BOOK
I.
Of
the
Errors
of
the
Senses
.
CHAP.
I.
I.
Of
the
Nature
and
Properties
of
the
UNDERSTANDING
.
II.
Of
the
Nature
and
Properties
of
the
WILL
,
and
wherein
its
Liberty
consists
.
ERROR
is
the
Cause
of
Man's
Misery
,
the
corrupt
Principle
that
has
produc'd
Evil
in
the
World
;
't
is
this
,
which
begets
and
cherishes
in
our
Souls
all
the
Evils
that
afflict
us
,
and
we
can
never
expect
a
true
and
solid
Happiness
,
but
by
a
serious
Endeavour
to
avoid
it
.
Holy
Scripture
teaches
us
,
that
Men
are
miserable
,
only
because
they
are
Sinners
and
Criminals
,
and
they
would
be
neither
,
if
they
did
not
make
themselves
the
Slaves
of
Sin
by
assenting
to
Error
.
If
it
be
true
then
,
that
Error
is
the
Origin
of
Men's
Misery
,
how
very
just
is
it
,
that
they
should
endeavour
their
Deliverance
from
it
?
and
certainly
an
Effort
towards
it
would
not
be
vain
and
unrewarded
,
though
perhaps
it
might
not
have
all
the
effect
that
could
be
desired
;
admit
we
could
not
arrive
at
Infallibility
,
and
accomplish
an
absolute
Victory
,
yet
we
should
be
less
deceiv'd
,
and
subject
to
fewer
Evils
;
We
are
not
to
expect
an
entire
Felicity
in
this
Life
,
because
we
cannot
pretend
to
Infallibility
;
but
our
Endeavours
to
avoid
Error
must
be
as
continual
as
are
our
Aversions
for
Misery
.
In
a
word
,
as
we
earnestly
desire
Happiness
without
Hopes
of
attaining
it
here
,
so
we
must
vigorously
pursue
Infallibility
without
any
present
Pretensions
to
it
.
We
ought
not
to
imagine
any
great
Toyl
in
an
Enquiry
after
Truth
,
't
is
but
opening
our
Eyes
,
becoming
attentive
,
and
exactly
observing
the
[
](A51655-e15960-b)*
*
Book
VI.
following
Rules
.
Exactness
of
Thought
has
not
that
Trouble
and
Slavery
in
it
,
that
the
Imagination
represents
;
Nay
,
though
we
should
meet
some
little
Uneasiness
at
first
,
yet
the
attending
Satisfaction
will
abundantly
recompence
our
Pains
;
for
,
in
fine
,
't
is
that
which
produces
Light
,
and
discovers
Truth
.
But
to
spend
no
more
time
in
preparing
the
Reader
's
mind
to
a
Search
after
Truth
,
which
we
are
willing
to
believe
is
already
sufficiently
dispos'd
thereto
,
let
us
examine
the
Causes
and
Nature
of
our
Errors
;
And
since
the
Method
of
examining
things
in
their
Original
is
more
regular
and
clear
,
and
helps
us
to
a
deeper
Knowledge
of
them
than
any
other
Process
,
let
us
Essay
to
put
it
in
practice
here
.
The
Mind
of
Man
having
nothing
of
Matter
or
Extension
in
it
,
I.
Of
the
Nature
and
Properties
of
the
Understanding
.
is
,
undoubtedly
,
a
simple
and
indivisible
Substance
,
and
without
any
Composition
of
parts
,
yet
it
has
been
usual
to
make
a
distinction
of
two
Faculties
in
it
,
Vnderstanding
and
Will
,
(
which
we
shall
soon
explain
)
for
it
seems
the
Notions
or
Idea's
that
Men
have
of
them
,
are
not
so
clear
and
distinct
,
as
they
ought
to
be
.
But
because
these
Idea's
are
very
abstract
,
and
not
the
proper
Objects
of
the
Imagination
,
perhaps
it
will
not
be
amiss
to
express
them
by
their
Relation
to
those
Properties
,
which
are
agreeable
to
Matter
,
which
being
easie
to
be
imagin'd
,
will
render
the
Notions
,
which
't
is
fit
to
apply
to
these
Expressions
,
Vnderstanding
and
Will
,
more
distinct
and
familiar
to
us
;
We
must
only
take
heed
to
remember
,
that
these
Relations
betwixt
Mind
and
Matter
are
not
truly
adequate
,
and
that
the
Comparison
of
these
different
kinds
of
Beings
serve
only
to
make
the
Mind
more
attentive
,
and
,
as
it
were
,
sensible
of
the
Subject
we
Discourse
upon
.
Matter
or
Extension
includes
in
it
two
Properties
,
Receptibility
of
different
Figures
,
and
Capability
of
Motion
;
even
so
the
Mind
of
Man
has
two
Faculties
,
Vnderstanding
,
which
is
receptible
of
different
Idea's
,
and
Will
,
which
is
capable
of
different
Inclinations
,
or
of
willing
different
things
.
We
shall
explain
in
order
the
Relation
that
the
first
Property
of
Matter
has
to
the
first
Faculty
of
the
Mind
.
Extension
is
capable
of
receiving
two
sorts
of
Figures
,
External
,
as
Roundness
in
a
piece
of
Wax
,
Internal
,
as
that
which
is
proper
to
all
the
Particles
whereof
the
Wax
is
compos'd
;
for
't
is
certain
,
that
all
the
Particles
which
make
up
a
piece
of
Wax
,
are
very
different
in
Shape
from
those
which
compose
a
piece
of
Iron
;
I
call
then
,
for
distinction
sake
,
that
simply
a
Figure
,
which
is
External
,
and
that
Configuration
,
which
is
Internal
,
and
which
is
necessary
to
all
the
Particles
whereof
the
Wax
is
compos'd
,
so
as
to
be
what
it
is
.
Thus
also
the
Idea's
of
the
Soul
are
of
two
Sorts
,
(
taking
the
name
Idea
in
general
for
every
thing
that
the
Mind
immediately
perceives
)
the
first
represents
something
without
us
,
as
that
of
a
Square
,
a
House
,
&c.
the
second
,
that
which
passes
within
us
,
as
Sensation
,
whether
of
Grief
,
Pleasure
,
&c.
And
we
shall
see
hereafter
,
that
these
last
Idea's
are
nothing
else
but
a
Manner
of
the
Mind's
Existence
,
and
therefore
I
shall
call
them
the
Modifications
of
the
Mind
.
We
might
also
call
the
Inclinations
of
the
Soul
the
Modifications
thereof
;
For
't
is
evident
,
that
the
Inclination
of
the
Will
is
a
Manner
of
the
Souls
Existence
,
and
therefore
it
might
be
call'd
the
Modification
of
Soul
,
as
motion
in
Bodies
,
being
a
Manner
of
their
Existence
,
might
be
call'd
a
Modification
of
Matter
.
However
I
neither
call
the
Inclinations
of
the
Will
,
nor
Motions
of
Matter
,
Modifications
;
since
these
Inclinations
and
these
Motions
have
,
ordinarily
,
relation
to
something
External
;
for
the
Inclinations
have
relation
to
Good
,
and
Motions
have
relation
to
some
External
Body
.
But
the
Figures
and
Configurations
of
Bodies
,
and
the
Sensations
of
the
Soul
,
have
no
necessary
relation
to
any
thing
without
;
For
even
as
a
Figure
is
round
,
when
all
the
External
parts
of
a
Body
are
equally
distant
from
the
Center
without
any
relation
to
things
External
,
so
all
the
Sensations
,
of
which
we
are
capable
,
could
subsist
,
if
there
were
no
Object
without
us
,
their
Existence
includes
no
necessary
relation
to
Bodies
which
seem
to
cause
them
,
as
shall
be
proved
elsewhere
;
and
they
are
nothing
else
but
the
Soul
modified
after
such
or
such
a
manner
,
so
that
they
are
properly
the
Modifications
of
the
Soul
;
I
shall
then
take
the
Liberty
to
call
them
so
,
to
explain
my self
.
The
first
and
principal
agreement
betwixt
that
Property
,
that
matter
has
of
reserving
different
Figures
and
different
Configurations
,
and
that
Faculty
which
the
Soul
has
of
receiving
different
Idea's
,
and
different
Modifications
,
is
this
,
even
as
the
Property
of
receiving
different
Figures
and
different
Configurations
is
entirely
passive
and
includes
no
action
,
so
also
the
Faculty
of
receiving
different
Idea's
and
different
Modifications
in
the
Mind
is
entirely
passive
and
includes
no
action
:
I
call
this
Faculty
or
Capacity
,
which
the
Soul
has
of
receiving
all
things
,
VNDERSTANDING
.
Whence
we
must
conclude
,
that
't
is
the
Vnderstanding
which
perceives
,
since
there
is
nothing
else
that
receives
the
Idea's
of
Objects
,
for
't
is
the
same
thing
for
the
Soul
to
perceive
an
Object
,
as
to
receive
the
Idea
which
represents
it
.
'T
is
also
the
Understanding
which
perceives
the
Modifications
of
the
Soul
;
for
I
mean
by
the
word
,
Vnderstanding
,
that
passive
Faculty
of
the
Soul
,
by
which
it
receives
all
the
different
Modifications
whereof
it
is
capable
;
For
't
is
the
same
thing
to
the
Soul
to
receive
that
manner
of
Existence
,
which
is
call'd
Pain
,
as
to
perceive
Pain
;
since
it
can
receive
Pain
no
other
way
but
by
perceiving
it
;
whence
we
must
conclude
,
that
't
is
the
Understanding
which
imagines
absent
Objects
,
and
perceives
those
that
are
present
,
and
that
the
Sense
and
Imagination
are
only
the
Understanding
,
perceiving
Objects
by
the
Organs
of
the
Body
,
as
shall
be
explain'd
hereafter
.
Because
,
when
Men
feel
Pain
,
or
any
thing
else
,
they
perceive
it
ordinarily
,
by
the
means
of
the
Organs
of
Sense
,
they
commonly
say
,
that
't
is
the
Senses
which
perceive
it
,
without
knowing
distinctly
what
they
mean
by
the
Term
Sense
;
they
fancy
there
's
some
Faculty
,
distinct
from
the
Soul
,
which
makes
it
,
of
the
Body
capable
of
feeling
,
for
they
believe
the
Organs
of
Sense
do
really
participate
of
our
perceptions
.
They
imagine
,
that
the
Body
does
so
far
assist
the
Mind
to
perceive
,
that
if
the
Mind
was
separated
from
the
Body
it
could
perceive
nothing
at
all
:
But
these
thoughts
are
the
effects
of
Prejudice
,
and
of
judging
according
to
our
present
State
of
Life
,
in
which
we
perceive
nothing
without
the
Help
of
the
Organs
of
Sense
,
as
shall
be
explain'd
more
at
large
.
'T
is
to
accommodate
my self
to
the
common
way
of
speaking
,
that
I
shall
say
hereafter
the
Senses
perceive
,
but
by
the
word
Sense
I
only
mean
that
passive
Faculty
of
the
Soul
just
mention'd
;
that
is
,
the
Understanding
perceiving
something
by
means
of
what
passes
in
in
the
Organs
of
the
Body
according
to
the
Institution
of
Nature
,
as
shall
be
elsewhere
explain'd
.
Another
agreement
between
the
passive
Faculty
of
the
Soul
and
that
of
Matter
,
is
,
that
as
Matter
is
not
truly
chang'd
by
an
alteration
of
its
Figure
;
for
Instance
,
Wax
receives
no
considerable
Change
for
being
round
or
square
,
so
the
Mind
receives
no
Change
by
the
Diversity
of
Idea's
which
it
has
;
I
mean
,
the
Mind
receives
no
considerable
Change
,
although
it
receives
an
Idea
of
a
Square
,
or
a
Circle
,
in
perceiving
a
Square
,
or
a
Circle
.
Farther
,
as
it
may
be
said
,
that
Matter
undergoes
considerable
Changes
,
when
it
looses
the
Configuration
proper
to
the
parts
of
the
Wax
,
to
receive
that
which
is
proper
to
Fire
and
Smoke
,
when
the
Wax
is
chang'd
into
Fire
and
Smoke
;
so
it
may
be
said
,
that
the
Soul
receives
very
considerable
Alterations
,
when
it
changes
its
Modifications
,
and
suffers
Pain
,
after
having
felt
Pleasure
.
Whence
we
must
conclude
,
that
Idea's
are
to
the
Soul
very
near
,
what
Figures
are
to
Matter
;
and
that
Configurations
are
much
the
same
to
Matter
,
that
Sensations
are
to
the
Soul
.
There
are
yet
other
agreements
betwixt
the
Figures
and
Configurations
of
Matter
,
and
the
Idea's
and
Modifications
of
the
Mind
,
for
it
seems
that
Matter
is
an
Image
of
the
Mind
;
I
only
mean
,
there
are
Properties
in
Matter
,
which
have
betwixt
themselves
Relations
,
much
like
those
which
are
found
amongst
the
Properties
belonging
to
the
Mind
,
although
the
Nature
of
the
Mind
is
very
different
from
that
of
Matter
,
as
shall
be
clearly
shewn
hereafter
.
From
all
that
I
have
said
,
I
would
have
it
well
remembred
,
that
by
the
Understanding
,
I
mean
that
passive
Faculty
,
which
the
Soul
has
of
perceiving
,
that
is
,
of
receiving
not
only
different
Idea's
,
but
also
innumerable
Sensations
,
even
as
Matter
is
capable
of
receiving
all
Manner
of
External
Figures
and
Internal
Configurations
.
The
other
Property
of
Matter
is
,
that
't
is
capable
of
receiving
several
Motions
,
and
the
other
Faculty
of
the
Soul
is
,
that
't
is
capable
of
receiving
several
Inclinations
,
let
us
compare
these
together
.
As
the
Author
of
Nature
is
the
Universal
Cause
of
all
Motions
,
which
are
found
in
Matter
,
so
is
He
also
the
General
Cause
of
all
the
Natural
Inclinations
in
our
Minds
,
and
even
as
all
Motions
are
made
in
a
Streight
Line
,
if
they
do
not
meet
with
some
particular
and
foreign
Causes
,
which
determine
and
change
them
into
Curve
Lines
,
so
all
the
Inclinations
we
receive
from
God
,
are
right
,
and
could
not
have
any
other
End
but
the
possession
of
Good
and
Truth
,
were
there
not
some
Extraneous
Cause
which
determines
the
Impression
of
Nature
towards
evil
ends
:
Now
't
is
this
foreign
Cause
,
which
is
the
Origin
of
all
our
Evils
,
and
which
Corrupts
all
our
Inclinations
.
To
understand
this
well
,
we
must
know
,
that
there
is
a
very
considerable
Difference
betwixt
the
Impression
or
Motion
,
which
the
Author
of
Nature
produces
in
Matter
,
and
the
Impression
or
Motion
towards
Good
in
General
,
which
the
same
Author
of
Nature
continually
Impresses
on
the
Mind
;
for
Matter
is
wholly
unactive
,
it
has
no
power
to
stop
it's
Motion
,
or
to
determine
or
turn
it self
,
one
way
rather
than
another
:
Its
motion
,
as
I
have
said
before
,
is
made
always
in
a
Strait
Line
,
and
when
diverted
from
this
motion
,
it
describes
a
Curve
,
the
nearest
to
a
right
line
that
's
possible
,
because
't
is
God
that
impresses
on
it
its
Motion
,
and
regulates
its
Determination
.
But
't
is
not
to
with
the
Will
;
[
](A51655-e16540-b)*
*
See
the
Explanations
.
it
may
be
said
in
one
sense
to
be
active
,
and
to
have
in
it self
a
Power
of
determining
differently
the
Inclination
or
Impression
that
God
gives
it
,
for
tho'
it
cannot
stop
this
Impression
,
it
may
in
a
sense
be
said
to
turn
it
which
way
it
pleases
,
and
thereby
cause
all
the
disorders
,
that
are
in
its
Inclinations
,
and
all
the
Miseries
,
which
are
the
certain
and
necessary
Consequences
of
Sin
.
So
that
by
the
Word
WILL
,
I
wou'd
be
understood
to
mean
,
the
Natural
Impression
or
Motion
,
which
carries
us
towards
indetermin'd
and
universal
Good
:
And
by
the
Word
LIBERTY
,
I
only
understand
the
Power
which
the
Mind
has
of
turning
that
Impression
towards
agreeable
Objects
,
and
so
sixing
our
natural
Inclinations
on
some
particular
Object
,
which
before
were
loose
and
indetermin'd
to
Vniversal
Good
;
that
is
,
to
God
,
who
comprehends
in
himself
all
that
's
Good
,
Whence
't
is
easie
to
discover
,
that
tho'
our
Natural
Inclinations
are
voluntary
,
yet
they
are
not
always
free
with
that
Liberty
of
Indifference
,
that
I
am
speaking
of
,
which
includes
the
Power
of
Willing
or
not
Willing
,
or
of
Willing
the
contrary
to
what
our
Natural
Inclinations
carry
us
;
for
tho'
't
is
voluntarily
and
freely
that
Men
love
Good
in
General
,
since
they
can't
love
against
their
Will
,
and
't
is
a
Contradiction
to
suppose
the
Will
should
ever
suffer
Constraint
,
however
they
love
it
not
freely
in
the
sense
that
I
have
just
explain'd
,
since
't
is
out
of
the
Power
of
our
Will
not
to
wish
to
be
Happy
.
But
it
must
be
well
observ'd
,
that
the
Mind
consider'd
as
push'd
on
towards
Good
in
General
,
can't
determine
its
Motion
towards
a
particular
Good
,
if
the
same
Mind
,
consider'd
as
susceptible
of
Idea's
,
has
not
the
Knowledge
of
this
particular
Good
;
that
is
,
in
the
common
way
of
speaking
,
the
Will
is
a
blind
Power
,
which
can
only
desire
those
things
that
the
Understanding
represents
to
it
:
So
that
the
Will
can't
differently
determine
the
Impression
it
has
for
Good
,
and
all
its
Natural
Inclinations
,
but
by
commanding
the
Understanding
to
represent
to
it
some
particular
Object
.
The
Power
then
that
the
Will
has
of
determining
its
Inclinations
,
necessarily
includes
an
ability
of
carrying
the
Understanding
towards
agreeable
Objects
.
I
will
explain
by
an
Example
,
what
I
have
said
concerning
Will
and
Liberty
.
A
Man
represents
to
himself
a
Preferment
under
the
Notion
of
a
Good
,
which
he
can
hope
for
;
immediately
the
Will
wills
this
Good
,
that
is
,
the
Impression
,
that
the
Mind
continually
receives
towards
Indetermin'd
and
Universal
Good
,
inclines
it
to
this
Preferment
:
But
as
this
Preferment
is
not
the
Universal
Good
,
and
is
not
consider'd
in
a
clear
and
distinct
view
of
the
Mind
,
as
Universal
Good
,
(
for
the
Mind
never
sees
clearly
that
which
is
not
)
the
Impression
,
that
he
had
receiv'd
of
Vniversal
Good
,
is
not
wholly
stopt
by
this
particular
Good
,
the
Mind
has
some
motion
to
go
yet
farther
,
it
is
not
necessarily
nor
invincibly
in
Love
with
this
Dignity
,
but
is
at
Liberty
in
respect
thereof
.
Now
its
Liberty
consists
in
this
,
that
being
not
fully
convinc'd
that
this
Dignity
includes
all
the
Good
,
which
he
is
capable
of
loving
,
he
may
suspend
his
Judgment
and
Love
,
and
afterwards
(
as
shall
be
explain'd
in
the
third
Book
)
he
may
,
by
the
Union
which
he
has
with
the
Universal
Being
,
or
that
which
includes
every
Good
,
think
of
other
things
,
and
consequently
love
other
Goods
.
In
fine
,
we
may
compare
all
other
Goods
,
love
'em
according
to
the
Order
and
Degree
in
which
they
are
lovely
,
and
refer
'em
to
him
,
which
includes
them
all
,
and
which
is
only
worthy
to
limit
our
Love
,
as
being
only
able
to
fill
all
our
Capacity
of
Loving
.
Almost
the
same
thing
may
be
said
of
the
Knowledge
of
Truth
,
as
of
the
Love
of
Good
;
We
love
the
Knowledge
of
Truth
as
the
Enjoyment
of
Good
,
by
a
Natural
Impression
;
and
this
Impression
,
as
well
as
that
which
carries
us
towards
Good
,
is
not
invincible
,
its
only
so
by
the
evidence
,
or
by
the
perfect
and
absolute
knowledge
of
the
Object
:
And
we
are
as
free
in
our
false
Judgments
,
as
in
our
irregular
Affections
,
as
shall
be
shown
in
the
following
Chapter
.
CHAP.
II.
I.
Of
Judgments
and
Reasonings
.
II.
That
they
depend
upon
the
Will
.
III.
What
use
must
be
made
of
its
Liberty
in
respect
of
them
.
IV.
Two
General
Rules
to
avoid
Error
and
Sin
.
V.
Necessary
Reflections
upon
these
Rules
.
IT
might
well
be
concluded
,
Of
Judgments
and
Reasonings
.
from
what
has
been
said
in
the
preceeding
Chapter
,
that
the
Understanding
never
judges
,
since
it
only
perceives
;
or
since
Judgments
and
Reasonings
,
even
in
respect
of
the
Understanding
,
are
only
pure
Perceptions
:
'T
is
the
Will
alone
which
properly
Judges
in
acquiescing
in
that
which
the
Understanding
represents
to
it
,
and
in
voluntarily
resting
there
,
't
is
this
also
which
deceives
us
;
but
these
things
must
be
explain'd
more
at
large
.
I
say
then
,
there
is
no
Difference
in
respect
of
the
Understanding
,
between
a
simple
Perception
,
and
a
Judging
and
Reasoning
,
save
,
that
the
Understanding
perceives
a
simple
thing
by
a
simple
Perception
,
without
any
relation
to
any
thing
whatever
;
that
it
perceives
the
relation
betwixt
two
or
more
things
in
Judging
;
that
,
in
fine
,
it
perceives
the
relations
that
are
betwixt
the
relations
of
things
in
reasoning
.
So
that
all
the
operations
of
the
Understanding
are
pure
Perceptions
.
When
we
perceive
,
for
Example
,
twice
2
or
4
,
this
is
only
a
Simple
Perception
:
When
we
Judge
that
2
times
2
are
4
,
or
that
2
times
2
are
not
5
,
the
Understanding
does
only
yet
receive
the
relation
of
Equality
which
is
between
2
times
2
and
4
,
or
the
relation
of
Inequality
that
is
between
2
times
2
and
5.
Thus
the
Judgment
,
in
respect
of
the
Understanding
,
is
only
the
Perception
of
the
Relation
between
two
or
more
things
;
but
Reasoning
is
the
Perception
of
the
Relation
that
is
found
(
not
between
two
or
more
things
,
for
this
would
be
Judgment
,
but
)
between
two
or
more
Relations
of
two
or
more
things
.
Thus
,
when
I
conclude
that
4
is
less
than
6
,
and
that
2
times
2
making
4
,
is
also
consequently
less
than
6
,
I
perceive
not
only
the
Relation
of
Inequality
between
2
times
2
and
6
,
for
then
this
would
be
only
Judging
,
but
the
Relation
of
Inequality
which
is
betwixt
the
Relation
of
2
times
2
and
4
,
and
the
Relation
between
4
and
6
,
which
is
Reasoning
.
The
Understanding
then
only
perceives
,
and
the
Will
only
judges
and
reasons
by
resting
it self
voluntarily
in
what
the
Understanding
represents
to
it
;
as
we
said
before
.
Nevertheless
,
II.
That
Judgments
and
Reasoning
depend
upon
the
Will
.
when
those
things
that
we
consider
are
self
evident
,
it
appears
to
us
,
that
it
is
not
then
voluntarily
that
we
assent
to
them
;
so
that
we
are
inclin'd
to
believe
,
that
't
is
not
our
Will
,
but
Understanding
which
judges
of
them
.
But
to
be
convinc'd
of
our
Error
,
we
must
know
,
that
things
which
we
consider
,
are
only
then
entirely
evident
,
when
the
Understanding
hath
examin'd
them
on
all
sides
,
and
all
their
necessary
relations
,
in
order
to
judge
of
them
;
whence
it
happens
,
that
as
the
Will
can
will
nothing
without
knowing
,
so
it
cannot
act
on
the
Understanding
:
I
mean
,
it
can't
desire
that
it
should
represent
any
new
thing
in
its
Object
,
because
it
has
already
consider'd
it
in
every
respect
,
by
which
it
has
any
Relation
to
the
proposed
Question
:
the
Will
is
then
oblig'd
to
acquiesce
in
that
,
which
the
Understanding
has
already
represented
,
and
to
trouble
or
agitate
it
no
farther
;
and
this
acquiescing
is
that
,
which
is
properly
call'd
Judgment
and
Reasoning
.
And
thus
,
this
Acquiescence
or
Judgment
not
being
free
,
when
things
are
in
their
utmost
evidence
,
appears
to
us
to
be
involuntary
.
But
so
long
as
there
is
any
thing
obscure
in
the
Subject
that
we
consider
,
or
that
we
are
not
entirely
assur'd
that
we
have
discover'd
all
,
that
is
necessary
to
resolve
the
Question
,
as
it
frequently
happens
in
such
as
are
very
difficult
,
and
include
many
Relations
;
we
are
at
our
Liberty
not
to
consent
,
and
the
Will
can
yet
command
the
Understanding
to
apply
it self
to
a
new
Enquiry
;
hence
we
are
not
so
far
from
believing
,
that
the
Judgments
,
we
form
upon
these
Subjects
,
are
voluntary
.
Nevertheless
,
the
greatest
part
of
Philosophers
pretend
,
that
even
these
Judgments
,
which
we
form
upon
obscure
things
,
are
involuntary
,
and
will
generally
have
it
,
that
a
consent
to
Truth
is
an
action
of
the
Understanding
,
which
they
call
Assensus
,
to
distinguish
it
from
a
Consent
to
Good
,
which
they
attribute
to
the
Will
,
and
which
they
call
Corsensus
.
But
the
Cause
of
their
Distinction
and
Error
is
this
,
That
in
this
present
State
of
Life
,
we
often
see
evident
Truths
without
any
reason
of
Doubt
,
and
so
the
Will
is
not
indifferent
in
the
Consent
that
it
gives
to
them
,
as
we
have
explain'd
above
:
But
't
is
not
the
same
thing
as
to
Good
,
we
know
nothing
of
it
,
without
having
some
reason
of
doubting
whether
we
ought
to
love
it
;
our
Passions
,
and
the
Inclinations
which
we
Naturally
have
for
sensible
Pleasures
,
are
confus'd
Reasons
,
yet
very
strong
,
because
of
the
Corruption
of
our
Nature
,
and
they
make
us
cold
and
indifferent
even
in
the
Love
of
God
.
And
thus
,
we
evidently
perceive
our
Indifference
,
and
are
inwardly
convinc'd
that
we
make
use
of
our
Liberty
,
when
we
love
God
.
But
we
do
not
in
like
manner
perceive
that
we
use
our
Liberty
,
when
we
consent
to
Truth
,
especially
when
it
appears
Self-evident
;
and
this
makes
us
believe
that
our
Consent
to
Truth
is
involuntary
,
as
if
it
were
necessary
that
our
actions
were
indifferent
to
be
voluntary
,
and
as
if
the
Blessed
did
not
love
God
voluntarily
without
being
interrupted
by
something
else
,
just
as
we
consent
to
this
evident
Proposition
,
Geometricians
love
not
Truth
,
but
the
knowledge
of
Truth
,
altho'
the
contrary
is
commonly
asserted
.
twice
2
is
4
,
without
being
hindred
from
believing
it
by
some
appearance
of
a
contrary
Reason
.
But
,
that
we
may
distinctly
perceive
the
Difference
that
there
is
betwixt
the
Wills
consent
to
a
Truth
,
and
its
consent
to
Goodness
,
we
must
know
the
Difference
that
is
betwixt
Truth
and
Goodness
,
taken
in
the
common
acceptation
,
and
in
relation
to
us
.
The
Difference
consists
in
this
.
Goodness
concerns
and
affects
us
,
but
Truth
affects
us
not
,
for
Truth
consists
only
in
the
relation
that
two
or
more
things
have
between
themselves
,
but
Goodness
consists
in
the
relation
of
Agreeableness
that
things
have
with
us
.
Hence
there
's
but
one
Action
of
the
Will
in
respect
of
Truth
,
which
is
its
Acquiescence
,
or
Assent
,
to
the
Representation
of
the
relation
that
is
between
things
;
But
in
respect
of
Goodness
there
are
two
,
its
Acquiescence
or
Assent
to
the
relation
of
Agreement
that
things
have
with
us
,
and
its
Love
or
Motion
towards
such
a
thing
;
which
actions
are
very
different
,
altho'
they
are
ordinarily
confounded
,
for
there
's
much
difference
betwixt
simply
acquiescing
in
,
and
being
carry'd
by
Love
to
what
the
Mind
represents
,
since
Men
often
acquiesce
in
things
,
which
they
could
wish
were
not
,
and
which
they
do
.
Now
,
if
we
consider
well
of
things
,
we
shall
plainly
perceive
that
't
is
the
Will
always
that
assents
not
to
things
,
unless
they
be
disagreeable
to
it
,
but
to
the
Representation
of
things
,
and
the
Reason
why
the
Will
acquiesces
in
things
,
which
are
in
their
utmost
Evidence
,
is
,
(
as
we
have
already
said
)
because
there
is
not
in
those
things
any
Relation
which
ought
to
have
been
consider'd
,
that
the
Understanding
hath
not
perceiv'd
.
So
that
it
is
,
as
it
were
,
necessary
for
the
Will
to
leave
off
Debating
,
and
unprofitably
Fatiguing
it self
,
and
rest
in
full
Assurance
,
that
it
is
not
deceiv'd
,
since
there
's
nothing
yet
farther
,
upon
which
it
can
exercise
its
Understanding
.
We
must
chiefly
remark
,
that
in
the
State
we
now
are
,
we
have
only
an
imperfect
Knowledge
of
things
;
and
by
consequence
,
't
is
absolutely
necessary
that
we
have
this
Liberty
of
Indifference
,
by
which
we
may
forbear
giving
our
Assent
.
To
see
the
Necessity
of
it
,
we
must
consider
that
we
are
carry'd
by
our
Natural
Inclinations
towards
Truth
and
Goodness
,
so
that
the
Will
inclining
it self
only
to
such
things
,
as
the
Mind
has
some
knowledge
of
,
it
must
carry
it self
to
that
,
which
has
the
appearance
of
Truth
and
Goodness
;
but
because
every
thing
,
which
has
the
appearance
of
Goodness
,
is
not
always
what
it
appears
to
be
,
its
evident
that
if
the
Will
were
not
free
,
and
if
it
were
infallibly
and
necessarily
carry'd
to
every
thing
,
that
has
these
appearances
of
Goodness
and
Truth
,
it
would
very
often
be
deceiv'd
;
whence
it
seems
we
might
conclude
,
that
the
Author
of
its
Being
was
also
the
Author
of
its
Wandrings
and
Errors
.
God
has
then
given
us
Liberty
,
III.
Of
the
Use
that
we
must
make
of
Liberty
,
that
we
may
never
be
deceiv'd
.
that
we
might
keep
our selves
from
being
deceiv'd
,
and
from
all
the
Evils
which
are
the
effect
of
our
Errors
,
by
never
yielding
a
full
Assent
to
appearances
of
Truth
,
but
only
to
Truth
it self
,
that
is
,
in
continually
applying
the
Mind
,
and
commanding
it
to
Examine
,
till
it
has
clear'd
and
resolv'd
every
thing
that
was
to
be
Examin'd
;
For
Truth
is
scarce
ever
without
Evidence
,
and
Evidence
consists
only
in
a
clear
and
distinct
view
of
all
the
Parts
and
Relations
of
the
Object
,
which
are
necessary
to
give
an
assur'd
Judgment
.
The
Use
then
,
that
we
must
make
of
our
Liberty
,
is
,
TO
USE
IT
AS
MUCH
AS
WE
CAN
;
that
is
,
Never
to
consent
to
any
thing
whatever
,
till
we
are
compell'd
to
it
,
as
it
were
by
the
inward
Reproaches
of
our
Reason
.
To
submit
to
false
Appearances
of
Truth
,
is
to
enslave
our selves
against
the
Will
of
God
,
but
to
submit
our selves
fairly
to
the
secret
Reproaches
of
our
Reason
,
which
follow
our
not
assenting
to
Evidence
,
this
is
to
obey
the
Voice
of
Eternal
Truth
.
Here
are
then
the
two
establish'd
Rules
,
which
I
spoke
of
,
which
are
very
necessary
in
all
Speculative
and
Moral
Sciences
,
and
which
we
ought
to
look
upon
,
as
the
Foundation
of
all
Humane
Sciences
.
The
first
,
General
Rules
to
avoid
Sin
.
which
relates
to
Sciences
,
is
this
;
Never
to
give
an
entire
assent
,
but
to
Propositions
that
appear
so
evidently
true
,
that
we
can't
refuse
them
without
feeling
an
inward
regret
,
and
secret
reproaches
of
our
Reason
;
that
is
,
without
we
knew
clearly
that
we
should
make
an
ill
use
of
our
Liberty
,
if
we
would
not
assent
,
or
would
extend
our
Power
to
things
,
over
which
we
have
none
.
The
second
,
which
respects
Morality
,
is
this
;
Never
to
love
any
Good
,
absolutely
,
if
we
can
without
remorse
forbear
.
Whence
it
follows
,
that
we
ought
to
love
nothing
absolutely
,
and
without
relation
to
any
thing
else
,
but
God
,
for
't
is
he
only
,
from
the
Love
of
whom
we
can't
abstain
without
this
sort
of
Remorse
;
that
is
,
without
an
evident
knowledge
of
our
doing
ill
,
supposing
him
known
by
Reason
and
Revelation
.
But
we
must
observe
here
,
Necessary
reflections
upon
these
General
Rules
.
that
when
those
things
that
we
perceive
do
appear
very
probable
to
us
,
we
find
our selves
extreamly
inclin'd
to
believe
them
;
nay
,
we
are
uneasie
,
when
we
are
not
perswaded
of
them
;
so
that
if
we
are
not
very
cautious
,
we
are
in
much
danger
of
assenting
to
them
,
and
consequently
of
deceiving
our selves
;
for
't
is
a
great
chance
that
Truth
is
exactly
like
to
Probability
.
Hence
it
is
that
I
have
expressly
laid
down
in
these
Rules
,
that
we
must
consent
to
nothing
but
what
we
see
evidently
,
unless
we
should
make
an
ill
use
of
our
Liberty
,
if
we
did
not
consent
.
Now
,
altho'
we
perceive
our selves
extreamly
inclin'd
to
assent
to
an
appearance
of
Truth
,
yet
if
we
take
care
to
examine
whether
we
evidently
see
our selves
oblig'd
to
consent
thereto
,
we
shall
find
the
contrary
;
for
if
appearance
of
Truth
is
grounded
upon
the
Impression
of
our
Senses
,
I
say
,
an
appearance
of
Truth
,
falsely
so
called
,
then
we
shall
be
strongly
inclin'd
to
comply
therewith
,
not
perceiving
any
other
Cause
than
some
Passion
,
or
General
Affection
,
that
we
have
for
that
which
pleases
the
Senses
,
as
will
fully
appear
hereafter
.
But
,
if
an
appearance
of
Truth
arises
from
some
Conformity
with
Truth
,
as
commonly
all
probable
Knowledge
,
taken
in
a
certain
sense
,
is
true
,
then
if
we
reflect
upon
our selves
,
we
shall
perceive
that
we
are
inclin'd
to
two
things
,
viz.
to
Believe
,
and
to
Examine
yet
farther
,
but
we
shall
never
find
our selves
so
much
perswaded
,
as
to
think
we
do
ill
,
if
we
do
not
absolutely
assent
.
Now
these
two
Inclinations
,
which
we
find
in
us
,
in
reference
to
Probabilities
,
are
very
good
,
for
we
can
,
and
must
assent
to
apparent
Truths
,
so
far
as
they
bear
the
Image
of
Truth
;
however
,
we
must
not
yet
intirely
assent
,
according
to
the
Rule
before
laid
down
,
but
thorowly
examine
the
Object
,
that
we
may
have
a
perfect
knowledge
of
its
Nature
,
truly
distinguish
between
Truth
and
Falshood
,
and
afterwards
intirely
submit
,
if
Evidence
compells
us
thereto
.
We
ought
much
to
accustom
our selves
to
distinguish
between
Truth
and
appearance
of
Truth
,
by
an
inward
Examination
of
our selves
,
as
I
have
already
said
;
for
't
is
for
want
of
this
sort
of
Examination
,
that
we
perceive
our selves
touch't
after
the
same
manner
with
two
things
so
different
.
For
indeed
't
is
a
matter
of
the
greatest
Consequence
to
make
Good
use
of
our
Liberty
,
by
denying
always
nor
A●●en
to
things
,
or
loving
them
,
till
we
find
our selves
compell'd
thereto
by
the
powerful
Voice
of
the
Author
of
Nature
,
which
I
before
call'd
the
Reproaches
of
our
Reason
,
and
the
Regret
of
our
Conscience
.
All
the
Duties
of
Spiritual
Beings
,
as
well
of
Angels
as
of
Men
,
consists
chiefly
in
this
Practice
,
and
it
may
positively
be
affirm'd
,
that
,
if
they
carefully
use
their
Liberty
,
and
not
blindly
enslave
themselves
to
Lies
and
Vanity
,
they
are
in
the
way
to
the
greatest
perfection
,
that
they
are
capable
of
;
provided
they
suffer
not
their
Understanding
to
lie
idle
,
but
carefully
and
continually
excite
it
to
new
Knowledge
,
rendring
it
capable
of
the
greatest
Truths
,
by
constant
meditations
upon
such
Subjects
as
are
worthy
their
application
.
To
perfect
our
Minds
,
it
's
not
sufficient
to
use
our
Liberty
always
,
so
as
to
assent
to
nothing
,
as
some
Persons
do
,
who
pride
themselves
in
knowing
nothing
,
but
doubting
all
things
;
nor
must
we
so
assent
to
every
thing
,
as
many
others
,
who
fear
nothing
so
much
as
being
ignorant
of
something
,
and
pretend
to
know
all
things
;
but
we
must
make
a
Good
use
of
our
Vnderstanding
by
continual
Meditations
,
so
that
we
may
have
frequent
Opportunities
of
being
able
to
assent
to
what
it
proposes
without
fear
of
being
deceiv'd
.
CHAP.
III.
I.
Answers
to
some
Objections
.
II.
Remarks
upon
what
hath
been
said
about
the
necessity
of
Evidence
.
IT
is
not
very
difficult
to
divine
,
that
the
practice
of
the
first
Rule
,
which
I
spoke
of
in
the
preceeding
Chapter
,
will
not
please
all
the
World
,
but
especially
those
imaginary
Learned
,
who
pretend
to
know
all
things
,
and
yet
know
nothing
at
all
,
pleasing
themselves
in
speaking
confidently
of
the
most
difficult
things
,
and
who
certainly
are
ignorant
of
the
most
easie
.
They
will
not
fail
to
say
with
Artistotle
,
that
Certainty
is
only
to
be
found
in
Mathematicks
,
but
in
Morality
and
Physics
Probability
suffices
;
That
Descartes
was
very
much
out
in
treating
of
Physics
,
as
he
did
of
Geometry
,
which
was
the
reason
he
fail'd
in
the
attempt
;
That
't
is
impossible
for
Man
to
know
Nature
,
That
it's
Springs
and
Secrets
are
impenetrable
to
the
Humane
Mind
;
and
many
other
fine
things
,
which
they
set
off
with
a
great
deal
of
Pomp
and
Magnificence
,
maintaining
it
from
the
Authority
of
a
multitude
of
Authors
,
and
value
themselves
much
upon
knowing
their
Names
,
and
being
able
to
cite
some
Passages
from
them
.
I
would
intreat
these
Gentlemen
to
talk
no
more
of
what
they
profess
they
do
not
know
,
and
put
a
Check
to
the
ridiculous
Motions
of
their
Vanity
,
in
forbearing
to
compose
such
great
Volumes
upon
those
Subjects
,
which
,
according
to
their
own
Confession
,
they
are
ignorant
of
.
But
let
these
Persons
seriously
Examine
,
whether
it
be
not
absolutely
necessary
either
to
be
deceiv'd
,
or
never
to
give
our
entire
Consent
,
except
to
things
fully
evident
?
Whether
Truth
does
not
always
accompany
Geometry
,
because
Geometricians
observe
this
Rule
?
And
if
the
Errors
,
into
which
some
are
fallen
,
concerning
the
Quadrature
of
the
Circle
,
the
Duplication
of
the
Cube
,
and
some
other
very
difficult
Problems
,
proceed
not
from
some
Precipitation
,
or
Prejudice
,
which
made
'em
take
an
appearance
of
Truth
for
Truth
it self
?
Let
'em
consider
also
on
the
other
hand
,
if
Falseness
and
Confusion
does
not
reign
in
common
Philosophy
,
because
Philosophers
content
themselves
with
such
an
easie
Probability
as
is
convenient
for
their
Vanity
and
Interests
.
Do
we
not
find
every
where
an
infinite
Diversity
of
Opinions
,
even
upon
the
same
Subjects
,
and
consequently
an
Infinity
of
Errors
?
Yet
a
great
number
of
Disciples
suffer
themselves
to
be
seduc'd
,
and
blindly
submit
to
the
Authority
of
these
Philosophers
,
without
even
comprehending
their
Opinions
.
'T
is
true
,
there
are
some
who
perceive
after
twenty
or
thirty
years
Loss
of
time
,
that
they
have
learnt
nothing
in
their
Lectures
,
but
they
are
asham'd
to
make
a
sincere
Confession
of
it
.
They
first
prove
after
their
own
way
,
that
no
certain
Knowledge
can
be
attained
and
afterwards
they
acknowledge
,
that
they
know
nothing
,
because
they
believe
they
may
then
safely
do
it
without
any
Jest
upon
their
Ignorance
.
It
would
be
sufficient
matter
of
Diversion
and
Laughter
,
to
hear
them
give
an
account
of
their
fine
progress
in
Learning
,
and
to
get
them
in
a
humour
of
declaring
all
the
Fatigues
they
have
endur'd
to
acquire
it
;
but
altho
this
Learned
and
profound
Ignorance
deserves
our
Raillery
,
it
's
much
better
to
forbear
it
,
and
to
pity
those
who
have
thus
spent
so
many
years
,
only
to
Learn
this
false
Proposition
,
I
know
nothing
,
which
is
an
Enemy
to
all
Science
and
Truth
.
Since
the
Rule
then
,
which
I
have
establish'd
,
is
so
necessary
in
a
Search
after
Truth
,
as
we
have
seen
it
is
,
so
that
nothing
can
be
objected
against
those
that
propose
it
;
Let
such
as
will
not
take
pains
to
observe
it
,
at
least
,
not
condemn
so
Illustrious
an
Author
as
Monsieur
Descartes
was
,
because
he
followed
,
or
endeavour'd
,
as
near
as
he
could
,
to
follow
it
;
They
would
not
Consure
him
so
rashly
,
if
they
knew
him
,
nor
would
they
read
his
Works
,
as
Fables
and
Romances
,
which
Men
read
for
their
Diversion
,
not
Instruction
;
if
they
throughly
consider'd
this
Author
,
they
would
still
find
in
themselves
some
Notions
,
and
Principles
of
Truth
that
he
teaches
,
which
would
undeceive
'em
in
spight
of
the
Prejudices
of
their
False
Learning
.
That
Master
which
inwardly
Dictates
to
us
,
would
have
us
hear
him
rather
than
the
Authority
of
the
greatest
Philosophers
,
He
is
pleased
when
He
Instructs
,
provided
we
apply
our selves
to
what
He
says
;
't
is
by
Mieditation
,
and
a
very
exact
Attention
,
that
we
interrogate
him
;
and
't
is
by
a
certain
inward
Conviction
,
and
the
secret
Reproaches
of
those
that
do
not
consent
to
it
,
by
which
He
answers
.
We
should
so
read
the
Works
of
Men
,
as
not
to
hope
to
be
instructed
by
Man
,
but
interrogate
Him
that
is
the
Light
of
the
World
,
so
that
we
may
be
enlightn'd
with
the
rest
of
the
World
,
if
He
does
not
enlighten
us
after
we
have
Enquir'd
of
Him
,
no
doubt
we
Enquir'd
amiss
.
Whether
therefore
we
read
Aristotle
or
Descartes
,
we
must
not
presently
believe
either
,
but
meditate
as
they
did
,
or
ought
to
have
done
,
with
all
the
attention
whereof
we
are
capable
,
and
afterwards
obey
the
Voice
of
our
Common
Master
,
and
honestly
submit
our selves
to
the
inward
Convictions
and
Motions
which
we
feel
in
Meditation
.
After
this
we
are
permitted
to
Judge
for
or
against
Authors
;
And
thus
having
first
digested
the
Principles
of
Descartes's
and
Aristotle's
Philosophy
,
we
may
reject
the
one
,
and
approve
the
other
;
and
may
be
even
assur'd
,
that
the
last
shall
never
explain
any
Phoenomenon
of
Nature
by
his
own
Principles
,
which
have
been
useless
for
these
Two
thousand
years
,
although
his
Philosophy
has
been
Studied
by
the
Learned
in
almost
all
parts
of
the
World
,
and
that
on
the
Contrary
,
we
may
boldly
say
of
the
other
,
that
he
hath
penetrated
into
that
which
appeared
most
obscure
in
the
Eyes
of
Men
,
and
hath
shew'd
'em
a
sure
way
to
d●●cover
all
Truths
that
a
limited
Understanding
can
comprehend
.
But
without
relying
on
the
Opinion
that
we
may
have
of
these
two
Philosophers
,
and
of
all
others
,
let
us
still
look
upon
'em
as
Men
,
and
let
not
the
Aristotelians
be
displeased
,
if
,
after
having
walk'd
so
many
Ages
in
Darkness
,
without
being
able
to
make
any
further
Advancement
,
we
are
willing
to
see
with
our
own
Eyes
,
and
if
,
after
having
been
led
like
blind
Men
,
we
now
remember
that
we
have
Eyes
,
and
essay
to
Conduct
our selves
.
Let
us
then
be
fully
convinc'd
of
this
Rule
,
Never
to
give
an
entire
assent
but
to
things
that
are
evident
.
This
is
the
most
necessary
of
all
Rules
in
a
Search
after
Truth
,
and
let
us
not
admit
any
thing
into
our
Minds
as
Truth
,
but
what
appears
with
the
Evidence
that
this
Rule
demands
.
We
must
be
persuaded
thereof
,
to
lay
by
our
Prejudices
,
and
it
's
absolutely
necessary
that
we
be
deliver'd
from
our
Prepossessions
to
enter
into
the
Knowledge
of
Truth
,
because
the
Mind
must
be
Purified
before
it
can
be
Enlighten'd
.
Sapientia
prima
est
Stulitia
caruisse
.
But
before
we
finish
this
Chapter
,
II.
Remarks
upon
what
has
been
said
about
the
necessity
of
Evidence
.
we
must
Remark
Three
Things
:
The
first
is
,
that
I
speak
not
here
of
Matters
of
Faith
,
which
admit
not
the
same
Evidence
as
Natural
Sciences
do
,
because
we
cannot
perceive
things
,
but
by
the
Idea's
which
we
have
of
them
,
for
God
hath
only
given
us
those
Idea's
,
which
are
necessary
to
conduct
us
in
the
Natural
Order
of
Things
according
to
which
we
are
created
,
so
that
the
Mysteries
of
Faith
being
of
a
Supernatural
Order
,
we
must
not
be
surpriz'd
if
we
have
not
the
same
Idea's
of
them
;
for
our
Souls
are
created
by
Virtue
of
a
General
Decree
,
by
which
we
have
all
the
Notions
that
are
necessary
for
us
;
See
the
Explanations
.
But
the
Mysteries
of
Faith
have
been
establish'd
only
by
the
Order
of
Grace
,
which
,
according
to
our
Ordinary
way
of
Conception
,
is
a
Decree
consequent
to
that
Order
of
Nature
.
We
ought
then
to
distinguish
the
Mysteries
of
Faith
from
Natural
Things
.
We
must
equally
submit
to
Faith
and
Evidence
,
but
in
Matters
of
Faith
we
must
not
look
for
such
Evidence
as
is
in
Natural
Things
;
we
must
not
rely
upon
the
Faith
,
that
is
,
upon
the
Authority
of
Philosophers
.
In
a
word
,
to
be
Faithful
,
we
must
believe
things
not
comprehended
by
Reason
;
but
to
be
Philosophers
,
we
must
take
nothing
upon
Trust
.
'T
is
universally
agreed
upon
,
that
there
are
other
Truths
besides
those
of
Faith
,
in
which
it
would
be
unjust
to
demand
incontestible
Demonstrations
,
such
,
for
Instance
,
as
relate
to
History
,
and
other
things
depending
upon
Mans
Will
.
For
there
are
two
sorts
of
Truth
,
Necessary
and
Contingent
,
I
call
them
Necessary
Truths
,
that
are
Immutable
in
their
Nature
,
and
have
been
Decreed
by
the
unchangeable
Will
of
God
,
all
others
are
Contingent
Truths
;
Mathematicks
,
Physicks
,
Metaphysicks
,
and
even
a
great
part
of
Morality
,
contain
Necessary
Truths
;
History
,
Grammar
,
particular
Laws
or
Customs
,
and
many
other
things
,
which
depend
upon
the
uncertain
Will
of
Man
,
include
only
Contingent
Truths
.
'T
is
requir'd
then
,
that
the
Rule
,
which
I
have
before
establish'd
,
be
exactly
observed
in
a
Search
after
Necessary
Truths
,
whose
Knowledge
may
be
call'd
Science
;
and
we
must
content
our selves
with
the
greatest
probability
of
Truth
in
History
,
which
contains
the
Knowledge
of
Contingent
Things
,
for
one
may
generally
call
by
the
name
of
History
the
Knowledge
of
Languages
,
Customs
,
and
even
that
of
the
Different
Opinions
of
Philosophers
,
when
they
are
only
learn'd
by
Memory
,
without
having
had
any
Evidence
or
Certainty
of
them
.
The
second
Thing
to
be
Remark'd
,
is
,
that
in
Morals
,
Politicks
,
Medicine
,
and
in
all
Practical
Sciences
,
we
are
oblig'd
to
content
our selves
with
Probabilities
,
not
always
,
but
for
a
time
,
not
because
it
satisfies
the
Mind
,
but
because
there
is
a
necessity
for
it
,
and
because
,
if
we
should
defer
acting
,
till
we
were
fully
assur'd
of
success
,
we
should
often
loose
the
opportunity
.
But
though
there
's
a
necessity
of
our
Acting
,
yet
we
should
doubtfully
rely
upon
the
event
of
these
things
we
execute
,
and
endeavour
to
make
such
a
progress
in
these
Sciences
,
as
that
we
may
in
our
Affairs
act
with
more
certainty
;
for
this
ought
to
be
the
ordinary
end
of
the
Study
and
Employ
of
all
Thinking
Men.
In
fine
,
the
third
Observation
is
,
that
we
must
not
absolutely
despise
Probabilities
,
because
it
ordinarily
happens
,
that
many
of
'em
being
join'd
together
,
can
as
strongly
convince
us
,
as
the
most
evident
Demonstrations
.
Of
this
there
are
infinite
Examples
in
Physick
and
Morality
.
So
that
oftentimes
't
is
of
use
to
collect
a
sufficient
number
of
them
,
for
Matters
which
can't
be
otherwise
demonstrated
.
I
must
confess
here
,
that
the
Rule
which
I
have
impos'd
is
very
rigorous
;
that
many
would
rather
desire
not
to
Reason
at
all
,
than
to
Reason
upon
these
Conditions
,
that
they
will
not
move
very
fast
under
such
Incommodious
Circumspections
;
yet
they
must
agree
with
me
,
that
they
should
proceed
surely
in
following
this
Rule
,
and
that
hitherto
,
for
having
made
too
much
haste
,
they
have
been
oblig'd
to
turn
back
again
;
and
even
a
great
many
Men
will
agree
with
me
,
that
since
Monsteur
Descartes
hath
discover'd
more
Truths
in
thirty
years
than
all
other
Philosophers
,
because
he
submitted
to
this
Law
:
therefore
,
if
many
Men
would
Philosophize
as
he
did
,
they
might
in
time
know
the
greatest
part
of
those
things
,
which
are
necessary
for
as
happy
a
Life
,
as
can
be
had
upon
an
Earth
,
which
God
hath
Cursed
.
CHAP.
IV.
I.
Of
the
Occasional
Causes
of
Error
,
and
that
of
these
there
are
Five
Principal
ones
.
II.
The
General
Design
of
the
Whole
Work
,
and
the
Particular
Design
of
the
First
Book
.
WE
have
seen
,
that
Men
are
only
deceiv'd
,
because
they
make
not
that
use
of
their
Liberty
which
they
ought
to
do
,
and
because
they
do
not
moderate
the
haste
and
eagerness
of
the
Will
for
bare
appearances
of
Truth
;
that
Error
consists
only
in
a
Consent
of
the
Will
,
which
is
more
capacious
than
the
Perception
of
the
Understanding
;
since
Men
would
not
be
deceiv'd
,
if
they
only
judg'd
of
what
they
understand
.
But
though
,
properly
speaking
,
't
is
only
an
ill
Use
of
Liberty
which
is
the
Cause
of
Error
,
yet
it
may
be
said
,
that
we
have
many
Faculties
,
which
are
also
the
Causes
thereof
,
not
true
Causes
,
but
such
as
may
be
call'd
Occasional
ones
.
I.
Of
the
Occasional
Causes
of
these
there
are
Five
principal
ones
.
All
our
Modes
of
Perceiving
,
are
so
many
Occasions
of
Deceiving
us
,
for
since
our
false
Judgments
include
two
things
,
the
Consent
of
the
Will
,
and
the
Perception
of
the
Understanding
,
it
is
very
evident
,
that
all
our
Modes
of
Perception
may
occasionally
deceive
us
,
since
they
are
able
to
incline
us
to
precipitate
and
rash
Assents
.
Now
,
since
't
is
necessary
,
first
to
convince
the
Soul
of
its
Weakness
and
Errors
,
to
create
in
it
just
desires
of
being
delivered
from
them
,
and
that
it
may
more
easily
lay
aside
its
Prejudices
,
we
shall
endeavour
to
make
an
exact
Division
of
all
its
Modes
of
Perception
,
which
will
be
as
so
many
Heads
,
to
every
one
of
which
we
shall
hereafter
refer
the
different
Errors
we
are
subject
to
.
The
Soul
can
perceive
things
three
ways
,
by
the
pure
Vnderstanding
,
by
the
Imagination
,
and
by
the
Senses
.
It
perceives
by
the
pure
Understanding
,
Spiritual
and
Universal
Things
,
common
Notions
,
the
Idea
of
Perfection
,
and
of
an
Infinitely
perfect
Being
,
and
generally
all
its
Thoughts
,
when
it
knows
them
by
Self-reflection
.
It
also
perceives
some
Material
Things
by
the
pure
Understanding
,
as
Extension
with
its
Properties
,
for
't
is
only
the
pure
Understanding
which
can
perceive
a
Circle
,
a
perfect
Square
,
a
Figure
with
a
thousand
Angles
,
and
such
like
things
.
These
kinds
of
Perceptions
I
call
pure
Intellections
,
or
pure
Perceptions
,
because
't
is
not
necessary
for
the
Mind
to
form
Corporeal
Images
in
the
Brain
to
represent
all
those
things
.
The
Soul
perceives
only
Material
Things
by
the
Imagination
,
which
represents
them
when
absent
,
as
if
they
were
present
,
by
forming
Images
of
them
in
the
Brain
.
'T
is
thus
that
we
imagine
all
sorts
of
Figures
,
as
a
Circle
,
a
Triangle
,
a
Face
,
a
Horse
,
Cities
,
Campaignes
,
&c.
whether
we
have
ever
seen
them
or
not
.
These
sorts
of
Perceptions
I
call
Imaginations
,
because
the
Soul
represents
these
things
by
forming
Images
of
them
in
the
Brain
;
and
because
we
cannot
form
Images
of
Spiritual
Things
,
it
follows
,
that
the
Soul
cannot
imagine
them
,
which
ought
to
be
well
observed
.
In
fine
,
the
Soul
only
perceives
sensible
and
gross
Objects
by
the
Senses
,
which
,
when
present
,
make
an
Impression
upon
the
External
Organs
of
its
Body
;
Thus
it
sees
Plains
and
Rocks
,
when
presented
to
its
Eyes
,
and
feels
the
hardness
of
Iron
,
the
point
of
a
Sword
,
and
such
like
things
,
and
these
sorts
of
Perceptions
I
call
Sentiments
or
Sensations
.
The
Soul
then
only
perceives
things
after
these
three
ways
,
which
is
evident
,
if
we
consider
that
all
things
we
perceive
are
either
Spiritual
or
Material
;
if
they
are
Spiritual
,
't
is
only
the
pure
Vnderstanding
which
can
know
them
;
but
if
they
are
Material
,
they
will
be
either
present
or
absent
;
if
they
are
absent
,
the
Soul
perceives
them
only
by
the
Imagination
;
if
present
,
by
the
Impression
which
they
make
upon
its
Senses
;
and
thus
,
as
we
said
before
,
our
Souls
only
perceive
things
after
three
ways
,
by
the
pure
Vnderstanding
,
by
the
Imagination
,
and
by
the
Senses
.
We
may
then
look
upon
these
three
Faculties
,
as
certain
Heads
,
to
which
we
may
refer
Mens
Errors
,
and
the
Causes
of
these
Errors
,
and
so
avoid
the
Confusion
wherein
their
great
number
would
infallibly
involve
us
,
if
we
should
speak
of
'em
without
any
Method
.
But
our
Inclinations
and
Passions
act
also
very
strongly
upon
us
,
they
dazle
our
Minds
by
their
false
lights
,
they
cover
and
fill
it
with
darkness
;
Thus
our
Inclinations
and
Passions
engage
us
in
an
infinite
number
of
Errors
,
when
we
follow
this
false
light
which
they
produce
in
us
.
We
must
then
consider
them
,
with
the
three
Faculties
of
the
Mind
,
as
the
Sources
of
our
Errors
and
Miscarriages
,
and
to
the
Errors
of
the
Senses
,
Imagination
,
and
pure
Vnderstanding
,
also
join
these
that
may
be
attributed
to
the
Passions
and
Natural
Inclinations
.
Thus
we
may
refer
all
the
Errors
of
Men
,
and
the
Causes
of
these
Errors
,
to
Five
Heads
,
of
which
we
shall
Treat
as
follows
.
First
we
shall
speak
of
the
Errors
of
the
Senses
,
secondly
of
the
Errors
of
the
Imagination
,
thirdly
of
the
Errors
of
the
pure
Vnderstanding
,
fourthly
of
the
Errors
of
the
Inclinations
,
fifthly
of
the
Errors
of
the
Passions
.
In
fine
,
after
having
essayed
to
free
the
Mind
from
these
Errors
,
to
which
it
is
subject
,
we
shall
give
a
General
Method
to
conduct
it
in
a
Search
after
Truth
.
Let
us
first
Explain
the
Errors
of
our
Senses
,
or
rather
the
Errors
which
we
fall
into
for
want
of
making
a
right
Use
of
our
Senses
.
We
shall
not
insist
so
much
upon
particular
Errors
,
which
are
almost
infinite
,
as
upon
the
General
Causes
of
these
Errors
,
and
of
such
things
as
we
believe
necessary
for
the
Knowledge
of
the
Nature
of
Mans
Mind
.
CHAP
V.
OF
THE
SENSES
.
I.
Two
ways
of
Explaining
how
they
are
corrupted
by
Sin
.
II.
That
't
is
not
our
Senses
,
but
our
Liberty
,
which
is
the
true
Cause
of
our
Errors
.
III.
A
Rule
not
to
be
deceiv'd
in
the
Vse
of
our
Senses
.
WHen
we
seriously
Examine
the
Senses
and
Passions
of
Man
,
we
find
'em
so
proportion'd
to
the
end
for
which
they
are
given
us
,
that
we
are
not
of
their
Opinion
,
who
say
,
they
are
wholly
corrupted
by
Original
Sin
;
But
to
shew
that
't
is
not
without
Reason
that
we
dissent
from
them
,
't
is
necessary
to
explain
in
what
Order
the
Faculties
and
Passions
of
our
first
Parent
were
,
whilst
in
a
State
of
Righteousness
,
and
the
Changes
and
Disorders
which
happen'd
in
them
after
his
Sin
;
These
things
may
be
conceiv'd
two
ways
,
the
first
of
which
is
this
:
It
appears
,
Two
ways
of
Explaining
the
Corruption
of
the
Senses
by
Sin
.
if
we
consider
the
Genuine
Order
of
things
,
that
the
Soul
is
sensible
of
greater
pleasure
,
proportionably
to
the
greatness
of
the
Goods
which
it
enjoys
.
Pleasure
is
an
Instinct
of
Nature
,
or
to
speak
more
intelligibly
,
't
is
an
Impression
of
God
himself
inclining
us
towards
some
Good
,
which
must
be
so
much
the
stronger
,
as
the
Good
is
greater
.
According
to
this
Principle
,
I
think
we
cannot
doubt
,
but
that
our
first
Parent
coming
out
of
the
Hands
of
God
,
and
before
his
Sin
,
found
the
greatest
pleasure
in
the
most
solid
Goods
.
Since
therefore
he
was
Created
to
Love
God
,
and
since
God
was
his
true
Good
,
it
may
said
,
that
he
was
inclined
to
delight
in
God
,
who
induc'd
him
to
his
Love
by
a
Sensation
of
Pleasure
,
and
gave
him
such
Internal
Satisfactions
in
his
Duty
,
as
counterbalanc'd
the
greatest
Pleasures
of
Sense
,
and
such
as
,
since
the
Fall
,
Men
are
insensible
of
,
without
a
particular
Grace
.
Nevertheless
,
as
he
had
a
Body
,
which
God
would
have
him
preserve
,
and
look
upon
,
as
part
of
himself
,
he
also
made
him
perceive
such
Pleasures
by
his
Senses
,
as
we
taste
in
the
use
of
things
,
that
are
proper
for
the
Preservation
of
Life
.
We
dare
not
decide
,
whether
the
first
Man
,
before
his
Fall
,
could
avoid
agreeable
,
or
disagreeable
Sensations
,
in
the
very
moment
that
the
Principal
part
of
his
Brain
was
mov'd
by
the
Actual
use
of
Sensible
Things
;
perhaps
,
he
had
this
Command
over
himself
,
because
of
his
Submission
to
God
,
yet
the
contrary
appears
more
probable
,
for
tho'
Adam
could
stay
the
Emotions
of
the
Spirits
and
Blood
,
and
the
Shaking
of
the
Brain
,
which
Objects
excited
in
him
,
because
not
being
yet
disordered
,
his
Body
was
necessarily
subject
to
his
Mind
:
Yet
't
is
not
likely
that
he
could
forbear
having
Sensations
of
Objects
,
at
such
time
as
he
had
not
stopt
the
Motions
which
they
produc'd
in
some
part
of
his
Body
,
to
which
his
Soul
was
immediately
United
;
for
the
Union
of
the
Soul
and
Body
,
consisting
chiefly
in
a
Mutual
Relation
between
the
Sensations
of
the
Soul
,
and
the
Motions
of
the
Organs
of
the
Body
,
it
appears
that
it
would
have
been
rather
Arbitrary
than
Natural
,
if
Adam
could
have
been
Insensible
,
when
the
chief
part
of
his
Body
receiv'd
some
Impression
from
External
Objects
;
but
I
forbear
making
my self
a
Party
in
these
two
Opinions
.
The
first
Man
then
took
Pleasure
in
that
which
added
Perfection
to
his
Body
,
even
as
in
that
which
did
so
to
his
Soul
;
and
because
he
was
in
a
perfect
State
,
he
found
the
Pleasure
of
the
Soul
much
greater
than
that
of
the
Body
;
so
that
it
was
much
easier
for
him
to
preserve
his
Righteousness
,
without
the
Grace
of
Jesus
Christ
,
than
it
is
for
us
,
since
without
it
we
feel
but
little
satisfaction
in
our
Duty
;
S.
Greg.
Hom.
39.
upon
the
Gospels
.
yet
he
suffer'd
himself
unhappily
to
be
Seduc'd
,
and
lost
his
Righteousness
by
his
Disobedience
;
and
the
principal
Change
which
happen'd
to
him
,
and
which
caus'd
all
the
Disorder
of
his
Senses
and
Passions
,
is
,
That
God
forsook
him
by
way
of
Punishment
,
and
would
no
longer
be
his
Good
,
or
,
rather
,
would
not
any
longer
make
him
sensible
of
that
Pleasure
which
assur'd
him
that
he
was
his
Good
:
So
that
Sensible
Pleasures
,
which
do
but
incline
a
Man
to
Corporeal
Good
,
remaining
only
,
and
being
no
longer
Counterballanc'd
by
these
,
which
formerly
carry'd
him
to
his
true
Good
,
the
strict
Union
which
he
had
with
God
is
strangely
weaken'd
,
and
that
which
he
had
with
his
Body
is
much
strengthned
;
Sensible
Pleasure
reigns
in
his
Corrupted
Heart
,
by
enslaving
him
to
all
Sensible
Objects
,
and
the
Corruption
of
his
Heart
hath
darkned
his
Mind
,
by
turning
it
aside
from
that
Light
which
Enlightens
it
,
and
inclining
it
to
Judge
only
of
Things
,
as
they
can
have
any
Relation
with
Bodies
.
