PREFACE
to
the
Second
Volume
;
Which
may
serve
as
an
Answer
to
the
ANIMADVERSIONS
on
the
First
.
SOme
time
since
was
publish'd
a
Book
entituled
,
Animadversions
upon
the
Search
after
Truth
,
wherein
,
at
the
same
time
,
are
examin'd
part
of
M.
des
Cartes
's
Principles
,
being
a
Letter
by
an
Academick
in
Paris
,
&c.
'T
is
said
this
Book
attacks
me
,
and
truly
not
without
Reason
;
for
the
Title
shews
it
,
and
the
Author
manifests
it
was
his
Design
;
which
gives
me
a
Right
and
imposes
on
me
a
sort
of
Obligation
of
speaking
my
Thoughts
of
it
.
For
besides
that
,
I
ought
to
disabuse
some
people
who
delight
in
these
petty
Quarrels
,
and
immediately
determine
on
the
side
of
the
Criticks
that
gratifie
their
Passion
;
I
think
my self
bound
to
give
some
Answer
to
the
Aggressor
,
that
I
may
not
be
thought
to
be
●ilent
out
of
Insolence
or
Impotence
.
The
Animadverter
may
pardon
me
,
if
he
pleases
,
if
I
sometimes
seem
to
give
him
Provocation
;
I
should
be
very
sorry
so
much
as
to
design
it
.
But
I
cannot
defend
my self
without
wounding
him
,
nor
repell
the
Blows
he
makes
at
me
,
without
making
him
feel
,
and
others
know
his
Weakness
and
Imbecillity
.
Self-defence
is
a
natural
Obligation
,
but
the
Defence
of
Truth
is
absolutely
indispensible
.
See
here
in
short
his
Design
:
He
supposes
the
Book
he
animadverts
on
,
is
a
Method
for
laying
the
Foundations
of
the
Sciences
.
He
reduces
this
Method
to
fourteen
Heads
,
and
shews
that
they
are
either
Suppositions
without
Proof
,
or
Assertio●s
without
Foundation
,
and
consequently
that
the
Substance
of
the
Book
is
intirely
useless
to
the
Enquiry
after
Truth
;
though
there
are
here
and
there
some
Observations
in
it
that
place
it
in
the
rank
of
Works
which
have
gain'd
the
Estimation
of
our
Age.
I
answer
in
General
,
that
the
Author
of
the
Animadversions
has
not
understood
,
or
has
dissembled
the
Understanding
the
Design
of
the
Book
he
impungs
;
it
being
plain
that
the
principal
Design
of
it
,
is
to
discover
the
Errours
we
are
subject
to
.
'T
is
true
it
treats
of
the
Nature
of
the
Senses
,
Imagination
and
Intellect
;
but
't
is
manifest
,
and
I
precaution
in
several
places
,
that
this
is
only
to
discover
these
Errours
in
their
Causes
:
This
being
the
Method
I
always
endeavour
to
observe
,
as
believing
it
most
advantageous
to
the
enlightning
the
Mind
.
The
Title
of
the
first
Page
of
the
Book
he
opposes
,
wherein
are
to
be
seen
in
Capitals
,
CONCERNING
THE
ERROURS
OF
TH●
SENSES
;
the
very
Table
of
the
same
Book
,
or
rather
the
Place
where
I
make
the
Division
of
the
whole
Work
,
might
have
taught
him
my
Design
,
if
he
had
desir'd
to
know
it
,
where
he
might
have
read
these
words
,
which
methinks
are
clear
enough
:
Chap.
4.
E.
1.
And
so
all
the
Errours
of
Men
,
and
the
Causes
of
them
,
may
be
reduc'd
to
five
Heads
,
and
we
shall
treat
of
them
according
to
that
order
.
First
,
We
shall
speak
of
the
Errours
of
the
SENSES
.
Secondly
,
Of
the
Errours
of
IMAGINATION
.
Thirdly
,
Of
the
Errours
of
the
PURE
INTELLECT
.
Fourthly
,
Of
the
Errours
of
our
INCLINATIONS
.
And
fifthly
,
Of
the
Errours
of
the
PASSIONS
.
And
thus
having
made
an
Ess●y
to
rid
the
Soul
of
the
Errours
which
she
is
subject
to
,
WE
SHALL
,
Lastly
,
LAY
DOWN
A
GENERAL
METHOD
TO
CONDUCT
HER
IN
THE
SEARCH
OF
TRUTH
.
'T
is
plain
enough
from
this
Division
,
that
the
first
Volume
,
which
is
the
subject
of
our
A●thor's
Animadversions
,
treats
only
of
the
Senses
,
Imagination
and
Intellect
,
and
that
the
Method
which
he
supposes
I
have
given
,
ought
to
be
the
Subject
of
the
Second
Volume
.
Nevertheless
as
he
is
pleased
to
make
me
undertake
a
Design
I
do
not
execute
,
that
he
may
have
the
more
to
Charge
upon
my
Conduct
,
so
he
goes
to
prove
it
was
my
Design
to
lay
down
a
Method
in
that
Book
.
I
do
him
no
Injury
,
says
he
,
Page
9
,
10.
in
looking
on
his
Book
as
a
Method
to
lay
the
Foundations
of
the
Sciences
:
For
besides
that
the
Title
expresses
so
much
,
he
declares
himself
upon
the
Point
in
the
following
manner
;
Page
1.
Let
us
examaine
the
Causes
and
Nature
of
our
Errours
,
and
since
the
Method
of
examining
things
,
by
considering
them
in
their
Birth
and
Origin
,
is
the
most
regular
and
perspicuous
,
and
serves
better
than
others
to
give
us
a
thorough
knowledge
of
them
,
let
us
try
to
put
it
here
in
practice
.
I
do
a
Man
no
Injury
,
when
I
say
he
designs
to
draw
an
Hercules
;
but
if
I
shew
that
instead
of
an
Hercules
,
he
takes
a
Polyphemus
,
or
Thersites
,
I
make
him
ridiculous
:
Should
I
say
with
many
others
,
that
the
Animadverter
is
a
Cartesian
,
or
that
he
designed
by
his
Animadversions
on
my
Book
to
defend
the
Doctrine
of
Des
Cartes
,
I
should
not
wrong
him
;
but
if
at
the
same
time
I
should
shew
that
he
opposes
me
without
understanding
me
,
I
should
possibly
offend
him
.
'T
is
then
injuring
a
Man
,
to
charge
upon
him
Designs
which
he
never
had
,
to
render
him
ridiculous
.
But
a
Man
must
be
wretchedly
in
the
wrong
who
imposes
them
on
such
as
have
,
like
me
in
several
places
,
explain'd
themselves
clearly
upon
the
Subject
.
But
the
Title
of
my
Book
evidences
as
much
,
for
't
is
concerning
the
Search
after
Truth
.
I
answer
,
That
to
search
out
Truth
,
two
things
are
requisite
;
first
to
be
delivered
from
the
Prejudices
of
Childhood
,
or
vulgar
Errours
;
Secondly
,
to
have
a
good
Method
.
The
Title
of
the
Book
is
comprehensive
of
these
two
parts
.
I
have
given
the
first
in
the
former
Volume
,
but
the
Animadverter
will
needs
have
it
,
that
I
have
given
the
second
;
which
surely
is
unreasonable
.
He
ought
rather
to
correct
the
Title
by
the
Book
,
if
the
Title
displeased
him
,
than
to
go
about
to
ruine
a
whole
Book
for
the
Title
's
sake
.
But
,
continues
our
Aurhor
,
I
declare
my self
upon
the
Point
in
this
manner
,
Let
us
examine
the
Causes
and
Nature
of
our
Errours
,
and
since
the
Method
of
examining
things
,
Page
10.
by
considering
them
in
their
Birth
and
Origin
,
is
the
most
regular
and
perspicuous
,
and
serves
better
than
others
to
give
us
a
thorough
knowledge
of
them
;
let
us
try
to
put
it
here
in
practice
.
I
have
been
shewing
,
that
I
have
declar'd
distinctly
enough
in
the
Division
I
have
made
of
my
work
,
that
I
gave
not
my
Method
in
the
first
Volume
;
this
cannot
be
doubted
.
But
let
us
see
whether
this
passage
was
enough
to
make
him
think
I
have
given
a
Method
:
I
say
,
Let
us
examine
the
Causes
and
Nature
of
our
Errours
.
My
Design
therefore
according
to
this
Passage
,
is
to
examine
the
Causes
and
Na●ure
of
our
Errours
.
That
's
plain
.
I
continue
,
And
since
the
Method
of
examining
things
by
considering
th●m
in
their
Birth
and
Origin
,
is
more
regular
and
perspicuous
than
others
;
let
us
try
to
put
it
in
practice
.
My
Design
therefore
is
to
examine
the
Causes
and
Nature
of
our
Errours
methodically
;
can
any
one
from
hence
believe
I
have
given
a
Method
?
If
so
,
we
may
believe
there
is
no
Author
but
has
given
a
Method
,
since
there
is
none
but
has
the
same
Design
as
my self
to
write
methodically
.
I
might
even
say
that
the
Animadverter
has
design'd
to
give
a
Method
,
and
impugn
him
by
his
own
Weapons
,
but
that
he
had
rather
be
thought
to
have
written
without
any
.
These
are
the
Proofs
imployed
by
him
to
demonstrate
I
have
given
a
Method
.
The
fourteen
Heads
of
this
Imaginary
Method
,
are
in
the
places
whence
they
are
taken
,
either
incidental
Propositions
,
or
Answers
to
Objections
,
or
Opinions
he
ascribes
to
me
,
for
want
of
Understanding
what
he
engages
;
or
lastly
Examples
,
which
of
themselves
neither
are
nor
can
be
Heads
of
a
Method
.
Here
follows
the
first
of
these
Heads
.
I
begin
thus
,
The
Mind
(
or
Soul
)
of
Man
being
neither
material
nor
extended
,
is
undoubtedly
a
simple
Substance
,
Page
1.
indivisible
,
and
without
any
Composition
of
Parts
,
notwithstanding
it
has
been
the
custom
to
distingish
in
it
two
Faculties
,
namely
,
the
Understanding
and
the
Will
;
which
it
is
necessary
in
the
first
place
to
explain
:
for
it
seems
,
&c.
And
in
order
to
render
the
abstract
Ideas
of
these
two
words
sensible
,
I
explain
them
not
as
our
Author
misrepresents
me
,
with
Relation
to
the
Essence
of
Matter
,
which
he
supposes
unknown
;
but
by
Relation
to
the
Properties
which
all
the
World
acknowledge
are
in
Matter
:
i.
e.
the
capacity
of
being
mov'd
,
and
of
receiving
different
external
Figures
,
and
internal
Configurations
.
The
Animadverter
supposing
,
as
has
been
said
,
that
the
Book
he
impugns
is
a
Method
,
begins
thus
:
Page
20.
The
first
thing
to
be
observ'd
when
a
Man
pretends
to
the
search
of
Truth
,
is
not
to
suppose
he
has
already
found
it
,
though
he
be
in
perfect
possession
of
it
,
&c.
And
lower
,
Which
thing
the
Author
seems
not
to
have
sufficiently
consider'd
;
Page
21.
for
at
his
very
first
setting
out
,
he
engages
in
the
supposition
of
a
thing
,
the
Knowledge
whereof
is
the
principal
motive
to
his
Enquiry
after
Truth
,
and
which
he
ought
not
to
determine
before
he
had
exhausted
the
greatest
Questions
in
Philosophy
.
Thus
it
is
he
enters
on
his
matter
in
his
first
Chapter
.
The
Mind
of
Man
being
neither
material
nor
extended
,
&c.
'T
is
easie
to
see
this
Supposition
is
not
indifferent
,
&c.
I
answer
,
first
,
that
it
was
not
my
Design
to
give
a
Method
in
the
Book
he
impugns
,
but
only
to
prepare
the
Mind
by
delivering
it
from
Prejudices
.
Secondly
,
that
though
it
had
been
my
Design
,
I
might
have
suppos'd
some
Truths
,
which
are
commonly
acknowledg'd
;
as
that
the
Soul
is
not
material
:
especialy
if
I
employ
them
not
as
a
Foundation
to
build
some
System
on
.
I
answer
in
the
third
place
,
that
the
Proposition
he
will
have
to
be
an
Head
of
my
Method
,
is
an
incidental
Proposition
.
The
bare
construction
of
the
words
,
is
a
sufficient
indication
;
the
process
of
the
Discourse
an
undeniable
proof
;
and
all
that
I
say
in
this
place
might
subsist
though
the
Soul
were
material
.
'T
is
not
the
part
of
a
good
Critick
to
take
an
incidental
Proposition
,
for
a
Fundamental
,
and
an
Head
of
a
Method
.
Nor
is
this
to
prove
I
have
suppos'd
to
have
found
the
Truth
I
am
in
quest
of
;
since
the
thing
I
suppose
,
or
rather
which
I
do
not
examine
,
is
not
of
any
use
to
me
.
When
it
was
necessary
,
to
the
sequel
of
Discourse
,
to
know
that
the
Soul
was
a
kind
of
Being
distinct
from
Matter
,
[
](A51674-e74700-b)*
*
Book
1.
Ch.
9.
B.
3.
in
several
places
.
I
have
prov'd
it
,
or
referr'd
to
those
that
have
.
But
why
will
he
oblige
me
to
prove
a
thing
in
this
place
,
which
would
be
useless
to
the
following
Discourse
,
and
I
should
have
been
sorry
to
have
prov'd
here
?
Whether
the
Soul
be
material
or
not
,
it
is
always
true
,
that
it
has
been
the
custom
to
distinguish
two
Faculties
in
it
,
the
Understanding
and
Will
.
These
two
words
are
in
use
,
and
I
may
employ
them
;
they
are
perhaps
obscure
,
and
I
ought
to
define
them
;
and
because
their
Ideas
are
abstract
,
I
may
make
them
sensible
.
This
is
what
I
have
done
,
and
I
cannot
yet
see
what
any
one
can
blame
in
it
.
At
my
very
first
setting
out
,
he
says
,
I
engage
in
the
supposition
of
a
thing
,
the
knowledge
whereof
is
the
principal
motive
to
my
Enquiry
after
Truth
,
and
which
I
ought
not
to
determine
before
having
exhausted
the
greatest
Questions
in
Philosophy
.
All
this
Discourse
is
false
,
I
engage
not
in
a
Supposition
,
for
incidental
Propositions
come
not
into
account
.
The
principal
motive
to
my
Enquiry
after
Truth
,
is
not
to
know
whether
the
Soul
be
Material
or
Immaterial
;
and
so
far
is
this
Question
from
being
insoluble
,
till
having
drain'd
the
greatest
Questions
of
Philosophy
,
that
its
Resolution
depends
on
no
other
.
This
Question
is
not
complex'd
,
and
the
bare
Comparison
of
Ideas
which
answer
to
the
terms
is
sufficient
to
resolve
it
,
as
I
shall
shew
in
the
sixth
Book
,
though
this
is
not
discoverable
by
those
who
make
more
use
of
their
Imagination
than
their
Reason
.
There
is
no
necessity
of
explaining
this
more
at
present
;
we
need
but
know
that
this
Supposition
is
an
incidental
Proposition
,
from
which
I
draw
no
Conseqence
,
and
which
I
should
have
been
to
blame
to
prove
;
and
yet
if
we
will
credit
the
Animadverter
,
Page
22.
What
is
worst
of
all
,
is
that
this
sole
Anticipation
is
enough
to
ruine
all
the
hopes
the
Search
after
Truth
might
have
rais'd
in
us
.
In
the
four
or
five
first
Pages
which
our
Animadverter
spends
in
refuting
the
first
pretended
Head
of
the
Imaginary
Method
,
many
things
would
deserve
our
consideration
,
if
we
thought
our selves
obliged
to
let
the
World
know
all
his
Faults
;
for
he
imposes
on
me
here
,
as
in
other
places
,
without
any
Proof
,
Opinions
and
Designs
which
never
entred
my
Head
;
and
he
does
it
with
a
confidence
which
is
capable
of
surprising
all
those
who
believe
others
on
their
Words
.
I
am
willing
to
think
he
is
too
honest
and
sincere
a
Man
to
prevaricate
,
and
to
be
prodigal
of
that
Respect
which
is
due
to
the
Publick
;
but
if
so
,
there
is
Levity
or
Temerity
in
his
enterprise
:
he
should
not
have
undertaken
to
oppose
what
he
did
not
understand
.
Yet
I
cannot
chuse
but
relate
how
he
finishes
his
first
Attack
;
we
shall
know
what
we
are
to
think
of
the
rest
by
the
Beginning
and
End
.
I
said
that
the
Soul
being
a
Simple
and
Indivisible
Substance
has
no
parts
;
however
it
had
been
the
custom
to
distinguish
in
it
two
Faculties
,
the
Understanding
and
Will
,
&c.
This
has
given
occasion
to
the
Animadverter
to
accuse
me
of
Contradiction
;
and
after
having
prov'd
,
after
his
manner
,
by
many
Interrogations
and
Rhetorical
Figures
extremely
convincing
,
he
concludes
with
these
words
,
which
represent
his
whole
figurative
Reasoning
in
short
,
and
for
that
Reason
he
has
put
it
in
Italick
;
Which
is
the
same
thing
,
says
he
,
as
if
I
should
say
,
THE
SOUL
IS
WITHOUT
ANY
COMPOSITION
OF
PARTS
;
BUT
YET
I
AM
GOING
TO
EXPLAIN
HOW
SHE
CONTAINS
THEM
.
You
see
,
Sir
,
continues
he
,
that
this
Supposition
serves
only
to
throw
us
immediately
into
obscurity
;
besides
that
,
it
is
contrary
on
other
grounds
to
the
success
of
this
Method
.
But
who
ever
took
Faculties
for
Parts
?
Certainly
the
Passion
for
Criticising
must
be
very
blind
,
to
put
into
the
Mouth
of
a
Man
of
Parts
,
so
extraordinary
Comparisons
,
and
to
make
him
believe
the
World
must
be
content
with
them
.
But
let
us
examine
his
second
Head
of
my
pretended
Method
,
and
see
how
he
impugns
it
.
After
having
shewn
that
to
the
avoiding
Errour
,
we
must
only
give
our
consent
to
things
appearing
in
such
Light
and
Evidence
as
make
it
impossible
for
us
to
withhold
it
,
without
clearly
Understanding
the
secret
Reproaches
of
our
Reason
:
I
adjoyn
;
Page
9.
'T
is
not
however
to
be
denied
but
there
are
some
Truths
,
besides
those
of
Faith
,
for
which
it
would
be
unreasonable
to
demand
indisputable
Demonstrations
,
as
are
those
which
relate
to
matter
of
Fact
in
History
,
and
other
things
which
have
their
dependence
on
the
Will
of
Men
;
for
there
are
two
kinds
of
Truth
,
the
one
necessary
,
the
other
contingent
.
And
because
these
two
words
Necessary
and
Contingent
,
are
not
it
may
be
clear
enough
,
I
explain
them
thus
:
I
call
necessary
Truths
those
which
are
immutable
by
their
Nature
,
and
those
which
have
been
fix'd
and
determin'd
by
the
Will
of
God
,
which
is
not
subject
to
change
:
All
other
sorts
of
Truth
are
contingent
.
And
lower
,
We
demand
therefore
an
exact
observation
of
the
Rule
we
have
been
establishing
in
the
Search
of
necessary
Truths
,
the
knowledge
of
which
may
be
call'd
Science
;
and
we
must
be
content
with
the
greatest
probability
in
History
,
which
includes
the
knowledge
of
things
contingent
.
For
under
,
&c.
I
wish
it
might
be
examin'd
,
first
,
whether
the
things
I
have
been
saying
are
clear
or
obscure
?
Whether
it
may
not
be
suppos'd
there
are
necessary
Truths
,
as
that
2
times
2
are
4
,
and
contingent
Truths
as
that
Mr.
—
shall
say
such
a
thing
at
such
an
hour
,
especially
when
we
have
no
design
of
establishing
any
System
upon
this
Supposition
?
Whether
there
be
any
thing
more
certain
than
this
Supposition
,
whereby
it
may
be
proved
.
Lastly
,
whether
a
Man
can
reasonably
persuade
himself
,
that
I
lay
down
for
one
of
the
Heads
of
my
Method
,
or
a
Supposition
essential
to
any
System
,
a
Proposition
which
begins
with
FOR.
This
being
suppos'd
I
come
now
to
produce
the
Reasonings
of
our
Animadverter
against
what
I
have
said
of
contingent
and
necessary
Truths
,
I
shall
only
place
in
the
Margin
some
Notes
or
Answers
I
shall
think
necessary
;
this
being
the
shortest
and
easiest
way
for
me
;
since
it
is
an
harder
thing
than
is
imagined
to
answer
clearly
such
as
are
unintelligible
and
inconsequent
Reasoners
.
For
we
must
at
least
put
their
Objections
in
some
form
to
solve
them
,
which
cannot
be
always
done
,
either
because
they
will
not
bear
it
,
or
because
we
do
not
understand
them
.
For
my
own
part
,
I
am
very
glad
it
cannot
be
imagined
I
use
the
Animadversions
,
as
the
Animadverter
has
us'd
the
Search
;
or
that
from
different
Passages
of
this
Book
I
compose
an
incomprehensible
peice
of
Nonsense
.
ANIMADVERSIONS
.
The
Second
Supposition
concerning
Necessary
Truths
,
Page
9.
ANIMADVERSIONS
.
THE
Second
thing
supposed
by
the
Author
is
,
that
there
are
two
sorts
of
Truths
,
Necessary
and
Contingent
.
I
know
not
for
what
reason
he
looks
upon
what
he
here
asserts
,
as
[
](A51674-1-1)(a)
undeniable
,
and
why
he
does
not
think
of
proving
it
.
For
this
is
one
of
the
most
considerable
Questions
that
has
employed
the
Learned
,
especially
the
Ancients
;
insomuch
that
the
first
Philosophers
were
[
](A51674-1-2)(b)
all
,
except
Parmenides
,
of
a
contrary
opinion
to
that
he
maintains
in
this
place
.
Yet
Parmenides
acknowledged
but
one
necessary
Truth
,
whereas
he
supposes
a
very
great
number
.
Protagoras
believ'd
there
was
no
Truth
on
the
part
of
things
,
so
far
was
he
from
owning
any
necessary
;
and
that
Man
was
the
Measure
and
Rule
of
all
that
could
come
in
Question
;
that
there
was
nothing
but
mere
Appearances
,
and
no
Realities
,
and
consequently
there
were
no
Truths
to
seek
,
or
Errours
to
avoid
,
all
being
equally
true
,
or
rather
equally
false
.
The
Pyrronists
have
still
maintained
there
was
nothing
certain
or
truly
determined
,
or
that
if
there
were
,
yet
we
could
not
know
it
.
The
new
Philosophers
grant
that
individuals
are
no
wise
immutable
,
but
are
subject
to
continual
Vicissitudes
;
which
being
so
,
what
becomes
of
necessary
Truths
?
I
speak
not
of
those
which
are
found
in
the
Mathematicks
,
that
ought
to
make
a
Question
[
](A51674-1-3)(c)
apart
;
but
of
those
he
supposes
in
Physicks
,
Medicine
and
Morality
,
though
I
still
except
those
which
regard
the
Essence
or
Existence
of
a
God
.
Where
then
could
he
place
them
,
except
in
the
[
](A51674-1-4)(d)
Species
and
Essences
of
the
same
Individuals
which
are
subject
to
change
?
And
if
these
Essences
or
Species
are
nothing
but
Ideas
,
as
may
be
suspected
if
their
immutability
be
only
in
appearance
,
should
not
we
,
in
following
that
supposition
,
engage
in
an
Errour
,
which
would
absolutely
exclude
us
from
the
knowledge
of
the
true
state
of
things
?
But
let
us
see
what
the
Author
calls
necessary
Truths
,
for
at
least
he
explains
what
he
means
by
these
words
,
I
call
necessary
Truths
,
those
which
are
immutable
by
their
Nature
,
and
those
which
have
been
fixed
and
determined
by
the
Will
of
God
,
which
is
not
subject
to
change
.
To
say
that
these
Truths
are
immutable
by
their
Nature
,
what
is
it
more
than
to
say
,
they
are
immutable
because
immutable
,
unless
this
signifies
they
are
essentially
so
without
any
external
assistance
?
But
if
these
Truths
were
necessary
in
this
manner
,
how
were
they
determin'd
by
the
Will
of
God
,
since
God
being
free
,
as
the
Author
will
not
deny
,
he
might
,
if
he
had
pleas'd
,
have
not
determin'd
them
to
be
immutable
[
](A51674-1-5)(e)
.
And
if
so
,
they
are
immutable
only
by
Grace
,
because
God
will'd
it
so
,
and
determin'd
them
to
that
state
of
immutability
.
This
being
so
,
how
come
they
to
be
immutable
by
their
Nature
,
since
it
was
possible
for
them
to
be
liable
to
change
?
But
if
it
were
not
possible
for
them
to
be
subject
to
change
,
how
could
they
be
determin'd
by
God
to
be
immutable
?
and
how
could
he
have
fix'd
them
by
the
operation
of
his
Will
?
The
Author
may
explain
himself
upon
this
Point
,
if
he
think
convenient
;
mean
time
it
is
no
little
concern
to
know
whether
God
can
change
the
Essences
of
things
,
and
make
two
Contradictories
true
at
the
same
time
;
for
as
a
celebrated
Divine
of
our
Age
has
said
upon
the
same
words
that
are
now
under
examination
,
Is
God
the
Author
of
the
Truth
of
his
own
Existence
?
Or
ought
we
to
affirm
that
we
can
form
a
right-lined
Triangle
,
whose
three
Angles
shall
be
greater
than
two
Rights
;
or
that
shall
have
one
Side
longer
than
the
other
two
?
In
a
word
,
if
it
be
possible
for
Contradictories
to
be
true
and
false
at
the
same
time
,
what
will
become
of
humane
Reasoning
?
And
what
shall
we
say
to
those
Theological
Conclusions
,
which
assure
us
that
God
is
not
Corporeal
,
that
he
is
not
subject
to
Change
,
that
he
has
always
been
?
[
](A51674-1-6)(f)
&c.
[
](A51674-1-7)(g)
Might
we
not
say
in
following
this
Hypothesis
,
that
its
possible
for
him
to
have
been
eternally
,
and
not
to
have
been
eternally
;
that
he
is
liable
and
not
liable
to
change
?
I
mean
not
to
pronounce
upon
so
difficult
a
Question
,
but
I
may
affirm
the
Author
had
no
right
to
do
it
,
especially
in
the
Circumstances
he
has
done
it
,
and
without
alleadging
sufficient
Proofs
.
Yet
methinks
I
perceive
a
shew
of
Reasoning
in
these
words
,
and
by
the
Will
of
God
which
is
not
subject
to
change
.
He
seems
to
consider
the
Will
of
God
as
the
Cause
of
the
Necessity
of
these
Truths
.
But
if
so
,
he
proves
too
much
in
the
place
where
we
complain
he
proves
nothing
at
all
;
for
if
what
God
wills
be
immutable
,
because
his
Will
is
not
subject
to
change
;
it
follows
that
whatever
he
wills
,
must
have
an
equal
immutability
,
since
it
is
the
same
Will
which
is
the
Cause
of
it
:
Mean
while
it
is
certain
he
wills
things
which
are
subject
to
change
,
when
he
determines
the
Existence
or
Non-existence
of
Creatures
in
the
Vicissitude
of
times
[
](A51674-1-8)(h)
.
Thus
though
God
should
have
fix'd
these
Truths
but
for
some
Ages
,
his
Will
thereby
would
be
no
less
immutable
,
than
for
his
producing
daily
all
those
admirable
changes
which
make
the
Beauty
of
the
Universe
.
But
the
Author
will
say
,
God
wills
that
these
Truths
should
be
immutable
for
ever
.
But
how
could
he
know
this
,
had
he
any
particular
Revelation
?
yet
he
speaks
as
possitively
as
if
he
was
very
certain
.
It
may
be
he
bottoms
upon
this
,
that
if
these
Truths
seem
immutable
to
us
whilst
they
are
subject
to
change
,
we
should
err
in
pretending
to
Science
[
](A51674-1-9)(l)
.
But
if
it
were
so
,
all
that
could
thence
be
concluded
is
that
the
first
Philosophers
,
the
Academicks
and
Pyrronists
,
have
better
Philosophiz'd
than
the
Peripateticks
,
Cartesians
,
and
other
Dogmatists
;
and
I
do
not
believe
the
Author
would
establish
his
Philosophy
upon
such
a
Sophism
,
unless
there
were
necessary
Truths
,
we
could
have
no
true
Science
;
therefore
there
are
necessary
Truths
.
[
](A51674-1-10)(m)
But
though
we
might
suppose
there
were
necessary
Truths
in
Physick
,
Medicine
,
&c.
and
might
determine
about
this
Question
,
without
being
utterly
excluded
from
the
knowledge
of
Truth
.
Though
these
Truths
were
necessary
by
their
Nature
,
and
their
immutability
by
some
new
Mystery
was
still
an
effect
of
the
free
determination
of
the
Will
of
God
.
Though
the
necessity
of
these
Truths
proceeded
from
the
immutability
of
this
Will
,
whilst
yet
it
is
the
Cause
of
all
the
Changes
happening
in
the
Universe
.
Though
we
should
be
moreover
assur'd
that
God
had
resolv'd
to
preserve
these
Truths
in
an
entire
immutability
.
We
must
still
suppose
in
order
to
enter
into
his
Opinion
,
the
knowledge
of
the
Existence
of
God
and
of
his
Will
,
of
his
Liberty
and
of
his
Power
.
[
](A51674-1-11)(n)
Which
obliges
me
to
make
some
Reflexions
upon
what
he
has
borrowed
from
Faith
to
add
to
Reasons
Philosophical
,
which
is
what
we
may
look
upon
as
his
third
Supposition
.
After
having
prov'd
that
we
must
yield
only
to
Evidence
,
except
in
matters
of
Faith
,
which
are
not
submitted
to
the
disquisition
of
Reason
;
I
conclude
with
these
words
.
Page
9.
Mysteries
then
of
Faith
must
be
distinguished
from
things
of
Nature
:
we
ought
equally
to
submit
to
Faith
and
to
Evidence
,
but
in
the
concernments
of
Faith
we
must
not
look
for
Evidence
,
as
in
those
of
Nature
we
ought
not
to
take
up
with
Faith
;
that
is
,
with
the
Authority
of
Philosophers
.
In
a
word
,
to
be
a
Believer
't
is
required
to
assent
blindly
,
but
to
be
a
Philosopher
it
is
necessary
to
see
plainly
.
Mysteries
of
Faith
must
be
distinguished
from
things
of
Nature
.
Thus
judiciously
speaks
the
Author
,
and
concludes
with
these
words
,
which
might
even
pass
for
[
](A51674-1-12)(o)
a
Proverb
:
To
be
a
Believer
't
is
requir'd
to
assent
blindly
,
but
to
be
a
Philosopher
't
is
necessary
to
see
plainly
.
Mean
while
I
wonder
he
observes
not
in
his
Book
the
Resolution
he
made
of
not
[
](A51674-1-23)(p)
mingling
the
concerns
of
Religion
with
the
decisions
of
Philosophy
:
for
it
's
too
visible
that
one
half
of
his
Book
is
nothing
but
Reflexions
upon
original
Sin
,
deprav'd
Manners
,
and
corrupt
Inclinations
,
which
Christian
Morality
is
to
correct
.
[
](A51674-1-13)(q)
I
blame
not
his
Piety
in
this
,
nor
believe
it
a
thing
unbecoming
a
Christian
to
labour
upon
these
Subjects
.
But
that
ought
to
be
reserv'd
for
Sermons
.
[
](A51674-1-14)(r)
Or
if
he
had
design'd
to
take
the
occasion
of
insinuating
these
Morals
,
as
knowing
that
the
true
way
of
moving
the
Heart
pathetically
is
to
do
it
by
discovering
to
the
Mind
the
Truths
that
are
of
nearest
concernment
to
it
;
he
might
have
satisfied
that
laudable
desire
,
but
should
have
contriv'd
for
that
purpose
particular
Chapters
,
which
he
has
done
too
in
some
places
.
But
once
more
,
a
very
little
thing
will
serve
to
confound
the
Light
we
begin
to
receive
in
the
Search
after
Truth
.
[
](A51674-1-15)(s)
We
cannot
at
the
same
time
satisfie
both
Reason
and
Faith
,
since
Reason
obliges
us
to
open
our
Eyes
,
and
Faith
commands
us
to
shut
them
.
[
](A51674-1-16)(t)
And
yet
I
find
he
has
so
interwoven
his
principal
Propositions
with
the
Credenda
of
Religion
,
that
he
seems
to
talk
more
like
a
Divine
than
Philosopher
.
For
example
,
Page
6.
among
other
things
he
concludes
,
That
[
](A51674-1-17)(u)
if
the
Will
had
not
this
Liberty
,
but
must
have
embrac'd
every
thing
that
came
cloath'd
with
an
appearance
of
Truth
,
it
would
have
almost
ever
been
deceived
;
whence
probably
it
might
be
concluded
that
the
Author
of
its
Being
was
the
Author
of
its
Errours
and
Seducements
.
And
afterwards
,
We
have
therefore
a
Liberty
given
us
by
God
,
that
we
might
avoid
falling
into
Errour
.
'T
is
visible
this
reasoning
is
founded
on
the
Author
's
supposing
God
will
not
deceive
us
[
](A51674-1-18)(x)
.
But
may
it
not
be
doubted
whether
God
has
not
made
us
for
the
enjoyment
of
probability
only
,
and
resolv'd
to
reserve
the
knowledge
of
Truth
as
his
own
peculiar
;
or
whether
he
designs
not
this
as
a
pure
accession
to
our
Happiness
[
](A51674-1-19)(y)
in
Heaven
;
wherefore
we
ought
not
to
conclude
that
he
would
be
a
Deceiver
,
if
he
should
not
afford
us
the
means
of
discovering
it
.
[
](A51674-1-20)(z)
I
leave
it
,
Sir
,
to
you
to
think
what
the
Pyrronists
would
say
,
if
they
should
hear
this
arguing
.
Many
such
there
are
in
the
process
of
this
piece
,
especially
in
the
last
part
,
whereof
most
Chapters
contain
Arguments
which
include
theological
Questions
[
](A51674-1-21)(a)
.
[
](A51674-1-22)(b)
Whether
then
he
considers
all
these
Suppositions
as
Articles
of
Faith
,
or
regards
them
as
Truths
demonstrable
by
Philosophy
,
he
ought
still
to
distinguish
them
from
the
Fundamentals
of
his
Work
.
If
he
considers
them
as
Articles
of
Faith
,
he
is
very
well
p●rsuaded
they
are
obscure
:
If
he
looks
on
them
as
conclusions
of
Humane
Science
,
his
Method
ought
to
precede
them
,
and
not
imploy
them
as
Principles
to
depend
upon
.
If
I
thought
the
World
would
be
concern'd
to
know
exactly
that
the
Animadverter
has
not
understood
what
he
has
pretended
to
encounter
,
I
would
thus
continue
him
on
to
the
end
of
his
Book
,
and
would
make
it
undeniably
appear
that
he
has
hardly
ever
taken
my
Sense
,
and
that
he
had
no
Idea
of
my
Design
;
but
I
believe
that
reasonable
Men
will
be
very
indifferent
in
this
particular
:
and
therefore
not
to
weary
them
to
no
purpose
,
and
yet
to
discharge
that
Debt
which
some
persons
think
I
owe
to
Truth
,
I
will
answer
in
few
words
all
the
Chapters
of
the
Animadversions
;
and
I
desire
such
as
shall
have
leasure
and
curiosity
enough
,
to
examine
whether
my
Answers
are
just
,
by
confronting
the
Animadversions
with
the
Search
.
In
the
fourth
Article
or
Chapter
,
the
Animadverter
opposes
my
Opinions
at
large
,
without
knowing
them
.
He
does
not
consider
there
are
two
sorts
of
Traces
,
one
which
the
Mind
forms
to
represent
things
by
,
as
the
Trace
which
accompanies
the
Idea
of
a
Square
;
the
other
which
accompanies
abstract
Ideas
but
represents
them
not
;
such
are
the
Traces
which
the
Sound
of
Words
and
the
Sight
of
Characters
produce
in
the
Brain
,
which
naturally
have
no
power
to
represent
or
raise
Ideas
.
This
one
Distinction
overthrows
the
grand
Reasonings
of
our
Author
.
In
this
fifth
Chapter
he
puts
upon
me
many
Opinions
which
I
never
had
.
'T
is
not
true
,
That
I
acknowledge
all
our
Ideas
to
be
but
Modes
of
our
Soul
's
existing
.
Page
44.
On
the
contrary
,
I
have
in
the
third
Book
which
he
reflects
on
,
given
a
Chapter
on
purpose
to
shew
that
Opinion
indefensible
.
When
a
Man
will
play
the
Critick
,
't
is
fit
,
methinks
,
he
should
read
the
Book
he
takes
to
task
.
Page
47.
Nor
is
it
true
,
that
I
own
that
the
Ideas
we
receive
by
the
Senses
,
represent
only
the
Effects
produc'd
in
us
by
external
Objects
.
I
have
said
the
contrary
in
several
places
,
in
the
fifteenth
Chapter
of
the
first
Book
,
and
elsewhere
.
Why
does
he
not
cite
,
or
rather
why
does
he
not
examine
what
he
Criticises
on
?
For
what
remains
,
I
cannot
distinctly
conceive
all
the
Argumentations
he
here
makes
.
I
know
not
the
Reason
of
them
:
those
who
attentively
read
them
may
think
of
them
what
they
please
.
But
I
scruple
not
to
affirm
,
that
he
is
so
far
from
impugning
my
Opinion
about
the
manner
of
the
Minds
perceiving
external
Objects
;
that
on
the
contrary
,
what
he
says
in
this
Article
shews
he
knows
nothing
of
it
.
In
his
sixth
Chapter
,
he
imposes
on
me
what
he
calls
my
sixth
Supposition
;
or
rather
he
has
no
knowledge
of
my
Opinion
upon
that
Subject
:
To
me
he
seems
not
so
much
as
to
have
read
what
I
have
written
on
it
;
Page
56
,
57.
he
affirms
in
several
places
that
I
bottom
upon
Mr.
des
Cartes
's
resolution
upon
that
Question
,
when
yet
my
Opinion
is
intirely
different
from
his
.
But
't
is
evident
to
all
that
understand
Mr.
des
Cartes
,
and
have
read
what
I
have
said
upon
that
Question
,
that
the
Author
neither
understands
mine
nor
Mr.
des
Cartes's
Opinions
.
Mean-while
he
argues
vehemently
without
knowing
what
he
opposes
,
and
even
sometimes
without
discovering
what
he
aims
at
.
The
Author
is
very
much
in
the
wrong
in
his
seventh
Chapter
,
to
require
me
to
prove
the
Existence
of
Extension
,
Page
62.
when
I
mean
only
to
assault
the
Errours
of
the
Senses
in
point
of
sensible
Qualities
,
and
I
should
have
repented
if
I
had
follow'd
that
Method
.
I
prove
what
is
serviceable
to
me
in
the
sequel
,
and
I
establish
nothing
upon
the
Supposition
he
attributes
to
me
.
Page
64.
Moreover
I
cannot
tell
how
it
came
into
his
Head
,
after
seven
years
,
to
complain
of
an
Answer
of
Monsieur
Rohault
;
he
should
have
replied
to
it
whilst
he
was
alive
,
but
he
wanted
courage
:
for
every
one
knows
with
what
accuracy
and
force
that
learned
Man
repell'd
the
Blows
that
were
offer'd
him
,
and
with
two
or
three
words
,
pronounc'd
without
all
manner
of
Heat
and
Passion
,
humbled
the
Imagination
of
such
as
being
full
of
themselves
,
thought
to
cover
him
with
confusion
.
In
answer
to
the
eighth
Chapter
,
I
desire
the
Author
to
take
notice
,
first
,
that
there
is
difference
between
an
Evil
,
Page
80.
and
the
Representation
of
it
;
and
therefore
the
Will
may
fly
the
former
,
and
yet
aquiesce
in
the
latter
.
Secondly
,
that
though
the
Will
be
nothing
but
the
natural
Motion
of
the
Soul
towards
Good
in
general
?
yet
the
Rest
or
Acquiescence
of
the
Soul
in
evident
Truths
proceeds
from
the
Will
,
because
Rest
is
produ'd
by
Motion
.
God
will
still
imprint
on
us
this
natural
Motion
of
Love
,
when
we
shall
intirely
repose
our selves
upon
him
.
For
the
Motion
of
Love
doth
not
cease
by
the
possession
of
Good
,
and
by
the
view
of
Truth
,
as
Motion
of
Bodies
is
interrupted
by
Rest.
We
might
say
farther
,
that
even
Bodies
rest
not
as
capable
of
Figures
,
but
with
respect
to
Motion
.
The
rest
need
no
Answer
,
if
the
Reader
will
carefully
consider
those
places
in
the
Search
which
he
attacks
;
for
't
is
needless
to
answer
Objections
which
vanish
upon
a
distinct
Understanding
of
what
I
have
written
,
though
they
appear
considerable
in
themselves
.
In
the
ninth
Chapter
the
Author
opposes
my
own
Objections
,
and
neglects
the
Answers
I
have
given
them
;
and
not
knowing
there
are
several
sorts
of
Liberty
,
he
fancies
,
with
a
great
deal
of
Joy
,
that
I
have
fallen
into
a
Contradiction
.
I
have
nothing
to
say
to
his
Tenth
Chapter
,
but
that
what
he
comments
on
seems
too
clear
to
stand
in
need
of
his
Reflexions
;
Page
98.
and
that
I
think
it
cannot
reasonably
be
doubted
there
is
a
City
in
Italy
call'd
Rome
,
though
it
cannot
be
mathematically
demonstrated
.
In
the
eleventh
Chapter
,
the
Author
does
not
observe
that
I
have
referred
to
some
Books
of
St.
Austin
,
and
the
Meditations
of
Mr.
des
Cartes
,
to
prove
a
thing
,
which
yet
is
sufficiently
receiv'd
,
and
which
he
pretends
I
had
no
right
to
suppose
.
He
ought
to
know
my
Design
was
not
to
establish
a
System
,
and
to
remember
that
all
I
vigorously
demand
,
is
,
to
enter
into
some
diffidence
of
our
Senses
;
as
I
have
caution'd
in
the
last
Chapter
concerning
the
Errours
of
the
Senses
.
In
answer
to
the
Consequences
he
infers
in
his
Twelfth
Chapter
,
against
an
Example
alleadg'd
by
me
,
and
which
he
will
have
to
pass
for
an
Head
of
my
Method
,
we
need
but
say
,
that
Men
ought
to
reason
only
upon
their
clear
and
distinct
Ideas
,
whithout
being
sollicitous
about
what
they
cannot
reach
;
and
that
't
is
not
necessary
to
know
whether
there
are
actually
Bodies
without
us
,
to
conclude
many
Physical
Truths
.
I
have
no
more
to
say
to
his
Thirteenth
Chapter
,
but
that
I
wish
a
Man
would
attentively
read
what
I
have
said
concerning
the
manner
of
our
knowing
the
Soul
,
in
the
Seventh
Chapter
of
the
Second
Part
of
the
Third
Book
,
and
the
Chapter
following
,
where
I
speak
of
the
Essence
of
Matter
.
Last
of
all
,
to
do
justice
to
the
Reasonings
of
the
last
Chapter
;
it
suffices
to
know
distinctly
my
manner
of
explaining
how
we
see
external
Objects
.
This
is
all
I
thought
necessary
to
answer
to
the
Animadverter
,
as
being
persuaded
that
those
who
thoroughly
conceive
my
Notion
will
have
no
need
of
an
Illustration
upon
the
pretended
Difficulties
he
urges
to
me
;
and
others
who
have
not
read
nor
comprehended
the
things
I
treat
of
in
the
Book
he
opposes
,
would
not
understand
the
largest
Answers
I
could
give
them
.
'T
is
sufficiently
manifest
from
the
three
first
Chapters
of
the
Animadversions
,
which
I
have
refuted
more
at
large
,
what
,
we
are
to
think
of
the
other
,
which
I
have
answerd
in
a
word
or
two
.
Those
who
have
Time
and
Inclination
may
examine
them
more
exactly
:
but
for
my
own
part
I
should
think
I
wasted
both
my
own
time
and
that
of
others
,
if
I
should
stay
to
collect
all
the
Paralogisms
which
are
scatter'd
through
his
Book
,
to
acquaint
those
persons
with
them
,
who
doubtless
have
little
or
no
desire
to
know
them
.
The
Reason
and
Judgment
of
worthy
Men
cannot
suffer
those
long-winded
Discourses
,
which
tend
to
no
good
,
but
onely
shew
the
Spleen
and
ill
Humour
of
their
Authors
;
and
't
is
a
ridiculous
thing
to
imagine
that
others
interess
themselves
in
our
Quarrels
,
and
to
call
them
to
be
Witnesses
of
the
weakness
and
vain
efforts
of
our
Adversary
.
He
that
attacks
me
has
no
reason
to
find
fault
with
my
manner
of
Defence
;
for
if
I
answer
not
all
his
Animadversions
in
an
ample
way
,
't
is
not
because
I
despise
him
.
He
may
conclude
,
that
I
should
not
have
warded
off
the
Blows
he
design'd
me
,
if
I
did
not
think
him
able
to
hurt
me
;
and
I
think
I
have
more
reason
to
complain
of
the
negligence
of
his
Animadverting
,
than
he
has
to
be
angry
at
my
manner
of
answering
him
.
Had
our
Author
zealously
buckled
to
engage
me
,
I
am
persuaded
he
had
found
me
Exercise
;
for
I
judge
not
of
the
Strength
of
his
Parts
by
a
venturous
Sally
of
his
Pen
,
which
he
seems
only
to
make
by
way
of
Pastime
.
Thus
the
negligence
he
manifests
is
to
my
advantage
,
and
for
my
part
I
complain
not
of
his
remisness
,
as
being
unworthy
his
Application
and
his
Anger
.
All
that
I
am
sorry
for
,
is
,
that
he
speaks
not
seriously
of
serious
things
;
that
he
sports
with
Truth
,
and
wants
some
of
that
Respect
which
is
due
to
the
Publick
,
when
he
trys
to
over-wit
it
several
different
ways
,
as
this
Answer
in
part
has
manifested
.
If
I
have
been
oblig'd
to
speak
of
him
as
I
have
done
on
some
occasions
,
he
must
thank
no
body
but
himself
;
for
I
have
suppress'd
,
for
fear
of
displeasing
him
,
many
Expressions
and
Thoughts
,
which
his
manner
of
acting
breeds
naturally
in
the
Mind
.
I
have
so
great
an
Aversion
to
all
useless
Con●ests
,
and
that
are
prejudicial
to
Charity
,
that
I
will
never
answer
those
who
oppose
me
without
understanding
me
,
or
whose
Discourses
give
me
some
reason
to
believe
they
have
some
other
motive
than
the
Love
of
Truth
.
As
for
others
I
shall
endeavour
to
satisfie
them
.
I
see
plainly
,
that
if
I
were
oblig'd
to
answer
all
that
have
the
good
Will
of
assaulting
me
,
I
should
scarce
ever
enjoy
the
repose
I
desire
.
But
as
there
is
no
Law
in
France
which
hinders
them
from
speaking
,
so
there
is
none
which
forbids
me
to
be
silent
.
It
may
be
whilst
I
am
silent
,
my
Insulters
may
find
themselves
ill
treated
by
some
invisible
hand
;
for
I
cannot
help
it
,
if
the
Love
of
Truth
provokes
some
Wits
,
who
might
do
it
with
better
Grace
,
to
defend
a
Work
in
which
they
had
no
part
.
But
I
wish
this
promise
I
make
,
and
freely
without
any
constraint
,
may
be
remembred
;
and
that
those
Writings
may
not
be
imputed
to
me
,
which
I
might
make
,
but
which
I
declare
I
never
will
.
Mean-time
I
think
that
those
that
have
nothing
solid
to
oppose
to
me
,
had
much
better
say
nothing
,
than
fatigue
the
World
with
Writings
,
which
break
Charity
,
and
are
useless
to
the
discovery
of
Truth
.
ANSWER
.
(a)
'T
IS
because
this
is
more
certain
than
any
thing
else
,
and
that
there
is
nothing
certain
if
this
be
not
.
For
if
Two
times
Two
are
necessarily
equal
to
Four
,
if
a
Whole
be
necessarily
bigger
than
its
Part
,
there
are
necessary
Truths
.
I
know
not
for
what
reason
the
Animadverter
would
have
me
think
of
proving
what
cannot
be
prov'd
,
unless
by
something
more
obscure
and
difficult
.
This
is
not
to
Philosophize
[
](A51674-e76190-b)*
*
Pref.
Page
4.
after
the
manner
of
the
ancient
Academy
.
(b)
This
is
curious
and
far
fetch'd
.
All
the
first
Philosophers
,
except
Parmenides
,
have
denied
there
were
necessary
and
contingent
Truths
.
What
wonder
is
it
?
'T
is
a
fine
thing
,
this
Erudition
;
certainly
Meditation
can
never
teach
us
what
we
learn
from
the
reading
the
Ancients
,
though
we
understand
them
but
by
halves
.
But
't
is
visible
that
our
Author
understands
the
old
Philosophers
no
better
than
the
new
.
(c)
I
say
indeed
that
ought
to
make
a
Question
apart
,
but
he
will
let
it
have
no
part
.
(d)
The
demand
is
pleasant
,
but
the
Author
would
not
have
made
it
,
if
he
had
but
read
the
Third
Book
of
the
Search
after
Truth
,
since
I
have
there
clearly
given
my
Thoughts
upon
these
things
.
But
it
seems
our
Author
takes
Truths
for
certain
little
Beings
,
which
are
born
and
die
every
Moment
.
(e)
There
are
two
sorts
of
immutable
Truths
.
Some
are
immutable
of
themselves
,
or
by
their
Nature
,
as
that
twice
Two
are
Four
;
and
others
because
they
have
been
determin'd
by
the
Will
of
God
,
which
is
not
subject
to
change
;
as
that
a
Bowl
should
move
another
on
such
an
encounter
.
'T
is
easie
to
see
he
has
not
understood
what
he
pretends
to
oppose
.
He
was
not
aware
that
the
Conjuctive
Particle
and
had
sometimes
the
same
purport
as
the
Disjunctive
or
;
for
if
he
had
observ'd
it
,
he
could
with
no
good
Grace
have
seriously
wrangled
upon
the
Ambiguity
of
a
Particle
.
He
might
have
easily
consider'd
that
Truths
which
are
Necessary
by
their
Nature
,
as
that
Two
times
Two
make
Four
,
need
not
the
Will
of
God
to
make
them
such
.
But
be
it
granted
,
that
I
had
not
sufficiently
explain'd
my self
;
yet
the
place
on
which
he
criticises
being
but
accessary
to
my
Design
,
it
was
not
necessary
to
explain
my self
more
at
large
.
Would
a
Man
be
at
the
pains
of
reading
it
,
he
might
see
I
needed
only
to
say
,
there
were
necessary
Truths
,
and
that
I
was
not
oblig'd
to
examine
the
cause
of
their
nececessity
.
(f)
For
my
part
I
know
not
what
he
drives
at
:
this
is
a
very
commodious
way
of
criticising
;
a
Man
has
Reason
whenever
he
desires
it
.
(g)
He
imposes
on
me
three
Falsities
in
six
Lines
.
I
have
never
determin'd
upon
this
Question
,
neither
in
undue
Circumstances
,
nor
with
insufficient
Proofs
;
for
I
have
not
so
much
as
spoken
of
it
;
but
if
he
has
a
mind
to
know
my
Thoughts
of
it
,
I
fear
not
to
affirm
that
God
cannot
cause
Contradictories
to
be
true
and
false
at
the
same
time
.
(h)
He
confounds
Beings
with
Truths
.
Man
is
capable
of
Reason
and
Sense
.
A
Globe
may
be
divided
into
two
Hemispheres
.
A
Man
and
a
Globe
are
subject
to
change
,
but
these
Truths
are
immutable
.
(l)
All
this
concerns
not
me
,
but
only
shews
the
Fecundity
of
our
Author
.
(m)
Consider
,
if
you
please
,
all
these
Flourishes
,
endeavour
to
understand
them
,
and
admire
how
the
Imagination
seduces
Reason
:
I
think
our
Author
may
be
said
to
resemble
a
Man
,
who
imagining
he
sees
his
Enemy
at
hand
,
should
presently
charge
against
the
Phantom
,
should
pierce
it
with
his
Sword
,
should
cut
off
its
Head
;
and
then
,
over-joy'd
with
so
successful
and
easie
a
Conquest
,
should
triumphantly
exclaim
,
though
my
Pistols
had
miscarried
,
my
sword
had
run
him
through
;
but
though
my
Sword
had
missed
him
,
yet
I
had
cut
off
his
Head
;
but
lastly
,
though
his
Head
should
have
remained
upon
his
Shoulders
,
yet
I
found
him
so
feeble
and
easily
to
be
conquered
,
that
I
had
nothing
to
fear
from
him
.
'T
is
visible
from
all
these
Flourishes
,
that
our
Author
fancies
he
has
severely
handled
me
,
whilst
yet
I
am
as
insensible
of
his
Wounds
,
as
the
Enemy
the
poor
Man
thought
he
had
so
cruelly
Butcher'd
.
(n)
I
ought
in
our
Author's
opinion
to
have
begun
with
Theology
to
prove
methodically
there
are
necessary
and
contingent
Truths
:
but
I
do
not
believe
that
Conduct
would
have
had
the
Approbation
of
many
People
;
and
seeing
it
is
an
hard
task
to
content
the
Criticks
,
I
cannot
believe
our
Animadverter
would
have
been
well
satisfied
.
This
third
Head
,
which
I
am
going
to
comment
on
,
as
on
the
preceding
,
sufficiently
shews
us
what
he
is
.
(o)
I
know
not
whether
what
I
say
ought
to
be
rank'd
amongst
Proverbs
and
Quibbles
,
for
that
depends
upon
the
Tast
;
and
I
refer
my self
to
those
whom
the
Passion
for
criticising
has
not
made
over
scrupulous
and
dainty
.
They
likewise
may
reflect
whether
this
niceness
suits
well
with
the
Author
of
this
Discourse
,
and
whether
he
ought
so
much
to
pretend
to
an
exquisite
Tast.
(q)
Can
he
not
see
that
these
things
are
not
of
themselves
Articles
of
Faith
,
and
that
we
may
speak
of
the
Goodness
of
God
,
deprav'd
Manners
,
and
corrupt
Inclinations
without
having
recourse
to
Faith
.
(
p
)
There
's
a
great
difference
between
mingling
and
confounding
.
I
shall
always
distinguish
things
of
Faith
from
those
of
Nature
,
as
I
here
say
ought
to
be
done
.
But
I
never
made
a
Resolution
not
to
speak
of
God
or
Christian
Morality
in
treating
about
the
Search
after
Truth
.
The
Author
seems
not
to
understand
me
,
that
he
may
play
the
Critick
with
less
trouble
.
(r)
There
are
in
these
Animadversions
some
little
Raileries
which
provoke
to
Pity
,
but
this
might
raise
ones
Indignation
.
Let
him
know
once
for
all
,
that
if
I
consented
to
the
Publication
of
this
Book
,
't
was
chiefly
because
it
contains
those
things
which
he
condemns
as
Enthusiasms
.
Page
12.
(s)
If
he
speaks
of
himself
,
we
ought
to
take
his
word
for
it
.
(t)
What
he
has
said
is
true
,
but
what
he
goes
to
conclude
from
it
is
false
,
it
being
Reason
and
not
Faith
which
teaches
us
God
is
no
Deceiver
.
(u)
He
has
here
suppress'd
two
words
,
which
give
all
the
force
to
my
reasoning
,
which
runs
thus
,
If
it
must
infallibly
and
necessarily
have
embrac'd
every
thing
;
we
shall
see
by
and
by
what
reason
he
had
for
this
Retrenchment
.
(x)
Reason
teaches
us
,
that
God
is
no
Deceiver
,
and
Faith
supposes
it
;
which
is
quite
contrary
to
what
the
Animadverter
imagines
.
(y)
It
cannot
be
doubted
when
we
have
Reasons
for
it
;
but
it
is
needless
to
stand
to
answer
all
these
Questions
.
(z)
I
do
not
conclude
it
with
that
Argument
:
Mine
is
good
,
and
this
good
for
nothing
;
there
is
difference
between
INFALLIBLY
and
NECESSARILY
forcing
us
to
embrace
Errour
,
and
not
giving
us
the
means
to
discover
Truth
.
Certainly
these
words
,
Infallibly
and
Necessarily
,
ought
not
to
be
suppress'd
.
(a)
He
cannot
shew
a
place
in
the
whole
Book
he
animadverts
on
,
where
I
suppose
any
Article
of
Faith
as
a
Principle
from
whence
to
draw
any
Consequences
Essential
to
the
Search
of
Truth
.
But
he
imagines
if
a
Man
speaks
but
of
the
Goodness
of
God
,
deprav'd
Manners
,
and
corrupt
Inclinations
,
he
is
treating
of
some
Article
of
Faith
.
(b)
Methinks
these
two
Conclusions
have
no
other
aim
than
to
gain
by
surprise
some
little
Applauses
from
such
as
give
them
gratis
.
ADVERTISEMENT
.
SInce
the
first
Impression
of
this
second
part
,
two
Books
have
been
publish'd
relating
to
it
.
The
first
entituled
,
Animadversions
upon
the
Animadversions
on
the
Search
after
Truth
,
wherein
is
discovered
,
&c.
I
am
highly
oblig'd
to
the
Author
of
these
Animadversions
for
the
Honour
he
seems
to
do
me
by
the
Title
of
his
Book
;
but
since
this
Title
may
make
the
World
believe
I
had
some
hand
in
his
Work
,
I
think
my self
oblig'd
to
say
,
that
though
I
am
very
well
satisfied
with
his
Person
,
I
am
not
extremely
pleas'd
with
his
Book
.
Methinks
that
those
who
meddle
in
defending
or
opposing
others
,
ought
to
read
their
Works
carefully
,
so
as
to
be
throughly
acquainted
with
their
Opinions
.
But
the
Search
after
Truth
,
you
'll
say
,
merits
not
the
Application
of
Men
of
Parts
:
True
,
it
deserves
not
therefore
that
the
Person
spoken
of
,
who
undoubtedly
is
a
Man
of
great
Sense
and
Worth
should
either
impugn
or
defend
it
.
The
Title
of
the
second
Book
runs
thus
;
The
Animadverter's
Answer
to
the
Preface
of
the
second
Volume
of
the
Search
after
Truth
,
wherein
is
examin'd
&c.
I
intreat
those
who
interess
themselves
in
the
difference
of
others
,
not
to
believe
me
on
my
bare
word
,
nor
easily
to
imagine
I
am
in
the
right
.
I
think
I
have
Liberty
to
demand
of
them
,
that
they
will
carefully
examine
the
Answers
I
have
made
to
the
Animadversions
in
that
Preface
,
and
the
Argumentations
of
the
Animadverter
,
in
reference
to
the
Book
oppos'd
?
so
I
think
I
may
without
offence
to
the
Author
of
this
Answer
,
require
of
those
who
would
judge
of
it
,
not
to
imagine
he
has
reason
on
his
side
,
upon
a
slight
and
transient
reading
of
his
Book
.
I
desire
them
not
to
judge
of
any
of
his
Answers
before
having
examined
it
,
with
reference
to
this
Preface
and
the
preceeding
Books
.
Take
here
for
an
instance
the
first
of
his
Answers
,
which
begins
thus
.
Vpon
what
the
Author
of
the
Search
pretends
,
the
Animadverter
imposes
on
him
touching
his
Design
[
](A51674-e76650-b)(a)
(a)
Page
1
▪
The
Animadverter's
Answer
.
.
'T
is
not
imposing
on
him
,
to
make
his
Book
pass
for
a
Collection
of
Observations
,
thought
by
him
useful
to
the
discovery
of
Truth
.
'T
is
plain
I
have
positively
declared
that
I
look
upon
his
Book
,
as
a
Collection
of
many
Remarks
,
&c.
If
the
Author
had
consider'd
these
words
,
he
would
not
have
accus'd
me
of
imposing
on
him
:
for
he
could
not
deny
but
he
had
a
Design
of
offering
something
serviceable
to
the
discovery
of
Truth
,
which
is
all
that
I
attributed
to
him
.
And
lower
,
Wherein
I
even
prove
that
that
is
not
to
be
imputed
to
him
,
which
he
affirms
I
impose
upon
him
.
Lastly
,
he
concludes
this
Article
with
these
words
;
'T
is
therefore
evident
the
Author
of
the
Search
cannot
prove
I
impose
on
him
,
unless
he
will
maintain
he
had
a
Design
of
writing
a
Book
altogether
useless
to
the
Search
of
Truth
.
These
Words
might
possibly
make
a
Man
imagine
,
I
had
without
Reason
accus'd
the
Animadverter
of
imposing
on
me
in
the
Design
of
the
Search
;
but
whoever
would
but
confront
what
he
here
says
with
the
foregoing
Preface
,
or
with
what
he
has
said
himself
,
pag.
9
,
10.
of
his
Animadversions
,
would
I
hope
be
of
another
mind
.
That
I
may
not
give
the
trouble
of
turning
to
it
,
these
are
my
words
.
Nevertheless
as
he
is
pleas'd
to
make
me
undertake
a
Design
I
do
not
execute
,
that
he
may
have
the
more
to
charge
upon
my
Conduct
,
so
he
goes
to
prove
it
was
my
Design
to
lay
down
a
Method
in
that
Book
.
I
do
him
no
injury
,
says
he
,
in
looking
on
his
Book
as
a
Method
to
lay
the
Foundation
of
the
Sciences
.
For
besides
that
the
Title
expresses
so
much
,
he
declares
himself
upon
the
Point
in
the
following
manner
:
Let
us
examine
the
Causes
and
Nature
of
our
Errours
;
and
since
the
Method
of
examining
things
by
considering
them
in
their
Birth
and
Origin
is
the
most
regular
and
perspicuous
,
and
serves
better
than
others
to
give
us
a
thorough
knowledge
of
them
,
let
us
try
to
put
it
here
in
practice
.
Methinks
these
words
,
I
do
him
no
injury
,
says
he
,
&c.
which
I
cite
out
of
the
Animadversions
,
are
clear
enough
,
and
that
a
Man
need
but
understand
English
to
see
that
the
Animadverter
imposes
on
me
a
Design
of
giving
a
Method
,
and
pretends
too
to
prove
it
by
the
Title
of
the
Search
,
as
also
by
a
passage
of
the
same
Book
;
and
yet
he
boldly
concludes
this
Article
with
these
words
,
'T
is
therefore
evident
the
Author
of
the
Search
cannot
prove
I
impose
on
him
,
&c.
But
what
!
he
has
positively
declar'd
he
look'd
upon
the
Search
after
Truth
,
as
a
Collection
of
many
Observations
.
I
cannot
deny
,
says
he
,
but
he
had
a
Design
of
offering
something
useful
to
the
discovery
of
Truth
,
which
is
ALL
(
mark
that
word
)
I
attribute
to
him
.
Since
he
has
a
mind
to
be
diverted
,
see
my
Answer
.
A
Painter
has
drawn
a
Polyphemus
,
and
standing
behind
his
Piece
,
hears
some
Critick
say
,
Look
here
,
Gentlemen
,
the
Artist
design'd
to
paint
an
Hercules
;
but
if
you
mind
it
,
it
is
a
Polyphemus
.
The
Painter
,
out
of
patience
,
starts
from
behind
the
Scene
,
and
gives
the
Spectators
to
undrestand
,
he
had
no
Design
of
representing
an
Hercules
,
and
that
he
imposes
on
him
.
The
Critick
surpriz'd
,
addresses
the
Painter
,
Sir
,
why
so
angry
?
what
did
you
design
to
represent
?
Polyphemus
,
returns
the
Painter
.
Strange
,
Sir
!
replies
the
Critick
,
why
do
you
say
I
impose
on
you
?
I
call
these
Gentlemen
to
witness
,
that
ALL
that
I
said
,
was
,
you
had
drawn
a
Polyphemus
:
upon
which
the
Painter
withdraws
contented
,
and
says
no
more
.
I
think
my self
therefore
obliged
to
rest
silent
upon
such
like
Answers
.
I
have
shewn
by
the
Animadverter's
own
words
,
that
he
imposes
on
me
a
Design
of
giving
a
Method
in
the
first
Book
of
the
Search
,
and
that
he
likewise
pretends
to
prove
it
.
I
have
cited
the
place
of
the
Animadversions
,
from
whence
I
have
taken
my
proof
.
Nevertheless
,
this
Author
affirms
he
does
not
impose
on
me
;
that
't
is
evident
I
cannot
prove
it
;
that
he
proves
quite
contrary
;
that
what
I
say
he
imposes
on
me
is
not
to
be
imputed
to
me
;
that
ALL
he
atributes
to
me
is
a
Design
of
offering
something
useful
to
the
discovery
of
Truth
.
In
a
word
,
that
he
has
positively
declared
he
look'd
on
the
Search
as
a
Collection
of
many
Observations
?
as
if
from
his
regarding
the
Search
as
a
Collection
,
it
were
to
be
concluded
I
had
no
other
Design
.
I
say
no
more
then
,
but
hope
this
Example
may
keep
Men
from
judging
without
examining
.
I
have
taken
the
three
first
Pages
of
his
Book
,
and
have
not
given
my self
the
liberty
of
chusing
,
which
ought
to
be
consider'd
;
yet
I
intend
not
this
for
an
Answer
,
remembring
the
obligation
I
have
laid
on
my self
at
the
end
of
the
preceding
Preface
;
and
I
had
rather
those
who
think
I
have
not
satisfied
the
Animadversions
,
because
I
have
answer'd
but
three
Chapters
at
length
,
should
say
,
this
Book
whereof
I
answer
but
three
Pages
,
remains
without
Reply
,
than
weary
the
World
with
Answers
,
which
tend
only
to
the
justifyng
other
Replies
.
F.
MALEBRANCHE's
TREATISE
Concerning
the
SEARCH
after
TRUTH
.
TOME
II.
BOOK
V.
CHAP.
I.
Of
the
Nature
and
Original
of
Passions
in
general
.
THE
Mind
of
Man
has
two
essential
or
necessary
Relations
extreamly
different
;
the
one
to
God
,
and
the
other
to
its
Body
.
As
mere
Mind
,
it
is
essentially
united
to
the
Divine
Word
,
the
Eternal
Wisdom
and
Truth
;
since
it
is
only
by
that
Union
that
't
is
capable
of
thinking
,
as
is
proved
in
the
Third
Book
.
As
a
humane
Mind
,
it
has
an
essential
Relation
to
its
Body
,
since
it
is
by
Virtue
of
that
Union
that
it
imagines
and
perceives
by
its
Senses
,
as
is
explained
in
the
First
and
Second
Book
.
We
call
the
Mind
Sense
or
Imagination
,
when
the
Body
is
the
natural
or
occasional
Cause
of
its
Thoughts
:
and
we
call
it
Understanding
,
when
it
acts
by
it self
,
or
rather
,
when
God
acts
in
it
,
or
his
Light
illuminates
it
several
different
ways
,
without
a
necessary
Relation
to
what
is
done
in
the
Body
.
It
's
even
so
with
the
Will
of
man
;
as
a
Will
,
it
essentially
depends
on
the
Love
that
God
bears
to
himself
,
on
the
Eternal
Law
,
and
in
short
on
the
Will
of
God
.
It
is
only
because
God
loves
himself
,
that
we
love
any
thing
;
for
if
God
did
not
love
himself
,
or
did
not
continually
influence
the
Soul
of
man
with
a
Love
like
his
own
;
that
is
,
with
the
Motion
of
Love
,
which
a
Man
feels
in
himself
for
Good
in
general
;
we
should
love
nothing
,
we
should
will
nothing
,
and
consequently
should
be
destitute
of
Will
;
since
Will
is
nothing
else
but
that
Impression
of
Nature
that
carries
us
towards
Good
in
general
,
as
hath
been
said
several
times
[
](A51674-e77190-b)*
*
Book
1.
Chap.
1.
and
elsewhere
.
.
But
the
Will
,
considered
as
the
Will
of
Man
,
essentially
depends
upon
the
Body
,
since
it
is
by
reason
of
the
Motion
of
the
Blood
and
Animal
Spirits
,
that
it
feels
its
self
affected
with
all
its
sensible
Commotions
.
And
therefore
I
have
called
Natural
Inclinations
all
the
Motions
,
which
the
Soul
has
common
with
pure
Intelligences
,
together
with
some
in
which
the
Body
hath
a
great
Share
,
but
of
which
it
is
only
the
indirect
Cause
and
End
,
and
I
have
explained
them
in
the
foregoing
Book
.
—
Here
I
understand
by
Passions
,
All
the
Motions
which
naturally
affect
the
Soul
,
on
occasion
of
the
extraordinary
Motion
of
the
Blood
and
Animal
Spirits
.
And
so
shall
these
sensible
Commotions
be
the
Subject
of
this
Book
.
Though
the
Passions
be
inseparable
from
the
Inclinations
,
and
Men
be
only
susceptible
of
a
sensible
Love
and
Hatred
,
because
they
are
capable
of
a
Spiritual
Love
and
Hatred
;
however
it
was
though
fit
to
treat
of
them
separately
,
in
order
to
prevent
Confusion
.
For
if
it
be
considered
,
That
the
Passions
are
far
stronger
and
livelyer
than
the
Natural
Inclinations
;
that
they
have
for
the
most
part
other
Objects
,
and
are
always
produced
by
different
Causes
:
it
will
be
granted
,
That
we
do
not
distinguish
,
without
Reason
,
things
that
are
inseparable
in
their
own
Nature
.
Men
are
capable
of
Sensations
and
Imaginations
only
because
they
are
capable
of
pure
Intellections
,
the
Senses
and
Imagination
being
inseparable
from
the
Mind
;
and
yet
none
finds
fault
with
those
that
distinctly
treat
of
those
Faculties
of
the
Soul
,
which
are
naturally
inseparable
.
Last
of
all
,
the
Senses
and
Imagination
differ
not
more
from
the
pure
Understanding
,
than
the
Passions
from
the
Inclinations
.
And
therefore
as
the
three
first
Faculties
use
to
be
distinguished
,
so
ought
also
the
two
last
;
that
we
may
the
better
distinguish
what
the
Soul
receives
from
its
Author
,
with
Relation
to
its
Body
,
from
that
which
it
also
has
from
him
,
but
without
that
Relation
.
The
only
Inconveniency
that
may
grow
out
of
the
distinction
of
two
things
so
naturally
united
,
is
the
necessity
of
repeating
some
things
that
had
been
said
before
,
as
is
usual
in
the
like
occasions
.
Man
is
one
,
though
he
be
Compounded
of
several
parts
,
and
the
union
of
those
parts
is
so
intimate
,
that
one
of
them
cannot
be
affected
without
a
Commotion
of
the
whole
.
All
his
Faculties
are
linked
together
,
and
so
subordinated
,
that
it
is
impossible
to
explain
some
of
them
,
without
touching
upon
the
others
.
So
that
when
we
labour
to
find
out
a
Method
to
prevent
Confusion
,
we
necessarily
fall
into
Repetitions
:
but
't
is
better
to
repeat
,
than
not
to
be
Methodical
,
because
we
ought
above
all
to
be
plain
and
intelligible
;
and
therefore
whatever
we
can
doe
in
this
occasion
,
is
to
repeat
,
if
possible
,
without
wearying
the
Reader
.
The
Passions
of
the
Soul
are
Impressions
of
the
Author
of
Nature
,
which
incline
us
to
love
our
Body
▪
and
whatever
is
useful
for
its
preservation
:
As
the
natural
Inclinations
are
Impressions
of
the
same
Author
,
that
principally
move
us
to
love
him
as
the
Sovereign
Good
.
The
natural
or
occasional
Cause
of
these
Impressions
is
the
Motion
of
the
Animal
Spirits
,
which
disperse
through
the
Body
,
to
produce
and
maintain
in
it
a
disposition
suitable
to
the
Object
perceiv'd
,
that
the
Mind
and
Body
may
in
that
conjuncture
mutually
help
each
other
.
For
't
is
the
Institution
of
God
that
our
Willings
be
attended
with
such
Motions
of
our
Body
,
as
are
fit
to
put
them
in
execution
;
and
that
the
Motions
of
our
Body
which
Machinally
rise
in
us
,
at
the
perception
of
some
Object
,
be
follow'd
with
a
Passion
of
the
Soul
,
that
inclines
us
to
will
what
seems
at
that
time
profitable
to
the
Body
.
It
is
the
continual
Impression
of
the
Will
of
God
upon
us
,
that
keeps
us
so
strictly
united
to
a
portion
of
matter
;
for
if
that
Impression
of
his
Will
should
cease
but
a
moment
,
we
should
instantly
be
rid
of
the
Dependency
upon
our
Body
,
and
all
the
Changes
it
undergoes
.
For
I
cannot
understand
what
some
people
imagine
,
that
there
is
a
necessary
Connection
betwixt
the
Motion
of
the
Blood
and
Animal
Spirits
,
and
the
Commotions
of
the
Soul
.
Some
small
Particles
of
Choler
violently
move
in
the
Brain
,
must
therefore
the
Soul
be
agitated
with
some
Passion
,
and
must
that
Passion
be
Anger
rather
than
Love
?
What
Relation
can
there
be
conceived
betwixt
the
Idea
of
an
Enemy's
Imperfections
,
the
Passion
of
Contempt
or
Hatred
,
and
the
Corporeal
Motion
of
some
Particles
of
the
Blood
,
that
beat
against
some
parts
of
the
Brain
?
How
they
can
imagine
that
the
one
depend
upon
the
other
,
and
that
the
Union
or
Connection
of
two
things
so
distant
,
and
so
incompatible
,
as
the
Mind
and
Matter
,
can
be
caused
and
preserved
any
otherwise
,
than
by
the
continual
and
Almighty
Will
of
the
Author
of
Nature
,
is
to
me
unconceivable
.
Those
that
suppose
that
Bodies
necessarily
and
by
themselves
communicate
their
Motion
to
each
other
,
in
the
instant
of
their
concourse
,
make
but
a
probable
supposition
?
neither
is
their
prejudice
altogether
groundless
,
since
Bodies
seem
to
have
an
Essential
Relation
to
Bodies
.
But
the
Mind
and
Body
are
two
sorts
of
Beings
so
opposite
,
that
those
who
think
that
the
Commotions
of
the
Soul
necessarily
follow
upon
the
Motion
of
the
Blood
and
Animal
Spirits
,
do
it
without
the
least
probability
.
For
nothing
but
our
own
Consciousness
of
the
Union
of
those
two
Beings
,
and
the
Ignorance
of
the
continual
Operations
of
God
upon
his
Creatures
,
can
make
us
imagine
another
Cause
of
the
Union
of
our
Soul
and
Body
,
than
the
Will
of
God
.
It
is
hard
to
determine
,
whether
that
Union
or
Connection
of
the
thoughts
of
the
Mind
of
Man
,
with
the
Motions
of
his
Body
,
is
a
punishment
of
Sin
,
or
a
Gift
of
Nature
.
And
some
persons
believe
it
a
rash
and
imprudent
Attempt
to
chuse
one
of
these
Opinions
rather
than
the
other
.
It
is
well
known
,
that
Man
before
his
Sin
was
not
a
Slave
,
but
absolute
Master
of
his
Passions
,
and
that
he
could
,
merely
by
his
Will
,
stop
at
his
pleasure
,
the
Agitation
of
the
Blood
that
caused
them
.
But
we
can
hardly
persuade
our selves
that
the
Body
did
not
importune
the
Soul
of
the
first
Man
to
find
out
such
things
as
were
fit
for
the
preservation
of
his
Life
:
We
can
scarce
believe
but
Adam
before
his
Sin
found
Fruits
pleasant
to
the
sight
and
grateful
to
the
Taste
,
if
we
rightly
consider
the
words
of
the
Holy
Scripture
;
nor
shall
we
come
to
think
that
the
Oeconomy
of
the
Senses
and
Passions
,
which
is
so
wonderfully
contrived
and
adapted
to
the
preservation
of
the
Body
,
is
a
Corruption
of
Nature
,
instead
of
its
Original
Institution
.
Doubtless
Nature
is
at
this
present
corrupted
:
the
Body
acts
too
violently
upon
the
Mind
:
and
whereas
it
ought
only
to
make
an
humble
Representation
of
its
wants
to
the
Soul
,
it
domineers
over
her
,
takes
her
off
from
God
,
to
whom
she
ought
to
be
inseparably
united
,
and
continually
applies
her
to
the
search
of
such
sensible
things
,
as
tend
to
its
preservation
.
She
is
grown
as
it
were
material
and
terestrial
ever
since
her
Fall
;
the
Essential
Relation
and
Union
that
she
had
with
God
being
broken
,
that
is
to
say
,
God
being
withdrawn
from
her
,
as
much
as
he
could
be
without
her
destruction
and
annihilation
.
A
thousand
disorders
have
attended
the
absence
or
departure
of
him
that
preserv'd
her
in
Order
;
and
without
making
a
longer
Enumeration
of
our
Miseries
,
I
freely
confess
that
Man
since
his
Fall
is
corrupted
in
all
his
parts
.
That
Fall
however
has
not
quite
destroyed
the
Work
of
God
;
for
we
can
still
discover
in
Man
,
what
God
at
first
put
in
him
;
and
his
immutable
Will
,
that
constitutes
the
Nature
of
every
thing
,
was
not
changed
by
the
Inconstancy
and
Fickleness
of
the
Will
of
Adam
.
Whatever
God
has
once
will'd
he
still
wills
,
and
because
his
Will
is
efficatious
,
brings
it
to
pass
.
The
Sin
of
Man
was
indeed
the
Occasion
of
that
Divine
Will
,
that
makes
the
Dispensation
of
Grace
,
but
Grace
is
not
contrary
to
Nature
;
neither
do
they
destroy
each
other
;
since
God
is
not
opposed
to
himself
,
that
he
never
repents
,
and
that
his
Wisdom
being
without
Limits
,
his
Works
will
be
without
End
.
And
therefore
the
Will
of
God
,
that
constitutes
the
Dispensation
of
Grace
,
is
superadded
to
that
which
makes
the
Oeconomy
of
Nature
,
in
order
to
repair
and
not
to
change
it
.
There
are
then
in
God
but
these
two
general
Wills
,
and
the
Laws
by
which
he
governs
the
World
depend
on
one
or
other
of
them
.
It
will
plainly
appear
,
by
what
follows
,
that
the
Passions
are
very
well
order'd
,
if
considered
only
in
reference
to
the
Preservation
of
the
Body
,
though
they
deceive
us
in
some
very
rare
and
particular
Occasions
,
which
the
universal
Cause
did
not
think
fit
to
remedy
.
Thence
I
conclude
,
That
the
Passions
belong
to
the
Order
of
Nature
,
since
they
cannot
be
ranked
under
the
Order
of
Grace
.
'T
is
true
,
that
seeing
the
Sin
of
the
first
man
has
deprived
us
of
the
Help
of
an
always-present
God
,
and
always
ready
to
defend
us
;
It
may
be
said
,
That
Sin
is
the
Cause
of
our
excessive
adhesion
to
sensible
things
,
because
Sin
has
estranged
us
from
God
,
by
whom
alone
we
can
be
rid
of
our
Slavery
.
But
without
insisting
longer
upon
the
Enquiry
after
the
first
Cause
of
the
Passions
let
us
examine
their
Extent
,
their
particular
Nature
,
their
End
,
their
Use
,
their
Defects
,
and
whatever
they
comprehend
.
CHAP.
II.
Of
the
Vnion
of
the
Mind
with
sensible
things
;
or
of
the
Force
and
Extent
of
the
Passions
in
general
.
IF
all
those
who
read
this
Work
would
be
at
the
pains
to
reflect
upon
what
they
feel
within
themselves
;
it
would
not
be
necessary
to
insist
upon
our
Dependency
upon
all
sensible
Objects
.
I
can
say
upon
this
Head
but
what
every
one
knows
as
well
as
I
do
,
if
he
will
but
think
on
it
;
and
was
therefore
very
much
inclined
to
pass
it
over
.
But
Experience
having
taught
me
,
That
Men
often
forget
themselves
so
far
,
as
not
to
think
or
be
aware
of
what
they
feel
,
nor
to
enquire
into
the
Reason
of
what
passes
in
their
own
Mind
;
I
thought
it
fit
to
propose
some
Considerations
that
may
help
them
to
reflect
upon
it
.
And
even
I
hope
,
That
those
who
know
such
things
will
not
think
their
Reading
ill
bestowed
:
for
though
we
do
not
care
to
hear
simply
rehearsed
what
we
very
well
know
,
yet
we
use
to
be
affected
with
Pleasure
at
the
hearing
of
what
we
know
and
feel
together
.
The
most
honourable
Sect
of
Philosophers
,
of
whose
Opinions
many
Pretenders
boast
still
now
a-days
,
will
persuade
us
,
That
it
is
in
our
power
to
be
happy
.
The
Stoicks
[
](A51674-e77520-b)*
*
Tunc
beatum
esse
te
judica
cum
tibi
ex
te
gaudium
omne
nascetur
;
cum
in
his
quae
homines
eripiunt
,
optant
,
custodiunt
,
nihil
inveneris
,
non
dico
quod
malis
,
sed
quod
velis
.
Sen.
Epist.
124.
continually
say
,
We
ought
only
to
depend
upon
our selves
;
we
ought
not
to
be
vexed
for
the
Loss
of
Dignities
,
Estates
,
Friends
,
Relations
;
we
ought
to
be
always
calm
and
without
the
least
Disturbance
whatever
happens
;
Banishment
,
Injuries
,
Affronts
,
Diseases
,
and
even
Death
are
no
Evils
,
and
ought
not
to
be
feared
,
and
a
thousand
Paradoxes
of
that
Nature
,
which
we
are
apt
enough
to
believe
;
both
because
of
our
Pride
,
that
makes
us
affect
Independency
,
as
that
because
Reason
teaches
us
that
most
part
of
the
Evils
,
which
really
afflict
us
,
would
not
be
able
to
disturb
us
,
if
all
things
remained
in
good
Order
.
But
God
has
given
us
a
Body
,
and
by
that
Body
united
us
to
all
sensible
things
:
Sin
has
subjected
us
to
our
Body
,
and
by
our
Body
made
us
dependent
upon
all
sensible
things
.
It
is
the
Order
of
Nature
,
it
is
the
Will
of
the
Creatour
,
that
all
the
Beings
that
he
has
made
should
hang
together
:
And
therefore
being
united
to
all
things
,
and
the
Sin
of
the
first
Man
having
made
us
dependent
on
all
Beings
,
to
which
God
had
only
united
us
:
there
is
now
none
but
he
is
at
once
united
and
subjected
to
his
Body
,
and
by
his
Body
to
his
Relations
,
Friends
,
City
,
Prince
,
Country
,
Cloaths
,
House
,
Estate
,
Horse
,
Dog
,
to
all
the
Earth
,
to
the
Sun
,
the
Stars
,
and
the
Heavens
.
It
's
then
ridiculous
to
tell
Men
,
that
it
is
in
their
power
to
be
happy
,
wise
,
and
free
:
It
is
to
jeer
them
,
seriously
to
advise
them
they
ought
not
to
be
afflicted
for
the
Loss
of
their
Friends
or
Estates
.
For
as
it
were
absurd
to
exhort
Men
not
to
feel
Pain
when
they
are
beaten
,
or
not
to
be
sensible
of
Pleasure
when
they
eat
with
an
Appetite
;
so
the
Stoicks
are
either
unreasonable
,
or
not
in
good
earnest
,
when
they
cry
,
That
we
ought
not
to
be
sorry
for
the
Death
of
our
Father
,
the
Loss
of
our
Goods
,
our
Banishment
,
Imprisonment
,
and
the
like
;
nor
to
be
glad
of
the
happy
Success
of
our
Affairs
:
since
we
are
united
to
our
Country
,
Goods
,
Friends
,
&c.
by
a
Natural
Union
,
which
at
present
has
no
dependence
on
our
Will
.
I
grant
that
Reason
teaches
us
,
we
are
to
undergo
Banishment
without
Sorrow
:
but
the
same
Reason
likewise
teaches
us
we
ought
to
endure
the
cutting
off
our
Arm
without
Pain
;
because
the
Soul
is
superiour
to
the
Body
,
and
that
,
according
to
the
light
of
Reason
,
her
happiness
or
misery
ought
not
to
depend
upon
it
:
but
't
is
ridiculous
to
argue
against
Experience
,
which
in
this
occasion
will
convince
us
that
things
are
not
so
,
as
our
Reason
intimates
they
ought
to
be
.
The
Philosophy
of
the
Christians
is
quite
different
from
that
;
they
deny
not
but
Pain
is
an
Evil
,
and
that
it
is
hard
to
be
separated
from
those
things
to
which
Nature
has
united
us
,
or
to
rid
our selves
from
the
Slavery
Sin
has
reduc'd
us
to
.
They
agree
that
it
is
a
Disorder
that
the
Soul
shall
depend
upon
her
Body
,
but
they
own
withall
that
she
depends
upon
it
,
and
even
so
much
that
she
cannot
free
her self
from
that
Subjection
but
by
the
Grace
of
our
Lord.
I
see
,
Rom.
7
▪
23
,
24
▪
saith
St.
Paul
,
another
Law
in
my
Members
warring
against
the
Law
of
my
Mind
,
and
bringing
me
into
Captivity
to
the
Law
of
Sin
,
which
is
in
my
Members
.
O
wretched
Man
that
I
am
!
who
shall
deliver
me
from
the
Body
of
this
Death
?
the
Grace
of
God
through
Jesus
Christ
our
Lord
shall
do
it
.
The
Son
of
God
,
his
Apostles
and
all
his
true
Disciples
command
us
above
all
to
be
Patient
,
because
they
know
that
Mis●ry
must
be
the
Expect●tion
and
Portion
of
the
Righteous
.
In
short
,
true
Christians
or
true
Philosophers
,
say
nothing
but
what
is
agreeable
to
sound
Reason
and
Experience
;
whereas
all
Nature
continually
impugns
the
proud
Opinion
and
presumption
of
the
Stoicks
.
The
Christians
know
that
to
free
themselves
in
some
manner
from
the
Subjection
they
are
under
,
they
must
endeavour
to
deprive
themselves
of
all
those
things
that
they
cannot
enjoy
without
Pleasure
,
nor
want
without
Pain
;
it
being
the
only
means
to
preserve
that
Peace
and
Liberty
of
Mind
,
which
they
owe
to
their
Deliverer's
Beneficence
.
On
the
contrary
the
Stoicks
,
following
the
false
Notions
of
their
Chimerical
Philophy
,
imagine
that
they
are
wise
and
happy
,
and
that
they
need
but
think
upon
Vertue
and
Independency
,
to
become
Vertuous
and
Independent
.
Sound
Reason
and
Experience
assure
us
,
that
the
best
way
not
to
feel
the
smart
of
stinging
is
to
shun
the
Nettle
:
but
the
Stoicks
say
,
Sting
me
never
so
much
,
I
shall
by
the
strength
of
my
Mind
,
and
the
help
of
my
Philosophy
,
raise
my self
so
high
above
my
Body
,
that
all
your
pricking
shall
not
reach
me
.
I
can
demonstrate
that
my
Happiness
depends
not
upon
it
,
and
that
Pain
is
not
an
Evil
;
and
you
shall
see
by
the
Colour
of
my
Face
,
and
by
the
whole
deportment
of
my
Body
,
that
my
Philosophy
has
made
me
invulnerable
.
Their
Pride
bears
up
their
Courage
,
however
it
hinders
not
but
that
they
should
suffer
Pain
with
Vexation
,
and
be
really
miserable
;
so
that
their
Union
with
their
Body
is
not
destroyed
,
nor
their
Pain
vanished
;
but
all
this
proceeds
from
their
Union
with
other
Men
,
strengthened
by
the
desire
of
their
Esteem
,
which
in
some
manner
withstands
the
Union
of
their
Soul
with
their
Body
.
The
sensible
view
of
the
Spectators
,
to
whom
they
are
united
,
stops
the
Course
of
the
Animal
Spirits
that
should
follow
upon
the
pain
,
and
blots
out
the
Impression
they
would
make
upon
their
Face
;
for
was
there
no
body
to
look
on
them
,
that
Phantasm
of
Constancy
and
Liberty
of
Mind
would
presently
vanish
:
So
that
the
Stoicks
do
only
in
some
degree
withstand
the
Union
of
their
Soul
to
their
Body
,
by
making
themselves
greater
Slaves
to
other
Men
,
to
whom
they
are
united
by
a
drift
of
Glory
.
And
't
is
therefore
an
undoubted
truth
,
that
all
Men
are
united
to
all
sensible
things
,
both
by
Nature
and
their
Concupiscence
;
which
may
sufficiently
be
known
by
Experience
,
and
of
which
all
the
Actions
of
Mankind
are
sensible
demonstrations
,
though
Reason
seems
to
oppose
it
.
Though
this
Union
be
common
to
all
Men
,
't
is
not
however
of
an
equal
Extent
and
Strength
in
all
;
for
as
it
proceeds
from
the
Knowledge
of
the
Mind
;
so
it
may
be
said
that
we
are
not
actually
united
to
unknown
Objects
.
A
Clown
in
his
Cottage
does
not
concern
himself
with
the
Glory
of
his
Prince
and
Country
,
but
only
with
the
honour
of
his
own
and
the
Neighbouring
Villages
;
because
his
Knowledge
does
not
extend
farther
.
The
Union
with
such
Objects
as
we
have
seen
,
is
stronger
than
the
Union
to
those
we
have
only
imagin'd
,
or
heard
relation
of
;
because
by
Sensation
we
are
more
strictly
united
to
sensible
things
,
as
leaving
deeper
Impressions
in
our
Brain
,
and
moving
the
animal
Spirits
in
a
more
violent
manner
,
than
when
they
are
only
imagin'd
.
Neither
is
that
Union
so
strong
in
those
that
continually
oppose
it
,
that
they
may
adhere
to
the
Goods
of
the
Mind
,
as
it
is
in
those
who
suffer
themselves
to
be
carried
away
and
inslav'd
by
their
Passions
,
since
Concupiscence
increases
and
strengthens
that
Union
.
Last
of
all
,
the
several
Employments
and
States
of
this
Life
,
together
with
the
various
dispositions
of
divers
Persons
,
cause
a
considerable
difference
in
that
sensible
Union
which
Men
have
with
Earthly
Goods
:
Great
Lords
have
greater
Dependencies
than
other
Men
,
and
their
Chains
,
as
I
may
call
them
,
are
longer
.
The
General
of
an
Army
depends
on
all
his
Souldiers
,
because
all
his
Souldiers
reverence
him
.
This
Slavery
is
often
the
Cause
of
his
Valour
;
and
the
desire
of
being
esteem'd
by
those
that
are
Witnesses
of
his
Actions
,
often
drives
him
to
Sacrifice
to
it
more
sensible
and
rational
desires
.
The
same
may
be
said
of
all
Superiours
,
and
those
that
make
a
great
Figure
in
the
World
,
Vanity
being
many
times
the
Spur
of
their
Vertue
,
because
the
love
of
Glory
is
ordinarily
stronger
than
the
love
of
Truth
.
I
speak
here
of
the
love
of
Glory
,
not
as
a
simple
Inclination
but
a
Passion
,
since
that
love
may
become
sensible
,
and
is
often
attended
with
very
lively
and
violent
Commotions
of
the
Animal
Spirits
.
Again
the
different
Ages
and
Sexes
are
primary
Causes
of
the
difference
of
Passions
.
Children
love
not
the
same
things
as
adult
and
old
Men
,
or
at
least
love
them
not
with
that
Force
and
Constancy
.
Women
depend
only
on
their
Family
and
Neighbourhood
;
but
the
dependencies
of
Men
extend
to
their
whole
Country
,
because
't
is
their
part
to
defend
it
;
and
that
they
are
mightily
taken
up
with
those
great
Offices
,
Honours
and
Commands
,
that
the
State
may
bestow
upon
them
.
There
is
such
a
variety
in
the
Employments
and
Engagements
of
Men
,
that
it
is
impossible
to
explain
them
all
.
The
disposition
of
Mind
in
a
Married
Man
is
altogether
different
from
that
of
a
single
Person
;
for
the
former
is
in
a
manner
wholly
taken
up
with
the
care
of
his
Family
.
A
Fryar
has
a
Soul
of
another
make
,
and
depends
upon
fewer
things
than
the
Men
of
the
World
,
and
even
than
Secular
Ecclesiasticks
,
but
he
is
stronger
fastned
to
those
few
things
.
One
may
argue
in
the
same
manner
concerning
the
different
States
of
Men
in
general
,
but
the
little
sensible
engagements
cannot
be
explain'd
,
because
they
differ
almost
in
every
private
Person
;
it
often
hapning
that
men
have
particular
Engagements
altogether
opposite
to
those
that
they
ought
to
have
in
reference
to
their
condition
.
But
though
the
different
Genius
and
Inclinations
of
Men
,
Women
,
Old
Men
,
Young
Men
,
Rich
,
Poor
,
Learned
,
and
Ignorant
,
in
short
of
all
the
different
Sexes
,
Ages
and
Conditions
,
might
be
fully
treated
of
in
general
;
yet
they
are
too
well
known
by
those
that
are
conversant
with
the
World
,
and
of
all
the
thinking
part
of
Mankind
,
to
increase
with
them
the
Bulk
of
this
Book
;
especially
,
seeing
that
our
Eyes
may
afford
us
a
very
pleasant
and
solid
Instruction
of
all
such
matters
.
But
if
any
chuse
to
read
them
in
Greek
,
rather
than
to
learn
them
by
his
own
reflection
on
what
he
sees
,
I
refer
him
to
the
second
Book
of
the
Rhetoricks
of
Aristotle
;
which
I
take
to
be
the
Master-Piece
of
that
Philosopher
;
because
he
says
there
few
things
,
in
which
he
can
be
mistaken
;
and
that
he
seldom
ventures
to
prove
what
he
asserts
.
It
is
therefore
evident
that
the
sensible
Union
of
the
Mind
of
Men
,
with
whatever
has
any
Relation
to
the
preservation
of
their
Life
,
or
of
the
Society
of
which
they
are
Members
,
differs
in
different
Persons
;
reaching
farther
in
those
that
have
more
Knowledge
,
that
are
in
a
higher
Station
,
and
are
indued
with
a
larger
Fancy
;
whereas
that
Union
is
stricter
and
stronger
in
those
that
are
more
sensible
,
that
have
a
livelyer
Imagination
,
and
have
more
blindly
given
up
themselves
to
the
violence
of
their
Passions
.
Such
Considerations
upon
the
almost
infinite
Bands
that
fasten
Men
to
sensible
Objects
,
are
of
an
extraordinary
Use
;
and
the
best
way
to
become
a
great
proficient
in
this
sort
of
Learning
,
is
the
study
and
observation
of
our selves
;
since
from
the
Inclinations
and
Passions
,
of
which
we
are
conscious
in
our selves
,
we
can
be
fully
assur'd
of
all
the
inclinations
of
other
Men
,
and
can
make
a
good
guess
at
a
great
part
of
the
Passions
they
are
subject
to
:
to
which
adding
the
Information
we
can
get
of
their
particular
Exgagements
,
and
of
the
different
Judgments
that
follow
from
every
different
Passion
,
of
which
we
shall
speak
hereafter
;
it
may
perhaps
not
prove
so
hard
a
Task
to
guess
most
part
of
their
Actions
,
as
it
is
for
an
Astronomer
to
foretell
an
Eclipse
.
For
though
Men
be
free
,
yet
it
seldom
happens
that
they
make
use
of
their
Liberty
,
in
opposition
to
their
natural
Inclinations
and
violent
Passions
.
Before
the
Close
of
this
Chapter
I
must
observe
,
that
it
is
one
of
the
Laws
of
the
Union
of
the
Soul
and
Body
,
that
all
the
Inclinations
of
the
Soul
,
even
those
she
has
for
Goods
,
that
have
no
relation
to
the
Body
,
should
be
attended
with
Commotions
of
the
Animal
Spirits
,
that
render
those
Inclinations
sensible
;
because
Man
being
not
a
pure
Spirit
,
it
is
impossible
he
should
have
any
Inclination
altogether
pure
,
and
without
mixture
of
any
Passion
whatsoever
.
So
that
the
love
of
Truth
,
Justice
,
Vertue
,
of
God
himself
,
is
always
attended
by
some
Motion
of
the
Animal
Spirits
that
render
that
love
sensible
,
though
we
be
not
aware
of
their
sensibility
,
being
then
taken
up
with
livelyer
Sensations
.
Just
as
the
Knowledge
of
Spiritual
things
is
always
accompanied
with
traces
on
the
Brain
,
which
indeed
make
that
Knowledge
more
lively
,
but
commonly
more
confused
:
'T
is
true
we
are
frequently
inapprehensive
of
the
Imagining
Faculty's
mixing
in
any
manner
with
the
Conception
of
an
abstracted
Truth
.
The
Reason
of
it
is
,
that
those
Truths
are
not
represented
by
Images
,
or
traces
of
Nature's
Institution
,
and
that
all
the
traces
that
raise
such
Ideas
,
have
no
Relation
with
them
,
but
such
as
proceeds
from
Chance
,
or
the
Free-will
of
Men.
For
Instance
,
Arithmeticians
and
Algebraists
,
who
apply
themselves
to
very
abstracted
Objects
,
make
however
a
very
great
use
of
their
Imagination
,
in
order
to
fix
the
view
of
their
Mind
upon
these
Spiritual
Ideas
.
The
Cyphers
,
the
Letters
of
the
Alphabet
,
and
the
other
Figures
which
they
see
or
imagine
,
are
always
join'd
to
those
Ideas
,
though
the
traces
that
are
wrought
by
these
Characters
have
no
proper
Relation
to
those
abstracted
Objects
,
and
so
can
neither
change
nor
obscure
them
:
Whence
follows
,
that
by
a
proper
Use
and
Application
of
these
Cyphers
and
Letters
,
they
come
to
discover
such
remote
and
difficult
Truths
,
as
could
not
be
found
out
otherwise
.
Since
therefore
the
Ideas
of
such
things
as
are
only
perceivable
by
the
pure
Understanding
,
can
be
connected
with
the
traces
of
the
Brain
,
and
that
the
sight
of
Objects
that
are
beloved
,
hated
or
fear'd
by
a
Natural
Inclination
,
can
be
attended
with
the
Motion
of
the
Animal
Spirits
;
it
plainly
appears
,
that
the
thoughts
of
Eternity
,
the
fear
of
Hell
,
the
hope
of
an
Eternal
Happiness
,
though
they
be
Objects
never
so
insensible
,
can
however
raise
in
us
very
violent
Passions
.
And
therefore
we
can
say
that
we
are
united
in
a
sensible
manner
,
not
only
to
such
things
as
relate
to
the
preservation
of
our
Life
,
but
also
to
Spiritual
things
,
with
which
the
Mind
is
immediately
,
and
by
it self
united
.
And
even
it
often
happens
,
that
Faith
,
Charity
,
and
Self-Love
,
make
that
Union
with
Spiritual
things
stronger
,
than
that
by
which
we
are
join'd
to
all
sensible
Objects
.
The
Soul
of
the
true
Martyrs
is
more
united
to
God
,
than
to
their
Body
;
and
those
that
suffer
Death
for
asserting
a
false
Religion
,
which
they
believe
to
be
true
,
give
us
sufficiently
to
know
,
that
the
fear
of
Hell
has
more
power
upon
them
than
the
fear
of
Death
.
There
is
for
the
most
part
so
much
heat
and
obstinacy
on
both
sides
,
in
the
Wars
of
Religion
,
and
the
defence
of
Superstitions
,
that
it
cannot
be
doubted
but
some
Passion
has
a
hand
in
it
;
and
even
a
Passion
far
stronger
and
stedfaster
than
others
,
because
it
is
kept
up
by
an
Appearance
of
Reason
,
both
in
such
as
are
deceived
,
and
in
those
that
follow
the
Truth
.
We
are
then
united
by
our
Passions
to
whatever
seems
to
be
the
Good
or
the
Evil
of
the
Mind
,
as
well
as
to
that
which
we
take
for
the
Good
or
Evil
of
the
Body
.
Whatever
can
be
known
to
have
any
relation
to
us
can
affect
us
,
and
of
all
the
things
we
know
,
there
is
not
one
but
it
has
some
reference
or
other
to
us
.
We
are
somewhat
concern'd
even
for
the
most
abstracted
Truths
,
when
we
know
them
;
because
there
is
at
least
that
Relation
of
Knowledge
betwixt
them
and
our
Mind
,
and
that
in
some
manner
we
look
on
them
as
our
Property
,
by
virtue
of
that
Knowledge
.
We
feel
our selves
as
wounded
when
they
are
impugned
;
and
if
we
be
wounded
,
then
surely
we
are
affected
and
disturb'd
.
So
that
the
Passions
have
such
a
vast
and
comprehensive
Dominion
,
that
it
is
impossible
to
conceive
any
thing
in
reference
to
which
it
may
be
said
,
that
Men
are
exempt
from
their
Empire
.
But
let
's
now
see
what
is
their
Nature
,
and
endeavour
to
discover
whatever
they
comprehend
.
CHAP.
III.
A
particular
Explanation
of
all
the
Changes
,
happening
either
to
the
Body
or
Soul
in
every
Passion
.
SEven
things
may
be
distinguished
in
each
of
our
Passions
,
save
Admiration
only
,
which
is
indeed
but
an
Imperfect
Passion
.
The
first
is
the
Judgment
the
Mind
makes
of
an
Object
,
or
rather
the
confused
or
distinct
View
of
the
Relation
that
Object
has
to
us
.
The
second
is
a
New
Determination
of
the
Motion
of
the
Will
towards
that
Object
,
provided
it
be
or
seem
to
be
a
Good
.
Before
that
View
,
the
Natural
Motion
of
the
Soul
was
either
undetermin'd
,
that
is
to
say
,
she
was
carried
towards
Good
in
general
,
or
it
otherwise
determined
by
the
knowledge
of
some
particular
Object
.
But
in
the
very
instant
of
the
mind
perceiving
that
Relation
of
the
new
Object
to
it self
,
that
general
Motion
of
the
Will
is
forthwith
determin'd
,
conformably
to
the
perception
of
the
Mind
.
The
Soul
advances
near
that
Object
by
her
Love
,
that
she
may
relish
it
,
and
discover
her
good
in
it
,
through
a
sensible
delectation
which
the
Author
of
Nature
affords
her
,
as
a
Natural
Reward
of
her
Inclination
to
Good
.
She
judged
that
that
Object
was
a
Good
by
an
abstracted
and
unpathetick
Reason
,
but
she
persists
in
the
persuasion
of
it
,
through
the
Efficacy
of
Sensation
;
and
the
livelyer
that
Sensation
is
,
the
stronger
is
her
adhesion
to
the
Good
that
seems
to
be
the
Cause
of
it
.
But
if
that
particular
Object
be
considered
as
Evil
,
or
able
to
deprive
us
of
some
Good
,
there
happens
no
New
Determination
in
the
Motion
of
the
Will
;
but
only
the
Motion
towards
the
Good
,
oppos'd
to
that
seemingly
evil
Object
,
is
augmented
:
which
augmentation
is
greater
or
les●er
,
as
the
Evil
seems
to
be
more
or
less
formidable
to
us
.
For
indeed
we
hate
only
because
we
love
,
and
the
Evil
that
is
without
us
is
judg'd
no
farther
Evil
,
than
with
reference
to
the
Good
of
which
it
deprives
us
:
So
that
Evil
being
consider'd
as
a
privation
of
Good
,
to
fly
from
Evil
is
to
fly
the
privation
of
Good
,
which
is
the
same
thing
as
to
tend
towards
Good
;
and
therefore
there
happens
no
new
determination
of
the
Natural
Motion
of
the
Will
,
at
the
presence
of
an
unwelcome
Object
;
but
only
a
Sensation
,
painful
,
distasteful
or
imbitter'd
,
which
the
Author
of
Nature
inflicts
on
the
Soul
,
as
a
pain
naturally
consequent
to
her
being
depriv'd
of
Good
.
[
](A51674-e78040-b)*
*
Before
Sin
,
that
Sensation
was
not
a
pain
,
but
only
a
warning
;
because
,
as
I
have
said
elsewhere
,
Adam
might
,
whenever
he
pleased
,
stop
the
Motion
of
the
Animal
Spirits
that
produce
Pain
:
So
that
,
if
he
ever
felt
pain
,
't
was
because
he
consented
to
feel
it
;
or
rather
he
never
felt
any
,
because
he
never
had
a
mind
to
feel
it
.
Reason
alone
had
not
been
sufficient
to
carry
her
to
it
,
wherefore
this
painful
and
vexing
Sensation
is
superadded
to
quicken
her
.
Thence
I
conclude
,
that
in
any
Passion
whatsoever
,
all
the
Motions
of
the
Soul
towards
Good
,
are
the
Motions
of
Love
.
But
as
we
are
affected
with
divers
Sensations
,
according
to
the
various
Circumstances
that
attend
the
View
of
Good
,
and
the
Motion
of
the
Soul
towards
it
;
so
we
come
to
confound
our
Sensations
with
the
Commotions
of
the
Soul
,
and
to
imagine
as
many
different
Motions
in
the
Passions
,
as
there
are
different
Sensations
.
Upon
this
head
it
must
be
observed
that
Pain
is
a
true
and
real
Evil
,
and
no
more
the
Privation
of
Pleasure
,
than
Pleasure
the
Privation
of
Pain
:
for
there
is
a
great
difference
betwixt
not
feeling
or
being
depriv'd
of
such
a
Sensation
of
Pleasure
,
and
the
actual
enduring
of
Pain
:
So
that
every
Evil
is
not
precisely
so
,
because
it
deprives
us
of
Good
,
but
only
that
Evil
,
as
I
have
explain'd
,
that
is
without
us
,
or
is
not
a
Modification
of
our
Soul
.
Nevertheless
as
by
Goods
and
Evils
we
commonly
understand
things
good
or
evil
,
and
not
the
Sensations
of
Pleasure
and
Pain
,
which
are
rather
the
natural
Tokens
by
which
the
Soul
distinguishes
Good
from
Evil
;
it
may
be
said
methinks
without
Equivocation
,
that
Evil
is
nothing
but
the
privation
of
Good
,
and
that
the
natural
motion
of
the
Soul
,
that
removes
us
from
Evil
,
is
the
same
with
that
which
carries
us
to
good
;
for
in
brief
,
all
natural
Motion
being
an
Impression
of
the
Author
of
Nature
,
whose
acting
centers
in
himself
,
and
who
can
incline
us
only
towards
himself
:
The
true
Motion
of
the
Soul
is
always
essentially
the
Love
of
Good
,
and
but
accidentally
an
Aversion
from
Evil.
I
grant
that
Pain
may
be
consider'd
as
an
Evil
,
and
in
that
sense
the
Motion
of
the
Passions
,
which
is
stir'd
up
by
it
,
is
not
real
,
since
we
never
will
Pain
;
and
though
we
positively
will
the
absence
of
Pain
,
yet
't
is
only
because
we
positively
will
the
Preservation
or
Perfection
of
our
Being
.
The
third
thing
to
be
observ'd
in
every
Passion
is
the
Sensation
that
attends
them
;
the
Sensation
of
Love
,
Hatred
,
Desire
,
Joy
,
Sorrow
,
which
are
all
different
in
the
different
Passions
.
The
fourth
thing
is
a
new
Determination
of
the
course
of
the
Animal
Spirits
and
Blood
to
the
outward
and
inward
parts
of
the
Body
.
Before
the
View
of
the
Object
of
the
Passion
,
the
vital
Spirits
were
dispers'd
throughout
the
whole
Body
,
for
the
preservation
of
all
its
parts
in
general
;
but
at
the
appearance
of
that
new
Object
,
all
this
Order
and
Oeconomy
is
disturb'd
,
and
most
part
of
the
Spirits
are
thrown
into
the
Muscles
of
the
Arms
,
Legs
,
Face
,
and
other
exteriour
parts
of
the
Body
,
to
put
them
in
a
disposition
suitable
to
the
ruling
Passion
,
and
to
give
it
such
a
gesture
and
motion
,
as
are
necessary
for
the
obtaining
or
avoiding
the
imminent
Good
or
Evil
:
But
if
its
own
Forces
are
insufficient
for
its
occasions
,
these
same
Spirits
are
distributed
in
such
a
manner
as
make
it
machinally
utter
certain
words
and
cries
;
and
which
diffuse
over
the
Face
and
the
rest
of
the
Body
,
such
an
air
and
comportment
,
as
is
capable
of
actuating
others
with
the
same
Passion
it self
is
possess'd
with
.
For
Men
and
Beasts
having
a
mutual
cohesion
by
the
Eyes
and
Ears
,
when
any
one
of
them
is
in
a
violent
Commotion
,
it
necessarily
affects
the
Spectators
and
Hearers
,
and
naturally
makes
upon
their
Imagination
such
an
Impression
as
troubles
them
,
and
moves
them
to
preserve
it
.
As
to
the
rest
of
the
Animal
Spirits
,
they
violently
descend
into
the
Heart
,
Lungs
,
Liver
,
Spleen
,
and
other
Viscera
,
thence
to
draw
contributions
,
and
to
hasten
those
parts
to
send
forth
a
sufficient
and
timely
supply
of
Spirits
,
necessary
to
preserve
the
Body
in
that
extraordinary
Contention
.
The
fifth
thing
is
a
sensible
Commotion
of
the
Soul
,
who
feels
her self
agitated
by
an
unexpected
overflow
of
Spirits
.
This
sensible
Commotion
of
the
Soul
always
attends
that
Motion
of
the
Spirits
,
that
the
Soul
may
participate
of
all
that
affects
the
Body
;
even
as
the
Motion
of
Spirits
is
raised
in
the
Body
,
when
the
Soul
is
carried
toward
any
Object
.
For
the
Body
and
Soul
being
mutually
united
,
their
Motions
are
reciprocal
.
The
sixth
thing
are
several
Sensations
of
Love
,
Hatred
,
Joy
,
Desire
,
Sorrow
,
that
are
produced
,
not
by
the
Intellectual
view
of
Good
or
Evil
,
as
those
that
have
been
already
mention'd
,
but
by
the
various
concussions
that
are
caused
in
the
Brain
by
the
Animal
Spirits
.
The
seventh
thing
is
a
certain
Sensation
of
Joy
,
or
rather
internal
Satisfaction
,
which
detains
the
Soul
in
her
Passion
,
and
assures
her
that
she
is
in
the
fittest
State
she
can
be
,
in
reference
to
the
Object
she
considers
.
This
internal
satisfaction
attends
all
the
Passions
whatsoever
,
whether
they
proceed
from
the
sight
of
an
Evil
,
or
from
the
sight
of
a
Good
,
Sorrow
as
well
as
Joy
.
This
satisfaction
makes
all
the
Passions
pleasant
,
and
induces
us
to
yield
our
consent
,
and
give
up
our selves
to
them
;
and
't
is
that
satisfaction
which
must
be
overcome
by
the
Delights
of
Grace
,
and
the
Comforts
of
Faith
and
Reason
.
For
as
the
Joy
of
the
Mind
is
the
result
of
a
certain
or
evident
Knowledge
that
we
are
in
the
best
state
that
can
be
in
relation
to
the
Objects
perceiv'd
by
the
Understanding
;
so
the
pleasantness
of
the
Passions
is
a
natural
consequence
of
that
confused
Sensation
we
have
of
being
in
the
best
state
we
can
be
in
reference
to
those
things
we
perceive
by
our
Senses
.
Now
't
is
by
the
Joy
of
the
Mind
,
and
the
Comforts
of
Grace
,
that
the
false
delight
of
the
Passions
,
which
makes
us
Slaves
to
sensible
Goods
,
must
be
vanquished
.
All
the
forementioned
things
are
to
be
found
in
all
the
Passions
,
unless
they
be
raised
by
confused
Sensations
,
and
that
the
Mind
perceive
not
the
Good
or
Evil
from
whence
they
proceed
;
for
then
't
is
plain
that
they
have
not
the
three
first
qualifications
.
It
likewise
appears
that
all
these
things
are
not
free
,
since
they
are
in
us
without
our
Consent
,
and
even
against
it
since
the
Sin
;
but
that
the
Consent
of
our
Will
is
the
only
thing
which
is
really
in
our
power
.
However
it
will
be
fit
to
explain
all
these
things
more
at
large
,
and
to
make
them
more
sensible
by
some
Instances
.
Let
us
suppose
a
Man
to
whom
an
Affront
has
been
actually
offer'd
,
or
one
whose
Imagination
is
either
naturally
strong
and
lively
,
or
over-heated
by
some
Accident
,
as
a
Disease
or
a
Surfeit
of
Sorrow
and
Melancholy
.
This
Man
in
his
Closet
fancies
that
such
a
one
,
who
perhaps
does
not
think
upon
him
,
is
willing
and
ready
to
wrong
him
.
The
sensible
View
,
or
the
Imagination
of
the
Opposition
betwixt
the
Actions
of
his
Enemy
and
his
own
designs
,
will
be
the
first
Cause
of
his
Passion
.
That
the
Motion
of
this
Man's
Will
may
acquire
some
new
determination
,
it
is
not
absolutely
necessary
that
he
should
receive
,
or
imagine
he
receives
any
Affront
;
for
't
is
sufficient
that
his
Mind
only
should
think
on
it
,
without
his
Body's
being
concern'd
in
it
.
However
as
this
new
determination
would
not
be
the
determination
of
a
Passion
,
but
only
a
most
weak
and
languishing
Inclination
:
'T
is
better
to
suppose
that
some
great
opposition
is
actually
made
to
this
Man's
Designs
,
or
that
he
strongly
fancies
that
it
will
be
so
;
than
to
make
another
Supposition
,
wherein
the
Senses
and
Imagination
are
little
or
not
at
all
concern'd
.
The
second
thing
to
be
consider'd
in
this
Man's
Passion
,
is
an
increase
of
the
Motion
of
his
Will
towards
that
Good
,
of
which
his
real
or
pretended
Enemy
endeavours
to
deprive
him
:
the
stronger
the
opposition
is
,
or
appears
,
the
more
considerable
will
be
the
increase
.
He
at
first
hates
his
Adversary
,
only
because
he
loves
that
Good
,
and
his
Hatred
against
him
grows
in
proportion
to
his
Love
for
it
;
because
the
Motion
of
the
Will
in
the
Passion
of
Hatred
is
at
bottom
nothing
else
but
a
Motion
of
Love
;
that
Motion
of
the
Soul
towards
Good
not
differing
from
that
by
which
she
avoids
its
Privation
,
as
has
been
already
observ'd
.
The
third
thing
is
a
Sensation
suitable
to
that
Passion
;
in
our
Instance
't
is
a
Sensation
of
Hatred
.
But
though
the
Motion
of
Hatred
be
the
same
with
that
of
Love
,
yet
the
Sensation
of
Hatred
is
altogether
different
from
that
of
Love
,
as
any
one
may
experience
in
himself
.
Motions
are
Actions
of
the
Will
,
but
Sensations
are
Modifications
of
the
Mind
.
The
Motions
of
the
Will
are
natural
Causes
of
the
Sensations
of
the
Mind
;
and
these
Sensations
of
the
Mind
reciprocally
encourage
and
keep
up
the
Motions
of
the
Will
in
their
Determination
.
The
Sensation
of
Hatred
is
in
the
Man
before
us
,
the
natural
result
of
the
Motion
of
his
Will
,
excited
upon
the
view
of
Evil
,
and
this
Motion
is
afterwards
maintained
by
the
Sensation
it
hath
produced
.
What
we
have
just
now
said
of
this
Man
might
happen
to
him
,
though
he
had
not
a
Body
.
But
because
he
's
made
up
of
two
Substances
naturally
united
,
the
Motions
of
his
Soul
are
communicated
to
his
Body
,
and
those
of
his
Body
to
his
Soul
;
so
that
the
new
Determination
,
or
the
increase
of
the
Motion
of
his
Will
,
naturally
causes
a
new
Determination
in
the
Motion
of
the
Animal
Spirits
,
which
is
always
different
in
all
the
Passions
,
though
the
Motion
of
the
Soul
be
still
almost
the
same
.
The
Spirits
therefore
are
violently
driven
into
the
Arms
,
Legs
and
Face
,
to
dispose
the
Body
in
a
manner
adapted
to
the
Passion
,
and
to
shed
over
the
Face
the
Look
of
an
injured
Person
,
with
reference
to
all
the
Circumstances
of
the
Injury
receiv'd
,
and
to
the
Quality
and
Capacity
both
of
the
Agent
and
Patient
.
That
Expansion
of
the
Spirits
is
so
much
the
more
strong
,
abundant
and
quick
,
as
the
Good
is
greater
,
the
Opposition
more
vehement
,
and
the
Brain
livelyer
affected
.
And
therefore
if
the
Person
whereof
we
speak
only
imagine
himself
injur'd
,
or
if
he
receive
a
real
but
slight
injury
,
that
makes
no
considerable
concussion
in
the
Brain
,
the
Expansion
of
the
Animal
Spirits
will
prove
weak
and
languishing
,
and
perhaps
insufficient
to
alter
the
natural
and
ordinary
Disposition
of
the
Body
.
But
if
the
Outrage
be
exceeding
great
,
or
the
Imagination
enflam'd
,
the
Brain
will
be
extraordinarily
shaken
,
and
the
Spirits
so
violently
dispers'd
,
that
in
a
moment
they
will
imprint
on
the
Face
and
Body
the
Symptoms
of
the
ruling
Passion
.
If
he
be
strong
enough
to
obtain
the
Victory
,
his
Countenance
will
be
fierce
and
threatning
.
If
weak
and
unable
to
withstand
the
overwhelming
Evil
,
he
will
appear
humble
and
submissive
.
His
Moans
and
Tears
naturally
exciting
in
the
Spectators
,
and
even
in
his
Enemy
Motions
of
Pity
,
he
will
draw
from
thence
those
succours
which
he
could
not
expect
from
his
own
strength
.
True
it
is
,
that
if
the
Spirits
and
Fibres
of
the
Brain
,
in
the
Spectators
and
Adversary
of
that
unhappy
Wretch
,
be
already
agitated
with
a
violent
Motion
,
contrary
to
that
which
breeds
Compassion
in
the
Soul
,
the
bemoanings
of
the
Distress'd
will
but
increase
their
Fury
;
and
so
would
his
undoing
be
inevitable
,
should
he
always
keep
the
same
Countenance
and
Aspect
.
But
Nature
has
provided
for
it
,
for
at
the
sight
of
the
imminent
loss
of
a
great
good
,
there
are
naturally
produced
on
the
Face
such
strange
and
surprizing
Characters
of
Rage
and
Despair
,
as
to
disarm
the
most
Barbarous
Enemies
,
and
to
make
them
as
it
were
unmovable
.
That
frightfull
and
unexpected
sight
of
the
Lineaments
of
Death
,
drawn
by
the
Hand
of
Nature
upon
the
Face
of
an
unfortunate
Person
,
stops
in
the
very
Enemy
,
stricken
therewith
,
the
Motions
of
the
Spirits
and
Blood
,
that
carried
him
to
Revenge
;
and
in
that
favourable
moment
of
Audience
,
Nature
printing
again
an
humble
submissive
air
upon
the
Face
of
the
poor
Wretch
,
that
begins
to
entertain
some
hopes
,
because
of
the
unmovableness
,
and
alteration
of
the
Countenance
,
of
his
Enemy
,
the
Animal
Spirits
of
that
Enemy
receive
a
new
determination
,
of
which
they
were
not
capable
a
moment
before
;
and
this
Machinal
Motion
of
Compassion
which
he
yields
to
,
inclines
the
Soul
to
yield
to
the
Pleas
of
Charity
and
Mercy
.
Because
a
Man
taken
up
with
a
Passion
cannot
,
without
a
great
plenty
of
Spirits
,
produce
or
preserve
in
his
Brain
an
Image
of
his
Misery
lively
enough
,
nor
a
Concussion
sufficiently
strong
,
to
give
his
Body
an
extraordinary
and
constrain'd
Disposition
:
the
corresponding
Nerves
within
the
Body
receive
upon
his
sight
of
the
Evil
,
the
Concussions
and
Agitations
that
are
necessary
to
infuse
,
into
all
the
Vessels
that
communicate
with
the
Heart
,
fit
Humours
,
to
the
producing
such
Spirits
as
the
Passion
requires
.
For
the
Animal
Spirits
spreading
through
the
Nerves
that
go
to
the
Liver
,
Spleen
,
Pancreas
,
and
all
the
other
Viscera
,
agitate
and
shake
them
,
and
by
their
Agitation
force
out
such
Humours
as
those
parts
keep
in
reserve
,
for
the
Wants
and
Exigencies
of
the
Machine
.
But
if
those
Humours
always
flowed
in
the
same
manner
into
the
Heart
;
if
they
received
an
equal
Fermentation
in
different
times
,
and
the
Spirits
,
that
are
made
of
them
,
regularly
ascended
into
the
Brain
,
we
should
not
see
such
hasty
Changes
in
the
Motions
of
the
Passions
.
For
instance
,
the
sight
of
a
Magistrate
would
not
stop
,
of
a
sudden
,
the
extravagant
Transports
of
an
enraged
Person
,
persuing
his
Revenge
;
and
his
Face
,
all
fiery
with
Blood
and
Spirits
,
would
not
in
an
instant
turn
pale
and
wan
for
fear
of
Punishment
.
So
,
to
hinder
those
Humours
that
are
mixed
with
the
Blood
from
entering
the
Heart
constantly
in
the
same
manner
,
there
are
Nerves
that
surround
all
the
Avenues
thereof
,
which
being
compressed
or
dilated
by
the
Impression
,
that
the
sight
of
the
Object
,
and
the
strength
of
the
Imagination
produce
in
the
Spirits
,
shut
up
or
open
the
way
to
those
Humours
.
And
lest
the
said
Humours
should
undergo
the
same
Agitation
and
Fermentation
in
the
Heart
in
divers
times
;
there
are
other
Nerves
that
cause
the
Beatings
of
it
,
which
being
not
equally
agitated
in
the
different
Motions
of
the
Spirits
,
drive
not
the
Blood
with
the
same
force
into
the
Arteries
.
Other
Nerves
spread
through
the
Lungs
,
distribute
the
Air
to
the
Heart
,
by
constringing
or
relaxing
several
Branches
of
the
Trachea
used
in
Respiration
,
and
order
the
Fermentation
of
the
Blood
proportionably
to
the
Circumstances
of
the
predominant
Passion
.
Last
of
all
,
to
regulate
with
the
greatest
Accuracy
and
Readiness
the
Course
of
the
Spirits
,
there
are
Nerves
surrounding
the
Arteries
,
as
well
those
that
end
in
the
Brain
,
as
those
that
carry
the
Blood
into
the
other
parts
of
the
Body
;
so
that
the
Concussion
of
the
Brain
,
which
accompanies
the
unexpected
Sight
of
some
Circumstance
,
for
which
't
is
convenient
that
the
Motions
of
the
Passion
should
be
alter'd
,
suddenly
determines
the
Course
of
the
Spirits
to
the
Nerves
thus
surrounding
the
Arteries
;
that
by
their
Contraction
they
may
shut
up
the
Passage
to
the
Blood
that
ascends
into
the
Brain
,
and
by
their
Dilatation
lay
it
open
to
that
which
runs
into
all
the
other
Parts
of
the
Body
.
When
those
Arteries
that
carry
the
Blood
to
the
Brain
are
free
and
open
;
and
on
the
contrary
,
those
that
disperse
it
through
the
rest
of
the
Body
are
strongly
bound
up
by
these
Nerves
,
the
Head
must
all
be
full
of
Blood
,
and
the
Face
appear
all
fiery
;
but
some
Circumstance
altering
the
Commotion
of
the
Brain
,
that
caused
that
Disposition
in
the
Nerves
,
the
Arteries
that
were
strait
bound
are
loosened
,
and
on
the
contrary
,
the
Arteries
of
the
Brain
strongly
contracted
.
Then
is
the
Head
emptied
of
Bloud
,
the
Face
covered
with
Paleness
,
and
the
small
quantity
of
Blood
,
which
issues
from
the
Heart
,
and
which
the
Nerves
before
mentioned
admit
into
it
,
as
the
Fewel
to
keep
in
Life
,
descends
most
or
all
into
the
lower
parts
of
the
Body
;
the
Brain
wants
Animal
Spirits
,
and
all
the
rest
of
the
Body
is
seized
with
Weakness
and
Trembling
.
To
explain
and
prove
the
Particulars
of
what
we
have
mentioned
,
it
would
be
necessary
to
give
a
general
Knowledge
of
Physicks
,
and
a
particular
of
the
Humane
Body
;
but
those
two
Sciences
are
still
too
imperfect
to
be
treated
of
with
as
much
Accuracy
as
I
could
Wish
:
besides
that
,
should
I
proceed
farther
in
this
Matter
,
it
would
carry
me
too
far
from
my
Subject
;
and
therefore
I
only
design
here
to
give
a
gross
and
general
Idea
of
the
Passions
,
and
am
satisfied
,
provided
that
this
Idea
be
not
false
.
Those
Concussions
of
the
Brain
,
and
Motions
of
the
Blood
and
Spirits
,
are
the
fourth
thing
to
be
found
in
every
Passion
,
and
produce
the
fifth
,
namely
the
sensible
Commotions
of
the
Soul
.
At
the
very
Instant
that
the
Animal
Sprits
are
driven
from
the
Brain
into
the
rest
of
the
Body
,
to
produce
such
Motions
as
are
fit
to
keep
up
the
Passion
;
the
Soul
is
carried
towards
the
good
perceived
:
and
this
more
or
less
strongly
,
according
as
the
Spirits
come
down
from
the
Brain
with
more
or
less
vehemence
;
for
't
is
that
Concussion
of
the
Brain
which
agitates
the
Soul
and
the
Animal
Spirits
.
The
Motion
of
the
Soul
towards
Good
is
so
much
stronger
,
as
the
View
of
Good
is
more
sensible
and
apparent
;
and
the
Motion
of
the
Spirits
that
proceed
from
the
Brain
,
and
flow
into
the
other
parts
of
the
Body
,
is
the
more
violent
,
as
the
Vibration
of
the
Fibres
of
the
Brain
,
caused
by
the
Impression
of
the
Object
or
of
the
Imagination
,
is
more
forcible
;
because
that
Concussion
of
the
Brain
occasioning
a
more
sensible
and
lively
View
of
Good
,
necessarily
makes
the
Commotion
of
the
Soul
in
the
Passions
to
increase
proportionably
to
the
Motion
of
the
Spirits
.
Those
Commotions
of
the
Soul
are
not
different
from
those
that
immediately
follow
the
Intellectual
View
of
Good
,
which
we
have
mentioned
before
:
only
they
are
stronger
and
livelyer
,
because
of
the
Union
of
the
Soul
and
Body
,
and
the
sensibleness
of
the
View
that
produces
them
.
The
sixth
thing
to
be
met
with
is
the
Sensation
of
the
Passion
;
the
Sensation
of
Love
,
Hatred
,
Desire
,
Joy
or
Sorrow
▪
This
Sensation
is
not
at
all
different
from
that
which
has
been
spoken
of
;
only
't
is
livelyer
,
because
the
Body
has
a
greater
share
in
it
:
but
't
is
always
attended
with
confused
Sensation
of
Satisfaction
,
that
makes
all
the
Passions
grateful
;
which
is
the
last
thing
to
be
found
in
each
of
them
,
as
has
been
already
hinted
.
The
Cause
of
this
last
Sensation
is
such
;
At
the
sight
of
the
Object
of
a
Passion
,
or
of
any
new
Circumstance
,
part
of
the
Animal
Spirits
are
driven
from
the
Head
to
the
outward
Parts
of
the
Body
,
to
put
it
in
the
Disposition
that
the
Passion
requires
;
together
with
which
some
other
Spirits
make
a
violent
descent
into
the
Heart
,
Lungs
,
and
other
Viscera
,
to
draw
from
thence
the
necessary
Supplies
,
as
has
been
already
sufficiently
explained
.
Now
the
Body
is
never
in
a
convenient
Sta●e
,
but
the
Soul
relishes
it
with
great
Satisfaction
;
whereas
it
is
never
in
a
State
con●rary
to
its
Good
and
Preservation
,
but
that
she
endures
it
with
pain
.
And
therefore
when
we
follow
the
Motions
of
our
Passions
,
and
stop
not
the
Course
of
the
Spirits
,
which
the
View
of
the
Object
of
the
Passion
produces
in
the
Body
,
to
put
in
it
the
most
convenient
State
with
relation
to
that
Object
,
the
Soul
by
Nature's
Law
is
affected
with
a
Sensation
of
Satisfaction
and
Delight
,
because
her
Body
is
in
the
Disposition
it
requires
:
whereas
when
,
according
to
the
Laws
of
Reason
,
the
Soul
stops
the
Current
of
the
Spirits
,
and
withstands
those
Passions
,
she
suffers
a
Pain
proportionable
to
the
Evil
that
may
from
thence
arise
to
the
Body
.
For
as
the
Reflection
that
the
Soul
makes
upon
her self
is
necessarily
accompanied
with
the
Joy
or
Sorrow
of
the
Mind
,
and
afterwards
with
the
Joy
or
Sorrow
of
the
Senses
;
when
doing
her
Duty
,
and
submitting
to
the
Orders
of
God
,
she
is
conscious
that
she
is
in
a
due
and
convenient
state
;
or
when
having
given
her self
up
to
her
Passions
,
she
is
afterwards
affected
with
Remorse
,
which
teaches
her
that
she
is
in
a
corrupt
Disposition
:
So
the
Course
of
the
Spirits
raised
for
the
good
of
the
Body
,
is
first
attended
with
sensible
,
and
afterwards
with
Spiritual
Joy
or
Sorrow
,
according
as
the
Course
of
the
Animal
Spirits
is
retarded
or
promoted
by
the
Will
.
There
is
however
this
notable
difference
betwixt
the
Intellectual
Joy
that
attends
the
clear
Knowledge
of
the
good
Estate
of
the
Soul
,
and
the
sensible
Pleasure
that
accompanies
the
confused
Sensation
of
the
good
disposition
of
the
Body
;
that
the
intellectual
Joy
is
solid
and
substantial
,
without
Remorse
,
and
as
immutable
as
its
Original
Cause
,
the
Truth
;
whereas
sensible
Joy
is
almost
ever
followed
with
the
Sorrow
of
the
Mind
,
or
the
Remorse
of
the
Conscience
,
and
is
as
restless
and
fickle
,
as
the
Passion
or
Agitation
of
the
Blood
from
whence
it
proceeds
.
To
conclude
,
the
first
is
for
the
most
part
attended
with
an
exceeding
Joy
of
the
Senses
when
it
is
derived
from
the
Knowledge
of
the
great
good
that
the
Soul
possesses
;
whereas
the
other
is
very
rarely
accompanied
with
any
great
Joy
of
the
Mind
,
though
it
proceeds
from
a
Good
,
considerable
for
the
Body
,
but
contrary
to
the
Good
or
Perfection
of
the
Soul
.
'T
is
nevertheless
true
,
That
without
the
Grace
of
our
Lord
,
the
satisfaction
the
Soul
relishes
when
she
gives
her self
up
to
her
Passions
is
more
grateful
,
than
that
which
she
enjoys
when
she
follows
the
Rules
of
Reason
;
which
satisfaction
is
the
Source
of
all
the
Disorders
that
have
attended
the
Original
Sin
,
and
would
have
made
us
all
Slaves
to
our
Passions
,
had
not
the
Son
of
God
rid
us
from
their
Tyranny
,
by
the
Delectation
of
his
Grace
.
For
what
I
have
said
on
behalf
of
the
Joy
of
the
Mind
in
opposition
to
the
Joy
of
the
Senses
,
is
only
true
amongst
the
Christians
,
and
was
altogether
false
in
the
Mouths
of
Seneca
,
Epicurus
,
and
all
the
most
rational
of
the
Heathen
Philosophers
;
because
the
Yoke
of
Christ
is
only
sweet
to
those
that
belong
to
him
,
and
his
Burthen
only
light
▪
when
his
Grace
helps
us
to
support
the
Weight
of
it
.
CHAP.
IV.
That
the
Pleasure
and
Motion
of
the
Passions
engage
us
in
Errours
,
and
false
Judgments
about
Good
;
That
we
ought
continually
to
resist
them
.
How
to
impugn
Libertinism
.
ALL
those
general
Qualities
and
Effects
of
the
Passions
,
that
we
have
hitherto
treated
of
,
are
not
free
,
they
are
in
us
without
our
Leave
,
and
nothing
but
the
Consent
of
our
Will
is
wholly
in
our
Power
.
The
View
or
Apprehension
of
Good
is
naturally
followed
with
a
Motion
of
Love
,
a
Sensation
of
Love
,
a
Concussion
of
the
Brain
,
a
Motion
of
the
Spirits
,
a
new
Commotion
of
the
Soul
that
encreases
the
first
Motion
of
Love
,
a
new
Sensation
of
the
Soul
,
that
likewise
augments
the
first
Sensation
of
Love
;
and
lastly
,
a
Sensation
of
Satisfaction
which
recompenses
the
Soul
for
the
Bodies
being
in
a
convenient
State
.
All
this
happens
to
the
Soul
and
Body
naturally
and
mechanally
;
that
is
,
without
her
having
any
part
in
it
,
nothing
but
her
Consent
being
her
own
real
Work
.
This
Consent
we
must
regulate
,
preserve
,
and
keep
free
,
in
spite
of
all
the
Struggle
and
Attempts
of
the
Passions
.
We
ought
to
submit
our
Liberty
to
none
but
God
,
and
to
yield
to
nothing
but
to
the
Voice
of
the
Author
of
Nature
,
to
inward
Evidence
,
and
Conviction
,
and
to
the
secret
Reproaches
of
our
Reason
.
We
ought
never
to
consent
,
but
when
we
plainly
see
,
we
should
make
an
ill
Use
of
our
Liberty
,
in
with-holding
our
Consent
.
This
is
the
principal
Rule
to
be
observ'd
for
the
avoiding
of
Errour
.
God
only
makes
us
evidently
perceive
,
That
we
ought
to
yield
to
what
he
requires
of
us
;
to
him
alone
therefore
we
ought
to
devote
our
Services
.
There
is
no
Evidence
in
the
Allurements
and
Caresses
,
in
the
Threats
and
Frightnings
caused
in
us
of
the
Passions
;
they
are
only
confused
and
obscure
Sensations
,
to
which
we
must
never
yield
up
our selves
.
We
must
wait
till
all
those
false
Glimpses
of
the
Passions
vanish
,
till
a
purer
Light
illuminates
us
,
till
God
speaks
inwardly
to
us
.
We
must
enter
within
our selves
,
and
there
seek
him
that
never
leaves
us
,
that
always
enlightens
us
.
He
speaks
low
,
but
his
Voice
is
distinct
;
his
Light
is
weak
,
but
pure
.
But
no
,
his
Voice
is
as
strong
as
't
is
distinct
,
and
his
Light
is
as
bright
and
active
as
't
is
pure
.
But
our
Passions
continually
keep
us
from
home
,
and
by
their
Noise
and
Darkness
,
hinder
us
from
being
instructed
by
his
Voice
,
and
illuminated
by
his
Light
.
He
speaks
even
to
those
that
ask
him
no
Questions
;
and
those
,
whom
Passions
have
carried
farthest
from
him
,
fail
not
yet
many
times
to
hear
some
of
his
Words
,
Heb.
iv
.
12
,
13.
but
loud
,
threatning
,
astonishing
Words
,
sharper
than
a
two-edged
Sword
,
piercing
into
the
inmost
Recesses
of
the
Soul
,
and
discerning
the
Thoughts
and
Designs
of
the
Heart
.
For
all
things
are
open
to
his
Eyes
,
and
he
cannot
see
the
unruly
Actions
of
Sinners
,
without
lashing
them
inwardly
with
smarting
Reproofs
.
We
must
then
re-enter
into
our selves
,
and
approach
near
him
;
we
must
interrogate
him
,
listen
to
him
,
and
obey
him
;
for
by
always
listning
to
him
,
we
shall
never
be
deceived
;
and
always
obeying
him
,
we
shall
never
be
subjected
to
the
Inconstancy
of
the
Passions
,
and
the
Miseries
due
to
Sin
.
We
must
not
,
like
some
pretenders
to
Wit
,
whom
the
Violence
of
Passion
has
reduced
to
the
Condition
of
Beasts
;
who
,
having
a
long
time
despised
the
Law
of
God
,
seem
at
last
to
have
retained
no
Knowledge
of
any
other
than
that
of
their
infamous
Passions
:
We
must
not
,
I
say
,
imagine
,
as
do
those
Men
of
Flesh
and
Blood
,
that
it
is
following
God
,
and
obeying
the
Voice
of
the
Author
of
Nature
,
to
give
up
our selves
to
the
Motions
of
Passions
,
and
to
comply
with
the
secret
Desires
of
our
Heart
:
This
is
the
utmost
possible
Blindness
;
't
is
,
according
to
St.
Paul
,
the
temporal
Punishment
of
Impiety
and
Idolatry
,
that
is
to
say
,
the
Desert
of
the
most
enormous
Crimes
.
And
herein
indeed
the
greatness
of
this
terrible
Punishment
consists
,
that
instead
of
allaying
the
Anger
of
God
,
as
do
all
the
others
in
this
World
,
it
continually
exasperates
and
encreases
it
,
till
that
dreadful
Day
comes
,
wherein
his
just
Wrath
shall
break
out
to
the
Confusion
of
Sinners
.
Their
Arguings
however
seem
likely
enough
,
as
being
agreeable
to
common
Sense
,
countenanc'd
by
the
Passions
,
and
such
,
I
am
sure
,
as
all
the
Philosophy
of
Zeno
could
never
overthrow
.
We
must
love
Good
,
say
they
;
Pleasure
is
the
Sign
which
Nature
has
affix'd
to
it
to
make
it
known
,
and
that
Sign
can
never
be
fallacious
,
since
God
has
instituted
it
to
distinguish
Good
from
Evil.
We
must
avoid
Evil
,
say
they
again
;
Pain
is
the
Character
which
Nature
has
annex'd
to
it
,
and
a
Token
in
which
we
cannot
be
mistaken
;
since
it
was
instituted
by
God
for
the
distinguishing
it
from
Good
.
We
feel
Pleasure
in
complying
with
our
Passions
,
Trouble
and
Pain
in
opposing
them
;
and
therefore
the
Author
of
Nature
will
have
us
to
give
up
our selves
to
our
Passions
,
and
never
to
resist
them
,
since
the
Pleasure
and
Pain
wherewith
he
affects
us
in
those
Cases
,
are
the
infallible
Criterion
of
his
Will
.
And
consequently
,
it
is
to
follow
God
,
to
comply
with
the
Desire
of
our
Hearts
;
and
't
is
to
obey
his
Voice
,
to
yield
to
the
Instinct
of
Nature
,
which
moves
us
to
the
satisfying
our
Senses
and
our
Passions
.
This
is
their
way
of
Reasoning
,
whereby
they
confirm
themselves
in
their
infamous
Opinions
:
And
thus
they
think
to
shun
the
secret
Reproofs
of
their
Reason
;
and
in
Punishment
of
their
Crime
God
suffers
them
to
be
dazzled
by
those
false
Glimpses
;
delusive
Glarings
,
which
blind
them
instead
of
inlightning
them
,
and
strike
them
with
such
an
insensible
Blindness
,
as
they
do
not
so
much
as
wish
to
be
cured
of
it
.
God
delivers
them
to
a
reprobate
Sense
,
he
gives
them
up
to
the
Desires
of
their
corrupt
Heart
;
to
shameful
Passions
,
to
Actions
unworthy
of
Men
,
as
the
Holy
Scripture
speaks
,
that
having
fatned
themselves
by
their
Debauches
,
they
may
to
all
Eternity
be
the
fit
Sacrifice
of
his
Vengeance
.
But
let
us
solve
this
Difficulty
which
they
offer
.
The
Sect
of
Zeno
,
not
knowing
how
to
untie
the
Knot
,
has
cut
it
,
by
denying
that
Pleasure
is
a
Good
,
and
Pain
an
Evil
:
But
that
's
too
venturous
a
Stroke
,
and
a
Subterfuge
unbecoming
Philosophers
,
and
very
unlikely
,
I
am
sure
,
to
convert
those
who
are
convinc'd
by
Experience
,
That
a
great
Pain
is
a
great
Evil.
Since
therefore
Zeno
,
and
all
his
Heathen
Philosophy
,
cannot
solve
the
Difficulty
of
the
Epicures
,
we
must
have
recourse
to
a
more
solid
and
inlightned
Philosophy
.
'T
is
true
,
that
Pleasure
is
Good
,
and
Pain
Evil
;
and
that
Pleasure
and
Pain
have
been
join'd
by
the
Author
of
Nature
to
the
Use
of
certain
Things
,
by
which
we
judge
whether
they
are
Good
or
Evil
,
which
make
us
persue
the
Good
and
fly
from
the
Evil
,
and
almost
ever
follow
the
Motions
of
the
Passions
.
All
this
is
true
,
but
relates
only
to
the
Body
,
which
to
preserve
,
and
keep
long
a
Life
much
like
to
that
of
Beasts
,
we
must
suffer
our selves
to
be
ruled
by
our
Passions
and
Desires
.
The
Senses
and
Passions
are
only
given
us
for
the
good
of
the
Body
;
sensible
Pleasure
is
the
indelible
Character
which
Nature
has
affix'd
to
the
Use
of
certain
Things
,
that
without
putting
our
Reason
to
the
trouble
of
examining
them
,
we
might
presently
imploy
them
for
the
preservation
of
the
Body
;
but
not
with
intent
that
we
should
love
them
:
For
we
ought
only
to
love
those
Things
which
Reason
undoubtedly
manifests
to
be
our
Good
.
We
are
Reasonable
Beings
;
and
God
,
who
is
our
Sovereign
Good
,
requires
not
of
us
a
blind
,
an
instinctive
,
a
compell'd
Love
,
as
I
may
say
,
but
a
Love
of
Choice
,
an
enlightned
Love
,
a
Love
that
submits
to
him
our
whole
Intellectual
and
Moral
Powers
.
He
inclines
us
to
the
Love
of
him
,
in
shewing
us
by
the
Light
that
attends
the
Delectation
of
his
Grace
,
that
he
is
our
Chief
Good
;
but
he
moves
us
towards
the
Good
of
the
Body
only
by
Instinct
and
a
confused
Sensation
of
Pleasure
,
because
the
Good
of
the
Body
is
undeserving
of
either
the
Attention
of
our
Mind
,
or
the
Exercise
of
our
Reason
.
Moreover
,
our
Body
is
not
our selves
;
't
is
something
that
belongs
to
us
,
and
,
absolutely
speaking
,
we
cannot
subsist
without
it
:
The
Good
of
the
Body
therefore
is
not
properly
our
Good
;
for
Bodies
can
be
but
the
Good
of
Bodies
.
We
may
make
use
of
them
for
the
Body
,
but
we
must
not
be
taken
up
with
them
.
Our
Soul
has
also
her
own
Good
,
viz.
the
only
Good
that
is
superiour
to
her
,
the
only
one
that
preserves
her
,
that
alone
produces
in
her
Sensations
of
Pleasure
and
Pain
:
For
indeed
none
of
the
Objects
of
the
Senses
can
of
themselves
give
us
any
Sensation
of
them
;
it
is
only
God
who
assures
us
of
their
Presence
,
by
the
Sensation
he
gives
us
of
them
;
which
is
a
Truth
that
was
never
understood
by
the
Heathen
Philosophers
.
We
may
and
must
love
that
which
is
able
to
make
us
sensible
of
Pleasure
,
I
grant
it
:
But
by
that
very
Reason
we
ought
only
to
love
God
,
because
he
only
can
act
upon
our
Soul
;
and
the
utmost
that
sensible
Objects
can
do
,
is
to
move
the
Organs
of
our
Senses
.
But
what
matters
it
,
you
'll
say
,
from
whence
those
grateful
Sensations
come
?
I
will
taste
'em
.
O
thou
ungrateful
Wretch
!
know
the
Hand
that
showres
down
Good
upon
thee
.
You
require
of
a
just
God
unjust
Rewards
:
You
desire
he
should
recompence
you
for
the
Crimes
you
commit
against
him
,
and
even
at
the
very
time
of
committing
them
;
you
make
use
of
his
immutable
Will
,
which
is
the
Order
and
Law
of
Nature
,
to
wrest
from
him
undeserved
Favours
;
for
with
a
guilty
Managery
you
produce
in
your
Body
such
Motions
as
oblige
him
to
make
you
relish
all
sorts
of
Pleasures
.
But
Death
shall
dissolve
that
Body
;
and
God
,
whom
you
have
made
subservient
to
your
unjust
Desires
,
will
make
you
subservient
to
his
just
Anger
,
and
mock
at
you
in
his
turn
.
'T
is
very
hard
,
I
confess
,
that
the
Enjoyment
of
Corporeal
Good
should
be
attended
with
Pleasure
,
and
that
the
Possession
of
the
Good
of
the
Soul
should
often
be
conjoin'd
with
Pain
and
Anguish
.
We
may
indeed
believe
it
to
be
a
great
Disorder
,
by
this
Reason
,
that
Pleasure
being
the
Character
of
Good
,
and
Pain
of
Evil
,
we
ought
to
possess
a
Satisfaction
infinitely
greater
in
loving
God
,
than
in
making
use
of
sensible
Things
;
since
He
is
the
true
,
or
rather
the
only
Good
of
the
Mind
.
So
doubtless
will
it
be
one
Day
,
and
so
was
it
most
probably
before
Sin
entred
into
the
World
:
At
least
,
't
is
very
certain
,
that
before
the
Fall
Man
suffered
no
Pain
in
discharging
his
Duty
.
But
God
is
withdrawn
from
us
since
the
Fall
of
Adam
;
he
is
no
more
our
Good
by
Nature
,
but
only
by
Grace
;
we
feel
now
no
Delight
and
Satisfaction
in
the
Love
of
him
,
and
he
rather
thrusts
us
from
,
than
draws
us
to
him
.
If
we
follow
him
,
he
gives
us
a
Rebuff
;
if
we
run
after
him
,
he
strikes
us
;
and
if
we
be
obstinate
in
our
Persuit
,
he
continues
to
handle
us
more
severely
,
by
inflicting
very
lively
and
sensible
Pains
upon
us
.
And
when
,
being
weary
of
walking
through
the
rough
and
stony
Ways
of
Vertue
,
without
being
supported
by
the
Repast
of
Good
,
or
strengthned
by
any
Nourishment
,
we
come
to
feed
upon
sensible
Things
,
he
fastens
us
to
them
by
the
relish
of
Pleasure
,
as
though
he
would
reward
us
for
turning
back
from
him
,
to
run
after
counterfeit
Goods
.
In
short
,
since
Men
have
sinn'd
,
it
seems
,
God
is
not
pleas'd
that
they
should
love
him
,
think
upon
him
,
or
esteem
him
their
only
and
sovereign
Good
.
It
is
only
by
the
delectable
Grace
of
Christ
our
Mediator
,
that
we
sensibly
perceive
that
God
is
our
proper
Good
.
For
Pleasure
being
the
sensible
Mark
of
Good
,
we
then
perceive
God
to
be
our
Good
,
when
the
Grace
of
our
Redeemer
makes
us
love
him
with
Pleasure
.
Thus
the
Soul
not
knowing
her
own
Good
,
either
by
a
clear
View
,
or
by
Sensation
,
without
the
Grace
of
Jesus
Christ
,
she
takes
the
Good
of
the
Body
for
her
own
;
she
loves
it
,
and
closes
to
it
with
a
stricter
Adhesion
by
her
Will
,
than
ever
she
did
by
the
first
Institution
of
Nature
.
For
Corporeal
Good
being
now
the
only
one
left
that
is
sensible
,
must
needs
operate
upon
Man
with
more
Violence
,
strike
his
B●ain
livelier
,
and
consequently
be
felt
and
imagined
by
the
Soul
in
a
more
sensible
manner
:
And
the
Animal
Spirits
receiving
a
more
vehement
Agitation
,
the
Will
by
consequence
must
love
it
with
a
greater
Ardency
and
Pleasure
.
The
Soul
might
before
Sin
blot
out
of
her
Brain
the
too
lively
Image
of
Corporeal
Good
,
and
dissipate
the
sensible
Pleasure
this
Image
was
attended
with
.
The
Body
being
subject
to
the
Mind
,
the
Soul
might
on
a
sudden
stop
the
quavering
Concussion
of
the
Fibres
of
the
Brain
,
and
the
Commotion
of
the
Spirits
,
by
the
meer
Consideration
of
her
Duty
:
But
she
lost
that
Power
by
Sin
.
Those
Traces
of
the
Imagination
,
and
those
Motions
of
the
Spirits
,
depend
no
more
upon
her
;
whence
it
necessarily
follows
,
that
the
Pleasure
,
which
by
the
Institution
of
Nature
is
conjoin'd
to
those
Motions
and
Traces
,
must
usurp
the
whole
Possession
of
the
Heart
.
[
](A51674-e78950-b)*
*
See
Dial.
5.
of
Chris●ian
Conversations
,
about
the
end
.
Man
cannot
long
resist
that
Pleasure
by
his
own
Strength
;
't
is
Grace
that
must
obtain
a
perfect
Victory
;
Reason
alone
can
never
doe
it
:
None
but
God
,
as
the
Author
of
Grace
,
can
overcome
himself
as
the
Author
of
Nature
,
or
rather
exorate
himself
as
the
Revenger
of
Adam's
Rebellion
.
The
Stoicks
,
who
had
but
a
confused
Knowledge
of
the
Disorders
of
Original
Sin
,
could
not
answer
the
Epicures
.
Their
Felicity
was
but
Ideal
,
since
there
is
no
Happiness
without
Pleasure
,
and
no
Pleasure
to
be
sensibly
perceiv'd
by
them
in
Vertuous
Actions
.
They
might
feel
indeed
some
Joy
in
following
the
Rules
of
their
phantastick
Vertue
;
because
Joy
is
a
natural
Consequence
of
the
Consciousness
our
Soul
has
of
being
in
the
most
convenient
State
.
That
Spiritual
Joy
might
bear
up
their
Spirits
for
a
while
,
but
was
not
strong
enough
to
withstand
Pain
,
and
overcome
Pleasure
.
Secret
Pride
,
and
not
Joy
,
made
them
keep
their
Countenance
;
for
when
no
body
was
present
,
all
their
Wisdom
and
Strength
vanished
,
just
as
Kings
of
the
Stage
lose
all
their
Grandeur
in
a
Moment
.
It
is
not
so
with
those
Christians
that
exactly
follow
the
Rules
of
the
Gospel
.
Their
Joy
is
solid
,
because
they
certainly
know
,
that
they
are
in
the
most
convenient
State
:
Their
Joy
is
great
,
because
the
Good
they
possess
through
Faith
and
Hope
is
Infinite
;
for
the
Hope
of
a
great
Good
is
always
attended
with
a
great
Joy
;
and
that
Joy
is
so
much
livelier
,
as
the
Hope
is
stronger
;
because
a
strong
Hope
representing
the
Good
as
present
,
necessarily
produces
Joy
,
as
also
that
sensible
Pleasure
which
ever
attends
the
Presence
of
Good
.
Their
Joy
is
not
restless
and
uneasie
,
because
grounded
on
the
Promises
of
God
,
confirm'd
by
the
Blood
of
his
Son
,
and
cherished
by
that
inward
Peace
and
unutterable
Sweetness
of
Charity
,
which
the
Holy
Ghost
sheds
into
their
Hearts
.
Nothing
can
separate
them
from
their
true
Good
,
which
they
relish
and
take
Complacency
in
by
the
Delectation
of
Grace
.
The
Pleasures
of
Corporeal
Good
are
not
so
great
as
those
they
feel
in
the
Love
of
God
.
They
love
Contempt
and
Pain
:
They
feed
upon
Disgraces
,
and
the
Pleasure
they
find
in
their
Sufferings
,
or
rather
the
Pleasure
they
find
in
God
,
for
whom
they
despise
all
the
rest
,
to
unite
themselves
to
him
,
is
so
ravishing
and
transporting
,
as
to
make
them
speak
a
new
Language
,
and
even
boast
;
as
the
Apostles
did
of
their
Miseries
and
Abuses
,
when
they
departed
from
the
presence
of
the
Council
,
rejoicing
that
they
were
counted
worthy
to
suffer
shame
for
the
Name
of
JESUS
.
Act.
5.41
.
Such
is
the
Disposition
of
Mind
in
true
Christians
,
when
they
are
most
basely
affronted
for
the
Defence
of
Truth
.
CHRIST
being
come
to
restore
the
Order
which
Sin
had
overthrown
,
and
that
Order
requiring
that
the
greatest
Goods
be
accompanied
with
the
most
solid
Pleasures
;
it
is
plain
,
that
things
ought
to
be
in
the
manner
we
have
said
.
