BOOK
V.
of
the
Passions
.
CHAP.
I.
Of
the
Nature
and
Original
of
the
Passions
in
general
.
THE
Mind
of
Man
has
two
essential
or
necessary
relations
,
which
are
very
different
,
the
one
to
God
,
and
the
other
to
its
Body
;
as
it
is
a
pure
Spirit
it
is
essentially
united
to
the
Word
of
God
,
to
the
Eternal
Wisdom
and
Truth
,
for
't
is
only
by
this
Union
that
it
is
capable
of
thinking
,
as
has
been
shewn
in
the
3d
Book
;
as
an
humane
Spirit
it
has
an
essential
relation
to
its
Body
,
and
because
of
this
union
,
it
is
sensible
,
and
imagines
,
as
has
been
explained
in
the
First
and
Second
Books
.
I
call
that
sense
or
imagination
of
the
Mind
when
the
Body
is
the
natural
or
occasional
cause
of
its
thoughts
,
and
that
understanding
when
it
acts
of
it self
,
or
rather
when
God
acts
in
it
,
or
when
his
light
enlightens
it
after
many
different
manners
,
independantly
of
any
thing
whatever
that
passes
in
its
Body
.
'T
is
the
same
in
respect
of
the
humane
Will
;
as
a
Will
,
it
essentially
depends
upon
the
Love
which
God
bears
to
himself
,
upon
the
Eternal
Law
,
in
a
word
upon
the
Will
of
God
;
'T
is
only
because
God
loves
himself
that
we
love
any
thing
,
and
if
God
did
not
love
himself
,
or
if
he
did
not
continually
imprint
upon
the
Soul
of
Man
a
Love
like
to
his
,
I
mean
that
motion
of
Love
which
we
receive
for
good
in
general
,
we
should
love
nothing
,
we
should
will
nothing
,
and
consequently
we
should
be
without
any
will
,
since
the
will
is
nothing
else
but
the
impression
of
Nature
which
carries
towards
good
in
general
,
as
we
have
often
said
before
,
Book
I.
Ch.
I.
and
elsewhere
.
But
the
Will
as
it
is
an
humane
Will
,
essentially
depends
upon
the
Body
,
for
't
is
only
from
the
motions
of
the
Blood
and
Spirits
,
that
it
perceives
it self
agitated
with
all
sensible
Emotions
;
I
therefore
give
the
name
of
Natural
Inclinations
to
all
the
motions
of
the
Soul
which
are
common
to
us
with
pure
Intelligences
,
and
some
of
those
in
which
the
Body
has
a
great
share
,
but
whereof
it
is
only
indirectly
the
Cause
and
the
End
,
as
I
have
explained
in
the
preceding
Book
;
and
here
I
design
by
the
word
Passions
all
the
Emotions
which
the
Soul
naturally
feels
by
means
of
the
extraordinary
Motions
of
the
Animal
Spirits
and
Blood
,
These
are
the
sensible
Emotions
which
shall
be
the
Subject
of
this
Book
.
Although
the
Passions
are
inseparable
from
the
Inclinations
,
and
Men
were
no
farther
capable
of
sensible
love
or
hatred
than
as
they
are
capable
of
the
mental
,
yet
I
thought
it
would
not
be
amiss
to
treat
distinctly
of
'em
to
avoid
confusion
;
Those
that
consider
the
Passions
are
much
more
strong
and
lively
than
the
Natural
Inclinations
,
for
other
Objects
,
and
which
are
always
produced
from
other
Causes
,
will
acknowledge
,
that
't
is
not
without
reason
that
I
have
separated
things
that
are
inseparable
in
their
nature
.
Men
are
only
capable
of
Sensations
and
Imaginations
as
they
are
capable
of
pure
Intellections
,
the
Senses
and
Imagination
being
inseparable
from
the
Mind
,
however
no
one
has
opposed
a
distinct
Treatise
of
these
two
Faculties
of
the
Soul
,
although
they
are
naturally
inseparable
.
In
fine
,
the
Senses
and
Imagination
don't
differ
any
more
from
the
pure
Understanding
,
than
the
Passions
do
from
the
Inclinations
,
so
that
we
must
distinguish
these
two
last
Faculties
as
it
has
been
usual
to
do
with
the
three
first
,
that
we
may
be
better
able
to
discern
what
the
Soul
receives
from
its
Author
by
means
of
the
Body
,
from
that
which
it
has
from
him
independant
of
the
Body
.
The
only
inconvenience
that
will
naturally
result
from
the
distinction
of
these
two
things
thus
naturally
united
,
will
be
(
as
it
happens
upon
like
occasions
)
a
necessity
of
repeating
some
things
which
have
been
already
said
.
Man
is
one
,
although
composed
of
many
parts
;
and
the
union
of
these
parts
is
so
strict
,
that
it
can't
be
touch'd
in
one
place
without
affecting
the
whole
:
all
his
Faculties
have
such
a
mutual
dependance
upon
one
another
,
and
are
so
subordinate
,
that
't
is
impossible
to
explain
any
one
of
'em
without
speaking
something
of
the
other
;
Thus
by
endeavouring
to
avoid
confusion
,
I
am
obliged
10
repetition
,
but
't
is
better
to
repeat
than
confound
,
because
my
business
is
to
write
as
clear
as
I
can
,
and
in
this
necessity
of
repetition
,
I
can
only
endeavour
so
to
repeat
as
not
to
be
troublesom
to
my
Reader
.
The
Passions
of
the
Soul
are
Impressions
of
the
Author
of
Nature
,
which
incline
us
to
love
out
Body
,
and
whatever
may
be
useful
to
its
preservation
:
as
the
Natural
Inclinations
are
the
Impressions
of
the
same
Author
,
which
chiefly
incline
us
to
love
him
as
the
Soverain
Good
.
The
natural
or
occasional
Cause
of
these
Impressions
is
the
motion
of
the
Animal
Spirits
to
beget
and
cherish
an
agreeable
disposition
to
the
Object
which
is
perceived
;
so
that
the
Mind
and
Body
are
mutually
assistant
on
this
occasion
.
For
't
is
the
Order
of
God
,
that
the
Motions
of
our
Body
which
are
proper
to
execute
the
Order
of
our
Will
should
follow
it
,
and
that
the
Motions
of
our
Body
which
are
mechanically
excited
in
us
at
the
sight
of
any
Object
,
should
be
accompanied
with
a
passion
of
our
Soul
which
inclines
us
to
will
that
which
appears
useful
to
the
Body
;
't
is
this
continual
impression
of
the
Will
of
God
upon
us
,
which
so
strictly
unites
us
to
a
portion
of
Matter
,
and
if
this
impression
of
his
Will
should
but
cease
for
one
moment
,
we
should
from
that
moment
be
,
freed
from
the
dependance
we
have
upon
all
the
changes
which
happen
to
our
Body
.
I
can't
comprehend
how
some
persons
imagine
that
there
is
an
absolutely
necessary
connection
between
the
Motions
of
the
Spirit
and
Blood
,
and
the
Emotions
of
the
Soul
,
some
little
particles
of
Choler
are
violently
mov'd
in
the
Brain
,
therefore
the
Soul
must
necessarily
be
agitated
with
some
Passion
,
and
this
Passion
must
rather
be
Anger
than
Love
;
What
relation
can
be
conceived
betwixt
the
Idea
of
an
Enemies
Imperfection
,
a
Passion
of
Contempt
or
Hatred
,
and
betwixt
the
Corporeal
Motion
of
some
Particles
of
Blood
which
beat
against
some
parts
of
the
Brain
?
How
can
a
Man
perswade
himself
of
such
a
dependance
?
and
that
the
Union
or
Alliance
of
two
things
so
different
and
incompatible
as
Mind
and
Matter
,
can
be
caused
and
preserved
after
any
other
manner
than
by
the
continual
,
and
Almighty
,
and
Omnipotent
Will
of
the
Author
of
Nature
?
Those
who
think
that
Bodies
do
necessarily
and
of
themselves
communicate
Motion
in
the
moment
of
their
Concourse
,
think
something
like
truth
,
for
indeed
this
prejudice
has
some
foundation
,
Bodies
seem
to
have
an
essential
relation
to
Bodies
,
but
the
Mind
and
Body
are
two
kinds
of
Beings
so
opposite
,
that
those
who
think
the
Emotions
of
the
Soul
do
necessarily
follow
the
Motions
of
the
Spirits
and
Blood
,
think
something
that
has
not
the
least
appearance
of
truth
,
certainly
't
is
only
our
own
Consciousness
of
the
Union
of
those
two
Beings
,
and
our
Ignorance
of
the
continual
Operations
of
God
upon
his
Creatures
,
which
makes
us
imagine
another
Cause
of
the
Union
of
our
Soul
and
Body
besides
the
Will
of
God
.
It
is
difficult
to
determine
whether
this
relation
or
connexion
of
the
thoughts
of
Mans
Mind
with
the
Motion
of
his
Body
,
is
the
Punishment
of
Sin
or
the
Gift
of
Nature
,
and
some
Persons
believe
it
would
be
rashness
to
decide
either
way
;
't
is
well
known
that
Man
before
Sin
was
no
Slave
,
but
absolate
Master
of
his
Passions
,
and
by
his
Will
did
easily
stay
the
agitation
of
the
Blood
which
caused
them
;
But
I
should
be
hardly
perswaded
that
the
Body
did
not
sollicite
the
Soul
of
the
first
Man
to
an
enquiry
after
things
which
were
proper
for
the
preservation
of
his
Life
,
or
that
Adam
before
his
Fall
was
insensible
that
Fruits
were
agreeable
to
his
sight
,
and
pleasant
to
his
taste
,
especially
if
I
may
believe
the
Scripture
,
and
that
this
so
just
,
so
marvellous
an
Oeconomy
of
his
Senses
and
Passions
for
the
preservation
of
his
Body
was
a
Corruption
of
Nature
rather
than
the
first
Institution
.
Doubtless
Nature
is
now
corrupted
,
the
Body
acts
with
too
much
power
upon
the
Mind
,
instead
of
submissively
representing
to
it
its
necessities
,
it
tyrannizes
over
it
,
and
ravishes
it
from
God
,
to
whom
it
ought
to
be
inseparably
united
,
and
continually
prompts
it
to
a
pursuit
of
such
sensible
things
as
may
be
proper
for
its
conservation
,
the
Mind
is
become
as
it
were
immaterial
and
earthy
by
Sin
,
that
relation
and
Essential
Union
which
it
has
with
God
is
lost
,
I
mean
God
has
withdrawn
himself
from
it
,
as
much
as
possible
without
destroying
or
annihilating
it
.
Innumerable
disorders
have
followed
the
absence
or
estrangement
of
him
who
kept
it
in
order
,
and
without
making
a
longer
enumeration
of
our
Miseries
,
Man
is
by
the
fall
throughly
corrupted
in
all
his
parts
.
But
this
fall
has
not
destroyed
the
Work
of
God
,
that
which
God
gave
to
the
first
Man
is
always
sound
in
him
,
the
immutable
Will
of
God
which
constitutes
the
Nature
of
every
thing
,
was
not
changed
by
the
levity
and
inconstancy
of
Adam
s
Will
:
every
thing
that
God
did
Will
he
yet
Wills
,
and
because
his
Will
is
efficacious
,
he
effects
whatever
he
Wills
.
Mans
Sin
was
indeed
the
occasion
that
the
Divine
Will
did
not
constitute
the
Order
of
Grace
,
but
Grace
is
not
contrary
to
Nature
,
the
one
destroys
not
the
other
;
Because
God
fights
not
against
himself
,
he
never
repents
,
and
his
Wisdom
having
no
limits
,
his
Works
will
have
no
end
.
The
Will
of
God
which
constitutes
the
Order
of
Grace
is
joined
to
that
Will
which
effects
the
Order
of
Nature
,
not
to
change
it
,
but
to
repair
it
.
There
are
only
two
General
Wills
in
God
,
and
whatever
is
well
regulated
in
the
World
depends
upon
one
of
these
;
The
Passions
are
very
well
ordered
,
if
they
are
only
considered
in
order
to
the
Bodies
preservation
,
although
they
sometimes
deceive
us
in
few
and
particular
Cases
,
which
the
Universal
Cause
has
not
willed
to
remedy
;
we
may
then
conclude
that
the
Passions
are
of
the
,
Order
of
Nature
,
though
they
cannot
be
of
the
Order
of
Grace
.
It
is
true
,
if
we
consider
that
the
Sin
of
the
first
Man
has
deprived
us
of
the
assistance
of
a
God
that
is
Omnipresent
,
and
always
ready
to
defend
us
,
it
may
then
be
said
that
Sin
is
the
Cause
of
our
relation
to
sensible
things
,
because
it
has
separated
us
from
God
by
whom
only
we
can
be
delivered
from
their
Slavery
.
But
without
insisting
any
longer
upon
an
Enquiry
after
the
full
Cause
of
our
Passions
,
let
us
examine
their
extention
,
their
nature
in
particular
,
their
end
,
their
use
,
their
defects
,
and
whatever
relates
to
'em
.
CHAP.
II.
Of
the
Vnion
of
the
Mind
with
Sensible
Things
,
or
of
the
power
or
extension
of
the
Passions
in
General
.
IF
all
those
who
read
this
Work
would
be
at
the
trouble
of
reflecting
upon
what
they
feel
in
themselves
,
it
would
be
needless
to
shew
here
the
dependance
we
have
upon
sensible
Objects
;
I
can
say
nothing
in
this
matter
which
all
the
World
does
not
know
as
well
as
my self
if
they
will
but
think
;
so
that
I
would
forbear
to
say
any
of
it
,
if
experience
did
not
teach
me
,
that
Men
are
so
very
forgetful
of
themselves
,
that
they
do
not
so
much
as
think
upon
what
they
feel
,
nor
enquire
into
the
reasons
of
what
passes
in
their
Mind
:
I
thought
it
necessary
to
say
some
things
here
which
may
prepare
'em
to
reflect
upon
it
;
and
I
hope
that
those
who
know
'em
already
will
not
be
uneasie
at
the
reading
of
'em
:
for
although
we
are
not
delighted
with
the
bare
repetition
of
what
we
know
already
,
yet
we
may
be
pleased
with
the
repetition
of
what
we
know
and
think
of
at
the
same
time
.
The
most
honourable
Sect
of
Philosophers
,
and
that
whose
Opinions
many
Men
do
now
think
it
their
glory
to
embrace
,
would
perswade
us
that
it
is
in
our
own
power
to
be
happy
:
The
Stoics
continually
tell
us
of
self
dependance
,
Jam
beatum
esse
te
judica
cum
tibi
in
te
goudium
omne
nasc
.
tur
:
cum
in
his
que
homines
eripiunt
,
optant
,
custediunt
,
nihil
inveneris
,
non
d●co
quod
malis
,
sed
quod
velis
,
Sen.
Ep.
124.
that
we
must
not
be
afflicted
at
the
loss
of
our
Reputation
,
Goods
,
Friends
,
or
Relations
;
That
we
must
be
always
of
an
even
temper
of
Mind
,
and
easie
whatever
happens
,
whether
Exile
,
Injuries
,
Affronts
,
Distempers
,
and
even
Death
it self
,
for
these
are
not
Evils
to
be
feared
;
In
fine
,
they
tell
us
of
many
such
like
things
,
which
we
are
enough
inclined
to
believe
,
as
well
because
our
Pride
makes
us
in
love
with
Independence
,
as
because
our
Reason
tells
us
,
that
indeed
the
greatest
part
of
these
Evils
which
really
afflict
us
,
were
incapable
of
doing
it
,
if
all
things
were
in
order
.
But
God
has
given
us
a
Body
,
and
by
this
Body
united
us
to
all
sensible
things
;
Sin
has
subjected
us
to
our
Body
,
and
by
our
Body
has
made
us
dependent
upon
all
sensible
things
;
This
is
the
order
of
Nature
,
this
is
the
Will
of
the
Creator
,
that
all
Beings
which
he
hath
made
should
be
united
together
;
thus
we
are
united
to
all
things
,
and
't
is
the
Sin
of
the
first
Man
which
has
made
us
dependent
upon
all
Beings
to
which
God
has
only
allied
us
;
Thus
is
there
none
that
is
not
now
united
and
wholly
subjected
to
his
Body
,
and
by
his
Body
to
his
Relations
,
his
Friends
,
his
City
,
his
Prince
,
his
Country
,
his
Clothes
,
his
House
,
his
Lands
,
his
Horse
,
his
Dog
,
to
all
the
Earth
,
the
Sun
,
the
Stars
,
to
all
the
Heavens
.
'T
is
therefore
ridiculous
to
tell
Men
,
that
it
is
in
their
power
to
be
Happy
,
Wise
,
and
Free
,
and
they
only
mock
those
whom
they
seriously
advise
not
to
be
afflicted
at
the
loss
of
their
Friends
or
Goods
,
't
is
even
as
ridiculous
to
advise
Men
not
to
feel
pain
when
they
are
beaten
,
or
not
to
be
pleased
when
they
eat
with
an
appetite
;
Thus
the
Stoics
are
either
unreasonable
,
or
mock
us
when
they
preach
to
us
to
be
easie
under
the
death
of
a
Father
,
the
loss
of
Goods
,
Exile
,
Imprisonment
,
and
such
like
things
,
and
not
to
rejoyce
at
the
good
success
of
our
Affairs
,
for
we
are
united
to
our
Country
,
our
Goods
,
our
Relations
,
&c.
by
a
Natural
Tye
,
which
now
depends
not
upon
our
Will.
Indeed
I
cenfess
that
Reason
teaches
us
to
suffer
Exile
chearfully
,
but
the
same
Reason
tells
us
we
ought
to
endure
the
cutting
off
an
Arm
without
pain
;
The
Soul
is
above
the
Body
,
and
according
to
the
light
of
Reason
,
a
Man's
happiness
or
unhappiness
ought
not
to
depend
upon
it
;
but
Experience
sufficiently
proves
to
us
that
things
are
not
as
our
Reason
tells
us
they
should
be
,
and
it
is
ridiculous
to
Philosophize
against
Experience
.
Christians
dont
philosophize
after
this
manner
,
they
confess
that
pain
is
an
evil
,
that
it
is
not
without
uneasiness
that
they
are
ravished
from
those
things
to
which
Nature
has
united
them
;
and
that
it
is
a
difficult
thing
to
be
delivered
from
the
slavery
into
which
Sin
has
reduced
us
.
They
grant
that
it
is
a
disorder
that
the
Soul
depends
upon
the
Body
,
yet
so
as
that
it
may
be
delivered
from
this
dependence
by
the
Grace
of
Jesus
Christ
.
I
feel
,
says
St.
Paul
,
a
law
in
my
Body
which
fights
against
the
law
of
my
Mind
,
and
which
enslaves
it
to
the
Law
of
Sin
which
is
in
my
Members
;
unhappy
Man
that
I
am
!
Who
shall
deliver
me
from
this
Body
of
death
?
it
will
be
the
Grace
of
God
through
our
Lord
Jesus
Christ
.
The
Son
of
God
,
the
Apostles
,
and
all
his
true
Disciples
do
recommend
patience
to
us
above
all
things
,
because
they
knew
that
he
that
will
live
holily
must
endure
affliction
.
In
short
,
true
Christians
or
true
Philsophers
say
nothing
which
is
not
agreeable
to
good
Sense
and
Experience
,
but
Universal
Nature
does
continually
contradict
the
Opinion
or
Pride
of
the
Stoics
.
Christians
know
,
that
to
deliver
themselves
in
some
manner
from
the
dependance
they
are
in
,
they
must
labour
to
deprive
themselves
of
all
things
which
they
cannot
enjoy
without
pleasure
,
nor
be
deprived
of
without
pain
;
that
that
is
the
only
means
to
preserve
the
peace
and
liberty
of
Mind
,
which
they
have
received
by
the
Grace
of
their
Saviour
.
The
Stoics
on
the
contrary
following
the
false
Idea's
of
their
Chimerical
Philosophy
imagined
themselves
wise
and
happy
,
and
that
there
needed
no
more
than
to
think
on
Virtue
and
Independence
,
to
become
Virtuous
and
Independant
.
Reason
and
Experience
tells
us
,
the
best
way
not
to
suffer
the
pain
of
pricking
,
is
to
avoid
being
prick'd
.
But
the
Stoics
say
,
Prick
me
,
and
by
the
force
of
my
Mind
,
and
help
of
my
Philosophy
,
I
will
separate
my self
after
such
a
manner
from
my
Body
,
that
I
will
not
feel
whatever
passes
there
.
I
can
demonstrate
,
that
my
happiness
depends
not
upon
it
,
that
pain
is
not
an
evil
;
and
you
shall
see
by
the
air
of
my
Face
,
and
firm
posture
of
all
the
rest
of
my
Body
,
that
my
Philosophy
makes
me
invulnerable
.
Their
Pride
maintains
their
Courage
;
but
it
does
not
hinder
them
from
effectively
suffering
Pain
with
some
inquietude
,
nor
prevent
them
from
being
Miserable
.
Thus
the
union
they
have
with
their
Body
is
not
destroyed
,
nor
their
pain
dissipated
;
but
the
union
they
have
with
other
Men
,
fortified
by
the
desire
of
their
esteem
,
in
some
measure
resists
this
other
union
they
have
with
their
own
Bodies
.
The
sensible
sight
of
those
who
look
upon
them
,
and
to
whom
they
are
united
,
stays
the
course
of
the
spirits
which
accompany
pain
,
and
effaces
the
air
that
would
be
imprinted
on
their
Countenance
;
for
if
no
body
looked
upon
them
,
this
air
of
Constancy
and
freedom
of
Mind
would
immediately
vanish
.
Thus
the
Stoics
only
in
some
measure
resist
the
union
that
they
have
with
their
Bodies
,
by
becoming
greater
Slaves
to
other
Men
,
to
whom
they
are
united
by
the
passion
of
glory
.
'T
is
then
a
certain
truth
,
that
all
Men
are
united
to
all
sensible
things
,
both
by
Nature
and
Concupiscence
;
we
sufficiently
discover
it
by
Experience
,
although
Reason
seems
to
oppose
it
,
and
almost
all
the
actions
of
Men
are
sensible
and
demonstrative
proofs
of
it
.
Though
this
union
is
common
to
all
Men
,
yet
it
is
not
of
an
equal
extension
and
power
in
all
;
for
it
follows
the
knowledge
of
the
Mind
;
we
may
say
we
are
not
actually
united
to
unknown
Objects
;
a
Countryman
in
his
Cottage
does
not
interest
himself
in
the
glory
of
his
Prince
or
Country
,
but
only
in
that
of
his
own
or
Neighbouring
Villages
,
because
his
knowledge
extends
no
farther
.
The
union
we
have
to
such
sensible
Objects
as
we
have
seen
,
is
stronger
than
that
we
have
to
those
we
have
imagined
,
and
which
we
have
only
heard
of
.
'T
is
by
Sensation
that
we
unite
our selves
more
strictly
to
sensible
things
;
for
Sensation
produces
much
greater
Traces
in
the
Brain
,
and
excites
a
much
more
violent
motion
in
the
Spirits
than
the
Imagination
only
.
This
union
is
not
so
strong
in
those
who
continually
oppose
it
,
that
they
may
adhere
to
the
goods
of
the
Mind
,
as
in
others
who
follow
the
motions
of
their
Passions
,
and
permit
themselves
to
be
subjected
to
them
;
for
desire
augments
and
fortifies
this
union
.
In
fine
,
different
Employs
,
different
Conditions
,
as
well
as
different
Dispositions
of
Mind
,
make
a
considerable
difference
in
the
sensible
Union
that
Men
have
with
Earthly
Goods
.
The
great
are
united
to
many
more
things
than
others
,
their
slavery
is
farther
extended
.
A
General
of
an
Army
is
united
to
all
his
Soldiers
,
because
they
all
reverence
him
:
This
slavery
often
creates
valour
;
and
the
desire
of
being
esteemed
of
all
those
who
look
upon
him
,
often
obliges
him
to
sacrifice
other
more
sensible
and
more
reasonable
desires
to
it
.
It
is
the
same
with
those
that
are
in
power
,
or
that
are
popular
.
'T
is
vanity
often
which
animates
their
vertue
;
because
the
love
of
glory
,
is
commonly
stronger
than
the
love
of
truth
.
I
speak
here
of
the
love
of
glory
,
not
as
a
simple
inclination
,
but
as
a
passion
;
because
indeed
this
love
may
be
sensible
,
and
it
is
often
accompanied
with
very
lively
and
violent
emotions
of
the
spirits
.
Different
Ages
and
Sexes
are
also
the
chief
causes
of
the
Passions
of
Men.
Children
do
not
love
the
same
things
,
as
the
adult
and
aged
do
;
or
,
at
least
,
not
with
so
much
force
and
constancy
.
Women
are
united
only
to
their
Family
and
Neighbourhood
,
but
Men
to
their
whole
Country
;
'T
is
their
part
to
defend
it
,
they
choose
great
Places
,
Honours
,
and
Commands
.
There
is
so
great
a
variety
in
the
Employments
and
Affairs
of
Men
,
that
it
is
impossible
to
express
it
.
The
disposition
of
the
Mind
of
a
Married
Man
is
not
the
same
with
one
that
is
a
Batchelor
;
the
care
of
his
Family
does
often
wholly
take
up
his
thoughts
.
Monks
have
neither
a
Mind
nor
a
Heart
inclined
like
other
Men
,
nor
even
like
other
Ecclesiasticks
,
they
are
united
to
fewer
things
,
but
they
are
more
strongly
united
to
them
.
We
may
thus
speak
in
general
of
the
different
Conditions
of
Men
;
but
we
cannot
explain
the
little
sensible
engagements
which
are
almost
all
of
them
different
in
each
particular
Person
;
for
it
often
enough
happens
that
Men
have
particular
engagements
entirely
opposite
to
those
they
ought
to
have
in
reference
to
their
Condition
.
But
although
we
may
in
general
terms
express
the
different
Characters
of
the
Mind
,
the
different
Inclinations
of
Men
and
Women
,
old
and
young
,
rich
and
poor
,
learned
and
ignorant
,
and
in
short
of
the
different
Sexes
,
Ages
,
and
Employment
,
Yet
these
things
are
too
well
known
to
those
who
live
in
the
World
,
and
who
reflect
upon
what
they
see
,
to
swell
this
Volume
with
them
.
We
need
but
open
our
Eyes
to
be
agreeably
and
solidly
instructed
in
these
things
.
For
those
who
choose
rather
to
read
them
in
Greek
,
than
to
learn
them
by
any
reflexion
upon
what
passes
before
their
Eyes
;
I
refer
them
to
the
Second
Book
of
Aristotles
Rhetorick
;
which
I
believe
is
the
best
Piece
of
that
Philosopher's
,
because
few
things
are
there
said
that
can
deceive
us
,
thô
he
seldom
proves
what
he
advances
.
It
is
then
evident
,
that
this
sensible
Union
of
the
Mind
of
Men
,
with
whatever
has
any
relation
to
the
preservation
of
their
lives
,
or
the
Society
whereof
they
consider
themselves
as
Members
,
is
different
in
different
Persons
,
since
it
is
most
extensive
in
those
that
have
most
knowledge
,
are
most
noble
,
have
the
highest
Employments
,
and
greatest
Imaginations
;
and
and
that
it
is
more
strict
and
stronger
in
those
who
are
most
Sensible
,
have
the
most
lively
Imagination
,
and
who
most
blindly
follow
the
motions
of
their
Passions
.
It
is
very
useful
often
to
reflect
upon
the
almost
infinite
Manners
whereby
Men
are
tied
to
sensible
Objects
;
and
one
of
the
best
ways
to
become
very
knowing
in
these
things
,
is
to
study
and
observe
our selves
.
'T
is
by
the
experience
of
what
we
feel
in
our selves
,
that
we
are
instructed
in
the
knowledge
of
all
the
inclinations
of
other
Men
,
and
of
the
Passions
they
are
subject
to
:
But
if
to
these
Experiments
we
add
the
knowledge
of
their
particular
Engagements
,
and
that
of
the
Judgments
proper
to
each
of
the
Passions
,
of
which
we
shall
afterwards
speak
,
it
may
be
we
shall
not
have
so
much
difficulty
to
guess
at
the
greatest
part
of
their
Actions
,
as
Astronomers
have
to
predict
Eclipses
.
For
although
Men
are
free
,
it
is
very
rare
that
they
make
a
good
use
of
their
liberty
,
against
their
natural
inclinations
and
violent
passions
.
Before
we
end
this
Chapter
we
must
farther
remark
,
that
it
is
one
of
the
Laws
of
the
Union
of
the
Soul
and
Body
,
that
all
the
Inclinations
of
the
Soul
,
even
of
those
it
has
for
the
goods
that
have
no
relation
to
the
Body
,
are
accompanied
with
the
emotions
of
the
Animal
Spirits
,
which
make
these
Inclinations
sensible
;
because
Man
,
not
being
a
pure
Spirit
,
it
is
impossible
that
he
should
have
any
inclination
so
pure
as
to
have
no
mixture
of
any
passion
.
Thus
the
love
of
Truth
,
Justice
,
and
of
God
himself
,
is
always
accompanied
with
some
Traces
of
the
Brain
,
which
renders
this
knowledge
more
lively
,
but
commonly
more
confused
.
It
is
true
,
that
very
often
we
do
not
discover
that
our
Imagination
is
a
little
employed
,
at
the
same
time
we
conceive
an
Abstracted
Truth
:
The
reason
is
,
because
these
Truths
have
no
Images
or
Traces
instituted
by
Nature
to
represent
them
,
and
all
Traces
which
stir
them
up
have
no
other
relation
to
them
,
but
that
of
Mans
Will
,
or
chance
which
has
so
placed
them
.
For
Arithmeticians
,
and
even
Algebraists
,
who
only
consider
Abstracted
Things
,
often
make
use
of
their
Imaginations
to
keep
their
Minds
fixt
upon
these
Idea's
.
Cyphers
,
Alphabetical
Letters
,
and
other
Figures
which
they
see
or
imagine
,
are
always
joined
to
these
Ideas
;
although
the
Traces
which
are
formed
by
these
Characters
have
no
relation
to
them
,
and
so
can
make
them
neither
false
nor
confused
:
And
thus
by
a
regulated
use
of
Figures
and
Letters
,
they
discover
the
most
difficult
Truths
,
which
otherwise
it
would
be
impossible
to
find
out
.
The
Idea's
of
things
which
can
only
be
perceived
by
the
pure
Understanding
,
may
then
be
connected
to
the
Traces
of
the
Brain
;
and
the
fight
of
Objects
that
we
love
,
hate
,
and
fear
by
a
Natural
Inclination
,
may
be
accompanied
with
the
motion
of
the
Spirits
:
It
is
plain
that
the
thought
of
Eternity
,
the
fear
of
Hell
,
the
hopes
or
an
Eternal
Happiness
,
although
they
be
Objects
that
strike
not
the
Senses
,
yet
may
excite
violent
Passions
in
us
.
So
that
we
may
say
we
are
united
after
a
sensible
manner
,
not
only
to
all
things
that
relate
to
the
preservation
of
Life
;
but
also
to
Spiritual
things
to
which
the
Mind
is
immediately
united
by
it self
.
It
even
happens
very
often
:
that
Faith
,
Charity
,
and
Self-love
make
this
union
to
Spiritual
things
stronger
,
than
that
whereby
we
are
joined
to
all
sensible
things
.
The
Souls
of
true
Martyrs
are
more
united
to
God
than
to
their
Bodies
;
and
those
who
die
to
maintain
the
truth
of
a
false
Religion
,
sufficiently
shew
that
the
fear
of
Hell
has
more
power
over
them
than
the
fear
of
death
has
.
There
is
often
so
much
heat
and
prejudice
on
both
sides
in
Religious
Wars
,
and
in
the
defence
of
Superstitions
,
that
we
cannot
doubt
but
there
is
some
Passions
in
them
;
and
such
a
one
as
is
stronger
and
much
more
constant
than
any
other
,
because
it
is
built
upon
an
appearance
of
Reason
,
as
well
in
those
that
are
deceived
as
in
others
.
We
are
then
by
our
Passions
united
to
what
ever
appears
to
us
to
be
a
good
or
evil
to
the
Mind
,
as
well
as
to
what
ever
seems
to
be
so
to
the
Body
.
There
is
nothing
which
we
can
discover
to
have
any
relation
to
us
,
which
is
not
capable
of
affecting
us
;
and
amongst
all
the
things
that
we
know
,
there
is
none
that
has
not
some
relation
to
us
:
We
have
always
some
interest
even
in
the
most
abstracted
Truths
,
when
we
know
them
,
because
at
least
there
is
that
relation
of
knowledge
between
them
and
our
Minds
.
They
are
ours
,
if
I
may
so
say
,
by
our
knowledge
.
We
feel
that
they
hurt
us
when
we
dispute
them
,
and
if
they
hurt
us
,
it
is
certain
that
they
agitate
and
disquiet
us
.
Thus
the
Passions
have
so
vast
a
dominion
and
extension
,
that
it
is
impossible
to
conceive
any
thing
in
respect
to
them
,
whereof
we
could
be
certain
,
although
all
Men
were
exempt
from
their
empire
.
But
let
us
now
see
what
their
Nature
is
,
and
endeavour
to
discover
all
things
they
comprehend
.
CHAP.
III.
A
particular
Explanation
of
all
the
changes
that
happen
to
the
Body
and
Soul
by
means
of
the
Passions
.
WE
may
distinguish
seven
things
in
each
of
our
Passions
,
except
in
Admiration
,
which
also
is
but
an
imperfect
Passion
.
The
first
is
the
Judgment
the
Mind
makes
of
an
Object
,
or
rather
the
confused
,
and
distinct
view
of
the
relation
this
Object
has
to
us
.
The
second
is
a
new
determination
of
the
motion
of
the
Will
towards
this
Object
,
supposing
it
be
,
or
appears
to
be
a
good
.
Before
this
view
the
Natural
Motion
of
the
Soul
,
either
was
intermixed
,
viz.
carried
towards
good
in
general
,
or
it
was
otherwise
determined
by
the
knowledge
of
some
other
particular
Object
.
But
in
that
moment
the
Mind
perceived
the
relation
this
new
Object
had
to
it
,
this
general
Motion
of
the
Will
is
forthwith
determined
conformably
to
what
the
Mind
perceives
.
The
Soul
draws
near
to
this
Object
by
its
love
,
that
it
may
taste
it
,
and
discover
its
good
by
the
sensation
of
sweetness
,
which
the
Author
of
Nature
gives
it
as
a
Natural
Recompence
for
its
inclining
to
good
.
It
judged
that
this
Object
was
a
good
by
an
abstracted
Reason
which
affected
it
not
;
but
it
remains
convinced
by
the
efficacy
of
Sensation
,
and
the
more
lively
this
Sensation
is
,
the
stronger
it
unites
to
the
good
it
seems
to
produce
.
But
if
this
particular
Object
be
considered
as
evil
,
or
as
capable
of
depriving
us
of
any
good
,
no
new
determination
happens
to
the
Motion
of
our
Will
;
but
only
an
augmentation
of
Motion
towards
the
good
opposite
to
this
Object
which
appears
,
an
evil
,
which
augmentation
is
so
much
the
greater
,
as
the
appearing
Evil
is
more
to
be
feared
.
For
indeed
,
we
hate
only
because
we
love
,
and
an
External
Evil
is
judged
as
such
,
only
because
it
deprives
us
of
some
good
:
Thus
Evil
being
considered
as
the
privation
of
Good
,
to
fly
Evil
,
is
but
to
fly
the
privation
of
Good
,
which
is
the
same
thing
as
to
incline
towards
good
.
There
happens
no
new
determination
then
in
the
natural
motion
of
the
Will
at
the
meeting
with
an
Object
,
which
displeases
us
;
but
only
a
sensation
of
pain
,
disgust
,
or
bitterness
that
the
Author
of
Nature
has
imprinted
in
the
Soul
as
a
natural
pain
,
because
it
is
deprived
of
good
.
Reason
alone
would
not
be
sufficient
to
carry
us
to
it
,
there
must
also
be
stir
it
up
.
Before
Sin
sensation
was
no
pain
,
but
only
a
warning
;
because
,
as
I
have
already
said
,
Adam
might
when
he
would
stop
the
motion
of
the
Animal
Spirits
which
would
cause
pain
;
so
that
if
he
felt
pain
,
't
was
because
he
willed
it
as
a
good
;
or
rather
he
felt
it
not
,
because
he
would
not
feel
it
.
So
that
in
all
the
Passions
,
all
the
motions
of
the
Soul
towards
good
,
are
only
motions
of
love
.
But
because
we
are
touched
by
divers
Sensations
according
to
the
different
circumstances
which
accompany
the
prospect
of
the
good
,
and
motion
of
the
Soul
towards
it
;
we
confound
the
Sensations
with
the
emotions
of
the
Soul
,
and
we
imagine
as
many
different
motions
in
the
Passions
as
there
are
different
Sensations
.
Now
we
must
here
observe
that
Pain
is
a
real
and
true
Evil
,
and
that
it
is
no
more
the
privation
of
Pleasure
,
than
Pleasure
is
the
privation
of
Pain
;
for
there
is
a
difference
between
not
feeling
Pleasure
,
or
being
deprived
of
the
sensation
of
it
,
and
actually
suffering
Pain
;
so
that
all
Evil
is
not
such
precisely
,
because
it
deprives
us
of
good
;
but
only
,
as
I
have
shewn
,
the
Evil
which
is
External
,
and
which
is
not
a
manner
of
being
that
is
in
us
.
Nevertheless
,
as
by
Goods
and
Evils
,
we
generally
mean
things
Good
and
Evil
,
and
not
the
Sensation
of
Pleasure
and
Pain
,
which
are
rather
Natural
Marks
whereby
the
Soul
distinguishes
Good
from
Evil
;
it
seems
that
we
may
say
without
equivocation
,
that
Evil
is
only
a
privation
of
Good
,
and
that
the
Natural
motion
of
the
Soul
,
which
drives
us
from
Evil
,
is
the
same
with
that
which
inclines
us
to
Good
.
For
all
Natural
Motion
being
an
impression
of
the
Author
of
Nature
,
who
acts
only
for
himself
,
and
can
only
incline
us
towards
himself
;
The
true
Motion
of
the
Soul
is
always
an
essential
love
of
good
,
and
but
an
accidenttal
aversion
to
evil
.
It
is
,
true
,
that
Pain
may
be
considered
as
an
Evil
;
and
in
this
sense
the
Motions
of
the
Passions
that
it
excites
is
not
real
;
for
we
do
not
will
Pain
;
and
if
we
will
positively
that
Pain
should
not
be
,
it
is
because
we
would
positively
preserve
or
perfect
our
Being
.
The
third
thing
that
we
may
observe
in
every
Passion
,
is
the
Sensation
which
accompanies
them
:
for
the
Sensation
of
Love
,
Aversion
,
Desire
,
Joy
,
Sorrow
,
are
always
different
in
different
Passions
.
The
fourth
is
a
new
determination
of
the
course
of
the
Spirits
and
Blood
towards
the
External
parts
of
the
Body
,
and
towards
the
Internal
ones
:
before
the
sight
of
the
Object
that
moves
the
Passion
,
the
Animal
Spirits
were
dispersed
through
all
the
Body
,
to
preserve
all
the
parts
of
it
in
general
;
but
at
the
presence
of
this
new
Object
the
whole
Oeconomy
is
troubled
,
the
greatest
past
of
the
Spirits
are
pushed
into
the
Muscles
of
the
Arms
,
Legs
,
Face
,
and
all
the
External
parts
of
the
Body
,
to
put
them
in
a
proper
disposition
for
the
Passion
that
Rules
;
and
to
give
it
the
necessary
posture
and
motion
for
the
acquisition
of
good
,
or
to
fly
the
evil
that
presents
it self
;
but
if
its
own
Forces
are
not
sufficient
to
answer
its
occasions
,
these
same
Spirits
are
so
distributed
that
they
Mechanically
make
it
utter
certain
words
and
cries
,
which
diffuse
over
the
Face
and
the
rest
of
the
Body
such
an
Air
as
is
capable
of
agitating
others
with
the
same
Passion
it self
is
moved
with
.
For
,
as
Men
and
Animals
are
united
together
by
the
Eyes
and
Ears
,
when
any
one
of
them
is
agitated
,
he
necessarily
moves
all
those
that
look
upon
him
and
hear
him
,
and
naturally
makes
an
impression
upon
their
imagination
which
interests
them
in
his
preservation
.
As
for
the
rest
of
the
Animal
Spirits
,
they
violently
descend
into
the
Lungs
,
Liver
,
Spleen
,
and
the
rest
of
the
Bowels
,
to
demand
Contributions
from
all
those
parts
,
and
hasten
them
in
a
little
time
to
furnish
necessary
Spirits
to
preserve
the
Body
in
the
extraordinary
action
it
must
be
in
.
The
fifth
is
the
sensible
emotion
of
the
Soul
,
which
feels
it self
agitated
by
the
unexpected
overflowing
of
the
Spirits
.
This
always
accompanies
the
motion
of
the
Spirits
,
so
that
it
interests
it self
in
whatever
affects
the
Body
;
even
as
the
motion
of
the
Spirits
are
excited
in
the
Body
as
soon
as
the
Soul
is
carried
toward
any
Object
:
the
Soul
and
Body
being
mutually
united
,
their
motions
are
reciprocal
.
The
sixth
,
are
the
different
Sensations
of
Love
,
Aversion
,
Joy
,
Sorrow
,
Desire
,
caused
not
by
the
intellectual
fight
of
good
or
evil
,
as
those
we
have
already
spoke
of
,
but
by
the
different
shakings
that
the
Animal
Spirits
cause
in
the
Brain
.
The
seventh
is
a
certain
Sensation
of
Joy
,
or
rather
of
inward
Complacency
,
which
stops
the
Soul
in
its
passion
,
and
assures
it
,
that
't
is
in
the
condition
that
is
proper
for
it
,
in
relation
to
the
Object
it
considers
.
This
internal
Complacency
generally
accompanies
all
the
Passions
,
those
which
proceed
from
the
prospect
of
an
Evil
,
as
well
as
those
that
proceed
from
the
prospect
of
a
Good
,
Sorrow
,
as
well
as
Joy
.
'T
is
this
Complacency
that
renders
all
our
Passions
agreeable
,
and
which
inclines
us
to
consent
and
abandon
our selves
to
them
.
In
short
,
't
is
this
Complacency
that
must
be
overcome
by
the
delight
of
Grace
,
the
joy
of
Faith
,
and
Reason
.
For
as
the
joy
of
the
Mind
always
results
from
the
certain
or
evident
knowledge
,
that
we
are
in
the
best
estate
we
can
be
,
in
relation
to
the
things
we
perceive
;
so
the
Complacency
of
the
Passions
is
a
Natural
Consequence
of
the
confused
Sensations
we
have
,
that
we
are
in
the
best
condition
we
can
be
,
in
relation
to
the
things
we
feel
.
Now
by
the
joy
of
the
Mind
and
delights
of
Grace
we
must
conquer
the
false
Complacency
of
our
Passions
,
which
makes
us
slaves
to
sensible
goods
.
All
these
things
we
have
spoke
of
occur
in
every
Passion
,
when
they
are
excited
by
confused
Sensations
,
and
that
the
Mind
perceives
neither
the
good
nor
evil
which
can
cause
them
,
for
then
't
is
plain
the
three
first
things
are
not
concerned
in
them
.
We
likewise
see
that
all
those
things
are
not
free
,
that
they
are
in
us
without
our
consent
,
and
even
against
it
since
the
Fall
;
and
that
there
is
only
the
consent
of
our
Will
which
truly
depends
upon
us
.
But
it
seems
necessary
to
explain
all
these
things
more
at
large
,
and
to
render
them
more
sensible
by
some
Examples
.
Let
us
suppose
then
that
a
Man
has
actually
received
some
affront
,
or
that
being
naturally
of
a
very
lively
and
quick
imagination
,
he
has
been
agitated
by
some
accident
,
as
a
disease
,
a
melancholy
retirement
,
or
the
like
,
and
imagines
to
himself
in
his
Closet
,
that
such
a
Person
,
who
does
not
so
much
as
think
upon
him
,
is
willing
and
prepared
to
hurt
him
.
The
sensible
prospect
or
imagination
of
the
relation
which
is
betwixt
the
actions
of
his
Enemy
and
his
own
Designs
,
will
be
the
first
cause
of
his
Passion
.
It
is
not
even
absolutely
necessary
that
this
Man
should
receive
or
imagine
he
received
some
affront
,
for
the
motion
of
his
Will
to
receive
some
new
determination
:
It
is
enough
that
he
think
it
in
his
Mind
only
,
without
the
Body's
having
any
part
in
it
.
But
as
this
new
determination
wou'd
not
be
a
determination
of
Passion
,
but
a
pure
inclination
very
weak
and
languishing
,
we
shou'd
suppose
that
this
Man
actually
suffers
some
great
opposition
in
his
designs
,
or
that
he
strongly
imagines
that
he
shall
do
so
,
rather
than
make
another
supposition
wherein
the
Senses
and
Imagination
have
little
or
no
share
.
The
second
thing
we
may
consider
in
the
Passion
of
this
Man
,
is
an
increase
of
the
motion
of
his
Will
towards
the
good
,
the
possession
whereof
his
real
or
imaginary
Enemy
would
hinder
him
;
and
the
increase
is
so
much
the
greater
,
as
the
opposition
that
would
be
made
,
appears
stronger
to
him
.
He
first
hates
his
Enemy
,
only
because
he
loves
this
good
,
and
his
hatred
is
so
much
the
greater
,
as
his
love
is
stronger
;
because
the
motion
of
his
Will
in
his
hatred
is
here
in
effect
only
a
motion
of
love
,
the
motion
of
the
Soul
towards
good
,
not
differing
from
that
whereby
we
fly
the
privation
of
it
,
as
has
been
already
said
.
The
third
thing
is
the
Sensation
proper
to
the
Passion
,
and
in
this
it
is
a
Sensation
of
Hatred
;
The
motion
of
Hatred
is
the
same
as
that
of
Love
,
but
the
Sensation
of
Hatred
is
quite
different
from
that
of
Love
,
which
every
one
may
know
by
his
own
experience
.
Motions
are
actions
of
the
Will
;
but
Sensations
are
modifications
of
the
Mind
.
The
Motions
of
the
Will
are
the
Natural
Causes
of
the
Sensations
of
the
Mind
;
and
these
Sensations
of
the
Mind
in
their
turn
maintain
the
Motions
of
the
Will
in
their
determination
.
The
Sensation
of
Hatred
is
in
this
Man
a
Natural
Consequence
of
the
Motions
of
his
Will
,
which
is
excited
at
the
sight
of
Evil
;
and
this
Motion
is
afterwards
maintained
by
the
Sensation
it
causes
.
What
we
have
said
of
this
Man
,
might
even
happen
although
he
should
have
no
Body
.
But
because
he
is
composed
of
two
parts
naturally
united
,
the
Motions
of
his
Mind
communicate
themselves
to
his
Body
,
and
those
of
his
Body
to
his
Mind
.
Thus
the
new
determination
,
or
the
increase
of
the
Motions
of
his
Will
,
naturally
produces
a
new
determination
in
the
Motion
of
the
Animal
Spirits
,
which
always
differs
in
all
the
Passions
,
although
the
Motion
of
the
Soul
be
generally
the
same
.
The
Spirits
then
are
forcibly
pushed
into
the
Arms
,
Legs
,
and
Face
,
to
give
the
Body
a
disposition
necessary
for
the
Passion
;
and
to
disperse
over
the
Face
the
Air
a
Man
ought
to
have
when
we
offend
him
,
in
relation
to
all
the
circumstances
of
the
Injury
he
receives
,
and
the
quality
or
power
of
him
that
does
,
and
of
him
that
suffers
the
Affront
.
And
this
diffusion
of
the
Spirits
is
so
much
the
stronger
,
more
abundant
,
and
quicker
,
as
the
good
is
greater
,
the
opposition
stronger
,
and
the
Brain
more
sensibly
affected
.
If
then
the
Person
of
whom
we
speak
,
should
only
receive
some
injury
in
his
imagination
,
or
if
he
receives
a
real
one
,
but
flight
,
and
such
as
can
make
no
considerable
shaking
in
the
Brain
,
the
diffusion
of
the
Animal
Spirits
will
be
weak
and
languishing
;
and
perhaps
insufficient
to
change
the
common
and
natural
disposition
of
the
Body
.
But
if
the
injury
be
great
,
and
his
imagination
be
heated
,
it
will
cause
a
great
shaking
in
his
Brain
,
and
the
Spirits
would
he
diffused
with
so
much
force
,
that
in
a
moment
they
would
create
in
his
Body
the
air
and
gesture
of
the
ruling
Passion
.
If
it
is
strong
enough
to
overcome
,
his
air
would
be
threatning
and
fierce
.
If
it
is
weak
,
and
cannot
resist
the
evil
that
oppresses
him
,
his
air
would
be
humble
and
submissive
.
His
Complaints
and
Tears
would
naturally
,
excite
in
the
Standers-by
,
and
even
in
his
Enemy
,
motions
of
Pity
,
and
from
thence
they
would
draw
the
relief
that
could
be
hoped
for
from
his
own
power
.
It
is
true
that
the
Spectators
and
Enemy
of
this
Miserable
Person
,
have
the
Spirits
and
Fibres
of
their
Brain
already
agitated
I
with
a
violent
motion
,
contrary
to
that
which
produces
Compassion
in
the
Soul
,
the
Complaints
of
this
Man
would
but
exasperate
their
Rage
,
and
so
his
Misfortune
would
be
inevitable
,
should
he
always
continue
in
the
same
air
and
gesture
.
But
Nature
has
well
provided
in
this
case
;
for
at
the
sight
of
the
near
loss
of
a
great
good
,
it
naturally
forms
upon
the
Face
,
such
lively
and
surprizing
Characters
of
Rage
and
Despair
,
as
to
disarm
the
most
Barbarous
Enemies
,
and
make
them
become
like
Statues
.
The
terrible
and
unexpected
fight
of
the
Lineaments
of
Death
drawn
by
the
Hand
of
Nature
upon
the
Face
of
a
Miserable
Wretch
,
stops
in
the
Enemy
,
who
is
affected
with
it
the
Motion
of
the
Spirits
and
Blood
which
carried
him
to
Revenge
;
and
in
that
moment
of
favour
and
attention
,
Nature
draws
a-new
a
humble
and
submissive
air
upon
the
Face
of
this
unfortunate
Man
,
who
begins
to
hope
because
of
the
change
of
his
Enemy's
Countenance
;
whose
Animal
Spirits
receive
a
new
determination
they
were
not
capable
of
a
moment
before
;
so
that
he
Mechanically
enters
into
the
motions
of
Compassion
,
which
naturally
incline
his
Soul
to
Charity
and
Mercy
.
A
Passionate
Man
cannot
without
a
great
abundance
of
Spirits
,
either
produce
or
preserve
in
his
Brain
,
an
Image
of
his
misfortune
lively
enough
,
or
a
commotion
strong
enough
,
to
give
the
Body
a
forced
and
extraordinary
gesture
;
the
Nerves
,
which
answer
to
the
inward
part
of
his
Body
,
receive
at
the
sight
of
any
evil
,
the
necessary
shocks
and
agitations
that
cause
the
humours
that
are
fit
to
produce
the
Spirits
which
the
passion
requires
,
to
run
into
all
the
Vessels
that
have
communication
with
the
heart
.
For
the
Animal
Spirits
being
dispersed
through
the
Nerves
which
go
to
the
Liver
,
Spleen
,
Pancreas
,
and
generally
to
all
the
Bowels
,
they
agitate
and
shake
them
,
and
by
their
agitation
press
forth
the
humors
that
these
parts
preserve
for
the
Exigencies
of
the
Machine
.
But
if
these
humors
always
flowed
after
the
same
manner
into
the
heart
,
if
they
there
received
at
divers
times
a
like
fermentation
,
and
if
the
Spirits
,
which
are
formed
therein
,
equally
ascended
into
the
Brain
,
we
shou'd
not
see
such
hasty
changes
in
the
motions
of
the
Passions
.
The
sight
of
a
Magistrate
,
for
instance
,
wou'd
not
in
a
moment
stop
the
transports
of
of
a
furious
Man
who
is
persuing
his
revenge
,
and
his
face
heated
with
Blood
and
Spirits
,
wou'd
not
all
of
a
sudden
become
pale
and
languid
through
the
apprehension
of
some
punishment
.
Thus
to
hinder
these
humors
that
are
mixt
with
the
Blood
,
from
entring
after
the
same
manner
into
the
Heart
,
there
are
Nerves
which
environ
them
at
their
passage
,
which
by
being
contracted
or
dilated
,
by
the
impression
that
the
sight
of
the
Object
,
and
power
of
the
Imagination
,
produce
in
the
Spirits
,
shut
up
,
or
open
the
way
to
those
humors
.
And
to
hinder
the
same
from
receiving
a
like
agitation
,
and
fermentation
in
the
heart
,
at
divers
times
;
there
are
also
Nerves
that
cause
the
Palpitations
,
which
being
not
equally
agitated
in
the
different
motions
of
the
Spirits
,
do
not
push
the
Blood
with
the
same
force
into
the
Arteries
.
Other
Nerves
dispersed
through
the
Lungs
,
distribute
the
Air
to
the
heart
,
by
contracting
and
dilating
the
branches
of
the
Trachea
,
which
serve
for
respiration
,
and
after
this
manner
regulate
the
fermentation
of
the
Blood
,
in
relation
to
the
circumstances
of
the
Passion
which
rules
.
And
,
in
fine
,
to
regulate
the
course
of
the
Spirits
with
the
greatest
exactness
and
speed
,
there
are
Nerves
which
environ
the
Arteries
,
as
well
those
which
go
to
the
Brain
,
as
those
which
conduct
the
Blood
to
all
other
parts
of
the
Body
.
So
that
the
shaking
of
the
Brain
,
which
accompanies
the
unexpected
sight
of
some
Circumstance
,
because
of
which
it
is
proper
to
change
all
the
motions
of
the
Passion
,
suddenly
determine
the
course
of
the
Animal
Spirits
to
the
Nerves
which
encompass
these
Arteries
,
that
by
their
contraction
they
may
shut
up
the
passage
whereby
the
Blood
ascends
into
the
Brain
,
and
by
their
dilating
,
lay
open
that
which
disperses
it self
through
all
the
other
parts
of
the
Body
.
These
Arteries
which
carry
the
Blood
to
the
Brain
,
being
free
,
and
all
those
which
disperse
it
through
the
rest
of
the
Body
,
being
strongly
tied
by
these
Nerves
,
the
Head
will
be
filled
with
Blood
,
and
the
Face
coloured
with
it
.
But
any
circumstance
changing
the
shaking
of
the
Brain
,
which
caused
this
disposition
in
these
Nerves
,
the
Arteries
that
were
contracted
are
unloosed
,
and
the
others
on
the
contrary
are
strongly
contracted
.
Thus
the
Head
is
void
of
Blood
,
a
paleness
diffused
over
the
Face
,
and
the
little
Blood
which
goes
out
of
the
Heart
,
and
which
the
Nerves
,
we
spoke
of
,
admit
into
it
to
maintain
life
,
descend
mostly
into
the
lower
part
of
the
Body
;
the
Brain
is
defective
of
Animal
Spirits
,
and
all
the
rest
of
the
Body
is
seized
with
a
weakness
and
trembling
.
To
explain
,
and
particularly
prove
,
what
we
have
already
said
,
it
would
be
necessary
to
give
a
general
knowledge
of
Physics
,
and
a
particular
one
of
Human
Bodies
.
But
these
two
Sciences
are
also
too
imperfect
to
be
treated
of
with
all
the
exactness
I
could
wish
besides
,
if
I
should
push
this
matter
farther
,
it
would
soon
carry
me
from
my
subject
;
and
therefore
I
shall
only
give
a
general
and
gross
Idea
of
the
Passions
,
and
am
satisfied
,
provided
this
Idea
be
not
false
.
These
Shakings
of
the
Brain
,
and
Motions
of
the
Blood
and
Spirits
,
are
the
fourth
thing
that
is
found
in
each
of
our
Passions
,
and
they
produce
the
fifth
,
which
is
the
sensible
Emotion
of
the
Soul
.
In
the
same
time
that
the
Animal
Spirits
are
pushed
from
the
Brain
into
the
rest
of
the
Body
,
there
to
produce
the
Motions
that
's
proper
to
maintain
the
Passion
,
the
Soul
is
carried
towards
the
good
that
it
perceives
;
and
that
so
much
the
more
violently
as
the
Spirits
go
out
of
the
Brain
with
the
more
force
,
because
it
is
the
same
shaking
of
the
Brain
which
acts
the
Soul
and
Animal
Spirits
.
The
Motion
of
the
Soul
towards
good
is
so
much
the
greater
,
as
the
sight
of
good
is
more
sensible
;
and
the
Motion
of
the
Spirits
which
proceed
from
the
Brain
to
disperse
themselves
into
the
rest
of
the
Body
,
is
so
much
the
more
violent
,
as
the
shaking
of
the
Fibres
of
the
Brain
,
caused
by
the
impression
of
the
Object
or
Imagination
,
is
stronger
;
so
this
same
shaking
of
the
Brain
rendring
the
sight
of
the
good
more
sensible
,
it
is
necessary
that
the
Emotions
of
the
Soul
in
the
Passions
should
augment
in
the
same
proportion
as
the
Motion
of
the
Spirits
do
.
These
Emotions
of
the
Soul
differ
not
from
those
which
immediately
follow
the
intellectual
sight
of
the
good
we
have
spoke
of
:
They
are
only
stronger
and
more
lively
because
of
the
union
of
the
Soul
and
Body
,
and
the
sensibility
of
the
sight
which
produces
them
.
The
sixth
thing
which
occurs
is
the
Sensation
of
Passion
;
the
Sensation
of
Love
,
Aversion
,
Desire
,
Joy
,
Sorrow
,
&c.
This
Sensation
is
not
different
from
that
we
have
already
spoke
of
;
it
is
only
more
quick
,
because
the
Body
hath
a
great
share
in
it
.
But
it
is
always
followed
with
a
certain
Sensation
of
Sweetness
,
which
renders
all
our
Passions
agreeable
to
us
,
and
is
the
last
thing
observed
in
every
one
of
our
Passions
,
as
has
been
already
said
.
The
cause
of
this
last
Sensation
is
thus
;
At
the
sight
of
the
Object
of
the
Passion
,
or
any
new
Circumstance
,
some
of
the
Animal
Spirits
,
are
pushed
from
the
Head
to
the
extream
parts
of
the
Body
,
to
put
it
into
the
gesture
the
Passion
requires
;
and
others
forcibly
descend
into
the
Heart
,
Lungs
,
and
Bowels
,
from
thence
to
draw
necessary
assistances
,
which
has
already
been
explained
.
Now
it
never
happens
that
the
Body
is
in
the
condition
it
ought
to
be
,
but
the
Soul
receives
much
satisfaction
from
it
;
whereas
if
the
Body
is
in
an
estate
contrary
to
its
good
and
preservation
,
the
Soul
suffers
much
pain
.
Thus
when
we
follow
the
Motions
of
our
Passions
,
and
stop
not
the
course
of
the
Spirits
which
the
sight
of
the
Object
of
the
Passion
causes
in
our
Body
,
to
put
it
in
the
condition
it
ought
to
be
in
relation
to
this
Object
;
The
Soul
will
by
the
Laws
of
Nature
receive
this
Sensation
of
delight
and
inward
satisfaction
,
because
the
Body
is
in
the
state
it
ought
to
be
in
.
On
the
contrary
,
when
the
Soul
,
following
the
Rules
of
Reason
,
stops
the
course
of
the
Spirits
,
and
resists
these
Passions
,
it
suffers
pain
proportionably
to
the
evil
which
might
from
thence
happen
to
the
Body
.
For
even
as
the
reflexion
that
the
Soul
makes
upon
it self
,
is
necessarily
accompanied
with
the
Joy
or
Sorrow
of
the
Mind
,
and
afterwards
with
the
Joy
or
Sorrow
of
the
Senses
;
when
doing
its
duty
,
and
submitting
to
the
order
of
God
,
it
would
discover
that
in
a
proper
condition
,
or
abandoning
it self
to
its
Passions
it
is
touched
with
remorse
,
which
teaches
it
that
't
is
in
an
ill
disposition
.
Thus
the
course
of
the
Spirits
excited
by
the
good
of
the
Body
,
is
accompanied
with
a
sensible
Joy
or
Sorrow
,
and
afterwards
with
a
Spiritual
one
,
according
as
the
course
of
the
Animal
spirits
is
hindered
or
favoured
by
the
Will
.
But
there
is
this
remarkable
difference
between
the
Intellectual
Joy
that
accompanies
the
clear
knowledge
of
the
good
estate
of
the
Soul
,
and
the
sensible
Pleasure
which
accompanies
the
confused
Sensation
of
the
good
disposition
of
the
Body
,
that
the
Intellectual
Joy
is
solid
,
without
remorse
,
and
as
immutable
as
the
truth
which
causes
it
,
whereas
sensible
Joy
is
generally
accompanied
with
Sorrow
of
the
Mind
,
or
remorse
of
Conscience
,
whence
it
is
unquiet
and
as
inconstant
as
the
Passion
or
Agitation
of
the
Blood
which
causes
it
:
In
fine
,
the
first
is
almost
always
accompanied
with
a
great
Joy
of
the
Senses
,
when
it
is
a
consequence
of
the
knowledge
of
a
great
good
,
that
the
Soul
possesses
;
and
the
other
is
seldom
accompanied
with
any
Joy
of
the
Mind
,
although
it
be
a
consequence
of
a
great
good
which
only
happens
to
the
Body
,
if
it
is
contrary
to
the
good
of
the
Soul
.
It
is
therefore
true
,
that
without
the
Grace
of
JESVS
CHRIST
,
the
satisfaction
the
Soul
tastes
in
abandoning
it self
to
its
Passions
,
is
more
agreeable
than
that
it
feels
in
following
the
Rules
of
Reason
;
and
it
is
this
Satisfaction
which
is
the
cause
of
all
the
Disorders
that
have
followed
Original
Sin
,
and
it
would
make
us
all
Slaves
to
our
Passions
,
if
the
Son
of
God
did
not
deliver
us
from
their
servitude
,
by
the
delights
of
his
Grace
;
For
indeed
what
I
have
said
on
the
behalf
of
the
Joy
of
the
Mind
against
the
Joy
of
the
Senses
,
is
only
true
amongst
Christians
;
and
was
absolutely
false
in
the
Mouth
of
Seneca
and
Epicurus
,
and
in
short
,
of
all
the
Philosophers
who
appeared
the
most
reasonable
;
because
the
Yoke
of
JESVS
CHRIST
is
only
sweet
to
those
that
belong
to
him
,
and
his
Burthen
only
seems
light
to
us
,
when
his
Grace
supports
us
under
it
.
CHAP.
IV.
That
the
Pleasures
and
Motions
of
the
Passions
engage
us
in
Errors
,
at
the
sight
of
Good
;
and
therefore
we
ought
continually
to
resist
them
.
With
the
manner
how
to
oppose
Libertinism
.
WHatsoever
we
have
already
in
general
explained
about
the
qualities
and
effect
of
the
Passions
,
shews
them
not
to
be
free
,
they
take
up
their
residence
in
our
Breasts
without
our
leave
,
and
there
is
nothing
but
the
consent
of
our
Will
which
absolutely
depends
upon
us
.
The
prospect
of
Good
is
naturally
followed
with
a
Motion
and
Sensation
of
Love
,
a
Shaking
of
the
Brain
,
and
Motion
of
the
Spirits
,
a
new
Emotion
of
the
Soul
which
increases
the
first
Motion
of
Love
,
and
a
new
Sensation
of
the
Soul
which
augments
the
first
Sensation
of
Love
,
and
,
in
fine
,
a
Sensation
of
Complacency
which
recompences
the
Soul
for
the
Bodies
being
in
a
state
convenient
for
it
.
All
these
things
pass
in
the
Soul
and
Body
Naturally
,
and
Mechanically
;
that
is
,
without
their
having
any
part
in
it
,
since
our
consent
only
truly
depends
upon
us
.
This
Consent
must
also
be
regulated
,
preserved
,
and
kept
free
,
notwithstanding
all
the
endeavours
of
our
Passions
to
the
contrary
.
'T
is
to
God
alone
that
it
must
submit
its
liberty
,
yielding
only
to
the
Voice
of
the
Author
of
Nature
,
Internal
Evidence
,
and
to
the
secret
reproaches
of
Reason
.
We
should
never
consent
,
but
when
we
clearly
see
we
should
make
an
ill
use
of
our
liberty
if
we
refused
it
:
And
this
is
the
chief
Rule
that
must
be
observed
to
avoid
Error
.
'T
is
God
only
who
evidently
shews
us
,
that
we
must
submit
to
what
ever
he
requires
;
to
him
alone
therefore
we
must
wholly
devote
our selves
.
There
is
no
Evidence
in
the
Alurements
and
Caresses
;
the
Frights
and
Menaces
we
receive
from
our
Passions
:
They
are
only
confused
and
obscure
Sensations
to
which
we
must
never
give
ear
.
We
must
stay
till
these
false
lights
of
the
Passions
are
dissipated
,
and
wait
for
a
purer
light
to
guide
us
,
till
God
himself
speaks
to
us
.
We
must
enter
into
our selves
,
and
there
enquire
for
him
that
never
leaves
us
,
but
continually
instructs
us
,
He
speaks
low
,
but
his
Voice
is
distinct
;
he
illuminates
but
little
,
yet
his
light
is
pure
;
Rather
his
Voice
is
as
strong
as
't
is
distinct
,
and
his
Light
as
bright
and
active
as
't
is
pure
.
But
our
Passions
keep
us
always
out
of
our selves
,
and
by
their
noise
and
darkness
hinder
us
from
being
instructed
by
his
Voice
,
and
illuminated
by
his
Light
.
He
even
speaks
to
those
who
ask
nothing
of
him
,
and
those
whose
Passions
have
put
them
at
the
greatest
distance
from
him
,
do
nevertheless
now
and
then
hear
some
of
his
Words
;
But
they
are
such
Words
as
are
strong
,
threatning
and
terrible
;
and
pierce
more
than
a
two
edged
Sword
,
which
penetrates
the
most
secret
Recesses
of
the
Soul
,
and
discerns
the
thoughts
and
motions
of
the
Heart
:
Heb.
4.12
,
13.
For
all
things
are
open
before
his
Eyes
,
and
he
cannot
behold
the
irregularity
of
Sinners
without
making
them
inwardly
to
feel
his
severe
Reproaches
.
We
ought
therefore
to
enter
into
our selves
,
to
approach
near
him
;
to
desire
him
to
inform
us
of
what
we
would
know
,
to
hearken
to
and
obey
him
:
For
if
we
always
give
ear
to
him
,
we
should
never
be
deceiv'd
;
and
by
continually
Obeying
him
,
we
should
free
our selves
from
the
miseries
and
inconstancies
of
our
Passions
,
to
which
Sin
has
subjected
us
.
We
must
not
think
with
some
pretended
Wits
,
whom
the
pride
of
their
Passions
have
reduced
to
the
condition
of
Beasts
,
and
who
having
so
long
contemned
the
Law
of
God
,
seem
at
last
to
know
no
other
than
that
of
their
infamous
Passions
:
We
ought
not
,
I
say
,
like
those
Men
that
are
guided
merely
by
Flesh
and
Blood
,
to
imagine
that
in
following
the
motions
of
our
Passions
,
and
secret
desires
of
our
own
Hearts
,
we
shou'd
follow
God
,
and
obey
the
voice
of
the
Author
of
Nature
;
for
this
would
be
the
utmost
blindness
;
and
according
to
St.
Paul
,
Rom.
1.
the
temporal
punishment
for
Impiety
and
Idolatry
:
that
is
,
the
punishment
of
the
greatest
Crimes
.
Indeed
,
this
punishment
is
so
much
the
greater
,
as
that
instead
of
appeasing
the
wrath
of
God
,
as
all
other
temporal
ones
do
,
it
continually
exasperates
and
encreases
it
,
until
the
terrible
day
,
wherein
his
just
anger
shall
triumph
over
all
Sinners
.
Their
Arguments
however
want
not
probability
,
and
seeming
very
agreeable
to
common
Sense
;
they
are
favoured
by
the
Passions
,
and
could
never
be
destroy'd
by
all
the
Philosophy
of
Zeno.
We
must
love
good
,
say
they
,
and
pleasure
is
the
character
that
Nature
has
,
united
to
it
;
and
by
this
character
we
can
never
be
deceived
,
since
it
proceeds
from
God
,
who
has
affixed
it
thereto
that
we
might
distinguish
it
from
evil
.
We
must
also
fly
evil
,
continue
they
,
and
pain
is
the
character
that
Nature
has
united
to
that
,
nor
can
we
be
deceiv'd
by
it
,
since
God
has
instituted
it
,
that
thereby
we
might
discern
it
from
good
.
We
taste
Pleasure
when
we
abandon
our selves
to
our
Passions
;
and
feel
Pain
and
Bitterness
in
resisting
them
.
Therefore
the
Author
of
Nature
would
have
us
give
up
our selves
to
our
Passions
,
and
never
resist
them
;
since
the
Pleasure
and
Pain
he
makes
us
feel
in
these
occurrences
are
certain
proofs
of
his
Will
in
respect
to
them
,
To
follow
God
therefore
is
to
persue
the
desires
of
our
own
Hearts
,
and
to
obey
him
,
is
to
conform
our selves
to
the
instinct
of
Nature
,
which
enclines
us
to
satisfie
our
Senses
and
Passions
.
After
this
manner
they
confirm
themselves
in
their
impious
Opinions
,
and
by
this
means
endeavour
to
stifle
the
secret
reproaches
of
their
Reason
,
and
for
the
punishment
of
their
Crimes
,
God
permits
them
to
be
dazled
with
these
false
lights
,
which
blind
instead
of
enlightning
them
,
but
with
such
a
blindness
,
as
they
are
,
insensible
of
,
and
wish
not
to
be
delivered
from
.
God
gives
them
over
to
a
reprobate
Sense
,
abandons
them
to
the
desires
of
their
Hearts
,
to
shameful
Passions
,
and
Actions
unworthy
of
Man
,
as
the
Scripture
tells
us
,
that
after
being
as
it
were
fatned
by
their
Debauches
,
they
may
to
all
Eternity
become
the
victims
of
his
Wrath.
But
we
will
solve
the
difficulty
they
propose
,
which
the
Sect
of
Zeno
not
being
able
to
do
,
have
denied
that
Pleasure
was
good
,
or
Pain
an
evil
.
But
this
was
too
rash
an
attempt
,
and
unbecoming
Philosophers
,
and
I
dont
believe
it
ever
made
those
change
their
Opinion
,
who
experimentally
found
that
a
great
Pain
was
a
great
Misery
.
Since
therefore
Zeno
and
all
the
Heathen
Philosophy
could
not
resolve
this
difficulty
,
offered
by
the
Epicureans
,
therefore
we
must
have
recourse
to
a
more
solid
and
enlightened
Philosophy
.
'T
is
true
,
that
Pleasure
is
good
,
and
Pain
an
evil
;
and
that
Pleasure
and
Pain
by
the
Author
of
Nature
have
been
affixed
to
the
use
of
certain
things
,
to
make
us
capable
of
judging
whether
they
are
good
or
bad
:
That
we
must
choose
the
good
,
fly
the
evil
,
and
generally
follow
the
motions
of
our
Passions
.
All
this
is
true
,
but
it
only
relates
to
the
Body
,
to
preserve
which
,
and
long
to
continue
a
Life
like
to
that
of
Beasts
,
we
must
suffer
our selves
to
be
governed
by
our
Passions
and
Desires
.
The
Senses
and
Passions
were
only
given
us
for
the
good
of
the
Body
;
sensible
Pleasure
is
the
character
which
Nature
has
joined
to
the
use
of
certain
things
,
that
without
taking
the
pains
to
examine
them
by
Reason
,
we
might
employ
'em
for
the
preservation
of
the
Body
;
but
not
that
we
should
love
them
;
for
we
ought
to
love
nothing
but
what
Reason
most
certainly
discovers
to
us
to
be
our
good
.
We
are
Rational
Beings
,
and
God
who
is
our
chief
Good
,
requires
not
of
us
,
a
blind
Love
,
a
Love
of
Instinct
,
or
one
that
is
forced
;
but
a
Love
of
Choice
,
of
Knowledge
,
and
such
a
one
as
subjects
our
Mind
and
Hearts
to
him
.
He
induces
us
to
love
him
by
discovering
to
us
by
the
light
that
accompanies
the
delection
of
his
Grace
,
that
he
is
our
Soveraign
Good
:
but
inclines
us
to
the
good
of
the
Body
only
by
instinct
,
and
a
confused
sensation
of
Pleasure
,
because
the
good
of
the
Body
deserves
neither
the
application
of
the
Mind
,
nor
exercise
of
our
Reason
.
But
farther
,
our
Body
is
not
our selves
;
't
is
something
that
belongs
to
us
,
without
which
absolutely
speaking
,
we
may
exist
:
The
Good
of
the
Body
therefore
is
not
properly
our
good
,
for
Bodies
can
be
only
the
good
of
Bodies
,
which
we
may
make
use
of
for
the
good
of
our
Body
,
but
we
must
not
unite
our selves
to
them
.
Our
Soul
has
likewise
a
Good
peculiar
to
her self
,
viz.
that
good
only
that
is
superiour
to
her
,
who
alone
preserves
,
and
produces
in
her
the
sensations
of
Pain
and
Pleasure
.
For
in
fine
,
all
the
objects
of
our
Senses
are
of
themselves
uncapable
of
making
us
perceive
them
,
and
't
is
God
alone
that
can
teach
us
they
are
present
,
by
the
sensation
he
gives
us
of
them
,
which
is
a
Truth
the
Heathen
Philosophers
could
never
comprehend
.
We
may
,
and
I
confess
ought
to
love
what
is
capable
of
making
us
feel
Pleasure
.
And
't
is
for
that
reason
we
must
love
none
but
God
,
because
't
is
only
he
who
can
act
in
our
Souls
,
since
sensible
objects
can
only
move
the
Organs
of
our
Senses
.
But
perhaps
it
may
be
answered
by
some
,
what
matters
it
from
whence
these
agreeable
Sensations
come
,
we
will
enjoy
them
?
Ingrateful
as
they
are
,
not
to
acknowledge
the
hand
that
so
kindly
bestows
these
Goods
.
They
would
have
a
just
God
give
unjust
Rewards
,
and
recompense
them
for
the
Crimes
they
commit
against
him
,
at
the
very
time
they
commit
them
:
They
would
make
use
of
his
immutable
Will
,
which
is
the
Order
and
Law
of
Nature
,
to
force
undeserved
favours
from
him
.
For
by
a
criminal
Artifice
they
produce
such
motions
in
their
Bodies
which
obliges
him
to
make
them
taste
all
sorts
of
Pleasures
.
But
Death
will
corrupt
this
Body
,
and
God
whom
they
have
made
subservient
to
their
unjust
Desires
,
will
make
them
submit
to
his
just
Anger
,
and
will
mock
them
in
his
turn
.
'T
is
true
,
't
is
a
very
hard
thing
that
the
possession
of
the
Goods
of
the
Body
should
be
attended
with
Pleasure
,
and
that
that
of
the
Goods
of
the
Soul
should
often
be
tied
to
Pain
and
Sorrow
.
We
may
look
upon
it
as
a
great
irregularity
,
because
Pleasure
being
the
character
of
Good
,
as
Pain
is
that
of
Evil
,
we
ought
infinitely
to
take
more
delight
in
the
love
of
God
than
in
the
use
of
sensible
things
,
since
God
is
the
true
,
or
rather
the
only
Good
of
the
Mind
.
This
will
certainly
happen
one
day
,
and
't
is
very
probable
't
was
so
before
the
Fall
;
at
least
't
is
certain
before
Sin
entered
into
the
World
we
felt
no
pain
in
the
exercise
of
our
Duty
.
But
God
has
withdrawn
himself
from
us
ever
since
the
Fall
of
Adam
,
he
is
no
longer
our
Good
by
Nature
,
but
only
by
Grace
;
for
now
we
naturally
find
no
satisfaction
in
loving
him
,
and
he
rather
diverts
us
from
,
then
enclines
us
to
love
him
:
If
we
follow
him
he
repulses
us
,
if
we
run
after
him
he
smites
us
;
if
we
are
constant
in
our
persuit
,
he
still
treats
us
ill
,
and
makes
us
suffer
very
lively
and
sensible
Griefs
.
But
when
being
weary
with
walking
in
the
hard
and
painful
Paths
of
Virtue
,
without
being
incouraged
by
the
relish
of
Good
,
or
assisted
by
any
Nourishment
,
we
begin
to
feed
upon
sensible
things
,
to
which
he
unites
us
by
the
taste
of
Pleasure
,
as
if
he
would
reward
us
for
turning
aside
from
him
to
follow
those
perishing
Goods
.
In
short
,
since
the
first
Sin
,
it
seems
as
if
God
were
not
pleased
that
we
should
love
or
think
upon
him
,
or
that
we
should
look
upon
him
as
our
only
and
chief
Good
.
It
is
only
through
the
Grace
of
JESVS
CHRIST
that
we
are
now
sensible
that
God
is
our
Good
;
since
't
is
by
his
Grace
that
we
take
any
pleasure
and
satisfaction
in
the
love
of
God
.
Thus
the
Soul
neither
discovering
her
own
Good
by
a
clear
view
,
or
by
sensation
,
without
the
Grace
of
JESVS
CHRIST
,
she
takes
the
Good
of
the
Body
for
her
own
:
She
loves
it
,
and
is
more
strictly
united
to
it
,
by
her
Will
,
than
she
was
by
the
first
Institution
of
Nature
.
For
the
Good
of
the
Body
being
the
only
one
left
that
we
are
now
sensible
of
,
it
necessarily
acts
the
more
powerfully
upon
Man
,
affects
his
Brain
more
livelily
,
and
consequently
the
Soul
must
feel
and
imagine
it
after
a
more
sensible
manner
.
And
the
Animal
Spirits
being
more
violently
agitated
,
the
Will
must
needs
love
it
with
more
Ardour
and
Pleasure
.
Before
Sin
the
Soul
was
able
to
efface
out
of
the
Brain
an
over
lively
image
of
sensible
good
,
and
cause
the
pleasure
that
attended
this
image
to
vanish
.
The
Body
being
thus
submitted
to
the
Mind
,
the
Soul
could
in
an
instant
put
a
stop
to
the
shaking
of
the
Fibres
of
the
Brain
,
and
emotion
of
the
Spirits
,
only
by
the
consideration
of
its
Duty
.
But
now
it
remains
no
longer
in
its
power
,
nor
do
these
traces
of
the
Imagination
,
and
motions
of
the
Spirits
,
any
longer
depend
upon
it
;
and
therefore
by
a
necessary
consequence
,
Pleasure
,
which
by
the
order
of
Nature
is
affixed
to
these
traces
and
motions
,
is
become
the
only
Master
of
the
Heart
.
Man
cannot
long
resist
this
Pleasure
by
his
own
strength
,
't
is
Grace
only
that
can
entirely
overcome
it
;
because
none
but
God
,
as
the
Author
of
Grace
,
can
overcome
himself
as
the
Author
of
Nature
,
or
rather
can
appease
himself
as
the
Revenger
of
Adam's
Disobedience
.
See
the
Fifth
Dialogue
of
the
Christian
Conversations
towards
the
end
.
The
Stoics
,
who
had
but
a
confused
knowledge
of
the
disorders
of
original
Sin
,
could
not
confute
the
Epicureans
;
their
happiness
being
but
barely
Ideal
,
since
there
is
no
felicity
without
Pleasure
;
and
they
could
not
relish
Pleasure
in
the
meer
persuit
of
vertuous
actions
:
't
is
true
,
they
might
find
some
satisfaction
in
following
the
Rules
of
their
imaginary
Virtue
,
because
it
is
a
natural
consequence
of
the
knowledge
our
Soul
has
,
that
she
's
in
the
most
eligible
condition
she
can
be
in
.
This
joy
of
the
Mind
might
maintain
their
Resolutions
for
some
time
,
but
it
was
not
strong
enough
to
resist
Pain
and
conquer
Pleasure
.
'T
was
secret
Pride
,
and
not
Joy
,
that
made
them
keep
their
Countenance
;
for
when
no
one
was
present
they
soon
lost
all
their
Power
and
Wisdom
,
like
Kings
upon
the
Theatre
,
whose
Grandeur
vanishes
in
a
moment
.
It
is
very
different
with
those
Christians
who
exactly
follow
the
Rules
of
the
Gospel
.
Their
Joy
is
solid
,
because
they
most
certainly
know
they
are
in
the
happiest
condition
they
can
possibly
be
at
present
:
Their
Joy
is
also
great
,
because
the
Good
they
taste
through
Faith
and
Hope
is
infinite
.
For
the
Hope
of
a
great
Good
is
always
attended
with
a
sensible
Joy
;
and
this
Joy
is
so
much
the
more
vigorous
,
as
the
Hope
is
stronger
;
because
a
strong
Hope
representing
the
Good
as
present
,
necessarily
produces
that
Joy
,
and
sensible
Pleasure
which
always
accompanies
the
presence
of
Good
.
Nor
is
their
Joy
uneasie
,
because
it
is
founded
upon
the
promises
of
God
,
by
the
Blood
of
whose
Son
it
is
confirmed
,
and
maintain'd
by
the
inward
Peace
,
and
inexpressible
sweetness
of
Charity
,
which
the
Holy
Ghost
diffuses
in
their
Hearts
.
Nothing
can
separate
them
from
the
true
Good
,
when
they
taste
and
are
pleased
with
it
through
the
Delectation
of
Grace
.
The
Pleasures
of
Corporeal
Enjoyments
are
not
so
great
,
as
those
they
feel
in
the
love
of
God
;
rather
than
quit
them
they
choose
Contempt
and
Pain
,
they
are
not
affrighted
at
Reproaches
and
Disgrace
,
and
the
Pleasures
they
find
in
their
Sufferings
,
or
to
speak
more
properly
,
those
they
meet
with
in
God
,
when
they
contemn
every
thing
to
be
united
to
him
,
are
so
violent
that
they
transport
them
,
and
makes
them
speak
a
new
Language
,
and
with
the
Apostles
,
boast
of
the
Miseries
and
Injuries
they
suffer
.
The
Scripture
tells
us
,
That
when
the
Apostles
departed
from
the
Council
,
they
were
filled
with
Joy
that
they
were
accounted
worthy
to
suffer
shame
for
the
Name
of
JESUS
.
And
this
is
the
disposition
of
Mind
in
true
Christians
,
when
they
have
received
the
greatest
Affronts
for
defending
the
Truth
.
JESVS
CHRIST
being
come
to
reestablish
that
Order
that
Sin
had
overthrown
,
and
Order
requiring
that
the
greatest
Goods
should
be
accompanied
with
the
most
solid
Pleasures
;
it
is
plain
that
things
ought
to
happen
after
the
manner
we
have
related
,
But
besides
Reason
,
Experience
confirms
it
;
for
a
Person
no
sooner
takes
a
resolution
of
contemning
every
thing
for
God
,
but
he
is
commonly
so
affected
with
a
Pleasure
,
or
inward
Joy
,
that
he
as
sensibly
feels
God
to
be
his
Good
,
as
before
he
evidently
knew
him
to
be
so
.
True
Christians
assure
us
every
day
,
that
the
Joy
they
have
in
the
Love
and
Service
of
God
is
inexpressible
;
and
't
is
very
reasonable
to
believe
them
concerning
what
passes
in
themselves
.
The
wicked
on
the
contrary
are
perpetually
tormented
with
mortal
Disquiets
;
and
such
as
are
divided
betwixt
God
and
the
World
,
partake
also
of
the
Joys
of
the
Righteous
,
and
Dissatisfactions
of
the
Wicked
;
They
complain
of
their
Miseries
,
and
't
is
likewise
just
to
believe
their
Complaints
are
not
groundless
.
God
strikes
Men
to
the
very
quick
,
when
they
make
choice
of
any
other
object
for
their
chief
Good
but
himself
,
and
't
is
this
wound
that
makes
them
really
miserable
:
But
fills
the
Mind
of
those
with
excessive
Joy
,
who
only
unite
themselves
to
him
;
and
't
is
this
Joy
which
gives
the
true
Felicity
.
The
abundance
of
Riches
and
possession
of
Honours
and
Dignities
being
external
,
cannot
cure
the
wound
God
makes
.
And
as
Poverty
and
Contempt
are
also
without
us
,
so
they
cannot
hurt
us
when
the
Almighty
protects
us
.
It
is
evident
by
what
has
been
said
,
that
the
objects
of
our
Passions
are
not
our
Good
,
and
that
we
must
only
follow
their
Motions
for
the
preservation
of
our
Lives
:
That
sensible
Pleasure
in
respect
of
our
Good
,
is
what
our
Sensations
are
in
relation
to
the
Truth
;
and
even
as
we
find
our
Senses
deceive
us
in
matters
of
Truth
,
so
our
Passions
deceive
us
concerning
our
Good
:
That
we
must
submit
to
the
Delectation
of
Grace
,
because
it
evidently
enclines
us
to
love
the
true
Good
;
nor
is
followed
with
the
secret
reproaches
of
Reason
,
like
the
blind
instinct
and
confused
pleasure
of
the
Passions
;
but
is
always
attended
with
a
secret
Joy
agreeable
to
the
condition
we
are
in
:
And
last
of
all
,
since
God
only
can
act
upon
our
Mind
,
we
can
find
no
Felicity
out
of
God
;
except
we
would
suppose
that
God
rewards
none
but
the
Disobedient
,
or
Commands
us
to
love
that
most
which
least
deserves
our
love
.
CHAP.
V.
That
the
Perfection
of
the
Mind
consists
in
its
Vnion
with
God
,
by
the
knowledge
of
Truth
and
love
of
Virtue
;
And
that
on
the
contrary
,
its
Imperfection
proceeds
only
from
its
dependance
on
the
Body
,
because
of
the
disorder
of
its
Senses
and
Passions
.
THE
least
reflexion
is
enough
to
discover
to
us
,
that
the
good
of
the
Mind
must
necessarily
be
something
Spiritual
;
for
Bodies
are
much
inferior
to
the
Mind
,
and
cannot
act
upon
it
by
their
own
strength
:
They
are
not
able
immediately
to
unite
themselves
to
it
,
nor
are
they
intelligible
of
themselves
,
and
therefore
cannot
be
its
good
.
On
the
contrary
,
Spiritual
Things
are
intelligible
from
their
own
Nature
,
and
may
unite
themselves
to
the
Mind
;
consequently
be
its
good
,
if
we
suppose
them
superior
to
it
;
for
that
a
thing
may
be
the
good
of
the
Mind
,
it
is
not
enough
to
be
Spiritual
like
that
,
it
must
be
above
it
,
that
it
may
be
able
to
act
upon
it
,
instruct
and
recompence
it
;
otherwise
it
cou'd
neither
make
it
more
happy
nor
more
perfect
,
and
therefore
cou'd
not
be
its
good
.
Of
all
things
both
Intelligible
and
Spiritual
,
there
is
none
but
God
that
is
thus
superior
to
the
Mind
;
from
whence
it
follows
,
that
nothing
but
he
is
,
or
can
be
its
true
good
,
nor
can
we
therefore
become
more
perfect
or
more
happy
,
but
in
the
enjoyment
of
God
.
Every
one
is
convinced
,
that
the
knowledge
of
the
Truth
,
and
love
of
Virtue
,
makes
the
Mind
more
perfect
;
and
that
the
blindness
of
the
Mind
,
and
irregularity
of
the
Inclinations
,
renders
it
more
imperfect
.
The
knowledge
of
Truth
,
and
love
of
Virtue
then
,
can
be
nothing
else
but
the
union
of
the
Mind
with
God
,
and
even
a
kind
of
possessing
of
him
:
And
the
blindness
of
the
Mind
,
and
irregularity
of
the
Heart
,
can
likewise
be
nothing
else
but
the
separation
of
the
Mind
from
God
,
and
the
uniting
the
Mind
to
something
inferior
to
it
,
like
the
Body
,
since
only
this
union
can
make
it
imperfect
and
unhappy
.
Thus
to
be
acquainted
with
Truth
,
to
know
things
that
are
the
most
agreeable
,
or
consonant
to
the
Rules
of
Virtue
,
is
to
know
God
himself
.