But
after
all
,
we
cannot
say
that
there
was
any
great
Change
in
respect
of
the
Senses
,
't
is
as
if
two
Weights
hang'd
in
Aequilibrio
in
a
Ballance
,
and
I
should
take
something
from
one
of
them
,
the
other
would
weigh
down
,
without
any
Change
in
its
self
,
in
Relation
to
the
first
Weight
,
since
it
is
still
the
same
.
Thus
after
the
Fall
of
Adam
,
the
Pleasures
of
the
Senses
have
Sensualiz'd
the
Soul
,
for
want
of
those
Internal
Delights
,
which
before
Counterballanc'd
the
Inclination
we
have
for
Sensible
Goods
,
but
without
such
a
considerable
Change
in
the
Senses
as
is
commonly
imagin'd
.
But
to
come
to
the
second
way
of
Explaining
the
Disorders
of
Sin
,
and
which
is
certainly
more
Reasonable
than
the
preceeding
:
'T
is
very
different
from
the
former
,
because
it
depends
upon
a
different
Principle
,
however
they
both
agree
in
what
respects
the
Senses
.
Because
we
are
Compos'd
of
Mind
and
Body
,
we
have
two
sorts
of
Goods
to
enquire
after
,
viz.
Those
of
the
Mind
,
and
those
of
the
Body
.
We
have
also
two
ways
of
knowing
whether
a
thing
is
good
or
bad
for
us
,
by
the
Help
of
the
Mind
only
,
or
by
the
Assistance
of
the
Mind
and
Body
together
;
We
can
know
what
is
Good
for
us
,
by
a
clear
and
evident
Knowledge
,
as
also
by
a
Confus'd
Sensation
.
I
know
,
by
Reason
,
that
Justice
is
Amiable
;
I
also
know
,
by
Taste
,
that
such
Fruit
is
Good
:
The
Beauty
of
Justice
is
not
Tasted
,
the
Goodness
of
Fruit
is
not
known
by
Reason
,
the
Goods
of
the
Body
deserve
not
the
application
of
a
Mind
,
which
God
has
made
only
for
himself
;
the
Mind
then
must
receive
such
kind
of
Goods
,
by
a
short
and
Incontestable
Proof
of
Sensation
,
without
examining
any
further
:
Stones
are
improper
for
Nourishment
,
Experience
proves
it
,
and
Taste
alone
will
convince
all
Men
of
it
.
Pleasure
and
Pain
are
therefore
Natural
and
Indubitable
Characters
of
Good
and
Evil
,
I
confess
it
,
but
't
is
for
such
things
only
,
as
in
their
own
Nature
are
neither
good
nor
bad
,
nor
can
be
known
for
such
,
by
a
clear
and
distinct
Knowledge
;
and
't
is
only
for
such
things
,
that
,
being
below
the
Mind
of
Man
,
can
neither
Reward
nor
Punish
it
:
In
fine
,
't
is
for
such
things
only
,
as
are
unworthy
the
Application
of
the
Mind
;
and
about
which
,
God
being
unwilling
our
Mind
should
be
imploy'd
,
inclines
us
to
them
only
by
a
certain
Instinct
;
I
mean
,
by
agreeable
or
disagreeable
Sensations
.
But
as
for
God
,
who
is
only
the
true
Good
of
the
Mind
,
and
who
only
is
above
it
,
who
only
can
Reward
it
a
thousand
different
ways
,
who
is
only
worthy
its
Application
,
and
who
is
not
afraid
,
that
those
that
Love
him
,
should
not
find
him
Amiable
;
He
is
not
content
to
be
lov'd
with
a
Blind
Love
,
or
a
Love
of
Instinct
,
but
will
be
lov'd
with
a
Rational
Love
,
and
a
Love
of
Choice
.
If
the
Mind
saw
only
those
things
in
Objects
,
that
are
truly
there
,
with
adding
other
things
to
them
by
the
Imagination
,
which
really
are
not
,
it
would
find
much
difficulty
to
Love
,
or
make
Use
of
them
;
so
that
it
is
,
as
it
were
,
necessary
for
them
to
appear
agreeable
,
by
causing
Sensations
which
they
have
not
,
but
't
is
not
so
with
God
,
it
's
sufficient
to
see
him
as
he
is
,
to
incline
us
to
him
,
and
it
is
not
necessary
that
he
make
use
of
this
Instinct
of
Pleasure
,
as
a
kind
of
Artifice
,
to
draw
our
Love
to
him
,
without
his
deserving
it
.
Hence
we
must
conclude
,
that
Adam
was
not
carried
to
the
Love
of
God
,
and
his
Duty
,
by
[
](A51655-e18690-b)*
*
Soe
the
Explanations
.
prepossessed
Pleasure
,
because
the
Knowledge
which
he
had
of
God
,
as
his
Good
,
and
the
Joy
that
he
continually
felt
,
Deus
ab
initio
constituit
hominem
&
reliquit
illum
in
manu
consilii
sui
adjecit
mandata
&
precepta
sua
Ecc.
15.15
.
as
a
necessary
consequent
of
seeing
his
Happiness
,
in
being
United
to
God
,
might
suffice
to
keep
him
to
his
Duty
,
and
make
him
act
more
Deservingly
,
than
if
he
had
been
,
as
it
were
,
Determin'd
by
a
prepossess'd
Pleasure
.
After
this
manner
he
enjoy'd
full
Liberty
;
and
,
perhaps
,
't
was
in
this
Condition
that
the
Holy
Scripture
would
Represent
him
by
these
Words
,
God
made
Man
in
the
beginning
,
and
after
having
propos'd
his
Commandments
to
him
,
he
left
him
to
himself
;
that
is
,
without
determining
him
by
the
Sense
of
some
Prepossess'd
Pleasure
,
only
keeping
him
close
to
a
clear
Light
of
his
Happiness
and
Duty
.
But
Experience
hath
shown
the
frailty
of
Adam
,
in
so
Regulated
and
Happy
Estate
,
as
that
he
was
in
before
his
Fall
,
to
the
Shame
of
Free
Will
,
and
the
Glory
of
God
alone
.
But
it
cannot
be
said
that
Adam
was
inclin'd
to
seek
after
,
and
make
use
of
Sensible
Things
,
by
an
exact
Knowledge
of
the
Relation
they
might
have
with
his
Body
,
for
if
he
had
,
he
must
have
Examin'd
the
Configurations
of
the
parts
of
some
Fruit
,
with
all
the
parts
of
his
own
Body
,
and
the
Relation
resulting
from
both
,
to
be
able
to
Judge
,
whether
in
the
heat
of
his
Blood
,
and
a
thousand
other
Dispositions
of
his
Body
,
this
Fruit
would
be
proper
for
his
Nourishment
;
't
is
plain
,
that
his
Mind
was
intirely
imploy'd
upon
things
that
were
unworthy
its
application
,
and
even
unprositably
enough
,
because
he
was
not
long
preserv'd
after
this
manner
.
If
we
consider
then
,
that
the
Mind
of
Adam
was
not
Infinite
,
we
may
safely
say
,
that
he
knew
not
all
the
Properties
of
Bodies
that
were
about
him
,
since
't
is
manifest
that
they
are
Infinite
;
and
if
it
be
granted
,
which
cannot
reasonably
be
deny'd
,
that
his
Mind
was
not
made
to
Examine
the
Motions
and
Configurations
of
Matter
,
but
for
the
Contemplation
of
God
,
no
one
can
be
displeas'd
,
if
we
assert
,
that
it
was
biass'd
and
disorder'd
in
that
time
,
wherein
all
things
should
have
been
perfectly
well
order'd
,
if
he
had
been
oblig'd
to
turn
his
Mind
from
the
Consideration
of
the
Perfection
of
his
true
Good
,
to
Examine
the
Nature
of
some
Fruit
for
his
Nourishment
.
Adam
then
had
the
same
Sensations
as
we
have
,
which
suggested
to
him
what
was
necessary
for
his
Body
,
without
being
diverted
from
God
;
he
was
Sensible
of
Pleasures
as
we
are
,
and
even
of
Pains
,
or
prepossess'd
and
indeliberate
Aversions
,
but
these
Pleasures
and
Pains
could
not
Enslave
him
,
or
render
him
Unhappy
like
us
,
because
that
being
Absolute
Master
of
all
the
Motions
which
were
excited
in
his
Body
,
he
immediately
put
a
stop
to
them
,
if
he
only
wish'd
they
might
cease
,
and
certainly
he
always
wish'd
it
,
in
respect
of
Pain
.
How
happy
had
he
been
,
and
we
also
,
if
he
had
done
the
same
in
respect
of
Pleasure
,
and
if
he
had
not
voluntary
strayed
from
the
presence
of
his
God
,
by
suffering
his
Mind
to
be
taken
up
with
the
Beauty
,
and
expected
Sweetness
of
the
Forbidden
Fruit
,
or
,
perhaps
,
with
a
Presumptuous
Joy
that
was
excited
in
his
Soul
,
at
the
Consideration
of
his
Natural
Perfections
.
But
after
he
had
Sin'd
,
those
Pleasures
which
before
only
modestly
Accosted
him
,
and
those
Pains
,
which
without
disturbing
his
Felicity
,
only
put
him
in
mind
that
he
might
Fall
,
and
become
Miserable
,
were
not
any
longer
under
his
Command
,
his
Senses
and
Passions
Revolted
against
him
,
they
became
Irregular
,
and
made
him
,
like
us
,
a
Slave
to
all
Sensible
Things
.
Thus
the
Senses
and
Passions
,
do
not
derive
their
Origination
from
Sin
,
but
only
the
Power
they
have
of
Tyrannizing
over
Sinners
;
and
this
Power
has
not
so
much
disorder'd
the
Senses
,
as
the
Mind
and
Will
of
Men
,
which
ceasing
to
be
so
strictly
united
to
God
.
do
not
any
longer
receive
that
Light
and
Vigour
,
by
which
they
might
preserve
their
Liberty
and
Happiness
.
From
these
two
ways
of
Explaining
the
Disorders
of
Sin
,
we
may
easily
gather
,
A
Remedy
for
that
Disorder
which
Original
Sin
hath
caused
in
the
World
;
and
the
foundation
of
Christian
Morality
.
that
there
are
two
things
necessary
for
our
Recovery
.
The
first
is
,
That
we
must
lessen
that
Load
we
sink
under
,
and
which
drags
towards
Sensible
.
Goods
,
by
continually
Retrenching
our
Pleasures
,
and
Mortifying
our
Sensuality
with
Repentance
and
Circumcision
of
Heart
.
The
second
is
,
That
we
must
beg
the
Assistance
of
God's
Grace
,
and
that
prepossess'd
Delight
which
[
](A51655-e18850-b)*
*
See
the
Explanations
.
Jesus
Christ
hath
particularly
Merited
for
us
;
without
which
,
whatever
we
retrench
from
that
first
load
,
will
still
oppress
us
,
and
however
small
it
is
,
it
will
Infallibly
draw
into
Sin
and
Disorder
.
These
two
things
are
absolutely
Necessary
for
us
,
to
begin
and
persevere
in
our
Duty
;
Reason
,
as
we
have
show'd
,
does
perfectly
agree
with
the
Gospel
in
this
,
and
from
both
we
learn
,
that
Humility
,
Self-denial
,
and
the
Diminution
of
the
Power
of
Sin
,
are
necessary
Preparations
for
our
Recovery
,
by
the
Power
of
Grace
,
and
Re-union
with
God
.
But
in
our
present
State
,
tho'
we
are
continually
oblig'd
to
strive
against
our
Senses
,
yet
we
must
not
thence
conclude
,
that
they
are
absolutely
corrupted
and
deprav'd
;
for
if
we
consider
that
they
are
given
us
for
the
Preservation
of
our
Bodies
,
we
shall
find
that
they
admirably
well
perform
their
Duty
,
and
conduct
us
,
after
so
just
and
faithful
a
manner
,
for
the
end
we
receiv'd
them
,
that
it
seems
very
injurious
so
to
accuse
them
of
Corruption
and
Disorder
;
they
so
readily
inform
the
Soul
by
Pain
and
Pleasure
,
by
agreeable
and
disagreeable
Sensations
,
of
what
is
necessary
to
be
done
or
omitted
,
for
the
Preservation
of
Life
,
that
we
have
little
reason
to
say
,
this
order
and
exactness
is
the
Consequence
of
Sin
.
'T
is
not
our
Serser
,
but
our
all
use
of
our
L●hert●
that
●●
〈…〉
Our
Senses
then
are
not
so
deprav'd
as
is
imagin'd
,
but
the
inward
Constitution
of
our
Soul
;
't
is
our
Liberty
that
is
Corrupted
;
't
is
not
our
Senses
,
but
our
Will
that
deceives
us
,
by
its
precipitate
Judgments
.
For
Example
,
when
we
see
the
Light
,
't
is
certain
that
we
see
it
;
when
we
feel
Warmth
,
we
are
not
deceiv'd
,
if
we
believe
we
feel
it
,
whether
before
or
after
Sin
,
but
we
are
deceiv'd
,
when
we
judge
that
the
Heat
we
feel
is
out
of
the
Soul
that
feels
it
;
as
shall
be
Explained
hereafter
.
The
Senses
then
do
not
deceive
us
,
if
we
make
a
good
use
of
our
Liberty
,
and
if
we
accustom
not
our selves
,
upon
their
account
,
to
Judge
of
things
with
too
much
precipitation
;
but
since
it
is
very
difficult
to
refrain
from
it
,
and
we
are
,
as
it
were
,
constrain'd
thereto
,
because
of
the
strict
Union
between
our
Soul
and
Body
,
I
shall
lay
down
a
Method
to
conduct
us
in
our
use
of
them
,
so
as
to
avoid
Error
.
We
must
exactly
observe
this
Rule
,
A
Rule
to
avoid
Error
in
using
our
Senses
.
Never
to
Judge
by
the
Senses
,
of
things
as
they
are
in
themselves
,
but
only
of
the
Relation
that
they
have
between
themselves
;
for
,
indeed
,
they
are
not
given
us
to
know
the
Truth
of
Things
in
themselves
,
but
only
for
the
Conservation
of
our
Body
.
But
that
we
may
be
wholly
deliver'd
from
that
easiness
and
inclination
we
have
of
following
our
Senses
,
in
a
Search
after
Truth
,
we
shall
particularize
,
in
the
following
Chapters
,
some
of
the
chief
,
and
general
Errors
which
we
are
liable
to
;
whence
the
Truth
,
of
what
we
have
advanc'd
,
will
be
more
Evident
.
CHAP.
VI.
I.
Of
the
Errors
of
the
Sight
,
in
respect
of
Extension
,
consider'd
in
it self
.
II.
An
Enumeration
of
these
Errors
,
as
to
Invisible
Objects
.
III.
Of
the
Errors
of
the
Sight
,
concerning
Relative
Extension
.
SIght
is
the
first
,
the
most
Noble
,
and
most
Extensive
of
all
the
Senses
,
if
then
they
were
given
us
for
a
Discovery
of
Truth
,
this
alone
would
assist
us
more
than
all
the
others
together
;
So
that
if
we
can
destroy
that
Authority
,
which
our
Eyes
have
over
our
Reason
,
there
's
little
need
of
any
thing
else
to
undeceive
us
,
and
to
create
in
us
a
General
Diffidence
of
all
our
Senses
.
We
shall
then
show
,
that
we
must
not
rely
upon
the
Testimony
of
our
Sight
,
to
Judge
of
the
Truth
of
things
,
as
they
are
in
themselves
,
but
only
to
discover
what
Relation
they
have
to
the
Preservation
of
our
Body
;
that
our
Eyes
generally
deceive
in
all
they
represent
to
us
,
in
the
Greatness
of
Bodies
,
in
their
Figures
and
Motions
,
in
Light
and
Colours
,
which
are
the
only
things
we
see
;
that
all
these
things
are
not
what
they
really
appear
to
be
;
that
all
the
World
is
deceiv'd
in
them
,
and
by
this
Error
led
into
innumerable
others
.
We
shall
begin
with
Extension
,
and
produce
those
Proofs
which
incline
us
to
believe
,
that
we
never
see
any
thing
as
it
is
.
We
commonly
see
Animals
with
Microscopes
,
Of
the
Errors
of
Sight
in
respect
of
Extension
,
consider'd
in
it self
.
much
less
than
a
Grain
of
Sand
,
that
is
almost
Invisible
to
the
naked
Eye
;
[
](A51655-e19100-b)*
*
Journal
des
Scavans
du
12.
Nov
,
1668.
we
have
even
seen
some
a
thousand
times
yet
less
.
These
living
Atoms
walk
as
well
as
other
Animals
.
Then
they
have
Legs
,
and
Feet
,
and
Bones
in
these
Legs
to
uphold
them
,
Muscles
to
move
them
,
Tendons
,
and
an
infinite
Number
of
Fibres
in
each
Muscle
;
and
lastly
,
Blood
,
or
Animal
Spirits
,
extreamly
subtile
and
fine
,
to
fill
and
contribute
successive
Motion
to
these
Muscles
.
It
's
impossible
,
without
this
,
to
conceive
that
they
Live
,
are
Nourish'd
,
and
Transport
their
little
Bodies
into
different
Places
,
according
to
the
different
Impression
of
Objects
;
or
,
rather
,
't
is
impossible
that
even
those
,
who
have
employ'd
all
their
Life
time
in
Anatomy
,
and
an
Enquiry
into
Nature
,
should
represent
the
number
,
diversity
,
and
fineness
of
all
the
parts
whereof
these
little
Bodies
are
necessarily
Compos'd
,
to
make
them
live
,
and
execute
all
those
things
,
that
we
see
them
do
.
The
Imagination
is
lost
and
astonish'd
,
at
the
sight
of
so
surprizing
a
Smallness
;
it
cannot
apprehend
,
nor
take
hold
of
such
Parts
that
have
no
hold
for
it
;
and
altho'
Reason
convinces
us
of
the
Truth
of
what
we
have
said
,
yet
the
Senses
and
Imagination
oppose
it
,
and
often
compel
us
to
doubt
of
it
.
Our
Sight
is
extreamly
limited
,
but
we
must
not
limit
its
Object
,
the
Idea
which
it
gives
us
of
Extension
hath
very
narrow
Bounds
,
but
we
must
not
thence
conclude
,
that
Extension
hath
the
same
Bounds
;
it
is
,
doubtless
,
Infinite
in
one
Sense
,
and
this
little
part
of
Matter
,
that
is
hid
from
Eyes
,
is
capable
of
containing
a
World
,
in
which
there
are
as
many
things
,
tho'
much
less
in
Proportion
,
as
in
this
great
World
we
Inhabit
.
The
little
Animals
we
spoke
of
,
have
,
perhaps
,
other
little
Animals
,
which
they
devour
,
that
are
Imperceptible
,
because
of
their
Stupendious
Smallness
.
That
which
is
a
Handworm
,
in
respect
of
us
,
these
Animals
are
so
in
respect
of
it
;
and
,
perhaps
,
there
are
in
Nature
yet
lesser
and
lesser
,
ad
infinitum
,
in
so
strange
a
Proportion
as
this
,
betwixt
a
Man
and
a
Handworm
.
We
have
Evident
,
and
Mathematical
Demonstrations
,
of
the
infinite
Divisibility
of
Matter
,
and
this
is
sufficient
to
incline
us
to
believe
,
that
there
may
be
Animals
lesser
and
lesser
,
ad
Infinitum
,
altho'
out
Imagination
is
lost
in
the
Thought
.
God
made
Matter
only
to
form
Admirable
Works
thereof
,
and
since
we
are
certain
there
are
no
Particles
,
whose
Smallness
is
capable
of
limiting
his
Power
in
the
formation
of
those
little
Animals
,
why
do
we
unreasonably
limit
and
diminish
the
Idea
we
have
of
an
Infinite
Creator
,
by
measuring
his
Power
and
Operations
by
our
Finite
Understanding
?
Experience
has
already
undeceived
us
in
part
,
by
shewing
us
Animals
a
thousand
times
less
than
a
Hand-worm
,
why
would
we
have
them
to
be
the
last
and
least
of
all
?
for
my
part
I
see
no
reason
to
imagine
it
,
on
the
contrary
,
it
's
much
more
probable
to
believe
,
that
there
are
some
yet
much
lesser
than
those
we
have
discovered
;
for
indeed
those
little
Animals
are
not
so
much
wanting
for
Microscopes
,
as
Microscopes
for
them
.
When
we
examine
the
[
](A51655-e19190-b)*
*
Principle
of
Generation
.
Germ
(
in
the
midst
of
Winter
)
taken
out
of
the
Bole
of
Tulip
,
either
by
the
Naked
Eye
,
or
a
Convex
Glass
we
very
easily
discover
leaves
in
it
that
will
become
green
,
those
that
are
to
compose
the
Flower
of
the
Tulip
,
that
little
Triangular
part
which
encloses
the
Seed
,
and
the
six
little
Columns
which
encompass
it
at
the
bottom
of
the
Tulip
;
so
that
we
cannot
doubt
but
the
Germ
in
the
Bole
of
the
Tulip
contains
a
whole
Tulip
.
It
is
reasonable
to
believe
the
same
of
the
Germ
of
a
Grain
of
Mustard
,
that
of
the
Kernel
of
an
Apple
,
and
generally
of
all
sorts
of
Trees
and
Plants
,
although
undiscoverable
by
the
Naked
Eye
,
nor
even
with
a
Microscope
;
and
it
may
be
confidently
said
,
that
all
Trees
are
contain'd
in
little
in
the
Germ
of
their
Seed
.
It
does
not
appear
unreasonable
to
think
that
there
are
an
infinite
number
of
Trees
in
one
single
Germ
,
since
it
does
not
only
contain
the
Tree
whose
Seed
it
is
,
but
also
a
great
number
of
other
Seeds
,
which
may
also
include
in
themselves
new
Trees
,
and
new
Seeds
of
Trees
,
which
last
also
may
contain
other
Trees
and
Seeds
as
fruitful
as
the
first
,
and
thus
on
ad
infinitum
.
So
that
according
to
this
Opinion
,
which
cannot
appear
impertinent
or
ridiculous
to
any
,
but
those
who
measure
the
Wonders
of
the
Almighty
Power
of
God
after
the
Idea's
of
their
own
Senses
and
Imaginations
,
one
might
say
,
that
in
one
Kernel
only
of
an
Apple
there
might
be
Apple-Trees
,
Apples
,
and
Seeds
of
Apple-Trees
for
almost
infinite
Ages
,
in
the
proportion
of
a
perfect
Apple-Tree
to
an
Apple-Tree
in
its
Seed
;
and
that
Nature
does
only
unfold
these
little
Trees
by
administring
a
sensible
growth
to
that
which
is
out
of
its
Seed
,
and
an
insensible
,
but
real
growth
,
proportionable
to
their
bigness
,
to
those
which
we
may
conceive
to
be
their
Seeds
;
for
we
cannot
doubt
but
that
there
may
be
Bodies
small
enough
to
insinuate
themselves
in
the
Fibres
of
these
Trees
,
which
we
may
conceive
to
be
their
Seeds
,
and
by
that
means
to
nourish
them
.
What
we
have
said
of
Plants
and
their
Germs
,
may
be
also
applied
to
Animals
,
and
the
Germ
of
which
they
are
produc'd
;
We
see
in
the
Germ
of
a
Tulip's
Bole
,
an
entire
Tulip
;
[
](A51655-e19330-b)*
*
The
Germ
〈…〉
〈…〉
.
we
also
see
in
the
Germ
of
a
new
laid
Egg
,
a
Chicken
perhaps
entirely
formed
,
although
it
has
not
been
hatch'd
.
We
discover
Frogs
in
the
Eggs
of
Frogs
,
and
other
Animals
besides
,
even
in
their
Germ
,
upon
a
Curious
Inquisition
;
but
when
the
Eyes
of
the
Body
can
pierce
no
deeper
,
the
Eyes
of
the
Mind
must
not
be
limited
,
[
](A51655-e19370-b)*
*
V●●●
.
De
〈…〉
,
M.
〈…〉
.
being
much
more
extended
.
We
suppose
then
,
that
all
the
Bodies
of
Men
and
Animals
,
which
shall
be
produc'd
till
the
Consummation
of
Ages
,
have
probably
been
produc'd
from
the
Creation
of
the
World
;
[
](A51655-e19380-b)*
*
〈…〉
.
I
mean
,
the
first
Female
Animals
were
perhaps
Created
with
all
those
of
the
same
Species
which
they
have
,
and
shall
Engender
to
the
end
of
the
World
.
We
might
carry
this
Thought
yet
farther
,
and
possibly
with
much
Reason
and
Truth
,
but
we
think
it
not
safe
to
search
too
deep
into
the
Works
of
God
,
which
are
altogether
infinite
;
not
only
our
Senses
and
Imagination
are
limited
in
their
Comprehension
,
but
also
the
pure
Mind
wholly
disengag'd
from
Matter
,
is
too
gross
and
feeble
to
penetrate
into
the
least
of
his
Works
,
't
is
lost
and
dissipated
,
dazled
and
affrighted
at
the
sight
of
what
we
call
an
Atome
,
according
to
the
Language
of
the
Senses
;
but
the
pure
Mind
has
always
this
advantage
above
the
Imagination
and
Senses
,
that
it
knows
its
own
weakness
,
and
the
greatness
of
God
;
that
it
perceives
the
infinity
in
which
it
is
lost
,
whereas
our
Imagination
and
Senses
debase
the
Works
of
God
,
and
raise
in
us
a
foolish
Considence
,
which
blindly
precipitates
us
into
Error
.
Our
Eyes
beget
in
us
no
Idea
of
all
these
things
that
we
discover
by
Microscopes
or
by
Reason
;
we
see
no
less
a
Body
with
our
Eyes
than
a
Worm
in
the
Skin
or
a
Mite
,
the
half
of
which
is
nothing
,
if
compar'd
with
our selves
:
A
Mite
is
but
as
a
Mathematick
Point
in
respect
of
us
,
it
cannot
be
divided
,
but
it
must
be
anni●●●lated
;
Our
Sight
then
does
not
represent
Extension
to
us
,
as
it
is
in
it self
,
but
according
to
what
it
is
in
proportion
to
our
Body
,
and
because
the
half
of
a
Mite
bears
no
proportion
to
our
Body
,
and
can
neither
profit
nor
injure
it
,
therefore
we
can't
see
it
.
But
if
our
Eyes
were
made
as
Microscopes
,
or
rather
,
if
they
were
as
small
as
those
of
Hand-worms
or
Mites
,
we
should
judge
otherwise
of
the
magnitude
of
Bodies
,
for
without
doubt
these
little
Animals
have
Eyes
qualified
to
see
all
that
is
about
them
,
as
also
their
own
Body
in
a
much
larger
proportion
than
we
see
it
,
if
not
they
would
not
receive
those
impressions
that
are
necessary
for
the
preservation
of
themselves
,
and
then
their
Eyes
would
be
wholly
useless
.
To
explain
these
things
thoroughly
,
we
must
consider
,
that
our
own
Eyes
are
indeed
nothing
else
but
Natural
Spectacles
,
that
their
Humours
produce
the
same
Effect
,
as
the
Glasses
in
Spectacles
,
and
that
according
to
the
Figure
of
the
Chrystaline
Humour
,
and
its
distance
from
the
Retina
,
we
see
Objects
very
differently
;
insomuch
,
that
we
are
certain
there
are
not
two
Men
in
the
World
,
who
see
things
in
the
same
bigness
,
unless
their
Eyes
were
in
all
respects
alike
.
This
is
a
Proposition
that
must
be
received
by
all
those
that
study
Opticks
,
viz.
That
Equidistant
Objects
appear
so
much
the
greater
,
by
how
much
the
Image
of
them
is
painted
greater
in
the
inward
part
of
the
Eye
.
Now
't
is
certain
,
that
those
Eyes
whose
Crystaline
Humour
is
more
Convex
,
have
lesser
Images
depai●ted
in
'em
,
in
proportion
to
their
Convexity
;
Those
then
who
are
the
nearest
sighted
,
having
the
Chrystaline
Humour
more
Convex
,
see
Objects
in
a
lesser
proportion
than
old
Men
who
have
occasion
for
Spectacles
in
Reading
,
or
those
who
have
common
Convexity
,
and
see
very
well
at
a
distance
.
All
these
things
are
easily
demonstrated
Geometrically
,
and
if
they
were
not
commonly
known
,
we
should
insist
the
longer
upon
them
;
but
because
many
have
treated
upon
these
Matters
,
those
that
would
be
better
inform'd
are
desir'd
to
consult
Authors
upon
it
.
Since
't
is
certain
that
there
are
not
two
Men
in
the
World
who
see
Objects
in
the
same
bigness
,
and
that
commonly
the
[
](A51655-e19460-b)*
*
See
the
Journal
des
Scavans
du
Mois
de
Janvier
,
1969.
same
Person
sees
the
same
things
greater
with
one
Eye
than
another
;
't
is
plain
that
we
are
not
to
trust
to
the
proportion
of
things
which
our
Eyes
represent
to
us
,
we
must
rather
consult
our
Reason
,
which
proves
,
that
we
cannot
determine
the
absolute
bigness
of
Bodies
that
are
about
us
,
nor
what
Idea
we
ought
to
have
of
the
Extension
of
a
Foot
Square
,
or
of
that
of
our
own
Body
,
so
as
that
this
Idea
should
truly
represent
it
to
us
;
for
Reason
tells
us
,
that
the
least
of
all
Bodies
,
consider'd
in
it self
,
would
not
be
little
,
since
it
is
compos'd
of
an
infinite
number
of
parts
,
out
of
every
one
of
which
God
could
form
a
World
,
which
would
be
but
as
a
Point
in
respect
of
all
the
rest
joined
together
.
Thus
the
Mind
of
Man
is
incapable
of
forming
an
Idea
great
enough
to
comprehend
the
least
Extension
in
the
World
since
it
is
limited
,
but
the
Idea
of
Matter
is
infinite
.
It
is
true
,
the
Mind
can
very
near
apprehend
the
proportions
,
that
are
betwixt
these
Infinites
whereof
the
World
is
Compos'd
,
that
one
,
for
Instance
,
is
the
double
of
another
,
that
a
[
](A51655-e19480-b)*
*
A
French
Measure
.
Toise
contains
6
Feet
,
yet
we
cannot
form
an
Idea
that
represents
what
these
things
are
in
themselves
.
We
'll
suppose
,
that
the
Mind
is
susceptible
of
those
Idea's
,
which
are
equal
to
,
or
which
measure
the
Extension
of
Bodies
that
we
see
,
for
it
would
be
very
difficult
to
perswade
Men
to
the
contrary
;
Let
us
examine
then
what
may
be
concluded
from
this
Supposition
;
This
doubtless
,
that
God
does
not
deceive
us
,
that
he
has
not
given
us
Eyes
like
Convex
Glasses
to
enlarge
or
diminish
Objects
,
therefore
we
must
believe
that
our
Eyes
represents
things
as
they
are
.
It
is
true
God
never
deceives
us
,
but
we
often
deceive
our selves
in
judging
of
things
with
too
much
precipitation
;
for
we
often
judge
that
Objects
,
whereof
we
have
Idea's
,
do
exist
,
and
that
they
perfectly
resemble
our
Idea's
;
yet
it
frequently
happens
,
that
the
Objects
are
either
unlike
our
Idea's
,
or
else
have
no
Existence
at
all
:
so
that
if
we
have
an
Idea
of
any
thing
,
it
does
not
follow
from
thence
,
that
such
a
thing
exists
,
much
less
,
that
it
should
wholly
resemble
the
Idea
we
have
of
it
;
for
altho'
God
produces
in
us
such
a
sensible
Idea
of
Magnitude
,
when
a
Toise
is
before
our
Eyes
,
it
follows
not
from
thence
,
that
this
Toise
hath
only
the
Extension
,
which
by
this
Idea
is
represented
to
us
.
For
,
first
,
all
Men
have
not
the
Sensible
Idea
of
this
Toise
,
since
all
have
not
their
Eyes
dispos'd
after
the
same
manner
.
Secondly
,
even
the
same
Person
has
not
the
same
Sensible
Idea
thereof
,
when
it
is
seen
with
one
Eye
,
and
then
with
the
other
,
as
we
Instanc'd
before
.
Lastly
,
it
often
happens
that
the
same
Person
,
hath
very
different
Idea's
of
the
same
Objects
at
different
times
,
according
as
he
believes
them
to
be
nearer
,
or
farther
off
him
;
which
shall
be
elsewhere
Explain'd
.
'T
is
then
an
unreasonable
Prejudice
,
to
believe
that
we
see
Bodies
according
in
their
just
bigness
,
for
our
Eyes
being
only
given
us
for
the
Preservation
of
our
Body
,
they
very
well
discharge
their
Office
,
when
they
cause
those
Idea's
of
Objects
in
us
,
that
are
proportionate
to
the
bigness
of
it
.
But
that
we
may
the
better
comprehend
how
we
ought
to
Judge
of
the
Extension
of
Bodies
,
in
Relation
to
the
Testimony
of
our
Eyes
,
let
us
imagine
,
that
God
had
created
a
Heaven
,
and
an
Earth
,
of
a
Portion
of
Matter
as
little
as
a
Hand
Ball
;
and
Men
,
upon
this
Earth
,
in
the
same
Proportions
with
those
in
our
Great
World
:
These
little
Men
would
see
one
another
,
and
the
parts
of
their
own
Bodies
,
as
also
the
little
Animals
,
which
would
be
capable
of
incommoding
them
,
or
else
their
Eyes
would
be
useless
as
to
their
Preservation
.
Upon
this
Supposition
it
is
Evident
,
that
these
little
Men
would
have
Idea's
,
as
to
the
bigness
of
Bodies
,
very
different
from
those
that
we
have
of
them
,
since
they
would
have
Relation
to
their
Little
World
,
which
,
tho'
as
a
Ball
,
in
respect
of
ours
,
they
would
look
upon
as
surrounded
with
infinite
Spaces
,
such
as
we
imagine
about
ours
.
Or
,
if
it
may
more
easily
be
conceiv'd
,
let
us
suppose
that
God
had
made
a
World
infinitely
greater
than
ours
,
so
that
this
New
World
should
be
,
in
respect
of
ours
,
as
ours
was
in
comparison
of
that
which
we
suppos'd
before
.
Let
us
also
suppose
,
that
God
had
observ'd
the
same
Proportion
,
in
all
the
Parts
of
this
New
World
,
as
he
had
done
in
ours
;
It
's
manifest
,
that
the
Men
of
this
last
World
would
be
greater
than
is
the
Space
betwixt
our
Earth
,
and
the
most
distant
Stars
that
we
see
;
this
being
suppos'd
,
if
they
had
the
same
Idea
of
the
Extension
of
Bodies
as
we
have
,
they
could
not
distinguish
even
some
parts
of
their
own
Body
,
and
would
see
some
others
of
prodigious
greatness
:
So
that
't
is
ridiculous
to
think
,
that
they
would
see
things
of
the
same
bigness
as
we
see
them
.
'T
is
evident
,
from
these
two
Suppositions
,
that
the
Men
of
the
Great
,
or
Little
World
,
would
have
very
different
Notions
,
about
the
greatness
of
Bodies
,
to
what
we
have
,
supposing
only
,
that
their
Eyes
gave
them
Idea's
of
the
Objects
,
that
were
about
them
,
proportionably
in
bigness
to
their
own
Bodies
;
Now
if
these
Men
were
much
assur'd
,
upon
the
Testimony
of
their
own
Eyes
,
that
Bodies
were
as
big
as
they
saw
them
,
it
's
evident
they
would
be
deceiv'd
,
and
no
body
can
doubt
of
it
;
yet
,
it
's
certain
,
they
would
have
full
as
much
reason
as
we
,
to
defend
their
Opinion
,
let
us
therefore
,
at
least
,
by
the
Example
of
this
Error
,
apprehend
our selves
to
be
very
uncertain
of
the
greatness
of
those
Bodies
that
we
see
,
and
that
all
we
can
know
by
sight
,
is
the
proportion
that
they
have
to
our
Bodies
.
In
a
word
,
that
our
Eyes
are
not
given
us
to
Judge
of
the
Truth
of
things
,
but
only
to
discern
those
things
that
may
either
Profit
,
or
Injure
us
.
But
Men
do
not
only
trust
their
Eyes
in
Judging
of
Visible
,
but
also
of
Invisible
Objects
;
they
even
conclude
,
that
nothing
exists
which
they
see
not
,
thus
arrogating
to
their
Sight
a
certain
infinite
perspicacity
.
'T
is
this
which
hinders
them
from
knowing
the
true
Causes
of
many
Natural
Effects
:
If
they
attribute
them
to
certain
Faculties
,
and
imaginary
Qualities
,
the
common
Reason
is
,
because
they
do
not
see
the
real
ones
,
which
consist
in
the
different
Configurations
of
these
Bodies
.
For
Example
,
They
see
not
the
Particles
of
Air
and
Flame
,
much
less
those
of
Light
,
or
of
other
Matter
yet
more
Subtile
;
and
this
inclines
them
to
believe
they
do
not
exist
,
or
at
least
,
to
judge
they
have
neither
Power
nor
Action
;
they
have
recourse
to
occult
Qualities
,
or
imaginary
Faculties
,
to
explain
all
the
effects
whereof
these
imperceptible
Particles
are
the
Natural
Cause
.
They
choose
rather
to
have
recourse
to
the
Horrour
of
a
Vacuum
,
for
explaining
the
Elevation
of
the
Water
in
Pumps
,
than
to
the
Weight
of
the
Air
;
to
the
Qualities
of
the
Moon
,
for
the
Flux
and
Reflux
of
the
Sea
,
than
to
the
pressure
of
the
Air
which
environs
the
Earth
;
to
attractive
Faculties
in
the
Sun
,
for
the
Elevation
of
Vapours
,
than
to
the
Simple
Motion
or
Impulsion
,
caus'd
by
the
parts
of
Subtile
Matter
,
which
are
continually
dispers'd
by
the
Sun
.
They
look
upon
that
as
an
Impertinent
Opinion
,
which
has
recourse
to
Flesh
and
Blood
,
to
solve
the
Motions
of
Animals
,
their
Habits
,
or
the
Corporeal
Memory
of
Man
,
which
is
owning
,
in
part
,
to
this
,
that
they
conceive
the
Brain
to
be
very
little
,
and
consequently
,
insufficient
to
conserve
the
traces
of
an
almost
infinite
number
of
things
,
which
are
there
;
they
are
willing
to
believe
,
tho'
they
know
not
how
to
conceive
it
,
that
Beasts
have
a
certain
Soul
which
is
neither
Body
nor
Mind
;
as
also
,
that
there
are
Qualities
,
and
Intentional
Species
,
to
solve
the
Habits
and
Memory
of
Men
,
and
such
other
like
things
,
of
which
they
have
no
particular
Notion
in
their
Minds
.
It
would
take
up
too
much
time
to
enumerate
the
Errors
which
this
prejudice
begets
in
us
,
almost
all
the
Errors
in
Physicks
are
owing
to
it
,
and
whoever
attentively
considers
it
,
will
be
amaz'd
thereat
.
Altho'
I
'm
unwilling
to
insist
much
upon
this
head
,
yet
I
can't
but
take
notice
of
the
Contempt
which
Men
commonly
have
for
Insects
,
and
other
little
Animals
,
which
are
generated
,
as
they
say
,
out
of
Corrupted
Matter
;
this
is
an
unjust
Contempt
,
which
is
founded
only
upon
the
Ignorance
of
the
thing
despis'd
,
and
the
prejudices
already
mention'd
.
There
is
nothing
Contemptible
in
Nature
,
all
the
Works
of
God
are
worthy
our
respect
and
admiration
,
especially
if
we
consider
the
admirable
ways
by
which
God
makes
and
preserves
them
.
The
least
Flies
are
as
perfect
Animals
as
the
biggest
Creatures
,
the
proportion
of
their
Members
is
as
Just
as
those
of
the
others
,
and
it
even
seems
,
that
God
has
given
them
more
Ornaments
to
recompence
the
littleness
of
their
Bodies
;
they
have
Crowns
,
Helmets
,
and
other
Curiosities
,
on
their
Heads
,
which
outdo
the
most
Luxuriant
Fancies
of
Men
;
and
I
may
confidently
aver
,
that
they
who
have
never
seen
any
thing
but
with
their
naked
Eye
,
have
never
beheld
any
thing
so
fine
,
so
exact
,
and
even
so
magnificent
,
in
the
Houses
of
the
greatest
Princes
,
as
what
we
discover
with
Microscopes
upon
the
Head
of
a
silly
Fly
.
It
's
true
,
these
things
are
very
small
,
but
yet
the
more
surprizing
,
because
there
are
so
many
Beauties
crouded
in
so
small
a
Space
,
and
altho'
they
are
very
common
,
yet
they
are
not
the
less
valuable
,
nor
less
perfect
in
themselves
;
on
the
contrary
,
the
Wisdom
of
God
is
more
apparent
,
who
hath
with
so
much
Magnificence
and
Profusion
,
perform'd
almost
an
infinite
number
of
Miracles
in
Creating
them
.
Nevertheless
,
our
Sight
reaches
not
these
Beauties
,
but
makes
us
despise
the
Works
of
God
,
so
worthy
our
admiration
;
and
because
these
Animals
are
little
,
in
comparison
of
our
Bodies
,
it
makes
us
consider
them
as
absolutely
little
and
contemptible
,
because
of
their
sm●llness
,
as
if
Bodies
could
be
little
in
themselves
.
Let
us
then
endeavour
to
distrust
the
Impressions
of
our
Senses
,
in
Judging
about
the
bigness
of
Bodies
;
and
when
we
say
,
for
Example
,
that
a
Bird
is
little
,
let
us
not
absolutely
understand
it
to
be
so
,
because
nothing
is
either
great
or
little
in
it self
.
Even
a
Bird
is
great
,
in
comparison
of
a
Fly
,
but
little
in
respect
of
our
Bodies
,
but
it
does
not
follow
that
it
is
so
absolutely
,
for
our
Body
is
not
the
Standard
Measure
of
other
Bodies
,
it
's
but
very
small
in
relation
to
the
Earth
,
and
that
in
relation
to
the
Circle
,
which
the
Sun
or
the
Earth
describes
,
one
about
the
other
,
and
this
Circle
,
in
comparison
of
the
Space
betwixt
us
and
the
fixt
Stars
;
and
thus
we
may
still
imagine
Spaces
larger
and
larger
,
ad
Infinitum
.
But
we
must
not
think
that
our
Senses
give
us
the
just
proportion
that
Bodies
have
to
one
another
,
III.
Of
the
Error
of
our
Eyes
,
about
Extension
of
Bodies
,
in
relation
to
one
another
.
for
exactness
is
not
essential
to
Sensible
Knowledge
,
which
is
only
useful
for
the
Preservation
of
Life
:
It
's
true
,
we
know
precisely
enough
the
proportion
that
Bodies
have
one
with
another
,
if
they
be
near
us
,
but
we
know
little
of
the
proportion
that
distant
Bodies
have
,
because
they
have
little
relation
to
our
Body
.
The
Idea
of
bigness
which
we
have
at
the
sight
of
some
Body
,
diminishes
in
proportion
,
to
the
condition
that
this
Body
is
in
of
hurting
us
,
and
this
Idea
is
presently
enlarg'd
as
Bodies
approach
us
,
or
rather
,
as
the
relation
they
have
with
our
Body
,
encreases
.
Lastly
,
this
Relation
wholly
ceases
,
I
mean
,
if
any
Body
is
so
little
,
or
distant
from
us
,
that
it
cannot
hurt
us
,
we
have
no
more
any
Sensation
of
it
.
So
that
by
the
Eye
,
we
may
sometimes
judge
very
near
of
the
proportion
that
some
Bodies
have
with
ours
,
as
also
,
of
that
they
have
among
themselves
,
but
we
must
never
believe
them
to
be
of
that
bigness
which
they
appear
to
us
.
Our
Eyes
,
for
Example
,
represent
the
Sun
and
Moon
about
the
bigness
of
one
or
two
Feet
over
,
but
we
must
not
imagine
,
as
Epicurus
and
Lucretius
did
,
that
they
are
really
of
this
bigness
;
the
Moon
appears
much
greater
to
the
Sight
than
the
fix'd
Stars
,
tho'
it
's
certain
,
that
in
comparison
of
them
,
it
is
very
small
.
Thus
,
likewise
,
we
see
every
day
,
upon
the
Earth
,
two
or
more
things
,
whose
bigness
we
cannot
truly
discover
,
because
it
's
necessary
to
have
their
true
distance
before
we
Judge
of
them
,
which
is
very
difficult
to
know
.
We
have
the
same
trouble
to
make
a
certain
Judgment
of
the
Proportion
of
two
Bodies
,
which
are
close
to
us
,
they
must
be
taken
in
our
hands
,
and
compar'd
together
;
and
after
all
,
we
frequently
remain
doubtful
about
them
.
This
is
evident
,
when
we
would
examine
two
pieces
of
Money
,
which
are
almost
equal
,
for
then
we
are
oblig'd
to
place
them
one
upon
another
,
to
try
,
by
a
surer
way
than
the
bare
sight
,
wh●ther
they
are
equal
or
not
.
Hence
we
conclude
,
that
our
sight
does
not
only
deceive
us
,
in
respect
of
the
bigness
of
Bodies
,
as
they
are
in
themselves
,
but
also
in
the
Proportion
which
they
have
when
compar'd
together
.
CHAP.
VII
.
I.
Of
the
Errors
of
Sight
,
in
respect
of
Figures
.
II.
We
have
no
Knowledge
of
the
least
Things
.
III.
The
Knowledge
we
have
of
the
greatest
Things
is
not
exact
.
IV.
An
Explication
of
certain
Natural
Judgments
which
keep
us
from
being
deceiv'd
.
V.
That
these
very
Judgments
deceive
us
in
particular
Occurrences
.
OUR
Sight
deceives
us
less
in
the
Representation
of
Figures
,
I.
Of
the
Errors
of
Sight
concerning
Figures
.
than
of
all
other
things
,
because
a
Figure
,
consider'd
in
it self
,
is
absolutely
nothing
,
and
because
its
Nature
consists
only
in
the
Relation
that
is
betwixt
the
Parts
which
terminate
some
Space
,
and
a
Point
which
is
conceiv'd
in
this
Space
,
and
which
may
be
call'd
,
as
in
a
Circle
,
the
Centre
of
the
Figure
;
yet
we
are
deceiv'd
a
thousand
ways
in
Figures
,
and
we
have
never
any
exact
Knowledge
of
them
by
the
Senses
.
We
shall
now
prove
,
II.
That
we
have
no
Knowledge
of
the
smallest
things
.
that
our
Sight
reaches
not
all
sort
of
Extension
,
but
that
only
which
hath
a
very
considerable
Relation
with
our
Body
;
and
for
this
reason
,
we
see
not
all
the
parts
of
the
least
Animals
,
or
those
that
compose
hard
or
liquid
Bodies
.
So
that
being
unable
to
perceive
all
these
Parts
,
because
of
their
smallness
,
it
follows
,
that
we
cannot
perceive
their
Figures
,
since
the
Figure
of
a
Body
is
only
the
Term
that
limits
it
.
There
are
then
an
infinite
number
of
Figures
,
and
even
of
the
greatest
,
which
our
Eyes
discover
not
to
us
,
and
therefore
they
incline
the
Mind
,
which
relies
too
much
upon
their
Capaciousness
,
and
which
does
not
sufficiently
examine
things
,
to
believe
that
these
Figures
do
not
Exist
.
As
for
Bodies
,
that
are
accommodated
to
our
Sight
,
III.
That
the
Knowledge
we
have
of
the
greatest
is
not
exact
.
which
are
very
few
in
number
in
comparison
of
others
,
we
discover
their
Figure
very
near
,
but
we
never
know
it
exactly
by
the
Senses
,
we
can't
even
be
assur'd
,
by
the
Sight
,
whether
a
Circle
or
a
Square
,
which
are
two
of
the
most
Simple
Figures
,
are
not
an
Ellipse
or
a
Parallelogram
,
altho'
we
had
these
Figures
in
our
Hands
,
and
as
near
our
Eyes
as
we
pleas'd
.
Moreover
,
we
can't
exactly
distinguish
whether
a
Line
is
right
or
not
;
especially
,
if
it
be
pretty
long
,
we
must
have
a
Rule
for
that
.
But
why
?
We
know
not
whether
the
Rule
it self
is
such
as
we
suppose
it
should
be
,
and
we
cannot
absolutely
assure
our selves
thereof
:
Yet
without
the
Knowledge
of
a
Line
,
another
Figure
can
never
be
known
,
as
is
evident
to
all
that
know
what
Figures
are
.
This
is
what
may
in
general
be
said
of
Figures
that
are
in
our
Hands
,
and
before
our
Eyes
,
but
if
they
are
supposed
at
a
distance
from
us
,
how
great
a
Change
should
we
find
in
the
Projection
they
make
upon
the
bottom
of
our
Eyes
?
I
'm
unwilling
to
describe
them
here
,
they
are
easily
Learn'd
in
any
Book
of
Opticks
,
or
by
examining
Figures
in
Picture
:
For
since
Painters
are
oblig'd
to
change
them
almost
every
where
that
they
may
appear
Natural
,
and
to
Paint
,
for
Example
,
Circles
like
Ellipses
,
't
is
an
Infallible
Mark
of
our
Errors
,
in
seeing
Objects
which
are
not
Painted
;
but
these
Errors
are
corrected
by
new
Sensations
,
which
may
be
look'd
upon
as
a
kind
of
Natural
Judgments
,
and
which
might
be
call'd
the
Judgments
of
the
Senses
.
When
we
behold
a
Cube
,
IV.
An
Explication
of
certain
Natural
Judgments
which
guard
us
from
Error
.
for
Example
,
't
is
certain
that
all
the
sides
,
or
Images
of
equal
bigness
with
them
,
are
never
Projected
on
the
bottom
of
our
Eyes
,
since
the
Image
of
every
one
of
these
sides
which
is
Painted
upon
the
Retina
,
or
Optic
Nerve
,
is
exactly
like
a
Cube
Painted
in
Perspective
;
nevertheless
,
we
see
them
all
equal
,
and
are
not
deceiv'd
.
Now
it
may
be
said
,
that
this
happens
by
a
kind
of
Judgment
which
we
make
Naturally
,
viz.
that
the
most
distant
Faces
of
a
Cube
must
not
Project
such
great
Images
,
upon
the
bottom
of
the
Eye
,
as
those
Faces
which
are
nearer
,
as
the
Senses
only
Perceive
,
but
never
Judge
,
to
speak
properly
:
'T
is
certain
that
this
Judgment
is
nothing
but
a
compounded
Sensation
,
which
consequently
may
be
sometimes
false
.
However
,
V.
That
these
Judgments
deceive
us
in
some
particular
Occurrences
.
that
which
is
nothing
else
but
Sensation
in
us
,
may
be
consider'd
in
respect
of
the
Author
of
Nature
,
who
excites
it
in
us
as
a
kind
of
Judgment
.
I
speak
sometimes
of
Sensations
as
of
Natural
Judgments
,
because
this
way
of
speaking
serves
to
give
a
reason
of
Things
,
as
may
be
seen
here
,
in
the
Ninth
Chapter
towards
the
end
,
and
in
many
other
places
.
Altho'
these
Judgments
,
which
I
have
spoke
of
,
are
useful
to
correct
our
Senses
very
many
ways
,
and
that
without
them
we
should
very
frequently
be
deceiv'd
,
yet
they
are
also
occasions
of
Error
.
For
Instance
,
If
it
happens
that
we
see
the
top
of
a
high
Steeple
,
behind
a
great
Wall
or
a
Mountain
,
it
will
appear
very
near
to
us
,
and
very
little
,
but
if
afterwards
we
should
see
it
,
at
the
same
distance
,
yet
with
many
Fields
and
Houses
betwixt
,
it
would
,
doubtless
,
appear
the
greater
,
and
at
a
farther
distance
,
altho'
,
in
each
Station
,
the
Projection
of
the
Rays
of
the
Spire
,
or
its
Image
,
which
is
Painted
at
the
bottom
of
our
Eyes
,
would
be
altogether
the
same
.
Now
,
it
may
be
said
,
that
we
see
it
greater
,
because
of
a
Judgment
that
we
Naturally
make
,
viz.
that
since
there
is
so
much
Land
betwixt
us
and
the
Steeple
,
it
must
be
further
,
and
consequently
greater
.
But
on
the
contrary
,
if
we
saw
no
Fields
betwixt
us
and
the
Steeple
,
altho'
we
even
knew
there
were
many
,
and
that
it
was
a
great
way
off
,
which
is
very
remarkable
,
it
would
always
appear
very
near
,
and
very
little
,
as
I
have
said
.
And
it
may
also
be
suppos'd
,
that
this
is
done
by
a
Natural
Judgment
of
our
Soul
,
which
thus
sees
this
Spire
,
because
it
Judges
it
about
five
or
six
hundred
paces
distant
;
for
,
commonly
,
our
Imagination
does
not
represent
a
greater
distance
,
between
Objects
and
us
,
if
it
be
not
assisted
by
a
Sensible
view
of
other
interjacent
Objects
,
beyond
which
it
can
yet
imagine
farther
.
'T
is
for
this
cause
,
See
the
9th
Chapter
towards
the
end
.
that
when
the
Moon
Rises
or
Sets
,
we
see
it
greater
,
than
when
it
is
elevated
above
the
Horizon
,
for
when
it
is
very
high
,
we
see
no
Objects
betwixt
it
and
us
,
whose
greatness
we
know
,
to
Judge
of
that
of
the
Moon
,
by
comparing
them
together
;
but
when
it
is
near
Setting
,
we
see
betwixt
it
and
us
many
Fields
,
whose
breadth
we
know
very
near
,
and
so
we
Judge
it
at
a
greater
distance
,
because
we
see
it
at
a
greater
.
It
's
observable
,
that
when
the
Moon
is
Risen
above
our
Heads
,
altho'
our
reason
assures
us
that
it
is
at
a
very
great
distance
,
yet
it
seems
to
us
to
be
very
little
,
and
very
near
;
for
,
indeed
,
these
Natural
Judgments
of
Sight
,
are
only
built
upon
the
Perceptions
of
the
same
Sight
,
and
Reason
cannot
correct
them
:
So
that
they
very
often
deceive
us
,
in
causing
us
to
form
free
Judgments
,
which
perfectly
agree
with
them
;
for
when
we
Judge
by
our
Senses
,
we
are
always
deceiv'd
,
but
we
are
never
deceiv'd
when
we
conceive
,
for
a
Body
only
Instructs
as
a
Body
,
but
God
always
teaches
us
Truth
,
as
I
shall
show
hereafter
.
These
false
Judgments
deceive
us
,
not
only
as
to
the
distance
and
bigness
of
Bodies
,
but
also
in
making
us
see
their
Figure
other
than
it
is
:
We
see
,
for
Example
,
the
Sun
and
Moon
,
and
other
Spherical
Bodies
,
very
distant
,
as
if
they
were
Plains
and
Circles
,
because
,
at
this
great
distance
,
we
cannot
distinguish
whether
the
opposite
part
is
nearer
to
us
than
the
others
;
and
,
because
of
this
,
we
Judge
it
at
an
equal
distance
.
'T
is
for
the
same
reason
,
we
Judge
that
all
the
Stars
,
and
the
blue
which
appears
in
the
Heaven
,
are
at
the
same
distance
,
and
,
as
it
were
,
a
perfectly
Convex
Vault
,
because
our
Mind
supposes
an
Equality
where
it
sees
no
Inequality
,
altho'
it
ought
not
positively
to
conclude
but
where
it
sees
evidently
.
I
shall
not
tarry
here
,
to
Explain
at
large
the
Errors
of
the
Sight
,
as
to
the
Figures
of
Bodies
,
because
any
Book
of
Optics
will
save
me
that
Labour
:
This
Science
,
indeed
,
does
only
show
how
the
Eyes
are
deceiv'd
,
and
all
its
direction
consists
but
in
helping
us
to
make
those
Natural
Judgments
we
have
spoke
of
,
at
such
time
as
we
ought
not
to
make
them
;
and
this
may
be
done
after
so
many
ways
,
that
there
is
not
one
Figure
in
the
World
which
may
not
be
Painted
after
a
thousand
different
manners
,
so
as
that
the
Sight
will
Infallibly
be
deceiv'd
thereby
.
But
this
is
not
a
place
to
Explain
these
things
thorowly
:
what
has
been
said
,
is
sufficient
to
show
,
that
we
must
not
trust
to
our
Eyes
,
when
they
represent
the
Figure
of
Bodies
to
us
,
altho'
we
are
not
so
subject
to
be
deceiv'd
by
Figures
as
other
things
.
CHAP.
VIII
.
I.
That
our
Eyes
do
not
inform
us
of
the
greatness
or
swiftness
of
Motion
consider'd
in
it self
.
II.
That
duration
,
which
is
necessary
to
be
understood
to
know
what
Motion
is
,
is
unknown
.
III.
Examples
of
the
Errors
of
Sight
in
respect
of
Motion
and
Rest
.
WE
have
discover'd
the
principal
and
most
general
Errors
of
the
Sight
about
the
Extension
of
Figures
,
we
must
now
correct
those
in
which
it
deceives
us
about
the
Motion
of
Matter
;
and
this
will
not
be
a
very
difficult
performance
,
after
what
we
have
said
about
Extension
;
for
there
is
so
great
a
relation
betwixt
these
two
things
,
that
if
we
are
deceiv'd
about
the
bigness
of
Bodies
,
we
must
unavoidably
be
deceiv'd
in
their
Motion
.
But
to
offer
nothing
except
what
is
clear
and
distinct
,
we
must
first
take
away
the
Equivocation
of
the
word
Motion
;
for
this
Term
commonly
signifies
two
things
,
the
first
is
a
certain
power
that
is
imagin'd
in
a
mov'd
Body
,
which
is
the
Cause
of
its
Motion
;
the
second
is
a
continual
removal
of
a
Body
that
is
departing
from
,
or
approaching
to
another
,
that
is
,
consider'd
as
in
a
State
of
Rest
.
When
we
say
,
for
Instance
,
that
a
Bowle
hath
communicated
its
Motion
to
another
,
the
word
Motion
is
here
taken
in
the
first
signification
,
but
if
it
be
said
simply
,
that
a
Boul
is
in
Motion
,
it
is
taken
in
the
second
Sense
.
And
indeed
this
term
Motion
signifies
both
the
Cause
and
Effect
together
,
which
yet
are
in
themselves
two
different
things
.
They
seem
to
me
to
be
in
the
grossest
and
most
dangerous
Error
concerning
force
,
who
attribute
to
it
Motion
,
and
the
transportation
of
Bodies
;
these
fine
terms
of
Nature
,
and
impressed
Qualities
,
seem
to
me
to
be
only
a
proper
Subterfuge
for
the
Ignorance
of
the
falsly
Learn'd
,
See
the
3d
Chapter
of
the
Second
Part
,
6.
l.
and
impious
Libertines
,
as
may
be
very
easily
proved
;
but
this
is
not
a
fit
place
to
treat
of
this
force
which
moves
Bodies
,
it
is
not
visible
,
and
I
am
here
speaking
only
of
the
Errors
of
our
Eyes
,
though
I
will
not
omit
it
where
it
is
necessary
.
Motion
taken
in
the
second
sense
,
and
for
the
removing
of
Bodies
which
is
distant
one
from
another
,
is
something
that
is
visible
,
and
a
fit
Subject
for
this
Chapter
.
I
have
,
I.
That
our
Eyes
do
not
truly
inform
us
of
the
greatness
or
swiftness
of
Motion
considered
in
it self
.
I
think
,
in
the
Sixth
Chapter
,
demonstrated
that
our
Sight
does
not
distinguish
the
Magnitude
of
Bodies
among
themselves
,
but
only
in
respect
to
the
proportion
they
have
one
to
another
,
and
particularly
to
ours
.
From
whence
I
conclude
also
,
that
we
cannot
know
the
true
and
absolute
greatness
of
their
Motions
,
viz.
of
their
Swiftness
,
or
Slowness
;
but
only
the
proportion
these
Motions
have
one
to
another
,
and
chiefly
with
that
which
generally
happens
to
our
Bodies
,
which
I
prove
thus
:
It
is
certain
that
we
cannot
judge
of
the
greatness
of
the
Motion
of
a
Body
,
but
by
the
length
and
space
that
the
same
Body
has
run
through
;
so
that
since
our
Eyes
do
not
discover
to
us
the
true
Length
of
the
Space
the
Body
passes
,
it
follows
,
that
they
cannot
discover
the
true
greatness
of
this
Motion
to
us
.
This
Proof
is
only
a
Consequence
of
what
I
have
said
of
Extension
,
and
is
evident
from
what
I
have
there
demonstrated
;
but
here
is
one
that
depends
upon
no
previous
Suppositions
;
I
say
then
,
that
although
we
cou'd
certainly
know
the
true
greatness
of
the
Space
it
passed
,
it
wou'd
not
from
thence
follow
,
II.
That
the
〈◊〉
which
is
necessary
in
order
to
the
discovering
the
greatness
of
Motion
,
is
unknown
to
us
.
that
we
cou'd
know
that
of
its
Motion
.
The
greatness
or
swiftness
of
Motion
includes
two
things
.
The
first
is
the
removing
of
a
Body
from
one
place
to
another
,
as
from
Paris
to
St.
Germains
;
the
second
is
the
time
that
is
necessary
to
remove
it
in
;
Now
it
is
not
sufficient
to
be
exactly
assur'd
how
much
space
there
is
between
Paris
and
St.
Germains
,
to
know
if
a
Man
went
thither
by
a
quick
or
slow
Motion
;
but
it
is
also
necessary
to
know
how
much
time
he
spent
in
going
thither
.
I
grant
then
that
the
true
Length
of
this
way
is
known
,
but
absolutely
deny
that
we
can
exactly
know
by
Sight
,
or
any
other
way
whatsoever
,
the
time
he
was
in
going
;
and
the
true
greatness
of
duration
.
It
is
evident
,
that
at
certain
times
one
hour
appears
as
long
as
four
,
and
on
the
contrary
,
at
another
time
,
four
hours
will
pass
insensibly
.
As
for
Instance
,
when
we
are
fill'd
with
Joy
,
the
time
seems
short
,
because
it
passes
without
our
thinking
of
it
;
but
when
we
are
opprest
with
grief
,
or
suffer
any
pain
,
the
days
then
seem
as
long
as
whole
years
:
The
reason
of
it
is
,
that
then
the
Mind
is
tired
with
its
duration
,
because
it
is
troublesome
to
it
,
as
if
it
applied
it self
thereto
the
more
for
knowing
it
better
;
and
so
it
thinks
it
longer
than
when
it
is
taken
up
with
Joy
,
or
some
agreeable
Imploy
,
which
makes
it
as
it
were
,
go
out
of
it self
to
possess
the
Object
of
its
Joy
;
for
even
as
a
Person
thinks
a
Picture
so
much
the
larger
,
as
he
considers
more
attentively
the
least
things
that
are
represented
therein
;
or
,
as
we
shall
think
the
Head
of
a
Fly
very
great
,
if
we
distinguish
all
the
parts
thereof
with
a
Microscope
.
Thus
the
Mind
thinks
its
duration
so
much
the
greater
,
as
it
considers
it
with
more
attention
,
and
is
sensible
of
all
the
parts
thereof
.
So
that
I
doubt
not
but
God
can
,
after
such
a
manner
,
apply
our
Minds
to
the
parts
of
Duration
,
by
producing
in
us
a
great
number
of
Sensations
in
a
very
little
time
,
as
that
an
hour
may
appear
as
long
as
many
Ages
;
for
,
in
fine
,
there
is
not
an
Instant
in
Duration
,
as
there
is
not
an
Atome
in
Bodies
,
and
even
as
the
least
particle
of
Matter
may
be
divided
ad
infinitum
,
so
we
may
likewise
assign
less
and
less
parts
of
Duration
to
Infinity
,
as
may
easily
be
demonstrated
.
If
therefore
the
Mind
was
attentive
to
these
little
parts
of
Duration
,
by
such
Sensations
as
leave
some
Traces
in
the
Brain
,
which
it
can
remember
,
it
wou'd
think
it
without
doubt
much
longer
then
they
otherwise
appear
to
be
.
But
indeed
the
use
of
Watches
sufficiently
prove
that
we
have
no
exact
knowledge
of
Duration
,
and
that
is
as
much
as
I
require
;
for
as
we
cannot
know
the
greatness
of
Motion
in
it self
,
so
we
can
no
more
know
that
of
Duration
,
as
we
have
shew'd
:
It
follows
then
,
that
if
we
cannot
exactly
know
the
absolute
greatness
of
Duration
,
we
cannot
precisely
understand
the
absolute
greatness
of
Motion
.
But
because
we
may
know
some
proportions
of
Durations
,
or
of
the
times
one
to
another
,
we
may
also
know
some
proportions
that
Motions
bear
to
one
another
,
even
as
we
can
know
that
the
Solar
year
is
longer
than
the
Lunar
;
thus
we
may
also
know
that
a
Cannon
Bullet
moves
faster
than
a
Bomb
;
so
that
if
the
use
of
our
Eyes
is
not
to
distinguish
the
absolute
greatness
of
Motion
,
yet
by
their
help
we
can
know
very
near
the
relative
greatness
,
that
is
,
the
proportion
which
one
Motion
bears
to
another
;
and
this
is
all
that
is
necessary
to
be
known
for
the
preservation
of
our
Bodies
.
III.
Example
of
the
Error
of
our
Eyes
about
the
Motion
or
Rest
of
Bodies
.
There
are
many
Occurrences
in
which
we
clearly
know
that
our
Sight
deceives
us
about
the
Motion
of
Bodies
;
It
frequently
happens
,
that
those
which
appear
to
move
,
do
not
move
,
and
on
the
contrary
,
those
which
seem
to
be
in
rest
,
are
in
motion
;
for
Example
,
when
we
sit
in
a
Vessel
that
Sails
very
fast
and
very
steadily
,
distant
Fields
and
Towns
appear
to
move
,
and
the
Vessel
to
stand
still
.