But
we
may
farther
confirm
and
strengthen
Reason
by
Experience
;
for
't
is
known
,
that
as
soon
as
any
Person
has
formed
but
the
bare
Resolution
to
despise
all
for
God
,
he
is
commonly
affected
with
a
Pleasure
or
internal
Joy
,
that
makes
him
as
sensibly
and
lively
perceive
that
God
is
his
Good
,
as
he
knew
it
evidently
before
.
The
true
Christians
assure
us
every
Day
,
that
the
Joy
they
feel
in
an
unmixt
loving
and
serving
God
,
is
inexpressible
;
and
't
is
but
reasonable
to
believe
the
Relation
they
make
of
what
happens
within
them
.
On
the
contrary
,
the
Impious
are
perpetually
vexed
with
horrible
Disquietudes
;
and
those
that
are
shar'd
betwixt
God
and
the
World
,
partake
of
the
Joys
of
the
Just
,
and
of
the
Vexations
of
the
Impious
:
They
complain
of
their
Miseries
,
and
't
is
reasonable
to
believe
that
their
Complaints
are
not
groundless
.
God
strikes
Men
to
the
Quick
,
and
through
the
very
Heart
,
when
they
love
any
thing
besides
him
;
and
't
is
this
Stroke
that
causes
a
real
Misery
.
He
pours
an
exceeding
Joy
into
their
Minds
,
when
all
their
Adherencies
are
to
him
only
,
and
that
Joy
is
the
Spring
of
true
Felicity
.
The
Abundance
of
Riches
and
Elevation
to
Honours
being
without
us
,
cannot
cure
us
of
the
Wound
God
makes
;
and
Poverty
and
Contempt
,
that
are
likewise
without
us
,
cannot
hurt
us
under
the
Almighty's
Protection
.
By
what
we
have
said
,
't
is
plain
,
That
the
Objects
of
the
Passions
are
not
our
Good
,
that
we
must
not
follow
their
Motions
,
unless
it
be
for
the
Preservation
of
Life
;
that
sensible
Pleasure
bears
the
like
Proportion
to
Good
,
as
Sensations
to
Truth
;
and
that
as
our
Senses
deceive
us
in
Matters
of
Truth
,
so
do
likewise
our
Passions
in
point
of
our
Good
;
that
we
ought
to
yield
to
the
Delectation
of
Grace
,
because
it
evidently
moves
us
to
the
Love
of
a
true
Good
,
is
not
followed
with
the
secret
Reproaches
of
Reason
,
as
the
blind
Instinct
and
confused
Pleasure
of
the
Passions
;
but
is
always
attended
with
a
secret
Joy
,
suitable
to
the
good
State
we
are
in
.
Last
of
all
,
since
God
alone
can
operate
upon
the
Mind
of
Man
,
he
cannot
find
any
Happiness
out
of
God
,
unless
we
would
suppose
that
God
rewards
Disobedience
,
or
that
he
commands
to
love
more
,
what
less
deserves
to
be
loved
.
CHAP.
V.
That
the
Perfection
of
the
Mind
consists
in
its
Vnion
with
God
,
by
the
Knowledge
of
Truth
,
and
the
Love
of
Vertue
;
and
contrariwise
,
that
its
Imper●ection
proceeds
only
from
its
Dependency
on
the
Body
,
caused
by
the
Disorder
of
the
Senses
and
Passions
.
THE
shortest
Reflection
is
sufficient
to
let
us
know
,
that
the
Good
of
the
Mind
must
needs
be
something
of
a
Spiritual
Nature
,
for
our
Bodies
are
much
inferiour
to
our
Mind
;
they
are
unable
to
act
upon
it
by
their
own
strength
;
they
cannot
immediately
unite
themselves
to
it
;
lastly
,
●hey
are
not
intelligible
of
themselves
,
and
therefore
cannot
be
its
Good
:
whereas
Spiritual
things
being
intelligible
of
their
own
Nature
,
can
be
united
to
the
Mind
,
and
consequently
be
its
Good
,
provided
they
be
Superiour
to
it
.
For
that
a
thing
may
be
the
Good
of
the
Mind
,
it
must
not
only
be
Spiritual
as
it self
;
but
it
must
also
be
Superiour
to
it
,
that
it
may
act
upon
it
,
enlighten
it
,
and
reward
it
;
since
otherwise
it
cannot
make
it
perfecter
and
happier
,
nor
by
consequence
be
its
Good
.
Now
,
of
all
Intelligible
or
Spiritual
things
,
God
alone
is
thus
Superiour
to
the
Mind
;
whence
it
follows
,
That
nothing
but
God
alone
,
either
is
,
or
can
be
,
our
true
Good
;
and
that
we
cannot
become
either
more
happy
or
more
perfect
,
but
by
enjoying
him
.
Every
one
is
persuaded
that
the
Knowledge
of
Truth
,
and
the
Love
of
Vertue
,
make
the
Mind
mo●e
perfect
;
and
that
the
Blindness
of
the
Mind
,
and
the
Depravation
of
the
Heart
,
lessens
its
natural
Perfection
.
The
Knowledge
of
Truth
,
and
the
Love
of
Vertue
,
cannot
then
be
any
thing
else
but
the
Union
of
the
Mind
to
God
;
or
,
if
I
may
so
speak
,
a
Possession
of
him
:
and
,
on
the
con●rary
,
the
Blindness
of
the
Mind
,
and
the
Depravation
of
the
Heart
,
can
be
nothing
else
but
a
separation
of
the
Mind
from
God
,
and
its
Union
with
something
Inferiour
to
it
,
viz.
with
the
●●dy
;
since
that
is
the
only
Union
that
can
make
it
imperfect
and
unhappy
.
And
therefore
to
know
the
Truth
,
or
to
know
things
as
far
as
they
are
agreeable
to
the
Rules
of
Truth
,
is
really
to
know
God
.
And
to
love
Vertue
,
or
to
love
things
as
far
as
they
are
amiable
,
or
according
to
the
Rules
of
Vertue
,
is
to
love
him
.
The
Mind
is
situate
,
as
it
were
,
betwixt
God
and
Bodies
,
betwixt
Good
and
Evil
,
between
that
w●i●h
enlightens
,
and
that
which
blinds
it
;
that
which
rules
,
and
that
which
misrules
it
;
that
which
can
make
it
perfect
and
happy
,
and
that
which
can
render
it
imperfect
and
miserable
.
When
it
discovers
some
Truth
,
or
sees
things
as
they
are
in
their
own
Nature
;
it
sees
them
in
the
Ideas
of
God
,
that
is
,
discovers
them
by
a
clear
and
distinct
view
of
what
is
in
God
representing
them
.
For
,
as
I
have
observed
elsewhere
,
the
Mind
of
Man
contains
not
in
it self
the
Perfections
or
Ideas
o●
all
the
Beings
it
is
capable
of
perceiving
:
't
is
not
the
universal
Being
,
and
therefore
cannot
see
i●
it self
such
things
as
are
distinguish'd
from
it self
.
It
does
not
instruct
or
enlighten
it self
,
by
consulting
with
it self
,
as
being
neither
Perfection
nor
Light
to
it self
;
it
stands
in
need
to
be
enlightned
by
the
immense
Light
of
Eternal
Truth
.
Thus
the
Mind
,
by
knowing
Truth
,
is
united
to
God
,
and
in
some
manner
knows
and
possesses
him
.
We
may
not
only
say
,
That
a
Mind
perceiving
the
Truth
,
partly
knows
God
,
who
comprehends
it
;
we
may
add
also
,
That
in
some
sort
it
knows
things
as
God
himself
knows
them
.
For
the
Mind
knows
their
true
Relations
,
and
so
does
God
;
the
Mind
sees
them
in
viewing
the
Perfections
of
God
that
represent
them
;
God
perceives
them
the
same
way
:
for
God
neither
perceives
by
Sense
,
nor
Imagination
;
but
sees
in
himself
,
as
being
the
Intellectual
World
,
the
Corporeal
and
Sensible
World
,
which
he
has
created
.
'T
is
the
same
with
the
Mind
in
its
Knowledge
of
Truth
:
it
comes
not
to
it
by
Sensation
or
Imagination
;
for
Sensations
and
Pantasms
offer
but
false
Representations
of
things
to
the
Mind
;
so
that
whosoever
discovers
the
Truth
,
sees
it
in
the
Intellectual
World
,
to
which
't
is
united
,
and
in
which
Good
sees
it
;
for
this
material
and
sensible
World
,
is
not
intelligible
of
it self
:
so
that
the
Mind
sees
in
the
Light
of
God
as
does
God
himself
,
all
the
things
which
it
plainly
sees
,
though
it
sees
them
very
imperfectly
and
so
very
differently
from
God
in
that
respect
.
Thus
when
the
Mind
sees
Truth
,
it
not
only
is
united
to
God
,
possesses
and
beholds
God
,
but
also
sees
Truth
in
one
sense
as
God
himself
sees
it
.
So
when
we
love
according
to
the
Rules
of
Vertue
,
we
love
God
;
for
by
regulating
our
Love
according
to
these
Rules
,
the
Impression
of
Love
towards
him
,
which
he
continually
produces
in
our
Heart
,
is
not
turn'd
off
by
free
Will
,
nor
chang'd
into
Self-Love
.
The
Mind
at
that
time
freely
follows
the
Impression
which
God
gives
:
and
God
never
giving
any
Impression
which
does
not
tend
towards
him
;
since
he
only
acts
for
himself
,
it
is
plain
,
That
to
love
according
to
the
Rules
of
Vertue
,
is
to
love
God
.
But
't
is
not
only
to
love
God
;
't
is
likewise
to
love
as
God
loves
:
He
loves
himself
only
,
and
his
Works
but
because
they
relate
to
his
Perfections
,
and
proportionably
to
the
degrees
of
Conformity
they
have
with
them
;
It
being
the
same
Love
by
which
God
loves
himself
,
and
whatever
he
has
made
or
done
.
To
love
according
to
the
Rules
of
Vertue
,
is
to
love
God
only
,
to
love
him
in
all
things
,
and
to
love
things
proportionably
as
they
partake
of
his
Goodness
and
Perfections
;
since
this
is
to
love
them
according
to
the
degree
they
are
lovely
.
In
short
,
't
is
to
love
by
the
Impression
of
the
same
Love
by
which
God
loves
himself
;
for
't
is
the
Love
by
which
God
loves
himself
,
and
whatever
else
with
relation
to
him
,
that
animates
us
,
when
we
love
as
we
ought
:
whence
I
conclude
,
That
we
then
love
,
as
God
loves
.
It
is
therefore
evident
,
That
the
Knowledge
of
Truth
,
and
the
regular
Love
of
Vertue
,
constitute
all
our
Perfection
,
since
they
are
the
costomary
Attendants
on
our
Union
with
God
;
which
also
affords
us
the
Enjoyment
of
him
▪
as
far
as
we
are
capable
of
it
,
in
this
Life
:
whereas
the
Blindness
of
the
Mind
,
and
the
Depravation
of
the
Heart
,
make
our
Imperfection
;
and
are
the
Results
of
the
Union
of
our
Soul
and
Body
,
as
I
have
proved
in
several
Places
;
shewing
that
we
never
know
the
Truth
,
nor
love
the
real
Good
,
when
we
follow
the
Impressions
of
our
Senses
,
Imaginations
,
and
Passions
.
All
this
is
evident
;
and
yet
Men
,
who
all
passionately
desire
the
Perfection
of
their
Being
,
care
but
little
to
increase
the
Union
which
they
have
with
God
;
nay
,
they
are
continually
at
work
to
strengthen
and
enlarge
that
which
they
have
with
sensible
things
.
The
Cause
of
that
surprizing
Disorder
cannot
be
too
much
explain'd
.
The
Possession
of
Good
must
naturally
produce
two
Effects
in
the
Possessour
;
at
once
must
render
him
more
perfect
,
and
more
happy
:
however
it
does
not
always
fall
out
so
.
'T
is
impossible
indeed
that
the
Mind
should
actually
enjoy
a
Good
,
without
being
actually
more
perfect
;
but
it
may
happen
that
it
actually
enjoys
it
,
without
being
actually
happier
.
Those
that
know
Truth
best
,
and
love
most
the
most
lovely
Goods
,
are
always
actually
more
perfect
,
than
those
that
live
in
blind
Ignorance
,
and
disorderly
Practice
;
but
they
are
not
always
actually
happier
.
It
is
even
so
with
Evil
;
it
ought
at
once
to
make
both
imperfect
and
unhappy
;
but
though
it
always
makes
Men
more
imperfect
,
yet
it
does
not
always
make
them
more
unhappy
;
or
at
least
makes
them
not
unhappy
proportionably
to
its
making
them
imperfect
.
Vertue
is
often
bitter
and
distastful
,
whereas
Vice
is
sweet
and
pleasant
;
so
that
it
is
especially
by
Faith
and
Hope
,
that
pious
Men
are
truly
happy
;
whilst
the
wicked
have
the
actual
Enjoyments
of
Pleasures
and
Delights
.
It
ought
not
to
be
so
indeed
,
but
however
it
is
so
;
Sin
has
brought
forth
that
Disorder
,
as
I
said
in
the
foregoing
Chapter
,
and
that
Disorder
is
the
principal
Cause
,
not
only
of
the
Corruption
of
our
Morals
,
but
also
of
the
Ignorance
and
Darkness
of
our
Mind
.
By
that
Disorder
it
is
that
our
Imagination
persuades
it self
,
that
Bodies
may
be
the
Good
of
the
Mind
:
For
Pleasure
,
as
I
have
often
said
,
is
the
sensible
Character
,
or
Mark
,
of
Good
.
But
now
of
all
the
Pleasures
we
enjoy
upon
Earth
,
the
most
sensible
are
those
which
we
imagine
to
receive
by
the
Body
.
We
judge
,
though
too
inconsiderately
without
doubt
,
that
Bodies
can
be
,
and
are
,
effectually
our
Good
.
And
't
is
so
hard
to
oppose
the
Instinct
of
Nature
,
and
to
withstand
the
Arguments
of
the
Senses
,
that
the
design
of
it
does
not
so
much
as
come
into
our
Mind
.
We
think
not
on
the
Disorders
introduc'd
by
Sin
.
We
consider
not
that
Bodies
can
act
upon
the
Mind
but
as
occasional
Causes
:
that
the
Mind
cannot
immediately
,
or
by
it self
,
enjoy
any
Corporeal
thing
,
and
that
all
the
ways
it
has
of
uniting
to
an
Object
are
by
its
Knowledge
and
Love
;
that
God
only
is
superiour
to
it
,
can
reward
or
punish
it
,
by
Sensations
of
Pleasure
or
Pain
,
that
can
enlighten
and
move
it
,
in
a
word
,
act
upon
it
.
Those
Truths
,
though
most
evident
to
attentive
Minds
,
are
not
however
so
powerful
to
convince
us
,
as
is
the
deceiving
Experience
of
a
sensible
Impression
.
When
we
consider
something
as
part
of
our selves
,
or
look
on
our selves
as
a
part
of
that
thing
,
we
judge
it
our
Good
to
be
united
to
it
;
we
love
it
,
and
this
love
is
so
much
the
greater
,
as
the
thing
,
whereunto
we
think
our selves
united
,
seems
to
be
a
more
considerable
part
of
the
whole
we
make
up
together
with
it
.
Now
there
are
two
sorts
of
Proofs
,
which
persuade
us
that
a
thing
is
part
of
our self
,
viz.
the
Instinct
of
Sensation
,
and
the
Evidence
of
Reason
.
By
the
Instinct
of
Sensation
I
am
persuaded
that
my
Soul
is
united
to
my
Body
,
or
that
my
Body
makes
part
of
my
Being
;
but
I
have
no
full
Evidence
of
it
,
since
I
know
it
not
by
the
light
of
Reason
,
but
by
the
Pain
or
Pleasure
I
feel
at
the
presence
and
impression
of
Objects
.
My
Hand
is
prick'd
,
I
suffer
Pain
;
thence
I
conclude
,
that
my
Hand
makes
part
of
my self
:
my
Cloaths
are
rent
,
and
I
endure
nothing
;
therefore
,
I
say
,
my
Cloaths
are
not
my self
:
my
Hair
is
cut
without
Pain
,
but
cannot
be
pluck'd
up
without
smart
;
that
puzzles
the
Philosopher
,
and
he
knows
not
what
to
determine
.
In
the
mean
while
this
perplexity
shows
,
that
even
the
wisest
rather
judge
by
the
instinct
of
Sensation
than
by
the
light
of
Reason
,
that
such
or
such
things
belong
or
belong
not
to
themselves
.
For
should
they
determine
them
by
Evidence
,
and
the
light
of
Reason
,
they
would
quickly
know
,
that
the
Mind
and
the
Body
are
two
sorts
of
Beings
,
altogether
opposite
;
that
the
Mind
cannot
be
united
to
the
Body
by
it self
,
and
that
the
Soul
is
wounded
when
the
Body
is
struck
,
only
because
of
her
Union
with
God
.
'T
is
then
only
by
the
Instinct
of
the
Sensation
that
we
look
on
our
Body
,
and
all
the
sensible
things
to
which
we
are
united
,
as
part
of
our selves
,
that
is
,
as
belonging
to
that
which
thinks
and
feels
in
us
:
For
what
is
not
,
cannot
be
known
by
evident
Reason
,
since
Evidence
discovers
Truth
alone
.
But
on
the
contrary
,
't
is
by
the
light
of
Reason
that
we
know
the
Relation
we
have
with
Intellectual
things
.
We
discover
,
by
a
clear
View
of
the
Mind
,
that
we
are
united
to
God
in
a
more
strict
and
essential
manner
than
to
our
Body
;
that
without
him
we
are
nothing
,
and
neither
can
doe
,
nor
know
,
neither
will
,
nor
be
sensible
of
any
thing
:
that
he
is
our
All
,
or
if
we
may
so
speak
,
that
we
make
up
a
whole
with
him
,
of
which
we
are
but
an
infinitely
small
part
.
The
light
of
Reason
discovers
us
a
thousand
Motives
to
love
God
only
,
and
to
dispise
Bodies
,
as
unworthy
of
our
Love
.
But
we
are
not
naturally
sensible
of
our
Union
to
God
,
nor
persuaded
that
he
is
our
All
,
by
the
Instinct
of
sense
;
't
is
only
the
Grace
of
our
Lord
which
produces
in
some
Men
that
spiritual
sense
to
help
them
to
overcome
the
contrary
Sensations
,
by
which
they
are
united
to
their
Body
.
For
God
,
as
the
Author
of
Nature
,
inclines
Minds
to
the
love
of
him
by
a
Knowledge
of
Illumination
,
and
not
of
Instinct
;
and
in
all
probability
,
't
is
but
since
the
Fall
that
God
,
as
the
Author
of
Grace
,
has
superadded
Instinct
to
Illumination
;
because
our
light
is
at
present
so
mightily
impair'd
,
as
to
be
incapable
of
bringing
us
to
God
,
being
besides
continually
weakn'd
by
contrary
pleasure
or
instinct
,
and
rendred
ineffectual
.
We
therefore
discover
by
the
light
of
the
Mind
,
that
we
are
united
to
God
,
and
to
the
intellectual
World
which
he
contains
;
and
are
convinced
by
Sensation
,
that
we
are
united
to
our
Body
,
and
by
it
to
the
material
and
sensible
World
God
has
Created
.
But
as
our
Sensations
are
more
lively
,
moving
,
frequent
and
lasting
than
our
Illuminations
,
so
't
is
not
strange
that
our
Sensations
should
agitate
us
,
and
quicken
our
love
for
sensible
things
;
whereas
our
Light
dissipates
and
vanishes
,
without
producing
any
zeal
and
ardency
for
Truth
.
'T
is
true
that
several
Men
are
persuaded
that
God
is
their
real
Good
,
love
him
as
their
All
,
and
earnestly
desire
to
strengthen
and
increase
their
Union
with
him
.
But
few
evidently
know
,
that
by
meditating
on
the
Truth
we
unite
our selves
to
God
,
as
far
as
natural
strength
can
attain
;
that
it
is
a
sort
of
Enjoyment
of
him
,
to
contemplate
the
true
Ideas
of
things
;
and
that
that
abstracted
view
of
some
general
and
immutable
Truths
,
on
which
all
the
particulars
depend
,
are
flights
of
a
Mind
that
sequesters
it self
from
the
Body
to
unite
it self
to
God
.
Metaphysicks
,
speculative
Mathematicks
,
and
all
those
universal
Sciences
,
which
regulate
and
contain
the
particular
,
as
the
Universal
Being
comprehends
all
particular
Beings
,
seem
to
be
Chimerical
to
most
Men
,
as
well
to
the
pious
as
to
those
that
do
not
love
God
.
So
that
I
dare
hardly
make
bold
to
say
,
that
the
study
of
those
Sciences
is
the
most
pure
and
perfect
Application
to
God
,
that
the
Mind
may
be
naturally
capable
of
;
and
that
it
is
by
the
sight
of
the
Intellectual
World
,
which
is
their
Object
,
that
God
has
produced
and
still
knows
this
sensible
World
,
from
which
Bodies
receive
their
Life
,
as
Spirits
live
from
the
other
.
Those
that
purely
follow
the
Impressions
of
their
Senses
,
and
motions
of
their
Passions
,
are
not
capable
of
relishing
the
Truth
,
because
it
flatters
them
not
.
And
even
the
Vertuous
,
who
constantly
oppose
their
Passions
when
they
proffer
them
false
Goods
,
do
not
always
resist
them
when
they
conceal
from
them
the
Truth
,
and
make
it
despicable
;
because
one
may
be
pious
without
being
a
Man
of
parts
.
To
please
God
we
need
not
exactly
know
,
that
our
Senses
,
Imagination
,
and
Passions
,
always
represent
things
otherwise
than
they
are
;
since
it
appears
not
that
our
Lord
and
his
Apostles
ever
intended
to
undeceive
us
of
several
Errours
upon
this
matter
,
which
Descartes
has
discover'd
to
us
▪
There
is
a
great
difference
betwixt
Faith
and
Understanding
,
the
Gospel
and
Philosophy
:
the
greatest
Clowns
are
capable
of
Faith
,
but
few
can
attain
to
the
pure
Knowledge
of
Evident
Truth
.
Faith
represents
to
vulgar
Men
God
as
the
Creator
of
Heaven
and
Earth
,
which
is
a
sufficient
motive
of
Love
and
Duty
towards
him
;
whereas
Reason
,
knowing
that
God
was
God
before
he
was
Creator
,
not
only
considers
him
in
his
Works
,
but
also
endeavours
to
contemplate
him
in
himself
;
or
in
that
immense
Idea
of
the
infinitely
perfect
Being
,
which
is
included
in
him
.
The
Son
of
God
,
who
is
the
Wisdom
of
his
Father
,
or
the
Eternal
Truth
,
made
himself
Man
,
and
became
sensible
,
that
he
might
be
known
by
Men
of
Flesh
and
Blood
,
by
gross
material
Men
;
that
he
might
instruct
them
by
that
which
was
the
Cause
of
their
Blindness
,
and
draw
them
to
the
love
of
him
,
and
disengage
them
from
sensible
goods
,
by
the
same
things
that
had
enslav'd
them
;
for
having
to
doe
with
Fools
,
he
thought
fit
to
take
upon
him
a
sort
of
Folly
whereby
to
make
them
wise
:
So
that
the
most
pious
Men
,
and
truest
Believers
,
have
not
always
the
greatest
Understanding
.
They
may
know
God
by
Faith
,
and
love
him
by
the
help
of
his
Grace
,
without
understanding
,
that
he
is
their
All
,
in
the
sense
Philosophers
understand
him
;
and
without
thinking
,
that
the
abstracted
Knowledge
of
Truth
is
a
sort
of
a
Union
with
him
.
We
ought
not
therefore
to
be
surprized
,
if
so
few
Persons
labour
to
strengthen
their
natural
Union
with
God
by
the
Knowledge
of
Truth
,
since
to
this
there
is
required
a
continual
opposition
of
the
Impressions
of
the
Senses
and
Passions
,
in
a
very
different
way
from
that
which
is
usual
with
the
Vertuous
,
who
are
not
always
persuaded
,
that
the
Senses
and
Passions
abuse
them
in
the
manner
that
has
been
explain'd
in
the
foregoing
Books
.
The
Sensations
and
Thoughts
,
in
which
the
Body
has
a
share
,
are
the
sole
and
immediate
Cause
of
the
Passions
,
as
proceeding
from
the
Concussion
of
the
Fibres
of
the
Brain
,
raising
some
particular
Commotion
in
the
Animal
Spirits
:
And
therefore
Sensations
are
the
only
sensible
proofs
of
our
dependence
on
some
things
,
which
they
excite
us
to
love
:
but
we
feel
not
our
Natural
Union
with
God
,
when
we
know
the
Truth
,
and
do
not
so
much
as
think
upon
him
,
because
he
is
,
and
operates
in
us
so
privately
and
insensibly
,
as
to
be
imperceptible
to
our selves
:
And
this
is
the
Reason
that
our
natural
Union
with
God
raises
not
our
Love
for
him
.
But
it
goes
quite
otherwise
with
our
Union
to
sensible
things
.
All
our
Sensations
prove
it
,
and
Bodies
appear
before
our
Eyes
,
when
they
act
in
us
.
Their
Action
is
visible
and
manifest
.
Our
Body
is
even
more
present
to
us
than
our
Mind
,
and
we
consider
the
former
as
the
best
part
of
our Selves
.
So
that
our
Union
to
our
Body
,
and
by
it
to
sensible
Objects
,
excites
in
us
a
violent
Love
,
which
increases
that
Union
,
and
makes
us
depend
on
things
that
are
infinitely
below
us
.
CHAP.
VI.
Of
the
more
general
Errours
of
the
Passions
,
with
some
particular
Instances
.
'T
IS
the
part
of
Moral
Philosophy
to
discover
the
particular
Errours
concerning
Good
,
in
which
our
Passions
engage
us
,
to
oppose
irregular
affections
,
to
restore
the
Integrity
of
the
Heart
,
and
to
rule
the
Course
of
our
Life
.
But
here
we
chiefly
aim
at
giving
Rules
to
the
Mind
,
and
finding
out
the
Causes
of
our
Errours
,
in
reference
to
Truth
;
so
that
we
shall
not
proceed
farther
in
those
Matters
that
relate
to
the
Love
of
true
Good
.
We
are
tending
to
the
Instruction
of
the
Mind
,
and
only
take
the
Heart
in
the
way
,
in
as
much
as
the
Heart
is
its
Master
.
We
search
into
Truth
it self
,
without
a
special
Respect
to
our selves
;
and
we
consider
its
Relation
with
us
,
only
because
that
Relation
is
the
Spring
of
Self-love's
disguising
and
concealing
it
from
us
:
for
we
judge
of
all
things
by
our
Passions
,
whence
it
is
that
we
mistake
in
all
things
,
the
Judgments
of
Passions
never
agreeing
with
the
Judgments
of
Truth
.
'T
is
what
we
learn
in
these
excellent
Words
of
St.
Bernard
.
[
](A51674-e79450-b)*
*
Amor
sicut
nec
Odium
,
veritatis
Judicium
nescit
.
Vis
Judicium
Veritatis
audire
?
Sicut
audio
,
Joan.
5.30
.
sic
judico
:
non
sicut
odi
,
non
sicut
amo
,
non
sicut
timeo
.
Est
Judicium
Odii
,
Joan.
19.7
.
ut
illud
;
Nos
Legem
habemus
,
&
secundum
legem
nostram
debet
mori
.
Est
&
Timoris
,
Joan.
11.48
.
ut
illud
;
Si
dimittimus
eum
sic
,
venient
Romani
,
&
tollent
nostrum
locum
&
gentem
.
Judicium
verò
Amoris
,
ut
David
de
filio
parricidâ
,
2
Sam.
18.5
.
Parcite
,
inquit
,
puero
Absalom
.
S.
Bern.
de
grad.
humilitatis
.
Neither
Love
nor
Hatred
know
how
to
make
a
Judgment
according
to
Truth
.
Will
you
hear
a
true
Judgment
?
As
I
hear
,
I
judge
,
says
our
Lord
;
he
says
not
as
I
hate
,
as
I
love
,
or
as
I
fear
.
Here
you
have
a
Judgment
of
Hatred
:
We
have
a
Law
,
say
the
Jews
,
and
by
that
Law
he
ought
to
die
.
Here
a
Judgment
of
Fear
:
If
we
let
him
alone
,
say
the
Pharisees
,
the
Romans
shall
come
,
and
take
away
our
Place
and
Nation
.
Here
another
of
Love
,
as
that
of
David
,
speaking
of
his
Parricide
Son
,
Spare
the
young
Man
Absalom
.
Our
Love
,
Hatred
,
and
Fear
cause
us
to
make
false
Judgments
only
.
Nothing
but
the
pure
Light
of
Truth
can
illuminate
our
Mind
;
nothing
but
the
distinct
Voice
of
our
common
Master
can
cause
us
to
make
true
Judgments
,
provided
we
only
judge
of
what
he
says
,
and
as
he
says
,
in
Imitation
only
of
our
Lord
,
as
I
hear
I
judge
:
But
let
's
see
how
it
is
that
our
Passions
seduce
us
,
that
we
may
the
easier
resist
them
.
The
Passions
are
so
nearly
related
to
the
Senses
,
that
,
remembring
what
hath
been
said
in
the
first
Book
,
it
will
not
be
difficult
to
explain
,
how
they
lead
us
into
Errour
;
because
the
general
Causes
of
the
Errours
of
the
Passions
are
altogether
like
to
those
of
the
Errours
of
the
Senses
.
The
most
general
Cause
of
the
Errours
of
the
Senses
,
is
,
as
we
there
have
shewn
,
our
attributing
to
external
Objects
,
or
to
the
Body
,
the
proper
Sensations
of
our
Soul
,
annexing
Colours
to
the
Superficies
of
Bodies
,
diffusing
Light
,
Sounds
and
Odours
in
the
Air
,
and
fixing
Pain
and
Titillation
to
those
Parts
of
our
Body
that
receive
some
Changes
by
the
Motion
of
other
contiguous
Bodies
.
Almost
the
same
thing
may
be
said
of
the
Passions
:
we
too
rashly
ascribe
to
the
Objects
,
that
cause
,
or
seem
to
cause
,
them
,
all
the
Dispositions
of
our
Heart
,
our
Goodness
,
Meekness
,
Malice
,
Sowreness
,
and
all
the
other
Qualities
of
our
Mind
.
The
Object
that
begets
some
Passion
in
us
,
seemes
afrer
a
sort
to
contain
in
it self
the
Passion
produced
in
us
,
when
we
consider
it
,
as
sensible
things
seem
to
contain
in
themselves
the
Sensations
,
which
their
Presence
excites
in
us
.
When
we
love
any
Person
,
we
are
naturally
inclin'd
to
believe
that
he
loves
us
,
and
can
hardly
imagine
that
he
designs
to
hurt
us
,
or
to
oppose
our
Desires
.
But
if
Hatred
succeed
in
the
place
of
Love
,
we
cannot
Persuade
our selves
that
he
has
any
Affection
for
us
;
we
interpret
all
he
does
in
the
worst
Sense
,
we
are
always
distrustful
and
upon
our
Guard
,
though
he
thinks
not
upon
us
,
or
perhaps
intended
to
doe
us
Service
.
In
short
,
we
unjustly
attribute
to
the
Person
that
stirs
up
a
passion
in
us
,
all
the
Dispositions
of
our
Heart
,
and
with
as
much
Imprudence
,
as
we
ascribe
to
the
Objects
of
the
Senses
,
all
the
Qualities
of
our
Mind
.
Moreover
by
the
same
Reason
that
we
believe
,
other
Men
receive
the
same
Sensations
from
the
same
Objects
as
we
do
;
we
think
they
are
agitated
with
the
same
Passions
,
for
the
same
Subjects
if
they
are
in
a
State
of
being
susceptible
of
them
.
We
suppose
them
to
love
and
desire
the
same
things
as
we
our selves
do
,
whence
proceed
secret
Jealousies
and
Hatreds
,
if
the
desired
Good
cannot
be
enjoyed
entire
by
several
;
for
the
contrary
happens
in
Goods
that
can
be
possessed
without
Division
by
several
Persons
,
as
Science
,
Vertue
,
the
Sovereign
Good
,
and
the
like
.
We
also
suppose
that
they
hate
,
fear
or
fly
from
the
same
things
that
we
do
;
whence
proceed
secret
Plots
or
publick
Associations
,
according
to
the
nature
and
state
of
the
thing
hated
,
by
which
means
we
hope
to
rid
our selves
of
our
Miseries
.
We
therefore
ascribe
to
the
Objects
of
our
Passions
the
Commotions
they
produce
in
us
,
thinking
that
all
other
Men
,
and
even
sometimes
Beasts
,
are
agitated
as
we
are
;
and
besides
judge
yet
more
rashly
,
the
Cause
of
our
Passions
,
which
is
often
but
imaginary
,
is
really
in
some
Object
.
When
we
have
a
passionate
Love
for
any
Body
,
his
Grimace
and
Faces
are
charming
,
his
Ugliness
is
not
distastful
,
his
ill-composed
Motions
and
Gestures
are
regular
,
or
at
least
natural
.
If
he
never
speak
,
he
is
wise
;
if
he
be
a
great
Talker
,
he
is
witty
;
if
he
speak
upon
all
adventures
,
he
's
Universal
;
if
he
continually
interrupt
others
,
it
is
because
he
's
full
of
Fire
,
of
Life
,
and
Spirit
;
if
he
pretend
to
top
and
sway
every
where
,
't
is
because
he
deserves
it
.
Thus
can
Passion
cover
or
dissemble
the
Imperfections
of
Friends
,
and
advantagiously
set
off
their
most
inconsiderable
Qualities
.
But
when
that
Friendship
,
which
only
proceeds
as
other
Passions
do
,
from
the
Agitation
of
the
Blood
and
Animal
Spirits
,
comes
to
cool
,
through
want
of
Heat
and
Spirits
fit
to
nourish
it
;
when
Interest
or
some
false
Relation
alters
the
Disposition
of
the
Brain
;
then
Hatred
succeeding
Love
,
is
sure
to
represent
to
us
in
that
Object
of
our
Passion
all
the
Defects
that
are
capable
of
stirring
up
our
just
Aversion
.
We
perceive
in
him
Qualities
quite
contrary
to
those
we
admired
before
:
We
are
asham'd
of
having
lov'd
him
;
and
the
ruling
Passion
never
fails
to
justifie
it self
,
and
to
ridicule
that
which
it
has
follow'd
.
The
Power
and
Injustice
of
Passions
are
not
included
within
such
narrow
Limits
as
those
we
have
described
,
but
extend
infinitely
farther
;
not
only
disguising
their
principal
Object
,
but
also
whatever
has
any
reference
to
it
.
They
make
us
love
not
only
the
Qualities
of
our
Friends
,
but
also
most
part
of
those
of
the
Friends
to
our
Friends
.
And
in
those
who
are
endued
with
any
strength
and
extent
of
Imagination
,
the
Passions
have
so
vast
a
reach
and
out-let
,
that
it
is
not
possible
to
determine
their
Limits
.
Those
Things
I
have
mention'd
,
are
such
general
and
fruitful
Principles
of
Errour
,
Prejudice
,
and
Injustice
,
that
it
is
impossible
to
observe
all
the
Consequences
of
them
:
Most
of
the
Truths
,
or
rather
Errours
,
entertained
in
some
Places
,
Times
,
Commonalties
,
and
Families
,
proceed
from
thence
.
What
is
followed
in
Spain
,
is
rejected
in
France
;
what
is
true
at
Paris
,
is
false
at
Rome
;
what
is
certain
amongst
the
Dominicans
,
is
uncertain
amongst
the
Franciscans
;
and
what
appears
undoubted
to
the
Black
Fryars
,
seems
an
Errour
to
the
White
.
The
Dominicans
believe
themselves
obliged
to
stick
to
St.
Thomas
.
Why
?
Because
that
Doctor
was
one
of
their
Order
:
Whereas
the
Franciscans
follow
the
Opinion
of
Scotus
,
because
he
was
a
Black
Fryar
.
There
are
likewise
Truths
and
Errours
proper
to
certain
Times
.
The
Earth
turned
two
thousand
Years
ago
;
then
it
remain'd
unmovable
till
our
Days
,
wherein
it
has
began
to
turn
again
.
Aristotle
was
formerly
burnt
,
and
a
Provincial
Council
,
approved
by
the
Pope
,
most
wisely
forbad
his
Physicks
to
be
taught
:
He
was
admired
ever
since
,
and
falls
now
again
into
Contempt
.
Opinions
that
are
now
publickly
received
in
the
Schools
,
were
formerly
rejected
as
Heresies
,
and
their
Assertors
excommunicated
by
the
Bishops
;
because
Passions
stirring
up
Factions
,
Factions
establish
those
sorts
of
Truths
or
Errours
,
that
are
as
inconsistent
as
the
Principle
they
proceed
from
.
Men
may
indeed
be
indifferent
as
to
the
Unmovableness
of
the
Earth
,
[
](A51674-e79910-b)*
*
Concil.
A●gl
.
per
Spelman
.
A●
.
1287.
or
the
Essence
of
Bodies
,
consider'd
in
themselves
;
but
they
are
no
longer
so
,
when
they
look
on
those
Opinions
as
defended
by
their
Adversaries
.
Thus
Hatred
,
kept
up
by
a
confused
sense
of
Piety
,
breeds
an
indiscreet
Zeal
,
that
kindles
by
degrees
,
and
at
last
produces
such
Events
,
as
are
not
so
surprizing
to
all
the
World
,
till
a
great
while
after
their
arrival
.
We
can
hardly
imagine
that
Passions
should
reach
so
far
,
because
we
know
not
that
their
Impetuosity
extends
to
whatever
may
satisfie
them
.
Perhaps
H●man
would
have
done
no
harm
to
the
Jewish
People
;
but
because
Mordecai
,
a
Jew
,
forbore
to
salute
him
,
he
on
a
sudden
design'd
the
destroying
of
the
whole
Nation
,
that
his
Revenge
might
be
the
more
splendid
.
Two
Men
sue
each
other
about
a
Piece
of
Land
;
they
ought
only
to
produce
in
Court
their
Titles
to
it
,
and
to
say
nothing
but
what
relates
to
the
Case
,
or
to
set
it
off
fair
.
However
,
they
seldom
fail
to
slander
one
another
,
to
contradict
each
other
in
every
thing
,
to
raise
trifling
Contestations
and
Accusations
,
and
to
intricate
the
Suit
with
an
infinity
of
Accessary
Circumstances
,
which
confound
the
Principal
.
In
short
,
the
Passions
reach
as
far
as
the
sight
of
the
Mind
does
,
in
those
that
are
affected
by
them
.
I
would
say
,
there
is
nothing
to
which
we
may
suppose
their
Object
to
be
related
,
but
their
Motion
will
extend
to
it
;
which
is
done
after
the
following
manner
.
The
Tracks
of
the
Objects
are
so
connected
to
each
other
in
the
Brain
,
that
it
is
impossible
the
Course
of
the
Spirits
should
violently
move
any
one
of
them
,
without
raising
several
others
at
the
same
time
.
The
principal
Idea
of
the
Thing
perceiv'd
,
is
therefore
necessarily
accompanied
with
a
vast
number
of
accessary
Ideas
,
which
increase
more
and
more
,
as
the
Impression
of
the
Animal
Spirits
is
more
violent
.
Now
that
Impression
cannot
but
be
very
violent
in
the
Passions
,
because
they
continually
hurry
into
the
Brain
abundance
of
such
Spirits
as
are
fit
to
preserve
the
Traces
of
the
Ideas
which
represent
their
Object
.
So
that
the
Motion
of
Love
or
Hatred
extends
not
only
to
the
Chief
Object
of
either
Passion
,
but
also
to
all
the
Things
that
are
found
any
ways
relating
to
it
;
because
the
Motion
of
the
Soul
in
the
Passion
follows
the
Perception
of
the
Mind
,
as
the
Motion
of
the
Animal
Spirits
in
the
Brain
follows
the
Traces
of
the
Brain
,
as
well
those
that
excite
the
principal
Idea
of
the
Passion
's
Object
,
as
those
that
are
related
to
it
.
And
therefore
we
must
not
be
surprized
if
Men
carry
their
Hatred
or
Love
to
such
a
heighth
,
and
commit
such
strange
and
capricious
Actions
.
Every
one
of
those
Effects
has
its
proper
Cause
,
though
unknown
to
us
;
because
their
accessary
Ideas
being
not
always
like
to
ours
,
we
cannot
rightly
judge
of
them
:
So
that
Men
act
always
by
some
particular
Reason
,
even
in
those
Actions
that
appear
most
extravagant
to
us
.
CHAP.
VII
.
Of
the
Passions
in
particular
:
And
first
,
Of
Admiration
,
and
its
ill
Effects
.
WHatever
I
have
said
hitherto
of
the
Passions
is
general
,
yet
't
is
no
hard
matter
to
draw
particular
Inferences
from
it
:
If
one
do
but
reflect
upon
what
occurs
in
his
own
Breast
,
and
upon
the
Actions
of
others
,
he
will
discover
at
one
View
,
a
greater
number
of
those
Truths
,
than
can
be
explain'd
in
a
considerable
time
.
However
,
there
are
so
few
who
think
of
retiring
into
themselves
,
and
make
any
Attempt
to
that
purpose
,
that
,
to
quicken
them
,
and
raise
their
Attention
,
it
will
not
be
amiss
somewhat
to
descend
into
Particulars
.
It
seems
,
when
we
handle
or
strike
our selves
,
that
we
are
almost
insensible
;
whereas
if
we
be
but
never
so
little
touched
by
others
,
we
receive
such
lively
Sensations
as
awaken
our
Attention
.
In
a
word
,
as
it
never
comes
into
our
Mind
to
tickle
our selves
;
and
if
it
did
,
perhaps
the
Attempt
would
be
unsuccessful
:
So
,
almost
for
the
same
Reason
,
the
Soul
cares
not
to
feel
and
sound
her self
,
is
presently
disgusted
at
that
sort
of
Exercise
,
and
commonly
is
incapable
of
feeling
or
knowing
all
the
Parts
that
belong
to
her
,
till
touch'd
and
made
sensible
to
her
by
others
:
So
that
it
will
be
necessary
,
for
the
facilitating
some
People
in
acquiring
the
Knowledge
of
themselves
,
to
mention
some
of
the
particular
Effects
of
the
Passions
,
to
●each
them
,
by
touching
them
,
of
what
Make
and
Constitution
their
Soul
is
of
.
In
the
mean
while
,
those
that
shall
read
the
following
Thoughts
,
must
be
forewarn'd
,
that
they
will
not
always
be
touched
to
the
Quick
,
nor
be
aware
that
they
are
subject
to
the
Passions
and
Errours
of
which
I
shall
speak
;
because
particular
Passions
are
not
always
the
same
in
all
Men.
All
Men
indeed
have
the
same
natural
Inclinations
,
which
referr
not
to
the
Body
;
and
likewise
all
those
that
relate
to
it
,
when
't
is
in
a
very
good
Constitution
:
But
its
various
Tempers
and
frequent
Alterations
,
produce
an
infinite
Variety
in
particular
Passions
:
To
which
diversity
of
Constitutions
,
if
that
variety
of
Objects
be
added
,
which
cause
very
different
Impressions
upon
those
who
follow
not
the
same
Employments
and
manner
of
Life
,
it
will
plainly
appear
,
that
such
a
Person
,
who
is
lively
touched
by
some
Things
in
one
Place
of
his
Soul
,
may
be
absolutely
insensible
as
to
many
others
;
so
that
we
should
commonly
mistake
,
should
we
always
judge
of
the
Commotions
of
others
by
what
we
feel
in
our selves
.
I
am
not
afraid
of
being
deceiv'd
,
when
I
assert
,
That
all
Men
would
be
happy
;
for
I
fully
and
certainly
know
,
that
Chinese
and
Tartars
,
Angels
and
Devils
,
in
a
word
,
all
Spirits
whatsoever
,
have
an
Inclination
for
Felicity
:
Nay
,
I
know
that
God
shall
never
produce
any
Spirit
without
that
Desire
.
I
never
saw
either
Chinese
or
Tartar
;
so
that
I
never
learn'd
it
from
Experience
,
nor
yet
from
my
inward
Consciousness
,
which
only
teaches
me
that
I
would
my self
be
happy
.
God
alone
can
inwardly
convince
me
,
that
all
other
Men
,
Angels
,
and
Devils
,
desire
Happiness
;
and
he
only
can
assure
me
,
that
he
will
never
create
a
Spirit
that
shall
not
care
for
Felicity
:
For
who
else
can
positively
assure
me
of
what
he
does
,
and
even
thinks
?
And
as
he
cannot
deceive
me
,
so
I
may
safely
relie
on
what
I
learn
from
him
:
And
therefore
I
am
certain
that
all
Men
would
be
happy
,
because
that
Inclination
is
natural
,
and
independent
on
the
Body
.
It
goes
quite
otherwise
with
particular
Passions
:
For
,
because
I
love
Musick
,
Dancing
,
Hunting
,
Sweet-meats
,
high-season'd
Dishes
,
&c.
I
cannot
certainly
conclude
that
other
Men
have
the
same
Passions
.
Pleasure
is
doubtless
sweet
and
grateful
to
Men
;
but
all
find
it
not
in
the
same
Things
.
The
Love
of
Pleasure
is
a
Natural
Inclination
,
not
depending
upon
the
Body
,
and
therefore
general
to
all
Men
:
But
the
Love
of
Musick
,
Hunting
,
or
Dancing
,
is
not
general
,
because
the
Disposition
of
the
Body
from
which
it
proceeds
being
different
in
several
Persons
,
the
Passions
they
produce
are
not
always
the
same
.
General
Passions
,
as
Desire
,
Joy
,
and
Sorrow
,
are
the
Mean
betwixt
natural
Inclinations
and
particular
Passions
.
They
are
general
,
as
well
as
Inclinations
;
but
they
are
not
always
of
the
same
strength
;
because
the
Cause
which
produces
and
feeds
them
is
not
always
equally
active
.
There
is
an
infinite
Variety
in
the
Degrees
of
Agitation
of
the
Animal
Spirits
,
in
their
Plenty
and
Scarcity
,
in
their
Solidity
and
Fineness
,
and
in
the
Relation
betwixt
the
Fibres
of
the
Brain
and
those
Spirits
.
And
therefore
it
often
happens
,
that
we
touch
not
Men
in
any
part
of
their
Soul
,
when
we
treat
of
particular
Passions
;
but
if
they
chance
to
be
touched
,
they
are
violently
moved
.
On
the
contrary
,
the
mentioning
of
general
Passions
and
Inclinations
never
fail
to
affect
us
,
but
so
weakly
and
faintly
,
that
we
are
scarce
sensible
of
it
.
I
mention
this
,
lest
any
should
judge
of
what
I
say
by
his
own
Commotions
,
that
he
either
has
,
or
shall
receive
from
my
Discourse
;
but
rather
that
he
should
judge
of
it
by
considering
the
Nature
of
the
Passions
I
speak
of
.
Should
we
purpose
to
handle
all
the
particular
Passions
,
and
distinguish
them
by
the
Objects
that
raise
them
,
it
is
plain
,
the
Task
would
be
endless
,
and
we
should
only
repeat
the
same
thing
:
The
former
,
because
the
Objects
of
the
Passions
are
infinite
;
the
latter
,
because
we
should
be
constantly
engag'd
in
the
same
Subject
.
The
particular
Passions
for
Poetry
,
History
,
Mathematicks
,
Hunting
,
Dancing
,
are
but
one
general
Passion
:
For
,
for
example
,
the
Passions
of
Desire
or
Joy
for
whatever
pleases
,
are
not
different
Passions
,
though
delightful
Objects
in
particular
differ
much
.
And
therefore
the
Number
of
Passions
must
not
be
multiplied
by
the
Number
of
Objects
,
which
are
infinite
;
but
only
by
the
principal
Relations
they
may
have
to
us
:
And
so
it
will
appear
,
as
we
shall
explain
it
hereafter
,
that
Love
and
Hatred
are
the
Mother-Passions
,
which
produce
no
other
general
Passions
,
besides
Desire
,
Joy
,
and
Sorrow
:
that
the
particular
Passions
are
made
up
only
of
those
Three
primitive
,
and
more
or
less
compounded
,
according
to
the
number
of
accessary
Ideas
,
that
attend
the
principal
Idea
of
the
Good
or
Evil
,
which
has
rais'd
them
,
or
as
the
Good
and
Evil
are
more
or
less
circumstantiated
with
reference
to
us
.
If
we
remember
what
has
been
said
of
the
Connection
of
Ideas
,
and
that
in
all
great
Passions
the
Animal
Spirits
being
extreamly
agitated
,
stir
up
in
the
Brain
all
the
Traces
any
ways
related
to
the
moving
Object
;
we
shall
own
,
that
there
is
an
infinite
Variety
of
different
Passions
,
which
have
no
particular
Names
,
and
cannot
be
explain'd
but
by
saying
they
are
inexplicable
.
If
the
primitive
Passions
,
of
the
Complication
of
which
others
are
made
up
,
were
not
susceptible
of
more
or
less
,
it
would
not
be
difficult
to
determine
the
Number
of
all
the
Passions
;
but
that
number
of
complicated
Passions
must
needs
be
infinite
,
because
one
and
the
same
Passion
having
infinite
Degrees
,
may
by
its
Conjunction
with
others
be
infinitely
complicated
;
so
that
there
were
perhaps
never
two
Men
affected
with
the
same
Passion
,
if
by
that
Name
be
understood
an
even
Mixture
and
Likeness
of
all
the
Motions
and
Sensations
that
are
occasionally
rais'd
in
us
upon
the
presence
of
some
Object
.
But
as
more
or
less
do
not
alter
the
Species
,
so
it
may
be
said
,
that
the
Number
of
Passions
is
not
infinite
;
because
the
Circumstances
that
attend
Good
or
Evil
,
which
excite
the
Passions
,
are
not
innumerable
.
But
let
us
explain
our
Passions
in
particular
.
When
we
see
any
thing
the
first
time
,
or
when
having
seen
it
several
times
accompanied
with
some
Circumstances
,
we
see
it
again
attended
with
others
,
we
are
surprized
,
and
admire
it
.
Thus
a
new
Idea
,
or
a
new
Connection
of
old
Ideas
,
raises
in
us
an
Imperfect
Passion
,
which
is
the
first
of
all
,
and
nam'd
Admiration
.
I
call
it
imperfect
,
because
't
is
not
excited
either
by
the
Idea
or
Sense
of
Good
:
The
Brain
being
then
struck
in
some
unusual
Places
,
or
in
a
new
manner
,
the
Soul
is
sensibly
moved
,
and
therefore
must
needs
strongly
apply
her self
to
what
is
new
in
that
Object
;
for
the
same
Reason
that
a
bare
Tickling
the
Soale
of
the
Feet
raises
a
very
lively
and
moving
Sensation
in
the
Soul
,
rather
by
the
Novelty
than
by
the
Strength
of
the
Impression
.
There
are
other
Reasons
of
the
Application
of
the
Soul
to
new
Things
;
but
I
have
explain'd
them
,
where
I
speak
of
the
Natural
Inclinations
.
Here
we
consider
the
Soul
only
as
related
to
the
Body
,
in
which
respect
the
Commotion
of
the
Spirits
is
the
natural
Cause
of
her
Application
to
new
Things
.
In
Admiration
,
strictly
taken
,
we
consider
things
only
as
they
are
in
themselves
,
or
as
they
appear
,
and
look
not
on
them
as
related
to
us
,
or
as
good
or
bad
.
Hence
it
comes
,
that
the
Spirits
disperse
not
through
the
Muscles
to
give
the
Body
the
Disposition
that
is
required
for
persuing
Good
,
or
shunning
Evil
;
and
shake
not
the
Nerves
that
go
to
the
Heart
and
other
Viscera
,
to
hasten
or
retard
the
Fermentation
or
Motion
of
the
Blood
,
as
it
happens
in
other
Passions
.
All
the
Spirits
go
the
Brain
,
to
print
a
lively
and
distinct
Image
of
the
surprizing
Object
,
that
the
Soul
may
consider
and
know
it
again
;
whilst
the
rest
of
the
Body
remains
in
the
same
posture
,
and
as
unmovable
:
For
as
there
is
no
Commotion
in
the
Soul
,
so
there
is
no
Motion
in
the
Body
.
When
the
admired
Things
appear
great
,
Admiration
is
always
follow'd
with
Esteem
,
and
sometimes
with
Veneration
;
whereas
it
is
always
accompanied
with
Contempt
,
and
sometimes
with
Disdain
,
when
they
appear
little
.
The
Idea
of
Grandeur
causes
a
great
Motion
of
the
Spirits
in
the
Brain
,
and
the
Tracks
that
represent
it
are
kept
very
long
:
And
likewise
a
great
Motion
of
the
Spirits
raises
in
the
Soul
an
Idea
of
Greatness
,
and
powerfully
fixes
the
Mind
on
the
Consideration
of
that
Idea
.
On
the
contrary
,
the
Idea
of
Littleness
produces
but
an
inconsiderable
Motion
of
Spirits
in
the
Brain
,
and
the
Traces
representing
it
are
soon
blotted
out
:
And
likewise
a
small
Motion
of
Spirits
raises
in
the
Soul
an
Idea
of
Meanness
,
and
stays
the
Mind
but
little
on
the
Consideration
of
that
Idea
.
Those
things
deserve
to
be
taken
notice
of
.
When
we
consider
our selves
,
or
something
united
to
us
,
our
Admiration
is
always
accompanied
with
some
moving
Passion
,
which
however
only
agitates
the
Soul
and
the
Spirits
,
that
go
to
the
Heart
;
because
there
being
no
Good
to
seek
,
nor
Evil
to
avoid
,
the
Spirits
disperse
not
themselves
through
the
Muscles
,
to
dispose
the
Body
to
some
Action
.
The
Contemplation
of
the
Perfection
of
our
Being
,
or
of
something
belonging
to
it
,
naturally
produces
Pride
,
or
Self-esteem
,
Contempt
of
others
,
Joy
,
and
some
other
Passions
.
The
Contemplation
of
our
own
Grandeur
,
causes
Haughtiness
;
that
of
our
Strength
,
Valour
,
or
Boldness
;
and
that
of
any
other
Advantage
naturally
raises
some
other
Passion
,
which
is
still
a
kind
of
Pride
.
On
the
contrary
,
the
Con●ideration
of
some
Imperfection
of
our
Being
,
or
of
something
belonging
to
it
,
naturally
produces
Humility
,
Contempt
of
our selves
,
Reverence
for
others
,
Sorrow
,
and
some
other
Passions
.
The
●ight
of
our
Littleness
causes
Pusilanimity
;
that
of
our
Weakness
,
Timidity
▪
and
that
of
any
Disadvantage
whatsoever
,
naturally
raises
some
other
Passion
,
which
is
still
a
kind
of
Humility
.
But
neither
that
Humility
,
nor
that
Pride
,
are
properly
Vertues
or
Vices
;
being
only
Passions
or
involuntary
Commotions
,
which
yet
are
very
useful
to
Civil
Society
,
and
even
in
some
Cases
absolutely
necessary
for
the
preservation
of
the
Life
or
Goods
of
those
that
are
actuated
by
them
.
'T
is
necessary
,
for
instance
,
to
be
humble
and
timorous
,
and
even
outwardly
to
testifie
that
Disposition
of
the
Mind
,
by
a
modest
Look
,
and
respectful
or
timorous
Deportment
,
when
we
are
in
the
Presence
of
a
Person
of
Quality
,
or
one
that
is
proud
and
powerful
:
It
being
almost
ever
profitable
for
the
Good
of
the
Body
,
that
the
Imagination
should
stoop
before
sensible
Grandeur
,
and
give
it
outward
Marks
of
its
inward
Submission
and
Veneration
.
But
this
is
done
naturally
and
machinally
,
without
the
Consent
of
the
Will
,
and
sometimes
notwithstanding
its
Opposition
.
Even
such
Beasts
,
as
Dogs
,
which
stand
in
need
of
prevailing
upon
those
with
whom
they
live
,
have
ordinarily
their
Bodies
so
disposed
,
that
it
machinally
takes
the
Posture
that
is
most
suitable
,
in
reference
to
those
that
are
about
them
:
For
that
is
absolutely
necessary
to
their
Preservation
.
And
if
Birds
,
and
some
other
Creatures
,
want
such
a
Disposition
,
't
is
because
they
need
not
asswage
the
Fury
of
those
whom
they
can
escape
by
Flight
,
or
whose
Help
is
not
necessary
for
the
Preservation
of
their
Life
.
It
can
never
be
too
much
observ'd
,
that
all
the
Passions
which
are
raised
in
us
,
at
the
sight
of
something
external
,
machinally
spread
on
the
Face
those
Looks
that
are
fit
and
suited
to
our
present
State
;
that
is
,
those
that
are
apt
by
their
Impression
machinally
to
dispose
the
Spectators
to
such
Passions
and
Motions
as
are
useful
for
the
Good
of
Civil
Society
.
Admiration
it self
,
when
produced
in
us
by
the
Perception
of
something
external
,
which
others
can
consider
as
well
as
we
,
puts
the
Face
in
such
a
Shape
as
is
fit
to
strike
others
with
a
machinal
Impression
of
Admiration
;
and
which
acts
so
regularly
on
the
Brain
,
that
the
Spirits
contain'd
in
it
are
driven
to
the
Muscles
of
the
Face
,
to
fashion
it
into
a
Look
altogether
like
our
own
.
This
Communication
of
the
Passions
of
the
Soul
and
the
Animal
Spirits
,
to
unite
Men
together
,
in
reference
to
Good
and
Evil
,
and
to
make
them
altogether
like
,
not
only
by
the
Disposition
of
their
Mind
,
but
also
by
the
Posture
of
their
Body
,
is
so
much
the
greater
and
more
observable
,
as
the
Passions
are
more
violent
;
by
reason
that
the
Animal
Spirits
are
then
agitated
with
more
strength
.
And
this
must
needs
be
so
,
because
the
Good
and
Evil
being
then
greater
,
or
more
present
,
requires
a
greater
Application
,
and
a
stricter
Association
of
Men
to
seek
or
avoid
them
.
But
when
the
Passions
are
moderate
,
as
Admiration
usually
is
,
their
Communication
is
insensible
;
and
they
do
not
alter
the
Countenance
,
by
which
the
Communication
uses
to
be
wrought
:
For
there
being
no
urgent
Occasion
,
it
would
be
needless
to
put
a
Force
on
the
Imagination
of
others
,
or
to
take
them
off
from
their
Business
,
to
which
their
Application
is
perhaps
more
requisite
,
than
to
the
looking
on
the
Causes
of
those
Passions
.
There
is
nothing
more
wonderful
,
than
that
Oeconomy
of
the
Passions
and
Dispositions
of
the
Body
,
in
reference
to
the
surrounding
Objects
.
All
our
machinal
Actions
are
most
becoming
the
Wisdom
of
our
Maker
.
God
has
made
us
susceptible
of
all
those
Passions
chiefly
to
unite
us
with
all
sensible
Things
,
for
the
Preservation
of
Society
,
and
of
our
corporeal
Being
;
and
his
Design
is
so
exactly
perform'd
by
the
Construction
of
his
Work
,
that
we
cannot
but
admire
his
Wisdom
in
the
Contrivance
of
the
Springs
and
Texture
of
it
.
However
,
our
Passions
,
and
all
those
imperceptible
Bands
which
tie
us
to
the
surrounding
Objects
,
often
prove
,
by
our
own
Fault
,
fruitful
Causes
of
Errours
and
Disorders
.
For
we
make
not
of
our
Passions
the
Use
we
ought
to
do
;
we
allow
them
every
thing
,
and
know
not
so
much
as
the
Bounds
we
ought
to
prescribe
to
their
Power
;
so
that
the
weakest
and
least
moving
Passions
,
as
Admiration
for
instance
,
have
strength
enough
to
draw
us
into
Errour
.
Some
Examples
whereof
are
these
.
When
Men
,
and
especially
those
that
are
endu'd
with
a
lively
Imagination
,
contemplate
the
best
side
of
themselves
,
they
find
for
the
most
part
a
great
deal
of
Self-complacency
and
Satisfaction
;
and
their
internal
Satisfaction
is
increased
by
the
Comparison
they
make
betwixt
themselves
and
others
that
are
not
so
airy
and
spirituous
:
Besides
that
they
have
many
Admirers
,
and
that
few
of
their
Opposers
gain
Success
and
Applause
;
for
Reason
is
seldom
or
never
applauded
,
in
opposition
to
a
strong
and
lively
Imagination
.
In
short
,
the
Face
of
their
Hearers
takes
on
such
submissive
and
dutiful
Looks
,
and
expresses
,
at
every
new
Word
they
say
,
such
lively
Strokes
of
Admiration
,
that
they
admire
themselves
too
;
and
that
their
Imagination
,
pufft
up
with
their
pretended
Advantages
,
fills
them
with
an
extraordinary
Satisfaction
of
themselves
.
And
since
we
cannot
see
Men
in
the
heighth
of
a
Passion
,
without
receiving
some
impression
from
it
,
and
adopting
,
as
I
may
say
,
their
Sentiments
;
how
should
it
be
possible
that
those
who
are
surrounded
with
a
Throng
of
Admirers
,
should
give
no
access
to
a
Passion
that
is
so
flattering
and
so
grateful
to
Self-love
?
Now
that
high
Esteem
which
Persons
of
a
strong
and
lively
Imagination
have
of
themselves
and
their
good
Qualities
,
puffs
them
up
with
Pride
,
and
gives
them
a
Magisterial
and
Decisive
Comportment
;
they
listen
to
others
,
but
with
Contempt
;
they
answer
,
but
with
Jeering
;
they
think
,
but
with
reference
to
themselves
;
and
as
they
look
on
the
Attention
of
the
Mind
,
that
is
so
requisite
for
the
discovery
of
Truth
,
as
a
Slavery
;
so
they
are
altogether
indocible
.
Pride
,
Ignorance
,
and
Blindness
,
go
hand
in
hand
.
The
bold
,
or
rather
vain-glorious
Wits
,
will
not
be
the
Disciples
of
Truth
,
and
never
retire
into
themselves
,
unless
it
be
to
contemplate
and
admire
their
supposed
Perfections
;
so
that
he
who
resists
the
Proud
,
shines
in
the
middle
of
their
Darkness
,
without
dissipating
it
.
There
is
,
on
the
contrary
,
a
certain
Disposition
of
the
Blood
and
Animal
Spirits
,
that
occasions
too
mean
Thoughts
of
our selves
.
The
Scarcity
,
the
Dulness
,
and
Fineness
of
the
Animal
Spirits
,
join'd
to
the
Coursness
of
the
Fibres
of
the
Brain
,
cause
the
Imagination
to
be
weak
and
languishing
:
And
the
Contemplation
,
or
rather
the
confused
Sense
of
that
Faintness
of
Imagination
,
is
what
breeds
in
us
a
vicious
Humility
,
which
we
may
call
Meanness
of
Spirit
.
All
Men
are
susceptible
of
the
Truth
,
but
all
apply
not
themselves
to
him
who
alone
is
able
to
teach
it
.
The
Proud
make
their
Address
and
listen
but
to
themselves
;
and
the
Dis-spirited
make
their
Application
to
the
Proud
,
and
submit
themselves
to
their
Determinations
.
Both
the
one
and
the
other
give
ear
to
bare
Men.
Proud
Minds
follow
the
Fermentation
of
their
own
Blood
,
that
is
,
their
own
Imagination
;
and
the
Low-spirited
are
over-sway'd
by
the
over-ruling
Countenance
of
the
Proud
,
and
so
are
both
subjected
to
Vanity
and
Lies
.
The
Proud
is
like
a
rich
and
powerful
Man
,
who
has
a
great
Retinue
,
who
measures
his
own
Greatness
by
the
number
of
his
Attendants
,
and
his
Strength
by
that
of
the
Horses
of
his
Coach
:
whereas
the
Low-spirited
is
like
a
poor
,
weak
,
and
languishing
Wretch
,
who
though
he
have
the
same
Spirit
and
Principles
,
yet
because
he
is
Master
of
Nothing
,
imagines
he
is
almost
Nothing
himself
.
However
,
our
Retinue
is
not
our self
,
and
so
far
is
the
plenty
of
the
Blood
and
Animal
Spirits
,
the
vigour
and
impetuousness
of
the
Imagination
,
from
leading
us
to
the
Truth
,
that
on
the
contrary
nothing
carries
us
so
far
from
it
;
whereas
't
is
the
Dull
,
if
I
may
so
call
them
,
that
is
,
the
cool
and
sedate
Minds
,
that
are
the
fittest
for
the
Discovery
of
solid
and
hidden
Truths
.
Their
Passions
being
silent
and
quiet
,
they
may
listen
in
the
Recess
of
their
Reason
to
the
Truth
that
teaches
them
;
but
most
unhappily
they
mind
not
its
Words
,
because
it
speaks
low
,
without
a
forcible
sound
,
and
that
nothing
wakens
them
but
a
mighty
Noise
.
Nothing
convinces
them
but
what
glitters
to
appearance
,
and
is
judg'd
great
and
magnificent
by
the
Senses
;
they
love
to
be
dazled
with
Brightness
,
and
rather
chuse
to
hear
those
Philosophers
,
who
tell
them
their
Stories
and
Dreams
,
and
assert
,
as
the
false
Prophets
of
former
times
,
that
the
Truth
has
spoken
to
them
(
though
it
has
not
)
than
to
listen
to
Truth
it self
.
For
they
have
already
suffer'd
four
thousand
Years
,
and
that
without
opposition
,
humane
Pride
to
entertain
them
with
Lies
,
which
they
reverence
and
keep
to
,
as
to
Holy
and
Divine
Traditions
.
It
seems
the
God
of
Truth
is
wholly
gone
from
them
;
they
think
on
him
and
consult
him
no
more
,
they
meditate
no
more
,
and
cover
their
neglect
and
laziness
,
with
the
delusive
pretences
of
a
sacred
Humility
.
'T
is
true
,
that
we
cannot
of
our selves
discover
the
Truth
;
but
we
can
doe
it
at
all
times
with
the
assistance
of
him
that
enlightens
us
,
and
can
never
doe
it
with
that
of
all
the
Men
in
the
World
.
Those
that
know
it
best
cannot
shew
it
to
us
,
unless
we
ask
it
of
him
,
to
whom
they
have
made
their
Application
;
and
unless
he
be
pleased
to
answer
our
Questions
,
that
is
,
our
Attention
,
as
he
has
done
theirs
.
We
are
not
therefore
to
believe
,
because
Men
say
this
or
that
,
for
every
Man
is
a
Liar
;
but
because
he
that
cannot
deceive
speaks
to
us
,
and
we
must
perpetually
interrogate
him
for
the
solution
of
our
Difficuties
.
We
ought
not
to
trust
to
them
that
speak
only
to
the
Ears
;
instruct
but
the
Body
,
or
at
the
utmost
move
but
the
Imagination
.
But
we
ought
attentively
to
listen
unto
,
and
faithfully
believe
him
who
speaks
to
the
Mind
,
informs
the
Reason
,
and
piercing
into
the
most
abstruse
Recesses
of
the
inward
Man
,
is
able
to
enlighten
and
strengthen
him
,
against
the
outward
and
sensible
Man
,
that
continually
labours
to
seduce
and
corrupt
him
.
I
often
repeat
these
things
,
because
I
believe
them
most
worthy
of
a
serious
Consideration
.
God
alone
is
to
be
honour'd
,
because
he
only
can
endue
us
with
Knowledge
,
as
't
is
he
alone
that
can
fill
us
with
Pleasure
.
There
is
sometimes
in
the
animal
Spirits
,
and
the
rest
of
the
Body
,
a
Disposition
that
provokes
to
Hunting
,
Dancing
,
Running
,
and
other
Corporeal
Exercises
,
wherein
the
Force
and
Activity
of
the
Body
are
most
conspicuous
:
Which
Disposition
is
very
ordinary
to
young
Men
,
especially
before
their
Body
be
in
a
State
of
Consistency
.
Children
cannot
stay
in
one
place
,
and
will
always
be
moving
,
if
they
follow
their
humour
.
For
whereas
all
their
Muscles
are
not
yet
strengthened
,
nor
perfectly
finisht
;
therefore
God
,
who
as
the
Author
of
Nature
,
regulates
the
Pleasures
of
the
Soul
,
with
reference
to
the
Good
of
the
Body
,
causes
them
to
be
delighted
with
such
Exercises
as
may
invigorate
it
.
Thus
whilst
the
Flesh
and
Fibres
of
their
Nerves
are
yet
soft
,
the
Channels
through
which
the
animal
Spirits
must
necessarily
flow
,
to
produce
all
sorts
of
Motion
,
are
wore
,
and
kept
open
,
Humours
have
no
time
to
settle
,
and
all
Obstructions
and
Causes
of
Corruption
are
removed
.
The
confused
Sensation
that
young
Men
have
of
that
Disposition
of
their
Body
,
makes
them
pleased
with
the
thoughts
of
their
Strength
and
Dexterity
.
They
admire
themselves
when
they
know
how
to
measure
their
Motions
,
and
to
make
extraordinary
ones
,
and
are
ambitious
of
being
in
the
presence
of
Spectators
and
Admirers
.
Thus
they
strengthen
by
degrees
their
Inclination
to
Corporeal
Exercises
,
which
is
one
of
the
principal
Causes
of
Ignorance
and
Brutishness
.
For
besides
the
time
that
is
by
that
meanes
lavisht
away
,
the
little
use
they
make
of
their
Understanding
,
causes
the
chief
part
of
the
Brain
,
in
whose
tractableness
the
force
and
quickness
of
the
Mind
especially
consists
,
to
become
altogether
inflexible
,
and
the
animal
Spirits
,
through
disuse
,
are
difficultly
dispers'd
in
the
Brain
,
in
a
manner
requisite
to
think
of
what
they
please
.
This
incapacitates
most
part
of
the
Nobility
and
Gentry
,
especially
such
as
follow
the
War
,
to
apply
themselves
to
any
thing
.
They
answer
with
a
Word
and
a
Blow
,
as
the
Proverb
says
;
for
if
you
speak
any
thing
that
they
don't
willingly
hear
,
instead
of
thinking
upon
a
suitable
Reply
,
their
Animal
Spirits
insensibly
flow
into
the
Muscles
that
raise
the
Arm
,
and
make
them
answer
without
Consideration
,
with
a
Blow
,
or
a
Threatning
Gesture
;
because
their
Spirits
,
agitated
by
the
Words
they
hear
,
are
conveyed
to
such
Places
,
as
are
most
open
through
Habit
and
Exercise
.
The
sense
of
their
Corporeal
Strength
confirms
them
in
those
insulting
Manners
;
and
the
submissive
Aspect
of
their
Hearers
puffs
'em
up
with
such
an
absurd
Confidence
,
as
makes
them
believe
they
have
said
very
fine
things
,
when
they
have
but
haughtily
and
brutishly
uttered
Impertinencies
;
being
flater'd
by
the
Fear
and
Caution
of
the
Standers
by
.
It
is
not
possible
to
have
applied
our selves
to
any
Study
,
or
to
make
actual
profession
of
any
Science
,
to
be
either
Author
or
Doctor
,
without
being
conscious
of
it
.
But
that
very
Consciousness
naturally
produces
in
some
Men
such
a
vast
Number
of
Imperfections
,
that
it
would
be
better
with
them
if
they
wanted
those
Honourable
Qualities
.
As
they
look
upon
them
as
their
most
considerable
Perfections
,
so
they
are
extreamly
pleased
with
that
Contemplation
;
they
set
them
before
the
Eyes
of
others
with
all
the
possible
Dexterity
,
and
conceive
they
have
thereby
right
to
judge
of
every
thing
without
Examination
.
If
any
be
so
couragious
as
to
contradict
them
,
they
at
first
endeavour
skillfully
,
and
with
a
sweet
and
obliging
Countenance
,
to
insinuate
what
they
are
,
and
what
right
they
have
to
determine
of
such
Matters
:
And
if
any
still
presume
to
oppose
them
,
and
that
they
be
at
a
loss
for
an
Answer
,
they
do
not
stick
openly
to
declare
what
they
think
of
themselves
and
of
their
Adversaries
.
Every
inward
Sense
of
any
Qualification
we
enjoy
,
naturally
swells
up
the
Courage
.
A
Trooper
well
mounted
and
accoutred
,
who
neither
wants
Blood
nor
Spirits
,
is
ready
to
undertake
any
thing
;
that
Disposition
inspiring
him
with
an
undaunted
Boldness
.
So
it
goes
with
a
Man
of
Letters
;
when
he
fansies
himself
to
be
Learned
,
and
that
the
Haughtiness
of
his
Heart
has
corrupted
his
Mind
,
he
becomes
,
if
I
may
so
speak
,
bold
and
fierce
against
Truth
.
Sometimes
he
rashly
impungs
it
without
knowing
it
,
at
other
times
he
consciously
betrays
it
;
and
relying
upon
his
imaginary
Learning
,
is
always
ready
to
assert
,
either
the
Affirmative
or
Negative
,
according
as
he
is
possessed
with
a
Spirit
of
Contradiction
.
It
goes
quite
otherwise
with
those
that
make
no
Ostentation
of
Learning
:
they
are
not
positive
;
neither
do
they
speak
,
unless
they
have
something
to
say
;
and
it
even
often
happens
that
they
remain
silent
when
they
should
speak
.
They
have
neither
that
Fame
,
nor
those
outward
Characters
of
Learning
,
which
spur
Men
on
to
speak
without
Knowledge
,
and
so
may
decently
hold
their
Peace
:
but
the
Pretenders
are
afraid
to
make
a
stop
,
since
they
are
sensible
they
shall
be
despis'd
for
their
Silence
,
even
when
they
have
nothing
to
say
;
and
that
they
are
not
always
in
danger
of
falling
into
Contempt
,
though
they
speak
but
Impertinencies
,
provided
they
utter
them
with
a
Scientifick
Confidence
.
What
makes
Men
capable
of
thinking
,
enables
them
to
know
the
Truth
;
but
neither
Honours
,
Riches
,
University-Degrees
,
nor
Chimerical
Erudition
,
makes
them
capable
of
thinking
.
It
's
their
own
Nature
,
for
they
are
made
to
think
,
because
they
are
created
for
the
Truth
.
Even
bodily
Health
qualifies
them
not
for
thinking
well
,
but
only
is
a
less
Hinderance
than
Sickness
.
Our
Body
assists
us
in
some
manner
in
perceiving
by
Sense
,
and
imagining
;
but
not
at
all
in
conceiving
.
For
though
without
its
Help
we
cannot
attentively
meditate
,
nor
oppose
the
continual
Impression
of
the
Senses
and
Passions
,
which
endeavour
to
perplex
and
obliterate
our
Ideas
,
because
in
this
present
State
,
we
cannot
overcome
the
Body
,
but
by
the
Body
;
yet
't
is
plain
that
the
Body
cannot
illuminate
the
Mind
,
nor
produce
in
it
the
Light
of
Understanding
,
since
every
Idea
that
discovers
the
Truth
proceeds
from
Truth
it self
.
All
that
the
Soul
receives
from
the
Body
relates
only
to
it
,
and
when
she
follows
those
Glimpses
,
she
sees
nothing
but
Phantasms
and
Dreams
;
that
is
to
say
,
she
sees
not
things
as
they
are
in
themselves
,
but
only
as
they
have
relation
to
her
Body
.
As
the
Idea
of
our
own
Greatness
or
Littleness
is
a
frequent
occasion
of
Errour
,
so
likewise
the
Ideas
of
outward
things
that
have
refference
to
us
,
make
no
less
dangerous
an
Impression
.
We
have
already
observ'd
that
the
Idea
of
Greatness
is
always
attended
with
a
great
Motion
of
Spirits
,
and
a
great
Motion
of
the
Spirits
is
ever
accompanied
with
the
Idea
of
Greatness
:
and
that
on
the
contrary
,
that
of
Littleness
is
always
followed
with
a
small
Motion
of
Spirits
,
which
is
in
its
turn
accompanied
with
the
Idea
of
Meanness
.
From
that
Principle
't
is
easy
to
infer
,
that
such
things
as
produce
in
us
great
Motions
of
Spirits
,
must
naturally
appear
greater
,
stronger
,
and
more
real
and
perfect
than
others
;
for
in
the
word
Greatness
I
comprehend
all
those
Qualifications
,
and
such
like
.
So
that
sensible
Good
must
needs
seem
to
us
more
considerable
and
solid
,
than
that
which
cannot
be
felt
;
if
we
judge
of
it
by
the
Motion
of
the
Spirits
,
and
not
by
the
pure
Idea
of
Truth
.
A
great
House
,
a
sumptuous
Retinue
,
a
fine
Furniture
,
Offices
,
Honour
,
Riches
,
will
then
appear
to
us
to
have
more
greatness
and
reality
in
them
than
Justice
and
other
Vertues
.
When
we
compare
Vertue
to
Riches
by
the
pure
Eyes
of
the
Mind
,
we
prefer
Vertue
:
but
if
we
make
use
of
our
Corporeal
Eyes
and
Imagination
,
and
judge
of
those
things
by
the
Motion
of
the
Spirits
,
which
they
raise
in
us
,
we
shall
doubtless
chuse
Riches
rather
than
Vertue
.
'T
is
from
the
same
Principle
that
we
imagine
that
spiritual
and
insensible
things
are
almost
nothing
;
that
the
Ideas
of
our
Mind
are
less
noble
than
the
Objects
they
represent
;
that
there
is
less
reality
and
substance
in
the
Air
than
in
Metalls
,
and
in
Water
than
in
Ice
;
that
those
vast
Spaces
that
reach
from
the
Earth
to
the
Firmament
,
are
empty
,
or
that
the
Bodies
that
fill
them
have
not
so
much
reality
and
solidity
,
as
the
Sun
and
Stars
.
In
short
,
our
reasoning
upon
that
false
Principle
induces
us
into
an
infinite
number
of
Errours
,
concerning
the
Nature
and
Perfection
of
every
thing
.
A
great
Motion
of
Spirits
,
and
by
consequence
a
strong
Passion
,
always
attending
the
sensible
Idea
of
Grandeur
,
and
a
small
Motion
,
and
consequently
a
weak
Passion
,
still
accompanying
the
sensible
Idea
of
Meanness
;
we
are
very
attentive
to
,
and
bestow
a
great
deal
of
our
time
on
the
study
of
such
things
as
raise
the
sensible
Idea
of
Grandeur
;
whereas
we
neglect
those
which
afford
but
the
sensible
Idea
of
Meanness
.
Those
great
Bodies
,
for
instance
,
which
make
their
Circumvotions
over
our
Heads
,
have
ever
made
a
great
Impression
upon
Men
,
who
at
first
ador'd
them
,
because
of
their
Light
and
Brightness
,
or
sensible
Idea
of
Grandeur
;
some
bolder
Wits
presum'd
to
examine
their
Motions
:
so
that
the
Stars
have
been
in
all
Ages
the
Object
,
either
of
the
Study
,
or
of
the
Veneration
of
the
greatest
part
of
Mankind
.
It
may
even
be
said
,
that
the
fear
of
their
Phantastick
Influences
,
which
still
fright
Astrologers
and
weak
Persons
,
is
a
sort
of
Adoration
,
paid
by
a
Brain-sick
Imagination
,
to
the
Idea
of
Greatness
that
represents
Celestial
Bodies
.
But
the
Body
of
Man
,
on
the
contrary
,
that
is
infinitely
more
admirable
,
and
deserves
more
our
Application
,
than
whatever
we
can
know
of
Saturn
,
Jupiter
,
and
other
Planets
,
has
remained
a
long
time
almost
unknown
.
The
sensible
Idea
of
dissected
parts
of
Flesh
,
having
nothing
great
,
but
being
rather
distastful
and
noisome
;
it
is
but
a
few
years
since
Men
of
Parts
have
looked
upon
Anatomy
,
as
a
Science
that
deserved
their
study
.
There
have
been
Princes
and
Kings
that
boasted
of
being
Astronomers
;
the
height
and
magnitude
of
the
Stars
seem'd
to
suit
their
Dignity
and
Grandeur
:
but
I
know
not
of
any
that
were
ever
ambitious
of
knowing
Anatomy
,
and
skilfully
dissecting
a
Heart
,
or
a
Brain
.
The
same
may
be
said
of
several
other
Sciences
.
Rare
and
extraordinary
things
incite
in
Mens
Minds
greater
and
more
sensible
Motions
,
than
such
as
are
seen
every
day
;
we
admire
them
,
and
by
a
natural
Consequence
we
fix
on
them
an
Idea
of
Greatness
,
that
is
followed
with
Passions
of
Esteem
and
Reverence
.
This
perverts
the
Reason
of
several
Persons
,
who
are
so
very
respectful
and
curious
of
all
the
Remains
of
Antiquity
,
and
whatever
comes
from
far
,
or
is
rare
and
extraordinary
,
that
they
are
as
Slaves
to
them
;
because
the
Mind
dares
not
sit
and
pronounce
upon
the
Objects
of
its
Veneration
.
I
grant
Truth
is
in
no
great
danger
,
because
some
Men
are
taken
up
with
the
Medals
,
Arms
and
Habits
of
the
Ancients
,
or
with
the
Dress
of
the
Chinese
and
Savages
.
It
is
not
altogether
unserviceable
,
to
know
the
Map
of
Ancient
Rome
,
nor
the
ways
from
Tomquin
to
Nanquin
,
though
it
be
more
useful
to
us
to
know
those
from
London
to
Oxford
,
or
from
Paris
to
St.
Germain
or
Versailles
.
In
short
,
we
cannot
find
fault
with
those
that
will
enquire
into
the
History
of
the
Wars
betwixt
the
Greeks
and
Persians
,
betwixt
the
Tartars
and
Chinese
;
let
them
have
for
Thucydides
,
Xenophon
,
or
any
other
whatsoever
,
as
much
Inclinations
as
they
please
.
But
we
cannot
suffer
that
Admiration
of
Antiquity
should
lord
it
over
Reason
;
that
it
should
be
forbidden
to
make
use
of
our
Understanding
in
examining
the
Opinions
of
the
Ancients
,
and
that
the
Discovery
and
Demonstration
of
their
Errours
should
pass
for
a
rash
and
presumptuous
Attempt
.
Truth
is
of
all
Times
and
Ages
.
If
Aristotle
did
discover
it
,
it
may
still
be
found
out
:
his
Opinions
are
to
be
proved
by
strong
Reasons
;
for
if
they
were
solid
in
his
time
,
they
will
be
so
in
ours
.
'T
is
to
deceive
our selves
,
to
pretend
to
demonstrate
natural
Truths
by
humane
Authorities
.
It
may
perhaps
be
proved
,
that
Aristotle
has
had
such
and
such
Thoughts
,
upon
such
and
such
Subjects
;
but
't
is
a
very
slender
improvement
of
Reason
,
to
read
Aristotle
,
or
any
other
Author
,
with
great
Diligence
and
Trouble
,
that
we
may
historically
learn
his
Opinions
,
and
teach
them
to
others
.
We
cannot
without
Indignation
look
on
some
Universities
that
were
established
for
the
Enquiry
and
Defence
of
Truth
,
and
are
now
turned
into
particular
Sects
,
and
boast
of
studying
and
maintaining
the
Opinions
of
some
Men.
We
are
ready
to
fall
into
Passion
at
the
reading
of
those
Philosophers
and
Physicians
,
who
store
their
Books
with
so
many
Quotations
,
that
one
would
rather
take
them
for
Commentaries
of
the
Civil
and
Cannon
Law
,
than
for
Tracts
of
Natural
Philosophy
and
Physick
.
For
who
can
suffer
that
Reason
and
Experience
should
be
deserted
,
and
the
Fancies
of
Plato
,
Aristotle
,
Epi●urus
,
or
any
other
Philosopher
,
blindly
followed
.
Such
strange
methods
would
perhaps
strike
us
dumb
with
Amazement
,
though
we
were
not
hurt
by
them
;
I
mean
,
though
these
Gentlemen
did
not
impung
the
Truth
,
which
alone
we
think
our selves
obliged
to
espouse
:
But
their
admiring
the
Dreams
of
the
Ancients
inspires
them
with
a
blind
Zeal
against
Truths
newly
discovered
;
they
cry
them
down
without
knowing
them
;
they
oppose
them
without
understanding
them
,
and
by
the
strength
of
their
Imagination
infuse
their
Sentiments
into
the
Minds
and
Hearts
of
their
Auditors
and
Admirers
.
As
they
judge
of
those
new
Discoveries
by
the
Esteem
they
have
for
their
Authors
,
and
that
their
Contemporaries
which
they
have
seen
and
convers'd
with
,
have
not
that
big
and
extraordinary
Appearance
,
which
the
Imagination
attributes
to
Ancient
Authors
;
so
they
have
no
Consideration
for
the
Modern
.
For
the
Idea
of
the
Men
of
our
Age
raises
nothing
but
Contempt
,
because
it
is
not
attended
with
violent
and
surprizing
Motions
.
Limners
and
Statuaries
never
represent
Ancient
Philosophers
as
other
Men
,
but
give
them
a
big
Head
,
and
a
broad
and
high
Fore-head
,
and
a
long
and
venerable
Beard
.
That
's
a
good
Argument
to
prove
that
the
Vulgar
Sort
has
some
such
Idea
of
them
;
for
Painters
picture
things
as
they
represent
them
to
themselves
,
and
follow
the
Natural
Motions
of
the
Imagination
;
and
so
for
the
most
part
we
look
on
the
Ancients
as
Uncommon
Men.
Whereas
Imagination
representing
Men
of
our
Age
like
to
those
with
whom
we
daily
converce
,
and
producing
no
extraordinary
Motion
in
the
Spirits
,
raises
nothing
in
the
Soul
but
Contempt
and
Indifferency
towards
them
.
I
have
seen
Des-Crates
,
said
one
of
those
learned
Admirers
of
Antiquity
,
I
have
known
him
,
and
conversed
with
him
several
times
;
he
was
an
honest
Man
,
and
no
Fool
,
but
had
nothing
extraordinary
.
He
had
form'd
a
contemptible
Idea
of
the
Cartesian
Philosophy
,
because
he
had
conversed
with
the
Author
some
minutes
,
and
had
not
observed
in
him
those
great
and
extraordinary
Looks
that
oversway
the
Imagination
.
If
he
were
puzzled
with
some
Arguments
of
that
Philosopher
,
he
proudly
said
,
meaning
it
a
sufficient
Answer
,
That
he
had
known
him
formerly
.
I
could
wish
those
Gentlemen
might
see
Aristotle
otherwise
than
in
Picture
,
and
converse
an
hour
with
him
,
provided
he
should
speak
French
,
or
English
,
and
not
Greek
,
and
not
make
himself
known
,
before
they
had
declar'd
their
Opinion
of
him
.
Such
things
as
bear
the
Character
of
Novelty
,
whether
they
be
new
in
themselves
,
or
appear
in
a
new
Order
or
Situation
,
agitate
us
very
much
,
striking
the
Brain
in
places
that
are
most
sensible
,
because
least
exposed
to
the
Course
of
the
Spirits
.
Such
things
as
bear
a
sensible
Mark
of
Greatness
,
do
also
strangely
move
us
,
because
they
stir
up
a
great
Motion
of
the
Spirits
.
But
such
as
at
once
come
attended
with
Characters
of
Novelty
and
Greatness
,
do
not
simply
move
us
:
they
overthrow
,
ravish
,
stupifie
us
by
their
violent
Commotions
.
For
Instance
,
Those
who
speak
nothing
but
Paradoxes
attract
the
Admiration
of
weak
Minds
,
because
what
they
say
has
the
Character
of
Novelty
:
those
that
speak
by
Sentences
,
and
use
high
and
lofty
Flights
,
inspire
Veneration
,
because
they
seem
to
say
something
great
.
But
those
that
joyn
Loftiness
to
Novelty
,
and
Greatness
to
Rarity
,
never
fail
of
ravishing
and
stupifying
the
Vulgar
Sort
,
though
they
should
speak
but
Impertinences
;
for
that
pompous
and
stately
Nonsence
,
insani
fulgores
,
those
false
Declamatory
Glitterings
for
the
most
part
dazle
the
Eyes
of
infirm
Minds
,
and
make
such
a
lively
and
surprizing
Impression
upon
their
Imagination
,
that
they
know
not
where
they
are
,
that
they
venerate
the
Power
that
blinds
'em
,
and
cast
'em
down
,
and
admire
,
as
shining
Truths
,
confused
and
unexpressible
Sensations
.
CHAP.
VIII
.
A
Continuation
of
the
same
Subject
;
What
good
Vse
can
be
made
of
Admiration
,
and
other
Passions
.
ALL
Passions
have
two
very
considerable
Effects
,
for
they
apply
the
Mind
,
and
win
the
Heart
:
by
the
former
they
may
,
by
a
due
use
,
be
made
serviceable
to
the
Knowledge
of
Truth
;
because
Application
produces
that
light
by
which
it
is
discovered
:
but
the
latter
Effect
is
always
disadvantageous
;
because
Passions
cannot
win
the
Heart
,
but
by
corrupting
the
Reason
;
and
representing
things
,
not
as
they
are
in
themselves
,
or
according
to
Truth
,
but
as
they
are
related
to
us
.
Admiration
is
,
of
all
Passions
,
that
which
least
affects
the
Heart
;
because
't
is
the
Sight
of
things
consider'd
as
Good
or
Evil
,
that
agitates
us
,
and
that
the
Consideration
of
their
Greatness
or
Smallness
,
without
any
other
Relation
to
us
,
makes
but
little
Impression
upon
us
:
so
that
the
Admiration
that
attends
the
Knowledge
of
the
Greatness
or
Littleness
of
new
things
,
we
consider
,
corrupts
the
Reason
much
less
than
any
other
Passion
;
and
can
even
be
of
great
use
for
the
Knowledge
of
Truth
,
provided
we
be
very
careful
to
hinder
its
being
followed
by
other
Passions
,
as
it
happens
for
the
most
part
.
In
Admiration
the
Animal
Spirits
are
strongly
driven
to
those
places
of
the
Brain
,
that
represent
the
new
Object
as
it
is
in
it self
;
which
print
thereon
Traces
of
it
,
distinct
and
deep
enough
to
be
long
continued
,
and
consequently
afford
to
the
Mind
a
clear
Idea
,
and
easie
to
be
remembred
;
and
therefore
it
cannot
be
denied
,
but
Admiration
may
be
very
useful
to
Sciences
,
since
it
applies
and
enlightens
the
Mind
;
whereas
other
Passions
apply
the
Mind
,
but
enlighten
it
not
.
They
apply
it
,
because
they
raise
the
Animal
Spirits
,
but
enlighten
it
not
,
or
enlighten
it
with
false
and
deceiving
Glimpses
,
because
they
drive
those
Spirits
in
such
a
manner
,
as
that
they
represent
Objects
,
only
as
they
are
related
to
us
,
and
not
as
they
are
in
themselves
.
There
is
nothing
harder
,
than
to
apply
our selves
a
considerable
time
to
any
thing
which
we
admire
not
:
because
the
Vital
Spirits
are
not
then
easily
carried
to
places
fitted
to
represent
them
.
In
vain
we
are
exhorted
to
be
attentive
;
we
can
have
no
Attention
,
or
none
sufficiently
long
,
though
we
may
have
an
abstracted
,
but
not
moving
Persuasion
,
That
the
thing
deserves
our
Application
.
We
must
needs
deceive
our
Imagination
to
quicken
our
Spirits
,
and
represent
to
our selves
in
a
new
Manner
,
the
Subject
on
which
we
will
meditate
,
that
we
may
raise
in
us
some
Motion
of
Admiration
.
We
meet
every
day
with
Men
that
relish
not
Study
,
and
find
nothing
so
painful
as
the
Application
of
Mind
:
They
are
convinced
that
they
ought
to
study
certain
Matters
,
and
to
doe
their
utmost
endeavours
for
it
;
but
their
endeavours
are
,
for
the
most
part
,
vain
;
their
progress
is
inconsiderable
,
and
quickly
follow'd
by
weariness
.
True
it
is
that
the
Animal
Spirits
obey
the
order
of
the
Will
,
and
make
us
attentive
,
when
we
desire
it
,
but
when
the
Commanding
Will
is
the
Will
of
mere
Reason
,
that
is
not
kept
up
by
some
Passion
,
it
is
so
weak
and
languishing
,
that
our
Ideas
are
like
wandering
Phantasms
,
that
afford
us
but
a
transient
glimpse
,
and
vanish
in
a
moment
.
Our
Animal
Spirits
receive
so
many
private
Orders
from
the
Passions
,
and
are
become
by
nature
and
habit
so
prone
to
perform
them
,
that
they
are
easily
turn'd
from
those
new
and
rough
ways
,
through
which
the
Will
endeavours
to
lead
them
.
So
that
it
is
especially
in
such
Cases
,
that
we
need
a
particular
Grace
to
know
the
Truth
,
since
we
cannot
any
considerable
time
bear
up
the
Mind
against
the
incumbent
weight
of
the
Body
;
or
if
we
can
,
yet
we
never
doe
all
we
are
able
.
But
when
some
Motion
of
Admiration
quickens
us
,
the
animal
Spirits
naturally
run
to
the
Tracks
of
the
Object
which
have
raised
it
,
represent
it
clearly
to
the
Mind
,
and
produce
in
the
Brain
whatever
is
requir'd
to
Perspicuity
and
Evidence
,
without
putting
the
will
to
the
trouble
of
managing
the
rebellious
Spirits
.
Hence
it
comes
that
those
that
are
prone
to
Admiration
,
are
fitter
to
study
than
others
;
are
quick
and
ingenious
,
and
others
slow
and
dull
.
In
the
mean
while
,
when
Admiration
grows
to
such
an
Excess
,
as
to
produce
Amazement
and
Stupefaction
,
or
when
it
does
not
excite
to
rational
Curiosity
,
it
may
prove
of
very
ill
Consequence
because
the
animal
Spirits
are
then
taken
up
with
representing
the
admired
Object
by
one
of
its
Faces
,
without
so
much
as
thinking
on
the
others
,
which
ought
no
less
to
be
Considered
.
Those
Spirits
likewise
supersede
their
spreading
through
all
the
parts
of
the
Body
for
the
performance
of
their
ordinary
Functions
,
whilst
they
imprint
such
deep
Traces
of
the
Object
,
and
break
so
great
a
number
of
the
Fibres
of
the
Brain
,
that
that
Idea
raised
by
them
can
never
be
blotted
out
of
the
Mind
.
It
is
not
enough
that
Admiration
should
make
us
attentive
,
unless
it
makes
us
curious
;
neither
is
it
suficient
for
the
full
knowledge
of
an
Object
,
to
consider
one
of
its
Faces
,
unless
we
be
so
far
inquisitive
,
as
to
examine
them
all
;
that
we
may
judge
of
it
upon
sure
grounds
.
And
therefore
when
Admiration
moves
us
not
to
examine
things
with
the
utmost
Accuracy
,
but
instead
of
that
stops
our
Enquiry
,
it
is
very
unprofitable
to
the
Knowledge
of
Truth
,
because
it
fills
up
the
Mind
with
likelihoods
and
probabilities
,
and
incites
us
to
judge
rashly
and
precipitately
of
all
things
.
Admiration
must
not
center
in
its
self
,
but
its
business
is
to
facilitate
Examination
.
The
Animal
Spirits
that
are
naturally
excited
in
Admiration
,
offer
themselves
to
the
Soul
,
that
she
may
use
them
to
represent
the
Object
more
distinctly
to
her self
,
and
to
know
it
better
.
This
is
Nature's
Institution
,
for
Admiration
ought
to
move
us
to
Curiosity
,
and
Curiosity
to
conduct
us
to
the
Knowledge
of
Truth
:
But
the
Soul
knows
not
how
to
make
an
Advantage
of
her
own
Strength
;
she
prefers
a
certain
satisfactory
Sensation
,
that
she
receives
from
the
plenty
of
the
Spirits
that
affect
her
,
before
the
Knowledge
of
the
Object
that
has
raised
them
;
and
she
chuses
rather
to
be
conscious
of
her
own
Riches
than
to
dissipate
them
by
use
;
not
much
unlike
those
Misers
who
chuse
rather
to
hoard
up
their
Treasures
,
than
to
supply
their
wants
with
them
.
Men
are
generally
pleased
with
whatever
raises
any
kind
of
Passion
.
They
not
only
spend
Money
to
be
moved
to
Sorrow
,
by
the
Representation
of
a
Tragedy
,
but
they
also
throw
it
away
upon
Legerdemains
,
that
may
stir
up
their
Admiration
;
since
it
cannot
be
said
that
they
give
it
to
be
deceived
.
Therefore
that
inward
and
satisfactory
Sensation
,
which
we
are
conscious
of
in
Admiration
,
is
the
principal
cause
why
we
dwell
upon
it
,
without
putting
it
to
the
use
which
Nature
and
Reason
prescribe
to
us
.
For
that
delectable
Sensation
so
powerfully
holds
the
Admirers
Bent
to
the
admired
Object
,
that
they
will
fall
into
a
Passion
,
if
any
shew
them
its
Vanity
.
A
mourning
Person
relishes
so
well
the
sweetness
of
Sorrow
,
that
he
's
angry
with
those
that
go
about
to
make
him
merry
.
The
case
is
the
same
with
Admirers
;
who
seem
to
be
wounded
by
the
Endeavours
that
are
made
to
demonstrate
the
unreasonableness
of
their
Admiration
,
because
they
feel
that
the
secret
Pleasure
they
receive
from
that
Passion
,
diminishes
proportionably
as
the
Idea
that
caused
it
vanishes
from
the
Mind
.
The
Passions
perpetually
labour
to
justifie
themselves
,
and
insensibly
persuade
us
we
doe
well
to
be
led
by
them
.
The
Satisfaction
and
Pleasure
,
with
which
they
affect
the
Mind
,
that
is
to
be
their
Judge
,
draws
it
over
by
degrees
to
their
side
,
inspiring
it
with
such
,
and
the
like
Reasons
.
We
are
to
judge
of
things
but
according
to
our
Ideas
,
but
of
all
Ideas
the
most
sensible
are
the
most
real
,
since
they
act
upon
us
with
the
greatest
force
,
and
therefore
't
is
by
those
Ideas
that
I
must
judge
of
them
.
Now
the
Subject
I
admire
contains
a
sensible
Idea
of
Greatness
,
I
must
then
judge
of
it
by
that
Idea
,
for
I
ought
to
esteem
and
love
Greatness
;
and
therefore
I
am
in
the
right
when
I
insist
upon
,
and
am
taken
up
with
that
Object
.
And
indeed
the
Pleasure
which
the
Contemplation
of
its
Idea
affords
me
is
a
natural
proof
that
it
is
for
my
good
to
think
upon
it
;
since
I
seem
to
add
to
my
growth
by
such
thoughts
,
and
fancy
that
my
Mind
is
more
enlarged
by
embracing
so
great
an
Idea
;
whereas
the
Mind
ceases
to
exist
when
it
thinks
upon
nothing
.
Should
that
Idea
vanish
,
my
Mind
,
it
seems
,
should
vanish
with
it
,
or
at
least
become
smaller
and
narrower
,
if
it
should
fix
upon
a
less
considerable
Idea
;
so
that
the
preservation
of
that
great
Idea
,
being
the
preservation
of
my
own
Greatness
,
and
the
perfection
of
my
Being
,
I
am
in
the
right
to
admire
;
nay
others
ought
to
admire
me
for
it
,
should
they
give
me
my
due
.
For
I
am
really
something
great
,
by
the
Relation
I
have
to
great
things
,
and
I
enjoy
them
in
some
manner
by
my
Admiration
,
and
that
Foretast
which
a
sort
of
Hope
affords
me
.
Other
Men
would
be
Happy
,
as
well
as
I
am
my self
,
if
,
knowing
my
Greatness
,
they
should
fix
themselves
upon
the
Cause
that
produces
it
;
but
they
are
blind
and
insensible
to
great
and
fine
things
,
and
know
not
how
to
raise
and
make
themselves
considerable
.
It
may
be
said
,
That
the
Mind
naturally
,
and
without
Reflection
,
argues
in
some
such
manner
,
when
it
it
suffers
it self
to
be
led
away
by
the
abusive
Meteors
of
the
Passions
:
Those
Reasonings
have
some
Likelihood
,
though
their
Weakness
be
sufficiently
visible
;
however
,
that
Probability
,
or
rather
the
confused
Sense
of
the
Probobility
that
attends
natural
and
inconsiderate
Arguments
,
is
so
prevalent
,
that
they
never
fail
of
seducing
us
,
when
we
stand
not
upon
our
guard
.
For
Instance
,
When
Poetry
,
History
,
Chymistry
,
or
any
other
Humane
Science
has
struck
the
Imagination
of
a
young
Man
with
some
Motions
of
Admiration
,
if
he
do
not
carefully
watch
the
Attempt
these
Motions
make
upon
his
Mind
,
if
he
examine
not
to
the
bottom
the
Use
of
those
Sciences
,
if
he
compare
not
the
Trouble
of
learning
them
with
the
Benefits
that
may
accrue
to
him
;
in
short
,
if
he
be
not
as
nice
in
his
Judgment
as
he
ought
to
be
,
he
runs
the
hazard
of
being
seduced
by
his
Admiration
,
shewing
him
only
the
fairest
Part
of
those
Sciences
;
and
't
is
even
to
be
feared
,
lest
they
should
so
far
corrupt
his
Heart
,
as
that
he
should
never
awake
out
of
his
Dream
,
even
when
he
comes
to
know
it
to
be
but
a
Dream
;
because
it
is
not
possible
to
blot
out
of
the
Brain
deep
Tracks
,
engraven
and
widened
by
a
long-continued
Admiration
.
And
therefore
we
ought
to
take
diligent
care
to
keep
our
Imagination
untainted
;
that
is
to
say
,
to
hinder
the
formation
of
dangerous
Traces
,
that
corrupt
the
Heart
and
Mind
.
I
shall
here
set
down
a
very
useful
Way
to
prevent
not
only
the
Excess
of
Admiration
,
but
also
of
all
other
Passions
in
general
.
When
the
Motion
of
the
Animal
Spirits
is
so
violent
,
as
to
imprint
on
the
Brain
deep
Traces
that
corrupt
the
Imagination
,
it
is
always
attended
with
some
Commotion
of
the
Soul
:
And
as
the
Soul
cannot
be
moved
without
being
conscious
of
it
,
she
is
thereby
sufficiently
warn'd
to
stand
upon
her
guard
,
and
to
examine
whether
it
be
for
her
good
to
suffer
those
Traces
to
be
enlarged
and
finished
.
But
at
the
time
of
the
Commotion
,
the
Mind
is
not
so
free
,
as
rightly
to
judge
of
the
Usefulness
of
those
Traces
,
because
the
same
Commotion
deceives
and
inclines
it
to
indulge
them
:
We
must
therefore
endeavour
to
stop
that
Commotion
,
or
to
turn
to
some
other
Place
the
Current
of
the
Spirits
that
cause
it
;
and
in
the
mean
while
't
is
absolutely
necessary
to
suspend
our
Judgment
.
But
we
ought
not
to
imagine
that
the
Soul
always
can
,
by
her
bare
Will
,
stop
the
Course
of
the
Spirits
that
hinder
her
from
making
use
of
her
Reason
;
her
ordinary
Power
being
not
sufficient
to
quell
Motions
not
raised
by
her
;
so
that
she
must
dexterously
endeavour
to
deceive
an
Enemy
that
attacks
her
unawares
.
As
the
Motions
of
the
Spirits
stir
up
respective
Thoughts
in
the
Soul
,
so
our
Thoughts
excite
such
and
such
Motions
in
the
Brain
;
so
that
to
stop
a
rising
Motion
of
the
Spirits
,
a
bare
Will
is
not
sufficient
,
but
Stratagem
must
be
us'd
;
and
we
must
skilfully
represent
to
our selves
such
Things
as
are
contrary
to
those
that
stir
up
and
indulge
that
Motion
,
whence
a
Revulsion
will
arise
:
But
if
we
would
only
determine
another
way
the
Motion
of
the
Spirits
already
risen
,
we
must
not
think
of
contrary
but
only
different
Things
from
those
that
have
produced
it
,
which
will
certainly
make
a
Diversion
.
But
because
the
Diversion
and
Revulsion
are
great
or
little
,
as
the
new
Thoughts
are
accompanied
with
a
greater
or
less
Motion
of
the
Spirits
;
we
must
carefully
observe
,
what
sort
of
Thoughts
agitate
us
most
,
that
we
may
in
urging
Occasions
represent
them
to
our
seducing
Imagination
,
and
use
our selves
so
much
to
that
sort
of
Resistance
,
that
no
surprizing
Motion
may
affect
our
Soul
.
If
we
take
care
firmly
to
unite
the
Idea
of
Eternity
,
or
some
other
solid
Thought
,
to
those
violent
and
extraordinary
Motions
,
they
will
never
be
stirr'd
up
for
the
future
,
without
raising
that
Idea
,
and
furnishing
us
with
Weapons
to
resist
them
.
This
appears
from
Experience
,
and
from
the
Reason
mention'd
in
the
Chapter
Of
the
Connection
of
Ideas
[
](A51674-e81430-b)*
*
Book
2.
Part
2.
Chap.
3.
;
so
that
we
must
not
imagine
it
absolutely
impossible
,
by
a
dexterous
Managery
,
to
conquer
our
Passions
,
when
we
are
stedfastly
resolv'd
upon
it
.
However
,
by
that
Resistance
we
ought
not
to
pretend
to
Impeccability
,
nor
to
the
avoiding
of
all
Errours
whatsoever
.
First
,
Because
't
is
very
difficult
to
acquire
and
preserve
such
a
Habit
,
as
that
our
extraordinary
Motions
shall
raise
in
us
Ideas
fit
to
oppose
them
.
Secondly
,
Though
we
should
have
gotten
that
Habit
,
those
Motions
of
the
Spirits
will
directly
excite
the
Ideas
to
be
impugned
,
and
but
indirectly
supply
us
with
the
necessary
Weapons
to
assault
them
:
So
that
the
Evil
Ideas
,
being
still
the
principal
,
will
be
stronger
than
the
Good
,
that
are
but
accessary
;
and
the
latter
ever
stand
in
need
of
the
Help
of
the
Will
.
Thirdly
,
Those
Motions
of
the
Spirits
may
be
so
violent
,
as
to
take
up
the
whole
Capacity
of
the
Soul
;
so
that
there
will
remain
no
room
,
if
I
may
so
speak
,
for
the
reception
of
the
accessary
Idea
,
that
is
proper
to
make
a
Revulsion
in
the
Spirits
;
or
not
at
least
for
such
a
Reception
as
may
incite
us
to
an
attentive
Contemplation
of
it
.
Lastly
,
There
are
so
many
particular
Circumstances
,
that
can
make
that
Remedy
useless
,
that
though
it
ought
not
to
be
neglected
,
yet
we
must
not
relie
too
much
upon
it
.
We
must
have
a
perpetual
Recourse
to
Prayer
,
that
we
may
receive
from
Heaven
necessary
Helps
in
the
time
of
Temptation
;
and
in
the
mean
while
endeavour
to
present
to
the
Mind
some
Truths
so
solid
and
prevalent
,
as
that
they
may
overcome
the
most
violent
Passions
.
For
I
must
needs
add
by
the
way
,
That
several
pious
Persons
often
return
into
the
same
Faults
,
because
they
fill
their
Mind
with
a
great
many
Truths
that
are
more
glittering
than
solid
,
and
fitter
to
weaken
and
dissolve
,
than
to
fortifie
it
against
Temptations
;
whereas
others
,
that
are
not
endued
with
so
much
Knowledge
,
faithfully
stick
to
their
Duty
,
because
of
some
great
and
solid
Truth
,
which
they
have
rendred
familiar
,
and
which
bears
'em
up
and
strengthens
them
in
all
Occasions
.
CHAP.
IX
.
Of
Love
and
Aversion
,
and
their
principal
Species
.
LOve
and
Hatred
are
the
Passions
that
immediately
succeed
Admiration
;
for
we
dwell
not
long
upon
the
Consideration
of
an
Object
,
without
discovering
the
Relations
it
hath
to
us
,
or
to
something
we
love
.
The
Object
we
love
,
and
to
which
consequently
we
are
united
by
that
Passion
,
being
for
the
most
part
present
,
as
well
as
that
which
we
actually
admire
;
our
Mind
quickly
,
and
without
any
considerable
Reflection
,
makes
the
necessary
Comparisons
,
to
find
out
the
Relations
they
have
to
each
other
,
and
to
us
;
or
else
is
naturally
aware
of
them
,
by
a
preventing
Sense
of
Pleasure
and
Pain
.
Then
it
is
,
that
the
Motion
of
Love
we
have
for
our selves
,
and
for
the
beloved
Object
,
extends
to
that
which
is
admired
;
if
the
Relation
it
has
immediately
to
us
,
or
to
something
united
to
us
,
appear
advantageous
,
either
by
Knowledge
or
Sensation
.
Now
that
new
Motion
of
the
Soul
,
(
or
rather
that
Motion
of
the
Soul
newly
determin'd
,
join'd
to
that
of
the
Animal
Spirits
,
and
followed
with
the
Sensation
that
attends
the
new
Disposition
,
that
the
same
new
Motion
of
the
Spirits
produces
in
the
Brain
)
is
the
Passion
we
call
here
Love
.
But
when
we
feel
by
any
Pain
,
or
discover
by
a
clear
and
evident
Knowledge
,
that
the
Union
or
Relation
of
the
admired
Object
would
prove
disserviceable
to
us
,
or
to
something
united
to
us
,
then
the
Motion
of
the
Love
we
have
for
our selves
,
or
for
the
Thing
united
to
us
,
terminates
in
us
,
or
cleaves
to
the
united
Object
,
without
following
the
View
of
the
Mind
,
or
being
carried
to
the
admired
Thing
.
But
as
the
Motion
towards
Good
in
general
,
which
the
Author
of
Nature
continually
imprints
on
the
Soul
,
carries
her
to
whatever
is
known
and
felt
,
because
what
is
either
intelligible
or
sensible
is
Good
in
it self
;
so
it
may
be
said
,
that
the
Resistance
of
the
Soul
against
that
natural
Motion
which
attracts
it
,
is
a
kind
of
voluntary
Motion
,
which
terminates
in
Nothingness
.
Now
that
voluntary
[
](A51674-e81720-b)*
*
Lest
any
should
mistake
what
I
call
here
voluntary
Motion
,
I
desire
him
to
read
the
first
Illustration
on
the
first
Chapter
.
It
would
intricate
my
Conceptio●s
should
I
say
whatever
relates
to
it
,
to
satisfie
the
Nicety
of
some
Persons
.
Motion
of
the
Soul
being
join'd
to
that
of
the
Spirits
and
Blood
,
and
followed
by
the
Sensation
that
attends
the
new
Disposition
,
which
that
Motion
of
the
Spirits
produces
in
the
Brain
,
is
the
Passion
we
call
here
Aversion
or
Hatred
.
That
Passion
is
altogether
contrary
to
Love
,
and
yet
't
is
never
without
Love
:
It
is
altogether
contrary
to
it
,
because
Aversion
separates
,
and
Love
unites
;
the
former
has
most
commonly
Nothingness
for
its
Object
;
and
the
latter
has
always
a
Being
:
The
former
resists
the
natural
Motion
,
and
makes
it
of
no
effect
;
whereas
the
latter
yields
to
it
,
and
makes
it
victorious
.
However
,
Aversion
is
never
separated
from
Love
,
because
Evil
,
the
Object
of
the
former
,
is
the
Privation
of
Good
;
so
that
to
fly
from
Evil
,
is
to
fly
from
the
Privation
of
Good
;
that
is
to
say
,
to
tend
to
Good
:
And
therefore
the
Aversion
of
the
Privation
of
Good
,
is
the
Love
of
Good
.
But
if
Evil
be
taken
for
Pain
,
the
Aversion
of
Pain
is
not
the
Aversion
of
the
Privation
of
Pleasure
;
because
Pain
is
as
real
a
Sensation
as
Pleasure
,
and
therefore
is
not
the
Privation
of
it
:
But
the
Aversion
of
Pain
,
being
the
Aversion
of
some
internal
Misery
,
we
should
not
be
affected
with
that
Passion
,
should
we
not
love
our selves
.
Lastly
,
If
Evil
be
taken
for
what
causes
Pain
in
us
,
or
for
whatever
deprives
us
of
Good
,
then
Aversion
depends
on
Self-love
,
or
on
the
Love
of
something
to
which
we
desire
to
be
united
:
So
that
Love
and
Aversion
are
two
Mother-Passions
,
opposite
to
each
other
;
but
Love
is
the
First
,
the
Chief
,
and
the
most
Universal
.
As
at
that
great
Distance
and
Estrangement
we
are
from
God
since
the
Fall
,
we
look
upon
our
Being
as
the
Chief
Part
of
the
Things
to
which
we
are
united
;
so
it
may
be
said
in
some
sense
,
that
our
Motion
of
Love
for
any
thing
whatsoever
,
is
an
Effect
of
Self-love
.
We
love
Honours
,
because
they
raise
us
;
our
Riches
,
because
they
maintain
and
preserve
us
;
our
Relations
,
Prince
,
and
Country
,
because
we
are
concern'd
in
their
Preservation
.
Our
Motion
of
Self-love
reaches
to
all
the
Things
that
relate
to
us
,
and
to
which
we
are
united
;
because
't
is
that
Motion
which
unites
us
to
them
,
and
spreads
our
Being
,
if
I
may
so
speak
,
on
those
that
surround
us
,
proportionably
as
we
discover
by
Reason
,
or
by
Sensation
,
that
it
is
our
Interest
to
be
united
to
them
.
And
therefore
we
ought
not
to
think
,
that
,
since
the
Fall
,
Self-Love
is
only
the
Cause
and
Rule
of
all
other
Affections
;
but
,
that
most
part
of
other
Affections
are
Species
of
Self-love
:
For
when
we
say
,
that
a
Man
loves
any
new
Object
,
we
must
not
suppose
that
a
new
Motion
of
Love
is
produc'd
in
him
;
but
rather
,
that
knowing
that
Object
to
have
some
Relation
or
Union
with
him
,
he
loves
himself
in
that
Object
,
and
that
with
a
Motion
of
Love
coeval
to
himself
.
For
indeed
without
Grace
there
is
nothing
but
Self-love
in
the
Heart
of
Man
:
The
Love
of
Truth
,
of
Justice
,
of
God
himself
,
and
every
other
Love
that
is
in
us
,
by
the
first
Institution
of
Nature
,
have
ever
since
the
Fall
been
a
Sacrifice
to
Self-love
.
There
is
no
doubt
,
however
,
but
the
most
wicked
and
barbarous
Men
,
Idolaters
and
Atheists
themselves
,
are
united
to
God
by
a
natural
Love
,
of
which
consequently
Self-love
is
not
the
Cause
;
for
they
are
united
to
him
by
their
Love
to
Truth
,
Justice
,
and
Vertue
;
they
praise
and
esteem
good
Men
,
and
do
not
love
them
because
they
are
Men
,
but
because
they
see
in
them
such
Qualities
as
they
cannot
forbear
to
love
,
because
they
cannot
forbear
to
admire
and
judge
them
amiable
.
And
therefore
we
love
something
besides
our selves
;
but
Self-love
over-rules
all
the
rest
,
and
Men
forsake
Truth
and
Justice
for
the
smallest
Concerns
:
For
when
by
their
natural
Force
they
venture
their
Goods
and
Lives
to
defend
oppress'd
Innocence
,
or
on
any
other
Occasion
,
their
greatest
Spur
is
mere
Vanity
,
and
the
hopes
of
getting
a
Name
by
the
seeming
Possession
of
a
Vertue
which
is
reverenc'd
by
all
the
World
.
They
love
Truth
and
Justice
when
on
their
side
,
but
never
against
themselves
;
because
without
Grace
they
cannot
obtain
the
least
Victory
over
Self-love
.
There
are
many
other
sorts
of
natural
Love
:
We
naturally
love
our
Prince
,
Country
,
Relations
,
those
that
have
any
Conformity
of
Humour
,
Designs
,
and
Employments
with
us
:
But
all
those
sorts
of
Love
are
very
weak
,
as
well
as
the
Love
of
Truth
and
Justice
;
and
Self-love
being
the
most
violent
of
all
,
conquers
them
so
easily
,
as
to
find
no
other
Resistance
but
what
it
creates
against
it self
.
Bodies
that
strike
against
others
,
lose
their
Motion
proportionably
as
they
communicate
it
to
the
stricken
;
and
,
after
having
moved
many
other
Bodies
,
may
at
last
entirely
lose
their
own
Motion
.
It
is
not
so
with
Self-love
:
It
determines
every
other
Love
by
its
Impressions
upon
it
,
and
its
own
Motion
diminishes
not
;
on
the
contrary
,
it
gets
new
Strength
by
its
new
Victories
:
For
as
that
Motion
never
goes
out
of
the
Heart
,
so
it
cannot
be
lost
,
though
it
be
continually
communicated
.
Self-love
is
therefore
the
Ruling
and
Universal
Love
,
since
it
is
to
be
found
,
and
bears
the
sway
every
where
;
so
that
all
the
Passions
having
no
proper
Motion
of
their
own
,
it
may
be
said
,
that
Self-love
is
the
most
extensive
and
powerful
of
all
Passions
,
or
the
Ruling
and
Universal
Passion
.
And
as
all
Vertues
are
but
Species
of
that
first
Vertue
we
call
Charity
,
according
to
St.
Austin
;
so
all
Vices
and
Passions
are
but
as
so
many
Effects
and
Sorts
of
Self-love
,
or
of
that
general
Vice
we
call
Concupiscence
.
We
often
distinguish
in
Morals
the
Vertues
or
Species
of
Charity
,
by
the
Difference
of
Objects
;
but
that
sometimes
confounds
the
true
Idea
we
ought
to
have
of
Vertue
,
which
rather
depends
on
its
own
Motive
,
than
any
thing
else
:
And
therefore
we
shall
not
follow
that
Method
in
treating
of
the
Passions
,
nor
distinguish
them
by
the
Objects
;
because
one
and
the
same
Object
may
excite
them
all
,
and
that
ten
thousand
Objects
may
raise
but
one
.
For
though
Objects
differ
from
each
other
,
yet
they
differ
not
always
in
relation
to
us
,
nor
do
they
stir
up
in
us
different
Passions
.
The
promis'd
Staff
of
a
Mareschal
of
France
differs
from
a
Bishop's
Crosier
,
or
Pastoral
Staff
promis'd
;
yet
those
two
Marks
of
Honour
excite
almost
the
same
Passion
in
the
Ambitious
,
since
they
raise
in
the
Mind
of
both
the
same
Idea
of
Good
.
But
the
same
Mareschal's
Staff
,
when
promised
,
granted
,
enjoyed
,
taken
away
,
stirs
up
Passions
altogether
different
,
because
it
raises
in
the
Mind
different
Ideas
of
Good
.
We
must
not
then
multiply
the
Passions
by
their
different
Objects
that
cause
them
;
but
only
admit
as
many
as
there
are
accessary
Ideas
that
attend
the
chief
Idea
of
Good
or
Evil
,
and
considerably
alter
it
in
relation
to
us
.
For
the
general
Idea
of
Good
,
or
the
Sensation
of
Pleasure
,
which
is
good
to
him
that
enjoys
it
,
agitating
the
Soul
and
Animal
Spirits
,
produces
the
general
Passion
of
Love
;
and
the
accessary
Ideas
of
that
Good
determine
that
general
Agitation
of
Love
,
and
Course
of
the
Spirits
in
such
a
particular
manner
,
as
puts
the
Mind
and
Body
in
a
convenient
Disposition
in
relation
to
the
perceived
Good
:
And
thus
they
produce
all
the
particular
Passions
.
And
therefore
the
general
Idea
of
Good
produces
an
indeterminate
Love
,
which
is
but
an
Extension
of
Self-love
.
The
Idea
of
Good
,
as
possess'd
,
produces
a
Love
of
Joy
:
The
Idea
of
Good
,
not
as
possess'd
,
but
hop'd
for
,
that
is
,
as
judg'd
possible
to
be
possess'd
,
produces
a
Love
of
Desire
:
And
lastly
,
The
Idea
of
any
Good
,
that
is
neither
possess'd
nor
hop'd
for
;
or
,
which
is
the
same
,
the
Love
of
any
Good
which
we
cannot
hope
to
enjoy
without
losing
some
other
,
or
which
we
cannot
preserve
when
we
are
possess'd
of
it
,
produces
a
Love
of
Sorrow
.
Those
are
the
Three
simple
and
primitive
Passions
that
have
Good
for
their
Object
;
for
the
Hope
that
produces
Joy
,
is
not
a
Commotion
of
the
Soul
,
but
a
simple
Judgment
.
However
,
we
must
observe
,
That
Men
confine
not
their
own
being
within
themselves
,
but
extend
it
to
all
Things
and
Persons
,
to
whom
they
believe
it
their
Advantage
to
unite
themselves
:
So
that
we
must
conceive
that
they
are
possess'd
in
some
manner
of
a
Good
,
when
enjoy'd
by
their
Friends
,
though
they
do
not
possess
it
immediately
themselves
:
And
therefore
when
I
say
,
That
the
Possession
of
Good
produces
Joy
,
I
understand
it
not
only
of
an
immediate
Possession
or
Union
,
but
also
of
any
other
;
for
we
naturally
feel
a
Joy
upon
the
Success
or
good
Fortune
of
those
we
love
,
Evil
,
as
I
said
,
can
be
taken
Three
ways
;
for
the
Privation
of
Good
,
for
Pain
,
and
for
the
Thing
that
causes
the
Privation
of
Good
,
or
produces
Pain
.
In
the
first
sense
,
the
Idea
of
Evil
being
the
same
with
the
Idea
of
a
Good
not
enjoy'd
,
it
is
plain
that
Idea
produces
Sorrow
,
or
Desire
,
or
even
Joy
;
for
Joy
is
always
excited
from
that
we
find
our selves
exempt
of
the
Privation
of
Good
,
that
is
to
say
,
when
we
possess
Good
:
So
that
those
Passions
that
refer
to
Evil
,
taken
in
that
sense
,
are
the
same
as
those
that
relate
to
Good
,
because
at
the
Bottom
they
have
likewise
Good
for
their
Object
.
When
Evil
signifies
Pain
,
which
alone
is
always
a
real
Evil
to
him
that
suffers
it
,
whilst
he
suffers
it
;
then
the
Sense
of
that
Evil
produces
those
Passions
of
Sorrow
,
Desire
,
and
Joy
,
that
are
Species
of
Aversion
,
and
not
of
Love
;
because
their
Motion
is
altogether
opposite
to
that
which
accompanies
the
Perception
of
Good
,
that
Motion
being
but
the
Resistance
of
the
Soul
against
the
natural
Impression
.
The
Actual
Sense
of
Pain
produces
an
Aversion
of
Sorrow
.
The
Pain
we
suffer
not
,
but
are
afraid
to
suffer
,
produces
an
Aversion
of
Desire
.
And
lastly
,
the
Pain
we
neither
suffer
,
nor
are
afraid
to
suffer
;
or
,
what
is
the
same
,
the
Pain
that
shall
be
attended
by
a
considerable
Reward
,
or
the
Pain
from
which
we
are
freed
,
produces
an
Aversion
of
Joy
.
Those
are
the
Three
simple
or
primitive
Passions
that
have
Evil
for
their
Object
;
for
the
Fear
that
produces
Sorrow
,
is
not
a
Commotion
of
the
Soul
,
but
a
bare
Judgment
.
Lastly
,
If
by
Evil
we
understand
the
Person
or
the
Thing
that
deprives
us
of
Good
,
or
causes
us
to
endure
Pain
,
the
Idea
of
Evil
produces
a
Motion
of
Love
and
Aversion
together
,
or
only
a
Motion
of
Aversion
:
The
former
,
when
the
Evil
is
that
which
deprives
us
of
Good
;
for
by
the
same
Motion
we
tend
towards
Good
,
and
fly
from
that
which
hinders
its
Possession
:
And
the
latter
,
when
't
is
the
Idea
of
an
Evil
which
causes
Pain
in
us
;
for
't
is
by
the
same
Motion
of
Aversion
that
we
hate
Pain
,
and
whatever
produces
it
.
And
therefore
there
are
Three
simple
or
primitive
Passions
that
relate
to
Good
,
and
as
many
that
refer
to
Pain
,
or
to
that
which
causes
it
,
viz.
Joy
,
Desire
,
and
Sorrow
.
For
we
are
joyful
when
Good
is
present
,
and
Evil
is
past
;
we
are
sorrowful
when
Good
is
gone
,
and
Pain
is
present
;
and
we
are
agitated
with
Desires
when
Good
and
Evil
are
to
come
.
Those
Passions
that
relate
to
Good
are
particular
Determinations
of
that
Motion
God
gives
us
for
Good
in
general
,
and
therefore
have
a
real
Object
;
but
others
,
who
have
not
God
for
the
Cause
of
their
Motion
,
terminate
only
in
Nothingness
.
CHAP.
X.
Of
Passions
in
particular
;
and
in
general
of
the
way
to
explain
them
,
and
to
know
the
Errours
they
cause
.
WHen
we
consider
how
Passions
are
formed
,
it
visibly
appears
,
that
their
Number
is
undeterminable
,
or
that
there
are
more
than
we
have
Terms
to
express
them
by
.
For
Passions
differ
not
only
by
the
various
Complication
of
the
Three
first
Primitive
,
which
would
not
encrease
them
to
a
great
Number
;
but
also
differ
by
the
different
Perceptions
and
Judgments
that
cause
or
accompany
them
.
Those
different
Judgments
of
the
Soul
,
concerning
Good
or
Evil
,
produce
different
Motions
in
the
Animal
Spirits
,
to
dispose
the
Body
in
relation
to
the
Object
,
and
consequently
cause
in
the
Soul
Sensations
that
are
not
altogether
like
:
Whence
it
proceeds
,
that
some
Passions
are
observ'd
to
differ
from
each
other
,
though
their
Commotions
be
not
different
.
In
the
mean
while
,
the
Commotion
of
the
Soul
being
the
chief
Thing
observable
in
every
Passion
,
't
is
better
to
refer
them
to
the
Three
original
Passions
,
in
which
those
Commotions
are
very
different
,
than
to
treat
confusedly
and
disorderly
of
them
,
in
reference
to
the
different
Perceptions
we
may
have
of
the
Good
and
Evil
that
raises
them
.
For
we
may
have
so
many
different
Perceptions
of
Objects
,
in
reference
to
Time
,
to
our selves
,
to
what
belongs
to
us
,
to
the
Persons
or
Things
to
which
we
are
united
,
either
by
Nature
or
Choice
,
that
it
is
wholly
impossible
to
make
an
accurate
Enumeration
of
them
▪
When
the
Soul
perceives
any
Good
which
she
cannot
enjoy
,
it
may
perhaps
be
said
,
that
she
hopes
for
it
,
though
she
desires
it
not
:
However
,
't
is
plain
,
that
this
her
Hope
is
not
a
Passion
,
but
a
simple
Judgment
.
And
therefore
't
is
the
Commotion
that
attends
the
Idea
of
any
Good
,
of
which
we
take
the
Enjoyment
to
be
possible
,
that
adopts
Hope
into
a
true
Passion
.
It
is
the
same
when
Hope
grows
into
Security
:
For
the
latter
is
a
Passion
,
only
because
of
the
Commotion
of
Joy
that
mixes
with
that
of
Desire
;
since
the
Judgment
of
the
Soul
that
considers
any
Good
as
certain
,
is
a
Passion
but
as
much
as
it
is
a
foregoing
Taste
of
the
Good
that
affects
us
.
Last
of
all
,
When
Hope
diminishes
,
and
is
succeeded
by
Despair
,
't
is
visible
again
,
that
the
latter
is
a
Passion
but
because
of
the
Commotion
of
Sorrow
that
mixes
with
that
of
Desire
;
for
the
Judgment
of
the
Soul
,
that
considers
any
Good
as
unattainable
,
would
not
be
a
Passion
,
should
we
not
be
actuated
by
that
Judgment
.
But
because
the
Soul
never
looks
upon
Good
or
Evil
without
any
Commotion
,
and
even
without
any
Alteration
in
the
Body
,
we
often
give
the
Name
of
Passion
to
the
Judgment
that
produces
it
,
confounding
together
whatever
happens
both
to
the
Soul
and
Body
at
the
sight
of
any
Good
or
Evil
:
For
the
Words
,
Hope
,
Fear
,
Boldness
,
Shame
,
Impudence
,
Anger
,
Pity
,
Derision
,
Grief
,
and
the
Names
of
all
other
Passions
in
common
use
,
are
short
Expressions
made
up
of
several
Terms
,
by
which
can
be
explain'd
in
particular
whatever
Passions
contain
.
We
understand
by
the
Word
Passion
the
View
of
the
Relation
any
thing
has
to
us
,
the
Commotion
and
Sensation
of
the
Soul
,
the
Concussion
of
the
Brain
,
and
the
Motion
of
the
Spirits
,
a
new
Commotion
and
Sensation
of
the
Soul
;
and
lastly
,
a
Sensation
of
Pleasure
that
always
attends
the
Passions
,
and
makes
them
grateful
.
All
these
we
commonly
understand
by
the
Name
of
Passions
;
but
sometimes
it
only
signifies
either
the
Judgment
that
raises
it
,
or
only
the
Commotion
of
the
Soul
,
or
the
bare
Motion
of
the
Spirits
and
Blood
,
or
lastly
,
something
else
that
accompanies
the
Commotion
of
the
Soul
.
It
is
very
useful
,
for
the
Knowledge
of
Truth
,
to
abridge
Ideas
and
Expressions
;
but
that
often
causes
some
considerable
Errour
,
especially
when
those
Ideas
are
abridg'd
by
popular
Use
:
For
we
ought
never
to
abridge
them
,
but
when
we
have
made
them
very
clear
and
distinct
,
by
a
great
Application
of
Mind
;
and
not
,
as
't
is
ordinarily
done
,
as
to
Passions
and
sensible
Things
,
when
we
have
made
them
familiar
to
us
by
their
Sensations
,
and
the
mere
Action
of
the
Imagination
,
which
easily
imposes
on
the
Mind
.
There
is
a
great
difference
betwixt
the
pure
Ideas
of
the
Mind
,
and
the
Sensations
or
Commotions
of
the
Soul
.
Pure
Ideas
are
clear
and
distinct
,
but
't
is
a
hard
Task
to
make
them
familiar
;
whereas
Sensations
and
Commotions
are
intimate
with
us
,
but
can
never
plainly
and
distinctly
be
known
.
Numbers
,
Extension
,
and
their
Properties
,
may
be
clearly
known
;
but
unless
we
make
them
sensible
by
some
expressive
Characters
,
't
is
very
difficult
to
represent
them
to
our
Mind
,
because
whatever
is
abstracted
moves
us
not
.
On
the
contrary
,
the
Commotions
and
Sensations
of
the
Soul
may
easily
be
represented
to
the
Mind
,
though
the
Knowledge
we
have
of
them
be
but
confused
and
imperfect
;
for
all
the
Words
that
raise
them
,
lively
strike
the
Soul
,
and
make
it
attentive
.
Thence
it
proceeds
,
that
we
often
imagine
we
rightly
understand
some
Discourses
that
are
altogether
incomprehensible
;
and
that
reading
some
Descriptions
of
the
Sensations
and
Passions
of
the
Soul
,
we
persuade
our selves
that
we
perfectly
comprehend
them
;
because
they
strongly
move
us
,
and
that
all
the
Words
that
reverberate
upon
our
Eyes
agitate
our
Soul
.
The
hearing
of
the
very
Names
of
Shame
,
Despair
,
Impudence
,
&c.
straightway
excite
in
our
Mind
a
confused
Idea
,
and
obscure
Sensation
,
that
powerfully
influences
us
;
and
because
this
Sensation
is
very
familiar
to
us
,
and
presents
it self
without
any
Trouble
or
Endeavour
of
the
Mind
,
we
fancy
it
to
be
clear
and
distinct
.
These
Words
,
however
,
are
the
Names
of
compounded
Passions
,
and
by
consequence
abridg'd
Expressions
,
which
popular
Use
has
made
up
of
many
confused
and
obscure
Ideas
.
Seeing
we
are
oblig'd
to
employ
such
Terms
as
common
Use
has
approv'd
of
,
the
Reader
should
not
be
surpriz'd
to
meet
with
Obscurity
,
and
sometimes
with
a
sort
of
Contradiction
in
our
Words
.
And
if
it
were
but
consider'd
that
the
Sensations
and
Commotions
of
the
Soul
,
that
answer
to
the
Terms
us'd
in
such
Discourses
,
are
not
wholly
the
same
in
all
Men
,
because
of
their
different
Dispositions
of
Mind
,
they
would
not
so
easily
condemn
us
,
when
they
could
not
enter
into
our
Opinions
.
This
I
say
,
not
so
much
to
prevent
Objections
against
my self
,
as
that
we
may
understand
the
Nature
of
the
Passions
,
and
what
we
are
to
think
of
Books
treating
of
such
Matters
.
After
so
many
Cautions
,
I
shall
not
stick
to
say
,
that
all
the
Passions
may
be
referr'd
to
the
three
Primitive
,
namely
,
Desire
,
Joy
and
Sorrow
;
and
that
it
is
specially
by
the
different
Judgments
the
Soul
makes
of
Goods
and
Evils
,
that
such
as
relate
to
the
same
Primitive
Passion
differ
from
each
other
.
For
Instance
,
I
may
say
that
Hope
,
Fear
,
and
Irresolution
,
that
is
the
Mean
betwixt
them
both
,
are
Species
of
Desire
:
That
Boldness
,
Courage
and
Emulation
,
&c.
have
a
greater
Relation
to
Hope
,
than
to
all
others
;
and
that
Timidity
,
Cowardise
,
Jealousie
,
&c.
are
Species
of
Fear
.
I
may
say
,
that
Alacrity
and
Glory
,
Kindness
and
Gratefulness
,
are
Species
of
Joy
,
caused
by
the
Sight
of
the
Good
that
we
know
to
be
in
us
,
or
in
those
to
whom
we
are
united
;
as
Derision
or
Jeering
is
a
sort
of
Joy
,
commonly
arising
at
the
Sight
of
the
Evil
that
befalls
those
from
whom
we
are
separated
.
Lastly
,
That
Distaste
,
Tediousness
,
Regret
,
Pity
,
Indignation
,
are
so
many
kinds
of
Sorrow
,
caused
by
the
Consideration
of
something
displeasing
.
But
besides
those
Passions
,
and
several
others
I
pass
by
,
which
particularly
relate
to
some
of
the
Primitive
Passions
,
there
are
yet
many
others
,
whose
Commotion
is
almost
equally
compounded
,
either
of
Desire
and
Joy
,
as
Impudence
,
Anger
and
Revenge
;
or
of
Desire
and
Sorrow
,
as
Shame
,
Regret
and
Vexation
;
or
of
all
Three
together
,
when
Motives
of
Joy
and
Sorrow
meet
.
And
though
these
last
Passions
have
no
particular
Names
that
I
know
of
,
they
are
however
the
most
common
;
because
in
this
Life
we
scarce
ever
enjoy
any
Good
without
a
Mixture
of
Evil
,
nor
suffer
any
Evil
without
Hopes
of
being
freed
of
it
,
and
enjoying
Good
.
And
though
Joy
be
altogether
contrary
to
Sorrow
,
yet
it
allows
of
its
Company
,
and
even
admits
it
an
equal
Sharer
in
the
Capacity
of
the
Soul
as
Volent
,
when
the
Sight
of
Good
and
Evil
divide
its
Capacity
as
Intelligent
.
All
the
Passions
therefore
are
Species
of
Desire
,
Joy
and
Sorrow
;
and
the
chief
difference
betwixt
those
of
the
same
sort
must
be
taken
from
the
different
Perceptions
or
Judgments
that
cause
or
accompany
them
.
So
that
to
become
learned
in
the
Nature
of
Passions
,
and
to
make
of
them
the
most
accurate
Enumeration
possible
,
it
is
requisite
to
enquire
into
the
different
Judgments
that
may
be
made
of
Good
and
Evil.
But
as
we
especially
intend
to
find
out
the
Cause
of
our
Errours
,
we
need
not
so
much
to
insist
upon
the
Judgments
that
precede
or
cause
the
Passions
,
as
upon
those
that
follow
them
,
and
which
the
Soul
makes
of
Things
when
she
is
agitated
by
some
Passion
,
because
those
last
Judgments
are
the
most
liable
to
Errour
.
Such
Judgments
as
precede
and
cause
the
Passions
,
are
almost
ever
false
in
something
,
because
they
are
,
for
the
most
part
,
grounded
upon
such
Perceptions
of
the
Soul
as
consider
Objects
in
relation
to
her
,
and
not
as
they
are
in
themselves
.
But
the
Judgments
that
follow
the
Passions
are
false
all
manner
of
ways
;
because
such
Judgments
being
only
made
by
the
Passions
,
are
only
grounded
upon
the
Perceptions
the
Soul
has
of
Objects
as
relating
to
her
,
or
rather
to
her
own
Commotion
.
In
the
Judgments
that
precede
the
Passions
,
Truth
and
Falshood
are
join'd
together
;
but
when
the
Soul
is
agitated
,
and
judges
by
every
Inspiration
of
the
Passion
,
Truth
vanishes
,
and
Falshood
remains
to
be
the
Principle
of
so
many
more
false
Conclusions
as
the
Passion
is
greater
.
All
Passions
justifie
themselves
,
continually
offering
to
the
Soul
the
moving
Object
,
in
the
fittest
way
for
preserving
and
increasing
her
Commotion
.
The
Judgment
,
or
the
Perception
that
causes
it
,
gets
still
new
Forces
from
the
Increase
of
the
Passion
,
and
the
Passion
likewise
augments
proportionably
as
the
Judgment
that
produces
it
,
in
its
turn
,
is
strengthen'd
.
Thus
false
Judgments
and
Passions
join
in
Confederacy
,
for
their
mutual
Preservation
.
And
should
the
Heart
never
cease
sending
up
Spirits
for
keeping
open
the
Tracks
of
the
Brain
,
and
supplying
the
Expences
,
which
that
violent
Sensation
or
Commotion
make
of
the
same
Spirits
,
Passions
would
perpetually
increase
,
and
never
allow
us
to
be
sensible
of
our
Errours
.
But
as
all
our
Passions
depend
on
the
Fermentation
and
Circulation
of
the
Blood
,
and
that
the
Heart
can
never
furnish
as
many
Spirits
as
are
necessary
for
their
Preservation
,
they
must
needs
expire
when
the
Spirits
diminish
,
and
the
Blood
grows
cool
again
.
Though
it
be
an
easie
matter
to
discover
the
ordinary
Judgments
of
Passions
,
yet
't
is
not
a
thing
to
be
neglected
;
there
being
few
Subjects
that
deserve
more
the
Application
of
an
Enquirer
after
Truth
,
who
endeavours
to
free
himself
from
the
Dominion
of
the
Body
,
and
will
judge
of
every
thing
by
true
Ideas
.
We
may
instruct
our selves
in
this
Matter
two
ways
,
either
by
pure
Reason
,
or
by
our
inward
Consciousness
,
when
we
are
agitated
by
some
Passion
.
For
Instance
,
Experience
teaches
us
,
That
we
are
apt
to
judge
of
those
we
love
not
,
to
their
Disadvantage
,
and
to
spit
all
the
Venom
of
our
Hatred
at
the
Object
of
our
Passion
.
We
also
know
by
Reason
,
that
as
we
cannot
hate
but
what
is
Evil
;
so
't
is
necessary
for
the
preservation
of
Hatred
,
that
the
Mind
should
represent
to
it self
the
worst
part
of
its
Object
.
For
't
is
sufficient
to
suppose
that
all
Passions
justifie
themselves
,
and
give
such
a
Disposition
,
first
to
the
Imagination
,
then
to
the
Mind
,
as
is
fit
to
preserve
their
own
Commotion
,
directly
to
conclude
what
are
the
Judgments
which
all
the
Passions
cause
us
to
make
.
Those
that
are
endued
with
a
strong
and
lively
Imagination
,
that
are
extremely
sensible
,
and
much
subject
to
the
Motions
of
Passions
,
may
perfectly
inform
themselves
of
those
things
by
their
own
inward
sense
;
and
it
often
comes
to
pass
,
that
they
speak
of
them
in
a
more
pleasing
and
instructing
manner
than
others
,
whose
Reason
over-tops
their
Imagination
:
yet
it
follows
not
,
that
those
that
discover
best
the
Springs
of
Self-love
,
that
penetrate
farthest
into
Man's
Heart
,
and
more
sensibly
discover
its
Recesses
,
are
always
the
greatest
Understandings
.
This
only
proves
that
they
are
livelier
,
quicker
of
Imagination
,
and
sometimes
more
malicious
than
others
.
But
those
that
without
consulting
their
inward
Sense
,
make
use
only
of
their
Reason
to
enquire
into
the
Nature
and
Effects
of
Passions
;
though
they
be
not
always
so
quick-sighted
as
others
,
are
always
more
rational
,
and
less
obnoxious
to
Errour
;
because
they
judge
of
things
as
they
are
in
themselves
:
They
see
very
near
what
Men
posse●t
with
Passions
can
doe
,
as
they
suppose
them
more
or
less
agitated
;
but
do
not
rashly
judge
of
the
Actions
of
others
,
by
what
they
would
doe
themselves
in
such
Occasions
;
for
they
well
know
,
that
Men
are
not
equally
sensible
to
the
same
things
,
nor
alike
susceptible
of
involuntary
Commotions
,
and
therefore
't
is
not
by
consulting
our
Sensations
which
the
Passions
create
in
us
,
but
by
listening
to
Reason
,
that
we
must
treat
of
the
Judgments
that
accompany
them
;
lest
we
should
draw
our
own
Picture
,
instead
of
discovering
the
Nature
of
Passions
in
general
.
CHAP.
XI
.
That
all
the
Passions
justifie
themselves
.
What
Judgments
they
cause
us
to
make
in
their
Vindication
.
WE
need
no
long
deduction
of
Arguments
to
demonstrate
,
That
all
Passions
justifie
themselves
:
That
Principle
is
sufficiently
evident
,
both
by
our
internal
Consciousness
of
our selves
,
and
the
Behaviour
of
those
we
see
agitated
by
them
;
and
therefore
we
need
only
barely
propound
it
,
to
consider
it
as
we
should
do
.
The
Mind
is
such
a
Slave
to
the
Imagination
,
that
it
always
obeys
when
the
Imagination
is
over-heated
;
and
dares
not
answer
when
the
same
is
incensed
,
because
it
meets
with
Abuses
when
it
resists
,
and
is
always
rewarded
with
some
Pleasure
when
it
humours
that
imperious
Faculty
.
Even
those
whose
unruly
Imagination
persuades
them
they
are
transmuted
into
Beasts
,
find
out
Reasons
to
prove
they
must
live
as
Beasts
do
,
walk
Four-footed
,
eat
Grass
,
and
imitate
every
Action
that
is
purely
Brutal
.
They
find
Pleasure
in
living
by
the
Impressions
of
their
Passion
,
and
suffer
inward
Pain
in
resisting
it
;
which
is
sufficient
to
make
Reason
,
that
commonly
descends
to
be
the
Slave
to
Pleasure
,
to
argue
in
such
a
manner
as
may
best
defend
the
Cause
of
it
.
If
therefore
it
be
true
that
all
Passions
justifie
themselves
,
't
is
evident
that
Desire
must
of
it self
move
us
to
judge
favourably
of
its
Object
,
if
it
be
a
Desire
of
Love
,
and
unkindly
if
it
be
a
Desire
of
Aversion
.
The
Desire
of
Love
is
a
Motion
of
the
Soul
raised
by
the
Spirits
,
that
provoke
it
to
the
Enjoyment
or
Use
of
such
things
as
are
not
in
its
power
;
for
we
desire
even
the
Continuation
of
our
Enjoyment
,
because
future
things
depend
not
on
us
.
'T
is
then
necessary
for
the
Justification
of
that
Desire
,
that
the
Object
which
produces
it
be
esteemed
good
in
it self
,
or
in
reference
to
something
else
:
the
contrary
must
be
said
of
that
Desire
,
which
is
a
kind
of
Aversion
.
I
grant
,
we
cannot
judge
any
thing
to
be
good
or
bad
,
without
some
Reason
;
but
Passions
have
no
Object
which
is
not
good
in
some
sense
.
And
if
it
may
be
said
there
are
some
,
which
contain
no
real
Goodness
,
and
therefore
cannot
be
contemplated
as
Good
by
the
Mind
;
yet
no
one
can
say
but
they
may
be
enjoyed
as
Good
,
since
they
are
supposed
to
agitate
us
;
and
that
Commotion
,
Enjoyment
,
or
Sense
is
more
than
sufficient
to
move
the
Soul
to
entertain
a
kind
Opinion
of
the
Object
.
If
we
so
easily
judge
that
Fire
contains
in
it self
the
Heat
we
feel
,
and
Bread
the
Savour
we
relish
,
because
of
the
Sensation
those
Bodies
excite
in
us
;
though
that
be
never
so
incomprensible
to
the
Mind
,
which
cannot
conceive
Heat
and
Savour
as
Modifications
of
a
Body
:
thence
it
follows
,
That
there
is
no
Object
of
our
Passions
,
how
vile
and
contemptible
soever
it
appears
,
but
we
may
judge
it
good
,
when
the
Enjoyment
of
it
affects
us
with
pleasure
.
For
as
we
imagine
that
Heat
goes
out
of
Fire
when
we
feel
it
,
so
we
blindly
believe
,
that
the
Objects
of
the
Passions
cause
the
pleasure
which
we
receive
in
their
Enjoyment
,
and
that
therefore
they
are
good
,
since
they
are
able
to
doe
us
good
.
The
like
may
be
said
of
the
Passions
that
have
Evil
for
their
Object
.
But
,
as
I
said
just
before
,
there
is
nothing
but
deserves
either
Love
or
Aversion
,
either
by
it self
,
or
by
something
else
to
which
it
relates
;
and
when
we
are
agitated
with
some
Passion
,
we
quickly
discover
in
its
Object
the
Good
or
Evil
that
may
nourish
the
same
.
It
is
therefore
easie
to
know
by
Reason
the
Judgments
which
our
Passions
make
,
whilst
agitating
us
.
For
,
if
a
Desire
of
Love
move
us
,
we
may
well
conceive
that
it
will
not
fail
to
justifie
it self
,
by
the
favourable
Judgments
it
shall
make
of
its
Object
.
We
easily
perceive
that
those
Judgments
will
have
more
Extent
,
as
the
Desire
shall
be
more
violent
;
and
that
they
will
be
sometimes
absolute
and
without
exception
,
though
but
a
very
small
part
of
the
thing
appears
good
.
We
may
without
difficulty
understand
that
those
favourable
Judgments
will
reach
all
things
,
that
shall
have
,
or
seem
to
have
,
any
Connection
with
the
principal
Object
of
the
Passion
,
proportionably
to
the
strength
of
the
Passion
,
and
the
Extent
of
the
Imagination
.
The
contrary
will
happen
if
it
be
a
Desire
of
A●version
,
the
Reasons
of
which
are
as
easily
comprehended
,
and
perfectly
confirmed
and
made
good
by
Experience
.
But
let
us
make
these
Truths
more
sensible
and
familiar
by
some
Instances
.
Men
naturally
desire
Knowledge
,
because
all
Minds
are
created
for
Truth
.
But
that
Desire
,
how
just
and
reasonable
soever
it
may
be
in
it self
,
often
becomes
a
dangerous
Vice
,
by
the
false
Judgments
that
attend
it
;
Curiosity
frequently
offers
to
the
Mind
vain
Objects
of
its
Study
and
Lucubrations
,
ascribes
to
them
false
Ideas
of
Greatness
,
ennobles
them
with
the
deceiving
Lustre
of
Rarity
,
and
dresses
them
up
with
such
gay
and
splendid
Apparel
,
that
one
can
hardly
forbear
to
Contemplate
them
with
too
much
Pleasure
and
Application
.
There
is
no
Trifle
but
will
wholly
take
up
some
Persons
,
whose
fruitless
Toil
is
still
justified
by
the
false
Judgments
that
arise
from
their
vain
Curiosity
.
For
instance
,
those
that
bestow
their
time
in
Learning
Tongues
,
imagine
that
all
the
Sciences
consist
in
the
Knowledge
of
Terms
,
and
find
out
a
Thousand
Reasons
to
justifie
themselves
;
and
the
Veneration
those
pay
them
whom
an
unknown
Term
confounds
,
is
none
of
the
weakest
,
though
the
least
reasonable
.
Some
Persons
employ
their
whole
lives
in
learning
to
speak
,
who
ought
perhaps
to
hold
their
Peace
all
the
while
;
since
't
is
evident
he
ought
to
be
silent
,
who
has
nothing
worth
the
hearing
to
say
.
But
't
is
not
that
which
they
propose
from
their
Learning
.
They
should
know
that
he
must
think
well
,
use
his
Understanding
to
exactness
,
discern
Truth
from
Falshood
,
clear
Ideas
from
obscure
,
those
of
the
Mind
from
those
of
the
Imagination
,
that
will
speak
accurately
.
They
imagine
themselves
fine
and
uncommon
Wits
,
because
they
know
how
to
please
the
Ear
with
an
Elegant
Harmony
,
how
to
flatter
the
Passions
by
Figures
and
●aking
Gestures
;
how
to
rejoyce
the
Imagination
by
lively
and
sensible
Expressions
;
whilst
they
leave
the
Mind
empty
of
Ideas
,
void
of
Light
and
Understanding
.
Some
probable
reason
may
justifie
their
Passion
,
that
spend
a
great
deal
of
time
in
the
study
of
their
own
Tongue
,
since
they
make
use
of
it
all
their
Life
;
but
as
to
those
who
indifferently
apply
themselves
to
all
sorts
of
Languages
,
I
know
not
what
to
say
in
their
behalf
.
The
Passion
of
those
who
make
a
complete
Library
of
all
sorts
of
Dictionaries
,
may
be
excusable
,
as
well
as
the
Curiosity
of
those
,
who
make
a
collection
of
Coins
and
Medals
of
all
Countries
and
Times
;
that
may
be
useful
in
some
occasions
,
and
if
it
doe
them
not
much
good
,
at
least
it
does
them
no
harm
;
a
Store-house
of
such
Curiosities
being
not
cumber●ome
,
since
they
carry
not
with
them
either
their
Books
or
Medals
.
But
how
may
the
Passion
of
those
be
justifiable
,
that
make
their
Head
a
Library
of
Dictionaries
,
that
neglect
their
Affairs
and
Essential
Duties
for
words
of
no
use
.
They
are
smatterers
in
their
own
Tongue
,
frequently
mingling
strange
and
unknown
words
in
their
Discourses
,
and
never
paying
their
Countreymen
with
Current
Money
.
Their
Reason
seems
not
to
be
better
guided
than
their
Tongue
;
for
all
the
Corners
and
Recesses
of
their
Memory
are
so
full
of
Etymologies
,
that
their
Minds
must
lie
as
stifl'd
under
the
innumerable
number
of
words
that
are
perpetually
flying
about
it
.
However
,
it
must
be
granted
that
Philologers
and
Linguists
will
not
stick
for
Reasons
to
justifie
their
capricious
Studies
.
Which
to
know
,
you
need
but
to
listen
to
the
Judgments
those
pretenders
to
Science
make
of
Tongues
;
or
suppose
some
Opinions
,
that
are
taken
amongst
them
for
undoubted
Axioms
,
together
with
the
Inferences
that
may
be
deduc'd
from
them
.
For
instance
,
that
those
Persons
who
speak
several
Tongues
,
are
as
many
individual
Men
as
they
know
different
Languages
,
since
Speech
distinguishes
us
from
Beasts
;
that
the
Ignorance
of
Tongues
deprives
us
of
a
multitude
of
things
,
since
Ancient
Philosophers
and
Strangers
are
more
Learned
then
we
.
Suppose
but
these
and
the
like
Principles
and
Conclusions
,
and
you
'll
quickly
form
such
Judgments
as
are
fit
to
beget
the
Passion
for
Tongues
,
and
consequently
like
those
,
wherewith
the
same
Passion
inspires
the
Linguists
to
vindicate
their
Studies
.
There
is
not
a
Science
so
abject
and
contemptible
,
but
some
part
of
it
will
shine
very
bright
to
the
Imagination
,
and
dazle
the
Mind
,
when
Passion
heightens
those
false
Glimpses
.
That
Splendour
,
I
own
,
vanishes
when
the
Blood
and
Spirits
cool
,
and
the
Light
of
Truth
begins
to
shine
;
but
that
Light
disappears
also
,
when
the
Imagination
grows
warm
again
,
and
leaves
but
some
transitory
Shadows
of
those
solid
Reasons
which
pretended
to
condemn
our
Passion
.
Farthermore
,
when
the
Passion
that
agitates
us
finds
it self
a
dying
,
it
repents
not
of
its
demeanour
,
but
on
the
contrary
it
disposes
all
things
,
either
to
an
honourable
Funeral
,
or
to
be
reviv'd
spedily
again
;
that
is
to
say
,
it
always
prepares
the
Mind
to
frame
Judgments
in
its
Vindication
.
In
this
condition
it
makes
a
sort
of
Alliance
with
such
other
Passions
as
may
keep
it
up
in
its
weakness
,
supply
it
with
Spirits
and
Blood
,
in
its
necessity
;
raise
it
out
of
its
Ashes
,
and
give
it
a
new
Birth
.