The
Mind
is
,
as
it
were
,
placed
between
God
and
the
Body
,
Good
and
Evil
;
between
what
instructs
and
blinds
it
,
regulates
and
disorders
it
,
what
can
make
it
perfect
and
happy
,
and
what
can
make
it
imperfect
and
miserable
.
When
it
discovers
any
Truth
,
or
sees
things
as
they
are
in
themselves
,
it
sees
them
in
the
Idea's
of
God
;
that
is
,
by
a
clear
and
distinct
view
of
what
it
is
in
God
that
represents
them
.
For
as
I
have
before
intimated
,
the
Mind
of
Man
does
not
,
in
it self
,
include
the
Perfections
or
Idea's
,
of
all
the
Beings
it
is
capable
of
considering
:
'T
is
not
the
Universal
Being
,
and
therefore
does
not
see
in
it self
such
things
as
are
distinct
from
it
;
by
consulting
it self
,
it
is
neither
capable
of
enlightening
or
instructing
it self
,
for
't
is
neither
its
own
Perfection
nor
Light
;
it
stands
in
need
of
the
immense
Light
of
Truth
by
which
it
is
united
to
,
and
possesses
God
in
some
manner
.
But
we
cannot
only
say
,
that
the
Mind
,
which
is
acquainted
with
Truth
,
does
in
some
manner
know
God
who
includes
it
,
but
we
may
likewise
add
,
That
in
part
it
knows
things
as
God
himself
knows
them
;
for
the
Mind
knows
their
true
Relations
,
and
God
knows
them
also
;
the
Mind
discovers
them
by
viewing
the
Perfections
of
God
who
represents
them
,
God
sees
them
likewise
by
the
same
means
.
For
in
short
,
God
neither
sees
nor
imagines
,
but
perceives
in
himself
,
as
he
is
the
Intellectual
World
,
the
Material
and
Sensible
one
which
he
has
created
.
It
is
the
same
with
the
Mind
in
its
knowledge
of
Truth
,
it
perceives
it
not
by
Sensation
and
Imagination
:
Sensations
and
Phantoms
,
only
represent
false
Relations
to
the
Mind
;
and
whoever
discovers
the
Truth
,
can
only
see
it
in
the
Intellectual
World
to
which
't
is
united
,
and
in
which
God
himself
sees
it
;
for
this
Material
and
Sensible
World
,
is
not
intelligible
of
it self
.
The
Mind
then
sees
in
the
Light
of
God
what
e'er
it
sees
clearly
;
thô
it
sees
them
but
imperfectly
,
and
in
that
respect
very
differently
from
what
God
sees
them
.
So
that
when
the
Mind
discovers
the
Truth
,
it
is
not
only
united
to
God
,
but
possesses
,
and
beholds
him
;
and
in
one
sense
,
sees
the
Truth
as
God
himself
does
.
Likewise
,
when
our
Love
is
regulated
by
Virtue
,
we
love
God
;
for
when
we
love
according
to
these
Rules
,
the
impression
of
love
that
God
continually
produces
in
our
hearts
inclines
us
towards
him
,
and
is
neither
diverted
by
Free-will
,
nor
changed
into
Self-love
.
The
Mind
then
does
only
,
with
the
greatest
freedom
,
follow
this
impression
that
God
gives
it
;
and
the
Almighty
never
giving
it
any
impression
but
what
tends
towards
him
,
since
he
only
acts
for
himself
:
It
is
evident
,
that
when
we
love
according
to
the
Rules
of
Virtue
,
we
love
God
.
But
't
is
not
only
to
love
God
,
't
is
also
to
love
as
God
does
;
who
only
loves
himself
,
and
his
Works
,
because
they
relate
to
his
Perfections
,
and
loves
these
Works
proportionably
to
the
relation
they
have
to
these
Perfections
:
And
indeed
,
't
is
the
same
love
whereby
God
loves
himself
,
and
whatever
he
has
created
.
To
love
according
to
the
Rules
of
Virtue
,
is
to
love
God
only
;
and
to
love
God
in
every
thing
,
is
to
love
every
thing
so
far
as
it
partakes
of
his
Goodness
and
Perfection
,
since
that
is
to
love
them
in
proportion
to
their
Amiableness
.
In
short
,
't
is
to
love
by
the
impression
of
the
same
love
whereby
God
loves
himself
;
for
't
is
that
love
by
which
God
loves
himself
,
and
whatever
relates
to
him
,
which
animates
us
,
when
we
love
as
we
ought
to
do
:
And
therefore
we
then
love
as
God
loves
.
It
is
then
evident
,
that
the
knowledge
of
Truth
,
and
regulated
love
of
Virtue
,
produces
all
our
Perfections
,
since
they
are
commonly
the
consequences
of
our
Union
with
God
,
and
even
lead
us
to
the
enjoyment
of
him
,
as
much
as
we
are
capable
in
this
life
.
And
on
the
contrary
,
the
blindness
of
our
Minds
,
and
irregularity
of
our
Inclinations
,
are
the
cause
of
all
our
imperfections
,
being
the
Natural
effects
of
the
union
of
our
Mind
with
our
Body
,
as
I
have
before
proved
,
in
shewing
that
we
never
discover
the
Truth
,
nor
love
the
true
Good
,
when
we
follow
the
impressions
of
our
Senses
,
Imaginations
and
Passions
.
Tho'
these
things
are
so
evident
,
yet
Men
,
who
ardently
,
desire
to
perfect
their
Being
,
take
very
little
pains
to
encrease
their
union
with
God
,
but
continually
endeavour
to
strengthen
and
enlarge
that
they
have
with
Sensible
things
.
The
cause
of
this
strange
irregularity
cannot
be
too
fully
explain'd
.
The
possession
of
Good
must
naturally
produce
these
two
effects
in
him
that
enjoys
it
;
it
makes
him
more
perfect
,
and
at
the
same
time
more
happy
:
Yet
it
does
not
always
happen
so
;
I
confess
,
't
is
impossible
that
the
Mind
shou'd
actually
possess
any
good
,
and
not
be
actually
more
perfect
,
but
it
may
actually
enjoy
a
good
,
without
being
made
more
happy
by
it
.
Those
who
are
best
acquainted
with
the
Truth
,
and
have
the
greatest
love
for
the
most
amiable
good
,
are
always
actually
more
perfect
than
those
that
are
still
subjected
to
blindness
and
disorder
,
yet
are
they
not
always
actually
more
happy
.
It
is
the
same
thing
in
respect
to
Evil
,
it
makes
men
both
imperfect
and
unhappy
at
the
same
times
;
yet
tho'
it
always
renders
them
more
imperfect
,
it
does
not
always
make
them
more
unhappy
;
or
,
at
least
,
it
does
not
make
them
unhappy
in
proportion
to
the
imperfection
it
gives
them
.
Virtue
is
often
unpleasant
and
bitter
,
and
Vice
sweet
and
agreeable
;
so
that
't
is
chiefly
through
Faith
and
Hope
,
that
good
Men
are
truly
happy
,
whilst
the
Wicked
actually
enjoy
Pleasure
and
Delights
.
It
ought
not
to
be
thus
't
is
true
;
but
so
it
is
,
Sin
having
caused
this
disorder
,
as
I
have
shew'd
in
the
preceding
Chapter
;
and
't
is
this
disorder
that
is
the
chief
cause
,
not
only
of
all
the
irregularities
of
our
Hearts
,
but
also
of
the
blindness
and
ignorance
of
our
Minds
.
Our
Imagination
is
by
this
disorder
perswaded
,
that
the
Body
may
be
the
good
of
the
Mind
;
for
Pleasure
,
as
I
have
many
times
intimated
,
is
the
Character
,
or
Sensible
Mark
of
Good
;
and
the
most
sensible
Earthly
enjoyments
,
are
those
which
we
imagine
we
receive
from
the
Body
.
Wherefore
,
without
much
reflexion
,
we
judge
that
Bodies
may
be
,
and
even
truly
are
our
Good
:
And
't
is
so
difficult
to
oppose
the
Instinct
of
Nature
,
and
to
resist
the
Proofs
of
Sensation
,
that
we
never
so
much
as
think
of
it
.
We
reflect
not
upon
the
disorders
that
Sin
has
produced
,
and
consider
not
that
Bodies
can
only
act
upon
the
Mind
as
occasional
Causes
;
That
the
Mind
cannot
immediately
,
or
of
it self
,
enjoy
any
corporeal
thing
;
and
that
it
can
unite
it self
to
no
object
but
by
its
knowledge
and
love
:
God
only
being
above
us
,
can
recompence
or
punish
us
with
Sensations
of
Pleasure
,
or
Pain
,
which
can
instruct
more
;
and
,
in
short
,
act
in
us
.
These
truths
,
altho'
very
evident
to
attentive
Minds
,
are
not
so
powerful
to
convince
us
,
as
the
deceitful
Experience
of
a
sensible
impression
.
When
we
consider
any
thing
as
part
of
our selves
,
or
look
upon
our selves
as
part
of
this
thing
which
we
judge
is
good
for
us
to
be
united
to
,
we
have
a
love
for
it
;
and
this
love
is
so
much
the
greater
,
as
the
thing
which
we
take
to
be
united
to
us
▪
appears
a
more
considerable
part
of
the
whole
which
we
compose
with
it
.
Now
there
are
two
sorts
of
Proofs
which
perswade
us
that
a
thing
is
part
of
our selves
;
the
instinct
of
Sensation
,
and
evidence
of
Reason
.
By
the
instinct
of
Sensation
,
I
am
perswaded
that
my
Soul
is
united
to
my
Body
,
or
that
my
Body
makes
up
part
of
my
Being
;
yet
I
have
no
full
evidence
of
it
,
since
't
is
not
by
the
light
of
Reason
that
I
conclude
it
,
but
by
the
Pain
or
Pleasure
I
feel
when
Objects
strike
my
Senses
.
If
I
prick
my
hand
I
suffer
pain
,
therefore
I
conclude
my
hand
to
be
a
part
of
my Self
;
but
if
my
Cloaths
are
torn
I
suffer
nothing
,
therefore
determine
they
do
not
belong
to
my
Being
.
My
Hair
is
cut
without
pain
,
but
cannot
be
pluck'd
off
without
it
:
This
perplexes
the
Philosophers
,
and
they
know
not
how
to
decide
it
,
but
their
indetermination
shews
the
wisest
Judge
,
rather
by
the
instinct
of
Sensation
than
light
of
Reason
,
that
such
things
are
,
or
are
not
a
part
of
themselves
:
For
if
they
concluded
from
Evidence
and
Reason
,
they
wou'd
soon
discover
that
the
Mind
and
Body
are
Beings
of
different
Species
,
and
that
the
Mind
cannot
be
united
to
the
Body
of
it self
;
that
't
is
only
through
the
union
we
have
with
God
,
that
the
Soul
is
wounded
when
the
Body
is
struck
.
Therefore
't
is
only
by
the
instinct
of
Sensation
that
we
look
upon
our
Bodies
,
and
all
the
sensible
things
we
are
united
to
,
as
parts
of
our selves
;
I
mean
,
as
part
of
what
thinks
and
feels
within
us
,
because
what
is
not
,
cannot
be
discover'd
by
the
evidence
of
Reason
,
since
evidence
discovers
nothing
but
Truth
.
And
on
the
contrary
,
't
is
by
the
light
of
Reason
that
we
discover
the
relation
we
have
with
intellectual
things
;
By
a
clear
view
of
the
Mind
,
we
discover
that
we
are
united
to
God
after
a
more
strict
and
essential
manner
than
we
are
to
our
Bodies
;
That
without
him
we
are
nothing
;
can
neither
do
,
nor
know
,
will
,
nor
feel
any
thing
;
That
he
is
our
All
,
and
if
we
may
so
speak
,
that
we
make
but
one
whole
with
him
,
whereof
we
are
an
infinitely
small
part
.
The
light
of
Reason
discovers
a
thousand
Motives
to
us
,
that
wou'd
induce
us
to
love
God
only
,
and
contemn
the
Body
as
unworthy
of
our
love
;
but
we
are
hot
naturally
sensible
of
our
union
with
God
,
nor
by
the
instinct
of
Sensation
,
but
only
through
the
Grace
of
our
SAVIOVR
perswaded
that
he
is
our
All
;
which
Grace
causes
such
a
Spiritual
Sensation
in
some
Persons
,
as
it
assists
them
in
conquering
that
contrary
Sensation
which
unites
them
to
the
Body
.
For
God
,
as
he
is
the
Author
of
Nature
,
inclines
our
Minds
to
love
him
,
by
an
enlightened
knowledge
,
and
not
one
of
instinct
:
And
very
probable
't
is
,
since
the
Fall
,
that
he
,
as
Author
of
Grace
,
has
added
Instinct
to
Illumination
,
because
our
light
is
now
so
much
diminished
,
that
it
is
incapable
of
carrying
us
to
God
;
besides
its
being
continually
weakened
,
and
made
ineffectual
by
contrary
Pleasure
and
Instinct
.
We
,
by
the
light
of
the
Mind
,
then
discover
,
that
we
are
united
both
to
God
,
and
the
Intellectual
World
he
includes
;
and
by
Sensation
are
convinced
,
that
we
are
united
to
our
Bodies
,
and
by
them
to
the
Material
and
Sensible
World
,
which
God
has
created
.
But
as
our
Sensations
are
more
lively
,
moving
,
frequent
,
and
even
more
lasting
than
our
Illuminations
,
so
we
cannot
think
it
strange
that
our
Sensations
shou'd
agitate
us
,
and
stir
up
our
love
to
all
Sensible
Things
,
and
that
our
light
dissipates
and
vanishes
without
producing
in
us
any
Zeal
for
the
Truth
.
It
is
true
,
there
are
many
Men
who
are
perswaded
that
God
is
their
true
Good
,
love
him
as
their
All
,
and
who
ardently
desire
to
encrease
and
strengthen
the
union
they
have
with
him
;
but
few
evidently
perceive
,
that
to
know
and
consider
the
Truth
,
is
to
unite
themselves
to
God
with
all
their
Natural
power
;
that
't
is
a
kind
of
enjoying
of
him
,
to
meditate
on
the
true
Idea's
of
things
;
and
that
this
abstracted
view
of
certain
,
general
,
and
immutable
Truths
,
which
determine
all
particular
ones
,
are
the
flights
of
a
Mind
which
quits
the
Body
to
be
united
to
God
.
Metaphysics
,
Speculative
Mathematics
,
and
all
Universal
Sciences
,
which
regulate
and
include
particular
ones
,
as
the
Universal
Being
comprehends
all
particular
Beings
,
seem
Chimerical
to
most
Men
,
even
to
the
Religious
,
as
well
as
to
those
who
do
not
love
God
:
So
that
I
dare
hardly
say
,
that
by
enquiring
into
these
Sciences
,
the
Mind
applies
it self
to
God
,
after
the
most
pure
and
perfect
manner
it
is
naturally
capable
of
;
and
that
't
is
by
a
prospect
of
the
Intellectual
World
,
which
is
the
Object
of
these
Sciences
,
that
God
has
created
,
and
still
knows
this
Sensible
World
;
from
whence
Bodies
receive
their
life
,
as
Spirits
live
from
the
other
.
Those
who
only
follow
the
impression
of
their
Senses
and
Motions
of
their
Passions
,
are
incapable
of
relishing
truth
because
it
does
not
flatter
them
.
And
good
Men
who
continually
oppose
their
Passions
when
they
present
false
goods
to
them
,
do
not
always
resist
them
,
when
they
obscure
the
truth
,
or
make
it
contemptible
to
them
;
because
Persons
may
be
Pious
without
extraordinary
Judgments
.
To
make
us
acceptable
to
God
,
't
is
not
requisite
for
us
exactly
to
know
that
our
Senses
,
Imaginations
,
and
Passions
,
always
represent
things
otherwise
to
us
than
they
are
;
for
indeed
it
does
not
appear
that
JESVS
CHRIST
or
his
Apostles
designed
to
undeceive
us
of
several
Errors
that
D'cartes
has
since
discovered
to
us
upon
this
matter
.
There
is
a
great
deal
of
difference
between
Faith
and
Knowledge
,
the
Gospel
and
Philosophy
;
The
most
ignorant
are
capable
of
Faith
,
but
few
are
able
to
understand
Evident
Truths
.
Faith
represents
God
as
the
Creator
of
Heaven
and
Earth
,
to
the
most
Simple
,
which
is
enough
to
induce
them
to
love
and
serve
him
:
but
Reason
considers
God
not
only
in
his
Works
,
because
she
knows
he
existed
before
he
was
a
Creator
,
and
therefore
endeavours
to
Contemplate
him
in
himself
,
or
in
the
great
and
vast
Idea
of
an
infinitely
perfect
Being
which
is
included
in
him
.
The
Son
of
God
,
who
is
the
Wisdom
of
the
Father
,
or
the
Eternal
Truth
,
was
made
Man
,
and
became
sensible
to
discover
himself
to
the
carnal
and
most
ignorant
:
That
he
might
instruct
them
by
that
which
caused
their
blindness
,
and
encline
them
to
love
him
,
and
loose
them
from
sensible
Objects
,
by
the
same
things
that
had
captivated
them
.
For
when
he
had
to
do
with
Fools
,
he
made
use
of
a
kind
of
simplicity
to
make
them
wise
;
so
that
the
most
Religious
and
Faithful
have
not
always
the
greatest
Understanding
.
They
may
know
God
by
Faith
,
and
love
him
through
the
assistance
of
his
Grace
,
without
discerning
him
to
be
their
All
,
after
the
same
manner
as
Philosophers
do
,
and
without
reflecting
that
the
abstracted
knowledge
of
Truth
is
a
kind
of
union
with
him
.
We
must
not
therefore
be
surprized
,
if
there
are
but
few
Persons
who
endeavour
to
strengthen
their
Natural
Union
they
have
with
God
,
by
seeking
after
the
Truth
;
since
to
this
end
it
would
be
necessary
constantly
to
oppose
the
impression
of
the
Senses
and
Passions
after
a
very
different
manner
from
that
which
is
familiar
to
the
most
Virtuous
Persons
;
for
most
good
Men
are
not
always
perswaded
that
the
Senses
and
Passions
deceive
us
after
the
manner
we
have
explained
in
the
precedent
Books
.
Those
Sensations
and
Thoughts
,
wherein
the
Body
has
any
share
,
are
the
true
and
immediate
cause
of
our
Passions
;
because
't
is
only
the
shaking
of
the
Fibres
of
the
Brain
that
excites
any
particular
emotion
in
the
Animal
Spirits
;
so
that
only
our
Sensations
can
sensibly
convince
us
that
we
depend
on
certain
things
,
which
they
excite
us
to
love
:
But
we
feel
not
the
Natural
Union
we
have
with
God
,
when
we
discover
the
Truth
;
nor
so
much
as
think
upon
him
,
for
he
is
within
us
,
and
operates
after
such
a
secret
and
insensible
manner
that
we
perceive
him
not
:
Our
Natural
Union
with
him
therefore
does
not
excite
us
to
love
him
;
But
our
Union
with
Sensible
Things
is
quite
different
;
All
our
Sensations
declare
this
Union
,
and
Bodies
present
themselves
to
our
Eyes
when
they
act
in
us
,
nor
is
any
thing
they
do
concealed
.
Even
our
own
Body
is
more
present
to
us
than
our
Mind
,
and
we
consider
it
as
the
best
part
of
our selves
.
Thus
the
Union
we
have
with
our
Body
,
and
through
that
,
with
all
sensible
Objects
,
excites
a
violent
love
in
us
,
which
increases
this
Union
,
and
makes
us
depend
upon
things
that
are
infinitely
below
us
.
CHAP.
VI.
Of
the
most
general
Errors
of
the
Passions
.
Some
particular
Examples
of
them
.
IT
's
the
part
of
Moral
Philosophy
to
enquire
into
all
the
particular
Errors
wherein
our
Passions
engage
us
concerning
good
;
to
oppose
the
irregularities
of
Love
,
to
establish
the
sincerity
of
the
Heart
,
and
regulate
the
Manners
.
But
our
chief
intent
here
is
to
give
Rules
for
the
Mind
,
and
to
discover
the
causes
of
our
Errors
in
respect
of
Truth
;
so
that
we
shall
pursue
no
further
,
those
things
already
mentioned
,
which
relate
only
to
the
love
of
the
true
Good
:
We
will
then
proceed
to
the
Mind
,
but
shall
not
pass
by
tne
Heart
,
because
it
has
the
greatest
influence
over
the
Mind
:
We
will
enquire
after
the
Truth
in
it
self
,
and
without
thinking
on
the
relation
it
has
to
us
,
only
so
far
as
this
relation
is
the
occasion
that
Self-love
disguises
and
conceals
it
from
us
:
for
we
judging
of
all
things
according
to
our
Passions
,
deceive
our selves
in
all
things
;
the
Judgments
of
the
Passions
never
agreeing
with
the
Judgments
of
the
Truth
.
'T
is
what
we
may
learn
from
these
admirable
words
of
St.
Bernard
:
[
](A51660-e51440-b)*
*
Amor
sicut
nec
odium
,
veritatis
judicium
nescit
.
Vis
judicium
veritatis
audire
?
Joan
5.30
.
Sicut
audio
sic
judico
:
Non
sicut
odi
,
non
sicut
amo
,
non
sicut
timeo
.
Est
judicium
,
odii
,
ut
illud
:
Nos
legem
habemus
&
secundum
legem
Nostram
,
debet
mori
.
Joan
19.7
.
Est
&
timoris
,
ut
illud
:
si
dimittimus
eum
sic
,
venient
Romani
,
&
tollent
Nostrum
locum
&
gentem
.
Joan
11.48
.
Judicium
vero
amoris
,
ut
David
de
filiô
parricidâ
.
Parcite
,
inquit
,
puero
Absalom
,
2
Reg.
18.5
.
St.
Bern.
de
grad
humilitatis
.
Neither
love
nor
hatred
,
says
he
,
know
how
to
judge
according
to
truth
.
But
if
you
will
hear
a
true
Judgment
.
I
judge
according
to
what
I
hear
,
not
as
I
hate
,
love
,
or
fear
.
This
is
a
Judgment
of
hatred
,
We
have
a
law
,
and
according
to
our
law
he
ought
to
die
.
This
is
a
Judgment
of
fear
,
If
we
let
him
alone
,
the
Romans
will
come
and
take
away
our
Place
and
Nation
.
This
is
a
Judgment
of
love
,
as
David
speaks
of
his
parricide
son
,
Spare
the
young
Man
Absalom
.
Our
Love
,
Hatred
,
and
Fear
,
cause
us
to
make
false
Judgments
only
;
and
nothing
but
the
pure
Light
of
Truth
,
can
enlighten
our
Mind
.
'T
is
only
the
distinct
Voice
of
our
common
Master
that
instructs
us
to
make
solid
Judgments
,
and
he
will
infallibly
do
it
,
provided
we
only
judge
of
what
he
says
,
and
according
to
what
he
says
,
Sicut
audio
,
sic
judico
,
As
I
hear
I
judge
.
But
let
us
see
after
what
manner
our
Passions
seduce
us
,
that
we
may
the
more
easily
resist
them
.
The
Passions
have
so
great
a
relation
to
the
Senses
,
that
't
will
not
be
difficult
to
discover
after
what
manner
they
engage
us
in
Error
,
if
we
but
remember
what
has
been
said
in
the
First
Book
.
For
the
general
Causes
of
the
Errors
of
our
Passions
are
entirely
like
those
of
the
Errors
of
our
Senses
.
The
most
general
cause
of
the
Errors
of
our
Senses
is
,
as
we
have
shewn
in
the
First
Book
,
our
attributing
to
our
Body
,
or
to
External
Objects
,
those
Sensations
which
belong
to
our
Soul
;
affixing
Colours
to
the
Surfaces
of
Bodies
;
diffusing
of
Light
,
Sounds
,
Odours
in
the
Air
;
and
assigning
Pain
and
Pleasure
to
those
parts
of
our
Body
which
receive
any
change
by
the
motion
of
other
Bodies
which
meet
them
.
The
same
thing
may
be
said
of
our
Passions
:
we
imprudently
attribute
to
those
Objects
which
cause
,
or
seem
to
cause
them
,
all
the
dispositions
of
our
Heart
;
Goodness
,
Meekness
,
Malice
,
Ill-nature
,
and
all
the
other
Qualities
of
our
Mind
.
Whatever
Object
produces
any
Passion
in
us
;
in
some
manner
seems
to
include
in
it self
,
what
it
stirs
up
in
us
,
when
we
think
upon
it
:
Even
as
sensible
Objects
appear
to
us
to
include
the
Sensations
their
presence
excites
.
When
we
love
any
Person
,
we
are
naturally
inclined
to
believe
they
love
us
,
and
't
would
be
difficult
for
us
to
imagine
that
they
had
either
any
design
to
hurt
us
,
or
to
oppose
our
desires
.
But
if
hatred
succeeds
love
,
we
cannot
believe
that
they
design
us
any
good
;
we
interpret
all
their
actions
in
the
worst
sense
,
and
are
always
suspicious
and
upon
our
guard
,
although
perhaps
they
think
not
of
us
,
or
else
intend
to
do
us
some
service
.
In
short
,
we
unjustly
attribute
all
the
dispositions
of
our
Heart
,
to
those
Persons
who
excite
any
Passion
in
us
;
even
as
we
imprudently
ascribe
all
the
qualities
of
our
Mind
to
sensible
Objects
.
Moreover
,
by
the
same
reason
that
we
believe
all
Men
receive
the
same
Sensations
of
the
same
Objects
as
we
do
,
we
think
that
all
Men
are
acted
with
the
same
Passions
as
we
are
upon
the
same
subjects
,
provided
we
believe
they
are
capable
of
being
moved
by
them
.
We
imagine
they
love
,
what
we
love
,
or
desire
what
we
desire
:
from
whence
proceed
Jealousies
and
secret
Aversions
,
if
the
good
we
are
in
pursuit
of
cannot
be
wholly
possessed
by
many
:
but
if
several
Persons
can
possess
it
without
dividing
it
,
as
they
may
the
soveraign
Good
,
Science
,
Vertue
,
&c.
then
't
is
quite
of
another
matter
.
We
likewise
think
they
hate
,
shun
,
and
fear
the
same
things
as
we
do
,
and
from
thence
comes
Associations
and
secret
Conspiracies
according
to
the
nature
of
the
thing
we
hate
,
by
this
means
hoping
to
deliver
our selves
from
our
Miseries
.
We
attribute
therefore
the
Emotions
of
our
Passions
to
those
Objects
that
produce
them
in
us
,
and
believe
that
all
other
Men
,
and
even
sometimes
that
Beasts
are
agitated
like
us
;
besides
,
we
judge
yet
more
rashly
,
that
the
cause
of
our
Passion
,
which
is
often
only
imaginary
,
is
really
in
some
Object
.
When
we
have
a
Passionate
Love
for
any
one
,
we
think
every
thing
is
amiable
in
them
:
His
Grimaces
are
Charming
,
his
Ugliness
is
not
displeasing
;
his
Irregular
Motions
and
Unhandsom
Gestures
are
Just
,
or
at
least
Natural
.
If
he
never
speaks
,
't
is
because
he
is
Wise
;
if
he
talks
much
,
he
is
very
Witty
;
if
he
speaks
upon
every
thing
,
his
Knowledge
is
universal
;
if
he
continually
interrupts
others
,
it
proceeds
from
his
Quickness
,
Vicacity
,
and
Fire
:
In
short
,
if
he
would
be
chief
in
all
Company
,
't
is
because
he
Merits
it
.
Thus
our
Passion
after
this
manner
hides
or
disguises
the
Defects
of
our
Friends
,
and
on
the
contrary
magnifies
the
least
good
Quality
in
them
.
But
if
this
Love
is
only
founded
upon
the
agitation
of
the
Blood
and
Animal
Spirits
like
the
rest
of
the
Passions
,
in
time
it
cools
for
want
of
heat
,
or
proper
Spirits
to
maintain
it
;
and
if
interest
or
any
other
false
relation
change
the
disposition
of
the
Brain
,
hatred
will
succeed
this
love
,
and
will
not
fail
to
make
us
imagine
in
the
Object
of
our
Passion
,
all
the
defects
that
can
cause
a
just
Aversion
.
In
the
same
Person
we
shall
see
such
Qualities
as
are
directly
contrary
to
what
we
admired
before
;
and
be
ashamed
that
ever
we
loved
them
;
and
the
Predominant
Passion
will
be
sure
to
justifie
it self
,
and
make
that
it
succeeds
ridiculous
.
The
power
and
injustice
of
the
Passions
are
not
limited
to
what
we
have
already
said
,
they
are
infinitely
farther
extended
.
Our
Passions
do
not
only
disguise
their
principal
Object
,
but
likewise
whatever
has
any
relation
to
it
:
They
not
only
make
all
the
Qualities
of
our
Friends
agreeable
,
but
also
the
greatest
part
of
the
Qualities
of
our
Friends
Friends
.
And
even
go
farther
in
those
that
have
a
great
and
strong
Imagination
,
for
their
Passions
have
so
vast
a
dominion
and
extension
,
that
it
is
impossible
to
determine
their
limits
.
What
I
have
already
mentioned
are
such
general
and
pregnant
Principles
of
Errors
,
Prejudices
,
and
Injustices
,
that
't
is
impossible
to
remark
all
the
Consequences
of
them
;
Most
of
the
Truths
,
or
rather
Errors
,
of
certain
Places
,
Times
,
Commonalties
,
and
Families
,
have
their
rise
from
them
.
What
is
approved
in
Spain
,
is
rejected
in
France
;
what
is
Orthodox
in
Paris
,
is
condemned
at
Rome
;
what
the
Dominicans
espouse
,
the
Franciscans
disapprove
;
and
what
is
undoubted
to
the
one
,
is
erroneous
to
the
other
:
The
Dominicans
think
it
their
Duty
to
follow
Sr.
Thomas
,
and
why
?
because
he
was
one
of
their
Order
;
and
on
the
contrary
the
Franciscans
embrace
the
Opinions
of
Scotus
,
because
he
belonged
to
theirs
.
There
are
also
Truths
and
Errors
peculiar
to
certain
times
;
The
Earth
moved
about
Two
thousand
years
ago
,
and
from
thence
it
has
continued
fix'd
till
our
days
,
and
now
begins
to
turn
again
.
Aristotle
has
been
formerly
burnt
,
and
a
Provincial
Council
approved
of
by
a
Pope
,
has
wisely
forbidden
the
teaching
of
his
Physics
;
ever
since
he
has
been
admired
,
and
now
begins
again
to
be
despised
.
There
are
some
Opinions
now
received
in
the
Schools
,
which
have
formerly
been
look'd
upon
as
Heresies
,
and
those
who
maintained
them
have
been
Excommunicated
as
Hereticks
by
some
of
the
Bishops
:
Because
Passions
causing
Factions
,
these
Factions
produce
such
Truths
or
Errors
as
are
as
inconstant
as
the
Cause
which
produces
them
,
For
instance
,
Men
may
be
indifferent
in
respect
to
the
stability
of
the
Earth
,
or
the
essence
of
Bodies
:
but
continue
no
longer
so
,
Concil.
Angl.
per
Spelman
,
An.
1287.
when
they
are
maintained
by
such
as
they
hate
.
Thus
Aversion
upheld
by
a
confused
Sense
of
Piety
,
produces
an
indifferent
Zeal
,
which
kindles
by
little
and
little
,
and
at
last
causes
such
Events
as
appears
so
strange
to
every
one
a
long
time
after
they
happen
.
We
can
scarcely
think
that
the
Passions
should
go
so
far
,
but
't
is
because
we
don't
consider
they
extend
to
whatever
can
satisfie
them
.
Haman
it
may
be
would
have
done
no
harm
to
the
Jews
,
if
Mordecai
had
saluted
him
,
but
he
being
a
Jew
,
and
refusing
it
,
the
whole
Nation
must
perish
that
his
revenge
might
be
the
more
magnificent
.
When
there
is
a
dispute
between
two
Persons
who
has
a
right
to
an
Estate
,
they
ought
only
to
bring
their
Titles
,
and
speak
what
relates
to
their
Case
,
or
can
best
set
it
off
;
yet
they
fail
not
to
use
all
manner
of
reproaches
one
against
another
,
to
contradict
each
other
in
every
thing
,
and
to
introduce
a
thousand
unnecessary
Accusations
,
and
perplex
their
Suit
with
an
infinite
number
of
Accessory
Circumstances
which
confound
the
Cause
.
And
indeed
all
Passions
extend
as
far
as
the
prospect
of
their
Mind
who
are
moved
with
them
;
since
there
is
nothing
that
we
take
to
have
any
relation
with
the
Object
of
our
Passions
,
to
which
the
motions
of
these
Passions
do
not
extend
;
which
is
done
as
follows
.
The
Traces
of
Objects
are
really
so
connected
one
with
another
in
the
Brain
,
that
't
is
impossible
the
course
of
the
Spirits
should
violently
stir
up
any
of
them
,
without
affecting
the
rest
at
the
same
time
.
The
chief
Idea
therefore
of
what
we
think
of
,
is
necessarily
accompanied
with
a
great
number
of
accessory
Idea's
,
which
are
so
much
the
more
increased
as
the
impression
of
the
Animal
Spirits
are
more
violent
.
And
this
impression
of
the
Spirits
seldom
fails
to
be
violent
in
the
Passions
,
because
the
Passions
continually
and
powerfully
force
into
the
Brain
an
abundance
of
these
Spirits
that
are
proper
to
preserve
the
Traces
of
the
Idea's
which
represent
their
Object
.
Thus
the
motion
of
Love
or
Hatred
extend
not
only
to
the
principal
Object
of
the
Passion
,
but
likewise
to
whatever
we
discover
to
have
any
relation
to
this
Object
;
because
in
the
Passion
the
motion
of
the
Soul
follows
the
perception
of
the
Mind
;
even
as
the
motion
of
the
Animal
Spirits
in
the
Brain
,
follow
the
Traces
of
the
Brain
as
well
as
those
which
excite
the
chief
Idea
of
the
Object
of
the
Passion
,
as
those
that
relate
to
it
.
We
must
not
therefore
wonder
if
Men
carry
their
Hatred
or
Love
so
far
,
and
perform
such
Capricious
and
Surprizing
Actions
.
There
is
a
particular
Reason
of
all
these
Effects
although
we
do
not
know
them
;
because
their
accessory
Ideas
are
not
always
like
ours
,
we
cannot
discover
them
.
Thus
there
is
always
some
cause
or
other
for
those
actions
which
appear
most
ridiculous
and
extravagant
.
CHAP.
VII
.
Of
the
Passions
in
particular
,
and
first
of
Admiration
and
its
ill
Effects
.
WHatever
I
have
hitherto
said
of
the
Passions
is
general
,
but
it
will
not
be
very
difficult
to
draw
particular
Inferences
from
thence
;
It
is
only
requisite
to
make
some
reflexion
upon
what
passes
within
our selves
,
and
the
actions
of
others
,
for
us
to
discover
more
of
these
sort
of
Truths
at
one
view
,
than
we
could
explain
in
a
considerable
time
.
Yet
there
are
so
few
Persons
who
think
of
retiring
into
themselves
,
and
make
any
endeavour
to
that
end
,
that
to
excite
them
to
it
,
and
stir
up
their
attention
,
it
will
be
necessary
to
descend
to
particulars
.
When
we
hit
or
strike
our selves
,
it
seems
as
if
we
were
almost
insensible
;
but
if
we
are
only
touched
by
others
,
we
receive
Sensations
lively
enough
to
stir
up
our
Attention
.
In
short
,
we
never
tickle
our selves
,
or
so
much
as
think
of
it
,
and
it
may
be
we
could
not
do
it
if
we
had
a
mind
to
it
.
'T
is
almost
for
the
same
reason
that
the
Soul
neglects
to
enquire
into
and
examine
it self
,
it
is
immediately
displeased
with
this
sort
of
enquiry
,
and
is
commonly
incapable
of
discovering
or
perceiving
what
belongs
to
it
,
except
when
excited
or
stirred
up
by
others
.
Thus
to
assist
some
Persons
in
the
knowing
of
themselves
,
it
is
necessary
to
relate
some
of
the
particular
Effects
of
the
Passions
,
that
by
affecting
them
therewith
,
we
may
make
them
sensible
of
all
the
parts
their
Soul
are
composed
of
.
Those
who
will
read
what
follows
must
nevertheless
be
advertized
,
that
they
will
not
always
be
sensible
that
I
touch
them
,
nor
will
they
always
find
themselves
subject
to
the
Passions
and
Errors
I
shall
speak
of
,
because
all
particular
Passions
are
not
always
the
same
in
all
Men.
'T
is
true
indeed
all
Men
have
the
same
Natural
inclinations
which
have
no
relation
to
the
Body
,
when
their
Bodies
are
perfectly
well
disposed
.
But
the
different
temperaments
of
Bodies
,
and
their
frequent
changes
,
cause
a
great
deal
of
variety
in
particular
Passions
.
And
if
to
the
diversity
of
the
Body's
constitution
we
add
that
which
proceeds
from
Objects
,
which
likewise
makes
very
different
impressions
upon
all
those
who
have
neither
the
same
Employs
nor
manner
of
living
;
it
is
evident
that
such
a
Person
may
feel
himself
strongly
affected
in
some
place
of
his
Soul
by
certain
things
,
who
will
yet
absolutely
remain
insensible
of
many
others
.
Thus
we
should
often
be
deceived
,
if
we
judged
of
what
others
feel
by
what
passes
in
our selves
.
I
am
not
afraid
of
being
mistaken
when
I
affirm
that
all
Men
would
be
happy
,
for
I
am
absolutely
assured
that
the
Chinese
and
Tartars
,
Angels
,
Devils
,
and
even
all
Spirits
whatever
,
have
an
inclination
for
felicity
.
I
know
likewise
that
God
will
never
produce
any
Spirit
without
this
desire
.
Yet
is
it
not
experience
that
has
taught
it
me
,
I
never
saw
either
Chinese
or
Tartar
;
nor
is
it
the
inward
testimony
of
my
Conscience
,
for
that
only
teaches
me
I
would
be
happy
my self
:
But
't
is
God
alone
who
can
inwardly
convince
me
that
all
other
Men
,
Angels
,
and
Devils
,
have
a
desire
to
be
happy
;
and
't
is
he
only
who
can
assure
me
,
that
he
will
never
give
a
Being
to
any
Spirit
who
will
be
indifferent
in
respect
to
it
.
For
who
is
there
besides
himself
that
can
positively
assure
me
of
what
he
does
,
and
even
of
what
he
thinks
?
And
as
he
can
never
deceive
me
,
so
I
cannot
doubt
of
what
he
teaches
me
.
I
am
therefore
certain
that
all
Men
would
be
happy
because
this
inclination
is
natural
,
and
depends
not
upon
the
Body
.
But
it
is
very
different
in
particular
Passions
;
For
though
I
should
extreamly
love
Musick
,
Dancing
,
Hunting
,
Sweetmeats
,
or
Luxurious
Dishes
,
&c.
I
could
conclude
nothing
certain
from
thence
concerning
the
Passions
of
other
Men.
Pleasure
doubtless
is
sweet
and
agreeable
to
all
Men
,
but
every
one
does
not
find
it
in
the
same
Object
:
The
love
of
pleasure
is
a
Natural
inclination
,
depends
not
on
the
Body
,
and
is
therefore
general
to
all
Men.
But
the
inclination
for
Music
,
Dancing
,
and
Hunting
,
is
not
general
,
because
the
disposition
of
the
Body
on
which
it
depends
,
being
different
in
all
Men
,
whatsoever
Passions
depend
upon
it
,
are
not
always
the
same
.
General
Passions
,
as
Desire
,
Joy
,
Sorrow
,
&c.
keep
the
mean
between
Natural
inclinations
,
and
particular
Passions
.
They
are
general
as
well
as
the
Inclinations
,
but
not
equally
strong
;
because
that
which
produces
and
maintains
them
,
is
not
always
it self
equally
active
.
There
is
also
a
great
deal
of
variety
in
the
degrees
whereby
the
Animal
Spirits
are
agitated
,
in
their
plenty
,
and
fineness
,
and
in
the
relation
betwixt
the
Fibres
of
the
Brain
and
these
Spirits
.
Thus
it
often
happens
,
that
we
don
't
at
all
affect
some
Persons
,
when
we
speak
of
particular
Passions
;
but
if
we
chance
to
touch
them
,
they
are
violently
moved
.
But
with
general
Passions
and
Inclinations
,
it
is
quite
contrary
,
we
are
always
affected
when
they
are
mentioned
,
yet
after
such
a
weak
and
languishing
manner
,
that
we
scarcely
perceive
it
.
I
speak
these
things
to
prevent
any
Persons
judging
whether
I
am
deceived
,
by
the
Sensation
only
which
he
has
received
of
what
I
have
already
or
shall
afterwards
say
,
for
I
would
have
every
one
judge
by
considering
the
Nature
of
the
Passsions
I
treat
of
.
If
I
proposed
the
treating
of
every
particular
Passion
,
or
to
distinguish
them
by
all
the
Objects
which
excite
them
;
it
's
plain
I
should
never
conclude
,
and
should
only
repeat
the
same
thing
:
The
first
is
evident
because
the
Objects
of
our
Passions
are
infinite
;
and
the
last
also
,
since
we
must
always
treat
of
the
same
Subject
.
The
particular
Passions
for
Poetry
,
History
,
Mathematics
,
Hunting
,
and
Dancing
,
are
only
one
and
the
same
general
Passion
;
for
,
for
instance
,
the
Passions
of
Desire
or
Joy
,
or
for
whatever
pleases
,
differ
not
,
although
the
peculiar
Pleasures
which
excite
them
do
.
We
must
not
therefore
multiply
the
number
of
the
Passions
according
to
the
number
of
Objects
which
are
infinite
,
but
only
by
the
chief
relations
they
may
have
in
respect
to
us
.
And
after
this
manner
we
shall
discover
,
as
will
further
appear
upon
our
Explanation
,
that
Love
and
Hatred
are
the
Mother
Passions
,
Which
produce
no
other
general
Passions
but
Desire
,
Joy
,
and
Sorrow
,
and
that
particular
Passions
are
composed
only
of
these
three
first
;
and
are
so
much
the
more
compounded
as
the
chief
Idea
of
Good
or
Evil
which
excites
them
,
is
accompanied
with
a
greater
number
of
Accessory
Ideas
,
or
that
the
Good
or
Evil
are
more
Circumstantiated
in
respect
to
us
.
If
we
remember
what
has
been
said
of
the
connexion
of
Ideas
,
and
that
in
all
great
Passions
the
Animal
Spirits
being
extreamly
agitated
,
stir
up
in
the
Brain
all
the
Traces
which
have
any
relation
with
the
Object
which
affects
us
;
we
shall
find
,
that
there
are
an
infinite
number
of
different
Passions
which
have
no
particular
name
,
and
which
we
can
no
way
explain
,
but
must
confess
they
are
inexplicable
.
If
the
Original
Passions
which
compose
the
rest
,
were
not
capable
of
more
or
less
;
we
should
have
no
difficulty
in
determining
the
number
of
all
the
Passions
;
but
the
number
of
those
Passions
which
are
produced
by
the
complication
of
others
must
necessarily
be
infinite
,
because
the
same
Passion
having
infinite
degrees
,
it
may
by
joining
it self
with
others
be
infinitely
complicated
:
So
that
perhaps
two
Men
were
never
moved
by
the
same
Passion
,
if
by
the
same
Passion
we
understand
the
collecting
together
of
all
equal
Motions
,
and
like
Sensations
,
which
at
the
presence
of
any
Object
is
stirred
up
in
us
.
But
as
the
more
or
less
do
not
alter
the
Species
,
so
we
may
say
that
the
number
of
Passions
is
not
infinite
,
because
the
Circumstances
which
accompany
the
Good
or
Evil
may
be
limited
.
But
let
us
explain
our
Passions
in
particular
.
When
we
see
any
thing
the
first
time
,
or
when
we
have
many
time
seen
it
attended
with
certain
Circumstances
,
we
are
surprized
and
admire
at
it
if
we
afterwards
see
it
appear
in
another
manner
.
Thus
a
new
Idea
,
or
a
new
Connexion
of
old
Ideas
,
begets
in
us
an
imperfect
Passion
,
which
is
the
first
of
all
,
and
which
I
name
Admiration
.
I
call
this
Passion
imperfect
,
because
it
is
neither
excited
by
the
Idea
nor
Sensation
of
Good
.
The
Brain
being
then
shaken
in
certain
places
which
never
were
before
affected
,
or
after
a
manner
that
is
perfectly
new
,
the
Soul
is
sensibly
touched
with
it
,
and
consequently
strongly
applies
it self
,
to
whatever
it
finds
new
in
that
object
;
for
the
same
reason
,
as
a
simple
tickling
at
the
Soles
of
the
Feet
,
excites
a
most
lively
and
moving
Sensation
in
the
Soul
,
rather
through
the
novelty
than
the
force
of
the
impression
.
There
is
yet
other
Reasons
for
the
Souls
applying
it self
to
Novelties
,
but
I
have
explained
them
where
I
spoke
of
Natural
Inclinations
.
We
here
consider
the
Soul
in
relation
to
the
Body
,
and
according
to
this
relation
't
is
the
emotion
of
the
Spirits
which
is
the
Natural
Cause
of
its
application
to
new
things
.
In
Admiration
strictly
taken
,
we
consider
things
only
as
they
are
in
themselves
,
or
according
to
their
appearances
;
and
not
as
they
relate
to
us
,
or
as
they
are
good
or
bad
.
And
therefore
the
Spirits
diffuse
not
themselves
through
the
Muscles
,
to
give
a
proper
disposition
to
the
Body
,
to
pursue
good
,
or
avoid
evil
;
nor
agitate
the
Nerves
,
which
goes
to
the
Heart
,
and
to
the
rest
of
the
Bowels
,
to
hasten
,
or
delay
the
fermentation
and
motion
of
the
Blood
,
as
it
happens
in
the
rest
of
the
Passions
.
All
the
Spirits
go
towards
the
Brain
,
there
to
trace
a
lively
and
distinct
image
of
the
surprizing
object
,
that
the
Soul
may
consider
and
know
it
again
;
But
the
rest
of
the
Body
continues
in
the
same
posture
,
and
as
if
it
were
immoveable
.
For
there
being
no
emotion
in
the
Soul
,
there
is
also
no
motion
in
the
Body
.
If
what
we
admire
appears
great
,
the
admiration
is
always
followed
with
Esteem
,
and
sometimes
with
Veneration
:
But
on
the
contrary
,
it
is
always
accompanied
with
Contempt
,
and
sometimes
Disdain
,
when
it
appears
little
.
The
Idea
of
Greatness
produces
a
great
motion
of
Spirits
in
the
Brain
,
and
the
trace
that
represents
it
is
preserved
a
long
time
:
A
great
motion
of
Spirits
likewise
excites
the
Idea
of
Greatness
in
the
Soul
,
and
strongly
fixes
the
Mind
on
the
consideration
of
this
Idea
.
But
the
Idea
of
Littleness
creates
in
the
Brain
but
an
inconsiderable
motion
of
the
Spirits
,
and
the
trace
which
represents
it
does
not
continue
long
.
Also
,
when
the
Spirits
are
but
little
moved
,
they
cause
in
the
Soul
an
Idea
of
Meanness
,
and
stays
the
Mind
but
a
very
little
in
the
consideration
of
this
Idea
:
These
things
deserve
to
be
well
observed
.
When
we
consider
our selves
,
or
any
thing
which
is
united
to
us
,
our
Admiration
is
always
attended
with
some
Passion
which
moves
us
.
But
this
agitation
is
only
in
the
Soul
,
and
in
the
Spirits
which
go
to
the
Heart
;
because
there
being
no
good
that
it
makes
us
seek
after
,
nor
evil
that
it
makes
us
shun
,
the
Spirits
are
not
dispersed
through
the
Muscles
to
dispose
the
Body
to
any
action
.
The
thoughts
of
the
perfection
of
our
Being
,
or
of
any
thing
belonging
to
it
,
naturally
produces
Pride
,
the
esteem
of
our Selves
,
contempt
of
others
,
Joy
,
and
some
other
Passions
.
The
prospect
of
Grandeur
produces
Haughtiness
;
that
of
Power
,
Generosity
or
Boldness
;
and
the
sight
of
any
,
other
advantagious
quality
naturally
produces
some
other
Passion
,
which
will
be
always
a
kind
of
Pride
.
On
the
contrary
,
the
foresight
of
some
Imperfection
of
our
Being
,
or
of
any
thing
which
belongs
to
it
,
will
naturally
produce
Humility
,
contempt
of
our selves
,
respect
for
others
,
sorrow
,
and
some
other
Passions
.
The
prospect
of
Poverty
creates
meanness
of
Spirit
;
that
of
weakness
,
Timerousness
;
and
thus
the
sight
of
any
disadvantageous
quality
naturally
produces
a
Passion
,
which
will
be
a
kind
of
Humility
.
But
this
Humility
,
as
well
as
that
Pride
,
is
properly
neither
a
Virtue
nor
a
Vice
.
They
are
both
of
'em
only
Passions
or
involuntary
Motions
,
which
are
nevertheless
very
useful
to
civil
Society
,
and
even
absolutely
necessary
in
some
occurrences
for
the
preservation
of
the
Life
or
Goods
of
those
who
are
actuacted
by
them
.
It
is
necessary
for
instance
,
to
be
humble
and
timerous
,
and
even
outwardly
to
testifie
the
disposition
of
our
Minds
by
a
respectful
and
modest
Air
,
when
we
are
in
the
presence
of
a
Person
of
Quality
,
or
of
a
proud
and
powerful
Man
:
For
't
is
commonly
advantagious
for
the
Good
of
the
Body
,
that
the
imagination
should
submit
at
the
sight
of
sensible
Grandeur
,
and
that
it
should
give
it
external
Marks
of
its
Humility
,
and
inward
Veneration
.
But
this
is
Naturally
and
Mechanically
performed
without
the
Will
's
having
any
share
in
it
,
and
often
even
notwithstanding
all
its
Resistance
:
Even
Bruits
themselves
have
need
of
it
,
as
Dogs
,
to
prevail
with
those
they
live
with
,
have
their
Machine
composed
after
such
a
manner
,
that
they
assume
such
an
Air
as
they
ought
to
have
in
relation
to
those
about
'em
,
as
is
absolutely
necessary
for
their
preservation
.
And
if
Birds
,
or
any
other
Animals
have
not
a
fit
disposition
of
Body
to
give
'em
this
Air
,
't
is
because
they
have
no
occasion
to
asswage
those
the
effects
of
whose
Anger
they
can
avoid
by
flight
;
and
without
whose
help
they
can
preserve
their
lives
.
It
cannot
be
too
much
considered
that
all
the
Passions
,
which
are
excited
in
us
,
at
the
sight
of
some
external
object
,
does
Mechanically
imprint
upon
the
face
of
those
that
are
struck
with
it
,
a
suitable
Air
,
that
is
,
an
Air
that
Mechanically
disposes
all
those
who
see
it
to
such
Passions
and
Motions
as
are
useful
to
the
good
of
Society
;
nay
Admiration
it self
,
when
it
is
only
caused
in
us
by
the
fight
of
something
External
,
and
which
others
may
consider
,
as
well
as
we
,
diffuses
through
our
Face
an
Air
which
Mechanically
imprints
Admiration
in
others
,
and
which
even
acts
upon
their
Brain
after
so
regulated
a
manner
,
that
the
Spirits
which
are
contained
in
it
are
impelled
into
the
Muscles
of
their
Face
,
to
form
there
an
Air
like
ours
.
This
Communication
of
the
Passions
of
the
Soul
,
and
Motions
of
the
Animal
Spirits
,
to
unite
Men
together
in
relation
to
good
and
evil
,
and
to
make
'em
resemble
each
other
,
not
only
by
the
disposition
of
their
Minds
,
but
also
by
that
of
their
Body
,
is
so
much
the
greater
,
and
more
observable
as
the
Passions
are
more
violent
,
because
then
the
Animal
Spirits
are
agitated
with
more
force
;
Now
this
is
necessary
,
because
the
Evils
being
greater
or
more
present
,
we
must
apply
our selves
the
more
,
and
be
strongly
united
amongst
our selves
,
to
shun
,
or
to
discover
them
,
But
when
the
Passions
are
very
moderate
,
as
Admiration
commonly
is
,
they
don't
sensibly
communicate
themselves
,
nor
produce
such
an
Air
by
which
they
are
accustomed
to
do
it
.
For
since
there
's
no
extraordinary
occasion
,
't
would
be
unnecessary
to
put
any
force
upon
the
imagination
of
others
,
or
to
divert
them
from
their
employments
;
on
which
perhaps
't
is
more
requisite
they
should
be
engag'd
,
than
in
considering
the
Causes
of
these
Passions
.
There
is
nothing
more
surprising
than
this
Oeconomy
of
our
Passions
,
and
disposition
of
our
Body
in
relation
to
those
objects
which
encompass
us
.
Whatsoever
is
Machinally
performed
in
us
,
is
most
worthy
the
Wisdom
of
him
who
Created
us
.
And
as
God
has
made
us
capable
Of
all
the
Passions
which
act
in
us
,
chiefly
to
unite
us
to
all
sensible
things
,
for
the
preservation
of
Society
,
and
of
our
own
Bodies
,
and
his
design
is
so
faithfully
executed
by
the
construction
of
his
work
,
so
we
cannot
but
admire
the
Springs
and
curiosity
thereof
.
Yet
our
Passions
,
and
all
these
imperceptible
Bands
by
which
we
are
united
to
whatever
is
about
us
,
often
prove
through
our
faults
,
very
considerable
Causes
of
our
Errors
and
Irregularities
:
For
we
make
not
that
use
we
ought
of
our
Passions
;
we
permit
them
every
thing
,
and
do
not
so
much
as
know
the
limits
that
should
be
prescribed
to
their
Power
.
Thus
even
these
Passions
,
which
like
Admiration
are
but
weak
,
and
agitate
us
the
least
,
have
yet
power
enough
to
lead
us
into
Error
.
Of
which
here
follows
some
instances
.
When
Men
,
and
chiefly
those
who
have
a
vigorous
Imagination
,
consider
themselves
on
the
best
side
,
they
are
commonly
very
well
satisfied
with
themselves
;
and
their
inward
satisfaction
never
fails
of
encreasing
when
they
compare
themselves
with
such
as
are
more
dull
and
heavy
than
they
.
Besides
,
there
is
many
Persons
that
admire
'em
too
;
and
very
few
who
oppose
them
with
any
success
or
applause
;
(
for
Reason
is
scarcely
ever
applauded
in
opposition
to
a
strong
and
lively
imagination
)
and
in
short
,
such
a
sensible
Air
of
submission
and
respect
is
form'd
upon
the
Face
of
all
their
Hearers
,
who
have
likewise
such
lively
traces
of
admiration
at
every
new
word
they
speak
,
that
they
also
admire
themselves
,
and
their
Imagination
swells
them
up
with
all
these
advantages
,
and
makes
'em
extreamly
satisfied
in
their
own
Abilities
:
For
,
if
we
cannot
see
a
Passionate
Man
without
receiving
some
impression
from
his
Passion
,
or
in
some
measure
engaging
our selves
in
his
Sentiments
;
how
could
it
be
possible
for
those
,
who
are
surrounded
with
a
great
number
of
Admirers
,
to
give
no
reception
to
a
Passion
which
so
agreeably
flatters
Self-Love
?
Now
this
high
esteem
that
Persons
of
a
strong
and
lively
Imagination
have
of
themselves
,
and
their
good
Qualities
,
swell
'em
up
with
Pride
,
and
makes
them
assume
a
Majestic
and
Decisive
Air
:
They
hear
others
with
Contempt
,
answer
'em
in
Raillery
,
and
only
think
in
relation
to
themselves
;
Looking
upon
the
attention
of
the
Mind
as
a
kind
of
Servitude
,
even
where
't
is
necessary
to
discover
the
Truth
,
they
become
wholly
Indocible
.
Pride
,
Ignorance
,
and
Blindness
,
are
always
Companions
.
The
Mighty
Wits
,
or
rather
the
Proud
and
Vain-glorious
ones
,
will
never
be
Disciples
of
the
Truth
:
They
never
retire
within
themselves
,
but
to
admire
and
applaud
their
own
Acquirements
:
So
that
he
,
who
resists
the
Proud
,
shines
in
the
midst
of
their
darkness
without
dissipating
it
.
There
is
,
on
the
contrary
,
a
certain
disposition
in
the
Blood
and
Animal
Spirits
,
which
gives
us
too
mean
an
opinion
of
our selves
;
Their
scarcity
,
heaviness
,
and
fineness
,
joined
to
the
grossness
of
the
Fibres
of
the
Brain
,
make
our
Imagination
weak
and
languishing
:
And
the
Sight
,
or
rather
confused
Sensation
of
this
weakness
and
languor
of
our
Imaginations
,
creates
such
a
vicious
humility
in
us
,
as
we
may
call
meanness
of
Spirit
.
All
Men
are
capable
of
the
Truth
,
but
do
not
apply
themselves
to
him
who
is
only
able
to
teach
them
.
The
Proud
depend
upon
themselves
,
and
hearken
to
none
else
;
And
these
mistaken
humble
ones
,
address
themselves
to
the
Proud
,
and
submit
to
all
their
Decisions
:
Thus
both
listen
only
to
Man
.
The
Mind
of
the
Proud
,
obeys
the
fermentation
of
their
own
Blood
,
that
is
their
own
Imagination
:
And
that
of
the
mean
spirited
,
submits
to
the
commanding
Air
of
the
Proud
;
so
that
both
are
subjected
to
Vanity
and
Lyes
.
The
Proud
are
like
a
rich
and
powerful
Man
,
who
having
a
great
Equipage
,
measures
his
own
greatness
by
the
number
of
his
Followers
,
and
his
strength
by
that
of
his
Horses
which
draw
his
Coach
.
These
mistaken
humble
ones
,
having
the
same
Spirit
and
same
Principles
,
resemble
a
poor
miserable
languishing
wretch
,
who
imagines
himself
almost
nothing
,
because
he
possesses
nothing
.
Yet
our
Equipage
is
not
our selves
;
and
so
far
is
the
abundance
of
the
Blood
and
Spirits
,
vigour
and
impetuosity
of
the
Imagination
,
from
leading
us
to
Truth
,
that
,
on
the
contrary
,
there
is
nothing
which
diverts
us
more
from
it
.
It
is
the
dull
,
if
I
may
call
them
so
,
the
cold
and
sedate
Minds
,
which
are
most
capable
of
discovering
the
most
solid
and
intricate
Troths
.
In
the
silence
of
their
Passions
,
they
may
hearken
to
that
Truth
which
teaches
them
in
the
most
secret
recesses
of
their
Reason
;
but
unhappily
,
they
think
not
of
applying
themselves
to
its
word
,
because
it
speaks
without
a
sensible
lustre
,
and
in
a
low
voice
,
and
nothing
affects
them
but
a
noise
:
Nothing
convinces
them
but
what
seems
sparkling
,
great
and
magnificent
,
to
the
Judgment
of
the
Senses
;
they
are
not
pleased
without
they
are
dazled
,
and
choose
rather
to
hearken
to
those
Philosopbers
,
who
relate
their
Visions
and
Dreams
to
them
;
and
who
,
with
the
false
Prophets
of
Old
,
affirm
the
Truth
has
spoken
to
them
,
tho'
it
has
not
,
than
to
give
Ear
to
the
Truth
it self
.
For
above
this
four
thousand
years
,
the
Pride
of
Man
has
,
without
opposition
,
put
off
lies
and
falshoods
,
which
have
been
respectfully
received
,
and
even
preserved
as
Holy
and
Divine
Traditions
.
It
seems
as
if
the
God
of
Truth
was
no
longer
with
them
;
they
neither
consult
nor
meditate
on
him
any
longer
,
but
cover
their
idleness
and
neglect
with
the
deceitful
appearance
of
an
holy
Humility
.
Indeed
,
of
our selves
,
we
cannot
discover
the
Truth
,
but
we
may
all
times
do
it
by
the
assistance
of
him
who
enlightens
us
;
altho'
we
never
can
do
it
by
the
help
of
all
the
Men
in
the
World
.
Those
even
,
who
are
best
acquainted
with
it
,
cannot
discover
it
to
us
,
if
we
do
not
our selves
inquire
of
him
who
has
inform'd
them
,
and
if
he
answer
not
our
attention
as
he
has
answered
theirs
.
We
must
not
therefore
receive
any
thing
upon
the
credit
of
Man
,
for
they
are
all
Liers
;
but
because
he
who
cannot
deceive
us
has
spoken
to
us
,
we
ought
continually
to
beg
his
Instruction
.
We
must
not
believe
those
,
who
speaking
to
the
Ear
,
instruct
only
the
Body
,
or
,
at
most
,
act
upon
the
Imagination
;
but
we
must
attentively
hearken
,
and
faithfully
believe
him
who
speaks
to
the
Mind
,
instructs
the
Reason
,
and
who
penetrating
into
the
most
secret
recesses
of
the
inward
Man
,
is
capable
of
enlightening
and
fortifying
it
against
the
outward
and
sensible
Man
,
which
continually
endeavours
to
seduce
and
abuse
us
.
I
so
often
repeat
these
things
,
because
I
think
them
most
worthy
of
a
serious
reflexion
;
'T
is
God
alone
that
we
must
Honour
,
since
there
is
none
but
ha
who
is
able
to
give
us
knowledge
,
or
make
us
capable
of
Pleasure
.
There
is
sometimes
to
be
observed
in
the
Animal
Spirits
,
and
the
rest
of
the
Body
,
a
certain
disposition
,
which
inclines
us
to
Hunting
,
Dancing
,
Running
,
and
to
all
Exercises
in
general
,
wherein
the
strength
and
agility
of
the
Body
are
most
conspicuous
.
This
disposition
is
commonly
in
Young
men
,
and
chiefly
in
those
whose
Bodies
are
not
perfectly
form'd
.
Children
cannot
stay
long
in
one
place
,
but
are
always
in
action
when
they
follow
their
humour
:
For
as
their
Muscles
are
not
yet
strong
,
nor
perfectly
finish'd
,
God
,
the
Author
of
Nature
,
regulates
the
pleasures
of
the
Soul
,
in
relation
to
the
good
of
the
Body
,
so
as
to
make
them
find
pleasure
in
these
Exercises
,
which
help
to
fortify
and
confirm
the
strength
of
their
Bodies
.
Thus
,
whilst
the
Flesh
and
Fibres
of
the
Nerves
are
still
soft
,
the
little
passages
,
through
which
the
Animal
Spirits
must
necessarily
flow
,
to
produce
all
sorts
of
motions
,
are
kept
open
and
preserv'd
;
the
humours
have
no
time
to
settle
,
and
all
Obstructions
,
and
causes
of
Putrefaction
,
are
prevented
.
The
confused
Sensation
which
Young
men
have
of
the
disposition
of
their
Bodies
,
make
them
please
themselves
in
the
thoughts
of
their
strength
and
activity
.
They
admire
themselves
when
they
know
how
to
measure
their
motions
,
or
are
able
to
make
any
uncommon
ones
;
and
even
wish
to
be
in
company
of
such
persons
as
may
behold
and
admire
them
.
Thus
,
by
little
and
little
,
they
strengthen
their
inclination
for
all
bodily
Exercises
,
which
is
one
of
the
chief
causes
of
the
Ignorance
and
Brutality
of
Men
:
For
besides
the
time
that
is
lost
in
these
Exercises
,
the
little
use
Men
make
of
their
Minds
,
is
the
cause
that
the
chief
part
of
the
Brain
,
(
whose
flexibility
produces
a
strength
and
vivacity
of
Mind
)
becomes
wholly
untractable
,
and
the
Animal
Spirits
are
not
easily
dispersed
through
the
Brain
,
after
such
a
manner
,
as
to
make
them
capable
of
thinking
of
whatever
they
please
.
This
is
the
reason
that
most
part
of
the
Nobility
,
and
such
as
are
trained
up
to
the
War
,
are
incapable
of
applying
themselves
to
any
thing
;
they
argue
upon
things
according
to
the
Proverb
,
A
Word
and
a
Blow
.
And
if
we
say
any
thing
to
them
,
they
have
not
a
mind
to
hear
,
instead
of
thinking
what
answer
ought
to
be
made
;
their
Animal
Spirits
insensibly
flow
into
the
Muscles
,
by
whose
assistance
they
lift
up
their
Arms
,
and
answer
without
any
reflexion
,
by
a
blow
,
or
some
threatning
gesture
,
because
their
Spirits
being
agitated
by
the
words
they
hear
,
they
are
carried
to
those
places
which
are
most
open
,
through
habit
and
exercise
;
and
the
knowledge
they
have
of
the
strength
of
their
Bodies
,
confirms
them
in
these
insolent
behaviours
:
And
observing
the
respectful
Air
of
those
who
hear
them
,
they
are
puft
up
with
a
foolish
confidence
,
which
makes
them
utter
many
fierce
and
brutish
impertinencies
,
believing
,
at
the
same
time
,
that
they
have
spoke
many
fine
things
,
because
the
fear
and
prudence
of
others
was
favourable
to
them
.
It
is
not
possible
to
apply
our selves
to
any
Study
,
or
actually
to
make
a
profession
of
any
Science
without
it
;
we
can
be
neither
Authors
nor
Doctors
,
without
remembring
what
we
are
.
But
this
alone
,
often
,
naturally
,
produces
in
the
Mind
of
good
men
so
many
Defects
,
that
't
would
be
very
advantageous
for
them
if
they
were
without
those
honourable
Titles
.
As
they
imagine
them
to
be
their
chief
Perfections
,
they
always
think
on
them
with
Pleasure
,
discover
them
to
others
with
all
possible
Artifice
,
and
even
pretend
they
have
given
them
a
right
to
judge
of
all
things
without
examination
.
If
any
Person
has
Courage
enough
to
oppose
them
,
they
soon
Craftily
,
and
with
a
sweet
and
obliging
Air
,
insinuate
what
they
are
,
and
the
right
they
have
to
decide
all
things
.
But
if
afterwards
any
is
so
bold
as
to
resist
them
,
and
they
want
an
answer
,
they
will
then
openly
say
what
they
think
of
themselves
,
and
those
who
oppose
them
.
All
inward
Sensation
of
any
advantage
that
we
possess
naturally
encreases
our
Courage
;
A
Soldier
well
Armed
and
Mounted
,
who
wants
neither
Blood
nor
Spirits
,
is
ready
to
undertake
any
thing
:
The
disposition
he
finds
himself
in
makes
him
bold
and
daring
.
It
is
the
same
with
a
Learned
Man
,
when
he
believes
himself
so
,
and
when
the
vanity
of
his
Heart
has
corrupted
his
Mind
;
he
becomes
,
if
we
may
say
so
,
bold
and
confident
against
the
Truth
.
Sometimes
he
rashly
opposes
it
without
knowing
it
,
and
sometimes
betrays
it
after
he
has
discovered
it
,
and
confiding
in
his
false
Learning
,
he
is
always
ready
to
maintain
the
Negative
or
Affirmative
,
according
as
the
Spirit
of
Contradiction
possesses
him
.
It
is
very
different
with
those
who
boast
not
of
their
Learning
;
they
are
not
decisive
:
It
is
rare
that
they
speak
if
they
have
not
something
to
say
.
Nay
,
it
often
happens
,
that
they
are
silent
when
they
ought
to
speak
;
they
have
not
that
reputation
,
nor
those
external
marks
of
Learning
,
which
perswade
them
to
speak
they
know
not
what
.
These
may
safely
hold
their
Tongues
,
but
Pretenders
to
Sciences
are
affraid
to
continue
silent
,
for
they
know
,
well
they
shall
be
despised
if
they
hold
their
Tongues
,
although
they
have
nothing
material
to
say
;
and
on
the
contrary
,
they
will
not
always
be
condemned
,
although
they
say
only
impertinent
things
,
provided
they
speak
them
after
a
Scientific
manner
.
What
makes
men
capable
of
thinking
,
makes
them
fit
to
discover
Truth
;
but
't
is
neither
Honour
,
Riches
,
nor
Dignities
,
nor
false
Learning
,
that
can
give
them
this
capacity
,
it
proceeds
from
their
Nature
:
They
are
made
to
think
,
because
they
are
made
for
Truth
.
Even
Health
it self
is
not
sufficient
to
make
them
think
well
,
all
that
it
can
do
is
,
not
to
be
so
great
an
impediment
as
Sickness
is
.
Our
Body
,
in
some
manner
,
assists
us
by
Sense
and
Imagination
,
but
it
does
not
help
our
Conception
:
For
although
,
without
help
of
the
Body
,
we
might
,
by
meditation
,
oppose
out
Idea's
to
the
continual
Efforts
of
the
Senses
and
Passions
,
which
perplex
and
efface
them
,
because
we
can
only
,
at
present
,
overcome
the
Body
by
the
Body
:
Yet
it
is
plain
,
that
the
Body
cannot
illuminate
the
Mind
,
nor
produce
the
Light
of
Understanding
in
it
,
for
every
Idea
which
discovers
the
Truth
,
comes
from
Truth
it self
.
What
the
Soul
receives
by
the
Body
,
is
only
for
the
Body
it self
,
and
when
it
persues
those
Phantoms
,
it
discovers
nothing
but
Illusions
and
Chimera's
;
I
mean
,
it
does
not
see
things
as
they
are
in
themselves
,
but
only
as
they
relate
to
the
Body
.
If
the
Idea
of
our
own
greatness
or
littleness
is
often
an
occasion
of
our
Error
,
the
Idea
we
have
of
external
things
,
and
what
has
any
relation
to
us
,
causes
not
a
lest
dangerous
impression
.
We
have
just
said
,
that
the
Idea
of
greatness
is
always
attended
with
a
great
Motion
of
Spirits
,
and
that
a
great
Motion
of
Spirits
is
always
accompanied
with
an
Idea
of
greatness
;
and
that
,
on
the
contray
,
the
Idea
of
littleness
is
always
attended
with
a
weak
motion
of
Spirits
,
and
that
a
weak
Motion
of
the
Spirits
is
always
accompanied
with
an
Idea
of
littleness
.
From
this
Principle
't
is
easie
to
conclude
,
that
such
things
as
produce
a
great
Motion
of
to
the
Spirits
in
us
,
must
naturally
appear
to
us
to
have
more
Greatness
,
that
is
,
more
Power
,
more
Reality
,
and
more
Perfection
,
than
others
,
for
by
Greatness
I
mean
all
these
things
,
and
many
such
like
.
So
that
Sensible
Things
must
appear
to
us
greater
,
and
more
solid
,
than
those
which
cannot
be
felt
,
if
we
judge
of
them
by
the
Motion
of
the
Spirits
,
and
not
by
the
pure
Idea
of
Truth
.
A
great
House
,
a
magnificent
Train
,
fine
Furniture
,
Offices
,
Honours
,
Riches
,
&c.
appear
to
have
more
greatness
and
reality
in
them
,
than
Virtue
and
Justice
do
.
When
we
compare
Virtue
with
Riches
by
a
clear
view
of
the
Mind
,
then
Virtue
gains
the
preference
;
but
when
we
make
use
of
our
Eyes
and
Imaginations
,
and
judge
of
these
things
only
by
the
emotion
of
the
Spirits
that
they
excite
in
us
,
we
undoubtedly
prefer
Riches
to
Virtue
.
'T
is
from
this
Principle
that
we
have
so
mean
an
Opinion
of
Spiritual
things
which
do
not
affect
the
Senses
;
That
the
Idea's
of
our
Minds
are
less
Noble
than
the
Objects
they
represent
;
That
there
is
less
reality
and
substance
in
Air
than
in
Metals
,
in
Water
than
in
Ice
;
That
the
spaces
betwixt
Earth
and
Heaven
are
avoid
,
or
else
that
the
Bodies
which
fill
it
,
have
not
so
much
reality
and
solidity
as
the
Sun
and
Stars
have
.
In
fine
,
if
we
fall
into
an
infinite
number
of
Errors
about
the
Nature
and
Perfection
of
every
thing
,
't
is
because
we
argue
upon
this
false
Principle
.
A
great
motion
of
Spirits
,
and
consequently
a
strong
Passion
,
always
accompanies
a
sensible
Idea
of
greatness
;
and
a
small
motion
of
Spirits
,
and
a
weak
Passion
likewise
,
attends
a
sensible
Idea
of
littleness
;
We
apply
our selves
much
,
and
bestow
a
great
deal
of
our
time
in
the
Study
of
whatever
may
excite
a
sensible
Idea
of
greatness
,
and
neglect
what
gives
us
a
sensible
Idea
of
littleness
.
Those
great
Bodies
,
for
instance
,
which
move
about
us
,
have
always
made
an
impression
upon
us
;
we
at
first
adored
them
,
because
of
the
sensible
Idea
we
had
of
their
greatness
and
brightness
.
Some
bolder
Genii
have
examined
their
Motions
;
and
in
all
Ages
,
the
Stars
have
been
the
Object
either
of
the
Study
or
Veneration
of
many
Men.
We
may
even
say
,
that
the
fear
of
these
imaginary
influences
,
which
at
this
day
terrify
Astrologers
and
some
weak
Persons
,
is
a
kind
of
adoration
that
a
depraved
Imagination
pays
to
the
Idea
of
greatness
,
which
represents
these
Coelestial
Bodies
.
The
Body
of
Man
,
on
the
contrary
,
tho'
infinitely
more
admirable
and
worthy
our
application
,
than
whatever
can
be
known
of
Jupiter
and
Saturn
with
all
the
rest
of
the
Planets
,
is
almost
unknown
to
us
.
The
sensible
Idea
of
the
dissected
parts
of
the
flesh
hath
nothing
great
in
it
,
and
even
causes
disgust
and
horror
;
so
that
't
is
but
a
few
years
since
Ingenious
persons
look'd
upon
Anatomy
as
a
Science
which
merited
their
application
.
Kings
and
Princes
have
been
Astronomers
,
and
proud
of
that
Title
.
The
grandeur
of
the
Stars
seemed
to
agree
well
with
the
greatness
of
their
Dignities
,
but
I
don't
believe
they
thought
it
any
honour
to
understand
Anatomy
,
and
to
be
able
to
dissect
a
Heart
or
a
Brain
well
.
It
is
the
same
with
many
other
Sciences
.
Rare
and
extraordinary
things
,
produce
greater
and
more
sensible
Motions
in
the
Spirits
than
those
which
we
see
every
day
;
we
admire
them
,
and
consequently
affix
some
Idea
of
greatness
to
them
,
and
thus
they
excite
in
the
Spirits
Passions
of
esteem
and
veneration
.
'T
is
this
which
overturns
the
Reason
of
many
Men
,
for
some
are
so
curious
and
respectful
for
every
thing
of
Antiquity
,
what
comes
from
far
,
or
is
rare
and
extraordinary
,
that
their
Minds
become
Slaves
to
it
,
because
the
Mind
dares
make
no
Judgment
upon
what
it
respects
.
Truth
,
I
grant
,
is
in
no
great
danger
,
because
some
Men
wholly
employ
themselves
about
Medals
,
Arms
,
the
Dress
of
the
Ancients
,
the
Chinese
or
Barbarians
.
It
is
not
absolutely
useless
to
know
the
Map
of
Old
Rome
,
or
the
Roads
from
Tomquin
to
Nanquin
,
altho'
it
be
more
useful
to
know
those
we
shall
have
more
occasion
to
Travel
.
In
fine
,
we
have
nothing
to
object
against
the
knowledge
of
the
true
History
of
the
War
of
the
Greeks
with
the
Persians
,
or
of
the
Tartars
with
the
Chinese
;
or
that
persons
shou'd
have
an
extraordinary
inclination
for
Thucidides
and
Xenophon
,
or
for
any
other
that
pleases
them
.
But
we
cannot
suffer
that
Reason
shou'd
be
so
subjected
to
the
admiration
of
Antiquity
;
that
we
must
be
forbidden
to
make
use
of
our
Understanding
to
examine
the
Opinions
of
the
Ancients
,
and
that
those
who
discover
and
show
the
falseness
of
them
,
shou'd
pass
for
presumptious
and
rash
Persons
.
There
has
been
Truths
in
all
Ages
;
if
Aristotle
has
discovered
some
of
them
,
further
discoveries
may
be
also
made
to
this
day
:
The
Opinions
of
this
Author
must
be
proved
by
good
Reasons
,
for
if
Aristotle's
Sentiments
were
solid
in
his
time
,
they
will
be
so
now
.
'T
is
a
pure
illusion
,
to
pretend
to
prove
Natural
Truths
by
Humane
Authority
;
perhaps
we
may
prove
,
that
Aristotle
had
such
and
such
thoughts
upon
certain
Subjects
,
but
't
wou'd
not
be
very
reasonable
to
read
Aristotle
,
or
any
other
Author
whatever
,
with
much
assiduity
and
pains
,
only
to
learn
his
Opinions
Historically
,
and
to
instruct
others
after
the
same
manner
.
We
cannot
,
without
some
dislike
,
consider
certain
Universities
which
were
Established
only
for
an
Enquiry
into
,
and
Defence
of
the
Truth
,
that
have
now
Espoused
a
particular
Sect
and
Glory
in
studying
and
defending
the
Opinions
of
some
Men
:
Nor
can
we
,
without
some
regret
,
read
those
Philosophers
and
Physicians
who
fill
their
Books
with
lo
many
Citations
,
that
one
wou'd
rather
take
them
for
Commentaries
upon
Divinity
and
Civil
Law
,
than
Treatises
of
Physicks
or
Medicine
:
For
who
can
be
content
to
quit
Reason
and
Experience
,
blindly
to
follow
the
Imaginations
of
Aristotle
,
Plato
,
Epicurus
,
or
any
other
Philosopher
whatever
?
However
we
might
,
perhaps
,
continue
unmoved
,
and
without
reply
,
at
the
sight
of
so
strange
a
Conduct
,
if
we
did
not
feel
our selves
offended
by
it
;
I
mean
,
if
those
Gentlemen
did
not
oppose
themselves
to
the
Truth
,
to
which
only
they
ought
to
be
united
.
But
their
Admiration
for
the
Visions
of
the
Ancients
,
inspires
them
with
a
blind
Zeal
against
any
new
discoveries
of
the
Truth
;
they
decry
them
without
knowing
them
,
oppose
them
without
apprehending
them
,
and
by
the
power
of
their
Imaginations
,
infuse
into
the
Mind
and
Heart
of
those
who
hear
and
admire
them
,
the
same
Sensations
wherewith
they
are
affected
.
As
they
judge
of
these
new
Discoveries
only
by
the
esteem
they
have
of
their
Authors
,
and
since
those
they
have
seen
,
and
with
whom
they
converse
,
have
not
this
great
and
extraordinary
Air
that
the
Imagination
attributes
,
to
Ancient
Authors
,
they
cannot
esteem
them
:
For
the
Idea
of
the
Men
of
our
own
Age
,
not
being
attended
with
these
extraordinary
motions
which
strike
the
Mind
,
it
naturally
excites
nothing
but
Contempt
.
Limners
and
Statuaries
,
never
represent
the
Ancient
Philosophers
like
other
Men
;
They
make
them
great
Heads
,
large
and
high
Foreheads
,
long
and
magnificent
Beards
.
This
is
a
good
proof
,
that
the
generality
of
Men
naturally
form
a
like
Idea
of
them
,
for
Painters
draw
things
as
they
appear
to
them
;
they
follow
the
natural
motions
of
their
Imaginations
.
Thus
we
generally
look
upon
the
Ancients
as
extraordinary
Men
;
but
,
on
the
contrary
,
the
Imagination
represents
the
Men
of
our
time
like
those
we
see
every
day
,
and
that
producing
no
extraordinary
motion
in
the
Spirits
,
it
only
excites
in
the
Soul
a
contempt
and
indifferency
for
them
.
I
have
seen
D'Cartes
,
says
one
of
these
Learned
Men
who
only
admire
Antiquity
;
I
have
known
,
and
discoursed
with
him
many
times
;
he
was
an
honest
Man
;
nor
did
he
want
Wit
,
yet
he
had
nothing
extraordinary
.
Thus
he
has
a
mean
Idea
of
D'Cartes
Philosophy
,
because
he
had
discoursed
some
moments
with
him
,
and
discovered
nothing
of
this
great
and
extraordinary
Air
in
him
which
heats
the
Imagination
.
He
even
thinks
it
a
sufficient
answer
to
any
difficult
Arguments
of
this
Philosopher
which
perplex'd
him
a
little
,
to
say
considently
that
he
had
formerly
known
him
.
It
were
to
be
wished
,
that
these
sort
of
Men
cou'd
see
Aristotle
otherwise
than
in
Painting
,
and
have
an
hours
Conversation
with
him
,
provided
he
spoke
not
to
them
in
Greek
,
but
in
their
own
Tongue
,
without
knowing
who
he
was
till
after
they
had
made
a
Judgment
of
him
.
Whatever
bears
the
Character
of
Novelty
,
whether
because
it
is
new
in
it self
,
or
that
it
appear
in
a
new
order
or
situation
,
it
agitates
us
much
,
for
it
affects
the
Brain
in
places
which
are
so
much
the
more
sensible
,
as
they
are
less
exposed
to
the
course
of
the
Spirits
;
and
such
things
as
have
a
sensible
mark
of
greatness
also
affects
us
much
,
because
they
excite
a
great
Motion
of
Spirits
in
us
.
But
what
,
at
the
same
time
,
bears
the
Character
of
Greatness
and
Novelty
too
,
does
not
only
agitate
us
,
it
confounds
,
elevates
,
and
astonisheth
us
by
its
violent
agitations
.
Those
,
for
Instance
,
who
speak
Paradoxes
,
make
themselves
admired
,
for
they
say
only
such
things
as
have
the
Character
of
Novelty
.
Such
as
speak
in
Sentences
,
and
only
use
choice
and
proper
Words
,
cause
themselves
to
be
respected
,
for
they
seem
to
say
something
great
:
But
those
who
join
Eloquence
to
Novelty
,
the
Great
to
the
Extraordinary
,
seldom
ever
fail
of
ravishing
and
astonishing
the
vulgar
sort
,
altho'
they
speak
nothing
but
impertinencies
.
This
pompous
and
magnificent
Jargon
,
insano
fulgoret
,
these
false
Lights
of
Orators
,
commonly
dazle
weak
Minds
;
they
make
so
lively
and
surprizing
an
impression
upon
their
Imagination
that
they
remain
,
confounded
,
and
respect
:
this
power
which
abases
and
blinds
them
,
and
admire
,
as
the
brightest
Truths
,
such
confused
Sentiments
as
cannot
be
expressed
.
CHAP.
VIII
.
A
Continuation
of
the
same
Subject
;
of
the
good
Vse
that
may
be
made
of
Admiration
,
and
the
rest
of
the
Passions
.
All
the
Passions
have
two
very
considerable
Effects
,
they
apply
the
Mind
,
and
gain
the
Heart
.
By
the
former
they
may
be
very
useful
to
the
discovery
of
Truth
,
provided
we
know
how
to
make
use
of
them
,
for
application
produces
knowledge
,
and
knowledge
discovers
the
Truth
.
But
in
respect
to
their
gaining
the
Heart
,
they
always
produce
an
ill
Effect
;
because
they
only
win
it
by
corrupting
the
Reason
,
and
representing
things
to
it
not
as
they
are
in
themselves
,
or
according
to
truth
;
but
according
to
the
relation
they
bear
to
us
.
Of
all
Passions
,
that
which
least
affects
the
Heart
is
Admiration
:
For
't
is
the
prospect
of
things
that
are
either
good
or
evil
which
agitates
us
,
for
the
sight
of
things
as
they
are
great
or
small
without
any
other
relation
to
us
,
affects
us
very
little
or
not
at
all
.
Thus
Admiration
which
accompanies
the
knowledge
of
the
greatness
or
smallness
of
new
things
which
we
would
consider
,
corrupt
the
Reason
much
less
than
any
other
Passion
;
and.
it
may
even
be
of
great
use
in
the
knowledge
of
the
Truth
,
provided
we
take
care
to
hinder
its
being
followed
by
any
of
the
other
Passions
,
as
it
commonly
happens
.
In
Admiration
the
Animal
Spirits
are
forcibly
impelled
towards
those
places
in
the
Brain
which
represent
the
new
Object
as
it
is
in
it self
:
They
make
distinct
Traces
there
,
and
deep
enough
to
continue
a
long
time
;
consequently
the
Mind
has
a
clear
Idea
of
them
,
and
can
easily
resolve
them
.
Thus
we
cannot
deny
but
Admiration
may
be
very
useful
in
the
Sciences
since
it
applies
and
instructs
the
Mind
.
It
is
not
so
with
the
rest
of
the
Passions
,
they
apply
the
Mind
,
but
instruct
it
not
.
They
apply
it
because
they
stir
up
the
Animal
Spirits
;
but
they
instruct
it
not
,
or
else
do
it
by
a
false
and
deceitful
light
,
since
after
such
a
manner
they
impel
these
same
Spirits
,
as
they
represent
Objects
only
according
to
the
relation
they
have
to
us
,
and
not
as
they
are
in
themselves
.
There
is
nothing
so
difficult
as
to
apply
our selves
long
to
any
thing
when
we
don't
admire
it
,
the
Animal
Spirits
are
not
then
easily
carried
to
those
places
which
are
necessary
to
represent
it
;
't
would
be
in
vain
to
sollicit
our
attention
,
we
could
not
animadvert
,
or
at
least
not
very
long
;
although
we
might
otherwise
be
perswaded
after
an
abstracted
manner
,
and
which
agitated
not
the
Spirits
,
that
the
thing
very
well
deserved
our
application
.
It
is
requisite
we
should
deceive
our
Imagination
to
stir
up
our
Spirits
,
and
that
we
should
after
a
new
manner
represent
the
Subject
we
would
meditate
on
,
that
we
might
excite
in
our selves
some
motion
of
Admiration
.
We
every
day
see
such
Persons
as
have
no
inclination
for
Study
,
nothing
appears
more
painful
to
them
than
application
of
Mind
;
yet
are
they
convinced
they
ought
to
study
certain
things
,
and
to
that
end
they
use
their
utmost
endeavours
;
but
they
are
unsuccessful
,
and
they
advance
not
much
;
but
immediately
leave
them
.
It
is
true
the
Animal
Spirits
obey
the
orders
of
the
Will
,
and
make
it
attentive
whenever
we
desire
it
:
But
when
the
Will
,
which
commands
,
is
purely
reasonable
,
and
depends
not
upon
any
Passion
,
it
is
performed
after
so
weak
and
languishing
a
manner
,
that
our
Ideas
then
resemble
Phantoms
which
are
but
just
seen
,
and
disappear
in
a
moment
.
Our
Animal
Spirits
receive
so
many
secret
orders
from
our
Passions
,
and
both
by
Nature
and
habit
,
have
so
great
a
facility
to
execute
them
,
as
that
they
are
very
easily
diverted
from
the
new
and
difficult
ways
where
the
Will
would
engage
them
to
go
,
so
that
't
is
chiefly
in
these
Occurrences
that
we
have
need
of
particular
Grace
to
assist
us
in
the
discovery
of
the
Truth
,
because
we
cannot
by
our
own
power
long
resist
the
influences
of
the
Body
which
conquer
and
suppress
the
Mind
;
or
if
we
have
this
ability
,
we
never
make
use
of
it
.
But
when
we
are
excited
by
any
motion
of
Admiration
,
the
Animal
Spirits
naturally
disperse
themselves
towards
the
Traces
of
the
Object
which
caused
it
:
They
clearly
represent
it
to
the
Mind
;
and
produce
in
the
Brain
what
is
necessary
to
create
knowledge
and
evidence
,
without
troubling
the
Will
to
fatigue
it self
by
forcing
these
unwilling
Spirits
.
Thus
those
who
are
capable
of
Admiration
are
much
fitter
for
Study
than
such
as
are
not
susceptible
of
it
:
The
first
are
quick
and
ingenious
,
the
last
dull
and
stupid
.
Yet
when
Admiration
becomes
excessive
,
and
proceeds
either
to
astonish
or
affright
us
,
or
does
not
incline
us
to
Rational
Curiosity
,
it
commonly
produces
ill
Effects
.
For
then
the
Animal
Spirits
are
all
employed
to
represent
the
Object
we
admire
on
one
side
only
;
we
don't
even
think
whether
we
may
consider
it
farther
or
not
;
nor
do
the
Animal
Spirits
disperse
themselves
so
much
as
into
the
common
parts
of
the
Body
,
to
perform
their
functions
there
;
but
imprint
such
deep
footsteps
of
the
Object
they
represent
,
and
break
so
great
a
number
of
the
Fibres
of
the
Brain
,
that
the
Idea
they
create
can
never
after
be
effaced
from
the
Mind
.