Thus
if
a
Man
were
plac'd
in
the
Planet
Mars
,
he
would
judge
by
his
Sight
that
the
Sun
,
Earth
,
and
the
other
Planets
,
with
all
the
fix'd
Stars
,
revolve
about
him
once
in
about
24
or
25
hours
,
in
which
time
Mars
turns
round
upon
his
own
Axis
,
yet
the
Sun
,
Earth
,
and
Stars
do
not
turn
about
this
Planet
,
so
that
this
Man
would
see
things
as
in
motion
which
mov'd
not
,
and
would
believe
himself
to
be
in
rest
whilst
he
was
in
motion
.
I
will
not
stay
to
explain
here
,
how
the
Man
sitting
in
the
Vessel
might
correct
the
Error
of
his
Eyes
,
and
how
he
,
whom
we
have
suppos'd
in
the
Planet
Mars
,
would
obstinately
persist
in
his
Error
;
because
it
is
very
easie
to
know
the
reason
thereof
,
especially
if
we
should
reflect
upon
what
would
happen
to
a
Man
sleeping
in
a
Vessel
,
and
who
being
suddenly
awaked
,
and
looking
about
him
should
only
see
the
top
of
the
Mast
of
some
other
Vessel
coming
towards
him
,
certainly
if
he
saw
no
Sails
fill'd
with
Wind
,
no
Seaman
at
Work
,
and
perceiv'd
no
agitation
of
his
Vessel
,
nor
any
thing
else
of
this
nature
,
he
would
absolutely
doubt
whether
of
the
two
Vessels
were
in
Motion
,
in
vain
would
he
Consult
his
Eyes
,
and
even
his
Reason
,
to
discover
where
the
Motion
lay
.
CHAP.
IX
.
A
Continuation
of
the
same
Subject
.
I.
A
General
Proof
of
the
Errors
of
our
Sight
about
Motion
.
II.
That
it's
necessary
to
know
the
distance
of
Objects
,
to
judge
of
the
swiftness
of
their
Motion
III.
An
Examination
of
Means
to
know
their
distances
.
TAke
this
General
Proof
of
all
the
Errors
we
are
liable
to
,
in
respect
of
Motion
.
Let
A
be
the
Eye
of
the
Beholder
,
C
the
Object
which
I
suppose
at
a
considerable
distance
from
A
,
I
say
that
though
the
Object
remains
immovable
in
C
,
he
may
believe
it
as
distant
as
D
,
or
as
near
him
as
B
:
and
though
the
Object
should
recede
to
D
,
or
approach
to
B
,
he
might
believe
it
immovable
in
C
;
on
the
contrary
,
although
it
approach
towards
B
,
he
may
believe
it
immovable
in
C
,
or
receding
towards
D
;
And
although
the
Object
advances
from
C
,
to
E
,
H
,
G
or
K
,
he
may
believe
that
it
's
only
mov'd
from
C
to
F
,
or
I
;
On
the
contrary
,
although
the
Object
were
remov'd
from
C
to
F
or
●
,
he
might
believe
that
it
was
mov'd
to
E
,
or
H
,
or
else
to
G
or
K.
But
if
the
Object
be
mov'd
in
a
line
equally
distant
from
the
Beholder
,
that
is
by
a
Circumference
,
whose
Center
should
be
the
Eye
of
the
Beholder
,
although
the
Object
move
from
C
to
P
,
he
may
believe
that
it
moves
only
from
B
to
O
;
and
on
the
contrary
,
if
it
moves
from
B
to
O
,
he
may
believe
it
moves
from
C
to
P.
If
beyond
the
Object
C
,
there
be
another
Object
M
which
he
believes
immovable
,
although
it
moves
towards
N
;
or
if
C
moves
more
slowly
towards
F
,
than
M
towards
N
,
it
will
appear
to
move
towards
Y
,
and
on
the
contrary
,
if
,
&c.
II.
That
it
is
necessary
to
know
the
distance
of
Objects
to
find
the
swiftness
of
the
Motion
.
It
's
evident
that
the
Proof
of
all
these
Propositions
,
except
the
last
,
in
which
there
's
no
difficulty
,
depends
only
upon
one
thing
,
that
is
,
we
can't
always
make
a
certain
Judgment
of
the
distance
of
Objects
,
and
if
so
,
it
follows
,
that
we
cannot
know
whether
C
is
advanc'd
towards
D
,
or
whether
it
approaches
towards
B
;
and
thus
also
of
the
other
Propositions
.
Now
to
see
whether
the
Judgments
we
form
about
the
distance
of
Objects
are
certain
,
we
are
only
to
examine
the
Means
we
are
to
make
use
of
in
judging
;
and
if
these
Means
are
uncertain
,
III.
An
Examination
of
the
Means
of
knowing
the
distance
of
Objects
.
we
cannot
judge
infallibly
,
there
are
many
of
them
,
and
they
must
be
explain'd
.
The
first
,
the
most
general
,
and
sometimes
the
most
certain
way
,
that
we
have
to
judge
of
the
distance
of
Objects
,
is
the
Angle
,
which
the
Rays
of
our
Eyes
make
,
whose
point
of
Concurrence
is
,
or
measures
,
the
Object
;
When
this
Angle
is
very
great
,
we
see
the
Object
very
near
;
on
the
contrary
,
when
it
is
very
little
,
we
see
it
very
distant
;
And
the
Change
which
happens
in
the
Situation
of
our
Eyes
,
according
to
the
Changes
of
this
Angle
,
is
the
means
whereof
our
[
](A51655-e21310-b)*
*
The
Soul
does
not
make
all
the
Judgments
that
are
attributed
to
it
,
th●se
Natural
Judgments
are
only
Sensations
;
and
I
only
speak
thus
that
I
may
better
explain
things
.
Soul
makes
use
,
to
judge
of
the
distance
or
nearness
of
Objects
;
for
even
as
a
blind
Man
,
who
shou'd
have
in
his
Hands
two
streight
Sticks
,
whose
length
he
did
not
know
,
might
by
a
kind
of
Natural
Geometry
,
judge
very
near
of
the
distance
of
some
Body
,
in
touching
it
with
the
end
of
these
two
Sticks
,
by
the
disposition
and
distance
of
his
hands
:
So
it
may
be
said
,
that
the
Soul
Judges
of
the
distance
of
an
Object
by
the
disposition
of
its
Eyes
,
which
is
not
the
same
,
when
the
Angle
by
which
he
sees
,
is
sometimes
greater
,
See
the
4th
Article
of
Chap.
7.
and
sometimes
less
,
when
the
Object
is
nearer
,
and
when
it
is
farther
off
.
We
shall
be
easily
perswaded
of
this
,
if
we
take
the
pains
to
make
this
very
easie
Experiment
:
Hang
a
Ring
upon
a
Thread
with
the
edge
towards
you
,
or
else
thrust
one
Stick
into
the
Earth
,
and
take
another
in
your
Hand
,
which
shall
be
crooked
at
the
end
,
go
back
two
or
three
steps
from
the
Ring
or
the
Stick
,
wink
with
one
Eye
,
and
try
to
put
the
Stick
in
your
Hand
through
the
Ring
,
or
to
touch
the
other
in
the
Ground
traversly
,
about
the
height
of
your
Eyes
;
you
will
be
surpriz'd
,
not
to
be
able
to
do
that
once
in
an
hundred
times
,
which
you
believe
is
so
easie
to
be
done
.
Now
if
you
even
lay
by
the
Stick
,
and
attempt
to
put
your
Finger
into
the
Ring
,
hanging
with
the
edge
towards
you
,
you
will
find
it
difficult
aforne
you
were
just
at
it
.
But
it
must
be
well
observ'd
,
that
what
I
have
said
about
putting
a
crooked
Stick
through
a
Ring
,
or
touching
another
Stick
traversly
,
will
not
hold
,
if
the
Eye
be
in
a
right
Line
with
the
opening
of
the
Ring
,
for
then
there
would
be
no
difficulty
in
it
;
but
it
would
be
easier
to
effect
it
with
one
Eye
shut
,
than
with
both
the
Eyes
open
,
because
that
would
guide
us
.
Now
it
may
be
said
,
that
the
difficulty
which
is
found
in
hitting
the
hole
of
the
Ring
traversly
,
with
but
one
Eye
open
,
is
owing
to
this
,
that
the
Eye
being
shut
,
the
Angle
,
which
I
have
spoken
of
,
is
unknown
;
for
to
know
the
bigness
of
the
Angle
at
the
Eye
,
it
is
not
sufficient
to
know
the
length
of
the
Base
,
and
one
of
the
Angles
at
the
Base
,
(
unless
the
other
be
right
)
but
we
must
also
know
the
other
Angle
at
the
Base
,
or
the
length
of
one
of
the
sides
,
which
can't
exactly
be
known
,
but
by
opening
the
other
Eye
:
And
thus
the
Soul
cannot
make
use
of
its
Natural
Geometry
to
Judge
of
the
distance
of
the
Ring
.
The
disposition
of
the
Eyes
,
which
accompanies
the
Angle
,
form'd
by
the
Visual
Rays
that
meet
in
the
Object
,
is
then
one
of
the
best
,
and
most
Universal
Methods
,
which
the
Soul
makes
use
of
,
to
Judge
of
the
distance
of
Things
:
If
this
Angle
then
,
does
not
admit
of
any
Sensible
Change
,
when
the
Object
is
near
,
if
we
approach
to
it
,
or
recede
from
it
;
it
will
follow
that
the
Method
is
false
,
and
that
the
Soul
cannot
make
use
of
it
,
to
Judge
of
the
distance
of
that
Object
.
Now
't
is
very
easie
to
know
,
that
this
Angle
changes
remarkably
,
when
an
Object
that
is
but
one
Foot
from
our
Eyes
,
is
remov'd
to
four
;
if
it
be
only
remov'd
from
four
to
eight
,
the
change
is
much
less
sensible
,
if
from
eight
to
twelve
,
't
is
still
less
;
if
from
a
thousand
to
a
hundred
thousand
,
't
is
yet
less
.
Lastly
,
the
change
will
be
wholly
insensible
,
if
the
Object
were
remov'd
into
the
Imaginary
Spaces
;
so
that
if
there
were
a
considerable
Space
betwixt
A
and
C
,
the
Soul
could
not
,
by
this
means
,
know
whether
the
Object
is
nearer
to
B
or
D.
'T
is
for
this
reason
,
that
we
see
the
Sun
and
Moon
as
if
they
were
wrapt
up
in
Clouds
,
althô
they
are
extreamly
distant
behind
them
,
and
that
we
Naturally
believe
all
the
Stars
are
at
an
equal
distance
,
and
that
the
Comets
are
fix'd
,
or
almost
without
any
motion
,
towards
the
latter
end
of
their
Course
:
As
also
,
that
they
wholly
dissipate
after
some
Months
,
because
they
remove
from
us
,
in
very
near
a
right
Line
,
to
our
Eyes
,
and
lose
themselves
in
the
great
Spaces
,
whence
they
return
not
till
after
many
Years
,
or
even
after
many
Ages
.
To
explain
the
second
way
,
The
second
way
of
Judging
of
the
distance
of
Objects
.
which
the
Soul
makes
use
of
,
to
Judge
of
the
distance
of
Objects
,
we
must
know
,
that
't
is
absolutely
necessary
that
the
Figure
of
the
Eye
be
different
,
according
to
the
different
distance
of
the
Objects
that
we
see
;
for
when
a
Man
sees
an
Object
near
him
,
it
's
necessary
that
his
Eyes
were
more
extended
than
if
the
Object
were
farther
off
,
because
,
that
to
the
end
the
Rays
of
this
Object
may
meet
upon
the
Optic
Nerve
,
(
which
is
necessary
for
Vision
)
the
distance
between
this
Nerve
and
the
Chrystaline
Humour
,
must
be
the
greater
.
It
is
true
,
that
if
the
Chrystaline
Humour
became
more
Convex
,
when
the
Object
is
near
,
it
would
have
the
same
effect
as
if
the
Eye
was
more
extended
;
but
it
's
incredible
,
that
the
Chrystaline
Humour
can
easily
change
its
Convexity
,
and
yet
,
on
the
other
side
,
we
have
a
very
sensible
Proof
,
that
the
Eye
is
extended
,
or
drawn
out
in
length
:
for
Anatomy
teaches
us
,
that
there
are
Muscles
which
encompass
the
middle
of
the
Eye
,
and
that
one
may
perceive
the
Effort
of
these
Muscles
in
compressing
,
or
extending
it
when
any
Object
is
to
be
seen
very
near
.
But
't
is
not
necessary
to
know
here
,
after
what
manner
this
is
done
,
it
's
enough
that
it
happens
from
the
change
of
the
Eye
,
whether
it
be
,
that
the
Muscles
,
that
environ
it
,
compress
it
,
or
whether
the
little
Nerves
,
that
answer
to
the
Ciliary
Ligaments
,
which
keep
the
Chrystaline
,
Humour
suspended
among
the
other
Humours
of
the
Eye
,
do
relax
,
to
encrease
the
Convexity
of
the
Eye
,
or
contract
themselves
to
diminish
it
.
For
,
in
fine
,
the
change
which
happens
,
be
it
what
it
will
,
is
only
to
cause
,
that
the
Rays
of
Objects
may
exactly
meet
together
just
upon
the
Optic
Nerve
.
Now
't
is
manifest
,
that
when
the
Object
is
five
hundred
Paces
,
or
ten
thousand
Leagues
distant
,
we
see
it
with
the
same
disposition
of
the
Eye
,
without
any
sensible
change
in
the
Muscles
which
encompass
it
,
or
in
the
Nerves
which
answer
to
the
Ciliary
Ligaments
of
the
Chrystaline
Humour
;
and
the
Rays
of
Objects
meet
very
exactly
upon
the
Retina
,
or
Optic
Nerve
.
Thus
the
Soul
would
Judge
that
Objects
,
ten
thousand
,
or
a
hundred
thousand
Leagues
distant
,
are
only
five
or
six
hundred
Paces
off
,
if
it
Judg'd
only
of
their
distance
by
the
disposition
of
the
Eyes
,
which
I
have
spoken
of
.
However
,
't
is
certain
that
the
Soul
makes
use
of
this
means
when
the
Object
is
near
:
If
,
for
Example
,
an
Object
is
but
half
a
Foot
from
us
,
we
distinguish
well
enough
its
distance
,
by
the
disposition
of
the
Muscles
,
which
compress
our
Eyes
,
so
as
to
extend
them
a
little
;
and
even
this
disposition
is
painful
:
If
the
Object
is
at
the
distance
of
two
Foot
,
we
yet
distinguish
it
,
because
the
disposition
of
the
Muscles
is
a
little
sensible
,
althô
it
is
not
any
longer
painful
,
but
if
we
remove
the
Object
to
some
considerable
distance
,
this
disposition
of
the
Muscles
becomes
so
insensible
,
that
it
does
not
in
the
least
assist
us
in
Judging
of
the
distance
of
the
Object
.
These
are
two
Means
that
the
Soul
uses
to
Judge
of
the
distance
of
Objects
,
which
are
very
useless
when
the
Object
is
five
or
six
hundred
Paces
distant
from
us
;
and
which
,
also
,
are
not
certain
,
althô
the
Object
were
nearer
.
The
third
Means
consists
in
the
bigness
of
the
Image
,
The
third
Means
to
Judge
of
the
distance
of
Objects
.
which
is
Painted
at
the
bottom
of
the
Eye
,
and
which
represents
the
Objects
as
we
see
them
.
'T
is
granted
,
that
this
Image
diminishes
in
proportion
to
the
distance
of
the
Object
,
but
by
how
much
the
Object
,
that
changes
its
distances
removes
farther
off
,
by
so
much
is
the
diminution
less
sensible
:
For
when
an
Object
is
at
some
reasonable
distance
,
suppose
five
or
six
hundred
Paces
,
more
or
less
,
in
proportion
to
its
magnitude
,
there
arises
very
considerable
alterations
in
its
Elongation
,
without
any
sensible
change
in
the
Image
which
represents
it
,
as
is
easie
to
be
showed
.
Thus
,
also
,
this
third
Means
has
the
same
defect
as
the
two
preceding
.
It
may
be
further
observ'd
,
that
the
Soul
judges
not
of
distant
Objects
,
whose
Image
is
Painted
very
small
upon
the
Retina
.
For
Example
,
when
I
see
a
Man
,
or
a
Tree
,
at
the
distance
of
a
hundred
Paces
,
or
else
many
Stars
in
the
Heavens
,
I
judge
not
that
the
Man
is
more
distant
than
the
Tree
,
or
that
little
Stars
are
farther
off
than
the
great
ones
,
althô
the
Images
of
the
Man
,
and
little
Stars
,
are
Painted
less
upon
the
Retina
than
the
Tree
,
or
the
great
Stars
.
Moreover
,
the
bigness
of
the
Object
must
be
known
to
judge
near
of
its
distance
;
and
because
I
know
that
a
House
is
greater
than
a
Man
,
altho'
the
Image
thereof
be
less
than
that
of
a
Man
,
yet
I
do
not
therefore
judge
it
nearer
,
imagine
the
same
of
the
Stars
,
our
Eyes
representing
them
all
at
the
same
distance
,
althô
it
be
very
reasonable
to
believe
some
more
distant
from
us
than
others
.
Thus
there
are
an
Infinity
of
Objects
,
whose
distance
we
cannot
know
,
since
there
's
an
Infinity
of
them
whose
greatness
we
are
ignorant
of
.
We
also
Judge
of
the
distance
of
the
Object
,
The
fourth
and
fifth
Means
.
by
the
power
whereby
it
acts
upon
our
Eyes
,
because
a
distant
one
acts
more
weakly
than
another
;
also
by
the
distinction
and
clearness
of
the
Image
which
is
form'd
in
the
Eye
;
because
,
when
an
Object
is
distant
,
its
necessary
that
the
Eye-sight
dilate
,
and
consequently
,
the
Rays
meet
together
a
little
confusedly
:
Hence
it
is
,
that
Objects
which
are
but
a
little
distinct
,
or
such
as
we
see
confusedly
appear
distant
from
us
;
and
on
the
contrary
,
clear
and
distinct
Objects
appear
to
be
near
us
.
It
's
evident
enough
,
that
these
last
means
are
not
proper
to
Judge
of
the
distance
of
Objects
with
any
certainty
:
I
shall
not
insist
upon
the
last
of
all
,
which
is
that
that
helps
the
Imagination
,
and
which
easily
carries
the
Soul
to
Judge
of
very
distant
Objects
.
The
sixth
and
principle
Means
consists
in
this
,
The
sixth
Means
to
Judge
of
the
distance
of
Bodies
.
That
the
Eye
does
not
exhibit
to
the
Soul
an
Object
by
it self
,
and
distinct
from
others
,
but
also
all
Objects
lying
betwixt
us
and
that
,
which
we
consider
.
When
,
for
Example
,
we
look
upon
a
distant
Steeple
,
we
commonly
see
,
at
the
same
time
,
many
interjacent
Fields
and
Houses
,
and
because
we
judge
of
the
distance
of
these
Fields
and
Houses
,
and
see
the
Steeple
is
beyond
them
,
we
judge
also
that
it
is
very
distant
,
and
also
greater
,
than
if
we
saw
it
alone
:
However
,
the
Image
thereof
,
which
is
traced
at
the
bottom
of
our
Eye
,
is
always
of
an
equal
bigness
,
whether
there
are
Fields
and
Houses
betwixt
us
or
not
,
provided
we
see
it
at
an
equal
distance
,
which
is
suppos'd
.
Thus
we
judge
of
the
bigness
of
Objects
by
their
imagin'd
distance
,
and
the
Bodies
betwixt
us
and
the
Object
do
much
assist
our
Imagination
in
it
,
even
as
we
judge
of
Duration
,
or
the
length
of
Time
,
after
some
Action
done
by
the
remembrance
of
a
confess'd
Series
of
Things
,
which
we
have
done
,
or
of
Thoughts
which
we
have
successively
had
after
this
Action
,
for
't
is
all
these
Thoughts
and
Actions
which
have
succeeded
one
another
,
that
assist
our
Mind
in
judging
of
the
length
or
duration
of
some
Time
;
or
,
rather
,
a
confus'd
remembrance
of
all
the
successive
Thoughts
about
the
same
thing
,
is
nothing
else
but
our
Judgment
of
Duration
,
even
as
a
confus'd
sight
of
the
Fields
,
which
are
betwixt
us
and
the
Steeple
,
is
the
same
thing
as
our
Judgment
of
the
distance
thereof
.
Hence
't
is
easie
to
know
,
the
true
Reason
why
the
Moon
appears
greater
when
it
rises
,
than
when
it
is
much
elevated
above
the
Horizon
,
for
when
it
rises
it
appears
many
Leagues
distant
from
us
,
and
even
beyond
the
Sensible
Horizon
,
or
the
Earth
which
terminates
our
sight
,
whereas
we
judge
it
to
be
but
about
half
a
League
from
us
,
or
seven
or
eight
times
as
high
as
our
Houses
,
when
it
is
most
elevated
above
the
Horizon
.
Thus
we
judge
it
much
greater
when
it
is
near
the
Horizon
,
than
when
it
is
very
distant
from
it
,
because
we
imagine
it
much
more
distant
from
us
,
when
it
rises
,
than
when
is
it
very
high
.
It
's
true
,
there
are
a
great
many
Philosophers
,
who
attribute
what
I
have
said
to
the
Vapours
which
rise
out
of
the
Earth
:
I
agree
with
them
,
that
Vapours
,
refracting
the
Rays
of
Objects
,
make
them
appear
the
greater
.
I
know
there
are
more
Vapours
betwixt
us
and
the
Moon
,
when
it
rises
,
than
when
it
is
risen
very
high
,
and
consequently
,
it
must
appear
something
greater
,
than
if
it
were
always
equally
distant
from
us
:
However
,
it
cannot
be
said
that
this
refraction
of
the
Rays
of
the
Moon
,
is
the
cause
of
these
apparent
Changes
of
its
greatness
,
for
this
refraction
hinders
not
,
but
that
the
Image
which
is
traced
in
the
bottom
of
our
Eyes
,
at
the
rising
of
the
Moon
,
is
not
less
than
that
which
is
form'd
there
when
it
has
been
risen
a
considerable
time
.
Astronomers
,
which
Measure
the
Diameters
of
the
Planets
,
observe
,
that
that
of
the
Moon
grows
larger
in
proportion
to
its
distance
from
the
Horizon
,
and
consequently
,
in
proportion
to
its
appearing
less
to
us
;
so
that
the
Diameter
of
the
Image
,
Painted
at
the
bottom
of
our
Eyes
,
is
lesser
when
we
see
it
greater
.
Indeed
,
when
the
Moon
arises
,
it
's
more
distant
from
us
,
by
the
Semi-diameter
of
the
Earth
,
than
when
it
is
perpendicularly
over
our
Head
,
which
is
the
reason
that
its
Diameter
is
greater
than
when
it
arises
above
the
Horizon
,
because
then
it
approaches
to
us
.
That
then
,
which
is
the
cause
of
our
seeing
it
greater
when
it
rises
,
is
not
the
refraction
of
its
Rays
,
made
by
the
Vapours
coming
out
of
the
Earth
,
since
the
Image
,
which
is
form'd
by
these
Rays
,
is
then
less
,
but
it
is
the
Natural
Judgment
that
we
make
of
its
distance
,
because
it
appears
beyond
the
Earth
,
which
we
see
very
distant
from
us
,
as
was
explain'd
before
,
and
I
'm
surpriz'd
that
Philosophers
should
look
upon
the
reason
of
this
appearance
,
and
deceit
of
our
Eyes
,
to
be
more
difficult
to
find
out
,
than
the
greatest
Equations
of
Algebra
.
This
means
of
Judging
of
the
distance
of
any
Object
,
by
the
Knowledge
of
the
distance
of
Things
,
lying
betwixt
us
and
it
,
is
of
great
use
to
us
,
when
the
other
ways
,
which
I
have
spoken
of
,
fail
us
,
for
by
this
we
can
Judge
,
that
certain
Objects
are
distant
from
us
many
Leagues
,
which
we
cannot
by
any
of
the
others
,
however
,
if
we
Examine
,
we
shall
find
many
defects
in
it
.
For
,
first
,
this
way
serves
only
to
Judge
of
Objects
which
are
upon
the
Earth
,
and
but
very
rarely
,
and
for
the
most
,
very
unprofitably
,
of
Things
that
are
in
the
Air
,
or
in
the
Heavens
.
Secondly
,
we
can't
make
use
of
it
upon
the
Earth
,
but
in
things
that
are
a
very
few
Leagues
distant
from
us
.
And
thirdly
,
we
must
be
assur'd
,
that
there
are
betwixt
us
and
the
Object
,
neither
Vallies
,
Mountains
,
or
any
such
thing
,
which
hinders
us
from
making
use
of
this
means
.
Lastly
,
I
believe
there
are
none
who
have
not
had
Experience
enough
,
in
this
subject
,
to
be
perswaded
that
it
is
extreamly
difficult
,
to
make
a
certain
Judgment
of
the
distance
of
Objects
,
by
a
sensible
view
of
Things
placed
betwixt
them
and
the
Object
:
But
I
have
enlarg'd
too
much
already
upon
this
head
.
These
are
the
Means
by
which
we
Judge
of
the
distance
of
Objects
,
we
have
observ'd
considerable
defects
in
them
,
and
may
conclude
,
that
the
Judgments
which
are
form'd
upon
them
must
be
very
uncertain
.
Hence
I
can
easily
show
the
Truth
of
the
Propositions
which
I
have
advanced
.
I
have
suppos'd
the
Object
at
[
](A51655-e21660-b)*
*
See
the
preceding
Figure
.
C
,
considerable
distant
from
A
,
then
it
may
by
many
steps
advance
towards
D
or
B
,
without
my
knowing
it
,
since
I
have
no
certain
means
to
judge
of
its
distance
;
it
may
even
be
suppos'd
to
recede
towards
D
,
when
't
is
imagin'd
to
approach
towards
B
,
because
the
Image
of
the
Object
is
sometimes
Painted
greater
upon
the
Optic
Nerves
,
whether
because
the
Air
,
which
is
betwixt
the
Object
and
the
Eye
,
causes
a
greater
refraction
one
time
than
another
,
or
whether
it
happens
,
sometimes
,
from
the
little
tremblings
of
this
Nerve
;
or
,
lastly
,
whether
the
Impression
which
the
imperfect
uniting
of
the
Rays
,
upon
the
Optic
Nerve
,
are
dispers'd
and
communicated
to
the
parts
which
ought
not
to
be
affected
with
them
,
for
it
may
happen
from
many
different
Causes
.
Thus
the
Image
of
the
same
Objects
,
being
enlarg'd
on
these
occasions
,
inclines
the
Soul
to
believe
the
Object
is
near
:
Suppose
as
much
be
said
about
the
other
Propositions
.
Before
I
conclude
this
Chapter
,
I
must
observe
,
that
it
much
concerns
us
,
for
the
preservation
of
our
Life
,
to
know
well
the
Motion
and
Rest
of
Bodies
,
in
proportion
to
their
nearness
to
us
;
and
that
it
signifies
little
,
to
have
an
exact
Knowledge
of
the
Truth
of
these
Things
,
when
they
are
remov'd
to
a
great
distance
from
us
.
This
will
evidently
show
,
that
what
I
have
advanc'd
in
general
about
all
the
Senses
,
as
that
they
do
not
help
us
to
the
Knowledge
of
Things
,
but
in
respect
to
the
preservation
of
our
Body
,
and
not
according
to
what
they
are
in
themselves
,
is
exactly
true
in
this
case
;
since
we
have
a
more
exact
Knowledge
of
the
Motion
,
or
Rest
of
Bodies
,
in
proportion
to
their
nearness
:
and
which
we
cou'd
examine
by
the
Senses
,
than
when
they
are
so
distant
;
That
the
Relation
they
have
to
our
Bodies
ceases
,
as
when
they
are
five
or
six
hundred
Paces
from
us
,
if
they
are
of
an
ordinary
bigness
,
and
even
nearer
than
that
if
they
are
less
;
or
,
in
fine
,
farther
off
,
if
they
are
greater
.
CHAP.
X.
Of
Errors
about
Sensible
Qualities
.
I.
A
distinction
of
Soul
and
Body
.
II.
An
Explication
of
the
Organs
of
the
Senses
.
III.
To
what
part
of
the
Body
the
Soul
is
immediately
Vnited
.
IV.
How
Objects
act
upon
Bodies
.
V.
How
upon
the
Soul
;
with
Reasons
why
the
Soul
does
not
perceive
the
Motions
of
the
Fibres
of
the
Body
.
VI.
Four
things
which
are
Confounded
in
every
Sensation
.
WE
have
seen
in
the
preceding
Chapters
,
that
the
Judgments
we
form
by
these
means
of
our
Eyes
,
about
Extension
,
Figure
and
Motion
,
are
never
exactly
true
;
yet
,
we
must
confess
,
they
are
not
absolutely
false
,
they
include
,
at
least
,
this
Truth
,
That
Extension
,
Figure
and
Motion
,
whatever
they
are
,
are
without
us
.
It
's
true
,
we
often
see
things
which
are
not
,
and
which
never
were
;
and
we
ought
not
to
conclude
,
that
a
thing
is
without
us
,
from
hence
only
,
that
we
see
it
without
us
;
there
is
no
necessary
connexion
between
an
Idea
that
is
presented
to
the
Mind
of
Man
,
and
the
Existence
of
a
thing
which
this
Idea
represents
.
That
which
happens
to
those
who
sleep
,
or
are
delirious
,
sufficiently
proves
this
;
however
,
we
can
ordinarily
be
assur'd
,
that
Extension
,
Figures
and
Motions
,
which
we
see
,
are
without
us
:
These
are
not
meer
imaginary
things
,
they
are
real
;
and
we
are
not
deceiv'd
if
we
believe
they
have
a
real
Existence
,
and
which
is
independant
of
our
Mind
,
though
it
's
very
[
](A51655-e21920-b)*
*
See
the
Explanations
.
difficult
to
prove
it
.
It
is
then
evident
,
that
the
Judgments
we
make
about
the
Extension
,
Figures
,
and
Motions
of
Bodies
,
contain
some
Truth
;
but
the
same
cannot
be
said
of
those
things
that
belong
to
Light
,
Colours
,
Sapors
,
Odours
,
and
all
other
sensible
Qualities
;
for
Truth
is
never
to
be
found
there
,
as
we
have
shown
before
.
We
do
not
here
distinguish
Light
from
Colours
,
because
we
believe
they
are
not
very
different
,
nor
can
be
separately
explain'd
.
We
shall
be
oblig'd
to
speak
of
other
sensible
Qualities
in
General
at
the
same
time
that
we
treat
of
these
two
,
because
they
might
be
explain'd
from
the
same
Principles
.
We
ought
to
be
very
attentive
to
the
things
that
follow
,
for
they
are
of
the
most
important
Consequence
,
and
much
more
useful
than
those
things
we
have
yet
spoken
of
.
I
suppose
first
,
Distinction
of
the
Soul
and
Body
.
that
the
Reader
has
made
some
Reflexion
upon
the
two
[
](A51655-e21970-b)*
*
I
here
cast
Idea
,
every
thing
that
is
the
immediate
Object
of
the
Mind
.
Idea's
which
are
found
in
our
Soul
,
one
which
represents
the
Body
to
us
,
and
the
other
the
Mind
;
that
he
is
able
to
distinguish
them
by
the
positive
Attributes
which
they
include
;
in
a
word
,
that
he
be
well
persuaded
that
Extention
is
different
from
Thought
.
Or
else
,
I
suppose
him
to
have
Read
and
Consider'd
some
Places
of
St.
Augustin
,
as
the
10th
Chapt.
of
the
10th
Book
of
the
Trinity
,
the
4th
and
14th
Chap.
of
the
Book
of
the
Quantity
of
the
Soul
,
or
the
Meditations
of
Descartes
,
especially
that
which
respects
the
Distinction
of
the
Soul
and
Body
;
Or
,
lastly
,
the
Sixth
Discourse
of
M.
de
Cordemoy
,
du
discernement
de
l'ame
&
du
Corps
.
I
suppose
also
,
II.
Explication
of
the
Organs
of
the
Senses
.
that
he
knows
the
Anatomy
of
the
Organs
of
the
Senses
,
and
that
they
are
compos'd
of
small
Branches
,
which
have
their
Original
in
the
middle
of
the
Brain
,
whence
they
disperse
themselves
through
all
the
Members
of
Sensation
,
and
that
at
last
,
without
any
interruption
,
terminate
at
the
Extreme
parts
of
the
Body
;
That
whilst
we
are
Awake
or
in
Health
,
one
of
their
Extremities
cannot
be
mov'd
but
the
other
is
also
mov'd
,
because
of
their
perpetual
Intension
;
just
as
an
extended
Cord
cannot
be
mov'd
in
one
part
,
without
communicating
motion
to
another
.
The
Reader
must
also
know
,
that
these
little
Strings
or
Branches
,
may
be
affected
after
two
ways
,
either
at
the
end
,
which
is
at
the
extremity
of
the
Body
,
or
at
that
which
is
in
the
Brain
;
If
these
little
Strings
are
shaken
by
the
Action
of
External
Bodies
upon
them
,
and
this
Motion
is
not
communicated
to
the
Brain
,
as
it
often
happens
in
sleep
,
then
the
Mind
receives
no
new
Sensation
by
that
Action
;
but
if
these
Strings
are
mov'd
in
the
Brain
by
the
Course
of
the
Animal
Spirits
,
or
by
some
other
Cause
,
the
Soul
perceives
something
,
although
the
parts
of
these
Strings
,
which
are
out
of
the
Brain
,
and
which
are
dispers'd
through
all
the
parts
of
our
Bodies
,
be
in
perfect
rest
,
as
it
often
happens
in
sleep
.
It
is
not
amiss
to
observe
here
by
the
by
,
III.
The
Soul
is
immediately
united
to
that
part
of
the
Brain
where
the
Strings
of
the
Organs
of
the
Senses
meet
.
how
Experience
teaches
us
,
that
we
do
sometimes
feel
pain
in
such
parts
of
our
Bodies
as
have
been
cut
off
,
because
the
Strings
of
the
Brain
which
belong
to
those
respective
parts
being
shaken
after
the
same
manner
as
if
they
were
effectually
hurt
,
the
Soul
feels
a
very
real
Pain
in
these
Imaginary
Parts
;
Now
all
these
things
shew
visibly
,
that
the
Soul
immediately
resides
in
that
part
of
the
Brain
where
all
the
Organs
of
Sense
meet
;
I
mean
,
it
perceives
all
the
Changes
,
which
pass
there
by
means
of
Objects
which
Cause
,
or
have
been
accustom'd
to
Cause
them
;
and
perceives
nothing
that
passes
out
of
this
part
,
but
by
the
interposition
of
the
Fibres
which
terminate
there
;
This
Position
being
well
conceiv'd
,
it
will
not
be
very
difficult
to
shew
how
Sensation
is
made
,
which
must
be
explain'd
by
some
Example
.
When
I
thrust
the
Point
of
a
Needle
into
my
Hand
,
IV.
An
Example
how
Objects
affect
Bodies
.
this
Point
removes
and
separates
the
Fibres
of
the
Flesh
,
the
Fibres
are
continued
from
this
place
to
the
Brain
,
and
when
one
sleeps
they
are
extended
enough
not
to
be
shaken
,
unless
those
of
the
Brain
be
also
shaken
;
it
follows
,
then
that
the
Extremities
of
these
Fibres
which
are
in
the
Brain
are
also
moved
.
If
the
Motion
of
the
Fibres
in
my
Hand
is
moderate
,
that
of
the
Fibres
of
the
Brain
will
be
so
also
;
and
if
the
Motion
is
violent
to
break
something
upon
my
Hand
,
it
will
be
much
stronger
and
more
violent
in
the
Brain
.
Thus
also
,
if
I
come
near
the
Fire
,
the
small
parts
of
Wood
,
which
it
continually
,
in
great
number
,
and
with
much
violence
,
disperses
,
(
as
may
be
prov'd
by
Reason
,
though
our
Sight
fails
us
in
it
)
shake
these
Fibres
,
and
communicate
a
part
of
their
Motion
;
If
this
Motion
,
I
say
,
is
moderate
,
that
of
the
extremity
of
the
Fibres
of
the
Brain
which
answer
to
the
Hand
,
will
be
moderate
;
but
if
this
Motion
is
violent
enough
in
the
Hand
to
separate
some
parts
,
as
it
happens
when
a
Man
burns
,
the
Motion
of
the
Internal
Fibres
of
the
Brain
will
be
proportionably
more
violent
.
This
is
what
happens
to
our
Body
when
Objects
Act
upon
it
;
We
must
now
consider
what
happens
to
the
Soul
.
It
resides
principally
,
V.
The
effect
th●●
Objects
have
upon
the
Soul●
and
Reasans
why
the
Soul
d●●
;
n●t
perceive
the
Motions
of
the
Fibre
;
of
the
Bod.
if
I
may
be
permitted
to
say
so
,
in
this
part
of
the
Brain
where
all
the
Strings
of
our
Nerves
meet
together
,
't
is
placed
there
to
cherish
and
conserve
all
the
parts
of
our
Body
,
and
consequently
it
's
necessary
that
it
be
advertis'd
of
all
the
Changes
which
happen
thereto
,
and
that
it
can
distinguish
those
which
are
Conformable
to
the
Constitution
of
its
Body
from
the
others
,
because
it
would
be
very
useless
to
know
'em
absolutely
,
and
without
any
relation
to
its
Body
.
Since
therefore
all
these
Changes
of
our
Fibres
,
which
have
no
other
real
Existence
but
in
the
Motions
which
commonly
differ
only
as
to
the
more
or
less
,
it
's
necessary
that
the
Soul
look
upon
'em
as
Changes
essentially
different
;
for
although
in
themselves
they
differ
but
little
,
This
●●●fu●
〈…〉
〈◊〉
is
only
a
Compos'd
Sensation
.
yet
we
must
always
consider
'em
as
essentially
different
in
respect
of
the
preservation
of
the
Body
.
Motion
,
for
Example
,
which
causes
Pain
,
very
often
differs
but
a
little
from
that
which
causes
Titillation
,
it
is
not
necessary
that
there
be
an
Essential
difference
between
these
two
Motions
;
but
it
's
necessary
that
there
be
an
Essential
difference
between
Titillation
and
Pain
,
which
these
two
Motions
cause
in
the
Soul
;
for
the
shaking
of
the
Fibres
which
accompanies
Titillation
,
〈…〉
I
〈…〉
of
Natural
Judgments
in
●
.
1.
Lib.
1.
informs
the
Soul
of
the
good
Constitution
of
it's
Body
,
that
there
is
power
enough
to
resist
the
impression
of
the
Object
,
and
that
it
must
not
apprehend
it self
hurt
;
but
the
Motion
which
accompanies
Pain
being
a
little
more
violent
,
is
capable
of
breaking
fome
Fibre
of
the
Body
,
and
the
Soul
must
be
advertis'd
by
fome
disagreeable
Sensation
to
take
care
thereof
;
Thus
,
although
the
Motions
which
pass
in
the
Body
differ
only
as
to
more
or
less
,
between
themselves
,
yet
if
they
are
consider'd
in
respect
to
the
preservation
of
our
Life
,
it
may
be
said
that
they
differ
essentially
.
Hence
our
Soul
is
sensible
only
of
the
Action
of
Objects
upon
the
Fibres
of
our
Flesh
;
it
would
be
of
no
use
at
all
to
it
to
know
them
,
nor
could
it
receive
from
them
sufficient
light
,
to
judge
whether
the
things
about
us
were
capable
of
destroying
or
cherishing
the
Oeconony
of
our
Body
;
but
it
perceives
it self
touch'd
by
these
Sensations
which
differ
essentially
;
and
precisely
observing
the
Qualities
of
Objects
,
as
they
stand
related
to
the
Body
,
they
make
it
to
perceive
very
distinctly
whether
or
no
these
Objects
are
capable
of
hurting
it
.
Besides
this
,
we
must
consider
,
that
if
the
Soul
only
perceives
that
which
passes
in
its
Hand
,
when
burnt
;
if
it
only
sees
the
Motion
and
Separation
of
fome
Fibres
,
it
would
not
be
at
all
concern'd
,
and
it
might
even
sometimes
out
of
Fancy
and
Caprice
take
a
satisfaction
in
it
,
like
those
Madmen
that
divert
themselves
by
breaking
every
thing
to
pieces
in
their
Fury
.
Or
else
,
even
as
a
Prisoner
would
not
be
uneasie
to
see
one
demolish
the
Walls
that
confin'd
him
,
but
would
even
rejoyce
in
hopes
of
being
deliver'd
very
soon
;
so
if
we
only
perceive
the
separation
of
the
parts
of
our
Body
,
when
we
are
burnt
,
or
receive
any
hurt
,
we
should
soon
be
persuaded
that
our
Happiness
is
not
confin'd
in
the
Body
,
which
rather
obstructs
it
,
and
therefore
we
should
be
very
glad
to
see
it
destroy'd
.
Hence
it
is
observable
,
that
the
Author
of
the
Union
of
our
Soul
and
Body
hath
,
with
great
Wisdom
,
ordain'd
,
that
we
should
be
sensible
of
pain
,
when
there
happens
a
change
to
the
Body
which
is
capable
of
hurting
it
;
as
when
a
Needle
pierces
the
Flesh
,
or
Fire
separates
fome
parts
thereof
,
and
that
we
should
be
sensible
of
Titillation
or
an
agreeable
Heat
when
these
Motions
are
moderated
;
without
perceiving
either
the
truth
of
what
passes
in
our
Body
,
or
the
Motions
of
these
Fibres
of
which
we
have
already
spoke
.
First
;
Because
in
perceiving
Pain
and
Pleasure
which
differ
otherwise
than
in
the
more
and
less
,
we
more
easily
distinguish
Objects
which
are
the
occasion
of
them
;
Secondly
,
because
this
way
of
informing
us
,
whether
we
ought
to
unite
or
separate
from
Bodies
which
are
about
us
,
is
more
short
,
and
does
less
imploy
the
Capacity
of
the
Mind
which
was
made
for
God
.
Lastly
,
Because
Pain
and
Pleasure
being
Modifications
of
the
Soul
,
which
it
perceives
by
means
of
its
Body
,
and
which
affect
more
than
the
knowledge
of
Motion
or
fome
Fibres
,
which
belong
thereto
,
this
obliges
the
Mind
to
be
much
concern'd
,
and
strengthens
the
Union
betwixt
the
Soul
and
Body
of
Man
:
From
all
this
it
is
evident
,
that
our
Senses
were
not
given
us
to
teach
us
truth
,
but
for
the
preservation
of
our
Body
.
What
we
have
said
of
Titillation
and
of
Pain
must
be
generally
understood
of
all
other
Sensations
,
as
will
be
better
seen
hereafter
;
We
began
with
these
two
Sensations
rather
than
with
others
,
because
they
are
more
lively
,
and
help
us
to
conceive
more
sensibly
what
was
to
be
said
.
It
is
now
very
easily
shewn
how
we
fall
into
an
Infinity
of
Errors
about
Light
and
Colours
,
and
generally
about
all
sensible
Qualities
.
Cold.
Heat
,
Odours
,
Sapors
,
Sound
,
Pain
,
Titillation
,
&c.
And
if
I
would
stay
to
particularize
every
one
belonging
to
every
Object
of
the
Senses
,
whole
years
would
not
suffice
to
enumerate
them
,
because
they
are
almost
infinite
,
I
shall
therefore
content
my self
to
speak
of
'em
in
General
.
In
almost
all
Sensations
there
are
four
different
things
which
are
confounded
,
VI.
Four
things
which
are
confounded
in
every
Sensation
.
because
they
are
done
all
together
,
and
as
it
were
in
an
Instant
,
and
this
is
the
Principle
of
all
the
other
Errors
of
our
Senses
.
The
first
is
the
Action
of
the
Object
;
that
is
,
in
Heat
,
for
Example
,
the
Impulsion
or
Agitation
of
the
Particles
of
Wood
against
the
Fibres
of
the
Hand
.
The
second
is
the
Passion
of
the
Organ
of
Sense
,
that
is
,
the
Agitation
of
the
Fibres
of
the
Hand
caus'd
by
that
of
the
Particles
of
Fire
,
which
Agitation
is
communicated
to
the
Brain
,
because
otherwise
the
Soul
would
perceive
nothing
.
The
third
is
the
Passion
,
Sensation
,
or
Perception
of
the
Soul
,
that
is
,
what
every
one
feels
who
is
near
the
Fire
.
The
fourth
is
the
Judgment
that
the
Soul
makes
,
as
to
that
which
is
in
the
Hand
or
in
the
Fire
:
Now
this
Judgment
is
Natural
,
or
rather
it
is
a
Compounded
Sensation
:
But
this
Sensation
,
or
this
Natural
Judgment
,
is
almost
always
follow'd
by
another
free
Judgment
,
which
the
Soul
is
so
accustom'd
to
,
that
it
can
scarce
refrain
from
it
.
These
four
things
are
very
different
,
as
may
be
shewed
,
however
Men
do
not
carefully
distinguish
them
,
but
are
inclin'd
to
confound
them
by
reason
of
the
strict
union
betwixt
the
Soul
and
Body
,
which
hinders
us
from
separating
the
Properties
of
Matter
from
those
of
the
Mind
.
Yet
it
is
easie
for
any
Man
to
know
,
that
of
these
four
things
which
pass
in
us
when
we
perceive
some
Object
,
the
two
first
are
proper
to
the
Body
,
and
the
two
last
to
the
Soul
,
provided
he
consider
a
little
the
Nature
of
the
Soul
and
Body
as
he
ought
to
do
,
which
I
have
suppos'd
;
But
these
things
must
be
explain'd
in
Particulars
.
CHAP.
XI
.
I.
Of
the
Error
we
are
subject
to
in
respect
of
the
Action
of
Objects
upon
the
External
Fibres
of
our
Senses
.
II.
The
Cause
of
that
Error
.
III.
An
Objection
and
Answer
.
IN
this
and
the
three
following
Chapters
we
shall
Treat
of
these
Four
Things
which
are
confounded
and
taken
for
pure
Sensation
;
and
shall
only
in
general
explain
the
Errors
we
are
subject
to
;
because
,
if
we
should
enter
into
particulars
,
it
would
be
endless
.
Yet
,
I
do
not
doubt
,
but
I
may
so
assist
the
Mind
of
such
as
will
seriously
Meditate
upon
what
shall
be
said
,
as
to
make
them
capable
of
discovering
with
great
facility
all
the
Errors
that
are
caused
from
our
Senses
;
but
it
will
be
requisite
then
,
that
they
shou'd
think
with
fome
application
both
upon
the
preceding
and
following
Chapters
.
The
first
of
these
things
which
we
confound
in
all
our
Sensations
,
I.
Of
the
Erro
we
are
ju●ject
to
in
respect
to
the
Objects
acting
upon
the
Fibres
of
our
Serses
.
is
the
Action
of
Objects
upon
the
External
Fibres
of
our
Body
.
It
is
most
certain
that
there
is
hardly
any
distinction
made
between
the
Sensation
of
the
Soul
,
and
this
Action
of
the
Objects
;
of
which
there
needs
no
proof
;
for
Example
,
almost
all
Men
imagine
,
that
the
heat
they
feel
is
in
the
Fire
which
causes
it
;
that
Light
is
in
the
Air
,
and
Colours
upon
Coloured
Objects
;
they
have
no
thoughts
upon
the
Motions
of
fome
imperceptible
Bodies
which
cause
these
Sensations
.
It
is
true
,
II.
The
Cause
of
the
Error
.
that
they
do
not
imagine
that
pain
is
in
the
Needle
that
pricks
them
,
as
they
judge
heat
to
be
in
the
Fire
;
the
reason
is
,
because
the
Needle
and
its
Action
are
visible
,
but
the
Particles
of
the
Wood
which
go
out
from
the
Fire
,
and
their
Motion
against
our
Hands
are
not
seen
;
so
that
seeing
nothing
that
strikes
our
Hands
when
we
warm
our selves
,
and
feeling
heat
,
we
naturally
judge
this
heat
to
be
in
the
Fire
,
because
we
see
nothing
else
there
.
So
that
't
is
commonly
true
,
that
we
attribute
our
Sensations
to
Objects
,
when
the
Causes
of
these
Sensations
are
unknown
to
us
,
and
because
Pain
and
Tititation
are
produced
by
sensible
Bodies
,
as
with
a
Needle
,
a
Feather
which
we
see
and
touch
,
and
therefre
we
do
not
judge
that
there
is
any
thing
like
to
these
Sentiments
,
in
those
Objects
that
cause
them
in
us
.
It
is
certain
indeed
,
III.
Objection
.
that
we
do
not
imagine
that
the
burning
is
in
the
Fire
,
but
only
in
the
Hand
,
although
it
is
caused
by
Particles
of
the
Wood
as
well
as
the
Heat
,
which
we
always
attribute
to
the
Fire
.
But
the
reason
of
it
is
,
the
burning
is
a
kind
of
Pain
,
and
having
many
times
judged
that
Pain
is
not
in
the
External
Body
which
Causes
it
,
we
are
induced
also
to
make
the
same
Judgment
of
Burning
.
What
further
persuades
us
to
judge
after
this
manner
,
is
,
that
Pain
or
Burning
does
strongly
apply
our
Soul
to
the
affected
parts
of
our
Bodies
,
and
that
diverts
us
from
thinking
on
other
things
.
Thus
the
Mind
unites
the
Sensation
of
burning
to
that
Object
that
is
nearest
to
it
.
And
because
we
soon
after
perceive
that
the
burning
hath
left
fome
visible
Marks
in
that
part
where
we
felt
the
Pain
,
this
confirms
us
in
the
Judgment
we
have
made
that
the
burning
is
in
the
Hand
.
But
this
must
not
hinder
us
from
receiving
this
general
Rule
,
that
we
use
to
attribute
our
Sensations
to
Objects
,
every
time
they
act
upon
us
by
the
Motion
of
fome
invisible
Particle
.
This
is
the
reason
that
we
generally
believe
that
Colours
,
Light
,
Odours
,
Taste
,
Sound
,
and
fome
other
Sensations
,
are
in
the
Air
,
or
in
the
External
Objects
which
cause
them
,
because
all
Sensations
are
produced
in
us
by
the
Motion
of
fome
Imperceptible
Bodies
.
CHAP.
XII
.
I.
Of
the
Errors
concerning
the
Motions
of
the
Fibres
of
our
Senses
.
II.
That
either
we
perceive
not
these
Motions
,
or
else
confound
them
with
our
Sensations
.
III.
Experience
,
which
proves
it
.
IV.
Three
sorts
of
Sensations
.
V.
The
Errors
which
accompany
them
.
THE
second
thing
that
may
be
observed
in
each
of
our
Sensations
,
I.
Errors
concerning
the
motions
or
shaking
of
the
Fibres
of
our
Senses
.
II.
That
we
confound
them
with
the
Sensa●on
of
our
Soul
,
and
sometime
again
do
not
perceive
them
.
is
the
shaking
of
the
Fibres
of
our
Nerves
,
which
is
communicated
unto
the
Brain
;
and
we
deceive
our selves
in
this
,
that
we
confound
this
shaking
with
the
Sensation
of
the
Soul
,
and
judge
there
is
none
when
we
perceive
it
not
by
the
Senses
.
We
confound
,
for
instance
,
the
Motion
that
the
Fire
excites
in
the
Fibres
of
our
Hands
with
the
Sensation
of
Heat
,
and
we
say
that
the
Heat
is
in
our
Hand
.
But
because
we
feel
not
the
shaking
that
visible
Objects
produce
in
the
Optick
Nerve
,
which
is
in
the
bottom
of
the
Eye
,
we
think
that
this
Nerve
is
not
shaken
,
and
that
it
is
not
cover'd
with
the
Colours
that
appear
to
us
;
on
the
contrary
,
we
judge
that
't
is
only
external
Objects
upon
which
these
Colours
are
dispersed
,
yet
we
may
see
by
the
following
Experiment
,
that
Colours
are
almost
as
strong
and
lively
in
the
bottom
of
the
Optick
Nerve
,
as
upon
visible
Objects
.
Take
the
Eye
of
an
Ox
that
is
newly
killed
,
III.
Experience
,
which
proves
it
.
and
strip
the
Skins
from
it
that
are
opposite
to
the
Apple
of
of
the
Eye
,
in
the
place
where
the
Optick
Nerve
is
,
and
put
in
their
room
a
little
bit
of
Paper
that
is
very
thin
;
and
place
this
Eye
in
the
hole
of
a
Window
,
so
that
the
Apple
be
in
the
Air
,
and
the
back
part
of
the
Eye
be
in
the
Chamber
,
which
must
be
shut
close
so
that
it
may
be
very
dark
;
and
then
all
the
Colours
of
the
Objects
which
are
without
the
Chamber
,
will
appear
upon
the
bottom
of
the
Eye
,
but
represented
upside
down
.
And
if
these
Colours
shou'd
happen
not
to
be
very
lively
,
if
the
Objects
which
are
painted
at
the
bottom
of
the
Eye
are
too
near
,
the
Eye
must
be
lengthned
by
pressing
the
sides
closer
together
,
and
on
the
contrary
,
it
must
be
compess'd
,
if
the
Objects
are
too
far
off
.
By
this
Experiment
,
't
is
plain
,
that
we
ought
to
judge
,
or
be
sensible
of
the
Colours
at
the
bottom
of
our
Eyes
,
after
the
same
manner
as
we
judge
the
Heat
to
be
in
our
Hand
,
if
our
Senses
were
given
us
to
discover
the
truth
,
and
if
we
were
guided
by
Reason
in
the
Judgments
we
make
upon
the
Objects
of
our
Senses
.
But
to
be
able
to
give
a
Reason
for
the
variety
of
our
Judgments
upon
sensible
Qualities
,
't
is
necessary
that
we
consider
how
strictly
the
Soul
is
united
to
the
Body
,
and
that
it
is
so
sensualized
since
Original
Sin
,
that
many
things
are
attributed
to
it
which
belong
to
the
Body
,
and
that
it
is
now
hardly
to
be
distinguished
from
it
;
so
that
it
ascribes
to
it
not
only
all
its
Sensations
,
which
we
are
speaking
of
,
but
also
the
force
of
Imagining
,
and
even
sometimes
the
power
of
Reasoning
.
For
there
has
been
a
great
number
of
Philosophers
that
have
been
ignorant
and
foolish
enough
to
believe
,
that
the
Soul
was
only
a
more
fine
and
subtile
part
of
the
Body
.
If
we
read
Tertullian
,
we
shall
soon
see
too
many
proofs
of
what
I
say
,
since
we
shall
find
him
of
the
same
Opinion
,
with
a
great
number
of
Authors
whom
he
Cites
.
It
is
true
in
the
Book
of
the
Soul
he
endeavours
to
prove
,
that
Faith
,
Scripture
,
and
even
particular
Revelation
oblige
us
to
believe
that
the
Soul
is
Corporeal
.
I
will
not
refute
these
Opinions
,
because
I
have
already
supposed
that
we
ought
to
have
read
fome
of
St.
Augustin
or
Descartes
Works
,
which
wou'd
have
sufficiently
shewn
the
extravagancy
of
these
Thoughts
;
and
also
wou'd
have
confirm'd
the
Mind
in
the
distinction
betwixt
Extention
and
Thought
,
betwixt
the
Soul
and
Body
.
The
Soul
is
then
so
blind
that
she
is
ignorant
of
her self
,
and
does
not
see
that
her
own
Sensations
belong
to
her
.
II.
An
Explanation
of
the
three
kinds
of
the
Sensations
of
the
Soul
.
To
explain
this
we
must
distinguish
three
sorts
of
Sensations
in
the
Soul
,
some
strong
and
lively
,
others
weak
and
languishing
,
and
some
again
in
the
medium
between
both
.
The
strong
and
lively
Sensations
are
those
which
surprize
the
Mind
,
and
awaken
it
with
some
force
,
because
they
are
either
very
agreeable
,
or
very
troublesome
,
such
as
are
Pain
or
Pleasure
,
Heat
or
Cold
,
and
generally
all
such
as
are
not
only
accompanied
with
Impressions
in
the
Brain
,
but
also
with
some
Motions
of
the
Spirit
,
such
as
are
proper
for
the
exciting
the
Passions
,
as
shall
afterwards
be
explained
.
The
Weak
and
Languishing
Sensations
are
those
which
very
little
affect
the
Soul
,
and
which
are
neither
very
agreeable
,
nor
very
troublesome
,
as
a
Moderate
Light
,
all
Colours
,
Ordinary
Sounds
,
which
are
very
weak
,
&c.
And
the
Medium
between
both
I
call
those
sort
of
Sensations
which
indifferently
touch
the
Soul
,
as
a
great
Light
,
a
violent
Sound
,
&c.
Now
it
is
to
be
observed
,
that
a
Weak
and
Languishing
Sensation
may
become
indifferent
,
and
afterwards
strong
and
lively
.
For
Example
,
the
Sensation
that
we
have
of
Light
is
weak
,
when
the
Light
of
a
Flambeau
is
weak
and
languishing
,
or
very
far
from
us
,
and
afterwards
this
Sensation
may
become
indifferent
,
if
the
Flambeau
be
brought
near
enough
to
us
;
and
at
last
it
may
become
very
strong
and
lively
,
if
the
Flambeau
be
brought
so
near
our
Eyes
that
they
be
dazled
with
it
,
or
else
,
when
we
look
upon
the
Sun
.
Thus
the
Sensation
of
Light
may
be
strong
,
weak
,
or
moderate
,
according
to
its
different
degrees
.
These
are
then
the
Judgments
that
our
Soul
makes
of
these
three
sorts
of
Sensations
,
V.
Errors
which
accompany
our
Sensations
.
wherein
we
may
perceive
,
that
it
almost
always
blindly
follows
the
sensible
Impressions
,
or
Natural
Judgments
of
our
Senses
,
and
that
it
is
pleased
,
if
we
may
so
say
,
in
dispersing
it self
over
all
the
Objects
that
it
considers
,
and
by
divesting
it self
to
cloath
them
.
The
first
of
these
Sensations
is
so
lively
and
moving
,
that
the
Soul
can
scarce
hinder
it self
from
acknowledging
,
that
in
some
respect
they
belong
to
it
,
so
that
it
does
not
only
judge
them
to
be
in
the
Object
,
but
also
believes
them
to
be
in
the
Members
of
the
Body
,
which
it
considers
as
a
part
of
it self
.
Thus
it
judges
that
Cold
and
Heat
are
not
only
in
the
Ice
and
Fire
,
but
that
they
are
also
in
its
own
Hands
.
The
Languishing
Sensations
so
little
affect
the
Soul
,
that
it
does
not
believe
them
to
belong
to
it
;
nor
that
they
are
either
within
it self
,
or
the
Body
,
but
only
in
the
Objects
:
'T
is
for
this
reason
that
we
take
away
Light
and
Colours
from
our
Soul
and
Eyes
,
thereby
to
adorn
External
Objects
with
them
,
although
Reason
teaches
us
,
that
they
are
not
in
the
Idea
we
have
of
Matter
.
And
Experience
shews
us
we
ought
to
judge
them
in
our
Eyes
,
as
well
as
upon
Objects
,
since
we
see
them
as
well
there
as
in
the
Objects
,
as
I
have
proved
by
the
Instance
of
an
Oxe's
Eye
placed
at
the
hole
of
a
Window
.
Now
the
Reason
why
all
Men
do
not
immediately
see
that
Colours
,
Odours
,
Taste
,
and
all
other
Sensations
are
only
Modifications
of
their
Soul
;
is
,
because
we
have
no
clear
Idea
of
our
Soul
.
For
when
we
know
any
thing
by
the
Idea
which
represents
it
,
we
clearly
know
all
the
Modifications
it
can
have
.
All
Men
agree
,
for
Example
,
that
Roundness
is
a
Modification
of
Extension
,
by
a
clear
Idea
which
represents
it
.
See
Chap.
7.
2d
part
of
the
3d
Book
.
Thus
not
knowing
our
Soul
by
its
Idea
,
as
I
shall
explain
hereafter
,
but
only
by
the
Internal
Sentiment
we
have
thereof
,
we
know
not
by
a
simple
Sight
,
but
only
by
Reasoning
,
whether
Whiteness
,
Light
,
Colours
,
and
other
Weak
and
Languishing
Sensations
,
are
not
Modifications
of
our
Soul
;
but
for
the
lively
Sensations
,
such
as
Pain
and
Pleasure
,
we
easily
judge
they
are
within
us
because
we
are
very
sensible
that
they
affect
us
;
and
have
no
need
to
know
them
by
their
Ideas
,
to
perceive
they
belong
us
.
As
for
Indifferent
Sensations
the
Soul
is
very
much
perplexed
with
them
,
for
on
the
one
hand
it
wou'd
follow
the
Natural
Judgments
of
the
Senses
and
therefore
it
removes
from
it
,
as
much
as
possible
,
these
sort
of
Sensations
,
to
attribute
them
to
the
Objects
;
but
on
the
other
side
,
it
cannot
avoid
feeling
within
self
that
they
belong
to
it
,
especially
when
these
Sensations
come
near
those
that
I
call
strong
and
lively
;
so
that
't
is
after
this
manner
that
it
guides
it self
in
the
Judgment
it
makes
of
them
;
if
a
Sensation
affects
it
very
much
,
it
concludes
it
to
be
in
its
own
Body
,
as
well
as
in
the
Object
;
and
if
it
touches
it
but
a
little
,
the
Soul
believes
it
only
in
the
Object
.
And
if
this
Sensation
is
exactly
in
the
Medium
between
the
Strong
and
Weak
,
then
it
knows
not
what
to
determine
,
if
it
Judges
by
the
Senses
.
For
Instance
,
if
one
looks
upon
a
Candle
at
a
little
distance
,
the
Soul
judges
that
the
Light
is
only
in
the
Object
;
but
if
the
Candle
is
brought
nearer
,
it
judges
it
to
be
not
only
in
the
Candle
,
but
also
in
the
Eyes
.
But
if
we
draw
back
about
a
foot
from
it
,
the
Soul
continues
sometime
without
judging
whether
or
no
the
Light
is
only
in
the
Object
;
never
thinking
,
as
it
ought
to
do
,
that
this
Light
is
or
can
be
,
only
a
Propriety
,
or
Modification
of
Matter
,
and
that
it
is
only
within
it self
;
because
it
does
not
think
it
necessary
to
make
use
of
its
Reason
to
discover
the
Truth
of
what
appears
therein
,
but
only
of
the
Senses
,
which
never
discovers
it
,
and
are
only
given
us
for
the
preservation
of
our
Bodies
.
Now
why
the
Soul
makes
no
use
of
her
Reason
,
that
is
,
of
her
Understanding
,
when
she
considers
an
Object
which
may
be
perceived
by
the
Senses
,
is
,
because
she
is
not
affected
by
things
that
she
perceives
by
the
pure
Understanding
;
and
that
,
on
the
contrary
,
she
is
most
lively
touch'd
by
Sensible
things
;
for
the
Soul
applies
it self
much
to
what
affects
it
much
,
and
neglects
applying
it self
to
things
that
do
not
touch
it
.
Thus
she
almost
always
conforms
her
free
Judgments
,
to
the
Natural
Judgments
of
her
Senses
.
To
be
able
to
Judge
rightly
of
Light
and
Colours
,
as
well
as
all
other
Sensible
Qualities
,
we
must
carefully
distinguish
the
Sensation
of
Colour
,
from
the
Motion
of
the
Optic
Nerve
,
and
by
Reason
,
discover
that
Motions
and
Impulsions
,
are
Proprieties
of
Bodies
,
and
that
thus
they
may
meet
in
Objects
,
and
in
the
Organs
of
our
Senses
;
but
that
Light
and
Colours
which
we
see
,
are
Modifications
of
the
Soul
,
very
different
from
others
,
and
of
which
also
we
have
as
different
Idea's
.
It
is
certain
,
for
instance
,
that
a
Country
Man
sees
Colours
very
plainly
,
and
distinguishes
them
from
every
thing
that
has
no
Colour
.
It
is
also
as
certain
,
that
he
perceives
no
Motion
either
in
Coloured
Objects
,
or
in
the
bottom
of
his
Eyes
;
and
that
therefore
he
concludes
,
Colour
is
not
Motion
.
Likewise
,
a
Country
man
is
as
sensible
of
Heat
,
and
hath
a
sufficient
Knowledge
to
distinguish
it
from
all
things
which
are
not
Heat
,
and
yet
he
does
not
think
that
't
is
only
because
the
Fibres
of
his
Hands
are
moved
;
he
thinks
the
Heat
therefore
,
that
he
feels
,
is
not
Motion
,
since
his
Idea's
of
Heat
and
Motion
are
very
different
,
and
he
can
have
the
one
without
the
other
:
For
there
is
no
reason
to
be
given
,
that
a
Square
is
not
round
,
but
only
because
our
Idea
of
a
Square
,
is
different
from
that
we
have
of
a
Circle
,
and
that
we
can
think
of
the
one
,
without
thinking
of
the
other
.
There
's
only
a
little
attention
requisite
,
to
be
able
to
know
,
that
't
is
not
necessary
,
that
the
Cause
,
which
makes
us
feel
such
or
such
a
thing
,
contains
it
in
it self
.
Thus
it
is
not
needful
,
that
I
have
Light
in
my
Hand
,
that
I
might
see
it
,
when
I
strike
my
Eyes
;
nor
is
it
necessary
,
that
there
shou'd
be
Heat
in
the
Fire
,
to
make
me
feel
it
,
when
I
hold
my
Hand
to
it
;
or
,
that
any
other
Sensible
Quality
,
that
I
perceive
,
shou'd
be
in
the
Object
;
it
is
sufficient
,
that
they
cause
some
Motion
in
the
Fibres
of
my
Flesh
,
so
that
my
Soul
,
which
is
united
thereto
,
be
Modified
by
some
Sensation
.