For
Passions
are
not
unconcern'd
for
one
another
,
and
those
that
can
live
together
,
faithfully
contribute
to
their
mutual
preservation
.
So
that
all
the
Passions
that
are
not
contrary
to
the
Studies
of
Tongues
,
or
of
any
thing
else
,
do
continually
sollicite
and
fully
confirm
those
Judgments
that
are
made
to
vindicate
it
.
A
Pretender
to
Learning
imagines
himself
,
now
as
surrounded
with
respectfull
Hearers
,
then
as
Conquerour
of
those
whom
he
has
amaz'd
with
his
unintelligible
words
;
and
almost
always
as
one
rais'd
far
above
the
common
sort
of
Men.
He
flatters
himself
with
the
Commendations
he
receives
,
with
the
Preferments
that
are
proposed
to
him
,
with
the
Courtship
that
is
made
to
him
.
He
's
of
all
Times
and
Countries
:
He
is
not
limited
,
as
vulgar
Wits
,
to
the
present
,
nor
confin'd
within
the
Walls
of
his
Town
;
but
is
continually
communicating
himself
abroad
,
and
his
Communication
makes
his
Delight
.
See
how
many
Passions
combine
together
to
manage
the
Cause
of
pretended
Learning
,
how
hotly
they
prosecute
their
Judgments
,
and
bribe
the
Mind
in
its
favour
.
Should
every
Passion
act
separately
,
without
caring
for
the
rest
,
they
would
vanish
immediately
after
their
Rise
,
not
being
able
to
make
a
sufficient
number
of
false
Judgments
to
maintain
themselves
,
and
defend
the
Glimmerings
of
Imagination
against
the
Light
of
Reason
:
But
all
Passions
concur
admirably
well
to
their
mutual
Preservation
,
assisting
and
strengthning
each
other
,
though
never
so
remote
,
provided
they
be
not
declared
Enemies
,
as
though
they
were
minded
to
follow
the
Rules
of
a
well-order'd
State
.
If
the
Passion
of
Desire
were
alone
,
all
the
Judgments
it
might
pass
would
only
amount
to
represent
the
Good
as
attainable
:
For
the
Desire
of
Love
,
consider'd
as
such
,
is
produced
by
the
Judgments
we
make
,
that
it
is
possible
to
enjoy
such
a
Good
:
And
so
this
Desire
could
only
form
Judgments
about
the
Possibility
of
enjoying
it
;
since
the
Judgments
which
follow
and
preserve
the
Passions
,
are
exactly
like
those
which
precede
and
produce
them
.
But
that
Desire
is
animated
by
Love
,
fortified
by
Hope
,
increased
by
Joy
,
renewed
by
Fear
,
attended
by
Courage
,
Emulation
,
Anger
,
Irresolution
,
and
several
other
Passions
,
that
form
each
in
their
turn
a
great
variety
of
Judgments
,
which
succeed
each
other
,
and
maintain
the
Desire
that
has
produced
them
.
'T
is
not
therefore
strange
that
the
desire
of
a
mere
Trifle
,
or
of
a
Thing
that
is
evidently
hurtful
or
fruitless
,
should
however
justifie
it self
against
Reason
for
many
Years
,
nay
,
during
the
whole
Life
of
a
Man
that
is
agitated
with
it
,
since
so
many
other
Passions
endeavour
to
vindicate
it
.
I
shall
here
set
down
in
few
Words
how
Passions
justifie
themselves
,
that
I
may
explain
Things
by
distinct
Ideas
.
Every
Passion
agitates
the
Blood
and
Spirits
,
which
,
when
agitated
,
are
driven
into
the
Brain
by
the
sensible
Sight
of
the
Object
,
or
the
Strength
of
the
Imagination
,
in
such
a
manner
as
is
fit
to
imprint
deep
Tracks
representing
that
Object
.
They
bend
,
and
even
sometimes
break
by
their
impetuous
Course
the
Fibres
of
the
Brain
,
and
thereby
leave
the
Imagination
soil'd
and
corrupted
.
For
these
Traces
obey
not
the
Commands
of
Reason
,
nor
will
they
be
blotted
out
when
it
pleases
;
on
the
contrary
,
they
put
a
Force
upon
it
,
and
oblige
it
incessantly
to
consider
Objects
in
such
a
manner
as
moves
and
inclines
it
to
favour
the
Passions
.
Thus
the
Passions
act
upon
the
Imagination
,
and
the
corrupted
Imagination
makes
an
Effort
against
Reason
,
by
continually
representing
Things
not
as
they
are
in
themselves
,
that
the
Mind
might
pronounce
a
true
Judgment
;
but
as
they
are
in
reference
to
the
present
Passion
,
that
it
might
pass
a
favourable
Sentence
in
its
behalf
.
The
Passions
not
only
bribe
the
Imagination
and
Mind
in
their
favour
,
but
produce
in
other
Parts
of
the
Body
such
Dispositions
as
are
necessary
to
preserve
them
.
The
Spirits
they
move
,
stop
not
in
the
Brain
,
but
run
,
as
I
have
elsewhere
shewn
,
to
all
other
Parts
of
the
Body
,
especially
to
the
Heart
,
the
Liver
,
the
Spleen
,
and
the
Nerves
that
surround
the
principal
Arteries
;
and
lastly
,
to
all
Parts
whatsoever
,
that
may
supply
necessary
Spirits
for
the
maintenance
of
the
predominant
Passion
.
But
while
these
Spirits
disperse
themselves
into
all
the
Parts
of
the
Body
,
they
destroy
all
along
,
and
by
degrees
,
whatever
might
hinder
their
Course
,
and
make
their
Passages
so
slippery
and
smooth
,
that
a
very
inconsiderable
Object
exceedingly
moves
us
,
and
consequently
inclines
us
to
make
such
Judgments
as
favour
the
Passions
:
Thus
it
comes
to
pass
,
that
they
establish
and
justifie
themselves
.
If
we
consider
how
various
the
Constitution
of
the
Fibres
of
the
Brain
,
and
withal
the
Commotion
and
Quantity
of
the
Spirits
and
Blood
may
be
,
in
the
different
Sexes
and
Ages
,
we
shall
easily
and
nearly
conjecture
to
what
Passions
some
Persons
are
most
subject
,
and
consequently
,
what
Judgments
they
pass
upon
Objects
.
For
instance
,
we
may
make
a
very
near
Guess
,
by
the
plenty
or
want
of
Spirits
that
is
observable
in
some
People
,
the
same
Thing
being
proposed
and
explained
to
them
in
the
same
manner
,
that
some
of
them
will
make
Judgments
of
Hope
and
Joy
,
whilst
others
shall
pass
such
Judgments
as
proceed
from
Fear
and
Sorrow
.
For
those
that
abound
with
Blood
and
Spirits
,
as
young
Men
,
cholerick
Persons
,
and
those
that
are
of
a
Sanguine
Complexion
use
to
doe
,
being
very
susceptible
of
Hope
,
because
of
the
secret
Sense
of
their
Strength
,
will
not
believe
that
they
shall
meet
with
any
Opposition
to
their
Designs
,
which
they
may
not
overcome
;
and
so
will
quickly
feed
themselves
with
a
borrowed
Taste
of
the
Good
they
hope
to
enjoy
,
and
will
pass
such
Judgments
as
are
fit
to
justifie
their
Hope
and
Joy
.
But
those
that
want
agitated
Spirits
,
as
Old
Men
,
and
those
that
are
of
a
Phlegmatick
and
Melancholy
Temper
,
being
inclined
to
Fear
and
Sorrow
,
because
their
Soul
is
conscious
of
her
own
Weakness
,
and
destitute
of
Spirits
to
perform
her
Orders
,
will
make
quite
contrary
Judgments
,
imagine
insuperable
Difficulties
to
justifie
their
Fear
,
and
give
up
themselves
to
Envy
,
Sorrow
,
Despair
,
and
other
sorts
of
Aversion
,
of
which
weak
Persons
are
most
susceptible
.
CHAP.
XII
.
That
such
Passions
as
have
Evil
for
their
Object
,
are
the
most
Dangerous
and
Vnjust
:
And
that
those
that
have
the
least
Mixture
of
Knowledge
,
are
the
most
lively
and
sensible
.
OF
all
the
Passions
the
several
sorts
of
Aversions
make
their
Judgments
the
most
remote
from
Reason
,
and
the
most
dangerous
;
there
being
no
Passion
which
corrupts
and
bribes
Reason
so
much
in
its
behalf
,
as
Hatred
and
Fear
;
Hatred
chiefly
in
the
Cholerick
,
or
in
those
whose
Spirits
are
in
a
perpetual
agitation
;
and
Fear
in
the
Melancholy
,
or
those
whose
gross
and
heavy
Spirits
are
neither
easily
moved
,
nor
soon
quieted
.
But
when
●atred
and
Fear
conspire
together
to
bribe
Reason
,
which
is
very
frequently
done
,
then
there
are
no
Judgments
so
unjust
and
capricious
,
but
they
will
pass
and
defend
them
with
an
insuperable
Obstinacy
.
The
Reason
of
this
is
,
That
as
in
this
Life
Evil
strikes
the
Soul
more
to
the
quick
,
than
Good
;
so
the
Sense
of
Pain
is
livelier
than
that
of
Pleasure
:
Injuries
and
Scandals
more
sensibly
affect
us
,
than
Commendations
and
Applause
;
and
though
there
are
Men
indifferent
as
to
the
enjoying
some
Pleasures
,
and
receiving
certain
Honours
;
yet
there
is
scarce
one
that
can
bear
Pain
and
Contempt
without
Uneasiness
.
And
therefore
Hatred
,
Fear
,
and
other
sorts
of
Aversion
,
that
have
Evil
for
their
Object
,
are
most
violent
Passions
,
which
shake
the
Mind
with
such
unexpected
Commotions
,
as
discompose
and
stupifie
it
,
and
quickly
pierce
into
the
bottom
of
the
Heart
,
dethrone
Reason
,
and
pass
upon
all
sorts
of
Subjects
erroneous
and
unjust
Sentences
,
to
favour
their
tyrannical
Madness
.
Of
all
Passions
they
are
the
most
cruel
and
distrustful
,
contrary
to
Charity
and
Civil
Society
,
and
at
the
same
time
the
most
ridiculous
and
extravagant
,
since
they
give
such
impertinent
and
frantick
Judgments
,
as
excite
the
Laughter
and
Indignation
of
all
other
Men.
Those
Passions
inspired
the
Pharisees
with
these
absurd
Discourses
:
What
are
we
doing
?
This
Man
works
many
Miracles
:
Joh.
11.47
.
If
we
let
him
alone
,
all
Men
will
believe
in
him
,
and
the
Romans
will
come
and
destroy
both
our
City
and
Nation
.
They
agreed
that
our
Saviour
had
wrought
many
Miracles
;
for
the
Resurrection
of
Lazarus
was
undeniable
:
But
what
were
the
Judgments
of
their
Passions
?
To
murther
both
JESUS
and
Lazarus
whom
he
had
raised
from
the
Dead
!
Why
JESUS
?
Because
,
say
they
,
if
we
let
him
alone
,
all
Men
will
believe
in
him
,
and
the
Romans
shall
come
and
extirpate
our
Nation
.
Joh.
12.11
.
And
why
Lazarus
?
Because
that
,
by
reason
of
him
,
many
of
the
Jews
went
away
,
and
believed
on
Jesus
.
Oh
Judgments
equally
Cruel
and
Irrational
!
Cruel
,
through
Hatred
;
and
Irrational
,
through
Fear
:
The
Romans
shall
come
,
and
destroy
our
City
and
Nation
.
The
same
Passions
moved
a
great
Assembly
,
consisting
of
Annas
the
High-Priest
,
Caiaphas
,
John
,
Alexander
,
and
as
many
as
were
of
the
Kindred
of
the
High-Priest
,
to
speak
thus
:
What
shall
we
doe
with
these
Men
?
Act.
4.16
,
17.
For
that
,
indeed
,
a
notable
Miracle
hath
been
done
by
them
,
is
manifest
to
all
them
that
dwell
in
Jerusalem
,
and
we
cannot
deny
it
.
But
lest
it
should
spread
farther
,
let
us
threaten
to
punish
them
severely
,
if
they
preach
the
Name
of
JESUS
any
more
.
All
those
great
Men
,
agitated
by
their
Passions
,
and
blinded
by
their
false
Zeal
,
pass
Judgment
both
impertinent
and
unjust
.
They
dare
not
punish
the
Apostles
,
because
of
the
People
,
and
that
the
Man
who
had
been
miraculously
cured
was
above
Forty
Years
of
Age
,
and
present
in
the
Assembly
;
but
threaten
them
,
lest
they
should
●each
in
the
Name
of
Jesus
;
supposing
they
ought
to
condemn
the
Doctrine
,
Act.
5.28
.
because
they
put
the
Author
to
death
:
You
intend
,
say
they
,
to
bring
this
Man's
Blood
upon
us
.
When
false
Zeal
unites
it self
to
Hatred
,
it
shelters
it
from
the
Reproofs
of
Reason
,
and
justifies
it
so
well
,
that
we
scruple
not
to
be
led
by
its
Motions
.
When
Ignorance
and
Weakness
accompany
Fear
,
they
extend
it
to
innumerable
Subjects
,
and
drive
on
its
Commotions
to
that
heighth
,
that
the
least
Suspicion
disturbs
and
frightens
Reason
.
False
Zealots
imagine
they
serve
God
,
when
they
obey
their
Passions
:
They
blindly
follow
the
secret
Motions
of
their
Hatred
,
as
Inspirations
from
internal
Truth
;
and
insisting
with
great
satisfaction
on
the
Proofs
of
Sense
that
justifie
that
Excess
,
their
Errours
become
confirmed
with
an
unconquerable
Stubbornness
.
As
to
ignorant
and
weak
Persons
,
they
create
to
themselves
Matter
of
ridiculous
and
fantastick
Fears
;
like
Children
that
walk
in
the
dark
without
a
Guide
and
Light
,
fansie
frightful
Bugbears
,
are
distur'd
and
cry
out
as
though
they
were
undone
.
Knowledge
retrieves
them
if
they
be
ignorant
;
but
if
they
be
weak
,
their
Imagination
continues
crazed
,
and
the
least
thing
that
relates
to
that
frightful
Object
,
renews
the
Tracks
,
and
opens
the
Current
of
the
Spirits
,
which
cause
the
Symptoms
of
their
Fear
:
So
that
it
is
altogether
impossible
to
cure
or
pacifie
them
for
ever
.
But
when
false
Zeal
meets
with
Hatred
and
Fear
in
a
weak
Mind
,
it
incessantly
produces
such
unjust
and
violent
Judgments
,
as
cannot
be
thought
upon
without
Horrour
▪
To
change
a
Mind
possest
with
those
Passions
,
requires
a
greater
Miracle
than
that
which
converted
St.
Paul
;
and
his
Cure
would
be
absolutely
impossible
,
could
we
se●
Bounds
to
the
Power
and
Mercy
of
God
.
Those
that
walk
in
the
Dark
,
rejoyce
at
the
sight
of
Light
;
but
this
Man
cannot
suffer
it
,
because
it
wounds
him
by
opposing
his
Passion
.
His
Fear
is
in
some
sort
voluntary
,
as
being
produced
by
his
Hatred
;
and
therefore
he
loves
to
feel
its
Commotions
,
because
we
love
to
be
agitated
even
with
the
Passions
that
have
Evil
for
their
Object
,
when
the
Evil
is
only
imaginary
,
or
rather
when
we
know
,
as
in
Tragedies
,
that
the
Evil
cannot
hurt
us
.
The
Phantasms
which
those
that
walk
in
the
Dark
frame
in
their
Imaginations
,
vanish
at
the
Approach
of
Light
;
but
the
idle
Dreams
of
this
sort
of
Men
will
not
disappear
at
the
Light
of
Truth
,
which
instead
of
dissipating
the
Darkness
of
their
Mind
,
incenses
their
Imagination
;
so
that
the
frustrated
Light
recoils
,
because
they
are
wholly
taken
up
with
the
Objects
of
their
Passion
;
and
it
seems
those
Apparitions
have
a
real
Body
,
since
they
reflect
some
weak
Rays
of
the
Light
that
falls
upon
them
.
But
though
we
should
suppose
in
those
Men
a
sufficient
Teachableness
and
Attention
,
to
listen
to
,
and
comprehend
the
Reasons
that
may
dissipate
their
Errours
;
yet
their
Imagination
being
disorder'd
by
Fear
,
and
their
Heart
corrupted
by
Hatred
and
false
Zeal
,
those
Reasons
,
how
solid
soever
they
might
be
,
could
not
long
stop
the
impetuous
Stream
of
those
violent
Passions
,
nor
hinder
them
from
speedily
justifying
themselves
by
sensible
and
convincing
Proofs
.
For
we
ought
to
observe
,
that
there
are
transitory
Passions
,
which
never
return
;
whereas
there
are
others
that
are
constant
and
permanent
.
Those
that
are
not
kept
up
by
the
sight
of
the
Mind
,
but
are
only
produced
and
fortified
by
the
sensible
View
of
an
Object
,
and
the
Fermentation
of
the
Blood
,
are
not
lasting
,
but
commonly
die
soon
after
their
Birth
;
whereas
those
that
are
associated
with
the
Contemplation
of
the
Mind
,
are
steady
,
because
the
Principle
that
produces
them
is
not
subject
to
change
,
as
Blood
and
Humours
are
.
So
that
Hatred
,
Fear
,
and
all
other
Passions
that
are
excited
or
preserved
by
the
Knowledge
of
the
Mind
,
and
not
raised
by
the
sensible
View
of
Evil
,
must
needs
be
durable
,
and
withal
very
violent
and
unjust
.
However
,
those
Passions
are
not
the
most
lively
and
sensible
,
as
we
shall
now
shew
.
The
Perception
of
Good
and
Evil
,
which
raises
the
Passions
,
is
produced
Three
ways
;
by
the
Senses
,
by
the
Imagination
,
and
by
the
Mind
.
By
way
of
the
Senses
it
produces
very
quick
and
sensible
Passions
;
by
way
of
the
Imagination
,
much
weaker
;
but
those
which
proceed
from
the
Perception
of
Good
and
Evil
by
the
Mind
alone
,
are
true
Passions
,
on
no
other
account
than
as
that
View
of
Good
and
Evil
is
always
attended
by
some
Motion
of
the
Animal
Spirits
.
Passions
are
only
given
us
for
the
good
of
the
Body
,
and
for
uniting
us
by
it
to
sensible
Things
:
For
though
sensible
Things
are
neither
good
nor
bad
,
in
reference
to
the
Mind
;
yet
they
are
so
in
relation
to
the
Body
,
to
which
the
Mind
is
united
:
So
that
the
Senses
and
Imagination
,
discovering
much
better
than
the
Mind
the
Relation
of
sensible
Objects
to
our
Body
,
must
needs
raise
Passions
far
livelier
than
a
clear
and
evident
Knowledge
:
But
because
our
Knowledge
is
always
attended
with
some
Commotion
of
the
Spirits
,
a
clear
and
evident
Knowledge
of
a
great
Good
,
or
a
great
Evil
,
not
to
be
discover'd
by
the
Senses
,
always
raises
some
secret
Passion
.
However
,
all
clear
and
evident
Knowledge
of
any
Good
or
Evil
,
is
not
always
followed
with
a
sensible
and
perceptible
Passion
;
as
all
our
Passions
are
not
accompanied
with
an
intellectual
Knowledge
.
For
,
as
we
sometimes
think
upon
Good
or
Evil
,
without
being
conscious
of
any
Commotion
;
so
we
often
feel
our selves
agitated
with
Passion
,
without
knowing
or
sometimes
without
being
sensible
of
the
Cause
.
A
Man
that
sucks
in
a
good
Air
is
affected
with
Joy
,
and
knows
not
why
,
nor
what
sort
of
Good
he
enjoys
that
produces
it
:
And
if
some
invisible
Corpuscle
mixes
with
his
Blood
,
and
hinders
its
Fermentation
,
he
is
taken
with
Sorrow
,
and
may
even
ascribe
the
Cause
of
it
to
something
visible
,
that
offers
it self
to
him
in
the
time
of
his
Passion
.
Of
all
Passions
,
none
are
more
sensible
nor
quick
,
and
consequently
less
mingled
with
Knowledge
,
than
Horrour
and
Antipathy
,
Agreeableness
and
Sympathy
.
A
Man
sleeping
under
the
Shadow
of
a
Tree
,
often
starts
up
,
when
a
Fly
stings
him
,
or
a
Leaf
tickles
him
,
as
though
a
Serpent
had
bitten
him
:
The
confused
Sense
of
a
Thing
as
terrible
as
Death
it self
,
frightens
him
,
and
he
finds
himself
surpriz'd
with
a
very
strong
and
violent
Passion
,
which
is
an
Aversion
of
Desire
,
before
he
bethinks
himself
.
On
the
contrary
,
a
Man
in
want
discovers
by
chance
some
small
Good
,
the
Sweetness
of
which
surprizes
him
;
and
he
is
inconsiderately
taken
up
with
that
Trifle
,
as
though
it
were
the
greatest
Good
in
the
World
,
without
making
any
Reflection
on
it
.
The
same
happens
in
the
Motions
of
Sympathy
and
Antipathy
.
We
see
in
a
Company
a
Person
whose
Deportment
and
Manners
have
some
secret
Agreeableness
to
the
present
Disposition
of
our
Body
;
so
his
Sight
pierces
and
strikes
us
,
and
we
are
inclined
,
without
Reflection
,
to
love
and
wish
him
well
.
Thus
we
are
agitated
by
I
don't
know
what
,
since
Reason
has
no
Share
in
it
.
The
contrary
befals
those
whose
Aspect
and
Looks
shed
,
as
it
were
,
Disgust
and
Aversion
:
They
have
I
know
not
what
,
that
offends
and
puts
us
back
:
for
the
Mind
understands
nothing
in
it
;
the
Senses
only
are
competent
Judges
of
sensible
Beauty
and
Ugliness
,
which
are
the
Objects
of
those
kinds
of
Passions
.
F.
MALEBRANCHE's
TREATISE
Concerning
the
SEARCH
after
TRUTH
.
BOOK
VI.
Concerning
METHOD
.
CHAP.
I.
The
Design
of
this
Book
.
Two
general
Ways
for
the
Preserving
Evidence
in
the
Search
of
Truth
,
which
shall
be
the
Subject
of
this
Tract
.
WE
have
seen
in
the
foregoing
Books
,
that
the
Mind
of
Man
is
very
obnoxious
to
Errour
;
that
the
Deceptions
of
his
Senses
[
](A51674-e83560-b)*
*
Lib.
I.
,
the
Visions
of
his
Imagination
[
](A51674-e83600-b)†
†
Lib.
II.
,
and
the
Abstractions
of
his
Mind
[
](A51674-e83640-b)‖
‖
Lib.
III.
,
lead
him
into
frequent
Mistakes
;
that
the
Inclinations
of
his
Will
[
](A51674-e83680-b)⸪
⸪
Lib.
IV.
,
and
the
Passions
of
his
Heart
[
](A51674-e83720-b)*
*
Lib.
V.
,
almost
ever
conceal
the
Truth
from
him
,
and
never
suffer
it
to
appear
without
being
tinged
with
those
false
Colours
that
flatter
Concupiscency
.
In
short
,
we
have
partly
discover'd
the
Errours
of
the
Mind
,
with
their
Causes
:
Now
't
is
time
we
should
shew
the
Way
that
leads
to
the
Knowledge
of
Truth
,
and
give
the
Mind
all
the
possible
Skill
and
Strength
to
walk
therein
,
without
straying
or
wearying
it self
in
vain
.
But
,
to
spare
the
Readers
an
unprofitable
Labour
,
we
think
fit
to
advise
them
,
this
Last
Book
is
only
made
for
such
as
earnestly
desire
to
seek
the
Truth
by
themselves
,
and
to
make
use
of
the
Force
of
their
own
Mind
for
that
purpose
.
I
require
them
to
despise
for
a
while
all
probable
Opinions
,
to
wave
the
strongest
Conjectures
,
to
neglect
the
Authority
of
all
the
Philosophers
,
to
free
themselves
,
as
far
as
possible
,
from
all
Prejudice
,
Interest
,
and
Passion
;
to
enter
into
an
extreme
Mistrust
of
their
Senses
and
Imagination
:
In
a
word
,
well
to
remember
the
greatest
part
of
the
Things
that
have
been
said
in
the
former
Books
.
I
attempt
,
in
this
last
Book
,
to
give
the
Mind
all
the
Perfection
it
can
naturally
attain
to
,
by
supplying
it
with
the
necessary
Helps
to
become
more
attentive
and
enlarg'd
,
and
prescribing
it
those
Rules
that
must
be
observed
in
the
Inquiry
after
Truth
,
that
it
may
never
mistake
,
but
learn
in
time
whatever
can
be
known
.
Could
I
carry
this
Design
to
its
utmost
Perfection
,
which
I
pretend
not
,
this
being
but
an
Essay
towards
it
,
I
might
boast
to
have
found
out
an
Universal
Science
,
which
would
make
those
truly
learned
that
knew
how
to
make
use
of
it
;
since
they
would
have
the
Foundation
of
all
the
particular
Sciences
,
which
they
would
acquire
proportionably
as
they
should
make
use
of
that
Universal
Science
:
For
,
by
this
Treatise
we
endeavour
to
render
the
Mind
capable
of
passing
a
true
and
certain
Judgment
upon
all
the
Questions
that
are
not
beyond
its
reach
.
As
,
to
be
a
good
Mathematician
,
't
is
not
sufficient
to
learn
by
Heart
all
the
Demonstrations
of
Euclid
,
Pappus
,
Archimedes
,
Apollonius
,
and
others
that
have
written
of
Geometry
;
so
,
to
be
a
Learned
Philosopher
,
't
is
not
enough
to
have
read
Plato
,
Aristotle
,
Des
Cartes
,
and
perfectly
to
know
their
Sentiments
upon
Philosophical
Questions
.
For
the
Knowledge
of
all
the
Opinions
and
Judgments
of
other
Men
,
either
Philosophers
or
Geometricians
,
is
rather
a
History
,
than
a
Science
;
the
true
Science
that
perfects
,
as
far
as
possible
,
the
Mind
,
consisting
in
a
certain
Ability
of
solidly
judging
of
all
things
proportion'd
to
its
Reach
.
But
,
not
to
lose
time
,
nor
prepossess
the
Reader
with
precipitate
Judgments
,
let
us
begin
to
treat
of
such
an
important
Matter
.
First
of
all
,
we
ought
to
remember
the
Rule
that
has
been
established
,
and
proved
at
the
beginning
of
the
First
Book
,
because
't
is
the
Foundation
and
Principle
of
whatever
we
shall
say
hereafter
.
And
therefore
I
repeat
it
;
We
must
never
give
a
full
Consent
,
but
to
those
Propositions
that
appear
so
evidently
true
,
that
they
cannot
be
denied
it
,
without
feeling
an
inward
Pain
,
and
the
secret
Reproaches
of
our
Reason
;
that
is
to
say
,
without
clearly
knowing
we
should
make
a
wrong
Use
of
our
Liberty
by
with-holding
our
Consent
.
For
,
as
many
times
as
we
yield
to
Probabilities
,
we
certainly
venture
to
be
mistaken
;
and
't
is
but
by
good
Chance
,
or
a
lucky
Hit
,
if
we
be
not
really
deceived
.
So
that
the
confused
Sight
of
a
great
number
of
Probabilities
,
upon
different
Subjects
,
makes
not
our
Reason
more
perfect
;
nothing
but
the
clear
View
of
the
Truth
being
able
to
afford
it
any
real
Perfection
and
Satisfaction
.
Thence
't
is
easie
to
conclude
,
That
since
,
according
to
our
first
Rule
,
nothing
but
Evidence
can
assure
us
that
we
are
not
deceived
,
we
ought
to
take
a
special
care
to
preserve
that
Evidence
in
all
our
Perceptions
;
that
we
may
pass
a
sound
Judgment
upon
all
the
Things
to
which
our
Reason
can
attain
,
and
discover
as
many
Truths
as
we
are
capable
of
.
The
Things
that
can
produce
and
preserve
that
Evidence
,
are
of
two
sorts
;
some
are
within
us
,
and
in
some
manner
depending
on
us
;
others
are
out
of
our
Jurisdiction
.
For
,
as
to
see
distinctly
visible
Objects
,
't
is
required
to
have
a
good
Sight
,
and
to
fix
it
steadfastly
upon
them
;
which
two
Things
are
in
us
,
or
in
some
manner
depending
on
us
:
So
't
is
requisite
to
have
a
sound
Understanding
,
and
a
strong
Application
,
in
order
to
pierce
into
the
bottom
of
intelligible
Truths
;
which
two
Things
are
in
us
,
or
in
some
sort
in
our
power
.
But
as
the
Eyes
stand
in
need
of
Light
to
see
,
which
Light
depends
upon
foreign
Causes
;
so
the
Mind
needs
Ideas
to
conceive
,
which
,
as
it
has
been
proved
elsewhere
,
have
no
Dependency
upon
us
,
but
are
furnished
to
us
by
a
foreign
Cause
.
So
that
should
the
Ideas
of
Things
supersede
being
present
to
our
Minds
,
as
often
as
we
desire
to
see
them
;
should
he
that
enlightens
the
World
conceal
them
from
us
;
it
would
not
be
more
possible
for
us
to
redress
it
,
or
to
know
any
thing
,
than
it
is
to
see
visible
Objects
when
the
Light
is
gone
.
But
we
have
no
reason
to
fear
it
:
For
the
Presence
of
Ideas
being
natural
to
our
Minds
,
and
depending
on
the
general
Will
of
God
,
which
is
constant
and
immutable
,
they
can
never
disappear
,
nor
fail
us
in
the
Discovery
of
such
Things
as
are
attainable
by
Natural
Reason
.
For
,
the
Sun
that
enlightens
the
Minds
,
is
not
like
that
which
illuminates
Bodies
;
it
is
never
eclipsed
,
nor
goes
ever
down
,
but
penetrates
every
thing
without
dividing
its
Light
.
The
Ideas
of
all
Things
being
then
continually
present
to
us
,
even
when
we
do
not
attentively
consider
them
;
all
that
we
need
doe
to
make
all
our
Perceptions
evident
,
is
only
to
look
for
such
Means
as
can
increase
the
Attention
and
Extent
of
the
Mind
;
as
nothing
else
is
required
on
our
side
,
to
distinguish
visible
and
present
Objects
,
but
to
have
good
Eyes
,
and
to
fix
them
thereupon
.
However
,
because
the
Objects
we
consider
have
more
Relations
than
we
can
discover
at
once
,
by
a
simple
Essay
of
Thought
;
we
still
need
some
Rules
,
skilfully
to
unfold
the
Difficulties
;
by
which
Succours
,
the
Mind
,
being
grown
more
attentive
and
extended
,
may
with
a
full
Evidence
discover
all
the
Relations
of
the
Thing
examined
.
We
shall
divide
this
Sixth
Book
into
Two
Parts
.
We
shall
treat
in
the
First
,
of
those
Supplies
that
may
afford
the
Mind
more
Attention
and
Extent
;
and
in
the
Second
we
shall
prescribe
those
Rules
that
it
must
follow
in
the
Inquiry
after
Truth
,
to
pass
sound
and
undeceivable
Judgments
.
CHAP.
II.
That
Attention
is
necessary
to
preserve
Evidence
in
our
Knowledge
:
That
the
Modifications
of
the
Soul
make
her
attentive
,
but
share
and
take
up
too
much
her
Capacity
of
Perceiving
.
WE
have
shewn
at
the
Beginning
of
this
Work
,
that
the
Understanding
does
nothing
but
perceive
;
and
that
,
as
to
its
Concern
,
there
is
no
difference
betwixt
bare
Perceptions
,
Judgments
,
and
Reasonings
,
unless
it
be
,
that
the
second
and
third
are
Perceptions
more
composed
than
the
first
;
because
they
not
only
represent
many
Things
,
but
also
the
Relations
they
have
together
.
For
naked
Perceptions
represent
only
Things
to
the
Mind
;
whereas
Judgments
represent
the
Relations
that
are
betwixt
Things
and
Reasonings
,
the
Relations
that
are
betwixt
the
Relations
of
Things
,
provided
they
be
simple
Reasonings
;
for
if
they
were
Complex
,
they
would
represent
Relations
of
Relations
,
or
compound
Relations
,
which
are
between
the
Relation
of
Things
,
and
so
ad
infinitum
.
For
,
proportionably
as
Relations
multiply
,
so
the
Reasonings
,
that
represent
them
to
the
Mind
,
become
more
composed
:
However
,
Judgments
and
simple
Reasonings
,
as
well
as
those
that
are
composed
,
are
but
,
as
to
the
Understanding
,
bare
Perceptions
,
since
it
does
no
more
than
simply
perceive
,
as
has
been
already
observed
.
Whence
it
appears
,
that
the
Understanding
never
falls
into
Errour
,
since
there
is
none
in
Perceptions
;
and
,
that
Errour
it self
is
not
of
an
intelligible
nature
:
For
,
as
we
have
already
said
many
times
,
it
consists
in
a
too
hasty
Consent
of
the
Will
,
which
suffers
it self
to
be
dazzled
by
some
false
Glimpse
,
and
,
instead
of
keeping
its
Liberty
as
long
as
possible
,
negligently
relies
upon
the
Appearance
of
Truth
.
Notwithstanding
,
as
it
commonly
happens
that
the
Understanding
has
but
confused
and
imperfect
Perceptions
of
Things
;
so
't
is
really
a
Cause
of
our
Errours
,
though
only
occasional
.
For
,
as
the
Corporeal
Sight
leads
us
into
Mistake
,
when
it
represents
outward
Objects
confusedly
and
imperfectly
;
confusedly
,
when
they
are
at
too
great
a
distance
,
or
for
want
of
Light
;
and
imperfectly
,
when
it
only
shews
such
Faces
of
them
as
look
towards
us
:
So
the
Understanding
often
having
but
a
confused
and
imperfect
Conception
of
Things
,
because
they
are
not
sufficiently
present
to
it
,
and
that
it
discovers
not
all
their
Parts
,
causes
the
Will
,
that
too
easily
yields
to
those
obscure
and
imperfect
Conceptions
,
to
fall
into
many
Errours
.
We
must
then
look
out
for
Means
that
may
hinder
our
Perceptions
from
being
confused
and
imperfect
.
And
because
,
as
every
one
knows
,
nothing
can
make
them
more
clear
and
distinct
,
than
Attention
;
we
must
find
out
Means
to
become
more
and
more
attentive
.
Thus
we
may
hope
to
keep
to
Evidence
in
our
Reasonings
,
and
even
to
survey
all
at
once
the
necessary
Connexion
betwixt
all
the
Parts
of
our
longest
Inferences
.
To
find
out
those
Means
,
't
is
necessary
to
persuade
our selves
of
what
has
been
said
elsewhere
,
That
the
Mind
gives
not
an
equal
Attention
to
all
the
Things
it
perceives
:
For
it
applies
it self
infinitely
more
to
such
as
affect
,
modifie
,
and
penetrate
it
,
than
to
those
which
,
though
they
be
present
,
yet
do
not
concern
or
belong
to
it
:
In
short
,
't
is
more
taken
up
with
its
own
Modifications
,
than
with
the
bare
Ideas
of
Objects
,
which
Ideas
are
Things
different
from
it self
.
Thence
it
comes
,
that
we
consider
but
with
tediousness
,
dislike
,
and
remissness
,
the
abstracted
Ideas
of
the
pure
Understanding
;
that
we
apply
our selves
much
more
to
Things
that
we
imagine
,
especially
when
our
Imagination
is
strong
,
and
the
Tracks
of
our
Brain
very
deep
:
And
lastly
,
that
we
are
wholly
taken
up
with
sensible
Qualities
,
and
even
so
,
that
we
can
afford
no
Attention
to
the
pure
Ideas
of
the
Mind
,
when
we
feel
something
very
pleasant
or
painful
.
For
Pain
,
Pleasure
,
and
other
Sensations
,
being
Modes
of
the
Souls
Existence
,
't
is
impossible
we
should
exist
without
perceiving
them
,
and
having
the
Capacity
of
the
Mind
taken
up
,
since
our
Sensations
are
nothing
but
Perceptions
.
But
't
is
not
so
with
the
pure
Ideas
of
the
Mind
,
since
they
may
be
intimately
united
to
it
,
without
its
taking
the
least
notice
of
them
.
For
,
though
God
is
most
intimately
united
with
us
,
and
comprehends
the
Ideas
of
whatever
we
see
;
yet
those
Ideas
,
though
never
so
present
,
and
,
as
I
may
say
,
in
the
middle
of
our selves
,
are
concealed
from
us
,
when
the
Motions
of
the
Spirits
do
not
raise
their
Traces
,
or
when
our
Will
applies
not
the
Mind
to
consider
them
;
that
is
to
say
,
when
it
performs
not
those
Acts
to
which
the
Author
of
Nature
has
joined
the
Representation
of
those
Ideas
.
This
is
the
Foundation
of
whatever
we
shall
say
concerning
the
Means
that
can
improve
our
Attention
,
which
Means
will
be
drawn
from
the
very
Nature
of
the
Mind
;
so
that
't
is
to
be
hoped
,
that
they
will
not
prove
fruitless
and
chimerical
,
as
many
others
,
that
are
more
puzling
than
serviceable
.
And
though
they
should
not
be
as
useful
as
we
could
wish
,
yet
the
Time
that
shall
be
bestowed
upon
their
Reading
will
not
be
entirely
lost
,
since
this
will
afford
us
a
fuller
Knowledge
of
the
Nature
of
the
Mind
.
The
Modifications
of
the
Soul
have
Three
Causes
,
the
Senses
,
the
Imaginations
,
and
the
Passions
:
For
every
one
experimentally
knows
,
that
Pain
and
Pleasure
,
and
all
other
strong
Sensations
,
lively
Imaginations
,
and
vehement
Passions
,
take
up
the
Mind
so
much
as
to
make
it
incapable
of
Attention
,
at
the
time
they
too
vigorously
affect
it
;
because
they
fill
,
as
I
may
say
,
its
whole
Capacity
,
or
Faculty
of
Perceiving
.
And
even
when
those
Modifications
are
moderate
,
they
still
divide
its
Capacity
in
some
sort
;
so
that
it
cannot
give
up
it self
wholly
to
the
Consideration
of
abstracted
Truths
.
Thence
we
must
draw
this
important
Conclusion
,
That
those
that
will
earnestly
apply
themselves
to
search
after
Truth
,
must
carefully
,
and
as
far
as
possible
,
avoid
all
the
Sensations
that
are
too
lively
,
as
a
great
Noise
,
a
bright
Light
,
Pleasure
,
Pain
,
&c.
That
they
must
incessantly
watch
over
the
Purity
of
their
Imagination
,
lest
deep
Traces
should
be
imprinted
on
their
Brain
,
which
would
continually
disturb
,
and
,
as
it
were
,
dissolve
the
Mind
;
and
that
they
must
above
all
stop
the
Motions
of
the
Passions
,
which
make
so
powerful
an
Impression
on
the
Body
and
Soul
,
that
it
is
for
the
most
part
impossible
the
Mind
should
think
upon
any
thing
else
.
For
though
the
pure
Ideas
of
Truth
are
always
present
,
yet
they
cannot
be
attended
to
,
while
the
whole
Reach
and
Compass
of
our
Thoughts
are
charg'd
with
these
penetrating
Modifications
.
However
,
as
it
is
not
possible
that
the
Soul
should
be
free
of
Passion
,
Sensation
,
or
any
other
particular
Modification
,
we
must
make
a
Vertue
of
Necessity
,
and
endeavour
to
draw
,
from
those
very
Modifications
,
such
Succours
as
can
make
us
more
attentive
:
But
the
Use
of
them
requires
great
Skill
and
Circumspection
,
if
we
desire
to
make
an
Advantage
of
them
;
and
we
must
carefully
examine
how
far
we
have
occasion
for
them
,
that
we
may
use
them
only
when
the
necessity
of
being
attentive
compels
us
to
it
.
CHAP.
III.
Of
the
Vse
that
can
be
made
of
the
Passions
and
Senses
,
to
preserve
the
Attention
of
the
Mind
.
THE
Passions
that
may
successfully
incite
us
to
the
Enquiry
after
Truth
,
are
those
that
afford
Strength
and
Courage
to
overcome
the
trouble
of
rendring
our selves
attentive
:
There
are
some
good
,
and
others
bad
;
the
Good
are
such
as
the
Desire
of
finding
out
the
Truth
,
of
getting
so
much
Light
as
to
conduct
our selves
,
and
be
useful
to
our
Neighbours
,
and
the
like
;
the
Bad
,
or
Dangerous
are
,
the
Desire
of
getting
Fame
,
of
making
Establishments
,
of
rising
above
our
Fellows
,
and
others
yet
more
corrupted
,
of
which
we
need
not
speak
.
In
our
present
unhappy
State
,
it
often
happens
,
that
the
least
rational
Passions
are
the
most
inciting
to
the
Enquiry
after
Truth
,
and
are
more
pleasant
Consolations
in
all
the
Troubles
we
are
at
to
discover
it
,
than
such
as
are
juster
,
and
more
reasonable
:
For
Instance
,
Vanity
moves
us
much
more
than
the
Love
of
Truth
;
and
we
see
every
day
such
Persons
as
are
extraordinarily
given
to
study
,
as
long
as
they
find
Men
before
whom
they
can
boast
of
their
Learning
;
whereas
they
entirely
forsake
it
,
when
they
meet
with
no
body
more
to
listen
to
them
.
The
confused
Prospect
of
the
Glory
that
surrounds
them
when
they
vend
their
Opinions
,
bears
up
their
Courage
in
the
most
fruitless
and
tedious
Studies
:
But
if
either
by
Chance
,
or
the
Necessity
of
their
Affairs
,
they
come
to
be
taken
off
from
that
little
Flock
of
Applauders
,
their
Heat
presently
cools
,
the
most
solid
Studies
are
no
longer
alluring
;
Distaste
,
Tediousness
and
Moro●eness
overtake
them
,
and
make
them
forsake
all
.
Vanity
did
triumph
over
their
natural
Laziness
,
but
now
Laziness
triumphs
over
the
Love
of
Truth
;
for
Vanity
may
sometimes
resist
Laziness
,
but
Laziness
commonly
proves
too
strong
and
powerful
for
the
Love
of
Truth
.
However
,
as
the
Passion
for
Glory
may
be
referr'd
to
a
good
End
,
as
,
to
the
Glory
of
God
,
the
publick
Use
,
the
Preservation
of
our
good
Name
;
some
Persons
may
perhaps
be
allow'd
,
in
some
cer●ain
Cases
,
to
make
use
of
that
Passion
,
as
a
powerful
Help
to
make
the
Mind
more
attentive
.
But
Care
must
be
taken
to
use
it
only
when
the
reasonable
Passions
,
whereof
mention
has
been
made
,
are
not
sufficient
,
and
that
our
Duty
engages
us
to
apply
our selves
to
Subjects
that
are
very
disgusting
;
First
,
because
that
Passion
is
very
dangerous
to
the
Conscience
;
Secondly
,
because
it
insensibly
draws
us
into
ill
Studies
,
that
have
more
Lustre
than
Use
or
Truth
in
them
;
and
Lastly
,
because
it
is
very
difficult
to
moderate
it
,
and
that
we
often
become
its
Fool
and
Property
;
and
instead
of
enlightning
the
Mind
,
we
only
strengthen
the
Concupiscence
of
Pride
,
which
both
corrupts
our
Moral
Powers
,
and
darkens
our
Understanding
with
an
undissolvable
Obscurity
.
For
it
must
be
consider'd
how
That
Passion
insensibly
increases
,
settles
and
fortifies
it self
in
the
Heart
of
Man
;
and
when
it
is
too
violent
,
instead
of
helping
the
Mind
in
the
Search
of
Truth
,
it
strangely
blinds
it
,
and
even
persuades
it
that
Things
are
just
as
it
desires
they
should
be
.
Sure
it
is
,
there
would
not
be
so
many
false
Inventions
,
nor
imaginary
Discoveries
,
were
not
Men's
Heads
giddy'd
by
the
ardent
Desire
of
appearing
Inventors
.
For
the
firm
and
obstinate
Persuasion
wherein
several
Persons
have
been
to
have
found
,
for
Instance
,
the
Perpetual
Motion
,
the
Quadrature
of
the
Circle
,
the
Duplication
of
the
Cube
by
ordinary
Geometry
,
in
all
likelihood
proceeded
from
an
extraordinary
Desire
of
seeming
to
have
perform'd
what
others
have
vainly
attempted
.
And
therefore
't
is
fitter
to
excite
in
us
such
Passions
as
are
so
much
more
useful
to
our
searching
out
of
Truth
,
as
they
are
more
strong
,
and
wherein
the
Excess
is
not
to
be
fear'd
:
Such
are
the
Desires
of
making
a
good
Use
of
our
Mind
;
of
freeing
our selves
from
Prejudices
and
Errours
;
of
getting
a
sufficient
Light
to
behave
our selves
in
our
Condition
;
and
such
others
as
neither
engage
us
into
fruitless
Studies
,
nor
carry
us
on
to
rash
and
inconsiderate
Judgments
.
When
we
have
begun
to
taste
the
pleasure
of
making
use
of
our
Mind
,
to
be
sensible
of
the
Profit
that
arises
from
it
,
have
freed
our selves
of
violent
Passions
,
and
have
disrelish'd
sensible
Pleasures
,
which
always
prove
the
Masters
of
,
or
rather
the
Tyrants
over
Reason
,
in
those
that
indiscreetly
give
up
themselves
to
them
;
we
need
not
other
Passions
,
but
such
as
we
have
spoken
of
,
to
become
attentive
upon
the
Subjects
on
which
we
desire
to
meditate
.
But
most
Men
are
not
in
that
Condition
;
they
have
neither
Taste
,
nor
Understanding
,
nor
Curiosity
for
any
thing
but
what
affects
the
Senses
;
their
Imagination
is
corrupted
by
an
almost
infinite
Number
of
deep
Traces
,
which
raise
none
but
false
Ideas
;
and
as
they
depend
upon
all
the
Objects
that
resort
to
the
Senses
and
Imagination
,
so
they
always
judge
by
the
Impression
they
receive
from
them
;
that
is
,
with
reference
to
themselves
.
Pride
,
Debauchery
,
the
various
Engagements
,
the
restless
Desires
of
Advancement
,
which
are
so
common
amongst
the
Men
of
the
World
,
darken
the
Sight
of
Truth
,
and
stifle
in
them
the
Sense
of
Piety
;
because
they
separate
them
from
God
,
who
alone
is
able
to
enlighten
,
as
he
alone
is
able
to
govern
us
.
For
we
cannot
increase
our
Union
with
sensible
Things
,
without
diminishing
that
which
we
have
with
intellectual
Truth
,
since
we
cannot
be
at
the
same
time
strictly
united
with
Things
so
different
and
opposite
.
Those
whose
Imagination
is
pure
and
chaste
,
that
is
,
whose
Brain
is
not
fill'd
up
with
deep
Traces
,
that
fasten
them
to
visible
Things
,
may
easily
unite
themselves
to
God
,
listen
attentively
to
the
Truth
that
speaks
to
them
,
and
even
forbear
the
Use
of
the
most
just
and
rational
Passions
.
But
as
to
those
that
live
amongst
the
Great
,
who
depend
upon
too
many
things
,
and
whose
Imagination
is
soil'd
by
the
false
and
obscure
Ideas
of
sensible
Objects
,
they
cannot
apply
themselves
to
the
Truth
,
unless
they
be
born
up
by
some
Passion
,
strong
enough
to
countervail
the
Weight
of
the
Body
,
that
carries
them
down
;
and
to
imprint
Traces
on
their
Brain
,
that
may
make
a
Revulsion
upon
the
Animal
Spirits
.
However
,
as
every
Passion
can
only
by
it self
perplex
our
Ideas
,
they
ought
to
use
that
Help
but
so
far
as
Necessity
requires
;
and
all
Men
ought
to
study
themselves
,
that
they
may
proportionate
their
Passions
to
their
Weakness
.
It
is
no
hard
matter
to
find
a
Method
of
raising
in
us
such
Passions
as
we
desire
,
since
the
Knowledge
we
have
given
in
the
foregoing
Books
of
the
Union
betwixt
Soul
and
Body
has
sufficiently
open'd
the
way
to
it
:
In
a
word
,
no
more
is
requir'd
,
than
to
think
attentively
upon
those
Objects
,
that
by
the
Institution
of
Nature
are
able
to
raise
the
Passions
.
Thus
we
may
almost
at
any
time
excite
in
our
Hearts
whatever
Passion
we
have
occasion
for
;
but
because
we
can
easier
excite
them
at
any
time
than
suppress
them
,
or
remedy
the
Disorders
they
cause
in
the
Imagination
,
we
must
be
very
sober
and
cautious
in
employing
them
.
Above
all
,
we
must
take
care
not
to
judge
of
Things
by
Passion
,
but
only
by
the
clear
Sight
of
the
Truth
,
which
is
almost
impossible
when
the
Passions
are
somewhat
lively
;
they
ought
only
to
raise
our
Attention
,
but
they
never
fail
of
stirring
up
their
proper
Ideas
,
and
violently
driving
the
Will
to
judge
of
Things
by
those
Ideas
that
affect
it
,
rather
than
by
the
pure
and
abstracted
Ideas
of
Truth
,
that
make
no
Impression
upon
it
:
So
that
we
often
make
Judgments
which
last
no
longer
than
the
Passion
,
because
they
are
not
produced
by
the
clear
Sight
of
the
immutable
Truth
,
but
by
the
Circulation
of
the
Blood
.
True
it
is
that
Men
are
wonderfully
obstinate
in
some
Errours
,
which
they
maintain
as
long
as
they
live
;
but
then
those
Errours
have
other
Causes
than
the
Passions
,
or
at
least
depend
on
such
as
are
permanent
and
lasting
,
proceeding
from
the
Constitution
of
the
Body
,
from
Interest
,
or
from
some
other
durable
Cause
.
For
Instance
;
Interest
being
a
Motive
of
a
continual
standing
,
produces
a
Passion
that
never
dies
;
and
the
Judgments
that
arise
from
it
are
very
long
liv'd
.
But
all
the
other
Sentiments
of
Men
,
which
depend
upon
particular
Passions
,
are
as
inconstant
as
the
Fermentation
of
their
Humours
:
They
say
one
while
this
,
another
while
that
;
and
yet
what
they
say
is
commonly
conformable
to
what
they
think
:
And
as
they
run
from
one
counterfeit
Good
to
another
,
by
the
Motion
of
their
Passion
,
and
are
disgusted
at
it
when
that
Motion
ceases
;
so
they
run
from
one
false
System
into
another
,
and
ardently
assert
a
false
Opinion
,
when
Passion
makes
it
probable
;
which
,
the
Passion
ebbing
,
they
afterwards
forsake
.
By
their
Passions
they
taste
of
every
Good
,
without
finding
any
really
so
;
and
by
the
same
Passions
see
all
Truths
,
without
discovering
any
thing
absolutely
true
;
though
in
the
time
of
their
Passion
,
what
they
taste
seems
to
them
the
Sovereign
God
,
and
what
they
see
an
undeniable
Truth
.
The
Senses
are
the
second
Spring
,
whence
we
can
draw
Succours
to
make
the
Mind
attentive
.
Sensations
are
the
very
Modifications
of
the
Soul
,
and
differ
from
the
pure
Ideas
of
the
Mind
;
the
former
raising
a
much
stronger
Attention
than
the
latter
.
So
that
't
is
plain
,
that
to
supply
the
want
of
Application
to
insensible
Truths
,
it
may
be
fit
to
express
them
in
a
sensible
and
moving
manner
.
'T
is
for
that
Reason
,
that
Geometricians
express
by
sensible
Lines
,
the
Proportions
that
are
betwixt
several
Magnitudes
;
for
by
drawing
Lines
upon
Paper
,
they
draw
,
as
I
may
say
,
answerable
Ideas
upon
their
Mind
,
and
make
them
more
familiar
by
Seeing
them
at
the
same
time
that
they
Conceive
them
.
Thus
several
very
difficult
Things
may
be
taught
to
Children
,
though
they
be
not
susceptible
of
abstracted
Truths
,
by
reason
of
the
Nicety
of
the
Fibres
of
their
Brain
:
Their
Eyes
see
nothing
but
Colours
,
Pictures
,
Images
;
but
their
Mind
considers
the
Ideas
that
answer
those
sensible
Objects
.
But
we
must
take
a
special
Care
not
to
over-shadow
the
Objects
which
we
will
consider
or
represent
to
others
,
with
so
much
Sensibility
,
that
the
Mind
should
be
more
taken
up
with
it
,
than
with
the
Truth
it self
,
which
is
a
most
considerable
and
common
Fault
;
for
we
meet
every
day
with
Men
that
apply
themselves
only
to
what
moves
the
Senses
,
and
express
themselves
in
such
a
sensible
manner
,
that
Truth
is
as
stifled
under
a
vain
and
pompous
Apparel
of
their
false
Eloquence
;
so
that
their
Hearers
,
being
more
affected
with
the
Measure
of
their
Periods
,
and
the
Motions
of
their
Figures
,
than
by
the
Reasons
they
alledge
,
give
way
to
be
persuaded
,
without
so
much
as
knowing
what
causes
their
Persuasion
,
or
what
they
are
persuaded
of
.
And
therefore
we
must
so
carefully
moderate
the
Sensibility
of
our
Expressions
,
as
only
just
to
make
the
Mind
attentive
.
There
is
nothing
more
beautiful
than
Truth
;
neither
can
we
pretend
to
make
it
handsomer
,
by
daubing
it
with
sensible
Colours
,
that
have
no
Solidity
in
them
,
and
are
pleasing
but
a
short
time
.
We
might
perhaps
make
it
more
fine
and
delicate
,
but
should
enerve
and
emasculate
it
:
So
that
we
ought
not
to
set
it
off
with
so
much
Lustre
and
Brightness
,
that
the
Mind
be
more
taken
up
with
the
Ornaments
,
than
with
the
Body
it self
;
this
being
to
deal
with
it
as
some
Persons
do
with
themselves
,
when
loaded
with
such
abundance
of
Gold
and
precious
Stones
,
they
appear
the
least
considerable
part
of
the
whole
which
they
make
up
with
their
Clothes
.
We
must
dress
the
Truth
as
are
those
Magistrates
of
Venice
,
who
are
oblig'd
to
wear
a
plain
Gown
and
a
Cap
,
to
distinguish
them
from
the
Commonalty
;
that
Men
may
look
on
their
Faces
with
Reverence
and
Attention
,
without
admiring
their
Apparel
.
Lastly
,
We
must
take
care
not
to
surcharge
it
with
too
great
a
Retinue
of
delightful
Things
,
that
dissipate
the
Mind
,
and
obstruct
its
View
,
lest
we
should
give
to
any
thing
else
the
Honours
due
to
it
:
As
it
often
happens
to
Princes
,
who
cannot
be
distinguish'd
amongst
the
great
Number
of
their
Courtiers
and
Attendants
,
who
assume
to
themselves
that
Air
of
Greatness
,
and
Majestical
Countenance
,
which
only
becomes
the
Sovereigns
themselves
.
But
to
give
a
more
considerable
Instance
,
I
say
,
that
Truth
must
be
proposed
to
others
,
as
it
manifests
it self
.
The
Sight
of
Men
,
since
the
Fall
of
their
Fore-fathers
,
is
too
weak
to
look
on
Truth
it self
,
and
therefore
Sovereign
Truth
has
made
it self
sensible
by
coming
invested
with
our
Humanity
,
that
it
might
attract
our
Thoughts
,
enlighten
our
Mind
,
and
appear
lovely
to
our
Eyes
.
So
we
may
,
according
to
that
Pattern
,
adorn
with
something
sensible
the
Truths
we
endeavour
to
understand
our selves
,
and
to
teach
others
,
that
we
may
fix
the
Mind
upon
them
,
which
loves
what
is
sensible
,
and
is
not
easily
delighted
by
Things
that
flatter
not
the
Senses
.
The
Eternal
Wisdom
has
made
it self
sensible
,
but
not
glittering
and
pompous
;
becoming
sensible
,
not
to
fasten
us
to
what
is
sensible
,
but
to
raise
us
to
what
is
intellectual
,
and
to
condemn
and
sacrifice
Sensibility
in
his
own
Person
.
So
we
must
make
use
,
in
the
Knowledge
of
Truth
,
of
something
sensible
,
but
not
too
splendid
;
that
cannot
indear
too
much
the
sensible
Object
,
but
only
keep
open
the
Eye
of
our
Mind
in
the
Contemplation
of
mere
intellectual
Truths
:
Such
Sensibility
should
be
employ'd
,
as
we
may
dissipate
,
annihilate
,
and
willingly
sacrifice
upon
the
Sight
of
the
Truth
,
to
which
it
has
conducted
us
.
The
Eternal
Wisdom
has
offer'd
it self
to
us
from
without
,
in
a
sensible
manner
,
not
to
keep
us
abroad
,
but
that
we
may
retire
within
our selves
,
and
that
the
Inner
Man
might
intellectually
consider
it
:
So
we
must
,
in
our
Search
of
Truth
,
make
use
of
something
sensible
,
which
may
not
keep
us
abroad
gazing
on
its
Lustre
,
but
make
us
enter
into
our selves
,
and
strengthen
our
Attention
and
Union
to
the
Eternal
Truth
,
which
only
is
able
to
rule
the
Mind
,
and
enlighten
it
upon
any
Subject
whatsoever
.
CHAP.
IV.
Of
the
Vse
of
Imagination
to
make
the
Mind
attentive
,
and
especially
of
the
Vsefulness
of
Geometry
.
WE
had
need
be
very
circumspect
and
cautious
in
the
Choice
and
Use
of
those
Helps
that
we
may
draw
from
our
Senses
and
Passions
,
to
become
attentive
to
the
Truth
;
because
our
Senses
and
Passions
too
vividly
affect
us
,
and
so
much
fill
up
the
Capacity
of
the
Mind
,
that
it
often
sees
nothing
but
its
own
Sensations
,
when
it
proposes
to
discover
Things
in
their
own
Nature
.
But
as
to
those
Succours
which
our
Imagination
may
afford
us
,
they
make
the
Mind
attentive
,
without
fruitlesly
dividing
its
Capacity
,
and
wonderfully
help
us
to
a
clear
and
distinct
Perception
of
Objects
;
so
that
they
are
for
the
most
part
very
useful
,
as
will
be
made
plain
by
some
Instances
.
We
know
that
a
Body
is
moved
by
two
or
several
different
Causes
,
towards
two
or
several
different
Places
,
whereunto
it
is
equally
or
unequally
driven
by
these
Forces
;
that
the
Force
of
the
Motion
perpetually
increases
or
decreases
,
according
to
some
known
Proportion
.
We
are
asked
what
way
that
Body
goes
,
in
what
place
it
shall
be
at
such
or
such
a
Moment
,
with
what
degree
of
Celerity
it
shall
be
endued
when
't
is
come
to
such
a
place
;
and
other
like
Questions
.
2.
But
if
the
Force
that
moves
it
towards
B
be
equal
to
that
which
moves
it
towards
C
,
then
divide
the
Lines
AB
and
AC
into
the
parts
1
,
2
,
3
,
4.
I
,
II
,
III
,
IV
,
equally
distant
from
A
:
If
the
Force
that
moves
it
towards
B
be
double
of
that
which
moves
it
towards
C
,
take
in
the
Line
AB
Parts
that
are
double
of
those
that
you
cut
in
AC
:
If
that
Force
be
subduple
,
take
them
subduple
;
if
it
be
thrice
greater
or
lesser
,
cut
them
likewise
thrice
greater
or
lesser
;
and
so
proportionably
.
The
Divisions
of
those
Lines
will
represent
to
the
Imagination
the
different
Degrees
of
those
moving
Forces
,
and
withal
,
the
Space
that
they
shall
cause
the
Body
to
run
over
.
First
,
That
Line
AXYE
expresses
the
true
Degrees
of
the
compound
Motion
:
For
we
sensibly
perceive
,
that
if
each
of
the
Forces
which
produce
it
can
promote
the
Body
a
Foot
in
a
Minute
,
its
composed
Motion
will
be
of
two
Foot
in
a
Minute
,
if
both
moving
Forces
do
perfectly
agree
;
since
in
that
Case
it
is
enough
to
add
AB
to
AC
.
But
if
those
Forces
are
not
altogether
equal
,
the
composed
Motion
AE
will
be
greater
than
one
of
the
Compoundings
,
AB
or
AC
,
by
the
Line
YE
:
Whereas
if
those
Motions
be
opposite
in
any
thing
,
the
composed
will
be
lesser
than
either
of
the
compounding
,
by
the
Line
YE
;
and
if
they
be
entirely
opposite
,
it
will
come
to
nothing
.
Secondly
,
The
Line
AXYE
represents
to
the
Imagination
the
Way
which
that
Body
shall
go
:
For
we
sensibly
perceive
in
what
Proportion
it
shall
advance
more
to
one
than
to
the
other
side
.
We
likewise
perceive
,
that
all
the
compound
Motions
are
direct
,
when
each
of
the
compounding
is
always
the
same
,
though
they
be
unequal
betwixt
themselves
;
or
when
the
Compoundings
are
always
equal
betwixt
themselves
,
though
they
be
not
constantly
the
same
.
Lastly
,
It
plainly
appears
,
that
the
Lines
described
by
those
Motions
are
crooked
,
when
the
Compounding
are
both
unequal
to
each
other
,
and
not
always
the
same
.
For
Instance
:
After
what
has
been
said
,
it
is
enough
only
to
know
,
that
a
Body
that
was
in
A
at
such
a
time
,
is
in
E
at
such
another
;
and
that
the
different
Forces
that
drive
it
,
describe
Lines
that
make
such
an
Angle
as
BAC
,
to
discover
the
Line
of
its
composed
Motion
,
and
the
different
Degrees
of
Celerity
of
the
simple
Motions
;
provided
we
know
that
those
Motions
are
equal
or
uniform
to
each
other
.
For
when
we
have
two
Points
of
a
Right
Line
,
we
have
it
entire
,
and
we
can
compare
the
Right
Line
AE
,
or
the
composed
Motion
that
is
known
,
with
the
Lines
AB
,
and
AC
,
that
is
,
with
the
simple
Motions
that
are
unknown
.
Now
let
us
afresh
suppose
a
Stone
driven
from
A
to
B
,
by
an
uniform
Motion
,
but
descending
towards
E
with
an
unequal
,
like
to
that
which
ponderous
Bodies
are
thought
generally
to
tend
to
the
Centre
of
the
Earth
,
according
to
the
common
Opinion
;
that
is
to
say
,
let
the
Spaces
which
it
passes
over
be
amongst
themselves
as
the
Squares
of
the
Times
in
which
it
passes
them
over
;
the
Line
which
it
shall
describe
will
be
a
Parabola
,
and
the
Point
in
which
the
Stone
shall
be
at
every
Moment
of
its
Motion
,
may
be
determined
with
the
utmost
Nicety
and
Exactness
.
For
,
if
at
the
first
Moment
that
Body
falls
Two
Foot
from
A
towards
C
,
in
the
second
Six
,
in
the
third
Ten
,
in
the
fourth
Fourteen
,
and
that
it
be
driven
by
an
uniform
Motion
from
A
towards
B
,
which
is
Sixteen
Foot
in
length
;
't
is
evident
,
that
the
Line
which
that
Body
describes
is
a
Parabola
,
whose
Parameter
is
Eight
Foot
long
;
because
the
Square
of
the
Lines
that
are
applied
the
Diameter
,
which
Lines
mark
the
Times
,
and
the
regular
Motion
of
A
towards
B
,
is
equal
to
the
Rectangle
of
the
Parameter
,
through
the
Lines
that
mark
the
unequal
and
accelerated
Motions
;
so
that
the
Squares
of
the
applied
Lines
,
or
the
Squares
of
the
Times
,
will
be
amongst
themselves
,
as
the
Parts
of
the
Diameter
contained
betwixt
the
Pole
and
the
applied
Lines
.
16
:
64
:
:
2
:
8
64
:
144
:
:
8
:
18
,
&c.
The
bare
looking
on
the
sixth
Figure
is
sufficient
to
persuade
us
of
all
this
;
for
the
Semicircles
shew
that
A2
is
to
A4
,
that
is
,
to
the
applied
Line
2X
,
its
equal
,
as
2X
is
to
A8
:
That
A18
is
to
A12
,
that
is
,
to
the
applied
Line
18X
,
as
18X
is
to
A8
,
&c.
And
therefore
,
that
the
Rectangles
A2
by
A8
,
and
A18
by
A8
,
are
equal
to
the
Squares
of
2X
and
18X
,
&c.
and
consequently
those
Squares
have
the
same
Proportion
to
each
other
,
as
those
Rectangles
.
The
Parallels
upon
AB
and
AC
,
which
cut
each
other
at
the
Points
XXX
,
do
also
sensibly
shew
the
Way
of
that
Body
,
and
the
Places
in
which
it
must
be
at
such
a
time
.
Lastly
,
They
represent
to
the
Eyes
the
true
Degrees
of
the
composed
Motion
,
and
of
its
Acceleration
,
in
any
determinate
Time
.
Let
's
suppose
again
a
Body
moving
from
A
towards
B
and
C
,
but
unequally
on
both
sides
.
If
that
Inequality
be
always
and
every
where
alike
,
or
if
it
either
encreases
or
diminishes
in
the
same
proportion
,
the
Line
which
it
shall
describe
will
be
a
Right
.
And
though
there
should
be
an
Inequality
,
either
in
the
Augmentation
or
Diminution
of
the
simple
Motions
,
whatever
that
Inequality
be
,
it
will
not
be
hard
to
find
the
Line
that
represents
to
the
Imagination
the
Motion
composed
of
the
simple
Motions
,
if
you
express
those
Motions
by
Lines
,
and
draw
to
these
Lines
Parallels
cutting
each
other
:
For
,
the
Line
that
shall
pass
through
all
the
Intersections
of
those
Parallels
,
will
represent
the
Motion
composed
of
those
Motions
that
are
unequal
,
and
unequally
increased
or
diminished
.
If
we
desire
exactly
to
know
how
long
a
Body
has
been
in
coming
to
such
a
Point
,
from
its
setting
out
;
the
Parallels
drawn
from
the
Point
upon
AB
,
or
AC
,
will
shew
it
;
for
the
Divisions
of
AB
,
and
AC
,
mark
the
Time
.
And
likewise
,
if
we
desire
to
know
the
Place
to
which
a
Body
shall
arrive
within
some
certain
Time
,
the
Parallels
drawn
from
the
Divisions
of
the
Lines
AB
and
AC
,
that
represent
the
Time
,
will
,
by
their
Intersection
,
shew
us
the
Point
we
seek
for
.
As
to
its
Distance
from
the
Term
whence
it
has
begun
to
move
,
it
will
always
be
easie
to
know
it
,
by
drawing
a
Line
from
that
Point
towards
A
;
for
the
Length
of
that
Line
will
be
known
,
by
comparing
it
either
to
AB
or
AC
,
which
are
known
.
But
as
to
the
Length
of
the
Way
through
which
that
Body
has
run
,
in
advancing
to
this
Point
,
it
will
still
be
hard
to
discover
it
;
because
AE
,
the
Line
of
its
Motion
,
being
crooked
,
cannot
be
compared
with
either
of
those
Right
Lines
.
If
you
would
determine
the
infinite
Points
through
which
that
Body
must
pass
,
that
is
,
nicely
describe
,
and
by
a
continual
Motion
,
the
Line
AE
,
you
had
need
make
a
Pair
of
Compasses
that
should
move
according
to
all
the
Conditions
express'd
in
the
Suppositions
that
have
been
mentioned
;
which
would
be
very
difficult
to
invent
,
and
impossible
to
perform
,
and
almost
unprofitable
,
to
discover
the
Relations
of
Things
betwixt
themselves
;
since
commonly
we
need
not
all
the
Points
of
which
a
Line
is
composed
,
but
only
some
,
to
help
the
Imagining
Faculty
,
when
it
considers
those
Motions
.
Those
Instances
are
sufficient
to
shew
,
that
we
may
by
Lines
express
and
represent
to
the
Imagination
most
of
our
Ideas
;
and
that
Geometry
,
which
teaches
to
compare
those
Lines
,
and
thereby
know
their
several
Relations
,
is
of
a
greater
use
and
extent
than
is
commonly
supposed
.
For
,
Astronomy
,
Musick
,
Mechanicks
,
and
generally
all
the
Sciences
,
whose
Objects
are
susceptible
of
more
or
less
,
and
may
be
consider'd
under
the
Notion
of
extended
,
that
is
to
say
,
all
accurate
Sciences
,
may
be
referr'd
to
Geometry
;
because
all
Speculative
Truths
,
consisting
in
the
Relations
of
things
,
or
in
Relations
betwixt
their
Relations
,
they
may
all
be
referr'd
to
Lines
;
Geometrical
Consequences
may
be
drawn
from
them
;
and
when
those
Consequences
are
made
sensible
by
Lines
,
't
is
almost
impossible
to
mistake
.
Thus
may
Sciences
be
carried
very
far
with
great
easiness
.
For
Instance
,
The
Reason
why
we
distinctly
know
,
and
precisely
mark
an
Octave
,
a
Fifth
,
a
Fourth
in
Musick
,
is
that
the
Sounds
are
expressed
by
Strings
exactly
divided
;
and
that
we
know
that
the
String
which
sounds
an
Octave
is
in
double
proportion
with
that
from
whence
the
Octave
rises
;
that
a
Fifth
is
with
it
in
a
Sesquialter
Proportion
,
or
as
3
to
2
,
and
so
of
the
rest
.
For
the
Ear
alone
cannot
judge
of
Sounds
,
with
so
much
nicety
and
accuracy
as
a
Science
requires
.
The
most
skilful
Practitioners
,
the
most
delicate
and
nicest
Ears
are
not
sensible
enough
to
observe
the
difference
betwixt
certain
Sounds
,
and
judging
of
things
by
the
Sensation
they
have
of
them
,
fasly
imagine
that
there
's
none
at
all
.
Some
cannot
distinguish
betwixt
an
Octave
and
3
thirds
,
others
fancy
that
the
Major
Tone
differs
not
from
the
Minor
;
so
that
the
Comma
,
which
is
their
Difference
,
is
insensible
to
them
,
and
much
more
the
Schisma
,
which
is
but
the
half
of
the
Comma
.
And
therefore
,
't
is
Reason
alone
that
manifestly
shews
us
,
that
the
space
of
the
String
which
makes
the
Difference
betwixt
certain
Sounds
,
being
divisible
into
several
parts
,
there
may
still
be
a
great
number
of
different
Sounds
,
very
usefull
for
Musick
,
which
the
Ear
cannot
distinguish
.
Whence
it
plainly
appears
,
that
without
Arithmetick
and
Geometry
,
we
should
have
no
exact
and
regular
Knowledge
of
Musick
;
neither
could
we
succeed
in
that
Science
but
by
Chance
and
Imagination
,
and
so
Musick
would
cease
from
being
a
Science
,
grounded
upon
undeniable
Demonstrations
.
In
the
mean
while
it
must
be
granted
,
that
the
Songs
which
owe
their
birth
to
the
strength
of
Imagination
,
are
,
for
the
most
part
,
finer
and
more
pleasant
to
the
Senses
,
than
those
that
are
composed
by
Rule
.
And
likewise
in
Mechanicks
,
the
Heaviness
of
a
Body
,
and
the
Distance
of
the
Centre
of
Heaviness
from
its
Prop
,
being
capable
of
more
of
less
,
both
may
be
figured
by
Lines
:
So
that
Geometry
is
usefull
to
discover
and
demonstrate
an
infinite
number
of
new
Inventions
,
very
convenient
to
this
Life
,
and
pleasing
to
the
Mind
,
because
of
their
Evidence
.
For
Instance
,
If
a
Weight
of
six
pounds
is
to
be
put
in
aequilibrium
with
one
of
three
,
let
that
Weight
of
six
pound
hang
on
the
Arm
of
a
Balance
,
at
two
Foot
distance
from
the
Prop:
then
only
knowing
this
general
Principle
of
all
Mechanicks
,
That
Weights
to
stand
in
aequilibrium
,
must
be
in
a
reciprocal
Proportion
with
their
Distances
from
the
Prop
;
(
that
is
,
That
one
Weight
must
be
to
the
other
,
as
the
Distance
betwixt
the
last
Weight
and
the
Prop
is
to
the
Distance
of
the
first
Weight
from
the
said
Prop
;
)
it
will
be
easie
to
find
out
by
Geometry
,
what
must
be
the
Distance
of
a
Weight
of
Three
pounds
,
that
all
may
remain
in
aequilibrio
;
if
you
find
by
the
Twelfth
Proposition
of
the
Sixth
Book
of
Euclid
,
a
fourth
proportional
Line
,
which
here
will
be
of
four
Foot
.
So
that
you
may
plainly
discover
all
the
Truths
that
depend
upon
that
fundamental
Principle
of
Mechanicks
,
(
when
once
known
,
)
by
the
use
of
Geometry
;
that
is
,
by
representing
with
Lines
whatever
can
be
considered
in
Mechanicks
.
Geometrical
Lines
and
Figures
are
therefore
most
proper
to
represent
to
the
Imagination
,
the
Relations
betwixt
Magnitudes
,
or
betwixt
things
that
differ
in
degree
of
more
and
less
,
as
Spaces
,
Times
,
Weights
,
&c.
as
well
because
they
are
most
simple
Objects
,
as
that
they
are
imagin'd
with
great
easiness
.
It
may
even
be
said
,
to
the
Honour
of
Geometry
,
That
Lines
can
represent
to
the
Imagination
more
things
than
the
Mind
can
know
.
Since
Lines
can
express
the
Relations
of
incommensurable
Magnitudes
,
that
is
,
such
Relations
as
cannot
be
known
,
because
there
is
no
common
Measure
to
compare
them
together
.
But
that
Advantage
is
not
very
considerable
,
as
to
the
Search
after
Truth
;
because
those
sensible
Representations
of
incommensurable
Magnitudes
,
discover
nothing
to
the
Mind
.
Geometry
is
therefore
exceedingly
useful
,
to
make
the
Mind
attentive
to
those
things
,
whose
Relations
we
desire
to
discover
:
However
it
must
be
granted
,
that
it
is
sometimes
an
Occasion
of
Errour
,
because
the
evident
and
pleasant
Demonstrations
of
that
Science
,
takes
us
up
so
much
,
that
we
have
not
a
sufficient
Regard
for
the
Consideration
of
Nature
.
Thence
it
comes
,
that
the
new-invented
Engines
do
not
all
succeed
;
that
those
Musical
Composures
,
in
which
the
Proportions
of
Consonances
are
best
observed
,
are
not
always
the
most
grateful
;
and
that
the
most
accurate
Calculations
of
Astronomy
do
not
always
best
foretell
the
Incidence
and
Duration
of
Eclipses
.
Nature
is
not
abstracted
;
Levers
and
Wheels
,
in
Mechanicks
,
are
not
Mathematical
Lines
and
Circles
:
All
Men
are
not
pleased
with
the
same
Musical
Tunes
,
nor
even
the
same
Man
at
different
times
;
for
their
Satisfaction
proceeds
from
the
Commotions
of
their
Spirits
,
than
which
nothing
can
be
more
variable
.
And
as
to
Astronomy
,
the
Course
of
the
Planets
is
not
perfectly
regular
,
whilst
floating
in
the
vast
Spaces
they
are
irregularly
carried
by
the
fluid
Matter
that
surrounds
them
:
So
that
the
Errours
of
Astronomy
,
Musick
,
Mechanicks
,
and
all
Sciences
in
which
Geometry
is
used
,
are
not
to
be
ascribed
to
that
undoubted
Science
,
but
to
the
false
Application
that
is
made
of
it
.
For
Instance
,
we
suppose
that
Planets
,
by
their
Motion
,
describe
Circles
and
Ellipses
perfectly
regular
,
And
though
that
be
not
exactly
true
,
yet
w●
doe
well
to
suppose
it
so
,
that
we
may
draw
Inferences
from
thence
,
and
because
it
wants
but
little
of
being
true
;
but
we
must
still
remember
,
that
the
Principle
from
which
we
argue
is
a
Supposition
.
Likewise
in
Mechanicks
,
we
suppose
Wheels
and
Levers
perfectly
hard
without
gravity
and
rubbing
,
and
like
to
Mathematical
Lines
and
Circles
:
or
rather
,
we
have
not
a
sufficient
consideration
for
the
said
Gravity
and
rubbing
,
for
the
Nature
of
the
Matter
,
and
the
Relation
those
things
have
betwixt
them
.
We
mind
not
that
Hardness
and
Bulk
increase
Heaviness
;
Heaviness
fretting
,
whilst
fretting
diminishes
Force
,
and
causes
the
Engine
to
break
,
or
wears
it
out
very
quickly
:
So
that
what
often
succeeds
upon
a
small
portion
of
Matter
,
seldom
takes
effect
upon
a
great
Body
.
No
wonder
therefore
if
we
mistake
,
since
we
argue
from
Principles
not
fully
known
;
nor
yet
because
it
rids
us
not
of
all
Errours
,
must
we
imagine
Geometry
useless
.
It
makes
us
draw
from
our
Suppositions
very
true
and
consequential
Inferences
;
and
affords
us
an
evident
Knowledge
of
what
we
consider
,
by
making
us
attentive
.
We
can
even
discover
by
its
means
,
the
Falshood
of
our
Suppositions
;
for
being
certain
of
the
Truth
of
our
Reasonings
,
which
however
do
not
agree
with
Experience
,
we
discover
that
our
Principles
are
false
.
But
without
Geometry
and
Arithmetick
we
can
discover
nothing
,
that
is
somewhat
difficult
,
in
the
most
accurate
Sciences
,
though
we
argue
from
certain
and
undeniable
Principles
.
We
must
then
look
upon
Geometry
as
a
sort
of
universal
Science
,
which
opens
and
enlarges
the
Mind
,
makes
it
attentive
,
and
affords
it
so
much
Skill
as
to
regulate
its
Imagination
,
and
to
draw
from
it
all
the
possible
Succours
.
For
by
the
assistance
of
Geometry
,
the
Mind
regulates
the
Motion
of
the
Imagination
,
and
the
Imagination
regulated
keeps
up
the
View
and
Application
of
the
Mind
.
But
that
we
may
learn
to
make
a
good
use
of
Geometry
,
we
must
observe
that
all
the
things
that
fall
under
the
Imagination
,
are
not
as
easily
imaginable
one
as
the
other
;
since
all
the
Images
do
not
equally
fill
the
Capacity
of
the
Mind
.
'T
is
more
difficult
to
imagine
a
Solid
than
a
Plain
,
and
this
than
a
simple
Line
;
because
the
clear
perception
of
a
Solid
requires
a
greater
thought
than
that
of
a
Plain
,
and
a
Line
.
Even
Lines
differ
,
as
to
this
,
amongst
themselves
;
a
Parobolick
,
Elliptick
,
or
some
other
very
composed
Line
,
requires
more
thinking
,
that
is
,
takes
up
the
Mind
more
than
the
Figure
of
a
Circle
,
and
this
than
a
right
Line
;
because
't
is
harder
to
imagine
Lines
that
are
described
by
very
composed
Motions
,
and
have
several
different
Relations
,
than
those
that
are
drawn
by
Motions
very
simple
,
and
have
but
a
few
Relations
.
For
Relations
cannot
be
clearly
perceived
without
the
Attention
of
the
Mind
to
several
things
,
and
as
their
number
is
greater
,
so
must
the
thought
or
the
perception
be
more
extended
.
Hence
it
happens
,
that
there
are
Figures
so
much
composed
,
that
they
extend
beyond
the
reach
of
a
distinct
Imagination
;
whereas
others
may
be
imagin'd
with
great
facility
.
Amongst
the
three
sorts
of
Right-lined
Angles
,
viz.
the
acute
,
the
right
,
and
the
obtuse
,
none
but
the
Right
raises
a
very
distinct
and
determinate
Idea
.
For
as
there
are
an
Infinity
of
either
acute
or
obtuse
Angles
,
that
differ
all
from
one
another
;
so
we
can
imagine
nothing
nicely
nor
distinctly
,
when
we
imagine
an
acute
or
obtuse
Angle
.
But
we
cannot
be
mistaken
in
imagining
a
right
Angle
;
the
Idea
of
it
is
so
very
distinct
,
and
its
Image
which
it
raises
in
the
Brain
so
very
nea●
and
just
.
True
it
is
,
that
we
may
determine
the
general
and
indefinite
Idea
of
an
acute
Angle
to
the
particular
Idea
of
an
Angle
of
30
degrees
,
which
Idea
is
as
accurate
as
that
of
an
Angle
of
90
,
that
is
,
or
a
right
Angle
;
but
the
Image
of
it
,
which
we
may
endeavour
to
imprint
on
the
Brain
,
will
never
●e
so
very
exact
,
as
that
of
a
right
Angle
;
being
not
used
to
describe
that
Image
,
we
cannot
draw
it
but
by
thinking
on
a
Circle
,
or
on
the
determinate
Portion
of
a
Circle
divided
into
equal
Pa●●s
.
But
to
imagine
a
right
Angle
,
we
need
not
think
on
that
division
of
a
Circle
;
the
bare
Idea
of
a
Perpendicular
is
sufficient
for
the
Imagination
to
draw
the
Image
of
that
Angle
;
and
we
can
●●present
Perpendiculars
without
trouble
,
being
used
to
see
all
things
standing
upright
.
Hence
it
is
easie
to
judge
,
That
to
have
a
simple
,
distinct
,
and
well-determin'd
Object
,
apt
to
●e
easily
imagin'd
,
and
consequently
to
make
the
Mind
attentive
,
and
to
promote
its
Evidence
in
the
Truths
it
is
in
quest
of
;
we
must
reduce
all
the
Magnitudes
we
consider
to
plain
Superficies
,
termin'd
by
Lines
and
right
Angles
,
as
are
perfect
Squares
,
and
other
right
Angled
Figures
,
or
to
bare
right
Lines
;
for
these
are
the
Figures
whose
nature
is
the
most
easily
known
.
We
pretend
not
however
that
all
the
Subjects
of
our
Knowledge
and
Enquiry
,
may
be
represented
by
Geometrical
Lines
and
Figures
.
There
are
many
,
which
neither
can
nor
ought
to
be
brought
under
that
Rule
.
For
Instance
,
the
Knowledge
of
a
God
,
Allmighty
,
All-just
,
on
whom
all
things
depend
all
manner
of
ways
,
who
commands
his
Creatures
to
obey
his
Orders
,
that
they
may
be
capable
of
Happiness
;
that
Knowledge
,
I
say
,
is
the
Principle
of
all
Morality
,
and
of
an
infinite
number
of
certain
and
undoubted
Consequences
;
yet
neither
the
Principle
,
nor
the
Consequences
,
can
be
represented
by
Geometrical
Figures
.
Neither
is
it
possible
to
figure
and
represent
by
Lines
many
Notions
of
Natural
Philosophy
,
which
yet
may
evidently
discover
to
us
several
Truths
.
However
,
it
may
be
truly
said
,
that
an
Infinity
of
things
may
be
examin'd
and
learn'd
by
that
Geometrical
Method
;
which
is
ever
advantageously
imploy'd
,
since
it
accustoms
the
Mind
to
Attention
,
by
causing
it
to
make
a
regular
use
of
its
Imagination
;
and
that
things
which
are
learn'd
that
way
,
are
more
clearly
demonstrated
,
and
easier
retain'd
than
others
.
I
might
have
ascribed
to
the
Senses
,
the
Assistances
we
derive
from
Geometry
,
to
preserve
the
Attention
of
the
Mind
;
but
though
Lines
be
something
sensible
,
yet
,
I
thought
,
Geometry
belongs
rather
to
the
Imagination
,
than
to
the
Senses
.
It
would
be
unprofitable
to
set
down
my
Reasons
for
it
;
which
could
only
justifie
the
order
I
have
observed
in
this
Treatise
:
and
that
's
a
thing
not
very
material
to
our
purpose
.
I
have
not
yet
spoken
of
Arithmetick
and
Algebra
,
because
the
Cyphers
and
Letters
of
the
Alphabet
,
that
are
used
in
those
Sciences
,
are
not
so
serviceable
to
strengthen
the
Attention
of
the
Mind
as
to
encrea●e
its
Extent
,
as
we
shall
explain
it
in
the
following
Chapter
.
These
are
the
general
Helps
to
improve
the
Attention
of
the
Mind
:
I
know
of
no
other
,
besides
a
firm
Resolution
of
being
attentive
;
of
which
we
forbear
to
speak
,
because
we
suppose
it
in
those
that
give
up
themselves
to
study
.
There
are
,
however
,
some
others
particular
to
some
Persons
;
as
,
some
Meats
,
some
Drinks
,
some
Places
,
some
Dispositions
of
the
Body
,
and
the
like
;
which
every
one
must
learn
from
Experience
,
observing
the
State
of
his
Imagination
after
the
Meal
,
and
what
Things
best
preserve
,
or
most
dissipate
the
Attention
of
the
Mind
.
This
only
may
be
said
in
general
,
That
the
moderate
Use
of
such
Aliments
as
make
many
Animal
Spirits
,
is
very
fit
to
improve
the
Attention
of
the
Mind
,
and
the
Strength
of
the
Imagination
,
when
't
is
weak
and
languishing
.
CHAP.
V.
Of
the
Means
to
improve
the
Extent
and
Capacity
of
the
Mind
:
That
Arithmetick
and
Algebra
are
of
absolute
Necessity
to
it
.
WE
ought
not
hastily
to
imagine
,
that
the
Extent
and
Capacity
of
the
Mind
can
really
be
increased
.
The
Humane
Soul
is
,
if
I
may
so
speak
,
a
determined
Quantity
,
or
a
Portion
of
Thought
,
contained
within
some
certain
Bounds
,
which
she
cannot
pass
:
She
cannot
grow
greater
,
or
more
capacious
than
she
is
:
She
neither
swells
up
,
nor
dilates
,
as
't
is
commonly
believed
of
Liquors
and
Metals
;
and
perceives
never
more
at
one
time
,
than
another
.
This
,
I
confess
,
seems
contrary
to
Experience
;
since
sometimes
we
think
upon
many
Objects
,
and
sometimes
but
upon
one
;
and
even
we
often
suppose
,
that
we
think
upon
nothing
.
However
,
if
it
be
consider'd
,
that
Thought
is
to
the
Soul
,
what
Extension
is
to
Matter
;
it
will
plainly
appear
,
that
as
a
Body
cannot
truly
be
more
extended
at
one
time
than
another
,
so
,
if
we
conceive
it
right
,
the
Soul
cannot
think
more
at
one
time
than
another
;
whether
it
be
then
that
she
perceives
many
Objects
,
or
is
taken
up
with
one
,
or
even
when
she
is
said
to
think
upon
nothing
.
But
the
Reason
why
we
imagine
that
we
think
more
at
one
time
than
another
,
is
,
that
we
do
not
sufficiently
distinguish
betwixt
confused
and
distinct
Perceptions
.
More
Thought
is
doubtless
required
,
or
the
Capacity
of
Thinking
must
be
more
fill'd
,
distinctly
to
perceive
several
Objects
,
than
one
alone
;
but
we
need
not
more
Thought
,
to
perceive
many
Things
confusedly
,
than
one
alone
distinctly
.
Thus
the
Degrees
or
Quantity
of
Thought
is
equal
in
the
Soul
,
when
she
considers
many
Things
,
and
when
she
considers
only
one
:
For
,
when
she
is
taken
up
with
one
Thing
,
she
has
always
a
clearer
Idea
of
it
,
than
when
she
applies
her self
to
many
.
For
,
't
is
fit
to
be
observed
,
That
a
simple
Perception
sometimes
contains
as
much
Thought
,
or
fills
as
much
the
Thinking
Capacity
of
the
Mind
,
as
a
Judgment
,
and
even
a
composed
Reasoning
;
since
Experience
teaches
us
,
that
the
simple
but
lively
,
clear
,
and
evident
Perception
of
one
Thing
,
engages
our
Application
,
and
possesses
us
as
much
,
as
a
composed
Reasoning
,
or
the
ob●cure
and
confused
Perception
of
several
Relations
betwixt
many
Things
.
For
,
as
there
is
as
much
or
more
Sensation
in
the
sensible
Sight
of
an
Object
,
which
I
hold
near
my
Eyes
,
and
curiously
examine
;
than
in
the
Sight
of
a
spacious
Field
,
on
which
I
cast
a
negligent
and
careless
Eye
;
because
the
nearness
of
the
Sensation
of
the
Object
near
my
Eyes
,
makes
up
for
the
Extent
of
that
confused
Sensation
of
those
many
Things
which
I
slightly
and
unattentively
look
upon
in
a
Field
:
So
the
spiritual
Sight
the
Mind
hath
of
an
Object
,
is
often
so
lively
and
distinct
,
that
it
contains
as
much
and
more
Thought
,
than
the
View
of
the
Relations
betwixt
many
Things
.
True
it
is
,
that
at
some
certain
times
it
seems
to
us
as
though
we
thought
but
upon
one
Thing
,
which
yet
we
can
hardly
comprehend
;
whereas
at
other
times
we
comprehend
that
Thing
,
and
several
others
,
with
great
easiness
:
Thence
we
imagine
,
that
the
Soul
has
more
Extent
,
and
a
larger
Capacity
of
Thinking
,
at
one
time
,
than
at
another
.
But
our
Mistake
is
visible
;
for
the
Reason
why
at
some
certain
times
we
can
scarce
conceive
the
easiest
Things
,
proceeds
not
from
the
Capacity
of
the
Soul
's
being
straitned
or
impair'd
;
but
from
its
being
fill'd
with
some
lively
Sensation
of
Pain
or
Pleasure
,
or
with
a
great
number
of
weak
and
dark
Sensations
,
that
cause
a
sort
of
Giddiness
,
which
is
commonly
nothing
else
but
the
confused
Sensation
of
a
great
number
of
Things
.
A
Piece
of
Wax
is
susceptible
of
a
very
distinct
Figure
;
but
cannot
admit
two
,
without
a
Mixture
of
both
;
since
it
cannot
be
perfectly
round
and
square
at
the
same
time
:
and
if
one
should
pretend
to
give
it
a
Million
of
Figures
,
none
of
them
would
be
distinct
.
And
in
that
Case
,
supposing
that
Piece
of
Wax
capable
of
knowing
its
own
Figures
,
yet
it
could
not
tell
which
it
is
that
terminates
it
on
all
sides
,
the
number
would
be
so
great
.
It
is
even
so
with
our
Soul
,
when
a
very
great
number
of
Modifications
take
up
her
Capacity
;
she
can
perceive
none
distinctly
,
because
she
has
not
a
separate
Sensation
of
them
,
and
so
thinks
she
is
sensible
of
nothing
.
She
cannot
say
that
she
feels
Pain
,
Pleasure
,
Light
,
Sound
,
Savour
;
't
is
none
of
those
Qualities
,
and
yet
't
is
them
all
together
,
she
is
sensible
of
.
And
though
we
should
suppose
that
the
Soul
is
not
subject
to
the
confused
and
unruly
Motion
of
the
Animal
Spirits
,
and
so
free
from
the
Contagion
of
her
Body
,
as
to
have
her
Thoughts
altogether
independent
on
what
happens
in
it
;
yet
it
might
fall
out
that
we
should
easier
understand
some
Things
at
one
time
than
at
another
,
without
any
Enlargement
or
Diminution
in
the
Capacity
of
our
Soul
;
for
then
we
might
think
upon
particular
Objects
,
or
of
Being
indefinite
and
in
general
.
The
general
Idea
of
Infinite
is
inseparable
from
the
Mind
,
and
wholly
takes
up
its
Capacity
,
whenever
it
thinks
upon
no
particular
Thing
:
For
when
we
say
,
that
we
think
on
nothing
,
it
signifies
not
that
we
think
not
upon
that
general
Idea
,
but
only
that
our
Thoughts
are
not
applied
to
any
particular
Object
.
And
certainly
,
if
that
Idea
did
not
fill
our
Mind
,
we
could
not
think
,
as
we
do
,
upon
all
sorts
of
Things
;
since
we
cannot
think
upon
Objects
of
which
we
have
no
Knowledge
.
And
if
that
Idea
were
not
more
present
to
the
Mind
when
we
suppose
we
think
upon
nothing
,
than
when
we
are
busie
about
some
particular
Object
,
we
could
as
easily
think
upon
whatever
we
please
,
when
we
are
mightily
taken
up
with
some
particular
.
Truth
,
as
when
we
are
not
attentive
unto
any
thing
:
Which
is
repugnant
to
Experience
.
For
,
to
instance
,
when
we
are
strongly
engag'd
in
meditating
on
some
Geometrical
Proposition
,
we
find
not
so
much
easiness
to
think
upon
other
Things
,
as
when
we
are
diverted
by
no
particular
Thought
.
And
therefore
we
think
more
on
the
General
and
Infinite
Being
,
when
we
think
less
on
the
Particular
and
Finite
;
and
we
think
always
as
much
at
one
time
as
at
another
.
We
cannot
then
improve
the
Extent
and
Capacity
of
the
Mind
,
by
swelling
it
up
,
as
I
may
say
,
and
giving
it
more
Reality
than
it
has
received
from
Nature
:
But
only
by
a
skilful
and
dexterous
managing
thereof
;
which
is
done
to
the
best
advantage
by
Arithmetick
and
Algebra
:
For
those
Sciences
afford
Means
of
abridging
Ideas
so
methodically
,
and
reducing
them
into
such
an
Order
,
as
that
the
Mind
,
with
its
little
Extent
,
is
capable
,
with
their
Assistance
,
of
discovering
very
composed
Truths
,
and
such
as
appear
at
first
sight
incomprehensible
.
But
we
must
draw
these
Things
from
their
Principle
,
that
we
may
explain
them
with
more
clearness
and
certainty
.
Truth
is
nothing
else
but
a
real
Relation
,
either
of
Equality
or
Inequality
:
Whereas
Falsehood
is
but
the
Negation
of
Truth
,
or
a
false
and
fantastick
Relation
.
Truth
is
that
which
is
,
and
Falsehood
is
not
;
or
,
if
you
will
,
is
that
which
is
not
.
We
never
mistake
when
we
see
Relations
that
are
,
since
we
cannot
be
deceived
when
we
see
the
Truth
:
But
we
always
mistake
,
when
we
judge
that
we
see
some
Relations
that
are
not
in
being
;
for
then
we
see
a
Falsehood
,
we
see
what
is
not
,
or
rather
we
see
not
at
all
.
Whoever
sees
a
Relation
of
Equality
betwixt
two
times
Two
,
and
Four
,
sees
a
Truth
,
because
there
is
such
a
Relation
as
he
sees
;
and
whoever
sees
a
Relation
of
Inequality
betwixt
twice
Two
,
and
Five
,
sees
a
Truth
,
because
he
sees
a
Relation
that
really
is
:
But
whoever
judges
that
he
sees
a
Relation
of
Equality
betwixt
two
times
Two
,
and
Five
,
mistakes
,
because
he
sees
,
or
rather
supposes
he
sees
,
a
Relation
of
Equality
where
there
is
none
.
Truths
are
but
Relations
,
and
the
Knowledge
of
Truths
is
the
Knowledge
of
Relations
:
But
Falsehood
is
not
,
and
the
Knowledge
of
Falsehood
,
or
a
false
Knowledge
,
is
,
if
it
may
be
so
said
,
the
Knowledge
of
what
is
not
;
and
what
is
not
,
cannot
be
known
,
but
by
Relation
to
what
is
:
So
Errour
cannot
be
understood
,
but
by
comparing
it
to
Truth
.
There
may
be
distinguished
as
many
Species
of
Falsehood
,
as
of
Truth
;
and
as
there
are
Three
sorts
of
Relations
,
viz.
of
one
Idea
to
another
;
of
an
Object
to
its
Idea
,
or
of
an
Idea
to
its
Object
;
and
lastly
,
of
one
Object
to
another
:
So
there
are
Three
kinds
of
Truth
and
Falsehood
;
namely
,
betwixt
Ideas
,
betwixt
Things
and
their
Ideas
,
and
betwixt
Things
themselves
.
It
is
true
,
that
2
times
2
are
4
;
't
is
false
,
that
twice
2
are
5
:
That
is
a
Truth
and
a
Falsehood
betwixt
Ideas
.
'T
is
true
,
that
there
is
one
Sun
;
't
is
false
,
that
there
are
two
:
Here
you
have
a
Truth
and
a
Falsehood
betwixt
Things
and
their
Ideas
.
'T
is
true
,
that
the
Earth
is
bigger
than
the
Moon
;
and
't
is
false
,
that
the
Sun
is
smaller
than
the
Earth
:
There
is
a
Truth
and
Falsehood
betwixt
Objects
themselves
.
Of
those
Three
sorts
of
Truths
,
such
as
are
betwixt
Ideas
are
Eternal
and
Immutable
,
and
upon
that
account
are
the
Rule
and
Measure
of
all
others
;
because
every
Rule
and
Measure
ought
to
be
unchangeable
.
And
as
Arithmetick
,
Algebra
,
and
Geometry
,
are
general
Sciences
,
that
rule
and
contain
all
the
particular
;
so
they
only
consider
those
sorts
of
Truths
.
All
Truths
or
Relations
betwixt
Creatures
,
or
betwixt
Ideas
and
created
Things
,
are
obnoxious
to
those
Changes
whereof
Creatures
are
susceptible
.
Nothing
but
the
Truth
betwixt
our
Ideas
and
the
Sovereign
Being
,
or
betwixt
Ideas
themselves
,
is
Immutable
;
because
neither
God
,
nor
the
Ideas
he
contains
,
are
subject
to
Alteration
.
And
therefore
't
is
only
that
sort
of
Truths
which
are
betwixt
our
Ideas
,
that
we
try
to
discover
by
the
Exercise
of
our
Reason
;
since
we
,
for
the
most
part
,
make
use
of
our
Senses
to
discover
the
others
;
as
,
we
use
our
Eyes
and
Hands
to
ascertain
us
of
the
Existence
of
Things
,
and
to
know
the
Relations
of
Equality
or
Inequality
betwixt
them
.
There
is
nothing
but
Ideas
of
which
the
Mind
can
Infallibly
know
the
Relations
by
it self
,
and
without
the
use
of
Senses
.
But
there
are
not
only
Relations
betwixt
our
Ideas
,
there
are
also
Relations
betwixt
the
Relations
of
our
Ideas
,
betwixt
the
Relations
of
those
Relations
,
betwixt
the
Collection
of
many
Relations
,
and
so
ad
infinitum
;
that
is
to
say
,
that
there
are
Truths
infinitely
compounded
and
perplexed
.
In
Geometrical
Stile
we
call
a
simple
Truth
,
or
the
Relation
of
one
Idea
to
another
,
(
as
the
Relation
of
4
to
2
,
or
to
2
times
2
)
a
Geometrical
Reason
,
or
only
a
Reason
:
For
the
Excess
and
Defect
of
an
Idea
,
or
,
to
use
the
common
Terms
,
the
Excess
or
Defect
of
a
Magnitude
,
is
not
properly
a
Reason
;
nor
equal
Excesses
and
Defects
,
equal
Reasons
.
When
the
Ideas
or
Magnitudes
are
equal
,
there
is
a
Reason
of
Equality
,
and
one
of
Inequality
when
they
are
unequal
.
The
Relation
betwixt
Relations
of
Magnitudes
,
that
is
to
say
,
between
Reasons
,
is
called
Compounded
Reason
,
because
't
is
a
compounded
Relation
;
as
the
Relation
of
6
to
4
,
and
3
to
2.
When
the
Compounding
Reasons
are
equal
,
the
Compounded
bears
the
Name
of
Proportion
,
or
Duplicate
Reason
.
The
Relations
of
8
to
4
,
and
6
to
3
,
are
a
Proportion
;
because
those
two
Relations
are
equal
.
It
must
be
observed
,
That
all
the
Relations
or
Reasons
,
as
well
simple
as
compounded
,
are
true
Magnitudes
,
that
very
Name
of
Magnitude
being
a
relative
Term
,
and
necessarily
importing
a
Relation
:
For
,
there
is
nothing
Great
by
it self
,
and
without
Relation
to
another
,
besides
the
Infinite
or
Unite
.
All
entire
Numbers
are
as
true
Relations
as
Fractions
themselves
,
or
as
Numbers
compared
with
,
or
divided
by
,
others
;
though
we
do
not
consider
this
,
because
entire
Numbers
may
be
express'd
by
one
Arithmetical
Figure
.
So
4
,
for
instance
,
or
8
8/2
2
,
is
as
true
a
Relation
as
2
2/4
4
,
or
2
2/8
8
,
though
the
Unite
to
which
4
relates
,
be
not
expressed
,
but
understood
,
4
being
equal
to
4●●
,
or
8
8/2
2
;
and
therefore
every
Magnitude
being
a
Relation
,
or
every
Relation
being
a
Magnitude
,
it
is
plain
that
we
can
express
all
Magnitudes
by
Cyphers
,
and
represent
them
by
Signs
to
the
Imagination
.
So
that
all
Truths
being
but
Relations
,
to
know
all
Truths
exactly
,
both
simple
and
compounded
,
it
is
sufficient
to
have
an
exact
Knowledge
of
all
sorts
of
Relations
,
simple
and
compound
:
We
have
already
observed
,
that
there
are
two
,
viz.
Relations
of
Equality
,
and
Inequality
.
It
is
plain
,
that
those
of
Equality
are
alike
;
and
that
as
soon
as
we
know
that
a
Thing
is
equal
to
another
that
is
known
,
we
have
an
accurate
Knowledge
of
its
Relation
:
But
it
goes
not
so
with
Inequality
;
for
because
we
know
that
a
Tower
is
higher
than
a
Fathom
,
and
lower
than
a
thousand
,
it
follows
not
that
we
have
a
true
Idea
of
its
Heighth
,
or
of
its
Relation
with
a
Fathom
.
To
compare
things
together
,
or
rather
critically
to
measure
the
Relations
of
Inequality
,
there
is
required
a
very
exact
Measure
,
a
simple
and
very
intelligible
Idea
,
an
universal
Measure
,
which
may
be
adap●ed
to
all
sorts
of
Subjects
.
That
Measure
is
Unity
,
which
serves
to
measure
all
Things
,
and
without
which
't
is
impossible
to
have
an
accurate
Knowledge
of
any
.
But
all
Numbers
being
made
up
of
Unites
,
't
is
evident
,
that
without
the
Ideas
of
Numbers
,
and
a
Method
of
comparing
and
measuring
those
Ideas
,
that
is
,
without
Arithmetick
,
't
is
not
possible
to
make
any
Progress
in
the
Knowledge
of
Compound
Truths
.
And
as
Ideas
,
and
the
Relations
betwixt
Ideas
;
in
short
,
all
sorts
of
Magnitudes
can
be
greater
or
less
than
others
;
so
they
canno●
be
made
equal
,
but
by
more
or
less
Unites
join'd
,
or
repeated
as
often
as
't
is
necessary
:
So
that
it
is
only
by
the
Addition
and
Subtraction
of
Unity
,
or
of
the
Parts
of
the
Unity
(
when
't
is
conceived
as
divided
)
that
we
exactly
measure
all
sorts
of
Magnitudes
,
and
discover
all
sorts
of
Truths
.
Now
Arithmetick
and
Algebra
are
,
of
all
Sciences
,
those
that
afford
us
most
Skill
and
Light
to
effect
those
Operations
,
and
to
manage
the
Capacity
of
the
Mind
to
the
best
Advantage
,
since
they
endue
it
with
all
the
Perfection
and
Extent
that
it
is
capable
of
,
and
teach
it
to
discover
all
the
Truths
that
can
be
exactly
known
.
For
ordinary
Geometry
does
not
so
perfect
the
Mind
,
as
the
Imagination
;
and
the
Truths
which
that
Science
discovers
,
are
not
always
so
evident
as
the
Masters
of
it
fansie
.
For
instance
:
They
suppose
they
have
express'd
the
Value
of
some
Magnitudes
,
when
they
have
proved
them
to
be
equal
to
some
Lines
,
that
are
the
Subtendant
of
Right
Angles
,
whose
Sides
are
perfectly
known
;
or
to
others
,
that
are
determined
by
some
one
of
the
Conick
Sections
.
But
their
Mistake
is
visible
;
for
those
Subtendants
are
unknown
themselves
.
We
know
more
exactly
the
√
8
,
or
the
√
20
,
than
a
Line
imagined
or
described
upon
Paper
,
to
be
the
Subtendant
of
a
Right
Angle
,
whose
Sides
are
2
,
or
one
Side
of
which
is
2
,
and
the
other
4
:
At
least
we
know
,
that
the
√
4
is
very
near
3
,
and
that
the
√
20
is
about
4
½
and
there
are
Rules
to
come
infinitely
nearer
and
nearer
the
true
Magnitude
;
and
if
we
cannot
attain
to
it
,
't
is
because
the
Mind
cannot
comprehend
Infinite
.
Whereas
we
have
but
a
very
confused
Idea
of
the
Magnitude
of
Subtendant
Lines
,
and
are
even
obliged
to
have
recourse
to
the
√
8
,
or
the
√
20
,
to
express
them
.
So
that
the
Geometrical
Constructions
that
are
used
to
represent
the
Value
of
unknown
Quantities
,
are
not
so
conducible
to
the
Mind
,
to
discover
the
Relations
or
Truths
sought
for
,
as
to
rule
the
Imagination
:
But
as
we
are
more
inclined
to
imploy
our
Imagination
,
than
our
Mind
;
so
Men
of
Learning
have
commonly
more
esteem
for
Geometry
,
than
for
Arithmetick
and
Algebra
.
To
understand
perfectly
,
that
Arithmetick
and
Algebra
,
join'd
together
,
are
a
real
Logick
,
or
the
Means
to
discover
the
Truth
,
and
afford
the
Mind
as
much
Extent
as
it
can
acquire
,
it
is
sufficient
to
make
some
Reflections
upon
the
Rules
of
those
Sciences
.
We
have
observed
,
That
all
Truths
are
but
Relations
;
that
the
most
simple
,
and
best
known
of
all
,
is
that
of
Equality
;
that
it
is
the
initial
Relation
,
from
whence
we
must
begin
to
measure
others
,
whereby
to
have
an
exact
Idea
of
Inequality
;
that
the
Measure
of
Inequality
is
the
Unite
,
which
must
be
repeated
or
subtracted
as
often
as
the
Excess
or
Defect
of
unequal
Magnitudes
require
it
.
Thence
it
is
plain
,
that
all
the
Operations
that
may
be
subservient
to
discover
the
Relations
of
Equality
,
are
only
Additions
and
Subtractions
;
Additions
of
Magnitudes
,
to
make
Magnitudes
even
;
Additions
of
Relations
,
to
make
equal
Relations
,
or
to
put
Magnitudes
in
proportion
with
each
other
;
and
lastly
,
Additions
of
the
Relations
of
Relations
,
to
equal
Relations
of
Relations
,
or
to
put
Magnitudes
in
a
Compound
Proportion
.
To
equal
4
to
2
,
we
need
only
add
2
to
2
,
or
subtract
2
from
4
;
or
lastly
,
to
add
the
Unite
to
2
,
and
subtract
it
from
4
;
that
's
plain
.
To
even
the
Relation
or
Reason
of
8
to
2
,
to
that
of
6
to
3
,
we
must
not
add
3
to
2
,
or
subtract
3
from
8
,
so
that
the
Excess
of
one
Number
to
the
other
ever
should
be
equal
to
3
,
which
is
the
Excess
of
6
above
3
;
that
would
be
an
Addition
,
and
Evening
of
simple
Magnitudes
:
But
we
must
consider
first
,
which
is
the
Magnitude
of
the
Relation
of
8
to
2
,
or
what
is
the
Value
of
8
8/2
2
;
and
we
shall
find
,
that
dividing
8
by
2
,
the
Quotient
of
that
Reason
will
be
4
,
or
that
8
8/2
2
is
equal
to
4.
We
must
likewise
see
which
is
the
Magnitude
of
the
Relation
of
6
to
3
;
and
finding
it
equal
to
2
,
we
shall
discover
,
that
those
two
Reasons
,
8
8/2
2
equal
to
4
,
and
6/●
equal
to
2
,
differ
only
by
2
:
So
to
make
them
even
,
we
may
either
add
6
6/3
3
to
6
6/3
3
,
equal
to
2
▪
which
will
make
●2/3
,
that
is
,
a
Relation
equal
to
8
8/2
2
;
or
subtract
4
4/2
2
,
equal
to
2
,
from
8
8/2
2
,
which
will
make
4
4/2
2
,
that
is
,
a
Relation
equal
to
6
6/3
3
;
or
lastly
,
adding
the
Unite
to
6
6/3
3
,
and
sutracting
it
from
8
8/2
2
,
we
shall
have
9
9/3
3
and
6
6/2
2
,
which
are
equal
Relations
;
for
9
is
to
3
,
as
6
to
2.
Lastly
,
To
find
out
the
Greatness
of
Inequality
betwixt
Relations
,
proceeding
,
one
from
a
Compounded
Reason
,
or
from
the
Relation
of
a
Relation
of
12
to
3
,
and
3
to
1
;
and
the
other
from
a
Compounded
Reason
,
or
from
the
Relation
of
a
Relation
,
as
of
8
to
2
,
and
2
to
1
;
we
must
follow
the
same
Method
.
First
,
The
Magnitude
of
the
Reason
of
12
to
3
,
is
marked
by
4
;
4
being
the
Quotient
of
the
Reason
of
12
to
3
,
and
3
the
Quotient
of
that
of
3
to
1
;
and
the
Quotient
of
Reason
of
the
Quotients
4
and
3
,
is
4/3.
Secondly
,
The
Quotient
of
8
to
2
,
is
4
;
and
that
of
2
to
1
,
is
2
;
and
the
Quotient
of
the
Quotients
4
and
2
,
is
2
:
So
that
the
Inequality
betwixt
the
Relations
,
that
here
result
from
the
Relations
of
the
Relations
,
is
the
Difference
betwixt
4
4/2
2
and
2
,
that
is
to
say
,
●/3
:
And
therefore
add
2/●
to
the
Relation
of
the
Reasons
12
to
3
,
and
3
to
1
;
or
subtract
them
from
the
Relations
of
the
other
Reasons
,
8
to
2
,
and
2
to
1
;
and
you
'll
make
even
those
Relations
of
Relations
,
and
produce
a
Compounded
Proportion
.
Thus
we
may
use
Additions
and
Subtractions
to
equal
Magnitudes
,
and
their
Relations
both
simple
and
compounded
;
and
likewise
to
frame
an
accurate
Idea
of
the
Greatness
of
their
Inequality
.
True
it
is
,
that
we
use
also
Multiplications
and
Divisions
,
both
simple
and
compounded
;
but
they
are
only
Compound
Additions
and
Subtractions
.
To
multiply
4
by
3
,
is
to
make
as
many
Additions
of
4
,
as
3
contains
Unites
;
or
to
find
a
Number
that
has
the
same
Relation
to
4
,
as
3
with
the
Unite
.
To
divide
12
by
4
,
is
to
subtract
4
from
12
as
often
as
possible
;
that
is
,
to
find
a
Relation
to
the
Unite
,
that
may
be
equal
to
that
of
12
to
4
;
for
3
,
which
is
the
Quotient
,
has
the
same
Relation
to
1
,
as
12
has
to
4.
The
Extractions
of
the
Square
,
Cubick
,
and
other
Roots
,
are
but
Divisions
,
to
find
out
one
,
two
,
or
three
mean
proportional
Magnitudes
.
'T
is
evident
,
that
the
Mind
of
Man
is
so
narrow
,
his
Memory
so
unfaithful
,
and
his
Imagination
so
shallow
,
that
,
without
the
use
of
Figures
,
and
Writing
,
and
the
Skill
of
Arithmetick
,
it
would
be
impossible
to
make
the
necessary
Operations
,
to
know
the
Inequality
of
Magnitudes
,
and
their
Relations
,
especially
where
many
Numbers
must
be
added
or
subtracted
;
or
,
which
is
the
same
thing
,
when
those
Numbers
are
very
great
,
and
can
be
added
but
by
Parts
:
For
some
of
them
would
still
be
forgotten
,
there
being
no
Imagination
so
extended
,
as
to
add
together
very
great
Fractions
,
as
4723
4723/1203
1203
,
12431
12431/17240122
17240122
;
or
to
subtract
one
from
the
other
.
Multiplication
,
Division
,
and
the
Extraction
of
Roots
in
entire
Numbers
,
are
infinitely
more
puzling
,
than
simple
Additions
or
Subtractions
.
The
Mind
alone
,
without
the
help
of
Arithmetick
,
is
too
shallow
and
weak
to
make
such
Operations
;
and
it
would
be
to
no
purpose
to
insist
upon
the
Proofs
of
it
.
Notwithstanding
,
Analyticks
,
or
Algebra
,
is
still
more
excellent
than
Arithmetick
;
because
it
less
divides
the
Capacity
of
the
Mind
,
and
abridges
the
Ideas
in
the
most
simple
and
easie
manner
imaginable
.
What
may
be
done
in
a
long
time
by
Arithmetick
,
is
performed
in
a
moment
by
Algebra
,
without
puzling
the
Mind
by
the
Change
of
Cyphers
;
and
the
Tediousness
of
Operations
.
And
lastly
,
There
are
knowable
Things
,
and
necessary
to
be
known
,
of
which
Arithmetick
alone
cannot
afford
the
Knowledge
;
but
I
believe
not
that
there
is
any
Thing
useful
,
and
which
may
be
certainly
and
exactly
known
,
but
it
may
be
found
out
by
an
Arithmetical
and
Algebraical
Method
.
So
that
those
two
Sciences
are
the
Foundation
of
all
others
,
and
help
us
to
the
true
Means
to
acquire
all
those
that
are
accurate
,
because
the
Capacity
of
the
Mind
cannot
be
better
managed
than
it
is
by
Arithmetick
,
and
especially
by
Algebra
.
THE
SECOND
PART
OF
THE
SIXTH
BOOK
,
Concerning
METHOD
.
CHAP.
I.
Of
the
Rules
that
are
to
be
observed
in
the
Search
after
Truth
.
HAving
explain'd
the
means
how
to
improve
the
Attention
and
Extension
of
the
Mind
,
by
which
alone
it
may
acquire
a
greater
perfection
,
that
is
,
become
more
enlightned
,
sagacious
and
piercing
;
it
is
time
to
set
down
those
Rules
,
the
Observation
whereof
is
absolutely
necessary
to
resolve
any
Question
whatsoever
.
I
shall
insist
long
upon
it
,
and
endeavour
to
explain
them
by
several
Instances
;
that
their
necessity
may
be
better
known
,
and
the
Mind
accustomed
to
make
use
of
them
;
it
being
not
so
difficult
or
necessary
,
to
know
them
theoretically
,
as
to
put
them
in
Practice
.
Let
none
expect
here
very
extraordinary
,
surprizing
and
abstruse
things
:
For
on
the
contrary
,
that
those
Rules
may
be
good
,
they
must
be
very
simple
,
natural
and
few
,
very
plain
and
intelligible
,
and
depending
on
each
other
;
in
short
,
such
as
may
lead
our
Mind
,
and
rule
our
Attention
,
without
distracting
either
:
For
Experience
shews
that
the
Logick
of
Aristotle
is
of
no
great
use
,
because
it
takes
up
the
Mind
too
much
,
and
disturbs
the
Attention
it
ought
to
give
to
the
Subjects
of
its
Enquiry
.
Let
then
those
Lovers
of
Mysteries
and
rare
Inventions
lay
aside
for
a
while
that
capricious
humour
,
and
consider
,
as
attentively
as
they
can
,
whether
the
Rules
we
shall
prescribe
are
sufficient
to
preserve
Evidence
in
the
Preceptions
of
the
Mind
,
and
to
discover
the
most
hidden
Truths
.
Unless
they
suffer
themselves
to
be
unjustly
prejudiced
against
those
Rules
,
by
the
simplicity
and
easiness
of
the
same
,
I
hope
that
the
great
use
which
may
be
made
of
them
,
as
we
shall
shew
hereafter
,
will
convince
them
,
that
the
most
clear
and
simple
Principles
are
the
most
pregnant
and
fecund
,
and
that
rare
and
difficult
things
are
not
always
so
useful
as
our
fruitless
Curiosity
endeavours
to
persuade
us
.
The
Principle
of
all
those
Rules
is
,
that
we
must
always
preserve
Evidence
in
our
Reasonings
,
to
discover
Truth
without
Fear
,
and
danger
of
being
mistaken
.
From
that
Principle
follows
this
general
Rule
,
that
respects
the
Subject
of
our
Studies
:
We
ought
only
to
Reason
upon
such
things
,
whereof
we
have
clear
and
distinct
Ideas
;
and
by
a
necessary
consequence
,
we
must
still
begin
with
the
most
simple
and
easie
Subjects
,
and
insist
long
upon
them
,
before
we
undertake
the
Enquiry
into
such
as
are
more
composed
and
difficult
.
The
Rules
that
concern
the
Method
to
be
taken
in
resolving
Questions
,
depend
likewise
on
the
same
Principle
;
and
the
first
of
those
Rules
is
,
that
we
must
very
distinctly
conceive
the
State
of
the
Question
proposed
to
be
resolv'd
:
that
is
,
have
Ideas
of
the
Terms
so
distinct
,
as
that
we
may
compare
them
together
,
and
discover
the
Relations
which
we
look
for
.
When
those
Relations
cannot
be
found
out
by
an
immediate
comparison
of
their
Ideas
,
then
the
second
Rule
is
,
that
we
must
try
by
an
Essay
of
Thought
to
discover
one
,
or
several
intermediate
Ideas
,
that
may
be
a
means
or
common
measure
to
discover
the
Relations
that
are
betwixt
those
things
.
A
special
care
is
to
be
taken
that
those
Ideas
be
the
more
clear
and
distinct
,
as
the
Relations
we
endeavour
to
discover
are
more
nicely
exact
and
numerous
.
When
the
Questions
are
very
difficult
,
and
require
a
long
Examination
,
the
third
Rule
is
,
that
we
must
carefully
take
off
from
the
Subject
to
be
consider'd
,
all
things
whose
Examination
is
not
needful
to
the
Discovery
of
the
Truth
we
are
in
quest
of
.
For
the
Capacity
of
the
Mind
must
not
be
vainly
shar'd
and
divided
,
but
its
strength
must
only
be
employed
in
such
things
as
may
enlighten
it
;
so
that
all
those
things
which
are
to
be
laid
aside
,
are
such
as
concern
not
the
Question
,
and
which
,
when
taken
off
,
leave
it
whole
and
entire
.
When
the
Question
is
thus
brought
within
the
least
compass
,
the
fourth
Rule
is
,
to
divide
the
Subject
of
our
Meditations
into
Parts
,
and
consider
them
one
after
the
other
in
a
natural
order
;
beginning
with
the
most
simple
,
or
those
that
contain
the
least
number
of
Relations
,
and
never
medling
with
the
more
composed
,
before
the
most
simple
are
distinctly
known
,
and
become
familiar
.
When
they
are
become
familiar
by
Meditation
,
the
fifth
Rule
is
,
to
abridge
Ideas
and
dispose
them
in
the
Imagination
,
or
write
them
upon
Paper
,
that
they
may
no
longer
clog
and
fill
up
the
Capacity
of
the
Mind
.
Though
that
Rule
be
always
useful
,
yet
't
is
not
of
absolute
necessity
;
unless
it
be
in
very
intricate
Questions
,
that
require
a
great
extent
of
Mind
,
(
for
the
Mind
is
only
enlarg'd
by
the
abridgment
of
Ideas
)
.
But
the
use
of
that
Rule
and
the
following
,
is
best
known
by
Algebra
.
The
Ideas
of
all
the
things
that
necessarily
require
Examination
,
being
clear
,
familiar
,
abridg'd
,
and
disposed
and
ranged
in
good
order
in
the
Imagination
,
or
written
upon
Paper
,
the
sixth
Rule
is
,
to
compare
them
all
by
the
Rules
of
Complications
,
one
with
the
other
alternately
,
either
by
the
View
of
the
Mind
alone
,
or
by
the
Motion
of
the
Imagination
,
attended
with
the
View
of
the
Mind
,
or
by
the
Calculation
of
the
Pen
joined
to
the
attention
of
the
Mind
and
Imagination
.
If
amongst
all
the
Relations
that
result
from
those
Comparisons
,
you
find
not
that
which
you
enquire
after
,
then
take
off
again
all
the
Relations
that
are
not
subservient
to
resolve
the
Question
,
make
the
others
familiar
,
abridge
them
,
posture
and
dispose
them
in
the
Imagination
,
or
write
them
upon
Paper
,
compare
them
together
by
the
Rules
of
Complications
,
and
then
see
whether
the
composed
Relation
that
is
look'd
for
,
is
one
of
the
composed
Relations
that
result
from
those
new
Comparisons
.
If
none
of
those
new
discover'd
Relations
contain
the
Solution
of
the
Question
,
then
take
off
again
those
that
are
useless
,
make
the
other
familiar
,
&c.
[
That
is
,
doe
the
same
over
and
over
,
and
]
continuing
thus
,
you
shall
discover
the
Truth
or
Relation
you
enquire
after
,
how
composed
soever
it
may
be
;
provided
you
can
extend
the
Capacity
of
your
Mind
to
it
,
by
abridging
your
Ideas
,
and
still
in
all
your
Operations
having
before
your
Eyes
the
Scope
you
aim
at
.
For
't
is
the
continual
and
steady
view
of
the
Question
which
must
regulate
all
the
advances
of
the
Mind
;
since
we
should
always
know
whither
we
are
going
.
We
must
above
all
take
care
not
to
satisfie
our selves
with
some
glimpse
or
likelyhood
;
but
begin
anew
so
often
the
Comparisons
that
are
conducible
to
discover
the
Truths
enquired
after
,
as
that
we
may
not
withold
our
Assent
to
it
,
without
feeling
the
secret
Lashes
and
Reproofs
of
our
internal
Master
that
Answers
our
Questions
,
that
is
,
the
Application
of
our
Mind
,
and
the
Desires
of
our
Heart
.
Then
will
that
Truth
serve
as
an
infallible
Principle
,
to
proceed
in
the
Acquisition
of
Sciences
.
All
the
Rules
we
have
given
are
not
necessary
in
all
sorts
of
Questions
:
for
the
first
Rule
is
sufficient
in
those
that
are
easie
:
and
we
need
but
in
some
others
the
first
and
second
.
In
short
,
since
we
must
make
use
of
those
Rules
,
'till
we
have
discover'd
the
Truth
we
seek
for
;
it
follows
,
that
the
more
difficult
the
Questions
are
,
the
greater
must
the
number
of
those
Rules
be
which
we
must
put
in
practice
.
Those
Rules
are
not
very
numerous
,
but
very
natural
,
as
depending
upon
each
other
,
and
may
be
made
so
familiar
as
to
fall
of
themselves
into
the
Mind
,
as
often
as
shall
be
requisite
.
In
short
,
they
can
rule
the
Attention
of
the
Mind
without
dividing
it
,
which
is
in
great
part
what
we
could
desire
;
but
they
look
so
inconsiderable
in
themselves
,
that
to
make
them
more
recommendable
,
it
is
necessary
to
shew
that
the
Philosophers
are
fallen
into
a
great
many
Errours
,
and
Extravagancies
,
by
not
observing
so
much
as
the
two
first
,
which
are
the
chief
and
easiest
of
all
;
whereas
Des
Cartes
,
by
their
use
,
has
discover'd
all
those
great
and
fruitful
Truths
,
which
are
to
be
learn'd
in
his
Works
.
CHAP.
II.
Of
the
general
Rule
that
concerns
the
Subject
of
our
Studies
:
That
School-Philosophers
observe
it
not
,
which
is
the
Cause
of
several
Errours
in
their
Physicks
.
THE
first
of
these
Rules
,
and
which
respects
the
Subject
of
our
Studies
,
teaches
,
that
we
must
not
argue
,
except
from
clear
Ideas
;
whence
it
follows
,
that
to
study
methodically
,
we
must
begin
with
things
most
simple
and
easie
to
be
understood
,
and
insist
long
upon
them
,
before
we
undertake
to
enquire
after
the
more
composed
and
difficult
.
Every
one
will
easily
grant
the
necessity
of
that
general
Rule
;
plainly
seeing
,
that
he
walks
in
the
dark
,
who
reasons
upon
obscure
Ideas
,
and
uncertain
Principles
.
But
't
will
be
matter
of
surprize
to
hear
us
affirm
,
that
it
is
hardly
ever
observed
;
and
that
the
greatest
part
of
those
Sciences
,
which
still
at
this
day
flush
the
Pride
of
some
false
Pretenders
to
Science
,
are
only
grounded
upon
such
Ideas
,
as
are
either
too
confused
,
or
too
general
,
to
be
conducible
to
the
finding
out
of
Truth
.
Aristotle
,
who
so
justly
deserves
the
Quality
of
Prince
of
such
Philosophers
,
(
as
being
the
Father
of
that
Philosophy
which
they
so
studiously
cultivate
,
)
reasons
very
seldom
upon
other
Ideas
,
than
such
as
are
confused
and
sensible
,
and
upon
others
that
are
general
,
undetermin'd
,
and
representing
nothing
particular
to
the
Mind
.
For
the
ordinary
Expressions
of
that
Philosopher
are
so
perplexed
,
as
to
represent
only
to
the
Senses
and
Imagination
,
the
confused
Sentiments
we
have
of
sensible
things
;
or
to
make
his
Disciples
speak
in
such
a
rambling
and
indeterminate
manner
,
as
not
to
understand
themselves
.
Most
of
his
Works
,
but
especially
his
Eight
Books
of
Physicks
,
on
which
are
as
many
different
Commentators
as
there
are
Professors
of
Philosophy
,
are
a
mere
Logical
Tattle
,
where
he
talks
much
,
and
says
nothing
:
Not
that
his
Stile
is
too
copious
and
diffused
,
but
because
he
has
a
particular
Talent
at
being
succinct
,
and
saying
nothing
but
Words
.
In
his
other
Works
he
makes
not
such
frequent
use
of
his
loose
and
general
Terms
;
but
those
he
employs
raise
only
the
confused
Ideas
of
the
Senses
;
by
which
Ideas
he
pretends
,
in
his
Problems
,
and
elsewhere
,
to
resolve
in
two
Words
an
infinite
Number
of
Questions
,
of
which
it
may
be
demonstrated
that
they
are
altogether
insoluble
.
But
that
my
Meaning
may
be
better
understood
,
what
I
have
proved
in
other
Places
must
here
be
remembred
,
viz.
That
all
the
Terms
that
excite
nothing
but
sensible
Ideas
,
are
equivocal
;
nay
,
and
what
's
to
be
well
observ'd
,
Equivocal
from
Errour
and
Ignorance
,
which
must
needs
cause
an
infinite
number
of
Delusions
.
The
Word
Ram
is
equivocal
,
signifying
an
Animal
that
ruminates
,
and
a
Constellation
into
which
the
Sun
enters
at
Spring
;
but
that
seldom
causes
any
Mistake
:
For
he
must
be
an
Astrologer
with
a
Witness
,
who
should
imagine
any
Relation
betwixt
those
two
Things
,
and
believe
,
for
instance
,
that
we
are
subject
at
that
time
to
vomit
up
the
Medicines
that
we
take
,
because
the
Ram
is
a
ruminating
Beast
.
But
as
to
the
Terms
of
sensible
Ideas
,
but
few
acknowledge
them
for
Equivocal
.
Aristotle
and
the
Ancient
Philosophers
did
not
so
much
as
dream
on
't
;
which
will
be
agreed
to
by
any
one
that
has
read
any
of
their
Books
,
and
distinctly
knows
the
Cause
why
those
Words
are
liable
to
Equivocation
.
For
nothing
is
more
evident
,
than
that
the
Philosophers
Opinion
,
as
to
that
Matter
,
was
quite
contrary
to
the
Truth
.
For
instance
:
When
they
say
,
that
Fire
is
hot
,
Grass
green
,
Sugar
sweet
;
they
understand
,
just
as
Children
,
and
the
vulgar
of
Men
,
that
Fire
contains
in
it
what
they
feel
when
they
warm
themselves
;
that
Grass
has
painted
upon
it
the
Colours
they
see
;
that
Sugar
is
endued
with
that
Sweetness
they
taste
when
they
eat
it
;
and
so
as
to
all
other
visible
and
sensible
Qualities
;
which
cannot
be
denied
by
those
that
have
read
their
Writings
.
They
talk
of
sensible
Qualities
as
of
Sensations
;
they
take
Heat
for
Motion
.
And
thus
,
by
the
Equivocation
of
Terms
,
they
confound
the
Modes
of
Existence
peculiar
to
Bodies
,
with
the
Modifications
of
the
Soul
.
'T
is
no
longer
since
than
Des
Cartes's
time
,
that
to
those
confused
and
indeterminate
Questions
,
Whether
Fire
is
hot
,
Grass
green
,
and
Sugar
sweet
,
&c.
we
use
to
answer
by
distinguishing
the
Equivocation
of
sensible
Terms
that
express
them
.
If
by
Heat
,
Colour
,
and
Savour
,
you
understand
such
and
such
Dispositions
of
Parts
,
or
Motion
of
insensible
Particles
,
then
Fire
is
hot
,
Grass
green
,
and
Sugar
sweet
.
But
if
by
Heat
,
and
other
Qualities
,
you
understand
what
I
feel
when
near
the
Fire
,
what
I
see
when
I
see
Grass
,
&c.
Fire
is
not
hot
,
nor
Grass
green
,
&c.
For
the
Heat
I
feel
,
and
the
Colours
I
see
,
are
only
in
the
Soul
,
as
has
been
proved
in
the
First
Book
.
But
as
Men
commonly
suppose
,
that
what
they
feel
is
the
same
with
that
which
is
in
the
Object
;
so
they
believe
they
are
in
the
right
,
when
they
judge
of
the
Qualities
of
Objects
by
their
own
Sensations
:
And
thus
they
hardly
say
two
Words
without
speaking
a
Falsehood
,
and
never
say
any
thing
upon
that
Matter
,
but
what
is
obscure
and
confused
;
and
that
for
the
several
following
Reasons
.
First
,
Because
all
Men
have
not
the
same
Sensations
of
the
same
Objects
,
nor
even
the
same
Man
in
different
Times
,
or
when
different
Parts
of
his
Body
are
affected
by
them
.
What
is
sweet
to
one
,
is
bitter
to
another
;
what
is
hot
to
one
,
is
cold
to
another
;
what
seems
hot
to
a
Man
when
he
is
cold
,
feels
cold
to
himself
when
he
is
hot
,
or
when
other
Parts
of
his
Body
are
affected
.
Water
,
that
feels
warm
to
the
Hands
,
will
seem
cold
if
we
wash
with
it
any
Part
near
the
Heart
.
Salt
,
that
is
savoury
to
the
Tongue
,
is
pricking
and
smarting
to
a
Wound
.
Sugar
is
sweet
,
and
Aloes
very
bitter
to
the
Tongue
;
but
nothing
is
either
sweet
or
bitter
to
the
other
Senses
:
So
that
when
we
say
,
a
Thing
is
cold
,
sweet
,
bitter
,
&c.
that
same
has
no
certain
Signification
.
Secondly
,
Because
different
Objects
can
cause
the
same
Sensation
.
Plaister
,
Bread
,
Snow
,
Sugar
,
Salt
,
&c.
are
of
the
same
Colour
;
and
yet
their
Whiteness
is
different
,
if
we
judge
of
'em
otherwise
than
by
the
Senses
:
And
therefore
when
we
say
,
that
Meal
is
white
,
we
say
not
any
thing
distinctly
significative
.
The
third
Reason
is
,
Because
such
Qualities
of
Bodies
as
occasion
Sensations
altogether
different
,
are
however
almost
the
same
;
whereas
such
as
excite
very
near
the
same
Sensation
,
are
often
very
different
.
The
Qualities
of
Sweetness
and
Bitterness
differ
but
little
in
Objects
;
whereas
the
Sense
of
Sweet
essentially
differs
from
that
of
Bitter
.
The
Motions
that
cause
Smart
and
Tickling
,
differ
but
in
more
or
less
;
and
yet
the
Sensations
of
Tickling
and
Smart
are
essentially
different
.
On
the
contrary
,
the
Sharpness
of
Fruit
differs
not
so
much
from
Bitterness
,
as
Sweetness
does
;
however
,
that
sharp
Quality
is
the
farthest
from
Bitterness
that
possibly
can
be
:
For
,
a
Fruit
that
is
sharp
for
being
unripe
,
must
undergo
a
great
many
Changes
,
before
it
grows
bitter
from
Rottenness
,
or
too
much
Ripeness
.
When
Fruits
are
ripe
,
they
taste
sweet
;
and
bitter
,
when
over-ripe
:
Bitterness
and
Sweetness
therefore
in
Fruits
differ
but
in
degree
of
more
and
less
;
which
may
be
the
Reason
why
they
seem
sweet
to
some
Persons
,
whilst
they
taste
bitter
to
others
:
Nay
,
there
are
those
to
whom
Aloes
seem
as
sweet
as
Honey
.
The
same
may
be
said
of
all
sensible
Ideas
;
so
that
the
Words
Sweet
,
Bitter
,
Salt
,
Sowre
,
Acid
,
&c.
Red
,
Green
,
Yellow
,
&c.
of
such
and
such
a
Smell
,
Savour
,
Colour
,
&c.
are
all
equivocal
,
and
raise
no
clear
and
distinct
Idea
in
the
Mind
.
However
,
School-Philosophers
,
and
the
vulgar
part
of
Men
,
judge
of
all
the
sensible
Qualities
of
Bodies
by
the
Sensations
they
receive
from
them
.
Nor
do
the
Philosophers
only
judge
of
these
sensible
Qualities
by
their
own
Sensations
of
them
;
but
also
judge
of
the
Things
themselves
,
from
the
Judgments
they
have
pass'd
about
sensible
Qualities
:
For
,
from
their
having
had
Sensations
of
certain
Qualities
essentially
different
,
they
judge
that
there
is
a
Generation
of
new
Forms
,
producing
those
fantastick
Differences
.
Wheat
appears
yellow
,
hard
,
&c.
Meal
,
white
,
soft
,
&c.
Thence
,
upon
the
Testimony
of
their
Eyes
and
Hands
,
they
infer
,
That
those
Bodies
are
essentially
different
,
unless
they
chance
to
think
on
the
Manner
of
the
Transmutation
of
Wheat
into
Flower
:
For
Meal
is
nothing
but
bruised
and
ground
Corn
;
as
Fire
is
only
divided
and
agitated
Wood
;
as
Ashes
are
but
the
grossest
Parts
of
the
divided
Wood
without
Agitation
;
as
Glass
is
but
Ashes
,
whose
Particles
have
been
polished
and
rounded
by
the
Attrition
caus'd
by
the
Fire
:
And
so
in
other
Transmutations
of
Bodies
.
'T
is
therefore
evident
,
that
sensible
Words
and
Ideas
are
altogether
unserviceable
to
a
just
stating
,
and
clear
resolving
of
Questions
;
that
is
,
to
the
Discovery
of
Truth
.
Yet
there
are
no
Questions
,
how
intricate
soever
they
may
be
,
by
the
equivocal
Terms
of
the
Senses
,
but
Aristotle
,
and
most
part
of
other
Philosophers
,
pretend
to
resolve
them
in
their
Books
,
without
the
foregoing
Distinctions
,
and
without
considering
that
they
are
equivocal
by
Errour
and
Ignorance
.
If
,
for
example
,
those
Persons
who
have
employed
the
best
part
of
their
Life
in
reading
Ancient
Philosophers
and
Physicians
,
and
have
wholly
imbib'd
their
Spirit
and
Opinions
,
are
ask'd
whether
Water
be
wet
,
whether
Fire
be
dry
,
Wine
hot
,
the
Blood
of
Fishes
cold
,
Water
rawer
than
Wine
,
Gold
perfecter
than
Mercury
;
whether
Plants
and
Beasts
have
Souls
;
and
a
thousand
like
undetermin'd
Questions
;
they
rashly
answer
,
by
consulting
only
the
Impressions
of
Objects
upon
their
Senses
,
or
the
Tracks
the
reading
of
Authors
has
left
upon
their
Memory
.
They
never
think
those
Terms
are
equivocal
;
't
is
a
Wonder
to
them
they
should
need
a
Definition
;
and
they
cannot
endure
those
that
endeavour
to
let
'em
understand
,
that
their
Procedure
is
too
quick
,
and
that
they
are
seduced
by
their
Senses
;
and
though
they
are
never
at
a
loss
for
Distinctions
to
perplex
the
most
evident
Things
,
yet
in
these
Questions
,
in
which
Equivocation
needs
so
much
to
be
removed
,
they
find
nothing
to
distinguish
.
If
we
consider
,
that
most
of
the
Questions
of
Philosophers
and
Physicians
contain
some
equivocal
Terms
,
like
to
those
that
have
been
spoken
of
;
we
shall
not
doubt
,
but
that
those
Learned
Gentlemen
,
that
could
not
define
them
,
were
unable
to
say
any
Thing
solid
and
real
,
in
the
bulky
Volumes
they
have
compos'd
:
Which
is
,
in
a
manner
,
sufficient
to
overthrow
most
of
the
Opinions
of
the
Ancients
.
It
is
not
so
with
Des
Cartes
;
he
perfectly
knew
how
to
distinguish
those
Things
:
He
ne'er
resolves
any
Question
by
sensible
Ideas
;
and
whoever
shall
be
at
the
pains
to
read
him
,
shall
see
,
that
he
clearly
,
evidently
,
and
almost
ever
demonstratively
,
explains
the
chief
Operations
of
Nature
by
the
sole
and
distinct
Ideas
of
Extension
,
Figures
,
and
Motion
.
The
second
sort
of
equivocal
Words
,
that
is
much
in
request
amongst
Philosophers
,
contains
all
those
general
Terms
of
Logick
by
which
any
Thing
may
be
easily
explain'd
,
without
so
much
as
knowing
it
.
Aristotle
was
the
Man
that
made
the
most
of
it
;
his
Books
are
full
of
nothing
else
,
and
some
are
but
a
mere
Logick
:
He
proposes
and
resolves
all
Things
by
the
specious
Words
of
Genus
,
Species
,
Act
,
Power
,
Nature
,
Form
,
Faculty
,
Quality
,
Causa
per
se
,
Causa
per
accidens
:
His
Followers
can
hardly
understand
that
those
Words
signifie
Nothing
,
and
that
one
is
not
more
learned
than
he
was
,
when
he
has
heard
,
that
Fire
dissolves
Metals
by
its
dissolving
Faculty
;
that
a
Man
digests
not
,
because
his
Stomach
is
weak
,
or
because
his
Concoctive
Faculty
does
not
operate
as
it
should
do
.
I
grant
,
that
those
who
use
such
general
Terms
and
Ideas
for
the
Explication
of
all
Things
,
commonly
fall
not
into
so
many
Errours
,
as
those
that
only
employ
such
Words
as
raise
the
confused
Ideas
of
the
Senses
.
The
School-Philosophers
are
not
so
liable
to
be
deceived
,
as
some
opinionative
and
dogmatical
Physicians
,
who
build
Systems
upon
Experiments
,
the
Reasons
of
which
are
unknown
to
them
;
because
the
School-men
talk
so
generally
,
that
they
do
not
venture
much
out
of
their
Depth
.
Fire
heats
,
dries
,
hardens
,
and
softens
,
because
it
has
the
Faculty
of
producing
those
Effects
:
Sena
purges
by
its
purgative
Quality
:
Bread
nourishes
by
its
nutritious
Quality
.
These
Propositions
are
not
liable
to
mistake
;
for
a
Quality
is
that
which
denominates
a
Thing
by
such
a
Name
;
Master
Aristotle's
Definition
is
undeniable
:
But
he
speaks
true
only
because
he
says
nothing
;
and
if
his
rambling
,
loose
,
and
indefinite
Notions
engage
not
into
Errour
,
at
least
they
are
wholly
unserviceable
to
the
Discovery
of
Truth
.
For
,
though
we
know
that
there
is
in
Fire
a
substantial
Form
,
attended
with
a
Million
of
Faculties
,
like
to
that
of
heating
,
dilating
,
melting
Gold
,
Silver
,
and
other
Metals
,
lightening
,
burning
,
roasting
;
the
Idea
of
that
substantial
Form
,
with
all
its
Faculties
of
producing
Heat
,
Fluidity
,
Rarefaction
,
will
not
help
me
to
resolve
this
Question
,
Why
Fire
hardens
Clay
,
and
softens
Wax
?
There
being
no
Connection
betwixt
the
Ideas
of
Hardness
in
Clay
and
Softness
in
Wax
,
and
those
of
a
substantial
Form
in
Fire
,
and
its
Faculties
of
Rarefaction
,
Fluidity
,
&c.
The
same
may
be
said
of
all
general
Ideas
;
which
are
utterly
insufficient
for
resolving
any
Question
.
But
when
I
know
that
Fire
is
nothing
else
but
divided
Wood
,
whose
Parts
are
in
a
continual
Agitation
,
by
which
alone
it
raises
in
me
the
Sensation
of
Heat
;
and
that
the
Softness
of
Clay
consists
in
a
Mixture
of
Water
and
Earth
;
those
Ideas
being
not
general
and
confused
,
but
particular
and
distinct
,
it
will
not
be
difficult
to
perceive
that
the
Heat
of
Fire
must
harden
Clay
,
nothing
being
easier
to
conceive
,
than
that
one
Body
may
move
another
,
if
it
meet
with
it
,
being
it self
in
Motion
.
We
likewise
easily
perceive
,
that
since
the
Heat
we
feel
near
the
Fire
is
caused
by
the
Motion
of
the
invisible
Particles
of
Wood
striking
against
our
Hands
,
Face
,
&c.
if
we
expose
Clay
to
the
Heat
of
Fire
,
the
Particles
of
Water
,
that
are
mixed
with
those
of
Earth
,
being
more
thin
and
disunited
,
and
consequently
more
agitated
by
the
Action
and
Impulse
of
the
fiety
Corpuscles
,
than
the
gross
Particles
of
Earth
,
must
be
separated
and
expelled
,
and
the
other
remain
dry
and
hard
.
We
shall
perceive
with
the
same
Evidence
,
that
Fire
must
produce
a
quite
contrary
Effect
upon
Wax
,
if
we
know
that
it
is
composed
of
Particles
that
are
branched
,
and
almost
of
the
same
Bulk
.
Thus
may
particular
Ideas
be
subservient
to
the
Enquiry
after
Truth
,
whilst
loose
and
undeterminate
Notions
are
not
only
altogether
unserviceable
,
but
also
insensibly
engage
us
into
Errour
.
For
,
these
Philosophers
are
not
content
to
make
use
of
those
general
Terms
,
and
uncertain
Ideas
which
answer
to
them
;
they
moreover
pretend
,
that
those
Words
signifie
some
particular
Beings
;
they
give
out
,
that
there
is
a
Substance
distinguished
from
Matter
,
which
is
the
Form
of
it
;
and
withal
,
an
infinite
Number
of
little
Beings
,
really
distinguished
from
that
Matter
and
Form
,
of
which
they
suppose
as
many
as
they
have
different
Sensations
of
Bodies
,
or
as
those
Bodies
are
supposed
to
produce
different
Effects
.
However
,
't
is
visible
to
any
attentive
Person
,
that
those
little
Beings
,
for
instance
,
that
are
said
to
be
distinguished
from
Fire
,
and
suppos'd
to
be
contained
in
it
for
the
producing
Heat
,
Light
,
Hardness
,
Fluidity
,
&c.
are
but
the
Contrivances
of
the
Imagination
,
that
rebells
against
Reason
;
since
Reason
has
no
particular
Idea
that
represents
those
little
Beings
.
When
the
Philosophers
are
asked
,
What
is
the
illuminating
Faculty
in
Fire
?
They
only
answer
,
That
't
is
a
Being
which
is
the
Cause
that
Fire
is
capable
of
producing
Light
.
So
that
their
Idea
of
that
illuminating
Faculty
differs
not
from
the
general
Idea
of
Cause
,
and
the
confused
Idea
of
the
Effect
they
see
;
and
therefore
they
have
no
clear
Idea
of
what
they
say
,
when
they
admit
those
particular
Beings
;
and
so
say
what
they
not
only
understand
not
,
but
what
's
impossible
to
be
understood
.
CHAP.
III.
Of
the
most
dangerous
Errour
in
the
Philosophy
of
the
Ancients
.
PHilosophers
not
only
speak
without
understanding
themselves
,
when
they
explain
the
Effects
of
Nature
by
some
Beings
of
which
they
have
no
particular
Idea
;
but
also
establish
a
Principle
whence
very
false
and
pernicious
Consequences
may
directly
be
drawn
.
For
,
supposing
with
them
,
that
there
are
in
Bodies
certain
Entities
distinguished
from
Matter
,
and
having
no
distinct
Idea
of
those
Entities
;
't
is
easie
to
imagine
,
that
they
are
the
real
or
principal
Causes
of
the
Effects
we
see
.
And
this
is
the
very
Opinion
of
the
vulgar
Philosophers
.
The
prime
Reason
of
their
supposing
those
substantial
Forms
,
real
Qualities
,
and
other
such
like
Entities
,
is
,
to
explain
the
Effects
of
Nature
:
But
when
we
come
attentively
to
consider
the
Idea
we
have
of
Cause
or
Power
of
acting
,
we
cannot
doubt
but
that
it
represents
something
Divine
:
For
,
the
Idea
of
a
Sovereign
Power
is
the
Idea
of
a
Sovereign
Divinity
;
and
the
Idea
of
a
subordinate
Power
,
the
Idea
of
an
inferiour
Divinity
,
yet
a
true
Divinity
;
at
least
,
according
to
the
Opinion
of
the
Heathens
,
supposing
it
to
be
the
Idea
of
a
true
Power
or
Cause
.
And
therefore
we
admit
something
Divine
in
all
the
Bodies
that
surround
us
,
when
we
acknowledge
Forms
,
Faculties
,
Qualities
,
Virtues
,
and
real
Beings
that
are
capable
of
producing
some
Effects
by
the
force
of
their
Nature
;
and
thus
insensibly
approve
of
the
Sentiments
of
the
Heathens
,
by
too
great
a
Deference
for
their
Philosophy
.
Faith
indeed
corrects
us
;
but
it
may
perhaps
be
said
,
that
the
Mind
is
a
Pagan
,
whilst
the
Heart
is
a
Christian.
Moreover
,
it
is
a
hard
Matter
to
persuade
our selves
,
that
we
ought
neither
to
fear
nor
love
true
Powers
and
Beings
,
that
can
act
upon
us
,
punish
us
with
some
Pain
,
or
reward
us
with
some
Pleasure
.
And
as
Love
and
Fear
are
a
true
Adoration
,
it
is
hard
again
to
imagine
why
they
must
not
be
ador'd
:
For
,
whatever
can
act
upon
us
as
a
true
and
real
Cause
,
is
necessarily
above
us
,
according
to
Reason
and
St.
Austin
;
and
,
by
the
same
Reason
and
Authority
,
't
is
likewise
an
immutable
Law
,
That
inferiour
Beings
should
be
subservient
to
superiour
:
Whence
that
great
Father
concludes
,
That
the
Body
cannot
operate
upon
the
Soul
[
](A51674-e87620-b)*
*
Ego
enim
ab
anima
h●c
corpus
animari
non
pu●o
,
nisi
intentione
●acientis
:
nec
ab
isto
quicquam
illam
pati
arbitror
,
sed
facere
de
illo
,
&
in
illo
,
tanquam
subjecto
divinitus
dominationi
suae
.
l.
6.
Mu●c
.
c.
5.
See
also
De
quantit
.
Anim.
c.
34.
,
and
that
nothing
can
be
above
her
but
God
only
.
The
chief
Reasons
that
God
Almighty
uses
in
the
Holy
Scriptures
,
to
prove
to
the
Israelites
,
that
they
ought
to
adore
,
that
is
,
to
love
and
fear
him
,
are
drawn
from
his
Power
to
reward
or
punish
them
;
representing
to
them
the
Benefits
they
have
received
from
him
,
the
Punishments
he
has
inflicted
upon
them
,
and
his
Power
that
is
always
the
same
.
He
forbids
them
to
adore
the
Gods
of
the
Heathens
,
as
such
as
have
no
Power
over
them
,
and
can
doe
them
neither
harm
nor
good
.
He
commands
them
to
honour
him
alone
,
as
the
only
true
Cause
of
Good
and
Evil
,
Reward
and
Punishment
;
Amos
3.6
.
none
of
which
can
befal
a
City
,
according
to
the
Prophet
,
but
what
comes
from
him
,
by
reason
that
natural
Causes
are
not
the
true
Causes
of
the
Hurt
they
seem
to
doe
us
;
and
as
it
is
God
alone
that
acts
in
them
,
so
't
is
He
alone
that
must
be
fear'd
and
lov'd
in
them
:
Soli
Deo
Honor
&
Gloria
.
Lastly
,
The
Sense
of
fearing
and
Loving
what
may
be
the
true
Cause
of
Good
and
Evil
,
appears
so
natural
and
just
,
that
it
is
not
possible
to
cast
it
off
.
So
that
in
that
false
Supposition
of
the
Philosophers
,
which
we
are
here
endeavouring
to
destroy
,
that
the
surrounding
Bodies
are
the
true
Causes
of
our
Pain
and
Pleasure
;
Reason
seems
to
justifie
a
Religion
like
the
Pagan
Idolatry
,
and
approve
the
universal
Depravation
of
Morals
.
Reason
I
grant
,
teaches
not
,
to
adore
Onions
and
Leeks
,
for
instance
,
as
the
Sovereign
Divinity
;
because
they
can
never
make
us
altogether
happy
when
we
have
them
,
or
unhappy
when
we
want
them
:
neither
did
the
Heathens
worship
them
with
an
equal
Homage
as
their
great
Jupiter
,
whom
they
fansied
to
be
the
God
of
Gods
;
or
as
the
Sun
,
whom
our
Senses
represent
as
the
universal
Cause
,
that
gives
Life
and
Motion
to
all
things
,
and
which
we
can
hardly
forbear
to
look
on
as
the
Sovereign
Divinity
,
if
we
suppose
,
as
the
Pagan
Philosophers
,
that
he
Comprehends
in
his
Being
,
the
true
Causes
of
what
he
seems
to
produce
,
as
well
upon
our
Soul
and
Body
,
as
upon
all
the
Beings
that
surround
us
.
But
if
we
must
not
pay
a
Sovereign
Worship
to
Leeks
and
Onions
,
they
deserve
,
at
least
,
some
particular
Adoration
;
I
mean
they
may
be
thought
upon
and
loved
in
some
manner
,
if
it
be
true
,
that
they
can
in
some
sort
make
us
happy
,
and
may
be
honour'd
proportionably
to
the
good
they
doe
us
.
Surely
Men
that
listen
to
the
Reports
of
Sense
,
think
Pulse
capable
of
doing
them
good
;
otherwise
the
Israelites
would
not
have
bewailed
the
loss
of
them
in
the
Wilderness
,
or
look'd
on
themselves
as
unhappy
,
for
being
deprived
thereof
,
had
they
not
fansied
to
themselves
some
great
Happiness
in
the
Enjoyment
of
them
.
See
what
an
Abyss
of
Corruption
Reason
plunges
us
into
,
when
it
goes
hand
in
hand
with
the
Principles
of
Pagan
Philosophy
,
and
follows
the
footsteps
of
the
Senses
.
But
that
the
Falshood
of
that
wretched
Phylosophy
,
and
the
Certainty
of
our
Principles
,
and
Distinctness
of
our
Ideas
may
not
be
longer
doubted
;
it
will
be
necessary
plainly
to
establish
the
Truths
that
contradict
the
Errours
of
the
Ancient
Philosophers
,
or
to
prove
in
few
words
,
that
there
is
but
one
true
Cause
,
since
there
is
but
one
true
God
;
that
the
Nature
and
Force
of
every
thing
is
nothing
but
the
Will
of
God
;
that
all
Natural
things
are
not
real
,
but
only
occasional
Causes
;
and
some
other
Truths
depending
on
them
.
It
is
evident
,
that
all
Bodies
,
great
and
little
,
have
no
force
to
move
themselves
:
a
Mountain
,
a
House
,
a
Stone
,
a
Grain
of
Sand
,
the
minutest
and
bulkiest
Bodies
imaginable
,
are
alike
as
to
that
.
We
have
but
two
sorts
of
Ideas
,
viz.
of
Spirits
and
Bodies
;
and
as
we
ought
not
to
speak
what
we
conceive
not
,
so
we
must
only
argue
from
those
two
Ideas
.
Since
therefore
our
Idea
of
Bodies
,
convinces
us
that
they
cannot
move
themselves
,
we
must
conclude
that
they
are
moved
by
Spirits
.
But
considering
our
Idea
of
finite
Spirits
,
we
see
no
necessary
Connexion
betwixt
their
Will
,
and
the
Motion
of
any
Body
whatsoever
;
on
the
contrary
,
we
perceive
that
there
is
not
nor
can
be
any
.
Whence
we
must
infer
,
if
we
will
follow
Light
and
Reason
,
That
as
no
Body
can
move
it self
,
so
no
Created
Spirit
can
be
the
true
and
principal
Cause
of
its
Motion
.
