verifie
the
thing
abovesaid
,
we
might
bring
many
examples
,
as
Moses
,
Lycurgus
,
Solon
,
and
other
founders
of
Kingdomes
and
Commonwealths
,
who
could
well
,
having
an
absolute
power
in
their
hands
,
ordain
laws
for
the
common
good
;
but
I
will
let
them
pass
,
as
well
know
.
I
shall
alleadg
only
one
,
not
so
famous
,
but
well
worthy
their
consideration
,
who
desire
to
be
good
Law-makers
:
which
is
,
That
Agis
King
of
Sparta
advising
to
reduce
the
Spartans
within
those
bounds
the
Laws
of
Licurgus
had
included
them
;
thinking
that
,
because
they
had
broken
out
of
that
strictness
,
his
City
had
lost
very
much
of
the
ancient
vertue
,
and
by
consequent
of
force
and
government
,
was
in
the
beginning
of
his
attempts
slain
by
the
Spartan
Ephores
,
as
one
,
that
aim'd
to
possess
himself
of
the
Tyranny
.
But
Cleomenes
afterwards
succeeding
him
in
the
Kingdom
,
upon
his
reading
of
Agis
Records
and
Writings
,
which
fell
into
his
hands
,
he
understood
his
intention
,
and
grew
desirous
himself
,
to
bring
the
same
thing
to
pass
;
but
found
it
was
impossible
to
do
that
good
to
his
Country
,
unless
he
became
absolute
of
authority
,
it
seeming
to
him
,
by
reason
of
mens
ambition
,
that
he
was
unable
to
do
good
to
many
,
against
the
will
of
a
few
.
And
taking
a
fit
opportunity
,
at
length
hee
brought
in
all
the
Ephores
,
and
every
one
else
that
could
withstand
him
,
and
afterwards
restor'd
into
force
Licurgus
his
Lawes
:
Which
deliberation
had
bin
able
to
have
a
new
reviv'd
Sparta
,
and
gain'd
Cleomenes
the
reputation
Licurgus
had
,
if
then
the
Macedons
power
had
not
grown
so
vast
,
and
the
other
Grecian
Republick
been
so
weake
.
For
after
such
order
given
,
being
set
upon
by
the
Macedons
,
and
finding
himself
single
too
weak
to
deale
with
them
,
there
being
none
could
give
him
assistance
,
was
overcome
;
and
his
project
(
though
just
and
commendable
)
became
unperfect
.
Wheresore
,
upon
the
weighing
of
all
these
things
together
,
I
conclude
,
it
necessary
that
a
founder
of
a
Republiek
ought
alone
to
have
an
absolute
authority
;
and
that
Romulus
,
for
the
death
of
Remus
and
Tatius
,
deserves
rather
excuse
than
blame
.
CHAP.
X.
As
the
Founders
of
a
Commonwealth
or
Kingdom
are
exceedingly
praise-worthy
,
so
the
beginners
of
a
Tyranny
deserve
much
infamy
.
AMongst
all
commendable
men
,
those
deserve
esteem
in
the
first
place
,
who
have
taken
care
in
laying
the
grounds
of
divine
worship
,
and
true
Religion
:
the
next
belongs
to
them
who
have
been
the
founders
of
Commonwealths
or
Kingdoms
.
After
those
are
they
famous
that
commanding
over
Armies
have
inlarg'd
either
their
Kingdom
or
Country
.
To
these
wee
may
adjoyn
learned
men
.
And
because
they
are
of
different
dignities
,
every
one
of
them
are
valued
according
to
their
degree
.
And
to
all
other
men
,
whose
number
is
infinite
,
wee
use
to
give
that
share
of
commendations
,
which
their
Art
and
Skill
deserves
.
On
the
contrary
,
infamous
are
they
and
execrable
,
that
are
the
perverters
of
Religion
,
the
dissipatours
of
Kingdoms
and
Republicks
,
enemies
of
vertue
and
learning
,
and
of
any
other
art
,
that
brings
profit
,
and
renown
to
mankind
;
as
also
are
the
irreligious
,
the
mad-braind
,
the
ignorant
,
the
slothful
,
and
base
.
And
there
will
never
be
any
so
foolish
,
or
so
wise
,
so
mischievous
or
so
good
,
that
the
choice
of
the
two
qualities
of
men
being
made
him
,
will
not
commend
that
which
is
commendable
,
and
blame
the
blameable
.
Notwithstanding
seeing
that
the
most
part
,
as
it
were
,
beguiled
by
counterfeit
good
,
and
vain
glory
,
suffer
themselves
either
voluntarily
or
ignorantly
to
be
counted
in
the
number
with
those
that
merit
more
blame
then
praise●
And
having
meanes
with
their
perpetual
honor
to
frame
a
Republick
or
Kingdom
,
yet
affect
they
a
Tyranny
;
neither
are
they
advis'd
by
this
course
,
what
reputation
,
what
glory
,
what
honor
,
security
,
quiet
,
and
satisfaction
of
mind
they
flie
from
,
and
into
what
infamy
,
dispraise
,
blame
,
danger
,
and
unquietness
they
plunge
themselves
:
And
it
is
impossible
,
that
,
they
that
live
private
men
in
a
Common-wealth
,
or
that
by
fortune
,
or
by
their
vertues
become
Princes
,
if
they
read
the
histories
,
or
make
any
account
of
antiquities
therein
related
,
that
those
private
men
,
I
say
,
had
not
rather
be
Scipioes
in
their
native
Country
,
than
Cesars
;
and
those
that
are
Princes
,
rather
Agesilaus
,
Timoleon
,
or
Dion
,
than
Nabis
,
Phalaris
,
or
Dionysius
:
for
they
would
perceive
these
execedingly
in
all
mens
hatred
,
and
,
these
as
much
beloved
.
They
would
see
also
how
Timoleon
and
those
of
his
like
had
no
lefs
power
in
their
Country
,
then
had
Dionysius
or
Phalaris
;
but
they
would
find
also
they
had
far
more
security
.
Nor
let
any
be
deeeived
by
Cesars
glory
,
seeing
his
memory
much
celebrated
by
writers
:
for
they
that
Praise
him
,
were
corrupted
by
his
fortune
,
and
frighted
by
the
continuance
of
the
Empire
,
which
being
govern'd
under
that
name
,
gave
not
writers
leave
to
speak
freely
of
him
.
But
he
that
would
know
what
free
writers
would
say
of
him
,
let
him
look
upon
that
they
say
of
Cataline
:
and
Cesar
is
so
much
the
more
to
be
disprais'd
,
in
that
he
executed
the
ill
,
the
other
did
but
intend
.
Let
him
see
also
how
much
they
praise
Brutus
;
so
that
not
daring
to
blame
the
other
,
because
of
his
power
,
they
attributed
much
honor
to
his
Enemy
.
Let
him
consider
also
him
that
is
become
Prince
in
a
Republick
,
what
praises
,
after
Rome
was
made
an
Empire
,
those
Emperors
rather
deserv'd
,
that
liv'd
under
the
Laws
,
as
good
Princes
,
than
they
that
went
a
contrary
course
to
them
;
and
he
shall
find
,
that
Titus
,
Nerva
,
Trajan
,
Adrian
,
and
Antonius
and
Marcus
had
no
need
of
Praetorian
soldiers
,
nor
a
multitude
of
the
legions
to
guard
them
;
for
their
own
vertues
,
the
good
will
of
the
people
,
and
the
love
of
the
Senate
did
defend
them
.
Moreover
he
shall
see
,
that
the
Eastern
and
Western
Armies
were
not
enough
to
save
Caligula
,
Nero
,
Vitellius
,
and
the
other
wicked
Emperors
from
their
Enemies
,
whom
their
vile
conditions
and
damned
lives
had
procured
them
.
And
if
their
Story
were
well
read
over
,
it
might
serve
to
give
good
instruction
to
any
Prince
,
to
shew
him
the
way
of
glory
and
of
disgrace
,
the
way
of
security
,
and
of
distrust
.
For
of
26
Emperors
,
that
were
from
Cesar
to
Maximinus
,
16
were
slain
,
10.
only
died
natural
deaths
.
And
if
any
of
those
that
were
slain
were
good
,
as
Galba
and
Pertinax
,
it
proceeded
from
the
corruption
the
predecessor
had
left
among
the
soldiers
.
And
if
among
those
,
those
that
died
natural
deaths
,
any
were
wicked
or
lewd
,
as
Severus
,
it
was
caus'd
by
his
great
fortune
and
valonr
,
which
two
accompany
very
few
.
Hee
shall
see
also
by
reading
this
Story
,
how
a
man
may
order
a
good
Kingdome
:
for
all
those
Emperours
that
succeeded
in
the
Empire
by
inheritance
,
except
Titus
,
were
mischievous
;
those
that
were
adopted
,
were
all
good
,
as
were
those
five
from
Nerva
to
Marcus
.
And
as
the
Empire
fell
upon
the
heyres
,
it
return'd
alwaies
to
its
destruction
.
Let
a
Prince
be
put
in
mind
of
the
times
from
Nerva
to
Marcus
,
and
compare
them
with
those
that
went
before
them
,
and
that
follow'd
them
;
let
him
choose
in
which
he
would
have
been
borne
,
or
over
whether
he
would
have
had
command
.
For
in
those
that
were
govern'd
by
the
good
,
he
shall
see
a
Prince
live
in
security
in
the
midst
of
his
secure
Citizens
,
the
world
replenish'd
with
peace
and
justice
,
the
Senate
enjoying
their
authority
,
the
Magistrates
their
honours
,
and
the
wealthy
Citizens
their
estates
,
nobility
and
vertue
exalted
,
and
with
these
all
rest
and
good
.
And
on
the
other
side
all
rancour
,
dissoluteness
,
corruption
,
and
ambition
extinguished
,
he
shall
see
a
returne
of
the
golden
age
,
where
every
one
may
keep
and
defend
what
reputation
he
pleases
,
and
in
the
end
shall
see
the
world
triumph
,
the
Prince
reverenc'd
and
honour'd
,
and
the
people
in
agreement
and
security
If
afterwards
he
consider
severally
the
times
of
the
other
Emperours
,
he
shall
find
the
warres
made
them
terrible
,
and
seditions
full
of
discord
;
as
well
in
peace
as
in
war
cruell
;
so
many
Princes
slain
with
the
sword
,
so
many
civil
,
so
many
forrain
warres
,
Italy
afflicted
,
and
full
of
new
misfortunes
,
the
Cities
thereof
having
been
sackt
and
ruin'd
;
he
shall
see
Rome
burnt
,
the
Capitol
by
her
own
Citizens
defac'd
and
spoyl'd
,
the
antient
temples
desolated
,
and
their
ceremonies
neglected
,
the
cities
repleate
with
adulteries
,
the
sea
full
of
banishments
,
and
the
rocks
besmeard
with
blood
.
He
shall
see
follow
in
Rome
a
numberless
number
of
cruelties
;
and
Nobility
,
wealth
,
honours
,
and
above
all
,
vertue
reputed
as
a
most
capital
crime
.
He
shall
see
accusers
rewarded
,
servants
corrupted
against
their
masters
,
children
against
their
parents
,
and
they
,
who
had
not
enemies
,
oppressed
by
their
friends
,
and
then
he
shall
know
very
well
,
how
much
Rome
,
Italy
,
and
the
world
was
beholding
to
Caesar
.
And
without
doubt
,
if
he
be
borne
of
mankind
,
he
will
be
frighted
from
imitating
those
wicked
times
,
and
inflam'd
with
zeale
to
trace
the
good
.
And
truly
a
Prince
ayming
at
glory
,
would
with
to
be
Lord
of
a
disorder'd
City
,
not
to
ruine
it
wholly
,
as
did
Caesar
,
but
to
recompose
and
restore
it
,
as
Romulus
.
And
beleeve
me
,
the
heavens
cannot
give
men
greater
occasion
of
glory
,
nor
men
desire
it
.
And
if
to
renew
and
restore
the
frame
of
a
City
,
there
were
necessity
for
a
man
to
depose
his
Principality
,
the
man
that
did
not
set
it
in
order
because
he
would
not
fall
from
his
dignity
,
should
yet
deserve
excuse
.
But
when
he
could
hold
his
Principality
,
and
yet
restore
the
government
,
he
is
no
way
excusable
.
And
in
sum
,
let
them
be
well
advis'd
,
to
whom
the
heavens
present
such
opportunity
,
that
either
of
these
two
wales
be
propounded
them
,
the
one
that
gives
them
security
in
life
,
and
makes
them
glorious
after
death
;
the
other
that
causes
them
to
live
in
continual
troubles
,
and
leave
behind
them
in
everlasting
infamy
.
CHAP.
XI
.
Of
the
Romans
Religion
.
THough
Romulus
were
Romes
first
founder
,
and
she
was
to
acknowledge
from
him
her
birth
and
bringing
up
;
notwithstanding
the
heavens
judging
that
Romulus
his
lawes
were
not
sufficient
for
such
an
Empire
,
put
it
into
the
Roman
Senat
's
mindes
to
elect
Numa
Pompilius
to
succeed
Romulus
,
that
what
he
left
unfinished
,
the
other
might
supply
.
Who
finding
a
very
fierce
people
,
and
being
desirous
to
reduce
them
into
civil
obedience
by
peaceable
waies
,
applied
himself
to
Religion
,
as
a
thing
wholly
necessary
to
preserve
civility
;
and
ordain'd
it
in
such
a
sort
,
that
for
many
ages
there
was
not
such
a
feare
of
God
,
as
in
that
Commonwealth
.
Which
facilitated
much
any
enterprise
,
whatsoever
either
the
Senate
,
or
those
brave
Roman
courages
did
undertake
.
And
whosoever
shall
discourse
of
the
innumerable
actions
of
the
people
of
Rome
jointly
,
and
of
many
of
the
Romans
by
themselves
in
severall
,
shal
perceive
that
those
Citizens
fear'd
more
to
break
an
oath
,
than
the
lawes
;
as
they
that
made
more
account
of
the
power
of
God
,
than
of
man
;
as
it
appears
manifestly
,
by
the
examples
of
Scipio
and
Manlius
Torquatus
:
for
after
that
Hannibal
had
given
the
Romans
an
overthrow
at
Canna
,
many
Citizens
assembled
together
,
and
being
affrighted
resolv'd
to
quit
the
country
,
and
go
into
Sieily
;
which
Scipio
understanding
went
and
found
them
out
,
and
with
his
sword
drawn
in
his
hand
compelled
them
to
sweare
,
they
would
never
forsake
their
native
country
.
Lucius
Manlius
,
that
was
afterwards
call'd
Torquatus
,
was
accus'd
by
Marcus
Pomponius
Tribune
of
the
people
,
and
before
the
judgment
day
came
,
Titus
went
to
find
Marcus
,
and
threatning
to
kill
him
if
he
swore
not
to
take
the
accusation
off
from
his
father
,
bound
him
by
his
oath
:
and
he
though
by
feare
compell'd
to
sweare
,
yet
took
the
accusation
off
:
and
so
those
Citizens
,
whom
neither
the
love
to
their
country
,
nor
the
lawes
thereof
could
retain
in
Italy
,
were
kept
by
force
of
an
oath
they
were
constrained
to
take
:
and
that
Tribune
laid
aside
the
hatred
he
bore
to
the
father
,
the
injury
he
receiv'd
of
the
son
,
and
his
own
reputation
,
to
keep
the
oath
he
took
:
which
proceeded
of
nothing
else
,
but
the
Religion
Numa
brought
in
among
them
.
And
it
is
manifest
,
if
a
man
consider
well
the
Roman
histories
,
of
how
much
availe
their
Religion
was
for
the
commanding
of
armies
,
to
reconcile
the
common
people
,
to
preserve
good
men
,
and
to
shame
the
lewd
.
So
that
if
we
were
to
dispute
,
to
whether
Prince
Rome
were
more
oblig'd
,
Romulus
or
Numa
;
I
beleeve
Numa
would
be
prefer'd
;
for
where
Religion
is
,
military
discipline
is
easily
brought
in
;
and
where
they
are
already
warlike
,
and
have
no
Religion
,
this
hardly
followes
.
And
it
is
plain
,
that
Romulus
to
order
the
Senate
,
and
frame
certain
other
civil
and
military
ordinances
,
had
no
need
of
the
authority
of
a
God
,
which
to
Numa
was
necessary
,
who
feign'd
to
have
familiar
conversation
with
a
Nymph
,
who
instructed
him
wherewith
continually
to
advise
the
people
.
And
all
sprung
from
this
,
because
he
desiring
to
settle
new
orders
,
and
unaccustomed
in
that
City
,
doubted
that
his
own
authority
was
not
of
full
force
.
And
truly
never
was
there
yet
any
maker
of
extraordinary
laws
in
a
nation
,
that
had
not
his
recourse
to
God
;
for
other
.
wise
the
laws
had
not
been
accepted
.
For
many
several
goods
are
known
by
a
wise
man
,
which
have
not
such
evident
reasons
in
themselves
,
that
he
by
perswasion
can
quickly
make
others
conceive
them
.
Therefore
the
wise
men
,
that
would
free
themselves
of
this
difficulty
,
have
recourse
to
a
God
:
so
did
Lycurgus
,
so
Solon
,
so
many
others
,
whose
design
was
the
same
with
theirs
.
Thereupon
the
people
of
Rome
admiring
his
goodness
and
wisdom
yeelded
to
all
his
purposes
.
But
it
is
true
,
because
those
times
were
then
full
of
Religion
,
and
those
men
rude
and
gross
,
on
whom
he
spent
his
pains
,
this
much
facilitated
his
designs
,
being
thereby
able
to
mould
them
into
a
new
forme
.
And
without
question
,
if
any
one
in
these
daies
would
frame
a
Republick
,
he
should
find
it
easier
to
deale
with
rude
mountainers
,
who
had
never
known
any
civility
,
than
with
those
who
had
been
accustomed
to
live
in
Cities
,
where
the
government
's
corrupted
:
and
a
carver
shall
easier
cut
a
saire
Statue
out
of
a
rough
marble
,
than
out
of
one
that
hath
been
bungl'd
upon
by
another
.
Wherefore
having
well
considered
all
,
I
conclude
,
that
the
Religion
introduc'd
by
Nutna
was
one
of
the
principal
occasions
of
that
cities
happiness
;
for
that
caus'd
good
orders
,
good
orders
brought
good
fortune
,
and
from
their
good
fortunes
grew
all
the
happy
successes
of
their
enterprises
:
and
as
the
observance
of
divine
worship
occasions
the
greatness
of
a
Commonwealth
;
so
the
contempt
of
it
destroys
it
.
For
where
the
feare
of
God
is
wanting
,
it
must
needs
be
that
either
that
Kingdom
goes
to
ruine
,
or
that
it
be
supported
by
the
awe
it
stands
in
of
the
Prince
,
who
may
supply
the
defects
of
Religion
:
and
because
Princes
are
but
short-liv'd
,
that
Kingdom
must
needs
have
an
end
quickly
,
according
as
the
vertue
thereof
failes
:
from
whence
it
comes
,
that
governments
which
depend
upon
the
vertue
of
one
man
,
abide
but
a
while
,
because
that
vertue
ends
with
his
life
;
and
it
seldome
chances
that
it
is
renew'd
by
succession
,
as
well
saies
the
Poet
Dante
.
Rade
volte
discende
per
li
rami
L'humana
probitate
&
questo
vuole
,
Quel
,
che
lada
,
perche
da
lui
si
chiami
.
Therefore
the
safety
of
a
commonwealth
or
kingdom
consists
not
wholly
in
a
Prince
that
governs
wisely
while
he
lives
,
but
in
one
that
so
orders
it
,
that
he
dying
,
it
can
preserve
it self
.
And
although
it
be
easier
to
work
rude
and
untaught
people
to
a
new
course
and
frame
,
yet
argues
it
not
therefore
an
impossibility
to
prevaile
with
men
that
have
liv'd
in
a
civill
government
,
and
presume
somewhat
to
understand
themselves
.
The
Florentines
think
not
themselves
either
ignorant
or
rude
,
yet
were
they
perswaded
by
Frier
Jerom
Savanarola
,
that
he
talked
with
GOD.
I
will
not
judge
whether
it
were
true
or
not
,
because
we
ought
not
to
speak
of
such
a
great
personage
,
but
with
reverence
.
But
truly
I
say
,
that
very
many
beleev'd
him
,
not
having
seen
any
great
matter
to
perswede
them
thereto
:
for
his
life
,
doctrine
,
and
the
subject
he
took
,
were
sufficient
to
make
them
credit
him
.
Wherefore
let
no
man
be
discouraged
,
as
if
he
could
not
reach
to
what
another
hath
heretofore
attaind
;
for
men
,
as
we
said
in
our
preface
,
were
born
,
liv'd
and
died
,
under
the
same
laws
of
nature
.
CHAP.
XII
.
Of
what
importance
it
is
to
hold
a
worthy
esteem
of
Religion
,
and
that
Italy
for
having
fail'd
therein
,
by
means
of
the
Church
of
Rome
,
hath
gone
to
wrack
.
THose
Princes
or
those
Republicks
which
would
keep
themselves
from
ruine
,
are
above
all
other
things
,
to
preserve
the
ceremonies
of
their
Religion
incorrupted
,
and
maintain
it
alwaies
venerable
.
For
there
is
no
greater
sign
of
a
countries
going
to
destruction
,
then
to
see
in
it
the
contempt
of
divine
worship
.
And
this
is
easie
to
be
understood
,
it
being
once
known
upon
what
ground
the
Religion
is
built
where
a
man
is
born
.
For
every
Religion
hath
the
foundation
of
its
being
upon
some
principal
thing
.
The
life
of
the
Gentiles
Religion
subsisted
upon
the
answers
of
the
oracles
,
and
upon
the
sect
of
the
conjecturers
and
soothsayers
:
all
the
other
ceremonies
,
sacrifices
,
and
rites
depended
on
these
.
Because
they
easily
believ'd
,
that
that
God
that
could
foretell
thee
thy
future
good
or
evill
,
could
also
send
it
thee
.
From
hence
came
the
Temples
,
the
Sacrifices
and
supplications
,
and
all
other
ceremonies
in
their
veneration
:
for
the
Oracle
of
Delos
,
the
Temple
of
Jupiter
Ammon
,
and
other
famous
Oracles
held
the
world
in
devotion
and
admiration
.
As
they
afterwards
began
to
speak
in
imperious
manner
,
and
their
falshood
was
discover'd
among
the
people
,
men
began
to
be
incredulous
,
and
apt
to
disturb
all
good
orders
,
Therefore
the
Princes
of
a
Republick
or
Kingdom
should
maintain
the
grounds
of
the
Religion
they
hold
;
and
this
being
done
,
they
shall
easily
keep
their
Commonwealth
religious
,
and
eonsequently
vertuous
and
united
.
They
ought
also
to
favour
and
increase
all
those
things
that
advantage
it
,
howsoever
that
they
think
them
false
;
and
the
rather
should
they
do
it
,
the
wiser
they
Ammiratus
taxes
him
,
saying
,
it
was
rather
the
opinion
of
a
cunning
and
crafty
man
,
then
of
one
that
had
either
any
religion
or
morality
in
him
,
whose
plain
and
simple
conditions
ought
to
be
free
from
all
fraud
and
falshood
;
and
however
the
Romans
were
deceiv'd
herein
,
which
cannot
be
deny'd
,
yet
without
doubt
they
never
did
this
,
thinking
to
deceive
themselves
,
or
with
intention
to
deceive
others
.
Thus
Ammi
.
And
indeed
it
savours
of
Atheisme
,
bringing
the
mistress
to
serve
the
hand-maid
,
religion
to
serve
policy
;
as
if
the
seasons
of
the
year
ought
to
accommodate
themselves
to
men
,
rather
then
men
accommodate
themselves
to
the
seasons
;
not
considering
that
Religion
propounds
to
a
man
a
further
end
then
policy
points
at
.
A
Prince
therefore
should
be
well
aware
of
such
evill
devices
,
beleeving
constantly
that
the
Religion
hath
no
need
of
helpe
from
falshood
,
nor
can
gain
any
strength
by
lies
.
are
and
understand
the
causes
of
natural
things
.
And
because
this
course
hath
been
taken
by
many
wise
men
,
hence
grew
the
opinion
of
miracles
which
are
celebrated
even
in
false
Religions
;
for
wise
men
augment
them
what
beginning
so
ever
they
have
,
and
their
authority
afterwards
gives
them
credit
.
Of
these
miracles
there
was
great
quantity
at
Rome
:
and
among
others
there
was
this
one
;
the
Roman
soldiers
sacking
the
Vejentes
City
,
some
of
them
went
into
the
Temple
of
Juno
,
and
comming
to
her
image
ask'd
her
,
wilt
thou
go
to
Rome
?
some
thought
she
nodded
,
another
thought
she
said
,
yes
.
For
those
men
being
very
religious
(
which
T.
Livius
shews
,
for
that
entry
into
the
Temple
was
without
tu
mult
)
all
devout
and
full
of
reverence
,
imagined
they
heard
that
answer
,
which
p●radventure
they
presuppos'd
before
●and
would
be
made
them
;
this
opinion
and
belief
was
altogether
favour'd
and
augmented
by
Camillus
and
the
other
principal
men
of
the
City
.
Which
Religion
if
it
were
maintained
among
the
Princes
of
the
Christian
Republick
according
as
by
the
institutor
thereof
it
was
ordain'd
,
the
Christian
States
and
Republicks
would
be
far
more
in
unity
,
and
enjoy
more
happiness
far
then
now
they
do
:
nor
does
any
thing
give
us
so
shrewd
a
conjecture
of
the
declining
of
it
,
as
to
see
,
that
those
people
that
are
neerest
neighbours
to
the
Church
of
Rome
,
head
of
our
Religion
,
are
the
most
inreligious
.
And
whosoever
would
well
consider
the
original
grounds
thereof
,
and
look
upon
the
present
use
how
much
this
differs
from
those
,
without
question
he
would
judge
the
ruine
or
scourge
thereof
were
near
at
hand
.
And
because
some
are
of
opinion
,
that
the
welfare
of
Italy
depends
upon
the
Church
of
Rome
,
yet
the
contrary
might
rather
be
proved
,
considering
those
that
in
the
Church
of
Rome
observe
not
the
precepts
they
ought
,
but
rather
adulterate
the
holy
and
Catholick
Ordinances
which
were
wont
to
be
kept
.
Moreover
this
comes
to
pass
,
because
the
Church
hath
alwaies
held
,
and
still
holds
this
Country
divided
:
and
truly
never
was
any
Province
either
united
or
happy
,
unless
it
were
wholly
reduc'd
to
the
obedience
of
one
Commonwealth
,
or
Prince
;
as
it
befel
France
and
Spain
.
And
the
cause
that
Italy
is
not
in
the
same
terms
,
nor
hath
not
one
Republick
or
one
Prince
to
govern
it
,
is
only
the
Church
;
for
having
inhabited
there
and
held
the
●e●●mporal
Government
,
it
hath
never
been
so
potent
,
nor
of
such
prowess
,
that
it
could
get
the
rest
of
Italy
into
its
hands
,
and
become
Lords
thereof
.
And
on
the
other
side
,
it
was
never
so
weak
,
that
for
fear
of
losing
the
temporal
dominion
it
could
not
call
in
a
powerfull
friend
to
defend
it
against
him
that
were
grown
too
puissant
in
Italy
;
as
anciently
it
hath
been
seen
by
sundry
experiences
,
when
by
means
of
Charles
the
Great
it
drove
out
the
Lombards
,
who
had
as
it
were
the
absolute
power
of
all
Italy
;
and
when
in
our
daies
it
took
the
Venetians
power
from
them
by
the
Frenchmens
ayd
,
and
afterwards
chased
away
the
French
by
help
of
the
Swisses
.
Therefore
the
Church
being
not
powerfull
to
subdue
all
Italy
it self
,
nor
yet
suffering
any
other
to
master
it
,
hath
been
the
cause
,
that
it
could
never
be
brought
to
have
but
one
head
;
but
hath
alwaies
been
under
more
Princes
and
Lords
;
whereupon
is
grown
such
a
disunion
,
and
so
much
weakness
,
that
Italy
hath
been
made
asprey
not
only
of
powerfull
Barbarians
,
but
of
any
the
next
assaylant
.
For
which
we
and
other
Italians
are
beholding
to
the
Church
&
none
else
.
And
whosoever
would
readily
see
the
truth
by
certain
experience
,
it
were
needfull
he
were
of
such
power
,
as
to
send
the
Court
of
Rome
,
with
the
authority
it
hath
in
Italy
,
to
dwell
in
the
Switzers
Country
,
who
at
this
day
are
the
only
people
that
live
,
for
their
Religion
and
military
discipline
,
as
their
ancestors
did
:
and
he
should
find
that
in
a
short
time
the
ill
orders
and
customs
of
that
Court
would
breed
more
disorder
in
that
Country
,
then
any
accident
else
could
,
that
should
evergrow
there
.
CHAP.
XIII
.
In
what
manner
the
Romans
avail'd
themselves
of
their
Religion
,
in
ordering
the
City
,
in
undertaking
their
designes
,
and
in
stopping
of
tumulis
.
I
Think
it
not
out
of
purpose
,
to
bring
some
example
,
where
in
the
Romans
serv'd
themselves
of
their
Religion
,
for
the
ordering
of
their
City
,
and
the
following
of
their
enterprises
.
And
though
many
there
are
in
T.
Livius
,
yet
I
will
content
my self
with
these
.
The
people
of
Rome
having
created
their
Tribunes
of
Consular
power
,
and
except
one
,
all
Plebeians
,
and
it
falling
out
that
year
,
that
there
was
pestilence
and
famine
,
and
certain
other
prodigies
,
the
Nobility
of
Rome
took
hold
of
this
occasion
,
at
the
Tribunes
new
creation
,
to
say
that
the
Gods
were
angry
,
because
Rome
had
abus'd
the
Majesty
of
their
Empire
,
and
that
they
had
no
other
means
to
appease
them
,
then
to
reduce
the
election
of
the
Tribunes
to
the
former
course
.
Whence
it
came
,
that
the
people
frighted
by
this
superstition
made
the
Tribunes
all
of
the
Nobility
.
The
like
was
also
in
their
Conquest
of
the
Vejentes
City
,
that
the
Commanders
of
their
Armies
did
serve
themselves
of
the
Religion
,
to
keep
them
in
heart
for
any
enterprise
:
for
that
year
the
Albanilak
being
miraculously
sweld
,
and
the
Roman
Soldiers
weari●d
with
the
long
siege
,
and
intending
to
●return
to
Rome
,
the
Romans
found
,
that
Apollo
and
certain
other
Oracles
told
them
,
that
that
year
the
Vej●ntes
City
should
be
taken
,
that
the
water
of
the
Albanlake
should
be
pour'd
out
:
which
thing
made
the
soldiers
endure
the
tediousnes
,
of
the
war
and
the
siege
,
perswaded
by
the
hope
they
had
to
take
the
Town
,
and
were
contented
to
continue
the
enterprise
;
so
that
Camillus
being
made
Dictatour
subdued
the
City
after
ten
years
siege
.
And
so
the
accustomed
Religion
help'd
well
,
both
for
the
taking
in
of
that
Town
,
and
for
the
restitution
of
the
Tribunship
to
the
Nobility
;
for
without
the
ayde
thereof
,
the
one
or
the
other
had
hardly
had
their
success
.
And
this
other
example
I
must
also
add
to
this
purpose
.
There
were
in
Rome
a
great
many
tumults
rais'd
upon
the
occasion
of
Terentillus
a
Tribune
,
he
desiring
to
make
a
law
,
for
causes
which
hereafter
we
shall
declare
in
their
place
.
Among
the
first
remedies
which
the
Nobility
serv'd
themselves
of
,
was
the
Religion
,
whereof
they
made
use
two
waies
:
In
the
first
,
they
made
the
Sibill's
books
be
searcht
,
and
answer
as
it
were
to
the
City
,
that
by
means
of
civill
discord
they
should
hazzard
the
loss
of
their
liberty
that
year
:
which
thing
,
though
the
Tribunes
had
herein
discover'd
their
subtilty
,
yet
it
so
frighted
the
people
,
that
it
quite
took
off
their
eagerness
in
the
pursuit
.
The
other
way
was
,
that
when
Appius
Herdonius
with
a
great
number
of
outlaws
,
and
slaves
,
near
upon
four
thousand
men
,
having
possess'd
themselves
by
right
of
the
Capitoll
,
so
that
it
might
be
fear'd
that
if
the
Aequi
or
Volsci
,
the
Romans
sworn
enemies
,
had
approacht
the
Town
,
they
might
have
taken
it
:
the
Tribunes
not
forbearing
for
all
this
to
continue
in
their
obstinacy
,
and
to
enact
the
law
made
by
Terentillus
,
saying
this
assault
of
their
;
feigned
,
and
not
true
,
one
Puhlius
Valerius
a
grave
citizen
,
and
of
good
authority
,
went
out
of
the
Senate
,
and
told
them
partly
in
friendly
termes
,
and
partly
in
threatning
,
the
dangers
in
which
the
City
stood
,
and
the
unseasonableness
of
their
demand
,
and
thereby
brought
the
people
to
swear
,
they
would
not
forsake
the
Consuls
command
.
Whereupon
the
people
being
return'd
to
obedience
,
recover'd
the
Capitoll
by
force
.
But
the
Consul
Publius
Valerius
being
slain
in
this
conflict
,
there
was
forthwith
another
Consul
made
,
one
Titus
Quintius
,
who
to
keep
the
people
from
idleness
,
and
to
give
no
space
to
think
again
of
Terentillus
his
law
,
commanded
them
to
go
forth
of
Rome
with
him
against
the
Volsci
,
saying
that
by
the
oath
they
had
taken
not
to
abandon
the
Consul
,
they
were
bound
to
follow
him
;
whereunto
the
Tribunes
oppos'd
,
saying
,
that
oath
was
made
to
the
Consul
now
slain
,
not
to
him
.
Yet
Titus
Livius
shews
that
the
people
in
awfulness
to
their
Religion
world
rather
obey
the
Consul●
than
beleeve
the
Tribunes
,
saying
these
words
in
favour
of
the
ancient
Religion
:
Men
did
not
then
adaies
so
little
reverence
the
Gods
,
as
now
;
nor
people
wrest
their
oaths
,
nor
the
laws
,
to
their
own
ends
.
Whereby
,
the
Tribunes
doubting
then
to
lose
their
whole
dignity
,
agreed
with
the
Consul
to
submit
to
his
obedience
,
and
that
for
a
whole
year
they
would
treat
no
more
of
Terentillus
his
law
,
and
the
Consuls
for
a
year
should
not
draw
the
people
out
to
war
;
and
thus
the
Religion
gave
the
Senate
means
to
overcome
that
difficulty
,
which
,
without
it
,
they
could
never
have
master'd
.
CHAP.
XIV
.
The
Romans
interpreted
their
Auspices
,
as
necessity
requir'd
,
and
with
discretion
made
a
shew
to
observe
their
Religion
,
yet
upon
occasion
they
neglected
it
;
but
if
any
did
rashly
contemn
it
,
they
punisht
them
.
THe
Soothsayings
were
not
only
(
as
before
we
have
discours'd
)
for
the
most
part
,
the
ground
of
the
Gentiles
ancient
Religion
,
but
they
were
also
the
occasions
of
the
Roman
Republiques
welfare
.
Whereupon
the
Romans
had
more
regard
of
them
,
than
of
any
order
else
,
and
made
use
of
them
in
their
Consular
assemblies
,
in
the
beginning
of
their
enterprises
,
in
drawing
forth
their
armies
into
the
field
,
in
fighting
of
pitcht
battells
,
and
in
any
other
action
of
theirs
of
importance
either
civill
or
military
.
Nor
ever
would
they
have
undertaken
any
expedition
,
till
first
they
had
perswaded
the
soldiers
,
the
Gods
had
promis'd
them
the
Victory
.
And
among
the
other
orders
of
Soothsayers
,
they
had
some
in
their
Armies
,
they
call'd
Pollarij
.
And
whensoever
they
intended
to
fights
battell
with
the
Enemy
,
they
would
have
the
Pollarij
to
make
their
conjectures
:
and
when
the
Chickens
peckt
,
they
went
to
fight
with
good
Auspaces
;
and
not
pecking
,
they
forbare
to
fight
.
Notwithstanding
when
●ason
shew'd
something
was
to
be
done
,
hough
the
divination
,
were
averse
,
yet
were
they
not
scarr'd
from
it
:
but
,
they
turn'd
and
woond
it
with
such
terms
and
fashions
so
properly
,
that
it
appear'd
,
they
did
it
not
with
an
contempt
of
Religion
.
Which
course
was
us'd
once
in
a
fight
,
by
Papirius
the
Consull
,
which
he
had
(
of
great
importance
)
with
the
Samnites
,
after
which
they
were
much
worn
and
broken
.
For
Papirius
encountring
with
the
Samnites
,
and
perceiving
in
the
skirmish
that
the
victory
was
sure
,
had
a
mind
hereupon
to
fight
a
full
battell
,
and
therefore
commanded
the
Pollarij
,
they
should
make
their
conjectures
;
but
the
Chickens
not
Pecking
,
and
the
chief
soothsayer
seeing
the
forwardness
of
the
army
to
fight
,
and
the
opinion
the
General
and
all
the
soldiers
had
of
the
victory
,
that
he
might
not
take
away
the
occasion
of
well
doing
from
the
army
sent
back
to
the
Consull
,
that
the
soothsayers
answer'd
well
;
so
that
while
Papirius
was
ordering
his
squadrons
,
some
of
the
Pollarij
having
told
certain
soldiers
,
that
the
Chickens
had
not
peckt
,
they
told
it
to
Spurius
Papirius
the
Consulls
nephew
,
and
he
again
to
the
Consul
;
whereto
he
suddenly
reply'd
,
that
he
should
take
a
care
to
perform
his
own
duty
well
,
and
that
for
himself
and
the
army
the
conjectures
were
faire
;
and
if
the
Soothsayer
had
told
lyes
,
it
would
turn
to
his
own
loss
:
and
that
in
effect
it
should
succeed
according
to
his
prognostication
,
he
commanded
the
L●vetenants
to
place
the
Pollarij
in
the
forefront
of
the
battell
.
Whereupon
it
chanc't
that
going
forward
against
their
enemies
,
one
of
the
Roman
Soldiers
threw
a
dart
,
and
as
it
hap'd
,
slew
a
principal
Soothsayer
:
which
being
come
to
the
Consuls
eare
,
he
said
that
all
things
went
forward
luckily
,
and
with
the
Gods
favour
,
for
the
Army
by
the
death
of
that
lyer
was
purg'd
of
all
crime
,
and
excus'd
of
the
wrath
conceiv'd
against
them
.
And
thus
by
knowing
how
to
accommodate
his
designs
to
the
divinations
,
he
chose
to
fight
,
the
Army
never
perceiving
that
he
had
any
whit
neglected
the
rites
of
their
Religion
.
Appius
Pulcher
went
a
contrary
course
to
this
,
in
Sicily
,
in
the
first
Carthaginian
wars
;
who
desirous
to
fight
with
the
enemy
,
caus'd
the
Pollarij
to
make
their
divinations
;
and
they
answering
that
the
Chickens
did
not
feed
,
he
said
,
let
us
see
then
if
they
will
drink
,
and
so
made
them
be
thrown
into
the
sea
,
and
then
fighting
,
lost
the
day
.
And
thereupon
he
was
afterwards
condemn'd
at
Rome
,
and
Papirius
honour'd
;
not
so
much
,
the
one
for
having
won
,
and
the
other
for
having
lost
,
as
the
one
for
having
crost
the
soothsayers
with
much
discretion
,
the
other
very
rashly
.
Nor
was
there
any
other
end
of
this
manner
of
soothsaying
,
then
to
incourage
the
soldiers
to
fight
,
for
boldness
always
wins
the
victory
:
which
thing
was
not
only
in
use
with
the
Romans
,
but
with
forrainers
also
;
whereof
I
have
a
purpose
to
bring
an
example
in
the
Chapter
following
.
CHAP.
XV.
The
Samnites
,
for
the
extream
remedy
to
their
broken
State
,
have
recourse
to
Religion
.
THE
Samnites
having
been
sundry
times
routed
by
the
Romans
,
and
at
last
overthrown
in
Tuscany
,
their
Armies
and
their
Captains
slain
,
and
their
confederates
overcome
,
who
were
the
Tuscans
,
French
,
and
Umbrians
:
They
could
not
suhsist
,
neither
by
their
own
,
nor
their
friends
forces
,
yet
they
would
not
quit
the
war
,
not
regarding
though
they
had
but
ill
success
in
the
defence
of
their
liberty
;
but
had
rather
be
overcome
,
then
forbear
to
trie
if
they
could
get
the
victory
.
Whereupon
they
put
it
to
the
last
proof
.
And
because
they
knew
the
obstinacy
of
the
soldiers
minds
would
help
the
victory
well
forward
,
and
to
induce
them
hereto
,
there
was
no
better
means
then
Religion
,
they
advis'd
to
renew
an
old
sacrifice
of
theirs
by
the
help
of
Ovius
Pattius
their
Priest
:
which
they
order'd
in
this
manner
;
the
folemn
sacrifice
being
made
,
and
amidst
the
slain
beasts
,
and
the
altars
set
on
fire
,
having
caus'd
the
chief
of
the
Army
to
swear
never
to
forsake
the
fight
,
they
cal'd
the
soldiers
one
by
one
,
and
in
the
midst
of
those
altars
enclos'd
by
many
Centurions
with
their
fwords
drawn
,
first
they
made
them
swear
,
they
should
not
disclose
any
thing
they
either
heard
or
saw
:
afterwards
with
words
of
execration
,
and
verses
full
of
horrour
made
them
vow
and
promise
to
the
Gods
,
to
be
ready
in
whatsoever
their
General
should
command
,
never
to
abandon
the
fight
,
and
kill
whomsoever
they
saw
fly
;
which
if
they
fail'd
in
,
might
it
light
upon
their
family
and
kindred
.
And
some
of
them
being
amaz'd
,
and
refusing
to
swear
,
were
presently
slain
by
their
Centurions
,
so
that
the
rest
that
followed
them
,
frighted
by
the
sierceness
of
the
spectacle
,
swore
all
.
And
to
augment
the
magnificence
of
their
meeting
,
being
sixty
thousand
men
,
half
of
them
were
clad
with
white
cloth
,
with
plumes
and
seathers
upon
their
helmets
,
and
thus
arrai'd
they
incamp'd
themselves
at
Aquilonia
.
Against
these
came
Papirius
,
who
in
his
speech
to
incourage
his
soldiers
,
said
,
Surely
their
plumes
could
make
no
wounds
,
nor
their
painted
and
golden
shields
defend
the
blows
of
the
Roman
Pikes
.
And
to
take
away
the
doubt
his
soldiers
had
of
their
enemies
because
of
the
oath
taken
,
said
,
it
was
rather
a
discouragement
to
them
then
otherwise
;
for
they
were
afraid
of
their
own
people
,
the
Gods
,
and
their
enemies
.
And
when
they
came
to
the
fight
,
the
Samnites
were
overthrown
,
for
the
Roman
vertue
,
and
the
feare
conceiv'd
by
reason
of
their
former
losses
,
overcame
what
ever
obstinacy
they
could
have
resolv'd
on
by
force
of
their
Religion
or
oath
taken
.
Yet
it
is
plain
,
how
they
thought
they
could
have
no
other
refuge
,
nor
try
other
remedy
,
that
could
give
them
hope
to
recover
their
lost
vertue
.
Which
fully
shewes
,
how
great
confidence
Religion
well
us'd
can
give
.
And
though
haply
this
part
would
be
fit
rather
to
have
place
among
the
extrinsecall
matters
,
yet
depending
upon
one
of
the
most
important
ordinances
of
the
Roman
Republick
,
I
thought
better
to
insert
it
in
this
place
,
that
I
might
not
be
driven
to
interrupt
my
discourse
,
and
have
need
to
return
hereunto
many
times
.
CHAP.
XVI
.
People
accustomed
to
live
under
a
Prince
,
if
by
any
accident
they
become
free
,
have
much
adoe
to
maintain
their
liberty
.
HOW
hard
it
is
for
a
people
,
us'd
to
live
,
in
subjection
to
a
Prince
,
afterwards
to
maintain
their
liberty
,
if
by
any
accident
they
get
it
,
as
Rome
did
upon
the
Tarquins
banishment
,
very
many
examples
shew
us
,
which
we
read
in
the
memorialls
of
ancient
histories
.
And
not
without
good
reason
:
for
the
people
is
nothing
different
from
a
brute
beast
,
which
(
though
fierce
of
nature
and
wilde
)
hath
been
bred
alwaies
in
a
den
and
under
command
;
and
though
by
ehance
it
hath
got
loose
into
the
fields
,
yet
not
being
used
to
seek
the
sood
,
nor
being
acquainted
with
the
coverts
,
where
to
hide
itself
,
becomes
the
prey
of
the
first
that
seeks
to
take
it
,
The
self-same
thing
befalls
a
people
used
to
live
under
the
government
of
others
;
the
which
not
having
knowledg
to
treat
of
publick
desences
or
offences
,
not
knowing
the
neighbour
Princes
,
nor
yet
known
by
them
,
quickly
returns
under
the
yoke
,
which
oftentimes
is
heavier
,
then
that
which
before
was
taken
from
their
neck
;
and
they
come
to
fall
into
these
difficulties
,
though
as
yet
there
be
not
entred
among
them
much
disorder
.
For
a
people
that
is
quite
debauch'd
cannot
for
a
little
while
,
no
not
a
whit
,
enjoy
their
liberty
,
as
it
shall
after
appear
.
And
therefore
our
speeches
are
not
of
those
people
,
where
corruption
is
overgrown
,
but
where
there
is
more
good
then
naught
.
To
this
former
we
may
add
another
difficulty
,
which
is
,
that
the
State
that
becomes
free
,
procures
enemies
that
side
against
it
,
and
not
friends
to
side
with
it
.
Those
hold
together
as
enemies
,
who
got
advantages
by
the
tyrannical
government
,
feeding
upon
the
Princes
riches
whereby
they
used
to
help
themselves
,
which
being
now
taken
from
them
,
they
cannot
rest
content
,
but
every
one
is
necessitated
to
try
if
he
can
again
recall
the
Royalty
,
that
so
they
may
recover
their
former
advancements
.
They
get
not
,
as
I
have
said
,
friends
to
side
with
them
;
for
the
free
government
propounds
honours
and
rewards
upon
some
worthy
and
determinated
occasions
,
otherwise
it
rewards
none
,
nor
honours
none
.
And
when
a
man
hath
received
those
honours
and
those
advantages
,
which
he
thinks
,
he
deserv'd
;
he
acknowledges
no
obligation
to
them
that
reward
him
.
Moreover
,
that
common
good
which
men
reap
of
free
government
,
is
not
known
by
any
,
while
it
is
possest
;
which
is
,
to
injoy
freely
ones
own
without
suspicion
,
not
to
doubt
of
his
wives
or
daughters
honours
,
not
to
be
in
fear
for
his
sons
,
or
for
himself
.
For
no
man
thinks
himself
beholding
to
one
that
offends
him
not
.
And
therefore
if
they
come
to
have
a
free
State
,
as
it
is
above
mentioned
,
there
arise
those
that
will
be
partisans
against
them
,
and
not
side
with
them
:
and
to
prescribe
a
remedy
for
these
inconvenients
and
disorders
,
which
these
difficulties
might
bring
us
,
there
is
none
more
potent
,
nor
soveraign
,
nor
necessary
,
than
to
kill
Brutus
his
sonns
,
who
as
the
Story
shews
,
were
induc'd
together
with
other
young
Romans
,
to
conspire
against
their
native
country
,
for
no
other
reason
,
than
because
they
could
not
so
extraordinarily
advantage
themselves
under
the
Consuls
,
as
under
the
Kings
;
so
that
they
thought
the
peoples
liberty
was
become
their
slavery
.
And
he
that
undertakes
to
govern
a
multitude
either
by
way
of
liberty
,
or
by
way
of
Principality
,
and
assures
not
himself
of
those
that
are
enemies
to
his
new
State
,
is
not
like
to
continue
long
.
True
it
is
,
that
I
judge
those
Princes
very
unfortunate
,
who
to
secure
their
dominions
are
to
go
extravagant
waies
,
having
the
vast
multitude
for
their
enemies
:
for
he
that
hath
but
few
enemies
,
easily
and
without
many
offences
secures
himself
;
but
he
that
hath
the
universality
against
him
,
is
never
out
of
jealousie
;
and
the
more
cruelty
he
uses
,
the
weaker
becomes
his
power
.
So
that
the
greatest
remedy
he
hath
,
is
to
make
the
people
friendly
.
And
though
this
discourse
be
different
from
the
former
,
treating
here
of
an
exceeding
good
Prince
,
and
there
of
a
Republick
,
yet
that
I
may
not
return
here
often
upon
this
occasion
,
I
shall
say
somewhat
of
it
,
but
briefly
.
And
therefore
if
a
Prince
would
gain
the
good
will
of
a
people
,
that
was
enemy
to
him
(
speaking
of
those
Princes
,
that
are
become
Tyrants
of
their
native
country
)
I
say
,
he
ought
to
examine
first
,
what
the
people
desire
;
and
he
shall
alwaies
find
,
that
they
desire
two
things
;
the
one
,
to
be
reveng'd
of
him
that
occasion'd
their
slavery
;
the
other
,
to
have
their
liberty
restor'd
.
To
the
first
,
the
Prince
can
satisfie
in
whole
,
to
the
second
in
part
.
As
for
the
first
,
there
is
an
example
to
the
point
.
Clearchus
a
Tyrant
of
Heraclea
being
in
banishment
,
it
happen'd
that
upon
a
difference
risen
between
the
people
and
the
nobility
of
Heraclea
,
that
the
nobility
,
finding
themselves
too
weak
,
turn'd
to
favour
Clearchus
,
and
conspiring
with
him
,
against
the
will
of
the
people
,
let
him
into
the
Town
,
and
took
away
the
peoples
liberty
;
so
that
Clearchus
being
in
a
streight
between
the
insolence
of
the
nobility
,
whom
he
could
not
any
way
content
,
nor
rectify
,
and
the
rage
of
the
people
,
that
could
not
indure
thus
to
have
lost
their
liberty
,
resolv'd
in
one
,
to
free
himself
of
the
importunity
of
the
Nobles
,
and
withall
to
gain
the
people
.
And
to
this
purpose
having
taken
a
convenient
opportunity
,
cut
in
pieces
all
the
Nobility
,
to
the
peoples
great
satisfaction
,
And
thus
he
satlsfy'd
one
of
the
desires
the
people
have
,
that
is
,
to
be
reveng'd
.
But
as
for
the
peoples
other
desire
,
to
recover
their
liberty
,
if
the
Prince
cannot
satisfy
them
,
let
him
examine
,
what
are
the
reasons
make
them
desire
sreedom
,
and
he
shall
find
,
there
is
but
a
small
number
of
them
would
be
free
,
to
command
.
But
all
the
rest
,
which
are
the
many
,
desire
liberty
to
life
securely
.
For
in
all
Republicks
of
what
manner
soever
ordered
,
not
above
forty
or
fifty
Citizens
attain
to
the
degrees
of
authority
:
and
because
these
are
but
few
,
it
is
an
easie
thing
to
be
sure
of
them
,
either
by
taking
them
out
of
the
way
,
or
by
letting
them
share
of
such
honours
,
as
agree
to
their
conditions
,
which
they
may
very
well
be
contented
with
.
Those
others
,
whom
it
suffices
,
If
they
can
live
securely
,
are
easily
satisfied
by
making
ordinances
and
laws
,
wherewith
together
with
his
power
,
he
may
comprehend
their
safety
in
general
.
And
when
a
Prince
does
this
,
and
that
the
people
perceive
it
,
that
by
no
accident
he
breaks
those
laws
,
they
will
begin
in
a
short
time
to
live
secure
and
content
.
Wee
have
an
example
of
the
Kingdom
of
France
,
which
continues
not
in
quiet
by
other
means
,
than
that
their
Kings
are
tyed
to
many
laws
,
wherein
the
security
of
all
his
people
is
containd
.
And
he
that
was
the
founder
of
that
State
,
ordain'd
,
that
the
Kings
should
dispose
of
the
wars
and
the
moneys
at
their
pleasures
,
but
with
all
other
matters
they
had
nothing
to
do
,
but
they
were
at
the
laws
appointment
.
That
Prince
therefore
or
Republick
,
which
secures
not
themselves
at
their
entrance
into
the
government
,
ought
at
least
take
hold
of
the
first
occasion
,
as
the
Romans
did
.
He
that
lets
that
pass
,
repents
himself
too
late
,
of
not
having
done
what
he
should
.
The
people
of
Rome
being
not
as
yet
debauch't
,
when
they
recovered
their
liberty
,
might
well
maintain
it
,
when
Brutus
his
sonnes
were
slain
,
and
the
Tarquins
dead
,
by
those
remedies
,
and
orders
,
which
we
have
at
several
times
recounted
.
But
had
the
people
been
corrupted
,
neither
in
Rome
,
nor
any
where
else
,
could
they
have
found
means
strong
enough
to
preserve
it
,
as
in
the
Chapter
sollowing
we
shall
shew
.
CHAP.
XVII
.
A
disorderly
people
,
getting
their
liberty
,
cannot
keep
themselves
free
without
very
great
difficulties
.
I
think
it
necessarily
true
,
that
either
the
Kings
were
to
be
expelled
out
of
Rome
,
or
else
Rome
it self
would
have
grown
feeble
and
of
no
worth
;
for
considering
how
exceedingly
the
Kings
were
corrupted
,
if
after
that
rate
two
or
three
successions
had
followed
,
and
that
corruption
that
was
in
them
had
distended
it self
throughout
the
members
,
so
that
they
likewise
had
received
of
the
corruption
,
it
had
been
impossible
ever
to
have
reformed
it
.
But
losing
the
head
when
the
body
was
sound
,
it
might
easily
be
reduced
to
a
free
and
orderly
government
.
And
this
should
be
presupposed
for
certain
,
that
a
debaucht
City
living
under
a
Prince
,
though
that
Prince
with
all
his
stock
be
rooted
out
,
yet
can
it
not
become
free
,
but
rather
fall
still
into
the
hands
of
new
Lords
,
who
continually
make
an
end
one
of
another
.
And
without
the
creation
of
some
new
Prince
,
they
shall
never
have
an
end
,
unless
he
by
his
goodness
and
valour
maintain
them
free
.
But
their
liberty
is
of
no
longer
conyinuance
than
his
life
,
as
was
that
o●
Syracusa
for
Dions
and
Timoelons
lives
:
whose
vertues
in
several
times
,
while
they
liv'd
kept
that
City
free
;
so
soon
as
they
were
dead
,
it
fell
into
the
former
servitude
,
We
find
not
a
braver
example
then
that
of
Rome
,
which
upon
the
Tarquins
banishments
,
could
presently
lay
hold
off
,
and
maintaine
that
liberty
.
But
Caesar
being
slain
,
C.
Caligula
,
Nero
,
and
the
whole
race
of
the
Caesars
blotted
out
,
it
could
not
,
not
onely
keep
,
no
not
so
much
as
give
a
beginning
to
their
liberty
.
Neither
did
so
great
variety
of
accidents
in
one
and
the
same
citie
proceed
from
other
,
than
that
,
when
the
Tarquins
were
expell'd
,
the
people
of
Rome
were
not
toucht
with
this
corruption
,
and
in
these
latter
times
they
were
throughly
infected
.
For
then
to
settle
their
mindes
in
a
resolution
against
Kings
,
it
was
enough
to
take
an
oath
of
them
,
that
never
any
King
should
raigne
at
Rome
.
But
in
the
after
ages
,
the
authority
and
severity
of
Brutus
,
with
all
the
Orientall
Regions
,
were
not
of
force
to
hold
them
in
disposition
to
maintain
that
Liberty
,
which
he
like
the
first
Brutus
had
restored
them
.
Which
sprung
from
that
corruption
,
which
Marius
his
faction
spread
among
the
people
;
whereof
Caesar
coming
to
be
the
Chiefe
,
could
so
blind
that
multitude
,
that
they
could
not
perceive
the
yoke
,
which
he
himself
put
on
their
neck
.
And
though
this
example
of
Rome
be
better
than
any
other
,
yet
will
I
alleadge
to
this
purpose
,
some
people
known
in
our
dayes
.
And
therefore
I
say
,
that
no
meanes
could
ever
bring
Milan
or
Naples
to
their
freedome
,
by
reason
of
the
infection
of
all
their
members
.
Which
appeared
after
the
death
of
Philip
Visconti
,
when
Milan
desiring
to
recover
her
liberty
,
neither
was
able
,
nor
knew
how
to
keepe
it
.
Yet
that
of
Rome
was
a
great
happiness
,
that
their
Kings
grow
naught
suddenly
,
that
they
were
banisht
,
and
that
before
the
infection
was
gone
down
into
the
bowels
of
that
Citie
,
which
was
the
occasion
that
those
many
tumults
,
which
were
raised
in
Rome
(
men
doing
it
to
a
good
end
)
did
not
hurt
,
but
help
the
Commonwealth
.
And
we
may
make
this
conclusion
,
that
where
the
matter
is
corrupted
,
lawes
,
though
well
made
,
profit
little
,
unless
they
have
such
a
maker
,
that
with
strong
hand
forces
obedience
to
them
,
till
the
matter
become
good
:
which
,
whether
it
hath
ever
happened
,
I
know
not
,
or
whether
it
be
possible
it
can
happen
:
for
it
is
plain
,
as
a
little
before
I
said
,
that
a
City
declining
by
corruption
of
matter
,
if
ever
it
chances
to
rise
again
,
it
is
meerly
by
the
vertue
of
one
man
,
who
is
then
living
,
and
not
by
the
vertue
of
the
generality
,
that
keepes
the
good
lawes
in
force
:
and
suddenly
when
that
man
is
dead
,
it
returnes
to
the
old
guise
,
as
it
came
to
pass
at
Thebes
,
which
,
by
the
vertue
of
Epaminondas
while
he
liv'd
,
could
subsist
in
forme
of
a
Republique
and
government
,
but
he
being
gone
,
it
fell
into
the
former
disorders
.
The
reason
is
,
because
a
man
cannot
live
so
long
a
time
as
is
sufficient
to
disaccustome
them
to
the
ill
,
and
accustome
them
throughly
to
the
good
.
And
if
one
man
of
a
very
long
life
,
or
two
vertuous
Governors
successively
continued
,
do
not
dispose
of
them
to
good
,
when
one
of
them
failes
,
as
I
have
said
before
,
they
are
presently
ruined
,
unless
the
other
with
many
dangers
,
and
much
bloudshed
recover
them
out
of
destruction
.
For
that
corruption
and
unfitness
for
freedome
,
arises
from
an
inequality
,
that
is
in
the
City
:
and
if
a
man
would
reduce
it
to
equality
,
he
must
use
many
extraordinary
wayes
,
which
few
know
or
will
serve
themselves
of
,
as
other
where
more
particularly
shall
be
said
.
CHAP.
XVIII
.
In
what
manner
in
a
corrupted
City
a
free
state
may
be
maintained
,
being
gotten
;
or
how
when
they
have
it
not
,
it
may
be
gotten
,
and
well
order'd
.
I
Thinke
,
it
will
not
be
out
of
the
way
,
nor
disagreeing
to
the
former
discourse
,
to
consider
whether
in
a
City
disordered
,
a
free
State
can
be
preserv'd
,
that
being
there
a
soot
already
;
or
not
being
there
,
how
it
may
be
attain'd
,
and
then
reduc'd
to
good
order
.
Whereupon
,
I
say
,
that
it
is
very
hard
to
do
the
one
or
the
other
:
and
though
it
be
almost
impossible
to
give
a
strict
rule
thereof
(
because
we
should
necessarily
proceed
according
to
the
degrees
of
the
corruption
)
yet
it
not
being
unfit
to
reason
of
every
thing
,
I
shall
not
let
this
pass
.
And
I
presuppose
a
city
corrupted
in
extremity
,
from
whence
I
shall
come
more
to
augment
such
a
difficulty
,
because
there
are
no
lawes
nor
ordinances
sufficient
to
bridle
a
universall
corruption
.
For
as
there
is
need
of
lawes
,
to
preserve
good
customes
;
so
,
to
have
the
lawes
well
observ'd
,
there
is
need
of
good
customes
.
Besides
this
,
the
ordinances
and
lawes
made
in
a
Republique
at
birth
thereof
,
when
men
were
good
,
serve
not
to
purpose
afterwards
,
when
once
they
are
growne
vicious
.
And
if
the
lawes
vary
being
accommodated
according
to
the
accidents
,
seldome
or
never
vary
the
old
orders
of
the
city
:
which
makes
that
the
new
lawes
suffice
nor
,
because
the
orders
that
continue
in
force
do
corrupt
.
And
to
lay
this
part
more
plain
to
the
understanding
,
I
say
,
that
in
Rome
there
was
the
order
of
government
,
or
rather
of
the
states
,
and
the
lawes
afterwards
which
together
with
the
Magistrates
did
bridle
the
Citizens
.
The
order
of
the
state
was
the
authority
of
the
people
,
of
the
Senate
,
of
the
Tribuns
,
and
of
the
Consuls
the
manner
of
demanding
or
creating
of
Magistrates
and
the
manner
of
making
lawes
.
These
orders
little
or
nothing
did
they
vary
among
the
Citizens
;
the
lawes
varied
which
bridled
the
citizens
,
as
did
that
law
against
adulteries
,
against
expences
,
against
ambition
,
and
many
others
,
according
as
by
degrees
the
citizens
grew
corrupted
.
But
the
orders
of
state
standing
sted
.
fast
,
which
in
the
time
of
corruption
were
no
longer
good
,
those
lawes
which
were
renew'd
again
,
were
not
of
force
to
keep
men
good
,
but
would
have
been
well
helpt
,
if
when
the
lawes
were
renew'd
,
the
orders
also
had
bin
chang'd
.
And
that
it
is
true
that
such
orders
in
a
corrupted
city
were
not
good
,
it
is
expresly
seen
in
two
principal
heads
.
As
for
the
creation
of
Magistrates
,
and
making
lawes
,
he
people
of
Rome
gave
the
Consulate
and
the
other
Prime
degrees
of
the
city
,
onely
to
those
that
sued
for
them
.
This
order
was
in
the
beginning
good
,
because
none
stood
for
them
,
but
those
citizens
that
esteem'd
themselves
worthy
of
them
,
and
to
receive
the
repulse
was
a
shame
;
so
that
to
be
thought
worthy
,
every
one
did
well
.
But
this
way
afterwards
in
a
corrupted
City
proov'd
very
hurtfull
;
for
not
the
best
deserving
men
,
but
the
most
powerfull
,
sued
for
the
magistracy
,
and
those
of
small
power
(
howsoever
vertuous
)
forbore
to
demand
them
for
fear
.
It
came
not
to
this
inconvenient
,
at
once
,
but
by
degrees
,
as
men
fall
into
all
other
inconvenients
.
For
the
Romans
having
brought
under
Affrica
,
and
Asia
,
and
reduc'd
well
nigh
all
Greece
to
their
obedience
,
doubted
no
way
of
their
liberty
,
and
thought
they
had
no
more
enemies
could
scare
them
.
Thus
farre
their
security
,
and
the
weakness
of
their
enemies
workt
,
that
the
people
of
Rome
in
bestowing
the
Consulate
,
regarded
not
vertue
so
much
as
favour
,
raising
to
that
dignity
those
that
could
make
most
friends
,
not
those
that
knew
best
how
to
subdue
their
enemies
.
After
,
from
those
that
had
most
favour
,
they
fell
to
give
them
to
those
that
had
most
power
.
So
that
the
good
,
by
reason
of
the
defect
of
this
order
,
were
quite
excluded
.
A
Tribun
of
the
people
and
any
other
Citizen
might
propound
a
law
to
the
people
,
and
thereupon
every
Citizen
had
the
liberty
to
speak
either
in
favour
of
it
,
or
against
it
,
before
it
were
determin'd
of
.
This
order
was
commendable
,
while
the
integrity
of
the
Citizens
held
:
for
it
was
alwayes
well
,
that
every
one
may
give
his
opinion
thereupon
,
that
the
people
,
having
heard
every
one
,
may
after
make
choyce
of
the
best
.
But
the
Citizens
being
grown
mischievous
,
this
order
became
naught
;
for
those
that
were
powerfull
onely
propounded
lawes
,
not
for
the
common
good
,
but
to
advance
their
own
powers
,
and
against
those
dar'd
none
to
speak
,
for
fear
of
these
.
So
that
the
people
was
brought
either
by
falshood
or
force
to
determine
their
own
ruine
.
Therefore
it
was
necessary
,
to
the
end
that
Rome
in
her
corrupted
age
should
maintaine
her
liberty
,
that
as
in
the
progress
of
her
life
she
had
made
new
lawes
,
so
should
she
have
made
new
orders
:
for
other
orders
and
other
manners
of
living
ought
to
be
ordain'd
in
a
good
subject
,
and
others
in
a
bad
;
nor
can
the
forme
be
like
,
where
the
matter
is
quite
contrarily
dispos'd
.
But
these
orders
are
either
to
be
renewed
all
of
a
sudden
when
they
are
discovered
to
be
no
longer
good
,
or
else
by
little
and
little
,
when
their
defaults
be
taken
notice
of
by
every
one
:
I
say
,
that
either
the
one
or
the
other
of
these
two
things
are
almost
impossible
.
For
to
renew
them
by
degrees
,
it
is
fit
a
very
wise
man
should
be
the
cause
of
it
,
who
should
foresee
this
inconvenient
afarre
off
:
and
when
any
of
these
arise
,
it
is
a
very
likely
thing
that
none
of
these
men
step
forth
;
and
when
they
should
they
would
never
be
able
to
perswade
another
what
they
eonceiv'd
;
because
men
accustomed
alwaies
to
live
in
one
manner
,
will
not
alter
it
;
and
the
rather
not
seeing
that
evill
present
,
which
is
to
be
shew'd
by
conjectures
.
Touching
the
innovation
of
these
orders
on
a
sudden
when
every
one
knowes
they
are
not
good
;
I
say
,
that
this
unprofitableness
,
which
is
easily
knowne
,
is
hard
to
correct
;
for
to
effect
this
ordinary
meanes
serve
not
,
they
being
rather
hurtfull
;
but
of
necessity
extraordinary
remedies
are
to
be
put
in
practise
,
as
violence
and
war
;
and
in
any
case
ought
a
man
strive
to
become
prince
of
that
city
that
he
may
have
power
to
order
it
at
his
pleasure
.
And
because
the
restoring
of
a
city
to
a
politique
and
a
civil
government
,
presupposes
a
good
man
;
and
by
violence
to
become
Prince
of
a
Commonwealth
presupposes
an
evil
man
,
for
this
cause
it
shall
very
seldome
come
to
pass
,
that
a
good
man
will
ever
strive
to
make
himself
Prince
by
mifchievous
wayes
,
although
his
ends
therein
be
all
good
;
nor
will
a
wicked
man
by
wicked
meanes
attaining
to
be
Prince
,
do
good
;
nor
ever
comes
it
into
his
heart
to
use
that
authority
well
,
which
by
evil
meanes
he
came
to
.
From
all
these
things
above
written
arises
the
difficulty
or
impossibility
,
that
is
in
corrupted
cities
,
theree
to
maintaine
a
Republique
,
or
to
create
one
anew
.
And
when
it
were
to
be
created
or
maintained
,
it
were
fittest
to
reduce
it
rather
towards
a
popular
state
;
to
the
end
that
those
men
,
who
by
reason
of
their
insolence
cannot
be
amended
by
the
lawes
,
might
in
some
manner
be
restrained
as
it
were
by
a
regall
power
.
And
to
constraine
them
by
any
other
way
to
become
good
,
would
either
be
a
most
cruel
attempt
,
or
altogether
impossible
:
As
I
said
before
,
that
Cleomenes
did
,
who
that
he
might
command
alone
flew
the
Ephores
;
and
if
Romulus
for
the
same
reasons
slew
his
brother
,
and
Titus
Tatius
the
Sabine
,
but
afterwards
excercised
very
vertuously
their
authority
:
yet
it
is
to
be
noted
that
neither
the
one
nor
the
other
of
them
had
the
subject
staind
with
that
corruption
,
whereof
we
have
discoursed
in
this
Chapter
:
and
therefore
they
might
intend
well
;
and
when
they
did
not
,
give
colour
to
a
bad
designe
with
a
good
success
.
CHAP.
XIX
.
A
very
mean
Prince
may
easily
subsist
,
succeeding
a
brave
and
valourous
Prince
:
but
a
mean
one
following
a
mean
,
brings
a
State
into
great
hazzard
.
WHen
we
consider
the
valour
,
and
the
manner
of
Romulus
,
Numa
,
and
Tullus
proceedings
,
the
first
Roman
Kings
,
we
shall
find
,
that
Rome
hit
upon
a
very
great
fortune
,
having
the
first
King
fierce
and
warlick
,
the
second
peaceable
and
religious
,
the
third
of
like
courage
to
Romulus
,
and
a
lover
of
war
rather
then
peace
.
For
in
Rome
it
was
necessary
,
that
in
her
infancy
there
should
arise
some
one
to
order
her
in
the
eourse
of
civill
government
;
but
in
like
manner
it
was
afterwards
needfull
that
the
other
Kings
should
betake
themselves
again
to
Romulus
his
valour
,
otherwise
that
City
would
have
become
effeminate
,
and
been
prey'd
on
by
her
neighbours
.
Whence
we
may
observe
,
that
the
successor
,
though
not
of
so
great
valour
as
the
predecessour
,
is
able
to
maintain
a
State
by
the
valour
of
him
that
hath
govern'd
it
before
,
and
enjoy
the
fruits
of
his
labour
:
but
if
it
come
to
pass
,
either
that
he
be
of
long
life
or
that
after
him
there
follows
no
other
of
like
valour
as
the
first
,
of
necessity
that
kingdom
must
go
to
ruine
.
So
on
the
contrary
,
if
two
of
great
valour
successively
follow
one
the
other
,
it
is
often
seen
,
they
effect
mighty
things
,
and
eternize
their
names
.
David
was
a
man
for
armes
,
for
learning
and
judgement
excellent
:
and
such
was
his
valour
,
that
having
overcome
and
subdued
his
neighbours
,
he
left
his
son
Solomen
a
peaceable
Kingdom
,
which
he
might
well
maintain
by
peacefull
meanes
,
without
any
war
,
and
happily
possess
the
fruits
of
his
fathers
vertue
.
But
he
could
not
leave
it
now
to
Roboam
his
sonn
,
who
not
resembling
his
Grandfather
in
vertue
,
nor
having
the
like
good
hap
his
father
had
,
with
much
adoe
remain'd
heire
to
the
sixth
part
of
the
Kingdom
.
Bajazet
the
Turkish
Sultan
,
although
he
gave
himself
rather
to
peace
then
war
,
yet
could
he
also
enjoy
his
father
Mahomets
labors
;
who
having
as
David
beaten
all
his
neighbours
left
him
a
setled
Kingdom
,
easie
to
be
continued
by
peace
:
but
if
his
sonn
Selimus
,
now
raigning
,
had
resembled
the
Father
and
not
the
Grandfather
,
that
Kingdom
had
gone
to
wrack
.
But
we
see
this
man
like
to
outgoe
his
Grandfathers
glory
.
Whereupon
I
agree
with
these
examples
,
that
after
an
excellent
Prince
a
feeble
one
may
subsist
,
but
after
one
feeble
one
a
Kingdom
cannot
stand
with
another
,
unless
it
be
such
a
one
as
France
,
which
subsists
by
force
of
her
ancient
ordinances
.
And
those
are
weak
Princes
,
that
are
not
in
the
exercise
of
war
.
And
therefore
I
conclude
with
this
discourse
,
that
such
was
Romulus
his
valour
,
that
it
could
give
space
to
Numa
Pompilius
for
many
years
by
peacefull
means
to
govern
Rome
.
But
him
followed
Tullus
,
who
by
his
courage
recover'd
Romu'us
reputation
:
after
him
came
Ancus
,
so
endowed
by
nature
,
that
he
knew
how
to
use
peace
,
and
support
war
.
And
first
he
addrest
himself
in
a
peaceable
way
;
but
presently
when
he
knew
that
his
neighbours
,
thinking
him
esseminate
,
undervalu'd
him
,
he
consider'd
that
to
maintain
Rome
,
he
was
to
apply
himself
to
the
warres
,
and
rather
follow
Romulus
his
steps
,
than
Numas
.
Hence
let
all
Princes
,
that
hold
a
State
,
take
example
,
that
he
that
resembles
Numa
,
shall
either
keep
it
or
lose
it
,
as
the
times
prove
,
and
fortunes
wheele
turns
;
but
he
that
takes
after
Romulus
,
arm'd
as
he
with
wisdom
and
force
,
shall
hold
it
in
any
case
,
unless
by
an
obstinate
and
overmighty
power
it
be
wrested
from
him
.
And
certainly
we
may
well
think
,
if
Rome
had
light
upon
a
man
,
for
her
third
King
,
who
knew
not
how
by
armes
to
recover
her
reputation
,
she
could
never
afterwards
,
or
not
without
much
adoe
,
have
taken
root
,
or
attain'd
that
grow'th
she
after
grew
to
.
And
thus
whiles
she
liv'd
under
the
Kings
,
she
ran
the
hazzard
of
ruining
under
a
weake
or
naughty
King
.
CHAP.
XX.
Two
continued
successions
of
vertuous
Princes
worke
great
effects
;
and
Commonwealths
well
ordered
of
necessity
have
vertuous
succession
:
And
therefore
are
their
gains
and
increases
great
.
AFter
Rome
had
banisht
her
Kings
,
she
was
deliver'd
of
those
dangers
which
,
as
is
before
said
,
she
hazzarded
,
a
feeble
or
naughty
King
succeeding
in
her
.
For
the
sum
of
the
Empire
was
reduc'd
unto
Consuls
,
who
came
not
to
the
government
,
by
inheritance
,
or
treachery
,
or
by
extream
ambition
,
but
by
the
voices
of
the
Citizens
;
and
they
were
alwaies
very
worthy
men
,
whose
vertue
and
fortune
Rome
enjoying
,
could
from
time
to
time
attain
to
her
vastest
greatness
,
in
but
so
many
more
years
,
as
she
had
been
under
her
Kings
.
For
we
see
,
that
two
continued
successions
of
brave
Princes
are
of
force
enough
to
conquer
the
whole
world
,
as
was
Philip
of
Macedon
,
and
Alexander
the
great
.
Which
so
much
the
rather
ought
a
Republick
do
,
having
the
means
to
choose
not
only
two
successions
,
but
an
infinite
number
of
valorous
Princes
,
who
follow
one
the
other
;
which
valourous
succession
may
alwaies
be
in
every
well
order'd
Common-wealth
.
CHAP.
XXI
.
What
blame
that
Prince
or
Republick
deserves
,
that
wants
soldiers
of
his
own
subjects
.
THE
Princes
of
these
times
,
and
the
modern
Republicks
,
who
for
defences
or
offences
want
soldiers
of
their
own
,
may
be
ashamed
of
themselves
,
and
consider
by
the
example
of
Tullus
,
that
this
defect
is
not
for
want
of
men
fit
for
war
,
but
by
their
fault
,
who
had
not
the
understanding
to
make
their
men
soldiers
.
For
Tullus
,
Rome
having
been
forty
years
in
peace
,
found
not
(
when
he
succeeded
in
the
Kingdom
)
a
man
that
had
been
ere
at
war
.
Yet
he
intending
to
make
war
,
serv'd
not
himself
either
of
the
Samnites
or
Tascans
,
nor
of
others
train'd
up
in
armes
,
but
advis'd
as
a
very
prudent
man
,
to
make
use
of
his
own
people
.
And
such
was
his
vertue
,
that
on
a
sudden
with
his
discipline
he
made
them
very
good
soldiers
.
Truer
it
is
than
any
other
truth
,
if
where
men
are
,
there
want
soldiers
,
it
is
the
Princes
fault
,
not
any
other
defect
either
of
scituation
or
nature
.
Whereof
we
have
a
very
late
example
:
For
every
one
knows
,
how
of
late
daies
the
King
of
England
assayl'd
the
Kingdom
of
France
,
and
took
no
other
soldiers
than
his
own
people
.
And
by
reason
that
Kingdom
had
not
been
at
war
above
thirty
years
before
,
it
had
neither
soldier
nor
Captain
that
ever
had
been
at
war
;
yet
he
nothing
doubted
with
those
to
set
upon
a
Kingdom
furnisht
with
Captains
and
good
Armies
,
who
had
continually
born
armes
in
the
warrs
of
Italy
.
All
this
proceeded
from
that
this
King
was
a
very
wise
man
,
and
that
Kingdom
well
govern'd
;
which
in
time
of
peace
neglected
not
military
discipline
.
Pelopidas
and
Epaminondas
,
Thebans
,
after
they
had
set
Thebes
at
liberty
,
and
drawn
her
out
of
bondage
of
the
Spartan
government
,
perceiving
well
they
were
in
a
City
accustomed
to
servitude
,
and
in
the
midst
of
esseminate
people
,
yet
made
no
difficulty
(
such
was
their
vertue
)
to
train
them
up
in
arms
,
and
with
those
to
go
and
meet
the
Spartan
Armies
in
the
field
,
and
overcome
them
.
And
he
that
makes
relation
of
it
,
saies
,
that
these
two
prov'd
in
short
time
,
that
not
only
in
Lacedemon
soldiers
were
bred
,
but
in
any
other
place
where
men
are
bred
,
if
they
found
any
could
train
them
in
the
exercise
.
As
it
appears
that
Tullus
knew
how
to
train
them
to
the
war
.
And
Virgill
could
not
better
express
this
opinion
,
nor
with
other
words
come
near
it
,
where
he
saies
:
—
—
—
Residesque
movebit
Tullus
in
arma
viros
—
—
—
—
People
with
peace
grown
dull
,
that
nere
us'd
armes
.
Tullus
shall
soldiers
make
—
—
—
—
CHAP.
XXII
.
What
we
may
observe
in
the
case
of
the
three
Horatij
Romans
,
and
the
three
Curiatij
Albans
.
TULLUS
the
Roman
King
and
Metius
the
Alban
made
an
agreement
,
that
that
people
should
be
Lord
of
the
other
,
whose
three
,
above
mentioned
,
champions
vanquisht
the
others
.
All
the
Curiatij
,
Albans
,
were
slain
;
there
remain'd
alive
onely
one
of
the
Horatij
,
Romans
;
and
by
this
,
Metius
King
of
the
Albans
with
his
people
became
subject
to
the
Romans
.
And
this
Horatius
the
Conquerour
returning
into
Rome
,
and
meeting
one
of
his
own
sisters
,
who
had
been
married
to
one
of
the
three
dead
Curiatij
,
that
lamented
the
death
of
her
husband
,
slew
her
.
Whereupon
that
Horatius
was
brought
into
judgement
,
and
after
many
disputes
freed
,
rather
at
his
Fathers
suite
,
than
for
his
own
merits
,
Where
three
things
are
to
be
considered
.
One
,
that
the
whole
fortune
of
the
State
ought
never
be
hazzarded
with
a
part
of
the
forces
.
The
other
,
that
in
a
City
well
govern'd
faults
be
never
made
amends
for
with
deserts
:
The
third
,
that
matches
were
never
wisely
made
,
where
a
man-ought
or
can
doubt
the
performance
will
not
follow
.
For
so
much
imports
it
a
City
to
become
subject
,
that
a
man
ought
not
beleeve
,
that
any
of
those
Kings
or
people
would
rest
content
,
that
three
of
their
fellow
citizens
should
have
brought
them
to
this
yoke
;
of
which
mind
we
saw
Metius
was
:
who
,
though
presently
after
the
Romans
victory
,
he
acknowleg'd
himself
vanquisht
,
and
promis'd
obedience
to
Tullus
,
yet
in
the
first
expedition
they
were
to
meet
against
the
Vejentes
,
it
appear'd
,
how
he
sought
to
deceive
him
;
as
he
,
that
was
too
late
aware
of
his
rashness
in
the
bargain
he
made
.
And
because
we
have
spoken
enough
of
this
third
thing
to
be
noted
,
we
shall
speak
onely
of
the
other
two
,
in
the
two
following
Chapters
.
CHAP.
XXIII
.
That
the
whole
fortune
ought
not
be
laid
at
stake
,
where
the
whole
forces
try
not
for
it
:
and
for
this
cause
it
is
often
hurtfull
to
guard
the
passages
.
NEver
was
he
thought
good
gamester
,
that
would
hazzard
his
whole
●●st
,
upon
less
then
the
strength
of
his
whole
game
:
And
this
is
done
divers
waies
.
One
is
,
doing
as
Tullus
and
Metius
did
,
when
they
committed
the
whole
fortune
of
their
countrey
,
and
the
valour
of
so
many
men
as
the
one
and
the
other
had
in
their
armies
,
to
the
vafour
and
fortune
of
three
of
their
citizens
,
which
were
but
a
very
small
part
of
either
of
their
forces
.
Nor
did
they
consider
,
how
by
this
adventure
all
the
toyle
their
ancestors
had
taken
in
ordering
the
Commonwealth
so
,
that
it
might
long
continue
free
,
and
to
make
the
citizens
defenders
of
their
liberty
,
was
all
in
vain
,
it
being
left
in
the
hands
of
so
few
to
lose
it
.
Which
thing
those
Kings
could
not
have
known
how
more
to
have
undervalued
.
And
for
the
most
part
they
likewise
fall
into
the
same
inconvenient
,
who
(
upon
the
enemies
approach
)
intend
to
keep
the
hard
places
and
guard
the
passages
.
For
this
resolution
will
alwayes
be
hurtfull
,
unless
in
that
hard
passage
thou
canst
bring
together
all
thy
whole
forces
.
And
in
such
case
,
this
course
may
be
well
taken
.
But
the
place
being
rough
,
and
it
not
being
possible
to
hold
all
thy
forces
there
,
there
is
loss
in
it
.
And
to
judge
thus
I
am
perswaded
by
the
example
I
finde
of
those
,
that
when
they
are
assaulted
by
a
powerfull
enemy
,
their
country
being
environed
with
mountaines
and
rocky
places
,
have
never
endeavoured
to
fight
with
the
enemy
upon
the
passages
or
mountaines
,
but
have
gone
beyond
to
encounter
them
:
or
when
they
would
not
do
this
,
they
have
expected
them
among
the
mountains
,
in
plain
and
easy
places
and
not
mountainous
;
and
the
reason
thereof
hath
been
given
before
.
For
it
is
not
possible
to
bring
many
men
together
to
the
guard
of
mountainous
places
,
because
provisions
for
long
time
cannot
easily
be
furnish'd
,
and
because
the
passages
are
streight
and
capable
of
few
,
and
therefore
not
possible
to
withstand
an
enemy
pressing
on
with
the
gross
of
his
army
.
And
it
is
an
easy
thing
for
the
enemy
to
come
on
with
his
gross
;
because
his
intention
is
but
to
pass
on
,
and
not
to
stay
.
And
it
is
impossible
for
him
that
awaits
him
,
to
await
in
gross
,
having
to
lodge
there
for
a
longer
time
,
not
knowing
when
the
enemy
wiil
pass
in
places
(
as
I
said
)
streight
and
barren
.
Loosing
therefore
that
passage
which
thou
hadst
intended
to
keep
,
and
wherein
thy
people
and
thy
army
repos'd
some
trust
,
most
commonly
there
enters
such
a
terror
into
the
rest
of
thy
people
,
that
without
any
means
to
make
trial
of
their
valor
,
thou
art
left
the
loser
,
and
with
part
of
thy
forces
thou
hast
lost
all
thy
fortunes
.
Every
one
knows
with
what
difficulty
Anniball
past
the
Alpes
,
which
divides
Lombardy
from
France
,
and
those
,
which
divide
Lombardy
from
Tuscany
;
yet
the
Romans
first
expected
him
upon
the
Tesin
,
and
afterwards
upon
the
plain
of
Arezo
;
and
would
rather
have
their
army
wasted
by
their
enemies
,
in
places
where
they
might
overcome
,
then
bring
it
upon
the
Alpes
,
where
likely
it
would
have
been
destroyed
by
the
malignity
of
the
place
.
And
whosoever
shall
with
discretion
read
histories
,
shall
find
that
very
few
expert
Commanders
have
assayd
to
keep
the
like
passages
,
for
these
reasons
we
have
said
;
and
because
they
cannot
all
divide
themselves
,
the
mountains
being
as
open
fields
,
and
not
having
only
ordinary
and
accustomed
,
but
many
by-waies
,
though
not
known
to
strangers
,
yet
to
the
inhabitants
,
by
whose
help
thou
shalt
be
guided
any
way
in
despight
of
the
opposers
.
Whereof
we
can
alleadg
a
very
late
example
.
In
the
year
1515
when
Francis
the
first
King
of
France
intended
to
pass
into
Italy
,
to
recover
the
State
of
Lombardy
,
the
greatest
ground
they
had
that
disswaded
his
enterprise
,
was
,
that
the
Swisses
would
step
his
passage
on
the
mountains
,
And
as
after
experience
shew'd
it
,
this
ground
of
theirs
was
slight
.
For
that
King
having
left
aside
two
or
three
places
kept
by
them
,
came
from
thence
by
another
way
unknown
,
and
was
sooner
in
Italy
then
any
were
aware
of
him
,
So
that
herewith
being
daunted
,
they
retir'd
into
Milan
,
and
all
the
people
of
Lombardy
took
the
French
party
,
having
fail'd
in
the
opinion
they
had
,
that
the
French
men
would
be
stop'd
on
the
top
of
the
mountains
.
CHAP.
XXIIII
.
Commonwealths
well
order'd
appoint
rewards
and
punishments
for
their
people
,
and
never
recompence
the
one
with
the
other
.
THE
deserts
of
Horatius
had
been
exceeding
great
,
having
by
his
valour
vanquish'd
the
Curiatij
.
His
offence
was
horrible
,
having
slain
his
sister
.
Notwithstanding
such
a
kind
of
homicide
so
much
displeas'd
the
Romans
that
it
brought
them
to
dispute
,
whether
they
should
grant
him
his
life
,
though
his
merits
were
so
great
and
so
fresh
:
Which
thing
,
to
him
that
looks
but
superficially
on
it
,
would
seem
an
example
of
popular
ingratitude
.
Yet
he
that
shall
examin
better
,
and
with
more
consideration
inquire
,
what
the
orders
of
Commonwealths
ought
to
be
,
shall
rather
blame
that
people
for
having
absolv'd
him
,
then
for
having
had
a
mind
to
condemn
him
.
And
this
is
the
reason
,
For
never
any
Republick
in
good
ordrr
,
eancell'd
the
faults
of
their
citizens
with
their
deserts
.
But
having
ordain'd
rewards
for
good
service
,
and
punishments
for
desservice
,
and
having
rewarded
one
when
he
had
done
well
,
if
afterwards
he
commit
any
offence
,
they
chastise
him
without
any
regard
to
his
former
merits
.
And
when
these
orders
are
strictly
observ'd
,
a
city
continues
long
free
,
otherwise
it
would
soone
go
to
ruine
.
For
if
a
man
growne
into
great
reputation
for
some
notable
peece
of
service
done
to
the
state
,
should
take
upon
him
the
confidence
that
he
could
without
danger
of
punishment
commit
any
offence
,
in
a
short
time
would
he
become
so
unreasonably
insolent
,
that
the
civill
state
could
no
longer
consist
.
It
is
very
necessary
,
if
we
would
have
punishment
for
offences
fear'd
,
alwayes
to
reward
good
deserts
,
as
it
appeares
they
did
at
Rome
.
And
though
the
Republique
be
but
poore
,
and
can
bestow
but
little
,
yet
may
the
subject
well
content
himselfe
with
that
little
;
for
so
even
a
small
gift
bestowd
on
any
one
,
for
requitall
of
a
good
,
though
great
,
shall
finde
with
him
that
receives
it
an
honourable
and
thankfull
acceptance
.
The
story
of
Horatius
Cocles
is
very
well
knowne
,
and
that
also
of
Mutius
Scevola
;
how
the
one
bore
up
the
enemies
upon
a
bridge
,
till
it
was
cut
off
behinde
him
;
the
other
burnt
his
owne
hand
,
for
having
mistaken
,
when
he
meant
to
have
killed
Porsena
the
Tuscan
King
.
To
these
for
two
such
notable
acts
was
given
by
the
publilick
two
acres
of
ground
to
each
of
them
.
And
marke
also
the
story
of
Manlius
Capitolinus
.
To
him
for
having
delivered
the
Capitoll
from
the
French
,
which
were
encamp'd
before
it
,
they
who
together
with
him
were
within
besieg'd
gave
him
a
small
measure
of
flour
,
which
reward
(
according
to
the
then
present
fortune
of
Rome
)
was
large
,
and
of
such
a
quality
too
,
that
afterwards
Manlius
,
either
moov'd
by
envy
,
or
his
owne
ill
nature
,
occasion'd
a
sedition
in
Rome
,
and
seeking
to
get
the
people
of
his
faction
,
was
,
without
any
regard
had
of
his
good
deserts
,
thrown
headlong
downe
from
that
Capitoll
which
he
,
to
his
great
renowne
,
had
formerly
deliver'd
.
CHAP.
XXV
.
Whosoever
would
reforme
an
ancient
state
in
a
free
city
,
let
him
retain
at
least
the
shadow
of
the
old
customes
.
HE
that
hath
a
minde
to
reforme
the
state
of
a
City
,
to
bring
it
into
liking
,
and
the
better
with
every
ones
satisfaction
to
maintaine
it
,
is
forc'd
to
keep
the
forme
or
shadow
of
the
ancient
customes
,
to
the
end
the
people
perceive
not
the
change
of
them
,
though
indeed
they
are
quite
new
,
&
farr
different
from
the
fore-past
.
For
they
generally
satisfy
themselves
as
well
with
that
that
seemes
to
be
,
as
that
that
is
.
Nay
rather
are
they
many
times
more
mov'd
with
appearances
,
then
truthes
.
And
for
this
cause
,
the
Romans
knowing
this
necessity
,
when
first
they
lived
free
,
having
in
change
of
one
King
created
two
Consuls
,
would
not
suffer
them
to
have
more
then
twelve
Lictors
,
because
they
should
not
outgo
the
number
of
those
that
attend
on
the
King
.
Moreover
,
when
the
yearly
sacrifice
was
made
in
Rome
,
which
could
not
be
done
without
the
presence
of
the
King
,
and
the
Romans
willing
that
the
people
,
by
the
absence
of
a
King
,
should
not
find
a
lacke
of
any
of
the
old
ceremonies
,
created
a
head
of
the
said
sacrifice
,
whom
they
call'd
the
King
Priest
;
who
yet
was
lower
in
degree
,
then
the
high
Priest
.
So
that
this
way
the
people
was
satisfied
of
that
sacrifice
,
and
never
had
any
occasion
by
any
default
in
it
,
to
wish
their
Kings
again
restored
.
And
this
they
all
ought
to
observe
,
that
would
cancell
the
old
manner
of
living
in
a
city
,
and
reduce
it
to
a
new
and
free
course
.
For
being
these
novelties
somewhat
moove
mens
mindes
,
therefore
thou
shouldst
do
well
to
call
thy
wits
about
thee
,
and
work
these
alterations
in
the
old
mould
,
as
much
as
might
be
.
And
if
the
magistrates
,
both
in
number
,
and
authority
,
and
durance
,
differ
from
the
ancient
,
at
least
let
them
keep
the
same
name
:
And
this
(
as
I
have
said
)
rather
ought
he
to
observe
,
who
meanes
to
take
upon
him
an
absolute
authority
,
which
is
call'd
a
Tyranny
,
for
he
is
to
innovate
every
thing
.
CHAP.
XXVI
.
A
new
Prince
in
a
city
or
Province
taken
by
him
,
should
make
innovations
in
every
thing
.
WHosoever
becomes
Prince
of
a
city
or
state
,
and
the
rather
,
when
his
forces
are
but
weake
to
keep
it
,
and
means
not
to
hold
it
neither
as
a
Kingdome
,
nor
as
a
regular
Republique
,
the
best
expedient
he
can
find
,
for
the
maintenance
of
that
Principality
,
is
,
that
he
(
himself
being
a
new
Prince
)
make
every
thing
new
in
the
state
,
as
it
is
ordinary
in
the
cities
to
make
new
governments
with
new
names
,
with
new
jurisdictions
,
with
new
men
,
and
to
enrich
the
poore
,
as
David
did
,
when
he
came
to
the
crowne
.
That
filled
the
hungry
with
good
things
,
and
the
rich
sent
empty
away
.
To
build
moreover
new
cities
,
and
to
pull
down
some
that
are
built
,
to
remove
the
inhabitants
Macedon
Alexanders
father
,
who
by
these
means
became
of
a
little
King
,
Prince
of
all
Greece
.
And
he
that
writes
of
him
sayes
,
that
he
chang'd
his
people
from
Province
to
Province
,
as
herds-men
change
their
herds
from
pasture
to
pasture
.
These
courses
are
very
cruel
,
and
against
all
Christian
and
humane
manner
of
living
.
And
every
man
ought
refuse
to
be
a
King
,
and
desire
rather
to
live
a
private
man
,
then
reigne
,
so
much
to
the
ruine
of
mankind
.
Yet
he
that
will
not
use
that
first
way
of
good
,
if
he
will
preserve
himself
,
must
enter
into
this
of
evil
.
But
men
take
to
certain
middle
wayes
,
which
are
very
naught
;
for
they
know
not
how
to
be
all
good
,
nor
all
evil
:
as
shall
be
shewed
for
example
in
the
next
chapter
.
CHAP.
XXVII
.
It
is
very
seldom
,
that
men
know
how
to
be
altogether
mischievous
,
or
altogether
good
.
POpe
Julius
the
second
going
in
the
year
1505
to
Bolonia
to
chase
out
of
that
state
the
house
of
the
Benticogli
,
which
had
held
the
Principallity
of
that
city
a
hundred
years
,
had
a
minde
also
to
draw
Iohn
Pagolus
Baglioni
out
of
Perugia
,
whereof
he
was
a
Tyrant
,
as
he
that
had
conspired
against
all
Tyrants
,
that
were
seised
of
any
of
the
Churches
lands
:
and
being
come
near
Perugia
,
with
this
resolution
knowne
to
every
one
,
stayed
not
to
enter
the
City
with
his
Army
to
guard
him
,
but
went
in
without
a
guard
,
notwithstanding
that
Iohn
Pagolus
was
therein
with
much
people
,
which
he
had
got
together
for
his
defence
.
So
that
carried
forward
by
that
rage
wherewith
he
governed
all
things
,
with
his
ordinary
guard
he
put
himself
in
his
enemies
hands
,
whom
afterwards
he
led
away
with
him
,
leaving
a
governor
in
that
city
,
to
keep
it
for
the
Church
.
By
the
wise
men
,
that
were
with
the
Pope
,
was
noted
the
rashness
of
the
Pope
,
and
the
base
cowardise
of
John
Pagolus
;
nor
could
they
conceit
,
whence
it
came
,
that
he
did
not
to
his
perpetual
renown
suppress
then
at
once
his
enemy
,
and
enrich
himself
with
the
prey
,
all
the
Cardinalls
being
then
with
the
Pope
,
who
had
the
best
of
all
their
Jewels
with
them
.
Neither
could
any
man
think
that
he
abstain'd
either
for
goodness
or
conscience
sake
,
that
withheld
him
.
For
into
the
heart
of
a
wicked
man
,
that
incestuously
convers'd
with
his
sister
,
and
that
had
slain
his
cousins
and
nephewes
,
to
rule
,
there
could
never
enter
any
religious
respect
.
Whereupon
every
one
concluded
,
that
men
know
not
how
to
be
honourably
mischievous
,
nor
perfectly
good
.
And
where
a
mischief
hath
in
it
greatness
,
and
is
generous
in
some
part
,
they
know
not
how
to
enter
into
it
.
So
Iohn
Pagolus
,
who
made
no
account
of
being
an
incestuous
and
publique
paricide
,
knew
not
(
or
to
say
better
)
had
not
the
courage
,
though
upon
just
occasion
,
to
do
an
exploit
that
every
one
should
have
admir'd
him
for
,
and
he
left
of
himself
an
everlasting
memory
;
being
the
first
that
had
shew'd
the
Prelats
what
a
thing
it
is
to
set
at
naught
,
him
that
lives
,
and
reignes
,
as
they
did
;
and
so
had
done
an
act
,
whose
greatness
had
surpast
all
infamy
,
and
what
ever
danger
could
depend
on
it
.
CHAP.
XXVIII
.
For
what
reason
the
Romans
were
less
ungratefull
to
their
citizens
,
than
the
Athenians
.
WHosoever
reades
the
actions
of
Republiques
,
shall
find
in
all
of
them
some
kinde
of
ingratitude
towards
their
citizens
,
but
less
in
Rome
,
than
in
Athens
,
or
peradventure
than
in
any
Commonwealth
else
.
And
if
we
would
enquire
after
the
reason
thereof
,
speaking
of
Rome
and
Athens
,
I
think
it
happen'd
,
because
the
Romans
had
less
occasion
to
suspect
their
citizens
,
than
had
the
Athenians
.
For
at
Rome
,
considering
her
from
the
banishment
of
her
Kings
till
Sylla
,
and
Marius
,
her
liberty
was
never
taken
away
by
any
of
her
citizens
,
so
that
she
had
no
great
reason
to
suspect
them
,
or
by
consequence
suddenly
to
offend
them
.
The
contrary
befell
Athens
;
for
her
liberty
being
taken
from
her
in
her
most
flourishing
time
,
and
under
colour
of
doing
her
some
good
,
so
soon
as
she
became
free
,
remembring
the
wrong
she
had
receiv'd
,
and
the
slavery
she
had
indur'd
,
became
a
sharp
revengeress
,
not
only
of
her
citizens
faults
,
but
of
the
shadow
of
their
faults
.
From
hence
came
the
banishment
and
the
death
of
so
many
rare
men
.
From
hence
the
order
of
the
Osteacisme
,
and
all
other
violence
,
which
in
several
times
by
her
was
done
to
the
prime
of
her
citizens
,
And
that
is
very
true
which
those
that
write
of
civil
government
say
,
that
the
people
bit●
more
siercely
,
after
they
have
recover'd
their
liberty
,
than
while
they
have
continually
maintain'd
it
.
Whosoever
then
considers
what
is
said
,
will
neither
in
this
blame
Athes
,
nor
commend
Rome
:
but
will
●ccuse
onely
the
necessity
,
because
of
the
diversity
of
accidents
which
did
arise
in
this
city
For
he
shall
see
,
if
narrowly
he
look
into
affairs
,
if
Romes
liberty
had
been
taken
away
,
as
was
that
of
Athens
,
Rome
would
not
have
been
more
pitifull
to
her
citizens
,
than
was
Athens
.
Whereof
one
may
make
a
very
good
guess
,
by
that
which
chanc't
,
after
the
banishment
of
the
Kings
,
against
Collatine
,
and
Publius
Valerius
:
whereof
the
first
(
although
he
had
his
hand
in
the
setting
of
Rome
at
liberty
)
was
banisht
,
for
no
other
occasion
,
than
that
he
was
sirnamed
Tarquin
.
The
other
having
onely
given
suspicion
of
himself
,
by
building
a
house
upon
the
hill
Celius
,
was
like
to
have
bin
banisht
.
So
that
we
may
well
think
(
seeing
how
suspicious
and
severe
Rome
was
in
these
two
things
)
that
she
would
have
bin
as
ungratefull
,
as
Athens
,
if
,
as
she
in
her
infancy
and
before
her
growth
,
had
bin
so
much
wrong'd
.
And
that
I
need
not
turn
again
to
this
subject
of
ingratitude
,
I
shall
speak
further
of
it
in
the
Chapter
following
.
CHAP.
XXIX
.
Whether
of
two
be
the
more
ungratefull
,
a
people
,
or
a
Prince
.
ME
thinks
it
is
not
out
of
the
purpose
of
our
former
matter
,
to
discourse
,
whether
a
Prince
or
people
give
us
greater
examples
of
ingratitude
.
●nd
the
better
to
argue
this
part
,
I
say
,
this
vice
of
ingratitude
growes
either
of
covereousness
or
suspicion
.
For
when
a
people
or
Prince
have
sent
out
a
Commander
of
theirs
,
in
any
expedition
of
importance
,
where
that
Commander
overcoming
hath
gain'd
a
great
deale
of
glory
,
that
Prince
or
people
is
in
like
manner
bound
to
reward
him
:
and
if
in
F●w
of
reward
he
disgraces
him
,
or
wrongs
him
,
incited
thereunto
by
avarice
,
not
willing
by
reason
of
this
coveteousness
,
to
satisfie
him
,
he
commits
an
errour
,
without
excuse
,
and
drawes
upon
himself
everlasting
infamy
.
Yet
are
there
many
Princes
,
who
offend
in
this
kind
.
And
Cornelius
Tacitus
declares
in
this
Sentence
It
is
more
pleasing
to
revenge
an
injury
,
then
to
requite
a
courtesy
:
for
thanks
is
thought
a
burden
,
but
revenge
a
gain
.
But
when
he
rewards
him
not
,
but
rather
hur●s
him
,
not
through
avarice
,
but
upon
suspicion
,
then
the
people
or
Prince
deserves
some
excuse
.
And
of
these
ingratitudes
practis'd
for
such
cause
we
read
many
;
for
that
Commander
who
valorously
hath
gain'd
his
Lord
a
Kingdom
,
by
conquering
his
enemies
,
replenishing
himself
with
glory
,
and
his
souldiers
with
riches
,
of
force
gets
such
reputation
with
his
own
soldiers
,
with
his
enemies
,
and
his
Kings
own
subjects
,
that
that
victory
can
no
wayes
sayour
well
to
his
Lord
that
put
him
in
the
imployment
.
And
because
mens
natures
are
ambitious
,
and
full
of
suspicion
,
and
know
not
how
to
set
limits
to
their
fortune
,
it
is
impossible
,
but
that
suspicion
which
grows
in
the
Prince
after
that
Commanders
victory
,
shall
by
himself
be
increas'd
upon
some
way
or
terme
insolently
us'd
;
so
that
the
Prince
cannot
advise
himself
otherwise
,
than
to
provide
for
his
own
safety
.
And
to
this
end
,
thinks
either
to
put
him
to
death
,
or
to
take
away
his
reputation
,
which
he
hath
gotten
in
his
army
,
or
among
his
people
,
and
withall
diligence
to
shew
,
that
his
valour
got
not
the
victory
,
but
rather
it
came
by
chance
,
or
by
the
enemies
cowardise
,
or
by
the
direction
of
the
other
Captaines
,
who
were
together
with
him
in
that
imployment
.
After
that
Vespasian
,
being
in
Judea
,
was
by
his
army
declar'd
Emperor
,
Antonius
Primus
,
who
was
then
with
another
army
in
Illiria
,
took
his
part
,
and
came
thence
into
Italy
against
Vitellius
,
who
commanded
at
Rome
,
and
valorously
conquer'd
two
Vitellian
armies
,
and
made
himself
,
Master
of
Rome
;
so
that
Mutianus
sent
by
Vespanian
found
all
already
gotten
by
Antonius
his
valor
,
and
all
difficulties
surpassed
.
The
reward
Antonius
gain'd
hereby
,
was
,
that
Mutianus
took
away
his
command
of
the
army
,
and
by
little
and
little
made
him
of
no
authority
in
Rome
;
whereupon
Antonius
went
away
to
Vespasian
,
who
was
yet
in
Asia
,
by
whom
he
was
so
coldly
receiv'd
,
that
in
a
short
time
depriv'd
of
all
dignity
he
dyed
in
despaire
.
And
of
these
examples
stories
are
full
.
In
our
daies
,
every
one
living
knows
,
with
what
industry
and
valour
Gonsalvus
Ferdinand
,
warring
in
the
Kingdom
of
Naples
against
the
Frenchmen
for
Ferdinand
King
of
Arragon
,
brought
that
Kingdom
under
his
obedience
;
and
how
he
had
for
reward
of
his
conquest
,
that
Ferdinand
parted
from
Arragon
,
and
came
to
Naples
,
and
first
discharged
him
of
his
command
of
soldiers
,
afterwards
took
from
him
the
fortresses
,
and
then
brought
him
away
with
him
into
Spain
,
where
a
while
after
he
dyed
in
disgrace
.
Therefore
this
suspicion
is
so
natural
in
Princes
,
that
they
cannot
escape
it
;
and
it
is
impossible
they
prove
thankfull
to
those
,
who
by
victory
have
under
their
banners
made
great
conquests
.
And
from
that
which
a
Prince
is
not
free
,
't
is
no
marvaile
,
nor
a
thing
worthy
of
greater
note
,
that
a
people
is
not
free
.
For
a
city
living
free
hath
two
ends
,
the
one
to
gain
,
the
other
to
keep
it self
free
;
and
it
cannot
be
,
but
in
the
one
or
the
other
by
excess
of
love
it
may
erre
.
Touching
the
errors
in
getting
,
they
shall
be
spoken
of
in
their
place
:
as
for
the
errors
in
maintaining
their
liberty
,
there
are
these
among
others
,
to
hurt
those
citizens
they
should
reward
,
and
to
suspect
those
they
should
repose
upon
.
And
though
these
wayes
in
a
Republique
come
to
corruption
,
cause
great
evils
,
and
that
many
times
they
hasten
it
to
a
Tyranny
,
as
at
Rome
it
befell
Caesar
,
who
by
strong
hand
took
away
that
,
which
unthankfulness
denied
him
:
yet
in
a
Commonwealth
not
corrupted
,
are
they
causes
of
great
good
,
and
make
it
live
more
free
,
keeping
men
for
fear
of
punishment
more
vertuous
and
less
ambitious
.
It
is
true
,
that
of
all
people
that
ever
reign'd
,
upon
the
causes
above
alleadg'd
,
Rome
was
the
least
ungratefull
;
for
of
her
ingratitude
we
may
say
,
there
is
no
other
example
,
but
that
of
Scipio
;
for
Coriolanus
and
Camillus
were
banisht
for
the
injury
,
the
one
and
the
other
had
done
the
people
.
But
the
one
was
not
pardoned
,
because
he
alwaies
continued
his
malicious
mind
against
the
people
;
the
other
was
not
only
recall'd
,
but
all
his
lifetime
after
,
ador'd
as
a
Prince
.
But
the
ingratitude
us'd
towards
Scipio
,
grew
from
a
suspicion
the
citizens
began
to
have
of
him
,
which
was
never
conceived
of
the
others
;
which
arose
first
from
the
greatness
of
the
enemy
Scipio
had
overcome
;
from
the
reputation
that
the
conquest
of
so
long
and
perrilous
a
war
had
given
him
;
from
the
quick
dispatch
of
it
:
from
those
favours
which
youth
,
wisdome
,
and
other
his
memorable
vertues
had
gotten
him
.