There
is
no
Relation
,
between
Motions
and
Sensations
,
it
is
true
,
but
there
is
none
also
between
the
Body
and
Mind
;
and
since
Nature
,
or
the
Will
of
our
Creator
,
has
joined
these
two
Substances
together
,
how
opposite
soever
they
are
in
their
Nature
,
it
must
not
seem
surprizing
if
their
Modifications
are
Reciprocal
;
it
is
necessary
that
they
shou'd
be
so
,
that
they
may
together
make
an
entire
Being
.
We
must
observe
,
that
our
Senses
being
given
us
for
the
Preservation
of
our
Bodies
,
it
is
very
proper
that
they
shou'd
incline
us
,
to
make
such
Judgments
as
we
do
of
Sensible
Qualities
.
It
is
much
more
advantageous
to
us
,
to
feel
Pain
and
Heat
,
as
being
in
our
Bodies
,
than
if
we
Judg'd
them
only
to
be
in
the
Objects
that
cause
them
,
because
,
that
Pain
and
Heat
being
capable
of
prejudicing
our
Members
,
it
is
fit
we
shou'd
be
advertiz'd
when
they
are
affected
therewith
,
so
as
to
prevent
their
being
hurt
by
them
.
But
it
is
not
so
with
Colours
,
they
cannot
easily
hurt
the
bottom
of
the
Eye
where
they
meet
together
,
and
it
is
of
no
use
for
us
to
know
they
are
Painted
there
.
These
Colours
are
only
necessary
to
discover
Objects
more
distinctly
,
and
that
is
the
reason
our
Senses
induce
us
to
attribute
them
only
to
the
Objects
.
So
the
Judgments
,
to
which
the
impression
of
our
Senses
carry
us
,
are
more
Just
,
if
we
consider
them
with
relation
to
the
Preservation
of
our
Bodies
;
but
nevertheless
,
they
are
various
,
and
very
far
from
the
Truth
,
as
has
already
been
shown
,
in
part
,
and
will
more
evidently
appear
hereafter
.
CHAP.
XIII
.
I.
Of
the
Nature
of
Sensations
.
II.
That
we
know
them
better
than
we
lelieve
we
do
.
III.
An
Objection
and
Answer
.
IV.
Why
we
imagine
we
know
nothing
of
our
Sensations
.
V.
That
we
deceive
our selves
in
believing
that
all
Men
have
the
same
Sensations
of
the
same
Objects
.
VI.
Objection
and
Answer
.
THE
third
thing
that
is
in
each
of
our
Sensations
,
I.
A
Definition
of
Sensations
.
or
in
what
we
feel
,
for
Example
,
when
we
are
near
the
Fire
,
is
,
a
Modification
of
our
Soul
in
relation
to
what
passes
in
the
Body
to
which
it
is
united
.
This
Modification
is
agreeable
,
when
what
passes
in
the
Body
is
proper
to
assist
the
Circulation
of
the
Blood
,
and
the
other
Functions
of
Life
,
which
is
called
by
the
Equivocal
Term
of
Heat
;
and
this
Modification
is
painful
,
and
perfectly
different
from
the
other
,
when
what
passes
in
the
Body
is
capable
of
incommoding
and
burning
it
,
that
is
,
when
the
Motions
that
are
in
the
Body
,
are
capable
of
breaking
any
of
its
Fibres
,
and
this
is
generally
called
Pain
or
Burning
,
and
so
of
other
Sensations
;
but
these
are
the
common
thoughts
Men
have
upon
this
subject
.
The
first
Error
is
,
that
we
unreasonably
imagine
we
have
no
knowledge
of
our
Sensations
.
II.
That
we
know
our
own
Sensations
,
better
than
we
believe
we
do
.
We
see
a
great
many
Men
every
day
who
much
concern
themselves
to
know
what
Pleasure
,
Pain
,
and
the
other
Sensations
are
;
they
grant
that
they
are
only
in
the
Soul
,
and
that
they
are
but
the
Modifications
of
it
.
'T
is
true
these
sort
of
Men
are
very
much
to
be
admired
at
,
for
being
willing
to
learn
what
they
cannot
but
know
already
,
for
it
is
not
possible
that
a
Man
shou'd
be
entirely
ignorant
what
Pain
is
,
when
he
feels
it
.
A
Person
,
for
Instance
,
that
burns
his
Hand
,
distinguishes
very
well
the
Pain
he
feels
from
Light
,
Colour
,
Sound
,
Taste
,
Smell
,
Pleasure
,
and
from
all
other
Pain
than
what
he
feels
;
He
very
well
distinguishes
it
from
Admiration
,
from
Desire
,
and
Love
;
from
a
Square
,
a
Circle
,
and
Motion
:
in
fine
,
he
discerns
it
very
different
from
all
things
which
are
not
this
Pain
that
he
feels
.
Now
,
if
he
had
no
knowledge
of
Pain
,
I
wou'd
fain
know
how
he
can
have
any
certainty
,
that
what
he
feels
is
none
of
these
things
.
We
have
some
knowledge
therefore
of
what
we
immediately
feel
,
when
we
see
Colours
,
or
when
we
have
any
other
Sensation
;
and
even
't
is
most
certain
,
that
if
we
knew
it
not
,
we
cou'd
know
no
sensible
Object
;
for
't
is
evident
we
cou'd
not
distinguish
Water
from
Wine
,
if
we
did
not
know
that
the
Sensations
we
have
of
one
of
them
,
is
different
from
those
we
have
of
the
other
,
and
so
of
all
things
we
know
by
our
Senses
.
It
is
true
,
that
if
I
was
pressed
and
required
to
explain
what
Pain
,
Pleasure
,
and
Colour
is
,
&c.
I
cou'd
not
do
it
as
it
ought
to
be
done
by
Words
;
but
it
follows
not
from
thence
,
that
if
I
see
Colour
,
or
burn
my self
,
I
do
not
know
,
at
least
,
after
some
manner
,
what
I
actually
feel
.
Now
the
reason
why
all
Sensations
cannot
be
well
explained
by
Words
,
as
all
other
things
are
,
is
,
III.
Objection
and
Answer
.
because
it
depends
upon
the
Will
of
Man
,
to
affix
the
Idea's
of
Things
to
such
Names
as
they
please
;
they
may
call
Heaven
Ouranos
,
Schamajim
,
&c.
as
the
Greeks
and
Hebrews
did
;
but
even
those
Men
cannot
,
at
their
pleasure
,
affix
their
Sensations
to
Words
,
or
even
to
any
other
thing
;
they
see
not
Colours
,
altho'
they
speak
of
them
,
if
they
open
not
their
Eyes
:
They
relish
not
Tastes
,
if
no
change
happens
in
the
order
of
the
Fibres
of
their
Tongue
or
Brain
.
In
a
word
,
Sensations
depend
not
upon
Mans
Will
,
and
it
is
only
he
who
hath
made
them
,
that
preserves
them
in
the
mutual
Correspondence
that
is
between
the
Modifications
of
the
Soul
,
and
those
of
the
Body
;
so
that
if
any
one
shou'd
desire
me
to
represent
to
him
Heat
or
Colour
,
I
cannot
find
Words
for
that
,
but
I
must
impress
in
the
Organs
of
his
Senses
,
the
Motions
to
which
Nature
unites
these
Sensations
;
I
must
take
him
to
the
Fire
,
and
show
him
some
Pictures
.
This
is
the
Reason
,
why
't
is
impossible
to
give
the
Blind
the
least
Knowledge
of
what
we
mean
by
Red
,
Green
,
Yellow
,
&c.
For
since
we
cannot
make
our selves
be
understood
,
when
he
that
hears
us
,
has
not
the
same
Idea's
as
we
that
speak
;
It
is
manifest
,
that
Colours
not
being
united
to
the
sound
of
Words
,
or
to
the
motion
of
the
Nerve
of
the
Ear
,
but
to
that
of
the
Optic
Nerve
,
they
cannot
be
represented
to
the
Blind
,
since
their
Optic
Nerve
cannot
be
shaken
by
coloured
Objects
.
We
have
then
some
Knowledge
of
our
Sensations
,
let
us
now
see
from
whence
it
is
,
that
we
seek
yet
to
know
them
,
and
believe
our selves
ignorant
thereof
;
this
is
,
without
doubt
,
the
reason
.
The
Soul
,
IV.
Why
it
is
we
imagine
we
do
not
know
our
own
Sensations
.
since
Original
Sin
,
is
become
,
as
it
were
,
Corporeal
,
by
its
inclination
;
its
love
,
for
Sensible
Things
,
continually
diminishes
the
Union
,
or
Relation
,
that
it
hath
to
Intelligible
Things
:
It
is
with
great
disgust
,
that
it
conceives
Things
which
do
not
produce
some
Sensations
in
it
,
and
it
immediately
ceases
to
consider
them
:
It
does
all
that
is
in
its
power
,
to
produce
some
Images
in
its
Brain
,
which
represent
them
;
and
it
is
so
much
accustomed
to
this
kind
of
Conception
from
our
Infancy
,
that
it
even
thinks
it
cannot
know
,
what
it
cannot
imagine
.
Yet
there
are
many
things
,
which
not
being
Corporeal
,
cannot
be
represented
to
the
Mind
by
Corporeal
Images
,
as
our
Soul
,
with
all
its
Modifications
:
But
when
our
Soul
wou'd
represent
to
it self
its
own
Nature
and
Sensations
,
it
does
all
it
can
to
form
a
Corporeal
Image
thereof
;
It
seeks
it self
in
all
Corporeal
Beings
,
and
takes
it self
sometimes
for
one
,
and
sometimes
for
another
;
one
while
for
Air
,
and
then
again
for
Fire
,
or
for
the
Harmony
of
the
parts
of
its
Body
.
Thus
being
willing
to
find
it self
amongst
Bodies
,
and
imagining
its
own
Modifications
,
which
are
its
Sensations
,
to
be
the
Modifications
of
Bodies
,
we
must
not
wonder
if
it
Errs
,
and
is
intirely
Ignorant
of
it self
.
What
yet
induces
it
further
to
be
willing
to
imagine
its
Sensations
,
is
,
that
it
Judges
them
to
be
in
the
Objects
,
and
that
they
are
even
Modifications
thereof
;
and
consequently
,
that
't
is
something
Corporeal
,
and
which
can
be
Imagin'd
.
It
Judges
therefore
,
that
the
Nature
of
its
Sensations
consists
only
in
the
Motion
that
causes
them
,
or
in
some
other
Modification
of
a
Body
;
but
when
it
finds
that
which
is
different
from
what
it
feels
,
which
is
neither
Corporeal
,
nor
can
be
represented
by
Corporeal
Images
,
this
embarasses
it
,
and
makes
it
believe
that
it
does
not
know
its
own
Sensations
.
As
for
those
,
who
do
not
make
these
vain
Efforts
,
See
the
Explanations
of
the
7th
Chapter
of
the
2d
Part
,
l.
3.
to
represent
the
Soul
,
and
its
Modifications
,
by
Corporeal
Images
,
and
yet
are
Solicitous
to
know
the
Nature
of
their
Sensations
,
they
must
consider
,
that
neither
the
Soul
,
or
its
Modifications
,
are
to
be
known
by
the
Idea's
,
taking
the
word
Idea
in
its
true
sense
,
as
I
have
determin'd
,
and
explain'd
it
in
the
Third
Book
,
but
only
by
an
inward
Sensation
:
So
that
when
they
desire
the
Soul
,
and
its
Sensations
,
to
be
explain'd
by
some
Idea's
,
they
require
what
is
impossible
for
all
Mankind
to
give
them
,
since
Man
cannot
Instruct
us
in
giving
us
Idea's
of
Things
,
but
only
in
making
us
reflect
upon
those
we
already
have
.
The
second
Error
we
are
subject
to
,
in
respect
to
our
Sensations
,
is
our
attributing
them
to
Objects
,
as
has
already
been
explained
in
the
11th
and
12th
Chapters
.
The
third
is
,
V.
That
we
d●ceive
our selves
in
believing
that
all
Men
have
the
same
S●nsations
of
the
same
Objects
.
our
Judging
that
every
one
has
the
same
Sensations
of
the
same
Objects
.
For
Example
,
we
believe
all
Mankind
that
sees
the
Sky
,
takes
it
to
be
Blue
,
and
the
Fields
to
be
Green
,
and
all
Visible
Objects
to
be
after
the
same
manner
as
they
appear
to
us
;
and
so
of
all
other
Sensible
Qualities
of
the
rest
of
our
Senses
.
Many
persons
will
wonder
,
that
I
shou'd
bring
such
things
in
question
as
they
have
thought
Indisputable
,
yet
I
dare
affirm
,
they
have
never
had
any
reason
to
Judge
of
them
after
the
manner
they
have
done
;
and
altho'
I
cannot
Mathematically
demonstrate
to
them
that
they
are
deceived
,
yet
I
can
demonstrate
,
't
is
by
the
greatest
Chance
in
the
World
if
they
are
not
deceived
.
Nay
,
I
have
sufficient
Reasons
to
be
assur'd
,
that
they
certainly
,
are
in
an
Error
.
To
know
the
Truth
of
what
I
advance
,
we
must
remember
what
I
have
already
proved
,
viz.
that
there
is
a
great
difference
between
Sensations
,
and
the
causes
of
them
;
for
from
thence
we
may
Judge
,
that
its
possible
,
absolutely
speaking
,
that
the
same
Motions
of
the
Internal
Fibres
of
the
Optic
Nerve
,
do
not
cause
the
same
Sensations
in
different
persons
,
that
is
,
to
see
the
same
Colours
;
and
that
such
a
Motion
may
happen
,
which
shall
cause
in
one
the
Sensation
of
Green
,
or
Gray
in
another
,
or
even
a
new
Sensation
,
which
no
body
before
ever
had
.
It
is
certain
that
this
may
be
,
and
that
Reason
does
not
demonstrate
the
contrary
to
us
,
yet
't
is
generally
agreed
,
that
't
is
not
probable
it
should
be
so
;
It
is
much
more
reasonable
to
believe
,
that
God
acts
always
after
the
same
manner
,
in
respect
to
the
Union
he
hath
created
between
our
Souls
and
Bodies
,
and
that
he
hath
tyed
the
same
Idea's
,
and
the
same
Sensations
,
to
like
Motions
of
the
Internal
Fibres
of
the
Brain
,
altho'
in
different
Persons
.
Let
us
take
it
for
granted
then
,
as
the
same
Motions
of
those
Fibres
,
which
end
in
the
middle
of
the
Brain
,
are
accompanied
with
the
same
Sensations
in
all
Men
;
so
if
it
happens
,
that
the
same
Objects
produce
not
the
same
Motions
in
their
Brain
,
by
consequence
they
do
not
excite
the
same
Sensations
in
their
Soul
.
Now
it
appears
indisputable
to
me
,
that
all
Mens
Organs
of
their
Senses
,
not
being
disposed
after
the
same
manner
,
they
cannot
receive
the
same
impressions
from
the
same
Objects
.
For
instance
,
The
blows
a
Porter
hits
himself
over
the
sides
,
to
warm
himself
,
wou'd
be
sufficient
to
lame
a
great
many
Men
:
The
same
blow
wou'd
produce
many
different
Motions
,
and
by
consequence
,
as
many
different
Sensations
,
in
a
Man
of
a
strong
Constitution
,
and
in
a
Child
,
or
a
Woman
,
that
is
of
a
weak
Constitution
.
So
that
there
not
being
two
Persons
in
the
World
,
who
we
can
be
certain
have
the
Organs
of
their
Senses
in
a
perfect
conformity
,
we
cannot
affirm
that
there
is
two
Persons
in
the
World
who
have
exactly
the
same
Sensations
of
the
same
Objects
.
This
is
the
Original
of
that
strange
variety
which
we
meet
with
in
the
Inclinations
of
Men.
There
are
some
who
love
Musick
extreamly
,
and
others
who
are
insensible
of
it
;
and
even
amongst
those
that
delight
in
it
,
some
love
one
kind
of
Musick
,
and
others
another
,
according
to
the
almost
infinite
diversity
that
is
found
in
the
Fibres
of
the
Nerve
of
the
Ear
,
in
the
Blood
,
and
in
the
Spirits
.
For
instance
,
how
great
a
difference
there
is
between
the
Musick
of
France
,
that
of
Italy
,
of
Chinese
,
and
other
places
;
and
by
consequence
,
between
the
Tastes
that
different
People
have
of
different
kinds
of
Musick
.
Nay
,
it
even
happens
,
that
at
different
times
,
by
the
same
Consorts
,
we
receive
different
Impressions
;
for
if
the
Imagination
is
heated
by
a
great
quantity
of
agitated
Spirits
,
we
are
much
more
pleased
with
a
bold
and
dissonant
Musick
,
than
with
one
that
is
more
sweet
,
and
more
agreeable
to
mathematical
Rules
and
Exactness
.
This
Experience
proves
,
and
it
is
not
very
difficult
to
give
a
reason
of
it
.
It
is
the
same
also
of
Odours
,
he
that
loves
to
smell
of
the
Flower
of
an
Orange
,
it
may
be
cannot
endure
a
Rose
,
and
the
contrary
.
There
is
likewise
as
much
diversity
in
Tastes
,
as
in
any
other
of
the
Sensations
;
Sauces
must
be
very
different
equally
to
please
different
Persons
,
nay
,
to
please
the
same
Person
at
different
times
.
One
loves
that
which
is
sweet
,
another
that
which
is
sowre
;
one
thinks
Wine
agreeable
,
another
hates
it
;
and
the
same
Person
who
liked
it
when
he
was
well
,
thinks
it
bitter
and
unpleasant
when
he
's
in
a
Fever
;
and
so
of
the
rest
of
the
Senses
:
Yet
all
Men
love
Pleasure
,
they
all
delight
in
agreeable
Sensations
,
and
have
all
,
in
respect
to
that
,
the
same
Inclination
;
they
receive
not
then
the
same
Sensations
of
the
same
Objects
,
since
they
love
them
not
equally
.
Thus
,
what
makes
one
Man
say
he
loves
that
which
is
sweet
,
is
,
because
the
Sensation
he
has
thereof
is
agreeable
;
and
that
which
causes
another
to
say
he
does
not
love
what
is
sweet
,
is
,
that
indeed
he
has
not
the
same
Sensation
as
he
that
loves
it
:
And
when
he
says
he
loves
not
that
which
is
sweet
,
he
does
not
mean
he
does
not
love
to
have
the
same
Sensation
with
the
other
,
but
that
he
has
it
not
:
So
that
he
speaks
improperly
,
when
he
says
he
loves
not
that
which
is
sweet
,
he
ought
to
say
he
does
not
love
Sugar
,
Hony
,
&c.
that
every
one
else
thinks
to
be
sweet
and
agreeable
,
and
that
he
has
not
the
same
Taste
as
others
have
,
because
the
Fibres
of
his
Tongue
are
otherwise
disposed
.
This
is
a
very
Sensible
Example
:
Suppose
that
of
twenty
Persons
,
there
was
one
amongst
them
who
had
his
Hands
very
cold
,
and
knew
not
the
Words
that
are
made
use
of
to
explain
the
Sensations
of
heat
and
cold
;
and
that
on
the
contrary
,
all
the
rest
had
their
Hands
extreamly
hot
.
If
in
Winter
,
cold
Water
was
carried
to
all
of
them
to
Wash
in
,
those
whose
Hands
were
very
hot
,
would
immediately
,
upon
washing
one
after
another
,
say
this
Water
is
very
cold
,
I
don't
love
it
;
but
when
the
other
,
whose
Hands
were
extreamly
cold
,
should
come
at
last
to
wash
his
Hands
,
he
wou'd
say
,
on
the
contrary
,
I
don't
know
why
you
don't
love
cold
Water
,
for
my
part
,
I
take
a
great
deal
of
pleasure
in
feeling
the
cold
,
and
washing
my
Hands
in
it
.
From
this
Instance
't
is
very
clear
,
that
when
this
last
shou'd
say
I
love
cold
,
it
shou'd
signifie
nothing
else
but
that
he
loves
heat
,
and
feels
it
,
whereas
the
others
feel
the
contrary
.
And
so
when
a
Man
says
,
I
love
what
is
bitter
,
and
cannot
abide
sweet
things
,
it
is
only
to
be
understood
,
that
he
has
not
the
same
Sensations
as
those
who
say
they
love
sweet
Things
,
and
have
an
aversion
for
whatsoever
is
bitter
.
It
is
then
certain
,
that
a
Sensation
which
is
agreeable
to
one
Person
,
is
also
to
all
those
who
feel
the
same
;
but
that
the
same
Objects
cause
not
the
same
Sensation
in
all
the
World
,
because
of
the
different
dispositions
of
the
Organs
of
the
Senses
,
which
is
of
the
highest
consequence
to
be
observ'd
,
both
in
respect
to
Philosophy
and
Morality
.
'T
is
true
,
an
Objection
may
here
be
rais'd
,
but
't
will
be
very
easily
solved
,
viz.
It
sometimes
happens
,
that
persons
who
extreamly
love
certain
sorts
of
Food
,
come
afterwards
to
have
an
aversion
for
them
,
either
because
in
Eating
they
have
found
some
Dirt
in
them
,
or
have
been
Sick
,
because
they
have
Eat
to
excess
of
them
;
or
else
for
some
other
reasons
.
These
same
Persons
say
,
they
no
longer
love
the
same
Sensations
that
they
loved
formerly
,
for
they
have
them
still
when
they
Eat
the
same
Food
,
and
yet
they
are
not
agreeable
to
them
.
To
answer
to
this
Objection
,
it
must
be
observed
,
that
when
those
Persons
taste
any
Food
that
they
have
so
much
aversion
to
,
they
have
two
very
different
Sensations
at
the
same
time
;
they
have
that
of
the
Food
they
Eat
,
according
to
the
Objection
,
and
they
have
also
another
Sensation
of
Dislike
,
which
,
for
instance
,
proceeds
from
the
strong
Imagination
they
have
of
the
Dirt
in
what
they
Eat
:
The
reason
of
it
is
,
that
when
two
Motions
are
made
in
the
Brain
at
the
same
time
,
the
one
is
never
excited
after
the
other
,
except
it
be
after
a
considerable
time
.
Thus
,
because
the
agreeable
Sensation
never
comes
without
this
other
disgustful
one
,
and
because
we
confound
things
that
are
produced
at
the
same
time
,
we
imagine
that
this
Sensation
that
was
formerly
agreeable
to
us
,
is
now
no
longer
so
;
Yet
if
it
is
always
the
same
,
it
is
necessary
that
it
should
always
be
agreeable
.
So
that
if
we
imagine
it
is
not
agreeable
,
't
is
because
it
is
join'd
and
confounded
with
another
,
that
causes
more
distaste
than
the
other
does
of
agreeableness
.
There
is
more
difficulty
to
prove
that
Colours
,
and
some
other
Sensations
,
which
I
have
called
weak
and
languishing
,
are
not
the
same
in
all
Men
,
because
all
those
Sensations
so
little
affect
the
Soul
,
that
we
cannot
distinguish
them
so
well
as
we
can
Tastes
,
or
other
Sensations
more
strong
and
lively
,
the
one
being
more
agreeable
than
the
other
;
and
thus
to
discover
the
diversity
of
Sensations
that
are
found
in
different
Persons
,
by
the
variety
of
their
pleasure
or
dislike
:
Reason
,
which
always
shows
that
the
other
Sensations
are
not
the
same
in
different
Persons
,
tells
us
also
,
that
there
will
be
a
variety
in
the
Sensations
they
have
of
Colours
.
And
indeed
,
there
is
no
doubt
but
there
is
much
diversity
in
the
Organs
of
Sight
in
different
Persons
,
as
well
as
in
those
of
the
Ear
,
or
the
Taste
;
for
there
is
no
reason
to
suppose
a
perfect
resemblance
in
the
disposition
of
the
Optic
Nerve
in
all
Men
,
since
there
is
an
infinite
variety
in
every
thing
in
Nature
,
and
chiefly
in
those
that
are
Material
,
't
is
therefore
very
probable
that
all
Men
see
not
the
same
Colours
in
the
same
Objects
.
Yet
I
believe
it
never
,
or
very
rarely
happens
,
that
Persons
see
White
or
Black
to
be
of
any
other
Colour
than
we
do
,
altho'
they
do
not
see
it
equally
White
or
Black
:
But
for
mixt
Colours
,
as
Red
,
Yellow
,
and
Blue
,
and
chiefly
such
as
are
compounded
of
all
three
,
I
believe
there
are
few
Persons
who
have
perfectly
the
same
Sensation
of
them
.
For
Instance
,
there
are
some
Persons
,
who
when
they
look
upon
cettain
Bodies
with
one
Eye
,
take
them
to
be
Yellow
,
and
when
they
behold
them
with
the
other
,
see
them
to
be
Green
or
Blue
;
yet
if
we
suppos'd
these
Persons
Born
blind
of
one
Eye
,
or
with
both
their
Eyes
so
dispos'd
,
to
see
that
Blue
which
we
call
Green
,
they
wou'd
believe
they
saw
Objects
of
the
same
colour
as
we
see
them
,
because
by
Green
or
Blue
,
they
wou'd
always
have
understood
what
they
see
Yellow
or
Red.
We
may
further
prove
,
that
all
Men
see
not
the
same
Objects
of
the
same
Colour
,
because
,
according
to
the
observation
of
some
,
the
same
Colours
do
not
equally
please
all
sorts
of
Persons
,
and
if
these
Sensations
were
the
same
,
they
wou'd
be
equally
agreeable
to
all
Men
;
but
because
very
weighty
doubts
may
be
raised
against
the
Answer
I
have
given
to
the
precedent
Objection
,
I
do
not
believe
it
solid
enough
to
insist
upon
it
.
Indeed
,
it
is
very
seldom
that
we
are
as
much
more
pleased
with
one
Colour
than
another
,
even
as
we
are
much
more
pleased
with
one
Taste
than
another
?
The
reason
is
,
the
Sensations
of
Colours
are
not
given
us
to
Judge
,
whether
or
no
Bodies
are
proper
for
our
Nourishment
,
that
is
distinguished
by
Pleasure
and
Pain
,
which
are
the
Natural
Characters
of
Good
and
Evil
;
Objects
,
in
respect
to
their
Colour
,
are
neither
good
nor
bad
to
Eat
.
If
Objects
appear
agreeable
,
or
disagreeable
to
us
,
in
respect
to
their
Colour
,
their
sight
wou'd
be
always
followed
with
the
course
of
those
Spirits
which
excite
,
and
accompany
the
Passions
,
since
the
Soul
cannot
be
touched
without
moving
it
,
and
we
shou'd
often
hate
good
Things
,
and
love
bad
,
so
that
we
shou'd
not
long
preserve
our
lives
.
In
fine
,
the
Sensations
of
Colours
are
only
given
us
to
distinguish
Bodies
from
one
another
,
and
therefore
it
does
as
well
,
if
we
see
Herbs
Red
,
as
if
we
see
them
Green
,
provided
the
Person
that
sees
them
Red
or
Green
,
sees
them
always
after
the
same
manner
.
But
we
have
said
enough
of
these
Sensations
,
let
us
now
speak
of
Natural
Judgments
,
and
the
free
Judgments
which
accompany
them
;
which
is
the
fourth
thing
that
we
confound
with
the
three
others
,
that
we
have
already
mention'd
.
CHAP.
XIV
.
I.
Of
the
false
Judgments
that
accompany
our
Sensations
,
and
which
we
confound
with
them
.
II.
Reasons
of
these
false
Judgments
.
III.
That
Error
is
not
in
our
Sensations
,
but
only
in
these
Judgments
.
'T
IS
easily
foreseen
,
I.
Of
the
false
Judgments
that
accompany
our
Sensations
,
and
which
we
confound
with
them
.
that
we
shall
not
meet
with
many
Persons
that
will
not
be
offended
with
this
General
Proposition
that
I
here
advance
,
viz.
That
we
have
no
Sensation
of
External
Objects
,
which
include
not
one
,
or
many
Judgments
;
we
know
,
very
well
,
that
the
generality
of
the
World
do
not
believe
,
that
there
is
so
much
as
one
Judgment
in
our
Sensations
,
either
true
or
false
;
so
that
these
Persons
,
being
surprized
with
the
Novelty
of
this
Proposition
,
will
say
,
without
doubt
,
in
themselves
,
But
how
can
it
be
?
I
do
not
Judge
this
Wall
to
be
white
,
I
see
very
well
what
it
is
:
Nor
do
I
Judge
Pain
to
be
in
my
Hand
,
I
most
certainly
feel
it
to
be
there
:
And
who
can
doubt
of
things
so
certain
,
if
they
do
not
feel
Objects
otherwise
than
I
do
?
Indeed
,
their
Inclinations
for
the
Prejudices
which
they
have
imbib'd
from
their
Infancy
,
carries
them
much
further
,
and
if
they
do
not
Reproach
and
Contemn
those
,
whom
they
believe
to
be
perswaded
of
a
contrary
Opinion
to
their
own
,
without
doubt
they
deserve
to
be
placed
in
the
Number
of
Moderate
Persons
.
But
we
must
not
here
stay
to
Prophesie
of
the
ill
success
of
our
Thoughts
,
it
will
be
more
to
the
purpose
,
to
endeavour
to
produce
them
with
the
strongest
Proofs
,
and
so
clearly
discover
them
,
that
they
may
be
no
sooner
well
examin'd
,
or
attentively
consider'd
,
but
they
must
be
submitted
to
.
Since
't
is
necessary
to
prove
that
we
have
no
Sensation
of
External
Objects
,
which
does
not
include
some
false
Judgment
,
take
it
thus
:
It
seems
Indisputable
to
me
,
that
our
Souls
do
not
fill
those
vast
Spaces
which
are
between
us
and
the
fixt
Stars
,
altho'
it
shou'd
be
granted
that
themselves
are
extended
;
so
likewise
,
it
is
not
reasonable
to
believe
that
our
Souls
are
in
the
Firmament
,
when
they
behold
the
fixt
Stars
there
:
Nor
is
it
Credible
that
they
should
go
out
of
their
Bodies
a
thousand
Paces
,
to
see
Houses
at
that
distance
:
It
is
therefore
necessary
,
that
our
Souls
see
Houses
and
Stars
where
they
are
not
,
since
it
goes
not
out
of
the
Body
where
it
is
,
and
yet
sees
them
out
of
it self
.
Now
as
the
Stars
,
which
are
immediately
united
to
the
Soul
,
which
are
those
only
that
it
can
see
,
are
not
in
the
Heavens
;
it
from
thence
follows
,
that
all
Men
who
see
Stars
in
the
Heavens
,
and
afterwards
voluntarily
Judging
that
they
are
there
,
make
two
false
Judgments
,
whereof
the
one
is
Natural
,
and
the
other
Free
.
One
is
a
Judgment
of
the
Senses
,
or
a
Compounded
Sensation
,
according
to
which
we
ought
not
to
Judge
,
the
other
is
a
Free
Judgment
of
the
Will
,
which
we
cannot
hinder
our selves
from
making
;
and
by
conquence
,
which
we
ought
not
to
do
,
if
we
would
avoid
Error
.
But
the
reason
that
we
believe
that
these
Stars
,
II.
The
Reasons
of
these
false
Judgments
.
which
we
see
immediately
are
out
of
the
Soul
,
and
in
the
Firmament
,
is
,
because
it
is
not
in
the
power
of
the
Soul
to
see
them
when
it
pleases
,
for
it
cannot
perceive
them
,
when
the
Motions
,
to
which
the
Idea's
of
these
Objects
are
Naturally
ty'd
,
happen
in
its
Brain
.
Now
because
the
Soul
perceives
not
the
Motions
of
its
Organs
,
but
only
its
own
Sensations
,
and
that
it
knows
these
same
Sensations
are
not
produced
in
it
by
its
own
power
,
it
is
induced
to
Judge
that
they
are
without
,
and
in
the
cause
which
represents
them
to
it
;
and
it
hath
so
often
made
these
kind
of
Judgments
,
in
the
same
time
it
perceived
the
Objects
,
that
it
can
scarcely
hinder
it self
from
making
them
.
It
will
be
very
necessary
to
explain
the
foundation
of
what
I
have
said
,
to
shew
the
usefulness
of
this
infinite
number
of
little
Beings
,
that
we
call
Species
and
Idea's
,
which
are
as
nothing
,
and
which
represent
all
things
;
that
we
create
and
destroy
when
we
please
,
and
that
our
Ignorance
hath
made
us
imagine
to
render
a
Reason
for
things
that
we
understand
not
.
We
shou'd
show
the
solidity
of
their
Opinion
,
who
believe
God
is
the
true
Father
of
Light
,
who
only
Instructs
all
Men
,
without
whom
the
most
simple
Truths
cou'd
not
be
Intelligible
,
and
the
Sun
,
tho'
never
so
bright
,
wou'd
not
be
so
much
as
Visible
to
us
;
who
acknowledge
no
other
Nature
than
the
Will
of
God
,
and
who
,
upon
these
Reflexions
,
have
confessed
that
the
Idea's
,
which
represent
the
Creatures
to
us
,
are
only
the
Perfections
of
God
,
which
answer
to
these
same
Creatures
,
and
represent
them
to
us
.
It
wou'd
be
requisite
also
,
to
show
the
Nature
of
Idea's
,
and
then
it
wou'd
be
easie
to
speak
more
clearly
of
what
I
have
mentioned
,
but
that
it
wou'd
carry
us
too
far
.
In
the
third
Book
,
these
things
shall
be
more
fully
explained
,
and
order
requires
it
shou'd
be
referred
till
then
.
It
suffices
,
for
the
present
,
that
I
bring
a
most
Sensible
and
Indisputable
Example
,
wherein
we
shall
find
many
Judgments
confounded
,
with
one
and
the
same
Sensation
.
I
believe
there
is
no
body
in
the
World
,
who
looks
upon
the
Moon
,
but
sees
it
about
a
thousand
Paces
from
himself
,
and
who
thinks
it
not
greater
,
when
it
Rises
or
Sets
,
than
when
it
is
very
high
above
the
Horizon
;
and
it
may
be
also
,
that
we
only
believe
we
see
it
greater
,
without
thinking
that
we
make
any
Judgment
in
its
Sensation
.
Yet
it
is
Indisputable
,
that
if
there
was
not
some
kind
of
Judgment
included
in
the
Sensation
,
we
shou'd
not
see
the
Moon
in
the
distance
it
appears
to
be
:
And
besides
,
it
wou'd
appear
less
to
us
when
it
rises
,
than
when
it
is
got
a
great
way
above
the
Horizon
;
since
we
see
it
great
when
it
rises
,
only
because
we
believe
it
farther
off
,
by
a
Natural
Judgment
,
which
I
have
spoken
of
in
the
6th
Chapter
:
But
besides
our
Natural
Judgments
,
which
we
may
look
upon
as
compounded
Sensations
,
there
is
almost
in
all
our
Sensations
a
free
Judgment
;
for
Men
not
only
determine
by
a
Natural
Judgment
,
that
Pain
,
for
instance
,
is
in
their
Hand
,
but
they
also
make
a
free
Judgment
thereof
,
they
not
only
feel
it
there
,
but
likewise
believe
it
so
,
and
have
so
habituated
themselves
to
form
such
Judgments
,
that
they
find
it
very
difficult
to
avoid
it
:
Yet
these
Judgments
are
very
false
in
themselves
,
altho'
very
useful
for
the
preservation
of
Life
,
for
our
Senses
Instruct
us
only
for
our
Bodies
,
and
all
our
free
Judgments
,
which
are
conformable
to
our
Senses
,
are
very
far
from
the
Truth
.
But
that
we
may
not
leave
all
these
things
,
without
giving
some
Means
to
discover
the
Reasons
thereof
,
we
must
know
that
there
are
two
sorts
of
Beings
;
such
as
our
Soul
sees
immediately
,
and
others
that
it
knows
only
through
the
Means
of
the
first
.
For
Instance
,
when
I
perceive
the
Sun
rising
,
I
first
perceive
that
which
I
see
immediately
,
and
because
I
perceive
that
first
Sun
only
,
by
reason
there
is
something
without
me
,
which
produces
certain
Motions
in
my
Eyes
and
Brain
,
I
Judge
that
this
first
Sun
,
which
is
in
my
Soul
,
is
without
,
and
that
it
Exists
.
It
may
further
happen
that
we
see
this
first
Sun
,
which
is
intirely
united
to
our
Soul
,
tho'
the
other
be
not
upon
the
Horizon
,
and
even
whether
it
exists
or
no
;
so
we
may
see
this
first
Sun
greater
when
the
other
rises
,
than
when
it
is
very
high
,
and
altho'
it
be
true
,
that
this
first
Sun
that
we
immediately
see
,
be
greater
than
the
other
rises
,
it
follows
not
from
thence
that
this
other
be
greater
,
for
't
is
not
properly
that
which
rises
,
that
we
see
,
since
it
is
distant
from
us
many
Millions
of
Miles
,
but
it
is
that
first
that
is
truly
greater
,
and
such
as
we
see
it
,
because
all
things
that
we
immediately
see
,
are
always
what
we
see
them
to
be
,
and
we
deceive
our selves
only
because
we
Judge
,
that
what
we
immediately
see
is
in
the
External
Object
,
which
causes
that
Vision
in
us
.
So
when
we
see
Light
,
in
seeing
this
first
Sun
,
which
is
immediately
united
to
our
Mind
,
we
do
not
deceive
our selves
in
believing
we
see
it
,
it
is
not
possible
to
doubt
thereof
:
But
our
Error
is
.
our
Willing
without
any
Reason
,
nay
,
against
all
Reason
,
that
this
Light
,
that
we
immediately
see
,
exists
in
the
Sun
,
which
is
without
us
:
'T
is
also
the
same
thing
in
respect
to
other
Objects
of
our
Senses
.
III.
Error
is
not
in
our
Sensations
,
but
only
in
our
Judgments
.
If
we
observe
carefully
,
what
has
been
said
in
the
beginning
and
continuation
of
this
Work
,
we
shall
easily
see
,
that
of
all
things
that
happen
in
each
Sensation
,
Error
proceeds
from
the
Judgments
we
make
,
by
which
we
think
that
our
Sensations
are
in
the
Objects
.
First
,
it
is
not
an
Error
to
be
ignorant
,
that
the
Action
of
Objects
consists
in
the
Motion
of
some
of
their
parts
,
and
that
this
Motion
communicates
it self
to
the
Organs
of
our
Senses
,
which
are
the
two
first
things
to
be
observed
in
each
Sensation
;
for
there
is
a
great
deal
of
difference
,
between
being
ignorant
of
a
thing
,
and
having
a
false
Notion
of
it
.
Secondly
,
we
deceive
our selves
not
in
the
third
,
which
is
properly
Sensation
;
when
we
feel
Heat
,
see
Light
,
Colours
,
or
other
Objects
,
it
is
true
that
we
see
them
,
altho'
at
the
same
time
we
shou'd
be
Mad
;
for
there
is
nothing
more
certain
,
than
that
all
the
Visionaries
see
what
they
think
they
do
,
and
their
Error
consists
only
in
this
,
that
they
Judge
what
they
see
,
to
exist
truly
without
them
,
because
they
see
it
so
.
It
is
this
Judgment
that
includes
a
Consent
of
our
Liberty
,
and
by
consequence
,
that
which
is
subject
to
Error
;
and
we
ought
always
to
hinder
our selves
from
making
it
,
according
to
the
Rule
we
have
laid
down
in
the
beginning
of
this
Book
:
that
we
ought
never
to
Judge
of
any
thing
,
when
we
can
hinder
our selves
from
it
,
and
where
Evidence
and
Certainty
does
not
constrain
us
thereto
,
as
it
happens
here
;
for
altho'
we
feel
our selves
extreamly
inclined
,
by
a
strong
Habit
,
to
Judge
that
our
Sensations
are
in
the
Objects
,
as
that
Heat
is
in
the
Fire
,
and
Colours
in
Pictures
,
yet
we
see
not
that
certain
Evidence
and
Reason
,
which
presses
,
and
obliges
us
,
to
believe
it
;
and
thus
we
voluntarily
submit
to
Error
,
by
the
ill
use
that
we
make
of
our
Liberty
,
when
we
freely
form
such
Judgments
.
CHAP.
XV.
An
Explanation
of
the
particular
Errors
of
Sight
,
which
may
serve
us
as
an
Example
of
the
General
Errors
of
our
Senses
.
THE
Way
,
I
believe
,
is
now
made
plain
,
for
the
discovery
of
the
Errors
of
our
Senses
in
general
,
as
they
have
any
Relation
to
Sensible
Qualities
,
which
have
been
treated
on
,
upon
the
occasion
of
Light
and
Colours
,
which
in
order
ought
to
be
first
explained
.
It
seems
necessary
now
to
come
to
particulars
,
and
to
examine
severally
,
the
Errors
into
which
every
one
of
our
Senses
betray
us
;
but
we
shall
not
now
enlarge
upon
these
things
,
because
from
what
has
been
already
said
,
a
little
attention
will
easily
supply
a
long
Discourse
,
which
we
should
be
oblig'd
to
make
:
We
shall
produce
only
the
general
Errors
,
into
which
our
.
Sight
betrays
us
,
in
reference
to
Light
and
Colours
;
and
we
doubt
not
,
but
this
Example
alone
,
will
be
sufficient
to
inform
us
,
of
the
Errors
of
all
the
other
Senses
.
When
we
have
look'd
some
time
upon
the
Sun
,
this
is
what
passes
in
our
Eyes
and
Soul
;
and
these
are
the
Errors
we
fall
into
.
Those
who
know
the
first
Elements
of
Dioptrics
,
and
any
thing
of
the
admirable
Structure
of
our
Eyes
,
are
not
ignorant
that
the
Rays
of
the
Sun
are
refracted
in
the
Chrystaline
,
and
other
Humours
,
and
that
they
meet
afterwards
upon
the
Retina
,
or
Optic
Nerve
,
which
,
as
it
were
,
furnishes
with
Hangings
,
all
the
bottom
of
the
Eye
,
even
as
the
Rays
of
the
Sun
,
which
pass
through
a
Convex
Glass
,
meet
together
in
the
focus
,
at
two
,
three
,
or
four
Fingers
breadth
distant
,
in
proportion
to
its
Convexity
:
Now
Experience
shows
,
that
if
one
put
at
the
focus
of
the
Convex-Glass
,
a
little
piece
of
Stuff
,
or
black
Paper
[
](A51655-e24320-b)*
*
Black
Paper
easily
burns
,
but
there
must
be
a
greater
Convexity
to
burn
White
Paper
in
the
same
time
.
,
the
Rays
of
the
Sun
make
so
great
an
impression
upon
this
Stuff
,
or
Paper
,
and
agitate
the
small
Particles
thereof
,
with
so
great
a
violence
,
that
they
break
and
separate
them
from
one
another
.
In
a
word
,
they
burn
them
,
or
reduce
them
into
Smoak
and
Ashes
.
Thus
we
must
conclude
,
from
this
Experience
,
that
if
the
Pupil
,
through
which
the
Light
passes
,
were
so
dilated
,
that
it
would
permit
an
easie
passage
for
the
Rays
of
the
Sun
,
or
on
the
contrary
,
was
so
contracted
as
to
obstruct
them
,
our
Retina
would
suffer
the
same
thing
as
the
piece
of
Stuff
,
or
black
Paper
,
and
the
Fibres
would
be
so
very
much
agitated
,
that
they
would
soon
be
broken
and
burnt
.
It
is
for
this
reason
,
that
most
Men
are
sensible
of
a
Pain
,
if
they
look
upon
the
Sun
but
for
one
moment
,
because
they
cannot
so
well
close
up
the
Orifice
of
the
Pupil
,
but
that
there
will
enter
sufficient
Rays
,
to
agitate
the
Strings
of
the
Optic
Nerve
with
much
violence
,
and
not
without
danger
of
breaking
them
.
The
Soul
has
no
knowledge
of
what
we
have
spoke
,
and
when
it
looks
upon
the
Sun
,
it
neither
perceives
its
Optic
Nerve
,
nor
any
Motion
in
it
;
but
that
's
not
the
Error
,
't
is
only
a
simple
Ignorance
:
The
first
Error
it
falls
into
,
is
,
that
it
Judges
the
Pain
it
feels
,
is
in
its
Eye
.
If
immediately
,
after
looking
upon
the
Sun
,
we
go
into
a
dark
place
,
with
our
Eyes
open
,
the
Motion
of
the
Fibres
of
the
Optic
Nerve
,
caus'd
by
the
Rays
of
the
Sun
,
diminishes
,
and
changes
by
little
and
little
.
This
is
all
the
Change
that
can
be
perceived
in
the
Eyes
,
however
,
't
is
not
what
the
Soul
perceives
there
,
but
only
a
White
and
Yellow
Light
:
Its
second
Error
is
,
it
Judges
that
the
Light
it
sees
is
in
the
Eyes
,
or
upon
the
next
Wall
.
In
fine
,
the
agitation
of
the
Fibres
of
the
Retina
,
always
diminishes
,
and
ceases
by
little
and
little
;
for
when
a
Body
has
been
shaken
,
nothing
can
be
perceived
in
it
but
a
diminution
of
its
Motion
,
but
't
is
not
that
which
the
Soul
perceives
in
its
Eyes
,
it
sees
the
White
become
an
Orange
colour
,
afterwards
Red
,
and
then
Blue
;
And
the
reason
of
this
Error
is
,
that
we
Judge
there
are
changes
in
our
Eyes
,
or
upon
the
next
Wall
,
that
differ
much
,
as
to
the
more
or
less
,
because
the
Blue
,
Orange
,
and
Red
Colours
,
which
we
see
,
differ
much
otherwise
among
themselves
besides
in
the
more
and
less
.
These
are
some
Errors
which
we
are
subject
to
in
reference
to
Light
and
Colours
;
and
these
Errors
beget
many
others
,
which
shall
be
explain'd
in
the
following
Chapters
.
CHAP.
XVI
.
I.
That
the
Errors
of
our
Senses
are
the
most
general
and
fruitful
Principles
,
whence
we
draw
all
the
false
conclusions
,
which
in
their
turns
also
,
serve
us
for
Principles
.
II.
The
Origine
of
Essential
Differences
.
III.
Of
substantial
Forms
.
IV.
Of
some
other
Errors
in
the
Philosophy
of
the
Schools
.
I
Suppose
I
have
sufficiently
explain'd
,
I.
The
Errors
of
our
Senses
serve
us
for
the
most
useful
,
and
fruitful
Principles
,
to
draw
false
Consequences
,
which
in
their
turns
also
serve
for
Principles
.
to
unprejudic'd
Persons
,
and
such
as
are
capable
of
any
attention
of
Mind
,
in
what
our
Sensations
consist
,
and
the
general
Errors
which
are
found
in
them
.
It
rests
now
to
show
,
that
Men
use
these
general
Errors
as
incontestable
Principles
,
by
which
they
will
explain
all
things
,
that
they
draw
an
Infinity
of
false
Consequences
from
them
,
which
also
,
in
their
turns
,
serve
for
Principles
to
draw
other
Consequences
;
and
that
thus
,
by
little
and
little
,
they
have
compos'd
Imaginary
Sciences
,
that
have
nothing
of
substance
or
reality
in
them
,
and
which
they
follow
with
a
blind
impetuosity
;
but
which
,
like
Phantasms
,
exhibit
to
those
that
embrace
them
only
confusion
,
and
the
shame
of
being
seduc'd
,
or
that
Character
of
Folly
,
which
makes
us
take
pleasure
in
feeding
upon
Illusions
and
Chimera's
.
But
this
must
be
particulariz'd
in
some
Examples
.
It
has
been
already
said
,
that
we
are
accustom'd
to
attribute
our
own
Sensations
to
Objects
,
and
that
we
judge
Colours
,
Odours
,
Sapours
,
and
other
Sensible
Qualities
,
to
be
in
Objects
that
are
Colour'd
,
Odiferous
,
&c.
We
have
discover'd
that
this
is
an
Error
;
we
must
now
show
that
we
make
use
of
this
Error
,
as
a
Principle
whence
we
draw
our
false
Consequences
,
which
Consequences
we
also
esteem
as
other
Principles
,
upon
which
we
build
our
Reasonings
.
In
a
word
,
we
must
here
explain
in
what
order
the
Mind
proceeds
,
in
searching
out
some
special
Truths
;
where
this
false
Principle
,
viz.
Our
Sensations
are
in
Objects
,
is
once
so
imbib'd
,
that
it
looks
upon
it
as
indubitable
.
But
to
render
this
more
Sensible
,
let
us
take
some
particular
Body
,
whose
Nature
we
would
enquire
into
,
and
let
us
see
,
for
Example
,
what
a
Man
would
do
,
that
should
apply
himself
to
know
the
Nature
of
Honey
and
Salt
:
The
first
thing
,
would
be
to
consider
their
Colour
,
Smell
,
Taste
,
and
other
Sensible
Qualities
;
what
those
of
the
Honey
are
,
and
what
those
of
the
Salt
;
in
what
they
agree
,
and
in
what
they
differ
;
and
what
Relation
they
can
have
with
the
Qualities
of
other
Bodies
:
This
being
done
,
I
believe
he
would
reason
much
after
this
manner
,
supposing
he
believ'd
it
an
incontestable
Principle
,
that
Sensations
were
in
Objects
.
The
Original
differences
that
are
attributed
to
Objects
;
that
these
differences
are
in
the
Soul
.
Whatever
I
perceive
by
tasting
,
seeing
,
and
feeling
this
Hony
and
Salt
,
are
in
this
Hony
and
Salt
.
Now
't
is
certain
,
that
what
I
perceive
in
this
Hony
,
differs
essentially
from
what
I
perceive
in
this
Salt
;
the
whiteness
of
the
Salt
does
,
without
doubt
,
differ
more
from
the
Colour
of
the
Hony
than
in
the
more
or
less
;
and
the
sweetness
of
the
Hony
,
from
the
pungent
taste
of
the
Salt
;
and
consequently
,
there
must
be
an
essential
difference
betwixt
Hony
and
Salt
,
since
all
that
I
am
sensible
of
in
both
,
does
not
only
differ
as
to
the
more
or
less
,
but
also
essentially
.
This
would
be
the
first
step
this
Man
would
make
;
for
doubtless
,
he
cannot
judge
that
Hony
and
Salt
differ
essentially
,
but
because
there
are
some
appearances
in
the
one
,
essentially
different
from
the
other
:
I
mean
,
the
Sensations
that
he
has
of
Hony
,
differ
essentially
from
those
of
Salt
,
since
he
only
judges
thereof
by
the
Impressions
they
make
upon
the
Senses
;
he
then
looks
upon
this
Consequence
as
a
new
Principle
,
from
whence
he
draws
other
conclusions
after
this
manner
.
Since
then
the
Hony
and
Salt
,
The
Original
of
substanti●l
Forms
.
and
other
natural
Bodies
,
differ
essentially
from
one
another
,
it
follows
that
those
are
grosly
deceiv'd
,
who
would
perswade
us
,
that
all
the
difference
betwixt
these
Bodies
consists
only
in
the
different
Configuration
of
the
Particles
which
compose
them
:
For
since
Figure
is
not
essential
to
different
Bodies
,
let
the
Figure
of
those
Particles
,
which
are
imagin'd
to
be
in
the
Hony
,
be
changed
,
the
Hony
will
remain
still
Hony
,
altho'
its
parts
shou'd
receive
the
Figure
of
the
Parts
of
Salt
.
So
that
it
's
necessary
there
shou'd
be
some
substance
,
which
being
join'd
to
the
first
common
Matter
of
all
different
Bodies
,
constitutes
their
essential
difference
from
one
another
.
This
is
the
second
advance
which
this
Man
would
make
,
and
this
is
the
happy
discovery
of
substantial
Forms
:
These
are
the
fruitful
substances
which
produce
every
thing
in
Nature
,
altho'
they
only
subsist
in
the
Imagination
of
our
Philosophers
.
But
let
us
see
the
Properties
which
he
will
liberally
bestow
upon
this
Entity
of
his
Invention
,
for
no
doubt
but
he
will
dispoil
other
Substances
,
of
their
essential
Properties
,
to
Cloath
this
.
Since
then
,
The
Original
of
all
other
general
Errors
in
the
Physics
of
the
Schools
.
there
are
in
every
Natural
Body
two
Substances
which
compose
it
;
one
which
is
common
to
Hony
,
Salt
,
and
other
Bodies
;
the
other
which
makes
Hony
to
be
Hony
,
Salt
,
Salt
,
and
other
Bodies
to
be
what
they
are
.
It
follows
that
the
first
,
which
is
Matter
,
having
no
contrariety
,
and
being
indifferent
to
all
Forms
,
must
rest
without
any
force
or
action
,
because
it
has
no
need
of
defending
it self
;
but
for
others
,
which
are
substantial
Forms
,
they
have
need
of
being
always
accompanied
with
Qualities
and
Faculties
to
defend
them
;
they
must
always
be
upon
their
Guard
,
for
fear
of
being
surprized
;
they
must
perpetually
look
to
their
own
Preservation
,
extend
their
Empire
over
their
Neighbouring
Matter
,
and
push
their
Conquests
as
far
as
they
can
,
for
if
they
were
weak
and
actionless
,
other
Forms
would
surprize
them
,
and
soon
annihilate
them
;
they
must
then
always
fight
,
and
nourish
these
Antipathies
,
and
Irreconcileable
Hatreds
,
against
other
Hostile
Forms
which
endeavour
to
destroy
them
.
If
it
happens
that
one
Form
shou'd
take
the
Matter
of
another
Form
;
As
if
,
for
Example
,
the
form
of
a
Carcass
seize
the
Body
of
a
Dog
,
this
form
must
not
be
barely
contented
to
annihilate
the
form
of
a
Dog
,
its
hatred
must
also
extend
to
the
destruction
of
all
those
qualities
which
its
Enemy
had
;
the
hair
of
the
Carcass
must
forthwith
wax
white
,
with
a
whiteness
of
a
new
creation
;
the
Blood
must
be
red
after
such
a
manner
,
as
we
cannot
suspect
it
to
be
counterfeit
,
and
the
whole
Body
must
be
cover'd
with
qualities
that
are
faithful
to
the
new
form
,
and
defend
it
according
to
the
little
power
which
the
qualities
of
a
dead
Body
have
,
which
must
also
be
destroy'd
in
their
turn
:
But
because
they
cannot
always
fight
,
and
because
all
things
seek
rest
,
it
's
certainly
necessary
that
the
Fire
,
for
instance
,
have
its
Center
,
whether
it
always
tends
by
its
lightness
,
and
natural
Inclination
,
that
it
may
once
be
at
rest
,
and
burn
no
more
,
and
that
it
may
even
lay
by
its
heat
,
which
it
only
kept
here
below
for
its
defence
.
These
are
a
few
of
the
Consequences
which
result
from
this
last
Principle
,
that
there
are
Substantial
Forms
,
which
we
have
made
our
Philosopher
conclude
with
a
little
too
much
liberty
,
for
these
are
usually
deliver'd
with
a
graver
Air.
There
are
yet
an
Infinity
of
other
Consequences
,
which
every
Philosopher
is
continually
making
according
to
his
Humour
and
Inclination
,
according
to
the
Fruitfulness
or
Barrenness
of
his
Imagination
;
for
these
are
the
only
things
which
make
them
differ
from
one
another
.
We
must
not
stop
here
,
to
overthrow
these
Chimerical
Substances
,
other
Persons
have
sufficiently
examin'd
them
,
and
shown
that
there
are
no
such
things
in
Nature
,
and
that
they
serve
only
to
afford
a
very
great
number
of
ridiculous
,
and
even
contradictory
Consequences
.
We
are
satisfy'd
that
we
have
discover'd
their
Original
in
the
Mind
of
Man
,
and
to
have
show'd
that
they
are
all
owing
,
at
this
time
,
to
the
common
Prejudice
,
That
Sensations
are
in
the
Objects
perceived
:
For
,
if
what
has
been
said
,
be
consider'd
with
little
attention
,
viz.
That
it
's
necessary
,
for
the
preservation
of
our
Body
,
to
have
Sensations
that
are
essentially
different
,
altho'
the
Impressions
,
which
Objects
make
upon
our
Bodies
,
differ
very
little
;
We
shall
clearly
see
,
that
't
is
a
fault
to
imagine
so
great
differences
in
the
Objects
of
our
Senses
.
But
I
must
here
mention
,
by
the
by
,
that
there
's
nothing
to
be
objected
against
these
Terms
,
Form
and
Essential
difference
.
Hony
is
certainly
Hony
by
its
form
,
and
't
is
thus
that
it
essentially
differs
from
Salt
,
but
this
form
,
or
this
essential
difference
,
consists
only
in
the
different
Configuration
of
its
parts
;
't
is
this
different
Configuration
which
causes
Hony
to
be
Hony
,
and
Salt
,
Salt
:
And
altho'
its
only
accidental
to
Matter
in
general
,
to
have
the
Configuration
of
the
parts
of
Hony
,
or
Salt
,
and
so
to
have
the
form
of
Hony
or
Salt
,
it
may
,
nevertheless
,
be
said
,
that
it
is
essential
to
Hony
or
Salt
,
to
be
what
they
are
,
to
have
such
or
such
a
Configuration
of
Parts
.
Even
as
Sensations
of
Cold
,
Heat
,
Pleasure
,
and
Pain
,
are
not
essential
to
the
Soul
as
a
Soul
,
but
because
it
is
by
these
Sensations
,
that
it
's
said
to
be
sensible
of
Heat
,
Cold
,
Pleasure
,
and
Pain
.
CHAP.
XVII
.
I.
Another
Example
drawn
from
Morals
,
which
shows
that
our
Senses
only
offer
us
false
Goods
.
II.
That
't
is
God
only
who
is
our
true
Good
.
III.
The
Origine
of
the
Errors
of
the
Epicureans
and
Stoics
.
IT
has
been
sufficiently
proved
,
in
my
Opinion
,
that
this
Prejudice
,
Our
Sensations
are
in
Objects
,
is
a
very
fruitful
Principle
of
Error
in
Physics
;
it
must
now
be
shown
,
from
Reasons
drawn
from
Morals
,
that
the
same
Prejudice
join'd
with
this
,
That
Objects
are
the
only
,
and
true
Causes
of
our
Sensations
,
is
also
very
dangerous
.
There
's
nothing
so
common
in
the
World
,
I.
An
Example
drawn
from
Morals
,
that
our
Senses
only
offer
us
false
Goods
.
as
to
see
Men
who
are
Wedded
to
Sensible
Goods
:
Some
love
Musick
,
others
good
Eating
,
and
others
are
passionate
for
other
things
.
Now
thus
they
reason
,
to
perswade
themselves
that
all
these
Objects
are
Goods
,
viz.
All
these
agreeable
Tastes
which
please
us
in
Banquets
,
these
Sounds
which
affect
the
Ear
,
and
these
other
Pleasures
which
we
perceive
upon
other
occasions
,
are
certainly
included
in
Sensible
Objects
,
or
,
at
least
,
't
is
these
Objects
that
are
the
occasion
of
them
;
or
,
in
fine
,
we
cannot
have
Sensations
without
them
.
Now
't
is
impossible
to
doubt
,
whether
Pleasure
be
Good
,
whether
Pain
be
Evil
;
we
are
inwardly
convinc'd
thereof
,
and
consequently
,
the
Objects
of
our
Senses
are
very
real
Goods
,
which
we
ought
to
enjoy
that
we
may
be
happy
.
This
is
the
Reasoning
that
we
ordinarily
,
I
shall
explain
in
the
last
Book
,
in
what
sense
Objects
work
upon
Bodies
.
and
inconsiderately
make
;
and
this
is
that
,
which
inclines
us
to
believe
that
our
Sensations
are
in
Objects
,
that
Objects
have
in
themselves
the
power
of
making
us
Sensible
;
that
we
look
upon
things
as
our
Goods
,
which
are
infinitely
below
us
,
which
can
only
act
upon
our
Bodies
,
by
producing
some
Motions
in
their
Fibres
,
but
can
never
act
upon
our
Souls
,
or
make
us
sensible
of
Pleasure
or
Pain
.
Certainly
,
if
it
is
not
the
Soul
which
acts
upon
it self
,
upon
occasion
of
what
passes
in
the
Body
,
nothing
else
but
God
can
do
it
;
and
if
it
is
not
the
Soul
which
causes
Pleasure
,
or
Pain
,
according
to
the
different
shaking
of
the
Fibres
of
its
Body
,
as
it
's
very
likely
it
does
not
,
since
it
often
perceives
Pleasure
and
Pain
without
its
consent
:
I
know
no
other
Hand
that
is
powerful
enough
to
produce
this
Sensation
in
it
,
but
that
of
the
Author
of
Nature
.
Indeed
,
there
's
none
but
God
that
is
our
true
Good
,
II.
That
't
is
God
only
who
is
our
Good
,
and
that
all
Sensible
Objects
can't
make
us
sensible
of
Pleasure
.
't
is
he
only
that
can
affect
us
with
all
these
Pleasures
we
are
capable
of
,
and
who
,
in
his
Knowledge
and
Love
,
ha●●
Decreed
to
excite
them
in
us
.
And
these
Pleasures
,
which
he
hath
link'd
to
the
Motions
which
pass
in
our
Body
,
to
make
us
careful
of
our
own
Preservation
,
are
very
little
,
very
weak
,
and
very
short
,
altho'
we
are
enslav'd
to
them
in
this
State
whereinto
Sin
has
reduc'd
us
;
but
the
Pleasures
which
he
will
excite
in
his
Elect
in
Heaven
,
are
infinitely
greater
,
since
he
made
us
to
know
and
love
him
;
for
according
to
the
Order
of
Nature
,
greater
Goods
affect
us
with
greater
Pleasure
,
and
since
God
is
infinitely
above
all
things
,
the
Pleasure
of
those
that
shall
enjoy
him
will
certainly
surpass
all
Pleasures
.
What
we
have
said
of
the
Cause
of
our
Errors
,
III.
The
Original
of
the
Errors
of
the
Epicureans
and
Sto●es
.
in
reference
to
Good
,
does
sufficiently
inform
us
of
the
falsness
of
the
Opinions
of
the
Stoics
and
Epicureans
about
the
Supream
Good
:
The
Epicureans
placed
it
in
Pleasure
,
and
because
they
felt
it
as
well
in
Vice
as
in
Vertue
,
and
even
more
commonly
in
the
first
than
the
second
,
they
gave
themselves
up
to
all
sorts
of
Voluptuousness
.
Now
the
first
Cause
of
their
Error
was
,
that
Judging
falsely
there
was
something
agreeable
in
the
Objects
of
their
Senses
,
or
that
they
were
the
true
Causes
of
the
Pleasures
they
felt
,
and
being
,
besides
this
,
convinc'd
by
an
inward
Sensation
which
they
had
in
themselves
,
that
Pleasure
was
a
Good
for
them
,
or
,
at
least
,
for
the
time
they
enjoy'd
it
,
they
gave
themselves
up
to
the
Government
of
all
the
Passions
,
which
they
apprehended
would
not
incommode
them
afterwards
;
whereas
,
they
ought
to
have
consider'd
,
that
the
Pleasure
which
is
felt
in
Sensible
Things
,
cannot
be
in
these
things
as
their
true
Causes
,
nor
after
any
other
manner
;
and
consequently
,
that
Sensible
Goods
cannot
be
such
in
respect
of
our
Soul
.
They
should
also
have
consider'd
the
other
Things
which
we
have
explain'd
.
The
Stoics
,
on
the
contrary
,
being
perswaded
that
Sensible
Pleasures
were
only
in
the
Body
,
and
for
the
Body
,
and
that
the
Soul
ought
to
have
its
particular
Good
,
placed
its
Happiness
in
Vertue
.
Now
this
is
the
Origine
of
their
Errors
,
they
believ'd
that
Sensible
Pain
and
Pleasures
were
not
in
the
Soul
,
but
only
in
the
Body
;
they
made
use
of
this
false
Judgment
as
a
Principle
for
other
false
Conclusions
,
as
that
Pain
is
not
an
Evil
,
nor
Pleasure
a
Good
;
That
the
Pleasures
of
Sense
are
not
good
in
themselves
,
but
that
they
are
common
to
Men
and
Beasts
:
And
,
nevertheless
,
it
is
easie
to
show
,
that
altho'
the
Epicureans
and
Stoics
were
deceiv'd
in
many
things
,
yet
they
were
in
the
right
in
some
,
for
the
happiness
of
the
Happy
consists
in
an
accomplish'd
Vertue
;
I
would
say
,
in
the
Knowledge
and
Love
of
God
,
and
is
a
very
great
Pleasure
which
continually
attends
them
.
Let
us
then
well
remember
,
that
external
Objects
include
nothing
,
neither
agreeable
nor
disagreeable
,
that
they
are
not
the
Causes
of
our
Pleasures
,
and
that
we
have
no
reason
either
to
fear
or
love
them
,
but
that
God
only
is
to
be
fear'd
and
lov'd
,
because
he
only
is
able
to
Punish
or
Reward
us
,
to
make
us
Sensible
of
Pain
or
Pleasure
.
In
fine
,
't
is
only
in
God
,
and
from
God
,
that
we
can
expect
Pleasures
,
for
which
we
have
so
strong
,
so
natural
,
and
so
just
an
Inclination
.
CHAP.
XVIII
.
I.
Our
Senses
deceive
us
in
things
which
are
not
Sensible
.
II.
An
Example
drawn
from
the
Conversation
of
Men.
III.
We
must
not
confide
in
Sensible
Habits
.