But
when
we
think
on
the
Idea
of
God
,
or
of
a
Being
infinitely
perfect
,
and
consequently
Almighty
,
we
are
aware
that
there
is
such
a
Connexion
betwixt
his
Will
and
the
Motion
of
all
Bodies
,
that
it
is
impossible
to
conceive
he
should
will
that
a
Body
be
moved
,
and
it
should
not
be
moved
.
And
therefore
if
we
would
speak
according
to
our
Conceptions
,
and
not
according
to
our
Sensations
,
we
must
say
that
nothing
but
his
Will
can
move
Bodies
.
The
moving
force
of
Bodies
is
not
then
in
themselves
,
this
force
being
nothing
but
the
Will
of
God
:
Bodies
then
have
no
proper
Action
,
and
when
a
moving
Ball
meets
with
another
,
and
moves
it
,
the
former
communicates
nothing
of
its
own
to
the
latter
,
as
not
having
in
it self
the
Impression
it
communicates
;
though
the
former
be
the
Natural
Cause
of
the
latter's
Motion
;
and
therefore
a
natural
Cause
is
not
a
true
and
real
Cause
,
but
only
an
occasional
;
which
in
such
or
such
a
Case
determines
the
Author
of
Nature
to
act
in
such
or
such
a
manner
.
'T
is
certain
that
all
things
are
produced
by
the
Motion
of
visible
or
invisible
Bodies
;
for
Experience
teaches
us
,
that
those
Bodies
,
whose
parts
are
in
greater
Motion
,
are
always
the
most
active
,
and
those
that
Cause
the
greatest
Alterations
in
the
World
:
so
that
all
the
Forces
of
Nature
are
but
the
Will
of
God
,
who
Created
the
World
;
because
he
will'd
it
,
who
spake
and
it
was
done
[
](A51674-e87800-b)*
*
Psal.
33
▪
9.
;
who
moves
all
things
,
and
produces
all
the
Effects
we
see
,
because
he
has
established
some
Laws
,
by
which
Bodies
Communicate
their
Motion
to
each
other
when
they
meet
together
;
and
because
those
Laws
are
efficacious
,
they
and
not
the
Bodies
act
.
There
is
then
no
Force
,
Power
,
nor
true
Cause
in
all
the
Material
and
sensible
World
:
Nor
need
we
admit
any
Forms
,
Faculties
,
or
real
Qualities
to
produce
Effects
,
which
the
Bodies
bring
not
forth
,
or
to
divide
with
God
his
own
Essential
Force
and
Power
.
As
Bodies
cannot
be
the
true
Causes
of
any
thing
;
so
likewise
the
most
Noble
Spirits
are
subject
to
the
same
impotency
on
that
respect
:
They
cannot
know
any
thing
,
unless
God
enlightens
them
;
nor
have
the
Sensation
of
any
thing
,
unless
he
modifies
them
;
nor
will
,
unless
he
moves
them
towards
himself
:
They
may
indeed
determine
the
Impression
God
has
given
them
to
himself
,
towards
other
Objects
;
but
I
doubt
whether
it
can
be
call'd
a
Power
.
For
if
to
be
able
to
sin
is
a
Power
,
it
is
such
a
one
,
as
the
Almighty
wants
,
saith
St.
Austin
somewhere
.
If
Men
had
of
themselves
the
Power
of
loving
Good
,
it
might
be
said
that
they
have
some
Power
;
but
they
cannot
so
much
as
love
,
but
because
God
Wills
it
,
and
that
his
Will
is
Efficacious
.
They
love
,
because
God
continually
drives
them
towards
Good
in
general
,
that
is
,
towards
himself
,
for
whom
alone
they
are
Created
and
preserved
.
God
moves
them
,
and
not
themselves
,
towards
Good
in
general
:
and
they
only
follow
that
Impression
by
a
free
Choice
,
according
to
the
Law
of
God
,
or
determine
it
towards
false
and
seeming
Goods
,
according
to
the
Law
of
the
Flesh
;
But
they
cannot
determine
it
but
by
the
sight
of
Good
.
For
being
able
to
doe
nothing
without
an
Impression
from
above
,
they
are
incapable
of
loving
any
thing
but
Good
.
But
though
it
should
be
supposed
,
which
is
true
in
one
sense
,
that
Spirits
have
in
themselves
the
Power
of
knowing
Truths
,
and
loving
Good
;
should
their
Thoughts
and
Will
produce
nothing
outwardly
,
it
might
still
be
said
,
that
they
were
impotent
and
unoperative
.
Now
it
seems
undeniable
,
that
the
Will
of
Spirits
is
not
able
to
move
the
smallest
Body
in
the
World
;
it
being
evident
there
is
no
necessary
Connexion
betwixt
the
Will
we
may
have
of
moving
our
Arm
,
for
instance
,
and
the
Motion
of
the
same
Arm.
It
moves
indeed
whenever
we
will
it
,
and
we
may
be
call'd
,
in
that
sense
,
the
natural
cause
of
the
Motion
of
our
Arm
;
yet
natural
Causes
are
not
true
,
but
only
occasional
,
as
acting
by
the
mere
force
and
efficacy
of
the
Will
of
God
,
as
we
have
already
explain'd
.
For
how
is
it
possible
for
us
to
move
our
Arm
?
To
perform
this
,
't
is
requir'd
we
should
have
Animal
Spirits
,
and
send
them
through
certain
Nerves
towards
certain
Muscles
,
to
swell
up
and
contract
them
,
for
so
that
Motion
is
perform'd
,
as
some
pretend
,
though
others
deny
it
,
and
assert
that
the
Mystery
is
not
yet
discover'd
.
However
it
be
,
most
Men
know
not
so
much
as
that
they
have
Spirits
,
Nerves
and
Muscles
,
and
yet
move
their
Arms
with
as
much
and
more
dexterity
than
the
most
skilful
Anatomists
.
Men
therefore
will
the
moving
their
Arm
,
but
't
is
God
that
is
able
,
and
knows
how
to
doe
it
.
If
a
Man
cannot
overthrow
a
Tower
,
yet
he
knows
what
must
be
done
to
effect
it
:
but
not
one
amongst
them
knows
what
the
Animal
Spirits
must
doe
to
move
one
of
his
Fingers
.
How
should
they
then
move
the
whole
Arm
of
themselves
?
These
things
appear
very
evident
to
me
,
and
,
I
suppose
,
to
all
thinking
Persons
;
though
they
may
be
incomprehensible
to
others
,
such
as
are
only
used
to
the
confused
voice
of
the
Senses
.
But
Men
are
so
far
from
being
the
true
Causes
of
the
Motions
produc'd
in
their
Body
,
that
it
seems
to
imply
a
Contradiction
they
should
be
so
.
For
a
true
Cause
is
that
betwixt
which
and
its
Effect
,
the
Mind
percieves
a
necessary
connexion
;
for
so
I
understand
it
.
But
there
is
none
besides
the
infinitely
perfect
Being
,
betwixt
whose
Will
and
the
Effects
the
Mind
can
perceive
a
necessary
Connexion
;
and
therefore
none
but
God
is
the
true
Cause
,
or
has
a
real
Power
of
moving
Bodies
.
Nay
,
it
seems
unconceivable
,
that
God
should
communicate
this
Power
,
either
to
Angels
or
Men
:
And
those
that
pretend
that
the
Power
we
have
of
moving
our
Arm
is
a
true
Power
,
must
by
Consequence
grant
that
God
can
give
Spirits
the
Power
of
creating
,
annihilating
,
and
doing
all
possible
things
;
in
short
,
that
he
can
make
them
Almighty
,
as
I
am
going
to
pove
.
God
needs
not
Instruments
to
act
,
't
is
enough
he
should
Will
the
Existence
of
a
thing
,
in
order
to
its
Existing
;
because
it
is
contradictory
that
he
should
will
a
thing
,
and
his
Will
should
not
be
fulfilled
.
And
therefore
his
Power
is
his
Will
,
and
to
communicate
his
Power
is
to
communicate
his
Will
;
so
that
to
communicate
his
Will
to
a
Man
or
an
Angel
,
can
signifie
nothing
else
,
but
to
will
that
whenever
that
Man
or
Angel
shall
desire
that
such
or
such
a
Body
be
moved
,
it
may
actually
be
moved
.
In
which
Case
I
see
two
Wills
concurring
together
,
that
of
God
,
and
that
of
the
Angel
,
and
to
know
which
of
them
is
the
true
Cause
of
the
Motion
of
that
Body
,
I
enquire
which
is
the
Efficacious
.
I
see
a
necessary
Connexion
betwixt
the
Will
of
God
,
and
the
thing
willed
;
in
this
Case
God
wills
that
whenever
the
Angel
shall
desire
that
such
a
Body
be
moved
,
it
be
really
so
.
There
is
then
a
necessary
Connexion
betwixt
the
Will
of
God
,
and
the
Motion
of
that
Body
,
and
consequently
God
is
the
true
Cause
of
that
Motion
,
and
the
Will
of
the
Angel
is
only
occasional
.
Again
,
to
make
it
more
evidently
manifest
,
let
us
suppose
God
wills
it
should
happen
quite
contrary
to
the
Desire
of
some
Spirits
,
as
may
be
thought
of
the
Devils
,
or
some
other
wicked
Spirits
in
Punishment
of
their
Sins
.
In
that
Case
it
cannot
be
said
God
communicates
his
Power
to
them
;
since
nothing
happens
of
what
they
wish
.
However
the
Will
of
those
Spirits
shall
be
the
natural
Cause
of
the
produced
Effects
:
as
such
a
Body
shall
be
removed
to
the
Right
,
because
they
wish
it
were
moved
to
the
Left
;
and
the
Desires
of
those
Spirits
shall
determine
the
Will
of
God
to
act
,
as
the
Will
of
moving
the
Parts
of
our
Body
,
determine
the
first
Cause
to
move
them
;
and
therefore
the
Desires
of
all
finite
Spirits
are
but
occasional
Causes
.
If
,
after
all
these
Reasons
,
it
be
still
asserted
,
that
the
Will
of
an
Angel
moving
a
Body
is
a
true
,
and
not
a
bare
occasional
Cause
;
't
is
evident
,
that
the
self-same
Angel
might
be
the
true
Cause
of
the
Creation
and
Annihilation
of
all
things
,
since
God
might
as
well
communicate
to
him
his
Power
of
Creating
,
and
annihilating
Bodies
,
as
that
of
moving
them
,
if
He
should
will
that
they
should
be
created
,
and
annihilated
:
in
a
word
,
if
he
will'd
that
all
things
should
be
performed
according
to
the
Angel's
Desires
,
as
he
wills
that
Bodies
be
moved
as
the
Angel
pleases
;
if
therefore
it
may
be
said
,
that
an
Angel
or
Man
are
true
Movers
,
because
God
moves
Bodies
as
they
desire
;
that
Man
or
Angel
might
likewise
be
call'd
true
Creatours
,
since
God
might
create
Beings
on
occasion
of
their
Will
:
Nay
,
perhaps
it
might
be
said
,
that
the
vilest
of
Animals
,
or
even
mere
Matter
,
is
the
real
Cause
of
the
Creation
of
some
Substance
;
if
it
be
supposed
with
some
Philosophers
,
that
God
produces
substantial
Forms
,
whenever
the
Disposition
of
Matter
requires
it
.
And
lastly
,
since
God
has
resolved
from
all
Eternity
,
to
create
some
certain
things
,
at
some
certain
times
;
those
Times
might
also
be
called
the
Causes
of
the
Creation
of
such
Beings
;
with
as
much
right
as
't
is
pretended
,
that
a
Ball
meeting
with
another
is
the
true
Cause
of
the
Motion
that
is
communicated
to
it
;
because
God
,
by
his
general
Will
,
that
constitutes
the
Order
of
Nature
,
has
decreed
,
that
such
or
such
Communication
of
Motions
should
follow
upon
the
Concourse
of
two
Bodies
.
There
is
then
but
one
true
Cause
,
as
there
is
one
true
God
:
Neither
must
we
imagine
,
that
what
precedes
an
Effect
does
really
produce
it
.
God
himself
cannot
communicate
his
Power
to
Creatures
according
to
the
Light
of
Reason
;
He
cannot
make
them
true
Causes
,
and
change
them
into
Gods
.
But
though
he
might
doe
it
,
we
conceive
not
why
he
should
will
it
.
Bodies
,
Spirits
,
pure
Intelligences
,
all
can
doe
nothing
.
'T
is
he
who
has
made
Spirits
,
that
enlightens
and
moves
them
;
't
is
he
who
has
created
Heaven
and
Earth
,
that
regulates
all
their
Motions
:
In
fine
,
't
is
the
Authour
of
our
Being
that
performs
our
Desires
;
Semel
jussit
,
semper
paret
:
He
moves
even
our
Arms
,
when
we
use
them
against
his
Orders
;
for
he
complains
by
his
Prophets
,
That
we
make
him
subservient
to
our
unjust
and
criminal
Desires
.
All
those
little
Divinities
of
the
Heathens
,
all
those
particular
Causes
of
Philosophers
,
are
Chimeras
,
which
the
wicked
Spirit
endeavours
to
set
up
,
that
he
may
destroy
the
Worship
of
the
true
God
.
The
Philosophy
we
have
received
from
Adam
,
teaches
us
no
such
things
;
but
that
which
has
been
propagated
by
the
Serpent
;
for
,
ever
since
the
Fall
,
the
Mind
of
Man
is
turned
Heathen
.
That
Philosophy
,
join'd
to
the
Errours
of
the
Senses
,
has
made
Men
pay
their
Worship
to
the
Sun
,
and
is
still
the
universal
Cause
of
the
Disorders
of
their
Mind
,
and
the
Corruption
of
their
Heart
.
Why
,
say
they
,
by
their
Actions
,
and
sometimes
by
their
Words
,
should
we
not
love
Bodies
,
since
they
are
able
to
afford
us
Pleasure
?
And
why
are
the
Israelites
blam'd
for
lamenting
the
Loss
of
the
Garlick
and
Onions
of
Egypt
,
since
the
Privation
of
those
things
,
which
enjoyed
,
afforded
them
some
Happiness
,
made
them
in
some
sort
unhappy
?
But
the
Philosophy
that
is
mis-call'd
New
,
and
represented
as
a
Bugbear
to
frighten
weak
Minds
;
that
is
despised
and
condemned
without
hearing
:
that
New
Philsosophy
,
I
say
,
(
since
it
must
have
that
name
,
)
destroys
all
the
Pretences
of
the
Libertines
,
by
the
establishing
its
very
first
Principle
that
perfectly
agrees
with
the
first
Principle
of
the
Christian
Religion
[
](A51674-e87990-b)*
*
Haec
est
Religio
Christiana
,
fratres
mei
,
quae
praedicatur
per
universum
mundum
horrentibus
inimicis
,
&
ubi
vincuntur
murmurantibus
▪
ubi
praevalent
saevientibus
;
haec
est
Religio
Christiana
,
ut
COLATVR
VNVS
DEVS
,
NON
MVLTI
DII
,
QVIA
NON
FACIT
ANIMAM
BEATAM
NISI
VNVS
DEVS
.
Aug.
Tr.
23.
in
Joan.
,
namely
,
That
we
must
love
and
fear
none
but
God
,
since
none
but
He
alone
can
make
us
happy
.
As
Religion
declares
that
there
is
but
one
true
God
,
so
this
Philosophy
shews
that
there
is
but
one
true
Cause
.
As
Religion
teaches
that
all
the
Heathen
Divinities
are
but
dead
Metals
,
and
immovable
Stone
;
so
this
Philosophy
discovers
,
that
all
the
second
Causes
,
or
Divinities
of
the
Philosophers
,
are
but
unactive
Matter
,
and
ineffective
Wills
.
As
Religion
commands
,
not
to
bow
to
those
Gods
that
are
not
Gods
,
so
this
Philosophy
teaches
,
not
to
prostrate
our
Minds
and
Imagination
before
the
phantastick
Grandeur
and
Power
of
pretended
Causes
,
which
are
not
Causes
:
which
we
ought
neither
to
love
,
nor
to
fear
,
nor
be
taken
up
with
;
but
think
upon
God
alone
,
see
and
adore
,
love
and
fear
him
in
all
things
.
But
that
's
not
the
Inclination
of
some
Philosophers
;
they
will
neither
see
God
,
nor
think
upon
him
;
for
ever
since
the
Fall
there
is
a
secret
Opposition
betwixt
God
and
Man
.
They
delight
in
Gods
of
their
own
Invention
;
in
loving
and
fearing
the
Contrivances
of
their
Heart
,
as
the
Heathens
did
the
Works
of
their
Hands
.
They
are
like
those
Children
,
who
tremble
at
the
sight
of
their
Play-Fellows
,
after
they
have
dawb'd
and
blacken'd
them
.
Or
,
if
they
desire
a
more
noble
Comparison
,
though
perhaps
not
so
just
,
they
resemble
those
famous
Romans
,
who
reverenced
the
Fictions
of
their
Mind
,
and
foolishly
adored
their
Emperours
,
after
they
themselves
had
let
loose
the
Eagle
at
their
Canonization
.
CHAP.
IV.
An
Explication
of
the
Second
Part
of
the
General
Rule
:
That
the
Philosophers
observe
it
not
,
but
that
Des
Cartes
has
exactly
followed
it
.
WE
have
been
shewing
to
what
Errours
Men
are
liable
,
when
they
reason
upon
the
false
and
confused
Ideas
of
the
Senses
,
and
their
rambling
and
undetermin'd
Notions
of
Logick
;
whence
it
appears
,
that
to
keep
to
Evidence
in
our
Perceptions
,
't
is
absolutely
necessary
exactly
to
observe
that
Rule
we
have
prescrib'd
;
and
to
examine
which
are
the
clear
and
distinct
Ideas
of
things
,
that
we
may
only
argue
by
deduction
from
them
.
In
that
same
general
Rule
,
concerning
the
Subject
of
our
Studies
,
there
is
yet
a
remarkable
Circumstance
;
namely
,
That
we
must
still
begin
with
the
most
simple
and
easie
things
,
and
insist
long
upon
them
,
before
we
undertake
the
Enquiry
after
the
more
composed
and
difficult
.
For
if
,
to
preserve
Evidence
in
all
our
Perceptions
,
we
must
only
reason
upon
distinct
Ideas
,
't
is
plain
that
we
must
never
meddle
with
the
Enquiry
of
compound
things
,
before
the
simple
,
on
which
they
depend
,
have
been
carefully
examin'd
,
and
made
familiar
to
us
by
a
nice
Scrutiny
;
since
the
Ideas
of
compound
things
,
neither
are
,
nor
can
be
clear
,
as
long
as
the
most
simple
,
of
which
they
are
composed
,
are
but
confusedly
and
imperfectly
known
.
We
know
things
imperfectly
,
when
we
are
not
sure
to
have
considered
all
their
Parts
:
and
we
know
them
confusedly
,
when
they
are
not
familiar
enough
to
the
Mind
,
though
we
may
be
certain
of
having
consider'd
all
their
Parts
.
When
we
know
them
but
imperfectly
,
our
Argumentations
are
only
probable
:
when
we
perceive
them
confusedly
,
there
is
neither
Order
not
Light
in
our
Inferences
;
and
often
we
know
not
where
we
are
,
or
whither
we
are
going
:
But
when
we
know
them
both
imperfectly
and
confusedly
,
which
is
the
commonest
of
all
,
we
know
not
so
much
as
what
we
would
look
for
,
much
less
by
what
Means
we
are
to
find
it
:
So
that
it
is
altogether
necessary
to
keep
strictly
to
that
Order
in
our
Studies
,
Of
still
beginning
by
the
most
simple
Things
,
examining
all
their
Parts
,
and
being
well
acquainted
with
them
,
before
we
meddle
with
the
more
composed
,
that
depend
on
the
former
.
But
that
Rule
agrees
not
with
the
Inclination
of
Man
,
who
naturally
despises
whatever
appears
easie
;
his
Mind
being
made
for
an
unlimited
Object
,
and
almost
incomprehensible
,
cannto
make
a
long
Stay
on
the
Consideration
of
those
simple
Ideas
,
which
want
the
Character
of
Infinite
,
for
which
he
is
created
.
On
the
contrary
,
and
for
the
same
Reason
,
he
has
much
Veneration
,
and
an
eager
Passion
,
for
great
,
obscure
,
and
mysterious
Things
,
and
such
as
participate
of
Infinity
:
Not
that
he
loves
Darkness
;
but
that
he
hopes
to
find
in
those
deep
Recesses
a
Good
,
and
Truth
capable
of
satisfying
his
Desires
.
Vanity
likewise
gives
a
great
Commotion
to
the
Spirits
,
stirring
them
to
what
is
great
and
extraordinary
,
and
encouraging
them
with
a
foolish
Hope
of
hitting
right
.
Experience
teaches
,
that
the
most
accurate
Knowledge
of
ordinary
Things
gives
no
great
Name
in
the
World
;
whereas
to
be
acquainted
with
uncommon
Things
,
though
never
so
confusedly
and
imperfectly
,
always
procures
the
Esteem
and
Reverence
of
those
who
willingly
conceive
a
great
Idea
of
whatever
is
out
of
their
depth
of
Understanding
:
And
that
Experience
determines
all
those
who
are
more
sensible
to
Vanity
than
to
Truth
,
(
which
certainly
make
up
the
greatest
Number
)
to
a
blind-fold
Search
of
a
specious
,
though
chimerical
,
Knowledge
of
what
is
great
,
rare
,
and
unintelligible
.
How
many
are
there
that
reject
the
Cartesian
Philosophy
,
for
that
ridiculous
Reason
,
That
its
Principles
are
too
simple
and
easie
:
There
are
in
this
Philosophy
no
obscure
and
mysterious
Terms
;
Women
,
and
Persons
unskill'd
in
Greek
and
Latin
,
are
capable
of
learning
it
.
It
must
then
be
,
say
they
,
something
very
inconsiderable
,
and
unworthy
the
Application
of
great
Genius's
.
They
imagine
,
that
Principles
so
clear
and
simple
are
not
fruitful
enough
to
explain
the
Effects
of
Nature
,
which
they
supposed
to
be
dark
,
intricate
,
and
confused
:
They
see
not
presently
the
Use
of
those
Principles
,
that
are
too
simple
and
easie
to
stop
their
Attention
long
enough
to
make
them
understand
their
Use
and
Extent
.
They
rather
chuse
to
explain
Effects
whose
Causes
are
unknown
to
them
,
by
unconceivable
Principles
,
than
by
such
as
are
both
simple
and
intelligible
.
For
the
Principles
these
Philosophers
are
wont
to
explain
obscure
Things
by
,
are
not
only
obscure
themselves
,
but
utterly
incomprehensible
.
Those
that
pretend
to
explain
Things
extremely
intricate
,
by
Principles
clear
and
generally
receiv'd
,
may
easily
be
refuted
,
if
they
succeed
not
;
since
to
know
whether
what
they
say
be
true
,
one
needs
only
comprehend
well
what
they
say
.
The
falsely-learn'd
are
not
pleased
with
this
,
and
obtain
not
the
Admiration
they
pursue
in
using
intelligible
Principles
;
for
,
as
soon
as
one
understands
their
Notions
,
he
plainly
perceives
that
they
say
nothing
:
But
when
they
make
use
of
unknown
Principles
,
and
speak
of
very
complex'd
Things
as
though
they
exactly
knew
all
their
Relations
,
they
are
admired
by
their
Hearers
,
who
understand
not
what
they
say
;
because
we
are
naturally
inclin'd
to
reverence
whatever
goes
above
the
reach
of
our
Understanding
.
Now
,
as
obscure
and
incomprehensible
Things
seem
to
hang
better
with
each
other
,
than
with
such
as
are
clear
and
intelligible
;
so
incomprehensible
Principles
are
much
more
made
use
of
in
very
difficult
and
abstruse
Questions
,
than
such
as
are
easie
and
intelligible
.
There
is
nothing
so
difficult
,
but
,
by
the
means
of
these
Principles
,
Philosophers
and
Physicians
will
solve
it
in
few
Words
;
for
their
Principles
being
yet
more
incomprehensible
than
any
Questions
that
can
be
proposed
them
,
those
Principles
being
taken
for
granted
,
no
Difficulty
can
afterwards
put
them
to
a
Nonplus
.
Thus
,
for
instance
,
they
boldly
,
and
without
boggling
,
make
answer
to
these
dark
and
undetermin'd
Questions
,
viz.
Why
the
Sun
attracts
Vapours
?
Why
the
Peruvian
Bark
stops
the
Quar●an
Ague
?
Why
Rhubarb
purges
Choler
,
and
the
Polychrest-Salt
Phlegm
?
and
the
like
.
Most
Men
seem
pretty
well
satisfied
with
their
Answers
,
because
obscure
and
incomprehensible
Things
shake
Hands
together
:
But
unintelligible
Principles
suit
not
Questions
that
may
be
clearly
and
easily
resolv'd
,
because
by
that
Solution
it
plainly
appears
,
that
they
are
altogether
insignificant
.
The
Philosophers
cannot
explain
,
by
their
Principles
,
How
Horses
draw
a
Coach
?
Why
Dust
stops
a
Watch
?
How
the
Trepoly-Stone
cleanses
Metals
,
and
a
Brush
our
Clothes
?
For
,
they
would
appear
ridiculous
to
all
the
World
,
should
they
suppose
a
Motion
of
Attraction
,
and
Attractive
Faculties
,
to
explain
why
the
Coach
follows
the
Horses
;
and
a
Detersive
Faculty
in
the
Brush
,
for
cleansing
of
Clothes
,
&c.
So
that
their
great
Principles
are
only
serviceable
in
dark
and
intricate
Questions
,
by
reason
of
their
Incomprehensibility
.
We
ought
not
therefore
to
insist
upon
any
Principle
that
appears
not
plain
and
evident
,
and
of
which
it
may
be
supposed
,
that
some
Nations
reject
it
:
But
we
must
attentively
consider
the
Ideas
we
have
of
Extension
,
Figure
,
and
Local
Motion
,
and
the
Relations
they
have
between
them
:
If
we
conceive
them
distinctly
,
and
find
them
so
plain
and
clear
,
as
to
be
persuaded
they
were
ever
generally
received
by
all
Nations
,
we
must
dwell
upon
them
,
and
examine
all
their
Relations
:
But
if
they
seem
obscure
and
dark
to
us
,
we
must
endeavour
to
find
others
.
For
,
if
to
avoid
the
Fear
of
Mistakes
and
Errours
,
it
is
always
requisite
to
preserve
Evidence
in
our
Percep●ions
,
it
follows
,
that
we
must
argue
only
from
clear
Ideas
,
and
from
Relations
distinctly
known
.
To
consider
in
order
the
Properties
of
Extension
,
we
must
,
as
Des
Cartes
did
,
begin
with
the
most
simple
Relations
,
and
thence
proceed
to
the
more
composed
;
not
only
because
this
Method
is
the
most
natural
,
and
bears
up
the
Mind
in
its
Operations
;
but
also
because
God
ever
acting
with
Order
,
and
by
the
most
simple
Ways
,
that
sort
of
Examination
of
our
Ideas
,
and
their
Relations
,
will
better
manifest
to
us
his
Works
.
And
if
we
consider
,
that
the
most
simple
Relations
always
offer
themselves
first
to
the
Imagination
,
when
't
is
not
determin'd
to
think
rather
on
one
Thing
than
another
,
it
will
appear
,
that
to
find
out
that
Order
we
prescribe
,
and
to
discover
very
composed
Truths
,
it
is
sufficient
to
look
attentively
,
and
without
prejudice
,
upon
Objects
;
provided
always
we
skip
not
too
hastily
from
one
Subject
to
another
.
When
we
look
attentively
upon
Matter
,
we
easily
conceive
that
one
Part
may
be
separated
from
another
;
that
is
to
say
,
we
easily
conceive
a
Local
Motion
,
which
Motion
produces
a
Figure
in
each
of
the
Bodies
moved
.
The
most
simple
of
all
Motions
,
which
first
occurs
to
the
Imagination
,
is
a
Motion
in
a
Right
Line
.
Supposing
then
,
that
some
Part
of
Matter
is
moved
in
a
Right
Line
,
it
will
necessarily
displace
some
other
Portion
of
Matter
it
shall
find
in
its
way
,
which
latter
shall
circularly
move
to
take
the
Room
which
the
former
has
left
:
Hence
comes
a
Circular
Motion
.
And
if
we
conceive
infinite
Motions
in
a
Right
Line
,
in
an
infinite
number
of
similar
Parts
of
that
immense
Extension
we
consider
,
it
will
again
necessarily
follow
,
that
all
these
Bodies
mutually
hindring
each
other
,
shall
all
conspire
by
their
reciprocal
Action
and
Re-action
,
that
is
,
by
the
mutual
Communication
of
all
their
particular
Motions
,
to
produce
one
that
is
Circular
.
That
first
Consideration
of
the
most
simple
Relations
of
our
Ideas
,
already
discovers
to
us
the
necessity
of
the
Vortexes
of
Des
Cartes
,
that
their
Number
will
be
so
much
greater
,
as
the
Motions
in
a
Right
Line
of
all
the
Parts
of
the
Extension
,
having
been
more
contrary
to
each
other
,
shall
with
more
difficulty
have
been
reduc'd
to
the
same
Motion
;
and
that
amongst
those
Vortexes
,
the
greatest
will
be
those
in
which
most
Parts
shall
have
concurr'd
together
to
the
same
Motion
,
or
whose
Parts
shall
have
had
more
Strength
to
continue
their
Motion
in
a
Right
Line
.
In
the
mean
while
,
care
must
be
taken
not
to
dissipate
nor
weary
our
Mind
,
by
vainly
applying
it
to
the
vast
Number
and
unmeasurable
Greatness
of
those
Vortexes
:
We
must
rather
insist
upon
some
one
of
them
for
some
time
,
and
orderly
and
attentively
enquire
after
all
the
Motions
of
the
Matter
it
contains
,
and
all
the
Figures
wherewith
the
Parts
of
that
Matter
may
be
endued
.
As
there
is
no
simple
Motion
but
that
in
a
Right
Line
,
we
must
first
consider
it
,
as
that
in
which
all
Bodies
cotinually
tend
to
move
themselves
;
since
God
always
acts
by
the
most
simple
Ways
:
And
if
Bodies
move
Circularly
,
't
is
only
because
meeting
with
constant
Oppositions
,
they
are
perpetually
turn'd
from
their
direct
Motion
.
So
that
all
Bodies
being
not
of
an
equal
Bulk
,
and
the
biggest
having
more
Strength
than
others
to
continue
their
Motion
in
a
Right
Line
,
we
easily
conceive
,
that
the
smallest
Bodies
must
sink
to
the
Centre
of
the
Vortex
,
and
the
biggest
rise
towards
the
Circumference
;
since
the
Lines
which
moving
Bodies
are
suppos'd
to
describe
at
the
Circumference
of
a
Circle
,
are
nearer
to
a
Right
Line
,
than
those
which
they
describe
towards
the
Centre
.
If
we
conceive
again
,
that
every
Part
of
that
Matter
could
not
at
first
move
,
and
meet
with
a
perpetual
Opposition
to
its
Motion
,
without
being
smooth'd
and
rounded
,
and
having
its
Angles
broken
off
;
we
shall
discover
,
that
all
that
Extension
will
be
compos'd
of
two
sorts
of
Bodies
,
viz.
of
round
Globules
,
which
perpetually
turn
upon
their
own
Centre
,
and
that
in
several
different
Ways
,
and
,
besides
that
particular
Motion
,
are
carried
about
by
the
Motion
common
to
all
the
Vortex
;
and
of
a
very
fluid
and
agitated
Matter
,
produced
from
the
Motion
of
the
foresaid
Globules
.
Besides
the
Circular
Motion
common
to
all
the
Parts
of
the
Vortex
,
that
subtle
Matter
must
yet
have
another
particular
,
and
almost
direct
,
from
the
Circle
of
the
Vortex
to
the
Circumference
,
through
the
Intervals
of
the
Globules
,
that
leave
a
Passage
open
:
So
that
the
Motion
composed
of
those
Motions
will
represent
a
Spiral
Line
.
That
fluid
Matter
,
call'd
by
Des
Cartes
,
the
first
Element
,
being
divided
into
Parts
that
are
much
smaller
,
and
have
not
so
much
strength
to
continue
their
direct
Motion
,
as
the
Globules
,
or
second
Element
;
't
is
evident
,
that
the
first
Element
must
take
up
the
Centre
of
the
Vortex
,
and
fill
the
empty
Spaces
which
the
Parts
of
the
Second
leave
between
them
;
and
that
the
rest
of
the
Vortex
must
be
filled
with
those
Parts
of
the
Second
,
and
come
nearer
to
the
Circumference
,
proportionably
to
their
Bulk
,
or
to
the
Force
they
have
of
continuing
their
Motion
in
a
Direct
Line
.
As
to
the
Figure
of
the
whole
Vortex
,
after
what
has
been
said
,
it
cannot
be
doubted
,
but
that
the
Distance
from
one
Pole
to
the
other
,
will
be
shorter
than
that
of
the
Line
which
cuts
the
Equator
.
And
if
we
consider
that
the
Vortexes
surround
and
compress
each
other
unequally
,
we
shall
plainly
see
that
their
Equator
[
](A51674-e88550-b)*
*
By
Equator
I
understand
the
greatest
Crooked
Line
which
the
Matter
of
the
Vortex
describes
.
is
a
crooked
irregular
Line
,
that
comes
near
to
an
Ellipsis
.
These
are
the
Things
that
offer
themselves
naturally
to
the
Mind
,
when
we
attentively
consider
what
should
happen
to
the
Parts
of
Extension
,
perpetually
tending
to
move
in
a
Right
Line
,
that
is
,
in
the
most
simple
Motion
.
If
we
now
suppose
a
Thing
which
seems
most
worthy
the
Divine
Power
and
Wisdom
,
namely
,
That
God
has
formed
the
whose
Universe
at
once
,
in
the
same
State
those
Parts
would
have
naturally
fallen
into
and
disposed
themselves
in
time
,
by
the
most
simple
Ways
;
and
that
he
preserves
them
by
the
same
natural
Laws
:
In
a
word
,
if
we
compare
our
Ideas
with
the
visible
Objects
,
we
shall
conclude
,
that
the
Sun
is
the
Centre
of
the
Vortex
;
that
the
Corporeal
Light
,
which
it
diffuses
every
where
,
is
nothing
but
the
continual
Effort
of
the
little
Globules
,
tending
to
remove
from
the
Centre
of
the
Vortex
;
which
Light
must
be
communicated
in
an
Instant
through
those
vast
Spaces
,
because
they
being
full
of
those
Globules
,
one
cannot
be
press'd
upon
,
without
the
Motion
of
all
the
others
that
are
opposite
to
it
.
Several
other
Consequences
may
be
drawn
from
what
has
been
said
,
because
the
most
simple
Principles
are
the
most
fruitful
to
explain
the
Works
of
a
Being
which
always
acts
by
the
most
simple
Ways
.
But
we
still
want
to
consider
some
Things
that
will
be
incident
to
Matter
.
Let
us
then
imagine
,
that
there
are
several
Vortexes
,
like
to
that
we
have
described
in
few
Words
;
that
the
Stars
,
which
are
so
many
Suns
,
are
the
Centres
of
those
Vortexes
,
which
surround
each
other
,
and
are
disposed
in
such
a
manner
,
as
that
they
hinder
one
anothers
Motion
the
least
they
can
;
but
that
before
Things
came
to
that
Perfection
,
the
weakest
Vortexes
were
carried
away
,
and
as
it
were
swallowed
up
by
the
strongest
.
To
understand
this
,
we
need
but
suppose
that
the
first
Element
,
which
is
at
the
Centre
,
may
fly
,
and
perpetually
flies
out
through
the
Intervals
of
the
Globules
,
towards
the
Circumference
of
the
Vortex
;
and
that
at
the
same
time
that
this
Centre
or
Star
empties
it self
through
the
Equator
,
other
Matter
of
the
first
Element
comes
into
it
through
the
Poles
;
for
neither
the
Star
nor
its
Poles
can
empty
themselves
at
one
side
,
without
being
fill'd
at
another
,
since
there
is
no
Vacuity
in
Extension
.
But
as
an
infinite
number
of
Causes
may
hinder
a
great
Quantity
of
the
first
Element
from
coming
into
that
Star
,
the
Parts
of
the
first
Element
that
shall
be
forced
to
remain
in
it
,
will
be
necessitated
to
adapt
themselves
so
,
as
to
move
one
and
the
same
way
;
which
causes
them
to
fasten
and
link
themselves
together
,
and
constitutes
them
into
Spots
;
which
condensing
and
thickning
into
Crusts
,
cover
by
degrees
the
Centre
;
and
out
of
the
most
subtil
and
agitated
of
all
Bodies
,
are
form'd
into
gross
and
solid
Matter
.
This
course
sort
of
Matter
is
called
by
Des
Cartes
,
the
third
Element
,
and
is
endued
with
an
infinite
number
of
Shapes
and
Figures
,
as
is
the
first
Element
,
from
which
it
is
generated
and
produced
.
That
Star
being
thus
over-grown
with
Spots
and
Crusts
,
and
become
like
the
other
Planets
,
has
no
longer
a
sufficient
Strength
to
defend
its
Vortex
against
the
continual
Struggle
and
Irruptions
of
those
that
surround
it
;
therefore
it
insensibly
diminishes
:
The
Matter
that
composes
it
,
is
dispersed
on
all
sides
,
and
the
strongest
of
the
neighbouring
Vortexes
carries
the
greatest
part
away
,
and
at
last
involves
the
Planet
that
is
the
Centre
of
it
.
This
Planet
being
wholly
surrounded
with
the
Matter
of
the
great
Vortex
,
swims
along
in
it
,
only
keeping
,
together
with
some
of
the
Matter
of
its
own
Vortex
,
its
former
Circular
Motion
,
and
takes
at
last
such
a
Situation
,
as
puts
it
in
Aequilibrio
with
an
equal
Quantity
of
the
Matter
in
which
it
swims
.
If
it
has
but
little
Solidity
and
Magnitude
,
it
descends
very
near
the
Centre
of
the
surrounding
Vortex
;
because
having
no
great
Force
to
continue
its
Motion
in
a
Right
Line
,
it
must
take
such
a
Place
in
that
Vortex
,
as
that
an
equal
Quantity
of
the
second
Element
,
endeavouring
to
remove
from
the
Centre
,
may
be
in
Aequilibrio
with
it
;
that
being
the
only
Place
where
it
can
be
exactly
balanc'd
.
If
that
Planet
be
of
greater
Bulk
and
Solidity
,
it
must
seek
its
Aequilibrium
in
a
Place
more
distant
from
the
Centre
of
the
Vortex
.
And
lastly
,
If
there
is
no
Place
in
the
Vortex
,
in
which
an
equal
Quantity
of
its
Matter
hath
as
much
Solidity
as
this
Planet
,
and
consequently
as
much
Strength
to
continue
its
Motion
in
a
Direct
Line
,
perhaps
because
the
Planet
shall
be
very
bulky
,
and
over-grown
with
very
solid
and
condens'd
Crusts
;
it
shall
not
stop
in
that
Vortex
,
as
finding
no
Aequilibrium
in
the
Matter
that
composes
it
;
but
pass
from
Vortex
to
Vortex
,
until
it
meets
with
a
Place
in
which
it
may
be
equally
balanced
by
a
competent
Quantity
of
Matter
;
so
that
it
will
sometimes
be
seen
in
its
Passage
,
as
the
Comets
are
,
when
it
shall
be
in
our
Vortex
,
and
at
a
convenient
Distance
from
us
:
But
it
will
not
be
seen
in
a
long
time
,
when
it
shall
be
in
other
Vortexes
,
or
in
the
utmost
Boundary
of
ours
.
If
we
hereupon
conclude
,
that
a
single
Vortex
may
,
by
reason
of
its
Bulk
,
Strength
,
and
advantageous
Situation
,
insensibly
undermine
,
involve
,
and
carry
away
several
Vortexes
,
and
even
such
as
shall
have
conquer'd
others
;
it
will
necessarily
follow
,
that
the
Planets
that
have
been
form'd
in
the
Centre
of
the
conquer'd
Vortexes
,
being
entered
into
the
great
and
conquering
Vortex
,
place
themselves
in
Aequilibrio
with
an
equal
Volume
of
the
Matter
in
which
they
swim
:
So
that
if
those
Planets
are
unequal
in
Solidity
,
they
will
float
at
unequal
Distances
from
the
Centre
of
the
Vortex
in
which
they
swim
.
But
if
two
Planets
have
very
near
the
same
Force
to
continue
that
Direct
Motion
;
or
if
a
Planet
carries
in
its
small
Vortex
one
or
several
other
smaller
Planets
,
which
it
shall
have
conquer'd
,
according
to
our
Way
of
conceiving
the
Formation
of
Things
:
Then
the
smallest
Planets
will
turn
about
the
greatest
,
whilst
the
greatest
shall
turn
upon
its
own
Centre
;
and
all
these
Planets
shall
be
carried
by
the
Motion
of
the
great
Vortex
,
at
a
Distance
very
near
equal
from
its
Centre
.
We
are
obliged
,
by
the
Light
of
Reason
,
to
dispose
in
that
Order
the
Parts
that
compose
the
whole
Universe
,
which
we
imagine
to
have
been
formed
by
the
most
simple
Ways
.
For
all
that
had
been
said
is
only
grounded
on
the
Idea
of
Extension
,
the
Parts
of
which
are
supposed
to
move
in
the
most
simple
Motion
,
which
is
that
in
a
Right
Line
.
And
when
we
examine
by
the
Effects
,
whether
we
are
mistaken
in
the
Explication
of
Things
by
their
Causes
,
we
are
surprized
to
see
the
Phenomaena
of
Celestial
Bodies
so
perfectly
agreeing
with
our
Ratiocinations
.
For
we
perceive
all
the
Planets
that
are
in
the
middle
of
a
small
Vortex
turning
upon
their
own
Centre
,
as
the
Sun
does
,
and
swimming
in
the
Vortex
of
the
Sun
,
and
about
the
Sun
;
the
smallest
and
least
solid
nearest
to
it
,
and
the
most
solid
at
a
greater
distance
.
We
likewise
observe
,
that
there
are
some
,
as
the
Comets
,
which
cannot
remain
in
the
Vortex
of
the
Sun
:
And
lastly
,
that
there
are
several
Planets
,
which
have
other
smaller
turning
about
them
,
as
the
Moon
does
about
the
Faith
:
Jupiter
has
four
of
them
,
Mars
has
three
,
and
perhaps
Saturn
has
so
many
,
and
so
small
,
that
they
resemble
a
continued
Circle
,
of
which
the
thickness
cannot
be
perceived
,
because
of
their
too
vast
distance
.
Those
Planets
being
the
biggest
we
can
observe
,
it
may
be
imagin'd
,
that
they
have
been
produced
from
Vortexes
which
had
a
sufficient
strength
to
conque●
others
,
before
they
were
involved
in
the
Vortex
we
live
in
.
All
these
Planets
turn
upon
their
own
Centre
,
the
Earth
within
24.
hours
,
Mars
within
25.
or
thereabouts
,
Jupiter
within
about
10
,
&c.
They
all
turn
about
the
Sun
,
Mercury
the
nearest
in
about
4.
Months
;
Saturn
the
remotest
in
about
30.
Years
,
and
those
that
are
betwixt
them
in
more
or
less
time
,
which
however
keep
not
an
exact
proportion
with
their
distance
.
For
the
matter
in
which
they
swim
makes
a
swifter
Circumvolution
when
't
is
nearer
to
the
Sun
,
because
the
Line
of
its
Motion
is
then
shorter
.
When
Mars
is
opposite
to
the
Sun
,
he
is
then
near
enough
to
the
Earth
,
but
is
at
a
vast
distance
from
it
when
he
is
in
Conjunction
with
him
.
The
like
may
be
said
of
the
other
superiour
Planets
,
as
Saturn
and
Jupiter
;
for
the
inferiour
,
as
Venus
and
Mercury
are
,
to
speak
properly
,
never
opposite
to
the
Sun
.
The
Lines
,
which
all
the
Planets
seem
to
describe
about
the
Earth
,
are
no
Circles
,
but
are
very
like
Ellipses
,
which
Ellipses
seem
very
much
to
differ
,
because
of
the
different
Situation
of
the
Planets
in
reference
to
us
.
In
short
,
whatever
may
be
observed
with
any
certainty
in
the
Heavens
,
touching
the
Motion
of
the
Planets
perfectly
agrees
with
what
has
been
said
of
their
Formation
by
the
most
simple
ways
.
As
to
the
fixed
Stars
,
Experience
teaches
us
,
that
some
diminish
and
entirely
vanish
away
,
whilst
others
that
are
wholly
new
appear
;
the
lustre
and
bulk
of
which
sensibly
increase
.
They
increase
or
diminish
proportionably
as
the
Vortexes
,
in
whose
Centre
they
lye
,
admit
more
or
less
of
the
first
Element
.
We
cease
to
see
them
when
they
are
overspread
with
Spots
and
Crusts
,
and
begin
to
discover
them
,
when
those
Spots
,
which
obstruct
their
lustre
,
are
entirely
dissipated
.
All
these
Stars
keep
very
near
the
same
distance
from
each
other
,
since
they
are
Centres
of
Vortexes
which
are
not
conquer'd
,
and
remain
Stars
as
long
as
they
can
resist
the
Invasion
of
others
.
They
are
all
bright
like
as
many
little
Suns
,
because
they
are
all
,
as
he
is
,
the
Centers
of
unconquer'd
Vortexes
.
They
are
all
at
an
unequal
distance
from
the
Earth
,
though
they
appear
as
if
they
were
fastned
to
a
Vault
;
for
if
the
Parallaxe
of
the
nearest
with
the
remotest
has
not
yet
been
observable
,
by
the
different
situation
of
the
Earth
from
6
to
6
Months
;
it
is
because
that
difference
is
too
inconsiderable
in
reference
to
our
distance
from
the
Stars
,
to
make
that
Parallaxe
sensible
.
Perhaps
by
means
of
the
Telescopes
,
it
will
one
day
or
other
become
somewhat
observable
.
In
short
,
whatever
the
Senses
and
Experience
may
observe
in
the
Stars
,
differs
not
from
what
we
have
discover'd
by
the
Mind
,
whilst
we
examin'd
the
most
simple
and
natural
Relations
that
are
betwixt
the
Parts
and
the
Motions
of
Extension
.
To
search
after
the
Nature
of
Terrestrial
Bodies
;
we
must
conceive
that
the
first
Element
being
made
up
of
an
infinite
number
of
different
Figures
,
the
Bodies
that
result
from
their
Mixture
must
be
very
different
.
So
that
there
will
be
some
whose
Parts
shall
be
branched
,
others
long
,
others
very
near
round
,
but
all
irregular
,
several
ways
.
When
their
Parts
are
branched
and
gross
,
they
are
hard
,
but
flexible
,
and
not
elastick
,
as
Gold
:
If
their
Parts
be
not
so
gross
,
they
are
soft
,
and
fluid
,
as
Gums
,
Fats
,
Oyles
;
but
if
their
branched
Parts
be
extremely
fine
,
they
are
like
the
Air.
If
the
long
Parts
of
Bodies
are
gross
and
inflexible
,
they
are
pungent
,
incorruptible
,
and
dissolvible
,
as
Salts
;
if
those
long
Parts
be
flexible
,
they
are
insipid
like
Water
;
if
the
gross
Parts
be
of
very
irregular
and
different
Figures
,
they
are
like
Earth
and
Stones
.
In
short
,
thence
must
needs
arise
Bodies
of
several
different
Natures
,
and
two
will
hardly
be
found
exactly
alike
,
by
reason
of
the
infinite
number
of
Figures
incident
to
the
first
Element
,
which
can
never
be
complicated
after
the
same
manner
in
two
different
Bodies
.
What
Figure
soever
those
Bodies
may
have
,
if
their
Pores
be
large
enough
to
give
way
to
the
second
Element's
passing
all
manner
of
ways
,
they
will
be
transparent
like
Air
,
Water
,
Glass
,
&c.
If
the
first
Element
entirely
surrounds
some
of
their
Parts
and
affords
them
a
sufficient
force
and
commotion
to
repel
the
second
Element
on
all
sides
,
they
will
appear
Luminous
like
flame
;
if
they
drive
back
all
the
second
Element
that
falls
upon
them
,
they
will
be
very
white
;
if
they
receive
it
without
repelling
it
,
they
will
be
very
black
;
and
lastly
,
if
they
repel
it
by
several
Concussions
and
Vibrations
,
they
will
appear
of
different
colours
.
As
to
their
Situation
,
the
heaviest
,
or
those
that
have
least
force
to
continue
their
direct
Motion
,
will
be
the
nearest
to
the
Centre
,
as
are
Metals
:
Earth
,
Water
and
Air
,
will
be
more
remote
,
and
all
Bodies
will
keep
the
same
Situation
in
which
we
observe
them
;
because
they
will
recede
from
the
Centre
of
the
Earth
,
as
far
as
their
Motion
will
allow
.
It
must
not
seem
strange
that
I
now
say
,
that
Metals
have
less
force
to
continue
their
direct
Motion
,
than
Earth
,
Water
,
and
other
less
solid
Bodies
,
though
I
have
formerly
said
,
that
the
most
solid
Bodies
have
more
strengh
than
others
to
continue
their
direct
Motion
.
For
the
Reason
why
Metals
are
not
so
apt
to
continue
to
move
,
as
Earth
and
Stones
,
is
that
Metals
have
less
Motion
in
themselves
;
it
being
true
however
,
that
of
two
Bodies
unequal
in
solidity
,
but
moved
with
an
equal
swiftness
,
that
the
most
solid
will
have
more
force
to
pursue
its
Motion
in
a
right
Line
;
because
the
most
solid
has
then
the
greater
Motion
,
and
that
Motion
is
the
Cause
of
strength
.
But
if
we
would
understand
the
Reason
why
Bodies
,
gross
and
solid
,
are
heavy
towards
the
Center
of
Vortexes
,
but
light
at
a
considerable
distance
from
it
;
we
must
know
,
that
these
Bodies
receive
their
Motion
from
the
subtle
matter
that
invirons
them
,
and
in
which
they
swim
.
Now
that
subtle
matter
actually
moving
in
a
Circular
Line
,
and
only
tending
to
move
in
a
right
Line
;
it
only
Communicates
that
Circular
Motion
to
the
gross
Bodies
it
carries
along
with
it
:
and
as
to
its
tendency
to
remove
from
the
Centre
in
a
Right
Line
,
it
only
communicates
that
to
them
as
far
as
it
is
a
necessary
sequel
of
the
Circular
communicated
Motion
.
For
it
must
be
observed
,
that
the
Parts
of
the
subtle
matter
tending
to
different
sides
,
can
only
compress
the
gross
Body
they
convey
;
since
that
Body
cannot
go
several
different
ways
at
the
same
time
.
But
because
the
subtle
Matter
,
that
lies
about
the
Centre
of
the
Vortex
,
has
a
far
greater
Motion
than
that
which
it
spends
in
circulating
,
and
because
it
communicates
only
its
Motion
Circular
,
and
common
to
all
its
Parts
,
to
the
gross
Bodies
which
it
carries
;
and
that
if
these
Bodies
should
chance
to
have
more
Motion
than
what
is
common
to
the
Vortex
,
they
would
soon
lose
that
overplus
,
by
communicating
it
to
the
little
Bodies
they
meet
with
;
thence
't
is
evident
,
that
gross
Bodies
,
towards
the
Centre
of
the
Vortex
,
have
not
so
much
Motion
as
the
Matter
in
which
they
swim
;
each
part
of
which
has
its
own
particular
and
various
Motion
,
besides
the
Cicular
and
common
.
Now
if
gross
Bodies
have
less
Motion
,
they
have
less
Tendency
to
move
in
a
right
Line
,
and
if
they
have
less
Tendency
,
they
are
forc'd
to
yield
to
those
that
have
more
,
and
consequently
to
approach
the
Centre
of
the
Vortex
,
that
is
,
in
short
they
must
be
heavyer
,
as
they
are
more
gross
and
solid
.
But
when
solid
Bodies
are
very
remote
from
the
Centre
of
the
Vortex
,
as
the
Circular
Motion
of
the
subtle
Matter
is
then
very
great
,
because
it
spends
very
near
its
whole
Motion
in
wheeling
about
;
Bodies
have
then
so
much
more
Motion
as
they
have
more
Solidity
;
because
they
go
as
swift
as
the
subtle
Matter
in
which
they
swim
:
and
so
they
have
more
force
to
continue
their
direct
Motion
.
Wherefore
gross
Bodies
at
a
certaine
distance
from
the
Centre
of
the
Vortex
,
are
so
much
lighter
as
they
are
more
solid
.
This
makes
it
apparent
,
that
the
Earth
is
metallick
towards
the
Centre
,
and
not
so
solid
about
the
Circumference
;
that
Water
and
Air
must
remain
in
the
Situation
wherein
we
see
them
;
but
that
all
those
Bodies
are
[
](A51674-e89370-b)*
*
That
is
,
are
driven
towards
the
Centre
of
the
Earth
.
ponderous
;
the
Air
as
well
as
Gold
and
Quick-silver
;
because
they
are
more
solid
and
gross
than
the
first
and
second
Element
.
This
shews
likewise
that
the
Moon
is
at
too
great
a
distance
from
the
Centre
of
the
Vortex
of
the
Earth
to
be
heavy
,
though
it
be
solid
;
that
Mercury
,
Venus
,
the
Earth
,
Mars
,
Jupiter
,
and
Saturn
,
cannot
fall
into
the
Sun
,
and
that
they
are
not
solid
enough
to
travel
out
of
this
Vortex
,
as
the
Comets
do
;
that
they
are
in
Aequilibrio
with
the
Matter
in
which
they
swim
,
and
that
if
a
Musket
Ball
,
or
a
Cannon
Bullet
,
could
be
shot
high
enough
,
those
two
Bodies
would
become
little
Planets
,
or
perhaps
Comets
,
that
would
not
stay
in
any
Vortex
,
as
being
endued
with
a
competent
Solidity
.
I
pretend
not
to
have
sufficiently
explain'd
all
the
things
I
have
mention'd
,
or
to
have
deduced
from
the
simple
Principles
of
Extension
,
Figure
and
Motion
all
the
possible
Inferences
,
I
only
intended
to
shew
the
Method
Des
Cartes
has
used
in
the
discovery
of
Natural
things
,
that
this
Method
and
his
Ideas
may
be
compared
with
those
of
other
Philosophers
;
I
design'd
here
no
more
,
and
yet
I
may
venture
to
assert
,
that
if
one
would
supersede
admiring
the
Virtue
of
the
Loadstone
,
the
regular
Motion
of
the
ebbing
and
flowing
of
the
Sea
,
the
noise
of
Thunder
,
the
Generation
of
Meteors
;
in
short
,
if
any
desire
to
get
a
well-grounded
Knowledge
of
Natural
Philosophy
,
as
he
can
doe
nothing
better
than
to
read
and
medi●ate
his
Books
;
so
he
can
doe
nothing
at
all
,
unless
he
follows
his
Method
,
I
mean
unless
he
Reason
as
he
did
,
upon
clear
Ideas
,
still
beginning
with
the
most
simple
and
familiar
.
Neither
do
I
pretend
that
this
Author
is
Infallible
;
for
I
think
I
can
demonstrate
that
he
has
been
mistaken
in
several
places
of
his
works
.
But
't
is
more
advantageous
for
his
Readers
to
believe
that
he
hath
been
deceived
,
than
if
they
were
persuaded
that
whatever
he
said
was
true
:
A
Man
that
should
take
him
to
be
infalible
would
read
him
without
Examination
,
believe
him
without
understanding
what
he
says
,
learn
his
Opinions
as
we
learn
History
,
and
would
never
form
and
perfect
his
Mind
.
He
himself
advertises
his
Readers
to
observe
whether
he
be
deceived
,
and
to
believe
nothing
of
what
he
says
,
but
what
the
Evidence
compells
them
to
.
For
he
is
not
like
those
false
pretenders
to
Science
,
who
endeavouring
to
Lord
it
over
the
Minds
,
will
be
believed
upon
their
own
word
;
and
who
instead
of
making
Men
the
Disciples
of
the
inward
Truth
,
by
proposing
only
clear
and
distinct
Ideas
,
labour
what
they
can
to
submit
them
to
the
Authority
of
Heathens
,
and
press
upon
Men
incomprehensible
Opinions
by
unintelligible
Reasons
.
The
chief
thing
that
is
found
fault
with
in
Des
Cartes's
System
,
is
the
manner
in
which
he
feigns
that
the
Sun
,
Stars
,
Earth
,
and
all
the
Bodies
that
surround
us
,
have
been
produced
;
forasmuch
as
it
seems
contrary
to
what
Holy
Writ
teaches
us
of
the
Creation
of
the
World
;
since
,
according
to
him
,
one
would
say
,
that
the
whole
Universe
has
been
formed
of
its
own
accord
,
so
as
we
see
it
now
a-days
;
to
which
several
Answers
may
be
made
.
First
,
As
to
the
pretended
Contrarieties
betwixt
Moses
and
Des
Cartes
,
those
that
assert
it
,
have
not
perhaps
examin'd
them
both
,
with
as
much
Attention
as
those
who
have
shewn
,
by
publick
Writings
,
that
the
sacred
History
of
the
Creation
perfectly
agrees
with
the
opinion
of
that
Philosopher
.
But
the
chief
Answer
is
,
that
Des
Cartes
never
pretended
that
things
should
ever
have
been
made
by
degrees
,
and
as
he
describes
them
.
For
at
the
first
Article
of
the
Fourth
Part
of
his
Philosophical
Principles
,
which
runs
thus
:
That
the
former
Hypothesis
is
to
be
retain'd
,
notwithstanding
its
being
false
,
to
find
out
the
true
Causes
of
natural
Things
;
he
expresly
asserts
the
contrary
in
these
words
.
Though
I
pretend
not
that
the
Bodies
of
this
visible
World
were
ever
produced
in
the
manner
that
has
been
described
before
,
of
which
the
Reader
has
been
already
sufficiently
forewarn'd
;
yet
I
must
still
keep
to
the
same
Hypothesis
,
to
explain
what
appears
upon
Earth
;
For
if
I
may
,
as
I
hope
I
can
,
plainly
shew
by
those
means
the
most
intelligible
and
certain
Causes
of
all
Natural
things
,
and
they
cannot
be
found
out
another
way
;
I
may
thence
reasonably
conclude
,
that
though
the
World
was
not
at
the
Beginning
fram'd
in
this
manner
,
but
created
immediately
by
God
,
yet
the
Nature
of
all
things
it
contains
ceases
not
to
be
the
very
same
,
as
though
they
had
been
produced
in
that
very
method
.
Des
Cartes
knew
that
to
understand
the
Nature
of
things
,
they
must
be
consider'd
in
their
Birth
and
Original
,
and
that
beginning
with
those
that
are
most
simple
,
we
ought
to
drive
them
up
to
the
Fountain
head
,
and
that
the
business
is
not
to
examine
,
whether
God
working
by
the
most
simple
ways
,
formed
the
World
by
degrees
,
or
struck
it
out
at
a
single
Blow
;
but
that
,
in
what
manner
soever
God
may
have
produced
his
Works
,
they
ought
to
be
first
consider'd
in
their
Principles
,
if
we
would
understand
them
,
and
afterwards
we
should
observe
,
how
consistent
our
thoughts
are
with
the
Operations
of
God
,
by
comparing
them
together
.
He
knew
that
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
by
which
God
preserves
all
his
Works
in
their
present
Order
and
Situation
are
the
same
Laws
,
with
those
by
which
he
might
have
formed
and
disposed
them
;
It
being
evident
to
all
considering
Men
,
that
if
God
had
not
disposed
his
Works
in
an
instant
,
in
the
same
manner
they
would
have
order'd
and
postur'd
themselves
in
time
;
the
whole
Oeconomy
of
Nature
would
be
destroy'd
,
since
the
Laws
of
Preservation
would
be
contrary
to
those
of
the
first
Creation
.
If
the
whole
Universe
remains
in
the
Order
in
which
we
see
it
,
't
is
because
the
Laws
of
Motion
which
preserve
it
in
that
Order
,
were
capable
of
producing
it
in
it
;
and
if
God
had
established
it
in
an
Order
different
from
that
into
which
those
Laws
of
Motion
should
have
put
it
,
all
things
would
be
turned
upside
down
,
and
place
themselves
by
the
force
of
those
Laws
,
in
the
Order
which
they
at
present
keep
.
A
Man
desires
to
discover
the
Nature
of
a
Chicken
,
to
that
end
he
opens
every
day
Eggs
taken
from
under
a
Brood-Hen
;
he
examines
what
part
moves
and
grows
first
,
he
quickly
perceives
that
the
Heart
begins
to
beat
,
and
to
drive
out
Blood
through
small
Conduits
on
all
sides
,
that
are
the
Arteries
;
which
Blood
comes
back
to
the
Heart
through
the
Veins
,
that
the
Brain
likewise
appears
at
first
,
and
that
the
Bones
are
the
last
formed
.
By
that
he
frees
himself
from
many
Errours
,
and
even
draws
from
those
Observations
several
Consequences
very
useful
for
the
Knowledge
of
living
Creatures
.
What
fault
may
be
found
with
the
conduct
of
such
a
Man
,
and
how
may
it
be
given
out
,
that
he
pretends
to
persuade
,
that
God
formed
the
first
Chicken
,
by
creating
an
Egg
,
and
giving
it
a
competent
degree
of
heat
to
hatch
it
?
because
he
tries
to
discover
the
Nature
of
Chickens
in
their
first
Formation
?
Why
then
should
Des
Cartes
be
accused
of
being
opposite
to
the
Holy
Scriptures
,
for
that
designing
to
discover
the
Nature
of
visible
things
,
he
examines
the
formation
of
them
by
the
Laws
of
Motion
,
which
are
inviolably
observ'd
on
all
occasions
.
He
never
[
](A51674-e89610-b)*
*
Princ.
Part.
3.
§.
45.
doubted
but
that
the
World
was
created
at
first
with
all
its
perfection
;
that
there
were
Sun
,
Earth
,
Moon
and
Stars
;
that
in
the
Earth
there
were
not
only
the
Seeds
of
Plants
,
but
also
the
Plants
themselves
;
and
that
Adam
and
Eve
were
not
born
Infants
,
but
made
adult
.
The
Christian
Faith
teaches
us
that
,
and
natural
Reason
persuades
us
the
same
;
for
when
we
consider
the
infinite
Power
of
God
,
we
cannot
think
he
should
ever
have
made
any
thing
which
was
not
altogether
perfect
.
But
as
we
should
better
understand
the
nature
of
Adam
and
Eve
,
and
the
Trees
of
Paradise
,
by
examining
how
Children
are
insensibly
form'd
in
their
Mothers
Womb
,
and
how
Plants
are
deriv'd
from
their
Seeds
,
than
by
merely
considering
how
they
were
when
Created
by
God
at
the
Creation
of
the
World
;
so
if
we
can
find
out
Principles
very
simple
and
easie
,
out
of
which
,
as
out
of
some
Seeds
,
we
can
manifestly
shew
the
Stars
,
the
Earth
,
and
all
visible
things
might
have
been
produced
;
though
we
very
well
know
that
it
was
never
so
,
(
yet
)
that
will
be
more
conducible
to
explain
their
Nature
,
than
if
we
should
only
describe
them
so
as
they
now
are
,
or
as
we
believe
they
were
Created
,
and
because
I
suppose
I
have
found
out
such
Principles
,
I
shall
indeavour
briefly
to
Explain
them
.
Des
Cartes
was
persuaded
that
God
formed
the
World
all
at
once
;
but
he
also
believed
that
God
Created
it
in
the
same
State
and
Order
,
and
with
the
same
Disposition
of
Parts
,
in
which
it
would
have
been
,
had
it
been
made
gradually
,
and
by
the
most
simple
ways
.
And
that
thought
is
worthy
both
of
the
Power
and
Wisdom
of
God
;
of
his
Power
,
because
he
has
made
in
a
Moment
all
his
Works
in
the
highest
Perfection
;
and
of
his
Wisdom
,
because
he
has
shewn
that
he
perfectly
foresaw
whatever
could
befall
Matter
,
if
it
were
moved
by
the
most
simple
ways
:
and
likewise
because
the
Order
of
Nature
could
not
subsist
,
if
the
World
had
been
produced
by
ways
,
that
is
,
by
Laws
of
Motion
,
contrary
to
the
Laws
by
which
it
is
preserv'd
,
as
I
have
already
mention'd
.
'T
is
ridiculous
to
say
,
that
Des
Cartes
believed
the
World
might
have
been
formed
of
it self
,
since
he
owns
with
all
those
that
follow
the
light
of
Reason
,
that
Bodies
cannot
move
themselves
by
their
own
strength
;
and
that
all
the
immutable
Laws
of
the
Communication
of
Motions
are
but
consequences
of
the
immutable
Will
of
God
,
who
always
acts
in
the
same
manner
.
His
proving
that
God
alone
gives
Motion
to
Matter
,
and
that
Motion
produces
in
Bodies
all
their
different
Forms
,
was
sufficient
to
hinder
the
Libertines
from
making
an
Advantage
of
his
System
.
On
the
contrary
,
if
Atheists
should
reflect
on
the
Principles
of
this
Philosopher
,
they
would
quickly
be
forced
to
confess
their
Errours
;
for
if
they
can
assert
,
with
the
Heathens
,
that
Matter
is
uncreated
,
they
cannot
also
maintain
that
it
can
move
it self
by
its
own
Power
:
So
that
Atheists
would
at
least
be
obliged
to
acknowledge
the
true
Mover
,
if
they
refused
to
confess
the
true
Creatour
.
But
the
Ordinary
Philosophy
affords
'em
sufficient
pretences
to
blind
themselves
,
and
defend
their
Errours
;
for
it
speaks
of
some
impress'd
Virtues
,
certain
motive
Faculties
,
in
a
word
,
of
a
certain
Nature
which
is
the
Principle
of
Motion
in
every
thing
;
And
though
they
have
no
distinct
Idea
of
it
,
yet
by
reason
of
the
Corruption
of
their
Heart
,
they
willingly
put
it
in
the
room
of
the
true
God
,
imagining
that
it
performs
all
the
Wonders
that
they
see
occur
.
CHAP.
V.
An
Explication
of
the
Principles
of
the
Peripatetick
Philosophy
,
in
which
is
shewn
,
that
Aristotle
never
observed
the
Second
Part
of
the
General
Rule
;
and
his
Four
Elements
,
with
the
Elementary
Qualities
,
are
examined
.
THat
the
Reader
may
compare
the
Philosophy
of
Des
Cartes
with
that
of
Aristotle
,
it
will
be
convenient
to
set
down
in
few
words
what
the
latter
has
taught
concerning
Elements
and
Natural
Bodies
in
general
;
which
the
most
learned
believe
he
has
done
in
his
Four
Books
Of
the
Heavens
.
For
his
Eight
Books
of
Physicks
belong
rather
to
Logick
,
or
perhaps
to
Metaphysicks
,
than
to
Natural
Philosophy
;
since
they
consist
of
Nothing
but
loose
and
general
terms
,
that
offer
no
distinct
and
particular
Idea
to
the
Mind
.
Those
Four
Books
are
entituled
Of
the
Heavens
,
because
the
Heavens
are
the
chief
amongst
the
simple
Bodies
which
he
treats
of
.
That
Philosopher
begins
his
Work
by
proving
that
the
World
is
perfect
,
in
the
following
manner
.
All
Bodies
have
three
Dimensions
and
cannot
have
more
,
because
the
number
three
comprehends
all
,
according
to
the
Pythagoreans
.
But
the
World
is
the
Coacervation
of
all
Bodies
,
and
therefore
the
World
is
perfect
.
By
that
ridiculous
Proof
,
it
may
also
be
demonstrated
,
that
the
World
cannot
be
more
imperfect
than
it
is
,
since
it
cannot
be
composed
of
parts
that
have
less
than
three
Dimensions
.
In
the
Second
Chapter
,
he
first
supposes
some
Peripatetick
Truths
,
as
that
all
Natural
Bodies
have
of
themselves
the
force
of
moving
,
which
he
proves
neither
here
nor
elsewhere
;
but
on
the
contrary
asserts
,
in
the
First
Chapter
of
his
Second
Book
of
Physicks
,
that
to
endeavour
to
prove
it
is
absurd
,
because
't
is
evident
of
it self
,
and
that
none
but
those
who
cannot
distinguish
what
is
known
of
it self
from
what
is
not
,
insist
upon
proving
plain
by
obscure
things
.
But
it
has
been
shewn
elsewhere
,
that
it
is
altogether
false
that
natural
Bodies
should
have
of
themselves
the
force
of
moving
,
and
it
appears
evident
only
to
such
as
follow
,
with
Aristotle
,
the
Impressions
of
their
Senses
,
and
make
no
use
of
their
Reason
.
Secondly
,
He
says
that
all
local
Motion
is
made
in
a
Line
,
either
direct
or
circular
,
or
composed
of
both
;
but
if
he
would
not
think
upon
what
he
so
rashly
proposes
,
he
ought
at
least
to
have
open'd
his
Eyes
that
he
might
see
an
Infinite
number
of
different
Motions
,
which
are
not
made
of
either
the
right
or
circular
:
Or
rather
he
ought
to
have
thought
that
the
Motions
composed
of
the
direct
may
be
infinitely
varied
,
when
the
compounding
Motions
increase
or
diminish
their
swiftness
in
an
infinite
number
of
different
ways
,
as
may
be
observed
by
what
has
been
said
before
[
](A51674-e89860-b)*
*
Sup.
Ch.
4.
.
There
are
,
says
he
,
but
two
simple
Motions
,
the
right
and
the
Circular
,
and
therefore
all
the
others
are
composed
of
them
.
But
he
mistakes
,
for
the
Circular
Motion
is
not
simple
,
since
it
cannot
be
conceived
,
without
thinking
upon
a
Point
to
which
it
relates
,
and
whatever
includes
a
Relation
is
relative
and
not
simple
.
This
is
so
true
that
the
Circular
Motion
may
be
conceived
as
produced
from
two
Motions
in
a
right
Line
,
whose
Swiftness
is
unequal
,
according
to
a
certain
Proportion
.
But
a
Motion
composed
of
two
others
,
made
in
a
right
Line
,
and
variously
increasing
or
diminishing
in
swiftness
,
cannot
be
simple
.
Thirdly
,
He
says
that
all
the
simple
Motions
are
of
three
sorts
,
one
from
the
Centre
,
the
other
towards
the
Centre
,
and
the
third
about
it
.
But
't
is
false
that
the
last
,
viz.
the
Circular
Motion
should
be
simple
,
as
has
been
already
said
.
And
't
is
false
again
that
there
are
no
simple
Motions
besides
upwards
and
downwards
.
For
all
the
Motions
in
a
right
Line
are
simple
,
whether
they
approach
to
,
or
remove
from
the
Centre
,
the
Poles
,
or
any
other
Point
.
Every
Body
,
says
he
,
is
made
up
of
three
Dimensions
,
and
therefore
the
Motion
of
all
Bodies
must
have
three
simple
Motions
.
What
Relation
is
there
betwixt
simple
Motions
and
Dimensions
?
Besides
,
every
Body
has
three
Dimensions
,
and
none
has
three
simple
Motions
.
Fourthly
,
He
supposes
that
Bodies
are
either
simple
or
composed
,
and
calls
simple
Bodies
,
those
that
have
the
force
of
moving
themselves
,
as
Fire
,
Earth
,
&c.
adding
,
that
the
compounded
receive
their
Motion
from
the
compounding
.
But
in
that
sense
there
are
no
simple
Bodies
,
since
none
have
in
themselves
any
Principle
of
their
Motion
:
there
are
also
none
composed
,
since
there
are
no
simples
of
which
they
should
be
made
;
and
so
there
would
be
no
Bodies
at
all
.
What
Fancy
is
it
,
to
define
the
simplicity
of
Bodies
by
a
Power
of
moving
themselves
.
What
distinct
Ideas
can
be
fixed
to
the
Words
of
simple
and
composed
Bodies
,
if
the
simple
are
only
defined
in
Relation
to
an
Imaginary
moving
force
?
But
let
us
see
what
Consequences
he
draws
from
those
Principles
.
The
Circular
Motion
is
simple
.
The
Heavens
move
Circularly
,
and
therefore
their
Motion
is
simple
:
But
simple
Motion
can
be
ascribed
only
to
a
simple
Body
,
that
is
to
say
,
to
a
Body
that
moves
of
it self
;
And
therefore
the
Heavens
are
a
simple
Body
distinguished
from
the
four
Elements
,
that
move
in
right
Lines
.
'T
is
plain
enough
that
such
Arguments
contain
nothing
but
false
and
absurd
Propositions
.
Let
us
examine
his
other
Proofs
,
for
he
alleadges
a
great
many
shameful
and
nonsensical
ones
,
to
prove
a
thing
as
useless
as
it
is
false
.
His
second
Reason
to
shew
that
the
Heavens
are
a
simple
Body
distinguished
from
the
Four
Elements
,
supposes
that
there
are
two
sorts
of
Motion
,
one
natural
,
and
the
other
violent
or
against
Nature
.
But
't
is
sufficiently
plain
to
all
those
that
judge
of
things
by
clear
and
distinct
Ideas
,
that
Bodies
having
not
in
themselves
any
such
Principle
of
their
Motion
as
Aristotle
pretends
,
there
can
be
no
Motion
violent
or
against
Nature
.
'T
is
indifferent
to
all
Bodies
to
be
moved
or
not
,
either
one
way
or
another
.
But
this
Philosopher
,
who
judges
of
things
by
the
Impressions
of
the
Senses
,
imagines
that
those
Bodies
,
which
by
the
Laws
of
the
Communications
of
Motions
,
always
place
themselves
in
such
or
such
a
Situation
,
in
reference
to
others
,
doe
it
of
their
own
accord
,
and
because
it
is
most
convenient
for
them
,
and
best
agrees
with
their
Nature
.
Here
follows
the
Argument
of
Aristotle
.
The
Circular
Motion
of
the
Heavens
is
natural
,
or
against
Nature
.
If
natural
,
the
Heavens
are
a
simple
Body
distinguished
from
the
Elements
,
since
the
Elements
never
move
circularly
by
a
natural
Motion
.
If
the
Circular
Motion
of
the
Heavens
is
against
their
Nature
,
they
will
be
some
one
of
the
Elements
,
as
Fire
,
Water
,
&c.
or
something
else
.
But
the
Heavens
can
be
none
of
the
Elements
:
as
for
instance
,
if
the
Heavens
were
Fire
,
that
Element
tending
naturally
upwards
,
the
Heavens
would
have
two
contrary
Motions
,
viz.
the
circular
and
the
ascending
,
which
is
impossible
.
If
the
Heavens
be
some
other
Body
,
which
moves
not
circularly
by
its
own
Nature
,
they
will
have
some
other
natural
Motion
,
which
cannot
likewise
be
;
for
if
that
Motion
be
ascending
,
they
will
be
Fire
or
Air
;
and
if
descending
,
Water
or
Earth
:
Therefore
,
&c.
I
shall
not
insist
upon
shewing
the
particular
Absurdities
of
those
Reasonings
,
but
only
observe
in
general
,
that
all
that
which
this
Philosopher
here
says
,
has
no
signification
,
and
that
there
is
neither
Truth
nor
Inference
well
drawn
.
His
third
Reason
is
as
follows
.
The
first
and
most
perfect
of
all
simple
Motions
must
be
that
of
a
simple
Body
,
and
of
the
first
and
most
perfect
among
simple
Bodies
.
But
the
circular
Motion
is
the
first
and
most
perfect
amongst
simple
Motions
,
because
every
circular
Line
is
perfect
,
and
that
no
right
Line
is
so
.
For
if
it
be
finite
,
something
may
be
added
to
it
;
if
infinite
,
it
is
not
yet
perfect
,
since
it
has
no
end
[
](A51674-e90000-b)*
*
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
and
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
make
a
Pun
in
Greek
,
as
in
English
Finis
and
finished
.
Thus
that
Philosopher
proves
,
that
an
infinite
Line
is
not
perfect
,
because
't
is
not
finished
.
,
and
that
things
are
not
perfect
but
when
they
are
finished
;
and
therefore
the
circular
Motion
is
the
first
and
most
perfect
of
all
,
and
a
Body
moving
circularly
is
simple
,
and
the
first
and
most
Divine
amongst
simple
Bodies
.
Here
you
have
his
fourth
Reason
.
Every
Motion
is
either
natural
,
or
not
;
but
every
Motion
which
is
not
natural
to
some
Bodies
,
is
natural
to
some
others
:
For
,
we
see
that
the
ascending
and
descending
Motions
,
which
are
not
natural
to
some
Bodies
,
are
so
to
others
;
for
Fire
naturally
descends
not
,
but
Earth
does
.
Now
the
Circular
Motion
is
not
natural
to
any
of
the
Four
Elements
;
there
must
then
be
a
simple
Body
to
which
that
Motion
is
natural
;
and
therefore
the
Heavens
,
which
move
Circularly
,
are
a
simple
Body
,
distinguished
from
the
Four
Elements
.
Lastly
,
The
Circular
Motion
is
either
natural
or
violent
to
some
Body
or
other
:
If
it
be
natural
,
't
is
evident
that
Body
must
be
one
of
the
most
simple
and
perfect
:
But
if
it
be
against
Nature
,
't
is
strange
how
that
Motion
endures
for
ever
;
since
we
see
that
all
Motions
against
Nature
are
of
a
short
continuance
.
And
therefore
we
must
believe
,
after
all
those
Reasons
,
that
there
is
some
Body
separated
from
all
those
that
environ
us
,
whose
Nature
is
the
more
perfect
,
as
it
lies
at
a
greater
distance
.
Thus
argues
Aristotle
;
but
I
defie
the
best
and
most
intelligent
of
his
Interpreters
to
fix
distinct
Ideas
to
his
Words
,
and
to
shew
that
this
Philosopher
begins
with
the
most
simple
Things
,
before
he
speaks
of
the
more
composed
;
which
is
however
altogether
necessary
to
exact
Reasonings
,
as
I
have
already
proved
.
If
I
were
not
afraid
of
being
tedious
,
I
would
be
at
the
pains
to
translate
some
Chapters
of
Aristotle
:
But
besides
that
none
who
can
understand
him
,
care
to
read
him
in
English
,
or
in
any
other
vulgar
Tongue
,
I
have
sufficiently
shewn
,
by
what
I
have
related
from
him
,
that
his
Way
of
Philosophizing
is
wholly
unserviceable
to
the
Discovery
of
Truth
:
For
,
he
says
himself
,
in
the
Fifth
Chapter
of
this
Book
,
That
those
that
mistake
at
first
in
any
thing
,
mistake
ten
thousand
times
more
,
if
they
proceed
:
So
that
it
being
apparent
,
that
he
knows
not
what
he
says
in
the
two
first
Chapters
of
his
Book
,
we
may
reasonably
believe
,
that
it
is
not
safe
to
yield
to
his
Authority
,
without
examining
his
Reasons
.
But
that
we
may
be
the
more
persuaded
of
it
,
I
proceed
to
shew
,
that
there
is
no
Chapter
in
this
First
Book
but
has
some
Impertinency
.
In
the
Third
Chapter
he
says
,
That
the
Heavens
are
incorruptible
,
and
uncapable
of
Alteration
;
of
which
he
alledges
several
Childish
Proofs
,
as
,
that
they
are
the
Habitation
of
the
Immortal
Gods
,
and
that
no
Change
was
ever
observed
in
them
.
This
last
Proof
would
be
good
enough
,
could
he
say
,
that
ever
any
Body
was
come
back
from
thence
,
or
that
he
had
approached
Celestial
Bodies
sufficiently
near
to
observe
their
Alterations
.
And
yet
I
doubt
whether
at
this
time
any
one
should
yield
to
his
Authority
,
since
Telescopes
assure
us
of
the
contrary
.
In
the
Fourth
Chapter
he
pretends
to
prove
,
That
the
Circular
Motion
has
no
Opposite
;
though
it
be
plain
,
that
the
Motion
from
East
to
West
is
contrary
to
that
which
is
made
from
West
to
East
.
In
the
Fifth
Chapter
he
very
weakly
proves
,
That
Bodies
are
not
Infinite
;
drawing
his
Arguments
from
the
Motion
of
simple
Bodies
:
For
what
hinders
,
but
there
may
be
above
his
Primum
mobile
some
unmovable
Extension
.
In
the
Sixth
,
he
loses
time
in
shewing
,
That
the
Elements
are
not
Infinite
:
For
,
who
can
doubt
of
it
,
when
he
supposes
,
with
him
,
that
they
are
included
within
the
surrounding
Heavens
?
But
he
ridicules
himself
,
by
drawing
his
Proofs
from
their
Gravity
and
Lightness
.
If
Elements
,
says
he
,
were
Infinite
,
there
would
be
an
Infinite
Heaviness
and
Lightness
;
which
cannot
be
:
Ergo
,
&c.
Those
that
desire
to
see
his
Arguments
at
length
,
may
read
them
in
his
Books
;
for
I
reckon
it
a
loss
of
Time
to
relate
them
.
He
goes
on
in
the
Seventh
Chapter
to
prove
,
That
Bodies
are
not
Infinite
;
and
his
first
Argument
supposes
it
necessary
for
every
Body
to
be
in
Motion
,
which
he
neither
does
nor
can
demonstrate
.
In
the
Eighth
he
asserts
,
That
there
are
not
many
Worlds
of
the
same
Nature
,
by
this
ridiculous
Reason
,
That
if
there
were
another
Earth
besides
this
we
inhabit
,
the
Earth
being
ponderous
of
its
own
nature
,
it
would
fall
upon
ours
,
which
is
the
Centre
of
all
ponderous
Bodies
.
Whence
has
he
learned
this
,
but
from
his
Senses
?
In
the
Ninth
he
proves
,
That
it
is
not
so
much
as
possible
that
there
should
be
several
Worlds
,
because
if
there
was
any
Body
above
the
Heavens
,
it
would
be
simple
or
composed
,
in
a
natural
or
violent
State
;
which
cannot
be
,
for
Reasons
which
he
draws
from
the
Three
sorts
of
Motions
already
spoken
of
.
In
the
Tenth
he
asserts
,
That
the
World
is
Eternal
,
because
it
cannot
have
had
a
Beginning
,
and
yet
last
for
ever
;
because
we
see
,
that
whatever
is
made
,
is
corrupted
in
Time
.
He
has
learned
this
likewise
from
his
Senses
:
But
who
has
taught
him
,
that
the
World
will
always
endure
?
He
spends
the
Eleventh
Chapter
in
explaining
what
Incorruptible
signifies
;
as
though
Equivocation
was
here
very
dangerous
,
or
that
he
was
to
make
a
great
Use
of
his
Explanation
.
However
,
that
Word
Incorruptible
is
so
clear
of
it self
,
that
Aristotle
needed
not
have
troubled
himself
with
explaining
in
what
Sense
it
must
be
taken
,
or
in
what
Sense
he
takes
it
.
It
had
been
more
convenient
to
define
an
infinite
Number
of
Terms
,
very
usual
with
him
,
which
raise
nothing
but
sensible
Ideas
;
for
so
perhaps
we
should
have
learned
something
by
the
reading
of
his
Works
.
In
the
Last
Chapter
of
this
First
Book
of
the
Heavens
,
he
endeavours
to
shew
,
That
the
World
is
incorruptible
,
because
't
is
impossible
it
should
have
had
a
Beginning
,
and
yet
last
eternally
.
All
Things
,
says
he
,
subsist
either
for
a
finite
or
infinite
Time
;
but
what
is
only
infinite
in
one
sense
,
is
neither
finite
nor
infinite
,
and
therefore
nothing
can
subsist
in
that
Manner
.
This
is
the
way
of
arguing
with
the
Prince
of
Philosophers
,
and
the
Genius
of
Nature
;
who
,
instead
of
discovering
,
by
clear
and
distinct
Ideas
,
the
true
Cause
of
natural
Effects
,
lays
the
Foundation
of
a
Pagan
Philosophy
upon
the
false
and
confused
Ideas
of
the
Senses
,
or
upon
such
Ideas
as
are
too
general
to
be
useful
to
the
Search
after
Truth
.
I
condemn
not
Aristotle
for
not
knowing
that
God
has
created
the
World
in
Time
,
to
manifest
his
Power
,
and
the
Dependency
of
Creatures
;
and
that
he
will
never
destroy
it
,
to
shew
that
he
is
immutable
,
and
never
repents
of
his
Designs
:
But
I
may
find
fault
with
him
for
proving
,
by
trifling
Reasons
,
that
the
World
is
of
Eternal
Duration
.
For
,
though
he
be
sometimes
excusable
as
to
the
Opinions
he
maintains
,
yet
he
's
for
the
most
part
intollerable
as
to
the
Reasons
he
alledges
,
when
he
treats
of
Subjects
that
are
somewhat
difficult
.
What
I
have
already
said
,
may
perhaps
be
sufficient
to
evince
it
;
though
I
have
not
related
all
the
Errours
I
have
met
with
in
the
Book
whence
the
former
are
extracted
,
and
that
I
have
endeavour'd
to
make
him
speak
plainer
than
is
customary
with
him
.
But
for
an
entire
and
full
Conviction
,
that
the
Genius
of
Nature
will
never
discover
the
secret
Springs
and
Contrivances
of
it
,
it
will
be
convenient
to
shew
,
that
his
Principles
,
upon
which
he
reasons
for
the
Explication
of
natural
Effects
,
have
no
Solidity
in
them
.
'T
is
evident
that
nothing
can
be
discover'd
in
Physicks
,
without
beginning
with
the
most
simple
Bodies
;
that
is
,
with
the
Elements
;
into
which
all
others
are
resolv'd
,
because
they
are
[
](A51674-e90410-b)*
*
De
Coelo
,
l.
3.
c.
3.
contain'd
in
them
either
actually
or
potentially
,
to
speak
in
a
Peripatetick
Stile
.
But
no
distinct
Explication
of
those
simple
Bodies
can
be
found
in
the
Works
of
Aristotle
;
whence
follows
,
that
his
Elements
being
not
clearly
known
,
't
is
impossible
to
discover
the
Nature
of
Bodies
which
are
compos'd
of
them
.
He
says
indeed
,
that
there
are
four
Elements
,
Fire
,
Air
,
Water
and
Earth
;
but
he
gives
no
clear
Manifestation
of
their
Nature
,
by
any
distinct
Idea
:
He
pretends
not
that
those
Elements
are
the
Fire
,
Air
,
Water
and
Earth
that
we
see
;
for
if
it
were
so
,
our
Senses
at
least
would
afford
us
some
Knowledge
of
them
.
I
grant
that
in
several
places
of
his
Works
he
endeavours
to
explain
them
by
the
Qualities
of
Heat
and
Cold
,
Moisture
and
Dryness
,
Gravity
and
Levity
.
But
that
Method
is
so
impertinent
and
ridiculous
,
that
it
cannot
be
conceiv'd
how
so
many
Learned
Men
could
be
satisfied
with
it
;
which
I
proceed
to
demonstrate
.
Aristotle
pretends
in
his
Book
of
the
Heavens
,
that
the
Earth
is
the
Centre
of
the
World
,
and
that
all
Bodies
which
he
is
pleas'd
to
call
simple
,
because
he
supposes
that
they
are
mov'd
by
their
own
Nature
,
must
move
by
simple
Motions
.
He
asserts
,
that
besides
the
Circular
Motion
,
which
he
pretends
to
be
simple
,
and
by
which
he
proves
that
the
Heavens
,
which
he
supposes
to
move
circularly
,
are
a
simple
Body
,
there
are
two
other
simple
Motions
;
one
downwards
,
from
the
Circumference
to
the
Centre
;
and
the
other
upwards
,
from
the
Centre
to
the
Circumference
:
That
those
simple
Motions
are
proper
to
simple
Bodies
,
and
consequently
that
Earth
and
Fire
are
such
Bodies
;
one
of
which
is
altogether
heavy
,
and
the
other
perfectly
light
.
But
because
Gravity
and
Levity
may
be
proper
to
a
Body
,
either
wholly
,
or
in
part
,
he
concludes
that
there
are
two
other
Elements
,
or
simple
Bodies
,
one
of
which
is
partly
light
,
and
the
other
partly
ponderous
,
viz.
Water
and
Air.
Thus
he
proves
that
there
are
four
Elements
,
and
no
more
.
It
is
plain
to
all
those
who
examine
the
Opinions
of
Men
by
their
own
Reason
,
that
all
those
Propositions
are
false
,
or
cannot
at
least
be
taken
for
clear
and
undeniable
Principles
,
which
may
afford
very
plain
and
distinct
Ideas
,
whereon
to
lay
the
Foundation
of
Natural
Philosophy
.
'T
is
certain
that
nothing
can
be
more
absurd
,
than
to
establish
the
Number
of
Elements
upon
the
imaginary
Qualities
of
Heaviness
and
Lightness
;
saying
,
without
any
farther
Proof
,
that
some
Bodies
are
ponderous
,
and
others
light
,
of
their
own
Nature
:
For
if
any
thing
may
be
asserted
without
Proof
,
it
may
be
said
that
all
Bodies
are
naturally
heavy
,
and
endeavour
to
approach
the
Centre
of
the
World
,
as
the
place
of
their
Rest.
And
the
contrary
may
be
asserted
too
,
viz.
That
all
Bodies
are
light
of
their
own
Nature
,
and
tend
to
rise
to
the
Heavens
,
as
to
the
place
of
their
greatest
Perfection
.
For
if
you
object
to
him
who
maintains
the
Gravity
of
Bodies
,
that
Fire
and
Air
are
light
;
he
needs
but
answer
,
that
Fire
and
Air
are
not
light
;
but
that
being
less
ponderous
than
Earth
and
Water
,
they
seem
to
us
to
be
light
:
And
that
it
goes
with
those
Elements
,
as
with
a
piece
of
Wood
that
appears
light
upon
the
Water
;
not
by
reason
of
any
natural
Levity
,
since
it
falls
down
when
in
the
Air
;
but
because
Water
being
heavier
,
seizes
the
lower
Place
,
and
forces
it
to
ascend
.
On
the
contrary
,
If
you
object
to
him
that
defends
the
natural
Levity
of
Bodies
,
that
Earth
and
Water
are
ponderous
;
he
will
likewise
answer
,
That
those
Bodies
seem
heavy
,
because
they
are
not
so
light
as
those
that
surround
them
:
That
Wood
,
for
instance
,
appears
to
be
ponderous
when
in
the
Air
,
not
because
of
its
natural
Gravity
,
since
it
ascends
when
in
the
Water
,
but
because
it
is
not
so
light
as
Air.
And
therefore
't
is
ridiculous
to
suppose
,
as
an
undeniable
Principle
,
that
Bodies
are
either
light
or
heavy
of
their
own
Nature
;
it
being
,
on
the
contrary
,
evident
,
that
none
has
the
Force
of
moving
it self
,
and
that
't
is
indifferent
to
be
moved
either
upwards
or
downwards
,
to
the
East
or
to
the
West
,
to
the
South
or
to
the
North
,
or
in
any
other
possible
manner
.
But
let
us
grant
to
Aristotle
,
That
there
are
four
Elements
,
such
as
he
pretends
;
two
of
which
are
heavy
,
viz.
Earth
and
Water
;
and
the
two
other
light
of
their
own
Nature
,
viz.
Fire
and
Air
;
what
Consequence
may
be
drawn
from
thence
,
for
the
Knowledge
of
the
Universe
?
Those
four
Elements
are
not
the
visible
Fire
,
Air
,
Water
and
Earth
,
but
something
quite
different
,
which
we
know
neither
by
the
Senses
,
nor
by
Reason
,
having
no
distinct
Idea
of
them
.
Let
all
natural
Bodies
be
compos'd
of
them
,
since
Aristotle
has
said
it
:
But
the
Nature
of
those
Compounds
is
still
unknown
,
and
cannot
be
discovered
,
but
by
knowing
the
four
Elements
,
or
the
simple
Bodies
of
which
they
are
made
,
since
the
Composed
is
known
only
by
the
Simple
.
Fire
,
says
Aristotle
,
is
light
by
its
own
Nature
;
the
ascending
Motion
is
simple
:
Fire
is
therefore
a
simple
Body
,
since
Motion
must
be
proportion'd
to
the
Moveable
.
Natural
Bodies
are
compos'd
of
simple
,
there
is
then
Fire
in
all
natural
Bodies
,
but
a
Fire
which
is
not
like
to
that
we
see
;
for
Fire
is
often
but
in
potentia
in
the
Bodies
that
are
made
of
it
.
What
signifie
all
these
Peripatetick
Discourses
?
That
there
is
Fire
in
all
Bodies
,
either
actual
or
potential
,
that
is
to
say
,
that
all
Bodies
are
compos'd
of
something
we
see
not
,
and
the
Nature
of
which
is
wholly
unknown
unto
us
.
Now
we
have
made
a
very
fair
Progress
.
But
though
Aristotle
shews
us
not
the
Nature
of
Fire
,
and
other
Elements
,
of
which
all
Bodies
are
made
up
;
yet
one
may
imagine
,
that
he
will
at
least
discover
their
principal
Qualities
and
Properties
.
Let
us
also
examine
what
he
says
upon
that
Account
.
He
declares
that
there
are
four
principal
Qualities
which
belong
to
the
Sense
of
Touching
,
L.
2.
&
3.
de
Gene.
&
Corrup
.
viz.
Heat
,
Cold
,
Humidity
and
Siccity
;
of
which
all
the
other
are
compos'd
.
He
distributes
those
primitive
Qualities
into
the
four
Elements
,
ascribing
Heat
and
Dryness
to
Fire
,
Heat
and
Moisture
to
the
Air
,
Cold
and
Moisture
to
Water
,
and
Cold
and
Dryness
to
Earth
.
He
asserts
that
Heat
and
Cold
are
active
Qualities
;
but
that
Dryness
and
Moisture
are
passive
.
He
defines
Heat
,
What
congregates
Things
of
the
same
kind
;
Cold
,
What
congregates
Things
either
of
the
same
,
or
of
different
Species
;
Moisture
,
What
cannot
easily
be
contain'd
in
its
own
Limits
,
but
is
easily
kept
within
foreign
Bounds
;
and
Dryness
,
What
is
easily
contain'd
within
its
own
Limits
,
but
will
hardly
be
adapted
to
the
Bounds
of
surrounding
Bodies
.
Thus
,
according
to
Aristotle
,
Fire
is
a
hot
and
dry
Element
,
and
therefore
congregates
Homogeneous
Things
,
is
easily
contain'd
within
its
own
Limits
,
and
hardly
within
others
:
Air
is
a
hot
and
moist
Element
,
and
therefore
congregates
Homogeneous
Things
,
can
hardly
be
kept
within
its
own
Limits
,
but
easily
within
others
:
Water
is
a
cold
and
moist
Element
,
and
therefore
congregates
both
Homogeneous
and
Heterogeneous
Things
,
is
hardly
contain'd
within
its
own
Limits
,
but
easily
within
others
:
And
lastly
,
Earth
is
a
cold
and
dry
Element
,
or
such
an
one
as
aggregates
Things
,
both
of
the
same
and
different
Natures
,
is
easily
contain'd
within
its
own
Limits
,
but
can
hardly
be
adapted
to
others
.
There
you
have
the
Elements
explain'd
,
according
to
the
Opinion
of
Aristotle
,
or
the
Definitions
he
has
given
of
their
principal
Qualities
;
and
because
,
if
we
may
believe
him
▪
the
Elements
are
simple
Bodies
,
out
of
which
others
are
constituted
;
and
their
Qualities
are
simple
Qualities
,
of
which
all
others
are
compos'd
,
the
Knowledge
of
those
Elements
and
Qualities
must
be
very
clear
and
distinct
,
since
the
whole
Natural
Philosophy
,
or
the
Knowledge
of
all
sensible
Bodies
,
which
are
made
of
them
,
must
be
deduc'd
from
thence
.
Let
us
then
see
what
may
be
wanting
to
those
Principles
.
First
,
Aristotle
fixes
no
distinct
Idea
to
the
Word
Quality
:
It
cannot
be
known
whether
by
Quality
he
understands
a
real
Being
distinguish'd
from
Matter
,
or
only
a
Modification
of
Matter
;
he
seems
one
while
to
take
it
in
the
former
,
and
at
another
time
in
the
latter
Sense
.
I
grant
that
in
the
8th
Chapter
of
his
Categories
,
he
defines
Quality
,
that
by
which
Things
are
denominated
so
or
so
;
but
that
is
not
plain
and
satisfactory
.
Secondly
,
His
Definitions
of
the
four
Primitive
Qualities
,
viz.
Heat
,
Cold
,
Moisture
and
Dryness
,
are
either
false
,
or
useless
.
We
will
begin
with
his
Definition
of
Heat
:
Heat
,
says
he
,
is
that
which
congregates
Homogeneous
Things
.
First
,
Though
that
Definition
should
be
true
,
That
Heat
always
congregates
Homogeneous
Bodies
;
yet
we
cannot
see
how
it
perfectly
explains
the
Nature
of
Heat
.
Secondly
,
'T
is
false
that
Heat
congregates
Homogeneous
Things
;
for
Heat
dissipates
the
Particles
of
Water
into
Vapour
,
instead
of
heaping
them
together
:
It
congregates
not
likewise
the
Parts
of
Wine
,
or
any
Liquor
or
Fluid
Body
whatsoever
,
even
to
Quick-silver
.
On
the
contrary
,
it
resolves
and
separates
both
Solid
and
Fluid
Bodies
,
whether
of
the
same
or
different
Natures
;
and
if
there
be
any
,
the
Parts
of
which
Fire
cannot
dissipate
,
it
is
not
because
they
are
homogeneous
,
but
because
they
are
too
gross
and
solid
to
be
carry'd
away
by
the
Motion
of
the
fiery
Particles
.
Thirdly
,
Heat
,
in
reality
,
can
neither
congregate
nor
segregate
the
Parts
of
any
Body
whatsoever
;
for
,
that
the
Parts
of
Bodies
may
be
congregated
,
separated
or
dissipated
,
they
must
be
moved
:
But
Heat
can
move
nothing
,
or
at
least
,
it
appears
not
that
it
can
move
Bodies
;
for
though
we
consider
Heat
with
all
the
possible
Attention
,
we
cannot
discover
that
it
may
communicate
to
Bodies
a
Motion
which
it
has
not
it self
.
We
see
,
indeed
,
that
Fire
moves
and
separates
the
Parts
of
such
Bodies
as
lie
expos'd
to
its
Action
,
but
it
is
not
perhaps
by
its
Heat
,
it
being
not
evident
whether
it
has
any
;
it
is
rather
by
the
Action
of
its
Parts
,
which
we
visibly
perceive
to
be
in
a
continual
Motion
;
for
these
fiery
Particles
striking
against
a
Body
,
must
needs
impart
to
it
somewhat
of
their
Motion
,
whether
there
is
or
is
not
any
Heat
in
Fire
.
If
the
Parts
of
that
Body
be
not
very
solid
▪
Fire
will
dissipate
them
;
but
if
they
be
very
gross
and
solid
,
Fire
can
but
just
move
them
,
and
make
them
slide
one
over
the
other
.
And
Lastly
,
If
there
be
a
Mixture
of
subtile
and
gross
Parts
,
Fire
will
only
dissipate
those
which
it
can
push
so
far
as
to
separate
them
from
the
others
.
So
that
Fire
can
only
separate
;
and
if
it
congregate
,
't
is
only
by
Accident
.
But
Aristotle
asserts
quite
contrary
:
De
Gener.
&
Corrupt
▪
l.
2.
c.
2.
Separating
,
says
he
,
which
some
ascribe
to
Fire
,
is
but
congregating
Homogeneous
Things
;
for
't
is
only
by
Accident
that
Fire
carries
off
Things
of
different
Nature
.
If
this
Philosopher
had
at
first
distinguished
the
Sensation
of
Heat
,
from
the
Motion
of
the
small
Particles
,
of
which
the
Bodies
called
hot
are
composed
,
and
had
afterwards
defined
Heat
,
taken
from
the
Motion
of
Parts
,
by
saying
,
that
Heat
is
what
agitates
and
separates
the
invisible
Parts
,
or
which
visible
Bodies
are
made
up
;
he
would
have
given
a
tolerable
definition
of
Heat
;
though
not
full
and
satisfactory
:
because
it
would
not
accurately
discover
the
Nature
of
Motion
in
hot
Bodies
.
Aristotle
defines
Cold
,
what
congregates
Bodies
of
the
same
,
or
different
Nature
:
but
that
Definition
is
worth
nothing
,
for
Cold
congregates
not
Bodies
.
To
congregate
them
,
it
must
move
them
:
but
if
we
consult
our
Reason
we
shall
find
,
that
Cold
can
move
nothing
;
for
we
understand
by
that
word
,
either
what
we
feel
when
we
are
cold
,
or
what
causes
our
Sensation
.
As
to
our
Sensation
,
't
is
plain
that
it
is
merely
Passive
,
and
can
neither
move
nor
drive
any
thing
.
And
as
to
the
Cause
of
that
Sensation
,
reason
tells
us
,
if
we
examine
things
,
that
it
is
merely
rest
,
or
a
Cessation
of
Motion
:
So
that
Cold
in
Bodies
being
no
more
than
the
Cessation
of
that
sort
of
Motion
which
attends
Heat
,
't
is
evident
that
if
Heat
separate
,
Cold
does
not
.
And
therefore
Cold
coacervates
neither
things
of
the
same
,
nor
of
different
nature
;
since
what
cannot
drive
on
Bodies
cannot
amass
them
together
.
In
a
word
,
as
it
does
nothing
,
it
must
needs
congregate
nothing
.
Aristotle
judging
of
things
by
his
Senses
,
imagin'd
Cold
to
be
as
positive
as
Heat
;
and
because
the
Sensations
of
Heat
and
Cold
are
both
real
and
positive
,
he
supposes
them
both
likewise
to
be
active
Qualities
:
and
indeed
,
if
we
follow
the
Impressions
of
the
Senses
,
we
shall
be
apt
to
believe
that
Cold
is
a
very
active
Quality
;
since
cold
Water
congeals
,
accumulates
,
and
hardens
in
a
moment
melted
Gold
and
Lead
,
when
they
are
pour'd
upon
it
from
a
Crucible
;
though
the
Heat
of
those
Metals
be
yet
strong
enough
to
separate
the
Parts
of
the
Bodies
which
they
touch
.
'T
is
plain
,
by
what
has
been
said
in
the
First
Book
,
concerning
the
Errours
of
the
Senses
,
That
if
we
relye
upon
the
Judgment
the
Senses
make
of
the
Qualities
of
sensible
Bodies
,
't
is
impossible
to
discover
any
certain
and
undeniable
Truth
,
that
may
serve
as
a
Principle
to
proceed
in
the
Knowledge
of
Nature
.
For
one
cannot
so
much
as
discover
that
way
,
what
things
are
hot
,
and
what
cold
;
amongst
several
Persons
,
who
touch
luke-warm
Water
,
it
feels
cold
to
those
that
are
hot
,
See
Book
I.
from
ch.
11.
●o
ch.
15.
and
hot
to
those
that
are
cold
.
And
if
we
suppose
Fishes
susceptible
of
Sensation
,
't
is
very
probable
that
they
feel
it
warm
,
when
all
or
most
Men
feel
it
cold
.
It
is
the
same
with
Air
,
that
seems
to
be
hot
or
cold
,
according
to
the
different
Dispositions
of
the
Bodies
of
those
that
are
exposed
to
it
.
Aristotle
pretends
that
it
is
hot
,
but
I
fansie
that
the
Nothern
Inhabitants
are
of
another
Opinion
,
since
several
learned
Men
,
whose
Climate
is
as
hot
as
that
of
Greece
,
have
asserted
it
to
be
cold
.
But
that
Question
,
which
has
made
so
much
noise
in
the
Schools
,
will
never
be
resolv'd
,
as
long
as
no
distinct
Idea
shall
be
affixed
to
the
Word
Heat
.
The
Definitions
Aristotle
lays
down
of
Heat
and
Cold
cannot
settle
that
Idea
.
For
Instance
,
Air
,
and
even
Water
,
though
never
so
hot
and
scalding
,
congregate
the
parts
of
melted
Lead
together
with
those
of
any
other
Metal
whatsoever
.
Air
conglutinates
all
sorts
of
Fat
joyn'd
with
Gums
,
or
any
other
solid
Bodies
.
And
he
shall
be
a
very
formal
Peripatetick
,
who
should
think
of
exposing
Mastich
,
to
the
Air
,
to
separate
the
pitchy
from
the
Earthy
part
,
and
other
compound
Bodies
to
uncompound
them
.
And
therefore
Air
is
not
hot
,
according
to
the
Definition
which
Aristotle
gives
of
Heat
.
Air
separates
Liquors
from
the
Bodies
that
are
imbued
with
them
,
hardens
Clay
,
dries
spread
Linen
,
though
Aristotle
makes
it
moist
,
and
so
is
hot
and
drying
,
according
to
the
same
Definition
;
therefore
it
cannot
be
determined
by
that
Definition
,
whether
or
no
Air
is
hot
.
It
may
indeed
be
asserted
that
Air
is
hot
in
reference
to
Clay
,
since
it
separates
the
Water
from
the
Earthy
Part.
But
must
we
try
all
the
various
Effects
of
Air
upon
all
Bodies
,
before
we
can
be
assured
,
whether
there
is
Heat
in
the
Air
we
breath
in
?
If
it
be
so
,
we
shall
never
be
sure
of
it
,
and
't
is
as
good
not
to
philosophize
at
all
upon
the
Air
we
respire
,
but
upon
some
certain
pure
and
elementary
Air
,
not
to
be
found
here
below
,
of
which
we
can
very
dogmatically
assert
,
with
Aristotle
,
that
it
is
hot
,
without
giving
the
least
Proof
of
it
,
nor
even
distinctly
knowing
what
we
understand
either
by
that
Air
,
or
by
the
Heat
ascribed
to
it
.
For
thus
we
shall
lay
down
Principles
scarce
to
be
destroyed
;
not
because
of
their
Plainness
and
Certainty
,
but
by
reason
of
their
Darkness
,
and
their
being
like
to
Apparitions
,
which
cannot
be
wounded
,
because
they
have
not
a
Body
.
I
shall
not
insist
upon
Aristotle's
Definitions
of
Moisture
and
Dryness
;
it
being
evident
,
that
they
explain
not
their
Nature
.
For
according
to
those
Definitions
,
Fire
is
not
dry
,
since
it
is
not
easily
contained
within
its
own
limits
;
and
Ice
is
not
moist
,
since
it
keeps
within
its
proper
Bounds
,
and
can
difficultly
be
adapted
to
external
Bounds
.
But
if
fluid
be
understood
by
the
Word
humid
,
or
moist
,
it
may
again
be
said
,
that
Ice
is
not
moist
;
and
that
Flame
,
melted
Gold
,
and
Lead
,
are
very
humid
.
If
by
humid
or
moist
be
understood
what
easily
cleaves
to
any
thing
,
Ice
is
not
humid
,
and
Pitch
,
Fat
,
and
Oil
,
are
moister
than
Water
,
since
they
cleave
to
Bodies
more
strongly
than
it
does
.
Quick-silver
is
moist
in
that
sense
,
for
it
cleaves
to
Metals
;
whereas
Water
is
not
perfectly
moist
,
since
it
cleaves
not
to
most
of
them
.
So
that
't
is
unserviceable
to
have
recourse
to
the
Testimony
of
the
Senses
,
to
defend
the
Opinions
of
Aristotle
.
But
without
farther
examining
his
wonderful
Definitions
of
the
four
Elementary
Qualities
,
let
us
suppose
that
whatever
the
Senses
teach
us
of
those
Qualities
is
incontestable
:
let
us
muster
up
all
our
Faith
,
and
believe
all
those
Definitions
very
accurate
:
Only
let
it
be
allowed
us
to
enquire
whether
all
the
Qualities
of
sensible
Bodies
are
made
of
these
Elementary
Qualities
.
Aristotle
pretends
it
,
and
he
must
do
so
indeed
,
since
he
looks
upon
those
Four
primitive
Qualities
,
as
the
Principles
of
all
the
things
which
he
intends
to
explain
in
his
Books
of
Physicks
.
He
teaches
us
,
that
Colours
are
produced
from
the
Mixture
of
those
Four
Elementary
Qualities
;
White
is
produced
when
Moisture
exceeds
Heat
;
as
in
old
Men
,
when
they
grow
gray
;
Black
when
Moisture
is
exhausted
,
as
in
the
Walls
of
Cisterns
;
and
all
other
Colours
by
the
like
Mixtures
:
that
Odours
and
Savours
arise
from
different
Degrees
of
Dryness
and
Moisture
,
mix'd
together
by
Heat
and
Cold
;
and
that
even
Gravity
and
Levity
do
depend
thereon
.
In
short
,
All
sensible
Qualities
must
needs
be
produced
,
according
to
Aristotle
,
by
Two
active
Principles
,
viz.
Heat
and
Cold
:
and
composed
of
Two
passive
,
namely
,
Dryness
and
Moisture
;
that
there
may
be
some
probable
Connexion
betwixt
his
Principles
,
and
the
Consequences
he
draws
from
them
.
However
't
is
yet
a
harder
Task
to
persuade
us
of
such
things
,
than
any
of
those
that
have
been
hitherto
related
from
Aristotle
.
We
can
scarce
believe
that
the
Earth
,
and
other
Elements
,
would
not
be
colour'd
,
or
visible
,
if
they
were
in
their
natural
Purity
,
without
Mixture
of
those
Elementary
Principles
,
though
some
learned
Commentators
on
that
Philosopher
assert
it
.
We
understand
not
what
Aristotle
means
when
he
assures
us
,
that
gray
Hair
is
produced
by
Moisture
,
because
in
old
Men
Moisture
exceeds
Heat
;
though
to
illustrate
his
thought
we
put
the
definition
instead
of
the
thing
defined
.
For
it
looks
like
an
incomprehensible
piece
of
Nonsence
to
say
that
the
Hair
of
old
Men
becomes
gray
,
because
what
is
not
easily
contained
within
its
own
Limits
,
but
may
be
within
others
,
exceeds
what
congregates
homogeneous
things
.
And
we
are
as
hard
put
it
to
believe
that
Savour
is
well
explain'd
,
by
saying
it
consists
in
a
mixture
of
Dryness
,
Moisture
,
and
of
Heat
,
especially
when
we
put
,
instead
of
those
words
,
the
Definitions
given
by
that
Philosopher
;
as
it
would
prove
useful
,
if
they
were
just
and
good
.
And
none
perhaps
could
forbear
laughing
,
if
instead
of
the
Definitions
which
Aristotle
gives
of
Hunger
and
Thirst
when
he
says
,
that
Hunger
is
the
desire
of
what
is
hot
and
dry
,
and
Thirst
the
desire
of
what
is
cold
and
moist
;
we
should
substitute
the
Definitions
of
those
words
,
calling
Hunger
the
desire
of
that
which
coacervates
things
of
the
same
nature
,
and
is
easily
contained
within
its
own
Limits
,
and
difficultly
within
others
;
and
defining
Thirst
,
the
desire
of
that
which
congregates
things
of
the
same
and
different
natures
,
and
which
can
hardly
be
contained
within
its
own
bounds
,
but
is
easily
kept
within
others
.
Surely
't
is
a
very
useful
Rule
to
know
whether
Terms
have
been
well
defined
,
and
to
avoid
mistakes
in
reasoning
,
often
to
put
the
Definition
instead
of
the
thing
defined
;
for
that
shews
whether
the
words
are
equivocal
,
and
the
Measures
of
the
Relations
false
and
imperfect
,
or
whether
we
argue
consequently
.
If
it
be
so
,
what
Judgment
can
be
made
of
Aristotle's
Arguments
,
which
become
an
impertinent
and
ridiculous
Nonsence
,
when
we
make
use
of
that
Rule
?
and
what
may
also
be
said
of
all
those
who
argue
upon
the
false
and
confused
Ideas
of
the
Senses
,
since
that
Rule
which
preserves
Light
and
Evidence
,
in
all
exact
and
solid
Reasonings
,
brings
nothing
but
confusion
in
their
Discourses
?
'T
is
not
possible
to
lay
open
the
foolish
Capriciousness
and
Extravagance
of
Aristotle's
Explications
upon
all
sorts
of
matters
.
When
he
treats
of
simple
and
easie
Subjects
,
his
Errours
are
plain
and
obvious
to
be
discover'd
;
but
when
he
pretends
to
explain
very
composed
things
and
depending
on
several
Causes
,
his
Errours
are
as
much
compounded
as
the
Subjects
he
speaks
of
;
so
that
it
is
impossible
to
unfold
them
all
,
and
set
them
before
others
.
That
great
Genius
,
who
is
said
to
have
so
well
succeeded
in
his
Rules
for
defining
well
,
knows
not
so
much
as
which
are
the
things
that
may
be
defined
,
because
he
puts
no
Distinction
betwixt
a
clear
and
distinct
▪
and
a
sensible
Knowledge
,
and
pretends
to
know
and
explain
other
things
of
which
he
has
not
so
much
as
a
distinct
Idea
.
Definitions
ought
to
explicate
the
Nature
of
things
,
and
the
words
of
which
they
consist
must
raise
in
the
Mind
distinct
and
particular
Notions
.
But
't
is
impossible
to
define
in
that
manner
sensible
Qualities
,
as
Heat
,
Cold
,
Colour
,
Savour
,
&c.
When
you
confound
the
Cause
with
the
Effect
,
the
Motion
of
Bodies
with
the
Sensation
that
attends
it
;
because
Sensations
being
Modifications
of
the
Soul
,
which
are
not
to
be
known
by
clear
Ideas
,
but
only
by
internal
Sensation
as
I
have
explain'd
it
in
the
third
Book
;
it
is
impossible
to
fix
to
those
words
,
Ideas
which
we
have
not
.
As
we
have
Distinct
Ideas
of
a
Circle
,
a
Square
,
a
Triangle
,
and
therefore
know
distinctly
their
Nature
,
so
we
can
give
good
Difinitions
of
them
,
and
even
deduce
from
our
Ideas
of
those
Figures
all
their
Properties
,
and
explain
them
to
others
by
such
words
as
are
fixed
to
those
Ideas
.
But
we
cannot
define
either
Heat
or
Cold
,
in
as
much
as
they
are
sensible
Qualities
,
because
we
know
them
not
distinctly
,
and
by
Ideas
;
but
only
by
Conscience
and
inward
Sensation
.
Neither
must
we
define
the
Heat
that
is
without
us
by
any
of
its
Effects
.
For
if
we
substitute
such
a
Definition
in
its
place
,
we
shall
find
that
it
will
only
conduce
to
lead
us
into
Errour
.
For
Instance
,
if
Heat
be
defined
what
congregates
homogeneous
things
,
without
adding
any
thing
else
,
we
may
by
that
Definition
mistake
for
Heat
such
things
as
have
no
Relation
to
it
.
For
then
it
might
be
said
,
that
the
Loadstone
collects
the
Filings
of
Iron
,
and
separates
them
from
those
of
Silver
,
because
't
is
hot
;
that
a
Dove
eats
Hempseed
when
it
leaves
other
Grain
,
because
that
Bird
is
hot
;
that
a
covetous
Man
separates
his
Guineas
from
his
Silver
,
because
he
is
hot
.
In
short
,
there
is
no
impertinency
,
but
that
Definition
would
induce
one
into
it
,
were
he
dull
enough
to
follow
it
.
And
therefore
that
Definition
explains
not
the
nature
of
Heat
,
nor
can
it
be
imploy'd
to
deduce
all
its
properties
from
it
:
since
by
literally
insisting
upon
it
,
we
should
draw
ridiculous
Conclusions
;
and
by
putting
it
instead
of
the
thing
defined
,
fall
into
Nonsense
.
However
,
if
we
carefully
distinguish
Heat
from
its
Cause
;
though
it
cannot
be
defined
,
in
as
much
as
it
is
a
Modification
of
the
Soul
,
whereof
we
have
no
Idea
:
yet
its
Cause
may
be
defined
,
since
we
have
a
distinct
Idea
of
Motion
.
But
we
must
observe
that
Heat
▪
taken
for
such
a
Motion
,
causes
not
always
in
us
the
Sense
of
Heat
.
For
Instance
,
Water
is
hot
,
since
its
Parts
are
fluid
,
and
in
Motion
,
and
most
probably
it
feels
warm
to
Fishes
,
at
least
't
is
warmer
than
Ice
,
whose
Parts
are
more
quiet
;
but
't
is
cold
to
us
,
because
it
has
less
Motion
than
the
Parts
of
our
Body
;
what
has
less
Motion
than
another
,
being
in
some
manner
quiet
,
in
respect
of
that
.
And
therefore
't
is
not
with
reference
to
the
Motion
of
the
Fibres
of
our
Body
,
that
the
Cause
of
Heat
,
or
the
Motion
that
excites
it
,
ought
to
be
defined
.
We
must
,
if
possible
,
define
that
Motion
absolutely
,
and
in
it self
:
for
then
our
Definition
will
be
subservient
to
know
the
Nature
and
Properties
of
Heat
.
I
hold
not
my self
oblig'd
to
examine
farther
the
Philosophy
of
Aristotle
,
and
to
extricate
his
so
much
confus'd
and
puzling
Errours
.
I
have
shewn
,
methinks
,
that
he
proves
not
the
Existence
of
his
four
Elements
,
and
defines
them
wrong
;
that
his
Elementary
Qualities
are
not
such
as
he
pretends
,
that
he
knows
not
their
Nature
,
and
that
all
the
Second
Qualities
are
not
made
of
them
;
and
lastly
,
that
though
we
should
grant
him
that
all
Bodies
are
compos'd
of
the
four
Elements
,
and
the
Second
Qualities
of
the
First
,
his
whole
System
would
still
prove
useless
for
the
finding
out
of
Truth
,
since
his
Ideas
are
not
clear
enough
to
preserve
Evidence
in
all
our
Reasonings
.
If
any
doubt
whether
I
have
propos'd
the
true
Opinions
of
Aristotle
,
he
may
satisfie
himself
by
consulting
his
Books
of
the
Heavens
,
and
of
Generation
and
Corruption
,
whence
I
have
exextracted
almost
all
that
I
have
said
of
him
.
I
would
relate
nothing
out
of
his
Eight
Books
of
Physicks
,
because
some
learned
Men
pretend
they
are
but
a
mere
Logick
;
which
is
very
apparent
,
since
nothing
but
rambling
and
undetermin'd
Words
are
to
be
found
in
them
.
As
Aristotle
often
contradicts
himself
,
and
that
almost
all
sorts
of
Opinions
may
be
defended
by
some
Passages
drawn
out
of
him
,
I
doubt
not
but
some
Opinions
,
contrary
to
those
I
have
ascrib'd
to
that
Philosopher
,
may
be
prov'd
out
of
himself
:
And
I
shall
not
warrant
for
him
;
but
it
is
sufficient
for
me
that
I
have
the
Books
I
have
quoted
,
to
justifie
what
I
have
said
of
him
;
and
I
care
little
whether
those
Books
are
Aristotle's
,
or
not
;
taking
them
for
such
,
as
I
find
them
upon
the
publick
Fame
;
for
we
ought
not
to
trouble
our selves
with
enquiring
into
the
true
Genealogy
of
Things
,
for
which
we
have
no
great
Esteem
.
CHAP.
VI.
General
and
necessary
Directions
to
proceed
orderly
in
the
Search
after
Truth
,
and
in
the
Choice
of
Sciences
.
LEST
it
should
be
said
,
that
we
have
only
been
destroying
the
Reasonings
of
others
,
but
establish
nothing
certain
and
undeniable
of
our
own
;
it
will
be
convenient
to
propose
,
in
few
words
,
what
Order
we
ought
to
observe
in
our
Studies
,
for
the
avoiding
Errour
:
and
I
design
withal
to
shew
some
Truths
and
Sciences
that
are
very
necessary
,
as
bearing
such
a
Character
of
Evidence
,
as
that
we
cannot
withold
our
Consent
,
without
feeling
the
secret
Upbraidings
of
our
Reason
.
I
shall
not
explain
at
large
those
Truths
and
Sciences
;
that
's
already
done
,
and
I
intend
not
to
reprint
the
Works
of
others
,
but
only
to
refer
to
them
,
and
to
shew
what
Order
we
must
keep
in
our
Studies
,
to
preserve
Evidence
in
all
our
perceptions
.
The
first
Knowledge
of
all
,
is
that
of
the
Existence
of
our
Soul
;
all
our
Thoughts
are
so
many
undeniable
Demonstrations
of
it
,
for
nothing
is
more
evident
,
than
that
whatever
actually
thinks
,
is
actually
something
.
But
though
it
be
easie
to
know
the
Existence
of
our
Soul
,
yet
her
Essence
and
Nature
are
not
so
easily
discovered
.
If
we
desire
to
know
what
she
is
,
we
must
take
care
above
all
,
not
to
confound
her
with
the
things
to
which
she
is
united
.
If
we
doubt
,
will
,
argue
;
we
must
only
believe
,
that
the
Soul
is
something
that
doubts
,
wills
,
argues
,
and
nothing
more
,
as
long
as
we
have
not
felt
in
her
other
Properties
:
for
we
know
our
Soul
only
by
the
inward
Sensation
we
have
of
her
.
We
must
not
mistake
her
for
our
Body
,
for
Blood
,
for
Animal
Spirits
,
for
Fire
,
and
many
other
things
for
which
Philosophers
have
mistaken
her
.
We
must
believe
of
the
Soul
no
more
than
we
are
forced
to
believe
of
her
,
by
a
full
conviction
of
our
inward
Sense
,
for
otherwise
we
shall
be
deceiv'd
.
Thus
we
shall
know
,
by
a
simple
view
,
or
by
internal
Sensation
,
whatever
may
be
known
of
the
Soul
;
without
being
obliged
to
long
reasonings
that
might
lead
us
into
Errour
.
For
when
we
reason
,
Memory
operates
;
and
whereever
Memory
operates
,
there
may
be
Errour
;
supposing
our
Knowledge
should
depend
on
some
wicked
Spirits
that
should
take
delight
in
deceiving
us
.
Though
I
should
suppose
,
for
instance
,
a
God
,
who
took
delight
in
thus
abusing
me
;
yet
I
am
persuaded
that
I
could
not
be
deceived
in
a
Knowledge
of
simple
Perception
,
as
is
that
by
which
I
know
that
I
am
,
that
I
think
,
or
that
2
and
2
are
4.
For
I
am
conscious
to
my self
,
that
in
this
extravagant
Supposition
,
such
a
deluding
Spirit
,
though
never
so
potent
,
could
not
make
me
doubt
that
I
am
,
or
that
2
times
2
are
4
;
because
I
perceive
those
things
with
a
simple
view
or
Perception
,
and
without
the
use
of
Memory
.
But
when
I
reason
,
as
I
see
not
evidently
the
Principles
of
my
Reasonings
,
but
only
remember
that
I
have
evidently
seen
them
.
If
that
seducing
God
should
join
that
Remembrance
to
false
Principles
,
as
he
might
do
if
he
pleas'd
,
I
should
conclude
nothing
but
what
was
false
.
Just
like
those
that
make
long
Calculations
;
fancying
they
remember
that
they
have
plainly
seen
that
9
times
9
are
72
,
or
that
21
is
a
primitive
Number
,
or
some
other
Errour
of
that
Nature
,
draw
false
Inferences
from
thence
.
And
therefore
't
is
necessary
to
know
God
,
and
to
be
assured
that
he
is
no
Deceiver
;
if
we
desire
to
be
fully
convinced
that
the
most
certain
Sciences
,
as
Arithmetick
and
Geometry
are
true
Sciences
;
for
without
that
their
Evidence
is
not
full
,
and
we
can
still
with-hold
our
Consent
.
And
't
is
likewise
necessary
to
know
by
a
simple
View
,
and
not
by
Reasoning
,
that
God
is
no
Deceiver
;
since
reasoning
may
still
be
false
,
in
the
supposition
of
a
deluding
God
.
All
the
ordinary
Proofs
of
the
Existence
and
Perfections
of
God
,
drawn
from
the
Existence
and
Perfections
of
his
Creatures
,
are
methinks
liable
to
this
Defect
,
that
they
convince
not
the
Mind
with
a
simple
Perception
.
All
those
Arguments
are
Reasonings
convincing
in
themselves
;
but
because
they
are
Reasonings
,
they
are
not
demonstrative
in
supposing
a
wicked
and
deceitfull
Genius
.
They
sufficiently
shew
that
there
is
a
Power
superiour
to
us
,
which
is
granted
even
by
that
foolish
Supposition
:
but
they
do
not
fully
persuade
us
that
there
is
a
God
,
or
a
Being
infinitely
perfect
;
so
that
the
Conclusion
of
those
Arguments
is
more
evident
than
the
Principle
.
T
is
more
evident
that
there
is
a
Power
superiour
to
us
,
than
that
there
is
a
World
,
since
no
Supposition
can
obviate
our
demonstrating
that
superiour
Power
;
whereas
in
supposing
an
evil
and
deceitfull
Spirit
,
't
is
impossible
to
prove
the
Existence
of
the
World
:
because
it
may
still
be
conceived
,
that
this
wicked
Genius
gives
us
the
Sense
of
things
that
are
not
in
being
;
as
Sleep
,
and
some
Distempers
,
make
us
perceive
things
that
never
were
,
and
even
feel
an
actual
pain
in
imaginary
Members
,
such
as
we
have
lost
,
or
that
we
never
had
.
But
the
Arguments
of
the
Existence
and
Perfections
of
God
,
drawn
from
our
Idea
of
infinite
,
are
Proo●s
of
simple
sight
.
We
see
there
is
a
God
,
as
soon
as
we
perceive
infinite
;
because
necessary
Existence
is
included
in
the
Idea
of
infinite
,
and
that
nothing
but
infinite
can
furnish
to
us
the
Idea
of
an
infinite
Being
.
We
likewise
see
that
God
is
no
Deceiver
,
because
knowing
that
he
is
infinitely
perfect
,
and
that
infinite
cannot
want
any
Perfection
,
we
plainly
perceive
that
he
will
not
seduce
us
,
and
even
that
he
cannot
,
because
he
can
but
what
he
wills
,
and
what
he
is
able
to
will
.
And
therefore
there
is
a
God
,
a
true
God
,
and
a
God
that
never
deceives
us
;
though
he
does
not
always
enlighten
us
,
and
that
we
are
obnoxious
to
Mistakes
,
when
we
want
his
Light
.
Attentive
Minds
perceive
all
those
Truths
,
by
a
simple
intuitive
Perception
,
though
we
seem
to
make
Arguments
,
that
we
may
demonstrate
them
to
others
;
so
that
they
may
be
supposed
as
unquestionable
Principles
of
our
Reasonings
;
for
having
known
that
God
delights
not
in
deceiving
us
,
nothing
hinders
but
we
may
proceed
to
Reason
.
'T
is
also
plain
that
the
certainty
of
Faith
depends
on
that
Principle
,
That
there
is
a
God
uncapable
of
Deceipt
.
For
the
Existence
of
God
,
and
the
Infallibility
of
his
Divine
Authority
,
are
rather
a
natural
Knowledge
and
common
Notions
,
as
to
Minds
capable
of
serious
Attention
,
than
Articles
of
Faith
;
though
to
have
a
Mind
susceptible
of
a
sufficient
Attention
rightly
to
conceive
those
Truths
,
and
willingly
to
apply
our selves
to
the
understanding
them
,
be
a
particular
Gift
of
God
.
From
that
Principle
,
That
God
is
no
Deceiver
,
we
might
likewise
infer
,
that
we
have
a
real
Body
,
to
which
we
are
united
in
a
particular
manner
,
and
that
we
are
surrounded
with
several
others
[
](A51674-e91910-b)*
*
See
Illustration
X.
of
Book
I.
.
For
we
are
inwardly
convinced
of
their
Existence
by
the
continual
Sensations
,
which
God
produces
in
us
,
and
which
we
cannot
correct
by
Reason
,
without
offending
Faith
;
though
we
can
correct
by
Reason
the
Sensations
that
represent
them
,
as
endu'd
with
some
Qualities
and
Perfections
that
are
not
in
them
:
So
that
we
ought
not
to
believe
that
they
are
such
as
we
see
or
imagine
them
,
but
only
that
they
exist
,
and
that
they
are
such
as
we
conceive
them
by
Reason
.
But
that
we
may
proceed
orderly
,
we
must
not
yet
examine
whether
we
have
a
Body
,
whether
there
are
others
about
us
,
or
whether
we
have
only
bare
Sensations
of
Things
which
exist
not
.
Those
Questions
include
too
great
Difficulties
,
and
are
not
perhaps
so
necessary
as
may
be
imagin'd
to
perfect
our
Mind
,
and
to
have
an
accurate
Knowledge
of
Natural
and
Moral
Philosophy
,
and
some
other
Sciences
.
We
have
within
us
the
Ideas
of
Numbers
and
Extension
,
whose
Existence
is
undeniable
,
and
their
Nature
immutable
;
and
which
would
eternally
supply
us
with
Objects
to
think
on
,
if
we
desire
to
know
all
their
Relations
:
It
is
necessary
to
begin
to
make
use
of
our
Minds
upon
those
Ideas
,
for
some
Reasons
,
which
it
will
not
be
amiss
to
explain
,
whereof
the
principal
are
Three
.
The
First
is
,
That
those
Ideas
are
the
most
clear
and
evident
of
all
:
For
if
,
to
avoid
Errour
,
we
must
still
keep
to
Evidence
in
our
Reasonings
,
't
is
plain
that
we
must
rather
argue
from
the
Ideas
of
Numbers
and
Extension
,
than
from
the
confus'd
or
compos'd
Ideas
of
Physicks
,
Morals
,
Mechanicks
,
Chymistry
,
and
other
Sciences
.
Secondly
,
Those
Ideas
are
the
most
distinct
and
exact
of
all
,
especially
those
of
Numbers
:
So
that
the
Habit
(
which
proceeds
from
the
Exercise
of
Arithmetick
and
Geometry
)
of
not
being
content
till
we
precisely
know
the
Relations
of
Things
,
endues
the
Mind
with
such
an
Exactness
of
Thought
,
as
is
not
to
be
found
in
those
that
are
satisfied
with
the
Probabilities
so
obvious
to
be
met
with
in
other
Sciences
.
The
Third
and
chief
Reason
is
,
That
those
Ideas
are
the
immutable
Rules
and
common
Measure
of
all
the
Objects
of
our
Knowledge
:
For
those
that
perfectly
know
the
Relations
of
Numbers
and
Figures
,
or
rather
the
Art
of
making
such
Comparisons
as
are
requisite
to
know
them
,
have
a
kind
of
Universal
Knowledge
,
and
a
very
sure
Means
evidently
and
certainly
to
discover
whatever
goes
not
beyond
the
ordinary
Limits
of
the
Mind
.
But
those
that
are
not
skilful
in
this
Art
,
cannot
with
Certainty
discover
such
Truths
as
are
somewhat
intricate
,
though
they
have
very
clear
Ideas
of
Things
,
and
endeavour
to
know
their
Compound
Relations
.
These
,
or
the
like
Reasons
,
mov'd
some
of
the
Antients
to
apply
their
Youth
to
the
Study
of
Arithmetick
,
Algebra
and
Geometry
.
Undoubtedly
they
well
knew
that
Arithmetick
and
Algebra
endue
the
Mind
with
such
an
Insight
and
Penetration
,
as
was
not
to
be
gotten
by
other
Studies
;
and
that
Geometry
manages
the
Imagination
so
well
,
as
that
it
is
not
easily
puzzl'd
or
confounded
;
for
that
Faculty
of
the
Soul
,
so
necessary
to
Sciences
,
acquires
by
the
Use
of
Geometry
,
such
an
universal
Nicety
as
promotes
and
preserves
the
clear
View
of
the
Mind
,
even
in
the
most
intricate
Difficulties
.
And
therefore
,
he
that
desires
always
to
preserve
Evidence
in
his
Perceptions
,
and
discover
naked
Tru●hs
,
without
Mixture
of
Darkness
and
Errour
,
must
begin
with
the
Study
of
Arithmetick
,
Algebra
and
Geometry
,
after
he
has
obtain'd
some
Knowledge
,
at
least
of
himself
,
and
the
Sovereign
Being
.
As
for
Books
that
make
the
Way
to
those
Sciences
easie
,
I
may
refer
to
the
Meditations
of
des
Cartes
,
as
to
the
Knowledge
of
God
,
and
our selves
;
to
the
Elements
of
Mathematicks
,
newly
printed
,
as
to
Arithmetick
and
Algebra
;
to
the
New
Elements
of
Geometry
,
printed
in
1667
,
or
to
the
Elements
of
Father
Taquet
,
Jesuit
,
printed
at
Antwerp
in
1665
,
as
to
ordinary
Geometry
;
and
as
to
Conick
Sections
,
and
the
Solution
of
Geometrical
Problemes
,
to
the
Treatises
of
Monsieur
de
la
Hire
,
intituled
,
Of
Conick
Sections
,
Of
Geometrical
Places
,
and
Of
the
Construction
of
Equations
;
to
which
may
be
added
,
the
Geometry
of
des
Cartes
.
I
would
not
have
advis'd
to
the
Elements
of
Mathematicks
,
as
to
Arithmetick
and
Algebra
,
if
I
knew
any
Author
who
had
clearly
demonstrated
those
Sciences
;
but
Truth
obliges
me
to
a
thing
,
for
which
I
may
be
blam'd
by
some
People
;
for
Algebra
and
Analyticks
being
altogether
requisite
for
the
Discovery
of
compos'd
Truths
,
I
must
needs
shew
my
Esteem
for
a
Book
which
carries
those
Sciences
very
far
,
and
which
,
in
the
Opinion
of
many
Learned
,
explains
them
more
clearly
than
they
had
been
hitherto
.
By
the
careful
Study
of
those
general
Sciences
,
we
shall
evidently
know
a
great
Number
of
Truths
,
very
serviceable
in
all
accurate
and
particular
Sciences
.
We
may
afterwards
study
Natural
and
Moral
Philosophy
,
as
being
very
useful
,
though
no●
very
fit
to
make
the
Mind
nice
and
quick-sighted
.
And
if
we
desire
to
preserve
Evidence
in
all
our
Perceptions
,
we
must
take
a
special
Care
not
to
be
opinionated
of
any
Principle
that
is
not
evident
,
and
to
which
the
Chinese
,
for
instance
,
would
not
be
suppos'd
to
dissent
,
after
having
throughly
weigh'd
and
consider'd
it
.
And
therefore
we
must
only
admit
in
Physicks
those
Notions
which
are
common
to
all
Men
,
such
as
Axioms
of
Geometry
,
and
the
clear
Ideas
of
Extension
,
Figure
,
Motion
,
Rest
,
and
others
of
that
nature
,
if
there
be
any
.
Perhaps
it
will
be
said
,
that
Extension
is
not
the
Essence
of
Matter
:
But
what
is
that
to
the
purpose
?
'T
is
sufficient
that
the
World
,
which
we
conceive
to
consist
of
Extension
,
appears
like
to
that
we
see
,
though
it
be
not
made
of
such
a
Matter
,
which
is
good
for
nothing
,
and
altogether
unknown
,
whilst
so
much
Noise
is
made
about
it
.
It
is
not
absolutely
necessary
to
examine
whether
there
are
actually
External
Beings
,
corresponding
to
those
Ideas
;
for
we
argue
not
from
those
Beings
,
but
from
their
Ideas
.
We
must
only
take
care
that
our
Reasonings
which
we
make
upon
the
Properties
of
Things
,
agree
with
our
inward
Consciousness
;
that
is
,
that
our
Thoughts
perfectly
agree
with
Experience
;
because
in
Physicks
we
endeavour
to
discover
the
Order
and
Connexion
of
Effects
with
their
Causes
,
either
in
Bodies
if
they
exist
,
or
in
the
Sense
we
have
of
them
if
they
are
not
in
being
.
I
say
not
,
however
,
that
we
can
doubt
whether
Bodies
are
actually
existing
,
when
we
consider
that
God
is
not
a
Deceiver
;
and
that
the
Order
he
has
constituted
in
our
Sentiments
of
Things
▪
both
as
to
natural
Occurrences
,
and
such
as
are
wrought
to
create
our
Belief
of
what
Reason
is
at
a
Loss
to
comprehend
,
is
very
regular
.
But
I
observe
this
,
because
't
is
not
necessary
to
insist
at
first
very
long
upon
a
thing
which
no
body
doubts
of
,
and
is
not
extremely
conducible
to
the
Knowledge
of
Physicks
,
consider'd
as
a
true
Science
.
Neither
must
we
puzzle
our
Heads
with
enquiring
whether
there
are
in
the
Bodies
about
us
some
other
Qualities
,
besides
those
of
which
we
have
clear
Ideas
;
for
we
must
only
reason
upon
our
Ideas
;
and
if
there
be
any
thing
of
which
we
have
no
clear
,
distinct
and
particular
Idea
,
we
shall
never
know
it
,
nor
argue
from
it
with
any
Certainty
:
Whereas
,
perhaps
,
by
reasoning
upon
our
Ideas
,
we
may
follow
Nature
,
and
perhaps
discover
that
she
is
not
so
hidden
as
is
commonly
imagin'd
.
As
those
who
have
not
study'd
the
Properties
of
Numbers
,
often
imagine
that
it
is
not
possible
to
resolve
some
Problemes
,
which
are
however
simple
and
easie
;
so
those
that
have
not
meditated
upon
the
Properties
of
Extension
,
Figures
and
Motions
,
are
very
apt
to
believe
,
and
even
to
assert
,
that
most
part
of
the
Physical
Questions
are
inexplicable
.
But
we
must
not
be
deterr'd
by
the
Opinion
of
those
who
have
examin'd
nothing
,
or
nothing
at
least
with
due
Application
:
For
though
few
Truths
concerning
Natural
Things
have
been
fully
demonstrated
,
yet
't
is
certain
that
there
are
some
that
are
general
which
cannot
be
doubted
of
,
though
it
be
very
possible
not
to
think
upon
them
,
to
know
nothing
of
them
,
and
to
deny
them
.
If
we
meditate
orderly
,
and
with
due
Time
and
all
necessary
Application
,
we
shall
discover
several
of
those
certain
Truths
I
speak
of
:
But
for
more
Conveniency
,
it
will
be
requisite
carefully
to
read
des
Cartes's
Principles
of
Philosophy
,
without
approving
of
any
thing
he
says
,
till
the
Strength
and
Plainness
of
his
Reasons
shall
suffer
us
to
doubt
no
longer
.
As
Moral
Philosophy
is
the
most
necessary
of
all
Sciences
,
so
it
must
be
study'd
with
the
greatest
Application
;
it
being
very
dangerous
to
follow
in
this
the
Opinions
of
Men.
But
to
the
avoiding
Errour
,
and
keeping
to
Evidence
in
our
Perceptions
,
we
must
only
meditate
upon
such
Principles
as
are
confess'd
by
all
those
whose
Hearts
are
not
corrupted
by
Debauchery
,
and
their
Minds
blinded
with
Pride
:
For
there
is
no
Moral
Principle
undeniable
to
Minds
of
Flesh
and
Blood
,
who
aspire
to
the
Quality
of
Bold
Wits
.
Such
People
conceive
not
the
most
simple
Truths
;
or
if
they
do
,
they
constantly
deny
them
through
a
Spirit
of
Contradiction
,
and
to
keep
up
the
Reputation
of
great
Wits
.
Some
of
the
most
general
Principles
of
Morality
are
,
That
God
having
made
all
things
for
himself
,
has
made
our
Understanding
to
know
,
and
our
Will
to
love
him
:
That
being
so
just
and
powerful
as
he
is
,
we
cannot
be
happy
but
by
obeying
his
Commands
,
nor
be
unhappy
in
following
them
:
That
our
Nature
is
corrupted
,
our
Mind
depending
on
our
Body
,
our
Reason
on
our
Senses
,
and
our
Will
on
our
Passions
:
That
we
are
uncapable
of
performing
what
we
plainly
see
to
be
our
Duty
,
and
that
we
have
need
of
a
Redeemer
.
There
are
yet
many
other
Moral
Principles
;
as
,
That
Retirement
and
Penitency
are
necessary
to
diminish
our
Union
with
sensible
Objects
,
and
to
increase
that
which
we
have
with
intelligible
Goods
,
true
Goods
,
and
the
Goods
of
the
Mind
:
That
we
cannot
enjoy
vehement
Pleasures
,
without
becoming
Slaves
to
them
:
That
nothing
must
be
undertaken
by
Passion
:
That
we
must
not
long
for
Settlements
in
this
Life
,
&c.
But
because
these
last
Principles
depend
on
the
former
,
and
on
the
Knowledge
of
Man
,
it
behoves
us
not
to
take
them
at
first
for
granted
.
If
we
orderly
meditate
upon
those
Principles
,
with
as
much
Care
and
Application
as
so
great
a
Subject
deserves
,
and
admit
no
Conclusion
for
true
but
such
as
follows
from
those
Principles
,
we
shall
compose
a
very
certain
System
of
Morals
,
and
perfectly
agreeable
with
that
of
the
Gospel
,
though
not
so
large
and
compleat
.
I
grant
that
in
Moral
Reasonings
it
is
not
so
easie
to
preserve
Evidence
and
Exactness
,
as
in
some
other
Sciences
;
and
that
the
Knowledge
of
Man
being
absolutely
necessary
to
those
that
will
proceed
far
,
many
Learners
make
no
considerable
Progresses
therein
:
They
will
not
consult
themselves
,
to
be
sensible
of
the
Weakness
of
their
Nature
:
They
are
soon
weary
of
interrogating
the
Master
,
who
inwardly
teaches
them
his
Will
;
that
is
,
the
Immutable
and
Eternal
Laws
,
and
the
true
Principles
of
Morality
:
They
cannot
listen
with
Pleasure
to
him
that
speaks
not
to
their
Senses
,
who
answers
not
according
to
their
Desires
,
and
flatters
not
their
secret
Pride
:
They
have
no
Veneration
for
such
Words
,
the
Lustre
of
which
dazles
not
their
Imagination
,
which
are
lowly
pronounc'd
,
and
never
distinctly
heard
but
when
the
Creatures
are
silent
:
But
they
consult
with
Pleasure
and
Reverence
Aristotle
,
Seneca
,
or
some
new
Philosophers
,
who
seduce
them
by
the
Obscurity
of
their
Words
,
by
the
Elegancy
of
their
Expressions
,
or
the
Probability
of
their
Reasons
.
Since
the
Fall
of
our
first
Parents
we
esteem
nothing
but
what
refers
to
the
Preservation
of
the
Body
,
and
the
Conveniencies
of
Life
;
and
as
we
discover
that
sort
of
Good
by
means
of
the
Senses
,
so
we
endeavour
to
use
them
on
all
Occasions
.
The
Eternal
Wisdom
,
which
is
our
true
Life
,
and
the
only
Light
that
can
illuminate
us
,
often
shines
but
upon
the
Blind
,
and
speaks
but
to
the
Deaf
,
when
it
speaks
within
the
Recesses
of
our
Soul
,
because
we
are
for
the
most
part
exercis'd
abroad
.
And
as
we
are
continually
putting
Questions
to
the
Creatures
,
to
learn
any
News
from
them
of
the
Good
we
are
in
search
of
,
it
was
requisite
,
as
I
have
said
elsewhere
,
that
this
Wisdom
should
offer
it self
to
our
Senses
,
yet
without
going
out
of
our selves
,
that
we
might
learn
by
sensible
Words
and
convincing
Examples
,
the
way
to
eternal
Happiness
.
God
perpetually
imprints
on
us
a
natural
Love
for
him
,
that
we
may
always
love
him
;
yet
by
that
same
Motion
of
Love
we
incessantly
recede
from
him
,
running
with
all
the
strength
he
gives
us
to
the
sinsible
Good
which
he
forbids
us
to
love
;
and
therefore
as
he
desires
we
should
love
him
,
so
he
must
make
himself
sensible
and
offer
himself
before
us
,
to
stop
by
the
delectation
of
his
Grace
all
our
restless
Agitations
,
and
begin
our
Cure
by
Sensations
or
Satisfactions
,
like
to
the
preventing
Pleasures
that
had
been
the
Original
of
our
Disease
.
For
these
reasons
I
pretend
not
that
Men
may
easily
discover
,
by
the
strength
of
their
Mind
,
all
the
Rules
of
Morality
necessary
to
Salvation
,
and
much
less
that
they
should
be
able
to
act
according
to
their
Light
;
for
their
Heart
is
still
more
corrupted
than
their
Mind
.
I
only
say
,
that
if
they
admit
nothing
but
evident
Principles
,
and
argue
consequently
from
them
,
they
shall
discover
the
same
Truths
that
are
taught
us
in
the
Gospel
:
because
it
is
the
same
Wisdom
,
which
speaks
immediately
,
and
by
it self
,
to
those
that
discover
the
Truth
in
evident
Reasonings
,
and
which
speaks
in
the
Holy
Scriptures
to
those
that
understand
them
in
their
right
sense
.
We
must
therefore
study
Morality
in
the
Gospel
,
to
spare
our selves
the
trouble
of
Meditation
,
and
to
learn
with
certainty
the
Laws
and
Rules
of
our
Life
and
Manners
.
As
to
those
who
are
not
satisfied
with
a
bare
Certainty
,
because
it
only
convinces
the
Mind
,
without
enlightening
it
,
they
must
meditate
upon
those
Laws
,
and
deduce
them
from
their
natural
Principles
;
that
they
may
know
evidently
by
Reason
what
Faith
has
already
taught
them
,
with
an
absolute
Certainty
.
Thus
they
will
convince
themselves
,
that
the
Gospel
is
the
most
solid
Book
in
the
World
,
that
Christ
perfectly
knew
the
Disorders
and
Distempers
of
Nature
,
that
he
has
rectified
and
cured
them
in
a
manner
the
most
useful
to
us
,
and
most
worthy
of
himself
,
that
can
be
conceived
.
But
that
the
Light
of
Philosophers
is
nothing
but
a
dark
Night
,
and
their
most
splendid
Vertues
,
an
intolerable
Pride
:
In
short
,
that
Aristotle
,
Seneca
,
and
all
the
rest
are
but
Men
,
to
say
nothing
worse
.
CHAP.
VII
.
Of
the
Vse
of
the
First
Rule
concerning
particular
Questions
.
WE
have
sufficiently
insisted
upon
the
general
Rule
of
Method
,
more
especially
regarding
the
Subject
of
our
Studies
,
and
shewn
,
that
Des
Cartes
has
exactly
followed
it
in
his
System
of
the
World
;
whereas
Aristotle
and
his
Disciples
have
not
observed
it
.
We
proceed
now
to
the
particular
Rules
that
are
necessary
to
resolve
all
sorts
of
Questions
.
The
Questions
that
may
be
formed
upon
all
sorts
of
Subjects
are
of
so
many
Kinds
,
as
that
it
is
not
easie
to
enumerate
them
.
However
I
shall
set
down
the
principal
.
Sometimes
we
search
after
the
unknown
Causes
of
some
Effects
that
are
known
,
and
sometimes
after
unknown
Effects
by
known
Causes
.
Fire
burns
and
dissipates
Wood
,
we
enquire
after
the
Cause
of
it
.
Fire
consists
in
a
violent
Motion
of
the
fiery
Particles
;
we
desire
to
know
what
Effects
that
Motion
is
able
to
produce
,
whether
it
may
harden
Clay
,
melt
Iron
,
&c.
Sometimes
we
seek
the
Nature
of
a
thing
by
its
Properties
,
and
sometimes
its
Properties
by
its
Nature
,
that
is
known
to
us
.
We
know
,
or
suppose
,
that
Light
is
transmitted
in
a
moment
;
and
however
,
that
it
is
reflected
and
collected
by
a
concave
Mirrour
,
so
as
to
consume
and
melt
the
most
solid
Bodies
;
and
we
design
to
make
use
of
those
Properties
to
discover
its
Nature
.
On
the
contrary
we
know
,
that
all
the
space
that
reaches
from
the
Earth
to
the
Heavens
,
is
full
of
little
Spherical
and
most
movable
Bodies
,
which
continually
endeavour
their
removal
from
the
Sun
:
We
desire
to
discover
whether
the
endeavour
of
those
small
Bodies
may
be
transmitted
in
an
instant
;
whether
being
reflected
by
a
concave
Glass
,
they
must
unite
themselves
,
and
dissipate
or
melt
the
solidest
Bodies
.
Sometimes
we
enquire
after
all
the
Parts
of
the
Whole
,
and
sometimes
after
the
Whole
by
its
Parts
.
We
search
after
all
the
unknown
Parts
of
a
Whole
that
is
known
,
when
we
seek
all
the
Aliquot
Parts
of
a
Number
,
all
the
Roots
of
an
Equation
,
all
the
Right
Angles
of
a
Figure
,
&c.
And
we
enquire
after
an
unknown
Whole
,
all
the
Parts
of
which
are
known
,
when
we
seek
the
Summ
of
several
Numbers
,
the
Area
of
many
Figures
,
the
Dimensions
of
different
Vessels
.
Or
we
seek
a
Whole
,
one
Part
of
which
is
known
,
and
whose
other
Parts
,
though
unknown
,
include
some
known
Relation
with
that
which
is
unknown
;
as
when
we
seek
what
is
that
Number
,
one
Part
of
which
,
as
15
,
being
known
,
makes
with
the
other
part
the
half
,
or
the
third
of
an
unknown
Number
;
or
when
we
seek
an
unknown
Number
equal
to
15
,
and
to
the
double
of
the
Root
of
that
unknown
Number
.
Lastly
,
We
often
enquire
whether
some
things
are
equal
,
or
like
to
others
;
and
how
much
they
are
unequal
or
different
:
As
when
we
desire
to
know
whether
Saturn
is
greater
than
Jupiter
,
and
how
much
the
former
surpasses
the
latter
:
Whether
the
Air
of
Rome
is
hotter
than
that
of
London
,
and
how
many
degrees
.
What
is
general
in
all
Questions
is
,
that
they
are
formed
for
the
Knowledge
of
some
Truths
;
and
because
all
Truths
are
Relations
,
it
may
generally
be
said
,
that
in
all
Questions
,
we
search
but
after
the
Knowledge
of
some
Relations
,
either
betwixt
things
,
or
betwixt
Ideas
,
or
betwixt
things
and
their
Ideas
.
There
are
Relations
of
several
sorts
,
as
betwixt
the
Nature
of
things
,
betwixt
their
Magnitudes
,
their
Parts
,
their
Attributes
,
their
Qualities
,
Effects
,
Causes
,
&c.
but
they
may
all
be
reduced
to
two
,
viz.
to
Relations
of
Magnitude
and
of
Quality
;
comprehending
under
the
former
,
all
those
in
which
things
are
consider'd
as
suceptible
of
more
and
less
;
and
all
the
others
under
the
latter
.
So
that
it
may
be
said
,
that
all
Questions
tend
to
discover
some
Relation
,
either
of
Magnitude
or
of
Quality
.
The
first
and
chief
Rule
is
,
That
we
must
very
distinctly
know
the
state
of
the
Question
to
be
resolv'd
;
and
have
such
distinct
Ideas
of
its
Terms
,
that
we
may
compare
them
together
,
and
discover
their
unknown
Relations
.
We
must
then
first
very
clearly
perceive
the
unknown
Relation
enquired
after
;
for
't
is
plain
,
that
if
we
have
no
certain
Mark
to
distinguish
it
,
when
't
is
sought
for
,
or
when
't
is
found
,
our
labour
will
be
fruitless
.
Secondly
,
We
must
,
as
far
as
possible
,
make
the
Ideas
which
answer
to
the
Terms
of
the
Question
,
distinct
,
by
taking
off
their
Equivocation
;
and
make
them
clear
,
by
considering
them
with
all
the
possible
Attention
:
for
if
those
Ideas
are
so
confused
and
obscure
,
as
that
we
cannot
make
the
necessary
Comparisons
,
to
discover
the
Relations
we
look
for
,
we
are
not
yet
in
a
state
of
resolving
the
Question
.
Thirdly
,
We
must
consider
with
all
possible
Attention
,
the
Conditions
expressed
in
the
Question
,
if
any
there
be
;
since
without
that
we
can
but
confusedly
understand
the
state
of
that
Question
:
besides
that
the
Conditions
commonly
trace
out
the
way
to
resolve
it
.
So
that
when
the
state
of
a
Question
,
and
its
Conditions
are
rightly
understood
,
we
not
only
know
what
we
enquire
after
,
but
also
sometimes
by
what
means
it
may
be
discovered
.
I
grant
that
Conditions
are
not
express'd
in
all
Questions
,
but
then
those
Questions
are
undeterminate
,
and
may
resolved
several
ways
;
as
when
't
is
required
to
find
out
a
Square
Number
,
a
Triangle
,
&c.
without
specifying
any
other
particulars
:
Or
it
may
be
that
the
Querist
knows
not
how
to
resolve
,
or
that
he
conceals
them
,
in
order
to
puzzle
the
Resolver
;
as
when
't
is
required
to
find
out
Two
mean
Proportionals
betwixt
Two
Lines
,
without
adding
by
the
Intersection
of
the
Circle
and
Parabola
,
or
of
the
Circle
and
Ellipsis
,
&c.