Which
things
were
so
great
,
that
the
Magistrates
of
Rome
fear'd
his
authority
,
more
than
any
thing
Which
displeas'd
the
grave
men
,
as
a
matter
not
accustomed
in
Rome
.
And
his
manner
of
living
was
thought
so
extraordinary
,
that
Priscus
Cato
,
reputed
a
man
of
great
integrity
,
was
the
first
that
stir'd
against
him
,
and
said
,
that
a
city
could
not
be
called
free
,
where
the
Magistrates
stood
in
fear
of
one
citizen
.
So
if
the
people
of
Rome
in
this
case
followed
Cato's
opinion
,
they
deserve
that
excuse
,
which
I
said
before
,
those
Princes
and
people
merit
,
who
through
suspicion
prove
unthankfull
.
Wherefore
concluding
this
discourse
,
I
say
,
that
whether
this
vice
be
used
either
through
suspicion
or
covetousness
,
it
shall
appear
that
the
people
never
put
it
in
practise
upon
covetousness
,
and
upon
suspicion
less
than
Princes
,
having
less
cause
to
be
suspicious
,
as
quickly
it
shall
be
declared
.
CHAP.
XXX
.
What
means
a
Prince
or
Republique
should
use
to
avoid
this
vice
of
ingratitude
:
or
what
A
Commander
or
Citizen
,
to
be
free
from
their
danger
.
A
Prince
to
avoyd
this
necessity
of
living
with
suspicion
,
or
being
ungratefull
,
ought
personally
go
to
the
warrs
,
as
in
the
beginning
did
those
Roman
Emperors
,
and
in
our
daies
the
Turk
does
;
and
as
those
that
are
valorous
have
done
,
and
yet
do
.
For
overcoming
,
the
glory
and
the
gain
is
all
their
own
.
And
when
they
are
not
there
in
person
,
(
the
glory
of
the
action
belonging
to
another
)
they
think
,
they
cannot
well
make
that
conquest
their
own
,
unlefs
they
put
out
that
glory
in
another
which
they
themselves
knew
not
how
to
get
,
and
so
become
ungratefull
,
and
unjust
.
And
without
doubt
greater
is
their
loss
,
than
their
gain
;
but
when
either
through
negligence
,
for
lack
of
judgment
they
stay
idle
at
home
,
and
send
out
a
Commander
,
I
have
no
other
precept
to
give
them
,
than
what
they
know
of
themselves
.
But
I
advise
that
Commander
,
because
,
as
I
think
,
he
can
hardly
escape
the
nips
of
unthankfulness
,
that
he
betake
himself
to
one
of
these
two
expedients
;
either
presently
upon
his
victory
let
him
leave
his
army
,
and
put
himself
into
his
Princes
hands
,
abstaining
from
any
action
savouring
of
insolence
or
ambition
,
that
so
he
having
no
occasion
given
of
suspicion
may
have
reason
to
reward
him
,
or
at
least
not
hurt
him
:
Or
when
he
likes
not
to
do
thus
,
let
him
resolutely
take
part
against
him
,
and
use
all
those
means
whereby
he
may
think
to
hold
from
his
Prince
what
he
hath
gotten
,
procuring
the
soldiers
and
the
subjects
good
wills
;
let
him
make
friendship
with
his
neighbors
,
possess
with
his
men
the
strong
places
,
corrupt
the
Chief
of
his
army
,
and
assure
himself
of
those
he
cannot
;
and
this
way
endeavor
to
punish
his
Lord
for
the
ingratitude
he
would
have
us'd
towards
him
.
Otherwaies
there
are
not
;
but
(
as
it
was
said
before
)
men
know
not
how
to
be
wholly
vicious
,
nor
wholly
good
.
And
alwaies
it
comes
to
pass
,
that
presently
after
the
victory
,
they
will
not
part
with
their
army
;
behave
themselves
with
modesty
they
cannot
,
and
to
stand
upon
defyance
in
some
honorable
termes
they
know
not
how
.
So
that
being
irresolute
which
way
to
take
,
between
delay
and
doubt
they
are
suppressed
.
But
to
a
Republique
which
would
avoyd
this
vice
of
ingratitude
,
we
cannot
apply
the
same
remedy
,
we
may
to
a
Prince
;
that
is
,
that
she
go
herself
,
and
not
send
out
in
her
imployments
,
being
necessitated
to
make
use
of
some
one
of
her
citizens
.
It
sutes
well
therefore
,
that
for
her
best
remedy
,
she
take
the
same
course
the
Commonwealth
of
Rome
took
,
to
be
less
unthankfull
then
all
others
.
Which
grew
from
her
manner
of
government
;
for
the
whole
city
,
both
Nobles
and
Plebeians
being
train'd
up
to
war
,
there
arose
alwaies
in
Rome
in
all
ages
men
of
such
valour
,
experience
,
and
reputation
,
that
there
was
no
occasion
to
doubt
of
any
one
of
them
,
they
being
many
who
kept
one
another
in
order
.
And
so
long
they
continued
●iu
integrity
,
and
with
regard
not
to
make
others
jealous
of
their
ambition
,
nor
give
occasion
to
the
people
to
do
them
harme
,
taking
them
for
ambitious
persons
;
for
if
any
one
were
made
Dictator
,
he
got
most
honor
by
it
,
that
laid
down
his
Dictatorship
soonest
.
And
so
such
like
way
not
being
sufficient
to
raise
suspect
,
could
not
breed
ingratitude
.
So
that
a
Republique
that
would
not
have
cause
given
her
to
be
unthankfull
,
should
governe
her self
in
the
same
manner
Rome
did
.
And
a
citizen
that
would
be
free
from
all
their
despights
,
should
follow
the
same
steps
the
citizens
of
Rome
went
.
CHAP.
XXXI
.
That
the
Roman
Commanders
were
never
extraordinarily
punish'd
for
any
error
committed
;
nor
at
all
punish'd
,
when
either
by
their
ignorance
,
or
upon
some
unlucky
resolution
taken
by
them
the
Commonwealth
suffer'd
loss
.
THE
Romans
,
as
formerly
we
have
discours'd
,
were
not
only
less
ungrateful
,
than
other
Commonwealths
,
but
also
were
more
pitifull
,
and
more
advised
in
the
punishment
of
the
Generalls
of
their
armies
,
than
any
else
.
For
if
their
fault
proceeded
from
malice
,
yet
they
gently
chastis'd
them
;
but
if
it
was
through
ignorance
,
they
were
so
far
from
punishing
them
,
that
they
rewarded
and
honour'd
them
.
This
manner
of
proceeding
was
well
consider'd
by
them
;
for
they
judg'd
it
a
matter
of
great
importance
to
those
that
commanded
their
armies
,
to
have
their
mind
free
,
without
any
clog
upon
it
,
and
without
any
outwards
respects
to
restrain
them
in
their
resolutions
;
because
they
would
not
add
new
difficulties
and
danger
to
a
thing
by
it self
hard
and
dangerous
:
advising
well
that
with
these
hindrances
a
man
cannot
bravely
execute
his
designs
.
For
example
,
when
they
sent
an
army
into
Greece
,
against
Philip
of
Macedon
,
or
into
Italy
against
Anniball
,
or
against
those
people
they
first
overcame
;
That
Commander
to
whom
the
imployment
was
committed
had
the
vexation
of
all
those
cares
that
follow
such
charges
which
are
of
weight
and
importance
.
Now
if
to
such
cares
,
this
were
added
,
that
many
examples
of
the
Romans
were
recorded
,
where
they
had
crucifyed
or
otherwise
put
to
death
those
that
had
lost
any
battels
,
it
was
impossible
,
that
that
Captain
among
so
many
suspicions
cou'd
resolve
any
thing
couragiously
.
Therefore
they
deeming
these
sufficiently
punish'd
with
the
shame
of
their
loss
,
they
were
not
willing
to
startle
them
with
any
more
grievous
punishment
Here
is
one
example
,
of
a
fault
committed
,
and
not
through
ignorance
.
Sergius
and
Verginius
were
incamp'd
against
the
Veyans
,
each
of
them
commanding
a
part
of
the
army
:
Sergius
was
to
incounter
the
Tuscans
,
and
Verginius
was
to
set
upon
the
other
side
:
It
chanc'd
,
that
Sergius
being
assaulted
by
the
Falisci
,
and
other
people
,
endur'd
rather
to
be
quite
rout'd
and
put
to
flight
,
before
he
would
send
for
ayd
to
Verginius
.
And
on
the
other
side
,
Verginius
,
staying
til
til
he
should
humble
himself
,
would
rather
see
the
dishonour
of
his
country
,
and
the
ruine
of
the
army
,
than
succour
him
.
A
case
indeed
very
exemplary
,
and
of
much
malice
;
neither
would
it
have
bin
for
the
Common-wealth
of
Romes
reputation
,
to
have
let
the
one
or
the
other
pass
without
censure
.
True
it
is
,
that
where
another
Republique
would
have
punish'd
them
with
death
,
this
punish'd
them
only
in
a
sum
of
money
.
The
cause
hereof
was
,
not
that
their
offences
deserv'd
not
greater
punishment
,
but
because
the
Romans
would
in
this
case
,
for
the
reasons
already
alleadged
,
continue
their
ancient
customes
.
And
touching
errors
of
ignorance
,
we
have
no
better
example
,
than
that
of
Maro
;
through
whose
rashness
the
Romans
having
bin
broken
at
Canne
by
Hanniball
,
where
the
Republique
came
indanger
to
lose
her
liberty
,
yet
because
it
was
ignorance
,
and
not
malice
,
they
not
only
did
not
chasise
him
;
but
honor'd
him
,
and
the
whole
order
of
the
Senat●rs
m●thim
upon
the
way
in
his
return
to
Rome
;
and
because
they
could
not
thank
him
for
the
battel
fought
,
they
thankt
him
yet
that
he
was
return'd
to
Rome
,
and
had
not
despair'd
of
the
Roman
State
.
When
Papirius
Cursor
would
have
put
Fabius
to
death
,
for
having
contrary
to
his
command
fought
with
the
Samnites
,
among
other
reasons
which
Fabius
his
Father
brought
against
the
Dictators
obstinacy
was
this
,
that
the
people
of
Rome
,
in
any
loss
that
ever
her
Captains
had
made
,
had
never
done
that
which
Papirius
in
a
victory
would
have
done
.
CHAP.
XXXII
.
A
Republique
or
Prince
should
not
defer
to
do
good
unto
men
,
until
their
necessity
requires
it
.
ALthough
it
succeeded
happily
to
the
Romans
,
to
have
us'd
liberality
towards
the
people
upon
occasion
of
a
sudden
danger
,
when
Porsenna
made
war
against
Rome
,
to
restore
the
Tarquins
,
where
the
Senate
doubting
of
the
people
,
lest
they
would
sooner
accept
of
the
Kings
,
than
endure
out
the
war
;
to
make
themselves
sure
of
them
,
they
took
off
from
them
the
taxes
of
salt
,
and
every
kind
of
grievance
,
saying
,
the
poor
contributed
enough
to
the
common
good
,
if
they
did
but
nourish
their
children
;
and
thereupon
in
regard
of
this
benefit
,
the
people
expos'd
themselves
to
indure
the
siege
,
the
famine
,
and
the
war
.
Yet
let
none
,
presuming
upon
this
example
,
delay
to
gain
the
good
will
of
the
people
til
the
times
of
danger
;
for
it
will
never
prove
so
well
to
them
,
as
it
did
to
the
Romans
;
for
the
generality
will
think
they
have
not
this
good
from
thee
,
but
from
thy
adversaries
;
and
being
to
fear
,
that
,
when
that
necessity
is
past
,
thou
wilt
withhold
from
them
that
good
which
of
force
thou
didst
them
,
they
will
not
think
themselves
any
way
beholding
to
thee
.
And
the
reason
why
this
business
succeeded
well
to
the
Romans
,
was
,
because
the
State
was
new
,
and
not
well
setled
yet
;
and
that
people
also
had
seen
,
that
formerly
laws
had
bin
made
for
their
advantage
,
as
that
of
appeal
to
the
people
;
so
that
they
might
well
perswade
themselves
,
that
the
good
they
had
,
was
done
them
,
not
so
muth
upon
occasion
of
their
enemies
coming
,
as
from
the
good
disposition
of
the
Senate
towards
them
.
Moreover
,
the
Kings
were
yet
fresh
in
their
memory
,
by
whom
they
had
bin
many
waies
scorn'd
,
and
abus'd
.
And
because
such
like
occasions
seldom
fall
out
,
it
seldom
also
comes
to
pass
,
that
the
like
remedies
are
of
use
:
whosoever
therefore
sit
at
the
helme
in
a
state
,
be
it
either
a
Commonwealth
,
or
a
Prince
,
should
consider
before
hand
,
what
contrary
times
may
come
upon
them
,
and
what
men
in
their
troubles
they
may
stand
in
need
of
;
and
therefore
should
live
with
them
alwaies
in
such
a
manner
,
that
upon
any
accident
chancing
,
they
may
find
them
ready
and
willing
to
serve
their
occasions
.
And
he
that
governs
otherwise
,
either
Prince
,
or
Republique
,
but
especially
a
Prince
,
and
afterwards
upon
the
exigent
,
when
danger
is
at
hand
,
thinks
with
any
benefits
to
recover
or
obligemen
to
him
,
is
much
deceiv'd
;
for
he
does
not
onely
not
secure
himself
,
but
hastens
his
own
destruction
.
CHAP.
XXXIII
.
When
an
inconvenient
is
much
grown
,
either
in
a
state
,
or
against
a
state
,
it
is
better
to
beare
with
it
for
a
while
,
then
presently
to
struggle
with
it
.
WHen
the
commonwealth
of
Rome
grew
in
reputation
,
force
,
and
rule
,
the
neighboring
people
,
who
at
first
were
not
aware
of
the
harme
this
new
Republique
might
do
them
,
began
,
though
late
,
to
know
their
fault
;
and
desiring
to
remedy
that
which
at
first
they
had
neglected
,
nigh
fourty
several
people
were
joyned
together
a●ainst
Rome
;
whereupon
the
Romans
,
among
the
remedies
they
were
wont
to
make
use
of
in
their
extreamest
dangers
,
betook
them
to
create
a
Dictatour
,
that
is
,
to
give
power
to
one
man
,
that
without
calling
any
Council
he
might
resolve
,
and
without
any
appeal
,
he
might
execute
his
resolutions
.
Which
remedy
,
as
then
it
serv'd
to
purpose
,
and
was
the
occasion
they
overcame
those
eminent
dangers
:
so
it
was
alwaies
exceeding
profitable
in
all
those
occasions
,
which
in
the
grow'th
of
the
Empire
at
any
time
did
rise
against
the
Republique
.
Upon
which
accident
we
are
first
to
discourse
,
how
that
,
when
an
inconvenient
that
rises
either
in
a
Commonwealth
or
against
a
Commonwealth
,
caus'd
by
an
inward
or
an
outward
cause
,
is
become
so
great
,
that
it
begins
to
make
every
one
afraid
,
the
safer
course
is
,
to
temporise
with
it
,
then
strive
forthwith
to
extinguish
it
.
For
most
commonly
it
proves
,
that
they
who
indeavor
to
quench
it
kindle
it
much
more
,
and
suddenly
pluck
down
that
mischief
upon
their
heads
,
which
was
then
but
fear'd
from
thence
.
And
of
such
like
accidents
many
arise
in
the
Commonwealth
,
oftner
upon
inward
oceasions
then
outward
.
Where
oftentimes
,
either
a
citizen
is
suffered
to
lay
hold
of
more
forces
then
is
reasonable
;
or
else
some
law
begins
to
be
corrupted
,
which
is
the
very
nerve
and
life
of
liberty
.
And
this
error
is
suffer'd
to
pass
on
so
far
,
that
there
is
more
danger
in
the
remedy
,
then
in
the
evil
.
And
so
much
the
harder
is
it
to
know
these
inconvenients
at
their
birth
,
by
how
much
more
it
seems
to
agree
with
mens
natures
,
alwaies
to
favor
things
in
their
beginnings
:
and
these
favors
are
of
more
force
,
rather
then
in
any
thing
else
,
in
those
works
that
seem
to
have
somewhat
of
vertue
in
them
,
and
are
done
by
young
men
.
For
if
in
a
republique
any
young
noble
man
put
forward
himself
,
having
in
him
extraordinary
vertue
,
all
the
citizens
begin
to
cast
their
eyes
on
him
,
and
agree
together
without
any
consideration
to
honor
him
;
so
that
if
he
hath
any
touch
of
Ambition
,
meeting
with
those
favors
nature
affords
him
,
and
this
accident
coming
suddenly
in
place
,
before
the
Citizens
perceive
the
errors
they
are
in
,
it
falls
out
that
they
have
small
means
to
help
themselves
.
And
when
these
,
that
have
the
remedies
in
their
powers
,
would
put
them
in
practise
,
they
do
but
with
haste
augment
his
authority
.
Hereof
we
might
alleadge
sundry
examples
;
but
I
will
give
onely
one
out
of
our
own
city
.
Cosmus
of
Medici
,
from
whom
the
house
of
Medici
in
this
city
took
the
beginning
of
their
greatness
,
came
into
such
reputation
,
through
the
favor
that
his
own
wisdom
and
the
other
citizens
ignorance
gave
him
,
that
he
began
to
make
the
state
somewhat
afraid
of
him
,
so
that
some
citizens
held
it
very
dangerous
to
offend
him
,
and
others
as
dangerous
to
let
him
alone
.
But
Nicholas
of
Vizzano
living
at
the
same
time
,
who
was
esteem'd
a
very
expert
man
in
civil
affairs
;
and
being
that
the
first
error
was
made
is
not
knowing
the
dangers
that
might
arise
upon
Cosmus
his
reputation
,
while
he
liv'd
,
would
never
suffer
,
that
they
should
make
the
second
,
which
was
,
that
they
should
indeavor
to
put
him
down
;
judging
that
such
an
assay
would
be
altogether
the
ruine
of
their
state
,
as
in
effect
it
came
to
pass
,
which
was
after
his
death
.
For
those
citizens
that
were
left
,
not
following
this
advice
,
made
themselves
strong
against
Cosmus
,
and
chas'd
him
out
of
Florence
.
Whereupon
it
follow'd
that
his
faction
resenting
the
injury
,
a
while
after
recall'd
him
,
and
made
him
Prince
of
the
Commonwealth
;
to
which
step
he
could
never
have
climb'd
,
without
that
manifest
opposition
.
The
selfsame
befell
Rome
with
Caesar
,
whose
vertue
being
favor'd
by
Pompey
and
others
,
at
length
came
to
change
their
favor
into
fear
,
whereof
Cic●ro
witnesses
,
saying
,
that
Pompey
had
late
begun
to
fear
Caesar
.
Which
fear
caus'd
them
to
think
upon
the
remedies
,
and
the
remedies
they
us'd
hasten'd
the
ruine
of
their
Commonwealth
.
I
say
then
,
that
seeing
it
is
a
hard
thing
to
know
these
evils
when
they
arise
,
this
difficulty
being
occasion'd
by
a
deceit
,
wherewith
most
things
in
their
beginning
do
deceive
,
the
wiser
way
is
to
dissemble
them
,
when
they
are
knowne
,
then
to
oppose
them
.
For
temporizing
with
,
them
they
either
are
extinguish'd
of
themselves
,
or
at
least
the
evill
is
put
off
for
a
longer
time
.
And
in
all
affaires
Princes
ought
to
be
well
advis'd
,
who
intend
either
to
suppresse
evills
,
or
to
oppose
their
forces
and
their
invasions
,
that
in
liew
of
hurt
they
do
them
not
good
;
and
thinking
to
thrust
on
forward
a
businesse
,
they
draw
it
not
after
them
;
or
instead
of
choaking
a
plant
,
they
water
is
not
.
And
they
should
well
consider
,
wherein
the
greatest
force
consists
,
and
when
they
find
their
powers
sufficient
to
heale
what
is
amiffe
,
they
should
then
apply
their
strongest
remedies
;
or
otherwise
,
let
it
alone
,
nor
in
any
case
meddle
with
it
;
for
it
would
fall
out
as
before
hath
bin
said
,
and
as
it
befel
the
neighbours
of
Rome
;
for
whom
it
had
bin
better
,
after
that
Rome
was
so
growne
in
strength
,
with
treaties
of
peace
to
indeavour
to
quiet
it
and
so
yet
keep
it
backward
,
rather
then
by
making
a
strong
warre
against
it
,
to
force
it
to
new
courses
,
and
new
defences
.
For
to
what
other
purpose
serv'd
their
conspiracy
,
then
to
make
them
more
lively
,
and
to
thinke
upon
new
wayes
,
whereby
in
a
farre
shorter
time
they
much
inlarg'd
their
power
?
Among
which
,
was
the
creation
of
a
Dictatour
,
by
which
,
new
order
they
not
onely
overcame
the
dangers
that
hung
over
their
heads
,
but
it
was
an
occasion
to
stop
very
many
misischiefes
,
which
without
that
remedy
the
commonwealth
must
needs
have
incurr'd
.
CHAP.
XXXIIII
.
The
Dictatours
authority
did
good
,
and
not
harme
,
to
the
Commonwealth
of
Rome
;
and
how
authorities
which
the
citizens
take
upon
them
of
themselves
,
and
not
those
that
are
given
them
by
the
peoples
free
voices
,
are
hurtfull
to
the
civill
government
.
THose
Romans
are
by
some
writer
condemned
,
that
found
out
in
that
city
the
way
to
create
a
Dictatour
,
as
a
thing
that
in
time
might
occasion
the
Roman
Tyranny
;
alleadging
,
that
the
first
tyrant
that
was
in
that
city
,
commanded
it
under
the
title
of
a
Dictatour
,
saying
,
that
if
this
had
not
bin
,
Caesar
could
never
with
any
publque
title
have
given
any
honest
colour
to
his
tyranny
.
Which
matter
was
never
well
examined
by
him
that
holds
this
opinion
,
but
beleev'd
without
ground
.
For
it
was
not
the
name
,
not
the
degree
of
the
Dictatour
,
that
brought
Rome
into
bondage
,
but
it
was
the
authority
the
Citizens
tooke
upon
themselves
through
the
long
continuance
of
their
rule
.
And
if
in
Rome
there
had
bin
wanting
the
title
of
a
Dictatour
,
they
would
have
taken
another
:
for
forces
will
easily
gaine
titles
,
but
not
titles
forces
.
And
we
see
it
,
that
the
Dictatour
,
while
he
was
made
according
to
the
publique
orders
,
and
not
by
his
owne
authority
,
alwayes
did
good
to
the
city
.
For
those
magistrates
that
are
created
,
and
those
authorities
that
are
given
by
extraordinary
courses
wrong
the
Republiques
,
and
not
those
that
come
the
rodinary
way
As
it
appeares
it
followed
in
so
long
a
processe
of
time
,
that
never
any
Dictatour
did
otherwise
,
then
good
to
the
Commonwealth
.
Whereof
there
are
very
evident
proofes
.
First
because
to
put
a
citizen
in
case
that
he
can
do
hurt
,
and
take
extaordinary
authority
upon
him
,
we
must
suppose
him
to
have
many
conditions
,
which
in
a
Republique
not
corrupted
he
can
never
have
;
for
he
must
be
very
rich
,
and
have
many
adherents
and
partisans
,
which
he
cannot
have
,
if
the
lawes
be
strictly
observ'd
;
and
in
case
they
had
,
such
kind
of
men
are
so
doubted
,
that
the
citizens
free
votes
seldome
meete
in
them
.
Moreover
,
the
Dictarous
was
created
onely
for
a
time
,
and
not
for
ever
,
and
onely
to
remedy
the
present
necessity
;
for
which
he
was
created
.
And
by
his
authority
he
had
power
to
resolve
by
him
what
courses
to
take
against
urgent
danger
,
and
to
execute
any
thing
without
calling
a
counsell
,
and
to
punish
any
one
without
appeale
.
Yet
could
he
do
nothing
,
tending
to
the
diminution
of
the
state
,
as
it
would
have
bin●
to
take
away
the
Senates
authority
,
or
the
peoples
,
to
disanull
the
old
ordinances
of
the
city
,
and
to
make
new
;
so
that
,
the
short
time
of
his
Dictatourship
meeting
with
his
authority
,
which
was
limited
to
him
,
and
the
people
of
Rome
not
corrupted
,
it
was
unpossible
he
should
exceed
his
bounds
,
and
hurt
the
city
:
and
,
we
finde
by
experience
,
that
he
evermore
advantag'd
it
.
And
indeed
among
other
Roman
ordinances
,
this
is
one
deserves
consideration
,
and
worthy
to
be
reckoned
among
those
which
contributed
to
the
inlargement
of
that
Empire
:
for
without
such
like
course
taken
,
cities
could
hardly
escape
out
of
such
extravagant
michiefes
;
for
the
wayes
ordinarily
us'd
in
Republiques
.
which
more
slowly
(
being
that
no
counsell
,
nor
magistrate
hath
power
of
himselfe
to
go
through
with
any
matter
,
but
in
many
things
nave
neede
of
of
one
another
,
because
there
goes
time
in
getting
together
their
consents
)
their
remedies
are
very
dangerous
,
when
they
are
to
cure
that
which
cannot
stay
for
time
:
and
therefore
Commonwealths
among
their
orders
should
have
some
such
like
way
;
and
the
Republique
of
Venice
(
which
is
excellent
among
these
modernes
)
hath
reserv'd
the
authority
to
a
few
citizens
,
that
in
occurrences
of
importance
,
without
more
advice
,
all
of
them
joyntly
of
accord
may
resolve
;
for
when
in
a
Republique
there
wants
such
an
expedient
,
it
must
needs
by
keeping
the
old
customes
go
to
ruine
,
or
to
escape
it
,
break
them
.
And
in
a
Commonwealth
,
it
were
to
be
desir'd
,
that
nothing
should
chance
,
which
might
call
in
the
use
of
extraordinary
courses
.
For
though
that
extraordinary
way
at
that
time
did
good
,
yet
the
example
prooves
of
ill
consequence
:
for
the
custome
is
brought
in
,
to
breake
the
old
orders
at
first
for
good
,
which
afterwards
under
that
colour
are
broken
to
ill
intent
.
So
that
a
Republique
can
never
be
perfect
,
unlesse
with
her
lawes
she
hath
provided
for
all
things
,
and
for
every
mischance
ordain'd
the
remedy
,
and
tract
out
the
way
of
her
government
:
and
therefore
concluding
I
say
,
that
those
Republiques
which
in
their
dangers
have
not
recourse
to
a
Dictatour
,
or
such
like
authorities
,
will
alwayes
in
those
heavy
accidents
fall
to
ruine
.
And
,
in
this
new
ordinance
the
manner
of
making
the
choice
is
to
be
noted
,
how
judiciously
it
was
provided
for
by
the
Romans
;
for
the
creation
of
the
Dictatour
being
some
what
a
disgrace
to
the
Consulls
,
the
heads
of
the
City
being
as
well
to
come
under
obedience
,
as
others
;
and
presupposing
,
that
some
distaste
hereof
might
arise
among
the
citizens
,
they
ordein'd
the
power
of
making
this
choice
should
be
in
the
Consuls
;
thinking
,
that
when
the
occasion
came
,
that
Rome
should
stand
in
need
of
this
Royall
power
,
they
would
do
it
with
a
good
will
,
and
that
they
doing
it
themselves
,
it
would
lesse
grieve
them
:
For
the
hurts
,
or
any
evil
that
a
man
brings
voluntarily
upon
himself
,
and
of
his
owne
choyce
,
are
farre
lesse
troublesome
,
then
those
that
are
done
him
by
another
:
although
that
afterwards
in
the
latter
times
,
the
Romans
us'd
in
liew
of
a
Let
the
Consull
takecare
the
Commonwealth
receive
no
dammage
.
And
to
returne
to
our
matter
,
I
conclude
,
that
the
neighibouring
inhabitants
of
Rome
by
seeking
to
suppresse
them
,
made
them
not
onely
provide
for
their
defence
,
but
also
gave
them
the
way
how
they
might
with
more
force
,
better
advice
,
and
greater
authority
offend
them
.
CHAP.
XXXV
.
The
reason
,
why
in
Rome
the
creation
of
the
Decemvirate
was
hurtfull
to
the
liberty
of
that
Republique
,
notwitstanding
that
it
was
made
by
publique
and
free
voices
.
AND
it
seemes
contrary
to
that
which
was
said
before
,
that
the
authority
which
is
seis'd
on
by
violence
,
not
that
which
is
given
by
suffrages
,
is
hurtfull
to
Commonweales
,
as
the
election
of
the
ten
Citizens
created
by
the
people
of
Rome
to
make
lawes
therin
,
who
in
time
became
tyrants
in
it
,
and
without
any
respect
laid
hold
on
the
liberty
thereof
.
Where
we
ought
well
consider
the
manner
of
giving
the
authority
,
and
the
time
for
which
it
is
given
:
and
when
an
absolute
authority
is
given
for
a
long
time
(
calling
a
yeare
or
somewhat
more
a
long
time
)
it
will
alwayes
be
dangerous
,
and
will
produce
either
good
or
bad
effects
,
according
as
the
persons
to
whom
it
shall
be
intrusted
shall
proove
good
or
bad
:
and
if
we
looke
into
the
authority
the
ten
had
,
and
that
which
the
Dictatours
had
,
we
shall
find
that
of
the
ten
farre
to
outreach
the
other
.
For
when
the
Dictatour
was
created
,
the
Tribuns
,
the
Consuls
,
and
the
Senate
remain'd
still
in
their
authority
,
nor
could
the
Dictatour
take
it
from
them
And
if
he
could
deprive
one
of
the
Consulship
,
and
remove
another
from
the
Senate
,
yet
could
he
not
disanull
the
whole
order
of
Senatours
,
and
make
new
lawes
:
so
that
the
Senate
,
the
Consuls
,
and
the
Tribuns
continuing
with
their
authority
,
came
to
be
as
a
guard
upon
him
,
to
keepe
him
from
swerving
out
of
he
right
way
.
But
in
the
creation
of
the
ten
there
fell
out
the
cleane
contrary
;
for
they
cashierd
the
Consuls
and
Tribuns
and
gave
authority
of
themselves
to
make
lawes
and
every
thing
else
,
as
absolutly
as
the
people
of
Rome
.
So
that
being
absolute
of
themselves
without
Consuls
,
without
Tribuns
,
without
appeale
to
the
people
,
and
hereby
having
none
to
looke
into
their
courses
,
the
second
yeare
they
had
the
meanes
,
especially
moov'd
by
the
ambition
of
Appius
,
to
become
insolent
.
And
hereupon
it
is
to
be
noted
,
that
when
it
is
said
,
that
a
power
given
by
free
suffrages
,
never
hurt
any
Commonwealth
,
we
must
presuppose
,
that
the
people
suffer
not
themselves
to
be
induc'd
to
give
it
,
unlesse
with
due
circumstances
,
and
at
due
seasons
.
But
when
,
either
being
deceiv'd
,
or
upon
some
other
occasion
leading
them
blindsold
,
they
are
brought
to
give
it
undiscreetly
,
and
in
that
kind
as
the
people
of
Rome
gave
it
to
the
ten
,
it
will
befall
them
alwayes
,
as
it
did
to
these
.
Which
is
easily
proov'd
,
considering
the
causes
that
held
the
Dictatours
in
goodnesse
,
and
those
that
gave
the
ten
occasion
of
becomming
evill
.
And
advising
also
how
those
Republiques
have
done
,
that
have
bin
thought
well
governed
,
in
the
giving
of
authority
for
a
long
time
,
as
the
Sparitans
gave
their
Kings
,
and
the
Venetians
their
Duke
;
for
a
man
may
preceive
that
in
one
or
other
sort
they
had
their
guards
upon
them
,
that
they
who
were
ill
dispos'd
could
not
at
their
pleasures
abuse
that
authority
.
Nor
availes
it
in
this
case
,
that
the
matter
is
not
corrupted
;
for
an
absolute
authority
corrupts
the
matter
in
a
very
short
time
,
gathers
friends
,
and
makes
partisans
,
neither
is
poverty
or
want
of
good
kindred
a
let
;
for
wealth
,
and
every
other
advantage
presently
runnes
after
them
,
as
particularly
in
the
ereation
of
the
ten
we
shall
treate
.
CHAP.
XXXVI
.
The
citizens
who
have
possessed
the
greatest
charges
in
the
Commonwealth
,
ought
not
to
disdaine
the
lesse
,
as
unworthy
of
them
.
THe
Romans
had
made
Marcus
Fabius
,
and
Caius
Manlius
Consuls
,
and
gain'd
a
very
glorious
battell
of
the
Veyentes
and
the
Etruscans
,
where
in
Quintus
Fabius
was
slaine
.
the
Consuls
brother
,
who
had
bin
consul
the
yeare
before
.
Where
we
should
well
consider
,
how
proper
the
lawes
of
that
citie
were
for
her
advancement
.
and
how
much
those
other
Republique
that
trace
not
herfoote
steps
,
decevie
themselves
.
For
though
the
Romans
were
zealous
lovers
of
glory
,
yet
never
did
they
esteeme
it
dishonourable
at
one
time
to
obey
,
where
other
whiles
they
had
commanded
;
and
to
serve
in
that
army
whereof
they
had
bin
Commanders
.
which
custome
is
contrary
to
the
opinion
,
lawes
,
and
courses
of
the
citizens
of
our
times
.
And
in
Venice
yet
is
this
errour
,
that
a
citizen
having
borne
a
great
office
,
esteemes
it
a
disgrace
to
accept
of
a
lesse
,
and
the
citie
allowes
him
to
refuse
it
.
Which
thing
though
it
were
honourable
for
the
private
,
yet
is
it
wholly
unprofitable
for
the
publique
For
a
Commonwealth
may
expect
better
performance
from
,
and
repose
more
trust
in
that
citizen
,
who
descends
from
a
greater
charge
to
undertake
a
lesse
,
then
in
him
that
from
a
lesse
arises
to
the
command
of
a
greater
.
Because
they
cannot
with
good
reason
trust
him
with
their
weighty
affayres
,
unlesse
they
see
men
about
him
of
such
reverence
and
vertue
that
his
inexperience
may
be
guided
and
directed
by
their
vertue
and
authority
.
And
if
in
Rome
there
had
bin
that
custome
which
is
in
Venice
,
and
other
Republique
and
moderne
Kingdomes
,
that
he
who
had
once
bin
Consull
would
never
goe
to
the
warr
afterwards
,
but
as
Consul
,
many
things
very
prejudiciall
to
the
free
government
of
the
state
would
have
growne
therupon
;
and
through
the
errours
committed
by
these
new
men
,
and
by
their
ambition
,
which
they
might
have
us'd
with
more
freedome
,
not
having
those
grave
men
about
them
,
by
whose
presence
they
might
be
so
kept
in
awe
,
that
they
should
not
dare
to
step
aside
:
and
so
they
would
have
become
dissolute
;
which
would
all
have
turn'd
to
the
publique
losse
.
CHAP.
XXXVII
.
VVhat
distaste
the
Agrarian
law
gave
in
Rome
,
and
that
it
is
very
offensive
to
make
a
law
in
a
Commonwealth
,
that
lookes
far
backwards
,
and
yet
goes
directly
against
an
ancient
custome
of
the
Citie
.
IT
is
an
opinion
of
the
ancient
writers
,
that
men
are
wont
to
vex
themselves
in
their
crosses
,
and
glut
and
cloy
themselves
in
their
prosperity
;
and
that
from
the
one
and
the
other
of
these
two
passions
proceede
the
same
affects
:
for
at
what
time
soever
men
are
freed
from
fighting
for
necessity
,
they
are
presently
together
by
the
ears
through
ambition
;
which
is
so
powerfull
in
mens
hearts
,
that
to
what
degree
fo●ver
they
arise
,
it
never
abandons
them
.
The
reason
is
,
because
nature
hath
created
men
in
such
a
sort
,
that
they
can
desire
every
thing
,
but
not
attaine
to
it
.
So
that
the
desire
of
getting
being
greater
then
the
power
to
get
,
thence
growes
the
dislike
of
what
a
man
injoyes
,
and
the
small
satisfaction
a
man
hath
thereof
.
Hereupon
arises
the
change
of
their
states
,
for
some
men
desiring
to
have
more
,
and
others
fearing
to
lose
what
have
they
already
,
they
procede
to
enmities
and
warre
,
from
whence
comes
the
destruction
of
one
country
,
and
the
advantage
of
another
.
This
discourse
I
have
made
,
because
it
suffis'd
not
the
Commons
of
Rome
,
to
secure
themselves
from
the
Nobility
by
creating
the
Tribuns
,
to
which
desire
they
were
forc'd
by
nenecessity
;
but
that
they
suddenly
,
upon
the
obteining
thereof
began
to
contend
out
of
ambition
,
and
thinke
to
share
equally
with
the
nobility
both
in
honours
and
fortunes
,
as
the
things
that
are
in
most
value
with
men
.
Whereupon
grew
that
disease
that
brought
forth
the
quarrell
touching
the
Agrarian
law
.
And
in
conclusion
,
caus'd
the
destruction
of
the
Roman
Republique
.
And
because
Commonwealths
well
ordered
are
to
maintain
the
publique
wealthy
,
and
the
particulars
poore
,
it
is
likely
there
was
in
Rome
some
defect
in
this
law
,
which
either
was
not
so
exactly
fram'd
at
the
beginning
,
but
that
every
day
it
had
need
of
some
revising
and
amending
;
or
that
the
making
of
it
was
so
long
put
off
,
that
it
became
scandalous
to
look
so
farre
backwards
;
or
that
being
well
instituted
at
first
,
in
time
it
grew
by
use
corrupt
.
So
in
what
manner
soever
it
were
,
that
law
was
never
mention'd
in
Rome
,
but
that
the
whole
city
was
in
a
tumult
.
This
law
had
two
principall
heads
.
By
one
they
order'd
that
no
citizen
could
possesse
more
then
so
many
acres
of
ground
:
by
the
other
,
that
the
lands
which
they
tooke
from
their
enemies
should
be
divided
among
the
people
of
Rome
.
It
came
therefore
to
thwart
the
Nobility
two
manner
of
wayes
;
because
they
that
had
the
greatest
states
in
possessio
,
were
not
permitted
by
thelaw
who
were
the
greater
part
of
the
Nobility
;
and
there
upon
ought
not
to
injoy
it
:
and
when
the
enemies
goods
should
be
divided
among
the
common
people
,
they
tooke
from
the
Nobility
the
meanes
to
grow
rich
.
These
quarrells
then
being
taken
up
against
potent
persons
,
and
they
by
their
resistance
thinking
to
defend
the
publique
,
whensoever
(
as
it
is
said
)
mention
was
made
of
this
law
,
the
whole
city
was
in
an
uproare
;
and
the
Nobility
wrought
it
out
with
patience
and
with
diligence
,
either
by
drawing
an
army
forth
into
the
field
,
or
by
opposing
another
Tribune
against
him
that
propounded
it
,
or
sometimes
by
yeelding
a
part
,
or
else
by
sending
a
Colony
into
that
place
which
was
to
be
divided
,
as
it
befell
them
of
the
Country
of
Antium
,
for
which
upon
a
dispute
touching
this
law
,
there
was
a
Colony
drawne
out
of
Rome
and
sent
into
this
place
,
unto
whom
the
said
County
was
consign'd
.
Where
Titus
Livius
uses
a
notable
kind
of
speech
,
saying
,
that
with
much
adoe
they
found
any
one
in
Rome
,
that
would
give
in
their
names
to
go
to
the
said
Colony
,
the
people
being
rather
desirous
of
these
advantages
in
Rome
,
then
to
go
and
injoy
them
in
Antium
.
And
the
quarrell
touching
this
law
continued
a
good
while
,
till
the
Romans
transported
their
armes
into
the
uttermost
parts
of
Italy
,
and
likewise
out
of
Italy
.
After
which
,
as
it
seemes
,
it
ceas'd
:
which
so
fell
out
,
because
the
fields
,
which
the
enemies
of
Rome
possessed
,
were
farre
apart
from
the
peoples
sight
,
and
in
a
place
where
it
was
not
safe
to
come
to
cultivate
them
,
and
therefore
grew
they
lesse
desirous
of
them
,
and
the
Romans
also
did
lesse
use
to
punish
their
enemies
in
that
manner
.
And
when
they
did
dispossess
any
towne
of
the
territory
,
they
there
distributed
Colonies
,
so
that
upon
such
reasons
this
law
was
laid
asleepe
till
the
Gracchies
time
,
by
whom
it
being
afterwards
awaked
,
quite
ruin'd
the
Roman
liberty
.
For
they
found
their
adversaries
strength
doubled
;
and
hereupon
kindled
such
a
hatred
betweene
the
people
,
and
the
Senate
,
that
they
came
to
blowes
and
to
bloud
without
civill
meane
,
or
order
.
So
that
the
publique
magistrates
having
no
power
to
give
remedy
hereto
,
nor
either
of
the
factions
relying
on
them
,
they
sought
private
helpes
,
each
party
thinking
to
make
a
head
should
defend
them
.
In
this
quarrell
,
and
disorder
,
the
people
chose
Marius
,
and
made
him
foure
times
Consull
;
and
so
long
he
continued
his
Consulship
,
with
small
interva's
,
that
he
had
power
of
his
owne
selfe
to
make
himselfe
thrice
more
Consul
.
Against
which
pestilence
the
Nobility
having
no
other
remedy
,
began
to
favour
Sylla
;
and
having
made
him
head
of
their
faction
,
they
came
to
civill
warres
,
and
after
much
bloodshed
and
change
of
chance
,
the
Nobility
remain'd
conquerer
These
quarrells
were
anew
reviv'd
in
Caesar
and
Pompeyes
time
;
for
Caesar
being
made
head
of
Marius
his
party
,
and
Pompey
of
Syllaes
,
coming
to
fight
,
Caesar
remain'd
victour
;
who
was
the
first
tyrant
in
Rome
,
(
so
that
that
city
never
after
injoy'd
her
liberty
,
such
beginning
then
,
and
end
had
the
Agrarian
law
.
And
although
we
shew'd
other
where
,
how
the
discords
of
Rome
between
the
Senat
and
the
People
preserv'd
Romes
liberty
,
because
they
sprung
from
those
lawes
in
favor
of
liberty
,
and
therefore
the
end
of
this
Agrarian
law
may
seeme
disagreeing
to
such
a
conclusion
;
yet
I
say
,
that
upon
this
I
no
way
change
my
opinion
;
for
so
great
is
the
Nobilities
ambition
,
that
if
by
divers
wayes
and
sundry
meanes
it
were
not
abated
in
a
city
,
it
would
suddenly
bring
that
city
to
destruction
:
so
that
if
the
strife
touching
the
Agrarian
law
had
much
adoe
in
three
hundred
yeares
to
inthrall
Rome
;
it
is
like
enough
it
would
have
bin
brought
much
sooner
into
servitude
,
when
the
people
both
with
this
law
,
and
also
with
their
other
humours
,
had
not
alwayes
bridled
the
Nobilities
ambition
.
We
see
by
this
also
,
how
much
men
esteeme
wealth
rather
then
honours
,
because
the
Nobility
of
Rome
,
if
it
toucht
matter
of
honour
,
ever
gave
way
to
the
people
without
any
extraordinary
distasts
:
but
when
it
concern'd
their
wealth
,
so
obstinatly
did
they
defend
it
,
that
the
people
to
vent
their
humour
had
their
recourse
to
those
extravagant
wayes
that
are
above
discours'd
of
.
The
Authors
of
which
disorder
were
the
Gracchi
,
whose
intention
ought
to
be
commended
,
rather
then
their
discretion
.
For
to
take
away
a
disorder
grown
in
a
Commonwealth
,
and
hereupon
to
make
a
law
that
lookes
faire
backwards
,
is
a
course
ill
advis'd
of
;
and
(
as
formely
it
hath
been
said
at
large
)
it
doth
nothing
else
but
hasten
that
evill
to
which
the
disorder
guides
thee
;
but
giving
way
to
the
time
some
what
,
either
the
mischiefe
comes
slower
,
or
of
it selfe
at
length
before
it
comes
to
the
upshot
)
goes
out
CHAP.
XXXVIII
.
Weake
Commonwealths
are
hardly
drawne
to
a
certaine
resolution
,
and
know
not
how
to
determine
:
and
the
course
they
ordinarily
take
,
they
are
rather
forc'd
to
,
then
choose
of
them selves
.
THere
being
in
Rome
a
very
grievous
pestilence
,
and
thereupon
the
Volsci
and
the
Equi
thinking
a
fit
time
presented
to
bring
the
city
of
Rome
into
subjection
,
these
two
people
having
got
a
very
great
army
together
,
set
upon
the
Latini
and
the
Hernici
,
and
wasted
their
country
:
this
the
Latini
and
Hernici
were
constrain'd
to
give
notice
of
at
Rome
,
and
intreat
,
that
the
Romans
would
undertake
their
defence
:
to
whom
the
Romans
,
exceedingly
afflicted
by
the
plague
,
answer'd
that
they
should
take
a
course
to
defend
themselves
with
their
owne
forces
,
because
they
were
not
then
able
to
do
it
.
Wherein
appeares
the
magnanimity
and
wisdome
of
that
Senate
,
that
even
in
all
fortunes
they
would
reigne
and
give
law
to
those
deliberations
their
vassalls
should
make
;
nor
were
they
asham'd
to
resolve
any
thing
,
when
necessity
press'd
them
to
it
,
though
contrary
to
their
manner
of
living
,
and
the
resolutions
usually
made
by
them
.
This
I
say
,
because
at
other
times
the
same
Senate
had
forbidden
the
said
people
to
arme
and
defend
themselves
;
and
therefore
to
a
Senat
,
whose
judgment
had
bin
weaker
then
was
theirs
,
it
would
have
seem'd
an
abatement
of
reputation
,
to
have
granted
them
such
a
defence
.
But
they
alwayes
weighed
businesses
in
their
due
balance
,
and
ever
chose
the
lesser
ill
in
lieu
of
the
greater
good
:
for
it
agreed
ill
with
them
;
to
see
themselves
unable
to
defend
their
subjects
;
and
they
were
as
little
content
,
that
they
should
arme
without
them
,
for
the
reasons
alleadged
,
and
others
also
that
are
evident
.
Yet
knowing
,
that
in
any
case
upon
necessity
they
were
to
take
armes
,
having
the
enemy
upon
their
backes
,
they
tooke
the
more
honourable
part
,
and
would
rather
,
that
what
they
were
to
do
,
they
should
do
it
with
their
leave
,
to
the
end
that
having
disobeyed
upon
necessity
,
they
should
not
be
accustomed
to
disobey
voluntarily
.
And
though
this
may
well
appeare
a
course
fit
for
every
Republique
to
take
,
the
weake
and
ill
advised
Common
wealths
cannot
do
the
like
,
nor
know
not
how
to
stand
upon
termes
of
honour
in
the
like
niceties
.
The
Duke
Valentine
had
taken
Faeuza
,
and
made
Bologna
yeeld
to
his
conditions
;
afterwards
desiring
to
returne
from
thence
to
Rome
through
Tuscany
,
sent
a
confident
of
his
into
Florence
to
aske
passage
for
himselfe
with
his
army
.
Hereupon
they
consulted
at
Florence
,
how
to
manage
this
businesse
,
nor
did
any
one
advise
them
to
grant
it
him
.
Wherein
they
followed
not
the
course
the
Romans
tooke
:
for
the
Duke
being
exceedingly
well
armed
,
and
the
Florentines
in
a
manner
disarmed
,
that
they
could
not
hinder
his
passage
,
it
had
bin
much
more
for
their
honour
,
if
it
had
seem'd
that
he
had
passd
with
their
licence
,
rather
then
by
force
;
for
there
it
was
wholly
their
disgrace
,
which
had
bin
in
part
lesse
,
if
they
had
carried
it
otherwise
.
But
the
worst
condition
these
weak
Republiques
have
,
is
to
take
to
no
resolution
,
so
that
what
party
soever
they
take
,
they
take
it
perforce
;
and
if
any
good
be
done
them
,
it
is
forc'd
upon
them
,
for
which
they
owe
no
thankes
to
their
owne
wisdome
.
I
will
give
two
other
examples
,
that
happen'd
in
our
dayes
in
the
state
of
our
city
,
In
the
yeare
1500
,
when
Lewi
the
12
of
France
had
recover'd
Milan
,
being
desirous
to
put
Pisa
into
our
hands
,
for
the
summe
of
50000
ducats
,
which
the
Florentines
had
promis'd
him
,
after
such
restitution
,
he
sent
his
army
commanded
by
the
Lord
Beaumont
towards
Pisa
,
in
whom
,
(
although
he
were
a
French
man
)
yet
the
Florentines
repos'd
much
trust
.
This
army
and
Captaine
came
on
betweene
Cascina
and
Pisa
,
to
assaile
the
walls
,
where
staying
some
daies
to
give
order
for
the
siege
,
there
came
some
Deputies
of
Pisa
to
Beavmont
,
who
offer'd
to
yeeld
up
the
city
to
the
French
army
with
these
conditions
,
that
upon
the
Kings
word
he
should
promise
,
not
to
give
them
into
the
Florentines
hands
,
till
after
foure
monthes
,
which
termes
were
utterly
resus'd
by
the
Florentines
,
whereupon
ensued
,
that
after
a
while
they
left
the
siege
with
disgrace
.
Nor
was
that
accord
refus'd
for
other
reason
,
then
because
they
doubted
of
the
Kings
word
;
although
(
such
was
the
weaknes
of
their
counsell
)
that
they
were
forc'd
to
put
themselves
into
his
protection
,
though
they
trusted
him
not
:
nor
in
the
meane
while
did
they
consider
,
that
the
King
could
easier
deliver
Pisa
into
their
hands
,
having
gotten
possession
of
it
,
than
promise
hee
would
deliver
that
which
hee
had
not
yet
in
his
power
:
wherein
if
hee
had
fayl'd
,
it
had
bin
easy
to
discover
the
Kings
intention
,
and
so
have
spar'd
their
cost
.
In
such
sort
that
it
had
bin
a
great
deal
more
to
their
advantage
,
had
they
agreed
,
that
Beaumont
should
have
taken
it
upon
any
promise
;
as
it
was
seene
afterwards
by
experience
in
the
yeare
1502.
when
upon
the
rebellion
of
Arezzo
,
the
Lord
Jubalt
was
sent
by
the
King
of
France
with
succours
to
the
Florentines
.
Who
being
come
neare
to
Arezzo
,
began
to
treate
agreement
with
the
towne
,
which
upon
certaine
termes
would
have
yeelded
,
as
before
the
Pisans
,
but
were
againe
refused
by
the
Florentines
.
Which
Jubalt
perceiving
,
and
thinking
that
the
Florentines
did
little
understand
themselves
,
hee
began
to
practise
an
agreement
with
them
by
himself
,
without
admitting
the
commissaries
into
the
party
,
so
that
hee
concluded
a
peace
of
his
owne
head
,
and
thereupon
entred
Arezzo
with
his
owne
people
,
shewing
the
Florentines
,
they
were
fooles
,
and
understood
not
the
affaires
of
the
world
;
and
if
they
desir'd
to
have
Arezzo
in
their
hands
,
they
should
let
the
King
know
of
it
,
who
could
more
easily
deliver
it
them
,
having
his
people
already
in
the
towne
,
then
if
they
were
without
before
the
walls
.
In
Florence
they
forbare
not
to
rayle
upon
,
and
blame
the
said
Jubalt
,
till
they
understood
,
that
if
Beaumont
had
bin
like
Jubalt
,
they
should
have
had
Pisa
as
well
as
Arezzo
.
And
thus
to
returne
to
our
purpose
,
Republiques
which
will
not
come
to
resolution
,
seldome
make
any
party
much
to
their
advantage
,
unlesse
they
are
forc't
thereupon
:
because
their
weaknesse
will
never
suffer
them
to
determine
,
where
there
is
any
doubt
:
and
unlesse
that
doubt
bee
cancell'd
by
a
neessitie
that
violently
thrusts
them
forward
,
they
remaine
always
in
suspence
.
CHAP.
XXXIX
.
The
same
accidents
are
seene
to
befall
severall
peoples
.
THIS
is
easily
knowne
by
any
one
that
considers
things
present
and
things
long
past
,
that
in
all
Cities
and
all
peoples
there
are
now
the
same
desires
and
the
same
humours
,
there
were
alwayes
;
So
that
it
is
very
easy
for
him
that
examines
with
diligence
the
things
that
are
past
,
to
foresee
the
future
in
any
Commonwealth
,
and
to
serve
himself
of
those
remedies
,
which
were
in
use
among
the
auncients
;
or
not
finding
of
those
which
were
us'd
,
to
devise
new
,
for
the
resemblance
these
accidents
have
with
the
auncient
.
But
because
these
considerations
are
neglected
,
or
not
understood
by
the
Reader
;
or
if
understood
,
not
knowne
to
him
that
governs
,
it
followes
,
that
continually
in
all
successions
of
ages
the
same
offeeces
happen
.
The
Citie
of
Florence
after
94
yeares
having
lost
a
part
of
their
dominions
,
as
Pisa
and
other
Townes
,
was
forc't
to
make
warre
against
those
that
held
them
.
And
because
hee
that
had
them
in
his
hands
,
was
of
great
power
,
it
came
it
passe
,
that
they
were
at
great
expence
in
the
warrs
,
without
good
successe
.
From
these
great
expences
they
proceeded
with
impositions
to
grieve
the
people
,
and
from
those
grievances
came
the
peoples
murmurings
and
complaints
.
And
for
that
this
warre
was
order'd
by
a
Magistracie
of
tenne
Citizens
,
who
were
call'd
the
Councell
of
tenne
for
the
warre
,
they
were
malic't
by
the
whole
body
of
the
Citie
,
as
the
Authours
of
the
warre
,
and
the
expences
of
the
same
;
and
they
began
to
p●rswade
themselves
,
that
by
taking
away
that
Magistracie
,
they
should
end
their
wars
;
so
that
having
to
make
new
,
they
would
not
supply
the
places
,
but
rather
suffering
that
Magistracie
to
expire
,
they
referr'd
their
imployments
all
to
the
Senate
:
Which
resolution
was
so
hurtfull
,
that
not
onely
it
ended
not
the
warre
,
(
as
the
generality
was
perswaded
)
but
those
men
being
put
out
of
the
imployment
,
who
guided
it
with
understanding
,
there
followed
such
confusion
,
that
besides
Pisa
,
they
lost
Arezzo
,
and
many
other
places
,
in
so
much
that
the
people
perceiving
their
errour
,
and
that
the
feaver
occasion'd
the
mischiefe
,
and
not
the
Physitian
,
they
created
anew
the
Magistracie
of
tenne
.
The
selfe
same
humour
grew
up
in
Rome
against
the
name
of
the
Consuls
;
for
the
people
seeing
one
warre
arise
from
another
,
giving
them
no
rest
,
where
they
ought
to
have
attributed
it
wholly
to
their
neighbours
ambition
,
who
d●sir'd
to
suppresse
them
,
they
imputed
it
rather
to
the
ambition
of
the
nobilitie
;
who
not
being
able
in
Rome
to
chastise
the
people
protected
by
the
,
Tribunitiall
power
,
indeavour'd
to
draw
them
our
of
Rome
under
the
Consuls
,
and
there
to
oppresse
them
,
where
they
had
no
assistance
.
And
hereupon
they
thought
it
necessary
to
take
away
the
Consuls
,
or
so
to
limit
their
power
,
that
they
should
have
no
authority
over
the
people
neither
at
home
nor
abroad
.
The
first
that
assa●d
to
put
that
law
in
practise
,
was
one
Terentillus
a
Tribun
,
who
propounded
they
should
create
five
men
,
to
consider
the
Consuls
power
,
and
moderate
it
.
Which
thing
much
angred
the
nobility
,
giving
them
to
thinke
,
that
the
Majestic
of
the
Empire
was
wholly
declined
;
and
that
there
was
not
left
to
the
Nobilitie
any
dignity
more
in
the
Commonwealth
.
Yet
such
was
the
Tribuns
obstinacie
,
that
the
Consuls
name
was
quite
put
out
,
and
in
the
conclusion
they
were
contented
after
some
other
order
taken
,
rather
to
create
Tribuns
with
Consulan
power
,
than
the
Consuls
;
in
such
hatred
had
they
their
name
and
their
authority
.
And
so
they
proceeded
a
long
time
,
till
at
length
,
having
knowne
their
errous
,
as
the
Florentins
return'd
to
the
Counsell
of
tenne
,
so
they
anew
created
their
Consuls
.
CHAP.
XL.
The
Creation
of
the
Decemvirate
in
Rome
,
and
what
the
rein
is
to
be
noted
;
where
among
many
other
things
is
consider'd
,
how
by
the
like
accident
a
Republique
may
be
preserv'd
,
or
suppressed
.
HAving
a
purpose
to
discourse
particularly
of
the
accidents
that
happen'd
at
Rome
upon
the
creation
of
the
Decemvirate
,
methinks
it
is
not
much
out
of
the
way
first
to
relate
summarily
the
story
of
that
creation
;
and
afterwards
to
sift
out
the
parts
that
are
in
those
notable
actions
;
which
are
many
and
of
good
consideration
,
as
well
for
those
that
endeavor
to
maintain
a
Republique
free
,
as
for
them
that
intend
to
bring
it
under
the
yoke
;
for
in
this
discourse
there
will
appear
many
errors
committed
by
the
Senate
,
and
by
the
people
,
in
prejudice
of
the
Common
liberty
,
and
many
faults
made
by
Appius
Chiefe
of
the
Decemvirate
,
lammageable
to
that
tyrannie
which
he
had
presupposed
already
founded
in
Rome
.
After
many
disputes
and
strifes
past
between
the
people
and
the
Nobility
,
about
the
framing
of
new
lawes
in
Rome
,
whereby
they
might
firmly
establish
the
liberty
of
that
State
,
with
one
accord
they
sent
Spurius
Posthumius
with
two
other
Citizens
to
Athens
,
for
the
copies
of
those
lawes
which
Solon
gave
to
that
City
,
that
thereupon
they
might
found
the
Roman
Ordinances
.
After
their
returne
,
they
came
to
appoint
the
men
that
were
to
examine
and
frame
the
said
lawes
.
And
they
ordained
ten
Citizens
for
a
year
,
of
which
Appius
Claudius
was
one
,
a
cunning
and
a
turbulent
man
.
And
that
they
might
without
any
respect
make
such
lawes
,
they
took
away
the
power
of
all
other
Magistrates
in
Rome
,
espeaially
of
the
,
Tribuns
and
Consuls
.
They
took
away
also
all
appeal
to
the
people
;
so
that
these
new
officers
became
absolute
Princes
of
Rome
.
Afterwards
Appius
gain'd
the
authority
of
all
his
other
companions
,
by
means
of
the
favors
the
people
did
him
,
for
he
was
grown
so
popular
in
his
behaviour
,
that
it
seem'd
a
mervail
,
how
so
suddenly
he
had
chang'd
his
nature
and
disposition
,
having
alwaies
before
this
time
bin
thought
a
cruel
persecutor
of
the
common
people
.
These
ten
governed
themselves
very
moderately
,
not
having
above
twelve
Lictors
,
who
always
went
before
him
that
was
Chiese
among
them
.
And
although
they
had
the
absolute
authority
,
yet
when
they
were
to
punish
any
Citizen
of
Rome
for
homicide
,
they
cited
him
in
presence
of
the
people
,
and
made
them
judge
him
.
They
writ
their
laws
in
ten
Tables
;
and
before
they
confirm'd
them
,
published
them
to
the
general
view
,
that
every
man
might
read
and
understand
them
,
whereby
it
might
be
known
if
there
were
any
fault
in
them
,
which
before
their
confirmation
should
be
amended
.
After
this
Appius
caus'd
a
rumour
to
be
spread
throughout
Rome
that
if
to
these
ten
Tables
an
addition
of
twoothers
were
made
,
they
would
be
perfect
So
that
the
conceithereof
gave
the
people
occasion
to
make
the
Councell
of
tenne
againe
for
another
yeare
,
whereunto
the
people
consented
willingly
,
as
well
because
they
would
not
have
the
Consuls
anew
●created
,
as
for
that
they
hop'd
they
might
well
subsist
without
Tribuns
,
these
being
judges
of
the
causes
,
as
is
aforesaid
:
It
being
then
agreed
to
make
a
new
election
,
the
whole
nobility
betook
themselves
to
sue
for
these
honors
,
and
Appius
was
amongst
the
formost
of
them
,
and
behav'd
himself
in
his
suit
with
so
much
courtesie
towards
the
people
,
that
all
his
competitors
were
jealous
of
it
.
They
did
not
beleeve
,
that
he
being
so
proud
a
man
,
used
all
this
courtesie
for
nought
.
And
being
in
doubt
publiquely
to
oppose
him
,
they
resolved
to
do
it
cunningly
,
and
so
though
he
were
the
youngest
of
them
all
,
they
gave
him
the
authority
to
propound
to
the
people
the
ten
that
were
to
be
elected
,
thinking
he
would
use
the
same
terms
others
did
,
not
to
name
himself
,
being
a
thing
unusual
and
disgracefull
in
Rome
.
But
he
took
this
impediment
for
an
opportunity
:
And
named
himself
among
the
first
,
to
the
admiration
,
and
displeasure
of
all
the
Nobility
;
and
after
named
nine
others
to
his
own
purpose
.
Which
new
creation
made
for
another
yeer
,
began
to
shew
the
people
and
the
Nobility
their
error
;
for
suddenly
,
Appius
made
an
end
of
dissembling
to
be
what
he
was
not
:
and
began
to
show
his
inbred
pride
:
and
infected
his
companions
with
his
own
evil
conditions
:
and
to
fright
the
people
and
the
Senate
,
in
exchange
of
twelve
Lictors
,
they
made
a
hundred
and
twenty
.
The
fear
was
equall
in
all
,
for
a
while
;
but
they
began
afterwards
to
give
respect
to
the
Senate
,
and
rudely
to
handle
the
Commons
.
If
any
one
being
wrong'd
by
one
of
these
Iudges
did
appeal
to
another
,
he
was
worse
abused
in
his
appeal
,
than
in
his
first
tryal
.
So
that
the
people
having
perceived
their
error
,
began
to
look
the
Nobility
in
the
face
with
a
great
deal
of
sorrow
;
And
thence
they
took
occasion
to
seek
after
their
liberty
,
from
whence
by
fearing
their
bondage
,
they
had
brought
the
Commonwealth
into
that
misery
.
And
the
Nobility
was
wel
pleased
with
this
their
affliction
:
That
being
weary
of
their
present
condition
,
they
might
desire
to
have
their
Consuls
restored
.
The
dayes
came
at
length
that
ended
the
year
:
the
two
Tables
of
the
lawes
were
finished
but
not
published
.
The
ten
hereupon
tooke
occasion
to
continue
on
their
Magistracie
,
and
hold
the
State
by
violence
,
and
make
the
young
Nobilitie
their
guard
,
on
whom
they
bestowed
the
goods
of
those
they
condemned
.
With
which
gifts
the
youth
being
corrupted
,
lov'd
rather
their
own
licentious
life
,
than
the
common
liberty
.
It
fell
out
about
this
time
,
that
the
Sabini
and
the
Volsci
made
war
against
the
Romans
.
Upon
which
fear
the
ten
began
to
see
the
weakness
of
their
own
estate
:
for
without
the
Senate
they
could
not
take
order
for
the
war
;
and
assembling
the
Senate
together
they
thought
they
lost
their
authority
:
yet
upon
meer
necessity
they
took
this
last
course
;
and
having
gotten
the
Senators
together
,
many
of
them
spake
against
the
pride
of
the
tenn
,
and
in
particular
Valerius
and
Horatius
;
and
their
authority
had
bin
quite
abolished
,
but
that
the
Senate
,
of
meer
envy
to
the
Common
people
,
would
not
shew
their
authority
,
thinking
,
that
if
the
ten
should
voluntarily
depose
their
Magistracy
,
the
making
of
Tribuns
of
the
people
might
perhaps
be
left
.
The
war
was
then
resolved
of
,
and
two
armies
were
led
forth
commanded
by
part
of
the
ten
:
and
Appius
staid
at
home
to
govern
the
City
.
Whereupon
it
happen'd
,
that
he
fell
in
love
with
Virginia
;
and
when
he
would
have
taken
her
by
force
,
her
Father
Virginius
to
free
her
,
slew
her
;
whereupon
ensued
divers
tumults
at
Rome
,
and
in
the
armies
,
which
being
brought
back
again
and
joyn'd
with
the
remainder
of
the
people
at
Rome
,
went
apart
thence
to
the
holy
mount
:
where
they
staid
,
til
the
ten
had
deposed
their
Magistracy
,
and
that
the
Tribuns
and
Consuls
being
created
,
Rome
was
restor'd
to
the
ancient
forme
of
liberty
.
It
is
noted
then
by
the
text
,
that
the
inconvenient
of
setting
up
a
Tyranny
grew
first
upon
the
same
occasions
,
that
the
greater
part
of
Tyrannies
ordinarily
use
to
arise
upon
in
Cities
,
and
this
is
from
the
overmuch
desire
the
people
have
of
liberty
,
and
the
excessive
ambition
the
Nobility
have
to
command
.
And
when
they
agree
not
to
make
a
law
in
favor
of
liberty
,
and
either
party
betakes
it self
to
favour
some
one
,
then
suddenly
starts
up
a
tyranny
.
The
people
and
the
Nobility
of
Rome
consented
to
create
the
ten
;
and
to
create
them
with
so
great
authority
,
as
they
did
for
the
desire
they
both
had
,
the
one
to
extinguish
the
memory
of
the
consuls
,
the
other
of
the
Tribuns
.
When
they
were
created
,
the
people
thinking
that
Appius
was
become
of
the
popular
faction
,
and
rudely
handled
the
Nobility
,
the
people
betook
themselves
to
favour
him
.
And
when
a
people
is
led
into
such
an
error
,
as
to
give
reputation
to
any
one
,
because
he
creates
those
evil
that
they
hate
,
if
he
hath
wit
,
it
will
alwaies
come
to
pass
,
that
he
shall
make
himself
Lord
of
that
City
;
for
he
will
wait
his
opportunity
together
with
the
peoples
favor
to
extinguish
the
Nobility
,
and
will
never
endeavor
to
oppress
the
people
,
till
he
hath
quite
supprest
the
Nobles
;
at
which
time
when
the
people
shall
perceive
themselves
to
be
in
bondage
,
they
shall
not
know
whether
to
have
recourse
for
help
.
This
course
have
they
all
held
,
that
have
laid
the
foundations
of
a
Tyrannie
in
any
Commonwealth
.
Which
if
Appius
had
likewise
held
,
his
tyrannie
would
have
bin
of
longer
durance
,
and
not
have
fail'd
so
quickly
;
but
he
went
the
clean
contrary
way
;
nor
could
a
man
have
done
more
undiscreetly
,
than
he
,
who
to
maintain
a
tyrannie
,
made
those
his
enemies
that
bestowed
it
first
upon
him
,
and
could
still
make
it
good
,
and
fought
to
gain
those
to
be
his
friends
,
who
neither
agreed
to
give
it
him
,
nor
could
maintain
it
to
him
,
and
so
lost
those
that
were
his
friends
,
and
strove
to
make
those
his
friends
,
that
could
not
be
so
:
For
though
the
nobility
desire
to
tyrannize
,
yet
that
part
of
the
nobility
that
hath
not
a
share
in
the
tyrannie
,
is
alwaies
enemy
to
the
tyrant
;
nor
is
it
possible
ever
to
gain
them
all
to
his
side
,
by
reason
of
the
nobilities
exceeding
ambition
and
excessive
avarice
,
seeing
that
the
tyrant
cannot
have
so
great
wealth
,
nor
so
many
honors
,
as
to
satisfie
them
all
.
And
thus
Appius
,
forsaking
the
people
,
and
cleaving
to
the
nobility
,
committed
a
most
evident
error
,
and
so
for
other
reasons
abovesaid
;
and
because
,
if
a
man
will
hold
any
thing
by
violence
,
he
that
forces
must
needs
be
stronger
than
he
that
is
forced
.
From
whence
it
comes
,
that
those
Tyrarts
who
have
the
generality
to
friend
,
and
the
great
ones
their
enemies
,
are
in
the
more
safety
,
because
,
their
violence
is
supported
with
greater
forces
,
than
that
which
is
favored
by
the
Nobility
,
and
hated
by
the
people
:
for
with
the
peoples
favor
the
Forces
within
are
sufficient
to
maintain
themselves
,
as
they
were
to
Nabis
Tyrant
of
Sparta
,
when
all
Greece
and
the
people
of
Rome
assaulted
him
,
having
made
himself
sure
of
some
few
of
the
Nobility
,
and
alwaies
having
the
people
his
friend
,
wherewith
he
defended
himself
:
which
he
could
not
have
done
,
if
they
had
bin
otherwise
.
In
that
other
degree
,
to
have
but
few
friends
at
home
,
the
forces
within
suffice
nor
,
but
must
be
sought
after
abread
:
and
they
are
to
be
of
three
kinds
,
the
one
to
have
a
guard
of
strangers
,
to
assure
thy
person
;
the
other
,
to
have
an
army
in
the
country
,
which
may
serve
the
same
turn
the
people
could
;
the
third
,
to
hold
correspondence
and
friendship
with
thy
put
issant
neighbours
,
who
may
defend
thee
.
And
whosoever
takes
these
courses
,
and
observes
them
rightly
,
though
the
people
be
his
enemy
,
yet
in
some
sort
may
he
save
himself
.
But
Appius
could
not
by
any
army
make
himself
master
of
the
Country
,
the
country
there
and
Rome
being
one
and
the
same
thing
;
and
what
he
could
do
,
he
knew
not
how
to
do
,
and
so
perish'd
in
his
beginning
.
The
Senate
also
and
the
people
in
the
creation
of
the
Decemvira●e
committed
very
great
errors
.
For
,
though
it
be
formerly
said
in
the
discourse
touching
a
Dictator
,
that
those
Magistrates
,
who
are
made
of
themselves
,
not
those
that
are
chosen
by
the
people
,
endammage
the
liberty
,
yet
the
people
ought
,
when
they
make
their
Magistrates
,
take
such
order
in
their
making
,
that
they
restrain
them
by
some
regards
from
growing
wicked
.
And
where
they
should
set
a
guard
over
them
,
to
keep
them
good
,
the
Romans
took
it
away
,
creating
that
the
sole
Magistracy
in
Rome
,
nullifying
all
the
rest
,
for
the
excessive
desire
(
as
we
before
said
)
The
Senate
had
to
suppress
the
Tribuns
,
and
the
Common
people
the
Consuls
:
which
blinded
them
both
so
,
that
they
concur'd
in
this
disorder
:
for
men
(
as
King
Ferdinand
said
)
do
oftentimes
like
certain
lesser
birds
of
prey
,
who
so
eagerly
pursue
the
prey
,
whereunto
they
have
a
natural
provocation
,
that
they
perceive
not
a
greater
bird
over
their
heads
with
like
eagerness
ready
to
seize
on
them
.
The
people
of
Romes
error
then
is
made
plain
by
this
discourse
,
as
I
propounded
it
in
the
beginning
,
in
going
to
save
their
liberty
;
as
Appius
his
errors
also
in
going
to
seize
upon
the
Tyranny
.
CHAP.
XLI
.
Of
humble
to
become
,
proud
,
of●
mercifull
cruel
,
without
passing
through
the
due
means
between
these
extreams
,
argues
indiscretion
,
and
turns
nothing
to
advantage
.
AMong
other
termsill
us'd
by
Appius
,
to
maintain
his
tyranny
,
it
was
not
of
small
moment
,
to
leap
too
suddenly
from
one
quality
to
another
:
for
his
craft
in
deceiving
the
people
,
by
dissembling
popularity
,
was
used
to
good
purpose
.
The
terms
likewise
he
held
to
cause
a
new
creation
of
the
ten
,
were
well
us'd
:
As
also
his
boldness
in
creating
himself
one
of
them
,
contrary
to
the
nobilities
opinion
It
was
a
course
rightly
taken
,
to
chuse
his
collegues
to
his
own
turn
:
but
it
was
not
advisedly
done
,
presently
upon
this
(
according
as
I
sayd
above
)
to
change
his
disposition
at
an
instant
,
of
a
friend
to
shew
himself
enemy
to
the
people
,
of
curteous
to
become
insolent
,
of
mild
harsh
,
and
to
do
this
so
suddenly
,
that
without
any
excuse
he
discovers
to
all
the
falshood
of
his
heart
.
For
he
that
hath
seem'd
good
for
a
while
,
and
would
,
to
serve
his
own
turn
,
become
wicked
,
should
come
to
it
by
the
due
degrees
;
and
in
such
sort
goeon
with
his
occasions
,
that
before
the
different
disposition
deprive
him
of
his
ancient
favors
,
it
may
have
given
him
so
many
new
,
that
his
authority
be
no
way
diminished
:
otherwise
being
found
unmask'd
and
without
friends
,
he
perishes
.
CHAP.
XLII
.
How
easily
men
may
be
corrupted
.
IT
is
remarkable
also
in
this
matter
touching
the
Decemvirate
,
how
easily
men
are
corrupted
,
so
that
they
make
themselves
become
of
aquite
contrary
nature
,
though
at
first
good
,
and
well
brought
up
:
considering
how
that
youth
,
which
Appius
had
taken
near
to
him
for
guard
of
his
person
,
began
to
favor
the
tyranny
,
for
a
very
small
profit
which
they
made
thereof
.
And
how
Quintus
Fabisu
,
one
of
the
second
ten
that
were
chosen
,
being
an
excellent
man
;
blinded
with
a
little
ambition
,
and
perswaded
by
the
malignity
of
Appius
,
chang'd
all
his
good
conditions
into
very
bad
,
and
became
like
him
;
which
being
throughly
examin'd
,
shall
cause
those
that
institute
the
lawes
of
Republiques
or
Kingdoms
to
be
more
exactin
bridling
humane
desires
,
and
in
taking
from
them
all
hope
of
escaping
scot-free
whensoever
they
offend
.
CHAP.
XLIII
.
They
that
fight
for
their
own
glory
,
are
the
good
and
faithfull
soldiers
.
IT
is
considerable
also
upon
the
above
written
treaty
,
what
difference
there
is
between
an
army
satisfied
and
contented
in
it self
,
fighting
for
its
own
glory
,
and
that
which
is
ill
dispos'd
,
fighting
for
other
mens
ambition
;
for
where
the
Roman
armies
were
alwaies
wont
under
the
Consuls
to
be
victorious
,
under
the
Decem.
virate
they
were
alwaies
losers
.
From
this
example
may
we
know
in
part
the
reasons
why
mercenary
soldiers
are
unprofitable
,
who
have
no
other
obligation
to
make
them
stand
true
to
thee
,
but
some
small
stipend
thou
bestowest
on
them
.
Which
cannot
be
a
motive
so
sufficient
,
or
of
such
weight
,
as
to
gain
thee
their
truth
and
love
so
far
,
as
to
die
in
thy
behalf
.
For
in
those
armies
,
wherein
there
is
not
that
affection
towards
him
for
whom
they
fight
,
which
makes
them
become
his
partisans
where
can
never
be
so
much
valor
,
as
to
subdue
or
resist
an
enemy
that
hath
never
so
little
vertue
or
courage
.
And
because
neither
this
affection
,
nor
contention
can
grow
in
others
,
more
then
in
thy
natural
subject
,
it
is
necessary
in
the
maintaining
of
a
state
,
whether
it
be
Commonwealth
or
Kingdom
,
to
arme
the
native
subjects
,
as
we
see
all
they
have
done
,
who
with
their
armies
have
made
any
great
conquests
.
The
Roman
armies
under
the
Decemvirates
were
valorous
as
formerly
:
but
because
the
same
disposition
was
not
in
them
,
they
atchiev'd
not
the
like
exploits
.
But
so
soon
as
the
Decemvirate
had
an
end
,
and
they
,
as
free
men
,
began
to
war
,
they
took
to
them
again
their
former
courages
,
and
by
consequence
their
undertakings
prov'd
successfull
,
according
to
their
ancient
wont
.
CHAP.
XLIIII
.
A
multitude
without
a
head
is
unprofitable
:
and
a
man
should
not
first
threaten
;
and
afterward
demand
the
power
.
THe
Common
people
of
Rome
,
upon
the
occasion
of
Verginius
being
gone
apart
armed
into
the
Holy
Mount
,
the
Senate
deputed
some
unto
them
to
demand
,
by
what
authority
they
had
forsaken
their
Captains
and
retired
into
the
mountain
;
and
such
was
the
esteem
of
the
Senates
authority
,
that
the
people
having
no
head
of
their
multitude
,
no
man
durst
make
answer
.
And
Titus
Livius
sayes
,
they
wanted
not
what
to
answer
,
but
they
wanted
who
should
answer
:
Which
thing
does
punctually
shew
the
unprofitableness
of
a
multitude
without
a
head
,
and
therefore
Verginius
perceiving
the
disorder
,
sound
the
expedient
of
creating
twenty
Tribuns
of
war
who
should
be
their
head
to
answer
,
and
confer
with
the
Senate
.
And
having
demanded
,
that
Valenius
and
Horatius
should
be
sent
them
,
to
whom
they
would
declare
their
mindes
,
these
refused
to
go
,
til
the
ten
had
deposed
their
magistracy
:
and
being
come
to
the
mountain
where
the
people
was
,
the
demands
were
,
that
they
would
have
the
Triburs
of
the
people
created
again
,
and
that
they
might
appeal
to
the
people
from
every
magistrate
,
and
that
all
the
ten
should
be
deliver'd
into
their
hands
,
and
they
would
burn
them
quick
:
Valerius
and
Horatius
commended
their
first
demands
:
and
blam'd
their
latter
,
as
Impious
,
saying
,
You
condemn
cruelty
,
and
yet
you
use
it
your selves
.
And
they
were
advis'd
to
leave
making
mention
of
the
ten
,
and
attend
onely
to
lay
hold
of
their
authority
and
power
,
and
afterwards
they
should
not
want
means
of
satisfaction
;
where
plainly
it
appears
,
how
much
it
savors
of
folly
,
and
little
of
wisdome
,
to
demand
a
thing
,
and
before-hand
to
say
,
I
will
do
ill
with
it
.
For
a
man
ought
not
herein
discover
his
intention
,
but
first
in
any
case
indeavor
to
be
master
of
what
he
desires
.
For
it
is
enough
to
ask
a
man
his
weapons
,
without
saying
to
him
,
I
will
kill
thee
with
them
,
being
thou
hast
power
,
when
thou
art
possest
of
them
,
to
do
as
thou
list
.
CHAP.
XLV
.
It
is
a
matter
of
very
evil
example
,
when
he
that
makes
a
law
neglects
the
observing
of
it
:
and
it
is
very
dangerous
in
a
state
,
to
make
a
continuall
practise
of
cruel
executions
.
THe
agreement
being
made
and
Rome
reduc'd
to
her
ancient
forme
,
Verginius
cited
Appius
before
the
people
,
to
defend
his
own
cause
:
whom
appearing
accompanied
with
many
of
the
Nobility
,
Verginius
commanded
to
be
cast
into
prison
.
Appius
began
to
cry
out
,
and
appeal
to
the
people
.
Verginius
said
,
he
was
not
worthy
to
be
allow'd
that
appeal
which
himself
had
destroy'd
,
or
have
the
people
defend
him
,
who
had
so
much
endammag'd
them
.
Appius
replied
,
that
they
ought
not
to
violate
that
appeal
,
which
they
with
such
earnest
desire
had
ordain'd
.
For
all
this
he
was
imprison'd
,
and
before
the
day
of
giving
judgment
,
he
slew
himself
.
And
though
Appius
his
lewd
life
deserv'd
any
punishment
,
yet
savor'd
it
but
little
of
eivil
government
,
to
violate
the
lawes
,
and
especially
that
which
was
but
then
made
.
For
I
beleeve
not
,
there
is
any
thing
of
worse
example
in
a
Republique
,
then
to
make
a
law
,
and
not
observe
it
;
and
the
more
,
when
he
that
makes
it
breaks
it
.
Florence
after
the
ninty
fourth
year
having
its
state
reestablish'd
by
the
aid
of
Frier
Ierom
Savanarola
,
whose
writings
shew
his
learning
,
wisdome
,
and
vertue
,
and
having
among
other
ordinances
to
assure
the
citizens
,
caus'd
a
law
to
be
made
,
that
a
man
might
appeal
to
the
people
from
the
sentences
,
which
for
matter
of
state
,
the
Eight
,
or
the
Seignory
should
give
:
which
law
he
long
perswaded
,
and
with
much
a
do
at
length
obtain'd
.
It
happen'd
that
a
while
after
the
confirmation
of
it
,
five
citizens
were
condemn'd
to
death
by
the
Seignory
for
some
offence
touching
the
state
;
and
they
desiring
to
appeal
,
were
not
suffer'd
,
and
so
the
law
not
observ'd
.
Which
more
wrong'd
the
reputation
of
that
Frier
,
then
any
other
accident
.
For
if
that
appeal
was
profitable
,
he
should
have
caus'd
it
to
be
observ'd
,
if
otherwise
,
he
should
never
have
so
urg'd
the
making
of
it
.
And
so
much
more
remarkable
was
this
accident
,
in
that
the
Frier
in
those
many
sermons
which
he
made
,
after
the
breach
of
this
law
,
never
either
condemned
him
that
broke
it
,
or
excus'd
the
breach
,
as
he
that
would
not
condemn
any
thing
that
serv'd
to
his
purpose
;
and
excuse
it
he
could
not
.
Which
having
discover'd
his
ambitious
and
sactious
mind
,
took
much
from
his
credit
,
and
charg'd
him
with
blame
enough
.
It
is
a
very
great
fault
also
in
a
state
,
every
day
in
the
citizens
mindes
to
renew
the
memory
of
old
wrongs
done
to
this
or
that
man
with
new
punishments
,
as
it
befell
at
Rome
after
the
Decemvirate
.
For
all
the
ten
,
and
other
citizens
at
sundry
times
were
accus'd
,
and
condemn'd
,
so
that
all
the
Nobility
were
exceedingly
affrighted
,
thinking
they
would
never
leave
condemning
them
,
til
they
had
destroyed
the
whole
Nobility
.
And
certainly
it
had
produc'd
some
inconvenient
in
the
city
,
if
Marcus
Duellius
the
Tribun
had
not
taken
order
for
it
.
Who
made
a
decree
,
that
for
a
whole
year
it
should
not
be
lawfull
for
any
man
to
cite
or
accuse
any
citizen
of
Rome
,
which
assur'd
all
the
Nobility
.
Where
we
see
,
how
great
a
hurt
it
is
to
a
Republique
or
Prince
,
to
hold
their
subjects
minds
in
suspicion
and
fear
with
continual
persecutions
and
punishments
:
and
without
doubt
a
worse
course
cannot
be
taken
.
For
men
that
begin
to
doubt
of
mischief
,
in
any
case
provide
for
themselves
in
their
dangers
,
and
grow
bolder
,
and
less
respectfull
how
they
venture
on
novelties
.
Wherefore
it
is
necessary
either
never
to
hurt
any
,
or
the
hurt
that
is
to
be
done
to
do
at
once
,
and
afterwards
let
men
injoy
some
assurance
,
that
may
give
them
cause
to
quiet
and
settle
their
minds
.
CHAP.
XLVI
.
Men
arise
by
degrees
from
one
ambition
to
another
:
and
first
they
aime
no
further
,
then
that
they
themselves
suffer
no
hurt
of
others
,
afterwards
they
strive
to
be
able
to
hurt
others
.
THe
people
of
Rome
having
recovered
their
liberty
,
and
being
return'd
into
their
former
state
,
or
rather
greater
,
insomuch
as
they
had
made
new
laws
,
which
were
as
new
foundations
laid
to
establish
their
power
,
it
seem'd
probable
,
that
Rome
for
some
while
would
have
bin
at
quiet
;
yet
by
experience
the
contrary
was
seen
,
for
every
day
there
sprung
up
new
tumults
and
new
disagreements
.
And
because
Titus
Livius
very
judiciously
gives
the
reason
from
whence
they
grew
,
methinks
it
is
not
out
of
purpose
,
punctually
to
relate
his
words
where
he
sayes
,
that
alwaies
either
the
people
or
the
Nobility
waxed
proud
,
when
the
other
grew
humble
;
and
when
the
Commons
containd
themselves
modestly
within
their
bounds
,
then
began
the
youth
of
the
Nobility
to
provoke
them
with
all
manner
of
injuries
;
nor
could
the
Tribuns
much
remedy
this
,
for
they
also
had
their
shares
in
the
sufferance
.
The
Nobility
on
the
other
side
,
although
well
they
wot
that
their
youth
was
too
insolent
,
yet
being
that
insolency
was
to
be
committed
by
one
side
,
they
wished
rather
their
own
should
be
the
actors
,
then
the
commonalty
.
And
thus
the
desire
of
maintaining
the
liberty
caused
each
to
proceed
so
far
til
they
oppressed
the
other
.
And
the
order
of
these
accidents
is
,
that
while
men
endeavor
to
be
out
of
fear
themselves
,
they
begin
to
put
others
in
fear
;
and
that
injury
which
they
chase
from
themselves
,
they
thrust
upon
another
,
as
if
there
were
a
necessity
either
to
hurt
or
to
be
hurt
.
Hereby
is
seen
in
what
manner
among
other
things
Common-wealths
come
to
dissolution
,
and
men
rise
from
one
ambition
to
another
.
And
as
that
sentence
of
Salust
put
in
Caesars
mouth
,
was
very
true
;
That
all
evil
examples
first
spring
from
good
beginnings
.
The
first
thing
that
those
citizens
(
as
is
above
said
)
endeavor
,
who
behave
themselves
ambitiously
in
a
Republick
,
is
,
not
onely
to
be
out
of
the
reach
of
private
mens
wrongs
,
but
out
of
the
Magistrates
power
.
To
attain
hereto
,
they
seek
after
friendships
,
which
they
gain
by
means
,
in
appearance
honest
,
either
by
supplying
their
want
of
moneys
,
or
by
protecting
them
from
those
that
are
too
mighty
for
them
.
And
because
this
seems
worthy
and
noble
,
every
one
is
easily
deceived
,
and
thereupon
no
body
seeks
to
remedy
it
,
till
he
presevering
in
the
same
course
without
let
,
becomes
such
a
one
,
that
the
private
Citizens
stand
in
aw
of
him
,
and
the
Magistrates
bear
him
respect
.
And
when
he
is
grown
to
this
height
,
and
no
order
first
taken
for
restraint
of
his
greatness
,
he
comes
to
be
in
such
termes
,
that
it
proves
very
dangerous
to
justle
with
him
,
for
the
causes
I
have
formerly
alleadged
,
of
the
danger
there
is
to
strive
with
an
inconvenient
,
which
is
already
come
to
some
growth
in
a
city
,
because
then
it
is
brought
to
such
an
exigent
,
that
there
is
a
necessity
to
seek
either
to
extinguish
it
with
danger
of
sudden
ruine
:
or
letting
it
alone
,
to
submit
to
the
yoke
of
bondage
,
unless
death
or
some
other
accident
prevent
it
.
For
being
once
come
to
the
terms
above
written
,
that
both
citizens
and
Magistrates
stand
in
fear
to
offend
him
,
and
his
,
without
much
adoe
after
will
they
understand
their
own
strength
,
and
hurt
at
their
own
pleasure
.
Whereupon
a
Republique
among
her
wayes
of
government
ought
to
use
this
,
to
watch
carefully
over
her
citizens
,
that
they
have
not
power
under
the
colour
of
good
to
do
mischief
:
and
that
their
reputation
be
such
as
may
advantage
the
Commonwealth
,
and
not
wrong
it
,
as
in
its
own
place
we
shall
argue
it
.
CHAP.
XLVII
.
Men
,
though
they
are
deceiv'd
in
generalities
,
yet
are
they
not
so
easily
beguiled
in
particulars
.
THE
people
of
Rome
(
as
is
abovesaid
)
having
taken
in
distaste
the
very
name
of
Consuls
,
&
being
desirous
that
Plebeyans
might
be
made
Consuls
,
or
their
authority
limited
,
the
Nobility
,
that
the
Consular
authority
might
as
well
be
chosen
out
of
the
Commons
as
the
Nobility
;
The
people
were
herewith
contented
,
thinking
to
abolish
the
Consulate
,
and
to
have
their
share
in
this
highest
dignity
Hence
grew
a
notable
accident
,
that
when
they
came
to
create
these
Tribuns
,
which
they
could
have
made
all
Plebeyans
,
the
people
chose
Titus
Livius
uses
these
words
:
The
event
of
these
assemblies
,
or
Councils
,
shewed
,
that
mindes
differ
much
,
when
contention
is
made
for
liberty
or
honour
,
and
when
all
strife
being
appeas'd
,
the
judgments
rest
clear
.
And
examining
from
whence
this
proceeds
,
I
beleeve
it
is
from
thence
that
men
are
more
deceiv'd
in
generalities
,
than
in
particularities
.
The
Common
people
of
Rome
thought
generally
,
they
deserv'd
the
Consulate
,
because
they
were
the
greatest
part
of
the
City
,
because
they
underwent
the
greater
dangers
in
the
wars
,
because
they
were
they
,
by
force
of
whose
armes
Rome
maintain'd
her
liberty
,
and
became
mighty
.
And
thinking
(
as
is
said
)
this
their
desire
reasonable
,
they
would
have
this
authority
in
any
case
.
But
when
they
came
to
pass
their
judgments
in
particular
upon
their
own
men
,
they
perceiv'd
their
weakness
,
and
judg'd
that
no
one
of
them
deserv'd
that
,
which
raking
them
all
together
,
they
thought
they
had
bin
worthy
of
.
So
that
being
asham'd
of
them
,
they
had
recourse
to
those
that
were
of
merit
:
At
which
resolution
Titus
Livius
worthily
marvailing
,
sayes
thus
;
This
modesty
,
uprightness
,
and
greatness
of
mind
,
where
shall
you
now
adayes
find
it
in
one
man
,
which
then
was
in
whole
people
?
In
confirmation
hereof
,
another
notable
example
may
be
brought
which
happen'd
in
Capua
,
after
that
Hanniball
had
broken
the
Roman
army
at
Cannae
:
upon
which
occasion
all
Italy
being
in
an
uproar
,
Capua
was
ready
to
rise
too
,
for
the
hatred
there
was
between
the
people
and
the
Senate
.
And
at
that
time
Pacuvius
Calanus
being
the
principal
Magistrate
,
and
perceiving
the
great
hazzard
they
went
to
be
slain
by
them
,
and
the
city
yielded
up
to
Hanniball
,
now
that
the
State
of
Rome
was
in
distress
.
Afterwards
he
added
,
that
if
they
would
let
him
order
the
business
,
he
would
provide
so
,
that
they
should
be
both
friends
;
but
he
would
shut
them
all
up
in
the
Palace
,
and
by
giving
the
people
power
over
them
to
chastise
them
,
save
them
.
The
Senators
yielded
to
his
advice
,
and
he
call'd
the
people
together
,
having
the
whole
Senate
shut
up
in
the
Palace
,
and
said
,
that
the
time
was
come
wherein
they
might
take
down
the
Nobilities
pride
,
and
revenge
themselves
on
them
for
the
injuryes
they
had
received
at
their
hands
,
he
holding
them
all
prisoners
in
his
keeping
:
but
because
he
thought
they
liked
not
their
City
should
be
without
government
,
it
was
fit
(
being
they
intended
to
kill
the
old
Senators
)
to
create
new
ones
first
.
And
therefore
he
had
put
the
names
of
all
the
Senators
in
a
bag
,
and
so
would
begin
to
draw
them
forth
one
by
one
before
them
;
and
so
put
them
to
death
presently
,
as
soon
as
they
should
have
made
choice
of
a
Successor
.
And
having
begun
to
take
out
one
,
when
he
was
nam'd
,
there
was
a
great
noise
made
,
calling
him
a
proud
,
cruell
,
and
arrogant
man
.
And
Pacu
〈…〉
vius
requiring
that
they
should
make
an
exchange
of
him
,
the
whole
multitudestood
silent
.
And
after
a
little
while
one
of
the
Commons
was
named
:
whereat
one
began
to
whistle
,
another
to
laugh
,
some
to
speak
in
one
sort
,
some
in
another
.
And
so
followed
all
the
rest
one
after
another
as
they
were
nam'd
,
being
thought
unworthy
to
be
made
Senators
,
so
that
Pacuvius
hereupon
taking
occasion
,
sayd
'
seeing
that
you
judge
that
this
City
must
needs
be
in
ill
case
without
a
Senate
,
and
you
are
not
agreed
to
change
your
old
Senators
,
I
think
it
would
be
well
that
ye
were
made
friends
;
for
this
fright
wherein
the
Senators
have
bin
put
will
so
humble
them
,
that
the
courtesie
which
ye
sought
otherwhere
,
ye
shall
find
with
them
.
And
hereunto
being
agreed
,
there
followed
the
union
;
and
it
was
plain
,
how
they
were
deceived
,
when
they
were
forc'd
to
come
to
particulars
.
Besides
,
people
in
judging
generally
of
affairs
and
their
accidents
are
beguil'd
,
which
they
afterwards
understand
in
particular
,
and
perceive
the
deceit
.
After
the
year
1494.
the
Principal
men
of
the
City
being
chac't
out
of
Florence
,
and
there
being
not
any
orderly
government
,
but
rather
an
ambitious
licentiousness
,
so
that
things
went
from
bad
to
worse
,
many
of
the
popular
faction
perceiving
the
destruction
of
the
City
,
and
understanding
no
other
cause
thereof
,
they
blam'd
the
ambition
of
some
powerfull
man
,
that
nourish'd
these
disorders
,
to
the
end
he
might
make
of
it
a
State
to
his
own
purpose
,
and
take
away
the
liberty
;
and
these
men
were
alwayes
in
the
publique
places
of
meeting
,
speaking
evil
of
many
Citizens
,
and
threatning
them
,
that
if
ever
they
came
to
the
government
of
the
State
,
they
would
discover
this
their
treachery
and
chastise
it
.
It
happen'd
oftentimes
,
that
some
of
these
or
the
like
were
prefer'd
to
the
Principal
Magistracy
,
and
when
they
were
once
in
the
place
,
and
saw
things
nearer
,
they
knew
well
the
disorders
from
whence
they
grew
,
and
the
dangers
that
hung
over
them
,
and
the
difficulty
to
remedy
them
.
And
having
seen
how
the
times
and
not
the
men
caus'd
the
disorder
,
became
forthwith
of
another
mind
,
and
chang'd
their
opinion
.
For
the
knowledg
of
things
in
particular
took
away
that
deceit
,
which
when
they
considered
generally
,
was
presupposed
in
them
:
so
that
they
that
had
first
,
when
they
were
private
men
,
heard
them
speak
,
and
saw
them
afterwards
being
prefer'd
to
the
chief
Magistracy
stand
quiet
,
thought
it
came
not
from
an
exacter
knowledge
of
things
,
but
because
they
had
bin
carried
away
,
and
corrupted
by
the
great
ones
.
And
this
befalling
many
men
many
times
,
it
came
to
a
Proverb
,
that
said
,
these
are
of
one
mind
in
the
piazza
,
and
of
another
in
the
palace
.
Considering
therefore
this
whole
discourse
,
we
see
,
how
a
man
may
quickly
open
the
peoples
eyes
,
for
seeing
that
a
generality
deceives
them
,
it
is
expedient
to
bring
them
to
descend
to
particulars
,
as
Pacuvius
did
in
Capua
,
and
the
Senate
in
Rome
.
I
think
also
,
this
may
pass
for
a
conclusion
,
that
no
wise
man
ought
to
avoyd
the
peoples
judgment
in
particular
things
,
about
the
distributions
of
degrees
and
dignities
:
for
onely
in
this
the
people
are
not
deceived
;
or
if
sometime
they
are
deceived
,
it
is
very
seldom
;
but
a
few
men
are
oftentimes
deceived
,
when
they
are
to
make
the
like
distribution
:
Nor
do
I
take
it
to
be
superfluous
,
to
shew
,
in
the
next
Chapter
,
the
order
the
Senate
held
to
clear
the
peoples
judgments
in
these
distributions
.
CHAP.
XLVIII
.
He
that
would
not
have
a
Magistracy
given
to
one
that
is
base
and
lewd
,
let
him
cause
it
to
be
demanded
either
by
one
that
is
very
base
and
lewd
,
or
by
one
that
is
noble
and
very
good
.
WHen
the
Senate
was
afraid
that
the
Tribuns
with
Consular
authority
would
be
chosen
out
of
the
Plebeyans
,
they
held
one
of
these
two
courses
to
prevent
it
:
either
they
made
some
of
the
best
reputed
men
of
Rome
stand
for
the
magistracy
,
or
they
used
fit
means
to
corrupt
some
forbid
Plebeyan
and
of
the
basest
condition
,
who
crept
in
to
be
competitor
with
the
Plebeyans
that
usually
of
the
best
quality
stood
for
it
.
This
last
way
made
the
people
asham'd
to
bestow
it
,
and
the
first
asham'd
to
refuse
it
,
all
which
turnes
to
the
purpose
of
our
former
discourse
:
where
it
s
shewed
,
though
the
people
be
deceived
in
generals
,
yet
is
it
not
in
particulars
.
CHAP.
XLIX
.
If
those
cities
that
have
had
their
beginning
free
,
as
Rome
,
have
found
difficulty
to
make
lawes
that
can
maintain
them
;
so
those
that
have
had
their
beginning
immediatly
servile
,
find
almost
an
impossibility
of
it
.
How
hard
a
thing
it
is
,
in
the
ordering
of
a
Republique
to
make
provision
of
all
such
laws
as
may
keep
it
free
,
the
proceedings
of
the
Roman
Republique
does
well
shew
;
Where
notwithstanding
that
many
lawes
were
made
first
by
R●mulus
,
after
by
Numa
,
Tullus
Hostilius
,
and
Servius
,
and
last
by
the
ten
Citizens
created
for
the
like
work
,
nevertheless
alwaies
in
the
managing
of
that
city
new
necessities
were
discover'd
,
and
it
was
needfull
to
make
new
laws
:
as
it
befell
when
they
created
the
Censours
,
which
was
one
of
those
orders
that
help'd
to
keep
Rome
free
at
that
time
when
she
liv'd
in
liberty
:
for
being
made
Arbiters
of
the
fashions
and
manners
of
Rome
,
they
were
a
special
occasion
that
Rome
held
off
so
long
from
being
corrupted
.
Indeed
in
the
beginning
of
that
Magistracy
they
committed
one
error
creating
it
for
five
years
:
but
not
long
after
wards
it
was
amended
by
the
wisdome
of
Mamercus
the
Dictator
,
who
,
by
a
new
law
he
made
,
reduc'd
the
said
magistracy
to
the
terms
of
eighteen
moneths
.
Which
the
Censour
,
that
were
then
in
office
took
so
much
a
miss
that
they
put
Mamercus
out
of
the
Senate
'
which
thing
was
much
blam'd
both
by
the
people
and
the
fathers
.
And
because
the
story
shews
not
any
where
,
that
Mamercus
could
defend
himself
,
it
must
needs
be
,
that
either
the
historian
was
defective
,
or
the
laws
of
Rome
in
this
part
not
perfect
:
for
it
is
not
well
,
that
in
a
Commonwealth
it
should
so
be
ordein'd
,
that
a
citizen
for
publishing
a
law
agreeable
to
the
liberty
they
liv'd
in
,
should
be
wrong'd
without
any
remedy
,
But
returning
to
the
beginning
of
this
discourse
;
I
say
,
that
a
man
ought
to
consider
by
the
creation
of
this
new
magistrate
,
that
if
those
cities
that
have
had
their
beginnings
free
,
and
were
under
their
own
government
,
as
Rome
,
with
much
adoe
can
find
out
good
laws
to
maintain
them
free
,
it
is
no
marvel
,
that
those
cities
which
have
had
their
beginnings
immediatly
servile
,
have
not
found
not
onely
difficulty
,
but
impossibity
ever
so
to
order
themselves
,
that
they
can
quietly
come
to
a
civil
government
,
as
appears
it
befell
the
city
of
Florence
,
because
her
beginning
was
in
Subjection
to
the
Roman
Empire
,
and
having
gotten
leisure
to
breathe
,
began
to
make
her
own
laws
,
which
having
bin
mingled
with
the
ancient
,
that
were
naught
,
could
not
work
any
good
effect
,
and
thus
she
proceeded
in
a
government
for
200
years
(
as
we
have
by
certain
relations
)
without
ever
attaining
to
such
a
condition
,
that
she
could
truly
be
term'd
a
Republique
:
and
these
difficulties
which
she
hath
had
,
have
those
Cities
alwaies
had
whose
beginnings
have
bin
like
hers
And
though
many
times
by
publique
and
free
voices
ample
authority
hath
bin
given
to
some
few
Citizens
to
reforme
this
,
yet
never
have
they
order'd
it
to
the
advantage
of
the
publique
,
but
to
serve
the
turn
of
their
own
faction
,
which
hath
caus'd
more
disorder
,
then
order
in
the
City
.
And
to
come
to
some
particular
example
,
I
say
,
among
other
things
which
he
that
ordains
a
Republique
should
consider
,
is
,
that
he
well
advise
to
what
men
he
gives
the
power
of
life
and
death
over
his
Citizens
.
This
was
well
provided
for
in
Rome
;
for
by
ordinary
course
they
might
appeal
to
the
people
:
yet
if
there
were
any
occasion
of
importance
,
where
,
to
delay
execution
,
by
means
of
the
appeal
,
was
dangerous
,
they
had
the
help
of
a
Dictator
,
who
had
power
immediatly
to
execute
;
which
remedy
they
never
us'd
,
but
upon
necessity
.
But
Florence
and
other
Cities
beginning
as
she
did
,
that
is
servile
,
had
this
authority
committed
alwaies
to
a
stranger
,
who
was
sent
by
the
Prince
,
to
this
purpose
.
When
afterwards
they
became
free
,
they
continued
this
authority
in
a
stranger
,
whom
they
called
their
Captain
.
Which
thing
,
because
he
might
easily
be
corrupted
by
the
potent
Citizens
,
was
very
pernicious
.
But
afterwards
this
order
chagning
upon
the
alteration
of
the
states
,
they
ordained
eight
Citizens
,
to
supply
the
Captains
place
.
Which
order
of
evil
became
very
evil
,
for
the
reasons
we
have
otherwhere
alleadged
,
that
a
few
are
alwaies
servants
of
a
few
,
and
especially
of
the
most
wealthy
:
from
which
the
City
of
Veuice
is
well
guarded
,
which
hath
ten
citizens
,
who
have
power
to
punish
any
Citizen
without
appeal
:
and
because
they
would
not
be
of
sufficient
force
to
punish
those
that
are
potent
,
though
they
have
the
authority
they
have
ordained
the
Quarantie
,
or
council
of
forty
:
and
besides
,
they
have
taken
care
,
that
the
council
of
the
Pregai
,
which
is
the
chiefer
council
,
may
punish
them
:
so
that
,
where
there
is
no
want
of
an
accuser
,
they
are
never
destitute
of
a
Judge
,
to
restrain
the
great
mens
insolency
.
There
is
then
no
marvail
(
seeing
that
in
Rome
order'd
by
it self
,
and
by
so
many
sage
persons
,
there
grew
every
day
new
occasions
,
whereupon
new
lawes
were
to
be
made
in
favor
of
the
Common
liberty
)
if
in
other
Cities
which
have
had
their
beginnings
more
disordered
,
there
arise
such
difficulties
that
put
them
quite
past
all
recovery
.
CHAP.
L.
The
power
of
stopping
the
publique
actions
of
the
city
,
should
not
be
given
into
the
hands
of
one
council
,
or
one
magistracy
.
TItus
Quincius
Cincinnatus
;
and
Cneus
Iulius
Mentus
were
Consuls
together
in
Rome
,
who
upon
a
quarrel
arisen
between
them
two
,
made
a
stay
in
all
the
actions
belonging
to
the
Republique
:
which
the
Senate
seeing
,
perswaded
them
to
create
a
Dictator
,
to
the
end
that
might
be
done
,
which
,
by
reason
of
their
discord
,
was
hindred
.
But
the
Consuls
disagreeing
in
every
thing
else
,
in
this
alone
were
of
accord
both
of
them
,
not
to
make
a
Dictator
:
so
that
the
Senate
finding
no
other
help
,
desir'd
assistance
from
the
Tribuns
,
who
with
the
Senates
authority
forc'd
the
Consuls
to
obey
.
Where
the
profitable
use
of
the
Tribunate
is
in
the
first
place
remarkable
,
which
serv'd
to
good
purpose
to
bridle
the
great
mens
ambitions
exercis'd
not
onely
against
the
Common
people
,
but
also
among
themselves
:
in
the
next
place
,
that
it
should
never
be
so
ordain'd
in
a
city
,
that
a
few
should
resolve
of
those
things
that
are
the
ordinary
maintenance
of
a
Common-wealth
.
For
example
,
if
thou
givest
the
power
to
one
Consul
to
make
a
distribution
of
honors
and
profits
,
or
to
a
Magistrate
to
dispatch
some
business
to
be
done
,
it
is
fit
to
impose
a
necessity
on
him
,
that
he
do
it
in
any
case
,
or
so
provide
that
another
might
and
should
do
it
:
otherwise
the
order
would
be
defective
,
and
perilous
,
as
we
see
it
was
in
Rome
,
unless
they
could
have
oppos'd
the
Consuls
obstinacy
with
the
Tribuns
authority
.
In
the
Commonwealth
of
Venice
the
great
council
bestows
both
the
honors
and
the
profits
.
It
sometime
chanc't
,
that
the
universality
upon
some
disdaine
conceiv'd
,
or
by
reason
of
some
false
suggestion
did
not
make
choice
of
any
successours
to
the
Magistrates
of
their
Cities
,
nor
to
their
Ministers
of
State
abroad
,
which
was
a
very
great
disorder
;
for
all
at
once
,
their
Townes
and
Cities
wanted
their
lawfull
Iudges
;
nor
could
any
thing
be
obtained
while
the
universality
were
appeased
,
or
were
no
longer
deceived
.
And
this
inconvenient
would
have
brought
those
Cities
to
ill
termes
,
had
not
some
discreet
Citizens
otherwise
taken
order
for
them
.
Who
having
layd
hold
of
a
fit
occasion
,
made
a
law
,
that
all
the
Magistrates
within
or
without
the
Citie
should
continue
still
in
their
offices
,
till
new
choice
were
made
,
and
their
successours
appointed
.