It
is
not
enough
for
Admiration
to
render
us
attentive
,
it
must
also
make
us
curious
:
Nor
is
it
sufficient
for
us
to
consider
one
side
of
any
Object
to
discover
it
fully
,
we
must
examine
it
throughly
,
or
else
we
cannot
judge
truly
of
it
:
So
that
when
Admiration
does
not
induce
us
to
examine
things
with
the
utmost
exactness
,
or
when
it
hinders
us
from
it
,
it
is
very
useless
in
the
discovery
of
Truth
:
Then
it
only
fills
the
Mind
with
probabilities
and
appearances
,
and
inclines
it
to
judge
rashly
of
every
thing
.
To
Admire
for
Admiration
sake
,
is
not
sufficient
,
we
must
Admire
that
we
may
afterwards
examine
with
the
more
facility
;
the
Animal
Spirits
which
naturally
stir
up
Admiration
in
us
,
freely
offer
their
assistance
to
the
Soul
,
that
it
may
use
them
to
represent
the
Object
more
distinctly
,
and
that
it
may
better
discover
it
.
This
is
the
institution
of
Nature
;
for
Admiration
must
lead
us
to
Curiosity
,
and
Curiosity
guide
us
to
the
discovery
of
Truth
.
But
the
Soul
does
not
know
how
to
make
use
of
its
power
;
it
prefers
a
certain
Sensation
of
Complacency
which
it
receives
from
this
abundance
of
Spirits
that
affect
it
,
before
the
knowledge
of
the
Object
which
excites
them
:
It
chooses
rather
to
enjoy
plenty
of
Spirits
than
to
dissipate
them
by
use
,
in
which
it
resembles
certain
Covetous
Persons
,
who
prefer
the
possession
of
their
Silver
,
before
the
benefits
they
might
in
their
Necessities
receive
from
it
.
Men
generally
please
themselves
with
whatever
affects
them
in
any
Passion
;
They
don't
only
give
their
Money
to
make
themselves
affected
with
Sorrow
at
the
representation
of
a
Tragedy
,
but
likewise
throw
it
away
upon
Leigerdemain
that
may
raise
their
Admiration
;
for
we
cannot
say
they
give
it
to
be
deceived
.
The
Sensation
of
Internal
Pleasure
which
the
Soul
feels
in
Admiration
,
is
then
the
chief
cause
why
we
dwell
upon
it
without
making
that
use
of
it
that
Reason
and
Nature
prescribes
us
:
For
't
is
this
Sensation
of
Complacency
which
keeps
the
Admirers
so
strictly
united
to
the
Subjects
of
their
Admiration
;
that
they
will
fall
into
a
Passion
if
we
shew
them
the
vanity
of
it
.
When
an
Afflicted
Person
tastes
the
sweetness
of
Sorrow
,
we
anger
him
if
we
try
to
divert
him
from
it
;
It
is
the
same
with
those
who
admire
any
thing
,
it
seems
to
'em
as
if
we
would
injure
them
,
when
we
endeavour
to
shew
them
their
Admiration
is
without
any
Reason
;
because
they
feel
that
secret
Pleasure
they
received
from
the
Passion
diminish
proportionally
as
the
Idea
which
caused
it
is
effaced
out
of
their
Mind
.
The
Passions
always
endeavour
to
justifie
themselves
,
and
insensibly
perswade
us
that
't
is
reasonable
to
follow
them
:
The
Complacency
and
Pleasure
they
make
the
Mind
feel
,
which
ought
to
be
their
Judge
,
corrupts
it
in
their
favour
;
and
inspires
it
with
such
like
Reasoning
:
I
ought
to
judge
of
things
only
according
to
the
Ideas
I
have
of
'em
:
And
of
all
my
Ideas
,
the
most
sensible
,
are
the
most
real
,
since
they
act
the
most
powerfully
upon
me
;
It
is
therefore
by
them
I
ought
the
rather
to
judge
:
Now
the
Subject
I
admire
includes
a
sensible
Idea
of
greatness
;
then
I
must
judge
according
to
this
Idea
,
for
I
ought
to
have
an
esteem
and
love
for
greatness
.
So
that
I
have
reason
to
stop
at
this
Object
,
and
employ
my self
upon
it
;
Indeed
the
pleasure
I
feel
,
at
the
sight
of
the
Idea
which
represents
it
,
is
a
Natural
proof
that
't
is
my
good
to
think
upon
it
;
for
it
seems
to
me
that
I
grow
great
my self
whilst
I
consider
it
,
and
that
my
Mind
has
more
extension
when
it
embraces
so
great
an
Idea
.
The
Mind
ceasing
to
be
when
it
thinks
of
nothing
,
if
this
Idea
shou'd
vanish
it
seems
to
me
that
my
Mind
would
vanish
with
it
,
or
that
it
would
become
less
and
more
contracted
if
it
applied
it self
to
an
Idea
that
was
less
.
The
preservation
of
this
great
Idea
,
is
then
the
preservation
of
the
greatness
and
perfection
of
my
Being
;
and
therefore
I
have
reason
to
admire
it
.
Others
also
ought
to
admire
me
if
they
would
do
me
justice
,
since
I
am
something
great
through
the
relation
I
have
to
great
things
:
I
in
some
measure
possess
them
by
the
admiration
I
have
for
them
,
and
I
feel
the
good
by
a
foretaste
that
a
kind
of
hope
makes
me
enjoy
.
Other
Men
would
be
happy
as
well
as
I
,
if
knowing
my
greatness
they
like
me
applied
themselves
to
the
Cause
which
produced
it
;
but
they
are
blind
and
have
no
knowledge
of
either
great
or
fine
things
,
and
know
not
how
either
to
raise
or
make
themselves
become
consider
able
.
We
may
say
the
Mind
naturally
reasons
after
this
manner
,
without
making
any
reflexion
when
it
permits
it self
to
be
guided
by
the
deceitful
lights
of
its
Passions
.
These
Arguments
have
some
probability
,
bus
't
is
plain
they
have
no
solidity
in
them
:
And
this
appearance
or
rather
confused
Sensation
of
it
which
attends
these
Natural
Reasonings
made
without
reflexion
,
have
so
much
power
,
that
if
we
don't
take
great
care
they
will
never
fail
of
seducing
us
.
For
instance
,
when
Poetry
,
History
,
Chimistry
,
or
any
other
Humane
Science
,
has
struck
the
Imagination
of
a
young
Man
with
any
Motions
of
Admiration
;
if
he
don't
carefully
watch
the
efforts
these
Motions
make
upon
his
Mind
;
If
he
does
not
throughly
examine
what
the
advantages
of
these
Sciences
are
;
and
compare
the
troubles
he
shall
have
in
the
learning
,
with
the
profit
he
shall
afterwards
receive
from
them
;
and
,
in
short
,
if
he
is
not
as
curious
as
is
requisite
to
judge
well
,
there
is
a
great
deal
of
danger
that
his
Admiration
will
not
only
shew
him
these
Sciences
with
the
fairest
side
outwards
,
but
seduce
him
also
.
It
is
likewise
very
much
to
be
feared
that
it
will
corrupt
his
Heart
after
such
a
manner
,
that
he
shall
not
be
able
to
destroy
the
illusion
,
tho'
he
afterwards
come
to
know
it
to
be
such
;
because
't
is
impossible
to
efface
such
deep
Traces
out
of
his
Brain
as
a
continual
Admiration
shall
have
wrought
there
.
For
that
reason
he
must
continually
stir
up
the
purity
of
his
Imagination
,
he
must
hinder
these
dangerous
Traces
from
being
formed
which
will
corrupt
the
Mind
and
Heart
.
I
shall
here
prescribe
a
very
useful
way
to
prevent
not
only
the
excess
of
Admiration
,
but
also
of
all
other
Passions
in
general
.
When
the
Motion
of
the
Animal
Spirits
is
violent
enough
,
to
make
such
deep
Traces
in
the
Brain
as
corrupt
the
Imagination
,
it
is
always
attended
with
some
emotion
of
the
Soul
.
Thus
the
Soul
cannot
be
moved
without
being
sensible
of
it
,
it
is
sufficiently
advertised
to
take
care
or
it self
,
and
to
examine
whether
it
is
advantageous
that
these
Traces
should
be
strengthned
and
made
compleat
.
But
in
the
time
of
the
emotion
,
the
Mind
not
being
free
enough
to
judge
of
the
usefulness
of
these
Traces
,
because
this
emotion
deceives
and
inclines
it
to
favour
them
;
it
must
make
its
utmost
endeavour
to
stop
this
emotion
,
or
else
divert
the
motion
of
the
Spirits
which
cause
it
;
and
in
the
mean
time
it
is
absolutely
necessary
for
it
to
suspend
its
Judgment
.
Now
it
must
not
be
imagined
that
the
Soul
can
always
barely
by
its
own
Will
stop
this
course
of
Spirits
which
hinder
it
from
making
use
of
its
Reason
.
It
s
common
powers
are
not
sufficient
to
make
such
Motions
cease
which
it
has
not
excited
.
So
that
it
must
make
use
of
artifices
to
endeavour
to
deceive
an
Enemy
,
that
attacks
it
only
by
surprize
.
As
the
motion
of
the
Spirits
stir
up
certain
thoughts
in
the
Soul
,
so
these
Thoughts
also
excite
certain
motions
in
our
Brain
.
Thus
,
when
we
would
stop
any
motion
of
the
Spirits
,
which
is
stirred
up
in
us
,
it
is
not
sufficient
to
will
that
it
should
cease
,
for
that
is
not
always
capable
of
stoping
it
:
We
must
make
use
of
some
Artifices
,
and
represent
things
contrary
to
those
which
excite
and
maintain
this
motion
,
and
this
would
cause
a
Revulsion
.
But
if
we
would
only
determine
a
motion
of
Spirits
already
excited
to
some
other
place
,
we
must
not
think
of
contrary
things
,
but
only
on
such
things
as
differ
from
those
which
produce
it
,
and
this
will
undoubtedly
divert
them
.
But
because
a
Diversion
and
Revulsion
will
be
great
or
little
in
proportion
as
our
new
thoughts
shall
be
attended
with
a
great
or
less
motion
of
Spirits
;
we
must
be
very
careful
in
observing
well
what
those
Thoughts
are
which
agitate
as
most
,
that
in
pressing
occasions
we
may
be
able
to
represent
,
them
to
our
Imagination
which
seduces
us
,
and
we
must
endeavour
to
form
so
strong
an
habit
of
resistance
by
this
method
,
that
the
motion
which
surprizes
us
may
be
no
more
excited
in
our
Souls
.
If
we
take
care
to
make
an
intent
application
of
the
Idea
of
Eternity
,
or
any
other
serious
Thoughts
to
these
extraordinary
motions
which
are
excited
in
us
,
those
violent
and
great
motions
will
never
happen
again
without
stirring
up
in
us
at
the
same
time
this
Idea
,
and
which
will
consequently
furnish
us
with
the
means
to
resist
them
.
Those
things
are
proved
both
by
Experience
,
and
the
Reasons
brought
in
the
Chapter
Of
the
Connection
of
Idea's
:
So
that
we
ought
not
to
think
it
absolutely
impossible
by
any
Artifice
to
conquer
the
efforts
of
our
Passions
,
when
our
Wills
are
firmly
determined
to
do
it
.
However
we
must
not
pretend
that
we
can
become
Impeccable
,
or
shun
all
error
by
this
manner
of
Resistance
.
For
first
,
't
is
difficult
to
acquire
and
preserve
such
an
habit
,
as
that
our
extraordinary
Motions
shall
stir
up
in
us
such
Ideas
as
are
proper
to
oppose
them
.
Secondly
,
supposing
we
have
acquired
it
,
these
motions
of
the
Spirits
would
directly
excite
those
Ideas
which
we
must
oppose
,
and
but
indirectly
those
which
we
must
oppose
to
them
.
So
that
the
ill
Idea's
being
the
principal
,
they
will
always
have
more
power
than
those
which
are
only
accessary
:
and
it
will
be
always
necessary
for
the
Will
to
assist
the
latter
.
In
the
third
place
,
these
motions
of
the
Spirits
may
be
so
violent
,
that
they
may
fill
the
whole
capacity
of
the
Soul
,
so
that
there
remains
no
more
room
,
if
we
may
be
permitted
so
to
speak
,
to
receive
the
accessary
Idea
that
is
fit
to
make
a
Revulsion
in
the
Spirits
,
or
to
receive
it
after
such
a
manner
as
we
may
consider
it
with
any
attention
:
In
fine
,
there
are
so
many
particulas
circumstances
which
may
make
this
remedy
useless
,
that
we
must
not
too
much
confide
in
it
,
although
on
the
other
side
we
ought
not
to
neglect
it
.
We
must
continually
have
recourse
to
Prayer
,
that
we
may
receive
from
Heaven
those
assistances
as
are
necessary
in
the
time
of
Temptations
,
and
also
endeavour
to
present
to
the
Mind
some
Truth
that
is
so
solid
and
strong
,
that
by
this
means
we
may
conquer
the
most
violent
Passions
.
For
I
must
needs
advertize
by
the
way
,
that
several
pious
Persons
often
fall
again
into
the
same
Errors
,
because
they
fill
their
Minds
with
a
great
number
of
such
Truths
as
have
more
lustre
than
power
,
and
are
fitter
to
dissipate
and
divide
their
Minds
than
to
fortifie
it
against
Temptation
;
whereas
unlearned
and
ignorant
Persons
are
faithful
in
their
Duty
,
because
they
make
some
great
and
serious
Truth
familiar
to
them
,
which
fortifies
and
upholds
them
in
all
Occurrences
.
CHAP.
IX
.
of
Love
and
Aversion
,
and
of
their
principal
kinds
.
LOve
and
Aversion
are
the
first
Passions
which
succeed
Admiration
.
We
do
not
long
consider
an
object
without
discovering
the
Relations
it
has
to
us
,
or
to
something
that
we
Love
:
The
object
that
we
Love
,
and
to
which
consequently
we
are
united
,
by
Love
,
being
almost
always
present
to
us
,
as
well
as
that
which
we
actually
admire
;
our
Mind
without
any
pain
,
or
great
reflection
,
makes
the
necessary
Comparisons
to
discover
the
Relations
they
have
to
each
other
,
and
to
us
,
or
else
it
is
naturally
advertized
of
'em
by
the
preventing
Sensations
of
Pleasure
and
Complacency
.
And
then
the
motion
of
Love
we
have
for
our selves
,
and
the
object
that
we
Love
,
extends
it self
unto
that
we
admire
,
if
the
relation
that
it
immediately
has
with
us
,
or
with
any
thing
we
are
united
to
,
appears
advantagious
to
us
,
either
by
Knowledge
or
Sensation
.
Now
this
new
motion
of
the
Soul
,
or
rather
motion
of
the
Soul
newly
determined
,
being
joined
to
that
of
the
Animal
Spirits
,
and
followed
with
the
Sensation
which
accompanies
the
new
disposition
,
that
this
new
motion
of
Spirits
produces
in
the
Brain
,
is
the
Passion
that
we
here
call
Love
.
But
if
we
feel
by
any
Pain
,
or
discover
by
a
clear
and
evident
Knowledge
,
that
the
union
or
relation
of
the
object
we
admire
,
is
disadvantageous
to
us
,
or
to
any
thing
we
are
united
to
:
Then
the
motion
of
Love
that
we
have
for
our selves
,
and
for
what
is
united
to
us
,
is
limited
in
us
,
or
carried
towards
it
;
and
follows
not
the
sight
of
the
Mind
,
nor
employs
it self
on
the
object
of
our
Admiration
.
But
as
the
motion
towards
good
in
general
,
which
the
Author
of
Nature
continually
imprints
in
the
Soul
,
carries
us
towards
what
we
know
,
and
feel
,
to
be
so
,
because
what
is
intelligible
and
sensible
is
good
in
it self
:
We
may
say
that
the
resistance
which
the
Soul
makes
against
this
natural
motion
that
draws
it
away
,
is
a
kind
of
voluntary
motion
which
terminates
in
Nothingness
.
Now
this
voluntary
motion
of
the
Soul
being
joyned
to
that
of
the
Spirits
and
Blood
,
That
we
may
not
be
mistaken
in
respect
to
what
I
here
call
voluntary
Motion
,
it
is
requisite
to
read
the
first
explanation
upon
the
first
Chapter
.
and
followed
with
the
Sensation
which
accompanies
the
new
disposition
that
this
motion
of
Spirits
produces
in
the
Brain
,
is
the
Passion
that
we
here
call
Aversion
.
This
Passion
is
absolutely
contrary
to
Love
,
yet
is
never
without
Love
:
It
is
wholly
contrary
,
because
this
separates
,
I
should
only
perplex
the
thought
if
I
spoke
whatever
related
to
it
,
to
satisfie
some
difficult
Persons
,
and
that
unites
:
The
former
has
Nothingness
for
its
object
,
and
the
latter
always
some
Being
,
whereby
't
is
excited
:
Aversion
refists
natural
Motion
,
and
makes
it
of
no
effect
,
whereas
Love
yields
to
it
,
and
makes
it
victorious
.
But
it
is
never
separated
from
Love
;
for
if
evil
,
which
is
its
object
,
is
taken
for
a
privation
of
good
,
to
fly
evil
is
to
fly
the
privation
of
good
,
that
is
,
to
incline
towards
good
;
and
so
that
to
hate
the
privation
of
good
,
is
to
love
good
it self
.
But
if
evil
is
taken
for
Pain
,
and
the
aversion
of
Pain
is
not
an
aversion
of
the
privation
of
Pleasure
,
since
Pain
is
as
real
a
Sensation
as
Pleasure
,
it
is
not
therefore
the
privation
of
it
:
but
the
aversion
of
Pain
being
the
aversion
to
some
inward
Misery
,
we
should
not
have
this
aversion
if
we
had
not
love
.
Indeed
,
evil
may
be
taken
for
whatever
causes
Pain
in
us
,
or
deprives
us
of
good
:
and
then
aversion
depends
upon
the
love
of
our selves
,
or
of
something
to
which
we
wish
to
be
united
.
Love
and
Hatred
are
then
the
two
Mother
Passions
,
and
opposite
to
each
other
;
but
Love
is
the
first
,
chief
,
and
most
Universal
.
Being
also
since
the
Fall
so
far
removed
and
separated
from
good
as
we
are
,
and
looking
upon
our
own
being
as
the
chief
part
of
every
thing
we
are
united
to
,
we
may
in
one
Sense
say
,
that
the
motion
of
Love
,
which
we
have
to
all
things
,
is
only
a
consequence
of
Self-Love
.
We
love
Honours
,
because
they
raise
us
above
others
;
Riches
,
because
they
defend
and
preserve
us
;
Our
Relations
,
Prince
,
and
Country
,
because
we
are
interested
in
their
preservation
.
The
motion
of
love
that
we
have
for
our selves
extends
to
every
thing
that
relates
to
us
,
and
to
whatever
we
are
united
:
For
't
is
even
this
motion
which
unites
,
and
diffuses
,
if
I
may
so
say
,
our
Being
into
those
which
encompass
us
,
in
proportion
as
we
discover
by
Reason
,
or
discern
by
Sensation
,
that
't
is
advantageous
to
be
united
to
them
.
So
that
we
must
not
think
that
since
the
Fall
,
Self-Love
is
only
the
cause
and
rule
of
all
other
Loves
,
but
that
most
Loves
are
only
kinds
of
Self-Love
.
For
when
we
say
a
Man
loves
a
new
object
,
we
must
not
think
that
a
new
motion
of
love
is
produced
in
this
Man
:
But
rather
that
knowing
that
this
object
has
some
relation
or
union
with
him
,
he
loves
himself
in
that
object
,
and
by
a
motion
of
Love
as
old
as
himself
.
For
indeed
,
without
Grace
,
there
is
only
Self-Love
in
the
Heart
of
Man
.
For
the
love
of
Truth
,
Justice
,
and
even
of
God
himself
,
and
every
other
Love
that
has
been
in
us
from
the
first
Inftitution
of
Nature
,
is
ever
since
the
fall
the
Sacrifice
of
self-love
.
We
doubt
not
nevertheless
,
but
the
most
wicked
and
barbarous
Men
,
as
Idolaters
,
and
even
Atheists
themselves
,
are
united
to
God
by
a
Natural
Love
,
and
of
which
consequently
Self
Love
is
not
the
cause
.
By
Love
they
are
united
to
Truth
,
Justice
,
and
Virtue
:
They
praise
and
esteem
good
Men
;
and
't
is
not
because
they
are
Men
that
they
love
them
,
but
because
they
see
good
qualities
in
them
which
they
cannot
avoid
loving
,
since
they
cannot
hinder
themselves
from
admiring
and
judging
them
aimable
.
Thus
we
love
something
else
besides
our selves
;
but
Self-Love
is
always
predominant
over
all
other
loves
.
Men
abandon
Truth
and
Justice
for
triffling
Interests
:
and
if
by
their
natural
Powers
they
hazard
their
Lives
and
Fortunes
to
defend
oppressed
innocency
,
or
any
other
occasion
.
They
are
induced
by
little
else
than
Vanity
;
and
to
make
themselves
considerable
by
the
apparent
possession
of
some
Virtue
which
all
the
world
reverences
.
They
love
Virtue
and
Justice
,
but
never
when
't
is
against
themselves
.
They
may
love
them
when
they
agree
,
but
never
when
they
are
opposite
to
their
Interest
:
for
they
can
never
without
Grace
gain
the
least
conquest
over
Self-Love
.
There
are
also
many
other
natural
loves
:
We
Naturally
love
our
Prince
,
our
Country
,
our
Relations
,
and
those
that
we
find
conformable
to
our
Humours
,
Designs
,
Employments
;
but
all
these
loves
are
very
weak
,
as
well
as
the
love
of
Truth
and
Justice
,
and
Self-Love
being
the
most
violent
of
all
loves
,
it
always
overcomes
them
,
without
finding
any
other
resistance
than
what
it
makes
it self
.
Bodies
which
strike
one
another
lose
their
motion
,
in
proportion
as
they
communicate
it
to
those
they
meet
;
and
they
may
at
last
lose
it
all
if
they
shock
many
other
Bodies
.
But
't
is
not
so
with
Self-Love
;
it
determines
all
other
loves
by
the
impression
it
gives
them
,
yet
its
motion
diminishes
not
:
On
the
contrary
it
acquires
new
Powers
by
its
new
Victories
:
and
as
its
motion
goes
not
out
of
the
Heart
,
it
is
not
lost
,
although
it
is
continually
communicated
.
Self-Love
is
then
the
commanding
and
universal
Love
;
since
it
is
found
every
where
,
and
reigns
where-ever
it
is
found
.
So
that
all
the
Passions
have
no
other
motion
than
that
of
Self-Love
,
we
may
also
say
,
that
Self-Love
is
the
most
extensive
,
and
strongest
of
all
Passions
,
or
that
't
is
the
commanding
and
universal
Passion
.
For
even
as
all
Virtues
are
only
kinds
of
the
first
Virtue
,
that
we
call
Charity
,
as
St.
Augustine
has
shown
;
so
all
Vices
,
and
even
all
Passions
,
are
likewise
only
consequences
or
kinds
of
Self-Love
,
or
proceed
from
this
general
Vice
we
call
Concupiscence
.
We
often
distinguish
in
Morality
,
the
Virtues
or
Kinds
of
Charity
by
the
difference
of
its
Objects
:
but
that
sometimes
confounds
the
true
Idea
we
ought
to
have
of
Virtue
,
which
rather
depends
upon
its
own
motive
than
on
any
thing
else
,
and
therefore
we
shan't
follow
this
method
in
treating
of
the
Passions
:
We
will
not
here
distinguish
them
by
their
objects
,
because
one
object
alone
may
excite
them
all
,
and
yet
ten
thousand
objects
must
excite
but
one
:
For
altho'
objects
differ
amongst
themselves
;
they
are
not
always
different
in
relation
to
us
,
and
they
excite
not
different
Passions
in
us
.
A
promised
Marshal's
Staff
differs
from
a
promised
Bishop's
Crosier
;
yet
these
two
marks
of
Honour
excite
very
near
the
same
Passion
in
Ambitious
Persons
;
because
they
stir
up
a
like
Idea
of
Good
in
the
Mind
.
But
the
same
Mareschal's
Staff
,
when
promised
,
granted
,
enjoyed
,
or
taken
away
,
excites
very
different
Passions
,
since
it
raises
in
the
Mind
different
Ideas
of
Good
.
We
must
not
therefore
multiply
the
Passions
according
to
the
different
Objects
which
cause
them
,
but
only
admit
so
many
of
'em
,
as
there
are
accessary
Ideas
,
which
attend
the
principal
Idea
of
Good
or
Evil
,
and
considerably
change
it
in
relation
to
us
.
For
the
general
Idea
of
Good
,
or
the
Sensation
of
Pleasure
,
which
is
a
good
to
him
who
tastes
it
,
agitating
the
Soul
and
Animal
Spirits
,
it
produces
the
general
Passion
of
Love
:
And
the
accessory
Ideas
of
this
Good
,
determine
the
general
agitation
of
the
Soul
,
and
the
course
of
the
Animal
Spirits
after
a
particular
manner
,
which
puts
the
Mind
and
Body
into
the
disposition
it
ought
to
be
in
relation
to
the
Good
we
perceive
,
and
thus
they
produce
all
particular
Passions
.
Thus
the
general
Idea
of
Good
produces
an
indeterminate
Love
,
which
is
only
an
extension
of
Self-Love
.
The
Idea
of
the
Good
which
we
possess
producs
a
a
love
of
Joy
.
The
Idea
of
a
Good
that
we
do
not
yet
,
but
hope
hereafter
to
possess
,
that
is
,
which
we
judge
we
may
be
able
to
possess
,
produces
a
love
of
Desire
.
In
fine
,
the
Idea
of
a
Good
which
we
possess
not
,
nor
have
any
hopes
of
possessing
;
or
which
is
the
same
,
the
Idea
of
a
Good
that
we
have
no
hopes
of
possessing
without
the
loss
of
some
other
,
or
such
an
one
as
we
cannot
preserve
when
we
possess
it
,
produces
a
love
of
Sorrow
.
These
are
the
three
simple
or
primitive
Passions
which
have
Good
for
their
object
;
for
the
hope
which
produces
Joy
,
is
not
an
emotion
of
the
Soul
,
but
a
simple
Judgment
.
But
we
must
observe
that
Men
limit
not
their
being
in
themselves
,
but
extend
it
to
ail
things
and
Persons
to
whom
it
may
appear
advantagious
to
be
united
.
So
that
we
must
conceive
that
they
in
some
manner
possess
a
good
when
their
Friends
enjoy
it
,
although
they
do
not
immediately
possess
it
themselves
.
Thus
when
I
say
,
that
the
possession
of
Good
produces
Joy
,
I
mean
not
only
of
the
immediate
union
or
possession
,
but
of
all
others
;
for
we
naturally
feel
Joy
when
any
good
fortune
happens
to
those
we
love
.
Evil
,
as
I
have
before
said
;
may
be
taken
in
three
different
ways
,
either
for
the
privation
of
Good
,
or
for
Pain
,
or
in
fine
,
for
the
thing
which
causes
the
privation
of
Good
,
or
produces
Pain
.
In
the
first
Sense
,
the
Idea
of
Evil
being
the
same
with
the
Idea
of
a
Good
that
we
possess
not
,
it
is
plain
this
Idea
produces
Sorrow
,
or
Desire
,
or
even
Joy
:
For
Joy
is
always
excited
when
we
feel
our selves
deprived
of
the
privation
of
Good
,
that
is
,
when
we
possess
Good
.
So
that
the
Passions
which
regard
evil
,
taken
in
this
Sense
,
are
the
same
with
those
which
regard
Good
,
because
in
effect
they
have
Good
likewise
for
their
object
.
But
if
by
Evil
we
mean
Pain
,
which
only
is
always
a
real
Evil
to
him
who
suffers
it
,
whilst
he
suffers
it
;
then
the
sensation
of
this
Evil
produces
the
Passions
of
Sorrow
,
Desire
,
and
Joy
,
which
are
kinds
of
Hatred
and
not
Love
:
for
their
motion
is
absolutely
opposite
to
that
which
accompanies
the
sight
of
Good
;
this
motion
being
only
the
opposition
of
the
Soul
,
which
resists
the
natural
impression
.
The
actual
Sensation
of
Pain
produces
ah
aversion
of
Sorrow
.
Pain
,
which
we
do
not
actually
suffer
▪
but
are
afraid
of
suffering
,
produces
an
aversion
of
Desire
.
In
fine
,
the
Pain
that
we
do
not
suffer
,
nor
are
apprehensive
of
suffering
;
or
which
is
the
same
,
the
Pain
that
we
do
not
foresee
we
shall
suffer
without
some
great
Recompence
,
or
the
Pain
which
we
feel
our selves
delivered
from
,
produces
an
aversion
of
Joy
.
These
are
the
three
primitive
or
simple
Passions
which
have
Evil
for
their
object
,
for
fear
which
produces
Sorrow
is
not
an
emotion
of
the
Soul
,
but
a
simple
Judgment
.
Lastly
,
if
by
Evil
we
mean
the
Person
or
thing
which
deprives
us
of
Good
,
or
makes
us
suffer
Pain
;
the
Idea
of
Evil
produces
a
motion
of
Love
and
Aversion
together
,
or
simply
a
motion
of
Aversion
.
The
Idea
of
Evil
produces
a
motion
of
Love
and
Aversion
together
,
when
the
Evil
is
what
deprives
us
of
a
Good
:
For
't
is
by
the
same
motion
that
we
encline
towards
Good
,
and
remove
our selves
from
what
hinders
our
possession
of
it
.
But
this
Idea
only
produces
a
motion
of
Aversion
,
when
't
is
the
Idea
of
an
Evil
,
which
makes
us
suffer
Pain
:
for
't
is
by
the
same
motion
of
Aversion
that
we
hate
Pain
,
and
whatever
produces
it
.
Thus
there
are
three
simple
or
primitive
Passions
which
respect
Good
,
and
as
many
others
which
regard
Pain
,
or
which
causes
it
,
viz.
Joy
,
Desire
,
and
Sorrow
:
For
we
have
Joy
when
a
Good
is
present
,
or
an
Evil
past
:
We
feel
Sorrow
when
Good
is
past
,
and
Evil
present
;
and
are
agitated
with
Desire
,
when
Good
and
Evil
are
to
come
.
The
Passions
which
regard
Good
are
particular
determinations
of
the
motion
which
God
gives
us
towards
Good
in
general
,
and
therefore
their
object
is
real
:
But
others
who
have
not
God
for
the
cause
of
their
motion
,
terminate
only
in
nothingness
.
CHAP.
X.
Of
the
Passions
in
particular
,
the
manner
of
explaining
them
in
general
,
and
of
discovering
the
Errors
of
which
they
are
the
cause
.
IF
we
consider
how
compound
the
Passions
are
,
we
shall
plainly
discover
that
their
number
cannot
be
determined
,
and
that
there
are
many
more
of
them
than
we
have
terms
to
express
.
The
Passions
do
not
only
draw
their
differences
from
the
various
Combinations
of
the
three
first
,
for
then
there
wou'd
be
but
a
few
of
them
;
but
their
difference
proceeds
likewise
,
from
the
different
Perceptions
,
and
different
Judgments
which
cause
or
accompany
them
.
The
different
Judgments
which
the
Soul
makes
of
Good
and
Evil
,
cause
different
Motions
in
the
Animal
Spirits
,
to
dispose
the
Body
in
relation
to
the
Object
;
and
consequently
,
create
such
Sensations
in
the
Soul
,
as
are
not
absolutely
alike
.
Thus
they
are
the
cause
,
as
we
have
observed
,
of
the
difference
between
certain
Passions
,
whose
emotions
resemble
each
other
.
However
,
the
emotion
of
the
Soul
being
the
chief
thing
which
occurs
in
each
of
our
Passions
,
it
is
much
better
to
refer
them
all
to
the
three
Original
ones
,
in
which
these
emotions
are
very
different
,
than
to
treat
of
them
confusedly
and
without
order
,
in
relation
to
the
different
perceptions
that
we
may
have
of
the
Good
and
Evil
which
causes
them
,
for
we
may
have
so
many
different
perceptions
of
Objects
,
in
relation
to
time
;
to
our selves
,
to
what
belongs
to
us
,
in
relation
to
Persons
or
Things
,
to
which
we
are
united
,
either
by
Nature
,
or
the
choice
of
our
Will
,
that
it
is
absolutely
impossible
to
make
an
exact
enumeration
of
them
.
When
the
Soul
perceives
a
Good
which
she
may
enjoy
,
we
may
,
perhaps
,
say
,
she
hopes
for
it
,
altho'
she
desires
it
not
:
But
it
is
plain
,
this
Hope
is
not
a
Passion
,
but
a
simple
Judgment
.
So
that
't
is
the
emotion
which
accompanies
the
Idea
of
Good
,
the
possession
of
which
we
judge
to
be
possible
,
which
makes
this
.
Hope
to
be
a
true
Passion
.
When
Hope
is
changed
into
Security
,
't
is
still
the
same
thing
;
it
is
not
a
Passion
only
because
of
the
emotion
of
Joy
which
is
then
mixt
with
that
of
Desire
,
for
the
Judgment
of
the
Soul
,
which
considers
a
Good
as
not
being
likely
to
fail
of
it
,
is
a
Passion
only
,
because
the
foresight
of
Good
agitates
us
.
In
short
,
when
Hope
diminishes
,
and
Despair
succeeds
it
,
it
is
also
plain
that
this
Despair
is
a
Passion
only
,
because
of
the
emotion
of
Sorrow
,
which
is
then
mixt
with
this
Desire
;
for
the
Judgment
of
the
Soul
,
which
considers
a
Good
as
not
being
able
to
happen
,
is
not
a
Passion
except
this
Judgment
agitates
us
.
But
because
the
Soul
never
considers
Good
or
Evil
without
some
emotion
,
and
even
without
some
change
happen
in
the
Body
,
we
often
give
the
Name
of
Passion
to
the
Judgment
which
produces
this
Passion
,
because
we
confound
whatsoever
passes
in
the
Soul
and
Body
at
the
sight
of
any
Good
or
Evil
;
for
the
words
,
Hope
,
Fear
,
Rashness
,
Shame
,
Impudence
,
Anger
,
Pity
,
Derision
,
Regret
,
in
short
,
the
Names
we
commonly
give
to
all
the
other
Passions
,
are
short
expressions
whereby
we
can
expalain
,
in
particular
,
whatever
the
Passions
include
.
By
the
word
Passion
,
we
understand
the
view
of
the
relation
that
any
thing
has
with
us
,
the
emotion
and
sensation
of
the
Soul
,
the
shaking
of
the
Brain
,
and
motion
of
the
Spirits
,
a
new
emotion
and
new
sensation
of
the
Soul
;
and
,
in
fine
,
a
sensation
of
Complacency
,
which
always
attends
the
Passions
,
and
makes
them
agreeable
:
All
these
things
we
mean
by
it
.
But
sometimes
,
by
the
Name
of
Passion
,
we
only
understand
either
the
Judgment
that
excites
it
,
or
the
emotion
of
the
Soul
,
or
the
motion
of
the
Spirits
and
Blood
,
or
something
else
which
attends
the
emotion
of
the
Soul
.
To
abridge
Idea's
and
their
expressions
,
is
a
very
useful
thing
in
the
knowledge
of
Truth
;
yet
it
is
often
the
cause
of
some
great
Error
,
when
these
Idea's
are
abridged
through
Popular
Custom
,
for
we
must
never
abridge
our
Idea's
,
but
when
we
have
made
them
clear
and
distinct
by
a
great
application
of
Mind
,
and
not
,
as
we
commonly
do
,
by
the
Passions
,
and
all
sensible
Things
,
when
once
we
have
made
them
famillar
by
Sensations
,
and
the
meer
action
of
the
Imagination
which
deceives
the
Mind
.
There
is
a
great
deal
of
difference
between
the
pure
Idea's
of
the
Mind
,
and
the
sensations
or
emotions
of
the
Soul
.
The
pure
Idea's
of
the
Mind
are
clear
and
distinct
,
but
difficultly
made
familiar
;
whereas
,
on
the
contrary
,
the
sensations
and
emotions
of
the
Soul
are
very
famillar
,
but
impossible
to
be
discern'd
clearly
and
distinctly
.
Numbers
,
extension
,
and
their
Properties
,
we
clearly
know
;
but
before
we
have
made
them
sensible
by
some
Characters
which
express
them
,
't
is
difficult
to
present
them
,
for
whatever
is
abstracted
affects
us
not
.
Sensations
,
and
the
emotions
of
the
Soul
,
on
the
contrary
,
are
easily
represented
to
the
Mind
,
altho'
we
only
know
them
after
a
very
confused
and
imperfect
manner
,
and
all
the
terms
which
excite
them
strongly
agitate
the
Soul
,
and
render
it
attentive
.
From
whence
it
happens
,
that
we
often
imagine
we
very
well
apprehend
such
Discourses
as
are
absolutely
incomprehensible
;
and
when
we
read
certain
descriptions
of
the
Sensations
and
Passions
of
the
Soul
,
we
perswade
our selves
that
we
understand
them
perfectly
,
because
we
are
livelily
touched
with
them
,
for
all
the
words
we
read
agitate
the
Soul
.
We
have
no
sooner
pronounced
the
words
Shame
,
Despair
,
Impudence
,
but
it
as
soon
stirs
up
in
our
Minds
a
certain
confused
Idea
,
and
obscure
Sensation
,
which
strongly
applies
us
;
and
because
this
Sensation
is
very
familiar
,
and
represented
to
us
without
any
trouble
or
effort
of
the
Mind
,
we
perswade
our selves
that
it
is
clear
and
distinct
.
Yet
these
words
are
the
Names
of
compounded
Passions
;
and
consequently
,
the
abridged
expressions
that
vulgar
Custom
has
made
of
many
confused
and
obscure
Idea's
.
As
we
are
obliged
to
make
use
of
such
terms
as
are
approved
by
Custom
,
so
we
must
not
be
surprised
to
find
obscurity
,
and
sometimes
a
kind
of
contradiction
,
in
our
words
.
And
if
we
reflected
,
that
the
sensations
and
emotions
of
the
Soul
,
which
answered
to
the
terms
we
make
use
of
in
the
like
Discourses
,
are
not
perfectly
the
same
in
all
Men
,
because
of
their
difference
dispositions
of
Mind
,
we
shou'd
not
so
easily
condemn
others
when
they
are
not
of
our
Opinions
.
I
don't
say
this
so
much
to
prevent
the
Objections
which
may
be
made
against
me
,
as
to
make
the
Nature
of
the
Passions
be
well
apprehended
,
and
to
teach
us
what
we
ought
to
think
of
Treatises
which
are
written
upon
this
Subject
.
After
all
these
precautions
,
I
believe
I
may
say
that
all
the
Passions
may
be
referr'd
to
the
three
Primitive
ones
,
Desire
,
Joy
,
and
Sorrow
;
and
that
't
is
chiefly
through
the
different
Judgments
the
Soul
makes
of
Good
and
Evil
,
that
those
which
relate
to
one
and
the
same
Primitive
Passion
differ
amongst
themselves
.
I
may
say
that
Hope
,
Fear
,
and
Irresolution
,
which
keep
the
Mean
between
these
two
,
are
kinds
of
desire
;
that
Boldness
,
Courage
,
Emulation
,
&c.
relate
more
to
Hope
than
to
the
other
two
;
and
that
Fearfulness
,
Cowardise
,
and
Jealousie
,
&c.
are
kinds
of
Fear
.
I
may
further
say
,
that
Cheerfulness
and
Glory
,
Favour
and
Acknowledgment
,
are
kinds
of
Joy
,
caused
by
the
sight
of
the
good
we
discover
in
our selves
,
or
in
those
to
whom
we
are
united
;
as
Laughing
and
Rallery
is
a
sort
of
Joy
which
is
commonly
excited
in
us
,
at
the
sight
of
the
Evil
which
happens
to
our
Enemies
.
Lastly
,
disgust
,
tediousness
,
regret
,
pity
,
and
indignation
,
are
kinds
of
sorrow
caused
at
the
sight
of
something
which
displeases
us
.
But
besides
these
Passions
,
and
many
others
which
I
mention
not
,
and
which
particularly
relate
to
some
one
of
the
Primitive
Passions
,
The
number
of
the
Passions
is
greater
than
the
number
of
terms
we
express
'em
by
.
there
are
also
many
others
whose
emotion
is
almost
equally
compound
,
either
of
Desire
and
Joy
,
as
Impudence
,
Anger
,
Revenge
,
or
of
Desire
and
Sorrow
,
as
Shame
,
Regret
,
and
Despight
;
or
of
all
three
when
we
meet
with
Motives
of
Joy
and
Sorrow
joined
together
.
But
altho'
these
last
Passions
have
not
,
as
I
know
of
,
any
particular
Name
,
they
are
nevertheless
the
most
common
,
because
in
this
Life
we
hardly
ever
enjoy
any
Good
without
the
mixture
of
some
Evil
,
and
that
we
scarcely
ever
suffer
any
Evil
without
some
hopes
of
being
delivered
from
it
,
and
of
possessing
some
Good
.
And
altho'
Joy
be
quite
contrary
to
Sorrow
,
it
nevertheless
admits
it
,
and
even
with
his
Passion
shares
the
Souls
capacity
of
Willing
,
as
he
prospect
of
Good
and
Evil
divides
the
Souls
capacity
of
perceiving
.
All
the
Passions
therefore
are
kinds
of
Desire
,
Joy
,
and
Sorrow
;
and
the
chief
difference
to
be
observed
between
the
Passions
of
the
same
kind
,
proceeds
from
the
different
Perceptions
,
or
different
Judgments
which
cause
or
accompany
them
;
so
that
it
is
necessary
to
enquire
into
the
different
Judgments
that
we
make
of
Good
and
Evil.
But
as
our
chief
design
here
is
to
search
after
the
cause
of
our
Error
,
we
ought
not
so
much
to
stop
at
the
examining
the
Judgments
which
follow
them
,
and
which
the
Soul
makes
of
Objects
when
it
is
agitated
by
any
Passion
,
for
't
is
these
last
Judgments
which
are
the
most
liable
to
Error
.
Those
Judgments
which
precede
and
cause
the
Passions
,
are
commonly
false
in
something
,
for
they
are
generally
upheld
upon
the
perceptions
of
the
Soul
,
in
as
much
as
it
considers
things
in
relation
to
it self
,
and
not
according
as
they
are
in
themselves
:
But
those
Judgments
which
follow
the
Passions
are
false
in
every
respect
,
for
the
Judgments
which
form
the
Passions
are
upheld
only
upon
the
perceptions
the
Soul
has
of
Objects
in
relation
to
it self
,
or
rather
in
relation
to
its
emotion
.
In
those
Judgments
which
precede
the
Passions
,
both
the
true
and
the
false
are
joined
together
;
but
when
the
Soul
is
agitated
,
and
Judges
of
every
thing
according
to
the
inspiration
of
the
Passion
,
the
true
is
dissipated
,
and
the
false
preserved
,
from
whence
are
drawn
so
many
more
false
conclusions
as
the
Passion
is
greater
.
Every
Passion
justifies
it self
;
they
continually
represent
to
the
Soul
that
Object
which
affects
it
,
after
such
a
manner
as
is
most
proper
to
preserve
and
encrease
its
agitation
.
The
Judgment
or
Perception
which
causes
it
,
is
fortified
in
proportion
as
the
Passion
encreases
;
and
the
Passion
encreases
ini
proportion
as
the
Judgment
which
produces
it
,
is
in
its
turn
fortified
:
False
Judgments
and
Passions
continually
contribute
to
their
mutual
preservation
.
So
that
if
the
Heart
ceased
not
sometimes
to
supply
such
Spirits
as
are
proper
to
maintain
the
traces
of
the
Brain
,
and
the
distributions
of
the
same
Spirits
,
which
are
necessary
to
preserve
the
sensation
and
emotion
of
the
Soul
which
accompanies
the
Passions
,
they
wou'd
continually
encrease
,
and
we
shou'd
never
discover
our
Errors
.
But
as
all
our
Passions
depend
upon
the
fermentation
and
circulation
of
the
Blood
,
and
as
the
Heart
cannot
always
furnish
such
Spirits
as
are
requisite
for
their
preservation
,
they
must
necessarily
cease
when
the
Spirits
diminish
and
the
Blood
cools
.
If
it
is
so
very
easie
to
discover
the
common
Judgments
of
the
Passions
,
we
ought
not
to
neglect
it
;
There
are
few
Subjectys
more
worthy
the
application
of
those
who
enquire
into
the
Truth
,
and
endeavor
to
deliver
themselves
from
the
dominion
of
their
Bodies
,
and
who
wou'd
judge
of
all
things
according
to
the
true
Idea's
of
them
.
We
may
instruct
our selves
upon
this
Subject
two
different
ways
,
either
by
reason
only
,
or
by
the
internal
sensation
that
we
have
of
our selves
when
we
are
agitated
with
any
Passion
.
For
instance
,
we
know
by
our
own
Experience
,
that
we
are
inclined
to
judge
disadvantageously
of
those
we
love
not
,
and
to
discover
all
the
malignity
of
our
hatred
,
by
that
means
,
to
the
Object
of
our
Passion
.
We
may
also
,
by
pure
Reason
,
discover
that
hating
only
what
is
Evil
,
it
is
necessary
for
the
preservation
of
hatred
,
that
the
Mind
shou'd
represent
its
Object
on
the
worst
side
;
for
,
indeed
,
it
is
sufficient
to
suppose
all
the
Passions
justify
themselves
,
and
that
they
divert
the
Imagination
,
and
afterwards
the
Mind
,
in
such
a
manner
as
is
fit
to
preserve
their
own
emotion
,
that
we
conclude
what
those
Judgments
are
which
all
the
Passions
cause
us
to
make
.
Those
who
have
a
strong
and
lively
Imagination
,
are
extreamly
sensible
,
and
very
subject
to
the
Motions
of
the
Passions
,
may
perfectly
instruct
themselves
in
these
things
by
the
sensation
they
have
of
what
passes
within
them
;
and
even
speak
of
them
after
a
more
agreeable
manner
,
and
sometimes
more
instructive
,
than
those
who
have
more
Reason
than
Imagination
.
For
,
we
must
not
think
that
such
as
best
discover
the
Springs
of
Self-love
,
that
penetrate
farthest
,
and
after
a
more
sensible
manner
,
unfold
the
secrets
of
Man's
heart
,
are
always
the
most
Learned
:
'T
is
,
indeed
,
often
a
mark
that
they
are
more
lively
,
more
imaginative
,
and
sometimes
more
malicious
than
others
.
But
those
who
without
consulting
their
internal
Sensation
,
only
make
use
of
their
Reason
to
discover
the
Nature
of
their
Passions
,
and
what
they
are
capable
of
producing
,
if
they
are
not
always
as
penetrating
as
others
,
they
are
always
more
reasonable
,
and
less
subject
to
Error
,
for
they
judge
of
things
as
they
are
in
themselves
:
They
see
very
near
what
the
Passions
can
perform
,
according
as
they
suppose
them
more
or
less
moved
,
and
they
do
not
judge
rashly
of
such
things
as
others
wou'd
,
or
wou'd
not
do
in
such
occurrences
,
by
what
they
wou'd
do
themselves
;
for
they
very
well
know
,
that
all
men
are
not
equally
sensible
of
the
same
things
,
nor
equally
susceptible
of
involuntary
emotions
,
so
that
't
is
not
by
consulting
the
Sensations
which
the
Passions
excite
in
us
,
but
by
hearkning
to
Reason
,
that
we
must
speak
of
the
Judgments
which
accompany
the
Passions
,
lest
we
shou'd
only
discover
our selves
instead
of
showing
the
Nature
of
the
Passions
in
general
.
CHAP.
XI
.
How
all
the
Passions
justifie
themselves
,
and
of
the
judgments
they
cause
us
to
make
in
their
vindication
.
IT
will
not
be
necessary
to
bring
many
Arguments
to
demonstrate
that
all
the
Passions
justifie
themselves
:
This
Principle
is
evident
enough
by
the
internal
Sensation
we
have
of
our selves
,
and
the
conduct
of
those
whom
we
see
agitated
with
any
Passion
;
it
will
be
sufficient
to
expose
it
,
that
we
may
afterwards
take
heed
of
it
.
The
Mind
is
such
a
slave
to
the
Imagination
,
that
it
always
obeys
it
,
when
it
is
heated
by
it
:
It
dares
not
answer
it
when
't
is
incens'd
,
because
it
treats
it
ill
if
it
makes
any
resistance
,
and
always
recompences
it
with
some
pleasure
when
it
acquiesses
in
its
designs
.
Those
even
whose
imagination
is
so
irregular
that
they
believe
themselves
transformed
into
Beasts
,
find
some
reasons
to
prove
that
they
ought
to
live
like
them
;
walk
upon
all
four
,
feed
upon
Grass
,
and
imitate
all
the
actions
which
agree
only
to
Beasts
.
They
find
a
great
deal
of
pleasure
in
following
the
impressions
of
their
Passions
;
and
feel
themselves
inwardly
afflicted
when
they
resist
them
:
and
't
is
enough
,
if
reason
,
which
accommodates
it self
,
and
is
commonly
serviceable
to
pleasure
,
argues
after
such
a
manner
as
is
proper
to
defend
the
cause
of
it
.
If
therefore
it
be
true
that
all
Passions
justifie
themselves
,
it
is
evident
that
desire
of
it self
inclines
us
to
judge
advantageously
of
its
Object
,
if
it
is
a
desire
of
love
;
and
disadvantageously
,
if
't
is
a
desire
of
aversion
.
The
desire
of
love
is
a
motion
of
the
Soul
excited
by
the
Spirits
,
to
will
the
enjoyment
or
use
of
such
things
as
are
not
in
our
power
;
for
if
we
desire
the
continuation
of
our
enjoyment
,
't
is
because
future
things
are
not
in
our
power
.
It
is
therefore
necessary
to
justifie
desire
,
that
the
Object
which
produces
it
should
be
judged
good
in
it self
,
or
in
relation
to
some
other
;
and
we
must
think
the
contrary
of
that
desire
which
is
a
kind
of
aversion
.
It
is
true
we
cannot
judge
a
thing
to
be
good
or
bad
,
if
there
is
not
some
reason
for
it
;
but
there
is
no
Object
of
our
Passions
which
is
not
good
in
some
sense
:
If
we
can
say
that
there
is
some
of
them
which
include
no
good
,
and
which
consequently
cannot
be
perceived
as
good
by
the
sight
of
the
Mind
;
yet
it
cannot
be
said
but
they
may
be
relished
as
good
,
since
we
suppose
our selves
to
be
agitated
by
them
;
and
this
taste
or
sensation
is
sufficient
to
incline
the
Soul
to
judge
advantageously
of
an
Object
.
If
we
judge
so
easily
that
Fire
contains
in
it self
the
heat
we
feel
,
and
Bread
the
savour
we
taste
,
because
of
the
sensations
that
these
Bodies
excite
in
us
,
although
it
be
wholly
incomprehensible
to
the
Mind
,
since
that
can
only
conceive
heat
and
savour
,
to
be
the
manners
of
being
of
a
Body
;
there
is
no
Object
of
our
Passions
how
vile
and
contemptible
soever
it
appears
to
be
,
that
we
do
not
judge
to
be
good
when
we
feel
pleasure
in
the
enjoyment
of
it
.
For
as
we
imagine
that
heat
goes
our
of
Fire
when
we
feel
it
,
we
blindly
believe
that
the
Object
of
the
Passions
cause
the
pleasure
that
we
taste
when
we
enjoy
them
;
and
that
therefore
they
are
good
since
they
are
capable
of
doing
us
good
;
the
same
may
be
said
of
those
Passions
which
have
evil
for
their
Object
.
But
as
I
have
just
before
said
,
there
is
nothing
which
is
not
worthy
of
love
or
aversion
,
either
in
it self
,
or
something
else
to
which
it
has
relation
;
and
when
we
are
agitated
by
any
Passion
,
we
soon
discover
the
good
or
evil
in
its
Object
which
favours
or
opposes
it
.
Thus
by
reason
't
is
easie
to
find
out
what
Judgments
these
Passions
,
whereby
we
are
agitated
,
form
in
us
.
For
if
't
is
a
desire
of
love
which
acts
us
,
we
soon
apprehend
that
it
will
not
fail
to
justifie
it self
by
the
advantageous
judgments
it
will
make
upon
its
Object
.
We
easily
see
these
Judgments
will
be
so
much
the
more
extended
,
as
the
desire
is
more
violent
;
and
that
they
will
be
often
full
and
absolute
although
the
thing
appears
only
good
in
part
,
without
we
easily
conceive
that
these
advantageous
Judgments
will
extend
to
every
thing
which
has
or
seems
to
have
any
connection
with
the
principal
Object
of
the
Passion
;
and
that
so
much
the
more
as
the
Passion
is
stronger
,
and
the
Imagination
more
extensive
.
But
if
it
be
a
desire
of
aversion
,
the
quite
contrary
will
happen
,
for
Reasons
as
easily
apprehended
.
Experience
sufficiently
proves
these
things
,
and
therein
it
perfectly
agrees
with
Reason
;
but
we
will
make
these
Truths
more
sensible
by
some
Instances
.
All
Men
naturally
desire
Knowledge
,
for
every
Mind
is
made
for
the
Truth
:
But
the
desire
of
knowing
,
how
just
and
reasonable
soever
it
may
be
in
it self
,
often
becomes
a
very
dangerous
Vice
through
the
false
Judgments
which
attend
it
.
Curiosity
often
offers
to
the
Mind
the
main
Objects
of
its
Meditations
and
Cares
:
It
often
affixes
false
Ideas
of
greatness
to
these
Objects
:
It
elevates
them
by
the
deceitful
lustre
of
rarity
,
and
represents
them
so
charming
and
attractive
,
that
't
is
difficult
to
contemplate
them
without
too
much
pleasure
and
application
.
There
is
no
trifle
whatever
,
but
some
Persons
are
wholly
taken
up
about
,
and
their
employment
is
always
justified
by
the
false
judgments
their
vain
curiosity
induces
them
to
make
.
Those
,
for
instance
,
who
are
curious
about
words
,
imagine
it
to
be
a
knowledge
of
certain
terms
wherein
all
Sciences
consist
:
They
find
a
thousand
Arguments
to
perswade
themselves
of
it
,
and
the
veneration
paid
them
by
those
,
who
are
confounded
by
unknown
terms
,
is
none
of
the
weakest
although
it
be
the
least
reasonable
.
Some
Men
are
learning
all
their
lives
to
speak
,
who
yet
perhaps
ought
to
be
silent
as
long
as
they
live
;
for
't
is
evident
we
should
hold
our
Tongues
when
we
have
nothing
to
say
that
is
worth
the
hearing
;
but
they
don't
learn
to
speak
,
to
remain
silent
.
They
do
not
sufficiently
consider
,
that
to
be
able
to
speak
well
,
't
is
requisite
to
think
well
,
have
an
exact
judgment
,
to
discern
truth
from
falsehood
,
clear
Ideas
from
those
which
are
obscure
,
and
distinguish
those
of
the
Mind
,
from
such
as
proceed
from
the
Imagination
.
They
think
themselves
uncommon
and
curious
Wits
,
because
they
know
how
to
satisfie
the
Ear
by
an
exact
measure
,
flatter
the
Passions
by
figures
and
agreeable
motions
,
and
delight
the
Imagination
by
sensible
and
lively
Expressions
,
whilst
they
leave
the
Mind
empty
of
Ideas
without
knowledge
and
understanding
.
Those
who
imploy
a
great
part
of
their
time
in
the
study
of
their
own
Tongue
,
have
some
appearance
of
Reason
to
justifie
them
,
since
they
make
use
of
it
all
their
lives
;
and
this
is
enough
to
excuse
the
Passion
of
some
Persons
.
But
I
confess
it
difficult
with
any
shadow
of
Reason
,
to
excuse
the
Passion
of
such
as
indifferently
apply
themselves
to
all
sorts
of
Languages
.
Something
may
be
said
in
favour
of
their
Inclination
who
make
a
compleat
Library
of
all
sorts
of
Dictionaries
,
as
well
as
for
the
Curiosity
of
such
,
who
collect
the
Coins
of
all
Nations
and
Ages
;
since
it
may
be
useful
in
some
Occurrences
;
and
if
it
is
no
great
advantage
to
them
,
at
least
't
is
no
injury
;
for
they
have
a
Storehouse
of
Curiosities
which
does
not
perplex
them
,
since
they
carry
about
them
neither
their
Books
nor
their
Medals
;
But
I
don't
see
how
we
can
justifie
the
Passion
of
those
who
make
their
Head
a
Library
of
Dictionaries
;
They
even
forget
their
Affairs
and
most
essential
Duties
,
for
Words
of
no
use
;
They
speak
their
own
Tongue
with
hesitation
,
and
at
every
turn
mix
unknown
and
barbarons
terms
in
their
Discourses
,
and
never
speak
to
their
Country-men
in
their
own
Language
.
And
indeed
their
Reason
is
no
better
managed
than
their
Tongue
,
for
every
corner
and
recess
of
their
Memory
is
full
of
Etymologies
,
that
their
Minds
are
as
it
were
choaked
with
an
innumerable
company
of
Words
,
which
continually
fly
about
it
.
Nevertheless
it
must
be
granted
that
Philologists
and
Linguists
will
not
fail
to
justifie
their
trifling
Studies
;
But
how
!
only
hear
the
Judgments
that
those
falsly
Learned
Persons
make
of
the
Tongues
,
and
you
shall
know
it
:
Or
else
do
but
suppose
certain
Axioms
which
pass
amongst
them
for
indisputable
,
and
from
thence
draw
their
usual
Consequences
;
for
instance
,
that
those
who
understand
several
Languages
,
are
as
many
different
Men
,
as
they
can
speak
Tongues
,
since
't
is
by
speech
they
are
distinguished
from
Beasts
:
That
being
unaquainted
with
the
Tongues
,
is
the
reason
we
are
ignorant
of
an
infinite
number
of
things
,
since
the
Ancient
Philosophers
and
Strangers
are
much
more
learned
than
we
are
;
Thus
,
if
we
suppose
the
like
Principles
and
Conclusions
,
we
shall
soon
form
such
Judgments
as
are
fit
to
produce
a
Passion
for
Languages
,
and
which
Judgments
will
consequently
be
like
those
that
the
same
Passion
creates
in
Philologists
for
the
justification
of
their
Studies
.
The
meanest
and
most
contemptible
Sciences
,
will
in
some
part
or
other
appear
glorious
to
the
Imagination
,
and
will
easily
dazle
the
Mind
through
the
false
lustre
that
Passion
diffuses
through
it
.
It
is
true
,
this
splendor
vanishes
,
when
the
Spirits
and
Blood
are
cooled
,
and
the
light
of
truth
begins
to
appear
;
but
this
light
is
likewise
dissipated
when
the
Imagination
becomes
warm
,
and
obscurely
presents
to
us
those
solid
Reasons
which
seemed
to
condemn
our
Passion
.
But
when
the
Passion
which
animated
us
,
feels
it self
decaying
,
it
does
not
repent
of
its
conduct
;
on
the
contrary
we
may
say
,
that
it
disposes
of
all
things
in
such
a
manner
,
that
it
may
dye
with
honour
,
or
else
revive
again
soon
after
:
That
is
,
it
always
inclines
the
Mind
to
form
such
Judgments
as
justifie
it
.
In
this
condition
it
also
contracts
a
kind
of
Covenant
with
all
the
rest
of
the
Passions
,
which
can
assist
it
in
its
weakness
,
supply
it
with
Spirits
and
Blood
at
its
necessity
,
rekindle
its
ashes
,
and
give
it
new
life
;
for
the
Passions
are
not
indifferent
in
respect
to
each
other
;
and
those
which
can
live
together
faithfully
contribute
to
one
anothers
preservation
.
Thus
the
Judgments
,
which
justifie
the
inclination
we
have
for
Languages
,
or
what
else
pleases
us
,
are
continually
solicited
and
fully
confirmed
by
all
the
Passions
which
are
not
opposite
to
it
.
A
pretender
to
Learning
sometimes
fancies
himself
surrounded
with
such
Persons
as
hear
him
with
respect
,
sometimes
as
victorious
over
those
whom
he
has
astonished
by
his
incomprehensible
Words
,
and
generally
thinks
himself
far
above
the
common
sort
of
Men.
He
flatters
himself
with
the
praises
they
give
him
,
the
preferments
proposed
to
him
,
and
with
the
courships
made
to
his
Person
.
He
is
of
all
times
and
Countreys
,
and
not
limited
like
common
Wits
,
to
the
present
time
,
or
within
the
Walls
of
his
own
Town
;
but
continually
communicates
himself
,
and
this
communication
creates
his
pleasure
.
Thus
many
Passions
combine
with
that
he
has
for
false
Learning
,
which
all
endeavour
to
justifie
it
,
and
warmly
solicite
the
Judgments
in
its
favour
.
It
every
Passion
acted
only
for
it self
,
without
being
concerned
for
the
rest
,
they
would
immediately
dissipate
after
they
were
produced
;
not
being
able
to
make
false
Judgments
enough
for
their
own
subsistence
,
nor
to
maintain
long
the
representations
of
the
Imagination
against
the
light
of
Reason
.
But
every
thing
is
regulated
in
our
Passions
after
the
most
exact
manner
that
is
possible
,
for
their
mutual
preservation
.
They
fortifie
one
another
,
the
most
remote
giving
some
assistance
;
and
't
is
enough
for
'em
,
if
they
are
not
declared
enemies
,
to
observe
amongst
themselves
all
the
rules
of
a
well
ordered
Society
.
Should
the
Passion
of
Desire
be
alone
,
every
Judgment
that
proceeded
from
it
,
could
only
tend
to
represent
the
good
as
possible
;
for
the
desire
of
love
,
considered
as
such
,
is
produced
only
by
the
Judgment
that
we
make
of
the
possession
of
some
good
that
is
attainable
;
so
that
this
desire
could
only
form
Judgments
upon
the
possibility
of
enjoying
it
,
since
those
Judgments
which
follow
and
preserve
the
Passions
,
are
wholly
like
those
which
precede
and
produce
them
.
But
desire
is
animated
by
love
,
fortified
by
hope
,
encreased
by
joy
,
renewed
by
fear
,
attended
with
courage
,
emulation
,
anger
,
irresolution
,
and
many
other
Passions
;
which
in
their
turns
form
an
infinite
variety
of
Judgments
,
that
succeed
one
another
,
and
so
maintain
the
desire
which
produced
them
.
It
is
no
wonder
therefore
if
the
desire
of
a
pure
trifle
,
or
of
something
that
is
manifestly
useless
,
or
injurious
,
continually
justifies
it self
in
opposition
to
Reason
,
for
many
years
,
or
during
the
whole
Life
of
a
Man
who
is
agitated
by
it
,
since
there
are
so
many
Passions
which
plead
in
its
behalf
.
And
that
I
may
explain
things
by
distinct
Ideas
,
I
shall
briefly
shew
how
the
Passions
justifie
themselves
.
All
Passion
agitates
the
Blood
and
Spirits
;
and
these
agitated
Spirits
are
carried
to
the
Brain
,
either
by
the
sensible
sight
of
the
Object
,
or
power
of
the
Imagination
,
after
such
a
manner
as
is
proper
to
form
deep
Traces
to
represent
this
Object
:
By
their
impetuous
course
they
bend
,
and
even
sometimes
break
the
Fibres
of
the
Brain
,
and
the
Imagination
is
thereby
sully'd
and
corrupted
.
For
these
Traces
submit
not
to
Reason
,
they
are
not
effaced
when
that
wishes
it
;
but
on
the
contrary
do
violence
to
it
,
and
even
continually
oblige
it
to
consider
Objects
,
after
such
a
manner
as
agitates
and
inclines
it
to
favour
the
Passions
.
Thus
the
Passions
act
upon
the
Imagination
,
and
the
Imagination
being
corrupted
fights
against
Reason
,
by
continually
representing
things
to
it
,
not
according
as
they
are
in
themselves
,
whereby
the
Mind
might
make
a
true
Judgment
,
but
as
they
relate
to
the
present
Passion
,
to
incline
it
to
make
a
Judgment
in
favour
of
it
.
The
Passions
do
not
only
corrupt
both
the
Imagination
and
Mind
in
favour
of
'em
,
but
likewise
produce
in
the
rest
of
the
Body
every
disposition
that
is
necessary
for
their
preservation
.
The
Spirits
which
are
agitated
by
them
stop
not
in
the
Brain
,
but
are
carried
,
as
I
have
already
intimated
,
to
all
the
other
parts
of
the
Body
;
They
are
chiefly
dispersed
into
the
Heart
,
Liver
,
Spleen
,
and
into
the
Nerves
which
encompass
the
principal
Arteries
:
In
short
,
they
are
thrown
into
all
parts
whatever
,
which
can
supply
necessary
Spirits
for
the
preservation
of
the
ruling
Passion
.
But
when
these
Spirits
are
thus
dispersed
into
the
parts
of
the
Body
,
they
by
little
and
little
destroy
whatever
can
resist
their
course
;
till
at
last
they
make
their
passage
so
slippery
and
smooth
,
that
the
smallest
Object
extreamly
agitates
us
,
and
consequently
inclines
us
to
form
such
Judgments
as
favour
the
Passions
.
And
't
is
after
this
manner
that
they
establish
and
justifie
themselves
.
If
we
consider
how
various
the
constitution
of
the
Fibres
of
the
Brain
is
,
how
different
the
agitation
and
abundance
of
the
Spirits
and
Blood
in
different
Sexes
,
and
at
different
Ages
;
it
will
be
easie
enough
to
discover
very
near
what
Passions
certain
Persons
are
most
subject
to
,
and
consequently
what
Judgments
they
will
make
upon
such
Objects
.
For
Instance
;
we
may
nearly
guess
by
the
abundance
or
scarcity
of
Spirits
,
which
we
observe
in
certain
Persons
,
that
the
very
same
thing
being
equally
proposed
and
explained
to
them
,
many
will
form
Judgments
of
hope
and
joy
upon
it
,
and
others
of
fear
and
sorrow
.
For
those
who
have
abundance
of
Blood
and
Spirits
,
as
commonly
Young
Men
,
Sanguine
and
Cholerick
Persons
have
,
easily
conceive
hope
,
because
of
the
secret
sense
of
their
Strength
;
They
will
not
believe
they
shall
find
any
opposition
in
their
designs
which
they
cannot
conquer
;
and
immediately
please
themselves
with
the
foretast
of
a
good
they
hope
to
possess
;
and
will
form
all
sorts
of
Judgments
which
are
fit
to
justifie
their
hope
and
joy
.
But
such
as
want
agitated
Spirits
,
as
Old
Men
,
Melancholy
and
Flegmatick
Persons
do
,
being
inclined
to
fear
and
sorrow
,
because
their
Soul
grows
weak
,
and
is
destitute
of
Spirits
to
execute
its
Orders
,
they
form
quite
contrary
Judgments
,
imagining
unconquerable
difficulties
to
justifie
their
fear
,
and
abandon
themselves
to
envy
,
sorrow
,
despair
,
and
to
certain
kinds
of
aversion
,
of
which
weak
Persons
are
most
susceptible
.
CHAP.
XII
.
That
such
Passions
,
as
have
Evil
for
their
Object
,
are
most
dangerous
and
unjust
;
and
such
as
are
attended
with
the
least
knowledge
,
are
the
most
lively
and
sensible
.
OF
all
the
Passions
,
those
whose
Judgments
are
most
unreasonable
,
and
most
to
be
feared
,
are
all
kinds
of
Aversion
.
There
are
no
Passions
whatever
that
corrupts
the
Reason
more
in
favour
of
'em
,
than
hatred
and
fear
do
:
Hatred
chiefly
in
the
Cholerick
,
or
in
such
whose
Spirits
are
in
continual
agitation
;
and
Fear
in
the
Melancholic
,
or
in
those
whose
gross
and
heavy
Spirits
are
neither
soon
agitated
,
nor
easily
appeased
.
But
when
Hatred
and
Fear
conspire
together
to
corrupt
the
Reason
,
which
is
very
common
,
then
there
are
no
Judgments
so
unjust
and
fantastic
,
but
they
are
capable
of
producing
and
maintaining
with
an
insuperable
obstinacy
.
The
reason
of
which
is
,
because
the
Soul
is
in
this
life
more
lively
affected
with
evil
than
good
,
the
sensation
of
pain
being
more
quick
than
that
of
pleasure
.
We
are
much
more
sensible
of
injuries
and
reproaches
than
praises
and
applause
;
and
if
we
meet
with
some
Persons
that
have
a
great
indifference
for
the
enjoyment
of
certain
pleasures
,
or
the
receiving
of
certain
honours
,
yet
would
it
be
very
difficult
to
find
any
who
would
quietly
suffer
pain
and
contempt
.
Thus
Hatred
,
Fear
,
and
the
other
kinds
of
Aversion
which
have
Evil
for
their
Object
,
are
very
violent
Passions
.
They
give
the
Mind
such
unforeseen
shocks
,
and
stupify
and
discompose
it
;
and
soon
penetrate
into
the
most
secret
recesses
of
the
Soul
;
They
dethrone
Reason
,
and
upon
all
sorts
of
subjects
pronounce
erroneous
and
unjust
Judgments
,
in
favour
of
their
folly
and
tyranny
.
Of
all
the
Passions
these
are
the
most
cruel
and
distrustful
,
the
most
destructive
to
Charity
and
Civil
Society
,
and
likewise
the
most
ridiculous
and
extravigant
:
for
they
form
such
impertinent
and
fantastic
Judgments
,
as
excites
the
laughter
and
indignation
of
all
Men.
These
Passions
put
these
extravagant
Speeches
in
the
Mouth
of
the
Pharisees
:
Joh.
c.
11.47
.
What
do
we
?
this
Man
works
many
Miracles
.
If
we
let
him
alone
all
Men
will
believe
in
him
:
And
the
Romans
will
come
and
destroy
both
our
City
and
Nation
.
They
agreed
that
JESVS
CHRIST
did
many
Miracles
;
the
resurrection
of
Lazarus
was
undeniable
.
But
what
was
the
Judgment
of
their
Passions
?
To
put
JESVS
CHRIST
to
death
,
and
Lazarus
whom
he
had
raised
to
life
:
And
why
must
JESVS
CHRIST
die
?
because
,
if
we
let
him
alone
,
all
Men
will
believe
him
,
and
the
Romans
will
come
and
ruine
our
Nation
:
And
why
must
Lazarus
be
put
to
death
?
because
,
upon
his
account
many
Jews
went
away
and
believed
in
JESVS
.
Joh.
c.
12.11
.
These
are
both
cruel
and
extravagant
Judgments
together
;
cruel
through
hatred
,
and
extravagant
through
fear
:
The
Romans
will
come
and
ruine
our
City
and
Nation
.
'T
was
the
same
Passions
induced
a
great
.
Assembly
,
consisting
of
Annas
the
High
Priest
,
Caiaphas
,
John
,
Alexander
,
and
all
those
who
were
a
kin
to
the
High
Priest
,
to
speak
thus
;
What
shall
we
do
with
these
Men
?
for
that
indeed
a
notable
Miracle
hath
been
done
by
them
,
is
manifest
to
all
them
that
dwell
in
Jerusalem
,
and
we
cannot
deny
it
.
Acts
c.
4.
16
,
17.
But
that
it
spread
no
farther
amongst
the
People
,
let
us
threaten
to
punish
them
,
if
henceforward
they
teach
any
more
in
the
Name
of
JESUS
.
All
these
great
Men
pronounced
both
an
impertinent
and
an
unjust
Judgment
,
because
they
were
agitated
by
their
Passions
,
and
blinded
by
their
false
Zeal
.
They
durst
not
punish
the
Apostles
because
of
the
People
,
and
because
the
Man
who
had
been
miraculously
cured
,
was
above
40
years
old
,
and
present
in
the
Assembly
;
But
threatened
them
to
hinder
'em
from
preaching
in
the
Name
of
JESVS
.
Believing
they
ought
to
condemn
a
Doctrine
,
whose
Author
they
had
put
to
death
,
You
intend
,
say
they
to
the
Apostles
,
to
bring
this
Man's
Blood
upon
us
.
When
false
Zeal
is
joined
to
Hatred
,
Acts
c.
5.
it
shelters
it
from
the
reproaches
of
Reason
,
and
after
such
a
manner
justifies
it
that
we
do
not
scruple
to
follow
its
motions
;
and
when
ignorance
and
weakness
accompany
fear
,
they
extend
to
an
infinite
number
of
subjects
,
and
so
well
fortifie
its
emotions
,
that
the
least
suspicion
frightens
and
disturbs
the
Reason
.
False
Zealors
think
they
do
God
service
when
they
submit
to
their
Passions
;
they
blindly
follow
the
secret
motions
of
their
Hatred
,
as
proceeding
from
the
Internal
Truth
;
and
stopping
with
satisfaction
at
such
sensible
proofs
as
justifie
their
excess
,
they
confirm
themselves
in
their
errors
with
an
unconquerable
obstinacy
.
As
for
Ignorant
and
Weak
Persons
they
create
to
themselves
ridiculous
and
imaginary
subjects
of
fear
;
and
like
Children
,
who
walk
in
the
dark
without
a
guide
,
they
imagine
frightful
Bugbears
,
are
disturb'd
and
cry
out
as
if
they
were
undone
;
light
re-assures
them
if
they
are
ignorant
,
but
if
Men
have
weak
Minds
,
their
imagination
is
always
disturbed
:
The
least
thing
which
relates
to
that
frightful
Object
renews
the
traces
and
course
of
the
Spirits
which
causes
the
symtom
of
their
fear
;
so
that
't
is
absolutely
impossible
to
cure
or
appease
them
for
ever
.
But
when
false
Zeal
meets
with
Hatred
and
Fear
,
in
a
weak
Mind
,
it
continually
produces
such
unjust
and
violent
Judgments
in
it
,
that
we
cannot
think
on
'em
without
horror
.
To
change
the
Mind
possessed
with
these
Passions
requires
a
greater
Miracle
than
that
which
converted
St.
Paul
,
and
to
cure
it
would
be
absolute
impossible
,
if
we
could
set
bounds
to
the
Mercy
and
Power
of
God
.
Those
who
walk
in
the
dark
rejoyce
at
the
appearance
of
light
,
but
this
Man
cannot
endure
it
,
since
it
hurts
him
,
because
it
resists
his
Passion
.
His
fear
being
in
some
manner
voluntary
,
because
't
is
produced
by
his
hatred
,
he
loves
to
be
affected
by
it
,
since
we
love
to
be
agitated
by
those
Passions
which
have
Evil
for
their
Object
,
when
the
Evil
is
imaginary
;
or
rather
,
when
we
know
as
in
Tragedies
,
that
the
Evil
can't
hurt
us
.
The
Phantoms
that
these
form
to
themselves
who
walk
in
the
dark
,
vanish
at
the
approach
of
light
:
But
this
Man's
Phantoms
cannot
be
dissipated
by
the
light
of
the
truth
;
for
instead
of
dissipating
the
darkness
of
his
Mind
,
it
only
incenses
his
imagination
;
so
that
whilst
he
applies
himself
to
the
Object
of
his
Passion
the
light
reflects
,
and
it
seems
to
him
as
if
these
Phantoms
had
real
Bodies
,
since
they
reflect
some
weak
rays
of
light
which
strike
upon
them
.
But
if
we
should
suppose
in
these
Persons
a
sufficient
docility
and
reflection
to
make
'em
listen
to
,
and
apprehend
such
Reasons
as
are
capable
of
dissipating
their
Errors
,
yet
their
imagination
being
disordered
through
fear
,
and
their
Hearts
corrupted
through
hatred
and
false
zeal
,
these
Reasons
,
how
solid
soever
they
might
be
in
themselves
,
would
not
be
able
long
to
stop
the
impetuous
motions
of
these
violent
Passions
,
nor
hinder
them
from
speedily
justifying
themselves
by
sensible
and
convincing
proofs
.
For
we
must
observe
that
there
are
some
Passions
which
never
return
again
,
whereas
there
are
others
that
are
constant
and
durable
.
Those
which
are
not
maintained
by
the
sight
of
the
Mind
,
but
only
produced
and
fortified
by
the
sensible
view
of
some
Object
,
and
the
fermentation
of
the
Blood
continue
not
,
but
commonly
die
immediately
after
they
are
produced
.
But
those
which
are
attended
with
the
contemplation
of
the
Mind
are
lasting
;
for
the
Principle
which
causes
them
is
not
subject
to
change
like
the
Blood
and
Humours
.
So
that
Hatred
,
Fear
,
and
all
the
rest
of
the
Passions
which
are
stirr'd
up
or
preserved
by
the
knowledge
of
the
Mind
,
and
not
by
the
sensible
sight
of
some
Evil
,
must
necessarily
subsist
long
.
These
Passions
are
therefore
more
durable
,
violent
,
and
unjust
,
but
not
more
lively
and
sensible
,
as
has
already
been
shown
.
The
perception
of
Good
and
Evil
,
which
excite
the
Passions
,
is
produced
three
several
ways
,
by
the
Senses
,
Imagination
,
and
the
Mind
.
The
perception
of
Good
and
Evil
by
the
Senses
,
or
Sensation
of
Good
and
Evil
,
produces
the
quickest
and
most
sensible
Passions
;
Good
and
Evil
perceived
by
the
Imagination
only
,
excites
them
after
a
much
weaker
manner
;
and
the
perception
of
Good
and
Evil
by
the
Mind
purely
,
never
produces
true
ones
,
because
it
is
always
attended
with
some
motion
of
the
Animal
Spirits
.
The
Passions
are
given
us
only
for
the
good
of
the
Body
,
and
by
that
to
unite
us
to
all
sensible
things
;
for
although
sensible
things
can
be
neither
good
or
bad
in
respect
to
the
Mind
,
they
are
so
however
in
relation
to
the
Body
to
which
they
are
united
.
Thus
the
Senses
discovering
much
better
the
relation
that
sensible
Objects
have
to
the
Body
,
than
the
Mind
it self
can
:
They
must
excite
much
more
lively
Passions
than
a
clear
and
evident
knowledge
is
able
to
do
.
But
because
all
our
discoveries
are
attended
with
some
motion
of
the
Spirits
,
a
clear
and
evident
knowledge
of
a
great
Good
and
great
Evil
,
which
is
not
perceived
by
the
Senses
,
always
excites
some
secret
Passion
.
Yet
all
our
clear
and
evident
discoveries
of
Good
and
Evil
,
are
not
followed
by
some
sensible
Passion
which
we
perceive
;
and
so
on
the
other
side
all
our
Passions
are
not
attended
with
some
knowledge
of
the
Mind
.
For
,
if
we
sometimes
think
of
Good
and
Evil
without
feeling
our selves
moved
,
we
often
find
our selves
moved
with
some
Passions
without
knowing
what
they
are
,
nay
sometimes
without
perceiving
the
cause
of
'em
.
One
who
breaths
in
a
good
Air
feels
a
motion
of
Joy
,
without
knowing
from
whence
it
proceeds
,
or
what
good
't
is
he
possesses
which
causes
this
Joy
.
And
if
there
is
any
invisible
Body
which
mingles
with
the
Blood
,
and
hinders
its
fermentation
,
it
will
produce
sorrow
;
and
perhaps
he
will
attribute
the
cause
of
his
sorrow
to
any
visible
thing
which
occurs
in
that
moment
of
his
Passion
.
Of
all
the
Passions
none
are
more
sensible
,
or
more
quick
,
and
consequently
less
attended
with
the
knowledge
of
the
Mind
,
than
horrour
and
antipathy
,
agreeableness
and
sympathy
.
It
sometimes
happens
that
a
Man
sleeping
under
a
shady
Tree
would
of
a
suddain
and
unexpectedly
be
waked
at
the
sting
of
a
Gnat
,
or
tickling
of
a
Leaf
,
even
as
if
he
were
bitten
with
a
Serpent
.
The
confused
Sensation
of
something
as
terrible
as
death
frights
him
,
without
perceiving
that
he
is
agitated
with
a
most
powerful
and
violent
Passion
,
which
is
an
aversion
of
desire
.
On
the
contrary
,
a
Man
in
some
necessity
by
chance
discovers
a
small
good
,
the
satisfaction
of
which
surprizes
him
,
and
he
applies
himself
to
this
trifle
as
to
the
greatest
good
imaginable
,
without
making
the
least
reflexion
upon
it
:
The
like
also
happens
in
the
motions
of
sympathy
and
antipathy
.
We
sometimes
see
a
certain
Person
,
whose
habit
and
external
appearance
has
some
secret
alliance
with
the
present
disposition
of
our
Body
,
we
are
forthwith
touched
with
a
vehement
inclination
for
him
,
and
without
any
reflexion
,
are
induced
to
love
and
wish
him
well
:
'T
is
this
,
I
know
not
what
,
which
agitates
us
,
since
Reason
has
no
share
in
it
:
And
the
contrary
happens
in
respect
to
those
,
whose
Air
and
Manners
excite
disgust
and
horrour
in
us
;
They
have
,
I
know
not
what
,
disagreeableness
which
shocks
and
terrifies
,
but
the
Mind
perceives
it
not
,
since
the
Senses
are
the
only
proper
Judges
of
sensible
Beauty
and
Deformity
,
which
are
the
Objects
of
these
sorts
of
Passions
.
A
SEARCH
AFTER
TRUTH
.
BOOK
VI.
Of
Method
.
CHAP.
I.
The
Design
of
this
Book
,
and
the
two
general
Means
to
preserve
Evidence
in
an
Enquiry
after
Truth
,
which
will
be
the
Subject
of
this
Book
.
IN
the
preceding
Books
we
have
seen
how
subject
to
Error
the
Mind
of
Man
is
;
that
he
is
deceived
every
Moment
by
the
Illusions
of
his
[
](A51660-e54500-b)(a)
(a)
Book
1.
Senses
,
the
[
](A51660-e54510-b)(b)
(b)
Book
2.
Visions
of
his
Imagination
,
and
Abstractions
[
](A51660-e54520-b)(c)
(c)
Book
3.
of
his
Mind
,
that
the
Inclinations
[
](A51660-e54530-b)(d)
(d)
Book
4.
of
his
Will
,
and
his
[
](A51660-e54540-b)(e)
(e)
Book
5.
Passions
are
a
Means
to
obscure
the
Truth
,
and
never
suffer
it
to
appear
,
except
it
has
a
Tincture
of
those
false
Colours
which
flatter
Concupiscence
.
In
a
word
,
we
have
in
part
discovered
the
Errors
of
the
Mind
,
and
their
Causes
:
It
is
now
Time
to
show
the
Way
which
will
conduct
us
to
the
Knowledge
of
the
Truth
,
and
give
the
Mind
all
the
Power
and
Assistance
we
can
,
to
enable
it
to
keep
this
Way
,
without
either
straying
,
or
vainly
fatiguing
it self
.
But
to
avoid
giving
the
Reader
any
unnecessary
Trouble
in
the
Perusal
of
this
last
Book
;
I
think
fit
to
advertise
him
,
that
't
is
only
writ
for
those
,
that
wou'd
,
of
themselves
,
seriously
enquire
into
Truth
;
and
to
this
end
employ
the
utmost
Power
of
their
own
Minds
.
I
would
have
them
for
a
time
lay
aside
all
probable
Opinions
,
and
hot
rely
on
the
strongest
Conjectures
;
but
neglect
the
Authority
of
all
Philosophers
,
and
as
much
as
possible
,
divert
themselves
of
their
Prejudices
,
Self-love
and
Passions
:
Very
much
distrusting
their
Senses
and
Imaginations
:
And
in
fine
,
that
they
well
remember
the
greatest
Part
of
those
things
that
have
been
told
them
in
the
preceding
Books
.
The
Design
of
this
last
Book
is
an
Endeavour
to
help
the
Mind
to
all
the
Perfection
it
is
naturally
capable
of
,
by
furnishing
it
with
whatsoever
is
necessary
to
render
it
more
capacious
and
attentive
;
and
in
prescribing
such
Rules
as
must
be
observed
in
an
Enquiry
after
Truth
,
to
prevent
its
being
ever
deceived
,
and
to
teach
it
,
in
some
time
Time
,
all
that
can
be
known
.
If
we
were
to
carry
this
Design
to
its
utmost
Perfection
,
which
we
pretend
not
to
do
,
since
this
is
only
an
Essay
;
it
might
be
said
,
That
we
ought
to
have
given
an
universal
Science
,
that
those
that
wou'd
have
made
use
of
it
,
might
have
been
truly
learned
;
since
they
wou'd
have
had
the
Foundation
of
all
particular
Sciences
,
and
acquired
them
proportionably
to
the
use
they
had
made
of
this
universal
one
.
For
we
endeavour
,
by
this
Treatise
,
to
make
the
Mind
capable
of
forming
true
and
certain
Judgments
upon
all
Questions
which
shall
be
proportioned
to
it
.
As
a
Memory
that
is
able
to
retain
all
the
Demonstrations
of
Euclid
,
Archimedes
,
Pappus
,
Apollonius
,
and
all
that
have
writ
of
Geometry
,
is
not
sufficient
to
make
a
Man
a
good
Geometrician
;
so
neither
is
it
enough
to
have
read
Plato
,
Aristotle
,
and
Descartes
,
and
perfectly
to
know
their
Sentiments
about
Philosophy
,
to
make
a
Man
a
learned
Philosopher
.
The
Knowledge
of
all
the
Opinions
and
Judgments
of
other
Men
,
whether
Philosophers
or
Geometricians
,
cannot
so
properly
be
called
a
Science
as
an
History
:
For
true
Science
,
which
alone
can
give
the
Mind
of
Man
that
Perfection
it
is
now
capable
of
,
consists
in
a
certain
Ability
to
judge
solidly
of
all
things
that
are
adapted
to
it
.
But
not
to
lose
Time
,
and
to
prevent
the
prejudicing
any
Person
by
precipitated
Judgments
,
we
will
begin
to
treat
of
this
important
Matter
.
We
must
first
call
to
mind
the
Rule
that
has
been
proved
and
established
in
the
beginning
of
the
first
Book
,
because
it
is
the
Foundation
and
chief
Principle
of
whatsoever
we
shall
hereafter
say
;
therefore
I
'll
repeat
it
:
We
ought
never
to
give
our
intire
Assent
,
except
to
such
Propositions
as
appear
so
evidently
true
,
that
we
cannot
refuse
it
them
,
without
feeling
some
inward
Pain
,
and
secret
Reproaches
of
our
Reason
;
that
is
,
without
a
clear
knowledge
,
that
we
should
make
an
ill
use
of
our
Liberty
,
if
we
would
not
give
our
Assent
.
Every
Time
we
assent
to
Probabilities
,
we
put
our selves
into
a
certain
Danger
of
being
deceived
,
and
are
almost
always
actually
deceived
;
and
if
we
are
not
,
't
is
a
mere
Effect
of
Chance
and
Good
Fortune
.
Thus
a
confused
Sight
of
a
great
Number
of
Probabilities
upon
different
Subjects
,
can
never
add
any
Perfection
to
our
Reason
;
for
't
is
only
a
clear
Sight
of
the
Truth
,
that
can
give
either
that
,
or
any
solid
Satisfaction
.
The
Conclusion
therefore
is
very
plain
,
That
Evidence
only
,
according
to
our
first
Rule
,
can
secure
us
from
being
deceived
:
We
ought
above
all
things
,
to
be
very
careful
to
preserve
this
Evidence
in
all
our
Perceptions
,
that
we
may
be
able
to
make
a
sound
Judgment
of
whatsoever
may
be
submitted
to
our
Reason
,
and
to
discover
all
the
Truths
we
are
capable
of
.
Such
things
as
can
either
produce
or
preserve
this
Evidence
,
are
of
two
Sorts
.
Some
of
which
are
within
,
or
in
some
manner
depending
on
us
;
and
others
which
have
no
Connection
with
us
.
For
to
see
Objects
distinctly
,
it
is
necessary
to
have
a
good
Sight
,
and
to
give
a
good
Attention
to
these
Objects
,
and
both
these
are
within
us
,
or
in
some
manner
depend
upon
us
:
A
good
Understanding
is
likewise
necessary
,
and
a
strong
Application
for
the
penetrating
into
the
Bottom
of
intelligible
Truths
;
which
also
are
either
in
,
or
in
some
manner
depend
upon
us
.