And
therefore
't
is
altogether
necessary
,
that
the
distinguishing
Character
of
what
is
searched
after
,
be
very
distinct
,
and
not
equivocal
,
or
that
it
be
only
proper
to
the
thing
enquired
;
otherwise
we
could
not
be
certain
whether
the
Question
proposed
is
resolved
.
We
must
likewise
carefully
separate
from
the
Question
all
the
Conditons
that
make
it
intricate
,
and
without
which
it
subsists
entire
;
because
they
fruitlessly
divide
the
capacity
of
the
Mind
.
Besides
that
we
have
not
a
distinct
perception
of
the
state
of
the
Question
,
as
long
as
the
Conditions
that
attend
it
are
useless
.
Suppose
,
for
instance
,
a
Question
were
proposed
in
these
Words
;
to
cause
that
a
Man
besprinkled
with
some
Liquors
,
and
crowned
with
a
Garland
of
Flowers
,
be
not
able
to
rest
,
though
he
sees
nothing
that
is
capable
of
moving
him
.
We
must
enquire
whether
the
word
Man
is
Metaphorical
;
whether
the
word
Rest
is
equivocal
;
whether
it
relates
to
local
Motions
,
or
to
Passions
,
as
the
last
words
,
though
he
sees
nothing
that
is
capable
of
moving
him
,
seem
to
hint
:
Lastly
,
We
must
enquire
whether
the
Conditions
,
besprinkled
with
some
Liquors
,
and
crowned
with
a
Garland
of
Flowers
are
essential
.
Lastly
,
The
state
of
that
ridiculous
and
undeterminate
Question
being
thus
plainly
known
,
't
will
be
easie
to
resolve
it
,
by
saying
that
we
need
but
put
a
Man
in
a
Ship
,
with
the
Conditions
expressed
in
the
Question
.
The
Skill
of
those
that
propose
such
Questions
,
is
to
join
some
Conditions
to
them
,
that
seem
necessary
though
they
be
not
so
;
that
the
Mind
of
the
Resolver
may
be
diverted
to
things
that
are
unserviceable
,
as
to
the
Solution
of
it
.
As
in
this
Question
,
which
Servant-Maids
often
put
to
Children
;
I
have
seen
,
say
they
,
Hunters
,
or
rather
Fishers
,
which
carried
with
them
what
they
could
not
catch
,
and
threw
into
the
Water
what
they
catch'd
;
the
Mind
being
prepossessed
with
the
Ideas
of
Fishers
that
take
Fish
,
cannot
understand
the
state
of
that
Foolish
Question
;
the
whole
Difficulty
of
which
comes
from
hence
,
that
we
think
not
that
Hunters
and
Fishers
,
as
well
as
other
Men
,
often
seek
in
their
Cloaths
some
little
Animals
,
which
they
throw
away
if
they
catch
,
and
carry
with
them
if
they
find
them
not
.
Sometimes
all
the
Conditions
that
are
necessary
to
resolve
a
Question
are
not
mention'd
,
which
makes
them
as
hard
as
the
expressing
of
unserviceable
Characters
,
as
in
the
following
;
to
make
a
Man
unmovable
,
without
binding
or
wounding
him
;
or
rather
,
by
putting
his
little
Finger
into
his
Ear
;
so
that
he
shall
not
be
able
to
stir
,
until
he
takes
his
little
Finger
out
of
his
Ear
;
that
at
first
appears
impossible
,
and
't
is
really
so
:
for
any
one
may
walk
having
his
little
Finger
in
his
Ear
;
but
there
wants
a
Condition
,
which
,
if
it
were
express'd
,
would
remove
the
whole
Difficulty
:
for
you
need
but
make
a
Man
embrace
a
Bed-post
,
or
something
like
,
and
put
his
little
Finger
into
his
Ear
,
so
that
the
Post
be
included
between
his
Arm
and
Ear
,
it
being
plain
he
cannot
stir
without
taking
out
his
Finger
.
It
is
not
mentioned
that
there
is
yet
something
to
be
done
,
on
purpose
that
the
Mind
should
not
seek
for
,
nor
discover
it
.
But
those
that
undertake
the
resolving
of
such
Questions
,
must
make
all
the
Queries
that
are
requisite
,
to
understand
the
point
wherein
lies
the
Stress
of
the
Difficulty
.
Those
arbitrary
Questions
appear
to
be
foolish
,
and
are
indeed
so
in
one
Sense
,
as
far
as
nothing
is
learn'd
by
their
Solution
.
However
they
are
not
so
different
from
natural
Questions
as
may
be
imagin'd
;
for
both
are
resolved
by
a
Method
that
is
very
near
the
same
.
And
as
the
Skill
or
Maliciousness
of
Men
,
makes
arbitrary
Questions
intricate
and
difficult
;
so
natural
Effects
are
of
themselves
surrounded
with
Obscurity
and
Darkness
,
that
must
be
dissipated
by
the
Attention
of
the
Mind
,
and
by
Experiments
,
which
are
a
sort
of
Queries
put
to
the
Author
of
Nature
;
even
as
Equivocations
,
and
useless
Circumstances
are
taken
off
from
arbitrary
Questions
,
by
the
skilful
Queries
that
are
made
to
the
Proposers
.
Let
us
explain
these
things
methodically
,
and
in
a
more
serious
and
instructing
Manner
.
There
are
many
Questions
which
appear
very
difficult
,
because
they
are
not
understood
,
which
should
rather
be
taken
for
Axioms
,
that
need
some
Explication
,
than
for
true
Questions
;
for
some
Propositions
which
are
undeniable
,
when
the
Terms
that
compose
them
are
rightly
understood
,
must
not
methinks
be
ranked
in
the
Number
of
Questions
.
For
Instance
,
It
is
proposed
as
a
very
difficult
Question
,
Whether
the
Soul
be
immortal
;
because
they
who
propose
,
or
pretend
to
resolve
it
,
do
not
distinctly
apprehend
the
Sense
of
the
Terms
.
For
as
the
Words
Soul
and
immortal
signifie
different
things
,
and
that
they
know
not
how
to
understand
them
,
so
they
cannot
tell
whether
the
Soul
is
immortal
,
having
no
distinct
Idea
,
either
of
what
they
ask
,
or
enquire
after
.
By
the
Word
Soul
may
be
understood
a
Substance
that
thinks
,
wills
,
feels
,
&c.
or
it
may
be
taken
for
the
Motion
or
Circulation
of
the
Blood
,
and
the
Configuration
of
the
parts
of
the
Body
;
and
lastly
,
for
the
Blood
it self
,
and
the
Animal
Spirits
.
Likewise
by
the
Word
immortal
,
we
understand
what
cannot
perish
by
the
ordinary
Force
of
Nature
,
or
what
cannot
be
changed
;
or
lastly
,
what
cannot
be
corrupted
or
dissipated
,
as
a
Vapour
or
Smoke
.
The
Words
Soul
and
immortal
,
being
suppos'd
thus
distinguished
into
their
several
Significations
,
a
very
mean
Attention
of
the
Mind
will
be
able
to
judge
whether
she
is
immortal
or
not
.
First
,
't
is
plain
that
the
Soul
taken
in
the
first
Sense
,
or
for
a
thinking
Substance
,
is
immortal
,
if
you
explain
immortal
in
the
first
Sense
,
what
cannot
perish
by
the
ordinary
Force
of
Nature
;
since
't
is
not
conceivable
,
that
any
Substance
should
be
annihilated
,
but
that
to
conceive
the
Possibility
of
it
,
we
must
have
Recourse
to
the
Omnipotence
of
God
.
Secondly
,
The
Soul
is
immortal
,
taking
immortal
in
the
third
Sense
,
for
what
cannot
be
corrupted
,
nor
resolved
into
Vapour
,
or
Smoke
;
since
't
is
evident
,
that
what
cannot
be
divided
into
several
Parts
,
cannot
be
corrupted
,
nor
resolved
into
Vapours
.
Thirdly
,
The
Soul
is
not
immortal
,
taking
it
in
the
second
Sense
,
for
what
is
unchangeable
;
for
we
have
convincing
Proofs
enow
of
the
Alterations
of
our
Soul
,
which
feels
one
while
Pain
and
another
Pleasure
,
which
often
desires
some
things
which
she
afterwards
ceases
to
desire
;
which
is
united
to
a
Body
from
which
she
may
be
separated
,
&c.
If
the
Word
Soul
be
taken
in
some
other
Sense
,
it
will
be
as
easie
to
perceive
,
whether
she
is
immortal
,
fixing
a
determin'd
Sense
to
that
Epithet
.
And
therefore
what
makes
such
Questions
difficult
,
is
,
that
they
are
not
distinctly
understood
,
or
that
the
Words
,
in
which
they
are
express'd
are
equivocal
;
so
that
they
rather
need
Explication
than
Proof
.
There
are
some
People
so
dull
,
and
others
so
fanciful
,
as
that
they
always
take
the
Soul
for
some
Configuration
of
the
Parts
of
the
Brain
,
and
for
the
Motion
of
the
Spirits
.
'T
is
indeed
impossible
to
prove
that
the
Soul
is
immortal
,
and
unperishable
in
that
Sense
,
the
contrary
being
evident
:
so
that
this
is
not
a
Question
difficult
to
be
resolved
,
but
a
Proposition
which
't
is
not
easie
to
make
some
people
apprehend
;
because
they
have
not
the
same
Ideas
as
we
,
and
that
they
labour
all
they
can
not
to
have
them
,
and
to
blind
themselves
.
When
we
are
asked
,
whether
the
Soul
is
immortal
,
or
any
other
Question
whatsoever
;
we
must
first
take
off
the
Equivocation
of
Words
,
and
know
in
what
Sense
they
are
understood
,
that
we
may
distinctly
conceive
the
State
of
the
Question
.
If
those
that
propose
it
are
ignorant
of
the
Signification
,
we
must
put
Queries
to
them
,
in
order
to
illuminate
and
determine
them
.
If
by
these
Queries
we
discover
,
that
their
Ideas
are
not
agreeable
with
ours
,
't
is
in
vain
to
answer
them
;
for
to
answer
one
who
imagines
that
a
Desire
,
for
instance
,
is
nothing
but
the
Motion
of
some
small
Particles
call'd
Spirits
;
that
a
Thought
is
but
a
Trace
or
an
Image
,
which
the
Objects
or
those
Spirits
have
left
in
the
Brain
;
and
that
all
the
Reasonings
of
Men
consist
but
in
the
various
Situation
of
some
little
Corpuscles
,
which
dispose
themselves
differently
in
the
Head
;
to
answer
him
,
I
say
,
that
the
Soul
taken
in
his
Sense
is
immortal
,
is
to
deceive
him
,
or
to
appear
ridiculous
to
him
;
but
to
tell
him
that
she
is
mortal
,
is
,
in
some
Sense
,
to
confirm
him
in
a
very
dangerous
Errour
:
we
must
then
reply
nothing
at
all
,
but
only
endeavour
to
make
him
retire
into
himself
,
that
he
may
receive
the
same
Ideas
that
we
have
from
him
who
is
only
able
to
enlighten
him
.
'T
is
likewise
a
Question
which
seems
pretty
difficult
,
To
know
whether
Beasts
have
a
Soul
;
however
the
Equivocation
being
taken
off
,
it
is
so
far
from
being
hard
,
that
those
who
suppose
they
have
one
,
and
those
that
think
they
have
none
,
are
ignorantly
at
bottom
of
the
same
Opinion
.
The
Soul
may
be
taken
for
something
Corporeal
,
dispersed
through
all
the
Body
,
which
gives
it
Life
and
Motion
;
or
else
for
something
Spiritual
.
Those
that
pretend
Beasts
have
no
Soul
,
understand
it
in
the
second
Sense
;
for
never
any
Man
denied
that
there
is
in
Animals
something
Corporeal
,
which
is
the
Principle
of
their
Life
or
Motion
;
since
it
cannot
be
denied
even
of
Watches
.
On
the
contrary
,
Those
who
assert
that
Beasts
have
Souls
,
understand
it
in
the
first
Sense
;
for
few
believe
them
endued
with
a
Spiritual
and
Indivisible
Soul
:
so
that
both
Peripateticks
and
Cartesians
believe
that
Beasts
have
a
Soul
,
or
a
Corporeal
Principle
of
their
Motion
,
and
both
think
they
have
none
,
or
that
there
's
nothing
in
them
Spiritual
,
and
Indivisible
.
And
therefore
the
Difference
betwixt
the
Paripateticks
and
Cartesians
consists
not
in
that
the
former
believe
Beasts
have
a
Soul
,
and
the
latter
deny
it
;
but
only
in
that
the
Aristotelians
think
that
Beasts
are
capable
of
Pain
and
Pleasure
,
of
perceiving
Colours
,
hearing
Sounds
,
and
of
all
the
other
Sensations
and
Passions
of
Men
;
whereas
the
Cartesians
are
of
a
contrary
Opinion
.
The
latter
distinguish
the
Word
Sensation
,
to
take
off
the
Equivocation
.
For
instance
,
They
say
that
when
one
is
too
near
the
Fire
,
the
Parts
of
Wood
strike
against
his
Hand
,
vibrate
the
Fibres
;
which
Vibration
is
communicated
to
the
Brain
,
and
determines
the
Animal
Spirits
contained
in
it
to
disperse
through
the
outward
Parts
of
the
Body
,
in
such
a
manner
as
is
fit
to
make
them
shrink
in
,
or
withdraw
.
They
agree
that
all
those
things
,
or
the
like
,
may
possibly
be
found
in
Animals
,
and
that
they
actually
are
,
as
being
Properties
of
Bodies
:
And
the
Peripateticks
dissent
not
from
it
.
The
Cartesians
add
,
that
the
Percussion
or
Vibration
of
the
Fibres
of
the
Brain
in
Men
,
is
attended
with
a
Sensation
of
Heat
,
and
that
the
course
of
the
Animal
Spirits
to
the
Heart
,
and
other
Viscera
,
is
accompanied
with
a
Passion
of
Hatred
,
or
Aversion
;
which
Sense
and
Passion
of
the
Soul
they
deny
to
be
in
Beasts
,
whereas
the
Peripateticks
assert
,
that
Brute
Animals
feel
that
Heat
as
well
as
we
do
;
that
they
have
,
as
we
,
an
Aversion
to
what
is
uneasie
to
them
;
and
generally
,
that
they
are
capable
of
all
our
Sensations
and
Passions
.
The
Cartesians
do
not
think
that
Beasts
are
sensible
of
Pleasure
or
Pain
,
nor
that
they
love
or
hate
any
thing
;
because
they
admit
nothing
in
them
but
what
is
material
,
and
believe
not
that
Sensations
and
Passions
may
be
Properties
of
any
Matter
whatsoever
.
On
the
contrary
some
Peripateticks
esteem
Matter
capable
of
Sensation
and
Passion
,
when
't
is
extremely
subtle
and
refined
;
that
Beasts
may
feel
,
by
means
of
the
Animal
Spirits
,
that
is
to
say
,
of
a
very
subtle
and
fine
Matter
;
and
that
our
Soul
is
susceptible
of
Sensation
and
Passion
,
only
because
she
is
united
to
such
a
Matter
.
And
therefore
to
resolve
that
Question
,
Whether
Beasts
have
a
Soul
,
we
must
retire
within
our selves
,
and
consider
with
all
possible
Attention
our
Idea
of
Matter
:
if
we
can
conceive
that
Matter
so
and
so
figur'd
,
as
square
,
round
,
oval
,
&c.
is
some
Pain
,
Pleasure
,
Heat
,
Colour
,
Odour
,
Sound
,
&c.
then
we
may
assert
that
the
Soul
of
Beasts
,
though
never
so
material
,
is
however
capable
of
Sense
;
but
if
we
cannot
conceive
it
,
we
must
not
assert
it
;
for
we
must
assure
no
farther
than
we
can
conceive
.
And
likewise
if
we
conceive
that
Matter
toss'd
and
extremely
agitated
upwards
,
downwards
,
in
a
Circular
,
Spiral
,
Parabolical
,
Elliptick
Line
,
&c.
is
any
thing
of
Love
,
Hatred
,
Joy
,
Sorrow
,
&c.
We
may
say
that
Beasts
have
the
same
Passions
as
we
,
but
if
we
apprehend
it
not
,
we
must
not
say
it
,
unless
we
will
speak
without
understanding
our selves
.
But
I
am
sure
no
Motion
of
Matter
will
ever
be
mistaken
for
Love
,
or
Joy
,
by
him
that
shall
earnestly
think
upon
it
:
So
that
to
resolve
that
Question
,
Whether
Beasts
have
Sense
,
we
need
only
take
off
Equivocation
,
as
those
that
are
called
Cartesians
use
to
do
;
for
then
that
Question
will
be
made
so
simple
and
easie
,
as
to
be
resolved
with
a
little
Attention
.
'T
is
true
that
St.
Austin
supposing
,
according
to
the
common
prejudice
of
Mankind
,
Lib.
4.
de
Anima
&
ejus
Origine
.
Cap.
23.
de
quantitate
Animae
&
alias
.
that
Beasts
have
a
Soul
;
which
he
never
doubted
of
,
as
far
as
I
can
perceive
,
because
he
never
seriously
examin'd
it
in
his
Works
:
this
great
Man
,
I
say
,
perceiving
that
it
is
contradictory
to
say
,
that
a
Soul
,
or
a
Substance
which
thinks
,
feels
desires
,
&c.
is
material
,
believed
that
the
Soul
of
Beasts
was
really
spiritual
and
indivisible
.
He
proves
by
very
evident
Reasons
,
that
a
Soul
,
or
whatever
has
Sense
,
Imagination
,
Fear
,
Desire
,
&c.
must
needs
be
Spiritual
;
but
I
never
observed
that
he
produc'd
any
Reason
to
maintain
that
Beasts
have
Souls
.
He
even
cares
not
to
prove
it
,
because
't
is
likely
that
scarce
any
body
doubted
of
it
in
his
time
.
There
being
now
Men
,
who
endeavour
wholly
to
free
themselves
of
their
Prejudices
,
and
call
in
Question
all
Opinions
that
are
not
grounded
upon
clear
demonstrative
Reasonings
:
it
has
been
call'd
into
doubt
,
whether
Animals
have
a
Soul
susceptible
of
the
same
Sensations
and
Passions
as
ours
;
however
there
are
still
several
Defenders
of
the
ancient
Prejudices
,
who
pretend
to
prove
that
Beasts
feel
,
will
,
think
,
and
argue
,
even
as
we
do
,
though
in
a
more
imperfect
manner
.
Dogs
,
say
they
,
know
their
Masters
,
love
them
,
and
patiently
bear
the
Blows
they
receive
from
them
,
as
judging
it
their
best
interest
not
to
forsake
them
;
but
as
to
Strangers
,
they
hate
them
so
much
as
not
to
away
with
their
Flatterings
.
All
Animals
love
their
Young
;
Birds
,
which
build
their
Nests
in
the
extremities
of
the
Branches
,
sufficiently
shew
,
that
they
are
afraid
lest
some
Creature
should
devour
them
:
They
judge
those
Branches
too
weak
to
bear
their
Enemies
,
though
strong
enough
to
support
both
their
Young
and
their
Nests
.
Even
Spiders
,
and
the
vilest
Insects
,
give
some
Intimations
of
an
Intelligence
that
animates
them
:
For
one
cannot
but
wonder
at
the
conduct
of
a
little
Beast
,
which
though
it
be
blind
,
yet
finds
means
to
trapan
in
its
Nets
,
others
that
have
Eyes
and
Wings
,
and
are
so
bold
as
to
attack
the
biggest
Animals
we
see
.
I
grant
that
all
the
actions
that
Beasts
perform
are
certain
indications
of
an
Intelligence
;
for
whatever
is
regular
demonstrates
it
.
A
Watch
shews
the
same
;
for
't
is
impossible
Chance
should
have
composed
its
Wheels
,
but
an
understanding
Agent
must
have
ordered
its
Motions
.
We
plant
a
Seed
inverted
,
the
Roots
that
were
upward
sink
down
into
the
Ground
of
themselves
,
and
the
Seminal
Nib
that
was
turn'd
downwards
endeavours
to
alter
its
Position
,
to
break
out
:
That
intimates
an
Intelligence
.
That
Plant
produces
Knots
at
certain
Distances
,
to
strenghen
it self
;
it
covers
its
Seed
with
a
Skin
that
preserves
it
,
and
surrounds
it
with
Prickles
to
defend
it
:
This
still
denotes
an
Intelligence
.
In
short
,
whatever
we
see
done
,
either
by
Plants
or
by
Animals
,
undoubtedly
denotes
an
understanding
Agent
.
All
the
true
Cartesians
agree
to
it
,
but
they
make
Distinctions
,
to
take
away
as
much
as
possible
,
the
Equivocation
of
Words
.
The
Motions
of
Beasts
and
Plants
intimate
an
Intelligence
,
but
that
Intelligence
is
not
Matter
,
and
is
much
distinguished
from
Beasts
,
as
that
which
disposes
the
Wheels
of
a
Watch
is
distinguished
from
the
Watch
it self
.
For
that
Intelligent
Being
seems
infinitely
Wise
,
Powerful
,
and
infinitely
the
same
who
has
framed
us
in
our
Mother's
Womb
,
and
affords
us
a
growth
to
which
all
the
attempts
of
our
Mind
and
Will
cannot
add
so
much
as
a
Span.
And
therefore
there
is
in
Beasts
neither
Understanding
nor
Soul
,
in
the
sense
those
Words
are
commonly
taken
.
They
eat
without
pleasure
,
they
cry
without
Pain
,
they
grow
without
being
conscious
of
it
,
they
neither
desire
,
nor
fear
,
nor
know
any
thing
;
and
if
they
act
in
such
a
manner
as
intimates
an
Intelligence
,
it
is
because
God
having
made
them
for
a
certain
time
,
he
has
framed
their
Body
in
such
a
manner
as
that
they
machinally
,
and
without
Fear
,
shun
whatever
is
able
to
destroy
them
.
Otherwise
it
must
be
said
,
that
there
is
more
Understanding
in
the
smallest
Insect
,
or
even
in
a
little
Seed
,
than
in
the
most
Ingenious
Man
;
it
being
certain
that
there
are
in
them
more
different
Parts
,
and
regular
Motions
,
than
we
are
able
to
know
.
But
as
Men
are
used
to
confound
all
things
,
and
imagine
that
their
Soul
produces
in
their
Bodies
most
or
all
the
Motions
and
Changes
which
befal
it
,
they
fix
to
the
Word
Soul
the
wrong
Idea
of
Former
and
Preserver
of
the
Body
.
So
that
thinking
that
their
Soul
produces
in
them
whatever
is
absolutely
requisite
to
the
Preservation
of
their
Life
,
though
she
knows
not
so
much
as
the
Contexture
of
the
Body
which
she
animates
,
they
judge
that
there
must
needs
be
a
Soul
in
Beasts
,
to
produce
all
the
Motions
and
Changes
which
befall
them
,
because
they
are
so
like
those
which
occur
in
us
.
For
Beasts
are
begot
,
fed
,
strengthened
,
as
our
Body
:
they
eat
,
drink
,
sleep
,
as
we
do
;
because
we
are
altogether
like
them
,
as
to
our
Body
:
the
only
Difference
betwixt
us
and
them
consisting
in
this
,
that
we
have
a
Soul
,
and
they
have
none
.
But
our
Soul
frames
not
our
Body
,
digests
not
our
Aliments
,
and
gives
no
Motion
and
Heat
to
our
Blood
.
She
feels
,
wills
,
argues
,
and
animates
the
Body
,
as
to
the
Sensations
and
Passions
that
relate
to
it
:
but
not
by
dispersing
her self
through
our
Members
,
to
communicate
Sense
and
Life
to
them
;
for
our
Body
can
receive
nothing
of
what
belongs
to
the
Mind
.
Thence
't
is
plain
,
that
the
Reason
why
we
cannot
resolve
several
Questions
,
proceeds
from
our
not
distinguishing
,
and
even
from
our
not
thinking
to
distinguish
the
different
significations
of
a
Word
.
'T
is
true
,
that
we
distinguish
sometimes
,
but
we
do
it
so
ill
,
that
instead
of
taking
off
the
Equivocation
of
Words
by
our
Distinctions
,
we
make
them
more
perplexed
and
dark
.
For
instance
,
when
we
are
asked
,
whether
the
Body
lives
,
how
it
lives
,
and
in
what
manner
the
Rational
Soul
animates
it
.
Whether
the
Animal
Spirits
,
the
Blood
,
and
other
Humours
live
;
whether
the
Teeth
,
the
Hair
,
and
the
Nails
are
animated
,
&c.
we
distinguish
the
Words
,
live
and
be
animated
,
in
living
or
being
animated
with
a
Rational
,
with
a
Sensitive
,
or
with
a
Vegetative
Soul
.
But
that
Distinction
is
only
fit
to
perplex
the
Question
;
for
those
Words
want
an
Explanation
themselves
;
and
perhaps
the
two
last
,
Vegetative
and
Sensitive
,
are
inexplicable
and
inconceivable
in
the
Sense
they
are
commonly
understood
.
If
we
desire
to
fix
a
clear
and
distinct
Idea
to
the
Word
Life
,
we
may
say
,
That
the
Life
of
the
Soul
is
the
Knowledge
of
Truth
,
and
the
love
of
Good
;
or
rather
,
that
her
Thoughts
are
her
Life
;
and
that
the
Life
of
the
Body
consists
in
the
Circulation
of
the
Blood
,
and
the
just
Proportion
and
Mixture
of
Humours
;
or
rather
,
that
the
Life
of
the
Body
is
such
a
Motion
of
its
parts
as
is
fit
for
its
Preservation
.
The
Ideas
fix'd
to
the
Word
Life
being
thus
made
plain
,
it
will
evidently
appear
,
First
,
That
the
Soul
cannot
communicate
her
Life
to
the
Body
,
since
she
cannot
make
it
think
.
Secondly
,
That
she
cannot
give
it
the
Life
by
which
it
is
fed
,
grows
,
&c.
since
she
knows
not
so
much
as
what
is
requisite
to
digest
our
Aliments
.
Thirdly
,
That
she
cannot
make
it
feel
,
since
Matter
is
incapable
of
Sensation
,
&c.
Thus
all
other
Questions
concerning
that
Subject
,
may
be
resolved
without
Trouble
;
provided
the
Words
,
in
which
they
are
express'd
,
excite
clear
Ideas
;
for
if
they
raise
confused
and
dark
,
it
is
impossible
to
solve
them
.
In
the
mean
while
,
't
is
not
always
absolutely
necessary
to
have
Ideas
that
perfectly
represent
those
things
,
the
Relations
of
which
we
desire
to
examine
.
It
is
often
sufficient
to
have
but
an
initial
or
imperfect
Knowledge
of
them
,
because
we
seek
not
always
exactly
to
know
their
Relations
.
I
shall
explain
this
more
at
large
.
There
are
Truths
or
Relations
of
two
Sorts
;
some
are
exactly
known
,
and
others
but
imperfectly
.
We
exactly
know
the
Relation
betwixt
such
a
Square
,
and
such
a
Triangle
,
but
have
only
an
imperfect
Knowledge
of
the
Relation
betwixt
London
and
York
.
We
know
that
such
a
Square
is
equal
to
such
a
Triangle
,
double
or
treble
of
it
,
&c.
but
we
only
know
that
London
is
bigger
than
York
,
without
knowing
precisely
how
much
.
Moreover
there
are
infinite
Degrees
of
Imperfection
in
Knowledge
;
and
no
Knowledge
is
imperfect
,
but
in
reference
to
a
more
perfect
.
For
Instance
,
We
know
that
London
is
bigger
than
Lincoln's
Inn
●ields
,
and
that
Knowledge
is
only
imperfect
,
in
Relation
to
another
more
exact
,
by
which
we
might
accurately
know
,
how
much
London
is
larger
than
that
open
place
contained
in
it
.
There
are
therefore
several
sorts
of
Questions
.
First
,
There
are
some
in
which
we
seek
a
perfect
Knowledge
of
all
the
exact
Relations
of
two
or
several
things
betwixt
each
other
.
Secondly
,
There
are
some
in
which
we
search
after
the
perfect
Knowledge
of
some
exact
Relation
betwixt
two
or
several
things
.
Thirdly
,
There
are
some
in
which
we
enquire
after
the
perfect
Knowledge
of
some
Relation
nearly
approaching
to
the
exact
Relation
,
that
is
betwixt
two
or
more
several
things
.
Fourthly
,
There
are
some
in
which
we
are
content
to
find
a
general
and
indefinite
Relation
.
'T
is
evident
,
First
,
That
to
resolve
the
Questions
of
the
First
sort
,
and
perfectly
to
know
all
the
exact
Relations
of
Magnitude
and
Quality
betwixt
two
or
more
things
;
we
must
have
distinct
Ideas
perfectly
representing
them
,
and
compare
them
together
in
all
the
possible
manners
.
We
may
,
for
Instance
,
resolve
all
the
Questions
that
tend
to
discover
the
exact
Relations
betwixt
2
and
8
,
because
both
Numbers
being
accurately
known
may
be
compared
together
,
as
much
as
is
necessary
to
know
the
exact
Relations
of
their
Magnitude
and
Quality
.
We
may
know
that
8
is
4
times
2
,
and
that
8
and
2
are
even
,
but
not
square
Numbers
.
'T
is
plain
,
Secondly
,
That
to
resolve
Questions
of
the
second
sort
,
and
accurately
to
know
some
Relation
of
Magnitude
or
Quality
,
which
is
betwixt
two
or
more
things
;
't
is
necessary
and
sufficient
distinctly
to
know
those
Faces
by
which
they
must
be
compared
,
to
discover
the
enquired
Relation
.
For
Instance
,
to
resolve
such
Questions
as
tend
to
discover
some
exact
Relations
betwixt
4
and
16
,
as
that
4
and
16
are
even
and
square
Numbers
,
it
's
sufficient
exactly
to
know
that
4
and
16
can
be
divided
into
equal
parts
without
Fractions
,
and
that
both
are
the
product
of
a
Number
multiplied
by
it self
;
and
't
is
to
no
purpose
to
examine
what
is
their
true
Magnitude
:
It
being
plain
,
that
to
know
the
exact
Relations
of
Quality
betwixt
things
,
a
distinct
Idea
of
their
Quality
is
sufficient
,
without
thinking
on
their
Magnitude
;
and
that
to
know
the
exact
Relations
of
Magnitude
,
we
need
not
search
after
the
true
Quality
,
an
accurate
Knowledge
of
their
Magnitude
being
all
that
is
required
.
Thirdly
,
It
clearly
appears
that
to
resolve
the
Questions
of
the
third
sort
,
or
to
know
some
Relation
very
near
approaching
the
exact
Relation
that
is
betwixt
two
or
several
things
;
it
is
enough
nearly
to
know
the
Faces
by
which
they
must
be
compared
,
to
discover
the
Relation
required
,
whether
it
be
of
Magnitude
or
Quality
.
For
Instance
,
I
may
evidently
know
that
the
√
8
is
greater
than
2
,
because
I
may
very
near
know
the
true
Magnitude
of
the
√
8
;
but
I
cannot
discover
how
much
the
√
8
is
greater
than
2
,
because
I
cannot
exactly
find
out
the
true
Magnitude
of
the
√
8.
Lastly
,
'T
is
evident
that
to
resolve
the
Questions
of
the
fourth
sort
,
or
to
discover
general
and
undefinite
Relations
,
it
is
enough
to
know
things
in
a
manner
propotion'd
to
the
need
we
stand
in
of
comparing
them
together
,
to
find
out
the
required
Relation
.
So
that
't
is
not
necessary
to
the
Solution
of
all
sorts
of
Questions
,
to
have
very
distinct
Ideas
of
their
Terms
,
or
perfectly
to
know
the
things
expressed
by
those
words
.
But
our
knowledge
must
be
the
more
exact
,
as
the
Relations
we
search
after
are
more
accurate
and
numerous
:
For
as
we
have
said
in
imperfect
Questions
,
imperfect
Ideas
of
the
things
consider'd
are
sufficient
to
resolve
them
perfectly
,
that
is
,
as
far
as
they
reach
.
And
many
Questions
may
be
resolved
even
without
any
distinct
Idea
of
their
Terms
;
as
when
we
are
ask'd
whether
Fire
is
capable
of
melting
Salt
,
hardning
Clay
,
resolving
Lead
into
Vapours
,
and
the
like
,
we
understand
perfectly
those
Questions
,
and
may
very
well
solve
them
,
though
we
have
no
distinct
Idea
of
Fire
,
Salt
,
Clay
,
&c.
Because
the
Querists
only
desire
to
know
,
whether
we
are
ascertained
by
sensible
Experiments
that
Fire
produces
those
Effects
.
And
therefore
may
receive
a
satisfactory
Answer
,
by
a
knowledge
drawn
from
the
Senses
.
CHAP.
VIII
.
An
Application
of
the
other
Rules
to
particular
Questions
.
QUestions
are
of
two
sorts
,
some
are
simple
and
others
compound
.
The
former
may
be
solved
by
the
bare
Attention
of
the
Mind
to
the
Ideas
of
the
words
,
in
which
they
are
expressed
:
but
the
Solution
of
the
latter
must
be
perform'd
by
comparing
them
to
a
third
or
to
many
other
Ideas
.
We
cannot
find
out
the
unknown
Relations
that
are
express'd
in
the
Terms
of
a
Question
,
by
immediately
comparing
the
Ideas
of
those
Terms
,
since
they
can
neither
be
joined
nor
compared
.
We
must
then
have
one
or
several
mean
Ideas
,
that
we
may
make
such
Comparisons
,
as
are
necessary
to
discover
those
Relations
;
taking
a
special
Care
that
those
mean
Ideas
be
the
more
clear
and
distinct
,
as
the
Relations
enquired
after
are
more
exact
and
numerous
.
That
Rule
is
but
a
Consequence
of
the
first
,
but
of
an
equal
importance
with
it
.
For
if
exactly
to
know
the
Relation
of
the
things
compared
,
it
is
necessary
to
have
clear
and
distinct
Ideas
of
them
:
It
plainly
follows
from
the
same
Reason
,
that
we
must
have
an
accurate
knowledge
of
the
mean
Ideas
,
by
which
we
intend
to
make
our
Comparisons
;
since
we
must
distinctly
know
the
Relation
of
measure
with
each
of
the
things
measured
,
to
find
out
their
Relations
.
I
shall
give
some
Instances
of
it
.
When
we
put
a
piece
of
Cork
,
or
other
small
and
light
Vessel
,
in
the
Water
,
with
a
Loadstone
in
it
,
and
offer
to
the
North
Pole
of
that
Stone
the
same
Pole
of
another
Magnet
which
we
keep
in
our
Hands
,
we
presently
perceive
that
the
former
Load-stone
flies
back
,
as
though
it
were
driven
by
a
violent
Wind.
'T
is
requir'd
to
discover
the
Cause
of
that
Effect
.
'T
is
plain
that
to
render
a
Reason
of
the
Motion
of
that
Load-stone
,
it
is
not
sufficient
to
know
the
Relations
it
has
to
the
other
;
for
we
might
perfectly
know
them
all
,
and
yet
not
understand
how
two
Bodies
could
repel
each
other
without
meeting
.
We
must
therefore
examine
what
are
the
Things
which
we
distinctly
conceive
capable
,
according
to
the
Course
of
Nature
,
of
moving
Bodies
;
for
't
is
requir'd
to
find
out
the
natural
Cause
of
the
Motion
of
a
Load-stone
,
which
is
certainly
a
Body
.
And
therefore
we
must
not
have
recourse
to
any
Quality
,
Form
,
or
Being
,
which
by
a
clear
Knowledge
we
cannot
conceive
capable
of
moving
Bodies
;
neither
must
we
ascribe
their
Effect
to
an
understanding
Agent
,
since
we
are
not
assur'd
that
Intelligences
are
the
ordinary
Causes
of
the
natural
Motions
of
Bodies
,
and
know
not
so
much
as
whether
they
can
produce
Motion
.
We
plainly
know
that
it
is
a
natural
Law
,
that
Bodies
should
move
each
other
when
they
meet
:
We
must
then
endeavour
to
explain
the
Motion
of
the
Load-stone
,
by
the
Means
of
some
concurrent
Body
.
'T
is
true
that
something
besides
a
Body
may
move
it
;
but
as
long
as
we
have
no
distinct
Idea
of
that
Thing
,
we
must
not
admit
it
as
a
proper
Means
to
discover
what
is
searched
after
,
nor
to
explain
it
to
others
;
for
to
contrive
a
Cause
which
none
clearly
conceives
,
is
not
to
give
account
of
an
Effect
.
We
must
not
then
trouble
our selves
to
enquire
whether
there
is
,
or
is
not
any
other
natural
Cause
of
the
Motion
of
Bodies
,
besides
the
mutual
Impulse
;
but
rather
suppose
that
there
is
none
,
and
attentively
consider
what
Bodies
may
meet
with
,
and
move
that
Load-stone
.
We
presently
see
that
it
is
not
mov'd
by
the
Magnet
we
keep
in
our
Hands
,
since
it
touches
it
not
;
but
because
't
is
mov'd
only
when
that
Magnet
is
brought
near
it
,
and
that
it
moves
not
of
it self
▪
we
must
infer
that
it
is
mov'd
by
some
small
Effluviums
,
or
little
Bodies
,
that
proceed
from
that
Magnet
,
and
are
driven
to
the
other
Load-stone
.
To
discover
those
Corpuscles
,
we
must
not
open
our
Eyes
,
nor
nearly
consider
that
Magnet
;
for
our
Senses
might
impose
upon
our
Reason
,
and
make
us
judge
that
nothing
proceeds
out
of
it
,
because
we
perceive
it
not
.
Perhaps
we
should
not
reflect
that
we
see
not
the
most
impetuous
Winds
,
nor
several
other
Bodies
that
produce
very
surprizing
Effects
:
We
must
then
keep
close
to
that
clear
and
intelligible
Means
,
and
carefully
examine
all
the
Effects
of
a
Load-stone
,
to
discover
how
that
Magnet
may
continually
vent
so
many
little
Bodies
,
without
diminishing
;
for
the
Experiments
we
shall
make
will
discover
,
that
the
small
Particles
that
evaporate
at
one
side
,
immediately
re-enter
through
another
;
and
will
serve
to
explain
all
the
Difficulties
that
may
be
objected
against
the
Method
of
solving
this
Question
.
But
it
must
be
observ'd
,
that
this
Medium
must
not
be
forsaken
,
though
we
should
not
be
able
to
answer
some
Objections
proceeding
from
our
Ignorance
in
several
things
.
If
we
desire
not
to
examine
why
Load-stones
remove
from
each
other
when
their
Poles
of
the
same
Name
are
in
Opposition
to
each
other
,
but
rather
why
they
approach
and
endeavour
to
unite
together
when
the
North
Pole
of
one
is
opposite
to
the
South
Pole
of
the
other
,
the
Question
will
be
more
difficult
,
and
one
Medium
alone
will
not
be
sufficient
to
resolve
it
;
for
it
is
not
enough
exactly
to
know
the
Relations
betwixt
the
Poles
of
those
two
Load-stones
,
nor
to
have
recourse
to
the
Medium
propos'd
in
the
fore-going
Question
;
for
that
Means
seems
only
fit
to
hinder
the
Effect
,
whereof
the
Cause
is
sought
for
:
Neither
must
we
propose
any
of
those
Things
that
are
not
clearly
known
to
be
the
natural
and
ordinary
Causes
of
Corporeal
Motion
;
nor
evade
the
Difficulty
of
the
Question
,
by
the
rambling
and
uncertain
Notion
of
an
Occult
Quality
in
Load-stones
,
by
which
they
attract
each
other
;
for
the
Mind
cannot
conceive
any
such
Attraction
in
Bodies
.
The
Impenetrability
of
Bodies
plainly
convinces
us
,
that
Motion
may
be
communicated
by
Impulsion
;
and
Experience
evidently
proves
,
that
it
is
communicated
that
way
:
But
there
is
no
Reason
,
nor
Experiment
,
that
clearly
demonstrates
the
Motion
of
Attraction
;
for
when
the
true
and
certain
Cause
of
the
Experiments
,
which
are
alledg'd
to
prove
that
sort
of
Motion
,
is
found
out
,
it
is
visible
that
what
appear'd
to
be
done
by
Attraction
,
is
produc'd
by
Impulsion
.
We
must
not
therefore
insist
upon
any
other
Communication
of
Motion
but
that
effected
by
Impulsion
,
since
this
Way
is
sure
,
and
undeniable
;
whereas
all
the
others
imaginable
have
at
least
some
Obscurity
in
them
.
But
though
it
might
be
demonstrated
,
that
mere
Corporeal
Things
have
some
other
Principles
of
Motion
besides
the
Concourse
of
Bodies
,
this
might
not
however
be
reasonably
rejected
,
but
must
rather
be
insisted
upon
preferably
to
all
others
,
it
being
the
most
clear
,
and
most
evident
;
and
appearing
so
undeniable
,
that
we
may
confidently
assert
,
that
it
has
always
been
receiv'd
by
all
Nations
and
Ages
in
the
World
.
Experience
shews
,
that
a
Load-stone
,
freely
swimming
upon
the
Water
,
draws
towards
that
which
we
keep
in
our
Hands
when
their
different
Poles
are
opposite
to
each
other
;
we
must
then
conclude
,
that
the
Load-stone
upon
the
Water
is
driven
to
it
.
But
as
the
Magnet
we
hold
cannot
drive
the
other
,
seeing
this
other
approaches
it
,
and
that
the
free
Load-stone
only
moves
at
the
Presence
of
the
other
Magnet
,
't
is
plain
that
to
resolve
this
Question
by
the
receiv'd
Principle
of
the
Communication
of
Motions
,
we
must
have
recourse
to
two
Means
at
least
.
If
we
know
that
the
Parts
of
the
Air
are
in
perpetual
Agitation
,
as
those
of
all
fluid
Bodies
use
to
be
,
we
shall
not
doubt
but
they
continually
strike
against
the
Load-stone
c
,
which
they
surround
;
but
because
they
strike
it
equally
on
all
sides
,
they
impel
it
one
way
no
more
than
another
,
as
long
as
there
is
an
equal
Quantity
of
Air
on
all
sides
.
It
being
so
,
't
is
easie
to
judge
that
the
Magnet
C
hinders
,
lest
there
should
be
as
much
Air
towards
a
as
towards
b
,
which
cannot
be
done
but
by
its
diffusing
some
other
Corpuscles
betwixt
C
and
c
,
and
therefore
there
ex●ale
such
Particles
ou●
of
both
Load-stones
,
which
filling
up
that
Space
,
and
carrying
away
the
Air
about
a
,
make
the
Load-stone
c
less
press'd
on
that
side
than
on
the
other
;
and
it
must
by
consequence
approach
the
Magnet
C
,
since
all
Bodies
move
towards
the
side
on
which
there
is
the
least
Pressure
or
Resistance
.
But
if
in
the
Load-stone
c
,
about
the
Pole
a
,
there
were
not
many
Pores
fit
to
receive
the
small
Particles
streaming
out
of
the
Pole
B
of
the
Magnet
C
,
and
too
small
to
admit
those
of
the
Air
,
't
is
plain
that
those
small
Particles
being
more
agitated
than
the
Air
,
since
they
are
to
chase
it
from
betwixt
the
Load-stones
,
they
would
drive
the
Load-stone
c
,
and
remove
it
from
the
Magnet
C
:
Therefore
,
since
the
Load-stone
c
approaches
to
,
or
removes
from
the
Magnet
C
,
according
as
they
are
oppos'd
by
different
or
the
same
Poles
,
we
must
needs
infer
that
the
Poles
a
and
b
of
the
Load-stone
c
are
full
of
different
Pores
;
otherwise
,
the
small
Particles
issuing
out
of
the
Magnet
C
could
not
have
a
free
Passage
,
without
impelling
the
Load-stone
c
at
the
side
a
,
nor
would
they
repel
it
at
the
side
b.
What
I
say
of
one
of
these
Load-stones
,
must
be
understood
of
the
other
.
'T
is
plain
that
we
always
learn
something
by
that
Method
of
Arguing
from
clear
Ideas
,
and
undeniable
Principles
:
For
we
have
discover'd
that
the
Air
which
environs
the
Load-stone
c
,
was
driven
from
thence
by
Corpuscles
perpetually
flowing
out
of
the
Pores
of
both
Load-stones
;
which
Corpuscles
find
a
free
Passage
at
one
side
,
but
are
shut
out
at
the
other
.
If
we
desir'd
nearly
to
discover
the
Bigness
and
Figure
of
the
Pores
of
the
Load-stone
through
which
those
Particles
pass
,
we
ought
to
make
other
Experiments
;
but
that
would
lead
us
to
Subjects
which
we
intend
not
to
trea●
of
.
The
Curious
may
consult
des
Cartes's
Principles
of
Philosophy
:
I
only
observe
,
as
an
Answer
to
an
Objection
which
will
presently
be
made
against
this
Hypothesis
;
that
is
,
Why
those
small
Particles
cannot
re-enter
through
the
Pores
from
whence
they
came
?
That
besides
that
the
Pores
of
the
Load-stones
may
be
suppos'd
to
be
wrought
like
the
Channelling
of
a
Screw
,
which
may
pruduce
the
propos'd
Effect
;
it
may
be
said
likewise
,
that
the
small
Branches
,
of
which
those
Pores
are
made
,
bend
one
way
to
obey
and
yield
to
the
Motion
of
the
entring
Particles
;
whereas
they
stand
on
end
,
and
shut
them
out
another
way
:
So
that
we
must
not
be
surpriz'd
at
this
Difference
betwixt
the
Pores
of
the
Load-stone
,
for
it
may
be
explain'd
in
several
manners
,
and
the
only
Difficulty
consists
in
chusing
the
best
.
If
we
had
endeavour'd
to
resolve
the
fore-mention'd
Question
,
beginning
with
the
Corpuscles
that
are
suppos'd
to
stream
out
of
the
Magnet
C
,
we
should
have
found
the
same
;
and
likewise
discover'd
that
Air
is
compos'd
of
an
infinite
Number
of
Parts
that
are
in
a
perpetual
Motion
,
without
which
it
would
be
impossible
that
the
Load-stone
c
could
approach
the
Magnet
C.
I
insist
not
on
the
Explication
of
this
,
because
there
is
no
Difficulty
in
it
.
Here
follows
a
Question
more
compound
and
complicate
than
the
fore-going
;
for
the
Solution
of
which
,
't
is
necessary
to
make
use
of
many
Rules
.
'T
is
ask'd
,
Which
may
be
the
Natural
and
Mechanical
Cause
of
the
Motion
of
our
Members
.
The
Idea
of
Natural
Cause
is
clear
and
distinct
when
understood
,
as
I
have
explain'd
it
in
the
former
Question
:
But
the
Words
,
Motion
of
our
Members
,
are
equivocal
and
confus'd
,
because
there
are
several
such
Motions
;
some
being
Voluntary
,
others
Natural
,
and
others
Convulsive
.
There
are
also
different
Members
in
the
Humane
Body
;
and
therefore
,
according
to
the
first
Rule
,
I
must
ask
,
Of
which
of
these
Motions
the
Cause
is
requir'd
from
me
?
But
if
the
Question
be
left
undetermin'd
,
and
to
my
Discretion
,
I
examine
it
after
this
manner
.
I
attentively
consider
the
Properties
of
those
Motions
;
and
discovering
at
first
that
Voluntary
Motions
are
sooner
perform'd
than
Convulsive
,
I
infer
that
their
Cause
is
different
,
and
therefore
that
I
may
and
must
examine
the
Question
by
Parts
,
for
it
seems
to
require
a
long
Discussion
.
I
restrain
then
my self
to
consider
only
Voluntary
Motions
;
and
because
several
of
our
Members
are
employ'd
about
them
,
I
content
my self
for
the
present
with
the
Consideration
of
the
Arm.
I
observe
that
it
is
compos'd
of
several
Muscles
,
which
are
most
or
all
in
Action
when
we
raise
so●ething
from
the
Ground
,
or
remove
it
from
one
place
to
the
other
:
But
I
only
insist
upon
one
,
being
willing
to
suppose
that
the
others
are
very
near
fashion'd
after
the
same
manner
.
I
inform
my self
of
its
Texture
and
Shape
by
some
Book
of
Anatomy
,
or
rather
by
the
sensible
Sight
of
its
Fibres
and
Tendons
,
which
I
cause
to
be
dissected
in
my
presence
,
by
some
skilful
Anatomist
,
to
whom
I
put
all
the
Queries
which
,
in
the
sequel
,
may
exhibit
to
my
Mind
a
Medium
to
find
out
what
I
seek
for
.
After
such
a
serious
Consideration
,
I
cannot
doubt
but
the
Principle
of
the
Motion
of
my
Arm
depends
on
the
Contraction
of
its
Muscles
which
compose
it
.
I
am
likewise
content
,
lest
I
should
puzzle
my self
with
too
many
Difficulties
,
to
suppose
,
according
to
the
common
Opinion
,
that
this
Contraction
is
perform'd
by
the
Animal
Spirits
,
which
filling
up
the
Ventricle
of
those
Muscles
,
may
cause
their
Extremities
to
come
nearer
.
Now
the
whole
Question
concerning
Voluntary
Motion
is
reduc'd
to
this
Point
;
How
the
small
Quantity
of
Animal
Spirits
which
are
contain'd
in
our
Arm
,
may
at
the
Command
of
the
Will
,
so
suddenly
swell
the
Muscles
,
as
to
afford
a
sufficient
Strength
to
list
up
an
Hundred
Weight
,
or
more
.
Upon
an
attentive
Reflexion
thereupon
,
the
first
Means
that
offers
it self
to
the
Imagination
,
is
commonly
that
of
a
quick
and
violent
Fermentation
,
like
to
that
of
Gun-powder
,
or
of
some
Liquors
fill'd
with
Volatile
Salt
,
when
they
are
mix'd
with
others
that
are
Acid
,
or
full
of
a
fixed
Salt
.
A
small
quantity
of
Gun-powder
is
able
,
when
kindled
,
to
raise
not
only
an
Hundred
Weight
,
but
even
a
Tower
,
and
a
Mountain
.
Earthquakes
,
that
overthrow
Cities
,
and
shake
whole
Countries
,
proceed
from
Spirits
kindling
under
the
Ground
,
almost
as
Gun-powder
▪
So
that
supposing
in
the
Arm
such
a
Cause
of
the
Fermentation
and
Dilatation
of
the
Spirits
,
it
may
be
look'd
upon
as
the
Principle
of
that
Force
,
by
which
Men
perform
so
sudden
and
violent
Motions
.
But
as
we
ought
to
mistrust
those
Means
that
are
offer'd
to
the
Mind
by
the
Senses
,
and
of
which
we
have
no
clear
and
evident
Knowledge
,
so
we
must
not
easily
admit
this
;
for
it
is
not
sufficient
to
give
an
Account
of
the
Strength
and
Quickness
of
our
Motions
,
by
a
Comparison
:
For
this
is
both
a
confus'd
,
and
imperfect
Account
;
because
we
are
here
to
explain
a
voluntary
Motion
,
and
Fermentation
is
not
so
.
The
Blood
is
exceedingly
fermented
in
Fevers
,
and
we
cannot
hinder
it
:
The
Spirits
are
inflam'd
and
agitated
in
the
Brain
,
but
we
cannot
rule
their
Agitation
,
nor
lessen
it
by
our
Desire
.
When
a
Man
moves
the
Arm
several
Ways
,
a
Thousand
Fermentations
,
great
and
small
,
swift
and
●low
,
ought
to
begin
,
and
(
what
is
harder
to
explain
)
to
end
likewise
in
a
Moment
,
as
often
and
as
soon
as
it
is
desir'd
,
if
this
Hypothesis
were
true
.
Besides
,
Those
Fermentations
ought
not
to
dissipate
all
their
Matter
,
but
need
always
be
ready
to
take
Fire
.
When
a
Man
has
walk'd
Twenty
Miles
,
how
many
Thousand
times
must
the
Muscles
,
employ'd
in
walking
,
have
been
fill'd
and
empty'd
;
and
what
a
vast
quantity
of
Spirits
would
be
requir'd
,
if
Fermentation
should
dissipate
and
deaden
them
so
often
?
And
therefore
this
Supposition
is
insufficient
to
explain
such
Motions
of
our
Body
as
entirely
depend
upon
our
Will
.
'T
is
plain
that
the
present
Question
may
be
reduc'd
to
this
Problem
of
Mechanicks
,
To
find
●ut
by
Pneumatick
Engines
a
Means
to
overcome
such
a
Force
as
an
Hundred
Weight
by
another
Force
,
though
never
so
small
;
as
that
of
an
Ounce
Weight
:
And
that
the
Application
of
that
small
Force
may
produce
the
desir'd
Effect
,
at
the
Discretion
of
the
Will
.
The
Solution
of
that
Problem
is
easie
,
and
the
Demonstration
of
it
clear
.
It
may
be
solv'd
by
a
Vessel
which
hath
two
Orifices
,
one
of
which
is
a
little
more
than
1600
times
larger
than
the
other
,
in
which
the
Pipes
of
two
equal
Bellows
are
inserted
;
and
let
a
Force
precisely
1600
times
stronger
than
the
other
be
apply'd
to
the
Bellows
of
the
larger
Mouth
,
for
then
the
Force
1600
times
weaker
shall
overcome
the
stronger
.
The
Demonstration
of
which
is
clear
in
Mechanicks
,
since
the
Forces
are
not
exactly
in
a
reciprocal
Proportion
with
their
Mouths
;
and
that
the
Relation
of
the
weaker
Force
to
the
smaller
Mouth
,
is
greater
than
the
Relation
of
the
stronger
Force
to
the
larger
Mouth
.
But
to
solve
this
Problem
by
an
Engine
which
sets
better
before
the
Eyes
the
Effect
of
the
Muscles
,
than
the
Former
:
We
must
blow
a
little
in
a
Foot-ball
,
and
hinder
the
Air
from
going
out
with
a
Sucker
;
then
put
upon
that
Foot-ball
,
half
full
of
Wind
,
a
Stone
of
5
or
600
weight
;
or
having
set
it
on
a
Table
,
lay
on
it
a
Board
,
and
on
that
Board
a
huge
Stone
,
or
cause
a
heavy
Man
to
sit
upon
the
Board
,
allowing
him
to
hold
by
something
,
that
he
may
sit
the
faster
upon
the
rising
Foot-ball
;
for
if
you
blow
again
into
it
only
with
the
Mouth
,
it
will
raise
the
Stone
that
compresses
it
,
or
the
Man
that
sits
upon
it
.
The
Reason
of
this
is
,
that
the
Mouth
of
the
Foot-ball
is
so
small
,
or
at
least
must
be
suppos'd
so
,
in
comparison
to
the
Capaciousness
of
the
Foot-ball
that
withstands
the
Weight
of
the
Stone
,
that
by
such
means
a
very
small
,
is
able
to
overcome
a
very
great
Force
.
If
we
also
consider
that
Breath
alone
is
capable
of
violently
driving
a
Leaden
Ball
through
a
long
and
strait
Trunk
,
because
the
Strength
of
the
Breath
is
not
dissipated
,
but
continually
renew'd
,
it
will
visibly
appear
,
that
the
necessary
Proportion
betwixt
the
Mouth
and
the
largeness
of
the
Foot-ball
being
suppos'd
,
Breath
alone
may
overcome
a
very
considerable
Force
.
If
we
therefore
conceive
that
the
whole
Muscles
,
or
each
of
the
Fibres
of
which
they
are
made
,
have
,
as
this
Foot-ball
,
a
competent
Capacity
to
admit
Animal
Spirits
,
that
the
Pores
through
which
those
Spirits
flow
are
yet
proportionably
straiter
than
the
Neck
of
a
Bladder
,
or
the
Aperture
of
the
Foot-ball
;
that
the
Spirits
are
detain'd
in
,
or
driven
through
the
Nerves
,
almost
as
the
Breath
through
a
Trunk
;
that
the
Spirits
are
more
agitated
than
the
Air
of
the
Lungs
,
and
driven
with
a
greater
Violence
to
the
Muscles
than
it
is
in
a
Bladder
;
we
shall
perceive
that
the
Motion
of
the
Spirits
which
are
dispers'd
through
the
Muscles
,
can
conquer
the
Force
of
the
heaviest
Weight
we
carry
;
and
that
if
we
cannot
move
other
more
ponderous
,
this
Want
of
Strength
proceeds
not
so
much
from
the
Spirits
,
as
from
the
Fibres
and
Membranes
of
which
the
Muscles
are
compos'd
,
which
would
burst
should
we
make
too
great
an
Effort
.
Besides
,
If
we
observe
that
by
the
Laws
of
the
Union
betwixt
Soul
and
Body
,
the
Motion
of
those
Spirits
,
as
to
their
Determination
,
depends
on
the
Will
of
Man
,
we
shall
see
that
the
Motion
of
the
Arm
must
needs
be
voluntary
.
'T
is
true
that
we
move
our
Arm
so
readily
,
that
it
seems
,
at
first
sight
,
incredible
that
the
Course
of
the
Spirits
into
the
Muscles
should
be
so
swift
as
to
effect
that
Motion
.
But
we
ought
to
consider
that
those
Spirits
are
extremely
agitated
,
always
ready
to
pass
from
one
Muscle
into
another
;
and
that
a
small
quantity
of
that
Spirituous
Liquor
may
sufficiently
swell
them
up
,
so
as
to
move
them
,
or
to
lift
up
from
the
Ground
something
very
light
:
For
we
cannot
raise
great
Weights
very
readily
,
because
that
Effort
requires
a
great
stretching
and
swelling
of
the
Muscles
,
which
cannot
be
perform'd
by
the
Spirits
that
are
in
the
neighbouring
or
Antagonist
Muscles
;
and
therefore
some
Time
is
requir'd
to
call
in
more
Spirits
to
their
help
,
and
in
such
a
Quantity
,
as
that
they
may
be
able
to
withstand
the
Heaviness
of
the
Weight
.
Thus
we
see
that
those
that
are
loaden
cannot
run
,
and
that
a
ponderous
thing
is
not
lifted
up
from
the
Ground
so
readily
as
a
Straw
.
If
we
consider
that
those
that
are
of
a
fiery
Temper
,
or
heated
with
Wine
,
are
quicker
than
others
;
that
amongst
living
Creatures
,
those
whose
Spirits
are
more
agitated
,
as
Birds
,
move
swifter
than
those
in
which
Blood
is
colder
,
as
it
is
in
Frogs
;
and
that
in
some
of
them
,
as
the
Chamelion
,
the
Tortoise
,
and
some
Insects
,
the
Spirits
are
so
little
agitated
,
that
their
Muscles
are
not
sooner
fill'd
than
a
Foot-ball
would
be
by
the
Breath
of
a
Man
.
All
these
things
being
well
observ'd
,
may
probably
make
our
Explication
acceptable
.
But
though
that
part
of
the
Question
propos'd
which
concerns
Voluntary
Motions
be
sufficiently
resolv'd
,
yet
we
must
not
assert
that
it
is
fully
and
perfectly
,
or
that
nothing
else
in
our
Body
contributes
to
those
Motions
besides
what
has
been
mention'd
;
for
most
probably
there
are
a
Thousand
Springs
that
facilitate
them
,
which
will
for
ever
be
unknown
,
even
to
those
who
give
a
better
Guess
upon
the
Works
of
God
.
The
second
Part
of
the
Question
to
be
examin'd
concerns
the
Natural
Motions
,
or
those
that
have
nothing
extraordinary
in
them
,
as
Convulsions
have
;
but
are
absolutely
necessary
to
the
Preservation
of
our
Machine
,
and
consequently
altogether
independent
on
our
Will
.
I
first
consider
with
all
the
possible
Attention
,
what
Motions
have
those
Conditions
,
and
whether
they
are
perfectly
alike
:
And
as
I
quickly
perceive
that
they
are
for
the
most
part
different
from
each
other
,
lest
I
should
perplex
my self
with
too
many
things
,
I
shall
only
insist
upon
the
Motion
of
the
Heart
;
which
,
of
all
the
inward
Parts
,
is
the
best
known
,
and
its
Motions
the
most
sensible
.
Whilst
I
examine
its
Construction
,
I
observe
two
Things
,
amongst
many
others
:
First
,
That
it
is
compos'd
of
Fibres
,
as
the
other
Muscles
:
And
Secondly
,
That
there
are
two
remarkable
Cavities
in
it
:
And
therefore
I
judge
that
its
Motion
may
be
perform'd
by
means
of
the
Animal
Spirits
,
since
it
is
a
Muscle
;
and
that
the
Blood
ferments
and
dilates
in
it
,
since
it
has
Cavities
.
The
first
of
these
Judgments
is
founded
upon
what
I
have
said
before
:
The
second
,
upon
the
Heart
's
being
much
hotter
than
any
other
Parts
of
the
Body
;
and
that
it
diffuses
Heat
,
together
with
Blood
,
into
all
our
Members
;
and
that
those
two
Ventricles
could
neither
be
form'd
,
nor
preserv'd
,
but
by
the
Dilatation
of
the
Blood
:
So
that
they
are
subservient
to
the
Cause
that
has
produc'd
them
.
I
can
then
give
a
sufficient
Reason
of
the
Motion
of
the
Heart
,
by
the
Spirits
that
agitate
,
and
the
Blood
that
dilates
it
,
during
the
Fermentation
:
For
though
the
Cause
I
alledge
of
its
Motion
should
not
be
true
,
yet
I
plainly
see
that
it
is
sufficient
to
produce
it
.
It
may
be
,
that
the
Principle
of
Fermentation
or
Dilatation
of
Liquors
is
not
so
well
known
to
all
Readers
,
as
that
I
may
pretend
to
have
explain'd
an
Effect
,
by
generally
shewing
that
it
proceeds
from
Fermentation
:
But
all
particular
Questions
are
not
to
be
resolv'd
by
ascending
to
the
first
Cause
,
though
that
may
be
done
too
,
and
a
true
System
on
which
all
particular
Effects
depend
,
discover'd
,
provided
we
only
insist
upon
clear
Ideas
.
But
that
Way
of
Philosophizing
is
neither
the
exactest
,
nor
yet
the
shortest
.
To
comprehend
this
,
it
must
be
observ'd
that
there
are
Questions
of
two
sorts
;
in
the
first
,
it
is
requir'd
to
discover
the
Nature
and
Properties
of
some
Thing
;
in
the
others
,
we
only
desire
to
know
whether
a
Thing
has
such
or
such
Properties
;
or
if
we
know
it
has
,
we
desire
only
to
discover
what
is
the
Cause
of
them
.
To
solve
the
Questions
of
the
first
sort
,
we
must
consider
Things
in
their
Birth
and
Original
,
and
conceive
that
they
are
always
produc'd
by
the
most
simple
and
natural
Ways
:
But
the
Solution
of
the
others
requires
a
very
different
Method
,
for
they
must
be
resolv'd
by
Suppositions
;
and
then
we
must
examine
whether
those
Suppositions
induce
into
any
Absurdity
,
or
whether
they
lead
to
any
Truth
plainly
and
clearly
known
.
For
instance
,
We
desire
to
discover
the
Properties
of
the
Roulet
,
or
some
one
of
the
Conick
Sections
:
We
must
consider
those
Lines
in
their
Generation
,
and
form
them
by
the
most
simple
and
least
perplexing
Ways
;
for
that
is
the
best
and
shortest
Means
to
discover
their
Nature
and
Properties
.
We
easily
see
that
the
Sub●endent
of
the
Roulet
is
equal
to
the
Circle
whence
it
is
form'd
:
And
if
we
discover
not
many
of
its
Properties
that
way
,
't
is
because
the
Circular
Line
that
produces
it
is
not
sufficiently
known
.
But
as
to
Lines
merely
Mathematical
,
the
Relations
of
which
may
be
more
clearly
known
,
such
as
are
Conick
Sections
;
't
is
sufficient
for
the
discovering
a
vast
Number
of
their
Properties
,
to
consider
them
in
their
Generation
:
Only
we
must
observe
,
that
as
they
may
be
produc'd
by
a
Regular
Motion
several
Ways
,
so
all
sorts
of
Generation
are
not
equally
proper
to
enlighten
the
Mind
;
that
the
most
simple
are
the
best
;
and
that
it
often
happens
,
notwithstanding
that
some
particular
Methods
are
fitter
than
others
,
to
demonstrate
some
particular
Properties
.
But
when
it
is
not
requir'd
to
discover
in
general
the
Properties
of
a
Thing
,
but
to
know
whether
such
a
Thing
has
such
a
Property
;
then
we
must
suppose
that
it
actually
enjoys
it
,
and
carefully
examine
the
Consequences
of
that
Supposition
,
whether
it
induces
into
a
manifest
Absurdity
,
or
leads
to
an
undeniable
Truth
,
that
may
serve
as
a
Means
to
find
out
what
is
sought
for
.
That
is
the
Method
which
Geometricians
use
to
solve
their
Problems
:
They
suppose
what
they
seek
,
and
examine
what
will
follow
of
it
;
they
attentively
consider
the
Relations
that
result
from
the
Supposition
;
they
represent
all
those
Relations
that
contain
the
Conditions
of
the
Problem
,
by
Equations
,
and
then
reduce
those
Equations
,
according
to
the
usual
Rules
;
so
that
what
is
unknown
,
is
found
equal
to
one
or
several
Things
perfectly
known
.
I
say
therefore
,
that
when
't
is
requir'd
to
discover
in
general
the
Nature
of
Fire
,
and
of
the
different
Fermentations
,
which
are
the
most
universal
Causes
of
natural
Effects
,
the
shortest
and
surest
Way
is
to
examine
them
in
their
Principle
.
We
must
consider
the
Formation
of
the
most
agitated
Bodies
,
the
Motion
of
which
is
diffus'd
into
those
that
ferment
.
We
must
by
clear
Ideas
,
and
by
the
most
simple
Ways
,
examine
what
Motion
may
produce
in
Matter
.
And
because
Fire
and
the
various
Fermentations
are
very
general
Things
,
and
consequently
depending
upon
few
Causes
,
there
will
be
no
need
of
considering
very
long
what
Matter
is
able
to
perform
when
animated
by
Motion
,
to
find
out
the
Nature
of
Fermentation
in
its
very
Principle
;
and
we
shall
learn
withall
several
other
Things
,
altogether
requisite
to
the
Knowledge
of
Physicks
:
Whereas
he
that
would
in
such
a
Question
argue
from
Suppositions
,
so
as
to
ascend
to
the
first
Causes
,
even
to
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
by
which
all
things
are
form'd
,
would
make
a
great
many
of
them
that
should
prove
false
and
unprofitable
.
He
might
perhaps
discover
that
the
Cause
of
the
Fermentation
is
the
Motion
of
an
invisible
Matter
;
communicated
to
the
agitated
Parts
of
Matter
:
For
't
is
sufficiently
known
,
that
Fire
and
the
various
Fermentations
of
Bodies
,
consist
in
their
Agitation
;
and
that
by
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
Bodies
receive
their
immediate
Motion
only
from
their
meeting
with
others
that
are
more
agitated
:
So
that
he
might
discover
that
there
is
an
invisible
Matter
,
the
Motion
of
which
is
communicated
to
visible
Bodies
by
Fermentation
.
But
't
is
morally
impossible
that
he
should
ever
,
by
his
Suppositions
find
out
how
all
that
is
perform'd
;
which
however
is
not
so
hard
to
do
,
when
we
examine
the
Formation
of
Elements
,
or
of
Bodies
,
of
which
there
is
a
greater
Number
of
the
same
Nature
;
as
is
to
be
seen
in
Monsieur
des
Cartes's
System
.
The
Third
Part
of
the
Question
concerning
Convulsive
Motions
,
will
not
be
very
difficult
to
solve
,
if
we
suppose
that
there
are
in
our
Bodies
Animal
Spirits
susceptible
of
Fermentation
;
and
withall
,
Humours
so
piercing
,
as
to
insinuate
themselves
into
the
Pores
of
the
Nerves
,
through
which
the
Spirits
are
di●●us'd
into
the
Muscles
;
provided
always
that
we
pretend
not
to
determine
the
true
Texture
and
Disposition
of
those
invisible
Parts
that
contribute
to
these
Convulsions
.
When
we
have
separated
a
Muscle
from
the
rest
of
the
Body
,
and
hold
it
by
the
two
Ends
,
we
sensibly
perceive
that
it
endeavours
to
contract
it self
when
prick'd
in
the
Middle
.
'T
is
likely
that
this
depends
on
the
Construction
of
the
imperceptible
Parts
,
of
which
it
is
made
;
which
are
as
so
many
Springs
determin'd
to
some
certain
Motions
,
by
that
of
Compunction
.
But
who
can
be
sure
he
has
found
out
the
true
Disposition
of
the
Parts
employ'd
in
the
Production
of
that
Motion
;
and
who
can
give
an
uncontroverted
Demonstration
of
it
?
Certainly
that
appears
altogether
impossible
,
though
perhaps
by
long
thinking
we
might
imagine
such
a
Construction
of
Muscles
,
as
would
be
fit
to
perform
all
the
Motions
we
know
them
to
be
capable
of
;
we
must
not
therefore
pretend
to
determine
the
true
Construction
of
the
Muscles
.
However
,
because
it
cannot
be
reasonably
doubted
,
but
that
there
are
Spirits
susceptible
of
some
Fermentation
,
by
the
Mixture
of
a
very
subtile
heterogeneous
Matter
;
and
that
acriminious
and
pungent
Humours
may
creep
into
the
Nerves
,
that
Hypothesis
may
be
suppos'd
.
Now
to
proceed
to
the
Solution
of
the
Question
propos'd
:
We
must
first
examine
how
many
sorts
of
Convulsive
Motions
there
are
;
and
because
their
Number
is
indefinite
,
we
must
insist
on
the
Principal
,
the
Causes
of
which
seem
to
be
different
:
We
must
consider
in
what
Parts
they
are
made
,
what
Diseases
precede
and
follow
them
;
whether
they
are
attended
with
Pain
,
or
free
from
it
;
and
above
all
,
what
are
the
Degrees
of
their
Swiftness
and
Violence
;
for
some
are
very
swift
and
violent
;
others
are
very
swift
,
but
not
violent
;
a
third
sort
are
violent
,
and
not
swift
;
and
others
again
are
free
from
both
these
Symptoms
:
Some
finish
and
begin
afresh
perpetually
,
others
keep
the
Parts
rigid
and
unmoveable
for
some
time
;
and
others
deprive
us
of
their
Use
,
and
altogether
deform
them
.
All
this
being
well
weigh'd
,
it
will
be
no
hard
matter
to
explain
in
general
,
after
what
has
been
said
concerning
Natural
and
Voluntary
Motions
,
how
the
Convulsive
are
perform'd
:
For
if
we
conceive
that
some
Matter
,
capable
of
fermenting
the
Spirits
,
mixes
with
those
contain'd
in
a
Muscle
,
it
must
needs
swell
up
,
and
produce
in
that
part
a
Convulsive
Motion
.
If
that
Motion
may
easily
be
resisted
,
't
is
a
sign
that
the
Nerves
are
not
yet
obstructed
by
any
Humour
,
since
we
may
empty
the
Muscle
of
the
Spirits
that
have
enter'd
into
it
,
and
determine
them
to
swell
up
the
opposite
Muscle
.
But
if
we
cannot
do
it
,
we
must
conclude
that
pungent
and
piercing
Humours
have
some
part
at
least
in
that
Motion
:
Even
it
may
often
happen
that
those
Humours
are
the
only
Cause
of
Convulsions
,
since
they
may
determine
the
Course
of
the
Spirits
to
some
certain
Muscles
,
by
opening
some
Passages
that
convey
them
,
and
shutting
others
:
Besides
,
that
they
may
contract
the
Tendons
and
Fibres
,
by
penetrating
their
Pores
.
When
a
very
ponderous
Weight
hangs
at
the
end
of
a
Rope
,
it
may
considerably
be
rais'd
by
only
wetting
that
Cord
;
because
the
Particles
of
Water
penetrating
as
so
many
little
Wedges
betwixt
the
Threads
of
the
Rope
,
shorten
it
by
dilating
it
:
So
the
piercing
and
pungent
Humours
,
insinuating
into
the
Pores
of
the
Nerves
,
contract
them
,
stretch
the
Parts
to
which
they
are
tied
,
and
produce
in
the
Body
Convulsive
Motions
,
that
are
extremely
slow
,
violent
and
painful
,
and
and
often
leave
the
Part
sadly
distorted
for
a
long
time
.
As
to
the
Convulsive
Motions
that
are
very
swift
,
they
are
caus'd
by
the
Spirits
;
but
it
is
not
necessary
that
those
Spirits
should
receive
any
Fermentation
;
't
is
enough
that
the
Conduits
,
through
which
they
pass
,
be
more
open
at
one
side
than
at
the
other
.
When
all
the
Parts
of
the
Body
are
in
their
natural
Situation
,
the
Animal
Spirits
diffuse
themselves
equally
and
readily
through
them
,
according
to
the
Necessities
of
the
Machine
,
and
faithfully
perform
the
Orders
of
the
Will
.
But
when
Humours
disturb
the
Disposition
of
the
Brain
,
alter
or
variously
move
the
Apertures
of
the
Nerves
,
or
penetrate
into
the
Muscles
,
they
agitate
their
Springs
;
and
the
Spirits
diffusing
into
those
Parts
after
a
new
and
unusual
manner
,
produce
extraordinary
Motions
,
without
the
Consent
of
the
Will
.
However
,
we
may
often
,
by
a
strong
Resistance
,
hinder
some
of
those
Motions
,
and
insensibly
diminish
the
Traces
that
produce
them
,
even
when
the
Habit
is
wholly
form'd
.
Those
that
look
carefully
to
themselves
,
find
little
Difficulty
in
preventing
Grimaces
,
unbecoming
Gestures
,
and
a
sourish
Countenance
,
though
their
Body
have
a
Disposition
to
them
;
and
may
even
conquer
them
when
strengthen'd
by
Habit
,
but
with
a
great
deal
more
Difficulty
;
for
such
Dispositions
should
always
be
oppos'd
in
their
Birth
,
and
before
the
Spirits
have
traced
out
a
Way
not
easie
to
be
stopp'd
up
.
The
Cause
of
those
Motions
is
often
in
the
agitated
Muscle
,
and
proceeds
from
some
pungent
Humour
,
or
fermenting
Spirits
;
but
we
must
judge
that
it
is
in
the
Brain
,
especially
when
the
Convulsions
agitate
not
one
or
two
parts
of
the
Body
,
but
most
or
all
;
and
withall
,
in
several
Diseases
which
alter
the
natural
Constitution
of
the
Blood
and
Spirits
.
'T
is
true
,
that
one
Nerve
often
having
different
Branches
,
which
disperse
through
Parts
of
the
Body
very
remote
,
as
into
the
Face
and
Bowels
,
it
sometimes
happens
that
a
Convulsion
,
the
Cause
of
which
lies
in
a
Part
to
which
some
one
of
those
Branches
resorts
,
may
have
Communication
with
those
to
which
other
Branches
reach
,
without
proceeding
from
the
Brain
,
and
without
a
Corruption
of
the
Spirits
.
But
when
the
Convulsive
Motions
are
common
to
most
Parts
of
the
Body
,
we
must
needs
say
,
either
that
the
Spirits
ferment
in
a
very
extraordinary
manner
,
or
that
the
Order
and
Disposition
of
the
Parts
of
the
Brain
is
disturb'd
,
or
that
it
proceeds
from
both
Causes
together
.
I
shall
not
insist
any
longer
upon
this
Question
,
because
it
grows
so
compound
,
and
depending
on
so
many
things
,
when
we
enter
into
Particulars
,
that
it
cannot
easily
be
made
serviceable
to
a
clear
Explication
of
the
Rules
we
have
given
.
There
is
no
Science
which
may
supply
us
with
more
Examples
,
to
shew
the
Usefulness
of
those
Rules
,
than
Geometry
,
and
especially
Algebra
,
since
these
two
Sciences
make
a
perpetual
Use
of
them
.
Geometry
plainly
discovers
the
Necessity
always
to
begin
with
the
most
simple
Things
,
and
which
include
the
least
Number
of
Relations
:
It
always
examines
those
Relations
by
Measures
that
are
clearly
known
;
it
takes
off
whatever
is
unserviceable
to
discover
them
;
it
divides
into
Parts
Compound
Questions
,
disposes
those
Parts
,
and
examines
them
in
order
.
In
short
,
The
only
Fault
to
be
found
in
this
Science
is
,
as
I
have
observ'd
elsewhere
,
that
it
affords
no
convenient
Means
to
abridge
Ideas
,
and
discover'd
Relations
:
So
that
though
it
regulates
the
Imagination
,
and
makes
the
Mind
exact
;
yet
it
increases
not
its
Extent
very
much
,
neither
does
it
give
a
Capacity
to
discover
very
compound
Truths
.
But
Algebra
,
continually
teaching
to
abridge
,
and
in
the
shortest
Way
imaginable
,
Ideas
and
their
Relations
,
extremely
improves
the
Capacity
of
the
Mind
;
for
nothing
so
compound
can
be
conce●v'd
in
the
Relations
of
Magnitudes
,
but
the
Mind
may
discover
it
in
time
by
the
Means
it
affords
,
when
we
know
the
Way
that
ought
to
be
taken
.
The
fifth
Rule
,
and
the
following
,
which
speak
of
the
Method
of
abridging
Ideas
,
concern
only
that
Science
,
for
none
else
has
a
convenient
Way
of
abridging
them
;
so
that
I
shall
not
insist
upon
their
Explication
.
Those
who
have
a
great
Inclination
for
Mathematicks
,
and
desire
to
give
their
Mind
all
the
Force
and
Extent
it
is
capable
of
,
and
to
put
themselves
into
a
State
of
discovering
,
without
a
Tutor
,
an
infinite
Number
of
new
Truths
,
will
perceive
,
if
they
earnestly
apply
themselves
to
Algebra
,
that
the
Usefulness
of
that
Science
,
as
to
the
Enquiry
after
Truth
,
proceeds
from
its
observing
the
Rules
we
have
prescrib'd
.
But
I
must
advertise
,
that
by
Algebra
,
I
especially
understand
that
which
des
Cartes
and
some
others
have
made
use
of
.
Before
the
Conclusion
of
this
Book
,
I
shall
set
down
an
Example
somewhat
at
large
,
to
shew
the
Usefulness
of
the
whole
Treatise
:
I
shall
represent
by
it
the
Advances
of
a
Man
who
,
in
the
Discussion
of
an
important
Question
,
endeavours
to
free
himself
from
Prejudices
;
I
shall
at
first
make
him
fall
into
some
Faults
,
that
they
may
excite
the
Remembrance
of
what
has
been
said
elsewhere
:
But
at
last
,
his
Attention
leading
him
to
the
Truth
enquir'd
after
,
I
induce
him
speaking
positively
,
and
as
one
who
pretends
to
have
solv'd
the
Question
he
examin'd
.
CHAP.
IX
.
The
last
Instance
to
shew
the
Vsefulness
of
this
Treatise
,
wherein
the
Cause
of
the
Vnion
of
Parts
in
Bodies
,
and
withall
,
the
Rules
of
the
Communication
of
Motion
,
are
examin'd
.
BOdies
are
united
together
three
different
Ways
,
by
Continuity
,
Contiguity
,
and
in
a
third
manner
,
that
has
no
particular
Name
;
because
it
seldom
happens
,
I
shall
call
it
by
the
general
Term
of
Union
.
By
Continuity
,
or
by
the
Causes
of
it
,
I
understand
somewhat
or
other
which
causes
the
Parts
of
a
Body
to
hold
so
strongly
together
,
that
we
must
use
violence
to
separate
them
;
for
which
Reason
they
are
look'd
upon
as
a
Whole
.
By
Contiguity
I
understand
that
,
whatever
it
is
,
which
makes
me
judge
that
two
Bodies
touch
one
another
immediately
,
so
as
that
there
is
nothing
betwixt
them
;
though
I
judge
not
that
they
are
strictly
united
,
because
I
may
easily
separate
them
.
By
the
third
Word
,
Union
,
I
understand
something
or
other
which
makes
two
Glasses
,
or
two
Marble-Stones
,
whose
surfaces
are
well
rub'd
and
polished
upon
each
other
,
to
adhere
together
,
so
as
that
though
they
can
easily
be
separated
,
by
making
them
glide
over
one
another
,
yet
we
find
some
resistance
when
we
endeavour
to
do
it
in
another
manner
.
Now
these
two
united
Glasses
,
or
Marble-stones
,
cannot
be
said
to
be
continuous
,
because
they
are
not
conceived
as
a
Whole
,
since
they
may
easily
be
separated
some
certain
way
.
Neither
is
this
a
Contiguity
,
though
it
be
something
very
like
it
,
because
those
two
pieces
of
Glass
,
or
Marble
,
are
strictly
enough
united
,
and
even
more
than
the
Parts
of
soft
and
liquid
Bodies
,
as
those
of
Butter
and
Water
.
These
Words
being
thus
explained
,
we
must
now
enquire
after
the
Cause
that
unites
Bodies
,
and
the
difference
betwixt
Continuity
,
Contiguity
,
and
the
Union
of
Bodies
,
taken
in
this
particular
Sense
:
I
shall
first
seek
the
cause
of
Continuity
,
or
that
,
I
don't
know
what
,
which
unites
the
Parts
of
a
Body
,
and
links
them
so
strictly
together
,
that
violence
must
be
used
to
separate
them
,
and
that
they
are
look'd
upon
as
making
together
but
one
Whole
.
I
hope
that
this
Cause
being
found
out
,
it
will
prove
no
hard
task
to
discover
the
rest
.
It
seems
now
necessary
to
me
,
that
this
,
I
don't
know
what
,
which
binds
even
the
smallest
Parts
of
that
piece
of
Iron
I
hold
in
my
Hands
,
should
be
something
very
powerful
,
since
I
must
use
a
very
great
Force
to
break
off
a
small
Part
of
it
.
But
am
not
I
extremely
mistaken
,
for
may
not
that
difficulty
I
find
in
breaking
the
least
piece
of
this
Iron
,
come
from
my
Weakness
,
and
not
from
the
Resistance
of
the
Iron
?
And
indeed
,
I
remember
,
I
have
formerly
used
a
greater
violence
than
I
now
do
,
to
break
a
piece
of
Iron
like
this
;
and
if
I
fell
sick
,
it
might
happen
that
my
utmost
endeavours
could
not
perform
it
.
I
see
therefore
that
I
must
not
judge
absolutely
of
the
firmness
with
which
the
Parts
of
Iron
are
joyned
together
,
by
the
endeavours
I
make
to
dis-unite
them
,
but
only
judge
that
they
stick
very
strictly
to
each
other
in
relation
to
my
little
Strength
,
or
that
they
hang
more
firmly
together
than
the
Parts
of
my
Flesh
;
since
the
Sense
of
Pain
I
feel
in
using
too
much
Force
advertises
me
,
I
shall
sooner
disunite
the
Parts
of
my
Body
,
than
those
of
the
Iron
.
Thence
I
conclude
,
That
as
I
am
not
absolutely
strong
nor
weak
,
so
Iron
and
other
Bodies
are
not
absolutely
hard
or
flexible
;
but
only
in
reference
to
the
Cause
that
acts
upon
them
.
And
that
my
Endeavours
cannot
be
a
Rule
to
measure
the
Degrees
of
Force
,
that
must
be
used
to
overcome
the
Resistance
and
Hardness
of
Iron
;
since
Rules
must
be
unvariable
;
whereas
those
Endeavours
vary
,
according
to
the
Time
,
the
plenty
of
Animal
Spirits
,
and
the
Hardness
of
Flesh
;
for
,
after
all
,
I
cannot
always
produce
the
same
Effects
by
the
same
Endeavours
.
This
Consideration
frees
me
from
a
Prejudice
,
that
made
me
imagine
strong
Bands
to
unite
the
Parts
of
Bodies
,
which
Bands
perhaps
are
not
in
being
,
and
I
hope
it
will
not
be
unprofitable
hereafter
:
for
I
am
wonderfully
apt
to
judge
of
all
things
with
relation
to
my self
,
and
to
follow
the
Impressions
of
my
Senses
,
of
which
I
shall
more
carefully
beware
.
But
let
us
proceed
.
Having
thought
some
Time
,
and
search'd
with
some
Application
,
the
Cause
of
this
strict
Union
,
without
being
able
to
discover
it
;
I
find
my self
inclin'd
by
my
own
natural
Laziness
,
to
judge
,
as
several
others
do
,
that
it
is
the
Form
of
Bodies
that
preserves
the
Union
betwixt
their
Parts
,
or
the
Friendship
and
Inclination
they
have
for
such
as
are
alike
to
them
:
And
to
form
other
judgements
of
like
nature
;
nothing
being
more
convenient
than
sometimes
to
suffer
our selves
to
be
seduc'd
,
and
to
become
Learned
on
a
sudden
,
with
little
Expence
.
But
I
intend
to
believe
nothing
but
what
I
know
,
nor
to
suffer
my self
to
be
cast
down
by
my
own
Laziness
,
nor
to
yield
to
bare
Glimpses
.
Let
us
therefore
lay
aside
those
Forms
and
Inclinations
,
of
which
we
have
no
distinct
and
particular
,
but
only
confused
and
general
Ideas
,
which
methinks
we
only
frame
with
reference
to
our
Nature
,
and
the
Existence
of
which
several
Persons
,
and
perhaps
whole
Nations
,
do
not
own
.
But
methinks
I
see
the
Cause
of
this
strict
Union
of
the
Parts
which
make
up
hard
Bodies
,
without
admitting
any
thing
in
it
,
but
what
all
the
World
grants
;
or
at
least
,
what
all
the
World
distinctly
conceives
to
be
possible
.
For
every
one
distinctly
conceives
,
that
all
Bodies
are
composed
,
or
may
be
composed
of
small
Parts
:
It
may
then
be
that
some
shall
be
crooked
and
branched
,
and
be
able
,
as
many
little
Fetters
,
strongly
to
hold
others
;
or
that
they
shall
be
so
intricated
amongst
each
others
Branches
,
that
it
will
not
be
easie
to
disunite
them
.
I
am
so
much
the
apter
to
yield
to
this
Thought
,
as
I
see
visible
Parts
of
the
gross
Bodies
,
hold
and
bind
one
another
this
way
.
But
I
can
scarce
sufficiently
mistrust
my
Prejudices
and
Impression
of
my
Senses
.
I
must
therefore
more
strictly
examine
this
Matter
,
and
enquire
after
the
Reason
,
why
even
the
minutest
and
last
solid
Parts
of
Bodies
,
in
short
,
even
the
Parts
of
every
one
of
these
little
Bands
,
hang
together
:
For
they
cannot
be
united
by
other
smaller
Bands
;
since
I
suppose
them
to
be
solid
.
Or
if
I
say
they
are
united
in
that
Manner
,
it
will
reasonably
be
ask'd
,
What
unites
these
others
together
?
and
so
in
infinitum
.
I
am
again
extremely
apt
to
say
,
that
this
Column
is
hard
by
its
Nature
;
or
that
the
small
Fetters
,
of
which
hard
Bodies
are
made
up
,
are
Attoms
,
the
Parts
of
which
cannot
be
divided
;
as
being
the
Essential
and
last
Parts
of
Bodies
,
and
essentially
crooked
,
branched
,
or
of
a
perplex'd
Figure
.
But
I
freely
own
this
is
not
solving
the
Difficulty
,
and
that
laying
aside
my
Prejudices
,
and
the
Illusions
of
my
Senses
,
I
should
be
in
the
wrong
,
to
have
Recourse
to
an
abstracted
Form
,
and
to
embrace
a
Phantasm
of
Logick
,
for
the
Cause
I
enquire
after
.
I
mean
,
I
should
be
in
the
wrong
to
conceive
,
as
something
real
and
distinct
,
the
rambling
or
indefinite
Idea
of
Nature
or
Essence
;
which
expresses
nothing
but
what
is
known
to
us
;
and
so
to
take
an
abstracted
universal
Form
for
the
Physical
Cause
of
a
real
Effect
:
for
there
are
Two
things
which
I
cannot
too
much
mistrust
.
The
first
is
,
The
Impression
of
my
Senses
;
and
the
other
,
My
Readiness
to
take
abstracted
Natures
,
and
general
Ideas
of
Logick
,
for
real
and
particular
,
by
which
two
Principles
of
Errour
I
remember
to
have
been
often
seduc'd
.
For
to
return
to
the
Difficulty
in
hand
;
't
is
not
possible
to
conceive
how
those
little
Fetters
should
be
indivisible
by
their
own
Essence
and
Nature
,
nor
consequently
how
they
should
be
inflexible
;
since
,
on
the
contrary
,
I
conceive
them
most
divisible
,
nay
,
necessarily
divisible
by
their
own
Essence
and
Nature
.
For
the
Part
A
is
most
certainly
a
Substance
as
well
as
B
;
and
consequently
't
is
plain
that
A
may
exist
without
B
,
since
Substances
may
exist
without
one
another
,
otherwise
they
would
be
no
Substances
.
It
cannot
be
said
that
A
is
no
Substance
;
for
't
is
plain
that
that
is
not
a
bare
Mode
,
whereas
every
Being
is
either
a
Substance
,
or
the
Mode
of
a
Substance
.
And
therefore
since
A
is
not
a
Mode
,
it
is
a
Substance
,
and
may
exist
without
B
;
and
much
more
the
Part
A
exists
separately
from
B
;
so
that
this
Fetter
is
divisible
into
A
and
B.
Moreover
,
if
this
Fetter
were
indivisible
or
crooked
by
its
own
Nature
and
Essence
,
there
would
happen
a
thing
quite
contrary
to
what
we
see
by
Experience
;
for
not
one
Body
could
be
broken
.
Let
us
suppose
,
as
before
,
a
Piece
of
Iron
composed
of
many
Fetters
perplexed
within
one
another
,
and
A
a
B
b
to
be
two
of
them
;
I
say
it
will
not
be
possible
to
disintangle
them
,
and
consequently
to
break
the
Iron
.
For
to
break
it
,
the
Fetters
that
make
it
up
must
be
bent
,
which
however
are
supposed
inflexible
by
their
own
Nature
and
Essence
.
If
they
be
not
supposed
inflexible
,
but
only
indivisible
by
their
own
Nature
,
the
Supposition
would
be
unserviceable
for
solving
the
Question
.
For
then
the
Difficulty
will
be
,
Why
those
little
Fetters
obey
not
the
Force
that
is
used
to
bend
a
Bar
of
Iron
?
Neither
must
they
be
supposed
indivisible
,
if
they
be
not
supposed
inflexible
:
For
if
the
Parts
of
those
Fetters
could
change
their
situation
in
reference
to
one
another
,
't
is
visible
that
they
might
be
separated
;
since
there
is
no
Reason
why
,
if
one
part
may
be
somewhat
removed
from
the
other
,
it
could
not
be
entirely
removed
.
And
therefore
whether
these
little
Fetters
are
supposed
indivisible
or
inflexible
,
the
Question
cannot
be
solved
by
that
means
:
for
if
they
be
only
supposed
indivisible
,
a
Piece
of
Iron
must
be
broken
without
trouble
;
and
if
they
be
supposed
inflexible
,
it
will
be
impossible
to
break
it
;
since
the
little
Fetters
that
make
up
the
Iron
,
being
intricated
within
one
another
,
it
will
be
impossible
to
disintangle
them
.
Let
us
therefore
solve
the
Difficulty
by
clear
and
undeniable
Principles
,
and
find
the
Reason
why
that
little
Band
has
two
Parts
A
B
so
firmly
united
to
one
another
.
'T
is
needful
,
I
perceive
,
to
divide
the
Subject
of
my
Meditation
into
Parts
,
that
I
may
examine
it
the
more
exactly
,
and
with
less
Intention
of
Thought
;
since
I
could
not
at
first
,
at
a
single
view
,
and
with
the
whole
Attention
I
am
capable
of
,
discover
what
I
enquired
after
.
This
I
might
have
done
at
the
beginning
;
for
when
the
Subjects
of
our
Meditation
are
somewhat
abstruse
,
't
is
always
the
best
way
to
consider
them
by
parts
,
and
not
fruitlessly
weary
our selves
with
the
vain
Hopes
of
meeting
happily
with
the
Truth
.
What
I
enquire
after
is
,
The
Cause
of
the
strict
Union
betwixt
the
minute
Parts
,
that
make
up
the
little
Fetter
A
B.
Now
I
conceive
only
distinctly
three
Things
that
can
be
the
Cause
sought
for
,
viz.
The
very
Parts
of
that
little
Fetter
,
or
the
Will
of
the
Author
of
Nature
,
or
lastly
invisible
Bodies
surrounding
such
little
Bands
.
I
might
yet
alledge
,
as
the
Cause
of
these
things
,
the
Form
of
Bodies
,
the
Qualities
of
Hardness
,
or
some
occult
Quality
,
the
Sympathy
betwixt
Parts
of
the
same
Species
,
&c.
but
since
I
have
no
distinct
Idea
of
those
fine
things
,
I
neither
must
nor
can
ground
my
Reasonings
thereupon
:
so
that
if
I
find
not
the
Cause
I
search
after
,
in
those
things
of
which
I
have
distinct
Ideas
,
I
will
not
fruitlessly
trouble
my self
with
the
Contemplation
of
such
rambling
and
general
Notions
of
Logick
;
and
shall
forbear
speaking
of
what
I
understand
not
.
But
let
us
examine
the
first
of
these
things
,
that
may
be
the
Cause
,
why
the
Parts
of
that
small
Band
are
so
firmly
joined
;
viz.
the
very
Parts
of
which
it
is
made
up
.
When
I
only
consider
the
Parts
of
which
hard
Bodies
are
composed
,
I
am
inclined
to
believe
,
That
no
[
](A51674-e96470-b)*
*
M.
Des
Cartes
his
Principles
,
Art
.
55.
Part.
II.
Cement
,
which
unites
the
Parts
of
that
Fetter
,
can
be
imagin'd
besides
themselves
and
their
own
Rest
:
for
of
what
Nature
could
it
be
?
It
cannot
be
a
thing
subsisting
of
it self
,
since
all
those
minute
Parts
being
Substances
,
for
what
Reason
should
they
be
united
by
other
Substances
but
themselves
?
Neither
can
it
be
a
Quality
different
from
Rest
;
because
there
is
no
Quality
more
contrary
to
Motion
,
that
may
separate
those
Parts
,
but
their
own
Rest
:
but
besides
Substances
and
their
Qualities
,
we
know
not
any
other
sorts
of
things
.
'T
is
true
,
that
the
Parts
of
hard
Bodies
remain
united
,
as
long
as
they
are
in
Rest
one
by
another
;
and
that
when
they
are
once
in
Rest
,
they
remain
of
themselves
in
the
same
state
,
as
long
as
they
can
;
but
this
is
not
what
I
enquire
after
,
and
I
know
not
how
too
I
came
to
mistake
the
Subject
.
I
endeavour
here
to
discover
,
why
the
Parts
of
hard
Bodies
have
so
great
a
strength
,
to
remain
in
Rest
one
by
another
,
that
they
withstand
the
Force
that
is
used
to
move
them
.
[
](A51674-e96540-b)*
*
Art.
43.
ibid.
I
might
however
answer
my self
,
that
every
Body
has
truly
Force
of
continuing
fix'd
in
its
present
state
,
and
that
this
Force
is
equal
whether
in
Motion
or
Rest
:
But
that
the
Reason
why
the
parts
of
hard
Bodies
remain
in
Rest
by
one
another
,
and
that
we
can
[
](A51674-e96560-b)†
†
Art.
63.
difficultly
move
and
separate
them
,
is
our
not
imploying
sufficient
Motion
to
overpower
the
Rest.
This
is
probable
,
but
I
am
seeking
Certainty
,
if
it
be
to
be
found
,
and
not
bare
Probability
.
And
how
can
I
know
with
Certainty
,
and
Evidence
,
that
each
Body
has
this
Force
to
continue
in
the
state
it
's
in
,
and
that
this
Force
is
equal
both
as
to
Motion
and
Rest
,
since
Matter
on
the
contrary
,
seems
indifferently
passive
to
either
,
and
altogether
destitute
of
Force
.
Let
us
have
recourse
then
with
M.
des
Cartes
to
the
Will
of
the
Creatour
,
which
is
,
it
may
be
,
that
Force
which
Bodies
seem
to
have
in
themselves
,
which
is
the
second
thing
above
mention'd
,
suppos'd
capable
of
preserving
the
Parts
of
this
little
Fetter
we
speak
of
,
so
closely
link'd
to
one
another
.
Certainly
,
't
is
possible
that
God
may
will
every
Body
should
remain
in
its
present
state
,
and
that
his
Will
should
be
the
Force
which
unites
their
Parts
to
one
another
,
as
I
otherwise
know
his
Will
to
be
the
Moving
Force
which
puts
Bodies
in
Motion
:
For
since
Matter
is
incapable
of
moving
it self
,
I
have
Reason
,
methinks
,
to
conclude
it
is
a
Spirit
,
and
even
the
Author
of
Nature
,
which
puts
it
and
preserves
it
in
Motion
,
by
preserving
it
successively
in
different
places
by
his
bare
Will
;
in
as
much
as
an
Almighty
Being
acts
not
with
Instruments
,
and
his
Will
is
necessarily
follow'd
by
Effects
.
[
](A51674-e96630-b)*
*
Art.
33.
Part.
II.
I
acknowledge
then
,
it
's
possible
that
God
may
will
that
every
thing
remain
in
its
present
state
,
whether
it
be
Motion
or
Rest
,
and
that
his
Will
may
be
the
natural
Power
,
which
Bodies
have
of
remaining
in
the
state
they
once
have
obtain'd
.
And
if
so
,
we
must
like
M.
des
Cartes
,
measure
that
Power
,
conclude
what
ought
to
be
the
Effects
of
it
,
and
give
Rules
for
the
Force
and
Communication
of
Motions
upon
the
Collision
of
different
Bodies
,
in
proportion
to
their
Magnitude
;
since
we
have
no
other
way
of
coming
to
the
knowledge
of
that
general
and
immutable
Will
of
God
,
who
makes
the
different
Power
these
Bodies
have
of
acting
upon
,
and
resisting
one
another
,
consist
in
their
different
Magnitude
and
Swiftness
.
But
however
,
I
have
no
infallible
proof
that
God
wills
by
a
positive
Will
,
that
Bodies
remain
in
Rest
,
and
one
would
think
it
sufficient
for
God
to
will
the
Existence
of
Matter
,
not
only
to
cause
it
to
exist
,
but
to
exist
in
Rest.
The
case
is
not
the
same
with
Motion
,
since
the
Idea
of
a
Matter
mov'd
,
certainly
includes
two
Powers
to
which
it
is
related
,
viz.
that
which
created
,
and
also
that
which
mov'd
it
.
But
the
Idea
of
a
Matter
in
Rest
,
includes
only
the
Idea
of
a
Power
which
has
created
it
,
whilst
there
is
no
necessity
of
any
other
Power
to
put
it
in
Rest
,
since
if
we
barely
conceive
Matter
,
without
thinking
on
any
Power
,
we
shall
necessarily
conceive
it
in
Rest.
Thus
it
is
I
conceive
things
:
for
I
am
to
judge
by
my
Ideas
;
and
my
Ideas
tell
me
,
Rest
is
but
the
privation
of
Motion
.
For
God
need
but
cease
to
will
the
Motion
of
a
Body
;
to
make
its
Motion
cease
,
and
to
cause
it
to
Rest.
But
I
remember
I
have
heard
from
many
very
ingenious
Persons
,
that
Motion
seem'd
to
them
as
much
the
privation
of
Rest
,
as
Rest
the
privation
of
Motion
.
And
some
will
not
doubt
to
affirm
,
for
Reasons
I
can't
comprehend
,
that
Motion
seems
rather
a
privation
than
rest
.
I
do
not
distinctly
call
to
Mind
the
Reasons
they
alledge
:
however
this
ought
to
make
me
suspicious
,
lest
my
Ideas
should
be
false
.
For
though
most
Men
say
what
they
please
upon
Subjects
that
seem
of
little
moment
,
yet
I
have
Reason
to
believe
the
Persons
I
speak
of
,
were
pleas'd
to
speak
what
they
thought
:
wherefore
I
must
still
examine
my
Ideas
more
carefully
.
To
me
it
seems
a
thing
of
undoubted
Certainty
,
and
the
Gentlemen
before
mention'd
won't
deny
it
,
I
imagine
here
only
God
,
my self
,
and
one
Bowl
.
that
't
is
the
Will
of
God
which
moves
Bodies
.
The
Force
then
which
that
Bowl
I
see
in
Motion
has
,
is
the
Will
of
God
that
moves
it
;
what
now
is
God
requir'd
to
do
to
stop
it
?
Must
he
Will
,
by
a
positive
Will
,
that
it
should
Rest
?
or
is
it
sufficient
to
cease
to
will
its
Motion
?
'T
is
plain
,
that
if
God
but
cease
to
will
the
Motion
of
this
Bowl
,
the
cessation
of
its
Motion
,
and
consequently
Rest
will
succeed
the
cessation
of
the
Will
of
God
.
For
the
Will
of
God
,
which
was
the
Force
that
moved
the
Bowl
,
desisting
,
that
Force
desists
,
and
the
Bowl
will
be
no
longer
mov'd
.
Therefore
the
cessation
of
the
moving
Force
produces
Rest
:
Rest
then
has
no
Force
to
cause
it
;
but
is
a
bare
privation
that
supposes
no
positive
Will
in
God
.
Thus
we
should
admit
in
God
a
positive
Will
without
any
Reason
or
Necessity
,
if
we
ascribed
to
Bodies
any
Force
to
remain
in
Rest.
But
to
overthrow
this
Argument
if
possible
,
Let
us
now
suppose
a
Bowl
at
Rest
,
as
before
we
suppos'd
it
in
Motion
,
what
must
God
do
in
order
to
agitate
it
?
Is
it
enough
that
he
ceases
to
will
its
repose
?
if
so
,
I
have
hitherto
made
no
advance
;
for
that
Motion
will
be
equally
the
privation
of
Rest
,
as
Rest
of
Motion
.
I
suppose
then
that
God
desists
to
will
the
Rest
of
this
Bowl
;
but
supposing
it
,
I
see
it
not
put
in
Motion
;
and
if
any
others
do
,
I
desire
them
to
inform
me
with
what
degree
of
Motion
it
is
carried
.
Certainly
't
is
impossible
it
should
be
mov'd
,
or
have
any
degree
of
Motion
:
and
't
is
impossible
to
conceive
any
degree
of
Motion
in
it
,
barely
from
our
conceiving
that
God
ceases
to
will
it
should
be
at
Rest
;
because
it
goes
not
with
Motion
as
it
does
with
Rest.
Motions
are
infinitely
various
,
and
are
susceptible
of
more
and
less
;
but
Rest
being
nothing
,
one
cannot
differ
from
another
.
One
and
the
same
Bowl
which
moves
twice
as
fast
at
one
time
as
at
another
,
has
twice
as
much
Force
,
or
Motion
,
at
one
time
as
at
another
.
But
it
cannot
be
said
that
the
same
Bowl
has
Rest
double
at
one
time
to
its
Rest
at
another
.
There
must
therefore
be
a
positive
Will
in
God
,
to
put
a
Bowl
in
Motion
,
or
to
give
it
such
a
Force
as
it
may
move
it self
with
:
But
he
need
only
cease
to
will
it
should
be
mov'd
,
to
cause
its
Motion
to
desist
;
that
is
,
to
make
it
Rest.
Just
as
to
the
creating
a
World
,
it
is
not
enough
that
God
cease
to
will
its
non-existence
,
unless
he
likewise
positively
will
the
manner
it
shall
exist
in
.
But
in
order
to
annihilate
it
,
there
is
no
need
of
God's
willing
it
should
not
exist
,
since
God
cannot
will
Nothingness
by
a
positive
Will
,
but
barely
,
that
he
cease
to
will
its
Being
.
I
consider
not
here
Motion
and
Rest
,
according
to
their
relative
Capacity
;
(
for
't
is
manifest
that
resting
Bodies
have
as
real
Relations
to
those
about
them
,
as
Bodies
in
Motion
)
I
only
conceive
that
Bodies
mov'd
have
a
moving
Force
,
and
that
others
at
Rest
have
no
Force
at
all
to
persevere
in
it
;
because
the
Relations
of
mov'd
to
the
circumambient
Bodies
,
perpetually
changing
,
they
need
a
continual
Force
to
produce
these
Changes
;
it
being
indeed
nothing
but
these
Changes
,
that
cause
all
that
Novelty
we
observe
in
Nature
;
but
there
is
no
need
of
Force
to
do
nothing
.
When
the
Relation
of
a
Body
to
those
surrounding
it
is
constantly
the
same
,
there
is
nothing
done
;
and
the
Continuance
of
that
Relation
,
I
mean
the
Action
of
the
Will
of
God
,
which
preserves
it
,
is
not
different
from
that
which
preserves
the
Body
it self
.
If
it
be
true
,
as
I
conceive
,
That
Rest
is
but
the
Privation
of
Motion
,
the
least
Motion
,
or
that
of
the
least
Body
mov'd
,
will
include
a
greater
Force
or
power
than
the
Rest
of
the
greatest
Body
;
and
so
the
least
Force
,
and
the
least
Body
,
suppos'd
to
be
mov'd
[
](A51674-e96850-b)*
*
By
a
Body
in
a
Vacuum
,
I
understand
one
so
separate
from
others
,
whether
hard
or
liquid
,
as
that
there
is
none
either
to
aid
or
hinder
the
Communication
of
Motions
.
in
a
Vacuum
,
against
another
never
so
great
and
bulky
,
will
be
capable
of
moving
it
;
since
the
largest
Body
at
Rest
will
have
no
power
of
resisting
the
least
Body
that
shall
strike
against
it
.
Therefore
the
Resistance
which
is
made
by
the
Parts
of
hard
Bodies
,
to
hinder
their
Separation
,
necessarily
proceeds
from
something
else
than
their
Repose
.
But
't
is
necessary
to
demonstrate
by
sensible
Experiments
,
what
we
have
been
proving
by
abstracted
Reasonings
,
to
see
whether
our
Ideas
comport
with
the
Sensations
we
receive
from
Effects
.
For
it
often
happens
that
such
Reasonings
deceive
us
,
at
least
will
not
convince
others
,
and
especially
such
as
are
prejudiced
to
the
contrary
.
M.
Des
Cartes's
Authority
has
such
an
influence
upon
some
Mens
Reason
,
that
unless
we
prove
all
imaginable
ways
,
that
great
Man
in
an
Errour
,
we
cannot
disabuse
them
.
What
I
have
said
will
be
readily
admitted
by
such
as
are
not
prepossess'd
with
a
contrary
Opinion
;
and
I
perceive
that
I
shall
even
be
blam'd
by
them
,
for
proving
things
which
seem
to
them
indisputable
:
However
,
the
Cartesians
well
deserve
our
endeavours
to
content
them
.
The
others
may
pass
over
this
Discourse
,
if
they
think
it
tedious
.
Here
then
are
some
Experiments
which
sensibly
demonstrate
that
Rest
has
no
power
to
resist
Motion
,
and
which
consequently
evince
,
that
the
Will
of
the
Author
of
Nature
,
which
constitutes
the
Power
and
Force
every
Body
has
to
continue
in
its
present
state
,
respects
not
Rest
,
but
Motion
only
;
since
Bodies
consider'd
in
themselves
have
no
Force
at
all
.
We
daily
see
great
Ships
,
whilst
floating
in
the
Water
,
mov'd
with
little
Bodies
striking
against
them
.
From
which
Experience
I
conclude
,
notwithstanding
all
the
subterfuges
of
Monsieur
des
Cartes
and
the
Cartesians
,
that
if
these
great
Bodies
were
in
a
Vacuum
,
they
might
be
moved
with
much
greater
facility
,
since
the
Reason
of
a
Vessel
's
being
mov'd
in
the
Water
with
some
difficulty
,
is
the
resistance
the
Water
makes
to
the
imparted
Motion
;
which
in
a
void
space
will
not
be
found
.
Now
that
which
manifestly
shews
that
Water
resists
the
Motion
impressed
on
the
Vessel
,
is
the
cessation
of
its
Motion
some
time
after
the
Impulsion
,
which
certainly
would
not
happen
,
did
not
the
Vessel
lose
its
Motion
,
by
communicating
it
to
the
Water
;
or
if
the
Water
yielded
to
its
passage
without
any
opposition
;
or
lastly
,
imparted
to
it
some
of
its
own
Motion
.
Therefore
since
a
Vessel
agitated
in
the
Water
,
ceases
by
degrees
to
move
,
't
is
an
infallible
sign
that
the
Water
,
instead
of
forwarding
,
as
Monsieur
des
Cartes
pretends
,
withstands
its
Motion
;
and
consequently
it
would
be
infinitely
easier
to
move
a
great
Body
in
a
Vacuum
than
in
Water
,
since
there
would
be
no
resistance
on
the
part
of
surrounding
Bodies
.
'T
is
evident
therefore
,
that
Rest
has
no
Force
to
resist
Motion
,
and
that
the
least
Motion
contains
more
Power
and
Force
then
the
greatest
Rest
;
or
at
least
,
that
we
ought
not
to
measure
the
Force
of
Motion
and
Rest
,
by
the
Proportion
we
find
between
the
Magnitude
of
Bodies
in
those
two
States
,
as
Monsieur
des
Cartes
has
done
.
'T
is
true
,
there
is
some
reason
to
believe
that
the
Vessel
is
mov'd
,
whilst
in
the
Water
,
by
reason
of
the
continual
change
which
happen
in
the
watery
parts
about
it
,
though
to
us
it
seems
not
to
change
its
place
:
And
this
has
been
an
inducement
to
M.
Des
Cartes
and
some
Persons
to
believe
,
that
't
is
not
the
bare
Force
of
the
impelling
Agent
which
makes
it
advance
in
Water
;
but
that
having
before
receiv'd
a
great
deal
of
Motion
from
the
little
parts
of
the
surrounding
Liquid
,
which
press
it
equally
on
all
sides
,
this
Motion
is
only
determin'd
by
the
adventitious
Motion
of
the
impelling
Body
;
so
that
what
moves
a
Body
in
Water
,
could
not
do
it
in
a
Vacuum
.
And
thus
it
is
that
M.
Des
Cartes
and
his
Followers
defend
the
Rules
of
Motion
they
have
given
us
.
Let
us
suppose
,
for
Example
,
a
Piece
of
Wood
of
a
Foot
square
,
plac'd
in
a
liquid
Body
,
all
the
little
parts
whereof
act
and
move
against
it
;
and
because
they
press
it
equally
on
all
sides
,
as
well
towards
A
as
B
,
the
piece
of
Wood
stirs
neither
one
way
nor
another
:
Now
if
I
drive
another
Piece
of
Wood
of
half
a
Foot
against
the
former
,
on
the
side
A
,
I
see
it
advance
forward
;
hence
I
conclude
,
that
it
might
be
mov'd
in
a
Vacuum
with
less
Force
than
that
of
the
Piece
that
drives
it
,
for
the
foregoing
Reasons
.
But
the
Persons
I
speak
of
deny
it
,
and
answer
,
that
the
reason
of
the
greater
Piece's
advancing
,
when
urg'd
by
the
little
one
,
is
,
that
the
[
](A51674-e97070-b)*
*
Art.
5.
latter
unable
to
move
it
singly
,
being
joyn'd
with
the
parts
of
the
agitated
Liquid
,
determines
them
to
drive
it
by
imparting
some
of
their
Motion
to
it
.
But
't
is
manifest
that
by
this
Answer
,
the
Piece
of
Wood
,
when
once
mov'd
,
could
never
diminish
its
Motion
;
but
must
,
on
the
contrary
,
perpetually
increase
it
.
For
according
to
this
Answer
,
the
Piece
of
Wood
is
more
driven
by
the
Water
to
the
side
of
A
than
B
,
therefore
it
must
perpetually
proceed
;
and
because
this
Impulsion
is
continual
,
its
Motion
must
constantly
increase
.
But
,
as
I
have
said
,
the
Water
is
so
far
from
facilitating
its
Motion
,
that
it
continually
resists
it
;
which
resistance
still
lessening
it
more
and
more
,
at
last
makes
it
altogether
insensible
.
But
I
am
now
to
prove
that
the
Piece
of
Wood
which
is
equally
push'd
by
the
little
parts
of
the
encompassing
Water
,
has
no
Motion
or
Force
at
all
,
capable
of
moving
it
,
though
it
continually
changes
its
immediate
place
;
and
the
Surface
of
the
Water
round
it
is
different
at
different
times
.
For
if
it
be
so
that
a
Body
equally
press'd
on
all
sides
,
as
a
Piece
of
Wood
,
be
destitute
of
Motion
,
undoubtedly
that
foreign
Force
that
strikes
against
it
,
must
communicate
it
,
since
at
the
time
of
this
Force's
urging
it
on
,
the
Water
resists
,
and
insensibly
dissipates
the
impress'd
Motion
,
causing
it
,
by
little
and
little
,
at
last
to
cease
.
It
is
certain
,
at
least
to
those
I
speak
to
,
that
there
is
no
more
Motion
in
Nature
at
one
time
than
another
;
and
that
Bodies
at
rest
cannot
be
put
in
Motion
,
but
by
the
Collision
of
some
agitated
Bodies
,
which
communicate
their
Motion
to
them
.
Whence
I
conclude
,
that
a
Body
,
which
I
suppose
created
perfectly
at
Rest
in
the
midst
of
Water
,
will
never
receive
any
degree
of
Motion
,
from
the
little
parts
of
the
Water
which
surround
it
,
and
which
strike
continually
against
it
,
provided
their
Force
be
equal
on
all
sides
;
because
all
these
little
parts
which
dash
equally
against
it
on
all
sides
,
rebounding
again
with
their
whole
Motion
,
communicate
none
of
it
;
and
consequently
this
Body
ought
to
be
consider'd
as
at
Rest
,
and
without
any
moving
Force
,
though
it
continually
changes
its
Situation
.
Now
the
proof
I
have
for
the
rebounding
of
these
little
parts
,
together
with
their
whole
Motion
,
is
this
;
That
otherwise
the
Water
which
touches
this
Body
,
must
grow
very
cold
,
or
even
congeal'd
,
and
become
almost
as
hard
as
the
Wood
upon
its
Surface
,
since
the
Motion
of
the
watry
parts
ought
to
be
equally
diffus'd
into
the
little
parts
of
the
Body
they
encompass
.
But
that
I
may
accommodate
my self
to
the
Patrons
of
M.
Des
Cartes's
Opinion
,
I
am
willing
to
grant
that
we
ought
not
to
consider
a
Vessel
on
the
Water
as
at
Rest.
I
grant
likewise
,
that
all
the
parts
of
the
environing
Water
are
●ubservient
to
the
new
Motion
imprinted
by
the
Waterman
,
though
it
be
but
too
visible
by
the
decrease
of
the
Boat
's
Motion
,
that
they
resist
it
more
on
the
side
where
it
makes
,
than
on
the
other
whence
it
is
driven
:
Notwithstanding
which
supposition
,
I
say
,
that
of
all
the
Parts
of
Water
in
the
River
,
according
to
M.
Des
Cartes
,
there
are
none
which
can
promote
the
Motion
of
the
Vessel
,
except
those
which
immediately
touch
it
on
the
side
it
is
driven
on
.
For
[
](A51674-e97150-b)*
*
Art.
63.
according
to
that
Philosopher
,
The
Water
being
fluid
,
all
the
parts
that
go
to
its
Composition
,
act
not
conjointly
against
the
Body
we
would
move
;
but
only
those
which
touching
it
,
conjointly
bear
upon
it
.
But
those
which
conjointly
bear
upon
the
Vessel
,
and
the
Boat's-man
together
,
are
twenty
times
more
inconsiderable
than
the
Boat
.
'T
is
plain
therefore
,
from
the
Explication
given
by
M.
Des
Cartes
in
this
Article
,
concerning
the
difficulty
we
find
to
break
a
Nail
between
our
Fingers
,
that
a
little
Body
is
capable
of
moving
one
much
bigger
than
it self
.
For
in
short
,
our
Hands
are
not
so
fluid
as
Water
;
and
when
we
would
break
a
Nail
,
there
are
more
parts
that
act
jointly
in
our
hands
,
than
in
the
Water
which
pushes
against
a
Vessel
.
But
here
's
a
more
sensible
Experiment
.
Take
a
Plank
well
smooth'd
,
or
any
other
very
hard
Plain
,
drive
in
it
a
Nail
half
way
,
and
set
this
Plain
in
a
somewhat
inclining
posture
;
then
place
a
Bar
of
Iron
an
hundred
times
thicker
than
the
Nail
,
an
Inch
or
two
above
it
,
and
letting
it
slide
down
,
it
will
not
break
it
.
Mean
time
it
is
observable
,
that
,
according
to
Des
Cartes
,
all
the
parts
of
the
Bar
,
as
being
hard
and
solid
,
act
jointly
upon
the
Nail
.
If
therefore
there
were
no
other
C●ment
than
Rest
to
unite
the
parts
of
the
Nail
,
the
Bar
of
Iron
being
an
hundred
times
bigger
,
ought
by
the
Fifth
Rule
of
M.
Des
Cartes
,
and
according
to
Reason
,
communicate
somewhat
of
its
Motion
to
the
part
of
the
Nail
it
fell
upon
;
that
is
,
to
break
it
,
and
pass
on
,
even
though
this
Bar
should
slide
with
a
very
gentle
Motion
.
Therefore
we
must
seek
some
other
Cause
than
the
Rest
of
Bodies
,
that
makes
them
hard
,
and
capable
of
resisting
the
violence
that
is
offer'd
to
break
them
,
since
Rest
has
no
Force
to
withstand
Motion
:
And
I
am
persuaded
these
Experiences
are
sufficient
to
evince
,
that
the
abstracted
Proofs
we
have
given
are
not
false
.
We
must
then
examine
the
third
Thing
we
supposed
before
might
be
the
cause
of
the
strict
Union
found
between
the
Parts
of
hard
Bodies
;
namely
,
an
invisible
Matter
which
surrounds
them
;
and
which
being
rapidly
mov'd
,
pushes
most
violently
the
external
and
internal
Parts
of
these
Bodies
,
and
constringes
them
in
such
a
manner
as
requires
greater
strength
to
separate
them
,
than
has
that
invisible
and
extremely
agitated
Matter
.
Methinks
I
might
reasonably
conclude
,
that
the
Union
of
the
constituent
Parts
of
hard
Bodies
depends
on
an
invisible
Matter
which
surrounds
and
compresses
them
,
since
the
two
other
things
,
supposed
possible
Causes
of
this
union
,
have
been
discover'd
not
to
be
truly
so
.
For
since
I
meet
with
Resistance
in
breaking
a
Piece
of
Iron
,
which
Resistance
proceeds
not
from
the
Iron
,
nor
the
Will
of
God
,
as
I
think
I
have
proved
,
it
must
necessarily
proceed
from
some
invisible
Matter
,
which
can
be
no
other
than
that
which
immediately
surrounds
and
compresses
it
.
Nevertheless
,
I
shall
give
some
positive
Proofs
of
this
Opinion
,
after
I
have
more
largely
explain'd
it
by
some
Instance
.
Take
a
Globe
of
any
hard
Metal
,
which
is
hollow
within
,
and
divided
in
two
Halfs
,
join
them
together
with
a
little
Bond
of
Wax
at
the
place
of
their
Union
,
and
then
extract
the
Air
:
these
two
half
Globes
will
be
so
firmly
join'd
to
one
another
,
that
two
Teams
of
Horses
fastned
to
the
Rings
on
the
opposite
sides
of
the
Globe
,
shall
not
separate
them
,
provided
they
be
large
in
proportion
to
the
Number
of
Horses
;
when
yet
if
the
Air
be
suffer'd
to
enter
,
one
Man
shall
separate
them
with
a
great
deal
of
Ease
.
From
this
Experiment
't
is
easie
to
conclude
,
that
what
united
the
two
Hemispheres
to
one
another
,
was
the
Pressure
of
the
surrounding
Air
upon
their
outward
and
convex
Surface
,
whilst
there
was
no
Compression
in
their
concave
and
inward
parts
;
so
that
the
Action
of
the
Horses
which
drew
the
two
Hemispheres
on
either
side
,
could
not
conquer
the
Resistance
made
by
innumerable
little
Parts
of
Air
,
by
their
pressing
these
two
Halfs
:
But
the
least
Force
is
capable
of
dividing
them
when
the
Air
entring
in
the
Copper
Globe
,
drives
against
the
Concave
and
inward
Surfaces
,
as
much
as
the
external
Air
presses
against
the
outward
and
convex
.
Take
,
on
the
contrary
,
the
Bladder
of
a
Carp
,
and
put
it
in
a
Vessel
from
which
the
Air
is
pump'd
:
this
Bladder
being
full
of
Air
,
will
crack
and
burst
,
because
then
there
is
no
exteriour
Air
to
resist
that
within
the
Bladder
.
'T
is
likewise
for
the
same
Reason
I
have
given
of
the
first
Experiment
,
that
two
Glass
or
Marble
Plains
,
ground
and
polish'd
upon
one
another
,
so
cling
together
,
that
Violence
must
be
us'd
to
separate
them
one
way
;
because
the
two
parts
of
the
Marble
are
press'd
and
constring'd
by
the
external
Air
that
surrounds
them
,
and
are
not
so
strongly
press'd
by
that
between
.
I
might
produce
infinite
other
Experiments
to
prove
that
the
gross
Air
which
surrounds
Bodies
strongly
unites
their
Parts
:
But
what
I
have
said
is
enough
to
give
a
distinct
Explication
of
my
Thoughts
upon
the
present
Question
.
I
say
then
,
that
what
causes
the
Parts
of
hard
Bodies
and
the
little
Fetters
before-mentioned
to
hang
so
closely
united
to
each
other
,
is
,
there
being
other
little
Bodies
infinitely
more
agitated
than
the
course
Air
we
breath
,
which
bear
against
them
,
and
compress
them
;
and
that
which
makes
it
so
hard
to
separate
them
,
is
not
their
Rest
,
but
the
Agitation
of
these
little
surrounding
Bodies
.
So
that
that
which
resists
Motion
is
not
Rest
,
(
this
being
but
the
Privation
of
it
,
and
has
no
Force
at
all
,
)
but
some
contrary
Motion
.
This
simple
Exposition
of
my
Opinion
perhaps
seems
reasonable
;
yet
I
foresee
,
that
many
Persons
will
not
easily
be
induc'd
to
yield
to
it
.
Hard
Bodies
make
so
great
Impression
on
the
Senses
when
they
strike
us
,
or
when
we
use
Violence
to
break
them
,
that
we
are
inclin'd
to
believe
their
Parts
more
strictly
united
than
they
really
are
.
And
on
the
contrary
,
the
little
Bodies
which
I
have
said
encompass
them
,
and
to
which
I
have
ascribed
the
Force
of
causing
this
Union
,
making
no
Impression
on
our
Senses
,
seem
too
weak
to
produce
so
sensible
an
Effect
.
But
to
take
away
this
Prejudice
,
which
bottoms
on
the
Impressions
of
our
Senses
,
and
on
the
Difficulty
we
find
to
imagine
Bodies
more
little
and
agitated
than
those
we
daily
see
;
't
is
to
be
consider'd
,
that
the
Hardness
of
Bodies
is
not
to
be
measur'd
with
relation
to
our
Hands
,
or
the
Endeavours
we
are
able
to
make
,
which
are
different
at
different
times
.
For
indeed
,
if
the
greatest
Force
of
Men
be
nothing
in
comparison
with
that
of
the
subtle
Matter
,
we
should
be
much
to
blame
to
believe
,
that
Diamonds
,
and
the
hardest
Stones
,
cannot
derive
their
Hardness
from
the
Compression
of
those
little
rapid
Bodies
which
environ
them
.
Now
we
may
visibly
discover
how
inconsiderably
weak
is
Humane
Force
,
if
it
be
consider'd
that
Man's
Power
of
moving
his
Body
in
so
many
manners
,
proceeds
from
a
very
moderate
Fermentation
of
the
Blood
,
which
somewhat
agitates
the
smaller
Parts
of
it
,
and
so
produces
the
Animal
Spirits
.
For
't
is
the
Agitation
of
these
Spirits
,
which
makes
the
Strength
of
the
Body
,
and
gives
us
the
Power
of
making
those
Endeavours
which
we
groundlesly
regard
,
as
something
great
and
mighty
.
But
it
must
be
observ'd
,
that
this
Fermentation
of
our
Blood
,
is
but
a
small
Communication
of
that
subtle
Matter
's
Motion
we
have
been
speaking
of
.
For
all
the
Fermentations
of
visible
Bodies
are
nothing
but
Communications
of
Motion
from
the
Invisible
,
since
every
Body
receives
its
Agitation
from
some
other
.
'T
is
not
therefore
to
be
wonder'd
if
our
Force
be
not
so
great
as
that
of
the
same
subtle
Matter
we
receive
it
from
.
But
if
our
Blood
fermented
as
much
in
our
Heart
as
Gun-Powder
ferments
,
and
is
agitated
when
Fire
is
put
to
it
;
that
is
,
if
our
Blood
receiv'd
as
great
a
Communication
of
Motion
from
the
subtle
Matter
,
as
Gun-Powder
receives
,
we
might
do
extraordinary
things
with
a
great
deal
of
Ease
;
as
break
a
Bar
of
Iron
,
overturn
an
House
,
&c.
provided
we
suppose
a
competent
proportion
between
our
Members
and
our
Blood
so
violently
agitated
.
We
must
therefore
rid
our selves
of
our
Prejudice
,
and
not
,
following
the
Impression
of
our
Senses
,
imagine
that
the
Parts
of
hard
Bodies
are
so
strongly
united
to
one
another
,
because
of
the
Difficulty
we
find
to
break
them
.
But
if
moreover
,
we
consider
the
Effects
of
Fire
in
Mines
,
the
Gravity
of
Bodies
,
and
several
other
natural
Effects
,
which
have
no
other
Cause
then
the
Commotion
of
these
insensible
Corpuscles
,
as
is
prov'd
by
M.
Des
Cartes
in
many
places
of
his
Works
,
we
shall
manifestly
discover
,
that
it
does
not
exceed
their
Force
,
to
unite
and
bind
together
the
Parts
of
hard
Bodies
so
powerfully
as
we
find
them
.
For
in
short
,
I
fear
not
to
affirm
,
that
a
Cannon-Bullet
,
whose
Motion
seems
so
extraordinary
,
receives
not
the
thousandth
part
of
the
Motion
of
the
subtle
Matter
which
surrounds
it
.
My
Assertion
will
not
be
doubted
of
,
if
it
be
consider'd
,
First
,
That
the
Gun-Powder
is
not
all
inflam'd
,
nor
at
the
same
instant
:
Secondly
,
That
though
it
were
all
on
Fire
in
the
self-same
Moment
,
yet
it
floats
a
very
short
time
,
in
the
subtle
Matter
;
and
Bodies
swimming
but
a
little
while
in
others
,
can
receive
no
great
Motion
from
them
;
as
may
be
seen
in
Boats
when
riding
in
a
Stream
,
which
receive
their
Motion
by
degrees
.
Thirdly
,
and
principally
,
That
each
part
of
the
Powder
can
receive
but
a
collateral
Motion
,
which
the
subtle
Matter
yields
to
.
For
Water
only
communicates
to
the
Vessel
the
direct
Motion
which
is
common
to
all
the
parts
of
it
,
which
Motion
is
generally
very
inconsiderable
in
respect
of
the
others
.
I
might
still
prove
to
M.
Des
Cartes's
Followers
,
the
Greatness
of
the
subtle
Matter
's
Motion
,
by
the
Motion
of
the
Earth
,
and
the
Heaviness
of
Bodies
;
from
whence
might
be
drawn
very
certain
and
exact
Proofs
,
if
that
were
necessary
to
my
Subject
.
But
in
order
to
have
one
sufficient
Proof
of
the
violent
Agitation
of
the
subtle
Matter
,
to
which
I
ascribe
the
Hardness
of
Bodies
,
it
suffices
(
without
seeing
Des
Cartes's
Works
)
to
read
attentively
what
I
have
written
in
the
second
Chapter
of
the
fourth
Book
,
towards
the
End
.
Being
now
deliver'd
from
our
Prejudices
,
which
induc'd
us
to
believe
our
Efforts
very
potent
,
and
those
of
the
subtle
Matter
which
surrounds
and
constringes
hard
Bodies
,
very
feeble
;
being
likewise
satisfied
of
the
vehement
Commotion
of
this
Matter
,
by
what
has
been
said
of
Gun-Powder
;
't
will
be
no
hard
Matter
to
discover
,
that
't
is
absolutely
necessary
that
this
Matter
,
acting
infinitely
more
on
the
Surface
,
than
the
Inside
of
the
hard
Bodies
it
encompasses
and
compresses
,
should
be
the
Cause
of
their
Hardness
,
or
of
the
Resistance
we
feel
when
we
endeavour
to
break
them
.
But
since
there
are
always
many
Parts
of
this
invisible
Matter
passing
through
the
Pores
of
hard
Bodies
,
they
not
only
render
them
hard
,
as
I
have
before
explain'd
;
but
are
also
the
Causes
that
some
are
springing
,
and
elastical
,
that
others
stand
bent
,
and
others
still
are
Fluid
and
liquid
;
and
in
short
are
the
Cause
not
only
of
the
Force
which
the
Parts
of
hard
Bodies
have
to
remain
close
by
one
another
;
but
of
that
likewise
which
the
parts
of
fluid
Bodies
have
to
separate
;
or
,
which
is
the
same
thing
,
are
the
Cause
of
the
Hardness
of
some
Bodies
,
and
the
Fluidity
of
others
.
But
whereas
't
is
absolutely
necessary
to
know
distinctly
the
Physicks
of
M.
Des
Cartes
,
the
Figure
of
his
Elements
,
and
of
the
parts
which
constitute
particular
Bodies
,
to
account
for
the
stiffness
of
some
and
the
flexibility
of
others
,
I
shall
not
insist
upon
explaining
it
.
Such
as
have
read
the
Works
of
that
Philosopher
,
will
easily
imagine
what
may
be
the
cause
of
these
things
;
whereas
it
would
be
a
difficult
task
for
me
to
explain
it
;
and
those
who
are
unaquainted
with
that
Author
would
have
a
very
confus'd
Notion
of
the
Reasons
I
might
offer
.
Nor
shall
I
stand
to
resolve
a
vast
number
of
Difficulties
which
I
foresee
will
be
urg'd
against
what
I
have
been
establishing
,
because
if
those
who
propose
them
have
no
knowledge
of
true
natural
Philosophy
,
I
should
but
tire
and
confound
them
instead
of
satisfying
them
.
But
if
they
were
Men
of
Science
,
I
could
not
answer
them
without
a
long
train
of
diagrams
and
reasoning
.
Wherefore
I
think
it
best
to
intreat
those
who
shall
find
any
Difficulty
in
what
I
have
said
,
to
give
this
Discourse
a
more
careful
perusal
;
not
doubting
but
if
they
read
it
and
consider
it
as
they
ought
,
all
their
Objections
will
fall
to
the
Ground
.
But
after
all
,
if
they
think
my
Request
inconvenient
,
let
them
sit
still
,
there
being
no
great
danger
in
the
Ignorance
of
the
Cause
of
the
Hardness
of
Bodies
.
I
speak
not
here
of
contiguity
:
for
't
is
manifest
that
contiguous
things
touch
so
little
,
that
there
's
always
a
good
quantity
of
subtle
Matter
passing
between
them
,
which
endeavouring
to
continue
its
Motion
in
a
right
Line
hinders
them
from
uniting
.
As
to
the
union
found
between
two
Marbles
that
have
been
polish't
one
upon
another
,
I
have
already
explain'd
it
;
and
't
is
easie
to
see
,
that
though
the
subtle
Matter
passes
constantly
between
the
two
parts
,
as
close
as
they
are
yet
the
Air
cannot
get
in
;
and
therefore
't
is
that
which
compresses
and
constringes
the
two
parts
together
,
and
makes
them
so
difficult
to
be
disunited
,
unless
we
glide
them
over
one
another
.
For
all
this
it
is
manifest
that
the
Continuity
,
Contiguity
and
Union
of
two
Marbles
would
be
one
and
the
same
thing
in
a
vacuum
:
for
neither
have
we
different
Ideas
of
them
,
so
that
it
would
be
to
talk
without
understanding
our selves
to
make
them
differ
absolutely
,
and
without
any
regard
to
the
surrounding
Bodies
.
I
now
come
to
make
some
Reflexions
upon
M.
Des
Cartes's
Opinion
,
and
the
Original
of
his
Errour
:
I
call
his
Opinion
an
Errour
,
because
I
can
find
no
sincere
way
of
defending
what
he
has
said
upon
the
Rules
of
Motion
,
and
the
Cause
of
the
Hardness
of
Bodies
towards
the
end
of
the
second
Part
of
his
Principles
in
several
places
;
and
that
he
seems
to
have
evidently
prov'd
the
Truth
of
the
contrary
Opinion
.
This
great
Man
most
distinctly
conceiving
that
Matter
could
not
naturally
move
it self
,
but
that
the
moving
Force
of
all
Bodies
was
nothing
but
the
general
Will
of
the
Author
of
Nature
;
and
that
therefore
the
Communications
of
their
Motion
upon
their
mutual
Collision
,
must
come
from
the
same
Will
,
yielded
to
be
carry'd
away
with
this
Notion
,
That
the
Rules
of
the
different
Communication
of
Motions
must
be
fetch'd
from
the
Proportion
found
between
the
different
Magnitudes
of
Colliding
Bodies
;
it
being
impossible
to
penetrate
into
the
Designs
and
Will
of
God
.
And
whereas
he
concluded
that
every
thing
had
the
Force
to
persevere
in
its
present
State
,
whether
it
were
in
Motion
,
or
Rest
,
because
God
,
whose
Will
constituted
this
Force
,
acts
always
in
the
same
manner
;
he
inferr'd
that
Rest
had
an
equal
Force
with
Motion
.
Thus
he
measur'd
the
Effects
of
the
Power
of
Rest
by
the
Greatness
of
the
Body
it
resided
in
,
as
well
as
those
of
Motion
:
And
hence
he
gave
the
Rules
of
the
Communication
of
Motion
which
are
seen
in
his
Principles
,
and
the
Cause
of
the
Hardness
of
Bodies
,
which
I
have
endeavour'd
to
refute
.
'T
is
a
hard
matter
not
to
submit
to
the
Opinion
of
Monsieur
des
Cartes
,
when
we
contemplate
it
on
the
same
side
:
For
,
once
more
,
since
the
Communication
of
Motions
proceeds
only
from
the
Will
of
the
Author
of
Nature
,
and
that
we
see
all
Bodies
continue
in
the
State
they
have
once
been
put
in
,
whether
it
be
Motion
or
Rest
,
it
seems
that
we
ought
to
seek
for
the
Rules
of
the
different
Communications
of
Motion
upon
the
Concourse
of
Bodies
;
not
in
the
Will
of
God
,
which
is
unknown
to
us
;
but
in
the
Proportion
that
is
found
between
the
Magnitudes
of
these
same
Bodies
.
I
do
not
therefore
admire
that
Monsieur
des
Cartes
should
light
upon
this
Notion
;
but
I
only
wonder
he
did
not
correct
it
,
when
having
push'd
on
his
Discoveries
,
he
found
out
the
Existence
,
and
some
Effects
of
the
subtile
Matter
which
surrounds
all
Bodies
.
I
am
surpriz'd
to
find
him
,
in
the
132d
Article
of
the
Fourth
Part
,
attribute
the
Elastick
Force
of
certain
Bodies
to
the
subtile
Matter
,
and
yet
not
ascribe
to
it
their
Hardness
,
and
the
Resistance
they
make
to
our
Endeavours
to
bend
and
break
them
;
but
only
to
the
Rest
of
their
Parts
.
Art.
55.
&
43.
of
the
second
Part
,
and
elsewhere
.
For
I
think
it
evident
,
that
the
Cause
of
the
Elasticity
and
Stiffness
of
some
Bodies
,
is
the
same
with
that
which
impowers
them
to
resist
the
Violence
that
is
us'd
to
break
them
:
For
indeed
,
the
Force
which
is
employ'd
in
breaking
a
piece
of
Steel
,
has
but
an
insensible
Difference
from
that
which
is
us'd
to
bend
it
.
I
mean
not
to
multiply
Reasons
here
,
which
one
might
give
for
the
proving
these
things
;
nor
to
answer
some
Difficulties
possible
to
be
urg'd
about
Bodies
which
are
not
sensibly
springing
,
and
yet
are
difficultly
bent
:
For
all
these
Difficulties
vanish
,
if
we
consider
that
the
subtile
Matter
cannot
easily
make
new
Tracks
in
Bodies
which
break
in
bending
,
as
in
Glass
and
temper'd
Steel
;
which
it
can
easier
do
in
such
Bodies
as
are
compos'd
of
branchy
Parts
,
and
that
are
not
brittle
,
as
in
Gold
and
Lead
:
And
Lastly
,
that
there
is
no
hard
Body
;
but
has
some
kind
of
Elaterium
.
'T
is
a
hard
matter
to
persuade
one's
self
that
Monsieur
des
Cartes
did
positively
believe
the
Cause
of
Hardness
to
be
different
from
that
which
makes
the
Elasticity
;
and
what
looks
most
likely
,
is
,
that
he
made
not
sufficient
Reflexion
on
that
matter
.
When
a
Man
has
for
a
long
time
meditated
on
any
Subject
,
and
is
well
satisfied
about
that
of
his
present
Enquiry
,
he
commonly
thinks
no
farther
on
it
;
he
believes
that
the
Conceptions
he
had
of
it
are
undeniable
Truths
,
and
that
it
is
needless
to
examine
them
any
more
.
But
a
Man
has
so
many
Things
in
him
which
disrelish
his
Application
,
provoke
him
to
precipitate
Judgments
,
and
subject
him
to
Errour
,
that
though
his
Mind
remains
apparently
satisfied
,
yet
it
is
not
always
well
instructed
in
the
Truth
.
Monsieur
des
Cartes
was
a
Man
,
like
us
:
No
greater
Solidity
,
Accuracy
,
Extent
,
and
Penetration
of
Thought
is
any
where
to
be
met
with
,
than
in
his
Works
,
I
confess
;
but
yet
he
was
not
infallible
:
Therefore
't
is
very
probable
he
remain'd
so
settl'd
in
his
Opinion
,
from
his
not
sufficiently
reflecting
that
he
asserted
something
in
the
Consequence
of
his
Principles
,
contrary
to
it
.
He
grounded
it
on
very
specious
and
probable
Reasons
;
but
such
notwithstanding
,
as
being
not
capable
of
themselves
to
force
his
Consent
,
he
might
still
have
suspended
his
Judgment
;
and
consequently
,
as
a
Philosopher
,
he
ought
to
have
done
it
.
It
was
not
enough
to
examine
in
a
hard
Body
,
what
was
in
it
that
might
make
it
so
;
but
he
ought
likewise
to
have
thought
on
the
invisible
Bodies
,
which
might
give
it
Hardness
;
as
he
did
at
the
End
of
his
Philosophical
Principles
,
when
he
ascrib'd
to
them
the
Cause
of
their
Elasticity
:
He
ought
to
have
made
an
exact
Division
,
and
comprehensive
of
whatever
might
contribute
to
the
Hardness
of
Bodies
.
It
was
not
enough
to
have
sought
the
Causes
of
it
in
the
Will
of
God
;
he
ought
also
to
have
thought
on
the
subtile
Matter
,
which
surrounds
these
Bodies
:
For
though
the
Existence
of
that
violently
agitated
Matter
was
not
yet
proved
in
the
place
of
his
Principles
where
he
speaks
of
Hardness
;
it
was
not
however
rejected
;
he
ought
therefore
to
have
suspended
his
Judgment
,
and
have
well
remember'd
that
what
he
had
written
concerning
the
Cause
of
Hardness
,
and
of
the
Rules
of
Motion
,
was
fit
to
be
revis'd
;
which
I
believe
was
neglected
by
him
;
or
at
least
,
he
has
not
sufficiently
consider'd
the
true
Reason
of
a
thing
very
easie
to
be
discover'd
,
and
which
yet
is
of
greatest
Consequence
in
Natural
Philosophy
.
I
thus
explain
my self
:
Monsieur
des
Cartes
well
knew
that
to
the
Support
of
his
System
,
(
the
Truth
of
which
he
could
not
reasonably
suspect
,
)
it
was
absolutely
necessary
that
great
Bodies
should
always
communicate
some
of
their
Motion
to
the
lesser
which
they
met
with
;
and
that
the
latter
should
rebound
at
the
Encounter
of
the
former
,
without
the
like
Loss
of
their
own
:
For
otherwise
,
the
first
Element
would
not
have
all
the
Motion
that
is
necessary
above
the
second
,
nor
the
second
above
the
third
;
and
so
all
his
System
would
be
absolutely
false
,
as
is
manifest
to
those
who
have
a
little
consider'd
it
.
But
in
supposing
that
Rest
has
Force
to
resist
Motion
,
and
that
a
great
Body
in
Rest
cannot
be
mov'd
by
another
less
than
it self
,
though
most
violently
striking
against
it
,
't
is
plain
that
great
Bodies
must
have
much
less
Motion
than
an
equal
Mass
of
little
ones
,
since
they
may
always
by
that
Supposition
communicate
their
own
Motion
,
but
cannot
always
receive
any
from
the
lesser
.
Thus
this
Supposition
being
not
contrary
to
all
that
Monsieur
des
Cartes
had
laid
down
in
his
Principles
,
from
the
beginning
,
to
the
Establishment
of
his
Rules
of
Motion
,
and
according
very
well
with
the
Consequence
of
these
same
Principles
,
he
thought
the
Rules
of
Motion
,
which
he
believ'd
he
had
demonstrated
in
their
Cause
,
were
sufficiently
confirm'd
by
their
Effects
.
I
agree
with
Monsieur
des
Cartes
in
the
Bottom
of
the
Thing
,
that
great
Bodies
communicate
their
Motion
much
easier
than
the
lesser
;
and
that
therefore
his
first
Element
is
more
agitated
than
the
second
,
and
the
second
than
the
third
;
but
the
Cause
is
manifest
without
recourse
to
his
Supposition
.
Little
and
fluid
Bodies
,
as
Water
,
Air
,
&c.
can
but
communicate
to
any
great
ones
an
uniform
Motion
,
which
is
common
to
all
their
Parts
.
The
Water
of
a
River
can
only
communicate
to
a
Boat
a
descending
Motion
,
which
is
common
to
all
the
little
Parts
the
Water
is
composed
of
;
each
of
which
Particles
,
besides
its
common
Motion
,
has
infinite
others
,
which
are
particular
.
Which
Reason
makes
it
evident
that
a
Boat
,
for
instance
,
cannot
have
so
much
Motion
as
an
equal
Volume
of
Water
,
since
the
Boat
can
only
receive
from
the
Water
a
direct
Motion
,
and
common
to
all
the
Parts
of
it
.
If
twenty
Parts
of
a
fluid
Body
drive
against
any
other
Body
on
one
side
whilst
there
are
as
many
urging
it
on
the
other
,
it
remains
immoveable
;
and
all
the
Particles
of
the
surrounding
Fluid
it
swims
in
,
rebound
without
losing
any
thing
of
their
Motion
.
Therefore
gross
Bodies
,
whose
Parts
are
united
one
to
the
other
,
can
receive
only
a
circular
and
uniform
Motion
from
the
Vortex
of
the
encompassing
subtile
Matter
.
This
Reason
seems
sufficient
to
give
us
to
understand
why
gross
Bodies
are
not
so
much
agitated
as
little
ones
;
and
that
it
is
not
necessary
to
the
explaining
these
things
,
to
suppose
any
Force
in
Rest
to
resist
Motion
.
The
Certainty
of
Monsieur
des
Cartes's
Philosophical
Principles
cannot
therefore
be
of
Use
in
proving
or
defending
his
Rules
of
Motion
.
And
we
have
Reason
to
believe
that
if
Monsieur
des
Cartes
himself
had
,
without
Prepossession
,
examin'd
his
Principles
afresh
,
at
the
same
time
weighing
such
Reasons
as
I
have
alledg'd
,
he
would
not
have
believ'd
the
Effects
of
Nature
had
corroborated
his
Rules
;
nor
have
fallen
into
a
Contradiction
,
in
attributing
the
Hardness
of
hard
Bodies
only
to
the
Rest
of
their
Parts
,
and
their
Elasticity
to
the
Effort
of
the
subtile
Matter
.
I
now
come
to
give
the
Rules
of
the
Communication
of
Motion
in
a
Vacuum
,
which
follow
upon
what
I
have
before
establish'd
concerning
the
Nature
of
Rest.
Bodies
being
not
hard
in
a
Vacuum
,
since
they
are
only
so
by
the
pressure
of
the
subtile
Matter
that
surrounds
them
,
if
two
Bodies
meet
together
,
they
would
flatten
without
rebounding
:
We
must
therefore
suppose
them
hard
by
their
own
Nature
,
and
not
by
the
pressure
of
the
subtile
Matter
,
to
give
these
Rules
.
Rest
having
no
Force
to
resist
Motion
,
and
many
Bodies
being
to
be
consider'd
but
as
one
at
the
Instant
of
their
Collision
,
't
is
plain
they
ought
not
to
rebound
,
save
when
they
are
equal
in
their
Bulk
and
Swiftness
,
or
that
their
Swiftness
compensates
for
the
Want
of
Bulk
,
or
their
Bulk
the
Want
of
Swiftness
.
And
't
is
easie
from
hence
to
conclude
,
that
they
ought
in
all
other
Cases
so
to
communicate
their
Motion
,
as
afterwards
to
proceed
along
together
,
with
an
equal
Pace
.
[
](A51674-e98010-b)*
*
General
Rules
of
the
Commuication
of
Motions
.
Wherefore
,
to
know
what
ought
to
happen
in
all
the
different
Suppositions
of
the
Magnitude
and
Celerity
of
Colliding
Bodies
,
we
need
only
add
together
all
the
Degrees
of
Motion
of
two
or
more
,
which
ought
to
be
consider'd
but
as
one
in
the
Moment
of
their
Concourse
,
and
afterwards
divide
the
Summ
of
the
whole
Motion
proportionably
to
the
Bulk
of
each
respective
Body
.
Hence
I
conclude
,
that
of
the
[
](A51674-e98030-b)†
†
See
M.
des
Cartes's
Rules
in
the
second
Part
of
his
Principles
.
seven
Rules
of
Motion
,
Monsieur
des
Cartes
has
given
,
the
three
first
are
good
.
That
the
Fourth
is
false
,
and
that
B
ought
to
communicate
its
Motion
to
C
,
in
proportion
to
the
bigness
of
the
same
C
,
and
after
go
along
in
Company
;
so
as
if
C
be
double
to
B
,
and
B
have
three
Degrees
of
Motion
,
it
must
give
away
two
of
them
:
For
I
have
sufficiently
prov'd
,
that
Monsieur
des
Cartes
ought
not
to
have
suppos'd
in
Rest
,
a
Force
to
resist
Motion
.
That
the
Fifth
is
true
.
That
the
Sixth
is
false
,
and
that
B
ought
to
communicate
half
of
its
Motion
to
C.
And
that
the
Seventh
is
false
,
and
that
B
ought
ever
to
communicate
its
Motion
to
C
,
in
proportion
to
the
Magnitude
and
Motion
of
both
B
and
C.
But
that
if
,
according
to
the
Supposition
,
C
be
double
to
B
,
and
have
three
Degrees
of
Motion
,
whilst
C
has
but
two
,
they
must
proceed
together
in
Company
,
C
and
B
being
but
one
Body
at
the
time
of
their
Collision
;
and
therefore
we
must
add
together
the
Degrees
of
Swiftness
,
which
are
five
,
and
afterwards
divide
them
in
proportion
to
their
bigness
,
and
so
distribute
1
3
3/2
2
to
B
,
and
3
⅓
to
C
,
which
is
double
to
B.
But
these
Rules
,
though
certain
,
from
what
I
have
said
,
are
yet
contrary
to
Experience
,
since
we
are
not
in
a
Vacuum
.
The
chief
of
those
Experiences
,
which
are
contrary
to
what
I
have
said
about
the
Rules
of
Motion
,
is
,
the
constant
rebounding
of
hard
Bodies
,
when
they
meet
,
one
one
way
,
and
another
another
;
or
at
least
,
their
not
going
in
Company
after
their
Encounter
.
In
Answer
to
which
,
we
must
call
to
mind
what
we
have
formerly
said
of
the
Cause
of
Elasticity
;
namely
,
That
there
is
a
Matter
,
of
a
strangely-violent
Motion
,
which
continually
passes
into
the
Parts
of
hard
Bodies
,
and
makes
them
so
by
its
compressing
both
their
outward
and
inward
Parts
:
For
it
will
be
easie
from
hence
to
see
,
that
at
the
time
of
Percussion
two
encountring
Bodies
drive
and
turn
off
the
Current
of
this
Matter
from
the
places
nearest
to
the
stricken
;
which
Matter
resisting
with
great
Violence
,
repells
the
two
Bodies
,
which
strike
against
each
other
,
and
restores
its
Passage
,
which
the
Percussion
had
stopp'd
up
.
That
which
more
clearly
still
proves
my
Opinion
is
this
,
That
if
two
Bowls
of
Lead
,
or
of
any
other
less
Elastick
Matter
,
meet
,
they
rebound
not
after
their
Collision
,
but
proceed
almost
according
to
the
Rules
before
establish'd
,
which
they
keep
to
so
much
more
exactly
as
they
are
less
springing
.
Bodies
therefore
rebound
after
their
Percussion
,
because
they
are
hard
;
that
is
,
as
I
have
explain'd
,
because
there
is
an
extremely
agitated
Matter
,
which
compresses
them
,
and
which
passing
through
their
Pores
with
an
extreme
Violence
,
repel
the
Bodies
which
strike
against
them
.
But
it
ought
to
be
suppos'd
that
the
Percutient
Bodies
break
not
those
which
they
dash
against
by
a
Motion
over-powering
the
Resistance
the
little
Parts
of
the
subtile
Matter
are
capable
of
making
;
as
when
we
discharge
a
Musket
against
a
piece
of
Wood.
'T
is
true
,
the
subtile
Matter
compresses
soft
Bodies
,
and
passes
with
a
rapid
Course
through
their
Pores
,
no
less
than
through
those
of
hard
;
and
yet
these
soft
Bodies
have
no
Elasticity
:
The
Reason
whereof
is
this
;
that
the
Matter
passing
through
soft
Bodies
,
can
with
a
great
deal
of
Ease
open
it self
new
Passages
,
by
reason
of
the
Minuteness
of
the
Parts
composing
them
,
or
of
some
other
particular
Configuration
,
proper
for
that
Effect
;
which
hard
Bodies
will
not
admit
,
by
reason
of
the
Largeness
and
Situation
of
their
Parts
,
which
are
contrary
to
the
same
.
Thus
when
a
hard
Body
strikes
another
that
is
soft
,
it
alters
all
the
Roads
the
subtile
Matter
us'd
to
pass
through
,
which
is
commonly
visible
;
as
in
a
Musket-Bullet
,
which
flattens
when
it
is
smitten
.
But
when
a
hard
Body
strikes
against
another
like
it
,
it
either
makes
none
,
or
very
few
new
Paths
;
and
the
subtile
Matter
in
its
Pores
is
oblig'd
to
return
upon
the
same
Ground
,
or
else
must
repel
the
Body
which
blocks
up
its
little
Avenues
.
Lastly
,
It
seems
evident
,
that
every
mov'd
Body
,
continually
endeavouring
to
tend
in
a
Right
Line
,
and
declining
from
it
as
little
as
is
possible
when
it
meets
Resistance
,
ought
never
to
rebound
,
since
by
that
Motion
it
extremely
deviates
from
a
Right
.
'T
is
necessary
therefore
,
either
that
Bodies
should
grow
flat
,
or
that
the
stronger
should
conquer
the
weaker
,
and
make
it
bear
it
company
:
But
because
Bodies
are
springing
,
and
hard
,
they
cannot
go
in
company
,
since
if
A
pushes
a
,
a
repels
A
;
and
so
they
must
recede
from
one
another
.
Notwithstanding
,
if
two
Bodies
were
in
a
Vacuum
,
though
never
so
hard
,
they
would
go
in
company
,
because
having
no
Body
to
surround
them
,
they
could
have
no
Elastick
Force
,
the
Striker
making
no
Resistance
to
the
Striking
;
but
Air
,
Gravitation
,
&c.
resisting
the
great
Motion
which
the
striking
Body
gives
the
stricken
,
the
stricken
resists
the
striking
,
and
hinders
it
from
following
:
For
Experience
teaches
us
,
that
Air
and
Gravity
resist
Motion
;
and
that
this
Resistance
is
so
much
greater
,
as
the
Motion
is
more
violent
.
'T
is
easie
to
discover
from
what
I
have
been
saying
,
how
it
comes
to
pass
,
that
in
the
Percussion
of
different
Bodies
,
encompass'd
with
Air
or
Water
,
&c.
sometimes
the
Smiting
rebounds
,
sometimes
communicates
all
its
Motion
,
and
remains
as
it
were
unmoveable
;
and
sometimes
it
follows
the
Smitten
,
but
always
with
less
Degrees
of
Swiftness
,
if
one
or
other
of
them
be
not
perfectly
soft
:
For
all
this
depends
on
the
Proportion
that
is
found
between
the
Magnitude
,
the
Hardness
,
and
the
Weight
of
one
and
the
other
,
supposing
them
mov'd
with
an
equal
Swiftness
:
If
they
are
very
hard
,
the
Smiting
rebounds
more
,
because
the
Elaterium
is
stronger
.