And
thus
they
tooke
away
from
that
counsell
all
opportunity
of
enabling
them
,
with
the
Commonwealths
danger
,
to
stop
the
publique
actions
.
CHAP.
LI.
A
Commonwealth
or
Prince
should
make
a
shew
to
doe
that
of
a
free
mind
,
which
indeed
meere
necessitie
compells
them
to
doe
.
WIse
men
gaine
themselves
alwayes
the
thanks
of
every
thing
in
their
actions
,
although
in
truth
meere
necessitie
constraines
them
in
any
case
to
doe
them
.
This
discretion
was
well
made
use
of
by
the
Romane
Senate
,
when
they
resolv'd
to
ad
a
dayly
stipend
out
of
the
Common
treasury
to
those
that
served
in
the
warres
;
it
being
then
of
custome
there
to
serve
as
their
own
proper
charges
.
But
the
Senate
ceiving
,
that
after
that
manner
they
could
not
long
make
warre
;
and
hereupon
neither
could
they
besiege
townes
,
nor
lead
their
armies
farre
off
;
and
judging
it
needfull
they
should
doe
the
one
and
the
other
,
they
determined
to
allow
the
sayd
stipends
,
which
they
did
in
such
a
way
,
that
they
got
themselves
thanks
for
that
,
to
which
they
were
bound
by
necessitie
.
And
this
present
was
so
acceptable
to
the
people
,
that
all
Rome
seem'd
overjoyd
with
it
,
they
thinking
it
to
be
a
great
benefit
,
which
they
never
had
hopes
of
,
nor
of
themselves
had
ever
sought
after
.
And
though
the
Tribuns
did
their
best
to
blot
out
these
thanks
,
by
shewing
it
was
a
matter
of
grievance
and
not
of
case
to
the
people
,
seeing
of
necessitie
they
were
to
impose
greater
taxes
on
them
,
wherewith
to
pay
these
stipends
,
yet
could
they
not
prevayle
so
much
,
but
that
the
people
tooke
it
very
thankfully
.
Which
also
the
Senate
augmented
by
the
course
they
tooke
in
ordering
of
the
tributes
.
For
the
greatest
and
heaviest
were
those
they
layd
upon
the
Nobilitie
,
and
so
were
those
that
were
first
payd
.
CHAP.
LII
.
To
stay
the
insolence
of
one
that
growes
powerfull
in
a
Commonwealth
,
there
is
no
way
more
secure
,
and
lesse
offensive
,
than
to
seike
before
hand
,
and
so
prevent
him
of
those
wayes
by
which
he
attains
to
that
power
.
WEe
see
by
the
above
written
discourse
,
how
great
credit
the
Nobility
got
with
the
people
,
upon
the
demonstrations
make
for
their
advantage
,
as
well
by
the
stipend
appoined
,
as
also
by
the
course
they
tooke
in
imposing
the
taxes
:
in
which
way
if
the
Nobilitie
had
continued
,
they
had
wholly
avoyded
all
manner
of
tumult
in
that
Citie
,
and
they
had
taken
from
the
Tribuns
the
credit
they
had
with
the
people
,
and
by
consequence
their
authority
.
And
truly
it
is
not
possible
in
a
Commonwealth
,
especially
in
those
that
are
corrupted
,
by
any
better
way
,
lesse
hurtfull
,
and
more
easy
to
oppose
the
ambition
of
any
Citizen
,
than
to
prepossesse
those
wayes
,
by
which
a
man
perceives
he
takes
his
course
,
to
attaine
that
dignitie
hee
aymes
at
.
Which
meanes
if
they
had
put
in
practise
against
Cosmus
of
Medici
,
his
adversaries
had
gotten
more
by
the
bargaine
,
than
by
chasing
him
from
Florence
:
For
if
those
Citizens
that
were
at
brabble
with
him
had
taken
the
course
to
favour
the
people
,
they
had
without
any
imbroyle
or
violence
taken
out
of
his
hands
those
weapons
which
were
to
him
of
greatest
advantage
.
Peter
Soderini
gain'd
himself
credit
with
this
onely
in
the
Citie
of
Florence
,
that
he
favou'd
the
universality
.
Which
universality
gave
him
the
repute
,
to
be
a
lover
of
the
Cities
libertie
.
And
surely
for
those
Citizens
that
envyed
his
greatnesse
,
it
was
much
easier
,
and
had
bin
a
businesse
of
fairer
carriage
,
of
lesse
danger
and
dammage
to
the
Commonwealth
,
to
lay
hold
before
hand
of
those
wayes
by
which
he
became
great
,
than
by
offering
to
oppose
him
,
lest
that
in
ruining
him
,
the
whole
remainder
of
the
Common-wealth
also
should
have
fallen
to
ruine
.
For
if
they
could
have
taken
out
of
his
hands
the
forces
whereby
hee
became
strong
,
which
they
might
easily
have
done
,
they
could
in
all
their
publique
counsells
and
resolutions
have
oppos'd
him
without
suspicion
or
regard
.
And
if
any
man
should
reply
,
that
if
the
Citizens
that
hated
Peter
committed
an
orrour
in
not
prepossessing
the
wayes
wherby
he
gain'd
upon
the
people
:
Peter
also
came
to
commit
an
errour
in
not
laying
hold
beforehand
of
those
wayes
by
which
his
adversaries
frighted
him
:
I
answer
,
that
Peter
deserves
excuse
,
as
well
because
it
was
hard
for
him
to
doe
it
,
as
because
the
meanes
were
not
fit
for
him
to
use
.
For
the
wayes
by
which
he
was
hurt
,
were
to
favour
the
house
of
Medici
,
by
which
favours
they
overmaster'd
him
,
and
at
last
ruin'd
him
.
Yet
Peter
could
not
fairely
take
his
part
,
because
hee
could
not
with
any
good
repute
destroy
that
libertie
,
over
which
hee
was
appointed
as
guardian
;
and
seeing
these
favors
could
not
passe
in
private
,
they
were
suddenly
exceeding
dangerous
to
Peter
:
for
what
way
soever
it
had
bin
that
he
had
bin
discover'd
to
be
a
friend
of
the
Medici
,
he
had
fallen
into
the
jealousie
,
and
incurr'd
the
hatred
of
the
people
.
Whereupon
his
enemyes
had
had
greater
power
to
suppresse
him
,
then
formerly
they
had
.
Therefore
men
ought
in
every
resolution
,
consider
the
defects
and
dangers
thereunto
belonging
,
and
not
fasten
on
any
one
of
them
,
when
they
carry
with
them
more
danger
then
profit
,
notwithstanding
that
they
seeme
well
to
tend
to
the
end
propounded
:
for
being
otherwise
,
in
this
case
it
would
befall
them
,
as
it
befell
Tullius
,
who
by
going
about
to
diminish
Marc
Antonius
his
power
,
increas'd
it
.
For
Marc
Antonius
being
judged
an
enemy
of
the
Senate
,
and
he
having
got
together
a
great
army
,
good
part
whereof
had
followed
Caesars
faction
,
Tullius
to
take
these
souldiers
from
him
,
perswaded
the
Senate
to
set
up
the
reputation
of
Octavianus
,
and
seng
him
accompanied
with
the
Consuls
,
and
an
armie
against
Marc
Antonius
;
alleadging
,
that
so
soone
as
ere
the
souldiers
that
followed
Marc
Antonius
should
heare
the
name
of
Octavianus
,
Caesars
nephew
,
and
that
would
be
call'd
Caesar
too
,
they
would
forsake
the
other
,
and
follow
this
.
So
that
Marc
Antonius
being
dispossest
of
his
advantages
would
easily
be
suppressed
.
Which
fell
out
cleane
contrary
.
For
Marc
Antonius
got
Octavianus
to
his
part
,
who
leaving
〈…〉
lius
and
the
Senate
joyned
forces
with
him
.
Which
thing
proov'd
wholly
the
ruine
of
those
great
mens
party
.
Which
also
it
was
easy
to
have
conjectur'd
:
nor
was
that
credible
which
Tullius
perswaded
himselfe
;
but
he
should
rather
have
made
account
,
that
neither
that
name
that
with
so
great
glory
had
exterminated
his
enemies
,
and
gain'd
himself
the
principality
in
Rome
,
nor
yet
his
heirs
,
or
adherents
,
would
ever
suffer
them
quietly
to
injoy
their
libertie
.
CHAP.
LIII
.
The
people
deceiv'd
by
a
false
shew
of
good
oftentimes
seek
their
owne
ruine
;
and
that
great
hope
and
large
promises
doe
easily
move
them
.
WHen
the
●yentes
Citie
was
taken
,
the
people
of
Rome
were
possess'd
of
an
opinion
,
that
it
would
be
profitable
for
them
to
send
halfe
the
Romans
to
dwell
at
Veyum
:
and
because
that
Citie
had
a
plentifull
country
about
it
,
frequent
with
buildings
,
and
neare
neighbouring
to
Rome
,
halfe
of
the
Romane
Citizens
might
thereby
be
enrich't
,
without
giving
any
disturbance
to
the
civill
government
by
reason
of
their
neare
scituation
.
Which
thing
the
Senate
and
the
graver
Romans
thought
so
unprofitable
or
rather
so
hurtfull
,
that
they
freely
profess'd
,
they
would
rather
suffer
death
,
then
agree
to
any
such
matter
:
so
that
the
businesse
coming
to
dispute
,
did
so
iorage
the
people
against
the
Senate
,
that
they
had
come
to
blowes
and
to
bloud
,
had
not
some
of
the
graver
and
reverenter
Citizens
oppos'd
themselves
against
their
furie
;
whose
regard
bridled
the
people
so
,
that
they
proceeded
not
in
their
insolencie
.
Here
two
things
are
to
be
noted
,
the
first
,
〈◊〉
people
many
times
deceived
by
an
imaginary
good
,
cover
their
owne
ruine
;
and
unlesse
they
be
given
to
understand
,
which
is
the
evill
,
and
which
the
good
,
by
some
man
they
trust
,
the
Republiques
ordinarily
run
much
hazzard
.
And
when
it
so
falls
out
,
that
the
people
hath
no
great
confidence
in
any
one
,
as
sometimes
it
comes
to
passe
,
having
bin
of
late
deceived
either
by
things
,
or
men
,
of
necessitie
they
goe
to
ruine
.
And
Dante
,
to
this
purpose
,
sayes
,
in
his
discourse
of
a
Monarchie
:
A
populo
molte
volte
grida
,
Viva
la
sua
morte
amocoia
lavita
The
vulgar
oftimes
their
own
ruine
chuse
And
life
for
death
ignorantly
refuse
.
From
this
increduliti
〈…〉
ises
,
that
sometimes
in
Commonwealths
good
courses
are
not
taken
,
as
formerly
it
was
sayd
touching
the
Venetians
,
when
being
set
upon
by
so
many
enemyes
,
they
could
not
resolve
till
they
were
quite
ruin'd
,
to
gain
any
of
them
againe
,
by
restitution
of
what
they
had
wrongfully
taken
Whereupon
warre
was
made
against
them
,
and
a
conspiracie
of
the
Princes
.
Wherefore
when
we
consider
here
,
that
which
is
easy
,
and
that
which
is
hard
to
perswade
a
people
to
,
this
distinction
is
to
be
made
.
Either
,
that
which
thou
art
to
perswade
them
to
,
represents
at
the
first
view
gaine
or
losse
;
or
is
a
course
that
carryes
somwhat
in
it
of
courage
or
cowardise
,
And
when
in
things
that
are
propounded
to
the
people
,
there
appears
advantage
,
though
cover
ly
therebe
disadvantage
in
it
;
and
when
it
seemes
couragious
,
though
underneath
there
be
covertly
hid
the
destruction
of
the
Republique
,
it
will
alwayes
be
very
easy
to
draw
the
multitude
thereto
.
And
so
likewise
it
will
bee
alwayes
very
difficult
to
perswade
them
to
those
courses
,
where
there
appears
either
cowardise
or
losse
,
though
when
it
is
better
weigh'd
and
advis'd
upon
,
therin
is
contein'd
both
safety
and
advantage
.
And
what
I
have
said
is
confirmed
with
very
many
examples
of
the
Romans
,
as
also
with
those
from
abroad
,
both
moderne
and
ancient
.
For
from
hence
grew
the
evill
opinion
which
was
rais'd
in
Rome
of
Fab
Max.
who
could
not
perswade
the
people
of
Rome
,
that
it
was
profitable
for
that
commonwealth
to
proceed
slowly
in
that
war
,
&
to
susteine
and
beare
up
against
Hanniballs
violence
without
fighting
:
for
the
people
deem'd
it
a
base
course
,
nor
had
they
judgement
to
discerne
the
advantage
there
was
to
be
gotten
by
it
:
nor
had
Fab.
reasons
sufficient
to
make
it
plaine
by
demonstrations
:
&
ordinarily
the
people
are
so
much
blinded
in
these
opinions
of
courage
,
that
though
they
of
Rome
had
committed
that
error
to
give
power
to
him
that
was
Commander
of
the
horse
under
Fab.
to
fight
with
Hannib
.
whether
F.
would
or
no
,
&
that
by
reason
thereof
the
Roman
army
had
like
to
have
bin
broken
,
if
F.
had
not
succourd
it
,
yet
this
experience
serv'd
them
not
,
but
that
they
afterwards
made
Varro
C.
not
for
any
other
worth
of
his
,
but
because
in
al
meetings
&
publique
places
of
Rome
,
he
had
bragg'd
he
would
discomfit
Han.
whensoever
he
had
power
given
him
to
do
it
:
whence
came
the
battell
&
discomfiture
at
Cannae
,
&
near
upon
the
ruine
of
Rome
.
I
will
alleadge
one
other
Ro.
example
.
Hanniball
had
bin
in
Italy
8.
or
10.
yeares
,
&
had
fill'd
the
whole
country
full
of
bloudy
slaughters
of
the
Romans
,
when
there
came
into
the
Senate
one
M.
Centenius
Penula
,
a
very
base
fellow
,
yet
he
had
had
some
place
of
charge
in
the
armie
;
And
offer'd
,
that
if
they
would
give
him
authoritie
to
leavy
an
armie
of
voluntaries
,
in
what
place
soever
it
were
in
Italie
,
hee
would
in
a
short
time
deliver
into
their
hands
Hanniball
,
either
prisoner
or
dead
.
The
Senate
thought
his
demand
very
rash
,
yet
they
considering
that
if
it
were
denied
him
,
and
afterwards
his
motion
were
made
knowne
to
the
people
,
that
some
trouble
might
arise
thereupon
,
and
so
the
evill
will
and
envy
thereof
light
upon
the
Senate
,
they
yielded
to
him
,
being
content
rather
to
suffer
the
hazzard
of
all
those
that
went
out
with
him
,
then
to
give
any
occasion
of
raising
new
discontents
among
the
people
,
considering
how
likely
this
course
was
to
be
acceptable
,
and
how
hard
to
be
disswaded
.
He
went
then
with
this
inordinate
and
rude
multitude
to
seek
out
Hanniball
,
with
whom
he
no
sooner
met
,
but
he
and
all
his
troops
were
either
slaine
or
routed
.
In
Greece
in
the
city
of
Athens
,
Nicias
a
very
grave
and
discreet
man
,
could
never
perswade
the
people
that
it
was
not
for
their
good
to
go
and
undertake
an
expedition
against
Sicily
,
so
that
they
having
resolved
thereupon
,
contrary
to
the
wise
mens
likeings
,
there
ensued
the
whole
ruine
of
Athens
.
Scipio
when
he
was
made
Consull
,
and
that
he
desir'd
the
province
of
Affricke
,
promising
the
utter
ruine
of
Carthage
,
whereunto
the
Senate
not
agreeing
by
the
advice
of
Fabius
Maximus
,
threatened
to
propound
it
to
the
people
,
as
he
that
well
knew
how
such
like
resolutions
pleas'd
them
.
We
could
also
to
this
purpose
lay
downe
some
examples
of
our
owne
city
,
as
was
that
of
Hercules
Betivogli
,
commander
for
the
Florentines
,
together
with
Antoni
Giacomini
;
after
they
had
routed
Bartolomeus
Alvianus
at
Saint
Vincenti
,
they
went
to
incampe
before
Pisa
,
which
enterprise
was
resolv'd
on
by
the
people
upon
the
brave
promises
Hercules
made
them
;
though
many
discreet
citizens
did
no
way
like
of
it
,
yet
they
could
not
hinder
it
,
thrust
on
by
the
generall
desire
,
which
was
grounded
on
the
commanders
large
promises
.
I
say
therefore
,
that
there
is
not
an
easier
way
to
inlarge
a
Commonwealth
,
where
the
people
hath
the
authority
,
then
to
put
them
into
brave
undertakings
.
For
where
the
people
is
of
any
worth
or
valour
,
those
will
be
alwayes
well
lik'd
of
,
and
if
any
man
be
of
different
opinion
,
he
shall
not
be
of
force
to
perswade
it
.
But
if
hereupon
comes
the
destruction
of
the
city
,
thence
proceeds
also
,
and
most
ordinarily
the
particular
ruine
of
those
citizens
who
are
made
the
commanders
of
such
like
undertakings
;
for
the
people
having
presupposed
the
victory
,
when
they
go
by
the
losse
,
never
impute
it
to
their
General
's
evill
fortune
or
want
of
sufficient
forces
,
but
blame
him
rather
of
treason
or
ignorance
,
and
so
either
put
him
to
death
,
imprison
or
confine
him
,
as
it
befell
very
many
Carthaginian
Captains
,
and
Athenians
.
Nor
shall
any
of
the
former
victories
gloriously
gotten
,
afterwards
shelter
them
,
for
the
present
mishap
cancels
the
records
of
all
good
past
:
as
it
befell
Antoni
Giacomini
our
countrey
man
here
,
who
not
having
overcome
the
Pisans
,
as
the
people
presupposed
,
and
he
had
promised
,
fell
into
such
disgrace
with
the
people
,
that
for
all
his
many
good
services
past
,
he
lived
rather
by
the
courtesy
of
those
that
having
power
with
the
people
,
protected
him
,
then
by
any
assurance
else
was
given
him
.
CHAP.
LIV.
What
authority
the
presence
of
great
and
worthy
personages
hath
to
appease
and
quiet
the
rage
of
a
multitude
.
THe
second
thing
remarkable
upon
the
text
alleadged
in
the
former
Chapter
is
,
that
nothing
so
readily
restrains
the
fury
of
a
multitude
inraged
,
as
the
reverence
of
some
grave
man
comming
among
them
,
as
Virgil
sayes
to
the
same
purpose
,
and
not
without
reason
.
Tum
pietate
gravem
ac
meritis
si
forte
virum
quem
Conspexere
,
silent
,
arrectisque
auribus
astant
.
And
therefore
that
man
of
worth
and
merit
,
that
either
hath
the
command
of
an
army
,
or
that
abides
in
a
city
where
a
tumult
arises
,
ought
represent
himself
upon
the
occasion
,
with
the
greatest
grace
,
and
in
as
honorable
termes
as
may
be
,
cladding
himself
with
the
ornaments
belonging
to
his
degree
and
quality
,
to
gain
him
the
more
reverence
.
A
few
years
agoe
,
Florence
was
divided
into
two
factions
,
of
the
Frateschi
and
Arrabiati
,
for
so
they
were
called
:
and
comming
to
blowes
,
the
Frateschi
were
overcome
,
among
whom
was
Paul
Antonius
Sodorini
,
a
citizen
of
great
esteem
in
those
dayes
:
and
the
people
in
the
time
of
those
tumults
going
in
armes
to
sack
his
house
,
Franciscus
his
brother
then
Bishop
of
Valterra
,
and
now
Cardinal
,
was
by
chance
in
his
house
,
who
presently
having
perceived
the
stir
,
and
seen
the
multitude
comming
,
clad
himself
with
his
most
honorable
vestments
and
thereupon
his
episcopal
rochet
,
and
so
met
these
armed
people
,
where
by
the
awfulness
of
his
person
and
good
words
he
staid
them
:
Which
thing
throughout
the
City
for
many
dayes
was
much
noted
and
celebrated
.
I
conclude
then
that
there
is
not
a
more
setled
nor
more
necessary
remedy
to
stop
the
fury
of
a
multitude
,
then
the
presence
of
such
a
man
,
who
in
his
aspect
and
worth
brings
an
awful
reverence
with
him
.
And
thereupon
we
see
(
to
return
to
the
text
formerly
alleadged
)
with
what
obstinacy
the
Commons
of
Rome
accepted
the
party
,
to
go
to
Veium
,
thinking
it
advantagious
to
them
,
but
never
considering
the
mischief
therein
involved
;
and
how
being
there
arose
divers
tumults
upon
the
occasion
,
there
would
have
bin
harme
done
,
had
not
the
Senate
accompanied
with
many
grave
and
reverent
personages
restrained
their
fury
.
CHAP.
LV.
How
easily
things
are
ordered
in
a
city
where
the
people
is
not
corrupted
:
and
that
where
a
parity
is
there
is
no
place
for
a
Principallity
;
and
where
that
is
not
,
a
Republique
cannot
be
.
ALthough
that
heretofore
we
have
sufficiently
treated
,
what
is
to
be
feared
and
what
to
be
hoped
for
of
Cities
that
are
corrupted
:
yet
methinks
it
is
not
out
of
purpose
to
consider
a
resolution
the
Senate
took
,
touching
the
vow
Camillus
made
,
to
give
the
tenth
part
of
the
prey
they
took
from
the
Veientes
,
to
Apollo
.
Which
prey
being
fallen
into
the
peoples
hands
,
seeing
they
could
no
otherwise
ever
see
any
account
of
it
,
the
Senate
made
an
edict
,
that
every
one
should
publiquely
produce
the
tenth
part
of
what
he
had
gotten
in
the
spoil
of
Veium
.
And
though
this
resolution
took
not
place
,
the
Senate
having
afterwards
found
out
another
expedient
,
and
by
other
means
given
satisfaction
to
Apollo
for
the
people
,
yet
we
perceive
by
these
determinations
,
how
much
the
Senate
trusted
in
the
peoples
goodness
and
how
they
judg'd
,
that
there
was
not
one
of
them
but
wou'd
punctually
bring
forth
what
he
was
commanded
by
the
edict
.
And
on
the
other
side
,
how
the
people
thought
not
in
any
part
to
deceive
the
edict
,
by
giving
less
then
was
due
,
but
rather
to
free
themselves
therefrom
,
by
shewing
their
open
distaste
at
such
course
taken
.
This
example
with
many
others
,
above
alleadged
,
give
very
good
evidence
of
the
great
goodness
and
religion
was
in
that
people
,
and
what
might
be
hop'd
for
of
them
.
And
truly
where
this
goodness
is
not
,
little
can
be
hop'd
for
:
as
we
can
hope
for
nothing
in
those
countreys
,
which
in
these
daies
we
see
corrupted
,
as
in
Italy
above
others
,
so
France
and
Spain
retain
a
part
of
the
same
corruption
:
and
if
in
those
countreys
we
see
not
so
great
disorders
as
every
day
arise
in
Italy
,
it
proceeds
not
so
much
from
the
peoples
goodness
(
which
is
very
much
fail'd
)
as
from
that
they
are
under
one
King
who
keeps
them
together
in
union
,
not
onely
by
his
vertue
,
but
by
the
ordinary
course
of
government
in
those
Kingdomes
,
which
is
not
yet
quite
perverted
.
This
goodness
is
yet
seen
in
Germany
,
and
this
kind
of
conscience
is
also
of
great
force
with
those
people
,
which
is
the
occasion
that
many
Republiques
continue
free
,
and
do
so
strictly
observe
their
own
laws
,
that
no
forrain
enemy
abroad
,
nor
ambitious
man
at
home
,
dares
offer
to
seize
on
them
.
And
to
proove
this
true
,
that
in
those
countreys
there
remain
still
the
marks
of
that
ancient
goodness
,
I
will
give
another
example
,
like
to
that
abovesaid
of
the
Senate
and
of
the
people
of
Rome
.
Those
Republiques
use
,
when
they
chance
to
have
need
of
any
money
they
lay
out
for
the
common
good
,
that
the
Magistrates
,
or
the
Consuls
,
having
,
authority
,
should
taxe
the
inhabitants
of
the
city
one
or
two
in
the
hundred
,
of
that
which
every
man
is
worth
.
And
such
a
resolution
being
made
according
to
the
order
of
the
town
,
every
man
comes
before
thereceivers
of
that
tax
,
and
having
first
taken
an
oath
to
pay
a
convenient
sum
,
he
throws
into
a
chest
,
appointed
to
that
purpose
,
what
in
his
conscience
he
thinks
he
should
pay
.
Of
which
payment
there
is
no
other
witness
,
but
he
that
payes
.
Whereby
we
may
well
guess
at
the
great
good
and
religion
there
is
yet
left
among
those
men
.
And
we
may
well
think
,
that
every
one
payes
the
due
sum
;
for
if
it
were
not
paid
,
the
imposition
would
not
yeeld
that
quantity
,
as
those
of
old
time
were
wont
to
do
:
which
failing
,
the
deceipt
would
appear
:
whereupon
they
would
seek
some
other
means
to
leavy
their
moneys
,
then
this
.
Which
goodness
is
so
much
the
more
to
be
admir'd
in
these
times
,
because
it
is
very
rare
,
or
rather
remains
onely
in
this
countrey
.
Which
proceeds
from
two
things
,
the
one
,
because
they
have
not
had
much
commerce
with
their
neighbors
;
for
neither
have
these
gone
into
their
countreys
,
nor
they
come
to
visit
these
,
because
they
have
bin
contented
with
those
goods
,
to
feed
on
those
victuals
,
and
to
be
clad
with
those
wools
,
which
the
countrey
affords
;
whereby
is
taken
away
the
occasion
of
all
conversation
,
and
the
beginning
of
all
corruption
.
For
so
they
could
not
learn
the
French
,
Spanish
,
or
Italian
manners
,
which
nations
together
corrupt
the
whole
world
.
The
other
reason
is
,
because
those
Republiques
where
the
common
liberty
is
preserv'd
,
and
uncorrupted
,
do
not
permit
that
any
citizen
of
theirs
should
live
after
the
manner
of
a
gentleman
,
but
rather
maintain
among
them
an
equality
;
and
those
that
live
in
that
countrey
are
cruel
enemies
to
the
Lords
and
Gentlemen
.
And
if
by
chance
they
fall
into
their
hands
,
they
put
them
to
death
,
as
the
principal
authors
of
corruption
,
and
occasions
of
scandal
.
And
to
make
plain
this
name
of
gentlemen
what
it
is
,
I
say
,
that
those
are
call'd
gentlemen
,
that
live
in
idleness
,
yet
deliciously
,
of
the
profits
of
their
estates
,
without
having
any
care
to
cultivate
their
lands
,
or
to
take
any
other
pains
necessary
to
the
maintenance
of
mans
life
.
These
kind
of
men
are
very
hurtfull
in
every
Commonwealth
,
and
countrey
;
but
worse
are
they
,
that
,
besides
the
foresaid
fortunes
,
hold
strong
Castles
,
and
have
vassals
that
obey
them
.
With
these
two
sorts
of
men
the
Kingdom
of
Naples
abounds
.
the
countrey
about
Rome
,
Romagna
,
and
Lombardia
.
This
is
the
cause
,
that
in
those
countreys
there
hath
never
bin
any
Republique
nor
any
civil
government
:
for
such
kinds
of
men
are
enemies
to
all
civil
government
.
And
if
a
man
had
a
minde
to
bring
into
such
countreys
the
forme
of
a
Commonwealth
,
he
would
find
it
impossible
;
but
to
bring
them
under
some
order
,
if
any
man
had
the
power
,
he
could
take
no
other
course
,
then
reduce
them
to
a
Royalty
.
The
reason
is
this
,
because
where
the
matter
is
so
extreamly
corrupted
,
that
the
laws
are
not
able
to
restrain
it
,
it
is
needfull
to
ordain
together
with
them
a
greater
power
,
which
is
the
authority
of
a
King
,
who
by
his
absolute
and
extraordinary
power
may
be
of
force
to
bridle
the
excessive
ambition
and
corruption
of
the
mighty
.
This
reason
is
verified
in
the
example
of
Tuscany
:
where
we
see
that
in
a
small
space
of
countrey
three
Republiques
have
long
consisted
,
Florence
,
Siena
,
and
Lucca
;
and
that
the
other
cities
of
that
countrey
serve
in
such
a
kind
,
that
they
have
their
dispositions
and
their
orders
much
like
them
,
and
that
they
would
willingly
maintain
the
common
liberty
,
all
this
arises
from
hence
,
because
there
are
no
lords
of
Castles
in
those
countreys
,
and
never
a
one
,
or
very
few
Gentlemen
;
but
such
equality
,
that
an
understanding
man
that
hath
appli'd
himself
to
the
knowledg
of
the
ancient
civil
governments
,
might
easily
reduce
them
to
a
free
state
.
But
their
misfortune
hath
bin
so
great
,
that
as
yet
they
have
not
lit
upon
any
man
that
had
either
the
power
or
knowledg
to
put
it
in
execution
.
This
conclusion
then
I
draw
from
hence
,
that
he
that
strives
to
frame
a
Republique
where
there
are
many
gentlemen
,
cannot
do
it
,
unless
he
first
dspatch
them
all
out
of
the
way
:
and
he
that
would
erect
a
Monarchy
or
a
Principallity
where
there
is
much
equality
,
shall
never
effect
it
,
unless
he
drawes
out
of
that
equality
many
of
ambitious
and
turbulent
mindes
,
and
makes
them
rather
gentlemen
in
effect
,
then
in
title
,
enriching
them
with
Castles
,
and
possessions
,
allowing
them
the
favor
of
wealth
and
men
,
to
the
end
that
he
being
plac'd
in
the
midst
of
them
,
by
their
means
may
maintain
his
power
,
and
they
by
his
favor
preserve
their
ambition
,
and
the
rest
be
constrain'd
to
bear
that
yoke
which
force
and
nothing
else
can
make
them
endure
.
And
there
being
by
this
way
a
proportion
from
him
that
forces
,
to
him
that
is
forced
,
thereby
men
continue
setled
every
one
in
their
order
.
And
because
to
bring
a
countrey
to
be
a
Republique
which
is
fit
to
be
a
Kingdom
,
and
of
one
fit
to
be
a
Republique
to
make
a
Kingdome
,
is
a
subject
worthy
of
a
man
of
extraordinary
judgment
and
authority
;
many
there
have
bin
that
have
endeavor'd
it
,
but
few
have
bin
able
to
go
through
with
it
:
because
the
weight
and
consequence
thereof
partly
frights
them
,
and
partly
so
overbears
them
,
that
they
fail
in
their
first
beginnings
.
I
think
the
experience
we
have
of
the
Republique
of
Venice
will
seem
a
little
to
contrary
my
opinion
,
that
where
there
are
gentlemen
,
a
Republique
cannot
be
instituted
:
for
there
none
can
partake
of
the
dignities
,
unless
they
be
gentlemen
.
The
answer
hereto
is
,
that
this
example
makes
no
opposition
against
us
;
for
the
gentlemen
in
that
Republique
are
rather
in
name
,
then
in
effect
:
for
they
have
not
great
revenues
out
of
possessions
,
and
lands
,
but
their
great
wealth
is
founded
upon
merchandise
,
and
moveable
goods
;
and
moreover
none
of
them
hold
any
Castles
,
or
have
any
jurisdiction
over
men
:
but
the
name
of
gentleman
among
them
is
a
name
of
honor
and
credit
,
not
being
grounded
upon
any
of
those
things
that
caus'd
those
in
other
cities
to
be
call'd
gentlemen
.
And
as
other
Republiques
have
all
their
divisions
under
several
names
,
so
Venice
is
divided
into
the
Gentility
,
and
the
Commonalty
;
and
their
order
is
,
that
those
are
capable
of
all
honors
,
these
not
.
Which
is
not
any
cause
of
imbroile
among
them
,
for
the
reasons
we
have
other
where
said
.
Let
a
Common-wealth
then
be
there
ordain'd
,
where
allthings
are
reduc'd
to
an
equality
;
and
contrariwise
,
let
a
Prince
be
made
,
where
great
inequality
is
;
otherwise
shall
there
be
neither
proportion
nor
continuance
.
CHAP.
LVI
.
Before
strange
accidents
and
changes
befall
a
City
or
a
countrey
,
usually
there
are
some
prodigies
which
forerun
them
,
or
men
that
foretell
them
.
FRom
whence
this
proceeds
I
know
not
,
but
it
is
evident
as
well
by
ancient
as
modern
examples
,
that
no
very
heavy
accident
ever
befell
any
countrey
or
City
,
that
hath
not
bin
foretold
either
by
some
Diviners
,
or
by
some
revelations
,
or
prodigies
,
or
signes
from
heaven
.
And
not
to
goe
too
far
from
home
to
fetch
the
proof
hereof
,
every
one
knows
how
long
before
the
coming
of
Charles
the
eighth
of
France
into
Italy
was
foretold
by
Fryer
Jerome
Savanarola
:
and
how
besides
this
,
it
was
said
throughout
all
Tuscany
,
that
there
were
heard
in
the
aire
,
and
seen
over
Arrezzo
,
many
men
in
armes
skirmishing
together
.
Moreover
we
all
know
here
that
before
Laurens
of
Medici
the
old
mans
death
the
Duemo
or
principal
Church
was
fir'd
with
lightning
on
the
top
,
even
to
the
ruine
thereof
.
Nor
is
any
man
here
ignorant
how
a
little
before
that
Peter
Soderini
,
who
had
bin
made
the
Florentines
chief
Standard-bearer
for
life
,
was
banish'd
and
depriv'd
of
his
dignities
,
the
Palace
was
in
the
same
manner
burnt
with
lightning
.
A
man
might
alleadge
other
examples
beside
these
,
but
I
leave
them
rather
to
avoyd
tediousness
.
I
shall
relate
that
onely
which
Titus
Livius
speaks
of
,
before
the
the
Frenchmens
coming
to
Rome
,
and
that
is
,
how
one
Marcus
Ceditius
a
Plebeyan
told
the
Senate
,
that
he
had
heard
at
midnight
,
as
he
past
by
the
new
way
,
a
voyce
greater
than
any
mans
,
which
warn'd
him
to
tel
the
Magistrates
that
the
Frenchmen
were
coming
to
Rome
.
The
reason
hereof
I
think
fit
to
be
discours'd
upon
,
and
treated
of
by
some
man
well
versed
in
the
knowledge
of
natural
and
supernatural
things
,
which
I
profess
not
.
Yet
it
may
be
,
as
some
Philosophers
will
have
it
,
that
the
ayre
being
full
of
spirits
,
who
by
their
natural
knowledge
foreseeing
things
to
come
take
compassion
upon
men
,
and
advertise
them
by
such
like
signes
,
to
the
end
they
should
prepare
themselves
for
their
defence
.
But
however
it
is
,
we
may
find
it
true
,
that
alwaies
after
such
strange
accidents
,
new
and
extraordinary
chances
befall
countreys
.
CHAP.
LVII
.
The
Common
people
united
are
strong
and
vigorous
,
but
taken
apart
and
separated
,
vile
and
contemptible
.
MAny
Romans
(
the
countrey
all
about
being
much
ruined
and
wasted
upon
the
Frenchmens
passage
to
Rome
)
were
gone
to
dwell
at
Veyum
,
contrary
to
the
appointment
and
order
of
the
Senate
;
who
,
to
remedy
this
disorder
,
commanded
by
their
publique
edicts
,
that
every
one
within
a
set
time
,
under
a
certain
penalty
,
should
return
to
inhabite
at
Rome
.
At
which
edicts
at
first
,
they
against
whom
they
were
directed
,
scoffed
;
but
afterwards
,
when
the
time
drew
near
that
they
were
to
obey
,
they
all
yielded
their
obedience
.
And
Titus
Livius
uses
Of
fierce
that
they
were
all
in
general
,
each
one
out
of
his
particular
fear
became
obedient
.
And
truly
the
nature
of
a
multitude
in
this
particular
cannot
better
be
laid
open
,
than
here
in
this
Text
it
is
shewed
:
for
the
multitude
is
many
times
very
insolent
in
their
speeches
against
their
Princes
decrees
.
Afterwards
when
they
see
their
punishment
near
and
certain
,
not
trusting
to
one
another
,
they
hasten
all
to
obedience
;
so
that
it
plainly
appears
,
that
a
man
ought
to
have
regard
to
the
good
or
ill
disposition
of
the
people
towards
him
;
if
it
be
good
,
to
take
such
order
that
it
may
still
continue
;
if
ill
,
to
provide
so
that
it
cannot
hurt
him
.
This
is
meant
for
those
ill
dispositions
which
the
people
have
bred
in
them
upon
any
other
occasion
,
than
for
the
loss
of
their
liberty
,
or
for
the
love
of
their
Prince
,
who
is
yet
living
.
For
the
evil
humors
that
arise
from
these
causes
are
terrible
beyond
measure
,
and
have
need
of
great
remedies
to
restrain
them
.
Their
other
indispositions
will
be
easy
,
when
they
have
not
made
choyce
of
any
heads
,
to
whom
they
may
have
their
recourse
:
for
on
oneside
,
there
is
not
a
more
dreadfull
thing
,
than
a
dissolute
multitude
,
and
without
a
head
:
and
on
the
other
side
,
there
is
nothing
weaker
then
it
;
for
though
they
have
their
weapons
in
their
hands
,
yet
will
it
be
easy
to
reduce
them
,
provided
that
thou
canst
avoyd
the
first
shock
of
their
furie
:
for
when
their
rage
is
a
little
appeas'd
and
every
one
considers
that
he
is
to
return
again
to
his
home
,
they
begin
then
a
little
to
doubt
of
themselves
,
and
to
take
a
care
for
their
safety
,
either
by
flight
or
agreement
.
Therefore
a
multitude
up
in
armes
,
desiring
to
escape
these
dangers
,
is
to
make
ehoyce
of
a
head
out
of
themselves
who
may
direct
them
,
keep
them
united
,
and
provide
for
their
defence
,
as
did
the
common
people
of
Rome
,
when
after
the
death
of
Verginia
,
they
departed
from
Rome
,
and
for
their
own
preservations
,
they
chose
20
Tribuns
from
among
themselves
:
which
if
they
do
not
,
there
allwaies
befalls
them
that
which
Titus
Livius
saies
in
his
above
written
discourse
,
that
joyntly
together
they
are
of
strength
and
vigor
;
but
when
each
one
afterwards
begins
to
advise
of
his
own
danger
,
they
become
weak
and
contemptible
.
CHAP.
LVIII
.
The
multitude
is
more
wise
and
constant
,
then
a
Prince
.
THat
nothing
is
more
vain
or
inconstant
than
the
multitude
,
as
well
our
Author
Titus
Livius
,
as
all
other
Historians
do
affirm
:
for
we
find
it
often
in
the
relations
of
mens
actions
,
that
the
multitude
hath
condemned
some
man
to
death
,
whom
afterwards
they
have
grieved
for
and
exceedingly
wish'd
for
again
:
as
we
see
the
people
of
Rome
did
for
Manlius
Capitolinus
,
whom
after
they
had
condemn'd
to
death
,
they
much
desir'd
again
.
And
these
are
the
words
of
the
Author
.
The
people
,
after
that
by
his
death
they
perceiv'd
themselves
free
from
danger
,
wished
him
alive
again
.
And
in
another
place
,
when
he
shewes
the
accidents
that
followed
in
〈…〉
cusa
after
the
death
of
Hieronymus
,
Hie
〈…〉
nephew
,
he
sayes
,
This
is
the
nature
of
the
multitude
,
that
they
are
either
slavish
in
their
obedience
,
or
insolent
in
their
auihority
.
I
know
not
,
whether
herein
I
undertake
not
too
hard
a
task
,
so
full
of
difficulties
,
that
I
must
either
give
it
over
with
shame
,
or
continue
it
with
blame
,
having
a
desire
to
defend
that
,
which
,
as
I
have
said
,
is
accused
by
all
writers
.
But
however
it
be
,
I
do
not
judge
it
,
nor
ever
will
,
a
defect
to
defend
some
opinions
with
their
reasons
,
without
any
intention
to
use
either
authority
or
force
.
Therefore
I
say
,
that
of
that
defect
whereof
those
writers
accuse
the
multitude
,
all
men
in
particular
are
guilty
,
and
especially
Princes
:
for
every
one
that
is
not
regulated
by
the
lawes
would
commit
the
same
errors
which
the
loose
multitude
does
.
And
this
we
may
easily
know
,
for
there
are
and
have
bin
many
evil
Princes
;
and
vertuous
and
discreet
ones
but
a
few
.
I
speak
of
Princes
,
that
have
bin
able
to
break
the
bridle
that
could
check
them
;
among
whom
we
reckon
not
those
that
were
in
Egypt
,
when
in
that
very
ancientest
antiquity
that
countrey
was
governed
by
the
lawes
;
nor
those
of
Spavta
,
nor
those
that
in
our
daies
are
in
France
,
which
Kingdom
is
order'd
more
by
the
laws
,
than
any
other
which
in
these
times
we
have
knowlege
of
.
And
these
Kings
which
grow
up
under
such
constitutions
are
not
to
be
accounted
in
that
number
,
from
whence
we
are
to
consider
the
nature
of
every
man
by
himself
,
and
discerne
if
he
be
like
the
multitude
:
for
in
parallell
with
them
,
we
should
set
down
a
multitude
in
like
manner
regulated
by
the
lawes
,
as
they
are
,
and
therein
shall
be
found
the
same
goodness
that
is
in
them
:
and
we
shall
see
they
neither
insolently
domineere
,
nor
slavishly
serve
,
as
the
people
of
Rome
,
which
whilest
the
Republique
continued
uncorrupted
,
never
serv'd
basely
,
nor
rul'd
proudly
,
but
with
their
own
customes
,
and
Magistrates
held
their
own
degree
honorably
.
And
when
it
was
necessary
to
rise
up
against
one
that
were
powerfull
,
they
did
it
,
as
it
appear'd
in
the
example
of
Manlius
,
and
in
that
of
the
ten
,
and
others
,
who
went
about
to
oppress
them
.
And
when
it
was
requisite
they
should
obey
the
Dictators
,
and
the
Consuls
,
for
the
common
safety
,
they
did
it
likewise
:
and
if
the
people
of
Rome
desired
again
Manlius
Capitolinus
being
dead
,
it
is
no
marvail
;
for
they
desired
his
vertues
,
which
had
bin
such
,
that
the
remembrance
of
them
mov'd
every
one
to
compassion
,
and
might
be
of
force
likewise
to
work
the
same
effect
in
a
Prince
:
for
it
is
the
opinion
of
all
writers
,
that
vertue
is
commended
even
in
ones
enemies
.
And
if
Manlius
,
in
the
midst
of
that
great
desire
had
bin
reviv'd
,
the
people
of
Rome
would
have
given
the
same
judgement
upon
him
that
they
had
done
when
they
drew
him
out
of
prison
,
and
condemn'd
him
to
death
.
In
like
manner
we
see
there
were
some
Princes
esteem'd
wise
too
,
that
have
put
some
men
to
death
,
whom
afterwards
they
have
much
desired
again
;
as
Alexander
did
Clitus
,
and
others
of
his
friends
,
and
Herod
Mariamme
.
But
that
which
our
Historian
speaks
touching
the
nature
of
the
multitude
,
belongs
not
to
that
which
is
regulated
by
the
lawes
,
as
was
that
of
the
Romans
,
but
to
that
which
is
loose
,
as
was
that
of
the
Syracusians
,
which
committed
those
errors
that
men
inraged
and
dissolute
fall
into
,
as
did
Alexander
the
Great
,
and
Herod
,
in
the
cases
aforesaid
.
Therefore
the
nature
of
the
multitude
is
not
more
blame-worthy
,
than
that
of
Princes
:
for
all
equally
do
erre
,
when
all
without
respect
have
power
to
erre
.
Whereof
,
besides
this
I
have
alleadged
,
there
are
examples
enough
,
as
well
among
the
Roman
Emperors
,
as
other
Kings
and
Princes
,
where
we
may
see
such
unconstancy
and
variation
of
life
,
as
never
was
yet
seen
in
any
multitude
.
I
conclude
then
,
beyond
the
common
opinion
,
which
sayes
,
that
the
people
when
they
have
the
Principallity
in
their
hands
,
are
various
,
mutable
,
unthankfull
,
affirming
that
these
faul●s
are
no
otherwise
in
them
,
than
they
are
in
particular
Princes
.
And
if
a
man
blamed
both
peoples
and
Princes
together
,
he
might
say
true
;
but
exempting
Princes
,
he
is
deceiv'd
.
For
a
people
that
rules
,
and
is
well
in
order
,
will
be
constant
,
prudent
and
gratefull
,
as
well
as
a
Prince
,
or
better
,
though
esteem'd
wise
.
And
on
the
other
side
,
a
Prince
loosen'd
from
the
law
will
be
unthankfull
,
various
,
and
imprudent
,
more
than
the
people
:
and
the
diversitie
of
their
proceeding
arises
not
from
the
diversity
of
their
dispositions
(
because
in
all
of
them
it
is
much
after
one
manner
,
and
if
there
be
any
advantage
on
either
side
,
it
is
on
the
peoples
part
)
but
rather
that
the
one
hath
more
regard
to
the
lawes
under
which
they
live
,
than
the
other
.
And
he
that
considers
the
people
of
Rome
,
shall
find
that
for
four
hundred
years
the
name
of
a
King
was
hatefull
to
them
,
and
yet
were
they
zealous
for
the
glory
,
and
common
good
of
their
countrey
:
and
he
shall
see
many
examples
among
them
that
witness
the
one
thing
,
and
the
other
of
them
And
if
any
man
alleadge
to
mee
the
unthankfulnesse
they
used
towards
Scipio
,
I
answer
that
which
formerly
at
large
was
sayd
in
this
matter
,
where
it
was
made
plaine
,
that
people
are
lesse
ungratefull
than
Princes
.
But
as
touching
wisedome
,
and
settled
stayednesse
,
I
say
that
a
people
is
wiser
and
more
stayd
,
and
of
more
exact
judgment
than
a
Prince
.
And
therefore
not
without
cause
the
peoples
voyce
is
likened
to
Gods
voyce
;
for
wee
see
that
the
universall
opinions
bring
to
passe
rare
effects
in
their
presages
,
so
that
it
seemes
by
their
secret
vertues
they
foresee
their
owne
good
or
evill
.
And
touching
their
judgement
in
things
,
it
is
seldome
seene
,
that
when
they
heare
two
Oratours
,
pleading
each
of
them
a
contrary
part
,
when
they
are
both
of
equall
worth
,
but
that
they
follow
the
better
opinion
,
and
are
very
capable
of
the
truth
they
heare
.
And
if
in
matters
of
courage
,
or
in
things
that
appeare
profitable
(
as
it
was
abovesayd
)
they
erre
,
many
times
also
does
a
Prince
erre
,
drawne
aside
by
his
owne
passions
,
which
are
greater
in
them
then
in
the
people
.
We
see
likewise
in
their
choosing
of
Officers
,
they
make
a
farre
better
choice
then
does
a
Prince
.
Nor
will
a
people
ever
be
perswaded
to
advance
to
dignity
a
man
infamous
and
of
a
corrupt
life
,
to
which
a
Prince
may
easily
and
diverse
wayes
be
brought
.
We
see
a
people
begin
to
hate
some
one
thing
,
and
continue
many
ages
in
the
same
opinion
,
which
we
see
not
it
a
Prince
.
And
of
the
one
and
the
other
of
these
two
things
,
the
people
of
Rome
shall
serve
me
for
witnesse
,
which
in
so
many
hundreds
of
yeares
,
in
so
many
electio
〈…〉
of
Consulls
and
Tribuns
,
never
made
foure
choices
,
whereof
they
had
cause
to
repent
them
.
And
they
hated
so
much
(
as
I
said
)
the
name
of
a
King
,
that
no
citizen
of
theirs
could
ever
so
farre
oblige
them
,
that
if
once
he
affected
the
Royalty
,
they
would
pardon
his
due
punishment
.
Moreover
we
see
,
that
in
those
cities
where
the
Principality
is
in
the
people
,
in
a
short
time
exceeding
great
increases
are
made
,
and
farre
greater
then
those
that
have
bin
made
under
the
government
of
a
Prince
,
as
Rome
did
after
the
banishment
of
her
Kings
,
and
Athens
after
she
freed
her selfe
from
Pisistratue
;
which
proceeds
from
nothing
else
,
but
that
the
peoples
governments
are
better
then
Princes
.
Nor
will
we
agree
to
this
,
that
all
that
our
Historian
sayes
in
the
text
before
alleadged
,
or
any
where
else
,
opposes
this
our
opinion
;
for
if
we
shall
run
over
all
the
disorders
of
peoples
,
&
the
disorders
of
Princes
,
and
all
the
glorious
actions
of
people
,
as
those
also
of
Princes
,
we
shall
see
the
people
farre
surmount
the
Princes
in
vertue
and
in
glory
.
And
if
Princes
exceede
the
people
in
ordaining
of
Lawes
,
in
framing
a
civill
government
,
in
making
of
statutes
and
new
institutions
,
yet
in
the
maintenance
and
preservation
hereof
the
people
go
so
farre
beyond
them
,
that
they
attaine
to
the
glory
of
their
founders
.
And
in
summe
,
to
conclude
this
matter
,
I
say
,
that
as
Princes
states
have
lasted
long
,
so
likewise
have
those
of
Republiques
;
and
the
one
and
the
other
have
had
need
to
be
regulated
by
the
lawes
:
for
a
Prince
that
hath
the
power
to
doe
what
he
list
,
commits
divers
follies
;
and
a
people
that
can
do
what
they
will
,
seldome
give
great
proofes
of
their
wisdome
.
If
then
the
argument
be
touching
a
Prince
and
a
people
tied
and
chained
to
their
lawes
,
a
man
shall
see
more
vertue
in
the
People
,
then
in
the
Prince
:
but
if
the
reasoning
be
of
the
one
and
the
other
loose
from
the
lawes
,
fewer
errours
will
appeare
in
the
people
then
in
the
Prince
;
and
those
lesse
,
and
which
are
capable
of
greater
remedies
:
for
a
good
man
may
easily
have
the
meanes
to
perswade
with
a
licentious
and
tumultuous
people
,
and
so
reduce
them
to
reason
.
But
to
a
mischievous
Prince
no
man
can
speake
,
nor
is
there
any
other
remedy
but
the
sword
.
and
therefore
was
checkt
by
his
owne
conscience
.
And
that
in
the
Psalm
,
140.
Touch
not
mine
anointed
,
&c.
Nor
doe
the
heathen
writers
any
thing
give
way
hereunto
;
wherefore
Tacitus
sayes
,
Ferenda
regum
ingenia
,
neque
usui
crebras
mutationes
.
Ann.
12.
and
Quomodo
sterilitatem
&
caetera
naturae
mala
,
ita
luxum
vel
avaritiam
dominantium
tolerate
:
Vitia
erunt
donec
homines
,
sed
neque
haec
continua
,
&
meliorum
interventu
pensantur
.
Hist.
4.
I
neede
not
alleadge
others
:
The
troubles
that
fell
upon
the
Roman
Empire
when
they
began
to
murder
their
Princes
,
however
bad
,
may
argue
their
part
:
which
was
when
Nero
,
Otho
,
Galba
,
Vitellius
successively
were
slaine
,
Tacitus
speaking
of
the
story
he
writ
of
it
,
sayes
it
was
,
Opus
plenum
magnis
casibus
,
arroxpraelijs
,
discors
seditioni
bus
,
ipsa
etiam
pace
saevum
,
Hist.
1.
For
they
are
much
deceived
who
promise
themselves
quiet
by
meanes
of
a
Tyrants
death
:
for
as
Iulius
Caesar
said
,
Kingdomes
never
change
them
without
great
combustions
,
and
states
suffer
worser
michiefes
,
by
not
enduring
insolent
princes
.
For
howbeit
both
particulars
,
and
the
publique
also
smarts
because
of
this
disorder
,
yet
the
life
of
the
Prince
is
the
very
soule
and
bond
of
the
Republique
:
Rege
incolumi
mens
omnibus
una
est
,
Amisso
rapere
fidem
,
sayes
the
Poet.
This
case
hath
bin
argued
by
diverse
at
large
,
and
the
onely
remedy
is
thus
concluded
on
.
The
treacle
of
this
venim
is
prayer
and
not
vengeance
:
the
people
oppressed
shal
lift
up
their
heart
to
God
,
as
did
the
Israelites
,
when
tyrannis'd
over
by
Pharaoh
;
for
the
cruelties
of
bad
Princes
come
not
to
passe
by
chance
;
and
therefore
is
it
necessary
to
have
our
recourse
to
God
,
who
sometimes
for
chastisement
sometimes
for
try
all
permits
them
.
force
to
cure
the
peoples
evill
,
when
as
that
of
Kings
requires
the
sword
;
there
is
no
man
that
will
not
say
,
but
that
where
the
medicines
mustbe
stronger
,
the
more
dangerous
are
the
evills
.
When
a
people
is
risen
in
tumult
,
the
follies
which
they
commit
are
not
so
perillous
,
nor
is
there
such
feare
to
be
had
of
the
present
evill
,
as
of
that
which
may
befall
,
it
being
possible
some
Tyrant
may
grow
up
in
the
midst
of
that
confusion
.
But
during
the
time
of
mischievous
Princes
the
contrary
happens
;
for
the
greatest
feare
is
of
the
present
evill
;
and
of
the
time
to
come
there
is
hope
,
men
easily
perswading
themselves
,
that
his
evill
life
may
produce
their
liberty
.
So
that
a
man
may
see
the
difference
between
the
one
and
the
other
;
the
desperate
feare
of
the
one
,
is
,
of
the
present
state
;
of
the
other
,
of
the
state
into
which
it
may
fall
.
The
multitudes
cruelties
are
exercis'd
against
those
that
they
feare
,
lest
they
should
seize
upon
the
common
good
.
The
Princes
against
those
that
they
feare
,
lest
they
should
seeke
to
recover
their
owne
againe
.
But
the
opinion
against
the
people
growes
dayly
,
for
every
one
may
freely
speake
evill
of
the
people
without
feare
,
even
while
they
have
the
government
in
their
hands
.
A
man
speakes
not
evill
of
Princes
,
but
with
many
fears
and
jealousies
.
Nor
is
it
much
out
of
purpose
(
seeing
the
matter
drawes
me
to
it
)
to
argue
in
the
Chapter
following
,
what
Confederacies
a
man
may
best
trust
to
,
either
those
that
be
made
with
a
Republique
,
or
that
are
made
with
a
Prince
.
CHAP.
LIX
.
What
Confederation
or
league
is
rather
to
be
trusted
,
either
that
which
is
made
with
a
Republique
,
or
that
is
made
with
a
Prince
.
BEcause
every
day
we
have
it
,
that
one
Prince
with
another
,
or
one
Republique
with
another
make
leagues
,
and
joyne
friendship
together
,
and
in
like
manner
also
confederacies
are
drawne
and
agreements
made
betweene
a
Republique
and
a
Prince
.
I
thinke
to
examine
,
which
is
the
firmest
league
,
whereof
a
man
should
make
surest
account
of
;
either
of
that
with
a
Republique
,
or
the
other
with
a
Prince
.
And
examining
the
whole
,
I
beleeve
that
in
many
cases
they
are
alike
,
and
in
some
there
is
some
difference
:
and
therefore
,
that
accords
made
by
force
shall
not
be
truly
kept
thee
neither
by
Prince
nor
commonwealth
.
And
I
thinke
that
when
feare
comes
upon
them
touching
their
state
,
as
well
the
one
as
the
other
,
rather
then
perish
,
will
breake
their
faith
with
thee
,
and
requite
thee
with
unthankfulnesse
.
Demetrius
,
he
that
was
ever
termed
the
taker
of
cities
,
had
done
exceeding
much
good
to
the
Athenians
;
it
chanc'd
afterwards
,
that
being
routed
by
his
enemies
,
and
seeking
refuge
in
Athens
as
in
a
city
that
was
his
friend
,
and
much
ingag'd
to
him
,
he
was
not
admitted
into
it
.
Which
griev'd
him
much
more
then
the
losse
of
his
souldiers
and
army
had
done
.
Pompey
when
his
army
was
routed
by
Caesar
in
Thessaly
,
fled
into
Egypt
to
Ptolomy
,
who
formerly
had
bin
restor'd
by
him
into
his
kingdome
,
and
was
put
to
death
by
him
.
Which
things
we
see
had
the
same
occasions
:
yet
more
humanity
and
lesse
injury
was
us'd
by
the
Republique
,
then
by
the
Prince
.
Therefore
where
there
is
fear
,
a
man
shal
finde
in
effect
the
same
faith
.
And
if
there
be
any
Commonwealth
or
Prince
who
to
keepe
their
faith
with
thee
,
expect
while
they
ruine
,
it
may
proceed
also
from
the
same
occasion
.
And
as
for
a
Prince
,
it
may
well
chance
,
that
he
is
allied
to
some
powerfull
Prince
,
who
though
he
then
hath
not
the
opportunity
to
defend
him
,
yet
may
he
well
hope
,
that
in
time
he
may
restore
him
into
his
state
,
or
else
that
having
taken
side
with
him
as
partisan
,
he
thinkes
he
cannot
obtaine
a
faithfull
and
fair
accord
with
his
enemy
.
Of
this
sort
were
those
Princes
of
the
Kingdome
of
Naples
,
that
tooke
part
with
the
French
.
And
for
Republiques
,
of
this
sort
was
Saguntum
in
Spaine
,
which
till
it
was
ruin'd
tooke
part
with
the
Romans
;
and
so
was
Florence
for
siding
with
the
French
in
the
yeare
one
thousand
five
hundred
and
twelve
.
And
I
believe
,
having
summ'd
up
every
thing
,
that
in
these
cases
,
where
the
danger
is
urgent
,
there
is
more
assurance
rather
in
the
Republiques
,
then
in
the
Princes
:
for
though
the
Republiques
were
of
the
same
minde
and
had
the
same
intention
as
Princes
had
,
yet
for
that
they
move
but
slowly
,
it
will
cause
them
to
stay
longer
in
resolving
themselves
,
then
a
Prince
will
;
and
thereupon
they
will
be
longer
a
breaking
their
faith
then
he
.
Confederacies
are
broken
for
profit
,
Wherein
Commonwealths
are
farre
stricter
in
their
observance
of
accords
,
then
Princes
.
And
we
might
bring
many
examples
,
where
even
for
a
very
small
gaine
a
Prince
hath
broken
his
faith
;
and
where
exceeding
great
advantages
could
not
one
whit
move
a
Commonwealth
,
as
was
the
party
Themistocles
propounded
to
the
Athenians
,
to
whom
in
an
oration
made
them
he
said
,
that
he
could
advise
them
so
,
that
their
country
should
gaine
much
advantage
by
it
,
but
them
he
might
not
tell
it
,
for
feare
of
discovering
it
,
for
by
the
discovery
the
opportunity
of
doing
it
would
be
taken
away
.
Whereupon
the
Athenians
chose
Aristides
,
to
whom
he
should
communicate
this
secret
,
and
together
with
him
consult
upon
it
:
whom
Themistocles
shew'd
how
the
whole
navall
army
of
all
Greece
was
in
their
hands
under
their
protection
,
though
intrusted
them
upon
their
faith
,
so
that
it
was
in
their
power
by
the
ruine
thereof
to
make
themselves
Lords
of
all
Greece
.
Whereupon
Aristides
told
the
people
that
Themistocles
advice
was
exceeding
profitable
,
but
very
dishonest
.
For
which
cause
the
people
wholly
resus'd
it
,
which
Philip
of
Macedon
would
not
have
done
,
nor
those
other
Princes
who
seeke
their
owne
gaine
rather
,
and
have
made
more
advantage
by
breaking
their
faith
,
than
by
any
way
else
.
Touching
the
breaking
of
agreements
,
upon
the
not
observance
of
some
particulars
therein
,
I
meane
not
to
meddle
with
them
,
being
ordinary
matters
;
but
I
speak
of
those
that
breake
upon
extraordinary
and
maine
points
.
Wherein
,
by
what
we
have
said
,
I
beleeve
the
people
are
lesse
faulty
than
the
Princes
,
and
therefore
may
better
bee
trusted
than
they
.
CHAP.
LX.
How
the
Consulship
and
every
other
Magistracie
in
Rome
was
given
without
respect
of
age
.
IT
appeares
by
order
of
the
Story
,
that
the
Commonwealth
of
Rome
,
after
that
the
Consulship
came
among
the
people
,
bestowed
it
upon
their
Citizens
,
without
regard
of
yeares
or
bloud
:
and
indeed
they
never
had
respect
to
age
,
but
altogether
aimed
at
vertue
,
whether
it
were
in
young
,
or
old
.
Which
wee
perceive
by
the
testimonie
of
Valerius
Corvinus
,
who
at
23.
yeares
of
age
was
made
Consul
.
And
the
same
Valerius
,
speaking
to
his
souldiers
,
sayd
,
That
the
Consulship
was
the
reward
of
vertuc
,
and
not
of
bloud
.
Which
thing
,
Valerius
Corvinus
,
of
Scipio
,
and
Pompey
,
and
many
others
,
that
triumphed
very
young
.
THE
SECOND
BOOKE
.
THE
PREFACE
.
MEN
do
alwaies
commend
,
but
not
alwaies
with
reason
,
the
times
of
old
,
and
blame
the
present
:
and
they
take
part
so
much
with
things
past
,
that
they
celebrate
not
onely
those
ages
which
they
have
known
by
the
memory
writers
have
lest
them
,
but
those
also
,
which
now
being
old
,
they
remember
they
have
seen
in
their
youth
.
And
when
this
their
opinion
is
false
,
as
most
commonly
it
is
,
I
perswade
my self
the
reasons
that
bring
them
into
this
error
,
are
divers
.
And
the
first
I
take
to
be
,
that
of
matters
of
old
the
truth
is
not
wholly
known
,
&
of
thoi●
actions
most
commonly
those
things
are
conceal'd
that
would
bring
any
infamy
upon
the
times
,
but
whatsoever
advances
their
credit
&
glory
is
set
out
with
magnificence
.
For
most
writers
do
so
much
follow
the
conquerors
fortune
,
that
to
make
their
victories
glorious
,
they
not
only
augment
what
they
have
vertuously
done
but
they
so
illustrate
their
enomies
actions
,
that
those
that
are
afterwards
born
in
any
of
their
countreys
,
either
conquering
or
conquered
,
have
cause
to
admire
those
men
and
times
,
and
so
consequently
are
forc'd
exceedingly
to
praise
and
love
them
.
Besides
this
,
men
hating
things
either
for
fear
,
or
envic
,
two
very
powerfull
causes
of
hatred
are
quite
spent
in
things
that
are
passed
,
being
they
are
not
able
to
hurt
,
nor
can
give
occasion
of
envic
.
But
on
the
contrary
part
,
it
comes
to
pass
that
those
things
that
are
now
in
hand
,
and
we
see
,
which
by
reason
of
the
through
knowledge
we
have
of
them
,
no
tittle
thereof
being
conceal'd
from
us
,
and
knowing
in
them
together
with
the
good
,
many
things
worthy
dislike
,
hereupon
we
are
compell'd
to
judge
them
much
Inferior
to
matters
of
old
,
although
that
in
truth
the
present
deserve
far
more
glory
and
reputation
:
this
I
say
,
not
arguing
touching
the
arts
,
which
are
now
brought
to
such
perfection
,
that
the
times
cannot
take
from
them
,
nor
add
but
little
more
glory
to
them
;
but
speaking
of
things
belonging
to
means
lives
and
manners
,
whereof
the
proofes
are
not
very
evident
;
I
answer
,
that
this
custome
above
written
of
praising
and
blaming
is
sometimes
false
and
sometimes
true
:
for
sometimes
they
must
needs
light
upon
the
truth
;
because
all
humane
things
are
continually
in
motion
,
and
either
rise
or
fall
.
As
we
see
the
civil
government
of
a
city
or
countrey
so
ordain'd
by
some
rare
person
,
that
for
a
time
even
by
reason
of
the
worth
of
this
man
,
the
State
mends
much
,
and
is
more
and
more
amplified
:
he
that
is
then
borne
in
that
State
,
and
commends
more
the
times
of
old
,
than
those
moderne
,
is
much
deceiv'd
:
and
the
cause
of
his
errour
proceeds
from
those
things
that
have
bin
formerly
sayd
.
But
those
that
are
afterwards
born
in
that
City
or
countrie
,
whose
dayes
are
onely
during
their
decline
from
their
excellence
,
then
erre
nor
.
And
I
devising
with
my selfe
whence
these
things
proceed
,
I
think
the
world
hath
continued
alwayes
in
one
manner
,
and
that
in
i●
hath
beene
alwayes
as
much
good
as
evill
;
but
that
that
good
and
evill
does
change
from
country
to
country
,
as
it
appeares
by
that
which
is
discover'd
to
us
of
those
ancient
kingdomes
,
which
alter'd
from
the
one
to
the
other
,
by
change
of
manners
.
But
the
world
continued
the
same
.
There
was
onely
this
difference
,
that
where
it
first
had
plac'd
its
vertue
in
Assiria
,
it
afterwards
remov'd
it
into
Media
,
then
into
persia
,
in
so
much
that
at
length
it
came
into
Italie
,
and
so
to
Rome
.
And
if
after
the
Romane
Empire
there
succeeded
not
any
other
that
lasted
,
nor
where
the
world
had
retired
all
its
vertue
together
;
yet
we
see
it
was
spread
abroad
into
severall
Nations
,
where
men
behav'd
themselves
very
bravely
and
valouroufly
,
as
in
the
Kingdome
of
France
,
the
Kingdome
of
the
Turks
,
and
that
of
the
Soldan
;
so
now
adayes
in
Germanie
,
and
so
among
those
that
were
first
of
the
Saracin
sect
,
which
did
great
exploits
,
and
made
themselves
masters
of
so
great
a
part
of
the
world
,
after
they
had
destroyed
the
Easterne
Empire
of
Rome
.
In
all
these
Provinces
then
,
after
the
Romanes
were
ruined
,
and
in
all
these
sects
hath
that
vertue
resided
;
and
now
in
some
of
them
indeed
it
may
be
wished
for
,
but
in
othersome
worthily
commended
.
And
he
that
is
borne
in
those
Countries
,
and
praises
the
times
past
more
than
the
present
,
may
be
deceived
:
but
he
that
is
borne
in
Italy
and
not
in
Greece
,
and
is
not
become
either
in
Italy
,
a
Tramontan
,
or
in
Greece
,
a
Turk
,
hath
reason
to
blame
the
times
present
,
and
commend
the
former
,
for
therein
were
many
things
made
them
marvail
,
but
in
these
there
is
nothing
can
recover
them
out
of
extream
misery
,
infamy
,
and
disgrace
,
where
there
is
no
observance
either
of
Religion
or
Lawes
,
nor
of
warlike
discipline
,
but
they
are
wholly
bespotted
with
all
manner
of
filthiness
.
And
so
much
the
more
detestable
are
these
vices
,
by
how
much
they
are
most
in
those
that
are
greatest
,
who
sitting
in
their
Tribunals
command
all
,
and
will
be
ador'd
.
But
returning
to
our
discourse
,
I
say
,
that
if
mens
understandings
are
corrupted
in
matter
of
judgment
,
touching
which
age
is
the
better
,
the
present
or
that
of
old
,
in
those
things
by
reason
of
their
antiquitie
they
could
not
have
such
an
exact
knowledge
,
as
they
might
have
of
their
own
times
,
yet
should
they
not
be
corrupted
in
old
men
touching
the
judgement
of
the
times
of
their
youth
,
and
old
age
,
having
known
and
seen
equally
the
one
and
the
other
;
Which
thing
would
be
true
,
if
those
men
all
the
time
of
their
lives
continued
still
at
the
same
state
of
judgement
,
and
had
the
same
desires
.
But
they
altering
,
though
the
times
,
change
not
,
yet
cannot
seem
so
to
men
to
continue
the
same
,
they
having
other
desires
,
other
delights
,
and
other
considerations
in
their
old
age
,
than
in
their
youth
:
for
the
strength
of
mens
bodies
,
when
they
grow
old
,
decaying
,
and
their
judgements
and
understandings
increasing
,
as
must
needs
be
,
that
those
things
which
in
their
youths
they
thought
supportable
and
good
,
becomes
afterwards
to
them
growing
old
intollerable
and
hurtfull
:
and
where
these
men
ought
herein
to
lay
the
fault
upon
their
own
judgements
,
they
blame
the
times
.
Besides
this
,
the
desire
of
man
being
insatiable
(
because
of
nature
he
hath
it
,
that
he
can
and
will
desire
every
thing
,
though
of
fortune
he
be
so
limited
,
that
he
can
attain
but
a
few
)
there
arises
thence
a
dislike
in
mens
minds
,
and
a
loathing
of
the
things
they
injoy
which
causes
them
to
blame
the
times
present
and
commend
those
pass'd
,
as
also
those
that
are
to
come
,
although
they
have
no
motives
grounded
upon
reason
to
incite
them
thereto
.
I
know
not
then
,
whether
I
shall
deserve
to
be
numbred
among
them
that
are
deceiv'd
;
if
too
much
in
these
discourses
of
mine
I
shall
praise
the
times
of
the
ancient
Romans
,
and
blame
our
own
.
And
truly
if
the
vertue
that
then
reign'd
,
and
the
vice
that
now
reigns
,
were
not
more
clear
than
the
Sun
,
I
should
not
speak
so
freely
,
for
fear
I
should
incur
the
censure
of
that
error
whereof
I
have
now
blam'd
others
:
but
the
matter
being
so
evident
,
that
every
man
sees
it
,
I
shall
with
boldness
speak
that
plainly
which
I
conceive
of
those
&
these
times
,
to
the
end
those
young
men
who
shall
chance
to
read
these
my
writings
,
may
avoyd
the
evil
of
these
times
,
and
prepare
their
minds
to
imitate
the
good
of
these
of
old
,
whensoever
their
good
,
fortune
shall
give
them
occasion
:
for
it
is
the
duty
of
a
good
man
,
to
reach
unto
others
that
good
,
which
by
reason
of
the
malignity
of
the
times
,
and
of
fortune
,
thou
hast
not
bin
able
to
do
thy self
,
to
the
end
that
many
being
given
to
understand
hereof
,
some
of
them
,
whom
the
heavens
shall
more
favor
,
may
put
it
in
practice
.
And
having
in
my
former
book
of
discourses
spoken
of
the
Romans
deliberations
,
touching
their
affairs
within
the
City
;
in
this
we
shall
treat
of
those
which
the
people
of
Rome
did
,
belonging
to
the
enlargement
of
the
Empire
.
CHAP.
I.
Which
contributed
more
to
the
Romans
in
the
conquest
of
their
Empire
,
either
their
virtue
,
or
their
fortune
.
MAny
have
bin
of
opinion
,
among
whom
is
Plutarch
a
great
Writer
,
that
the
people
of
Rome
were
more
favor'd
by
fortune
,
than
assisted
by
their
vertues
,
in
gaining
their
Empire
.
And
among
other
reasons
which
he
alleadges
to
that
purpose
,
he
sayes
,
it
appears
by
the
confession
of
the
same
people
,
that
they
acknowledged
all
their
victories
from
fortune
,
having
consecrated
more
Temples
to
her
,
than
to
any
other
god
.
And
Livie
seems
to
side
with
this
opinion
:
because
it
is
very
seldome
,
that
he
brings
in
any
Roman
speaking
where
he
makes
mention
of
vertue
,
but
that
he
joynes
fortune
therewith
.
Whereunto
I
will
not
yield
in
any
termes
,
nor
think
I
it
can
be
maintain'd
:
for
if
never
any
Republique
made
the
same
Progress
that
Rome
made
;
it
is
because
never
hath
any
Republique
bin
so
order'd
to
make
its
advantage
,
as
Rome
was
:
for
the
valour
of
their
armies
gain'd
them
their
Empire
,
and
their
order
of
proceeding
,
and
their
own
mannor
with
that
which
their
first
founder
likewise
devised
for
them
,
made
them
keep
what
they
had
gotten
,
as
hereafter
in
several
discourses
shall
be
declar'd
.
That
two
strong
wars
never
at
the
same
time
met
together
to
shake
their
state
,
they
say
,
it
was
the
people
of
Romes
fortune
,
and
not
their
valor
:
for
they
had
no
wars
with
the
Latins
,
til
they
had
not
onely
beaten
the
Samnites
,
but
were
fain
to
undertake
a
war
in
defence
of
them
.
Neither
war'd
they
with
the
Tuscans
,
til
they
had
first
subdued
the
Latins
,
and
wholly
weakned
the
Samnices
with
many
routes
:
whereof
if
two
entire
powers
(
when
they
were
fresh
)
had
joyned
together
against
the
Romans
,
without
doubt
a
man
may
easily
conjecture
that
the
ruine
of
the
Roman
Republique
would
have
followed
thereupon
.
But
however
this
thing
came
to
pass
,
it
never
befell
them
to
have
two
strong
wars
made
against
them
at
once
,
but
rather
luckily
it
proov'd
,
that
when
one
began
,
the
other
ended
,
and
at
the
end
of
one
another
began
,
Which
we
may
easily
see
,
by
viewing
their
wars
,
how
they
followed
in
order
:
for
letting
alone
those
wars
which
they
made
before
Rome
was
taken
by
the
Frenchmen
,
we
see
,
that
whilest
they
fought
with
the
Aequi
and
the
Volsci
,
never
(
so
long
as
these
people
were
of
any
considerable
power
)
did
any
other
people
set
upon
them
.
They
they
being
conquer'd
,
the
war
against
the
Samnites
began
;
and
though
before
the
finishing
of
this
war
the
Latins
Rebel'd
against
the
Romans
,
nevertheless
,
when
that
rebellion
followed
,
the
Samnites
were
in
league
with
Rome
,
and
with
their
army
help'd
the
Romans
to
bring
down
the
Latins
pride
;
and
when
they
were
subdued
,
the
war
with
the
Samnites
again
was
reviv'd
.
But
their
forces
being
broken
by
divers
defeats
given
them
,
the
war
with
the
Tuscans
arose
;
and
when
that
was
quieted
,
the
Samni
es
began
anew
to
stir
,
upon
Pyrrhus
has
passage
into
Italy
;
when
he
was
defeated
,
and
beaten
back
into
Greece
,
then
first
was
kindled
the
fire
of
the
Carthaginian
wars
:
nor
was
that
quenched
til
that
all
the
French
,
as
well
beyond
,
as
on
this
side
the
Alpes
,
conspired
against
the
Romans
;
so
that
between
Pobolonia
and
Pisa
,
where
now
is
the
tower
at
Saint
Vincenti
,
they
were
vanquish'd
with
a
very
great
slaughter
.
After
this
,
for
the
space
of
20
years
,
they
had
not
any
war
of
much
importance
:
for
they
had
no
quarrel
with
any
but
with
the
Ligurians
,
and
the
remainder
of
those
French
that
werein
Lombardie
:
and
so
they
continued
,
til
the
second
Carrhaginian
war
begin
;
Which
troubled
Italie
for
16
years
space
.
Which
being
made
an
end
of
with
great
glory
,
that
of
Macedon
sprung
up
,
and
was
ended
,
when
that
of
Antiochus
,
and
afterwards
that
of
Asia
took
their
turns
.
After
which
victorie
,
there
remained
not
in
the
whole
world
neither
Prince
nor
Republique
that
either
by
themselves
or
altogether
could
oppose
the
Roman
Forces
.
But
before
that
last
victory
,
he
that
considers
the
order
of
these
wars
,
and
the
manner
of
their
proceeding
,
shall
find
mingled
with
their
fortune
much
valour
and
wisdome
;
so
that
he
who
examines
the
occasion
of
such
fortune
,
shall
easily
discover
it
:
for
it
is
very
certain
,
that
when
a
Prince
or
a
people
have
gained
such
a
reputation
,
that
neither
prince
nor
people
bordering
upon
him
dares
by
himself
assault
him
,
and
is
afraid
of
him
,
it
will
alwaies
so
fall
out
,
that
none
of
them
all
will
set
upon
him
,
unless
forc'd
thereto
,
so
that
it
shall
be
at
that
great
Princes
choyce
,
to
war
with
which
of
his
neighbors
he
shall
please
,
and
the
rest
with
little
pains
to
quiet
.
Who
,
partly
in
regard
of
his
power
,
partly
beguil'd
by
some
devices
he
shall
make
use
of
to
lull
them
asleep
,
are
easily
kept
from
stirring
.
And
for
other
powerfull
Princes
,
who
are
more
remote
and
have
no
dealing
with
him
,
they
look
upon
the
matter
,
as
a
thing
afar
off
,
and
nothing
belonging
to
them
.
In
which
error
they
continue
so
long
,
til
the
fire
comes
close
to
their
doors
:
which
then
being
come
so
near
,
they
have
no
means
to
extinguish
it
,
but
only
to
use
their
own
armes
,
which
suffice
nor
,
the
enemy
being
now
grown
exceeding
mighty
.
I
will
let
pass
,
how
the
Samnites
stood
still
and
look'd
upon
the
Romans
,
while
they
overcame
the
Volsci
and
the
Aequi
:
and
that
I
may
not
be
too
tedious
,
I
will
satisfie
my self
with
the
Carthaginians
,
who
were
of
great
power
and
estimation
,
when
the
Romans
war'd
with
the
Samnites
and
Tuscans
:
for
even
then
they
were
Masters
of
all
Affrica
,
and
had
Sardinia
and
Scicily
in
their
hands
,
and
had
the
rule
of
some
part
of
Spain
.
Who
being
that
their
forces
were
remote
from
the
people
of
Romes
confines
,
never
thought
of
assaulting
them
,
nor
of
giving
succours
to
the
Samnites
,
and
Tuscans
;
but
as
if
the
Romans
increase
had
bin
the
Carthaginians
advantage
,
they
made
a
confederacy
with
them
,
seeking
their
friendship
:
nor
did
they
perceive
their
error
committed
,
til
the
Romans
having
subdued
all
those
peoples
that
lay
between
them
and
the
Carthaginians
,
began
to
make
war
with
them
for
the
rule
of
Scicily
and
Spain
.
The
self-same
befell
the
French
,
that
hapned
to
the
Carthaginians
,
and
so
to
Philip
of
Macedon
,
and
Antiochus
;
and
every
one
of
them
beleeved
(
while
the
Romans
were
busy
with
another
)
that
that
other
might
chance
to
vanquish
them
,
and
that
they
had
time
enough
,
either
by
peace
or
war
,
to
defend
themselves
from
them
.
So
that
,
I
beleeve
,
that
the
same
fortune
herein
the
Romans
had
,
all
Princes
would
have
had
,
provided
,
that
they
proceeded
as
the
people
of
Rome
did
,
and
were
of
equal
valour
with
them
.
To
this
purpose
it
would
not
be
unfit
,
to
declare
the
course
the
people
of
Rome
held
in
their
entryes
into
other
Princes
countreys
,
but
that
inour
treaty
of
Principallities
,
we
have
discoursed
thereupon
at
laege
.
I
will
only
say
this
in
bries
,
they
alwaies
did
put
in
practice
to
make
themselves
some
friends
in
the
Countreys
they
came
newly
acquainted
with
,
who
served
them
for
a
ladder
to
climb
up
to
them
,
or
a
gate
to
enter
them
,
or
a
tye
to
hold
them
;
as
it
appears
,
by
means
of
the
Capuans
they
enterd
into
Samnium
,
by
the
Camertins
into
Tuscany
,
by
the
Mamertins
into
Scicly
,
by
the
Saguntins
into
Spain
,
by
Mafinissa
into
Affrica
,
by
the
Ae
olians
into
Greece
,
by
Eumenes
and
other
Princes
into
Asia
,
by
the
Masilians
and
the
Heduans
into
France
.
And
so
they
never
fail'd
of
the
like
supports
,
whereby
to
facilitate
their
undertakings
,
either
in
the
inlargement
of
their
dominions
,
or
in
the
maintaining
them
.
Which
,
those
people
that
shall
observe
,
shall
find
themselves
in
less
want
of
good
fortune
,
than
they
who
neglect
it
.
And
to
the
end
,
that
every
one
may
know
of
what
avail
our
vertue
was
beyond
their
for
une
,
in
the
conquest
of
their
Empire
,
we
will
treat
in
the
Chapter
following
,
concerning
the
quality
of
those
people
with
whom
they
were
to
make
war
,
and
with
what
obstinacy
they
defended
their
liberty
.
CHAP.
II.
What
people
the
Romans
had
to
make
war
withall
,
and
how
obstinately
they
fought
for
the
defence
of
their
liberty
.
NOthing
made
it
more
painfull
to
the
Romans
to
vanquish
their
neighbors
near
about
them
,
as
also
some
other
Countreys
further
off
,
then
the
affection
that
in
those
days
many
people
did
bear
to
their
liberty
,
which
they
so
obstinately
defended
,
that
they
had
never
bin
subdu'd
,
but
by
an
excessive
valour
:
for
,
by
many
examples
,
we
know
to
what
dangers
they
expos'd
themselves
,
as
well
for
the
maintenance
as
the
recovery
of
it
;
and
what
revenges
they
took
against
those
that
had
laid
hold
on
it
.
We
know
likewise
what
dammages
peoples
and
cities
receive
by
servitude
And
whereas
now
adayes
,
there
is
onely
one
Countrey
that
can
say
,
she
hath
free
Cities
in
her
:
in
ancient-times
people
liv'd
very
free
in
all
countreys
.
We
see
that
in
those
times
whereof
at
this
present
we
speak
,
in
Italy
from
the
Alpes
(
which
make
a
partition
between
Tuscany
and
Lombardy
)
even
to
the
very
point
of
Italy
,
there
were
many
free
peoples
,
as
were
the
Tuscans
,
the
Romans
the
Samnites
,
and
many
others
,
that
dwelt
in
the
other
parts
of
Italy
:
nor
does
any
man
relate
,
that
there
was
any
King
,
besides
those
that
raign'd
in
Rome
,
and
Porsena
King
of
Tuscany
;
whose
race
how
it
came
to
an
end
,
history
leaves
us
no
memory
.
But
we
plainly
see
,
that
at
the
same
time
the
Romans
went
to
incamp
before
Vejum
,
Tuscany
was
free
,
and
so
absolutely
injoy'd
their
liberty
,
and
withall
so
much
hated
the
name
of
a
Prince
,
that
the
inhabitants
of
Vejum
for
their
defence
having
made
a
King
among
them
,
ask'd
aid
of
the
Tuscans
against
the
Romans
;
but
they
resolv'd
after
many
deliberations
taken
,
to
give
them
none
whiles
they
liv'd
under
a
King
,
judging
it
not
right
to
defend
their
countrey
,
who
of
themselves
had
subjected
it
to
another
.
And
it
is
an
easy
thing
to
gue●s
,
whereupon
it
is
that
people
take
such
an
affection
to
their
liberty
:
because
we
see
by
experience
,
that
cities
have
never
bin
much
amplified
neither
in
domition
nor
riches
,
unless
only
during
their
liberty
.
And
truly
it
is
a
strange
thing
to
consider
,
unto
what
greatness
Athens
attained
in
the
space
of
a
hundred
years
,
after
she
had
freed
her self
from
Pisistratus
his
tyranny
:
but
above
all
it
is
most
strange
to
think
unto
what
greatness
Rome
attained
after
she
was
deliver'd
from
her
Kings
:
The
reason
thereof
is
easy
to
be
understood
:
for
it
is
no
mans
particular
go●●
,
but
the
common
good
,
that
amplifies
the
city
.
And
without
question
this
common
good
is
not
regarded
but
in
Republiques
,
for
there
whatsoever
makes
for
their
advantage
is
put
in
practice
:
and
though
it
turns
to
this
or
that
private
mans
loss
,
yet
are
they
so
many
,
whom
the
said
good
concerns
,
that
they
are
alwaies
able
to
put
it
forward
,
in
despight
of
those
few
that
suffer
by
it
.
The
contrary
falls
our
,
when
there
is
a
prince
;
where
,
most
commonly
,
that
which
makes
for
him
endammages
the
City
,
and
that
which
makes
for
the
city
hurts
him
;
so
that
suddenly
where
a
Tyranny
Menenius
Agrippa
made
use
of
,
to
reconcile
the
Commons
of
Rome
,
upon
distaste
against
the
Senate
,
gone
a
part
in
the
holy
mount
:
On
a
time
that
in
man
all
things
accorded
well
together
,
each
particular
member
advis'd
,
and
complaind
that
by
their
care
and
pains
all
things
necessary
were
sought
after
,
and
provided
for
the
belly
,
and
that
the
belly
onely
remaind
idle
amongst
them
,
injoying
,
those
delicates
which
their
labor
had
prepar'd
:
and
thereupon
conspir'd
together
that
the
hands
should
not
put
meat
to
the
mouth
,
nor
the
mouth
receive
it
,
nor
the
teeth
chaw
it
:
but
thus
while
in
this
choler
they
thought
by
famine
to
subdue
the
belly
,
the
whole
body
fainted
.
Whereby
it
came
to
appear
that
the
belly
afforded
its
service
too
,
and
as
well
gave
as
receiv'd
nourishment
,
distributing
by
the
veins
,
throughout
the
whole
body
,
out
of
this
meat
which
it
had
disgested
,
the
blood
well
concocted
,
whereby
each
part
was
nourish'd
.
Who
is
it
that
feels
not
,
when
any
part
fails
,
the
whole
is
in
disorder
?
and
who
sees
not
likewise
,
when
any
part
of
the
body
drawes
unto
it
more
then
its
proportionable
nutriture
,
that
the
whole
pines
thereupon
?
as
from
the
swelling
of
the
spleen
,
the
health
of
the
whole
body
is
disturb'd
,
and
therefore
by
some
Politiques
not
unfitly
compared
to
a
Princes
exchequer
,
which
when
it
excessively
abounds
beggers
the
whole
countrey
.
And
it
is
a
folly
to
think
(
saith
a
Spauish
author
)
that
the
poverty
of
the
Comminalty
will
not
redound
to
the
breaking
of
private
patrimonies
,
nor
can
great
revenues
continue
there
,
where
the
Commonwealth
is
rack'd
to
the
very
bones
.
All
these
things
serve
to
argue
the
mutual
sympathy
,
as
between
the
head
and
the
members
,
so
between
the
Prince
and
his
subjects
;
and
to
divide
the
interest
of
the
Prince
from
that
of
the
people
,
cannot
agree
with
good
policy
;
for
as
in
the
natural
body
it
breeds
diseases
,
so
in
the
politique
it
produces
disorder
and
destruction
.
growes
upon
a
free
state
,
the
least
ill
that
can
thence
result
to
those
cities
,
is
not
to
proceed
,
nor
increase
more
in
power
,
nor
wealth
:
but
for
the
most
part
,
or
rather
alwaies
,
it
comes
to
pass
,
that
they
go
backward
:
And
if
hap
would
have
it
,
that
a
Tyranc
should
proove
valorous
,
who
by
his
courage
and
prowess
should
inlarge
his
dominions
,
there
would
thence
no
profit
arise
to
the
Republique
,
but
to
him
alone
:
for
he
cannot
advance
any
of
these
citizens
that
are
brave
and
worthy
,
over
whom
he
tyrannizes
,
unless
he
desires
to
give
himself
some
jeulousy
of
them
.
Nor
can
he
yet
subject
or
make
tributary
the
cities
that
he
conquers
,
to
that
city
which
he
tyrannizes
over
;
for
it
is
not
for
his
advantage
to
make
it
powerfull
;
it
rather
makes
for
him
,
to
hold
the
state
disjoyn'd
,
that
each
town
and
province
acknowledge
him
,
in
so
much
that
of
his
conquests
,
he
onely
reaps
he
good
,
and
not
his
countrey
.
And
he
hat
would
see
the
confirmation
of
this
opinion
,
let
him
read
Xenophon
in
his
treaty
of
a
Tyranny
It
is
no
marval
then
,
that
the
peoples
of
old
did
so
extreamly
harc
Tyrants
,
and
lov'd
the
free
gouernment
,
&
that
the
very
name
of
liberty
was
in
such
request
amongst
them
:
as
it
happen'd
,
when
Hieronymus
,
nephew
of
Hiero
the
Siracusan
,
was
slain
in
Siracusa
:
for
the
news
of
his
death
being
brought
to
his
army
,
which
lay
not
far
from
the
city
,
they
began
to
rise
up
in
tumult
,
and
take
their
armes
in
hand
against
them
that
slew
him
:
but
when
they
perceiv'd
that
in
Siracusa
all
cried
out
liberty
,
allured
with
the
delight
of
that
name
,
they
were
all
appeas'd
,
and
laid
aside
their
anger
conceiv'd
against
them
that
kil'd
the
Tyrant
,
&
advis'd
together
by
what
means
there
might
be
ordain'd
in
that
city
a
free
government
.
And
it
is
no
marvail
,
that
people
take
extraordinary
revenge
of
those
that
have
laid
hold
of
their
liberty
.
Touching
which
there
are
many
examples
,
whereof
I
intend
to
relate
onely
one
,
that
fell
out
in
Corcira
a
City
of
Greece
,
in
the
times
of
the
Peloponnesian
war
:
where
the
province
being
divided
into
two
factions
,
one
of
which
followed
the
Athenians
,
the
other
the
Spartans
;
it
came
to
pass
,
that
of
many
cities
which
were
divided
among
themselves
,
the
one
part
follow'd
the
friendship
of
the
Spartans
,
the
other
that
of
Athens
;
it
happening
so
,
that
in
the
said
city
the
Nobility
prevail'd
,
and
tooke
from
the
people
their
liberty
;
but
the
people
by
means
of
the
Athenians
took
heare
again
,
and
having
laid
hold
on
the
Nobility
,
shut
them
up
into
a
prison
capable
of
them
all
,
from
whence
they
drew
them
out
by
eight
and
by
ten
at
a
time
,
pretending
to
banish
them
into
severall
parts
,
but
they
put
them
to
death
after
a
cruell
manner
.
Whereof
they
that
remain'd
having
some
notice
,
resolv'd
as
much
as
lay
in
their
power
,
to
avoid
this
shamefull
death
;
so
that
arm'd
with
what
they
could
get
,
and
fighting
with
those
that
sought
to
enter
,
they
defende'd
the
passage
into
the
prison
:
whereupon
,
the
people
running
together
uncovered
the
top
of
the
house
,
and
with
the
ruines
thereof
overwhelm'd
them
.
There
follow'd
also
in
the
said
province
many
such
other
horrible
chances
,
so
that
we
find
it
true
,
that
people
pursue
more
agerly
the
revenge
of
a
liberty
once
taken
from
them
actually
,
then
of
that
which
was
onely
contriv'd
in
the
intention
to
be
pluck'd
from
them
.
Weighing
then
from
whence
it
may
arise
,
that
in
the
times
of
old
people
esteem'd
more
of
liberty
,
then
now
a
dayes
,
I
beleeve
it
proceeds
from
the
same
cause
which
makes
men
lesse
valiant
now
adayes
then
formerly
,
which
I
thinke
is
the
difference
of
our
education
from
that
of
old
,
grounded
upon
the
difference
of
our
Religion
from
the
ancient
:
for
our
Religion
having
shew'd
Titus
Livius
avowes
it
)
were
so
powerfull
and
warlike
,
that
they
were
of
force
,
till
the
time
of
Papirius
Cursor
the
Consul
,
sonne
of
the
first
Papirius
,
to
resist
the
Romans
,
which
was
for
the
space
of
forty
six
yeares
,
after
so
many
routes
,
destruction
of
their
townes
,
and
so
many
slaughters
made
in
their
country
:
especially
considering
the
country
then
,
where
so
many
cities
were
,
and
such
a
vast
number
of
men
,
though
now
almost
not
inhabited
.
And
then
there
was
such
order
,
and
so
great
force
,
that
it
was
insuperable
,
had
it
not
bin
assaulted
by
a
Roman
power
.
And
it
is
an
easy
thing
to
know
,
whence
that
order
and
this
disorder
arise
,
for
all
that
came
from
the
free
manner
of
living
then
,
and
this
from
the
slavery
now
.
For
all
countries
and
provinces
which
live
free
in
every
part
,
as
formerly
I
said
,
make
exceeding
large
progresses
:
for
here
we
see
the
people
more
numerous
,
because
the
marriages
are
more
free
,
and
desir'd
by
men
:
being
that
every
one
willingly
begets
those
children
which
he
beleeves
he
can
bring
up
,
and
nourish
,
without
doubting
their
patrimony
will
be
ravish'd
from
them
;
and
when
he
knowes
they
are
borne
free
and
not
slaves
,
so
that
by
meanes
of
their
vertue
they
may
become
Princes
.
We
see
riches
likewise
increase
there
in
greater
measure
,
as
well
those
which
arise
from
cultivation
,
as
those
which
are
gotten
by
the
trades
of
handicraftsmen
:
for
every
one
is
more
provident
in
gaining
and
multiplying
of
those
goods
,
which
,
when
he
hath
gotten
,
he
beleeves
he
shall
peaceably
injoy
.
From
whence
it
comes
to
passe
,
that
men
even
contend
who
shall
more
advance
the
private
and
publique
good
;
so
that
the
one
and
the
other
increase
exceedingly
.
The
contrary
hereof
followes
in
al
those
countries
that
live
in
servitude
;
and
so
much
the
more
faile
they
of
their
accustomed
good
,
by
how
much
their
servitude
is
harder
.
And
of
all
hard
servitudes
,
none
exceeds
that
which
is
subject
to
a
free
Republique
,
because
ordinarily
it
is
of
longest
continuance
,
and
so
least
hopes
there
are
of
being
deliver'd
from
it
:
a
second
reason
is
,
the
end
of
a
Republique
is
to
enfeeble
and
weaken
all
other
bodies
in
her
,
whereby
to
augment
her
owne
.
Which
thing
a
Prince
that
brings
thee
under
his
rule
does
not
,
especially
if
it
be
not
some
Barbarian
Prince
,
a
ruiner
of
countries
,
and
a
destroyer
of
all
civill
societyes
among
men
,
as
are
the
easterne
Princes
.
But
if
any
of
them
have
bin
instructed
in
humane
customes
and
the
arts
ordinary
among
men
,
they
most
commonly
affect
equality
in
the
cities
they
have
subdued
,
and
let
them
still
possesse
all
their
arts
and
ancient
customes
;
so
that
,
if
they
cannot
increase
,
as
in
liberty
,
they
goe
not
to
wracke
,
as
in
thraldome
,
speaking
of
that
thraldome
into
which
cities
fall
,
when
they
serve
a
stranger
;
for
I
have
formerly
spoken
enough
of
subjection
to
a
native
.
Whosoever
then
considers
well
all
that
which
is
said
,
will
not
much
marvaile
at
the
power
which
the
Samnites
had
being
free
,
nor
at
their
weakenesse
into
which
afterwards
they
fell
by
servitude
.
And
Titus
Livius
gives
us
good
testimony
thereof
in
many
places
,
in
Hanniballs
warres
,
where
he
declares
,
that
the
Samintes
being
oppressed
by
one
Legion
of
souldiers
,
that
were
in
Nola
,
sent
Ambassadours
to
Hanniball
to
intreat
him
for
succours
;
whose
speeches
were
to
this
purpose
,
that
they
had
for
a
hundred
yeares
warr'd
with
the
Romans
,
serving
themselves
onely
of
their
owne
souldiers
and
Captaines
,
and
had
many
times
withstood
two
Consular
armies
,
and
two
Consuls
,
and
that
now
they
were
brought
so
low
,
they
had
much
a
doe
to
defend
themselves
from
one
small
Roman
legion
that
was
in
Nol●●
.
CHAP.
III.
Rome
became
a
great
citie
,
by
ruining
those
that
were
near
neighbours
to
her
,
and
by
admitting
strangers
without
difficulty
to
share
in
her
dignisies
.
ALL
this
while
Rome
wax'd
great
upon
the
ruines
of
Alba.
Those
that
intend
a
city
should
farre
inlarge
the
bounds
of
her
domnions
,
ought
withall
indeavour
provide
,
that
she
be
well
fraught
with
inhabitants
:
for
without
a
great
multitude
of
men
in
her
,
she
will
never
be
able
to
grow
great
.
And
this
is
done
two
wayes
,
either
by
love
or
by
force
:
by
love
holding
the
wayes
open
and
secure
to
strangers
,
that
might
have
a
design
to
come
and
dwell
in
it
,
to
the
end
that
every
one
might
come
willingly
to
inhabit
it
;
by
force
ruining
and
defacing
the
neighbour
cities
and
sending
out
the
inhabitants
thereof
to
dwell
in
thine
:
all
which
was
punctually
observ'd
in
Rome
,
so
that
in
the
timeof
the
sixth
King
in
Rome
there
dwelt
80
thousand
men
able
to
beare
armes
:
for
the
Romans
meant
to
behave
themselves
like
the
good
husbandman
,
who
to
make
a
plant
grow
big
,
and
fructify
,
and
ripen
well
its
fruits
,
cuts
off
the
firstsprouts
it
thrusts
forth
,
that
so
the
vertue
thereof
remaining
yet
in
the
roote
of
the
plant
,
may
shortly
after
bring
forth
others
more
lively
and
fruitfull
.
And
that
this
course
held
was
necessary
and
good
for
the
founding
and
inlarging
of
an
Empire
,
the
Example
of
Sparta
and
Athens
shewes
us
plaine
,
who
being
both
very
warlike
Republiques
,
and
furnished
with
excellent
lawes
,
yet
could
they
never
attaine
to
the
Roman
Empires
greatnesse
,
which
seemed
indeed
a
little
more
tumultuary
and
not
so
well
ordered
as
they
,
whereof
can
be
alleadged
no
other
reason
,
then
that
aforesaid
.
For
Rome
having
inlarged
by
those
two
wayes
the
body
of
her
city
,
was
able
to
put
in
armes
six
hundred
and
80
thousand
souldiers
,
whereas
Sparta
and
Athens
never
exceeded
each
of
them
twenty
thousand
men
.
Which
proceeded
not
from
that
the
scituation
of
Rome
was
more
bountifull
then
theirs
,
but
onely
from
the
different
course
they
tooke
:
for
Licurgus
founder
of
the
Spartan
Republique
considering
that
nothing
could
soone
take
away
the
power
of
his
lawes
,
then
a
commixtion
of
new
inhabitants
,
did
what
he
could
to
hinder
strangers
from
living
with
them
;
and
that
they
should
neither
joyne
matrimonies
with
them
,
nor
admit
them
into
their
civill
government
,
nor
have
any
thing
to
do
with
them
,
which
are
the
ordinary
occasions
of
accord
among
men
.
He
ordained
likewise
that
leather
money
should
passe
currant
,
thereby
to
take
from
every
one
the
defire
to
come
thither
and
bring
any
merchandise
,
or
art
to
them
:
so
that
,
that
citie
could
never
grow
big
by
multiplying
her
inhabitants
.
And
because
all
our
actions
imitate
nature
,
it
is
neither
possible
,
nor
naturall
,
that
the
slender
body
of
a
tree
should
beare
a
grosse
bough
;
therefore
a
smal
Republique
cannot
hold
cities
nor
kingdomes
of
greater
power
and
strength
then
she
her selfe
is
;
and
if
perchance
it
comes
to
passe
that
she
layes
hold
on
them
,
it
befalls
her
as
it
does
that
tree
the
boughs
whereof
are
greater
then
the
body
,
that
sustaining
it
with
much
adoe
,
with
every
small
b'ast
it
is
broken
,
as
we
see
it
happen'd
to
Sparta
:
which
having
seized
on
the
rule
of
all
the
cities
of
Greece
,
Thebes
no
sooner
rebell'd
against
her
,
but
all
the
other
cities
likewise
fell
from
her
,
and
so
remain'd
as
the
dead
trunk
of
a
tree
without
branches
:
which
could
never
befall
Rome
,
having
her
body
and
stocke
so
huge
,
that
it
was
of
force
with
ease
to
support
any
bough
whatsoever
.
This
manner
then
of
proceeding
,
together
with
those
others
which
we
shall
afterwards
speake
of
,
made
Rome
exceeding
great
and
powerfull
.
Which
Titus
Livius
shewes
in
few
words
where
he
sayes
,
All
this
while
Rome
wax'd
great
upon
the
ruines
of
Alba
CHAP.
IIII.
Republiques
have
taken
three
particular
courses
,
to
amplifie
and
inlarge
their
states
.
HE
that
hath
read
the
ancient
histories
with
observation
,
findes
that
Commonwealths
have
three
manner
of
wayes
to
amplify
their
states
.
The
one
hath
bin
that
which
the
ancient
Tuscans
followed
,
to
make
a
league
of
many
Republiques
together
,
where
no
one
is
preserred
before
the
other
,
neither
in
authority
nor
in
dignity
;
and
to
make
other
cities
partakers
with
them
in
their
gains
;
just
as
now
adayes
the
Swisses
do
,
and
formerly
in
Greece
the
Achaeans
and
Etolians
were
wont
.
And
because
the
Romans
had
much
war
with
the
Tuscans
,
the
better
to
shew
the
quality
of
this
first
way
,
I
will
inlarge
my self
in
giving
notice
of
them
par
ieularly
.
Before
the
Romans
had
any
great
power
in
Italy
,
the
Tuscans
were
very
mighty
both
by
sea
and
by
land
:
and
though
there
is
no
particular
history
that
touches
their
affairs
,
yet
is
there
some
small
remembrance
thereof
,
and
some
signes
left
us
of
their
greatness
;
and
we
know
,
how
they
sent
a
colony
to
the
sea
coast
above
,
called
by
them
Adria
,
which
prooved
of
such
renown
,
that
it
gave
the
name
to
that
sea
,
and
the
Latins
call
it
the
Adri
tick
to
this
day
.
Moreover
we
know
,
that
they
had
conquered
all
from
Tiber
,
to
the
very
foot
of
the
Alpes
,
which
encompass
the
whole
body
of
Italy
.
Notwithstanding
that
two
hundred
years
before
the
Romans
grew
to
any
considerable
strength
,
the
said
Tuscans
lost
the
dominion
of
that
countrey
which
is
now
called
Lombardy
;
Which
was
seized
on
by
the
French
;
who
either
driven
by
necessity
,
or
allured
by
the
delicacy
of
the
fruits
,
especially
the
wines
,
came
into
Italy
under
the
conduct
of
Bellovesus
their
Captain
,
and
having
defeated
and
chased
out
the
natives
;
seated
themselves
in
that
place
,
therein
built
many
cities
,
and
called
the
Countrey
Gallia
,
from
the
name
they
then
bare
;
and
this
they
held
til
they
were
conquered
by
the
Romans
.
The
Tuscans
then
liv'd
with
that
equality
,
and
proceeded
in
the
amplifying
their
State
,
in
that
first
manner
,
spoken
of
before
:
and
there
were
twelve
Cities
,
among
which
were
Clusium
,
Vejum
,
Desola
,
Aretium
,
and
Volaterra
and
the
like
;
who
by
way
of
league
rul'd
their
dominions
;
nor
could
they
inlarge
their
conquests
beyond
the
bounds
of
Italy
,
whereof
also
there
was
a
great
part
left
untoucht
by
them
,
for
the
reasons
which
we
shall
afterwards
tell
.
The
other
manner
is
to
make
allies
,
yet
not
so
thought
,
that
thou
still
reservest
not
to
thy self
the
principal
place
in
the
command
&
rule
and
title
of
all
the
exploits
,
which
course
was
alwaies
observ'd
by
the
Romans
.
The
third
manner
is
,
to
make
them
immediatly
subjects
,
and
not
allies
,
as
did
the
Spa●tans
and
Athenians
:
of
which
three
waies
,
this
last
is
altogether
unprofitable
;
as
it
appears
,
it
was
in
the
two
foresaid
Republiques
,
which
,
for
no
other
cause
went
to
ruine
,
but
for
possessing
themselves
of
those
dominions
,
which
they
were
not
able
to
hold
.
For
it
is
a
thing
of
great
difficulty
and
pains
to
hold
the
government
of
Cities
by
violence
,
especially
of
those
that
have
bin
accustomed
to
live
free
.
And
if
thou
beest
not
in
armes
,
and
well
furnished
with
good
numbers
of
soldiers
,
thou
canst
neither
command
,
nor
rule
them
.
And
to
be
able
to
do
this
,
it
is
necessary
to
make
friends
and
companions
,
who
may
assist
thee
in
multiplying
the
people
of
thy
City
.
And
because
these
two
Cities
,
did
neither
the
one
nor
the
other
of
these
,
their
manner
of
proceeding
was
of
no
advantage
to
them
.
And
because
Rome
which
gives
us
an
example
touching
this
third
manner
,
did
the
one
and
the
other
,
therefore
grew
it
to
that
excessive
power
:
and
for
that
she
alone
took
this
course
of
living
,
she
alone
therefore
became
so
mighty
:
For
she
having
taken
to
her
throughout
all
Italy
many
for
her
companions
to
help
her
,
who
in
many
things
liv'd
with
her
upon
equal
termes
;
but
on
the
other
side
,
as
is
abovesaid
,
reserving
to
her self
alwaies
the
seat
of
the
Empire
,
and
the
title
of
commanding
,
these
their
companions
(
who
were
never
aware
of
it
)
with
their
own
pains
&
loss
of
their
own
bloud
came
to
bring
their
own
necks
to
the
yoke
:
for
when
they
began
to
transport
their
Armies
out
of
Italy
,
and
to
reduce
Kingdomes
into
Provinces
,
&
to
make
thosetheir
subjects
,
who
for
that
they
were
used
to
live
under
Kings
,
were
never
much
troubled
to
become
Subjects
;
and
receiving
Roman
Governors
over
them
,
and
having
bin
overcome
by
Armies
,
whereof
the
Romans
had
the
name
and
title
,
they
acknowledged
no
other
head
,
but
Rome
.
So
that
those
allyes
of
Rome
that
were
in
Italy
,
found
themselves
on
a
sudden
begirt
round
by
Romes
Subjects
,
and
oppress'd
by
an
exceeding
vast
City
,
as
then
Rome
was
:
and
when
they
perceiv'd
the
deceit
into
which
they
had
bin
train'd
,
it
was
too
late
to
help
it
,
Rome
had
then
gotten
such
authority
with
forrein
Nations
,
and
was
then
of
such
strength
within
it self
,
the
people
of
their
City
being
grown
very
numerous
and
warlike
.
And
although
those
their
companions
,
to
be
reveng'd
on
them
for
these
injuries
,
conspir'd
together
against
them
,
yet
in
a
short
time
were
they
losers
by
the
war
,
making
their
own
conditions
worse
:
for
of
allies
,
they
became
Subjects
.
Which
manner
of
proceeding
(
as
is
said
)
hath
bin
observ'd
onely
by
the
Romans
:
nor
can
a
Republique
that
would
enlarge
her
State
take
any
other
;
for
experience
hath
not
shew'd
us
any
course
more
certain
or
true
.