WE
have
sufficiently
explain'd
the
Errors
of
our
Senses
,
in
respect
of
their
Objects
,
as
of
Light
,
Colours
,
and
other
Sensible
Qualities
;
we
must
now
show
how
they
seduce
us
about
Objects
,
to
which
they
have
no
relation
,
by
obstructing
our
serious
attention
,
and
inclining
us
to
Judge
of
them
upon
their
Testimony
.
This
is
what
deserves
very
well
to
be
Explain'd
.
Attention
and
Application
of
Mind
,
I.
That
our
Senses
deceive
us
in
things
which
are
not
Sensible
.
to
the
clear
and
distinct
Idea's
we
have
of
Objects
,
is
the
most
necessary
thing
in
the
World
to
know
their
Nature
;
for
as
it
is
impossible
to
see
the
Beauty
of
any
Work
,
without
opening
our
Eyes
,
and
looking
earnestly
upon
it
,
so
the
Mind
cannot
evidently
see
the
greatest
part
of
Things
,
with
the
Relations
they
have
to
one
another
,
unless
it
considers
them
attentively
.
Now
't
is
certain
,
that
nothing
diverts
us
more
from
attending
the
clear
and
distinct
Idea's
of
our
Senses
,
and
consequently
,
from
removing
us
farther
from
the
Truth
,
and
also
deceiving
us
.
To
apprehend
this
Truth
it
's
necessary
to
know
,
that
the
three
ways
of
perceiving
,
viz.
by
the
Senses
,
Imaginations
and
Pure
Vnderstanding
,
do
not
all
equally
affect
the
Soul
,
and
consequently
,
not
afford
the
same
equal
attention
to
every
thing
it
perceives
by
their
means
,
for
it
is
much
affected
with
what
touches
it
much
,
and
less
with
that
which
touches
it
little
.
Now
that
which
it
perceives
by
the
Senses
,
touches
and
engages
it
extreamly
,
but
that
which
it
knows
by
the
Imagination
affects
much
less
;
but
what
the
Understanding
represents
to
it
,
I
mean
,
what
it
perceives
of
it self
independent
of
the
Senses
and
Imagination
,
does
very
seldom
excite
it
.
No
body
can
doubt
,
but
that
the
least
pain
of
the
Senses
is
more
present
to
the
Mind
,
and
renders
it
more
attentive
,
than
the
Meditation
of
a
thing
of
much
greater
consequence
.
The
reason
of
this
is
,
that
the
Senses
represent
Objects
as
present
,
but
the
Imagination
as
absent
:
Now
,
according
to
the
Laws
of
Order
,
amongst
many
Goods
or
Evils
proposed
to
the
Soul
,
those
which
are
present
touch
and
affect
the
Soul
more
than
all
the
others
which
are
absent
,
because
it
's
necessary
for
the
Soul
to
determine
readily
upon
what
is
to
be
done
in
this
occurrence
.
Thus
it
is
much
more
affected
with
a
little
Pricking
,
than
with
the
most
elevated
Speculations
;
and
the
Pleasures
and
Evils
of
this
World
,
make
a
greater
impression
upon
it
,
than
the
terrible
Pains
,
or
infinite
Pleasures
of
Eternity
.
The
Senses
then
extreamly
affect
the
Soul
with
what
they
represent
to
it
;
now
as
it
is
limited
,
and
cannot
clearly
conceive
many
things
at
a
time
,
so
it
cannot
clearly
apprehend
what
the
Understanding
represents
to
it
,
at
the
same
time
as
the
Senses
offer
something
to
its
consideration
;
it
then
forsakes
the
clear
and
distinct
Idea's
of
the
Understanding
,
however
proper
they
are
to
discover
the
Truth
of
things
as
they
are
in
themselves
,
and
applies
it self
only
to
the
confus'd
Idea's
of
the
Senses
,
which
affect
it
more
,
and
which
represent
things
unto
it
,
not
as
they
are
in
themselves
,
but
only
according
to
the
Relation
they
have
with
its
Body
.
If
a
Man
,
II.
An
Example
drawn
from
the
Conversation
of
M●n
.
for
Example
,
would
explain
some
Truth
,
it
's
necessary
that
he
make
use
of
Speech
,
and
that
he
express
his
internal
Motions
and
Sentiments
in
sensible
Motions
and
Ways
:
Now
the
Soul
cannot
,
at
the
same
time
,
perceive
distinctly
many
things
.
Thus
having
always
a
great
attention
for
what
comes
by
the
Senses
,
it
very
seldom
considers
the
reasons
propos'd
to
it
,
but
it
is
much
affected
with
the
sensible
Pleasure
,
which
depends
upon
the
Measure
of
Periods
,
upon
the
Relations
of
Gestures
with
Words
,
upon
the
Beauties
of
a
Face
,
upon
the
Air
and
Manner
of
one
that
speaks
;
however
,
after
it
has
heard
,
it
must
Judge
,
this
is
the
Custom
.
Thus
its
Judgments
must
be
different
,
according
to
the
diversity
of
Impressions
which
it
shall
receive
by
the
Senses
.
If
,
for
Example
,
he
that
speaks
,
delivers
himself
easily
;
if
he
keeps
an
agreeable
Measure
in
his
Periods
,
if
he
has
the
Air
of
a
Gentleman
,
and
a
Man
of
Sense
,
and
if
he
is
a
Person
of
Quality
,
if
he
has
a
great
Retinue
,
if
he
speaks
with
Authority
and
Gravity
,
if
others
hear
him
with
Respect
and
Silence
,
if
he
Converses
with
Wits
of
the
first
Classis
;
in
sine
,
if
he
is
happy
enough
to
please
and
to
be
esteemed
,
he
shall
have
Reason
in
whatever
he
advances
,
his
very
Dress
shall
pass
for
Demonstration
.
But
if
he
is
so
unhappy
,
as
to
have
the
contrary
Qualities
,
however
,
concludingly
he
demonstrates
,
he
shall
prove
nothing
at
all
:
Let
him
speak
the
finest
things
in
the
World
,
they
shall
never
be
taken
notice
of
,
the
attention
of
his
Auditors
being
only
to
that
which
touches
the
Senses
;
the
disgust
they
shall
entertain
to
see
a
Man
appear
despicably
,
shall
wholly
take
them
up
,
and
divert
that
application
which
is
due
to
his
Thoughts
;
his
attire
shall
make
its
Master
,
and
every
thing
that
he
says
,
contemptible
;
and
his
way
of
speaking
being
that
which
is
peculiar
to
a
Thoughtful
Philosopher
,
shall
incline
his
Auditors
to
believe
,
that
these
sublime
Truths
he
treats
of
,
being
above
their
ordinary
Capacity
,
are
only
delirious
and
extravagant
Notions
.
These
are
the
Judgments
of
Men
,
their
Eyes
and
Ears
Judge
of
Truth
,
and
not
of
Reason
,
even
in
these
very
things
which
depend
only
on
Reason
,
because
Men
are
only
affected
with
sensible
and
agreeable
Objects
,
and
scarce
ever
bring
with
them
a
strong
and
serious
Attention
for
the
discovery
of
Truth
.
III.
We
must
not
rest
upon
a
sensible
and
agreeable
manner
of
doing
〈◊〉
thing
.
Nevertheless
,
it
is
very
unjust
to
Judge
of
things
after
that
manner
,
and
to
despise
Truth
,
because
it
wants
those
Ornaments
which
please
and
slatter
our
Senses
:
Philosophers
,
and
discerning
Persons
,
should
be
asham'd
to
enquire
more
Industriously
into
agreeable
Matters
than
into
Truth
it self
,
and
to
feed
their
Mind
with
the
Vanity
of
Words
,
rather
than
the
Truth
of
Things
.
'T
is
common
to
the
unthinking
part
of
the
World
,
to
Souls
of
Flesh
and
Blood
,
to
suffer
themselves
to
be
won
by
the
fine
Periods
,
Figures
and
Motions
,
which
excite
the
Passions
.
Omnia
enim
stolidi
magis
admirantur
,
amantque
Inversis
quae
sub
verbis
latitantia
cernunt
.
Veraque
constituunt
,
quae
belle
tangere
possunt
Aures
,
&
lepido
quae
sunt
fucata
sonore
.
But
Wise
men
endeavour
to
Guard
themselves
against
the
Malignant
Power
,
and
prevailing
Charms
of
these
sensible
Manners
,
of
doing
things
;
their
Senses
impose
upon
them
,
as
well
as
other
Mens
,
for
,
indeed
,
they
are
Men
,
but
they
generously
despise
their
Testimonies
;
they
imitate
the
famous
Example
of
the
Judges
of
Areopagus
,
who
forbad
the
Advocates
to
make
use
of
deceitful
Words
and
Figures
,
and
would
never
hear
them
but
in
a
dark
place
,
lest
their
agreeable
Gestures
should
perswade
them
in
prejudice
of
Truth
and
Justice
:
And
lastly
,
that
they
might
apply
themselves
the
better
to
consider
the
solidity
of
their
Reasons
.
CHAP.
XIX
.
Two
other
EXAMPLES
.
I.
The
first
of
our
Errors
concerning
the
Nature
of
Bodies
.
II.
The
second
,
of
those
that
relate
to
the
Qualities
of
these
Bodies
.
WE
have
show'd
that
there
are
a
great
number
of
Errors
,
whose
first
Original
is
owing
to
the
strong
application
of
the
Soul
for
whatever
comes
by
the
Senses
,
and
the
inadvertence
for
things
which
the
Understanding
represents
to
it
.
We
have
given
an
Example
of
it
,
drawn
from
the
Conversation
of
Men
,
which
is
of
very
great
consequence
in
Morals
:
Here
are
now
others
,
deduc'd
from
the
Nature
of
Things
,
which
its
very
necessary
to
observe
in
Physics
.
One
of
the
principal
Errors
that
respects
Physics
,
I.
Errors
about
the
Nature
of
Bodies
.
is
,
that
Men
imagine
a
much
greater
substance
in
Bodies
,
which
fall
under
the
Cognizance
of
their
Senses
,
than
others
which
they
perceive
not
;
the
greatest
part
of
Men
believe
,
that
there
is
much
more
Matter
in
Gold
and
Lead
than
in
Air
or
Water
:
And
even
Children
,
who
only
observe
by
their
Senses
the
effects
of
Air
,
commonly
imagine
that
there
is
nothing
real
in
it
.
Gold
and
Siver
are
very
heavy
,
very
hard
and
sensible
;
Water
and
Air
,
on
the
contrary
,
are
insensible
:
From
thence
Men
conclude
,
that
the
first
have
more
reality
than
the
last
;
they
judge
of
the
Truth
of
Things
,
by
the
sensible
Impression
which
always
deceives
us
,
and
neglect
the
clear
and
distinct
Idea's
of
the
Mind
which
never
deceive
us
,
because
what
is
Sensible
affects
and
touches
us
more
,
but
what
is
intelligible
stupifies
us
.
These
false
Judgments
respect
the
substance
of
Bodies
;
here
's
another
which
relates
to
the
Qualities
of
these
same
Bodies
.
Men
frequently
Judge
,
II.
Errors
about
their
Qualities
and
Perfection
.
that
Objects
,
which
excite
in
them
the
most
agreeable
Sensations
,
are
the
most
perfect
and
pure
,
without
knowing
in
what
Perfection
,
and
the
Purity
of
Matter
consists
,
and
even
without
being
concerned
about
it
.
They
say
,
for
Example
,
that
Dirt
is
impure
,
and
that
Water
is
very
clear
and
pure
,
but
Camels
who
love
muddy
Waters
,
and
those
Animals
that
delight
in
Dirt
,
are
not
of
their
Opinion
.
These
are
Beasts
,
't
is
true
,
but
Men
that
love
the
Entrails
of
a
Woodcock
,
the
Excrements
of
a
Polcat
,
say
not
that
this
is
impurity
,
altho'
they
say
the
same
of
all
other
kinds
of
Animals
.
Lastly
,
Musk
and
Amber
are
generally
esteemed
of
all
Men
,
tho'
they
are
nothing
else
but
Excrements
.
Certainly
,
Men
never
Judge
of
the
Perfection
of
Matter
and
its
Purity
,
but
only
in
relation
to
their
own
Senses
;
and
thence
it
happens
,
that
the
Senses
being
different
in
all
Men
,
as
has
been
sufficiently
explain'd
,
they
must
judge
very
differently
of
the
Perfection
and
Purity
of
Matter
.
Thus
the
Books
,
which
are
daily
Compos'd
upon
the
Imaginary
Perfections
,
that
are
attributed
to
certain
Bodies
,
are
necessarily
fill'd
with
Errors
,
and
variety
of
strange
Fancies
,
since
the
Reasonings
,
which
they
contain
,
are
grounded
only
upon
the
false
,
confus'd
and
irregular
Idea's
of
our
Senses
.
Philosophers
must
not
say
,
that
Matter
is
Pure
or
Impure
;
they
know
not
what
they
precisely
mean
by
the
Words
Pure
and
Impure
;
they
should
not
speak
without
knowing
what
they
say
:
I
mean
,
without
having
clear
and
distinct
Idea's
,
which
answer
to
the
terms
they
make
use
of
,
for
if
they
had
join'd
clear
and
distinct
Idea's
to
each
of
these
Words
,
they
would
see
,
that
that
which
they
call
Pure
,
would
very
often
be
Impure
;
and
that
which
appears
to
them
to
be
Impure
,
would
oftentimes
be
found
very
Pure
.
If
they
would
,
for
Example
,
that
that
Matter
should
be
the
most
Pure
and
Perfect
,
whose
Parts
are
most
thin
and
apt
for
Motion
,
Gold
,
Silver
,
and
precious
Stones
,
would
be
very
imperfect
Bodies
;
Air
and
Fire
,
contrariwise
,
would
be
very
perfect
:
Flesh
beginning
to
corrupt
,
and
smell
ill
,
would
be
tending
to
Perfection
,
and
a
noisome
Carcass
would
be
more
perfect
than
common
flesh
.
But
if
,
on
the
contrary
,
they
would
have
it
,
that
the
most
perfect
Bodies
are
they
,
whose
parts
were
most
gross
and
solid
,
and
more
unapt
for
Motion
,
the
Earth
would
be
more
perfect
than
Gold
,
and
the
Air
and
Fire
,
would
be
the
most
imperfect
of
all
Bodies
.
But
if
they
would
not
affix
these
clear
and
distinct
Idea's
,
to
the
terms
Pure
and
Perfect
,
which
I
have
mentioned
,
they
are
at
liberty
to
substitute
others
in
their
room
;
but
if
they
only
pretend
to
define
these
Words
by
sensible
Notions
,
they
will
eternally
confound
all
things
,
since
they
will
never
fix
a
signification
to
the
terms
which
expresses
them
.
All
Men
,
as
I
have
already
prov'd
,
have
very
different
Sensations
of
the
same
Objects
;
we
must
not
,
therefore
,
define
Objects
by
the
Sensations
which
we
have
of
them
,
except
we
delight
in
obscurity
and
confusion
.
But
,
in
short
,
I
cannot
see
that
there
is
any
Matter
,
not
excepting
even
that
which
the
very
Heavens
are
compos'd
of
,
that
is
more
perfect
than
another
:
All
Matter
seems
only
capable
of
Figure
and
Motion
,
and
't
is
the
same
thing
to
it
,
to
have
regular
or
irregular
Figures
and
Motions
.
Reason
does
not
tell
us
,
that
the
Sun
is
more
Perfect
or
Luminous
than
Dirt
,
nor
that
the
Beauties
of
our
Romances
and
Poets
,
have
any
advantage
over
corrupted
Carcasses
,
't
is
our
false
and
delusive
Senses
which
thus
dictate
to
us
.
Whatever
is
objected
against
this
,
all
Railleries
,
Exclamations
,
&c.
will
certainly
appear
ridiculous
and
cold
to
any
one
,
which
shall
attentively
examine
the
Reasons
that
I
have
brought
.
Those
who
perceive
,
or
only
have
Sensations
,
believe
the
Sun
full
of
Light
,
but
those
who
know
how
to
perceive
and
reason
,
do
not
believe
it
,
provided
they
use
as
much
Reason
as
Sensation
.
I
am
verily
perswaded
,
that
all
those
who
differ
the
most
,
as
to
the
Testimony
of
their
Senses
,
would
change
their
Opinion
,
if
they
would
seriously
meditate
upon
what
has
been
said
,
but
they
love
much
to
indulge
the
illusions
of
their
Senses
;
they
subject
themselves
a
great
while
to
their
Prejudices
,
they
too
much
forget
their
Mind
,
to
know
that
all
the
Perfections
,
which
they
seem
to
see
in
Bodies
,
are
only
such
in
relation
to
it
.
'T
is
not
these
sort
of
Men
that
I
speak
to
,
I
am
not
concern'd
for
their
Approbation
or
Esteem
,
they
will
not
hear
,
therefore
they
cannot
Judge
;
it
's
enough
that
Truth
is
defended
and
approved
,
by
those
who
seriously
endeavour
to
be
deliver'd
from
the
Errors
of
their
Senses
,
and
to
make
a
good
use
of
the
Light
of
their
Mind
:
'T
is
these
Persons
only
,
would
desire
to
Meditate
upon
these
Thoughts
,
with
the
greatest
attention
they
are
capable
of
,
in
order
to
judge
of
them
.
I
leave
the
Cause
to
them
,
to
condemn
or
approve
it
as
Judges
,
because
that
,
by
their
Meditation
,
they
have
acquir'd
to
themselves
such
a
Right
of
judging
of
the
Merit
,
or
Demerit
of
the
Cause
,
that
it
cannot
but
in
Justice
be
submitted
to
them
.
CHAP.
XX.
The
Conclusion
of
this
first
Book
,
I.
That
our
Senses
are
only
given
us
for
our
Bodys
.
II.
That
we
must
doubt
of
their
Testimony
.
III.
That
it
is
not
an
inconsiderable
thing
to
doubt
as
we
ought
to
do
.
WE
have
,
in
my
Opinion
,
I.
That
our
Senses
are
only
given
us
for
the
preservation
of
our
Body
.
sufficiently
discover'd
the
General
Errors
into
which
our
Senses
betray
us
,
both
in
respect
of
their
proper
Objects
,
as
also
of
those
things
which
are
not
perceiv'd
but
by
the
Understanding
.
I
believe
there
is
no
Error
we
are
subject
to
upon
their
occasion
,
whose
Cause
may
not
be
discover'd
in
some
of
those
things
which
have
been
already
mention'd
,
if
they
be
well
examin'd
.
We
have
also
seen
,
that
our
Senses
are
very
faithful
and
exact
to
Instruct
in
the
Relations
,
which
all
Bodies
,
that
are
about
us
,
have
to
one
another
,
but
that
they
are
incapable
of
informing
us
,
what
Bodies
are
in
themselves
;
that
,
a
right
use
of
them
,
tends
only
to
the
Preservation
of
our
Health
and
Life
;
that
we
cannot
sufficiently
despise
them
,
when
they
arrogate
Dominion
over
the
Mind
.
This
is
the
thief
thing
which
I
wish
may
be
well
remembred
in
all
this
first
Book
,
viz.
That
we
conceive
well
that
our
Senses
are
only
given
us
for
the
preservation
of
our
Body
,
that
we
six
this
Thought
in
our
Mind
;
and
that
to
be
deliver'd
from
the
Ignorance
we
are
now
involv'd
in
,
we
seek
for
other
assistances
besides
those
which
our
Senses
afford
●s
.
But
if
there
are
some
Persons
(
as
certainly
there
will
be
too
many
)
who
are
not
perswaded
of
there
last
Propositions
from
what
I
have
here
advanc'd
,
II.
We
must
distrust
the
Testimony
of
our
Senses
.
I
would
,
at
least
,
desire
this
of
them
,
That
they
would
only
learn
a
little
to
distrust
their
Senses
;
and
if
they
will
not
wholly
reject
their
Testimony
,
as
false
and
deceitful
,
that
they
will
not
refuse
to
doubt
of
it
.
And
indeed
,
it
appears
to
me
,
that
enough
has
been
said
,
to
create
,
at
least
,
some
scruple
in
the
Mind
of
reasonable
Persons
;
and
consequently
,
to
excite
them
to
make
use
of
their
Liberty
,
otherwise
than
they
have
yet
done
:
For
if
they
begin
to
doubt
,
whether
the
Testimony
of
their
Senses
are
true
,
they
will
more
easily
refrain
their
assent
,
and
so
keep
themselves
out
of
those
Errors
unto
which
they
have
hitherto
been
subject
.
Especially
,
if
they
well
remember
that
Rule
in
the
beginning
of
this
Treatise
,
Never
to
give
an
entire
assent
but
to
things
intirely
evident
,
and
to
which
they
cannot
refrain
consenting
,
without
knowing
certain●
,
that
they
should
make
an
ill
use
of
their
Liberty
,
if
they
did
not
consent
.
Besides
,
III.
Th●●
it
is
not
an
inconsiderable
thing
to
doubt
as
one
ought
to
do
.
let
no
one
imagine
that
he
has
made
but
a
small
advancement
,
if
he
has
only
learn'd
to
doubt
.
To
doubt
with
Judgment
and
Reason
,
is
not
so
small
a
thing
as
People
imagine
,
for
here
it
may
be
said
,
that
there
's
a
great
difference
betwixt
doubting
and
doubting
,
we
doubt
through
Passion
and
Brutality
,
through
Blindness
and
Malice
;
and
lastly
,
through
Fancy
,
and
only
because
we
would
doubt
.
But
we
doubt
also
with
Prudence
and
Caution
,
with
Wisdom
and
Penetration
of
Mind
.
Academics
and
Atheists
,
doubt
upon
the
first
grounds
,
true
Philosophers
on
the
second
:
The
first
doubt
is
a
doubt
of
darkness
,
which
does
not
conduct
us
into
light
,
but
always
removes
us
from
it
.
The
second
doubt
is
begot
of
Light
,
and
assists
us
in
some
manner
to
produce
it
in
its
proper
place
.
Those
who
doubt
only
after
the
first
manner
,
do
not
apprehend
what
it
is
to
doubt
with
Judgment
,
they
laugh
at
what
Defeartes
teaches
us
about
doubting
,
in
the
first
of
his
Metaphysical
Meditations
,
because
it
appears
to
them
that
he
would
only
have
them
doubt
out
of
fancy
;
that
he
would
only
have
them
say
,
in
general
,
that
our
Nature
is
infirm
,
our
Mind
is
full
of
blindness
,
that
we
must
take
great
care
to
deface
these
prejudices
,
and
other
like
things
.
It
is
not
sufficient
to
say
,
the
Mind
is
weak
,
we
must
be
sensible
of
its
weaknesses
.
It
is
not
enough
to
say
,
it
is
subject
to
Error
,
we
must
discover
in
what
our
Errors
consist
.
This
is
what
I
believe
has
been
begun
in
this
first
Book
,
by
explaining
the
Nature
and
Errors
of
our
Senses
;
I
shall
,
in
the
second
,
prosecute
the
same
design
,
by
explaining
the
Nature
and
Errors
of
our
Imagination
.
The
End
of
the
first
Book
.
A
SEARCH
AFTER
TRUTH
.
BOOK
IV.
Of
the
Inclinations
and
Natural
Motions
of
the
Mind
.
CHAP.
I.
I.
It
's
necessary
the
Mind
have
Inclinations
,
as
well
as
the
Body
Motions
.
II.
God
acts
the
Humane
Mind
only
for
himself
.
III.
Mens
Minds
are
only
inclin'd
to
Particular
Good
,
through
the
Motion
they
have
to
Good
in
General
.
IV.
The
Origine
of
the
Chief
Natural
Inclinations
,
which
will
make
up
the
Division
of
this
Fourth
Book
.
IT
would
not
be
necessary
to
Treat
of
Natural
Inclinations
,
as
we
are
going
to
do
in
this
Fourth
Book
;
nor
of
the
Passions
,
as
we
shall
do
in
the
following
;
in
order
to
discover
the
Causes
of
the
Errors
of
Mankind
,
if
the
Understanding
did
not
depend
on
the
Will
in
the
Perception
of
Objects
:
But
whereas
it
is
the
Will
that
directs
it
,
which
makes
it
resolve
,
and
applies
it
to
some
Objects
rather
than
others
;
it
is
absolutely
necessary
to
apprehend
its
Inclinations
well
,
to
penetrate
into
the
Causes
of
the
Errors
to
which
we
are
liable
.
If
God
,
I.
It
's
necessary
the
Mind
have
Inclinations
,
as
well
as
the
Body
Notions
.
when
he
Created
this
World
,
had
produced
Matter
infinitely
extended
,
without
giving
it
any
Motion
,
there
would
have
been
no
difference
in
Bodies
.
All
this
visible
World
would
still
have
been
a
meer
Mass
of
Matter
,
or
of
Extension
,
which
indeed
might
serve
to
discover
the
Grandeur
and
Power
of
its
Author
;
but
there
would
not
be
that
Succession
of
Forms
,
and
that
Variety
of
Bodies
,
which
compose
all
the
Beauty
of
the
Universe
,
and
which
incline
Mens
Minds
to
admire
the
Infinite
Wisdom
of
the
Governour
thereof
.
Therefore
I
am
of
Opinion
,
That
the
Inclinations
of
the
Mind
are
in
the
Spiritual
World
,
what
Motion
is
in
the
Material
World
;
and
that
if
the
Mind
were
without
Inclinations
,
or
if
it
never
had
any
Desire
,
we
should
not
meet
with
that
Variety
in
the
Order
of
Spiritual
Things
;
which
not
only
makes
the
World
admire
the
Profoundness
of
the
Wisdom
of
God
,
approve
the
Variety
of
Material
Objects
;
but
also
his
Mercy
,
his
Justice
,
his
Goodness
,
and
generally
all
his
other
Attributes
.
Thus
then
the
Difference
of
Inclinations
produces
in
the
Mind
,
an
Effect
much
like
unto
that
which
the
Difference
of
Motions
produces
in
the
Body
;
and
the
Inclinations
of
Mens
Minds
,
and
the
Motions
of
Bodies
together
,
constitute
all
the
Beauty
of
Created
Beings
.
Thus
all
Spirits
must
have
some
Inclinations
,
as
well
as
Bodies
have
different
Motions
.
But
let
us
endeavour
to
discover
what
Inclinations
they
ought
to
have
.
Were
not
our
Nature
Corrupted
,
it
would
not
be
necessary
to
seek
out
by
Reason
,
as
we
are
going
to
do
,
what
the
Natural
Inclinations
of
Created
Spirits
ought
to
be
:
It
would
be
sufficient
,
in
order
thereunto
,
to
consult
our selves
,
and
we
should
discover
,
by
the
Inward
Sentiments
we
have
of
what
passes
within
us
,
all
the
Inclinations
we
ought
Naturally
to
have
.
But
,
whereas
we
know
by
Faith
,
that
Sin
has
destroy'd
the
Order
of
Nature
,
and
that
Reason
informs
us
,
that
our
Inclinations
are
Irregular
,
as
it
will
appear
in
the
Sequel
,
we
are
obliged
to
go
another
way
to
work
:
Since
we
cannot
trust
to
what
we
feel
,
we
are
obliged
to
explain
things
in
a
more
Sublime
Manner
;
but
which
,
without
doubt
,
will
seem
to
have
but
little
Solidity
in
it
,
to
those
who
only
esteem
what
relates
to
the
Senses
.
It
is
an
undeniable
Truth
,
II.
The
Principal
End
of
the
Actions
of
God
is
himself
,
and
he
only
acts
Mens
Minds
for
himself
.
that
God
can
have
no
other
Principal
End
for
his
Operations
but
himself
;
and
that
he
may
have
several
Ends
less
Principal
,
which
tend
all
towards
the
Preservation
of
the
Beings
which
he
has
created
.
He
can
have
no
Principal
End
but
himself
,
because
he
cannot
Err
;
nor
place
his
Final
End
in
Beings
which
are
not
Perfect
.
But
he
may
propose
as
a
less
Principal
End
the
Preservation
of
Created
Beings
;
because
as
they
all
participate
of
his
Goodness
,
they
are
necessarily
Good
,
and
even
very
Good
according
to
Scripture
,
Valde
bona
.
Therefore
God
Loves
them
,
and
moreover
it
is
his
Love
which
preserves
them
;
for
all
Beings
only
subsist
because
God
Loves
them
.
Diligis
omnia
quae
sunt
,
says
the
Wise
Man
,
Nihil
odisli
eorum
quae
fecisti
:
Nec
enim
odiens
aliquid
constituisti
&
fecisti
.
Quomodo
autem
posset
aliquid
permanere
,
nisi
tu
voluisses
,
aut
quod
à
to
vocatum
non
esset
conserveretur
.
In
effect
it
is
not
possible
to
conceive
,
that
things
which
do
not
please
a
Being
which
is
infinitely
Perfect
and
Powerful
,
should
subsist
,
since
all
things
only
subsist
by
his
Will.
Therefore
God
wills
his
Glory
as
his
principal
End
,
and
the
Preservation
of
his
Creatures
for
his
Glory
.
The
Natural
Inclinations
of
Humane
Minds
,
being
certainly
continual
Impressions
of
the
Will
of
him
that
has
created
them
,
and
does
preserve
them
:
It
is
,
in
my
Opinion
,
necessary
that
those
Inclinations
should
be
intirely
like
unto
those
of
their
Creator
and
Preserver
.
Therefore
Naturally
they
can
have
no
principal
End
but
his
Glory
;
nor
no
other
Second
End
but
their
own
Preservation
and
that
of
others
;
but
always
in
relation
to
him
from
whom
they
have
their
Being
.
For
it
seems
undeniable
to
me
,
that
since
God
cannot
desire
that
the
Will
he
has
created
should
Love
an
Inferior
Good
more
than
a
Greater
,
that
is
,
That
it
should
Love
that
which
is
less
Lovely
,
more
than
that
which
is
more
Lovely
:
He
can
create
nothing
without
inclining
it
towards
himself
,
or
commanding
it
to
Love
him
above
all
things
;
though
he
may
create
it
Free
,
and
with
a
Power
to
withdraw
and
to
stray
from
him
.
Whereas
there
is
properly
but
one
Love
in
God
,
III.
Human
Minds
are
meerly
prone
to
particular
Good
,
through
the
Tendency
they
have
to
Good
in
General
.
which
is
the
Love
of
himself
:
And
that
God
can
Love
nothing
but
by
that
Love
,
since
he
can
Love
nothing
but
in
relation
to
himself
:
So
God
likewise
Imprints
but
one
Love
in
us
,
which
is
the
Love
of
Good
in
General
;
and
we
can
Love
nothing
but
by
that
Love
,
since
we
can
Love
nothing
but
what
is
,
or
seems
to
be
Good
.
It
is
the
Love
of
Good
in
General
,
which
is
the
Principle
of
our
particular
Affections
,
since
that
Love
really
is
nothing
but
our
Will
;
For
as
I
have
said
already
in
another
place
,
The
Will
is
nothing
but
the
continual
Impression
of
the
Author
of
Nature
,
which
inclines
the
Mind
of
Man
towards
Good
in
General
.
Certainly
we
must
not
imagine
that
this
Power
we
have
of
Loving
proceeds
from
us
,
or
is
at
our
Disposition
.
Nothing
but
the
Power
of
not
Loving
well
,
or
rather
of
misplacing
our
Affections
,
is
at
our
own
Disposition
;
by
reason
that
being
Free
,
we
may
apply
,
and
actually
do
apply
to
particular
Objects
,
and
consequently
to
false
Objects
,
the
Good
Love
which
God
does
not
cease
to
imprint
in
us
,
while
he
does
not
cease
to
preserve
us
.
But
not
only
our
Will
,
or
our
Love
for
Good
in
General
,
proceeds
from
God
;
but
Inclinations
for
particular
Goods
which
are
common
to
all
Men
,
though
not
equally
strong
in
all
Men
,
as
our
Inclination
for
the
Preservation
of
our
Being
,
and
of
those
that
are
united
to
us
by
Nature
,
are
also
Impressions
of
the
Will
of
God
upon
us
;
for
in
this
place
I
give
promiscuously
the
Name
of
Natural
Inclinations
to
all
the
Impressions
of
the
Author
of
Nature
,
which
are
common
to
all
Minds
.
I
said
but
even
now
,
that
God
loved
his
Creatures
,
IV.
The
Source
of
the
Chief
Natural
Inclinations
,
which
will
make
up
the
Division
of
this
fourth
Book
.
and
also
that
it
was
his
Love
which
gave
them
to
exist
,
and
did
preserve
their
Being
:
Therefore
as
God
continually
imprints
in
us
a
Love
like
unto
his
,
since
it
is
his
Will
which
makes
and
which
regulates
ours
;
he
likewise
gives
us
all
those
Natural
Inclinations
which
are
not
at
our
Choice
,
and
which
incline
us
of
necessity
to
the
Preservation
of
our
Being
,
and
of
those
we
live
with
.
For
,
though
Sin
has
Corrupted
all
things
,
it
has
not
destroy'd
them
.
Although
our
Natural
Inclinations
do
not
always
propose
God
as
their
End
by
the
Free
Choice
of
our
Will
,
God
is
always
their
Object
in
the
Institution
of
Nature
:
For
God
who
produces
and
preserves
them
in
us
,
only
produces
and
preserves
them
for
himself
.
All
Sinners
tend
towards
God
by
the
Impression
they
receive
from
God
,
though
they
withdraw
from
him
by
the
Error
and
Distraction
of
their
Mind
.
They
love
Good
,
for
we
can
never
love
otherwise
,
since
God
makes
us
Love
;
but
they
Love
ill
Objects
,
Ill
only
,
because
God
,
who
gives
even
Sinners
the
Power
of
Loving
,
forbids
their
Loving
them
,
because
since
the
Fall
they
withdraw
their
Affection
from
him
.
For
Men
imagining
that
Creatures
occasion
in
them
the
Pleasure
they
injoy
upon
their
account
,
incline
their
Affections
violently
towards
the
Body
,
and
fall
into
an
absolute
Forgetfulness
of
God
,
who
does
not
appear
before
their
Eyes
.
We
have
still
then
the
same
Natural
Inclinations
,
or
the
same
Impressions
of
the
Author
of
Nature
which
Adam
had
before
the
Fall
.
We
have
even
the
same
Inclinations
which
the
Blessed
have
in
Heaven
,
for
God
neither
Creates
nor
Preserves
any
Creatures
,
without
giving
them
a
Love
like
unto
his
.
He
Loves
himself
,
he
Loves
us
,
he
Loves
all
his
Creatures
:
Therefore
he
Inclines
all
Humane
Minds
to
Love
him
,
to
Love
themselves
,
and
to
Love
all
Creatures
.
But
were
as
all
our
Inclinations
are
only
Impressions
of
the
Author
of
Nature
,
which
incline
us
to
Love
him
and
all
things
for
his
sake
;
they
cannot
be
right
unless
we
love
God
with
all
our
Power
,
and
all
things
for
his
sake
,
by
the
Free
Choice
of
our
Will
:
For
we
cannot
,
without
Injustice
,
abuse
the
Love
God
gives
us
for
himself
,
by
applying
it
to
any
thing
but
himself
,
or
which
has
no
relation
to
himself
.
Thus
we
are
now
sensible
,
not
only
what
our
Natural
Inclinations
are
,
but
also
what
they
ought
to
be
;
in
order
to
be
well
regulated
,
and
according
to
the
Institution
of
their
Author
.
For
all
the
Disorder
of
our
Inclinations
consists
,
in
that
we
place
our
final
End
in
our selves
;
and
that
instead
of
doing
all
things
in
relation
to
God
,
we
do
all
things
in
relation
to
our selves
.
We
have
then
,
in
the
first
place
,
an
Inclination
for
good
in
General
,
which
is
the
Principle
of
all
our
Natural
Inclinations
,
of
all
our
Passions
,
and
of
all
the
Free
Actions
of
our
Will.
Secondly
,
We
have
an
Inclination
for
the
Preservation
of
our
Being
,
and
of
our
Happiness
.
Thirdly
,
We
have
all
an
Inclination
for
the
other
Creatures
,
when
they
are
of
use
to
us
,
or
to
those
we
Love
.
Moreover
,
we
have
several
other
particular
Inclinations
which
depend
on
these
;
but
we
shall
speak
of
them
elsewhere
.
We
only
design
in
this
Fourth
Book
,
to
refer
the
Errors
of
our
Inclinations
to
these
three
Heads
,
viz.
To
the
Inclination
we
have
to
Good
in
General
,
To
Self-Love
,
And
to
the
Love
of
our
Neighbour
.
CHAP.
II.
I.
The
Inclination
for
Good
in
General
,
is
the
Principle
of
the
Disquiet
of
our
Will.
II.
And
consequently
of
our
Negligence
and
Ignorance
.
III.
First
Example
,
Morality
,
little
known
to
many
Men.
IV.
Second
Example
,
The
Immortality
of
the
Soul
,
disputed
by
some
Men.
V.
That
our
Ignorance
is
exceeding
great
in
respect
of
abstracted
things
,
or
such
as
have
but
little
Relation
to
us
.
THat
vast
Capacity
which
the
Will
has
for
all
Good
in
General
,
I.
The
Inclination
for
Good
in
General
,
is
the
Principle
of
the
Disquiet
of
our
Will.
because
it
is
only
form'd
by
a
Good
which
includes
all
Good
in
it self
,
cannot
be
satisfied
by
all
the
things
which
the
Mind
represents
to
it
;
and
yet
that
continual
Motion
which
God
imprints
in
it
towards
Good
cannot
stand
still
.
This
Motion
never
ceasing
,
puts
the
Mind
,
of
necessity
,
into
a
continual
Agitation
.
The
Will
which
seeks
what
it
desires
,
obliges
the
Mind
to
represent
all
sorts
of
Objects
to
it self
.
The
Mind
accordingly
does
it
,
but
the
Soul
does
not
relish
them
;
or
if
it
does
,
is
not
satisfied
with
them
.
The
Soul
does
not
relish
them
,
by
reason
that
often
the
Perception
of
the
Mind
is
not
accompanied
with
Pleasure
;
for
it
is
through
Pleasure
that
the
Soul
relishes
its
Good
:
And
the
Soul
is
not
satisfied
with
it
,
by
reason
that
nothing
can
stop
the
Motion
of
the
Soul
but
him
that
gives
it
.
Whatever
the
Mind
represents
to
it self
as
its
Good
,
is
Finite
;
and
whatever
is
Finite
,
may
withdraw
our
Love
for
a
while
,
but
it
cannot
fix
it
.
When
the
Mind
considers
very
new
and
uncommon
Objects
,
or
that
have
some
relation
to
Infinity
,
the
Will
permits
the
Mind
to
examine
them
a
while
with
some
Attention
,
in
hopes
of
finding
what
it
is
in
search
of
,
because
whatever
appears
Infinite
,
bears
the
Character
of
its
real
Good
;
but
in
time
it
grows
weary
of
it
,
as
well
as
of
the
rest
.
Therefore
the
Will
is
always
disquieted
,
because
it
is
inclin'd
to
seek
for
that
which
it
can
never
find
,
and
which
it
always
hopes
to
find
:
It
Loves
whatever
is
Great
and
Extraordinary
,
and
resembles
Infinity
;
for
not
having
found
its
real
Good
in
Common
and
Familiar
things
,
it
hopes
to
find
it
in
such
as
are
unknown
to
it
.
We
will
demonstrate
in
this
Chapter
,
that
the
Disquiet
of
our
Wills
is
one
of
the
principal
Causes
of
our
Ignorance
,
and
of
the
Errors
into
which
we
fall
in
many
things
:
And
in
the
two
following
we
will
explain
what
it
is
that
produces
in
us
the
Inclination
we
have
for
every
thing
that
has
something
Great
or
Extraordinary
in
it
.
It
is
something
evident
by
what
has
been
said
,
II.
And
consequently
of
our
Negligence
and
Ignorance
.
First
,
That
the
Will
seldom
makes
use
of
the
Understanding
,
unless
on
Objects
that
have
some
Relation
to
us
,
and
that
it
very
much
neglects
all
others
;
for
being
ever
earnestly
desirous
of
Felicity
,
by
the
Impression
of
Nature
,
it
only
turns
the
Understanding
towards
such
things
as
seem
to
be
of
use
to
us
,
and
which
do
in
some
measure
please
us
.
Secondly
,
That
the
Will
does
not
permit
the
Understanding
to
apply
it self
long
even
to
such
things
as
it
is
delighted
with
:
Because
,
as
we
have
already
said
,
all
things
that
are
created
may
indeed
please
us
for
a
while
,
but
we
are
soon
disgusted
with
them
;
and
then
our
Mind
lays
them
by
,
to
seek
for
that
which
can
satisfie
it
elsewhere
.
Thirdly
,
That
the
Will
is
excited
thus
to
make
the
Mind
run
from
Object
to
Object
,
because
it
never
ceases
to
represent
consusedly
to
it
,
or
as
at
a
distance
,
that
which
includes
all
Beings
in
it self
,
as
we
have
declared
in
the
Third
Book
.
For
the
Will
being
desirous
,
as
it
were
,
to
draw
its
real
Good
near
to
it self
,
to
be
pleased
with
it
,
and
to
receive
from
it
the
Motion
which
animates
it
,
it
excites
the
Understanding
to
represent
that
Good
in
some
measure
.
But
then
it
is
no
longer
the
General
,
the
Universal
,
the
Infinitely
Perfect
Being
which
the
Mind
perceives
;
it
is
something
that
is
Bounded
and
Imperfect
,
which
not
being
able
to
stop
the
Motion
of
the
Will
,
nor
to
please
it
long
,
it
forsakes
it
to
turn
after
some
other
Object
.
And
whereas
the
Attention
and
Application
of
the
Mind
are
absolutely
necessary
to
discover
abstracted
Truths
,
it
is
evident
that
the
common
sort
of
Mankind
must
live
in
a
gross
Ignorance
,
in
respect
even
of
such
things
as
have
some
relation
to
them
;
and
that
it
is
impossible
to
express
their
Blindness
in
what
relates
to
abstracted
Truths
,
and
which
have
no
sensible
relation
to
them
.
But
we
must
endeavour
to
prove
these
things
by
Examples
.
Amongst
all
Sciences
Morality
has
most
relation
to
us
:
It
teaches
us
all
our
Duty
towards
God
,
III.
First
Example
,
Morality
little
known
among
many
Men.
towards
our
Prince
,
towards
our
Friends
and
Relations
,
and
generally
towards
all
that
are
about
us
.
Moreover
it
teaches
us
the
way
to
be
Eternally
Happy
;
and
all
Men
lie
under
an
Essential
Obligation
,
or
rather
Indispensible
Necessity
,
to
apply
themselves
wholly
to
it
:
And
yet
though
there
have
been
Men
on
Earth
these
Six
Thousand
Years
,
that
Science
is
still
very
Imperfect
.
That
part
of
Morality
which
relates
to
our
Duty
towards
God
,
and
which
undoubtedly
is
the
chief
,
since
it
relates
to
Eternity
,
has
hardly
been
known
by
the
most
Learned
;
and
even
in
our
days
we
find
Men
of
Sence
who
are
unacquainted
with
it
;
and
yet
it
is
the
easiest
part
of
Morality
.
For
in
the
first
place
,
Where
lies
the
Difficulty
to
discover
that
there
is
a
God
?
Whatever
God
has
made
proves
it
:
Whatever
Men
or
Beasts
do
,
proves
it
:
Whatever
we
think
,
whatever
we
see
,
whatever
we
feel
,
proves
it
.
In
a
word
,
There
is
nothing
but
what
proves
the
Existence
of
God
,
or
that
may
prove
it
to
attentive
Minds
,
who
apply
themselves
seriously
to
the
Knowledge
of
the
Author
of
all
Things
.
Secondly
,
It
is
evident
,
that
there
is
a
Necessity
to
follow
the
Commands
of
God
to
be
Happy
;
for
as
he
is
Powerful
and
Just
,
we
cannot
disobey
him
without
being
Punish'd
,
nor
obey
him
without
being
Rewarded
.
But
what
is
it
he
exacts
from
us
?
That
we
should
Love
him
;
That
our
Mind
should
be
taken
up
with
him
;
That
our
Hearts
should
be
turned
towards
him
.
For
wherefore
has
he
Created
our
Minds
?
Certainly
he
can
do
nothing
but
for
himself
:
Therefore
he
has
made
us
for
himself
only
;
and
we
are
Indispensibly
obliged
not
to
apply
elsewhere
the
Impression
of
that
Love
which
he
continually
preserves
in
us
,
in
order
that
we
should
continually
Love
him
.
These
Truths
are
easily
discovered
with
little
Application
:
And
yet
this
only
Principle
of
Morality
,
which
teaches
us
,
that
to
be
Vertuous
and
Happy
,
it
is
absolutely
necessary
to
Love
God
above
all
Things
and
in
all
Things
,
is
the
Foundation
of
all
Christian
Morality
.
Neither
does
it
require
an
extraordinary
Application
of
Mind
,
to
draw
from
thence
all
the
Consequences
we
stand
in
need
of
,
to
settle
the
general
Rules
of
our
Conduct
;
though
there
are
but
very
few
that
do
it
;
and
Men
continually
dispute
upon
Questions
of
Morality
,
which
are
the
Immediate
and
Necessary
Consequences
of
a
Principle
which
is
so
evident
as
that
is
.
The
Professors
of
Geometry
daily
makes
new
Discoveries
,
but
if
they
do
not
bring
it
to
a
greater
Perfection
,
it
is
because
they
have
already
drawn
the
most
Useful
and
Necessary
Consequences
out
of
their
Principles
.
But
most
Men
seem
Incapable
of
concluding
any
thing
out
of
the
first
Principle
of
Morality
.
All
their
Idea's
vanish
,
and
are
dissipated
as
soon
as
they
begin
to
think
upon
it
;
because
they
will
not
do
it
as
they
should
do
;
and
they
will
not
do
it
,
because
they
do
not
relish
it
,
or
because
they
are
too
soon
tired
with
it
after
their
having
relish'd
it
.
That
Principle
is
abstracted
,
Metaphysical
,
meerly
Intelligible
;
it
is
not
obvious
,
it
is
not
to
be
imagined
;
and
therefore
it
does
not
appear
solid
to
Carnal
Minds
,
or
to
Minds
that
only
see
with
the
Eyes
.
Nothing
is
found
in
that
Principle
capable
of
putting
a
stop
to
the
Disquiets
of
their
Will
,
and
afterwards
to
fix
the
Eyes
of
their
Mind
to
consider
it
with
some
Attention
.
What
Hopes
then
of
their
seeing
it
as
they
should
do
,
of
their
apprehending
it
rightly
,
and
of
their
concluding
directly
from
thence
what
they
should
Conclude
?
If
Men
had
but
an
Imperfect
Apprehension
of
that
Proposition
of
Geometry
:
That
the
sides
of
Triangles
that
are
alike
,
are
proportionable
one
to
another
;
certainly
they
would
not
be
great
Geometricians
.
But
if
besides
the
Confused
and
Imperfect
Idea
of
that
Fundamental
Proposition
of
Geometry
,
they
also
had
some
Interest
to
wish
,
that
the
sides
of
Triangles
that
are
alike
were
not
proportionable
;
and
that
false
Geometry
were
as
convenient
for
their
Perverse
Inclinations
as
false
Morality
,
they
might
very
well
be
guilty
of
Paralogisms
as
absurd
in
Geometry
as
in
Morality
,
because
their
Errors
would
please
them
,
and
that
Truth
would
only
Puzzle
,
Disturb
and
Vex
them
.
Therefore
we
need
not
wonder
at
the
Blindness
of
those
that
lived
in
the
former
Ages
,
whilst
Idolatry
reigned
in
the
World
,
or
of
those
that
live
in
our
Days
,
and
that
do
not
as
yet
enjoy
the
Benefit
of
the
Light
of
the
Gospel
.
It
was
necessary
for
Divine
Wisdom
to
make
it self
sensible
at
last
,
to
instruct
such
Men
as
only
consult
their
Senses
.
Truth
had
spoken
to
their
Minds
for
above
the
space
of
Four
thousand
Years
,
but
whereas
they
never
look'd
Inwardly
they
did
not
understand
it
:
It
was
necessary
that
it
should
speak
to
their
Ears
.
The
Light
which
directs
all
Men
,
did
shine
in
their
Darkness
,
without
being
able
to
expel
it
;
they
could
not
so
much
as
look
upon
it
.
It
was
necessary
that
the
Intelligible
Light
should
put
on
a
Veil
to
make
it self
visible
:
And
that
the
Word
should
cloath
it self
with
Flesh
;
and
that
the
Wisdom
of
God
which
lay
conceal'd
,
and
was
inaccessible
to
Carnal
Men
,
should
instruct
them
in
a
Carnal
way
,
Carnaliter
,
says
St.
Bernard
.
The
Majority
of
Men
,
Serm.
39.
De
Natali
Domini
.
and
particularly
the
Poor
(
which
are
the
most
worthy
Objects
of
the
Mercy
and
Providence
of
the
Creator
,
)
who
are
obliged
to
work
for
their
daily
Bread
,
are
very
Ignorant
and
Stupid
,
They
only
Hear
because
they
have
Ears
,
and
they
only
see
because
they
have
Eyes
.
They
are
incapable
of
looking
Inwardly
by
an
Effort
of
Mind
,
there
to
Interrogate
Truth
in
the
Silence
of
their
Senses
and
Passions
.
They
cannot
apply
themselves
to
Truth
,
by
reason
that
they
cannot
relish
it
:
Moreover
they
seldom
think
of
applying
themselves
to
it
,
because
Men
seldom
have
any
Thoughts
of
applying
themselves
to
things
that
do
not
concern
them
.
Their
unquiet
and
unsettled
Will
turns
their
Minds
continually
towards
all
the
Objects
that
Please
and
Divert
them
by
their
Variety
:
For
the
Multiplicity
and
Diversity
of
Sensible
Goods
,
hinder
Men
from
discovering
the
Vanity
of
them
,
and
still
keep
them
in
hopes
of
finding
the
real
Good
they
desire
in
them
.
Thus
though
the
Councils
which
Jesus
Christ
as
Man
,
as
the
way
,
as
the
Author
of
our
Faith
,
gives
us
in
the
Gospel
,
are
much
more
suitable
to
the
Weakness
of
our
Understanding
,
than
those
which
the
same
Jesus
Christ
,
as
Eternal
Wisdom
,
as
Inward
Truth
,
as
Intelligible
Light
Inspires
into
the
most
secret
Recesses
of
our
Reason
:
Though
Jesus
Christ
renders
those
Councils
Agreeable
by
his
Grace
,
Sensible
by
his
Example
,
Convincing
by
his
Miracles
,
yet
Men
are
so
stupid
,
and
so
incapable
of
Reflection
,
even
upon
things
which
are
absolutely
Necessary
for
them
to
know
well
,
that
they
hardly
ever
think
on
them
as
they
ought
.
Few
Men
observe
the
Beauty
of
the
Gospel
;
Few
Men
conceive
the
Solidity
and
Necessity
of
the
Councils
of
Jesus
Christ
;
Few
Meditate
upon
them
;
Few
esteem
them
as
their
Necessary
Food
,
or
fortifie
themselves
with
them
;
the
Continual
Agitation
of
the
Will
,
which
is
in
search
of
the
Taste
of
Good
,
IV.
Second
Example
,
The
Immortality
of
the
Soul
,
disputed
by
some
Persons
.
not
permitting
the
Mind
to
be
intent
upon
Truths
which
seem
to
deprive
it
thereof
.
Take
another
Example
.
It
concerns
the
Impious
highly
to
make
a
very
strict
enquiry
,
whether
their
Soul
is
Mortal
,
as
they
apprehend
it
,
or
whether
it
is
Immortal
,
as
Faith
and
Reason
tells
us
.
It
is
a
thing
of
the
utmost
Consequence
for
them
to
know
;
their
Eternity
is
concerned
in
it
,
and
the
very
Quiet
of
their
Mind
depends
upon
it
.
Why
is
it
then
they
do
not
know
it
,
or
that
they
remain
in
doubt
,
unless
it
be
that
they
are
not
capable
of
the
least
serious
Application
;
and
that
their
unsedate
and
corrupted
Will
does
not
allow
their
Mind
to
look
stedfastly
on
the
Reasons
which
are
contrary
to
these
Opinions
,
which
they
desire
should
be
true
?
For
in
fine
,
is
it
so
difficult
a
task
to
distinguish
the
difference
there
is
between
the
Soul
and
the
Body
,
between
what
thinks
,
and
what
is
extended
?
Do's
it
require
so
great
an
Attention
of
Mind
to
discover
that
a
Thought
is
neither
Round
nor
Square
:
That
Extent
is
only
capable
of
different
Figures
and
different
Motions
,
and
not
of
Thought
and
Reasoning
:
And
consequently
,
that
what
Thinks
,
and
what
is
Extended
,
are
two
Beings
directly
opposite
to
one
another
?
Yet
that
alone
is
sufficient
to
demonstrate
that
the
Soul
is
Immortal
,
and
that
it
cannot
Perish
,
even
though
the
Body
were
Annihilated
.
When
a
Substance
perishes
,
it
is
true
that
the
Modes
or
Manners
of
Existence
of
that
Substance
perish
with
it
.
If
a
piece
of
Wax
were
annihilated
,
it
is
certain
that
the
Forms
of
that
Wax
should
also
be
annihilated
with
it
;
because
the
Roundness
for
Example
of
the
Wax
,
is
in
Effect
nothing
but
the
Wax
it self
of
such
a
Shape
,
and
therefore
it
cannot
subsist
without
the
Wax
.
But
though
God
should
destroy
all
the
Wax
in
the
World
,
it
would
not
therefore
follow
,
that
any
other
Substance
,
nor
that
the
Modes
of
any
other
Substance
were
Annihilated
.
All
the
Stones
for
example
,
would
subsist
with
all
their
Modes
;
because
Stones
are
Substances
or
Beings
,
and
not
Modifications
of
the
Wax
.
In
like
manner
,
though
God
should
Annihilate
one
half
of
some
Bodies
,
it
would
not
follow
,
that
the
other
half
should
be
Annihilated
.
This
last
half
is
United
with
the
other
,
but
it
is
not
one
with
it
.
Thus
one
half
being
Annihilated
,
it
follows
indeed
according
to
Reason
,
that
the
other
half
has
no
longer
any
relation
to
it
;
but
it
do's
not
follow
that
it
ceases
to
be
;
because
as
its
Being
is
different
,
it
cannot
be
Annihilated
by
the
Annihilation
of
the
other
.
Therefore
it
is
clear
,
that
the
Thought
not
being
the
Modification
of
Extension
,
our
Soul
is
not
Annihilated
,
though
we
should
suppose
that
the
Body
were
Annihilated
by
Death
.
But
there
is
no
reason
to
believe
,
that
even
the
Body
is
Annihilated
when
it
is
destroy'd
.
The
parts
which
Compose
it
are
dissipated
into
Vapours
,
and
reduc'd
to
Powder
:
They
are
no
longer
seen
,
nor
are
they
any
longer
known
;
this
is
true
,
but
it
is
no
reason
to
conclude
,
that
they
are
no
longer
in
Being
;
for
the
Mind
perceives
them
still
.
Dividing
a
Grain
of
Mustard
into
Two
,
into
Four
,
or
Twenty
parts
,
it
would
be
Annihilated
to
our
sight
,
because
it
would
be
no
longer
seen
:
But
it
would
not
be
Annihilated
in
it self
,
nor
yet
to
the
Mind
;
for
the
Mind
would
see
it
,
though
it
were
divided
into
a
Thousand
,
or
an
Hundred
Thousand
Parts
.
'T
is
a
common
Notion
among
Men
who
consult
their
Reason
more
than
their
Senses
,
that
nothing
can
be
Annihilated
by
the
common
force
of
Nature
;
for
as
Naturally
,
nothing
can
be
made
out
of
nothing
,
neither
can
a
Substance
or
Being
become
nothing
.
Bodies
may
be
corrupted
,
if
we
may
call
the
Alterations
they
are
liable
to
,
Corruption
;
but
they
cannot
be
Annihilated
.
What
is
Round
may
become
Square
,
What
is
Flesh
may
become
Earth
,
Vapour
,
and
what
you
please
;
for
all
sorts
of
Extensions
are
capable
of
all
manner
of
Configurations
:
But
the
Substance
of
what
is
Round
,
and
of
what
is
Flesh
,
cannot
perish
.
There
are
certain
Laws
Establish'd
in
Nature
,
according
to
which
Bodies
change
their
Forms
successively
;
for
those
Successive
Forms
Compose
the
Beauty
of
the
Universe
,
and
Create
an
Admiration
in
us
for
its
Author
:
But
there
is
no
Law
in
Nature
for
the
Annihilation
of
any
Being
,
because
Annihilation
has
nothing
of
Beauty
or
Good
in
it self
,
and
because
the
Author
of
Nature
loves
his
Work
.
Therefore
Bodies
may
Alter
,
but
they
cannot
Perish
.
But
if
relying
on
the
Testimony
of
the
Senses
,
Men
would
maintain
obstinately
that
the
Reduction
of
Bodies
is
a
real
Annihilation
,
by
reason
that
the
Parts
into
which
they
are
reduc'd
are
Imperceptible
:
Let
them
remember
at
least
,
that
Bodies
can
only
be
divided
into
those
Imperceptible
Parts
,
because
they
are
Extended
.
But
if
the
Mind
is
not
Extended
,
it
will
not
be
Divisible
;
and
if
it
be
not
Divisible
,
it
must
be
granted
,
that
in
that
Sense
it
will
not
be
Corruptible
.
But
how
could
any
Body
imagin
that
the
Mind
were
Extended
and
Divisible
?
We
may
by
a
right
Line
cut
a
Square
into
two
Triangles
,
into
two
Paralelogrammes
,
or
long
Squares
,
into
two
Trapeza's
:
But
by
what
Line
can
it
be
conceiv'd
,
that
a
Pleasure
,
a
Pain
,
or
a
Desire
can
be
Cut
?
And
what
Figure
would
result
of
that
Division
?
Truly
I
cannot
think
,
that
Imagination
can
be
fruitful
enough
in
false
Idea's
,
to
satisfie
it self
upon
that
Subject
.
The
Mind
then
is
not
Extended
,
consequently
it
is
not
Divisible
:
It
is
not
liable
to
the
same
Alterations
as
the
Body
:
Nevertheless
,
it
must
be
granted
that
it
is
not
Immutable
by
its
Nature
.
If
the
Body
is
capable
of
an
infinite
number
of
different
Figures
,
and
of
different
Configurations
,
the
Mind
is
capable
of
an
infinite
number
of
different
Idea's
,
and
different
Modifications
.
As
after
our
Death
the
substance
of
our
Flesh
will
be
reduc'd
to
Earth
,
to
Vapours
,
and
to
an
infinite
number
of
other
Bodies
without
being
Annihilated
:
So
our
Souls
without
being
again
reduc'd
to
nothing
,
will
have
Thoughts
,
and
Sentiments
very
different
from
those
they
had
in
Life
.
It
is
also
necessary
while
we
are
alive
,
that
our
Body
should
be
Compos'd
of
Flesh
and
Bones
:
It
is
also
necessary
in
order
to
Live
,
that
our
Soul
should
have
the
Idea's
and
Sentiments
it
has
,
in
relation
to
the
Body
to
which
it
is
united
.
But
when
the
Soul
shall
be
separated
from
its
Body
,
it
will
be
at
full
Liberty
to
receive
all
sorts
of
Idea's
and
Modifications
,
very
different
from
those
it
has
at
present
;
as
our
Body
on
its
part
,
will
be
capable
of
receiving
all
sorts
of
Figures
and
Configurations
,
very
different
from
those
it
is
necessary
it
should
have
,
to
be
the
Body
of
a
Living
Man
.
What
I
have
said
,
does
in
my
Opinion
,
sufficiently
show
,
that
the
Immortality
of
the
Soul
is
not
a
thing
so
difficult
to
be
apprehended
.
What
then
is
the
reason
that
so
many
question
it
,
unless
it
be
,
that
they
are
unwilling
to
apply
themselves
as
much
as
may
be
,
to
examin
the
Reasons
which
prove
it
,
in
order
to
be
Convinc'd
?
And
why
is
it
that
they
are
unwilling
to
do
it
,
unless
it
be
that
their
Will
,
being
uneasie
and
inconstant
,
keeps
their
Understanding
in
a
continual
Agitation
;
insomuch
that
it
is
not
at
leisure
distinctly
to
perceive
those
very
Idea's
which
are
most
present
to
it
,
as
those
of
Thought
and
of
Extension
?
Just
like
a
Man
agitated
by
some
Passion
,
turning
his
Eyes
continually
on
all
sides
,
for
the
most
part
does
not
distinguish
the
nearest
Objects
,
and
the
most
Expos'd
to
his
Sight
.
For
indeed
the
Question
about
the
Immortality
of
the
Soul
,
is
one
of
the
easiest
Questions
to
resolve
,
when
without
Consulting
our
Imagination
,
we
consider
with
some
Attention
of
Mind
,
the
clear
and
distinct
Idea
of
Extension
,
and
the
Relation
it
can
have
to
Thought
.
If
the
Inconstancy
and
Levity
of
our
Will
does
not
permit
our
Understanding
to
penetrate
into
the
Bottom
of
things
which
are
present
to
it
,
and
which
we
are
highly
concern'd
to
know
;
it
is
easie
to
judge
,
that
it
will
be
more
averse
to
let
us
meditate
on
those
that
are
distant
,
and
which
have
no
relation
to
us
.
So
that
if
we
are
very
Ignorant
of
most
of
those
things
which
it
is
very
necessary
for
us
to
know
,
we
shall
not
have
a
great
Insight
into
those
which
seem
absolutely
vain
and
useless
to
us
.
It
will
not
be
necessary
for
me
to
endeavour
to
prove
this
by
tedious
Examples
,
which
have
no
considerable
Truths
in
them
;
for
if
we
may
be
allow'd
to
be
Ignorant
of
any
thing
,
it
is
of
those
things
which
are
of
no
Use
.
And
I
had
rather
not
be
believed
,
than
to
make
the
Reader
lose
his
Time
in
reading
things
that
are
wholly
useless
.
Though
there
are
not
many
persons
who
apply
themselves
seriously
to
things
absolutely
Vain
and
Useless
,
yet
the
number
of
them
is
but
too
great
:
But
there
can
never
be
too
many
of
those
who
do
not
apply
themselves
to
them
,
and
who
despise
them
,
provided
they
do
not
pretend
to
Judge
of
them
.
It
is
no
defect
in
a
limited
Mind
,
not
to
know
certain
things
;
it
is
only
a
defect
to
pretend
to
Judge
of
them
.
Ignorance
is
a
necessary
Evil
,
but
we
may
,
and
ought
to
avoid
Error
.
Therefore
I
do
not
condemn
Men
for
being
Ignorant
of
many
things
,
but
only
for
giving
rash
Judgments
about
those
things
.
When
things
have
a
great
relation
to
us
,
are
sensible
,
V
That
our
Ignorance
is
exceeding
great
in
respect
of
abstracted
things
,
or
such
as
have
but
little
relation
to
us
.
and
fall
easily
within
the
Compass
of
our
Imagination
,
we
may
say
,
that
the
Mind
applies
it self
to
them
,
and
may
have
some
knowledge
of
them
.
For
when
we
know
that
things
have
a
relation
to
us
,
we
think
upon
them
with
some
Inclination
;
and
when
we
find
that
they
concern
us
,
we
apply
our selves
to
them
with
pleasure
.
So
that
we
should
be
more
Learned
than
we
are
in
many
things
,
if
the
uneasiness
and
tossing
of
our
Will
did
not
Disturb
and
Fatigue
our
Attention
continually
.
But
when
things
are
abstract
,
and
not
very
sensible
,
it
is
difficult
to
attain
any
certain
knowledge
of
them
:
Not
that
abstracted
things
are
very
intricate
,
but
because
the
Attention
and
Sight
of
the
Mind
begins
,
and
Ends
commonly
with
the
sensible
Prospect
of
Objects
;
for
we
seldom
think
on
any
thing
but
what
we
see
and
feel
,
and
only
as
long
as
we
see
and
feel
it
.
It
is
most
certain
,
that
if
the
Mind
could
easily
apply
it self
to
clear
and
distinct
Idea's
,
without
being
any-wise
byass'd
by
Opinion
;
and
if
the
uneasiness
of
the
Will
did
not
continually
disturb
its
Application
,
we
should
meet
no
great
difficulties
in
many
Natural
Questions
,
which
we
look
upon
as
not
to
be
Explain'd
,
and
we
might
easily
be
deliver'd
of
our
Ignorance
and
Errors
in
relation
to
them
.
For
Example
;
It
is
an
undeniable
Truth
to
any
Man
of
Sense
,
that
Creation
and
Annihilation
are
things
which
surpass
the
common
force
of
Nature
.
Therefore
if
Men
did
remain
Attentive
to
that
pure
Notion
of
the
Mind
and
Reason
,
they
would
not
so
easily
admit
the
Creation
and
Annihilation
of
an
infinite
Number
of
New
Beings
,
as
of
Substantial
Forms
,
real
Qualities
and
Faculties
.
They
would
look
into
the
distinct
Idea's
we
have
of
Extension
,
Figure
,
and
Motion
,
for
the
reason
of
Natural
Effects
;
which
is
not
always
so
difficult
as
People
imagin
;
all
things
in
Nature
are
so
connected
together
,
and
prove
each
other
.
The
Effects
of
Fire
,
as
those
of
Canon
and
of
Mines
,
are
very
Surprising
;
and
their
cause
not
very
well
known
.
Nevertheless
,
if
Men
instead
of
relying
on
the
Impressions
of
their
Senses
,
and
on
some
false
or
deceitful
Experiments
,
did
firmly
fix
on
that
bare
Notion
of
the
Mind
alone
:
That
it
is
not
possible
for
a
Body
that
is
very
little
agitated
to
produce
a
violent
Motion
,
since
it
can
communicate
no
more
moving
Power
than
it
has
its
self
;
it
would
be
easie
from
that
alone
to
conclude
,
that
there
is
a
Subtle
and
Invisible
Matter
,
that
it
is
very
much
agitated
,
and
dispers'd
int
h
all
Bodies
,
and
several
other
like
things
which
would
teach
us
the
Nature
of
Fire
,
and
also
be
of
great
use
to
us
to
discover
other
Truths
yet
more
conceal'd
.