But
as
the
Eye
has
need
of
Light
to
see
,
and
this
Light
depends
upon
external
Causes
:
The
Mind
also
has
need
of
Idea's
to
conceive
;
and
these
Idea's
as
has
been
elsewhere
proved
,
depend
not
upon
us
,
but
on
an
external
Cause
,
which
furnishes
us
with
them
.
If
therefore
it
shou'd
happen
,
that
some
Idea's
of
things
were
not
presented
to
our
Minds
,
every
time
that
we
wished
to
have
them
;
and
if
he
who
enlightens
the
World
,
wou'd
conceal
them
from
us
,
't
wou'd
be
impossible
to
remedy
it
,
and
to
know
any
thing
,
even
as
it
is
impossible
for
us
to
see
Objects
without
Light
.
But
we
shall
never
have
any
reason
to
fear
it
;
for
the
Presence
of
Idea's
to
our
Mind
being
natural
,
and
depending
on
the
general
Will
of
God
,
which
is
always
constant
and
immoveable
,
we
can
never
fail
of
discovering
such
things
as
are
naturally
subjected
to
our
Reason
.
For
the
Sun
that
enlightens
the
Mind
,
is
not
like
the
Sun
that
enlightens
the
Body
:
It
is
never
eclipsed
,
and
it
penetrates
every
thing
without
having
its
Light
divided
.
The
Idea's
of
all
things
being
therefore
continually
present
to
us
,
even
when
we
do
not
consider
them
attentively
,
there
is
nothing
requisite
in
order
to
preserve
this
Evidence
in
all
our
Perceptions
,
but
to
find
a
means
of
making
our
Minds
more
attentive
and
capacious
:
So
to
be
able
well
to
distinguist
such
visible
Objects
as
are
presented
to
us
,
it
is
necessary
,
on
our
Part
,
to
have
a
good
Sight
,
and
to
consider
them
stedfastly
:
But
because
the
Objects
that
we
consider
,
have
often
more
Relations
than
we
can
be
able
to
discover
at
one
View
,
by
a
simple
Effort
of
the
Mind
:
We
have
yet
need
of
some
Rules
,
to
assist
us
in
the
disentangling
all
Difficulties
so
well
,
that
being
helpt
by
those
Rules
which
will
make
our
Mind
more
attentive
and
capacious
,
we
discover
,
with
an
intire
Evidence
,
all
the
Relations
of
those
things
that
we
examine
.
We
shall
therefore
divide
this
Book
into
two
Parts
.
In
the
first
we
shall
treat
of
the
Helps
the
Mind
may
make
use
of
to
become
more
attentive
and
capapacious
:
And
in
the
second
,
give
those
Rules
that
ought
to
be
followed
in
the
Enquiry
after
Truth
,
to
form
solid
Judgments
thereof
,
without
Fear
of
deceiving
our selves
.
CHAP.
II.
Attention
is
necessary
to
preserve
Evidence
in
all
our
Perceptions
,
that
the
Modifications
of
the
Soul
make
it
attentive
,
but
do
much
divide
its
Capacity
of
Perception
.
WE
have
shewed
in
the
Beginning
of
this
Work
,
That
the
Understanding
only
perceives
,
and
that
in
respect
to
the
Understanding
there
is
no
Difference
betwen
simple
Perceptions
,
Judgments
and
Reasonings
,
except
that
Judgments
and
Reasonings
are
much
more
compound
than
simple
Perceptions
are
;
because
they
do
not
only
represent
many
things
,
but
even
the
Relations
that
these
things
have
amongst
themselves
.
For
simple
Perceptions
only
represent
things
to
the
Mind
;
but
Judgments
represent
to
the
Mind
the
Relations
that
are
betwixt
these
things
;
and
simple
Reasonings
represent
the
Relations
which
are
between
the
Relations
of
things
:
But
compound
Reasonings
represent
the
Relations
of
Relations
,
or
the
compound
Relations
which
are
between
the
Relations
of
things
,
and
so
on
ad
Infinitum
.
For
whilst
these
Relations
are
multiplied
,
the
Reasonings
which
represent
them
to
the
Mind
become
more
compounded
.
But
Judgments
,
simple
and
compound
Reasonings
are
only
pure
Perceptions
,
in
respect
to
the
Understanding
;
because
the
Understanding
only
simply
perceives
,
as
has
been
before
intimated
.
Thus
Judgments
and
Reasonings
,
as
to
the
Understanding
,
being
pure
Perceptions
:
It
is
plain
that
the
Understanding
never
falls
into
any
Error
;
since
there
is
none
in
Perceptions
,
neither
is
Error
so
much
as
intelligible
.
For
,
as
we
have
often
said
already
,
it
consists
only
in
a
precipitate
Consent
of
the
Will
,
which
suffers
it self
to
be
dazled
by
some
false
Light
,
and
instead
of
preserving
its
Liberty
as
long
as
it
can
,
negligently
relies
on
the
Appearance
of
Truth
.
Nevertheless
,
since
it
commonly
happens
that
the
Understanding
hath
only
confused
and
imperfect
Perceptions
of
things
,
we
may
say
it
is
certainly
the
occasional
Cause
of
our
Errors
.
For
as
our
Eyes
often
deceives
us
,
because
they
represent
external
Objects
very
confused
and
imperfectly
to
us
:
Confused
when
they
are
too
distant
from
us
,
or
for
want
of
a
due
Light
;
and
imperfectly
,
because
they
only
represent
to
us
those
Sides
which
are
towards
us
:
So
the
Understanding
having
often
only
a
confused
,
and
imperfect
Idea
of
things
,
because
they
are
not
sufficiently
represented
to
it
,
and
because
it
discovers
not
all
their
Parts
,
causes
the
Will
to
fall
into
a
great
Number
of
Errors
,
in
yielding
too
easily
to
these
obscure
and
imperfect
Perceptions
.
It
is
therefore
necessary
to
find
some
means
to
hinder
our
Perceptions
from
being
confused
and
imperfect
;
and
because
nothing
can
make
them
more
clear
and
distinct
than
Attention
,
which
all
the
World
is
convinced
of
;
our
Care
must
be
to
find
such
a
Method
as
will
make
us
become
more
attentive
than
we
yet
are
.
This
will
be
a
Way
to
preserve
Evidence
in
all
our
Reasonings
,
and
make
us
able
,
at
one
View
,
to
perceive
a
necessary
Connection
between
all
the
Parts
of
our
longest
Deductions
.
In
order
to
find
this
means
,
't
is
necessary
that
we
shou'd
be
well
convinced
of
what
has
already
been
said
elsewhere
,
That
the
Mind
carries
not
an
equal
Attention
to
every
thing
it
perceives
;
for
it
applies
it self
infinitely
more
to
those
that
affect
,
modifie
,
and
penetrate
it
,
than
to
those
that
are
present
to
it
,
but
affect
it
not
,
nor
belong
to
it
.
And
in
fine
,
it
imploys
it self
much
more
about
its
own
Modifications
,
than
about
the
simple
Idea's
of
Objects
,
which
are
something
different
from
it self
.
This
is
the
Reason
that
with
some
Uneasiness
,
and
without
much
Application
,
we
consider
the
abstracted
Idea's
of
the
pure
Understanding
,
and
apply
our selves
much
more
to
such
things
as
fall
under
our
Imagination
,
especially
if
our
Imagination
is
strong
enough
to
make
deep
Traces
in
our
Brain
:
And
indeed
,
it
is
the
Cause
why
we
entirely
employ
our selves
about
sensible
Qualities
,
even
without
being
able
to
apply
our selves
to
the
pure
Idea's
of
the
Mind
,
whilst
we
feel
any
thing
that
's
either
very
agreeable
or
very
painful
.
for
Pain
,
Pleasure
,
and
the
rest
of
the
Sensations
being
only
the
Modifications
of
the
Mind
,
it
is
impossible
that
we
shou'd
exist
and
not
perceive
them
,
and
that
the
Capacity
of
our
Mind
shou'd
not
be
employed
about
them
,
since
our
Sensations
are
only
simple
Perceptions
.
But
it
is
not
the
same
with
the
pure
Idea's
of
the
Mind
;
since
they
may
be
intimately
united
to
it
,
without
considering
them
with
the
least
Attention
.
For
although
God
be
most
intimately
united
to
us
,
and
comprehends
the
Ideas
of
whatsoever
we
see
:
Yet
these
Idea's
,
though
present
and
within
our selves
,
are
hid
from
us
,
when
the
Motions
of
the
Spirits
stir
up
no
Traces
of
them
,
or
when
our
Will
applies
not
our
Mind
thereto
;
I
mean
when
it
forms
no
Acts
to
which
the
Representation
of
these
Idea's
are
connected
by
the
Author
of
Nature
.
This
is
the
Foundation
of
whatsoever
we
shall
propose
about
such
Assistances
as
may
render
our
Minds
more
attentive
,
so
that
these
Helps
will
be
founded
upon
the
very
Nature
of
the
Mind
,
and
there
is
some
Reason
to
hope
they
will
not
be
so
chimerical
and
useless
as
many
others
,
which
more
perplex
than
assist
the
Mind
.
But
if
they
are
not
so
useful
as
might
be
wished
,
all
the
Time
that
is
imployed
about
the
reading
them
will
not
be
lost
,
since
by
it
the
Reader
will
be
better
acquainted
with
the
Nature
of
his
Mind
.
The
Modifications
of
the
Soul
have
three
Causes
;
the
Senses
,
Imagination
and
Passions
:
Every
one
knows
by
his
own
Experience
,
that
Pleasures
,
Pains
,
and
in
general
,
all
Sensations
,
strong
Imaginations
,
and
great
Passions
,
so
much
possess
their
Mind
,
that
it
is
not
capable
of
Attention
,
when
it
is
too
livelily
touched
by
these
things
;
because
then
its
Capacity
or
Faculty
of
perceiving
is
wholly
filled
.
And
although
these
Modifications
shou'd
be
moderated
,
they
wou'd
nevertheless
in
some
manner
divide
the
Capacity
of
the
Mind
,
so
that
it
cou'd
not
wholly
imploy
it self
in
considering
the
Truth
of
things
that
are
never
so
little
abstracted
.
It
will
be
necessary
to
draw
this
important
Conclusion
:
That
all
those
that
wou'd
seriously
apply
themselves
to
a
Search
after
Truth
,
ought
to
be
very
careful
to
shun
,
as
much
as
possible
,
all
strong
Sensations
,
as
a
great
Noise
,
too
brisk
a
Light
,
Pleasure
,
Pain
,
&c.
and
continually
to
stir
up
the
Purity
of
their
Imagination
,
and
prevent
its
making
in
their
Brain
such
deep
Traces
as
continually
disquiet
and
dissipate
the
Mind
.
And
above
all
,
to
put
a
Stop
to
the
Motions
of
their
Passions
,
which
cause
such
powerful
Impressions
in
the
Body
and
Soul
,
that
't
is
generally
impossible
the
Mind
shou'd
think
of
any
thing
else
.
For
although
the
pure
Idea's
of
Truth
are
always
present
to
us
,
we
cannot
consider
them
,
when
the
Capacity
we
have
of
thinking
is
filled
with
these
Modifications
which
possess
us
.
However
,
as
it
is
impossible
that
the
Soul
shou'd
exist
without
Passion
,
Sensation
,
or
any
other
particular
Modification
:
We
must
make
a
Virtue
of
Necessity
,
and
even
draw
from
these
Modifications
some
Helps
to
render
us
more
attentive
.
Yet
must
we
make
use
of
much
Artifice
and
Circumspection
in
the
applying
these
Helps
to
gain
some
Advantage
from
them
.
The
need
we
have
of
them
must
be
well
examined
,
and
we
must
only
make
use
of
'em
so
far
as
the
Necessity
of
rendring
our selves
attentive
constrains
us
to
.
CHAP.
III.
Of
the
use
that
may
be
made
of
the
Passions
and
Senses
,
to
preserve
the
Attention
of
the
Mind
.
THE
Passions
which
it
is
necessary
for
us
to
make
use
of
to
excite
us
to
an
Enquiry
after
Truth
,
are
those
that
give
us
Strength
and
Courage
enough
to
surmount
all
the
Trouble
we
may
meet
with
in
endeavouring
to
render
our selves
attentive
,
some
of
which
are
good
and
some
bad
;
of
which
the
good
are
a
Desire
to
find
the
Truth
,
to
acquire
a
sufficient
Knowledge
to
conduct
our selves
,
to
render
us
useful
to
our
Neighbour
,
and
some
others
of
the
like
Nature
:
But
the
bad
or
dangerous
ones
are
such
as
a
desire
to
acquire
Reputation
,
to
make
some
Establishment
of
our
Fortune
,
to
raise
our selves
above
our
Neighbours
,
and
some
others
that
are
yet
more
irregular
,
of
which
it
is
not
necessary
to
speak
.
In
the
unhappy
Estate
we
now
are
in
,
it
often
happens
,
that
the
most
unreasonable
Passions
do
most
powerfully
excite
us
to
search
after
the
Truth
,
and
give
us
a
more
agreeable
Satisfaction
for
all
the
Pains
we
take
in
our
Pursuit
,
than
the
most
just
and
reasonable
Passions
do
.
Vanity
,
for
instance
,
excites
us
much
more
than
the
Love
of
Truth
;
and
we
every
Day
see
some
continually
applying
themselves
to
Study
,
when
they
find
Persons
to
whom
they
may
relate
what
they
have
learnt
;
but
who
intirely
abandon
their
Studies
when
they
have
not
an
Opportunity
to
discover
their
Acquirements
.
The
confused
Prospect
of
some
Glory
they
gain
when
they
put
off
their
Opinons
,
maintains
their
Courage
in
the
most
barren
and
tiresome
Studies
.
But
if
by
Chance
or
Necessity
of
their
Affairs
,
they
find
themselves
far
distant
from
their
little
flock
of
Admirers
,
their
Ardour
is
soon
cooled
,
and
even
the
most
solid
Studies
cannot
attract
them
:
Disgust
,
Wearisomness
,
and
Chagriu
seizes
them
,
and
they
quit
all
.
Vanity
triumphs
over
their
natural
Laziness
,
but
Laziness
in
its
turn
triumphs
over
the
Love
of
Truth
,
for
Vanity
sometimes
resists
Idleness
,
but
Idleness
is
generally
victorious
over
the
Love
of
Truth
.
Yet
the
Passion
for
Gloty
may
be
subservient
to
a
good
End
,
since
we
may
make
use
of
it
for
the
Glory
of
God
and
the
Profit
of
others
:
Some
Persons
may
be
permitted
,
on
several
Occasions
,
to
make
use
of
this
Passion
as
an
Help
to
make
the
Mind
more
attentive
;
but
we
must
take
great
Care
to
use
it
only
when
those
reasonable
Passions
we
have
already
mentioned
,
are
not
sufficient
;
and
when
our
Duty
obliges
us
to
apply
our selves
to
such
Subjects
as
we
are
discouraged
from
.
First
,
because
this
Passion
is
very
dangerous
in
respect
of
the
Conscience
:
Secondly
,
because
it
insensibly
engages
us
in
unprofitable
Studies
,
which
have
a
more
tempting
Appearance
than
either
Usefulness
or
Truth
in
them
:
In
fine
,
because
this
Passion
is
very
difficult
to
be
moderated
,
we
are
often
abused
by
it
;
and
while
we
believe
our
Mind
is
illuminated
by
it
,
we
often
strengthen
our
Concupiscence
;
which
not
only
corrupts
the
Heart
,
but
disperses
such
a
Darkness
through
the
Mind
as
is
morally
impossible
to
be
dissipated
.
We
ought
to
consider
that
this
Passion
is
insensibly
encreased
,
fortified
,
and
established
in
the
Heart
of
Man
;
and
that
when
it
is
too
violent
,
instead
of
assisting
the
Mind
in
a
Search
after
Truth
,
it
strangely
blinds
it
,
and
makes
it
believe
things
,
even
as
it
wishes
them
to
be
.
Without
doubt
,
we
shou'd
not
have
met
with
so
many
false
Inventions
and
imaginary
Discoveries
,
if
Men
had
not
suffered
their
Brains
to
be
disordered
by
their
Zeal
of
appearing
Inventers
.
For
the
firm
and
obstinate
Perswasion
many
Men
have
had
,
that
they
have
found
,
for
instance
,
the
perpetual
Motion
,
the
squaring
of
the
Circle
,
and
Duplication
of
the
Cube
by
common
Geometry
,
has
apparently
proceeded
from
the
great
Desire
they
had
of
appearing
to
have
effected
what
many
Persons
had
unsuccessfully
attempted
.
It
is
therefore
better
to
excite
those
Passions
in
us
which
are
so
much
the
more
useful
in
the
Search
after
Truth
,
as
they
are
more
strong
,
and
in
the
Excess
of
which
there
is
least
to
be
feared
;
as
the
Desires
of
making
a
good
use
of
our
Wit
;
of
delivering
our selves
from
Prejudices
and
Errors
;
of
acquiring
so
much
Wisdom
as
will
enable
us
to
conduct
our selves
through
whatsoever
Condition
we
are
in
,
and
other
the
like
Passions
;
which
engage
us
not
in
unuseful
Studies
,
nor
incline
us
to
make
too
precipitate
Judgments
.
When
we
begin
to
taste
the
Pleasure
that
is
found
in
the
Exercise
of
the
Mind
,
discover
the
Advantage
that
recurs
from
it
,
destroy
those
violent
Passions
,
and
disdainfully
reject
those
sensible
Pleasures
,
which
,
whilst
we
imprudently
permit
them
to
tyrannize
over
our
Reason
,
we
have
no
need
of
any
other
Passions
than
those
we
have
before
mentioned
,
to
make
us
attentive
upon
whatsoever
Subject
we
wou'd
consider
.
But
the
Generality
of
Mankind
are
not
in
this
Condition
.
They
have
no
good
Relish
of
any
thing
but
only
what
touches
the
Senses
.
Their
Imagination
is
corrupted
with
an
almost
infinite
Number
of
deep
Traces
,
which
only
stir
up
false
Idea's
:
For
they
are
united
to
every
thing
that
falls
under
the
Senses
and
Imagination
,
and
judge
always
according
to
the
Impression
they
have
received
from
them
,
in
Relation
to
themselves
.
Pride
,
Debauchery
,
Engagements
,
unquiet
Desires
to
raise
their
Fortune
,
so
commonly
obscure
the
Discovery
of
Truth
in
the
Men
of
this
World
,
that
it
stifles
in
them
the
Sentiments
of
Piety
;
because
they
separate
them
from
God
,
who
only
can
enlighten
us
,
as
he
only
can
govern
us
.
For
we
cannot
encrease
our
Union
with
sensible
things
,
without
diminishing
that
which
we
have
with
intellectual
Truths
:
Since
in
the
same
Time
we
cannot
be
so
strictly
united
to
things
that
are
so
different
and
opposite
.
Those
therefore
who
have
a
pure
and
chaste
Imagination
,
I
mean
such
whose
Brain
is
not
filled
with
deep
Traces
,
which
unite
them
to
sensible
things
,
may
easily
be
united
to
God
,
and
be
made
attentive
to
the
Truth
which
speaks
to
them
:
The
most
just
and
most
reasonable
Passions
will
be
sufficient
to
determine
such
Persons
.
But
those
that
live
in
the
World
who
are
united
to
too
many
things
,
and
whose
Imagination
is
spoiled
by
false
and
obscure
Idea's
,
which
sensible
Objects
have
excited
in
them
,
cannot
apply
themselves
to
the
Truth
,
if
they
are
not
born
up
by
some
Passion
that
is
strong
enough
to
counterballance
the
violent
Inclination
of
the
Body
which
draws
them
aside
,
and
to
form
such
Traces
in
their
Brain
as
may
be
capable
of
making
a
Revulsion
in
the
Animal
Spirits
.
But
as
all
Passion
of
it self
can
only
confound
Idea's
,
they
ought
to
make
no
more
use
of
them
than
Necessity
requires
,
and
all
Men
ought
so
to
study
themselves
,
as
may
enable
them
to
proportion
their
Passions
to
their
own
Weaknesses
.
It
is
not
difficult
to
find
some
means
of
exciting
such
Passions
in
our selves
as
we
wish
.
The
Knowledge
we
have
given
of
the
Union
of
the
Soul
and
Body
,
in
the
preceding
Books
,
affords
a
sufficient
means
to
accomplish
it
:
For
,
in
a
Word
,
't
is
enough
to
think
attentively
upon
such
Objects
,
which
according
to
the
Institution
or
Natture
are
capable
of
exciting
the
Passions
.
Thus
we
may
almost
always
raise
such
Passions
in
our
Hearts
as
we
have
Occasion
for
:
But
though
we
can
so
easily
cause
them
,
we
cannot
always
so
easily
extirpate
them
,
nor
remedy
the
Disorders
that
they
cause
in
the
Imagination
,
and
therefore
we
ought
to
use
them
with
great
Moderation
.
Above
all
things
,
we
must
be
cautious
that
we
do
not
Judge
of
things
by
our
Passion
,
but
only
by
a
clear
Sight
of
Truth
,
which
it
is
almost
impossible
to
observe
,
when
the
Passions
are
a
little
vigorous
.
Passion
ought
only
to
serve
us
to
stir
up
our
Attentions
,
but
it
always
produces
its
own
Idea's
,
and
it
presently
obliges
the
Will
to
judge
of
things
by
these
Idea's
that
affect
it
,
rather
than
by
the
pure
and
abstracted
Idea's
of
the
Truth
,
which
affect
it
not
.
So
that
such
Judgments
are
often
formed
,
which
last
no
longer
than
the
Passion
it self
,
because
it
is
not
a
clear
Sight
of
the
immutable
Truth
,
but
the
Circulation
of
the
Blood
which
produces
them
.
It
is
certain
,
that
Men
are
strangely
obstinate
in
their
Errors
,
and
that
they
generally
maintain
them
all
their
Lives
.
But
either
these
Errors
have
often
other
Causes
than
the
Passions
,
or
else
they
depend
upon
certain
durable
Passions
,
which
proceed
from
the
Conformation
of
the
Body
,
Interest
,
or
some
other
Cause
,
which
continues
a
long
Time
.
Interest
,
for
instance
,
indures
always
,
it
creates
a
Passion
which
never
dies
,
and
the
Judgment
that
these
Passions
form
are
very
lasting
.
But
all
other
Sentiments
of
Men
,
which
depend
upon
particular
Passions
,
are
as
inconstant
as
the
Fermentation
of
their
Humours
are
.
They
speak
sometimes
after
one
manner
,
and
sometimes
after
another
;
and
What
they
say
is
generally
conformable
to
what
they
think
.
They
run
from
one
false
Good
to
another
as
false
,
by
the
Motion
of
their
Passion
,
which
they
again
dislike
as
soon
as
this
Passion
ceases
.
So
also
they
run
from
one
false
System
to
another
.
They
ardently
embrace
a
false
Notion
,
when
their
Passion
renders
it
probable
;
but
this
Passion
being
once
extinguisht
,
they
abandon
it
.
They
taste
of
every
Good
by
their
Passions
,
without
finding
any
thing
that
is
really
so
:
And
by
the
same
Passions
they
see
all
Trtuths
,
without
discovering
any
:
Although
,
whilst
the
Passion
continues
,
what
they
taste
appears
to
them
to
be
the
Sovereign
Good
;
and
what
they
see
,
seems
to
them
to
be
an
indisputable
Truth
.
The
Second
Source
,
from
whence
we
may
draw
any
Helps
to
render
the
Mind
attentive
,
is
the
Senses
.
Sensations
are
the
proper
Modifications
of
the
Soul
,
pure
Idea's
of
the
Mind
are
something
different
:
Sensations
.
then
stir
up
our
Attention
in
a
much
more
lively
manner
than
pure
Idea's
do
;
so
that
it
is
plain
we
may
remedy
this
Defect
of
the
Application
of
the
Mind
to
Truths
that
do
not
affect
us
,
in
expressing
them
by
sensible
things
which
do
.
Ths
is
the
Reason
that
Geometers
express
the
Proportions
between
those
Magnitudes
they
wou'd
consider
by
sensible
Lines
.
By
drawing
Lines
upon
Paper
,
they
trace
,
if
I
may
so
say
,
the
Idea's
upon
their
Minds
which
answer
them
:
They
make
them
more
familiar
to
them
,
because
they
see
them
in
the
same
Time
they
wou'd
conceive
them
.
After
this
manner
many
things
that
are
difficult
enough
in
themselves
,
might
be
taught
to
Children
,
who
are
not
capable
of
abstracted
Truths
,
because
of
the
Tenderness
of
the
Fibres
of
their
Brain
.
They
see
only
with
their
Eyes
Colours
,
Pictures
,
Images
;
but
with
the
Mind
they
consider
not
the
Idea's
which
answer
to
these
Sensible
Objects
.
A
particular
Care
must
be
taken
not
to
obscure
Objects
that
we
wou'd
consider
our selves
,
or
discover
to
others
with
so
much
Sensibility
,
lest
the
Mind
shou'd
be
more
taken
up
with
it
than
with
the
Truth
it self
,
which
is
a
very
considerable
and
common
Fault
.
We
every
Day
see
Orators
,
who
apply
themselves
only
to
that
which
affects
the
Senses
,
and
who
express
themselves
after
so
sensible
a
manner
,
that
the
Truth
is
almost
stifled
under
the
Weight
of
their
vain
Ornaments
and
false
Eloquence
.
So
that
those
who
hear
them
,
being
much
more
touched
with
the
Measure
of
their
Periods
,
and
Motions
of
their
Figures
,
than
by
their
Arguments
,
suffer
themselves
to
be
overcome
,
without
either
knowing
what
perswades
them
,
or
of
what
they
are
perswaded
.
Much
Care
therefore
ought
to
be
taken
so
to
moderate
the
Sensibility
of
our
Expressions
,
that
they
may
only
render
the
Mind
more
attentive
.
There
is
nothing
so
beautiful
as
the
Truth
,
we
cannot
pretend
to
render
it
finer
by
painting
it
with
some
Sensible
Colours
,
which
have
nothing
solid
in
them
,
and
can
only
charm
for
a
little
Time
.
Perhaps
we
might
give
it
some
pretty
Strokes
,
but
we
shou'd
diminish
its
Strength
;
we
ought
not
to
cloath
it
so
bright
and
sparkling
as
to
make
the
Mind
more
attentive
to
its
Ornaments
,
than
to
the
Truth
it self
:
It
wou'd
be
to
treat
it
like
certain
Persons
who
load
themselves
with
so
much
Gold
and
precious
Stones
,
that
at
last
they
appear
the
least
considerable
thing
in
the
Figure
they
make
.
Truth
ought
to
be
cloathed
like
the
Magistrates
of
Venice
,
who
are
obliged
to
wear
such
a
simple
Robe
,
and
a
Cap
,
as
may
only
distinguish
them
from
other
Men
,
that
they
may
look
upon
them
with
Attention
and
Respect
,
rather
than
their
Apparel
.
And
indeed
,
Care
must
be
taken
not
to
give
it
too
great
a
Train
of
agreeable
things
,
that
will
only
serve
to
dissipate
the
Mind
,
and
hinder
it
from
discovering
it
,
lest
we
shou'd
give
to
something
else
the
Honours
that
are
only
due
to
that
:
As
sometimes
happens
to
Princes
,
that
we
see
amongst
a
great
Number
of
Courtiers
which
are
about
them
,
and
who
partake
too
much
of
that
Great
and
Majestick
Air
as
is
only
fit
for
Sovereigns
.
But
to
give
a
greater
Example
:
I
say
that
Truth
must
be
so
manifested
by
others
as
it
hath
manifested
it self
.
All
Men
,
since
the
Fall
of
their
first
Parents
,
have
too
weak
a
Sight
to
consider
Truth
in
it self
,
therefore
the
Sovereign
Truth
has
rendred
it self
sensible
,
by
taking
upon
it
our
Humanity
,
that
it
may
attract
our
Thoughts
,
enlighten
us
,
and
make
it self
amiable
in
our
Eyes
.
Thus
by
its
Example
we
may
cover
With
any
sensible
thing
those
Truths
that
we
wou'd
comprehend
our selves
,
or
teach
to
others
,
Co
that
we
may
attract
the
Mind
,
which
loves
what
is
sensible
,
and
which
is
not
easily
taken
with
any
thing
that
does
not
flatter
the
Senses
.
The
Eternal
Wisdom
has
made
it self
Sensible
,
but
not
Resplendent
:
It
is
become
sensible
,
not
to
make
us
acquiesce
in
sensible
things
,
but
to
raise
us
to
intelligible
things
:
It
became
sensible
to
condemn
and
sacrifice
in
its
own
Person
all
sensible
things
;
we
ought
therefore
in
our
Pursuit
after
the
Truth
,
to
make
use
of
such
sensible
things
as
dazle
not
too
much
,
or
stop
us
at
the
Sensible
Part
:
But
such
as
can
only
maintain
the
Presence
of
our
Minds
in
the
Contemplation
of
Truths
purely
intelligible
:
Such
sensible
things
we
must
make
use
of
,
as
we
can
dissipate
,
annihilate
,
or
sacrifice
with
Pleasure
,
as
soon
as
we
shall
have
discovered
those
Truths
for
which
we
made
use
of
it
.
The
Eternal
Wisdom
has
presented
●t
self
externally
in
a
sensible
manner
to
us
,
not
to
de●ain
us
abroad
,
but
to
recall
us
into
our selves
,
and
●hat
according
to
the
inward
Man
,
we
might
consider
tt
after
an
intelligible
manner
.
Thus
in
an
Enquiry
after
Truth
,
we
ought
to
make
use
of
such
sensible
things
as
may
not
stop
us
at
their
external
Brightness
;
but
cause
us
to
enter
within
our selves
,
make
us
attentive
,
and
unite
us
to
the
eternal
Truth
,
which
alone
presides
over
the
Mind
,
and
can
instruct
it
in
any
Subject
whatsoever
.
CHAP.
IV.
Of
the
use
that
may
be
made
of
the
Imagination
,
to
preserve
the
Attention
of
the
Mind
,
and
of
the
Advantage
of
Geometry
.
GReat
Circumspection
must
be
used
in
the
Choice
and
Use
of
such
Helps
as
may
be
drawn
from
our
Passions
and
Senses
to
render
us
attentive
to
Truth
:
Because
our
Passions
and
Senses
too
livelily
affect
us
,
and
after
such
a
manner
fill
the
Capacity
of
the
Mind
,
that
we
often
see
only
our
own
Sensations
when
we
think
we
have
discovered
the
things
themselves
that
we
sought
for
;
but
it
is
not
the
same
with
those
Advantages
that
may
be
drawn
from
the
Imagination
.
They
make
the
Mind
become
attentive
without
fruitlessly
dividing
its
Capacity
,
and
so
wonderfully
assist
us
to
perceive
Objects
clearly
and
distinctly
,
that
't
is
,
for
the
most
part
,
beneficial
to
make
use
of
them
.
But
we
shall
make
this
plain
by
some
Instances
.
We
know
that
a
Body
is
moved
by
two
or
many
different
Causes
,
towards
two
or
many
different
Places
;
that
these
Forces
impel
it
equally
or
unequally
,
that
they
encrease
or
diminish
continually
,
according
to
such
a
continued
Proportion
.
And
it
may
be
demanded
what
is
the
Line
this
Body
ought
to
move
in
,
the
Place
it
must
be
in
such
a
Moment
,
what
its
Swiftness
when
arrived
to
such
a
Place
,
and
other
things
of
the
like
Nature
?
diagram representing the connections between imagination, thought and the body
From
the
Point
A
,
where
suppose
it
to
be
when
this
Body
begins
to
move
,
draw
the
indefinite
Lines
A
B
,
A
C
,
which
make
the
Angle
B
A
C
,
is
they
cut
each
other
:
for
A
B
and
A
C
are
direct
,
and
cut
not
each
other
,
when
the
Motions
they
express
are
directly
opposite
.
After
this
manner
is
distinctly
represented
to
the
Imagination
,
or
if
you
will
,
to
the
Senses
,
the
Way
that
this
Body
wou'd
follow
,
if
there
was
only
one
of
these
forces
which
pushed
it
towards
one
of
these
Sides
C
or
B.
2.
If
the
Force
which
moves
this
Body
towards
B
,
is
equal
to
that
which
moves
it
towards
C
;
we
must
divide
the
Lines
A
B
and
A
C
into
the
Parts
1
,
2
,
3
,
4
,
and
I
,
II
,
III
,
IV
,
equally
distant
from
A.
If
the
Force
which
moves
it
towards
B
is
double
to
that
which
moves
it
towards
C
,
then
take
the
Parts
in
A
B
double
to
those
that
are
in
A
C.
If
this
Force
is
subduple
,
they
must
be
taken
subduple
:
If
three
times
greater
or
less
,
they
must
be
taken
proportionably
.
The
Division
of
these
Lines
furthe●
express
to
the
Imagination
,
the
Magnitude
of
the
different
Powers
which
move
these
Bodies
,
and
in
the
same
Time
the
Space
they
shall
cause
the
Body
to
run
through
.
3.
Through
these
Divisions
draw
Parallels
upon
A
B
,
and
A
C
,
to
have
the
Lines
,
1
X
,
2
X
,
3
X
,
&c.
equal
to
A
I
,
A
II
,
A
III
,
&c.
and
I
X
,
II
X
,
III
X
,
equal
to
A
1
,
A
2
,
A
3.
which
express
the
Spaces
that
these
Forces
are
capable
of
causing
this
Body
to
run
through
,
and
through
the
Intersection
of
these
Parallels
,
draw
the
Line
A
X
Y
E
,
which
represents
to
the
Imagination
,
first
,
the
true
Magnitude
of
the
compound
Motion
of
this
Body
,
that
in
the
same
time
we
conceive
to
be
pushed
towards
B
,
and
towards
C
,
by
two
different
Forces
,
according
to
such
or
such
a
Proportion
.
Secondly
,
the
Way
it
ought
to
keep
:
In
fine
,
every
Place
where
it
must
be
in
such
a
determined
Time
,
so
that
this
Line
serves
,
not
only
to
maintain
the
Presence
of
the
Mind
in
the
Enquiry
after
all
Truths
that
we
wou'd
discover
concerning
the
Question
proposed
:
But
even
represents
the
Resolution
after
a
very
sensible
and
convincing
manner
.
See
the
first
Figures
.
First
,
This
Line
A
X
Y
E
,
expresses
the
true
Magnitude
of
the
compound
Motion
;
for
we
see
sensibly
,
if
the
Forces
that
produce
it
,
can
each
make
this
Body
advance
a
Foot
in
a
Minute
,
its
compound
Motion
shall
be
two
Foot
in
a
Minute
,
if
the
compounding
Motions
perfectly
agree
.
For
in
this
case
it
suffices
to
add
A
B
to
A
C
;
and
if
these
Motions
do
not
entirely
agree
,
the
compounded
A
C
shall
be
greater
than
one
of
the
compounding
A
B
or
A
C
,
by
the
Line
Y
E.
But
if
these
Motions
are
opposite
in
any
thing
,
the
compounded
will
be
less
than
either
of
the
compounding
by
the
Line
Y
E
,
and
if
they
are
intirely
opposite
,
it
will
be
nothing
at
all
.
Secondly
,
This
Line
A
X
Y
E
represents
to
the
Imagination
the
Way
that
this
Body
ought
to
follow
;
and
sensibly
shows
,
according
to
what
Proportion
it
advances
more
on
one
Side
than
another
.
It
is
evident
also
that
all
the
compounded
Motions
are
right
,
when
each
of
the
compounding
is
always
the
same
,
although
they
be
unequal
amongst
themselves
,
or
else
when
the
compounding
are
equal
amongst
themselves
,
altho'
they
are
not
always
the
same
.
In
fine
,
it
is
visible
that
the
Lines
which
describe
these
Motions
,
are
Curves
,
when
the
compounding
are
unequal
amongst
themselves
,
and
are
not
always
the
same
.
This
Line
further
represents
to
the
Imagination
all
the
Places
where
this
Body
,
pushed
by
two
different
Forces
to
two
different
Places
,
will
be
found
:
So
that
we
may
precisely
mark
the
Point
this
Body
must
be
in
at
what
Instant
of
Time
we
please
.
For
instance
,
If
we
wou'd
know
where
it
wou'd
be
in
the
Beginning
of
the
fourth
Minute
:
We
only
need
divide
the
Lines
A
B
or
A
C
,
into
such
Parts
as
express
the
Space
that
these
known
Forces
will
each
of
them
be
capable
of
making
this
Body
run
through
in
a
Minute
,
and
take
off
three
of
these
Parts
in
some
one
of
these
Lines
,
and
afterwards
by
the
Beginning
of
the
fourth
;
draw
3
X
,
parallel
to
A
B
or
III
X
parallel
to
A
C.
For
it
is
evident
that
the
Point
X
,
which
one
or
other
of
these
Parallels
determine
in
the
Line
A
X
Y
E
,
marks
the
Place
where
this
Body
will
be
in
the
Beginning
of
the
third
Minute
of
its
Motion
.
Thus
this
Method
of
examining
Questions
does
not
only
maintain
the
Presence
of
the
Mind
,
but
even
shows
it
the
Resolution
thereof
,
and
gives
it
a
sufficient
Light
to
discover
things
unknown
,
by
the
Help
of
a
very
few
of
those
that
are
known
.
It
is
sufficient
,
for
Instance
,
after
what
has
been
said
that
we
only
know
that
a
Body
which
was
in
the
Point
A
,
in
such
a
Time
,
will
be
in
E
,
in
another
Time
;
and
that
the
different
Forces
push
it
by
Lines
,
which
make
a
given
Angle
,
as
B
A
C
;
to
discover
the
Line
of
its
compounded
Motion
,
and
the
different
Degrees
of
the
Velocities
of
simple
Motions
,
provided
we
now
these
Motions
to
be
uniform
or
equal
amongst
themselves
.
For
when
we
have
two
Points
of
a
right
Line
,
we
have
the
whole
;
and
we
may
compare
the
right
Line
A
E
,
or
the
compounded
Motion
which
is
known
with
the
Lines
A
B
and
A
C
,
viz.
the
simple
Motions
which
are
unknown
.
diagram representing the fall of a stone
C
,
by
an
unequal
Motion
,
like
to
that
which
we
commonly
believe
Bodies
weigh
in
their
Tendency
towards
the
Center
of
the
Earth
;
that
is
,
that
the
Spaces
run
through
,
are
amongst
themselves
,
as
the
Squares
of
the
Times
taken
up
in
running
through
them
:
The
Line
which
it
will
describe
will
always
be
a
Parabola
;
and
we
may
determine
with
the
greatest
Exactness
where
the
Point
will
be
in
such
a
Moment
of
its
Motoin
.
For
if
in
the
first
Moment
this
Body
falls
two
Foot
from
A
to
C
,
in
the
second
six
,
in
the
third
ten
,
in
the
fourth
fourteen
,
and
be
pushed
by
an
uniform
Motion
from
A
to
B
,
which
is
sixteen
Foot
long
,
it
is
plain
that
the
Line
which
it
will
describe
will
be
a
Parabola
,
whose
Perameter
will
be
eight
Foot
long
.
For
the
Square
of
the
Ordinates
to
the
Diameter
,
which
mark
the
Times
and
regular
Motion
of
A
to
B
,
will
be
equal
to
a
Rect-angle
of
the
Perameter
into
the
Lines
which
mark
the
unequal
and
accelerated
Motion
;
and
the
Squares
of
the
Ordinates
,
that
is
,
the
Squares
of
the
Times
will
be
amongst
themselves
,
as
the
Parts
of
the
Diameter
comprehended
between
the
Vertex
and
Ordinates
:
16.64
∷
2.8
,
64
:
14
4
∷
8
:
18
,
&c.
It
is
sufficient
to
consider
the
sixth
Figure
to
be
Perswaded
of
this
.
For
the
Semicircles
show
that
A
2
,
is
to
A
4
,
that
is
,
to
the
Ordinate
2
X
,
which
is
equal
to
it
,
as
2
X
is
to
A
B.
That
A
18
is
to
A
12
,
that
is
,
to
the
Ordinate
18
X
,
as
18
X
,
is
to
A
8
,
&c.
so
also
the
Rectangles
A
2
into
A
B
,
and
A
18
into
A
8
;
are
equal
to
the
Squares
of
2
X
,
and
18
X
,
&c.
And
consequently
these
Squares
are
between
themselves
,
as
these
Rectangles
are
.
The
Parallels
upon
A
B
and
A
C
,
which
intersect
one
another
in
the
Points
X.
X.
X.
likewise
very
sensibly
discover
the
Way
that
this
Body
must
keep
;
and
mark
the
Places
it
ought
to
be
in
at
such
a
Time
.
In
fine
,
they
represent
to
the
Eyes
in
a
determined
Time
,
both
the
true
Magnitude
of
the
compounded
Motion
,
and
of
its
Acceleration
.
Suppose
again
that
a
Body
is
moved
unequally
from
A
to
C
,
as
well
as
from
A
to
B
:
If
the
Inequality
is
alike
both
in
the
Beginning
and
all
along
,
viz.
if
the
Inequality
of
its
Motion
towards
C
is
like
to
that
towards
B
,
or
if
it
encreases
in
the
same
Proportion
,
the
Line
that
it
describes
will
be
right
.
But
if
we
suppose
that
there
is
some
Inequality
in
the
Increase
or
Diminution
of
simple
Motions
;
although
we
suppose
this
Inequality
what
we
please
,
it
will
be
always
easie
to
find
the
Line
,
which
represents
the
compounded
Motion
of
these
simple
Motions
to
the
Imagination
;
in
expressing
these
Motions
by
Lines
,
and
drawing
Parallels
to
these
Lines
which
shall
intersect
them
.
For
the
Line
that
shall
pass
through
all
the
Intersections
of
these
Parallels
,
will
represent
the
compounded
Motion
of
these
unequal
Motions
,
and
which
are
unequally
accelerated
or
diminished
.
For
instance
,
if
we
suppose
a
Body
be
moved
,
by
two
equal
or
unequal
Forces
whatever
,
that
one
of
these
Motions
continually
increases
or
diminishes
,
according
to
any
Geometrick
or
Arithmetick
Progression
:
And
likewise
that
the
other
Motion
increases
or
diminishes
according
to
any
Arithmetick
or
Geometrick
Progression
,
to
find
the
Points
by
which
the
Line
must
pass
that
represents
the
Motion
compounded
of
these
two
Motions
both
to
the
Eyes
and
Imagination
.
diagram representing actual and imagined motion
As
we
have
before
intimated
,
we
must
first
draw
the
two
Lines
A
B
and
A
C
,
to
express
the
two
simple
Motions
,
and
divide
these
Lines
according
to
the
Computation
of
the
Acceleration
of
these
Motions
.
If
we
suppose
the
Motion
expressed
by
the
Line
A
B
,
in
,
creases
or
diminishes
according
to
this
Arithmetick
Progression
,
∺
1
,
2
,
3
,
4
,
5
,
it
must
be
divided
in
the
Points
marked
,
1
,
2
,
3
,
4
,
5
:
And
if
we
suppose
the
Motion
expressed
by
the
Line
A
C
,
increases
according
to
this
continued
Geometrick
Progression
,
∺
1
,
2
,
4
,
8
,
16
,
or
diminishes
according
to
this
,
4
,
2
,
1
,
½
,
¼
,
⅛
,
we
must
,
afterwards
,
by
these
Divisions
,
draw
Parallels
to
A
B
and
A
C
,
and
the
Line
A
E
,
which
must
express
the
compounded
Motion
that
is
sought
,
shall
necessarily
pass
through
all
the
Points
where
these
Parallels
intersect
,
and
so
we
discover
the
Way
that
this
Body
,
once
put
in
Motion
,
ought
to
keep
.
If
we
wou'd
know
exactly
how
long
this
Body
hath
begun
to
be
moved
,
when
it
is
arrived
to
such
a
Point
:
The
Parallels
drawn
from
this
Point
upon
A
B
or
A
C
,
will
mark
it
,
for
the
Divisions
of
A
B
and
A
C
mark
the
Time
;
so
if
we
wou'd
know
the
Point
where
this
Body
will
be
in
such
a
Time
,
the
Parallels
drawn
from
the
Divisions
of
the
Lines
A
B
and
A
C
,
which
represent
this
Time
,
by
their
Intersection
mark
the
Point
which
is
sought
,
A.
For
the
Distance
of
the
Place
from
whence
it
began
to
move
,
it
will
always
be
easily
known
by
drawing
a
Line
from
this
Point
A
:
For
the
Length
of
this
Line
will
be
known
,
by
the
Proportion
it
has
to
A
B
or
to
A
C
,
which
are
known
.
But
for
the
Length
of
the
Way
that
this
Body
will
have
run
through
before
it
arrives
to
this
Point
,
will
be
difficult
to
be
known
,
because
the
Line
of
its
Motion
,
A
E
,
being
a
Curve
,
we
cannot
compare
it
to
any
of
these
right
Lines
.
But
if
we
wou'd
determine
the
infinite
Points
by
which
this
Body
must
pass
,
that
is
exactly
,
and
by
a
continued
Motion
describe
the
Line
A
E
,
we
must
make
a
Pair
of
Compasse
,
the
Motion
of
whose
legs
should
be
regulated
according
to
the
Conditions
expressed
in
the
Computation
we
have
already
made
,
which
is
often
very
difficult
to
invent
,
impossible
to
excute
,
and
unuseful
enough
to
discover
the
Relations
that
things
have
amongst
themselves
.
Since
commonly
we
have
not
need
of
all
the
Points
whereof
this
Line
is
composed
,
but
only
of
some
of
them
which
serve
to
guide
the
Imagination
when
it
considers
such
Motions
.
These
Examples
will
be
sufficient
to
show
,
That
we
may
express
by
Lines
,
and
so
represent
to
our
Imaginations
the
greatest
Part
of
our
Idea's
;
and
that
Geomertry
which
shows
us
how
to
make
all
the
Comparisons
that
are
necessary
in
order
to
knowing
the
Proportion
betwixt
Lines
,
is
of
a
much
more
extensive
Use
than
is
commonly
thought
.
For
in
fine
,
Astronomy
,
Musick
,
Mechanics
,
and
in
general
all
Sciences
which
treat
of
Objects
that
are
capable
of
more
and
less
,
and
which
consequently
we
may
look
upon
as
extended
,
that
is
,
all
exact
Sciences
have
Relation
to
Geometry
:
Because
all
Speculative
Truths
consisting
only
in
the
Relation
of
things
,
and
in
the
Relation
that
is
found
between
their
Relations
,
they
may
all
relate
to
Lines
.
We
may
draw
from
hence
many
Geometrical
Consequences
,
and
these
Consequences
being
made
sensible
by
Lines
which
represent
them
,
it
is
almost
impossible
to
deceive
our selves
,
and
we
may
carry
on
Sciences
very
far
with
much
Ease
.
For
instance
,
the
Means
be
which
we
discover
very
distinctly
,
and
precisely
mark
,
in
Musick
,
an
Eighth
,
a
Fifth
,
a
Fourth
,
is
that
Sounds
may
be
expressed
by
Cords
,
exactly
divided
;
and
we
know
that
a
String
which
sounds
an
Eighth
is
in
double
Proportion
to
another
by
which
an
Eighth
is
made
;
that
the
Fifth
is
in
sesquialter
Proportion
,
or
as
3
to
2
,
and
so
of
the
rest
.
For
the
Ear
only
,
cannot
judge
of
Sounds
with
that
Preciseness
and
Justness
which
is
necessary
to
a
Science
.
The
most
skilful
Practitinoners
,
who
have
the
most
delicate
and
fine
Ear
,
have
not
been
hitherto
sufficiently
able
to
discover
the
Difference
there
is
between
certain
Sounds
;
and
they
falsely
perswade
themselves
there
is
none
,
because
they
judge
of
thing
only
by
the
Sensations
they
have
of
them
.
Some
cannot
distinguish
any
Difference
between
an
Octave
and
three
Ditons
;
and
some
even
think
that
the
greater
Tone
is
not
different
from
the
less
;
so
that
a
Comma
which
constitutes
the
Difference
is
to
them
insensible
,
and
much
more
a
Schisma
,
which
is
but
half
a
Comma
.
It
is
only
Reason
therefore
which
manifestly
shows
that
the
Space
of
the
Line
which
makes
the
Difference
betwixt
certain
Sounds
,
being
divisible
into
many
Parts
,
there
may
also
be
a
great
Number
of
different
Sounds
,
which
wou'd
be
useful
in
Musick
,
that
the
Ear
cannot
discern
;
from
whence
it
is
plain
that
without
Arithmetick
and
Geometry
,
regular
and
exact
Musick
,
wou'd
be
unknown
to
us
,
and
we
cou'd
not
accomplish
any
thing
in
this
Science
,
but
by
chance
and
Imagination
;
and
so
Musick
wou'd
no
longer
be
a
Science
founded
upon
indisputable
Demonstrations
,
although
Airs
that
are
composed
by
the
Strength
of
the
Imagination
,
are
more
fine
and
agreeable
to
the
Senses
,
than
those
that
are
composed
by
Rules
.
So
in
Mechanicks
,
the
Gravity
of
some
Weights
,
and
the
Distance
of
the
Center
of
Gravity
of
these
Weights
from
the
Fulciment
being
capable
of
more
or
less
,
may
be
expressed
by
Lines
,
so
that
we
may
very
advantagiously
make
use
of
Geometry
to
discover
and
demonstrate
an
infinite
Number
of
new
Inventions
,
that
are
very
useful
to
Life
,
and
also
very
agreeable
to
the
Mind
,
because
of
the
Evidence
which
accompanies
them
.
If
for
instance
,
we
have
a
Weight
given
of
six
Pound
,
that
we
wou'd
put
in
Equilibrio
with
one
of
three
Pound
only
;
and
that
this
Weight
of
six
Pound
be
suspended
on
the
Beam
of
a
Ballance
,
two
Feet
distant
from
the
Fulciment
,
only
knowing
the
general
Principle
of
all
Mechanicks
:
That
the
Weights
to
continue
in
Equilibrio
,
must
be
in
Reciprocal
Proportion
to
their
Distance
from
the
Fulciment
:
That
is
,
one
Weight
must
be
to
the
other
Weight
as
the
Distance
which
is
between
the
last
Weight
from
the
Fulciment
,
is
to
the
Distance
between
the
first
from
the
same
Fulciment
;
it
will
be
easily
found
by
Geometry
,
what
the
Distance
of
the
Weight
of
three
Pound
ought
to
be
,
so
that
both
may
be
brought
into
Equilibrio
;
in
finding
a
fourth
stance
between
the
first
from
the
same
Fulciment
;
it
will
be
easily
found
by
Geometry
,
what
the
Distance
of
the
Weight
of
three
Pound
ought
to
be
,
so
that
both
may
be
brought
into
Equilibrio
;
in
finding
a
fourth
proportional
Line
,
according
to
the
twelfth
Propotition
of
the
sixth
Book
of
Euclid
,
which
will
be
of
four
Foot
.
Thus
only
knowing
the
Fundamental
Principle
of
Mechanicks
,
we
may
clearly
discover
all
the
Truths
that
depend
upon
it
,
by
applying
Geometry
to
Mechanicks
;
that
is
,
by
expressing
by
Lines
all
things
that
are
to
be
considered
in
Mechanicks
.
Geometrical
Lines
and
Figures
then
are
most
proper
to
represent
to
the
Imagination
the
Relation
that
is
between
Magnitudes
,
or
between
things
which
differ
as
to
more
or
less
,
as
Spaces
,
Times
,
Weights
,
&c.
as
well
because
they
are
very
simple
Objects
,
as
because
they
are
imagined
with
great
Facility
.
We
may
even
say
further
to
the
Advantage
of
Geometry
,
that
Lines
can
represent
to
the
Imagination
more
things
than
the
Mind
can
receive
:
Since
Lines
can
express
the
Relation
of
incommensurable
Magnitudes
,
that
is
,
of
Magnitudes
whose
Relations
we
cannot
know
,
because
they
have
no
common
Measure
by
which
can
compare
them
.
But
this
Advantage
is
not
very
considerable
in
an
Enquiry
after
Truth
,
since
these
sensible
Representations
of
incommensurable
Magnitudes
discover
nothing
to
the
Mind
.
Geometry
is
then
very
useful
to
render
the
Mind
attentive
to
such
things
whose
Relations
we
wou'd
discover
:
But
it
must
be
confessed
that
it
is
sometimes
an
Occasion
of
Error
,
because
we
so
very
much
apply
our selves
to
evident
and
agreeable
Demonstrations
which
this
Science
furnisheth
us
with
,
that
we
do
not
sufficiently
consider
Nature
.
'T
is
chiefly
for
this
Reason
,
that
all
Machines
that
have
been
invented
,
have
not
been
perfected
:
That
all
Musical
Compositions
wherein
the
Proportions
of
Consonancy's
are
the
best
observed
,
are
not
the
most
agreeable
;
and
that
the
most
exact
Computations
in
Astronomy
do
not
always
best
foretel
the
Greatness
and
Duration
of
Eclipses
.
Nature
is
not
abstracted
:
Levers
and
Mechanical
Wheels
are
not
Mathematical
Lines
and
Circles
:
The
Taste
of
Musical
Airs
is
not
always
the
same
in
all
Men
,
nor
even
in
the
same
Men
at
different
Times
.
They
change
according
to
the
different
Motions
of
the
Spirits
,
so
that
there
is
nothing
more
uncertain
.
As
for
what
respects
Astronomy
,
there
is
no
perfect
Regularity
in
the
Course
of
the
Planets
:
Moving
in
these
great
Spaces
they
are
disorderly
hurried
by
the
fluid
Matter
which
encompasses
them
:
So
that
the
Errors
we
are
subject
to
in
Astronomy
,
Mechanicks
,
Musick
,
and
in
all
the
Sciences
to
which
we
apply
Geometry
,
Proceeds
not
from
Geometry
,
which
is
an
indisputable
Science
,
but
from
the
false
Application
we
make
of
it
.
We
suppose
,
for
instance
,
that
the
Planets
,
by
their
Motions
,
describe
Circles
and
Elipses
perfectly
regular
,
which
though
it
is
not
true
,
yet
't
is
necessary
to
reason
from
it
,
for
the
Error
misses
but
very
little
of
truth
;
but
we
ought
always
to
remember
,
that
the
Principle
upon
which
we
reason
is
but
a
Supposition
:
So
in
Mechanicks
we
suppose
that
Wheels
and
Levers
are
perfectly
hard
,
and
like
Mathematical
Lines
and
Circles
,
without
Gravity
and
Attrition
,
or
rather
we
do
not
sufficiently
consider
their
Gravity
,
Attrition
,
Matter
,
or
the
Relation
that
these
things
have
amongst
themselves
,
that
Hardness
or
Magnitude
increases
Gravity
;
that
Gravity
increases
Attrition
,
and
Attrition
diminishes
the
Machine
.
Thus
,
what
is
often
accomplished
in
a
small
Portion
of
Matter
,
is
seldom
ever
affected
in
a
greater
.
It
is
no
Wonder
then
if
we
deceive
our selves
,
when
we
wou'd
reason
upon
Principles
that
are
not
exactly
known
:
Nor
can
we
conclude
Geometry
to
be
unuseful
,
because
it
delivers
us
not
from
all
our
Errors
.
Suppositions
established
,
make
us
argue
consequently
;
rendring
our selves
attentive
to
what
we
consider
,
make
us
know
it
evidently
.
We
even
by
that
means
discover
when
our
Suppositions
are
false
;
for
being
always
certain
that
our
Reasonings
are
true
,
and
Experience
agreeing
not
with
them
,
we
discover
that
our
Principles
are
false
.
But
without
Geometry
and
Arithmetick
we
can
discover
nothing
exactly
,
if
there
is
never
so
little
Difficulty
in
it
,
although
we
have
certain
and
indisputable
Principles
.
Therefore
we
ought
to
look
upon
Geometry
as
a
kind
of
universal
Science
,
which
inlarges
the
Mind
,
makes
it
attentive
,
and
gives
it
the
Art
of
regulating
the
Imagination
,
and
from
whence
may
be
drawn
all
the
Helps
that
it
can
receive
:
For
by
the
Assistance
of
Geometry
the
Mind
regulates
the
Motion
of
the
Imagination
;
and
the
Imagination
thus
regulated
maintains
the
Presence
and
Application
of
the
Mind
.
But
that
we
may
make
a
good
use
of
Geometry
,
we
must
observe
that
all
things
which
fall
under
the
Imagination
,
cannot
be
imagined
with
an
equal
Facility
;
for
all
Images
do
not
equally
fill
the
Capacity
of
the
Mind
.
It
is
more
difficult
to
imagine
a
solid
than
a
plane
,
and
a
plane
than
a
simple
Line
;
for
there
is
more
Thought
in
the
clear
View
of
a
solid
,
than
in
that
of
a
Plane
or
Line
.
It
is
so
likewise
with
different
Lines
,
more
Thought
is
requisite
,
that
is
,
a
greater
Capacity
of
Mind
,
to
represent
a
Parabolick
,
Eliptical
,
or
some
other
Line
more
compounded
,
than
to
represent
the
Circumference
of
a
Circle
;
and
more
for
the
Circumference
of
a
Circle
,
than
for
a
right
Line
;
because
't
is
more
difficult
to
imagine
Lines
which
are
described
by
very
compounded
Motions
,
and
which
have
many
Relations
,
than
those
which
are
described
by
the
most
simple
Motions
,
or
which
have
fewer
Relations
.
For
Relations
cannot
be
clearly
perceived
without
the
Attention
of
the
Mind
to
many
things
,
and
so
much
the
more
Thought
is
required
to
perceive
them
,
as
they
are
in
greater
Number
.
There
are
some
Figures
so
compounded
that
the
Mind
has
not
Extension
enought
to
imagine
them
distinctly
;
but
there
is
also
some
others
that
the
Mind
very
easily
imagins
.
Of
the
three
kinds
of
right
lined
Angles
;
the
acute
,
the
right
,
and
obtuse
;
it
is
only
the
right
that
raises
a
very
distinct
and
fixed
Idea
in
the
Mind
.
There
is
an
infinite
Number
of
acute
Angles
which
differ
amonst
themselves
;
it
is
the
same
also
with
the
obtuse
.
So
that
when
we
imagine
an
acute
or
an
obtuse
Angle
,
we
imagine
nothing
exact
or
distinct
;
but
when
we
imagine
a
right
Angle
we
cannot
deceive
our selves
;
the
Idea
is
very
distinct
,
and
even
the
Image
that
we
form
of
it
in
the
Brain
is
commonly
exact
enough
.
It
is
true
,
we
may
also
determine
the
general
Idea
of
an
acute
Angle
,
by
a
particular
Idea
of
an
Angle
of
thirty
Degrees
;
and
the
Idea
of
an
Angle
of
thirty
Degrees
,
is
as
exact
as
that
of
an
Angle
of
Ninety
,
or
of
a
right
Angle
.
But
the
Image
that
we
form
of
it
in
the
Brain
,
would
not
be
near
so
Just
as
that
of
a
right
Angle
.
We
are
not
accustomed
to
represent
this
Image
to
our selves
,
and
we
can
trace
it
only
by
thinking
upon
a
Circle
,
or
such
a
determined
Portion
of
a
Circle
divided
into
equal
parts
.
But
to
imagine
a
right
Angle
,
it
is
not
necessary
to
think
on
this
Division
of
the
Circle
,
the
Idea
only
of
a
Perpendicular
is
sufficient
for
the
Imagination
to
trace
the
Image
of
this
Angle
;
and
we
find
no
difficulty
to
represent
Perpendiculars
,
because
we
are
accustomed
to
see
all
things
stand
upright
.
It
is
therefore
very
easie
to
judge
,
that
to
have
a
simple
,
distinct
and
well-determined
Object
proper
to
be
easily
conceived
,
and
consequently
to
make
the
Mind
attentive
,
and
preserve
evidence
in
the
Truths
it
enquires
after
,
we
must
compare
all
Magnitudes
,
as
we
consider
them
,
to
simple
Surfaces
determined
by
Lines
and
right
Angles
,
as
perfect
Squares
and
other
right-lined
Figures
,
or
else
to
simple
right
Lines
;
for
these
are
the
Figures
whose
Nature
we
know
.
We
do
not
pretend
that
all
Subjects
,
whose
Knowledge
we
may
enquire
into
,
can
be
expressed
by
Lines
and
Geometrical
Figures
.
There
are
many
that
cannot
,
nay
that
ought
not
to
be
subjected
to
this
Rule
:
For
instance
,
The
Knowledge
we
have
of
a
God
infinitely
Powerful
,
infinitely
Just
,
upon
whom
all
things
depend
in
all
respects
,
who
wills
that
all
his
Creatures
should
execute
his
orders
to
make
themselves
capable
of
Happiness
.
This
Knowledge
.
I
say
,
is
the
Principle
of
all
Morality
;
and
from
hence
may
be
drawn
an
infinite
number
of
certain
and
indisputable
Consequences
;
and
yet
neither
this
Principle
nor
its
Consequences
can
be
expressed
by
Geometrical
Figures
;
neither
is
it
possible
to
determine
or
represent
by
Lines
an
infinite
number
of
Physical
Notions
,
which
may
nevertheless
evidently
discover
several
Truths
to
us
.
Yet
is
it
certain
that
there
are
a
great
many
things
which
may
be
examined
and
learned
by
this
Geometrical
Method
;
and
that
it
is
always
advantageous
to
use
it
,
because
it
accustoms
the
Mind
to
Attention
,
by
causing
it
to
make
a
regular
use
of
the
Imagination
;
and
that
things
which
are
learned
by
this
way
,
appear
more
clearly
demonstrated
,
and
are
more
easily
remembred
than
others
.
I
might
have
attributed
to
the
Senses
,
the
Assistance
which
is
drawn
from
Geometry
,
but
I
thought
that
Geometry
did
rather
belong
to
the
Imagination
than
to
the
Senses
,
although
Lines
are
something
sensible
:
It
would
be
unnecessary
here
to
give
he
Reasons
that
I
had
for
it
.
Since
they
would
only
serve
to
justifie
the
order
that
I
have
kept
in
what
I
have
said
,
which
is
not
essential
.
I
have
neither
spoke
of
Arithmetick
nor
Algebra
,
since
the
Numeral
Figures
,
and
Letters
of
the
Alphabet
,
which
are
used
in
these
Sciences
,
are
not
so
useful
to
increase
the
Attention
as
the
Capacity
of
the
Mind
,
as
shall
be
explained
in
the
following
Chapter
.
These
are
the
General
Helps
which
may
make
the
Mind
more
attentive
,
I
know
no
other
,
except
it
be
the
will
of
being
so
;
which
I
do
not
treat
of
,
because
it
is
supposed
that
all
those
who
Study
,
are
willing
to
give
Attention
to
what
they
Study
.
Nevertheless
there
are
many
others
which
are
peculiar
to
certain
persons
,
as
some
sort
of
Drinks
,
certain
Meats
,
certain
Places
,
and
certain
Dispositions
of
Body
;
with
some
other
helps
,
of
which
every
one
ought
to
be
instructnd
by
his
own
Experience
.
The
Condition
of
our
Imagination
ought
to
be
observed
after
Eating
;
and
we
must
consider
what
things
they
are
that
maintain
or
dissipate
the
Attention
of
the
Mind
.
What
more
general
might
be
said
,
is
,
That
the
moderate
use
of
such
Food
as
creates
many
Animal
Spirits
,
is
very
fit
to
increase
the
Attention
of
th
Mind
,
and
Strength
of
the
Imagination
,
in
those
who
have
them
Weak
and
Languishing
.
CHAP.
V.
Of
the
Means
to
increase
the
Extension
and
Capacity
of
the
Mind
.
That
Arithmetick
and
Algebra
are
absolutely
necessary
to
this
end
.
IT
ought
not
immediately
to
be
imagined
that
we
can
truly
increase
the
Extension
and
Capacity
of
the
Mind
.
The
Soul
of
Man
is
,
if
we
may
so
say
,
a
determined
Quantity
or
Portion
of
Thought
,
which
hath
limits
that
cannot
be
exceeded
:
The
Soul
cannot
become
more
Extensive
or
Capacious
than
it
is
:
It
is
not
swelled
nor
enlarged
after
the
same
manner
as
we
see
Liquors
and
Metals
are
.
In
fine
,
It
never
Perceives
more
in
one
time
than
in
another
.
It
is
true
this
seems
contrary
to
Experience
;
for
often
we
think
upon
many
Objects
,
and
as
oft
but
upon
one
only
;
and
we
often
say
likewise
,
that
we
think
upon
nothing
at
all
.
Yet
if
we
consider
,
that
Thought
is
to
the
Soul
what
Extension
is
to
the
Body
,
we
shall
plainly
discover
,
that
as
a
Body
cannot
be
truly
more
extended
at
one
time
than
another
,
so
,
if
we
conceive
aright
,
neither
can
the
Soul
think
more
at
one
time
than
another
:
Whether
it
perceives
many
Objects
,
or
but
one
,
or
even
in
the
time
that
we
say
we
think
on
nothing
at
all
.
But
the
reason
why
we
imagine
we
think
more
at
one
time
than
another
,
is
,
because
we
do
not
sufficiently
distinguish
between
confused
and
distinct
Perceptions
;
without
doubt
there
is
more
Thought
required
,
or
the
Capacity
of
Thinking
is
more
fitted
,
to
perceive
many
things
distinctly
at
once
,
than
to
perceive
but
one
only
:
But
there
is
not
more
Thought
requisite
to
perceive
many
things
confusedly
,
than
to
perceive
one
distinctly
.
So
there
is
no
more
Thought
in
the
Soul
when
it
thinks
of
many
things
,
than
when
it
thinks
of
but
one
;
since
when
it
thinks
of
but
one
only
,
it
always
perceives
it
much
more
clearly
,
than
when
it
applies
it self
to
many
.
For
it
must
be
observed
,
that
a
pure
simple
Perception
sometimes
includes
as
much
Thought
,
or
fills
as
much
the
Capacity
that
the
Mind
hath
of
Thinking
,
as
a
Judgment
,
nay
even
a
compounded
reasoning
:
Since
Experience
teaches
us
,
That
a
lively
,
clear
and
evident
Perception
but
of
one
thing
only
,
imploys
and
takes
up
the
Mind
as
much
as
a
compounded
Reasoning
,
or
an
obscure
and
confused
Perception
of
several
Relations
between
many
things
.
For
even
as
there
is
as
much
or
more
Sensation
in
the
sensible
view
of
an
Object
that
I
hold
near
my
Eyes
and
carefully
examine
,
as
in
the
prospect
of
a
whole
Field
,
that
I
look
upon
negligently
and
without
Attention
:
so
that
the
clearness
o
the
Sensation
that
I
have
of
the
Object
which
is
near
my
Eyes
,
recompences
the
Extension
of
the
confused
Sensation
I
have
of
many
things
,
that
I
see
without
Attention
in
a
Field
:
Thus
the
Prospect
the
Mind
has
of
one
Object
only
,
is
sometimes
so
lively
and
distinct
,
that
it
includes
as
much
or
even
more
Thought
,
than
a
Prospect
of
the
Relations
which
are
between
many
things
.
It
is
true
at
certain
times
,
it
seems
to
us
that
we
think
of
but
one
thing
,
and
nevertheless
we
have
some
difficulty
to
comprehend
it
well
;
and
at
other
times
we
comprehend
both
this
thing
and
many
others
with
great
Facility
.
From
thence
we
imagine
that
the
Soul
hath
more
Extension
,
or
a
greater
Capability
of
Thinking
at
one
time
than
another
;
but
it
is
plain
we
deceive
our selves
.
The
Reason
why
at
certain
times
we
have
some
Difficulty
to
conceive
the
most
easie
things
,
is
not
because
the
Thought
of
the
Soul
,
or
its
Capacity
of
Thinking
,
is
diminished
;
but
because
this
Capacity
is
filled
either
by
some
lively
Sensation
of
Pain
or
Pleasure
,
or
by
a
great
number
of
weak
and
obscure
Sensations
,
which
cause
a
kind
of
Vapor
,
and
which
for
the
most
part
proceeds
from
a
confused
Sensation
of
a
great
number
of
Things
.
A
piece
of
Wax
is
capable
of
a
very
distinct
Figure
,
yet
it
cannot
receive
two
,
but
then
one
will
confound
the
other
,
for
it
cannot
be
entirely
round
and
square
at
the
same
time
;
indeed
if
it
received
a
Million
,
none
of
them
would
be
distinct
.
Now
if
this
piece
of
Wax
was
capable
of
knowing
its
Figures
,
it
could
not
know
by
what
Figure
it
must
be
determined
,
if
the
number
of
them
were
too
great
.
It
is
the
same
with
our
Soul
,
when
a
great
number
of
Modifications
fill
its
Capacity
,
it
cannot
perceive
them
distinctly
,
because
it
sees
them
not
separately
;
this
makes
it
think
it
perceives
nothing
at
all
.
It
cannot
say
that
it
is
sensible
Pain
,
Pleasure
,
Light
,
Sound
,
Taste
;
it
is
none
of
all
these
,
and
yet
it
is
all
these
that
it
perceives
.
But
although
we
should
suppose
the
Soul
not
to
be
subjected
to
the
confused
and
irregular
Motions
of
the
Animal
Spirits
;
or
so
disingaged
from
the
Body
,
that
its
Thoughts
should
not
depend
upon
whatsoever
passed
in
it
;
it
might
then
happen
that
we
should
more
easily
comprehend
certain
things
in
one
time
than
in
another
,
and
yet
the
Capacity
of
the
Soul
be
neither
diminished
nor
increased
.
The
general
Idea
of
Infinity
is
inseparable
from
the
Mind
,
and
it
wholly
takes
up
its
Capacity
when
it
thinks
not
of
some
particular
thing
.
For
when
we
say
we
think
of
nothing
,
it
does
not
follow
that
we
do
not
think
of
this
general
Idea
,
but
simply
that
we
do
not
think
of
any
thing
in
particular
.
Certainly
if
our
Mind
was
not
filled
with
this
Idea
,
we
could
not
think
of
all
sorts
of
things
as
we
do
;
for
indeed
we
cannot
think
of
those
things
that
we
have
no
knowledge
of
.
And
if
this
Idea
was
no
more
present
to
the
Mind
,
when
it
seems
to
us
that
we
think
of
nothing
,
than
when
we
think
of
any
thing
in
particular
,
we
should
have
as
much
Facility
to
think
of
what
we
would
,
when
we
vigorously
apply
our selves
to
any
particular
Truth
,
as
when
we
apply
our selves
to
nothing
;
which
is
contrary
to
Experience
.
For
instance
,
When
we
are
attentive
to
any
Proposition
in
Geometry
,
we
cannot
so
easily
think
of
any
thing
else
,
as
when
we
are
diverted
by
no
particular
Thought
:
So
we
think
more
upon
the
General
and
Infinite
Being
,
when
we
think
least
on
Particular
and
Finite
Beings
:
Thus
we
think
as
much
at
one
time
as
another
.
We
cannot
therefore
increase
the
Extension
and
Capacity
of
the
Mind
by
swelling
it
up
,
if
we
may
so
say
,
and
in
giving
it
more
Reality
than
it
Naturally
has
,
but
only
by
managing
it
artificially
,
which
is
perfectly
done
by
Arithmetick
and
Algebra
.
For
these
Sciences
afford
means
of
abridging
our
Idea's
so
methodically
,
and
considering
them
in
such
an
order
,
that
although
the
Mind
hath
little
Extension
,
it
is
able
,
by
the
help
of
these
Sciences
,
to
discover
the
most
compounded
Truths
,
which
at
first
appear
incomprehensible
.
But
we
must
take
things
in
their
first
Principles
,
to
explain
them
with
the
utmost
Clearness
and
Certainty
.
Truth
is
nothing
else
but
a
real
Relation
of
Equality
or
Inequality
:
Falshood
is
only
a
Negation
of
Truth
,
or
a
False
and
Imaginary
Relation
.
Truth
is
that
which
Exists
,
Falshood
has
no
Being
;
or
if
you
will
,
it
is
that
which
is
not
:
We
never
deceive
our selves
when
we
see
real
Relations
,
since
we
are
not
deceived
when
we
see
the
Truth
:
We
always
deceive
our selves
,
when
we
judge
that
we
see
certain
Relations
,
and
these
Relations
are
not
:
For
when
we
see
Falshood
,
we
see
what
is
not
,
or
rather
we
see
nothing
at
all
.
Whosoever
sees
the
Relation
of
Equality
between
twice
two
and
four
,
sees
a
Truth
,
because
he
sees
a
relation
of
Equality
,
which
is
what
he
sees
it
to
be
.
So
whosoever
sees
a
relation
of
Inequality
,
between
twice
two
and
five
,
sees
a
Truth
,
because
he
sees
a
relation
of
Inequality
which
truly
Exists
:
But
if
any
one
judges
he
sees
a
relation
of
Equality
between
twice
two
and
five
he
deceives
himself
,
because
he
sees
,
or
rather
thinks
he
sees
a
relation
of
Equality
which
is
not
.
Truths
are
only
Relations
therefore
,
and
the
Knowledge
of
Truth
is
the
Knowledge
of
these
Relations
.
But
Falshood
is
not
,
and
the
Knowledge
of
Falshood
,
or
a
False
Knowledge
,
is
the
Knowledge
of
what
is
not
,
if
we
may
so
speak
;
for
as
we
cannot
know
what
is
not
,
only
in
relation
to
what
is
,
we
can
discover
Error
only
by
comparing
it
with
Truth
.
We
may
distinguish
as
many
different
kinds
of
Falshood
,
as
of
Truth
:
And
as
there
are
relations
of
three
sorts
,
viz.
of
one
Idea
to
another
,
of
an
Object
to
its
Idea
,
or
of
an
Idea
to
its
Object
;
and
lastly
,
between
one
Object
and
another
,
so
there
are
Truths
and
Falsities
of
three
sorts
:
There
are
some
between
Idea's
,
between
Things
and
their
Idea's
,
and
between
Things
only
.
It
is
true
that
twice
two
is
four
;
it
is
false
that
twice
two
are
five
:
Here
is
a
Truth
and
a
Falsity
between
Idea's
.
It
is
true
that
there
is
a
Sun
;
it
is
false
that
there
is
two
:
Here
is
a
Truth
and
a
Falshood
between
Things
and
their
Idea's
.
It
is
true
also
that
the
Earth
is
greater
than
the
Moon
;
and
it
is
false
that
the
Sun
is
less
than
the
Earth
:
Here
is
a
Truth
and
a
Falshood
which
is
only
between
Things
.
Of
these
three
sorts
of
Truths
,
those
that
are
between
Idea's
are
Eternal
and
Immutable
;
and
because
of
their
Immutability
,
they
are
also
the
Rules
and
Measures
of
all
other
;
for
all
Rules
and
Measures
ought
to
be
unchangeable
.
And
therefore
in
Arithmetick
,
Algebra
,
and
Geometry
,
we
only
consider
these
sorts
of
Truths
,
because
these
general
Sciences
regulate
and
include
all
particular
Sciences
.
All
Relations
,
or
Truths
which
are
between
created
things
,
or
between
Idea's
and
things
created
,
are
subject
to
the
Changes
that
all
Creatures
are
capable
of
.
The
Truths
only
,
which
are
between
our
Idea's
and
the
Supream
Being
are
immutable
;
as
are
those
that
are
between
Idea's
only
;
because
God
is
no
more
subject
to
Change
,
than
the
Idea's
which
he
includes
.
The
Truths
also
that
are
between
Idea's
,
are
only
those
that
we
endeavour
to
discover
by
the
Exercise
of
the
Mind
;
for
we
generally
make
use
of
our
Senses
to
discover
others
;
we
prove
the
Existence
of
things
by
our
Eyes
and
Hands
,
and
by
them
discover
the
Relations
of
Equality
or
Inequality
that
there
is
betwixt
them
.
'T
is
the
Relations
between
Idea's
only
,
that
the
Mind
can
Discover
of
it self
without
the
use
of
the
Senses
.
But
ther
are
not
only
Relations
between
Idea's
,
but
also
between
the
Relations
that
are
between
Idea's
,
between
the
Relations
of
the
Relations
of
Idea's
;
and
in
fine
,
between
the
aggregate
of
many
Relations
,
and
between
the
Relations
of
these
Aggregates
of
Relations
,
and
so
on
ad
infinitum
,
that
is
,
There
are
compounded
Truths
ad
infinitum
.
A
simple
Truth
of
Geometry
,
or
the
Relation
of
one
entire
Idea
to
another
,
as
the
Relation
of
four
to
two
,
or
to
twice
two
,
is
called
a
Geometrick
or
simple
Ratio
;
for
the
Excess
or
Defect
of
an
Idea
,
or
to
use
the
common
Terms
,
The
Excess
or
Defect
of
a
Magnitude
,
is
not
properly
a
Ratio
,
nor
are
equal
Excesses
or
Defects
equal
Ratio's
:
When
Idea's
or
Magnitudes
are
equal
,
't
is
a
Ratio
of
Equality
;
when
they
are
unequal
,
the
Ratio
is
of
Inequality
.
The
Relation
that
is
between
the
Relation
of
Magnitudes
,
that
is
,
between
their
Ratio's
,
is
called
a
Compounded
Ratio
,
because
it
is
a
compounded
Relation
:
As
the
Relation
that
is
between
the
Relation
of
6
to
4
,
and
of
3
to
2
is
a
compounded
Ratio
;
and
when
the
compounded
Ratio's
are
equal
,
this
compounded
Ratio
is
called
Proportion
or
double
Ratio
:
The
Relation
that
is
between
the
Relations
of
8
to
4
,
and
of
6
to
3
,
are
a
Proportion
,
because
these
Relations
are
equal
.
Now
it
must
be
observed
,
that
all
Relations
,
or
Ratio's
,
whether
Simple
or
Compounded
,
are
true
Magnitudes
;
and
that
the
Term
Magnitude
is
relative
,
and
necessarily
includes
some
Relation
;
for
there
is
nothing
great
of
it self
,
and
without
Relation
to
any
thing
else
,
except
Infinity
and
Vnity
.
All
whole
Numbers
are
as
really
Relations
as
fracted
Numbers
,
or
Numbers
compared
to
,
or
divided
by
others
:
Although
we
cannot
reflect
thereon
,
because
these
whole
Numbers
may
be
expressed
by
one
Arithmetick
Designation
:
For
instance
,
4/1
or
8/2
is
as
real
a
Relation
,
as
¼
or
2/8
:
The
Unity
to
which
4
reates
is
not
expressed
,
but
it
is
understood
,
for
4
is
a
Relation
as
well
as
4/1
or
8/2
,
since
4
is
equal
to
4/1
or
to
8/2.
All
Magnitudes
then
being
a
Relation
,
or
all
Relations
a
Magnitude
,
it
is
evident
that
all
Relations
may
be
expressed
by
Figures
,
and
represented
to
the
Imagination
by
Signs
.
Thus
all
Truths
being
only
Relations
,
to
discover
exactly
all
Truths
as
well
Simple
as
Compound
,
we
should
know
all
Relations
as
well
Simple
as
Compound
:
There
are
two
sorts
of
them
,
as
we
have
already
said
,
Relations
of
Equality
and
Inequality
:
It
is
plain
that
all
Relations
of
Equality
are
alike
,
and
as
soon
as
we
know
one
thing
is
equal
to
another
known
thing
,
we
know
exactly
the
Relation
of
it
.
But
it
is
not
the
same
with
those
of
Inequality
;
we
know
that
a
Tower
is
commonly
higher
than
six
feet
,
and
lower
than
a
thousand
;
and
yet
we
know
not
its
just
Magnitude
,
nor
the
Relation
it
has
to
six
Feet
.
To
compare
things
amongst
themselves
,
or
rather
exactly
to
measure
the
Relations
of
Inequality
,
we
must
have
an
exact
measure
;
we
must
have
a
simple
and
infinitely
Intelligible
Idea
,
which
may
be
accommodated
to
all
forts
of
Subjects
.
This
Measure
is
Unity
;
by
that
it
is
that
we
exactly
measure
all
things
,
and
without
it
is
impossible
to
know
any
thing
exactly
.
But
all
Numbers
being
compounded
of
Unity
,
it
is
self-evident
,
that
without
the
Idea's
of
Numbers
,
and
manner
of
comparing
and
measuring
these
Idea's
,
that
is
,
without
Arithmetick
,
it
is
impossible
to
advance
to
the
Knowledge
of
compounded
Truths
.
Idea's
,
or
the
Relations
between
Idea's
,
in
a
word
,
Magnitudes
,
when
they
are
greater
or
less
than
other
Magnitudes
,
cannot
be
made
equal
except
by
More
or
Less
,
which
is
compounded
of
Unity
;
so
many
times
repeated
as
is
necessary
:
So
it
is
only
by
Addition
and
Substraction
of
Unity
,
and
the
parts
of
Unity
(
when
we
conceive
it
divided
)
that
we
exactly
measure
all
Magnitudes
,
and
discover
all
Truths
.
Now
of
all
the
Sciences
Arithmetick
and
Algebra
are
principally
the
only
ones
,
which
teach
us
to
make
these
Operations
artificially
,
instructively
,
and
admirably
,
to
manage
the
Capacity
of
the
Mind
;
since
they
furnish
it
with
all
the
Perfection
and
Extension
it
is
capable
of
;
because
't
is
by
them
only
that
we
discover
all
knowable
Truths
with
the
greatest
Exactness
.
Common
Geometry
perfects
the
Imagination
more
than
it
does
the
Mind
;
and
the
Truths
which
we
discover
by
this
Science
,
are
not
always
so
evident
as
Geometers
imagine
.
For
instance
,
They
think
they
have
expressed
the
value
of
certain
Magnitudes
,
when
they
have
proved
them
equal
in
value
to
certain
Lines
,
as
the
Hypothenusa's
in
right
Angle
Triangles
whose
Legs
are
known
;
or
of
others
which
are
determined
by
some
of
the
Conick
Sections
.
But
it
is
plain
they
deceive
themselves
,
for
these
Hypothenusa's
for
instance
are
themselves
unknown
:
We
more
exactly
know
the
√
8
or
√
20
,
than
a
Line
that
we
imagine
,
or
describe
upon
Paper
for
the
Hypothenuse
of
a
right-angled
Triangle
,
whose
sides
are
two
,
whereof
one
is
two
and
the
other
four
:
We
know
at
least
that
√
8
approaches
very
near
to
3
,
and
that
√
20
is
about
4
½
;
and
by
certain
Rules
we
can
approach
Infinitely
nearer
and
nearer
to
their
true
Magnitude
;
and
if
we
cannot
arrive
to
it
,
't
is
only
because
the
Mind
cannot
comprehend
Infinity
:
But
we
have
only
a
very
confused
Idea
of
the
Magnitude
of
Hypothenusa's
,
and
we
are
even
obliged
to
have
recourse
to
√
8
or
√
20
to
express
them
.
Thus
Geometrick
Constructions
,
which
serve
to
express
the
values
of
unknown
quantities
,
are
not
so
useful
in
regulating
the
Mind
,
and
discovering
the
Relations
or
Truths
which
we
enquire
after
,
as
to
regulate
the
Imagination
.
But
as
we
are
much
more
pleased
to
make
use
of
our
Imagination
than
our
Mind
,
Studious
Persons
have
commonly
more
Esteem
for
Geometry
,
than
for
Arithmetick
and
Algebra
.
To
Make
it
perfectly
apprehended
,
that
Arithmetick
and
Algebra
together
are
the
true
Logick
,
which
serves
to
discover
things
as
they
are
,
and
to
give
the
Mind
all
the
Extension
it
is
capable
of
:
It
ill
be
sufficient
to
make
some
Reflections
upon
the
Rules
of
these
Sciences
.
We
have
a
little
before
said
,
that
all
Truths
are
only
Relations
;
that
the
most
simple
and
best
known
,
is
that
of
Equality
:
That
this
is
the
begining
from
whence
others
must
be
measured
,
to
have
an
exact
Idea
of
Inequality
;
that
the
Measure
we
are
obliged
to
make
use
of
is
Unity
;
that
we
must
add
of
substract
it
as
many
times
as
is
necessary
,
to
measure
the
Excess
or
Defect
of
the
Inequality
of
these
Magnitudes
.
From
thence
it
is
plain
that
all
Operations
,
which
may
be
of
use
to
discover
the
Relations
of
Equality
,
are
only
Additions
or
Substractions
:
Additions
of
Magnitudes
to
Equal
Magnitudes
,
Additions
of
Relations
to
equal
Relations
,
or
to
place
Magnitudes
in
Proportion
:
In
short
,
Addition
of
relations
to
equal
relations
,
or
to
put
Magnitudes
in
compounded
Proportion
.
To
equal
2
to
4
,
it
is
only
requisite
to
add
2
to
2
,
or
cut
off
2
from
4
;
or
to
add
unity
to
2
and
substract
it
from
4.
To
make
the
relation
of
8
to
2
,
equal
to
the
relation
of
6
to
3
,
we
must
not
add
3
to
2
,
nor
substract
3
from
8
;
so
that
the
excess
of
one
number
to
the
other
may
be
equal
to
3
,
which
is
the
excess
of
6
above
3
;
that
would
be
only
an
Addition
and
equalling
simple
Magnitudes
:
We
must
first
see
what
is
the
Magnitude
of
the
Ratio
of
8
to
2
,
or
which
is
all
one
8/2
;
and
we
find
by
dividing
8
by
2
,
that
the
Quote
of
this
Ratio
is
4
;
or
that
8/2
is
equal
to
4
;
we
must
also
examine
what
the
Magnitude
of
the
Relation
of
6
to
3
is
,
and
fin
that
't
is
equal
to
2.
Thus
we
discover
that
these
twe
Ratio's
8/2
is
equal
to
4
,
and
6/3
equal
to
2
,
differ
only
by
2
;
so
that
to
equal
them
,
we
may
either
add
6/3
(
equal
to
2
)
to
6/3
which
makes
12/3
which
is
a
relation
equal
to
8/2
,
or
else
substract
4/2
equal
to
2
from
8/2
,
and
there
remains
4/2
,
which
will
be
a
Ratio
equal
to
6/3
;
or
in
fine
,
add
unity
to
6/3
,
and
substract
it
from
8/2
,
and
we
shall
have
9/3
and
6/2
which
are
equal
Ratio's
,
for
9
is
to
3
as
6
to
2.
Lastly
,
To
find
the
Magnitude
of
the
Inequality
between
Relations
which
result
the
one
from
a
compounded
Ratio
,
or
from
the
relation
of
the
relation
of
12
to
3
,
and
of
3
to
1
;
and
the
other
of
the
compounded
Ratio
,
or
of
the
relation
of
the
relation
of
8
to
2
,
and
of
2
to
1
,
the
same
method
must
be
taken
.
First
,
The
Magnitude
of
the
Ratio
of
12
to
3
is
design'd
by
4
,
or
4
is
the
Quote
of
the
Ratio
of
12
to
3
,
and
3
is
the
Quote
of
that
of
3
to
1
;
and
the
Quote
of
the
Ratio
of
the
Quotes
of
4
and
3
is
4/3.
Secondly
,
The
Quote
of
8
to
2
is
4
,
and
that
of
2
to
1
is
2
;
and
the
Quote
of
the
Quotes
4
and
2
is
2.
In
fine
,
The
Inequality
between
the
relations
which
result
from
the
relations
of
the
relations
,
is
the
difference
between
4/2
and
2
,
viz.
2/3.
Therefore
2/3
added
to
the
relation
of
the
Ratio's
of
12
to
3
,
and
3
to
1
,
or
substracted
from
the
relation
of
the
other
Ratio's
8
to
2
,
and
2
to
1
,
equals
these
relations
of
relations
,
and
produces
a
compounded
Proportion
.
Thus
we
may
make
use
of
Addition
and
Substraction
,
to
equal
both
Magnitudes
and
their
relations
as
well
Compound
as
Simple
,
and
so
have
an
exact
Idea
of
the
Magnitude
of
their
Inequality
.
It
is
true
we
make
use
of
Multiplications
and
Divisions
as
well
simple
as
compounded
,
but
they
are
only
compounded
Additions
and
Substractions
.
Multiply
4
by
3
,
it
makes
as
many
Additions
of
4
as
3
,
contains
the
Additions
of
unity
,
or
finds
a
number
which
has
the
same
relation
to
4
,
as
the
3
has
to
unity
:
And
to
divide
12
by
4
,
is
to
substract
4
from
12
as
many
times
as
we
can
;
that
is
,
to
find
a
relation
to
unity
equal
to
that
of
12
to
4
;
for
3
which
will
be
the
Quote
of
it
,
has
the
same
relation
to
unity
as
12
to
4.
The
Extractions
of
square
and
cubick
Roots
,
&c.
are
only
Divisions
,
whereby
we
seek
one
,
two
,
or
three
Mean
Proportionals
.