This
way
formerly
spoken
of
concerning
the
leagues
,
wherein
anciently
the
Tuscans
,
Acheans
,
and
Aerosians
liv'd
,
and
which
now
adayes
the
Swisses
use
,
is
the
better
way
next
after
that
the
Romans
took
:
for
,
it
being
not
possible
by
it
to
grow
very
great
,
thou
gainest
two
advantages
thereby
,
the
one
,
that
easily
thou
drawest
no
war
upon
thee
;
the
other
,
that
what
thou
gettest
thou
easily
holdest
.
The
reason
why
they
cannot
grow
great
,
is
,
because
they
are
disunited
Republiques
,
and
placed
in
divers
seats
;
which
makes
it
more
difficult
to
consult
and
resolve
.
And
besides
,
because
they
are
not
very
greedy
of
extending
the
limits
of
their
dominions
;
for
that
divers
Commonalties
being
to
participate
of
that
rule
,
they
value
not
so
much
such
conquests
,
as
does
a
Republique
alone
,
which
hopes
to
injoy
it
all
her self
.
Moreover
,
they
govern
themselves
by
common
advice
and
counsel
,
and
therfore
of
force
they
must
be
slower
in
every
deliberation
,
then
they
that
live
within
the
walls
of
the
same
City
.
It
is
plain
also
by
experience
,
that
this
manner
of
proceeding
prescribes
it self
certain
bounds
,
which
it
passes
not
;
nor
have
we
any
example
that
they
were
exceeded
.
And
these
were
to
joyn
together
some
dozen
or
fourteen
Commonalties
,
and
afterwards
never
seek
to
go
beyond
that
:
for
being
come
to
those
terms
,
that
they
think
they
are
able
to
defend
themselves
against
every
one
,
they
desire
no
greater
power
,
as
well
because
necessity
does
not
bind
them
to
have
greater
force
;
as
also
because
they
understand
not
any
great
profits
that
arise
from
such
like
purchases
,
for
the
causes
formerly
alledged
:
for
then
of
necessity
they
must
either
go
on
forward
to
make
themselves
allyes
,
and
so
the
multitude
would
make
a
confusion
;
or
els
to
make
them
their
subjects
:
and
because
they
see
herein
many
difficulties
,
and
no
great
advantage
in
holding
them
,
they
make
no
account
of
them
.
Whereupon
,
when
they
have
attaind
to
such
greatness
,
that
they
think
they
may
live
secure
,
they
apply
themselves
to
two
things
;
the
one
to
entertain
others
in
their
protection
,
and
undertake
their
defences
,
and
by
these
means
to
draw
money
from
every
part
,
which
they
can
very
easily
divide
among
one
another
,
and
the
other
to
serve
in
the
wars
under
another
,
and
to
take
pay
of
this
or
that
Prince
,
who
gives
them
wages
for
their
service
,
as
now
adayes
the
Switzers
do
,
and
as
we
read
,
those
we
spoke
of
before
did
,
whereof
Titus
Livius
bears
witness
,
where
he
sayes
,
that
when
Philip
King
of
Macedon
came
to
a
parley
with
Titus
Quintius
Flamminius
,
to
treat
an
accord
in
presence
of
a
Prercur
of
the
Aetolians
,
the
said
Pretour
comming
to
some
words
with
Philip
;
was
reproved
by
him
for
avarice
and
infidelity
,
saying
,
that
the
Ae●olians
were
not
ashamed
to
take
pay
and
serve
in
the
wars
on
both
sides
,
so
that
many
times
their
ensignes
were
seen
in
two
contrary
Armies
.
We
know
withall
,
that
this
manner
of
proceeding
by
Leagues
hath
bin
alwayes
alike
,
and
hath
prodec'd
the
same
effects
.
We
see
also
,
that
that
way
of
making
people
become
subjects
hath
bin
alwaies
weak
,
and
brought
forth
but
small
advantages
;
and
when
they
have
exceeded
the
due
mean
,
they
have
gone
to
ruine
,
And
if
this
course
of
making
Subjects
,
be
unprofitable
in
warlike
Commonwealths
,
surely
in
those
that
are
disordered
,
it
must
needs
be
far
worse
,
as
in
our
daies
have
bin
the
Republiques
of
Italy
.
Wherefore
we
find
that
to
be
the
true
way
,
which
the
Romans
held
,
which
is
the
rather
to
be
admired
,
in
somuch
as
there
was
no
other
example
thereof
before
that
of
Rome
,
nor
since
hath
bin
any
that
hath
imitated
it
.
And
touching
the
leagues
,
there
are
the
Switzers
onely
&
the
Swevian
league
that
follows
them
.
And
,
as
in
the
conclusion
of
this
matter
shall
be
said
,
so
many
orders
observ'd
by
the
Romans
,
as
well
concerning
the
affairs
within
the
City
,
as
those
without
,
in
these
our
times
are
not
onely
not
followed
,
but
made
no
account
of
;
some
of
them
are
deem'd
untrue
,
some
unpossble
,
others
nothing
to
purpose
,
or
unprofitable
:
so
that
whiles
we
stand
still
in
this
ignorance
,
we
become
a
prey
to
any
that
invades
our
Countrey
.
And
though
it
should
seem
difficult
to
imitate
the
Romans
,
yet
ought
it
not
seem
so
,
to
follow
the
steps
of
the
ancient
Tuscans
,
especially
to
the
Tuscans
now
living
:
for
though
they
were
not
able
for
the
reasons
alledged
,
to
make
themselves
an
Empire
like
that
of
Rome
,
yet
could
they
gain
them
that
power
in
Italy
,
that
their
manner
of
proceeding
would
permit
them
,
which
for
a
long
time
was
with
great
glory
of
their
rule
,
and
wars
,
and
with
exceeding
great
commendation
of
their
manners
and
religion
.
Which
power
and
glory
was
first
abated
by
the
French
,
and
afterwards
quite
put
out
by
the
Romans
,
and
so
put
out
,
that
of
this
power
,
which
two
thousand
years
since
was
very
great
,
at
this
present
we
have
no
memory
left
.
Which
hath
made
me
muse
,
what
the
cause
is
that
matters
are
thus
forgotten
,
whereof
in
the
Chapter
following
we
shall
treat
.
CHAP.
V.
That
the
changes
of
Religions
and
Languages
,
together
with
the
chances
of
floods
or
pestilences
,
abolish
the
memory
of
things
.
TO
those
Philosophers
,
who
would
have
made
men
beleeve
that
the
world
is
eternal
,
I
think
one
might
have
replyed
,
that
if
such
antiquity
were
true
,
it
would
be
consequent
,
that
we
should
have
some
notice
of
more
then
five
thousand
years
time
past
,
being
that
it
is
not
apparent
,
how
the
remembrances
of
times
by
several
occasions
were
abolish'd
.
Whereof
part
proceeds
from
men
,
and
part
from
heaven
.
Those
that
proceed
from
men
,
are
the
changes
of
sects
and
tongues
:
for
when
a
new
sect
begins
,
that
is
,
a
new
religion
,
the
first
endeavor
,
to
gain
it self
reputation
,
is
,
to
blot
out
the
memory
of
the
old
;
and
when
it
so
falls
out
,
that
the
founders
of
the
new
sect
are
of
a
different
language
,
they
easily
extinguish
it
:
which
thing
is
known
,
by
considering
the
waies
,
which
the
Christian
Religion
used
against
the
Sect
of
the
Gentiles
,
whereby
it
hath
cancel'd
all
their
orders
and
ceremonies
,
and
defac't
the
whole
remembrance
others
learning
;
and
therefore
destroyd
all
the
registers
of
antiquity
they
could
find
:
which
our
Author
injuriously
imputes
to
the
Christians
,
being
that
they
time
out
of
minde
,
have
caus'd
those
books
to
be
taught
the
youth
in
their
schools
and
we
find
that
the
most
esteemd
Fathers
in
the
Church
were
adorn'd
with
that
learning
,
which
they
are
raxed
to
have
persecuted
;
which
serves
also
very
necessarily
for
the
better
understanding
and
illustrating
of
Theology
,
and
affords
good
arguments
many
times
to
our
Divines
for
the
conviction
of
the
Gentiles
out
of
their
own
writers
.
Nor
do
I
find
there
was
any
other
restraint
in
those
studies
,
than
that
men
were
advis'd
to
apply
themselves
soberly
thereunto
,
as
not
being
studies
to
dwell
in
,
but
tending
rather
to
the
service
of
Theology
.
of
thatancient
Theology
.
It
is
true
,
that
they
attaind
not
thorowly
to
wipe
out
the
knowledge
of
the
prime
men
thereof
,
which
was
occasioned
by
their
maintaining
of
the
Latin
tongue
,
to
which
they
were
forc't
,
being
they
were
to
write
this
new
Law
in
it
:
for
if
they
could
have
writ
it
in
a
new
tongue
,
considering
the
other
persecutions
they
made
against
it
,
there
would
have
bin
no
remembrance
left
of
things
past
.
And
whosoever
reads
what
courses
St.
Gregory
took
,
and
the
other
heads
of
the
Christian
Religion
,
shall
see
with
what
obstinacy
they
persecuted
all
the
ancient
memorials
,
burning
all
the
Poets
and
Historians
works
,
defacing
their
images
,
and
destroying
every
other
thing
that
gave
any
lightwww
.
of
that
antiquity
;
so
that
if
to
this
p●rsecution
,
they
had
added
a
new
language
,
we
should
have
seen
every
thing
in
a
short
time
forgotten
.
It
is
very
likely
therefore
that
what
the
founders
of
the
Christian
Religion
did
against
the
sect
of
the
Gentiles
,
they
of
Gentilis●●e
had
done
formerly
to
the
Sect
that
preceded
it
:
and
because
the
sects
in
a
five
or
six
thousand
years
chance
two
or
three
times
,
the
memory
of
things
past
before
that
time
is
utterly
lost
.
And
though
yet
there
remain
some
remembrance
thereof
,
we
take
it
as
some
fabulous
thing
,
whereunto
no
man
gives
credit
,
as
it
befalls
the
story
written
by
Diodorus
Siculus
,
in
which
though
he
gives
account
of
a
forty
or
fifty
thousand
years
,
nevertheless
is
it
esteemed
(
and
so
I
think
it
too
)
a
false
tail
.
As
for
the
causes
that
proceed
from
heaven
,
they
are
such
as
extinguish
the
race
of
mankind
,
and
reduce
to
a
small
number
the
inhabitants
of
part
of
the
world
;
and
this
comes
to
pass
,
either
by
pestilence
or
famine
,
or
by
a
deluge
of
waters
;
but
that
of
most
importance
is
this
last
,
because
it
is
more
universal
,
and
because
those
that
escape
,
are
all
such
as
live
among
the
mountains
and
are
simple
and
ignorant
people
,
who
having
no
knowledge
of
antiquity
,
cannot
derive
it
to
their
posterity
:
and
if
among
them
any
knowing
man
chance
to
escape
,
to
gain
himself
,
reputation
and
a
name
,
he
conceals
it
,
and
alters
it
at
his
own
pleasure
,
so
that
there
is
left
to
his
successors
only
so
much
as
he
hath
bin
pleas'd
to
commit
to
writing
,
and
no
more
.
And
that
these
in
undations
,
pestilences
,
and
famines
sometimes
come
,
I
beleeve
there
is
no
doubt
,
as
well
because
all
histories
are
full
of
them
,
as
for
that
we
see
this
effect
of
defacing
the
memory
of
things
,
as
also
becauie
it
accords
well
with
reason
that
it
is
so
:
for
nature
,
as
in
simple
bodies
,
when
there
is
gatherd
together
enough
superfluous
matter
,
moves
many
times
of
it self
,
and
makes
a
purgation
,
which
is
the
preservation
of
that
bodie
;
so
it
falls
out
in
this
mixt
body
of
mankinde
,
that
when
all
countries
are
stuffed
with
inhabitants
,
that
they
can
neither
live
there
,
nor
go
otherwhere
,
because
all
places
are
already
possessed
and
replenish'd
,
and
when
the
subtilty
and
wickedness
of
man
is
grown
to
that
fulness
it
can
attain
to
,
it
holds
with
reason
,
that
of
force
the
world
be
purged
by
one
of
these
three
waies
,
that
men
being
become
few
,
and
having
suffer'd
much
,
may
live
with
more
convenience
and
grow
better
,
whereupon
it
is
nothing
strange
,
that
,
as
it
is
abovesaid
,
the
Tuscan
nation
in
old
time
was
very
potent
,
full
of
Religion
and
vertue
,
had
their
own
manners
and
their
native
tongue
,
which
the
power
the
Romans
quite
abolish'd
,
so
that
,
as
it
is
said
,
onely
their
name
remains
still
in
the
memory
of
posterity
.
CHAP.
VI.
How
the
Romans
proceeded
in
making
of
war.
HAving
discours'd
,
how
the
Romans
proceeded
in
enlarging
their
State
,
we
will
now
treat
of
their
proceedings
in
making
of
war
,
and
in
every
one
of
their
actions
it
will
appear
with
how
great
judgement
,
they
left
aside
the
common
way
that
others
went
,
whereby
they
might
more
easily
attain
the
highest
pitch
of
greatness
.
The
intention
of
that
man
,
that
makes
war
,
either
by
election
or
by
ambition
,
is
to
get
,
and
keep
what
he
hath
gotten
,
and
to
proceed
so
there
with
,
that
he
may
enrich
and
not
impoverish
his
own
country
.
It
is
necessary
for
him
then
,
both
in
getting
and
holding
,
to
take
a
care
not
to
diminish
,
but
rather
to
augment
the
publique
profit
of
his
countrey
.
He
that
will
do
these
things
,
must
follow
the
way
and
course
the
Romans
took
,
who
at
first
made
their
wars
great
and
short
;
for
comming
into
the
field
with
huge
armies
,
all
the
wars
they
had
with
the
Latines
,
Samnites
and
Tuscans
,
they
dispatcht
in
a
very
short
time
:
and
if
notice
were
exactly
taken
of
all
those
wars
they
made
from
the
beginning
of
Rome
,
til
the
siege
of
Veium
,
we
should
find
they
were
all
ended
,
one
in
six
dayes
,
another
in
ten
,
and
a
third
in
some
twenty
dayes
space
:
for
their
custome
was
this
;
so
soon
as
ever
they
had
discover'd
the
war
,
they
presently
went
out
with
their
armies
and
fought
with
their
enemies
,
who
being
overmaster'd
(
to
save
their
Countrey
from
spoil
)
yeilded
to
their
conditions
,
and
the
Romans
condemn'd
them
in
loss
of
some
of
their
territories
,
and
those
they
turn'd
to
their
private
Profits
,
or
bestow'd
them
upon
some
Colony
they
sent
thither
,
which
being
seituate
upon
some
Frontier
of
theirs
,
became
Guardians
of
their
confines
,
to
the
advantage
of
the
inhabitants
of
that
Colony
,
who
had
those
fields
in
possession
,
and
with
the
profit
of
the
generality
of
Rome
,
that
held
this
guard
without
expence
.
Nor
could
there
be
any
way
more
assured
,
nor
of
more
strength
or
advantage
:
for
til
the
enemy
went
into
the
field
,
this
guard
was
sufficient
.
And
when
they
went
forth
strong
into
the
field
to
oppress
that
Colony
,
the
Romans
also
went
out
with
their
forces
,
and
join'd
battel
with
them
,
wherein
having
got
the
day
,
they
laid
more
heavy
burdens
on
them
,
and
so
return'd
home
.
Thus
came
they
by
little
and
little
to
great
credit
among
them
,
and
forces
in
themselves
.
And
this
course
held
they
alwaies
,
till
they
chang'd
their
manner
of
proceeding
in
war
:
which
was
after
the
siege
of
Vejum
,
where
to
enable
them
to
make
a
long
war
they
determined
to
pay
the
soldiers
,
whereas
formerly
,
being
that
the
wars
were
short
,
there
was
no
need
to
give
them
pay
.
And
though
the
Romans
gave
pay
,
and
that
by
vertue
hereof
they
were
able
to
make
longer
wars
,
and
to
make
those
more
remote
,
they
were
forc'd
to
stay
longer
in
the
field
,
yet
did
they
never
alter
from
their
first
order
,
to
dispatch
them
quickly
,
according
to
the
time
and
place
.
Nor
did
they
ever
leave
sending
of
Colonies
:
for
besides
their
natural
guise
,
the
Consuls
ambition
held
them
to
their
first
custome
of
making
their
wars
short
;
for
being
created
but
for
a
years
time
,
and
thereof
to
stay
at
home
six
moneths
,
they
desired
to
finish
the
war
,
that
they
might
triumph
.
To
send
Colonies
,
the
profit
and
great
advantage
they
made
thereof
,
still
prevail'd
with
them
.
They
altered
indeed
somwhat
touching
the
spoiles
,
whereof
they
were
not
so
liberal
,
as
in
former
times
they
had
bin
;
because
they
thought
there
was
not
so
great
need
,
the
soldiers
receiving
their
stipends
;
as
also
because
the
spoiles
being
greater
,
they
intended
therewith
so
to
fill
the
common
treasure
,
that
they
might
not
be
constrain'd
upon
any
enterprise
in
hand
to
leavy
monies
upon
the
City
.
Which
order
in
a
very
short
time
much
enrich'd
their
treasury
.
These
two
courses
then
they
took
,
about
the
dividing
the
spoiles
,
and
sending
of
Colonies
,
caus'd
Rome
to
grow
rich
by
the
war
,
whereas
other
Princes
and
Republiques
,
if
they
find
that
means
to
releeve
themselves
,
become
impoverishd
;
so
that
it
came
to
this
at
last
,
that
a
Consul
thought
he
might
not
triumph
unless
he
brought
much
gold
and
silver
and
spoils
of
every
kind
into
the
treasury
:
Thus
the
Romans
by
their
above
written
waies
,
sometimes
by
making
a
quick
end
of
the
wars
,
otherwhiles
by
drawing
them
out
at
length
with
discomfitures
and
invasions
and
treaties
to
their
advantage
,
grew
alwaies
more
mighty
.
CHAP.
VII
.
How
much
land
the
Romans
allowed
to
each
man
they
sent
out
to
inhabit
their
Colonies
.
BY
what
parcels
the
Romans
did
divide
the
land
among
them
,
I
beleeve
it
is
hard
to
find
out
the
truth
,
because
I
think
they
bestow'd
on
them
more
or
less
,
according
to
the
places
,
whether
they
sent
the
Colonies
;
and
it
is
credible
,
howsoever
the
case
went
,
and
whether
soever
they
were
sent
,
the
allowance
was
but
small
.
First
to
the
end
they
might
be
able
to
send
the
more
men
thither
,
they
being
intrusted
with
the
guard
of
that
countrey
.
Besides
,
because
they
living
sparingly
at
home
,
it
agrees
not
with
reason
,
that
they
would
allow
their
men
,
where
wishall
to
abound
much
abroad
And
Titus
Livius
sayes
,
that
,
to
each
man
they
gave
three
acres
and
a
half
and
a
twelfth
part
.
For
besides
the
things
above
written
,
they
judge
it
was
not
the
quantity
of
the
land
that
suppli'd
their
wants
,
but
the
well
c●●tiating
of
it
.
And
moreover
it
is
very
necessary
,
that
the
whole
Colony
have
fields
in
common
,
were
every
one
may
freely
feed
his
cattel
,
and
woods
from
whence
to
fetch
fuell
for
firing
,
without
which
a
Colony
cannot
well
subfist
.
CHAP.
VIII
.
The
occasion
,
wherefore
people
leave
their
own
native
soyles
,
and
invade
other
countreys
.
Seeing
that
we
have
formerly
discours'd
of
the
manner
of
proceeding
in
war
which
the
Romans
us'd
,
and
how
the
Tuscans
were
assail'd
by
the
French
,
me
thinks
it
were
not
much
from
the
matter
,
to
shew
,
that
there
are
two
sorts
of
war
made
.
The
one
is
through
the
ambitions
of
Princes
,
or
Commonwealths
,
who
indeavor
the
inlargement
of
their
dominions
;
such
as
were
the
wars
of
Alexander
the
Great
,
and
the
Romans
,
and
such
as
now
adayes
every
Prince
and
Potentate
makes
one
with
another
.
Which
wars
are
dangerous
indeed
,
but
yet
they
do
not
wholly
chase
the
inhabitants
out
of
a
countrey
;
for
the
Conqueror
is
contented
onely
with
the
obedience
of
nations
,
and
most
commonly
suffers
them
to
live
under
their
own
Laws
,
and
enjoy
their
own
goods
in
their
own
houses
.
The
other
kind
of
war
is
,
when
the
whole
people
with
all
their
families
,
rise
from
a
place
,
forced
either
by
famine
or
war
,
and
goe
to
seek
a
new
habitation
and
new
Countrey
,
not
out
of
ambition
to
command
,
as
the
others
,
but
to
possess
it
by
themselves
,
and
to
drive
thence
or
destroy
the
ancient
inhabitants
thereof
.
This
kind
of
war
is
very
cruel
and
terrible
:
And
touching
these
wars
,
Salust
speaks
in
the
end
of
the
Jugurthin
,
where
he
sayes
,
that
when
Jugurth
was
overcome
,
the
French
were
perceived
to
stir
,
who
then
came
into
Italy
:
and
there
he
relates
,
that
the
people
of
Rome
fought
with
all
other
Nations
for
rule
and
command
,
but
with
the
French
every
one
fought
for
his
life
and
safety
:
For
it
sufficeth
a
Prince
or
Commonwealth
that
assails
a
Countrey
,
to
destroy
onely
those
that
command
,
whereas
these
populations
must
make
a
general
destruction
,
being
that
they
will
live
upon
that
,
which
formerly
sustained
others
.
The
Romans
had
three
several
wars
of
these
,
exceeding
dangerous
.
The
first
was
that
when
Rome
was
taken
,
which
was
seis'd
on
by
those
Frenchmen
,
that
(
as
is
above
said
)
had
taken
Lombardy
from
the
Tuscans
,
and
seated
themselves
there
;
whereof
Titus
Livius
alledges
two
reasons
;
The
first
,
as
we
said
before
,
is
,
that
they
were
allur'd
by
the
pleasantness
of
the
fruits
and
the
wines
of
Italy
,
whereof
they
had
scarcity
in
France
:
the
second
,
that
the
people
in
France
being
exceedingly
multiplyed
,
the
Countrey
could
not
seed
them
,
whereupon
the
Princes
of
those
places
thought
it
fit
,
that
part
of
them
should
goe
to
seek
some
new
habitation
,
and
that
resolution
being
taken
,
they
chose
for
Captains
of
them
that
were
to
depart
,
Bellovessus
,
and
Sicovessus
,
two
French
Kings
,
whereof
Bellovessus
came
into
Italy
,
and
Sicovessus
went
into
Spain
.
Upon
the
passage
of
which
Bellovessus
follow'd
the
seisure
of
Lombardy
,
and
thereupon
the
war
,
which
first
the
French
made
against
Rome
.
Next
this
was
that
,
they
made
after
the
first
Carthaginian
war
,
when
between
Piombin
and
Pisa
they
slew
more
then
hundred
thousand
,
French
.
The
third
was
,
when
the
Germans
and
Cimbrians
came
into
Italy
,
who
having
overcome
several
Roman
Armies
,
were
subdu'd
by
Marius
.
The
Romans
then
masterd
these
three
very
perilous
wars
,
nor
was
there
need
of
less
valor
than
theirs
to
overcome
them
:
for
we
see
,
how
that
after
the
valor
of
the
Romans
faild
,
and
their
armies
lost
their
ancient
vertue
,
that
Empire
was
ruind
by
such
like
people
,
as
the
Goths
,
Vandalls
,
and
such
others
,
who
possessd
themselves
of
the
whole
western
Empire
.
Such
people
come
out
of
their
own
Countreys
,
as
is
above
said
,
compell'd
thereto
by
necessity
,
which
necessity
proceeds
either
from
famine
,
or
from
some
war
and
oppression
inflicted
on
them
in
their
own
Countreys
.
So
that
they
are
constraind
to
seek
new
habitations
.
And
these
either
are
in
great
multitudes
,
and
then
they
break
with
violence
into
others
countreys
,
destroy
the
Inhabitants
,
possess
their
goods
,
make
a
new
Kingdome
,
and
change
the
name
of
the
country
,
as
Moses
did
,
and
those
people
likewise
that
seiz'd
upon
the
Romane
Empire
;
for
these
new
names
,
that
are
in
Italy
,
and
in
the
other
Provinces
,
grew
from
nothing
else
,
than
that
they
were
so
named
by
their
new
Lords
.
As
is
Lombardy
now
,
which
was
called
Gallia
Cisalpina
;
France
was
called
Gallia
Transalpina
,
and
now
is
named
of
the
French
;
for
so
were
those
people
called
,
that
made
themselves
masters
of
it
.
Sclavonia
was
called
Illyrium
;
Hungary
,
Pannonia
;
England
,
Brittanny
;
and
many
other
Countreys
,
that
have
changed
their
names
,
which
it
would
be
too
long
to
recite
.
Moses
allso
called
that
part
of
Syria
,
which
he
made
himself
master
of
,
Jury
.
And
,
because
I
have
formerly
said
,
that
some
people
are
driven
out
of
their
own
habitations
by
war
,
whereupon
they
are
forc'd
to
seek
a
new
,
where
to
seat
themselves
,
I
will
alleage
an
example
to
that
purpose
,
of
the
Maurusians
,
ancientiy
a
people
of
Syria
;
Who
having
notice
of
the
Hebrews
comming
,
and
thinking
they
could
not
resist
them
,
thought
it
better
to
leave
their
Countrey
,
than
in
striving
to
save
that
,
lose
themselves
;
And
so
rising
thence
with
their
families
,
they
went
into
Affrique
,
where
they
sate
down
,
driving
out
the
Inhabitants
they
found
in
those
places
.
And
so
they
,
who
could
not
defend
their
own
Countrey
,
could
yet
take
that
of
others
from
them
.
And
Procopius
,
who
writes
of
the
war
,
that
Bellifarius
made
with
the
Vandals
,
that
possessed
themselves
of
Affrique
,
reports
that
he
read
Letters
written
in
certain
pillars
,
in
those
parts
where
these
Maurusians
did
inhabite
,
thus
saying
,
We
are
Maurusians
who
fled
from
the
face
of
Jesu
the
robber
,
who
was
Son
of
Nave
.
Where
the
occasion
of
the
departure
of
these
people
out
of
Syria
plainly
appears
;
wherefore
these
people
are
very
terrible
,
when
they
are
driven
out
by
extream
necessity
,
and
unless
they
be
encountred
by
puissant
forces
,
cannot
be
stopd
:
but
when
those
that
are
constraind
to
abandon
their
Countrey
are
not
very
numerous
,
there
is
no
such
danger
of
them
,
as
of
those
people
we
spoke
,
because
they
cannot
use
such
violence
,
but
ought
rather
by
some
stratagem
,
make
themselves
masters
of
some
strong
place
,
and
therein
being
setled
,
keep
it
by
making
of
friends
and
allies
;
as
we
see
Aeneas
did
with
Dido
,
the
Massilians
and
others
,
who
all
by
agreement
with
their
neighbors
,
where
they
once
set
themselves
down
,
were
able
to
continue
.
The
people
that
goe
forth
in
the
greatest
multitudes
,
and
those
also
that
have
gone
forth
,
almost
all
came
out
from
those
parts
of
Scythia
,
cold
,
and
poore
Countries
,
where
,
because
there
are
men
in
abundance
,
and
the
Country
of
that
condition
,
that
it
cannot
feed
them
all
,
they
are
compeld
to
goe
forth
,
having
many
causes
to
drive
them
out
,
and
nothing
to
keep
them
in
.
And
if
now
for
these
five
hundred
years
it
hath
not
happend
,
that
any
of
these
nations
have
made
an
inundation
upon
any
Countrey
,
it
hath
proceeded
from
several
reasons
.
The
first
is
,
the
great
evacuation
that
Countrey
made
in
the
declining
of
the
Empire
,
they
having
since
sent
out
huge
swarms
more
than
thirty
several
times
:
the
second
is
,
because
Germany
,
and
England
,
from
whence
these
people
came
,
have
their
Countries
well
mended
,
so
that
they
are
able
to
live
there
,
with
better
conveniency
;
and
thereupon
not
necessitated
to
change
their
seat
.
On
the
other
side
,
these
men
being
very
warli●
,
are
as
it
were
a
Bulwark
against
the
Scythians
,
who
border
upon
them
,
to
keep
them
within
their
confines
and
territories
:
and
many
times
there
chance
great
risings
among
the
Tartars
,
who
are
kept
in
by
the
Hungarians
and
Polacks
:
who
vaunt
,
and
not
without
reason
,
that
were
it
not
for
their
forces
,
Italy
and
the
Church
had
often
felt
the
weight
of
the
Tartars
Armies
.
And
this
shall
suffice
,
touching
those
forenam'd
peoples
.
CHAP.
IX
.
Vpon
what
occasions
commonly
warres
are
begun
among
Princes
.
THe
occasion
,
that
gave
beginning
to
the
warres
betweene
the
Romanes
and
Samnites
,
who
had
beeng
long
in
league
together
,
is
very
ordinary
,
and
happens
often
to
powerfull
Principalities
Which
occasion
,
either
comes
by
chance
,
or
else
is
offerd
by
him
that
desires
to
make
warre
.
That
which
was
betweene
the
Romans
and
Samnites
,
feil
out
by
chance
:
for
the
Samnites
intention
was
not
,
by
making
warre
first
against
the
Sidicini
,
and
then
against
the
Campani
,
afterwards
to
set
upon
the
Romanes
.
But
the
Campani
being
oppressed
,
having
their
recourse
to
Rome
,
beyond
the
Romanes
expectation
and
the
Samnites
,
the
Campani
giving
themselves
into
the
Romans
hands
,
they
were
constraind
to
desend
them
,
as
their
subjects
,
and
take
upon
them
that
warre
,
which
they
thought
with
their
honour
they
could
not
avod
:
For
it
seemd
very
reasonable
to
the
Romans
,
not
to
undertake
the
defence
of
the
Campani
,
though
their
friends
,
against
the
Samnites
their
friends
;
but
they
thought
it
also
a
shame
not
to
dessend
them
,
when
they
were
their
subjects
;
or
recommended
to
their
protection
,
judging
that
when
they
had
not
taken
that
defence
in
hand
,
they
cut
off
the
way
from
all
others
that
ever
should
have
a
mind
to
shelter
themselves
under
their
power
.
And
Rome
having
for
her
maine
end
the
Empire
and
glory
,
and
not
qui●t
,
could
not
refuse
this
enterprise
.
The
selfe
same
occasion
gave
beginning
to
the
first
warre
against
the
Carthaginians
,
for
the
defence
of
the
Massineses
,
which
the
Romans
undertooke
in
Sicily
;
which
fell
out
by
chance
also
.
But
now
the
second
warre
,
that
grew
between
them
,
came
not
by
chance
.
For
Hannibal
the
Carthaginian
Captaines
,
set
upon
the
Saguntins
that
were
allyes
to
the
Romans
in
Spaine
,
not
so
much
for
to
endammage
them
,
as
to
provoke
the
Romanes
to
warres
,
and
to
have
occasion
to
fight
with
them
,
and
so
to
passe
into
Italie
.
This
manner
of
kinoling
new
warres
hath
been
alwayes
usd
among
those
that
are
mighty
and
that
have
some
saith
joynd
,
some
other
respects
:
for
if
I
desire
to
make
warre
with
a
Prince
,
and
between
us
some
capitulations
of
peace
have
firmly
been
observed
a
long
time
,
upon
some
other
title
fair
justifiable
,
and
under
some
other
colour
,
I
will
assayle
some
ally
of
his
,
rather
than
himselfe
,
knowing
very
well
,
that
in
setting
upon
his
alley
,
eyther
he
will
resent
it
,
and
so
I
shall
have
my
intent
of
moving
warre
against
him
;
or
not
resenting
it
,
his
weaknesse
shall
be
discoverd
,
or
his
infidelitie
,
in
not
defending
one
that
is
under
his
protection
;
and
the
one
and
the
other
of
these
two
is
sufficient
to
discredit
him
,
and
facilitate
my
designes
.
Therefore
what
wee
have
formerly
sayd
,
may
be
noted
touching
the
taking
occasions
to
move
warre
,
out
of
this
example
of
the
yeelding
of
the
Campani
;
and
besides
what
remedie
a
Citie
may
have
,
which
cannot
by
her selfe
alone
make
her
defence
,
and
yet
in
any
case
would
not
fall
into
her
assaylants
hands
.
Which
is
freely
to
give
her selfe
into
his
hands
,
who
thou
hast
a
purpose
should
defend
thee
,
as
the
Capuans
to
the
Romanes
,
and
the
Florentines
to
Robert
King
of
Naples
,
who
though
he
would
not
defend
them
as
allyes
,
yet
afterwards
defended
them
being
his
subjects
,
against
the
forces
of
Castruvius
of
Lucca
,
who
then
put
them
hard
to
it
.
CHAP.
X.
Moneys
are
not
the
sinews
of
war
,
according
to
the
common
opinion
.
BEcause
every
one
can
begin
a
warre
at
his
owne
pleasure
,
but
not
end
it
,
a
Prince
should
before
he
undertake
an
enterprise
,
measure
his
owne
forces
,
and
order
himselfe
according
to
them
;
he
should
also
have
so
much
judgement
,
that
he
deceive
not
himselfe
with
the
conceit
of
his
owne
forces
;
and
he
shall
alwayes
be
sure
to
be
deceiv'd
when
he
measures
them
,
either
by
the
scituation
,
or
by
the
good
will
of
men
towards
him
,
his
owne
proper
forces
on
the
other
side
fayling
him
:
for
the
things
aforesayd
may
increase
well
thy
forces
,
though
give
thee
them
they
cannot
;
and
by
themselves
alone
they
are
of
on
worth
,
nor
nothing
avayle
without
the
helpe
of
Souldiers
fathfull
to
thee
:
for
great
store
of
treasure
serves
to
no
purpose
without
that
;
nor
the
strength
of
thy
Country
,
neither
doth
the
faithfulnesse
nor
good
will
of
men
last
;
for
these
cannot
be
faithfull
to
thee
,
thou
not
having
force
to
defend
them
.
Every
mountaine
,
every
lake
,
every
unaccessible
place
is
made
plaine
,
where
the
strong
defendants
are
wanting
.
Nay
rather
moneys
are
so
far
from
defending
thee
,
that
they
expose
thee
for
a
prey
.
Nor
is
there
any
thing
more
false
than
that
common
opinion
that
affirmes
Moneys
to
be
the
sinews
of
warre
,
which
sentence
was
first
given
by
Q.
Curtius
,
in
the
warre
betweene
Antipater
the
Macedonian
,
and
the
King
of
Sparta
;
Where
he
relates
,
that
for
want
of
moneys
,
the
King
of
Spar●a
was
forc'd
to
fight
,
and
was
broken
whereas
if
he
had
deferd
the
battell
a
few
dayes
,
newes
had
come
into
Greece
of
Alexanders
death
,
where
he
had
remaind
conqueror
without
combat
.
But
his
treasure
fayling
,
and
he
doubting
his
Armie
would
leave
him
for
want
thereof
,
was
constraind
to
hazard
the
battell
;
whereupon
Q
Curtius
sayes
,
that
moneys
are
the
firews
of
war
;
which
sentence
is
alledgd
every
day
,
and
followd
too
by
some
Princes
,
not
quite
so
wise
as
they
should
be
:
for
making
this
their
ground
,
they
beleeve
,
that
this
is
able
to
defend
them
,
if
they
have
treasure
enough
;
and
never
consider
,
that
if
treasure
were
of
force
to
overcome
,
that
Darius
would
have
conquerd
Alexander
,
the
Greekes
masterd
the
Romanes
,
and
in
our
dayes
the
Duke
Charles
subdu'd
the
Swissers
,
and
not
long
time
since
the
Pope
and
the
Florentins
together
would
have
found
no
difficultie
in
overcomming
Francis
Maria
nephew
of
Pope
Julius
the
second
in
the
warre
of
Orbin
.
But
all
these
above
nam'd
,
were
overcome
by
those
who
esteemd
not
mony
,
but
good
Souldiers
the
sinews
of
warre
.
Among
other
things
,
that
Croesus
King
of
Lydia
shewd
to
Solon
the
Athenian
,
was
a
treasure
unmeasurable
,
and
asking
him
what
he
thought
of
his
power
,
Solon
answerrd
him
,
he
thought
him
no
whit
the
more
powerfull
for
that
;
for
warre
was
made
with
iron
and
not
with
gold
,
and
some
one
might
come
,
who
had
more
iron
than
be
,
and
take
his
gold
from
him
.
Moreover
,
when
after
the
death
of
Alexander
the
Great
,
a
vast
multitude
of
French
pass'd
over
into
Greece
,
and
after
into
Asia
,
the
French
sending
Ambassadours
to
the
King
of
Macedon
to
treate
some
accord
,
that
King
to
shew
them
his
power
,
and
to
fright
them
,
let
them
see
his
treasure
,
where
was
much
gold
and
silver
,
whereupon
these
French
,
who
had
in
a
manner
concluded
a
firme
peace
,
brake
t
;
their
desire
grew
so
great
then
to
take
his
gold
from
him
:
and
so
was
that
King
despoyld
for
that
which
he
had
gatherd
together
to
defend
him
.
The
Venetians
also
,
a
few
yeares
since
,
having
their
treasury
full
of
coyne
,
lost
their
whole
State
,
being
not
able
to
defend
themselves
thereby
.
Wherefore
I
say
,
that
gold
as
the
common
opinion
cryes
it
up
,
is
not
the
sinewes
of
warre
,
but
a
good
Armie
of
slour
Souldiers
;
for
gold
is
not
sufficient
to
finde
good
Souldiers
,
but
good
Souldiers
are
able
well
to
finde
our
gold
.
As
for
the
Romanes
(
if
they
would
have
waged
warre
by
moneyes
rather
tha
with
the
sword
)
the
treasure
of
the
world
,
considering
their
vast
undertakings
,
and
the
great
difficulties
they
had
therein
,
would
not
have
servd
their
turnes
.
But
they
making
their
warres
with
the
sword
,
never
found
scarcitie
of
gold
;
for
they
had
it
in
abundance
brought
even
into
their
Camps
by
those
that
stood
in
feare
of
them
.
And
if
that
Spartan
King
for
want
of
money
,
were
to
hazard
the
fortune
of
a
battell
,
that
befell
him
upon
the
matter
of
moneys
,
which
many
times
hath
chanc'd
upon
other
occasions
:
for
it
hath
been
often
seene
,
that
when
an
Armie
wants
provision
of
victualls
,
and
is
necessitated
either
to
samish
or
sight
,
usually
they
make
choyce
to
fight
,
because
it
is
greater
honour
,
and
where
in
some
sort
Fortune
hath
in
her
power
to
savour
thee
.
Moreover
,
it
hath
often
come
to
passe
,
that
a
Commander
perceiving
succours
comming
to
his
enemies
Armie
,
must
either
fight
with
them
quickly
,
and
make
tryall
of
the
chance
of
battell
,
or
expecting
the
i●grossing
of
the
Armie
,
come
at
length
to
fight
perforce
upon
many
disadvantages
.
Besides
,
it
hath
been
seene
,
as
it
befell
Asdruball
,
when
in
the
Mar●hes
he
was
ass●ulted
by
Claudius
Nero
,
together
with
the
other
Romane
Consull
,
that
when
a
Captaine
is
necsstated
either
to
fly
or
fight
,
he
alwayes
makes
choyce
to
fight
;
thinking
by
this
bargaine
,
though
exceeding
hazardous
,
he
may
gaine
;
but
in
that
other
he
must
needs
lose
in
any
case
.
There
are
therefore
many
necessities
that
can
force
a
Captaine
beyond
what
he
intended
,
to
resolve
to
put
it
to
a
battell
,
among
which
sometimes
may
happen
the
scarcitie
of
moneys
,
though
not
therefore
should
wee
esteeme
moneyes
to
be
the
sinews
of
warre
rather
,
than
other
things
,
which
bring
men
into
the
like
necessities
.
Wee
may
therefore
resolve
the
question
,
that
money
is
not
the
sinews
of
warre
,
but
good
Souldiers
rather
.
It
is
true
,
moneys
are
necessary
in
the
second
place
,
but
it
is
such
a
necessitie
,
which
good
Souldiers
themselves
may
overcome
:
for
it
it
as
impossible
that
good
Souldiers
should
lack
money
,
as
by
moneys
alone
to
produce
good
Souldiers
.
What
we
here
averre
,
every
History
shews
us
to
be
true
in
many
places
,
notwithstanding
that
Pericles
perswaded
the
Athenians
to
make
warre
with
a●l
Peloponnesus
,
declaring
,
that
they
might
overcome
that
warre
with
industry
and
by
force
of
money
;
and
though
in
that
warre
the
Athenians
sometimes
prospeed
,
yet
at
last
they
lost
it
,
and
the
advice
,
and
good
Souldiers
of
Sparta
prevayld
more
,
than
the
industry
and
money
of
Athens
.
But
Titus
Livius
gives
us
a
better
testimony
for
this
opinion
then
any
one
else
,
where
discoursing
of
Alexander
the
Great
,
whether
if
he
had
come
into
Italie
,
he
had
been
able
to
vanquish
the
Romans
,
he
shews
there
three
things
necessary
in
the
warre
;
a
great
number
of
Souldiers
,
&
those
good
,
wise
Commanders
,
and
good
fortune
:
where
examining
,
whether
eyther
the
Romanes
or
Alexander
excelld
herein
,
at
length
he
concludes
,
without
making
any
mention
of
moneys
.
The
Capuans
,
when
they
were
requird
by
the
Sidicins
,
to
take
Armes
in
their
behalfe
against
the
Samnites
,
should
not
have
measurd
their
power
by
their
treasure
,
but
by
their
good
Souldiers
:
for
by
taking
that
course
they
tooke
to
assist
them
,
after
two
overthrowes
,
to
save
themselves
,
they
were
forc'd
to
become
tributaries
to
the
Romanes
.
CHAP.
XI
.
It
is
not
a
match
wisely
made
,
to
joyne
alliance
with
a
Prince
,
whose
credit
is
greater
then
his
strength
.
TItus
Livius
having
a
purpose
to
shew
the
Sidicins
errour
in
relying
upon
the
Capuans
aid
,
and
the
Capuans
errour
also
in
beleeving
they
were
able
to
defend
them
,
could
not
expresse
it
in
more
lively
termes
then
these
,
The
Capuans
contributed
to
the
Sidicins
ayd
,
rather
more
reputation
then
forces
.
Where
we
may
observe
,
that
those
leagues
that
are
made
with
Princes
,
who
have
not
either
the
commodity
to
assist
thee
by
reason
of
the
distance
of
place
,
or
forces
to
do
it
,
because
of
some
disorder
of
their
owne
at
home
,
or
for
some
other
occasion
,
add
rather
reputation
to
them
that
trust
in
them
,
then
any
strength
to
their
party
:
as
in
our
dayes
it
befell
the
Florentines
,
when
in
the
yeare
1479.
the
Pope
and
the
King
of
Naples
assayl'd
them
:
who
being
allyes
of
the
King
of
France
,
drew
from
that
allyance
more
reputation
to
their
side
,
then
safe
guard
:
as
likely
enough
it
would
befall
that
Prince
now
,
who
under
Maximilian
the
Emperours
protection
should
undertake
any
enterprise
:
for
this
is
one
sort
of
those
allyances
,
which
bring
more
fame
then
advantage
,
as
here
in
this
text
is
alledg'd
,
that
of
the
Capuans
brought
the
Sidicins
.
Therefore
in
this
point
the
Capuans
committed
an
errour
,
in
esteeming
their
owne
forces
greater
then
they
were
.
And
so
sometimes
the
small
discretion
men
have
,
causes
them
when
they
neither
know
how
,
nor
have
the
meanes
to
defend
themselves
,
to
take
upon
them
the
protections
of
others
which
the
Tarentines
also
did
:
who
,
when
the
Roman
army
was
going
to
joyne
battell
with
that
of
the
Samnites
,
sent
their
Ambassadours
to
the
Roman
Consul
,
to
let
him
understand
that
they
will'd
there
should
be
peace
betweene
those
two
people
;
and
how
that
otherwise
they
should
make
warre
against
the
party
that
should
refu●e
it
.
So
that
the
Consul
scoffing
at
this
proposition
,
caus'd
the
triumphs
to
sound
in
presence
of
their
ten
Ambassadours
,
and
so
made
his
army
march
towards
the
enemy
,
shewing
the
Tarentins
by
his
deeds
and
not
by
words
what
answer
they
deserv'd
.
And
having
now
discours'd
in
this
Chapter
against
some
courses
Princes
take
amisse
for
others
defence
,
I
will
in
that
that
followes
speake
touching
those
they
take
for
their
owne
defence
.
CHAP.
XII
.
Whether
it
be
better
for
a
Prince
,
fearing
to
be
assail'd
by
his
enemy
,
himselfe
first
to
begin
the
warre
with
him
,
or
to
expect
while
it
comes
home
to
him
.
I
Have
heard
it
disputed
sometimes
by
men
well
practis'd
in
military
discipline
,
if
there
be
two
Princes
neare
of
equal
force
,
and
the
one
that
is
the
more
resolute
have
proclaim'd
warre
against
the
other
,
which
were
the
best
course
for
that
other
,
either
to
attend
quietly
in
his
owne
confines
whiles
his
enemy
come
upon
him
,
or
else
to
goe
finde
him
at
home
,
and
there
assaile
him
.
And
I
have
heard
them
alledge
arguments
on
both
sides
;
and
those
that
argue
for
this
going
to
assaile
him
,
produce
the
counsell
that
Croesus
gave
Cyrus
,
when
being
arriv'd
upon
the
borders
of
the
Messagetes
to
make
warre
against
them
,
their
Queene
Thomyris
sent
him
word
,
that
he
should
take
his
choice
,
either
to
enter
into
her
kingdom
where
she
would
awaite
him
,
or
if
he
would
rather
that
she
should
come
and
si●nde
him
in
his
owne
.
And
when
the
matter
came
to
dispute
,
Croesus
advis'd
against
the
opinion
of
the
rest
,
to
goe
&
seeke
her
in
her
owne
country
;
urging
that
otherwise
if
he
overcame
her
farre
from
her
owne
confines
,
he
could
not
take
her
kingdome
from
her
,
because
she
would
have
time
to
repaire
her
losses
;
but
if
he
conqur'd
her
within
her
owne
territories
,
he
might
pursue
her
just
upon
her
slight
;
&
so
giving
her
no
time
of
recovery
,
take
the
state
from
her
.
Moreover
they
alledge
the
advice
that
Hanniball
gave
Antiochus
,
when
that
King
had
a
purpose
to
make
warie
against
the
Romans
,
where
he
shewes
how
the
Romans
could
not
be
overcome
but
in
Italy
;
for
there
another
might
availe
himselfe
of
their
armes
,
their
wealth
,
and
their
friends
also
.
But
whosoever
fought
with
them
out
of
Italy
,
leaving
Italy
free
to
them
,
left
them
that
strength
,
that
never
would
want
life
to
give
them
fresh
supplies
at
all
occasions
.
And
concluded
,
that
it
was
easier
to
take
Rome
from
them
,
then
the
Empire
;
and
Italy
,
rather
than
their
other
provinces
.
Agathocles
also
is
alleadg'd
,
who
not
being
able
to
support
the
war
at
home
,
assail'd
the
Carthaginians
,
who
then
had
made
warre
against
him
,
and
brought
them
to
aske
peace
.
The
example
of
Scipio
is
likewise
urg'd
,
who
to
take
the
warre
out
of
Italy
,
assail'd
Affricke
.
They
that
maintaine
the
contrary
,
say
,
that
he
that
would
bring
his
enemy
to
destruction
,
should
withdraw
him
from
home
.
The
Athenians
are
brought
for
example
,
who
while
they
made
a
convenient
warre
at
their
owne
homes
,
remain'd
victors
:
but
when
they
departed
out
of
their
country
,
and
transported
their
army
into
S●cily
,
they
quite
lost
their
liberty
.
They
alledge
the
poeticall
sables
withall
,
where
it
is
shew'd
,
how
that
Anteus
King
of
Lybia
assail'd
by
Egyptian
Hercules
was
insuperable
,
whiles
he
staid
for
him
within
the
confines
of
his
owne
Kingdome
,
but
when
by
Hercules
subtilty
he
was
trained
out
of
it
,
he
lost
both
state
and
life
.
Whereby
occasion
was
given
to
the
fable
of
Anteus
,
that
while
he
was
upon
the
ground
,
he
recovered
forces
from
his
Mother
,
which
was
the
ground
,
which
Hercules
perceiving
,
took
him
up
in
his
armes
,
and
held
him
from
the
earth
.
Moderne
advices
also
are
alledged
;
every
one
knowes
that
Ferdinand
King
of
Naples
was
in
his
dayes
held
a
very
wise
Prince
;
and
some
two
years
before
his
death
fame
flying
,
that
Charles
the
eight
then
King
of
France
had
a
determination
to
come
and
assail
him
,
after
he
had
made
much
preparation
fell
sick
,
when
on
his
death-bed
,
among
other
memorials
he
left
his
sonne
Alphonsus
,
was
this
also
,
that
he
should
attend
his
enemies
comming
within
his
Countrey
,
and
upon
no
case
should
dr●w
any
of
his
forces
out
of
his
state
,
but
should
await
them
within
his
own
confines
with
his
strength
entire
.
Which
was
not
followed
by
him
,
but
there
was
an
army
sent
into
Romania
,
which
without
any
combat
,
lost
both
it self
and
the
state
.
The
arguments
,
which
besides
the
things
abovesaid
,
are
brought
on
each
side
,
are
these
;
that
he
,
that
assailes
,
comes
on
with
more
courage
,
then
he
that
attends
,
which
gives
the
army
more
confidence
:
Besides
this
,
it
takes
away
from
the
enemy
divers
conveniencies
of
being
able
to
make
use
of
what
is
his
own
;
for
he
cannot
help
himself
upon
those
subjects
,
whose
houses
have
first
bin
sackt
and
their
goods
pillaged
:
and
for
having
the
enemy
in
the
house
;
the
Prince
is
constrained
to
take
more
care
how
he
wrings
money
from
them
,
and
vexes
them
:
so
that
he
comes
to
dry
that
fountain
,
as
Hannibal
sayes
,
which
furnishes
,
him
with
means
to
sustain
the
war
.
To
this
may
be
added
,
that
the
souldiers
being
in
a
forrain
countrey
,
are
forced
to
fight
,
and
of
that
necessity
makes
a
vertue
,
as
we
have
often
said
;
on
the
other
side
,
they
say
,
when
one
awaits
his
enemy
,
he
does
it
with
much
advantage
:
for
without
any
discommodity
to
thy self
thou
art
able
to
give
thine
enemy
much
trouble
to
come
by
his
provisions
,
and
other
necessaries
belonging
to
an
army
.
Thou
canst
also
better
hinder
his
designs
,
because
thou
knowest
the
countrey
better
then
he
.
Thou
canst
also
incounter
him
with
more
forces
,
because
there
they
may
easily
be
united
,
which
thou
canst
not
draw
all
from
home
.
Thou
canst
also
being
routed
,
recover
thy self
with
more
ease
,
because
many
of
thy
army
will
save
themselves
,
in
that
they
have
their
places
of
refuge
near
,
as
well
because
the
supplies
are
not
to
come
from
far
;
thou
bringst
to
the
hazzard
all
thy
forces
,
and
not
all
thy
fortune
;
whereas
parting
thence
thou
hazzardst
all
thy
fortune
with
but
a
part
of
thy
forces
.
And
some
there
have
bin
who
the
better
to
weaken
their
enemie
,
suffer
him
to
enter
many
dayes
journies
into
their
countrey
,
and
take
divers
townes
,
to
the
end
that
leaving
gatrisons
in
all
of
them
,
he
may
weaken
his
army
,
and
so
they
may
afterwards
fight
with
him
at
more
ods
.
But
to
give
my
opinion
herein
what
I
think
,
I
beleeve
,
this
distinction
is
to
be
made
;
Either
my
countrey
is
armed
,
as
was
that
of
the
Romans
,
or
that
of
the
Switzers
is
,
or
it
is
disarmed
as
that
of
the
Carthaginians
was
,
or
else
that
of
the
King
of
France
,
or
the
Italians
countrey
is
.
In
this
case
the
enemy
is
to
be
kept
off
from
comming
in
,
because
thy
advantage
than
consists
in
thy
revenue
,
and
not
in
thy
men
,
so
that
whensoever
the
current
thereof
is
cut
off
from
thee
,
thou
art
quite
spoil'd
;
nor
doth
any
thing
so
much
hinder
thee
,
as
the
war
within
thy
doores
.
The
Carthaginians
yeeld
us
evident
examples
hereof
,
who
,
whiles
they
had
their
own
home
free
,
were
able
with
their
revenue
to
make
war
against
the
Romans
,
which
,
when
it
was
assaild
,
could
not
supply
them
against
Agathocles
.
The
Florentines
had
not
any
remedy
against
Castruccius
Lord
of
●ucca
,
because
he
warr'd
with
them
in
their
owne
country
,
so
that
they
were
faine
,
for
their
defence
,
to
yeeld
themselves
to
Robert
King
of
Naples
.
But
Castruccius
being
dead
,
the
same
Florentines
had
the
courage
to
assail
the
Duke
of
Milan
at
his
owne
home
,
and
wrought
so
far
as
to
take
his
countrey
from
him
;
so
much
valor
shew'd
they
in
forrain
wars
,
and
such
cowardise
in
their
domestick
.
But
when
countries
are
armed
,
as
that
of
Rome
was
,
and
as
the
Switzers
are
,
the
nearer
thou
commest
to
them
,
the
harder
they
are
to
vanquish
;
for
these
bodies
are
able
to
bring
together
more
forces
to
resist
a
suddain
violence
,
then
they
are
to
,
assail
an
enemy
abroad
.
Neither
in
this
case
does
the
authority
of
Hanniball
move
me
,
because
his
passion
,
and
his
own
interest
,
made
him
say
so
to
Antiochus
;
●r
if
●h●
Romans
had
in
that
space
of
time
received
those
three
routs
in
France
,
which
they
had
in
Italy
by
Hanniball
,
without
doubt
they
had
bin
quite
undone
:
for
then
they
could
not
have
helped
themselves
by
the
remainders
of
their
armies
,
nor
could
they
have
had
those
conveniencies
to
repair
their
losses
,
nor
made
head
against
their
enemies
with
such
strength
as
they
did
.
We
never
find
,
that
to
afsail
any
countrey
they
sent
out
an
army
passing
the
number
of
50000.
But
to
defend
themselves
at
home
against
the
French
after
the
first
Punicke
war
,
they
armed
eighteen
hundred
thousand
men
.
Nor
could
they
afterwards
defeat
them
in
Lombardy
,
as
they
did
in
Tuscany
:
because
against
so
great
a
maltitude
of
enemies
,
they
had
never
been
able
to
draw
so
great
forces
so
far
out
,
nor
fight
with
them
upon
the
like
advantage
.
The
Cimbrians
broke
an
army
of
the
Romans
in
Germany
,
nor
could
the
Romans
any
way
help
themselves
.
But
when
they
came
into
Italy
,
that
they
once
united
their
forces
together
,
they
presently
dispatched
them
.
The
Switzers
it
is
easy
to
vanquish
our
of
their
own
Countrey
,
whether
they
cannot
send
above
thirty
or
forty
thousand
men
:
but
to
overcome
them
at
home
,
where
they
are
able
to
make
a
body
of
a
hundred
thousand
men
,
is
exceeding
difficult
.
I
conclude
therefore
anew
,
that
that
Prince
,
who
hath
his
people
armed
and
addrest
for
war
,
may
alwaies
well
expect
a
mighty
and
dangerous
war
at
his
own
home
,
neither
let
him
goe
to
meet
it
.
But
he
,
whose
subjects
are
unarmed
,
and
his
countrey
unaccustomed
to
war
,
let
him
alwaies
keep
it
as
far
from
home
as
he
can
.
And
so
the
one
and
the
other
,
each
in
their
degree
,
will
better
defend
themselves
.
CHAP.
XIII
.
That
men
rise
from
poore
and
small
beginnings
to
great
fortunes
,
rather
by
the
help
of
guile
than
force
.
I
Take
it
to
be
very
true
,
that
seldome
or
never
it
comes
to
pass
,
that
men
of
meane
fortunes
attain
to
any
high
degrees
without
force
or
fraud
:
unless
that
dignity
,
which
a
man
hath
gotten
,
came
to
him
by
gift
,
or
was
cast
on
him
by
inheritance
Neither
do
I
think
,
we
ever
find
,
that
force
alone
suffices
;
but
we
often
see
,
that
guile
alone
avails
,
as
he
shall
clearly
perceive
,
that
reads
Philip
of
Macedons
life
,
and
that
of
Agathocles
the
Sicilian
,
and
many
others
such
like
,
who
from
very
vile
and
poore
fortunes
have
gain'd
either
a
Kingdome
,
or
some
other
great
dignities
.
Xenophon
in
Cyrus
his
life
,
declares
this
necessity
of
deceit
,
being
that
the
first
expedition
which
he
makes
Cyrus
to
undertake
against
the
Armenian
King
,
is
full
of
guile
,
and
how
by
deceit
,
and
nor
by
force
he
makes
him
seize
on
his
Kingdom
;
by
which
Action
he
concludes
nothing
else
,
but
that
it
is
necessary
for
a
Prince
,
that
will
atcheive
great
matters
,
to
learn
to
be
a
cunning
deceiver
.
Besides
this
he
makes
him
deceive
Ciaxares
King
of
the
Medes
his
Mothers
uncle
many
waies
,
without
which
fraud
he
shews
Cyrus
could
never
have
attain'd
to
that
greatness
he
afterwards
came
.
And
I
beleeve
,
Dolus
an
virtus
quis
in
hoste
requir
it
,
is
not
meant
De
dolo
Malo
:
supposed
by
Machiavel
in
his
Prince
Chap.
19.
where
he
perswades
a
Prince
to
use
the
Lyons
force
,
and
the
Foxes
craft
.
To
be
able
in
all
Military
stratagems
and
slights
to
circumvent
the
enemy
,
is
one
of
the
most
requisite
and
not
able
parts
in
a
Commander
:
provided
there
be
no
breach
of
Faith
,
nor
Oath
violated
:
for
as
Tully
sayes
,
Est
jusjurandum
affirmatio
Religiosa
:
quod
autem
affirmate
,
quasi
Deo
teste
promiseris
,
id
tenendum
est
.
It
is
much
unworthy
of
a
Prince
(
sayes
a
worthy
late
Author
)
to
falsifie
his
word
,
either
to
enemy
or
subject
that
it
be
;
and
the
more
villanie
is
it
to
use
covert
fraud
,
than
open
violence
,
because
the
enemy
lies
more
open
by
giving
credit
to
his
faith
:
And
fraus
distringit
,
non
dissolvit
perjurium
.
And
with
how
much
more
solemnity
Princes
Oaths
are
ordinarily
taken
,
mee
thinks
,
so
much
the
more
sincerity
ought
they
to
carry
with
them
,
having
drawn
together
many
eyes
&
ears
as
witnesses
of
their
truth
or
falshood
.
I
shall
conclude
then
with
Tacitus
,
in
the
4.
of
his
Annal.
Caereris
mortalibus
in
constant
confilia
quod
sibi
conducere
putant
;
principum
diversa
sors
est
,
quibus
praecipua
rerum
ad
samam
dirigenda
.
that
there
was
never
any
plac'd
in
a
low
condition
that
ever
came
to
any
great
dignity
onely
by
plain
force
;
and
ingenuously
;
though
I
grant
that
by
guile
alone
one
well
may
,
as
John
Galeacius
did
who
took
from
his
uncle
Barnard
the
state
and
rule
of
Lombardy
.
And
that
,
which
Princes
are
necessitated
to
do
in
the
beginnings
of
their
increase
,
Republiques
are
likewise
forc'd
to
,
till
they
are
become
mighty
;
then
force
alone
suffices
.
And
because
Rome
in
every
part
lit
either
by
chance
or
by
choyce
upon
all
the
necessary
means
to
become
great
,
it
failed
not
also
of
this
,
nor
in
her
beginning
could
have
dealt
more
cunningly
,
than
to
take
the
course
we
formerly
discoursed
of
,
to
make
her
some
companions
;
for
under
this
name
,
she
brought
many
to
be
her
servants
,
as
were
the
Latins
,
and
other
people
neare
about
her
:
for
first
she
served
her self
of
their
armes
in
subduing
her
neighbours
round
about
,
and
in
taking
upon
her self
the
reputation
of
the
state
;
afterwards
when
she
had
brought
them
under
likewise
,
she
came
to
such
growth
,
that
no
power
was
able
to
withstand
her
.
And
the
Latins
never
perceived
their
own
servitude
,
til
after
that
they
saw
the
Samnites
twice
broken
,
and
forced
to
agreement
.
Which
victory
as
it
gained
the
Romans
great
reputation
with
forrain
Princes
,
whereby
they
heard
of
the
Romans
name
,
though
they
never
felt
their
armes
:
so
it
bred
great
envie
and
suspect
in
those
that
both
saw
and
felt
their
strength
,
among
which
were
the
Latins
:
And
so
far
prevailed
this
envie
and
fear
,
that
not
onely
the
Latins
,
but
the
Colonies
which
they
had
in
Latium
together
with
the
Capuans
by
them
lately
defended
,
conspired
all
against
the
name
of
the
Romans
.
And
the
Latins
mov'd
that
war
in
that
manner
,
as
is
formerly
said
,
that
for
the
most
part
wars
are
mov'd
,
not
assailing
the
Romans
,
but
defending
the
Sidicins
against
the
Samnites
,
against
whom
the
Samnites
made
war
with
the
Romans
leave
.
And
that
it
is
true
,
that
the
Latins
stirred
upon
the
knowledge
of
this
deceit
,
T.
Livius
declares
it
by
the
mouth
of
Annius
Setinus
a
Latin
Pretour
,
who
told
them
in
their
assemblie
,
thus
,
For
if
yet
we
can
endure
servitude
,
under
the
name
of
an
equal
league
.
Wherefore
we
find
the
Romans
in
their
first
growth
wanted
not
that
guile
,
which
they
had
need
to
make
use
of
,
that
from
low
beginnings
aim
to
mount
high
,
which
the
more
covert
it
is
,
is
the
less
discommendable
,
as
was
this
of
the
Romans
.
CHAP.
XIIII
.
They
are
often
deceiv'd
,
who
think
with
humility
to
overcome
pride
.
WEE
often
see
that
humility
does
not
onely
not
help
,
but
hurt
some
times
,
especially
when
it
is
used
towards
insolent
men
;
who
either
for
envie
or
some
other
occasion
,
have
conceiv'd
hatred
against
thee
.
Whereof
our
Historian
gives
us
good
testimony
in
this
occasion
of
war
between
the
Romans
and
the
Latins
:
for
the
Samnites
complaining
to
the
Romans
,
that
the
Latins
had
assaild
them
,
the
Romans
would
not
yet
forbid
the
Latins
that
war
,
being
desirous
nor
any
way
to
incense
them
.
Whereby
they
did
not
onely
not
incense
them
,
but
made
them
become
more
insolent
towards
them
,
so
that
they
sooner
discover'd
themselves
enemies
,
whereof
the
words
us'd
Te
tryed
their
patience
in
refusing
them
souldiers
;
who
doubts
but
they
were
angry
,
yet
this
disgrace
have
they
sufferd
:
they
have
heard
we
prepare
an
armie
against
the
Samnites
their
allyes
;
nor
for
this
stirred
they
one
foot
out
of
the
City
:
and
whence
came
this
modesty
of
theirs
think
ye
,
but
from
their
knowledge
as
well
of
your
Forces
as
their
own
?
And
therefore
hereby
we
plainly
see
,
how
much
the
Romans
patience
increased
the
Latines
arrogance
.
Wherefore
a
Prince
should
never
agree
to
descend
a
whit
from
his
ra●ck
,
not
ever
let
goe
any
thing
upon
accord
,
if
he
have
a
minde
to
leave
it
honorably
,
but
onely
then
when
he
is
able
,
or
when
he
thinks
also
he
is
able
to
maintain
it
:
for
it
is
better
for
the
most
part
(
the
matter
being
brought
to
such
termes
,
that
thou
canst
not
let
it
goe
in
the
manner
above
said
)
to
let
it
be
taken
from
thee
by
force
,
rather
than
by
fear
of
forces
:
for
it
thou
lettestit
goe
for
fear
,
thou
doest
it
to
free
thy self
from
war
,
which
most
commonly
it
will
not
doe
;
for
he
to
whom
with
such
open
cowa●dise
thou
hast
yeelded
this
,
will
not
there
with
rest
satisfi'd
,
but
take
other
things
from
thee
also
,
and
will
the
rather
be
incited
against
thee
,
in
that
he
values
thee
less
;
when
likewise
on
the
other
side
,
thou
shalt
finde
thy
friends
more
slack
in
thy
defence
,
esteeming
thee
either
weak
or
cowardly
.
But
if
thou
forthwith
upon
discovery
of
thy
enemies
intent
,
gettest
thy
forces
in
a
readiness
,
howsoever
they
be
inferior
to
his
,
he
will
begin
to
make
account
of
thee
,
as
also
will
other
Princes
thy
neighbours
abou
thee
,
so
that
some
there
will
be
who
will
have
a
minde
to
ayd
thee
(
thou
being
in
armes
)
who
,
if
thou
hadst
abandon'd
thy self
,
would
never
have
struck
stroke
for
thee
.
This
is
meant
,
when
thou
hast
but
one
enemy
.
But
in
case
thou
hast
more
,
thou
shalt
do
very
wisely
,
to
render
what
thou
hast
belonging
to
any
one
of
them
for
to
regain
him
to
thee
,
notwithstanding
the
war
be
discoverd
,
that
thou
mayest
take
him
asunder
from
the
other
confederates
thine
enemies
.
CHAP.
XV.
Weake
states
are
alwaies
irresolute
in
their
determinations
;
and
slow
deliberations
are
alwaies
hurtfull
.
IN
this
very
same
matter
,
and
in
the
same
beginnings
of
the
War
between
the
Latins
and
the
Romans
,
we
may
observe
,
that
in
every
consultation
it
is
good
to
come
to
the
particular
of
that
which
is
to
be
deliberated
on
,
and
not
to
stay
long
in
doubt
,
and
upon
the
uncertainty
of
a
thing
.
Which
is
manifest
in
the
consultation
the
Latins
made
,
when
they
thought
to
quit
themselves
of
the
Romans
:
for
the
Romans
having
had
some
sent
of
this
ill
humour
that
had
possessed
the
Latins
,
to
be
ascertained
of
the
master
,
and
to
try
if
without
armes
they
could
regain
those
people
,
gave
order
they
should
send
eight
Citizens
to
Rome
,
to
the
end
they
might
advise
with
them
.
The
Latins
,
understanding
this
,
and
being
conscious
to
themselves
of
many
things
done
contrary
to
the
will
of
the
Romans
,
called
an
assembly
together
,
to
appoint
who
should
go
to
Rome
,
and
to
give
them
order
what
they
should
The
sum
of
our
affairs
is
,
as
I
take
it
,
that
ye
should
advise
rather
what
we
should
do
,
than
what
we
should
say
;
for
it
is
an
easy
matter
,
when
things
are
once
resolved
on
,
to
put
them
into
fit
termes
.
Without
question
these
words
are
most
true
,
and
ought
to
be
relished
by
every
Prince
,
and
every
Commonwealth
:
for
during
the
uncertainly
and
doubt
of
that
which
a
man
will
do
,
there
is
no
man
knowes
what
he
should
say
:
but
when
the
mind
is
once
setled
and
resolved
of
what
is
to
be
done
,
words
to
the
purpose
easily
follow
.
I
have
the
more
willingly
noted
this
passage
,
by
reason
that
many
times
I
have
known
that
such
doubt
hath
much
wrong'd
publick
actions
,
even
to
the
loss
and
disgrace
of
our
Republike
.
And
it
shall
ever
come
to
pass
,
that
,
in
doubtfull
cases
,
and
where
there
is
need
of
judgement
to
deliberate
,
this
resolution
shall
be
when
they
are
to
be
advised
,
and
deliberated
on
by
weak
man
.
No
less
hurtfull
also
are
slick
and
slow
consultations
,
than
these
ambigu●us
,
especially
those
that
are
to
be
taken
in
favour
of
any
friend
;
for
slowness
helps
no
body
,
and
hurts
ones
self
.
These
resolutions
so
taken
,
proceed
either
from
weakness
of
courage
,
or
forces
,
or
from
their
malignity
that
should
resolve
,
who
guided
by
their
own
passtors
,
to
ruine
a
State
,
and
to
fulfill
some
desire
of
their
own
,
s●ff●r
not
the
consultation
to
goe
forward
,
but
rather
hinder
and
cross
it
.
For
good
Citizens
,
though
they
perceive
the
whole
stream
of
the
people
to
run
the
more
dangerous
way
,
yet
will
they
never
hinder
the
delibaration
,
being
that
those
affairs
attend
not
time
.
When
Jerome
the
Tyrant
in
Syraacusa
was
dead
,
there
being
a
great
war
between
the
Carthaginians
,
and
the
Romans
,
the
Syracusians
put
it
to
question
,
which
allyance
they
should
take
,
the
Roman
or
Carthaginian
;
and
such
was
the
eagerness
of
the
parties
,
that
the
matter
remain'd
in
doubt
,
and
they
took
to
neither
side
,
til'
that
Apollonides
one
of
the
cheif
men
in
Syracufia
,
in
a
very
discreet
Oration
of
his
,
shewed
that
they
were
not
to
be
blam'd
that
advised
to
adhere
to
the
Romans
,
nor
they
that
would
take
part
with
the
Carthaginians
,
but
rather
that
irresolution
and
slowness
in
taking
to
any
side
was
detestable
;
for
he
saw
fully
in
that
ambiguity
the
ruine
of
the
Republique
.
But
were
it
that
the
party
were
once
made
,
on
which
side
soe'r
it
were
,
a●man
might
conceive
some
good
hopes
upon
it
.
Nor
could
Titus
Livius
more
fully
shew
,
than
in
his
part
he
does
,
the
harme
which
this
hanging
in
suspence
drawes
after
it
.
He
makes
it
plain
also
in
this
case
of
the
Latins
;
for
the
Lavinians
being
sought
to
by
them
for
ayd
against
the
Romans
,
put
off
the
resolut
on
of
it
so
long
,
that
when
they
were
just
going
forth
of
the
town
to
give
succors
to
them
,
news
came
that
the
Latins
were
defeated
.
Whereupon
their
Pretour
Milonius
said
,
We
shall
pay
●ear
to
the
Romans
for
this
little
way
we
have
gone
:
for
if
at
first
they
had
resolv'd
either
to
help
,
or
not
to
help
the
Latins
,
not
helping
them
they
had
not
given
offence
to
the
Romans
;
but
helping
them
,
had
their
aid
,
come
in
time
,
with
the
addition
of
their
Forces
,
they
might
have
gain'd
them
the
victory
;
but
by
delay
loss
came
every
way
,
as
it
befell
them
.
And
had
the
Florentines
observ'd
this
well
,
they
had
never
receiv'd
so
many
dammages
nor
troubles
by
the
French
,
as
they
had
in
Lewis
the
twelfths
passage
into
Italy
against
Lodowicke
Duke
of
Milan
:
for
the
King
treating
of
such
a
passage
,
sought
the
Florentines
for
their
consent
;
and
their
Agents
that
were
with
the
King
,
agreed
with
him
,
to
stand
neuters
,
and
that
the
King
comming
into
Italy
,
should
maintain
them
in
their
State
,
and
receive
them
into
his
protection
,
and
gave
the
City
a
moneths
time
to
ratifie
this
.
Which
ratification
was
delayd
by
some
,
who
in
their
little
wisdome
favour'd
Duke
Lodowicks
affairs
,
til
that
the
King
was
even
upon
the
point
of
victory
,
when
the
Florentines
offering
the
ratification
,
it
would
not
be
accepted
by
the
King
,
who
knew
the
Florentines
came
by
force
,
and
not
willingly
to
his
friendship
.
Which
the
City
of
Florence
was
to
buy
out
dear
,
and
like
enough
to
have
lost
the
state
,
as
afterwards
another
time
upon
the
like
accident
it
chanc'r
.
And
so
much
the
worse
was
the
course
they
took
;
for
it
was
of
no
advantage
to
Duke
Lodowicke
,
who
if
he
had
bin
victour
,
would
have
shewed
more
displeasure
against
them
,
than
did
the
King
.
And
though
touching
the
mischief
this
weakness
brings
upon
a
Republique
,
we
have
formerly
spoken
in
another
Chapter
;
yet
upon
a
new
occasion
offerd
by
a
new
accident
,
I
had
a
minde
to
repeat
it
thinking
it
very
specially
a
matter
worthy
to
be
noted
by
all
Republiques
like
unto
ours
.
CHAP.
XVI
.
How
much
the
orders
used
by
our
Souldiers
in
these
modern
times
,
differ
from
those
of
the
ancients
.
THe
Romans
fought
not
a
battel
in
any
war
they
undertook
with
any
Nation
,
of
greater
importance
than
this
with
the
Latins
,
in
Torquatus
and
Decius
his
Consulship
:
for
in
all
reason
it
had
followed
,
that
as
the
Latins
by
losing
it
became
Subjects
,
the
Romans
should
have
undergone
the
same
condition
,
had
not
they
got
the
mast●ry
;
and
of
this
opinion
is
Titus
Livius
:
for
on
each
part
he
makes
the
Armies
equal
for
their
order
,
valour
,
resolution
,
and
number
;
he
makes
there
this
difference
only
,
that
the
Commanders
of
the
Roman
Army
were
of
more
valour
than
those
of
the
Latins
.
It
appears
also
that
in
the
ordering
of
this
battel
,
there
befell
two
accidents
,
the
like
whereof
was
never
seen
before
,
nor
since
have
we
had
but
rare
examples
following
them
:
that
of
two
Consuls
,
to
hold
their
Soldiers
minds
firm
and
obedient
to
their
commands
,
and
resolute
to
fight
,
the
one
kill'd
himself
,
the
other
his
Son
.
The
equality
which
Titus
Livius
sayes
in
these
two
Armies
,
was
,
because
they
had
both
serv'd
in
the
wars
a
long
time
together
;
they
used
the●ame
language
,
order
,
and
armes
:
for
in
the
ordering
of
their
battel
,
they
had
the
same
manner
,
and
their
Troupes
and
the
Captains
of
them
had
the
same
names
;
there
was
a
necessity
being
they
were
of
equal
force
and
valour
,
that
something
extraordinary
should
happen
,
that
could
se●tle
and
fix
the
ones
resolution
,
rather
than
the
others
:
in
which
(
as
otherwhere
we
have
said
)
consists
the
victory
:
for
while
that
lasts
in
the
combarants
hearts
,
the
Armies
never
turne
their
backs
.
And
to
the
end
it
might
last
the
longer
in
the
Romans
breasts
than
in
the
Latins
,
partly
fortune
,
and
partly
the
Consùls
valour
were
cause
;
for
Torquatus
killed
his
son
,
and
Decius
himself
.
Titus
Livius
,
where
he
shews
the
equality
of
their
forces
,
sets
downe
the
whole
order
the
Romanes
used
in
their
Armies
and
in
their
battels
.
Which
being
that
he
relates
at
large
,
I
will
not
rehearse
againe
,
but
discourse
onely
upon
that
I
shall
thinke
remarkable
,
and
which
,
because
it
hath
been
neglected
by
all
our
Captaines
of
later
times
,
hath
been
the
occasion
of
many
disorders
in
severall
Armyes
stand
battells
.
I
say
therefore
,
that
out
of
Livius
his
words
wee
gather
that
the
Romane
Army
had
three
principal
divisions
,
which
in
proper
termes
may
be
calld
Squadrons
;
the
first
was
of
the
Hastati
,
the
second
of
the
Prencipi
,
the
third
of
the
Triarij
:
and
each
of
these
had
their
horsemen
.
In
the
ordering
of
a
battell
,
they
plac't
the
Hastati
for
most
,
in
the
second
place
on
the
right
side
,
upon
the
shoulders
of
those
the
Prencipi
were
set
,
and
in
the
third
place
yet
in
the
same
file
,
the
riarij
came
.
The
horse
of
all
these
ranks
they
plac't
on
the
right
hand
and
on
the
left
of
these
three
battells
:
which
Squadrons
of
horse
from
their
formes
and
Places
were
call'd
wings
:
because
they
lookt
like
the
two
wings
of
that
body
.
They
rangd
the
first
Squadron
of
the
Hastati
,
which
was
in
front
,
in
a
manner
close
shut
together
,
that
it
might
be
able
either
to
force
upon
,
or
sustain
the
enemy
.
The
second
Squadron
of
the
Prencipi
(
because
it
was
not
the
first
to
fight
,
but
was
ordeind
to
succour
the
for
most
,
in
case
it
was
either
beaten
or
driven
backe
)
this
they
made
not
so
compact
together
,
but
kept
their
ranks
thinne
,
so
that
they
might
receive
in
to
them
without
disordering
themselves
the
first
Squadron
,
whensoever
being
prest
on
by
the
enemy
,
they
were
forc't
to
retire
.
The
third
Squadron
of
the
Triarij
had
their
ranks
yet
thinner
than
the
second
;
that
,
if
need
were
,
they
might
receive
the
two
former
Squadrons
of
the
Hastati
and
Prencipi
.
The
troupes
then
being
all
plac'd
in
this
order
,
began
the
fight
:
and
if
the
Hastati
were
forc'd
or
overcome
,
they
retir'd
into
the
thinnesse
of
the
ranks
of
the
Prencipi
,
and
they
united
together
,
and
having
made
of
two
battallions
one
body
,
undertooke
the
fight
afresh
;
and
if
these
were
beaten
back
and
routed
,
they
fell
backe
into
the
thinner
rankes
of
the
Triarij
,
and
so
all
the
battallions
became
one
body
,
renewd
the
fight
againe
,
where
if
they
vanquished
,
because
they
had
not
other
repayre
,
they
lost
the
day
.
And
because
that
alwayes
when
this
last
quadron
of
the
Triarij
came
to
try
for
it
,
the
Army
was
in
danger
,
thereupon
grew
his
Proverb
,
Thematter
came
so
farre
as
the
Triarij
.
The
de
Pors
Generall
of
the
French
forces
dyed
,
which
was
(
according
to
our
times
)
a
well
fought
battell
,
was
arranged
in
one
of
these
forenam'd
wayes
:
which
is
,
that
one
and
the
other
Armie
came
on
with
all
their
people
plac'd
to
shoulder
the
one
the
other
,
so
that
neither
army
had
but
one
front
,
and
were
much
more
in
breadth
then
in
depth
.
And
this
befalls
them
alwayes
,
where
they
have
a
large
plaine
,
as
they
had
at
Ravenna
.
For
knowing
the
disorder
they
make
in
retiring
,
by
placing
themselves
in
one
file
,
they
avoide
it
when
they
can
,
which
they
do
by
making
the
front
large
,
as
it
is
said
.
But
when
the
scite
of
the
country
restraines
them
,
they
remaine
in
the
forenam'd
disorder
,
without
advising
themselves
of
the
remedy
.
In
which
they
passe
through
their
enemies
countries
,
they
goe
out
to
forrage
,
or
venture
on
any
other
exploit
.
And
at
Saint
Regulus
in
that
occasion
of
Pisa
,
and
otherwhere
,
where
the
Florentines
were
routed
by
the
Pisans
,
during
the
warre
which
was
betweene
the
Florentines
and
that
city
,
for
their
rebellion
,
after
Charles
the
King
of
France
his
passage
into
Italy
,
those
defeates
were
caused
by
nothing
else
but
by
their
owne
horse
:
which
being
in
vantgard
,
and
by
the
enemies
beaten
backe
into
the
Florentine
foote
,
routed
it
,
whereupon
all
the
remainder
turn'd
their
backes
;
and
Criacus
de
Borgo
,
the
ancient
generall
of
the
Florentine
infantery
,
hath
said
it
many
times
in
my
hearing
,
that
they
had
never
bin
routed
but
by
their
own
horse
.
The
Swisses
who
are
the
principall
masters
of
our
modern
warres
,
when
they
serve
with
the
French
,
above
all
things
have
a
care
to
place
themselves
on
the
side
,
for
feare
their
owne
horse
driven
backe
should
beate
upon
them
.
And
howbeit
these
things
seeme
easie
to
understand
,
and
very
easie
to
practise
,
yet
hath
not
there
been
any
of
our
contemporary
Commanders
,
that
would
follow
these
ancient
orders
,
or
amend
the
moderne
.
And
though
they
have
made
their
Armies
tripartite
,
terming
the
one
the
Vauntguard
,
the
other
the
Battell
,
and
the
last
the
Rereguard
:
they
make
no
other
use
thereof
,
but
to
command
them
when
they
are
quatered
in
their
lodgings
,
but
in
any
service
,
very
seldome
it
is
(
as
is
formerly
said
)
but
that
they
make
all
these
bodies
run
one
fortune
.
And
because
many
to
excuse
their
own
ignorance
,
alledge
that
the
violence
of
the
Artillery
permits
not
that
many
of
the
ancient
orders
be
observd
,
I
will
argue
it
in
the
next
Chapter
,
and
examine
,
whether
the
Artillery
doe
hinder
the
practise
of
the
ancient
valour
.
CHAP.
XVII
.
What
esteeme
our
moderne
armies
ought
to
have
of
artilery
,
and
if
the
opinion
;
which
is
generally
conceived
of
it
,
be
true
.
WHen
I
consider
,
besides
the
things
formerly
written
,
how
many
pitcht
battells
were
fought
by
the
Romans
at
severall
times
,
that
general
opinion
which
many
hold
,
comes
into
my
minde
,
that
if
a●tilery
had
bin
used
in
those
dayes
,
the
Romans
could
never
so
easily
have
subdued
the
countryes
they
did
,
nor
have
brought
these
nations
they
did
,
to
become
their
tributaries
,
nor
in
any
case
could
they
have
made
such
brave
conquests
.
They
say
moreover
,
that
by
reason
of
these
guns
,
men
cannot
put
in
practice
nor
shew
the
valour
they
could
of
old
.
And
then
they
adde
a
third
matter
,
that
it
makes
it
more
difficult
to
come
to
a
battell
now
,
then
formerly
;
nor
can
they
containe
themselves
within
the
orders
of
those
times
,
so
that
in
time
the
warre
will
be
all
reduced
to
the
artillery
.
And
being
desirous
now
not
out
of
purpose
to
argue
touching
the
the
truth
of
such
opinions
,
and
how
much
artillery
hath
augmented
or
diminished
the
force
of
armies
,
and
whether
they
bereave
or
affoard
good
Captaines
occasion
to
behave
themselves
valourously
,
I
will
begin
to
speake
concerning
,
their
first
opinion
;
that
the
ancient
Roman
armies
would
never
have
made
those
conquests
they
did
,
had
artilery
bin
then
in
use
.
Whereupon
I
say
in
answer
,
that
warre
is
made
either
in
defence
or
offence
.
And
then
we
are
to
examine
,
to
which
of
these
two
parts
it
does
more
good
or
hame
.
And
though
reasons
may
be
alledged
on
both
sides
,
yet
I
thinke
,
that
without
comparison
the
defendant
receives
more
dammage
by
it
,
then
the
assailant
.
The
reason
,
which
hereof
I
give
,
is
,
that
the
defendant
is
either
within
a
walled
towne
,
or
in
the
field
within
trenches
:
If
he
be
in
a
towne
,
either
it
is
but
little
,
as
most
commonly
for
tresses
are
,
or
great
and
large
.
In
the
first
case
,
the
defendant
is
quite
lost
;
for
such
is
the
force
of
artillery
,
that
no
wall
be
it
of
what
thicknesse
it
will
,
but
in
a
few
dayes
is
ruined
by
it
.
And
if
those
that
are
within
the
walls
,
have
not
good
roome
to
retire
themselves
,
with
retrenchments
and
fortifications
,
they
are
lost
;
nor
can
they
support
the
shocke
of
the
enemy
,
when
he
would
enter
by
breach
in
the
wall
,
nor
hath
he
any
helpe
herein
of
his
artillery
:
for
this
is
a
maxime
,
that
where
met
can
enter
in
by
throngs
and
with
violence
,
the
artillery
cannot
keep
them
off
.
Therefore
the
furious
assaults
of
the
Tramontaines
it
is
not
possible
for
the
defendant
to
resist
;
but
the
assaults
the
Italians
give
,
are
well
enough
endured
,
who
never
all
in
a
●hrong
,
but
scatteringly
come
to
the
fight
,
which
they
by
a
name
very
fit
for
the
purpose
,
call
skirmishes
.
And
these
that
goe
with
this
disorder
and
timcrousnesse
to
enter
a
breach
,
where
artillery
is
,
go
to
an
apparent
death
,
and
against
them
artillery
is
a
good
use
:
but
those
who
in
throngs
,
when
the
one
presses
forward
the
other
,
come
to
the
breach
,
unlesse
sustained
by
ditches
and
ramparts
,
will
enter
any
place
,
and
the
artillery
shall
never
beat
them
off
;
and
though
some
few
of
them
be
slaine
,
yet
can
they
never
be
so
many
as
can
hinder
them
of
victory
.
That
this
is
true
,
we
finde
in
many
conquests
which
fortainers
have
here
made
in
Italy
,
especially
in
that
of
Brescia
:
for
that
towne
having
rebelled
against
the
French
,
and
the
fort
holding
good
yet
for
the
French
King
,
the
Venetians
were
to
support
all
the
violence
,
that
from
thence
could
fall
in
upon
the
towne
,
having
all
that
way
guarded
with
artillery
,
that
descended
from
the
fortresse
into
the
city
,
some
of
them
being
planted
against
the
front
,
others
upon
the
flankes
,
and
so
in
every
other
place
fir
.
Whereof
the
Lord
of
Fois
made
not
any
account
,
but
descending
a
foote
with
his
troopes
passed
through
the
midst
of
them
,
and
tooke
the
towne
,
nor
ever
appeared
it
that
he
had
received
thereby
any
notable
losse
.
So
that
he
who
defends
a
little
towne
(
as
it
is
said
)
which
is
walled
in
,
but
hath
not
space
to
retire
with
●etrenchments
and
fortifications
,
and
trusts
upon
the
artillery
,
is
presently
lost
.
And
thou
defendest
a
great
towne
,
and
hast
conveniency
for
retreat
,
yet
without
comparison
is
the
artillery
more
availeable
to
those
without
,
then
within
the
walls
.
First
,
because
thou
wouldest
with
thy
artillery
annoy
those
without
,
thou
must
of
force
raise
thy selfe
with
it
above
the
levell
:
for
while
thou
art
on
the
levell
,
every
small
fence
or
trench
that
the
enemy
makes
secures
him
,
and
thou
canst
no
wayes
dammage
him
;
so
that
thou
being
to
raise
thy selfe
,
and
to
mount
thy
peeces
on
the
curtaine
of
the
wall
,
or
some
other
way
,
drawest
two
difficulties
upon
thee
.
The
first
is
,
that
thou
canst
not
bring
ordnance
thither
,
neither
of
that
bignesse
nor
effect
,
that
he
without
can
,
being
that
great
things
are
not
manageable
in
small
spaces
.
The
other
is
,
that
though
we
grant
thou
canst
bring
such
peeces
thither
,
yet
canst
thou
not
make
those
safe
and
strong
fortifications
to
secure
thy
artilery
within
which
they
without
can
,
being
upon
the
plaine
ground
,
and
having
those
conveniences
,
and
that
roome
,
they
can
desire
.
So
that
it
is
impossible
for
him
that
defends
a
towne
to
keepe
his
artillery
mounted
on
those
high
places
,
when
those
without
have
store
of
great
and
good
peeces
.
And
if
he
brings
them
into
lower
places
,
they
become
for
the
most
part
unprofitable
,
as
it
is
said
.
So
that
the
defence
of
a
city
is
to
be
made
by
the
bodies
of
men
,
as
it
was
the
custome
of
old
,
and
with
the
small
shot
:
Whereby
if
they
make
any
small
advantage
,
in
regard
of
the
small
shot
,
they
suffer
as
much
losse
,
which
counterpoises
all
the
good
the
artillery
can
do
them
:
for
by
them
the
towne
walls
are
all
laid
flat
,
and
,
as
it
were
,
buried
in
the
ditches
,
so
that
when
the
enemy
comes
to
enter
by
assault
,
either
because
the
walls
are
beaten
downe
,
or
that
the
ditches
are
filled
,
he
that
is
within
,
hath
more
disadvantages
thereby
,
then
otherwise
he
had
.
And
therefore
(
as
it
was
formerly
said
)
these
instruments
of
wa●re
do
more
helpe
the
besieger
,
then
the
besieged
.
Touching
the
third
point
,
which
is
to
retire
into
the
campe
,
and
there
to
make
intrenchments
,
to
keepe
off
from
battell
till
some
convenience
or
advantage
gotten
,
I
say
,
that
herein
thou
hast
no
more
helpe
ordinarily
to
keepe
thee
from
fighting
,
then
had
the
ancients
.
And
sometimes
by
reason
of
the
artillery
thou
hast
more
disadvantage
:
for
if
the
enemy
come
upon
thee
,
and
have
some
small
advantage
of
the
field
,
as
it
may
easily
chance
that
he
gets
the
upper
ground
of
thee
,
or
that
at
his
arrivall
thou
hast
not
fully
cast
up
thy
trenches
,
nor
cover'd
thy selfe
well
with
them
,
presently
he
dislodges
thee
whithout
remdy
,
and
thou
art
forced
to
come
cut
of
thy
fortifications
and
fight
:
which
befell
the
Spaniards
in
the
battell
at
Ravenna
,
who
,
being
fortified
betweene
the
river
Roncus
,
and
a
trench
they
had
cast
up
,
the
fence
whereof
was
not
of
that
hight
was
needfull
,
so
that
the
French
had
gotten
some
small
advantage
of
the
ground
,
were
forc'd
by
the
artillery
out
of
their
fortifications
to
come
to
fight
.
But
grant
(
as
most
commonly
it
should
be
)
that
the
place
where
thou
hast
encamped
,
were
higher
then
those
others
whereof
the
enemies
were
masters
,
and
that
their
fortifications
were
good
and
secure
in
such
sort
as
by
meanes
of
scituation
and
other
thy
preparations
the
enemy
dares
not
assaile
thee
,
in
this
case
they
will
be
forced
to
use
those
meanes
,
which
of
old
they
were
wont
,
when
any
one
lay
with
his
army
,
where
he
could
not
be
endammag'd
,
which
were
to
forrage
the
country
and
pillage
it
,
to
beleager
some
of
the
cheife
townes
,
to
hinder
thy
provisions
,
so
that
by
some
necessity
thou
shalt
of
force
dislodge
and
be
brought
to
fight
,
where
the
artillery
,
as
we
shall
hereafter
shew
is
not
of
so
great
effect
.
Considering
then
what
sort
of
warres
the
Romars
made
,
being
in
all
most
all
of
them
they
were
assailants
,
and
not
defendants
,
it
shall
appeare
(
being
that
these
things
above
written
are
true
.
)
that
they
would
have
had
greater
advantages
,
and
sooner
have
made
their
conconquests
,
had
the
artillery
bin
in
those
times
.
Touching
the
second
point
,
that
men
cannot
make
proofe
of
their
valour
as
of
old
they
might
,
by
reason
of
the
artillery
,
I
say
,
that
it
is
true
,
that
where
men
are
to
shew
themselves
in
scattered
troops
,
they
run
more
hazard
,
then
when
they
are
to
scale
a
wall
or
make
such
like
assaults
,
where
they
are
not
all
in
one
body
,
but
each
one
a
part
shewes
himselfe
.
It
is
true
also
that
the
Captaines
and
Commanders
of
armies
are
exposed
to
more
danger
of
death
,
being
that
then
the
artillery
can
reach
them
in
any
place
;
nor
availes
it
them
to
be
in
the
hindermost
rankes
,
or
invironed
by
their
valiantest
Souldiers
.
Yet
we
see
,
that
neither
of
these
two
dangers
do
often
endammage
much
;
for
places
fortified
are
not
easily
scal'd
,
nor
do
they
weakly
goe
to
assaile
them
:
but
if
they
will
take
them
,
they
must
besieges
them
,
as
it
was
the
custome
of
old
.
And
where
they
take
their
townes
by
assault
,
the
dangers
now
a
dayes
are
not
much
greater
then
they
were
wont
to
be
:
for
even
in
those
times
they
who
defended
the
townes
,
wanted
not
their
instruments
of
warre
where
with
to
shoote
at
their
enemies
,
which
(
though
perhaps
they
were
not
of
that
violence
)
yet
for
slaughter
were
of
the
same
effect
.
Touching
the
death
of
Captaines
and
Commanders
,
in
foure
and
twenty
yeares
time
,
that
these
last
warres
have
bin
in
Italy
,
we
have
not
so
many
examples
,
as
in
ten
yeares
the
ancients
had
:
for
from
Count
Lodowicke
of
Mirandola
,
that
died
at
Ferrara
,
when
the
Venetians
,
a
few
yeares
since
,
assai'd
that
state
,
and
the
Duke
of
Nemours
,
that
died
at
Cerignuola
,
there
hath
not
any
one
bin
slaine
by
the
canon
:
For
the
Lord
of
Fois
was
slain
by
the
sword
at
Ravenna
,
and
not
by
the
Cannon
.
So
that
if
men
give
no
particular
proofs
of
their
valour
,
it
is
not
caused
by
their
canon
,
but
prooeeds
from
their
evil
orders
,
and
the
feebleness
of
their
armies
,
which
when
they
want
valour
in
the
gross
,
cannot
then
in
any
particular
make
shew
of
it
.
Touching
the
third
allegation
made
by
them
,
that
they
can
never
come
to
joyne
battel
,
but
that
the
sum
of
all
will
depend
upon
the
artillery
,
I
say
that
this
opinion
is
utterly
false
,
and
so
shall
it
be
held
by
those
who
according
to
the
valour
of
old
will
imploy
their
armies
:
for
whosoever
will
have
a
good
army
,
must
use
them
in
trainings
or
rather
in
battels
to
come
up
close
to
the
enemy
,
and
there
fall
to
handy
blows
with
him
,
and
take
him
by
the
coller
:
and
they
ought
to
ground
more
upon
the
infantry
then
the
cavallery
,
for
some
reasons
we
shall
here
,
after
alledge
.
And
when
they
shall
rely
most
upon
the
foot
,
and
upon
these
waies
we
have
spoken
of
,
the
artillery
becomes
quite
unprofitable
;
for
more
easily
can
the
infantry
avoyd
the
blow
of
the
cannon
by
comming
up
close
to
the
enemy
,
then
of
old
they
could
escape
the
sury
of
the
Elephants
,
the
chariors
arm'd
with
hooks
,
and
such
other
unaccusiomed
encounters
which
the
Roman
infantry
met
with
,
and
sound
remedy
against
,
which
they
would
to
much
the
more
easily
have
found
against
these
,
as
much
as
the
time
is
of
very
short
durance
in
which
the
artillery
can
harme
thee
,
in
comparison
of
of
that
wherein
the
Elephan●s
and
chariots
●id
mischeif
:
for
these
in
the
very
middle
and
heat
of
the
battle
did
put
all
into
disorder
;
whereas
the
artillery
hinders
thee
onely
before
the
battel
:
which
hinderance
the
infantry
easily
avoid
,
either
by
going
cover'd
under
the
naturall
scite
of
the
place
,
or
by
stooping
towards
the
ground
when
they
shoot
:
which
also
we
see
by
experience
is
not
necessary
,
especially
to
escape
the
canon
,
which
can
hardly
be
so
right
levell'd
,
but
that
if
they
go
high
they
miss
thee
,
if
low
they
come
short
of
thee
.
Afterwards
when
the
armies
are
come
to
handy
blowes
,
this
is
more
clear
then
the
light
,
that
neither
the
great
nor
small
shot
can
do
thee
much
harm
:
for
if
the
enemy
places
the
artillery
before
him
,
thou
mayst
easily
take
it
;
if
behind
him
,
it
hurts
himself
before
it
can
touch
thee
:
or
if
it
be
on
either
side
of
thee
,
it
cannot
so
gall
thee
,
but
that
thou
mayest
come
up
close
to
it
;
whereupon
will
follow
the
effect
we
have
said
.
Nor
needs
there
much
dispute
upon
this
:
for
we
have
seen
it
by
the
example
of
the
Switzers
,
who
at
Navarra
in
the
year
1513.
without
arrillery
or
horse
assail'd
the
French
army
within
their
fortifications
being
guarded
with
artillery
,
and
yet
routed
them
being
no
way
hinder'd
thereby
:
and
the
reason
is
,
(
besides
the
things
formerly
alledged
)
because
the
artillery
hath
need
to
be
guarded
,
if
we
would
it
should
make
any
good
execution
,
either
by
some
wall
,
or
trenches
or
some
kind
of
fortifications
,
and
when
it
fails
of
these
defences
it
becomes
a
prey
to
the
enemy
,
&
so
is
made
unprofitable
,
as
it
comes
to
pass
when
it
is
defended
onely
by
men
,
or
as
it
may
be
in
field
battels
,
it
cannot
be
plac'd
on
the
flank
,
unless
it
be
on
that
manner
,
that
the
ancients
used
their
instruments
of
war
,
when
they
plac'd
them
without
their
squadrers
,
because
they
should
play
from
without
the
ranks
;
and
whensoever
they
were
put
at
,
either
by
the
horse
or
others
they
retired
behind
the
legions
:
whose
ever
accounts
otherwise
of
them
,
does
not
well
understand
the
use
of
them
,
and
trusts'upon
that
,
which
may
easily
deceive
him
,
and
if
the
Turk
by
the
help
of
his
artillery
,
have
gaind
any
victory
of
the
Sophy
and
the
So'dan
,
it
was
not
occasion'd
by
other
vertue
of
it
,
then
by
the
affright
the
unusual
noise
thereof
put
the
horse
into
.
Therefore
I
conclude
,
comming
to
the
end
of
this
discourse
,
that
the
artillery
is
prossitable
in
an
army
,
where
there
is
a
mingle
of
the
ancient
valour
,
without
which
it
avails
little
against
a
couragious
army
.
CHAP.
XVIII
.
How
by
authority
taken
from
the
Romans
,
and
from
the
use
of
the
ancient
military
discipline
,
the
foot
is
more
to
be
esteemd
,
than
the
horse
.
WEE
can
plainly
sshew
it
by
many
reasons
and
examples
,
how
much
the
Romans
in
all
military
actions
did
prefer
the
infantry
before
the
cavalry
,
and
thereupon
grounded
the
assurance
of
all
their
executions
,
as
it
appears
by
many
examples
,
and
among
others
,
when
they
sought
with
the
Latins
near
the
lake
of
Regillum
,
where
the
Roman
Army
giving
ground
a
little
,
for
their
succours
,
the
horse-men
were
commanded
to
light
and
serve
a
soct
whereby
they
made
good
the
fight
and
gaind
the
victory
.
Where
it
is
manifest
,
the
Romans
had
more
confidence
in
them
being
a
foot
,
than
a
horseback
,
They
us'd
the
same
termes
in
many
other
fights
,
and
sound
it
alwaies
a
present
help
in
their
dangers
.
Nor
let
Hannibals
opinion
counterballance
this
,
who
seeing
in
the
battel
at
Canna
that
the
Consuls
made
their
horsemen
light
and
serve
afoot
,
scoffing
at
the
course
they
took
,
said
,
I
had
rather
indeed
they
should
be
delivered
bound
into
my
hands
.
Which
opinion
however
that
it
was
utterd
by
a
very
able
man
,
yet
if
we
are
to
follow
authorities
,
we
may
rather
give
credit
to
a
Roman
Commonwealth
,
and
so
many
excellent
Captains
,
that
flourished
in
it
,
than
to
one
Hanniball
alone
,
though
without
this
authority
the
reasons
are
evident
:
for
a
man
on
foot
can
go
in
many
places
,
where
a
horseback
he
cannot
:
he
may
be
able
to
instruct
them
,
how
to
keep
their
ranks
,
and
being
somewhat
confus'd
,
how
they
may
be
restored
again
.
It
is
very
hard
to
make
the
horse
keep
their
ranks
,
and
when
once
they
are
in
disorder
,
it
is
impossible
to
recover
them
.
Besides
this
,
as
we
see
it
among
men
,
so
is
it
among
horses
;
some
there
are
which
have
but
small
courage
,
others
again
exceeding
couragious
.
And
many
times
it
falls
out
,
that
a
brave
horse
is
back'd
by
a
cowardly
fellow
,
and
sometimes
a
timerous
jade
is
mounted
by
a
stout
Souldier
;
and
there
which
way
soever
it
is
that
this
disparitie
follows
,
arises
uprofitableness
and
disorder
.
The
infantry
well
united
in
their
ranks
are
easily
able
to
rout
the
horse
,
and
very
hardly
can
they
be
routed
by
them
:
Which
opinion
is
confirmed
(
besides
many
ancient
moderne
examples
)
by
their
authorities
who
have
left
us
the
records
of
ancient
Republiques
,
where
they
shew
us
,
how
that
at
first
they
began
to
make
war
a
horseback
,
because
they
understood
neither
the
order
nor
the
use
of
the
foot
,
which
when
they
once
had
the
knowledge
of
,
they
quickly
conceiv'd
how
much
more
profitable
they
were
than
the
horse
.
But
hereupon
it
follows
not
that
the
horse
are
not
necessary
in
armies
,
to
discover
,
and
to
forrage
and
prey
about
in
the
Countrey
,
and
to
pursue
the
enemies
in
their
slight
,
and
in
part
also
to
oppose
all
the
attempts
of
the
the
adversaries
horse
.
But
the
ground-worke
,
and
the
very
nerves
of
the
army
,
and
whereof
most
account
is
to
be
made
,
is
the
Infantry
.
And
among
the
Italian
Princes
faults
,
which
have
euthral'd
Italy
to
strangers
,
there
is
none
greater
than
that
they
made
no
account
of
this
order
,
and
turn'd
all
their
regard
towards
the
service
of
horsemen
:
Which
disorder
proceeded
from
the
evil
disposition
of
the
Captains
,
and
their
ignorance
that
govern'd
the
State
:
by
reason
that
for
these
twenty-five
years
last
past
all
the
military
affairs
in
Italy
were
in
the
hands
of
men
that
had
no
setled
estates
,
but
were
Captains
adventurers
,
serving
where
they
could
have
pay
,
who
presently
devised
how
they
could
maintain
their
reputation
,
they
continuing
in
armes
when
the
Princes
were
unarmed
.
And
because
they
could
not
continually
get
pay
for
a
good
number
of
foot
,
nor
had
any
subjects
whereof
to
serve
themselves
,
and
a
small
number
got
them
no
credit
,
they
be
took
themselves
to
horse
:
for
a
Captain
having
pay
for
200
or
300
horse
,
subsisted
thereby
in
good
repute
,
and
the
payment
was
not
such
,
but
that
those
that
rul'd
the
State
could
easily
satisfie
it
.
And
to
the
end
this
should
come
on
more
easily
,
and
to
keep
themselves
the
better
in
esteem
,
they
took
all
respect
and
reputation
from
the
foot
,
and
referred
all
to
their
cavallery
;
And
so
far
increas'd
they
this
disorder
,
that
in
the
greatest
Armie
they
levyed
,
the
least
part
of
them
was
foot
.
Which
custom
,
together
with
many
other
disorders
intermixt
with
it
,
hath
much
weakned
the
Italian
Soldiery
,
so
that
this
Country
hath
easily
bin
trodden
under
foot
by
all
strangers
.
This
error
,
of
esteeming
the
horse
more
than
the
foot
,
is
laid
open
yet
more
plainly
,
by
another
example
of
the
Romans
.
The
Romans
were
incamped
at
Sora
;
and
a
troop
of
horse
having
made
a
sally
out
of
the
town
to
assualt
the
Camp
,
a
Captain
of
the
Roman
horse
went
to
incounter
them
with
his
Cavalry
,
whereupon
the
first
shock
,
meeting
brest
to
brest
,
it
chanc'd
that
the
Commander
of
each
troop
was
slain
,
and
the
residue
being
left
without
government
,
and
the
skirmish
still
continuing
,
the
Romans
that
they
might
the
better
vanquish
their
enemies
,
light
from
their
horses
,
and
forc't
their
enemies
(
if
they
would
defend
themselves
)
to
do
the
like
,
wherewith
the
Romans
carried
away
the
victory
.
This
example
could
not
serve
better
to
the
purpose
,
in
shewing
of
how
much
value
the
infantry
is
,
above
the
horse
:
for
if
in
other
occasions
the
Consuls
made
the
horsemen
to
dismount
,
it
was
to
succour
the
foot
that
were
in
distress
,
and
had
need
of
ayd
.
But
in
this
place
they
light
not
to
assist
the
foot
,
nor
to
fight
with
their
enemies
foot
,
but
fighting
a
horseback
with
horsemen
,
they
thought
that
though
they
were
not
able
to
master
them
on
horseback
,
that
alightning
they
could
more
easily
vanquish
them
:
I
will
therefore
conclude
,
that
a
body
of
foot
in
good
order
and
array
cannot
without
much
difficulty
be
overcome
by
another
body
of
foot
.
Crassus
and
Marchus
Antonius
both
Romans
,
made
an
introde
of
many
daies
journeys
into
the
Parthians
Kingdome
,
with
a
very
few
horse
and
a
good
number
of
foot
,
where
they
incountred
with
numberless
troops
of
the
Parthian
horse
.
Crassus
was
left
there
dead
with
part
of
the
Army
;
Marcus
Antonius
valorously
sav'd
himself
.
Nevertheless
,
in
these
Roman
losses
it
appears
,
how
much
the
Infantry
exceeded
the
horse
:
for
being
in
an
open
Country
,
where
there
are
few
mountains
,
and
very
few
rivers
,
and
the
Sea-coast
far
off
,
and
remote
from
all
conveniency
,
yet
for
all
this
did
Marcus
Antonius
even
in
the
opinion
of
the
Parthians
themselves
,
very
valourously
escape
,
nor
ever
durst
the
whole
Parthian
Cavalry
venture
to
break
into
the
ranks
of
his
Army
.
If
Crassus
perish'd
there
,
whosoever
well
reads
his
actions
,
shall
find
,
that
he
was
rather
treacherously
beguild
,
than
forc'd
,
nor
ever
in
all
his
disorders
,
durst
the
Parthians
set
upon
him
,
but
alwaies
went
along
by
him
,
to
keep
in
his
soldiers
from
stragling
,
and
getting
of
provisions
,
and
by
promising
fairly
,
but
observing
nothing
,
brought
him
at
length
unto
extream
distress
.