For
,
since
Canons
and
Mines
have
such
great
Motions
,
and
all
the
Visible
Bodies
about
them
,
are
not
in
a
sufficient
Agitation
to
produce
them
;
it
is
a
certain
proof
that
there
are
other
Invisible
and
Insensible
Bodies
,
which
have
at
least
as
much
Agitation
as
the
Canon
Ball
:
But
with
being
very
Subtle
and
Thin
,
may
alone
freely
pass
,
and
without
breaking
through
the
Pores
of
the
Canon
before
it
is
Fir'd
;
that
is
,
as
Monsieur
Descartes
has
explain'd
it
more
at
large
,
before
their
having
surrounded
the
hard
and
gross
parts
of
the
Salt-petre
,
of
which
the
Powder
is
Compos'd
.
But
when
the
Fire
is
put
to
it
,
that
is
,
when
those
subtle
and
extreamly
agitated
Particles
,
have
surrounded
the
gross
and
solid
Parts
of
the
Salt-petre
,
and
have
thus
Communicated
their
very
strong
and
violent
Motion
to
them
,
then
all
does
Burst
of
necessity
;
because
the
Pores
of
the
Canon
,
which
left
an
open
passage
on
all
sides
for
the
subtle
Parts
before
mention'd
,
while
they
were
alone
,
are
not
large
enough
to
make
way
for
the
gross
Parts
of
the
Salt-petre
,
and
some
others
of
which
the
Powder
is
Compos'd
,
when
they
have
receiv'd
into
themselves
the
Agitation
of
the
Subtle
Parts
which
surrounds
them
.
For
as
the
Water
of
Rivers
which
flows
under
Bridges
does
not
shake
them
,
by
reason
of
the
smallness
of
its
Particles
:
Thus
the
very
subtle
and
very
thin
Matter
I
have
mention'd
,
passes
continually
through
the
Pores
of
all
Bodies
without
making
any
sensible
Alterations
in
them
.
But
then
likewise
,
as
the
said
River
is
capable
of
breaking
down
a
Bridge
,
when
carrying
along
with
it
some
great
Flakes
of
Ice
,
or
some
other
more
solid
Bodies
,
by
forcing
them
against
it
with
its
own
Motion
;
so
subtle
Matter
is
capable
of
producing
the
surprising
Effects
we
see
in
Canons
and
in
Mines
;
when
having
communicated
to
the
Parts
of
the
Powder
which
Float
in
the
midst
of
it
,
its
Motion
which
is
infinitely
more
Violent
,
and
more
Rapid
than
that
of
Rivers
and
Torrents
;
the
said
Parts
of
the
Powder
cannot
freely
pass
through
the
Pores
of
the
Bodies
which
enclose
them
,
by
reason
they
are
too
gross
;
so
that
they
violently
break
them
to
force
them
a
free
Passage
.
But
Men
do
not
easily
apprehend
those
subtle
small
Particles
,
which
they
repute
Chimera's
,
because
they
do
not
see
them
.
Contemplatio
ferè
definit
cum
aspectu
,
says
Bacon
.
The
greater
part
even
of
Philosophers
,
invent
some
New
Entity
,
rather
than
not
to
talk
upon
those
matters
which
they
are
Ignorant
of
:
And
if
any
Body
objects
against
their
false
and
incomprehensible
Suppositions
,
that
Fire
must
needs
be
compos'd
of
Parts
that
are
in
very
great
Agitation
,
since
it
produces
such
Violent
Motions
,
and
that
a
thing
cannot
Communicate
that
which
it
has
not
;
which
is
undoubtedly
a
most
clear
,
and
most
solid
Objection
:
They
confound
all
by
some
frivolous
Imaginary
distinction
,
as
that
of
Equivocal
and
Univocal
Causes
,
in
order
to
seem
to
say
something
,
though
in
reality
they
say
nothing
.
For
it
is
a
general
Notion
among
Men
of
Sense
and
Learning
,
that
there
can
be
no
real
Equivocal
Cause
in
Nature
;
and
that
it
has
been
invented
meerly
by
the
Ignorance
of
Men.
Therefore
Men
must
apply
themselves
more
to
the
consideration
of
clear
and
distinct
Notions
,
if
they
have
a
mind
to
understand
Nature
:
They
must
check
and
stop
the
Inconstancy
and
Levity
of
their
Will
a
little
,
if
they
design
to
penetrate
deeply
into
things
;
for
their
Mind
will
ever
be
weak
,
superficial
and
discursive
,
while
their
Will
remains
Light
,
Inconstant
and
Roving
.
It
is
true
,
it
requires
some
Fatigue
,
and
Men
must
constrain
themselves
to
become
Attentive
,
and
to
search
into
the
bottom
of
things
;
for
there
is
nothing
to
be
got
without
pains
.
It
is
shameful
for
Men
of
Sense
,
and
Philosophers
,
who
are
obliged
by
all
manner
of
reasons
to
enquire
into
,
and
to
defend
Truth
,
to
speak
without
knowing
what
they
say
,
and
to
be
satisfy'd
with
what
they
do
not
understand
.
CHAP.
III.
I.
Curiosity
is
natural
and
necessary
.
II.
Three
Rules
to
moderate
it
.
III.
Explanation
of
the
first
of
these
Rules
.
AS
long
as
Men
have
an
Inclination
for
a
Good
which
surpasses
their
Power
,
I.
Curiosity
is
natural
and
necessary
.
and
do
not
possess
it
,
they
will
have
a
secret
propension
for
whatever
looks
new
and
extraordinary
:
They
will
ever
run
after
such
things
as
they
have
not
as
yet
considered
,
in
hopes
of
finding
what
they
enquire
after
;
and
their
Mind
not
being
able
to
satisfie
it self
wholly
without
the
enjoyment
of
that
Good
for
which
they
are
made
;
they
will
ever
remain
uneasie
,
and
in
a
continual
Agitation
,
until
it
appears
to
them
in
its
Glory
.
This
disposition
of
Human
Minds
is
certainly
very
suitable
to
their
Condition
;
for
it
is
infinitely
better
to
be
uneasie
,
and
in
search
of
the
Happiness
one
does
not
possess
,
than
to
remain
in
a
false
Repose
,
and
to
be
pleas'd
with
falshood
,
and
a
delusive
Happiness
,
wherewith
Men
are
commonly
deluded
.
We
ought
to
have
a
sense
of
Truth
,
and
of
our
Happiness
:
Therefore
those
Things
that
are
new
and
extraordinary
must
excite
us
:
There
is
a
certain
kind
of
Curiosity
which
is
not
only
allowable
,
but
absolutely
necessary
;
for
whereas
common
and
ordinary
things
can
never
afford
true
Felicity
,
and
the
ancient
Opinions
of
Philosophers
are
very
uncertain
:
It
is
necessary
we
should
be
curious
for
New
Discoveries
,
and
always
uneasie
in
the
Enjoyment
of
common
Felicities
.
Should
a
Geometrician
give
us
New
Propositions
contrary
to
those
of
Euclide
,
Should
he
undertake
to
prove
,
that
that
Science
is
full
of
Errors
,
as
Hobbs
endeavour'd
to
do
in
a
Book
,
written
against
the
Pride
of
Geometricians
,
I
own
that
there
would
be
no
reason
to
complain
of
that
kind
of
Novelty
;
because
,
that
when
we
have
found
out
the
Truth
we
ought
to
stick
to
it
,
since
we
are
only
endu'd
with
Curiosity
in
order
to
find
it
out
?
Neither
are
Geometricians
often
guilty
of
being
Curious
of
New
Opinions
of
Geometry
.
They
would
soon
be
tir'd
with
a
Book
containing
nothing
but
Propositions
contrary
to
those
of
Euclide
;
for
being
fully
convinc'd
of
the
Truth
of
those
Propositions
by
unanswerable
Demonstrations
,
our
Curiosity
ceases
in
that
Point
:
Which
is
an
infallible
Argument
,
that
the
only
reason
of
the
Inclination
of
Men
after
Novelty
,
is
because
they
do
not
evidently
see
the
Truth
of
those
things
they
naturally
desire
to
know
,
nor
possess
Infinite
Felicity
,
which
they
are
naturally
desirous
to
possess
.
Therefore
it
is
necessary
that
Novelty
should
Excite
Men
,
and
that
they
should
Love
it
:
But
however
,
II.
Three
Rules
to
moderate
Curiosity
.
there
are
Exceptions
to
be
made
,
and
they
must
observe
certain
Rules
which
it
is
easie
to
infer
from
what
we
have
been
saying
,
that
the
Inclination
we
have
for
Novelty
is
only
given
us
in
order
to
seek
out
Truth
,
and
our
real
Felicity
.
There
are
Three
,
the
first
of
which
is
,
That
Men
must
not
be
fond
of
Novelty
in
things
relating
to
Faith
which
are
not
submitted
to
Reason
The
Second
,
That
Novelty
is
not
a
sufficient
Reason
to
induce
us
to
believe
that
things
are
Good
or
True
:
That
is
,
We
must
not
fancy
that
Opinions
are
true
because
they
are
new
;
nor
that
any
thing
can
be
capable
to
content
us
,
because
it
is
new
or
extraordinary
,
or
because
we
have
not
possess'd
it
before
.
The
Third
,
That
when
we
are
satisfy'd
that
Truths
are
so
conceal'd
that
it
is
morally
impossible
to
discover
them
,
and
that
Benefits
are
so
little
,
and
so
inconsiderable
that
they
cannot
satisfie
us
,
we
must
not
suffer
our selves
to
be
excited
by
the
Novelty
of
them
,
nor
to
be
seduc'd
by
false
hopes
.
But
it
is
necessary
to
explain
these
Rules
more
at
large
;
and
shew
how
by
a
neglect
of
'em
we
fall
into
an
infinite
number
of
Errors
.
We
often
meet
with
Minds
of
very
different
Humours
:
II.
Particular
explanation
of
the
first
of
those
Rules
.
Some
believe
every
thing
blindly
:
Others
will
never
believe
without
seeing
evidently
.
The
first
having
hardly
ever
made
any
use
of
their
Understanding
,
do
without
considering
,
believe
whatever
is
said
to
them
;
the
others
,
who
will
trust
to
nothing
but
their
Understanding
,
indifferently
condemn
all
sorts
of
Authorities
.
The
first
are
commonly
stupid
and
weak
Persons
,
like
Children
and
Women
;
the
others
are
proud
and
profane
Dispositions
,
like
Hereticks
and
Philosophers
.
It
is
very
difficult
to
find
Persons
who
keep
a
Medium
between
those
two
Extreams
,
and
who
never
look
for
Evidence
in
matters
relating
to
Faith
through
a
vain
Agitation
of
Mind
,
or
who
sometimes
believe
false
Opinions
without
Evidence
,
in
things
relating
to
Nature
,
through
an
indiscreet
Deference
,
and
low
Submission
of
Mind
.
If
they
are
Persons
of
Piety
,
who
submit
to
the
Authority
of
the
Church
in
all
things
,
their
Faith
extends
sometimes
,
if
I
may
use
the
Expression
,
even
to
Opinions
that
are
meerly
Philosophical
;
and
they
often
look
upon
them
with
the
same
Respect
as
is
only
due
to
the
Truths
of
Religion
.
A
false
Zeal
makes
them
too
easily
condemn
those
that
are
not
of
their
Opinion
.
They
harbour
injurious
Suspicions
against
those
that
make
New
Discoveries
.
It
is
sufficient
to
be
esteem'd
by
them
as
Libertines
,
to
deny
that
there
are
substantial
Forms
,
that
Animals
are
sensible
of
Pain
and
Pleasure
,
and
other
Philosophical
Opinions
,
which
they
look
upon
as
Truth
without
any
evident
Reason
,
only
because
they
imagin
there
are
necessary
Relations
between
those
Opinions
and
the
Truths
of
Faith
.
But
if
they
are
Persons
that
are
too
bold
,
their
Pride
induces
them
to
despise
the
Authority
of
the
Church
;
they
never
submit
willingly
to
it
.
They
delight
in
difficult
rash
Opinions
:
They
affect
to
pass
for
mighty
Wits
;
and
upon
that
account
they
speak
of
Divine
Mysteries
without
Respect
,
and
with
a
kind
of
Haughtiness
:
They
despise
all
as
Credulous
,
who
speak
modestly
of
certain
receiv'd
Opinions
.
Finally
,
they
are
very
much
inclin'd
to
doubt
of
every
thing
,
and
are
directly
oppos'd
to
those
who
are
too
easily
inclin'd
to
submit
to
the
Authority
of
Men.
It
is
obvious
,
that
these
two
Extreams
are
bad
,
and
those
who
will
not
admit
Evidence
in
Natural
Questions
are
blameable
,
as
well
as
those
who
would
have
Evidence
in
Mysteries
of
Faith
.
But
yet
those
who
Expose
themselves
to
be
mistaken
in
Philosophical
Questions
in
being
too
Credulous
,
are
without
doubt
more
excusable
than
the
others
who
run
the
hazard
of
falling
into
some
Heresie
or
other
in
doubting
Rashly
.
For
it
is
less
dangerous
to
fall
into
a
World
of
Errors
in
Philosophy
for
want
of
examining
them
,
than
to
fall
into
one
Heresie
for
want
of
submitting
with
Humility
to
the
Authority
of
the
Church
.
The
Mind
is
at
quiet
when
it
meets
Evidence
,
and
is
in
continual
Agitation
when
it
finds
none
.
Because
Evidence
is
the
Character
of
Truth
.
Thus
the
Error
of
Libertines
,
and
of
Hereticks
,
proceeds
from
their
doubting
of
the
Truth
of
the
Decisions
of
the
Church
,
because
they
are
not
Evident
,
and
they
hope
that
the
Truths
of
Faith
may
be
demonstrated
.
Now
their
Love
for
Novelty
is
Irregular
,
since
that
possessing
the
Truth
in
the
Faith
of
the
Church
,
they
ought
not
to
seek
farther
:
Besides
,
the
Truths
of
Faith
being
far
above
the
reach
of
their
Understanding
,
they
would
not
be
able
to
discover
them
,
supposing
that
according
to
their
False
Opinion
,
the
Church
were
guilty
of
Error
.
But
if
there
are
many
who
deceive
themselves
in
refusing
to
submit
to
the
Authority
of
the
Church
,
there
are
as
many
who
are
deceiv'd
in
submitting
to
the
Authority
of
Men.
We
must
submit
to
the
Authority
of
the
Church
,
because
it
can
never
submit
Blindly
to
the
Authority
of
Men
,
because
they
are
always
liable
to
Mistakes
.
What
the
Church
teaches
us
,
is
Infinitely
above
the
reach
of
Reason
:
What
Men
teach
us
,
is
submitted
to
our
Reason
:
So
that
as
it
is
a
Crime
,
and
an
Insupportable
Vanity
,
to
endeavour
to
find
out
the
Truth
in
Matters
of
Faith
by
our
Reason
,
without
regarding
the
Authority
of
the
Church
:
So
it
is
a
great
Indiscretion
,
and
a
despicable
poorness
of
Spirit
,
to
rely
blindly
on
the
Authority
of
Men
,
in
Things
which
relate
to
Reason
.
Nevertheless
,
most
of
those
that
are
esteem'd
Learned
Men
in
the
World
,
have
only
acquir'd
that
Reputation
,
by
knowing
the
Opinions
of
Aristotle
,
of
Plato
,
of
Epicurus
,
and
of
some
other
Philosophers
by
Heart
,
by
submitting
blindly
to
their
Sentiments
,
and
by
defending
them
with
Obstinacy
.
In
order
to
obtain
the
Reputation
of
Learning
in
the
Universities
,
it
is
sufficient
to
be
acquainted
with
the
Sentiments
of
some
Philosopher
:
Provided
they
will
Swear
In
Verba
Magistri
,
they
soon
become
Doctors
.
Most
Communities
stick
to
a
peculiar
Doctrine
,
which
the
Members
are
not
allow'd
to
deviate
from
.
What
is
True
in
some
,
is
often
False
in
others
.
They
are
sometimes
Proud
of
defending
the
Doctrine
of
their
Order
,
against
Reason
and
Experience
;
and
they
think
themselves
oblig'd
to
wrest
the
Truth
,
or
their
Authors
to
reconcile
them
:
This
produces
a
World
of
Frivolous
Distinctions
,
which
are
so
many
by
ways
,
that
lead
Infallibly
to
Error
.
If
any
Truth
is
discover'd
,
even
in
our
days
,
Aristotle
must
have
seen
it
;
or
if
Aristotle
be
against
it
,
the
Discovery
must
be
False
.
Some
make
that
Philosopher
speak
one
way
,
others
another
;
for
all
those
who
pretend
to
Learning
,
make
him
speak
their
Language
:
He
is
made
the
Author
of
all
sorts
of
Impertinencies
,
and
few
Discoveries
are
made
,
which
are
not
found
Enigmatically
in
some
corner
or
other
of
his
Books
.
In
a
word
,
he
is
ever
contradicting
himself
,
if
not
in
his
Works
,
yet
at
least
in
the
Mouths
of
those
that
teach
him
.
For
though
Philosophers
protest
,
and
even
pretend
to
teach
his
Doctrine
,
it
is
difficult
to
meet
two
that
agree
about
his
Sentiments
:
For
indeed
Aristotle's
Books
are
so
Obscure
,
and
fill'd
with
such
rambling
general
Terms
,
that
one
may
with
some
Appearance
of
Truth
,
impute
to
him
the
Opinions
of
those
that
are
most
opposite
to
his
.
It
is
easie
to
make
him
say
whatever
one
has
a
mind
to
in
some
of
his
Works
,
because
he
hardly
says
any
thing
in
them
,
though
he
makes
a
great
deal
of
Noise
;
as
Children
suppose
the
Sounds
of
the
Bells
to
say
what
they
please
,
because
they
make
a
great
deal
of
Noise
and
say
nothing
.
I
must
confess
that
it
seems
very
Rational
to
fix
and
to
stop
the
Mind
on
some
particular
Opinions
,
to
hinder
it
from
running
out
into
Extravagancies
.
But
what
then
?
Must
it
needs
be
done
by
Falshood
and
Error
?
Or
rather
can
any
one
believe
that
Error
can
fix
the
Mind
?
Let
Men
examine
how
difficult
it
is
to
find
Persons
of
Sense
pleased
with
the
reading
of
Aristotle
,
and
that
can
perswade
themselves
they
have
acquir'd
any
true
Science
,
even
after
having
grown
old
on
his
Books
;
and
it
will
appear
plainly
,
that
nothing
but
Truth
and
Evidence
can
fix
the
Agitations
of
the
Mind
;
and
that
Disputes
,
Aversions
,
Errors
and
even
Heresies
,
are
entertain'd
and
encourag'd
by
an
Ill
Manner
of
Study
.
Truth
consists
in
Individuality
,
it
is
not
capable
of
Variety
;
and
nothing
besides
it
can
reconcile
Peoples
Minds
:
Falshood
and
Error
only
serve
to
divide
and
agitate
them
.
I
do
not
question
but
there
are
some
who
do
verily
believe
,
that
he
they
call
the
Prince
of
Philosophers
,
is
no-wise
in
an
Error
,
and
that
Real
and
Solid
Philosophy
are
only
to
be
found
in
his
Works
.
There
are
some
who
fancy
,
that
though
it
is
Two
thousand
Years
since
Aristotle
wrote
,
no
body
has
yet
been
able
to
discover
that
he
was
guilty
of
any
Error
;
and
consequently
being
in
some
respects
Infallible
,
they
may
boldly
follow
him
,
and
quote
him
as
such
.
But
I
do
not
think
it
worth
my
while
to
answer
such
Persons
,
because
their
Ignorance
is
so
gross
,
that
it
only
deserves
Contempt
.
I
only
desire
them
to
tell
me
,
whether
Aristotle
,
or
any
of
his
Disciples
,
have
ever
deduced
any
Truths
from
the
Principles
of
Natural
Philosophy
which
may
be
called
his
;
or
if
they
,
or
any
of
them
,
have
done
it
themselves
,
let
them
declare
it
,
let
them
explain
it
,
and
let
them
prove
it
;
and
we
do
engage
our selves
,
never
more
to
speak
of
Aristotle
without
an
Elogy
;
we
will
no
longer
say
,
that
his
Principles
are
Useless
,
since
they
have
served
to
prove
one
Truth
;
but
there
is
no
reason
to
expect
it
.
They
were
long
since
challeng'd
to
do
it
,
and
particularly
by
Monsieur
Descartes
in
his
Metaphysical
Meditations
about
Forty
Years
ago
,
even
with
a
Promise
to
demonstrate
the
Falsity
of
that
Pretended
Truth
:
And
there
is
no
great
likelihood
to
believe
,
that
any
body
will
ever
presume
to
do
,
what
Monsieur
Descartes
greatest
Enemies
,
and
the
most
Zealous
Defenders
of
Aristotle's
Philosophy
,
have
not
hitherto
dar'd
to
undertake
.
Therefore
I
hope
I
may
presume
to
say
,
that
it
is
a
strange
Blindness
,
Poorness
of
Mind
,
and
Stupidity
of
Spirit
,
thus
to
submit
to
the
Authority
of
Aristotle
,
of
Plato
,
or
of
any
other
Philosopher
whatever
:
That
People
lose
their
time
in
reading
them
,
when
their
only
Design
is
to
get
their
Opinions
by
Heart
;
and
those
that
teach
them
make
their
Disciples
lose
theirs
likewise
.
Therefore
give
me
leave
to
say
with
St.
Austin
,
[
](A51655-e46380-b)*
*
Quis
tam
Stulte
curiosus
est
qui
filium
suum
mittat
in
Scholam
,
ut
quid
Magister
cogitet
discat
?
Aug.
de
Magistro
.
That
those
are
Foolishly
Curious
,
who
send
their
Sons
to
the
College
,
in
order
to
learn
the
Sentiments
of
their
Master
.
That
Philosophers
cannot
instruct
us
by
their
own
Authority
,
and
if
they
pretend
to
do
it
they
are
Unjust
:
That
it
is
a
kind
of
Folly
and
Impiety
to
Swear
their
Defence
Solemnly
:
And
finally
,
those
Injustly
confine
Truth
,
who
out
of
Interest
oppose
the
new
Opinions
of
Philosophy
which
may
be
True
,
to
preserve
those
which
are
sufficiently
known
to
be
False
or
Useless
.
CHAP.
IV.
A
Continuation
of
the
same
Subject
.
I.
Explanation
of
the
Second
Rule
of
Curiosity
.
II.
Explanation
of
the
Third
.
THE
Second
Rule
that
must
be
observ'd
,
is
,
I.
Second
Rule
of
Curlosity
.
That
Novelty
must
never
serve
as
a
Reason
to
believe
that
things
are
True
.
We
have
already
said
several
times
,
that
Men
must
not
rest
in
Error
,
and
in
the
False
Felicities
they
enjoy
:
That
it
is
necessary
they
should
Search
after
the
Evidence
of
Truth
,
and
the
real
Felicity
they
do
not
possess
;
and
consequently
that
they
should
look
after
such
things
as
are
New
and
Extraordinary
.
But
therefore
it
does
not
follow
that
they
should
always
stick
to
them
,
nor
believe
,
without
reason
,
that
Opinions
are
True
,
because
they
are
New
;
and
that
those
are
real
Felicities
which
they
have
not
as
yet
enjoy'd
.
Novelty
should
only
induce
them
to
examine
new
things
with
care
;
they
must
not
despise
them
,
because
they
do
not
know
them
;
nor
rashly
believe
that
they
contain
what
they
wish
and
hope
for
.
But
this
often
comes
to
pass
:
Men
after
having
examin'd
the
Ancient
and
Common
Opinions
,
have
not
discover'd
the
Light
of
Truth
in
them
:
After
having
had
a
Taste
of
the
usual
Felicities
of
the
World
,
they
have
not
found
that
Solid
Satisfaction
in
them
,
which
should
accompany
the
Possession
of
a
real
Good
:
So
that
their
Desires
and
their
Eagerness
are
not
allay'd
by
the
usual
Opinions
and
common
Felicities
.
For
which
reason
,
when
they
hear
any
thing
that
is
New
and
Extraordinary
,
the
Idea
of
Novelty
puts
them
in
hopes
at
first
,
That
it
is
the
thing
they
are
in
Search
of
.
And
whereas
it
is
Natural
to
Flatter
our selves
,
and
to
believe
that
Things
are
as
we
wish
they
might
be
;
their
Hopes
increase
proportionably
to
their
Desires
:
And
in
fine
,
they
Insensibly
change
into
Imaginary
Assurances
.
In
the
next
place
,
They
joyn
the
Idea
of
Novelty
,
and
the
Idea
of
Truth
,
so
close
together
,
that
the
one
never
offers
it self
without
the
other
;
and
that
which
is
most
New
,
appears
to
them
to
be
more
True
,
and
better
than
that
which
is
more
Usual
and
Common
;
in
which
they
are
very
different
from
those
,
who
out
of
Aversion
to
Heresie
,
have
joyn'd
the
Idea
of
Novelty
to
that
of
Falseness
,
imagining
that
all
New
Opinions
are
False
and
Dangerous
.
Therefore
we
may
say
that
this
usual
Disposition
of
the
Mind
,
and
of
the
Heart
of
Men
,
in
relation
to
that
which
bears
the
Character
of
Novelty
,
is
one
of
the
most
general
Causes
of
Errors
,
for
it
seldom
leads
them
to
Truth
;
whenever
it
does
,
it
is
by
Chance
and
good
Luck
:
And
finally
,
It
always
directs
them
from
their
real
Happiness
,
by
engaging
them
in
that
Multiplicity
of
Divertisements
and
False
Felicities
that
the
World
abounds
with
:
And
this
is
the
most
Dangerous
Error
into
which
they
can
fall
.
The
Third
Rule
against
the
Excessive
Desires
of
Novelty
is
,
II.
Third
Rule
of
Curiosity
.
That
when
we
are
certain
that
some
Truths
are
so
Mysterious
,
that
it
is
Morally
Impossible
to
discover
them
,
and
that
some
Felicities
are
so
Inconsiderable
that
they
can
never
make
us
Happy
,
we
ought
not
to
suffer
our selves
to
be
Excited
by
the
Novelty
of
them
.
Every
body
may
know
by
Faith
,
by
Reason
and
Experience
,
that
created
Goods
can
never
fill
the
Insinite
Capacity
of
the
Will.
Faith
teaches
us
,
That
all
the
Things
of
this
World
are
only
Vanity
;
and
that
our
Happiness
neither
consists
in
Honours
or
Riches
.
Reason
assures
us
,
That
since
it
is
not
in
our
Power
to
bound
our
Desires
,
and
that
we
are
Naturally
inclin'd
to
Love
all
Felicities
,
we
can
never
be
Happy
,
without
Possessing
that
which
Includes
them
all
.
Our
own
Experience
makes
us
Sensible
,
that
we
are
not
Happy
in
the
Possession
of
those
Goods
which
we
do
enjoy
,
since
we
still
wish
for
more
.
Finally
,
We
daily
see
that
the
Great
Felicities
which
the
most
Powerful
Princes
and
Kings
enjoy
on
Earth
,
are
not
capable
to
satisfie
their
Desires
;
that
they
are
even
more
Uneasie
and
more
Unhappy
than
others
;
and
that
being
Seated
on
the
highest
Spoke
of
the
Wheel
of
Fortune
,
they
are
the
more
liable
to
be
precipitated
and
shook
by
its
Motion
,
than
those
that
are
underneath
them
,
or
nearer
to
the
Center
.
For
they
never
fall
but
from
on
high
;
their
Wounds
are
always
great
;
and
all
the
Grandeur
they
are
attended
with
,
and
which
they
annex
to
their
own
Being
,
serves
only
to
Swell
and
Aggrandize
them
,
to
make
them
more
Sensible
of
a
greater
number
of
Wounds
,
and
expose
them
the
more
to
the
Strokes
of
Fortune
.
So
that
Faith
,
Reason
and
Experience
,
convincing
us
that
the
Delights
and
Pleasures
of
the
Earth
,
which
we
have
not
as
yet
tasted
,
could
not
make
us
Happy
though
we
should
enjoy
them
:
We
must
be
very
careful
,
according
to
that
Third
Rule
,
not
to
suffer
our selves
to
be
Foolishly
Flatter'd
with
vain
Hopes
of
Happiness
,
which
increasing
by
degrees
proportionably
to
our
Passion
and
to
our
Desires
,
would
change
at
last
into
a
False
Assurance
:
For
when
we
have
a
Violent
Passion
for
any
Good
,
we
always
look
upon
it
to
be
very
great
,
and
we
perswade
our selves
Insensibly
,
that
the
Possession
of
it
will
make
us
Happy
.
Therefore
we
must
resist
those
Vain
Desires
,
since
our
Endeavours
to
satisfie
them
would
be
in
vain
.
But
particularly
,
because
that
by
abandoning
our selves
to
our
Passions
,
and
by
employing
our
time
to
gratifie
them
,
we
lose
God
and
all
things
with
him
.
We
only
wander
from
one
False
Felicity
to
another
;
We
always
live
in
False
Hopes
;
We
dissipate
our
Spirits
,
and
are
agitated
a
Thousand
different
ways
;
We
meet
Oppositions
every
where
,
because
the
Advantages
we
seek
for
are
desired
by
many
,
and
cannot
be
possessed
by
many
.
For
as
St.
Paul
teaches
us
,
Chap.
6.
to
Tim.
Those
that
have
a
mind
to
grow
Rich
,
fall
into
Temptations
,
and
into
a
Snare
of
the
Devil
,
and
into
divers
useless
pernicious
Desires
,
which
precipitate
Men
into
the
Abyss
of
Perdition
and
Damnation
;
for
Covetousness
is
the
Root
of
all
Evil.
And
as
we
ought
not
to
seek
after
the
Goods
of
the
World
which
are
new
,
because
we
are
assur'd
that
we
shall
not
find
the
Happiness
we
look
for
;
neither
ought
we
to
have
the
least
Desire
of
knowing
new
Opinions
upon
a
great
number
of
difficult
Questions
,
because
we
are
inform'd
,
that
the
Mind
of
Man
is
not
capable
of
discovering
the
Truth
of
them
.
Most
of
the
Questions
that
are
treated
of
in
Morality
,
and
particularly
in
Natural
Philosophy
,
are
of
that
kind
;
and
therefore
it
behoves
us
to
be
very
diffident
of
many
Books
that
are
daily
written
upon
those
Obscure
Intricate
Matters
.
For
though
absolutely
speaking
the
Questions
they
contain
may
be
resolv'd
,
there
are
still
so
few
Truths
discover'd
,
and
so
many
others
to
know
,
before
we
can
come
to
those
the
said
Books
treat
of
,
that
we
cannot
read
them
without
adventuring
to
lose
considerably
.
Yet
Men
do
not
regulate
themselves
thus
,
they
do
quite
the
contrary
:
They
do
not
examine
whether
what
is
said
to
them
is
possible
:
Do
but
promise
them
extraordinary
Things
,
as
the
Reparation
of
Natural
Heat
,
of
Radical
Moisture
,
of
Vital
Spirits
,
or
other
things
they
do
not
understand
,
and
you
will
straight
excite
their
Vain
Curiosity
.
It
is
sufficient
in
order
to
blind
and
to
gain
them
to
propose
Paradoxes
to
them
;
to
use
obscure
Words
,
Terms
of
Influence
,
and
the
Authority
of
some
unknown
Authors
;
or
else
to
perform
some
very
sensible
and
extraordinary
Experiment
,
although
it
has
no
manner
of
relation
to
the
thing
proposed
,
for
it
is
enough
to
Surprise
them
,
in
order
to
Convince
them
.
If
a
Physician
,
a
Chy●urgion
,
an
Empirick
,
quote
Passages
in
Greek
and
Latin
,
and
make
use
of
new
and
extraordinary
Terms
,
they
pass
immediately
for
great
Men
;
Men
give
them
a
Power
over
Life
and
Death
;
they
are
believ'd
like
Oracles
;
they
fancy
themselves
far
above
the
common
Level
of
Mankind
,
and
think
they
penetrate
into
the
bottom
of
things
.
And
when
some
are
so
Indiscreet
as
to
intimate
,
that
they
are
not
satisfied
with
five
or
six
words
which
really
signifie
and
prove
nothing
;
they
fancy
that
those
People
have
not
commom
Sense
,
and
that
they
deny
first
Principles
.
And
indeed
the
first
Principles
of
those
Men
,
are
four
or
five
Scraps
of
Latin
out
of
some
Author
,
or
some
Greek
Passage
,
if
they
are
better
Scholars
.
Moreover
,
It
is
necessary
that
Learned
Physicians
should
sometimes
speak
a
Language
which
their
Patients
do
not
understand
,
in
order
to
gain
some
Reputation
,
and
to
be
obey'd
.
A
Physician
who
only
understands
Latin
,
may
be
esteem'd
in
a
Village
;
because
Latin
is
both
Greek
and
Arabick
to
Peasants
:
But
unless
a
Physician
can
at
least
read
Greek
,
to
learn
some
of
Hypocrates's
Aphorisms
,
he
must
not
expect
to
pass
for
a
Learned
Man
in
Cities
where
most
People
understand
Latin
.
For
which
reason
even
the
most
Learned
Physicians
knowing
this
Humour
of
Men
,
are
oblig'd
to
speak
like
Quacks
and
Illiterate
Men
;
and
one
must
not
always
judge
of
their
Capacity
and
Sense
,
by
what
they
say
in
their
Visits
.
CHAP.
V.
I.
Of
the
Second
Natural
Inclination
,
or
of
Self-Love
.
II.
It
is
divided
into
the
Love
of
Being
and
of
Well-Being
,
or
of
Greatness
and
Pleasure
.
THe
Second
Inclination
which
the
Author
of
Nature
imprints
continually
in
our
Will
,
I.
Of
the
Second
Natural
Inclination
,
or
of
Self-Love
.
is
the
Love
of
our selves
,
and
of
our
own
Preservation
.
We
have
already
said
,
That
God
loves
all
his
Works
;
and
that
it
is
only
the
Love
he
bears
them
that
preserves
them
;
and
which
Wills
,
That
all
created
Spirits
should
have
the
same
Inclinations
with
him
.
Therefore
it
is
his
Will
,
that
they
should
all
have
a
Natural
Inclination
for
their
Preservation
,
and
that
they
should
Love
themselves
.
Thus
it
is
lawful
and
reasonable
to
Love
our selves
,
since
we
are
Amiable
,
since
God
himself
Loves
us
,
and
since
it
is
his
Pleasure
that
we
should
Love
our selves
:
But
this
is
no
reason
that
we
should
Love
our selves
more
than
God
,
since
God
is
Infinitely
more
Amiable
than
we
are
.
It
is
Unjust
to
place
our
Final
End
in
our selves
,
and
not
to
Love
our selves
in
relation
to
God
;
because
,
as
we
have
no
Goodness
,
nor
any
Subsistance
of
our selves
,
but
only
what
we
participate
of
the
Goodness
and
Being
of
God
,
we
are
not
Amiable
of
our selves
,
but
only
in
relation
to
him
.
Nevertheless
,
The
Inclination
we
should
have
for
God
is
lost
by
Sin
;
and
all
that
remains
of
it
is
an
Infinite
Capacity
in
our
Will
for
all
Felicities
,
or
for
Good
in
General
,
and
a
strong
Inclination
to
possess
them
which
can
never
be
destroy'd
:
But
the
Inclination
we
ought
to
have
for
our
Preservation
or
Self-Love
,
has
increased
it self
to
that
degree
,
that
it
is
at
last
become
absolute
Master
of
the
Will.
It
has
moreover
chang'd
and
transform'd
into
its
own
Nature
the
Love
of
God
,
or
the
Inclination
which
we
have
for
Good
in
General
,
and
the
Love
which
we
ought
to
have
for
other
Men.
For
we
may
say
now
,
That
we
only
Love
our selves
,
since
we
Love
nothing
but
in
relation
to
our selves
;
whereas
we
ought
only
to
Love
God
,
and
all
things
in
relation
to
God
.
If
Faith
and
Reason
teach
us
,
that
God
is
the
only
Sovereign
Good
,
and
that
he
alone
can
make
us
perfectly
Happy
;
we
may
easily
conclude
that
we
must
Love
him
,
and
we
are
easily
enough
inclin'd
to
it
:
But
without
Grace
it
is
still
Self-Love
that
Induces
us
to
Love
him
.
Pure
Charity
is
so
much
above
our
Strength
,
that
we
are
so
far
from
Loving
God
for
himself
,
that
Humane
Reason
cannot
easily
conceive
,
that
we
can
Love
him
otherwise
than
in
relation
to
our selves
,
and
that
we
have
any
other
Final
End
but
our
own
Satisfaction
.
Self-love
then
is
the
absolute
Master
of
our
Will
,
since
the
Disorder
of
Sin
,
and
the
Love
of
God
and
of
our
Neighbour
,
are
now
only
the
Consequences
of
it
;
since
we
no
longer
Love
any
thing
,
but
because
that
in
Loving
it
,
we
expect
some
Advantage
,
or
that
we
actually
receive
some
Pleasure
by
it
.
This
Self-love
may
be
divided
into
two
Kinds
,
II.
Self-love
is
divided
into
the
Love
of
our
Being
and
Well-being
,
or
of
Greatness
and
Pleasure
.
viz.
Into
the
Love
of
Greatness
,
and
into
the
Love
of
Pleasure
;
or
else
into
the
Love
of
our
Being
,
and
of
the
Perfection
of
our
Being
;
and
into
the
Love
of
our
Well-being
,
or
of
Felicity
.
By
the
Love
of
Greatness
we
affect
Power
,
Preferment
,
Independency
,
and
that
our
Being
should
subsist
of
it self
.
We
desire
in
some
respect
to
have
a
Necessary
Being
:
In
one
Sense
we
are
desirous
to
be
like
Gods
;
for
none
but
God
has
properly
a
Being
which
is
necessarily
Existent
;
since
that
whatever
is
Dependent
exists
only
by
the
Will
of
him
on
whom
it
depends
.
Therefore
Men
wishing
the
Necessity
of
their
Being
,
also
desire
a
Power
over
others
.
But
by
the
Love
of
Pleasure
they
desire
not
only
a
Being
,
but
a
Well-being
;
because
Pleasure
is
a
manner
of
Being
,
which
is
best
and
most
Advantageous
to
the
Soul
.
We
must
note
,
that
Greatness
,
Excellence
and
Independence
of
the
Creature
,
are
not
kinds
of
Being
which
make
us
Happy
of
themselves
;
since
it
often
happens
,
that
Men
become
Miserable
in
proportion
to
their
growing
Great
.
But
as
for
Pleasure
,
it
is
a
kind
of
Being
which
we
cannot
receive
actually
,
without
actually
becoming
more
Happy
.
Greatness
and
Independence
for
the
most
part
are
not
in
us
,
and
commonly
they
only
consist
in
the
relation
we
have
to
those
things
which
are
about
us
.
But
Pleasures
are
in
the
very
Soul
,
and
they
are
real
Modes
by
which
it
is
modified
,
and
which
by
their
own
Nature
are
capable
of
satisfying
it
.
Therefore
we
look
upon
Excellence
,
Greatness
and
Independence
,
as
things
that
are
proper
for
the
Preservation
of
our
Being
,
and
even
sometimes
as
very
useful
,
according
to
the
Order
of
Nature
,
for
the
Preservation
of
the
Well-being
:
But
Pleasure
is
always
a
manner
of
Being
of
the
Mind
,
which
by
it self
makes
it
Happy
and
satisfies
it
;
so
that
Pleasure
is
a
Well-being
,
and
the
Love
of
Pleasure
the
Love
of
Well-being
.
Now
the
Love
of
Well-being
is
so
Powerful
,
that
it
sometimes
proves
Stronger
than
the
Love
of
Being
;
and
Self-Love
makes
us
sometimes
desire
not
to
be
,
because
we
have
not
a
Well-being
.
This
is
the
Case
of
all
the
Damned
,
who
according
to
the
Word
of
Jesus
Christ
,
had
better
not
to
be
,
than
to
be
so
Unhappy
as
they
are
;
because
these
Wretches
being
declar'd
Enemies
to
him
in
whom
all
Goodness
Centers
,
and
who
is
the
Sole
Cause
of
Pleasure
and
of
Pain
which
we
are
capable
of
;
it
is
impossible
they
should
enjoy
any
Satisfaction
;
they
are
and
will
be
Eternally
Unhappy
,
because
their
Will
will
ever
remain
in
the
same
Disposition
,
and
in
the
same
Irregularity
.
So
that
Self-Love
includes
two
Loves
,
the
Love
of
Greatness
,
of
Power
,
of
Independence
and
generality
of
all
things
which
seem
to
be
proper
for
the
Preservation
of
our
Being
;
and
the
Love
of
Pleasure
,
and
of
all
things
that
are
necessary
for
our
Well-being
,
that
is
,
To
be
Happy
and
Satisfied
.
Those
two
Loves
may
be
divided
several
ways
:
Whether
because
we
are
composed
of
two
different
parts
of
Soul
and
Body
,
according
to
which
they
may
be
divided
;
or
because
they
may
be
distinguish'd
or
specified
by
the
different
Objects
that
are
useful
for
our
Preservation
.
However
we
will
not
inlarge
upon
that
,
because
,
as
we
do
not
design
to
make
a
Treatise
of
Morality
,
it
is
not
necessary
to
make
an
Inquiry
into
,
and
an
exact
Division
of
all
the
things
we
look
upon
as
our
Felicities
.
It
was
only
necessary
to
make
this
Division
,
to
relate
the
cause
of
our
Errors
in
some
order
.
Therefore
we
shall
first
speak
of
those
Errors
which
are
caused
by
our
Inclination
for
Greatness
,
and
for
all
those
things
that
makes
our
Being
Independant
of
others
:
And
afterwards
we
shall
treat
of
those
which
proceed
from
the
Inclination
we
have
for
Pleasure
,
and
for
all
those
things
which
render
our
Being
the
best
it
can
be
for
us
,
or
that
contents
us
most
.
CHAP.
VI.
I.
Of
the
Inclination
we
have
for
every
thing
that
raises
us
above
other
Persons
.
II.
Of
the
false
Judgments
of
some
Pious
Persons
.
III.
Of
the
false
Judgments
of
the
Superstitious
and
Hypocrites
.
IV.
Of
Voetius
an
Enemy
to
Monsieur
Descartes
.
WHatever
raises
us
above
others
by
making
us
more
Perfect
,
as
Science
and
Virtue
;
I.
Of
the
Inclination
we
have
for
all
that
raises
us
above
other
Persons
.
or
that
gives
us
an
Authority
over
them
by
making
us
more
Powerful
,
as
Dignities
and
Riches
,
seem
in
some
measure
to
make
us
Independent
.
All
those
that
are
beneath
us
,
have
a
Respect
for
us
and
fear
us
;
they
are
always
ready
to
do
what
pleases
us
for
our
Preservation
;
and
they
dare
neither
Prejudice
us
,
nor
oppose
our
Desires
.
Therefore
Men
constantly
endeavour
to
possess
those
Advantages
which
raise
them
above
others
.
For
they
never
consider
that
both
their
Being
and
Well-being
in
Truth
only
depend
on
God
above
,
and
not
on
Men
;
and
that
the
true
Greatness
which
will
make
them
Eternally
Happy
,
does
not
consist
in
that
Rank
which
they
hold
in
the
Imagination
of
other
Men
,
as
Weak
and
as
Miserable
as
themselves
;
but
in
an
humble
Submission
to
the
Will
of
God
,
who
being
Just
,
will
not
fail
to
reward
those
who
remain
within
the
Order
he
hath
prescribed
.
But
Men
do
not
only
desire
Effectively
to
possess
Learning
and
Vertue
,
Dignities
and
Riches
;
they
also
use
their
utmost
Efforts
,
in
order
to
persuade
others
that
they
do
really
possess
them
.
And
if
it
may
be
said
,
that
they
endeavour
less
to
appear
Rich
than
to
be
really
so
;
it
may
also
be
said
,
that
they
often
take
less
care
to
be
Virtuous
,
than
to
appear
so
:
For
as
the
Author
of
the
Book
Entituled
,
Reflectiones
Morales
,
says
agreeably
,
Virtue
would
not
go
far
,
unless
it
were
accompanied
with
Vanity
.
The
Reputation
of
being
Rich
,
Learned
and
Virtuous
,
produces
in
the
Imagination
of
those
that
are
about
us
,
or
that
are
more
nearly
related
to
us
,
very
convenient
Dispositions
for
us
:
It
makes
them
fall
at
our
Feet
;
it
makes
them
act
in
our
Favour
;
it
Inspires
them
with
all
the
Motions
that
tend
to
the
Preservation
of
our
Being
,
and
to
the
Increase
of
our
Grandeur
.
Thus
Men
preserve
their
Reputation
,
as
a
Good
which
is
necessary
for
them
to
Live
with
Ease
in
the
World
.
All
Men
then
have
an
Inclination
for
Virtue
,
Learning
,
Dignities
and
Riches
,
and
for
the
Reputation
of
possessing
those
Advantages
.
We
will
now
endeavour
to
show
by
some
Examples
,
how
those
Inclinations
may
engage
them
into
Error
.
Let
us
begin
by
the
Inclination
that
Men
have
for
Virtue
,
or
for
the
Appearance
of
Virtue
.
Those
who
apply
themselves
Seriously
to
become
Virtuous
,
commonly
imploy
their
Mind
and
Time
to
understand
Religion
,
and
to
exercise
themselves
in
good
Works
:
They
only
desire
with
St.
Paul
,
to
be
acquainted
with
Jesus
Christ
Crucified
,
to
find
out
a
Remedy
for
the
Distemper
and
Corruption
of
their
Nature
.
They
desire
no
other
Knowledge
than
that
which
is
necessary
for
them
to
live
Christianly
,
and
to
know
their
Duty
;
after
which
they
apply
themselves
to
fulfil
them
with
Zeal
and
Exactness
.
And
therefore
they
seldom
trouble
themselves
about
Sciences
,
which
appear
Vain
and
Barren
in
respect
to
their
Salvation
.
No
Fault
can
be
found
with
that
Conduct
,
it
is
Infinitely
to
be
valued
;
II.
Of
the
false
Judgments
of
some
Pious
Persons
.
Men
would
Esteem
themselves
Happy
to
observe
it
exactly
;
and
they
often
repent
their
not
having
followed
it
more
.
But
this
is
unapprovable
,
that
since
it
is
certain
that
there
are
Sciences
absolutely
Humane
,
very
Certain
and
Useful
,
which
disingage
the
Mind
from
Sensible
Things
,
and
use
it
by
degrees
to
relish
the
Truths
of
the
Gospel
;
some
Pious
Persons
,
without
having
examin'd
them
,
condemn
them
too
freely
,
either
as
being
Useless
,
or
Uncertain
.
It
is
true
,
that
most
Sciences
are
very
uncertain
and
very
useless
:
Men
are
partly
in
the
right
,
to
believe
that
they
only
contain
Truths
which
are
of
little
use
.
No
body
is
oblig'd
to
study
them
;
and
it
is
better
to
despise
them
,
than
to
suffer
ones
self
to
be
deceiv'd
or
blinded
by
them
.
Nevertheless
we
may
affirm
,
That
it
is
very
necessary
to
know
some
Metaphysical
Truths
:
The
Universal
Knowledge
,
or
the
Existence
of
a
God
,
is
absolutely
necessary
,
since
even
the
Certainty
of
Faith
depends
on
the
Knowledge
which
Reason
gives
of
the
Existence
of
a
God
.
It
is
necessary
to
know
,
that
it
is
his
Will
which
makes
,
and
which
regulates
Nature
;
That
the
Force
or
Power
of
Natural
Causes
is
only
his
Will
:
In
a
word
,
That
all
things
whatever
depend
on
God
.
It
is
also
necessary
to
know
what
Truth
is
,
the
means
to
distinguish
it
from
Error
,
the
Distinction
between
the
Mind
and
Body
,
the
Consequences
that
may
be
drawn
from
it
,
as
the
Immortality
of
the
Soul
,
and
several
other
things
of
that
kind
which
may
be
known
with
certainty
.
The
Knowledge
of
Man
,
or
of
ones
self
,
is
a
Science
that
cannot
be
reasonably
despis'd
;
it
contains
a
World
of
things
which
are
absolutely
necessary
to
be
known
to
have
some
Justness
and
Penetration
of
Mind
:
And
we
may
say
,
That
if
a
Stupid
Ignorant
Man
is
Infinitely
above
Matter
,
because
he
knows
that
he
is
,
which
Matter
does
not
know
;
those
who
know
Man
,
are
far
above
Stupid
Ignorant
Persons
,
by
reason
that
they
know
what
they
are
,
which
the
others
do
not
know
.
But
the
Knowledge
of
Man
is
not
only
Valuable
,
because
it
raises
us
above
others
;
it
is
much
more
so
,
because
it
humbles
us
before
God
.
That
Knowledge
makes
us
perfectly
Sensible
of
the
Dependence
we
have
on
him
in
all
things
,
and
even
in
our
most
common
Actions
:
It
plainly
discovers
the
Corruption
of
our
Nature
:
It
disposes
us
to
apply
our selves
to
him
who
alone
can
cure
us
;
to
rely
wholly
on
him
,
and
not
to
trust
or
rely
on
our selves
:
And
thus
it
gives
many
Dispositions
of
Mind
,
which
are
very
proper
to
submit
our selves
to
the
Grace
of
the
Gospel
.
We
ought
at
least
to
have
a
Superficial
Tincture
,
and
a
general
Knowledge
of
the
Mathematicks
and
of
Nature
.
We
ought
to
learn
those
Sciences
in
our
Youth
;
they
disingage
the
Mind
from
Sensible
Things
,
and
hinder
it
from
becoming
Weak
and
Effeminate
:
They
are
useful
enough
in
Life
;
they
incline
us
towards
God
;
the
Knowledge
of
Nature
does
it
of
it self
;
and
that
of
the
Mathematicks
by
the
Disgust
it
Inspires
in
us
of
the
False
Impressions
of
our
Senses
.
Virtuous
Persons
must
not
despise
those
Sciences
,
nor
look
upon
them
as
Uncertain
and
Useless
,
unless
they
are
certain
that
they
have
studied
them
enough
to
judge
Solidly
of
them
:
There
are
many
others
which
they
may
boldly
Despise
;
Let
them
Condemn
the
Poets
to
the
Flames
,
Heathen
Philosophers
,
Rabbies
,
some
Historians
,
and
a
great
Number
of
Authors
,
which
make
the
Pride
and
Knowledge
of
some
of
the
Learned
;
we
shall
be
little
troubled
at
it
.
But
let
them
not
Condemn
the
Knowledge
of
Nature
,
as
being
contrary
to
Religion
;
since
Nature
being
regulated
by
the
Will
of
God
,
the
true
Knowledge
of
Nature
teaches
us
how
to
admire
the
Power
,
Grandeur
and
Wisdom
of
God
.
For
it
seems
that
God
has
form'd
the
Universe
in
order
,
that
we
should
Study
it
,
and
that
by
that
Study
we
should
learn
to
Know
and
to
Respect
the
Author
of
it
.
So
that
those
who
Condemn
the
Study
of
Nature
,
seem
to
oppose
the
Will
of
God
;
unless
they
pretend
that
Sin
has
rendred
Man
Incapable
of
that
Study
.
It
is
also
Vain
for
them
to
tell
us
,
That
the
Knowledge
of
Men
only
serves
to
make
them
Proud
and
Vain
,
because
those
who
have
the
Reputation
of
having
a
perfect
Knowledge
of
Man
,
though
they
often
know
him
Ill
,
are
commonly
Intolerably
Proud
:
For
it
is
evident
,
That
no
Man
can
know
himself
well
,
without
being
Sensible
of
his
Weakness
and
Miseries
.
Neither
are
they
Persons
of
a
real
and
solid
Piety
,
that
usually
condemn
what
they
do
not
understand
;
III.
Of
the
false
Judgments
of
the
Superstitious
and
Hypocrites
.
but
rather
Superstitious
and
Hypocrites
.
The
Superstitious
out
of
a
servile
Fear
,
and
through
a
baseness
and
weakness
of
Mind
are
startled
at
the
sight
of
a
lively
penetrating
Wit.
Do
but
,
for
Example
,
give
them
Natural
Reasons
for
Thunder
,
and
for
its
Effects
,
and
they
look
upon
you
strait
as
an
Atheist
.
But
the
Hypocrites
out
of
a
Hellish
Malice
,
transform
themselves
into
Angels
of
Light
.
They
make
use
of
the
appearances
of
holy
Truths
which
are
reverenc'd
by
all
the
World
to
oppose
Truths
,
which
are
but
little
known
,
and
little
valu'd
,
out
of
private
Interest
.
They
Combat
Truth
with
the
Image
of
Truth
;
and
often
in
their
Hearts
,
Laugh
at
what
all
the
World
Respects
;
they
establish
in
the
Opinion
of
Men
,
a
Reputation
,
which
is
so
much
the
more
solid
and
to
be
fear'd
,
as
the
thing
they
abuse
is
the
more
Sacred
.
Therefore
those
Persons
are
the
strongest
,
and
most
formidable
Enemies
of
Truth
.
Indeed
,
they
are
pretty
rare
,
but
a
small
number
of
them
is
capable
of
doing
a
great
deal
of
harm
.
The
appearance
of
Truth
and
of
Virtue
,
often
does
more
mischief
,
than
Truth
and
Virtue
do
good
;
for
one
cunning
Hypocrite
is
capable
to
overthrow
what
several
truly
Wise
and
Virtuous
Persons
have
rais'd
with
a
great
deal
of
Pain
and
Labour
.
Monsieur
Descartes
,
for
instance
,
has
demonstratively
prov'd
the
Existence
of
a
God
,
the
Immortality
of
our
Souls
,
several
other
Metaphysical
Questions
,
a
great
number
of
Physical
Ones
;
and
this
Age
is
infinitely
oblig'd
to
him
for
the
Truths
he
has
discover'd
.
Yet
here
starts
up
an
[
](A51655-e47430-b)*
*
Voetius
.
inconsiderable
Man
,
a
hot
and
vehement
Exclaimer
,
respected
by
some
People
for
the
Zeal
he
expresses
for
their
Religion
:
He
Writes
Injurious
Books
against
him
,
and
accuses
him
of
the
highest
Crimes
.
Descartes
is
a
Catholick
,
he
has
studied
under
the
Jesuits
;
he
has
often
mention'd
them
with
Reverence
.
That
is
sufficient
for
that
malicious
Man
to
perswade
People
that
are
Enemies
to
our
Religion
,
and
easily
mov'd
in
matters
so
Nice
as
those
of
Religion
,
that
he
is
an
Emissary
of
the
Jesuits
,
and
has
dangerous
Designs
:
Because
the
least
appearances
of
Truth
upon
matters
of
Faith
,
have
more
Force
upon
Peoples
Minds
,
than
real
and
effective
Truths
of
Physical
or
Meraphysical
things
have
,
which
are
little
valu'd
.
Monsieur
Descartes
has
written
about
the
Existence
of
God
.
That
is
matter
enough
for
that
Calumniator
to
exercise
his
false
Zeal
upon
,
and
to
oppose
all
the
Truths
his
Enemy
defends
.
He
accuses
him
of
being
an
Atheist
,
and
of
teaching
Atheism
cunningly
and
secretly
,
like
that
infamous
Atheist
call'd
Vanino
,
who
was
Burnt
at
Thoulouse
;
who
Cloak'd
his
Malice
and
Impiety
by
Writing
for
the
Existence
of
a
God
;
for
one
of
the
Reasons
urg'd
by
him
to
prove
his
Enemy
an
Atheist
,
is
,
That
he
did
Write
against
Atheists
,
as
Vanino
did
,
in
order
to
cover
his
Impiety
.
Thus
it
is
easie
for
a
Man
to
oppress
Truth
,
when
he
is
seconded
by
the
appearances
of
Truth
,
and
has
acquir'd
a
great
Ascendent
over
weak
Minds
.
Truth
delights
in
Mildness
,
and
in
Peace
;
and
as
strong
as
it
is
,
it
yields
sometimes
to
the
Pride
and
Haughtiness
of
Falshoods
,
which
Dresses
and
Arms
it self
with
her
Appearances
.
Truth
is
very
sensible
that
Error
can
never
harm
it
;
and
if
it
remains
sometimes
as
if
it
were
prescrib'd
and
in
Obscurity
,
it
is
only
to
wait
for
more
favourable
occasions
to
show
its
self
;
for
at
last
it
appears
,
for
the
most
part
,
stronger
and
brighter
than
ever
,
in
the
very
place
where
it
is
oppress'd
.
I
do
not
wonder
that
an
Enemy
of
Monsieur
Descartes
,
that
a
Man
of
a
different
Religion
from
his
,
that
an
Ambitious
Man
,
who
design'd
to
rise
upon
the
Ruins
of
Persons
that
are
above
him
,
that
a
Railer
without
Judgment
,
that
Voetius
should
speak
with
Contempt
of
what
he
neither
did
,
nor
could
understand
.
But
I
am
surpris'd
to
find
,
that
Persons
who
are
neither
Enemies
to
Monsieur
Descartes
,
nor
to
his
Religion
,
should
entertain
Sentiments
of
Aversion
and
Contempt
against
him
,
upon
the
account
of
the
Calumnies
they
have
read
in
Books
written
by
the
Enemies
of
his
Person
,
and
of
his
Religion
.
The
Book
written
by
that
Heretick
intitled
,
Desperata
causa
Papatus
,
sufficiently
shews
his
Impudence
,
his
Ignorance
,
and
his
Passion
,
and
his
desire
to
appear
Zealous
,
in
order
thereby
to
acquire
some
Reputation
among
those
of
his
Party
.
Therefore
he
is
not
a
Man
to
be
credited
upon
his
Word
.
For
as
there
is
no
reason
to
believe
all
the
Fables
he
has
Collected
in
that
Book
against
our
Religion
,
so
neither
is
there
any
to
Credit
the
Injurious
Accusations
he
has
invented
against
his
Enemy
.
Rational
Men
will
not
suffer
themselves
to
be
perswaded
,
that
Monsieur
Descartes
is
a
dangerous
Man
,
because
they
have
read
〈◊〉
in
some
Book
or
other
,
or
because
they
have
been
〈◊〉
so
by
Persons
,
whose
Piety
they
have
a
Respect
for
.
It
is
not
lawful
to
believe
Men
upon
their
b●re
Word
,
when
they
accuse
others
of
the
most
Enormous
Crimes
.
It
is
not
a
sufficient
proof
to
believe
a
thing
,
because
we
hear
it
affirm'd
by
a
Man
who
speaks
with
Zeal
and
Gravity
.
For
it
is
impossible
for
any
Person
to
relate
Falsities
,
and
Foolish
Stories
,
in
the
same
manner
as
he
would
relate
good
things
,
particularly
if
he
has
suffer'd
himself
to
be
impos'd
upon
out
of
Simplicity
and
Weakness
.
It
is
easie
to
discover
the
Truth
or
Falsity
of
the
Accusations
that
are
form'd
against
Descartes
;
his
Writings
are
Extant
,
and
easie
to
be
understood
,
by
those
that
are
capable
of
Attention
.
Therefore
I
would
advise
People
to
Read
his
Works
,
in
order
to
get
better
Proofs
against
him
than
bare
Report
,
and
I
do
not
question
but
after
they
have
read
and
examin'd
them
,
they
will
no
longer
Accuse
him
of
Atheism
;
and
that
on
the
contrary
,
they
will
pay
him
the
Respect
that
is
due
to
a
Man
,
who
has
plainly
and
evidently
demonstrated
,
not
only
the
Existence
of
a
God
,
and
the
Immortality
of
the
Soul
,
but
also
a
World
of
other
Truths
,
which
were
unknown
until
his
time
.
CHAP.
VII
.
Of
the
desire
of
Science
,
and
of
the
Judgments
of
pretenders
to
Learning
.
THe
Mind
of
Man
has
without
doubt
,
very
little
Capacity
and
Extent
,
and
yet
he
desires
to
know
every
thing
.
All
Human
Sciences
cannot
satifie
his
Desires
;
and
yet
his
Capacity
is
so
confin'd
,
that
he
cannot
perfectly
apprehend
any
one
particular
Science
.
He
is
in
a
continual
Agitation
,
and
desires
always
to
know
;
whether
he
be
in
hopes
of
finding
what
he
looks
for
,
as
we
have
said
in
the
preceding
Chapter
,
or
whether
he
perswades
himself
that
his
Soul
and
Mind
are
extended
by
the
vain
possession
of
some
extraordinary
Knowledge
.
The
unruly
desire
of
Happiness
and
Grandeur
,
makes
him
study
all
manner
of
Sciences
,
hoping
to
find
his
Felicity
in
the
Science
of
Morality
;
and
looking
for
this
false
Greatness
in
speculative
Sciences
.
What
is
the
reason
that
some
Persons
spend
all
their
Life
in
reading
of
Rabbi's
,
and
other
Books
Written
in
Foreign
,
Obscure
,
and
Corrupted
Languages
;
and
by
Authors
without
Judgment
and
Knowledge
:
But
that
they
perswade
themselves
,
that
when
they
are
skill'd
in
the
Oriental
Languages
,
they
are
greater
and
higher
than
those
who
are
Ignorant
of
them
?
And
what
is
it
that
can
encourage
them
in
their
ingrateful
,
painful
,
useless
Labour
,
unless
it
be
the
Hope
of
some
Preferment
,
and
the
Prospect
of
some
new
Grandeur
?
Indeed
they
are
look'd
upon
as
extraordinary
Men
;
they
are
Complimented
upon
their
profound
Learning
;
People
are
better
pleas'd
to
hear
them
than
others
:
And
though
it
may
be
said
,
that
they
are
commonly
the
least
Judicious
,
if
it
were
only
for
employing
all
their
Life
in
a
very
useless
Study
,
which
can
neither
make
them
Wiser
nor
Happier
:
Nevertheless
,
most
People
fancy
that
they
have
a
great
deal
more
Sense
and
Judgment
than
others
:
And
as
they
are
more
Larn'd
in
the
Etymology
of
Words
,
they
also
fancy
that
they
are
Learn'd
in
the
Nature
of
Things
.
The
same
reason
induces
Astronomers
to
spend
all
their
Time
and
Estate
to
get
an
exact
Knowledge
of
Things
;
which
are
not
only
useless
,
but
also
impossible
to
know
.
They
endeavour
to
find
an
exact
Regularity
in
the
Course
of
the
Planets
,
which
is
not
in
Nature
;
and
to
Form
Astronomical
Schemes
to
foretel
Effects
,
of
which
they
do
not
know
the
Causes
.
They
have
made
the
Selenography
,
or
Geography
of
the
Moon
,
as
if
People
design'd
to
Travel
thither
:
They
have
already
divided
it
among
those
that
are
Famous
in
Astronomy
:
There
are
few
of
them
that
have
not
already
some
Province
or
other
in
that
Country
,
as
a
Recompence
for
their
great
Labour
;
and
I
question
whether
they
are
not
Proud
of
having
been
in
Favour
with
him
that
has
so
magnificently
distributed
those
Kingdoms
among
them
.
What
is
the
reason
that
Rational
Men
apply
themselves
so
much
to
this
Science
,
and
yet
remain
in
gross
Errors
,
in
respect
to
Truths
which
they
ought
to
know
,
unless
they
Fancy
,
that
it
is
a
great
thing
to
know
what
passes
in
the
Heavens
?
The
knowledge
of
the
Vast
Things
that
passes
above
,
seems
to
them
more
Noble
,
Greater
,
and
more
worthy
of
their
great
Wit
,
than
the
knowledge
of
Vile
Abjects
,
Corruptible
Things
,
as
Sublunary
Bodies
are
in
their
Opinion
.
The
Nobleness
of
a
Science
is
deriv'd
from
the
Nobleness
of
its
Objects
:
It
is
a
great
Principle
!
Therefore
the
knowledge
of
the
Motion
of
unalterable
and
incorruptible
Bodies
,
is
the
highest
and
most
sublime
of
all
Sciences
.
And
for
that
reason
,
it
appears
to
them
worthy
of
the
Greatness
and
Excellency
of
their
Mind
.
Thus
Men
suffer
themselves
to
be
blinded
by
a
false
Idea
of
Grandeur
,
which
pleases
and
moves
them
.
As
soon
as
their
Imagination
is
struck
by
it
,
they
fall
down
before
that
Phantasm
,
they
Reverence
it
;
it
destroys
and
blinds
their
Reason
,
which
should
be
the
Judge
of
it
.
Men
seem
to
Dream
when
they
Judge
of
the
Objects
of
their
Passions
,
to
have
no
Eyes
,
and
to
want
Common
Sense
.
For
in
fine
,
where
lies
the
Excellency
of
the
knowledge
of
the
Motions
of
the
Planets
;
and
have
we
not
a
sufficient
knowledge
of
it
already
,
since
we
know
how
to
regulate
our
Months
and
our
Years
?
What
does
it
concern
us
to
know
,
whether
Saturn
is
surrounded
by
a
Ring
,
or
by
a
great
number
of
little
Moons
;
and
why
should
we
Dispute
about
it
?
Why
should
any
one
be
proud
of
having
foretold
the
greatness
of
an
Eclipse
;
which
perhaps
he
has
hit
better
upon
than
another
,
because
he
has
had
more
Luck
?
There
are
persons
appointed
by
the
King's
Order
to
observe
the
Stars
,
let
us
rely
upon
their
Observations
.
They
may
reasonably
apply
themselves
to
it
;
for
they
do
it
out
of
Duty
:
It
is
their
business
.