If
the
Smiting
is
very
little
,
the
Smitten
very
large
and
weighty
,
the
Smiting
rebounds
still
much
,
because
of
the
Weight
and
the
great
Mass
of
Air
surrounding
the
Smitten
,
which
withstands
the
Motion
.
Last
of
all
,
If
the
Force
of
the
Hardness
is
,
as
it
were
,
abated
by
the
little
Volume
of
Air
answering
the
Littleness
of
the
stricken
Body
,
or
the
contrary
;
it
may
happen
that
the
Smiting
may
remain
as
immoveable
after
the
Percussion
.
We
need
therefore
but
compare
the
Hardness
of
percutient
Bodies
,
and
the
Air
,
which
the
Percuss'd
ought
to
agitate
anew
at
the
time
of
Percussion
,
whereby
to
move
,
to
give
a
pretty
exact
Conjecture
concerning
what
must
happen
in
the
Percussion
of
different
Bodies
.
I
still
suppose
an
equal
Swiftness
in
the
striking
,
for
the
Air
more
resists
a
great
Motion
than
a
little
one
;
and
there
is
as
much
Motion
in
a
Body
twice
as
little
,
as
in
another
,
when
proceeding
twice
as
fast
as
that
other
.
Thus
the
Smitten
being
driven
as
fast
again
,
may
be
consider'd
as
having
a
Volume
of
Air
twice
as
big
,
to
repel
,
in
order
to
its
moving
.
But
it
ought
still
to
be
observ'd
,
that
at
the
Moment
of
one
Body's
striking
another
,
the
Parts
of
this
same
Body
have
two
contrary
Motions
;
for
those
on
the
Fore-side
have
a
backward
Tendency
,
by
reason
of
the
Collision
,
when
at
the
same
time
those
behind
tend
forwards
on
the
Account
of
the
first
Motion
;
and
't
is
that
Counter-motion
which
flattens
soft
Bodies
,
and
is
the
Cause
that
some
hard
Bodies
break
in
pieces
;
but
when
Bodies
are
very
hard
,
this
Counter-stroke
,
which
vibrates
some
of
the
Parts
,
and
makes
a
sort
of
Trepidation
in
them
,
as
appears
from
the
Sound
they
give
,
always
produces
some
Changes
in
the
Communication
of
Motion
,
which
are
very
difficult
to
be
known
,
for
many
Reasons
;
and
't
is
,
in
my
Mind
,
to
little
purpose
to
examine
them
in
particular
.
Would
a
Man
meditate
on
all
these
things
,
I
believe
he
would
easily
answer
some
Difficulties
which
might
still
be
rais'd
upon
the
Subject
;
but
if
I
thought
that
what
I
have
said
were
insufficient
to
shew
that
Rest
has
no
Force
to
resist
Motion
,
and
that
the
Rules
of
the
Communication
of
Motions
,
given
by
Monsieur
des
Cartes
are
in
part
false
,
I
would
here
make
out
that
it
is
impossible
by
his
Supposition
to
move
our selves
in
the
Air
:
And
that
which
makes
the
Circulation
of
Motion
in
Fluid
Bodies
possible
,
without
recurring
to
a
Vacuum
,
is
,
that
the
first
Element
easily
divides
it self
in
several
different
manners
,
the
Repose
of
its
Parts
having
no
Force
to
resist
Motion
.
The
CONCLUSION
of
the
Three
last
BOOKS
.
I
Have
,
if
I
mistake
not
,
sufficiently
shewn
in
the
Fourth
and
Fifth
Books
,
that
Men's
natural
Inclinations
and
Passions
frequently
occasion
their
falling
into
Errour
;
because
they
induce
them
more
to
a
precipitate
Judgment
,
than
a
careful
Examination
of
Things
.
I
have
shewn
in
the
Fourth
Book
,
that
our
Inclination
for
Good
in
general
,
is
the
Cause
of
the
Restlesness
of
the
Will
;
that
this
Restlesness
of
the
Will
puts
the
Mind
in
continual
Agitation
;
and
that
a
Mind
continually
agitated
,
is
utterly
unfit
for
the
Discovery
of
any
the
least
intricate
and
hidden
Truths
:
That
the
Love
of
new
and
extraordinary
Things
frequently
prepossesses
us
in
their
behalf
;
and
that
whatever
bears
the
Character
of
Infinite
,
is
capable
of
confounding
our
Imagination
,
and
mis-leading
us
.
I
have
explain'd
how
our
Inclination
for
Greatness
,
Elevation
and
Independency
insensibly
engage
us
in
a
falsly-pretended
Learning
,
or
in
the
Study
of
all
vain
and
useless
Sciences
,
which
flatter
the
secret
Pride
of
our
Heart
;
because
this
is
what
recommends
us
to
the
Admiration
of
the
Vulgar
.
I
have
shewn
,
that
the
Inclination
for
Pleasures
constantly
throws
off
the
View
of
the
Mind
from
the
Consideration
of
abstracted
Truths
,
which
are
the
most
simple
and
exuberant
;
and
permits
it
not
to
consider
any
thing
,
with
a
competent
Attention
and
Impartiality
,
to
judge
well
of
it
:
That
Pleasures
being
the
Modes
of
our
Souls
Existence
,
they
necessarily
divide
the
Capacity
of
the
Mind
;
and
that
a
Mind
thus
divided
,
cannot
fully
comprehend
a
Subject
of
any
great
Extent
.
Last
of
all
,
I
have
made
appear
,
that
the
Relation
and
Natural
Union
we
have
to
all
those
with
whom
we
live
and
converse
,
is
the
Occasion
of
many
Errours
we
fall
into
,
and
of
our
communicating
them
to
others
,
as
others
communicate
to
us
the
same
they
were
engag'd
in
.
In
the
Fifth
,
where
I
have
endeavour'd
to
give
some
Idea
of
our
Passions
,
I
have
,
I
think
,
made
it
sufficiently
evident
,
that
they
were
ordain'd
to
unite
us
to
all
things
sensible
;
and
to
give
us
,
as
we
are
among
them
,
a
due
and
necessary
Disposition
for
their
Preservation
and
our
own
:
That
as
our
Senses
unite
us
to
our
Body
,
and
expand
our
Soul
into
all
the
composing
Parts
of
it
;
so
our
Commotions
carry
us
,
as
it
were
,
out
of
our selves
,
and
diffuse
us
upon
all
things
round
about
us
:
That
,
Lastly
,
they
incessantly
represent
things
,
not
as
they
are
in
themselves
,
whereby
we
may
form
true
Judgments
;
but
according
to
the
Relation
they
have
to
us
,
whereby
to
form
Judgments
useful
to
the
Preservation
of
our
Being
,
and
of
those
to
whom
we
are
either
naturally
or
voluntarily
united
.
After
having
attempted
the
Discovery
of
Errours
in
their
Causes
,
and
the
Deliverance
of
the
Mind
from
the
Prejudices
it
is
subject
to
,
I
thought
it
was
time
at
last
to
prepare
it
for
the
Search
of
Truth
.
Wherefore
,
in
the
Sixth
Book
,
I
have
explain'd
the
Means
which
I
thought
most
natural
for
the
increasing
the
Attention
,
and
enlarging
the
Capacity
of
the
Mind
,
by
shewing
the
Use
that
might
be
made
of
its
Senses
,
its
Passions
,
and
Imagination
,
to
the
giving
it
all
the
Force
and
Penetration
it
is
capable
of
.
After
which
,
I
have
establish'd
certain
Rules
,
which
must
of
necessity
be
observ'd
for
the
Discovery
of
any
Truth
whatever
:
I
have
explain'd
them
by
many
Examples
,
that
I
might
make
them
more
sensible
;
and
have
chosen
those
which
I
thought
most
useful
,
or
that
included
more
fecund
and
general
Truths
;
that
they
might
be
read
with
greater
Application
,
and
be
made
more
sensible
and
familiar
.
Possibly
it
may
be
acknowledg'd
,
by
this
Essay
of
Method
which
I
have
given
,
how
necessary
it
is
to
reason
only
about
clear
and
evident
Ideas
,
and
in
which
we
are
inwardly
convinc'd
that
all
Nations
do
agree
;
and
never
to
proceed
to
Compound
Things
,
till
having
sufficiently
examin'd
the
Simple
,
whereon
they
depend
.
And
if
it
be
consider'd
that
Aristotle
and
his
Followers
have
not
observ'd
the
Rules
I
have
explain'd
,
as
we
ought
to
be
assur'd
by
the
Reasons
I
have
alledg'd
,
and
by
the
Correspondence
that
may
be
had
with
the
most
zealous
Defenders
of
that
Philosopher
,
it
may
be
we
shall
despise
his
Doctrine
,
in
spight
of
all
the
Impressions
which
persuade
such
as
give
way
to
be
amuz'd
by
Words
they
do
not
understand
.
But
if
we
take
notice
of
the
manner
of
Monsieur
des
Cartes's
Philosophizing
,
we
cannot
doubt
of
the
Solidity
of
his
Philosophy
:
For
I
have
sufficiently
shewn
that
he
reasons
but
upon
distinct
and
evident
Ideas
;
beginning
with
most
Simple
Things
,
and
afterwards
passing
on
to
the
more
Compound
,
which
depend
on
them
.
Those
who
shall
read
the
Works
of
that
Learned
Man
,
will
have
plenary
Conviction
of
what
I
say
of
him
,
provided
they
read
them
with
all
the
Application
that
is
necessary
to
understand
them
:
And
they
will
feel
a
secret
Joy
,
for
being
born
in
an
Age
and
Country
so
fortunate
,
as
to
free
them
from
the
Trouble
of
seeking
a
Master
to
teach
them
Truth
,
among
the
past
Ages
of
the
Heathens
;
and
in
the
Extremities
of
the
Earth
,
among
Barbarians
and
Strangers
.
But
as
we
ought
not
to
be
very
sollicitous
to
know
the
Opinions
of
Men
,
even
though
we
were
otherwise
assur'd
they
had
found
out
Truth
;
so
I
should
be
very
sorry
if
the
Esteem
I
manifest
for
Monsieur
des
Cartes
should
prepossess
any
Man
in
his
behalf
,
and
make
him
sit
down
satisfy'd
with
reading
and
retaining
his
Opinions
,
without
caring
to
be
enlighten'd
with
the
Light
of
Truth
.
This
would
be
preferring
Man
before
GOD
,
and
consulting
him
in
God's
stead
;
and
acquiescing
in
the
obscure
Answers
of
a
Philosopher
,
which
do
not
enlighten
us
,
to
avoid
the
Trouble
of
Interrogating
by
our
Meditation
Him
who
answers
and
enlightens
us
both
together
.
'T
is
a
mean
and
unworthy
thing
to
become
the
Partizan
of
any
Sect
,
and
to
look
upon
the
Authors
of
it
as
infallible
.
And
thus
Monsieur
des
Cartes
,
chusing
rather
to
make
Men
Disciples
of
Truth
,
than
Opinionated
Followers
of
his
Sentiments
,
expressly
forewarns
them
,
Not
to
take
any
thing
he
writes
upon
Trust
,
and
to
embrace
nothing
but
what
the
Force
and
Evidence
of
Reason
should
constrain
them
to
believe
.
He
desires
not
,
like
some
Philosophers
,
to
be
credited
upon
his
Word
:
He
ever
remembers
that
he
is
a
Man
;
and
that
disseminating
his
Light
but
by
Reflexion
,
he
ought
to
direct
the
Minds
of
those
who
would
be
illuminated
by
him
,
towards
Him
alone
who
can
make
them
more
perfect
by
the
Gift
of
Understanding
.
The
principal
Advantage
that
can
be
made
of
Application
to
Study
,
is
,
the
rendring
the
Mind
more
accurate
,
more
illuminated
,
more
penetrating
,
and
fit
for
the
Discovery
of
all
the
Truths
we
desire
to
know
.
But
such
as
read
the
Philosophers
,
with
Design
of
remembring
their
Opinions
,
and
factoring
them
to
others
,
approach
not
Him
who
is
the
Life
and
Nourishment
of
the
Soul
:
Their
Mind
grows
blind
and
enervate
,
by
their
Commerce
with
such
as
can
neither
strengthen
nor
enlighten
them
:
They
are
swell'd
up
with
a
spurious
sort
of
Learning
,
the
Weight
whereof
overwhelms
,
and
the
Glittering
blinds
them
;
and
fancying
to
themselves
they
are
hugely
learn●d
when
their
Heads
are
cramm'd
with
the
Opinions
of
the
Antients
,
they
forget
that
they
become
their
Disciples
who
,
St.
Paul
says
,
became
Fools
by
usurping
the
Name
of
Wise.
Dicentes
se
esse
Sapientes
,
stulti
facti
sunt
.
The
Method
I
have
given
will
,
if
I
mistake
not
,
be
highly
advantageous
to
those
who
desire
to
make
use
of
their
Reason
,
or
to
receive
of
God
the
Answers
he
gives
all
those
who
can
faithfully
consult
Him
:
For
I
think
I
have
said
what
is
chiefly
requir'd
to
corroborate
and
conduct
the
Attention
of
the
Mind
;
which
is
,
the
natural
Prayer
we
make
to
the
true
Master
of
all
Men
,
in
order
to
be
instructed
.
But
because
this
Natural
Way
of
Searching
out
Truth
is
very
painful
,
and
commonly
impracticable
,
except
in
the
Resolution
of
Questions
of
little
Use
,
the
Knowledge
whereof
commonly
more
gratifies
our
Pride
,
than
perfects
our
Understanding
;
I
think
it
my
Duty
to
say
,
(
that
I
may
profitably
conclude
this
Work
,
)
that
the
most
expeditious
and
certain
Method
of
discovering
Truth
,
and
uniting
our selves
to
God
in
the
purest
and
perfectest
manner
possible
,
is
,
to
live
as
becomes
true
Christians
;
to
follow
exactly
the
Precepts
of
Eternal
Truth
,
which
unites
it self
with
us
,
only
to
re-unite
us
with
it
:
'T
is
to
listen
rather
to
the
Dictates
of
our
Faith
,
than
Reason
;
and
to
tend
to
God
,
not
so
much
by
our
natural
Forces
,
which
,
since
the
Sin
,
are
altogether
languid
and
inactive
;
as
by
the
Assistance
of
Faith
,
by
which
alone
God
purposes
to
lead
us
into
that
immense
Light
of
Truth
which
will
dissolve
and
dissipate
all
our
Darkness
:
For
,
in
brief
,
't
is
much
better
,
as
good
Men
,
to
spend
some
Years
in
Ignorance
of
certain
Things
,
and
find
our selves
enlighten'd
in
a
Moment
,
for
ever
;
than
by
Natural
Means
,
and
abundance
of
Trouble
and
Application
,
purchase
a
very
imperfect
Science
,
that
shall
leave
us
in
Darkness
to
all
Eternity
.
ILLUSTRATIONS
UPON
THE
TREATISE
Concerning
the
SEARCH
after
TRUTH
.
THE
FIRST
ILLUSTRATION
UPON
THE
First
CHAPTER
of
the
First
BOOK
.
God
works
whatever
is
real
in
the
Motions
of
the
Mind
,
and
in
the
Determinations
of
them
;
notwithstanding
which
,
he
is
not
the
Author
of
Sin
.
He
works
whatever
is
real
in
the
Sensations
of
Concupiscence
,
and
yet
is
not
the
Author
of
it
.
SOME
Persons
pretend
that
I
relinquish
the
Comparison
of
the
Mind
and
Matter
too
soon
;
and
fansie
the
one
has
no
more
Power
than
the
other
to
determine
the
Impression
which
God
gives
it
;
and
therefore
wish
me
to
explain
(
if
I
can
)
what
it
is
that
God
works
in
us
,
and
what
we
do
our selves
,
when
we
sin
;
since
in
their
Opinion
,
I
shall
be
oblig'd
by
my
Explication
,
either
to
grant
that
Man
is
capable
of
giving
himself
some
new
Modification
,
or
to
acknowledge
that
God
is
actually
the
Author
of
Sin
.
I
answer
,
That
Faith
,
Reason
,
and
my
own
inward
Consciousness
,
oblige
me
to
quit
the
Comparison
where
I
do
;
being
every
way
convinc'd
,
that
I
have
in
my self
a
Principle
of
my
own
Determinations
,
and
having
Reasons
to
persuade
,
that
Matter
has
no
such
Principle
;
which
shall
be
prov'd
hereafter
:
Mean
while
here
is
what
God
operates
in
us
,
and
what
we
do
our selves
,
when
we
sin
.
First
,
God
continually
drives
us
,
by
an
invincible
Impression
,
towards
Good
in
general
.
Secondly
,
He
represents
to
us
the
Idea
of
a
particular
Good
,
or
gives
us
the
Sensation
of
it
.
Lastly
,
He
inclines
us
to
this
particular
Good
.
First
,
God
drives
us
continually
towards
Good
in
general
.
For
God
has
made
us
,
and
still
preserves
us
for
Himself
.
He
wills
that
we
shall
love
all
Good
,
and
is
the
first
,
or
rather
only
Mover
.
In
brief
,
this
is
evident
from
innumerable
things
that
I
have
said
elsewhere
,
and
those
I
speak
to
will
not
dispute
it
.
Secondly
,
God
represents
to
us
the
Idea
of
a
particular
Good
,
or
gives
us
the
Sensation
of
it
:
For
't
is
he
alone
that
enlightens
us
,
and
the
surrounding
Bodies
cannot
act
upon
our
Mind
.
In
a
word
,
we
are
neither
our
own
Light
,
nor
our
own
Felicity
,
as
I
have
proved
at
large
in
the
Third
Book
,
and
elsewhere
.
Lastly
,
God
inclines
us
to
this
particular
Good
:
For
God
inducing
us
to
all
that
's
Good
,
by
a
necessary
Consequence
,
inclines
us
to
particular
Goods
,
by
producing
the
Idea
or
Sensation
of
them
in
our
Mind
.
This
therefore
is
all
that
God
effects
in
us
when
we
sin
.
But
whereas
a
particular
Good
includes
not
in
it
all
Good
;
and
the
Mind
,
considering
it
with
a
clear
and
distinct
View
,
cannot
imagine
it
concludes
all
;
God
does
not
necessarily
and
invinsibly
incline
us
to
the
love
of
it
.
We
are
conscious
of
the
Liberty
we
have
to
stay
this
Love
,
and
of
our
Tendency
to
proceed
farther
:
In
a
word
,
we
feel
the
Impression
we
have
for
Good
Universal
:
or
,
to
speak
as
others
do
,
we
are
sensible
that
our
Will
is
not
under
any
constraint
or
necessity
to
fix
upon
this
particular
Good
.
So
then
this
is
what
the
Sinner
does
:
He
stops
,
he
rests
,
he
follows
not
the
Impression
of
God
,
he
does
nothing
:
For
Sin
is
Nothing
.
He
knows
that
the
grand
Rule
he
is
to
observe
is
to
employ
his
Liberty
so
far
as
it
will
go
;
and
that
he
is
not
to
fasten
upon
any
Good
,
unless
he
be
inwardly
convinc'd
it
would
be
offending
against
ORDER
,
to
refuse
to
stay
upon
it
.
If
he
discovers
not
this
Rule
,
by
the
light
of
his
Reason
,
he
learns
it
at
least
from
the
secret
Reproaches
of
his
Conscience
.
He
is
obliged
then
to
follow
the
Impression
he
receives
for
the
Universal
Good
;
and
to
think
of
other
Goods
besides
what
he
enjoys
,
and
what
he
is
only
to
make
use
of
:
For
't
is
by
thinking
on
other
Goods
besides
what
he
enjoys
,
that
he
can
produce
in
himself
new
Determinations
of
his
Love
,
and
make
use
of
his
Liberty
.
Now
I
prove
that
by
the
Impression
God
gives
him
for
Good
in
general
,
he
may
think
of
other
Goods
,
besides
that
of
his
present
Enjoyment
,
it
being
precisely
in
this
that
the
Difficulty
consists
.
See
the
6th
Chap.
of
Book
3.
and
its
Illustration
.
'T
is
a
Law
of
Nature
,
that
the
Ideas
of
Objects
should
offer
themselves
to
our
Mind
when
we
desire
to
think
of
them
,
provided
our
Capacity
of
Thought
be
not
fill'd
up
by
the
lively
and
confus'd
Sensations
we
receive
occasionally
from
the
Motions
in
our
Body
.
Now
we
can
Will
the
thinking
on
all
things
;
because
the
natural
Impression
which
carries
us
towards
Good
,
reaches
to
all
possible
Objects
of
our
Thought
:
And
we
can
at
all
times
think
on
all
things
;
because
we
are
united
to
Him
who
comprehends
the
Ideas
of
all
things
,
as
I
have
formerly
proved
.
If
it
be
true
then
that
we
can
Will
the
considering
nearly
,
what
we
already
see
as
afar
off
,
since
we
are
united
with
the
Universal
Being
;
and
if
it
be
certain
that
,
by
virtue
of
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
Ideas
approach
us
when
we
desire
it
;
we
ought
thence
to
infer
:
First
,
That
we
have
a
Principle
of
our
Determinations
.
For
't
is
the
actual
Presence
of
particular
Ideas
,
that
positively
determines
,
towards
particular
Goods
,
the
Motion
we
have
towards
Good
in
general
;
and
so
changes
our
Natural
Love
,
into
Free
and
deliberate
Loves
:
Our
Consent
,
or
Acquiescence
in
the
preception
of
a
Particular
Good
,
has
nothing
real
or
positive
in
it
on
our
Part
;
as
I
shall
explain
by
and
by
.
Secondly
,
That
the
Principle
of
our
Determinations
is
always
free
in
regard
to
particular
Goods
.
For
we
are
not
invincibly
inclin'd
to
love
them
;
since
we
can
examine
them
in
themselves
,
and
compare
them
with
the
Idea
which
we
have
of
the
Sovereign
Good
,
or
with
other
particular
Goods
.
Thus
the
Principle
of
our
Liberty
consists
in
this
,
that
being
made
for
God
,
and
united
to
him
,
we
can
always
think
on
the
true
Good
,
or
on
other
Goods
besides
those
which
our
Thoughts
are
actually
engag'd
on
.
But
this
,
on
supposition
that
our
Sensations
do
not
take
up
the
Capacity
of
our
Mind
.
For
to
the
end
we
may
be
free
with
the
Liberty
foremention'd
,
it
is
necessary
not
only
that
God
should
not
push
us
,
invincibly
,
to
particular
Goods
;
but
also
that
we
should
be
able
to
employ
our
Impression
for
Good
in
general
,
to
the
loving
other
Objects
than
those
we
love
at
present
.
But
as
those
only
can
be
the
actual
Objects
of
our
Love
,
which
can
be
of
our
Thoughts
;
and
that
we
cannot
actually
think
,
except
on
those
which
occasion
very
lively
Sensations
,
whilst
they
occasion
them
;
it
is
plain
,
that
the
dependance
we
have
upon
our
Body
weakens
our
Liberty
,
and
in
many
Junctures
,
quite
destroys
the
use
of
it
.
So
that
our
Sensations
obliterating
our
Ideas
;
and
the
Union
we
have
with
our
Body
,
whereby
we
discern
only
our selves
,
enfeebling
that
we
have
with
God
,
whereby
all
things
are
present
to
us
;
the
Mind
ought
not
to
give
way
to
be
shar'd
by
confus'd
Sensations
,
if
it
would
preserve
entire
the
free
Principle
of
its
Determinations
.
From
all
which
it
is
evident
,
that
God
is
not
the
Author
of
Sin
,
and
that
Man
endues
not
himself
with
any
new
Modifications
:
God
is
not
the
Author
of
Sin
;
because
he
continually
impresses
on
the
Sinner
,
who
stops
at
a
particular
Good
,
a
Motion
to
go
farther
;
gives
him
a
Power
of
thinking
on
other
things
,
and
tending
to
other
Goods
,
than
those
which
actually
engage
his
Thoughts
and
Affections
;
and
commands
him
not
to
love
whatever
he
can
refuse
to
love
without
inward
Disquiet
and
Remorse
:
withal
continually
recalling
him
to
his
God
,
by
the
secret
Reproaches
of
his
Reason
.
'T
is
true
that
in
one
sense
God
inclines
the
Sinner
to
Love
the
Object
of
his
Sin
;
if
this
Object
appears
Good
to
a
Sinner
:
for
as
most
Divines
say
,
whatever
there
is
of
a
positive
nature
of
Act
,
or
Motion
in
the
Sin
,
proceeds
from
God
.
But
't
is
only
by
a
false
Judgment
of
our
Mind
that
the
Creatures
seem
good
to
us
;
I
mean
capable
of
acting
in
us
,
and
making
us
happy
.
But
the
Sin
of
a
Man
consists
not
in
his
loving
a
particular
Good
;
for
every
Good
,
as
such
,
is
amiable
;
but
in
his
loving
only
this
Good
,
or
loving
it
as
much
or
more
than
another
that
is
greater
;
or
in
his
loving
a
Good
which
God
forbids
him
to
enjoy
;
for
that
the
Mind
being
subject
to
the
Body
,
See
the
Ilstration
upon
Ch.
3.
Part
2.
Book
6.
where
I
explain
my
meaning
more
distinctly
.
pursuant
to
the
Fall
,
the
Love
,
or
rather
the
Enjoyment
of
this
Good
,
would
encrease
his
Concupiscence
,
and
alienate
him
from
the
love
of
the
supreme
Good
.
In
a
word
,
the
Sin
of
Man
consists
in
his
not
referring
all
particular
Goods
to
the
supreme
:
or
rather
in
his
not
considering
and
loving
the
supreme
Good
in
all
the
particular
;
and
so
not
regulating
his
Love
by
the
WILL
of
GOD
,
or
according
to
essential
and
necessary
ORDER
,
of
which
all
Men
have
a
more
or
less
perfect
Knowledge
,
as
they
are
stricter
or
looser
united
to
God
;
or
are
more
or
less
Sensible
to
the
Impressions
of
their
Senses
and
Passions
.
For
our
Senses
import
our
Soul
into
our
whole
Body
;
and
our
Passions
,
as
it
were
,
export
it
to
circumambient
Objects
;
and
so
remove
us
from
the
Divine
Light
,
which
would
penetrate
and
illuminate
us
.
Nor
does
Man
give
himself
new
Modifications
:
For
the
Motion
of
Love
which
God
constantly
imprints
on
us
,
is
neither
augmented
nor
diminish'd
;
whether
we
do
or
do
not
actually
love
;
I
mean
,
whether
this
natural
Motion
of
Love
be
,
or
be
not
determin'd
by
some
Idea
of
our
Mind
.
Nor
does
this
Motion
cease
by
its
Acquiescence
in
the
Possession
of
Good
,
as
Motion
of
Bodies
ceases
by
their
Rest.
There
is
great
likelihood
that
God
pushes
us
at
all
times
alike
with
an
even
Force
towards
him
;
for
he
pushes
us
on
towards
Good
in
general
,
as
fast
as
we
are
capable
;
and
we
are
at
all
times
equally
capable
,
because
our
Will
,
or
our
natural
Capacity
of
Willing
,
is
always
equal
to
it self
.
Thus
,
I
say
,
the
Impression
,
or
natural
Motion
,
which
carries
us
towards
Good
,
never
encreases
or
diminishes
.
I
confess
we
have
no
clear
Idea
,
nor
indeed
inward
Sensation
of
the
Evenness
of
that
Impression
,
or
natural
Motion
towards
Good
:
But
this
comes
from
our
not
knowing
it
by
Idea
,
(
which
I
have
formerly
[
](A51674-e100950-b)*
*
See
the
7th
Chap.
of
the
3d
Book
▪
and
the
Illustration
upon
it
.
prov'd
,
)
and
from
our
not
being
conscious
of
our
Faculties
,
whilst
they
do
not
actually
operate
.
We
feel
not
what
is
natural
and
common
,
and
always
the
same
in
us
;
as
the
Heat
and
Beating
of
the
Heart
.
We
are
even
insensible
of
our
Habits
,
and
whether
we
are
deserving
of
the
Love
,
or
Wrath
of
God
[
](A51674-e100970-b)†
†
N●mo
scit
utrum
amore
,
vel
odio
dignus
scit
.
Eccl.
4.1
.
.
We
have
perhaps
infinite
Faculties
,
which
are
perfectly
unknown
to
us
:
For
we
are
not
inwardly
conscious
of
all
that
we
are
,
but
only
of
all
that
we
feel
.
Had
we
never
felt
Pain
,
nor
desir'd
particular
Goods
,
we
could
not
by
our
Self-Consciousness
,
have
told
whether
we
are
capable
of
feeling
Pain
,
or
of
willing
those
Goods
:
It
being
our
Memory
,
and
not
our
internal
Sense
,
which
teaches
us
we
are
capable
of
feeling
what
we
do
not
feel
;
or
of
being
mov'd
by
such
Passions
,
as
do
not
actually
agitate
us
.
There
is
nothing
therefore
that
can
hinder
our
believing
,
that
God
draws
us
towards
him
with
an
equal
Force
,
though
in
a
very
different
manner
;
and
that
he
preserves
in
our
Soul
an
equal
Capacity
of
willing
,
or
one
and
the
same
Will
,
as
he
preserves
in
Matter
,
collectively
taken
,
an
equal
quantity
of
Motion
.
But
though
this
should
not
be
certain
,
yet
I
can't
see
how
it
can
be
said
,
that
the
Augmentation
or
Diminution
of
the
Natural
Motion
of
our
Soul
depends
on
us
,
since
we
cannot
be
the
Cause
of
the
Extent
of
our
own
Will
.
It
is
moreover
certain
,
from
what
I
said
before
,
That
God
produces
and
preserves
in
us
all
that
's
real
and
positive
in
the
particular
Determinations
of
the
Motion
of
our
Soul
;
namely
,
our
Ideas
and
Sensations
:
For
this
it
is
which
determines
our
Motion
towards
Good
in
general
,
to
particular
Goods
,
but
not
in
an
irresistible
manner
,
because
we
have
a
tendency
to
go
farther
.
Hence
all
that
is
done
on
our
part
when
we
sin
,
is
our
not
doing
all
we
yet
have
the
power
to
do
,
by
means
of
our
impression
towards
Him
who
comprehends
all
Goods
;
for
all
our
Power
is
deriv'd
from
our
Union
with
Him
who
works
all
in
us
.
Now
the
principal
cause
of
our
sinning
is
,
that
preferring
Enjoyment
to
Examination
,
by
reason
of
the
Pleasure
accruing
to
our
Enjoying
,
and
the
Pain
attending
our
Examining
;
we
desist
to
employ
the
Motion
which
is
given
us
for
the
pursuit
and
disquisition
of
Good
;
and
we
dwell
upon
the
enjoyment
of
things
,
which
we
should
no
more
than
make
use
of
.
But
if
we
observe
the
Matter
nearly
,
we
shall
see
that
in
this
there
is
nothing
real
on
our
part
,
but
only
an
intermission
and
cessation
of
Enquiry
,
which
corrupts
,
as
I
may
say
,
the
Action
of
God
in
us
,
but
yet
can
never
destroy
it
.
So
then
,
when
we
do
not
sin
,
What
is
it
we
do
?
We
do
all
that
God
does
in
us
;
for
we
do
not
confine
to
a
particular
Good
,
or
rather
a
False
one
,
the
Love
which
God
impresses
on
us
for
the
True
.
And
when
we
sin
,
What
do
we
do
then
?
Nothing
.
For
we
love
a
false
Good
,
to
which
God
does
not
carry
us
by
an
irresistible
impression
;
we
cease
to
persue
the
true
Good
,
and
frustrate
the
Motion
God
gives
us
towards
it
[
](A51674-e101260-b)*
*
In
some
Editions
it
is
thus
:
But
we
love
a
particular
Good
:
True
;
but
Sin
consists
not
precisely
in
that
:
For
all
Good
is
amiable
,
and
ought
to
be
loved
.
Our
Love
is
in
it self
good
;
and
even
in
our
loving
that
particular
Good
,
we
follow
the
Impression
which
God
gives
us
.
Our
Sin
precisely
consists
in
our
fastening
upon
that
particular
Good
the
Impression
which
God
gives
us
to
love
all
Good
,
or
universal
Good
,
at
the
time
when
we
both
might
,
and
ought
to
love
it
.
Therefore
Sin
is
nothing
;
and
though
God
does
all
,
he
does
it
not
.
Now
whilst
,
&c.
.
Now
whilst
we
love
a
particular
good
only
,
or
against
ORDER
,
we
receive
as
great
an
impression
of
Love
from
God
,
as
if
we
did
not
fix
upon
it
.
Moreover
this
particular
Determination
,
which
is
neither
necessary
nor
invincible
,
is
given
us
of
God
;
and
therefore
in
sinning
,
we
produce
no
new
Modification
in
our selves
.
However
,
I
own
that
when
we
sin
not
,
but
resist
Temptation
,
we
may
be
said
in
one
sense
to
give
our selves
a
new
Modification
;
because
we
chuse
to
think
on
other
things
than
the
seeming
Goods
wherewith
we
are
tempted
.
But
all
that
we
then
do
,
is
produc'd
by
the
Action
which
God
puts
in
us
;
that
is
,
either
by
our
Motion
towards
Good
in
general
,
or
by
our
Will
assisted
by
Grace
;
I
mean
,
enlightned
by
Knowledge
,
and
forwarded
by
a
preventing
delectation
.
For
in
fine
,
If
the
willing
different
things
be
suppos'd
to
be
giving
different
Modifications
,
I
deny
not
but
in
this
Sense
,
the
Mind
may
diversly
modifie
it self
by
the
Action
it
receives
from
God
.
But
't
is
always
to
be
observ'd
,
that
this
Action
deriv'd
into
us
from
God
depends
upon
our selves
,
and
is
not
irresistible
,
with
respect
to
particular
Goods
.
For
upon
the
presentation
of
a
particular
Good
,
we
are
inwardly
conscious
of
our
Liberty
on
its
behalf
,
as
we
are
of
our
Pleasure
and
Pain
,
when
they
sensibly
affect
us
:
And
the
same
Reason
convinces
us
we
are
Free
,
that
convinces
us
we
Exist
;
for
't
is
the
inward
consciousness
or
feeling
of
our
own
Thoughts
,
that
give
us
to
know
we
have
a
Being
.
And
,
if
at
the
same
time
that
we
are
sensible
of
our
Liberty
,
with
respect
to
a
particular
Good
,
we
ought
to
doubt
of
it
,
for
want
of
having
a
clear
Idea
thereof
;
we
ought
no
less
to
doubt
of
our
Pain
,
and
our
Existence
at
the
time
of
our
Misery
,
since
we
have
no
clear
Idea
either
of
our
Soul
or
Pain
.
It
goes
quite
otherwise
with
our
inward
Sensation
or
Conscience
,
than
with
our
outward
Senses
.
The
latter
always
deceive
us
in
something
,
when
we
follow
their
reports
:
but
the
former
never
deceives
us
.
'T
is
by
the
outward
Senses
I
see
Colours
on
the
surface
of
Bodies
,
that
I
hear
Sound
in
the
Air
,
that
I
feel
Pain
in
my
Hand
;
and
their
Testimony
deceives
me
,
if
I
rely
upon
it
:
But
't
is
by
my
inward
Sensation
that
I
see
Colour
,
that
I
hear
Sound
,
that
I
suffer
Pain
;
and
I
err
not
in
believing
I
see
when
I
see
,
hear
when
I
hear
,
and
suffer
when
I
suffer
;
provided
I
stop
and
go
no
farther
.
These
things
are
too
self-evident
to
be
longer
insisted
on
.
Therefore
being
inwardly
conscious
of
our
Liberty
,
at
the
time
of
a
particular
Good
's
being
present
to
the
Mind
,
we
are
not
to
be
doubtful
of
our
Freedom
on
its
respect
.
But
whereas
this
inward
Sensation
is
sometimes
absent
from
our
Mind
,
and
we
consult
only
what
confus'd
remains
it
has
left
in
our
Memory
;
we
may
by
the
consideration
of
abstracted
reasons
,
which
keep
us
from
an
inward
feeling
,
persuade
our selves
that
't
is
impossible
for
Man
to
be
free
:
Just
as
a
Stoick
who
in
want
of
nothing
,
and
Philosophizing
at
his
Case
,
may
imagine
that
Pain
is
no
Evil
,
because
the
Internal
Sense
he
has
of
himself
,
does
not
actually
convince
him
of
the
contrary
;
and
so
he
may
prove
,
like
Seneca
,
by
reasons
in
one
sense
most
true
,
that
't
is
a
contradiction
for
the
wise
man
to
be
miserable
.
But
though
our
Self-consciousness
were
insufficient
to
convince
us
of
our
Freedom
,
yet
Reason
might
evince
as
much
:
For
since
the
light
of
Reason
assures
us
that
God
acts
only
for
himself
,
and
that
he
can
give
no
Motion
to
us
,
but
what
must
tend
towards
him
;
the
Impression
towards
Good
in
general
may
be
irresistible
;
but
't
is
plain
,
that
that
which
we
have
for
particular
Goods
must
be
necessarily
free
.
For
if
it
were
invincible
,
we
should
have
no
Motion
to
carry
us
to
God
,
though
he
gives
it
only
for
himself
;
and
we
should
be
constrain'd
to
settle
on
particular
Goods
;
though
GOD
,
ORDER
and
REASON
,
forbid
us
.
So
that
Sin
could
not
be
laid
at
our
door
,
and
God
would
be
the
real
Cause
of
our
Corruptions
;
forasmuch
as
we
should
not
be
Free
,
but
purely
Natural
,
and
altogether
necessary
Agents
.
Thus
though
inward
Sensation
did
not
teach
us
we
were
free
,
Reason
would
discover
it
was
necessary
for
Man
to
be
created
so
;
if
we
suppose
him
capable
of
desiring
particular
Goods
,
and
only
capable
of
desiring
them
through
the
Impression
or
Motion
which
God
perpetually
gives
us
for
himself
.
Which
likewise
may
be
prov'd
by
Reason
.
But
our
capacity
to
suffer
Pain
cannot
be
prov'd
this
way
;
but
can
only
be
discover'd
by
Conscience
,
or
inward
Sensation
;
and
yet
no
Man
can
doubt
but
a
Man
is
liable
to
suffer
Pain
.
As
we
know
not
our
Soul
by
any
clear
Idea
we
have
of
it
,
as
I
have
before
explain'd
,
so
't
is
in
vain
to
try
to
discover
what
it
is
in
us
that
terminates
the
Action
which
God
impresses
,
or
that
yields
to
be
conquer'd
by
a
resistible
Determination
,
and
which
we
may
change
by
our
Will
,
or
by
our
Impression
towards
all
Good
,
and
our
Union
with
him
,
who
includes
the
Ideas
of
all
Beings
.
For
in
short
,
we
have
no
clear
Idea
of
any
Modification
of
our
Soul
:
Nothing
but
our
Internal
Sense
can
teach
us
that
we
are
,
and
what
we
are
:
and
this
only
must
be
consulted
to
convince
us
we
are
free
.
And
its
Answers
are
clear
,
and
satisfactory
enough
upon
the
Point
,
when
we
actually
propose
to
our selves
any
particular
Good
;
for
no
Man
whatever
can
doubt
whether
he
be
invinsibly
inclin'd
to
eat
of
a
Fruit
,
or
avoid
some
slight
inconsiderable
Pain
.
But
if
instead
of
hearkning
to
our
Inward
Sensation
,
we
attend
to
abstracted
Reasons
,
which
throw
us
off
the
Contemplation
of
our selves
,
possibly
losing
sight
of
them
,
we
may
forget
that
we
are
in
Being
;
and
trying
to
reconcile
the
prescience
of
God
,
and
his
absolute
power
over
us
,
with
our
Liberty
,
we
shall
plunge
into
an
Errour
that
will
overturn
all
the
Principles
of
Religion
and
Morality
.
I
produce
here
an
Objection
which
is
usually
made
against
what
I
have
been
saying
,
which
though
but
very
weak
and
defective
,
is
strong
enough
to
give
a
great
many
trouble
to
evade
.
The
Hating
of
God
,
say
they
,
is
an
Action
which
does
not
partake
of
Good
;
and
therefore
is
all
the
Sinner's
,
God
having
no
part
in
it
:
And
consequently
Man
acts
and
gives
himself
new
Modifications
,
by
an
action
which
does
not
come
from
God
.
I
Answer
,
That
Sinners
hate
not
God
,
but
because
they
freely
and
falsly
judge
that
he
is
Evil
;
for
Good
,
consider'd
as
such
,
cannot
be
the
Object
of
Hatred
.
Therefore
they
hate
God
with
that
very
Motion
of
Love
he
influences
them
with
towards
Good
.
Now
the
Reason
why
they
conclude
he
is
not
Good
,
is
their
making
an
undue
use
of
their
Liberty
;
for
being
not
convinc'd
with
irresistible
Evidence
that
he
is
not
Good
,
they
ought
not
to
believe
him
Evil
,
nor
consequently
to
hate
him
.
In
Hatred
two
things
may
be
distinguish'd
,
viz.
the
Sensation
of
the
Soul
,
and
Motion
of
the
Will
.
This
Sensation
cannot
be
Evil
;
for
it
is
a
Modification
of
the
Soul
,
and
has
neither
Moral
Good
nor
Ill
in
it
.
Nor
is
the
Motion
more
corrupt
,
since
it
is
not
distinguishable
from
that
of
Love
.
For
External
Evil
being
only
the
privation
of
Good
,
't
is
manifest
,
that
to
fly
Evil
,
is
to
fly
the
privation
of
Good
,
that
is
,
to
pursue
Good
.
Wherefore
all
that
is
real
and
positive
,
even
in
our
Hatred
of
God
himself
,
has
nothing
Evil
in
it
;
and
the
Sinner
cannot
hate
God
,
without
an
abominable
abuse
of
the
action
which
God
incessantly
gives
to
incline
him
to
the
Love
of
Him
.
God
works
whatever
is
real
in
the
Sensations
of
Concupiscence
,
and
yet
is
not
the
Author
of
Concupiscence
.
This
Illustration
relates
to
the
fifth
Chapter
of
the
first
Book
of
the
Search
.
AS
the
Difficulties
that
are
rais'd
about
Concupiscence
,
are
near
akin
to
those
before
explain'd
;
I
think
it
convenient
to
shew
,
that
God
is
not
the
Author
of
Concupiscence
,
though
it
be
he
that
works
all
in
us
,
even
in
the
production
of
sensible
Pleasure
.
It
ought
,
I
think
to
be
granted
for
the
Reasons
produc'd
in
the
Fifth
Chapter
of
the
First
Book
of
the
preceding
Treatise
,
and
elsewhere
,
that
by
the
natural
Laws
of
the
Union
of
the
Soul
and
Body
,
Man
,
even
before
the
Fall
,
was
inclin'd
by
preventing
Pleasures
to
the
use
of
sensible
Goods
;
and
that
as
often
as
such
and
such
Traces
were
delineated
in
the
principal
part
of
his
Brain
,
such
and
such
Thoughts
arose
in
his
Mind
.
Now
those
Laws
were
most
Proper
and
Equitable
,
for
the
Reasons
I
there
have
given
:
Which
being
suppos'd
,
as
before
the
Trangressions
all
things
were
perfectly
well
order'd
,
so
Man
had
necessarily
that
Power
over
his
Body
,
as
that
he
could
prevent
the
production
of
these
Traces
when
he
would
;
Order
requiring
that
his
Mind
should
have
the
Dominion
over
his
Body
:
Which
Power
of
his
Mind
precisely
consisted
in
this
,
that
according
to
its
different
Desires
and
Applications
,
it
stopt
the
Communication
of
Motions
which
were
produc'd
in
his
own
Body
by
circumambient
Objects
,
over
which
his
Will
had
not
an
immediate
and
direct
Authority
,
as
over
his
proper
Body
:
And
it
cannot
,
I
think
,
be
conceiv'd
how
he
could
hinder
the
Formation
of
the
Traces
in
his
Brain
any
other
way
.
Therefore
the
Will
of
God
,
or
the
general
Law
of
Nature
,
which
is
the
true
Cause
of
the
Communication
of
Motions
,
depended
on
some
occasions
,
upon
the
Will
of
Adam
:
For
God
had
that
consideration
for
him
;
that
he
produc'd
not
without
his
consent
new
Motions
in
his
Body
,
or
at
least
in
the
principal
part
to
which
his
Soul
was
immediately
uni●ed
.
Such
was
the
Institution
of
Nature
before
the
Sin
.
ORDER
would
have
it
so
;
and
consequently
HE
whose
essential
and
necessary
Will
is
always
conformable
to
ORDER
.
Which
Will
remaining
immutably
the
same
,
the
Establish'd
Order
was
subverted
by
the
first
Man's
Disobedience
;
because
for
the
demerits
of
his
Sin
,
it
was
consonant
to
Order
,
that
he
should
be
Lord
of
nothing
.
It
is
not
reasonable
that
the
Sinner
should
suspend
the
Communication
of
Motions
,
that
the
Will
of
God
should
conform
to
his
;
In
the
Objection
to
the
Article
of
the
Illustration
upon
the
seventh
Chapter
of
the
second
Book
,
I
explain
what
I
here
say
in
general
of
the
loss
of
Power
,
Man
had
over
his
Body
.
or
that
any
exceptions
should
be
made
to
the
Law
of
Nature
on
his
Behalf
:
In
so
much
that
Man
is
subject
to
Concupiscence
,
his
Mind
depends
on
his
Body
;
he
feels
in
himself
indeliberate
Pleasures
,
and
involuntary
and
rebellious
Motions
,
pursuant
to
that
most
just
and
exact
Law
which
unites
the
two
Parts
of
which
he
is
compos'd
.
Thus
the
formal
Reason
of
Concupiscence
,
no
less
than
that
of
Sin
,
is
nothing
real
and
positive
;
being
no
more
in
Man
,
than
the
loss
of
the
Power
he
had
to
wave
,
and
suspend
to
the
Communication
of
Motions
on
some
occasions
:
Nor
are
we
to
admit
any
positive
Will
in
God
to
produce
it
.
For
this
loss
which
Man
has
sustain'd
,
was
not
a
consequence
of
Order
,
or
of
the
immutable
Will
of
God
,
which
never
swerves
from
it
,
and
is
constantly
the
same
;
but
only
a
consequence
of
Sin
,
which
has
rendred
Man
unworthy
of
an
Advantage
due
only
to
his
Innocence
and
Uprightness
.
Wherefore
we
may
say
,
that
not
God
,
but
Sin
only
,
has
been
the
Cause
of
Concupiscence
.
Nevertheless
,
God
Works
all
that
is
Real
and
Positive
in
the
Sensations
and
Motions
of
Concupiscence
;
for
God
does
every
thing
:
but
all
that
has
nothing
of
Evil.
'T
is
by
the
general
Law
of
Nature
,
that
is
,
by
the
Will
of
God
,
that
sensible
Objects
produce
in
Man's
Body
certain
Motions
,
and
that
these
Motions
raise
in
the
Soul
certain
Sensations
,
useful
to
the
preservation
of
the
Body
,
or
the
Porpagation
of
the
Species
.
Who
then
dare
presume
to
say
these
things
are
not
good
in
themselves
?
I
know
it
is
said
that
Sin
is
the
Cause
of
certain
Pleasures
.
But
do
they
that
say
it
,
conceive
it
?
Can
it
be
thought
that
Sin
,
which
is
nothing
,
should
actually
produce
something
?
Can
nothing
be
suppos'd
to
be
a
(
real
)
Cause
.
However
't
is
so
said
:
but
possibly
for
want
of
taking
due
pains
of
seriously
considering
what
they
say
;
or
because
they
are
unwilling
to
enter
on
an
Explication
that
is
contrary
to
the
Discourses
they
have
heard
from
Men
,
who
,
it
may
be
,
talk
with
more
Gravity
and
Assurance
,
than
Reflexion
and
Knowledge
.
Sin
is
the
Cause
of
Concupiscence
,
but
not
of
Pleasure
;
as
Free
Will
is
the
Cause
of
Sin
,
though
not
of
the
natural
Motion
of
the
Soul
.
The
Pleasure
of
the
Soul
is
good
,
as
well
as
its
Motion
or
Love
:
and
there
is
nothing
good
but
what
God
does
.
The
Rebellion
of
the
Body
,
and
the
guilt
of
Pleasure
,
proceed
from
Sin
:
As
the
Adherency
of
the
Soul
to
a
particular
Good
,
or
its
Rest
,
proceeds
from
the
Sinner
:
But
these
are
only
Privations
and
Nothings
,
whereof
the
Creature
is
capable
.
Every
Pleasure
is
Good
,
and
likewise
in
some
measure
makes
happy
the
Possessour
,
at
least
for
the
time
of
the
Enjoyment
:
But
it
may
be
said
to
be
evil
;
because
instead
of
elevating
the
Mind
to
Him
that
is
the
true
Cause
of
it
,
through
the
Errour
of
our
Intellectual
,
and
corruption
of
our
Moral
Part
,
it
prostrates
it
before
sensible
Objects
,
that
only
seem
to
produce
it
.
Again
it
is
evil
,
in
as
much
as
it
is
Injustice
in
us
who
are
Sinners
;
and
consequently
meriting
rather
to
be
punish'd
than
rewarded
,
to
oblige
God
pursuant
to
his
(
Primitive
)
Will
,
to
recompense
us
with
pleasant
Sensations
.
In
a
word
(
not
to
repeat
here
what
I
have
said
in
other
places
)
it
is
evil
,
because
God
at
present
forbids
it
,
by
Reason
of
its
alienating
the
Mind
from
himself
,
for
whom
he
hath
made
and
preserves
it
.
For
that
which
was
ordain'd
by
God
to
preserve
Righteous
Man
in
his
Innocence
,
now
fixes
sinful
Man
in
his
Sin
;
and
the
Sensations
of
Pleasure
,
which
he
wisely
establish'd
as
the
easiest
and
most
obvious
Expedients
to
teach
Man
,
(
without
calling
off
his
Reason
from
his
true
Good
,
)
whether
he
ought
to
unite
himself
with
the
invironing
Bodies
;
at
present
fill
the
Capacity
of
his
Mind
,
and
fasten
him
on
Objects
incapable
of
acting
in
him
,
and
infinitely
below
him
;
because
he
looks
upon
these
Objects
to
be
the
true
Causes
of
the
Happiness
he
enjoys
occasionally
from
them
.
THE
SECOND
ILLUSTRATION
UPON
THE
First
CHAPTER
of
the
First
BOOK
;
Where
I
say
,
That
the
Will
cannot
diversly
determine
its
Propensity
to
Good
,
but
by
commanding
the
Vnderstanding
to
represent
to
it
some
particular
Object
.
IT
must
not
be
imagin'd
that
the
Will
commands
the
Understanding
any
other
Way
than
by
its
Desires
and
Motions
,
there
being
no
other
Action
of
the
Will
:
nor
must
it
be
believ'd
that
the
Understanding
obeys
the
Will
,
by
producing
in
it self
the
Ideas
of
Things
which
the
Soul
desires
;
for
the
Understanding
acts
not
at
all
,
but
only
receives
Light
,
or
the
Ideas
of
Things
,
through
its
necessary
Union
with
Him
who
comprehends
all
Beings
in
an
intelligible
manner
,
as
is
explain'd
in
the
[
](A51674-e102790-b)*
*
See
the
Illustration
upon
the
6
●h
Chapter
of
Part
II.
Book
III.
Third
Book
.
Here
then
is
all
the
Mystery
;
Man
participates
of
the
Sovereign
Reason
,
and
Truth
displays
it self
to
him
proportionably
to
his
Application
,
and
his
praying
to
it
.
Now
the
Desire
of
the
Soul
is
a
Natural
Prayer
,
that
is
always
heard
;
it
being
a
natural
Law
,
that
Ideas
should
be
so
much
readier
,
and
more
present
to
the
Mind
,
as
the
Will
is
more
earnest
in
desiring
them
.
Thus
,
provided
our
Thinking
Capacity
,
or
Understanding
,
be
not
clogg'd
and
fill'd
up
by
the
confus'd
Sensations
we
receive
occasionally
from
the
Motions
occurring
in
our
Body
,
we
should
no
sooner
desire
to
think
on
any
Object
,
but
its
Idea
would
be
always
present
to
our
Mind
;
which
Idea
,
Experience
witnessing
,
is
so
much
more
present
and
clear
,
as
our
Desire
is
more
importunate
,
and
our
confus'd
Sensations
,
furnish'd
to
us
by
the
Body
,
less
forcible
and
applicative
,
as
I
have
said
in
the
foregoing
Illustration
.
Therefore
,
in
saying
that
the
Will
commands
the
Understanding
to
represent
to
it
some
particular
Object
,
I
meant
no
more
than
that
the
Soul
,
willing
to
consider
that
Object
with
Attention
,
draws
near
it
by
her
Desire
;
because
this
Desire
,
consequently
to
the
efficacious
Wills
of
God
,
which
are
the
inviolable
Laws
of
Nature
,
is
the
Cause
of
the
Presence
and
Clearness
of
the
Idea
that
represents
the
Object
.
I
could
not
at
that
time
speak
otherwise
than
I
did
,
nor
explain
my self
as
I
do
at
present
,
as
having
not
yet
prov'd
God
the
sole
Author
of
our
Ideas
,
and
our
particular
Volitions
only
the
occasional
Causes
of
them
.
I
spoke
according
to
the
common
Opinion
,
as
I
have
been
frequently
oblig'd
to
do
,
because
all
cannot
be
said
at
once
:
The
Reader
ought
to
be
equitable
,
and
give
Credit
for
some
time
,
if
he
would
have
Satisfaction
;
for
none
but
Geometricians
pay
always
down
in
hand
.
THE
ILLUSTRATION
UPON
THE
Third
CHAPTER
of
the
First
BOOK
;
Where
I
say
,
That
Mysteries
of
Faith
being
of
a
Supernatural
Order
,
we
need
not
wonder
if
we
want
the
Evidence
,
since
we
want
the
Ideas
of
them
.
WHen
I
say
that
we
have
no
Ideas
of
the
Mysteries
of
Faith
,
it
is
visible
from
the
foregoing
and
following
Discourse
,
that
I
speak
but
of
clear
Ideas
,
which
are
productive
of
Light
and
Evidence
,
and
which
give
us
a
Comprehension
of
the
Object
,
if
we
may
be
allow'd
so
to
speak
.
I
grant
that
a
Peasant
could
not
believe
,
for
Example
,
that
the
Son
of
God
was
made
Man
,
or
that
there
were
Three
Persons
in
the
Godhead
,
if
he
had
no
Idea
of
the
Union
of
the
WORD
with
our
Humanity
,
and
no
Notion
of
Person
.
But
if
these
Ideas
were
clear
,
we
might
by
considering
them
,
perfectly
comprehend
these
Mysteries
,
and
explain
them
to
others
;
and
so
they
would
be
no
longer
ineffable
Mysteries
.
The
Word
Person
has
,
as
[
](A51674-e103130-b)*
*
Ne
omnino
taceremus
interrogati
quid
▪
tres
cum
tres
esse
fateamur
;
S.
Aust.
de
Trin.
lib.
7.
cap.
4.
And
in
another
place
,
Cum
quaeritur
quid
tres
?
Magna
prorsus
inopia
humanum
laborat
Eloquium
.
Dictum
est
tamen
tres
personae
non
ut
illud
diceretur
,
sed
ne
taceretur
.
Ibid.
lib.
5.
cap.
9.
St.
Austin
says
,
been
apply'd
to
the
Father
,
Son
and
Holy
Ghost
,
not
so
much
to
express
distinctly
what
they
are
,
as
not
to
be
silent
upon
a
Mystery
whereof
we
are
oblig'd
to
speak
.
I
say
here
that
we
have
no
Ideas
of
our
Mysteries
,
as
I
said
elsewhere
we
have
no
Idea
of
our
Soul
;
because
the
Idea
we
have
of
the
latter
is
no
clearer
than
those
we
have
of
the
former
:
Therefore
the
Word
Idea
is
equivocal
;
sometimes
I
have
taken
it
for
whatever
represents
to
the
Mind
any
Object
,
whether
clearly
,
or
confus'd
and
darkly
;
sometimes
more
generally
,
for
whatever
is
the
immediate
Object
of
the
Mind
;
sometimes
likewise
for
that
which
represents
Things
so
clearly
to
the
Mind
,
that
we
may
with
a
bare
Perception
discover
whether
such
or
such
Modifications
do
belong
to
them
.
For
this
Reason
I
have
sometimes
said
we
[
](A51674-e103270-b)*
*
Chap.
10.
Book
I.
had
an
Idea
of
the
Soul
,
and
sometimes
deny'd
it
;
[
](A51674-e103300-b)†
†
See
Ch.
7.
Book
III.
and
its
Illustration
.
for
't
is
difficult
,
and
often
wearisom
and
ungrateful
to
observe
a
too
vigorous
Exactness
in
one's
Expressions
.
When
an
Author
contradicts
himself
but
in
the
Opinion
of
his
Criticks
,
or
such
as
would
fain
have
him
do
it
,
he
ought
not
to
be
much
concern'd
at
it
;
and
if
he
would
satisfie
by
tedious
Explications
whatever
the
Malice
or
Ignorance
of
Men
might
object
to
him
,
he
would
not
only
compose
an
ill
Book
,
but
all
his
Readers
would
be
disgusted
with
the
Answers
he
gave
to
Objections
,
either
imaginary
,
or
contrary
to
that
equitable
Temper
which
all
the
World
pretends
to
;
for
a
Man
cannot
endure
to
be
suspected
either
of
Malice
or
Ignorance
;
nor
is
it
allowable
to
answer
weak
or
invidious
Objections
for
the
most
part
,
except
when
there
are
Men
that
have
urg'd
them
,
and
so
have
skreen'd
the
Reader
from
the
Reproach
which
such
Answers
seem
to
asperse
on
those
that
demand
them
.
THE
ILLUSTRATION
On
these
Words
of
the
Fifth
CHAPTER
of
the
First
BOOK
,
This
being
the
Case
,
it
ought
to
be
concluded
that
Adam
was
not
invited
to
the
Love
of
God
,
and
the
rest
of
his
Duty
,
by
a
preventing
Pleasure
;
forasmuch
as
the
Knowledge
which
he
had
of
God
,
as
of
his
Good
,
and
the
Joy
he
was
continually
possess'd
with
,
necessarily
consequent
to
the
View
of
his
Felicity
in
his
uniting
himself
with
God
,
were
sufficient
Motives
to
recommend
his
Duty
to
him
,
and
to
make
his
Actions
more
meritorious
than
if
he
had
been
,
as
it
were
,
determin'd
by
a
preventing
Pleasure
.
IN
order
to
our
distinct
understanding
all
this
,
it
must
be
known
that
we
are
determin'd
to
act
from
only
Knowledge
and
Pleasure
;
for
whenever
we
begin
to
love
an
Object
,
't
is
from
our
discovering
by
Reason
that
it
is
good
,
or
feeling
by
Pleasure
that
it
is
agreeable
.
But
there
is
great
difference
between
Knowledge
and
Pleasure
:
Knowledge
enlightens
our
Mind
,
and
manifests
the
Good
,
but
does
not
actually
and
efficatiously
incline
us
to
the
loving
it
;
whereas
Pleasure
effectually
drives
and
determines
us
to
love
the
Object
that
seems
to
cause
it
.
Knowledge
,
or
Light
,
does
not
induce
us
of
it self
;
but
leaving
us
wholly
to
our selves
,
lets
us
freely
determine
our
own
Motion
to
the
Good
which
it
presents
:
Pleasure
,
on
the
contrary
,
anticipates
our
Reason
,
interrupts
us
from
consulting
it
,
leaves
us
not
to
our
own
Conduct
,
and
weakens
our
Liberty
.
Therefore
,
as
Adam
had
before
his
Fall
,
a
Time
appointed
to
merit
Eternal
Happiness
,
and
had
a
full
and
perfect
Liberty
to
that
intent
;
and
as
his
Light
was
sufficient
to
hold
him
closely
united
to
God
,
whom
he
already
lov'd
by
the
natural
Tendency
of
his
Soul
;
he
ought
not
to
be
carry'd
to
his
Duty
by
preventing
Ple●sures
,
which
would
have
lessen'd
his
Merit
by
lessening
his
Liberty
.
Adam
might
have
had
some
sort
of
Right
to
complain
of
God
,
if
he
had
hinder'd
him
from
meriting
his
Reward
as
he
ought
to
do
;
that
is
,
by
Actions
absolutely
free
:
And
it
had
been
a
sort
of
injuring
his
Free
Will
,
Fortissimo
quippe
dimisit
atque
permisit
facere
quod
vellet
.
Aug.
de
Corrupt
.
&
Grat.
cap.
12.
See
the
5th
Dialogue
of
the
Christian
Conversations
,
towards
the
End
of
the
Brussels
Edition
.
for
God
to
have
given
him
that
kind
of
Grace
which
is
at
present
only
necessary
to
counterpoise
the
preventing
Delights
of
Concupiscence
.
Whilst
Adam
had
all
necessary
Supplies
for
his
Perseverance
,
it
had
been
to
suspect
his
Vertue
,
and
,
as
it
were
,
to
accuse
him
of
Infidelity
,
to
give
him
any
Prevention
:
It
had
been
leaving
him
an
Occasion
of
Glorying
in
himself
,
to
have
taken
away
all
Sense
of
the
Wants
possible
to
befall
him
,
and
Infirmities
he
was
obnoxious
to
;
for
I
own
that
as
yet
he
had
neither
Want
nor
Weakness
.
Lastly
,
What
is
infinitely
more
considerable
,
it
had
been
to
render
the
Incarnation
of
JESUS
CHRIST
indifferent
;
which
certainly
was
the
first
and
greatest
Design
of
Him
who
suffer'd
all
Men
to
be
involv'd
in
Sin
,
that
he
might
shew
them
Mercy
in
JESUS
CHRIST
,
to
the
end
that
he
who
glories
might
glory
only
in
the
LORD
.
To
me
therefore
it
seems
undeniable
that
Adam
had
no
Sense
of
Preventing
Pleasures
in
his
Duty
,
but
it
does
not
seem
equally
certain
that
he
had
a
Sense
of
Joy
,
though
I
suppose
it
here
,
as
believing
it
highly
probable
.
But
to
explain
my self
:
There
is
this
Difference
between
Preventing
Pleasure
and
the
Pleasure
of
Joy
,
that
the
former
precedes
Reason
,
and
the
latter
follows
it
;
for
Joy
naturally
results
from
the
Knowledge
one
has
of
his
own
Happiness
or
Perfections
,
because
he
cannot
consider
himself
as
happy
or
perfect
,
but
he
must
instantly
thereupon
feel
a
certain
Joy
.
As
we
may
be
conscious
of
our
Happiness
by
Pleasure
,
or
discover
it
by
Reason
,
so
Joy
is
of
two
sorts
;
I
speak
not
here
of
that
which
is
purely
sensible
,
but
of
that
which
Adam
might
have
been
possess'd
with
,
as
necessarily
consequent
to
the
Knowledge
he
had
of
his
Happiness
in
uniting
himself
with
God
:
And
some
Reasons
there
are
,
which
make
it
doubtful
whether
he
was
actually
possess'd
of
it
.
The
Principal
of
all
is
,
that
his
Mind
perhaps
had
been
so
taken
up
with
it
,
that
it
had
robbed
him
of
his
Liberty
,
and
invincibly
united
him
to
God
;
for
't
is
reasonable
to
believe
that
this
Joy
ought
to
be
proportion'd
to
the
Happiness
which
Adam
possess'd
,
and
consequently
exceeding
great
.
But
in
answer
to
this
,
I
say
,
First
,
That
purely
Intellectual
Joy
leaves
the
Mind
to
its
entire
Liberty
,
and
takes
up
but
very
little
of
its
Thinking
Capacity
;
wherein
it
differs
from
Sensible
Joy
,
which
commonly
disturbs
the
Reason
,
and
lessens
the
Liberty
.
I
answer
,
Secondly
,
That
the
Happiness
of
Adam
at
the
first
Instant
of
his
Creation
,
did
not
consist
in
a
plenary
and
entire
Possession
of
the
Supreme
Good
,
it
being
possible
for
him
to
lose
it
,
and
become
miserable
:
But
herein
his
Happiness
especially
consisted
,
That
he
suffer'd
no
Evil
,
and
was
in
the
good
Favour
of
Him
who
must
have
perfected
his
Felicity
,
if
he
had
persever'd
in
his
State
of
Innocency
.
Thus
his
Joy
was
not
excessive
;
nay
,
it
was
or
ought
to
have
been
temper'd
with
an
Alloy
of
Fear
,
for
he
ought
to
have
been
diffident
of
himself
.
I
answer
,
Lastly
,
That
Joy
does
not
always
intend
the
Mind
upon
the
true
Cause
that
produces
it
:
As
a
Sense
of
Joy
arises
upon
the
Contemplation
of
one
's
own
Perfections
,
it
is
natural
to
believe
that
Prospect
is
the
Cause
of
it
;
for
when
a
Thing
constantly
follows
from
another
,
't
is
naturally
look'd
upon
as
one
of
its
Effects
.
Thus
a
Man
considers
himself
as
the
Author
of
his
own
present
Happiness
,
he
finds
a
secret
Complacency
in
his
Natural
Perfections
,
he
loves
himself
,
and
thinks
not
of
Him
who
operates
in
him
in
an
imperceptible
manner
.
'T
is
true
,
Adam
more
distinctly
knew
than
the
greatest
of
Philosophers
,
that
God
alone
was
able
to
act
in
him
,
and
produce
that
Sense
of
Joy
which
he
felt
upon
the
Consideration
of
his
Happiness
and
Perfections
.
This
he
knew
clearly
by
the
Light
of
Reason
,
when
he
attended
to
it
,
but
not
by
any
Sensation
;
which
,
on
the
contrary
,
taught
him
that
his
Joy
was
a
Consequence
of
his
Perfection
,
seeing
he
had
the
constant
Sense
of
it
,
and
that
without
any
Application
on
his
part
:
And
so
this
Sensation
might
lead
him
to
consider
his
own
Perfections
,
and
take
pleasure
in
himself
if
he
either
forgot
,
or
any
ways
lost
sight
of
Him
whose
Operations
in
us
are
not
of
a
sensible
Nature
.
So
far
would
this
Joy
have
been
from
rendring
him
impeccable
,
as
is
pretended
,
that
,
on
the
contrary
,
it
might
probably
be
the
Occasion
of
his
Pride
and
Fall
.
And
't
is
for
this
Reason
that
I
say
in
this
Chapter
,
that
Adam
ought
to
have
taken
care
not
to
have
suffer'd
the
Capacity
of
his
Mind
to
be
fill'd
with
a
presumptuous
Joy
,
kindled
in
his
Soul
upon
Reflexion
on
his
own
Natural
Perfections
.
THE
ILLUSTRATION
UPON
THE
Fifth
CHAPTER
of
the
First
BOOK
;
Where
I
say
,
That
Preventing
Delight
is
the
Grace
of
JESUS
CHRIST
.
THough
I
say
in
this
Chapter
,
that
Preventing
Delight
is
the
Grace
which
JESUS
CHRIST
has
particularly
merited
for
us
;
and
that
I
term
it
elsewhere
absolutely
,
The
Grace
of
our
LORD
;
yet
this
is
not
said
as
if
there
were
no
other
Grace
besides
this
,
or
as
if
there
were
any
but
what
He
has
merited
;
but
I
name
it
so
,
to
distinguish
it
from
the
Grace
which
GOD
gave
Adam
in
his
Creation
,
which
commonly
we
call
the
Grace
of
the
Creator
:
For
the
Grace
by
which
Adam
might
have
persever'd
in
Innocence
was
chiefly
a
Grace
of
Light
,
or
Knowledge
,
as
I
have
explain'd
in
the
foregoing
Reflexion
;
because
,
being
free
of
Concupiscence
,
he
had
no
need
of
Preventing
Pleasures
to
resist
it
.
But
the
Grace
which
is
at
present
necessary
to
support
us
in
our
Duty
,
and
to
beget
and
keep
Charity
alive
in
us
,
is
Preventing
Delectation
:
For
as
Pleasure
produces
and
cherishes
the
Love
of
the
Things
that
cause
,
or
seem
to
cause
it
;
so
Preventing
Pleasures
,
which
Bodies
occasionally
administer
,
produce
and
maintain
in
us
our
Cupidity
.
So
that
Cupidity
being
entirely
opposite
to
Charity
,
if
God
did
not
beget
and
sustain
in
us
the
Latter
by
Preventing
Delectations
,
't
is
plain
that
it
would
be
enfeebled
by
the
Preventing
Pleasures
of
Concupiscence
,
proportionably
as
Concupiscence
was
corroborated
by
them
.
What
I
here
say
,
supposes
that
God
leaves
our
Concupiscence
to
work
in
us
,
and
does
not
weaken
it
by
an
infus'd
Abhorrence
to
sensible
Objects
,
which
(
as
a
Result
from
Sin
)
must
necessarily
tempt
us
.
I
speak
of
Things
according
to
ordinary
procedure
:
But
supposing
that
God
lessens
Concupiscence
instead
of
increasing
Delectable
Grace
,
it
comes
to
the
same
thing
;
for
it
is
plain
that
a
Balance
may
be
put
two
Ways
in
aequilibrio
,
when
one
of
the
Scales
is
too
heavy
burthen'd
,
either
by
adding
Weight
to
the
opposite
Scale
,
or
retrenching
the
Excess
of
the
over-weighted
.
Nor
do
I
suppose
it
is
impossible
to
do
any
good
Action
,
without
a
Preventing
Delectation
:
Upon
which
Particular
I
have
explain'd
my self
sufficiently
in
the
Fourth
Chapter
of
the
Third
Book
.
And
it
seems
too
evident
to
be
doubted
,
that
a
Man
having
his
Heart
possess'd
with
the
Love
of
God
,
may
by
the
Strength
of
his
Love
,
unassisted
with
Preventing
Delight
,
give
,
for
instance
,
a
Peny
to
a
poor
Man
,
or
patiently
suffer
some
little
Affront
.
I
am
persuaded
likewise
that
this
Delight
is
not
necessary
,
except
when
the
Temptation
is
strong
,
or
the
Love
for
God
weak
.
However
,
it
may
be
said
to
be
absolutely
necessary
to
a
Righteous
Man
,
whose
Faith
might
(
one
would
think
)
be
resolute
,
and
his
Hope
strong
enough
to
conquer
very
violent
Temptations
;
the
Joy
or
Fore-taste
of
Eternal
Happiness
being
capable
of
resisting
the
sensible
Allurements
of
transitory
Goods
.
'T
is
true
,
Delectation
,
or
Actual
Grace
,
is
necessary
to
every
good
Action
,
if
by
these
Words
be
meant
Charity
,
in
which
Sense
St.
Austin
commonly
took
them
:
For
't
is
evident
,
that
whatever
is
done
without
some
Respect
or
other
had
to
God
,
is
good
for
nothing
.
But
clearing
the
Terms
of
Equivocations
,
and
taking
Delectation
in
the
Sense
I
have
given
,
I
cannot
see
how
what
I
have
said
can
be
call'd
in
question
.
But
see
wherein
the
Difficulty
consists
:
Pleasure
and
Love
are
suppos'd
to
be
one
and
the
same
thing
,
because
seldom
apart
;
and
St.
Austin
does
not
always
distinguish
them
:
And
on
this
Supposition
they
may
reasonably
say
as
they
do
;
and
we
may
conclude
with
St.
Austin
,
Quod
amplius
nos
delectat
,
secundum
id
operemur
necesse
est
:
For
certainly
we
will
what
we
love
;
and
so
likewise
it
may
be
said
,
that
we
cannot
perform
any
good
or
meritorious
Action
,
without
Delectation
or
Charity
.
Chap.
3.
Book
V.
But
I
hope
to
make
it
appear
in
the
Explanation
I
shall
make
upon
the
Tract
concerning
the
Passions
,
that
there
is
as
much
difference
between
Pleasure
and
deliberate
or
indeliberate
Love
,
as
there
is
between
our
Knowledge
and
our
Love
,
or
(
to
give
a
sensible
Representation
of
this
Difference
)
between
the
Figure
of
a
Body
and
its
Motion
.
THE
ILLUSTRATION
Upon
what
I
have
said
at
the
Beginning
of
the
Tenth
CHAPTER
of
the
First
BOOK
,
And
in
the
Sixth
CHAPTER
of
the
Second
BOOK
,
CONCERNING
METHOD
:
That
't
is
very
difficult
to
prove
the
Existence
of
Bodies
:
What
we
ought
to
Esteem
of
the
Proofs
which
are
brought
of
their
Existence
.
MEN
are
commonly
perfectly
ignorant
of
what
they
presume
best
to
understand
,
and
have
a
good
Knowledge
of
other
things
,
whilst
they
imagine
they
have
not
so
much
as
their
Ideas
.
When
their
Senses
have
to
do
in
their
Judgments
,
they
submit
to
what
they
do
not
comprehend
;
at
least
to
what
they
know
but
imperfectly
and
confusedly
.
And
when
their
Ideas
are
purely
intellectual
,
(
give
me
leave
to
use
such
Expressions
,
)
they
will
hardly
admit
undeniable
Demonstrations
.
What
Notion
,
for
Instance
,
have
the
generality
of
Men
,
when
we
prove
to
them
most
of
Metaphysical
Truths
;
when
we
demonstrate
the
Existence
of
a
God
,
the
Efficacy
of
his
Will
,
the
Immutability
of
his
Decrees
:
That
there
is
but
one
God
,
or
true
Cause
,
that
works
all
in
all
things
;
but
one
Supreme
Reason
which
all
Intelligent
Beings
participate
;
but
one
necessary
Love
,
which
is
the
Principle
of
all
created
Wills
?
They
think
we
pronounce
Words
without
Sense
;
that
we
have
no
Ideas
of
the
things
advanc'd
;
and
that
we
had
better
say
nothing
.
Metaphysical
Truths
and
Arguments
are
not
of
a
sensible
Nature
;
they
have
nothing
moving
and
affecting
,
and
consequently
leave
not
Conviction
behind
them
.
Nevertheless
,
abstract
Ideas
are
certainly
the
most
distinct
;
and
Metaphysical
Truths
the
most
clear
and
evident
of
all
other
.
Men
sometimes
say
they
have
no
Idea
of
God
,
nor
any
Knowledge
of
his
Will
,
and
commonly
believe
too
what
they
say
;
but
't
is
for
want
of
knowing
what
they
know
,
it
may
be
,
best
:
For
where
's
the
Man
that
hesitates
in
answering
to
the
Question
,
Whether
God
is
Wise
,
Just
,
or
Powerful
?
Whether
he
is
Divisible
,
Triangular
,
Movable
,
or
subject
to
any
kind
of
Change
whatever
?
Whereas
we
cannot
answer
without
scruple
,
and
fear
of
being
mistaken
,
whether
certain
Qualities
do
or
do
not
belong
to
a
Subject
which
we
have
no
Idea
of
.
So
again
,
Who
is
it
dares
say
,
that
God
acts
not
by
the
most
simple
Means
?
That
he
is
irregular
in
his
Designs
?
That
he
makes
Monsters
by
a
positive
,
direct
,
and
particular
Will
,
and
not
by
a
kind
of
Necessity
?
In
a
word
,
That
his
Will
is
,
or
may
be
,
contrary
to
ORDER
,
whereof
every
Man
knows
something
,
more
or
less
:
But
if
a
Man
had
no
Idea
of
the
Will
of
GOD
,
he
might
at
least
doubt
whether
he
acted
according
to
certain
Laws
,
which
he
clearly
conceives
he
is
obliged
to
follow
,
on
Supposition
HE
will
act
.
Men
therefore
have
the
Ideas
of
things
purely
Intelligible
;
which
Ideas
are
much
clearer
than
those
of
sensible
Objects
:
They
are
better
assured
of
the
Existence
of
a
God
,
than
of
that
of
Bodies
;
and
when
they
retire
into
themselves
,
they
more
clearly
discover
certain
Wills
of
God
,
by
which
he
produces
and
preserves
all
Beings
,
than
those
of
their
best
Friends
,
or
whom
they
have
studied
all
their
Lives
:
For
the
Union
of
their
Mind
with
God
,
and
that
of
their
Will
with
his
,
that
is
,
with
the
Law
Eternal
,
or
Immutable
Order
,
is
immediate
,
direct
,
and
necessary
;
whereas
their
Union
with
sensible
Objects
,
being
founded
only
for
the
Preservation
of
their
Life
and
Health
,
gives
them
no
Knowledge
of
these
Objects
,
but
as
they
relate
to
that
Design
.
'T
is
this
immediate
and
direct
Union
,
which
is
not
known
,
says
St.
Austin
,
but
by
those
whose
Mind
is
purified
;
that
enlightens
our
most
secret
Reason
,
and
exhorts
and
moves
us
in
the
inmost
Recesses
of
our
Heart
.
By
this
we
learn
both
the
Thoughts
and
the
Wills
of
God
;
that
is
,
Eternal
Truths
and
Laws
:
For
no
one
can
doubt
but
we
know
some
of
them
with
Evidence
.
But
our
Union
with
our
choicest
Friends
teaches
us
not
evidently
either
what
they
think
,
or
what
they
will
.
We
think
we
know
right
well
,
but
we
are
most
commonly
mistaken
,
because
we
receive
our
Information
only
from
their
Lips
.
Nor
can
our
Union
,
which
we
have
through
our
Senses
,
with
circumambient
Bodies
,
instruct
us
:
For
the
Testimony
of
the
Senses
is
never
exactly
true
,
but
commonly
every
way
false
,
as
I
have
made
appear
in
this
Treatise
;
and
't
is
for
that
Reason
I
say
't
is
an
harder
thing
than
is
believ'd
,
to
prove
positively
the
Existence
of
Bodies
,
though
our
Senses
tell
us
they
exist
;
because
Reason
does
not
so
readily
inform
us
,
as
we
imagine
;
and
it
must
be
most
attentively
consulted
to
give
us
a
clear
Resolve
.
But
as
Men
are
more
Sensible
than
Reasonable
,
so
they
more
willingly
listen
to
the
Verdict
of
the
Senses
,
than
the
Testimony
of
internal
Truth
;
and
because
they
have
always
consulted
their
Eyes
to
be
assur'd
of
the
Existence
of
Matter
,
without
troubling
their
Heads
to
advise
with
their
Reason
;
they
are
surpriz'd
to
hear
it
said
,
it
is
hard
to
demonstrate
it
.
They
think
they
need
but
open
their
Eyes
,
to
see
that
there
are
Bodies
;
but
if
this
does
not
take
away
all
suspition
of
Illusion
,
they
believe
it
abundantly
sufficient
to
come
near
and
handle
them
;
after
which
they
can
hardly
conceive
we
can
have
any
possible
Reasons
to
make
us
doubt
of
their
Existence
.
But
if
we
believe
our
Eyes
,
they
'll
tell
us
,
that
Colours
are
laid
upon
the
surface
of
Bodies
,
and
Light
diffus'd
in
the
Air
and
Sun
;
our
Ears
make
us
hear
Sounds
as
undulated
in
the
Air
,
and
ecchoing
from
the
ringing
Bodies
;
and
,
if
we
credit
the
Report
of
the
other
Senses
,
Heat
will
be
in
the
Fire
,
Sweetness
in
the
Sugar
,
Odour
in
Musk
,
and
all
sensible
Qualities
in
the
Bodies
which
seem
to
exhale
or
disperse
them
.
And
yet
it
is
certain
,
from
the
Reasons
I
have
given
in
the
First
Book
,
concerning
the
Search
after
Truth
,
that
these
Qualities
are
not
out
of
the
Soul
that
feels
them
,
at
least
it
is
not
evident
they
are
in
the
Bodies
that
are
about
us
.
What
Reason
therefore
is
there
,
from
the
Reports
of
our
always-treacherous
and
delusive
Senses
;
to
conclude
,
there
are
actually
Bodies
without
us
,
and
that
they
are
like
those
we
see
;
I
mean
those
which
are
the
immediate
Object
of
our
Soul
,
when
we
behold
them
with
bodily
Eyes
?
Certainly
this
does
not
want
Difficulty
,
whatever
may
be
said
of
it
.
Farther
:
If
the
Existence
of
any
Body
may
be
certainly
prov'd
upon
the
Testimony
of
our
Senses
,
none
could
have
better
Pretence
than
That
to
which
the
Soul
is
immediately
united
:
The
liveliest
Sensation
,
and
that
which
seems
to
have
the
most
necessary
relation
to
an
actually-existing
Body
,
is
Pain
.
And
yet
it
often
happens
that
those
who
have
lost
an
Arm
feel
most
violent
Pains
in
it
long
after
it
has
been
cut
off
.
They
know
well
enough
they
want
it
,
when
they
consult
their
Memory
,
or
only
look
upon
their
Body
;
but
the
Sense
of
Pain
deceives
them
:
And
if
,
as
it
often
happens
,
they
be
suppos'd
to
have
quite
forgotten
what
formerly
they
were
,
and
to
have
no
other
Senses
left
them
than
that
whereby
they
feel
Pain
in
their
imaginary
Arm
;
certainly
they
could
not
be
convinc'd
but
that
they
had
an
Arm
in
which
they
felt
so
violent
torment
.
There
have
been
those
who
have
believ'd
they
had
Horns
on
their
Heads
;
others
who
have
imagin'd
they
were
made
of
Butter
,
or
Glass
,
or
that
their
Body
was
not
of
the
Shape
of
other
Mens
,
but
fashion'd
like
that
of
a
Cock
,
a
Wolf
,
or
an
Ox.
But
these
,
you
'll
say
,
were
mad
Men
;
and
I
readily
believe
it
.
But
their
Soul
was
capable
of
deceiving
them
about
these
things
,
and
consequently
all
other
Men
may
fall
into
the
same
Errours
,
if
they
judge
of
Objects
by
the
Testimony
of
their
Senses
:
For
it
must
be
observ'd
,
that
these
mad
Men
actually
feel
themselves
to
be
such
as
they
think
they
are
,
and
their
Errour
consists
not
in
the
Sensation
they
have
,
but
in
the
Judgment
they
make
.
If
they
should
only
say
,
they
felt
or
saw
themselves
like
Cocks
,
they
would
not
be
deceiv'd
:
But
herein
only
they
deceive
themselves
,
in
that
they
believe
their
Body
like
that
they
feel
;
I
mean
,
like
that
which
is
the
immediate
Object
of
their
Mind
,
when
they
consider
it
.
And
so
those
who
believe
themselves
such
as
they
really
are
,
are
no
more
judicious
in
their
Judgments
they
make
of
themselves
than
these
mad
Men
,
if
they
judge
precisely
by
the
Testimony
of
their
Senses
;
but
are
to
thank
their
Fortune
more
than
their
Reason
,
if
they
are
not
mistaken
.
But
at
the
Bottom
,
How
can
we
be
sure
that
those
who
go
under
the
Notion
of
mad
Men
are
really
what
they
are
taken
for
?
May
we
not
say
they
are
reckon'd
craz'd
,
because
they
have
peculiar
Sentiments
?
For
't
is
evident
,
that
a
Man
is
not
reckon'd
mad
for
having
the
Sense
of
what
is
not
,
but
only
for
having
a
Sense
of
things
quite
contrary
to
that
of
others
,
whether
their
Sense
be
true
or
false
,
right
or
wrong
.
A
Clown
,
for
Example
,
having
his
Eyes
so
dispos'd
as
to
see
the
Moon
just
such
as
she
is
,
or
only
so
as
she
is
beheld
,
or
sometime
may
be
hereafter
,
with
new-invented
Glasses
looks
on
her
with
Admiration
,
and
cries
to
his
Companions
,
What
high
Mountains
and
deep
Valleys
,
what
Seas
,
The
M●on
when
beheld
with
a
Telescope
looks
much
like
what
is
here
represented
.
and
Lakes
,
and
Gulphs
,
and
Rocks
,
do
I
behold
!
See
,
says
he
,
what
a
vast
Sea
lies
all
along
the
East
,
whilst
nothing
but
Land
and
Mountains
extend
from
West
to
South
!
Don't
you
see
on
the
same
hand
a
Mountain
higher
than
ever
we
beheld
?
And
don't
you
wonder
to
see
a
Sea
all
over
black
,
and
an
huge
dreadful
Gulph
in
the
middle
of
the
Planet
?
What
would
his
Fellows
answer
to
such
Exclamations
?
Or
what
would
they
think
of
him
?
Certainly
,
that
he
was
Mad
,
or
Lunatick
,
and
distemper'd
by
the
malign
Influences
of
the
Planet
he
beholds
and
admires
:
For
no
Man
has
the
same
Notions
,
and
that
's
enough
.
Thus
to
be
mad
in
the
Opinion
of
others
,
there
's
no
need
to
be
really
so
,
but
only
to
have
Thoughts
and
Sensation
different
from
them
:
For
if
all
Men
should
believe
themselves
to
be
Cocks
,
he
that
maintain'd
he
had
an
humane
Shape
would
certainly
go
for
a
Fool
or
a
Mad
Man
.
But
you
'll
say
,
Has
a
Man
a
Beak
at
the
end
of
his
Nose
,
and
a
Comb
upon
his
Head
?
I
suppose
not
;
but
I
don't
know
so
much
,
when
I
judge
only
by
my
Senses
,
and
know
not
how
to
put
them
to
their
proper
use
.
In
vain
shall
I
try
by
handling
my
Head
and
Face
;
for
I
feel
my
own
Body
,
and
those
about
me
,
but
with
Hands
whose
length
and
figure
I
don't
know
.
Nay
I
cannot
be
certainly
assur'd
whether
I
have
truly
Hands
or
not
;
for
that
which
makes
me
think
I
have
,
is
,
that
at
the
time
that
I
seem
to
move
them
,
there
happen
some
Motions
in
a
particular
part
of
my
Brain
,
which
,
in
the
vulgar
Notion
,
is
the
Seat
of
the
Common
Sense
.
But
it
may
be
I
have
not
that
Part
which
is
so
generally
talk'd
of
,
and
so
little
known
;
at
least
I
am
not
sensible
of
this
,
though
I
feel
my
Hands
;
so
that
I
have
more
right
to
believe
I
have
Hands
than
that
little
Gland
which
is
still
daily
disputed
against
.
But
,
Lastly
,
I
know
neither
the
Figure
nor
Motions
of
this
Gland
,
and
yet
I
am
assured
,
that
by
them
only
I
can
be
instructed
in
the
Figure
and
Motion
of
my
own
Body
,
and
those
that
are
round
about
me
.
Well
then
,
What
are
we
oblig'd
to
conclude
from
all
this
?
Why
,
that
't
is
not
a
Body
that
can
give
Light
to
Reason
;
that
the
Part
to
which
the
Soul
is
immediately
united
,
is
neither
visible
nor
intelligible
of
it self
;
that
neither
our
own
nor
surrounding
Bodies
can
be
the
immediate
Object
of
our
Mind
;
that
we
cannot
learn
from
our
Brain
so
much
,
as
whether
it
actually
exists
,
much
less
whether
there
are
circumambient
Bodies
:
That
therefore
we
are
to
fly
to
the
Existence
of
some
superiour
Intelligence
,
who
alone
is
capable
of
acting
in
us
,
in
such
a
manner
as
to
give
a
real
Representation
of
external
Bodies
,
without
giving
us
any
Idea
of
our
Brain
,
though
the
Motions
produc'd
in
it
serve
as
an
Occasion
to
this
Intelligent
Being
,
to
discover
these
Bodies
to
us
:
For
,
in
short
,
we
see
with
Eyes
,
whose
Figure
we
do
not
know
,
what
is
the
Figure
of
external
Bodies
;
and
though
the
Colours
which
appear
on
Objects
,
are
no
livelier
than
those
which
are
painted
on
the
Optick
Nerve
,
these
are
quite
hid
from
us
,
whilst
we
admire
the
Splendour
of
the
other
.
But
after
all
,
Under
what
Obligation
is
an
Intelligent
Being
to
shew
us
Bodies
upon
some
Motions
happening
in
our
Brain
?
Again
,
What
Necessity
is
there
of
external
Bodies
for
him
to
stir
up
these
Motions
in
our
Brain
?
Do
not
Sleep
,
Passions
,
and
Madness
,
produce
these
Motions
,
though
external
Bodies
do
not
contribute
to
them
?
Is
it
evident
,
that
Bodies
incapable
of
moving
one
another
,
[
](A51674-e105120-b)*
*
See
Ch.
3.
Part
II.
of
Book
VI.
with
the
Illustration
.
should
communicate
to
those
they
strike
,
a
moving
Force
which
they
have
not
in
themselves
?
But
grant
that
Bodies
move
themselves
,
and
those
they
strike
against
;
can
we
thence
infer
,
that
he
who
gives
Being
to
all
things
cannot
immediately
by
himself
stir
up
in
our
Brain
the
Motions
to
which
the
Ideas
of
our
Mind
are
connected
?
Lastly
,
Where
's
the
Contradiction
,
that
our
Soul
should
receive
new
Ideas
whilst
our
Brain
remains
without
new
Motions
;
since
it
is
certain
the
latter
do
not
produce
the
former
,
since
we
have
no
Knowledge
of
these
Motions
,
and
that
God
alone
can
represent
to
us
our
Ideas
,
[
](A51674-e105220-b)†
†
See
Ch.
6.
Part
II.
of
Book
III.
with
its
Illustration
.
as
I
have
elsewhere
proved
.
Therefore
't
is
absolutely
necessary
(
positively
to
be
assured
of
the
Existence
of
external
Bodies
)
to
know
God
who
gives
us
the
Sensation
of
them
;
and
to
know
,
that
,
because
he
is
infinitely
perfect
,
he
cannot
deceive
us
.
For
if
the
Intelligence
,
who
furnishes
us
with
the
Ideas
of
all
things
,
would
,
as
I
may
say
,
divert
himself
,
by
representing
Bodies
as
actually
existing
,
whilst
there
was
nothing
of
them
,
it
is
plain
he
could
easily
do
it
.
For
these
,
or
the
like
Reasons
,
M.
des
Cartes
,
resolving
to
establish
his
Philosophy
on
immovable
Foundations
,
thought
he
had
no
right
to
suppose
the
Existence
of
Bodies
,
nor
to
prove
them
by
sensible
Arguments
,
though
highly
convincing
with
the
common
part
of
Mankind
.
Undoubtedly
he
knew
as
well
as
we
,
that
he
needed
but
open
his
Eyes
to
see
Bodies
,
and
to
draw
near
and
handle
them
,
to
be
satisfied
whether
his
Eyes
abused
him
in
their
Reports
.
He
well
enough
knew
the
Mind
of
Man
,
to
judge
that
such
like
Proofs
had
been
acceptable
and
welcome
:
But
he
did
not
seek
for
sensible
Probabilities
,
nor
vain
and
popular
Applauses
;
preferring
despis'd
Truth
before
the
Glory
of
an
unmerited
Reputation
;
and
chusing
rather
to
render
himself
ridiculous
to
little
Souls
,
by
Doubts
,
thought
by
them
extravagant
,
than
to
assert
what
he
thought
not
certain
and
undeniable
.
But
though
M.
des
Cartes
has
given
the
strongest
Arguments
that
bare
Reason
could
furnish
out
for
the
Existence
of
Bodies
;
though
it
be
evident
,
that
God
is
no
Deceiver
,
and
it
may
be
said
he
would
really
deceive
us
,
did
we
deceive
our selves
,
whilst
we
made
a
due
use
of
our
Mind
,
and
the
other
Faculties
,
whereof
he
is
the
Author
;
yet
it
may
be
affirmed
,
that
the
Existence
of
Matter
is
not
yet
perfectly
demonstrated
:
For
,
in
fine
,
in
point
of
Philosophy
,
we
are
to
believe
nothing
till
the
Evidence
of
it
obliges
us
;
but
to
make
use
of
our
Liberty
as
much
as
we
can
,
giving
no
greater
Extent
to
our
Judgments
than
our
Perceptions
.
Wherefore
,
when
we
see
Bodies
,
we
should
judge
only
that
we
see
them
,
and
that
these
visible
or
intelligible
Bodies
actually
exist
.
But
why
must
we
judge
positively
there
is
a
Material
World
without
us
,
like
the
Intelligible
World
we
perceive
?
But
,
say
you
,
we
see
these
Bodies
without
us
,
and
likewise
very
remote
from
that
we
animate
:
We
may
then
judge
they
are
without
us
,
and
yet
our
Judgments
reach
no
farther
than
our
Perceptions
.
But
what
?
Don't
we
see
Light
without
us
,
and
in
the
Sun
,
though
it
be
not
in
it
?
But
be
it
so
:
Bodies
that
we
see
without
us
are
really
without
us
;
for
indeed
it
is
not
to
be
deny'd
.
But
is
it
not
evident
that
there
are
Outnesses
,
and
Remotenesses
,
and
intelligible
Spaces
in
the
intelligible
World
,
which
is
the
immediate
Object
of
our
Mind
?
The
material
Body
which
we
animate
(
observe
it
well
)
is
not
the
same
we
see
when
we
behold
it
,
I
mean
when
we
turn
our
corporeal
Eyes
upon
it
,
but
an
intelligible
Body
;
and
there
are
intelligible
Spaces
between
this
intelligible
Body
and
the
intelligible
Sun
we
see
,
as
there
are
material
Spaces
between
our
Body
and
the
Sun
which
we
behold
.
Certainly
God
ordain'd
Spaces
between
Bodies
which
he
created
,
but
he
neither
sees
these
Bodies
nor
these
Spaces
by
themselves
;
he
can
only
see
them
by
Bodies
and
Spaces
intellectual
:
God
derives
no
Knowledge
but
from
himself
;
he
sees
not
the
material
World
,
save
in
the
intelligible
World
which
he
comprehends
,
and
in
the
Knowledge
he
has
of
his
own
Will
,
which
gives
actually
Existence
and
Motion
to
all
things
.
Therefore
there
are
intelligible
Spaces
between
the
intelligible
Bodies
which
we
immediately
see
,
as
there
are
material
Spaces
between
Bodies
which
our
Eyes
behold
.
Now
it
ought
to
be
observ'd
,
that
as
there
is
none
but
God
who
knows
his
Will
by
himself
,
which
produces
all
Beings
;
it
is
impossible
to
know
from
any
other
,
whether
there
be
actually
without
us
●
material
World
like
that
we
see
;
because
the
material
World
is
neither
Visible
,
nor
Intelligible
of
it self
.
Therefore
to
be
fully
convinc'd
of
the
Existence
of
Bodies
,
it
is
not
only
necessary
to
demonstrate
there
is
a
God
,
and
that
he
is
no
Deceiver
;
but
also
that
this
God
has
assur'd
us
there
is
such
a
World
actually
created
:
Which
thing
I
find
wanting
in
M
▪
des
Cartes's
Works
.
God
speaks
to
the
Mind
,
and
obliges
it
to
assent
but
two
several
ways
.
By
Evidence
and
Faith
.
I
acknowledge
that
Faith
obliges
us
to
believe
the
Existence
of
Bodies
:
But
as
to
Evidence
,
methinks
it
wants
something
to
be
perfect
;
and
that
we
are
not
invincibly
carry'd
to
believe
there
is
any
thing
Existing
besides
God
and
our
own
Mind
.
'T
is
true
,
we
have
an
extream
propension
to
believe
there
are
such
things
,
as
circumambient
Bodies
;
So
far
I
agree
with
M.
des
Cartes
.
But
this
Propension
however
natural
,
does
not
evidently
force
us
;
but
only
perswasively
induce
us
,
by
the
impression
.
But
we
ought
only
to
form
our
Free
Judgments
,
as
Light
and
Evidence
oblige
us
:
for
if
we
leave
our selves
to
the
guidance
of
sensible
Impressions
,
we
shall
seldom
or
ever
be
unmistaken
.
For
how
comes
it
that
we
erre
in
the
Judgments
we
make
about
sensible
Qualities
,
about
the
Magnitude
,
Figure
,
and
Motion
of
Bodies
,
but
from
our
following
an
Impression
like
that
which
induces
us
to
believe
the
Existence
of
Bodies
?
Do
not
we
sensibly
perceive
the
Fire
to
be
hot
,
Snow
to
be
white
,
and
the
Sun
to
be
all
glorious
with
a
radiating
Light
?
Do
not
we
see
that
sensible
Qualities
no
less
than
Bodies
are
without
us
?
And
yet
't
is
certain
,
that
the
former
which
we
see
without
us
are
not
really
so
;
or
if
you
had
rather
,
there
is
no
certainty
about
it
.
What
Reason
then
have
we
to
judge
,
that
besides
intelligible
Bodies
which
we
see
there
are
others
that
we
behold
.
Or
what
Evidence
can
a
Man
have
,
that
an
Impression
,
not
only
delusive
,
in
respect
of
sensible
Qualities
,
but
also
in
regard
to
the
Magnitude
,
Figure
,
and
Motion
of
Bodies
,
should
not
be
as
treacherous
in
respect
to
the
actual
Existence
of
the
Bodies
themselves
:
I
ask
,
what
Evidence
can
a
Man
have
?
For
as
to
Probabilities
I
grant
they
are
not
wanting
.
I
know
very
well
there
's
this
Difference
between
sensible
Qualities
,
and
Bodies
;
that
Reason
much
easier
corrects
the
Impression
,
or
natural
Judgments
which
relate
to
sensible
Qualities
,
than
those
which
concern
the
Existence
of
Bodies
:
and
likewise
that
all
the
corrections
made
by
Reason
,
with
reference
to
sensible
Qualities
,
perfectly
comport
with
Religion
,
and
Christian
Morality
,
and
that
we
cannot
deny
the
Existence
of
Bodies
,
through
a
Principle
of
Religion
.
'T
is
easie
to
conceive
that
Pleasure
,
and
Pain
,
Heat
,
and
even
Colours
,
are
not
Modes
of
corporeal
Existence
;
that
sensible
Qualities
in
general
are
not
contain'd
in
the
Idea
we
have
of
Matter
.
In
a
Word
,
that
our
Senses
do
not
represent
sensible
Objects
,
as
they
are
in
their
own
nature
,
but
as
they
are
with
reference
to
the
preservation
of
our
Health
and
Life
;
which
is
conformable
,
not
only
to
Reason
,
but
much
more
to
Religion
,
and
Christian
Morality
;
as
has
been
evidenc'd
in
several
places
of
this
Treatise
.
But
't
is
not
so
easie
to
be
positively
ascertain'd
of
the
Non-existence
of
External
Bodies
,
as
it
is
to
be
positively
convinc'd
,
that
Pain
and
Heat
are
not
in
the
Bodies
which
seem
to
cause
them
in
us
.
'T
is
most
certain
,
at
least
,
that
there
's
a
possibility
of
outward
Bodies
:
We
have
no
Argument
to
prove
there
are
none
,
and
we
have
a
very
strong
inclination
to
believe
there
are
;
and
therefore
we
have
more
reason
to
conclude
for
the
Existence
than
the
Non-existence
of
them
;
and
consequently
it
seems
that
we
ought
to
believe
they
are
.
For
we
are
naturally
inclin'd
to
follow
our
natural
Judgment
so
long
as
it
's
not
positively
corrigible
by
Light
and
Evidence
.
For
every
natural
Judgment
coming
from
God
may
be
rightly
seconded
by
our
free
Judgments
,
when
God
furnishes
us
not
with
means
to
manifest
its
falsity
;
And
if
on
such
occasions
we
mistake
,
the
Author
of
our
Mind
may
seem
in
a
manner
to
be
the
Author
of
our
Errors
and
Delinquencies
.
This
Reasoning
is
,
possibly
,
good
:
though
it
must
be
acknowledg'd
that
it
ought
not
to
go
for
an
Evident
Demonstration
of
the
Existence
of
Bodies
:
For
indeed
God
does
not
irresistibly
force
us
to
consent
to
it
;
if
we
give
our
consent
,
it
is
a
free
act
,
and
we
may
with-hold
it
if
we
please
:
If
this
arguing
I
have
made
be
just
,
we
are
to
believe
it
highly
probable
,
that
there
are
Bodies
;
but
this
bare
Argumentation
alone
ought
not
to
give
us
a
plenary
Conviction
and
Acquiescence
;
otherwise
,
it
is
we
our selves
that
act
,
and
not
God
in
us
;
it
being
by
a
free
act
,
and
consequently
liable
to
Error
,
that
we
consent
,
and
not
by
an
invincible
Impression
:
for
we
believe
it
freely
because
we
will
,
and
not
because
we
see
any
obliging
Evidence
.
Surely
nothing
but
Faith
can
convince
us
of
the
actual
Existence
of
Bodies
:
We
can
have
no
exact
Demonstration
of
any
other
Being's
Existence
,
than
the
necessary
:
and
if
we
warily
consider
it
,
we
shall
find
it
even
impossible
to
know
with
perfect
Evidence
,
whether
GOD
is
,
or
is
not
the
Creatour
of
a
Material
,
and
sensible
World
;
for
no
such
Evidence
is
to
be
met
with
,
except
in
necessary
Relations
,
which
are
not
to
be
found
betwixt
GOD
,
and
such
a
World
as
this
.
It
was
possible
for
him
not
to
have
created
it
:
If
he
has
made
it
,
it
is
because
he
will'd
it
,
and
freely
will'd
it
.
The
Saints
in
Heaven
see
by
an
evident
Light
,
That
the
FATHER
begets
the
SON
,
and
that
the
HOLY
GHOST
proceeds
from
the
FATHER
and
the
SON
;
for
these
are
necessary
Emanations
:
But
the
World
being
no
necessary
Emanation
from
GOD
;
those
who
most
clearly
see
his
Being
,
see
not
evidently
his
External
Productions
.
Nevertheless
I
am
perswaded
,
that
the
Blessed
are
certain
of
the
World's
Existence
;
but
't
is
because
GOD
assures
them
of
it
,
by
manifesting
his
Will
to
them
,
in
a
manner
by
us
unknown
;
and
we
on
Earth
are
certain
too
:
but
't
is
because
Faith
obliges
us
to
believe
,
That
GOD
has
created
this
World
;
and
that
this
Faith
is
conformable
to
our
natural
Judgments
,
or
our
compound
Sensations
,
when
they
are
confirm'd
by
all
our
Senses
,
corrected
by
our
Memory
,
and
rectify'd
by
our
Reason
.
I
confess
,
that
at
first
sight
the
Proof
or
Principle
of
our
Faith
seems
to
suppose
the
Existence
of
Bodies
:
Fides
ex
auditu
.
It
seems
to
suppose
Prophets
,
Apostles
,
Sacred-Writ
and
Miracles
;
but
if
we
closely
examine
it
,
we
shall
find
,
that
in
supposing
but
the
Appearances
of
Men
,
Prophets
,
Apostles
,
Holy
Scripture
,
Miracles
,
&c.
what
we
have
learn'd
from
these
supposs'd
Appearances
,
stands
undeniably
certain
;
since
,
as
I
have
prov'd
in
several
places
of
this
Work
,
GOD
only
can
represent
to
the
Mind
these
pretended
Appearances
;
and
He
is
no
Deceiver
.
For
Faith
supposes
all
this
,
Now
in
the
Appearance
of
Holy
Scripture
,
and
by
the
Seemingness
of
Miracles
,
we
learn
,
That
GOD
has
created
an
Heaven
and
an
Earth
,
that
the
Word
is
made
Flesh
,
and
other
such
like
Truths
,
which
suppose
the
Existence
of
a
created
World
.
Therefore
Faith
verifies
the
Existence
of
Bodies
;
and
all
these
Appearances
are
actually
substantiated
by
it
.
'T
is
needless
to
insist
longer
upon
answering
an
Objection
,
which
seems
too
abstracted
for
the
common
part
of
Men
;
and
I
believe
that
this
will
be
enough
to
satisfie
those
who
pretend
not
to
be
over-difficult
.
From
all
which
we
are
to
conclude
,
That
we
both
may
,
and
ought
to
correct
our
Natural
Judgments
,
or
compound
Perceptions
,
which
relate
to
the
sensible
Qualities
,
we
attribute
to
the
Bodies
that
surround
us
,
or
to
That
we
animate
.
But
as
for
natural
Judgments
,
which
relate
to
the
actual
Existence
of
Bodies
;
though
absolutely
,
we
are
not
oblig'd
to
form
free
ones
to
accord
with
them
;
yet
we
ought
not
to
supersede
doing
it
,
because
these
natural
Judgments
agree
perfectly
with
Faith
.
Finally
,
I
have
made
this
Explanation
,
chiefly
to
the
intent
we
may
seriously
reflect
upon
this
Truth
;
That
nothing
but
Eternal
Wisdom
can
enlighten
us
,
and
that
all
sensible
Notices
,
wherein
our
Body
is
concern'd
,
are
fallacious
;
at
least
are
not
attended
with
that
Light
,
which
we
feel
our selves
oblig'd
to
submit
to
.
I
am
sensible
that
these
Notions
will
not
pass
with
the
common
sort
of
Men
;
and
that
as
they
are
dispos'd
by
the
Superfluity
,
or
Poverty
of
their
Animal
Spirits
,
they
will
either
ridicule
,
or
flinch
at
the
Reasonings
I
have
laid
down
.
For
the
Imagination
cannot
endure
abstract
and
un-ordinary
Truths
:
but
either
considers
them
as
ghastly
Spectres
,
or
ridiculous
Phantasms
;
But
I
chuse
rather
to
be
the
Subject
of
Droll
,
and
Raillery
for
the
strong
and
bold
Imagination
,
and
the
Object
of
Indignation
,
and
Fear
to
the
weak
and
timorous
;
than
to
be
wanting
in
what
I
owe
to
Truth
,
and
to
those
generous
Defenders
of
the
Mind
against
the
Efforts
of
the
Body
,
who
know
how
to
distinguish
the
Responses
of
illuminating
Wisdom
,
from
the
confus'd
Noise
of
the
perplexing
,
and
erroneous
Imagination
.
THE
ILLUSTRATION
UPON
THE
Fifth
CHAPTER
of
the
Second
BOOK
.
Of
the
Memory
,
and
Spiritual
Habits
.
I
Had
no
mind
to
speak
in
this
Chapter
of
the
Memory
,
and
spiritual
Habits
,
for
several
Reasons
;
the
chief
of
which
is
,
That
we
have
no
clear
Idea
of
our
Soul
.
For
how
can
we
clearly
explain
what
are
the
Dispositions
which
the
Operations
of
the
Soul
leave
in
her
;
(
which
Dispositions
are
her
Habits
)
whilst
we
have
no
clear
Knowledge
of
the
Nature
of
our
Soul
?
'T
is
plain
that
't
is
impossible
to
know
distinctly
the
Changes
,
whereof
a
Being
is
capable
,
when
we
have
no
distinct
Knowledge
of
the
Nature
of
that
Being
.
For
if
,
for
Instance
,
we
had
no
clear
Idea
of
Extension
,
in
vain
should
we
endeavour
to
discover
its
Figures
.
However
,
since
I
am
desir'd
to
speak
of
a
Matter
which
I
know
not
in
it self
;
see
what
a
compass
I
fetch
,
that
I
may
only
keep
to
clear
Idea's
.
I
suppose
that
there
's
none
but
God
who
acts
upon
the
Mind
,
and
represents
to
it
the
Idea's
of
all
things
;
and
that
if
the
Mind
perceive
any
Object
by
a
very
clear
and
distinct
Idea
,
't
is
because
God
represents
that
Idea
in
a
most
perfect
manner
.
I
farther
suppose
,
that
the
Will
of
God
being
entirely
conformable
to
ORDER
,
and
Justice
,
we
need
but
to
have
a
Right
to
any
thing
,
to
obtain
it
.
The
Suppositions
being
laid
down
,
which
are
easily
conceiv'd
,
the
Spiritual
Memory
is
readily
explain'd
.
For
Order
requiring
,
that
Spirits
,
which
have
frequently
thought
of
any
Object
,
should
more
easily
think
again
upon
it
,
and
have
a
more
clear
and
lively
Idea
of
it
,
that
those
who
have
but
seldom
consider'd
it
;
The
Will
of
God
,
which
continually
operates
by
Order
,
represents
to
their
Understanding
,
as
often
as
desir'd
,
the
clear
and
lively
Idea
of
that
Object
.
So
that
according
to
this
Explication
,
the
Memory
,
and
other
Habits
of
pure
Intelligences
,
consists
not
in
an
Easiness
of
operating
,
which
results
from
any
Modifications
of
their
Being
;
but
in
the
immutable
Order
of
God
,
and
in
a
Right
the
Mind
obtains
to
those
things
,
which
have
been
already
submitted
to
it
.
And
all
the
Power
of
the
Mind
immediately
and
solely
depends
on
God
alone
;
the
force
or
facility
of
acting
,
which
all
Creatures
have
in
their
Operations
,
being
in
this
Sence
but
the
efficacious
Will
of
the
Creatour
.
Nor
do
I
think
we
are
oblig'd
to
give
up
this
Explication
,
by
reason
of
the
evil
Habits
of
Sinners
▪
and
damn'd
Persons
.
For
tho'
God
does
all
that
is
Real
,
and
Positive
in
the
Actions
of
Sinners
,
it
is
evident
,
by
what
I
have
said
in
the
first
Illustration
,
that
he
is
not
the
Author
of
Sin
.
Nevertheless
I
believe
,
as
I
think
I
ought
,
that
after
the
Action
of
the
Soul
,
there
remain
some
Changes
which
dispose
it
to
that
same
Action
again
.
But
as
I
know
them
not
,
so
I
cannot
explain
them
;
for
I
have
no
clear
Idea
of
my
own
Mind
,
wherein
to
discover
all
the
Modifications
it
is
capable
of
.
I
believe
by
Theological
,
and
not
clear
and
evident
Proofs
;
See
the
Illustration
upon
the
7th
Chap.
of
Part
II.
Book
III.
that
the
Reason
of
pure
Intelligences
seeing
the
Objects
they
have
before
consider'd
,
more
distinctly
than
others
,
is
not
meerly
because
God
represents
them
in
a
livelier
and
perfecter
manner
;
but
because
they
are
really
more
dispos'd
to
receive
the
same
Action
of
God
in
them
.
Just
as
the
facility
of
playing
on
an
Organ
,
which
some
have
acquir'd
,
proceeds
not
from
any
greater
Force
and
Action
,
which
the
Animal
Spirits
(
that
are
necessary
to
the
Motion
of
the
Fingers
)
have
in
them
,
than
in
other
Men
:
but
from
the
Smoothness
,
and
Glibness
which
the
Passages
of
the
Animal
Spirits
have
gotten
by
Exercise
,
as
in
this
Chapter
is
explain'd
:
But
yet
I
grant
the
Use
of
Memory
,
and
the
other
Habits
is
unnecessary
in
those
,
who
being
perfectly
united
to
God
,
find
in
his
Light
,
all
sorts
of
Idea's
;
and
in
his
Will
,
all
the
facility
of
acting
that
can
be
desired
.
THE
ILLUSTRATION
UPON
THE
Seventh
CHAPTER
of
the
Second
BOOK
.
A
Reduction
of
the
Proofs
and
Explications
I
have
given
of
Original
Sin
:
Together
with
the
Answer
to
the
Objections
,
that
I
thought
most
urgent
.
IN
order
to
answer
methodically
to
the
Difficulties
that
may
arise
,
touching
Original
Sin
,
and
its
manner
of
Derivation
from
Fathers
to
Children
;
I
thought
fit
to
exhibit
in
few
words
,
what
I
have
said
on
that
Subject
,
in
several
places
of
the
foregoing
Treatise
.
Here
follow
my
principal
Proofs
,
which
I
have
disposed
after
a
particular
fashion
,
to
make
them
more
sensible
to
those
that
will
consider
them
.
I.
God
wills
Order
in
his
Works
.
What
we
clearly
conceive
to
be
agreeable
to
Order
,
God
wills
;
and
what
we
conceive
clearly
to
be
repugnant
to
It
,
God
wills
not
:
which
is
a
Truth
,
manifest
to
all
those
who
can
consider
the
infinitely
perfect
Being
,
with
a
steady
and
clear'd
View
.
Nothing
can
unfix
,
or
trouble
their
prospect
of
this
Truth
;
whilst
they
clearly
see
,
that
all
the
Difficulties
that
can
be
raised
against
this
Principle
,
proceed
but
from
the
Ignorance
of
those
things
which
are
necessary
to
be
known
to
solve
them
.
II.
God
has
no
other
End
in
his
Operations
,
than
himself
;
this
Order
demands
.
III.
God
creates
,
and
preserves
the
Mind
of
Man
to
be
taken
up
with
him
,
to
know
and
to
love
him
;
as
being
himself
the
End
of
his
own
Works
;
Order
will
have
it
so
.
God
cannot
will
,
that
a
Being
should
love
what
is
not
amiable
;
or
rather
,
He
cannot
will
,
that
what
is
less
amiable
,
should
be
more
beloved
.
Therefore
't
is
evident
that
Nature
is
corrupted
,
and
in
Disorder
,
since
the
Mind
loves
Bodies
that
are
not
amiable
,
and
that
commonly
more
than
God
.
Original
Sin
,
then
,
or
the
Corruption
of
Nature
,
needs
no
Proof
:
For
every
one
finds
plain
enough
in
himself
a
Law
,
which
captivates
and
disorders
him
;
a
Law
that
is
not
given
by
God
,
since
it
is
contrary
to
Order
,
by
which
His
Will
is
governed
.
IV.
Nevertheless
Man
before
his
Fall
,
was
admonished
by
preventing
Sensations
;
and
not
by
clear
Knowledge
,
whether
he
ought
to
unite
to
,
or
separate
from
the
encompassing
Bodies
;
Order
required
it
.
'T
is
a
Disorder
,
that
the
Mind
should
be
oblig'd
to
apply
it self
to
them
:
for
though
it
may
be
united
to
them
,
it
is
not
made
for
them
.
It
ought
therefore
to
have
Knowledge
of
God
,
and
Sense
of
Bodies
.
Again
;
whereas
Bodies
are
incapable
of
being
the
Good
of
the
Mind
,
it
would
with
Regret
and
Pain
,
unite
to
them
,
if
it
knew
them
to
be
only
what
they
are
,
without
being
sensible
of
something
in
them
,
which
is
not
.
Wherefore
the
Counterfeit
Good
ought
to
be
discerned
by
a
preventing
Sensation
,
that
it
may
be
lov'd
with
a
Love
of
Instinct
;
and
the
True
Good
ought
to
be
known
by
a
clear
Knowledge
,
that
it
may
be
lov'd
with
a
rational
Love
,
and
a
Love
of
Choice
.
Lastly
,
Man
being
made
,
and
preserved
by
God
,
to
know
,
and
love
him
;
ought
not
to
have
the
Capacity
of
his
Mind
either
possess'd
,
or
shar'd
in
spight
of
him
,
with
the
Knowledge
of
the
infinite
Figures
,
and
Configurations
of
Bodies
about
him
,
or
of
that
he
animates
;
and
yet
to
know
by
a
clear
Knowledge
,
Whether
such
a
Fruit
,
at
such
a
Season
,
be
fit
for
Nourishment
of
his
Body
,
manifestly
requires
the
Intelligence
of
so
many
things
,
and
the
making
so
many
Argumentations
,
as
would
quite
fill
up
the
most
comprehensive
of
created
Minds
.
V.
But
though
the
first
Man
was
advertis'd
by
preventing
Sensations
,
Whether
he
ought
,
or
ought
not
to
make
use
of
surrounding
Bodies
,
yet
he
was
not
mov'd
by
involuntary
,
and
rebellious
Passions
;
and
he
obliterated
out
of
his
Mind
the
Idea's
of
sensible
things
,
when
he
pleas'd
,
whether
he
us'd
them
or
not
;
because
Order
would
have
it
so
.
The
Mind
may
be
united
to
a
Body
,
but
it
should
command
it
,
and
not
depend
on
it
.
Again
,
All
the
Love
which
God
invests
us
with
,
ought
to
terminate
on
him
,
because
he
produces
nothing
in
us
but
what
is
for
himself
.
Lastly
,
Bodies
are
not
amiable
;
but
below
what
within
us
is
capable
of
loving
.
Therefore
in
the
first
Institution
of
Nature
,
Bodies
could
not
turn
our
Mind
towards
them
,
nor
incline
it
to
consider
them
,
and
love
them
,
as
its
Goods
.
VI.
The
Bodies
about
us
act
not
on
our
Soul
,
save
when
they
produce
some
Motions
in
our
Body
,
and
that
these
Motions
are
communicated
to
the
principal
Part
of
our
Brain
.
For
it
is
by
the
Changes
which
happen
in
this
Part
,
that
the
Soul
changes
her self
,
and
finds
her self
mov'd
by
sensible
Objects
.
This
I
have
sufficiently
prov'd
,
and
Experience
demonstrates
the
same
.
Which
being
suppos'd
,
it
is
clear
,
from
the
preceding
Article
,
that
Adam
stopt
when
he
pleas'd
,
the
Motions
communicated
to
his
Body
,
at
least
those
communicated
to
the
principal
part
of
his
Brain
:
Order
will'd
it
so
;
and
consequently
He
whose
Will
always
conforms
to
Order
,
and
who
can
do
nothing
against
It
though
He
be
Almighty
.
Thus
Man
might
,
on
certain
Occasions
,
suspend
the
Natural
Law
of
the
Communication
of
Motions
,
seeing
he
was
not
tainted
with
Concupisence
,
nor
did
he
feel
in
himself
any
involuntary
and
rebellious
Motions
.
VII
.
But
Adam
lost
that
Power
by
sinning
;
Order
would
have
it
so
:
for
it
is
not
reasonable
,
that
in
Favour
of
a
Sinner
,
and
a
Rebel
,
there
should
be
any
other
Exceptions
,
to
the
general
Law
of
the
Communication
of
Motions
,
than
what
are
absolutely
necessary
to
the
Preservation
of
our
Life
and
Civil
Society
.
Therefore
the
Body
of
Man
being
continually
shaken
,
by
the
Action
of
sensible
Objects
,
and
his
Soul
agitated
by
all
the
Concussions
of
the
principal
part
of
his
Brain
,
he
is
become
a
dependent
on
the
Body
,
to
which
he
was
only
united
,
and
over
which
he
had
a
Sovereignty
before
his
Fall
.
VIII
.
Let
us
see
now
how
the
first
Man
was
capable
of
sinning
.
It
is
natural
to
love
Pleasure
,
and
to
tast
it
;
and
this
was
not
forbidden
Adam
.
The
Case
is
the
same
with
Joy
:
one
may
rejoice
at
the
sight
of
his
Natural
Perfections
;
That
is
not
evil
in
it self
.
Man
was
made
to
be
happy
,
and
't
is
Pleasure
and
Joy
which
actually
beatifie
and
content
:
Adam
therefore
tasted
Pleasure
in
the
use
of
sensible
Goods
;
and
he
felt
a
Joy
upon
viewing
his
own
Perfections
:
For
't
is
impossible
to
consider
ones
self
,
as
happy
,
or
perfect
,
and
not
be
possess'd
with
it
.
He
felt
no
such
Pleasure
in
his
Duty
;
for
though
he
knew
God
was
his
Good
,
it
was
not
in
a
sensible
way
;
as
I
have
prov'd
in
several
places
.
So
the
Joy
he
might
find
in
his
Duty
,
was
not
very
sensible
;
which
being
suppos'd
,
we
conclude
,
That
whereas
the
first
Man
had
not
an
infinite
Capacity
of
Mind
,
his
Pleasure
,
or
his
Joy
weakned
its
clear
sight
,
which
gave
him
to
know
,
That
God
was
his
Good
,
and
that
he
ought
only
to
love
him
.
For
Pleasure
is
in
the
Soul
,
and
the
Modification
of
it
;
and
therefore
fills
up
our
Capacity
of
Thought
,
proportionably
as
it
affect
and
works
on
us
:
this
is
a
thing
which
we
learn
by
Experience
,
or
rather
from
that
inward
Sensation
we
have
of
our selves
.
We
may
then
conceive
,
That
the
first
Man
having
insensibly
suffer'd
the
Capacity
of
his
Mind
,
to
be
possess'd
,
or
divided
,
by
the
lively
Sense
of
a
presumptuous
Joy
,
or
,
it
may
be
,
some
Love
,
or
sensible
Pleasure
;
the
Presence
of
God
,
and
the
Consideration
of
his
Duty
were
eras'd
from
his
Mind
,
for
neglecting
couragiously
to
pursue
his
Light
in
the
Search
of
his
True
Good
:
so
this
Distraction
made
him
capable
of
falling
.
For
his
principal
Grace
and
strength
was
his
Light
,
and
the
clear
Knowledge
of
his
Duty
;
forasmuch
as
then
he
had
no
need
of
preventing
Delights
,
which
are
now
necessary
to
oppose
to
Concupisence
.
IX
.
And
it
must
be
observ'd
,
that
neither
the
preventing
Sense
of
Pleasure
,
which
Adam
felt
in
the
use
of
the
Goods
of
the
Body
,
nor
the
Joy
that
possess'd
him
,
when
reflecting
on
his
own
Happiness
or
Perfection
,
was
the
true
Cause
of
his
Fall
;
for
he
knew
very
well
,
that
none
but
God
could
give
him
that
Sense
of
Pleasure
or
Joy
:
and
so
he
in
Duty
should
have
lov'd
him
only
,
forasmuch
as
none
merits
our
Love
,
save
the
true
Cause
of
our
Felicity
.
As
nothing
perturbated
his
Knowledge
and
Light
,
whilst
he
strove
to
keep
it
pure
and
incorrupt
;
so
he
might
,
and
ought
to
have
expung'd
from
his
Mind
,
those
Sensations
which
divided
it
,
and
which
endanger'd
its
falling
off
,
and
losing
sight
of
him
,
who
strengthened
,
and
enlightned
it
.
He
ought
to
have
well
remembred
,
that
if
God
offer'd
himself
not
to
his
Sense
,
but
only
his
Vnderstanding
,
as
his
Good
,
it
was
to
afford
him
a
readier
way
to
merit
his
Reward
,
by
a
continual
Exercise
of
his
Liberty
.
Supposing
then
,
That
Adam
and
Eve
have
sinn'd
,
and
consequently
thereupon
felt
in
themselves
involuntary
and
rebellio●s
Motions
;
I
say
,
That
their
Children
must
needs
be
born
Sinners
,
and
subject
,
as
they
were
,
to
Motions
of
Concupiscence
.
See
my
Reasons
for
it
.
X.
I
have
prov'd
at
large
,
in
the
Chapter
that
occasion'd
this
Discourse
,
that
there
is
such
a
Communication
between
the
Brain
of
the
Mother
,
and
that
of
the
Child
,
that
all
the
Motions
and
Traces
excited
in
the
former
,
are
stirr'd
up
in
the
latter
.
Therefore
as
the
Soul
of
the
Infant
is
united
to
its
Body
,
at
the
very
instant
of
its
Creation
,
it
being
the
Conformation
of
the
Body
,
which
obliges
God
,
in
consequence
of
his
general
Will
,
to
inform
it
with
a
Soul
;
't
is
plain
,
that
at
the
very
moment
of
this
Soul's
Creation
,
it
has
corrupt
Inclinations
,
and
turns
towards
the
Body
:
since
it
has
,
from
that
same
moment
,
●nclinations
answerable
to
the
Motions
that
are
actually
in
the
Brain
it
is
united
to
.
XI
.
But
because
it
is
a
Disorder
,
That
the
Mind
should
propend
to
Bodies
,
and
expend
its
Love
upon
them
;
the
Infant
is
a
Sinner
,
and
in
Disorder
,
as
soon
as
out
of
the
Hands
of
his
Maker
.
God
,
who
is
the
Lover
of
Order
,
hates
him
in
this
Estate
;
notwithstanding
his
Sin
is
not
free
and
eligible
.
But
his
Mother
conceiv'd
him
in
Iniquity
,
because
of
the
Communication
establish'd
by
the
Order
of
Nature
,
betwixt
her
Brain
,
and
the
Brain
of
her
Infant
.
XII
.
Now
this
Communication
is
very
good
in
its
Institution
,
for
several
Reasons
.
First
,
Because
useful
,
and
it
may
be
,
necessary
to
the
Conformation
of
the
Foetus
.
Secondly
,
Because
the
Infant
,
by
this
means
,
might
have
some
Intercourse
with
his
Parents
;
it
being
but
reasonable
,
that
he
should
know
,
to
whom
he
was
oblig'd
for
his
Body
,
which
he
animated
.
Lastly
,
He
could
not
,
but
by
help
of
this
Communication
,
know
external
Occurrences
,
and
think
of
them
,
as
he
should
do
.
Having
a
Body
,
't
was
fit
he
should
have
Thoughts
relating
to
it
,
and
not
be
hood-wink'd
to
the
Works
of
God
,
amongst
which
he
liv'd
.
There
are
,
likely
,
many
other
Reasons
for
this
Communication
than
those
I
have
given
;
but
these
are
sufficient
to
justifie
it
,
and
to
cover
His
Conduct
from
Censure
and
Reproach
,
every
Will
of
whom
is
necessarily
conformable
to
ORDER
.
XIII
.
However
,
there
is
no
Reason
,
that
the
Infant
,
in
spight
of
his
Will
,
should
receive
the
Traces
of
sensible
Objects
.
If
the
Souls
of
Children
were
created
but
one
moment
before
they
were
united
to
their
Bodies
;
if
they
were
but
an
instant
in
a
State
of
Innocence
and
Order
;
they
would
have
plenary
Right
and
Power
,
from
the
necessity
of
Order
,
or
of
the
Eternal
Law
,
to
suspend
that
Communication
:
just
as
the
first
Man
,
before
his
Sin
,
stopt
when
he
pleas'd
the
Motions
which
arose
in
him
;
Order
requiring
,
That
the
Body
should
be
obedient
to
the
Mind
.
But
whereas
the
Souls
of
Children
were
never
well-pleasing
to
God
;
it
was
never
reasonable
,
that
God
on
their
behalf
should
dispence
with
the
Law
of
the
Communication
of
Motions
;
and
so
it
is
just
that
Infants
should
be
born
Sinners
,
and
in
Disorder
.
And
the
Order
of
Nature
,
which
is
just
,
and
equitable
,
was
not
the
Cause
of
their
Sin
;
but
the
Sin
of
their
Progenitors
.
In
which
sence
it
is
not
just
and
reasonable
,
that
a
sinful
Father
should
procreate
Children
perfecter
than
himself
,
or
that
they
should
have
a
Dominion
over
their
Bodies
,
which
their
Mother
has
not
over
her
own
.
XIV
.
'T
is
true
,
That
after
the
Sin
of
Adam
,
which
ruin'd
and
corrupted
all
things
,
God
might
by
changing
something
in
the
Order
of
Nature
,
have
remedied
the
Disorder
which
that
Sin
had
caus'd
.
But
God
changes
not
his
Will
in
that
manner
:
He
wills
nothing
but
what
is
just
,
and
what
He
once
wills
,
He
ever
wills
.
He
never
corrects
himself
,
nor
repents
of
what
he
does
;
but
his
Will
is
constant
and
immutable
.
His
Eternal
Decrees
depends
not
on
the
inconstant
Will
of
Man
,
nor
is
it
just
they
should
be
submitted
to
it
.
XV.
But
if
it
may
be
permitted
to
dive
into
the
Councels
of
the
Almighty
,
and
to
speak
our
Thoughts
upon
the
Motives
,
which
might
determine
him
to
establish
the
Order
now
explain'd
,
and
permit
the
Sin
of
Adam
;
I
can't
see
how
we
can
conceive
a
Notion
more
worthy
the
Greatness
of
God
,
and
more
consonant
to
Reason
and
Religion
,
than
to
believe
his
principal
Design
in
his
External
Operations
,
was
the
Incarnation
of
his
SON
,
That
God
establish'd
the
Order
of
Nature
,
See
the
5.
Dialogue
of
Christian
Conversation
.
Aug.
in
Jul.
lib.
6.
cap.
3.
and
permitted
the
Disorder
which
befel
it
,
to
help
forward
his
Great
Work
;
that
He
permitted
all
Men
to
be
subject
to
Sin
,
that
none
might
glory
in
himself
;
and
suffer'd
Concupiscence
in
the
Perfectest
,
and
Holiest
of
Men
,
lest
they
should
take
a
vain
Complacency
in
their
own
Persons
.
For
upon
considering
the
Perfection
of
one's
Being
,
't
is
difficult
to
despise
it
,
unless
,
at
the
same
time
,
we
contemplate
,
and
love
the
Supreme
Good
;
before
whom
all
our
Perfection
and
Greatness
dissolves
,
and
falls
to
nothing
.
I
own
,
That
Concupiscence
may
be
the
occasion
of
our
Merit
,
and
that
't
is
most
just
the
Mind
should
for
a
Season
follow
Order
with
Pain
and
Difficulty
,
that
it
may
merit
to
be
eternally
subject
to
it
with
Ease
and
Pleasure
.
I
grant
,
That
upon
that
Prospect
God
might
have
permitted
Concupiscence
,
when
he
foresaw
the
Sin
.
But
Concupiscence
not
being
absolutely
necessary
to
our
Meriting
,
if
God
permitted
it
,
it
was
,
That
Man
might
be
able
to
do
no
good
,
without
the
Aids
which
JESUS
CHRIST
has
merited
for
him
:
and
that
he
might
not
glory
in
his
own
strength
.
For
't
is
visible
,
That
a
Man
cannot
encounter
and
conquer
himself
,
unless
animated
by
the
Spirit
of
Christ
,
who
,
as
Head
of
the
Faithful
,
inspires
them
with
quite
opposite
Sentiments
to
those
of
Concupiscence
,
deriv'd
to
them
from
the
Original
Man
.
XVI
.
Supposing
then
,
That
Infants
are
born
with
Concupiscence
,
't
is
plain
they
are
effectively
Sinners
,
since
their
Heart
is
set
upon
Bodies
as
much
as
it
is
capable
:
there
is
as
yet
in
their
Will
but
one
Love
,
and
that
disorder'd
and
corrupt
;
and
so
they
have
nothing
in
them
that
can
be
the
Object
of
the
Love
of
God
,
because
he
cannot
love
Disorder
.
XVII
.
But
when
they
have
been
regenerated
in
JESUS
CHRIST
,
that
is
,
when
their
Heart
has
been
converted
to
God
,
either
by
an
actual
Motion
of
Love
,
or
by
an
internal
Disposition
,
like
that
which
remains
after
an
Act
of
Loving
God
:
then
Concupiscence
is
no
more
a
Sin
in
them
,
because
it
does
not
solely
possess
the
Heart
,
nor
domineer
any
longer
in
it
.
Habitual
Love
,
which
remain●
in
them
,
through
the
Grace
of
Baptism
in
our
LORD
,
is
more
free
,
or
more
strong
than
that
which
is
in
them
through
the
Contagion
of
Concupiscence
deriv'd
from
Adam
.
They
are
like
the
Just
,
who
in
their
Sleep
obey
the
Motions
of
Concupiscence
,
yet
lose
not
the
Grace
of
their
Baptism
,
because
their
Consent
to
these
Motions
is
involuntary
.
XVIII
.
It
should
not
be
thought
strange
,
That
I
believe
it
possible
for
Children
to
love
God
with
a
Love
of
Choice
,
at
the
time
of
their
Baptism
.
For
since
the
Second
Adam
is
contrary
to
the
First
,
why
should
he
not
,
at
the
time
of
Regeneration
,
deliver
Children
from
the
Servitude
of
their
Body
,
whereunto
they
are
subjected
by
the
First
?
That
being
enlightned
and
quickned
by
a
lively
and
efficacious
Grace
,
to
the
loving
of
God
,
they
may
love
him
with
a
free
and
rational
Love
,
without
being
obstructed
by
the
first
Adam
.
You
say
,
it
is
not
observable
,
that
their
Body
for
a
moment
leaves
acting
on
the
Mind
:
But
is
that
such
a
Wonder
,
that
we
can't
see
what
is
not
visible
?
One
single
Instant
is
sufficient
for
the
Exercise
of
that
Act
of
Love
:
And
as
it
may
be
perform'd
in
the
Soul
,
without
imprinting
any
Footsteps
in
the
Brain
,
't
is
no
more
to
be
admir'd
,
that
the
Adult
in
their
Baptism
do
not
always
mind
it
;
for
we
have
no
Memory
of
things
which
are
not
registred
in
the
Traces
of
the
Brain
.
XIX
.
St.
Paul
teaches
us
,
That
the
Old
Man
,
or
Concupiscence
,
is
crucify'd
with
JESUS
CHRIST
,
and
that
we
are
dead
and
buried
with
him
by
Baptism
.
What
means
this
,
but
that
then
we
are
deliver'd
from
the
Warring
of
the
Body
against
the
Mind
,
and
that
Concupiscence
is
as
it
were
Mortify'd
in
that
moment
:
'T
is
true
it
revives
;
but
having
been
destroy'd
,
and
thereby
left
Children
in
a
State
of
loving
God
,
it
can
do
them
no
harm
by
its
reviving
.
For
when
there
are
two
Loves
in
the
Heart
,
a
Natural
,
and
a
Free
,
Order
will
,
that
the
Free
be
only
respected
.
But
if
Infants
in
Baptism
lov'd
God
by
an
Act
in
no
wise
free
,
and
afterwards
lov'd
Bodies
by
many
Acts
of
the
same
Species
;
God
could
not
perhaps
,
according
to
Order
,
have
more
respect
to
one
single
Act
,
than
to
many
,
which
were
all
natural
,
and
without
Liberty
.
Or
rather
,
if
their
contrary
Love●
were
equal
in
force
,
he
must
have
respect
to
that
which
was
last
;
by
the
same
Reason
,
that
when
there
has
been
successively
in
an
Heart
Two
Free-Loves
contrary
to
each
other
,
God
has
always
respect
to
the
Last
,
since
Grace
is
destroy'd
by
any
one
Mortal
Sin
.
XX.
Nevertheless
,
it
cannot
be
deny'd
,
but
God
may
justifie
the
Infant
,
without
interrupting
the
Dominion
of
his
Body
over
his
Mind
;
or
convert
his
Will
towards
him
,
by
depositing
in
his
Soul
a
Disposition
like
that
,
which
remains
after
an
Actual
Motion
of
our
Loving
God
.
But
that
way
of
acting
,
I
doubt
,
seems
less
Natural
than
the
Other
;
for
it
cannot
clearly
be
conceiv'd
what
these
remaining
Dispositions
can
be
.
'T
is
true
,
that
ought
not
to
be
much
admir'd
;
since
having
no
clear
Idea
of
our
Soul
,
See
Ch.
7.
Part
II.
of
Book
II.
with
its
Illustration
.
as
I
have
elsewhere
prov'd
,
we
need
not
wonder
if
we
know
not
all
the
Modifications
it
is
capable
of
.
But
the
Mind
cannot
be
fully
satisfied
upon
things
,
which
it
does
not
clearly
conceive
;
and
without
recourse
to
an
extraordinary
Miracle
,
we
cannot
see
what
can
give
the
Soul
these
Dispositions
,
without
a
preceding
Act
:
surely
it
cannot
be
done
by
ways
that
seem
most
plain
and
simple
.
Whereas
the
second
Adam
acting
on
the
baptiz'd
Infant
's
Mind
for
one
moment
,
the
contrary
to
what
the
first
Adam
produc'd
in
it
before
,
Regeneration
is
perform'd
by
the
usual
ways
of
acting
which
God
takes
in
his
sanctifying
the
Adult
:
For
the
Infant
,
at
that
moment
,
being
void
of
Sensations
and
Passions
,
which
divide
its
Thinking
and
Willing
Capacity
,
has
nothing
to
encumber
it
,
and
prevent
its
knowing
and
loving
its
true
Good
.
This
is
all
I
say
at
present
,
because
it
is
not
necessary
to
know
precisely
,
how
Regeneration
of
Infants
is
perform'd
;
provided
we
admit
in
them
a
true
Regeneration
,
or
an
inward
and
real
Justification
,
caus'd
by
Acts
,
or
at
least
by
Habits
of
Faith
,
Hope
,
and
Charity
.
My
offering
an
Explication
,
so
repugnant
to
Prejudices
,
is
design'd
for
the
Satisfaction
of
those
,
who
will
not
allow
of
Spiritual
Habits
,
and
to
prove
to
them
the
Possibility
of
the
Regeneration
of
Infants
:
For
the
Notion
of
Imputation
seems
to
me
to
include
a
manifest
Contradiction
;
it
being
impossible
,
That
God
should
consider
his
Creatures
as
Righteous
,
and
actually
love
them
,
whilst
they
are
actually
in
Disorder
and
Corruption
.
Though
he
may
for
his
SON's
sake
have
a
Design
to
re-instate
them
in
ORDER
,
and
love
them
when
re-instated
.
OBJECTIONS
Against
the
Proofs
and
Explications
of
Original
Sin
.
OBJECTION
against
the
first
Article
.
GOD
wills
Order
,
it
is
true
;
but
't
is
his
Will
that
makes
it
:
it
does
not
suppose
it
:
Whatever
God
wills
is
in
Order
purely
for
this
Reason
that
God
wills
it
:
At
every
Objection
turn
to
the
Article
it
is
made
against
.
If
God
wills
that
Minds
should
be
subject
to
Bodies
,
should
love
and
fear
them
,
there
is
no
disorder
in
all
this
.
If
God
will'd
that
two
times
two
should
not
be
four
,
we
should
not
speak
false
,
in
saying
two
times
two
were
not
four
:
For
it
would
be
a
Truth
.
God
is
the
Principle
of
all
Truth
:
and
the
Master
of
all
Order
:
he
supposes
nothing
;
neither
Truth
,
nor
Order
:
but
makes
all
.
ANSWER
.
Then
all
is
thrown
in
Confusion
.
There
is
no
longer
any
Science
nor
Morality
,
nor
undeniable
Proofs
of
our
Religion
.
Which
consequence
is
evident
to
any
Man
who
clearly
comprehends
this
false
Principle
;
That
God
produces
Order
and
Truth
by
a
Will
absolutely
Free
.
But
this
is
not
to
answer
it
.
I
Answer
then
that
God
can
neither
do
nor
will
any
thing
without
knowledge
;
that
therefore
his
Will
supposes
something
;
but
what
it
supposes
is
nothing
of
a
created
nature
,
Order
,
Truth
,
Eternal
Wisdom
,
is
the
Exemplar
of
all
the
Works
of
God
:
which
Wisdom
is
not
made
;
God
who
makes
all
things
never
made
it
,
though
he
constantly
begets
it
by
the
necessity
of
his
Being
.
Whatever
God
wills
is
in
Order
,
for
that
sole
reason
,
that
he
wills
it
:
No
body
denies
it
.
But
this
is
because
God
cannot
act
against
himself
,
that
is
,
his
Wisdom
and
his
Knowledge
.
He
is
at
liberty
not
to
produce
any
External
Work
:
but
supposing
he
will
act
;
he
cannot
act
otherways
than
by
the
immutable
order
of
his
Wisdom
,
which
he
necessarily
Loves
.
For
Religion
and
Reason
teach
me
that
he
works
nothing
without
his
SON
,
without
his
WORD
,
without
his
WISDOM
.
Therefore
I
fear
not
to
affirm
,
that
God
cannot
positively
will
that
the
mind
should
be
subject
to
the
Body
.
Because
that
Wisdom
,
whereby
God
wills
,
whatever
he
wills
,
makes
me
clearly
understand
it
is
contrary
to
Order
:
And
I
see
this
clearly
in
that
same
Wisdom
;
because
it
is
the
Soveraign
and
Universal
Reason
,
which
is
participated
by
all
Spirits
,
for
which
all
Intelligences
are
created
,
and
by
which
all
Men
are
Reasonable
.
For
no
Man
is
his
own
Reason
,
Light
,
and
Wisdom
;
unless
it
be
when
his
Reason
is
Particular
,
his
Light
,
an
Ignis
fatuus
,
and
his
Wisdom
Folly
.
As
the
Generality
of
Men
know
not
distinctly
that
it
is
only
Eternal
Wisdom
which
enlightens
them
;
and
that
Intelligible
Ideas
which
are
the
Immediate
object
of
their
Mind
,
are
not
created
;
so
they
imagine
,
that
Eternal
Laws
and
Immutable
Truths
,
receive
their
Establishment
from
a
free
will
of
God
.
And
this
is
what
occasion'd
M.
des
Cartes
to
say
,
that
God
was
able
to
effect
that
twice
four
should
not
be
eight
;
and
that
the
three
Angles
of
a
Triangle
should
not
be
equal
to
two
Rights
.
Because
there
is
no
Order
,
says
he
,
no
Law
,
no
Reason
,
Goodness
or
Truth
,
but
depends
on
God
,
and
that
is
he
who
from
all
Eternity
,
has
ordain'd
and
establish'd
,
as
supreme
Legislator
,
Eternal
Truths
.
Answer
to
the
sixth
Objection
against
his
Meditations
.
Art.
6.
Art.
8.
This
Learned
Man
did
not
observe
that
there
was
an
Order
,
a
Law
,
a
Sovereign
Reason
Coeternal
with
God
,
and
necessarily
lov'd
by
him
,
and
accordingly
to
which
he
must
necessarily
act
,
supposing
he
will
act
.
For
God
is
indifferent
as
to
his
External
Workings
,
but
the
manner
of
his
working
,
though
he
be
perfectly
free
,
is
not
indifferent
to
him
.
He
always
acts
in
the
wisest
and
perfectest
manner
possible
:
he
constantly
follows
immutable
,
and
necessary
Order
.
Thus
God
is
at
liberty
not
to
make
either
Spirits
,
or
Bodies
,
but
if
he
creates
these
two
Kinds
of
Beings
,
See
the
Illustration
upon
the
6th
Chap.
of
Part
II.
Book
III.
he
must
create
them
by
the
simplest
ways
,
and
situate
them
in
the
most
perfect
Order
.
He
may
for
Example
unite
Spirits
to
Bodies
,
but
I
maintain
that
he
cannot
subject
them
thereunto
,
unless
in
pursuance
of
the
Order
which
he
always
follows
,
the
Sin
of
Spirits
obliges
him
to
use
them
in
that
manner
:
as
I
have
already
explain'd
in
the
seventh
Article
,
and
in
the
first
Explication
towards
the
end
.
To
anticipate
some
instances
that
might
be
urg'd
against
me
,
I
think
it
necessary
to
say
that
Men
are
to
blame
to
consult
themselves
when
they
would
know
what
God
can
do
or
will
.
They
are
not
to
judge
of
his
wills
by
the
inward
sense
they
have
of
their
own
Inclinations
.
For
otherwise
they
would
often
make
him
an
unjust
,
cruel
,
sinful
,
instead
of
an
Almighty
God
.
They
ought
to
lay
aside
the
general
Principle
of
their
Prejudices
,
which
disposes
them
to
judge
of
all
things
with
reference
to
themselves
,
and
not
to
attribute
to
God
what
they
do
not
clearly
conceive
to
be
included
in
the
Idea
of
a
Being
infinitely
perfect
.
For
they
ought
not
to
judge
of
things
save
by
clear
Ideas
.
And
then
the
God
they
worship
,
will
not
be
like
those
of
Antiquity
,
Cruel
,
Adulterous
,
Voluptious
,
as
the
Persons
who
have
imagin'd
them
:
nor
will
he
resemble
the
God
of
some
Christians
,
who
to
make
him
as
powerful
as
the
Sinner
wishes
him
,
ascribe
to
him
an
actual
power
of
acting
against
all
Order
,
of
leaving
Sin
unpunisht
,
and
of
condemning
to
eternal
Torments
Persons
never
so
righteous
and
Innocent
.
Second
OBJECTION
against
the
First
Article
.
If
God
wills
Order
,
what
is
it
that
makes
Monsters
,
I
say
not
amongst
Men
;
for
they
have
sinned
,
but
amongst
Animals
and
Plants
?
What
is
the
cause
of
the
general
corruption
of
the
Air
which
breeds
so
many
Diseases
?
By
what
Order
is
it
that
the
Seasons
are
so
irregular
,
and
that
the
Sun
and
the
Frost
burn
up
and
kill
the
Fruits
of
the
Earth
?
Is
it
to
act
with
Wisdom
and
Order
,
to
furnis●
an
Animal
with
parts
quite
useless
,
and
to
congeal
the
Fruits
after
they
are
perfectly
formed
?
Is
not
this
rather
because
God
does
what
he
pleases
,
and
that
his
power
supersedes
all
Order
and
Rule
?
For
to
mention
things
of
greater
Importance
than
the
Fruits
of
the
Earth
,
wherewith
he
may
do
as
he
sees
good
:
the
Clay
whereof
God
makes
Vessels
of
wrath
,
is
the
same
with
that
which
he
fashions
Vessels
of
Mercy
:
ANSWER
.
These
are
the
difficulties
which
serve
only
to
obscure
the
Truth
,
as
proceeding
from
the
darkness
of
the
Mind
.
We
know
that
God
is
just
:
we
see
that
the
wicked
are
Happy
:
ought
we
to
deny
what
wee
see
;
ought
we
to
doubt
of
what
we
know
,
because
we
may
possibly
be
so
stupid
as
not
to
know
,
and
so
Libertine
as
not
to
believe
what
Religion
teaches
us
of
future
Torments
?
So
we
know
that
God
is
Wise
;
and
all
that
he
does
is
Good
;
mean
while
we
see
Monsters
,
or
defective
Works
.
What
are
we
to
believe
that
God
is
out
of
his
aim
,
or
that
these
Monsters
are
not
his
handiwork
?
Certainly
if
we
have
sence
and
constancy
of
Mind
,
we
shall
believe
neither
the
one
nor
the
other
.
For
't
is
manifest
that
God
does
all
,
and
that
whatever
he
does
is
as
perfect
as
possible
,
with
relation
to
the
simplicity
and
fewness
of
the
means
he
imploys
,
in
the
Formation
of
his
Work
.
We
must
hold
fast
to
what
we
see
,
and
not
quit
our
ground
for
any
difficulties
impossible
to
be
resolv'd
;
when
our
Ignorance
is
the
cause
of
that
Impossibility
.
If
Ignorance
must
raise
Difficulties
,
and
such
like
Difficulties
overthrow
the
best
establisht
Opinions
,
what
will
remain
certain
among
Men
who
know
not
all
things
?
What
?
Shall
not
the
brightest
Lights
be
able
to
disperse
the
least
Darkness
;
and
shall
any
little
shadow
Eclipse
the
clearest
and
the
liveliest
Light
?
But
though
the
answering
such
sort
of
Difficulties
might
be
dispenc'd
with
,
without
Prejudice
to
the
fore-establis●t
Principle
;
yet
it
is
not
amiss
to
show
they
are
not
unanswerable
.
For
the
Mind
of
Man
is
so
unjust
in
its
Judgments
,
that
it
may
possibly
prefer
the
Opinions
which
seem
to
result
from
these
imaginary
Difficulties
,
before
certain
Truths
,
which
no
Man
can
doubt
of
,
but
because
he
will
;
and
with
that
design
ceases
to
examine
them
.
I
say
then
that
God
wills
order
,
though
there
are
Monsters
;
and
't
is
moreover
because
God
wills
order
,
that
there
are
Monsters
;
and
this
is
my
reason
.
Order
requires
that
the
Laws
of
nature
whereby
God
produces
that
infinite
Variety
,
so
conspicuous
in
the
World
,
should
be
very
simple
,
and
very
few
in
number
.
Now
't
is
the
simplicity
of
these
general
Laws
,
which
in
some
particular
Junctures
,
and
because
of
the
Disposition
of
the
subject
,
produces
irregular
Motions
,
or
rather
Monstrous
Combinations
:
and
consequently
God's
willing
order
is
the
cause
of
these
Monsters
.
Thus
God
does
not
positively
or
directly
will
the
Existence
of
Monsters
:
but
he
positively
wills
certain
Laws
of
the
Communication
of
Motions
,
whereof
Monsters
are
the
necessary
consequences
;
because
these
Laws
,
though
of
a
most
simple
kind
,
are
nevertheless
capable
of
producing
that
variety
of
forms
which
can't
be
sufficiently
admired
.
For
Example
:
In
consequence
of
the
general
Laws
of
the
Communication
of
Motions
,
there
are
some
Bodies
which
are
driven
near
the
Centre
of
the
Earth
.
The
Body
of
a
Man
,
or
an
Animal
is
one
of
these
:
that
which
upholds
him
in
the
Air
breaks
under
his
Feet
:
is
it
just
,
or
according
to
Order
,
that
God
should
change
his
general
Will
,
for
that
particular
Case
?
Surely
it
seems
not
probable
.
That
Animal
therefore
must
necessarily
break
,
or
maim
its
Body
.
And
thus
we
ought
to
argue
about
the
generation
of
Monsters
.
ORDER
requires
that
all
Beings
should
have
what
's
necessary
to
their
Preservation
,
and
the
Propagation
of
the
Species
;
provided
this
may
be
done
by
most
simple
Means
,
and
worthy
the
Wisdom
of
God
.
And
so
we
see
that
Animals
,
as
also
Plants
have
general
Means
to
preserve
themselves
,
and
to
continue
their
Species
:
and
if
some
Animals
fail
thereof
,
in
some
particular
Occasions
,
't
is
because
these
general
Laws
,
whereby
they
were
form'd
,
reach
not
these
private
Emergencies
,
because
they
respect
not
Animals
separately
,
but
generally
extend
to
all
Beings
;
and
that
the
Good
of
the
Publick
must
be
preferr'd
before
Particular
Advantages
.
'T
is
evident
,
That
if
God
made
but
one
Animal
,
it
would
not
be
Monstrous
:
But
Order
would
require
,
That
he
should
not
make
that
Animal
by
the
same
Laws
that
he
at
present
forms
all
others
;
for
the
Action
of
God
must
be
proportion'd
to
his
Design
.
By
the
Laws
of
Nature
he
designs
not
the
making
one
Animal
,
but
a
whole
World
;
and
he
must
make
it
by
the
simpliest
Means
,
as
Order
requires
.
'T
is
enough
then
that
the
World
be
not
monstrous
,
or
that
the
general
Effects
be
suitable
to
the
general
Laws
,
to
vindicate
the
Work
of
God
from
Censure
and
Reproach
.
If
,
for
all
particular
Changes
,
God
had
instituted
so
many
particular
Laws
;
or
if
He
had
constituted
in
every
Being
a
particular
Nature
or
Principle
,
of
all
the
Motions
that
arrive
in
it
;
I
confess
it
would
be
hard
to
ju●tifie
his
Wisdom
against
so
visible
Disorders
.
We
should
perhaps
be
forc'd
to
confess
,
either
that
God
wills
not
Order
,
or
that
he
knows
not
how
,
or
is
not
able
to
rectifie
Disorder
.
For
,
in
short
,
it
seems
to
me
impossible
to
ascribe
an
almost
infinite
Number
of
second
Causes
,
of
natural
Forces
,
Vertues
,
Qualities
and
Faculties
,
to
what
we
call
the
Sports
and
Disorders
of
Nature
,
with
a
Salvo
to
the
infinite
Power
and
Wisdom
of
the
Author
of
all
things
.
OBJECTION
against
the
Second
Article
.
GOD
can
never
act
for
Himself
.
A
wise
Being
will
do
nothing
useless
;
but
whatever
God
should
do
for
himself
,
would
be
useless
;
because
he
wants
nothing
.
God
wills
nothing
for
himself
,
if
by
the
Necessity
of
his
Essence
he
has
all
the
Perfection
he
can
desire
.
And
if
God
desires
nothing
for
himself
,
he
works
nothing
for
himself
,
since
he
works
only
by
the
Efficacy
of
his
Will
.
The
Nature
of
Good
,
is
to
be
communicative
and
diffusive
;
't
is
to
be
useful
to
others
,
and
not
to
it self
;
't
is
to
seek
out
;
't
is
,
if
it
be
possible
,
to
create
Persons
whom
it
may
make
happy
.
Therefore
it
is
a
Contradiction
,
for
God
,
who
is
essentially
and
supremely
good
,
to
act
for
himself
.
ANSWER
.
GOD
may
be
said
to
act
for
himself
two
ways
;
either
with
intent
to
derive
some
Advantage
from
what
he
does
;
or
to
the
end
,
his
Creature
may
find
its
Happiness
and
Perfection
in
him
.
I
enquire
not
,
at
present
,
whether
God
acts
for
himself
,
in
the
first
sense
;
and
whether
to
receive
an
Honour
worthy
of
himself
,
he
has
made
,
and
restor'd
all
things
by
his
SON
,
in
whom
,
according
to
the
Scripture
,
all
things
subsist
.
I
only
assert
,
that
God
cannot
create
,
and
preserve
Spirits
,
in
order
to
know
,
and
love
created
Beings
.
'T
is
an
Immutable
,
Eternal
,
and
necessary
Law
.
That
they
should
know
,
and
love
God
;
as
I
have
explain'd
in
the
Third
Article
.
Thus
this
Objection
does
not
impugn
my
Principle
,
but
,
on
the
contrary
,
corroborates
it
:
and
if
it
be
certain
,
that
't
is
the
Nature
of
Good
to
disseminate
,
and
communicate
it self
abroad
,
(
for
I
stand
not
to
examine
that
Axiome
)
't
is
evident
,
That
God
being
essentially
and
supreamly
Good
,
it
is
no
Contradiction
he
should
act
in
the
Sence
I
intended
.
OBJECTION
against
the
Fourth
Article
.