I
should
think
I
were
to
take
much
pains
in
perswading
that
the
valour
of
the
infantry
does
much
excel
that
of
the
horse
,
but
that
there
are
many
modern
examples
which
give
us
a
very
satisfactory
testimony
.
And
t
is
well
known
that
9000
Swisses
at
Navarra
,
formerly
alleaged
by
us
,
went
to
encounter
10000
horse
and
as
many
more
foot
,
&
vanquish'd
them
:
for
the
horse
could
no
way
harm
them
,
and
the
foot
being
for
the
most
part
Gascoignes
and
ill
ordered
,
they
made
small
account
of
.
We
see
likewise
that
afterwards
36000
Swisses
,
went
to
find
Francis
the
French
King
about
Milan
,
who
had
an
army
of
20000
horse
and
40000
foot
,
and
a
100
tire
of
Ordnance
;
and
though
they
gaind
not
the
battel
at
at
Navarra
,
yet
they
fought
bravely
two
dayes
together
,
and
when
at
length
they
were
broken
the
moity
of
them
escap'd
.
Marcus
Regulus
Attilius
presum'd
with
his
infantry
to
incounter
not
onely
the
enemies
horse
,
but
their
Elephants
;
and
though
his
purpose
came
not
to
effect
,
yet
was
it
not
so
,
but
that
the
valour
of
his
infantry
was
such
,
that
he
had
very
good
reason
to
hope
he
might
well
overcome
that
difficulty
.
And
therefore
I
answer
,
that
he
that
would
overcome
a
body
of
foot
in
good
array
,
must
oppose
them
with
another
body
of
foot
in
better
order
than
they
;
otherwise
he
sustains
an
evident
loss
.
In
the
dayes
dayes
of
Philip
Visconti
Duke
of
Milan
,
there
came
down
into
Lombardy
some
16000
Swisses
,
whereupon
the
Duke
Carmignuola
being
then
his
General
,
sent
him
with
neare
upon
a
thousand
horse
and
some
few
foot
to
incounter
them
:
Who
not
knowing
the
manner
of
their
fighting
,
went
to
meet
them
with
his
horse
,
not
doubting
but
that
he
could
presently
rout
them
.
But
finding
them
to
stand
firm
,
and
having
lost
many
Souldiers
,
retir'd
;
yet
being
a
very
able
man
,
and
knowing
in
new
accidents
how
to
try
new
wayes
,
having
repaird
his
broken
troupes
,
he
went
again
to
meet
them
,
where
he
made
all
his
armed
men
a
light
,
and
serve
on
foot
,
and
so
by
them
having
made
a
head
to
those
of
his
infantry
,
he
invested
the
Swisses
,
who
found
no
way
to
help
themselves
:
for
Carmignuolaes
horsemen
bring
lighted
,
who
were
wel
arm'd
,
were
able
with
facilitie
to
enter
into
the
Swisses
ranks
without
much
hurt
:
which
when
they
had
pierc'd
,
they
could
easily
harme
;
so
that
of
their
whole
number
there
was
left
onely
that
part
alive
,
that
was
by
Carmignuolaes
curtesie
preserv'd
.
I
beleeve
well
that
many
know
this
difference
of
valour
that
is
between
the
one
and
the
other
of
these
orders
,
but
so
unhappy
are
these
times
,
that
neither
the
ancient
nor
modern
examples
,
nor
the
acknowledgement
of
the
error
is
of
force
to
prevail
with
modern
Princes
to
readvise
themselves
and
consider
,
that
to
recover
the
reputation
of
the
Souldiery
of
a
Countrey
or
State
,
it
is
necessary
to
revive
again
these
orders
and
entertain
them
near
their
persons
,
to
encourage
them
and
allow
them
means
to
live
,
to
the
end
they
may
restore
to
them
both
life
and
reputation
.
But
as
we
use
to
forsake
these
customs
,
so
we
leave
other
orders
also
formerly
spoken
of
;
whereupon
it
comes
to
pass
,
that
the
very
conquests
we
make
turne
to
our
losses
,
and
not
to
the
advancement
of
a
State
,
as
hereafter
we
shall
say
.
CHAP.
XIX
.
That
Conquests
in
Republiques
not
well
govern'd
,
and
which
proceed
not
according
to
the
Roman
vertue
,
prove
rather
their
ruine
,
than
advancement
.
THese
opinions
contrary
to
the
truth
,
and
grounded
on
evil
precedents
,
which
have
bin
introduced
by
these
our
corrupt
ages
,
cause
men
not
to
stand
much
upon
straying
from
old
wonted
uses
.
Some
thirty
years
agoe
,
an
Italian
would
never
have
bin
perswaded
,
that
ten
thousand
foot
in
a
plain
had
ever
bin
able
to
assault
ten
thousand
horse
and
so
many
more
foot
,
and
not
only
fight
with
them
,
but
vanquish
them
too
,
as
it
is
plain
by
the
example
of
the
battel
at
Navarra
;
by
us
sundry
times
alleag'd
.
And
however
that
Stories
are
full
of
them
,
yet
would
they
not
have
given
us
credit
:
and
if
they
had
beleeved
us
,
they
would
have
said
,
that
in
these
dayes
men
are
better
arm'd
,
and
that
a
squadron
of
men
at
armes
would
have
bin
of
force
to
have
shock'd
with
a
rock
,
and
not
only
with
a
body
of
foot
,
and
thus
with
these
false
excuses
they
corrupted
their
judgments
.
Nor
would
they
have
taken
into
consideration
,
that
Lucullus
with
a
few
foot
routed
a
150000
horse
that
Tigranes
led
,
and
yet
among
those
horsemen
there
was
a
sort
of
them
very
like
our
men
at
armes
.
And
so
this
fallacy
was
discover'd
by
the
example
of
forrain
Nations
.
And
as
thereby
it
proves
true
,
touching
the
infantry
,
which
is
related
in
Story
,
so
ought
it
be
beleev'd
that
all
the
rest
of
the
ancient
orders
are
true
and
usefull
.
And
when
this
were
once
credited
,
Republiques
and
Princes
would
fail
less
,
and
be
of
more
strength
to
resist
any
force
should
come
upon
them
,
nor
hope
so
much
in
the
flight
;
and
those
that
should
have
in
their
hands
the
government
of
State
,
would
be
better
able
to
guide
it
,
either
by
way
of
amplification
or
by
way
of
preservation
,
and
would
think
that
to
increase
the
number
of
their
Citizens
,
and
make
them
as
their
associates
and
not
vassals
,
to
send
forth
Colonies
to
keep
the
countries
gained
,
to
make
a
general
stock
out
of
the
booties
taken
,
to
tame
the
enemy
with
incursions
,
&
by
set
battels
,
&
not
long
sieges
,
to
maintain
the
publique
state
in
wealth
,
&
the
private
in
scarcity
,
and
to
be
industrious
in
keeping
the
armies
in
good
discipline
,
are
the
means
to
inlarge
a
Commonwealth
&
gain
an
Empire
.
And
when
this
way
of
amplification
should
not
like
them
,
then
should
they
think
that
all
addition
to
their
state
are
the
ruine
of
Commonwealths
,
and
therefore
should
restrain
all
ambition
,
regulating
their
City
according
to
their
lawes
and
customs
,
forbidding
all
inlargments
,
only
ayming
at
defenee
of
what
they
have
,
and
keeping
them
under
good
government
,
as
the
Republicks
of
Germany
do
,
and
so
have
liv'd
free
a
good
while
.
Notwithstanding
(
as
otherwhere
I
have
said
,
when
I
discours'd
touching
the
difference
there
was
in
the
ordering
of
a
State
to
become
fit
to
conquer
;
and
the
ordering
of
one
to
be
able
to
maintain
it self
)
it
is
impossible
,
that
a
Republick
should
have
the
hap
to
stand
quiet
,
and
enjoy
her
own
liberty
,
with
her
small
Territories
:
for
though
she
molest
not
others
yet
she
shall
be
molested
her self
:
she
may
also
have
some
mind
or
some
necessity
in
some
part
to
extend
her
bounds
:
and
in
case
she
have
no
enemy
abroad
,
yet
may
she
find
some
one
at
home
,
as
it
must
needs
be
alwaies
that
such
be
found
among
a
great
many
potent
citizens
,
and
if
those
Republicks
of
Germany
can
subsist
in
that
manner
,
&
have
been
able
to
continue
for
a
time
it
arises
from
some
conditions
,
that
are
in
that
Country
,
&
which
are
no
where
else
sound
,
nor
could
they
maintain
such
a
manner
of
government
without
them
.
This
part
of
Germany
,
whereof
I
speak
,
was
subject
to
the
Roman
Empire
,
as
were
France
&
Spain
;
but
when
the
Empire
began
to
decline
,
&
the
title
of
the
Empire
was
brought
into
that
Country
,
the
most
potent
of
those
Cities
began
(
according
to
the
baseness
or
the
necessity
of
those
Emperors
)
to
set
themselves
at
liberty
,
buying
themselves
out
from
the
Empire
,
and
reserving
thereunto
only
a
a
certain
annual
rent
.
Insomuch
as
by
little
and
little
,
all
those
Cities
,
which
he●d
immediatly
of
the
Emperor
,
and
were
no
way
in
subjection
to
any
Prince
,
in
such
like
manner
set
themselves
free
.
It
happened
in
the
same
times
,
when
these
Cities
bought
out
their
liberties
,
that
certain
communalties
of
the
Duke
of
Austria's
subjects
,
rebell'd
agianst
him
,
among
which
were
Tilibourg
,
the
Swisses
and
others
,
who
prospering
in
the
beginning
,
by
little
and
little
came
to
such
growth
,
that
they
not
only
shook
off
the
Austrian
yoke
,
but
even
became
a
terror
to
all
their
neighbours
,
and
these
are
those
they
call
Swisses
.
This
Country
therefore
is
divided
into
the
Swisses
,
Republcks
,
which
they
call-free
Townes
,
Princes
,
and
the
Emperor
.
And
the
reason
why
among
such
variety
of
governments
there
arise
no
warres
,
or
if
any
do
,
why
they
continue
not
,
is
that
reverence
they
yeeld
to
the
Emperor
,
who
albeit
he
hath
no
great
forces
,
yet
is
held
in
such
esteem
among
them
,
that
he
alwaies
reconciles
them
,
&
with
his
authority
interposing
himself
as
Mediator
,
takes
away
all
discontents
:
&
the
greatest
&
longest
warrs
that
have
been
there
,
were
those
that
follow'd
between
the
Swisses
&
the
Duke
of
Austria
;
and
though
now
for
these
many
years
the
Emperor
and
the
Duke
of
Austria
have
been
one
and
the
same
thing
,
yet
was
he
never
so
powerful
as
to
tame
the
Swisses
insolence
,
where
there
was
never
any
means
of
accord
,
unless
it
were
by
force
;
nor
hath
the
residue
of
Germany
ever
given
him
much
assistance
:
partly
because
those
communalties
cannot
find
in
their
hearts
to
hurt
those
that
desire
to
live
under
a
civil
government
,
as
they
themselves
do
and
partly
because
those
Princes
are
not
able
,
being
poor
,
or
will
not
,
by
reason
that
they
envy
too
great
puissance
.
Those
commonalties
therfore
may
live
contented
with
their
small
dominions
,
because
they
have
no
occasion
(
in
regard
of
the
Imperial
Authority
)
to
wish
it
greater
.
They
may
live
the
better
in
union
within
their
owne
walls
,
because
they
have
the
enemy
near
at
hand
,
who
would
willingly
take
any
opportunity
to
lay
hold
on
them
,
whensoever
they
should
fall
into
discord
:
but
if
that
country
were
otherwise
conditioned
,
it
were
fit
for
them
to
seeke
the
inlargement
of
their
State
,
&
so
interrupt
their
owne
rest
:
and
because
otherwhere
there
are
not
the
like
termes
,
this
manner
of
living
cannot
be
followed
,
and
there
is
a
necessity
either
to
strengthen
the
State
by
way
of
leagues
,
or
to
amplifie
it
as
the
Romans
did
.
And
whosoever
undertake
any
other
course
of
government
,
seeke
not
their
owne
life
,
but
ruine
and
desttruction
:
for
many
wayes
,
and
for
many
reasons
are
conquests
hurtfull
:
for
it
is
very
possible
to
gaine
dominion
,
and
not
strength
;
and
he
that
does
increase
his
dominions
,
&
yet
growes
not
in
strength
,
must
needs
go
to
wrack
.
They
cannot
grow
strong
,
that
grow
poore
in
the
wars
,
although
they
prove
victorious
,
because
their
conquests
cost
them
more
then
they
get
by
them
,
as
the
Venetians
&
the
Florentins
did
,
who
have
bin
much
weaker
,
when
the
one
commanded
all
Lombardy
,
and
the
other
Tuscany
,
then
when
the
one
was
contented
with
the
seaonley
and
the
other
with
six
miles
round
of
territories
:
for
al
this
preceeded
from
their
desire
to
conquer
,
&
their
ignorance
to
take
the
right
course
:
and
they
deserve
the
more
blame
,
in
that
they
have
very
little
excuse
having
seene
the
ways
the
Romanes
went
,
because
they
might
have
followed
their
example
,
being
that
the
Romanes
without
any
patterne
to
follow
,
by
their
own
judgment
,
found
out
a
fit
way
to
go
.
Moreover
sometimes
such
gains
gotten
do
no
smal
harm
to
a
well
govern'd
Commonwealth
,
when
either
such
a
city
or
country
is
conquer'd
that
abounds
with
pleasures
,
where
by
conversation
with
them
,
their
manners
are
learned
,
as
it
happen'd
to
Rome
at
first
in
the
conquest
of
Capua
,
&
afterwards
to
Hannibal
.
And
had
Capua
been
of
further
distance
from
the
City
,
that
the
soldiers
error
had
not
had
the
remedy
near
hand
,
or
that
Rome
had
been
in
some
part
corrupted
,
without
question
that
conquest
had
prov'd
the
Roman
Republicks
ruine
.
And
T.
Livius
witnesses
the
same
in
these
words
:
Even
then
was
Capua
little
good
for
the
military
discipline
,
which
being
the
instrument
of
all
sorts
of
pleasures
,
besotted
the
soldiers
minds
so
,
that
they
forgot
their
native
Countries
.
And
truly
such
like
Cities
sufficiently
avenge
themselves
on
their
Conquerors
without
fight
,
or
loss
of
blood
;
for
by
infecting
them
with
their
contagious
vices
,
they
expose
them
to
the
conquest
of
whoever
assailes
them
.
And
Juvenal
could
not
better
have
expressed
this
,
then
where
in
his
Satyres
he
saies
,
that
by
their
conquests
of
forrain
nations
,
their
minds
were
possessed
with
forrain
vices
,
in
exchange
of
parsimony
,
&
other
excellent
vertues
;
Glutrony
and
luxury
making
their
habitation
there
,
revenged
the
worlds
Conquest
on
them
.
If
therefore
these
gettings
were
likely
to
have
been
dangerous
to
the
Romans
,
in
the
times
that
they
proceeded
with
such
wisdome
and
vertue
,
how
will
they
prove
to
those
who
go
on
in
much
different
waies
from
them
?
and
who
besides
the
other
errors
they
run
into
(
whereof
we
have
formerly
spoken
enough
)
serve
themselves
of
either
mercenary
or
auxiliary
soldiers
?
whereupon
those
mischiefs
often
befall
them
,
which
we
shall
mention
in
the
following
chap.
CHAP.
XX.
What
hazzard
that
Prince
or
Commonwealth
runs
,
which
is
serv'd
by
auxiliary
and
mercenary
soldiers
.
IF
in
another
work
of
mine
I
had
not
treated
at
large
of
mercenary
and
auxiliary
soldiers
how
unprofitable
they
are
,
and
how
very
profitable
the
native
soldiers
of
the
Country
are
,
I
would
much
more
have
inlarged
my self
in
this
discourse
,
than
now
I
purpose
;
but
having
otherwhere
discours'd
hereupon
at
length
,
I
shall
now
only
point
at
it
.
Not
yet
did
I
think
fit
wholly
to
pass
it
over
,
having
found
in
Titus
Livius
so
large
an
example
belonging
to
those
soldiers
:
for
auxiliary
soldiers
are
those
that
a
Prince
or
Commonwealth
sends
with
their
Captains
and
pay
ready
furnish'd
in
thy
aid
.
And
comming
to
the
text
of
T.
Livius
,
I
say
,
that
the
Romans
having
in
severall
places
broken
two
armies
of
the
Samnites
with
their
forces
,
which
they
sent
to
succor
the
Capuans
,
and
thereby
freed
them
from
that
warr
the
Samnites
made
against
them
,
purposing
to
return
to
Rome
,
to
the
end
the
Capuans
dispoyl'd
of
ayd
should
not
a
new
becom
a
prey
to
the
Samnites
,
left
behind
them
in
the
country
about
Capua
two
legions
to
defend
them
.
Which
legions
growing
corrupt
through
idleness
,
began
to
be
insnar'd
with
the
delicacies
thereof
So
that
having
for
gotten
their
owne
country
,
and
the
reverence
they
ought
to
the
Senate
,
they
resolved
to
take
armes
,
and
make
themselves
Lords
of
that
Country
,
which
they
by
their
valours
had
defended
,
thinking
those
inhabitants
not
worthy
to
injoy
those
goods
,
which
they
knew
not
how
to
defend
.
Which
thing
,
the
Romanes
having
had
some
inkling
of
it
before
,
was
stopped
,
and
punished
by
them
,
as
,
where
we
speak
of
conspiracies
,
it
shall
be
show'd
at
large
.
Therefore
I
say
again
,
that
of
all
kindes
of
souldiers
the
auxiliaries
are
the
most
dangerous
;
Because
among
those
,
that
Prince
or
Republique
that
uses
them
for
ayd
,
hath
no
authority
,
but
onely
he
that
sends
them
:
for
auxiliary
souldiers
are
those
that
are
sent
th●e
by
a
Prince
,
as
I
have
sayd
,
under
the
command
of
his
own
Captaines
,
under
his
own
ensignes
and
pay
also
,
as
this
army
was
,
which
the
Romanes
sent
to
Capua
.
These
kinds
of
souldiers
,
when
they
have
vanquished
,
most
commonly
pillage
as
well
them
that
have
hir'd
them
,
as
the
enemy
against
whom
they
have
hired
them
;
and
this
they
do
,
either
through
the
maligne
disposition
of
their
Prince
that
sends
them
,
or
through
their
owne
ambition
And
however
the
Romanes
had
no
intention
to
violate
the
agreement
and
conventions
made
with
the
Capuans
,
yet
the
facility
wherewith
those
souldiers
thought
themselves
able
to
take
their
towne
,
was
such
that
it
might
have
been
of
force
to
perswade
them
to
think
of
taking
the
town
and
State
from
the
Capuans
:
Many
examples
to
this
purpose
may
be
alledg'd
;
but
this
,
and
that
of
the
inhabitants
of
Rhegium
shall
suffice
me
,
from
whom
both
lives
&
town
were
taken
by
one
legion
of
soldiers
,
which
the
Romans
had
there
left
in
garrison
.
Therefore
a
Prince
or
a
Republick
should
rather
take
any
other
course
,
than
seek
to
bring
auxiliary
soldiers
into
his
Country
,
principally
when
he
is
most
to
rely
upon
them
:
for
any
accord
or
agreement
(
though
very
hard
)
to
which
he
shall
yeeld
with
his
enemy
,
shall
be
more
tolerable
than
this
.
And
if
things
past
were
well
call'd
to
mind
,
and
those
that
are
present
well
consider'd
on
,
for
one
that
hath
had
good
success
in
such
a
business
,
a
man
shall
find
exceeding
many
who
have
been
abus'd
.
And
a
Prince
,
or
an
ambitious
Republick
can
never
have
a
fitter
opportunity
to
seise
on
a
Town
or
Country
,
than
when
they
are
requir'd
to
send
their
armies
for
defence
thereof
.
Wherefore
he
that
is
so
ambitious
,
that
not
only
for
his
own
defence
,
but
for
offence
to
another
,
calls
in
such
like
aids
,
seeks
to
gain
that
he
cannot
hold
,
and
which
also
he
that
gets
it
for
him
,
can
at
his
pleasure
take
from
him
,
But
so
great
is
mans
ambition
,
that
if
he
can
fulfill
his
desire
for
the
present
,
he
is
never
aware
of
that
evill
,
which
shortly
after
may
thence
redound
to
him
.
Nor
do
the
ancient
examples
avail
any
thing
with
him
,
as
well
in
this
,
as
in
other
things
we
have
treated
of
:
for
were
men
hereby
mov'd
,
they
would
perceive
that
the
more
freely
and
fairly
they
dealt
with
their
neighbours
,
and
the
farther
of
they
were
from
making
themselves
masters
of
them
,
the
more
readily
would
they
offer
to
cast
themselves
into
their
armes
,
as
hereafter
shall
appear
by
example
of
the
Capuans
.
CHAP.
XXI
.
The
first
Pretour
that
the
Romans
ever
sent
to
any
place
,
was
to
Capua
,
four
hundred
years
after
they
began
to
make
war.
HOw
much
the
Romans
in
their
manner
of
proceeding
in
their
Conquests
did
differ
from
those
,
who
now
a
daies
inlarge
their
dominions
,
we
have
formerly
discours'd
enough
,
and
how
they
suffer'd
those
Towns
which
they
did
not
utterly
race
,
to
live
with
their
own
laws
,
as
well
those
that
yeelded
to
them
as
subjects
,
as
those
that
came
under
their
protection
as
associates
.
And
in
them
they
left
no
marks
of
the
Roman
Empire
,
but
tied
them
to
some
certain
conditions
,
which
whiles
they
observ'd
,
they
still
maintain'd
them
in
their
state
and
dignity
.
And
we
know
that
these
courses
were
continued
till
they
began
to
Conquer
abroad
out
of
Italy
,
and
that
they
reduc'd
Kingdomes
and
States
into
Provinces
.
Whereof
the
example
is
very
clear
;
for
the
first
place
that
ever
they
sent
any
Preror
to
was
Capua
,
whether
they
sent
him
not
through
their
own
ambition
,
but
upon
the
Capuans
intreaty
,
who
(
being
they
were
at
discord
one
with
another
)
judg'd
it
necessary
to
have
a
Citizen
of
Rome
amongst
them
,
that
might
put
them
in
order
again
and
reunite
them
.
The
Antiates
also
mov'd
by
their
example
,
and
constrain'd
by
the
same
necessity
requir'd
to
have
a
Prefect
sent
them
.
And
T.
Livius
saies
upon
this
occasion
,
and
upon
this
new
way
of
ruling
;
That
now
not
only
the
Roman
armes
,
but
their
lawes
also
were
in
great
repute
.
We
see
therefore
how
much
this
course
taken
,
further'd
the
Romans
advancement
:
for
those
Cities
especially
that
are
accustomed
to
live
free
,
or
to
be
govern'd
by
their
own
Citizens
,
are
well
enough
contented
to
live
in
another
manner
of
quiet
under
a
rule
they
see
not
(
though
it
may
bring
some
burden
with
it
too
)
rather
than
under
that
which
they
having
every
day
in
their
view
,
continually
reproaches
them
with
their
slavery
.
Besides
this
;
the
Prince
gains
hereby
another
advantage
,
that
his
Officers
having
not
in
their
hands
these
judicatures
and
magistracies
,
whereby
they
were
to
regulate
those
Cities
,
there
can
no
imputation
or
aspersion
be
cast
upon
the
Prince
.
And
hereby
many
occasions
of
calumny
and
hatred
against
him
are
taken
away
.
And
that
this
is
true
,
besides
ancient
examples
,
which
we
could
alledge
,
we
have
one
of
late
memory
in
Italy
:
for
as
it
is
well
known
(
Geneva
having
been
several
times
possessed
by
the
French
)
that
King
did
alwaies
(
except
at
this
present
time
)
send
them
a
French
Governor
,
who
under
him
should
govern
them
.
For
this
present
only
,
but
upon
any
intention
of
the
Kings
;
but
it
seem'd
necessity
so
order'd
it
,
he
hath
suffered
them
to
be
governed
by
their
own
lawes
,
and
to
have
a
Genowes
for
their
Magistrate
.
And
I
make
no
question
but
that
he
that
inquires
which
of
these
two
waies
most
secures
the
King
for
his
rule
over
them
,
&
gives
the
people
most
satisfaction
,
would
the
rather
alow
of
this
latter
.
Moreover
men
cast
themselves
the
more
freely
into
thy
armes
,
the
further
off
they
think
thee
from
being
desirous
to
rule
;
&
so
much
the
less
do
they
fear
thee
in
regard
of
their
liberty
,
by
how
much
the
more
curteous
and
familiar
thou
art
with
them
.
This
familiarity
and
free
manner
of
behaviour
made
the
Capuans
hasty
to
aske
a
Prerour
of
the
Romans
:
but
had
the
Romans
of
themselves
made
but
the
least
shew
they
would
have
sent
one
thicher
,
they
would
presently
have
been
in
jealousie
of
them
,
and
started
from
them
.
But
what
need
we
go
to
Capua
and
Rome
for
examples
,
having
store
enough
at
Florence
and
in
Tuscany
?
It
is
well
known
how
long
since
it
is
that
Pistotia
willingly
yeelded
it self
to
the
government
of
Florence
.
It
is
as
well
known
also
,
what
enmity
hath
been
between
the
Florentines
and
the
Pisans
,
the
Luckeses
and
the
Seneses
;
and
this
difference
of
diposition
proceeds
not
from
thence
,
that
the
Pistoyeses
value
not
their
liberty
,
as
well
as
others
do
,
but
because
the
Florentines
us'd
these
with
that
respect
they
do
their
own
brothers
,
but
the
others
they
treated
as
enemies
.
This
was
the
occasion
made
the
Pistoyeses
offer
themselves
freely
to
be
govern'd
by
them
;
and
the
others
struggle
with
all
might
and
main
,
as
yet
they
do
also
,
not
to
come
under
them
.
And
doubtless
,
had
the
Florentines
either
by
way
of
alliances
or
succours
grown
familiar
with
their
neighbours
,
and
not
have
alwaies
scar'd
them
,
they
had
at
this
instant
been
Lords
of
all
Tuscany
.
But
hereupon
I
advise
not
,
that
armes
and
force
are
not
to
be
us'd
,
but
that
they
are
to
be
reserv'd
for
the
last
place
,
where
and
when
other
meanes
will
not
serve
.
CHAP.
XXII
.
How
erroneous
many
times
the
opinions
of
men
are
,
when
they
give
their
judgements
touching
great
affaires
.
HOw
false
oftentimes
mens
opinions
are
,
they
well
see
,
who
are
eye-witnesses
of
their
deliberations
,
which
many
times
unless
they
be
determined
of
by
able
men
,
are
contrary
to
all
truth
.
And
because
that
excellent
men
in
corrupted
Commonwealths
(
especially
in
peaceable
times
)
both
for
envy
and
occasions
of
ambition
are
maligned
,
such
adwise
is
follow'd
,
as
by
reason
of
a
common
error
is
well
approv'd
of
,
or
such
as
is
put
forward
by
men
that
aime
rather
at
grace
and
favour
then
the
general
good
.
This
error
afterward
is
discover'd
in
times
of
adversity
,
and
of
force
recourse
is
had
to
those
that
in
times
of
peace
were
utterly
forgotten
,
as
in
its
own
place
in
this
part
it
shall
fully
be
spoken
of
.
There
are
also
certain
accedents
where
men
are
very
easily
beguiled
,
if
not
well
experienced
in
affaires
,
the
present
accident
having
in
it self
many
likelihoods
fit
to
make
that
credible
,
whereof
in
such
a
case
men
are
perswaded
.
These
words
are
spoken
upon
that
which
Numicius
the
Pretour
(
after
that
the
Latins
were
defeated
by
the
Romans
)
perswaded
them
;
and
upon
that
which
few
years
since
,
many
beleeved
,
when
Francis
the
first
,
King
of
France
came
to
the
Conquest
of
Milan
,
which
was
defended
by
the
Swissers
.
Therefore
I
say
,
that
Lewis
the
Twelfth
being
dead
,
and
Francis
of
Angoulesme
succeeding
in
the
Kingdome
of
France
,
and
desiring
to
restore
the
Duchy
of
Milan
to
the
Kingdome
whereof
the
Switzers
had
of
late
possessed
themselves
,
by
means
of
Pope
Julius
the
seconds
encouragement
,
desired
to
have
some
aid
in
Italy
,
which
might
further
his
undertakings
,
so
that
besides
the
Venetians
,
whom
King
Lewis
had
gain'd
,
he
tried
the
Florentines
,
and
Pope
Leo
the
tenth
,
thinking
his
enterprise
much
facilitated
,
by
having
them
to
side
with
him
,
because
the
King
of
Spains
soldiers
were
in
Lombardy
,
and
some
of
the
Emperors
forces
in
Verona
.
Pope
Leo
yeelded
not
to
the
Kings
desire
,
but
by
those
that
counselled
him
,
he
was
perswaded
(
as
it
was
said
)
to
stand
neuter
,
showing
him
that
herein
consisted
certain
victory
:
for
it
was
nothing
at
all
for
the
Churches
good
,
to
have
either
mighty
in
Italy
,
the
King
or
the
Swissers
.
But
if
he
desired
to
restore
it
to
the
ancient
liberty
,
it
was
fit
to
free
it
from
the
one
and
the
other
.
And
because
it
was
not
possible
to
varquish
the
one
or
the
other
,
divided
or
united
,
it
was
not
ami's
to
let
them
overcome
one
another
,
and
that
afterwards
the
Church
with
her
allies
should
assaile
the
conqueror
,
and
it
was
impossible
to
find
a
better
occasion
then
the
present
,
both
being
incamped
:
and
so
the
Pope
having
his
forces
in
order
,
whereby
he
might
be
able
to
present
himself
upon
the
confines
of
Lombardy
,
near
the
two
armies
under
colour
of
guarding
his
own
state
,
should
there
abide
till
they
had
fought
their
battell
:
which
in
all
probability
(
each
army
being
very
valorous
)
could
not
but
prove
bloody
to
them
both
and
leave
the
Conqueror
so
feeble
,
that
the
Pope
might
easily
assaile
and
break
him
,
and
thereby
he
should
attain
to
become
Lord
of
Lombardy
,
and
only
arbitrator
of
all
Italy
.
And
how
erroneous
this
opinion
was
,
appear'd
by
the
event
of
the
matter
:
for
the
Swissers
being
vanquish'd
after
a
long
fight
,
the
Popes
and
the
Spanish
soldiers
were
so
far
from
assailing
the
Conquerors
,
that
they
prepared
themselves
with
what
haste
they
could
for
flight
;
which
also
would
have
little
avail'd
them
had
it
not
been
for
the
Kings
humanity
or
coldness
in
their
pursuit
,
who
sought
not
after
a
second
victory
,
but
was
contented
to
make
agreement
with
the
Church
.
This
opinion
hath
some
arguments
for
it
,
which
carry
a
colour
of
truth
,
but
indeed
are
far
from
it
:
for
it
seldome
comes
to
pass
,
that
the
Conqueror
loses
many
of
his
soldiers
;
for
of
them
,
there
are
some
only
slai
in
the
battel
,
and
not
in
the
flight
:
and
during
the
heat
of
the
combat
,
whiles
men
stand
face
to
face
one
with
another
,
few
of
them
fall
,
especially
because
for
the
most
part
this
continues
but
a
small
while
.
And
in
case
it
should
last
long
,
and
many
of
the
Conquerors
should
fall
;
yet
such
is
the
reputation
,
and
terror
also
,
that
victory
draws
with
it
,
that
it
far
exceeds
the
dammage
,
that
by
the
death
of
those
soldiers
can
be
suffer'd
.
So
that
an
Army
,
which
upon
the
opinion
,
that
such
a
one
were
weakned
,
going
to
assaile
it
,
would
be
much
deceived
,
unless
it
were
such
an
Army
that
at
all
times
,
before
and
after
the
victory
,
were
able
to
deale
with
it
.
In
this
case
the
assailing
Army
may
be
able
according
to
the
fortune
and
valor
it
hath
to
win
or
lose
:
but
that
which
had
formerly
fought
,
&
vanquish'd
,
would
have
some
advantage
of
the
other
:
Which
appears
plainly
by
the
experience
the
Latins
gave
us
,
and
the
fallacy
by
which
Numicius
the
Pretour
was
abus'd
,
as
also
by
the
dammage
which
those
people
brought
upon
themselves
by
beleeving
him
,
who
(
when
the
Romans
had
vanquish'd
the
Latins
)
cried
out
through
all
Latium
,
that
then
was
it
time
to
assaile
the
Romans
,
who
were
weakned
with
the
late
fight
they
had
with
the
Latines
;
that
the
Romans
had
carried
away
only
the
name
of
the
victory
,
but
had
suffered
all
other
sorts
of
dammages
,
even
as
much
as
if
they
had
been
overcome
,
and
that
any
small
force
,
if
now
a
fresh
it
should
assaile
them
,
were
enough
to
dispatch
them
.
Whereupon
those
people
that
gave
credit
to
him
,
levied
a
new
army
,
and
were
presently
defeated
,
and
so
suffered
that
loss
,
which
others
shall
that
hold
the
like
opinion
.
CHAP.
XXIII
.
How
much
the
Romans
in
giving
judgement
upon
their
subjects
,
whensoever
occasion
was
offer'd
,
that
constrain'd
them
thereunto
,
avoided
the
mid
way
,
and
rather
betook
themselves
to
one
of
the
extreames
.
THe
Latins
were
now
reduc'd
to
such
termes
,
that
they
could
neither
endure
peace
,
nor
maintain
War
.
Of
all
unhappy
conditions
this
is
the
worst
,
unto
which
a
Prince
or
Republick
can
be
brought
,
that
they
can
neither
accept
of
peace
,
nor
support
the
War
;
unto
which
those
are
reduc'd
,
who
are
overmuch
offended
at
the
conditions
of
peace
,
and
on
the
other
side
,
if
they
have
a
mind
to
make
war
,
either
they
must
cast
themselves
as
a
prey
into
the
hands
of
those
that
ayd
them
,
or
become
a
prey
to
their
enemy
.
And
into
these
mischances
men
fall
by
evil
advices
and
evil
courses
,
by
not
having
well
weighed
their
own
forces
,
as
before
it
was
said
:
for
that
Republique
or
Prince
,
that
should
well
weigh
them
,
very
hardly
would
ever
be
brought
to
those
termes
the
Latines
came
,
who
when
they
should
not
have
made
accord
with
the
Romans
,
made
it
,
and
when
,
they
should
not
have
broke
peace
with
them
brake
it
.
Whereby
they
brought
it
so
to
pass
that
their
agreement
and
disagreement
with
the
Romans
did
equally
endammage
them
.
The
Latins
then
were
overcome
and
much
broken
at
first
by
Manlus
Torquatus
,
and
afterwards
by
Camillus
;
who
having
forc't
them
to
yeeld
and
render
themselves
to
the
Romans
,
and
put
Garrisons
in
all
the
I
owns
in
Latium
,
and
taken
hostages
of
them
all
,
when
he
came
back
to
Rome
,
related
to
the
Senate
,
that
all
Latium
was
in
the
people
of
Romes
hands
.
And
because
this
judgement
is
remarkable
,
and
deserves
note
,
to
the
end
it
may
be
follow'd
,
when
Princes
have
the
like
occasions
given
them
,
I
will
produce
the
very
words
,
that
Livie
put
in
Camillus
his
mouth
,
which
did
testifie
both
of
the
manner
the
Romans
held
in
amplifying
the
State
,
and
that
in
their
judgements
touching
the
State
,
they
alwaies
avoided
the
middle
way
,
and
turn'd
to
the
extreams
:
for
a
government
is
nothing
else
,
but
to
have
such
a
tye
upon
the
subjects
,
that
they
either
cannot
,
or
will
not
hurt
thee
.
This
is
done
either
by
making
thy self
fully
sure
of
them
,
in
taking
away
from
them
all
means
to
hurt
thee
,
or
by
doing
them
so
much
good
,
that
it
is
not
probable
they
will
wish
to
change
their
state
:
all
which
is
there
comprehended
;
first
by
the
proposition
Camillus
made
,
and
afterwards
by
the
judgement
the
Senate
gave
thereupon
.
His
words
were
these
,
In
this
consultation
,
the
immortal
Gods
have
given
you
so
much
power
,
that
it
is
wholly
in
your
hands
to
chuse
,
whether
Latium
shall
continue
still
a
Nation
or
no.
And
therefore
now
may
ye
for
ever
procure
your selves
repose
and
security
from
thence
,
either
by
rigor
and
punishment
,
or
by
clemency
and
pardon
;
chuse
ye
whether
.
Are
ye
minded
to
proceed
by
way
of
cruelty
against
those
that
have
yeelded
,
and
are
vanquish'd
?
ye
may
indeed
blot
out
the
very
name
of
Latium
;
But
will
ye
,
as
your
ancestors
have
done
before
you
,
enlarge
the
Roman
Empire
,
by
receiving
into
your
City
those
whom
ye
have
conquer'd
?
Then
have
ye
here
means
to
grow
mighty
to
your
great
glory
.
Certes
that
government
is
of
all
other
most
sure
,
where
the
subjects
take
joy
in
their
obedience
.
And
therfore
it
is
behoovefull
,
whiles
their
mindes
are
in
suspence
between
fear
and
hope
,
to
prevent
them
either
with
speedy
punishment
or
benefit
.
To
this
purpose
followed
the
Senates
deliberation
,
which
was
according
to
the
Consuls
words
;
for
calling
them
Town
by
Town
,
before
them
,
those
that
were
of
any
moment
,
they
either
much
benefited
,
or
quite
ruined
them
,
granting
divers
exemptions
and
priviledges
to
those
they
would
do
good
to
,
freely
making
them
Citizens
,
and
giving
them
security
every
way
.
They
dismantled
the
other
strong
Towns
,
and
sent
Colonies
thither
,
and
brought
the
people
from
thence
into
Rome
,
and
so
dispersed
them
,
that
neither
with
their
arms
nor
counsel
they
could
do
any
more
harm
:
Nor
ever
did
they
make
use
of
any
neutral
way
,
in
things
(
as
I
have
said
)
of
moment
.
Princes
should
imitate
this
judgment
given
;
and
hereunto
the
Florentines
should
have
intended
,
when
in
the
year
1502.
Arezzo
and
the
valley
of
Chiana
rebelled
;
which
had
they
done
,
they
had
secured
their
Government
,
and
much
amplified
the
City
of
Florence
,
and
likewise
might
have
given
them
those
fields
they
wanted
for
their
sustenance
:
But
they
made
use
rather
of
that
middle
way
,
which
is
the
most
pernicious
,
in
giving
judgment
upon
men
,
so
that
part
of
the
Aretins
they
confined
,
part
they
condemned
,
and
took
from
all
of
them
their
honors
,
and
ancient
degrees
in
the
City
,
and
yet
left
the
City
whole
and
untouched
:
And
if
any
Citizen
in
their
Consultations
advised
that
Arezzo
should
be
dismantelled
,
and
razed
,
they
who
seemed
to
be
of
the
wiser
sort
,
said
it
would
be
a
disgrace
to
the
Florentines
to
raze
it
;
because
it
would
be
thought
then
that
Florence
wanted
forces
to
hold
them
;
which
are
some
of
those
Reasons
that
seem
to
be
,
but
are
not
true
:
For
by
the
same
reason
a
patricide
were
not
to
be
put
to
death
,
not
any
vile
or
scandalous
person
,
it
being
a
shame
for
that
Prince
to
shew
that
he
is
not
able
to
bridle
such
a
man
alone
:
and
these
kind
of
men
having
such
opinions
,
perceive
not
,
how
men
in
particular
,
and
sometimes
a
whole
City
together
too
,
do
wrong
a
State
:
so
that
for
others
example
,
and
his
own
safeguard
,
a
Prince
hath
no
other
remedy
,
but
uterly
to
raze
it
.
And
indeed
the
honor
consists
in
the
knowledg
and
power
to
chastise
,
and
not
in
being
able
to
hold
a
City
under
stil
with
many
dangers
:
for
the
Prince
that
punishes
not
him
that
offends
,
so
that
he
cannot
offend
more
,
is
esteemd
ignorant
and
unworthy
.
This
sentence
which
the
Romans
gave
,
is
confirm'd
by
the
judgement
they
gave
upon
the
Privernates
.
Where
by
the
Text
in
Livie
two
things
may
be
observed
:
the
one
,
which
is
formerly
spoken
of
,
that
subjects
are
either
to
be
oblig'd
by
good
done
them
,
or
else
to
be
quite
extingnish'd
;
the
other
is
,
how
much
avails
the
generous
conrage
of
the
minde
,
and
true
speaking
in
the
presence
of
sage
and
discreet
men
.
The
Senate
of
Rome
was
assembled
to
give
their
sentence
upon
the
Privernates
,
who
having
been
in
Rebellion
,
were
by
force
reduc'd
to
the
Roman
obedience
.
Many
Citizens
were
sent
from
the
Privernates
to
crave
pardon
of
the
Senate
,
who
What
Punishment
he
should
censure
the
Privernates
worthy
of
?
Whereunto
one
of
the
Privernates
reply'd
,
The
same
that
they
deserve
,
who
think
themselves
worthy
of
liberty
.
Whereunto
the
Consul
answerd
,
What
if
we
remit
you
your
punishment
,
what
peace
shall
we
hope
for
with
you
?
To
which
he
said
again
,
If
it
be
good
you
give
us
,
you
shall
have
it
faithfully
and
perpetually
observ'd
,
if
ill
,
not
long
.
Whereupon
the
wises
of
those
of
the
Senate
,
howbeit
many
were
angry
thereat
,
said
,
That
they
had
heard
a
stout
and
a
free
man
speak
;
neither
was
it
credible
that
any
Nation
,
or
any
man
indeed
,
would
continue
any
longer
,
than
he
must
needs
,
in
such
a
condition
,
whereof
he
repents
himself
;
and
there
onely
was
it
likely
a
peace
would
be
inviolably
kept
,
where
it
was
made
of
their
own
good
wills
and
freely
;
but
it
was
in
no
case
to
be
hop'd
for
there
,
where
they
were
brought
into
bondage
and
servitude
.
and
upon
these
words
they
decreed
,
that
the
Privernates
should
be
made
Citizens
of
Rome
,
and
honoured
them
with
all
the
priviledges
of
their
Bourgessie
,
saying
,
That
they
finally
were
worthy
to
be
Citizens
of
Rome
,
who
valu'd
nothing
else
in
comparison
of
their
liberty
.
So
much
were
these
generous
spirits
taken
with
this
stout
and
free
answer
:
for
,
an
answer
else
would
have
been
false
and
cowardly
.
And
those
that
think
otherwise
of
men
(
especially
such
as
are
us'd
to
be
free
,
or
to
their
thinking
are
free
)
are
much
deceiv'd
,
and
by
this
deceit
are
they
feduc'd
to
take
wrong
courses
for
themselves
,
and
of
little
satisfaction
to
others
:
from
whence
arise
the
often
rebellions
and
ruines
of
States
.
But
to
return
to
our
discourse
,
I
conclude
as
well
by
this
,
as
by
that
judgement
given
upon
the
Latins
,
when
sentence
is
to
pass
upon
puissant
Cities
,
and
that
have
been
accustomed
to
enjoy
their
liberties
,
it
is
necessary
either
utterly
to
raze
them
,
or
by
benefiting
of
them
to
oblige
them
;
otherwise
it
is
all
to
no
purpose
;
for
the
middle
way
here
in
is
absolutely
to
be
avoided
,
which
is
dangerous
,
as
it
prov'd
to
the
Samnites
,
having
inclos'd
the
Romans
at
the
gallows
of
Gaudium
,
when
they
would
not
follow
that
old
mans
counsell
that
advis'd
them
,
either
to
let
them
go
with
all
courtesie
and
love
,
or
put
them
all
to
the
sword
.
But
they
taking
that
neutral
way
,
disarming
them
,
and
putting
them
all
to
pass
under
the
gallows
,
let
them
go
with
shame
and
disdain
so
that
a
while
after
they
found
by
their
own
dammage
how
advantageous
that
old
mans
advice
had
been
,
and
how
hurtfull
their
own
resolution
was
,
as
we
shall
discourse
thereof
more
at
large
in
its
own
place
.
CHAP.
XXIV
.
Fortresses
in
general
do
more
harm
then
good
.
PEradventure
it
may
seem
to
the
wise
men
of
our
times
a
matter
not
well
advised
on
,
that
the
Romans
,
when
they
would
make
themselves
sure
of
the
people
of
Latium
,
and
of
the
City
of
Privernum
,
never
thought
upon
the
building
of
some
Fortress
which
might
serve
for
a
bridle
to
hold
them
in
obedience
,
especially
being
it
passes
for
a
Proverb
in
Florence
,
alledg'd
by
our
States
men
,
that
Pisa
and
other
such
like
Cities
should
be
kept
with
Citradells
.
And
truely
had
the
Romans
been
like
them
,
they
would
have
provided
for
the
building
of
them
:
but
because
they
were
of
another
kind
of
courage
,
and
judgement
,
and
had
another
manner
of
power
,
therefore
they
never
built
any
.
and
whiles
Rome
liv'd
free
,
and
observ'd
her
own
ordinances
,
&
institutions
,
for
the
propagation
of
vertue
,
she
never
built
any
one
to
keep
under
Cities
or
Provinces
,
though
it
may
be
,
she
preserv'd
some
of
them
she
found
already
built
.
Whereupon
having
seen
the
manner
of
the
Romans
proceedings
herein
,
and
that
of
the
Princes
of
our
times
,
I
think
to
take
it
into
consideration
,
whether
it
be
good
to
build
Fortresses
,
&
whether
they
advantage
or
wrong
him
that
builds
them
.
We
must
consider
then
,
that
Fortresses
are
built
either
for
resistance
against
the
enemy
,
or
for
defence
against
any
tumult
of
the
subjects
.
In
the
first
case
they
are
unnecessary
,
in
the
second
hurtfull
.
And
to
give
a
reason
,
wherefore
in
the
second
case
they
are
hurtfull
,
I
say
,
that
that
Prince
or
Republick
that
is
afraid
of
his
own
subjects
,
and
their
rebellion
,
must
needs
have
his
fear
arising
from
the
hatred
his
own
subjects
bear
him
;
and
that
hatred
from
his
own
evill
carriages
,
which
evill
carriages
proceed
from
thence
,
either
that
he
beleeves
he
is
able
to
keep
them
under
by
force
,
or
from
the
Princes
small
discretion
:
and
one
of
the
causes
that
makes
him
think
himself
able
to
rule
them
by
force
,
is
the
having
built
these
Citradels
,
over
them
:
for
evill
treatings
,
which
are
the
causes
of
hatred
,
for
the
most
part
are
deriv'd
from
thence
,
that
that
Prince
or
Republick
hath
Cittadels
upon
them
;
which
(
when
this
is
true
)
are
far
more
hurtful
,
than
profitable
:
for
first
(
as
it
is
said
)
they
make
thee
bolder
and
more
rough
among
thy
subjects
,
being
that
thou
hast
thy
security
within
them
:
for
all
these
forces
and
violences
which
are
in
use
to
bridle
a
people
withall
,
are
of
no
value
,
but
these
two
;
either
that
thou
hast
alwaies
a
good
Army
ready
to
send
into
the
field
,
as
the
Romans
had
,
or
that
thou
doest
disperse
,
extinguish
,
disorder
,
and
disunite
them
so
,
that
in
no
case
they
can
make
such
a
body
as
can
hurt
thee
:
for
be
it
that
thou
doest
impoverish
them
,
They
that
are
despoil'd
of
their
goods
,
have
weapons
left
them
.
If
thou
disarmst
them
,
Even
rage
will
find
them
weapons
.
If
thou
destroyest
their
heads
,
and
proceedest
still
to
injure
the
rest
,
there
will
grow
up
again
new
heads
,
as
fast
as
those
of
Hydra
.
If
thou
buildest
Cittadels
,
they
are
quite
unprofitable
in
time
of
peace
,
because
they
encourage
thee
to
wrong
them
;
but
in
time
of
war
they
are
of
least
use
;
for
then
are
they
assaulted
by
the
enemy
,
and
thy
subjects
too
;
nor
is
it
possible
they
can
resist
them
both
.
And
if
ever
they
were
unprofitable
,
they
are
now
a
dayes
so
,
in
regard
of
the
Artillery
,
by
reasons
of
whose
fury
and
violence
,
it
is
unpossible
to
defend
small
fortresses
,
and
where
there
is
no
place
for
retiring
with
new
retrenchments
,
as
formerly
hath
been
shew'd
.
But
I
will
dispute
this
matter
more
plainly
yet
.
Wilt
thou
O
Prince
with
these
Cittadels
curb
thy
Citizens
?
or
wilt
thou
whether
Prince
or
Commonwealth
that
thou
art
,
bridle
a
City
thou
hast
taken
by
war
?
I
will
address
my self
to
the
Prince
,
and
tel
him
,
that
such
a
Fortress
to
curb
his
Citizens
cannot
be
more
unprofitable
,
for
the
reasons
above
alleadgd
:
because
it
makes
thee
prompter
,
and
less
careful
how
thou
doest
oppress
them
,
which
oppression
makes
them
desperate
in
attempting
thy
ruine
,
and
so
inrages
them
,
that
that
Fortress
,
which
is
the
cause
thereof
,
can
no
way
preserve
thee
;
so
that
a
sage
and
good
Prince
,
to
keep
himself
still
good
,
and
that
he
may
not
give
occasion
to
,
nor
imbolden
his
children
to
become
bad
,
will
never
build
fortress
,
to
the
end
they
relie
not
upon
the
Cittadels
,
but
rather
upon
the
hearts
of
men
.
And
if
Count
Francis
Storce
that
came
to
be
Duke
of
Milan
was
reputed
wise
,
and
yet
in
Milan
he
built
a
Cittadel
,
I
say
,
that
herein
he
little
shewd
his
wisdome
,
as
appeard
by
the
effect
,
seeing
that
Fortress
proved
rather
a
disadvantage
and
loss
,
then
any
safeguard
to
his
heirs
:
for
thinking
that
by
means
thereof
they
might
pass
their
time
in
security
,
and
yet
injure
their
Citizens
and
subjects
,
they
forbare
not
any
kind
of
violence
;
whereupon
being
grown
very
odious
,
they
lost
the
state
,
so
soon
as
they
were
assail'd
by
their
enemy
.
Nor
could
that
fortress
defend
them
,
nor
did
it
any
way
advantage
them
in
the
war
,
and
in
time
of
peace
it
had
done
them
much
harme
;
for
if
there
had
been
no
such
citradel
,
and
they
for
want
of
discretion
onely
had
sharply
handled
some
of
their
subjects
,
they
might
sooner
have
discover'd
the
danger
,
and
withdrawn
themselves
from
it
,
and
so
afterwards
they
would
have
bin
able
with
more
courage
to
have
resisted
the
French
fury
,
having
their
subjects
to
freind
without
any
fortress
,
then
having
them
become
thine
enemies
with
thy
fortress
,
which
gives
thee
no
help
at
all
.
For
either
it
is
lost
by
the
treachery
of
him
that
guards
it
,
or
is
forced
by
the
assailant
,
or
else
by
famine
.
And
if
thou
wouldest
that
these
should
avail
thee
,
and
help
the
to
recover
a
state
lost
,
where
only
the
fortress
holds
for
thee
,
thou
must
have
an
army
,
wherewith
thou
maist
assault
him
that
chased
the
from
thence
.
And
whensoever
thou
hast
this
army
,
thou
couldest
not
in
any
wise
faile
of
recovering
the
State
,
howsoever
there
were
no
fortress
at
all
;
and
that
the
more
easily
,
by
how
much
the
Inhabitants
would
be
more
thy
friends
,
then
if
thou
hadst
ill-treated
them
through
presumption
upon
thy
fortress
.
And
it
hath
been
proved
by
experience
,
how
that
this
Cittadell
of
Milan
hath
little
availed
either
the
forces
or
the
French
party
in
the
adversity
of
the
one
or
other
,
but
hath
rather
brought
upon
them
many
ruins
and
mischiefes
,
having
never
advised
,
by
means
thereof
,
upon
any
fair
way
to
keep
that
state
.
Guido
Vbaldo
Duke
of
Vrbin
,
son
to
Frederick
,
who
in
his
daies
was
esteemed
a
great
Captain
,
being
driven
out
of
his
state
by
Caesar
Borgia
son
to
Pope
Alexander
the
sixt
,
when
afterwards
upon
a
new
grown
occasion
he
returned
thither
again
,
he
caused
all
the
fortresses
to
be
demolished
that
were
in
the
Country
,
thinking
they
did
more
harme
then
good
:
for
he
having
gained
mens
hearts
to
him
,
for
their
sakes
would
not
abide
them
;
and
in
regard
of
enemies
,
he
saw
they
were
not
able
to
defend
him
,
it
being
needfull
to
have
a
good
army
in
the
field
to
preserve
them
withall
,
so
that
he
resolved
to
raze
them
all
.
Pope
Julius
,
having
driven
the
Bentivogli
out
of
Bolonia
,
built
a
Cittadell
there
,
and
caused
a
governor
of
his
to
ransacke
them
shrewdly
,
insomuch
that
the
people
rebelled
,
and
he
suddenly
lost
the
Cittadel
,
so
that
it
served
him
to
little
purpose
,
or
rather
wronged
him
as
much
,
as
carrying
himself
otherwise
it
could
have
helped
him
.
Nicolas
of
Castello
father
of
the
Vitelli
,
returning
into
his
Country
from
whence
he
had
been
banished
,
forthwith
demolished
two
several
fortresses
,
which
Pope
Sextus
the
fourth
had
built
there
,
deeming
that
not
the
fortress
,
but
the
peoples
good
wills
were
more
likely
to
continue
him
in
his
State
.
But
of
all
other
examples
,
the
freshest
and
of
most
remarke
in
every
point
,
and
that
which
is
fittest
to
shew
the
incommodity
of
building
them
,
and
the
fruit
of
razing
them
,
is
that
of
Genua
which
fell
out
in
these
latter
times
.
It
is
well
known
how
that
Genua
in
the
yeare
1507.
rebelled
against
Lewis
the
Twelfth
,
King
of
France
,
who
came
in
person
,
and
with
all
his
strength
to
regain
it
:
which
being
done
,
he
caused
an
exceeding
strong
Cittadel
to
be
built
there
,
surpassing
in
strength
all
others
that
are
now
adaies
known
:
for
in
regard
of
the
scituation
,
and
the
other
circumstances
belonging
thereto
,
it
was
impregnable
,
being
placed
upon
the
very
point
of
a
hill
,
which
stretched
it self
out
into
the
sea
,
called
by
the
Genueses
,
Godefa
.
And
hereby
the
whole
port
,
and
a
great
part
of
the
Town
of
Genua
was
subject
to
its
battery
:
It
happend
afterwards
in
the
year
of
our
Lord
God
1512.
when
the
French
were
driven
out
of
Italy
,
for
all
the
fortress
,
Genua
rebelled
and
Octavian
Fregoso
recovered
the
State
thereof
,
who
by
his
industry
in
the
terme
of
16
moneths
took
it
by
famine
,
and
as
every
one
beleeved
,
so
he
was
advised
by
many
,
to
reserve
it
for
his
refuge
in
any
accident
.
But
he
,
as
he
was
exceeding
wise
,
knowing
that
they
were
not
fortresses
,
but
mens
good
wills
that
preserved
Princes
in
their
state
,
razed
it
to
the
ground
,
And
so
without
laying
the
foundation
of
his
dominion
upon
the
fortress
,
but
rather
upon
his
own
valour
and
judgement
,
he
hath
continually
held
it
,
and
holds
it
yet
.
And
whereas
a
thousand
foot
were
formerly
of
force
to
charge
the
state
of
Genua
,
his
adversaries
have
since
assailed
it
with
ten
thousand
,
and
have
not
been
able
to
hurt
him
.
By
this
therefore
it
appears
,
how
the
demolishing
of
the
fortress
hurt
not
Octavian
at
all
,
nor
did
the
building
of
it
advantage
the
King
of
France
:
for
when
he
was
able
to
come
into
Italy
bringing
an
army
with
him
,
he
might
recover
Genua
,
though
he
had
no
fortress
there
;
but
when
he
could
bring
no
army
with
him
into
Italy
,
neither
could
he
keep
the
Genueses
in
obedience
,
though
he
had
a
fortress
there
.
It
was
therefore
an
expence
to
the
King
to
build
it
,
and
a
shame
to
lose
it
,
and
to
Octavian
a
glory
to
regain
it
.
But
let
us
come
to
those
Republiques
that
raise
up
fortresses
,
not
in
their
native
countries
,
but
in
those
they
have
conquered
.
And
to
shew
this
fallacy
,
if
that
example
of
France
and
Genua
suffice
not
,
this
of
Florence
and
Pisa
may
,
where
the
Florentines
had
built
a
cittadel
,
to
keep
that
town
in
subjection
:
And
never
advised
themselves
,
that
a
City
which
had
alwaies
been
a
prosessed
enemy
to
the
Florentines
,
having
lived
free
,
which
hath
a
recourse
to
liberty
for
a
colour
of
Rebellion
,
it
was
necessary
(
being
desirous
to
keep
her
)
to
use
that
manner
the
Romans
had
,
either
to
take
her
as
a
companion
into
the
state
,
or
to
deface
and
ruine
her
:
for
of
what
value
cittadels
are
,
we
saw
in
King
Charles
his
comming
into
Italy
,
to
whom
they
were
yeelded
,
either
through
the
treachery
or
cowardise
of
their
governors
.
Whereas
if
they
had
not
been
,
the
Florentines
would
never
have
grounded
their
ability
of
keeping
Pisa
stil
upon
them
,
nor
would
the
King
have
been
of
power
that
way
to
have
bereaved
the
Florentines
of
that
City
;
and
those
means
,
whereby
untill
that
time
it
had
been
maintained
,
would
peradventure
have
been
of
force
to
preserve
it
.
And
without
doubt
they
could
not
have
made
a
worse
triall
,
then
that
of
the
fortresses
.
I
conclude
therefore
,
that
for
the
safety
of
ones
native
Country
,
a
strong
hold
is
but
hurtfull
;
&
to
keep
under
Towns
that
are
conquered
,
cittadels
availe
little
.
And
hereunto
the
Authority
of
the
Romans
shall
suffice
me
,
who
dismantelled
the
Towns
they
intended
to
hold
by
force
,
&
never
built
up
their
walls
;
and
if
any
one
against
this
opinion
should
alledge
me
the
example
of
Tarentum
in
ancient
times
,
and
in
these
modern
that
of
Brescia
,
which
places
,
by
means
of
the
cittadells
,
were
recovered
from
the
subjects
rebellion
:
I
answer
,
that
at
the
years
end
Fabius
Maximus
was
sent
with
the
whole
Army
to
recover
Tarentum
,
who
would
have
been
able
to
recover
that
,
though
thete
had
been
no
cittadell
there
.
And
though
Fabius
put
those
means
in
practise
,
yet
had
they
never
been
,
he
would
have
us'd
some
other
,
which
would
have
produced
the
same
effect
.
And
I
know
not
what
advantage
a
cittadell
yeelds
,
that
to
regain
thee
the
Town
,
requires
a
Consular
Army
,
and
a
Fabius
Maximus
for
commander
,
before
it
can
be
done
.
And
that
the
Romans
in
any
case
had
recover'd
it
plainly
,
appears
by
the
example
of
Capua
,
where
there
was
no
cittadell
,
but
they
got
it
by
the
soldiers
valor
.
But
to
that
of
Brescia
,
I
say
,
that
seldome
chances
which
befell
in
that
rebellion
,
that
the
fortress
which
is
possessed
still
by
thy
forces
(
the
Town
being
fallen
into
rebellion
)
should
have
a
great
army
to
friend
and
near
hand
,
as
was
that
of
the
French
:
for
the
Lord
De
Fois
the
Kings
General
being
with
his
army
at
Bolonia
,
when
he
understood
the
loss
of
Brescia
,
by
means
of
the
Fortress
indeed
recover'd
the
Towne
.
Therefore
that
Fortress
yet
stood
in
need
(
to
do
any
good
)
of
such
a
one
as
was
the
Lord
of
Fois
,
and
a
French
army
,
that
in
three
daies
might
relieve
them
;
so
that
this
example
against
those
on
the
contrary
side
is
of
small
weight
:
for
many
fortresses
have
been
taken
in
the
wars
in
our
daies
,
and
recover'd
by
the
same
fortune
that
the
field
hath
been
taken
,
and
recovered
again
,
not
only
in
Lombardy
,
but
in
Romania
,
in
the
Kingdom
of
Naples
,
and
in
all
parts
of
Italy
.
But
touching
the
building
of
sortresses
for
defence
against
forrain
enemies
,
I
say
,
they
are
not
usefull
to
those
people
,
nor
Kingdoms
,
who
have
good
armies
on
foot
;
they
are
rather
unprofitable
,
because
that
good
armies
without
fortresses
are
of
force
to
keep
them
:
but
fortresses
without
good
armies
cannot
defend
thee
.
And
this
we
see
by
experience
of
those
who
have
been
held
excellent
in
matters
of
state
and
government
and
other
things
,
as
we
know
the
Romans
and
Spartans
were
:
for
if
the
Romans
built
no
fortresses
,
the
Spartans
did
not
only
forbear
from
them
,
but
suffered
none
of
their
Cities
to
be
wall'd
in
neither
,
because
they
would
have
no
other
guard
but
a
mans
own
valor
,
to
defend
him
.
Whereupon
when
a
Spartan
was
asked
by
an
Athenian
,
whether
the
walls
about
Athens
were
not
very
faire
,
he
answered
him
,
yes
,
if
all
the
inhabitants
of
the
Town
were
women
.
To
that
Prince
then
that
hath
good
armies
,
when
upon
the
maritime
frontiers
of
his
state
he
hath
a
fortress
,
that
for
some
few
daies
he
is
able
to
sustain
the
enemy
,
till
things
are
somewhat
order'd
,
it
would
sometimes
be
of
small
avail
,
but
of
no
necessity
.
But
when
a
Prince
hath
no
strong
army
,
fortresses
either
in
the
heart
of
his
State
,
or
at
his
frontiers
,
are
hurtfull
,
or
unprofitable
:
hurtfull
,
because
he
easily
loses
them
,
and
being
lost
they
make
war
upon
him
;
or
put
case
they
are
so
strong
,
that
the
enemy
cannot
take
them
,
they
are
left
behind
by
the
enemies
army
,
and
so
they
become
of
no
service
.
For
good
armies
,
if
they
meet
not
with
very
sharp
encounters
,
enter
far
into
their
enemies
Countries
,
〈◊〉
thou
t
regard
either
of
Town
or
fortress
they
leave
behind
them
:
As
it
was
evident
in
the
ancient
Stories
,
and
as
we
see
Francis
Maria
did
,
who
in
these
latter
times
without
any
regard
of
them
,
left
ten
of
the
enemies
Cities
behind
him
,
to
assayl
that
of
Vrbin
,
That
Prince
then
that
can
raise
a
good
army
,
can
do
well
enough
,
without
having
any
strong
holds
:
but
he
that
cannot
have
an
army
ready
,
should
never
build
any
:
well
may
he
fortifie
the
City
of
his
abode
,
and
keep
it
in
good
strength
,
and
the
Citizens
thereof
well
disposed
,
whereby
he
may
be
able
to
support
the
enemies
violence
,
till
either
some
accord
,
or
some
forrain
aid
come
to
his
relief
.
All
other
designes
are
expensive
in
time
of
peace
,
and
unfruitfull
in
time
of
war
.
And
whosoever
shall
well
weigh
all
this
that
I
have
said
,
shall
perceive
that
the
Romans
as
they
were
in
all
other
their
affairs
very
judicious
,
so
were
they
very
well
advised
in
this
judgement
they
gave
upon
the
Latins
,
and
the
Privernates
,
where
taking
no
care
at
all
for
citadels
,
they
assur'd
themselves
of
them
by
wiser
and
better
waies
.
CHAP.
XXV
.
It
is
a
wrong
course
to
assayle
a
City
fallen
into
discord
,
thinking
by
means
thereof
,
to
master
it
.
IN
the
Roman
Republick
the
people
and
the
Nobility
were
so
far
fallen
asunder
,
that
the
Veyentes
together
with
the
Eburans
by
means
of
their
disagreement
,
thought
they
might
be
able
quite
to
root
out
the
Romans
:
and
having
levied
an
Army
,
and
forrag'd
all
the
Country
of
Rome
,
the
Senate
armed
out
Cneus
Manilius
and
M.
Fabius
against
them
,
who
having
brought
their
Army
near
to
that
of
the
Veyntes
,
they
forbear
not
with
all
insolences
and
reproaches
to
revile
them
,
and
disgrace
the
Roman
name
,
and
such
was
their
fool-hardiness
and
presumptions
that
the
Romans
though
then
they
were
ar●ods
one
with
another
,
came
to
agreement
,
and
so
comming
to
the
combat
,
broke
and
vanquish'd
them
.
We
see
therefore
how
much
men
deceive
themselves
(
as
formerly
we
have
treated
)
in
the
courses
they
take
,
and
that
many
times
where
they
think
to
get
,
they
lose
.
The
Veyentes
beleev'd
,
that
by
getting
upon
the
Romans
that
were
at
variance
one
with
another
,
they
should
overcome
them
,
but
it
prov'd
the
occasion
of
reconcilement
to
the
Romans
,
but
of
ruine
to
themselves
:
for
the
causes
of
discord
in
Republicks
,
is
most
commonly
idleness
and
peace
;
and
the
cause
of
union
and
concord
is
fear
and
war
.
Wherefore
had
the
Veyentes
been
wise
,
the
more
at
variance
they
had
perceived
Rome
to
have
been
,
so
much
the
more
should
they
have
forborn
from
war
against
them
,
and
with
devices
of
Peace
cast
about
how
to
master
them
.
The
way
is
,
to
endeavour
to
be
reputed
a
confident
friend
of
that
City
,
which
is
in
discord
:
and
whiles
they
come
not
to
armes
,
to
carry
himself
as
an
Umpire
between
both
parties
.
And
when
they
do
come
to
armes
,
to
afford
some
slow
favours
to
the
weaker
party
,
as
well
to
keep
them
still
at
war
,
and
consume
them
,
as
to
hinder
them
from
doubting
that
with
thy
great
forces
thou
meanest
to
suppress
them
,
and
become
their
Prince
.
And
when
this
part
is
well
plaid
,
it
cannot
fail
ordinarily
,
but
that
it
will
directly
have
the
success
thou
lookest
for
.
The
City
of
Pistoya
(
as
in
another
discourse
and
to
another
purpose
I
said
)
came
to
the
Florentines
Republick
,
by
no
other
trick
than
this
:
for
it
being
divided
in
factions
,
the
Florentines
now
favouring
the
one
,
and
then
the
other
without
any
imputation
of
blame
from
either
,
brought
them
to
such
terms
,
that
being
tir'd
with
their
tumultuous
living
,
they
came
willingly
to
cast
themselves
into
the
Florentines
armes
.
The
City
of
Siena
never
changed
her
State
upon
the
Florentines
favour
,
but
when
their
courtesies
came
but
thin
and
small
:
for
when
they
were
frequent
and
strong
,
they
united
them
rather
for
the
defence
of
the
State
in
which
they
liv'd
.
I
will
adde
to
these
aforesaid
one
other
example
.
Philp
Visconti
Duke
of
Milan
,
several
times
made
war
against
the
Florentines
,
grounding
much
upon
their
disagreements
,
and
alwaies
came
off
a
loser
.
Whereupon
he
was
wont
to
say
,
when
he
complained
of
the
evill
success
of
his
undertakings
,
that
the
Florentines
follies
had
made
him
spend
two
millions
of
gold
to
no
purpose
.
Therefore
(
as
it
was
said
before
)
the
Veyentes
and
the
Etruscans
deceived
themselves
by
this
conceit
of
theirs
,
and
were
at
last
in
a
set
battell
vanquish'd
by
the
Romans
.
And
thus
will
others
find
themselves
deceiv'd
,
whoever
shall
seek
by
the
like
course
,
and
upon
the
same
occasion
to
subdu
any
nation
or
people
.
CHAP.
XXVI
.
Contempt
and
contumely
begets
a
hatred
against
those
that
use
it
,
without
any
returne
of
advantage
to
them
.
I
Eeleeve
it
is
one
of
the
greatest
parts
of
wisdome
in
men
,
to
abstain
from
threatning
or
injuring
of
any
one
in
words
;
for
neither
the
one
nor
other
bereave
the
enemy
of
any
part
of
his
strength
;
but
the
one
makes
him
more
wary
of
thee
,
and
the
other
bear
more
deadly
hatred
against
thee
,
and
devise
by
all
manner
of
waies
he
can
to
hurt
thee
.
This
is
plain
by
the
example
of
the
Veyentes
,
whereof
we
spake
in
the
former
Chapter
:
who
to
the
wrong
of
making
war
against
the
Romans
,
added
the
reproach
of
words
,
from
which
every
prudent
Commander
ought
to
restrain
his
soldiers
:
so
that
they
are
things
that
incense
and
provoke
the
enemy
to
revenge
,
and
are
no
defence
(
as
it
is
said
)
against
the
hurt
he
does
,
insomuch
that
they
are
all
weapons
thrown
from
thee
,
which
returne
againe
upon
thee
,
Whereof
there
followed
a
notable
example
a
good
while
since
in
Asia
,
where
Gabades
a
Commander
of
the
Persians
,
having
a
long
while
lien
incamped
before
Amida
,
and
determined
upon
the
tediousness
of
the
siege
to
depart
,
and
therefore
to
that
purpose
rising
with
his
campe
,
those
of
the
Town
being
come
all
upon
the
walls
,
and
grown
insolent
upon
their
victory
,
forbore
no
kind
of
outrage
,
disgracing
,
blaming
and
reproaching
the
enemy
with
his
baseness
and
cowardise
:
whereupon
Gabades
being
incensed
,
alter'd
his
purpose
,
and
return'd
to
the
siege
,
where
such
was
their
indignation
at
the
contumely
,
that
in
a
few
daies
they
took
and
sack'd
the
Town
.
In
the
same
manner
it
befell
the
Veyentes
,
who
were
not
content
(
as
is
said
)
to
make
war
against
the
Romans
,
but
they
rayl'd
on
them
in
vile
termes
,
going
even
to
their
very
trenches
to
reproach
them
,
so
that
they
incensed
them
more
with
their
words
then
blowes
:
and
those
soldiers
which
were
hardly
drawn
to
fight
,
constrein'd
the
Consul
to
begin
to
fight
,
so
that
the
Veyentes
suffer'd
,
as
the
others
we
spoke
of
before
,
for
their
insolence
.
Wherefore
every
good
Commander
of
armies
,
and
good
Governor
of
Commonwealths
is
to
practice
all
possible
remedies
,
that
these
injuries
or
reproaches
be
not
us'd
either
in
the
city
or
the
army
,
neither
one
among
another
,
nor
against
the
enemy
:
for
being
practised
against
the
enemy
,
there
arise
from
thence
the
aforesaid
inconvenients
:
and
among
themselves
they
would
do
worse
,
when
there
is
no
reparation
made
,
which
wise
and
judicious
men
have
alwaies
awarded
.
When
the
Roman
legions
left
at
Capua
conspired
against
the
Capuans
,
as
in
its
place
shall
be
related
,
and
a
sedition
was
there
occasioned
by
this
conspiracy
,
(
which
was
afterwards
quieted
by
Valerius
Corvinus
)
among
other
constitutions
which
were
made
in
the
agreement
,
they
ordained
very
grievous
punishments
for
those
that
should
ever
reproach
any
of
those
soldiers
with
that
sedition
.
Tiberius
Gracchus
,
who
during
the
warrs
with
Hannibal
was
made
a
Captain
over
some
certain
number
of
slaves
,
whom
the
Romans
for
want
of
men
had
put
into
armes
,
ordained
specially
a
capital
punishment
for
any
that
should
object
to
any
of
them
their
servitude
:
so
hurtful
a
matter
(
as
it
is
said
)
was
it
thought
by
the
Romans
to
set
men
at
nought
,
and
reproach
them
with
any
disgrace
;
for
there
is
nothing
so
much
incenses
men
to
rage
or
breeds
more
hatred
in
them
,
whether
it
be
spoken
in
earnest
or
in
jeast
.
Bitter
taunts
when
they
have
too
great
a
mingle
of
truth
with
them
,
leave
behind
them
a
very
distastfull
remembrance
.
CHAP.
XXVII
.
Prudent
Princes
and
Commonwealths
ought
to
be
contented
with
the
victory
:
for
oftentimes
when
that
suffices
them
not
,
they
lose
it
.
THE
using
of
disgracefull
words
against
the
enemy
,
proceeds
most
commonly
from
an
insolencie
,
which
either
the
victory
or
a
false
hope
of
victory
incites
thee
to
:
which
false
hope
causes
men
to
erre
not
only
in
their
sayings
,
but
in
their
doings
also
:
for
this
hope
when
it
enters
into
mens
breasts
,
makes
them
go
beyond
the
point
,
and
many
times
lose
the
opportunity
of
having
a
certain
good
,
hoping
to
attain
unto
a
better
uncertain
good
:
and
because
this
is
a
matter
worthy
consideration
,
men
often
deceiving
themselves
,
to
the
dammage
of
their
State
,
I
am
of
advice
to
shew
it
particularly
by
ancient
examples
and
modern
,
being
it
cannot
so
distinctly
be
prov'd
by
reasons
.
Hannibal
,
after
he
had
defeated
the
Romans
at
Canna
,
sent
his
Agents
to
Carthage
,
to
give
them
notice
of
the
victory
,
and
to
demand
new
supplies
.
It
was
argued
in
the
Senate
,
what
was
fit
to
be
done
.
Hanno
an
old
man
and
a
discreet
Citizen
of
Carthage
advised
,
to
use
this
victory
wisely
,
and
make
peace
with
the
Romans
,
being
that
now
they
might
have
it
upon
reasonable
termes
,
having
gained
a
battell
;
and
that
they
should
not
go
about
to
seek
for
it
after
a
battell
lost
:
for
it
should
be
the
Carthaginians
design
to
shew
the
Romans
,
that
they
were
able
to
deal
with
them
,
and
having
gotten
a
victory
,
they
should
take
a
care
not
to
lose
it
for
hope
of
a
greater
.
This
course
was
not
taken
,
but
afterwards
the
Senate
of
Carthage
understood
that
this
was
very
good
counsell
,
when
the
occasion
was
lost
.
When
Alexander
the
Great
had
conquer'd
all
the
Levant
,
the
Commonwealth
of
Tyre
,
famous
in
those
daies
,
and
puissant
,
by
reason
that
their
City
was
seated
in
the
water
,
as
Venice
is
,
seeing
Alexanders
greatness
,
sent
Ambassadors
to
him
to
tell
him
,
that
they
would
become
his
faithfull
servans
,
and
yeeld
him
what
obedience
he
should
desire
,
but
that
they
would
not
admit
either
him
or
his
soldiers
into
their
Town
.
Whereat
Alexander
disdaining
,
that
any
one
City
should
shut
her
gates
against
him
,
seeing
he
had
forc'd
all
others
open
throughout
the
whole
world
,
would
not
accept
their
conditions
,
but
rejected
them
,
and
forthwith
sent
his
army
thither
.
That
Town
stood
in
the
water
,
and
was
well
provided
with
victualls
,
and
other
munition
fit
for
defence
,
so
that
Alexander
after
four
moneths
spent
,
considering
that
one
City
took
away
all
that
time
from
his
glory
,
which
many
other
great
conquests
never
did
,
and
therefore
determined
to
try
an
agreement
,
and
to
grant
what
they
of
themselves
had
asked
.
But
they
of
Tyre
being
grown
insolent
hereupon
,
not
only
refused
the
conditions
,
but
slew
those
that
came
to
treat
with
them
.
Whereupon
Alexander
all
enraged
at
this
affront
,
so
stronly
assaulted
the
Town
,
that
he
took
it
,
destroy'd
it
,
and
slew
or
made
slaves
all
the
men
therein
.
A
Spanish
Army
came
upon
the
Florentines
Territories
,
to
restore
the
Medici
into
Florence
,
and
to
lay
some
taxes
upon
the
Town
,
being
hired
hereunto
by
some
Citizens
inhabiting
therein
,
who
put
them
in
hopes
that
as
soon
as
they
should
set
foot
in
their
Country
,
they
would
take
armes
in
favour
of
them
;
they
comming
into
the
plain
,
and
none
of
these
discovering
themselves
to
be
for
them
,
because
they
had
want
of
victualls
,
tryed
to
make
an
agreement
,
whereupon
the
Florentines
grown
proud
,
would
not
accept
of
any
,
upon
which
occasion
followed
the
loss
of
Prato
,
and
the
ruine
of
that
State
.
Therefore
Princes
cannot
commit
a
greater
error
when
they
are
assail'd
(
in
case
the
assailants
are
far
more
puissant
then
they
)
then
to
refuse
all
termes
of
agreement
,
especially
when
they
are
proffer'd
them
:
for
never
will
such
poor
ones
be
offerd
,
wherein
is
not
in
a
good
measure
comprised
his
good
that
accepts
them
,
and
some
part
of
his
victory
.
Wherefore
the
Tyrians
should
have
satisfied
themselves
,
that
Alexander
accepted
those
conditions
he
had
formerly
refused
:
and
their
victory
had
been
great
enough
,
when
with
their
armes
in
hand
,
they
had
made
so
mighty
a
Prince
as
he
to
yeeld
to
their
demands
.
It
should
have
sufficed
the
Florentines
also
,
and
they
had
gotten
a
good
victory
too
,
if
the
Spanish
army
gave
way
to
any
of
their
desires
,
though
they
had
not
fulfilled
all
of
them
;
for
that
armies
design
was
to
change
the
State
of
Florence
,
to
take
away
her
devotion
to
France
,
and
to
draw
some
monies
from
her
.
When
of
these
three
the
people
had
yeelded
to
two
,
which
were
the
last
,
and
had
gotten
themselves
but
one
,
which
was
the
preservation
of
their
state
,
they
within
had
each
of
them
gained
some
honour
and
satisfaction
,
nor
should
the
people
have
troubled
themselves
for
the
other
two
things
,
one
remaining
to
them
;
nor
should
they
have
offered
,
sing
they
had
been
sure
of
a
certain
victory
to
hazard
it
at
fortunes
discretion
,
trying
even
the
extremity
thereof
,
which
never
any
wise
man
will
endanger
himself
in
,
unless
it
be
upon
necessity
.
Hanniball
being
departed
out
of
Italy
,
where
he
had
been
very
glorious
for
sixteen
years
,
recalled
by
his
own
country
men
the
Carthaginians
,
to
releive
his
native
Country
,
found
Asdruball
and
Siphax
defeated
,
the
Kingdome
of
Numidia
lost
,
and
Carthage
restrain'd
within
the
compass
of
her
own
walls
,
which
had
no
other
refuge
but
him
and
his
army
:
and
knowing
that
was
his
Countries
last
hopes
,
he
would
not
hazard
it
,
till
he
had
first
made
trial
of
all
other
remedies
:
nor
was
he
asham'd
to
ask
peace
,
judging
,
that
if
there
was
any
way
to
save
his
Country
,
it
was
by
that
,
and
not
by
war
,
which
being
refused
him
,
though
he
had
been
sure
to
lose
,
he
would
not
faile
to
fight
,
thinking
that
it
might
fall
out
so
,
that
possible
it
was
for
him
to
overcome
,
and
if
lose
,
it
he
must
lose
it
gloriously
.
And
if
Hanniball
,
who
was
so
valorous
a
captain
,
and
had
his
army
intire
,
did
require
peace
,
before
he
would
hazard
the
battell
,
when
he
perceived
that
in
losing
it
,
his
country
would
be
subdued
,
what
should
another
of
less
valor
and
experience
then
he
do
?
But
men
run
into
this
error
,
by
not
knowing
how
to
limit
their
hopes
,
so
that
grounded
on
their
own
vast
conceits
,
without
weighing
their
strengths
,
they
are
utterly
ruin'd
.
CHAP.
XXVIII
.
How
dangerous
a
thing
it
is
for
a
Republick
or
Prince
not
to
revenge
an
injury
done
against
a
publick
State
,
or
against
a
private
person
.
WHat
,
indignation
may
cause
men
to
do
,
is
easily
known
,
by
that
which
befell
the
Romans
,
when
they
sent
the
three
Fabij
for
Ambassadours
to
the
French
,
who
came
to
invade
Tuscany
,
and
in
particular
Clusium
:
for
the
people
of
Clusium
,
having
sent
to
require
aide
at
Rome
,
the
Romans
sent
their
Ambassadors
to
the
French
,
to
let
them
know
they
were
to
forbear
from
making
warr
against
the
Tuscans
,
which
ambassadours
being
upon
the
place
,
and
fitter
to
play
the
Soldiers
part
,
then
the
Ambassadors
,
the
French
and
the
Tuscans
comming
to
fight
,
they
rank'd
themselves
amongst
the
foremost
to
combat
the
French
,
whence
it
came
,
that
being
known
by
them
,
they
converted
all
the
hatred
they
bore
the
Tuscans
against
the
Romans
,
which
hatred
became
greater
:
for
the
French
by
their
Ambassadors
having
complained
to
the
Senate
of
this
injury
,
and
required
in
satisfaction
of
the
dammage
,
that
the
aforementioned
Fabij
should
be
given
into
their
hands
,
they
were
not
only
not
given
them
,
or
in
any
other
manner
punished
,
but
when
the
time
of
their
Assemblies
came
,
they
were
made
Tribuns
with
Consular
power
:
insomuch
that
the
French
perceiving
those
to
be
honored
,
that
should
have
been
punipunished
,
took
all
this
as
done
in
despight
and
disgrace
to
them
:
and
thus
incensed
with
rage
and
disdain
they
came
to
assaile
Rome
,
which
they
took
,
the
Capitoll
excepted
.
Which
destruction
fell
upon
the
Romans
,
only
for
their
inobservance
of
justice
:
for
their
Ambassadors
having
offended
against
the
law
of
nations
,
when
they
should
have
been
punished
,
were
honored
.
Therefore
it
is
worthy
consideration
,
how
much
every
Republick
or
Prince
should
beware
of
doing
the
like
wrong
,
not
only
against
a
nation
,
but
also
against
any
particular
man
:
for
if
a
man
be
exceedingly
offended
either
by
the
publick
,
or
by
any
private
man
,
and
hath
had
no
reparation
made
him
to
his
content
:
if
he
lives
in
a
Commonwealth
,
he
will
seek
even
with
the
utter
ruine
thereof
to
avenge
himself
:
if
he
lives
under
a
Prince
,
and
be
a
man
of
any
courage
,
he
will
never
rest
,
till
in
some
kind
or
other
he
be
revenged
on
him
,
however
that
he
knows
he
draws
thereby
his
own
destruction
on
his
head
.
And
to
verify
this
,
there
is
not
a
fitter
nor
truer
example
,
then
that
of
Philip
of
Macedon
Alexanders
Father
.
In
his
Court
there
was
a
very
handsome
young
noble
man
named
Pausanias
,
and
of
him
one
Attalus
,
one
of
the
cheifest
men
,
that
was
neer
about
Philip
,
was
inamourd
;
who
having
several
times
tryed
if
he
would
yeeld
to
him
,
and
finding
him
far
off
from
consenting
to
any
such
thing
,
determined
to
gain
that
by
a
trick
and
by
force
,
which
no
way
else
he
saw
he
could
attain
to
.
And
having
made
a
solemn
invitation
,
whereat
Pausanias
and
many
other
noble
men
met
,
after
that
every
one
had
liberally
eate
and
drinke
,
caus'd
Pausanias
to
be
taken
and
brought
to
some
by-chamber
,
were
not
only
by
force
he
satisfied
his
beastly
lust
upon
him
,
but
the
more
to
disgrace
him
,
he
made
him
be
so
used
by
many
others
in
the
like
manner
.
Of
which
injury
Pausanias
several
times
made
his
complaint
to
Philip
,
who
having
held
him
a
long
time
in
hope
of
revenging
him
,
instead
thereof
made
Attalus
governour
of
a
Province
in
Greece
;
whereupon
Pausanias
seeing
his
enemy
honored
,
and
not
punished
,
converted
his
indignation
not
against
him
that
had
injured
him
,
but
against
Philip
that
had
not
aveng'd
him
.
And
on
a
morning
when
Philips
daughter
was
solemnly
married
to
Alexander
of
Epirus
,
as
Philip
went
to
the
Temple
to
celebrate
the
espousals
,
he
slew
him
between
the
two
Alexanders
,
the
son
,
and
the
son
in
law
.
Which
example
is
much
like
that
of
the
Romans
,
and
is
remarkeable
for
all
those
that
rule
,
who
should
never
value
any
man
at
so
low
a
rate
,
as
to
think
(
that
by
heaping
injury
upon
injury
)
he
that
is
thus
wrong'd
will
not
devise
some
way
to
be
reveng'd
,
though
it
be
with
his
own
utter
loss
and
destruction
.
CHAP.
XXIX
.
Fortune
blinds
mens
minds
,
when
she
will
not
suffer
them
to
prevent
her
designes
.
IF
we
consider
well
the
course
of
humane
affaires
,
wee
shall
many
times
see
things
come
to
pass
,
and
chances
happen
which
the
heavens
altogether
would
not
,
that
order
should
be
taken
to
prevent
.
And
in
as
much
as
this
,
which
I
speak
of
,
befell
Rome
,
where
there
was
so
much
valor
,
so
much
Religion
and
good
order
,
it
is
no
marvail
if
the
same
thing
often
fall
out
in
a
City
or
Country
that
wants
the
said
things
:
and
because
this
place
is
very
remarkable
to
shew
the
power
heaven
hath
over
human
things
,
T.
Livius
at
large
and
with
words
of
very
great
efficacy
represses
it
,
saying
,
that
the
heavens
would
for
some
end
,
that
the
Romans
should
know
their
power
;
and
therefore
caus'd
those
Fabij
to
erre
,
that
were
sent
Ambassadors
to
the
French
,
and
by
their
means
provokt
them
to
make
war
against
Rome
.
And
afterwards
ordaind
,
that
for
the
suppressing
of
that
war
,
there
was
nothing
done
in
Rome
worthy
of
the
Romans
,
having
first
ordain'd
,
that
Camillus
,
who
only
was
able
to
remedy
so
great
a
mischief
should
then
be
banished
to
Ardea
.
And
then
the
French
comming
towards
Rome
,
they
who
to
resist
the
fury
of
the
Volsci
and
many
their
neighbouring
enemies
,
had
several
times
created
a
Dictatour
;
now
upon
the
approach
of
the
French
never
created
any
.
Moreover
,
for
their
choyce
of
Soldiers
,
it
was
very
weake
,
and
without
any
extraordinary
diligence
:
&
they
were
so
slow
in
taking
of
arms
,
that
they
were
hardly
time
enough
to
incounter
the
French
at
the
river
Allia
,
ten
miles
from
Rome
.
Here
the
Tribuns
pitcht
their
campe
without
any
ordinary
diligence
:
not
viewing
the
ground
first
,
neither
incompassing
it
with
trench
or
pali●ado
,
making
use
neither
of
human
nor
divine
helps
.
And
in
ranging
of
their
battell
,
they
left
their
ranks
so
thin
and
weak
,
that
as
well
the
Soldiers
as
the
Captains
did
nothing
worthy
of
the
Roman
discipline
.
They
fought
afterwards
without
any
effusion
of
blood
,
for
they
fled
before
they
were
assayl'd
:
the
greater
part
went
thence
to
Veium
,
the
other
retir'd
to
Rome
,
who
never
going
into
their
own
houses
,
went
unto
the
Capitoll
:
so
that
the
Senate
taking
no
care
to
defend
Rome
,
did
not
so
much
as
shut
the
gates
,
and
part
of
them
fled
from
thence
,
and
part
got
into
the
Capitoll
;
yet
in
defence
thereof
,
they
had
not
such
disorder
;
for
they
did
not
cloy
it
with
unusual
people
,
they
furnished
it
with
all
the
Corne
they
could
possibly
get
,
that
it
might
endure
out
the
siege
:
and
the
greater
part
of
the
unprofitable
multitude
of
old
men
,
women
,
and
children
,
fled
unto
the
neighbouring
Towns
about
,
the
rest
staid
at
Rome
for
a
prey
to
the
French
.
So
that
whoever
should
have
read
of
the
brave
atchievements
of
that
people
many
years
before
,
and
afterwards
of
these
times
following
them
,
would
have
much
a
do
to
beleeve
it
were
the
same
people
.
And
T.
Livius
having
reckon'd
up
the
aforesaid
disorders
,
concludes
thus
,
So
much
does
fortune
blind
mens
eyes
,
when
shee
would
not
have
her
force
withstood
.
Nor
can
this
conclusion
be
more
true
.
Whereupon
men
that
are
alwaies
under
hard
crosses
deserve
the
less
blame
,
as
they
that
enjoy
continuall
prosperity
also
merit
less
prayse
;
for
we
shall
many
times
see
those
led
to
their
destruction
,
and
these
advanc'd
to
an
extraordinory
greatness
by
some
occasion
the
heavens
have
presented
in
their
furtherances
hereto
,
giving
means
to
the
one
to
behave
himself
vertuously
,
&
quite
bereaving
the
other
of
them
.
And
we
may
well
say
fortune
does
this
,
for
she
makes
choyce
of
a
man
(
when
she
purposes
to
bring
great
matters
to
pass
)
of
such
judgement
and
spirit
,
that
knows
how
to
make
use
of
those
occasions
she
presents
him
.
So
in
like
manner
,
when
shee
would
bring
horrible
destructions
upon
any
Place
,
she
there
preferrs
men
to
that
purpose
,
that
they
may
help
to
draw
on
that
ruine
.
And
in
case
there
be
any
that
may
prevent
these
mischiefes
,
shee
either
brings
him
to
his
end
,
or
else
deprives
him
of
all
abilities
to
do
any
goood
.
This
we
very
well
know
by
our
Authors
discourse
,
how
that
fortune
for
to
amplify
Rome
,
and
to
bring
it
to
that
greatness
it
attain'd
to
,
deemd
it
necessary
to
scourge
it
,
as
we
shall
discourse
at
large
in
the
beginning
of
the
next
book
following
,
but
yet
would
not
wholly
ruin
it
.
And
this
appears
,
in
as
much
as
shee
banished
Camillus
,
but
put
him
not
to
death
:
shee
made
Rome
be
taken
,
but
not
the
Capitoll
:
shee
ordein'd
that
the
Romaus
should
not
think
out
any
thing
of
avayle
to
save
Rome
;
yet
for
defence
of
the
Capitoll
,
they
wanted
of
no
good
advice
.
To
the
end
Rome
should
be
taken
,
she
causd
the
greater
part
of
those
Soldiers
,
that
were
routed
at
Allia
,
to
go
to
Vejum
.
And
as
for
defence
of
the
City
of
Rome
,
she
cut
off
all
the
waies
to
order
it
,
so
shee
prepar'd
every
thing
ready
to
recover
it
again
,
having
conducted
an
intire
Roman
Army
to
Vejum
,
and
Camillus
to
Ardea
,
whereby
they
might
be
able
to
make
a
strong
head
under
the
command
of
a
Captain
never
blemished
with
any
disgrace
of
loss
yet
,
&
throughly
whole
in
his
reputation
,
for
the
recovery
of
his
Country
.
Wee
might
here
produce
some
modern
example
to
confirm
what
wee
have
said
:
but
because
I
think
it
unnecessary
,
being
this
may
well
suffice
,
I
shall
omit
it
.
I
avow
therefore
this
to
be
very
true
,
as
by
many
histories
wee
may
see
it
,
that
men
may
well
follow
fortune
,
but
not
oppose
it
;
they
may
well
weave
her
webs
,
but
not
break
them
.
Wherefore
let
men
never
abandon
themselves
,
being
they
know
not
what
shall
become
of
them
in
the
end
,
the
passages
of
their
fortunes
being
through
crooked
and
unknown
waies
;
they
should
ever
hope
,
and
so
hoping
put
on
still
,
and
never
give
over
in
despaire
,
whatsoever
chance
or
trouble
they
be
faln
into
.
CHAP.
XXX
.
Republicks
and
Princes
,
that
really
are
mighty
,
seek
not
by
monies
to
make
alliance
with
others
,
but
by
their
valour
,
and
repute
of
their
Forces
.
THe
Romans
were
straightly
besiegd
in
the
Capitoll
,
and
however
they
lookt
for
ayd
from
Vejum
,
and
from
Camillus
,
being
forc't
by
famine
,
they
came
to
termes
of
agreement
with
the
French
,
to
redeem
themselves
for
a
certain
sum
of
money
,
upon
which
agreement
,
as
they
were
weighing
the
gold
,
Camillus
,
arriv'd
with
his
Army
,
which
fortune
brought
to
pass
(
saies
our
Historian
)
to
the
end
that
the
Romans
should
not
live
redeemd
by
gold
.
Which
thing
is
not
only
remarkable
in
this
part
,
but
in
the
procese
of
this
Commonwealths
actions
,
where
it
is
evident
,
that
they
never
vanquished
Towns
with
moneys
,
nor
ever
bought
peace
by
mony
,
but
by
prowesse
in
the
warres
.
Which
I
think
never
befell
any
other
Republick
;
and
among
other
signes
by
which
a
man
discerns
the
power
of
a
State
,
he
is
to
marke
in
what
manner
it
lives
with
the
neighbouring
States
.
And
when
it
is
so
orderd
,
that
they
become
tributaries
thereunto
,
to
keep
friendship
with
it
,
there
is
an
assured
sign
,
that
that
State
is
powerfull
.
But
when
the
said
neighbours
,
though
inferious
to
it
,
draw
money
from
thence
,
there
is
then
a
great
evidence
of
the
weakness
thereof
.
Read
all
the
Roman
Stories
,
and
ye
shall
see
how
the
Massilians
,
the
Aeduans
,
the
Rhodians
,
Hiero
,
the
Siracusan
,
Enmenes
,
and
Massinissa
Kings
joyning
upon
the
confines
of
the
Roman
Empire
,
to
have
friendship
with
it
,
concur'd
in
expences
and
tribute
at
all
times
that
need
was
,
seeking
after
no
other
requitall
thereof
,
but
to
be
protected
by
it
.
Wee
shall
see
the
contrary
in
poor
and
feeble
States
;
and
so
beginning
at
ours
of
Florence
in
the
times
past
,
even
when
the
reputation
thereof
was
at
the
greatest
,
there
was
never
a
great
Lord
in
Romania
,
that
had
not
some
allowance
from
thence
,
and
besides
she
gave
to
those
of
Perugia
,
and
Castella
,
&
to
all
the
rest
of
her
neighbours
.
For
had
this
City
been
warlick
and
strong
,
the
contrary
would
have
followd
;
for
all
those
to
have
been
under
the
protection
of
it
,
would
have
given
money
,
and
have
sought
to
buy
its
friendship
,
and
not
to
sell
their
own
.
Neither
have
the
Florentines
alone
liv'd
in
this
baseness
,
but
the
Venetians
,
and
the
King
of
France
,
who
,
though
a
Prince
of
great
Dominions
,
lives
tributary
to
the
Swisses
,
and
the
King
of
Engl.
The
cause
whereof
is
,
in
that
he
disarmes
his
subjects
,
and
because
that
King
and
those
other
afore-named
had
rather
enjoy
a
present
profit
to
rack
their
people
and
squeese
them
,
and
avoid
rather
an
imaginary
than
a
real
danger
,
than
do
such
expedients
as
would
secure
and
for
ever
make
their
States
happy
.
Which
disorder
,
though
some
while
it
may
produce
quiet
,
yet
in
time
it
proves
the
cause
of
want
,
losses
,
and
unrecoverable
ruine
.
And
it
would
be
too
long
to
relate
,
how
many
times
the
Florentines
,
the
Venetians
,
and
this
Kingdome
,
have
redeemd
themselves
even
in
the
warrs
,
and
how
many
times
they
have
subjected
themselves
to
disgrace
,
which
the
Romans
were
only
once
like
to
have
done
.
It
would
be
tedious
to
tell
,
how
many
Towns
the
Florentines
and
Venetians
have
bought
,
whereof
afterwards
the
inconvenience
hath
been
found
,
and
how
that
those
things
that
are
bought
with
gold
,
men
know
not
how
to
desend
with
the
sword
.
The
Romans
observd
this
brave
way
and
manner
of
living
,
while
they
were
free
;
but
after
they
came
under
their
Emperors
governments
,
and
that
those
Emperors
grow
naught
,
and
lov'd
the
shade
,
and
could
not
endure
any
toyle
in
the
Sun
,
they
began
also
to
redeem
themselves
,
somtimes
from
the
Parthians
,
somtimes
from
the
Germans
,
and
now
and
then
also
from
some
others
of
their
neighbours
,
which
was
the
beginning
of
that
great
Empires
ruine
.
Whereupon
arose
the
like
inconvenients
from
their
having
disarm'd
their
people
,
from
whence
also
proceeds
another
greater
,
that
the
nearer
thy
enemy
comes
to
thee
,
the
weaker
he
finds
thee
;
for
whosoever
lives
after
that
manner
we
have
spoken
of
above
,
treats
evill
those
subjects
he
hath
within
his
dominions
,
because
his
men
are
not
so
well
disciplin'd
in
the
wars
,
as
to
keep
the
enemy
from
entring
into
the
heart
of
their
Country
Whence
it
proceeds
,
that
to
keep
the
enemy
off
:
he
allows
some
provision
of
moneys
to
those
Princes
or
people
that
border
upon
his
Country
.
And
thereupon
,
those
States
make
some
resistance
upon
the
confines
only
,
which
when
the
enemy
hath
past
,
they
have
no
kind
of
remedy
left
:
and
they
perceive
not
,
that
this
their
manner
of
proceeding
,
is
quite
contrary
to
all
good
order
:
for
the
heart
and
the
vital
parts
of
a
body
are
to
be
arm'd
,
and
not
the
extremities
thereof
;
for
it
can
live
without
those
,
but
if
these
be
hurt
it
dyes
:
but
these
States
keep
the
heart
disarm'd
,
and
arme
their
hands
and
feet
.
What
this
disorder
hath
done
at
Florence
,
hath
been
and
is
daily
seen
:
for
when
any
Army
posses
the
frontiers
,
and
enters
near
to
the
heart
of
the
Country
,
there
is
no
further
remedy
.
Wee
saw
not
long
since
the
same
proof
of
the
Venetians
;
and
had
not
their
.
City
been
begirt
by
the
waters
,
we
should
have
seen
an
end
of
it
.
Wee
have
not
so
often
seen
this
tryal
in
France
,
because
it
is
so
great
a
Kingdom
,
that
it
hath
few
enemies
mightier
than
it
:
nevertheless
.
when
the
English
invaded
that
Country
in
the
year
1513.
the
whole
Country
quak'd
,
and
the
King
himself
,
and
every
one
thought
,
that
one
defeat
alone
would
have
been
sufficient
to
lose
him
the
State
.
The
contrary
befell
the
Romans
;
for
the
nearer
the
enemy
approached
to
Rome
,
the
more
able
he
found
the
City
to
make
resistance
.
And
it
was
evident
,
when
Hannibal
came
into
Italy
,
that
after
three
defeats
,
and
the
slaughters
of
so
many
Captains
and
soldiers
,
they
were
not
only
able
to
sustain
the
enemy
,
but
to
vanquish
him
.
All
this
proceeded
from
that
they
had
well
armd
the
heart
,
and
made
small
account
of
the
extremities
;
for
the
foundation
of
their
State
was
the
people
of
Rome
;
and
the
Latins
,
and
the
other
Townes
their
allyes
in
Italy
,
and
their
Colonies
,
from
whence
they
drew
so
many
Soldiers
,
that
with
them
they
were
able
to
fight
with
and
keep
in
awe
the
whole
world
.
And
that
this
is
true
,
it
appears
by
the
question
Hanno
the
Carthaginian
put
to
Hannibals
agents
,
after
that
great
overthrow
at
Canna
,
who
having
exceedingly
magnified
Hannibals
great
acts
,
were
asked
by
Hanno
,
whether
any
of
the
Komans
were
yet
come
to
demand
peace
,
or
if
any
Town
of
the
Latins
,
or
any
of
their
Colonies
had
yet
rebelld
against
the
Roman
;
and
they
denying
the
one
and
the
other
,
Hanno
reply'd
,
Then
is
the
warr
yet
as
intire
as
it
was
at
first
.
We
see
therefore
by
this
discourse
,
and
what
wee
have
otherwhere
said
,
what
difference
there
is
between
the
proceedings
of
Republicks
now
adayes
,
and
those
of
the
ancients
.
Wee
see
also
hereupon
every
day
exceeding
great
losses
,
and
wonderfull
great
conquests
:
for
where
men
are
but
of
small
valour
and
resolution
,
fortune
shews
much
power
:
and
because
shee
is
alwaies
various
,
therefore
do
Common-wealths
and
States
change
often
,
and
will
alwaies
change
,
till
at
length
some
one
stand
up
,
who
is
so
much
a
lover
of
antiquitie
,
as
to
regulate
her
,
that
she
take
not
occasion
to
shew
at
every
turne
of
the
Sun
,
how
great
her
power
is
.
CHAP.
XXXI
.
How
dangerons
a
thing
it
is
,
to
give
credit
to
men
that
are
banished
out
of
their
Country
.
MEthinks
it
is
not
out
of
purpose
,
to
treat
among
these
other
discourses
,
how
dangerous
a
thing
it
is
to
trust
those
that
are
banished
out
of
their
Country
,
these
being
matters
that
every
day
are
practis'd
by
those
that
are
Rulers
of
States
;
especially
seeing
it
may
be
prov'd
by
a
memorable
example
out
of
T.
Livius
in
his
history
,
though
this
thing
be
out
of
his
purpose
quite
.
When
Alexander
the
Great
passed
into
Asia
with
his
Army
,
Alexander
of
Epirus
his
kinsman
&
uncle
,
came
with
certain
troopes
into
Italy
,
being
cald
upon
by
some
outlawd
Lucans
,
who
put
him
in
hope
,
that
by
their
means
he
might
become
master
of
that
whole
Country
.
Whereupon
it
came
to
pass
,
that
he
being
come
into
Italy
upon
their
word
and
assurance
,
was
slain
by
them
;
their
Citizens
,
having
promisd
them
their
return
into
their
Country
,
if
they
slew
him
.
Therefore
should
it
be
consider'd
,
how
vain
their
words
and
promises
are
,
who
are
banished
their
Countries
;
for
,
in
regard
of
their
word
,
it
is
to
be
thought
,
that
whensoever
by
other
means
than
thine
,
they
can
be
restord
to
their
Country
,
they
will
forsake
thee
,
and
cleave
to
others
,
notwithstanding
all
the
promises
they
have
made
thee
.
And
this
is
the
reason
why
there
is
no
hold
to
their
word
,
because
so
extream
is
their
desire
to
return
to
to
their
native
homes
,
that
naturally
they
beleeve
many
things
that
are
false
,
and
some
things
out
of
their
own
cunning
they
adde
;
so
that
between
what
they
think
,
and
what
they
say
they
think
,
they
put
thee
in
such
hopes
,
that
grounding
thereupon
,
thou
art
brought
to
a
vain
expence
,
or
to
undertake
somwhat
that
proves
thy
destruction
.
I
will
satisfie
my self
with
the
aforesaid
example
of
Alexander
,
and
only
this
other
of
Themistocles
the
Athenian
,
who
being
outlawd
,
fled
to
Darius
in
Asia
,
where
he
promised
him
so
much
,
when
he
should
invade
Greece
,
that
Darius
undertook
the
enterprise
.
But
Themistocles
not
being
able
to
make
good
his
promises
,
either
for
shame
or
fear
of
punishment
,
poisoned
himself
.
And
if
Themistocles
a
rare
man
committed
this
error
,
what
should
we
think
but
that
they
do
much
more
erre
,
who
because
of
their
less
vertue
will
suffer
themselves
to
be
more
violently
drawn
by
their
own
passions
and
desires
.
And
therefore
a
Prince
ought
to
proceed
very
slowly
in
undertakings
upon
the
relation
of
exil'd
men
;
for
otherwise
he
suffers
either
great
shame
,
or
dammage
by
them
And
because
it
seldom
comes
to
pass
,
that
Towns
and
Countries
are
taken
by
stealth
,
or
by
intelligence
that
any
one
hath
in
them
;
methinks
it
is
not
much
out
of
purpose
to
treate
thereof
in
the
Chapter
following
,
adding
thereunto
by
how
many
waies
the
Romans
got
them
.
CHAP.
XXXII
.
How
many
waies
the
Romans
used
to
make
themselves
masters
of
townes
.
THe
Romans
applying
themselves
all
to
the
war
,
did
evermore
make
it
with
all
advantage
possible
,
as
well
for
the
expence
,
as
for
every
thing
else
belonging
thereto
.
From
hence
it
proceeded
,
that
they
were
alwaies
aware
of
taking
of
townes
by
long
sieges
,
thinking
it
a
matter
of
great
charges
,
and
incommodity
,
that
surpasses
far
the
profit
their
conquest
thereof
can
bring
.
And
for
this
cause
they
though
it
more
for
their
own
advantage
,
to
take
a
town
any
way
else
then
by
siege
.
Whereupon
in
such
great
and
so
many
wars
,
we
have
very
few
examples
of
sieges
made
by
them
.
The
waies
then
whereby
they
got
their
townes
,
were
either
by
conquest
or
yeilding
.
And
this
conquest
was
either
by
force
or
open
violence
,
or
by
force
mingled
with
fraud
.
Open
violence
was
either
by
assault
,
without
beating
the
walls
,
which
was
to
beleagure
a
town
round
with
an
army
:
Aratus
Sicioneus
,
who
was
as
base
and
cowardly
in
any
action
by
day
,
as
he
was
of
worth
and
spirit
in
these
by
night
.
Which
we
may
well
think
was
rather
through
some
hidden
vertue
wherewith
he
was
endowed
,
then
because
there
was
naturally
required
in
them
the
more
good
luck
.
Many
of
these
waies
are
put
in
practice
,
few
of
them
come
to
trial
,
and
very
few
take
effect
.
Touching
the
gaining
of
townes
by
yeelding
,
they
yeeld
either
of
good
will
or
by
force
:
this
willingness
arises
either
upon
some
forrain
necessity
,
which
compels
them
to
fly
unto
thy
protection
,
as
Capua
did
unto
the
Romans
,
or
through
a
desire
to
be
wel
governed
,
being
allur'd
by
the
good
government
that
Prince
holds
among
them
that
have
given
themselves
into
his
hands
:
as
the
Rodians
,
the
Massilians
,
and
other
like
cities
did
,
that
gave
themselves
unto
the
Romans
.