They
do
it
with
Success
;
for
they
employ
all
their
Time
about
it
with
Art
,
Application
,
and
all
the
Exactness
imaginable
:
They
want
nothing
in
order
to
succeed
in
it
.
Therefore
we
ought
to
be
fully
satisfy'd
upon
a
matter
which
concerns
us
so
little
,
when
they
impart
their
Discoveries
to
us
.
Anatomy
is
a
very
good
Study
,
since
it
is
a
thing
of
great
use
,
and
since
we
ought
to
delight
in
the
Knowledge
of
things
that
〈◊〉
necessary
.
We
may
and
ought
to
apply
our
selve
to
whatever
may
contribute
any
thing
towards
our
Happiness
,
or
rather
to
Ease
our
Infirmities
●nd
Miseries
.
But
to
pass
whole
Nights
in
peeping
through
a
Telescope
to
discover
some
Spot
,
or
some
new
Planet
in
the
Heavens
,
to
the
prejudice
of
our
Health
,
to
the
impairing
our
Estate
,
to
the
neglecting
the
Care
of
our
Affairs
,
only
to
Visit
the
Stars
Regularly
,
and
to
measure
their
Size
and
Situation
;
is
in
my
Opinion
,
absolutely
to
forget
what
we
are
at
present
,
and
what
we
shall
be
hereafter
.
Let
no
Body
urge
,
that
it
is
in
order
to
discover
the
Greatness
of
him
that
has
form'd
all
these
great
Objects
.
The
least
Fly
discovers
more
the
Power
and
Wisdom
of
God
to
those
that
consider
it
with
Attention
,
and
without
being
prejudic'd
by
its
smallness
,
than
all
what
the
Astronomers
know
of
the
Heavens
.
Nevertheless
,
Men
are
not
made
to
consider
Flies
,
neither
do
I
approve
the
Pains
some
People
have
taken
to
instruct
us
how
Lice
,
and
all
kinds
of
Animals
are
Form'd
;
and
how
the
Transformations
of
different
Worms
into
Flies
,
and
Butterflies
,
are
effected
.
It
is
lawful
for
Men
to
amuse
themselves
about
these
things
,
when
they
have
nothing
else
to
do
,
to
divert
themselves
:
But
Men
ought
not
to
employ
all
their
time
about
it
,
unless
they
are
insensible
of
their
Miseries
.
They
ought
continually
to
apply
themselves
to
the
knowledge
of
God
and
of
themselves
;
to
labour
Seriously
to
overcome
their
Errors
and
Prejudices
,
their
Passions
and
Inclinations
for
Sin
;
earnestly
to
search
after
the
Truths
that
are
most
necessary
for
them
to
know
.
For
those
are
the
most
Judicious
,
that
take
most
Care
to
discover
the
most
solid
Truths
.
The
main
Cause
which
engages
Men
in
false
Studies
,
is
,
that
they
have
fix'd
the
Idea
of
Learning
to
a
Vain
,
Useless
Knowledge
,
instead
of
fixing
it
to
solid
and
necessary
Sciences
.
For
when
a
Man
resolves
upon
Learning
,
and
when
the
Spirit
of
Polymathy
begins
to
move
him
;
he
seldom
examins
what
Sciences
are
most
necessary
for
him
,
either
to
behave
himself
like
an
Honest
Man
,
or
to
improve
his
Reason
:
He
only
looks
upon
those
that
pass
for
Learned
Men
in
the
World
,
and
examins
what
renders
them
considerable
.
All
the
most
solid
and
necessary
Sciences
being
pretty
Common
,
the
Persons
that
possess
them
,
are
neither
admired
nor
respected
for
them
;
for
Common
things
are
look'd
upon
without
Attention
or
Emotion
,
though
never
so
excellent
and
admirable
in
themselves
.
So
that
those
who
aim
at
Learning
,
seldom
fix
on
those
Sciences
that
are
necessary
for
the
Conduct
of
this
Life
,
and
for
the
Perfection
of
the
Mind
.
Those
Sciences
do
not
Excite
in
them
that
Idea
of
Sciences
which
they
have
Form'd
to
themselves
;
for
those
are
not
the
Sciences
they
have
admir'd
in
others
,
and
which
they
desire
others
should
admire
in
them
.
The
Gospel
and
Morality
,
are
Sciences
that
are
too
Common
,
and
too
Ordinary
;
they
desire
to
learn
the
Criticisms
of
some
Terms
that
are
met
with
in
Ancient
Philosophers
,
or
in
Grecian
Poets
.
Languages
,
and
particularly
those
that
are
not
in
use
in
their
Country
,
as
Arabick
,
and
that
of
the
Rabbies
,
or
the
like
,
appear
to
them
most
worthy
of
their
Application
,
and
of
their
Study
.
If
they
read
the
Bible
,
it
is
not
to
learn
Religion
or
Piety
:
Points
of
Chronology
,
of
Geography
,
and
the
difficulties
of
Grammar
,
take
up
all
their
Minds
:
They
desire
the
knowledge
of
those
things
with
more
Zeal
,
than
the
wholsome
Truths
of
the
Gospel
:
They
are
desirous
to
possess
that
Science
themselves
which
they
have
foolishly
admir'd
in
others
,
and
which
Fools
will
not
fail
to
admire
in
them
.
The
same
appears
in
things
that
relate
to
the
Knowledge
of
Nature
,
they
seldom
Study
that
which
is
most
useful
in
it
,
but
that
which
is
least
Common
,
Anatomy
is
too
mean
for
them
,
but
Astronomy
is
a
more
exalted
Study
.
Common
Experiments
are
not
worthy
their
Application
;
but
those
extraordinary
and
surprising
Experiments
,
which
can
never
Improve
us
,
are
what
they
most
carefully
observe
.
The
most
Obscure
and
Ancient
Histories
are
those
they
are
Proud
to
be
acquainted
with
.
They
are
Ignorant
of
the
Genealogy
of
the
Princes
that
Reign
at
this
time
;
and
they
make
it
their
business
to
study
the
Descent
of
those
that
have
been
Dead
Four
Thousand
Years
ago
.
They
neglect
the
most
Noted
Histories
of
their
time
,
and
apply
themselves
carefully
to
the
Study
of
the
Fables
and
Fictions
of
the
Poets
.
They
hardly
hnow
their
own
Relations
;
but
if
you
please
,
they
will
quote
you
many
Authorities
to
prove
,
that
a
Roman
Citizen
was
Related
to
an
Emperor
,
and
other
like
things
.
They
hardly
know
the
Names
of
the
Dresses
that
are
worn
in
their
days
,
and
yet
lose
their
time
in
studying
those
of
the
Greeks
and
Romans
.
The
Animals
of
their
own
Country
are
little
known
by
them
,
and
yet
they
will
lavishly
employ
whole
Years
in
the
Composure
of
large
Volumes
,
about
the
Animals
mention'd
in
the
Bible
;
to
seem
to
have
guess'd
better
than
others
what
unknown
Terms
signisie
.
Such
a
Book
is
the
delight
of
its
Author
,
and
of
the
Learned
that
Read
it
;
for
being
full
of
Greek
,
Hebrew
,
and
Arabick
Passages
.
&c.
of
Quotations
of
Rabbi's
,
and
other
obscure
and
extraordinary
Authors
,
it
satissies
the
Vanity
of
the
Author
,
and
the
Foolish
Curiosity
of
the
Readers
;
who
will
think
themselves
more
Learned
than
others
,
when
they
can
proudly
affirm
,
that
there
are
Six
different
Words
in
Scripture
which
signifie
a
Lion
,
or
the
like
.
They
are
often
Ignorant
of
the
Map
of
their
own
Country
,
or
of
the
City
where
they
are
Born
,
while
they
study
the
Map
of
Ancient
Greece
,
of
Italy
,
of
the
Gauls
in
Julius
Caesar's
Time
,
or
the
Streets
and
publick
Places
of
Ancient
Rome
.
Labor
Stultorum
,
says
the
Wise
Man
,
affliget
eos
,
qui
nesciunt
in
urbem
pergere
.
They
do
not
know
the
Way
to
their
own
Town
,
and
they
Fatigue
themselves
Foolishly
in
useless
Discoveries
.
They
neither
know
the
Laws
,
nor
Customs
of
the
Places
where
they
Live
;
but
they
carefully
Study
Ancient
Rights
,
the
Laws
of
the
Twelve
Tables
,
the
Customs
of
the
Lacedemonians
,
or
of
the
Chinese
,
or
the
Ordinances
of
the
Great
Mogol
.
Finally
,
they
are
desirous
to
know
all
Extraordinary
distant
things
,
which
others
do
not
know
,
because
they
have
Foolishly
fix'd
the
Idea
of
Learning
on
those
things
;
and
that
it
is
sufficient
to
be
thought
Learned
,
only
to
know
what
others
are
Ignorant
of
,
though
at
the
same
time
they
are
Ignorant
of
the
most
necessary
and
most
excellent
Truths
.
The
Truth
is
,
that
the
Knowledge
of
all
those
things
,
and
the
like
,
is
call'd
Science
,
Learning
and
Doctrin
;
Use
will
have
it
so
:
But
there
is
a
Science
which
is
only
Folly
and
Vanity
according
to
Scripture
;
Doctrina
Stultorum
fatuitas
.
I
have
not
hitherto
observ'd
,
that
the
Holy
Ghost
,
which
gives
so
many
Elogies
to
Science
in
holy
Writ
,
says
any
thing
to
the
advantage
of
that
false
Science
,
which
I
have
now
mention'd
.
CHAP.
VIII
.
I.
Of
the
Desire
of
being
thought
Learned
.
II.
Of
the
Conversation
of
Pretenders
to
Learning
.
III.
Of
their
Works
.
IF
the
irregular
Desire
of
becoming
Learned
,
I.
Of
the
Desire
of
being
thought
Learned
.
often
renders
Men
more
Ignorant
,
then
the
Desire
of
being
thought
Learned
does
not
only
increase
their
Ignorance
,
but
it
seems
to
turn
their
Brains
:
Many
Men
stray
from
Common
Sense
,
by
endeavouring
to
surpass
it
,
and
talk
at
random
,
being
only
delighted
with
Paradoxes
.
They
keep
at
such
a
distance
from
Common
Thoughts
,
in
order
to
be
thought
extraordinary
Persons
,
that
they
really
succeed
in
it
,
and
that
no
Body
looks
upon
them
without
Admiration
,
or
without
Contempt
.
They
are
look'd
upon
sometimes
with
Admiration
;
when
being
preferr'd
to
some
Dignity
which
conceals
their
Ignorance
,
they
are
thought
to
be
as
much
above
others
by
their
Genius
and
Learning
,
as
they
are
by
their
Rank
,
or
by
their
Birth
.
But
for
the
most
part
they
are
look'd
upon
with
Contempt
,
and
sometimes
as
Mad
Men
,
when
they
are
more
strictly
examin'd
,
and
that
their
Greatness
does
not
conceal
them
from
the
Eyes
of
others
.
The
pretenders
to
Learning
evidently
discover
what
they
are
in
the
Books
they
Write
,
and
in
their
usual
Conversations
.
Perhaps
it
will
be
proper
to
say
something
about
it
.
As
it
is
only
Vanity
,
II.
Of
the
Conversations
of
pretenders
to
Learning
and
the
desire
of
appearing
more
than
others
,
which
ingages
them
to
Study
,
as
soon
as
they
are
ingag'd
in
Conversation
,
the
Passion
and
Desire
of
Greatness
awakens
them
anew
,
and
Transports
them
.
They
take
their
Flight
so
high
of
a
sudden
,
that
we
lose
sight
of
them
;
and
very
often
they
know
not
where
they
are
themselves
.
They
are
so
much
afraid
of
not
being
above
those
that
hear
them
,
that
they
are
offended
if
they
think
they
follow
others
.
They
are
startled
as
soon
as
any
body
desires
the
least
Explanation
,
and
fly
into
a
Passion
upon
the
least
Opposition
.
In
fine
,
They
say
things
that
are
so
New
,
and
so
Extraordinary
,
but
so
far
from
common
Sense
,
that
the
most
Prudent
have
much
ado
to
forbear
Laughing
,
while
the
rest
are
Amaz'd
.
Their
first
Heat
being
over
,
if
any
Man
that
has
so
much
Constancy
and
Firmness
of
Mind
,
as
not
to
have
been
confounded
by
them
,
shows
them
that
they
are
mistaken
;
they
nevertheless
persist
obstinately
in
their
Errors
.
The
Air
of
those
they
have
Confounded
Confounds
them
:
The
Sight
of
so
many
Approvers
,
whom
they
have
convinc'd
by
Impression
,
Convinces
them
by
a
rebound
:
Or
if
that
Sight
does
not
Convince
them
,
yet
it
Influences
them
to
that
degree
,
that
they
still
maintain
their
False
Sentiments
.
Vanity
does
not
allow
them
to
Retract
.
They
always
seek
out
some
Reason
to
defend
themselves
:
Moreover
,
they
never
speak
with
so
much
Heat
and
Eagerness
,
as
when
they
have
nothing
to
say
:
They
imagine
that
People
design
to
Affront
them
,
and
to
make
them
Despicable
,
whenever
they
urge
any
Reasons
against
them
;
and
the
more
Convincing
and
Judicious
they
are
,
the
more
they
Exasperate
their
Pride
and
Aversion
.
The
best
way
to
Vindicate
Truth
against
them
,
is
not
to
Dispute
;
since
it
is
better
both
for
them
and
for
us
,
to
leave
them
in
their
Errors
,
than
to
gain
their
Aversion
.
We
must
not
wound
their
Heart
in
order
to
cure
their
Mind
,
since
the
Wounds
of
the
Heart
are
more
Dangerous
than
those
of
the
Mind
:
Besides
,
It
happens
sometimes
,
that
we
have
to
do
with
Men
of
true
Learning
,
which
we
might
despise
for
want
of
conceiving
their
Thoughts
.
Therefore
the
best
way
is
,
to
desire
those
who
speak
in
a
decisive
manner
,
to
Explain
themselves
as
distinctly
as
they
can
,
without
allowing
them
to
change
the
Subject
,
or
to
use
obscure
equivocal
Terms
;
and
if
they
are
Persons
of
Sence
and
Learning
something
will
be
learn'd
by
them
;
but
if
they
are
only
Pretenders
to
Learning
,
they
will
soon
Confound
themselves
by
their
own
Words
,
and
have
no
reason
to
blame
any
body
besides
themselves
.
Perhaps
it
may
instruct
us
in
some
Respects
,
and
may
also
serve
to
divert
us
,
if
we
may
be
allow'd
to
divert
our selves
with
the
Weakness
of
others
,
when
we
endeavour
to
remedy
it
.
But
that
which
is
most
considerable
,
is
,
That
thereby
we
may
hinder
the
Weak
who
hearken'd
to
them
with
Admiration
,
from
submitting
to
Error
in
following
their
Decisions
.
For
it
is
observable
,
That
the
Number
of
Fools
,
or
of
those
that
suffer
themselves
to
be
guided
like
Machines
,
and
by
the
Impression
of
the
Senses
,
being
Infinitely
greater
than
that
of
those
who
have
an
Intelligible
Mind
,
and
who
are
perswaded
by
Reason
:
When
one
of
those
Learned
Men
speaks
of
and
decides
any
thing
,
there
are
always
a
greater
Number
of
those
that
Believe
him
upon
his
Word
,
than
of
those
that
Suspect
him
.
But
whereas
those
Pretenders
to
Learning
,
remove
themselves
as
far
as
they
can
from
common
Thoughts
,
both
out
of
a
Desire
to
meet
some
Opposers
to
Impose
upon
,
in
order
to
be
cry'd
up
and
to
appear
Learned
,
and
out
of
a
Spirit
of
Contradiction
;
their
Decisions
are
commonly
False
and
Obscure
,
and
it
is
difficult
to
hearken
to
them
without
falling
into
some
Error
.
Now
this
Method
of
discovering
the
Errors
of
others
,
or
the
Solidity
of
their
Sentiments
,
is
pretty
Difficult
to
be
put
in
Practice
:
The
Reason
of
it
is
this
,
That
Pretenders
to
Learning
are
not
the
only
Persons
who
would
seem
to
be
Ignorant
of
nothing
,
most
Men
have
that
Defect
,
particularly
those
that
have
some
Reading
,
and
that
have
Studied
,
which
is
the
reason
that
they
will
always
speak
and
explain
their
Sentiments
,
without
giving
a
sufficient
Attention
to
others
.
The
most
Complaisant
and
most
Reasonable
among
them
,
despising
the
Sentiments
of
others
in
their
Hearts
,
only
seem
to
be
Attentive
,
while
People
may
easily
discern
in
their
Eyes
,
that
they
do
not
observe
what
is
said
,
and
that
their
Mind
is
wholly
taken
up
with
what
they
design
to
prove
to
us
,
without
thinking
of
answering
us
.
This
is
what
often
makes
Conversations
very
dull
;
for
as
nothing
is
more
Pleasing
,
and
because
the
greatest
Honour
People
can
do
us
,
is
to
consider
our
Reasons
,
and
approve
our
Opinions
,
so
nothing
can
be
more
Offensive
,
than
to
see
that
People
do
not
apprehend
them
;
nor
so
much
as
take
the
least
care
that
they
may
do
it
.
For
in
fine
,
There
is
no
Pleasure
in
speaking
to
and
conversing
with
Statues
;
and
who
are
only
Statues
in
relation
to
us
,
because
they
have
no
value
for
us
,
and
who
have
no
thoughts
to
please
us
,
but
only
to
please
themselves
in
endeavouring
to
show
their
Parts
.
But
if
Men
knew
how
to
give
a
handsom
Attention
and
answer
well
,
Conversation
would
not
only
be
very
Agreeable
,
but
also
very
Useful
;
whereas
every
body
striving
to
be
thought
Learned
,
they
only
hear
one
another
;
they
act
sometimes
Uncharitably
,
and
seldom
or
never
discover
Truth
.
But
the
Blunders
that
are
committed
by
the
said
Pretenders
to
Learning
in
Conversation
,
are
excusable
in
some
Respects
.
It
may
be
urg'd
in
Favour
of
them
,
That
Men
are
but
little
attentive
to
what
is
spoken
at
that
time
;
That
the
most
Exact
are
sometimes
guilty
of
it
;
and
that
they
do
not
desire
their
Words
should
be
collected
like
those
of
Scaliger
,
and
of
Cardinal
du
Perron
.
There
is
some
Reason
in
these
Excuses
,
and
we
are
willing
to
believe
,
that
such
kind
of
Faults
deserve
some
Indulgence
.
People
are
desirous
to
speak
in
Conversation
,
but
there
are
unhappy
days
in
which
they
do
not
hit
things
right
.
We
are
not
always
in
a
Humour
to
think
and
to
express
our selves
well
;
and
Time
is
so
short
on
certain
Occasions
,
that
the
least
Cloud
,
and
the
least
absence
of
Mind
,
makes
those
which
have
the
greatest
Interest
and
Penetration
of
Min
,
stumble
unluckily
into
Extravagant
Absurdities
.
But
if
the
Faults
which
the
Pretenders
to
Learning
commit
in
Conversation
are
excusable
,
the
Faults
they
are
guilty
of
in
their
Books
,
after
mature
Deliberation
,
are
by
no
means
pardonable
,
especially
if
they
are
frequent
,
and
are
not
aton'd
by
some
good
thing
.
For
those
who
write
an
ill
Book
,
make
abundance
of
People
lose
their
time
in
reading
of
it
;
besides
their
falling
into
the
same
Errors
they
are
guilty
of
;
and
this
occasions
many
more
,
which
is
a
thing
of
very
ill
Consequence
.
But
though
it
be
a
greater
Fault
than
People
imagine
,
to
compose
an
ill
Book
,
or
only
an
useless
one
,
it
is
a
Fault
that
sooner
meets
with
Reward
than
Punishment
:
For
there
are
Crimes
which
Men
do
not
punish
,
whether
it
be
that
they
are
in
Fashion
,
or
because
their
Reason
is
not
commonly
so
steady
,
to
condemn
as
Criminals
,
whom
they
look
upon
to
be
Men
of
better
Sense
than
they
are
themselves
.
Authors
are
commonly
look'd
upon
as
Extraordinary
Men
,
who
soar
much
above
others
;
and
so
they
are
respected
instead
of
being
punish'd
.
Therefore
there
is
no
likelihood
that
Men
should
ever
erect
a
Tribunal
,
to
Examine
and
Condemn
all
such
Books
as
only
serve
to
Corrupt
Reason
.
So
that
we
must
never
expect
to
see
the
Republick
of
Letters
better
regulated
than
other
Republicks
are
,
since
both
are
compos'd
by
Men.
Moreover
it
is
very
necessary
,
in
order
to
remove
Error
,
to
allow
the
Republick
of
Letters
more
Liberty
than
others
,
in
which
Novelty
is
always
very
Dangerous
:
For
should
the
World
Incroach
upon
the
Liberty
of
Learned
Men
,
and
Condemn
all
Novelties
without
Discernment
,
it
would
confirm
us
in
our
Errors
.
Therefore
there
is
no
reason
to
find
fault
with
my
speaking
against
the
Government
of
the
Republick
of
Letters
;
and
with
●my
endeavouring
to
show
,
that
often
those
great
Men
which
are
admir'd
by
others
for
their
Profound
Learning
,
are
at
the
bottom
only
Vain
Proud
Men
,
without
Judgment
,
and
without
any
true
Science
.
I
am
oblig'd
to
speak
thus
of
them
,
least
People
should
blindly
submit
to
their
Decisions
,
and
follow
their
Errors
.
The
Proofs
of
their
Vanity
,
III.
Of
the
Books
of
Pretenders
to
Learning
.
of
their
Want
of
Judgment
,
and
of
their
Ignorance
,
are
apparent
in
their
own
Works
.
Those
who
will
give
themselves
the
Trouble
to
examine
them
,
with
an
Intent
to
Judge
of
them
by
the
Rule
of
Common
Sense
,
and
without
Prejudice
of
Esteem
for
those
Authors
,
will
find
that
most
of
the
Designs
of
their
Study
are
grounded
upon
an
unjudicious
Vanity
;
and
that
their
principal
End
is
,
not
to
perfect
their
Reason
,
and
much
less
to
regulate
the
Motions
of
their
Heart
;
but
only
to
Confound
others
,
in
order
to
appear
more
Learned
than
they
.
This
is
the
Reason
,
as
we
have
already
observed
,
that
they
always
fix
upon
odd
extraordinary
Subjects
;
and
that
they
only
use
odd
and
extraordinary
Expressions
to
explain
themselves
;
and
quote
none
but
odd
and
extraordinary
Authors
.
They
seldom
explain
themselves
in
their
own
Language
,
it
is
too
common
;
nor
yet
with
a
clear
,
plain
,
easie
Latin
;
they
do
not
speak
to
be
understood
,
but
to
be
admir'd
.
They
seldom
apply
themselves
to
Subjects
which
are
useful
for
the
Conduct
of
Life
,
that
seems
too
common
to
them
:
They
neither
endeavour
to
be
useful
to
others
,
nor
to
themselves
,
but
only
to
be
thought
Learned
.
They
give
no
Reasons
for
what
they
say
,
or
else
they
are
such
Mysterious
and
Incomprehensible
ones
,
as
neither
themselves
nor
any
body
else
conceives
with
Evidence
:
They
have
no
clear
Reasons
;
and
if
they
had
they
would
not
use
them
.
Those
Reasons
do
not
surprise
the
Mind
,
they
look
too
plain
and
too
common
,
every
body
is
capable
of
them
.
They
rather
chuse
to
relate
Authorities
to
prove
,
or
to
seem
to
prove
their
Thoughts
;
for
often
the
Authorities
they
alledge
,
prove
nothing
by
the
Sense
they
contain
;
they
only
prove
because
they
are
Greek
or
Arabick
.
But
it
will
not
be
amiss
to
speak
of
their
Quotations
,
it
will
in
some
respect
discover
the
Disposition
of
their
Minds
.
It
is
very
evident
,
in
my
Opinion
,
that
nothing
but
False
Learning
,
and
the
Spirit
of
Polimathy
,
could
make
Quotations
so
much
in
vogue
as
they
have
been
hitherto
,
and
as
they
are
still
among
some
of
the
Learned
;
for
it
is
not
very
difficult
to
find
Authors
,
who
quote
large
Passages
every
Moment
without
any
reason
for
it
;
either
because
the
things
they
advance
are
so
clear
that
no
body
doubts
them
;
or
because
they
are
so
Obscure
,
that
the
Authority
of
their
Authors
cannot
prove
them
:
Or
lastly
,
Because
the
Quotations
they
alledge
,
can
add
no
Ornament
to
what
they
say
.
It
is
repugnant
to
Common
Sense
,
to
introduce
a
large
Greek
Passage
,
to
prove
that
the
Air
is
Transparent
,
because
it
is
a
thing
that
is
known
by
every
body
:
To
use
the
Authority
of
Aristotle
to
persuade
us
that
there
are
Intelligences
which
move
the
Heavens
,
because
it
is
evident
that
Aristotle
could
know
nothing
of
it
:
Or
to
mix
Forteign
Languages
,
Arabick
and
Persian
Proverbs
in
French
and
Latin
Books
,
compos'd
for
every
bodies
use
;
because
those
Quotations
can
add
no
Ornaments
to
them
,
or
else
they
are
Fanrastical
Ornaments
,
which
disoblige
a
great
many
People
,
and
can
oblige
but
very
few
.
Nevertheless
most
of
those
that
would
be
thought
Learned
,
take
so
much
delight
in
those
kind
of
Quotations
,
that
they
are
not
asham'd
sometimes
to
introduce
them
in
Languages
they
do
not
understand
;
and
they
strain
hard
to
force
an
Arabick
Passage
into
their
Books
,
which
perhaps
they
cannot
read
.
Thus
they
puzzle
themselves
to
compass
a
thing
which
is
contrary
to
Common
Sense
,
yet
pleases
their
Vanity
,
and
makes
them
cry'd
up
by
Fools
.
They
have
also
another
Defect
which
is
very
considerable
,
and
that
is
,
They
take
little
care
to
show
,
they
have
read
with
Choice
and
Judgment
,
they
only
desire
to
appear
to
have
read
much
,
and
particularly
Obscure
Books
,
in
order
to
be
thought
great
Scholars
;
Books
that
are
Scarce
and
Dear
,
least
People
should
think
they
want
any
thing
;
Wicked
and
Impious
Books
which
Honest
Men
dare
not
read
:
Just
like
those
that
brag
of
Crimes
which
others
dare
not
commit
.
Therefore
they
will
rather
quote
you
very
Dear
,
very
Scarce
,
very
Ancient
,
and
very
Obscure
Books
,
than
such
as
are
more
Common
and
more
Intelligible
;
and
Books
of
Astrology
,
of
the
Caballa
,
and
of
Magick
,
than
good
Books
;
as
if
they
were
not
Sensible
,
that
Reading
being
the
same
thing
as
Conversation
,
they
should
endeavour
to
show
that
they
have
taken
care
to
read
good
Books
,
and
such
as
are
most
Intelligible
,
and
not
such
as
are
bad
and
Obscure
.
For
as
it
would
argue
a
Depravation
of
Mind
,
to
be
fond
of
Conversing
commonly
with
Men
we
do
not
understand
,
without
an
Interpreter
,
when
it
is
in
our
Power
to
inform
our selves
otherwise
of
what
we
desire
to
know
:
So
it
is
Ridiculous
to
read
only
such
Books
as
cannot
be
understood
without
a
Dictionary
,
when
the
same
things
may
be
learn'd
in
those
that
are
more
Intelligible
.
And
as
it
is
a
Sign
of
Madness
,
to
affect
the
Company
and
Conversation
of
Impious
Persons
;
so
it
is
the
Character
of
a
corrupted
Heart
,
to
delight
in
the
reading
of
ill
Books
.
But
it
is
an
Extravagant
piece
of
Pride
,
to
be
willing
to
perswade
,
that
one
has
read
even
those
that
one
has
not
read
,
which
nevertheless
is
pretty
frequent
:
For
there
are
Persons
that
are
but
Thirty
Years
of
Age
,
that
quote
more
Ill
Books
in
their
Works
,
than
they
could
have
read
in
several
Ages
;
and
yet
they
will
perswade
others
,
they
have
read
them
with
great
Exactness
.
But
most
of
the
Books
of
certain
Learned
Men
,
are
only
compil'd
by
dint
of
Dictionaries
,
and
they
have
hardly
read
any
thing
beyond
the
Contents
of
the
Books
they
quote
,
or
some
Common
Places
collected
out
of
different
Authors
.
I
dare
not
particularly
enlarge
upon
those
things
,
nor
give
Examples
of
them
,
for
fear
of
offending
Persons
so
Haughty
and
so
Splenatick
as
those
Pretenders
to
Learning
are
;
for
there
is
no
Delight
in
being
abus'd
in
Greek
and
Arabick
.
Moreover
,
It
is
not
very
Material
,
in
order
to
render
what
I
say
the
more
Sensible
,
to
give
particular
Proofs
of
it
;
Men
being
naturally
enough
inclin'd
to
find
Fault
with
the
Conduct
of
others
,
and
to
apply
what
has
been
said
.
In
the
mean
time
let
them
please
themselves
with
that
vain
Phantasm
of
Grandeur
;
and
let
them
give
each
other
the
Applauses
which
we
refuse
to
give
them
.
We
have
perhaps
already
disturb'd
them
too
much
in
an
Injoyment
,
which
seems
so
Sweet
and
so
Delightful
to
them
.
CHAP.
IX
.
How
the
Inclination
we
have
for
Honours
and
Riches
leads
us
to
Error
.
HOnours
and
Riches
,
as
well
as
Virtue
and
Sciences
,
which
we
have
been
speaking
of
,
are
the
Principal
things
that
raise
us
above
other
Men
;
for
our
Being
seems
to
Agrandize
and
become
Independent
by
the
Possession
of
these
Advantages
.
So
that
the
Love
we
bear
our selves
,
carrying
it self
naturally
to
Honours
and
Riches
,
we
may
affirm
at
least
,
that
all
People
have
some
Inclination
towards
them
.
Let
us
explain
in
few
words
,
how
these
Inclinations
hinder
us
from
finding
out
Truth
,
and
engage
us
into
Falsehood
and
Error
.
We
have
shown
in
divers
Places
,
that
a
great
deal
of
Time
,
Pains
,
Assiduity
,
and
Industry
of
Mind
,
are
required
to
discover
Truths
that
are
compos'd
and
surrounded
with
Difficulties
,
and
which
depend
on
many
Principles
.
From
thence
it
is
easie
to
conclude
,
That
Publick
Persons
,
who
have
great
Imployments
,
great
Estates
to
govern
,
and
great
Affairs
to
manage
,
and
who
much
Covet
Honours
and
Riches
,
are
not
very
fit
to
Search
after
these
Truths
;
and
that
they
often
are
guilty
of
Error
,
in
relation
to
Things
that
are
not
easily
known
,
when
they
set
up
for
Judges
of
them
.
1.
Because
they
have
but
very
little
Time
to
imploy
in
Search
of
Truth
.
2.
That
commonly
they
do
not
delight
in
it
.
3.
Since
they
are
not
very
capable
of
Attention
,
because
the
Capacity
of
their
Mind
is
divided
by
the
multitude
of
the
Idea's
of
such
things
as
they
desire
,
and
to
which
they
are
oblig'd
to
apply
themselves
.
4.
Because
they
think
they
know
every
thing
,
and
are
not
easily
perswaded
that
their
Inferiours
can
have
a
greater
share
of
Reason
than
they
have
;
for
though
they
are
willing
to
learn
some
things
of
them
,
they
are
unwilling
to
be
instructed
by
them
in
solid
and
necessary
Truths
:
They
fly
out
into
a
Passion
when
any
Body
contradicts
and
undeceives
them
.
5.
Since
all
their
Imaginations
are
commonly
applauded
,
though
never
so
false
and
opposite
to
Common
Sense
;
and
that
Men
Laugh
at
those
that
are
not
of
their
Opinion
,
though
they
maintain
undeniable
Truths
.
The
sordid
Flatteries
of
those
that
are
about
them
confirm
them
in
their
Errors
,
and
in
the
false
Esteem
they
have
of
themselves
,
and
so
encourages
them
to
judge
boldly
of
all
things
.
6.
Because
they
seldom
fix
on
any
but
sensible
Notions
,
which
are
fitter
for
Common
Conversations
,
and
to
preserve
the
Esteem
of
Men
,
than
the
pure
Idea's
of
the
Mind
,
which
serve
to
discover
Truth
.
7.
Since
those
who
aspire
to
any
Dignity
,
endeavour
as
much
as
they
can
to
suit
themselves
to
the
Capacity
of
others
;
because
nothing
Excites
the
Envy
and
Aversion
of
Men
so
much
as
too
uncommon
Sentiments
.
It
is
very
difficult
for
those
whose
Mind
and
Heart
is
taken
up
with
the
Thoughts
and
Desires
of
making
their
Fortune
,
to
discover
difficult
Truths
;
and
when
they
do
find
out
any
,
they
often
abandon
them
out
of
Interest
,
because
the
Defence
of
those
Truths
does
not
suit
with
their
Ambition
.
Men
must
often
Wink
at
Injustice
to
become
Magistrates
;
a
solid
and
uncommon
Piety
often
hinders
a
Man
from
obtaining
the
Goods
of
Fortune
;
and
the
generous
Love
of
Truth
often
deprives
Men
of
the
Pulpit
;
where
Truth
ought
to
be
Taught
.
All
these
Reasons
joyn'd
together
,
make
Men
that
are
much
above
others
by
their
Dignities
,
Nobility
,
and
Riches
,
or
such
who
only
think
of
rising
and
making
their
Fortune
,
very
liable
to
Error
,
and
little
capable
of
discovering
hidden
Truths
.
For
among
those
things
that
are
necessary
to
avoid
Error
in
Questions
that
are
somewhat
difficult
,
there
are
two
principal
ones
that
are
not
commonly
met
with
in
the
persons
we
are
speaking
of
,
viz.
Attention
of
Mind
to
Penetrate
into
the
Bottom
of
Things
;
and
Wisdom
enough
not
to
Judge
of
them
Rashly
.
Even
those
that
are
chosen
to
Teach
others
,
and
whose
Business
it
is
to
Inform
themselves
,
in
order
to
instruct
those
that
are
committed
to
their
Care
,
commonly
become
liable
to
Error
,
as
soon
as
they
become
Publick
Persons
:
Either
because
that
having
very
little
time
,
they
are
incapable
of
Attention
,
and
applying
themselves
to
things
which
require
a
great
deal
of
time
;
or
because
that
being
earnestly
desirous
to
appear
great
Scholars
,
they
boldly
decide
all
things
without
the
least
Consideration
,
and
will
hardly
suffer
any
Body
to
Oppose
,
and
to
Instruct
them
.
CHAP.
X.
Of
the
Love
of
Pleasure
in
relation
to
Morality
.
I.
We
must
shun
Pleasure
though
it
make
us
Happy
.
II.
It
must
not
incline
us
to
the
Love
of
Sensible
Delights
.
WE
have
spoken
in
the
three
preceding
Chapters
of
the
Inclination
we
have
towards
the
preservation
of
our
Being
,
and
how
it
occasions
our
falling
into
many
Errors
:
We
will
now
speak
of
that
which
we
have
for
Well-being
,
that
is
for
Pleasure
,
and
for
all
things
that
make
us
happier
and
more
contented
,
or
that
we
think
capable
of
doing
so
;
and
we
will
endeavour
to
discover
the
Errors
that
proceed
from
that
Inclination
.
There
are
Philosophers
who
do
what
they
can
to
perswade
Men
,
that
Pleasure
is
not
a
Good
,
and
that
Pain
is
not
an
Evil
:
That
we
may
be
Happy
in
the
midst
of
the
most
violent
Pains
and
Unhappy
amidst
the
greatest
Pleasures
.
As
these
Philosophers
are
very
Pathetick
and
Fanciful
,
they
without
much
difficulty
prevail
upon
the
Minds
of
Weak
People
,
who
easily
receive
the
Impression
which
those
that
speak
produce
in
them
:
For
Stoicks
are
a
little
Visionary
,
and
Visionaries
are
Vehement
;
and
so
they
easily
Imprint
in
others
the
false
Sentiments
they
are
possess'd
with
.
But
whereas
there
is
no
Conviction
against
Experience
,
and
our
Inward
Sentiments
,
those
pompous
magnificent
Reasons
vanish
,
with
all
their
Lustre
,
as
soon
as
the
Soul
is
affected
with
some
sensible
Pleasure
or
Pain
:
And
those
who
have
plac'd
all
their
Confidence
in
that
false
perswasion
of
their
Mind
,
are
depriv'd
of
Wisdom
and
Power
at
the
least
Attack
of
Vice
;
and
find
that
they
have
been
deceiv'd
,
and
that
they
are
vanquish'd
.
Since
Philosophers
cannot
give
their
Disciples
the
power
of
overcoming
their
Passions
;
at
least
,
I.
We
must
shun
Pleasurethough
it
make
u●
Happy
.
they
should
not
seduce
or
perswade
them
that
they
have
no
Enemies
to
Encounter
.
They
should
speak
the
Truth
;
Pleasure
is
always
a
Good
,
and
Pain
ever
an
Evil
:
But
it
is
not
always
advantagious
to
enjoy
Pleasure
;
for
it
is
sometimes
profitable
to
suffer
Pain
.
But
in
order
the
better
to
Explain
my
meaning
,
it
is
fit
to
know
,
1.
That
God
only
is
powerful
enough
to
act
in
us
,
and
to
make
us
sensible
of
Pleasure
and
Pain
.
For
it
is
evident
to
all
Men
that
consult
their
Reason
,
and
despise
the
Testimony
of
their
Senses
,
that
it
is
not
the
Objects
which
we
feel
,
that
Act
Effectively
in
us
,
and
that
it
is
not
our
Soul
neither
which
causes
pleasure
and
pain
in
it self
in
respect
to
them
.
2.
That
Good
is
commonly
to
be
given
,
only
in
order
to
the
performance
of
some
good
Action
,
or
to
reward
it
;
and
that
commonly
Evil
is
only
to
be
inflicted
in
order
to
prevent
an
Ill
Action
,
or
to
punish
it
:
And
therefore
since
God
always
acts
agreeable
to
Order
,
and
according
to
the
Rules
of
Justice
,
all
Pleasures
either
Incline
us
to
some
good
Action
,
or
reward
us
for
it
;
and
all
Pains
serve
to
prevent
some
ill
Action
,
or
to
punish
us
for
the
Committing
of
it
.
3.
That
there
are
Actions
that
are
good
in
one
sense
,
and
bad
in
another
.
For
instance
,
it
is
an
Ill
Action
to
expose
ones
self
to
Death
,
when
God
forbids
it
.
But
it
is
a
Good
One
when
God
Commands
it
.
For
all
our
Actions
are
Good
or
Ill
,
because
God
has
Commanded
,
or
forbidden
them
by
his
first
general
Will
,
which
is
the
Order
and
Institution
of
Nature
;
or
by
his
other
particular
Will
and
Commandments
,
which
are
necessary
for
the
re-establishment
of
Nature
.
Therefore
I
say
that
Pleasure
is
always
Good
;
but
that
it
is
not
always
advantageous
to
enjoy
it
.
1.
Because
that
instead
of
engaging
us
to
him
who
is
only
capable
of
causing
it
,
it
weans
us
from
him
to
Unite
us
to
that
which
seems
falsly
to
cause
it
.
It
sets
us
at
a
Distance
from
God
,
to
Unite
us
to
a
Vile
Creature
.
For
although
true
Philosophers
sometimes
think
that
Pleasure
is
not
occasion'd
by
outward
Objects
,
and
that
that
may
in
some
measure
Incline
them
to
Acknowledge
and
Love
God
in
all
things
;
nevertheless
since
the
Introduction
of
Sin
,
the
Reason
of
Man
is
so
Weak
,
and
his
Senses
and
Imagination
have
so
much
Power
over
his
Mind
,
that
they
soon
Corrupt
his
Heart
.
When
we
do
not
lay
aside
,
according
to
the
Advice
of
the
Gospel
,
all
things
that
do
not
of
themselves
incline
us
to
God
.
For
the
best
Philosophy
cannot
Cure
the
Mind
,
nor
resist
the
disorder
of
Voluptuousness
.
2.
Since
Pleasure
is
a
Reward
,
it
is
a
piece
of
Injustice
to
produce
Motions
in
our
Body
which
oblige
God
,
in
consequence
of
his
first
Will
,
to
make
us
feel
Pleasure
,
when
we
do
not
deserve
any
;
either
because
the
Action
we
do
is
Useless
or
Criminal
,
or
because
that
being
full
of
Sin
,
we
ought
not
to
desire
a
Reward
of
him
.
Man
before
the
Fall
might
justly
enjoy
sensible
Pleasures
in
his
Regular
Actions
:
But
since
the
Fall
there
are
no
sensible
Pleasures
altogether
Innocent
,
nor
any
but
such
as
are
capable
of
injuring
us
when
we
enjoy
them
;
for
often
the
bare
tasting
of
them
is
sufficient
to
make
us
Slaves
to
them
.
3.
Because
God
being
Just
,
he
must
needs
at
some
time
or
other
punish
the
Violence
that
is
offer'd
to
him
,
when
Men
oblige
him
to
recompence
with
Pleasure
the
Criminal
Actions
which
they
Commit
against
him
.
When
our
Soul
shall
be
no
longer
united
to
our
Bodies
,
God
will
no
longer
lye
under
the
Obligation
which
he
has
laid
upon
himself
,
to
give
us
Sensations
to
answer
to
the
Motions
of
the
Mind
;
and
he
will
still
remain
under
the
Obligation
of
satisfying
his
Justice
:
And
therefore
that
will
be
the
time
of
his
Vengeance
and
Wrath.
Then
without
changing
the
Order
of
Nature
,
and
remaining
always
Immutable
in
his
first
Will
,
he
will
punish
the
unjust
pleasures
of
the
Voluptuous
,
with
Pains
that
never
will
have
an
End
.
4.
Because
that
the
certainty
we
have
in
this
Life
that
the
said
Justice
must
be
perform'd
,
agitates
the
Mind
with
mortal
Disquiets
,
and
flings
it
into
a
kind
of
Despair
,
which
renders
the
Voluptuous
miserable
,
even
in
the
midst
of
the
greatest
Pleasures
.
5.
Since
commonly
dismal
Remorses
accompany
the
most
Innocent
Pleasures
,
because
we
are
convinc'd
that
we
deserve
none
;
and
those
Remorses
deprive
us
of
a
certain
Inward
Joy
,
which
is
found
even
in
actions
of
Penitence
.
Thus
though
Pleasure
is
a
Good
,
it
must
be
granted
that
it
is
not
always
advantageous
to
enjoy
it
for
these
Reasons
;
and
for
others
like
these
,
which
it
is
very
necessary
to
know
,
and
which
are
easily
deduced
from
these
;
and
it
is
always
very
advantageous
to
suffer
Pain
,
though
it
be
really
an
Evil.
Nevertheless
,
all
Pleasure
is
a
Good
,
and
actually
makes
those
Happy
that
enjoy
it
,
while
they
enjoy
it
,
and
as
long
as
they
enjoy
it
;
and
all
Grief
or
Pain
is
an
Evil
,
and
actually
makes
the
person
that
suffers
it
unhappy
,
while
he
suffers
it
,
and
as
long
as
he
suffers
it
.
It
may
be
said
that
the
Righteous
and
Holy
are
the
most
unhappy
Men
in
this
Life
,
and
the
most
worthy
of
Compassion
.
Si
in
vita
tantum
in
Christo
speramus
,
miserabiliores
sumus
omnibus
hominibus
,
says
Saint
Paul
;
for
those
that
Weep
,
and
suffer
Persecution
for
Justice
,
are
not
Happy
because
they
suffer
Persecution
for
Justice
;
but
because
the
Kingdom
of
Heaven
is
theirs
,
and
a
great
Reward
is
in
store
for
them
in
Heaven
;
that
is
,
Because
they
shall
be
Happy
.
Those
that
suffer
Persecution
for
Justice
are
thereby
Just
,
Virtuous
,
and
Perfect
,
because
they
are
in
the
Order
that
God
has
prescrib'd
,
and
Perfection
consists
in
following
him
:
but
they
are
not
Happy
because
they
Suffer
.
A
time
will
come
when
they
will
Suffer
no
more
;
and
then
they
will
be
Happy
,
as
well
as
Just
and
Perfect
.
However
,
I
do
not
deny
but
that
the
Righteous
may
be
Happy
in
some
measure
even
in
this
Life
,
by
the
strength
of
their
Hope
and
Faith
,
which
render
those
future
Felicities
,
as
it
were
,
present
to
their
Mind
.
For
it
is
certain
,
that
when
the
Hope
of
some
Happiness
is
strong
and
lively
,
it
draws
it
nearer
to
the
Mind
,
and
gives
it
a
taste
thereof
before-hand
:
And
thus
it
makes
us
Happy
in
some
measure
,
since
it
is
the
taste
and
possession
of
Good
and
of
Pleasure
,
which
makes
us
Happy
.
Therefore
it
is
unreasonable
to
tell
Men
that
sensible
Pleasures
are
not
Good
,
and
that
those
that
enjoy
them
are
never
the
Happier
;
since
it
is
not
true
,
and
at
the
time
of
Temptation
they
discover
it
to
their
misfortune
.
We
must
tell
them
,
that
those
Pleasures
are
good
in
themselves
,
and
capable
to
make
them
Happy
in
some
measure
:
Nevertheless
,
they
ought
to
avoid
them
for
the
Reasons
beforementioned
;
but
they
cannot
avoid
them
of
themselves
:
Because
they
desire
to
be
Happy
through
an
Inclination
which
they
cannot
overcome
,
and
those
transitory
Pleasures
which
they
ought
to
avoid
,
satisfie
it
in
some
measure
:
Thus
they
are
in
a
miserable
Necessity
of
losing
themselves
,
unless
they
are
assisted
.
It
is
necessary
to
tell
them
these
things
,
that
they
may
distinctly
know
their
Weakness
,
and
the
want
they
have
of
a
Redeemer
.
We
must
speak
to
Men
like
Jesus
Christ
,
and
not
like
the
Stoicks
,
who
neither
understand
the
Nature
nor
Distemper
of
Human
Minds
.
They
must
continually
be
told
,
that
they
must
hate
and
despise
themselves
,
and
not
look
for
an
Establishment
or
Happiness
on
Earth
:
That
they
must
daily
carry
their
Cross
,
or
the
Instrument
of
their
suffering
,
and
that
they
must
lose
their
Life
at
present
,
in
order
to
preserve
it
Eternally
.
They
must
be
taught
,
that
they
are
oblig'd
to
act
contrary
to
their
desire
,
to
make
'em
sensible
of
their
inability
to
good
.
For
Men
wou'd
be
invincibly
Happy
,
and
they
cannot
be
actually
so
,
unless
they
do
what
they
please
.
Perhaps
being
convinced
of
their
present
Evils
,
and
knowing
their
future
sufferings
,
they
may
humble
themselves
on
Earth
:
Perhaps
they
may
invoke
the
Assistance
of
Heaven
,
and
seek
a
Mediatour
;
be
afraid
of
sensible
Objects
,
and
timely
abhor
whatever
flatters
their
Senses
and
Concupiscence
.
And
it
may
be
they
may
thus
obtain
that
Spirit
of
Prayer
and
Repentance
which
is
so
necessary
to
obtain
Grace
,
and
without
which
there
is
no
Power
,
no
Health
,
nor
no
Salvation
to
be
expected
.
We
are
inwardly
convinc'd
that
Pleasure
is
Good
,
II.
It
must
not
incline
us
to
the
Love
of
sensible
Delights
.
and
that
the
inward
Conviction
thereof
is
not
False
,
for
Pleasure
is
really
Good
.
We
are
Naturally
Convinc'd
,
that
Pleasure
is
the
Character
of
Good
,
and
that
Natural
Conviction
is
certainly
true
;
for
that
which
Causes
Pleasure
is
certainly
very
Good
,
and
very
Lovely
.
But
we
are
not
convinc'd
,
that
either
sensible
Objects
,
or
our
Souls
themselves
,
are
capable
of
producing
Pleasure
in
us
;
for
there
is
no
reason
to
believe
it
,
and
there
are
a
Thousand
against
it
.
Therefore
sensible
Objects
are
neither
Good
,
nor
Lovely
.
Were
they
necessary
toward
the
Preservation
of
Life
,
we
ought
to
use
them
:
But
as
they
are
not
capable
of
Acting
in
us
,
we
ought
not
to
Love
them
.
The
Soul
must
only
Love
him
that
is
Good
,
who
only
is
capable
to
make
it
Happier
,
and
more
perfect
.
Therefore
it
should
only
Love
that
which
is
above
it
,
since
it
can
receive
its
Perfection
from
nothing
that
is
either
below
,
or
equal
to
it
.
But
whereas
we
judge
that
a
Thing
is
the
Cause
of
some
Effect
,
when
it
always
attends
it
,
we
fancy
that
they
are
Sensible
Objects
which
act
in
us
,
because
at
their
approach
we
have
new
Sensations
,
and
because
we
do
not
see
him
that
produces
them
really
in
us
.
We
taste
a
Fruit
,
and
we
find
a
Sweetness
;
we
impute
that
Sweetness
to
that
Fruit
;
we
conclude
that
it
causes
it
,
and
even
that
it
contains
it
.
We
do
not
see
God
as
we
see
and
as
we
feel
that
Fruit
;
we
do
not
so
much
as
think
on
him
,
nor
perhaps
on
our selves
:
Therefore
we
do
not
conclude
that
God
is
the
real
Cause
of
that
Sweetness
,
nor
that
the
said
Sweetness
is
a
Modification
of
our
Soul
;
we
impute
both
the
Cause
and
the
Effect
,
to
that
Fruit
which
we
eat
.
What
I
have
said
of
Sensations
which
have
a
relation
to
the
Body
,
is
also
to
be
understood
of
those
that
have
no
relation
to
it
,
as
those
which
are
found
in
pure
Intelligences
.
The
Mind
considers
it self
;
it
sees
that
nothing
is
wanting
to
its
Happiness
and
Perfection
;
or
else
it
sees
that
it
does
not
possess
what
it
desires
.
At
the
sight
of
its
Happiness
it
feels
Joy
;
at
the
sight
of
its
Misfortunes
it
endures
Sorrow
.
It
straight
fancies
,
that
it
is
the
sight
of
its
Happiness
which
produces
in
it self
that
Sentiment
of
Joy
,
because
the
said
Sentiment
always
attends
that
sight
.
It
also
imagines
,
that
it
is
the
sight
of
its
Misfortune
which
produces
in
it self
that
Sentiment
of
Grief
,
since
the
said
Sentiment
is
the
Consequence
of
this
sight
.
The
real
Cause
of
those
Sentiments
,
which
is
God
alone
,
does
not
appear
before
it
:
It
does
not
so
much
as
think
on
God
;
for
he
acts
in
us
without
our
knowing
it
.
God
rewards
us
with
a
Sentiment
of
Joy
,
when
we
know
that
we
are
in
the
Condition
in
which
we
ought
to
be
,
that
we
may
remain
in
it
,
that
our
Disquiet
may
cease
,
and
that
we
may
fully
enjoy
our
Happiness
,
without
suffering
the
Capacity
of
our
Mind
to
be
filled
with
any
thing
else
.
But
he
produces
a
Sentiment
of
Grief
in
us
,
when
we
are
Sensible
that
we
are
not
in
the
State
in
which
we
ought
to
be
,
so
that
we
may
not
remain
in
it
,
and
that
we
might
earnestly
seek
after
the
Perfection
that
is
wanting
in
us
.
For
God
pushes
us
continually
toward
Good
,
when
we
are
Sensible
that
we
do
not
possess
it
;
and
he
fixes
us
powerfully
upon
it
,
when
we
find
that
we
possess
it
fully
.
So
that
it
seems
evident
to
me
,
that
the
Intellectual
Sentiments
of
Joy
or
of
Grief
,
as
well
as
the
Sensible
ones
,
are
no
voluntary
Productions
of
the
Mind
.
Therefore
we
ought
continually
to
acknowledge
by
our
Reason
,
that
Invisible
Hand
which
fills
us
with
Bliss
,
and
which
disguises
it self
to
our
Mind
,
under
Sensible
Appearances
.
We
must
Adore
it
,
we
must
Love
it
;
but
we
must
also
Fear
it
,
for
since
it
fills
us
with
Pleasures
,
it
may
also
overwhelm
us
with
Grief
.
We
ought
to
Love
it
by
a
Love
of
Choice
,
by
a
Sensible
Love
,
by
a
Love
worthy
of
God
,
when
we
Love
him
because
we
know
that
he
is
Amiable
:
And
that
Love
is
worthy
of
us
,
because
that
being
Reasonable
,
we
ought
to
Love
that
which
Reason
informs
us
to
be
worthy
of
our
Love
.
But
we
Love
Sensible
Things
,
by
a
Love
that
is
unworthy
of
us
,
and
which
they
are
also
unworthy
of
:
For
being
Reasonable
,
we
Love
them
without
any
Reason
to
Love
them
,
since
we
do
not
clearly
know
that
they
are
Lovely
;
and
on
the
contrary
,
we
know
they
are
not
so
.
But
Pleasures
Seduce
us
,
and
make
us
Love
them
;
the
Blind
and
Irregular
Love
of
Pleasure
,
being
the
real
Cause
of
those
False
Judgments
of
Men
in
Subjects
of
Morality
.
CHAP.
XI
.
Of
the
Love
of
Pleasure
,
in
relation
to
Speculative
Sciences
.
I.
How
it
hinders
us
from
discovering
Truth
.
II.
Some
Examples
.
THE
Inclination
we
have
for
Sensible
Pleasures
being
disorder'd
,
is
not
only
the
Source
of
the
Dangerous
Errors
we
fall
into
in
cases
of
Morality
,
and
the
general
Causes
of
the
Depravation
of
our
Manners
;
it
is
also
one
of
the
Principal
Causes
of
the
Disorder
of
our
Reason
,
and
it
engages
us
Insensibly
into
very
gross
Errors
,
but
less
dangerous
upon
Subjects
that
are
meerly
Speculative
;
because
the
said
Inclination
hinders
us
from
having
a
sufficient
Attention
for
things
that
do
not
affect
us
,
to
apprehend
them
,
and
to
judge
well
of
them
.
We
have
already
spoken
in
several
places
,
of
the
Difficulty
Men
find
in
applying
themselves
to
Subjects
that
are
a
little
uncommon
,
because
the
Matter
we
treated
of
then
requir'd
it
.
We
spoke
of
it
towards
the
end
of
the
first
Book
,
in
showing
that
the
Sensible
Idea's
affecting
the
Soul
more
than
the
Pure
Idea's
of
the
Mind
,
it
often
applied
it self
more
to
the
Manner
than
the
Thing
it self
.
We
spoke
of
it
in
the
Second
,
because
in
treating
of
the
Delicacy
of
the
Fibers
of
the
Brain
,
we
show'd
whence
the
Softness
of
certain
Effeminate
Minds
did
proceed
.
Finally
,
We
spoke
of
it
in
the
Third
,
in
mentioning
of
the
Attention
of
the
Mind
,
when
we
were
about
proving
,
that
our
Soul
had
but
little
Attention
to
Things
that
were
meerly
Speculative
;
but
a
great
deal
more
to
such
as
affect
it
,
and
make
it
Sensible
of
Pleasure
or
Grief
.
Our
Errors
have
commonly
several
Causes
which
contribute
all
to
their
Rise
:
So
that
we
must
not
imagine
,
that
it
is
for
want
of
Order
that
we
sometimes
repeat
almost
the
same
things
,
and
that
we
impute
several
Causes
to
the
same
Errors
;
it
is
because
there
are
really
many
.
I
speak
still
of
occasional
Causes
;
for
we
have
often
declar'd
,
that
there
are
no
other
Real
and
True
,
but
the
ill
use
of
our
Liberty
,
which
we
do
not
always
make
use
of
so
much
as
we
might
,
as
we
have
explain'd
at
the
beginning
of
this
Work
.
No
body
ought
to
blame
us
,
if
in
order
to
make
Men
plainly
conceive
,
how
for
Example
the
Sensible
Manner
in
which
things
are
cover'd
,
does
Surprise
and
makes
us
liable
to
fall
into
Error
;
we
have
been
oblig'd
to
say
before-hand
in
the
other
Books
,
that
we
had
an
Inclination
for
Pleasures
,
which
seems
necessary
to
be
repeated
in
this
,
which
treats
of
Natural
Inclinations
,
and
the
same
of
some
other
things
in
other
places
.
All
the
Harm
it
will
occasion
is
,
that
there
will
be
no
necessity
to
say
many
things
here
,
which
we
should
have
been
oblig'd
to
explain
,
if
it
had
not
been
done
elsewhere
.
All
things
that
are
in
Man
,
are
so
dependant
on
one
another
,
that
we
find
our selves
often
overwhelm'd
,
under
the
number
of
things
we
are
to
treat
of
at
one
and
the
same
time
,
to
explain
perfectly
what
we
conceive
.
We
are
sometimes
necessitated
not
to
divide
things
that
are
joyn'd
by
Nature
one
to
another
,
and
to
proceed
contrary
to
the
order
we
had
prescrib'd
,
when
that
order
occasions
nothing
but
Confusion
,
as
it
happens
of
necessity
on
some
occasions
.
Yet
for
all
this
it
is
impossible
to
give
others
an
Idea
of
all
we
think
of
:
All
that
we
can
commonly
pretend
to
,
is
to
put
others
in
a
way
to
discover
with
Pleasure
and
Ease
,
what
we
have
discover'd
with
great
Labour
and
Pains
.
And
whereas
it
is
Impossible
to
discover
any
thing
without
Attention
,
we
must
particularly
study
the
Means
to
make
others
Attentive
.
'T
is
what
we
have
endeavour'd
to
do
,
though
we
acknowledge
we
have
perform'd
it
weakly
,
and
we
own
our
Faults
the
more
willingly
,
to
the
end
that
the
said
Confession
may
excite
those
who
shall
read
this
,
to
render
themselves
Attentive
of
their
own
accord
,
in
order
to
remedy
the
same
,
and
to
penetrate
to
the
bottom
of
these
Subjects
,
which
without
doubt
deserve
to
be
well
consider'd
.
The
Errors
,
into
which
the
Inclination
we
have
for
Pleasure
,
and
generally
for
all
things
that
affect
us
,
engage
us
,
are
Infinite
;
because
the
said
Inclination
dissipates
the
Sight
of
the
Mind
,
and
it
applies
it
continually
on
the
confus'd
Idea's
of
the
Senses
,
and
the
Imagination
;
and
it
inclines
us
to
judge
of
all
things
rashly
,
by
the
bare
relation
they
have
to
us
.
I.
How
it
hinders
us
from
discovering
Truth
.
We
never
see
Truth
,
until
we
see
things
as
they
are
;
and
we
never
see
them
as
they
are
,
unless
we
see
them
in
him
that
contains
them
after
an
Intelligible
manner
.
When
we
see
things
our selves
,
we
only
see
them
very
Imperfectly
,
or
rather
we
only
see
our
own
Sentiments
,
and
not
the
Things
we
are
desirous
to
see
,
and
which
we
falsely
imagine
we
do
see
.
It
requires
a
great
deal
of
Application
to
see
things
as
they
are
in
themselves
;
because
it
is
now
impossible
for
Man
to
unite
himself
to
God
without
Pain
and
Labour
:
To
see
things
in
our selves
,
requires
no
Application
on
our
part
,
since
we
feel
what
touches
us
even
against
our
Will.
Naturally
we
find
no
anticipating
Pleasure
in
the
Union
we
have
with
God
,
the
pure
Idea's
of
things
do
not
move
us
.
Therefore
the
Inclination
we
have
for
Pleasure
,
does
neither
apply
nor
unite
us
to
God
;
on
the
contrary
,
it
weans
and
removes
us
from
him
:
For
that
Inclination
induces
us
continually
to
consider
things
by
their
Sensible
Idea's
,
because
those
False
and
Impure
Idea's
affect
us
.
The
Love
of
Pleasure
,
and
the
actual
Injoyment
of
Pleasure
,
which
revives
and
increases
our
Love
for
it
,
removes
us
continually
from
Truth
,
to
cast
us
into
Error
.
Therefore
those
that
are
desirous
to
draw
near
to
Truth
,
to
be
guided
by
its
Light
,
must
begin
by
laying
aside
Pleasure
:
They
must
carefully
avoid
whatever
affects
and
agreeably
divides
the
Mind
;
for
the
Senses
and
Passions
must
be
silenc'd
,
in
order
to
hear
the
Word
of
Truth
;
it
being
necessary
to
withdraw
our
Affections
from
the
World
,
and
to
condemn
all
Sensible
Things
,
as
well
for
the
Perfection
of
the
Mind
,
as
for
the
Conversion
of
the
Heart
.
When
our
Pleasures
are
great
,
when
our
Sentiments
are
lively
,
we
are
not
capable
of
the
plainest
Truths
,
and
we
do
not
so
much
as
grant
common
Notions
,
unless
they
contain
something
that
is
Sensible
.
When
our
Pleasures
,
or
other
Sensations
are
moderate
,
we
can
discover
some
plain
easie
Truths
:
But
if
it
were
possible
for
us
wholly
to
lay
aside
Pleasures
and
Sensations
,
we
should
be
capable
of
discovering
with
ease
the
most
conceal'd
Truths
,
and
the
most
difficult
that
are
known
:
For
the
more
we
remove
from
that
which
is
not
God
,
the
nearer
we
draw
to
God
himself
,
we
avoid
Error
,
and
we
discover
Truth
.
But
since
the
Fall
,
since
the
unruly
Love
of
anticipating
Pleasures
,
which
rules
predominantly
,
the
Mind
is
become
so
weak
,
that
it
can
penetrate
into
nothing
,
and
so
Material
and
Dependant
on
the
Senses
,
that
it
cannot
reach
difficult
things
which
do
not
affect
it
.
It
does
not
even
perceive
common
Notions
,
and
often
concludes
for
want
of
Attention
,
that
they
are
False
and
Obscure
.
It
cannot
distinguish
the
Truth
of
things
from
their
Usefulness
,
the
relation
they
have
among
one
another
,
from
the
relation
they
have
to
us
;
and
it
often
believes
that
those
are
the
Truest
that
are
the
most
Useful
,
the
most
Agreeable
,
and
that
affect
it
most
.
In
fine
,
That
Inclination
Infects
and
Confounds
all
the
Perceptions
we
have
of
Objects
,
and
consequently
all
the
Judgments
we
make
of
them
.
Here
are
some
Examples
.
It
is
a
common
Notion
that
Virtue
is
preferable
to
Vice
;
that
it
is
better
to
be
Chaste
,
II.
Some
Examples
.
than
Intemperate
and
Voluptuous
.
But
our
Inclination
for
Pleasure
,
confounds
that
Idea
to
that
degree
on
some
occasions
,
that
we
have
but
a
glimpse
of
it
left
;
and
it
is
impossible
to
draw
the
Consequences
from
thence
,
which
are
necessary
for
the
Conduct
of
Life
.
The
Soul
is
so
taken
up
with
the
Pleasures
it
hopes
for
,
that
it
supposes
them
Innocent
,
and
aims
at
nothing
but
the
Means
to
enjoy
them
.
Every
body
knows
,
that
it
is
better
to
be
Just
than
Rich:
That
Justice
exalts
a
Man
more
than
the
Possession
of
the
most
Sumptuous
Buildings
,
which
often
serve
less
to
discover
the
Grandeur
of
the
Owner
,
than
the
Greatness
of
his
Injustices
and
Crimes
.
But
the
Pleasure
which
Inadvertent
People
receive
in
the
Vain
Ostentation
of
their
False
Grandeur
,
sufficiently
fills
up
the
small
Capacity
of
their
Mind
,
to
conceal
and
obscure
so
evident
a
Truth
from
them
.
They
foolishly
imagine
that
they
are
great
Men
,
because
they
have
great
Houses
.
Specious
Algebra
is
certainly
the
finest
,
I
mean
the
most
Fruitful
and
most
Certain
of
all
Sciences
;
without
it
the
Mind
has
neither
Penetration
nor
Extent
;
and
with
it
,
it
is
capable
of
knowing
almost
every
thing
that
can
be
known
with
Certainty
and
Evidence
.
As
Imperfect
as
that
Science
has
been
,
it
has
made
all
those
Famous
that
have
learn'd
it
,
and
that
have
known
how
to
Practice
it
:
They
have
thereby
discover'd
Truths
which
seem'd
almost
Incomprehensible
to
other
Men.
It
is
so
well
proportion'd
to
Humane
Minds
,
that
without
distracting
their
Capacity
with
useless
things
in
what
they
seek
after
,
it
conducts
them
Infallibly
to
what
they
aim
at
.
In
a
word
,
It
is
an
Universal
Science
,
and
as
it
were
the
Key
of
all
other
Sciences
;
yet
as
valuable
as
it
is
in
it self
,
it
has
nothing
in
it
that
is
taking
in
order
to
Charm
Men
,
by
this
reason
only
,
that
it
is
not
Sensible
.
It
has
been
buried
absolutely
in
Forgetfulness
for
several
Ages
.
There
are
at
this
very
time
,
many
Men
who
do
not
know
the
name
of
it
;
and
among
a
Thousand
Persons
,
you
will
hardly
meet
one
or
two
who
understand
any
thing
in
it
:
The
most
Learned
that
have
reviv'd
it
in
our
days
,
have
not
carried
it
very
far
,
and
have
not
handled
it
with
that
Order
and
Clearness
it
deserves
.