Ignorance
being
a
Consequence
of
Sin
,
Adam
before
his
Fall
had
a
perfect
Knowledge
of
the
Nature
of
his
own
Body
,
and
of
those
he
liv'd
amongst
:
He
must
,
for
Example
,
have
been
perfectly
acquainted
with
the
Nature
of
all
Animals
,
to
give
them
,
as
he
did
,
such
Names
as
agreed
to
them
.
ANSWER
.
'T
is
a
Mistake
:
Ignorance
is
neither
an
Evil
,
nor
a
Consequence
of
Sin
.
'T
is
Errour
or
Blindness
of
Mind
,
which
is
both
one
,
and
the
other
.
None
but
God
knows
all
things
without
any
Shadow
of
Ignorance
;
Ignorance
is
incident
to
the
brightest
,
and
most
enlightned
Intelligences
.
Whatever
is
finite
cannot
comprehend
Infinity
:
and
thus
there
is
no
Spirit
that
can
comprehend
only
all
the
Properties
of
Triangles
;
Adam
knew
,
the
first
minute
of
his
Creation
,
whatever
was
requisite
he
should
know
,
and
nothing
more
;
and
it
was
to
no
purpose
for
him
to
know
exactly
the
Disposition
of
all
the
Parts
of
his
Body
,
and
of
those
he
made
use
of
:
the
Reasons
are
to
be
seen
in
this
Article
,
and
elsewhere
.
The
Imposition
of
Names
,
in
Scripture
,
And
calls
them
all
by
their
names
Ps.
47.
rather
denotes
the
Authority
than
the
perfect
Knowledge
of
the
Imposer
.
As
the
Lord
of
Heaven
had
made
Adam
the
Lord
of
Earth
,
he
conceded
him
the
Privilege
of
giving
Names
to
the
Animals
,
as
he
himself
had
done
to
the
Stars
.
'T
is
evident
,
That
Sounds
,
or
Words
,
neither
have
,
nor
can
have
any
natural
relation
to
the
things
they
signifie
;
let
the
Divine
Plato
,
and
the
Mysterious
Pythagoras
say
what
they
please
of
it
.
One
might
perhaps
explain
the
Nature
of
an
Horse
,
or
an
Oxe
,
in
an
entire
Book
,
but
a
Word
is
not
a
Book
:
and
it
's
ridiculous
to
imagine
,
That
Monosyllables
,
as
Sus
,
which
in
Hebrew
signifies
a
Horse
,
and
S●bor
,
which
signifies
an
Oxe
,
should
represent
the
Nature
of
these
Animals
.
Notwithstanding
there
is
great
probability
these
Names
were
impos'd
by
Adam
,
since
they
are
found
in
Genesis
:
Chap.
1.19
.
the
Author
whereof
assures
us
,
That
the
Names
which
Adam
gave
the
Creatures
were
the
same
which
were
in
use
in
his
time
;
for
I
cannot
see
what
else
can
be
meant
by
these
Words
,
Omne
quod
vocavit
Adam
animae
viventis
,
ipsum
est
nomen
ejus
.
And
whatsoever
Adam
call'd
every
living
Creature
,
that
was
the
Name
thereof
But
I
grant
that
Adam
gave
Names
to
Animals
,
which
have
some
reference
to
their
Nature
,
and
I
subscribe
to
the
Learned
Etymologies
that
an
Author
of
this
Age
gives
us
of
them
.
I
will
that
he
call'd
domestick
Animals
Behemoth
,
because
of
their
keeping
silence
;
the
Ram
Ajil
,
because
he
is
strong
;
the
Buck
Sair
,
because
swift
;
the
Hog
Chazir
,
because
of
his
little
Eyes
;
the
Ass
Chamor
,
because
in
the
East
Country
red
Asses
are
common
.
But
I
can't
conceive
that
any
more
is
requisite
,
than
to
open
the
Eyes
to
know
if
a
Buck
be
swift
,
an
Ass
red
,
and
whether
a
Hog
has
little
or
great
Eyes
.
Adam
calls
by
the
Name
of
Beir
and
Behemah
,
what
we
term
a
Brute
,
or
a
great
domestick
Creature
,
because
these
Beasts
are
mute
and
stupid
.
What
should
we
thence
conclude
?
That
he
knew
perfectly
their
Nature
?
That
is
not
evident
:
I
should
rather
be
apprehensive
,
lest
it
should
be
thence
concluded
,
That
Adam
,
being
simple
enough
to
put
a
Question
to
an
Oxe
,
as
being
the
largest
of
domestick
Animals
,
and
wondring
that
he
could
not
answer
him
,
despis'd
him
,
and
nam'd
by
a
Term
of
Contempt
,
Beir
and
Behemah
.
Second
OBJECTION
against
the
Fourth
Article
.
Some
preventing
Sensations
are
incommodious
and
painful
:
Adam
was
just
and
innocent
,
and
consequently
ought
not
to
feel
the
smart
of
them
.
He
ought
then
on
all
occasions
to
be
guided
by
Reason
and
Knowledge
,
and
not
by
preventing
Sensations
,
like
those
we
have
at
present
.
ANSWER
.
I
confess
there
are
preventing
Sensations
,
which
are
disagreeable
and
painful
,
but
they
never
occasion'd
any
Pain
in
the
first
Man
;
because
in
the
instant
they
gave
him
any
,
he
,
by
an
Act
of
his
Will
,
withstood
the
Impression
,
and
,
in
the
very
instant
of
that
Volition
,
he
ceas'd
to
be
touch'd
with
it
.
These
Sensations
did
only
respectfully
caution
him
what
ought
to
be
done
,
or
omitted
;
and
did
not
incommode
his
Felicity
:
They
but
made
him
sensible
that
he
was
capable
of
losing
it
;
and
that
he
who
made
him
Happy
,
could
punish
and
make
him
miserable
,
if
he
fail'd
in
his
Fidelity
.
But
to
perswade
our selves
,
that
the
first
Man
was
never
overtaken
with
the
Sense
of
any
lively
Pain
,
we
need
but
consider
these
two
things
.
First
,
that
Pain
is
very
light
,
when
the
Motions
it
is
annex'd
to
are
very
languid
;
because
it
is
always
proportion'd
to
the
force
of
the
Motions
,
that
are
communicated
to
the
chief
part
of
the
Brain
.
Secondly
,
That
is
of
the
Nature
of
Motion
,
to
include
a
Succession
of
Time
;
and
it
cannot
be
violent
at
the
first
instant
of
its
Communication
.
Which
being
suppos'd
,
it
is
plain
,
that
the
first
Man
never
felt
a
violent
surprizing
Pain
,
that
was
capable
to
make
him
miserable
;
because
he
could
put
a
stop
to
the
Motions
that
caus'd
it
.
But
if
so
be
,
he
could
effectually
stop
them
,
at
the
first
instant
of
their
Action
,
there
is
no
doubt
but
he
would
do
it
,
since
he
was
always
desirous
of
Happiness
;
and
that
Aversion
is
naturally
conjoin'd
to
the
Sense
of
Pain
.
Adam
therefore
never
suffer'd
any
violent
Pain
;
but
I
think
we
are
not
oblig'd
to
say
,
that
he
never
felt
any
light
and
inconsiderable
smart
,
such
as
is
that
when
we
tast
a
sowre
Fruit
,
supposing
it
to
be
ripe
.
His
Felicity
had
been
very
tender
,
if
so
little
a
thing
had
been
able
to
disturb
it
.
For
such
Delicacy
is
a
sign
of
Weakness
:
for
how
can
that
Joy
and
Pleasure
be
substantial
,
that
such
a
Trifle
can
dissolve
and
annihilate
?
Pain
never
truly
molests
our
Happiness
but
when
it
is
involuntary
,
and
possesses
us
in
spight
of
our
Resistance
.
JESUS
CHRIST
was
happy
,
though
on
the
Cross
,
in
the
midst
of
his
Groans
,
and
Agonies
,
because
he
suffered
nothing
,
but
what
he
was
willing
to
undergo
.
Thus
Adam
suffering
nothing
against
his
will
,
it
cannot
be
said
we
make
him
unhappy
before
his
Sin
,
in
supposing
him
admonish'd
by
preventing
,
but
respectful
,
and
submissive
Sensations
,
of
what
he
ought
to
avoid
,
for
the
preservation
of
his
Life
.
OBJECTION
against
the
Fifth
Article
.
Adam
felt
preventing
Pleasures
:
But
these
are
involuntary
Motions
;
Therefore
Adam
was
agitated
with
involuntary
Motions
.
ANSWER
.
I
Answer
that
Adam's
Sensations
preceded
his
Reason
,
the
proofs
I
have
shown
for
it
in
the
Fourth
Article
.
But
I
deny
that
they
preceded
his
Will
;
or
that
they
stirr'd
up
in
it
any
particular
Motions
.
For
Adam
was
willingly
admonish'd
by
these
Sensations
,
what
he
ought
to
do
for
the
preservation
of
his
Life
:
But
he
was
never
willing
to
be
perturbated
by
them
in
spight
of
his
Will
.
For
that
's
a
Contradiction
.
Moreover
,
when
he
desir'd
to
apply
himself
to
the
contemplation
of
Truth
,
without
any
distraction
of
Thought
,
his
Senses
and
his
Passions
kept
an
intire
Silence
.
Order
would
it
should
be
so
;
for
that
's
a
necessary
sequel
of
that
absolute
power
he
had
over
his
Body
.
See
the
Illustration
upon
the
3d
Chap.
Book
V.
I
answer
secondly
,
that
it
is
not
true
,
that
the
Pleasure
of
the
Soul
is
the
same
thing
with
its
Motion
,
and
its
Love
.
Pleasure
and
Love
are
modes
of
the
Souls
Existence
.
But
Pleasure
has
no
necessary
relation
to
the
object
that
seems
to
cause
it
;
and
Love
is
necessarily
related
unto
Good
.
Pleasure
is
to
the
Soul
what
Figure
is
to
Body
:
and
Motion
is
to
Body
what
Love
is
to
the
Soul
.
But
the
Motion
of
a
Body
is
very
different
from
its
Figure
.
I
grant
that
the
Soul
which
has
a
constant
Prope●sity
to
Good
,
advances
,
as
I
may
say
,
more
readily
towards
it
,
when
instigated
by
a
sense
of
Pleasure
,
that
when
discourag'd
by
her
suffering
Pain
;
as
a
Body
when
driven
runs
easier
along
if
it
have
a
Spherical
,
than
if
it
have
a
Cubical
Figure
.
But
the
figure
of
a
Body
differs
from
its
Motion
,
and
it
may
be
Spherical
,
and
yet
remain
at
rest
.
'T
is
true
in
this
case
it
goes
not
with
Spirits
as
with
Bodies
;
those
cannot
feel
a
Pleasure
but
they
must
be
in
motion
:
because
God
who
only
makes
,
and
preserves
them
for
himself
,
drives
them
perpetually
on
towards
good
.
But
that
does
not
prove
that
the
pleasure
of
the
Soul
,
is
the
same
thing
as
its
Motion
:
For
two
things
,
though
differing
from
each
other
,
may
yet
be
always
found
inseparably
together
.
I
answer
lastly
,
that
although
pleasure
were
not
different
from
the
Love
or
Motion
of
the
Soul
,
yet
that
which
the
first
Man
felt
in
the
use
of
the
goods
of
the
Body
,
did
not
incline
him
to
the
Loving
Bodies
.
'T
is
true
,
Pleasure
carries
the
Soul
towards
the
object
,
that
causes
it
in
her
.
But
it
is
not
the
Fruit
that
we
eat
with
Pleasure
,
which
causes
the
Pleasure
in
us
.
Not
Bodies
but
God
only
can
act
upon
the
Soul
,
and
in
any
manner
make
it
happy
.
And
we
are
in
an
Error
to
think
that
Bodies
have
in
them
,
what
we
feel
occasionally
from
their
presence
.
Adam
before
his
Sin
,
being
not
so
stupid
as
to
imagine
,
that
Bodies
were
the
causes
of
his
Pleasures
,
was
not
carry'd
to
the
love
of
them
,
by
the
motions
that
accompany'd
his
Pleasures
.
If
pleasure
contributed
to
the
fall
of
the
first
Man
,
it
was
not
by
working
in
him
what
at
present
it
does
in
us
;
But
only
by
filling
up
or
dividing
his
capacity
of
Thought
,
it
effac'd
or
diminish'd
in
his
Mind
the
presence
of
his
true
good
,
and
of
his
Duty
.
OBJECTION
against
the
sixth
Article
.
What
likelyhood
is
there
that
the
immutable
Will
of
God
had
a
dependance
on
the
will
of
Man
,
and
that
on
Adam's
behalf
there
were
exceptions
made
to
the
general
Law
of
the
Communication
of
Motions
.
ANSWER
.
At
least
it
is
not
evident
but
such
exception
might
be
made
;
now
it
is
evident
that
immutable
order
requires
the
subjection
of
the
Body
to
the
Mind
:
and
't
is
a
contradiction
for
God
not
to
love
,
and
will
order
;
[
](A51674-e110710-b)*
*
In
the
Illustration
about
the
nature
of
Ideas
,
I
shall
more
particularly
explain
what
is
Order
,
and
why
God
necessarily
loves
it
.
for
God
necessarily
loves
his
Son
.
Therefore
it
was
necessary
before
the
Sin
of
the
first
Man
,
that
exceptions
should
be
made
in
his
favour
to
the
general
Law
of
the
Communication
of
Motions
.
This
seems
it
may
be
of
a
too
abstracted
nature
:
Here
then
is
somewhat
of
a
more
sensible
kind
.
Man
though
a
Sinner
has
the
power
of
moving
and
stopping
his
Arm
when
he
pleases
.
Therefore
according
to
the
different
Volitions
of
Man
,
the
Animal
Spirits
are
determin'd
to
the
raising
,
or
stopping
some
Motions
in
his
Body
;
which
certainly
cannot
be
perform'd
by
the
general
Law
of
the
Communication
of
Motions
.
If
then
the
will
of
God
be
still
submitted
to
our
own
:
why
might
it
not
be
submitted
to
the
will
of
Adam
?
If
for
the
good
of
the
Body
,
and
of
civil
Society
,
God
stops
the
communication
of
motions
in
Sinners
,
why
would
he
not
do
the
like
in
favour
of
a
Righteous
Man
,
for
the
good
of
his
Soul
,
and
for
the
preservation
of
the
Union
and
Society
with
his
God
for
whom
only
he
was
made
.
As
God
will
have
no
Society
with
Sinners
,
so
after
the
Sin
he
depriv'd
them
of
the
power
they
had
to
sequester
themselves
,
as
it
were
,
from
the
Body
to
unite
themselves
with
him
.
But
he
has
left
them
the
Power
of
stopping
or
changing
the
communication
of
Motions
,
with
reference
to
the
preservation
of
Life
,
and
of
Civil
Society
.
Because
he
was
not
willing
to
destroy
his
Work
;
having
before
the
construction
of
it
,
decreed
according
to
St.
Paul
,
to
re-establish
and
renew
it
in
Jesus
Christ
.
OBJECTION
against
the
Seventh
Article
.
Man
in
his
present
state
conveys
his
Body
all
manner
of
ways
:
he
moves
at
pleasure
all
the
parts
of
it
,
which
are
necessary
to
be
mov'd
for
the
prosecution
,
and
shunning
of
sensible
good
and
evil
:
and
consequently
he
stops
or
changes
every
moment
the
natural
communication
of
motions
,
not
only
for
trifles
,
and
things
of
little
importance
,
but
also
for
things
useless
to
Life
and
civil
Society
,
and
even
for
Crimes
,
which
violate
Society
,
shorten
Life
,
and
dishonour
God
all
manner
of
ways
.
God
wills
order
,
it
is
true
:
But
will
order
have
the
laws
of
motions
violated
for
the
sake
of
Evil
,
and
kept
inviolable
on
the
account
of
Good
.
Why
must
Man
lose
the
power
of
stopping
the
motions
which
sensible
objects
produce
in
his
Body
,
since
these
Motions
keep
him
from
doing
good
,
from
repairing
to
God
,
and
returning
to
his
duty
?
and
yet
retain
the
power
of
doing
so
much
evil
,
by
his
Tongue
and
his
Arm
,
and
other
parts
of
his
Body
,
whose
motions
depend
upon
his
will
?
ANSWER
.
To
the
answering
this
Objection
it
must
be
consider'd
,
that
Man
having
sin'd
ought
to
have
return'd
to
his
Original
nothing
.
For
being
no
longer
in
Order
,
nor
able
to
retrieve
it
,
See
the
Fifth
Dialogue
of
Christian
Conversations
.
he
ought
to
cease
to
Exist
.
God
loves
only
order
,
the
Sinner
is
not
in
order
,
and
therefore
not
in
the
Love
of
God
.
The
Sinner
therefore
cannot
subsist
,
since
the
subsistence
of
Creatures
depends
on
the
will
of
the
Creator
;
but
he
wills
not
that
they
should
exist
if
he
does
not
love
them
.
The
Sinner
cannot
by
himself
regain
lost
order
,
because
he
cannot
justifie
himself
,
and
all
that
he
can
suffer
cannot
atone
for
his
offence
.
He
must
then
be
reduc'd
to
nothing
.
But
as
it
is
unreasonable
to
think
that
God
makes
a
Work
to
annihilate
it
,
or
to
let
it
fall
into
a
state
worse
than
annihilation
,
't
is
evident
that
God
would
not
have
made
Man
,
nor
permitted
his
Sin
,
which
he
foresaw
,
unless
he
had
had
in
view
the
Incarnation
of
his
Son
;
in
whom
all
things
subsist
,
and
by
whom
the
Universe
receives
a
Beauty
,
a
Perfection
,
and
greatness
worthy
of
the
Wisdom
and
the
Power
of
its
Author
.
Man
▪
then
,
may
be
consider'd
after
his
Sin
without
a
Restorer
,
but
under
the
Expectation
of
one
.
In
considering
him
without
a
Restorer
,
we
plainly
see
he
ought
to
have
no
Society
with
God
;
that
that
he
is
unable
of
himself
to
make
the
least
approaches
to
him
;
that
God
must
needs
repel
him
,
and
severely
use
him
,
when
he
offers
to
leave
the
Body
to
unite
himself
to
him
:
that
is
to
say
,
that
Man
after
the
Sin
must
lose
the
power
of
getting
clear
of
sensible
impressions
,
and
motions
of
concupiscence
.
He
ought
likewise
to
be
annihilated
,
for
the
foremention'd
Reasons
.
But
he
expects
a
Restorer
,
and
if
we
consider
him
under
that
Expectation
,
we
see
clearly
that
he
must
subsist
.
He
and
his
Posterity
,
whence
his
Restorer
is
to
arise
;
and
thus
it
is
necessary
that
Man
after
his
Sin
preserve
still
the
power
of
diversely
moving
all
those
parts
of
the
Body
,
whose
motion
may
be
serviceable
to
his
Preservation
.
'T
is
true
that
Men
abuse
daily
the
power
they
have
of
producing
certain
motions
;
and
that
their
power
of
moving
their
tongue
for
Example
,
several
ways
,
is
the
cause
of
innumerable
Evils
.
But
if
it
be
minded
,
that
power
will
appear
absolutely
necessary
to
keep
up
Society
,
to
comfort
one
another
in
the
Exigences
of
thi●
present
Life
,
and
to
instruct
them
in
Religion
,
which
affords
hope
of
a
Redeemer
;
for
whom
the
World
subsists
.
If
we
carefully
examine
what
are
the
motions
we
produce
in
us
,
and
in
what
parts
of
our
Body
we
can
affect
them
,
we
shall
clearly
see
that
God
has
left
us
the
power
of
our
Body
no
farther
than
is
necessary
to
the
preservation
of
Life
,
and
the
cherishing
and
upholding
civil
Society
.
For
example
,
the
Beating
of
the
Heart
,
the
Dilatation
of
the
Midriff
,
the
peristaltick
motion
of
the
Guts
,
the
Circulation
of
the
Spirits
,
and
Blood
,
and
the
diverse
motions
of
the
Nerves
in
the
Passions
,
are
produc'd
in
us
without
staying
for
the
order
of
the
Soul
.
As
they
ought
to
be
much
what
the
same
on
all
occasions
,
nothing
obliges
God
to
submit
them
now
to
the
will
of
Man
.
But
the
motions
of
the
Muscles
imploy'd
in
stirring
the
Tongue
,
the
Arms
,
and
Legs
,
being
to
change
every
minute
,
according
to
the
almost
infinite
diversity
of
good
,
or
evil
Objects
all
about
us
,
it
was
necessary
these
motions
should
depend
on
the
will
of
Men.
But
we
are
to
remember
,
That
God
acts
always
by
the
simplest
ways
:
and
that
the
Laws
of
Nature
ought
to
be
general
;
and
that
so
,
God
having
given
us
the
power
of
moving
our
Arm
and
Tongue
,
he
ought
not
to
take
away
that
of
striking
a
Man
unjustly
,
or
of
slandering
or
reproaching
him
.
For
if
our
natural
Faculties
depended
on
our
Designs
,
there
would
be
no
Uniformity
nor
certain
Rule
in
the
Laws
of
Nature
:
which
however
must
be
most
simple
and
general
,
to
be
answerable
to
the
Wisdom
of
God
,
and
suitable
to
Order
.
So
that
God
,
in
pursuance
of
his
Decrees
,
chuses
rather
to
cause
the
Materiality
of
Sin
,
as
say
the
Divines
,
or
to
make
use
of
the
Injustice
of
Men
,
as
says
one
of
the
Prophets
,
than
by
changing
his
Will
to
put
a
stop
to
the
Disorders
of
Sinners
.
But
he
defers
his
revenging
the
injurious
Treatment
,
which
they
give
him
,
till
the
time
when
it
shall
be
permitted
him
to
do
it
,
without
swerving
from
his
immutable
Decrees
;
that
is
to
say
,
when
Death
having
corrupted
the
Body
of
the
voluptuous
,
God
shall
be
freed
from
the
necessity
he
has
impos'd
on
himself
,
of
giving
them
Sensations
and
Thoughts
relating
to
it
.
OBJECTION
against
the
Eleventh
and
Twelfth
Articles
.
Original
Sin
not
only
enslaves
Man
to
his
Body
,
and
subjects
him
to
the
Motions
of
Concupiscence
,
but
likewise
fills
him
with
Vices
wholly
Spiritual
:
not
only
the
Body
of
the
Infant
before
Baptism
being
corrupted
,
but
also
his
Soul
,
and
all
his
Faculties
stain'd
and
infected
with
Sin
.
Though
the
Rebellion
of
the
Body
be
the
principle
of
some
grosser
Vices
,
such
as
Intemperance
and
Vncleanness
,
yet
it
is
not
the
Cause
of
Vices
purely
Spiritual
,
as
are
Pride
and
Envy
.
And
therefore
Original
Sin
is
something
very
different
from
Concupiscence
,
which
is
born
with
us
:
and
is
more
likely
the
Privation
of
Grace
,
or
of
Original
Righteousness
.
ANSWER
.
I
acknowledge
,
That
Children
are
void
of
Original
Righteousness
;
and
I
prove
it
,
in
shewing
,
That
they
are
not
born
upright
,
and
that
God
hates
them
.
For
methinks
one
cannot
give
a
clearer
Idea
of
Righteousness
and
Vprightness
,
than
to
say
a
Will
is
upright
when
it
loves
God
,
and
that
it
is
crooked
and
perverse
when
it
draws
towards
Bodies
.
But
if
by
Righteousness
,
or
Original
Grace
,
we
understand
some
unknown
Qualities
,
like
those
which
God
is
said
to
have
infus'd
into
the
Heart
of
the
first
Man
,
to
adorn
him
,
and
render
him
pleasing
in
his
sight
;
it
is
still
evident
,
that
the
Privation
of
this
is
not
Original
Sin
;
for
to
speak
properly
,
that
Privation
is
not
hereditarily
transmitted
.
If
Children
have
not
these
Qualities
,
't
is
because
God
does
not
give
'em
them
;
and
if
God
does
not
bestow
them
,
't
is
because
they
are
unworthy
to
receive
them
:
and
't
is
that
Vworthiness
which
is
transmitted
,
and
which
is
the
Cause
of
the
Privation
of
Original
Righteousness
:
And
so
that
Vnworthiness
is
properly
Original
Sin
.
Now
this
Unworthiness
,
(
which
consists
,
as
I
have
shewn
,
in
this
:
That
the
Inclinations
of
Children
are
actually
corrupt
,
and
their
Heart
bent
upon
the
Love
of
Bodies
;
)
this
,
I
say
,
is
really
in
them
.
'T
is
not
the
Imputation
of
the
Sin
of
their
Father
;
they
are
actually
themselves
in
a
disorder'd
State
.
In
like
manner
as
those
who
are
justify'd
by
JESUS
CHRIST
,
of
whom
Adam
was
the
Type
,
are
not
justify'd
by
Imputation
:
But
are
really
restor'd
to
Order
,
by
an
inward
Righteousness
,
different
from
that
of
our
LORD
,
though
it
be
he
that
has
merited
it
for
them
.
The
Soul
has
but
two
natural
or
essential
Relations
;
the
one
to
God
,
and
the
other
to
her
Body
.
Now
't
is
evident
,
That
the
Relation
,
or
Union
which
she
has
with
God
,
cannot
vitiate
or
corrupt
her
:
and
therefore
she
is
neither
vicious
,
nor
corrupt
,
at
the
first
instant
of
her
Creation
;
but
by
the
relation
she
has
to
her
Body
.
Thus
one
of
the
two
must
needs
be
said
,
either
that
Pride
,
and
other
,
which
we
call
Spiritual
Vices
,
can
be
communicated
by
the
Body
,
or
that
Children
are
not
subject
to
them
at
the
moment
of
their
Birth
:
I
say
at
the
moment
of
their
Birth
;
for
I
do
not
deny
but
these
ill
Habits
are
easily
acquir'd
.
Though
pure
Intelligences
had
no
other
relation
than
to
God
,
and
at
the
instant
of
their
Creation
were
subject
to
no
Vice
,
yet
they
fell
into
Disorder
.
But
the
Cause
of
it
was
their
making
a
wrong
use
of
their
Liberty
,
whereof
Infants
have
made
no
use
at
all
:
For
Original
Sin
is
not
of
a
free
Nature
.
But
to
come
to
the
Point
;
I
am
of
Opinion
,
That
they
err
,
who
think
that
the
Rebellion
of
the
Body
is
the
Cause
but
of
gross
Vices
,
such
as
Intemperance
and
Vncleanness
;
and
not
of
those
which
are
call'd
Spiritual
,
as
Pride
and
Envy
:
and
I
am
persuaded
there
is
that
Correspondence
between
the
Disposition
of
our
Brain
,
and
those
of
our
Soul
,
as
that
there
is
not
perhaps
any
corrupt
Habit
in
the
Soul
,
but
what
has
its
Principle
in
the
Body
.
St.
Paul
in
several
places
terms
by
the
Name
of
the
Law
,
the
Wisdom
,
the
Desires
,
and
the
Works
of
the
Flesh
;
whatever
is
contrary
to
the
Law
of
the
Spirit
.
He
speaks
not
of
Spiritual
Vices
;
He
reckons
amongst
the
Works
of
the
Flesh
,
Idolatry
,
Heresies
,
Dissentions
,
and
many
other
Vices
which
go
by
the
Name
of
Spiritual
.
To
give
way
to
Vain-glory
,
Wrath
and
Envy
is
,
in
his
Doctrine
,
to
follow
the
Motions
of
the
Flesh.
In
short
,
It
appears
from
the
Expressions
of
that
Apostle
,
That
all
Sin
proceeds
from
the
Flesh
:
not
that
the
Flesh
commits
it
,
or
that
the
Spirit
of
Man
,
without
the
Grace
,
or
Spirit
of
CHRIST
,
can
do
good
:
but
because
the
Flesh
acts
upon
the
Spirit
in
such
a
manner
,
that
the
latter
works
no
evil
without
being
sollicited
to
it
by
the
former
.
Hear
what
St.
Paul
says
in
the
Epistle
to
the
Romans
,
I
delight
in
the
law
of
the
Lord
,
Rom.
c.
7.
after
the
inward
Man
.
But
I
see
another
law
in
my
members
warring
against
the
law
of
my
mind
,
and
bringing
me
into
captivity
to
the
law
of
sin
,
which
is
in
my
members
.
And
a
little
lower
;
So
then
with
my
mind
I
my self
serve
the
law
of
God
,
but
with
the
flesh
the
law
of
sin
:
He
speaks
after
the
same
manner
in
several
places
of
his
Epistles
.
So
that
Concupiscence
,
or
the
Rebellion
of
the
Body
,
not
only
disposes
us
to
Carnal
of
shameful
Vices
,
but
likewise
to
those
which
are
thought
to
be
Spiritual
.
I
here
shall
endeavour
to
prove
it
by
a
sensible
manner
.
When
a
Man
's
in
Conversation
,
it
is
certain
,
as
I
think
,
that
some
Tracks
are
machinally
produc'd
in
his
Brain
,
and
Motions
excited
in
his
Animal
Spirits
,
that
beget
in
his
Soul
corrupt
Thoughts
and
Inclinations
.
Our
Thoughts
on
these
Occasions
are
not
naturally
conformable
to
Truth
,
nor
our
Inclinations
to
Order
,
They
rise
in
us
for
the
Good
of
the
Body
,
and
of
the
present
Life
,
because
't
is
the
Body
that
exites
them
:
So
they
obliterate
the
Presence
of
God
,
and
the
Thoughts
of
our
Duty
out
of
our
Mind
;
and
tend
only
to
recommend
us
to
other
Men
,
and
make
them
consider
us
as
worth
their
Affection
and
Esteem
.
Therefore
this
secret
Pride
,
which
kindles
in
us
on
such
Occasions
,
is
a
Spiritual
Vice
,
whose
Principle
is
the
Rebellion
of
the
Body
.
For
Example
;
If
the
Persons
,
in
whose
Presence
we
are
,
are
rais'd
to
Honorary
Posts
and
Titles
,
the
Lustre
of
their
Grandeur
both
dazzles
and
dejects
us
.
And
as
the
Traces
which
their
Presence
imprints
on
our
Brain
are
very
deep
,
and
the
Motions
of
the
Spirits
rapid
;
they
radiate
,
as
I
may
say
,
through
all
the
Body
;
they
spread
themselves
on
the
Face
,
and
give
a
sensible
Testimony
of
our
Reverence
and
Fear
,
and
our
most
latent
Sentiments
.
Next
,
These
Traces
,
by
the
sensible
Expressions
of
our
inward
Motions
,
work
upon
the
Person
that
observe
us
;
whom
they
dispose
to
Sentiments
of
Candour
and
Civility
,
by
the
Traces
which
our
respectful
and
timorous
Deportment
machinally
produce
in
his
Brain
:
which
Traces
,
rallying
on
his
Face
,
and
disarm
him
of
that
Majesty
which
appear'd
in
't
,
and
give
the
rest
of
his
Body
such
an
Air
and
Posture
,
as
at
length
rid
us
of
our
Concern
,
and
re-embolden
us
.
Thus
by
a
mutual
and
frequent
Repercussion
of
these
sensible
Expressions
,
our
Air
and
Behaviour
at
last
settles
in
that
fashion
which
the
governing
Person
wishes
.
But
as
all
the
Motions
of
the
Animal
Spirits
are
attended
with
Motions
of
the
Soul
,
and
the
Traces
of
the
Brain
are
pursu'd
by
Thoughts
of
the
Mind
;
't
is
plain
,
that
since
we
are
depriv'd
of
the
Power
of
expunging
these
Traces
,
and
stopping
these
Motions
,
we
find
our selves
sollicited
,
by
the
over-ruling
Presence
of
the
Person
,
to
embrace
his
Opinions
,
and
submit
to
his
Desires
,
and
to
be
wholly
devoted
to
his
Pleasure
,
as
he
indeed
is
dispos'd
to
study
ours
,
but
in
a
very
different
manner
.
And
for
this
Reason
worldly
Conversation
quickens
and
invigorates
the
Concupiscence
of
Pride
,
as
dishonest
Commerce
,
feasting
and
enjoying
sensible
Pleasures
,
strengthen
Carnal
Concupiscence
;
which
is
a
Remark
very
necessary
for
Morality
.
'T
is
of
great
Use
and
Advantage
,
that
there
are
Traces
in
the
Brain
,
which
incessantly
represent
Man
to
himself
,
to
make
him
careful
of
his
Person
:
and
that
there
are
others
,
which
serve
to
make
and
preserve
Society
,
since
Men
are
not
made
to
live
alone
.
But
Man
having
lost
the
Power
of
erasing
them
when
he
pleas'd
,
and
when
convenient
,
they
perpetually
provoke
him
to
Evil.
As
he
cannot
hinder
their
representing
him
to
himself
,
he
is
continually
sollicited
to
Motions
of
Pride
and
Vanity
,
to
despise
others
,
and
center
all
things
in
himself
.
And
as
he
is
not
Master
of
those
Traces
which
importune
him
,
to
keep
up
Society
with
others
,
he
is
agitated
by
Motions
of
Complaisance
,
Flattery
,
Jealousie
,
and
the
like
Inclinations
,
as
it
were
in
spight
of
him
.
Thus
all
those
,
which
go
by
the
Name
of
Spiritual
Vices
,
derive
from
the
Flesh
;
as
well
as
Vnchastness
and
Intemperance
.
There
are
not
only
in
our
Brain
,
Dispositions
which
excite
in
us
Sensations
and
Motions
,
with
reference
to
the
Propagation
of
the
Species
,
and
the
Preservation
of
Life
;
but
it
may
be
a
greater
Number
that
stir
up
in
us
Thoughts
and
Passions
,
with
respect
to
Society
,
to
our
own
private
Advancements
,
and
to
those
of
our
Friends
.
We
are
by
Nature
united
to
all
surrounding
Bodies
,
and
by
them
,
to
all
the
things
that
any
way
relate
to
us
:
But
we
cannot
be
united
to
them
,
save
by
some
Dispositions
in
our
Brain
.
Having
not
therefore
the
Power
of
withstanding
the
Action
of
these
natural
Dispositions
,
our
Union
turns
into
Dependence
,
and
we
grow
subject
through
our
Body
to
all
kind
of
Vices
.
We
are
not
pure
Intelligences
:
all
the
Dispositions
of
our
Soul
produce
respective
Dispositions
in
our
Body
:
and
those
in
our
Body
mutually
excite
others
like
them
in
our
Soul
.
Not
that
the
Soul
is
absolutely
incapable
of
receiving
any
thing
,
except
by
the
Body
;
but
because
,
as
long
as
She
is
united
to
It
,
she
cannot
admit
any
Change
in
her
Modifications
,
without
making
some
Alteration
in
the
Body
.
'T
is
true
,
she
may
be
enlightned
,
or
receive
new
Ideas
,
and
the
Body
need
not
have
any
hand
in
it
;
but
that
's
because
pure
Ideas
are
not
Modifications
of
the
Soul
,
as
I
have
prov'd
in
another
place
.
I
speak
not
here
of
sensible
Ideas
,
because
these
include
a
Sensation
,
and
every
Sensation
is
a
mode
of
the
Souls
existing
.
The
Second
OBJECTION
against
the
Eleventh
and
Twelfth
Articles
.
As
by
one
Man
sin
entred
into
the
World
,
&c.
Rom.
5.12
.
If
Original
Sin
descends
,
by
reason
of
the
Communication
which
is
found
between
the
Brain
of
the
Mother
,
and
that
of
her
Infant
,
the
Mother
is
the
cause
of
the
Sin
;
and
the
Father
has
no
part
in
it
.
Yet
St.
Paul
teaches
us
,
that
by
Man
came
sin
into
the
World
:
He
does
not
so
much
as
speak
of
the
Woman
.
Therefore
,
&c.
ANSWER
.
I
was
shapen
in
Iniquity
,
and
in
sin
hath
my
Mother
conceiv'd
me
.
Ps.
51.5
.
Ec.
25.23
.
Luke
2.48
.
David
assures
us
,
that
his
Mother
conceiv'd
him
in
iniquity
:
and
the
Son
of
Syrach
says
,
Of
the
Woman
came
the
beginning
of
Sin
,
and
by
her
we
all
dy
.
Neither
of
them
speak
of
Man
.
St.
Paul
on
the
contrary
says
,
that
by
Man
,
Sin
entred
into
the
World
,
and
speaks
not
of
the
Woman
.
How
will
these
Testimonies
accord
,
and
which
of
the
two
is
to
be
justify'd
,
if
it
be
necessary
to
vindicate
either
.
In
discourse
we
never
attribute
to
the
Woman
any
thing
peculiar
to
the
Man
,
wherein
she
has
no
part
:
But
that
is
often
ascrib'd
to
the
Man
which
is
proper
to
the
Woman
,
because
her
Husband
is
her
Master
and
Head
.
We
see
that
the
Evangelists
,
and
also
the
Holy
Virgin
,
call
Joseph
the
Father
of
Jesus
,
when
she
says
to
her
Son
,
Behold
thy
Father
and
I
have
sought
thee
sorrowing
.
Therefore
seeing
we
are
assur'd
by
Holy
Writ
,
that
Woman
has
subjected
us
to
Sin
and
Death
,
it
is
absolutely
necessary
to
believe
it
;
nor
can
it
be
thrown
upon
the
Man
;
But
though
it
testifies
in
several
places
that
't
is
by
Man
that
Sin
enters
into
the
World
,
yet
there
is
not
an
equal
necessity
to
believe
it
,
since
what
is
of
the
Woman
is
commonly
attributed
to
the
Man
.
And
if
we
were
oblig'd
by
Faith
to
excuse
either
the
Man
,
or
the
Woman
,
it
would
be
more
reasonable
to
excuse
the
former
than
the
latter
.
However
I
believe
these
forecited
passages
are
to
be
litterally
explain'd
,
and
that
we
are
to
say
both
the
Man
and
Woman
are
the
true
causes
of
Sin
,
each
in
their
own
way
.
The
Woman
,
in
that
by
her
,
Sin
is
communicated
;
it
being
by
her
that
the
Man
begets
the
Children
;
and
the
Man
,
in
that
his
Sin
is
the
cause
of
Concupiscence
;
as
his
action
is
the
cause
of
the
fecundity
of
the
Woman
,
or
of
the
communication
that
is
between
her
and
her
Infant
.
It
is
certain
,
that
't
is
the
Man
that
impregnates
the
Woman
,
and
consequently
is
the
cause
of
that
communication
,
between
her
Body
and
the
Child's
,
since
that
communication
is
the
Principle
of
its
Life
.
Now
that
Communication
not
only
gives
the
Child's
Body
the
dispositions
of
its
Mother's
,
but
also
gives
its
Mind
the
dispositions
of
her
Mind
:
Therefore
we
may
say
with
St.
Paul
,
that
by
one
Man
sin
entred
into
the
world
;
and
nevertheless
by
reason
of
that
communication
we
may
say
,
that
Sin
came
from
a
Woman
,
and
by
her
we
all
dye
:
and
that
our
Mother
has
conceiv'd
us
in
Iniquity
,
as
is
said
in
other
places
of
Scripture
.
It
may
be
said
perhaps
,
that
though
Man
had
not
sinn'd
,
yet
Woman
had
produc'd
sinful
Children
;
for
having
her self
sinn'd
,
she
had
lost
the
Power
God
gave
her
over
her
Body
:
and
thus
,
though
Man
had
remain'd
Innocent
,
she
had
corrupted
the
Brain
,
and
consequently
the
Mind
of
her
Child
,
by
reason
of
that
communication
between
them
.
But
this
surely
looks
not
very
probable
.
For
Man
whilst
righteous
,
knowing
what
he
does
,
cannot
give
the
Woman
that
wretched
fecundity
of
conceiving
sinful
Children
.
If
he
remains
Righteous
he
wills
not
any
Children
but
for
God
,
to
whom
Infant
Sinners
cannot
be
well
pleasing
;
for
I
suppose
not
here
a
Mediator
.
I
grant
however
that
in
that
case
the
Marriage
had
not
been
dissolv'd
,
and
that
the
Man
had
known
his
Wife
.
But
it
is
certain
,
that
the
Body
of
the
Woman
belong'd
to
her
Husband
,
since
it
was
taken
out
of
his
;
and
was
the
same
Flesh.
Duo
in
carne
una
.
It
is
moreover
certain
,
that
Children
are
as
much
the
Fathers
as
the
Mothers
.
Which
being
so
,
we
can't
be
persuaded
that
the
Woman
would
have
lost
the
Power
over
her
Body
,
if
her
Husband
had
not
sinn'd
as
well
as
she
.
For
if
the
Woman
had
been
depriv'd
of
that
Power
whilst
the
Man
remain'd
Innocent
,
there
had
been
this
Disorder
in
the
Universe
,
that
an
upright
Man
should
have
a
corrupt
Body
,
and
sinful
Children
.
Whereas
it
is
against
Order
,
or
rather
a
contradiction
,
that
a
just
God
should
punish
a
perfectly
Innocent
Man
.
And
for
this
reason
Eve
feels
no
involuntary
and
rebellious
Motions
,
immediately
after
her
sin
;
as
yet
she
is
not
asham'd
of
her
Nakedness
,
nor
goes
to
hide
her self
.
On
the
contrary
,
she
comes
to
her
Husband
,
though
naked
as
her self
;
her
Eyes
are
not
yet
open'd
;
but
she
is
still
as
before
,
the
absolute
Comptroller
of
her
own
Body
.
Order
requir'd
that
immediately
after
her
Sin
,
her
Soul
should
be
disturb'd
by
the
rebellion
of
her
Body
,
and
by
the
shame
of
her
own
and
her
Husband's
nakedness
;
for
there
was
no
reason
that
God
should
any
longer
suspend
on
her
behalf
the
Laws
of
the
Communication
of
Motions
:
as
I
have
said
in
the
seventh
Article
.
But
because
her
Body
is
her
Husband
's
,
who
is
as
yet
Innocent
;
she
is
not
punish'd
in
this
Body
;
but
this
punishment
is
deferr'd
till
the
time
that
he
should
eat
himself
of
the
Fruit
which
she
presented
him
:
Then
it
was
they
both
began
to
feel
the
rebellion
of
their
Body
;
that
they
saw
they
were
naked
,
and
that
shame
oblig'd
them
to
cover
themselves
with
Fig-leaves
.
Thus
we
must
say
,
that
Adam
was
truly
the
cause
of
Original
Sin
,
and
Concupiscence
,
Gen.
c.
3.
since
it
was
his
Sin
that
depriv'd
both
himself
and
his
Wife
of
their
power
over
their
Body
;
by
which
defectiveness
of
power
the
Woman
produces
in
the
Brain
of
her
Child
such
tracks
as
corrupt
its
Soul
at
the
very
instant
of
its
Creation
.
OBJECTION
against
the
Twelfth
Article
.
'T
is
but
random
divining
to
say
the
communication
between
the
Mother's
and
the
Infant
's
Brain
is
necessary
or
useful
to
the
conformation
of
the
foetus
.
For
there
is
no
such
Communication
between
the
Brain
of
an
Hen
,
and
that
of
her
Chickens
,
which
notwithstanding
are
perfectly
and
compleatly
form'd
.
ANSWER
.
I
answer
that
in
the
seventh
Chapter
of
the
Second
Book
,
I
have
sufficiently
demonstrated
,
that
Communication
,
by
the
use
I
make
of
it
,
in
explaining
the
Generation
of
Monsters
;
as
also
certain
natural
Marks
and
Fears
deriv'd
from
the
Mother
.
For
't
is
evident
,
that
a
Man
who
swoons
away
at
the
sight
of
a
Snake
,
because
his
Mother
was
frighted
with
one
when
she
bore
him
in
her
Womb
,
could
not
be
subject
to
that
Infirmity
,
but
because
formerly
such
Traces
had
been
imprinted
on
his
Brain
,
as
these
which
open
upon
seeing
a
Snake
,
and
that
they
were
accompany'd
with
a
like
Accident
.
And
herein
I
am
no
Diviner
;
for
I
do
not
venture
to
determine
wherein
that
Communication
precisely
consists
.
I
might
say
it
was
perform'd
by
those
Fibres
which
the
Foetus
shoots
into
the
Matrix
of
the
Mother
,
and
by
the
Nerves
wherewith
that
part
is
,
very
probably
,
fill'd
;
and
in
saying
so
I
should
no
more
divine
,
than
would
a
Man
who
had
never
seen
the
Engines
call'd
La
Samaritaine
,
in
affirming
there
were
Wheels
and
Pumps
to
raise
the
Water
.
Nevertheless
I
can't
see
why
divining
is
not
sometimes
allowable
,
provided
a
Man
sets
not
up
for
a
Prophet
,
La
Samaritaine
upon
Pont
neuf
in
Paris
.
and
speaks
not
in
too
positive
a
strain
;
I
rather
think
he
is
permitted
to
speak
his
Thoughts
,
whilst
he
pretends
not
to
be
Infallible
,
nor
Lords
it
unjustly
over
others
by
dogmatical
Decisions
,
or
by
the
help
of
Scientifick
Terms
.
'T
is
not
always
divining
to
speak
of
things
which
are
not
visible
,
and
which
contradict
Prejudices
,
If
so
be
we
speak
no
more
than
we
easily
conceive
,
and
which
readily
makes
its
way
into
the
mind
of
others
who
desire
to
understand
Reason
.
I
say
then
,
that
supposing
the
general
Laws
of
the
Communication
of
Motions
,
such
as
they
are
there
is
great
Probability
that
the
particular
Communication
of
the
Mother's
Brain
,
with
that
of
her
Infant
,
is
necessary
to
form
its
Body
,
in
a
requisite
manner
;
or
at
least
is
necessary
to
give
the
Brain
of
the
Infant
certain
dispositions
,
which
ought
to
vary
according
to
different
Times
and
Countries
,
as
I
have
explain'd
in
the
same
Chapter
.
I
confess
there
is
no
Communication
between
the
Brain
of
an
Hen
,
and
that
of
a
Chicken
,
in
the
Egg
,
which
nevertheless
is
perfectly
well
form'd
.
But
it
ought
to
be
observ'd
,
that
the
Chicken
is
farther
advanc'd
in
the
Egg
,
when
the
Hen
lays
it
,
than
the
Foetus
when
it
descends
into
the
Matrix
:
which
may
well
be
concluded
,
since
there
goes
less
time
to
the
hatching
Chickens
,
than
there
goes
to
the
bringing
forth
Whelps
;
though
the
Belly
of
the
Bitch
being
very
hot
,
and
her
Blood
in
perpetual
motion
,
the
Whelps
should
be
sooner
form'd
than
the
Eggs
hatch'd
,
were
not
the
Chickens
farther
advanc'd
in
their
Eggs
,
than
the
Whelps
in
their
Cicatricles
.
Now
there
is
great
probability
that
the
formation
of
the
Chicken
in
the
Egg
,
before
it
was
laid
,
was
effected
by
the
communication
I
am
speaking
of
.
I
answer
in
the
second
place
,
that
the
growth
of
the
Body
of
Fowls
,
is
possibly
more
conformable
to
the
general
laws
of
Motion
than
that
of
four-footed
Animals
;
and
that
so
the
communication
of
the
Females
Brain
,
with
that
of
her
young
ones
,
is
not
so
necessary
in
Fowls
as
in
other
Animals
:
For
the
reason
that
makes
that
communication
necessary
,
is
probably
the
remedying
the
defect
of
these
general
Laws
,
which
in
some
particular
Cases
,
are
insufficient
to
regulate
the
Formation
and
Growth
of
Animals
.
I
answer
lastly
,
there
is
no
such
necessity
,
to
the
preservation
of
the
Life
of
Birds
,
that
they
should
have
so
many
particular
Dispositions
in
their
Brain
as
other
Animals
.
They
have
Wings
to
fly
harm
,
and
to
secure
their
feed
;
and
have
no
need
of
all
that
particular
Mechanism
which
is
the
principle
of
the
cunning
,
and
docility
of
some
domestick
Creatures
.
Therefore
the
old
ones
need
not
instruct
their
young
in
many
things
,
as
they
breed
them
,
nor
capacitate
them
to
be
taught
many
afterwards
,
by
giving
them
a
disposition
of
Brain
that
's
fit
for
Docility
.
Those
who
breed
young
Dogs
for
the
Game
,
sometimes
find
those
which
naturally
set
,
meerly
from
the
instruction
they
receiv'd
from
their
Damm
,
who
often
us'd
to
set
with
them
in
her
Belly
.
There
is
a
great
difference
almost
always
observable
in
the
breed
of
these
Creatures
,
some
of
which
are
much
more
Docil
and
Tractable
than
others
of
the
same
Species
.
But
I
do
not
think
there
ever
was
a
Fowl
that
taught
any
thing
extraordinary
to
her
young
;
that
a
Hen
,
for
Example
,
ever
hatch'd
a
Chicken
who
could
do
any
thing
but
what
they
all
do
naturally
.
Birds
then
are
not
so
tractable
or
capable
of
Instruction
as
other
Animals
.
The
Disposition
of
their
Brain
is
not
ordinarily
capable
of
many
Changes
;
nor
do
they
act
so
much
by
Imitation
,
as
some
domestick
Animals
.
Young
Ducks
,
which
follow
an
Hen
,
don't
stay
for
her
Example
to
take
the
Water
;
and
the
Chickens
,
on
the
contrary
,
never
betake
themselves
to
swim
,
though
hatch'd
and
led
by
a
Duck
,
that
loves
the
Water
.
But
there
are
Animals
that
easily
and
readily
imitate
the
uncommon
Motions
,
which
they
see
others
do
.
However
I
do
not
pretend
,
that
much
stress
is
to
be
laid
on
these
last
Reflections
,
since
they
are
not
necessary
to
establish
my
Opinion
.
Second
OBJECTION
against
the
Twelfth
Article
.
'T
is
likewise
divining
to
affirm
,
That
the
Mother
before
her
Sin
might
have
any
intercourse
with
her
Embryo
;
there
being
no
necessary
relation
between
our
Thoughts
and
Motions
happening
in
our
Brain
.
And
therefore
that
Communication
between
the
Mother's
and
the
Infant
's
Brain
is
useless
.
ANSWER
.
It
is
evident
,
That
without
this
Communication
,
the
Infant
was
incapable
of
having
any
Commerce
with
its
Mother
,
or
the
Mother
with
her
Infant
,
without
a
particular
Miracle
.
Now
before
the
Sin
Order
requir'd
,
That
the
Mother
should
have
notice
of
all
the
Corporeal
wants
of
her
Infant
,
and
that
the
Infant
should
resent
its
Obligations
to
its
Parents
.
Therefore
since
all
things
were
in
Order
before
the
Sin
,
and
that
God
acts
always
agreeably
to
Order
,
the
Mother
and
the
Child
had
some
Commerce
by
means
of
this
Communication
.
To
understand
wherein
this
Commerce
may
have
consisted
,
it
must
be
remembred
,
That
the
Connexion
of
the
Tracks
of
the
Brain
,
with
the
Ideas
of
the
Soul
,
may
be
several
ways
effected
,
either
by
Nature
,
Chap.
2.
Part
2.
or
by
the
Institution
of
Men
,
or
some
other
way
,
as
I
have
shewn
how
in
the
Second
Book
.
In
beholding
a
Square
,
or
the
Look
of
a
Person
suffering
any
Pain
,
the
Idea
of
a
Square
,
or
of
an
afflicted
Person
,
rises
in
the
Mind
.
This
is
common
to
all
Nations
,
and
the
Connexion
between
these
Ideas
and
these
Traces
,
is
natural
.
When
an
Englishman
hears
pronounc'd
,
or
reads
the
Word
Square
,
he
has
likewise
the
Idea
of
a
Square
:
but
the
Connexion
,
which
is
between
the
Sound
,
or
the
Letters
of
that
Word
,
and
its
Idea
,
is
not
natural
,
nor
is
it
general
with
all
the
World
.
I
say
then
,
That
the
Mother
and
her
Infant
must
naturally
have
had
a
Correspondence
between
them
,
upon
all
the
things
that
could
be
represented
to
the
Mind
by
natural
Connexions
:
That
if
the
Mother
,
for
Instance
,
had
seen
a
Square
,
the
Infant
would
have
seen
one
too
;
and
that
if
the
Infant
had
imagin'd
any
Figure
,
he
would
have
likewise
excited
the
Traces
of
the
same
Figure
in
the
Imagination
of
his
Mother
.
But
they
would
have
had
no
Commerce
together
about
things
of
a
purely
Spiritual
Nature
,
nor
even
about
Corporeal
things
,
whenever
they
conceiv'd
them
,
without
the
help
of
the
Senses
and
Imagination
.
The
Mother
might
have
thought
on
GOD
,
have
heard
or
read
the
Word
Square
,
or
the
like
;
and
yet
the
Child
not
have
discover'd
what
were
her
Thoughts
thereof
,
unless
in
Tract
of
Time
,
she
should
have
setled
a
new
Commerce
of
intellectual
Ideas
with
it
,
much
what
the
same
with
that
of
Nurses
,
when
they
teach
their
Children
to
speak
.
I
explain
and
prove
these
things
.
One
would
think
I
had
sufficiently
prov'd
them
,
by
the
Explication
I
gave
of
the
Cause
of
Hereditary
Aversions
,
and
Marks
which
Children
bring
with
them
into
the
World
,
deriv'd
from
the
Traces
of
their
Mothers
.
Now
these
Traces
of
corporeal
things
are
inseperable
from
their
Ideas
;
which
makes
the
Ideas
to
be
communicated
along
with
them
,
and
the
Children
to
see
,
feel
,
imagine
the
same
things
as
their
Mothers
.
They
have
now
,
whether
they
will
or
not
,
the
Sensations
of
their
Mothers
:
but
were
they
not
Sinners
,
they
would
have
had
the
power
of
hindring
,
when
they
pleas'd
,
the
Effect
of
that
their
Communication
with
their
Mother
.
They
might
likewise
have
re-excited
in
their
Brain
,
the
Tracks
which
they
receiv'd
from
their
Mothers
,
by
the
same
reason
that
we
imagine
what
we
please
,
when
our
Sensations
are
not
too
vivid
and
affecting
:
which
being
suppos'd
,
it
is
evident
,
That
the
Mother
,
when
considerately
attending
to
her
Infant
,
might
have
discover'd
,
by
a
kind
of
Repercussion
,
whether
or
no
it
receiv'd
the
Impression
she
excited
in
it
,
and
likewise
other
things
that
it
might
think
upon
.
For
as
the
Mother
could
not
vibrate
the
Fibres
of
her
Brain
,
but
the
Fibres
of
the
Infant
's
Brain
must
have
receiv'd
the
Impression
;
so
the
Infant
could
not
stop
that
Vibration
,
or
cause
any
other
,
without
giving
the
Mother
notice
by
some
light
Impression
,
provided
she
made
her self
very
attentive
,
by
the
power
she
had
of
stifling
every
other
Noise
than
that
which
her
Infant
caus'd
in
her
.
Thus
it
must
be
acknowledg'd
,
That
the
Mother
,
and
the
Infant
,
would
have
had
some
intercourse
before
the
Sin
,
or
else
we
must
deny
all
Correspondence
between
their
Brains
,
or
the
power
of
the
Soul
over
the
Body
,
to
be
such
as
I
have
before
maintain'd
.
This
appears
evident
,
though
the
wanton
Imagination
starts
,
and
Prejudices
band
against
it
.
'T
is
true
,
this
Commerce
at
first
would
have
reach'd
but
to
Matters
that
come
under
the
Senses
and
Imagination
;
it
not
being
absolutely
necessary
,
that
the
Child
,
which
had
only
a
Corporeal
Dependence
on
the
Mother
,
should
receive
from
her
any
other
Ideas
than
those
of
sensible
Objects
.
For
its
Soul
being
strictly
united
to
God
,
whilst
in
a
State
of
Innocency
,
would
have
receiv'd
immediately
from
him
all
the
Ideas
which
respected
not
the
Body
:
But
whereas
in
time
we
may
affix
the
most
abstract
Ideas
to
things
sensible
,
which
have
no
relation
to
them
,
this
Commerce
between
the
Mother
and
her
Child
,
would
,
very
likely
,
have
quickly
extended
to
things
of
a
more
Spiritual
Order
,
if
they
strove
to
correspond
about
such
sort
of
Matters
.
I
am
sensible
,
that
what
I
now
say
will
not
seem
reasonable
to
very
many
;
and
that
even
those
who
resist
their
Prejudices
,
and
labour
against
the
continual
Tide
of
sensible
Impressions
,
will
admire
at
the
Novelty
of
this
Notion
.
But
if
we
seriously
reflect
on
the
way
that
a
Master
takes
to
instruct
his
Disciples
,
and
observe
what
different
means
he
is
oblig'd
to
make
use
of
,
to
manifest
his
own
Ideas
of
things
to
them
;
the
Comparisons
he
makes
,
and
the
Judgments
he
passes
about
these
Ideas
,
and
the
other
Dispositions
of
his
Mind
,
in
reference
to
his
Scholars
;
we
shall
see
it
will
be
a
much
harder
Task
for
him
to
discover
his
Thoughts
and
inward
Dispositions
of
Mind
to
them
,
than
for
a
Mother
to
do
it
to
her
Infan●s
;
provided
we
only
suppose
,
that
the
Traces
of
the
Mother's
Brain
are
imprinted
on
the
Child's
,
which
is
evident
from
all
that
I
have
said
before
.
For
,
in
fine
,
it
is
manifest
,
that
the
Voice
,
and
all
exteriour
Signs
that
we
employ
to
express
our
Thoughts
to
others
,
obtain
the
desir'd
Effect
,
only
because
they
imprint
on
the
Brain
of
our
Hearers
,
the
same
Traces
,
and
raise
the
same
Emotions
of
the
Spirits
,
as
accompany
our
Ideas
,
and
our
inward
Disposition
,
on
their
respect
.
OBJECTION
against
the
Seventeenth
and
following
Articles
.
'T
is
a
rash
Assertion
to
say
,
Children
in
Baptism
are
justify'd
by
actual
Motions
of
their
Will
towards
God
.
We
must
not
give
vent
to
such
New
Opinions
;
which
do
no
good
,
but
only
make
a
noise
.
ANSWER
.
I
grant
,
that
we
ought
not
positively
to
affirm
,
That
Children
are
justify'd
by
formal
Acts
of
their
Will
:
I
believe
it
impossible
to
know
any
thing
of
it
;
and
that
we
are
not
positively
to
assert
any
thing
but
what
we
know
.
But
because
there
are
but
too
many
,
who
are
apt
to
believe
,
That
Justification
of
Children
is
only
external
,
and
by
Imputation
,
by
reason
,
say
they
,
they
are
incapable
of
performing
any
Act
of
Love
towards
God
;
I
think
it
fit
to
let
them
know
,
that
they
are
brought
by
Prejudice
to
that
Opinion
.
For
the
Prejudices
of
Men
,
in
respect
of
Children
,
are
such
,
as
make
them
commonly
fansie
they
have
no
Thought
in
their
Mother's
Womb
,
and
in
the
beginning
of
their
Age
,
and
even
that
they
are
absolutely
incapable
of
thinking
.
They
believe
that
they
have
not
so
much
as
the
Ideas
of
things
;
that
it
is
their
Masters
that
furnish
them
with
Discourse
;
and
that
if
they
have
any
Inclinations
,
they
are
of
another
Nature
from
ours
,
and
incompetent
to
carry
them
to
the
Sovereign
Good
.
The
greatest
part
of
Men
can't
distinctly
conceive
,
That
Childrens
Souls
are
like
those
of
grown
up
Persons
;
And
that
they
don't
come
to
Strength
and
Perfection
by
degrees
,
like
the
Body
;
And
that
if
they
were
deliver'd
one
moment
from
the
Impression
the
Body
made
upon
them
,
and
mov'd
by
the
Delectation
of
Grace
,
they
would
in
that
moment
be
more
pure
and
enlighten'd
than
the
Souls
of
the
greatest
Saints
;
who
feel
always
working
in
their
Mind
and
Heart
the
Leaven
of
Concupiscence
.
Concupiscence
is
commonly
look'd
upon
as
Natural
,
and
is
not
always
consider'd
as
a
consequence
of
Sin
:
and
this
makes
Men
conclude
unawares
,
that
the
Stupidity
of
Children
is
a
necessary
consequence
of
their
Infirmity
of
Body
,
Tenderness
of
Age
,
and
also
incapacity
of
Mind
.
Which
Conclusion
or
Prejudice
is
constantly
represented
to
the
Mind
,
and
prepossess
it
in
such
a
manner
,
as
hinders
it
from
examining
the
thing
in
its
own
Nature
.
Therefore
those
who
have
treated
of
the
Effect
of
Baptism
,
in
the
Ages
past
,
have
omitted
the
explaining
the
Regeneration
of
Infants
by
the
actual
Motions
of
their
Heart
:
Not
that
they
were
induc'd
by
strong
Reasons
to
judge
it
impossible
;
for
their
Works
do
not
shew
they
have
ever
so
much
as
examin'd
it
;
but
(
as
is
visible
)
because
they
have
supposs'd
it
so
;
and
that
it
has
hardly
entred
their
Heads
to
doubt
of
it
:
or
possibly
,
because
they
wa●'d
giving
an
Explication
so
repugnant
to
Prejudices
,
at
a
Time
when
no
such
Attempts
were
made
,
to
get
rid
of
them
,
as
now-a-days
there
are
.
But
if
it
be
consider'd
how
necessary
it
is
to
give
a
closer
Explication
than
that
,
for
Instance
,
which
St.
Austin
gives
in
[
](A51674-e113460-b)*
*
Lib.
1.
de
Napt
.
Cap.
25
,
26
,
27
,
&
in
Jul.
l.
6.
c.
19.
&
alibi
.
several
places
,
which
looks
towards
Imputation
;
though
in
others
he
speaks
in
a
way
that
does
[
](A51674-e113500-b)†
†
Ep
23.
lib.
de
peccator
.
meritis
,
c.
19.
&
alibi
.
not
countenance
it
:
If
it
be
consider'd
that
Imputation
is
very
commodious
,
and
likely
for
that
Reason
embrac'd
by
some
Ancient
and
[
](A51674-e113540-b)‖
‖
Innocent
.
III.
in
Decret.
3.
de
Baptismo
&
ejus
Effectu
.
Et
in
Concil.
Viennensi
generali
15.
sub
Clement
V.
Orthodox
Divines
;
and
moreover
absolutely
necessary
for
those
,
who
,
without
any
convincing
Proof
,
deny
Spiritual
Habits
;
whom
it
may
be
good
to
satisfie
,
if
possible
.
Lastly
,
If
respect
be
had
to
natural
Equity
,
which
forbids
us
to
condemn
the
secret
Purposes
and
Intentions
;
after
all
this
,
I
say
,
what
I
offer
may
possibly
appear
improbable
:
But
yet
I
can't
see
why
it
should
be
taken
ill
,
that
I
endeavour
to
content
even
the
most
querelous
Minds
touching
their
Difficulties
about
Original
Sin
.
THE
ILLUSTRATION
UPON
THE
Third
CHAPTER
of
the
Third
PART
of
the
Second
BOOK
.
Wherein
I
speak
of
the
power
of
Imagination
of
some
Authors
,
and
particularly
of
Tertullian
.
AS
I
am
well
satisfy'd
that
the
most
general
and
fruitful
Principle
of
Errors
in
the
Scicences
,
and
especially
in
Morals
,
is
the
Impression
made
by
lively
Imaginations
on
the
Mind
of
Men
,
who
are
manag'd
more
by
Mechanism
than
by
Reason
;
so
I
thought
it
lay
upon
me
to
set
this
truth
to
open
view
,
by
all
the
ways
that
might
awaken
them
from
their
slumber
on
its
account
:
And
because
Examples
strike
deepest
,
especially
when
the
Instance
is
somewhat
great
,
and
uncommon
;
I
thought
that
the
celebrated
Names
of
Tertullian
,
Seneca
,
and
Montague
,
were
the
most
proper
to
raise
their
Attention
,
and
give
them
a
sensible
conviction
of
the
contagious
Empire
of
the
Imagination
over
Reason
.
For
if
Words
,
all-dead
,
and
unanimated
by
the
look
and
sensible
behaviour
of
these
famous
Authors
,
have
still
more
Force
than
the
Reason
of
a
great
many
others
;
if
the
Turn
of
Expression
,
that
gives
but
a
faint
Id●a
of
the
sensible
action
,
which
the
Imagination
lively
diffuses
over
the
Face
,
and
the
rest
of
the
Body
of
those
who
are
pierc'd
with
what
they
say
;
is
able
to
Agitate
,
Penetrate
,
and
Convince
a
great
many
:
certainly
it
must
be
granted
that
nothing
is
more
dangerous
,
than
a
respectful
Attention
to
Men
of
a
strong
and
lively
Imagination
.
For
their
Air
and
Way
is
a
natural
Language
,
so
powerful
and
convincing
;
and
they
know
how
to
Image
things
so
passionately
to
the
Life
,
that
they
seldom
fail
of
raising
the
Senses
and
●assions
against
Reason
,
and
pouring
,
as
I
may
say
,
Conviction
and
Certitude
into
their
Spectators
.
I
easily
foresaw
,
in
alledging
these
great
Examples
,
that
it
was
impracticable
to
cure
those
who
were
amaz'd
,
and
thunder-struck
,
with
the
reading
of
these
three
fam'd
Authors
.
For
a
little
knowledge
of
the
nature
of
Man
will
suffice
to
teach
us
,
that
the
wounds
of
the
Brain
are
harder
to
be
heal'd
than
those
of
the
other
parts
of
the
Body
,
and
that
't
is
easier
to
close
up
a
sore
not
expos'd
to
fresh
insult
from
without
,
than
to
make
a
perfect
cure
of
an
inveterate
Prejudice
that
justifies
it self
each
minute
by
very-probable-Reasons
.
'T
is
extreamly
difficult
to
close
up
exactly
the
Traces
of
the
Brain
,
because
expos'd
to
the
course
of
the
Spirits
,
and
liable
to
be
constantly
renew'd
by
infinite
other
Traces
which
may
be
call'd
accessory
.
These
sorts
of
Wounds
cannot
ordinarily
be
cur'd
,
or
made
up
,
till
the
Brain
receives
others
more
deep
,
which
opposing
them
cause
a
violent
and
continual
Revulsion
in
the
Spirits
.
For
we
ought
not
to
reckon
a
Prejudice
quite
cur'd
,
when
we
fancy
it
is
,
because
we
are
not
actually
affected
with
it
:
then
only
the
cure
is
perfected
when
the
Trace
is
quite
shut
up
;
and
not
when
the
Spirits
desist
from
their
wanted
course
for
some
particular
Reason
.
I
knew
then
well
enough
that
such
as
had
been
prostrated
,
and
over-whelm'd
by
the
Force
and
Motions
of
Tertullian
,
ravish'd
and
dazl'd
by
the
loftiness
and
beauties
of
Seneca
,
charm'd
and
corrupted
by
the
gentile
,
easie
and
natural
Turns
of
Montague
,
would
not
change
their
Opinion
by
reading
a
few
Pages
of
my
Book
.
I
judg'd
on
the
contrary
I
should
incur
their
displeasure
,
by
trying
to
dissolve
the
inchantment
which
so
held
them
.
But
as
I
hop'd
these
Examples
would
be
useful
to
my
design
for
the
fore-mention'd
Reasons
:
I
thought
I
was
to
be
more
regardful
of
the
Profit
of
many
who
were
Free
from
Prepossession
,
than
of
the
Spleen
of
some
particulars
,
that
I
concluded
would
censure
the
liberty
I
had
taken
.
I
consider'd
there
were
very
few
so
strongly
prevented
with
esteem
for
these
Authors
,
but
it
was
hop'd
might
return
to
sound
sence
again
.
I
concluded
lastly
,
that
there
being
hardly
one
,
it
may
be
,
prepossess'd
with
all
Three
together
,
because
of
the
diverse
Characters
of
their
Imagination
;
the
most
Opinionated
might
find
I
was
in
the
right
in
a
good
many
things
▪
I
know
what
Respect
I
ought
to
have
for
the
Works
of
Tertullian
,
as
well
on
account
of
the
Subjects
that
he
treats
of
,
as
of
the
Approbation
they
have
receiv'd
from
several
Persons
,
who
ought
to
be
able
to
judge
of
them
.
And
I
have
sufficiently
manifested
that
Temper
of
Mind
,
by
what
I
have
said
of
him
,
and
by
the
Quality
of
the
Book
de
Pallio
,
of
which
alone
I
have
spoke
with
so
much
freedom
,
though
there
were
others
,
it
may
be
,
fitter
for
my
purpose
.
But
after
all
I
don't
think
that
Time
ought
to
change
and
amplifie
the
Ideas
of
things
;
that
all
Antiquities
are
venerable
;
and
that
illegitimate
Reasons
,
and
extravagant
ways
are
worthy
of
Respect
,
because
they
were
a
long
time
in
the
World
before
us
.
I
can't
think
that
affected
Obscurities
ought
to
be
venerated
like
Sacred
Mysteries
;
Sallies
of
Imagination
to
go
for
shining
Lights
of
Knowledge
;
and
African
Heats
,
which
work
in
a
Mind
naturally
full
of
Fire
,
to
be
look'd
on
as
Motions
of
a
Prophetick
Spirit
,
which
can
divulge
nothing
but
sublime
Truths
.
I
am
certain
,
that
even
those
who
defer
most
to
Tertullian's
Works
,
will
agree
with
me
in
all
this
,
and
that
they
are
too
equitable
,
to
justifie
the
Disorders
of
Imagination
against
Reason
.
But
it
may
be
they
are
a-kin
to
those
Judicious
Persons
,
who
,
though
they
infinitely
love
Truth
,
yet
they
are
not
insensible
to
outside
Manners
.
For
I
have
oftentime
observ'd
some
of
them
so
enchanted
with
certain
strong
,
lively
,
great
,
and
pompous
Expressions
of
Tertullian
,
that
having
prov'd
to
them
that
Author
was
none
of
the
most
Judicious
and
Reasonable
,
they
would
think
it
enough
to
convince
and
surprize
me
,
only
to
repeat
them
.
I
own
that
Tertullian
has
Expressions
extreamly
strong
and
bold
,
which
produce
most
lively
and
animated
Images
in
the
Mind
;
and
upon
that
score
I
justly
bring
him
for
an
Example
,
of
the
Power
which
strong
Imaginations
have
to
move
,
and
convince
by
Impression
.
Thus
those
who
urge
to
me
these
Objections
,
confirm
my
Opinion
by
opposing
it
.
Their
Prepossession
and
Esteem
for
Tertullian
justifies
my
Conduct
:
the
frequent
Citations
,
and
the
big
Words
,
which
they
alledge
,
prove
what
I
say
.
For
they
use
not
in
Discourse
to
produce
entire
Reasonings
;
but
often
quote
strong
and
lively
Expressions
,
in
order
to
dazzle
,
perturbate
,
and
convince
by
the
sensible
Impression
.
There
is
no
Reason
,
I
think
,
to
imagine
,
that
I
set
up
for
a
Censor
of
so
many
great
Men
,
who
cite
Tertullian
constantly
in
the
Pulpit
,
and
elsewhere
;
They
have
their
Reasons
for
it
:
into
which
I
neither
do
,
nor
ought
to
enquire
.
What
I
have
said
of
that
Author
is
methinks
evident
enough
:
Let
every
one
deduce
his
Consequences
according
to
his
Knowledge
,
without
attributing
those
Thoughts
to
me
,
which
I
never
had
.
Those
who
pretend
to
dive
into
the
Designs
of
others
frame
commonly
such
Phantasms
as
resemble
but
themselves
:
it
being
customary
with
Men
,
to
taint
,
and
infect
others
with
the
Venom
of
their
own
Passions
.
We
are
apt
to
measure
all
things
by
our selves
,
and
they
would
do
well
to
consider
,
who
condemn
me
,
whether
they
do
not
judge
themselves
un-a-wares
,
in
doing
it
.
But
if
they
would
have
me
declare
my self
upon
the
Citations
of
Tertullian
,
I
grant
a
Man
has
right
to
make
use
of
them
for
several
Reasons
;
and
likewise
that
they
are
sometimes
most
usefully
employ'd
,
to
make
some
practical
Truths
more
sensible
,
which
are
barren
and
unfruitful
,
as
long
as
they
lie
dormant
in
our
inward
Reasons
,
and
raise
in
us
no
contrary
Motions
to
those
which
the
Goods
of
the
Body
excite
in
us
.
Nevertheless
I
can't
think
those
Mens
Opinions
very
unreasonable
,
who
believe
we
are
not
to
cite
Authors
by
Name
,
save
when
they
are
infallible
;
and
that
,
except
in
things
out
of
Reasons
Prerogative
,
and
which
Authority
ought
to
take
place
,
no
Quotations
are
to
be
made
.
This
formerly
was
the
Custom
of
the
Fathers
:
St.
Cyprian
never
cited
Tertullian
though
he
has
taken
a
great
deal
from
him
;
and
if
it
be
true
what
St.
Jerome
reports
of
that
Holy
Bishop
,
by
hear-say
,
viz.
That
talking
of
Tertullian
he
call'd
him
his
Master
;
either
his
Name
must
not
have
been
so
Authoritave
,
nor
his
Expression
so
forcible
as
they
are
at
present
upon
Mens
minds
;
or
else
St.
Cyprian
was
wonderfully
rigorous
in
the
Observance
of
that
Custom
of
his
Time
:
it
being
very
strange
such
a
Disciple
should
never
have
mention'd
his
Master
in
any
of
his
Works
.
St.
Jerome's
History
is
commonly
urg'd
in
Defence
of
Tertullian
;
and
I
have
been
sometimes
told
,
I
was
too
blame
to
speak
so
as
I
did
,
of
a
Man
,
whom
St.
Cyprian
call'd
his
Master
.
But
I
question
whether
St.
Jerome
would
not
have
been
too
easie
of
belief
,
in
what
made
for
the
Honour
of
Tertullian
.
To
me
he
seems
to
have
had
somewhat
too
great
an
Inclination
for
him
,
Invidia
postea
&
contumetiis
Claricorum
Romanae
Ecclesiae
ad
Monrani
dogma
delapsus
,
in
multis
libris
novae
prophetiae
Meminit
.
Hieron
.
in
Catalogo
de
Script
.
Eccles.
since
he
in
some
measure
excuses
his
Fall
by
retorting
his
Heresie
on
the
Envy
of
the
Romish
Clergy
,
and
the
evil
Usage
he
receiv'd
from
them
.
But
if
that
Story
,
which
is
founded
only
on
what
St.
Jerome
heard
one
Person
say
,
be
true
;
I
must
confess
,
I
know
not
what
to
make
of
that
Silence
observ'd
by
St.
Cyprian
in
his
Writings
,
with
reference
to
Tertullian
.
That
Silence
of
a
Scholar
may
be
suspected
to
conceal
some
Mystery
not
advantagious
to
the
Master
;
and
if
that
History
,
as
well
as
Tertullian's
own
Works
,
did
not
give
us
sufficiently
to
understand
,
that
he
was
not
altogether
worthy
of
the
great
Esteem
that
is
paid
him
by
very
many
;
yet
I
question
whether
St.
Cyprian's
Conduct
,
his
Silence
,
his
Stile
,
his
Ways
,
would
not
be
sufficient
to
lessen
it
;
and
to
make
us
think
,
That
,
probably
,
that
Author's
Reputation
was
not
so
well
establish'd
in
Africa
it self
,
which
ought
to
have
been
more
favourable
to
him
than
a
Clime
so
temperate
as
ours
.
Our
own
Country
and
Africa
produce
very
different
Wits
:
the
Genius
of
the
former
,
being
natural
,
rational
,
and
irreconcileable
to
all
over-strain'd
Manners
,
it
is
strange
to
find
any
among
them
addicted
to
an
Author
,
who
never
studied
nor
follow'd
Nature
:
and
who
instead
of
consulting
his
Reason
,
suffers
himself
to
be
transported
by
his
ungovern'd
heats
into
altogether
obscure
,
monstrous
,
and
extravagant
Expressions
.
But
this
probably
is
owing
to
the
mighty
Force
of
Imagination
which
disarms
Reason
,
and
even
changes
Nature
.
And
indeed
a
Man
in
the
Fury
of
Passion
perturbates
,
and
even
changes
the
natural
situation
of
our
Imagination
to
adapt
it
to
his
own
.
And
then
there
is
no
Motion
but
what
seems
Natural
,
no
Expression
but
's
Agreeable
,
no
Nonsence
but
's
convincing
.
For
we
stand
to
examine
nothing
seriously
.
Now
as
the
Passions
vindicate
themselves
,
and
irregular
immaginations
take
delight
only
in
their
Irregularity
,
't
is
impossible
to
judge
soberly
of
things
,
as
long
as
the
Brain
preserves
the
violent
Impression
it
has
receiv'd
.
There
is
no
Man
in
the
Transport
of
Passion
but
is
perpetually
sollicited
to
justifie
it
;
nor
any
disturb'd
in
Brain
,
but
is
pleas'd
in
the
disturbance
.
For
if
those
who
fancy
themselves
Cocks
,
Wolves
,
Oxen
,
please
themselves
wonderfully
in
imitating
the
actions
that
are
customary
with
these
Creatures
,
though
quite
contrary
to
the
nature
of
Man
:
it
may
easily
be
judg'd
that
we
shall
be
far
from
condemning
the
Behaviour
of
those
,
who
by
the
Contagion
of
their
Imagination
have
made
us
in
a
manner
like
them
.
For
in
condemning
them
we
are
conscious
we
condemn
our selves
.
There
's
a
very
particular
Reason
why
some
of
the
Learn'd
should
glory
in
espousing
Tertullian
,
and
expressing
so
extraordinary
an
esteem
for
him
.
Which
is
that
affected
obscurity
,
which
serves
as
one
of
the
principal
Rules
of
his
Rhetorick
.
In
these
days
all
empty
and
senseless
Expressions
,
and
all
obscure
and
perplex'd
ways
of
speaking
,
go
under
the
name
of
nonsence
.
But
there
have
been
found
such
as
have
look'd
upon
Obscurity
,
as
one
of
the
greatest
mysteries
in
Eloquence
,
with
whom
the
Art
of
perswading
consisted
partly
in
being
unintelligible
.
If
publick
Haranguers
had
always
the
clear
and
distinct
Ideas
of
the
Truths
they
went
about
to
perswade
,
and
spoke
only
to
persons
that
were
capable
of
a
competent
Attention
to
understand
them
,
the
precept
of
affecting
obscurity
in
discourse
,
would
be
the
most
extravagant
in
the
World
.
But
though
this
precept
absolutely
contradicts
all
Reason
,
yet
it
may
be
said
to
be
proportionate
and
fit
for
the
Genius
of
most
Men
:
not
only
because
a
Mysterious
Obscurity
conceals
the
Ignorance
of
the
Speaker
,
but
also
for
its
raising
such
a
sense
in
others
as
disposes
them
to
yield
,
and
be
convinc'd
.
Experience
manifests
,
that
most
Men
esteem
what
they
do
not
comprehend
;
that
they
reverence
,
like
Mysteries
,
whatever
is
above
their
reach
,
and
think
an
Orator
has
a
wonderful
Talent
,
when
he
dazles
them
,
by
the
glitterings
of
discourse
,
and
by
a
Language
of
Imagination
,
when
Reason
has
nothing
to
do
.
The
Inclination
Men
have
for
Grandeur
exceeds
that
which
they
have
for
Truth
:
wherefore
Pompous
Nonsence
which
perswades
by
the
Impression
,
is
better
receiv'd
than
pure
Argumentation
which
perswades
by
force
of
Evidence
:
since
Evidence
makes
way
only
by
Reflections
,
which
always
cost
the
Maker
trouble
:
but
sensible
Conviction
flows
into
the
Soul
,
and
penetrates
it
in
a
most
agreeable
manner
.
The
Good
which
alone
is
capable
of
satisfying
our
desires
,
is
at
once
Infinite
,
and
Inaccessible
,
and
great
and
obscure
Expressions
have
something
of
this
Character
.
So
that
Obscurity
raising
our
Desires
,
whilst
Greatness
provokes
our
Admiration
,
and
Esteem
;
these
Expressions
win
us
by
the
Motions
they
produce
in
us
.
When
we
understand
,
or
think
we
understand
a
difficult
and
obscure
Author
,
we
value
our selves
above
others
that
do
not
;
and
sometimes
look
upon
them
,
as
Ignorant
.
The
Pains
we
have
taken
to
master
him
,
interess
us
in
his
Defence
.
For
by
venerating
this
Author
,
and
procuring
the
Veneration
of
others
,
we
justifie
our
own
studies
:
and
as
we
find
pleasure
in
justifying
our selves
,
so
we
must
not
fail
to
praise
and
defend
him
with
Earnestness
and
Zeal
,
and
by
lively
and
sensible
ways
.
These
Reasons
,
and
some
others
of
less
force
are
sufficient
,
I
think
,
to
let
us
know
,
that
the
obscurity
of
Tertullian
is
no
disadvantage
to
him
in
the
Opinion
of
some
Persons
;
and
that
likely
they
would
have
less
admir'd
him
,
if
the
Truths
which
are
scatter'd
over
his
Works
were
reduc'd
to
their
more
simple
and
clear
Ideas
.
Mathematical
Truths
and
Relations
are
always
Sum'd
up
in
their
Exponents
,
that
is
,
in
the
most
simple
terms
that
express
them
;
and
are
disengag'd
from
all
perplexing
and
obscuring
Dependencies
.
For
Geometricians
love
naked
Truth
;
and
desire
not
to
convince
by
Impression
,
but
by
Light
and
Evidence
.
But
what
would
become
of
most
of
Tertullian's
Thoughts
,
were
they
reduc'd
to
their
Exponents
by
the
Rules
of
Logical
Geometricians
,
and
should
we
see
them
strip'd
of
all
that
sensible
Pomp
which
dazles
Reason
.
Yet
if
we
would
judge
solidly
of
this
Author
's
Reasonings
,
we
ought
to
make
the
Experiment
.
However
I
do
not
pretend
that
Tertullian
ought
to
have
written
with
Geometrical
Plainness
.
Figures
which
express
our
sentiments
and
motions
,
with
respect
to
the
Truths
we
expose
to
others
,
are
absolutely
necessary
;
and
I
think
that
more
especially
in
discourse
of
Religion
and
Morality
we
ought
to
Employ
those
Ornaments
which
procure
all
the
reverence
that
is
due
to
Truth
,
and
those
Motions
which
actuate
the
Soul
,
and
incline
her
to
vertuous
Actions
.
But
we
are
not
to
dress
up
and
adorn
a
Phantasm
without
substance
and
reality
;
nor
excite
Motions
when
there
's
no
occasion
;
and
if
we
will
vigorously
impress
on
our
Hearers
Conviction
,
and
Certitude
,
't
is
necessary
that
the
Conviction
should
relate
to
something
true
and
solid
.
We
must
neither
convince
,
nor
be
convinced
without
knowing
evidently
,
distinctly
,
precisely
,
why
we
do
the
one
,
or
suffer
the
other
.
We
ought
to
know
both
what
we
say
,
and
what
we
think
;
and
only
to
Love
Truth
,
and
Knowledge
,
without
putting
out
the
Eyes
of
others
,
after
we
have
made
blind
our selves
.
THE
ILLUSTRATION
UPON
THE
Nature
of
IDEAS
.
Wherein
I
explain
how
we
see
all
things
in
God
,
both
Truths
and
Laws
Eternal
.
I
Hoped
that
what
I
had
said
upon
the
nature
of
Ideas
,
was
sufficient
to
have
shown
that
God
only
enlightens
our
understanding
.
But
I
have
found
by
Experience
,
that
there
are
Persons
incapable
of
a
competent
Attention
to
conceive
the
Reasons
I
have
given
of
this
Principle
.
Abstracted
reasons
are
incomprehensible
to
the
greatest
part
of
Men
,
but
that
which
is
sensible
awakens
them
,
and
fixes
and
keeps
open
the
Eye
of
their
Mind
.
They
cannot
consider
,
nor
,
consequently
,
comprehend
what
comes
not
under
the
Senses
,
nor
Imagination
.
Which
thing
I
have
often
said
,
nor
can
I
too
often
repeat
.
'T
is
plain
that
Bodies
are
not
visible
of
themselves
:
that
they
cannot
act
upon
our
mind
,
nor
represent
themselves
to
it
.
This
has
no
need
of
proof
;
but
is
discover'd
by
a
bare
perception
,
and
is
infinitely
more
certain
,
than
that
Bodies
communicate
their
Motion
when
they
meet
.
But
it
is
not
certain
,
save
with
those
who
silence
their
Senses
,
to
listen
to
their
Reason
.
Therefore
all
Mankind
believe
that
Bodies
impel
each
other
,
because
the
Senses
tell
them
so
,
but
they
do
not
believe
that
Bodies
are
of
themselves
absolutely
invisible
,
and
incapable
of
acting
on
the
Mind
,
because
the
Senses
do
not
tell
them
this
,
but
seem
to
say
the
contrary
.
Nevertheless
there
are
some
whose
reason
is
so
steadfast
and
resolv'd
,
as
to
rise
up
to
the
most
abstract
Truths
.
They
contemplate
them
with
attention
,
and
couragiously
resist
the
Impression
of
their
Senses
and
Imagination
.
But
the
Body
insensibly
weighing
down
the
Mind
,
they
relapse
,
these
Ideas
vanish
,
and
whilst
the
Imagination
stirs
up
more
sensible
and
lively
,
the
former
are
beheld
as
Apparitions
,
that
only
cause
mistrust
and
fear
of
delusion
.
We
are
easily
apt
to
distrust
those
Persons
,
or
things
we
are
not
familiar
with
,
and
which
have
not
afforded
us
any
sensible
pleasure
:
For
't
is
Pleasure
that
wins
the
Heart
,
and
Familiarity
that
cures
our
Trouble
and
disquiet
of
Mind
.
Wherefore
those
who
are
not
us'd
to
Metaphysical
,
and
abstract
Truths
,
are
very
prone
to
believe
we
purpose
to
seduce
them
,
when
we
only
labour
to
instruct
them
.
They
look
with
a
suspicious
Eye
,
and
a
kind
of
dread
,
upon
Ideas
which
have
nothing
charming
and
sensible
,
and
the
Love
they
bear
to
their
own
Repose
and
Felicity
,
speedily
rids
them
of
so
vexatious
a
Contemplation
,
which
seems
incapable
of
contenting
them
.
If
the
Question
,
before
us
,
were
not
of
the
greatest
Importance
,
the
Reasons
I
have
given
,
and
some
others
not
necessary
to
be
produc'd
,
would
oblige
me
to
say
no
more
of
it
;
for
I
foresee
that
whatever
I
can
say
upon
this
subject
will
never
enter
the
Heads
of
some
People
.
But
this
Principle
,
That
there
is
none
but
God
who
enlightens
us
;
and
that
this
illumination
is
effected
by
the
manifestation
of
an
immutable
,
and
necessary
Reason
,
or
Wisdom
;
seems
to
me
so
conformable
to
Religion
,
that
I
think
my self
indispensably
oblig'd
to
Explain
it
,
and
maintain
it
to
the
utmost
of
my
Power
.
I
had
rather
be
call'd
a
Visionist
,
Enthusiast
,
and
all
the
fine
Names
that
the
Imagination
,
(
which
in
little
Souls
is
always
Sarcastical
)
uses
to
oppose
to
reasons
it
cannot
comprehend
,
or
defend
it self
against
;
than
to
grant
that
Bodies
are
capable
of
instructing
me
;
that
I
am
my
own
Master
,
Reason
and
Light
:
and
that
to
be
thoroughly
inform'd
in
all
things
,
I
need
only
consult
my self
;
or
other
Men
,
who
perhaps
may
fill
my
Ears
with
a
loud
noise
,
but
certainly
cannot
infuse
Light
and
Knowledge
into
my
Mind
.
Here
then
are
some
farther
Reasons
for
the
Opinion
I
have
establish'd
,
in
the
Chapter
belonging
to
this
Illustration
.
No
body
will
deny
that
Man
is
capable
of
knowing
Truth
:
and
the
least
intelligent
Philosophers
acknowledge
that
he
partakes
of
a
certain
Reason
,
which
they
don't
determine
.
And
therefore
they
define
him
animal
Rationis
particeps
.
For
there
is
no
body
but
knows
,
at
least
confusedly
,
that
the
essential
difference
of
Man
consists
in
his
necessary
union
with
Universal
Reason
,
though
it
be
not
commonly
known
who
it
is
that
includes
this
Reason
,
and
little
Care
is
taken
to
discover
it
.
I
see
for
Example
,
that
two
times
two
are
four
,
and
that
a
Friend
is
preferable
to
a
Dog
;
and
I
am
certain
there
is
no
Man
in
the
World
but
sees
this
as
well
as
I.
Now
I
discover
not
these
truths
in
the
Mind
of
others
,
no
more
than
others
do
in
mine
:
Therefore
there
is
necessarily
an
Vniversal
Reason
which
enligntens
me
,
and
all
intelligent
Beings
.
For
if
the
Reason
I
consult
were
not
the
same
as
that
which
answers
the
Chinese
,
't
is
evident
,
I
could
not
be
assur'd
,
as
I
am
,
Siambo
videmus
verum
esse
quod
dicis
&
am●o
videmus
verum
esse
quod
di●o
,
ubi
quaeso
id
videmus
?
Nec
ego
utique
in
te
,
nec
tu
in
me
;
sed
ambo
in
ipsa
,
quae
supra
mentes
nostras
est
,
incommutabili
veritate
.
Confess
.
de
S.
Aug.
l.
12.
c.
25.
See
St.
Austin
De
libero
arbitrio
▪
&c.
Book
2.
Chap.
8.
that
the
Chinese
see
the
same
Truths
as
I
see
.
Therefore
the
Reason
we
consult
,
when
we
retire
into
our selves
,
is
an
universal
Reason
:
I
say
when
we
retire
into
our selves
,
for
I
speak
not
here
of
the
Reason
which
is
follow'd
by
a
Man
in
a
Passion
.
When
a
Man
prefers
the
Life
of
his
Coach-Horse
before
that
of
his
Coach-Man
,
he
has
his
Reasons
for
it
,
but
they
are
particular
Reasons
which
every
rational
Man
abhors
.
They
are
reasons
which
at
Bottom
are
not
reasonable
,
because
not
conformable
to
Soveraign
or
universal
Reason
,
which
all
Mankind
consults
.
I
am
certain
that
the
Ideas
of
things
are
immutable
,
and
that
Eternal
Truths
and
Laws
are
necessary
.
'T
is
impossible
they
should
not
be
what
they
are
.
But
in
my self
I
find
nothing
either
immutable
,
or
necessary
:
'T
is
possible
for
me
not
to
exist
:
or
exist
otherwise
than
I
do
.
There
may
be
Minds
that
are
not
like
me
:
and
yet
I
am
certain
there
can
be
no
mind
that
sees
other
Truths
,
and
Laws
than
what
I
see
.
For
every
mind
necessarily
sees
that
two
times
two
are
four
;
and
that
a
Friend
is
to
be
prefer'd
before
a
Dog
.
We
must
then
conclude
,
That
the
Reason
which
is
consulted
by
all
minds
is
an
immutable
and
necessary
Reason
.
Moreover
,
it
is
evident
,
that
this
same
reason
is
Infinite
.
The
mind
of
Man
clearly
conceives
that
there
either
are
,
or
may
be
an
infinite
number
of
intelligible
Triangles
,
Tetragones
,
Pentagones
,
and
other
such
like
Figures
.
Nor
does
it
only
conceive
,
that
the
Ideas
of
figures
are
inexhaustible
,
and
that
it
might
still
discover
new
ones
,
though
it
should
study
only
these
Figures
to
all
Eternity
;
but
it
perceives
an
Infinity
in
Extension
.
The
mind
clearly
perceives
that
the
number
which
multiplied
by
it self
produces
5
,
or
any
of
the
numbers
between
4
and
9
,
between
9
and
16
,
between
16
and
25
▪
&c.
is
a
Quantity
,
a
Relation
,
a
Fraction
,
whose
terms
contain
more
figures
than
will
reach
from
one
Pole
of
the
World
to
the
other
.
It
clearly
sees
it
is
such
a
Relation
as
none
but
God
can
comprehend
,
and
that
't
is
impossible
to
express
it
exactly
,
because
to
express
it
we
need
a
Fraction
whose
two
terms
are
Infinite
:
I
might
bring
a
great
many
such
Examples
,
from
which
we
might
conclude
,
not
only
that
the
Mind
of
Man
is
finite
,
but
that
the
Reason
he
consults
is
infinite
.
For
in
brief
,
his
Mind
clearly
sees
infinite
,
in
this
Reason
,
though
he
does
not
comprehend
it
,
since
he
can
compare
incommensurable
numbers
together
,
and
know
their
Relations
,
though
he
cannot
compare
them
with
the
unite
.
Or
,
(
that
we
may
stick
only
to
what
is
sensible
,
)
The
Reason
which
Man
consults
is
infinite
,
since
it
cannot
be
exhausted
,
and
it
has
always
something
to
answer
to
whatever
we
demand
.
But
if
it
be
true
,
that
the
Reason
whereof
all
Men
participate
be
universal
,
and
infinite
:
if
it
be
true
that
it
is
immutable
and
necessary
;
it
is
certain
,
that
it
differs
not
from
that
of
God
himself
.
For
none
but
the
universal
and
infinite
Being
contains
in
himself
universal
and
infinite
Reason
.
All
Creatures
are
particular
Beings
;
wherefore
Vniversal
Reason
is
not
created
.
No
Creatures
are
infinite
:
Universal
Reason
therefore
is
no
Creature
.
But
the
Reason
we
consult
is
not
only
Universal
and
Infinite
,
but
also
necessary
and
independant
,
and
we
conceive
it
in
one
sence
more
independant
than
God
himself
.
For
God
cannot
but
act
by
this
Reason
;
on
which
he
in
one
sence
depends
;
and
which
he
must
needs
consult
and
follow
.
But
God
consults
only
himself
:
He
depends
on
nothing
.
This
Reason
therefore
is
not
distinct
from
him
;
but
is
coeternal
and
consubstantial
with
him
.
We
see
clearly
that
God
cannot
punish
an
innocent
Creature
:
that
he
cannot
subject
minds
to
Bodies
,
and
that
he
's
oblig'd
to
follow
Order
.
We
see
therefore
the
Rule
,
Order
and
Reason
of
God
;
for
what
other
Wisdom
than
that
of
God
can
we
see
,
when
we
fear
not
to
affirm
,
that
God
is
oblig'd
to
follow
it
?
But
after
all
,
can
we
conceive
any
Wisdom
which
is
not
the
Wisdom
of
God
?
Does
Solomon
,
who
speaks
so
well
of
Wisdom
,
distinguish
it
into
two
sorts
?
Does
not
he
teach
us
that
which
is
Coeternal
with
God
,
that
by
which
he
has
establish'd
the
Order
we
see
in
his
Works
,
is
the
same
which
presides
over
all
Minds
;
and
which
Legislators
consult
to
make
Just
and
Reasonable
Laws
.
We
need
only
read
the
Eighth
Chapter
of
Proverbs
,
to
be
perswaded
of
this
Truth
.
I
know
that
the
Holy
Scripture
speaks
of
a
certain
Wisdom
,
which
it
names
the
Wisdom
of
the
Age
,
the
Wisdom
of
Men
;
but
then
it
speaks
only
according
to
appearance
,
or
ordinary
Opinion
:
For
we
learn
in
other
places
,
that
that
Wisdom
is
Folly
,
and
Abomination
,
not
only
before
God
,
but
before
all
Men
that
consult
Reason
.
Certainly
,
if
Eternal
Laws
and
Truths
depended
on
God
,
and
were
establish'd
by
a
free
will
of
the
Creator
:
in
a
word
,
if
the
Reason
we
consult
were
not
necessary
and
independant
:
it
seems
evident
to
me
,
that
we
must
bid
farewel
to
all
true
Science
;
and
that
we
might
err
in
affirming
that
the
Arithmetick
and
Geometrie
of
the
Chinese
is
the
same
as
ours
.
For
indeed
if
it
were
not
absolutely
necessary
that
2
times
4
should
be
8
,
or
the
three
Angles
of
a
Triangle
equal
to
two
right
ones
;
what
proof
could
we
have
that
these
sorts
of
Truth
were
not
like
those
which
are
receiv'd
,
but
in
some
Universities
,
and
which
continue
but
a
certain
Season
?
Do
we
clearly
conceive
that
God
cannot
desist
to
will
what
he
will'd
with
a
will
absolutely
free
and
indifferent
?
or
rather
do
we
clearly
conceive
it
impossible
for
God
to
have
will'd
certain
things
,
for
a
determinate
time
,
or
place
,
for
some
particular
Persons
,
or
certain
kinds
of
Beings
;
supposing
him
,
as
some
will
have
him
,
intirely
free
and
indifferent
in
that
Will
;
For
my
own
part
,
I
cannot
conceive
any
Necessity
in
Indifferency
,
nor
reconcile
two
so
opposite
things
together
.
But
let
it
be
suppos'd
,
that
it
can
be
clearly
perceiv'd
,
that
God
by
a
Will
intirely
indifferent
,
has
establish'd
for
all
times
,
and
for
all
places
,
Laws
and
Truths
Eternal
;
and
that
at
present
they
are
immutable
because
of
that
Decree
.
But
where
do
they
see
this
Decree
?
Has
God
created
any
Being
representative
of
it
?
Will
they
say
it
is
a
Modification
of
their
Soul
?
They
see
clearly
that
Decree
;
for
they
have
learn'd
that
Immutability
is
ascertain'd
to
Eternal
Truths
and
Laws
:
But
where
is
it
that
they
see
it
?
Certainly
if
they
see
it
not
in
God
,
they
see
it
not
at
all
.
For
that
Decree
can
be
no
where
but
in
God
,
nor
can
it
be
seen
but
where
he
is
.
The
Philosophers
cannot
then
be
certain
of
any
thing
,
unless
they
consult
God
,
and
are
answer'd
by
him
.
'T
is
in
vain
for
them
to
exclaim
:
and
they
must
either
yield
or
hold
their
Peace
.
But
after
all
,
that
Decree
is
an
ungrounded
Imagination
.
When
we
think
on
Order
and
Eternal
Laws
and
Truths
,
we
do
not
naturally
enquire
the
Cause
;
for
they
have
none
.
We
do
not
clearly
see
the
necessity
of
this
Decree
,
nor
do
we
think
immediately
upon
it
:
On
the
contrary
we
perceive
evidently
by
a
simple
view
,
that
the
nature
of
numbers
,
and
intelligible
Ideas
is
immutable
,
necessary
,
and
independent
.
We
see
clearly
that
it
is
absolutely
necessary
for
2
times
4
to
be
8
,
and
that
the
square
of
the
Diagonal
of
a
square
is
double
to
that
square
.
If
we
doubt
of
the
absolute
necessity
of
these
Truths
,
't
is
because
we
turn
our
back
upon
their
Light
,
reason
upon
a
false
Principle
,
and
search
for
their
nature
,
their
Immutability
;
and
independance
out
of
themselves
.
Thus
the
Decree
for
the
Immutability
of
these
Truths
is
a
fiction
of
the
mind
,
which
supposing
it
sees
not
what
it
sees
in
the
Wisdom
of
God
;
and
knowing
him
to
be
the
cause
of
all
things
,
thinks
it self
oblig'd
to
imagine
a
Decree
to
ascertain
immutability
to
these
Truths
,
which
it
cannot
choose
but
acknowledge
to
be
immutable
.
But
this
Supposition
is
false
,
and
we
ought
to
beware
of
it
.
'T
is
only
in
the
Wisdom
of
God
,
that
we
see
Eternal
,
immutable
,
and
necessary
Truths
:
nor
can
we
see
any
where
else
the
Order
which
God
himself
is
oblig'd
to
follow
,
as
I
have
said
before
:
The
mind
is
made
for
that
Wisdom
,
and
in
one
sence
it
can
see
nothing
else
.
For
if
it
can
see
the
Creatures
,
't
is
because
He
whom
it
sees
,
though
in
a
very
imperfect
manner
,
during
this
life
,
comprehends
them
all
in
the
immensity
of
his
Being
,
in
an
intelligible
manner
,
and
proportionate
to
the
mind
,
as
I
have
shown
in
another
place
.
If
we
had
not
in
our selves
the
Idea
of
Infinite
,
and
if
we
saw
not
all
things
by
the
natural
union
of
our
mind
with
universal
,
and
infinite
Reason
,
it
seems
evident
,
that
we
could
not
have
liberty
to
think
on
all
things
:
For
the
mind
cannot
desire
to
consider
things
except
it
has
some
Idea
of
them
,
and
it
is
not
in
its
Power
to
think
actually
on
any
thing
but
what
it
may
desire
to
think
on
.
And
so
we
shall
cashier
Man
of
his
Liberty
of
thinking
on
All
,
if
we
separate
his
mind
from
him
who
comprehends
all
.
Again
:
since
we
can
love
nothing
but
what
we
see
,
if
God
should
only
give
us
particular
Ideas
,
it
is
manifest
he
would
so
determine
all
the
Motions
of
our
Will
,
that
it
would
be
necessary
for
us
to
Love
only
particular
Beings
.
For
in
brief
,
if
we
had
not
the
Idea
of
infinite
,
we
could
not
love
it
:
and
if
those
who
positively
affirm
they
have
no
Idea
of
God
,
speak
as
they
think
,
I
scruple
not
to
affirm
they
have
never
lov'd
God
,
for
nothing
seems
certainer
to
me
,
than
that
nothing
can
be
the
Object
of
our
Love
,
which
is
not
of
our
conception
.
Lastly
,
If
Order
,
and
Eternal
Laws
were
not
immutable
,
by
the
necessity
of
their
nature
,
the
clearest
and
strongest
proofs
of
Religion
would
,
I
question
not
,
be
destroy'd
in
their
Principle
,
as
well
as
Liberty
,
and
the
most
certain
Sciences
.
For
it
is
evident
,
that
the
Christian
Religion
which
proposes
JESUS
CHRIST
as
a
Mediator
,
and
Restorer
,
supposes
the
Corruption
of
nature
,
by
original
Sin
.
But
what
proof
can
we
have
of
this
Corruption
?
The
flesh
wars
,
you
will
say
,
against
the
Spirit
,
has
brought
it
into
subjection
,
and
tyrannizes
over
it
.
This
I
grant
.
But
this
,
says
a
Libertine
,
is
no
Disorder
.
This
is
as
it
pleas'd
God
;
who
ordain'd
it
so
;
who
is
the
Master
of
his
own
decrees
;
and
who
constitutes
what
Order
he
thinks
fit
amongst
his
Creatures
.
How
shall
it
be
prov'd
that
't
is
a
Disorder
for
Minds
to
be
subjected
to
Bodies
,
unless
we
have
a
clear
Idea
of
Order
,
and
necessity
,
and
know
,
that
God
himself
is
oblig'd
to
follow
it
,
by
a
necessary
Love
which
he
bears
to
himself
?
But
farther
,
supposing
that
Order
depends
on
a
free
Decree
of
God
,
we
must
still
have
recourse
to
him
to
be
inform'd
of
it
:
God
must
nevertheless
be
consulted
,
notwithstanding
the
aversion
which
some
of
the
Learned
have
,
to
apply
to
him
;
and
this
truth
must
still
be
granted
,
that
we
have
need
of
God
to
be
instructed
.
But
that
suppos'd
free
Decree
which
is
the
cause
of
Order
,
is
a
meer
fiction
of
mind
for
the
Reasons
I
have
given
.
If
it
be
not
a
necessary
Order
that
Man
should
be
made
for
his
Author
,
and
that
his
will
should
be
conformable
to
Order
,
or
to
the
essential
and
necessary
will
of
God
:
If
it
be
not
true
that
Actions
are
good
or
ill
,
because
agreeable
or
repugnant
to
an
immutable
and
necessary
Order
,
and
that
this
same
order
requires
that
the
Good
should
be
rewarded
,
and
the
Evil
punish'd
:
Last
of
all
,
if
all
Men
have
not
naturally
a
clear
Idea
of
Order
,
even
of
such
an
one
as
God
himself
cannot
will
the
contrary
to
what
it
prescribes
,
(
since
God
cannot
will
Disorder
)
certainly
I
can
see
nothing
but
Universal
Confusion
.
For
what
is
there
to
be
blam'd
in
the
most
infamous
and
unjust
actions
of
the
Heathens
,
to
whom
God
has
given
no
Laws
?
What
will
be
the
reason
that
will
dare
to
judge
them
,
if
there
be
no
supream
reason
that
condemns
them
?
There
is
a
Poet
who
says
,
't
is
impossible
to
distinguish
Justice
from
Injustice
:
Nec
natura
potest
justo
secernere
iniquum
.
Lucretius
,
Diogenes
▪
and
a
Philosopher
that
will
have
it
an
infirmity
,
to
blush
or
be
asham'd
for
infamous
actions
.
These
and
the
like
Paradoxes
are
often
asserted
in
the
heat
of
Imagination
,
and
in
the
transport
of
the
Passions
.
But
how
can
we
condemn
these
Opinions
,
if
there
be
not
an
Universal
and
Necessary
Order
,
Rule
,
or
Reason
,
which
is
also
present
to
those
who
can
retire
into
themselves
?
We
fear
not
on
several
occasions
to
judge
others
,
and
also
our selves
:
but
by
what
Authority
should
we
do
it
,
if
the
inward
Reason
that
judges
,
when
we
seem
to
pronounce
Sentence
against
others
and
our selves
,
be
not
supream
,
and
common
to
all
men
?
But
if
this
Reason
were
not
present
to
those
who
retreat
into
their
own
Breast
;
and
if
the
Heathens
too
,
had
not
naturally
some
union
with
the
order
we
speak
of
;
upon
the
score
of
what
Sin
or
Disobedience
could
they
be
reckon'd
culpable
,
and
by
what
Justice
could
God
punish
them
?
This
I
say
,
upon
a
Prophet's
teaching
me
that
God
is
willing
to
[
](A51674-e115860-b)*
*
And
now
O
Inhabitants
of
Jerusalem
,
judge
betwixt
me
and
my
Vineyard
.
Isa.
5.3
make
Men
the
Arbiters
betwixt
him
and
his
People
,
provided
they
determine
by
the
immutable
,
and
necessary
order
of
Justice
.
Nero
kill'd
his
Mother
,
it
is
true
:
But
in
what
has
he
done
amiss
?
He
follow'd
the
natural
Motion
of
his
Hatred
:
God
gave
him
no
Precept
to
the
contrary
:
the
Laws
of
the
Jews
were
not
made
for
him
.
You
'll
say
perhaps
that
such
actions
are
restrain'd
by
the
Natural
Law
,
and
that
was
known
to
him
:
But
what
proof
can
you
have
of
it
?
For
my
own
part
I
agree
to
it
;
because
indeed
this
is
an
irresistible
Proof
for
an
Immutable
,
and
Necessary
Order
;
and
for
the
Knowledge
which
every
Mind
has
of
it
,
and
that
so
much
more
clear
,
as
it
is
more
united
to
Universal
Reason
,
and
less
sensible
to
the
impression
of
the
Senses
and
Passions
;
In
a
word
,
as
it
is
more
reasonable
.
But
't
is
requisite
that
I
explain
as
clearly
as
possibly
I
can
,
the
sense
I
have
about
Natural
,
or
Divine
Order
and
Law
.
For
the
difficulty
that
is
found
to
embrace
my
Opinion
,
proceeds
,
it
may
be
,
from
the
want
of
a
distinct
conception
of
my
meaning
.
'T
is
certain
that
God
comprehends
in
himself
,
after
an
intelligible
manner
,
the
Perfections
of
all
the
Beings
he
has
created
,
or
can
create
;
and
that
by
these
intelligible
Perfections
,
he
knows
the
Essence
of
all
things
,
as
by
his
own
Wills
he
knows
their
Existence
.
Which
perfections
are
likewise
the
immediate
Object
of
the
Mind
of
Man
,
for
the
Reasons
I
have
given
.
Therefore
the
intelligible
Ideas
,
or
the
Perfections
which
are
in
God
,
which
represent
to
us
what
is
external
to
him
,
are
absolutely
necessary
and
immutable
.
But
Truths
are
nothing
but
relations
of
Equality
,
or
Inequality
,
that
are
found
between
these
Intelligible
Beings
,
since
it
is
only
true
that
2
times
2
are
4
,
or
that
2
times
2
are
not
5
,
because
there
is
a
Relation
of
Equality
between
2
times
2
and
4
,
and
of
Inequality
between
2
times
2
and
5.
Therefore
Truths
are
as
immutable
,
and
necessary
as
Ideas
.
It
has
ever
been
a
truth
,
that
2
times
2
are
4
,
and
't
is
impossible
it
should
ever
be
false
:
which
is
visible
,
without
any
Necessity
,
that
God
,
as
supream
Legislator
,
should
have
establish'd
these
Truths
,
so
,
Art.
6.
&
8.
as
is
said
by
M.
des
Cartes
,
in
his
Answer
to
the
six
Objections
.
We
easily
comprehend
then
what
is
Truth
,
but
Men
find
some
difficulty
to
conceive
what
is
this
immutable
,
and
necessary
Order
:
what
is
this
Natural
,
and
Divine
Law
which
God
necessarily
wills
,
and
which
the
Righteous
likewise
will
.
For
a
Man's
Righteousness
consists
in
his
Loving
Order
,
and
in
his
conforming
his
Will
in
all
things
to
it
:
as
that
which
makes
a
Sinner
in
his
disliking
Order
in
some
things
,
and
willing
that
it
should
conform
to
his
Desires
.
Yet
methinks
these
things
are
not
so
mysterious
,
as
is
imagin'd
;
and
I
am
perswaded
all
the
difficulty
that
is
found
in
them
proceeds
from
the
trouble
the
mind
is
at
to
aspire
to
abstract
,
and
Metaphysical
Thoughts
.
Here
then
is
in
part
what
are
my
Thoughts
of
Order
.
'T
is
evident
that
the
perfections
which
are
in
God
representative
of
created
,
or
possible
Beings
,
are
not
all
Equal
:
That
those
for
Example
which
represent
Bodies
,
are
less
noble
,
than
others
that
represent
Spirits
;
and
that
even
in
those
which
represent
only
Bodies
,
or
Spirits
,
there
are
degrees
of
perfection
,
greater
and
lesser
ad
infinitum
.
This
is
clearly
,
and
easily
conceiv'd
,
though
it
be
hard
to
reconcile
the
simplicity
of
the
Divine
Essence
,
with
that
variety
of
Intelligible
Ideas
,
included
in
his
Wisdom
.
For
't
is
evident
,
that
if
all
the
Ideas
of
God
were
equal
,
he
could
see
no
difference
between
his
Works
;
since
he
cannot
see
his
Creatures
,
save
in
that
which
is
in
himself
,
representing
them
:
And
if
the
Idea
of
a
Watch
which
shows
the
Hour
,
with
all
the
different
Motions
of
the
Planets
,
were
no
perfecter
than
that
of
another
,
which
only
points
to
the
hour
,
or
than
that
of
a
Circle
and
a
Square
,
a
Watch
would
be
no
perfecter
than
a
Circle
.
For
we
can
judge
of
the
Perfection
of
Works
,
only
by
the
Perfection
of
the
Ideas
we
have
of
them
:
and
if
there
was
no
more
understanding
,
or
sign
of
Wisdom
,
in
a
Watch
,
than
a
Circle
,
it
would
be
as
easie
to
conceive
the
most
complicated
Machines
,
as
a
Square
,
or
a
Circle
.
If
then
it
be
true
,
that
God
is
the
Vniversal
Being
,
who
includes
in
Himself
all
Beings
,
in
an
intelligible
manner
,
and
that
all
these
intelligible
Beings
which
have
in
God
a
necessary
Existence
,
are
not
equally
perfect
;
't
is
evident
,
there
will
be
between
them
an
Immutable
and
Necessary
Order
,
and
that
as
there
are
Eternal
and
necessary
Truths
,
because
there
are
Relations
of
Magnitude
between
intelligible
Beings
,
there
must
likewise
be
an
immutable
and
necessary
Order
,
by
reason
of
the
Relations
of
Perfection
,
that
are
between
these
Beings
.
'T
is
therefore
an
Immutable
Order
,
that
Spirits
should
be
nobler
than
Bodies
,
as
it
is
a
necessary
Truth
,
that
2
times
2
should
be
4
,
or
that
2
times
2
should
not
be
5.
But
hitherto
immutable
Order
seems
rather
a
Speculative
Truth
,
than
a
necessary
Law
;
For
if
Order
be
consider'd
but
as
we
have
just
now
done
;
we
see
,
for
Example
,
that
it
is
True
,
that
Minds
are
more
noble
than
Bodies
:
but
we
do
not
see
that
this
Truth
is
at
the
same
time
an
Order
,
which
has
the
force
of
a
Law
,
and
that
there
is
an
Obligation
of
preferring
Minds
before
Bodies
.
It
must
then
be
consider'd
,
that
God
loves
himself
,
by
a
necessary
Love
;
and
therefore
has
a
greater
degree
of
love
for
that
which
in
him
represents
,
or
includes
a
greater
degree
of
perfection
,
than
for
that
which
includes
a
less
.
So
that
if
we
will
suppose
an
Intelligible
Mind
to
be
a
thousand
times
perfecter
,
than
an
Intelligible
Body
,
the
love
wherewith
God
loves
Himself
,
must
necessarily
be
a
thousand
times
greater
for
the
former
,
than
for
the
latter
.
For
the
Love
of
God
is
necessarily
proportion'd
to
the
Order
which
is
between
the
intelligible
Beings
,
that
he
includes
.
Insomuch
that
the
Order
which
is
purely
Speculative
,
has
the
force
of
a
Law
in
respect
of
God
himself
,
supposing
,
as
is
certain
,
that
God
loves
himself
Necessarily
.
And
God
cannot
love
Intelligible
Bodies
,
more
than
Intelligible
Minds
,
though
he
may
love
created
Bodies
better
than
created
Minds
,
as
I
shall
show
by
and
by
.
Now
that
immutable
Order
,
which
has
the
force
of
a
Law
in
regard
of
God
himself
,
has
visibly
the
force
of
a
Law
in
reference
to
us
.
For
this
Order
we
know
,
and
our
natural
love
comports
with
it
,
when
we
retire
into
our selves
,
and
our
Senses
and
Passions
leave
us
to
our
Liberty
;
In
a
word
,
when
our
Self-love
does
not
corrupt
our
Natural
.
Being
we
are
made
for
God
,
and
that
't
is
impossible
for
us
to
be
quite
separate
from
him
,
we
discern
in
him
this
Order
,
and
we
are
naturally
invited
to
love
it
.
For
't
is
His
Light
which
enlightens
us
,
and
his
Love
which
animates
us
,
though
our
Senses
and
Passions
obscure
this
Light
,
and
determine
against
Order
,
the
Impression
we
receive
to
love
according
to
it
.
But
in
spite
of
Concupiscence
which
conceals
this
Order
,
and
hinders
us
from
following
it
,
it
is
still
an
essential
,
and
indispensable
Law
to
us
;
and
not
only
to
us
,
but
to
all
created
Intilligences
,
and
even
to
the
Damn'd
.
For
I
do
not
believe
they
are
so
utterly
estrang'd
from
God
,
as
not
to
have
a
faint
Idea
of
Order
;
as
not
to
find
still
some
beauty
in
it
;
and
even
to
be
ready
to
conform
to
it
in
some
particular
Instances
,
which
are
not
prejudicial
to
Self-Love
.
Corruption
of
Heart
consists
in
Opposition
to
Order
.
Therefore
Malice
or
Corruption
of
Will
,
being
not
equal
,
even
among
the
Damn'd
,
it
is
plain
,
they
are
not
all
equally
opposite
to
Order
,
and
that
they
do
not
hate
it
in
all
cases
,
unless
in
consequence
of
their
Hatred
to
God
.
For
as
no
one
can
hate
Good
consider'd
barely
as
such
,
so
no
one
can
hate
Order
,
but
when
it
seems
to
thwart
his
Inclinations
.
But
though
it
seem
contrary
to
our
Inclinations
,
it
nevertheless
retains
the
force
of
a
Law
,
which
Condemns
,
and
also
punishes
us
,
by
a
Worm
that
never
dies
.
Now
then
we
see
what
Order
is
,
and
how
it
has
the
strength
of
a
Law
,
by
that
necessary
Love
which
God
has
for
himself
.
We
conceive
how
this
Law
comes
to
be
general
for
all
Minds
,
God
not
excepted
,
and
why
it
is
necessary
,
and
absolutely
indispensible
.
Lastly
,
we
conceive
,
or
we
may
easily
conceive
in
general
,
that
it
is
the
Principle
of
all
Divine
and
Humane
Laws
,
and
that
't
is
according
to
this
Law
that
all
Intelligences
are
judg'd
,
and
all
Creatures
dispos'd
in
the
respective
rank
that
belongs
to
them
.
I
acknowledge
it
is
not
easie
to
explain
all
this
in
particular
,
and
I
venture
not
to
undertake
it
.
For
should
I
go
to
show
the
Connexion
particular
Laws
have
with
the
general
,
and
account
for
the
agreement
which
certain
manners
of
acting
have
to
Order
,
I
should
be
forc'd
to
engage
in
Difficulties
,
that
it
may
be
I
could
not
resolve
,
and
which
would
lead
me
out
of
sight
of
my
subject
.
Nevertheless
if
it
be
consider'd
that
God
neither
has
,
nor
can
have
any
other
Law
,
than
his
own
Wisdom
,
and
the
necessary
Love
he
has
for
it
,
we
shall
easily
judge
,
that
all
Divine
Laws
must
depend
on
it
:
And
if
it
be
observ'd
that
he
has
made
the
World
with
reference
only
to
that
Wisdom
,
and
Love
,
since
he
acts
only
for
Himself
;
we
shall
not
doubt
but
all
natural
Laws
must
tend
to
the
Preservation
,
and
Perfection
of
this
World
,
according
to
indispensable
Order
,
and
by
their
dependance
on
necessary
Love
.
For
the
Wisdom
and
Will
of
God
regulates
all
things
.
There
is
no
need
I
should
explain
at
present
,
this
Principle
more
at
large
:
what
I
have
already
said
being
sufficient
to
infer
this
Consequence
,
That
in
the
first
institution
of
Nature
it
was
Impossible
for
Minds
to
be
subjected
to
Bodies
.
For
since
God
cannot
act
without
Knowledge
and
against
his
Will
,
he
has
made
the
World
by
his
Wisdom
,
and
by
the
motion
of
his
Love
:
He
has
made
all
things
by
his
Son
,
and
in
his
Holy
Spirit
,
as
we
are
taught
in
Scripture
.
Now
in
the
Wisdom
of
God
,
Minds
are
perfecter
than
Bodies
,
and
by
the
necessary
Love
God
has
for
himself
,
he
prefers
what
is
more
perfect
to
what
is
less
so
.
Therefore
it
is
not
possible
that
Minds
should
be
subject
to
Bodies
in
the
first
institution
of
Nature
.
Otherwise
it
must
be
said
,
that
God
in
creating
the
World
,
has
not
follow'd
the
Rules
of
his
Eternal
Wisdom
,
nor
the
Motions
of
his
natural
and
necessary
Love
:
which
not
only
is
inconceivable
,
but
involves
a
manifest
contradiction
.
True
it
is
that
at
present
the
created
Mind
is
debas'd
below
a
material
and
sensible
Body
,
but
that
's
because
Order
considered
as
a
necessary
Law
,
will
have
it
so
.
'T
is
because
God
loving
himself
by
a
necessary
Love
,
which
is
always
his
Inviolable
Law
,
cannot
love
Spirits
that
are
repugnant
to
him
,
nor
consequently
prefer
them
to
Bodies
,
in
which
there
is
nothing
evil
,
nor
in
the
hatred
of
God
.
For
God
loves
not
Sinners
in
themselves
.
Nor
would
they
subsist
in
the
Universe
but
through
JESUS
CHRIST
.
God
neither
preserves
them
,
nor
loves
them
,
See
the
Fifth
Dialogue
of
Christian
Conversations
.
but
that
they
may
cease
to
be
Sinners
,
through
the
Grace
of
CHRIST
JESUS
:
or
that
,
if
they
remain
eternally
Sinners
,
they
may
be
eternally
condemned
,
by
immutable
and
necessary
Order
,
and
by
the
Judgment
of
our
LORD
,
by
vertue
of
whom
they
subsist
for
the
Glory
of
the
Divine
Justice
:
for
without
Him
they
would
be
annihilated
.
This
I
say
by
the
way
,
to
clear
some
difficulties
that
might
remain
touching
what
I
said
elsewhere
about
Original
Sin
,
or
the
general
Corruption
of
Nature
.
'T
is
,
if
I
mistake
not
,
a
very
useful
reflection
to
consider
that
the
Mind
has
but
two
ways
of
knowing
Objects
.
By
Light
and
by
Sensation
.
It
sees
them
by
Light
,
when
it
has
a
clear
Idea
of
them
,
and
when
by
consulting
that
Idea
it
can
discover
all
the
properties
whereof
they
are
capable
.
It
sees
things
by
Sensation
,
when
it
finds
not
in
it self
their
clear
Idea
to
consult
it
;
and
so
cannot
clearly
discover
their
properties
;
but
only
know
them
by
a
confus'd
Sensation
without
Light
and
Evidence
.
'T
is
by
Light
and
a
clear
Idea
the
mind
sees
the
Essences
of
things
,
Numbers
and
Extension
:
'T
is
by
a
confus'd
Idea
,
or
Sensation
,
that
it
judges
of
the
Existence
of
Creatures
,
and
knows
its
own
.
What
the
Mind
perceives
by
Light
,
or
by
a
clear
Idea
,
it
perceives
in
a
most
perfect
manner
:
moreover
,
it
sees
clearly
that
all
the
Obscurity
,
or
Imperfection
of
its
Knowledge
proceeds
from
its
own
Weakness
and
Limitation
,
or
from
want
of
Application
,
and
not
from
the
Imperfection
of
the
Idea
it
perceives
.
But
what
the
mind
perceives
by
Sensation
is
never
clearly
known
:
not
for
want
of
any
Application
on
part
of
the
Mind
,
(
for
we
always
are
very
applicative
to
what
we
feel
,
)
but
by
the
defectiveness
of
the
Idea
,
which
is
extreamly
obscure
and
confus'd
.
Hence
we
may
conclude
that
it
is
in
God
,
or
in
an
immutable
nature
,
that
we
see
all
that
we
know
by
Light
,
or
a
clear
Idea
;
not
only
because
we
discover
by
Light
,
only
numbers
Extension
,
and
the
Essences
of
Beings
,
which
depend
not
on
a
free
Act
of
God
,
as
I
have
already
said
;
but
also
because
we
know
these
things
in
a
very
perfect
manner
,
and
we
should
even
know
them
in
an
infinitely
perfect
manner
,
if
our
thinking
Capacity
were
infinite
,
since
nothing
is
wanting
to
the
Idea
that
represents
them
.
We
ought
likewise
to
conclude
,
that
we
see
in
our selves
whatever
we
know
by
Sensation
.
However
,
this
is
not
,
as
if
we
could
produce
in
our selves
any
new
modification
,
or
that
the
sensations
,
or
modifications
of
our
Soul
could
represent
the
Objects
,
on
occasion
whereof
God
excites
them
in
us
:
But
only
that
our
Sensations
which
are
not
distinguished
from
our selves
,
and
consequently
cannot
represent
any
thing
distinct
from
us
,
may
nevertheless
represent
the
existence
of
Beings
,
or
cause
us
to
judge
that
they
exist
.
For
God
raising
Sensations
in
us
upon
the
presence
of
Objects
,
by
an
action
that
has
nothing
sensible
,
we
fancy
we
receive
from
the
Object
not
only
the
Idea
which
represents
its
essence
,
but
also
the
Sensation
which
makes
us
judge
of
its
existence
:
For
there
is
always
a
pure
Idea
,
and
a
confused
Sensation
in
the
Knowledge
we
have
of
things
as
actually
existing
,
if
we
except
that
of
God
,
and
of
our
own
Soul
.
I
except
the
Existence
of
God
.
For
this
we
know
by
a
pure
Idea
,
and
without
Sensation
,
since
it
depends
not
on
any
cause
,
and
is
included
in
the
Idea
of
a
necessary
Being
,
as
the
Equality
of
Diameters
is
included
in
the
Idea
of
a
Circle
.
And
I
except
the
Existence
of
our
Soul
;
because
we
are
inwardly
conscious
that
we
Think
,
Will
,
and
Feel
:
and
have
no
clear
Idea
of
our
Soul
,
as
I
have
sufficiently
explained
in
the
seventh
Chapter
of
the
second
Part
of
the
third
Book
,
and
elsewhere
.
These
are
some
of
the
Reasons
which
we
have
to
add
to
those
already
given
,
to
prove
that
all
our
Light
is
deriv'd
to
us
from
God
,
and
that
the
immediate
and
direct
Object
of
our
clear
and
evident
notices
is
an
immutable
,
and
necessary
Nature
:
Some
Objections
are
usually
made
against
this
Opinion
;
which
I
shall
now
endeavour
to
solve
.
Against
what
has
been
said
,
that
none
but
God
enlightens
us
,
and
that
we
see
all
things
in
him
.
OBJECTION
I.
OUR
Soul
thinks
because
it
is
her
Nature
.
God
in
creating
her
gave
her
the
faculty
of
thinking
:
and
she
needs
nothing
more
.
But
if
any
thing
else
is
wanting
,
let
us
stick
to
what
Experience
teaches
us
of
our
senses
,
which
is
,
that
they
are
the
manifest
causes
of
our
Ideas
.
'T
is
an
ill
way
of
Philosophizing
to
argue
against
Experience
.
ANSWER
.
I
cannot
but
admire
that
the
Cartesian
Gentlemen
,
who
with
so
much
reason
reject
and
scorn
the
general
Terms
of
Nature
and
faculty
should
so
willingly
employ
them
on
this
occasion
.
They
cry
out
against
a
Man
that
shall
say
the
Fire
burns
by
its
nature
,
and
converts
certain
Bodies
into
Glass
by
a
natural
Faculty
:
And
yet
some
of
them
fear
not
to
say
that
the
Humane
Mind
produces
the
Ideas
of
all
things
in
it self
by
its
nature
,
and
because
it
has
a
thinking
faculty
.
But
be
it
spoken
without
offence
,
these
words
are
no
more
significative
in
their
Mouths
,
than
in
the
Peripateticks
.
I
know
very
well
that
the
Soul
is
capable
of
thinking
.
But
I
know
likewise
that
extension
is
capable
of
Figures
:
The
Soul
is
capable
of
Will
as
matter
is
of
Motion
.
But
as
it
is
false
that
matter
though
capable
of
figure
,
and
motion
,
has
in
it self
a
force
,
faculty
,
or
nature
by
which
it
can
move
it self
,
and
give
it self
now
a
round
figure
,
and
anon
a
square
one
;
so
though
the
Soul
be
naturally
,
and
essentially
capable
of
Knowledge
,
and
Will
,
it
is
false
that
she
has
Faculties
whereby
she
can
produce
in
her
Ideas
,
or
motion
towards
good
.
There
is
a
great
difference
between
being
Moveable
,
and
self
moving
.
Matter
is
by
its
nature
moveable
,
and
capable
of
Figures
;
nor
can
it
subsist
without
a
figure
.
But
it
neither
moves
it self
,
nor
shapes
it self
,
nor
has
it
any
faculty
to
do
it
.
The
Mind
is
of
its
nature
capable
of
motion
,
and
Ideas
I
acknowledge
.
But
it
neither
moves
,
nor
enlightens
its
self
.
But
't
is
God
that
does
all
in
Minds
,
as
well
as
in
Bodies
.
Can
we
say
that
God
effects
the
changes
that
happen
in
matter
,
and
that
he
causes
not
those
which
occur
in
the
Mind
?
See
the
first
Illustration
.
Is
this
to
give
to
God
the
things
that
are
his
,
to
leave
these
latter
sort
of
Beings
to
their
own
management
?
Is
he
not
equally
Lord
of
all
things
?
Is
he
not
the
Creator
,
Preserver
,
and
true
mover
of
Minds
as
well
as
Bodies
?
Certainly
he
makes
all
,
both
Substances
,
Accidents
,
Beings
,
and
Modes
of
Being
.
For
in
short
,
he
knows
all
:
But
he
knows
nothing
but
what
he
does
.
We
therefore
streighten
him
in
his
Knowledge
,
if
we
limit
him
in
his
Action
.
But
if
it
must
be
said
that
Creatures
have
such
faculties
as
are
commonly
conceived
,
and
that
natural
Bodies
have
a
Nature
which
is
the
Principle
of
their
Motion
and
Rest
,
as
says
Aristotle
and
his
Followers
:
This
indeed
overthrows
all
my
Ideas
;
but
yet
I
will
rather
agree
to
it
,
than
say
the
Mind
enlightens
it self
.
Men
may
say
that
the
Soul
has
the
force
of
moving
diversly
the
Limbs
of
her
Body
,
and
of
communicating
to
them
Sense
and
Life
:
They
may
say
,
if
they
please
,
that
it
is
she
that
gives
heat
to
the
Blood
,
motion
to
the
Spirits
!
and
to
the
rest
of
her
Body
,
its
Bulk
,
Situation
and
Figure
:
Only
let
them
not
say
that
the
Mind
gives
Light
and
Motion
to
it self
.
If
God
works
not
all
,
let
us
allow
him
at
least
to
do
what
is
Noblest
and
Perfectest
in
the
World
.
And
if
Creatures
do
any
thing
,
let
them
move
Bodies
,
and
range
and
posture
them
as
they
think
fit
:
But
let
them
never
act
upon
Minds
.
We
will
say
(
if
that
will
serve
)
that
Bodies
move
each
other
,
after
they
have
been
mov'd
themselves
or
rather
will
sit
down
ignorant
of
the
different
Dispositions
of
matter
as
not
concerning
us
:
But
let
not
our
Minds
be
ignorant
whence
proceeds
the
Light
that
enlightens
them
:
Let
them
know
from
what
hand
they
receive
all
that
can
make
them
more
happy
,
or
more
perfect
,
let
them
acknowledge
their
dependence
in
its
whole
extent
,
and
know
,
that
whatever
they
actually
have
,
God
gives
them
every
moment
;
for
as
says
a
great
Father
upon
another
Subject
,
Est
quippe
sup●rb●a
▪
&
pecc●●um
maximum
,
uti
da●is
,
ta●quam
innaris
.
S
Bern.
de
diligendo
Deo
.
'T
is
a
very
criminal
Pride
to
use
the
gifts
of
God
,
as
our
own
innate
Perfections
.
Above
all
let
us
take
heed
of
imagining
that
the
Senses
instruct
Reason
,
that
the
Body
enlightens
the
Mind
,
that
the
Soul
receive
of
the
Body
what
it
wants
it self
.
We
had
better
believe
our selves
independent
,
than
to
believe
we
truly
depend
on
Bodies
.
'T
is
much
better
to
be
our
own
Masters
,
than
to
seek
for
Masters
among
inferior
Creatures
.
But
we
had
much
better
submit
our selves
to
Eternal
Truth
,
which
assures
us
in
the
Gospel
,
that
none
else
is
our
Instructor
;
than
to
believe
the
Testimony
of
our
Senses
,
or
of
some
Men
,
who
presume
to
talk
to
us
as
our
Teachers
.
Experience
(
whatever
may
be
said
,
)
does
not
countenance
prejudices
.
For
our
Senses
,
no
less
than
our
Teachers
after
the
Flesh
,
are
only
occasional
causes
of
the
Instruction
which
Eternal
Wisdom
infuses
into
our
most
inward
Reason
.
But
because
this
Wisdom
enlightens
us
by
an
insensible
Operation
,
we
imagine
it
is
our
Eyes
,
or
the
words
of
those
that
verberate
the
Air
against
our
Ears
,
who
produce
this
Light
,
or
pronounce
that
intelligible
Voice
which
instructs
us
.
And
for
this
Reason
,
as
I
have
said
in
another
place
,
our
LORD
thought
it
not
enough
to
instruct
us
in
an
intellible
manner
by
his
Divinity
;
unless
he
condescended
also
to
inform
us
in
a
sensible
way
by
his
Humanity
,
thereby
teaching
us
that
he
is
every
way
our
Master
.
And
because
we
cannot
easily
retire
into
our selves
,
to
consult
him
,
in
Quality
of
eternal
Truth
,
immutable
Order
,
intelligible
Light
,
he
has
rendred
Truth
sensible
by
his
Words
,
Order
Amiable
by
his
Example
,
Light
Visible
by
a
Body
which
breaks
the
force
of
its
Lustre
;
and
after
all
we
are
still
so
ungrateful
,
unjust
,
stupid
and
insensible
,
as
to
respect
as
our
Masters
,
and
that
against
his
express
prohibition
,
not
only
other
Men
,
but
it
may
be
the
most
insensible
and
vilest
Bodies
.
OBJECTION
II.
Since
the
Soul
is
more
perfect
than
Bodies
,
how
comes
it
that
she
cannot
include
in
her
that
which
represents
them
?
Why
may
not
the
Idea
of
extension
be
one
of
her
Modifications
;
't
is
true
there
is
none
but
God
who
acts
in
her
,
and
modifies
her
?
But
why
must
she
see
Bodies
in
God
if
she
can
see
them
in
her
own
Substance
,
she
is
not
material
,
it
's
confess'd
.
But
God
,
though
a
pure
Spirit
,
sees
Bodies
in
himself
;
why
then
may
not
the
Soul
though
Spiritual
see
Bodies
by
considering
herself
?
ANSWER
.
Do
not
we
see
that
there
is
this
difference
between
God
and
the
Humane
Soul
,
that
God
is
Being
without
restriction
,
Universal
,
Infinite
Being
,
and
the
Soul
is
a
sort
of
particular
Being
?
This
is
omitted
in
some
Editions
.
[
'T
is
a
property
of
infinite
to
be
at
the
same
time
one
,
and
yet
all
things
;
compos'd
as
we
may
say
of
infinite
perfections
,
and
yet
so
simple
that
every
perfection
he
possesses
,
includes
all
the
other
without
any
real
distinction
;
for
as
every
Divine
perfection
is
infinite
,
it
constitutes
the
whole
Divine
Essence
;
But
the
Soul
since
a
limited
Being
cannot
have
extension
in
her
without
becoming
material
.
]
God
includes
in
himself
Bodies
in
an
intelligible
manner
.
He
sees
their
Essences
or
Ideas
,
in
his
Wisdom
;
and
their
Existence
in
his
Love
,
or
in
his
Wills
.
This
must
necessarily
be
said
,
since
God
has
made
Bodies
;
and
he
knew
what
he
made
before
any
thing
was
created
.
But
the
Soul
cannot
see
in
her self
what
she
does
not
contain
:
Nor
can
she
see
clearly
what
she
does
contain
,
but
only
has
a
confus'd
Sensation
of
it
.
I
explain
my self
.
The
Soul
does
not
include
Intelligible
extension
,
as
one
of
her
modes
of
Being
:
Because
this
extension
is
not
any
mode
of
Being
but
a
true
Being
.
We
can
conceive
that
Extension
separately
from
any
thing
else
,
but
we
cannot
conceive
any
modes
of
Being
without
perceiving
the
Subject
,
or
Being
whereof
they
are
the
modes
.
We
perceive
this
extension
without
thinking
on
our
mind
,
and
we
cannot
conceive
it
to
be
any
modification
of
our
mind
.
This
extension
when
circumscrib'd
makes
some
figure
,
but
the
Limits
of
the
mind
cannot
be
figured
.
This
extension
having
parts
may
be
divided
,
at
least
in
one
sence
,
but
we
see
nothing
in
the
Soul
that
is
divisible
.
This
extension
therefore
that
we
see
is
no
mode
of
the
minds
Existence
,
and
therefore
the
mind
cannot
see
it
within
it self
.
How
can
we
see
it
in
one
species
of
Being
all
sorts
of
Beings
?
In
one
particular
and
finite
Being
,
a
Triangle
in
general
,
and
infinite
Triangles
?
For
in
fine
,
the
Soul
perceives
a
Triangle
,
or
a
Circle
in
general
,
though
it
be
a
Contradiction
for
the
Soul
to
have
a
modification
in
general
.
The
Sensations
of
Colour
which
the
Soul
ascribes
to
figures
make
them
particular
,
because
no
modification
of
a
particular
Being
can
be
general
.
Surely
we
may
affirm
what
we
clearly
conceive
.
But
we
clearly
conceive
that
the
Extension
which
we
see
is
something
distinct
from
our selves
,
therefore
we
may
affirm
,
that
this
extension
is
not
a
modification
of
our
Being
,
and
that
't
is
something
actually
distinct
from
us
.
For
we
must
observe
,
that
the
Sun
for
instance
that
we
see
is
not
that
we
look
upon
.
The
Sun
and
all
we
see
in
the
material
World
is
not
visible
of
it self
,
as
I
have
formerly
prov'd
.
The
Soul
can
only
see
the
Sun
to
which
she
is
immediately
united
.
But
we
have
a
clear
Perception
,
and
a
distinct
Sensation
,
that
the
Sun
is
something
different
from
us
.
Therefore
we
speak
against
our
Light
,
and
against
our
Conscience
,
when
we
say
the
Soul
sees
all
surrounding
Bodies
in
her
own
modifications
.
Pleasure
,
Pain
,
Savour
,
Heat
,
Colour
,
all
our
Sensations
,
and
Passions
,
are
the
modifications
of
our
Soul
.
But
though
they
be
so
,
do
we
clearly
know
them
?
Can
we
compare
Heat
with
Savour
,
Odor
with
Colour
?
Can
we
discover
what
Relation
there
is
between
Red
and
Green
?
Or
even
between
Green
and
Green
?
'T
is
not
so
with
figures
,
we
compare
them
with
one
another
,
we
find
out
exactly
their
Proportions
:
We
know
precisely
that
the
diagonal
of
a
Square
,
multiplied
into
it self
,
makes
a
Square
,
that
's
double
to
the
former
,
what
Analogy
is
there
between
these
intelligible
Figures
,
which
are
most
clear
Ideas
,
with
the
modifications
of
our
Soul
,
which
are
only
confus'd
Sensations
?
And
why
must
it
be
pretended
,
that
intelligible
Figures
cannot
be
perceived
by
the
Soul
,
unless
they
be
her
modifications
,
since
the
Soul
knows
not
any
of
her
modifications
by
a
clear
Idea
,
but
only
by
Conscience
or
internal
Sense
?
As
I
have
elsewhere
prov'd
,
and
shall
prove
again
in
the
next
Illustration
.
If
we
could
not
see
the
figures
of
Bodies
,
except
in
our selves
,
they
would
be
on
the
contrary
unintelligible
to
us
:
For
we
do
not
know
our selves
,
but
are
darkness
to
our selves
;
and
we
must
cast
our
Eye
outward
if
we
would
behold
our selves
!
And
we
shall
never
know
what
we
are
till
we
shall
contemplate
our selves
in
him
who
is
our
Light
,
and
in
whom
all
things
become
Light
.
For
no
where
but
in
God
material
Beings
are
perfectly
intelligible
;
but
out
of
him
the
most
Spiritual
Substances
are
utterly
invisible
.
The
Idea
of
Extension
,
which
we
see
in
God
,
is
most
clear
.
But
though
we
see
not
in
God
the
Idea
of
our
Soul
,
we
are
very
conscious
that
we
exist
,
and
are
sensible
of
what
we
actually
have
.
But
't
is
impossible
to
discover
what
we
are
,
or
any
of
the
modifications
we
are
capable
of
.
OBJECTION
III.
In
God
there
is
nothing
moveable
:
In
him
there
is
nothing
Figured
.
If
there
be
a
Sun
in
the
Intelligible
World
,
that
Sun
is
always
equal
to
it self
;
whereas
the
visible
Sun
appears
bigger
when
near
the
Horizon
,
than
when
remote
from
it
,
therefore
it
is
not
the
Intelligible
Sun
we
see
.
The
case
is
the
same
in
respect
of
other
Creatures
.
Therefore
we
see
not
in
God
the
Works
of
God
.
ANSWER
.
To
give
an
Answer
to
all
this
we
need
only
consider
,
that
God
includes
within
himself
,
an
infinite
intelligible
Extension
;
For
God
knows
Extension
,
in
as
much
as
he
has
made
it
,
and
he
can
know
it
no
otherwise
than
in
himself
.
Therefore
as
the
mind
may
perceive
part
of
that
intelligible
Extension
,
which
God
includes
,
it
is
certain
it
may
perceive
in
God
all
Figures
;
for
all
finite
Intelligible
Extension
is
necessarily
an
intelligible
Figure
,
since
Figure
is
nothing
but
the
termination
of
Extension
.
Moreover
that
Figure
of
intelligible
and
general
Extension
becomes
sensible
,
and
particular
,
by
Colour
,
or
some
other
sensible
Quality
,
which
the
Soul
ascribes
to
it
;
for
the
Soul
almost
always
bestows
her
own
Sensation
upon
a
lively
and
affecting
Idea
.
Thus
there
is
no
necessity
,
that
there
should
be
in
God
sensible
Bodies
,
or
Figures
in
Intelligible
Extension
,
in
order
to
our
seeing
them
in
God
,
or
that
God
may
see
them
himself
,
though
he
considers
nothing
but
himself
.
So
likewise
if
it
be
conceived
that
a
Figure
of
intelligible
Extension
,
made
sensible
by
Colour
,
should
be
taken
,
successively
,
from
the
different
Parts
of
that
same
infinite
Extension
;
or
if
it
be
conceiv'd
that
a
Figure
of
Intelligible
Extension
may
turn
upon
its
Center
,
or
successively
approach
another
,
we
perceive
the
motion
of
a
sensible
or
Intelligible
Figure
,
though
there
be
no
motion
in
intelligible
Extension
.
For
God
sees
not
the
motion
of
Bodies
in
his
Substance
,
or
in
the
Idea
he
has
of
them
in
himself
.
But
only
by
the
knowledge
he
has
of
his
own
Wills
relating
to
them
.
He
sees
their
Existence
only
by
that
way
,
because
his
Will
only
gives
Being
to
all
things
.
The
Wills
of
God
change
nothing
in
his
Substance
:
nor
do
they
move
it
:
Perhaps
Intelligible
Extension
is
immoveable
all
manner
of
ways
,
even
intelligibly
.
But
though
we
see
only
this
intelligible
Extension
,
immoveable
or
otherwise
,
it
seems
moveable
to
us
,
because
of
the
Sensation
of
Golour
,
or
the
confused
Image
remaining
after
the
Sensation
,
which
we
successively
annex
to
the
several
parts
of
Intelligible
Extension
,
that
furnishes
us
with
an
Idea
,
when
we
see
or
imagine
the
motion
of
any
Body
.
From
what
I
have
said
,
we
may
understand
why
we
see
the
Intelligible
Sun
,
sometimes
greater
and
sometimes
less
,
though
it
be
always
the
same
with
respect
to
God
.
For
all
that
is
requir'd
to
this
,
is
but
to
see
,
one
while
,
a
greater
part
of
Intelligible
Extension
,
and
another
while
a
less
,
and
to
have
a
lively
Sensation
of
Light
,
to
bestow
upon
that
part
of
Extension
.
Now
as
all
the
Parts
of
Intelligible
Extension
are
all
of
the
same
nature
,
they
may
all
indifferently
represent
any
Body
whatever
.
It
must
not
be
imagin'd
that
the
Intelligible
World
has
any
such
relation
to
the
material
and
sensible
,
that
there
must
be
for
instance
an
Intelligible
Sun
,
an
intelligible
Horse
,
and
an
Intelligible
Tree
destin'd
to
represent
to
us
the
Sun
,
an
Horse
and
a
Tree
;
and
that
all
those
who
see
the
Sun
necessarily
see
this
pretended
intelligible
Sun
.
All
intelligible
Extension
may
be
conceived
Circular
,
or
to
have
an
intelligible
Figure
of
an
Horse
,
or
a
Tree
,
and
so
may
serve
to
represent
the
Sun
,
an
Horse
and
Tree
,
and
consequently
be
a
Sun
,
a
Horse
and
a
Tree
in
the
intelligible
World
,
and
likewise
to
become
a
sensible
and
visible
Sun
,
Horse
,
and
Tree
,
if
the
Soul
has
any
Sensation
occasion
by
Bodies
to
affix
to
these
Ideas
.
Therefore
when
I
said
that
we
saw
different
Bodies
by
the
knowledge
we
have
of
the
Perfections
of
God
which
represent
them
:
I
did
not
mean
precisely
that
there
were
certain
particular
Ideas
in
God
to
represent
each
Body
in
particular
;
and
that
we
saw
such
a
particular
Idea
,
in
seeing
such
a
particular
Body
.
For
it
is
certain
we
could
not
see
this
Body
sometimes
great
,
and
sometimes
small
,
one
while
round
,
and
another
while
square
,
if
we
saw
it
by
a
particular
Idea
,
that
was
always
the
same
.
But
I
say
we
see
all
things
in
God
,
by
the
application
God
makes
of
intelligible
Extension
to
our
mind
,
in
a
thousand
different
ways
,
and
that
thus
intelligible
Extension
includes
in
it
all
the
Perfections
,
or
rather
differences
,
of
Bodies
;
because
of
the
different
Sensations
,
the
Soul
bestows
upon
the
Ideas
which
she
receives
occasionally
from
them
.
I
have
discours'd
after
another
manner
;
but
it
should
be
concluded
,
that
was
only
to
make
some
of
my
proofs
more
forcible
and
sensible
;
and
it
should
not
be
gather'd
from
what
I
have
here
said
,
that
the
foundation
of
those
proofs
is
ruin'd
.
I
could
give
the
reasons
of
the
different
ways
wherein
I
explain
my self
,
if
I
thought
it
necessary
.
I
venture
not
to
dive
deeper
into
this
Subject
for
fear
of
speaking
things
either
too
Abstract
,
or
Uncommon
:
Or
,
if
that
seem
better
,
for
fear
of
hazarding
to
speak
things
which
I
neither
know
,
nor
am
capable
of
discovering
:
Only
let
me
produce
those
passages
of
Scripture
which
seem
contrary
to
what
I
have
now
establish'd
,
which
I
shall
endeavour
to
Explain
.
OBJECTION
.
St.
John
in
his
Gospel
,
and
in
the
first
of
his
Epistles
,
says
,
No
man
hath
seen
God
at
any
time
▪
Ch.
1.18
.
Ch.
4.
●●
▪
The
only
begotten
Son
who
is
in
the
bosom
of
the
father
he
hath
declar'd
him
.
ANSWER
.
I
answer
,
that
't
is
not
properly
to
see
God
,
to
see
the
Creatures
in
him
.
'T
is
not
to
see
his
essence
to
see
the
essences
of
Creatures
in
his
Substance
;
as
it
is
not
to
see
a
Mirrour
,
to
view
only
the
Objects
it
represents
.
Not
but
that
we
might
say
with
St.
Paul
,
St.
Austin
,
St.
Gregory
,
Cor.
13.
and
many
other
Fathers
of
the
Church
,
that
we
see
God
in
this
Life
,
though
in
a
very
imperfect
Manner
.
The
Words
of
St.
Gregory
in
his
Morals
upon
Job
,
are
these
.
A
luce
incorruptibili
caligo
nos
nostrae
corruptionis
obscurat
;
L.
31.
c.
20
cumque
&
videri
aliquatenus
potest
&
tamen
videri
lux
ipsa
sicuti
est
non
potest
,
quam
longe
sit
indicat
.
Quam
si
mens
non
cerneret
,
nec
quia
longe
esse
videret
.
Si
autem
perfecte
jam
cerneret
,
profecto
hanc
quasi
per
caliginem
non
videret
.
Igitur
quia
nec
omnino
cernitur
,
nec
rursum
omnino
non
cernitur
,
recte
dictum
est
,
quia
a
longe
Deus
videtur
.
Though
St.
Gregory
in
explaining
this
passage
of
Job
,
Oculi
ejus
à
longe
prospiciunt
says
,
that
in
this
Life
we
only
see
God
a
far
of
:
This
is
not
as
if
God
were
not
most
present
to
us
;
but
that
the
Clouds
of
our
Concupiscence
conceal
him
from
us
.
Caligo
nos
nostrae
corruptionis
obscurat
.
For
in
other
places
,
he
with
St.
Austin
compares
the
light
of
God
,
which
is
God
himself
,
to
the
Light
of
the
Sun
which
surrounds
us
,
and
which
we
see
not
because
we
are
blind
,
or
shut
our
Eyes
when
dazled
with
its
Lustre
.
In
Sole
oculos
clausos
tenemus
.
St.
Austin
goes
farther
yet
than
his
faithful
Disciple
St.
Gregory
.
For
though
he
confesses
that
we
know
God
but
in
a
very
imperfect
manner
at
present
,
yet
he
affirms
,
in
several
places
,
Propinquior
nobis
qui
fecit
,
quam
multa
quae
facta
sunt
.
In
illo
enim
vivimus
,
movemur
,
&
sumus
.
Istorum
autem
pleraque
remota
sunt
à
mente
nostra
propter
dissimilitudinem
sui
generis
.
Recte
culpantur
in
libro
sapientia
inquisitores
▪
hujus
saeculi
.
Si
enim
tantum
,
inquit
,
potuerunt
valere
ut
possent
aestimare
saeculum
,
quomodo
ejus
Dominum
,
non
facilius
invenerunt
?
Ignota
enim
sunt
fundamenta
oculis
nostris
,
&
qui
fundavit
●erram
propinquat
mentibus
nostris
.
De
Gen.
ad
litt.
l.
5.
ch.
16
,
De
Trinitate
,
lib.
8.
ch.
8.
that
God
is
better
known
to
us
,
than
those
things
we
fancy
we
know
best
.
He
that
has
made
all
things
,
(
says
he
)
is
nearer
us
,
than
his
Creatures
;
For
in
him
we
have
Life
,
and
Motion
and
Being
,
Most
of
Created
Beings
are
not
proportionate
to
our
Mind
,
because
they
are
corporeal
,
and
of
a
sort
distinguish'd
from
it
.
And
lower
:
The
Inquirers
into
the
secrets
of
Nature
,
are
justly
condemn'd
in
the
Book
of
Wisdom
;
for
if
they
have
been
able
to
penetrate
what
is
most
secret
and
unreveal'd
to
Men
,
with
how
much
greater
ease
might
they
have
discover'd
the
Author
and
Sovereign
of
the
Vniverse
;
The
Foundations
of
the
Earth
are
hid
from
our
Eyes
:
But
he
that
laid
the
Foundations
is
present
to
our
Minds
.
And
for
this
Reason
that
Holy
Father
believes
,
that
he
that
has
Charity
knows
God
better
than
he
knows
his
Brother
.
Ecce
(
says
he
)
jam
potest
Notiorem
Deum
habere
quam
Fratrem
.
Plane
Notiorem
,
quia
praesentiorem
:
Notiorem
quia
interiorem
:
Notiorem
quia
certiorem
.
I
bring
not
any
other
proofs
of
St.
Austin's
Opinion
:
Those
who
desire
them
,
may
find
all
sorts
in
that
learn'd
Collection
Ambrosius
Victor
has
made
of
them
,
in
the
second
Volume
of
his
Christian
Philosophy
.
But
to
return
to
the
passage
of
St.
John
,
No
man
has
seen
God
at
any
time
I
believe
the
design
of
the
Evangelist
,
in
affirming
no
Man
has
seen
God
,
is
to
state
the
difference
between
the
Old
and
New
Testament
.
Between
JESUS
CHRIST
and
the
Patriarchs
and
Prophets
,
of
whom
it
is
written
,
that
they
have
seen
God
.
For
Moses
,
Jacob
,
Isaiah
,
and
others
,
saw
God
only
with
corporeal
Eyes
,
and
under
an
unknown
Form
:
They
have
not
seen
him
in
himself
,
Deum
nemo
vidit
unquam
;
But
the
only
Son
,
who
is
in
the
Bosom
of
the
Father
,
has
instructed
us
in
what
He
has
seen
.
Vnigenitus
qui
est
in
sinu
Patris
:
Ipse
enarravit
.
OBJECTION
.
St.
Paul
writing
to
Timothy
,
says
,
that
God
inhabits
inaccessible
Light
which
no
man
hath
seen
,
1
Tim.
16.16
▪
nor
can
see
if
the
Light
of
God
cannot
be
approach'd
to
,
we
cannot
see
all
things
in
it
▪
ANSWER
.
St.
Paul
cannot
be
contrary
to
St.
John
who
assures
us
,
that
JESUS
CHRIST
is
the
true
Light
that
lightens
all
Men
who
come
into
the
World
.
For
the
mind
of
Man
,
which
many
of
the
[
](A51674-e118780-b)*
*
St.
Cyrill
of
Alexandria
upon
the
words
of
St.
John
,
Erat
lux
vera
.
St.
Aug.
Tr.
14.
upon
St.
John
,
St.
Greg.
c.
27.
upon
28
of
Job
.
Fathers
call
Illuminated
,
or
Enlightned
Light
.
Lumen
Illuminatum
,
is
Enlightned
only
with
the
Light
of
Eternal
Wisdom
,
which
the
Fathers
therefore
call
Illuminating
Light
,
Lumen
Illuminations
.
David
advises
to
approach
to
God
,
and
to
be
englightned
by
him
;
Accedite
ad
eum
&
illuminamini
.