Touching
surrendring
up
upon
force
,
proceeds
either
from
a
long
siege
,
as
is
formerly
said
,
or
from
a
continual
oppression
of
incursions
,
pillagings
,
and
other
hard
usages
,
which
when
a
city
desires
to
be
freed
from
she
yeelds
her self
.
Of
all
those
said
ways
the
Romans
practised
this
last
more
then
foure
hundred
and
fifty
years
to
weary
out
their
neighbors
with
routs
and
incursions
,
and
by
gaining
credit
with
them
,
by
gaining
credit
with
them
,
by
means
of
agreements
made
,
as
we
have
said
otherwhere
;
and
upon
that
way
they
alwaies
grounded
,
though
they
tryd
all
,
but
in
the
other
they
found
things
either
dangerous
or
unprofitable
.
For
in
a
siege
,
there
is
length
of
time
and
expences
:
in
forcible
assault
,
doubt
and
danger
:
and
in
conspiracies
,
uncertainty
.
And
they
saw
,
that
by
the
defeat
of
an
enemies
army
,
sometimes
they
got
a
Kingdom
in
one
day
,
and
to
take
by
siege
a
town
that
was
obstinate
,
it
cost
them
many
years
.
CHAP.
XXXIII
.
How
the
Romans
gave
the
Commanders
of
their
armies
free
and
large
Commissions
.
I
Think
it
fit
for
him
(
that
by
reading
of
Livies
story
would
make
advantage
thereof
)
wel
to
consider
all
the
waies
of
the
people
and
Senate
of
Romes
proceedings
:
and
among
other
things
that
merite
consideration
,
his
is
one
,
to
see
with
what
authority
they
sent
forth
their
Consuls
,
Dictators
,
&
Commanders
of
armies
,
which
we
see
was
very
great
,
and
the
Senate
reserved
thing
else
to
themselves
,
but
a
power
to
make
new
wars
,
and
to
confirme
peace
,
but
they
referred
every
thing
else
to
the
arbitrement
and
power
of
the
Consul
:
for
when
the
people
and
the
Senate
had
once
resolved
on
the
war
,
(
as
for
example
sake
against
the
Latines
)
they
left
all
the
rest
to
the
Consuls
discretion
,
who
had
free
power
either
to
fight
a
batttel
,
or
to
leave
it
,
and
to
besiege
either
this
,
or
any
other
town
else
as
he
pleas'd
.
Which
things
by
many
examples
are
verified
,
and
especially
by
that
which
fell
out
in
an
expedition
against
the
Tuscans
:
for
Fabius
the
Consul
having
overcome
them
near
unto
Sutrium
,
and
intending
with
his
army
to
pass
the
wood
Cimina
,
and
go
into
Tuscany
,
he
did
not
onely
not
advise
with
the
Senate
,
but
gave
them
no
notice
at
all
of
it
,
though
he
was
to
make
the
war
in
a
new
countrey
full
of
doubts
and
dangers
:
which
is
witnessed
by
a
resolution
of
the
Senate
taken
directly
against
this
very
course
;
who
having
understood
of
the
victory
Fabius
had
gotten
,
and
doubting
he
would
venture
to
pass
the
said
woods
into
Tuscany
,
thinking
it
would
be
well
not
to
try
that
war
,
nor
ruin
that
hazzard
,
sent
two
Deputies
unto
Fabius
,
to
give
him
notice
,
they
would
not
have
him
pass
into
Tuscany
:
who
came
thither
,
when
he
had
already
past
,
and
gotten
the
victory
,
and
in
liew
of
hindring
the
war
,
they
returned
Ambassadors
of
his
conquest
and
victory
gotten
.
And
whosoever
considers
these
termes
,
will
find
them
discreetly
used
:
for
if
the
Senate
would
have
had
the
Consull
to
proceed
on
forwards
in
the
war
,
onely
as
they
gave
him
order
,
they
had
made
him
less
circumspect
,
and
slower
in
his
actions
:
for
he
would
have
thought
,
that
the
glory
of
the
victory
had
not
bin
wholly
his
,
but
that
the
Senate
had
participated
with
him
,
by
whose
counse
he
had
bin
governed
.
Besides
this
,
the
Senate
then
obliged
themselves
to
advise
in
things
they
could
not
have
the
means
to
understand
.
For
,
notwithstanding
than
among
them
there
were
men
exceedingly
well
experienced
in
the
wars
,
yet
being
they
were
not
upon
the
place
,
and
therefore
ignorant
of
very
many
particulars
,
which
are
needfull
for
him
to
know
that
will
advise
well
,
by
interposing
their
Councell
,
they
would
have
committed
many
errors
.
And
for
this
cause
they
suffered
the
Consul
to
do
all
of
himself
,
and
that
the
glory
thereof
should
be
entirely
his
,
the
love
of
which
they
thought
would
provoke
and
encourage
him
to
do
well
.
I
have
the
more
willingly
marked
this
place
,
because
I
see
that
the
Republiques
now
adayes
,
as
the
Venetian
and
the
Florentine
,
understand
it
not
so
:
and
if
their
Commanders
,
Proveditours
,
and
Commissioners
are
to
plant
any
battery
,
they
will
know
it
first
,
and
advise
thereupon
.
Which
course
deserves
the
same
praise
the
others
do
,
which
altogether
have
brought
them
into
those
miseries
they
now
suffer
.
THE
THIRD
BOOKE
.
CHAP.
I.
For
the
maintenance
of
a
Religion
or
a
Common-wealth
long
in
being
,
it
is
necessary
oftentimes
to
reduce
them
to
their
first
grounds
.
IT
is
most
true
,
that
all
things
in
the
world
have
an
end
of
their
life
:
but
those
things
eninjoy
that
course
that
is
generally
ordaind
them
by
heaven
,
whichdisorder
not
their
body
,
but
govern
it
in
such
a
regular
course
,
that
either
it
changes
not
,
or
if
it
does
,
it
is
for
the
better
,
and
not
for
the
worst
.
And
because
I
speak
of
mixt
bodies
,
such
as
are
Republiques
and
sects
,
I
say
,
that
those
changes
are
for
the
health
thereof
,
which
bring
them
back
to
their
first
beginnings
:
and
therefore
are
they
the
best
order'd
,
and
subsist
the
longest
which
(
by
the
help
of
their
own
orders
)
may
often
be
renewed
,
or
that
by
accident
without
the
same
orders
attain
to
the
said
renovation
.
And
it
is
more
clear
than
the
light
,
that
these
bodies
not
being
renewed
,
last
not
;
and
the
way
to
renew
them
is
(
as
is
said
)
to
reduce
them
to
their
first
beginnings
;
for
all
beginnings
of
Sects
,
Commonwealths
and
Kingdoms
,
must
needs
contain
some
goodness
in
them
,
by
means
whereof
they
recover
their
first
reputation
and
increase
:
for
in
process
of
time
that
goodness
growes
corrupt
,
and
unless
something
happen
,
that
reduces
it
to
the
just
mark
,
that
body
must
needs
be
destroyed
.
And
our
Doctors
of
Physick
say
(
speaking
of
the
bodies
of
men
)
That
a
man
daily
gathers
some
evil
,
which
sometimes
hath
need
of
cure
.
This
reducing
to
the
beginning
(
speaking
of
Commonwealths
)
is
done
either
by
some
outward
accident
,
or
by
some
prudence
within
.
Touching
the
first
,
we
see
it
was
necessary
,
that
Rome
should
be
taken
by
the
French
,
if
we
would
have
her
spring
again
;
and
thus
springing
again
,
should
recover
a
new
life
,
and
a
new
vertue
,
and
take
her self
a
new
to
the
observance
of
religion
,
and
justice
,
which
began
in
her
to
be
much
blemish'd
,
which
we
may
easily
gather
by
the
Story
of
Livie
,
where
he
shews
that
in
drawing
gut
the
army
against
the
French
,
and
in
creating
the
Tribunes
with
Consular
power
,
they
observed
not
any
religious
ceremonie
:
so
in
like
manner
,
they
did
not
onely
not
punish
the
three
Fabij
who
against
the
law
of
nations
had
fought
against
the
French
,
but
created
them
tribunes
.
And
we
may
well
think
,
that
of
other
good
laws
also
ordained
by
Romulus
,
and
their
other
sage
Princes
,
they
began
now
to
hold
less
esteem
than
was
reasonable
,
or
necessary
to
maintain
a
free
government
.
This
forrain
blow
therefore
lit
on
them
,
to
the
end
they
should
anew
betake
themselves
to
all
the
old
orders
of
their
City
,
and
to
shew
that
people
,
that
it
was
not
necessary
not
only
to
maintain
religion
and
justice
,
but
to
esteem
well
of
their
good
Citizens
,
&
to
make
more
account
of
their
vertue
,
than
of
those
profits
,
which
they
thought
they
lost
or
got
by
their
means
:
Which
we
see
,
came
directly
to
pass
;
for
presently
after
Rome
was
recovered
from
the
French
,
they
renewed
all
the
rites
of
their
ancient
Religion
,
they
punished
those
Fabij
who
fought
against
the
Law
of
Nations
,
and
afterwards
made
such
account
of
Camillus
his
vertue
and
goodness
,
that
the
Senate
&
all
others
wholly
laying
envy
aside
,
gave
the
whole
government
of
the
Commonwealth
into
hit
hands
.
It
is
necessary
therefore
(
as
I
have
said
)
that
men
,
who
live
together
in
any
order
,
should
often
revise
themselves
,
either
upon
occasion
given
by
outward
,
or
else
by
inward
accidents
.
And
for
these
last
,
they
must
either
proceed
from
a
law
,
which
may
take
a
review
as
it
were
of
the
men
that
are
in
that
body
,
or
else
from
some
good
man
that
may
arise
among
them
,
who
by
his
example
&
vertuous
actions
may
work
the
same
effect
,
which
that
law
or
order
can
.
This
good
then
arises
in
Common-wealths
,
by
the
vertue
of
some
man
,
or
the
force
of
some
order
.
And
touching
this
last
,
those
orders
that
reduc'd
the
Roman
Republick
to
its
own
beginning
,
were
the
Tribuns
of
the
people
,
the
Censors
,
&
all
those
other
laws
,
which
were
made
against
the
ambition
or
insolence
of
men
,
which
orders
have
need
to
be
quicken'd
by
the
vertue
of
some
one
Citizen
,
that
couragiously
joynes
with
them
for
their
execution
,
maugre
the
power
of
those
that
break
them
.
The
executions
whereof
,
before
the
sacking
of
Rome
by
the
French
,
were
notable
,
the
death
of
Brutus
his
sons
,
the
death
of
those
of
the
Decemvirate
,
that
of
Melius
touching
the
laying
down
the
price
of
their
corne
:
after
the
taking
of
Rome
,
was
the
death
of
Manlius
Capitolinus
,
the
death
of
the
son
of
Manlius
Torquatus
,
the
execution
which
Papirius
Cursor
did
upon
the
Commander
of
his
Cavallerie
,
the
accusation
of
the
Scipios
:
which
things
being
they
were
extraordinary
&
remarkable
,
whenosever
any
of
them
did
chance
,
caused
men
more
strictly
to
conforme
themselves
to
the
exact
rule
;
and
when
these
began
to
fall
out
seldom
,
then
began
they
to
give
men
more
leisure
to
grow
naught
,
and
become
more
dangerous
and
tumultuous
;
for
from
one
to
another
of
such
like
executions
,
there
should
not
pass
more
than
ten
years
time
;
for
after
such
a
time
men
begin
again
to
change
their
manners
and
trespass
against
the
lawes
:
and
unless
something
chance
,
which
anew
calls
the
punishment
to
memory
,
and
puts
them
in
fear
thereof
,
there
meer
together
so
many
delinquents
,
that
without
danger
they
cannot
be
punished
.
To
this
purpose
,
they
who
govern'd
the
State
of
Florence
from
1434.
to
1494.
said
it
was
necessary
every
fift
year
to
reforme
the
State
,
otherwise
it
was
hard
to
maintain
it
;
and
they
call'd
reforming
of
the
State
,
to
put
that
terror
and
fear
in
men
,
which
they
caus'd
in
them
at
the
first
founding
of
the
lawes
,
having
then
severely
punish'd
those
that
had
offended
against
their
manner
of
living
.
But
when
the
memory
of
that
punishment
is
once
extinguished
,
men
again
take
the
boldness
to
attempt
some
innovations
,
and
speak
ill
of
the
present
State
:
and
therefore
it
is
necessary
to
take
order
for
it
by
reducing
it
to
the
first
grounds
.
Also
this
bringing
back
of
Republiques
to
their
beginnings
,
arises
sometimes
from
the
plain
vertue
of
some
one
man
,
without
dependance
on
any
law
,
inciting
thee
to
any
execution
:
yet
are
they
of
so
great
reputation
,
and
of
such
remarke
,
that
the
good
men
desire
to
follow
them
,
and
the
bad
are
asham'd
to
live
contrarily
to
them
.
Those
that
in
Rome
particularly
worked
these
good
effects
,
were
Horatius
Cocles
,
Scevola
,
Fabritius
,
the
two
Decij
,
Regulus
,
Attilius
,
and
some
others
,
who
by
their
rare
and
worthy
examples
,
in
Rome
wrought
the
same
effect
that
good
lawes
and
good
orders
could
.
And
if
the
forenamed
executions
of
lawes
together
with
these
particulars
examples
had
succeeded
every
ten
years
in
this
City
,
it
had
been
of
necessary
consequence
that
it
could
never
be
corrupted
:
but
as
the
one
and
the
other
of
these
two
things
began
to
fall
out
seldome
,
the
corruptions
multiplied
:
for
after
Marcus
Regulus
the
like
example
was
never
more
seen
.
And
though
in
Rome
there
arose
the
two
Catoes
,
yet
such
was
the
distance
between
him
and
them
,
and
between
them
,
from
th'
one
to
th'
other
,
and
they
remained
so
alone
,
that
with
their
good
examples
they
could
effectuate
no
good
thing
,
and
especially
the
last
Cato
,
who
finding
a
great
part
of
the
City
corrupted
,
could
not
prevaile
so
by
his
example
,
as
to
better
his
Citizens
And
this
may
suffice
for
Republicks
.
But
touching
Religions
,
wee
see
also
these
reformations
are
necessary
,
by
example
of
our
Religion
:
which
had
it
not
been
reduc'd
again
to
its
principles
by
Saint
Francis
,
and
Saint
Dominique
,
it
would
have
been
quite
defac'd
:
for
these
by
their
poverty
,
and
their
imitation
of
Christs
life
,
made
a
new
impression
thereof
in
mens
minds
,
which
was
quite
blotted
our
thence
:
and
their
new
rules
were
so
powerfull
,
and
now
are
the
cause
that
the
dishonesty
of
the
Prelates
,
and
the
heads
of
the
Religion
,
do
not
ruine
it
,
partly
by
their
living
in
poverty
,
and
partly
by
the
great
credit
they
have
in
confessing
the
people
,
and
preaching
to
them
,
whereby
they
give
them
to
understand
that
it
is
evill
,
to
speak
evil
against
him
that
is
evill
;
and
that
it
is
good
,
rather
to
live
in
obedience
to
them
;
and
if
they
are
faulty
,
to
leave
them
to
the
chastisement
of
God
.
And
so
they
offend
the
most
they
can
;
for
they
feare
not
the
punishment
they
see
not
,
and
beleeve
not
.
This
reformation
then
hath
and
does
maintain
this
Religion
.
Kingdomes
also
have
need
of
reforming
and
restoring
their
laws
to
their
first
beginnings
.
And
wee
see
how
much
good
this
does
in
the
Kingdom
of
France
;
Which
Kingdom
is
governed
more
by
its
lawes
and
customes
than
any
other
Kingdom
else
.
Of
which
lawes
and
customes
,
the
Parliaments
are
the
principal
maintainers
,
and
especially
that
of
Paris
,
which
restores
them
again
to
life
,
whensoever
it
makes
any
execution
against
a
Prince
of
the
Realm
,
and
that
they
condemn
the
King
in
their
sentences
:
and
till
this
present
it
hath
maintained
it self
,
by
being
an
obstinate
executioner
against
that
Nobility
:
but
whensoever
it
should
suffer
any
of
their
faults
to
escape
unpunished
,
and
they
chance
to
multiply
,
without
doubt
it
would
come
to
pass
that
either
they
were
to
be
corrected
with
great
disorder
,
or
that
Kingdom
come
to
a
dissolution
.
Therefore
we
conclude
that
there
is
nothing
more
necessary
in
a
politick
government
,
Sect
,
Kingdom
,
or
Commonwealth
that
it
be
,
than
to
restore
it
to
that
reputation
which
in
its
first
beginning
it
had
,
and
take
a
care
that
either
the
customes
be
good
,
or
the
men
good
,
that
they
may
rather
work
this
effect
,
that
it
be
not
left
to
some
forraign
force
to
do
it
:
For
(
however
that
sometimes
it
be
an
excellent
remedy
,
as
it
prov'd
to
Rome
)
yet
is
it
so
dangerous
,
that
it
is
in
no
case
to
be
desir'd
:
And
to
make
it
appear
to
any
man
,
how
much
the
actions
of
particular
men
served
to
advance
Romes
greatness
,
and
wrought
many
good
effects
in
that
City
,
I
will
come
to
the
narration
and
discourse
of
them
,
within
the
bounds
whereof
wee
will
conclude
this
third
Book
,
and
last
part
of
this
first
decade
.
And
howbeit
the
Kings
actions
were
great
and
remarkable
,
being
the
History
sets
them
down
at
large
,
we
shall
omit
them
,
nor
speak
of
them
otherwise
,
unless
it
be
touching
some
thing
they
did
belonging
to
their
private
advantage
;
and
here
we
will
begin
with
Brutus
,
Father
of
the
Roman
liberty
.
CHAP.
II.
It
is
a
very
great
part
of
wisdome
,
sometime
to
seem
a
fool
.
NO
man
was
ever
reputed
so
sage
or
wise
for
any
thing
that
ever
he
did
,
as
Junius
Brutus
deserves
to
be
accounted
for
taking
upon
him
the
person
of
a
fool
;
and
though
Titus
Livius
expresses
no
other
but
one
reason
to
induce
him
thereto
,
which
was
to
live
in
security
,
and
preserve
his
patrimony
;
yet
if
we
consider
his
manner
of
proceeding
,
we
may
beleeve
,
that
he
thus
dissembled
,
to
the
end
he
might
be
less
observed
,
&
have
the
more
conveniency
to
suppress
the
Kings
,
and
free
his
Country
,
upon
any
occasion
offered
.
And
that
he
thought
upon
this
,
it
appears
first
in
the
interpretation
he
made
of
Apolloes
Oracle
,
when
he
fained
to
fall
down
,
that
he
might
kiss
the
ground
,
deeming
thereby
that
the
Gods
favour'd
his
designes
;
and
afterwards
when
at
the
occasion
where
Lucretia
was
slain
,
among
the
Father
,
husband
,
and
other
of
her
kindred
,
he
was
the
first
that
drew
the
knife
out
of
the
wound
,
and
made
those
that
were
present
sweare
they
would
never
more
endure
in
time
to
come
a
King
in
Rome
.
From
his
example
are
those
to
learn
,
that
are
discontented
with
any
Prince
:
and
firct
they
should
measure
and
weigh
their
own
forces
:
and
if
they
are
so
powerfull
,
that
they
are
able
to
discover
themselves
as
enemies
,
and
openly
make
war
against
him
,
then
ought
they
plainly
go
that
way
,
as
least
dangerous
and
the
morehonorable
.
But
if
they
be
of
such
condition
,
that
they
are
not
able
to
enter
into
termes
of
open
hostilitie
against
him
,
then
ought
they
to
use
al
industry
in
seeking
to
gain
his
favour
;
and
to
this
effect
enter
into
him
by
all
those
waies
that
are
fit
,
following
him
in
his
sports
,
and
taking
pleasure
in
all
those
things
they
see
he
delights
in
.
This
familiarity
first
causes
thee
to
live
secure
,
and
without
running
any
hazard
,
gives
thee
means
to
enjoy
that
Princes
good
fortune
with
him
,
and
layes
the
way
open
to
thee
to
satisfie
thy
own
mind
.
It
is
true
that
some
say
,
they
would
not
stand
so
near
the
Princes
,
as
to
be
oppressed
with
their
ruines
,
nor
so
far
off
,
but
that
when
their
ruine
comes
,
they
may
be
able
time
enough
to
rise
upon
some
part
of
their
ruines
.
Which
middle
way
would
be
the
truest
,
were
it
rightly
kept
.
But
because
I
think
it
is
impossible
,
it
is
meet
to
reduce
it
to
the
two
waies
above
mentioned
,
which
is
either
to
be
at
large
from
them
,
or
cleave
close
to
them
.
Hee
that
does
otherwise
,
if
he
be
a
man
of
eminent
qualities
,
lives
in
continuall
danger
.
Nor
sufficeth
it
to
say
,
I
care
not
for
any
thing
,
I
desire
neither
honors
,
nor
wealth
,
I
will
live
quietly
,
and
without
entring
into
any
faction
;
for
these
excuses
are
heard
,
but
pass
not
as
current
.
Neither
can
men
of
quality
chuse
this
standing
quiet
,
however
that
heartily
they
make
choyce
of
it
and
without
any
ambition
,
because
they
are
not
beleeved
in
it
,
in
so
much
as
though
they
themselves
would
,
yet
others
will
not
let
them
live
so
.
They
must
then
play
the
fool
as
Brutus
did
;
and
he
plaies
the
fool
a
great
deal
,
that
prayses
,
and
prates
to
them
,
is
present
at
,
and
bears
a
part
in
those
things
that
are
against
his
own
mind
,
to
comply
with
his
Princes
delights
.
And
seeing
we
have
spoken
of
this
mans
wisedome
in
recovering
of
the
State
,
we
will
now
speak
of
his
severity
in
maintaining
it
.
CHAP.
III.
That
it
was
necessary
,
for
preservation
of
the
new
gotten
liberty
,
to
put
Brutus
his
sons
to
death
.
B
Butus
his
severity
was
no
less
necessary
than
usefull
to
maintain
Rome
in
the
liberty
she
had
gotten
,
which
was
of
rare
example
in
all
memorials
of
things
happen'd
,
to
see
the
Father
sit
on
his
Tribunal
,
and
not
only
condemn
his
sons
to
death
,
but
be
present
and
assistant
at
it
.
And
this
is
alwaies
well
known
to
those
that
read
ancient
stories
,
how
that
after
the
change
of
a
State
,
either
from
a
Republick
into
a
Tyranny
,
or
from
a
Tyranny
into
a
Republick
,
some
memorable
execution
upon
the
enemies
of
the
present
condition
is
needfull
.
And
hee
that
sets
up
a
Tyranny
,
and
flaies
not
Brutus
;
and
hee
that
brings
in
liberty
,
and
slayes
not
Brutus
his
sons
,
can
hardly
subsist
.
And
because
for
merly
wee
have
discoursed
hereof
at
large
,
I
referr
my self
to
what
was
then
spoken
hereof
.
I
shall
alledge
here
only
one
example
which
was
in
our
times
,
and
in
our
Country
:
that
of
Peter
Soderini
,
who
thought
with
his
patience
and
goodness
to
overcome
that
passionate
desire
which
was
in
the
sons
of
Brutus
,
to
return
under
another
government
,
but
deceived
himself
therein
.
And
albeit
hee
by
his
wisdome
perceived
well
this
necessity
,
and
that
the
way
and
ambition
of
those
that
shov'd
against
him
,
gave
him
occasion
to
extinguish
them
,
yet
hee
never
bent
his
mind
to
it
:
for
besides
his
opinion
that
he
was
able
by
patience
and
goodness
to
worke
out
all
ill
humors
,
and
by
liberality
towards
them
,
to
weare
out
any
enmity
was
borne
against
him
,
hee
was
of
advice
(
as
many
times
by
discourse
hee
shewed
some
of
his
friends
)
that
if
hee
would
strongly
incounter
the
oppositions
were
made
against
him
,
and
master
his
adversaries
,
he
had
need
take
upon
him
extraordinary
authority
,
whereby
he
should
break
the
civil
equality
among
them
.
Which
thing
(
however
that
hee
should
never
afterwards
act
tyrannically
)
would
so
much
affright
the
multitude
,
that
they
would
never
agree
after
his
death
to
create
a
new
standard-bearer
for
life
,
which
dignity
he
held
fit
to
put
forward
and
maintain
.
This
respect
was
wise
and
good
:
yet
must
we
never
suffer
any
evill
to
continue
in
regard
of
a
good
,
being
that
good
may
easily
be
supprest
by
that
evill
.
And
he
should
beleeve
,
being
his
actions
and
his
intentions
were
to
bee
judged
by
their
end
(
in
case
that
good
fortune
and
life
should
have
accompanied
him
)
that
he
could
have
assured
every
one
,
how
that
what
he
had
done
,
was
for
the
safety
of
his
Country
,
not
for
his
own
ambition
,
whereby
he
might
have
been
able
to
regulate
things
in
such
a
manner
,
that
no
successor
of
his
could
do
that
for
evill
,
which
hee
had
done
for
good
.
But
the
first
opinion
deceived
him
,
not
knowing
that
malice
is
not
abated
by
time
,
nor
appeased
by
any
good
turne
.
So
that
because
he
was
ignorant
how
to
imitate
Brutus
,
he
lost
together
with
his
Country
the
State
,
and
his
own
reputation
.
And
as
it
is
a
hard
thing
to
save
a
free
State
,
so
is
it
not
easie
to
preserve
a
Monarchy
,
as
in
the
Chapter
following
it
shall
be
shewed
.
CHAP.
IV.
No
Prince
lives
secure
in
his
Principality
,
while
those
are
living
who
were
despoyld
of
it
.
THe
death
of
Tarquinus
Priscus
causd
by
the
sons
of
Ancus
,
and
the
death
of
Servius
Tullus
causd
by
Tarquinius
the
proud
,
shew
how
hard
and
dangerous
it
is
,
to
despoyle
any
one
of
a
Kingdome
,
and
suffer
him
to
live
,
though
he
indevour
by
many
favours
to
gaine
him
.
And
we
see
how
Tarquinius
Prisons
was
deceived
in
thinking
legally
to
possess
that
Kingdom
,
in
that
it
was
given
him
by
the
people
,
and
confirm'd
by
the
Senate
.
Neither
did
he
beleeve
that
disdain
could
so
much
prevaile
with
Ancus
his
sons
,
that
they
would
not
be
satisfied
,
with
what
all
Rome
was
contented
.
And
Servius
Tullus
deluded
himself
,
in
thinking
he
could
with
new
obligations
gain
the
good
will
of
Tarquins
sons
.
So
that
touching
the
first
,
every
Prince
may
well
be
advisd
that
he
cannot
live
sure
of
his
Principality
,
while
they
live
who
were
bereavd
of
it
.
Touching
the
second
,
every
one
that
is
of
power
may
well
remember
,
that
never
were
old
injuries
cancelld
with
new
favours
,
especially
when
the
new
favours
are
less
of
value
than
the
wrongs
done
And
without
all
doubt
Servius
Tullus
was
nothing
wise
to
think
that
Tarquins
sons
would
patiently
endure
to
be
his
sons
in
law
,
whose
King
they
thought
by
right
they
ought
to
be
.
And
this
desire
of
reigning
is
so
great
,
that
it
not
only
enters
their
breasts
,
that
look
to
succeed
in
the
Kingdome
,
but
they
also
who
no
waies
expect
it
.
As
in
Tarquinius
his
wife
,
Servius
his
young
daughter
,
who
would
wish
this
rage
against
that
piety
shee
ought
her
father
,
set
her
husband
against
him
,
to
take
his
life
from
him
,
and
his
Kingdome
thereby
;
so
much
more
accounted
she
to
be
a
Queen
,
than
the
daughter
of
a
King
.
If
then
Tarquininus
Priscus
and
Servius
Tullus
lost
the
Kingdom
for
not
assuring
themselves
of
those
upon
whose
right
they
had
usurpd
,
Tarquinius
the
proud
lost
it
for
not
observing
the
ancient
Kings
Customes
,
as
shall
be
shewd
in
the
Chapter
following
.
CHAP.
V.
What
it
is
that
makes
a
King
lose
his
Kingdome
,
which
he
enjoyes
by
right
of
inheritance
.
TArquinius
the
proud
having
stain
Servius
Tullus
,
and
of
him
no
heirs
remaining
behind
,
came
to
possess
the
Kingdom
securely
,
having
no
cause
to
feare
,
those
things
that
had
hurt
his
predecessours
.
And
however
his
way
of
getting
the
Kingdom
had
been
so
extraordinary
,
and
odious
,
yet
had
he
observd
the
ancient
customes
of
the
other
Kings
,
he
would
have
been
borne
with
:
nor
would
the
Senate
nor
the
Commonalty
have
risen
against
him
to
wrest
the
State
out
of
his
hands
.
Hee
was
not
then
banished
because
his
son
Sextus
ravisht
Lucretia
,
but
for
that
he
had
broken
the
laws
of
the
kingdome
,
and
ruld
tyrannously
,
having
taken
all
authority
from
the
Senate
,
and
reserved
it
wholly
to
himself
,
and
those
affaires
,
which
had
been
dispatcht
in
publick
by
the
Senate
of
Rome
with
generall
satssfaction
,
he
reduc'd
to
be
treated
in
his
own
Palace
,
which
gain'd
him
both
blame
and
envie
:
so
that
in
a
very
short
time
he
despoyld
Rome
of
all
that
liberty
which
she
had
alwaies
maintained
under
others
.
Nor
was
this
enough
to
make
the
Senate
his
enemy
,
but
he
provok'd
the
people
also
against
him
,
tiring
them
out
in
base
mechanick
services
,
and
such
as
were
far
different
from
that
,
wherein
his
ancestors
had
imployd
them
:
so
that
having
replenish'd
Rome
with
examples
of
his
cruelty
and
pride
,
he
had
now
dispos'd
all
the
Romans
minds
to
rebellion
,
whensoever
occasion
should
be
off
r'd
And
had
not
that
accident
of
Lucretia
fallen
out
,
so
soon
as
any
other
should
have
chanc'd
,
it
would
have
produc'd
the
same
effect
:
for
if
Tarquinius
had
liv'd
,
as
the
other
Kings
did
,
and
Sextus
his
son
had
committed
that
offence
,
Brutus
&
Collatinus
would
have
had
recourse
to
Tarquinius
,
for
revenge
against
Sextus
,
and
not
to
the
people
of
Rome
.
Therefore
let
Princes
know
,
that
at
the
same
houre
they
begin
to
lose
the
State
,
when
they
begin
to
violate
the
Laws
,
&
and
those
manners
&
customs
that
are
ancient
,
under
which
men
have
liv'd
a
long
time
.
And
in
case
they
come
to
lose
their
State
,
and
should
ever
become
so
wise
as
to
understand
with
what
facility
they
maintain
their
Principalities
,
who
follow
good
counsell
,
they
themselves
would
much
more
lament
their
loss
&
blame
themselves
more
than
others
would
:
for
it
is
much
easier
to
be
belov'd
by
the
good
,
than
by
the
bad
;
&
to
obey
the
Laws
,
than
command
over
them
.
And
if
they
would
understand
what
course
they
were
to
take
,
whereby
to
put
this
in
practice
,
and
that
they
are
not
to
undergo
greater
labour
than
to
view
the
lives
of
good
Princes
,
&
take
them
for
looking-glasses
,
such
as
were
Timoleon
the
Corinthian
,
&
Aratus
Sicioneus
,
&
such
like
,
in
whose
lives
they
shall
find
security
&
satisfaction
,
as
well
of
him
that
rules
,
as
of
him
that
is
ruled
,
they
would
have
a
desire
to
become
like
them
,
being
able
for
the
reasons
alledgd
to
do
so
;
for
men
,
when
they
are
well
governd
,
seek
after
no
other
liberty
,
as
it
befell
the
people
that
were
governd
by
the
two
were
named
before
,
who
were
constraind
to
be
Princes
whiles
they
liv'd
,
however
they
tryed
many
times
to
retire
themselves
to
a
private
life
.
And
because
in
this
&
the
two
precedent
Chapters
,
we
have
discoursed
of
humors
stird
up
against
Princes
,
and
of
the
conspiracy
made
by
Brutus
his
sons
against
their
Country
,
&
of
those
against
Tarquinius
Priscus
&
Servius
Tullus
:
methinks
it
is
not
out
of
our
purpose
to
speak
at
large
thereof
in
the
following
Chapter
,
being
a
matter
whereof
Princes
and
private
men
may
worthly
take
notice
.
CHAP.
VI.
Of
Conspiracies
.
I
Would
not
omit
to
discourse
somewhat
touching
Conspiracies
,
being
they
are
dangerous
for
Princes
and
private
men
also
:
for
wee
see
that
more
Princes
have
lost
their
lives
thereby
,
and
States
too
,
than
by
open
war
:
because
few
are
able
to
make
open
war
against
Princes
,
but
every
one
may
conspire
against
them
On
the
other
side
,
private
men
enter
not
into
a
more
dangerous
nor
rash
enterprise
than
this
:
for
it
is
full
of
difficulties
,
and
exceeding
perillous
every
way
;
From
whence
proceeds
it
,
that
many
of
them
are
practisd
,
but
few
succeed
.
To
the
end
there
of
that
Princes
may
learn
to
beware
of
these
dangers
,
and
private
men
be
more
fearful
to
thrust
themselves
into
them
,
or
rather
learn
to
content
themselves
to
live
under
that
rule
which
their
fortune
hath
allotted
them
,
I
shall
speak
thereof
more
at
large
,
not
omitting
any
thing
remarkable
,
that
may
serve
for
instruction
of
the
one
or
the
other
.
And
truly
that
of
Tacitus
is
well
termd
a
golden
sentence
,
where
he
saies
,
that
men
are
to
reverence
things
past
,
and
submit
to
what
is
present
;
and
should
wish
for
good
Princes
,
but
whatsoever
they
are
,
endure
them
:
and
verily
he
who
does
otherwise
,
ruines
both
himself
and
his
Country
.
Wee
must
then
(
entring
into
the
matter
)
consider
against
whom
Conspiracies
are
made
and
wee
shall
find
they
are
plotted
against
amans
Country
,
or
against
his
Prince
,
of
which
two
I
intend
this
present
discourse
:
for
touching
those
that
are
practis'd
to
deliver
a
Town
into
the
enemies
hands
that
besiege
it
,
or
that
have
likelihood
with
this
for
any
cause
,
wee
have
already
sufficiently
spoken
.
And
wee
will
treat
in
this
first
part
,
touching
that
against
a
Prince
:
and
first
we
will
examine
the
reasons
thereof
,
which
are
many
,
though
one
there
is
of
more
importance
than
all
the
rest
.
And
this
is
general
hatred
:
for
that
Prince
,
that
hath
provok'd
general
hate
,
must
needs
have
net●ed
some
particulars
,
somwhat
more
than
others
,
insomuch
that
they
long
to
be
revengd
on
him
:
and
they
are
the
more
incited
hereto
,
by
the
general
hatred
they
find
conceivd
against
him
.
A
Prince
then
ought
to
avoyd
these
publick
blames
,
and
how
he
should
behave
himself
to
avoid
them
(
having
treated
otherwhere
)
I
will
not
now
middle
:
for
if
he
beware
well
of
them
,
offences
against
particulars
shall
be
of
small
force
to
hurt
him
:
one
reason
is
,
because
Princes
seldom
light
upon
men
that
are
so
sensible
of
an
injury
as
to
run
such
extream
hazard
to
revenge
them
;
the
other
is
,
that
though
they
were
of
such
resolution
,
and
force
,
as
might
serve
to
do
it
,
yet
would
that
general
good
will
of
men
to
that
Prince
withhold
them
from
it
.
The
injuries
must
be
either
touching
the
fortunes
,
lives
,
or
honors
.
Of
those
that
are
touching
mens
lives
,
the
threats
are
more
dangerous
than
the
execution
,
or
rather
the
threats
are
very
dangerous
;
but
in
the
execution
there
is
no
danger
at
all
;
for
he
that
is
dead
cannot
think
upon
revenge
;
and
those
that
remain
alive
,
most
commonly
leave
to
think
of
him
that
is
dead
:
but
he
that
is
threatned
,
and
sees
himself
put
to
a
point
,
either
to
do
or
suffer
,
becomes
a
very
dangerous
man
to
the
Prince
,
as
we
shall
say
particularly
in
due
place
.
The
fortunes
and
honours
of
a
man
are
those
two
things
which
excepting
this
necessity
,
touch
men
more
nearely
then
any
other
offence
,
where
of
a
Prince
should
be
wel
aware
:
for
he
can
never
strip
a
man
so
bare
,
but
that
he
may
find
a
kinfe
to
revenge
himself
,
nor
so
much
dishonour
any
one
,
but
that
he
may
still
hold
an
obstinate
resolution
of
vengeance
.
And
touching
honours
,
the
dishonoring
of
women
is
of
most
importance
,
and
after
this
the
scorne
and
disgrace
of
their
persons
.
This
armed
Pausanias
against
Philip
of
Macedon
,
and
this
hath
put
weapons
in
many
others
hands
against
divers
Princes
.
And
in
our
dayes
Julius
Belanti
had
no
other
motive
to
conspire
against
Pandulphus
the
tyrant
of
Siena
,
but
onely
for
that
he
had
given
him
one
of
his
daughters
to
wife
and
afterwards
taken
her
away
from
him
,
as
in
its
place
we
shall
relate
.
The
greatest
cause
the
Pazzi
had
to
conspire
against
the
Medici
,
was
,
the
inheritance
of
John
Bonrosnei
,
whereof
they
were
dispossess'd
by
their
order
.
And
another
cause
,
and
a
very
great
one
too
,
why
men
plot
treachery
against
a
Prince
,
is
a
desire
which
they
have
to
free
their
countrey
,
which
hath
bin
seis'd
on
by
him
.
This
mov'd
Brutus
and
Cassius
against
Caesar
.
This
incited
many
others
against
Falaris
,
Dionysius
,
and
such
other
usurpers
of
their
Countries
.
Nor
can
any
Tyrant
free
himself
from
the
danger
of
his
humor
by
other
means
then
by
laying
down
his
Tyranny
.
And
because
we
find
none
will
doe
this
,
there
are
but
few
of
them
that
come
not
to
ill
ends
;
Which
gave
Iuvenal
occasion
to
say
,
Few
Tyrants
unto
Plutoes
Court
do
goe
,
The
dangers
that
(
as
I
said
before
)
accompany
conspiracies
,
are
great
,
and
continual
:
for
in
such
cases
there
is
danger
in
plotting
them
,
in
executing
them
,
and
after
they
are
executed
too
.
Those
that
conspire
,
are
either
one
or
more
;
that
of
one
cannot
be
termed
a
conspiracy
,
but
a
setled
resolution
bred
in
a
man
to
slay
a
Prince
.
This
alone
of
all
the
three
dangers
,
which
conspiracies
hazard
,
is
free
from
the
first
.
For
before
the
putting
it
in
execution
,
it
carries
no
hazard
with
it
,
being
none
is
made
privy
to
his
secret
,
nor
is
there
any
danger
,
that
his
purpose
come
to
the
Princes
eare
.
A
resolution
after
this
sort
may
happen
to
be
found
in
any
man
of
any
condition
,
little
or
great
,
Noble
or
ignoble
,
familiar
or
not
familiar
with
he
Prince
:
for
at
some
times
it
is
permitted
to
any
man
to
speak
with
him
and
;
he
that
comes
to
speak
with
him
may
vent
this
passion
of
his
minde
.
Pausanias
,
of
whom
we
have
otherwhere
spoken
,
slew
Philip
of
Macodon
,
as
he
was
going
to
the
Temple
environ'd
with
a
thousand
armed
men
,
and
between
his
own
son
and
son
in
law
;
but
he
was
one
of
the
Nobles
,
and
well
known
to
the
Prince
.
A
poore
and
abject
Spaniard
strook
Ferdinand
King
of
Spain
with
a
knife
in
the
neck
;
however
the
wound
was
not
mortal
,
yet
hereby
it
appeared
,
that
he
had
both
courage
and
opportunity
to
do
it
.
A
Turkish
Priest
nam'd
Dervis
,
drew
a
scimitarre
against
Bajazet
,
father
of
this
present
Turk
,
but
hit
him
not
,
yet
wanted
he
neither
courage
nor
commodity
for
his
purpose
.
Of
this
sort
of
resolutions
thus
bent
,
I
think
there
are
many
,
that
would
do
it
:
for
in
willing
this
,
there
is
neither
punishment
,
nor
danger
at
all
,
but
few
venture
to
act
it
;
and
of
those
that
do
,
exceeding
few
or
none
there
are
,
that
are
not
slaine
in
the
act
.
Therefore
no
man
willingly
will
thrust
himselfe
upon
a
certaine
death
.
But
let
us
leave
these
single
resolutions
,
and
come
to
consider
the
conspiracies
have
bin
made
by
great
men
,
or
those
that
are
very
familiar
with
the
Prince
:
for
others
(
unless
they
be
stark
mad
)
will
never
offer
to
conspire
:
for
mean
men
,
and
not
familiar
with
the
Prince
,
want
all
those
conveniencies
,
which
are
required
in
the
executing
of
a
conspiracy
.
First●
,
mean
men
cannot
find
those
that
will
be
true
to
them
:
for
no
one
man
can
apply
himself
to
their
wills
for
any
of
those
hopes
which
cause
men
to
adventure
upon
desperate
dangers
,
so
that
when
they
have
enlarged
themselves
to
two
or
three
persons
,
some
one
of
them
becomes
an
accuser
,
and
ruines
all
.
But
in
case
they
should
be
so
happy
,
that
none
should
discover
their
plots
,
yet
in
the
execution
are
they
beset
with
such
difficulties
having
not
free
access
unto
the
Prince
)
that
it
is
impossible
,
but
that
there
in
they
must
perish
:
for
if
great
men
,
who
ordinarily
come
near
him
,
are
oppress'd
with
such
difficulties
,
which
we
shall
presently
mention
,
it
must
needs
be
that
with
those
these
difficulties
must
perpetually
increase
.
Therefore
men
(
because
where
there
is
losse
both
of
life
and
fortunes
they
are
not
stark
mad
)
when
they
find
themselves
weak
,
are
well
aware
of
what
they
do
:
and
when
they
are
very
weary
of
a
Prince
,
they
are
contented
onely
to
curse
him
,
and
expect
,
while
those
that
are
of
higher
quality
then
themselves
,
do
avenge
them
.
And
yet
in
case
that
any
of
such
like
as
these
should
have
assailed
any
thing
,
the
design
they
had
might
well
be
laudable
,
but
not
their
wisdome
.
We
see
therefore
,
that
those
that
have
conspired
,
were
all
great
men
,
or
familiar
with
the
Prince
:
Whereof
many
have
conspired
,
as
well
being
mov'd
by
too
many
favors
,
as
by
too
many
injuries
.
As
Perennius
was
against
Commodus
,
Plautianus
against
Severus
,
Sejanus
against
Tiberius
.
All
these
were
by
their
Emperors
so
enriched
with
wealth
,
and
dignified
with
titles
and
honours
,
that
it
seemed
there
wanted
not
any
thing
to
perfect
their
power
but
the
Empire
it self
,
which
they
meaning
not
to
fail
of
,
betook
themselves
to
conspire
against
their
Prince
,
and
their
treasons
all
had
that
end
,
which
their
ingratitude
well
deserved
.
However
that
among
those
of
this
sort
in
these
latter
times
that
of
Iacob
Apianus
against
Petrus
Gambacorti
Prince
of
Pisa
succeeded
fortunately
,
which
Iacobus
having
had
his
education
and
breeding
and
credit
too
from
him
,
afterwards
took
the
state
from
him
.
Of
this
sort
was
that
of
Coppola
in
our
dayes
against
Ferdinand
King
of
Arragon
,
which
Coppola
having
attained
to
that
greatness
,
that
he
thought
he
wanted
nothing
but
the
Kingdom
,
meaning
not
to
go
without
,
lost
his
life
.
And
indeed
if
any
conspiracie
against
Princes
made
by
great
men
be
ever
like
to
take
effect
,
this
was
very
probable
,
being
made
by
one
that
might
have
been
termed
a
King
for
his
power
and
conveniencies
he
had
to
work
his
will
.
But
that
greedy
ambition
which
blinds
them
in
their
desire
to
rule
,
blinds
them
as
well
in
the
mannaging
of
this
enterprise
:
for
if
they
know
how
to
act
this
villany
with
discretion
,
it
were
impossible
but
it
should
succeed
.
A
Prince
then
that
would
be
well
wary
of
conspiracies
,
should
be
more
jealous
of
those
to
whom
he
hath
afforded
most
favours
,
then
of
those
to
whom
he
hath
done
most
wrongs
:
for
these
want
the
means
,
and
those
have
them
at
pleasure
,
and
the
will
is
a
like
;
for
the
desire
of
rule
is
as
great
or
greater
then
that
of
revenge
.
Wherefore
they
are
to
confer
but
so
much
authority
upon
their
favourites
,
that
still
between
it
and
the
Principality
they
keep
a
distance
,
and
leave
(
as
it
were
)
some
obstacle
in
their
way
;
otherwise
seldome
falls
it
out
but
that
it
chances
to
them
,
as
to
the
forementioned
Princes
.
But
let
us
return
to
our
order
.
I
say
,
that
being
they
are
to
be
great
men
that
plot
these
treasons
,
and
have
easie
access
unto
the
Prince
,
we
are
to
discourse
upon
the
successes
of
these
their
undertakings
,
what
they
have
been
,
and
point
at
the
reason
that
hath
caus'd
them
to
prove
happy
or
unhappy
.
And
(
as
I
formerly
said
)
at
three
severall
times
,
herein
are
dangers
found
.
In
the
plotting
,
in
the
acting
,
and
after
.
Therefore
are
there
very
few
that
prove
lucky
:
for
it
is
almost
impossible
to
pass
all
these
happily
.
And
beginning
to
treate
touching
the
dangers
of
the
the
first
,
that
are
of
most
importance
,
I
say
,
there
had
need
be
much
circumspection
and
advisement
,
which
likewise
had
need
be
seconded
by
good
fortune
,
that
in
the
contriving
and
ordering
of
a
conspiracy
,
it
be
not
disclosed
;
for
that
is
done
either
by
relation
,
or
by
conjecture
.
This
relation
proceeds
from
the
small
faith
;
or
small
discretion
of
those
men
with
whom
thou
communicatest
thy
secret
.
And
it
is
a
thing
ordinary
to
find
but
small
saith
;
for
thou
canst
not
communicate
it
but
to
thy
confidents
,
who
for
love
of
thee
may
adventure
death
,
or
to
men
that
are
discontented
with
the
Prince
.
Of
confidents
,
possible
it
is
that
one
or
two
may
be
found
;
but
when
thou
openest
thy self
to
more
;
it
is
impossible
thou
shouldest
find
them
.
Besides
the
good
will
they
beare
thee
,
had
need
be
very
great
,
to
the
end
they
be
not
affrighted
at
the
punishment
and
peril
they
incurre
.
Moreover
men
are
often
deceived
touching
the
love
,
which
thou
beleevest
another
bears
thee
,
nor
canst
thou
ever
assure
thy self
of
it
,
unless
thou
hast
had
experience
thereof
;
and
to
make
proof
of
it
herein
is
exceeding
dangerous
;
and
though
thou
hast
had
proof
thereof
in
some
other
dangerous
exploit
,
where
they
have
stuck
close
upon
thee
,
yet
canst
thou
not
from
thence
measure
them
for
this
,
being
this
danger
surpasses
all
others
.
If
thou
measurest
their
faith
by
their
discontent
against
their
Prince
,
therein
thou
mayest
easily
deceive
thy self
:
For
so
soon
as
thou
hast
revealed
thy
mind
to
that
malecontent
,
thou
givest
him
a
subject
whereupon
to
work
again
his
own
content
;
and
either
his
hatred
had
need
be
great
,
or
thy
power
with
him
of
much
force
to
keep
him
faithful
.
Hereupon
it
arises
,
that
very
many
of
them
are
discover'd
&
crush'd
even
in
the
egge
;
and
when
one
of
them
among
many
men
hath
bin
kept
secret
any
time
,
it
hath
bin
thought
of
as
a
miracle
as
was
that
of
Piso
against
Nero
,
&
in
our
daies
that
of
Laurence
and
Iulian
of
Medici
,
whereunto
above
fifty
persons
were
made
privy
,
who
met
together
all
to
discover
themselves
in
the
execution
thereof
.
As
for
the
discovery
for
want
of
discretion
,
that
falls
out
when
a
conspirator
is
not
wary
in
his
talk
,
so
that
a
servant
or
another
third
person
comes
take
notice
thereof
,
as
it
befe
Brutus
his
sonnes
,
who
in
contriving
the
business
with
Tarquins
Ambassadors
,
were
understood
by
a
slave
who
accused
them
:
or
else
through
a
certain
lightness
of
thine
own
,
thou
communicatest
it
to
a
woman
,
or
a
child
which
thou
lovest
,
or
some
such
slight
person
,
as
Dimus
did
,
one
of
those
that
conspir'd
with
Philotas
against
Alexander
the
Great
,
who
told
the
treason
to
Nicomacus
,
a
child
which
he
lov'd
,
who
presently
told
it
to
Ciballinus
his
brother
,
and
Ciballinus
to
the
King
.
Touching
discovery
by
conjecture
,
we
have
an
example
for
it
,
where
Piso
conspired
against
Nero
,
at
which
time
Sceuinus
one
of
the
conspirators
,
the
day
before
that
he
was
to
slay
Nero
,
made
his
will
,
and
gave
order
that
Milichius
his
freeman
should
cause
his
old
and
rusty
dagger
to
be
scoured
;
he
made
all
his
slaves
free
,
and
gave
them
money
;
he
appointed
many
clouts
to
bind
up
wounds
to
be
prepared
;
by
which
conjectures
Milichius
being
assured
of
the
business
,
accused
,
him
before
Nero.
Scevinus
was
taken
,
and
with
him
Natalis
one
of
the
Conspirators
,
who
had
bin
seen
the
day
before
to
talk
a
good
while
and
privately
in
his
company
,
who
not
agreeing
concerning
the
discourse
they
held
,
were
forc'd
to
confess
the
truth
.
So
that
the
treason
was
bewraied
,
and
the
conspirators
utterly
ruin'd
.
From
these
occasions
of
discovery
it
is
impossible
to
beware
,
but
that
through
malice
,
indiscretion
,
or
fondness
all
comes
to
light
,
whensoever
the
complotters
thereof
pass
the
number
of
three
or
four
;
and
in
case
that
more
then
one
of
them
chance
to
be
taken
,
it
is
impossible
but
that
it
must
be
so
;
for
two
cannot
be
so
well
agreed
of
all
their
discourses
together
,
but
that
in
some
things
they
shall
jarre
.
When
one
alone
that
is
resolute
,
is
laid
hold
on
,
he
may
through
the
strength
of
his
courage
,
be
able
to
conceal
the
rest
of
his
complices
:
but
then
must
his
consors
shew
no
less
resolution
than
he
,
in
standing
firm
and
not
discovering
themselves
by
flight
:
for
on
which
side
soever
courage
failes
,
either
on
his
that
is
taken
,
or
his
that
is
at
liberty
,
the
conspiracy
is
disclosd
.
And
the
example
alleadgd
by
T.
Livius
,
is
very
rare
in
the
treason
that
was
plotted
against
Ier
lamus
King
of
Siracusa
,
where
Theodorus
one
of
the
conspirators
being
taken
,
with
a
stout
courage
conceald
all
his
companions
,
and
accused
the
Kings
friends
;
and
on
the
other
part
,
all
the
confederates
were
confident
of
Theodorus
his
resolution
,
that
not
one
of
them
forsook
Siracusa
,
or
made
any
shew
of
fear
,
Wherefore
all
these
dangers
are
to
be
passed
in
the
ordering
of
a
conspiracy
,
before
the
acting
of
it
.
Against
which
these
are
the
remedies
;
The
first
and
truest
whereof
,
or
better
to
term
it
,
the
only
one
is
,
not
to
give
leisure
to
our
complices
to
accuse
us
,
nor
communicate
the
matter
unto
them
,
till
just
when
thou
meanest
to
put
it
in
execution
,
and
not
before
.
They
who
have
thus
done
,
assuredly
escape
the
dangers
belonging
to
the
practise
thereof
;
and
oftentimes
the
others
also
,
or
rather
have
they
all
had
good
success
:
and
I
think
every
one
that
is
wise
should
endeavor
to
carry
the
matter
thus
.
I
will
content
my self
to
produce
only
two
examples
.
Nelematus
not
being
able
to
indure
the
tyranny
of
Aristorimus
,
Tyrant
of
Epirus
,
assembled
together
in
his
house
many
of
his
friends
and
kinsfolke
,
and
having
encourag'd
them
to
set
their
Country
at
liberty
,
some
of
them
requir'd
time
to
be
advised
and
prepared
:
whereupon
Nelematus
causd
his
servants
to
shut
the
doors
,
and
told
those
he
had
cald
together
,
That
they
should
either
swear
presently
to
do
this
,
or
if
not
,
he
would
deliver
them
all
prisoners
to
Aristotimus
:
whereby
all
of
them
,
being
mov'd
,
swore
,
and
so
without
more
delay
,
went
and
put
in
execution
what
Nelematus
had
orderd
.
One
of
the
Magi
having
by
treachery
seisd
upon
the
kingdom
of
Persia
,
Orthanus
a
great
man
had
notice
thereof
,
and
found
out
the
deceit
,
and
thereupon
conferd
with
six
other
Princes
of
that
State
,
saying
,
he
was
now
underraking
to
vindicate
the
Kingdom
from
the
Tyranny
of
that
Magician
;
and
when
some
of
them
demanded
time
,
Darius
rose
up
(
one
of
the
six
that
was
cald
by
Orthanus
)
and
said
,
Either
wee
will
all
now
go
and
execute
this
,
or
else
I
will
go
and
accuse
you
all
:
so
rising
all
by
consent
,
and
not
giving
any
one
time
to
repent
himself
,
they
happily
effected
what
they
desir'd
.
Like
unto
these
two
examples
also
,
is
the
course
the
Aetolians
took
to
put
Nabis
the
Spartan
Tyrant
to
death
,
who
sent
Alessamenes
a
Citizen
of
theirs
with
300
horse
and
1000
foot
to
Nabis
,
under
colour
of
giving
him
ayd
:
the
secret
they
communicated
to
Alessamenes
only
;
the
others
that
were
with
him
they
charged
to
obey
him
in
whatsoever
matter
it
were
,
under
pain
of
banishment
.
This
man
went
into
Sparta
,
never
communicating
his
Commission
to
any
,
till
just
he
was
to
put
it
in
execution
,
whereupon
it
fell
out
that
he
slew
him
.
They
then
by
these
means
escap'd
the
dangers
that
accompany
the
plotting
and
ordering
of
Conspiracies
;
and
whoever
shall
do
as
they
did
,
shall
alwaies
be
sure
to
escape
them
:
And
that
every
one
also
is
able
so
to
do
,
I
will
shew
by
the
example
of
Piso
alledged
before
.
Piso
was
a
very
great
man
,
and
of
much
esteem
,
and
very
familiar
with
Nero
,
on
whom
we
much
rely'd
:
And
Nero
went
oftentimes
to
banquet
with
him
in
his
gardens
:
Piso
therefore
might
have
procur'd
himself
friends
of
spirit
and
courage
,
and
willing
too
to
put
such
a
thing
in
execution
,
being
a
matter
easie
for
any
great
man
to
compass
;
and
when
he
had
had
Nero
in
his
gardens
,
then
communicated
the
business
to
them
,
and
with
fit
words
perswaded
them
to
it
,
so
that
they
could
not
have
had
time
to
refuse
,
and
impossible
had
it
bin
,
but
that
it
must
have
taken
effect
.
And
if
we
shall
examine
all
the
others
we
have
mentiond
,
we
shall
find
very
few
could
have
bin
otherwise
carried
.
But
men
that
ordinarily
do
not
well
weigh
the
actions
of
the
world
,
often
commit
very
great
errors
,
and
the
greater
in
those
actions
,
that
have
something
of
extraordiry
in
them
,
as
this
.
The
matter
then
is
never
to
be
communicated
,
but
upon
necessity
,
or
even
at
the
very
acting
of
it
,
and
yet
if
thou
wilt
communicate
it
,
let
that
be
but
unto
one
of
whom
thou
hast
had
long
experience
,
or
that
therein
is
interested
upon
the
same
reasons
thou
art
.
It
is
easier
to
find
one
man
of
that
condition
than
many
,
and
thereby
also
is
less
danger
.
Moreover
,
when
he
should
deceive
thee
,
there
were
some
means
left
yet
to
desend
thee
,
which
could
not
be
where
the
conspirators
are
many
:
for
it
is
the
saying
of
a
wise
man
,
that
with
one
alone
a
man
may
speak
any
thing
for
one
man
;
I
,
is
as
good
as
another
mans
No
,
provided
that
nothing
be
given
by
thee
under
thine
own
hand-writing
.
And
of
writing
any
thing
a
man
shouldbe
as
wary
as
of
a
perilous
rock
;
for
nothing
convicts
thee
sooner
than
thine
own
hand
.
Plautianus
having
a
mind
to
skill
Severus
the
Emperor
,
Antonius
his
son
,
committed
the
execution
of
it
to
Saturninus
a
Tribune
:
who
purposing
to
accuse
and
not
obey
him
,
yet
doubting
when
he
should
come
to
the
tryal
,
Plautianus
would
be
beleev'd
before
him
,
asked
him
a
note
under
his
hand
,
that
might
give
him
assurance
of
his
Commission
;
which
Plautianus
,
blinded
with
ambition
,
gave
him
,
whereupon
it
follow'd
,
that
he
was
accus'd
and
convicted
by
the
Tribune
,
without
which
,
and
certain
other
tokens
,
Plautianus
had
carried
it
clear
against
him
,
so
boldly
he
deny'd
it
.
Therefore
when
one
only
accuses
,
there
may
be
some
remedy
,
especially
in
case
thou
beest
not
convicted
by
any
writing
of
thiue
,
or
countermarks
,
whereof
a
man
should
be
well
aware
.
In
Pisoes
conspiracie
there
was
a
woman
called
Epicaris
,
which
formerly
had
bin
one
of
Neroes
Mistresses
,
who
thinking
it
would
serve
well
to
purpose
to
joyn
with
the
conspirators
,
one
that
was
a
Captain
of
some
galleys
,
which
Nero
kept
for
his
safeguard
,
opened
to
him
the
conspiracie
,
but
not
who
were
the
conspirators
,
whereupon
that
Captain
contrary
to
his
word
given
,
accus'd
her
before
Nero
;
but
such
was
her
boldness
in
denying
it
,
that
Nero
was
astonish'd
thereat
,
&
condemned
her
not
.
There
are
then
in
communicating
the
matter
to
one
alone
two
dangers
;
the
one
that
the
party
go
not
voluntarily
to
accuse
thee
,
alledging
some
proof
against
thee
;
the
other
that
he
detect
thee
not
constraind
and
forc't
thereunto
by
torture
,
having
been
apprehended
upon
some
conjecture
or
suspition
had
of
him
:
but
in
either
of
these
two
dangers
there
is
some
remedy
,
being
that
in
the
one
it
may
be
deny'd
,
by
saying
the
party
did
it
out
of
hatred
he
bore
thee
;
and
in
the
other
,
by
alledging
that
the
extremity
of
torture
compell'd
him
to
utter
any
thing
,
though
false
.
It
is
wisdome
then
to
make
no
man
privy
to
such
a
secret
,
but
rather
to
order
it
conformably
to
the
above
alledged
examples
;
or
in
case
thou
revealst
it
,
not
to
exceed
one
,
where
though
there
be
somwhat
more
danger
,
yet
is
there
much
less
than
when
it
is
discoverd
to
divers
.
Near
unto
this
course
is
,
when
a
necessity
constrains
thee
to
do
that
to
the
Prince
,
which
thou
seest
he
would
do
unto
thee
,
which
necessity
is
so
excessive
,
that
it
gives
thee
leisure
only
to
provide
for
thy
security
.
This
necessity
brings
the
business
ordinarily
to
a
good
end
;
and
to
prove
it
,
two
examples
shall
suffice
mee
.
Cammodus
the
Emperor
did
use
Lettus
and
Elettus
,
Captains
of
his
guard
,
among
his
familiar
and
principal
friends
,
and
Martia
among
his
chief
Concubines
and
Mistresses
:
but
because
sometime
he
had
been
reprehended
by
them
for
some
things
done
,
whereby
he
had
disgrac'd
his
person
and
the
Empire
,
he
resolve'd
to
put
them
to
death
,
and
writ
in
a
list
the
names
of
Martia
,
Lettus
,
and
Eletius
,
and
some
others
,
who
the
night
following
he
meant
should
die
,
and
so
put
that
list
under
his
pillow
;
and
when
he
went
to
rise
,
a
little
boy
which
he
lov'd
,
playing
about
his
chamber
and
his
bed
,
found
that
list
,
and
going
out
with
it
in
his
hand
met
with
Martia
,
who
took
it
from
him
,
and
read
it
,
and
having
seen
the
contents
thereof
,
sent
for
Lettus
and
Elettus
,
whereupon
they
three
knowing
the
danger
they
were
in
,
resolv'd
to
prevent
it
,
and
so
without
longer
delay
the
night
following
slew
Commodus
.
Antoninus
Caracalla
the
Emperor
was
in
Mesopotamia
with
his
Armies
,
whereof
Macrinus
was
chief
Commander
,
a
man
more
politick
than
wa●lick
;
and
as
it
comes
to
pass
,
Princes
that
are
not
good
,
are
alwaies
fe●rfull
,
least
others
work
against
them
,
what
they
are
guilty
to
themselves
they
well
deserve
;
Antoninus
writ
to
Mate
nianus
his
friend
at
Rome
,
that
he
should
inquire
of
the
Astrologers
if
any
one
aspird
to
the
Empire
,
and
should
advise
him
of
it
.
Whereupon
Maternianus
writ
back
unto
him
,
Macrinus
was
he
that
aspired
therto
;
but
the
Letter
comming
first
to
Macrinus
his
hand
,
before
the
Emperors
,
and
he
thereby
perceiving
the
necessity
imposd
upon
him
,
agreed
with
Martialis
〈◊〉
Centurion
,
one
of
his
confidents
(
whose
brother
a
few
daies
before
Antoninus
had
slain
)
that
he
should
kill
him
,
which
was
luckily
done
by
him
.
It
is
evident
then
,
that
this
necessity
which
gives
no
leisure
,
works
even
the
same
effect
which
that
course
did
,
I
formerly
said
,
Nelematus
of
Epirus
took
.
We
see
also
that
prov'd
which
I
spoke
of
in
the
beginning
of
this
discourse
,
that
Princes
threats
r●tort
more
mischiefes
on
them
,
and
occasion
more
desperate
conspiracies
,
than
the
wrongs
they
do
;
wheroef
a
Prince
●ought
to
take
good
heed
:
for
men
are
either
to
be
well
treated
by
them
,
or
at
least
to
be
put
out
of
doubt
of
them
,
that
they
be
not
reducd
to
such
terms
,
as
to
think
they
must
of
force
either
kill
or
be
kild
:
Touching
the
dangers
that
are
incurrd
upon
the
execution
,
they
arise
either
from
changing
the
order
given
,
or
from
want
of
courage
in
the
actor
,
or
from
some
error
the
actor
commits
for
want
of
judgement
,
or
from
the
fayle
of
fully
perfecting
the
matter
in
hand
by
leaving
some
of
those
surviving
who
were
appointed
for
death
.
I
think
therefore
that
nothing
so
much
disturbs
or
hinders
mens
actions
,
as
at
an
instant
without
respite
of
time
,
to
be
compeld
to
alter
an
order
once
given
,
or
divert
the
course
of
it
a
different
way
from
that
it
was
first
intended
And
if
this
variation
causes
disorder
in
any
thing
,
it
is
in
the
actions
of
warr
,
and
such
like
matters
,
whereof
we
now
speak
:
for
in
such
occasions
,
there
is
nothing
so
necessary
for
men
to
do
,
as
to
resolve
with
themselves
to
execute
fully
all
that
is
look'd
for
at
their
hands
.
And
if
men
have
a
good
while
bent
their
minds
to
one
course
or
order
,
and
that
chance
suddenly
to
be
alterd
,
it
must
needs
breed
some
disturbance
to
them
all
,
and
ruine
the
whole
design
,
so
that
it
is
much
better
for
them
to
execute
any
thing
according
to
the
order
first
given
(
however
that
some
inconvenient
ensue
thereupon
)
then
,
by
desiring
to
cancell
that
,
to
enter
into
a
thousand
inconveniences
.
This
happens
when
they
have
not
time
to
put
themselves
in
order
again
:
for
when
a
man
hath
leisure
,
he
may
go
his
own
way
he
likes
best
.
The
Conspiracy
of
the
Pazzi
against
Laurence
and
Julian
of
the
house
of
Medi●ia
,
is
well
known
:
the
order
given
amongst
them
was
this
,
that
they
should
invite
the
Cardinal
of
Saint
George
to
dinner
,
and
thereat
kill
them
they
intended
;
where
they
had
their
appointments
who
were
to
slay
these
,
as
those
also
that
were
to
seize
on
the
Palace
,
and
they
that
were
to
run
about
the
streets
,
and
call
the
people
together
to
lay
hold
of
their
liberty
.
It
so
fell
out
,
that
the
Pazzi
and
the
Medici
together
with
the
Cardinal
being
in
the
Cathedral
Church
of
Florence
at
Masse
,
notice
was
given
that
Julian
would
not
dine
there
that
day
,
which
caused
the
Conspirators
to
consult
together
,
and
what
they
were
to
have
done
in
the
house
to
those
of
Medici
,
they
resolv'd
to
do
in
the
Church
,
which
gave
disturbance
to
the
whole
order
:
for
John
Baptista
de
Monte
sacro
,
would
not
be
guilty
of
murder
committed
in
the
Church
,
insomuch
as
they
were
forc't
to
change
the
actors
in
every
part
,
who
having
not
time
to
settle
&
confirm
their
resolutions
,
committed
such
errors
,
that
in
the
very
execution
thereof
they
were
all
ruin'd
.
Courage
sayles
him
that
is
to
execute
any
thing
,
either
through
reverence
of
the
person
he
is
to
do
the
mischief
upon
,
or
through
the
executioners
own
innate
cowardise
.
Such
is
the
Majesty
and
reverence
which
the
presence
of
a
Prince
carries
along
with
it
,
that
it
is
an
ordinary
thing
for
it
,
either
to
mitigate
or
toaffright
an
executioner
.
A
Slave
was
sent
to
Marius
,
when
he
was
taken
prisoner
by
the
Minturveses
,
to
kill
him
,
who
amaz'd
at
the
presence
of
the
man
,
and
at
the
remembrance
of
his
name
prov'd
so
cowardly
,
that
he
lost
all
power
to
slay
him
.
And
if
there
be
such
power
in
the
person
of
a
man
that
is
bound
,
and
in
prison
,
and
in
a
manner
choak'd
up
with
ill
fortune
,
how
much
more
may
we
think
there
is
in
a
Prince
that
is
at
liberty
at●ir'd
in
the
Majesty
of
his
ornaments
of
state
,
and
inviron'd
with
his
trayne
,
insomuch
that
the
pompe
thereof
is
of
force
to
affright
,
or
else
with
the
least
courtesie
he
shall
receive
thee
,
to
humble
thee
again
before
him
.
There
were
some
conspir'd
against
Sitalces
King
of
Thrace
,
and
they
appointed
amongst
them
a
day
for
the
execution
,
and
met
at
the
place
agreed
on
where
the
Prince
was
,
but
none
of
them
once
mov'd
to
hurt
him
,
so
that
they
parted
all
thence
without
attempting
any
thing
,
and
without
knowing
what
it
was
that
hinder'd
them
,
but
blaming
one
another
for
the
fayle
:
into
such
errors
they
often
fall
afterwards
,
in
so
much
as
the
treason
was
discover'd
,
and
they
suffer'd
punishment
for
that
evill
,
which
they
could
,
but
durst
not
act
.
Against
Alfonsus
Duke
of
Ferrara
,
two
of
his
own
brothers
conspir'd
together
,
and
us'd
the
helpe
of
one
Giannes
a
Priest
&
Musitian
belonging
to
that
Duke
who
many
times
at
their
intrety
brought
the
Duke
amongst
them
,
so
that
it
was
in
their
power
to
kill
him
;
yet
never
was
any
of
them
so
hardy
as
to
do
it
,
whereupon
at
length
being
discoverd
they
suffered
for
their
wickedness
,
and
want
of
wit
.
This
negligence
could
not
proceed
from
elsewhere
then
from
that
of
necessity
the
Princes
presence
did
affright
them
,
or
that
some
courtesie
he
shew'd
them
humbled
them
.
In
such
executions
an
inconvenient
or
error
many
times
arises
,
either
for
lack
of
discretion
or
courage
:
for
when
the
one
or
other
of
these
two
once
amazes
thee
,
thou
art
borne
forward
in
such
confusion
of
thy
understanding
,
that
it
makes
thee
both
say
and
do
what
thou
oughtst
not
.
And
that
men
are
thus
astonished
and
confounded
,
Livie
does
very
well
shew
it
,
where
he
sets
forth
Alexamenes
the
Etolian
,
as
he
went
about
to
kill
Nabis
the
Spartan
,
whereof
we
spake
formerly
,
that
when
hee
came
to
the
execution
,
and
discoverd
to
those
that
were
with
him
,
what
he
was
to
do
,
T.
Livius
saies
these
words
:
He
gathers
together
his
wits
to
him
,
which
the
consideration
of
so
weighty
a
matter
had
somewhat
disorderd
For
it
is
impossible
,
that
any
man
(
though
of
a
resolute
courage
,
&
accustomed
to
the
slaughters
of
men
,
and
use
of
his
weapons
)
should
not
be
quite
astonished
.
Therefore
choice
is
to
be
made
of
men
experienced
in
such
matters
,
nor
should
one
commit
them
to
any
other
,
however
he
be
esteem'd
very
couragious
:
for
let
no
man
that
hath
not
formerly
made
tryall
of
himself
,
presume
too
much
upon
his
courage
in
the
performance
of
any
great
exploit
.
This
amazement
then
may
either
cause
thee
to
let
thy
weapons
fall
out
of
thy
hands
,
or
such
words
from
thy
month
,
as
may
work
the
same
effect
.
Luciila
Commodus
his
sister
had
so
order'd
it
,
that
Quintianus
should
kill
him
.
And
he
awaited
Cowmodus
in
the
passage
into
the
Theater
,
where
with
a
naked
poinard
comming
up
to
him
,
he
cryed
out
,
This
the
Senate
sends
thee
;
which
words
caus'd
him
to
be
first
laid
hold
on
,
before
hee
could
bring
down
his
arme
to
strike
him
.
M.
Antonius
of
Volterra
appointed
(
as
wee
said
before
)
to
kill
Laurence
of
Medici
,
as
hee
came
near
him
,
said
,
Ah
Traitor
!
which
saying
of
his
occasioned
the
safety
of
Laurence
,
and
the
wrack
of
that
Conspiracy
.
Such
a
matter
may
be
fully
perfected
,
when
it
is
practised
only
against
one
head
,
for
the
reasons
alledged
:
but
very
hardly
can
it
well
be
accomplished
against
two
principals
,
or
rather
impossibly
:
for
it
is
impossible
that
one
and
the
like
action
should
succeed
at
the
same
instant
in
several
places
:
for
it
cannot
be
,
but
whither
a
man
will
or
no
,
the
one
shall
ruine
the
other
,
being
done
at
several
times
.
So
that
if
it
be
a
thing
very
hazardous
and
full
of
danger
and
small
advisedness
to
practise
against
the
person
of
one
Prince
alone
;
certainly
to
conspire
against
two
,
is
wholly
vain
and
to
no
purpose
.
And
were
it
not
for
the
reverence
I
bear
to
the
Historian
,
I
would
never
beleeve
,
that
were
possible
,
which
Herodian
says
of
Plautianus
,
that
he
gave
the
charge
to
Saturninus
the
Centurion
to
kill
Severus
and
Antoninus
abiding
in
severall
place
;
for
it
dissents
so
much
from
reason
,
that
nothing
else
but
this
authority
would
make
me
credit
it
.
Certain
young
men
of
Athens
conspir'd
together
against
Diocles
and
Hippias
Tyrants
of
that
City
,
and
slew
Diocles
;
but
Hippias
that
remaind
,
revenged
it
.
Chiones
and
Leonides
,
Heracleans
,
that
were
Platoes
Disciples
,
conspird
against
Clearchus
and
Satirus
that
were
Tyrants
;
they
slew
Clearchus
,
and
Satirus
that
was
left
alive
punished
the
fact
.
And
the
Pazzi
,
several
times
alledged
by
us
,
has
not
the
fortune
to
kill
but
Iulian
alone
.
Insomuch
as
every
one
should
be
so
wise
as
forbear
to
conspire
against
several
principals
:
for
he
neither
advantageth
himself
,
nor
his
Country
,
nor
any
body
else
:
but
rather
they
that
are
left
behind
,
become
more
intolerable
and
fiercer
,
as
Florence
,
Athens
,
and
Heraclea
,
which
I
spoke
of
before
,
know
well
It
is
true
,
that
the
conspiracy
which
Pelopidas
practised
to
free
Thebes
his
native
Country
,
had
all
manner
of
difficulties
,
yet
it
succeeded
luckily
:
for
Pelopidas
conspired
not
only
against
two
Tyrants
,
but
against
ten
:
and
not
only
was
he
not
a
confident
of
any
of
theirs
,
and
so
had
no
easie
access
unto
any
of
those
Tyrants
,
but
he
was
a
rebell
:
yet
for
all
this
came
he
into
Thebes
,
slew
the
Tyrants
and
set
the
Country
at
liberty
.
Nevertheless
he
affected
all
this
with
the
assistance
of
one
Carion
a
Counsellor
belonging
to
those
Tyrants
,
by
whose
means
he
had
easie
access
to
execute
his
purpose
.
Yet
let
none
take
example
from
him
:
for
it
was
an
enterprise
almost
impossible
,
and
a
miracle
it
was
that
it
succeeded
;
and
so
it
was
,
and
is
now
esteemed
by
those
writers
that
celebrate
the
memory
thereof
,
as
a
matter
of
great
rarity
,
and
without
patterne
.
Such
an
execution
may
be
hindred
by
a
false
imagination
,
or
upon
some
sudden
accident
,
that
arises
just
upon
the
fact
.
On
the
morning
that
Brutus
and
the
other
Conspirators
purposed
to
kill
Caesar
,
it
fell
out
so
that
he
talked
a
good
while
with
Cn.
Popilius
Len●●
,
one
of
the
Conspirators
,
whereupon
the
others
seeing
this
long
discourse
,
they
were
in
fear
least
the
said
Popilius
had
revealed
the
Conspiracy
to
Caesar
,
and
they
were
about
to
attempt
to
slay
Caesar
there
,
&
not
expect
till
he
came
into
the
Senate
,
had
it
not
been
that
when
the
discourse
ended
,
they
saw
that
Cesar
made
not
any
extraordinary
motion
thereat
,
and
so
they
settled
themselves
anew
.
These
false
conceits
are
to
be
consider'd
,
and
weigh'd
with
discretion
,
&
the
rather
,
because
they
are
easy
to
be
taken
;
for
he
that
hath
aguilty
conscience
,
easily
beleeves
that
others
talk
of
him
a
word
may
be
herd
spoken
to
another
purpose
,
that
may
much
trouble
thy
mind
,
and
make
thee
beleeve
it
touches
the
matter
thou
hast
in
hand
,
and
cause
thee
by
thy
flight
to
discover
thine
own
Conspiracy
,
or
put
the
action
into
disorder
by
hastening
it
faster
than
its
time
.
And
this
comes
to
pass
the
more
easily
,
where
Many
are
made
privy
to
the
Conspiracy
.
Touching
the
accidents
(
because
they
fall
out
unexpected
)
they
cannot
be
shewed
but
by
examples
,
and
make
men
wary
,
according
to
their
rule
.
●ulius
Belanti
of
Siena
(
of
whom
I
have
formerly
made
mention
)
for
the
hatred
which
he
bore
to
Pandulphus
that
had
taken
his
daughter
from
him
,
whom
he
had
first
given
him
to
wife
,
resolv'd
to
kill
him
,
and
chose
this
time
.
Pandulphus
went
almost
every
day
to
visit
a
kinsman
of
his
that
was
sick
,
and
in
going
thither
passed
by
Julius
his
house
:
Who
perceiving
this
,
provided
so
,
that
his
Conspirators
were
altogether
ready
in
his
house
to
kill
Pandulphus
,
as
hee
should
pass
and
having
plac'd
them
all
arm'd
in
the
entry
,
he
had
one
stood
in
the
window
,
that
as
Pandulphus
should
pass
,
when
he
came
near
to
the
entry
,
should
make
a
sign
.
It
chanc't
that
Pandulphus
comming
,
&
the
other
having
given
the
sign
,
he
met
a
friend
that
stopt
him
,
and
some
of
those
that
were
with
him
passed
forward
before
him
,
and
hearing
the
noise
of
armes
,
they
discoverd
the
ambush
laid
,
so
that
Pandulphus
escap'd
,
and
Julius
with
his
confederates
were
constrain'd
to
fly
from
Siena
.
The
chance
of
that
meeting
hindred
the
success
of
that
action
,
&
ruin'd
quite
Julius
his
enterprise
.
For
which
accidents
(
because
they
are
very
rare
)
we
cannot
find
any
remedy
,
it
is
very
necessary
to
examin
well
those
that
may
chance
,
and
help
them
as
we
can
.
It
remaines
now
only
,
that
we
discourse
of
the
dangers
which
they
run
after
the
execution
done
,
which
are
all
but
one
,
and
this
it
is
,
when
any
one
is
left
alive
to
revenge
the
dead
Prince
.
There
may
then
his
brothers
or
his
sons
be
left
,
or
other
of
his
allyes
to
whom
the
Principality
may
belong
,
&
may
be
left
alive
by
thy
negligence
,
or
upon
some
occasions
(
formerly
spoken
of
)
that
may
execute
this
revenge
,
as
it
befell
John
Andreas
of
Lampognano
,
who
together
with
his
Complotters
having
slain
the
Duke
of
Milan
,
and
there
being
left
alive
one
son
of
his
and
two
brothers
,
they
were
ready
at
hand
time
enough
to
revenge
his
death
.
And
truly
in
this
case
these
conspirators
are
excusable
:
because
they
have
here
no
remedy
,
but
when
any
of
them
survives
,
for
lack
of
good
advisement
,
or
through
their
negligence
,
then
indeed
thereis
no
excuse
to
be
made
for
them
.
Some
conspirators
at
Forly
slew
Count
Ierolamus
their
Lord
,
took
prisoners
his
wife
and
sons
,
which
were
but
little
ones
;
and
thinking
they
could
have
no
security
,
unless
they
became
masters
of
the
fortress
,
which
the
governour
was
not
willing
to
give
into
their
hands
;
whereupon
the
Lady
Katherine
(
for
so
the
Countess
was
called
)
promised
the
Traitors
,
that
if
they
would
let
her
enter
therein
,
she
would
cause
it
to
be
delivered
up
to
them
,
and
that
they
should
keep
her
sons
for
pledges
.
They
upon
her
word
thus
given
,
suffered
her
to
enter
in
,
who
so
soon
as
shee
was
within
the
walls
,
reproached
them
with
the
murder
of
her
husband
,
and
threatned
them
with
all
manner
of
revenge
;
&
to
let
them
know
shee
had
no
regard
of
her
children
,
she
shewed
them
her
privy
parts
,
saying
she
had
the
means
left
her
to
bring
forth
others
,
so
that
they
not
knowing
what
to
do
,
and
too
late
perceiving
their
own
error
,
suffered
perpetual
exile
in
punishment
of
their
lack
of
wit
.
But
of
all
dangers
that
can
befall
after
the
execution
,
there
is
node
mone
certain
,
nor
more
terrible
,
then
when
the
people
is
a
friend
to
that
Prince
thou
hast
slain
:
for
against
this
the
conspirators
can
have
no
remedy
:
for
they
can
never
secure
themselves
.
We
have
Caesar
for
example
hereof
,
who
because
he
had
the
people
of
Rome
to
friend
,
was
by
their
means
revenged
:
for
when
they
had
chased
the
conspirators
from
Rome
they
caused
all
of
them
in
several
places
to
be
slain
.
Treasons
that
are
practised
against
ones
own
Countrey
,
are
less
dangerous
for
those
that
work
them
,
then
those
that
are
practised
agaist
Princes
:
for
in
the
ordering
of
them
the
dangers
are
less
then
in
the
others
,
and
in
executing
of
them
they
are
the
same
,
and
after
the
execution
there
is
none
at
all
.
In
the
plotting
and
working
them
the
dangers
are
not
many
:
for
a
Citizen
may
frame
himself
so
,
as
to
be
capable
of
power
,
without
manifesting
his
mind
therein
or
intention
to
any
one
;
and
unless
those
his
purposes
receive
some
interruption
,
he
may
happily
proceed
in
his
design
:
but
if
any
law
made
,
chance
to
cross
them
,
he
must
stay
his
time
,
and
seek
some
other
course
.
This
is
to
be
understood
of
a
Republique
where
in
corruption
is
entred
in
some
part
;
for
in
one
not
corrupted
(
no
evil
beginning
taking
〈◊〉
place
there
)
these
thoughts
cannot
enter
into
the
heart
of
any
citizen
.
The
Citizens
then
may
by
several
means
and
many
waies
aspire
unto
the
Principality
,
where
they
run
no
hazard
of
being
oppress'd
,
as
well
because
Republiques
are
more
slew
then
a
Prince
and
stand
less
in
doubt
,
&
●●h
refore
are
less
wary
as
also
because
they
carry
more
respect
towards
their
principal
citizens
,
and
therefore
are
they
the
more
audacious
and
more
insolent
to
practise
against
them
.
Few
there
are
but
have
read
Catalines
conspiracy
written
by
Salust
,
&
know
how
that
afterwards
when
it
was
discovered
,
Cataline
,
did
not
only
abide
in
Rome
,
but
came
into
the
Senate-house
,
&
spoke
in
villanous
termes
against
the
Senate
and
the
Consul
;
so
great
was
the
respect
that
that
City
bore
to
her
Citizens
so
that
when
he
was
departed
from
Rome
,
and
had
his
Armies
already
on
foot
,
Lentulus
nor
those
others
had
never
been
layd
hold
on
,
had
not
there
been
letters
of
his
own
hand
brought
against
him
,
which
manifestly
accused
him
.
Hanno
the
most
potent
Citizen
in
Carthage
,
aspiring
to
a
Tyranny
,
had
provided
at
the
marriage
of
one
of
his
own
daughters
to
poison
all
the
Senate
,
and
afterwards
make
himself
Prince
.
When
this
matter
was
known
,
the
Senate
took
no
other
order
then
to
make
a
law
which
limited
the
excess
of
expences
anbanquets
and
weddings
;
such
was
the
respect
they
bore
to
men
of
their
qualities
.
It
is
very
true
that
in
the
executing
of
a
treason
against
ones
native
Country
,
there
is
more
difficulty
,
and
greater
dangers
;
for
very
seldome
is
it
,
that
thy
own
forces
suffice
,
being
to
conspire
against
so
many
;
for
every
one
hath
not
an
Army
at
his
command
,
as
Cesar
Agathocles
or
Cl●omenes
,
and
such
like
,
who
at
one
pluck
have
been
able
to
seise
on
the
Country
:
for
unto
such
the
way
is
easie
and
safe
enough
,
But
others
that
have
not
such
advantages
of
forces
,
must
do
it
either
with
some
slight
or
artifice
,
or
by
the
aide
of
forraine
forces
.
As
for
slights
and
tricks
,
Pisistratus
the
Athenian
having
over
come
the
Megarenses
,
and
thereby
got
credit
with
the
people
,
one
morning
came
out
among
them
wounded
,
saying
,
The
nobility
through
envy
had
thus
wrong'd
him
,
and
ask'd
leave
of
them
for
his
defence
to
have
a
guard
of
armd
men
about
him
.
By
this
power
he
easily
attain'd
to
such
greatness
,
that
he
brought
Athens
under
his
Tyranny
.
Pandulfus
Petrucci
return'd
himself
with
others
that
were
out-law'd
into
Siena
,
&
there
he
had
the
charge
given
him
over
the
common
guard
of
Justice
,
as
a
Mecanick
office
,
and
which
others
refus'd
,
yet
in
time
those
arm'd
men
gave
him
such
reputation
,
that
shortly
after
he
became
Lord
of
the
Town
.
Many
others
have
used
other
endeavors
,
and
other
waies
,
and
in
a
short
space
,
and
without
danger
have
attained
to
the
same
.
Those
that
by
their
own
force
,
or
by
help
of
forrain-forces
have
conspir'd
to
make
themselves
Lords
over
their
native
Countries
,
have
had
several
successes
,
as
fortune
hath
befriended
them
or
otherwise
.
Cataline
we
spoke
of
before
,
was
ruined
thereby
.
Hanno
(
of
whom
we
formerly
made
mention
)
when
the
poison
took
not
effect
,
armed
many
thousands
of
his
partisans
,
who
with
himself
were
all
slain
.
Some
of
the
prime
Citizens
of
Thebes
,
to
the
end
they
might
become
Lords
of
the
Town
,
called
to
their
aid
a
Sparian
army
,
and
so
took
upon
them
the
rule
of
that
City
.
So
that
when
we
shall
have
examined
all
the
conspiracies
made
against
a
Country
,
we
shall
not
find
any
,
at
least
very
few
,
that
in
the
plotting
thereof
have
been
suppressed
,
but
all
of
them
either
have
taken
effect
,
or
bin
ruined
in
the
execution
rather
.
When
they
are
once
acted
,
they
carry
not
with
them
any
further
dangers
,
then
the
nature
of
a
Principality
hath
in
it self
:
for
when
a
man
hath
once
gotten
to
be
a
Tyrant
,
he
hath
his
own
proper
and
ordinary
dangers
belonging
to
him
,
against
which
there
are
no
other
remedies
then
those
we
have
formerly
touch'd
.
This
is
that
which
I
had
to
write
touching
conspiracies
:
and
if
I
have
discours'd
of
those
onely
that
are
executed
with
the
sword
,
and
not
done
by
poison
,
it
is
because
they
have
all
the
same
rule
.
It
is
rue
,
that
those
done
with
poison
,
are
the
more
dangerous
,
because
they
are
more
uncertain
,
for
that
a
man
cannot
administer
by
every
one
,
and
he
must
needs
reveal
it
to
him
that
he
makes
his
instrument
;
and
from
this
necessity
of
revealing
it
,
arises
thy
danger
:
moreover
upon
many
accidents
a
draught
of
poison
cannot
prove
deadly
,
as
it
befell
those
that
slew
Co●modus
;
for
he
having
vomited
up
the
poison
which
they
gave
him
,
they
were
forced
to
strangle
him
,
before
they
could
make
him
dye
.
Whereupon
I
judge
that
Princes
have
not
a
greater
enemy
then
treason
;
because
when
a
treason
is
once
practised
against
them
,
it
either
brings
them
to
their
end
,
or
procures
them
much
infamy
;
for
if
it
succeeds
,
they
die
;
if
it
be
discovered
,
and
they
slay
the
traitors
,
men
always
suppose
it
hath
been
some
device
of
that
Princes
,
to
vent
his
ava●ice
and
cruelty
against
the
bloods
and
estates
of
those
he
hath
put
to
death
.
I
would
not
fail
therefore
to
warn
those
Princes
or
Republiques
against
which
treasons
have
been
devised
,
that
they
be
wary
,
when
a
conspiracy
is
once
disclosed
to
them
,
before
they
go
about
to
revenge
it
,
but
first
to
pty
narrowly
into
it
,
and
to
seek
to
understand
well
the
qualities
thereof
,
and
weigh
well
the
conditions
of
the
conspirators
,
and
their
own
;
and
when
they
finde
them
great
and
mighty
,
never
to
discover
them
,
till
they
be
furnished
with
sufficient
forces
to
crush
them
;
for
in
doing
otherwise
,
they
should
discover
it
to
their
own
ruin
:
Wherefore
they
ought
to
dissemble
it
with
all
possible
care
;
because
the
conspirators
,
when
they
finde
themselves
discovered
,
of
force
are
driven
to
act
what
they
can
without
respect
.
We
have
an
example
hereof
from
the
Romanes
,
who
having
lift
two
legions
of
souldiers
to
guard
the
Capuans
against
the
Samnitcs
,
as
otherwhere
we
have
said
,
the
heads
of
those
Legions
conspired
together
to
oppress
the
Capuans
:
Whereof
notice
being
given
at
Rome
,
the
matter
was
committed
to
Rutilius
the
new
Consul
,
that
he
should
take
order
for
it
,
who
to
lull
asleep
the
conspirators
,
gave
it
out
,
that
the
Senate
had
again
confirmed
the
Capuan
Legions
aboad
there
:
Which
those
soldiers
giving
credit
to
,
and
thinking
they
had
time
enough
to
execute
their
purpose
,
they
never
went
about
to
hasten
the
matter
:
And
so
they
stood
still
,
till
they
began
to
see
that
the
Consul
separated
them
one
from
another
,
which
thing
having
begotten
suspicion
in
them
,
made
them
discover
themselves
,
and
execute
their
design
.
Nor
can
there
be
a
fuller
example
on
the
one
or
the
other
part
:
for
hereby
it
appears
how
slow
men
are
in
matters
,
where
they
think
they
have
time
enough
;
and
how
quick
,
when
a
necessity
drives
them
to
it
.
Nor
can
a
Prince
or
Republique
(
that
would
defer
the
discovery
of
a
treason
for
his
own
advantage
)
take
a
better
course
,
then
by
some
device
or
trick
offer
the
conspirators
shortly
some
handsome
opportunity
,
to
the
end
that
they
attending
that
,
or
thinking
they
have
time
enough
,
may
give
leasure
to
that
Prince
or
Commonwealth
to
punish
them
.
They
who
have
done
otherwise
,
have
hastened
their
own
destruction
,
as
the
Duke
of
Athens
did
,
and
William
of
the
family
of
the
Pazzi
.
The
Duke
being
become
the
tyrant
of
Florence
,
and
understanding
that
there
was
a
conspiracy
plotted
against
him
,
caused
without
further
examining
the
matter
,
one
of
the
conspirators
to
be
laid
hold
on
,
which
gave
and
alarme
to
the
rest
,
whereupon
arming
themselves
,
they
took
the
state
from
him
.
William
being
a
Commissary
in
the
valley
of
Chiana
in
the
year
1501.
having
had
notice
,
that
in
Arezzo
there
was
a
conspiracy
in
favour
of
the
Vitelli
,
to
take
that
Town
from
the
Florentines
,
presently
went
to
the
town
,
and
not
considering
his
own
forces
,
nor
the
conspirators
,
nor
taking
order
to
furnish
himself
with
any
,
by
the
Bishops
advice
,
who
was
his
sons
,
caused
one
of
the
conspirators
to
be
laid
hands
on
,
whereupon
the
first
presently
took
arms
,
got
away
the
town
from
the
Florentines
,
and
William
of
a
Commissary
was
made
a
prisoner
.
But
when
those
conspiracies
are
feeble
,
they
may
and
ought
without
any
regard
be
suppressed
.
Yet
in
any
case
we
must
not
follow
two
courses
which
have
been
used
in
a
maner
contrary
one
to
the
other
:
The
one
by
the
forenamed
Duke
of
Athens
,
who
to
shew
he
believed
that
he
had
the
citizens
of
Florence
good
wills
,
put
one
to
death
that
detected
a
conspiracy
against
him
:
The
other
by
Dion
a
Siracusan
,
who
to
sound
the
minde
of
one
whom
he
had
in
suspicion
,
agreed
that
Callippus
,
of
whom
he
was
very
confident
,
should
make
him
believe
that
he
were
working
a
plot
against
him
;
but
these
matters
fell
out
ill
for
them
both
.
For
the
one
took
all
courage
away
from
the
accusers
,
and
encouraged
traitors
;
the
other
made
the
way
easie
to
his
own
ruine
,
or
rather
he
himself
was
principal
of
the
conspiracy
against
himself
,
and
so
it
fell
out
;
for
Callippus
(
being
that
he
could
without
any
respect
practise
such
a
thing
against
Dion
)
did
it
so
in
earnest
,
that
he
took
both
his
life
and
his
State
from
him
.
CHAP.
VII
.
From
whence
proceeds
it
,
that
of
the
changes
from
liberty
to
slavery
,
and
from
slavery
to
liberty
,
some
are
without
blood
,
others
exceeding
bloody
?
SOme
will
marvail
perchance
from
whence
it
comes
to
pass
,
that
of
many
changes
which
are
made
from
a
free
State
to
a
Tyrannical
,
and
contrarily
,
some
are
with
much
effusion
of
blood
,
others
quite
without
any
:
for
,
as
we
learn
by
Histories
,
in
such
like
alterations
sometimes
very
many
men
have
been
slain
,
and
sometimes
again
not
one
hath
suffered
any
injury
,
as
i●
befell
in
the
change
that
Rome
made
from
her
Kings
to
Consuls
,
wherein
none
but
the
Tarquins
were
banished
,
without
wrong
done
to
any
body
else
.
Which
depends
hereupon
;
for
that
State
that
is
changed
,
begins
first
either
by
violence
,
or
without
it
:
and
when
it
begins
with
violence
,
it
must
needs
begin
with
doing
wrong
to
many
;
and
it
is
necessary
afterwards
that
in
its
destruction
,
they
who
have
been
wronged
,
revenge
themselves
,
and
so
from
their
desire
of
revenge
proceeds
the
effusion
of
blood
and
death
of
many
.
But
when
that
State
is
begun
by
the
common
consent
of
an
universality
,
and
thereby
hath
been
amplify'd
,
it
hath
no
cause
afterwards
,
when
that
universality
is
ruined
,
to
wrong
others
then
the
head
onely
;
and
of
this
kinde
was
the
State
of
Rome
,
and
the
Tarquins
banishment
,
as
also
was
in
Florence
the
State
which
the
Medici
held
,
when
afterwards
in
their
destructions
in
the
year
1444.
none
else
were
hurt
but
they
.
And
so
such
like
changes
never
prove
very
dangerous
;
but
those
rather
are
very
full
of
danger
,
which
are
wrought
by
those
that
endeavor
to
revenge
themselves
withall
,
which
have
been
such
,
that
they
have
caused
horror
even
in
him
that
reads
them
.
And
because
of
examples
to
this
purpose
histories
are
full
fraught
,
I
will
let
this
pass
.
CHAP.
VIII
.
He
that
will
make
alteration
in
a
Republique
,
must
consider
the
subject
he
is
to
work
upon
.
IT
hath
been
formerly
treated
how
that
a
malicious
Citizen
cannot
work
mischief
in
a
Republique
that
is
not
grown
corrupted
;
which
conclusion
is
confirmed
(
besides
the
reasons
that
then
were
alledged
)
with
the
example
of
Sp.
Cassius
,
and
of
Manlius
Capitolinus
.
Which
Spurius
being
an
ambitious
man
,
and
desirous
to
take
upon
him
extraordinary
authority
in
Rome
,
and
gain
the
people
to
him
by
doing
them
many
good
turns
,
as
was
that
,
to
sell
them
those
fields
,
which
the
Romans
had
taken
from
the
Hermici
,
this
his
ambition
was
desc●yed
by
the
Fathers
,
and
so
much
suspected
,
that
when
hh
spoke
to
the
people
and
offered
to
give
them
those
moneys
,
which
the
Corn
was
sold
for
,
that
the
Publique
had
caused
to
be
brought
from
Sicily
,
they
wholly
refused
them
,
thinking
that
Spurius
meant
to
give
them
the
price
of
their
liberty
.
But
had
that
people
been
already
corrupted
,
they
would
not
have
refused
the
said
price
,
but
rather
have
opened
him
that
way
to
the
tyranny
,
which
now
they
shut
against
him
.
A
fuller
example
hereof
Manlius
Capitolinus
represents
unto
us
;
for
in
him
we
see
,
what
excellencies
of
mind
and
body
,
how
many
brave
exploits
acted
in
defence
of
a
mans
native
Country
,
a
brutish
desire
of
rule
quite
rases
out
:
which
(
as
it
appeared
)
grew
in
him
,
through
the
envy
he
bore
Camillus
for
the
honors
were
done
him
,
whereby
his
understanding
was
so
blinded
,
as
not
considering
the
manner
of
Government
used
in
the
City
,
nor
examining
,
whereupon
he
was
to
work
,
unapt
as
yet
to
receive
so
evil
a
form
,
betook
himself
to
raise
tumults
in
Rome
against
the
Senate
,
and
contrary
to
the
Laws
of
his
Country
.
Wherein
the
perfection
of
that
City
is
very
evident
,
and
the
goodness
of
the
matter
thereof
;
for
in
his
case
none
of
the
Nobility
,
however
that
they
were
very
eager
defenders
the
one
of
another
,
never
stirred
in
his
favour
,
nor
any
of
his
kindred
undertook
any
thing
in
his
defence
:
whereas
ordinarily
when
others
were
accused
,
they
used
to
accompany
them
in
a
rueful
manner
,
clad
in
black
,
and
all
sorrowful
;
whereby
they
might
gain
compassion
in
favor
of
the
defendant
,
and
with
Manlius
none
of
these
were
seen
.
The
Tribunas
of
the
people
,
who
were
wont
to
favour
those
things
,
which
seemed
to
be
mov'd
for
the
peoples
advantage
,
and
the
more
they
were
against
the
Nobility
,
so
much
the
forwarder
used
to
thrust
them
,
in
this
case
held
with
the
Nobility
to
suppress
a
common
mischief
.
The
people
of
Rome
exceedingly
desirous
of
their
own
advantage
,
and
a
great
favourer
of
any
thing
that
thwarted
the
Nobility
,
however
they
afforded
Manlius
many
favors
,
nevertheless
,
when
the
Tribunes
cited
him
,
and
referred
his
cause
to
be
judged
by
the
people
,
that
people
being
become
judge
of
a
defendant
,
without
regard
condemned
him
to
death
.
Wherefore
I
believe
there
is
not
any
example
in
this
History
more
proper
to
shew
the
goodness
of
that
Common-wealths
orders
,
then
this
,
seeing
that
not
one
of
this
whole
City
moved
in
behalf
of
a
very
valourous
Citizen
,
who
as
well
publikely
as
privately
had
done
many
worthy
acts
:
because
in
all
of
them
the
love
of
their
country
was
of
more
force
than
any
other
regard
,
and
they
considered
more
the
present
danger
;
that
depended
on
him
,
than
his
fore-past
deserts
,
so
that
by
his
death
they
set
themselves
at
liberty
.
And
T.
Livius
says
,
This
end
had
that
man
,
who
had
he
not
been
born
in
a
free
State
,
was
worthy
of
admiration
.
Where
two
things
are
to
be
considered
;
the
one
,
that
by
other
means
a
man
ought
to
seek
after
glory
in
a
City
corrupted
,
than
in
one
that
lives
strictly
according
to
the
civil
government
;
the
other
is
(
wich
is
almost
the
same
with
the
first
)
that
men
in
their
proceedings
,
and
the
rather
in
actions
of
consequence
should
consider
the
times
,
and
conforme
themselves
thereunto
:
and
those
that
by
their
evill
choice
,
or
natural
inclination
disagree
with
the
times
,
most
commonly
live
unhappily
,
and
their
actions
have
but
ill
successes
.
The
contrary
befalls
those
that
can
accord
with
the
times
:
and
without
question
,
by
the
Historians
words
which
we
for
merly
mentioned
,
we
may
make
this
conclusion
,
that
if
Manlius
had
been
borne
in
the
times
that
Marius
and
Silla
were
,
where
the
matter
was
already
corrupted
,
that
his
ambition
could
have
made
some
impression
therein
,
he
might
,
have
workd
the
same
effect
,
and
had
the
same
success
that
Silla
and
Marius
had
,
and
others
afterwards
,
who
after
them
aspird
to
the
Tyranny
.
So
in
like
manner
,
if
Silla
and
Marius
had
liv'd
in
Manlius
his
daies
.
they
had
been
crushd
in
the
very
egge
:
for
one
man
may
indeed
begin
with
his
evill
courses
and
mischievous
waies
to
debauch
the
people
of
a
City
:
but
it
is
impossible
that
one
mans
life
can
suffice
to
corrupt
it
so
,
that
he
himself
can
make
any
advantage
thereof
.
And
in
case
it
were
possible
,
that
in
tract
of
time
,
he
could
do
it
,
yet
would
it
be
impossible
,
in
regard
of
the
manner
of
mens
proceedings
,
who
are
impatient
,
and
cannot
defer
any
passion
of
theirs
long
.
Moreover
,
they
erre
in
their
affairs
,
and
in
those
especially
which
they
much
desire
,
in
so
much
as
either
through
their
small
patience
,
or
through
their
error
,
they
would
venture
upon
the
executing
of
their
purposes
,
in
counter
time
,
and
so
come
to
an
evill
end
.
Therefore
is
it
necessary
,
if
a
man
would
gain
authority
in
a
Republick
,
and
induce
some
ill
for
me
thereinto
,
to
find
the
matter
already
disorderd
by
time
,
and
that
by
little
and
little
,
and
from
age
to
age
is
brought
into
disorder
,
which
of
force
comes
thereunto
,
when
it
is
not
(
as
formerly
hath
been
said
)
refreshd
by
vertuous
examples
,
or
by
new
●aws
reduc'd
to
the
first
principles
.
Manlius
●hen
had
been
a
rare
man
,
and
famous
,
had
he
been
borne
in
a
corrupted
City
.
And
therefore
should
those
Citizens
that
in
Republicks
undertake
any
thing
either
in
favour
of
liberty
,
or
in
favour
of
Tyranny
,
consider
the
subject
they
are
to
work
on
,
and
from
thence
conjecture
the
difficulty
of
the
worke
:
for
it
is
as
hard
and
dangerous
to
set
free
a
people
that
would
live
in
thral●om
,
as
to
inthrall
a
people
that
would
live
free
.
And
because
we
have
before
rouchd
,
that
in
all
manner
of
actions
men
should
consider
the
quality
of
the
times
,
and
proceed
conformably
to
those
,
we
will
speak
of
them
at
length
in
the
Chapter
following
.
CHAP.
IX
.
How
a
man
must
of
necessity
change
with
the
times
,
if
he
will
alwaies
have
good
success
in
his
undertakings
.
I
Have
many
times
consider'd
,
how
the
occasion
of
mens
good
or
evill
fortunes
depends
upon
the
manner
of
the
encounter
of
their
proceedings
with
the
times
:
for
it
is
evident
,
that
some
men
proceed
in
their
affaires
with
violence
,
others
with
regard
and
wariness
.
And
because
that
in
the
one
and
other
of
these
two
ways
,
the
convenient
terms
are
transgressed
,
being
that
they
cannot
hit
upon
the
true
way
;
both
in
the
one
and
the
other
they
fail
.
But
he
fails
least
,
and
oftnest
lights
upon
good
success
,
that
meets
(
as
I
have
said
)
time
in
its
own
way
,
and
always
proceeds
according
as
his
own
nature
puts
him
forward
.
Every
one
knows
how
Fabius
Maximus
proceeded
with
his
Army
carefully
and
warily
,
far
from
all
that
kind
of
metle
and
confidence
which
other
whiles
the
Romans
used
;
and
his
good
fortune
would
have
it
,
that
this
his
way
agreed
well
with
the
times
:
for
Hannibal
being
come
a
young
man
into
Italy
,
and
with
a
fresh
gale
of
fortune
,
and
having
twice
broken
the
Romane
Armies
,
and
that
Republike
almost
lost
all
her
good
soldiers
,
and
therefore
being
affrighted
,
could
not
light
upon
better
fortune
than
to
have
such
a
Captain
,
who
by
his
slowness
and
wariness
should
keep
the
enemy
in
play
with
vain
delaies
:
Nor
could
Fabius
have
met
with
times
fitter
for
his
ways
:
whereupon
came
it
to
pass
that
he
grew
glorious
.
And
that
Fabius
did
this
upon
the
instigation
of
his
own
nature
,
and
not
upon
a
meer
choice
,
we
see
that
when
Scipio
desired
to
pass
over
into
Affrica
with
those
Armies
,
whereby
to
make
an
end
of
the
war
,
Fabius
much
contradicted
it
,
as
he
that
could
not
go
out
of
his
own
pace
,
nor
leave
his
own
custome
,
so
that
for
all
him
,
Hannibal
might
have
continued
still
in
Italy
;
for
he
perceived
not
,
that
the
times
were
changed
,
and
it
was
needful
to
alter
the
manner
of
making
war
.
And
had
Fabius
been
King
of
Rome
,
he
might
easily
have
spoiled
that
war
,
because
he
would
not
have
known
how
to
alter
his
proceedings
with
the
alteration
of
times
.
But
being
he
was
born
in
a
Republike
,
where
there
was
divers
Citizens
,
and
divers
humors
,
as
she
had
Fabius
,
who
was
excellent
in
those
times
,
when
the
war
was
onely
to
be
supported
;
so
had
she
Scipio
in
the
times
when
their
enemies
were
to
be
overcome
.
Whence
arises
it
,
that
a
Republike
hath
a
longer
life
,
and
longer
enjoys
good
fortune
than
a
principality
:
because
she
can
better
fit
her self
for
several
accidents
,
by
reason
of
the
variety
of
her
Subjects
that
are
in
her
,
then
can
a
Prince
:
for
a
man
that
is
accustomed
to
proceed
in
one
manner
,
never
alters
,
as
it
is
said
,
and
must
of
necessity
,
when
the
times
disagree
with
his
way
,
go
to
wrack
.
Peter
Soderini
,
formerly
spoken
of
,
proceeded
in
all
his
affairs
with
mildness
and
patience
:
and
he
and
his
Country
prospered
,
while
the
times
agreed
with
his
manner
of
proceedings
:
but
when
the
times
fell
out
so
,
that
it
was
needful
to
break
off
all
patience
and
mildness
,
he
knew
not
how
to
do
it
:
so
that
together
with
his
Country
he
fell
to
ruine
.
Pope
Julius
the
second
carried
himself
all
the
time
of
his
Pontificate
with
great
violence
and
rage
,
and
because
the
times
sorted
well
therewith
,
all
his
undertakings
succeeded
well
.
But
if
other
times
had
come
,
that
would
have
required
other
advice
,
of
force
he
must
have
gone
to
destruction
:
because
he
would
never
have
altered
his
manner
nor
order
in
his
proceedings
.