It
is
evident
that
the
Mind
of
Man
is
so
narrow
,
his
Memory
so
treacherous
,
and
his
Imagination
so
confin'd
,
that
without
the
use
of
Figures
and
Writing
,
and
the
artificial
way
we
have
of
using
them
in
Arithmetick
,
it
would
be
impossible
to
make
such
Operations
as
are
necessary
to
discover
the
Inequality
of
Magnitudes
and
their
relations
:
If
we
had
many
numbers
to
add
or
to
substract
,
or
which
is
the
same
thing
,
when
these
Numbers
are
great
,
and
that
we
could
only
add
them
by
parts
,
we
should
always
forget
some
of
them
.
There
being
no
Imagination
extensive
enough
to
add
Fractions
together
which
consist
of
many
places
,
as
,
or
to
substract
the
one
from
the
other
.
Multiplications
,
Divisions
and
Extractions
of
Roots
in
whole
numbers
are
infinitely
more
perplexing
,
than
pure
Additions
or
Substractions
:
Without
the
help
of
Arithmetick
,
the
Mind
is
too
confin'd
and
too
weak
to
make
them
;
and
it
is
so
plain
,
that
it
would
be
unnecessary
for
me
to
stop
here
to
prove
it
.
Yet
Algebra
is
a
thing
quite
different
from
Arithmetick
:
It
much
less
divides
the
Capacity
of
the
Mind
;
it
abridges
our
Idea's
after
the
most
simple
and
easie
Method
that
can
be
conceived
:
What
requires
quires
much
time
to
be
performed
in
Arithmetick
,
is
done
by
Algebra
in
a
moment
,
without
perplexing
the
Mind
by
changing
of
Figures
,
or
long
Operations
.
In
short
,
There
are
many
things
,
that
may
and
are
necessary
to
be
known
,
which
yet
we
cannot
have
an
exact
knowledge
of
by
Arithmetick
only
:
But
I
believe
there
is
nothing
useful
,
and
that
Men
can
know
exactly
,
but
it
may
be
discovered
by
Arithmetick
and
Algebra
together
.
So
that
these
two
Sciences
are
the
Foundation
of
all
others
,
and
give
us
the
true
way
of
acquiring
all
Sciences
exactly
;
because
by
their
assistance
we
may
better
manage
the
Capacity
of
the
Mind
.
PART
II.
Of
Method
.
CHAP.
I.
Of
the
Rules
that
must
be
observed
in
the
Enquiry
after
Truth
.
AFter
having
explained
the
Method
that
is
proper
to
render
the
Mind
more
attentive
and
capacious
,
which
is
the
only
Way
we
have
to
make
it
more
perfect
,
that
is
,
more
clear
and
penetrating
:
It
is
time
to
proceed
to
the
Rules
that
't
is
absolutely
necessary
to
observe
,
in
the
Resolution
of
all
Questions
.
This
I
shall
speak
pretty
fully
to
,
and
endeavour
to
explain
it
by
many
Instances
,
that
its
Necessity
may
the
better
appear
,
and
how
the
Mind
ought
to
be
accustomed
to
put
it
in
use
;
because
it
is
not
so
difficult
or
necessary
to
know
,
as
to
practise
well
.
Something
very
extraordinary
and
surprizing
must
not
be
expected
here
,
but
on
the
contrary
,
to
have
these
Rules
good
,
they
must
be
simple
,
natural
,
few
in
Number
,
very
intelligible
,
and
dependant
one
upon
another
.
In
a
Word
,
they
ought
only
to
conduct
our
Minds
,
and
regulate
our
Attention
without
dividing
it
.
For
Experience
sufficiently
shows
us
,
that
the
Logick
of
Aristotle
is
of
no
great
use
,
because
it
imploys
the
Mind
too
much
,
and
diverts
it
from
the
Attention
it
ought
to
give
to
those
Subjects
it
examines
.
Let
those
then
,
who
only
love
Mysteries
,
and
extraordinary
Inventions
,
for
some
time
quit
this
Fantastical
Humour
:
And
give
all
the
Attention
they
are
capable
of
,
that
they
may
examine
whether
the
Rules
that
we
lay
down
,
are
sufficient
always
to
preserve
Evidence
in
the
Perceptions
of
the
Mind
,
and
to
discover
the
most
hidden
Truths
.
If
they
do
not
unjustly
prejudice
themselves
against
the
Simplicity
and
Easiness
of
them
,
I
believe
they
will
acknowledge
,
from
the
Use
we
shall
hereafter
make
of
them
,
that
the
most
clear
and
simple
Principles
are
the
most
fruitful
,
and
that
extraordinary
and
difficult
things
are
not
always
so
useful
as
our
vain
Curiosity
would
dictate
to
us
.
The
chief
of
these
Rules
is
,
That
we
must
always
preserve
Evidence
in
our
Reasonings
,
to
be
able
to
discover
the
Truth
without
deceiving
our selves
.
On
this
Princip●e
depends
this
general
Rule
which
regards
the
Subject
of
our
Studies
,
viz.
That
we
ought
only
to
reason
upon
such
things
as
we
have
a
clear
Idea
of
.
And
by
a
necessary
Consequence
,
That
we
must
always
begin
with
the
most
simple
and
easie
things
,
and
continue
some
Time
upon
them
,
before
we
undertake
to
enquire
into
the
more
compounded
and
difficult
ones
.
The
Rules
which
respect
the
manner
of
resolving
Questions
,
depend
likewise
upon
this
first
Principle
;
and
the
first
of
these
Rules
is
,
That
we
must
have
a
distinct
conception
of
the
Condition
of
the
Question
that
is
proposed
to
be
resolved
,
and
have
Idea's
of
these
Terms
clear
enough
to
be
able
to
compare
them
,
and
so
to
discover
the
Relations
which
we
enquire
after
.
But
when
we
cannot
discover
the
Relations
that
things
have
amongst
themselves
,
by
immediately
comparing
them
:
The
second
Rule
is
,
One
or
many
intermediate
Idea's
must
be
found
by
the
Effort
of
the
Mind
,
which
may
serve
as
a
common
Measure
;
whereby
to
discover
the
Relations
that
are
between
them
.
It
must
be
inviolably
observed
,
that
these
Idea's
are
so
much
the
more
clear
and
distinct
,
as
the
Relations
we
endeavour
to
discover
,
are
more
accurate
and
in
greater
Number
.
But
when
Questions
are
difficult
,
and
of
long
Discussion
,
the
third
Rule
is
,
That
we
must
carefully
seperate
from
the
Sbject
that
we
would
consider
,
all
things
that
are
not
necessary
to
be
examined
to
discover
the
Truth
we
seek
:
For
we
must
not
fruitlesly
divide
the
Capacity
of
the
Mind
:
All
its
Power
ought
to
be
imployed
in
such
things
only
as
can
illuminate
it
.
Things
that
may
be
thus
separated
,
are
all
those
that
do
not
concern
the
Question
,
and
which
being
taken
away
,
the
Question
remains
intire
.
The
Question
being
thus
reduced
to
its
least
Terms
,
the
fourth
Rule
is
;
To
divide
the
Subject
of
our
Meditation
into
Parts
,
and
consider
them
one
after
another
,
according
to
their
Natural
Order
,
beginning
with
the
most
simple
,
viz.
those
that
include
the
fewest
Relations
,
and
never
to
pass
to
the
most
compounded
,
before
we
have
distinctly
discovered
the
most
simple
,
and
made
them
familiar
to
us
.
When
these
things
are
become
easie
to
us
,
by
Meditation
;
the
fifth
Rule
is
,
To
abridge
our
Idea's
,
and
afterwards
dispose
them
in
our
Imagination
,
or
write
them
upon
Paper
,
that
by
that
means
they
may
no
longer
fill
the
Capacity
of
the
Mind
.
Although
this
Rule
is
always
useful
,
it
is
not
absolutely
necessary
,
except
in
the
most
difficult
Questions
,
which
require
a
great
Capacity
of
Mind
,
because
we
inlarge
the
Mind
only
by
abridging
our
Idea's
.
The
Use
of
this
Rule
,
and
of
those
which
follow
,
cannot
be
discovered
by
any
other
Method
than
Algebra
The
Idea's
of
all
things
which
are
absolutely
necessary
to
be
considered
,
being
clear
,
familiar
,
short
,
and
put
in
order
by
the
Imagination
,
or
expressed
upon
Paper
:
The
sixth
Rule
is
,
They
must
all
be
compared
according
to
the
Rules
of
Combination
,
Alternately
one
with
the
other
,
either
by
a
simple
View
of
the
Mind
,
or
by
the
Motion
of
the
Imagination
,
accompanied
with
this
Prospect
of
the
Mind
,
or
else
by
the
Calculation
of
the
Pen
joyned
to
the
Attention
of
the
Mind
and
Imagination
.
If
of
all
the
Relations
which
result
from
all
these
Comparisons
,
there
shou'd
not
be
found
that
which
we
seek
:
We
must
,
anew
,
separate
from
all
these
Relations
,
those
that
are
not
useful
in
the
Resolving
the
Question
,
and
make
the
rest
easie
,
short
,
and
dispose
in
the
Imagination
,
or
express
them
upon
Paper
,
Compare
them
together
according
to
the
Rules
of
Combinations
,
and
examine
whether
the
compounded
Relation
that
we
seek
,
is
any
one
of
all
those
compounded
Relations
which
result
from
these
new
Comparisons
.
If
none
of
these
Relations
which
we
have
discovered
include
the
Resolution
of
the
Question
:
Then
all
these
Relations
must
be
thrown
by
as
useless
,
and
we
must
make
others
familiar
,
&c.
And
in
continuing
after
this
manner
,
we
shall
discover
the
true
Relation
that
we
seek
how
compounded
soever
it
be
;
provided
we
can
sufficiently
extend
the
Capacity
of
the
Mind
,
by
abridging
its
Idea's
,
and
through
all
these
Operations
bear
in
Mind
the
Term
we
look
for
,
't
is
a
continual
View
of
the
Question
that
must
regulate
all
the
Advances
of
the
Mind
,
since
't
is
necessary
to
know
what
we
enquire
after
.
Above
all
,
we
must
take
care
that
we
do
not
rest
satisfied
with
any
false
Appearance
or
Probability
,
but
so
often
begin
the
Comparisons
we
make
use
of
to
discover
the
Truth
till
we
cannot
refrain
our
assent
to
it
,
without
perceiving
the
secret
Reproaches
of
the
Master
,
who
answers
to
our
Request
.
I
mean
our
Endeavours
,
the
Application
of
our
Mind
,
and
our
Desires
;
and
then
this
Truth
may
serve
us
for
an
infallible
Principle
to
advance
us
in
the
Sciences
.
All
these
Rules
that
we
have
given
,
are
not
generally
necessary
in
all
Sorts
of
Questions
;
for
when
Questions
are
very
easie
,
the
first
Rule
is
sufficient
;
and
in
many
we
need
only
the
first
and
second
.
In
a
Word
,
since
we
must
make
use
of
these
Rules
,
until
we
have
discovered
the
Truth
that
we
seek
,
it
is
necessary
to
practise
them
so
much
the
more
as
the
Questions
are
more
difficult
.
These
Rules
are
not
very
numerous
.
They
depend
all
upon
one
another
.
They
are
natural
,
and
may
be
rendred
so
familiar
,
that
it
will
not
be
necessary
to
think
much
upon
them
when
we
have
Occasion
to
use
them
.
In
short
,
they
can
so
regulate
the
Attention
of
the
Mind
as
not
to
divided
it
,
which
is
a
great
Part
of
what
we
desire
.
But
they
appear
,
so
inconsiderable
of
themselves
that
to
recommend
them
,
it
is
necessary
to
show
that
Philosophers
are
fallen
into
a
great
many
Errors
and
Extravagances
,
because
they
have
not
so
much
as
observed
the
two
first
which
are
the
easiest
and
cheifest
;
and
that
't
is
also
by
the
Use
that
Mr.
Descartes
has
made
of
them
,
that
he
has
discovered
so
many
great
and
beneficial
Truths
in
his
Works
.
CHAP.
II.
Of
the
general
Rule
which
concerns
the
Subject
of
our
Studies
.
That
the
Philosophers
have
not
observed
it
,
which
has
caused
many
Errors
in
Physicks
.
THE
first
of
these
Rules
,
and
that
which
concers
the
Subject
of
our
Studies
,
teaches
us
that
we
ought
only
to
reason
upon
clear
Idea's
;
from
whence
this
Consequence
may
be
drawn
,
that
to
preserve
a
good
Order
in
our
Studies
,
we
must
begin
with
things
that
are
most
simple
,
and
easie
to
be
apprehended
,
and
continue
a
great
while
upon
them
before
we
undertake
the
Disquisition
of
the
most
compound
and
difficult
.
Every
one
will
agree
about
the
Necessity
of
this
general
Rule
,
for
't
is
plain
enough
,
that
to
reason
upon
obscure
Idea's
,
and
uncertain
Principles
,
is
to
walk
in
the
Dark
;
but
it
may
be
wondered
at
,
if
I
said
't
is
obobserved
but
very
seldom
,
and
that
most
of
the
Sciences
which
are
still
the
Subject
of
the
Pride
of
some
falsely
learned
Men
,
are
only
grounded
upon
either
too
confused
or
too
general
Idea's
,
to
be
useful
in
the
Disquisition
of
Truth
.
Aristotle
,
who
justly
deserves
the
Title
of
the
Prince
of
these
Philosophers
,
which
I
speak
of
,
because
he
is
the
Father
of
that
Philosophy
which
they
cultivate
with
so
much
Care
,
seldom
reasons
but
upon
confused
Idea's
which
are
received
by
the
Senses
,
and
upon
some
other
general
and
indeterminate
Idea's
,
which
represent
nothing
that
is
particular
to
the
Mind
;
for
the
Terms
common
to
this
Philosopher
,
can
only
serve
confusedly
to
express
to
the
Senses
and
Imagination
,
the
imperfect
Sensations
we
have
of
sensible
things
,
or
to
make
Men
speak
after
so
general
and
indeterminate
a
Manner
that
they
express
nothing
distinctly
.
Almost
all
his
Works
,
but
especially
his
eight
Books
of
Physicks
,
of
which
there
are
as
different
Commentators
,
as
there
are
Professors
in
Philosophy
,
are
nothing
but
a
mere
Logick
,
there
are
long
Discourses
in
it
,
without
any
thing
at
the
Bottom
:
'T
is
not
that
he
is
prolix
,
but
because
he
has
the
Secret
of
being
concise
,
and
of
affording
nothing
but
Words
:
He
does
not
make
such
a
frequent
Use
of
his
general
Terms
in
his
other
Works
,
but
those
he
uses
only
serve
to
stir
up
the
confused
Idea's
of
the
Senses
;
'T
is
by
those
Idea's
that
he
pretends
,
in
his
Problems
and
elsewhere
,
in
two
Words
,
to
resolve
an
infinite
Number
of
Questions
,
of
which
a
Demonstration
may
be
given
,
that
't
is
impossible
to
resolve
them
.
But
that
my
Meaning
may
the
better
be
comprehended
,
what
I
have
proved
elsewhere
must
be
remembred
,
viz
,
That
all
Terms
which
only
stir
up
sensible
Idea's
are
equivocal
,
but
what
is
to
be
considered
is
,
they
are
equivocal
through
Error
and
Ignorance
;
and
consequently
cause
an
infinite
Number
of
Errors
.
The
Word
Ram
is
equivocal
;
it
signifies
both
an
Animal
and
a
Constellation
,
in
which
the
Sun
enters
at
the
Spring
;
but
it
is
rare
that
we
are
deceived
by
it
.
For
he
must
be
a
mighty
Astrologer
who
shou'd
imagine
any
Relation
between
these
two
things
:
And
believe
,
for
instance
,
that
we
are
apt
to
vomit
at
that
Time
,
if
we
take
Medicines
,
because
the
Ram
chews
the
Cud.
But
for
the
Terms
of
sensible
Idea's
,
there
is
hardly
any
body
who
discovers
that
they
are
equivocal
.
Aristotle
,
and
the
ancient
Philosophers
,
have
not
so
much
as
thought
of
it
,
as
will
easily
be
granted
,
if
we
read
any
thing
of
their
Works
,
and
distinctly
know
the
Cause
why
these
Terms
are
equivocal
.
For
there
is
nothing
more
evident
,
than
that
the
Philosophers
have
received
the
contrary
to
what
ought
to
be
believed
upon
this
Subject
.
For
instance
,
when
they
say
Fire
is
hot
,
Grass
green
,
Sugar
sweet
,
&c.
they
think
with
Children
and
the
Vulgar
,
that
the
Fire
contains
what
they
feel
when
they
Warm
themselves
;
that
Herbs
have
the
same
Colours
upon
them
,
as
they
believe
they
see
;
and
that
Sugar
includes
the
Sweetness
in
it
that
we
taste
in
eating
;
and
so
of
all
things
which
we
see
or
feel
.
It
is
impossible
to
doubt
of
this
if
we
read
their
Writings
:
They
speak
of
sensible
Qualities
as
of
Sensations
:
They
take
Heat
for
Motion
,
and
thus
because
of
the
Equivocation
of
Terms
,
they
confound
the
Modifications
of
Bodies
with
the
Modifications
of
Spirits
.
'T
is
only
since
Descartes
,
that
these
confused
and
indetermined
Questions
,
whether
Fire
is
hot
,
Herbs
green
,
Sugar
sweet
,
&c.
have
been
answered
by
distinguishing
the
Equivocations
of
sensible
Terms
which
express
them
.
If
by
Heat
,
Colour
,
Taste
,
you
mean
such
or
such
a
Motion
of
insensible
Parts
;
Fire
is
hot
,
Herbs
green
,
Sugar
sweet
,
&c.
But
if
by
Heat
and
the
other
Qualities
,
you
mean
,
what
I
feel
near
the
Fire
,
what
I
see
when
I
look
upon
Herbs
,
&c.
Fire
is
not
hot
,
nor
Herbs
green
,
&c.
for
the
Heat
that
we
feel
,
and
Colours
which
we
see
,
are
only
in
the
Soul
,
as
I
have
proved
in
the
first
Part
of
this
Book
.
Now
,
as
Men
think
what
they
feel
,
is
the
same
thing
as
what
is
really
in
the
Object
:
They
think
they
have
a
Right
to
judge
of
the
Qualities
of
Objects
,
by
the
Sensations
they
have
of
them
.
So
they
speak
not
two
Words
without
saying
something
false
,
nor
ever
speak
any
thing
upon
this
matter
which
is
not
obscure
and
confused
;
as
many
following
Reasons
will
evince
.
The
first
,
because
all
Men
have
not
the
same
Sensations
,
nor
one
Man
at
different
Times
,
or
when
he
feels
the
same
Objects
by
different
Parts
of
his
Body
.
What
seems
sweet
to
this
Man
,
is
bitter
to
another
;
what
is
cold
to
this
,
the
same
is
hot
to
another
;
what
seems
hot
to
one
that
is
cold
,
seems
cold
to
the
same
Person
when
he
has
warmed
himself
,
or
if
he
feels
it
in
different
Parts
of
his
Body
.
If
Water
seems
hot
to
one
Hand
,
it
often
seems
cold
to
the
other
,
or
to
some
Part
near
the
Heat
,
if
washed
therewith
.
Salt
seems
savoury
to
the
Tongue
,
and
sharp
to
a
Wound
,
Sugar
seems
sweet
to
the
Mouth
,
and
Aloes
extreamly
bitter
,
but
nothing
is
either
sweet
or
bitter
to
the
rest
of
the
of
the
Senses
.
So
that
when
we
say
such
a
thing
is
cold
,
sweet
,
bitter
,
it
determines
nothing
certainly
.
The
second
,
because
different
Objects
may
produce
the
same
Sensation
.
Plaister
,
Bread
,
Snow
,
Sugar
,
Salt
,
&c.
produce
the
same
Sensation
of
Colour
:
Yet
their
Whiteness
is
different
,
if
we
judge
otherwise
of
them
than
by
the
Senses
.
So
when
we
say
Flower
is
white
,
we
say
nothing
distinctly
.
The
third
,
because
the
Qualities
of
Bodies
,
which
cause
in
us
Sensations
perfectly
different
,
are
almost
the
same
;
and
on
the
contrary
,
those
of
which
we
have
almost
the
same
Sensations
,
are
often
very
different
.
There
is
scarcely
any
Difference
in
the
Qualities
of
Sweetness
and
Bitterness
that
is
in
Objects
,
and
yet
the
Sensations
of
them
are
essentially
different
.
The
Motions
which
cause
Pain
or
Titilation
,
differ
only
as
to
the
more
or
less
;
and
yet
the
Sensations
of
Titilation
and
Pain
are
essentially
different
.
On
the
contrary
,
the
Sharpness
of
Fruit
differs
not
so
much
from
Bitterness
as
Sweetness
does
,
and
yet
this
Quality
is
the
most
distant
from
Bitterness
that
can
be
.
Since
it
is
requisite
that
a
Fruit
which
is
sharp
,
because
it
is
too
green
,
must
receive
a
great
Number
of
Changes
before
it
grows
bitter
for
being
too
much
ripe
or
rotten
.
When
Fruits
are
too
ripe
,
they
seem
sweet
,
and
when
they
are
a
little
too
ripe
they
seem
Bitter
:
Bitterness
and
Sweetness
in
Fruits
differ
then
only
as
to
the
more
or
less
;
and
that
is
the
reason
that
some
Persons
think
them
sweet
,
when
others
think
them
bitter
.
For
some
there
are
who
think
Aloes
as
sweet
as
Honey
.
It
is
the
same
with
all
Sensible
Idea's
.
The
Terms
of
sweet
,
bitter
,
salt
,
sharp
,
sower
,
&c.
of
red
,
green
,
yellow
,
&c.
of
such
and
such
Smells
,
Tasts
,
Colours
,
&c.
are
therefore
all
equivocal
,
and
stir
up
no
clear
and
distinct
Idea
in
the
Mind
:
Yet
School
Philosophers
,
and
the
vulgar
,
judge
of
all
the
Sensible
Qualities
of
bodies
,
only
by
the
Sensations
they
receive
from
them
.
These
Philosophers
,
not
only
judge
of
Sensible
Qualities
,
by
the
Sensations
they
receive
of
them
;
but
of
things
by
a
Consequence
of
the
Judgments
they
have
made
concerning
Sensible
Qualities
.
For
what
Sensations
they
have
essentially
different
from
certain
Qualities
,
they
believe
is
owing
to
a
Generation
of
new
Forms
which
produce
these
Imaginary
Differences
of
Qualities
,
Corn
appears
yellow
,
hard
,
&c.
Flower
white
,
soft
,
&c.
And
from
thence
they
conclude
from
the
Relation
of
their
Eyes
and
Hands
,
that
these
are
Bodies
essentially
different
,
not
considering
of
the
manner
whereby
Corn
is
changed
into
Flower
;
yet
Flower
is
only
Corn
broken
and
ground
;
as
Fire
is
only
Wood
divided
and
agitated
;
and
Ashes
,
the
grossest
Part
of
the
Wood
,
separated
without
Agitation
;
and
Glass
only
Ashes
whereof
each
Part
is
polished
,
and
made
a
little
round
by
the
Attrition
caused
by
Fire
;
and
so
of
other
Transmutations
of
Bodies
.
It
is
then
evident
,
that
Sensible
Terms
and
Idea's
are
wholly
useless
for
a
just
proposing
,
and
clear
resolving
of
Questions
,
or
the
Discovery
of
Truth
.
Yet
is
there
no
Question
,
however
perplexed
by
the
Equivocal
Terms
of
the
Senses
,
but
Aristotle
,
and
the
greatest
Part
of
the
Philosophers
,
pretend
in
their
Books
,
to
resolve
it
without
these
Distinctions
that
we
have
given
;
not
considering
they
are
Equivocal
through
Ignorance
and
Error
.
For
instance
,
if
we
demand
of
those
who
have
passed
their
whole
Lives
in
reading
the
ancient
Philosophers
or
Physicians
,
and
who
have
intirely
espoused
their
Sentiments
;
whether
Water
is
moist
,
Fire
dry
,
Wine
hot
,
the
Blood
of
Fishes
cold
,
if
Water
is
more
crude
than
Wine
,
Gold
more
perfect
than
Quicksilver
,
whether
Plants
and
Beasts
have
Souls
,
and
a
thousand
other
undetermined
Questions
?
They
will
easily
answer
,
without
consulting
any
thing
but
the
Impression
these
Objects
have
made
upon
their
Senses
,
or
what
their
Memories
have
retained
of
their
reading
.
They
do
not
perceive
that
these
Terms
are
equivocal
.
They
think
it
strange
that
they
must
define
them
,
and
are
impatient
if
we
endeavour
to
discover
to
them
,
that
they
go
a
little
too
fast
,
and
that
their
Senses
are
deceived
.
They
'll
make
Distinctions
enough
to
confound
the
most
evident
things
,
and
in
these
Questions
where
't
is
necessary
to
remove
the
Equivocation
,
they
see
nothing
to
distinguish
.
If
we
consider
that
the
greatest
Part
of
the
Questions
of
Philosophers
and
Physicians
include
some
equivocal
Terms
like
those
we
have
spoken
of
,
we
cannot
doubt
but
that
these
learned
Men
,
who
have
not
been
able
to
define
them
,
have
delivered
nothing
Solid
in
all
the
great
Volumes
they
have
composed
;
and
what
I
have
said
may
suffice
to
overthrow
almost
all
the
Opinions
of
the
Ancients
.
But
for
Descartes
,
he
perfectly
knew
how
to
distinguish
these
things
.
He
resolved
no
Question
by
Sensible
Idea's
;
and
if
we
take
the
Pains
to
read
him
,
we
shall
see
he
explained
every
thing
after
a
more
clear
and
evident
Manner
,
and
almost
always
demonstrated
them
only
by
the
distinct
Idea's
of
Extension
,
Figure
,
and
Motion
.
The
other
kind
of
equivocal
Terms
which
Philosophers
make
use
of
,
comprehend
all
these
general
Terms
of
Logick
,
by
which
it
is
easie
to
explain
things
without
having
any
Knowledge
of
them
.
Aristotle
has
made
the
most
use
of
them
,
all
his
Books
are
full
of
them
,
and
some
are
a
mere
Logick
.
He
proposes
and
resolves
all
things
by
these
Specious
Words
,
Genus
,
Species
,
Power
,
Nature
,
Form
,
Faculty
,
Quality
,
Causa
per
se
,
Causa
per
accidens
:
His
Followers
have
had
no
small
Trouble
to
apprehend
the
meaning
of
these
Words
which
signifie
nothing
at
all
,
nor
are
they
more
learned
than
before
,
when
they
have
heard
say
that
Fire
dissolves
Metals
,
because
it
has
a
Faculty
of
dissolving
them
;
and
that
a
Man
digests
not
because
he
has
a
weak
Stomach
,
or
that
his
Faculty
of
Concocting
does
not
perform
its
Functions
well
.
It
is
true
,
those
who
have
made
use
of
these
Terms
,
and
general
Idea's
,
to
explain
all
things
by
,
do
not
commonly
fall
into
so
great
a
Number
of
Errors
,
as
those
who
only
make
use
of
them
to
stir
up
the
confused
Ideas
of
the
Senses
.
The
Philosophers
of
the
Schools
are
,
not
so
subject
to
Error
as
certain
]
Dogmatical
decisive
Physicians
,
who
form
Systems
upon
some
Experiments
,
which
they
know
not
the
reason
of
;
because
they
speak
so
generally
that
they
run
no
great
Hazzard
.
The
Fire
warms
,
dries
,
hardens
,
and
softens
,
because
it
has
such
Faculties
as
produce
these
Effects
:
Senna
purges
by
its
Purgative
Quality
,
Bread
nourishes
by
its
Nutritive
Quality
:
These
Proportions
are
not
subject
to
Error
,
for
a
Quality
is
that
which
denotes
a
thing
by
such
a
Name
;
and
we
cannot
deny
it
to
Aristotle
,
for
indeed
this
Definition
is
indisputable
.
Such
,
or
the
like
manner
of
speaking
are
not
false
,
but
only
in
Effect
they
signifie
nothing
.
These
indetermined
Idea's
ingage
us
not
in
Error
,
but
they
are
wholy
useless
in
the
Discovery
of
Truth
.
For
although
we
know
there
is
a
substantial
Form
in
Fire
,
accompanied
with
a
thousand
Faculties
,
like
to
those
of
heating
,
dilating
,
melting
Gold
,
Silver
,
and
all
Metals
;
of
clearing
,
burning
,
and
baking
:
If
this
Difficulty
be
proposed
to
me
to
be
resolved
,
viz.
whether
Fire
can
harden
Dirt
and
soften
Wax
?
The
Idea's
of
Substantial
Form
,
and
of
those
Faculties
that
produce
Heat
,
Ratification
,
Fluidity
,
&c.
would
be
of
no
use
to
me
in
resolving
the
Question
;
for
there
being
no
Connexion
betwen
the
Idea's
,
of
the
Hardness
of
Dirt
,
and
Softness
of
Wax
,
and
those
of
the
Substantial
Form
of
Fire
,
and
the
Qualities
of
producing
Rarification
,
Fluidity
,
&c.
It
is
the
same
with
all
general
Idea's
,
so
they
are
wholly
useless
for
the
Ends
designed
.
But
if
we
know
that
Fire
is
nothing
else
but
the
Parts
of
Wood
put
into
continal
Motion
,
and
that
't
is
only
by
this
Agitation
,
that
it
excites
the
Sensation
of
Heat
in
us
:
If
we
knew
at
the
same
Time
that
the
Softness
of
Dirt
consists
only
in
a
Mixture
of
Earth
and
Water
,
as
these
Idea's
are
not
confused
and
general
,
but
distinct
and
particular
:
It
would
not
be
difficult
to
see
that
the
Heat
of
Fire
must
harden
Dirt
,
because
one
Body
can
move
another
,
being
it self
in
Motion
.
We
likewise
easily
discover
,
that
since
Heat
,
which
is
felt
near
the
Fire
,
is
caused
by
the
Motion
of
the
invisible
Parts
of
the
Wood
,
which
,
strike
against
the
Hands
,
if
we
expose
Dirt
to
the
Heat
of
the
Fire
,
the
Watery
Parts
,
which
are
joyned
to
the
Earth
,
being
more
lose
,
and
consequently
,
sooner
agitated
by
the
Shock
of
the
little
Bodies
which
go
out
from
the
Fire
,
than
the
gross
Particles
of
the
Earth
;
they
must
separate
and
leave
it
dry
and
hard
.
It
would
also
evidently
apppear
,
that
Fire
cannot
harden
Wax
,
if
we
knew
that
the
Particles
which
compose
it
,
are
branched
and
very
near
of
the
same
Bigness
.
Thus
particular
Idea's
are
very
useful
in
an
Enquiry
after
Truth
:
And
indeterminate
.
Idea's
are
hot
only
useless
,
but
on
the
contrary
,
insensibly
lead
us
into
Error
.
These
Philosophers
content
not
themselves
with
making
use
of
general
Terms
,
and
indetermined
Idea's
that
answer
nothing
:
But
they
will
have
those
Terms
signifie
certain
particular
Beings
.
They
pretend
that
there
is
some
Substance
distinct
from
Matter
,
which
is
the
Form
of
Matter
,
and
an
infinite
Company
of
little
Beings
really
distinct
from
Matter
and
Form
;
of
which
they
suppose
as
many
of
them
as
they
have
different
Sensations
of
Bodies
,
and
they
think
these
Bodies
produce
different
Effects
.
Yet
it
is
plain
to
any
Man
that
is
capable
of
Attention
,
that
all
these
little
Beings
,
distinct
from
Fire
;
for
instance
,
and
which
we
suppose
to
be
contained
therein
,
for
the
Production
of
Heat
,
Light
,
Hardness
,
Fluidity
,
&c
,
are
only
Fictions
of
the
Imagination
,
which
are
contrary
to
Reason
:
For
Reason
hath
no
particular
Idea
which
represents
these
little
Beings
.
If
we
ask
the
Philosophers
,
what
Sort
of
Entity
that
Faculty
in
the
Fire
is
which
gives
Light
,
they
will
only
answer
that
't
is
a
Being
which
is
the
Cause
why
Fire
is
capable
of
producing
Light
:
So
that
the
Idea
they
have
of
the
Faculty
of
Light
,
is
not
different
from
the
general
Idea
of
the
Cause
,
and
confused
Idea
of
the
Effect
which
we
see
.
They
have
therefore
no
clear
Idea
of
what
they
say
,
when
they
admit
these
particular
Beings
.
Thus
they
say
what
they
conceive
not
,
and
what
indeed
is
impossible
to
be
conceived
.
CHAP.
III.
Of
the
most
dangerous
Error
in
Philosophy
.
Of
the
Ancients
.
PHilosophers
have
not
only
spoke
what
they
did
not
conceive
,
when
they
explained
the
Effects
of
Nature
,
by
certain
Beings
which
they
have
no
particular
Idea
of
,
but
even
establish
a
Principle
from
whence
may
directly
be
drawn
most
false
and
dangerous
Consequences
.
For
if
,
according
to
their
Opinion
,
we
suppose
,
that
in
Bodies
there
are
some
Beings
distinct
from
Matter
;
and
not
having
any
distinct
Idea
of
these
Entities
,
we
might
easily
imagine
,
that
they
are
the
true
,
or
principal
Causes
of
the
Effects
which
we
see
produced
.
'T
is
even
the
common
Sentiment
of
most
Philosophers
:
For
't
is
chiefly
to
explain
these
Effects
,
that
they
make
use
of
Substantial
Forms
,
Real
Qualities
,
and
other
the
like
Entities
.
But
when
we
come
to
consider
attentively
,
the
Idea
we
have
of
Cause
or
Power
of
acting
,
we
cannot
doubt
but
that
it
represents
something
Divine
:
For
the
Idea
of
a
Sovereign
Power
,
is
the
Idea
of
Sovereign
Divinity
;
and
the
Idea
of
a
Subordinate
Power
,
is
the
Idea
of
an
inferiour
;
but
a
true
Divinity
at
least
,
according
to
the
Opinion
of
the
Heathens
,
if
it
be
the
Idea
of
a
Power
or
true
Cause
.
We
admit
therefore
something
Divine
in
all
Bodies
which
encompass
us
,
when
we
admit
Forms
,
Faculties
,
Qualities
,
Vertues
,
and
real
Beings
,
capable
of
producing
certain
Effects
,
by
the
Power
of
their
own
Nature
:
And
thus
,
they
insensibly
enter
into
the
Opinions
of
the
Heathens
,
by
the
Respect
they
have
for
their
Philosophy
.
Faith
indeed
works
it
,
but
it
may
perhaps
be
said
,
that
if
we
are
Christians
in
our
Hearts
,
we
are
Heathens
in
our
Minds
.
Moreover
,
it
is
difficult
to
perswade
our selves
,
that
we
ought
neither
to
love
or
fear
,
true
Powers
and
Beings
,
who
can
act
upon
us
,
punish
us
with
Pain
,
or
recompense
us
with
Pleasure
.
And
as
Love
and
Fear
are
a
true
Adoration
,
't
is
also
difficult
to
perswade
our selves
that
we
ought
not
to
adore
them
.
For
whatever
can
act
upon
us
,
as
a
real
and
true
Cause
,
is
necessarily
above
us
,
according
to
St.
Austin
and
right
Reason
:
The
same
Father
,
and
the
same
Reason
tells
us
,
't
is
an
immutable
Law
that
Inferiour
things
should
submit
to
superiour
.
And
from
hence
,
Ego
enim
ab
animâ
hoc
corpus
animari
non
puto
,
nifi
intentione
facientis
:
Nec
ab
isto
quicquam
illam
pati
Arbitror
,
sed
facere
de
illo
&
in
illo
,
tanquam
subjecto
divinitus
dominationi
suae
.
l.
6.
mus
.
c.
5.
*
this
great
Father
concludes
,
that
the
Body
cannot
act
upon
the
Soul
,
and
that
nothing
can
be
above
the
Soul
but
God
.
In
the
Holy
Scriptures
,
when
God
proves
to
the
Israelites
,
that
they
ought
to
adore
him
,
that
is
,
that
they
ought
to
fear
and
love
him
,
the
chief
Reasons
he
brings
,
are
taken
from
his
Power
,
to
recompence
and
punish
them
.
He
represents
to
them
the
Benefits
they
have
received
from
him
,
the
Evils
wherewith
he
hath
chastised
them
,
and
that
he
has
still
the
same
Power
.
He
forbids
them
to
adore
the
Gods
of
the
Heathens
,
because
they
have
no
Power
over
them
,
and
can
do
them
neither
Good
nor
Hurt
.
He
requires
them
to
honour
him
only
,
because
he
only
is
the
true
Cause
of
Good
and
Evil
,
and
that
there
happens
none
in
their
City
,
according
to
the
Prophet
,
which
he
has
not
done
;
for
Natural
Causes
are
not
the
true
Causes
of
the
Evil
that
appears
to
be
done
to
us
.
'T
is
God
alone
that
acts
in
them
,
and
't
is
he
only
that
we
must
fear
and
love
:
Soli
Deo
Honor
&
Gloria
.
In
short
,
this
Opinion
,
that
we
ought
to
fear
and
love
,
whatsoever
is
the
true
Cause
of
Good
and
Evil
,
appears
so
natural
and
just
,
that
it
is
impossible
to
destroy
it
;
so
that
if
we
suppose
this
false
Opinion
of
the
Philosophers
(
which
we
endeavour
here
to
confute
)
that
Bodies
which
encompass
us
are
the
true
Causes
of
the
Pleasures
and
Evils
which
we
feel
:
Reason
seems
to
justifie
a
Religion
like
to
that
of
the
Heathens
,
and
approves
of
the
universal
Irregularity
of
Manners
.
It
is
true
,
that
Reason
does
not
tell
us
that
we
must
adore
Onyons
and
Leeks
,
as
the
Sovereign
Divinity
;
because
they
cannot
make
us
intirely
happy
when
we
have
of
them
,
or
intirely
unhappy
when
we
want
them
.
Nor
have
the
Heathens
ever
done
to
them
so
much
Honour
as
to
the
great
Jupiter
,
upon
whom
all
their
Divinities
depend
,
or
as
to
the
Sun
,
which
our
Senses
represent
to
us
,
as
the
universal
Cause
,
which
gives
Life
and
Motion
to
all
things
,
and
,
which
we
cannot
hinder
our selves
from
regarding
as
a
Sovereign
Divinity
;
if
with
the
Heathen
Philosophers
,
we
suppose
it
includes
in
its
being
the
true
Causes
of
whatever
it
seems
to
produce
,
not
only
in
our
Bodies
and
Minds
,
but
likewise
in
all
Beings
which
encompass
us
.
But
if
we
must
not
pay
a
Sovereign
Honour
to
Leeks
and
Onyons
,
yet
we
may
always
render
them
some
particular
Adoration
:
I
mean
,
we
may
think
of
and
love
them
in
some
manner
;
if
it
is
true
,
that
in
some
sort
they
can
make
us
happy
,
we
must
honour
them
in
Proportion
to
the
Good
they
can
do
us
.
And
certainly
,
Men
who
give
Ear
to
the
Reports
of
their
Senses
,
think
that
Pulse
is
capable
of
doing
them
good
;
for
else
the
Israelites
,
for
instance
,
would
not
have
regretted
their
Absence
in
the
Defect
,
nor
considered
it
as
a
Misfortune
to
be
deprived
of
them
,
if
they
did
not
,
in
some
manner
,
look
upon
themselves
happy
in
the
Enjoyment
of
them
.
These
are
the
Irregularities
which
our
Reason
engages
us
in
,
when
it
is
joyned
to
the
Principles
of
the
Heathen
Philosophy
,
and
follows
the
Impressons
of
the
Senses
.
That
we
may
longer
doubt
of
the
Falseness
of
this
Miserable
Philosphy
,
and
the
Certainty
of
our
Principles
,
and
Clearness
of
the
Idea's
we
make
use
of
:
It
is
necessary
,
clearly
to
establish
those
Truths
which
are
opposite
to
the
Errors
of
the
ancient
Philosophy
,
and
to
prove
,
in
short
,
that
there
is
only
one
true
Cause
,
because
there
is
only
one
true
God
:
That
Nature
,
or
the
Power
of
every
thing
,
proceeds
only
from
the
Will
of
God
:
That
all
Natural
things
are
not
true
Causes
,
but
only
occasional
ones
;
and
some
other
Truths
which
will
be
the
Consequences
of
these
.
It
is
evident
that
all
Bodies
,
both
great
and
small
,
have
no
power
of
removing
themselves
:
A
Mountain
,
an
House
,
a
Stone
,
a
grain
of
Sand
;
and
in
short
,
the
least
or
biggest
Bodies
we
can
conceive
,
have
no
power
of
removing
themselves
.
We
have
only
two
sorts
of
Idea's
,
that
of
Bodies
,
and
that
of
Spirits
;
whereas
we
ought
to
speak
only
of
those
things
which
we
conceive
we
should
reason
according
to
these
two
Idea's
.
Since
therefore
the
Idea
we
have
of
all
Bodies
,
shows
us
that
they
cannot
move
themselves
,
it
must
be
concluded
that
they
are
moved
by
Spirits
only
.
But
when
we
examine
the
Idea
we
have
of
all
finite
Minds
,
we
do
not
see
the
necessary
Connexion
between
their
Wills
and
the
Motion
of
any
Body
whatsoever
it
be
:
On
the
contrary
,
we
see
that
there
is
none
,
nor
can
be
any
;
whence
we
ought
to
conclude
,
if
we
will
argue
according
to
our
Knowledge
,
that
as
no
body
can
be
able
to
move
it self
,
so
there
is
no
created
Spirit
can
be
the
true
or
principal
cause
of
the
Motion
of
any
body
whatever
.
But
when
we
think
of
the
Idea
of
God
,
viz.
of
a
Being
infinitely
Perfect
,
and
consequently
Almighty
,
we
know
that
there
is
such
a
Connexion
between
his
Will
,
and
the
Motion
of
all
Bodies
,
that
't
is
impossible
to
conceive
he
should
Will
the
Motion
of
a
Body
,
that
should
not
be
moved
:
We
must
then
say
,
that
his
Will
only
can
move
Bodies
,
if
we
will
speak
things
as
we
conceive
them
,
and
not
as
we
feel
them
.
The
moving
force
of
Bodies
therefore
,
is
not
in
the
Bodies
which
move
,
since
this
power
of
Motion
is
nothing
else
but
the
Will
of
God
.
Thus
Bodies
have
no
Action
,
and
when
a
Bowl
which
is
moved
,
by
meeting
it
moves
another
,
yet
it
communicates
nothing
of
its
own
;
for
in
it self
it
hath
not
the
Impression
that
it
communicates
to
the
other
:
Yet
a
Bowl
is
the
Natural
Cause
of
the
motion
which
it
communicates
.
A
Natural
Cause
then
is
not
a
real
and
true
Cause
,
but
only
an
occasional
one
,
and
which
determined
the
Author
of
Nature
to
act
after
such
and
such
a
manner
,
in
such
and
such
an
Occurrence
.
It
is
certain
,
that
't
is
by
the
Motion
of
visible
or
invisible
.
Bodies
that
all
things
are
produced
:
For
Experience
teaches
us
,
that
Bodies
,
whose
parts
are
in
greatest
Motion
,
always
act
more
than
others
,
and
produce
the
greatest
Change
in
the
World
.
All
the
Powers
of
Nature
then
proceed
from
the
Will
of
God
:
He
has
created
the
World
because
he
willed
it
:
Dixit
&
facta
sunt
:
He
moves
all
things
,
and
so
produces
all
the
Effects
that
we
see
happen
;
because
he
has
also
willed
certain
Laws
,
according
to
which
Bodies
communicate
their
Motions
in
their
Rencounter
;
and
because
these
Laws
are
Efficacious
they
act
,
and
Bodies
cannot
act
.
There
is
therefore
no
Force
,
Power
,
or
true
Cause
,
in
the
Material
and
Sensible
World
,
nor
must
we
admit
of
Forms
,
Facilities
,
and
real
Qualities
,
to
produce
Effects
that
Bodies
cannot
;
and
to
divide
,
with
God
,
the
Force
and
Power
which
is
Essential
to
him
.
Not
only
Bodies
cannot
be
the
true
Causes
of
any
thing
,
the
most
noble
Spirits
also
are
under
a
like
Impotence
.
They
can
know
nothing
it
God
does
not
enlighten
them
;
nor
can
they
have
any
Sensation
if
he
does
not
modifie
them
.
They
are
capable
of
willing
nothing
if
God
moves
them
not
towards
him
.
I
confess
they
can
determine
the
Impression
that
God
gives
them
towards
him
,
to
other
Objects
;
but
I
know
not
whether
that
can
called
a
Power
.
If
the
Capability
of
Sinning
is
a
Power
,
it
would
be
a
Power
which
the
Almighty
has
not
.
St.
Austin
says
in
some
of
his
Works
,
It
Men
had
in
themselves
the
Power
of
loving
Good
,
we
might
say
they
had
some
Power
:
But
can
only
Love
,
because
God
Wills
they
should
Love
,
and
because
his
Will
is
Efficacious
.
They
Love
only
,
because
God
continually
inclines
them
to
Good
in
General
;
that
is
,
towards
himself
:
For
God
has
created
them
only
for
himself
,
he
never
preserves
them
without
turning
them
towards
and
inclining
them
to
himself
.
They
have
no
Motion
towards
Good
in
general
,
't
is
God
who
moves
them
;
they
only
follow
by
an
entire
free
Choice
,
this
Impression
according
to
the
Law
of
God
,
or
determine
it
towards
a
false
Good
after
the
Law
of
the
Flesh
:
They
can
only
be
determined
by
a
Prospect
of
Good
:
For
being
able
to
do
only
what
God
makes
them
,
they
can
love
nothing
but
Good
.
But
if
we
should
suppose
what
is
true
in
one
Sense
,
that
Spirits
have
in
themselves
the
Power
of
knowing
Truth
and
loving
Good
,
if
their
Thoughts
and
Wills
produced
nothing
External
,
we
might
always
say
they
were
able
to
do
nothing
.
Now
it
appears
most
certain
to
me
,
that
the
Will
of
Spirits
is
not
capable
of
moving
the
least
Body
in
the
World
:
For
't
is
evident
there
is
no
necessary
Connexion
between
the
Will
we
have
of
moving
our
Arms
,
and
the
Motion
of
them
.
It
is
true
,
they
are
moved
when
we
please
,
and
by
that
means
we
are
the
Natural
Cause
of
their
Motion
:
But
Natural
Causes
are
not
true
Causes
,
they
are
only
Occasional
ones
,
which
act
meerly
through
the
Power
and
Efficacy
of
God
,
as
I
have
already
explained
.
For
how
can
we
move
our
Arms
?
To
move
them
we
must
have
Animal
Spirits
,
and
convey
them
by
certain
Nerves
,
into
such
and
such
Muscles
to
swell
and
contract
them
.
For
by
this
means
the
Arms
move
;
or
according
to
the
Opinion
of
some
,
we
know
not
yet
how
't
is
performed
:
And
we
see
,
that
Men
who
do
not
so
much
as
know
they
have
Spirits
,
Nerves
,
and
Muscles
to
move
their
Arms
,
yet
move
them
with
as
much
Art
and
Facility
,
as
those
that
understand
Anatomy
best
.
'T
is
then
granted
,
that
Men
Will
the
Motion
of
their
Arms
,
but
't
is
only
God
that
can
and
knows
how
to
remove
them
.
If
a
Man
cannot
throw
down
a
Tower
,
at
least
he
knows
well
what
must
be
done
in
order
to
it
:
But
there
is
no
Man
that
knows
so
much
,
as
what
he
must
do
to
move
one
of
his
Fingers
by
the
help
of
his
Animal
Spirits
.
How
then
can
Men
move
their
Arms
?
These
things
appear
evident
to
me
,
and
to
all
those
that
will
think
of
them
,
though
perhaps
they
may
be
incomprehensible
to
such
as
will
not
consider
them
.
But
Men
only
are
not
the
True
Causes
of
the
Motions
produced
in
their
Bodies
,
it
seems
even
a
Contradiction
that
they
should
be
so
.
A
True
Cause
is
such
an
one
as
the
Mind
perceives
a
necessary
Connexion
between
it
and
its
Effect
;
't
is
that
I
mean
.
Now
there
is
only
the
Infinitely
Perfect
Being
,
whose
Mind
can
perceive
a
necessary
Connexion
between
his
Will
and
the
Effects
of
it
.
'T
is
only
God
then
,
who
is
the
True
Cause
,
and
who
has
really
the
Power
of
moving
Bodies
.
I
say
moreover
,
't
is
not
probable
that
God
should
communicate
,
either
to
Men
or
Angels
,
this
Power
he
has
of
moving
Bodies
;
and
those
who
pretend
the
Power
we
have
of
moving
our
Arms
is
a
true
Power
,
must
confess
that
God
can
also
give
to
Spirits
the
Power
of
creating
,
annihilating
,
and
performing
all
possible
things
:
In
a
word
,
That
he
can
make
them
Almighty
,
as
I
shall
further
shew
.
God
has
no
need
of
any
Instrument
to
act
,
it
is
sufficient
if
he
Wills
a
thing
for
it
to
be
,
because
it
is
a
Contradiction
to
suppose
he
Wills
it
,
and
that
it
should
not
be
.
His
Power
then
is
his
Will
,
and
the
communicating
of
his
Power
is
a
Communication
of
his
Will.
But
to
communicate
his
Will
to
a
Man
or
an
Angel
,
can
signifie
nothing
else
but
Willing
;
some
body
,
for
instance
,
should
be
effectively
moved
when
't
is
Will'd
by
a
Man
or
an
Angel
.
Now
in
this
case
I
see
two
Wills
which
concur
when
an
Angel
would
move
a
Body
,
that
of
God
,
and
that
of
the
Angel
;
and
to
know
which
of
the
two
will
be
the
true
Cause
of
the
Motion
of
this
Body
,
we
must
know
which
it
is
that
is
Efficacious
.
There
is
a
necessary
Connexion
between
the
Will
of
God
,
and
what
he
Wills
.
God
Wills
in
this
case
,
that
a
Body
should
move
when
it
is
willed
by
an
Angel
:
There
is
a
necessary
Connexion
therefore
,
between
the.
Will
of
God
and
the
Motion
of
this
Body
;
and
consequently
't
is
God
who
is
the
true
cause
of
the
Motion
of
the
Body
,
and
the
Will
of
the
Angel
only
an
occasional
one
.
But
to
shew
it
yet
more
clearly
,
let
us
suppose
that
God
Wills
it
should
happen
quite
contrary
to
what
some
Spirits
desire
;
as
we
may
think
of
Devils
,
or
some
other
Spirits
,
who
merit
this
Punishment
;
we
cannot
say
in
this
case
,
that
God
communicates
his
Power
to
them
,
since
they
can
do
nothing
that
they
would
do
.
Yet
the
Wills
of
these
Spirits
would
be
the
Natural
Causes
of
whatever
Effects
should
be
produced
;
as
such
Bodies
should
be
moved
to
the
Right
Hand
,
because
these
Spirits
would
have
them
moved
to
the
Left
;
and
the
desire
of
these
Spirits
would
determine
the
Will
of
God
to
act
,
as
our
Wills
to
move
the
parts
of
our
Bodies
,
determine
the
first
Cause
to
move
them
:
So
that
the
Wills
of
Spirits
are
only
occasional
Causes
.
Yet
if
after
all
these
Reasons
,
we
will
still
maintain
,
that
the
Will
of
an
Angel
,
which
moves
any
body
,
should
be
a
true
Cause
,
and
not
an
occasional
one
;
it
is
plain
that
this
same
Angel
might
be
the
true
Cause
of
the
Creation
and
Annihilation
of
all
things
:
For
God
could
as
well
communicate
to
him
his
Prower
of
Creating
and
Destroying
Bodies
,
as
that
of
moving
them
,
if
he
will'd
that
things
should
be
created
and
annihilated
:
In
a
word
,
If
he
will'd
that
all
things
should
happen
as
the
Angel
wishes
them
,
even
as
he
Wills
Bodies
should
move
,
as
the
Angel
pleases
.
If
it
be
said
,
that
an
Angel
or
a
Man
would
be
the
true
movers
,
because
God
moves
Bodies
when
they
wish
it
;
it
may
also
be
said
,
that
a
Man
and
an
Angel
may
be
true
Creators
,
since
God
can
create
Beings
when
they
will
it
:
Nay
,
perhaps
it
might
be
said
,
that
the
molt
Vile
Animals
,
or
Matter
of
it self
,
should
be
the
effective
Cause
of
the
Creation
of
any
Substance
;
if
we
supposed
as
the
Philosophers
do
,
that
God
produces
substantial
Forms
whenever
the
Disposition
of
Matter
requires
it
.
In
fine
,
Because
God
has
resolved
from
all
Eternity
in
certain
times
to
create
such
or
such
things
,
we
might
also
say
,
that
these
times
should
be
the
Causes
of
the
Creation
of
these
Beings
,
as
reasonably
as
to
pretend
,
that
a
Bowl
which
meets
another
,
is
the
true
cause
of
the
motion
it
communicates
to
it
:
Because
God
has
determined
by
his
general
Will
,
which
constituted
the
Order
of
Nature
,
that
when
two
Bodies
should
meet
there
should
be
such
and
such
a
Communication
of
Motion
.
There
is
then
but
one
only
true
God
,
and
he
the
one
only
true
Cause
:
And
we
must
not
imagine
,
that
which
precedes
an
Effect
,
to
be
the
true
Cause
of
it
.
God
cannot
even
communicate
his
Power
to
the
Creatures
,
if
we
follow
the
Light
of
Reason
;
he
cannot
make
them
true
Causes
,
because
he
cannot
make
them
Gods
.
Bodies
,
Spirits
,
pure
Intelligences
,
can
all
do
nothing
.
'T
is
he
who
hath
made
these
Spirits
that
illuminates
and
acts
them
.
'T
is
he
who
has
created
the
Heavens
and
the
Earth
,
which
regulates
the
Motions
thereof
.
In
short
,
't
is
the
Author
of
our
Being
that
executes
our
Wills
,
semel
jussit
,
semper
paret
.
He
even
moves
our
Arms
when
we
make
use
of
them
against
his
Orders
,
for
he
complains
by
his
Prophets
▪
that
we
make
him
serve
our
unjust
and
criminal
Desires
.
All
these
little
Heathen
Divinities
,
and
all
these
particular
Causes
of
the
Philosophers
,
are
only
Chymera's
that
the
wicked
Spirit
endeavours
to
establish
to
ruin
the
Worship
of
the
true
God
.
It
is
not
the
Philosophy
they
have
received
from
Adam
,
which
teaches
these
things
;
't
is
that
they
have
received
from
the
Serpent
;
for
since
the
Fall
,
the
Mind
of
Man
is
perfectly
Heathenish
.
'T
is
this
Philosophy
which
joyned
to
the
Errors
of
the
Senses
,
has
made
them
adore
the
Sun
,
and
which
is
fall
at
this
Day
,
the
universal
Cause
of
the
Irregularity
of
the
Mind
,
and
Corruption
of
the
Heart
of
Man
.
By
their
Actions
,
and
sometimes
by
their
Words
;
why
say
they
,
should
we
not
love
the
Body
,
since
the
Body
is
capable
of
affording
us
all
Pleasures
?
And
why
do
we
laugh
at
the
Israelites
,
which
regretted
the
Loss
of
the
Garlick
and
Onyons
of
Egypt
;
since
,
in
Effect
,
they
were
unhappy
,
by
being
deprived
of
what
,
in
some
Measure
,
could
make
them
happy
?
But
the
new
Philosophy
,
which
they
represent
as
a
dismal
thing
,
to
affrighten
weak
Minds
,
that
is
despised
and
condemned
without
being
understood
.
The
new
Philosophy
,
I
say
,
since
they
are
pleased
to
call
it
so
,
destroys
all
the
Arguments
of
the
Libertines
,
by
the
Establishment
of
the
chiefest
of
its
Principles
,
which
perfectly
agrees
with
the
[
](A51660-e57780-b)*
*
Haec
est
Religio
Christiana
,
fratres
mei
,
quae
praedicatur
per
universum
mundum
horrentibus
inimieis
,
&
ubi
vincuntur
murmurantibus
,
ubi
praevalent
saevientibus
,
haec
est
Religie
Christiana
ut
,
Colatur
unus
Deus
non
Dii
,
qui
facit
Animam
Beatum
nisi
unus
Deus
.
Aug.
tr.
23.
in
Joan.
first
Principle
of
the
Christian
Religion
,
that
we
must
love
and
fear
but
one
God
,
since
there
is
only
one
God
who
can
make
us
happy
.
For
if
Religion
teaches
us
,
that
there
is
but
one
true
God
,
this
Philosophy
shews
us
there
is
but
one
true
Cause
.
If
Religion
informs
us
,
that
all
the
Divinities
of
the
Heathens
are
only
Stones
and
Metals
without
Life
and
Motion
:
This
Philosophy
discovers
to
us
also
,
that
all
second
Causes
,
or
all
the
Divinities
of
their
Philosophy
,
are
only
Matter
and
inefficacious
Wills
.
In
short
,
if
Religion
teaches
us
,
that
we
must
not
bow
our
Knees
to
false
Gods
.
This
Philosophy
also
tells
us
,
that
our
Imaginations
and
Minds
ought
not
to
be
prostituted
to
the
Imaginary
Greatness
and
Power
of
Causes
,
which
are
not
true
Causes
:
That
we
must
neither
love
nor
fear
them
,
nor
busie
our selves
about
them
;
but
think
upon
God
only
,
see
him
,
adore
him
,
fear
and
love
him
in
all
things
.
But
this
agrees
not
with
the
Inclination
of
some
Philosophers
:
They
will
neither
see
nor
think
upon
God
:
For
since
the
Fall
,
there
is
a
secret
Opposition
between
God
and
Man
:
Men
take
Pleasure
in
erecting
Gods
after
their
own
Fancy
,
they
voluntarily
love
and
fear
the
Fictions
of
their
own
Imagination
,
as
they
Heathens
did
the
Works
of
their
own
Hands
.
They
are
like
Children
who
tremble
at
their
Companions
,
after
they
have
daubed
their
Faces
:
Or
if
they
will
have
a
more
Noble
Comparison
,
although
perhaps
it
be
not
so
just
,
they
resemble
those
famous
Romans
,
who
had
some
Fear
and
Respect
for
the
Fictions
of
their
own
Minds
,
and
foolishly
adored
their
Emperors
after
they
had
let
loose
the
Eagle
when
they
deified
them
.
CHAP.
IV.
An
Explanation
of
the
Second
Part
of
the
general
Rule
.
That
Philosophers
neglect
it
,
but
Mr.
Descartes
has
very
exactly
observed
it
.
WE
have
already
shewed
unto
what
Errors
we
are
subject
,
when
we
reason
upon
the
false
and
confused
Idea's
of
the
Senses
;
and
upon
the
rambling
and
indeterminate
Idea's
of
pure
Logick
.
We
have
sufficiently
discovered
,
that
to
preserve
Evidence
in
our
Perceptions
,
it
is
absolutely
necessary
exactly
to
observe
the
Rule
that
we
have
prescribed
,
if
our
Idea's
are
clear
and
distinct
,
and
then
to
reason
according
to
these
Idea's
.
In
this
same
general
Rule
,
which
respects
the
Subject
of
our
Studies
,
there
is
yet
this
Circumstance
to
be
well
considered
:
Namely
,
that
we
must
always
begin
with
the
most
simple
and
easie
things
,
and
continue
a
long
Time
upon
them
,
before
we
undertake
more
compounded
and
difficult
ones
.
For
if
we
must
only
reason
upon
distinct
Idea's
always
to
preserve
Evidence
in
our
Perceptions
;
it
is
plain
,
that
we
must
never
proceed
to
an
Enquiry
after
compounded
things
,
before
we
have
very
carefully
examined
,
and
made
those
simple
ones
,
on
which
they
depend
,
familiar
to
us
.
Since
the
Idea's
of
compounded
things
,
neither
are
nor
can
be
clear
,
when
we
have
only
a
confused
and
imperfect
Knowledge
of
the
more
simple
which
compose
them
.
We
know
things
imperfectly
,
when
we
are
not
assured
that
we
have
considered
all
their
Parts
:
And
we
have
a
confused
Knowledge
of
them
,
when
they
are
not
familiar
to
the
Mind
,
although
we
are
certain
we
have
examined
them
in
all
their
Parts
,
When
we
know
them
but
imperfectly
,
we
only
reason
upon
Probabilities
;
when
we
perceive
them
confusedly
,
there
is
neither
Order
nor
Understanding
in
out
Deductions
:
We
often
know
neither
where
we
are
,
nor
where
we
go
.
But
when
we
know
them
imperfectly
and
confusedly
together
,
which
happens
most
commonly
;
we
have
neither
a
clear
Knowledge
of
what
we
enquire
after
,
nor
the
means
of
attaining
it
.
So
that
it
's
absolutely
necessary
to
keep
strictly
to
this
Order
in
our
Studies
.
To
begin
always
with
the
most
simple
things
,
examine
all
their
Parts
,
and
make
them
familiar
to
us
,
before
we
pass
to
the
more
compounded
on
which
they
depend
.
But
this
Rule
agrees
not
with
Mens
Inclinations
,
they
naturally
have
a
Contempt
for
whatever
appears
easie
;
and
their
Mind
which
was
not
made
for
a
limited
Object
that
may
be
easily
comprehend
,
cannot
stop
long
in
considering
these
simple
Idea's
,
which
have
no
Character
of
Infinity
for
which
they
are
made
.
On
the
contrary
,
and
for
the
same
Reason
,
they
have
much
Respect
and
Inclination
for
great
things
which
include
something
of
Infinity
,
and
such
things
as
are
obscure
and
mysterious
.
'T
is
not
because
they
love
Darkness
,
but
't
is
that
in
this
Darkness
they
hope
to
find
a
Good
and
a
Truth
capable
of
satisfying
them
.
Vanity
also
inclines
the
Mind
immediately
to
imploy
it self
about
great
and
extraordinary
things
;
and
gives
it
a
Foolish
Hope
of
accomplishing
whatever
it
undertakes
.
Experience
shews
us
,
That
the
most
exact
Knowledge
of
common
things
gives
no
Reputation
in
the
World
,
and
that
the
Knowledge
of
such
things
as
are
uncommon
,
how
confused
and
imperfect
soever
it
may
be
,
always
gains
Esteem
and
Respect
to
those
,
who
freely
express
some
high
Idea
of
what
they
understand
not
.
And
this
Experience
determines
all
those
,
who
are
more
sensibly
touched
with
Vanity
than
Truth
(
who
are
certainly
in
the
greatest
Number
)
to
make
a
blind
Enquiry
after
a
specious
and
imaginary
Knowledge
of
whatever
is
great
,
rare
,
and
obscure
.
How
many
Men
reject
the
Philosophy
of
Descartes
,
for
this
pleasant
Reason
,
that
his
Principles
are
too
simple
and
easie
,
There
are
no
obscure
and
mysterious
Terms
in
this
Philosophy
:
Women
,
and
Persons
who
know
neither
Greek
nor
Latin
,
are
capable
of
apprehending
it
:
It
must
therefore
be
of
very
small
Consequence
,
and
it
would
not
be
reasonable
for
great
Genii
to
apply
themselves
to
it
.
They
imagine
Principles
so
clear
and
simple
,
are
not
extensive
enough
to
explain
the
Effects
of
Nature
,
which
they
suppose
obscure
and
perplexed
.
They
do
not
immediately
see
the
Benefit
of
these
Principles
,
which
are
too
easie
and
simple
to
stop
their
Attention
,
so
long
as
it
is
necessary
to
discover
the
Use
and
Extent
of
them
.
They
rather
choose
to
explain
those
Effects
,
whose
Causes
they
do
not
comprehend
,
by
Principles
they
conceive
not
;
and
which
it
is
absolutely
impossible
to
conceive
,
than
by
such
as
are
both
simple
and
intelligible
.
For
these
Philosophers
explain
obscure
things
,
by
Principles
which
are
not
only
obscure
,
but
also
intirely
incomprehensible
.
When
any
Persons
undertake
to
explain
things
extreamly
perplexed
,
by
clear
and
known
Principles
,
it
is
easie
to
see
whether
or
no
they
accomplish
it
,
because
if
we
conceive
well
what
they
say
,
we
can
discover
whether
or
no
they
speak
true
.
So
the
fasly
Learned
would
not
find
their
Expectation
,
nor
make
themselves
admired
as
they
wish
to
be
,
if
they
made
use
of
intelligible
Principles
;
because
it
would
evidently
be
discovered
,
that
they
say
nothing
.
But
when
they
make
use
of
unknown
Principles
,
and
speak
of
very
compounded
things
,
as
if
they
exactly
knew
all
their
Relations
,
they
are
admired
,
because
what
they
say
is
not
conceived
,
and
we
naturally
have
a
Respect
for
what
passes
our
Understandings
.
Now
,
as
obscure
and
incomprehensible
things
seem
to
be
better
connected
,
than
such
as
are
clear
and
intelligible
:
Incomprehensible
Principles
are
of
a
greater
Use
than
intelligible
ones
,
in
the
most
compounded
Questions
.
There
is
nothing
so
difficult
but
Philosophers
and
Physicians
give
some
brief
Reason
of
it
from
their
Principles
:
For
their
Principles
being
yet
more
incomprehensible
,
than
all
the
Questions
that
can
be
put
to
them
,
if
they
be
once
taken
for
granted
,
there
is
no
Difficulty
but
will
soon
be
solved
.
For
instance
,
they
boldly
,
and
without
any
Hesitation
,
answer
these
obscure
and
indetermined
Questions
:
Why
is
it
that
the
Sun
attracts
.
Vapours
?
That
the
Jesuits
Powder
cures
the
Quartan
Feaver
?
That
Ruburb
purges
Choler
?
Chymical
Salt
,
Flegm
?
And
other
like
Questions
.
And
the
Generality
of
Mankind
are
satisfied
with
their
Answers
,
because
obscure
and
incomprehensible
agrees
with
both
.
But
unintelligible
Principles
do
not
well
agree
with
Questions
that
are
clearly
proposed
,
and
easily
resolved
;
because
it
is
evidently
discovered
,
that
they
signifie
nothing
.
These
Philosophers
cannot
,
by
their
Principles
,
explain
,
how
Horses
draw
a
Chariot
;
how
Dust
stops
a
Watch
;
how
Trepoly
cleanses
Metals
,
and
a
Brush
out
Cloaths
.
For
they
would
make
themselves
ridiculous
to
all
the
World
,
if
they
supposed
a
Notion
of
Attraction
,
and
attractive
Faculties
to
explain
the
Reason
why
Chariots
follow
the
Horses
which
are
fastned
to
them
,
and
a
detersive
Faculty
in
Brushes
for
cleaning
Cloaths
,
and
so
of
other
Questions
.
Therefore
their
great
Principles
are
useless
,
except
in
,
obscure
Questions
,
because
they
are
incomprehensible
.
We
must
not
therefore
stop
at
any
of
all
these
Principles
,
which
we
have
not
an
evident
and
clear
Knowledge
of
,
and
which
we
may
think
some
Nations
receive
not
.
We
must
attentively
consider
the
Idea's
we
have
of
Extension
,
Figure
,
Local
Motion
,
and
the
Relation
these
things
have
amongst
themselves
.
If
we
conceive
these
Idea's
distinctly
,
and
find
them
so
clear
,
that
we
are
perswaded
,
that
all
Nations
have
always
received
them
,
we
must
rest
here
,
and
examine
all
their
Relations
:
But
if
we
find
them
obscure
,
we
must
seek
after
others
.
For
if
to
reason
without
Fear
of
deceiving
our selves
,
it
is
always
necessary
to
preserve
Evidence
in
our
Perceptions
,
we
must
only
reason
upon
clear
Idea's
,
and
their
Relations
distinctly
known
.
In
order
to
consider
the
Properties
of
Extension
,
we
must
with
M.
Descartes
,
begin
with
the
most
simple
Relations
;
and
pass
from
the
more
simple
to
the
more
compounded
;
not
only
because
this
Method
is
Natural
,
and
assists
the
Mind
in
these
Operations
,
but
because
God
always
acts
in
this
Order
,
and
by
the
most
simple
Way
;
this
Manner
of
examining
our
Idea's
,
and
their
Relations
,
will
the
better
discover
his
Works
to
us
.
And
if
we
consider
that
the
most
simple
Relations
are
always
those
which
are
first
represented
to
the
Imagination
,
when
it
is
not
determined
rather
to
think
of
one
thing
than
on
another
:
We
shall
discover
,
that
it
will
be
enough
to
consider
things
attentively
and
without
Prejudice
,
to
enter
into
this
Order
that
we
prescribe
,
and
to
discover
the
most
compounded
Truths
,
provided
we
do
not
run
too
fast
from
one
Subject
to
another
.
If
then
we
attentively
consider
Extension
;
without
much
Difficulty
we
perceive
that
one
Part
may
be
separated
from
another
,
we
easily
conceive
Local
Motion
,
and
that
this
Local
Motion
produces
a
Figure
in
both
Bodies
which
are
moved
.
Of
all
Motions
,
the
most
simple
,
and
first
,
which
presents
it self
to
the
Imagination
,
the
Motion
of
a
right
Line
:
Let
us
suppose
then
,
that
there
is
some
Part
of
Extension
moved
in
a
right
Line
,
it
will
necessarily
displace
some
other
Portion
of
Matter
which
it
finds
in
its
Way
,
and
this
last
shall
move
Circularly
to
take
the
Place
that
the
other
leaves
,
and
by
that
means
make
a
Circular
Motion
.
But
if
we
conceive
an
infinite
Number
of
Motions
in
a
right
Line
,
in
an
infinite
Number
of
the
like
Parts
of
this
immense
Extension
which
we
would
consider
;
It
is
yet
necessary
,
that
all
these
Bodies
hinder
one
another
,
conspiring
all
by
their
mutual
Action
and
Reaction
;
I
mean
by
the
mutual
Communication
of
all
their
particular
Motions
,
to
produce
one
that
is
Circular
.
This
first
Consideration
of
the
most
simple
Relations
of
our
Idea's
,
already
discover
to
us
,
the
Necessity
of
Mr.
Descartes
Vortices
:
And
their
Number
will
be
so
much
the
greater
,
as
the
Motions
of
all
the
Parts
of
Extension
in
a
right
Line
,
having
been
the
more
contrary
one
to
the
other
,
they
shall
have
had
more
Difficulty
to
agree
in
the
same
Motion
;
and
that
of
all
these
Vortices
,
those
will
be
the
greatest
,
which
have
had
more
Parts
conspire
to
the
same
Motion
,
or
whose
Parts
should
have
had
more
Power
to
continue
their
Motion
in
a
right
Line
.
But
Care
must
be
taken
that
the
Mind
is
neither
fatigued
nor
dissipated
,
by
fruitlesly
applying
it
to
an
infinite
Number
,
and
immense
Magnitudes
of
Vortices
:
We
must
first
apply
our selves
some
Time
upon
one
of
these
Vortices
,
and
enquire
orderly
and
attentively
into
all
the
Motions
of
the
Matter
it
includes
,
and
all
the
Figures
wherewith
all
the
Parts
of
that
Matter
ought
to
be
endued
.
As
there
is
no
simple
Motion
bur
that
in
a
right
Line
,
we
must
first
consider
this
Motion
,
as
that
according
to
which
all
Bodies
incessantly
tend
to
move
in
,
since
God
always
acts
according
to
the
most
simple
Ways
,
and
that
in
Effect
Bodies
are
circularly
moved
,
because
they
find
continual
Opposition
in
their
direct
Motions
.
So
all
Bodies
,
not
being
of
an
equal
Magnitude
,
and
those
which
are
the
greatest
,
having
more
Power
to
continue
their
Motion
in
a
right
Line
than
others
;
we
easily
conceive
,
that
the
least
Bodies
must
be
near
the
Center
of
the
Vortex
,
and
the
greatest
towards
the
Circumference
:
Since
the
Lines
which
we
conceive
to
be
described
by
the
Motion
of
Bodies
,
which
are
at
the
Circumference
,
approach
more
to
a
right
Line
,
than
those
the
Bodies
describe
,
which
are
nearer
the
Center
.
If
we
again
think
,
that
each
Part
of
this
Matter
could
not
be
moved
at
first
,
and
in
its
Motion
endure
a
perpetual
Opposition
,
but
be
made
round
,
and
have
its
Corners
broke
;
we
should
easily
discover
,
that
all
this
Extension
would
be
only
composed
of
two
Sorts
of
Bodies
:
Round
Balls
which
incessantly
turn
upon
their
Center
,
after
many
different
Manners
,
and
which
,
besides
their
particular
Motion
,
are
also
hurried
on
by
the
common
Motion
of
thc
Vortex
;
and
with
a
more
fluid
and
more
agitated
Matter
,
which
is
produced
by
the
rubbing
of
the
Balls
before
mentioned
:
Besides
,
the
Circular
Motion
,
common
to
all
Parts
of
the
Vortix
,
this
subtil
Matter
will
still
have
a
particular
Motion
,
almost
in
a
right
Line
from
the
Center
of
the
Vortex
,
to
rhe
Circumference
,
by
the
Intervals
of
the
Balls
which
leave
it
a
free
Passage
:
So
that
the
Motion
compounded
of
these
Motions
,
will
be
in
a
Spiral
Line
.
This
fluid
Matter
that
M.
Descartes
calls
the
First
Element
,
being
divided
into
little
Parts
,
which
have
much
less
Power
to
continue
their
Motion
in
a
right
Line
,
than
the
Balls
or
Second
Element
:
It
is
evident
,
that
the
first
Element
must
be
in
the
Center
of
the
Vortex
,
and
fill
the
empty
Spaces
which
are
between
the
Parts
of
the
second
,
and
that
the
Parts
of
the
second
must
fill
the
rest
of
the
Vortex
,
and
approach
to
its
Circumference
in
Proportion
to
the
Magnitude
or
Power
they
have
to
continue
their
Motion
in
a
right
Line
.
As
to
the
Figure
of
the
whole
Vortex
,
we
cannot
doubt
from
what
has
been
said
,
that
the
Distance
of
one
Pole
to
the
other
,
will
be
shorter
than
the
Lines
which
go
cross
the
[
](A51660-e58150-b)*
*
By
Equator
,
I
mean
the
greatest
curve
Line
that
the
Matter
of
the
Vortex
describes
.
Equator
.
And
if
we
consider
that
the
Vortices
surrround
and
compress
each
other
unequally
,
we
shall
also
clearly
see
,
that
their
Equator
is
an
irregular
curve
Line
very
much
like
an
Elipsis
.
These
things
Naturally
present
themselves
to
the
Mind
,
when
we
attentively
consider
what
must
happen
to
the
Parts
of
Extension
,
which
continually
incline
to
move
in
a
right
Line
;
that
is
in
the
most
simple
of
all
Motions
.
If
we
would
now
suppose
a
thing
which
seems
most
worthy
the
Wisdom
and
Power
of
God
,
viz.
That
he
hath
,
in
an
instant
,
formed
the
Universe
in
the
same
Condition
that
its
Parts
would
in
Time
,
have
been
disposed
in
by
the
most
simple
Ways
,
and
that
he
also
preserves
them
by
the
same
Natural
Laws
:
In
short
,
if
we
would
apply
our
Thoughts
to
the
Objects
we
see
;
we
might
judge
the
Sun
to
be
the
Center
of
the
Vortex
:
That
the
Corporeal
Light
it
diffuses
on
all
sides
,
is
nothing
else
but
the
continual
Effort
of
little
Globules
,
which
incline
to
separate
themselves
from
the
Center
of
the
Vortex
;
and
that
this
Light
must
be
communicated
by
immense
Spaces
in
an
instant
,
because
the
whole
being
full
of
these
Globules
one
of
them
cannot
be
pressed
,
without
the
Motion
of
all
the
rest
that
are
opposite
to
it
.
We
may
still
deduce
many
other
Consequences
from
what
I
have
said
:
For
the
most
simple
Principles
are
the
most
proper
to
explain
his
Works
,
who
always
acts
according
to
the
most
simple
Ways
:
But
we
have
occasion
yet
to
consider
certain
things
which
must
happen
to
Matter
.
We
ought
then
to
think
that
there
is
more
Vortices
like
to
that
we
have
given
a
short
Description
of
;
that
the
▪
Centers
of
these
Vortices
are
Stars
,
which
are
as
so
many
Suns
:
That
the
Vortices
encompass
one
another
,
and
are
disposed
after
such
a
manner
as
to
prejudice
each
others
Motion
as
little
as
can
be
:
But
things
have
not
been
able
to
come
to
that
pass
,
but
the
weakest
Vortices
have
been
drawn
along
,
and
almost
swallowed
up
by
the
strongest
.
To
apprehend
which
,
we
need
only
reflect
,
that
the
first
Element
,
which
is
in
the
Center
of
a
Vortix
,
may
,
and
continually
does
,
get
out
by
the
Spaces
of
the
Balls
towards
the
Circumference
of
the
same
Vortix
,
and
that
at
the
Time
that
this
Center
or
Star
empties
it self
through
its
Equator
,
the
other
first
Element
must
re-enter
by
its
Poles
.
For
neither
the
Star
nor
its
Poles
can
be
emptied
on
one
side
without
being
filled
on
the
other
;
since
there
is
no
Void
in
Extension
.
But
because
an
infinite
Number
of
Causes
can
hinder
much
of
the
first
Element
,
from
entring
into
this
Star
which
we
speak
of
:
It
is
requisite
that
the
Parts
of
the
first
Element
,
which
are
obliged
to
remain
in
it
,
should
be
so
disposed
as
to
move
the
same
Way
.
'T
is
that
which
makes
them
unite
and
joyn
one
with
another
,
and
form
Spots
,
which
condense
into
Crusts
,
and
by
little
and
little
cover
the
Center
,
and
make
a
solid
and
gross
Matter
,
of
the
most
subtle
and
agitated
of
all
Bodies
.
'T
is
this
gross
Matter
that
Mr.
Descartes
calls
the
third
Element
;
and
it
must
be
observed
,
that
as
it
proceeds
from
the
first
,
whose
Figures
are
infinite
,
it
ought
to
be
invested
with
an
infinite
Number
of
different
Forms
.
This
Star
,
thus
covered
with
Spots
and
Crusts
,
and
become
like
the
other
Planets
,
is
no
longer
able
to
maintain
and
defend
its
Vortex
against
the
continual
Effort
of
those
that
environ
it
.
This
Vortex
therefore
diminishes
by
little
and
little
.
The
Matter
which
composes
it
,
is
dispersed
on
all
sides
;
and
the
strongest
Vortex
about
it
,
draws
the
greatest
Part
of
it
,
and
at
last
swallows
up
the
Planet
which
was
the
Center
of
it
.
This
Planet
being
encompassed
with
the
Matter
of
the
great
Vortex
,
it
swims
there
to
preserve
it self
with
some
little
Matter
of
its
own
Vortex
,
keeping
the
Circular
Motion
it
had
before
:
And
at
last
it
takes
a
Situation
there
,
which
puts
it
in
Equilibrio
with
an
equal
Quantity
of
Matter
in
which
it
swims
.
If
it
has
but
a
little
Solidity
and
Magnitude
left
,
it
descends
very
near
to
the
Center
of
the
Vortex
which
swallowed
it
up
;
because
,
having
some
Power
to
continue
its
Motion
in
a
right
Line
,
it
must
place
it self
in
this
Vortex
,
in
which
an
equal
Quantity
of
the
second
Element
,
has
as
much
Power
as
it
has
to
remove
it self
from
the
Center
,
for
it
can
be
in
Equilibrio
only
in
this
Place
.
If
this
Planet
is
greater
or
more
solid
,
it
will
be
in
Equilibrio
with
a
Place
more
distant
from
the
Center
of
the
Vortex
.
And
in
short
,
if
in
this
Vortex
there
is
any
Place
,
or
equal
Quantity
of
Matter
that
has
as
much
Solidity
as
this
Planet
,
and
consequently
,
as
much
Power
to
continue
its
Motion
in
a
right
Line
,
because
this
Planet
will
,
perhaps
,
be
very
great
,
and
covered
with
very
solid
and
thick
Crusts
;
it
cannot
stop
in
this
Vortex
,
since
it
cannot
be
put
in
Equilibrio
with
the
Matter
which
composes
it
.
This
Planet
will
pass
then
into
some
other
Vortex
,
and
if
it
cannot
be
in
Equilibrio
,
it
will
not
stay
there
neither
.
So
that
we
shall
see
it
sometimes
pass
like
Comets
,
when
they
happen
to
be
in
our
Vortex
,
and
near
enough
for
us
to
discern
them
:
And
we
shall
not
see
it
again
till
a
long
time
after
,
when
it
is
in
other
Vortices
,
or
in
the
Extremity
of
ours
.
If
we
how
think
that
one
Vortix
alone
,
by
its
Magnitude
,
Force
,
and
Advantagious
Situation
,
can
by
little
and
little
undermine
,
attract
,
and
swallow
up
many
Vortices
,
and
such
Vortices
which
before
had
swallowed
some
others
;
it
would
be
necessary
that
the
Planets
which
are
in
the
Centers
of
these
Vortices
,
being
entered
into
the
great
Vortex
which
has
swallowed
them
up
,
should
be
there
put
in
Equilibrio
with
an
equal
Quantity
of
Matter
in
which
they
swim
.
So
that
if
these
Planets
are
unequal
in
Solidity
,
they
will
be
in
an
unequal
Distance
from
the
Center
or
the
Vortex
in
which
they
swim
.
And
if
it
be
found
,
that
two
Planets
have
near
the
same
Power
to
continue
their
Motion
in
a
right
Line
,
or
that
one
Planet
draws
into
its
little
Vortex
,
one
,
or
many
other
less
Planets
,
which
,
according
to
our
Manner
of
conceiving
the
Formation
of
things
it
has
swallowed
up
,
then
this
little
Planet
shall
turn
about
the
great
one
while
that
turns
upon
its
Center
;
and
all
these
Planets
shall
be
carried
along
by
the
Motion
of
the
great
Vortex
,
in
almost
an
equal
Distance
from
its
Center
.
We
are
obliged
,
by
the
Light
of
Reason
,
so
to
dispose
the
Parts
which
compose
the
World
,
that
we
imagine
to
have
been
formed
by
the
most
simple
Ways
.
For
all
that
we
have
said
is
grounded
only
upon
the
Idea
we
have
of
Extension
,
the
Parts
of
which
we
suppose
to
incline
to
the
most
simple
Motion
,
which
is
that
of
a
right
Line
.
And
when
we
examine
by
the
Effects
,
whether
we
are
not
deceived
,
by
endeavouring
to
explain
things
by
their
Causes
,
we
areas
much
surprized
to
see
the
Phenomena
of
Celestial
Bodies
so
perfectly
agree
with
what
we
have
said
:
For
we
see
that
all
the
Planets
that
are
in
the
Middle
of
a
little
Vortex
,
turn
upon
their
own
Center
,
like
the
Sun
;
that
they
swim
all
in
the
Vortex
of
the
Sun
,
and
about
the
Sun
;
that
the
smallest
,
or
least
solid
,
are
nearest
the
Sun
;
and
the
more
solid
are
at
the
greatest
Distance
from
it
;
and
that
there
is
also
some
amongst
them
like
Comets
,
which
cannot
remain
in
the
Vortex
of
the
Sun
:
In
short
,
there
are
many
Planets
,
which
yet
have
many
little
ones
that
turn
about
them
,
as
the
Moon
does
about
the
Earth
.
Jupiter
has
four
of
them
,
and
Saturn
three
.
It
may
be
also
,
that
Saturn
has
so
great
a
Number
of
small
ones
,
that
they
form
a
continued
Circle
,
which
seems
to
have
no
Thickness
,
because
of
its
great
Distance
.
These
Planets
being
the
greatest
that
we
see
,
we
may
consider
them
as
having
been
engendered
of
Vortices
large
enough
to
have
swallowed
up
others
before
they
were
involved
in
the
Vortices
we
are
in
.
All
these
Planets
turn
upon
their
Center
,
the.
Earth
in
Twenty
Four
Hours
,
Mars
in
Twenty
Five
,
or
near
,
Jupiter
in
Ten
Hours
,
or
thereabouts
,
&c.
They
turn
about
the
Sun
,
Mercury
,
which
is
the
nearest
,
in
about
Four
Months
:
Saturn
,
which
is
the
farthest
off
,
in
Thirty
Years
near
;
and
those
which
are
between
both
,
in
more
or
less
Time
,
but
not
perfectly
in
the
Proportion
of
their
Distance
.
For
all
the
Matter
in
which
they
swim
,
turns
swifter
when
it
is
nearest
the
Sun
,
because
the
Line
of
its
Motion
is
then
shorter
.
When
Mars
is
opposite
to
the
Sun
,
he
is
very
near
the
Earth
,
and
very
distant
when
he
is
joyned
to
the
Sun
:
It
is
the
same
with
the
Superiour
Planets
,
Jupiter
and
Saturn
;
as
for
the
Inferiout
ones
,
such
as
Mercury
and
Venus
,
to
speak
properly
,
they
are
never
opposite
to
the
Sun
.
The
Lines
that
all
Planets
seem
to
describe
about
the
Earth
,
are
not
Circles
;
but
they
approach
very
near
to
Elipses
,
and
all
these
Elipses
appear
very
different
,
because
of
the
different
Situation
of
the
Planets
,
in
respect
to
us
:
In
short
,
all
that
we
observe
in
the
Heavens
,
with
any
Certainty
concerning
the
Motion
of
the
Planets
,
agrees
perfectly
well
with
what
we
have
said
of
their
Formation
,
according
to
the
most
simple
Ways
.
As
for
the
fixed
Stars
,
Experience
tells
us
,
some
of
them
diminish
and
intirely
disappear
,
and
some
of
them
also
there
are
,
which
appear
anew
,
whose
Brightness
and
Magnitude
much
augments
.
They
increase
or
diminish
as
the
Vortices
do
,
of
which
they
are
the
Centers
,
and
receive
more
or
less
of
the
first
Element
.
We
cease
to
see
them
,
when
they
are
made
up
of
Spots
and
Crusts
'
,
and
begin
again
to
discover
them
,
when
these
Spots
which
hindered
their
shining
,
are
wholly
dissipated
.
All
these
Stars
keep
near
the
same
Distance
amongst
themselves
,
since
they
are
the
Centers
of
Vortexes
,
and
are
not
drawn
so
much
as
they
resist
other
Vortexes
,
or
as
the
Stars
are
.
They
all
shine
like
Suns
,
because
like
the
Sun
,
they
are
the
Centers
of
some
Vortexes
,
which
are
not
yet
swallowed
up
.
They
are
all
equally
distant
from
the
Earth
,
although
they
appear
to
the
Eye
as
fastned
to
a
concave
Surface
:
For
if
we
have
not
yet
compared
the
Parallax
of
the
nearest
,
with
that
of
the
most
distant
,
by
the
different
Situation
of
the
Earth
from
six
Months
to
six
Months
,
it
is
because
this
Difference
of
Situation
is
not
great
enough
to
render
this
Parallax
sensible
,
because
of
the
Distance
we
are
from
the
Stars
.
It
may
be
by
the
means
of
Telescopes
some
small
matter
might
be
observed
.
In
fine
,
all
that
we
can
discover
in
the
Stars
by
our
Senses
,
and
Experience
,
is
not
different
from
what
we
have
discovered
by
the
Mind
,
by
examining
the
most
Natural
Relations
which
is
between
the
Parts
and
Motions
of
Extension
.
If
we
would
examine
the
Nature
of
Bodies
here
below
,
we
must
first
consider
,
that
whereas
the
first
Element
being
compounded
of
an
infinite
Number
of
different
Figures
,
the
Bodies
which
have
been
formed
out
of
the
Congeries
of
the
Parts
of
this
Element
would
be
manifold
.
Some
of
their
Parts
would
be
branched
,
others
long
,
and
others
round
,
but
irregular
in
every
respect
.
If
their
branched
Parts
are
gross
enough
,
they
would
be
hard
,
but
flexible
,
and
inelastick
,
like
Gold
:
If
their
Parts
are
less
gross
,
they
would
be
soft
and
fluid
,
like
Gums
,
Fat
,
or
Oyles
:
But
if
their
branched
Parts
are
extreamly
delicate
,
they
will
be
like
Air.