Being
Men
as
well
as
others
,
they
have
at
last
been
disgusted
with
those
pure
Truths
which
are
not
attended
by
Sensible
Pleasure
;
and
the
Disquietness
of
their
Will
being
Corrupted
by
Sin
,
the
Inconstancy
of
their
Mind
,
which
depends
on
the
Agitation
and
Circulation
of
the
Blood
,
has
not
allow'd
them
to
consider
any
longer
those
Great
,
those
Vast
,
and
those
Plentiful
Truths
,
which
are
the
Immutable
and
Universal
Rules
,
of
all
Transitory
and
particular
Truths
,
that
may
be
known
with
Exactness
.
Metaphysics
is
also
an
abstracted
Scie●●●
,
which
does
not
affect
the
Senses
,
the
Study
the●
of
afford
the
Soul
no
manner
of
Pleasure
;
for
which
reaso●
the
said
Science
is
very
much
neglected
;
and
〈◊〉
often
meet
Men
that
are
so
Stupid
,
as
boldly
to
d●●
common
Notions
.
There
are
some
that
deny
〈◊〉
one
may
,
or
ought
to
affirm
a
thing
is
,
by
what
is
included
in
the
clear
and
distinct
Idea
one
has
of
it
:
That
Nothing
has
no
Proprieties
;
That
a
thing
cannot
be
reduc'd
to
nothing
without
Miracle
;
That
no
body
can
move
it self
by
its
own
Force
;
That
an
Active
Body
can
communicate
no
more
Motion
to
any
Body
it
encounters
,
than
it
has
of
it self
,
and
the
like
.
They
have
never
consider'd
those
Axioms
with
Stediness
and
Clearness
enough
,
to
discover
the
Truth
of
them
distinctly
;
and
they
have
sometimes
made
Experiments
,
which
have
falsely
convinc'd
them
,
that
some
of
those
Axioms
were
not
true
.
They
have
seen
on
some
occasions
,
that
two
Visible
Bodies
meeting
each
other
,
ceas'd
both
to
move
after
the
Blow
:
They
have
seen
in
others
,
that
the
Bodies
which
were
hit
,
had
more
Motion
than
the
Visible
Bodies
that
did
hit
them
:
And
this
Sensible
Sight
of
some
Experiments
,
whose
reasons
they
see
not
,
makes
them
decide
things
against
certain
Principles
,
which
pass
for
common
Notions
in
the
Minds
of
all
those
that
are
capable
of
any
Attention
.
Ought
they
not
to
consider
,
that
Motions
may
be
communicated
from
Visible
Bodies
to
Invisible
ones
,
when
the
Bodies
that
are
in
motion
meet
;
or
from
the
Invisible
to
the
Visible
on
other
occasions
?
When
a
Body
is
Suspended
by
a
Cord
,
the
Knife
wherewith
that
Cord
is
cut
,
does
not
give
the
Motion
to
that
Body
,
it
is
an
Invisible
Matter
that
does
it
.
When
a
Coal
of
Fire
is
flung
into
a
heap
of
Gun-powder
,
it
is
not
the
motion
of
the
Coal
,
but
an
invisible
Matter
,
which
scatters
all
the
parts
of
that
Powder
,
and
which
gives
it
a
motion
capable
of
blowing
up
a
House
.
There
are
a
Thousand
ways
by
which
invisible
Matter
communicates
its
Motion
to
gross
visible
Bodies
:
At
least
it
is
not
evident
that
it
cannot
be
done
,
as
it
is
evident
that
the
moving
force
of
Bodies
can
neither
be
increas'd
nor
diminish'd
by
the
usual
force
of
Nature
.
So
Men
see
that
the
Wood
that
is
slung
into
the
Fire
,
ceases
to
be
what
it
is
;
and
that
all
the
Sensible
Qualities
they
observe
in
it
dissipate
themselves
;
and
from
thence
they
think
they
are
in
the
right
,
to
conclude
,
that
it
is
possible
for
a
thing
to
return
to
its
former
nothing
:
They
do
no
longer
see
the
Wood
,
and
they
only
see
a
few
Ashes
which
succeed
it
;
and
from
thence
they
judge
that
the
major
part
of
the
Wood
ceases
to
be
,
as
if
the
Wood
could
not
be
redu●●
〈◊〉
invisible
parts
At
least
it
is
not
so
evident
that
this
〈…〉
that
the
force
which
gives
a
being
to
all
things
,
is
not
subject
to
change
;
and
that
by
the
ordinary
force
of
Nature
,
what
is
,
cannot
be
reduced
to
nothing
,
as
what
is
not
,
cannot
begin
to
be
.
But
few
Men
know
what
it
is
to
look
within
themselves
,
there
to
hear
the
Voice
of
Truth
,
according
to
which
they
ought
to
judge
of
all
things
;
their
Eyes
regulate
their
Decisions
:
They
judge
according
to
what
they
feel
,
and
not
according
to
what
they
conceive
,
for
they
feel
with
Pleasure
,
and
conceive
with
Pain
.
Ask
all
Men
in
the
World
,
Whether
one
may
affirm
,
without
fear
of
being
deceiv'd
,
that
the
whole
is
greater
than
a
part
,
and
I
am
confident
that
there
is
not
one
,
but
will
answer
immediately
as
he
ought
to
do
.
Ask
them
in
the
next
place
,
Whether
we
may
likewise
,
without
fear
of
being
deceiv'd
,
affirm
of
a
thing
,
that
which
we
conceive
clearly
to
be
included
within
the
Idea
which
represents
it
;
and
you
will
find
,
that
few
will
grant
it
without
Hesitation
,
that
more
will
deny
it
,
and
that
the
major
part
of
them
will
not
know
what
to
answer
.
Yet
this
Metaphysical
Axiom
,
That
we
may
affirm
of
a
thing
,
which
we
conceive
clearly
to
be
included
in
the
Idea
which
represents
it
,
is
more
evident
than
this
Axiom
,
That
the
whole
is
greater
than
its
part
;
because
this
last
Axiom
is
not
an
Axiom
,
but
only
a
Conclusion
in
respect
to
the
first
.
One
may
prove
that
the
whole
is
greater
than
part
by
this
first
Axiom
;
but
this
first
can
be
proved
by
no
other
:
It
is
absolutely
the
first
,
and
the
Foundation
of
all
clear
and
evident
Knowledge
.
Why
then
does
no
body
hesitate
upon
the
Conclusion
,
and
yet
many
question
the
Principle
from
which
it
is
deriv'd
;
unless
it
be
because
the
Idea's
of
the
whole
and
of
part
are
Sensible
;
and
that
our
Eyes
inform
us
,
that
the
whole
is
larger
than
part
of
it
;
and
that
our
Eyes
do
not
see
the
Truth
of
the
first
Axiom
of
all
Sciences
?
As
there
is
nothing
in
this
Axiom
,
that
naturally
fixes
or
applies
the
Mind
,
we
must
be
willing
to
consider
it
constantly
and
willingly
,
in
order
to
make
an
evident
Discovery
of
the
Truth
thereof
.
But
Men
seldom
think
on
Objects
which
do
not
affect
their
Senses
;
and
when
they
do
,
it
has
no
Prevalency
with
them
.
For
to
continue
our
said
Example
,
they
think
it
evident
,
that
the
whole
is
greater
than
its
part
;
that
a
Mountain
of
Marble
is
possible
,
and
that
a
Mountain
without
a
Vale
is
impossible
;
and
that
it
is
not
equally
evident
that
there
is
a
God
.
Nevertheless
we
may
say
,
that
the
Evidence
is
equal
in
all
those
Propositions
,
since
they
are
all
equally
distant
from
the
first
Principle
.
This
is
the
first
Principle
:
We
must
attribute
that
to
a
thing
which
we
conceive
clearly
to
be
included
in
the
Idea
which
represents
it
:
We
clearly
conceive
that
there
is
more
Extent
in
the
Idea
we
have
of
the
whole
,
than
in
the
Idea
we
have
of
its
part
:
That
a
possible
Existence
is
contain'd
in
the
Idea
of
a
Mountain
of
Marble
,
the
Impossible
Existence
in
the
Idea
of
a
Mountain
without
a
Vale
;
and
the
necessary
Existence
in
the
Idea
we
have
of
God
,
I
mean
,
of
an
Infinitely
perfect
Being
.
Therefore
the
whole
is
larger
than
part
of
it
:
Therefore
a
Mountain
of
Marble
may
be
Existent
:
Therefore
a
Mountain
without
a
Vale
cannot
be
Existent
:
Therefore
God
or
an
Infinitely
Perfect
Being
does
necessarily
Exist
.
It
is
visible
that
these
Conclusions
are
equally
distant
from
the
first
Principle
of
all
Sciences
:
They
are
then
equally
evident
in
themselves
:
It
is
then
as
evident
that
God
does
Exist
,
as
that
the
whole
is
greater
than
its
part
.
But
whereas
the
Idea's
of
Infinite
,
of
Perfections
,
of
necessary
Existence
,
are
not
Sensible
,
like
the
Idea's
of
the
whole
and
of
its
part
,
Men
fancy
they
do
not
perceive
what
they
are
not
sensible
of
;
and
though
these
Conclusions
are
equally
Evident
in
themselves
,
they
are
not
however
equally
receiv'd
.
There
are
Men
who
endeavour
to
perswade
us
,
that
they
have
no
Idea
of
an
infinitely
perfect
Being
.
But
I
do
not
know
what
induces
them
to
answer
positively
,
when
they
are
ask'd
whether
an
infinitely
perfect
Being
is
Round
or
Square
,
or
something
like
it
:
For
they
ought
to
answer
,
that
they
know
nothing
of
it
,
if
it
be
true
that
they
have
no
Idea
of
it
.
There
are
others
who
grant
,
that
those
Reason
well
who
conclude
,
that
God
is
not
an
Impossible
Being
,
from
this
,
that
we
see
the
Idea
of
God
includes
no
Contradiction
,
or
an
impossible
Existence
;
and
they
will
not
allow
us
to
conclude
in
the
same
manner
,
that
God
Exists
necessarily
,
from
this
that
we
conceive
a
necessary
Existence
in
the
Idea
we
have
of
him
.
Finally
,
There
are
others
who
pretend
that
this
proof
of
the
Existence
of
God
is
a
Sophism
;
and
that
the
Argument
only
concludes
,
supposing
it
is
true
that
God
Exists
,
as
if
it
were
not
prov'd
.
This
is
our
proof
:
We
ought
to
attribute
that
to
a
thing
which
we
conceive
clearly
to
be
included
in
the
Idea
which
represents
it
.
This
is
the
general
Principle
of
all
Sciences
.
Necessary
Existence
is
included
in
the
Idea
which
represents
a
Being
infinitely
Perfect
;
they
grant
it
.
And
Consequently
we
must
say
,
that
the
infinitely
perfect
Being
Exists
.
Yes
,
say
they
,
supposing
that
he
Exists
.
But
let
us
make
such
an
Answer
to
such
an
Argument
,
to
the
End
that
the
World
may
Judge
of
the
Solidity
of
their
Answer
.
Here
is
an
Argument
like
it
.
We
ought
to
attribute
that
to
a
thing
which
we
conceive
clearly
to
be
included
in
the
Idea
which
represents
it
:
That
is
the
Principle
.
We
clearly
conceive
four
Angles
included
in
the
Idea
which
represents
a
Square
,
or
we
conceive
clearly
that
possible
Existence
is
included
in
the
Idea
of
a
Marble
Tower
:
Therefore
a
Square
has
Four
Angles
:
Therefore
a
Marble
Tower
is
possible
.
I
say
those
Conclusions
are
true
,
supposing
that
the
Square
has
Four
Angles
;
just
as
they
answer
that
God
Exists
,
supposing
he
does
Exist
:
That
is
to
say
in
a
word
,
The
Conclusions
of
those
Demonstrations
are
true
,
supposing
they
are
true
.
I
own
,
that
if
I
should
make
such
an
Argument
as
this
,
we
must
attribute
that
to
a
thing
which
we
conceive
clearly
to
be
included
in
the
Idea
which
represents
it
,
for
we
clearly
conceive
the
necessary
Existance
included
in
the
Idea
of
a
Body
infinitely
Perfect
,
consequently
a
Body
infinitely
Perfect
Exists
.
It
is
true
,
I
say
,
that
should
I
make
such
an
Argument
,
People
would
be
in
the
right
to
answer
,
that
it
would
not
conclude
the
Actual
Existence
of
a
Body
infinitely
Perfect
;
but
only
supposing
that
there
were
such
a
Body
,
it
would
have
its
Existence
in
it self
.
The
reason
of
it
is
,
that
the
Idea
of
a
Body
infinitely
Perfect
is
a
Fiction
of
the
Mind
,
or
a
Compounded
Idea
;
which
consequently
may
be
False
or
Contradictory
,
as
indeed
it
is
:
For
we
cannot
clearly
conceive
a
Body
infinitely
Perfect
;
since
a
particular
Finite
Being
,
as
a
Body
is
,
cannot
be
conceiv'd
to
be
Universal
and
Infinite
.
But
the
Idea
of
God
,
or
of
a
general
Being
,
of
an
unlimited
Being
,
of
an
infinite
Being
,
is
not
a
Fiction
of
the
Mind
.
It
is
not
a
Compounded
Idea
which
includes
any
Contradiction
;
nothing
can
be
plainer
,
though
it
Comprehends
all
that
is
,
and
whatever
may
be
.
Now
that
plain
and
natural
Idea
of
Being
or
Infinity
,
includes
a
necessary
Existence
;
for
it
is
evident
,
that
Being
(
I
do
not
say
such
a
Being
)
has
Existence
in
it self
;
and
that
Being
cannot
actually
not
be
Being
,
since
it
is
impossible
and
contradictory
,
that
Real
Being
should
be
without
an
Existence
.
It
may
chance
that
Bodies
may
not
be
,
because
Bodies
are
such
Beings
as
participate
of
Being
,
and
depend
on
it
.
But
unlimited
Being
is
necessary
;
it
is
Independent
;
it
derives
what
it
is
from
it self
.
All
that
is
proceeds
from
it
.
If
there
is
any
thing
,
it
is
,
since
all
proceeds
from
it
:
But
though
there
were
nothing
in
particular
,
it
would
be
;
because
it
is
of
it self
,
and
we
cannot
conceive
it
clearly
as
not
Being
,
unless
we
look
upon
it
as
Being
in
particular
,
or
like
such
a
Being
;
and
that
we
thus
consider
all
other
Idea's
besides
that
of
Being
.
For
those
that
do
not
see
that
God
is
,
commonly
do
not
consider
Being
,
but
such
a
Being
;
and
consequently
a
Being
that
may
be
,
and
may
not
be
.
Moreover
,
that
we
may
yet
more
distinctly
apprehend
this
proof
of
the
Existence
of
God
,
and
answer
some
Objections
that
might
be
made
,
more
clearly
,
we
must
remember
that
when
we
see
a
Creature
,
we
do
not
see
it
in
it self
,
nor
by
it self
;
for
we
only
see
it
,
as
it
has
been
prov'd
in
the
Third
Book
,
by
the
sight
of
some
Perfections
that
are
in
God
,
which
represent
it
.
Thus
we
may
see
the
Essence
of
that
Creature
,
without
seeing
its
Existence
;
we
may
see
in
God
that
which
represents
it
,
without
its
Existing
.
Therefore
necessary
Existence
is
not
included
in
the
Idea
which
represents
it
,
it
not
being
necessary
that
it
should
be
,
to
the
End
it
may
be
seen
.
But
the
Case
is
very
different
in
the
insinitely
perfect
Being
;
It
can
only
be
seen
in
it self
;
for
nothing
that
is
Finite
can
represent
Infinity
So
that
we
cannot
see
God
,
unless
he
Exists
:
It
is
impossible
to
see
the
Essence
of
a
Being
infinitely
Perfect
,
without
seeing
the
Existence
of
it
:
We
cannot
see
it
barely
as
a
possible
Being
:
Nothing
Comprehends
it
;
and
if
we
think
on
it
,
it
must
be
.
But
it
is
useless
to
propose
these
kind
of
Demonstrations
to
the
common
sort
of
Mankind
.
These
Demonstrations
may
be
call'd
Personal
,
by
reason
that
they
do
not
generally
convince
all
Men.
We
must
use
more
sensible
ones
in
order
to
Convince
them
;
and
indeed
they
are
not
wanting
:
For
no
Truth
has
more
Proofs
than
that
of
the
Existence
of
God
.
This
was
only
urg'd
to
shew
,
that
refin'd
Truths
making
hardly
any
Impressions
on
our
Senses
,
are
taken
for
Illusions
and
Chimera's
;
whereas
,
when
gross
palpable
Truths
affect
the
Senses
,
forcing
the
Soul
to
consider
them
,
we
are
easily
perswaded
that
they
have
a
great
deal
of
reality
;
for
since
the
Fall
they
make
strong
Impressions
on
our
Mind
.
'T
is
for
the
same
reason
,
that
there
is
no
prospect
to
hope
,
that
the
common
part
of
Mankind
will
ever
submit
to
this
Demonstration
to
prove
,
that
Animals
are
not
sensible
,
viz.
that
being
Innocent
,
which
all
the
World
grants
,
and
I
suppose
it
,
if
they
were
capable
of
Sensation
,
it
would
happen
that
under
a
God
infinitely
Just
and
Almighty
,
an
Innocent
should
suffer
Grief
,
which
is
a
pain
,
and
the
punishment
of
Sin
.
Men
are
commonly
incapable
of
seeing
the
Evidence
of
this
Axiom
,
Sub
justo
Deo
,
quisquam
nisi
mereatur
,
miser
esse
non
potest
;
which
St.
Austin
makes
use
of
with
a
great
deal
of
Reason
against
Julian
,
to
prove
Original
Sin
,
and
the
Corruption
of
our
Nature
.
They
Fancy
that
there
is
neither
Force
nor
Solidity
in
this
Axiom
,
and
in
some
others
which
prove
,
that
Beasts
are
not
sensible
,
because
as
we
have
already
said
,
those
Axioms
are
refin'd
,
and
include
nothing
that
is
sensible
or
palpable
,
or
make
any
Impression
upon
our
Senses
.
The
sensible
Actions
and
Motions
of
Beasts
,
towards
the
preservation
of
that
Life
,
are
Reasons
,
which
though
only
probable
,
affect
us
more
;
and
which
consequently
,
incline
us
much
more
powerfully
to
believe
that
they
are
sensible
of
Pain
or
Grief
,
when
they
cry
out
being
struck
●●an
that
refin'd
Reason
of
the
pure
Mind
,
though
most
certain
and
evident
in
it self
.
For
it
is
certain
,
that
most
Men
have
no
other
reason
to
believe
that
Animals
have
Souls
,
I
speak
according
to
the
Common
Opinion
,
which
is
,
that
the
Chicken
is
form'd
from
the
Egg
,
tho
perhaps
it
only
receives
its
Nutriment
from
it
.
but
the
sensible
Sight
of
all
what
Beasts
do
for
the
preservation
of
their
Life
.
That
is
apparent
enough
from
this
,
that
most
People
do
not
imagin
there
is
a
Soul
in
an
Egg
,
although
the
Transformation
of
an
Egg
into
a
Chicken
,
is
infinitely
more
difficult
than
the
bare
preservation
of
the
Chicken
,
when
it
is
absolutely
form'd
.
For
as
more
Ingenuity
is
requi
d
to
make
a
Watch
out
of
a
piece
of
Iron
,
than
to
make
it
go
when
it
is
finish'd
,
it
would
be
more
reasonable
to
admit
a
Soul
in
an
Egg
,
in
order
to
Form
a
Chicken
,
than
to
make
that
Chicken
live
when
it
is
perfectly
Form'd
.
But
Men
do
not
see
the
admirable
manner
how
a
Chicken
is
Form'd
,
as
they
always
sensibly
see
in
what
manner
they
seek
for
those
things
that
are
necessary
for
their
preservation
.
Therefore
they
are
not
inclin'd
to
believe
that
there
are
Souls
in
Eggs
,
by
some
sensible
Impression
of
necessary
Motions
to
Transform
Eggs
into
Chickens
;
but
they
allow
Animals
Souls
,
by
reason
of
the
sensible
Impression
of
the
External
Actions
of
those
Animals
for
preservation
of
their
Life
;
although
the
reason
I
have
here
alledg'd
,
is
stronger
to
give
Souls
to
Eggs
than
to
Chickens
.
The
second
Reason
,
which
is
,
that
Matter
is
incapable
of
feeling
,
and
of
desiring
,
is
certainly
demonstrative
against
those
who
say
,
that
Animals
are
sensible
,
notwithstanding
their
Soul
is
Corporeal
.
But
Men
will
Eternally
Confound
and
Intangle
those
Reasons
,
rather
than
own
a
thing
contrary
to
Proofs
that
are
not
only
probable
,
but
very
sensible
and
feeling
:
And
there
is
no
way
to
convince
them
absolutely
,
but
in
opposing
sensible
proofs
to
their
sensible
proofs
;
and
in
shewing
them
visibly
,
that
all
the
parts
of
Animals
are
only
Machinal
;
and
that
they
may
move
without
a
Soul
by
the
meer
Impression
of
Objects
,
and
by
their
peculiar
Constitution
;
as
Monsieur
Descartes
has
begun
to
do
it
in
his
Treatise
of
Man
.
For
all
the
most
certain
and
evident
reasons
of
the
Understanding
alone
will
never
perswade
them
the
contrary
of
the
obscure
Proofs
they
have
by
the
Senses
:
And
we
only
expose
our selves
to
the
Laughter
of
Persons
of
a
superficial
Understanding
,
that
are
not
capable
of
much
Attention
,
when
we
undertake
to
convince
them
by
Reasons
above
the
common
Level
,
that
Animals
have
no
Feeling
.
Therefore
it
behoves
us
well
to
remember
,
that
the
Violent
Inclinations
we
have
for
Divertisements
,
Pleasures
,
and
generally
,
for
all
that
does
affect
us
,
throws
us
into
a
great
number
of
Errors
:
Because
the
Capacity
of
our
Mind
being
Bounded
,
that
Inclination
withdraws
our
Mind
continually
from
the
Attention
we
should
give
to
the
clear
and
distinct
Idea's
of
the
Understanding
,
which
are
proper
to
discover
Truth
,
to
apply
it
to
the
false
,
obscure
,
and
deceitful
Idea's
of
our
Senses
;
which
Influence
the
Will
more
by
the
hope
of
Good
and
Pleasure
,
than
they
Instruct
the
Mind
by
their
Light
and
Evidence
.
CHAP.
XII
.
Of
the
Effects
which
the
thought
of
Future
Bliss
and
Sufferings
is
capable
of
producing
in
the
Mind
.
IF
it
happens
often
that
the
little
Pleasures
and
slight
Pains
which
we
actually
feel
,
nay
more
,
which
we
have
a
Prospect
of
,
strangely
disturb
our
Imagination
,
and
hinder
us
from
judging
of
things
according
to
their
true
Idea's
;
we
have
no
reason
to
believe
that
the
prospect
of
Eternity
cannot
act
upon
our
Mind
.
But
it
will
be
necessary
to
consider
what
it
may
be
capable
of
producing
there
.
We
must
observe
in
the
First
Place
,
that
the
hopes
of
an
Eternity
of
Pleasures
does
not
Act
so
powerfully
upon
the
Mind
,
as
the
fear
of
an
Eternity
of
Torments
.
The
Reason
of
it
is
,
Men
do
not
Love
Pleasure
so
much
,
as
they
Hate
Pain
.
Moreover
,
by
the
Internal
Knowledge
they
have
of
their
Disorders
,
they
are
sensible
that
they
deserve
Hell
;
and
they
see
nothing
in
themselves
to
Merit
such
great
Rewards
,
as
to
participate
of
the
Felicity
of
God
himself
.
They
are
sensible
when
they
please
,
and
even
sometimes
against
their
Will
,
that
far
from
deserving
Rewards
,
they
are
worthy
of
the
greatest
Chastisements
;
for
their
Conscience
never
leaves
them
;
but
they
are
in
the
like
manner
continually
convinc'd
,
that
God
is
willing
to
shew
his
Mercy
upon
Sinners
,
after
having
satisfy'd
his
Justice
upon
his
Son
.
Therefore
the
Just
themselves
have
more
Lively
Apprehensions
of
the
Eternity
of
Torments
,
than
Hopes
of
an
Eternity
of
Pleasures
.
The
prospect
of
Pain
then
consequently
,
is
more
prevailing
than
the
prospect
of
Reward
;
and
here
is
partly
that
which
it
is
capable
of
producing
,
not
alone
,
but
as
a
principal
Cause
.
It
produces
an
infinite
number
of
Scruples
in
the
Mind
,
and
confirms
them
so
much
,
that
it
is
almost
impossible
to
get
rid
of
them
.
It
Extends
,
as
it
were
,
even
Faith
to
prejudices
,
and
makes
us
pay
the
Worship
which
is
only
due
to
God
,
to
Imaginary
Powers
.
It
obstinately
fixes
the
Mind
on
vain
or
dangerous
Superstitions
.
It
makes
Men
earnestly
and
zealously
Embrace
Human
Traditions
,
and
Practices
that
are
useless
for
Salvation
,
Judaick
and
Pharisaick
Devotions
,
which
have
been
invented
by
servile
Fear
.
Finally
,
it
sometimes
throws
Men
into
a
blindness
of
Despair
:
Insomuch
,
that
looking
confusedly
on
Death
as
an
Annihilation
,
they
foolishly
hasten
to
make
away
with
themselves
,
to
be
freed
of
the
Mortal
Disquiets
which
possess
and
frighten
them
.
There
is
often
more
Charity
than
Self-Love
,
in
the
Scrupulous
,
as
well
as
in
the
Superstitious
;
but
there
is
nothing
but
Self-love
in
the
desperate
:
For
taking
the
thing
rightly
,
those
must
needs
Love
themselves
extreamly
,
who
chuse
rather
not
to
be
,
than
to
be
uneasie
.
Women
,
Young
People
,
and
Weak
Minds
are
the
most
subject
to
Scruples
and
Superstitions
,
and
Men
are
more
liable
to
Despair
.
It
is
easie
to
know
the
reason
of
these
things
.
For
it
is
Visible
,
that
the
Idea
of
Eternity
being
the
greatest
,
the
most
terrible
,
and
the
most
frightful
of
all
those
that
surprise
the
Mind
,
and
strike
the
Imagination
,
it
is
necessary
it
should
be
attended
with
a
long
Train
of
Accessory
Idea's
,
to
make
together
a
considerable
Effect
upon
the
Mind
,
because
of
the
Relation
they
have
to
that
great
and
terrible
Idea
of
Eternity
.
Whatever
has
any
relation
to
Infinity
cannot
be
Little
,
or
if
it
is
Little
in
itself
,
it
receives
an
immense
greatness
by
that
Relation
,
which
cannot
be
compar'd
to
any
thing
that
is
Finite
.
Therefore
whatever
has
any
relation
,
or
even
what
we
fancy
to
have
any
relation
,
either
to
an
unavoidable
Eternity
of
Torments
,
or
Delights
which
is
propos'd
to
us
,
must
needs
frighten
those
Minds
that
are
capable
of
any
Reflection
or
Thought
.
The
Fibers
of
the
Brains
of
Women
,
or
young
People
,
and
of
weak
Minds
,
being
,
as
I
have
said
elsewhere
,
Soft
and
Flexible
,
receive
deep
Marks
of
one
of
these
two
:
And
when
they
have
abundance
of
Spirits
,
and
are
more
capable
of
Thought
and
Just
Reflection
,
they
receive
by
the
Vivacity
of
their
Imagination
a
very
great
number
of
false
Impressions
and
Accessary
Idea's
,
which
have
no
Natural
Relation
to
the
Principal
Idea
.
Nevertheless
that
Relation
,
though
Imaginary
,
maintains
and
fortifies
those
False
Impressions
,
and
Accessary
Idea's
which
it
has
created
.
When
two
Lawyers
are
ingag'd
in
some
great
Cause
,
which
wholly
takes
up
their
Mind
,
and
yet
do
not
understand
the
Case
,
they
often
have
vain
Fears
,
being
in
dread
that
certain
things
may
Prejudice
them
which
the
Judges
have
no
regard
to
,
and
which
experienced
Lawyers
do
not
fear
.
The
Affair
being
of
very
great
Consequence
to
them
,
the
Motion
it
produces
in
their
Brains
diffuses
it self
,
and
is
communicated
to
distant
traces
which
have
naturally
no
relation
to
it
.
It
fares
just
in
the
same
manner
with
the
Scrupulous
,
they
unreasonably
form
to
themselves
Subjects
of
Fear
and
Disquiet
;
and
instead
of
examining
the
Will
of
God
in
the
Holy
Scriptures
,
and
of
relying
on
those
whose
Imagination
is
not
tainted
;
their
Mind
is
wholly
taken
up
with
an
Imaginary
Law
,
which
disorderly
Motions
of
Fear
impress
on
their
Brains
.
And
though
they
are
inwardly
convinc'd
of
their
Weakness
,
and
that
God
does
not
require
from
them
certain
Duties
which
they
prescribe
to
themselves
,
since
they
hinder
them
from
serving
him
;
they
cannot
forbear
preferring
their
Imagination
to
their
Understanding
,
and
from
submitting
rather
to
certain
Confused
Sentiments
which
frighten
and
plunge
them
into
Error
,
than
to
the
Evidence
of
Reason
,
which
gives
them
Assurance
,
and
leads
them
again
into
the
right
way
to
Heaven
.
We
meet
often
with
a
great
deal
of
Charity
and
Virtue
in
Persons
that
are
afflicted
with
Scruples
;
but
there
is
not
near
so
much
in
those
that
are
addicted
to
some
Superstitions
,
and
who
imploy
themselves
chiefly
about
some
Judaick
or
Pharisaick
Practices
.
God
will
be
ador'd
in
Spirit
and
in
Truth
;
He
is
not
satisfied
with
Gestures
and
External
Civilities
,
as
kneeling
in
his
Presence
,
and
being
Praised
by
the
Motion
of
the
Lips
,
when
the
Heart
has
no
share
in
it
.
Men
indeed
are
satisfied
with
those
Marks
of
Respect
,
but
't
is
because
they
cannot
search
into
the
Heart
;
for
even
Men
would
be
serv'd
in
Spirit
and
in
Truth
.
God
requires
our
Mind
and
our
Heart
;
he
has
only
made
it
for
himself
,
and
he
only
preserves
it
for
himself
:
But
there
are
many
People
,
who
unfortunately
for
themselves
refuse
him
those
things
,
over
which
he
has
absolute
Right
.
They
harbour
Idols
in
their
Hearts
,
which
they
adore
in
Spirit
and
in
Truth
,
and
to
whom
they
Sacrifice
themselves
.
But
whereas
the
True
God
threatens
them
in
the
Secret
of
their
Consciences
,
with
an
Eternity
of
Torments
to
punish
the
Excess
of
their
Ingratitude
;
yet
they
will
not
quit
their
Idolatry
;
they
bethink
themselves
of
performing
some
good
Works
externally
:
They
Fast
like
others
,
they
give
Alms
,
they
say
Prayers
,
they
continue
for
some
time
in
the
like
Exercises
;
and
whereas
they
are
troublesom
to
those
that
want
Charity
,
they
leave
them
commonly
to
imbrace
certain
little
Practices
or
easie
Devotions
,
which
agreeing
with
Self-Love
,
necessarily
and
insensibly
overthrows
all
the
Morals
of
Jesus
Christ
.
They
are
Faithful
,
Earnest
and
Zealous
Defenders
of
those
Humane
Traditions
,
which
Ignorant
Persons
perswade
them
to
be
very
Useful
,
and
such
things
as
the
Idea
of
Eternity
that
frightens
them
,
does
continually
represent
,
they
eagerly
defend
,
as
absolutely
necessary
for
their
Salvation
.
It
is
not
so
with
the
Just
:
They
hear
the
Threatnings
of
their
God
,
as
well
as
the
Impious
;
but
the
confused
Noise
of
their
Passions
,
does
not
hinder
them
from
hearkning
to
his
Counsels
.
The
false
Rays
of
Humane
Tradition
do
not
blind
them
so
far
,
as
to
make
them
Insensible
of
the
Light
of
Truth
.
They
put
their
Confidence
in
the
Promises
of
Jesus
Christ
,
and
they
follow
his
Councils
;
for
they
know
that
the
Promises
of
Men
are
as
Vain
as
their
Counsels
.
Nevertheless
we
may
say
,
That
that
Fear
which
the
Idea
of
Eternity
creates
in
their
Mind
,
produces
sometimes
so
great
a
Disorder
in
their
Imagination
,
that
they
dare
not
absolutely
Condemn
those
Humane
Traditions
;
and
that
sometimes
they
approve
them
by
their
Example
,
because
they
have
some
Appearance
of
Wisdom
in
their
Superstition
,
and
in
their
False
Humility
;
like
those
Pharisaical
Traditions
mentioned
by
St.
Paul
.
Col.
2.22
,
23.
But
that
which
is
particularly
worthy
of
Consideration
,
and
which
does
not
so
much
relate
to
the
Corruption
of
Manners
,
as
to
the
Disorder
of
the
Mind
,
is
,
That
the
Fear
we
have
before
mentioned
,
extends
to
the
Faith
,
as
well
as
the
Zeal
,
of
those
that
are
affected
with
it
;
even
to
Things
that
are
False
,
and
Unworthy
the
Holiness
of
our
Religion
.
There
are
many
People
who
do
believe
,
and
that
with
an
Obstinate
Faith
,
That
the
Earth
is
Immovable
in
the
Center
of
the
World
:
That
Animals
are
Sensible
of
real
Pain
:
That
there
are
Forms
or
Accidents
really
distinct
from
Matter
:
And
a
World
of
the
like
False
or
Uncertain
Opinions
,
because
they
fancy
that
they
should
oppose
the
Faith
in
denying
it
.
They
are
frighten'd
by
the
Expressions
of
the
Holy
Bible
,
which
speaks
to
our
Capacity
,
and
consequently
makes
use
of
the
common
Manner
of
Speaking
,
without
any
Design
to
Instruct
us
in
Natural
Philosophy
.
They
do
not
only
believe
what
the
Spirit
of
God
will
teach
them
,
but
also
all
the
Opinions
of
the
Jews
.
They
do
not
see
,
for
Example
,
that
Joshua
speaks
before
his
Soldiers
,
as
Copernicus
himself
,
Galileus
and
Descartes
would
speak
to
the
Vulgar
part
of
Mankind
;
and
that
though
he
had
been
of
the
Opinion
of
these
last
Philosophers
,
he
would
not
have
commanded
the
Earth
to
stand
still
,
because
he
could
not
have
made
his
Army
Sensible
,
by
unintelligible
words
,
of
the
Miracle
which
God
perform'd
for
his
People
.
Those
who
are
of
Opinion
that
the
Sun
is
Immovable
,
nevertheless
tell
their
Servants
,
their
Friends
,
and
even
those
that
are
of
their
Opinion
,
that
the
Sun
Rises
or
Sets
:
They
always
speak
like
other
Men
,
when
their
Principal
Design
is
not
to
Philosophise
.
Did
Joshua
perfectly
understand
Astronomy
;
or
if
he
did
,
did
his
Souldiers
understand
it
?
Or
if
both
he
and
his
Souldiers
were
skill'd
in
it
,
can
any
body
think
that
they
design'd
to
Philosophise
while
they
only
thought
of
Fighting
?
Therefore
Joshua
spoke
as
he
ought
to
do
,
although
both
he
and
his
Souldiers
had
believ'd
what
the
most
Eminent
Astronomers
believe
at
this
time
.
Nevertheless
those
words
of
that
great
Captain
,
Sun
,
stand
thou
still
upon
Gibeon
;
and
what
is
said
afterwards
,
that
the
Sun
stood
still
according
to
his
Command
,
perswade
many
People
,
that
the
Opinion
of
the
Motion
of
the
Earth
,
is
not
only
a
dangerous
Opinion
,
but
that
it
is
also
absolutely
Heretical
,
and
not
to
be
maintain'd
.
They
have
heard
that
some
Pious
Persons
,
for
whom
we
ought
to
have
a
great
deal
of
Respect
and
Deference
,
condemn'd
that
Opinion
.
They
have
a
confused
Knowledge
of
something
that
happen'd
upon
that
Subject
to
a
Famous
Astronomer
of
our
Age
,
and
that
seems
sufficient
for
them
to
believe
Obstinately
,
that
Faith
extends
even
to
that
Opinion
.
A
certain
confus'd
Sentiment
,
excited
and
entertain'd
by
a
Motion
of
Fear
,
which
they
hardly
perceive
,
makes
them
harbour
Diffidences
against
those
that
follow
Reason
in
things
which
relate
to
Reason
.
They
look
upon
them
as
Hereticks
:
They
are
Uneasie
and
Troubled
whenever
they
hear
them
speak
;
and
their
Secret
Apprehensions
create
in
their
Minds
the
same
Respect
,
and
the
same
Submission
for
their
own
vulgar
Opinions
,
and
for
many
other
Notions
of
Philosophy
,
as
for
Truths
which
are
the
Objects
of
Faith
.
CHAP.
XIII
.
I.
Of
the
Third
Natural
Inclination
,
which
is
the
Friendship
we
have
for
other
Men.
II.
It
Induces
us
to
approve
our
Friends
Thoughts
,
and
to
deceive
them
by
False
Praises
.
OF
all
our
Inclinations
taken
in
General
,
and
in
the
Sense
I
have
explain'd
it
in
the
first
Chapter
,
there
only
remains
that
which
we
have
for
those
we
Live
with
,
and
for
all
the
Objects
that
are
about
us
;
of
which
I
shall
hardly
say
any
thing
,
because
that
relates
more
to
Morality
and
Policy
,
than
to
our
Subject
.
As
that
Inclination
is
always
joyn'd
with
the
Passions
,
it
would
perhaps
be
sitter
to
speak
of
it
in
the
following
Book
:
But
Order
is
not
of
so
much
Consequence
in
that
Point
.
In
order
rightly
to
apprehend
the
Causes
and
Effects
of
that
Natural
Inclination
,
I.
Of
the
Third
Natural
Inclination
,
which
is
the
Friendship
we
have
for
other
Men.
it
is
fit
to
know
that
God
Loves
all
his
Works
,
and
that
he
Unites
them
strictly
one
to
another
for
their
Mutual
Preservation
.
For
continually
loving
the
Works
he
produces
,
since
they
are
produc'd
by
his
Love
,
he
also
continually
Imprints
in
our
Hearts
a
Love
for
his
Works
,
since
he
continually
produces
a
Love
in
our
Hearts
like
unto
his
.
And
to
the
end
the
Natural
Love
we
have
for
our selves
may
not
Annihilate
it self
,
and
overmuch
weaken
that
which
we
have
for
the
Things
that
are
not
in
us
:
And
on
the
contrary
,
That
those
two
Loves
which
God
puts
in
us
,
may
maintain
and
strengthen
each
other
,
he
has
united
us
in
such
a
manner
to
all
things
that
are
about
us
,
and
particularly
with
the
Beings
of
the
same
Species
with
us
,
that
their
Sufferings
Afflict
us
Naturally
,
their
Joy
Rejoyces
us
,
and
their
Grandeur
,
their
Fall
,
their
Diminution
,
seems
to
Augment
or
to
diminish
our
own
Being
.
The
new
Dignities
of
our
Relations
and
Friends
,
the
new
Acquisitions
of
those
that
have
most
relation
to
us
,
the
Conquests
and
Victories
of
our
Prince
,
and
even
the
new
Discoveries
of
the
new
World
,
seem
to
add
something
to
our
Subsistance
.
Being
united
to
all
these
things
,
we
rejoyce
at
their
Grandeur
and
Extension
;
we
could
even
wish
that
this
World
had
no
Limits
;
and
that
thought
of
some
Philosophers
,
that
the
Works
of
God
have
no
Bounds
,
does
not
only
seem
worthy
of
God
,
but
also
very
agreeable
to
Man
,
who
feels
a
Secret
Joy
at
his
being
a
part
of
Infinity
,
because
as
little
as
he
is
in
himself
,
he
fancies
that
he
becomes
as
it
were
Infinite
,
by
defusing
himself
into
the
Infinite
Beings
that
are
about
him
.
It
is
true
,
that
the
Union
which
we
have
with
all
the
Bodies
that
move
in
those
great
Spaces
,
is
not
very
strict
,
and
therefore
it
is
not
Sensible
to
most
Men
:
And
there
are
some
who
matter
the
new
Discoveries
that
are
made
in
the
Heavens
so
little
,
that
one
might
believe
they
are
no-wise
united
to
it
by
Nature
;
if
it
were
not
known
that
it
is
either
for
want
of
Knowledge
,
or
because
they
are
too
much
engag'd
to
other
things
.
The
Soul
,
though
united
to
the
Body
it
Animates
,
does
not
always
feel
the
Motions
of
it
;
or
if
it
does
,
it
does
not
always
apply
it self
to
them
.
The
Passion
which
moves
it
,
being
sometimes
greater
than
the
Sensations
which
affects
it
,
it
seems
to
be
more
powerfully
engag'd
to
the
Object
of
its
Passion
than
to
its
own
Body
:
For
it
is
principally
by
the
Passions
that
the
Soul
defuses
it self
upon
External
Objects
,
that
it
feels
it
is
really
united
to
every
thing
about
it
;
as
it
is
chiefly
by
Sensation
that
it
defuses
it self
in
its
own
Body
,
and
is
Sensible
that
it
is
united
to
all
the
Parts
that
Compose
it
.
But
whereas
one
cannot
conclude
that
the
Soul
of
a
Passionate
Person
is
not
united
to
his
Body
,
because
he
is
prodigal
of
his
Life
,
and
takes
no
Care
for
the
Preservation
of
it
:
So
there
is
no
reason
to
imagine
,
that
we
are
not
naturally
engag'd
to
all
things
,
because
there
are
some
for
which
we
are
not
concern'd
.
Would
you
for
Example
know
,
whether
Men
are
united
to
their
Prince
,
or
their
Country
?
Seek
out
some
who
understand
their
Interest
,
and
have
no
particular
Affairs
to
take
up
their
Mind
:
Then
you
will
see
how
Earnest
they
are
for
News
,
their
Disquiet
for
Battles
,
their
Joy
for
Victories
,
their
Affliction
in
Defeats
:
There
you
will
clearly
see
,
that
Men
are
strictly
united
to
their
Prince
and
their
Country
.
In
like
manner
,
Would
you
know
whether
Men
are
united
to
China
,
Japan
,
or
the
Planets
and
fix'd
Stars
?
Seek
out
some
,
or
else
imagine
some
,
whose
Country
and
Family
enjoy
a
profound
Peace
,
that
have
no
particular
Passions
,
and
that
do
not
actually
feel
the
Union
that
unites
them
to
things
that
are
nearer
us
than
the
Heavens
;
and
you
will
find
,
that
if
they
have
any
Knowledge
of
the
Greatness
and
Nature
of
those
Stars
,
they
will
rejoyce
at
the
Discovery
of
any
of
them
;
they
will
consider
them
with
Pleasure
;
and
if
they
are
Ingenious
,
they
will
willingly
take
the
Trouble
to
observe
and
Calculate
their
Motions
.
Those
who
are
busied
with
Affairs
,
seldom
mind
whether
any
Comet
appears
,
or
whether
there
is
an
Eclipse
:
But
those
who
are
not
so
closely
united
to
the
things
that
are
near
them
,
are
very
fond
of
these
sort
of
Events
;
because
there
is
nothing
to
which
we
are
not
united
,
though
we
do
not
always
feel
it
;
as
we
do
not
always
feel
that
our
Soul
is
united
,
I
do
not
say
to
our
Arm
,
or
to
our
Hand
,
but
to
our
Heart
,
and
to
our
Brain
.
The
strongest
Natural
Union
which
God
has
put
between
us
and
his
Works
,
is
that
which
united
us
with
those
Men
we
live
with
:
God
has
commanded
us
to
Love
them
like
our selves
;
and
that
the
Love
of
Choice
,
by
which
we
love
them
,
may
be
Firm
and
Constant
,
he
upholds
and
strengthens
it
continually
,
by
a
Natural
Love
which
he
imprints
in
us
.
In
order
thereunto
he
has
laid
upon
us
some
Invisible
Tyes
which
necessarily
oblige
us
to
Love
them
;
to
watch
their
Preservation
like
our
own
;
to
look
upon
them
as
necessary
parts
to
the
whole
which
we
compose
with
them
,
and
without
which
we
cannot
Subsist
.
There
is
nothing
more
Admirable
than
those
Natural
Relations
which
are
found
betwixt
the
Inclinations
of
the
Minds
of
Men
,
between
the
Motions
of
their
Bodies
,
and
between
these
Inclinations
and
Motions
.
All
this
Secret
Chain
is
a
Wonder
which
can
never
be
sufficiently
admir'd
,
and
which
can
never
be
apprehended
:
At
the
sight
of
any
Pain
which
Surprises
,
or
that
is
felt
,
for
example
,
we
cry
out
;
that
Cry
which
often
comes
out
before
we
are
aware
of
it
,
by
the
Disposition
of
the
Machine
,
Infallibly
strikes
the
Ears
of
those
that
are
near
enough
to
afford
us
the
Assistance
we
stand
in
need
of
:
It
penetrates
through
them
,
and
makes
it self
understood
to
People
of
all
Nations
,
and
of
all
Qualities
whatever
;
for
that
Cry
is
of
all
Languages
and
of
all
Qualities
,
as
indeed
it
ought
to
be
:
It
moves
the
Brain
,
and
in
a
Moment
changes
the
whole
Disposition
of
the
Body
of
those
that
are
struck
by
it
:
Morcover
,
it
makes
them
run
to
assist
before
they
are
aware
of
it
:
But
it
is
not
long
without
acting
upon
the
Mind
,
and
without
obliging
them
to
be
willing
to
relieve
them
,
and
of
thinking
of
Means
to
secure
those
that
have
made
that
Natural
Prayer
;
provided
always
the
said
Prayer
,
or
rather
this
pressing
Command
be
Just
and
according
to
the
Rules
of
Society
:
For
an
Indiscreet
Cry
,
made
without
a
Cause
,
or
out
of
a
vain
Fear
,
produces
Indignation
and
Scorn
in
the
Assistants
,
instead
of
Compassion
,
because
in
crying
without
a
cause
,
we
abuse
things
establish'd
by
Nature
for
our
Preservation
.
That
Indiscreet
Cry
naturally
produces
Aversion
,
and
the
Desire
of
revenging
the
Abuse
that
has
been
offer'd
to
Nature
,
I
mean
to
the
Order
of
things
,
provided
he
that
made
it
,
did
it
voluntarily
:
But
it
ought
only
to
produce
the
Passion
of
Laughter
,
mix'd
with
some
Compassion
,
without
Aversion
and
a
Desire
of
Revenge
;
when
it
proceeds
from
Fear
,
that
is
,
from
a
false
Appearance
of
a
pressing
Necessity
,
which
has
induced
any
one
to
cry
out
:
For
Laughter
or
Jest
is
necessary
to
repel
their
Fear
,
and
to
correct
them
;
and
Compassion
is
necessary
to
Succor
them
as
Weak
:
It
is
impossible
to
conceive
any
thing
better
order'd
.
I
do
not
pretend
to
explain
by
Example
,
which
are
the
Springs
,
and
the
Relations
which
the
Author
of
Nature
has
placed
in
the
Brains
of
Men
and
all
Animals
,
to
maintain
the
Consent
and
Union
which
is
necessary
for
their
Preservation
.
I
only
make
some
Reflections
upon
those
Springs
that
People
may
think
upon
them
,
and
may
carefully
inquire
,
not
how
those
Springs
move
,
nor
how
their
Motion
is
communicated
by
the
Air
,
by
the
Light
,
and
by
all
the
little
Bodies
that
surround
us
,
for
that
is
almost
Incomprehensible
and
is
not
necessary
,
but
at
least
to
know
what
are
the
Effects
of
it
:
One
may
by
different
Observations
,
discover
the
Bonds
that
unite
us
one
to
another
,
but
it
is
impossible
to
know
how
that
is
done
:
We
easily
see
how
a
Watch
points
out
the
Hour
;
but
it
requires
time
to
discover
the
Reasons
of
it
;
and
there
are
so
many
different
Springs
in
the
Brain
of
the
least
Animal
,
that
nothing
can
equal
it
in
the
most
studied
Machines
.
If
it
is
not
possible
perfectly
to
apprehend
the
Springs
of
our
Machine
,
neither
is
it
absolutely
necessary
;
but
it
is
absolutely
necessary
in
order
to
govern
our selves
,
to
know
the
Effects
which
those
Springs
are
capable
of
producing
in
us
.
It
is
not
necessary
to
know
how
a
Watch
is
made
to
use
it
;
but
if
Men
will
use
it
,
to
regulate
their
time
,
it
is
at
least
necessary
to
know
that
it
points
at
the
hours
.
Nevertheless
there
are
some
so
little
capable
of
Reflection
,
that
one
might
almost
compare
them
to
inanimated
Machines
;
they
do
not
feel
in
themselves
the
Springs
which
slacken
at
the
sight
of
Objects
;
they
are
often
agitated
without
perceiving
their
own
Motions
;
they
are
Slaves
without
feeling
their
Bonds
:
Finally
,
They
are
guided
a
Thousand
different
ways
,
without
knowing
the
Hand
of
him
that
guides
them
:
They
think
themselves
the
only
Authors
of
all
their
Motions
;
and
not
distinguishing
what
passes
within
them
,
as
a
Consequence
of
a
Free
Act
of
their
Will
,
from
that
which
is
produced
there
by
the
Impression
of
the
Bodies
which
are
about
them
,
they
think
they
guide
themselves
while
they
are
guided
by
some
other
.
But
this
is
not
a
proper
place
to
explain
these
things
.
The
Relations
which
the
Author
of
Nature
has
put
between
our
Natural
Inclinations
,
in
order
to
Unite
us
together
,
seems
yet
more
worthy
of
our
Application
and
Enquiries
,
than
those
that
are
between
Bodies
,
or
between
Minds
in
relation
to
Bodies
.
For
all
things
are
regulated
there
in
such
a
manner
,
that
the
Inclinations
which
seem
to
be
most
opposite
to
Society
,
are
the
most
useful
,
when
they
are
somewhat
moderated
.
The
desire
,
for
Instance
,
which
all
Men
have
for
Grandeur
,
tends
to
the
Dissolution
of
all
Societies
.
Nevertheless
,
that
desire
is
temper'd
in
such
a
manner
,
by
the
Order
of
Nature
,
that
it
serves
more
for
the
good
of
the
Publick
,
than
many
other
feeble
Languishing
Inclinations
.
For
it
gives
Emulation
,
it
Excites
Men
to
Vertue
,
it
Buoyes
up
their
Courage
in
the
Services
they
do
their
Country
;
and
so
many
Victories
would
not
be
won
,
did
not
Soldiers
,
and
particularly
Officers
aspire
to
Glory
,
and
to
Imployments
.
Thus
all
those
who
Compose
Armies
,
designing
only
their
own
Interest
,
do
notwithstanding
procure
the
Good
of
their
Country
.
Which
shews
,
that
it
is
very
advantageous
for
the
Publick
Good
,
that
all
Men
should
have
a
secret
desire
of
Grandeur
,
provided
it
be
moderated
.
But
should
all
private
Persons
appear
to
be
what
they
really
are
;
should
they
freely
tell
others
that
they
design
to
be
the
principal
Parts
or
Members
of
the
Body
they
Compose
,
and
never
to
be
the
least
,
it
would
not
be
the
way
to
Unite
them
together
.
All
the
Members
of
a
Body
cannot
be
the
Head
and
Heart
of
it
:
There
must
be
Feet
and
Hands
,
little
ones
as
well
as
great
ones
,
Men
to
Obey
as
well
as
to
Command
;
and
should
every
Body
say
openly
,
that
they
will
Command
and
never
Obey
,
as
indeed
every
Body
wishes
Naturally
,
it
is
visible
that
all
Bodies
Politick
would
destroy
themselves
,
and
Disorder
and
Injustice
would
Reign
every
where
.
Therefore
it
was
necessary
,
that
those
who
have
most
Sense
,
and
are
the
fittest
to
become
the
Noble
Parts
of
that
Body
,
and
to
Command
the
rest
,
should
be
Naturally
Civil
;
that
is
,
they
should
be
induc'd
by
a
secret
Inclination
,
to
shew
others
by
their
Behaviour
,
and
Affable
and
Gentile
Expressions
,
that
they
think
themselves
unworthy
of
being
thought
on
,
and
that
they
believe
they
are
the
least
of
Men
:
But
that
those
they
speak
to
are
worthy
of
all
sorts
of
Honours
,
and
that
they
have
a
great
Esteem
and
Veneration
for
them
.
In
fine
,
to
supply
the
defect
of
Charity
,
and
the
Love
of
Order
,
it
has
been
necessary
that
those
who
Command
others
,
should
have
the
Art
of
deceiving
'em
by
an
Imaginary
Humiliation
,
which
only
consists
in
Civilities
and
Words
,
in
order
to
enjoy
that
preheminence
without
Envy
which
is
necessary
in
the
whole
Body
.
For
thus
all
Men
do
in
some
measure
possess
the
Grandeur
they
desire
:
The
great
ones
possess
it
in
reality
,
[
](A51655-e50250-b)*
*
I
speak
as
a
Man
;
for
the
true
Grandeur
of
the
Earth
does
not
consist
in
a
turn
of
imagination
.
and
the
little
ones
,
and
the
weak
only
possess
it
in
Imagination
;
being
perswaded
in
some
measure
by
the
Compliments
of
others
,
that
they
are
not
look'd
upon
as
they
are
,
that
is
,
as
the
least
of
Men.
It
is
easie
to
conclude
by
the
by
,
from
what
we
have
said
,
That
it
is
a
great
Breach
of
Civility
to
speak
often
of
ones
self
,
especially
,
advantageously
,
though
one
did
possess
all
sorts
of
good
Qualifications
;
since
it
is
not
allowable
to
speak
to
those
we
Converse
with
as
if
we
were
above
them
,
unless
it
be
on
certain
occasions
,
and
when
there
are
External
and
Sensible
Characters
which
Elevate
us
above
them
.
For
Contempt
is
the
greatest
of
all
Injuries
:
It
is
that
which
is
most
capable
of
destroying
Society
;
and
we
must
not
expect
,
that
a
Man
to
whom
we
have
given
a
hint
,
that
we
look
upon
him
to
be
below
us
,
will
ever
join
with
us
,
because
Men
cannot
endure
to
be
thought
the
meanest
part
of
the
Body
they
Compose
.
The
Inclination
of
Men
for
Compliments
,
is
therefore
very
proper
to
Counterpoise
that
which
they
have
for
Esteem
and
Preferment
,
and
to
soften
the
Internal
Pain
which
those
feel
that
are
the
meanest
parts
of
the
Body
Politick
;
and
it
is
most
certain
,
that
the
mixture
of
those
two
Inclinations
does
produce
very
good
Effects
to
maintain
Society
.
But
there
is
a
strange
Corruption
in
those
Inclinations
,
as
well
as
in
the
Friendship
,
Compassion
and
Good
Will
of
the
others
,
which
tend
to
Unite
Men
together
.
That
which
ought
to
maintain
Civil
Society
,
often
causes
the
Communication
and
Establishment
of
Error
.
Of
all
the
Inclinations
that
are
necessary
for
Civil
Society
,
II.
That
Inclination
induces
us
to
approve
the
thoughts
of
our
Friends
,
and
to
deceive
them
by
false
Praises
.
those
which
throw
us
most
into
Error
are
Friendship
,
Favour
,
Gratitude
,
and
all
the
other
Inclinations
which
induce
us
to
speak
too
advantageously
of
others
when
they
are
present
.
We
do
not
limit
our
Love
to
the
Persons
of
our
Friends
,
but
we
also
Love
whatever
does
any
way
belong
to
them
:
And
as
they
commonly
express
some
Passion
in
the
Defence
of
their
Opinions
,
they
insensibly
incline
us
to
believe
them
,
to
approve
them
,
and
even
to
defend
them
with
more
Obstinacy
and
Passion
than
they
do
themselves
:
Because
it
would
often
look
ill
in
them
to
maintain
their
own
Opinions
with
Heat
;
But
no
Body
can
find
fault
with
us
if
we
defend
them
,
In
them
it
would
be
Self-Love
,
in
us
't
is
Generosity
.
We
have
an
Affection
for
other
Men
upon
several
accounts
;
for
they
may
please
and
serve
us
in
several
ways
.
The
resemblance
of
Humours
,
of
Inclinations
,
of
Imployments
;
their
Air
,
their
Behaviour
,
their
Virtue
,
their
Estate
,
the
Affection
or
Esteem
they
express
for
us
,
the
Services
they
have
done
us
,
or
that
we
expect
from
them
,
and
several
other
particular
reasons
,
do
determin
us
to
Love
them
.
Therefore
when
any
of
our
Friends
,
I
mean
some
Person
that
has
the
same
Inclinations
that
appears
well
,
that
speaks
agreeably
,
whom
we
think
Virtuous
,
or
of
great
Quality
,
who
expresses
an
Affection
and
Esteem
for
us
,
that
has
done
us
some
Service
,
or
from
whom
we
expect
any
;
or
finally
,
whom
we
Love
for
some
other
particular
reason
:
If
any
such
Person
,
I
say
,
chances
to
advance
some
Proposition
,
we
suffer
our selves
strait
to
be
perswaded
by
them
,
without
consulting
our
Reason
.
We
maintain
his
Opinion
without
examining
whether
it
be
Consonant
to
Truth
,
and
often
even
contrary
to
our
own
Conscience
,
according
to
the
Obscurity
and
Confusion
of
our
Mind
,
according
to
the
Corruption
of
our
Heart
,
and
according
to
the
advantage
we
expect
to
derive
from
our
false
Generosity
.
It
is
not
necessary
to
bring
particular
Examples
of
those
things
in
this
place
;
for
People
are
seldom
an
hour
in
any
Company
without
observing
several
,
if
they
will
reflect
a
little
upon
them
.
Favours
and
Laughters
,
according
to
the
old
saying
,
do
but
seldom
side
with
Truth
;
but
almost
always
with
those
they
Love
.
He
that
speaks
is
Obliging
and
Civil
:
Therefore
he
is
in
the
right
.
If
what
he
says
is
barely
likely
,
it
is
look'd
upon
as
True
;
and
if
what
he
urges
,
is
absolutely
ridiculous
and
impertinent
,
it
will
at
least
become
very
probable
.
If
it
is
a
Man
that
Loves
me
,
who
has
an
Esteem
for
me
,
who
has
done
me
some
Service
,
and
is
desirous
and
capable
of
doing
me
more
,
who
has
maintain'd
my
Opinion
on
other
Occasions
,
I
should
be
ungratesul
and
imprudent
in
opposing
his
,
or
even
in
failing
to
applaud
him
.
Thus
Truth
is
abus'd
,
and
is
made
subservient
to
Interest
;
and
thus
we
embrace
each
others
false
Opinions
.
An
honest
Man
can
never
be
offended
when
any
one
that
instructs
and
informs
him
,
provided
it
be
done
according
to
the
Rules
of
Civility
:
And
when
our
Friends
take
Offence
at
our
representing
modestly
to
them
,
that
they
are
deceiv'd
,
we
must
allow
them
to
Love
themselves
and
their
Errors
;
since
they
will
have
it
so
,
and
because
we
have
not
the
Power
to
Command
them
,
nor
to
change
their
Mind
.
But
a
real
Friend
must
never
approve
the
Errors
of
his
Friend
.
For
we
ought
to
consider
,
that
we
do
them
more
harm
than
we
are
aware
of
,
when
we
injudiciously
defend
their
Opinions
.
Our
Applauses
swell
their
Hearts
,
and
confirm
their
Errors
;
they
become
Incorrigible
;
they
Act
and
Decide
as
if
they
were
become
Infallible
.
Whence
comes
it
that
the
Richest
,
the
most
Powerful
,
the
Noblest
,
and
generally
all
those
that
are
Elevated
above
others
,
think
themselves
very
often
Infallible
;
and
behave
themselves
as
if
they
had
a
great
deal
more
Reason
than
those
that
are
of
a
mean
and
low
Condition
,
unless
it
be
because
all
their
thoughts
are
indifferently
and
basely
approv'd
?
So
the
Approbation
we
give
our
Friends
,
perswades
them
by
degrees
that
they
have
more
Sense
than
others
;
which
makes
them
Proud
,
Bold
,
Imprudent
,
and
capable
of
falling
into
the
present
Errors
without
perceiving
it
.
Therefore
our
Enemies
are
often
kinder
to
us
,
and
inform
our
Understanding
more
by
their
Oppositions
,
than
our
Friends
by
their
Approbations
;
because
our
Enemies
oblige
us
to
stand
upon
our
Guard
,
and
to
be
Attentive
to
what
we
urge
;
which
alone
is
capable
to
make
us
sensible
of
our
Errors
.
But
our
Friends
Lull
us
asleep
,
and
gives
us
a
false
Confidence
,
which
makes
us
vain
and
ignorant
.
Men
therefore
must
never
admire
their
Friends
,
and
submit
to
their
Sentiments
out
of
kindness
,
as
they
must
never
oppose
those
of
their
Enemies
out
of
Malice
,
but
must
lay
aside
the
Spirit
of
Flattery
or
Contradiction
to
become
sincere
,
and
approve
Evidence
and
Truth
where-ever
they
find
it
.
We
ought
also
to
be
fully
perswaded
,
that
most
Men
are
inclin'd
to
Flatter
and
Compliment
us
,
out
of
a
kind
of
Natural
Inclination
,
to
appear
Witty
,
to
gain
the
good
Will
of
others
,
and
in
hopes
of
some
return
;
or
finally
,
out
of
a
kind
of
Scorn
and
Raillery
;
and
we
ought
never
to
suffer
our selves
to
be
impos'd
upon
,
by
whatever
can
be
said
to
us
.
Do
we
not
daily
see
that
Persons
who
know
not
each
other
,
nevertheless
extol
one
another
to
the
Skies
,
the
very
first
time
they
see
and
speak
to
one
another
?
And
what
is
more
common
than
to
see
some
who
give
hyperbolical
praises
,
and
express
extraordinary
motions
of
admiration
to
a
Person
that
has
spoken
in
publick
;
even
in
the
presence
of
those
with
whom
they
have
laugh'd
at
him
a
little
before
.
Whenever
People
Cry
out
,
and
grow
Pale
with
admiration
,
and
seem
as
it
were
astonish'd
at
what
they
hear
,
it
is
not
a
good
proof
that
he
that
speaks
says
Wonders
;
but
rather
that
he
speaks
to
Flatterers
,
that
he
has
Friends
,
or
perhaps
Enemies
who
Laugh
at
him
.
It
is
because
he
speaks
in
an
engaging
Way
,
that
he
is
Rich
and
Powerful
,
or
if
you
will
have
it
so
,
it
is
a
pretty
good
proof
that
what
he
says
is
grounded
upon
the
Confused
and
Obscure
Notions
of
the
Senses
,
but
very
moving
and
very
agreeable
,
or
that
he
has
a
Lively
Imagination
,
since
praises
are
given
to
Friendship
,
Riches
,
Dignities
,
Probabilities
,
and
very
seldom
to
Truth
.
It
may
be
expected
perhaps
,
that
having
treated
in
general
of
the
Inclinations
of
the
Mind
,
I
should
descend
to
an
exact
Account
of
all
the
particular
Motions
they
resent
at
the
sight
of
Good
and
Evil
,
viz.
That
I
should
explain
the
Nature
of
Love
,
Hatred
,
Joy
and
Sadness
,
and
of
all
Intellectual
Passions
both
general
and
particular
,
as
well
Simple
as
Compounded
.
But
I
have
not
engag'd
to
Explain
all
the
different
motions
the
Mind
is
capable
of
.
I
am
willing
it
should
be
known
that
my
principal
Design
in
all
that
I
have
written
hitherto
about
a
Search
after
Truth
,
has
been
to
make
Men
sensible
of
their
Weakness
and
Ignorance
;
and
that
we
are
all
liable
to
Error
and
Sin
.
I
have
said
it
,
and
say
it
again
,
perhaps
some
will
remember
it
:
My
Design
never
was
to
give
a
particular
Account
of
the
Nature
of
the
Mind
:
But
I
have
been
oblig'd
to
say
something
about
it
,
to
explain
Errors
in
their
Original
,
and
in
order
;
in
a
word
,
to
make
my self
more
Intelligible
:
And
if
I
have
gone
beyond
the
Bounds
I
had
propos'd
,
it
is
because
I
thought
I
had
some
new
things
to
say
,
which
seem'd
to
me
of
Consequence
,
and
which
I
thought
might
be
read
with
Pleasure
.
Perhaps
I
was
mistaken
;
but
that
presumption
was
necessary
to
encourage
me
to
write
them
.
For
how
can
one
speak
,
without
hopes
of
being
hearken'd
unto
?
The
Truth
is
,
I
have
said
many
things
which
do
not
seem
to
belong
so
much
to
the
Subject
I
am
treating
of
,
as
that
particular
of
the
Motions
of
the
Soul
:
I
own
it
,
but
it
is
not
my
Intention
to
oblige
my self
to
any
thing
,
when
I
prescribe
a
Method
to
my self
.
I
lay
down
a
Rule
to
guide
me
,
but
I
reserve
to
my self
the
power
of
turning
aside
from
it
as
I
walk
,
if
I
meet
with
any
thing
that
deserves
to
be
consider'd
.
I
may
leave
the
way
sometimes
to
rest
my self
,
provided
I
do
not
lose
my self
.
Those
who
have
not
a
Mind
to
stop
with
me
,
may
go
on
,
if
they
please
,
't
is
but
turning
over
the
Leaf
:
But
if
they
are
offended
at
it
,
let
them
know
there
are
many
who
believe
those
places
which
I
have
pitch'd
upon
to
rest
in
,
make
them
find
the
Way
the
easier
and
more
delightful
.