And
that
we
cannot
change
our selves
,
there
are
two
reasons
;
the
one
because
we
cannot
resist
that
which
our
nature
is
inclined
to
;
the
other
is
,
because
when
one
man
in
such
a
kind
of
proceeding
hath
gone
on
luckily
,
it
is
impossible
to
perswade
him
,
that
things
will
prove
well
,
where
hee
proceeds
otherwise
.
Whereupon
it
comes
to
pass
,
that
in
one
man
fortune
varies
,
because
shee
changes
the
times
,
and
he
changes
not
his
courses
.
Thence
arises
also
the
ruine
of
a
City
,
because
the
orders
of
Common
wealths
change
not
with
the
times
,
as
we
have
treated
heretofore
at
large
,
but
they
are
flower
:
for
it
is
a
greater
trouble
to
them
to
change
;
and
to
effect
it
,
they
have
need
of
times
which
should
in
a
manner
take
a
Republick
quite
off
the
things
whereby
a
thorough
alteration
should
be
made
in
her
:
for
which
one
man
alone
suffices
not
by
changing
the
manner
of
her
proceedings
.
And
because
wee
have
made
mention
of
Fabius
Maximus
,
who
held
off
Hannibal
with
delayes
,
I
purpose
to
treate
in
the
following
Chapter
,
whether
a
Captain
,
being
desirous
to
fight
a
battel
with
the
enemy
in
any
case
,
can
be
so
hindred
that
he
do
it
not
.
CHAP.
X.
That
a
Captain
cannot
avoid
battell
,
when
his
enemy
will
fight
in
any
case
.
CNeus
Sulpitius
the
dictator
held
off
from
fighting
with
the
French
,
being
not
willing
to
stand
at
fortunes
discretion
in
a
tryall
against
his
enemy
,
whom
time
and
a
strange
Country
would
continually
weaken
and
consume
.
When
such
an
error
en●ues
,
where
all
men
or
the
greater
part
of
them
erre
,
I
think
it
not
much
amiss
mary
times
to
reprove
it
.
Wherefore
though
I
have
formerly
several
times
shewed
,
how
the
actions
about
great
matters
now
adays
differ
from
those
of
ancient
times
;
yet
I
think
it
not
superfluous
at
this
present
to
repeat
it
:
for
if
in
any
part
it
differs
from
the
ancient
orders
,
it
is
especially
in
military
orders
,
where
now
is
not
any
of
those
things
observed
,
which
the
ancients
made
much
account
of
.
And
this
inconvenient
grew
first
hereupon
,
because
Commonwealths
and
Princes
,
have
committed
this
care
to
o●hers
,
and
to
avoid
dangers
,
have
much
lai●
aside
that
exercise
;
and
if
perchance
sometime
a
King
in
our
days
venture
to
go
in
person
,
we
believe
not
therefore
that
he
seeks
out
any
new
orders
,
that
are
more
commendable
:
for
when
they
chance
to
give
themselves
to
that
imployment
,
they
do
it
rather
in
shew
of
their
pompe
,
then
upon
any
other
laudable
occasion
.
Yet
do
these
commit
lesser
errors
,
personally
visiting
their
armies
,
and
keeping
in
their
own
hands
the
Majesty
of
their
Government
,
then
Republikes
do
,
especially
those
of
Italy
,
which
trust
to
others
,
not
understanding
any
thing
in
the
wars
,
or
attending
to
any
thing
belonging
to
them
:
and
on
the
other
side
,
when
they
are
desirous
(
whereby
they
may
seem
to
be
Princes
)
to
take
any
thing
into
deliberation
,
they
commit
therein
exceeding
many
errors
.
And
however
that
other
where
I
have
treated
of
some
of
them
,
yet
at
this
present
I
will
not
forbear
to
tell
one
of
very
great
importance
.
When
these
lazy
Princes
,
or
effeminate
Commonwealths
send
forth
any
Commander
of
theirs
,
the
wisest
commission
that
they
think
they
can
give
him
,
is
to
charge
him
,
that
in
any
case
he
fight
not
a
battel
,
but
avoid
it
,
and
conceiting
with
themselves
that
herein
they
imitate
Fabius
Maximus
his
discretion
,
who
by
forbearing
to
fight
,
saved
the
Romane
State
;
they
understand
not
that
most
commonly
,
this
commission
is
either
to
no
purpose
,
or
else
hurtful
.
For
we
must
take
this
for
a
conclusion
,
that
a
General
,
that
will
abide
in
the
field
,
cannot
avoid
a
battel
,
when
the
enemy
will
in
any
case
fight
.
So
that
this
commission
is
but
thus
,
as
if
he
should
say
,
fight
with
thine
enemy
at
his
pleasure
,
and
not
at
thine
own
.
For
if
a
man
will
abide
in
the
field
and
not
fight
,
the
surest
way
is
to
keep
himself
fifty
miles
off
from
his
enemy
at
least
,
and
then
keep
good
espiouns
,
so
that
if
he
chance
to
bend
towards
thee
,
thou
maist
avoid
him
at
leisure
.
Another
course
is
to
immure
himself
up
in
a
City
;
but
the
one
and
the
other
of
these
two
courses
is
very
pernicious
.
In
the
first
he
leaves
his
Country
in
prey
to
the
enemy
;
and
a
valiant
Prince
will
rather
hazard
the
battel
than
prolong
the
war
with
so
much
dammage
to
his
Subjects
.
And
in
the
second
the
loss
is
evident
;
for
it
must
needs
be
,
that
retiring
thy self
within
the
walls
of
a
Town
with
thy
Army
,
thou
be
besiged
,
and
at
length
suffer
famine
,
and
so
be
forced
to
yeeld
:
insomuch
as
to
avoid
battel
by
either
of
these
two
means
,
must
needs
prove
very
hurtful
.
The
course
that
Fabius
Maximus
held
,
to
abide
in
strong
places
is
very
good
,
when
thou
hast
an
Army
so
valorous
,
that
the
enemy
dares
not
come
to
find
thee
in
thy
advantages
.
Nor
can
it
be
said
that
Fabius
avoided
fighting
,
but
rather
that
he
would
fight
at
his
advantage
.
For
if
Hannibal
had
gone
to
find
him
,
Fabius
would
have
staid
for
him
,
and
fought
with
him
;
but
Hannibal
durst
not
deal
with
him
after
his
manner
.
So
the
battel
was
as
well
avoided
by
Hannibal
as
by
Fabius
;
but
if
one
of
them
had
been
desirous
to
have
hazarded
in
any
case
,
the
other
had
but
one
of
these
three
remedies
,
to
wit
those
two
we
have
before
mentioned
,
or
to
flie
.
There
are
many
examples
and
maximes
in
the
war
,
which
the
Romanes
made
with
Philip
of
Macedon
,
Father
of
Perses
,
to
make
good
what
I
say
;
for
Philip
being
assailed
by
the
Romanes
,
resolved
not
to
come
to
battel
;
and
therefore
first
he
thought
to
do
as
Fabius
Maximus
had
done
in
Italy
,
and
placed
himself
with
his
Army
upon
the
top
of
a
mountain
,
where
he
fortified
himself
all
he
could
,
deeming
that
the
Romans
had
not
the
heart
to
come
and
find
him
there
;
but
when
they
went
thither
,
and
fought
with
him
,
and
drove
him
from
the
mountain
,
being
not
able
to
withstand
them
,
he
fled
with
the
greater
part
of
his
people
:
and
that
which
saved
him
was
the
roughness
of
the
Country
,
so
that
the
Romans
could
not
follow
the
pursuite
.
Philip
then
being
unwilling
to
fight
,
and
having
pitcht
his
campe
near
the
Romans
,
had
no
other
mean
but
to
fly
;
and
having
found
by
this
experience
,
that
when
they
meant
not
to
fight
,
it
was
not
enough
for
them
to
get
upon
the
top
of
the
mountains
;
and
having
no
mind
to
inclose
himself
in
any
Town
,
resolved
to
take
the
other
course
,
to
remove
many
miles
distant
from
the
Romanes
Campe.
Whereupon
,
if
the
Romanes
were
in
one
Province
,
they
went
into
another
,
and
so
always
they
went
thither
from
whence
the
Romanes
were
parted
:
and
considering
in
the
end
,
how
that
in
prolonging
the
war
this
way
,
his
own
estate
declined
,
and
how
that
his
Subjects
were
sometimes
by
himself
,
otherwhile
by
his
enemies
daily
oppressed
,
resolved
to
put
it
to
the
tryal
of
a
day
,
and
so
came
to
a
set
battel
with
the
Romanes
.
It
is
profitable
then
not
to
fight
,
when
the
Armies
have
these
conditions
which
Fabius
his
Army
had
,
or
that
then
had
that
of
Cneus
Sulpirius
,
which
are
,
to
have
an
Army
so
good
,
that
the
enemie
dares
not
come
and
find
thee
within
thy
fortifications
,
and
that
the
enemy
though
he
be
in
thy
Country
,
yet
hath
he
not
much
footing
therein
,
where
he
may
suffer
want
of
provisions
;
and
in
this
case
the
course
is
advantagious
for
the
reasons
Titus
Livius
alledges
:
Vnwilling
to
stand
at
fortunes
discretion
on
a
tryal
against
his
enemy
,
whom
time
and
a
strange
Country
would
daily
weaken
and
consume
.
But
in
any
other
case
the
battel
cannot
be
avoided
,
but
with
thy
shame
and
danger
:
for
to
flie
(
as
Philip
did
)
is
the
same
that
it
is
to
be
routed
,
and
that
with
the
more
disgrace
,
by
how
much
the
less
thou
hast
made
proof
of
thy
valor
.
And
however
he
had
the
luck
to
escape
,
another
could
not
have
had
the
like
,
unless
he
had
help
by
the
scituation
of
the
Country
,
as
well
as
he
.
That
Hannibal
was
a
master
in
the
art
of
war
,
I
think
every
one
will
acknowledge
,
and
being
to
oppose
Scipio
in
Affrica
,
if
he
had
seen
any
advantage
in
prolonging
the
war
,
without
doubt
he
would
have
done
it
,
and
peradventure
could
too
(
being
a
good
Commander
and
having
a
good
Army
)
as
well
as
Fabius
did
in
Italy
.
But
being
he
did
it
not
,
we
may
well
believe
,
that
some
important
reason
perswaded
him
so
;
for
a
Prince
that
hath
an
Army
levied
,
and
sees
that
for
want
of
moneys
or
friends
he
cannot
keep
them
long
together
,
is
a
very
fool
if
he
ventures
not
his
fortune
,
before
his
Army
falls
asunder
;
for
by
delaying
he
certainly
loses
,
whereas
hazzarding
he
might
overcome
.
Another
thing
there
is
yet
much
to
be
accounted
of
,
which
is
,
that
a
man
ought
(
even
in
his
losing
)
seek
to
gain
glory
;
and
it
is
more
glory
,
to
be
overcome
by
force
,
than
by
any
other
inconvenient
,
that
may
have
made
thee
lose
.
Therefore
it
must
needs
be
that
Hannibal
was
forc't
by
these
necessities
;
and
on
the
other
side
Scipio
,
if
Hannibal
would
have
protracted
the
war
,
and
he
durst
not
have
adventured
to
go
seek
him
in
his
Trenches
,
had
not
suffered
therein
,
in
that
he
had
already
overcome
Siphax
,
and
taken
so
many
Towns
in
Affrick
,
so
that
he
could
have
continued
there
with
security
and
conveniency
,
as
well
as
in
Italy
.
Which
was
not
so
with
Hannibal
,
when
he
had
to
deal
with
Fabius
,
nor
with
those
French-men
,
when
they
were
opposed
by
Sulpitius
.
So
much
the
less
also
can
he
avoid
the
fight
,
that
with
an
Army
invades
another
mans
Country
,
he
must
(
whensoever
the
enemie
faces
him
)
fight
with
him
,
and
if
he
incampes
before
any
Town
,
so
much
the
rather
is
he
obliged
to
fight
,
as
in
our
days
it
befell
Duke
Charles
of
Burgundy
,
who
being
set
down
before
Morat
,
a
Town
belonging
to
the
Swissers
,
was
assaulted
by
them
and
broken
:
and
so
it
chanc'd
to
the
French
Army
,
that
incamping
at
Novarra
,
was
in
like
manner
routed
by
the
Swissers
.
CHAP.
XI
.
He
that
hath
to
deal
with
many
,
however
that
he
be
the
weaker
,
provided
that
he
can
but
support
their
first
violence
,
overcomes
.
THe
Tribunes
of
the
peoples
power
in
Rome
was
great
,
and
necessary
,
as
many
times
we
have
said
:
for
otherwise
it
would
never
have
been
possible
to
bridle
the
Nobilities
ambition
,
which
would
much
sooner
,
then
it
did
,
have
corrupted
that
Commonwealth
:
yet
because
in
every
thing
(
as
is
often
said
)
some
evil
proper
to
every
thing
lies
lurking
in
it
,
which
causes
new
accidents
to
arise
,
it
is
needful
with
new
orders
to
remedy
them
.
Wherefore
the
Tribunitial
power
being
grown
insolent
,
and
terrible
to
the
Nobility
,
and
to
all
Rome
,
some
very
hurtful
inconvenient
to
the
Romane
liberty
would
have
risen
,
if
the
way
had
not
been
shewed
by
Appius
Claudius
,
whereby
they
might
defend
themselves
against
the
Tribunes
ambition
:
which
was
that
they
always
found
some
one
among
them
,
that
either
was
fearful
or
might
be
corrupted
,
or
that
was
a
lover
of
the
common
good
:
so
that
they
disposed
him
to
oppose
other
mens
wills
,
that
desired
to
draw
forward
any
deliberation
against
the
Senates
will
.
Which
remedy
was
a
great
allay
to
such
an
authority
,
and
a
long
time
much
helped
Rome
.
Which
thing
hath
made
me
consider
,
that
whensoever
many
powerful
ones
are
united
together
against
one
that
is
powerful
,
though
all
they
together
are
much
more
puissant
then
he
,
yet
may
there
much
more
be
hoped
for
in
him
alone
,
though
less
powerful
,
then
in
those
many
,
though
very
strong
:
for
(
leaving
a
part
all
those
things
,
wherein
one
alone
is
able
to
do
more
then
many
,
which
things
are
innumerable
)
this
will
always
come
to
pass
,
that
one
alone
,
taking
but
a
little
care
,
shall
be
able
to
disunite
those
many
,
and
so
weaken
that
body
which
was
strong
.
I
will
not
herein
alledge
ancient
examples
,
which
are
very
frequent
;
the
modern
shall
suffice
me
,
which
have
faln
in
our
days
.
In
the
year
1484.
all
Italy
conspired
against
the
Venetians
,
who
when
they
were
in
a
manner
wholly
lost
,
and
could
not
any
more
abide
in
the
field
with
their
Army
,
they
corrupted
Lodwick
that
then
ruled
in
Milan
,
and
by
means
of
that
corruption
made
an
accord
,
wherein
they
not
only
had
again
the
towns
they
had
lost
,
but
usurped
a
part
of
the
state
of
Ferrara
.
And
thus
they
that
had
been
loosers
in
the
war
,
remained
gainers
by
the
peace
.
A
few
years
past
,
the
whole
world
conspired
against
France
;
yet
before
they
came
to
see
the
end
of
the
war
,
Spain
broke
off
from
her
confederates
,
and
made
agreement
with
her
,
in
so
much
as
the
rest
of
the
confederates
also
were
forced
to
make
their
accords
too
.
So
that
without
doubt
,
we
ought
always
judge
,
when
we
see
a
war
made
by
many
against
one
,
that
that
one
is
like
to
be
a
gainer
at
the
end
,
provided
that
he
be
of
such
valour
,
that
he
is
able
to
sustain
the
first
brunts
,
and
so
govern
himself
with
the
time
as
to
attend
time
:
which
if
he
were
not
able
to
do
,
he
would
run
the
hazard
of
many
dangers
,
as
it
happened
to
the
Venetians
in
the
eighth
year
,
who
if
they
could
have
temporised
with
the
French
Army
,
and
so
have
had
time
to
gain
themselves
some
of
those
that
were
confederated
against
them
,
they
might
have
escaped
that
destruction
,
but
not
having
so
good
an
Army
,
as
thereby
to
play
with
the
enemy
awhile
;
and
hereupon
not
having
had
leisure
to
take
any
of
them
asunder
,
they
were
ruined
:
for
we
saw
,
that
the
Pope
when
he
had
what
was
his
,
became
their
friend
,
and
so
Spaine
,
and
very
willingly
the
one
and
the
other
of
these
two
Princes
would
have
saved
them
the
state
of
Lombardy
against
France
,
for
fear
of
making
it
too
great
in
Italy
,
if
it
had
been
in
their
power
.
The
Venetians
then
might
have
given
a
part
,
to
save
the
rest
,
which
if
they
had
done
in
time
,
that
it
had
appeared
it
was
not
of
extream
necessity
,
and
before
the
beginning
of
the
war
,
would
have
been
wisely
done
of
them
;
but
when
the
wars
were
begun
,
it
was
disgraceful
,
and
peradventure
of
small
benefit
.
But
before
such
imbroiles
,
few
of
the
Citizens
of
Venice
could
foresee
the
danger
,
very
few
the
way
to
help
,
and
none
to
advise
it
.
But
to
return
again
to
the
beginning
of
this
discourse
,
I
conclude
,
that
even
so
as
the
Senate
of
Rome
had
a
remedy
to
save
their
country
from
the
Tribunes
ambition
,
because
they
were
many
,
so
shall
any
Prince
that
is
assailed
by
many
,
finde
a
remedy
,
whensoever
he
knows
with
discretion
how
to
use
the
convenient
means
to
disunite
them
.
CHAP.
XII
.
That
a
wise
Commander
upon
his
own
souldiers
should
lay
all
manner
of
necessity
to
fight
,
and
take
it
,
as
much
as
he
can
,
from
his
enemies
.
AT
other
times
we
have
treated
,
of
what
advantage
necessity
is
to
hamane
actions
,
and
to
what
glory
they
have
thereby
been
promoted
;
and
that
by
some
moral
Philosophers
it
hath
been
written
,
that
mens
hands
and
tongues
two
of
their
worthiest
instruments
to
ennoble
them
,
would
never
have
worked
so
perfectly
,
nor
have
brought
mens
labors
to
that
excellency
,
whereunto
we
see
them
now
come
,
had
they
not
been
thrust
forward
by
necessity
.
The
vertue
then
of
such
necessity
being
known
by
the
ancient
Commanders
of
Armies
,
and
how
thereby
the
souldiers
minds
were
made
the
more
obstinate
to
fight
,
they
used
all
their
industry
,
to
force
them
by
it
.
And
on
the
other
side
,
they
aswell
endeavored
,
to
free
their
enemies
from
it
;
and
hereupon
many
times
they
opened
that
way
to
the
enemy
,
which
they
could
have
shut
against
them
,
and
shut
it
against
their
own
soldiers
,
which
they
could
have
left
open
for
them
.
He
then
that
desires
,
either
that
a
City
defend
it self
obstinately
,
or
that
an
Army
in
the
field
fight
it
out
resolutely
,
must
try
his
wits
to
make
an
impression
in
the
brests
of
them
that
are
to
fight
,
that
such
a
necessity
lies
upon
them
.
Whereupon
a
discreet
Commander
that
is
going
to
besige
a
Town
,
may
conjecture
of
the
facility
or
difficulty
in
taking
it
,
by
the
knowledge
and
consideration
of
the
necessity
that
binds
the
inhabitants
to
defend
themselves
;
and
as
he
finds
the
necessity
urging
them
to
be
great
,
so
let
him
judge
it
difficult
to
overcome
them
,
or
otherwise
easie
.
Whence
it
proceeds
,
that
those
Towns
which
have
rebelled
,
are
harder
to
be
regained
then
they
were
at
their
first
conquest
;
for
in
the
beginning
not
having
any
cause
to
fear
punishment
,
as
not
having
offended
,
they
yeeld
easily
;
but
thinking
(
after
they
have
rebelled
)
that
they
have
offended
,
and
hereupon
fearing
the
chastisement
,
they
prove
harder
to
be
recovered
.
Moreover
such
obstinacy
arises
from
the
innate
hatreds
which
neighboring
Princes
and
Republiques
,
bear
one
to
another
,
which
proceeds
from
their
ambition
to
rule
,
and
the
jealousie
of
their
own
state
,
especially
if
they
be
Republikes
as
it
chances
in
Tuscany
.
Which
strife
and
contention
hath
caused
,
and
ever
will
,
a
great
difficulty
in
the
mastery
of
the
one
or
other
.
Whereof
he
that
considers
well
the
City
of
Florences
neighbors
,
and
those
of
Venice
,
will
not
marvel
(
as
many
do
)
that
Florence
hath
spent
more
in
her
wars
,
and
gained
less
then
Venice
,
for
this
is
,
because
the
Venetians
never
found
their
neighboring
Towns
so
obstinate
in
their
defence
,
as
Florence
hath
;
for
that
all
the
Towns
confining
upon
Venice
have
been
accustomed
to
live
in
subjection
under
a
Prince
,
and
not
free
;
and
those
that
have
been
used
to
serve
,
make
small
account
of
changing
their
Lord
,
or
rather
many
times
they
much
desire
it
.
So
that
Venice
(
however
she
hath
had
more
powerful
neighbors
then
Florence
)
yet
because
she
hath
found
the
Townes
lesse
obstinate
against
her
,
hath
been
able
sooner
to
subdue
them
then
the
other
could
,
being
enuironed
round
,
by
free
Towns
.
A
Commander
therefore
should
(
to
return
to
our
first
discourse
)
when
he
sits
down
before
any
Town
,
provide
with
all
diligence
to
take
from
the
defendants
all
scruples
of
such
necessity
,
and
conquently
such
obstinacy
,
promising
pardon
,
if
they
are
afraid
of
punishment
:
and
if
they
doubt
their
liberty
is
aimed
at
,
shew
them
there
is
nothing
intended
against
the
common
good
,
but
against
some
few
ambitious
men
in
the
City
,
which
thing
hath
,
many
times
facilitated
such
enterprises
and
takings
of
Towns
.
And
though
such
colours
are
easily
seen
through
,
and
especially
by
understanding
men
,
yet
are
the
people
ost
deceived
thereby
,
who
being
desirous
of
the
present
peace
,
shut
their
eyes
against
any
other
,
snare
that
under
large
promises
can
be
laid
for
them
.
And
this
way
exceeding
many
Cities
have
been
reduced
to
servitude
,
as
it
befell
Florence
in
these
latter
days
,
and
Crassus
also
with
his
whole
Army
,
who
though
he
knew
the
Parthians
promises
were
not
to
be
credited
,
which
were
made
onely
to
take
from
his
soldiers
the
necessity
of
defending
themselves
,
yet
could
he
not
keep
them
obstinate
,
being
blinded
by
the
offers
of
peace
made
them
by
their
enemies
,
as
in
particular
may
be
seen
in
his
life
,
by
him
that
shall
read
it
.
When
the
Samnites
,
contrary
to
the
articles
of
agreement
,
upon
the
ambition
of
some
few
had
forraged
and
spoiled
the
Romans
their
confederates
fields
,
and
afterwards
sent
Ambassadors
to
Rome
to
require
peace
,
offering
to
make
restitution
of
all
that
was
taken
,
and
deliver
them
prisoners
the
authors
of
those
broyles
and
robberies
,
they
were
refus'd
by
the
Romans
,
and
sent
back
to
Samnium
without
hope
of
agreement
:
Claudius
Pontius
the
commander
of
the
Samnites
Army
,
with
a
notable
oration
of
his
shewed
,
the
Romans
would
have
war
in
any
case
;
and
though
for
their
own
parts
they
wished
for
peace
,
yet
necessity
made
them
take
the
war
in
hand
,
saying
these
words
,
They
justly
take
arms
that
are
forced
to
do
so
;
and
piously
too
who
have
no
other
hope
but
in
them
.
Upon
which
necessity
he
with
his
souldiers
grounded
his
hopes
of
victory
.
And
to
the
end
I
need
not
return
again
to
this
matter
,
I
think
it
fit
to
alledge
those
examples
of
the
Romans
,
which
are
most
worthy
of
remarke
;
Caius
Manilius
went
forth
with
an
army
to
incounter
the
Veientes
,
and
part
of
their
Army
having
forced
his
trenches
,
Manilius
came
speedily
with
new
Troops
to
sucour
his
own
,
and
that
the
Veientes
should
not
escape
,
guarded
all
the
passages
into
the
campe
.
Whereupon
the
Veientes
seeing
themselves
shut
in
of
all
sides
,
began
to
fight
with
such
fury
,
that
they
slew
Manilius
,
and
would
have
otherthrown
all
the
rest
of
the
Romans
,
if
,
by
the
wisdom
of
one
Tribune
,
a
way
for
them
to
escape
by
,
had
not
been
opened
.
Where
we
see
that
whiles
necessity
constraned
the
Veientes
to
fight
,
they
stood
to
it
stoutly
;
but
as
soon
as
a
way
was
opened
for
them
,
they
thought
more
upon
flying
then
fighting
.
The
Volsci
and
Equi
having
entered
with
their
armies
upon
the
Roman
territories
,
the
Consuls
were
sent
against
them
,
and
whiles
they
were
in
fight
,
the
Volscies
army
,
the
chief
whereof
was
Vectius
Metius
,
chanced
to
to
be
inclosed
between
their
own
trenches
,
which
the
Romans
were
now
become
masters
of
,
and
the
other
Roman
Army
,
who
seeing
they
must
all
either
die
or
make
way
by
the
sword
,
he
spake
thus
to
his
soldiers
,
Come
along
with
mee
;
there
is
neither
rampire
nor
ditch
to
oppose
you
,
but
men
only
against
men
:
you
are
equall
to
them
in
valour
,
and
,
which
is
the
last
and
hardest
weapon
,
your
necessity
gives
you
advantage
of
them
.
Insomuch
as
this
necessity
is
term'd
by
Titus
Livius
the
extreamest
and
greatest
weapon
.
Camillus
the
wisest
of
all
the
Roman
commanders
being
got
within
the
walls
of
the
Vejentes
City
with
his
Army
,
whereby
to
take
it
more
easily
,
and
to
free
the
enemies
from
that
last
necessity
of
defending
themselves
gave
command
so
that
the
Vejentes
heard
it
,
that
none
should
hurt
those
that
were
disarmd
:
so
that
having
cast
all
their
armes
upon
the
ground
,
that
City
was
taken
with
little
or
no
effusion
of
blood
;
Which
course
was
afterwards
followed
by
many
Commanders
.
CHAP.
XIII
.
Whether
more
trust
is
to
be
reposed
in
a
good
Commander
that
hath
a
weak
Army
,
or
in
a
good
Army
that
hath
a
weak
Commander
.
COriolanus
being
banished
from
Rome
,
went
from
thence
to
the
Volsci
,
where
having
gotten
together
an
Army
to
be
reveng'd
of
his
own
Citizens
,
came
from
thence
to
Rome
;
from
whence
he
was
mov'd
to
depart
,
rather
for
pitty
to
his
mother
,
than
by
the
Romans
forces
.
Upon
which
place
T.
Livius
saies
,
that
hereby
it
is
known
that
the
Commonwealth
of
Rome
grew
more
by
the
Captains
valours
,
than
the
soldiers
,
considering
that
the
Volsci
formerly
had
been
alwaies
losers
,
and
only
then
had
overcome
when
Co●iolanus
was
their
General
:
And
how
ever
that
Livie
holds
such
an
opinion
,
yet
we
see
in
many
places
of
his
History
,
that
Soldiers
without
any
Captain
have
given
extraordinary
proofs
of
their
valors
,
and
have
been
better
ordered
and
fiercer
after
the
death
of
their
Consuls
,
than
before
they
were
slain
,
as
it
happend
in
the
Army
which
the
Romans
had
in
Spain
under
the
Scipioes
,
which
when
the
two
Captains
were
slain
,
was
able
by
its
own
valor
not
only
to
save
it self
,
but
overcome
the
enemy
,
and
keep
that
Province
for
the
Republick
.
So
relating
all
,
wee
shall
find
many
examples
where
the
Soldiers
valor
alone
hath
got
the
day
,
and
many
others
where
the
Generals
valor
only
hath
done
the
same
effect
.
In
so
much
as
wee
may
well
judge
,
that
either
of
them
hath
need
of
the
other
.
And
here
it
is
not
amiss
to
consider
first
,
whether
is
most
to
be
feared
,
either
a
good
Army
led
by
an
unskilfull
Commander
,
or
a
good
Commander
followed
by
a
bad
Army
.
And
taking
after
Cesars
opinion
,
small
account
is
to
be
made
of
the
one
or
the
other
:
for
when
he
went
into
Spain
against
Afranius
and
Petrejus
,
who
had
with
them
a
good
Army
,
he
said
he
little
doubted
them
,
Because
he
went
against
an
Army
that
lacked
a
Commander
,
shewing
the
Commanders
weakness
.
On
the
contrary
when
he
went
into
Thessaly
against
Pompey
,
he
said
,
I
go
against
a
Commander
without
an
Army
.
Sempronius
Gracchus
to
train
them
,
who
in
a
small
time
made
a
very
good
Army
of
them
.
Pelopidas
and
Epaminondas
(
as
we
have
said
otherwhere
)
after
they
had
delivered
Thebes
their
native
Country
out
of
the
Spartans
bondage
,
made
the
Thebans
exceeding
good
Soldiers
in
a
short
time
,
that
they
were
able
not
only
to
sustain
'
,
but
overcome
the
Soldiers
of
Sparta
;
so
that
the
case
is
equal
on
both
sides
:
for
the
one
being
good
,
may
soon
find
the
other
so
:
yet
a
good
Army
without
a
good
head
,
ordinarily
becomes
insolent
and
dangerous
;
as
was
the
Macedonian
Army
after
Alexander
his
death
,
and
likewise
the
Veterane
soldiers
in
the
civil
warres
.
So
that
I
think
,
that
much
more
account
is
to
be
made
of
a
Commander
that
hath
time
and
convenience
to
train
up
and
arme
his
Soldiers
,
than
of
an
insolent
Army
,
having
a
Captain
from
among
them
tumultuarily
made
their
Chief
.
Wherefore
double
glory
and
renown
may
well
be
ascrib'd
to
those
Commanders
,
who
have
not
only
taken
upon
them
to
overcome
the
enemy
,
but
before
their
comming
to
fight
with
them
,
have
to
make
them
fit
for
the
occasion
,
disciplind
and
instructed
their
Armies
well
:
for
therein
appears
their
vertuo
double
and
admirable
;
whereas
if
the
charge
hereof
were
communicated
to
many
,
far
less
account
or
esteem
would
be
made
of
them
.
CHAP.
XIV
.
New
sleights
and
inventions
,
that
are
usd
in
the
midst
of
a
fight
,
and
new
cryes
that
are
heard
,
what
effects
they
produce
.
OF
what
moment
in
combates
and
fights
a
new
accident
is
,
that
arises
upon
any
new
matter
seen
or
heard
,
appears
in
many
places
,
and
especially
in
that
occasion
,
where
the
Romans
fought
with
the
Volsci
,
where
Qu●ntius
seeing
one
of
the
horns
of
his
Army
beginning
to
fayle
,
began
to
cry
out
aloud
,
that
they
should
stand
firm
:
because
the
other
horne
of
the
Army
was
already
victorious
:
by
which
words
,
having
encourag'd
his
own
,
and
affrighted
his
enemies
,
hee
overcame
them
.
And
if
such
vociserations
in
an
Army
well
orderd
be
of
great
effect
,
in
one
then
that
is
but
tumultuary
and
ill
disciplind
,
they
must
needs
be
of
much
greater
:
because
the
whole
frame
thereof
moves
by
the
like
wind
.
To
this
purpose
I
will
alledge
a
notable
example
befaln
in
our
dayes
.
The
City
of
Perugia
,
a
few
years
since
,
was
divided
into
two
factions
,
of
the
Oddi
,
and
the
Bagliori
;
these
raignd
there
,
the
others
were
banishd
men
,
who
having
by
help
of
their
allies
gotten
an
Army
together
,
and
brought
it
into
some
Town
consining
upon
Perugia
,
by
favour
of
their
faction
one
night
enterd
the
City
,
&
without
being
descryd
,
came
to
take
the
Piazza
;
&
because
that
City
hath
chains
on
all
the
corners
of
the
waies
,
which
kept
them
bard
,
the
Soldiers
belonging
to
the
Oddi
had
a
man
went
before
them
,
who
with
a
bar
of
Iron
was
to
break
the
locks
of
those
chains
,
to
the
end
the
horse
might
pass
,
&
there
being
but
one
only
left
them
to
break
,
which
immediately
opened
into
the
Piazza
,
and
now
a
generall
alarme
being
given
,
and
he
that
broke
them
,
being
oppressed
by
the
multitude
that
followd
him
,
and
not
able
therefore
well
to
lift
up
his
armes
with
his
bar
,
whereby
to
imploy
it
,
chanc'd
to
say
Stand
back
;
which
word
going
by
degrees
,
saying
back
,
began
to
cause
the
furthest
off
to
flie
,
and
so
by
little
and
little
the
rest
with
such
force
,
that
they
all
routed
one
another
.
And
thus
the
design
of
the
Oddi
,
by
occasion
of
so
poor
an
accident
,
became
frustrate
.
Where
we
may
consider
,
that
discipline
and
order
is
not
usefull
in
an
Army
so
much
for
orderly
fighting
,
as
that
every
small
accident
put
thee
not
quite
into
disorder
:
for
,
were
it
for
nothing
else
,
the
ordinary
multitude
is
unfit
for
the
warrs
,
because
every
rumor
,
every
voice
,
every
noise
changes
them
,
and
puts
them
to
flight
.
And
therefore
a
good
Commander
,
among
his
other
orders
,
ought
appoint
those
that
are
to
take
the
word
from
him
,
&
to
pass
it
to
others
,
and
accustome
his
Soldiers
,
so
that
they
give
no
credit
save
only
to
their
own
officers
,
to
the
end
that
they
tell
them
only
,
what
is
given
them
in
charge
from
him
:
for
when
this
part
is
not
well
observ'd
,
many
disorders
often
fall
out
.
Touching
the
sight
of
these
new
things
every
Commander
ought
well
bend
his
wits
,
to
make
some
shew
whiles
the
battail
is
in
tryal
,
whereby
to
encourage
his
own
,
and
dishearten
the
enemy
,
because
among
those
accidents
which
may
give
thee
the
victory
,
this
is
the
most
effectuall
.
Whereof
wee
alledge
for
testimony
the
example
of
Cneus
Sulpitius
the
Roman
Dictatour
,
who
comming
to
fight
a
battell
with
the
French
,
arm'd
all
the
poor
drudges
and
rascality
of
the
Camp
:
and
having
mounted
them
upon
Mules
and
poor
Asses
with
armes
and
ensignes
,
to
make
them
seem
as
if
they
were
cavallry
,
he
plac'd
them
behind
a
hill
,
and
commanded
that
at
a
signall
given
,
whiles
he
was
in
the
hottest
of
the
battel
they
should
shew
themselves
to
the
enemy
,
which
thing
so
ordered
and
done
,
put
the
French
men
in
such
a
fright
that
they
lost
they
day
.
And
therefore
a
good
Commander
ought
to
do
two
things
;
the
one
is
,
to
try
some
of
these
inventions
to
startle
the
enemy
:
the
other
,
to
stand
so
prepard
that
the
enemy
offering
any
such
to
him
,
he
may
be
able
to
discover
and
quite
frustrate
them
,
as
did
the
Indian
King
to
Semiramis
;
who
seeing
,
that
King
had
a
great
number
of
Elephants
,
to
affright
him
,
and
make
him
think
shee
had
more
her self
than
he
,
made
a
great
many
of
them
of
Bulls
and
Bufaloes
hides
,
and
having
put
them
upon
Camells
,
sent
them
before
:
but
that
King
finding
out
her
deceit
,
turnd
it
upon
her
not
only
vain
but
hurtfull
.
Mammercus
was
sent
Dictator
against
the
Fidenates
,
who
to
affright
the
Roman
Army
,
appointed
that
in
the
heat
of
the
skirmish
a
good
number
of
soldiers
should
sally
forth
of
Fidenas
with
lights
upon
the
top
of
their
Lances
,
to
the
end
that
the
Romans
taken
a
while
with
the
novelty
of
the
matter
,
should
fall
into
some
disorder
.
Whereupon
it
is
to
be
noted
,
that
when
such
devices
carry
more
truth
than
appearance
with
them
,
they
may
well
be
represented
to
the
view
of
men
,
because
that
having
in
them
a
great
deal
of
that
which
is
lively
and
likely
,
their
weakness
cannot
so
quickly
be
discoverd
:
but
when
they
have
more
of
fiction
in
them
than
of
truth
,
it
is
better
either
not
to
use
them
,
or
using
them
to
keep
them
off
at
such
a
distance
that
a
full
discovery
of
them
cannot
suddenly
be
made
,
as
was
that
trick
of
the
Muleters
Cn.
Sulpitius
practisd
:
for
when
there
is
nothing
but
weakness
within
them
,
as
they
are
approached
,
they
are
quickly
seen
through
,
and
do
thee
wrong
rather
than
give
thee
advantage
,
as
those
Elephants
did
to
Semiramis
,
and
the
fires
to
the
Fidenates
;
which
however
that
at
first
they
a
little
troubled
the
Army
,
yet
when
the
Dictatour
came
up
to
them
,
and
began
to
cry
out
,
That
they
might
be
ashamd
to
fly
from
the
smoak
like
Bees
,
but
that
they
should
rather
turn
back
their
slames
upon
them
,
saying
,
Bnrne
out
these
people
of
Fidenas
with
fire
,
whose
rancorous
spirits
you
could
never
asswage
with
all
your
courtesie
.
Thus
that
device
of
the
Fidenates
servd
them
to
no
purpose
,
and
so
they
lost
the
fight
.
CHAP.
XV.
That
the
command
of
an
Army
ought
to
be
given
in
charge
only
to
one
;
and
where
there
are
more
,
they
alwaies
erre
.
THe
Fidenates
having
rebelld
,
and
slain
that
Colony
,
which
the
Romans
had
sent
to
Fidenas
,
the
Romans
created
four
Tribuns
with
Consular
power
to
exact
satisfaction
for
this
wrong
done
:
whereof
one
being
left
for
the
safeguard
of
Rome
,
the
rest
were
sent
against
the
Fidenates
,
and
the
Vejentes
,
who
because
they
were
at
variance
one
with
another
,
brought
back
disgrace
from
the
service
,
though
no
loss
:
of
the
disgrace
they
were
the
cause
,
but
that
they
receivd
no
loss
,
the
Soldiers
valour
was
the
cause
.
Whereupon
the
Romans
seeing
this
disorder
,
had
their
recourse
to
the
creation
of
a
Dictator
,
to
the
end
one
alone
should
rectifie
again
,
what
three
had
disorderd
.
Whence
we
see
the
unprofitableness
of
many
Commanders
in
one
Army
or
Town
,
that
is
to
defend
it self
:
and
T.
Livius
cannot
more
plainly
express
it
,
than
in
these
words
,
here
written
;
Three
Tribuns
with
Consular
power
taught
us
how
unprofitable
a
thing
it
was
,
to
have
many
Commanders
in
the
warr
;
for
every
one
of
them
making
severall
parties
,
and
each
one
thinking
his
own
best
,
gave
opportunity
to
the
enemy
.
And
however
that
this
is
example
sufficient
to
prove
the
disorder
which
a
plurality
of
Commanders
causes
in
the
war
,
yet
will
I
alledge
some
other
as
well
modern
as
ancient
,
for
the
better
declaration
of
it
.
In
the
year
1500.
after
the
reprisal
of
Milan
by
Lewes
the
twelfth
of
France
,
he
sent
his
Army
to
Pisa
,
to
restore
it
to
the
Florentines
,
whether
John
Baptista
Ridolphi
and
Luke
Antony
of
the
Albizzi
were
sent
Commissaries
.
And
because
Iohn
Baptista
was
a
man
of
credit
and
years
,
Luke
left
the
whole
government
in
every
thing
unto
him
.
And
if
he
did
not
discover
his
ambition
in
opposing
him
,
yet
he
manifested
it
by
his
silence
,
and
neglecting
and
scorning
every
thing
that
was
orderd
,
so
that
he
nothing
furtherd
the
actions
of
the
Campe
neither
in
word
nor
in
deed
,
as
if
he
had
been
a
man
of
no
worth
.
But
afterwards
it
appeared
quite
contrary
,
when
upon
an
occasion
following
,
Iohn
Baptista
was
fain
to
returne
to
Florence
;
Luke
being
left
alone
shewd
his
abilities
,
both
by
his
courage
,
industry
and
counsell
.
All
which
things
were
in
a
manner
quite
lost
in
him
,
while
he
had
a
companion
.
I
will
anew
produce
in
confirmation
hereof
T.
Livius
his
words
,
who
relating
,
how
that
Quintius
and
Agrippa
his
Collegue
,
being
sent
by
the
Romans
against
the
Aequi
,
the
whole
disposing
of
the
war
was
in
Quintius
his
hands
,
and
saies
:
In
the
managing
of
weighty
affaires
,
it
is
the
safest
way
to
commit
the
main
charge
to
one
.
Which
is
clean
contrary
,
to
what
is
now
adaies
practised
by
our
Republicks
and
Princes
:
who
use
to
send
into
those
places
,
that
they
may
the
better
order
them
,
more
Commissaries
,
and
more
Commanders
than
one
,
which
causes
much
confusion
:
and
if
the
occasion
were
inquired
after
,
why
the
Italian
and
French
Armies
are
now
adaies
ruined
,
we
should
find
this
had
been
the
principall
.
And
it
may
truly
be
concluded
,
that
it
is
to
more
purpose
to
imploy
one
man
alone
of
but
ordinary
judgement
in
such
an
expedition
,
then
two
very
able
men
together
with
equall
commission
.
CHAP.
XVI
.
In
times
of
difficulty
and
perill
true
worth
and
vertue
is
sought
after
,
and
in
calme
and
quiet
times
,
not
mens
vertues
,
but
their
wealth
,
friends
,
and
parentage
preferre
them
.
IT
was
alwaies
and
ever
will
be
,
that
great
personages
and
the
worthyest
men
,
in
peaceable
times
,
are
of
small
esteem
:
for
because
of
envy
,
following
the
reputation
which
their
vertue
hath
gained
them
,
in
such
times
there
are
many
Citizens
,
that
are
ambitious
,
not
only
to
bee
their
equals
,
but
superiors
;
and
to
this
purpose
there
is
a
place
in
Thucydides
the
Greeke
Historian
,
which
serves
very
fitly
,
where
he
shewes
that
when
the
Athenian
Republick
came
off
victour
in
the
Peloponnesian
war
,
and
had
taken
down
the
Spartanes
pride
,
and
in
a
manner
subjected
all
Greece
,
the
Athenians
conceited
so
highly
of
themselves
,
as
that
they
designed
the
conquest
of
Sicile
also
.
This
enterprise
came
to
be
disputed
in
Athens
:
Alcibiades
and
some
other
Citizens
perswaded
it
,
as
they
that
little
caring
for
the
publick
good
,
thought
only
upon
the
advancing
their
own
particular
reputations
,
each
one
of
them
having
hopes
to
bee
sent
Commander
in
the
imployment
.
But
Nicias
that
was
the
principal
among
the
best
reputed
of
Athens
,
disswaded
it
:
and
the
greatest
reason
he
alledged
in
perswading
the
people
to
give
credit
to
his
words
,
was
this
,
because
while
hee
advised
them
thus
that
the
warr
should
nor
proceed
,
he
perswaded
them
to
that
which
was
not
for
his
advantage
;
for
while
Athens
was
in
peace
,
he
knew
,
there
were
many
Citizens
would
go
before
him
;
but
in
time
of
war
hee
was
sure
none
could
go
before
,
no
nor
come
near
him
.
Wee
see
therefore
,
that
in
Republicks
there
is
this
disorder
,
in
times
of
peace
to
make
small
account
of
able
men
,
which
thing
enrages
them
two
several
waies
,
the
one
to
see
their
own
degrees
fayl
them
;
the
other
to
see
unworthy
men
,
and
of
smaller
abilities
then
themselves
,
made
their
companions
or
rather
their
superiors
:
which
disorder
in
Republicks
hath
caused
much
destruction
;
for
those
Citizens
who
see
themselves
undeservedly
despised
,
and
know
that
quiet
times
are
the
occasion
thereof
,
devise
all
the
wayes
they
can
to
disturbe
them
,
suggesting
inducements
to
new
wars
in
prejudice
of
the
Commonwealth
.
And
devising
what
might
be
the
remedies
hereof
,
we
find
two
;
the
one
to
keep
the
Citizens
alwaies
poor
,
to
the
end
that
riches
without
vertue
should
not
be
able
to
corrupt
neither
those
nor
others
:
the
other
to
be
alwaies
so
ready
for
the
war
,
as
that
they
may
be
able
continually
to
make
war
,
&
may
have
need
alwaies
of
well
reputed
Citizens
,
as
Rome
did
in
her
first
beginnings
;
for
that
City
having
alwaies
some
Armyes
abroad
,
there
was
ever
place
left
to
mens
vertues
,
nor
could
they
bereave
such
a
one
of
his
dignity
,
that
deserved
it
;
or
confer
it
upon
another
not
deserving
it
;
for
in
case
that
such
a
thing
were
done
,
some
times
upon
mistake
or
for
tryall
,
there
quickly
ensued
such
a
disorder
thereupon
and
a
danger
,
that
all
returned
presently
into
the
right
way
.
But
these
other
Common-wealths
,
that
are
not
so
ordered
as
shee
,
and
that
then
only
make
war
when
necessity
constrains
them
,
cannot
free
themselves
of
such
an
inconvenient
,
or
rather
they
will
alwaies
incurr
it
,
and
there
will
ever
some
disorder
be
ready
to
arise
,
when
that
vertuous
Citizen
thus
neglected
is
of
a
revengefull
disposition
,
and
hath
in
the
City
some
good
repute
and
correspondence
;
and
from
this
the
City
of
Rome
kept
her self
free
a
good
while
.
Yet
she
(
after
she
had
subdu'd
Carthage
and
Antiochus
,
as
we
said
otherwhere
,
being
no
more
in
doubt
of
the
issue
of
her
warrs
)
thought
she
might
give
the
Command
of
her
Armies
to
whom
she
pleas'd
,
not
so
much
regarding
their
vertues
as
their
other
qualities
,
ingratiating
them
with
the
people
:
for
we
see
Paulus
Emilius
had
several
repulses
in
demanding
the
Consulate
,
before
he
was
made
Consul
,
till
the
Macedonian
war
chanc'd
,
which
because
it
was
thought
dangerous
,
by
general
consent
of
the
City
was
committed
to
him
.
In
our
City
of
Florence
after
the
year
1494.
many
warrs
following
,
one
upon
the
neck
of
the
other
,
and
all
the
Citizens
of
Florence
having
made
unlucky
tryal
of
themselves
,
the
City
by
chance
lit
upon
one
man
who-shewed
them
the
manner
how
their
Armies
were
to
be
commanded
,
which
was
Antoni
Giacomini
:
and
whiles
the
warrs
in
hand
were
perillous
,
the
other
Citizens
ambitions
ceas'd
;
and
in
the
election
of
Commissary
or
Commander
of
their
Armies
,
he
had
no
competitor
stood
with
him
.
But
when
as
any
war
was
to
be
made
where
no
hazard
was
,
but
a
great
deal
of
honor
and
dignity
,
he
found
alwaies
so
many
competitors
,
that
they
being
to
make
election
of
there
Commissaries
to
beleager
Piza
,
he
was
left
out
of
the
number
.
And
however
it
was
not
perceiv'd
evidently
,
that
evill
would
befall
the
State
,
because
Antony
was
not
sent
thither
,
yet
may
we
easily
conjecture
,
because
the
Pisans
having
no
means
for
further
defence
or
sustenance
,
had
Antony
been
sent
thither
,
they
would
before
that
have
been
so
straightly
beset
,
that
they
should
have
surrendred
themselves
to
the
Florentines
directions
.
But
they
being
besieged
by
Commanders
that
understood
not
how
to
begirt
,
nor
force
them
,
were
so
long
held
in
hand
,
that
the
City
of
Florence
bought
them
,
whereas
they
might
have
had
them
by
force
.
It
was
likely
that
such
a
distaste
with
Antony
might
have
done
much
,
and
he
had
need
truly
of
much
patience
,
and
so
good
a
disposition
as
not
to
desire
revenge
hereupon
,
either
with
the
destruction
of
the
City
(
if
he
were
able
)
or
with
the
wrong
of
any
particular
Citizen
,
where
of
a
Republick
ought
to
beware
,
as
in
the
Chapter
following
we
shall
treate
.
CHAP.
XVII
.
That
he
who
hath
receiv'd
any
notable
disgrace
or
injury
done
him
from
a
Prince
or
Commonwealth
,
should
never
after
be
intrusted
by
them
with
any
imployment
or
service
of
importance
.
A
Commonwealth
should
be
well
advis'd
,
never
to
commit
any
weighty
service
to
any
one
,
to
whom
any
notable
injury
hath
been
done
.
Claudius
Nero
(
who
left
his
Army
which
he
had
lying
in
front
against
Hannibal
,
and
with
part
thereof
went
into
the
Marches
to
find
the
other
Consul
,
to
combate
Asdrubal
,
before
he
should
joyn
with
Hannibal
)
had
formerly
in
Spain
been
incamp'd
against
Asdrubal
,
and
having
shut
him
up
in
a
place
with
his
Army
,
so
that
Asdrubal
,
was
either
to
fight
at
disadvantage
,
or
perish
by
famin
,
was
cunningly
by
Asdrubal
so
long
held
in
hand
with
certain
treaties
of
agreement
,
that
hee
scap'd
him
,
and
took
from
him
the
opportunity
he
had
to
suppress
him
.
Which
thing
being
known
at
Rome
,
got
him
great
discredit
as
well
with
the
Senate
as
the
people
,
and
he
was
spoken
of
very
disgracefully
throughout
the
City
,
to
his
great
disreputation
and
despight
thereat
too
:
but
being
afterwards
made
Consul
,
and
sent
against
Hannibal
,
took
the
course
we
have
said
,
which
was
a
very
dangerous
one
,
so
that
Rome
was
amazed
and
in
tumults
,
till
news
arived
of
Asdrubals
defeat
,
and
Claudius
being
afterwards
asked
on
what
ground
he
undertook
so
dangerous
a
course
,
where
without
an
extream
necessity
he
had
hazarded
the
liberty
of
Rome
,
answer'd
that
he
had
done
it
,
because
if
it
prov'd
lucky
,
he
should
recover
the
glory
he
had
formerly
lost
in
Spain
:
and
if
it
fayl'd
him
,
and
this
course
fell
out
cross
,
he
knew
he
should
be
reveng'd
of
that
City
and
those
Citizens
,
who
had
unthankfully
and
undiscreetly
wrong'd
him
.
And
when
these
passions
,
arising
from
such
offences
,
are
of
such
force
in
a
Citizen
of
Rome
,
and
in
those
dayes
before
corruption
was
crept
into
Rome
,
we
may
well
ghesse
how
powerfull
they
are
in
a
Citizen
of
such
a
City
that
is
not
so
regulated
nor
order'd
as
she
then
was
:
and
because
to
such
like
disorders
which
grow
up
in
Common-wealths
,
no
certain
remedy
can
be
assign'd
,
there
followes
an
impossibility
to
frame
a
perpetual
Commonwealth
for
by
many
unexpected
waies
desiruction
breaks
in
upon
it
.
CHAP.
XVIII
.
There
is
nothing
more
worthy
of
a
Commander
,
than
to
be
able
to
discover
before
ha●d
,
and
espye
out
the
enemies
practises
.
EPaminondas
the
Theban
said
,
that
nothing
was
more
advantageous
or
useful
to
a
Commander
,
than
to
know
the
enemies
designes
and
purposes
;
and
because
it
is
hard
to
attaine
to
that
knowledge
.
●he
deserves
the
greater
commendations
,
who
takes
such
a
course
that
he
ghesses
it
out
.
And
it
is
not
so
hard
to
discover
the
enemies
purposes
as
some
times
to
understand
his
actions
,
and
not
so
much
his
actions
,
which
by
him
are
done
a
far
off
,
as
those
present
and
near
hand
:
for
it
hath
many
times
chanc'd
,
that
a
fight
having
continued
til
night
,
he
hath
vanquished
that
thinks
he
hath
lo●
,
and
he
lost
that
thought
he
had
overcome
;
which
error
hath
caus'd
some
to
take
resolutions
clean
contrary
to
their
own
good
,
as
it
befell
Brutus
and
Cassius
,
who
upon
this
mistake
lost
their
war
;
for
Brutus
having
overcome
on
his
wing
,
Cassius
beleev'd
he
had
lost
,
that
the
whole
Army
was
broken
,
and
upon
this
error
despairing
of
his
own
safety
,
slew
himself
.
In
our
daies
in
the
battell
at
Saint
Cecily
in
Lombardy
that
Francis
the
King
of
France
sought
with
the
Swissers
,
the
night
overtaking
them
,
that
part
of
the
Swissers
,
which
remained
entire
,
thought
they
had
got
the
victory
,
knowing
nothing
of
those
that
had
been
broken
and
slain
.
Which
error
was
the
occasion
that
they
themselves
escap'd
not
,
staying
to
fight
again
on
the
morning
much
at
their
disadvantage
:
such
like
error
also
caused
to
mistake
,
and
well
near
ruined
thereby
the
Popes
&
the
Spanish
Army
,
which
upon
this
false
advice
of
victory
passed
the
Po
,
and
had
it
gone
never
so
little
on
for
warder
,
had
been
prisoner
to
the
French
,
who
were
the
Conquerors
.
The
like
error
to
this
happened
in
the
Romans
Campe
,
and
in
that
also
of
the
Equi
,
where
Sempronius
the
Consul
was
with
the
Army
to
enconnter
the
enemy
,
and
the
battell
being
joyned
,
the
combat
lasted
while
night
with
variable
fortune
on
the
one
and
the
other
side
:
and
night
being
come
,
each
Army
being
halfe
broken
,
neither
of
them
returned
to
their
quarters
,
but
both
of
them
chose
rather
to
withdraw
themselves
unto
the
adjoyning
hills
,
where
they
thought
they
might
bē
more
secure
,
and
the
Roman
Army
divided
itself
into
two
parts
,
whereof
the
one
went
with
the
Consul
,
the
other
with
one
Tempanius
a
Centurion
,
whose
valor
that
day
kept
the
Roman
Army
from
being
wholly
routed
;
the
morning
being
come
,
the
Roman
Consul
,
without
hearing
further
of
the
enemy
,
retired
towards
Rome
,
and
the
like
did
the
Equies
Armie
,
because
each
of
these
thought
the
enemy
had
been
victour
,
and
therefore
they
each
withdrew
themselves
,
without
any
regard
that
they
left
their
Campes
in
prey
to
the
Enemy
.
It
fell
out
that
Tempanius
who
was
there
with
the
remainder
of
the
Roman
Army
,
retiring
too
,
learned
by
certain
wounded
soldiers
of
the
Equi
,
that
their
Captaines
were
gone
and
had
abandoned
their
quarters
,
upon
which
news
he
went
into
the
Roman
quarters
and
saved
them
,
but
sacked
those
of
the
Equi
,
and
so
returned
victorious
to
Rome
:
which
victory
(
as
wee
see
)
consists
only
in
,
who
hath
notice
of
the
enemies
disorder
.
Where
we
should
consider
,
that
it
may
often
come
to
pass
,
that
the
two
Armies
which
are
in
front
one
against
another
,
may
be
both
in
the
like
disorder
,
and
suffer
the
same
wants
,
and
that
after
remaines
vanquisher
that
first
comes
to
knowledge
of
the
others
necessities
.
And
hereof
I
will
give
a
domestick
and
moderne
example
.
In
the
year
one
thousand
four-hundred
ninty
eight
,
when
the
Florentines
had
a
great
Army
about
Pisa
,
and
beleaguerd
the
Town
very
strongly
,
whereof
the
Venetians
having
undetaken
the
protection
,
and
notseeing
any
otherway
to
save
it
,
resolved
to
divert
the
war
,
by
assayling
the
territories
of
Florence
on
the
other
side
;
wherefore
with
a
strong
Army
they
entred
by
the
vally
of
Lamona
,
and
seised
upon
the
Village
of
Marradi
,
and
besieged
the
Fortress
of
Castiglione
which
is
upon
the
hill
above
:
Which
the
Florentines
perceiving
,
resolved
to
succour
Marradi
,
and
yet
not
lessen
their
forces
which
they
had
about
Pisa
;
so
that
having
levied
new
foot
,
and
appointed
new
horse
,
they
sent
them
that
way
,
whose
Commanders
were
Jacobus
Quartus
of
Appian
,
Lord
of
Piombin
,
and
Count
Rinuccius
of
Marcian
.
These
then
being
come
to
the
hills
above
Marradi
,
the
enemies
lest
beleaguering
Marradi
,
and
betook
themselves
to
the
Village
;
where
these
two
Armies
being
infront
one
against
the
other
for
some
daies
,
both
suffered
much
for
the
scarcity
of
provisions
.
and
other
necessaries
;
and
neither
daring
to
set
upon
the
other
,
nor
either
knowing
the
others
wants
,
both
at
once
resolved
over
night
to
raise
their
Campes
the
morning
following
,
and
retire
,
the
Venetian
toward
Berzighella
and
Faenza
,
the
other
toward
Casaglia
and
Mugello
.
the
morning
then
come
,
and
each
Campe
having
begun
to
send
away
their
carriages
,
by
chance
a
woman
parted
from
the
Bourg
of
Marradi
,
and
came
towards
the
Florentine
Campe
,
being
secure
enough
from
wrong
,
because
of
her
old
age
,
and
poverty
,
desirous
belike
to
see
some
of
her
friends
in
that
Campe
,
by
whom
the
Florentine
Captains
understanding
of
the
Venetian
Camps
departure
,
upon
this
news
grew
a
little
more
couragious
,
and
having
changed
their
purpose
,
as
if
they
had
dislodged
their
enemies
,
went
out
,
and
took
their
quarters
,
and
writ
to
Florence
,
they
had
repulsed
and
vanquished
them
.
Which
victory
proceeded
from
nothing
else
,
than
from
having
first
had
notice
of
their
enemies
departure
:
which
notice
had
it
been
given
on
the
other
side
,
would
have
wrought
the
same
effect
against
ours
.
CHAP.
XIX
.
Whether
in
the
government
of
a
multitude
,
mildness
or
severity
be
of
greater
availe
.
THe
Commonwealth
of
Rome
was
in
a
combustion
,
because
of
the
differences
between
the
Nobles
and
the
Commons
:
nevertheless
as
occasion
of
wars
was
offered
them
,
they
sent
forth
with
their
Armies
Quintius
and
Appius
Claudius
:
Appius
because
he
was
cruell
and
rough
in
commanding
,
was
ill
obeyed
by
those
that
followed
him
,
so
that
almost
quite
broken
he
fled
from
his
charge
.
Quintius
by
using
a
mild
and
gentle
behaviour
towards
his
soldiers
,
found
them
very
obedient
,
and
returned
with
victory
.
Whereupon
it
seems
,
that
to
governe
a
multitude
,
it
is
better
to
be
courteous
then
insolent
,
compassionate
rather
then
cruel
.
Notwithstanding
Cornelius
Tacitus
with
whom
many
other
writers
agree
,
in
a
saying
of
his
,
concludes
the
contrary
,
where
he
saies
,
To
rule
a
multitude
,
severity
is
of
more
force
then
mildness
.
And
Manlius
Tarquatus
.
But
he
that
commands
over
subjects
(
whereof
Cornelius
discourses
)
to
the
end
they
grow
not
insolent
,
and
by
reason
of
thy
two
great
mildness
tread
thee
not
under
foot
,
ought
rather
betake
himself
to
rigor
then
gentleness
.
But
this
a
so
is
not
to
exceed
moderation
,
for
fear
of
incurring
hatred
:
for
it
never
turns
to
any
Princes
advantage
to
gain
the
peoples
hate
.
The
way
to
avoid
it
is
,
to
lay
no
hands
on
the
subjects
estates
:
for
of
blood
(
when
rapine
is
not
the
covert
cause
there
)
no
Prince
is
thirsty
,
unless
forc'd
thereto
,
which
seldome
he
is
:
but
where
rapine
is
mixt
,
this
necessity
comes
alwaies
upon
them
,
nor
ever
want
they
occasion
,
nor
desire
to
shed
blood
,
as
in
another
treaty
to
this
purpose
is
discours'd
at
large
.
Quintius
was
more
praise
worthy
then
Appius
;
and
yet
the
saying
of
Cornelius
limited
as
it
ought
to
be
,
but
not
in
the
case
observ'd
by
Appius
,
deserves
approbation
.
And
because
we
have
spoken
of
severity
and
mildness
,
methinks
it
is
not
more
then
needs
to
shew
,
how
one
action
of
humanity
was
of
more
force
with
the
Falisci
,
then
many
violent
acts
of
hostility
.
CHAP.
XX.
One
example
of
humanity
prevail'd
more
with
the
Falisci
,
then
all
the
force
of
Rome
could
.
CAmillus
with
the
Army
being
set
down
before
the
Faliscies
Town
,
and
besieging
it
,
a
Pedagogue
that
taught
the
children
of
the
cheifest
men
of
the
City
,
thinking
to
gratify
Camillus
and
the
people
of
Rome
,
under
colour
of
exercise
going
forth
with
them
out
of
the
Town
,
brought
them
all
into
the
Campe
before
Camillus
:
where
having
presented
them
he
said
,
that
by
means
of
them
the
Town
would
forth
with
be
deliver'd
into
his
hands
.
Which
present
was
not
only
not
accepted
by
●amillus
,
but
having
caus'd
the
Pedagogue
to
be
strip'd
,
and
his
hands
bound
behind
him
,
and
given
to
each
one
of
those
children
a
rod
in
his
hand
,
caus'd
him
to
be
whip'd
back
again
by
them
with
many
stripes
into
the
Town
.
Which
when
they
of
the
Town
understood
,
Camillus
his
humanity
and
integrity
so
much
pleasd
them
,
that
not
desiring
longer
to
defend
themselves
,
they
resolv'd
to
render
up
the
Town
to
him
.
Where
it
is
to
be
considered
by
this
true
example
,
how
much
more
a
curteous
and
charitable
act
works
in
mens
minds
then
any
one
full
of
cruelty
and
violence
;
and
how
that
many
times
those
countries
and
cities
;
that
no
weapons
,
nor
warlick
instruments
,
nor
any
other
force
of
man
hath
been
able
to
open
,
one
action
of
humanity
,
piety
,
chastity
,
or
liberality
hath
laid
wide
open
.
Whereof
in
stories
(
besides
this
)
we
have
many
other
examples
.
And
we
all
see
that
the
Romans
by
war
were
not
of
power
to
drive
Pyrrhus
out
of
Italy
;
and
yet
Fabritius
his
Frankeness
sent
him
out
,
when
he
discover'd
to
him
the
offer
which
a
familiar
friend
of
his
had
made
the
Romans
to
poison
him
.
We
see
also
,
that
the
conquest
of
new
Carthage
got
not
Scipio
Affricanus
so
much
credit
in
Spaine
,
as
the
example
he
gave
of
his
chastity
,
when
he
restored
a
young
woman
he
took
,
which
was
exceeding
beautifull
,
untoucheed
by
him
to
her
husband
.
The
fame
of
which
action
got
him
friendship
throughout
all
Spaine
.
We
see
moreover
how
much
these
vertues
are
by
the
people
wished
for
in
great
men
,
and
how
much
commended
by
writers
,
both
by
those
that
set
forth
Princes
lives
,
and
those
also
that
give
instructions
how
they
ought
to
live
.
Among
whom
Zenophon
takes
much
painesin
shewing
what
honours
,
how
great
conquests
,
and
how
exceeding
good
reputation
Cyrus
gained
by
his
humanity
and
affability
,
and
by
abstaining
from
all
actions
of
pride
,
cruelty
,
luxury
,
and
other
vices
,
which
blemish
men
lives
.
Yet
notwithstanding
,
seeing
Hannibal
by
courses
contrary
to
these
,
gained
great
fame
,
and
great
victories
,
I
purpose
to
discourse
thereupon
in
the
Chapter
following
,
from
whence
this
proceeded
.
CHAP.
XXI
.
From
whence
it
came
,
that
Hannibal
by
a
manner
of
proceeding
different
from
that
of
Scipioes
,
wrought
the
same
effects
in
Italy
,
which
the
other
did
in
Spaine
.
I
Think
,
that
some
men
could
well
marvaile
,
seeing
certain
Commanders
(
notwithstanding
that
they
have
led
a
contrary
course
of
life
)
bring
to
effect
the
like
things
,
which
they
have
done
that
lived
in
the
manner
above
written
:
so
that
it
appears
,
that
the
cause
of
these
victories
depends
not
upon
the
aforesaid
reasons
;
and
it
seems
that
those
waies
gain
thee
neither
more
force
nor
better
fortune
,
being
that
glory
and
reputation
may
be
gotten
by
contrary
courses
.
And
not
to
part
from
the
men
I
have
above
written
of
,
and
the
better
to
clear
what
I
propounded
,
I
say
,
as
we
see
Scipio
enter
into
Spain
,
and
by
his
humanity
and
mildness
gain
the
friendship
of
that
whole
country
,
and
for
them
be
adored
and
admired
of
those
nations
:
on
the
contrary
side
wee
see
Hannibal
enter
into
Italy
,
using
all
contrary
waies
,
which
is
,
by
violence
,
cruelty
and
rapine
,
and
all
manner
of
infidelity
,
worke
the
same
effect
that
Scipio
did
in
Spain
:
for
to
Hannibal
all
the
Towns
in
Italy
rebelled
,
and
all
the
people
ran
after
him
.
And
considering
whence
this
may
arise
,
we
see
therein
many
reasous
:
the
first
is
,
that
men
are
desirous
of
new
matters
,
insomuch
as
very
often
times
as
well
they
that
live
at
case
,
as
they
who
do
not
,
desire
novelty
:
for
(
as
we
said
otherwhere
,
and
it
is
true
)
men
are
as
well
glutted
with
good
,
as
afflicted
and
vexed
with
evill
.
This
desire
therefore
opens
the
gates
wide
to
every
one
,
that
in
any
Country
makes
himself
the
cheif
of
any
innovation
.
And
be
he
a
stranger
,
they
run
after
him
;
if
of
the
Country
,
they
come
all
about
him
,
they
strengthen
and
favour
him
,
so
that
in
what
sort
soever
it
be
he
proceeds
,
he
comes
to
advance
exceedingly
in
those
places
.
Besides
this
,
men
are
thrust
forward
by
two
principal
things
,
either
by
love
or
feare
,
so
that
he
as
well
commands
them
that
makes
himself
beloved
,
as
he
that
causes
himself
to
be
feared
;
and
most
commonly
he
is
more
followed
and
obeyed
that
makes
himself
be
feared
,
then
he
that
makes
himself
beloved
.
Therefore
it
little
imports
a
Commander
by
which
of
these
wayes
he
goes
,
provided
that
he
be
a
Worthy
man
,
and
that
worth
causes
him
to
be
of
great
repute
among
men
:
for
when
that
worth
is
great
as
it
was
in
Hannibal
and
Scipio
,
it
cancells
all
the
errors
they
commit
,
either
by
the
great
love
they
beare
them
,
or
the
great
feare
they
stand
in
of
them
.
For
from
the
one
and
the
other
of
these
two
waies
great
inconveniences
may
arise
,
of
force
to
ruine
a
Prince
:
for
he
that
desires
to
be
too
much
belov'd
,
any
little
that
he
swerves
from
the
true
way
,
becomes
contemptible
.
And
that
other
who
would
be
too
much
feared
,
when
he
a
little
exceeds
the
mean
,
growes
odious
;
and
to
keep
the
middle
way
it
is
not
possible
:
for
our
nature
will
not
comport
it
.
But
it
is
necessary
to
allay
these
things
,
that
exceed
,
with
an
extraordinary
worth
,
as
Ha
nibal
and
Scpio
both
did
:
yet
it
appeard
that
the
one
and
the
other
of
them
were
endamag'd
by
their
manner
of
life
,
for
which
they
were
esteem'd
and
valu'd
.
The
valuation
of
both
of
them
we
have
already
spoke
of
:
the
damage
as
for
Scipio
,
was
that
his
own
Soldiers
in
Spain
together
with
some
of
his
friends
mutined
against
him
,
which
proceeded
from
nothing
else
than
because
they
feard
him
not
:
for
men
are
so
unsetled
that
upon
the
least
overture
made
to
their
ambition
,
they
forth
with
forget
all
the
good
will
they
owe
their
Prince
for
his
mildness
and
courtesie
,
as
did
the
aforesaid
Soldiers
and
friends
,
in
so
much
as
Scipio
,
to
remedie
this
inconvenient
,
was
constraind
to
practise
that
cruelty
in
some
part
,
which
he
had
abhor'd
.
As
for
Hannibal
,
we
have
no
particular
example
,
where
the
cruelty
he
us'd
,
or
his
small
faith
did
him
any
harm
.
But
we
may
well
conceive
,
that
Naples
and
many
other
Townes
that
continued
in
obedience
to
the
Romans
,
did
it
for
fear
thereof
.
This
we
see
plainly
,
that
his
wicked
manner
of
living
,
made
him
more
odious
to
the
people
of
Rome
,
than
any
other
enemy
that
Commonwealth
ever
had
:
so
that
,
whereas
to
Pyrrhus
(
while
he
was
with
his
Armie
in
Italy
)
they
discoverd
the
party
that
intended
to
poyson
him
,
they
never
forgave
it
Hannibal
(
though
disarm'd
and
banish'd
)
till
they
had
made
an
end
of
him
.
These
incommodities
then
accru'd
to
Hannibal
for
being
held
impious
,
a
breaker
of
his
faith
,
and
cruel
:
but
on
the
other
side
,
he
thereby
got
one
very
great
advantage
,
which
is
much
admired
by
all
Writers
,
that
in
his
army
(
though
composed
of
several
Nations
)
there
never
arose
any
mutiny
,
neither
among
themselves
,
nor
against
him
.
Which
we
caunot
derive
from
any
other
cause
than
from
the
terror
that
grew
from
his
person
,
which
was
so
great
,
mixt
with
the
reputation
he
gave
of
his
valor
,
that
it
kept
his
Soldiers
in
quietness
and
concord
.
I
conclude
then
,
that
it
imports
not
much
,
in
which
of
these
two
waies
a
Commander
proceeds
,
provided
he
hath
so
great
worth
in
him
,
as
may
well
season
the
one
and
the
other
manner
of
living
:
for
(
as
it
is
said
)
both
in
the
one
and
the
other
there
is
defect
and
danger
,
when
it
is
not
corrected
by
some
extraordinary
endowments
.
And
if
Hannibal
and
Scipio
,
the
one
by
commendable
means
,
and
the
other
by
detestable
courses
,
wrought
the
same
effect
,
me
thinks
I
should
not
forbear
to
discourse
also
of
two
Roman
Citizens
,
who
by
several
wayes
,
but
both
honorable
,
attaind
one
and
the
same
glory
.
CHAP
,
XXII
.
How
Manlius
Torquatus
his
rigor
,
and
Valereus
Corvinus
his
mildness
,
gaind
each
of
them
the
same
glory
.
AT
the
same
time
there
were
in
Rome
two
famous
Captaines
,
Monlius
Torquatus
and
Valerius
Corvinus
:
who
both
of
equal
vertue
,
had
a
like
triumph'd
,
and
liv'd
in
equal
credit
&
reputation
in
Rome
;
&
each
of
them
(
touching
the
enemy
)
had
with
equal
valor
gained
it
;
but
as
for
the
Armyes
,
and
treating
of
their
Soldiers
,
they
proceeded
exceeding
differently
:
for
Manlius
with
all
kind
of
severity
commanded
them
,
without
intermitting
his
Soldiers
pains
or
punishments
.
Valerius
on
the
other
part
in
all
kinds
and
termes
of
courtefie
treated
them
with
a
familiar
way
of
affability
;
for
it
appears
,
that
the
one
to
keep
his
Soldiers
in
obedience
put
his
own
son
to
death
,
and
the
other
never
hurt
any
.
Yet
in
such
a
differency
of
proceeding
,
each
produc'd
the
same
fruit
,
as
well
to
the
enemies
loss
,
as
the
Commonwealths
profit
,
and
his
own
particular
;
for
never
any
Soldier
refus'd
the
fight
or
mutini'd
against
them
,
or
in
any
part
disagreed
from
their
wills
,
however
that
Manlius
his
commands
were
so
rigorous
,
that
all
other
kinds
of
commands
,
which
exceeded
measure
in
everity
,
were
termed
Manlian
commands
.
Where
we
are
first
to
consider
,
whence
it
was
that
Manlius
was
constrained
to
proceed
so
rigidly
:
the
next
is
,
what
was
the
cause
that
these
two
different
waies
brought
forth
the
same
effect
:
and
in
the
last
place
,
which
is
the
better
of
the
two
,
and
more
profitable
to
imitate
.
If
any
man
consider
well
Manlius
his
disposition
,
from
the
time
that
T.
Livius
begins
to
make
mention
of
him
,
he
shall
find
him
,
a
very
valiant
man
,
religiously
loving
his
Father
and
his
Countrey
,
and
exceedingly
reverencing
his
Superiors
.
These
things
we
gather
from
the
slaughter
of
the
Frenchmen
,
from
the
defence
of
his
Father
against
the
Tribune
,
and
in
that
before
he
went
to
fight
with
the
Frenchmen
,
he
went
to
the
Consul
,
with
these
words
,
Without
thy
allowance
,
I
will
never
fight
with
the
enemy
;
no
though
I
were
assured
of
victory
.
When
a
man
then
so
dispos'd
attains
to
such
dignity
as
to
command
,
he
desires
to
find
all
other
men
like
himself
,
and
his
strong
courage
moves
him
to
command
strong
and
stout
things
:
and
the
same
(
when
once
they
are
commanded
)
will
likewise
that
they
be
observed
;
and
the
rule
is
most
certain
,
that
when
rigid
and
hard
things
are
commanded
,
it
is
fit
with
rigour
to
see
them
observd
;
otherwise
wouldst
thou
find
thy self
much
deciv'd
.
Where
it
is
to
be
noted
that
if
a
man
will
be
obeyed
,
it
is
necessary
he
know
how
to
command
;
and
they
know
how
to
command
,
that
make
a
comparison
between
their
own
quality
,
and
theirs
that
are
to
obey
;
and
when
they
see
a
proportion
,
then
let
them
command
;
but
when
a
disproportion
,
let
them
forbeare
.
And
therefore
a
wise
man
said
,
that
to
hold
a
Common-wealth
by
violence
and
force
,
it
was
needfull
there
were
a
proportion
between
the
person
forcing
,
and
the
party
forced
:
and
whenever
that
proportion
was
,
there
it
was
credible
that
that
violence
would
last
:
but
when
the
party
forced
was
of
more
force
than
the
person
forcing
,
it
might
be
doubted
that
violence
would
every
day
fail
.
But
returning
to
our
discourse
.
I
say
,
that
to
command
stout
and
strong
things
it
is
necessary
to
be
stout
too
:
and
he
that
is
of
this
stoutness
,
and
commands
such
things
,
can
never
by
mildness
cause
them
to
be
observ'd
:
but
he
that
hath
not
this
strength
of
courage
,
ought
beware
of
these
extraordinary
commands
,
and
in
those
ordinary
he
may
well
use
his
own
humanity
:
for
ordinary
punishments
are
not
imputed
to
the
Prince
,
but
to
the
lawes
and
customes
.
We
ought
then
to
be-believe
,
that
Manlius
was
forced
to
proceed
so
roughly
,
by
his
own
extraordinary
commands
,
whereunto
his
own
nature
was
inclinable
,
which
are
very
useful
in
a
Commonwealth
,
because
they
reduce
the
orders
thereof
to
their
originals
and
ancient
vigor
.
And
if
a
Republike
were
so
fortunate
,
that
she
often
had
(
as
we
have
formerly
said
)
some
one
by
his
example
to
renew
and
revive
the
Laws
,
and
not
retain
them
onely
from
running
to
ruine
,
but
draw
them
quite
back
to
their
beginnings
,
she
might
be
perpetual
.
So
that
Manlius
was
one
of
those
,
who
by
the
rigor
of
his
commands
maintained
the
military
discipline
in
Rome
,
drawn
thereunto
first
by
his
own
nature
,
afterwards
from
a
desire
which
he
had
that
that
should
be
observed
,
which
his
natural
inclination
had
made
him
ordain
.
On
the
other
side
Valerius
might
as
he
pleased
proceed
with
curtesie
,
as
he
,
whom
it
sufficed
,
that
the
accustomed
orders
were
observed
in
the
Romane
Armies
:
which
custome
(
because
it
was
good
)
was
enough
to
honor
him
,
and
yet
not
painful
to
observe
;
nor
did
it
force
Valerius
to
punish
the
offenders
,
as
well
because
it
may
be
there
were
none
,
as
for
that
if
there
had
been
any
,
they
imputed
(
as
it
is
said
)
their
punishments
to
the
wonted
orders
and
customes
,
and
not
to
the
Princes
cruelty
.
So
that
Valerius
had
power
to
cause
all
humanity
and
mildness
to
fl●w
from
himself
,
whereby
he
might
easily
gain
his
souldiers
good
wills
.
Whereupon
it
came
to
pass
that
the
one
or
the
other
having
the
same
obedience
,
were
able
,
though
proceeding
diversly
,
to
work
the
same
effect
.
They
that
would
follow
these
,
may
chance
to
fall
into
those
vices
of
contempt
and
hatred
,
as
I
said
in
my
discourse
before
of
Hanaibal
and
Scipio
,
which
is
avoided
by
an
excessive
worth
in
thee
,
and
not
otherwise
.
It
remains
now
that
we
consider
which
of
these
ways
of
proceeding
is
the
more
commendable
:
which
I
take
to
be
a
matter
disputable
,
because
as
well
the
one
as
other
is
much
prais'd
by
writers
.
Yet
they
that
write
how
a
Prince
should
rule
his
subjects
,
come
nearer
to
Valerius
then
Manlius
.
And
Xenophon
,
alledged
formerly
by
me
,
giving
many
examples
of
Cyrus
his
humanity
,
accords
much
with
that
which
T.
Livius
says
of
Valerius
:
for
being
made
Consul
against
the
Samnites
,
&
the
day
come
he
was
to
fight
,
he
spake
to
his
souldiers
with
that
affability
and
familiarity
,
with
which
he
used
to
behave
himself
towards
them
and
after
such
speaking
,
T.
Livius
saies
these
words
;
There
was
never
any
Captain
more
familiar
with
his
souldiers
,
among
the
meanest
of
them
,
freely
undergoing
all
services
:
besides
in
military
exercises
,
whereas
the
soldiers
use
to
contend
with
their
equals
either
in
swiftness
or
strength
,
he
himself
without
change
of
countenance
as
graciously
and
easily
lost
as
won
,
nor
scorned
he
any
one
that
offered
himself
to
match
him
;
liberal
he
was
,
and
affable
,
no
less
mindful
of
other
mens
liberties
then
of
his
own
dignity
;
and
which
is
the
greatest
point
of
popularity
,
the
same
course
he
took
to
attain
to
his
magistracy
,
the
same
he
followed
in
executing
it
.
In
like
manner
T.
Livius
speaks
honorably
of
Manlius
,
shewing
that
his
severity
in
putting
his
son
to
death
,
made
the
Army
so
obedient
to
the
Consul
,
that
it
was
a
cause
the
Romans
gain'd
the
victory
of
the
Latines
:
and
he
proceeds
so
far
in
commending
him
,
that
after
this
victory
,
having
set
down
all
the
order
of
the
battel
,
and
shewed
all
the
dangers
which
the
people
of
Rome
ran
,
and
the
difficulties
there
were
to
overcome
,
he
concludes
thus
,
that
onely
Manlius
his
valour
gave
the
Romans
that
victory
.
And
comparing
the
forces
of
the
two
Armies
together
,
affirms
,
that
that
side
would
have
overcome
,
which
soever
had
had
Manlius
for
their
Consul
.
So
that
considering
all
that
writers
speak
hereof
,
it
would
be
hard
to
give
a
good
judgement
hereupon
.
Nevertheless
,
not
to
leave
this
part
undecided
,
I
say
,
that
in
a
Citizen
living
under
the
laws
of
a
Republike
,
it
is
more
laudable
and
less
dangerous
to
proceed
as
Manlius
did
;
for
that
way
is
wholly
in
favour
of
the
publike
,
and
no
whit
regards
private
ambition
;
for
by
such
a
course
a
man
cannot
gain
any
partisans
,
shewing
himself
rigid
to
every
one
,
favoring
onely
the
common
good
:
for
no
man
behaving
himself
thus
,
can
get
any
particular
friends
,
which
we
term
(
as
it
was
said
before
)
Partisan
.
In
so
much
that
a
like
manner
of
proceeding
cannot
be
more
profitable
nor
more
approved
in
a
Republike
:
the
publike
advantage
nothing
failing
in
it
,
and
being
impossible
to
give
thereby
any
jealousie
of
private
ambition
.
But
in
the
course
Valerius
tooke
it
is
contrary
;
for
,
however
that
in
regard
of
the
publike
,
the
same
effects
are
produc'd
,
yet
there
arise
many
doubts
,
by
reason
of
the
particular
good
will
,
which
this
man
gaines
of
his
soldiers
,
which
in
a
long
continuance
of
government
might
much
wrong
the
common
liberty
.
And
if
in
publike
there
grew
no
mischief
hereupon
,
the
reason
was
,
because
the
Romans
minds
as
yet
were
not
corrupted
,
nor
he
long
continued
in
his
command
.
But
if
we
are
to
consider
a
Prince
as
Xenophon
does
,
we
must
wholly
take
to
Valerius
,
and
leave
Manlius
:
for
a
Prince
ought
in
his
soldiers
and
subjects
aim
at
love
and
obedience
:
that
he
maintains
the
old
orders
,
and
is
esteemed
vertuous
,
will
yeeld
him
obedience
:
and
love
his
affability
,
humanity
,
his
pity
and
those
other
indowments
Valerius
had
,
which
Xenophon
also
writes
were
in
Cyrus
:
for
to
be
a
Prince
well-willed
in
particular
,
and
to
have
his
whole
Army
as
particularly
affected
to
him
,
agrees
well
with
all
other
parts
of
his
state
.
But
in
a
Citizen
,
having
an
Army
so
to
take
part
with
him
,
this
part
agrees
not
with
the
rest
,
which
are
to
oblige
him
to
live
under
the
Laws
,
and
obey
the
Magistrates
.
We
read
among
the
ancient
stories
of
the
Venetian
Republike
,
how
that
the
Galleys
of
Venice
being
returned
home
,
and
a
difference
arising
between
them
of
the
Gallies
and
the
people
,
whereby
an
uprear
and
tumult
was
raised
,
nor
could
the
matter
be
quieted
by
force
of
officers
,
reverence
of
Citizens
,
nor
fear
of
the
principal
Magistrates
,
of
a
sudden
when
Peter
Loredanus
shewed
himself
to
those
Mariners
,
who
the
year
before
had
been
their
Commander
,
for
love
of
him
they
departed
and
left
the
fight
.
Which
obedience
.
begot
such
a
suspition
in
the
Senate
,
that
a
little
while
after
the
Venerians
either
by
im●prisonment
or
death
assured
themselves
o
,
him
.
I
conclude
therefore
that
Valerius
his
manner
of
proceeding
is
profitable
in
a
Prince
,
and
hurtful
in
a
Citizen
,
not
onely
to
his
country
,
but
to
himself
:
to
his
country
,
because
those
courses
prepare
a
way
to
tyranny
:
to
himself
;
for
when
his
country
is
suspicious
of
his
proceedings
,
it
is
constrained
to
make
sure
of
him
with
his
damage
.
So
on
the
contrary
I
affirm
that
Manlins
his
proceeding
in
a
Prince
is
hurtful
,
and
in
a
citizen
profitable
,
and
especially
to
the
country
,
and
also
seldom
offends
,
if
now
this
hatred
which
thy
severity
draws
after
it
,
be
not
increased
by
suspicion
which
by
means
of
thy
great
reputation
thy
other
vertues
charge
thee
with
,
as
by
and
by
shall
be
discoursed
touching
Camillus
.
CHAP.
XXIII
.
For
what
cause
Camillus
was
banished
from
Rome
.
WE
have
formerly
concluded
that
by
proceeding
as
Valerius
did
,
a
man
hurts
both
his
country
and
himself
.
And
by
proceeding
as
Manlius
did
,
a
man
advantages
his
country
,
and
sometimes
hurts
himself
.
Which
is
sufficiently
proved
by
the
example
of
Camillus
,
who
in
his
manner
of
proceeding
came
nearer
to
Manlius
then
Valerius
.
Whereupon
Titus
Livius
speaking
of
him
,
says
,
His
vertue
the
souldiers
hated
,
and
yet
admired
.
That
which
caused
the
admiration
of
him
,
was
his
carefulness
,
his
wisdom
,
the
magnanimity
of
his
spirit
,
and
the
good
order
in
imploying
and
commanding
his
Armies
.
That
which
got
him
hatred
,
was
,
that
he
was
more
fevere
in
chastising
then
liberal
in
rewarding
them
.
And
Titus
Livius
alledges
these
occasions
of
this
hatred
.
The
first
was
,
that
the
monies
which
were
made
of
the
sale
of
the
Veientes
goods
,
he
brought
all
into
the
treasury
,
and
divided
not
together
with
the
spoile
among
the
soldiers
.
The
second
,
that
in
his
triumph
he
made
his
triumphal
Chariot
be
drawn
with
four
white
horses
,
where
they
said
that
in
his
pride
he
strove
to
equal
the
Sun
.
The
third
,
that
he
made
a
vow
to
give
Apollo
the
tenth
part
of
the
prey
taken
from
the
Veientes
,
which
(
he
desiring
to
pay
his
vow
)
was
to
be
taken
out
of
the
soldiers
hands
,
who
already
had
got
possession
of
it
.
Where
those
things
are
very
easily
marked
,
that
make
a
Prince
odious
with
his
people
.
Of
which
the
principal
is
,
to
bereave
them
of
any
profit
,
which
is
a
matter
of
much
importance
:
for
the
things
that
carry
any
profit
with
them
,
when
a
man
is
deprived
thereof
,
he
never
forge●s
,
and
every
little
necessity
puts
thee
in
mind
of
them
;
and
because
necessities
haunt
us
every
day
,
thou
remembrest
these
things
every
day
:
the
other
thing
is
to
appear
lofty
and
puft
up
with
pride
,
then
which
nothing
is
more
odious
to
the
people
,
especially
those
that
enjoy
their
liberty
.
And
however
that
from
that
pride
and
stat●liness
of
theirs
the
people
receive
no
hur●●ye
do
they
always
hare
them
that
use
it
:
whereof
a
Prince
ought
to
beware
,
as
of
a
rock
;
for
to
procure
hatred
without
advantage
,
is
but
a
rash
and
foolish
course
.
CHAP.
XXIV
.
The
continuation
of
governments
brought
Rome
into
thraldom
.
IF
we
consider
well
the
proceedings
of
the
Roman
Republike
,
we
shall
see
that
two
things
were
the
cause
of
that
Republikes
dissolution
:
the
one
was
contentions
which
grew
upon
the
Agrarian
law
;
the
other
was
the
continuation
of
governments
.
Which
things
had
they
been
well
seen
into
in
the
beginning
,
and
due
remedies
applied
thereto
,
their
free
state
would
have
lasted
longer
,
and
probably
have
been
less
turbulent
.
And
however
,
that
as
for
the
prolonging
of
any
charge
we
see
not
that
in
Rome
any
tumult
was
raised
,
yet
in
effect
we
see
how
much
that
authority
hurt
the
City
,
which
the
Citizens
took
upon
them
by
such
decrees
.
And
if
the
other
Citizens
,
whose
magistracies
were
prorogued
,
had
been
wise
and
vertuous
,
as
L.
Quintius
,
this
inconvenient
would
never
have
fallen
out
,
whose
goodness
in
one
example
is
remarkable
:
for
there
being
an
agreement
made
between
the
Commons
and
the
Senate
,
and
the
Commons
having
prolonged
the
Tribunes
charges
for
one
year
,
judging
them
able
to
resist
the
Nobilities
ambition
,
the
Senate
would
for
strife
sake
,
with
the
Commons
,
and
not
to
seem
of
less
power
then
they
,
prologue
T.
Quintius
his
Consulship
:
who
absolutely
denyed
this
determination
of
theirs
,
saying
,
that
they
should
endeavor
to
blot
out
and
cancell
evil
examples
,
rather
then
increase
their
number
with
another
evil
one
;
and
so
would
needs
have
them
make
new
Consuls
.
Which
goodness
and
wisdom
had
it
been
in
all
the
Cities
of
Rome
,
it
would
never
have
suffered
the
introducing
of
that
custome
,
to
prolong
magistracies
:
and
from
thence
they
would
not
have
proceeded
to
the
continuation
of
Commands
over
Armies
,
which
thing
at
length
ruined
that
Republike
.
The
first
who
had
his
command
continued
to
him
,
was
P.
Philo
,
who
being
incamped
before
the
City
of
Palepolis
,
and
his
Consulship
coming
to
an
end
,
the
Senate
thinking
he
had
need
upon
gotten
the
victory
,
sent
him
no
successor
,
but
made
him
Proconsul
,
so
that
he
was
the
first
Proconsul
.
Which
thing
(
though
propounded
by
the
Senate
for
the
publike
good
)
was
that
which
in
time
brought
Rome
into
bondage
:
for
the
further
abroad
the
Romans
went
with
their
Armies
,
the
more
thought
they
such
prorogation
necessary
;
and
the
more
they
used
it
;
which
thing
produced
two
inconveniences
;
the
one
that
a
smaller
number
of
men
were
imployed
and
practised
in
commands
:
and
by
this
the
reputation
hereof
came
to
be
restrained
to
a
few
:
the
other
was
,
that
one
Citizen
continuing
long
time
commander
of
an
Army
,
got
it
to
himself
,
and
made
it
of
his
own
faction
.
For
that
Army
in
time
forgot
the
Senate
,
and
took
him
only
for
their
head
.
Hereby
it
came
that
Sylla
and
Marius
could
finde
soldiers
that
would
take
their
parts
against
the
Publike
.
By
these
means
could
Caesar
make
himself
Lord
of
his
native
country
.
Yet
if
the
Romans
had
not
prolonged
these
magistracies
and
commands
,
they
had
never
so
quickly
attained
so
great
power
:
and
had
their
conquests
been
more
slow
,
they
would
not
so
soon
have
faln
into
servitude
.
CHAP.
XXV
.
Of
Cincinnatus
and
many
other
Roman
Citizens
poverties
.
WEE
have
otherwhere
discoursed
,
that
the
most
profitable
ordinance
that
can
be
made
in
a
free
State
,
is
,
that
the
Citizens
be
kept
bare
and
poore
.
And
however
in
Rome
it
appears
not
what
order
that
was
which
wrought
this
effect
(
especially
considering
the
Agrarian
law
had
such
opposition
)
never
theless
it
was
seen
by
experience
,
that
four
hundred
years
after
Rome
was
built
,
there
was
very
great
poverty
:
nor
is
it
credible
,
that
other
greater
order
produc'd
this
effect
,
than
to
see
,
that
poverty
was
no
bar
to
any
preferment
whatsoever
,
or
any
honor
,
and
that
they
went
to
find
out
vertue
in
what
cottage
soever
she
dwelt
.
Which
manner
of
living
made
people
less
covet
wealth
.
This
appears
plain
,
because
when
Minutius
the
Consul
besieged
with
his
Army
by
the
Equi
,
Rome
was
exceedingly
afraid
,
least
that
Army
should
be
lost
,
so
that
they
created
a
Dictator
,
being
the
last
recourse
they
had
in
their
difficulties
,
and
this
was
L.
Quintius
Cincinnatus
,
who
at
that
time
was
in
his
little
Country
farm
,
which
he
then
manured
with
his
own
hands
.
T.
Livius
in
golden
words
,
saying
:
It
is
worth
the
while
,
to
bear
them
talke
,
that
value
nothing
in
regard
of
wealth
:
nor
think
they
a
man
can
have
access
either
unto
honours
or
vertue
,
but
where
riches
flow
abundantly
.
Cincinnatus
was
then
at
plough
in
his
Country
Village
,
which
exceeded
not
the
quantity
of
four
acres
of
ground
,
when
from
Rome
Deputies
were
sent
him
by
the
Senate
to
let
him
know
the
election
of
his
Dictatourship
,
and
to
shew
him
in
what
danger
the
Commonwealth
then
was
.
Hee
then
having
taken
to
him
his
gown
,
came
to
Rome
,
and
levied
an
Army
,
and
went
thence
and
deliverd
Minutius
;
and
having
broken
and
despolyed
the
enemies
,
and
set
him
free
,
would
not
permit
that
the
besieged
Army
should
partake
of
the
prey
,
saying
these
words
,
I
will
not
allow
thou
shouldst
partake
of
th●●
prey
,
whose
prey
thou
wert
to
have
been
:
And
deprived
Minutius
of
the
Consulship
,
and
made
him
Lieutenant
,
telling
him
,
Thou
shalt
stay
at
this
degree
,
till
thou
knowest
how
to
be
Consul
.
He
had
made
L.
Tarquinius
General
of
his
horse
,
who
out
of
meer
poverty
served
afoot
.
It
is
observable
(
as
is
said
)
what
honour
they
did
unto
poverty
,
and
how
that
to
a
good
and
worthy
man
four
acres
of
land
were
sufficient
to
maintain
him
.
Which
poverty
we
see
that
it
was
also
in
the
dayes
of
Marcus
Regulus
:
for
being
with
the
Armies
in
Affrica
,
he
asked
the
Senate
leave
,
he
might
turne
to
his
Country
farme
,
which
was
spoyled
by
his
husbandmen
.
Where
wee
see
two
very
notable
things
,
thè
one
the
poverty
,
and
how
they
were
conten●cd
therewith
,
and
how
it
sufficed
these
Citizens
to
gain
honour
from
the
wars
,
&
the
profits
thereof
they
left
to
the
publick
:
for
if
they
had
purposed
to
grow
rich
by
the
wars
,
it
would
little
have
troubled
them
,
that
their
fields
were
spoyled
.
The
other
is
to
consider
the
generous
rage
of
those
Citizens
,
who
when
they
were
made
Commanders
of
an
Army
,
exceeded
any
Prince
in
magnanimity
of
spirit
,
they
valued
neither
Kings
nor
Commonwealths
,
nothing
affrighted
or
terrified
them
;
and
afterwards
when
they
were
returned
to
live
private
men
,
became
parsimonious
,
humble
,
and
men
that
themselves
husbanded
and
took
pains
in
manuting
their
own
small
possessions
,
obedient
to
the
Magistrates
,
reverencing
their
superiors
,
so
that
it
seems
impossible
that
the
same
mind
could
endure
such
change
.
This
poverty
continued
yet
till
the
days
of
Paulus
Emilius
,
which
were
in
a
manner
the
last
happy
daies
of
that
Republick
,
where
a
Citizen
who
by
his
triumph
enrich'd
Rome
,
notwithstanding
kept
himself
very
poor
.
And
moreover
,
so
much
was
poverty
in
esteem
,
that
Paulus
for
reward
of
behaving
himself
bravely
in
the
war
,
gave
a
silver
cup
to
a
son-in-law
of
his
;
which
was
the
first
peece
of
Plate
he
ever
had
in
his
house
.
It
were
easy
with
a
long
discourse
to
shew
,
how
much
better
fruits
poverty
produces
than
riches
;
and
that
the
one
hath
honored
Cities
,
Countries
,
and
Religions
;
and
the
other
hath
been
the
destruction
thereof
,
had
not
this
subject
been
handled
several
times
by
other
writers
.
CHAP.
XXVI
.
How
that
upon
the
occasion
of
women
,
States
have
been
ruined
.
THere
fell
out
in
the
City
of
Ardea
between
the
Nobles
and
the
Commons
a
debate
by
reason
of
an
alliance
:
where
a
young
woman
that
was
an
heire
being
as
yet
to
marry
,
one
of
the
Commons
and
one
of
the
Nobles
woed
her
at
the
same
time
,
and
she
having
no
Father
alive
,
her
Tutors
desired
to
bestow
her
on
the
Plebeyan
,
and
her
Mother
on
the
Nobleman
:
whereupon
such
a
tumult
was
rais'd
,
that
they
came
to
blowes
,
where
the
Nobility
was
in
armes
in
favour
of
the
Nobleman
,
and
the
Commons
in
favour
of
the
Plebeyan
,
so
that
the
Commons
having
the
worse
,
went
out
of
Ardea
,
and
sent
for
ayd
to
the
Volsci
,
and
the
Nobles
sent
to
Rome
.
The
Volsci
were
there
first
,
and
as
soon
as
they
arrived
they
sat
down
before
Ardea
.
The
Romans
came
afterwards
upon
them
,
and
inclosed
the
Volsci
between
the
Town
and
them
,
so
that
they
forc'd
them
(
brought
to
it
by
famine
)
to
yeeld
to
their
discretion
.
And
the
Romans
entring
into
Ardea
,
and
putting
to
death
the
principals
of
the
sedition
,
accorded
all
the
matters
of
that
City
.
In
this
text
are
many
things
to
be
observed
.
First
we
see
,
that
women
have
been
the
occasions
of
many
destructions
,
and
have
brought
great
mischiefes
upon
the
Governors
of
Cities
,
and
have
caused
many
dissentions
in
them
.
And
(
as
it
hath
been
already
seen
in
this
our
Story
)
that
excess
committed
against
Lucretia
lost
the
Tarquins
their
State
.
That
other
act
against
Virginia
deprived
the
ten
of
their
power
.
And
Aristotle
among
the
principal
occasions
hee
shewes
of
Tyrants
destructions
,
reckons
the
injuries
they
did
some
others
for
their
women
in
deflowring
and
ravishing
them
,
or
defiling
their
marriage
beds
;
as
touching
this
part
,
in
the
Chapter
where
we
treated
of
Conspiracies
,
we
spoke
at
large
.
I
say
then
,
that
absolute
Princes
,
and
Governors
of
Commonwealths
are
to
take
no
smaller
care
hereof
,
but
ought
well
consider
the
disorders
,
which
may
grow
upon
such
an
accident
,
and
remedy
it
in
time
,
so
that
the
remedy
be
neither
with
the
hurt
,
nor
disgrace
of
their
state
,
or
Commonwealth
,
as
it
befell
the
Ardeates
,
who
for
having
suffered
that
difference
to
increase
among
Citizens
,
came
to
take
part
with
their
several
tactions
:
and
when
they
would
have
reunited
themselves
,
were
forc'd
to
send
for
forrain
ayds
,
which
is
the
beginning
of
a
servitude
at
hand
.
But
let
us
come
to
the
other
remarkeable
thing
of
the
manner
of
reuniting
Cities
,
whereof
in
the
Chapter
following
we
mean
to
treate
.
CHAP.
XXVII
.
How
a
City
at
discord
in
it self
is
to
be
united
;
and
how
that
opinion
is
not
true
,
that
to
maintain
Cities
in
obedience
,
it
is
necessary
to
keep
them
in
discord
,
and
divided
into
factions
.
BY
the
example
of
the
Roman
Consuls
,
who
made
a
reconciliation
among
the
Ardeates
,
the
way
is
shewed
how
,
matters
are
to
be
composed
in
a
City
at
variance
;
which
is
no
other
,
nor
can
otherwaies
be
held
,
then
by
putting
to
death
the
chief
ringleaders
of
seditions
:
for
of
necessity
one
of
these
three
waies
is
to
be
goneeither
to
put
them
to
death
,
as
they
did
,
or
remove
them
out
of
the
City
,
or
cause
them
to
make
peace
one
with
another
,
with
assurance
given
not
to
wrong
either
the
other
.
Of
these
three
waies
this
last
is
the
most
pernicious
,
less
certain
,
and
most
unprofitable
:
for
it
is
unpossible
,
where
much
blood
hath
been
shed
,
and
other
like
outrages
,
that
a
peace
made
by
force
should
continue
,
looking
one
another
in
the
face
every
day
:
and
it
is
very
hard
for
them
to
forbear
injuring
one
another
,
being
there
may
every
day
be
given
amongst
them
by
reason
of
their
dayly
conversation
new
occasions
of
quarrels
.
Whereupon
a
better
example
cannot
be
alledged
then
the
City
of
Pistoya
.
That
City
was
divided
(
as
still
it
is
)
fifteen
years
agoe
,
into
the
Panciatichi
,
and
the
Cancellieri
:
but
then
were
they
in
armes
,
now
they
have
laid
them
aside
.
And
after
many
brabbles
among
them
,
they
came
at
length
to
the
shedding
of
blood
,
to
demolishing
of
houses
,
and
pillaging
of
goods
,
and
to
all
other
termes
of
hostilitie
.
And
the
Florentines
that
were
to
reconcile
them
,
alwaies
took
that
third
course
:
and
thereupon
alwaies
arose
greater
tumults
and
greater
scandals
:
So
that
weary
hereof
,
they
came
to
take
that
secoud
course
,
to
remove
the
heads
of
the
factions
,
some
of
which
they
put
in
prison
,
others
they
confined
in
several
places
:
in
so
much
as
the
agreement
was
able
to
continue
,
and
so
hath
done
till
this
present
day
;
but
without
doubt
the
safest
way
had
been
the
first
.
But
because
such
like
executions
have
some
thing
in
them
of
greatness
of
spirit
and
magnanimity
,
a
feeble
Republick
knows
not
how
to
put
them
in
practise
,
but
is
so
far
there
from
,
that
hardly
arrives
she
to
use
the
second
remedy
.
And
these
are
some
of
those
errors
,
of
which
I
spake
in
the
beginning
,
that
the
Princes
of
our
times
commit
,
being
to
give
their
judgements
in
matters
of
weight
:
for
they
should
have
a
mind
to
se
,
how
they
have
carried
themselves
,
who
of
old
have
deliverd
their
opinions
in
like
cases
.
But
the
weakness
of
men
now
a
daies
,
caused
by
their
weak
education
,
and
their
little
knowledge
of
things
makes
them
esteem
those
opinions
of
the
ancients
partly
in
human
,
partly
impossible
.
Whereas
they
have
certain
of
their
moderne
opinions
,
quite
contrary
to
the
truth
,
as
is
that
,
where
the
wise
man
of
our
City
a
while
agoe
said
,
it
was
neeedfull
to
hold
Pistoia
by
factions
;
and
Pisa
with
Cittadells
:
nor
perceive
they
how
unprofitable
the
one
and
the
other
of
these
things
is
.
I
will
pass
over
the
Cittadels
,
because
formerly
wee
spake
of
them
at
large
,
&
now
discourse
of
the
incommodity
that
arises
from
holding
the
Towns
thou
hast
under
thy
government
,
divided
into
factions
.
And
touching
the
former
,
it
is
impossible
thou
canst
maintain
both
those
ancient
factions
,
Prince
or
Republick
thou
art
that
governst
them
:
for
by
nature
men
are
inclined
to
take
part
in
any
thing
that
is
divided
,
and
to
be
pleased
more
with
this
than
with
that
;
so
that
the
having
a
faction
in
that
Town
discontented
with
thee
,
is
a
cause
that
the
first
war
that
comes
,
thou
losest
it
:
for
it
is
impossible
to
guard
a
City
,
that
hath
enemies
without
dors
,
&
within
dores
.
If
it
be
a
Republick
that
governes
this
City
,
there
is
no
readier
way
to
make
thy
Subjects
become
nought
,
and
to
set
thy
City
at
variance
,
than
by
having
in
thy
dominions
a
Town
thus
at
odds
;
for
each
faction
seeks
favour
,
and
each
part
strives
to
gain
friends
by
all
manner
of
corruption
,
so
that
two
very
great
inconveniences
arise
thereupon
:
the
one
is
,
that
thou
canst
never
make
them
thy
friends
,
because
thou
canst
not
well
govern
them
,
the
rule
ofttimes
varying
,
sometimes
with
the
one
humor
,
sometimes
with
the
other
:
the
other
is
,
that
that
favouring
of
sides
must
needs
divide
thy
Republick
.
And
Blondus
speaking
of
the
Florentines
,
and
the
Pistoyeses
,
tells
us
certainly
,
that
while
the
Florentines
thought
to
reconcile
those
of
Pistoya
,
they
divided
themselves
.
Whereupon
wee
may
easily
perceive
the
evill
which
grows
upon
this
division
.
In
the
yeare
1501.
when
Aretium
was
lost
,
and
the
whole
vale
of
Tiber
,
and
that
of
Chiana
was
taken
by
the
Vitelli
and
the
Duke
Valentine
,
there
came
a
Gentleman
call'd
de
Lant
,
sent
by
the
King
of
France
,
to
cause
a
restitution
of
all
those
Towns
lost
to
the
Florentines
again
:
and
this
de
Lant
finding
in
every
one
of
those
Fortresses
men
,
who
when
they
came
to
visit
him
,
told
him
they
were
of
the
faction
of
Marzocco
,
he
much
blamd
their
division
,
saying
that
if
in
France
one
of
the
Kings
Subjects
should
say
hee
were
of
the
Kings
party
,
he
would
be
punished
:
because
such
a
speech
could
signifie
no
less
,
than
that
there
in
the
Country
were
people
enemies
to
the
King
,
whereas
that
King
will
that
all
those
Towns
be
his
friends
,
united
in
themselves
,
and
without
factions
.
But
all
these
waies
,
&
opinions
disserting
from
the
truth
,
arise
from
the
weakness
of
those
that
are
Princes
,
who
seeing
they
are
not
able
to
hold
their
States
by
force
and
valour
,
betake
themselves
to
such
like
devices
,
which
sometimes
when
things
are
in
quietness
helpe
somewhat
;
but
if
they
come
to
any
distress
,
and
that
they
have
warrs
,
they
quickly
shew
them
what
little
trust
thereis
to
be
had
in
them
.
CHAP.
XXVIII
.
That
the
Citizens
actions
ought
to
be
well
weighed
:
for
many
times
under
vertuous
and
charitable
deeds
are
laid
the
foundations
of
a
Tyranny
.
THe
City
of
Rome
being
much
oppressed
by
famine
,
and
the
publick
provisions
unsufficient
to
ease
it
,
one
Spurius
Melius
had
a
mind
,
being
very
rich
in
those
times
,
out
of
his
private
estate
to
make
provision
of
Gorn
,
and
feed
the
common
people
to
their
content
.
Whereupon
the
people
flocked
so
thick
about
him
in
favour
of
him
,
that
the
Senate
perceiving
the
inconvenient
that
grew
upon
this
his
liberality
,
to
suppress
it
before
it
took
better
hold
,
created
a
Dictatour
,
and
set
him
on
his
back
,
who
put
him
to
death
.