If
the
long
Parts
of
Bodies
are
gross
and
inflexible
,
they
will
be
sharp
,
incorruptible
,
easie
to
dissolve
like
Salt
:
If
these
same
long
Parts
are
flexible
,
they
will
be
insipid
like
Water
:
If
they
have
gross
and
irregular
Parts
in
every
respect
,
they
will
be
like
Earth
and
Stones
.
In
short
,
we
shall
have
Bodies
of
many
different
Natures
,
and
not
two
of
them
that
will
intirely
be
alike
;
because
the
first
Element
is
capable
of
an
infinite
Number
of
Figures
,
and
all
these
Figures
never
combine
after
the
same
manner
in
two
different
Bodies
.
Whatever
Figures
these
Bodies
have
,
if
they
have
Pores
great
enough
to
permit
the
second
Element
to
pass
through
,
they
will
be
transparent
,
like
Air
,
Water
,
and
Glass
,
&c.
whatever
Figures
these
Bodies
are
endued
with
,
if
the
first
Element
intirely
surrounds
some
Parts
of
them
,
and
agitates
them
strongly
,
and
swift
enough
to
repulse
the
second
Element
on
all
Sides
,
they
will
be
Luminous
like
Flame
.
If
these
Bodies
repulse
all
the
second
Element
which
shocks
them
,
they
will
be
very
white
;
if
they
receive
it
without
Opposition
,
they
will
be
very
black
:
In
short
,
if
they
repulse
it
by
divers
Shocks
or
Vibrations
,
they
will
appear
of
different
Colours
.
As
to
their
different
Situation
,
the
heaviest
that
is
,
those
that
have
the
least
Power
to
continue
their
Motion
in
a
right
Line
,
will
be
nearest
the
Center
,
as
Metals
;
Earth
,
Air
,
Water
,
will
be
more
distant
from
it
,
and
all
Bodies
would
keep
the
Situation
we
see
them
in
,
because
they
ought
to
be
placed
so
much
the
more
distant
from
the
Center
of
the
Earth
,
as
their
Motion
is
greater
And
we
must
not
be
surprized
,
if
I
now
say
,
that
Metals
have
less
tower
to
continue
their
Motion
in
a
right
tine
than
the
Earth
,
Water
,
and
other
Bodies
less
solid
;
although
I
have
before
said
,
that
the
most
solid
Bodies
have
more
Power
to
continue
their
Motion
in
a
right
Line
than
others
.
For
the
Reason
why
Metals
have
less
Power
to
continue
to
move
,
than
the
Earth
or
Stones
,
is
because
they
have
much
less
Motion
:
Since
it
is
always
true
,
that
two
Bodies
,
unequal
in
Solidity
,
being
moved
with
an
equal
Swiftness
,
the
most
solid
has
the
most
Power
to
keep
in
a
right
Line
,
because
then
the
most
solid
has
the
most
Motion
,
and
't
is
the
Motion
that
gives
the
Power
.
If
,
we
would
know
the
Reason
why
near
the
Center
of
the
Vortices
,
gross
Bodies
are
heavy
,
and
yet
are
light
when
they
are
more
distant
from
it
;
we
must
consider
,
that
great
Bodies
receive
their
Motion
from
the
subtle
Matter
which
environs
them
,
and
in
which
they
swim
.
Now
,
this
subtle
Matter
actually
moves
in
a
Circular
Line
,
and
only
inclinesto
move
in
a
right
Line
,
and
communicates
this
Circular
Motion
to
the
gross
Bodies
which
it
carries
along
with
it
,
without
communicating
to
them
its
Efforts
to
remove
from
the
Center
by
a
right
Line
,
only
so
much
as
this
Effort
is
followed
by
the
Motion
it
communicates
to
them
:
For
we
must
observe
,
that
the
Parts
of
the
subtle
Matter
,
making
an
Effort
towards
different
Sides
,
can
only
compress
the
gross
Bodies
they
carry
along
with
them
:
For
this
Body
cannot
go
to
different
Sides
at
the
same
Time
.
But
because
the
subtle
Matter
which
is
near
the
Center
of
the
Vortex
,
hath
much
more
Motion
than
it
imployes
in
the
Circulation
,
and
communicates
to
the
gross
Bodies
it
draws
after
it
,
only
its
Circular
Motion
,
which
is
common
to
all
its
Parts
:
And
if
gross
Bodies
should
chance
to
have
more
Motion
than
that
which
is
common
to
the
Vortix
,
they
would
soon
lose
it
,
by
communicating
it
to
the
little
Bodies
they
meet
:
From
when
it
is
plain
,
that
gross
Bodies
,
near
the
Center
of
the
Vortex
,
have
not
so
much
Motion
as
the
Matter
in
which
they
swim
;
each
Part
of
which
is
moved
after
many
different
Ways
,
besides
their
circular
or
common
Motion
.
Now
if
gross
Bodies
have
less
Motion
,
they
certainly
make
a
weaker
Effort
to
pass
into
a
right
Line
;
and
if
they
make
less
Efforts
,
they
are
obliged
to
give
way
to
those
that
make
more
,
and
consequently
,
to
approach
nearer
to
the
Center
of
the
Vortex
,
that
is
,
they
are
so
much
the
more
weighty
as
they
are
the
more
solid
.
But
where
gross
Bodies
are
far
distant
from
the
Center
of
the
Vortix
,
the
Circular
Motion
of
the
subtle
Matter
is
then
very
great
,
because
it
imploys
almost
all
its
Motion
in
turning
about
the
Center
of
the
Vortix
;
as
Bodies
have
so
much
the
more
Motion
as
they
have
more
Solidity
,
since
they
go
with
the
same
Swiftness
as
the
subtle
Matter
they
swim
in
,
and
have
more
Power
to
continue
their
Motion
in
a
right
Line
;
so
that
gross
Bodies
,
in
a
Distance
from
the
Center
of
the
Vortex
,
are
so
much
the
lighter
as
they
are
more
solid
.
This
agreed
,
we
may
consider
that
the
Earth
is
more
Metallick
towards
the
Center
;
that
it
is
not
very
Solid
hear
its
Circumference
:
That
Water
and
Air
must
continue
in
the
same
Situation
we
see
them
in
:
But
that
all
these
Bodies
are
heavy
[
](A51660-e58490-b)*
*
That
is
,
they
are
impelled
towards
the
Center
of
the
Earth
.
,
the
Air
is
heavy
as
well
as
Gold
and
Quick-silver
,
because
they
are
more
Solid
and
more
Gross
than
the
first
and
second
Element
.
This
granted
,
the
Moon
being
a
little
too
distant
from
the
Center
of
the
Vortex
of
the
Earth
is
not
heavy
although
it
be
solid
:
That
Mercury
Venus
,
the
Earth
,
Mars
,
Jupiter
,
and
Saturn
,
cannot
fall
into
the
Sun
,
and
that
they
are
not
solid
enough
to
go
out
of
this
Vortex
like
Comets
,
that
they
are
in
Equilibrio
,
with
the
Matter
they
swim
in
,
and
that
if
we
could
shoot
a
Musket
or
Cannon-bullet
high
enough
,
these
two
Bodies
would
become
little
Planets
,
or
like
little
Comets
which
could
no
longer
continue
in
Vortices
,
having
a
compleat
Solidity
.
I
do
not
pretend
to
have
sufficiently
explain'd
whatever
I
have
said
,
or
to
have
deduced
from
the
Simple
Principles
of
Extension
,
Figure
,
and
Motion
,
all
that
might
be
inferred
;
I
would
only
show
the
manner
Descartes
has
taken
to
discover
Natural
things
,
that
we
may
compare
his
Idea's
and
Method
with
that
of
other
Philosophers
.
I
had
here
no
other
design
:
But
I
am
not
afraid
to
affirm
,
that
if
we
would
cease
to
admire
the
Virtue
of
the
Loadstone
,
the
regulated
Motions
of
the
Flux
and
Reflux
of
the
Sea
,
the
Noise
of
Thunder
,
and
Generation
of
Meteors
,
In
short
,
If
we
would
instruct
our selves
in
the
Foundation
of
Physicks
,
there
is
no
better
way
to
do
it
,
than
by
Reading
and
Meditating
on
his
Works
;
so
we
can
make
nothing
of
it
if
we
follow
not
his
Method
,
I
mean
,
if
we
do
not
,
like
him
,
argue
from
clear
Idea's
,
beginning
always
with
the
most
Simple
.
'T
is
not
that
this
Author
is
Infallible
,
nay
,
I
believe
my self
able
to
demonstrate
that
he
is
mistaken
in
many
places
of
his
Works
:
But
't
is
more
Advantagious
to
those
that
read
him
,
to
believe
that
he
is
sometimes
deceived
,
than
if
they
were
perswaded
whatever
he
says
was
true
.
If
we
believed
him
Infallible
,
we
should
read
him
without
examining
,
we
should
believe
what
he
said
without
knowing
it
,
we
should
learn
his
Sentiments
as
we
do
Histories
,
and
should
not
inform
our
Minds
by
it
.
He
himself
tells
us
,
that
when
we
read
his
Works
,
we
ought
to
enquire
if
he
is
not
deceived
,
and
must
believe
nothing
he
says
,
except
Evidence
compels
us
to
it
.
For
he
is
not
like
to
those
falsly
Learned
Men
,
who
usurp
an
unjust
Dominion
over
the
Minds
of
others
,
requiring
to
be
believed
upon
their
word
;
and
who
instead
of
making
Men
Disciples
of
Internal
Truth
,
by
proposing
only
clear
Idea's
to
them
,
endeavour
to
submit
them
to
the
Authority
of
the
Heathens
,
and
by
Arguments
they
understand
not
,
make
them
receive
Opinions
they
cannot
comprehend
.
The
chief
thing
we
have
to
say
against
Descartes's
manner
of
producing
the
Sun
,
Stars
,
and
the
Earth
,
and
all
Bodies
which
are
about
us
,
is
because
it
appears
contrary
to
what
the
Holy
Scripture
tells
us
of
the
Creation
of
the
World
:
And
if
we
believe
this
Author
,
it
seems
that
the
Universe
was
form'd
from
it self
,
such
as
we
see
it
at
this
day
:
To
which
many
Answers
may
be
given
.
First
,
Those
who
say
Descartes
is
contrary
to
Moses
,
it
may
be
have
not
so
much
examined
both
the
Holy
Bible
and
Descartes
,
as
those
who
have
shown
by
their
publick
Writings
,
that
the
Creation
of
the
World
perfectly
agrees
with
the
Opinions
of
this
Philosopher
.
But
the
best
Answer
is
,
Descartes
never
pretended
things
were
made
just
as
he
described
them
;
for
in
the
first
Article
of
the
fourth
Part
of
his
Principles
,
which
is
,
That
to
find
the
true
Causes
of
whatever
is
upon
Earth
,
we
must
keep
the
Hypothesis
already
received
,
notwithstanding
it
should
be
false
.
He
positivesy
says
the
contrary
in
these
Terms
.
Although
I
require
not
a
Belief
,
that
Bodies
which
compose
this
visible
World
,
were
ever
produced
in
the
same
manner
I
have
described
them
,
(
as
I
before
intimated
)
I
am
nevertheless
obligēd
to
keep
here
the
same
Hypothesis
to
explain
whatever
is
upon
the
Earth
;
for
if
I
evidently
shew
,
as
I
hope
to
do
,
by
this
means
,
the
most
intelligible
and
certain
reasons
for
whatever
we
observe
in
it
;
and
that
it
cannot
he
done
by
any
other
Method
:
I
may
thence
reasonably
conclude
,
That
although
the
World
was
not
made
after
this
manner
in
the
Beginning
,
but
immediately
created
by
God
,
all
things
that
it
contains
,
cease
not
to
be
now
of
the
same
Nature
,
as
if
they
had
been
so
produced
.
Descartes
knew
,
that
to
apprehend
things
well
,
they
must
be
considered
in
their
Original
:
That
we
must
always
begin
with
the
most
Simple
things
:
That
we
must
not
perplex
our selves
whether
God
had
formed
his
Works
by
degrees
,
or
after
the
most
simple
ways
,
or
if
he
had
produced
them
all
at
once
:
But
however
God
had
made
them
,
to
know
them
well
,
we
must
first
consider
them
in
their
Principles
,
and
only
take
care
of
the
Consequence
,
and
then
see
how
our
Thought
might
agree
with
what
God
hath
done
.
He
knew
that
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
by
which
God
preserved
all
his
Works
in
the
Order
and
Situation
they
now
are
,
are
the
same
Laws
as
those
by
which
he
formed
and
disposed
them
:
For
't
is
plain
to
all
that
consider
things
attentively
,
that
if
God
had
made
his
whole
Work
all
at
once
,
in
the
same
Disposition
he
has
placed
it
in
time
;
the
whole
Order
of
Nature
would
have
been
overturned
,
since
the
Laws
of
Preservation
would
have
been
contrary
to
those
of
Creation
.
If
all
the
Universe
continues
in
the
order
we
see
it
,
't
is
because
the
Laws
of
Motion
which
preserve
it
in
this
order
,
were
capable
of
producing
it
.
And
if
God
had
placed
it
in
a
different
order
from
that
it
was
put
in
by
the
Laws
of
Motion
,
all
things
would
be
overturned
,
and
by
the
Force
of
those
Laws
be
placed
in
the
same
order
we
see
them
now
.
If
a
Man
would
discover
the
Nature
of
a
Chicken
,
he
ought
every
day
to
open
some
of
the
Eggs
that
the
Hen
sits
on
,
and
examine
what
grows
and
moves
first
:
He
soon
would
discover
that
the
Heart
begins
to
beat
,
and
on
all
sides
to
force
out
little
Chanels
of
Blood
which
are
Arteries
;
that
this
Blood
returns
to
the
Heart
by
Veins
,
that
the
Brain
also
soon
appears
,
and
that
the
Bones
are
the
last
parts
which
are
formed
.
By
this
means
he
delivers
himself
from
many
Errors
,
and
from
these
Observations
draws
many
Consequences
of
great
use
in
discovering
the
Nature
of
Animals
.
Who
can
say
any
thing
against
the
Conduct
of
this
Man
?
Can
it
be
said
,
that
he
pretends
that
God
made
the
first
Chicken
immediately
from
an
Egg
,
and
by
giving
it
a
certain
degree
of
Heat
caused
it
to
be
hatch'd
;
because
he
endeavours
to
discover
the
Nature
of
Chickens
in
their
Formation
?
Why
then
is
Descartes
accused
of
speaking
contrary
to
the
Scripture
,
because
intending
to
examine
the
Nature
of
visible
things
,
he
examines
the
Formation
of
them
by
the
Laws
of
Motion
in
all
their
Occurrences
?
He
never
doubted
,
[
](A51660-e58730-b)*
*
Art.
45.
of
the
third
Part
of
his
Principles
.
But
the
World
was
in
the
Beginning
created
in
its
utmost
Perfection
,
so
that
the
Sun
,
the
Moon
,
and
Stars
,
were
from
the
Beginning
;
and
that
the
Earth
had
not
only
in
it self
the
Seeds
of
Plants
,
but
that
even
Plants
themselves
covered
a
part
of
it
:
That
Adam
and
Eve
were
not
created
in
Infancy
,
but
at
perfect
Age.
The
Christian
Religion
,
says
he
,
will
have
us
believe
this
,
and
Natural
Reason
absolutely
perswades
us
of
this
Truth
,
because
considering
the
Almighty
Power
of
God
,
we
must
judge
,
that
whatever
he
has
made
,
has
its
utmost
Perfection
in
it
.
But
as
we
should
much
better
discover
the
Nature
of
Adam
,
and
that
of
the
Trees
of
Paradise
,
if
we
examined
how
Children
were
by
degrees
formed
,
in
the
Womb
,
and
how
Plants
sprung
up
from
their
Seeds
;
then
if
we
only
considered
them
as
they
were
after
God
had
created
them
,
so
we
should
better
understand
what
is
generally
the
Nature
of
all
things
in
the
World
,
if
we
could
imagine
some
Principles
which
are
very
Intelligible
and
Simple
;
from
which
we
might
clearly
see
,
that
the
Stars
,
the
Earth
,
and
in
short
,
all
the
visible
World
,
might
have
been
thus
produced
as
from
some
Seeds
,
although
we
know
they
were
not
produced
in
this
manner
;
than
if
we
describe
it
only
as
it
is
,
or
as
we
believe
it
was
created
:
And
because
I
think
I
have
found
such
Principles
,
I
will
endeavour
to
explain
them
.
M.
Descartes
thought
that
God
made
the
World
in
an
instant
,
but
also
believed
he
had
created
it
in
the
same
Order
and
Disposition
of
parts
as
it
would
have
been
in
,
if
he
had
formed
it
by
little
and
little
after
the
most
simple
way
.
And
this
Thought
is
worthy
the
Power
and
Wisdom
of
God
:
His
Power
,
since
in
a
Moment
he
has
created
all
his
Works
in
their
greatest
Perfection
:
Of
his
Wisdom
,
since
by
that
he
has
discovered
he
perfectly
foresaw
all
that
would
necessarily
happen
in
Matter
,
if
it
was
acted
by
the
most
simple
ways
:
And
also
because
the
Order
of
Nature
could
not
subsist
,
if
the
World
had
been
made
contrary
to
the
Laws
of
Motion
by
which
it
is
preserved
.
It
is
Ridiculous
to
say
M.
Descartes
believed
the
World
was
form'd
of
it self
,
since
he
acknowledges
,
as
all
those
do
who
follow
the
Light
of
Reason
,
that
no
Body
can
move
it self
;
and
that
all
the
immutable
Laws
of
the
Communication
of
Motion
,
are
only
the
Consequences
of
the
unchangeable
Will
of
God
,
who
continually
acts
after
the
same
manner
.
Having
proved
there
is
but
one
God
who
gives
Motion
to
Matter
,
and
that
Motion
produces
in
all
Bodies
,
all
the
different
Forms
we
see
them
cloathed
with
,
it
was
sufficient
to
take
away
from
Libertines
all
their
pretext
of
drawing
any
Advantage
from
his
System
.
On
the
contrary
,
If
the
Atheists
made
any
Reflection
upon
the
Principles
of
this
Philosophy
,
they
would
soon
find
themselves
constrained
to
acknowledge
their
Errors
.
For
if
,
like
the
Heathens
,
they
would
affirm
,
that
Matter
was
uncreated
,
they
could
not
also
,
maintain
,
that
it
would
ever
have
been
able
to
have
moved
of
it self
.
So
that
the
Atheists
would
at
least
be
obliged
to
confess
the
true
Mover
,
if
they
denied
the
true
Creator
.
But
common
Philosophy
furnishes
them
with
Methods
to
blind
themselves
and
maintain
their
Errors
;
for
it
tells
them
of
certain
impressed
Vertues
,
and
moving
Faculties
.
In
short
,
of
a
certain
Nature
which
is
the
Principle
of
Motion
in
every
thing
,
and
although
they
have
no
distinct
Idea
of
it
,
they
are
very
glad
,
because
of
the
Corruption
of
their
Hearts
,
to
put
it
in
the
place
of
the
true
God
,
by
concluding
it
is
that
which
produces
all
the
Wonders
we
see
.
CHAP.
V.
An
Explanation
of
the
Principles
of
the
Aristotelian
Philosophy
,
wherein
it
appears
he
never
observed
the
Second
Part
of
the
General
Rule
.
With
an
Examination
of
his
Elementary
Qualities
.
THAT
we
may
make
some
Comparison
between
the
Philosophy
of
Descartes
and
Aristotle
,
it
will
be
proper
to
give
a
little
Abridgment
of
what
he
thought
of
his
Elements
,
and
of
the
Nature
of
Bodies
in
General
,
which
the
most
Learned
believe
he
has
shewn
in
his
four
Books
de
Caelo
;
for
his
eight
Books
of
Physicks
belongs
rather
to
Logick
,
or
if
you
will
,
to
Metaphysicks
than
to
Physicks
,
since
they
are
only
composed
of
rambling
and
general
words
,
which
represent
nothing
distinct
and
particular
to
the
Mind
.
These
four
Books
are
entitled
de
Caelo
,
because
the
Heavens
are
the
chief
amongst
the
simple
Bodies
he
treats
of
.
This
Philosopher
begins
his
Work
with
proving
the
World
is
perfect
,
and
this
is
his
Argument
for
it
.
All
Bodies
have
three
Dimensions
,
they
cannot
have
more
,
for
according
to
the
Pythagoreans
,
the
number
Three
comprehends
every
thing
:
Now
the
World
is
a
Collection
of
all
Bodies
,
therefore
the
World
is
perfect
:
By
this
pleasant
proof
we
might
also
demonstrate
,
that
the
World
cannot
be
more
Imperfect
than
it
is
,
since
it
cannot
be
composed
of
parts
which
have
less
than
three
Dimensions
.
In
the
second
Chapter
he
immediately
supposes
certain
Peripatetical
Truths
:
1.
That
all
Natural
Bodies
have
the
power
of
Motion
in
themselves
,
which
he
neither
proves
here
nor
elsewhere
.
On
the
contrary
,
in
the
first
Chapter
of
his
second
Book
of
Physicks
he
affirms
,
That
't
is
Ridiculous
to
endeavour
to
prove
it
:
Because
,
says
he
,
it
is
self-evident
,
and
't
is
only
such
as
cannot
discern
what
is
known
of
it self
,
or
what
is
not
so
,
who
endeavour
to
prove
that
which
is
evident
,
by
that
which
is
obscure
.
But
we
have
already
shewn
that
't
is
absolutely
false
,
that
Natural
Bodies
have
in
themselves
the
power
of
moving
;
and
that
it
appears
evident
only
to
such
Persons
,
who
with
Aristotle
follow
the
Impression
of
their
,
Senses
,
and
make
no
use
of
their
Reason
.
He
says
in
the
second
place
,
That
all
Local
Motion
is
made
in
a
right
or
circular
Line
,
or
composed
of
both
:
But
if
he
would
not
consider
of
what
he
so
boldly
advances
,
he
ought
at
least
to
open
his
Eyes
,
and
then
he
would
soon
have
seen
an
infinite
number
of
Motions
,
which
are
neither
compounded
of
a
right
nor
circular
Line
.
Or
rather
he
should
have
thought
,
that
the
Motions
compounded
of
Motions
in
a
right
Line
,
might
have
been
infinitely
different
,
if
we
suppose
that
compounded
Motions
increase
or
diminish
their
Swiftness
in
an
infinite
number
of
different
ways
,
as
is
evident
from
what
has
been
said
before
.
There
are
,
says
he
,
only
these
two
simple
Motions
,
the
Right
,
and
the
Circular
,
of
which
all
Motions
are
composed
.
But
he
is
deceived
,
the
Circular
Motion
is
not
Simple
we
cannot
conceive
it
without
thinking
of
one
point
to
which
it
relates
;
and
whatever
includes
a
Relation
,
is
Relative
and
not
Simple
.
It
is
true
,
we
can
conceive
the
Circular
Motion
,
as
produced
by
two
Motions
in
a
right
Line
,
the
Swiftness
of
which
are
unequal
according
to
a
certain
Proportion
;
for
a
Motion
compounded
of
two
others
which
are
made
in
a
right
Line
,
and
which
diversly
increase
or
diminish
their
Swiftness
,
cannot
be
Simple
.
In
the
third
place
he
says
,
all
simple
Motions
are
of
three
sorts
,
one
from
the
Center
,
another
to
the
Center
,
and
the
third
about
the
Center
.
But
it
is
false
,
the
last
is
Simple
,
as
I
have
already
said
:
'T
is
also
false
that
there
is
no
simple
Motions
but
those
that
ascend
and
descend
;
for
all
Motions
in
a
right
Line
are
Simple
,
whether
they
approach
to
or
remove
from
the
Center
,
the
Poles
,
or
any
other
Point
.
All
Bodies
,
says
he
,
are
composed
of
three
Dimensions
.
Therefore
all
Bodies
ought
to
have
three
Simple
Motions
.
What
relation
is
there
between
these
,
Simple
Motions
and
Dimensions
?
Nay
more
,
all
Bodies
have
three
Dimensions
,
but
no
Bodies
three
Simple
Motions
.
In
the
fourth
place
,
he
supposes
that
Bodies
are
either
Simple
or
Compounded
;
and
he
says
,
Simple
Bodies
are
such
as
have
in
themselves
some
Power
of
Motion
,
as
Fire
,
Earth
,
&c.
and
that
the
compounded
ones
receive
their
Motion
from
those
which
compose
them
.
But
in
this
Sense
there
is
no
Simple
Bodies
at
all
,
for
there
are
none
which
have
in
themselves
any
Principle
of
their
Motion
.
Nor
is
there
any
compounded
Bodies
,
since
Compounded
suppose
Simple
,
which
are
not
;
thus
we
should
have
no
Bodies
at
all
.
What
Imagination
can
we
have
of
defining
the
Simplicity
of
Bodies
by
a
Power
of
moving
themselves
?
What
distinct
Idea's
are
united
to
these
words
of
Simple
and
Compound
Bodies
,
if
Simple
Bodies
are
only
defined
by
their
relation
to
an
Imaginary
Power
of
moving
themselves
?
But
let
us
examine
the
Consequences
he
draws
from
these
Principles
.
Circular
Motion
is
a
Simple
Motion
:
The
Heavens
move
circularly
;
therefore
this
Motion
is
Simple
.
Now
Simple
Motion
can
proceed
only
from
a
Simple
Body
,
that
is
,
from
a
Body
which
moves
by
its
own
Power
:
Therefore
the
Heavens
are
a
Simple
Body
distinct
from
the
four
Elements
which
move
by
right
Lines
.
It
is
very
evident
,
that
all
this
arguing
contains
only
false
and
absurd
Propositions
.
Let
us
examine
his
other
Proofs
,
for
he
brings
a
great
many
to
prove
a
thing
as
useless
as
it
is
false
.
His
second
reason
to
prove
that
the
Heavens
are
a
Simple
Body
,
distinct
from
the
four
Elements
,
supposes
two
sorts
of
Motions
,
the
one
Natural
,
and
the
other
Violent
or
against
Nature
.
But
it
is
plain
enough
to
all
those
who
judge
of
things
by
clear
Idea's
,
That
Bodies
having
not
in
themselves
the
Nature
or
Principle
of
their
Motion
,
as
Aristotle
understood
,
there
can
be
no
violent
Motion
,
or
such
as
is
contrary
to
Nature
.
It
is
indifferent
to
all
Bodies
,
whether
they
are
moved
or
not
;
moved
on
one
side
or
moved
on
the
other
.
But
Aristotle
who
judges
of
things
by
the
Impression
of
his
Senses
,
imagines
that
Bodies
which
are
always
placed
by
the
Laws
of
the
Communication
of
Motion
in
such
or
such
a
Situation
in
respect
to
others
,
are
placed
there
of
themselves
,
because
they
like
it
best
,
and
that
it
is
more
conformable
to
their
Nature
.
This
is
Aristotle's
way
of
arguing
.
The
Circular
Motion
of
the
Heavens
is
Natural
,
or
else
contrary
to
Nature
:
If
it
is
Natural
,
as
we
have
said
,
it
is
a
Simple
Body
distinct
from
the
Elements
,
since
the
Elements
move
not
circularly
by
their
Natural
Motion
.
If
the
Circular
Motion
is
against
the
Nature
of
the
Heavens
,
the
Heavens
would
be
composed
of
some
one
of
the
Elements
,
as
Fire
,
or
some
other
thing
.
But
the
Heavens
cannot
be
composed
of
any
of
the
Elements
,
for
,
if
for
instance
it
was
Fire
,
the
natural
Motion
of
Fire
being
to
ascend
,
the
Firmament
would
have
two
contrary
Motions
,
the
Circular
,
and
the
ascending
one
;
which
could
not
be
,
since
a
Body
cannot
have
two
contrary
Motions
.
If
the
Firmament
was
composed
of
some
other
Body
,
which
by
its
Nature
did
not
move
circularly
,
it
would
have
some
other
Natural
Motion
which
cannot
be
;
for
if
naturally
it
ascended
,
it
must
be
either
Fire
or
Air
;
if
it
descended
,
it
would
be
Earth
or
Water
:
Therefore
,
&c.
I
shall
not
stop
here
,
to
make
particular
Remarks
of
the
Absurdity
of
these
Arguments
:
I
only
say
in
general
,
that
what
Aristotle
here
says
signifies
nothing
distinct
,
and
that
there
is
nothing
of
Truth
or
Conclusion
in
it
.
His
third
Reason
is
as
follows
.
The
first
and
most
perfect
of
all
Simple
Motions
,
must
be
the
Motion
of
a
Simple
Body
,
and
even
of
the
first
and
most
perfect
of
Simple
Bodies
.
But
the
Circular
Motion
is
the
first
and
most
perfect
of
all
Simple
Motions
,
because
all
Circular
Lines
are
perfect
,
and
no
right
Line
is
so
.
For
if
it
is
Finite
,
we
may
add
something
to
it
;
if
Infinite
,
it
is
not
yet
perfect
,
since
it
has
no
[
](A51660-e59100-b)*
*
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
and
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
make
the
same
Equivocation
as
Finish'd
and
End
.
This
Philosopher
proves
thus
that
an
infinite
Line
is
not
perfect
,
because
't
is
not
finish'd
.
End
,
and
things
are
perfect
only
when
they
are
finished
;
therefore
Circular
Motion
is
the
first
and
most
perfect
of
all
Motion
:
Therefore
Bodies
which
more
circularly
are
Simple
,
and
the
first
and
most
Divine
of
Simple
Bodies
.
His
fourth
Argument
.
All
Motion
is
either
Natural
or
not
so
,
and
all
Motion
that
is
Unnatural
to
one
Body
,
is
Natural
to
some
other
:
We
see
that
Motions
that
descend
and
ascend
,
which
are
Unnatural
to
some
Bodies
,
yet
are
.
Natural
to
others
:
For
Fire
descends
not
Naturally
,
but
the
Earth
does
.
Now
the
Circular
Motion
is
not
Natural
to
any
of
the
four
Elements
:
There
must
be
then
a
Simple
Body
to
which
this
Motion
is
Natural
therefore
the
Heavens
which
are
moved
circularly
,
are
a
Simple
Body
differing
from
the
four
Elements
.
In
fine
,
The
Circular
Motion
is
Natural
or
Violent
in
some
Body
:
If
it
be
Natural
,
it
is
evident
that
Body
must
be
the
most
Simple
and
Perfect
:
If
it
is
not
Natural
,
it
is
very
strange
that
this
Motion
should
continue
always
,
since
we
see
all
unnatural
Motions
endure
but
a
little
time
.
We
must
therefore
,
after
all
these
Reasons
,
believe
,
that
there
is
some
other
Body
separate
from
all
those
which
surround
us
,
which
is
,
of
a
Nature
so
much
the
more
perfect
as
it
is
more
distant
from
us
.
Here
is
Aristotle's
Reasons
;
but
I
desie
the
most
Intelligent
of
his
Interpreters
to
joyn
distinct
Idea's
to
the
Terms
which
he
makes
use
of
;
and
to
prove
that
this
Philosopher
began
with
the
most
Simple
things
,
before
he
spoke
of
the
more
compounded
;
which
is
absolutely
necessary
to
reason
well
,
as
I
have
before
proved
.
If
I
was
not
afraid
of
being
tiresome
,
I
would
yet
translate
some
Chapters
of
Aristotle
.
But
besides
,
our
taking
little
Pleasure
to
read
them
in
our
own
Tongue
(
when
we
clearly
understand
what
he
means
)
I
have
sufficiently
shewn
by
the
little
I
have
related
,
that
his
Manner
of
Philosophizing
,
is
wholly
useless
for
the
Discovery
of
Truth
.
For
since
he
says
himself
,
in
the
Fifth
Chapter
of
this
Book
,
that
those
that
deceive
themselves
in
any
thing
at
first
,
deceive
themselves
a
Thousand
times
more
if
they
advance
far
.
It
is
plain
;
that
if
he
knew
not
what
he
said
in
the
two
first
Chapters
of
his
Book
;
we
may
reasonably
believe
,
that
it
is
not
safe
to
take
things
upon
his
Authority
,
without
examining
his
Reasons
.
But
to
be
better
perswaded
of
it
,
I
will
make
it
appear
,
that
there
is
not
one
Chapter
in
this
Book
wherein
there
is
not
some
Absurdity
.
In
the
third
Chapter
he
says
,
the
Heavens
are
incorruptible
,
and
not
subject
to
Alteration
,
he
brings
many
very
foolish
Arguments
to
prove
this
,
because
,
for
Example
,
there
is
the
Habitation
of
the
Immortal
Gods
,
and
because
there
was
never
any
Change
observed
in
them
:
This
last
Reason
might
be
admitted
,
if
Aristotle
could
have
proved
that
any
one
had
come
from
thence
,
or
had
lived
near
enough
to
these
celestial
Bodies
,
to
make
accurate
Observations
of
them
.
But
however
,
I
don't
know
who
would
believe
such
an
Authority
,
since
Telescopes
do
shew
us
the
contrary
.
He
pretends
,
in
the
Fourth
Chapter
,
to
prove
,
that
there
are
no
contrary
Circular
Motions
.
Yet
it
is
manifest
,
that
the
Motion
from
East
to
West
,
is
contrary
to
that
from
West
to
East
.
In
the
Fifth
Chapter
he
improperly
proves
,
that
Bodies
are
not
infinite
;
drawing
his
Proofs
from
the
Motion
of
simple
Bodies
:
For
What
hinders
but
that
there
may
be
above
his
Primum
Mobile
,
some
immoveable
Extension
?
In
the
Sixth
he
uselesly
amuses
himself
to
prove
,
that
the
Elements
are
not
infinite
.
For
who
can
doubt
of
it
,
when
we
suppose
with
him
,
that
they
are
included
in
the
Heavens
which
surrounds
them
?
But
he
makes
himself
ridiculous
,
when
he
endeavours
to
prove
it
by
their
Weight
and
Lightness
.
If
the
Elements
were
infinite
,
says
he
,
they
would
have
an
infinite
Weight
,
and
an
infinite
Lightness
,
which
cannot
be
.
Therefore
,
&c.
those
that
would
see
his
Arguments
at
large
,
may
read
them
in
his
Books
:
I
think
it
Loss
of
Time
to
relate
them
.
In
the
Seventh
he
continues
to
prove
,
that
Bodies
are
not
infinite
,
and
his
first
Proof
supposes
it
necessary
for
all
Bodies
to
be
in
Motion
;
which
he
does
not
prove
,
nor
indeed
can
it
be
proved
.
He
maintains
,
in
the
Eighth
,
that
there
are
not
many
Worlds
of
the
same
Kind
,
by
this
pleasant
Argument
.
If
there
was
another
Earth
,
like
this
we
inhabit
,
the
Earth
being
heavy
by
Nature
,
it
would
fall
upon
ours
,
because
ours
is
the
Center
to
which
all
heavy
Bodies
ought
to
tend
.
From
whence
has
he
learned
this
,
but
from
his
Senses
?
In
the
Ninth
he
proves
,
that
't
is
even
impossible
there
should
be
a
Plurality
of
Worlds
;
because
,
if
there
was
any
Body
above
the
Heavens
,
it
would
be
simple
or
compound
,
in
a
Natural
or
Violent
State
,
which
cannot
be
from
the
Reasons
he
has
drawn
from
his
three
Kinds
of
Motion
,
which
I
have
already
spoken
of
.
He
affirms
,
in
the
Tenth
,
that
the
World
is
Eternal
,
because
he
cannot
prove
that
it
had
a
Beginning
,
and
that
it
will
always
endure
;
since
we
see
whatsoever
is
created
corrupts
in
Time
.
This
he
has
likewise
learnt
from
his
Senses
.
But
who
has
taught
him
,
that
the
World
shall
always
endure
?
He
imploys
the
Eleventh
Chapter
in
explaining
what
we
mean
by
incorruptible
,
as
if
the
Equivocation
was
much
to
be
feared
,
and
that
a
great
Use
ought
to
be
made
of
its
Explanation
.
Yet
,
this
Term
Incorruptible
is
so
clear
of
it self
,
that
Aristotle
does
not
give
himself
the
Trouble
to
explain
,
neither
in
what
Sense
it
ought
to
be
taken
,
nor
how
he
understood
it
himself
:
It
would
have
been
more
to
the
Purpose
if
he
had
defined
an
infinite
Number
of
Terms
he
makes
use
of
,
which
stir
up
only
sensible
Idea's
:
For
we
might
then
,
it
may
be
,
have
learned
something
by
reading
his
Works
.
And
in
the
last
Chapter
of
the
first
Book
of
the
Heavens
,
he
essays
to
prove
,
that
the
World
is
incorruptible
,
and
will
eternally
endure
,
because
he
cannot
prove
it
had
a
Beginning
.
All
things
,
says
he
,
subsist
for
a
finite
or
infinite
Time
.
But
what
is
infinite
only
in
one
Sense
,
is
neither
finite
nor
infinite
.
Therefore
nothing
can
subsist
after
this
manner
.
This
is
the
way
of
reasoning
,
us'd
by
the
Prince
of
Philosophers
,
that
Genius
of
Nature
;
who
in
stead
of
discovering
die
true
Cause
of
Natural
Effects
by
clear
and
distinct
Idea's
,
has
established
a
Heathen
Philosophy
upon
the
false
and
confused
Idea's
of
the
Senses
;
or
upon
such
as
are
too
general
to
be
of
any
Use
in
an
Enquiry
after
Truth
.
I
do
not
here
find
Fault
with
Aristotle
,
because
he
did
not
know
that
God
created
the
World
in
Time
,
to
make
known
his
Power
,
and
the
Dependance
of
his
Creatures
;
and
that
he
will
never
destroy
it
,
that
we
may
know
also
that
he
is
immutable
,
and
never
repents
of
his
Designs
.
But
I
believe
my self
able
to
confute
his
weak
Proofs
of
the
Worlds
Eternity
.
Though
he
sometimes
is
excusable
in
the
Opinions
he
maintains
;
yet
he
is
hardly
ever
so
in
the
Reasons
he
brings
,
when
he
treats
on
Subjects
which
include
any
Difficulty
.
We
are
,
it
may
be
,
already
perswaded
of
it
by
what
I
have
said
,
although
I
have
not
related
all
the
Errors
I
have
met
with
in
the
Book
I
have
extracted
,
and
I
have
endeavoured
to
make
him
speak
more
clearly
than
he
was
accustomed
to
do
.
But
that
we
may
be
fully
convinced
,
that
the
Genius
of
Nature
hath
never
discovered
either
the
Secrets
or
Springs
of
it
:
It
will
be
proper
for
me
to
shew
,
that
the
Principles
this
Philosopher
makes
use
of
to
explain
Natural
Effects
,
have
no
Reason
in
them
.
It
is
plain
,
that
we
can
discover
nothing
in
Physicks
,
if
we
begin
not
with
the
most
simple
Bodies
,
the
Elements
;
For
the
Elements
are
the
Bodies
into
which
all
others
resolve
,
because
they
are
contained
in
them
either
actually
or
[
](A51660-e59460-b)*
*
I
speak
according
to
the
Sentiments
of
the
Peripateticks
,
c.
3.
l.
3.
de
Coelo
.
Potentially
,
so
Aristotle
defines
them
.
But
we
cannot
find
in
the
Works
of
Aristotle
,
that
he
has
,
by
a
distinct
Idea
,
explained
these
simple
Bodies
,
into
which
he
pretends
the
others
resolve
:
And
consequently
,
his
Elements
not
being
clearly
known
,
it
is
impossible
to
discover
the
Nature
of
the
Bodies
which
are
composed
of
them
.
This
Philosopher
says
true
,
that
there
are
four
Elements
,
Fire
,
Air
,
Water
,
and
Earth
.
But
he
does
not
clearly
know
the
Nature
of
them
:
He
gives
no
distinct
Idea
of
them
:
Nay
,
he
will
not
have
his
Elements
to
be
composed
of
the
Fire
,
Air
,
Water
,
and
Earth
that
we
see
;
for
in
short
,
if
it
were
so
,
we
should
at
least
have
some
Knowledge
of
them
by
our
Senses
.
It
is
true
,
in
many
Places
of
his
Works
,
he
endeavours
to
explain
them
,
by
the
Qualities
of
Heat
and
Cold
,
Humidity
and
Driness
,
Weight
and
Lightness
.
But
this
manner
of
Explication
is
so
impertinent
and
ridiculous
,
that
I
cannot
conceive
how
so
many
learned
Men
should
be
satisfied
with
it
.
'T
is
what
I
am
going
to
prove
.
Aristotle
,
in
his
Book
of
the
Heavens
,
pretends
that
the
Earth
is
the
Center
of
the
World
,
and
that
all
Bodies
,
which
he
pleases
to
call
simple
,
because
he
supposes
them
to
move
by
their
own
Nature
,
must
be
moved
by
simple
Motions
.
He
affirms
,
that
besides
the
Circular
Motion
,
which
he
maintains
to
be
simple
,
and
by
which
he
proves
,
that
the
Heavens
he
supposes
to
move
Circularly
,
are
a
simple
Body
,
that
there
is
only
two
which
are
simple
:
The
one
descending
,
or
from
the
Circumference
to
the
Center
,
the
other
ascending
,
or
from
the
Center
to
the
Circumference
:
That
these
simple
Motions
agree
with
simple
Bodies
;
consequently
,
that
the
Earth
and
Fire
are
simple
Bodies
,
one
of
which
is
absolutely
heavy
,
and
the
other
absolutely
light
:
But
because
Heaviness
and
Lightness
may
meet
in
one
Body
,
either
absolutely
,
or
in
part
,
he
concludes
,
that
there
are
also
two
Elements
or
simple
Bodies
,
one
of
which
is
heavy
in
part
,
and
the
other
light
in
part
,
viz.
Water
and
Air.
This
is
the
Method
he
takes
,
to
prove
,
that
there
are
four
Elements
,
and
no
more
.
It
is
evident
to
such
as
examine
Mens
Opinions
by
their
own
Reason
,
that
all
these
Propositions
are
false
,
or
at
least
,
they
can
never
pass
for
clear
and
indisputable
Principles
,
of
which
we
have
very
clear
and
distinct
Idea's
,
and
which
may
serve
for
the
Foundations
of
Physicks
.
It
is
certain
,
that
there
is
nothing
more
absurd
than
an
Essay
to
establish
the
Number
of
Elements
by
Imaginary
Qualities
of
Weight
and
Lightness
:
In
saying
without
any
Proof
,
that
there
are
some
Bodies
which
are
heavy
,
others
light
,
through
a
Principle
in
their
own
Nature
.
For
if
we
may
speak
without
proving
what
we
say
,
we
may
affirm
,
that
all
Bodies
are
naturally
heavy
,
and
that
all
endeavour
to
approach
to
the
Center
of
the
World
,
as
the
Place
of
their
Rest
:
And
we
may
on
the
contrary
maintain
,
that
all
Bodies
are
Naturally
light
,
and
have
a
Tendency
to
the
Heavens
,
as
the
Place
of
their
greatest
Perfection
:
For
if
we
object
to
him
,
who
says
,
all
Bodies
are
heavy
,
that
Air
and
Fire
are
light
,
he
can
only
answer
,
that
Fire
and
Air
are
not
light
,
but
only
less
weighty
than
Earth
and
Water
,
and
that
is
the
Reason
they
seem
light
.
It
is
so
with
these
Elements
,
as
if
a
Piece
of
Wood
,
which
seems
light
in
Water
,
not
because
it
is
light
of
it self
,
since
it
falls
down
when
it
is
in
the
Air
,
but
because
the
Water
,
which
is
more
heavy
,
makes
it
ascend
and
bears
it
up
.
If
,
on
the
contrary
,
we
should
object
to
one
who
would
maintain
,
that
all
Bodies
are
Naturally
light
,
that
Earth
and
Water
are
heavy
,
he
would
likwise
answer
,
that
these
Bodies
seem
heavy
because
they
are
not
so
light
as
others
which
surround
them
.
That
Wood
,
for
instance
,
seems
heavy
in
the
Air
,
not
because
it
is
heavy
,
since
it
swims
when
it
is
in
the
Water
,
but
because
it
is
not
so
light
as
Air.
It
is
therefore
ridiculous
to
suppose
these
Principles
indisputable
,
that
Bodies
are
heavy
or
light
in
their
own
Nature
.
On
the
contrary
,
't
is
plain
,
that
all
Bodies
have
not
the
Power
of
Motion
in
themselves
;
and
that
't
is
indifferent
to
them
whether
they
are
moved
upward
or
downward
,
East
or
West
,
North
or
South
,
or
any
other
Way
we
can
conceive
.
But
if
,
according
to
Aristotle
,
there
are
four
Elements
,
such
as
he
wishes
them
to
be
;
Two
Naturally
heavy
,
and
two
Naturally
light
,
viz.
Fire
,
Air
,
Earth
,
and
Water
.
What
Consequence
can
we
draw
from
thence
,
to
discover
the
Knowledge
of
the
Universe
?
These
Four
Elements
are
not
such
Fire
,
Air
,
Water
,
and
Earth
as
we
see
,
they
are
quite
different
;
we
know
them
not
by
our
Senses
,
and
still
less
by
Reason
,
because
we
have
no
distinct
Idea
of
them
.
I
mean
,
we
know
all
Natural
Bodies
are
composed
of
them
,
since
Aristotle
has
said
it
.
But
the
Nature
of
these
compounded
Bodies
is
unknown
to
us
,
and
we
cannot
discover
them
,
but
by
knowing
the
Four
Elements
or
simple
Bodies
which
compose
them
,
for
we
know
the
compound
only
by
the
simple
.
Fire
,
Aristotle
says
,
is
Naturally
light
;
the
ascending
Motion
is
simple
:
Therefore
Fire
is
a
simple
Body
,
since
Motion
must
be
proportioned
to
what
it
moves
.
Natural
Bodies
are
compounded
of
simple
Bodies
:
Therefore
there
is
Fire
in
all
Natural
Bodies
.
But
a
Fire
which
is
not
like
to
that
we
see
;
for
Fire
is
often
only
in
Power
in
Bodies
which
are
compounded
of
it
.
What
is
it
these
Periparetick
Discourses
teach
us
?
That
there
is
Fire
in
all
Bodies
either
Actual
or
Potential
;
that
all
Bodies
are
composed
of
something
which
we
do
not
see
,
and
whose
Nature
we
are
unacquainted
with
.
We
see
then
that
here
is
very
much
advanced
.
But
if
Aristotle
does
not
discover
to
us
the
Nature
of
Fire
,
and
the
other
Elements
of
which
all
Bodies
are
composed
,
probably
we
may
imagine
he
has
discovered
at
least
the
chief
Qualities
and
Properties
of
them
.
We
shall
further
examine
what
he
says
thereof
.
He
declares
to
us
,
there
are
four
principal
Qualities
which
belong
to
the
Sense
of
feeling
,
l.
2.
c.
2
,
3.
de
gen
.
&
corrupu
.
Heat
,
Cold
,
Moist
,
and
dry
,
of
which
all
others
are
composed
:
In
this
manner
he
distributes
these
first
Qualities
to
the
Four
Elements
.
To
the
Fire
he
gives
Heat
and
Dryness
;
to
the
Air
Heat
and
Moistness
;
to
the
Water
Coldness
and
Humidity
;
and
to
the
Earth
Coldness
and
Dryness
.
Chap.
2.
He
affirms
Heat
and
Cold
to
be
active
Qualities
,
and
Dryness
and
Humidity
to
be
passive
ones
.
He
thus
defines
Heat
,
That
what
collects
things
of
the
same
kind
:
Cold
,
which
assembles
all
things
,
either
of
the
same
or
of
a
different
kind
:
Moisture
,
that
which
is
not
easily
contained
in
its
own
Bounds
,
but
in
Foreign
Limits
:
and
Dryness
,
that
which
is
easily
contained
in
its
own
Bounds
,
and
not
easily
in
the
Limits
of
the
Bodies
that
are
about
it
.
Thus
,
according
to
Aristotle
,
Fire
is
a
hot
and
dry
Element
:
'T
is
therefore
an
Element
which
collects
things
of
the
same
Nature
,
which
is
easily
contained
within
its
own
Limits
,
and
difficultly
in
the
Limits
of
Forreign
Bodies
.
The
Air
is
an
hot
and
moist
Element
,
and
therefore
assembles
things
of
the
same
kind
,
and
is
not
easily
contained
in
its
own
Limits
,
but
in
that
of
others
.
Water
is
a
cold
and
moist
Element
,
which
gathers
things
together
,
both
of
the
same
and
of
a
different
Nature
,
which
is
hot
easily
contained
within
its
own
Bounds
,
but
in
that
of
others
.
And
in
fine
,
the
Earth
,
cold
and
dry
;
and
therefore
collects
things
of
the
same
and
of
a
different
Nature
,
which
is
not
easily
contained
in
its
own
Bounds
,
and
very
difficultly
in
that
of
others
.
Here
the
Elements
are
explained
according
to
the
Sentiment
of
Aristotle
,
or
according
to
the
Definitions
he
has
given
of
their
chief
Qualities
;
and
because
,
if
we
will
believe
him
,
the
Elements
are
simple
Bodies
,
whereof
all
others
are
compounded
;
the
Knowledge
of
these
Element
and
their
Qualities
must
be
most
clear
and
distinct
,
since
all
Physicks
,
or
the
Knowledge
of
Sensible
Bodies
which
are
composed
of
them
,
ought
to
be
deduced
from
thence
.
Let
us
see
then
what
is
defective
in
these
Principles
:
First
,
Aristotle
joyns
no
distinct
Idea
to
the
Word
Quality
.
We
know
not
whether
by
Quality
he
means
a
real
Being
distinct
from
Matter
,
or
only
the
Modification
of
Matter
:
It
seems
sometimes
as
if
he
meant
it
in
one
Sense
,
and
sometimes
in
another
.
It
is
true
,
in
the
Eighth
Chapter
of
Categories
,
he
defines
Quality
to
be
that
which
causes
a
thing
to
have
such
or
such
a
Name
,
but
that
will
not
satisfie
our
Demands
.
Secondly
,
the
Definitions
he
gives
of
his
four
first
Qualities
,
Heat
,
Cold
,
Moist
,
and
Dry
,
are
all
false
or
useless
.
This
is
his
Definition
of
Heat
,
Heat
is
that
which
assembles
things
of
a
like
Nature
,
First
,
we
do
not
see
that
this
Definition
perfectly
explains
the
Nature
of
Heat
,
although
it
should
be
true
,
that
Heat
collects
all
things
of
the
same
Nature
.
But
secondly
,
it
is
false
,
for
Heat
does
not
collect
all
things
of
the
same
Nature
.
Heat
does
not
assemble
the
Parts
of
Water
,
it
rather
dissipates
them
into
a
Vapour
.
Nor
does
it
assemble
the
Particles
of
Wine
,
or
those
of
all
other
Liquors
,
or
fluid
Bodies
whatever
:
Nor
even
,
those
of
Quicksilver
.
On
the
contrary
,
it
resolves
and
separates
all
solid
Bodies
,
and
even
Fluids
,
although
of
a
different
Nature
.
And
if
there
are
any
whose
Parts
Fire
cannot
dissipate
,
't
is
not
because
they
are
of
the
same
Nature
,
but
because
some
are
too
gross
and
too
solid
to
be
raised
by
the
Motion
of
the
Parts
of
Fire
.
In
the
third
place
,
Heat
indeed
can
neither
assemble
nor
dissipate
the
Parts
of
any
Body
whether
Homogeneous
or
Heterogeneous
.
For
to
assemble
,
to
separate
,
or
dissipate
the
Parts
of
any
Body
,
it
must
move
them
:
Now
Heat
can
move
nothing
;
or
at
least
,
't
is
not
evident
that
Heat
can
move
Bodies
:
For
although
we
consider
Heat
with
all
the
Attention
possible
,
we
can
only
discover
that
it
may
communicate
to
Bodies
a
Motion
which
it
has
not
in
it self
.
Yet
we
see
that
Fire
moves
and
separates
the
Parts
of
Bodies
that
are
exposed
to
it
:
It
is
true
,
but
it
may
be
,
it
is
not
from
its
Heat
,
for
even
it
is
not
evident
that
it
has
any
at
all
.
'T
is
rather
by
the
Action
of
its
Parts
,
which
are
visibly
in
a
continual
Motion
.
It
is
plain
,
that
the
Parts
of
Fire
which
strike
against
any
Body
,
must
communicate
a
Part
of
their
Motion
to
it
,
whether
there
is
Heat
in
Fire
or
not
.
If
the
Parts
of
this
Body
are
but
a
little
solid
and
gross
,
the
Fire
cannot
move
them
,
and
make
them
slip
one
upon
another
:
In
short
,
if
they
are
a
Mixture
of
subtle
and
gross
ones
,
the
Fire
can
only
dissipate
those
that
it
can
push
strong
enough
to
separate
intirely
from
the
rest
.
Thus
Fire
can
only
separate
them
;
and
if
it
assembles
them
,
't
is
merely
by
Accident
.
But
Aristotle
pretends
quite
the
contrary
.
Separation
,
says
he
,
which
some
attribute
to
Fire
,
is
only
a
resembling
of
things
of
the
same
kind
;
De
gen
.
&
corr
.
l.
2.
c.
2.
for
't
is
only
by
Accident
that
Fire
dissipates
things
of
a
different
kind
.
If
Aristotle
had
at
first
distinguished
the
Sentiment
of
Heat
from
the
Motion
of
the
Particles
,
whereof
the
Bodies
we
call
Heat
are
composed
,
and
had
afterwards
defined
Heat
taken
for
the
Motion
of
the
Parts
,
by
saying
,
Heat
is
that
which
agitates
and
separates
the
invisible
Parts
whereof
visible
Bodies
are
composed
,
he
would
have
given
a
tollerable
Definition
of
Heat
.
Nevertheless
,
it
would
not
perfectly
have
contented
us
,
because
it
would
not
precisely
have
discovered
to
us
the
Nature
of
the
Motion
of
hot
Bodies
.
Aristotle
defines
Coldness
,
to
be
that
which
assembles
Bodies
of
the
same
,
or
of
a
different
Nature
.
This
Definition
is
good
for
nothing
:
For
't
is
false
,
that
Cold
assembles
Bodies
.
To
assemble
them
,
it
must
move
them
,
but
if
we
consult
Reason
,
't
is
evident
,
Cold
can
move
nothing
.
In
Effect
,
by
Cold
he
means
,
either
what
we
feel
when
we
are
cold
,
or
that
which
causes
the
Sensation
of
Cold.
Now
it
is
plain
,
that
the
Sensation
of
Cold
can
move
nothing
,
since
it
can
push
nothing
.
What
it
is
that
causes
Sensation
,
we
cannot
doubt
when
we
examine
things
by
our
Reason
,
for
't
is
only
Rest
or
a
Cessation
from
Motion
.
So
Cold
in
Bodies
being
only
a
Cessation
from
this
Sort
of
Motion
which
accompanies
Heat
,
it
is
evident
that
if
Heat
separates
,
yet
Cold
does
not
.
Thus
Cold
assembles
neither
things
that
are
of
a
like
or
different
Nature
;
for
what
can
push
nothing
,
can
assemble
nothing
:
In
a
Word
,
as
it
does
nothing
,
it
collects
nothing
.
Aristotle
,
judging
of
things
by
the
Senses
,
imagines
Cold
is
also
positive
as
well
as
Heat
,
because
the
Sensations
of
Heat
and
Cold
are
both
real
and
positive
:
And
he
also
thinks
that
these
two
Qualities
are
active
.
And
indeed
,
if
we
follow
the
Impression
of
our
Senses
,
we
have
Reason
to
believe
that
Cold
is
a
very
active
Quality
,
since
cold
Water
congeals
,
reassembles
,
and
in
a
Moment
hardens
melted
Gold
or
Lead
,
after
a
little
is
poured
upon
them
,
although
the
Heat
of
these
Metals
is
great
enough
to
separate
the
Parts
of
any
Body
they
touch
.
It
is
evident
,
by
what
we
have
said
of
the
Errors
of
the
Senses
in
the
first
Book
,
that
if
we
rely
only
upon
the
Senses
,
to
judge
of
the
Qualities
of
Sensible
Bodies
,
it
is
impossible
to
discover
any
certain
and
undoubted
Truth
,
which
can
serve
as
a
Principle
to
assist
us
in
the
Knowledge
of
Nature
.
For
by
this
Method
only
we
cannot
discover
what
things
are
hot
,
and
what
cold
.
For
of
many
Persons
who
should
touch
Water
that
is
luke-warm
,
some
of
them
would
think
it
hot
,
and
others
cold
.
Those
that
are
of
a
hot
Constitution
would
think
it
cold
,
and
those
that
are
of
a
cold
would
think
it
hot
.
And
if
we
supposed
Fish
capable
of
Sensation
,
't
is
very
probable
they
would
think
it
hot
,
when
all
Men
think
it
cold
.
It
is
the
same
with
the
Air
,
it
seems
hot
or
cold
,
according
to
the
different
Dispositions
of
the
Bodies
that
are
exposed
to
it
.
Aristotle
pretends
't
is
hot
,
but
I
believe
those
that
dwell
towards
the
North
are
of
another
Mind
,
since
many
learned
Men
,
whose
Climate
is
not
colder
than
that
of
Greece
,
have
maintained
it
to
be
cold
.
But
this
Question
,
which
has
always
been
considerable
in
the
Schools
,
has
never
been
sufficiently
resolved
to
affix
any
distinct
Idea
to
the
Word
Heat
.
The
Definitions
Aristotle
gives
of
the
Words
Heat
and
Cold
,
can
fix
no
Idea
to
them
.
The
Air
,
for
instance
,
and
even
Water
,
though
never
so
hot
and
scalding
,
reassembles
the
Parts
of
melted
Lead
,
with
those
of
any
other
Metal
whatever
.
Air
collects
all
Fatness
in
Gums
and
other
solid
Bodies
.
And
one
must
be
a
Peripatetick
indeed
to
think
of
exposing
Mastich
to
the
Air
,
to
separate
the
Ashes
from
the
Pitch
,
or
any
other
compounded
Bodies
,
to
dissolve
them
again
.
The
Air
then
is
not
hot
according
to
the
Definition
Aristotle
gives
of
Heat
.
Air
separates
Liquors
from
Bodies
which
are
imbibed
in
it
,
hardens
Dirt
,
and
dries
Linnen
that
is
extended
in
it
,
although
Aristotle
makes
it
moist
:
The
Air
therefore
is
hot
and
drying
,
according
to
this
same
Definition
.
We
cannot
then
determine
the
Air
to
be
hot
or
cold
by
this
Definition
.
We
may
affirm
,
it
is
hot
,
in
respect
to
Dirt
,
since
it
separates
the
Water
from
the
Earth
that
is
mixed
with
it
:
But
must
we
try
all
the
divers
Effects
of
Air
upon
all
Bodies
,
to
know
whether
or
no
there
is
Heat
in
the
Air
we
breath
.
If
so
,
we
can
never
know
any
thing
of
it
;
the
shortest
Way
therefore
,
is
not
to
Philosophize
at
all
upon
the
Air
we
breath
in
.
But
upon
a
certain
Pure
and
Elementary
Air
which
is
not
to
be
found
here
below
,
and
positively
affirm
with
Aristotle
,
that
't
is
hot
,
without
giving
any
Proof
of
it
,
or
even
without
knowing
distinctly
what
we
mean
,
by
this
Air
or
by
this
Heat
;
For
this
Way
we
shall
give
Principles
that
will
not
easily
be
overthrown
,
not
because
of
their
Evidence
and
Solidity
,
but
because
they
are
obscure
like
Phantoms
which
cannot
be
hurt
,
because
they
have
no
Substances
.
I
shall
not
here
stay
upon
the
Definitions
that
Aristotle
gives
of
Moisture
and
Dryness
,
because
it
is
plain
enough
that
he
has
not
explained
the
Nature
of
them
.
For
according
to
these
Definitions
,
Fire
is
not
dry
,
since
it
is
not
easily
contained
within
its
own
Bounds
,
and
Ice
is
not
moist
since
it
is
contained
within
its
own
Bounds
,
and
is
not
easily
accommodated
to
the
Limits
of
other
Bodies
.
It
is
true
,
Ice
is
not
moist
,
if
by
moist
he
means
fluid
:
But
if
we
understand
it
so
,
we
may
say
Flame
is
very
hot
as
well
as
melted
Gold
or
Lead
:
It
is
likewise
true
,
that
Ice
is
not
moist
,
if
by
moist
we
mean
,
that
which
easily
sticks
to
things
that
touch
it
;
but
in
this
Sense
,
Pitch
,
Fat
,
and
Oyl
,
are
much
more
humid
than
Water
,
since
they
stick
more
strongly
than
Water
.
In
the
same
Sense
,
Quicksilver
is
moist
,
for
it
sticks
to
Metals
;
and
even
Water
is
not
perfectly
moist
,
for
it
cleaves
not
to
the
Generality
of
Metals
.
We
must
not
then
recur
to
the
Testimony
of
the
Senses
,
to
defend
the
Opinions
of
Aristotle
.
But
let
us
no
further
Examine
the
marvelous
Definitions
that
this
Philosopher
has
given
us
of
the
four
Elementary
Qualities
;
and
let
us
suppose
also
,
that
all
whatever
the
Senses
tell
us
of
these
Qualities
is
indisputable
.
Let
us
further
excite
our
Faith
,
and
believe
,
that
all
these
Definitions
are
most
just
.
Let
us
only
see
if
it
be
true
,
that
all
Qualities
of
Sensible
Bodies
are
compounded
of
these
Elementary
Qualities
.
Aristotle
pretends
it
,
and
he
ought
so
to
do
,
since
he
looks
upon
these
four
first
Qualities
as
the
Principles
of
those
things
he
would
explain
,
in
his
Books
of
Physicks
.
He
teaches
us
then
,
that
Colours
are
engendered
of
the
Mixture
of
die
four
Elementary
Qualities
;
that
white
is
produced
when
Humidity
surmounts
Heat
,
as
when
Old
Men
turn
Grey
:
Black
,
when
Humidity
is
overcome
by
Dryness
,
as
in
the
Walls
of
Cisterns
,
and
all
other
Colours
by
the
like
Mixtures
;
that
Tasts
and
Smells
are
also
produced
by
a
different
Mixture
of
dry
and
moist
,
caused
by
Heat
and
Cold
:
that
even
Lightness
and
Heaviness
depend
upon
it
.
In
a
Word
,
according
to
Aristotle
,
it
is
necessary
,
that
all
Sensible
Qualities
should
be
produced
by
the
two
Active
Qualities
of
Heat
and
Cold
,
and
be
compounded
of
the
two
Passive
,
moist
and
dry
,
that
there
may
be
some
probable
Connection
between
his
Principles
,
and
the
Consequences
he
draws
from
them
.
However
,
it
is
yet
more
difficult
to
perswade
our selves
of
all
these
things
,
than
of
all
those
that
we
have
hitherto
related
of
Aristotle
.
We
shall
have
some
Trouble
to
believe
that
the
Earth
,
and
other
Elements
would
not
be
coloured
or
visible
,
if
they
were
in
their
Natural
Purity
,
and
without
any
Mixture
of
Elementary
Qualities
,
although
the
learned
Commentators
of
this
Philosopher
,
assures
us
of
it
.
We
comprehend
not
what
Aristotle
means
when
he
affirms
the
Whiteness
of
the
Hair
to
be
produced
by
Humidity
,
because
the
Humidity
of
Old
Men
is
stronger
than
their
Heat
;
although
to
endeavour
to
clear
him
of
the
Thought
,
we
put
the
Definition
in
the
Place
of
the
thing
defined
:
For
it
seems
to
be
an
incomprehensible
Piece
of
Nonsence
,
to
say
the
Hairs
of
Old
Men
turn
White
,
because
that
which
is
not
easily
contained
in
its
own
Limits
,
but
in
the
Limits
of
other
Bodies
,
surmounts
what
assembles
things
of
the
same
Nature
.
Nor
have
we
less
Difficulty
to
believe
,
that
Taste
is
well
explained
,
when
he
says
it
consists
in
the
Mixture
of
Dryness
,
Humidity
,
and
Heat
;
chiefly
if
we
put
,
instead
of
these
Words
,
the
Definitions
this
Philosopher
has
given
of
them
,
as
it
would
be
useful
to
do
,
if
they
were
good
.
And
it
may
be
also
,
that
we
could
not
forbear
laughing
instead
of
the
Definitions
of
Hunger
and
Thirst
,
that
Aristotle
gives
of
them
by
saying
,
that
Hunger
is
the
Desire
of
Heat
and
Dry
,
and
Thirst
the
Desire
of
Cold
and
Moist
,
we
should
substitute
the
Definition
of
these
Words
,
calling
Hunger
,
The
Desire
of
what
assembles
things
of
the
same
Nature
,
and
of
what
is
easily
kept
within
its
own
Limits
,
and
difficultly
in
the
Limits
of
others
;
and
define
Thirst
,
the
Desire
of
what
assembles
things
of
the
same
,
and
of
different
Natures
,
and
of
what
cannot
be
easily
contained
in
its
own
Limits
,
but
easily
in
the
Limits
of
others
.
Certainly
't
is
a
very
useful
Rule
to
discover
,
if
we
have
defined
Terms
well
,
and
not
to
deceive
our selves
in
our
Reasonings
,
only
often
to
put
the
Definition
in
the
Place
of
the
thing
defined
:
For
by
that
means
we
know
whether
the
Terms
are
equivocal
,
and
the
Measures
of
the
Relation
false
and
imperfect
:
Or
if
we
reason
consequently
.
This
being
granted
,
what
can
we
say
of
the
Arguments
of
Aristotle
,
which
become
an
impertinent
and
ridiculous
Piece
of
Nonsence
,
when
we
make
use
of
this
Rule
?
And
what
must
we
say
likewise
of
all
those
that
reason
only
upon
the
false
and
confused
Idea's
of
the
Senses
,
since
this
Rule
which
preserves
Light
and
Evidence
in
all
just
and
solid
Arguments
,
only
breeds
Confusion
in
their
Discourses
.
It
is
not
possible
to
expose
the
Fantasticalness
and
Extravagances
of
the
Explanations
that
Aristotle
gives
of
all
sorts
of
Matters
,
when
the
Subjects
he
treats
of
are
simple
and
easie
,
his
Errors
are
simple
,
and
very
easily
discovered
,
but
when
he
pretends
to
explain
compounded
things
,
and
such
as
depend
upon
many
Causes
,
his
Errors
are
at
least
as
compounded
as
the
Subjects
he
treats
on
,
and
it
is
impossible
to
take
them
in
Pieces
so
as
to
discover
them
all
to
others
.
This
great
Genius
,
which
they
pretend
,
has
done
so
well
in
his
Rules
for
Definitions
,
did
not
so
much
as
know
what
things
were
necessary
to
be
defined
:
Because
,
putting
no
Distinction
between
a
clear
and
distinct
knowledge
,
and
a
Sensible
one
,
he
imagined
he
was
able
to
know
and
explain
things
to
others
,
which
he
had
no
distinct
Idea
of
himself
.
Definitions
must
explain
both
the
Nature
of
Things
,
and
the
Terms
which
compose
them
,
and
stir
up
in
the
Mind
,
distinct
and
clear
Idea's
of
them
.
But
't
is
impossible
,
after
this
manner
,
to
define
the
Sensible
Qualities
of
Heat
,
Cold
,
Colour
,
Taste
,
&c.
when
we
confound
the
Cause
with
the
Effect
,
and
the
Motion
of
Bodies
,
with
the
Sensation
which
accompanies
it
,
because
Sensations
being
Modifications
of
the
Soul
,
which
we
know
not
by
clear
Idea's
,
but
only
by
an
inward
Sensation
,
as
I
have
explained
in
the
third
Book
,
it
is
impossible
to
affix
Words
to
Idea's
we
have
not
.
As
we
have
clear
and
distinct
Idea's
of
a
Circle
,
a
Square
,
a
Triangle
,
and
so
distinctly
know
the
Nature
of
them
,
we
may
give
good
Definitions
thereof
:
We
can
even
deduce
the
Idea's
we
have
of
these
Figures
,
all
their
Properties
,
and
explain
them
to
others
,
by
Terms
to
which
these
Idea's
are
affixed
;
but
we
cannot
define
either
Heat
or
Cold
,
being
only
Sensible
Qualities
,
for
we
know
them
neither
distinctly
nor
by
Idea
,
but
only
by
Conscience
or
Internal
Sensation
.
Nor
must
we
define
Heat
,
which
is
external
,
by
any
Effects
:
For
if
we
substitute
in
its
Place
,
the
Definition
that
we
shall
give
it
,
we
shall
soon
see
that
this
Definition
will
only
deceive
us
.
If
for
instance
,
we
define
Heat
to
be
what
assembles
things
of
the
same
kind
,
without
saying
any
thing
more
;
we
may
,
in
following
this
Definition
,
take
such
things
for
Heat
,
as
have
no
Relation
to
it
.
We
may
say
,
that
the
Loadstone
assembles
the
Filings
of
Iron
,
and
separates
them
from
those
of
Silver
,
because
it
is
hot
;
that
a
Pigeon
eats
Hemp-Seed
,
and
leaves
other
Grain
,
because
she
is
hot
:
That
a
Covetous
Man
separates
his
Gold
from
his
Silver
,
because
he
is
hot
:
In
fine
,
there
is
no
Extravagancy
that
this
Definition
will
not
engage
us
in
,
if
we
were
stupid
enough
to
follow
it
.
This
Definition
then
does
not
explain
the
Nature
of
Heat
,
nor
can
we
make
use
of
it
to
deduce
all
its
Properties
,
since
if
we
keep
precisely
to
its
Terms
,
we
conclude
Impertinences
,
and
if
we
put
it
in
the
Place
of
the
thing
defined
,
we
shall
have
a
strange
Piece
of
Nonsence
.
Yet
,
if
we
carefully
distinguish
Heat
from
the
Cause
of
it
,
although
we
cannot
define
it
,
since
it
is
a
Modification
of
the
Soul
,
whereof
we
have
no
Idea
,
we
may
define
the
Cause
of
it
,
since
we
have
a
distinct
Idea
of
Motion
.
But
Care
must
be
had
,
that
Heat
,
taken
for
such
a
Motion
,
does
not
always
cause
the
Sensation
of
Heat
in
us
.
For
Water
,
for
instance
,
is
hot
,
since
its
Parts
are
fluid
and
in
Motion
;
and
't
is
apparent
,
that
Fish
feel
it
warm
,
at
least
warmer
than
Ice
,
whose
Parts
are
more
in
Rest
,
but
it
is
cold
in
relation
to
us
,
because
it
has
less
Motion
than
the
Parts
of
our
Bodies
:
For
what
hath
less
Motion
than
another
Body
,
is
in
some
manner
in
rest
,
in
respect
to
that
Body
.
So
that
't
is
not
in
Relation
to
the
Motion
of
the
Fibres
of
our
Bodies
,
that
we
must
define
the
Cause
of
Heat
,
or
the
Motion
which
excites
it
:
We
must
,
if
we
can
,
define
this
Motion
absolutely
and
in
it self
,
and
then
,
the
Definitions
we
shall
give
,
may
serve
to
discover
the
Nature
and
Properties
of
Heat
.
I
do
not
think
my self
obliged
to
examine
the
Philosophy
of
Aristotle
any
further
,
and
to
unravel
the
extreamly
confused
and
perplext
Errors
of
this
Author
.
It
seems
to
me
,
that
I
have
already
shewn
that
he
does
not
prove
his
four
Elements
,
and
that
he
defines
them
ill
:
That
his
Elementary
Qualities
are
not
such
as
he
pretends
,
that
he
knows
not
the
Nature
of
them
,
and
that
all
second
Qualities
are
not
compounded
of
them
.
And
lastly
,
although
we
should
grant
him
,
that
all
Bodies
were
composed
of
four
Elements
,
as
second
Qualities
of
the
first
,
his
whole
System
would
be
useless
in
a
Search
after
Truth
,
since
his
Idea's
are
not
clear
enough
always
to
preserve
Evidence
in
our
Ratiotinations
.
If
't
is
doubted
,
that
I
have
not
related
the
true
Opinions
of
Aristotle
,
it
may
easily
be
seen
by
examining
the
Books
he
has
writ
of
the
Heavens
,
of
Generation
and
Corruption
;
for
't
is
from
them
that
I
have
taken
almost
all
that
I
have
said
.
I
had
no
Design
to
relate
any
thing
of
his
Eight
Books
of
Physicks
,
because
there
is
some
learned
Men
who
pretend
,
that
't
is
only
a
Discourse
of
Logick
:
And
't
is
very
probable
,
since
we
find
there
many
indetermined
and
trifling
Words
.
As
Atistotle
often
contradicts
himself
,
and
as
we
may
maintain
almost
any
manner
of
Opinion
from
some
Passages
taken
out
of
him
,
I
doubt
not
but
we
may
prove
by
Aristotle
,
even
some
Opinions
,
contrary
to
those
I
have
attributed
to
him
;
but
I
am
not
afraid
of
it
,
it
is
sufficient
that
I
have
the
Book
by
me
I
cited
him
from
,
to
prove
what
I
have
said
.
Nay
,
I
shall
not
give
my self
any
great
Trouble
to
examine
whether
these
Books
are
Aristotle's
or
not
,
I
take
them
as
for
such
,
and
as
they
are
commonly
received
:
For
we
ought
not
to
disquiet
our selves
to
know
the
true
Genealogy
of
things
,
for
which
we
have
no
Esteem
.
CHAP.
VI.
Some
general
Advices
which
are
necessary
to
conduct
us
regularly
in
a
Search
after
Truth
,
and
in
a
Choice
of
the
Sciences
.
THAT
it
may
not
be
said
,
I
only
destroy
without
establishing
any
thing
certain
and
indisputable
in
this
Work
.
It
will
be
proper
to
shew
.
in
a
few
Words
,
the
Order
we
ought
to
keep
in
our
Studies
,
to
avoid
being
deceived
;
and
that
I
even
note
some
most
necessary
Truths
and
Sciences
,
in
which
we
may
meet
with
such
Evidence
,
as
we
cannot
hinder
our selves
from
consenting
to
them
without
suffering
the
secret
Reproaches
of
our
Reason
.
I
shall
not
explain
these
Truths
and
Sciences
at
large
,
because
't
is
already
done
:
I
do
not
pretend
to
make
a
new
Impression
of
other
Persons
Works
,
but
content
my self
with
referring
to
them
.
I
will
only
shew
the
Order
we
ought
to
keep
in
our
Studies
,
always
to
preserve
Evidence
in
our
Perceptions
.
Of
all
our
Discoveries
,
the
first
is
the
Existence
of
our
Souls
;
all
our
Thoughts
are
undoubted
Proofs
of
it
,
for
there
is
nothing
more
evident
than
whatever
actually
thinks
,
is
actually
something
.
But
if
it
is
easie
to
know
the
Existence
of
our
Souls
,
it
is
not
so
easie
to
know
the
Essence
and
Nature
of
them
.
If
we
would
know
what
it
is
,
we
must
above
all
things
,
take
great
care
,
not
to
confound
it
with
the
things
it
is
united
to
.
If
we
doubt
,
if
we
will
,
if
we
reason
,
we
must
only
believe
that
the
Soul
is
a
thing
which
doubts
,
wills
,
reasons
,
and
nothing
more
,
provided
we
have
no
Proof
of
its
having
any
other
Properties
.
For
we
know
our
Souls
only
by
the
Internal
Sensation
we
have
of
them
:
We
must
not
take
our
Soul
for
our
Body
,
nor
for
the
Blood
,
nor
Animal
Spirits
,
nor
for
Fire
,
nor
an
infinite
number
of
other
things
for
which
Philosophers
have
taken
it
.
We
must
believe
of
the
Soul
,
only
what
we
cannot
hinder
our selves
from
believing
of
it
;
and
what
we
are
fully
convinced
of
by
the
internal
Sensation
we
have
of
our selves
,
for
otherwise
we
should
be
deceived
.
Thus
we
may
know
by
a
simple
Prospect
or
an
internal
Sensation
,
what
can
be
known
of
the
Soul
,
without
being
obliged
to
make
such
Arguments
as
may
be
Erroneous
:
For
when
we
reason
the
Memory
Acts
;
and
where
we
make
use
of
our
Memory
,
we
may
be
deceived
;
perhaps
there
is
some
Ill
Genius
on
which
we
depend
in
our
Discoveries
,
and
which
diverts
it self
in
deceiving
us
.
If
for
instance
,
I
suppose
a
God
who
took
pleasure
in
seducing
me
,
I
am
well
perswaded
he
could
not
deceive
me
in
any
simple
Discoveries
,
as
in
those
whereby
I
know
that
I
am
,
or
of
what
I
think
,
or
that
twice
2
are
4.
For
although
I
should
really
suppose
such
a
God
,
and
as
powerful
a
one
as
I
can
feign
to
my self
,
I
find
that
in
this
extravagant
Supposition
I
could
not
doubt
that
I
was
,
or
that
twice
2
were
equal
to
4
,
because
I
perceived
these
things
by
a
simple
view
,
without
the
use
of
my
Memory
.
But
when
I
argue
,
not
seeing
evidently
the
Principles
of
my
Reasonings
,
and
only
remember
that
I
have
evidently
seen
them
:
If
this
deceiving
Deity
joyns
this
Memory
to
false
Principles
,
as
he
might
do
if
he
would
,
I
should
only
reason
falsly
,
like
those
that
make
long
Computations
,
imagining
they
remember
well
how
they
have
known
that
9
times
9
makes
72
,
or
that
21
is
a
prime
Number
,
or
some
such-like
Error
,
from
whence
they
draw
false
Conclusions
.
Thus
it
is
necessary
to
know
God
,
and
to
know
that
he
is
no
Deceiver
,
if
we
will
be
fully
convinced
that
the
most
certain
Sciences
,
as
Arithmetick
and
Geometry
,
are
true
Sciences
;
for
without
that
their
Evidence
is
not
full
,
and
we
may
still
refuse
our
Assent
.
And
it
is
further
necessary
to
know
by
a
simple
View
,
and
not
by
Reasoning
,
that
God
is
no
Deceiver
,
since
that
may
always
be
false
,
if
we
suppose
God
to
deceive
us
.
All
common
Proofs
of
the
Existence
and
Perfections
of
God
,
taken
from
the
Existence
and
Perfections
of
his
Creatures
,
have
this
Defect
it
seems
,
That
they
convince
not
the
Mind
by
a
simple
View
:
All
these
Proofs
are
Reasonings
,
which
are
convincing
in
themselves
:
But
being
Reasonings
,
they
are
not
convincing
,
if
we
suppose
an
ill
Genius
which
deceives
us
.
They
sufficiently
prove
that
there
is
a
Power
Superior
to
us
,
for
even
this
Extravagant
Supposition
establisheth
it
:
But
they
do
not
fully
convince
that
there
is
a
God
,
or
an
Infinitely
Perfect
Being
.
So
in
these
Reasonings
the
Conclusion
is
more
evident
than
the
Principles
.
It
is
more
plain
that
there
is
a
Power
Superior
to
us
,
than
that
there
is
a
World
;
since
there
is
no
Supposition
that
can
hinder
us
from
demonstrating
this
Superior
Power
,
whereas
supposing
an
ill
Genius
which
delights
to
deceive
us
,
it
is
impossible
to
prove
there
is
a
World
:
For
we
might
always
conceive
,
that
this
Ill
Genius
would
give
us
Sensations
of
things
,
which
existed
not
:
As
our
Dreams
and
certain
Sicknesses
make
us
see
things
that
never
were
;
and
make
us
even
effectively
feel
Pain
in
our
Imaginary
Members
which
we
have
lost
,
or
which
we
never
had
.
But
the
Proofs
of
the
Existence
and
Perfections
of
God
,
taken
from
the
Idea
we
have
of
Infinity
,
are
Proofs
from
a
simple
View
.
We
see
that
there
is
a
God
,
as
soon
as
we
behold
Infinity
,
because
necessary
Existence
is
included
in
the
Idea
of
Infinity
,
and
there
is
nothing
but
Infinity
to
which
we
can
give
the
Idea
we
have
of
an
Infinite
Being
.
We
see
also
that
God
is
no
Deceiver
,
because
knowing
that
he
is
infinitely
Perfect
,
and
that
Infinity
wants
no
Perfection
,
we
see
clearly
that
he
will
not
seduce
us
,
and
even
that
he
cannot
,
since
he
is
not
capable
of
willing
it
.
So
that
there
is
a
God
,
and
a
True
God
,
who
cannot
deceive
us
,
although
he
does
not
always
enlighten
us
;
and
though
we
often
deceive
our selves
when
we
think
he
enlightens
us
.
All
these
Truths
are
seen
at
one
view
by
an
attentive
Mind
,
although
we
seem
here
to
use
a
train
of
Arguments
to
shew
them
to
others
.
We
may
suppose
them
as
undoubted
Principles
upon
which
we
may
reason
;
for
having
first
discovered
that
God
is
not
pleased
with
deceiving
us
,
we
may
then
be
permitted
to
reason
.
It
is
evident
,
that
the
Certainty
of
Faith
also
depends
upon
this
Principle
,
That
there
is
a
God
which
is
not
capable
of
deceiving
us
.
For
the
Existence
of
God
,
and
Infallibility
of
the
Divine
Authority
,
are
rather
Natural
Knowledges
,
and
Notions
common
to
Minds
that
are
capable
of
a
Serious
Attention
,
than
Articles
of
Faith
:
Although
it
be
a
particular
Gift
of
God
,
to
have
a
Mind
capable
of
a
sufficient
Attention
,
to
apprehend
,
and
be
willing
to
apprehend
these
Truths
as
we
ought
.
From
this
Principle
,
That
God
is
no
Deceiver
,
we
may
also
conclude
,
That
we
certainly
have
a
Body
to
which
we
are
united
after
a
very
particular
manner
,
and
that
we
are
surrounded
with
many
others
.
For
we
are
Internally
convinced
of
their
Existence
,
by
the
continual
Sensations
that
God
produces
in
us
,
and
which
we
cannot
correct
by
Reason
without
hurting
our
Faith
;
although
we
may
by
Reason
correct
the
Sensations
which
represent
them
to
us
,
with
certain
Qualities
and
Perfections
which
they
have
not
.
So
that
we
ought
not
to
believe
them
such
as
we
see
them
,
or
imagine
them
,
but
only
that
they
Exist
,
and
are
such
as
we
conceive
them
by
our
Reason
.
But
that
we
may
reason
orderly
,
we
ought
not
yet
to
examine
whether
or
no
we
have
a
Body
,
and
if
there
are
any
others
about
us
,
or
whether
we
have
only
Sensations
of
Bodies
which
Exist
not
.
These
Questions
include
too
great
Difficulties
,
and
it
is
not
perhaps
so
necessary
to
resolve
them
to
perfect
our
Knowledge
as
we
may
imagine
,
nor
even
to
have
an
exact
Knowledge
of
Physicks
,
Morality
,
and
some
other
Sciences
.
We
have
in
our selves
the
Idea's
of
Numbers
and
Extension
,
whose
Existence
is
undoubted
,
and
whose
Nature
is
immutable
,
which
would
eternally
furnish
our
Thoughts
,
if
we
would
know
all
their
Relations
.
And
it
is
necessary
for
us
to
begin
to
exercise
our
Minds
upon
these
Idea's
,
for
Reasons
that
will
not
be
unnecessary
to
remark
,
whereof
the
chief
are
these
three
.
The
first
is
,
That
these
Idea's
are
the
most
clear
and
evident
of
all
:
For
if
to
shun
Error
we
ought
always
to
preserve
Evidence
in
our
Reasonings
,
it
is
plain
that
we
ought
rather
to
reason
upon
the
Idea's
of
Numbers
and
Extension
,
than
upon
the
confused
and
compound
Idea's
of
Physicks
,
Morality
,
Mechanicks
,
Chymistry
,
and
all
other
Sciences
.
The
second
is
,
These
Idea's
are
the
most
distinct
and
exact
of
all
,
chiefly
those
of
Numbers
.
So
that
the
Habit
we
gain
in
Arithmetick
and
Geometry
,
of
not
contenting
our selves
without
knowing
precisely
the
Relations
of
things
,
gives
the
Mind
a
certain
Exactness
that
those
have
not
,
who
content
themselves
with
the
Probability
that
is
to
be
met
with
in
other
Sciences
.
The
third
and
greatest
of
all
is
,
That
these
Idea's
are
the
immutable
Rules
and
common
Measures
,
of
all
other
things
that
we
know
or
can
know
.
Those
who
perfectly
know
the
Relations
of
Numbers
and
Figures
,
or
rather
the
Art
of
making
the
Comparisons
necessary
for
the
knowing
their
Relations
,
have
a
kind
of
universal
Science
,
and
a
most
certain
means
to
discover
evidently
and
certainly
whatsoever
exceeds
not
the
common
limits
of
the
Mind
.
But
those
that
have
not
this
Art
,
can
never
certainly
discover
any
Truths
,
if
but
a
little
compounded
,
although
they
have
very
clear
Idea's
of
those
things
whose
compounded
Relations
they
endeavour
to
know
.
These
or
the
like
,
are
the
Reasons
which
induced
the
Ancients
to
make
young
Men
study
Arithmetick
,
Algebra
,
and
Geometry
:
Without
doubt
they
knew
that
Arithmetick
and
Algebra
gave
a
certain
Penetration
to
the
Mind
,
that
could
not
be
acquired
by
other
Studies
;
and
that
Geometry
so
well
regulates
the
Imagination
that
it
is
not
easily
confounded
;
for
this
Faculty
of
the
Soul
,
so
necessary
for
the
Sciences
,
acquires
a
certain
just
Extension
by
the
use
of
Geometry
,
which
promotes
and
preserves
the
clear
view
of
the
Mind
in
the
most
perplexing
Difficulties
.
If
we
would
then
always
preserve
Evidence
in
our
Perceptions
,
and
discover
the
pure
Truth
without
any
Obscurity
or
Mixture
of
Error
,
we
ought
first
to
study
Arithmetick
,
Algebra
and
Geometry
,
at
least
after
having
acquired
some
Knowledge
of
our selves
and
the
Soveraign
Being
.
If
we
would
have
any
Book
which
Facilitates
these
Sciences
,
I
would
prefer
Descartes's
Meditations
to
know
God
and
our selves
;
and
to
learn
Arithmetick
and
Algebra
,
we
may
read
the
Mathematical
Elements
;
for
common
Geometry
,
Tacquet's
Elements
;
and
for
Conick
Sections
,
and
the
Resolution
of
Geometrick
Problems
,
De
la
Here's
Conicks
,
his
Geometrick
Places
,
and
Construction
of
Equations
,
to
which
we
may
add
Descartes's
Geometry
.
I
would
not
advise
to
the
reading
of
the
Mathematical
Elements
for
Arithmetick
and
Algebra
,
if
I
knew
of
any
Author
that
had
clearly
demonstrated
these
Sciences
;
but
the
Truth
obliges
me
to
a
thing
which
some
Men
will
oppose
.
Algebra
and
Arithmetick
being
absolutely
necessary
to
discover
compounded
Truths
,
I
believe
it
a
Duty
to
testifie
some
Esteem
for
a
Book
which
directs
very
far
in
these
Sciences
,
and
which
,
according
to
the
Opinion
of
some
Learned
Men
,
explains
them
more
clearly
than
any
one
has
yet
done
.
When
with
Care
and
Application
we
have
studied
these
general
Sciences
,
we
shall
evidently
discover
a
great
number
of
Truths
,
that
are
for
all
exact
and
particular
Sciences
.
Afterwards
we
may
study
Physicks
and
Morality
,
because
these
Sciences
are
very
useful
,
although
they
are
not
so
fit
to
make
the
Mind
exact
and
penetrating
.
And
if
we
would
always
preserve
Evidence
in
our
Perceptions
,
we
must
be
very
careful
that
we
are
never
prejudiced
in
favour
of
any
Principle
that
is
not
evident
;
and
from
which
the
Chinese
for
instance
would
not
be
supposed
to
dissent
after
,
having
throughly
weighed
and
considered
it
.
So
for
Physicks
we
must
only
admit
the
Notions
common
to
all
Men
,
viz.
The
Axioms
of
Geometricians
,
and
clear
Idea's
of
Extension
,
Figure
,
Motion
and
Rest
,
or
any
others
as
clear
as
these
.
It
may
perhaps
be
said
,
That
the
Essence
of
Matter
is
not
Extension
,
but
what
signifies
that
?
It
is
enough
that
the
World
which
we
conceive
to
be
formed
of
Extension
,
appears
like
to
that
which
we
see
,
if
it
be
not
of
this
matter
which
is
useless
and
unintelligible
,
although
we
make
such
a
noise
about
it
.