Here
is
to
be
noted
,
that
many
times
those
works
which
seem
to
be
done
upon
charity
and
piety
,
and
no
way
with
reason
to
be
condemn'd
,
prove
very
pernicious
and
dangerous
,
when
they
are
not
looked
to
in
good
time
.
And
to
argue
this
matter
more
particularly
,
I
say
that
a
Republick
cannot
subsist
,
nor
in
,
any
case
be
well
govern'd
without
Citizens
of
good
credit
and
reputation
.
On
the
other
side
the
Citizens
reputation
,
is
the
occasion
of
Tyranny
in
a
Commonwealth
.
And
if
we
will
regulate
this
matter
,
it
must
so
be
order'd
,
that
the
Citizens
stand
upon
such
manner
of
reputation
,
as
may
advantage
and
not
endammage
the
City
,
nor
the
liberty
thereof
.
And
therefore
the
means
are
to
be
examin'd
,
whereby
they
gain
reputation
,
which
in
effect
are
two
,
either
publick
or
private
.
The
publick
means
are
,
when
one
by
advising
well
,
and
doing
better
for
the
publick
benefit
,
gains
reputation
.
To
this
honour
the
way
should
be
set
open
to
the
Citizens
,
and
rewards
given
,
as
well
for
good
advices
,
as
good
actions
,
so
that
they
are
therefore
both
to
be
honoured
and
satisfied
:
for
when
these
reputations
are
gotten
by
these
plain
and
honest
courses
,
they
will
never
prove
dangerous
.
But
when
they
are
gain'd
by
particular
waies
(
which
is
the
other
means
by
us
alleadged
before
)
they
are
very
dangerous
and
hurtfull
.
The
private
waies
are
the
benefiting
this
and
that
other
particular
,
lending
monies
,
matching
with
their
daughters
,
protecting
them
against
the
magistrates
,
and
doing
them
such
other
like
favours
,
which
make
men
become
factions
,
and
encourage
him
that
is
thus
favour'd
by
them
,
to
think
he
may
be
able
to
corrupt
the
publick
,
&
violate
the
laws
.
Therefore
ought
a
Republick
that
is
well
ordered
,
give
easy
access
to
those
that
seek
favour
by
publick
means
,
but
bar
out
those
that
work
by
their
own
private
by
waies
,
as
Rome
did
,
we
see
.
For
in
reward
of
him
that
did
the
publick
goood
service
,
she
ordain'd
their
triumphs
and
all
those
other
honors
,
which
she
bestowed
on
her
Citizens
:
and
to
punish
those
,
who
under
diverse
colours
aspired
to
greatness
by
private
waies
,
she
appointed
the
publick
accusations
:
and
when
these
would
not
serve
,
because
the
people
was
blinded
with
the
shew
of
a
false
good
,
she
created
a
Dictator
,
who
by
a
Kinglike
power
should
reduce
those
into
their
rankes
again
that
were
broken
out
,
as
she
did
to
punish
Spurius
Melius
.
And
when
one
of
these
things
is
left
unpunished
,
it
is
of
force
to
ruine
a
Republick
;
for
hardly
upon
such
an
example
may
she
afterwards
be
brought
into
the
right
way
again
.
CHAP.
XXIX
.
That
the
peoples
faults
grow
first
from
their
Princes
.
PRinces
have
no
reason
to
complain
of
any
fault
,
which
the
people
that
is
under
their
governments
do
commit
:
for
their
faults
must
needs
proceed
either
from
their
negligence
,
or
because
they
are
blemished
with
the
like
errors
.
And
whoever
shall
run
over
the
nations
that
in
our
dayes
have
been
accounted
full
of
robberies
,
and
such
like
offences
,
shall
perceive
they
all
wholly
proceeded
from
those
that
govern'd
them
who
were
of
the
like
condition
.
In
Romania
those
Princes
in
it
before
they
were
extinguish'd
by
Pope
Alexander
the
sixth
,
gave
patterns
to
every
one
of
a
most
ungodly
and
unconscionable
life
:
for
here
a
man
might
see
horrible
executions
upon
every
slight
occasion
,
and
exceeding
great
rapines
:
Which
first
grew
from
the
wickedness
of
those
Princes
,
not
from
the
mischeivous
disposition
of
the
people
,
as
they
said
:
for
those
Princes
being
but
poor
,
and
yet
having
a
mind
to
live
as
stately
as
those
that
were
rich
,
were
necessitated
to
apply
themselves
to
many
rapins
,
and
to
practise
them
diverse
waies
,
and
among
other
dishonest
waies
they
toook
,
this
was
one
;
they
made
lawes
and
forbad
some
kind
of
action
to
be
done
;
afterwards
they
were
the
first
that
gave
the
occasion
to
break
it
,
nor
ever
punish'd
they
the
breakers
of
it
,
till
afterwards
when
they
saw
many
others
had
committed
the
same
fault
,
and
then
they
began
to
punish
the
breach
,
not
for
any
zeal
towards
the
law
made
,
but
for
covetousness
to
recover
the
penalty
:
whereupon
grew
many
inconvenients
:
and
above
all
this
,
that
the
people
were
impoverish'd
,
and
no
way
amended
,
and
those
that
were
impoverish'd
used
all
their
wits
to
work
upon
those
that
were
their
inferior
.
Whereupon
arose
all
these
evils
(
we
have
now
spoken
of
)
whereof
the
Prince
was
the
only
cause
.
And
that
this
is
true
,
T.
Livius
shews
us
,
where
he
relates
,
that
the
Roman
Ambassadors
,
carrying
a
gift
of
the
spoile
taken
from
the
Vejentes
to
Apollo
,
were
taken
by
the
Corsaires
of
Lipari
in
Sicily
,
and
there
brought
to
land
.
But
Timasitheus
their
Prince
,
having
understood
,
what
gift
it
was
,
whether
it
went
,
and
who
sent
it
,
though
he
were
borne
in
Lipari
,
yet
behaved
he
himself
like
a
worthy
Roman
,
and
told
the
people
,
that
it
was
impiety
to
lay
hands
on
such
a
gift
,
in
so
much
as
by
general
consent
they
set
the
Ambassadors
at
liberty
with
all
that
was
theirs
:
and
the
Historians
words
are
these
,
Timasitheus
made
all
the
multitude
religious
,
which
is
done
alwaies
like
a
true
governor
,
And
Laurence
of
Medicim
confirmation
so
this
opinion
saies
,
The
Princes
actions
as
examples
move
,
And
those
as
their
best
patterns
men
approve
.
CHAP.
XXX
.
A
Citizen
,
that
will
of
his
own
authority
do
any
good
work
in
his
own
City
,
of
necessity
must
first
extinguish
all
envy
;
and
what
order
is
to
be
given
for
the
defence
of
a
City
upon
the
enemies
approach
.
THe
Romane
Senate
having
notice
,
that
all
Tuscany
had
made
a
new
levy
of
souldiers
,
with
purpose
to
endammage
Rome
,
and
that
the
Latini
and
Hernici
,
who
formerly
had
been
their
friends
,
were
now
joyned
to
the
Volsoi
,
the
perpetual
enemies
of
Rome
,
considered
that
this
war
might
prove
perillous
.
And
Camillus
at
that
time
being
Tribune
with
Consular
power
,
thought
all
might
be
well
done
without
creating
a
Dictator
,
if
the
other
Tribunes
his
collegues
would
yeeld
up
unto
him
the
sum
and
whole
command
of
the
Empire
,
which
the
said
Tribunes
willingly
did
.
Nor
thought
they
(
says
T.
Livius
)
it
any
thing
derogated
from
their
Majesty
,
what
they
had
yeelded
to
his
.
Whereupon
Camillus
having
taken
this
obedience
upon
their
words
,
commanded
they
should
inroll
three
Armies
.
Of
the
first
he
would
be
general
to
go
against
the
Tuscans
;
Of
the
second
he
made
Quintus
Servilius
Conmander
,
whom
he
would
have
to
abide
near
about
Rome
,
to
withstand
the
Latini
and
the
Hernici
,
if
they
should
stir
.
He
gave
Lucius
Quintius
the
command
of
the
third
Army
,
which
he
levied
for
the
guard
of
the
City
,
the
defence
of
the
gates
and
the
court
of
justice
,
in
case
any
chance
should
happen
;
besides
this
he
ordained
,
that
Horatius
one
of
his
Collegues
,
should
make
provision
of
arms
and
corn
and
other
things
requisite
in
time
of
war.
He
made
Cornelius
also
his
Collegue
chief
of
the
Senate
,
and
over
the
publike
Councel
,
to
consult
upon
those
things
which
in
general
were
to
be
executed
.
Thus
were
the
Tribunes
in
those
times
disposed
for
the
good
of
their
Country
to
command
,
and
to
obey
.
It
is
noted
by
the
text
here
,
what
a
vertuous
and
prudent
man
may
do
,
and
what
great
good
he
may
because
of
,
and
how
much
he
may
be
able
to
advantage
his
country
,
when
by
means
of
his
goodness
and
vertue
,
he
hath
quite
extinguished
all
envy
,
which
many
times
is
the
cause
that
men
cannot
effectuate
a
good
work
,
the
said
envy
not
allowing
them
that
authority
which
it
is
necessary
they
should
have
in
matters
of
importance
.
And
this
envy
is
quite
put
out
two
ways
;
either
by
some
strong
and
difficult
accident
,
where
every
one
seeing
themselves
ready
to
perish
,
laying
ambition
aside
,
willingly
run
to
obey
him
,
whom
they
believe
by
his
vertue
able
to
deliver
them
,
as
it
befell
Camillus
:
who
having
given
so
many
proofs
of
his
being
an
admirable
man
,
and
having
been
thrice
Dictator
,
and
performed
that
place
alwayes
with
the
advantage
of
the
publike
,
and
no
way
to
his
own
profit
,
had
now
caused
men
not
to
be
afraid
of
his
greatness
And
because
he
was
so
magnanimous
,
and
of
such
great
credit
,
they
thought
it
no
shame
to
them
to
be
inferiors
to
him
:
And
therefore
saies
Titus
Livius
very
wisely
these
words
,
Nor
thought
they
it
any
things
,
&c.
Another
way
is
envy
blotted
out
,
when
either
by
violence
or
by
course
of
nature
they
dye
that
have
been
thy
competitors
in
attaining
to
any
reputation
,
or
greatness
;
who
seeing
the
more
esteemed
then
they
,
it
is
unpossible
they
ever
should
be
at
rest
,
or
have
any
patience
.
And
when
they
are
accustomed
to
live
in
a
corrupted
City
,
where
their
education
hath
not
bred
any
goodness
in
them
,
it
is
unpossible
,
let
what
accident
will
fall
out
,
that
they
should
ever
go
back
from
any
thing
;
and
without
doubt
to
have
their
wills
,
and
satisfy
the
waywardness
of
their
minds
,
they
would
be
contented
even
to
see
the
ruine
of
their
native
Country
.
To
overcome
this
envy
,
there
is
no
other
remedy
but
the
death
of
those
that
bear
it
:
and
when
fortune
is
so
favorable
to
that
vertuous
man
,
as
that
those
men
dye
a
natural
death
,
he
becomes
glorious
without
giving
any
scandal
,
when
without
any
obstacle
or
offence
he
may
display
his
vertues
.
But
when
he
hath
not
this
good
luck
,
he
must
devise
by
any
means
to
take
them
out
of
his
way
.
And
before
he
can
do
any
thing
he
must
practise
those
wayes
whereby
to
overcome
this
difficulty
.
And
he
that
reads
the
Bible
with
understanding
,
shall
see
that
Moses
was
forced
(
if
he
would
have
his
lawes
and
ordinances
proceed
)
to
put
a
great
number
of
men
to
death
,
who
provoked
by
nothing
else
but
envy
,
withstood
his
purpose
.
This
necessity
Numbers
the
16.
Moses
did
but
citie
them
as
to
appearance
:
but
GOD
immediately
sent
his
vengeance
:
For
the
earth
under
them
opened
,
vers.
31.
And
when
that
wretched
fellow
gathered
sticks
on
the
Sabboth
,
Numb
15.
Moses
awaited
till
GOD
passed●
the
sentence
upon
him
for
his
death
;
and
the
manner
thereof
,
vers.
35.
Therefore
Machiavell
may
justly
be
taxed
for
traducing
Moses
here
of
more
then
he
hath
warrant
for
,
making
no
other
esteem
of
Moses
his
bringing
the
Israelites
out
of
Egypt
,
and
his
leading
them
through
the
wilderness
,
then
of
Romulus
his
gathering
together
a●scattered
multitude
,
and
laying
the
foundation
of
that
Common-wealth
,
which
action
his
courage
and
ambition
of
rule
and
glory
thrust
him
upon
;
not
seeming
to
take
notice
,
that
Moses
was
immediately
called
by
GOD
,
and
sent
to
shew
his
wonders
and
judgements
against
the
Egyptians
,
and
to
conduct
the
Israelites
into
Canaan
(
according
to
GODS
promises
formerly
made
to
their
forefathers
)
wherein
he
behaved
not
himself
either
ambitiously
or
insolently
,
nor
was
any
thing
done
by
his
own
prowess
or
policy
,
but
meerly
by
the
ordinance
of
GOD.
Fryar
Jerom
Savonarola
knew
very
well
,
and
Peter
Soderini
chief
standard-bearer
of
Florence
knew
it
also
.
The
one
could
not
overcome
it
,
because
he
had
not
power
to
do
it
,
which
was
the
Fryar
,
and
because
he
was
not
well
understood
by
those
that
followed
him
who
might
have
had
power
to
have
done
it
.
But
it
was
not
his
fault
,
and
his
sermons
are
full
of
the
blames
he
lays
upon
the
wise
men
of
the
world
,
and
of
invectives
against
them
;
for
so
he
terms
those
envious
men
,
and
all
that
opposed
his
ordinances
.
That
others
believed
that
in
time
,
by
his
goodness
,
and
good
fortune
,
and
doing
good
turns
to
some
of
them
,
quite
to
extinguish
this
envy
,
seeing
himself
young
enough
too
,
and
then
wearing
so
many
new
favors
,
which
the
manner
of
his
proceeding
afforded
him
,
so
that
he
thought
he
was
able
to
overcome
those
many
that
enviously
opposed
him
,
without
any
scandal
,
violence
,
or
tumult
.
And
did
not
know
that
time
cannot
stay
;
goodness
is
not
sufficient
,
fortune
changes
;
and
there
is
no
gift
can
appease
malice
.
So
that
the
one
and
the
other
of
these
two
went
to
ruine
,
and
their
ruine
proceeded
either
from
their
ignorance
,
or
their
disability
to
overcome
this
envy
.
The
other
thing
remarkeable
is
the
order
which
Camillus
took
both
within
and
abroad
for
the
preservation
of
Rome
.
And
indeed
not
without
reason
the
good
Historians
(
as
ours
here
is
)
set
down
particularly
and
distinctly
certain
cases
,
to
the
end
posterity
should
learn
how
in
the
like
accidents
they
are
to
defend
themselves
.
And
it
ought
well
be
observ'd
in
this
text
,
that
there
is
not
a
more
dangerous
nor
unprofitable
defence
then
that
which
is
confusedly
made
,
and
with
out
order
,
and
this
appears
by
this
third
army
which
Camillus
caused
to
be
inrolled
,
and
to
be
left
at
Rome
to
guard
the
Town
:
for
many
would
have
judg'd
that
part
superfluous
,
where
the
people
is
most
commonly
arm'd
,
and
warlick
;
and
for
this
cause
a
man
would
not
think
it
needfull
to
have
them
inroll'd
otherwise
,
but
only
that
it
sufficed
to
cause
them
to
be
in
armes
as
occasion
should
require
.
But
Camillus
and
who
else
were
wise
as
he
was
,
think
otherwise
,
who
never
allow
a
multitude
to
take
armes
,
unless
by
certain
order
and
appointment
:
Wherefore
upon
this
example
,
he
that
is
appointed
over
the
guard
of
a
City
,
should
avoid
,
as
a
rock
,
the
arming
of
men
in
confusion
,
but
ought
first
have
those
chosen
and
registred
?
which
he
would
have
in
armes
,
and
whom
he
would
have
them
obey
,
where
their
rendezvous
,
and
whether
to
go
,
and
command
those
that
are
not
inrolled
to
abide
every
man
at
his
own
house
,
for
the
safeguard
thereof
.
They
that
shal
take
this
order
in
a
City
assailed
,
will
easily
be
able
to
defend
themselves
:
whoever
does
otherwise
,
shal
neither
imitate
Camillus
,
nor
defend
himself
.
CHAP.
XXXI
.
Powerfull
Commonwealths
,
and
great
and
worthy
personages
in
all
manner
of
fortune
retain
the
same
courage
,
and
the
same
dignity
.
AMong
other
matters
of
magnificence
,
that
our
Historian
brings
in
Camillus
speaking
or
doing
,
to
shew
how
an
excellent
man
ought
to
behave
himself
,
he
puts
these
words
in
his
mouth
:
Neithor
did
my
Dictatorship
elevate
my
courage
,
nor
hath
my
banishment
abated
it
:
By
which
words
we
see
that
great
personages
are
alwaies
the
same
in
all
fortunes
.
And
though
she
varies
,
now
exalting
them
,
and
then
bringing
them
low
,
they
never
differ
from
themselves
,
but
alwaies
hold
a
constant
resolution
,
so
steadily
fastened
to
their
ordinary
course
of
living
,
that
by
every
one
of
them
it
appears
that
chance
hath
no
power
over
them
.
Weake
men
behave
themselves
in
another
manner
:
for
they
befoole
and
besot
themselves
in
good
fortune
,
attributing
all
the
good
they
have
to
those
vertues
which
they
never
knew
;
whence
it
proceeds
that
they
grow
insupportable
and
odious
to
those
that
are
about
them
;
whereupon
depends
the
sudden
alteration
of
fortune
,
which
so
soon
as
they
look
once
in
the
face
,
they
fall
presently
into
the
other
defect
,
and
become
vile
and
abject
.
From
hence
it
comes
that
such
manner
of
of
Princes
thinke
rather
in
adversitie
how
to
make
an
escape
,
than
to
stand
upon
their
defence
,
as
those
that
for
having
made
evil
use
of
good
fortune
,
are
not
prepared
for
any
kind
of
safegard
.
This
vertue
,
and
this
vice
,
which
I
say
,
is
found
in
one
man
alone
,
we
find
also
in
a
Republike
,
of
which
the
Romanes
and
the
Venetians
serve
us
for
example
.
Those
former
never
any
bad
fortune
could
make
abject
,
nor
any
good
fortune
insolent
,
as
it
manifestly
appeared
after
the
defeat
they
had
at
Canna
,
and
after
the
victory
they
got
against
Antiochus
:
for
upon
that
defeat
,
however
a
very
great
one
,
because
it
had
been
the
third
together
,
they
never
grew
base
upon
it
,
but
continued
to
send
forth
Armies
;
they
would
not
redeem
prisoners
against
the
orders
they
had
made
,
nor
send
to
Hannibal
or
Carthage
to
ask
peace
,
but
casting
aside
all
those
unworthy
courses
,
they
thought
still
upon
providing
for
the
war
,
arming
for
want
of
souldiers
their
old
men
and
slaves
.
Which
thing
being
known
to
Hanno
the
Carthaginian
(
as
was
said
before
)
he
shewed
that
Senate
what
small
account
they
were
to
make
of
that
defeat
at
Canna
.
And
so
it
appeared
,
as
those
hard
times
did
not
affright
,
nor
abase
them
,
on
the
other
part
neither
did
their
more
fortunate
times
puffe
them
up
:
for
,
when
Antiochus
sent
Ambassadors
to
Scipio
to
require
an
agreement
,
before
they
came
to
joyn
battel
,
or
that
he
had
lost
it
,
Scipio
gave
him
certain
conditions
of
peace
,
which
were
,
that
he
should
retire
into
Syria
,
and
leave
the
rest
to
the
Romans
disposing
,
which
Antiochus
refusing
,
and
coming
to
battel
and
losing
it
,
sent
again
his
Ambassadors
to
Scipio
,
with
order
that
he
would
submit
to
all
those
conditions
which
the
Conqueror
should
impose
on
him
,
to
whom
he
propounded
no
other
conditions
than
what
he
had
fomerly
offered
before
the
victory
,
adding
these
words
:
That
the
Romanes
if
they
be
overcome
,
lose
not
their
courages
,
nor
when
they
overcome
grow
they
insolent
.
Clean
contrary
hereunto
we
have
seen
the
Venetians
do
:
who
in
their
prosperity
(
thinking
they
had
gotten
it
by
their
own
valor
which
they
never
were
guilty
of
)
grew
to
such
an
excess
of
insolence
,
that
they
termed
the
King
of
France
Saint
Marks
son
,
they
contemned
the
Church
;
and
their
ambition
all
Italy
would
not
hold
,
but
imagined
they
were
to
frame
a
Monarchy
like
that
of
the
Romanes
.
Afterwards
their
good
fortune
abandoning
them
,
and
that
they
were
a
little
routed
by
the
King
of
France
at
Vayla
,
they
not
onely
lost
all
their
State
by
rebellion
,
but
a
good
part
of
it
they
gave
up
to
the
Pope
and
the
King
of
Spaine
,
even
through
meer
baseness
and
cowardise
.
And
they
became
so
vile
and
abject
,
that
they
sent
Ambassadors
to
the
Emperor
,
to
offer
themselves
to
be
his
tributaries
,
and
writ
letters
to
the
Pope
full
of
baseness
and
submission
,
whereby
to
move
him
to
compassion
.
Into
which
unhappiness
they
fell
in
four
days
space
,
and
after
a
half
defeat
:
for
their
Army
come
to
battel
and
to
fight
,
in
their
retreat
lost
near
one
half
of
their
men
,
yet
so
that
one
of
their
Proveditors
that
escaped
,
came
to
Verona
with
above
five
and
twenty
thousand
souldiers
between
foot
and
horse
:
in
case
that
if
either
the
Venetians
,
or
any
of
their
orders
had
been
of
value
,
they
might
easily
have
recovered
themselves
,
and
looked
fortune
again
in
the
face
,
and
have
been
ready
either
to
overcome
,
or
lose
more
gloriously
,
or
get
more
honorable
terms
of
agreement
:
but
the
baseness
of
their
spirits
caused
by
the
quality
of
their
orders
,
nothing
good
in
matters
touching
the
war
,
made
them
at
once
lose
both
their
State
and
courage
.
And
so
will
it
alwaies
befall
any
that
shall
behave
themselves
as
they
did
:
for
this
growing
insolent
in
good
fortune
,
and
abject
in
evill
,
arises
from
the
manner
of
thy
proceeding
,
and
from
the
education
wherein
thou
hast
been
traind
up
:
Which
when
it
is
weak
&
vain
,
makes
thee
like
to
it self
,
when
otherwise
it
casts
thee
in
another
manner
of
mould
,
and
makes
thee
know
the
world
better
,
rejoycing
less
at
the
good
besalls
thee
,
as
also
grieving
less
at
the
evill
comes
upon
thee
:
and
that
which
is
said
of
one
man
alone
,
is
said
also
of
many
that
live
in
the
same
Commonwealth
,
who
attain
to
that
perfection
,
which
the
order
and
manner
of
government
thereof
wil
afford
.
And
though
otherwhere
we
have
said
,
that
the
foundation
of
all
States
is
good
military
discipline
;
and
where
this
is
not
,
there
can
neither
be
good
lawes
,
nor
any
other
thing
good
,
methinks
it
is
not
more
than
needs
to
repeate
it
again
;
for
to
many
purposes
,
in
the
reading
of
this
Story
,
wee
see
this
necessity
appeares
,
and
wee
see
that
neither
can
the
soldiers
be
good
,
unless
they
be
traind
and
practis'd
,
nor
can
they
be
train'd
,
unless
compos'd
of
thy
own
subjects
:
for
the
wars
do
not
alwaies
last
,
&
unpossible
it
is
they
should
:
therefore
is
it
necessary
to
be
able
to
practise
this
military
exercise
in
time
of
peace
;
neither
can
this
exercise
be
us'd
in
regard
of
the
expence
,
with
others
then
with
thy
own
subjects
.
Camillus
was
gone
(
as
we
said
before
)
with
the
Army
against
the
Tuscans
,
and
his
souldiers
hāving
seen
the
greatness
of
the
enemies
Army
were
much
amazd
at
it
,
thinking
themselves
too
weak
to
sustain
the
violence
of
their
enemies
:
the
rumor
of
this
fearefulness
comming
to
Camillus
his
eares
,
he
came
forth
abroad
amongst
them
,
and
going
about
through
the
Camp
,
speaking
now
to
one
soldier
,
and
then
to
another
,
workt
this
opinion
out
of
their
heads
,
and
in
conclusion
,
without
any
otherwise
ordering
of
his
Army
,
said
,
Let
every
man
doe
what
he
hath
learned
and
used
to
doe
.
And
whosoever
shall
well
consider
these
termes
and
the
words
he
said
to
them
,
for
their
encouragement
to
encounter
with
their
enemies
,
shall
perceive
that
none
of
these
things
could
be
said
or
done
to
an
Army
that
had
not
first
been
orderd
and
exercised
as
well
in
peace
as
in
war
:
for
upon
those
soldiers
that
have
not
learned
to
do
any
thing
,
a
Commander
cannot
rely
,
nor
beleeve
they
can
do
any
thing
to
the
purpose
:
and
were
a
new
Hannibal
to
command
them
,
he
could
not
subsist
:
for
a
General
(
during
the
battell
)
not
being
able
to
be
in
every
part
,
unless
he
have
first
taken
order
to
have
men
of
his
manner
of
courage
,
knowing
well
his
orders
,
and
the
wayes
of
his
proceeding
,
must
of
force
ruine
there
.
If
then
a
City
shall
be
armed
and
orderd
as
Rome
,
and
that
every
day
the
Citizens
are
put
to
it
to
make
tryal
in
particular
and
in
general
of
their
own
valor
,
and
the
power
of
fortune
,
it
shall
alwaies
come
to
pass
,
that
at
any
time
whatsoever
,
they
shall
continue
setled
in
the
same
resolution
,
and
keep
themselves
in
the
same
dignity
.
But
when
they
shall
be
disarmed
,
and
rest
only
upon
the
helpes
of
fortune
,
and
not
upon
their
own
valours
,
they
shall
change
as
her
wheel
turns
,
and
give
that
example
of
themselves
,
which
the
Venetians
gave
.
CHAP.
XXXII
.
What
means
some
have
practised
to
disturb
a
treaty
of
peace
.
CIrcei
and
Velitre
two
Roman
Colonies
being
rebelled
,
in
hope
that
the
Latines
would
defend
them
,
afterwards
the
Latines
being
overcome
,
and
so
those
hopes
failing
them
,
divers
of
the
Citizens
advised
,
they
should
send
Ambassadors
to
Rome
,
to
recommend
them
to
the
Senate
:
which
course
was
hindred
by
those
that
had
been
Authors
of
the
rebellion
,
who
were
afraid
least
the
whole
punishment
should
fall
upon
their
heads
;
and
therefore
to
cut
off
all
treaty
of
peace
,
they
incited
the
multitude
to
take
arms
,
and
make
an
incurfion
upon
the
Rome
territories
.
And
truely
when
any
one
desires
that
a
people
or
Prince
should
wholly
take
their
minds
off
from
agreement
,
there
is
no
truer
nor
certainer
way
than
to
make
them
do
some
foul
act
against
him
,
with
whom
thou
wouldst
not
have
the
accord
made
.
For
the
fear
of
that
punishment
which
he
shall
think
he
hath
deserved
for
his
fault
,
shall
always
keep
him
off
.
After
the
first
wars
which
the
Carthaginians
had
with
the
Romanes
,
those
soldiers
who
had
served
the
Carthaginians
in
that
war
in
Sicily
and
Sardinia
,
when
the
peace
was
concluded
,
went
back
into
Affrica
,
where
not
being
satisfied
for
their
pay
,
they
made
wars
against
the
Carthaginians
,
and
having
chosen
two
out
of
themselves
for
their
heads
,
Mathus
,
and
Spendius
,
they
took
divers
Towns
of
the
Carthaginians
,
and
sacked
divers
.
The
Carthaginians
willing
to
try
any
other
way
then
battell
,
sent
Asdrubal
a
Citizen
of
theirs
Ambassadour
to
them
,
who
they
thought
had
some
credit
with
them
,
having
formerly
been
their
General
.
And
he
being
come
,
and
Spendius
and
Mathus
desiring
to
oblige
all
these
Souldiers
,
never
to
hope
they
could
have
peace
again
with
the
Carthaginians
,
and
to
engage
them
in
the
war
,
perswaded
them
it
was
better
to
kill
him
,
with
all
the
Citizens
of
Carthage
,
which
then
they
had
prisoners
,
Whereupon
they
not
only
slew
them
,
but
put
them
to
death
with
torments
,
to
this
villainy
adding
an
edict
,
that
all
Carthaginians
,
who
in
time
to
come
were
taken
,
should
in
the
same
sort
be
slain
.
Which
deliberation
and
execution
made
that
Army
exceeding
cruell
and
obstinate
against
the
Carthaginians
.
CHAP.
XXXIII
.
It
much
furthers
and
advantages
an
Army
in
the
winning
of
a
battell
,
to
be
confident
of
their
own
forces
,
and
their
Generals
valour
.
IT
much
helpes
an
Army
towards
the
winning
of
a
battell
,
to
make
them
confident
,
that
in
any
case
they
cannot
chuse
but
vanquish
.
The
things
that
give
them
this
confidence
,
are
,
that
they
be
well
armed
and
well
orderd
,
and
be
acquainted
one
with
another
.
Nor
can
this
confidence
or
this
order
be
but
among
those
Soldiers
that
have
been
borne
and
liv'd
together
.
The
Commander
also
must
be
of
repute
,
so
that
the
Soldiers
may
be
confident
of
his
wisdome
:
and
they
shall
alwaies
be
so
,
when
they
perceive
him
to
be
a
man
orderly
carefull
,
and
couragious
,
and
that
maintains
well
,
and
with
esteem
the
Majesty
of
his
dignity
:
and
he
shall
alwaies
be
able
to
do
so
,
while
he
punisheth
their
faults
,
while
he
tires
not
out
the
soldiers
to
no
purpose
,
keeps
his
word
with
them
,
shewes
them
an
easie
way
to
vanquish
the
enemy
;
those
things
that
may
endanger
them
,
conceals
from
them
;
or
if
they
be
evident
,
by
his
speeches
lessons
their
opinion
of
them
:
which
things
well
observed
,
are
a
great
occasion
of
confidence
in
the
Army
;
and
that
confidence
of
victory
the
Romans
us'd
to
make
their
Armies
thus
confident
by
way
of
Religion
:
from
hence
proceeded
,
that
by
their
southsayings
and
auspiees
they
created
their
Consuls
,
they
levied
their
souldiers
,
march'd
with
their
armies
,
and
fought
their
battels
;
and
without
having
done
some
of
these
things
,
never
would
a
good
or
discreet
Commander
,
have
put
any
thing
to
hazard
,
deeming
that
he
might
easily
lose
,
unless
his
souldiers
had
first
understood
that
the
gods
were
on
their
side
.
And
when
any
Consul
or
Captain
of
theirs
should
have
fought
contrary
to
the
auspices
,
they
would
have
punishd
him
,
as
they
did
Claudius
Pulcher.
And
however
we
find
this
true
in
all
the
Roman
Histories
,
yet
it
is
proved
more
certain
by
the
words
which
Livie
brings
in
Appius
Claudius
speaking
,
who
complaining
to
the
people
of
their
Tribunes
insolency
,
and
shewing
that
by
means
of
them
the
auspices
and
other
matters
pertaining
to
Religion
were
corrupted
,
sayes
thus
:
Let
them
now
scoffe
at
Religion
;
for
,
what
matter
is
it
,
whether
the
chickens
feed
,
or
whether
they
come
slower
out
of
their
cage
,
whether
a
bird
hath
sung
or
no
?
these
,
t
is
true
,
are
all
small
things
:
but
by
not
contemning
of
these
little
things
,
our
Auncestours
have
exceedingly
amplified
this
Commonwealth
.
For
in
these
small
matters
there
is
force
to
hold
the
souldiers
united
and
confident
,
which
thing
is
a
principall
occasion
of
any
victory
.
Yet
must
these
things
be
accompanied
with
valour
,
otherwise
they
will
avail
little
.
The
Prenestini
having
their
Army
abroad
against
the
Romans
,
went
to
incampe
upon
the
river
of
Allia
,
a
place
where
the
Romans
had
been
overcome
by
the
French
,
which
they
did
to
make
their
own
souldiers
confident
,
and
to
affright
the
Romans
with
the
fortune
of
the
place
.
And
though
the
course
they
took
,
was
probable
for
those
reasons
wee
have
already
said
,
yet
the
conclusion
of
the
matter
shewed
,
that
true
valour
feares
not
every
small
accident
:
Which
the
Historian
sayes
very
well
,
in
those
words
which
he
makes
the
Dictatour
speak
,
who
saies
thus
to
the
Master
of
his
Cavallerie
:
Seest
thou
how
they
taking
benefit
of
their
fortune
,
have
incamped
themselves
upon
the
river
Allia
?
But
thou
making
use
of
thy
Armes
and
courage
assayle
the
very
heart
of
their
Armie
.
For
a
true
valour
,
a
good
discpline
,
and
an
assurance
taken
from
so
many
victories
,
cannot
be
extinguished
by
matters
of
small
moment
,
nor
does
any
vain
matter
affright
them
,
nor
one
disorder
hurt
them
,
as
we
saw
it
;
for
two
Manlij
being
Consuls
against
the
Volsei
,
by
reason
that
they
had
rashly
sent
part
of
their
Army
to
forrage
,
it
followed
,
that
both
they
that
were
gone
and
those
that
staid
behind
,
were
besieged
;
from
which
danger
,
not
the
wisedome
of
the
Consuls
,
but
the
Souldiers
own
valour
freed
them
,
where
T.
Livius
says
these
words
,
The
Souldiers
valour
even
without
a
Commander
was
thought
firme
and
constant
.
I
will
not
let
pass
one
terme
us'd
by
Fabius
,
being
newly
entred
with
his
Army
into
Tuscany
,
to
make
them
confident
,
deeming
such
a
confidence
to
be
the
more
necessary
,
now
that
he
had
brought
them
into
a
new
Country
,
and
to
fight
with
new
enemies
;
who
speaking
to
his
souldiers
before
the
fight
,
and
having
told
them
many
reasons
,
whereupon
they
might
hope
for
the
victory
,
said
,
that
he
could
also
tell
them
certain
good
things
,
and
where
they
might
plainly
see
the
victory
,
but
that
it
was
dangerous
to
disclose
them
.
Which
course
as
it
was
discreetly
us'd
,
so
deserves
it
it
to
be
followed
.
CHAP.
XXXIV
.
What
fame
,
report
,
or
opinion
causes
the
people
to
begin
to
cast
their
favours
upon
a
Citizen
:
and
whether
a
Prince
or
a
people
do
bestow
their
Magistracies
with
better
judgement
.
OTherwhere
we
said
,
that
T.
Manlius
,
who
afterwards
was
termed
Torquatus
,
sav'd
L.
Manlius
his
Father
from
an
acccusation
,
which
M.
Pomponions
Tribune
of
the
people
had
made
against
him
.
And
however
the
manner
of
saving
him
,
was
somewhat
violent
and
extraordinary
,
yet
that
filial
piety
towards
his
Father
,
was
so
acceptable
to
the
generall
,
that
it
was
not
only
not
blamed
,
but
when
Tribune
were
to
be
appointed
over
the
Legions
,
T.
Manlius
was
chosen
in
the
second
place
.
Upon
which
success
,
I
beleeve
it
fit
to
consider
,
what
way
the
people
take
to
give
their
judgements
upon
men
in
distributing
of
their
charge
that
thereby
we
may
see
,
whether
that
be
true
which
we
formerly
concluded
,
that
the
people
is
a
better
distributer
than
a
Prince
.
I
say
then
,
that
the
people
in
their
distribution
follows
the
report
that
goes
of
one
by
publick
voyce
and
fame
:
when
they
know
him
not
otherwise
by
his
ordinary
behaviour
,
or
by
presumption
or
opinion
conceived
of
him
.
Which
two
things
have
been
caused
either
by
the
Fathers
of
such
,
who
for
that
they
have
been
great
personages
,
and
of
ability
in
the
Cities
,
it
is
thought
their
sons
should
be
like
them
,
untill
by
their
actions
the
contrary
be
found
:
Or
else
it
is
caused
by
the
courses
such
a
one
takes
,
of
whom
we
speak
:
the
best
courses
and
waies
that
can
be
held
,
are
to
keep
company
with
grave
men
,
well
dispos'd
,
and
such
as
by
every
one
are
reputed
wise
.
And
because
there
cannot
be
a
greater
marke
or
discovery
of
a
man
then
by
the
company
he
frequents
,
without
question
he
that
uses
good
company
,
gaines
a
good
name
:
for
it
is
impossible
but
that
he
shall
much
resemble
them
.
Or
indeed
this
publick
reputation
is
gotten
by
some
extraordinary
and
notable
exploit
,
however
private
,
that
hath
proved
in
thy
hands
very
honorable
.
And
of
all
these
three
things
,
which
in
the
beginning
gain
any
one
a
good
reputation
,
nothing
gives
if
more
amply
then
this
last
:
for
that
first
of
parents
,
and
fathers
is
so
deceitfull
,
that
men
advance
therein
very
leisurely
,
and
that
is
presently
quite
spent
,
when
it
is
not
accompanied
by
the
the
proper
vertue
of
him
that
is
to
be
censured
.
The
second
way
,
which
makes
thee
be
known
by
the
company
thou
usest
,
is
better
then
the
first
;
but
is
much
inferior
to
the
third
;
for
untill
thou
hast
given
evidence
of
thy self
by
some
worthy
exploir
,
thy
repute
is
wholly
grounded
upon
opinion
,
which
is
very
easily
cancelled
.
But
that
third
being
begun
and
grounded
upon
thy
workes
,
gives
thee
at
first
such
renown
,
that
needs
must
it
be
,
that
afterwards
thou
commit
many
acts
contrary
thereunto
,
if
thou
wouldst
disannul
it
.
Therefore
ought
those
men
that
spring
up
in
a
Common-wealth
,
take
this
course
,
and
indeavour
by
some
extraordinary
act
to
begin
their
rise
.
Which
many
at
Rome
did
in
their
youths
,
either
by
publishing
of
a
law
,
furthering
the
common
good
,
or
by
accusing
some
potent
Citizen
as
a
breaker
of
the
laws
,
by
doing
such
like
notable
things
,
and
unwonted
,
whereof
men
should
have
occasion
to
speak
afterwards
.
Neither
are
such
like
things
needfull
only
to
begin
ones
reputation
,
but
they
are
as
necessary
for
the
maintenance
and
advancement
of
it
.
And
to
do
this
,
a
man
had
need
to
renew
them
again
,
as
Manlius
did
during
his
whole
life
:
for
when
he
had
defended
his
father
so
vertuously
and
beyond
the
ordinary
strain
,
and
by
this
action
taken
his
first
degree
of
reputation
,
after
some
years
he
fought
with
that
Frenchman
,
and
took
from
him
that
chain
of
gold
,
which
gave
him
the
name
of
Torquatus
:
nor
stay'd
he
upon
this
,
but
afterwards
in
riper
years
he
put
his
son
to
death
for
having
fought
without
his
allowance
,
however
he
had
vanquished
his
enemy
.
Which
three
actions
gave
him
a
greater
name
,
and
throughout
all
ages
make
him
more
famous
,
then
ever
any
triumph
or
victory
did
,
wherewith
he
was
adorn'd
as
much
as
any
other
Roman
.
And
the
reason
is
,
because
in
those
victories
Manlius
had
very
many
like
him
,
but
in
these
particulars
he
had
either
very
few
or
none
.
Scipio
the
elder
got
not
greater
glory
by
all
his
triumphs
,
then
that
action
of
defending
his
father
upon
the
Tesin
gained
him
in
his
youth
,
and
that
other
when
after
the
defeate
at
Canna
,
couragiously
with
his
sword
drawn
he
made
many
young
Romans
swear
they
would
never
abandon
Italy
,
as
already
then
among
them
it
was
resolv'd
which
two
actions
were
the
beginnings
of
his
reputation
,
which
made
him
a
way
to
his
triumphs
of
Spain
and
Africa
,
which
opinion
of
him
was
also
increased
,
when
he
sent
back
the
daughter
to
her
Father
,
and
the
wife
to
her
husband
in
Spain
.
This
manner
of
proceeding
is
not
alone
needful
for
those
Citizens
,
that
would
gain
reputation
,
whereby
to
attain
the
dignities
in
their
Commonwealth
,
but
is
also
necessary
for
Princes
to
maintain
their
credits
in
their
Principalities
:
for
nothing
gives
them
so
great
esteem
as
to
yeeld
some
rare
examples
of
themselves
,
by
some
deed
or
pithy
saving
,
agreeable
with
the
common
good
,
which
may
evidently
prove
the
Prince
either
magnanimous
,
or
liberall
,
or
just
;
and
that
he
is
such
a
one
,
that
his
life
may
serve
for
a
patterne
,
and
his
wise
sayings
may
be
used
by
his
subjects
as
proverbs
.
But
to
returne
,
whereat
we
began
this
discourse
,
I
say
'
that
the
people
,
when
they
begin
to
confer
any
dignity
upon
one
of
their
Citizens
,
grounding
upon
any
of
those
reasons
before
alledged
,
take
no
ill
ground
;
but
when
afterwards
the
frequent
examples
of
one
mans
good
carriage
makes
him
better
known
,
then
is
a
better
ground
taken
;
for
in
such
case
there
can
never
fall
any
deceit
.
I
speak
only
of
those
honours
which
are
given
to
men
in
the
beginning
,
before
they
be
well
known
by
a
certain
experience
,
or
that
they
transgress
from
one
action
to
another
unlike
it
;
Where
both
touching
the
salfe
opinion
and
the
corruption
,
they
alwaies
commit
less
errors
,
then
Princes
.
And
because
it
may
fall
out
,
that
the
people
might
be
deceived
in
the
report
,
in
the
opinion
,
and
actions
of
a
man
,
conceiving
them
greater
then
in
truth
they
are
,
which
would
not
be
so
with
a
Prince
,
because
it
is
like
it
should
be
told
him
,
or
that
he
should
be
advertised
thereof
by
some
of
his
Counsellours
;
to
the
end
therefore
that
the
people
want
not
these
advertisements
,
the
good
founders
of
Republicks
have
ordained
,
that
when
the
cheisest
dignities
of
Cities
are
to
be
bestowed
,
whereunto
it
might
prove
dangerous
to
prefer
unsufficient
men
,
and
seeing
the
peoples
wills
sometimes
bent
to
advance
some
one
unfit
,
that
it
may
be
lawfull
for
any
Citizen
,
and
accounted
as
an
honour
to
him
,
to
publish
in
their
assemblies
that
mans
defects
,
that
the
people
(
this
notice
not
failing
them
)
may
the
better
give
their
judgments
thereupon
.
And
that
this
was
customary
at
Rome
,
the
oration
which
F.
Maximus
made
,
witnessed
,
which
he
uttered
before
the
people
in
the
second
Punicke
warr
,
when
at
the
creation
of
the
Consulls
they
took
a
liking
to
T.
Ottasilius
;
and
Fabius
;
deeming
him
unsufficent
to
marnage
the
Consulate
in
those
times
,
spake
against
him
,
declaring
his
unsufficiency
,
insomuch
as
he
hindred
him
of
that
dignity
,
and
converted
the
peoples
favours
to
one
that
deserved
it
better
then
he
.
The
people
then
in
the
choice
of
their
Magistrates
judge
according
to
the
truest
markes
they
can
have
of
men
.
And
when
they
can
be
advised
,
as
Princes
are
,
they
run
into
fewer
errors
then
Princes
;
and
that
Citizen
that
will
begin
to
seek
the
peoples
favour
,
must
with
some
notable
exploit
gain
it
,
as
Titus
Manlius
did
.
CHAP.
XXXV
.
What
dangers
they
incurre
that
put
themselves
forwards
as
principals
to
advise
any
design
,
which
are
so
much
the
greate
,
by
how
much
this
carries
with
it
the
more
difficulty
and
perill
.
HOw
dangerous
a
thing
it
is
for
any
man
to
become
the
ringleader
of
any
new
matter
,
which
belongs
to
many
,
and
how
hard
a
thing
it
is
to
meddle
in
it
,
and
bring
it
on
forwards
,
and
make
it
good
being
thus
brought
forwards
,
would
be
too
long
and
too
deep
a
matter
to
discourse
on
.
Therefore
reserving
it
for
a
fitter
place
,
I
will
only
treate
of
those
dangers
,
which
Citizens
incur
,
or
those
that
advise
a
Prince
,
making
themselves
chief
in
perswading
him
to
any
weighty
and
important
resolution
,
so
that
the
Councell
thereof
is
wholly
imputed
to
them
:
for
,
men
judging
things
by
their
events
,
of
all
the
evill
that
arises
thereupon
,
the
blame
is
wholly
laid
on
him
as
author
;
and
if
good
come
of
it
,
he
is
commended
for
it
;
but
the
reward
comes
much
short
of
the
loss
is
hazarded
.
This
present
Sultan
Selimus
'
termed
the
great
Turk
,
having
made
preparation
(
as
some
report
,
who
now
come
from
his
Country
)
for
the
Conquest
of
Syria
and
Egypt
,
was
encouraged
by
one
of
his
Bashawes
,
who
was
then
upon
the
confines
of
Persia
,
to
undertake
rather
an
expedition
against
the
Sophy
;
by
whose
Counsell
being
perswaded
,
he
went
to
that
enterprise
with
an
exceeding
great
army
,
and
comming
into
a
very
vast
country
,
where
a
great
part
of
it
is
desert
,
and
rivers
very
few
,
and
finding
there
those
difficulties
,
which
long
since
had
ruin'd
many
Roman
armies
,
was
so
distressed
thereby
,
that
he
lost
there
by
famine
and
plague
(
however
that
in
the
war
he
were
the
vanquisher
)
a
great
part
of
his
army
.
Whereupon
being
errag'd
against
the
author
of
that
Counsell
,
he
put
him
to
death
.
We
reade
of
many
Citizens
,
that
were
the
advisers
to
such
and
such
enterprises
,
who
because
these
had
evill
success
,
have
straightway
been
banished
.
Certain
Citizens
of
Rome
there
were
,
who
as
authours
of
the
advice
,
stood
to
have
a
Consul
from
among
the
Commons
in
Rome
;
it
happened
,
that
the
first
of
them
,
that
went
abroad
with
their
armies
,
was
defeated
.
Whereupon
it
had
prov'd
but
unluckily
to
the
authors
of
that
Counsell
,
had
not
their
party
been
strong
,
by
whose
favour
such
resolution
was
taken
.
It
is
then
most
certain
,
that
they
who
advise
a
Republick
and
they
that
Counsell
a
Prince
,
are
equally
brought
into
these
streights
;
and
if
they
do
not
advise
those
things
,
which
they
take
to
be
profitable
either
for
the
City
or
the
Prince
without
respect
,
they
faile
of
their
duties
;
and
in
case
they
do
counsell
them
,
they
run
the
hazard
of
their
lives
,
and
of
their
estates
;
all
men
herein
being
so
blind
as
to
judge
advices
good
or
evill
by
the
success
they
take
.
And
devising
with
my self
by
what
means
they
might
escape
this
infamy
or
danger
,
I
see
no
other
way
,
then
that
they
put
things
forward
moderately
,
and
not
take
any
thing
upon
them
as
their
own
enterprise
,
and
give
their
opinion
without
passion
,
and
defend
it
also
modestly
without
passion
,
so
that
if
either
the
City
or
the
Prince
followthat
advice
.
it
may
seem
they
willingly
took
that
course
,
and
were
not
drawn
thereto
by
thy
importunity
.
When
thou
dost
so
,
it
is
not
reasonable
that
a
Prince
or
a
people
should
seek
revenge
on
thee
for
thy
counsell
,
it
being
not
followed
against
other
mens
wills
:
for
here
the
danger
is
,
that
many
having
contradicted
thee
,
in
the
unhappy
success
of
thy
advice
they
will
concur
in
working
thy
ruine
.
And
if
in
this
case
,
one
should
say
,
that
when
he
failes
of
that
glory
which
another
gets
by
being
one
alone
against
many
in
advising
any
course
,
when
it
proves
luckily
,
we
meete
here
with
two
advantages
to
countervail
it
:
the
first
is
to
be
quite
exempt
out
of
all
danger
:
the
second
is
,
if
thou
advisest
any
thing
modestly
,
and
by
reason
of
the
opposition
made
against
it
,
thy
Counsell
be
not
taken
,
and
some
disaster
follow
upon
the
advice
another
hath
given
,
thou
gainest
much
glory
thereby
.
And
however
the
glory
,
which
is
gotten
by
mischiefs
,
befallen
thy
City
or
thy
Prince
,
cannot
well
be
said
to
be
enjoyed
,
yet
is
there
some
account
to
be
made
of
them
.
I
beleeve
there
is
no
other
advice
can
be
given
to
men
in
this
part
;
for
the
perswading
them
to
hold
their
peace
,
and
not
give
their
opinion
,
would
be
a
thing
very
unprotable
to
the
Commonwealth
and
their
Princes
,
&
they
would
hardly
be
able
to
escape
danger
;
for
in
a
small
time
would
they
be
suspected
;
it
might
also
befall
them
,
as
it
did
those
friends
of
Porse
the
King
of
Macedon
,
who
having
been
defeated
by
Paulus
Emilius
,
&
flying
with
a
few
of
his
confidents
,
it
chanc'd
,
that
in
relating
things
past
,
one
of
them
began
to
tell
Perse
of
many
errors
committed
by
him
,
which
were
the
occasion
of
his
ruine
,
to
whom
Perse
turning
said
,
Traitor
,
and
hast
thou
delay'd
to
tell
me
it
,
untill
now
that
I
have
no
remedy
?
and
upon
these
words
slew
him
with
his
own
hand
.
And
thus
he
suffer'd
punishment
for
his
silence
when
he
should
have
spoken
,
and
for
having
spoken
when
he
should
have
held
his
peace
:
neither
avoided
he
the
danger
,
by
not
giving
his
advice
.
Wherefore
I
beleeve
the
rules
above
given
,
are
to
be
kept
and
observ'd
.
CHAP.
XXXVI
.
The
reason
wherefore
the
French
have
been
and
are
thought
in
combats
at
the
beginning
more
then
men
,
and
afterwards
less
then
women
.
THe
fierceness
of
that
Frenchman
who
challeng'd
any
Roman
whatsoever
,
near
the
river
Anien
,
to
fight
with
him
,
and
afterwards
the
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
him
and
T.
Manlius
,
put
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
of
that
which
T.
Livius
sayes
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
〈◊〉
the
Frenchmen
in
the
beginning
of
the
combat
are
more
then
men
,
and
in
the
end
thereof
prove
less
then
women
.
And
weighing
well
from
whence
this
may
proceed
,
many
beleeve
that
naturally
they
are
so
dispos'd
,
which
I
think
is
true
:
but
hence
it
followes
not
that
this
their
naturall
humor
,
which
makes
them
so
fierce
in
the
beginning
,
might
not
be
so
order'd
by
art
,
as
to
continue
them
fierce
till
the
very
conclusion
:
And
for
proof
hereof
,
I
say
,
that
there
are
armies
of
three
sorts
:
the
one
where
there
is
both
fury
and
order
,
for
from
the
order
arises
fury
and
valour
,
as
was
that
of
the
Romans
;
for
it
appears
in
all
their
histories
,
that
there
was
a
very
good
order
in
that
army
,
which
military
discipline
in
tract
of
time
had
brought
in
amongst
them
.
For
in
a
well
train'd
army
,
no
man
is
to
do
any
thing
but
by
rule
and
order
.
And
we
find
hereby
,
that
in
the
Roman
Army
(
from
which
,
insomuch
as
it
conquer'd
the
whole
world
,
all
others
may
take
example
)
they
neither
ate
,
nor
slept
,
nor
bought
,
neither
did
they
any
military
action
nor
domestick
without
the
Consuls
order
:
for
those
armies
which
do
otherwise
,
are
not
right
armies
;
and
if
they
come
to
make
any
trial
of
themselves
in
any
action
,
they
do
it
by
force
of
rage
and
violence
,
and
not
by
valour
:
but
where
valour
is
accompanied
with
due
ordinances
,
it
makes
good
use
of
the
fury
in
such
manner
and
in
such
times
that
no
difficulty
abates
it
,
nor
ever
quailes
the
courage
,
because
those
good
ordinances
reinforce
the
spirit
,
and
the
fury
,
both
being
still
maintained
by
the
hope
of
over
comming
,
which
never
failes
while
the
orders
hold
firme
.
The
contrary
falls
out
in
those
armies
wherein
is
fury
and
not
order
,
as
were
those
of
the
French
,
who
ever
faild
by
little
and
little
For
it
proved
not
,
that
their
first
assault
prevailed
,
and
that
their
fury
whereon
they
much
relied
,
was
not
maintained
by
an
ordinate
valour
,
not
having
any
thing
else
,
besides
that
,
wherein
to
trust
,
as
that
grew
coole
,
so
they
failed
.
On
the
other
side
the
Romans
doubting
less
of
dangers
by
reason
of
their
good
orders
,
not
distrusting
the
victory
,
fought
resolutely
and
obstinately
with
the
same
courage
and
valour
as
well
in
the
end
as
in
the
beginning
,
or
rather
enraged
by
fighting
,
they
grew
still
more
fierce
.
The
third
kind
of
armies
is
,
where
there
is
no
naturall
fury
,
nor
accidentall
order
,
as
the
Italian
armies
are
in
our
daies
,
which
are
quite
unprofitable
:
and
unless
they
incounter
with
an
army
which
upon
some
accident
chances
to
run
away
,
they
shall
never
overcome
:
and
without
alledging
other
examples
,
we
every
day
see
that
they
give
good
proofes
they
have
no
valour
at
all
.
And
because
by
T
Livius
his
testimony
,
every
one
may
understand
,
how
the
good
s●uldiery
ought
to
be
ordered
and
how
the
bad
is
,
I
will
set
down
Papirius
Cursor
his
words
,
having
a
mind
to
punish
Fabius
the
commander
of
the
horse
;
where
he
said
,
Let
neither
GOD
nor
man
be
had
in
any
reverence
,
nor
the
Generals
commands
,
nor
his
auspices
be
regarded
;
let
the
souldiers
pillaging
up
and
down
for
want
of
provision
as
well
in
their
friends
country
as
in
their
foes
,
let
them
casheere
themselves
,
at
their
pleasures
,
for
,
getting
their
oaths
,
let
them
quit
their
Ensignes
,
nor
come
together
at
command
:
let
them
fight
without
the
Generals
leave
by
night
or
by
day
in
place
of
advantage
or
disadvantage
,
caring
neither
for
ranke
nor
order
:
and
let
the
sacred
and
and
solemn
rites
of
warfare
become
like
the
blind
and
obscure
tricks
and
chances
of
robberies
.
By
the
text
here
we
may
easily
see
whether
the
warfare
in
our
daies
,
be
blind
and
casuall
,
or
sacred
and
solemn
,
and
how
much
it
comes
short
of
resembling
that
which
properly
is
termed
a
warfare
,
&
how
it
differs
from
a
furious
and
ordinate
warfare
as
was
that
of
the
Romans
,
or
from
a
furious
only
as
was
that
of
the
French
.
CHAP
,
XXXVII
.
Whether
slight
skirmishes
or
combats
are
necessary
before
a
great
battell
,
and
what
is
to
be
done
to
know
a
new
enemy
,
when
one
should
avoid
those
skirmishes
.
IT
seemes
that
in
humane
actions
(
as
otherwhere
we
have
discoursed
)
besides
other
difficulties
,
found
in
bringing
any
thing
to
its
perfection
,
there
is
alwaies
some
evill
very
nearly
neighbouring
to
the
good
:
Which
so
easily
grows
up
with
that
good
,
that
it
seems
unpossible
,
if
a
man
would
injoy
the
one
,
to
be
quit
of
the
other
.
And
this
wee
see
in
all
the
works
of
man
:
and
therefore
is
that
good
attain'd
with
difficulty
,
unless
by
thy
good
fortune
thou
be
so
assisted
,
that
she
by
her
power
overcome
this
ordinary
and
natural
inconvenient
.
The
Combate
between
Manlius
T●rquatus
and
the
Frenchman
hath
put
me
in
mind
hereof
,
where
T.
Livius
saies
That
combate
so
much
imported
the
event
of
the
war
,
that
the
French
Army
leaving
their
Campe
in
a
fright
,
went
into
the
Tiburtine
Country
,
and
thence
into
Campania
.
For
I
consider
on
the
one
side
,
that
a
good
Commander
ought
wholly
avoid
to
do
any
thing
which
being
but
of
small
moment
,
may
produce
but
evill
effects
in
his
Army
:
for
to
begin
a
skirmish
or
a
combate
wherein
the
whole
forces
are
not
imployed
,
and
yet
the
whole
fertune
is
there
laid
to
stake
,
is
a
thing
savouring
too
much
of
rashness
,
as
I
said
before
,
when
I
condemn'd
the
guarding
of
the
passages
.
On
the
other
side
I
consider
,
that
wise
and
experienced
Commanders
,
when
they
meet
with
a
new
enemy
,
and
that
is
of
reputatson
,
are
forc'd
before
they
come
to
joyne
battell
,
to
cause
their
souldiers
to
make
tryall
of
them
by
light
skirmishes
,
to
the
end
that
beginning
to
know
them
,
and
to
have
to
deale
with
them
,
they
may
be
rid
of
that
terror
which
the
report
and
reputation
of
these
men
have
put
them
in
.
And
this
part
in
a
Generall
is
of
exceeding
great
importance
;
for
there
is
a
kind
of
necessity
in
it
,
which
forceth
thee
thereunte
;
for
thou
wilt
think
that
thou
goest
to
thy
manifest
destruction
,
unless
thou
have
first
by
these
small
experiences
made
thy
soldiers
cast
out
that
terror
,
which
by
means
of
the
enemies
reputation
had
possessed
their
minds
.
Valerius
Corvinus
was
sent
by
the
Romans
with
an
Army
against
the
Samnites
,
who
were
new
enemies
,
and
these
formerly
had
never
proved
the
one
the
others
forces
,
where
T.
Livius
sayes
,
that
Valerius
caused
the
Romans
.
to
make
some
small
skirmishes
with
the
Samnites
,
That
a
new
war
,
and
a
new
enemy
might
not
affright
th●m
.
Notwithstanding
it
is
a
very
great
hazzard
,
that
thy
Souldiers
in
those
skirmishes
remaning
losers
,
their
fear
and
cowardise
grow
not
more
upon
them
,
and
that
effects
contrary
to
thy
purpose
follow
not
thereupon
,
that
is
,
that
thou
fright
them
not
,
whereas
thy
design
was
to
assure
them
.
So
that
this
is
one
of
those
things
,
which
hath
the
evill
so
near
neighbouring
unto
the
good
,
or
rather
they
are
so
neare
joyn'd
together
,
that
it
is
very
easy
to
mistake
the
one
for
the
other
:
Whereupon
I
say
,
that
a
good
Commander
should
be
very
careful
,
that
nothing
arise
,
which
upon
any
accident
may
take
away
the
courage
and
heart
of
his
soldiers
.
That
which
may
be
of
force
to
take
away
their
courage
,
is
to
begin
to
lose
:
and
therefore
a
man
should
be
well
aware
of
these
small
skirmishes
,
and
no
way
suffer
any
of
them
,
unless
with
exceeding
great
advantage
,
and
certain
hope
of
victory
.
Nor
ought
he
undertake
to
guard
any
passages
,
where
he
cannot
bring
his
whole
Army
together
.
Nor
should
he
keep
any
Towns
unless
it
be
those
that
by
losing
of
them
,
his
utter
ruine
followes
thereupon
;
and
those
that
he
guards
,
he
should
take
such
care
both
with
their
defences
and
also
with
his
Army
,
that
whenever
the
enemy
hath
any
design
to
assayle
them
,
he
may
make
use
of
all
his
forces
in
rescue
of
them
:
the
others
he
should
leave
undefended
:
for
whensoever
any
thing
is
lost
,
that
was
before
abandon'd
,
the
Army
being
yet
afoot
,
there
is
neither
the
reputation
of
the
war
lost
,
nor
the
hope
of
conquest
.
But
when
any
thing
is
lost
,
which
thou
hadst
purposed
to
defend
,
and
every
one
beleeve
,
thou
mightst
,
defend
,
there
is
the
dammage
and
loss
,
and
there
thou
hast
in
a
manner
,
as
those
Frenchmen
did
,
by
a
matter
of
small
moment
lost
the
whole
war
.
Philip
of
Macedon
the
Father
of
Perse
,
a
warlick
man
,
and
of
great
esteem
in
his
time
,
being
assavl'd
by
the
Romans
,
forsook
and
laid
wast
much
of
his
Country
,
as
he
,
who
because
he
was
wise
,
thought
it
more
pernicious
to
lose
reputation
by
not
being
able
to
defend
that
which
he
undertook
to
defend
,
then
by
leaving
it
in
prey
to
the
enemy
,
to
lose
it
as
a
thing
neglected
.
The
Romans
when
after
the
defeat
at
Canna
,
their
estate
was
in
great
perplexity
,
refus'd
many
that
were
under
their
protection
,
and
so
also
divers
of
their
own
Subjects
,
charging
them
to
defend
themselves
the
best
they
could
,
which
are
better
courses
far
,
than
to
undertakes
defences
,
and
afterwards
nor
be
able
to
go
through
with
them
;
for
hereby
those
friends
are
lost
,
and
forces
only
in
those
friends
.
But
returning
to
the
small
skirmishes
,
I
say
;
that
yet
if
a
Commander
be
forc'd
by
reason
of
the
newness
of
the
enemy
to
make
any
skirmish
,
he
ought
take
so
much
advantage
in
it
,
that
he
run
no
hazard
to
lose
it
,
nor
do
,
as
Marius
did
,
which
is
the
better
way
.
Who
going
against
the
Cimbrians
,
which
were
an
exceeding
fierce
people
,
and
came
to
make
a
prey
of
Italy
,
and
wheresoever
they
came
,
casting
a
great
terror
,
because
of
their
fierceness
and
multitude
,
and
by
reason
they
had
formerly
vanquish'd
a
Roman
Army
,
Marius
thought
it
necessary
before
he
came
to
joyn
battell
,
to
worke
somewhat
,
which
might
make
his
Souldiers
lay
aside
that
terrour
,
which
the
feare
of
the
enemy
had
put
them
in
;
and
as
a
very
well
advis'd
Commander
,
brought
his
Army
several
times
,
where
the
Cimbrians
with
their
troupes
were
to
pass
:
And
thus
within
the
fortifications
of
his
Campe
he
would
that
his
Souldiers
should
see
them
,
and
accustome
their
eyes
to
the
view
of
that
enemy
,
to
the
end
that
by
seeing
a
disordinate
multitude
loaded
with
baggage
and
unprofitable
armes
,
and
in
part
too
disarm'd
,
they
might
reassure
themselves
,
and
grow
desirous
of
battell
,
which
course
as
it
was
discreetly
practis'd
by
Marius
,
so
likewise
ought
it
be
diligently
imitated
by
others
,
whereby
they
might
not
be
forc'd
to
incurre
those
dangers
which
I
mentioned
before
,
nor
to
do
as
the
Frenchmen
did
:
Who
for
a
matter
of
small
moment
fled
in
a
fright
into
the
Triburtine
Country
,
and
streight
after
into
Compania
.
And
because
wee
have
alledg'd
Valerius
Corvinus
in
this
Treaty
,
in
the
Chapter
following
I
intend
,
by
the
helpe
of
his
words
,
to
shew
what
manner
of
man
a
Commander
should
be
.
CHAP.
XXXVIII
.
What
manner
of
man
that
General
ought
to
be
,
on
whose
abilities
an
Army
may
confidently
relie
.
VAlerius
Corvinus
was
(
as
we
said
formerly
)
abroad
with
an
Army
against
the
Samnites
,
new
enemies
of
the
people
of
Rome
,
whereupon
partly
to
assure
his
own
Souldiers
,
and
partly
to
make
them
know
the
enemy
,
he
caus'd
some
of
his
to
enter
into
certain
light
skirmishes
with
them
,
nor
contented
herewith
,
before
the
day
of
battell
would
needs
speak
to
his
own
souldiers
,
and
shew
with
all
efficacy
,
how
little
esteem
they
were
to
make
of
such
enemies
,
putting
them
in
minde
of
their
own
and
his
valour
also
:
where
it
may
be
noted
by
the
words
that
Livius
brings
him
in
speaking
,
what
manner
of
man
a
Commander
ought
to
be
,
in
whom
an
Army
is
to
have
confidence
:
which
words
are
these
;
And
also
to
consider
,
under
whose
conduct
and
auspices
you
fight
;
whether
he
you
are
to
hearken
unto
,
be
only
a
magnificent
exhorter
,
fierce
in
words
,
but
not
of
prowesse
to
shew
you
any
military
examples
,
or
else
such
a
one
that
knows
how
to
make
use
of
your
armes
to
march
before
your
ensignes
,
and
behave
himself
bravely
in
the
thickest
of
your
troops
.
I
would
have
yon
my
souldiers
to
follow
my
deeds
rather
then
my
words
,
and
not
to
seek
your
discipline
only
from
me
,
but
your
example
,
who
by
this
right
hand
have
gained
three
Consulships
and
the
height
of
honour
.
Which
words
well
consider'd
teach
every
man
how
he
ought
to
proceed
if
he
would
hold
the
dignity
of
a
Commander
;
and
whosoever
shall
otherwise
carry
it
,
shall
find
in
time
that
dignity
(
when
either
by
chance
or
ambition
he
is
raised
thereunto
)
will
rather
take
from
him
,
then
any
way
gain
him
reputation
:
for
titles
honour
not
men
,
but
men
their
titles
.
And
from
the
beginning
of
this
discourse
we
may
consider
,
that
if
great
Commanders
have
us'd
extraordinary
means
to
confirme
the
resolutions
of
an
Army
of
old
soldiers
,
when
they
were
to
encounter
with
unaccustomed
enemies
,
how
much
rather
is
there
pains
to
be
taken
with
an
army
of
fresh-water
soldiers
,
who
never
yet
look'd
the
enemy
in
the
face
for
if
an
unaccustomed
enemy
terrifies
an
army
of
old
soldiers
;
much
more
probable
is
it
that
any
enemy
should
affright
an
army
of
new
soldiers
,
Yet
we
have
many
times
seen
all
these
difficulties
overcome
by
the
exceeding
great
wisdome
of
good
Commanders
,
as
Gracchus
the
Roman
did
and
E●aminondas
the
Theban
,
of
whom
we
have
spoken
otherwhere
,
who
with
their
armies
of
new
souldiers
vanquished
armies
of
Veteranes
,
who
had
been
of
long
experience
.
The
courses
they
took
,
were
for
many
months
to
exercise
them
in
counterfeit
skirmishes
,
and
train
them
up
in
obedience
and
order
,
and
from
thence
they
came
to
imploy
them
with
a
great
deal
of
assurance
in
very
fierce
battells
.
Therefore
ought
no
warlike
man
doubt
,
but
that
he
may
be
able
to
make
good
soldiers
when
he
wants
not
men
:
for
that
Prince
who
hath
many
men
,
and
wants
souldiers
,
should
complain
rather
of
his
own
sloth
and
small
wisdome
,
then
of
the
peoples
cowardise
.
CHAP.
XXXIX
.
That
a
Commander
ought
exactly
know
scituations
.
AMong
other
things
befitting
the
General
of
an
Army
,
is
the
knowledge
of
scituations
and
countries
;
for
without
this
knowledge
in
general
and
in
particular
,
the
Commander
of
an
Army
cannot
well
effectuate
any
thing
.
And
because
all
sciences
,
if
a
man
would
be
exact
in
them
,
require
practice
,
this
is
one
that
askes
exceeding
much
practice
.
And
this
practice
or
(
as
I
may
terme
it
)
particular
knowledge
is
gain'd
rather
by
means
of
hunting
,
then
by
any
other
exercise
.
Wherefore
the
ancient
writers
say
,
that
those
Heroes
,
that
rul'd
the
world
in
their
days
,
were
brought
up
in
the
woods
and
in
frequent
huntings
:
for
the
chace
teacheth
thee
many
things
besides
this
knowledge
,
which
very
much
concernes
the
war
.
And
Xenophon
in
Cyrus
his
life
shewes
,
that
Cyrus
going
to
assaile
the
King
of
Armenia
,
as
he
gave
order
for
the
service
,
he
put
his
souldiers
in
mind
that
this
was
nothing
else
then
one
of
those
chaces
which
they
had
many
times
made
in
his
company
.
And
he
told
those
he
sent
to
lie
in
ambush
upon
the
mountains
,
that
they
were
like
unto
those
that
went
to
pitch
their
toiles
upon
the
hills
,
and
those
that
scowred
the
plain
;
that
they
were
like
those
that
went
to
put
up
the
beast
out
of
his
covert
,
to
the
end
that
being
chased
,
he
fall
into
the
toiles
.
This
is
said
to
shew
that
the
chase
according
as
Xenophon
allowes
of
it
,
hath
a
kinde
of
resemblance
of
war
.
And
therefore
is
such
exercise
very
honorable
and
well
beseeming
great
personages
.
Nor
can
this
knowledge
of
countries
by
any
fitter
means
be
learned
then
by
way
of
hunting
:
for
the
chace
makes
him
that
frequents
it
know
how
in
particular
the
country
lies
where
he
uses
to
hunt
;
and
when
a
man
hath
made
himself
well
acquainted
with
the
scite
,
of
one
country
,
he
afterwards
with
facility
comprehends
that
of
all
other
strange
Countries
:
for
every
Country
and
every
member
of
them
have
some
kind
of
conformity
one
with
another
,
so
that
he
who
knows
the
one
well
,
may
easily
attain
to
the
knowledge
of
the
other
.
But
he
that
hath
never
practised
the
one
,
very
hardly
or
never
,
unless
it
be
by
long
experience
,
can
know
the
other
;
whereas
he
that
is
well
versed
therein
,
at
the
first
cast
of
his
eye
knows
how
that
plane
lies
,
or
that
hill
rises
,
how
far
that
vally
reaches
,
and
all
such
other
like
things
,
whereof
for
the
time
to
come
he
hath
gained
a
settled
knowledge
.
And
that
this
is
true
,
T.
Livius
shewes
us
by
the
example
of
Publius
Decius
,
who
being
Tribune
of
the
souldiers
in
the
Army
which
Cornelius
the
Consull
led
against
the
Samnites
,
when
the
Consull
was
forc'd
to
betake
himself
to
a
vally
,
where
the
Romans
,
army
might
easily
have
been
inclosed
by
the
Samnites
,
this
Decius
perceiving
the
danger
they
were
in
,
said
to
the
Consul
,
Seest
thou
Aulus
Cornelius
that
hill
which
is
above
the
enemy
?
that
is
the
strength
of
our
hope
and
safety
,
if
we
,
because
the
Samnites
being
blinde
have
neglected
it
,
quickly
seise
on
it
.
And
before
these
words
uttered
by
Decius
,
T.
Livius
sayes
,
Publius
Decius
the
souldiers
Tribune
shewed
a
pretty
high
hill
which
lay
a
little
higher
then
the
enemies
campe
,
of
hard
ascent
to
men
incombred
with
compleat
armes
,
but
of
easy
access
to
men
lightly
harnessed
.
Whereupon
being
sent
thither
himself
by
the
Consull
with
3000
souldiers
,
and
having
sav'd
the
Roman
army
,
and
purposing
when
night
came
,
himself
to
depart
,
and
so
to
save
himself
and
his
own
souldiers
,
he
is
brought
in
thus
speaking
,
Follow
me
,
that
yet
while
it
is
day
light
we
may
discover
what
places
the
enemy
guards
and
which
way
we
may
get
out
.
All
these
things
he
went
to
view
clad
in
a
souldiers
cassocke
,
to
the
end
the
enemy
should
take
no
notice
the
Captaine
rounded
them
.
He
therefore
that
well
considers
this
whole
text
,
shall
see
how
profitable
and
necessary
for
a
Commander
it
is
to
understand
the
natural
scituations
of
countries
;
for
if
Decius
had
not
well
known
them
,
he
had
never
been
able
to
judge
what
advantage
it
was
to
the
Roman
army
to
seize
upon
that
hill
;
nor
could
he
have
been
able
to
discerne
at
such
distance
,
whether
thall
hill
were
accessible
or
no.
And
when
he
had
once
gotten
there
upon
it
,
having
a
mind
to
depart
and
return
again
to
the
Consul
,
being
invironed
round
with
enemies
,
he
would
never
have
been
able
so
far
off
to
spy
out
the
passages
to
escape
thence
,
and
discerne
which
places
were
guarded
by
the
enemy
,
so
that
it
must
be
of
necessity
,
that
Decius
had
a
very
exact
knowledge
,
whereby
he
brought
it
to
pass
that
by
the
taking
of
that
hill
,
the
Roman
Army
was
delivered
,
and
afterwards
he
himself
(
being
besieged
)
knew
how
to
find
a
way
of
escape
both
for
himself
and
those
that
were
with
him
.
CHAP.
XL.
How
deceit
is
commendable
,
used
against
the
enemy
in
time
of
war.
HOwever
that
the
use
of
fraud
in
any
action
be
detestable
,
yet
in
the
managing
of
a
war
it
is
a
thing
laudable
and
glorious
,
and
he
is
as
much
praise
,
that
vanquishes
the
enemy
by
deceit
,
as
he
that
overcomes
him
by
force
.
And
this
we
see
,
by
the
judgment
of
those
that
write
the
lives
of
great
personages
,
who
commend
Hannibal
and
others
,
who
have
been
very
notable
in
such
like
ways
of
proceeding
.
Whereof
because
there
are
many
examples
every
where
obvious
,
I
will
not
adde
any
.
I
will
say
this
only
,
that
I
mean
not
,
that
that
fraud
is
glorious
,
which
causes
thee
to
breake
thy
faith
given
,
and
agreements
made
:
for
that
,
though
it
may
sometimes
gain
thee
a
state
or
Kingdom
,
as
formerly
hath
been
said
,
yet
will
it
never
get
thee
any
glory
But
I
speak
of
such
a
deceit
,
which
is
put
in
practise
against
such
an
enemy
that
trusts
not
in
thee
,
and
that
consists
properly
in
matter
of
war
:
as
was
that
of
Hannibal
,
when
at
the
lake
of
Perugia
he
feigned
a
flight
,
whereby
he
might
have
inclos'd
the
Consul
and
the
Roman
Army
;
and
when
to
escape
out
of
Fabius
Maximus
hishand
,
he
tied
flaming
fire-brands
to
the
horns
of
his
whole
heard
of
cattel
.
The
like
unto
which
was
that
,
which
Pontius
the
Samnites
General
practised
to
shut
in
the
Roman
Army
at
the
gallows
of
Caudium
,
where
having
placed
his
army
behind
the
mountains
,
he
sent
many
of
his
soldiers
clad
like
shepherds
with
much
cattel
through
the
plain
,
and
they
being
taken
by
the
Romans
,
and
required
of
where
the
Samnites
army
was
,
agreed
all
,
according
to
the
order
received
from
Ponutis
,
to
say
that
it
was
gone
to
the
siege
of
Nocera
.
Which
thing
the
Consuls
believing
,
gave
them
opportunity
to
shut
them
up
in
those
precipices
of
Caudium
,
wherein
as
soon
as
they
entred
,
they
were
presently
besieg'd
by
the
Samnites
;
and
this
victory
gained
by
fraud
,
would
have
proved
very
glorious
to
Pontius
,
if
he
had
followed
his
fathers
counsel
,
who
advised
either
to
set
the
Romans
freely
at
liberty
,
or
put
them
all
to
the
sword
,
and
in
no
case
take
the
middle
way
,
Which
neither
gaines
friends
,
nor
takes
foes
out
of
the
way
.
Which
middle
way
was
always
pernicious
in
matters
of
state
,
as
other
where
it
hath
formerly
been
said
.
CHAP.
XLI
.
That
the
defence
of
ones
country
ought
to
be
undertaken
,
either
with
ignominy
,
or
with
glory
,
or
whatsoever
way
it
be
done
,
it
is
well
defended
.
THe
Consul
and
the
Romane
Army
,
as
is
above
said
,
were
besieged
by
the
Samnites
,
who
having
propounded
to
the
Romans
exceeding
dishonorable
terms
,
as
was
that
to
make
them
go
under
the
gallows
,
and
send
them
without
Arms
to
Rome
;
and
hereupon
the
Consuls
standing
amazed
,
and
the
whole
army
in
despair
,
Lucius
Lentulus
the
Romanc
Lieutenant
said
,
that
,
as
he
thought
,
no
conditions
were
to
be
refused
to
save
their
country
:
for
the
safety
of
Rome
consisting
in
the
life
of
that
Army
,
he
thought
it
good
to
save
it
in
any
case
:
and
that
the
Country
is
well
defended
,
by
what
means
soever
it
be
,
either
with
disgrace
,
or
with
glory
:
for
that
Army
being
saved
,
Rome
might
in
very
good
time
cancel
all
that
ignominy
;
but
in
case
it
were
not
saved
,
however
it
should
dye
gloriously
.
Rome
and
her
liberty
was
utterly
lost
,
and
so
his
advise
was
followed
.
Which
thing
deserves
well
to
be
noted
by
any
Citizen
that
chances
to
be
called
to
counsel
his
country
:
for
where
the
deliberation
is
wholly
touching
the
safty
of
the
country
,
there
ought
no
consideration
to
be
had
of
just
or
unjust
,
pitiful
or
cruel
,
honorable
or
dishonorable
,
but
rather
all
other
respect
being
laid
aside
,
that
course
is
to
be
taken
which
may
preserve
the
life
and
maintain
the
liberty
thereof
,
which
thing
is
followed
by
the
sayings
and
deeds
of
the
French
,
in
defence
of
the
Majesty
of
their
King
,
and
the
power
of
their
Kingdom
;
for
they
heat
nothing
with
more
impatience
,
then
that
it
should
be
said
Such
a
course
was
dishonorable
to
their
King
;
for
say
they
,
their
King
cannot
suffer
dishonor
in
any
resolution
taken
by
him
,
either
in
prosperous
or
adverse
fortune
:
for
whether
he
wins
or
loses
,
they
commend
the
action
,
and
say
it
was
done
like
a
King
.
CHAP.
XLII
.
Promises
extorted
by
force
,
ought
not
to
be
kept
.
WHen
the
Consuls
were
return'd
to
Rome
with
their
disarm'd
army
,
and
the
disgrace
which
was
put
upon
it
,
the
first
that
spake
in
the
Senate
,
that
the
peace
made
at
Candium
should
not
be
observ'd
,
was
the
Consul
S.
Posthumius
,
saying
that
the
people
of
Rome
was
not
tied
thereunto
,
but
that
he
himself
indeed
was
bound
,
and
the
rest
that
had
promis'd
the
peace
;
and
therefore
the
people
if
they
would
free
themselves
from
all
tyes
,
were
to
yeeld
up
him
and
the
rest
that
had
promis'd
it
with
him
into
the
Samnites
.
hands
:
and
this
conclusion
he
held
with
such
obstinacy
,
that
at
length
the
Senate
was
content
therewith
,
and
so
sending
him
and
the
others
to
Sanmiam
,
protested
to
the
Samnites
,
that
the
peace
was
of
no
force
.
And
in
this
case
so
favourable
was
fortune
to
Pesthumius
,
that
the
Samnites
held
him
not
;
and
when
he
was
returned
to
Rome
among
the
Romans
,
he
was
more
glorious
by
his
loss
,
then
Pentius
was
among
the
Samnites
by
his
conquest
.
Where
two
things
are
to
be
noted
.
The
one
is
,
that
in
what
action
soever
glory
may
be
gotten
;
for
in
victory
it
is
ordinarily
gain'd
,
but
in
loss
,
it
is
obtained
either
by
shewing
that
loss
came
not
by
thy
default
,
or
by
the
atcheivement
of
some
valorous
action
which
may
cancell
it
.
The
others
is
:
that
it
is
no
dishonour
to
violate
those
promises
which
by
force
thou
wert
constrain'd
to
make
;
and
always
premises
extorted
regarding
the
publick
,
when
there
is
want
of
strength
,
shall
be
broken
,
and
that
without
the
disgrace
of
him
that
breaks
them
.
Wherefore
in
all
histories
we
read
several
examples
,
and
every
day
in
these
moderne
times
we
see
many
of
them
;
and
,
not
only
among
Princes
,
promises
forc'd
when
they
want
strength
,
are
not
kept
,
but
also
all
other
promises
are
not
observed
,
when
the
occasions
faile
that
mov'd
them
to
promise
.
Which
if
it
be
a
thing
commendable
or
no
,
or
whether
such
like
ways
are
to
be
followed
by
a
Prince
or
no
,
it
is
at
large
disputed
by
us
in
our
treaty
concerning
a
Prince
,
so
that
for
this
present
we
shall
not
touch
it
.
CHAP.
XLIII
.
Those
men
that
are
bred
in
the
same
country
,
do
throughout
all
ages
keep
very
near
the
same
nature
and
disposition
.
WIse
men
are
wont
to
say
(
and
not
by
chance
nor
without
reason
)
that
he
who
will
see
what
shall
be
,
let
him
consider
what
hath
been
:
for
all
things
in
the
world
at
all
times
have
their
very
incounter
with
the
times
of
old
,
Which
comes
to
pass
,
because
those
things
are
wrought
by
men
,
who
were
always
&
are
subject
to
the
same
passions
;
&
therefore
follows
it
of
necessity
,
that
they
take
the
same
effect
.
It
is
true
,
that
their
actions
sometimes
in
this
province
are
more
vertuous
,
then
those
in
that
,
&
so
sometimes
in
that
more
then
in
this
,
according
to
the
forme
of
their
education
,
wherein
those
people
have
taken
their
manner
of
living
.
It
gives
a
facility
also
in
the
knowledge
of
future
things
by
those
that
are
past
,
to
see
one
Nation
a
long
time
hold
the
same
customes
and
conditions
,
being
either
alwayes
covetous
,
or
always
treacherous
,
or
having
some
other
such
vice
or
vertue
.
And
whosoever
shall
read
the
things
past
belonging
to
our
City
of
Florence
,
and
consider
also
what
hath
happened
in
the
latter
times
,
shall
finde
the
Germans
and
French
very
covetous
,
proud
,
cruel
,
and
unfaithful
:
for
in
all
these
four
,
several
times
have
they
much
wronged
our
City
.
And
touching
their
small
faith
,
every
one
know
monies
were
given
to
King
Charles
the
8.
of
France
,
and
he
promised
to
render
the
Cittadels
of
Pisa
,
and
yet
he
never
did
it
.
Wherein
that
King
manifested
his
small
faith
,
and
muth
avarice
.
But
let
us
pass
over
these
matters
of
late
memory
.
Every
one
may
well
have
heard
of
that
which
followed
in
the
war
that
the
Florentines
had
with
the
Vicounts
of
Milan
:
when
Florence
being
deprived
of
all
other
expedients
,
thought
to
bring
the
Emperor
into
Italy
,
by
his
reputation
and
forces
to
assail
Lombardy
.
The
Emperor
promised
to
bring
a
good
Army
with
him
,
and
undertake
that
war
against
the
Vicounts
,
and
defend
Florence
against
their
whole
power
,
in
case
that
at
his
rising
up
in
arms
the
Florentines
would
pay
him
an
hundred
thousand
ducates
,
and
at
his
arrival
in
Italy
another
hundred
thousand
;
to
which
agreements
the
Florentines
consented
,
and
having
made
the
first
paiment
,
and
afterwards
the
second
,
he
came
onely
to
Verona
,
and
thence
returned
back
again
,
having
not
done
any
thing
in
their
behalf
,
blaming
them
,
as
if
it
were
their
fault
,
for
not
having
observed
the
conditions
between
them
.
So
that
if
Florence
had
not
been
either
constrained
by
necessity
,
or
overcome
by
passion
,
and
had
read
and
known
the
ancient
customes
of
the
Barbarians
,
she
would
never
have
been
neither
this
time
,
nor
many
other
times
deceived
by
them
,
they
having
behaved
themselves
always
after
one
manner
,
and
in
every
part
,
and
with
every
one
used
the
same
terms
,
as
it
appears
they
formerly
did
to
the
Tuscans
,
who
being
oppressed
by
the
Romans
,
by
reason
they
had
been
several
times
put
in
flight
by
them
and
routed
,
and
seeing
that
by
their
own
forces
alone
they
were
not
able
to
make
resistance
,
they
agreed
with
the
French
,
who
dwelt
on
this
side
the
Alps
in
Italy
,
to
give
them
a
sum
of
mony
,
to
oblige
them
to
joyn
their
Armies
with
them
,
whereby
to
make
head
against
the
Romans
.
Whereupon
it
followed
,
that
they
having
taken
the
monies
,
would
not
afterwards
take
arms
for
them
,
saying
these
they
had
received
,
not
to
make
war
upon
their
enemies
,
but
that
they
should
forbear
to
forrage
the
country
of
Tuscany
.
And
thus
the
Tuscans
through
the
covetousness
and
small
truth
of
the
French
,
were
bereft
of
their
monies
and
left
without
the
succors
they
expected
from
them
.
Insomuch
as
we
see
by
this
example
of
the
ancient
Tuscans
,
and
that
of
the
Florentines
,
that
the
French
have
continually
used
the
same
terms
:
and
hereby
may
it
easily
be
conjectured
,
what
trust
Princes
can
repose
in
them
.
CHAP.
XLIV
.
By
sudden
;
surprisall
and
boldness
many
times
more
is
obtained
,
then
by
ordinary
means
can
be
gotten
.
THe
Samnites
being
invaded
by
the
Romans
,
and
their
army
unable
to
stand
in
the
field
against
them
,
determin'd
having
left
their
Towns
well
guarded
in
Samnium
,
to
pass
with
their
whole
Army
into
Tuscany
,
which
then
had
made
truce
with
the
Romans
,
to
try
with
that
passage
,
if
by
the
presence
of
their
Army
they
could
induce
the
Tuscans
to
take
armes
again
:
which
they
had
denied
to
their
Ambassadors
;
and
in
the
parly
the
Samnites
had
with
the
Tuscans
(
shewing
what
principally
moved
them
to
take
armes
)
they
used
a
notable
terme
,
where
they
said
,
They
had
rebelled
,
because
peace
was
more
grievous
to
these
in
subjection
,
then
was
war
to
them
that
enjoy
their
liberty
.
And
so
partly
by
perswasions
,
partly
by
the
presence
of
their
army
,
they
wrought
them
to
take
armes
.
Where
it
is
to
be
noted
,
that
when
any
Prince
desires
to
obtain
any
thing
of
another
,
he
ought
(
if
the
occasion
will
bear
it
)
never
give
him
time
to
advise
himself
,
but
carry
the
matter
so
,
that
he
may
see
the
necessity
of
his
sudden
resolution
,
which
is
,
when
he
that
is
required
,
perceives
that
by
his
deniall
,
or
delay
,
there
may
arise
a
sudden
and
dangerous
distaste
.
These
termes
were
seen
to
have
been
well
used
by
Pope
Julius
with
the
French
,
and
by
De
Fois
the
French
Kings
General
with
the
Marquess
of
Mantua
:
for
Pope
Julius
having
a
mind
to
expell
the
Bentivolij
out
of
Bolonia
;
and
to
this
purpose
thinking
he
had
need
of
the
French
forces
,
and
that
the
Venetians
should
stand
Newtralls
;
and
having
sollicited
the
one
and
the
other
to
this
intent
,
but
receiv'd
from
them
a
doubtful
and
various
answer
,
resolv'd
by
not
giving
them
leisure
to
bring
them
both
to
his
bent
.
Whereupon
parting
from
Rome
with
those
forces
he
could
put
together
,
he
went
thence
towards
Bolonia
,
and
to
the
Venetians
he
sent
that
they
should
continue
Newters
,
and
to
the
King
that
he
should
send
him
forces
;
so
that
they
all
being
restrain'd
by
the
small
time
they
had
,
and
considering
that
the
Pope
might
with
reason
take
an
open
distast
at
either
their
delay
or
refusal
,
gave
way
to
his
will
,
and
the
King
sent
him
aid
,
and
the
Venetians
remain'd
newters
.
De
Fois
also
being
with
his
Army
in
Bolonia
,
and
having
had
notice
of
the
rebellion
of
Bressia
,
and
being
desirous
to
go
to
recover
it
,
had
two
ways
,
the
one
through
the
Kings
own
dominions
long
and
tedious
,
the
other
short
through
the
dominion
of
Mantua
;
and
not
only
was
he
necessitated
to
pass
through
the
dominions
of
that
Marquess
,
but
of
force
was
to
pass
by
certain
sluces
between
marish
grounds
and
lakes
,
whereof
that
country
is
full
,
which
with
fortresses
&
other
means
were
shut
up
,
and
guarded
by
him
:
whereupon
De
Fois
having
resolv'd
to
take
the
shorter
passage
,
to
overcome
all
difficulties
,
&
give
no
time
to
the
Marquess
to
deliberate
,
at
the
same
instant
brought
his
souldiers
on
that
way
,
and
signified
to
the
Marquess
that
he
should
send
him
the
keys
of
the
passage
.
So
that
the
Marquess
surprised
by
this
sudden
resolution
,
sent
him
the
keys
,
which
he
would
never
have
done
,
if
De
Fois
had
carried
himself
more
cooly
in
the
matter
,
that
Marquess
being
in
league
with
the
Pope
and
the
Venetians
,
and
having
a
son
of
his
in
the
Popes
hands
,
which
things
gave
him
many
fair
colours
to
deny
him
.
But
being
assailed
by
the
sudden
course
taken
(
upon
the
reasons
already
alledged
)
yeelded
.
So
did
the
Tuscans
with
the
Samnites
,
having
upon
the
presence
of
that
Army
of
Samnium
taken
arms
,
which
they
had
otherwise
denyed
them
.
CHAP.
XLV
.
VVhich
course
is
the
better
in
a
battel
,
either
at
the
first
to
sustain
onely
the
enemies
shock
,
and
reserve
some
forces
till
the
latter
end
to
give
them
a
blow
withall
,
or
else
as
upon
the
main
to
venture
all
upon
the
fury
of
the
first
onset
.
DEcius
and
Fabius
the
Roman
Consuls
were
in
the
field
with
two
armies
against
the
Samnites
and
Tuscans
,
and
coming
to
the
skirmish
and
to
joyn
battel
together
,
it
is
worth
the
noting
in
that
service
,
which
of
those
ways
of
proceeding
,
practised
by
those
two
Consuls
,
were
the
better
:
for
D●●ius
with
all
his
force
and
violence
assailed
the
enemy
;
Fabius
only
held
them
up
,
judging
the
slow
assault
to
be
of
more
advantage
,
reserving
his
blow
till
the
last
,
when
the
enemy
should
have
lost
his
first
heat
of
fight
,
or
rage
(
as
some
terme
it
)
where
we
see
by
the
success
that
follow'd
,
that
Fabius
his
design
took
effect
better
then
that
of
Decius
,
who
tir'd
himself
so
in
the
first
onset
,
that
seeing
his
souldiers
ready
to
turne
their
faces
,
to
attain
to
that
glory
by
death
which
by
victory
he
could
not
,
in
imitation
of
his
father
,
he
sacrific'd
himself
for
the
Roman
Legions
.
Which
thing
when
Fabius
understood
,
that
he
might
gain
no
less
glory
by
living
,
then
his
Collegue
had
gotten
by
dying
,
put
forward
all
these
forces
,
which
he
had
reserv'd
for
the
last
pinch
,
whereby
he
carried
away
a
very
happy
victory
.
From
hence
is
it
evident
,
that
Fabius
his
manner
of
proceeding
is
the
more
secure
and
warrantable
.
CHAP.
XLVI
.
Whence
proceedes
it
,
that
one
family
in
a
City
holds
a
long
time
the
same
manners
and
disposition
.
IT
seems
that
not
only
one
City
hath
certain
wayes
and
orders
different
from
those
of
another
City
,
and
breeds
men
either
more
hardy
or
more
effeminate
,
but
in
the
same
City
we
see
the
same
difference
among
families
:
which
we
find
to
be
true
in
every
City
:
and
in
Rome
we
reade
of
many
examples
to
this
purpose
:
for
we
see
the
Manlij
were
hard
and
obstinate
men
,
the
Publicoli
courteous
and
lovers
of
the
people
,
the
Appij
ambitious
and
enemies
of
the
commonalty
,
and
so
many
other
families
,
have
had
their
qualities
differing
one
much
from
the
other
.
Which
thing
cannot
proceede
from
the
blood
only
,
for
that
must
needs
alter
by
reason
of
the
variety
of
marriages
;
but
it
must
come
from
the
education
,
which
one
family
hath
diverse
from
another
.
For
it
avails
much
,
that
a
youth
from
his
tender
years
begins
to
relish
well
or
ill
any
one
thing
:
for
of
necessity
it
must
make
an
impression
,
and
thereupon
give
a
rule
to
his
manner
of
proceeding
all
the
dayes
of
his
life
:
and
were
not
this
so
,
it
would
be
impossible
that
all
the
Appij
should
have
had
the
same
will
,
and
been
led
by
the
same
passions
,
as
T.
Livius
rema●kes
in
many
of
them
:
and
for
the
last
,
one
of
them
being
made
Censor
,
and
his
Collegue
at
the
end
of
eighteen
moneths
having
(
as
the
law
order'd
it
)
depos'd
his
magistracy
,
Appius
would
not
depose
his
,
saying
that
he
might
hold
his
yet
five
years
,
according
to
the
first
law
ordain'd
by
the
Censors
.
And
however
hereupon
many
speeches
were
made
,
and
many
tumults
were
caus'd
;
yet
was
there
no
helpe
to
make
him
lay
it
down
,
maugre
the
people
and
the
greater
part
of
the
Senate
.
And
whosoever
reads
the
oration
he
made
against
P.
Sempronious
Tribune
of
the
people
,
shall
note
upon
that
occasion
all
the
Appian
insolences
,
and
the
goodness
and
humanity
used
by
many
other
Citizens
in
obedience
of
the
laws
and
in
their
love
to
their
Country
.
CHAP.
XLVII
.
That
a
good
Citizen
for
the
love
of
his
country
ought
to
forget
all
private
wrongs
.
MAnlius
the
Consul
was
imployed
with
an
Army
against
the
Samnites
,
and
he
having
been
wounded
in
a
battell
,
and
the
Army
therefore
running
some
hazard
,
the
Senate
judg'd
it
necessary
to
send
Papirius
Cursor
thither
for
Dictator
,
to
supply
the
want
of
the
Consul
;
and
there
being
a
necessity
that
the
Dictator
should
be
nam'd
by
Fabius
who
was
then
in
Tuscany
with
an
Army
,
and
doubting
that
because
he
was
his
enemy
,
he
would
not
name
him
,
the
Senators
sent
him
two
Ambassadours
to
intreate
him
,
that
laying
aside
all
private
differences
for
the
publick
goods
sake
he
would
name
him
.
Which
Fabius
did
,
moved
by
the
love
he
bore
his
Country
;
howbeit
by
his
silence
,
and
many
other
signes
,
he
shewed
that
nomination
pressed
him
,
much
.
Whereof
all
those
,
that
would
be
thought
good
Citizens
,
ought
take
example
.
CHAP.
XLVIII
.
When
we
se
the
enemy
commit
a
great
errour
,
we
ought
to
beleeve
there
is
some
treachery
in
the
business
.
FVlvius
remaining
Lieftenant
in
the
Army
which
the
Romans
had
in
Tuscany
,
for
that
the
Consul
was
gone
to
Rome
by
reason
of
some
ceremonies
there
,
the
Tuscans
to
see
if
they
could
draw
this
man
forth
,
laid
an
ambuscado
near
the
Romans
campe
,
and
sent
some
soldiers
clad
like
shepherds
with
good
store
of
cattel
,
and
caused
them
to
come
insight
of
the
Roman
army
,
who
so
disguised
came
near
their
very
trenches
,
whereupon
the
Lieftenant
marvelling
at
this
their
presumption
,
not
thinking
it
a
thing
reasonable
,
found
such
an
expedient
as
discovered
the
deceit
,
and
so
the
Tuscans
,
plot
was
spoiled
.
Here
it
may
firly
be
noted
,
that
the
commander
of
an
army
ought
not
to
give
much
credit
to
an
errour
,
which
he
plainly
sees
the
enemy
run
into
:
for
there
will
alwaies
be
some
treachery
lurking
,
it
being
not
a
thir
〈◊〉
reasonable
that
men
should
be
so
unwary
.
But
oftentimes
the
desire
of
victory
so
blinds
mens
eyes
,
that
they
can
se
nothing
else
,
but
what
they
think
makes
all
for
their
advantage
.
The
Frenchmen
having
overcome
the
Romans
at
Alia
,
and
comming
to
Rome
,
and
finding
the
gates
open
,
and
without
guard
,
stayed
all
that
day
,
and
the
next
night
,
without
entring
in
,
fearing
some
treachery
,
and
not
possibly
beleeving
,
there
could
be
such
cowardise
and
so
small
understanding
in
the
Romans
,
as
utterly
to
abandon
their
Country
.
When
in
the
year
1508
the
Florentines
besieged
Pisa
,
Alphonso
del
Mutola
,
a
Citizen
of
Pisa
,
was
then
the
Florentines
prisoner
,
and
promised
if
he
were
set
free
that
he
would
open
a
gate
of
Pisa
to
the
Florentine
army
,
whereupon
he
had
his
liberty
;
afterwards
as
if
it
had
been
to
put
the
matter
in
execution
,
he
came
many
times
to
treate
with
the
commissaries
Deputies
,
but
came
not
privately
nor
by
stealth
,
but
openly
and
accompanied
by
some
Pisans
,
who
stood
aside
,
while
he
talked
with
the
Florentines
:
so
that
a
man
might
well
have
guest
at
his
double
heart
:
for
there
was
no
probability
,
that
if
the
end
of
this
practice
had
been
faithfuly
intended
,
as
it
was
promis'd
,
it
should
ever
have
been
so
openly
treated
.
But
the
desire
the
Florentines
had
to
be
masters
of
Pisa
,
did
so
blind
them
,
that
by
his
order
comming
to
the
gate
of
Lucca
,
they
left
there
divers
of
their
Captains
and
many
others
,
to
their
great
dishonour
,
by
meanes
of
the
said
Alphonsoes
double
dealing
with
them
.
CHAP.
XLIX
.
A
Republick
,
if
one
would
preserve
it
free
,
hath
every
day
need
of
provision
of
new
orders
,
and
in
regard
of
his
good
deserts
that
way
Fabius
was
term'd
Maximus
.
THere
is
a
necessity
(
as
it
hath
been
said
●other
where
)
that
every
day
in
a
vast
City
such
accidents
,
happen
as
have
need
of
the
Physitian
:
and
according
as
they
are
of
more
consequence
,
so
have
they
need
of
the
wiser
Physician
.
And
if
in
any
City
the
like
:
accidents
ever
happen'd
,
it
was
in
Rome
,
where
there
fell
out
both
strange
and
unexpected
,
as
was
that
,
when
it
seemed
,
that
all
the
Roman
dames
had
conspir'd
to
kill
their
husbands
:
so
many
were
there
that
had
poisoned
their
husbands
,
and
so
many
that
had
prepared
the
poyson
to
give
their
husbands
.
Such
like
also
was
that
conspiracy
of
the
Baccanalls
,
which
was
discovered
in
the
time
of
the
Macedonian
wars
,
wherein
were
intangled
many
thousands
of
men
and
women
:
and
had
it
not
been
revealed
,
it
would
have
proved
very
dangerous
for
that
City
,
or
else
if
the
Romans
had
not
been
accustomed
to
chastise
a
whole
multitude
of
offenders
:
for
were
there
not
other
exceeding
many
evident
tokens
to
shew
forth
the
greatness
and
magnificence
of
that
Republick
and
power
of
her
executions
,
yet
would
it
sufficiently
appear
by
the
quality
of
the
punishment
she
imposed
on
the
offenders
.
She
never
stood
upon
it
,
to
put
to
death
by
way
of
justice
a
whole
legion
at
once
,
and
a
whole
City
,
and
to
confine
eight
or
ten
thousand
men
,
with
extraordinary
hard
conditions
,
had
it
been
to
one
man
alone
,
much
more
to
so
many
.
As
it
befell
those
souldiers
,
who
had
fought
unfortunately
at
Canna
,
whom
she
confined
to
Sicily
,
and
layd
this
on
them
,
that
they
should
never
lodge
in
any
Townes
,
andshould
always
eate
standing
.
But
of
all
the
other
execution
,
the
most
terrible
was
that
decimation
of
armies
,
where
by
lot
throughout
a
whole
army
one
of
ten
was
put
to
death
.
Nor
could
there
,
to
chastise
a
whole
multitude
,
a
more
horrible
punishment
be
found
:
for
when
a
multitude
offends
,
where
the
author
is
not
certain
,
all
cannot
suffer
,
because
they
are
too
many
:
and
to
punish
one
part
,
and
let
the
other
go
scotfree
,
were
to
wrong
those
they
should
punish
,
and
those
that
escaped
free
would
be
encouraged
to
offend
another
time
.
But
to
put
to
death
the
tenth
part
by
lot
,
when
all
deserve
it
,
he
that
suffers
,
blames
his
evill
fortune
:
and
he
that
escapes
,
is
afraid
least
that
another
time
the
lot
may
fall
on
him
,
and
so
is
wary
not
to
offend
.
Those
empoisoners
then
&
Baccanalls
were
punished
as
their
offences
deserved
:
And
however
these
diseases
in
a
republick
produce
evill
effects
,
yet
are
they
not
deadly
:
for
that
almost
alwayes
there
is
time
given
to
correct
them
;
but
there
is
hardly
any
leasure
in
those
that
regard
the
state
,
which
unless
they
fall
under
the
hand
of
some
wise
man
,
ruine
the
City
.
There
was
in
Rome
,
by
reason
of
the
liberality
the
Romans
used
in
bestowing
the
Burgeouship
&
freedom
of
their
City
upon
strangers
,
so
many
new
people
borne
,
that
they
began
to
have
such
a
part
in
the
suffnages
,
that
the
government
began
to
vary
,
and
parted
with
those
things
and
from
those
men
,
by
whom
it
was
accustomed
to
walke
.
Which
Q.
Fabius
,
who
was
then
Censor
,
perceiving
,
the
placed
all
these
new
people
upon
whom
this
disorder
depended
,
under
four
Tribes
,
to
the
end
that
being
reduced
into
so
small
spaces
they
might
not
corrupt
the
whole
City
of
Rome
.
This
thing
was
well
understood
by
Fabius
,
and
by
him
was
there
a
convenient
remedy
applied
without
much
change
:
which
was
so
well
accepted
by
the
City
,
that
they
always
after
gave
him
the
title
of
Maximus
.
Nicolas
Machiavel
to
Zanobius
Buondelmontius
and
Cosimus
Rucelayus
health
.
I
Send
you
a
present
,
which
if
it
answers
not
my
obligations
to
you
,
yet
certainly
is
it
the
greatest
that
Nicolas
Machiavel
could
commend
unto
you
:
for
herein
I
have
expressed
what
I
know
,
and
what
I
have
learned
by
a
long
experience
,
and
continnal
reading
of
the
affairs
of
the
world
.
And
being
that
neither
you
nor
any
body
else
can
look
for
more
of
me
,
you
have
no
reason
to
complain
,
I
have
given
you
no
more
.
Well
may
you
be
sorry
at
the
feebleness
of
my
understanding
,
being
that
these
relations
of
mine
here
are
but
weake
,
and
at
the
errour
of
my
judgment
,
being
that
I
my self
several
times
in
my
discourses
am
deceived
.
Which
being
so
,
I
know
not
which
of
us
is
the
less
beholding
the
one
to
the
other
,
either
I
to
you
,
who
have
forced
me
to
wri●e
that
which
of
my
own
self
I
should
never
have
undertaken
:
or
you
to
me
,
who
have
given
you
but
smal
satisfaction
in
my
writings
.
Receive
this
then
so
,
as
things
should
be
taken
by
friends
,
where
more
regard
is
had
to
the
good
will
of
him
that
sends
,
then
to
the
worth
of
what
is
sent
.
And
beleeve
that
herein
I
have
one
alone
satisfaction
,
when
I
think
that
,
however
perchance
I
may
have
erred
in
many
circumstances
herein
,
in
this
alone
I
know
I
have
not
fail'd
in
making
choise
of
you
to
whom
before
all
others
I
may
dedicate
these
my
discourses
,
partly
because
in
thus
doing
I
have
shewed
some
thankfulness
for
the
good
turnes
you
have
done
me
,
and
partly
for
that
me
thinks
I
have
quit
the
common
custome
of
those
that
write
,
who
use
alwayes
to
dedieate
all
their
works
to
Princes
;
and
blinded
by
ambition
,
and
covetousness
,
attribute
to
him
the
commendations
of
all
vertuous
qualities
,
whereas
they
ought
to
blame
him
for
what
is
faulty
in
him
.
Whereupon
,
that
's
I
may
not
run
into
this
error
,
I
have
made
choice
,
not
of
those
that
are
Princes
,
but
of
those
that
for
their
many
good
parts
might
deserve
well
to
be
so
:
nor
of
those
that
are
able
to
bestow
preferments
,
honours
,
nor
wealth
upon
me
,
but
of
those
who
though
they
are
not
powerfull
,
yet
are
they
willing
to
do
well
for
me
:
for
men
,
if
they
would
carry
a
right
judgment
,
should
esteem
of
those
that
in
themselves
are
,
and
not
of
those
that
have
the
means
to
be
liberall
;
and
so
of
those
that
understand
how
to
governe
,
and
not
of
those
that
without
understanding
have
the
government
of
a
kingdom
.
And
writers
commend
rather
Hieron
of
Siracusa
when
he
was
a
private
man
,
then
Perse
of
Macedon
,
when
he
was
a
King
:
For
Hieron
wanted
nothing
else
of
being
a
Prince
,
then
a
Principality
:
that
other
had
no
part
of
a
King
but
a
Kingdome
.
Enjoy
therefore
that
good
or
that
evill
which
you
your selves
have
desired
:
and
if
you
shall
continue
still
in
this
error
,
that
these
my
opinions
be
acceptable
to
you
,
I
shall
not
faile
to
proceed
in
the
rest
of
the
story
,
as
in
the
beginning
I
made
my
promise
.
FINIS
.