It
is
not
absolutely
necessary
to
examine
whether
there
are
indeed
External
Beings
which
answer
to
these
Idea's
,
for
we
reason
not
upon
these
Beings
,
but
upon
their
Idea's
:
We
ought
only
to
take
care
that
the
Reasonings
we
make
upon
the
Properties
of
things
,
agree
with
the
Sensations
we
have
of
them
,
viz.
That
what
we
think
perfectly
agrees
with
Experience
,
because
we
endeavour
in
Physicks
to
discover
the
Order
and
Connection
of
Effects
with
their
Causes
,
or
in
Bodies
if
they
Exist
,
or
in
the
Sensations
we
have
of
them
if
they
have
no
Being
.
Indeed
we
cannot
doubt
whether
there
are
actually
any
Bodies
,
when
we
consider
that
God
is
no
Deceiver
,
or
reflect
upon
the
just
Order
which
he
hath
instituted
in
our
Sensations
,
whether
in
Natural
Occurrences
,
or
in
those
things
only
that
happen
to
make
us
believe
what
we
could
not
naturally
comprehend
:
But
it
is
not
necessary
at
first
sight
to
make
deep
Reflections
,
upon
a
thing
which
no
body
doubts
of
,
and
which
is
not
very
useful
in
the
Knowledge
of
Physicks
,
if
considered
as
a
true
Science
.
Nor
must
we
trouble
our selves
much
to
know
,
whether
there
is
,
or
is
not
,
any
other
Qualities
in
those
Bodies
that
surround
us
,
than
such
as
we
have
clear
Idea's
of
,
for
we
must
reason
only
according
to
our
Idea's
:
And
if
there
is
any
thing
else
,
of
which
we
have
not
a
dear
,
distinct
,
and
particular
Idea
,
we
can
never
know
any
thing
of
it
,
nor
reason
justly
upon
it
:
Whereas
if
we
reason
according
to
our
Idea's
,
we
follow
Nature
,
and
discover
that
it
is
not
so
hidden
as
we
commonly
imagine
.
So
those
that
have
not
studied
the
Properties
of
Numbers
,
often
imagine
that
't
is
not
possible
to
resolve
certain
Problems
,
although
most
Simple
and
Easie
;
and
those
that
have
not
thought
upon
the
Properties
of
Extension
,
Figure
and
Motion
,
are
extreamly
inclined
to
believe
and
maintain
,
that
Physical
Questions
are
inexplicable
.
We
must
not
stop
at
the
Opinion
of
those
that
have
examined
nothing
,
or
have
examined
nothing
with
a
necessary
Application
:
For
although
there
are
few
Truths
concerning
Natural
Things
which
are
fully
demonstrated
,
it
is
certain
that
there
are
some
general
ones
,
of
which
it
is
not
possible
to
doubt
,
although
it
is
very
possible
not
to
think
of
them
,
be
ignorant
,
and
deny
them
.
If
we
would
meditate
regularly
,
and
with
all
necessary
Application
,
we
should
discover
many
of
these
certain
Truths
that
I
speak
of
:
But
that
we
may
the
more
easily
discover
them
,
it
is
requisite
to
read
Descartes's
Principles
carefully
,
without
receiving
any
thing
he
says
,
except
when
the
Force
and
Evidence
of
his
Reasons
permit
us
not
to
doubt
of
it
.
As
Morality
is
the
most
necessary
of
all
Sciences
,
we
must
also
study
it
very
carefully
,
for
't
is
chiefly
in
that
Science
that
't
is
dangerous
to
follow
the
Opinions
of
Men
:
But
that
we
may
not
deceive
our selves
in
it
,
but
preserve
Evidence
in
our
Perceptions
,
we
must
only
meditate
upon
undoubted
Principles
,
such
as
are
confessed
by
all
those
whose
Minds
are
not
blinded
with
Pride
;
for
there
is
no
undoubted
Principle
of
Morality
for
Spirits
of
Flesh
and
Blood
▪
and
such
as
aspire
to
the
Quality
of
great
Wits
.
These
sort
of
Men
comprehend
not
the
most
simple
Truths
;
or
if
they
comprehend
them
,
at
least
they
always
dispute
them
,
through
a
Spirit
of
Contradiction
,
and
to
preserve
such
a
Reputation
.
Some
of
these
most
general
Principles
of
Morality
are
,
That
God
having
made
all
things
for
himself
,
he
has
created
our
Minds
to
know
,
and
our
Hearts
to
love
him
:
That
being
also
as
Just
and
Powerful
as
he
is
,
we
cannot
be
Happy
if
we
do
not
follow
his
Orders
,
nor
Unhappy
if
we
do
:
That
our
Nature
is
Corrupt
,
that
our
Minds
depend
upon
our
Bodies
,
our
Reason
upon
our
Senses
,
and
our
Wills
upon
our
Passions
:
That
we
are
uncapable
to
do
what
we
see
clearly
to
be
our
Duties
;
and
that
we
have
need
of
a
Saviour
.
There
are
also
many
other
Principles
of
Morality
,
as
,
That
a
retreat
from
the
eager
Pursuit
of
the
World
and
Repentance
,
are
necessary
to
disunite
us
from
Sensible
Objects
,
and
to
increase
that
which
we
have
with
intelligible
and
true
Goods
,
I
mean
,
those
of
the
Mind
:
That
we
cannot
enjoy
violent
Pleasure
without
becoming
Slaves
to
it
:
That
we
must
never
undertake
any
thing
through
the
Incitement
of
Passion
:
Nor
seek
an
Establishment
in
this
Life
,
&c.
But
because
these
last
Principles
depend
upon
the
precedent
,
and
on
the
Knowledge
of
Man
,
they
ought
not
immediately
to
pass
for
undoubted
.
If
we
consider
these
Principles
orderly
,
and
with
as
much
Care
and
Application
as
the
weight
of
the
Subject
requires
;
and
receive
for
true
only
the
Conclusions
consequently
deduced
from
these
Principles
,
we
shall
have
a
certain
Morality
,
which
perfectly
agrees
with
that
of
the
Gospel
,
although
it
is
not
compleat
and
large
.
It
is
true
,
in
Moral
Reasonings
,
it
is
not
so
easie
to
preserve
Evidence
and
Exactness
,
as
in
some
other
Sciences
;
and
the
Knowledge
of
Man
is
absolutely
necessary
to
those
that
would
make
any
great
Progress
:
And
this
is
the
reason
that
the
generality
of
Men
do
not
succeed
in
it
.
They
will
not
consult
themselves
to
know
the
Weakness
of
their
own
Nature
:
They
omit
to
enquire
of
the
Master
who
inwardly
teaches
them
his
own
Will
,
which
is
the
Immutable
and
Eternal
Law
,
and
the
true
Principles
of
Morality
.
They
do
not
hear
him
with
Pleasure
who
speaks
not
to
their
Senses
,
who
answers
not
according
to
their
Desires
,
nor
Flatters
their
Secret
Pride
:
They
have
no
respect
for
such
words
as
do
not
dazle
the
Imagination
,
which
are
pronounced
without
a
Noise
,
and
are
never
clearly
heard
but
in
the
Silence
of
the
Creatures
:
Yet
with
Pleasure
and
Deference
they
consult
Aristotle
,
Seneca
,
and
some
new
Philosophers
,
who
seduce
them
either
by
the
Obscurity
of
their
Words
,
the
Turn
of
their
Expressions
,
or
Probability
of
their
Reasons
.
Since
the
Sin
of
Adam
we
esteem
only
what
relates
to
the
Preservation
of
the
Body
,
and
Conveniency
of
Life
:
And
because
we
discover
these
sort
of
Goods
only
by
the
Means
of
our
Senses
,
we
make
use
of
them
in
all
Occurrences
.
The
Eternal
Wisdom
who
is
our
true
Life
,
and
the
only
Light
which
can
illuminate
us
,
often
shines
before
the
Blind
,
and
speaks
only
to
the
Deaf
,
when
it
speaks
in
the
Recesses
of
the
Soul
;
for
we
are
almost
always
out
of
our selves
.
As
we
continually
interrogate
all
Creatures
to
learn
some
new
Good
which
we
enquire
after
,
it
is
requisite
,
as
I
have
already
said
,
that
this
Wisdom
presents
it self
before
us
without
our
going
out
of
our selves
,
to
teach
us
by
sensible
Words
,
and
convincing
Examples
,
the
way
to
arrive
at
true
Felicity
.
God
continually
imprints
a
Natural
Love
in
us
for
him
,
that
we
may
always
Love
him
;
and
by
this
same
Motion
of
Love
we
continually
Estrange
our selves
from
him
,
by
running
with
all
the
Power
he
has
given
us
after
Sensible
Goods
,
which
he
has
forbid
us
to
do
.
So
that
willing
to
be
loved
by
us
,
he
renders
himself
Sensible
,
and
presents
himself
before
us
,
by
the
Delights
of
his
Grace
to
fix
all
our
Vain
Agitatitions
,
and
to
begin
our
Cure
,
by
Sensations
or
Delectations
like
to
those
which
had
been
the
Original
of
our
Disease
.
Therefore
I
do
not
pretend
that
Men
may
,
by
the
Power
of
their
Minds
,
so
easily
discover
all
the
Rules
of
Morality
which
are
necessary
to
Salvation
,
and
much
less
that
they
are
able
to
act
according
to
what
they
know
;
for
their
Heart
is
yet
more
Corrupted
than
their
Minds
.
I
only
say
,
that
if
they
admit
none
but
evident
Principles
,
and
consequently
reason
upon
these
Principles
,
they
will
discover
even
the
very
Truths
that
we
learn
in
the
Bible
;
because
't
is
the
same
Wisdom
which
immediately
speaks
from
it self
to
those
who
discover
Truths
from
the
Evidence
of
Reasoning
;
and
who
speaks
by
the
Holy
Scriptures
to
those
who
learn
it
from
their
Senses
.
We
must
then
study
Morality
in
the
Gospel
to
spare
our selves
the
Trouble
of
Meditation
,
and
Certainly
to
learn
those
Laws
according
to
which
we
ought
to
regulate
our
Manners
,
For
those
who
are
not
contented
with
Certainty
,
because
it
only
convinces
the
Mind
,
without
enlightning
it
,
must
carefully
Meditate
upon
these
Laws
,
and
deduce
them
from
their
Natural
Principles
,
that
they
may
evidently
discover
by
their
Reason
,
what
they
already
know
by
Faith
,
with
an
entire
Certainty
.
This
way
they
will
be
convinced
that
the
Gospel
is
the
most
Solid
of
all
Books
;
That
JESVS
CHRIST
perfectly
knew
the
Disorder
and
Distemper
of
Nature
:
That
he
has
procured
a
Remedy
the
most
Useful
for
us
,
and
the
most
Worthy
of
himself
:
But
that
the
Light
of
Philosophers
is
only
thick
Darkness
,
and
their
brightest
Vertues
only
an
insupportable
Pride
;
and
in
a
word
,
that
Aristotle
,
Seneca
,
&c.
are
only
at
best
but
Men
,
to
say
no
worse
of
them
.
CHAP.
VII
.
Of
the
Vse
of
the
first
Rule
which
respects
Particular
Questions
.
WE
have
sufficiently
explained
the
General
Rule
for
Method
,
which
chiefly
regards
the
Subject
of
our
Studies
,
and
to
prove
that
Descartes
has
exactly
followed
it
in
his
System
of
the
World
,
but
that
Aristotle
and
his
Followers
have
not
observed
it
.
It
is
now
proper
to
descend
to
particular
Rules
,
which
are
necessary
to
resolve
all
sorts
of
Questions
.
The
Questions
that
may
be
formed
upon
all
manner
of
Subjects
are
of
diverse
kinds
,
of
which
it
will
not
be
easie
to
give
a
particular
Enumeration
,
but
these
that
follow
are
the
chief
of
them
.
Sometimes
we
enquire
after
the
unknown
Causes
of
some
known
Effects
;
and
sometimes
seek
unknown
Effects
by
their
known
Causes
.
The
Fire
burns
,
and
dissipates
the
Wood
,
we
seek
the
Cause
of
it
.
Fire
consists
in
a
very
great
Motion
of
the
Fiery
Particles
;
we
would
know
what
Effects
this
Motion
is
capable
of
producing
,
if
it
can
harden
Dirt
,
and
melt
Iron
,
&c.
We
seek
sometimes
the
Nature
of
a
thing
by
its
Properties
;
and
sometimes
knowing
the
Nature
we
seek
the
Properties
of
things
:
We
know
,
or
at
least
suppose
,
that
Light
is
transmitted
in
an
instant
,
that
yet
it
is
re-united
and
reflected
by
the
means
of
a
concave
Mirror
,
in
such
sort
,
that
it
penetrates
the
most
Solid
Bodies
;
and
we
would
make
use
of
these
Properties
to
discover
the
Nature
of
it
.
On
the
contrary
,
We
know
that
all
the
Spaces
which
are
betwixt
Earth
and
Heaven
,
are
full
of
little
Spherical
Bodies
extreamly
agitated
,
and
which
continually
fly
from
the
Sun
:
And
we
would
know
if
these
little
Bodies
can
transmit
themselves
in
an
instant
,
or
if
being
reflected
by
a
Concave
Mirror
,
can
re-unite
,
and
dissipate
or
penetrate
the
most
Solid
Bodies
.
Sometimes
we
seek
all
the
Parts
from
the
whole
;
and
sometimes
a
whole
by
its
Parts
:
We
seek
all
the
unknown
Parts
of
a
whole
that
is
known
;
when
we
seek
all
the
Alliquot
parts
of
a
Number
,
all
the
Roots
of
an
Equation
,
all
the
right
Angles
which
a
Figure
contains
,
&c.
And
we
seek
an
unknown
whole
,
whose
Parts
are
known
,
when
we
seek
the
Sum
of
many
Numbers
,
the
Area
of
many
Figures
,
the
Capacity
of
different
Vessels
;
or
we
seek
a
whole
which
has
one
of
its
parts
known
,
and
the
others
,
although
unknown
,
include
some
known
Relation
with
what
is
unknown
:
As
when
we
enquire
what
that
Number
is
whereof
we
have
15
a
known
part
,
and
the
other
which
composes
it
,
is
the
half
or
third
of
the
unknown
Number
:
Or
when
we
seek
an
unknown
Number
which
is
equal
to
15
,
and
to
twice
the
Root
of
the
unknown
Number
.
In
fine
,
We
sometimes
enquire
if
certain
things
are
equal
or
like
to
others
,
or
how
far
they
are
unequal
or
different
:
As
when
we
would
know
if
Saturn
is
greater
than
Jupiter
,
or
how
near
their
Magnitudes
are
alike
:
If
the
Air
at
Rome
is
hotter
than
that
at
Marseilles
,
or
what
difference
between
them
.
What
is
general
in
all
Questions
is
,
that
we
form
them
only
to
know
some
Truths
;
and
because
all
Truths
are
but
Relations
;
we
may
say
generally
,
that
in
all
Questions
,
we
seek
only
the
Knowledge
of
some
Relations
,
whether
Relations
between
things
,
Relations
between
Idea's
,
or
Relations
between
things
and
their
Idea's
.
There
are
Relations
of
many
Kinds
,
there
are
some
between
the
Nature
of
things
,
between
their
Magnitudes
,
their
Parts
,
their
Attributes
,
Qualities
,
Effects
,
Causes
,
&c.
But
we
may
reduce
them
all
to
two
,
viz.
the
Relations
of
Magnitude
,
and
Relations
of
Quality
;
by
calling
all
those
Relations
of
Magnitude
;
which
are
between
things
considered
as
capable
of
More
or
Less
;
and
all
others
Relations
of
Qualities
.
Thus
we
may
say
,
that
all
Questions
tend
to
the
Discovery
of
some
Relations
of
Magnitude
or
Quality
.
The
first
and
chief
of
all
Rules
is
,
to
know
most
distinctly
the
State
of
the
Question
proposed
to
be
resolved
,
and
to
have
very
clear
Idea's
of
its
Terms
,
to
be
able
to
compare
,
and
by
this
means
discover
the
unknown
Relations
.
We
must
therefore
first
perceive
very
clearly
the
unknown
Relation
that
we
seek
;
for
it
is
evident
,
that
if
we
had
no
certain
Mark
to
discover
this
unknown
Relation
when
we
look
for
it
,
or
when
we
would
find
it
,
it
would
be
in
vain
for
us
to
enquire
after
it
.
Secondly
,
as
much
as
possible
,
we
must
render
those
Idea's
distinct
,
which
answer
to
the
Terms
of
the
Question
,
by
taking
away
all
Equivocal
Terms
,
and
make
them
clear
,
by
considering
them
with
all
possible
Attention
:
For
if
these
Idea's
are
so
confused
or
obscure
,
that
we
cannot
make
the
Comparisons
necessary
for
discovering
the
Relations
we
seek
,
we
are
not
yet
in
a
Condition
of
resolving
the
Question
.
In
the
third
place
,
we
must
consider
with
great
Attention
,
the
Conditions
exprest
in
a
Question
,
if
there
is
any
;
because
,
without
that
,
we
have
only
a
confused
Notion
of
the
State
of
the
Question
:
Besides
,
the
Conditons
generally
shew
the
Way
for
resolving
it
.
So
that
having
once
well
conceived
the
State
of
the
Question
,
and
Conditions
of
it
,
we
know
what
we
seek
,
and
sometimes
the
Way
that
we
must
take
to
discover
it
.
It
is
true
,
there
is
not
always
some
Conditions
exprest
in
Questions
;
but
then
these
Questions
are
indetermined
,
and
we
may
resolve
them
many
Ways
,
as
if
a
Square
,
Number
,
or
Triangle
is
required
,
&c.
without
specifying
any
more
;
or
else
't
is
because
he
that
proposes
them
,
knows
not
the
means
of
resolving
them
,
or
else
hides
them
with
a
Design
to
perplex
the
Question
:
As
if
it
is
required
to
find
two
mean
Proportionals
between
two
Lines
,
without
adding
,
by
the
Intersection
of
the
Circle
and
Parabola
,
or
Circle
and
Elipsis
,
&c.
It
is
therefore
absolutely
necessary
,
that
the
Character
by
which
we
know
what
we
seek
,
should
be
very
distinct
and
not
Equivocal
,
and
specifie
only
what
we
seek
,
otherwise
we
can
never
be
certain
of
having
resolved
the
Question
proposed
.
We
must
likewise
take
care
to
retrench
from
the
Question
,
whatever
Conditions
may
perplex
it
,
and
without
which
it
is
compleat
:
For
they
unnecessarily
divide
the
Capacity
of
the
Mind
.
Nay
,
we
cannot
be
said
to
know
the
State
of
a
Question
,
when
the
Conditions
which
accompany
it
are
useless
.
For
instance
,
if
a
Question
were
proposed
in
these
Terms
;
whether
a
Man
being
sprinkled
with
some
Liquors
,
and
covered
with
a
Garland
of
Flowers
,
can
be
able
to
rest
,
although
he
see
nothing
that
can
agitate
him
.
We
must
know
whether
the
Word
Man
is
not
Metaphorical
;
or
the
Word
Rest
Equivocal
,
if
it
is
not
taken
in
Relation
to
Local
Motion
,
or
in
Relation
to
the
Passions
,
as
these
Words
,
although
he
see
nothing
that
is
able
to
agitate
him
,
seem
to
note
.
We
must
know
if
the
Conditions
,
being
sprinkled
with
some
Liquors
,
and
crowned
with
a
Garland
of
Flowers
,
are
Essential
.
Afterwards
,
the
State
of
this
Ridiculous
and
Indetermined
Question
being
clearly
known
,
we
may
easily
resolve
it
,
by
saying
that
we
only
need
put
a
Man
into
a
Ship
,
according
to
the
Conditions
exprest
in
the
Question
.
The
Artifice
of
those
that
propose
such
like
Questions
,
is
to
joyn
Conditions
to
them
which
seem
to
be
necessary
,
although
they
are
not
,
to
divert
the
Mind
of
those
they
propose
them
towards
things
unuseful
to
be
resolved
.
As
in
that
Question
that
Servants
commonly
offer
to
Children
.
I
have
seen
,
say
they
unto
them
,
Hunters
or
Fishers
,
carry
away
with
them
what
they
could
not
take
,
and
cast
into
the
Water
what
they
took
.
The
Mind
being
prejudiced
with
the
Idea
of
Fishermen
angling
for
Fish
▪
it
cannot
conceive
what
they
mean
,
and
all
the
Diffiulty
there
is
to
resolve
this
trifling
Question
,
proceeds
from
their
not
having
conceived
it
clearly
,
and
not
thinking
that
Fishermen
,
as
well
as
others
,
sometimes
look
in
their
Cloaths
for
certain
little
Animals
,
which
they
throw
away
as
soon
as
they
have
taken
them
,
and
still
carry
with
them
what
they
cannot
catch
.
Sometimes
also
,
there
are
not
all
the
necessary
Conditions
in
a
Question
for
the
answering
it
,
and
that
makes
it
at
least
as
difficult
as
when
unuseful
ones
are
added
:
For
instance
in
this
,
to
make
a
Man
immoveable
,
without
binding
or
hurting
him
;
or
rather
,
having
put
a
Man's
little
Finger
in
his
own
Ear
,
by
this
Posture
,
to
make
him
so
immoveable
,
that
he
cannot
stir
from
the
Place
where
he
is
put
,
until
his
little
Finger
is
taken
from
his
Ear
again
.
This
at
first
appears
impossible
,
and
it
is
so
indeed
,
for
we
can
walk
very
well
,
although
our
little
Finger
be
in
our
Ear.
But
here
is
a
Condition
wanting
,
which
would
remove
all
Difficulty
,
if
it
was
expressed
,
viz.
That
he
must
be
made
to
embrace
some
Pillar
or
something
like
it
,
with
that
Arm
,
whereof
the
Finger
is
in
his
Ear
;
for
then
he
cannot
get
from
the
Place
without
taking
his
Finger
from
his
Ear.
It
is
not
added
as
a
Condition
of
a
Question
,
that
there
is
yet
some
other
thing
to
do
,
on
purpose
that
the
Mind
should
not
seek
for
it
nor
discover
it
;
But
those
who
undertake
to
resolve
these
sort
of
Questions
,
must
make
all
necessary
Demands
to
clear
the
Point
wherein
the
Difficulty
of
the
Question
consists
.
These
Arbitrary
Questions
seem
to
be
trifling
,
and
so
indeed
they
are
in
one
Sence
;
for
we
learn
nothing
by
resolving
them
:
Yet
are
they
not
so
different
from
Natural
Questions
,
as
perhaps
we
may
think
them
to
be
;
we
must
do
very
nigh
the
same
things
to
resolve
both
.
For
if
the
Craft
and
Malice
of
Men
make
Arbitrary
Questions
perplexing
and
difficult
to
resolve
;
Natural
Effects
are
also
in
themselves
incompassed
with
Obscurity
and
Darkness
:
And
these
Darknesses
must
be
dispersed
by
the
Attention
of
the
Mind
;
and
Experiments
,
which
are
kind
of
Demands
that
we
make
to
the
Author
of
Nature
,
even
as
we
take
away
Equivocal
and
useless
Circumstances
from
Arbitrary
Questions
by
Attention
of
the
Mind
,
and
by
the
proper
Demands
we
make
to
those
who
propose
them
.
But
let
us
explain
these
things
Methodically
,
and
in
a
more
Serious
and
Instructive
Manner
.
There
is
a
great
Number
of
Questions
which
seem
very
difficult
,
because
we
understand
them
not
,
and
which
therefore
want
an
Explication
:
Yet
,
which
ought
rather
to
pass
for
Axioms
,
than
true
Questions
;
for
it
seems
to
me
,
that
we
ought
not
to
place
in
the
Number
of
Questions
,
certain
undoubted
Propositions
,
whose
Terms
we
conceive
.
We
demand
,
for
instance
,
as
a
Question
difficult
to
be
resolved
,
whether
or
no
the
Soul
is
immortal
;
because
those
that
make
the
Question
,
or
that
pretend
to
resolve
it
,
do
not
clearly
conceive
the
Terms
of
it
.
As
the
Words
Soul
and
Immortal
signifie
different
things
,
and
know
not
how
they
are
understood
;
so
they
cannot
resolve
whether
it
is
Immortal
or
not
:
For
they
neither
know
precisely
what
they
demand
,
nor
what
they
seek
.
By
this
Word
Soul
,
we
may
understand
a
Substance
which
thinks
,
wills
,
feels
,
&c.
we
may
take
the
Soul
for
the
Circulation
of
the
Blood
,
and
Configuration
of
the
Parts
of
the
Body
;
or
we
may
take
it
for
the
Blood
and
Animal
Spirits
.
So
by
this
Word
Immortal
,
we
mean
what
cannot
perish
by
the
ordinary
Power
of
Nature
,
or
else
what
can
never
change
;
or
what
can
neither
corrupt
nor
dissipate
like
a
Vapour
or
Smoke
.
Thus
,
suppose
we
take
the
Words
Soul
and
Immortal
in
some
one
of
these
Significations
;
the
least
Attention
of
Mind
will
make
us
able
to
judge
whether
it
is
Immortal
or
not
.
For
first
,
't
is
plain
that
the
Soul
,
taken
in
the
first
Sense
,
viz.
for
a
Substance
which
thinks
,
is
Immortal
,
if
we
also
take
Immortal
in
the
first
Sense
,
for
what
cannot
perish
by
the
common
Power
of
Nature
;
for
't
is
not
even
conceivable
that
any
Substance
can
become
nothing
;
we
must
have
Recourse
to
the
extraordinary
Power
of
God
,
to
conceive
it
possible
.
Secondly
,
the
Soul
is
immortal
,
if
we
take
Immortal
in
the
third
Sense
;
for
what
cannot
corrupt
,
nor
resolve
into
a
Vapour
or
Smoke
;
for
't
is
evident
,
that
what
cannot
be
divided
into
an
infinite
Number
of
Parts
,
cannot
corrupt
or
be
resolved
into
a
Vapour
.
Thirdly
,
the
Soul
is
not
Immortal
,
if
we
take
Immortal
in
the
second
Sense
,
for
what
cannot
change
:
For
we
have
sufficient
convincing
Proofs
of
the
Variations
of
our
Soul
:
That
sometimes
it
feels
Pain
,
sometimes
Pleasure
,
sometimes
it
wills
certain
things
,
and
then
again
ceases
to
will
them
;
as
being
united
to
the
Body
,
it
cannot
be
separated
from
them
,
&c.
If
we
take
the
Word
Soul
in
any
other
Signification
,
't
will
be
very
easie
to
see
whether
it
is
Immortal
or
not
,
by
taking
the
Word
Immortal
in
a
fixed
and
certain
Sense
;
so
that
what
makes
these
Questions
difficult
,
is
because
we
conceive
them
not
distinctly
,
and
the
Terms
which
express
them
are
Equivocal
;
so
that
they
have
rather
need
of
Explanation
than
Proof
.
It
is
true
,
some
Persons
are
stupid
enough
,
and
others
sufficiently
Imaginative
;
to
take
the
Soul
always
for
a
certain
Configuration
of
the
Parts
of
the
Brain
,
arid
Motion
of
the
Spirits
,
and
it
is
certainly
impossible
to
prove
,
to
these
sort
of
Men
,
that
the
Soul
is
Imortal
and
cannot
perish
:
For
on
the
contrary
,
't
is
evident
,
that
the
Soul
,
taken
in
the
Sense
they
understand
it
,
is
Mortal
;
so
that
't
is
not
a
Question
difficult
to
resolve
,
but
a
Proposition
difficult
to
make
Men
understand
which
have
not
the
same
Idea's
of
it
as
we
have
,
and
who
do
all
they
can
not
to
have
them
,
and
to
blind
themselves
.
When
it
is
asked
,
if
the
Soul
is
Immortal
,
or
any
other
Question
whatever
,
we
must
immediately
take
away
the
Equivocal
Terms
,
and
know
in
what
Sense
they
are
taken
that
we
may
be
able
distinctly
to
conceive
the
Condition
of
the
Question
:
And
if
those
that
propose
it
,
know
not
what
they
mean
,
we
must
require
them
to
form
some
distinct
Notions
,
and
determine
them
.
If
we
ask
them
,
and
find
their
Idea's
agree
not
with
ours
,
it
will
be
useless
to
answer
them
:
For
what
Answer
can
we
make
to
a
Man
,
who
for
instance
,
imagines
that
a
Desire
is
only
the
Motion
of
some
Spirits
;
and
a
Thought
is
nothing
else
but
a
Trace
or
an
Image
,
that
Objects
or
Spirits
have
produced
in
the
Brain
;
and
that
all
the
reasoning
of
Men
consist
merely
in
the
different
Situation
of
some
little
Parts
,
which
are
diversely
disposed
in
the
Head
?
To
answer
him
,
that
the
Soul
,
taken
in
the
Sense
he
means
it
is
Immortal
,
is
to
deceive
him
,
or
make
our selves
ridiculous
to
him
:
But
to
answer
him
it
is
Immortal
,
would
be
in
one
Sense
to
confirm
him
in
an
Error
of
the
greatest
Consequence
.
We
must
therefore
not
answer
him
at
all
,
but
only
endeavour
to
make
him
re-enter
into
himself
,
that
he
may
receive
the
same
Idea's
as
we
do
,
of
him
who
is
only
capable
of
enlightening
him
.
'T
is
also
a
Question
which
appears
difficult
enough
to
resolve
,
viz.
Whether
Beasts
have
a
Soul
or
not
:
Yet
,
when
we
take
away
the
Equivocation
,
it
seems
no
longer
difficult
;
and
the
Generality
of
those
Men
who
think
they
have
,
do
not
know
the
Opinions
of
those
who
think
they
have
not
.
We
may
take
the
Soul
for
something
Corporeal
,
diffused
through
the
whole
Body
,
which
gives
it
Life
and
Motion
,
or
else
for
something
Spiritual
.
Those
who
say
Animals
have
no
Soul
,
understand
it
in
the
Second
Sense
;
for
no
Man
ever
denied
but
that
there
was
in
Animals
something
Corporeal
,
which
was
the
Principle
of
their
Life
and
Motion
,
since
they
cannot
even
deny
it
to
Watches
.
Those
on
the
contrary
,
who
affirm
Animals
have
Souls
,
mean
it
in
the
first
Sense
;
for
there
are
few
who
believe
Animals
have
a
Spiritual
and
indivisible
Soul
,
so
that
the
Peripateticks
and
Cartesians
do
both
believe
that
Beasts
have
a
Soul
,
viz.
a
Corporeal
Principle
of
their
Motion
;
and
both
of
them
believe
they
have
none
,
viz.
That
they
have
nothing
in
them
Spiritual
and
indivisible
.
Thus
the
Difference
that
is
between
the
Peripateticks
and
Cartesians
,
is
not
in
that
the
first
believe
Beasts
have
Souls
,
and
the
last
believe
it
not
:
But
only
in
that
the
first
think
Animals
capable
of
feeling
Pain
,
Pleasure
,
seeing
Colours
,
hearing
Sounds
,
and
generally
of
having
all
the
Sensations
and
Passions
that
we
have
;
and
the
last
doubt
it
.
The
Cartesians
distinguish
the
Word
Sensation
to
take
away
the
Equivocation
of
it
.
For
instance
,
they
say
,
that
when
we
are
too
near
the
Fire
,
the
Particles
of
Wood
strike
against
the
Hand
,
and
shake
the
Fibres
;
that
this
shaking
is
communicated
to
the
Brain
;
that
it
determines
the
Animal
Spirits
,
which
are
there
contained
,
to
diffuse
themselves
through
the
External
Parts
of
the
Body
,
in
a
proper
manner
to
make
them
retire
.
They
agree
,
that
all
these
things
,
or
the
like
,
may
meet
in
Animals
,
and
that
they
certainly
meet
there
,
because
these
are
the
Properties
of
Bodies
;
and
the
Peripateticks
grant
this
.
The
Cartesians
further
say
,
that
in
Man
the
shaking
of
the
Fibres
of
his
Brain
is
accompanied
with
a
Sensation
of
Heat
,
and
that
the
Course
of
the
Animal
Spirits
to
the
Heart
or
Bowels
,
is
followed
with
the
Passion
of
Hatred
or
Aversion
:
But
deny
that
these
Sensations
or
Passions
of
the
Soul
is
in
Beasts
.
The
Peripateticks
,
on
the
contrary
,
affirm
that
Beasts
feel
Heat
as
well
as
we
;
that
like
us
,
they
have
an
Aversion
for
whatever
incommodes
them
;
and
generally
,
that
they
are
capable
of
all
the
Sensations
and
Passions
that
we
are
.
The
Cartesians
do
not
think
that
Beasts
feel
Pain
or
Pleasure
,
or
that
they
love
or
hate
any
thing
;
because
they
admit
nothing
but
what
is
material
in
Beasts
,
and
they
do
not
believe
that
Sensations
or
Passions
are
Properties
of
Matter
,
whatever
it
may
be
.
Some
Peripateticks
on
the
contrary
,
think
that
Matter
is
capable
of
Sensation
and
Passion
,
when
it
is
,
as
they
say
,
Subtilized
;
that
Beasts
may
feel
,
by
the
means
of
Animal
Spirits
,
viz.
by
the
means
of
a
Matter
extreamly
fine
and
delicate
;
and
that
even
the
Soul
is
not
capable
of
Sensation
and
Passion
,
but
only
as
it
is
united
to
this
Matter
.
Thus
,
to
resolve
the
Question
,
whether
Beasts
have
a
Soul
,
we
must
re-enter
into
our selves
,
and
consider
the
Idea
we
have
of
Matter
,
with
all
the
Attention
we
are
capable
of
.
And
if
we
conceive
,
that
Matter
,
Figured
after
such
manner
,
as
Square
,
Round
,
Oval
,
&c.
is
capable
of
Pain
,
Pleasure
,
Heat
and
Cold
,
Colour
,
Smells
,
Sound
,
&c.
we
may
affirm
,
that
the
Souls
of
Beasts
,
how
material
soever
they
are
,
may
be
capable
of
Sensation
.
If
we
conceive
it
not
,
we
must
not
assert
it
is
,
for
we
must
only
affirm
what
we
conceive
:
So
if
we
conceive
,
that
Matter
,
agitated
up
and
down
in
a
Circular
,
Spiral
,
Parabolick
,
Eliptick
Line
,
&c.
be
capable
of
Love
,
Hatred
,
Joy
,
Sorrow
,
&c.
we
may
say
that
Beasts
have
the
same
Passions
with
us
.
If
we
see
it
not
,
we
must
not
say
it
,
at
least
without
confessing
,
we
speak
what
we
do
not
know
.
But
I
think
it
may
be
affirmed
,
that
we
never
believe
any
Motion
of
Matter
can
be
capable
of
Love
or
Joy
,
provided
we
think
Seriously
of
it
:
So
that
to
resolve
this
Question
,
if
Beasts
feel
;
we
need
only
take
away
the
Equivocation
,
as
Cartesians
do
;
for
this
way
we
reduce
it
to
a
Simple
Question
,
that
an
indifferent
Attention
of
Mind
will
suffice
to
resolve
it
.
It
is
true
,
that
St.
Austin
supposing
,
according
to
the
common
Prejudice
,
that
Beasts
have
Souls
(
or
at
least
,
I
have
not
read
in
his
Works
,
that
he
ever
Seriously
examined
it
,
or
called
it
in
Question
)
and
perceiving
well
the
Contradiction
of
saying
,
that
a
Soul
or
Substance
that
thinks
,
feels
,
desires
,
&c.
should
be
Material
,
he
believed
that
the
Souls
of
Beasts
were
certainly
Spiritual
and
Indivisible
.
He
has
proved
,
by
evident
Reasons
,
L
4.
de
anima
&
ejus
origine
.
c.
23.
l.
5.
de
quantitate
animae
,
and
elsewhere
that
all
Souls
,
that
is
,
whatever
feels
,
imagines
,
fears
,
doubts
,
desires
,
&c.
are
necessarily
Spiritual
;
but
I
have
not
observed
that
he
had
any
Reason
to
say
that
Beasts
had
Souls
.
He
does
not
give
himself
the
Trouble
to
prove
it
,
because
't
is
very
probable
that
in
his
Time
there
was
hardly
any
one
that
doubted
of
it
.
Now
there
are
some
who
endeavour
wholly
to
deliver
themselves
from
their
Prejudices
,
and
who
call
all
Opinions
in
Question
,
that
are
not
maintained
upon
clear
and
demonstrative
Reasons
,
who
begin
to
doubt
whether
Animals
have
a
Soul
capable
of
the
same
Sensations
and
Passions
as
ours
,
but
they
always
find
many
prejudiced
Defenders
,
who
pretend
to
prove
,
that
Beasts
feel
,
will
,
think
and
reason
as
we
do
,
although
in
a
much
more
imperfect
manner
.
Dogs
,
say
they
,
know
their
Masters
,
they
love
them
,
suffer
patiently
the
Blows
they
receive
from
them
,
because
they
judge
it
advantageous
for
them
,
not
to
abandon
them
:
But
for
Strangers
,
they
hate
them
so
violently
,
that
they
cannot
so
much
as
suffer
themselves
to
be
caressed
by
them
.
All
Animals
have
a
Love
for
their
Young
Ones
,
and
those
Birds
that
make
their
Nests
in
the
Extreme
Branches
of
a
Tree
,
make
it
plainly
appear
,
that
they
fear
certain
Animals
that
would
devour
them
:
They
think
these
Branches
are
too
weak
to
bear
their
Enemies
,
and
yet
strong
enough
to
support
their
Little
Ones
and
Nests
too
.
There
is
amongst
the
Spiders
,
and
the
most
vile
Insects
,
something
that
looks
like
an
Intelligence
,
which
Animates
them
:
For
we
cannot
forbear
admiring
the
Conduct
of
an
Animal
;
which
,
although
blind
,
finds
a
means
to
catch
others
in
its
Snares
,
that
have
both
Eyes
and
Wings
,
and
are
bold
enough
to
attack
the
greatest
Animal
that
is
.
It
is
true
,
that
all
the
Actions
of
Beasts
shew
that
there
is
an
Intelligence
,
for
whatever
is
regular
declares
it
;
a
Watch
even
shews
it
:
It
is
impossible
that
Chance
should
compose
its
Wheels
,
there
must
be
an
Intelligence
which
has
regulated
its
Motions
.
We
plant
a
Seed
in
an
inverse
Order
,
the
Roots
which
are
upwards
,
sink
of
themselves
into
the
Earth
;
and
the
Germ
which
was
turn'd
towards
the
Earth
,
also
turns
again
to
come
forth
,
and
this
testifies
an
Intelligence
:
This
Plant
is
joynted
at
convenient
Distances
,
to
fortifie
it self
;
it
covers
its
Grain
with
a
Skin
to
preserve
it
;
if
encompasses
it
with
Prickles
which
defends
it
:
This
shews
an
Intelligence
.
In
fine
,
all
that
we
see
Plants
do
,
as
well
as
Animals
,
certainly
denotes
an
Intelligence
.
All
true
Cartesians
grant
it
.
But
they
all
distinguish
,
for
they
take
away
as
much
as
possible
,
the
Equivocation
of
Terms
.
The
Motions
of
Beasts
and
Plants
shew
an
Intelligence
;
but
this
Intelligence
is
not
of
Matter
;
it
is
distinct
from
Beasts
,
as
that
which
disposes
the
Wheels
of
a
Watch
is
distinct
from
the
Watch.
For
indeed
,
this
Intelligence
appears
infinitely
wise
,
infinitely
powerful
,
and
the
same
which
has
formed
us
in
our
Mothers
Belly
,
and
given
us
Growth
,
to
which
we
could
not
,
by
all
the
Efforts
of
our
Minds
,
and
will
add
one
Cubit
.
Thus
in
Animals
,
there
is
neither
Intelligence
nor
Soul
,
as
we
commonly
understand
it
.
They
eat
without
Pleasure
,
cry
without
Pain
,
and
grow
without
Knowledge
:
They
fear
nothing
,
they
know
nothing
,
and
they
act
after
such
a
manner
as
intelligently
shews
that
it
is
God
who
made
them
,
that
preserves
them
;
he
has
so
formed
their
Bodies
,
that
they
Machinally
,
and
without
Fear
,
shun
whatsoever
would
destroy
them
;
otherwise
we
must
grant
that
there
is
more
Understanding
in
the
least
Animal
,
or
even
in
one
Grain
,
than
in
the
Wisest
Man
:
For
it
is
certain
,
there
is
more
different
Parts
,
and
more
regular
Motions
produced
in
them
,
than
we
are
capable
of
knowing
.
But
,
as
Men
are
accustomed
to
confound
all
things
,
and
to
imagine
that
their
Soul
produces
in
their
Bodies
,
almost
all
the
Motions
and
Changes
that
happen
to
it
:
They
falsly
affix
to
the
Word
Soul
,
the
Idea
of
producing
and
preserving
Bodies
.
Thus
they
think
their
Soul
produces
in
them
,
whatsoever
is
absolutely
necessary
for
the
Preservation
of
Life
,
although
it
know
not
even
how
the
Body
it
Animates
is
composed
:
They
judge
it
necessary
that
there
should
be
a
Soul
in
Beasts
,
to
produce
all
the
Motions
and
Changes
which
happen
to
them
;
because
they
are
like
to
what
is
performed
in
our
Bodies
:
For
Beasts
are
begotten
,
nourished
,
fortified
,
as
out
Bodies
are
:
They
Drink
,
Eat
,
Sleep
like
us
;
because
we
are
wholly
like
Beasts
in
our
Bodies
,
and
all
the
difference
there
is
between
us
and
them
,
is
,
That
we
have
a
Soul
,
and
they
have
not
.
But
the
Soul
we
have
does
not
form
our
Bodies
,
it
digests
not
our
Food
,
it
gives
neither
Motion
nor
Heat
to
our
Blood
:
It
Feels
,
Wills
and
Reasons
;
and
animates
the
Body
in
this
respect
.
It
has
Sensations
and
Passions
which
have
relation
to
it
.
It
is
not
that
't
is
diffused
through
all
our
Members
,
that
it
communicates
Sensation
and
Life
to
it
,
for
our
Body
can
receive
nothing
of
what
occurs
in
our
Mind
.
It
is
then
plain
,
That
the
reason
why
we
cannot
resolve
many
Questions
,
is
because
we
distinguish
nor
,
and
even
forget
to
distinguish
the
different
things
that
the
same
word
may
signifie
.
Sometimes
indeed
we
may
think
of
distinguishing
,
but
then
often
we
do
it
so
ill
,
that
instead
of
taking
away
the
Equivocation
of
Terms
,
by
the
Distinctions
we
give
them
,
we
make
them
become
more
obscure
.
For
instance
,
If
it
be
demanded
whether
the
Body
sees
,
how
it
sees
,
and
after
what
manner
the
reasonable
Soul
animates
the
Animal
Spirits
,
the
Blood
,
and
other
living
Humours
,
if
the
Teeth
,
Hair
and
Nails
,
are
animated
,
&c.
we
distinguish
the
words
to
live
and
be
animated
,
in
living
or
being
animated
with
a
rational
Soul
,
or
a
Sensitive
,
or
a
Vegetative
one
;
but
this
distinction
does
only
confound
the
state
of
the
Question
,
for
these
words
themselves
have
need
of
an
Explanation
,
and
it
may
be
even
that
the
two
last
,
Vegetative
and
Sensitive
Soul
are
inexplicable
and
incomprehensible
,
after
the
manner
we
commonly
understand
them
.
But
if
we
would
joyn
any
clear
and
distinct
Idea
to
the
word
Life
,
we
may
say
that
the
Life
of
the
Soul
is
the
Knowledge
of
Truth
and
Love
of
God
;
or
rather
,
that
its
Thought
is
its
Life
:
And
that
the
Life
of
the
Body
consists
in
the
Circulation
of
the
Blood
,
and
just
Temperament
of
Humours
;
or
rather
,
that
the
Life
of
the
Body
is
the
Motion
of
its
Parts
proper
for
its
Preservation
:
And
then
the
Idea's
applied
to
the
word
Life
being
clear
,
it
will
also
be
evident
,
1.
That
the
Soul
cannot
communicate
its
Life
to
the
Body
;
for
it
cannot
make
it
Think
.
2.
That
it
cannot
give
it
the
Life
by
which
it
is
nourished
,
grows
,
&c.
since
it
cannot
so
much
as
know
how
it
must
digest
what
it
eats
.
3.
It
can
make
it
feel
any
thing
,
since
Matter
is
incapable
of
Sensation
,
&c.
Thus
we
may
,
without
Pain
,
resolve
all
other
Questions
that
can
be
put
upon
this
Subject
,
provided
the
Terms
whereby
they
are
expressed
stir
up
clear
Idea's
:
And
it
is
impossible
to
resolve
them
,
if
the
Idea's
of
the
Terms
which
express
them
are
confused
and
obscure
.
Yet
is
it
not
always
absolutely
necessary
to
have
Idea's
,
which
perfectly
represent
the
things
whose
Relations
we
would
examine
:
It
often
suffices
to
have
an
imperfect
or
weak
Knowledge
of
them
,
because
sometimes
we
do
not
enquire
after
an
exact
Knowledge
of
their
Relations
,
as
I
shall
here
explain
.
There
are
Truths
or
Relations
of
two
sorts
,
some
exactly
known
,
and
others
that
are
but
imperfectly
discovered
:
We
exactly
know
the
Relation
between
such
a
Square
and
such
a
Triangle
;
but
we
do
not
perfectly
know
the
Relation
between
Paris
and
Orleance
;
we
know
that
a
Square
is
equal
to
a
Triangle
,
or
double
or
treble
to
it
,
&c.
but
we
only
know
that
Paris
is
greater
than
Orleance
,
without
knowing
how
much
.
Moreover
,
Between
imperfect
Knowledges
there
are
an
infinite
number
of
Degrees
,
and
even
all
these
Knowledges
are
only
imperfect
in
relation
to
the
more
perfect
ones
:
For
instance
,
We
perfectly
know
that
Paris
is
greater
than
the
Royal
Place
;
and
that
Knowledge
is
not
imperfect
,
but
in
relation
to
an
exact
Knowledge
,
according
to
which
we
should
justly
know
how
much
Paris
is
bigger
than
the
place
it
includes
.
Thus
there
are
Questions
of
many
sorts
.
1.
There
are
some
in
which
we
seek
the
perfect
Knowledge
of
all
exact
Relations
,
that
two
or
many
things
have
between
themselves
.
2.
There
are
some
,
in
which
we
enquire
after
the
perfect
Knowledge
of
some
exact
Relation
between
two
or
many
things
.
3.
There
are
some
,
in
which
we
seek
a
perfect
Knowledge
of
some
Relation
that
is
very
near
exact
,
which
is
between
two
or
more
things
.
4.
And
some
,
wherein
we
only
try
to
know
a
Relation
which
is
sufficiently
rambling
and
indetermined
.
It
is
plain
,
1.
That
to
resolve
Questions
of
the
first
Kind
,
and
perfectly
to
know
all
the
exact
Relations
of
Magnitude
and
Quality
that
is
between
two
or
many
things
,
we
must
have
distinct
Idea's
which
perfectly
represent
them
,
and
compare
these
things
all
possible
ways
.
We
may
,
for
instance
,
resolve
all
Questions
which
tend
to
discover
the
exact
Relations
which
are
between
2
and
8
,
because
2
and
8
being
exactly
known
,
we
may
compare
them
together
in
all
necessary
manners
,
to
discover
their
exact
Relations
of
Magnitude
or
Quality
:
We
may
know
that
8
is
Quadruple
of
2
,
that
8
and
2
are
even
Numbers
,
and
that
8
and
2
are
not
Squares
.
It
is
clear
in
the
second
place
,
That
to
resolve
Questions
of
the
second
Kind
,
and
exactly
to
discover
any
Relation
of
Magnitude
or
Quality
which
is
between
two
or
many
things
,
it
is
necessary
,
and
it
will
be
sufficient
to
know
very
distinctly
the
Superficies
of
them
,
according
to
which
we
must
compare
them
,
to
discover
the
Relation
we
seek
:
For
instance
,
To
resolve
any
Question
which
tends
to
the
discovering
some
exact
Relation
between
4
and
16
,
as
that
4
and
16
are
even
Numbers
and
Squares
,
it
is
sufficient
to
know
exactly
that
4
and
16
may
be
divided
into
half
without
a
Fraction
,
and
that
both
are
the
Product
of
a
Number
multiplied
by
it self
,
and
it
is
useless
to
examine
what
their
true
Magnitude
is
:
For
't
is
evident
,
To
know
the
exact
Relation
of
Quality
which
is
between
things
,
it
is
sufficient
to
have
a
very
distinct
Idea
of
their
Quality
,
without
thinking
any
thing
of
their
Magnitude
;
and
that
to
know
their
exact
Relations
of
Magnitude
,
it
sufficies
to
know
exactly
their
Magnitude
without
enquiring
after
their
true
Quality
.
It
is
plain
in
the
third
place
,
That
to
resolve
Questions
of
the
third
Kind
,
and
to
know
any
Relation
that
is
almost
exact
,
between
two
or
more
things
,
it
is
sufficient
to
know
pretty
near
the
Superficies
or
sides
thereof
,
according
to
which
we
must
compare
them
,
to
discover
the
approaching
Relation
that
we
seek
,
whether
it
be
of
Magnitude
or
Quality
.
For
instance
,
I
can
evidently
know
that
√
8
is
greater
than
2
,
because
I
can
know
very
near
the
true
Magnitude
of
the
√
8.
But
I
cannot
know
how
much
the
√
8
exceeds
2
,
because
I
cannot
exactly
know
the
true
Magnitude
of
√
8.
Lastly
,
It
is
plain
,
That
to
resolve
Questions
of
the
fourth
kind
,
and
discover
their
trifling
and
undetermined
Relations
,
it
suffices
to
know
things
after
a
manner
proportionate
to
the
need
we
have
of
comparing
them
,
to
discover
the
Relations
we
seek
.
So
that
to
resolve
all
sorts
of
Questions
,
't
is
not
always
necessary
,
to
have
very
distinct
Idea's
of
their
Terms
,
or
to
know
perfectly
the
things
their
Terms
signifie
:
But
it
is
requisire
to
know
them
so
much
the
more
exactly
,
as
the
Relations
we
endeavour
to
discover
are
more
exact
and
in
greater
Number
:
For
as
we
have
already
shewed
,
in
imperfect
Questions
it
is
enough
to
have
imperfect
Idea's
of
the
things
that
we
consider
,
to
resolve
these
Questions
perfectly
,
or
according
to
what
they
contain
:
And
we
likewise
resolve
Questions
very
well
,
although
we
have
no
distinct
Idea
of
the
Terms
which
express
them
;
for
when
it
is
demanded
if
Fire
is
capable
of
melting
Salt
,
hardening
Dirt
,
and
evaporating
Lead
,
and
a
thousand
other
like
things
,
we
understand
these
Questions
perfectly
,
and
can
very
well
resolve
them
,
although
we
have
no
distinct
Idea
of
Fire
,
Salt
,
Dirt
,
&c.
because
those
who
make
these
demands
,
would
only
know
,
if
we
have
had
any
sensible
Experience
,
that
Fire
has
produced
these
Effects
:
Wherefore
,
according
to
the
Discoveries
we
have
made
by
our
Senses
,
we
can
answer
them
in
such
a
manner
as
may
be
capable
of
satisfying
them
.
CHAP.
VIII
.
An
Application
of
the
other
Rules
to
particular
Questions
.
THere
are
Questions
of
two
sorts
,
Simple
and
Compound
:
The
Resolution
of
the
first
depends
alone
upon
the
Attention
of
the
Mind
to
the
clear
Idea's
of
the
Terms
which
express
them
:
The
others
cannot
be
resolved
but
by
the
Comparison
of
a
third
or
many
other
Idea's
;
we
cannot
discover
the
unknown
Relations
,
which
are
expressed
by
the
Terms
of
the
Question
,
by
immediately
comparing
the
Idea's
of
these
Terms
,
for
they
cannot
be
joyned
or
compared
.
We
must
therefore
have
one
or
many
mean
Idea's
,
to
be
able
to
make
necessary
Comparisons
to
discover
these
Relations
;
and
exactly
observe
that
these
mean
Idea's
are
clear
and
distinct
,
in
proportion
as
the
Relations
we
endeavour
to
discover
are
more
exact
and
in
greater
Number
.
This
Rule
is
only
a
Consequence
of
the
first
,
and
is
of
equal
Importance
:
For
if
it
is
necessary
to
know
exactly
the
Relations
we
compare
,
to
have
clear
and
distinctly
Idea's
of
them
:
For
the
same
reason
it
is
necessary
to
know
well
the
mean
Idea's
by
which
we
pretend
to
make
these
Comparisons
;
since
we
must
distinctly
know
the
Relation
of
Measure
with
each
of
the
things
that
we
measure
,
to
discover
the
Relations
of
them
.
For
instance
,
When
we
suffer
a
little
light
Vessel
to
swim
freely
with
a
Loadstone
in
it
,
if
we
turn
towards
the
North
Pole
of
this
Loadstone
,
another
Loadstone
that
we
hold
in
our
Hands
,
we
shall
immediately
see
the
first
Loadstone
retire
,
as
if
it
were
compelled
by
some
violent
Wind.
And
if
we
desire
to
know
the
Cause
of
this
Effect
.
It
is
plain
,
That
to
give
a
Reason
for
the
Motion
of
this
Loadstone
,
it
is
not
enough
to
know
the
Relations
it
has
with
the
other
;
for
although
we
should
even
perfectly
know
all
,
we
could
not
comprehend
how
these
two
Bodies
could
thrust
one
another
without
meeting
.
We
must
therefore
examine
what
things
we
know
distinctly
to
be
capable
according
to
the
Order
of
Nature
of
moving
Bodies
,
since
the
Question
is
to
discover
the
Natural
Cause
of
the
Motion
of
the
Loadstone
,
which
is
certainly
a
Body
:
To
that
end
we
must
not
have
recourse
to
any
Quality
,
Form
,
or
Entity
,
or
even
of
any
Intelligence
,
that
we
do
not
clearly
know
to
be
capable
of
moving
Bodies
:
For
we
cannot
certainly
know
,
that
Intelligences
are
the
common
Causes
of
the
Natural
Motions
of
Bodies
,
nor
even
whether
or
no
they
can
produce
Motion
.
We
know
evidently
,
That
't
is
a
Law
of
Nature
that
Bodies
should
move
each
other
when
they
meet
.
We
must
then
endeavour
to
explain
the
Motion
of
the
Loadstone
,
by
the
means
of
any
body
which
meets
it
.
It
is
true
,
that
it
may
be
something
else
besides
a
Body
which
moves
it
;
but
if
we
have
no
distinct
Idea
of
this
thing
,
we
must
not
make
use
of
it
as
a
fit
Mean
,
to
discover
what
we
seek
,
nor
to
explain
it
to
others
.
For
't
is
not
giving
a
Reason
of
an
Effect
,
to
ascribe
something
as
a
Cause
of
it
which
no
body
conceives
clearly
:
We
must
not
then
trouble
our selves
too
much
,
whether
there
is
any
other
Natural
Cause
of
the
Motion
of
Bodies
than
their
Mutual
Concurrence
;
but
rather
suppose
that
there
is
none
,
and
attentively
consider
what
Body
can
meet
and
move
this
Loadstone
.
We
discover
at
first
sight
,
that
't
is
not
the
Loadstone
we
hold
in
our
Hands
,
since
it
does
not
touch
that
which
is
moved
:
But
because
it
is
only
moved
at
the
approach
of
that
which
we
hold
in
our
Hands
,
and
is
not
moved
of
it self
,
we
ought
to
conclude
,
That
although
it
is
not
the
Loadstone
in
our
Hands
which
moves
it
,
it
must
be
some
little
Bodies
which
proceed
from
it
,
and
which
are
past
by
it
towards
the
other
Loadstone
.
To
discover
these
little
Bodies
,
we
must
not
open
our
Eyes
and
look
near
the
Loadstone
,
for
the
Senses
would
impose
upon
Reason
,
and
it
may
be
we
should
judge
that
nothing
proceeds
from
the
Loadstone
,
because
we
cannot
see
any
thing
go
out
from
thence
.
'T
is
very
probable
we
should
forget
that
we
do
not
see
the
most
impetuous
Winds
,
nor
many
other
Bodies
which
produce
as
extraordinary
Effects
:
We
must
keep
firm
to
this
clear
and
most
intelligible
Mean
,
and
carefully
examine
all
the
Effects
of
the
Loadstone
,
that
we
may
discover
how
it
can
continually
emit
these
little
Bodies
without
being
diminished
.
For
the
Experiments
that
have
been
made
shew
,
that
these
little
Bodies
that
go
out
on
one
side
,
immediately
enter
in
again
at
the
other
;
and
they
will
serve
to
explain
all
Difficulties
that
can
be
brought
against
the
manner
of
resolving
this
Question
.
But
it
must
be
well
observed
,
That
we
ought
not
to
abandon
this
Mean
,
although
even
we
could
not
answer
some
Difficulties
proceeding
from
our
Ignorance
in
several
things
.
If
we
have
not
a
Mind
to
examine
from
whence
it
is
that
Loadstones
are
repelled
,
when
we
oppose
the
same
Poles
to
each
other
;
but
rather
the
Reason
why
they
approach
and
joyn
to
each
other
,
when
we
present
the
North
Pole
of
the
one
to
the
South
Pole
of
the
other
,
the
Question
would
be
more
difficult
,
and
one
way
alone
would
not
be
sufficient
to
resolve
it
.
It
is
not
enough
to
know
exactly
the
Relations
that
are
between
the
Poles
of
these
two
Loadstones
,
nor
to
have
recourse
to
the
Means
we
have
taken
for
the
precedent
Question
;
for
on
the
contrary
,
this
Method
seems
to
hinder
the
Effect
whose
Cause
we
would
seek
.
Neither
must
we
have
recourse
to
any
thing
that
we
do
not
clearly
know
to
be
the
natural
and
common
Causes
of
Corporeal
Motions
,
nor
deliver
our selves
from
the
Difficulty
of
the
Question
,
by
a
rambling
and
undeterminate
Idea
of
an
Occult
Quality
in
Loadstones
,
by
which
they
attract
each
other
;
for
the
Mind
can
conceive
but
one
Body
,
as
having
a
sufficient
Power
to
attract
another
.
The
Impenetrability
of
Bodies
makes
us
clearly
conceive
,
that
Motion
may
be
communicated
by
Impulsion
;
and
Experience
proves
plainly
,
that
it
is
communicated
by
this
means
:
But
there
is
neither
Reason
nor
Experience
which
clearly
demonstrates
the
Motion
of
Attraction
;
for
in
the
Experiments
which
seem
most
proper
to
prove
this
kind
of
Motion
,
we
visibly
perceive
,
when
we
find
the
true
and
certain
Cause
,
that
what
appears
to
be
done
by
Attraction
,
is
only
perform'd
by
Impulsion
.
So
that
we
must
not
keep
to
any
other
Communication
of
Motion
,
but
that
which
is
made
by
Impulsion
:
Since
this
way
is
certain
and
undoubted
,
and
there
is
at
least
some
Obscurity
in
the
others
which
we
cannot
imagine
.
But
although
we
could
demonstrate
,
that
in
things
purely
Corporeal
there
are
other
Principles
of
Motion
than
the
meeting
of
Bodies
;
we
could
not
reasonably
reject
this
,
we
ought
even
to
keep
to
it
before
all
others
;
since
it
is
the
most
clear
and
evident
,
and
appears
so
undoubted
,
that
we
are
not
afraid
to
affirm
,
it
has
been
received
by
all
People
in
all
Ages
.
Experience
shews
us
,
that
a
Loadstone
that
swims
freely
upon
the
Water
,
draws
near
to
one
which
we
hold
in
our
Hands
,
when
we
present
different
Poles
;
we
must
then
conclude
that
it
is
pushed
towards
it
.
But
as
it
is
not
the
Loadstone
we
hold
that
pushes
that
which
swims
,
since
that
which
swims
draws
nigh
to
that
which
we
hold
,
and
nevertheless
that
which
swims
would
not
be
moved
,
if
we
did
not
present
that
to
it
which
we
hold
in
our
Hands
:
It
is
evident
,
that
at
least
we
must
recur
to
both
Methods
to
explain
this
Questoin
,
if
we
will
resolve
it
by
the
received
Principle
of
the
Communication
of
Motion
.
diagram representing the communication of motion in lodestones
The
Loadstone
c
draws
near
to
the
Loadstone
C
:
Therefore
the
Air
which
encompasses
it
pushes
it
,
since
there
is
no
other
Body
which
can
push
it
;
and
that
is
the
first
way
.
The
Loadstone
c
approaches
only
at
the
presence
of
the
Loadstone
C
;
therefore
't
is
necessary
that
the
Loadstone
C
should
determine
the
Air
to
push
the
Loadstone
c
;
and
that
is
the
second
way
.
It
is
evident
that
both
these
ways
are
absolutely
necessary
;
so
that
the
Difficulty
is
now
reduced
to
joyn
them
together
,
which
may
be
done
two
ways
,
either
in
beginning
with
something
known
in
the
Air
which
encompasses
the
Loadstone
c
,
or
by
beginning
with
something
known
in
the
Loadstone
C.
If
we
would
know
that
the
parts
of
Air
,
like
those
of
all
fluid
bodies
,
are
in
continual
Agitation
,
we
cannot
doubt
but
they
still
strike
against
the
Loadstone
c
which
they
surround
;
but
because
they
strike
it
equally
on
all
sides
,
they
do
not
push
it
more
on
one
side
that
another
,
whilst
there
is
an
equal
quantity
of
Air
on
both
sides
.
Things
being
thus
,
it
is
easie
to
judge
that
the
Loadstone
C
prevents
there
being
so
much
of
this
Air
as
we
speak
of
,
towards
a
as
towards
b
;
but
that
can
be
done
only
by
dispersing
some
other
bodies
in
the
space
which
is
between
C
and
c.
There
must
then
some
little
bodies
go
out
from
the
Loadstones
to
fill
this
space
.
So
these
little
bodies
chasing
away
the
Air
near
a
,
the
Loadstone
c
is
less
pushed
on
that
side
than
the
other
;
and
consequently
must
approach
to
the
Loadstone
C
,
since
all
bodies
move
to
the
side
where
they
are
least
pushed
.
But
if
the
Loadstone
c
had
not
many
Pores
about
the
Pole
a
,
fit
to
receive
the
little
bodies
which
go
out
from
the
Pole
B
of
the
other
Loadstone
,
and
too
small
to
receive
those
of
Air
:
It
is
plain
,
that
these
little
bodies
being
more
agitated
than
Air
,
since
they
are
to
chase
it
from
between
the
Loadstones
,
they
would
push
the
Loadstone
c
,
and
remove
it
from
C.
Thus
since
the
Loadstone
c
approaches
to
or
deviates
from
C
,
when
we
present
its
different
Poles
,
it
is
necessary
to
conclude
,
that
the
Poles
a
and
b
of
the
Loadstone
c
,
are
filled
with
different
Pores
:
Otherwise
the
little
bodies
which
are
emitted
from
the
Loadstone
C
,
would
not
freely
pass
without
pushing
the
Loadstone
c
by
the
side
a
,
and
would
not
be
repulsed
by
the
side
b
:
What
I
say
of
one
of
the
Loadstones
,
must
also
be
understood
of
the
other
.
It
is
evident
,
that
we
always
learn
something
by
this
way
of
reasoning
upon
clear
Idea's
and
undoubted
Principles
:
For
we
have
discovered
,
that
the
Air
which
encompasses
the
Loadstone
c
,
was
driven
from
between
the
Loadstones
by
Bodies
which
are
continually
emitted
from
their
Poles
'
which
find
free
passage
on
one
side
and
are
stopt
on
the
other
.
And
if
we
would
discover
near
what
the
Magnitude
and
Figure
of
the
Pores
of
this
Loadstone
are
,
through
which
these
little
bodies
pass
,
we
must
yet
make
other
Experiments
,
but
they
would
lead
us
to
subjects
which
we
intend
not
to
treat
of
.
Upon
these
Questions
we
may
consult
the
Principles
of
M.
Descartes
:
I
shall
only
answer
an
Objection
which
immediately
offers
it self
,
from
whence
is
it
that
these
little
bodies
cannot
re-enter
by
the
same
Pores
they
came
out
;
that
besides
a
certain
Figure
,
representing
the
Spiral
Chanels
of
a
Screw
,
which
we
may
suppose
to
be
in
the
Pores
producing
this
Effect
,
the
Inflexion
of
the
little
Branches
which
compose
these
Pores
,
may
in
one
Sense
obey
the
little
Bodies
which
pass
a-cross
them
,
and
in
another
Sense
make
them
rough
,
and
stop
their
passage
:
So
that
we
need
not
be
too
much
surprised
at
the
difference
of
the
Poles
of
the
Loadstone
,
for
this
difference
may
be
accounted
for
many
ways
;
and
all
the
difficulty
is
,
amongst
several
Causes
to
discover
the
true
one
.
If
we
had
endeavoured
to
resolve
the
Question
we
have
just
now
examined
,
in
beginning
with
the
Corpuscles
which
we
suppose
to
be
emitted
from
the
Loadstone
C
,
we
should
have
found
the
same
thing
:
And
we
should
likewise
have
discovered
,
that
the
Air
is
composed
of
an
infinite
Number
of
Particles
which
are
in
continual
Agitation
,
for
without
it
't
would
be
impossible
that
the
Loadstone
c
should
approach
to
the
Loadstone
C.
I
shall
not
stay
to
explain
this
,
because
't
is
not
difficult
.
I
will
give
you
here
a
Question
more
compound
than
the
foregoing
,
in
which
many
Rules
must
be
made
use
of
,
't
is
demanded
what
can
be
the
Natural
and
Mechanical
Cause
of
the
Motion
of
our
Members
.
The
Idea
of
Natural
Cause
is
clear
and
distinct
,
if
we
understand
it
,
as
I
have
explained
it
in
the
precedent
Question
;
but
the
Term
of
the
Motion
of
our
Members
,
is
equivocal
and
confused
;
for
there
are
many
sorts
of
these
Motions
,
some
of
the
Will
,
Natural
and
Convulsive
ones
.
There
are
likewise
different
Members
in
Mans
Body
:
So
that
according
to
the
first
Rule
,
I
must
ask
of
which
of
these
Motions
it
is
that
they
would
know
the
Cause
:
But
if
the
Question
is
left
indeterminate
,
so
that
I
may
make
use
of
any
I
shall
chuse
,
I
would
examine
the
Question
after
this
manner
.
And
first
,
consider
the
Properties
of
these
Motions
,
and
because
I
immediately
discover
,
that
Voluntary
Motions
are
commonly
more
readily
performed
,
than
the
Convulsive
ones
;
I
conclude
from
thence
,
that
their
Cause
is
different
:
Therefore
I
can
,
and
ought
to
examine
the
Question
by
Parts
;
for
it
would
appear
to
be
of
too
long
a
Discussion
.
I
would
oblige
my self
therefore
,
first
,
to
consider
Voluntary
Motion
;
and
because
we
have
many
Parts
which
concur
to
this
Motion
,
I
would
first
consider
the
Arm
,
as
composed
of
many
Muscles
,
which
have
generally
some
Action
,
when
we
lift
a
Weight
up
,
or
when
we
differently
move
Bodies
;
but
I
keep
only
to
one
,
supposing
the
rest
to
be
formed
very
near
after
the
same
manner
.
I
instruct
my self
of
its
Composition
,
by
the
Help
of
some
Book
of
Anatomy
,
or
rather
by
a
Sensible
Sight
of
its
Fibres
and
Tendons
,
which
I
get
some
able
Anatomist
to
dissect
for
me
,
to
whom
I
make
all
the
Demands
which
shall
afterwards
produce
in
my
Mind
some
Method
for
me
to
find
what
I
seek
.
Considering
therefore
all
things
attentively
,
I
cannot
doubt
but
the
Principle
of
the
Motion
of
my
Arm
depends
upon
the
Contraction
of
the
Muscles
which
compose
it
.
And
if
I
have
not
a
mind
to
perplex
my self
with
too
many
things
:
I
may
suppose
,
according
to
the
common
Opinion
;
that
this
Contraction
is
produced
by
the
Animal
Spirits
which
fill
these
Muscles
,
and
by
this
means
shorten
them
;
the
whole
Question
then
,
which
respects
Voluntary
Motion
,
will
be
reduced
,
to
know
how
the
few
Animal
Spirits
,
which
are
contained
in
an
Arm
,
can
suddenly
swell
the
Muscles
,
according
to
the
Orders
of
the
Will
,
with
a
sufficient
Force
to
lift
a
Burden
of
an
Hundred
Weight
or
more
.
When
we
consider
this
with
any
Application
,
the
first
means
that
presents
it self
to
the
Imagination
,
is
commonly
that
of
some
violent
and
quick
Fermentation
,
like
to
that
of
Gunpowder
,
or
certain
Liquors
filled
with
Volatile
Salt
,
when
they
are
mixed
with
those
that
are
Acid
,
or
full
of
fixt
Salt
.
A
little
Gunpowder
,
when
lighted
,
is
capable
of
raising
not
only
an
Hundred
Pound
Weight
,
but
a
Tower
,
and
even
a
Mountain
:
Earthquakes
,
which
overthrow
Towns
,
and
shake
whole
Provinces
,
are
also
produced
by
Spirits
,
which
are
kindled
under
Ground
,
much
like
Gunpowder
.
Thus
,
supposing
in
the
Arm
such
a
Cause
of
the
Fermentation
and
Dilatation
of
Spirits
;
we
may
say
,
that
it
is
the
Principle
of
the
Power
that
Men
have
to
perform
such
quick
and
violent
Motions
.
However
,
as
we
ought
to
distrust
this
means
,
which
enters
into
the
Mind
only
by
the
Senses
,
and
whereof
we
have
no
clear
and
evident
Knowledge
;
we
must
not
too
easily
admit
of
it
:
For
indeed
,
it
is
not
sufficient
to
give
a
Reason
of
the
Force
and
Quickness
of
our
Motions
by
a
Comparison
,
since
this
Reason
is
confused
and
imperfect
:
For
we
must
here
explain
a
Voluntary
Motion
,
and
Fermentation
is
not
Voluntary
.
The
Blood
excessively
ferments
in
Feavers
,
and
we
cannot
prevent
it
.
The
Spirits
are
inflamed
and
agitated
in
the
Brain
,
and
their
Agitation
diminishes
not
according
to
our
Desires
.
When
a
Man
moves
his
Arm
after
diverse
Ways
,
according
to
this
Explanation
,
he
must
make
a
Million
of
great
and
small
,
quick
and
slow
Fermentations
that
begin
(
and
which
is
still
more
difficult
to
explain
according
to
this
Supposition
)
that
end
in
the
same
Moment
he
wills
it
.
These
Fermentations
must
not
dissipate
all
their
Matter
,
and
this
Matter
must
be
always
ready
to
take
Fire
.
When
a
Man
walks
Ten
Miles
,
how
many
Thousand
Times
must
the
Muscles
,
which
he
uses
in
walking
,
be
filled
and
emptied
?
And
what
a
vast
Quantity
of
Spirits
would
be
required
if
Fermentation
should
dissipate
and
destroy
them
at
every
Step.
This
Reason
is
therefore
imperfect
,
to
explain
the
Motions
of
our
Bodies
which
entirely
depend
upon
our
Will.
It
is
evident
,
that
the
present
Question
consists
in
this
Mechanical
Problem
.
By
Pneumatick
Machines
,
to
find
the
means
of
overcoming
such
or
such
Force
,
suppose
a
Hundred
Weight
,
by
another
as
small
as
we
will
,
suppose
the
Weight
of
an
Ounce
;
and
that
the
Application
of
this
little
Force
shall
produce
its
desired
Effect
,
and
depend
upon
the
Will.
Now
this
Problem
is
easily
resolved
,
and
the
Demonstration
of
it
is
clear
.
We
may
resolve
it
by
a
Vessel
which
has
two
Orifices
,
one
of
which
is
a
little
more
than
1600.
Times
greater
than
the
other
,
in
which
let
there
be
inserted
the
Tubes
of
two
equal
Bellows
,
and
only
apply
a
Force
1600
Times
greater
than
the
other
,
to
the
Mouth
of
the
greater
Bellows
;
for
then
the
Force
of
1600
Times
the
less
,
shall
overcome
the
greater
.
The
Demonstration
of
it
is
clear
from
Mechanicks
,
since
the
Powers
are
not
exactly
in
Reciprocal
Proportion
with
the
Orifices
,
and
the
Relation
of
the
least
Force
to
the
least
Orifice
,
is
greater
than
the
Relation
of
greater
Force
to
the
greater
Orifice
.
But
to
resolve
this
Problem
by
a
Machine
which
represents
the
Effect
of
the
Muscles
,
better
than
this
Instance
already
mentioned
.
Blow
up
a
Foot-ball
and
let
there
be
a
great
Stone
of
5
or
6
Hundred
Weight
laid
upon
it
when
half
filled
with
Wind
,
or
place
the
Ball
upon
a
Table
with
a
Board
over
it
,
and
a
Stone
over
that
,
or
let
some
heavy
Man
sit
upon
it
,
holding
himself
by
something
that
he
may
be
able
to
resist
the
swelling
of
the
Foot-ball
.
For
if
one
blow
in
the
Foot-ball
once
only
with
his
Mouth
,
it
will
raise
up
the
Stone
,
which
presses
it
down
,
or
the
Man
who
sits
upon
it
;
provide
a
the
Orifice
,
by
which
the
Wind
enters
the
Foot-ball
,
have
a
Sucker
to
hinder
it
from
going
out
whilst
the
Person
takes
Breath
.
The
Reason
of
this
is
,
that
the
Orifice
in
the
Ball
is
so
small
,
or
ought
to
be
supposed
so
small
,
in
Relation
to
the
whole
Ball
which
is
compressed
by
the
Stone
,
that
a
small
Force
is
capable
to
overpower
a
great
one
by
this
method
.
If
we
consider
also
,
that
ones
Breath
is
capable
of
pushing
a
Ball
of
Lead
very
violently
by
the
means
of
a
long
Tube
,
because
the
Force
of
the
Breath
dissipates
not
,
but
continually
renews
:
we
may
visibly
discover
,
that
the
necessary
Proportion
between
the
Orifice
and
Capacity
of
the
Ball
,
being
supposed
,
ones
Breath
only
may
easily
overcome
a
very
great
Force
.
If
then
we
conceive
,
that
all
the
Muscles
,
or
each
of
the
Fibres
which
compose
them
,
have
like
this
Foot-ball
,
a
Capacity
fit
to
receive
the
Animal
Spirits
;
that
the
Pores
,
by
which
the
Spirits
insinuate
themselves
,
are
still
smaller
in
Proportion
than
the
Neck
of
a
Bladder
,
or
Orifice
of
a
Ball
;
that
the
Spirits
are
kept
in
,
and
pushed
forward
in
the
Nerves
,
like
Air
in
Tubes
,
and
that
the
Spirits
are
more
agitated
than
the
Breath
of
the
Lungs
,
and
pushed
with
more
Force
in
the
Muscles
,
than
in
Balls
:
We
shall
discover
,
that
the
Motion
of
the
Spirits
,
which
are
dispersed
through
the
Muscles
,
can
overcome
the
Force
of
the
most
weighty
Burthens
we
can
bear
;
and
that
if
we
cannot
carry
the
heaviest
,
the
Defect
of
the
Power
proceeds
not
so
much
from
the
Spirits
,
as
that
of
the
Fibres
and
Membranes
that
compose
the
Muscles
,
which
would
break
if
we
made
too
great
an
Effort
.
Besides
,
if
we
observed
,
that
by
the
Laws
of
the
Union
of
the
Soul
and
Body
,
the
Motions
of
these
Spirits
,
as
to
their
Determinations
,
depend
upon
the
Will
of
Man
,
we
should
plainly
see
that
the
Motions
of
the
Arms
must
be
voluntary
.
It
is
true
,
we
remove
our
Arms
with
so
much
Quickness
,
that
at
first
it
seems
incredible
,
that
the
Effusion
of
the
Spirits
in
the
Muscles
which
compose
them
,
should
be
quick
enough
to
produce
such
a
Motion
.
But
we
must
consider
,
that
these
Spirits
are
extreamly
agitated
,
always
ready
to
go
from
one
Muscle
to
another
,
and
that
there
is
not
need
of
many
to
swell
them
up
so
little
as
is
necessary
,
to
move
them
only
,
or
when
we
lift
any
thing
that
's
very
light
from
the
Ground
;
for
when
we
have
any
thing
heavy
to
lift
we
cannot
do
it
so
speedily
.
Burthens
being
heavy
,
will
much
swell
and
stretch
the
Muscles
.
To
swell
them
up
after
this
manner
,
requires
more
Spirits
than
there
is
in
the
adjoyning
or
opposite
Muscles
.
There
must
therefore
be
some
little
Time
to
collect
these
Spirits
,
in
a
Quantity
sufficient
to
resist
this
Weight
:
So
that
those
which
are
laden
cannot
run
,
and
those
that
take
any
weighty
thing
from
the
Ground
,
cannot
do
it
with
so
much
Haste
as
those
who
take
up
a
Straw
.
If
we
further
reflect
,
that
those
that
have
more
Heat
,
or
a
little
Wine
in
their
Heads
,
are
much
quicker
than
others
;
as
amongst
Animals
,
those
whose
Spirits
are
more
agitated
,
as
Birds
move
more
swiftly
than
they
that
have
their
Blood
cold
,
like
Frogs
:
And
that
even
amongst
them
there
are
some
,
as
the
Camelion
,
the
Tortoise
,
and
other
Infects
,
whose
Spirits
are
so
little
agitated
,
that
their
Muscles
fill
not
faster
than
a
little
Foot-ball
which
we
should
blow
up
.
If
we
well
consider
all
these
things
,
it
may
be
,
we
might
think
the
Explanation
already
given
fit
to
be
received
.
But
although
this
Part
of
the
proposed
Question
which
regards
Voluntary
Motions
,
is
sufficiently
resolved
:
We
must
not
however
,
affirm
that
it
is
wholly
so
,
and
that
there
is
nothing
more
in
our
Bodies
,
which
contributes
to
these
Motions
,
than
what
we
have
attributed
to
it
;
for
there
is
probably
in
our
Muscles
,
a
thousand
Springs
which
facilitate
these
Motions
,
and
will
be
eternally
unknown
to
those
,
even
who
make
the
strictest
Scrutinies
into
the
Works
of
God
.
The
second
Part
of
the
Question
which
must
be
examined
,
respects
Natural
Motions
,
or
those
sort
of
Motions
which
have
nothing
extraordinary
,
as
the
Convulsive
have
;
but
that
are
absolutely
necessary
to
the
Preservation
of
our
Machine
,
which
consequently
depend
not
entirely
upon
our
Wills
.
I
consider
then
first
,
with
all
the
Attention
I
am
capable
,
what
the
Motions
are
which
have
these
Conditions
,
and
if
they
are
wholly
alike
;
but
because
I
immediately
discover
,
that
almost
all
of
them
differ
one
from
another
,
not
to
perplex
my self
with
too
many
things
,
I
only
insist
upon
the
Motion
of
the
Heart
.
This
Part
is
the
most
known
,
and
its
Motions
most
sensible
.
I
then
examine
its
Structure
,
and
amongst
many
others
,
observe
two
things
.
The
first
,
that
't
is
composed
of
Fibres
like
other
Muscles
;
the
second
,
that
there
is
two
very
considerable
Cavities
in
it
.
I
therefore
judge
,
that
its
Motions
may
be
performed
by
the
Animal
Spirits
,
because
it
is
a
Muscle
,
and
that
the
Blood
there
ferments
and
dilates
its
self
,
since
there
are
Cavities
there
.
The
first
of
these
Determinations
is
founded
upon
what
I
have
already
said
;
and
the
second
,
because
the
Heart
is
much
hotter
than
all
the
other
Parts
of
the
Body
;
as
it
is
that
which
disperses
Heat
with
the
Blood
into
all
our
Members
,
that
these
two
Cavities
could
neither
have
been
formed
nor
preserved
,
but
only
by
the
Dilatation
of
the
Blood
;
and
that
thus
they
are
serviceable
to
the
Cause
which
produced
them
.
I
can
then
give
a
sufficient
Reason
for
the
Motion
of
the
Heart
,
by
the
Spirits
which
agitate
it
,
and
the
Blood
which
dilates
it
when
this
Blood
is
fermented
:
For
although
the
Cause
I
bring
for
its
Motion
,
should
not
perhaps
be
true
,
yet
it
appears
certain
to
me
,
that
it
is
sufficient
to
produce
it
.
It
's
true
,
that
the
Principle
of
the
Fermentation
or
Dilatation
of
the
Liquors
,
probably
is
not
enough
known
to
all
that
shall
read
this
Book
,
to
pretend
to
have
shewn
an
Effect
,
when
we
have
in
general
discovered
that
its
Cause
is
Fermentation
;
but
we
must
not
resolve
all
particular
Questions
by
going
back
unto
the
first
Causes
.
It
is
not
because
we
cannot
by
this
demonstrate
,
and
discover
the
true
System
upon
which
all
particular
Effects
depend
,
provided
we
stop
only
at
clear
Idea's
:
But
that
this
manner
of
Philosophizing
is
neither
the
most
exact
nor
shortest
.
To
explain
what
I
mean
,
we
must
know
there
are
Questions
of
two
Sorts
.
In
the
first
we
try
to
discover
the
Nature
and
Properties
of
something
:
In
the
others
we
only
desire
to
know
if
such
a
thing
hath
,
or
hath
not
such
a
Propriety
,
or
if
we
know
it
has
such
a
Propriety
,
we
would
only
know
the
Cause
of
it
.
To
resolve
Questions
of
the
first
Kind
,
we
must
consider
things
in
their
Original
,
and
always
conceive
them
produced
by
the
most
Simple
and
most
Natural
Ways
.
To
resolve
the
rest
,
a
very
different
manner
must
be
taken
:
They
must
be
done
by
Suppositions
,
and
we
must
examine
whether
these
Suppositions
make
us
guilty
of
any
Absurdity
,
or
if
they
conduce
to
any
Truth
clearly
known
.
For
Instance
,
we
would
discover
what
are
the
Properties
of
the
Cycloid
,
or
of
some
of
the
Conick
Sections
:
These
Lines
must
be
considered
in
their
Generation
,
and
formed
according
to
the
most
Simple
and
least
perplext
Ways
;
for
't
is
the
best
and
shortest
Method
to
discover
the
Nature
and
Properties
of
them
.
We
easily
see
that
the
Subtense
of
the
Cycloid
is
equal
to
the
Circle
which
forms
it
;
and
if
we
do
not
easily
discover
many
Properties
by
this
means
,
't
is
because
the
Circular
Line
which
serves
to
form
it
,
is
not
sufficiently
known
.
But
for
these
Lines
,
purely
Mathematical
,
or
such
whose
Relations
we
can
know
more
exactly
,
as
Conick
Sections
,
we
may
discover
a
great
Number
of
their
Properties
,
by
considering
them
in
their
Generation
.
We
must
only
observe
,
that
as
they
may
be
generated
by
a
Regular
Motion
several
Ways
;
so
all
Sorts
of
Generations
are
not
equally
proper
to
enlighten
the
Mind
,
but
the
most
Simple
are
the
best
;
and
that
it
often
happens
,
that
certain
particular
Methods
are
more
proper
than
others
,
to
demonstrate
some
particular
Properties
.
But
if
the
Question
is
not
in
general
to
discover
the
Properties
of
a
thing
,
but
to
know
if
a
thing
has
such
a
Property
:
Then
it
must
be
supposed
that
it
hath
it
effectively
,
and
examine
attentively
,
what
must
follow
this
Supposition
;
whether
it
leads
to
a
manifest
Absurdity
,
or
else
to
some
undoubted
Truth
,
which
may
serve
as
a
means
to
discover
what
we
enquire
after
.
And
't
is
that
Method
Geometricians
make
use
of
to
resolve
their
Problems
.
They
suppose
as
done
,
what
they
seek
for
,
and
examine
what
must
happen
from
thence
,
and
attentively
consider
the
Relations
which
result
from
their
Suppositions
.
They
represent
all
these
Relations
which
include
the
Condition
of
the
Problem
by
Equations
;
and
afterwards
reduce
these
Equations
,
according
to
their
Rules
,
so
that
what
is
unknown
,
they
find
equal
to
one
or
many
things
perfectly
known
.
If
the
Question
then
is
in
general
,
to
discover
the
Nature
of
Fire
,
and
the
different
Fermentations
,
which
are
the
most
universal
Causes
of
Natural
Effects
:
I
say
,
that
the
shortest
and
most
secure
Way
,
is
to
examine
it
in
its
Original
.
We
must
consider
the
Formation
of
the
most
agitated
Body
,
the
Motion
of
which
is
dispersed
into
those
that
ferment
.
By
clear
Idea's
,
and
the
most
Simple
Way
,
we
must
examine
what
Motion
is
capable
of
producing
in
Matter
.
And
because
Fire
and
different
Fermentations
are
very
general
things
,
and
which
consequently
depend
upon
few
Causes
;
it
will
not
be
requisite
long
to
consider
what
Matter
is
capable
of
when
it
is
animated
by
Motion
,
to
discover
the
Nature
of
Fermentation
is
its
Principle
;
and
at
the
same
time
we
shall
learn
many
other
things
absolutely
necessary
to
the
Knowledge
of
Physicks
:
Whereas
if
in
this
Question
,
we
would
reason
by
Suppositions
,
we
should
go
back
to
the
first
Causes
,
to
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
according
to
which
all
things
are
formed
;
and
suppose
many
false
things
,
which
would
be
of
no
Use
.
We
might
soon
discover
,
that
the
Cause
of
Fermentation
is
the
Motion
of
an
Invisible
Matter
,
which
communicates
its
self
to
the
Parts
of
that
which
acts
it
;
for
we
know
plain
enought
,
that
Fire
,
and
the
different
Fermentation
of
Bodies
,
consist
in
their
Agitation
,
and
that
by
the
Laws
of
Nature
.
Bodies
immediately
receive
their
Motion
only
by
their
meeting
with
some
others
more
agitated
.
Thus
we
may
discover
,
that
there
is
an
Invisible
Matter
,
whose
Agitation
is
communicated
to
Visible
Bodies
.
But
it
would
be
Morally
impossible
,
by
way
of
Supposition
,
to
discover
how
it
is
done
:
And
it
is
not
near
so
difficult
to
discover
,
when
we
examine
the
Formation
of
the
Elements
,
or
some
Bodies
,
whereof
there
's
a
great
Number
of
the
same
Nature
,
as
is
evident
by
Mr.
Descartes's
System
.
The
third
Part
of
the
Question
,
which
is
of
Convulsive
Motions
will
not
be
very
difficult
to
resolve
,
provided
we
suppose
in
Bodies
Animal
Spirits
,
capable
of
some
Fermentation
,
and
of
Humours
sufficiently
penetrating
,
to
insinuate
themselves
into
the
Pores
of
the
Nerves
,
by
which
the
Spirits
disperse
themselves
through
the
Muscles
,
provided
also
we
do
not
pretend
to
determine
what
the
true
Disposition
of
the
Invisible
Parts
is
,
which
contribute
to
these
Convulsive
Motions
.
When
we
have
separated
a
Muscle
from
the
rest
of
the
Body
,
and
hold
it
by
the
Extremities
,
we
Sensibly
perceive
that
it
makes
all
its
Effort
to
contract
it self
when
we
prick
it
in
the
Middle
.
It
is
very
probable
,
that
this
depends
upon
the
Construction
of
the
Imperceptible
Parts
that
compose
it
,
which
like
so
many
Springs
,
are
determined
to
certain
Motions
by
this
Pricking
.
But
who
can
affirm
they
have
found
the
true
Disposition
of
the
Parts
,
which
serve
to
produce
this
Motion
;
or
who
can
give
an
undoubted
Demonstration
of
it
?
Certainly
it
would
appear
impossible
,
although
it
may
be
through
the
Power
of
Thought
,
we
can
imagine
a
Construction
of
the
Muscles
,
fit
to
perform
all
the
Motions
we
see
them
capable
of
.
Yet
must
we
not
think
to
determine
what
is
the
true
Construction
of
the
Muscles
:
But
because
we
cannot
reasonably
doubt
,
that
there
are
Spirits
Susceptible
of
some
Fermentation
,
by
the
Mixture
of
some
Subtle
Matter
,
and
that
the
sharp
and
pungent
Humours
may
insinuate
themselves
into
the
Nerves
,
we
may
suppose
it
.
To
resolve
the
Question
proposed
,
we
must
first
examine
how
many
Sorts
of
Convulsive
Motions
there
are
;
and
because
the
Number
of
them
appears
indetermined
,
we
may
keep
to
the
chief
,
whose
Causes
seem
to
be
different
.
We
must
consider
the
Parts
wherein
they
are
performed
,
the
Diseases
which
precede
and
follow
them
:
If
they
are
produced
with
or
without
Pain
,
and
particularly
how
quick
and
violent
they
are
;
for
some
of
them
are
performed
very
quick
and
violent
,
others
with
Quickness
without
Violence
,
and
some
again
without
Quickness
or
Violence
.
There
are
some
of
them
which
continually
end
and
being
again
;
some
which
keep
the
Parts
stiff
and
without
Motion
for
some
Time
;
and
some
again
which
entirely
take
away
Persons
Senses
,
and
dis●igure
them
.
All
these
things
considered
,
't
is
not
difficult
in
general
to
explain
,
how
the
Convulsive
Motions
may
be
produced
,
after
what
we
have
already
said
of
Natural
and
Voluntary
Motions
.
For
if
we
conceive
that
there
is
some
Matter
capable
of
fermenting
the
Spirits
,
mixed
with
those
that
are
contained
in
a
Muscle
;
this
Muscle
will
be
swelled
up
,
and
shall
in
this
part
produce
a
Convulsive
Motion
.
If
we
can
easily
resist
this
Motion
,
it
will
be
a
sign
that
the
Nerves
are
not
stopt
by
any
Humour
,
since
we
can
empty
the
Muscle
of
the
Spirits
which
are
entred
there
,
and
determine
them
to
swell
up
the
opposite
Muscle
.
But
if
we
cannot
,
we
must
conclude
that
the
sharp
and
penetrating
Humours
have
at
least
some
share
in
this
Motion
.
It
may
even
sometimes
happen
,
that
these
Humours
are
the
sole
Cause
of
these
Convulsive
Motions
:
So
they
may
determine
the
Course
of
the
Spirits
to
certain
Museles
,
by
opening
the
Passages
which
carry
them
thither
,
and
shutting
up
some
others
:
Besides
,
they
may
contract
the
Tendons
and
Fibers
,
by
penetrating
their
Pores
.
When
a
very
heavy
Weight
hangs
at
the
bottom
of
a
Cord
,
we
can
raise
it
much
,
if
we
only
wet
the
Cord
;
because
the
Particles
of
Water
insinuate
themselves
like
so
many
little
Wedges
between
the
Threads
that
the
Cord
is
composed
of
,
and
shorten
it
by
making
it
thicker
.
So
the
penetrating
and
sharp
Humours
insinuate
themselves
into
the
Pores
of
the
Nerves
,
contract
them
,
stretch
the
parts
which
are
united
to
them
,
and
produce
Convulsive
Motions
in
the
Body
,
which
are
extream
slow
,
violent
and
painful
;
and
often
for
some
considerable
time
,
leave
a
very
great
Distortion
in
the
Part.
For
the
Convulsive
Motions
which
are
speedily
performed
,
they
are
caused
by
the
Spirits
;
but
't
is
not
necessary
that
these
Spirits
should
receive
any
Fermentation
;
it
is
enough
if
the
Conduits
they
pass
through
are
more
open
on
one
side
than
the
other
.
When
all
the
parts
of
the
Body
are
in
their
Natural
Situation
,
the
Animal
Spirits
equally
and
swiftly
disperse
themselves
every
where
in
respect
to
the
Exigency
of
the
Machine
,
and
Faithfully
execute
the
Orders
of
the
Will.
But
when
the
Humours
trouble
the
Disposition
of
the
Brain
,
and
change
or
diversly
move
the
Openings
of
the
Nerves
,
or
by
penetrating
into
the
Muscles
,
agitate
their
Springs
;
the
Spirits
disperse
themselves
through
the
Parts
after
new
manner
,
and
produce
extraordinary
Motions
there
without
the
consent
of
the
Will
.
Yet
may
we
sometimes
by
a
powerful
Resistance
prevent
any
of
these
Motions
,
and
even
by
degrees
diminish
the
Traces
which
produced
them
,
when
the
Habit
is
perfectly
formed
.
Those
who
take
care
of
them
,
may
very
easily
hinder
themselves
from
making
distorted
Faces
;
or
from
assuming
an
unpleasant
Air
or
indecent
Posture
,
if
the
Body
be
indisposed
.
These
things
may
be
overcome
although
they
are
confirmed
by
a
long
habit
,
but
with
much
difficulty
;
for
they
should
alwayes
be
resisted
in
their
original
,
before
the
course
of
the
Spirits
has
made
a
way
too
difficult
to
be
stopt
.
The
Cause
of
these
Motions
lies
sometimes
in
the
agitated
Muscle
,
and
is
some
Humour
that
pricks
,
or
some
Spirits
which
ferment
there
.
But
we
must
judge
it
to
be
in
the
Brain
,
chiefly
when
the
Convulsions
agitate
not
only
one
or
two
parts
of
the
Body
in
particular
,
but
almost
all
of
it
;
and
that
in
many
Distempers
which
change
the
Natural
Constitution
of
the
Blood
and
Spirits
.
It
is
true
,
that
one
Nerve
only
having
sometimes
different
Branches
,
which
are
sufficiently
dispersed
through
the
remote
parts
of
the
Body
,
as
through
the
Face
and
Bowels
;
it
often
happens
that
the
Convulsion
having
its
Cause
in
one
part
,
in
which
some
of
these
Branches
insinuate
themselves
,
can
communicate
it self
to
them
,
or
the
other
correspondent
Branches
,
without
the
Brains
being
any
cause
of
it
,
or
the
Spirits
corrupted
.
But
when
the
Convulsive
Motions
are
common
to
most
parts
of
the
Body
,
we
must
needs
say
,
that
either
the
Spirits
ferment
after
an
extraordinary
manner
,
or
that
the
Order
and
Disposition
of
the
parts
of
the
Brain
is
troubled
;
or
else
,
that
both
these
things
happen
together
.
I
will
stay
no
longer
upon
this
Question
,
for
it
becomes
so
compounded
,
and
depends
upon
so
many
things
,
when
we
desecend
to
Particulars
,
that
it
cannot
easily
ferve
to
explain
those
Rules
we
have
given
.
There
is
no
Science
which
furnishes
us
with
more
Examples
,
fit
to
shew
the
Usefulness
of
these
Rules
,
than
Geometry
and
chiefly
Algebra
,
for
in
these
two
Sciences
they
are
continually
used
.
Geometry
clearly
shews
the
necessity
there
always
is
of
beginning
with
the
most
simple
things
,
which
include
the
feweset
Relations
:
If
always
examines
these
Relations
by
Measures
evidently
known
:
It
takes
away
whatever
is
useless
in
the
discovery
of
them
,
divides
the
Questions
into
parts
,
ranks
these
parts
,
and
examines
them
in
order
.
In
short
,
The
only
Defect
in
this
Science
,
is
as
I
have
before
observed
,
that
it
has
not
a
very
proper
Method
to
abridge
the
Idea's
and
Relations
we
have
discovered
.
So
that
although
it
regulates
the
Imagination
,
and
makes
the
Mind
become
exact
,
it
does
not
much
increase
its
Extension
,
nor
render
it
capable
of
discovering
very
compound
Truths
.
But
Algebra
continually
teaches
us
to
abridge
Idea's
and
their
Relations
,
after
the
shortest
Method
in
the
World
,
and
extreamly
augments
the
Capacity
of
the
Mind
;
for
we
can
conceive
nothing
,
how
Compound
soever
,
in
the
Relations
of
Magnitude
,
that
the
Mind
cannot
in
times
discover
by
its
assistance
,
when
we
once
know
the
way
we
must
take
.
The
fifth
and
following
Rules
,
which
concern
the
way
of
abridging
Idea's
,
only
respect
this
Science
;
for
in
other
Sciences
we
have
no
commodious
way
of
abridging
them
;
so
that
I
shall
not
stay
to
explain
them
.
Those
that
have
a
great
Inclination
for
the
Mathematicks
,
and
will
give
to
their
Mind
all
the
Force
and
Extension
it
is
capable
of
;
and
thus
put
themselves
into
a
Condition
of
discovering
,
without
a
Tutor
,
an
infinite
number
of
known
Truths
,
will
,
if
they
seriously
apply
themselves
to
Algebra
,
discover
,
that
this
Science
is
so
useful
in
an
Enquiry
after
Truth
,
because
it
observes
the
Rules
we
have
prescribed
.
But
by
Algebra
,
I
mean
chiefly
that
which
Descartes
and
some
others
have
made
use
of
.
Before
I
conclude
,
I
will
give
an
Example
on
which
I
shall
insist
a
little
longer
,
that
we
may
be
the
better
able
to
see
what
use
may
be
drawn
from
it
.
In
this
Example
I
will
represent
the
Advances
of
a
Mind
,
which
would
examine
a
very
important
Question
,
and
endeavour
to
deliver
it self
from
its
Prejudices
.
I
shall
at
first
make
it
fall
into
some
Error
,
that
it
may
recollect
what
I
have
said
elsewhere
;
now
its
Attention
at
last
conducting
it
to
the
Truth
enquired
after
,
I
make
it
speak
positively
,
like
one
who
pretends
to
have
resolved
the
Question
he
has
examined
.
CHAP.
IX
.
The
last
Example
to
shew
the
Vsefulness
of
this
Work
,
in
which
the
Cause
of
the
Vnion
of
the
Parts
of
Bodies
,
and
also
the
Rules
of
the
Communication
of
Motion
,
are
examined
.
BOdies
are
united
together
after
three
different
ways
,
by
Continuity
,
Contiguity
,
and
a
third
way
,
which
has
no
particular
name
,
because
it
rarely
happens
,
and
which
I
call
by
the
general
Term
of
Vnion
.
By
Continuity
,
or
the
Cause
of
it
,
I
mean
that
I
know
not
what
,
which
links
together
the
Parts
of
a
Body
so
strongly
,
that
they
cannot
easily
be
separated
,
and
which
we
look
upon
as
making
altogether
but
one
whole
.
By
Contiguity
,
I
mean
that
I
know
not
what
,
which
makes
me
suppose
two
Bodies
touching
after
such
a
manner
so
that
there
is
nothing
between
them
;
but
which
I
judge
not
strictly
united
,
because
I
can
easily
separate
them
.
By
this
third
Term
Vnion
,
I
mean
that
I
know
not
what
,
which
is
the
cause
that
wo
Glasses
,
or
two
Marbles
,
whose
Surfaces
having
been
polished
by
rubbing
one
against
another
,
are
joyned
together
in
such
a
manner
,
that
although
we
can
very
easily
separate
them
by
making
them
slip
off
one
another
,
we
shall
nevertheless
have
some
trouble
to
do
it
by
any
other
Method
.
Now
this
is
not
Continuity
,
since
these
two
Glasses
or
Marbles
being
united
after
this
manner
,
are
not
conceived
as
making
but
one
Body
,
because
in
one
Sense
we
can
separate
them
so
easily
.
Nor
is
it
simply
Contiguity
,
although
it
comes
very
near
it
,
because
these
two
pieces
of
Glass
or
Marble
are
strictly
enough
united
,
and
even
much
more
than
the
Parts
of
soft
and
liquid
Bodies
,
as
those
of
Butter
and
Water
.
These
Terms
thus
explained
,
we
must
afterwards
enquire
into
the
Cause
which
unites
Bodies
,
and
the
Differences
between
Continuity
,
Contiguity
,
and
the
Vnion
of
Bodies
,
according
to
the
Sense
I
have
determined
.
I
first
seek
the
Cause
of
Continuity
,
or
that
I
know
not
what
,
which
keeps
the
Parts
of
a
Body
so
strictly
united
together
,
that
some
Force
must
be
used
to
separate
them
,
and
which
we
look
upon
together
as
making
one
whole
.
I
hope
this
Cause
being
found
,
we
shall
have
no
great
Difficulty
to
discover
the
rest
.
It
seems
now
necessary
to
me
,
that
this
I
know
not
what
,
that
ties
even
the
smallest
Parts
of
a
piece
of
Iron
together
which
I
hold
in
my
Hand
,
should
be
something
very
powerful
,
since
I
must
use
a
great
Force
to
break
off
one
little
part
of
it
.
But
I
deceive
my self
,
May
not
this
Difficulty
that
I
find
in
breaking
the
least
piece
of
Iron
,
proceed
from
my
Weakness
,
and
not
the
resistance
of
the
Iron
?
For
I
remember
that
I
have
formerly
used
more
Violence
than
I
do
now
,
to
break
a
piece
of
Iron
like
that
I
hold
in
my
Hand
;
and
if
I
fall
Sick
,
perhaps
I
could
not
even
do
it
by
the
utmost
Power
I
could
use
.
I
therefore
see
plainly
,
I
must
not
absolutely
judge
of
Firmness
,
whereby
the
parts
of
Iron
are
knit
together
,
by
the
Endeavours
I
make
to
dis-unite
them
:
I
must
only
judge
that
they
keep
very
strongly
together
in
relation
to
my
Weakness
,
or
that
they
keep
more
strongly
together
than
the
parts
of
my
Flesh
,
since
the
Sensations
of
Pain
that
I
have
whilst
I
make
too
great
Efforts
,
advertises
me
that
I
shall
rather
dis-unite
the
parts
of
my
Body
than
those
of
Iron
.
I
discover
then
,
that
as
I
am
not
absolutely
Strong
,
or
Weak
,
Iron
or
other
Bodies
,
are
not
absolutely
hard
or
flexible
,
but
only
in
relation
to
the
Cause
which
acts
upon
them
;
and
that
the
Efforts
I
make
cannot
serve
me
as
a
Rule
to
measure
the
greatness
of
the
Force
,
that
must
be
imployed
to
overcome
the
Resistance
and
Hardness
of
Iron
.
For
Rules
ought
to
be
invariable
,
and
these
Efforts
change
according
to
time
,
the
abundance
of
actual
Spirits
,
and
hardness
of
my
Flesh
;
since
I
cannot
always
produce
the
same
Effects
,
by
using
the
same
Endeavours
.
This
Reflection
delivers
me
from
a
Prejudice
that
I
had
,
which
made
me
imagine
the
Links
were
strong
which
united
the
parts
of
Bodies
,
which
Links
perhaps
are
nothing
at
all
;
and
I
hope
it
will
not
be
useless
to
me
in
the
Consequence
;
for
I
have
a
strange
Inclination
to
judge
of
every
thing
in
relation
to
my self
,
and
to
follow
the
Impressions
of
my
Senses
,
which
I
would
more
industriously
avoid
.
But
to
proceed
.
After
having
thought
some
time
,
and
with
some
application
enquired
the
cause
of
this
strict
Union
,
without
having
discovered
any
thing
of
it
,
I
find
my self
carried
by
my
Negligence
and
Nature
to
judge
with
many
others
,
that
't
is
the
Form
of
Bodies
which
preserves
the
Union
between
their
Parts
,
or
the
Amity
and
Inclination
they
have
for
their
likeness
;
for
there
is
nothing
more
commodious
than
to
suffer
our selves
sometimes
to
be
seduced
,
and
so
to
become
Learned
at
little
Cost
.
But
since
I
will
not
believe
any
thing
I
do
not
know
,
I
must
not
suffer
my self
to
be
thus
overcome
by
my
own
Idleness
,
nor
give
my self
up
to
bare
Appearances
.
Let
us
quit
therefore
these
Forms
and
Inclinations
,
whereof
we
have
no
distinct
and
particular
Idea's
,
but
only
confused
and
general
ones
,
that
it
may
be
we
form
only
in
relation
to
our
Nature
,
and
even
in
the
Existence
of
which
many
Persons
,
and
perhaps
whole
Nations
agree
not
.
It
seems
to
me
,
that
I
see
the
Cause
of
this
strict
Union
of
Parts
which
compose
hard
Bodies
,
without
admitting
of
any
other
thing
than
what
all
the
World
grants
to
be
in
them
,
or
at
least
all
that
the
World
conceives
distinctly
to
be
there
;
for
every
one
distinctly
conceives
,
that
all
Bodies
are
or
may
be
composed
of
little
Particles
.
Thus
it
may
be
there
are
some
of
them
which
are
crooked
and
branched
,
and
like
little
Links
capable
of
holding
others
strongly
together
,
or
else
that
they
intermix
all
their
Branches
,
so
that
we
cannot
easily
dis-unite
them
.
I
have
a
great
Mind
to
permit
my self
to
espouse
this
Thought
,
and
so
much
the
more
,
as
that
I
see
the
visible
Parts
of
great
Bodies
hold
and
unite
themselves
together
after
this
manner
.
But
I
cannot
too
much
distrust
my
Prejudices
and
the
Impression
of
my
Senses
:
I
must
therefore
yet
examine
the
Matter
more
closely
,
and
see
the
Reason
why
the
smallest
and
utmost
Parts
of
Solid
Bodies
,
in
a
word
,
even
the
Parts
of
each
of
these
Links
hold
together
;
for
they
cannot
be
united
by
other
Links
yet
smaller
,
since
I
suppose
them
solid
:
Or
else
,
If
I
say
they
are
united
after
this
manner
,
they
may
reasonably
demand
what
shall
unite
these
others
together
,
and
so
on
ad
infinitum
.
diagram representing presumed atomic links
So
that
now
the
Difficulty
of
the
Question
is
to
know
,
how
the
parts
of
these
little
Links
,
or
branched
parts
,
can
be
so
strictly
united
together
as
they
are
,
A
for
instance
with
B
,
which
I
suppose
parts
of
a
little
Link
.
Or
else
,
which
is
the
same
thing
,
Bodies
being
so
much
the
harder
,
as
they
are
more
solid
,
and
have
fewer
Pores
,
the
Question
now
is
,
to
know
how
the
parts
of
a
Column
,
composed
of
a
Matter
which
has
no
Pore
,
can
be
strongly
joyned
together
,
and
compose
a
very
hard
Body
;
for
we
cannot
say
that
the
parts
of
this
Column
is
held
by
little
Links
,
since
being
without
Pores
they
have
no
particular
Figure
.
I
find
my self
yet
extreamly
inclined
to
say
,
that
this
Column
is
naturally
hard
,
or
else
that
the
little
Links
,
whereof
hard
Bodies
are
composed
,
are
Atoms
,
whose
parts
cannot
be
divided
,
as
being
the
essential
and
utmost
parts
of
Bodies
,
which
are
essentially
crooked
,
or
branched
,
or
of
some
perplex'd
Figure
.
But
I
freely
confess
that
this
is
not
to
explain
the
Difficulty
,
and
that
quitting
the
Prejudices
and
Illusions
of
my
Senses
,
I
should
be
in
the
wrong
to
recur
to
an
abstracted
Form
,
and
embrace
a
Logical
Phantom
for
the
cause
I
seek
:
I
mean
,
I
should
be
in
the
wrong
,
to
conceive
as
something
real
and
distinct
,
a
rambling
Idea
of
the
Nature
of
Essence
,
which
expresses
only
what
we
know
:
And
thus
to
take
an
abstracted
and
universal
Form
,
as
a
Physical
Cause
of
a
real
Effect
.
For
there
are
two
things
which
I
cannot
too
much
distrust
;
the
first
is
,
The
Impression
of
my
Senses
;
and
the
other
,
The
Facility
I
have
to
receive
abstracted
Natures
,
and
general
Logical
Idea's
,
for
those
which
are
Real
and
Particular
:
I
remember
I
have
been
many
times
seduced
by
these
two
Principal
Errors
.
But
to
return
to
the
Difficulty
,
It
is
not
possible
for
me
to
conceive
,
how
these
little
Links
should
be
indivisible
by
their
Nature
and
Essence
,
nor
consequently
how
they
should
be
Inflexible
;
since
on
the
contrary
I
conceive
them
very
Divisible
,
and
necessarily
divisible
by
their
Nature
and
Essence
:
For
the
part
A
is
most
certainly
a
Substance
as
well
as
B
;
and
consequently
it
is
clear
,
that
A
can
exist
without
B
,
since
Substances
can
exist
one
without
another
;
because
otherwise
they
would
not
be
Substances
.
We
cannot
say
that
A
is
not
a
Substance
;
for
it
is
plain
it
is
not
a
bare
Mode
,
and
all
Beings
are
either
Modes
or
Substances
.
So
since
A
is
not
a
Mode
't
is
a
Substance
,
then
it
may
exist
without
B
,
and
much
more
may
the
part
A
exist
separately
from
B.
So
that
this
Link
is
divisible
in
A
and
in
B.
Moreover
,
If
this
Link
was
Indivisible
,
or
crooked
by
Nature
and
Essence
,
it
would
be
quite
contrary
to
what
we
Experience
,
for
then
we
could
not
break
any
body
.
Let
us
suppose
as
before
,
that
a
piece
of
Iron
is
composed
of
many
Links
,
which
is
intermix'd
one
in
another
,
whereof
A
,
a
and
B
,
b
,
are
two
of
them
:
I
say
that
we
cannot
unlink
them
,
and
consequently
that
we
could
not
break
this
Iron
:
For
to
break
it
,
we
must
bend
the
Links
that
compose
it
,
which
are
nevertheless
supposed
naturally
and
essentially
inflexible
.
And
if
we
do
not
suppose
them
inflexible
,
but
only
indivisible
by
their
Nature
,
the
Supposition
will
be
of
no
use
to
resolve
the
Question
:
For
then
the
Difficulty
would
be
to
know
,
why
these
little
Links
do
not
obey
our
Efforts
when
we
try
to
bend
a
Bar
of
Iron
.
Yet
if
we
suppose
them
not
Inflexible
,
we
must
not
suppose
them
Indivisible
;
for
if
the
parts
of
these
Links
can
change
their
Situation
one
in
respect
to
another
,
it
is
plain
that
they
may
be
separated
;
since
there
is
no
reason
why
,
if
one
part
could
remove
it self
a
little
from
the
other
,
it
could
not
be
absolutely
done
.
Then
whether
we
suppose
these
Links
Inflexible
or
Indivisible
,
we
cannot
by
this
means
resolve
the
Question
:
For
if
we
suppose
them
only
Indivisible
,
we
must
without
trouble
break
a
bit
of
Iron
:
And
if
we
suppose
them
Inflexible
,
it
will
be
impossible
to
break
them
,
since
the
little
Links
which
compose
the
Iron
being
embarrassed
one
in
another
,
it
will
be
impossible
to
unlink
them
.
Let
us
try
then
to
resolve
the
Difficulty
by
clear
and
undoubted
Principles
,
and
to
find
the
reason
why
this
little
Link
hath
these
two
parts
A
and
B
,
so
firmly
united
.
I
see
evidently
that
it
is
necessary
to
divide
the
Subject
of
my
Meditation
into
parts
,
that
I
may
examine
it
more
exactly
,
and
with
less
Intention
of
Mind
,
since
I
have
not
been
able
immediately
with
one
simple
view
,
and
all
the
Attention
I
am
capable
of
,
to
discover
what
I
would
find
.
And
't
is
what
I
might
have
done
from
the
beginning
;
for
when
the
Subjects
that
we
consider
are
a
little
intricate
,
't
is
alwayes
the
best
way
to
examine
them
in
parts
,
and
not
fatigue
our selves
unusefully
upon
false
Hopes
of
meeting
luckily
with
the
Truth
.
What
I
enquire
after
,
is
the
cause
of
the
strict
Union
that
is
between
the
little
Particles
which
compose
the
Link
A
B.
Now
there
is
only
three
things
that
I
distinctly
conceive
capable
of
being
the
cause
which
I
seek
,
viz.
The
parts
of
this
little
Link
,
the
Will
of
the
Author
of
Nature
,
or
lastly
,
the
Invisible
Bodies
which
surround
these
little
Links
.
I
might
yet
bring
for
the
Cause
of
these
things
,
the
Form
of
Bodies
,
the
Qualities
of
Hardness
,
or
some
occult
one
,
the
Simpathy
which
would
be
between
the
Particles
of
the
same
kind
,
&c.
but
because
I
have
not
a
distinct
Idea
of
these
fine
things
,
I
neither
ought
,
nor
can
maintain
my
Arguments
from
them
;
so
that
if
I
find
not
the
Cause
I
seek
,
in
things
that
I
have
a
distinct
Idea
of
;
I
will
not
uselessy
fatigue
my self
in
the
Contemplation
of
these
rambling
and
general
Logical
Idea's
,
and
will
cease
from
speaking
of
what
I
understand
not
.
But
let
us
examine
the
first
of
these
things
,
which
may
be
the
Cause
,
how
the
Particles
of
this
little
Link
are
so
strictly
united
,
viz.
the
little
Parts
it
is
composed
of
.
When
I
consider
only
the
Parts
whereof
hare
Bodies
are
composed
,
I
find
my self
inclined
to
believe
,
That
we
cannot
imagine
any
Cement
which
unites
the
Parts
of
this
Link
,
besides
themselves
and
their
own
Rest
:
For
of
what
Nature
could
it
be
?
It
would
not
be
a
thing
which
subsists
of
it self
,
for
all
these
little
Particles
being
Substances
,
for
what
Reason
should
they
be
united
by
other
Substances
than
by
themselves
?
Neither
will
it
be
a
different
Quality
from
Rest
,
because
there
is
no
Quality
more
contrary
to
Motion
which
might
separate
these
Parts
,
than
Rest
:
But
besides
Substances
and
their
Qualities
,
we
know
of
no
other
kind
of
Beings
.
It
is
very
true
,
Defc
.
Prin.
1.
Art
55.
p
2.
the
Parts
of
hard
Bodies
continue
united
,
whilst
they
are
in
Rest
one
with
another
;
and
when
they
are
once
in
Rest
,
they
continue
so
of
themselves
as
long
as
they
can
.
But
this
is
not
what
I
seek
,
I
know
not
how
I
came
to
mistake
the
Subject
,
I
endeavour
here
to
discover
why
the
Particles
of
hard
Bodies
have
Power
to
continue
in
Rest
one
by
another
,
and
how
they
resist
the
Efforts
we
make
to
move
them
.
I
might
then
answer
my self
,
Descartes
,
Princip.
Article
43.
of
the
second
Part.
that
each
Body
has
truly
a
Power
to
continue
in
the
State
't
is
in
,
and
that
this
Power
is
equal
,
either
in
respect
to
Motion
or
Rest
:
But
that
which
makes
the
Parts
of
hard
Bodies
continue
in
Rest
by
one
anotherd
,
so
that
we
are
troubled
to
separate
and
move
them
,
is
because
we
employ
not
Motion
enough
to
conquer
their
Rest
.
This
is
probable
,
it
is
true
,
but
I
seek
a
Certainty
,
if
it
can
be
found
,
and
not
only
a
Probability
.
Articl.
63.
And
how
can
I
certainly
and
evidently
know
that
each
Body
has
this
Power
to
continue
in
the
Condition
it
is
in
,
and
that
this
Power
is
equal
in
respect
to
Motion
and
Rest
;
since
on
the
contrary
,
Matter
appears
indifferent
to
Motion
and
Rest
,
and
absolutely
without
any
Power
.
Let
us
have
Recourse
then
with
Mr.
Descartes
,
to
the
Will
of
the
Creator
,
which
is
it
may
be
,
the
Power
that
Bodies
seem
to
have
in
themselves
;
't
is
the
second
thing
that
we
before
supposed
,
was
able
to
preserve
the
Parts
of
this
little
Link
we
speak
of
,
so
strongly
united
.
Certainly
,
't
is
impossible
that
God
may
will
each
Body
to
continue
in
the
Condition
it
is
in
,
and
that
his
Will
is
the
Power
which
unites
the
Parts
one
to
another
,
after
the
same
manner
as
I
have
elsewhere
considered
his
Will
to
be
the
moving
Power
which
puts
Bodies
in
Motion
:
For
since
Matter
cannot
move
of
it self
,
it
seems
to
me
,
that
I
must
judge
it
to
be
a
Spirit
,
and
even
that
't
is
the
Author
of
Nature
who
maintains
it
and
puts
it
in
Motion
,
by
successively
preserving
it
in
many
Places
by
his
Simple
Will
,
since
a
Being
,
infinitely
powerful
,
acts
not
by
Instruments
,
and
the
Effects
necessarily
follow
his
Will.
I
perceive
then
,
Descartes
,
Art.
33.
of
the
2d
Part.
Art:
.
45.
and
in
those
which
follow
.
't
is
possible
that
God
should
keep
every
thing
in
the
Condition
it
is
in
,
whether
it
be
in
Rest
or
in
Motion
,
and
that
his
Will
is
the
Natural
Power
that
Bodies
have
to
continue
in
the
State
in
which
they
have
once
been
placed
.
If
it
is
so
,
we
must
,
as
Descartes
has
done
,
measure
this
Power
,
conclude
what
ought
to
be
the
Natural
Effects
of
it
,
and
thus
give
Rules
for
the
Power
and
Communication
of
Motions
,
at
the
Concourse
of
different
Bodies
,
by
the
Proportion
of
Magnitude
that
is
found
between
these
Bodies
;
since
we
have
no
other
Way
to
discover
this
general
and
immurable
Will
of
God
,
who
causes
the
different
Powers
that
Bodies
have
to
act
upon
and
resist
one
another
,
besides
their
different
Magnitudes
and
Celerities
.
Yet
,
I
have
no
certain
Proof
,
that
by
a
positive
Will
,
God
keeps
Bodies
in
a
State
of
Rest
;
and
it
seems
sufficient
for
him
to
will
the
Existence
of
Matter
,
not
only
to
cause
it
to
exist
,
but
to
remain
in
Rest
.
It
is
not
the
same
in
respect
to
Motion
,
because
the
Idea
of
Matter
moved
,
certainly
includes
two
Powers
to
which
it
relates
,
viz.
That
which
created
it
,
and
that
which
moves
it
.
But
the
Idea
of
Matter
in
Rest
only
includes
the
Idea
of
a
Creating
Power
,
without
a
Necessity
of
one
to
keep
it
in
Rest
;
since
if
we
simply
conceive
Matter
,
without
thinking
of
any
Power
,
we
shall
necessarily
conceive
it
in
Rest
.
Thus
't
is
I
determine
things
,
for
I
must
judge
of
them
according
to
my
Idea's
,
and
according
to
them
,
Rest
is
but
a
Privation
of
Motion
:
For
't
is
sufficient
for
God
to
cease
to
will
that
a
Body
should
he
moved
,
for
its
Motion
to
cease
,
and
cause
it
to
remain
in
Rest
.
But
I
remember
I
have
heard
many
Ingenious
Persons
say
,
that
it
appeared
to
them
,
that
Motion
was
as
well
the
Privation
of
Rest
,
as
that
Rest
was
a
Privation
of
Motion
.
Some
even
have
assured
me
,
by
Reasons
I
could
not
apprehend
,
that
it
was
more
probable
that
Motion
was
rather
a
Privation
than
Rest
.
I
do
not
distinctly
remember
the
Arguments
they
brought
,
but
it
ought
to
make
me
suspect
my
Idea's
to
be
false
.
For
although
most
Men
speak
what
pleases
them
,
upon
Matters
that
do
not
appear
very
Important
:
Yet
,
I
have
Reason
to
believe
,
that
the
Persons
I
speak
of
,
took
Pleasure
in
speaking
what
they
conceived
.
I
must
therefore
still
examine
my
Idea's
very
carefully
.
'T
is
a
thing
which
appears
undoubted
to
me
,
and
these
Gentlemen
I
speak
of
grant
it
,
viz.
That
it
is
the
Will
of
God
which
moves
Bodies
.
The
Power
then
that
a
Bowl
has
,
which
I
see
in
Motion
,
is
the
Will
of
God
which
causes
it
to
move
:
And
what
must
God
now
do
to
cause
it
to
stop
?
Must
he
,
by
a
positive
Will
determine
it
to
be
in
Rest
,
I
imagine
here
that
there
is
only
God
,
my self
,
and
a
Bowl
.
or
else
is
it
sufficient
that
he
ceases
to
will
it
should
be
moved
?
It
is
evident
,
that
if
God
only
ceases
to
will
that
this
Bowl
should
be
moved
,
the
Cessation
of
this
Will
of
God
will
be
the
Cessation
of
the
Motion
of
the
Bowl
;
for
the
Will
of
God
,
which
was
the
Power
that
moved
the
Bowl
,
being
no
more
,
this
Power
will
continue
no
longer
,
nor
the
Bowl
therefore
any
more
moved
.
Thus
a
Cessation
of
the
Power
of
Motion
causes
Rest
.
Rest
has
therefore
no
Power
which
produces
it
:
'T
is
then
only
a
pure
Privation
,
which
supposes
not
a
positive
Will
in
God
;
so
that
it
would
be
unreasonable
and
unnecessary
to
admit
a
positive
Will
in
God
,
to
give
Bodies
any
Power
to
continue
in
Rest
.
But
let
us
,
if
possible
,
overthrow
this
Argument
;
suppose
now
a
Bowl
in
Rest
,
whereas
we
supposed
it
before
in
Motion
;
what
must
God
do
to
actuate
it
?
Will
it
be
enough
for
him
to
cease
to
will
it
should
be
in
Rest
?
If
it
is
so
,
I
have
yet
advanced
nothing
;
for
Motion
would
as
well
be
the
Privation
of
Rest
,
as
Rest
the
Privation
of
Motion
.
I
suppose
then
that
God
ceases
to
will
it
should
continue
in
Rest
,
but
if
this
be
granted
,
I
do
not
see
that
the
Bowl
moves
;
and
if
any
one
sees
it
moved
,
I
desire
them
to
tell
me
after
what
Degree
of
Motion
it
is
moved
.
Certainly
't
is
impossible
that
it
should
move
,
and
not
have
some
Degree
of
Motion
;
and
from
our
conceiving
only
that
God
ceases
to
will
it
should
be
in
Rest
,
it
is
impossible
to
conceive
it
to
go
with
any
Degree
of
Motion
;
because
it
is
not
the
same
with
Motion
as
Rest
.
Motions
are
infinitely
various
,
they
are
capable
of
More
or
Less
:
But
Rest
being
nothing
,
one
cannot
differ
from
another
.
A
Bowl
even
,
which
goes
twice
as
fast
in
one
Time
as
in
another
,
,
has
twice
as
much
Power
or
Motion
in
one
Time
as
in
another
;
but
we
cannot
say
that
the
same
Bowl
has
twice
as
much
Rest
in
one
Time
as
in
another
.
Thefore
it
must
be
a
positive
Will
from
God
,
to
put
a
Bowl
in
Motion
,
or
to
give
a
Bowl
such
a
Power
as
to
move
it self
;
and
it
is
enough
for
him
to
cease
willing
its
Motion
,
for
it
to
be
in
Rest
just
as
in
the
Creation
of
the
World
;
it
is
not
sufficient
that
God
should
will
the
World
should
exist
;
but
it
is
necessary
that
he
positively
wills
the
Manner
in
which
it
must
exist
.
And
to
annihilate
it
,
it
must
not
be
God's
willing
that
it
should
not
be
,
because
God
cannot
will
nothing
by
a
positive
Will
,
it
is
enough
only
that
God
,
ceases
to
will
that
it
should
exist
.
I
do
not
here
consider
Motion
and
Rest
according
to
their
Relative
Being
:
For
't
is
plain
,
that
Bodies
in
Rest
,
have
as
real
Relations
to
those
which
encompass
them
,
as
those
that
are
in
Motion
have
.
I
only
conceive
,
that
Bodies
which
are
in
Motion
,
have
a
moving
Power
,
and
those
that
are
in
Rest
,
have
no
Power
to
keep
themselves
in
Rest
,
because
the
Relation
that
Bodies
moved
have
to
those
which
encompass
them
,
always
changing
,
it
must
be
a
continual
Power
which
produces
these
continual
Changes
:
For
indeed
,
't
is
these
Changes
that
cause
whatsoever
Revolutions
we
see
in
Nature
.
But
there
is
no
need
of
Power
to
do
nothing
:
When
the
Relation
of
a
Body
to
those
that
surround
it
,
is
always
the
same
;
there
is
nothing
done
,
and
the
Preservation
of
this
Relation
,
I
mean
,
the
Action
of
the
Will
of
God
who
preserves
this
Relation
,
is
not
different
from
that
which
preserves
the
same
Body
.
By
a
Body
in
a
Void
,
I
mean
one
so
separated
from
others
,
as
well
hard
as
liquid
,
that
there
is
none
which
helps
or
hinders
the
Communication
of
Motion
.
If
it
is
true
,
as
I
conceive
,
that
Rest
is
only
a
Privation
of
Motion
,
the
least
Motion
,
I
mean
that
of
the
least
agitated
Body
,
includes
more
Force
or
Power
than
the
rest
of
the
greatest
Body
.
Thus
the
least
Force
,
or
smallest
Body
that
we
should
conceive
moved
in
a
Void
,
against
a
great
and
vast
Body
,
would
be
capable
of
moving
it
;
since
this
great
Body
being
in
Rest
,
it
will
have
no
Power
to
resist
the
little
Body
which
will
strike
against
it
;
so
that
the
Resistance
that
the
Parts
of
hard
Bodies
make
to
hinder
their
Separation
,
necessarily
proceeds
from
some
other
Cause
than
that
of
Rest
.
But
we
must
demonstrate
,
by
Sensile
Experiments
,
what
we
have
been
proving
by
abstracted
Reasonings
,
to
see
if
our
Idee's
agree
with
the
Sensations
that
we
receive
of
Objects
?
For
it
often
happens
that
such
Arguments
deceive
us
,
or
at
least
cannot
convince
others
,
and
particularly
such
as
are
prejudiced
on
the
contrary
Side
.
The
Authority
of
Descartes
has
so
much
Power
over
the
Reason
of
some
Men
,
that
one
must
prove
by
all
imaginable
Ways
,
that
this
great
Man
is
deceived
to
be
able
to
disabuse
them
:
What
I
have
said
,
will
make
a
deep
Impression
on
the
Mind
of
those
that
are
not
prejudiced
with
the
contrary
Opinion
;
and
I
plainly
see
they
will
blame
me
for
proving
things
which
appear
indisputable
to
them
.
But
the
Cartesians
very
well
deserve
that
I
should
use
my
endeavour
to
satisfie
them
;
others
may
pass
over
this
Discourse
,
if
they
think
it
tedious
.
Here
then
are
some
Experiments
which
sensibly
prove
,
that
Rest
has
no
Power
to
resist
Motion
,
and
which
consequently
discover
that
the
Will
of
the
Author
of
Nature
,
which
gives
the
Power
and
Force
that
each
Body
has
to
continue
in
that
State
wherein
it
is
,
respects
only
Motion
and
not
Rest
;
since
Bodies
have
no
Power
of
themselves
.
Experience
shews
us
,
that
very
great
vessels
,
which
swim
in
the
Water
,
may
be
agitated
by
the
least
Bodies
which
hit
against
them
.
From
thence
I
pretend
,
notwithstanding
all
the
Evasions
of
Descartes
and
the
Cartesians
,
that
if
these
great
Bodies
were
in
a
Void
,
they
might
yet
be
more
easily
agitated
:
For
the
Reason
why
there
is
some
little
Difficulty
to
move
a
Vessel
in
Water
,
is
because
the
Water
resists
the
Power
of
the
Motion
we
impress
on
it
,
which
would
not
happen
in
a
Void
;
and
what
manifestly
shews
us
,
that
Water
resists
the
Motion
we
impress
on
the
Vessel
,
is
the
Vessels
ceasing
to
be
agitated
some
time
after
it
has
been
moved
;
for
this
would
not
happen
,
if
the
Vessel
did
not
lose
its
Motion
by
communicating
it
to
the
Water
,
or
if
the
Water
gave
way
without
resisting
it
;
or
in
fine
,
if
it
partook
of
its
Motion
.
Thus
,
since
a
Vessel
agitated
in
the
Water
,
by
little
and
little
ceases
to
move
;
't
is
an
undoubted
Mark
that
the
Water
resists
its
Motion
instead
of
facilitating
it
,
as
Descartes
pretends
;
and
consequently
,
it
would
yet
be
infinitely
more
easie
to
agitate
a
great
Body
in
a
Void
than
in
Water
,
since
there
is
no
Resistance
from
Bodies
about
it
.
It
is
therefore
evident
,
that
Rest
has
no
Power
to
resist
Motion
,
that
the
least
Motion
contains
more
Power
and
Force
than
the
greatest
Rest
:
Or
at
least
,
that
we
ought
not
to
measure
the
Force
of
Motion
and
Rest
by
the
Proportion
that
is
found
between
great
Bodies
which
are
in
Motion
and
in
Rest
,
as
Descartes
has
done
.
It
is
true
,
there
is
some
Reason
to
believe
that
a
Vessel
is
agitated
as
soon
as
it
is
in
the
Water
,
because
of
the
continual
Change
which
happens
to
the
Parts
of
the
Water
that
encompass
it
,
although
it
seems
to
us
that
it
does
not
change
its
Place
.
It
is
that
which
has
made
Descartes
and
some
others
believe
,
that
't
is
not
the
Force
only
of
that
which
impels
it
,
that
makes
it
advance
in
the
Water
;
but
having
already
received
much
Motion
from
the
little
Parts
of
liquid
Bodies
which
surround
it
,
and
which
equally
push
it
on
all
sides
:
This
Motion
is
only
determined
by
the
new
Motion
of
that
which
pushes
it
:
So
that
that
which
agitates
a
Body
in
Water
,
could
not
do
it
in
a
Void
.
Thus
it
is
,
that
Descartes
,
and
those
that
are
of
his
Opinion
,
defend
the
Rules
of
Motion
that
he
has
given
us
.
For
instance
,
let
us
suppose
a
Piece
of
Wood
a
Foot
square
in
a
Liquid
Body
:
All
the
little
Parts
of
the
Liquid
Body
acts
upon
it
,
and
moves
against
it
,
and
because
they
equally
push
it
on
all
sides
,
as
well
towards
A
as
B
:
It
cannot
advance
nearer
to
one
side
than
another
:
But
if
I
then
push
another
Piece
of
Wood
of
half
a
Foot
,
against
the
first
,
toward
the
Side
A
;
I
shall
see
it
advance
.
And
from
thence
I
conclude
,
that
it
might
be
moved
,
if
in
a
Void
,
with
less
Force
than
that
whereby
this
Piece
of
Wood
pushes
it
,
for
the
Reasons
I
have
already
brought
.
But
the
Persons
I
speak
of
deny
it
,
and
answer
,
that
what
makes
the
great
Piece
of
Wood
advance
as
soon
as
it
is
pushed
by
the
little
one
,
is
because
the
little
one
which
could
not
move
it
of
it self
,
being
joyned
with
the
Parts
of
the
Liquid
Body
which
are
agitated
,
determine
them
to
push
it
,
and
communicate
to
it
one
Part
of
their
Motion
.
But
't
is
plain
,
that
according
to
this
Answer
,
the
Piece
of
Wood
being
once
agitated
,
must
not
diminish
its
Motion
,
but
on
the
contrary
,
continually
augment
it
.
Art.
5.
For
by
this
Answer
the
Piece
of
Wood
is
pushed
more
by
the
Water
to
the
Side
of
A
,
than
to
the
Side
of
B
;
therefore
it
must
always
advance
towards
it
.
And
because
this
Impulsion
is
continual
,
its
Motion
must
always
increase
.
But
as
I
have
already
said
,
the
Water
is
so
far
from
facilitating
its
Motion
,
that
it
continually
resists
it
,
and
its
Resistance
always
diminishes
it
,
and
at
last
will
make
it
perfectly
cease
.
We
must
now
prove
,
that
the
Piece
of
Wood
that
was
equally
pushed
by
the
little
Particles
of
the
Water
that
surrounds
it
,
has
no
Motion
or
Power
at
all
that
is
capable
to
move
it
;
although
it
continually
changes
its
Place
,
and
though
the
Surface
of
the
Water
which
encompasses
it
,
is
different
at
different
Times
.
For
if
it
is
so
,
that
a
Body
equally
pushed
on
all
Sides
,
as
this
Piece
of
Wood
is
,
has
no
Motion
;
it
is
certain
,
that
't
is
only
the
Forreign
Force
that
strikes
against
it
,
which
communicates
it
;
since
in
the
same
Time
that
this
forreign
Force
pushes
it
,
the
Water
resists
it
,
and
by
little
and
little
destroys
the
Motion
which
is
imprest
on
it
,
for
by
degrees
it
ceases
to
move
.
It
is
certain
,
at
least
to
those
whom
I
speak
to
,
that
there
never
is
in
Nature
more
Motion
at
one
Time
than
at
another
;
and
that
Bodies
in
Rest
are
moved
only
by
meeting
with
some
agitated
Bodies
,
which
communicate
their
Motion
to
them
.
From
thence
I
conclude
,
that
a
Body
which
I
suppose
created
perfectly
at
rest
in
the
middle
of
the
Water
,
will
never
receive
any
Degree
of
Motion
from
the
little
Particles
of
Water
which
surround
it
,
and
continually
strike
against
it
,
provided
they
push
it
equally
on
all
Sides
;
because
all
these
little
Particles
which
strike
against
it
equally
on
all
Sides
,
reflecting
with
all
their
Motion
,
they
communicate
none
to
it
;
and
consequently
,
this
Body
must
always
be
considered
as
in
Rest
,
and
without
any
moving
Power
,
although
it
continually
change
its
Surface
.
Now
the
Proof
I
have
,
that
these
little
Parts
reflect
thus
with
all
their
Motion
,
is
,
that
besides
this
,
that
we
cannot
conceive
the
thing
to
be
otherwise
,
the
Water
that
touches
this
Body
,
must
grow
cold
,
or
even
freeze
,
and
become
very
near
as
hard
as
the
Wood
upon
its
Surface
;
since
the
Motion
of
the
Particles
of
Water
would
be
equally
distributed
to
the
little
Parts
of
the
Body
they
encompass
.
But
to
accommodate
my self
to
those
that
defend
Descartes's
Sentiment
,
I
grant
,
we
must
not
consider
a
Boat
in
the
Water
as
in
Rest
.
I
also
allow
,
that
all
the
Parts
of
the
Water
which
are
about
it
,
agree
to
the
new
Motion
that
the
Water-man
imprints
on
it
,
although
it
be
but
too
visible
by
the
Diminution
of
the
Motion
of
the
Boat
,
that
it
resists
it
more
on
the
Side
it
goes
to
,
than
from
that
whence
it
was
pushed
.
This
supposed
,
I
say
,
that
from
all
the
Particles
of
Water
that
are
in
the
River
,
there
is
,
according
to
Descartes
,
only
those
that
immediately
touch
the
Boat
on
the
Side
from
whence
it
was
pushed
,
that
can
assist
its
Motion
.
Art.
63.
For
,
according
to
this
Philosopher
,
The
Water
being
fluid
,
all
the
Parts
of
which
it
is
composed
,
act
not
together
against
the
Body
we
would
move
,
but
only
those
,
that
touching
it
,
conjoyntly
bear
upon
it
.
Now
,
those
which
are
conjoyntly
born
upon
the
Boat
,
and
the
Waterman
together
,
are
twenty
times
less
than
the
Boat
.
See
Art.
63.
of
the
second
Part
of
his
Principles
.
It
is
therefore
plain
,
by
the
Explanation
,
that
Decartes
has
given
in
this
Article
,
upon
the
Difficulty
we
have
to
break
a
Nail
between
our
Hands
,
that
a
little
Body
is
capable
of
agitating
a
much
greater
than
it self
.
For
indeed
,
our
Hands
are
not
so
fluid
as
Water
,
and
when
we
would
break
a
Nail
,
there
is
more
Parts
joyned
together
,
which
act
conjoyntly
then
in
the
Water
which
pushes
a
Boat
.
But
here
is
a
more
Sensible
Experiment
:
If
we
take
a
Board
well
plained
,
or
some
other
very
hard
Plane
,
drive
in
it
a
Nail
half-way
,
and
set
the
Plane
in
an
inclining
Position
,
placing
a
Bar
of
Iron
an
hundred
times
thicker
than
the
Nail
above
it
,
and
suffer
the
Bar
to
slide
down
,
I
say
this
Nail
will
not
break
.
And
we
must
further
observe
,
That
according
to
Descartes
,
all
the
parts
of
this
Bar
rest
upon
and
conjoyntly
act
upon
this
Nail
,
for
this
Bar
is
hard
and
solid
.
If
then
there
was
no
other
Cement
than
rest
to
unite
the
parts
of
this
Nail
,
the
Bar
of
Iron
being
an
hundred
times
greater
than
the
Nail
,
Art.
63.
Art.
50.
would
according
to
Descartes's
fifth
Rule
,
and
according
to
Reason
,
communicate
some
of
its
Motion
to
the
part
of
the
Nail
it
fell
upon
,
that
is
,
break
it
and
pass
beyond
it
,
although
even
this
Bar
should
slide
but
very
slowly
.
So
that
we
must
seek
another
Cause
than
the
Rest
of
the
parts
,
to
make
Bodies
hard
,
or
capable
of
resisting
the
Efforts
that
we
make
,
when
we
would
break
them
,
since
Rest
has
no
power
to
resist
Motion
:
And
I
believe
these
Experiments
suffice
to
shew
,
that
the
abstracted
Proofs
we
have
brought
are
not
false
.
We
must
then
examine
the
third
thing
we
have
before
supposed
might
be
the
cause
of
the
strict
Union
that
is
found
between
the
parts
of
hard
Bodies
,
viz.
An
invisible
Matter
that
environs
them
,
which
being
extreamly
agitated
,
with
much
Violence
pushes
the
External
and
Internal
Parts
of
these
Bodies
,
and
compresses
them
after
such
a
manner
,
that
to
separate
them
,
more
Force
is
necessary
than
this
invisible
and
extreamly
agitated
Matter
has
.
It
seems
then
I
might
reasonably
conclude
,
that
the
Union
of
the
constituent
parts
of
hard
Bodies
depends
upon
the
subtle
Matter
which
encompasses
and
compresses
them
:
Since
the
two
other
things
that
we
can
think
to
be
the
Causes
of
this
Union
are
not
truly
so
,
as
we
have
already
seen
;
for
since
I
find
resistance
enough
in
breaking
a
piece
of
Iron
,
and
that
this
resistance
proceeds
neither
from
the
Iron
,
nor
the
Will
of
God
,
as
I
think
I
have
proved
;
it
must
necessarily
proceed
from
some
invisible
Matter
,
which
can
be
no
other
than
that
which
immediately
encompasses
and
compresses
it
.
Nevertheless
I
shall
further
give
some
positive
Proofs
of
this
Opinion
,
after
I
have
explained
it
more
at
large
by
some
Example
.
Take
a
Globe
of
any
hard
Metal
,
which
is
hollow
within
,
cut
it
into
two
Hemispheres
,
and
joyn
these
two
Hemispheres
with
a
little
Wax
at
the
place
of
their
union
,
and
exhaust
the
Air
out
of
it
;
these
two
Hemispheres
joyned
one
to
the
other
after
this
manner
,
if
many
Horses
were
fastened
to
them
,
some
on
one
side
and
some
on
the
other
,
could
not
be
separated
by
them
,
supposing
the
Magnitude
of
the
Hemispheres
to
be
in
Proportion
to
the
number
of
Horses
:
Yet
if
we
suffer
the
Air
to
re-enter
,
one
Person
alone
could
separate
them
without
any
Difficulty
.
It
is
easie
to
conclude
from
this
Instance
,
That
what
so
strongly
unites
these
two
Hemispheres
,
proceeds
from
their
being
compressed
and
surrounded
upon
their
External
and
Convex
Surface
by
the
Air
which
environs
them
,
whilst
there
was
no
Counterpressure
in
their
Internal
and
Concave
Surface
.
So
that
the
Action
of
the
Horses
that
drew
the
two
Hemispheres
on
both
sides
,
could
not
overcome
the
Efforts
of
an
infinite
Number
of
little
Particles
of
the
Air
that
resisted
them
,
by
pressing
these
two
Hemispheres
together
.
But
the
least
Force
is
capable
of
separating
them
,
when
the
Air
,
being
entred
again
within
the
Sphere
,
pushes
the
Concave
and
Internal
Surfaces
,
as
much
as
the
Air
without
presses
the
External
and
Convex
ones
.
But
if
,
on
the
contrary
,
we
take
a
Carps
Bladder
,
and
put
it
in
a
Vessel
,
from
whence
all
the
Air
has
been
exhausted
,
this
Bladder
,
being
full
of
Air
,
will
crack
and
break
,
because
then
there
is
no
Air
without
the
Bladder
to
resist
that
which
is
within
.
'T
is
likewise
the
same
Reason
that
I
have
given
for
the
first
Experiment
,
that
two
Planes
of
Glass
or
Marble
having
been
used
to
be
joyned
one
upon
another
,
so
that
in
one
Sense
we
find
some
resistance
in
the
separating
of
them
;
because
these
two
parts
of
Marble
are
pressed
and
constring'd
by
the
External
Air
which
encompasses
them
,
and
are
not
so
strongly
pushed
by
it
within
.
I
might
bring
an
infinite
Number
of
other
Experiments
,
to
prove
that
the
gross
Air
which
environs
Bodies
,
strongly
unites
their
Parts
;
but
what
I
have
said
,
may
suffice
clearly
to
explain
my
Thoughts
upon
the
present
Question
.
I
say
then
,
that
which
so
strongly
unites
the
Parts
of
hard
Bodies
,
and
these
little
Links
I
have
before
spoke
on
,
is
other
little
external
Bodies
infinitely
more
agitated
than
the
Air
we
breath
in
,
and
these
push
and
compress
them
;
and
that
which
gives
us
some
Trouble
to
separate
them
,
is
,
not
their
Rest
,
but
the
Agitation
of
these
little
Bodies
which
surround
them
:
So
that
what
resists
Motion
is
not
Rest
,
which
is
only
a
Privation
,
and
has
no
Power
of
it self
,
but
some
contrary
Motion
.
This
bare
Exposition
of
my
Opinion
perhaps
seems
reasonable
;
yet
I
well
foresaw
,
that
many
Persons
would
have
some
Difficulty
to
receive
it
.
Hard
Bodies
make
so
great
an
Impression
upon
our
Senses
,
when
they
strike
us
,
or
when
we
make
any
Effort
to
break
them
,
that
we
are
inclined
to
believe
their
Parts
are
united
much
more
strictly
than
indeed
they
are
.
And
on
the
contrary
,
the
little
Bodies
which
I
have
said
encompasses
them
,
and
to
which
I
have
given
the
Power
of
causing
this
Union
,
makes
no
Impression
upon
our
Senses
,
seeming
to
be
too
weak
to
produce
so
Sensible
an
Effect
.
But
to
destroy
this
Prejudice
,
which
is
founded
only
upon
the
Impressions
of
our
Senses
,
and
the
Difficulty
we
have
to
imagine
Bodies
smaller
and
more
agitated
than
those
we
see
every
Day
;
we
must
consider
that
the
Hardness
of
Bodies
must
not
be
judged
of
in
Relation
to
our
Hands
,
or
to
the
Efforts
we
are
capable
of
making
,
which
vary
at
different
Times
.
For
indeed
,
if
the
greatest
Force
of
Man
is
almost
nothing
in
Comparison
of
that
of
the
Subtle
Matter
,
we
should
be
very
much
in
the
wrong
to
believe
that
Diamonds
and
the
hardest
Stones
,
might
not
have
,
for
the
Cause
of
their
Hardness
,
the
Compression
of
little
rapid
Bodies
which
encompass
them
.
Now
we
may
plainly
discover
,
that
the
Force
of
Man
is
very
small
,
if
we
consider
,
that
the
Power
he
has
of
moving
his
Body
into
many
different
Ways
,
proceeds
only
from
a
little
Fermentation
of
his
Blood
,
which
by
agitating
some
few
little
Parts
,
so
produces
the
Animal
Spirits
.
For
't
is
the
Agitation
of
these
Spirits
,
which
gives
Force
to
our
Bodies
,
and
gives
it
a
Power
to
make
these
Efforts
,
that
we
unreasonably
look
upon
as
something
very
great
and
powerful
.
But
it
must
be
well
observed
,
that
this
Fermentation
of
our
Blood
is
only
a
very
little
Communication
of
the
Motion
of
this
subtle
Matter
we
speak
of
;
for
all
the
Fermentations
of
Visible
Bodies
,
are
only
Communications
of
the
Motion
of
Invisible
Bodies
,
since
every
Body
receives
its
Agitation
from
some
other
.
We
must
not
therefore
wonder
if
our
Power
is
not
so
great
as
that
of
this
Subtle
Matter
which
we
receive
it
from
.
But
if
our
Blood
fermented
as
much
in
our
Hearts
,
as
Gunpowder
does
when
we
put
Fire
to
it
,
that
is
,
if
our
Blood
received
as
great
a
Communication
of
the
Motion
of
this
Subtle
Matter
,
as
that
of
Gunpowder
receives
:
We
might
do
extraordinary
things
very
easily
,
as
break
Iron
,
throw
down
a
House
,
&c.
provided
we
suppose
there
was
an
agreeable
Proportion
between
our
Members
and
the
Blood
thus
agitated
.
We
ought
then
to
destroy
our
Prejudices
,
and
not
to
imagine
,
according
to
the
Impression
of
our
Senses
,
that
the
Parts
of
hard
Bodies
are
so
strongly
united
together
,
because
we
have
so
much
Trouble
to
break
them
.
But
if
we
should
consider
the
Effects
of
Fire
in
Mines
,
in
heavy
Bodies
,
and
in
many
other
Effects
of
Nature
,
which
have
no
other
Cause
than
the
Agitation
of
these
Invisible
Bodies
,
as
Descartes
has
proved
in
many
Places
,
we
should
manifestly
discover
,
that
't
is
not
above
their
Power
to
unite
and
compress
toge●her
the
Parts
of
hard
Bodies
as
strongly
as
we
see
they
are
united
.
For
in
fine
,
I
am
not
afraid
to
affirm
,
that
a
Cannon-Bullet
,
whose
Motion
appears
so
extraordinary
,
does
not
even
receive
the
Thousandth
Part
of
the
Motin
of
the
Subtle
Matter
that
is
about
it
.
We
should
not
doubt
of
what
I
advance
,
if
we
first
considered
,
that
Gunpowder
is
not
all
enkindled
in
the
same
Instant
:
Secondly
,
that
although
it
should
all
take
Fire
at
the
same
Instant
,
it
swims
but
a
very
little
while
in
the
Subtle
Matter
;
and
Bodies
which
swim
but
a
little
while
in
others
,
cannot
receive
much
Motion
from
them
;
as
we
may
see
in
Boats
that
we
abandon
to
the
Course
of
the
Water
,
which
receive
their
Motion
but
by
little
and
little
.
In
the
third
Place
,
and
chiefly
,
because
each
Particle
of
Powder
can
receive
only
the
Motion
which
the
Subtle
Matter
impresses
;
for
the
Water
communicates
to
the
Vessel
,
only
the
direct
Motion
which
is
common
to
all
the
Parts
thereof
,
which
is
generally
very
small
in
Relation
to
other
Motions
.
I
could
further
show
the
Greatness
of
the
Motion
of
the
Subtle
Matter
to
those
that
receive
Descartes's
Principles
,
by
the
Motion
of
the
Earth
,
and
Gravity
of
Bodie
;
and
could
,
even
from
thence
,
bring
Proofs
that
are
certain
and
exact
enough
,
but
it
is
not
necessary
to
my
Subiect
.
It
's
enough
,
without
having
read
the
Works
of
Descartes
,
or
having
a
sufficient
Proof
of
the
Agitation
of
this
Subtle
Matter
,
which
I
ascribe
as
the
Cause
of
the
Inflexibility
of
Bodies
,
to
read
with
some
Application
,
what
I
have
said
of
it
in
the
2d
.
Chap.
of
the
4th
.
Book
.
Being
then
now
delivered
from
the
Prejudices
which
incline
us
to
believe
that
our
Efforts
were
very
powerful
,
and
that
that
of
the
Subtle
Matter
which
environs
and
compresses
hard
Bodies
,
is
very
weak
,
and
being
otherwise
perswaded
of
the
violent
Agitation
of
this
Matter
,
by
what
I
have
said
of
Gunpowder
:
It
will
not
be
difficult
to
see
that
't
is
absotutely
necessary
that
the
Matters
acting
infinitely
more
upon
the
Surface
of
hard
Bodies
that
it
encompasses
and
compresses
,
than
within
the
same
Bodies
,
it
must
be
the
Cause
of
their
Inflexibility
,
or
the
Resistance
we
feel
when
we
endeavour
to
break
them
.
Now
,
as
there
is
always
many
Particles
of
this
Invisible
Matter
which
passes
through
the
Pores
of
hard
Bodies
,
they
make
them
not
only
hard
,
as
we
have
already
explained
,
but
further
,
are
the
Cause
that
some
are
Springy
and
Elastick
,
others
stand
bent
;
and
that
others
are
fluid
and
liquid
;
and
in
fine
,
that
they
are
not
only
the
Cause
of
the
Force
that
hard
Bodies
have
to
continue
united
together
,
but
also
that
fluid
Bodies
have
to
separate
,
that
is
,
are
the
Cause
that
some
Bodies
are
hard
,
and
others
fluid
.
But
because
't
is
absolutely
necessary
,
to
know
distinctly
the
Physicks
of
Descartes
,
the
Figure
of
his
Elements
,
and
Parts
which
compose
particular
Bodies
,
to
give
a
Reason
why
certain
Bodies
are
stiff
,
and
some
others
pliable
;
I
shall
not
stay
here
to
explain
it
.
Those
who
have
read
the
Works
of
this
Philosopher
,
will
easily
enough
imagine
what
may
be
the
Cause
thereof
,
which
I
could
not
explain
without
great
Difficulty
;
and
those
who
are
unacquainted
with
this
Author
,
would
but
confusedly
understand
the
Reason
that
I
might
bring
for
it
.
Nor
shall
I
also
stop
here
to
resolve
a
great
Number
of
Difficulties
,
that
I
foresee
may
be
brought
against
what
I
have
established
:
Because
,
if
those
that
raise
them
have
no
Knowledge
of
true
Physicks
,
I
should
only
tire
and
displease
them
,
instead
of
satisfying
them
:
But
if
they
are
learned
Persons
,
their
Objections
being
stronger
,
I
could
not
answer
them
but
by
a
great
Number
of
Figures
and
long
Discourses
;
so
that
I
believe
I
ought
to
desire
those
that
find
any
Difficulty
in
what
I
have
advanced
,
very
carefully
to
read
this
Chapter
over
again
;
for
I
hope
,
if
they
do
so
,
and
meditate
on
it
as
much
as
is
necessary
,
all
their
Objections
will
vanish
.
But
if
they
find
my
Request
incommodious
,
they
may
omit
it
;
for
there
is
no
great
Danger
in
being
ignorant
of
the
Cause
of
Bodies
inflexibility
.
I
speak
not
here
of
Contiguity
:
For
't
is
plain
,
Contiguous
things
touch
so
little
,
that
there
is
always
much
Subtle
Matter
which
passes
between
them
,
and
which
endeavours
to
continue
its
Motion
in
a
right
Line
,
to
prevent
their
uniting
.
For
the
Union
that
is
observed
between
Marbles
which
have
been
polished
one
upon
another
,
I
have
explained
it
,
and
't
is
easie
to
see
,
that
although
this
Subtle
Matter
always
passes
between
these
two
Parts
,
how
united
soever
they
may
be
,
the
Air
cannot
pass
it
;
and
therefore
't
is
that
which
compresses
and
binds
those
two
Pieces
of
Marble
together
,
and
causes
some
Trouble
to
disunite
them
,
if
we
do
not
make
them
slide
off
one
another
.
It
is
plain
,
from
all
this
,
that
the
Continuity
,
Contiguity
,
and
Union
of
two
Marbles
,
will
only
be
the
same
thing
in
a
Void
;
neither
have
we
different
Idea's
of
them
,
so
that
't
is
as
much
as
to
say
,
we
do
not
understand
them
,
if
we
make
them
absolutely
differ
,
without
any
Relation
to
the
Bodies
which
surround
them
.
Here
now
follows
some
Reflexions
upon
Descartes's
Sentiment
,
and
the
Original
of
his
error
.
I
call
his
Opinion
an
Error
,
because
I
find
no
Expedient
to
defend
what
he
says
of
the
Rules
of
Motion
,
and
Cause
of
the
Hardness
of
Bodies
,
in
many
Places
at
the
End
of
the
Second
Part
of
his
Principles
;
and
it
seems
to
me
,
that
I
have
sufficiently
proved
the
Truth
of
the
contrary
Opinion
.
This
great
Man
very
distinctly
conceived
that
Matter
could
not
move
of
it self
,
and
that
the
Natural
moving
Power
of
all
Bodies
,
was
nothing
else
but
the
general
Will
of
the
Author
of
Nature
,
and
that
the
Communications
of
the
Motions
of
Bodies
,
at
their
mutual
Meeting
,
could
only
proceed
from
this
same
Will.
If
we
take
this
for
granted
,
we
can
give
no
Rules
for
the
different
Communication
of
Motions
,
but
by
the
Proportion
that
is
found
between
the
different
Magnitude
of
Bodies
which
beat
against
them
,
since
it
is
impossible
to
penetrate
the
Designs
of
God's
Will.
And
because
he
judges
,
that
every
thing
had
Power
to
continue
in
the
State
it
was
in
,
whether
in
Motion
or
Rest
,
because
that
God
,
by
his
Will
,
determined
this
Power
always
to
act
after
the
same
manner
;
he
concludes
,
that
Rest
has
as
much
Power
to
act
as
Motion
:
So
he
measures
the
Effects
of
the
Power
of
Rest
by
the
Magnitude
of
Bodies
which
possessed
it
,
as
those
of
the
Power
of
Motion
;
and
hence
he
gave
the
Rules
for
the
Communication
of
Motion
that
are
in
his
Principles
,
and
the
Cause
of
the
Hardness
of
Bodies
which
I
have
endeavoured
to
refute
.
It
is
difficult
enough
not
to
be
of
Descartes's
Opinion
,
when
we
look
upon
it
as
he
did
;
for
once
more
,
since
the
Communication
of
Motions
proceed
only
from
the
Will
of
the
Author
of
Nature
,
and
that
we
see
all
Bodies
continue
in
the
State
they
are
once
placed
in
,
whether
it
be
Motion
or
Rest
;
It
seems
,
we
ought
to
seek
the
Rules
of
the
different
Communication
of
Motions
at
the
meeting
of
Bodies
,
not
in
the
Will
of
God
which
is
unknown
to
us
,
but
in
the
Proportion
there
is
between
the
Magnitudes
of
these
Bodies
.
I
do
not
therefore
wonder
that
Descartes
had
this
Thought
,
but
I
only
wonder
that
he
did
not
correct
it
,
when
he
had
made
a
farther
Advance
in
his
Discoveries
,
and
found
both
Existence
and
the
Effects
of
the
Subtle
Matter
which
environs
all
Bodies
.
I
am
surprized
,
that
in
the
132
Article
of
the
4th
Part
,
he
attributes
the
Elastick
Force
that
certain
Bodies
have
,
to
this
subtle
Matter
,
and
that
in
Articles
55
and
43
of
the
Second
Part
,
and
in
other
Places
,
he
does
not
attribute
it
to
their
Hardness
,
or
the
Resistance
they
make
when
we
endeavour
to
bend
or
break
them
,
but
to
the
rest
of
their
Parts
.
It
appears
evident
to
me
,
that
the
Cause
of
the
Elasticity
and
Stiffness
of
certain
Bodies
,
is
the
same
with
that
which
gives
them
the
Power
of
Resistance
,
when
we
would
break
them
;
for
indeed
,
the
Force
that
we
use
to
break
Steel
,
differs
but
insensibly
from
that
by
which
we
bend
it
.
I
will
not
here
bring
all
the
Reasons
that
might
be
urged
to
prove
these
things
;
nor
answer
to
any
Difficulties
that
we
might
form
from
hard
Bodies
making
no
Sensible
Resistance
,
and
yet
we
have
some
Trouble
to
bend
them
.
For
it
will
be
enough
to
make
these
Difficulties
vanish
,
to
consider
that
the
Subtle
Matter
cannot
easily
take
a
new
course
in
Bodies
which
break
when
we
bend
them
,
as
in
Glass
and
in
tempered
Steel
;
and
that
it
cannot
more
easily
do
it
in
Bodies
that
are
composed
of
branchy
Parts
which
are
not
brittle
,
as
in
Gold
and
Lead
:
And
indeed
,
there
is
no
hard
bodies
which
make
not
some
little
Resistance
.
It
is
difficult
enough
to
perswade
our selves
that
Descartes
positively
believed
the
Cause
of
Hardness
was
different
from
that
of
Elasticity
:
And
what
appears
most
probable
is
,
that
he
has
not
sufficiently
reflected
upon
the
Matter
.
When
we
meditate
long
upon
any
Subject
,
and
are
satisfied
in
things
we
would
know
,
we
often
think
no
more
of
them
:
We
believe
that
the
Thoughts
that
we
have
had
,
are
undoubted
Truths
,
and
't
is
useless
to
examine
farther
.
But
in
Men
there
are
many
things
which
disgust
them
against
Application
,
incine
them
to
a
rash
Assent
,
and
make
them
subject
to
Error
;
and
although
the
Mind
continues
apparently
satisfied
,
it
is
not
always
because
it
is
well
informed
of
the
Truth
.
Descartes
was
a
Man
like
us
:
I
confess
we
never
saw
more
Solidity
,
Exactness
,
Extension
,
and
more
Penetration
of
Mind
than
what
appears
in
his
Works
;
yet
he
was
not
infallible
.
So
that
it
is
probable
he
was
so
very
strongly
perswaded
of
his
Opinion
,
from
not
sufficiently
reflecting
that
he
asserted
something
elsewhere
in
nis
Principles
contrary
to
it
.
He
maintained
it
upon
very
specious
and
probable
Reasons
,
but
such
however
as
were
not
of
sufficient
Force
to
make
us
submit
,
and
therefore
he
might
,
and
ought
to
have
suspended
his
Judgment
.
It
is
not
enough
to
examine
,
in
a
hard
Body
,
what
might
be
the
Cause
that
made
it
so
;
We
ought
also
to
think
of
the
invisible
bodies
which
might
render
them
hard
,
as
he
has
done
at
the
End
of
his
Philosophical
Principles
,
when
he
attributes
the
Cause
of
Resistance
to
them
:
He
ought
to
have
made
an
exact
Division
,
which
comprised
whatsoever
might
contribute
to
the
Inflexibility
of
bodies
.
It
is
not
sufficient
still
to
seek
the
Cause
in
God's
Will
;
he
ought
also
to
have
thought
of
the
Subtle
Matter
which
environed
them
.
For
although
the
Existence
of
this
extreamly
agitated
Matter
was
not
yet
proved
in
that
Place
of
his
Principles
where
he
speaks
of
Hardness
,
it
was
not
then
rejected
:
He
ought
then
to
have
suspended
his
Judgment
,
and
to
have
remembered
that
what
he
had
writ
of
the
Cause
of
Hardness
,
and
Rules
of
Motion
,
ought
to
have
been
reviewed
anew
,
which
I
believe
he
did
not
do
carefully
enough
;
Or
else
he
did
not
sufficiently
consider
the
true
Reason
of
a
thing
that
is
very
easie
to
discover
,
and
which
yet
is
of
the
utmost
Consequence
in
Physicks
;
I
will
explain
it
.
Descartes
well
knew
,
that
to
maintain
his
System
,
of
the
Truth
which
he
could
not
reasonably
doubt
:
It
was
absolutely
necessary
that
great
bodies
should
always
communicate
their
Motion
to
the
lesser
bodies
they
should
meet
,
and
the
less
reflect
at
their
meeting
with
the
greater
,
without
a
like
Loss
on
their
Side
.
For
without
that
,
the
First
Element
would
not
have
all
the
Motion
that
it
is
necessary
it
should
have
above
the
Second
,
nor
the
Second
above
the
Third
;
and
his
whole
System
would
be
absolutely
false
,
as
is
sufficiently
known
to
those
that
have
but
thought
a
little
upon
it
.
But
in
supposing
that
Rest
had
Force
enough
to
resist
Motion
,
and
that
a
great
Body
in
Rest
,
could
not
be
moved
by
another
that
is
less
than
it
,
although
it
strike
it
with
a
furious
Agitation
:
It
is
plain
,
that
great
Bodies
must
have
much
less
Motion
than
a
like
Mass
of
little
Bodies
;
since
,
according
to
this
Supposition
,
they
can
always
communicate
what
they
have
,
and
cannot
always
receive
from
the
lesser
.
Thus
this
Supposition
not
being
contrary
to
whatsoever
Descartes
has
said
in
his
Principles
,
from
the
Beginning
unto
the
Establishment
of
his
Rules
of
Motion
,
and
agreeing
very
well
with
the
Sequel
of
his
Principles
;
he
believed
that
the
Rules
of
Motions
,
which
he
thought
he
had
demonstrated
in
their
Cause
,
were
also
sufficiently
confirmed
by
their
Effects
.
I
agree
with
Descartes
,
that
great
Bodies
communicate
their
Motion
much
more
easily
than
little
Bodies
do
;
and
therefore
his
First
Element
is
much
more
agitated
than
the
Second
,
and
the
Second
than
the
Third
.
But
the
Cause
of
it
is
clear
,
without
having
any
Regard
to
his
Supposition
.
Little
and
fluid
Bodies
,
as
Water
,
Air
,
&c.
can
only
communicate
to
great
Bodies
an
uniform
Motion
,
which
is
common
to
all
their
Parts
:
The
Water
in
a
River
can
only
communicate
to
a
Boat
,
the
Motion
of
Descent
,
which
is
common
to
all
the
little
Parts
of
which
the
Water
is
composed
,
and
every
one
of
these
Parts
,
besides
this
common
Motion
,
has
also
an
infinite
Number
of
other
Particulars
.
Thus
by
this
Reason
't
is
plain
,
that
a
Boat
for
instance
,
can
never
have
so
much
Motion
as
an
equal
Bulk
of
Water
,
since
the
Boat
can
only
receive
from
the
Water
,
that
Motion
which
is
direct
and
common
to
all
the
Parts
that
compose
it
.
If
Twenty
Particles
of
a
fluid
Body
push
any
other
Body
on
the
one
Side
,
and
as
many
on
the
other
,
it
will
continue
immoveable
,
and
all
the
little
Particles
of
the
fluid
Body
in
which
it
swims
,
rebound
up
without
losing
any
thing
of
their
Motion
.
Thus
great
Bodies
,
whose
Parts
are
united
,
can
only
receive
the
Circular
and
Uniform
Motion
of
the
Vortex
of
the
Subtle
Matter
which
environs
them
.
This
Reason
seems
sufficient
to
them
,
to
make
it
comprehended
how
great
Bodies
are
not
so
much
agitated
as
the
lesser
,
and
that
there
is
a
Necessity
for
an
Explanation
of
these
things
,
to
suppose
any
Force
in
Rest
to
resist
Motion
.
The
Certainty
of
Descartes's
Principles
cannot
be
a
sufficient
Proof
to
defend
his
Rules
of
Motion
;
and
we
may
believe
that
if
Descartes
himself
had
again
,
without
Prejudice
,
examined
his
Principles
,
and
compared
them
with
such
Reasons
as
I
have
brought
,
he
would
not
have
believed
that
the
Effects
of
Nature
had
confirmed
his
Rules
,
nor
have
fallen
into
a
Contradiction
,
by
attributing
the
Hardness
of
Bodies
only
to
the
rest
of
their
Parts
,
and
their
Elasticity
to
the
Force
of
a
Subtle
Matter
.
Here
follows
now
the
Rules
of
the
Communication
of
Motions
in
a
Void
,
which
are
only
the
Consequences
of
what
I
have
established
about
the
Nature
of
Rest
.
Bodies
not
being
hard
in
a
Void
,
since
they
are
only
hard
by
the
Pressure
of
the
Subtle
Matter
which
surrounds
them
,
if
Two
Bodies
meet
,
they
would
flatten
without
rebounding
;
we
must
therefore
give
these
Rules
:
Suppose
them
hard
of
themselves
,
and
not
by
the
Pressure
of
this
Subtle
Matter
.
Rest
having
no
Power
to
resist
Motion
,
and
many
Bodies
before
being
considered
as
one
only
in
the
moment
of
their
meeting
;
it
is
plain
,
they
ought
not
to
rebound
when
they
are
equal
in
Magnitude
and
Velocity
;
or
that
their
Velocity
supplies
the
Desect
of
their
Magnitude
,
or
their
Magnitude
the
Defect
of
their
Velocity
.
And
it
is
easie
from
thence
to
conclude
,
that
in
all
other
Cases
they
must
always
communicate
their
Motion
,
A
general
Rule
for
the
Communication
of
Motion
.
so
that
they
may
afterwards
proceed
with
an
equal
Swiftness
.
So
that
to
know
what
must
happen
in
all
the
different
Suppositions
of
Magnitude
and
Swiftness
of
Bodies
which
meet
one
another
;
we
need
only
add
together
all
the
Degrees
of
Motion
of
two
or
many
Bodies
,
which
must
be
considered
only
as
one
at
the
Time
when
they
meer
,
See
Descartes's
Rules
in
the
second
Part
of
his
Principles
.
and
after
divide
the
Sum
of
all
the
Motions
in
Proportion
to
the
Magnitude
of
these
Bodies
.
From
whence
I
conclude
,
that
of
the
Seven
Rules
that
Descartes
gives
of
Motion
;
the
Three
first
are
good
.
The
Fourth
is
false
,
and
B
must
communicate
its
Motion
to
C
,
in
Proportion
to
the
Magnitude
of
the
same
C
,
and
afterwards
move
together
:
So
that
if
C
is
double
to
B
,
and
B
has
Three
Degrees
of
Motion
,
it
must
communicate
Two
of
them
.
For
I
have
sufficiently
proved
,
that
Descartes
ought
not
to
have
supposed
Rest
to
have
had
any
Force
to
resist
Motion
.
That
the
Fifth
is
true
.
That
the
Sixth
is
false
,
and
that
B
must
communicate
the
Half
of
its
Motion
to
C.
diagram demonstrating how Descartes 'fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh rules of motion are false
And
that
the
seventh
is
false
,
since
B
must
always
communicate
its
Motion
to
C
in
Proportion
to
the
Magnitude
and
Motion
of
both
B
and
C.
That
if
,
according
to
the
Supposition
,
C
is
double
to
B
,
and
has
three
Degrees
of
Motion
,
whilst
C
has
but
two
,
they
must
necessarily
move
together
,
since
indeed
C
and
B
are
but
one
Body
at
the
Time
of
their
Meeting
;
and
because
we
must
add
the
Degrees
of
Swiftness
which
are
five
,
and
afterwards
divide
them
in
Proportion
to
their
Magnitude
,
and
so
give
1⅔
to
B
,
and
3⅓
to
C
the
double
of
B.
But
these
Rules
although
certain
by
what
I
have
said
,
are
yet
contrary
to
Experience
,
because
we
are
not
in
a
Void
.
The
chief
of
all
the
Experiments
,
which
are
contrary
to
what
I
have
said
of
the
Rules
of
Motion
,
is
,
that
it
always
happens
that
hard
Bodies
which
shock
each
other
,
do
still
rebound
different
Ways
,
or
at
least
they
do
not
follow
one
another
after
their
meeting
.
To
answer
to
which
we
must
call
to
mind
what
has
been
said
about
the
Cause
of
Elactity
;
that
there
is
a
Matter
whose
Agitation
is
strangely
violent
,
which
continually
passes
between
the
Parts
of
hard
Bodies
,
and
makes
them
so
by
compressing
them
as
much
upon
the
external
as
internal
Parts
.
For
from
thence
't
is
easily
seen
that
in
the
Time
of
Percussion
,
two
Bodies
which
meet
,
drive
or
divert
the
Course
of
this
Matter
from
the
nearest
Places
to
those
where
they
are
shockt
:
And
this
Matter
resisting
with
a
great
Violence
,
repels
the
two
Bodies
which
meet
,
and
restores
its
Passage
which
the
Percussion
had
stopt
up
.
That
which
proves
yet
more
clearly
what
I
have
said
,
is
that
if
two
Balls
of
Lead
,
or
some
other
less
elastick
Matter
,
meet
together
,
they
rebound
not
after
their
Shock
,
but
go
on
according
to
the
Rules
I
have
before
established
;
which
they
keep
with
so
much
the
more
Exactness
,
as
their
Elasticity
is
less
.
Bodies
then
rebound
after
their
Percussion
,
because
they
are
hard
,
that
is
,
as
I
have
explained
,
because
there
is
a
Sort
of
Matter
much
agitated
which
compresses
them
,
and
which
passing
thro'
their
Pores
with
a
great
Violence
,
repulses
the
Bodies
which
strike
against
one
another
.
But
we
must
suppose
that
the
Bodies
which
meet
break
not
those
they
strike
against
,
by
a
Motion
that
conquers
the
Force
,
which
these
little
Parts
of
subtle
Matter
has
to
resist
,
as
when
we
discharge
a
Musket
against
a
Piece
of
Wood
:
It
is
true
,
this
subtle
Matter
compresses
soft
Bodies
,
and
passes
very
quickly
thro'
their
Pores
,
as
well
as
it
does
thro'
those
of
the
hard
,
and
that
nevertheless
these
soft
Bodies
make
no
Resistance
.
The
Reason
is
because
the
Matter
which
passes
thro'
soft
Bodies
,
can
open
its
Passage
on
all
Sides
very
easily
,
because
of
the
Smallness
of
the
Parts
which
compose
them
,
or
of
some
particular
Configuration
proper
for
this
End
,
which
hard
Bodies
cannot
suffer
,
because
of
the
Grossness
and
contrary
Disposition
of
their
Parts
to
this
effect
.
Thus
when
a
hard
Body
shocks
another
that
is
soft
,
it
changes
all
the
Ways
by
which
the
subtle
Matter
passes
,
which
is
often
visible
,
as
in
a
Musket
Bullet
that
is
flatted
when
we
strike
it
.
But
when
a
hard
Body
hits
another
like
it self
,
it
produces
none
or
very
sew
new
Ways
,
and
the
subtle
Matter
which
is
within
its
Pores
is
forced
to
return
by
the
Way
it
came
,
or
else
it
repels
those
Bodies
which
shut
up
its
little
Passages
.
Suppose
A
an
hard
and
B
a
soft
Body
,
and
C
c
the
Channel
of
the
subtle
Matter
,
I
say
that
if
A
shocks
B
at
the
Point
c
,
the
Channel
C
c
is
obstructed
,
and
the
subtle
Matter
finds
out
new
Ways
in
this
soft
Body
.
Thus
the
subtle
Matter
having
a
free
Passage
,
it
repels
not
the
Bodies
which
hit
against
it
,
but
the
Bodies
themselves
change
their
Figure
and
become
a
little
flat
.
And
we
must
suppose
that
in
the
least
hard
Bodies
,
there
is
an
infinite
Number
of
Channels
like
to
C
c.
But
if
A
and
a
are
two
hard
Bodies
which
meet
,
the
Passage
C
c
will
be
straightened
,
and
the
subtle
Matter
which
is
there
obstructed
,
continuing
its
Motion
in
a
right
Line
,
must
for
want
of
new
Passages
,
repel
the
Body
which
shocks
it
with
so
much
the
more
Violence
as
its
Difficulty
is
greater
to
find
a
Way
,
or
else
the
Parts
of
the
Body
A
,
will
break
and
separate
from
one
another
,
and
be
reduced
into
Powder
,
or
very
small
Pieces
.
In
short
,
it
appears
evident
that
all
Bodies
in
Motion
continually
endeavour
to
keep
in
a
right
Line
,
and
turning
the
least
that
is
possible
when
they
meet
with
any
Resistance
,
they
must
never
reflect
,
since
by
reflecting
they
deviate
much
from
a
right
Line
.
It
must
therefore
be
either
that
Bodies
become
flat
,
or
that
the
strongest
overcome
the
weakest
,
and
make
it
move
the
same
Way
the
other
does
.
But
because
Bodies
are
elastick
and
hard
,
they
cannot
follow
one
another
,
since
if
A
pushes
a
,
a
will
repel
A
again
,
and
so
they
must
keep
asunder
from
one
another
.
Nevertheless
,
if
the
two
Bodies
were
in
a
Void
,
altho'
they
were
very
Hard
,
they
would
follow
one
another
,
because
having
no
Bodies
about
them
,
they
could
have
no
elastick
Force
,
the
shocked
not
at
all
resisting
that
which
shocks
it
:
But
Air
,
Gravity
,
&c.
resisting
the
great
Motion
that
the
striking
Body
gives
to
that
it
strikes
,
the
stricken
resists
the
striking
,
and
hinders
it
from
following
it
:
For
Experience
teaches
us
that
Air
and
Gravity
resists
Motion
,
and
so
much
the
more
as
the
Motion
is
more
violent
.
It
is
easie
to
discover
by
what
I
have
said
,
why
when
different
Bodies
meet
which
are
surrounded
with
Air
,
or
Water
,
&c.
sometimes
that
which
strikes
,
rebounds
,
and
sometimes
it
communicates
all
its
Motion
,
and
continues
as
if
it
were
immovable
,
and
sometimes
follows
the
stricken
,
but
always
with
less
Swiftness
,
if
either
of
them
is
absolutely
soft
:
For
the
whole
depends
only
upon
the
Proportion
which
is
between
their
Magnitude
,
Hardness
and
Gravity
,
supposing
they
are
moved
with
an
equal
Swiftness
.
If
they
are
very
inflexible
,
the
striking
Body
rebounds
more
,
because
the
Elasticity
is
stronger
.
If
the
striking
is
very
small
,
and
the
stricken
very
great
and
heavy
,
the
striking
will
rebound
still
more
,
because
of
the
Weight
and
great
Quantity
of
Air
which
encompasses
the
stricken
that
resists
this
Motion
.
In
fine
,
if
the
Force
of
the
Hardness
is
either
diminished
or
encreased
by
the
Colum
of
Air
which
answers
to
the
stricken
,
the
striking
which
rebounds
would
continue
in
Rest
after
Percussion
.
Or
on
the
contrary
,
the
striking
which
would
continue
in
Rest
after
the
Percussion
may
rebound
.
All
that
is
to
be
done
then
,
is
to
compare
the
Hardness
of
Bodies
which
meet
,
and
the
Air
which
the
impuls'd
Body
must
agitate
anew
in
the
Time
of
Percussion
that
it
may
move
,
to
foresee
very
near
what
must
happen
in
the
Percussion
of
different
Bodies
.
I
always
suppose
an
equal
Swiftness
in
the
meeting
,
for
the
Air
resists
a
great
Motion
more
than
it
does
a
small
one
,
and
there
is
as
much
Motion
in
a
Body
half
as
little
again
as
another
,
when
it
goes
as
fast
again
as
this
other
:
Thus
the
stricken
being
pushed
twice
as
swift
again
,
it
may
be
considered
as
having
a
Colum
of
Air
twice
as
great
to
impel
it
.
But
we
must
also
observe
,
that
in
the
Moment
that
one
Body
shocks
another
,
the
Parts
of
these
same
Bodies
have
two
contrary
Motions
:
For
those
that
are
foremost
have
an
Inclination
to
turn
because
of
the
Shock
,
at
the
same
Time
that
those
that
are
behind
,
incline
to
advance
because
of
the
first
Motion
,
and
't
is
this
Countermotion
that
flattens
soft
Bodies
,
and
even
makes
certain
hard
Bodies
break
.
Now
when
Bodies
are
very
hard
,
this
counterblow
which
shakes
their
Parts
,
and
causes
a
kind
of
trembling
in
them
,
as
appears
by
the
Sound
they
make
,
always
produces
some
Change
in
the
Communication
of
Motion
,
which
is
very
difficult
to
be
discovered
for
many
Reasons
,
and
it
seems
to
me
very
useless
to
examine
it
in
particular
.
If
one
would
think
upon
all
these
things
,
I
believe
he
might
easily
answer
some
Difficulties
that
may
still
remain
upon
this
Subject
.
But
if
I
thought
what
I
have
said
was
not
sufficient
to
shew
that
Rest
has
no
Power
to
resist
Motion
,
and
that
the
Rules
of
the
Communication
of
Motion
given
by
Descartes
,
are
in
Part
false
,
I
would
here
prove
,
that
according
co
his
Supposition
,
't
would
be
impossible
to
move
in
the
Air
;
and
that
what
makes
the
Circulation
of
Motion
in
fluid
Bodies
to
be
possible
without
recurring
to
a
Void
,
is
that
the
first
Element
being
easily
divided
after
many
different
Manners
,
the
rest
of
its
Parts
would
have
no
Power
to
resist
Motion
.