But
how
can
we
be
enlightned
by
it
,
if
we
cannot
see
the
Light
by
which
we
are
to
be
enlightned
?
Therefore
when
St.
Paul
says
,
that
Light
is
inaccessible
,
he
means
to
[
](A51674-e118930-b)†
†
Inaccessibilem
dixit
;
sed
omni
homini
●umana
sapienti
:
Scriptura
quippe
sacra
omnes
carnalium
sectatores
humanitatis
nomine
notare
solet
.
St.
Greg.
in
cap.
28.
Job
.
Carnal
Man
who
cannot
retire
into
himself
to
contemplate
it
:
Or
if
he
speaks
of
all
Men
,
't
is
because
there
are
none
but
are
disturb'd
from
the
perfect
Contemplation
of
Truth
,
because
our
Body
incessantly
troubles
the
attension
of
our
mind
.
OBJECTION
.
Ex.
33
▪
20.
God
answering
Moses
when
he
desired
to
see
him
,
says
,
Thou
canst
not
see
my
Face
;
for
there
shall
no
man
see
Me
and
live
.
ANSWER
.
It
is
evident
that
the
literal
sence
of
this
Passage
is
not
contrary
to
what
I
have
said
hitherto
.
For
I
do
not
suppose
it
possible
to
see
God
in
this
life
,
as
Moses
desired
to
see
Him
.
However
,
I
Answer
,
that
we
must
die
to
see
God
:
For
the
Soul
unites
herself
to
Truth
proportionably
as
she
quits
her
union
with
the
Body
:
Which
is
a
Truth
that
cannot
be
sufficiently
consider'd
.
Those
who
follow
the
Motions
of
their
passions
;
those
whose
Imagination
is
defil'd
,
with
the
enjoyment
of
Pleasures
;
Those
who
have
strengthned
the
Union
,
and
Correspondence
of
their
Mind
with
their
Body
:
Neither
is
it
found
in
the
land
of
the
living
.
Job
28.13
.
In
a
word
,
those
who
live
cannot
see
God
:
For
they
cannot
retire
into
themselves
to
consult
the
Truth
.
Happy
therefore
are
they
who
have
a
pure
Heart
,
a
disengag'd
Spirit
,
a
clear
Imagination
,
who
have
no
dependance
on
the
World
,
and
hardly
any
on
the
Body
.
In
a
word
,
happy
are
the
Dead
,
for
they
shall
see
God
.
Wisdom
has
publish'd
it
openly
upon
the
Mountain
;
and
Wisdom
whispers
it
secretly
to
those
who
consult
Her
by
retiring
into
themselves
.
Those
who
are
constantly
quickning
in
them
the
Concupiscence
of
Pride
,
who
are
indefatigably
forming
a
thousand
Ambitious
designs
,
who
unite
,
and
even
enslave
their
Soul
,
not
only
to
the
Body
,
but
all
surrounding
Objects
:
In
a
word
,
those
who
Live
not
only
the
Life
of
the
Body
,
but
also
that
of
the
World
,
cannot
see
God
:
For
WISDOM
inhabits
the
most
retired
and
inward
Reason
,
whilst
they
perpetually
expand
themselves
abroad
.
But
such
as
constantly
deaden
the
Activity
of
their
Senses
,
who
faithfully
preserve
the
Purity
of
their
Imagination
,
who
couragiously
resist
the
Motions
of
their
Passions
;
In
a
word
,
that
break
all
those
Bonds
whereby
others
continue
enchain'd
to
the
Body
,
and
sensible
grandeur
;
may
discover
infinite
Truths
,
and
see
that
Wisdom
which
is
bid
from
the
Eyes
of
all
Living
.
They
after
a
sort
do
cease
to
live
when
they
retire
into
themselves
:
Job
28.31
.
They
relinquish
the
Body
when
they
draw
near
to
Truth
.
For
the
mind
of
Man
obtains
that
Site
and
Position
between
God
and
Bodies
,
that
it
can
never
quit
the
one
but
it
must
approach
the
other
.
It
cannot
draw
towards
God
but
it
must
remove
from
Bodies
,
nor
pursue
Bodies
but
it
must
recede
from
God
:
But
because
we
cannot
give
an
absolute
Farewell
to
the
Body
,
till
Death
makes
the
separation
,
I
confess
it
impossible
,
till
then
,
to
be
perfectly
united
to
God
.
We
may
at
present
,
as
says
St.
Paul
,
see
God
confusedly
as
in
a
Glass
,
Now
we
see
through
a
Glass
darkly
,
but
then
face
to
face
.
Now
I
know
in
part
,
&c.
1
Cor.
13.2
.
but
we
cannot
see
him
face
to
face
.
Non
videbit
me
homo
&
vivet
.
Yet
we
may
see
him
in
part
,
that
is
,
imperfectly
and
confusedly
.
It
must
not
be
imagin'd
,
that
life
is
equal
in
all
Men
living
,
or
that
it
consists
in
an
indivisible
point
.
The
Dominion
of
the
Body
over
the
Mind
,
which
withstands
our
uniting
our selves
with
God
by
the
Knowledge
of
Truth
,
is
susceptible
of
more
and
less
.
The
Soul
is
not
equally
in
all
Men
united
by
Sensations
to
the
Body
,
which
she
animates
,
nor
by
Passions
to
those
,
her
Inclinations
carry
her
to
:
And
there
are
some
who
so
mortifie
the
Concupiscence
of
Pleasure
,
and
of
Pride
within
them
,
that
they
scarce
retain
any
Commerce
with
their
Body
,
or
the
World
;
and
so
are
as
it
were
Dead
:
St.
Paul
is
a
great
instance
hereof
,
who
chastis'd
his
Body
,
and
brought
it
to
subjection
;
who
was
so
humbled
,
and
destroy'd
,
that
he
thought
no
longer
on
the
World
,
nor
the
World
on
him
:
For
the
World
was
dead
,
and
crucified
to
him
,
as
he
was
dead
and
crucified
in
the
World
.
And
on
this
account
it
was
,
says
St.
Gregory
,
that
he
was
so
sensible
to
Truth
,
and
so
prepar'd
to
receive
those
Divine
Lights
which
are
included
in
his
Epistles
;
which
however
all
glorious
and
splendid
,
make
no
impression
save
on
those
who
mortifie
their
Senses
and
Passions
by
his
Example
.
The
natural
Man
receiveth
not
the
things
of
the
Spirit
of
God
,
for
they
are
foolishness
unto
him
.
1
Cor.
c.
2.14
.
Ad
Moysen
dicitur
,
non
videbit
me
homo
&
vivet
,
ac
si
aperte
diceretur
:
Nullus
unquam
Deum
spiritualiter
videt
qui
mundo
carnaliter
vivit
.
St.
Greg.
upon
the
28.
of
Job
ch.
28.
For
as
he
says
himself
,
the
carnal
and
sensible
Man
cannot
comprehend
Spiritual
things
:
Because
Worldly
address
the
tast
of
the
Age
,
to
fineness
of
Wit
,
the
Nicety
,
the
Liveliness
,
the
Beauty
of
Imagination
,
whereby
we
live
to
the
World
,
and
the
World
to
us
,
infuse
into
our
Mind
an
incredible
stupidity
and
a
sad
insensibility
to
all
those
Truths
which
cannot
be
perfectly
conceiv'd
,
unless
in
the
silence
and
calm
of
the
Senses
and
Passions
.
We
must
therefore
desire
that
Death
which
unites
us
to
God
,
or
at
least
the
image
of
that
Death
,
that
is
,
the
Mysterious
Sleep
in
which
all
our
External
Senses
being
lock'd
up
,
we
may
hear
the
Voice
of
internal
Truth
,
which
is
never
audible
but
in
the
silence
of
the
Night
,
when
Darkness
involves
sensible
Objects
,
and
when
the
World
is
as
it
were
dead
to
us
.
Thus
it
is
,
says
St.
Gregory
,
that
the
Spouse
heard
the
Voice
of
her
beloved
in
her
sleep
,
when
she
said
,
I
sleep
,
but
my
heart
wakes
;
Outwardly
I
slumber
but
my
heart
watches
within
:
For
having
no
life
nor
sense
with
reference
to
External
Objects
.
I
become
extreamly
sensible
to
the
Voice
of
inward
Truth
,
which
accosts
me
,
in
my
inmost
reason
.
Hinc
est
quod
sponsa
in
canticis
canticorum
sponsi
vocem
quasi
per
somnium
audierat
,
quae
dicebat
,
Ego
dormio
,
&
cor
meum
vigilat
.
Ac
si
diceret
,
dum
exteriores
sensus
ab
●ujus
vitae
sollicitudinibus
sopio
,
vacante
mente
,
vivacius
interna
cognosco
.
Foris
dormio
,
sed
intus
cor
vigilat
:
quia
dum
exteriora
quasi
non
sentio
,
interiora
solerter
apprehendo
.
Bene
ergo
Eliu
ait
quod
per
somnium
loquitur
Deus
.
St.
Gregory's
Morals
upon
the
33.
Ch.
of
Job
.
THE
ILLUSTRATION
UPON
THE
Seventh
CHAPTER
of
the
Second
PART
of
the
Third
BOOK
.
Where
I
prove
,
That
we
have
no
clear
Idea
of
the
Nature
,
or
Modifications
of
our
Soul
.
I
Have
often
said
,
and
think
sufficiently
prov'd
in
the
third
Book
,
of
the
preceding
Treatise
,
that
we
have
no
clear
Idea
,
but
only
the
Conscience
,
or
inward
Sensation
of
our
Soul
;
and
that
therefore
we
have
a
much
more
imperfect
knowledge
thereof
than
we
have
of
Extension
.
Answer
to
the
fifth
Objection
against
the
second
Meditation
towards
the
end
.
Which
to
me
seem'd
so
evident
,
that
I
did
not
think
it
necessary
to
prove
it
more
at
large
.
But
the
Authority
of
M.
des
Cartes
,
who
possitively
says
,
That
the
nature
of
the
Mind
is
better
known
than
that
of
any
other
thing
,
has
so
prepossess'd
some
of
his
Disciples
,
that
what
I
have
said
upon
that
Subject
,
serves
only
to
make
them
think
me
a
weak
Person
unable
to
reach
to
,
and
hold
fast
abstracted
Truths
,
which
have
nothing
in
them
to
welcome
and
retain
the
attention
of
their
Contemplators
.
I
confess
,
I
am
extreamly
Feeble
,
Sensible
,
and
Heavy
,
and
my
Mind
depends
on
my
Body
more
ways
than
I
can
express
.
I
know
it
:
I
feel
it
:
and
I
continually
labour
to
increase
this
knowledge
I
have
of
my self
.
For
though
we
cannot
help
our
being
miserable
;
we
ought
at
least
to
have
the
knowledge
,
and
the
sense
of
it
;
we
ought
at
least
,
to
be
humbled
,
upon
the
sight
of
our
inward
Miseries
,
and
to
acknowledge
the
need
we
have
of
being
deliver'd
from
this
Body
of
Death
which
throws
trouble
and
confusion
into
all
the
faculties
of
our
Soul
.
But
yet
the
Question
before
us
is
so
well
proportion'd
to
the
Mind
,
that
I
can
see
no
need
of
any
great
Application
to
resolve
it
,
and
for
that
reason
I
did
not
insist
upon
it
.
For
I
think
it
may
be
affirm'd
,
that
most
Mens
ignorance
about
the
Soul
,
as
of
its
distinction
from
the
Body
,
of
its
Spirituality
,
Immortality
,
of
its
other
properties
,
is
sufficiently
demonstrative
,
that
we
have
no
clear
and
distinct
Idea
of
it
.
It
may
be
said
that
we
have
a
clear
Idea
of
Body
,
because
we
need
but
consult
the
Idea
that
represents
it
,
to
discover
what
Modifications
it
is
capable
of
.
We
plainly
see
,
that
it
may
be
either
round
or
square
,
in
Rest
or
Motion
.
We
easily
conceive
,
that
a
square
may
be
divided
into
two
Triangles
,
two
Parallelograms
,
or
two
Trapezia
.
We
never
are
at
a
stand
what
to
answer
to
the
demand
,
whether
this
or
that
be
implied
or
denied
in
Extension
,
because
the
Idea
of
Extension
being
clear
,
we
may
easily
,
and
by
a
bare
perception
,
discover
what
it
includes
,
and
what
it
excludes
.
But
it
does
not
appear
to
me
that
we
have
any
such
Idea
of
our
Mind
,
as
can
discover
when
we
consult
it
,
the
Modifications
it
will
admit
.
Had
we
never
felt
either
Pleasure
or
Pain
,
we
could
not
tell
whether
our
Soul
were
susceptible
of
either
.
If
a
Man
had
never
eaten
a
Melon
,
felt
Smart
,
or
seen
Red
or
Blue
,
he
might
have
consulted
long
enough
this
pretended
Idea
of
his
Soul
,
before
he
could
distinctly
discover
whether
it
was
capable
or
not
,
of
such
Sensations
or
Modifications
.
I
say
farther
,
that
though
a
Man
actually
feel
Pain
,
or
sees
Colour
,
he
cannot
discover
by
a
simple
view
,
whether
these
Qualities
belong
to
the
Soul
.
He
'll
imagine
that
Pain
is
in
the
Body
,
which
occasions
him
to
suffer
it
,
and
that
Colour
is
diffus'd
upon
the
surface
of
Objects
,
though
it
be
clearly
conceiv'd
,
that
these
Objects
are
distinguish'd
from
the
Soul
.
To
be
satisfied
whether
or
no
sensible
Qualities
are
Modes
of
the
Mind's
existence
,
this
pretended
Idea
of
the
Soul
is
never
consulted
.
On
the
contrary
,
the
Cartesians
themselves
consult
the
Idea
of
Extension
,
and
reason
in
this
manner
:
Heat
,
Pain
,
Colour
,
cannot
be
Modifications
of
Extension
:
For
this
is
capable
but
of
different
figures
and
Motions
.
Now
there
are
but
two
kinds
of
Beings
,
Bodies
and
Minds
.
Therefore
Heat
,
Pain
and
Colour
,
and
all
other
sensible
Qualities
,
are
the
Furniture
of
the
Mind
.
Whilst
they
are
oblig'd
to
consult
their
Idea
of
Extension
,
to
discover
whether
sensible
Qualities
are
Modifications
of
their
Soul
;
is
it
not
evident
they
have
no
clear
Idea
of
it
?
For
otherwise
would
they
ever
bethink
themselves
of
so
indirect
a
Conduct
,
When
a
Philosopher
would
know
whether
Rotundity
belongs
to
Extension
,
does
he
enquire
into
the
Idea
of
the
Soul
,
or
any
other
besides
that
of
Extension
?
Does
he
not
see
clearly
in
the
same
Idea
of
Extension
,
that
Rotundity
is
a
Modification
of
it
?
And
would
it
not
be
extravagance
in
him
to
argue
thus
to
be
instructed
?
There
are
only
two
sorts
of
Beings
,
Minds
and
Bodies
:
Roundness
is
not
a
Modification
of
a
Mind
;
therefore
it
is
a
Modification
of
a
Body
.
We
discover
then
by
a
bare
perception
without
Argumentation
,
and
by
the
meer
Application
of
the
Mind
to
the
Idea
of
Extension
,
that
Roundness
and
every
other
Figure
is
a
Modification
belonging
to
Body
,
and
that
Pleasure
,
Pain
,
Heat
,
and
all
other
sensible
Qualities
,
are
not
Modifications
of
it
.
There
can
be
no
Question
propos'd
about
what
does
,
or
does
not
appertain
to
Extension
,
but
may
be
easily
,
readily
,
and
boldly
answer'd
by
the
sole
consideration
of
the
Idea
that
represents
it
.
All
Men
are
agreed
,
in
their
notion
,
and
beliefe
upon
this
Point
.
For
those
who
will
have
Matter
capable
of
Thought
,
do
not
imagine
this
Faculty
is
to
be
attributed
to
i●
because
of
Extension
,
being
perswaded
that
Extension
consider'd
,
precisely
as
such
,
cannot
Think
.
But
Men
are
not
so
well
agreed
about
what
they
are
to
think
of
the
Soul
,
and
her
Modifications
:
for
some
there
are
,
who
fancy
,
that
Pain
,
and
Heat
,
or
at
least
that
Clour
does
not
belong
to
her
.
And
a
Man
would
be
laught
at
among
some
Cartesians
,
that
should
affirm
,
the
Soul
grows
actually
Blue
,
Red
,
Yellow
,
and
that
she
is
dyed
with
all
the
Colours
of
the
Rain-Bow
,
when
she
contemplates
it
.
There
are
many
who
doubt
,
and
more
that
don't
believe
,
that
the
Soul
becomes
formally
stinking
upon
the
smell
of
carrion
;
and
that
the
tast
of
Sugar
,
Pepper
,
and
Salt
,
are
properties
belonging
to
her
.
Where
then
is
the
clear
Idea
of
the
Soul
that
the
Cartesians
may
consult
it
,
and
may
all
agree
about
the
subject
where
Colours
,
Savours
,
Odours
,
ought
to
enter
.
But
though
the
Cartesians
were
agreed
upon
these
difficulties
,
yet
we
were
not
to
conclude
from
their
agreement
,
that
we
have
a
clear
Idea
of
the
Soul
:
For
if
they
agree
at
last
that
't
is
she
which
is
actually
Green
,
or
Red
,
when
a
Man
sees
these
Colours
,
yet
this
could
not
be
concluded
without
a
long
train
of
Reasonings
;
they
could
not
see
it
by
a
simple
view
,
nor
ever
discover
it
by
consulting
the
pretended
Idea
of
the
Soul
,
but
rather
by
consulting
that
of
the
Body
.
They
could
not
be
certain
,
that
sensible
Qualities
belong'd
to
the
Soul
,
were
it
not
because
they
did
not
belong
to
Extension
,
whereof
they
have
a
clear
Idea
.
Nor
could
they
ever
convince
of
it
such
as
,
having
little
thought
,
are
incapable
of
complicated
Perceptions
,
or
Reasonings
;
or
rather
such
as
cannot
dwell
upon
the
consideration
of
the
clear
Idea
of
Body
,
and
who
are
apt
to
confound
all
things
:
And
so
there
would
be
always
,
Clowns
,
Women
,
Children
,
and
it
may
be
some
Scholars
,
and
Doctors
who
would
doubt
of
it
.
But
Women
,
and
Children
,
Learned
and
Unlearned
,
the
most
Intelligent
and
most
stupid
Persons
,
easily
conceive
,
by
their
Idea
of
Extension
,
that
it
is
susceptible
of
all
sorts
of
Figures
;
they
clearly
comprehend
that
Extension
is
not
capable
of
Pain
,
Savour
,
Odour
,
or
any
other
Sensation
,
when
they
but
faithfully
and
attentively
consider
the
Idea
only
that
represents
it
:
For
there
is
no
sensible
Quality
included
in
it's
representative
Idea
.
'T
is
true
,
they
may
doubt
whether
Body
is
,
or
is
not
capable
of
admitting
some
Sensation
,
or
sensible
Quality
:
But
then
they
understand
by
Body
some
other
thing
than
Extension
,
and
have
no
clear
Idea
of
Body
taken
in
this
sense
.
But
when
des
Cartes
,
or
the
Cartesians
,
whom
I
am
concern'd
with
,
maintain
that
the
Soul
is
better
known
than
Body
,
they
mean
only
by
Body
,
bare
Extension
.
Which
makes
me
admire
how
they
can
hold
,
that
the
nature
of
the
Soul
is
clearer
known
than
that
of
the
Body
,
since
the
Idea
of
Body
,
or
Extension
,
is
so
manifest
,
that
all
the
World
's
agreed
about
what
it
contains
,
and
what
it
excludes
,
whilst
the
Idea
of
the
Soul
is
so
confus'd
,
that
the
Cartesians
themselves
daily
dispute
,
whether
the
Modifications
of
Colour
appertain
to
it
.
We
know
,
(
say
these
Philosophers
,
with
their
Master
des
Cartes
)
the
nature
of
a
substance
so
much
more
distinctly
,
as
we
know
more
of
its
Attributes
.
Now
there
is
nothing
whereof
we
know
so
many
Attributes
as
of
our
Mind
.
Because
as
many
as
we
know
in
other
things
we
may
put
to
the
mind's
account
from
its
knowing
them
;
and
therefore
its
Nature
is
better
known
than
that
of
any
other
thing
.
But
who
is
it
that
sees
not
a
great
deal
of
difference
between
knowing
by
a
clear
Idea
and
knowing
by
Conscience
.
When
I
know
that
2
times
2
are
4
,
I
know
it
very
clearly
;
but
I
know
not
clearly
what
within
me
't
is
that
knows
it
.
I
feel
it
,
I
confess
;
I
know
it
by
consciousness
,
or
internal
sense
:
But
I
have
no
clear
Idea
of
it
as
I
have
of
Numbers
,
whose
Relations
I
can
distinctly
discover
.
I
can
reckon
in
my
mind
three
properties
,
one
of
knowing
that
2
times
2
are
4
,
another
of
knowing
that
3
times
3
are
9
,
a
third
of
knowing
that
4
times
4
are
16.
And
these
Properties
,
if
you
please
,
shall
be
different
from
one
another
,
and
so
I
may
count
an
infinite
number
of
Properties
belonging
to
me
.
But
I
deny
that
we
can
clearly
know
the
nature
of
the
things
that
we
can
reckon
thus
.
It
may
be
said
that
we
have
a
clear
Idea
of
a
Being
,
and
that
we
know
its
Nature
,
when
we
can
compare
it
with
others
,
which
we
likewise
have
a
clear
Idea
of
,
or
at
least
when
we
can
compare
together
the
Modifications
incident
to
it
.
We
have
clear
Ideas
of
Numbers
,
and
of
the
parts
of
Extension
,
because
we
can
compare
these
things
together
.
As
2
may
be
compar'd
with
4
,
4
with
16
,
and
every
number
,
with
any
other
:
So
likewise
a
square
may
be
compar'd
with
a
Triangle
,
a
Circle
with
an
Ellipsis
,
a
Square
and
a
Triangle
with
every
other
Square
and
Triangle
;
and
thus
a
Man
may
clearly
discover
the
relations
these
Figures
,
and
these
Numbers
have
to
one
another
.
But
we
cannot
compare
our
Mind
with
other
Beings
,
thereby
to
discover
clearly
their
Relations
;
nor
can
we
compare
the
Modifications
of
the
Mind
together
.
Can
we
clearly
discover
what
Relation
,
or
Proportion
there
is
between
Pleasure
and
Pain
,
Heat
and
Colour
?
Or
to
keep
to
Modifications
of
the
same
sort
;
can
we
determine
exactly
the
Proportion
between
Green
and
Red
,
Yellow
and
Purple
,
or
even
between
Purple
and
Purple
?
We
see
well
enough
that
one
is
darker
,
or
brighter
than
the
other
.
But
we
know
not
evidently
how
much
,
nor
what
it
is
to
be
Darker
or
Brighter
.
We
have
then
no
clear
Idea
either
of
the
Soul
,
or
her
Modifications
;
and
though
I
see
or
have
the
sense
of
Colours
,
Tasts
,
Smells
;
yet
I
may
say
as
I
have
done
,
that
I
know
them
not
by
a
clear
Idea
,
since
I
cannot
clearly
discover
their
Relations
.
'T
is
true
I
can
discover
the
exact
proportions
betwen
sounds
:
That
a
Diopason
for
instance
is
Double
,
that
a
Fifth
is
as
3
to
2
,
and
that
a
Fourth
is
as
4
to
3.
But
I
cannot
know
these
proportions
by
the
sensation
I
have
of
them
.
If
I
know
that
an
Eighth
or
Diopason
is
double
,
't
is
because
I
have
learn't
,
by
Experience
,
that
the
same
string
sounds
an
Eighth
,
when
having
stricken
it
whole
,
I
strike
it
presently
again
,
dividing
it
into
two
equal
parts
,
or
because
I
know
the
number
of
Vibrations
is
double
in
equal
time
,
or
by
some
such
way
,
and
this
because
the
Trepidations
of
the
air
,
the
Vibrations
of
the
strings
,
and
the
string
it self
are
things
which
may
be
compared
by
clear
Ideas
,
and
that
we
distinctly
conceive
what
relations
there
can
be
between
a
string
and
it's
parts
,
as
likewise
between
the
celerity
of
different
Vibrations
.
But
we
cannot
compare
sounds
betwixt
themselves
,
or
as
they
are
sensible
Qualities
,
and
Modifications
of
the
Soul
;
nor
that
way
are
their
Proportions
or
Relations
discoverable
.
And
though
Musicians
distinguish
very
well
the
different
concords
,
yet
they
do
not
distinguish
their
proportions
by
clear
Ideas
.
By
the
ear
only
they
judge
by
a
clear
Idea
,
or
otherwise
than
by
sensation
.
Therefore
Musicians
have
no
clear
Idea
of
sounds
,
as
they
are
sensations
or
Modifications
of
the
Soul
:
And
consequently
we
conceive
not
the
Soul
nor
her
Modifications
by
a
clear
Idea
,
but
only
by
Conscience
or
internal
sense
.
Moreover
we
know
not
wherein
consist
those
dispositions
of
the
Soul
,
which
facilitate
her
to
act
and
represent
Objects
to
her self
.
Nay
we
cannot
conceive
wherein
such
Dispositions
might
possibly
consist
.
I
say
farther
,
that
we
cannot
be
positively
assur'd
by
Reason
,
whether
the
meer
Soul
separate
from
the
Body
,
or
consider'd
without
relation
to
it
,
be
capable
of
Habits
or
Memory
.
But
how
can
we
be
ignorant
of
these
things
,
if
the
nature
of
the
Soul
be
better
known
to
us
than
of
the
Body
.
'T
is
easily
discern'd
wherein
that
readiness
consists
,
wherewith
the
animal
Spirits
flow
into
the
Nerves
,
which
they
have
often
us'd
to
glide
into
;
at
least
't
is
no
trouble
to
discover
,
that
whilst
the
condui●s
of
the
Nerves
are
widened
,
and
the
Fibres
recumbent
after
a
particular
manner
,
the
Spirits
may
easily
insinuate
themselves
.
But
what
is
it
we
can
conceive
capable
of
augmenting
the
Soul's
Facility
to
act
or
think
.
For
my
part
,
I
own
,
I
cannot
comprehend
it
:
And
in
vain
should
I
interrogate
my self
what
these
dispositions
are
;
For
I
could
give
my self
no
answer
,
nor
light
upon
the
matter
,
though
I
have
a
most
lively
sense
of
that
easiness
,
with
which
some
Thoughts
arise
in
me
.
And
if
I
had
no
particular
Reasons
to
induce
me
to
believe
that
I
really
have
such
Dispositions
,
though
I
know
them
not
in
me
;
I
should
judge
there
neither
was
spiritual
Habit
,
nor
Memory
in
my
Soul
.
But
in
short
,
seeing
there
is
doubt
and
scruple
about
it
,
we
have
an
infallible
Symptom
,
that
Men
are
not
so
enlightned
as
is
pretended
.
For
Doubt
can
never
be
reconcil'd
to
Evidence
,
and
clear
Ideas
.
'T
is
certain
,
that
a
Man
of
the
greatest
Understanding
,
cannot
evidently
know
whether
he
deserves
Hatred
or
Love
,
as
speaks
the
Wiseman
.
My
own
consciousness
of
my self
cannot
satisfy
me
herein
.
St.
Paul
says
indeed
,
his
Conscience
reproach'd
him
with
nothing
,
Eccl.
c.
9.1
.
I
judge
not
mine
own
self
.
For
I
known
nothing
by
my self
,
yet
I
am
not
hereby
justified
,
but
●e
that
judgeth
me
is
the
Lord
1
Cor.
●
4.4
.
John
13.37
.
yet
for
all
that
he
does
not
affirm
he
is
justified
;
On
the
contrary
he
asserts
he
is
not
thereby
justified
▪
and
that
he
dares
not
judge
himself
,
since
he
that
judges
is
the
Lord
.
But
having
a
clear
Idea
of
Order
,
if
we
had
another
as
clear
of
the
Soul
,
from
the
inward
feeling
of
our selves
we
should
evidently
know
,
whether
she
was
conformable
to
Order
.
We
should
know
whether
we
were
Righteous
or
not
,
and
we
could
exactly
discover
all
our
interiour
Dispositions
to
Good
and
Evil
,
whenever
we
were
conscious
of
them
.
But
if
we
could
know
our selves
just
as
we
are
,
we
should
not
be
so
subject
to
Presumption
;
And
there
is
great
likelihood
that
St.
Peter
would
not
have
said
to
his
Master
whom
he
was
not
long
after
to
deny
,
Why
cannot
I
follow
thee
now
?
I
will
lay
down
my
life
for
thy
sake
.
Animam
meam
pro
te
ponam
.
For
being
inwardly
conscious
of
his
own
Strength
and
good
Will
,
he
might
have
seen
with
Evidence
,
whether
he
had
Resolution
and
Courage
to
conquer
Death
,
or
rather
the
insults
of
a
silly
Maid
,
and
two
or
three
Servants
.
If
the
nature
of
the
Soul
be
more
known
than
any
other
.
If
the
Idea
we
have
of
her
be
as
clear
as
that
we
have
of
the
Body
,
I
ask
only
how
it
comes
to
pass
that
there
are
so
many
who
confound
her
with
it
?
Is
it
possible
to
confound
two
clear
Ideas
intirely
different
?
Let
us
do
justice
to
all
Mankind
:
Those
who
dissent
from
our
Opinion
are
as
rational
as
our selves
,
they
have
the
same
Ideas
of
things
,
and
are
partakers
in
the
same
Reason
.
Why
then
do
they
confound
what
we
distinguish
?
Do
they
use
on
other
occasions
to
confound
things
▪
whereof
they
have
clear
Ideas
?
Do
they
ever
confound
two
different
numbers
,
or
take
a
Square
for
a
Circle
?
And
yet
the
Soul
differs
more
from
the
Body
,
than
one
of
these
Figures
from
the
other
;
For
they
are
two
substances
which
are
in
nothing
alike
,
and
are
confounded
notwithstanding
.
Which
must
therefore
proceed
from
some
difficulty
there
is
to
discover
their
difference
;
from
it
s
not
being
observable
by
a
simple
perception
;
and
from
the
Impossibility
of
concluding
that
one
is
not
the
other
without
Argument
and
Reasoning
.
It
must
come
from
hence
,
viz.
That
the
Idea
of
Extension
must
be
cautiously
consulted
,
and
Extension
discover'd
to
be
no
Mode
of
Existence
of
a
Body
,
but
the
Body
it self
,
as
being
represented
a
subsisting
Thing
,
and
as
the
Principle
and
Foundation
of
whatever
we
conceive
clearly
in
Bodies
:
And
that
so
the
Modes
of
which
Body
is
capable
,
having
no
Proportion
of
sensible
Qualities
;
the
subject
of
these
Qualities
,
or
rather
the
Being
of
which
they
are
Modes
must
needs
be
different
from
Body
:
For
such
like
argumentation
is
requisite
to
prevent
our
confounding
the
Soul
with
the
Body
.
But
if
we
had
a
clear
Idea
of
the
Soul
,
as
we
have
of
Body
,
certainly
we
need
not
take
these
round-about
ways
to
distinguish
her
from
it
.
Since
it
would
be
discoverable
by
a
simple
view
,
and
with
as
great
ease
as
we
see
a
Circle
is
not
a
Square
.
I
insist
not
longer
upon
proving
that
we
know
not
the
Soul
nor
her
Modifications
by
clear
Ideas
.
Survey
our selves
on
what
side
soever
we
will
;
this
sufficiently
appears
:
And
I
had
not
added
this
to
what
I
have
said
in
the
Search
after
Truth
,
if
some
Cartesians
had
not
found
fault
with
it
.
If
this
will
not
satisfy
them
,
I
shall
expect
they
will
make
me
sensible
of
this
clear
Idea
,
which
I
am
not
able
to
find
in
my self
,
do
whatever
I
can
to
discover
it
.
THE
ILLUSTRATION
UPON
THE
Eighth
CHAPTER
of
the
Second
PART
of
the
Third
BOOK
.
Of
loose
and
general
terms
which
signify
nothing
.
How
they
are
distinguish'd
from
others
.
IN
order
to
comprehend
what
I
have
said
in
some
Places
;
how
that
they
give
not
the
reasons
of
things
who
explain
them
by
Logical
Terms
,
and
General
Ideas
we
need
but
consider
;
that
whatever
exists
is
reduc'd
to
Being
,
or
Modes
of
Being
;
whatever
Term
signifies
neither
of
these
signifies
nothing
,
and
every
Term
that
signifies
not
one
or
other
of
them
distinctly
,
and
in
particular
,
signifies
nothing
distinct
.
This
to
me
seems
most
clear
and
evident
,
but
what
is
evident
in
it self
,
is
not
so
to
all
the
World
.
Words
are
the
current
Coin
,
wherewith
Men
pay
themselves
,
and
others
.
All
Terms
that
are
inoffensive
to
the
Ear
,
have
free
Passport
amongst
them
.
And
Truth
comes
so
rarely
into
the
Commerce
of
the
World
,
that
those
who
speak
it
,
or
hear
it
,
have
commonly
no
regard
for
it
.
The
gift
of
Speech
is
the
greatest
of
Talents
;
the
language
of
Imagination
is
the
surest
of
means
;
and
a
Memory
charg'd
with
incomprehensible
Terms
will
always
make
a
splendid
appearance
,
whatever
the
Cartesians
may
say
of
it
.
When
Men
shall
have
no
addiction
but
to
Truth
,
they
will
be
Cautious
of
what
they
say
,
they
will
carefully
examine
their
own
meaning
,
rejecting
with
scorn
senseless
and
insignificant
Terms
,
and
closely
adhering
to
clear
Ideas
.
But
when
will
the
time
come
that
Men
shall
love
Truth
only
?
We
may
say
,
when
they
shall
depend
no
longer
on
their
Body
,
when
they
shall
have
no
necessary
relation
to
sensible
Objects
,
when
they
shall
not
any
more
corrupt
one
another
,
but
faithfully
consult
their
Master
who
instructs
them
in
the
recesses
of
their
Reason
.
But
this
will
never
happen
whilst
we
live
on
Earth
.
However
all
Men
are
not
equally
indifferent
for
Truth
.
If
there
are
some
who
speak
without
Reflection
,
and
hear
without
distinction
,
and
have
no
attention
but
to
what
affects
them
:
there
are
others
who
industriously
labour
to
inform
themselves
,
and
to
convince
others
of
the
Truth
.
And
to
these
chiefly
I
address
my self
,
for
at
their
Instance
I
entred
on
making
these
Remarks
.
I
say
then
that
whatever
is
,
whether
it
actually
exists
or
not
,
and
consequently
whatever
is
intelligible
is
either
a
Being
,
or
a
Mode
of
Being
.
By
Being
I
mean
something
of
an
absolute
Nature
,
or
that
may
be
conceiv'd
alone
,
as
unrelated
to
any
other
thing
.
By
Mode
of
Being
I
understand
something
relative
,
or
that
cannot
be
conceiv'd
alone
.
Now
there
are
two
kinds
of
Modes
of
Being
.
The
one
consists
in
the
Relation
of
the
Parts
of
any
Whole
,
to
any
Part
of
the
same
whole
:
The
other
in
the
Relation
of
one
thing
to
another
which
makes
not
any
Part
of
the
same
whole
.
The
Roundness
of
wax
is
a
Mode
of
Being
of
the
former
sort
,
as
consisting
in
the
Equality
of
Distance
,
which
have
all
the
Superficial
parts
to
the
central
.
The
Motion
or
situation
of
the
wax
is
a
Mode
of
Being
of
the
second
sort
:
Which
consists
in
the
Relation
the
wax
has
to
circumambient
Bodies
.
I
speak
not
of
motion
taken
for
the
Moving
Force
;
for
it
is
plain
,
that
that
force
neither
is
nor
can
be
a
Mode
of
Bodies
existing
,
for
conceive
them
Modified
how
we
will
,
we
cannot
conceive
them
as
a
moving
Force
.
It
being
certain
that
whatever
is
intelligible
,
is
either
a
Being
,
or
a
Mode
of
Being
,
it
is
as
evident
that
every
Term
that
signifies
not
one
or
other
of
these
,
signifies
nothing
;
and
that
every
Term
that
signifies
not
this
or
that
particular
Being
,
or
Mode
of
Being
,
is
obscure
and
confus'd
;
and
consequently
we
cannot
conceive
either
what
others
say
to
us
,
or
we
to
others
,
if
we
have
no
distinct
Ideas
of
Being
,
or
of
the
Mode
of
Being
,
which
respectively
answer
to
the
Terms
they
use
,
or
we
imploy
our selves
.
Nevertheless
I
grant
that
we
may
,
and
even
sometimes
must
imploy
those
words
which
do
not
directly
raise
distinct
Ideas
.
We
may
,
because
it
is
not
always
necessary
to
put
the
D●finition
instead
of
the
Defin'd
,
and
that
abridg'd
Expressions
are
to
good
use
imploy'd
though
confus'd
in
themselves
.
And
We
must
,
when
we
are
oblig'd
to
speak
of
things
whereof
we
have
no
clear
Idea
,
and
which
we
cannot
conceive
,
but
by
our
inward
Sensation
,
as
when
we
speak
of
the
Soul
,
and
her
Modifications
Only
we
must
take
care
not
to
use
obscure
and
equivocal
,
when
we
have
clear
Terms
;
or
any
which
may
excite
false
Ideas
in
those
we
speak
to
.
This
will
be
better
understood
by
an
instance
.
It
is
more
perspicuous
to
say
,
that
God
created
the
World
by
his
Will
,
than
to
say
he
created
it
by
his
Power
.
This
last
word
is
a
Logical
Term
,
which
excites
no
distinct
and
particular
Idea
,
but
affords
Liberty
to
imagine
that
the
Power
of
God
is
something
distinct
from
the
efficacy
of
his
Will
.
We
speak
more
clearly
when
we
say
God
pardons
Sinners
,
in
JESUS
CHRIST
;
than
in
absolutely
saying
,
he
forgives
them
by
his
Clemency
and
Mercy
:
These
Terms
are
Equivocal
;
and
administer
occasion
to
think
that
the
Clemency
of
God
,
is
,
it
may
be
contrary
to
his
Justice
:
That
Sin
may
be
left
unpunish'd
;
and
that
the
satisfaction
of
Our
LORD
is
not
necessary
,
and
the
like
.
These
Terms
of
a
Loose
and
Indefinite
sense
are
often
us'd
when
we
speak
of
the
Divine
Perfections
;
which
is
not
to
be
condemn'd
,
since
Philosophical
accuracy
is
not
at
all
times
necessary
.
But
by
a
culpable
dullness
and
negligence
such
abuse
is
made
of
these
general
Expressions
and
so
many
false
consequences
are
drawn
from
them
,
that
though
all
Men
have
the
same
Idea
of
God
,
and
that
they
consider
him
as
a
Being
infinitely
Perfect
;
yet
there
was
hardly
any
Imperfection
but
was
attributed
to
him
in
Idolatrous
times
,
and
Mens
discourses
of
him
were
commonly
unseemly
and
unworthy
:
And
all
for
want
of
carefully
comparing
the
things
they
said
of
him
with
the
Idea
that
represents
him
,
or
rather
with
Himself
.
But
chiefly
in
matter
of
natural
Philosophy
,
these
rambling
and
general
Terms
are
abus'd
,
which
excite
no
distinct
Ideas
either
of
Beings
or
their
Modes
.
For
example
when
we
say
that
Bodies
tend
to
their
Center
,
that
they
fall
by
their
Gravity
,
that
they
ascend
by
their
Levity
,
that
they
move
by
their
Nature
,
that
they
successively
change
their
Forms
,
that
they
act
by
their
Vertues
,
Qualities
,
Faculties
,
&c.
we
use
such
Terms
as
have
no
signification
,
and
all
these
Propositions
are
absolutely
false
,
in
the
sense
that
most
Philosophers
take
them
.
There
is
no
Center
in
the
sense
that
is
commonly
understood
.
These
Terms
,
Gravity
,
Form
,
Nature
,
and
the
like
,
excite
no
Idea
either
of
a
Being
or
a
mode
of
Being
.
They
are
empty
and
insignificative
Terms
,
which
Wise-Men
should
avoid
.
The
Knowledge
of
the
unwise
is
as
talk
without
sense
,
says
the
Son
of
Sirach
.
These
Terms
are
good
for
nothing
,
but
to
shelter
the
Ignorance
of
Pretenders
to
Learning
,
Eccl.
21.18
.
and
to
make
the
Ignorant
and
Libertines
believe
that
God
is
not
the
True
Cause
of
all
things
.
This
methinks
is
certain
,
and
easy
to
be
conceiv'd
:
Yet
most
Men
talk
freely
of
all
things
,
without
caring
to
examine
whether
the
Terms
they
employ
have
any
clear
and
exact
signification
.
And
many
Authors
there
are
of
huge
and
bulky
Volumes
,
in
which
its
harder
than
may
be
thought
,
to
find
any
passage
where
they
have
understood
what
they
have
written
.
Therefore
those
who
are
great
Readers
,
and
respectful
Hearers
of
the
rambling
and
general
Discourses
of
the
falsly
Learn'd
,
are
in
the
darkest
Ignorance
.
And
I
see
no
way
they
have
to
get
free
of
it
,
but
by
constantly
making
,
and
renewing
their
Resolution
,
of
believing
no
Man
on
his
word
,
and
before
they
have
annex'd
very
distinct
Ideas
to
the
most
common
Terms
which
others
use
.
For
these
Terms
are
not
clear
,
as
is
commonly
imagin'd
;
and
they
seem
so
only
from
the
common
Use
that
is
made
of
them
:
Because
Men
fancy
they
well
understand
what
they
say
or
hear
,
when
they
have
said
or
heard
the
same
an
hundred
times
,
though
they
have
never
examin'd
it
.
THE
ILLUSTRATION
UPON
THE
Conclusion
of
the
Three
First
BOOKS
.
That
Physicians
and
Casuists
are
absolutely
necessary
for
us
;
But
that
it
is
dangerous
to
consult
and
follow
them
in
many
occasions
.
CErtainly
Man
before
his
Fall
,
was
possess'd
of
all
things
necessary
to
preserve
his
Mind
and
Body
in
a
perfect
State
.
He
needed
neither
Physician
,
nor
Casuist
:
He
consulted
Inward
Truth
,
as
the
Infallible
Rule
of
his
Duty
;
and
his
Senses
were
so
faithful
in
their
Reports
,
that
they
never
deceiv'd
him
in
the
use
he
ought
to
make
of
encompassing
Bodies
,
for
the
preservation
of
his
own
.
But
since
the
Transgression
things
are
much
chang'd
,
We
consult
our
Passions
much
more
than
Law
or
Truth
Eternal
;
and
our
Senses
are
so
disorder'd
,
that
in
following
them
we
sometimes
destroy
our
Health
and
Life
.
The
Casuist
and
Physician
are
become
absolutely
necessary
.
And
those
who
pretend
to
be
most
dexterous
at
Self-management
upon
all
occasions
,
fall
commonly
into
the
grossest
Miscarriages
,
which
teach
them
a
little
too
late
,
that
they
follow
a
Master
that
is
not
over-wise
.
Nevertheless
I
think
I
may
say
that
Sin
has
not
so
disorder'd
all
the
faculties
of
the
Soul
,
but
that
we
may
consult
our selves
,
in
many
instances
,
and
that
it
often
fortunes
that
we
lose
the
Life
of
our
Soul
,
or
Body
,
by
applying
to
Physicians
,
unexpert
in
their
Profession
,
and
unacquainted
with
the
constitution
of
our
Body
,
or
to
Casuists
unskill'd
in
Religion
and
Morality
,
who
pierce
not
to
the
bottom
of
the
conscience
,
to
discover
the
Engagements
and
Dispositions
of
those
who
come
to
be
resolv'd
.
When
I
have
said
in
the
Conclusion
of
the
Three
first
Books
of
The
Search
after
Truth
,
has
given
occasion
to
some
Persons
,
to
imagine
I
pretended
that
in
Order
to
preserve
life
and
health
,
we
ought
to
follow
our
Senses
and
Passions
in
all
things
;
and
that
to
be
guided
in
our
Duty
it
was
needless
to
consult
other
Men
,
since
Eternal
Wisdom
is
our
Teacher
that
speaks
intelligibly
to
us
in
the
recesses
of
our
Reason
.
And
though
I
never
said
nor
thought
that
Physicians
and
Casuists
were
useless
,
some
Persons
expedite
at
judging
and
concluding
,
are
persuaded
it
was
my
Opinion
,
because
,
it
may
be
,
it
was
theirs
:
And
that
they
do
not
so
much
consider
Man
as
he
is
at
present
,
as
what
he
was
before
the
Fall
.
Here
then
in
a
great
part
are
my
Thoughts
upon
the
question
.
Man
may
be
consider'd
in
two
States
of
Body
,
Health
and
Sickness
.
If
he
be
consider'd
in
perfect
Health
,
it
cannot
I
think
be
doubted
but
his
senses
are
much
more
useful
to
preserve
it
,
than
the
Reason
and
Experience
of
the
ablest
Physicians
.
There
's
no
need
of
advising
with
the
Doctor
to
know
what
Weight
a
man
may
bear
,
whether
Wood
and
Stones
are
to
be
eaten
,
whether
he
may
throw
himself
from
a
Precipice
.
His
senses
teaching
him
,
in
the
readiest
and
most
undoubted
manner
,
what
ought
to
be
done
in
the
like
ordinary
occasions
.
Which
is
,
one
would
think
,
sufficient
,
to
justifie
what
I
have
said
in
the
conclusion
of
the
three
first
Books
.
But
that
will
not
serve
turn
to
justify
my
Thoughts
,
and
even
my
Words
in
another
place
.
viz.
That
our
senses
acquit
themselves
of
their
Duty
so
excellently
well
,
and
conduct
us
in
that
just
and
faithful
manner
to
their
End
,
Book
1.
that
they
seem
to
be
injuriously
charg'd
with
Corruptness
and
Irregularity
.
For
I
have
always
been
perswaded
that
the
Justness
,
Exactness
and
admirable
Order
which
is
found
in
our
Sensations
with
reference
to
the
preservation
of
Life
,
was
no
Consequence
of
Sin
,
but
the
first
Institution
of
Nature
.
'T
is
objected
that
at
present
this
Order
is
disorder'd
,
and
that
if
we
were
led
by
our
senses
,
we
should
not
only
eat
Poison
,
but
should
almost
always
receive
in
,
much
more
Nutriment
than
we
could
digest
.
But
as
to
Poisons
I
don't
believe
our
senses
would
ever
invite
us
to
eat
them
;
but
that
if
our
Eyes
should
by
chance
provoke
us
to
tast
them
,
we
should
not
find
in
them
a
relish
that
would
induce
us
to
swallow
them
,
supposing
these
Poisons
were
in
their
Natural
State
.
For
there
is
great
difference
between
Poisons
,
as
they
are
Naturally
produc'd
,
and
empoison'd
Food
;
between
crude
Pepper
,
and
Pepper'd
Meats
.
Our
senses
I
grant
invite
us
to
eat
Poison'd
Victuals
.
But
they
do
not
incline
us
to
eat
Poisons
,
or
it
may
be
,
not
so
much
as
to
taste
them
,
provided
these
Poisons
remain
in
the
capacity
wherein
God
has
produc'd
them
.
For
our
senses
reach
but
to
the
Natural
Order
of
things
as
constituted
by
their
Maker
.
I
grant
likewise
that
our
senses
at
present
induce
us
to
eat
certain
Meats
to
excess
and
surfeiting
,
but
that
's
because
these
Meats
are
not
in
their
Natural
State
.
We
should
never
perhaps
overcharge
our selves
with
Wheat
,
if
we
ground
it
with
Teeth
,
made
for
that
purpose
;
But
it
is
ground
,
and
sifted
,
and
kneaded
,
and
baked
;
Sophisticated
too
sometimes
with
Milk
,
with
Butter
,
and
Sugar
,
it
's
eaten
also
with
preserves
,
and
with
Ragoos
of
several
sorts
which
provoke
appetite
.
And
so
we
need
not
wonder
if
our
senses
incline
us
to
excess
,
when
Reason
and
Experience
lend
both
their
assistance
to
impose
on
them
.
So
it
is
in
respect
of
flesh
,
which
the
senses
abhor
when
Raw
and
Full
of
Blood
,
when
beheld
after
the
Animal
died
of
it self
.
But
Men
have
bethought
themselves
to
kill
the
Beasts
,
to
drain
out
the
Blood
,
to
concoct
the
flesh
with
Fire
,
to
Season
,
and
Disguise
it
,
and
after
this
accuse
their
Senses
of
Corruption
and
disorder
;
since
they
Imploy
their
Reason
in
preparing
other
sorts
of
Diet
than
Nature
supplies
to
them
,
I
must
own
there
is
need
of
the
same
Reason
to
Moderate
their
Appetite
,
in
their
Eating
:
And
if
the
Cooks
have
found
out
the
art
of
making
us
eat
Old
Shooes
in
their
High
Season'd
Dishes
,
it
lies
upon
us
to
make
as
much
use
of
our
reason
in
mistrusting
these
Adulterated
meats
which
are
not
such
as
God
has
made
them
:
For
he
has
given
us
our
senses
only
with
Relation
to
the
Natural
Order
of
things
.
It
must
farther
be
observ'd
that
our
Imagination
,
and
senses
are
mistrustful
and
suspicious
when
we
take
unusual
Aliments
.
For
if
a
Men
had
never
Eaten
,
nor
seen
Eaten
a
particular
Fruit
he
met
with
,
he
would
have
some
aversion
and
sense
of
fear
upon
the
tasting
it
:
His
●magination
and
senses
would
be
naturally
arrect
and
attentive
to
the
relish
it
afforded
;
though
never
so
hungry
he
would
eat
but
little
the
first
time
,
and
if
this
Fruit
had
any
dangerous
quality
it
would
be
sure
to
create
in
him
some
dread
or
abhorrence
.
Thus
his
Machine
would
be
so
dispos'd
as
to
decline
it
another
time
;
and
the
Odium
which
he
had
to
it
sensibly
discovering
it self
in
his
Looks
,
would
prevent
others
from
eating
it
.
All
this
would
be
perform'd
,
or
might
be
perform'd
in
him
,
whilst
Reason
had
no
share
in
it
:
For
I
speak
not
here
of
those
supplies
which
Reason
,
and
Experience
may
administer
.
But
seeing
our
Friends
take
corrupt
nutriment
,
we
do
the
same
:
For
we
live
by
Opinion
;
and
Example
emboldens
us
.
We
examine
not
the
effects
these
Aliments
may
produce
in
us
,
and
we
fear
not
to
eat
them
to
excess
.
But
our
senses
are
not
so
great
abettors
of
the
Intemperance
as
is
believ'd
.
'T
is
true
there
possibly
are
in
the
World
such
Fruits
as
that
their
Tasts
may
impose
on
Persons
never
so
attentive
to
the
Reports
of
their
senses
:
But
this
certainly
is
very
rare
:
And
we
ought
not
to
conclude
from
these
particular
instances
,
that
our
senses
are
all
corrupt
,
and
that
they
commonly
deceive
us
,
in
things
relating
to
the
good
of
the
Body
.
It
may
be
,
these
Fruits
deceive
our
Tast
,
because
we
have
altered
,
and
corrupted
our
Organ
by
the
frequent
use
of
unnatural
Nourishment
.
For
't
is
certain
that
the
High
Season'd
Dishes
,
we
feed
upon
,
by
their
too
Poignant
,
and
penetrating
Particles
,
hurt
the
Fibres
of
the
Tongue
,
and
deprive
it
of
it's
Niceness
and
Sagacity
.
The
Example
of
those
who
can
find
no
relish
except
in
Ragoos
,
proves
my
assertion
;
for
if
we
find
no
savour
in
Corn
,
and
in
crude
Flesh
,
't
is
because
our
Tongue
is
grown
insensible
to
those
Particles
,
whose
motions
are
Moderate
.
But
though
we
suppose
there
are
some
Fruits
whose
savour
is
capable
of
deceiving
the
most
curious
senses
,
and
which
still
retain
their
Natural
perfection
;
yet
we
ought
not
to
believe
this
proceeded
from
Sin
:
But
only
that
from
the
great
simplicity
of
Natural
Laws
,
(
by
vertue
of
which
the
sense
of
Tast
is
form'd
and
perfected
)
't
was
impossible
for
it
to
have
sufficient
Niceness
and
Sagacity
for
all
sorts
of
Eatables
.
Besides
,
that
defect
of
sense
would
not
be
remediless
,
because
when
the
Mother
had
an
aversion
to
dangerous
Fruits
,
she
would
communicate
it
to
her
Children
,
not
only
when
unborn
,
but
also
when
come
into
the
World
.
For
Children
only
Eat
what
is
given
them
by
their
Mothers
,
and
they
Machinally
,
and
by
the
Air
of
their
Countenance
infuse
into
them
an
abhorrence
for
Fruits
that
are
dangerous
to
be
Eaten
.
So
that
God
has
made
sufficient
Provision
by
our
senses
for
the
preservation
of
our
Life
,
and
nothing
can
be
better
Order'd
.
For
as
Order
requires
,
that
the
Laws
of
Union
of
our
Soul
and
Body
should
be
most
Simple
;
they
must
be
of
a
very
General
Nature
:
And
God
ought
not
to
establish
particular
Laws
for
such
instancess
and
emergences
,
as
most
rarely
happen
,
Reason
on
such
occasions
must
Help
out
the
Senses
:
For
Reason
may
be
employ'd
in
all
things
.
But
the
senses
are
determin'd
to
some
Natural
Judgments
,
which
are
the
most
advantageous
●maginable
,
as
I
have
prov'd
in
the
first
Book
.
Yet
even
these
Judgments
are
sometimes
fallacious
;
because
't
is
impossible
it
should
be
otherwise
without
multiplying
the
most
simple
Laws
of
Union
of
the
Body
with
the
Soul
.
If
we
consider
Man
as
now
he
is
,
under
a
State
of
Sickness
,
we
must
confess
his
senses
often
deceive
him
,
even
in
things
that
relate
to
the
preservation
of
his
Life
.
For
the
Oeconomy
of
his
Machine
being
disturb'd
in
Proportion
to
it's
disturbance
,
irregular
motions
must
unavoidably
be
excited
in
his
Brain
.
Nevertheless
his
senses
are
not
so
corrupted
,
as
is
Ordinarily
believ'd
:
And
God
has
so
wisely
provided
for
the
preservation
of
Life
by
the
Laws
of
Union
of
the
Soul
and
Body
,
that
though
these
laws
are
extreamly
simple
,
they
often
suffice
to
restore
us
to
our
Health
;
and
it
is
much
the
surer
way
to
follow
them
,
than
to
employ
our
Reason
,
or
certain
Physicians
that
do
not
carefully
study
the
disposition
of
their
Patients
.
For
as
a
wound
closes
and
heals
up
of
its
self
when
constantly
cleans'd
and
lick'd
,
as
is
done
by
Animals
when
wounded
:
So
Ordinary
diseases
are
speedily
dispers'd
,
when
we
let
them
alone
,
and
exactly
observe
that
course
of
Life
,
which
these
Diseases
,
as
it
were
by
instinct
,
and
Sensation
,
put
us
upon
.
Wine
,
for
example
;
seems
bitter
to
a
Man
in
a
Feaver
,
and
likewise
is
prejudicial
to
him
in
that
Condition
:
This
same
Man
finds
it
agreeable
to
the
Palate
,
when
he
is
in
Health
,
and
then
too
it
is
Wholesome
for
him
.
It
sometimes
even
happens
that
Wine
is
most
useful
to
the
Sick
that
relish
it
,
provided
their
tast
be
not
an
effect
of
the
Habit
of
drinking
it
,
and
that
their
desire
of
it
proceed
from
the
present
disposition
of
their
Body
:
That
it
cannot
be
doubted
but
that
we
are
to
consult
our
senses
in
Sickness
for
the
way
we
are
to
take
to
the
recovery
of
our
Health
.
Here
follows
my
Opinion
about
what
we
ought
to
do
.
'T
is
requisite
that
the
distemper'd
Person
should
be
extreamly
attentive
to
those
secret
desires
which
sometimes
arise
in
him
on
occasion
of
the
actual
disposition
of
his
Body
;
but
above
all
,
take
heed
lest
these
desires
should
be
the
consequence
of
some
preceding
Habit.
He
must
,
to
that
intent
,
slacken
,
as
I
may
say
,
the
bent
of
Imagination
,
or
,
thinking
on
nothing
that
may
determine
it
,
observe
to
what
he
is
inclin'd
,
and
examine
whether
his
present
Inclination
proceeds
from
the
actual
disposition
of
his
Body
:
Which
done
,
he
ought
to
follow
it
,
but
with
much
caution
and
reserve
;
it
being
extreamly
difficult
to
be
assur'd
whether
these
secret
Inclinations
are
owing
to
the
present
State
of
Body
;
and
't
is
sometimes
good
to
have
the
advice
of
some
Experienc'd
Person
upon
it
.
But
if
the
Sick
Person
thus
giving
a
loose
to
his
Imagination
,
as
I
have
been
saying
,
finds
nothing
offer
it self
to
his
Mind
,
he
must
remain
quiet
,
and
use
abstinence
,
for
this
likely
will
quicken
him
to
some
desire
,
or
spend
the
humours
that
distemper
him
.
But
if
the
disease
increase
,
notwithstanding
his
Abstinence
and
Rest
,
't
is
then
necessary
to
have
recourse
to
experience
and
the
Physician
.
He
must
give
then
an
exact
account
of
all
to
a
Skillful
one
that
knows
,
if
possible
,
the
Constitution
of
his
Body
;
He
must
clearly
explain
to
Him
the
beginnings
,
and
progress
of
his
Disease
,
and
the
State
of
Body
he
was
in
,
before
he
fell
into
it
,
that
He
may
consult
his
Experience
and
Reason
with
reference
to
the
Person
to
be
cur'd
by
him
.
And
then
though
the
Physician
prescribe
bitter
Medicines
,
and
which
are
really
sorts
of
Poison
,
yet
they
must
be
taken
because
we
Experimentally
know
that
these
Poisons
stay
not
in
the
Body
,
but
drive
out
sometimes
along
with
them
the
corrupt
humours
which
are
the
cause
of
the
Disease
.
Here
it
is
that
Reason
,
or
rather
Experience
,
must
over-rule
the
Senses
;
provided
the
abhorrence
of
the
recommended
Potion
be
not
of
a
fresh
date
.
For
if
this
Aversion
was
Cotemporary
with
the
disease
,
it
would
rather
be
a
Symptom
of
the
Medicine
's
being
of
the
same
Nature
with
the
ill
humours
that
caus'd
the
distemper
,
and
so
perhaps
would
be
augment
and
strengthen
it
.
Nevertheless
I
think
it
advisable
before
we
venture
upon
strong
Medicines
,
and
which
we
are
much
averse
to
,
to
begin
with
those
that
are
more
gentle
and
natural
:
As
by
Drinking
a
good
quantity
of
Water
,
or
taking
an
easie
Emetick
,
if
we
have
lost
our
Appetite
,
and
are
not
very
hard
to
Vomit
.
Water
may
attenuate
the
too
condens'd
humours
,
and
Facilitate
the
Circulation
of
the
Blood
into
all
the
Parts
of
the
Body
:
And
Vomitives
cleansing
the
Stomach
,
hinder
the
Nourishment
we
take
in
,
from
corrupting
,
and
feeding
any
longer
intermittent
Feavers
.
But
I
ought
not
to
insist
upon
these
things
.
I
am
therefore
of
Opinion
that
we
ought
to
follow
the
advise
of
the
wise
Physicians
,
who
are
not
too
hasty
and
expeditious
,
who
are
not
too
presumptuous
upon
the
Recipe's
,
nor
too
easie
to
give
their
Nostrums
and
Prescriptions
.
For
where
one
remedy
does
a
Sick
Man
good
,
there
are
a
great
many
that
do
him
harm
.
As
the
suffering
Persons
are
impatient
,
and
as
it
makes
not
for
the
Honour
of
the
Physicians
,
nor
the
profit
of
the
Apothecary
,
to
visit
the
sick
without
prescribing
to
them
,
so
they
visit
too
seldom
,
and
prescribe
too
often
.
When
therefore
a
Man
is
Sick
,
he
ought
to
request
of
his
Physician
,
that
he
would
●azard
nothing
;
but
follow
Nature
,
and
strengthen
it
i●
he
can
:
He
ought
to
let
him
know
that
he
has
more
Reason
,
and
Patience
,
than
to
take
it
ill
that
he
visits
him
often
without
giving
him
relief
:
For
on
these
occasions
he
sometimes
does
a
great
deal
,
who
does
no
mischief
.
I
conclude
then
that
we
must
have
recourse
to
Physicians
,
and
refuse
not
to
obey
them
,
if
we
would
preserve
our
Life
.
For
though
they
cannot
be
assur'd
of
restoring
our
Health
,
yet
sometimes
they
may
contribute
much
for
it
,
by
reason
of
the
continual
Experiments
,
they
make
upon
different
Diseases
.
They
know
indeed
very
little
,
with
any
exactness
,
yet
still
they
know
much
more
than
our selves
;
and
provided
they
will
give
themselves
the
trouble
of
studying
our
constitution
,
of
carefully
observing
all
the
Symptoms
of
the
Disease
,
and
diligently
attending
to
our
own
inward
Feeling
;
we
may
hope
from
them
all
the
Assistances
that
we
may
reasonably
expect
from
Men.
What
we
have
said
of
Physicians
may
in
a
manner
be
apply'd
to
Casuists
,
whom
't
is
absolutely
necessary
to
consult
on
some
occasions
;
and
commonly
useful
.
But
it
sometimes
happens
not
only
to
be
most
useless
,
but
highly
dangerous
,
to
advise
with
them
;
which
I
explain
and
prove
.
'T
is
commonly
said
that
humane
Reason
is
subject
to
Error
;
but
herein
there
is
an
equivocal
sence
,
which
we
are
not
sufficiently
aware
of
.
For
it
must
not
be
imagin'd
that
the
Reason
which
Man
consults
is
corrupted
,
or
that
it
ever
misleads
,
when
faithfully
consulted
.
I
have
said
it
,
and
I
say
it
again
,
that
none
but
the
Soveraign
Reason
makes
us
Rational
:
None
but
the
Supream
Truth
enlightens
us
,
nor
any
but
God
,
that
speaks
clearly
,
and
knows
how
to
instruct
us
.
We
have
but
one
True
Master
,
even
JESUS
CHRIST
Our
LORD
,
Eternal
WISDOM
,
the
WORD
of
the
Father
,
in
whom
are
all
the
Treasures
of
Wisdom
,
and
the
Knowledge
of
God
:
And
't
is
Blasphemy
to
say
,
this
Vniversal
Reason
,
whereof
all
Men
participate
,
and
by
which
alone
they
are
reasonable
,
is
subject
to
Error
,
and
capable
of
deceiving
us
.
'T
is
not
Man's
Reason
but
his
Heart
that
betrays
him
;
'T
is
not
his
Light
,
but
his
Darkness
that
hinders
him
from
seeing
.
'T
is
not
the
Union
he
has
with
God
,
which
seduces
him
,
no●
in
one
sence
,
his
Union
with
the
Body
:
But
't
is
the
dependance
he
has
on
his
Body
,
or
rather
,
't
is
because
he
will
deceive
himself
;
and
enjoy
the
Pleasure
of
Judging
,
before
he
has
been
at
the
Pains
of
Examining
;
't
is
because
he
will
rest
,
before
he
arrives
to
the
place
of
the
Rest
of
Truth
.
I
have
more
exactly
explain'd
the
cause
of
our
Errors
,
in
many
places
of
the
preceding
Book
,
and
I
here
suppose
what
I
there
have
said
.
Which
being
laid
down
,
I
affirm
it
is
needless
to
consult
Casuists
when
it
is
certain
,
that
Truth
speaks
to
us
;
which
we
are
sure
it
does
when
Evidence
displays
it self
in
the
Answers
that
are
made
to
our
Enquiries
,
that
is
,
to
the
attention
of
our
Mind
.
Therefore
when
we
retire
into
our
own
Breast
,
and
in
the
silence
of
our
Senses
,
and
Passions
,
hear
a
Voice
so
clear
,
and
intelligible
,
that
we
cannot
be
doubtful
of
the
Truth
of
it
,
we
must
submit
to
it
,
let
the
World
think
of
us
what
they
please
:
We
must
have
no
regard
to
custom
,
nor
listen
to
our
secret
Inclinations
,
nor
defer
too
much
to
the
resolves
of
those
who
go
for
the
Learned
part
of
Men.
We
must
not
give
way
to
be
misguided
by
the
false
shew
of
a
pretended
Piety
;
nor
be
humbled
by
the
oppositions
of
those
who
know
not
the
Soul
which
animates
them
:
But
we
must
bear
patiently
their
proud
Insults
,
without
condemning
their
Intentions
,
or
despising
their
Persons
.
We
must
,
with
simplicity
of
heart
,
rejoice
in
the
Light
of
Truth
,
which
illuminates
us
;
and
though
its
Answers
condemn
us
,
yet
ought
we
to
prefer
them
,
before
all
the
subtil
Distinctions
the
Imagination
invents
,
for
the
justification
of
the
Passions
.
Every
Man
,
for
Example
,
that
can
enter
into
himself
,
and
still
the
confus'd
noise
of
the
Senses
and
Passions
,
clearly
discovers
that
every
motion
of
Love
,
which
is
given
us
by
God
,
must
Center
upon
him
,
and
that
God
himself
cannot
dispense
with
the
Obligation
we
have
to
Love
him
,
in
all
things
.
'T
is
evident
,
that
God
cannot
supersede
acting
for
Himself
,
cannot
create
,
or
preserve
our
Will
,
to
will
any
thing
besides
him
,
or
to
will
any
thing
but
what
he
Wills
Himself
.
For
I
cannot
see
how
it
is
conceivable
,
that
God
can
Will
a
Creature
should
have
more
Love
for
what
is
less
lovely
,
or
should
Love
Soveraignly
,
as
its
end
,
what
is
not
Supreamly
amiable
.
I
know
well
that
Men
who
interrogate
their
Passions
,
instead
of
consulting
Order
,
may
easily
imagine
that
God
has
no
other
Rule
of
his
Will
than
his
will
it self
,
and
that
if
God
observes
Order
,
't
is
meerly
●ecause
he
will'd
it
,
and
has
made
this
same
Order
by
a
Will
absolutely
Free
and
Indifferent
.
There
are
those
who
think
there
is
no
Order
immutable
and
necessary
by
its
Nature
:
And
and
that
the
Order
or
Wisdom
of
God
,
whereby
he
has
made
all
things
,
though
the
first
of
Creatures
,
is
yet
it self
a
Creature
,
made
by
a
Free-Will
of
God
,
and
not
begotten
of
his
Substance
by
the
necessity
of
his
Essence
.
But
this
Opinion
which
shakes
all
the
Foundations
of
Morality
by
robbing
Order
,
and
the
Eternal
Laws
,
depending
on
it
,
of
their
Immutability
,
and
overturns
the
entire
Edifice
of
the
Christian
Religion
,
by
divesting
JESUS
CHRIST
,
or
the
WORD
of
God
,
of
his
Divinity
,
does
not
yet
so
perfectly
benight
the
Mind
,
as
to
hide
from
it
this
Truth
:
That
God
Wills
Order
.
Thus
whether
the
Will
of
God
Makes
Order
,
or
Supposes
it
,
we
clearly
see
when
we
retire
into
our selves
,
that
the
God
we
Worship
cannot
do
what
plainly
appears
to
us
to
be
contrary
to
Order
.
So
that
Order
Willing
that
our
Time
,
or
the
Duration
of
our
Being
,
should
be
for
him
that
preserves
us
,
that
the
Motion
of
our
Heart
should
continually
tend
towards
him
,
who
continually
impresses
it
in
us
;
that
all
the
Powers
of
our
Souls
should
labour
only
for
him
,
by
vertue
of
whom
they
act
.
Mark
12.30
.
God
cannot
dispense
with
the
Commandment
he
gave
by
Moses
in
the
Law
,
and
repeated
by
his
Son
in
the
Gospel
,
Thou
shalt
Love
the
Lord
thy
God
with
all
thy
Heart
,
and
with
all
thy
Soul
,
and
with
all
thy
Mind
,
and
with
all
thy
Strength
.
But
because
Order
requires
that
every
Righteous
Person
should
be
happy
,
and
every
Sinner
miserable
,
and
that
every
Action
conformable
to
Order
,
and
every
Motion
of
Love
to
God
should
be
rewarded
,
and
every
other
contrary
to
Order
,
or
that
tends
not
to
him
,
punish'd
:
It
is
evident
,
that
whoever
will
be
happy
must
constantly
tend
towards
God
;
and
reject
with
abhorrence
whatever
stops
or
retards
him
in
his
course
,
or
Weakens
his
propension
to
the
true
good
:
And
for
this
he
need
not
consult
any
Casuists
;
For
when
God
speaks
,
't
is
fit
that
Men
should
be
silent
:
And
when
we
are
absolutely
certain
,
that
our
Senses
,
and
Passions
,
have
no
Voice
in
those
resolves
we
hear
,
in
our
most
Secret
and
inward
Reason
,
we
ought
always
respectfully
to
attend
and
submit
to
them
.
Would
we
be
resolv'd
whether
we
may
go
to
a
Ball
or
a
Play
:
Whether
we
may
in
Conscience
spend
a
great
part
of
the
Day
in
Sports
,
and
vain
Conversation
,
whether
certain
Conversations
,
Studies
,
and
Employs
,
are
conformable
to
our
Obligations
.
Let
us
retire
into
our selves
;
and
hush
our
Senses
and
Passions
,
and
then
see
in
the
Light
of
God
,
whether
we
can
do
for
him
any
such
Action
:
Let
us
interrogate
him
who
is
the
Way
,
the
Truth
,
and
the
Life
,
to
know
if
the
Road
we
pursue
will
not
lead
us
to
the
Gates
of
Death
:
And
whether
(
God
being
Essentially
Just
,
and
necessarily
oblig'd
to
punish
what
is
not
agreeable
to
Order
,
and
to
reward
all
conformity
to
it
)
we
have
reason
to
believe
we
are
going
to
augment
,
or
ensure
our
Felicity
,
by
the
Action
we
intend
to
do
.
If
it
be
our
Love
to
God
that
leads
us
to
the
Ball
,
let
us
go
:
If
Heaven
is
to
be
gain'd
by
playing
,
let
us
play
Day
and
Night
:
If
we
have
in
prospect
the
Glory
of
God
in
our
Employment
,
let
us
exercise
it
;
Let
us
do
all
things
with
Joy
,
for
our
Recompence
shall
be
great
in
Heaven
.
But
if
after
having
carefully
examin'd
our
Essential
Obligations
,
we
clearly
discover
that
neither
our
Being
,
nor
the
Time
that
measures
it
,
is
at
our
own
disposal
,
and
that
we
do
an
unjust
thing
,
which
it
necessarily
lies
upon
God
to
punish
,
when
our
only
study
is
how
to
spend
our
time
in
Mirth
and
Pleasure
,
If
our
Lord
and
Master
CHRIST
,
who
has
purchas'd
us
by
his
Blood
,
●eproaches
our
In●idelity
and
Ingratitude
in
a
most
clear
and
intelligible
manner
,
for
living
after
the
Flesh
and
the
World
,
for
Leading
an
Effeminate
,
and
Voluptuous
Life
,
and
following
Opinion
and
Custom
:
Let
us
yield
to
his
Voice
,
and
not
harden
our
Hearts
,
nor
seek
out
such
Spiritual
,
Guides
,
as
comfort
us
under
these
Reproaches
,
and
secure
us
against
these
Menaces
,
and
involve
in
delightful
Clouds
that
Light
which
strikes
,
and
pierces
our
very
Soul
.
When
the
Blind
leads
the
Blind
they
both
fall
into
the
Ditch
,
says
the
Evangelist
.
But
if
God
excuses
not
the
Blind
who
commits
himself
to
the
Conduct
of
a
Blind
Leader
,
will
he
excuse
him
who
seeing
clearly
will
yet
willingly
be
guided
by
the
Blind
,
because
he
leads
him
pleasantly
,
and
entertains
him
by
the
way
,
according
to
his
Inclinations
?
These
voluntary
Blind
Men
ought
to
know
,
that
God
who
never
deceives
,
frequently
permits
these
Seducers
in
punishment
to
the
corrupt
Affections
of
those
that
seek
them
.
That
Blindness
is
a
penalty
of
Sin
,
though
it
be
often
the
cause
of
it
;
and
that
it
is
just
,
that
he
who
cared
not
to
hear
Eternal
Wisdom
,
who
spoke
only
for
his
good
,
should
at
last
suffer
himself
to
be
corrupted
by
Men
,
whose
deception
is
so
much
more
dangerous
,
as
their
Flatteries
are
more
pleasing
.
'T
is
true
't
is
no
easie
thing
to
retire
into
our selves
,
to
silence
our
Senses
,
and
Passions
,
and
to
distinguish
the
Voice
of
God
,
from
that
of
our
Body
:
For
we
most
commonly
take
sensible
Proofs
for
evident
Reasons
;
and
on
that
account
it
is
necessary
to
consult
the
Casuists
.
But
it
is
not
always
needful
:
For
we
see
our
Duty
on
many
occasions
,
with
the
clearest
Evidence
,
and
an
undoubted
certainty
.
And
then
it
is
even
dangerous
to
consult
them
,
unless
it
be
done
with
the
greatest
Sincerity
,
and
by
a
Spirit
of
Humility
,
and
Obedience
.
For
these
dispositions
oblige
God
to
prevent
our
deception
,
or
at
least
to
keep
us
from
deceiving
our selves
in
any
hurtful
manner
.
When
it
is
convenient
to
advise
with
a
Spiritual
Guide
,
such
an
one
is
to
be
chosen
as
understands
Religion
,
and
reverences
the
Gospel
,
and
is
acquainted
with
humane
Nature
.
We
must
take
heed
least
the
converse
of
the
World
has
corrupted
him
,
least
Friendship
should
make
him
too
Gentle
and
Complaisant
,
least
he
should
be
Brib'd
by
his
hopes
or
fears
of
us
;
We
must
choose
one
in
a
thousand
,
says
St.
Theresia
,
who
,
as
she
relates
her self
,
had
like
to
have
lost
her
way
to
Heaven
,
by
the
means
of
an
Ignorant
Guide
.
The
World
is
full
of
Deceivers
,
I
say
of
Well-Meaning
Deceivers
;
no
less
than
others
.
Those
who
Love
us
,
seduce
us
by
their
Complaisance
:
Those
who
are
below
us
,
flatter
us
;
out
of
Respect
or
Fear
:
Those
above
us
out
of
Contempt
,
or
Negligence
,
overlook
our
necessities
.
Besides
,
all
Men
give
us
Counsel
,
agreeable
to
the
Breviates
we
give
of
our
own
Condition
,
and
we
never
fail
to
make
the
best
of
our
Case
,
insensibly
laying
our
hand
upon
our
sore
when
we
are
asham'd
of
it
.
We
often
deceive
our
Counsellours
,
that
we
may
deceive
our selves
:
For
we
fancy
our selves
secure
,
whilst
we
follow
their
Directions
.
They
do
but
conduct
us
whither
we
design'd
to
go
;
and
yet
we
would
fain
perswade
our selves
,
in
spite
of
our
Light
,
and
the
Secret
reproofs
of
our
Reason
,
that
't
is
our
Obedience
which
determines
us
.
We
seduce
our selves
,
and
God
permits
us
;
but
we
can
never
deceive
him
who
Penetrates
the
Bottom
of
our
Hearts
.
And
though
we
deafen
our selves
never
so
much
to
the
Voice
of
Internal
Truth
,
we
are
sufficiently
made
sensible
by
the
inward
Reproaches
,
we
receive
,
from
the
Supream
Truth
,
leaving
us
to
our selves
,
that
it
enlightens
our
Darkness
,
and
discovers
all
the
Wiles
and
Stratagems
of
Self-Love
.
'T
is
therefore
evident
,
that
our
Reason
must
be
consulted
for
the
Health
of
our
Soul
,
as
our
Senses
are
to
be
advis'd
with
for
the
Health
of
our
Body
;
and
that
when
the
former
cannot
clearly
resolve
us
,
we
must
apply
to
the
Casuist
,
as
we
must
have
recourse
to
the
Physician
,
when
the
latter
are
defective
:
But
this
is
to
be
done
with
Judgment
,
since
Ignorant
Casuists
may
Murther
our
Soul
,
as
Vnskilful
Physicians
may
Poison
our
Body
.
Whereas
I
explain
not
in
particular
the
Rules
which
may
be
given
about
the
choice
and
use
that
's
to
be
made
of
Physicians
and
Casuists
.
I
desire
my
Sentiments
may
be
candidly
interpreted
,
and
that
it
may
not
be
imagin'd
I
am
against
drawing
all
possible
supplies
from
other
Men.
I
know
that
a
particular
Blessing
attends
our
submission
to
the
Opinions
of
the
Wise
and
Understanding
:
And
I
am
willing
to
believe
this
general
Rule
,
that
't
is
requisite
to
die
in
the
usual
Forms
,
is
surer
for
the
common
sort
of
Men
;
than
any
I
could
establish
for
the
Preservation
of
Life
.
But
because
't
is
of
perpetual
use
to
retire
into
our selves
,
to
consult
the
Gospel
;
and
to
listen
to
JESUS
CHRIST
,
whether
he
speaks
immediately
to
our
Mind
and
Heart
,
or
by
Faith
declares
himself
to
our
Ears
and
Eyes
;
I
thought
I
might
be
allow'd
to
say
what
I
have
said
.
For
our
Casuists
deceive
us
when
they
go
contrary
to
the
Doctrine
of
our
Faith
and
Reason
.
And
as
we
give
Honour
to
God
by
believing
that
his
Works
have
what
is
necessary
to
their
preservation
,
I
thought
I
could
make
Men
sensible
their
Machine
was
so
admirably
contriv'd
,
that
it
's
own
Nature
can
better
furnish
it
with
what
's
necessary
to
it's
safety
,
than
Science
and
even
the
Experience
of
the
ablest
Physicians
.
THE
ILLUSTRATION
UPON
THE
Third
CHAPTER
of
the
Fifth
BOOK
.
That
Love
is
different
from
Pleasure
and
Joy
.
THE
Mind
commonly
confounds
things
that
are
very
different
,
when
they
happen
at
the
same
time
,
and
are
not
contrary
to
each
other
.
As
I
have
shown
by
many
Instances
in
this
Work
;
because
herein
chiefly
consist
our
Errors
,
in
Respect
of
what
passes
within
us
.
Being
we
have
no
clear
Idea
of
●hat
constitutes
the
Nature
or
Essence
of
our
Mind
,
nor
of
any
of
the
Modification
it
can
receive
,
it
often
falls
out
,
that
to
our
confounding
different
things
,
they
need
but
happen
in
us
at
the
same
time
.
For
we
easily
confound
what
we
know
not
,
by
a
clear
and
distinct
Ide●
.
It
is
not
only
impossible
clearly
to
conceive
wherein
consists
the
difference
of
our
Internal
Motions
;
it
is
even
difficult
to
discover
any
difference
between
them
:
For
to
do
this
we
must
turn
our
Eyes
inward
,
and
retire
into
our selves
;
not
to
consider
them
with
reference
to
Good
and
Evil
,
which
we
do
willingly
enough
:
But
to
contemplate
our selves
with
an
abstract
and
barren
consideration
,
which
costs
us
great
trouble
,
and
distraction
of
Thought
.
We
easily
conceive
,
that
the
Roundness
of
a
Body
differs
from
its
Motion
;
and
though
we
know
by
Experience
,
that
a
Bowl
on
a
plane
cannot
be
press'd
without
being
mov'd
,
and
so
Motion
and
Roundness
are
found
together
:
Yet
we
use
not
to
confound
them
with
one
another
,
because
we
conceive
Motion
and
Figure
by
clear
and
distinct
Ideas
.
But
't
is
not
so
with
Pleasure
and
Love
,
which
we
almost
always
confound
together
.
Our
Mind
grows
,
as
it
were
Moveable
by
Pleasure
,
as
a
Bowl
by
it's
roundness
,
and
because
it
is
never
void
of
an
impression
towards
Good
,
it
immediately
puts
it self
in
Motion
towards
the
Objects
which
causes
,
or
seems
to
cause
the
Pleasure
.
So
that
the
Motion
of
Love
happening
in
the
Soul
at
the
very
time
of
it's
feeling
this
Pleasure
,
is
sufficient
to
make
her
undistinguish
or
confound
them
,
because
she
has
no
clear
Idea
of
her
Love
and
Pleasure
as
she
has
of
Figure
and
Motion
.
And
for
this
Reason
some
are
perswaded
,
that
Pleasure
and
Love
are
not
different
,
and
that
I
distinguish
too
many
things
in
each
of
our
Passions
.
But
that
it
may
clearly
appear
,
that
Pleasure
and
Love
are
two
very
different
things
:
I
divide
Pleasures
into
two
sorts
,
the
one
sort
precedes
Reason
,
as
are
agreeable
Sensations
,
and
go
commonly
by
the
Name
of
the
Pleasures
of
the
Body
.
The
other
sort
neither
precede
Reason
,
nor
the
senses
,
and
are
generally
call'd
the
Pleasures
of
the
Soul
.
Such
is
the
Joy
that
arise
in
us
,
in
pursuance
of
a
clear
knowledge
of
confus'd
sensation
we
have
of
some
Good
,
that
either
does
,
or
shall
accrue
to
us
.
For
Example
,
a
Man
in
tasting
a
Fruit
,
which
he
does
not
know
,
finds
pleasure
in
eating
it
,
if
it
be
good
for
Nourishment
.
Which
is
a
preceding
or
preventing
Pleasure
;
for
since
he
feels
it
before
he
knows
whether
the
Fruit
be
good
,
't
is
evident
it
prevents
his
Reason
.
An
Huntsman
when
hungry
expects
to
find
,
or
actually
finds
something
Eatable
;
which
gives
him
an
actual
sense
of
Joy
.
Now
this
Joy
is
a
Pleasure
which
follows
the
knowledge
of
his
present
or
future
good
.
It
is
perhaps
evident
by
this
distinction
of
Pleasure
into
that
which
follows
,
and
that
which
prevents
Reason
;
that
neither
of
them
but
differs
from
Love
.
For
preventing
pleasure
undoubtedly
precedes
Love
,
since
it
precedes
all
Knowledge
,
which
some
way
or
other
is
always
suppos'd
by
Love
.
On
the
contrary
,
Joy
,
or
the
Pleasure
which
supposes
foregoing
Knowledge
,
presupposes
likewise
Love
;
since
Joy
supposes
either
a
confus'd
Sensation
,
or
a
clear
Knowledge
of
the
present
or
future
Possession
of
what
we
Love
:
For
if
we
possess'd
a
thing
for
which
we
have
no
Love
,
we
should
receive
no
Joy
from
it
.
Therefore
Pleasure
is
very
different
from
Love
,
since
that
which
prevents
Reason
;
prevent
and
causes
Love
,
and
that
which
follows
Reason
,
necessarily
supposes
Love
;
as
an
Effect
supposes
the
Cause
.
Moreover
,
if
Pleasure
and
Love
were
the
same
thing
,
there
could
be
no
Pleasure
without
Love
,
nor
Love
without
Pleasure
,
otherwise
a
thing
could
be
without
it self
.
Nevertheless
a
Christian
Loves
his
Enemy
,
and
a
well-educated
Child
his
Father
,
though
never
so
irrational
and
unkind
.
The
Sight
of
their
Duty
,
the
Fear
of
God
,
the
Love
of
Order
and
Justice
causes
them
to
Love
,
not
only
without
Pleasure
,
but
even
with
a
sort
of
Horrour
,
those
Persons
that
are
no
ways
delightful
.
I
own
they
sometimes
have
the
Sense
of
Pleasure
or
Joy
,
upon
the
Reflection
,
that
they
perform
their
Duty
;
or
upon
the
Hopes
of
being
rewarded
as
they
do
deserve
.
But
besides
,
that
this
Pleasure
is
very
manifestly
different
from
the
Love
they
bear
to
their
Father
,
and
Enemy
;
though
perhaps
it
may
be
the
Motive
of
it
,
it
sometimes
is
not
so
much
as
the
Motive
of
their
acting
;
but
't
is
only
an
abstract
View
of
Order
,
or
a
Notion
of
Fear
,
which
preserves
their
Love
.
In
one
sense
it
may
be
truly
said
,
they
have
a
Love
for
these
Persons
,
even
whilst
they
do
not
think
of
them
.
For
Love
remains
in
us
during
the
Avocations
of
Thought
,
and
in
Sleep
:
But
I
conceive
that
Pleasure
has
no
longer
a
Substance
in
the
Soul
,
than
she
is
aware
of
it
.
Thus
Love
or
Charity
remaining
in
us
without
Pleasure
or
Delectation
,
cannot
be
maintain'd
to
be
the
very
same
thing
.
Since
Pleasure
and
Pain
are
two
contraries
;
if
Pleasure
were
the
same
with
Love
,
Pain
would
not
differ
from
Hatred
.
But
't
is
evident
,
that
Pain
is
different
from
Hatred
;
because
it
often
subsists
without
it
.
A
Man
,
for
Instance
,
who
is
wounded
unawares
,
suffers
a
most
real
and
cutting
Pain
,
whilst
he
is
free
from
Hatred
.
For
he
knows
not
even
the
Cause
of
his
Pain
,
or
the
Object
of
his
Hatred
,
or
rather
the
Cause
of
his
Pain
not
deserving
his
Hatred
,
cannot
raise
it
.
Thus
he
Hates
not
that
Cause
of
his
Pain
,
though
his
Pain
moves
or
disposes
him
to
Hatred
.
'T
is
true
,
he
deservedly
Hates
Pain
;
but
the
Hatred
of
Pain
is
not
Pain
,
but
supposes
it
.
Hatred
of
Pain
does
not
Merit
our
Hatred
,
as
does
Pain
:
For
the
former
is
,
on
the
contrary
,
very
agreeable
;
in
that
we
are
pleased
in
Hating
it
,
as
we
are
displeased
in
Suffering
it
.
Pain
therefore
not
being
Hatred
,
the
Pleasure
which
is
contrary
to
Pain
is
not
Love
,
which
is
contrary
to
Hatred
,
and
consequently
the
Pleasure
which
is
precedaneous
to
Reason
,
is
not
the
same
thing
as
Love
.
I
prove
likewise
that
Joy
,
or
the
Pleasure
which
pursues
Reason
,
is
distinguish'd
from
Love
.
Joy
and
Sorrow
being
contraries
;
if
Joy
were
the
same
thing
with
Love
,
Sorrow
and
Hatred
would
be
all
one
.
But
it
is
evident
,
that
Sorrow
differs
from
Hatred
,
because
it
sometimes
has
a
separate
Subsistence
.
A
Man
,
for
Example
,
by
chance
finds
himself
depriv'd
of
things
that
he
has
need
of
;
this
is
enough
to
make
him
sorrowful
:
But
it
cannot
provoke
him
to
Hatred
;
Either
because
he
knows
not
what
it
was
that
depriv'd
him
of
this
necessary
thing
;
or
because
,
being
unworthy
of
his
Hatred
,
it
could
not
excite
it
.
'T
is
true
,
this
Man
Hates
the
Privation
of
the
Good
which
he
Loves
;
But
it
is
manifest
,
that
this
kind
of
Hatred
is
really
Love
:
For
he
Hates
the
Privation
of
Good
,
meerly
because
he
Loves
Good
;
and
since
to
fly
the
Privation
of
Good
,
is
to
tend
towards
Good
;
Is
is
evident
,
that
the
Motion
of
his
Hatred
is
not
different
from
that
of
his
Love
.
Therefore
his
Hatred
,
if
he
have
any
,
being
not
contrary
to
his
Love
,
and
Sorrow
being
always
contrary
to
Joy
,
it
is
evident
,
that
his
Sorrow
is
not
his
Hatred
:
and
consequently
Joy
is
different
from
Love
.
Lastly
,
It
is
evident
,
that
Sorrow
proceeds
from
the
Presence
of
something
which
we
hate
,
or
rather
from
the
Absence
of
something
which
we
Love
.
Therefore
Sorrow
supposes
Hatred
,
or
rather
Love
,
but
't
is
very
different
from
them
both
.
I
know
St.
Austin
defines
Pain
to
be
an
Aversion
the
Soul
conceives
from
the
Bodies
being
disposed
otherwise
than
she
would
have
it
;
and
that
he
often
confounds
Delectation
with
Charity
,
Pleasure
with
Joy
,
Pain
with
Sorrow
;
Pleasure
and
Joy
with
Love
;
Pain
and
Sorrow
,
with
Aversion
or
Hatred
.
But
there
's
great
Probability
this
Holy
Father
in
all
this
follow'd
the
common
way
of
speaking
of
the
Vulgar
,
who
confound
most
of
those
things
which
occur
in
them
at
one
and
the
same
time
:
Or
,
it
may
be
,
did
not
examine
these
things
in
so
Nice
and
Philosophical
a
manner
as
he
might
have
done
.
Yet
I
think
I
both
may
and
ought
to
say
,
that
to
me
it
seems
necessary
exactly
to
distinguish
these
things
,
if
we
would
explain
our selves
clearly
and
without
Equivocation
upon
most
of
the
Questions
handled
by
him
.
For
even
Men
of
a
quite
opposite
Opinion
use
to
build
upon
the
Authority
of
this
great
Man
,
because
of
the
various
Senses
and
Constructions
his
Speech
will
afford
;
which
is
not
always
Nice
and
accurate
enough
to
reconcile
Persons
,
who
are
perhaps
more
eager
to
dispute
,
than
desirous
to
agree
.
THE
ILLUSTRATION
UPON
THE
Third
CHAPTER
of
the
Second
PART
of
the
Sixth
BOOK
.
Concerning
the
Efficacy
ascribed
to
Second
Causes
.
EVER
since
the
Transgression
of
our
first
Parent
,
the
Mind
rambling
constantly
abroad
,
forgets
both
it self
,
and
Him
who
pierces
and
enlightens
it
;
and
is
so
absurdly
pliant
to
the
Seducements
of
its
Body
,
and
those
about
it
,
as
to
imagine
its
own
Happiness
and
Perfection
is
to
be
found
in
them
.
He
that
alone
is
able
to
act
in
us
,
is
at
present
hidden
from
our
Eyes
:
His
Operations
are
of
an
insensible
kind
;
and
though
he
produces
and
preserves
all
Beings
,
yet
the
Mind
whilst
the
earnest
Enquirer
of
the
Cause
of
all
things
,
cannot
easily
know
him
,
though
it
meets
him
every
moment
.
Some
Philosophers
chuse
rather
to
imagine
a
Nature
and
particular
Faculties
,
as
the
Causes
of
those
which
we
term
Natural
Effects
,
than
to
render
to
God
all
the
Honour
that
is
due
to
his
Power
.
And
though
they
have
no
Proof
,
nor
even
clear
Idea
of
this
pretended
Nature
and
Faculties
,
as
I
hope
to
make
appear
,
they
had
rather
talk
without
knowing
what
they
say
,
and
reverence
a
purely
imaginary
Power
,
than
by
any
Essay
of
Thought
to
discover
that
Invisible
Hand
which
works
all
in
all
things
.
'T
is
unavoidable
for
me
to
believe
that
one
of
the
most
deplorable
Consequences
of
Original
Sin
,
is
our
having
no
Taste
nor
Sense
for
God
;
or
our
Incapacity
of
Tasting
or
Meeting
him
without
a
sort
of
Dread
and
Abhorrence
.
We
ought
to
see
God
in
all
things
,
to
be
sensible
of
his
Power
and
Force
in
all
Natural
Effects
;
to
admire
his
Wisdom
in
the
wonderful
Order
of
his
Creatures
:
In
a
word
,
to
Worship
,
to
Fear
,
to
Love
Him
only
in
all
his
Works
.
But
in
our
present
State
there
is
a
Secret
Opposition
between
Man
and
GOD
;
Man
,
conscious
of
his
being
a
Sinner
,
hides
himself
,
flies
the
Light
,
and
is
afraid
to
meet
his
Maker
;
and
therefore
had
rather
imagine
in
surrounding
Bodies
,
a
blind
Power
or
Nature
with
which
he
can
be
familiar
,
than
find
in
them
the
terrible
Power
of
an
Holy
and
Just
GOD
,
who
knows
and
Operates
all
in
all
.
I
confess
there
are
very
many
Persons
,
who
from
another
Principle
than
that
of
the
Heathen
Philosophers
,
follow
their
Opinion
about
Nature
,
and
Second
Causes
:
But
I
hope
to
convince
them
in
the
Process
of
this
Discourse
,
that
they
fall
into
this
Sentiment
,
out
of
a
Prejudice
which
't
is
impossible
to
shake
off
,
without
those
Succours
which
are
furnish'd
by
the
Principles
of
a
Philosophy
,
that
has
not
always
been
sufficiently
known
.
For
in
all
likelihood
,
this
is
what
has
kept
them
from
declaring
for
an
Opinion
,
which
I
think
my self
oblig'd
to
espouse
.
I
have
a
great
many
Reasons
which
will
not
let
me
attribute
to
Second
or
Natural
Causes
,
a
Force
,
Power
,
or
Efficacy
,
to
produce
any
thing
whatever
.
The
chief
whereof
is
,
That
this
Opinion
is
to
me
utterly
inconceivable
.
Though
I
use
all
possible
Endeavours
to
comprehend
it
,
I
cannot
find
in
my self
the
Idea
to
represent
to
me
,
what
can
be
that
Force
or
Power
ascrib'd
to
the
Creatures
.
And
I
need
not
fear
passing
a
rash
Judgment
,
in
affirming
that
those
who
hold
that
the
Creatures
are
endued
with
a
Force
and
Power
,
advance
what
they
do
not
clearly
conceive
.
For
,
in
short
,
if
the
Philosophers
clearly
conceive
,
that
Second
Causes
have
a
true
Force
to
act
and
produce
their
Like
;
I
being
a
Man
as
well
as
they
,
and
participating
of
the
same
Sovereign
Reason
,
might
in
all
probability
discover
the
Idea
which
represent
to
them
that
Force
.
But
,
all
the
efforts
that
my
Mind
can
make
can
discover
no
other
Force
,
Efficacy
or
Power
,
than
in
the
Will
of
the
Infinitely
perfect
Being
.
Besides
,
when
I
think
upon
the
different
Opinions
of
Philosophers
upon
this
subject
,
I
can
no
longer
doubt
of
my
assertion
.
For
if
they
saw
clearly
what
this
Power
of
Creatures
was
,
or
what
was
in
them
truly
powerful
,
they
would
agree
in
their
Opinion
about
it
.
When
Men
cannot
accord
,
though
they
have
no
private
Interest
to
hinder
them
,
't
is
a
certain
Sign
they
have
no
clear
Idea
of
what
they
say
,
and
that
they
understand
not
one
another
,
especially
if
they
dispute
on
subjects
that
are
not
of
a
Complex
Nature
,
and
of
difficult
discussion
;
like
this
before
us
.
For
there
would
be
no
difficulty
to
resolve
it
,
if
Men
had
a
clear
Idea
of
a
created
Force
or
Power
.
Here
then
follow
some
of
their
Opinions
,
that
we
may
see
how
little
agreement
there
is
among
them
.
For
the
most
extraordinary
of
these
Opinions
.
See
Suarez
Metaphysicks
.
Disp.
18.
Sect.
2.
Assert
.
2.
&
3.
Scot.
in
4.
Sent.
Dist.
12.1
.
D.
37.2
.
D.
17.
Palaudan
.
in
4.
Sent.
D.
12.
Q.
1
Art.
1.
Perer.
8.
Phys.
Ch.
3.
Conimbr
.
upon
Aristotle's
Physicks
,
and
many
others
cited
by
Suarez
.
See
Eonseca's
Metaphys
.
qu.
13.
Sect.
3.
and
Soncin
.
and
Javell
.
upon
the
same
Question
.
There
are
Philosophers
who
maintain
that
second
Causes
act
by
their
Matter
,
Figure
and
Motion
,
and
these
in
one
sense
are
right
enough
:
Others
by
their
substantial
form
.
Many
by
Accidents
or
Qualities
,
some
by
Matter
and
Form
;
others
by
Form
and
Accidents
,
and
others
still
by
certain
vertues
,
or
faculties
distinct
from
all
this
.
There
are
of
them
who
affirm
that
the
substantial
Form
produces
Forms
;
and
the
Accidental
Form
,
Accidents
:
Others
say
that
the
Forms
produce
both
other
Forms
and
Accidents
:
Others
,
still
that
bare
Accidents
are
not
only
capable
of
producing
Accidents
,
but
even
Forms
.
But
it
must
not
be
imagin'd
that
those
for
instance
,
who
say
,
that
Accidents
can
produce
Forms
by
vertue
of
the
Form
they
are
join'd
to
,
understand
it
the
same
way
.
For
one
part
of
them
will
have
Accidents
to
be
the
very
Force
,
or
Virtue
of
the
Substantial
Form
:
Another
that
they
imbibe
into
them
the
Influence
of
the
Form
,
and
only
act
so
by
vertue
of
it
:
A
Third
lastly
will
have
them
to
be
but
Instrumental
Causes
.
But
neither
are
these
latter
sort
altogether
agreed
about
what
is
meant
by
Instrumental
Cause
,
and
the
vertue
they
receive
from
the
Principal
.
Nor
can
the
Philosophers
compromise
about
the
Action
whereby
second
Causes
produce
their
Effects
.
For
some
of
them
pretend
that
Causality
ought
not
to
be
produc'd
,
since
it
is
this
which
produces
.
Others
will
that
they
truly
act
by
their
own
Action
.
But
they
are
involv'd
in
so
many
Labyrinths
in
explaining
precisely
wherein
this
Action
consists
,
and
there
are
so
many
different
Opinions
about
it
,
that
I
cannot
find
in
my
Heart
to
recite
them
.
Such
is
the
strange
variety
of
Opinions
,
though
I
have
not
produc'd
those
of
the
Ancient
Philosophers
,
or
that
were
born
in
very
remote
Countries
.
But
we
have
sufficient
Reason
to
conclude
,
that
they
are
no
more
agreed
upon
the
subject
of
second
Causes
,
than
those
before
alledg'd
.
Avicenna
,
for
instance
,
is
of
Opinion
that
Corporeal
Substances
cannot
produce
any
thing
but
Accidents
:
Ruvio
lib.
2.
Ph.
Tract.
4.
qu.
2.
This
,
according
to
Ruvio
,
is
his
Hypothesis
.
He
supposes
that
God
produces
immediately
a
most
perfect
Spiritual
Substance
:
That
this
produces
another
less
perfect
,
and
this
a
third
,
and
so
on
to
the
last
,
which
produces
all
Corporeal
Substances
;
and
Corporeal
Substances
,
Accidents
.
But
Avicembrom
not
able
to
comprehend
how
Corporeal
Substances
;
which
cannot
penetrate
each
other
,
should
cause
alterations
in
them
,
See
Suarez
Disp.
18.
Sect.
1.
supposes
that
there
are
Spirits
which
are
capable
of
acting
on
Bodies
,
because
they
alone
can
penetrate
them
.
For
these
Gentlemen
not
admitting
the
Vacuum
,
nor
the
Atoms
of
Democritus
,
nor
having
sufficient
knowledge
of
the
subtil
matter
of
M.
des
Cartes
,
could
not
with
the
Gassendists
and
Cartesians
,
think
of
Bodies
which
were
little
enough
to
insinuate
into
the
pores
of
those
that
are
hardest
,
and
most
solid
.
Methinks
this
diversity
of
Opinions
justifies
this
thought
of
ours
,
that
Men
often
talk
of
things
which
they
understand
not
;
and
that
the
Power
of
Creatures
,
being
a
Fiction
of
Mind
,
of
which
we
have
naturally
no
Idea
,
every
Man
makes
it
,
and
imagines
it
what
he
pleases
.
'T
is
true
,
this
Power
has
been
acknowledg'd
for
a
Real
and
True
,
by
most
Men
in
all
Ages
;
but
it
has
never
yet
been
prov'd
,
I
say
not
demonstratively
,
but
in
any
wise
so
,
as
to
make
an
impression
upon
an
Attentive
,
thinking
Man
.
For
the
confus'd
Proofs
which
are
built
only
upon
the
fallacious
Testimony
of
the
Senses
,
and
Passions
,
are
to
be
rejected
by
those
who
know
how
to
exercise
their
Reason
.
Ch.
1.
of
the
second
Book
of
his
Physicks
.
Aristotle
,
speaking
of
what
they
call
Nature
,
says
it
is
Ridiculous
to
go
about
to
prove
that
Natural
Bodies
have
an
inward
Principle
of
Motion
and
Rest
;
because
says
he
,
it
is
a
thing
that
's
Self-Evident
.
He
likewise
does
not
doubt
but
a
Bowl
which
strikes
another
,
has
the
force
of
putting
it
in
Motion
.
This
is
witnessed
by
his
Eyes
,
and
that
's
enough
for
him
,
who
seldom
follows
any
other
Testimony
than
of
the
Senses
,
(
very
rarely
that
of
his
Reason
)
and
is
very
indifferent
whether
it
be
intelligible
or
not
.
Those
who
impugn
the
Opinion
of
some
Divines
,
who
have
written
against
Second
Causes
,
say
,
like
Aristotle
,
that
the
Senses
convince
us
of
their
Efficacy
:
And
this
is
their
first
and
principal
Proof
.
'T
is
evident
,
say
they
,
that
the
Fire
burns
,
that
the
Sun
shines
,
that
Water
cools
,
and
he
must
be
out
of
his
Senses
who
can
doubt
of
it
.
See
Fonsesa
,
Suarez
,
and
others
before
cited
.
The
Authors
of
the
other
Opinion
,
says
the
great
Averroes
,
are
out
of
their
Wits
.
We
must
,
say
almost
all
the
Peripateticks
,
use
sensible
Proofs
for
their
Conviction
,
who
deny
this
Efficacy
,
and
so
oblige
them
to
confess
we
are
capable
of
acting
on
them
,
and
wounding
them
.
'T
is
a
judgment
which
[
](A51674-e124230-b)*
*
Book
1.
of
his
Topicks
.
C.
1.
Aristotle
has
already
pronounc'd
against
them
,
and
it
ought
to
be
put
in
Execution
.
But
this
pretended
Demonstration
cannot
but
create
Pity
:
For
it
gives
us
to
know
the
Weakness
of
an
Humane
Mind
:
And
that
the
Philosophers
themselves
are
infinitely
more
sensible
than
Reasonable
.
It
evinces
that
those
who
glory
in
being
the
Inquirers
of
Truth
,
know
not
even
whom
they
are
to
consult
to
hear
any
News
of
it
:
Whether
Soveraign
Reason
,
which
never
deceives
,
but
always
speaks
things
as
they
are
in
themselves
,
or
the
Body
which
speaks
only
out
of
Interest
,
and
with
reference
to
the
preservation
and
convenience
of
Life
.
For
in
fine
what
prejudices
will
not
be
justified
if
we
set
up
our
Senses
for
Judges
,
to
which
most
of
them
owe
their
Birth
?
As
I
have
shown
in
The
Search
after
Truth
.
When
I
see
a
Bowl
shock
another
,
my
Eyes
tell
me
,
or
seem
to
tell
me
,
that
it
is
the
True
Cause
of
the
motion
it
impresses
;
for
the
true
cause
that
moves
Bodies
,
is
not
visible
to
my
Eyes
.
But
if
I
interrogate
my
Reason
,
I
evidently
see
,
that
Bodies
having
no
Power
to
move
themselves
,
and
their
moving
force
being
nothing
but
the
Will
of
God
,
which
preserves
them
successively
in
different
places
,
they
cannot
communicate
a
Power
which
they
have
not
,
nor
could
communicate
,
if
they
had
it
.
For
't
is
plain
that
there
must
be
Wisdom
,
and
that
Infinite
,
to
regulate
the
communication
of
motions
,
with
that
exactness
,
Proportion
,
and
Uniformity
which
we
see
.
A
Body
cannot
know
that
infinite
multitude
of
impuls'd
Bodies
round
about
it
;
and
though
we
should
suppose
it
to
have
knowledge
,
yet
it
would
not
have
enough
so
proportionably
to
regulate
and
distribute
,
at
the
instant
of
protrusion
,
the
moving
force
it self
is
carried
with
.
When
I
open
my
Eyes
,
the
Sun
appears
to
me
splendidly
glorious
in
Light
:
And
it
seems
not
only
to
be
visible
it self
,
but
to
make
all
the
World
so
too
.
Methinks
't
is
he
that
arrays
the
Earth
with
flowers
,
and
enriches
it
with
Fruits
.
That
gives
Life
to
Animals
and
striking
by
His
Heat
into
the
very
Womb
of
the
Earth
,
impregnates
Her
with
Stones
Marbles
and
Metalls
.
But
in
consulting
my
Reason
I
see
nothing
of
all
this
:
And
if
I
faithfully
consult
it
,
I
plainly
discover
the
seducement
of
my
Senses
,
and
find
that
God
Works
all
in
all
.
For
knowing
that
all
the
changes
which
accrue
to
Bodies
,
have
no
other
principle
than
the
different
Communications
of
Motions
,
which
occur
in
visible
and
invisible
Bodies
:
I
see
that
God
does
all
;
since
't
is
his
Will
that
causes
,
and
his
Wisdom
that
regulates
all
these
Communications
.
I
suppose
that
Local
Motion
is
the
principle
of
Generations
,
Corruptions
,
Alterations
,
and
Universally
of
all
the
changes
incident
to
the
Corporeal
World
;
which
is
an
Opinion
sufficiently
now
receiv'd
among
Men
of
Letters
.
But
let
their
Opinion
about
it
be
what
it
will
,
that
matters
not
much
;
since
it
seems
much
easier
to
conceive
,
that
a
Body
drives
another
when
it
strikes
it
,
than
to
comprehend
how
Fire
can
produce
Heat
and
Light
,
and
educe
from
the
power
of
matter
a
substance
that
was
not
in
it
before
.
And
if
it
be
necessary
to
acknowledge
that
God
is
the
True
Cause
of
the
different
Communications
of
Motion
,
by
a
much
stronger
reason
we
should
conclude
,
that
none
but
He
can
Create
,
and
Annihilate
real
Qualities
,
and
substantial
Forms
.
I
say
Create
and
Annihilate
:
For
it
seems
to
me
at
least
as
difficult
to
educe
from
matter
a
substance
that
was
not
in
it
,
or
to
reduce
it
into
it
again
,
whilst
yet
there
nothing
remains
of
it
,
as
to
create
it
,
or
Annihilate
it
.
But
I
stick
not
to
the
Terms
:
And
I
make
use
of
those
,
because
there
are
no
other
that
I
know
of
,
which
express
without
Obscurity
and
Ambiguity
,
the
changes
suppos'd
by
the
Philosophers
to
arrive
every
moment
by
the
force
of
second
Causes
.
I
had
some
scruple
to
set
down
here
,
the
other
Arguments
which
are
commonly
urg'd
,
for
the
Force
and
Efficacy
of
natural
Causes
;
For
they
appear
so
weak
and
trifling
to
those
who
withstand
Prejudices
,
and
prefer
their
Reason
before
their
Senses
,
that
I
can
scarce
believe
,
methinks
,
that
Reasonable
Men
could
be
perswaded
by
them
.
However
I
produce
,
and
answer
them
,
since
there
are
many
Philosophers
who
urge
them
.
ARGUMENT
I.
If
second
Causes
did
not
Operate
,
say
[
](A51674-e124690-b)*
*
In
his
Metaph.
Disp.
18.
Sect.
1.
Assert
.
1.
Suarez
,
[
](A51674-e124710-b)†
†
In
Metaph
.
Arist.
qu.
7.
Sect.
2.
Fonseca
,
and
some
others
,
Animate
things
could
not
be
distinguish'd
from
Inanimate
,
since
neither
one
,
nor
the
other
,
would
have
an
inward
principle
of
their
Actions
.
ANSWER
.
I
answer
,
that
Men
would
have
the
same
sensible
proofs
that
have
convinc'd
them
of
the
distinction
they
make
between
things
Animate
and
Inanimate
.
They
would
still
see
Animals
do
the
same
Actions
,
as
eat
,
grow
,
cry
,
run
,
bound
,
&c.
and
would
discern
nothing
like
this
in
Stones
:
See
Book
4.
Ch.
11.
toward
the
end
,
and
Book
6.
Part
2.
Ch.
7.
And
this
one
thing
makes
the
vulgar
Philosophers
believe
,
that
Beasts
live
,
and
that
Stones
do
not
.
For
we
are
not
to
fancy
that
they
know
by
a
clear
and
distinct
view
of
Mind
,
what
is
the
Life
of
a
Dog
.
'T
is
their
Senses
which
regulate
their
Decisions
upon
this
Question
.
If
it
were
necessary
,
I
could
prove
here
that
the
principle
of
the
Life
of
a
Dog
differs
not
from
the
principle
of
the
Motion
of
a
Watch.
For
the
Life
of
Bodies
whatever
they
be
,
can
consist
but
in
the
Motion
of
their
Parts
:
And
we
may
easily
judge
that
the
same
subtil
matter
,
which
causes
the
Fermentation
of
the
Blood
,
and
Animal
Spirits
,
in
a
Dog
,
and
which
is
the
principle
of
his
Life
,
is
no
perfecter
than
that
which
gives
Motion
to
the
Spring
of
a
Watch
,
or
which
causes
the
Gravitation
in
the
Weights
of
a
Clock
,
which
is
the
principle
of
their
Life
,
or
to
speak
as
others
do
,
of
their
Motion
.
It
behoves
the
Peripateticks
to
give
those
whom
they
stile
Cartesians
a
clear
Idea
of
what
they
call
the
Life
of
Beasts
,
Corporeal
Soul
,
Body
which
Perceives
,
and
Desires
,
Sees
,
Feels
,
Wills
,
and
then
we
shall
clearly
resolve
their
Difficulties
,
if
after
that
they
shall
persist
in
raising
them
.
ARGUMENT
II.
It
were
impossible
to
discover
the
Differences
,
or
Powers
of
the
Elements
:
So
that
Fire
might
refrigerate
as
Water
,
and
nothing
would
be
of
a
settled
and
fix'd
Nature
.
ANSWER
.
I
answer
,
That
whilst
Nature
remains
as
it
is
,
that
is
to
say
,
whilst
the
Laws
of
the
Communication
of
Motions
remain
constantly
the
same
;
it
is
a
Contradiction
,
that
Fire
should
not
burn
,
or
separate
the
Parts
of
certain
Bodies
.
Fire
cannot
refrigerate
like
Water
,
unless
it
becomes
Water
;
for
Fire
being
only
Fewel
,
See
Ch.
2.
Book
IV.
whose
Parts
have
been
violently
agitated
by
an
invisible
surrounding
Matter
,
as
is
easie
to
demonstrate
;
it
is
impossible
its
Parts
should
not
Communicate
some
of
their
Motion
to
approaching
Bodies
:
Now
as
these
Laws
are
constant
,
the
Nature
of
Fire
,
its
Virtues
and
Qualities
are
unchangeable
.
But
this
Nature
,
and
these
Vertues
,
are
only
Consequences
of
the
General
and
Efficacious
Will
of
GOD
,
who
does
all
in
all
things
.
Therefore
the
Study
of
Nature
,
is
in
all
respects
false
and
vain
,
when
we
look
for
other
true
Causes
than
the
Wills
of
the
ALMIGHTY
.
I
confess
that
we
are
not
to
have
recourse
to
God
,
or
the
Universal
Cause
,
when
we
require
the
Reason
of
particular
Effects
.
For
we
should
be
ridiculous
to
assert
,
for
Instance
,
That
GOD
dries
the
Ways
,
or
Freezes
the
Water
in
the
River
.
We
must
say
,
The
Air
dries
the
Earth
,
because
it
moves
,
and
bears
off
the
Water
with
it
that
dilutes
it
:
Or
that
the
Air
,
or
the
subtil
Matter
Freezes
the
River
in
Winter
,
because
at
that
time
it
communicates
not
sufficient
Motion
to
the
Parts
that
constitute
the
Water
.
In
a
Word
,
we
must
,
if
we
can
,
assign
the
Natural
and
particular
Cause
of
the
Effects
propos'd
,
to
Examination
.
But
because
the
Action
of
these
Causes
consists
in
the
moving
Force
,
which
actuates
them
,
which
moving
Force
is
the
Will
of
GOD
,
(
which
create
them
)
,
we
ought
not
to
say
they
have
in
themselves
a
Force
or
Power
to
produce
any
Effects
.
And
when
in
Reasoning
we
are
at
last
arriv'd
to
a
general
Effect
,
of
which
we
seek
the
Cause
;
't
is
no
good
Philosophy
to
imagine
any
other
than
the
general
.
And
to
feign
a
certain
Nature
,
a
first
Moveable
,
and
universal
Soul
,
or
some
such
Chimera
,
whereof
we
have
no
clear
and
distinct
Idea
,
would
be
to
argue
like
an
Heathen
Philosopher
.
For
Example
,
when
we
are
ask'd
,
whence
it
comes
that
some
Bodies
are
in
motion
,
or
that
the
agitated
Air
communicates
its
Motion
to
the
Water
,
or
rather
whence
proceeds
the
mutual
Protrusion
of
Bodies
:
Motion
and
its
Communication
being
a
general
Effect
,
on
which
all
others
depend
;
we
cannot
answer
,
I
do'nt
say
like
Christians
,
but
Philosophers
,
without
ascending
to
God
who
is
the
Universal
Cause
:
Since
't
is
His
Will
that
is
the
moving
Force
of
Bodies
,
and
that
regulates
the
Communication
of
their
Motions
.
Had
he
will'd
there
should
be
no
new
Production
in
the
World
,
he
would
not
have
put
its
Parts
in
motion
:
And
if
hereafter
He
shall
will
the
Incorruptibility
of
some
of
the
Beings
he
had
made
,
he
shall
cease
to
will
the
Communication
of
Motions
in
point
of
those
Beings
.
ARGUMENT
III.
'T
is
needless
to
Plow
,
to
Water
,
and
give
several
preparatory
Dispositions
to
Bodies
,
to
fit
them
for
what
we
desire
from
them
.
For
GOD
has
no
need
of
preparing
the
Subjects
on
which
he
Works
.
Suarez
.
ib.
ANSWER
.
I
answer
;
That
GOD
may
do
absolutely
all
he
pleases
,
without
finding
any
Dispositions
in
the
Subjects
he
works
upon
.
But
he
cannot
do
it
without
a
Miracle
,
or
by
Natural
ways
;
that
is
,
by
the
General
Laws
of
the
Communication
of
Motions
,
which
he
has
constituted
,
and
which
he
almost
always
follows
in
his
Actings
.
GOD
never
multiplies
his
Wills
without
Reason
;
but
acts
always
by
the
simplest
Ways
;
and
for
that
Reason
he
makes
use
of
the
Collision
of
Bodies
,
in
giving
them
Motion
.
Not
that
this
Collision
is
absolutely
necessary
to
it
,
as
our
Senses
tell
us
,
but
that
being
the
Occasion
of
the
Communication
of
Motions
,
there
need
be
but
very
few
Natural
Laws
to
produce
all
the
admirable
Effects
we
see
.
For
by
this
means
we
may
reduce
all
the
Laws
of
the
Communication
of
Motions
to
one
:
Viz.
That
percutient
Bodies
being
considered
as
but
one
,
at
the
Moment
of
their
Contact
,
See
Chap.
the
last
of
The
Search
.
or
Collision
,
the
moving
Force
is
divided
between
them
at
their
Separation
,
according
to
the
Proportion
of
their
Magnitude
.
But
whereas
concurrent
Bodies
are
surrounded
with
infinite
others
,
which
act
upon
them
,
by
Virtue
and
Efficacy
of
this
Law
;
however
constant
and
uniform
this
Law
be
,
it
produces
a
World
of
quite
different
Communications
,
because
it
acts
upon
infinite
Bodies
,
which
are
all
related
to
one
another
.
It
is
necessary
to
Water
a
Plant
to
make
it
grow
;
because
by
the
Laws
of
the
Communication
of
Motions
,
hardly
any
other
than
Watry
Particles
can
by
their
Motion
,
and
by
reason
of
their
Figure
,
insinuate
and
Wind
up
themselves
into
the
Fibres
of
Plants
,
and
by
variously
fastning
and
combining
together
,
take
the
Figure
that
's
necessary
to
their
Nourishment
.
The
subtil
Matter
which
is
constantly
flowing
from
the
Sun
,
may
,
by
its
agitating
the
Water
,
lift
it
into
the
Plants
;
but
it
has
not
a
competent
Motion
to
raise
gross
Earthy
Particles
.
Yet
Earth
and
Air
too
are
necessary
to
the
Growth
of
Plants
;
Earth
to
preserve
the
Water
at
their
Root
,
and
Air
to
give
this
Water
a
Moderate
Fermentation
.
But
the
Action
of
the
Sun
,
the
Air
,
and
Water
,
consisting
but
in
the
Motion
of
their
Parts
,
in
proper
speaking
,
GOD
is
the
only
Agent
.
For
as
I
have
said
,
there
is
none
but
He
that
can
by
the
efficacy
of
his
Will
,
and
by
the
Infinite
Extent
of
his
Knowledge
cause
and
regulate
those
infinitely
infinite
Communications
of
Motions
,
which
are
made
every
moment
,
and
in
a
Proportion
infinitely
exact
,
and
regular
.
ARGUMENT
IV.
Can
God
resist
,
and
Fight
against
Himself
?
Bodies
justle
,
strike
,
and
resist
one
another
,
therefore
Gods
Acts
not
in
them
,
unless
it
be
by
his
concourse
.
For
if
it
were
he
only
that
produc'd
,
and
preserv'd
Motion
in
Bodies
,
he
would
take
care
to
divert
them
before
the
Collision
,
as
knowing
well
that
they
are
impenetrable
.
To
what
purpose
are
Bodies
driven
to
be
beaten
back
again
,
why
must
they
proceed
to
recoil
?
Or
what
signifies
it
to
produce
and
Preserve
useless
Motions
;
Is
it
not
an
Absurdity
to
say
that
God
impugns
himself
,
and
that
He
destroys
his
Works
,
when
a
Bull
fights
with
a
Lyon
,
when
a
Wolf
devours
a
Sheep
,
and
a
Sheep
eats
the
Grass
which
God
makes
to
grow
?
Therefore
there
are
Second
Causes
.
ANSWER
.
Therefore
Second
Causes
do
all
,
and
God
does
nothing
at
all
.
For
God
cannot
act
against
himself
,
but
Concourse
is
Action
.
The
concurring
to
contrary
Actions
is
giving
contrary
Concourse
,
and
consequently
doing
contrary
Actions
.
To
concur
with
the
Action
of
Creatures
that
resist
each
other
,
is
to
Act
against
himself
.
To
concur
to
useless
Motions
,
is
to
Act
in
vain
.
But
God
does
nothing
needless
or
in
vain
;
he
does
no
contrary
Actions
,
and
therefore
concurs
not
to
the
Action
of
Creatures
that
often
destroy
one
another
,
and
makes
useless
Actions
and
Motions
.
See
where
this
proof
of
Second
Causes
leads
us
.
But
let
us
see
what
Reason
says
to
it
.
God
Works
all
in
every
thing
,
and
nothing
resists
him
.
He
Works
all
in
all
things
,
in
as
much
as
his
Will
both
makes
,
and
regulates
all
Motions
:
And
nothing
resists
him
,
because
he
does
what
ever
he
Wills
.
But
let
us
see
how
this
is
to
be
conceiv'd
.
Having
resolv'd
to
produce
by
the
simplest
ways
,
as
most
conformable
to
Order
that
infinite
Variety
of
Creatures
which
we
admire
,
he
will'd
that
Bodies
should
move
in
a
right
line
,
because
that
is
the
most
simple
.
But
Bodies
being
impenetrable
,
and
their
Motions
tending
in
Lines
that
oppose
,
or
intersect
one
another
,
they
must
necessarily
fall
foul
together
,
and
consequently
cease
moving
in
the
same
manner
.
God
foresaw
this
,
yet
notwithstanding
positively
will'd
the
Collision
,
or
shock
of
Bodies
;
not
that
he
's
delighted
in
impugning
himself
,
but
because
he
design'd
to
make
use
of
this
Collision
as
an
Occasion
for
his
establishing
the
General
Law
of
the
Communication
of
Motions
;
by
which
he
foresaw
he
must
produce
an
infinite
Variety
of
admirable
Effects
.
For
I
am
perswaded
that
these
two
Natural
Laws
which
are
the
simplest
of
all
others
:
Namely
,
that
All
Motion
tends
to
make
it self
in
a
right
line
;
and
that
in
the
Collision
,
Motions
are
Communicated
proportionably
to
the
magnitude
of
the
Colliding
Bodies
;
are
sufficient
to
produce
such
a
World
as
we
see
:
That
is
,
the
Heaven
and
Stars
,
and
Planets
,
and
Comets
,
Earth
,
Water
,
Air
,
and
Fire
:
In
a
Word
,
the
Elements
,
and
all
Unorganiz'd
,
and
inanimate
Bodies
.
For
Organiz'd
Bodies
depend
on
many
other
Natural
Laws
,
which
are
perfectly
unknown
.
It
may
be
living
Bodies
are
not
form'd
like
others
by
a
determinate
number
of
Natural
Laws
.
For
there
is
great
probability
,
they
were
all
form'd
at
the
Creation
of
the
World
,
and
that
Time
only
gives
them
a
necessary
Growth
,
to
make
them
Visible
to
our
Eyes
;
Nevertheless
,
it
is
certain
,
they
receive
that
Growth
by
the
General
Laws
of
Nature
,
whereby
all
other
Bodies
are
form'd
which
is
the
Reason
,
that
their
Increase
is
not
always
Regular
.
I
say
then
that
God
by
the
first
of
Natural
Laws
positively
Wills
,
and
consequently
Causes
the
Collision
of
Bodies
;
and
afterwards
imploys
this
Collision
as
an
Occasion
of
establishing
the
Second
Natural
Law
;
which
regulates
the
Communication
of
Motions
;
and
that
thus
the
actual
Collision
,
is
the
Natural
,
or
Occasional
Cause
of
the
Actual
Communication
of
Motions
.
If
this
be
well
consider'd
,
it
will
be
evidently
acknowledg'd
that
nothing
can
be
better
Order'd
.
But
supposing
that
God
had
not
so
Ordain'd
it
,
and
that
he
had
diverted
Bodies
,
when
ready
to
encounter
,
as
if
there
were
a
Vacuum
to
receive
them
,
First
they
would
not
be
subject
to
that
perpetual
Vicissitude
which
makes
the
Beauty
of
the
Universe
:
For
the
Generation
of
some
Bodies
is
perform'd
by
the
Corruption
of
Others
;
and
't
is
the
contrariety
of
their
Motion
which
produces
their
Variety
.
Secondly
God
would
not
act
in
the
most
simple
manner
:
For
if
Bodies
ready
to
meet
should
continue
on
their
Motion
,
without
touching
,
they
must
needs
describe
Lines
curv'd
in
a
thousand
different
Fashions
;
and
consequently
different
Wills
must
be
admitted
in
God
to
determine
their
Motions
.
Lastly
,
if
there
were
no
Uniformity
in
the
Action
of
Natural
Bodies
,
and
that
their
Motion
were
not
made
in
a
right
Line
,
we
should
have
no
certain
Principle
for
our
Reasonings
in
natural
Philosophy
,
nor
for
our
conduct
in
many
Actions
of
our
Life
.
'T
is
not
a
disorder
that
Lyons
eat
Wolves
,
and
that
Wolves
eat
Sheep
,
and
Sheep
grass
,
of
which
God
has
had
so
special
a
regard
,
as
to
give
it
all
things
necessary
to
its
preservation
,
and
likewise
a
Seed
for
perpetuating
it's
kind
.
This
proves
second
causes
no
more
,
than
the
Plurality
of
Causes
,
of
contrary
Principles
of
Good
,
and
Evil
,
which
the
Manichees
imagin'd
to
account
for
these
effects
:
But
't
is
a
certain
Sign
of
the
Grandeur
,
Wisdom
and
Magnificence
of
God
.
For
God
does
no
works
unbecoming
an
infinite
Wisdom
,
and
he
does
them
with
that
profusion
as
is
a
manifest
proof
of
his
Power
,
and
Greatness
.
Whatever
is
destroy'd
,
is
repair'd
again
by
the
same
Law
that
destroy'd
it
:
So
great
is
the
Wisdom
,
Power
and
Fecundity
of
that
Law
.
God
prevents
not
the
destruction
of
Beings
by
any
new
Will
:
not
only
because
the
first
suffices
to
restore
them
;
but
especially
because
his
Wills
are
of
much
greater
value
than
the
Reparation
of
these
Beings
.
They
are
far
more
valuable
than
all
that
they
produce
.
And
God
had
never
made
this
World
,
since
not
worthy
of
the
Action
by
which
it
was
produc'd
,
unless
he
had
other
prospects
than
are
known
by
the
Philosophers
,
and
knew
how
to
honour
himself
in
JESUS
CHRIST
,
with
an
honour
which
the
Creatures
are
not
capable
of
giving
him
.
When
a
House
falls
,
and
crushes
an
Honest
Man
to
death
:
a
greater
Evil
happens
,
than
when
one
Beast
devours
another
,
or
when
a
Body
is
forc'd
to
rebound
by
the
shock
it
receives
from
the
Encounter
of
another
.
But
God
does
not
multiply
his
Wills
,
to
redress
either
the
true
or
apparent
Disorders
which
are
the
necessary
Consequences
of
natural
Laws
.
God
ought
not
to
correct
nor
change
these
Laws
,
though
they
sometimes
produce
Monsters
.
He
is
not
to
confound
the
Order
,
and
simplicity
of
his
Ways
.
He
must
neglect
mean
and
little
things
:
I
would
say
,
he
must
not
have
particular
Wills
to
produce
effects
,
which
are
not
equivalent
to
,
or
worthy
of
the
Action
of
the
Producer
.
God
works
not
Miracles
save
when
Order
which
he
constantly
follows
requires
it
:
which
Order
requires
that
he
should
act
by
the
most
simple
ways
;
and
make
no
exceptions
to
his
general
Wills
,
but
when
't
is
absolutely
necessary
to
his
designs
,
or
on
particular
occasions
,
which
we
are
absolutely
ignorant
of
.
Though
we
are
all
united
to
Order
,
or
the
Wisdom
of
God
,
yet
we
know
not
all
the
Rules
of
it
.
We
see
in
it
what
we
ought
to
do
,
but
we
cannot
discover
in
it
what
God
ought
to
Will
,
nor
is
it
our
business
to
be
very
sollicitous
to
know
it
.
A
great
instance
of
what
I
have
said
,
we
have
in
the
Damnation
of
an
infinite
number
of
Persons
,
whom
God
suffer'd
to
perish
in
times
of
Ignorance
▪
and
Error
:
God
is
infinitely
Good
:
He
loves
all
his
Works
;
He
wills
that
all
Men
should
be
sav'd
,
and
come
to
the
Knowledge
of
the
Truth
,
for
he
has
made
them
to
injoy
him
.
And
yet
the
greatest
number
are
Damn'd
.
They
live
and
die
in
blindness
,
and
will
remain
in
it
to
all
Eternity
.
Comes
not
this
from
his
acting
by
the
simplest
means
,
and
his
following
Order
?
[
](A51674-e125730-b)*
*
See
the
Illustration
upon
the
Fourth
Chapter
of
the
second
Part
concerning
Method
.
We
have
shown
,
that
according
to
Order
,
God
ought
not
to
prevent
by
Indeliberate
Pleasures
the
[
](A51674-e125740-b)†
†
See
the
first
Illustration
upon
the
Fifth
Chapter
.
will
of
the
first
Man
,
whose
Fall
has
disorder'd
Nature
.
It
was
requisite
that
all
Men
should
descend
from
one
,
not
only
because
that
is
the
most
simple
way
,
but
for
several
too
Theological
and
abstract
Reasons
to
be
here
explain'd
.
In
fine
we
ought
to
believe
this
conformable
to
the
Order
which
God
follows
,
and
to
the
Wisdom
he
always
consults
in
the
intention
,
and
execution
of
his
designs
.
The
first
Man's
Sin
has
produc'd
infinite
Evils
,
I
confess
,
but
certainly
Order
requir'd
that
God
should
permit
it
,
and
that
he
should
instate
Man
in
a
peccable
condition
.
God
minded
to
repair
his
laps'd
Work
,
seldom
gives
Victorious
Graces
that
prevail
over
the
malice
of
the
greatest
Sinners
.
Sometimes
he
gives
Graces
useless
to
the
conversion
of
the
Receiver
,
though
he
foresees
their
inutility
,
and
sometimes
sheds
them
in
great
Plenty
,
yet
with
little
effect
:
Commonly
he
acts
as
it
were
by
degrees
,
giving
Men
secret
inspirations
of
Self-denial
and
Repentance
,
as
formerly
he
gave
them
Counsels
in
his
Gospel
.
Thus
he
prepares
them
for
the
grace
of
Conversion
,
and
last
of
all
bestows
it
.
Why
all
these
round-about
Methods
and
ways
indirect
?
Would
it
not
have
been
enough
for
him
to
have
positively
Will'd
the
Conversion
of
a
Sinner
,
to
have
effected
it
in
an
efficacious
and
irresistible
manner
?
But
is
not
it
visible
that
this
proceeds
from
his
acting
by
the
simplest
Methods
,
and
Orders
willing
it
,
though
we
do
not
always
see
it
?
For
God
must
necessarily
follow
Order
,
and
Wisdom
in
his
actings
,
though
these
are
Unfathomable
Abysses
to
the
Mind
of
Man
.
There
are
certain
most
simple
Laws
in
the
Order
of
Grace
,
by
which
God
for
the
most
part
acts
:
For
this
Order
has
its
Rules
as
well
as
that
of
Nature
,
though
we
know
them
not
,
as
we
see
those
of
the
Communications
of
Motions
.
Only
let
us
follow
the
Counsels
which
are
given
us
in
the
Gospel
by
him
,
who
perfectly
knows
the
Laws
of
Grace
.
This
I
say
to
pacify
the
unjust
Complaints
of
Sinners
,
who
despise
the
Counsels
of
JESUS
CHRIST
,
and
charge
their
Malignity
and
disorders
upon
God
.
They
would
have
God
show
Miracles
in
their
behalf
,
and
dispense
with
the
general
Laws
of
Grace
.
They
lead
their
Life
in
Pleasures
,
they
seek
out
for
Honours
,
and
daily
renew
those
wounds
which
sensible
Objects
have
given
their
Brain
,
and
add
more
to
them
,
and
after
this
expect
God
should
cure
them
by
a
Miracle
.
Not
unlike
wounded
Men
,
who
in
the
excess
of
their
Pain
tear
their
Cloaths
,
renovate
their
Wounds
,
and
when
in
the
sight
of
approaching
Death
,
complain
of
the
cruelty
of
their
Surgeons
.
They
would
have
God
to
save
them
,
because
say
they
,
God
is
Good
,
Wise
,
Powerful
,
and
needs
but
determine
it
,
to
make
us
happy
.
Why
did
he
make
us
to
damn
and
destroy
us
?
They
ought
to
know
that
God
Wills
they
should
be
sav'd
,
and
to
that
intent
has
done
all
that
could
be
done
by
Order
,
and
Wisdom
,
which
he
consults
.
We
cannot
believe
that
he
deserts
us
,
whilst
he
gives
us
his
own
Son
to
be
our
Mediator
,
and
Sacrifice
.
Yes
,
God
is
willing
that
all
Mankind
should
be
sav'd
;
but
by
ways
that
we
ought
to
study
with
care
,
and
follow
with
caution
and
weariness
.
God
is
not
to
consult
our
Passions
,
in
the
Execution
of
his
designs
:
He
can
have
no
regard
but
to
his
Eternal
Wisdom
,
nor
follow
any
other
rule
than
the
Divine
Order
,
which
Order
will
have
us
imitate
JESUS
CHRIST
,
and
obey
his
Counsels
,
for
our
Sanctification
and
Salvation
.
But
if
God
has
not
predestin'd
all
Men
to
be
conformable
to
the
Image
of
his
Son
,
who
is
the
Model
,
and
Exemplar
of
the
Elect
:
'T
is
because
herein
God
acts
by
the
most
simple
means
,
with
reference
to
his
designs
,
which
all
make
for
his
Glory
:
'T
is
because
God
is
an
universal
Cause
,
which
ought
not
to
act
like
particular
Causes
,
which
have
particular
Volitions
for
all
they
do
.
'T
is
because
his
Wisdom
,
which
in
this
respect
,
is
an
Abyss
to
our
apprehensions
,
Wills
it
so
.
Lastly
,
't
is
because
this
Conduct
is
more
worthy
of
God
than
could
be
any
other
more
favourable
for
the
Reprobate
.
For
even
they
are
condemn'd
by
an
Order
as
worthy
our
Adorations
,
as
that
whereby
the
Elect
are
sanctified
and
sav'd
:
And
nothing
but
our
Ignorance
of
Order
,
and
our
Self-love
,
make
us
blame
a
Conduct
which
the
Angels
and
Saints
eternally
admire
.
But
let
us
return
to
the
proofs
of
the
efficacy
of
second
Causes
.
ARGUMENT
V.
If
Bodies
had
not
a
certain
Nature
or
Force
to
act
with
,
and
if
God
did
all
things
,
there
would
be
nothing
but
what
was
Supernatural
,
in
the
most
ordinary
effects
.
The
distinction
of
Natural
,
and
Supernatural
,
which
has
been
so
well
receiv'd
in
the
World
,
and
establisht
by
the
universal
approbation
of
the
Learn'd
,
would
be
Chimerical
and
Extravagant
.
ANSWER
.
I
answer
that
distinction
is
absurd
in
the
Mouth
of
Aristotle
,
since
the
Nature
he
has
establisht
is
a
meer
Chimera
.
I
say
that
distinction
is
not
clear
in
the
mouth
of
the
Vulgar
part
of
Men
,
who
judge
of
things
by
the
Impression
they
make
upon
their
Senses
.
For
they
know
not
precisely
what
they
mean
when
they
say
,
the
Fire
burns
by
it's
Nature
.
I
say
that
this
distinction
may
pass
in
the
mouth
of
a
Divine
,
if
he
means
by
natural
Effects
,
the
consequences
of
the
General
Laws
which
God
has
settled
for
the
production
and
preservation
of
all
things
:
And
by
supernatural
Effects
those
which
are
independent
on
these
Laws
.
In
this
sense
the
Distinction
is
true
.
But
the
Philosophy
of
Aristotle
together
with
the
Impression
of
the
senses
,
makes
it
,
as
I
think
,
dangerous
,
because
it
may
divert
from
God
the
too
respectful
admirers
of
the
Opinions
of
that
wretched
Philosopher
;
or
such
as
consult
their
senses
instead
of
retiring
into
themselves
to
consult
the
Truth
.
And
therefore
that
distinction
is
not
to
be
made
use
of
without
an
Explication
,
St.
Austin
having
us'd
the
word
fortune
,
retracted
it
,
though
there
are
few
that
could
be
deceiv'd
by
it
.
Lib.
1.
de
Retract.
1
Cor.
10.19
.
St.
Paul
speaking
of
meats
offer'd
to
Idols
,
advertises
that
an
Idol
is
nothing
.
If
the
Nature
of
the
Heathen
Philosophy
be
a
fiction
,
if
that
nature
be
nothing
,
it
should
be
precaution'd
,
for
that
there
are
many
who
are
abus'd
by
it
:
And
more
than
we
suppose
who
inconsiderately
attribute
to
it
the
Works
of
God
,
who
are
taken
up
with
this
Idol
,
or
fiction
of
the
Humane
mind
,
and
pay
it
those
Honours
which
are
only
due
to
the
Divinity
.
They
are
willing
to
let
God
be
Author
of
Miracles
,
and
some
Extraordinary
effects
,
which
in
one
sense
,
are
little
worthy
of
his
Greatness
and
Wisdom
,
and
they
refer
to
the
Power
of
their
Imaginary
nature
those
constant
and
regular
Effects
,
which
none
but
the
Wise
know
how
to
admire
.
They
suppose
too
that
this
so
wonderful
disposition
which
all
living
Bodies
have
to
preserve
themselves
,
and
beget
their
like
,
is
a
production
of
their
Nature
:
For
according
to
these
Philosophers
the
Sun
and
Man
beget
a
Man
.
We
may
still
distinguish
between
supernatural
and
natural
Order
,
several
ways
.
For
we
may
say
that
the
supernatural
relates
to
future
Goods
;
that
it
is
establish't
,
upon
consideration
of
the
merits
of
CHRIST
;
that
it
is
the
first
and
principal
in
the
designs
of
God
;
and
other
things
enough
to
preserve
a
distinction
,
which
they
are
vainly
apprehensive
should
fall
to
the
ground
.
ARGUMENT
VI.
The
main
proof
which
is
brought
by
the
Philosophers
for
the
Efficacy
of
second
Causes
,
is
drawn
from
the
will
and
liberty
of
Man
,
Man
wills
,
and
determines
of
himself
.
But
to
Will
and
Determine
is
to
Act.
'T
is
certainly
Man
who
commits
Sin
,
God
not
being
the
Author
of
it
,
any
more
than
of
Concupiscence
and
Error
.
Therefore
Man
acts
.
ANSWER
.
I
have
sufficiently
explain'd
in
several
Places
of
the
Treatise
about
the
Search
of
Truth
,
what
is
the
Will
,
and
Liberty
of
Man
,
and
especially
in
the
first
Chapter
of
the
first
Book
,
and
in
the
first
Illustration
upon
it
;
so
that
it
is
needless
to
repeat
it
again
.
I
acknowledge
Man
Wills
,
and
Determines
himself
,
in
as
much
as
God
causes
him
to
Will
;
incessantly
carries
him
towards
good
,
and
gives
him
all
the
Idea's
and
Sensations
,
by
which
he
determines
his
Impression
.
I
know
likewise
that
Man
alone
commits
Sin
.
But
I
deny
that
therein
he
does
any
thing
;
For
Sin
,
Errour
,
and
even
Concupiscence
are
nothing
.
I
have
explain'd
my self
upon
this
Point
in
the
first
Illustration
.
Man
wills
,
but
his
Volitions
are
impotent
in
themselves
;
they
produce
nothing
,
and
God
works
all
notwithstanding
them
.
For
't
is
even
God
that
makes
our
Will
,
by
the
Impression
he
gives
us
towards
Good
.
All
that
Man
has
from
himself
are
[
](A51674-e126440-b)*
*
Nemo
habet
de
suo
nisi
mendacium
&
peccatum
,
Concil.
Araus
.
2.
Can.
22.
Errour
and
Sin
,
which
are
nothing
.
There
is
a
great
difference
between
our
Minds
and
Bodies
that
are
about
us
;
I
grant
,
Our
Mind
in
one
sense
Wills
,
Acts
,
and
Determines
it self
.
Our
own
inward
Consciousness
is
an
evident
Conviction
.
If
we
were
destitute
of
Liberty
,
there
could
be
no
future
Recompence
and
Punishment
,
for
't
is
our
Liberty
that
makes
our
Actions
good
or
bad
;
and
without
it
Religion
would
be
but
a
Phantasm
,
and
a
Dream
.
But
that
which
we
cannot
see
clearly
is
,
That
Bodies
have
a
force
of
Acting
.
This
it
is
we
cannot
comprehend
,
and
this
we
deny
,
when
we
deny
the
Efficacy
of
Second
Causes
.
Even
the
Mind
acts
not
in
that
measure
which
is
imagin'd
.
I
know
that
I
will
,
and
that
I
Will
freely
;
I
have
no
Reason
to
doubt
of
it
;
which
is
stronger
than
that
inward
feeling
I
have
of
my self
.
Nor
do
I
deny
it
,
but
I
deny
that
my
Will
is
the
[
](A51674-e126590-b)*
*
In
the
Sence
explain'd
in
the
Chapter
belonging
to
this
Illustration
.
true
Cause
of
the
Motion
of
my
Arm
,
of
the
Idea's
of
my
Mind
,
and
of
other
things
which
accompany
my
Volitions
.
For
I
see
no
Relation
between
so
different
things
:
Nay
,
I
most
clearly
see
there
can
be
no
Analogy
between
my
Will
to
move
my
Arm
,
and
the
Agitation
of
some
little
Bodies
,
whose
Motion
and
Figure
I
do
not
know
,
which
make
choice
of
certain
Nervous
Canals
,
amongst
a
Million
of
others
unknown
to
me
,
in
Order
to
cause
in
me
the
Motion
I
desire
,
by
a
World
of
Motions
,
which
I
desire
not
.
I
deny
that
my
Will
produces
in
me
my
Idea's
:
I
cannot
see
how
't
is
possible
it
should
;
for
since
it
cannot
Act
or
Will
without
Knowledge
,
it
supposes
my
Idea's
,
but
does
not
make
them
.
(
Nay
,
I
do
not
so
much
as
know
precisely
what
an
Idea
is
.
)
I
cannot
tell
,
whether
we
produce
them
out
of
nothing
,
and
send
them
back
to
the
same
nothing
,
when
we
cease
to
perceive
them
.
I
speak
after
the
Notion
of
some
Persons
.
I
produce
,
you
'll
say
,
my
Idea's
by
the
Faculty
,
which
God
gives
me
of
Thinking
.
I
move
my
Arm
,
because
of
the
Union
which
God
has
establish'd
between
my
Mind
and
Body
.
Faculty
,
Vnion
,
are
Logical
Terms
,
of
loose
and
indeterminate
Signification
.
There
is
no
particular
Being
,
nor
Mode
of
Being
,
which
is
either
Faculty
or
Vnion
.
Therefore
these
Terms
ought
to
be
explain'd
.
If
,
you
'll
say
,
that
the
Union
of
my
Mind
and
Body
consists
,
in
God's
willing
,
That
,
upon
my
Desire
to
move
my
Arm
,
the
Animal
Spirits
should
betake
themselves
to
the
Muscles
it
is
compos'd
of
,
to
move
it
in
the
manner
desir'd
:
I
clearly
understand
this
Explication
,
and
receive
it
:
But
this
is
exactly
my
own
Assertion
.
For
if
my
Will
determine
that
of
God
,
't
is
evident
,
that
my
Arm
is
mov'd
,
not
by
my
Will
,
which
is
impotent
of
it self
,
but
by
the
Will
of
God
,
which
never
fails
of
its
Effect
.
But
if
it
be
said
,
The
Union
of
my
Mind
and
Body
consists
in
God's
giving
me
a
[
](A51674-e126770-b)*
*
I
still
mean
a
true
and
efficacious
Force
.
Force
to
move
my
Arm
,
as
he
has
given
my
Body
likewise
a
Force
of
making
me
feel
Pleasure
and
Pain
;
to
the
end
I
may
be
sollicitous
for
this
Body
,
and
be
concern'd
for
its
Preservation
;
certainly
this
is
to
suppose
the
thing
in
dispute
,
and
to
make
a
Circle
.
No
Man
has
a
clear
Idea
of
that
Force
which
the
Soul
has
over
the
Body
,
or
the
Body
over
the
Soul
;
nor
knows
very
well
what
he
says
when
he
positively
asserts
it
.
That
Opinion
has
been
embrac'd
through
Prejudice
,
has
been
learn'd
in
Infancy
,
and
in
the
Age
of
Sense
.
But
Understanding
,
Reason
,
and
Reflexion
have
no
part
in
it
;
which
is
manifest
enough
from
what
I
have
said
in
the
foregoing
Treatise
.
But
you
'll
say
,
I
know
by
my
inward
Conscience
of
my
Action
,
that
I
really
have
this
Force
;
and
therefore
am
not
mistaken
in
believing
it
.
I
answer
,
That
when
I
move
my
Arm
,
I
am
conscious
to
my self
of
the
Actual
Volition
by
which
I
move
it
;
and
I
err
not
in
believing
I
have
that
Volition
.
I
have
moreover
an
inward
Sense
of
a
certain
Effort
or
Endeavour
,
which
accompanies
this
Volition
,
and
it
is
to
believ'd
that
I
make
this
Endeavour
.
Last
of
all
,
I
grant
that
[
](A51674-e126820-b)*
*
It
seems
evident
to
me
that
the
Mind
knows
not
by
internal
Sensation
,
or
Conscience
,
the
motion
of
the
Arm
she
Animates
.
She
knows
by
Conscience
only
what
she
feels
,
or
thinks
.
By
inward
Sensation
,
or
Conscience
,
we
know
the
sense
we
have
of
the
Motion
of
our
Arm.
But
Conscience
does
not
notify
the
Motion
of
our
Arm
,
or
the
pain
we
suffer
in
it
,
any
more
than
the
Colours
we
see
upon
Objects
.
Or
if
this
will
not
be
granted
,
I
say
,
that
inward
Sensation
is
not
infallible
,
for
Error
is
generally
found
in
the
Sensations
when
they
are
compos'd
.
I
have
sufficiently
prov'd
it
in
the
first
Book
of
the
Search
after
Truth
.
I
have
an
inward
feeling
of
the
Motion
of
my
Arm
,
at
the
instant
of
this
Effort
;
which
suppos'd
,
I
agree
to
what
is
said
,
That
the
Motion
of
the
Arm
is
perform'd
at
the
instant
a
Man
feels
this
Effort
,
or
has
a
practical
Volition
of
moving
his
Arm.
But
I
deny
that
this
Effort
,
which
is
no
more
than
a
Modification
,
or
Sensation
of
the
Soul
,
which
is
given
us
to
make
us
understand
our
Weakness
,
and
to
afford
us
a
confus'd
and
obscure
Sensation
of
our
Strength
,
can
be
capable
of
moving
,
and
determining
the
Spirits
.
I
deny
there
is
any
Analogy
or
Proportion
between
our
Thoughts
,
and
the
Motions
of
Matter
.
I
deny
that
the
Soul
has
the
least
Knowledge
of
the
Animal
Spirits
,
which
she
imploys
to
move
the
Body
Animated
by
her
.
Last
of
all
,
Though
the
Soul
exactly
knew
the
Animal
Spirits
,
and
were
capable
of
moving
them
,
or
determining
their
Motions
,
yet
I
deny
that
with
all
this
she
could
make
choice
of
these
Ductus
of
the
Nerves
,
of
which
she
has
no
Knowledge
,
so
as
to
drive
the
Spirits
into
them
,
and
thereby
move
the
Body
with
that
Readiness
,
Exactness
,
and
Force
;
as
is
observable
even
in
those
who
are
the
least
acquainted
with
the
Structure
of
their
Body
.
For
supposing
that
our
Volitions
are
truly
the
moving
Force
of
Bodies
,
(
howbeit
that
seems
inconceivable
)
how
can
we
conceive
the
Soul
moves
her
Body
?
The
Arm
for
Example
is
mov'd
by
means
of
an
inflation
or
contraction
caus'd
by
the
Spirits
in
some
of
the
Muscles
,
that
compose
it
.
But
to
the
end
the
Motion
imprinted
by
the
Soul
on
the
Spirits
in
the
Brain
may
be
Communicated
to
those
in
the
Nerves
,
and
from
thence
to
others
in
the
Muscles
of
the
Arm
,
the
Volitions
of
the
Soul
must
needs
multiply
,
or
change
in
proportion
to
those
almost
infinite
shocks
or
Collisions
,
that
are
made
by
the
little
Bodies
that
constitute
the
Spirits
.
But
this
is
inconceivable
,
without
admitting
in
the
Soul
,
an
infinite
number
of
Volitions
,
upon
the
least
Motion
of
the
Body
,
since
the
moving
it
would
necessarily
demand
an
innumerable
multitude
of
Communications
of
Motions
.
For
in
short
,
the
Soul
being
but
a
particular
Cause
;
and
not
able
to
know
exactly
the
degrees
of
agitation
,
and
the
dimensions
of
infinite
little
Corpuscles
,
which
encounter
,
upon
the
dispersion
of
the
Spirits
into
the
Muscles
;
she
could
not
settle
a
General
Law
for
the
Communication
of
these
Spirits
Motion
,
nor
follow
it
exactly
,
if
she
had
establish't
it
.
Thus
it
is
evident
,
the
Soul
could
not
move
her
Arm
,
although
she
had
the
Power
of
determining
the
Motion
of
the
Animal
Spirits
.
These
things
are
too
clear
to
be
longer
insisted
on
.
The
case
is
the
same
with
our
Thinking
Faculty
.
We
are
inwardly
conscious
that
we
Will
the
Thinking
on
something
;
that
we
make
an
effort
to
that
purpose
,
and
that
in
the
Moment
of
our
desire
and
effort
,
the
Idea
of
the
thing
presents
it self
to
our
Mind
,
but
our
inward
Sensation
does
not
tell
us
,
that
our
Will
or
Effort
produces
our
Idea
.
Reason
does
not
assure
us
that
it
's
possible
;
and
only
prejudice
makes
us
believe
that
our
desires
are
the
causes
of
our
Ideas
,
whilst
we
experiment
an
hundred
times
a
Day
,
that
the
latter
accompany
or
pursue
the
former
.
As
God
and
his
Operations
have
nothing
sensible
in
them
,
and
as
we
are
not
conscious
of
any
thing
but
our
desires
that
precede
the
presence
of
our
Ideas
,
so
we
do
not
think
our
Ideas
can
have
any
other
cause
than
these
desires
.
But
view
the
thing
closely
,
and
we
shall
see
no
force
in
us
to
produce
them
;
neither
Reason
nor
Conscience
giving
us
any
information
thereupon
.
I
don't
think
my self
oblig'd
to
transcribe
all
the
other
proofs
employ'd
by
the
patrons
for
the
Efficacy
of
Second
Causes
.
Because
they
seem
so
trifling
that
I
might
be
thoughts
to
design
to
render
them
Ridiculous
:
And
I
should
make
my self
so
,
if
I
gave
them
a
Serious
Answer
.
An
Author
,
for
Example
,
very
gravely
asserts
in
behalf
of
his
Opinion
:
Created
Beings
are
true
Material
,
Formal
,
Final
Causes
,
why
must
not
they
likewise
,
be
Efficient
or
Efficacious
?
I
fancy
I
should
give
the
World
little
satisfaction
,
if
to
answer
this
Gentlemans
Question
,
I
should
stand
to
explain
so
gross
an
Ambiguity
,
and
show
the
difference
between
an
Efficacious
cause
and
that
which
the
Philosophers
are
pleas'd
to
call
material
.
Therefore
I
leave
such
arguments
as
these
to
come
to
those
which
are
drawn
from
Holy-Writ
.
ARGUMENT
VII
.
The
Defenders
of
the
Efficacay
of
Second
Causes
,
commonly
alledge
the
following
Passages
to
support
their
Opinion
.
Let
the
Earth
bring
forth
Grass
:
Gen.
1.
Let
the
Waters
bring
forth
the
moving
Creature
that
hath
Life
,
and
Fowl
that
may
fly
,
&c.
Therefore
the
Earth
and
Water
,
by
the
Word
of
God
,
receiv'd
the
Power
of
producing
Plants
,
and
Animals
.
Afterwards
God
Commanded
the
Fowls
and
Fishes
to
multiply
,
Be
fruitful
and
multiply
,
and
fill
the
Waters
in
the
Seas
,
and
let
Fowl
multiply
in
the
Earth
.
Therefore
he
gave
them
a
Power
of
begetting
their
like
.
Our
Saviour
in
the
fourth
Chapter
of
St.
Mark
says
,
the
Seed
which
falls
on
good
Ground
,
brings
forth
Fruit
an
Hundred-fold
,
and
that
the
Earth
bringeth
forth
Fruits
of
her self
,
first
the
blade
then
the
Ear
,
after
that
the
full
Corn
in
the
Ear.
Lastly
,
it
is
written
in
the
Book
of
Wisdom
,
that
the
Fire
had
as
it
were
forgotten
it's
strength
to
Burn
,
in
favour
of
the
People
of
God
.
It
is
therefore
certain
from
the
Old
and
New
Testament
,
that
Second
Causes
have
an
Active
Force
.
ANSWER
.
I
answer
,
that
in
Holy-Writ
there
are
many
Passages
which
ascribe
to
God
the
pretended
Efficacy
of
Second
Causes
,
some
of
which
are
these
.
I
am
the
Lord
that
maketh
ALL
THINGS
,
Isa.
44.24
.
Job
10.8
.
that
stretcheth
forth
the
Heavens
ALONE
,
that
spreadeth
abroad
the
Earth
by
MY SELF
.
Thine
hands
have
made
me
and
fashion'd
me
[
](A51674-e127320-b)*
*
Vulg.
totum
.
2
Macc.
Ch.
7.
v
▪
22
,
23.
Acts
17
▪
25.
Psal.
104
,
14.
together
round
about
.
I
cannot
tell
how
you
came
into
my
Womb.
—
It
was
not
I
that
form'd
the
Members
of
every
one
of
you
.
But
doubtless
the
Creator
of
the
World
who
form●d
the
Generation
of
Man
,
&c.
Seeing
he
giveth
to
Life
,
and
breath
,
and
all
things
.
He
causeth
Grass
to
grow
for
the
Cattle
,
and
Herb
for
the
service
of
Men
,
that
he
may
bring
forth
food
out
of
the
Earth
.
There
are
infinite
such
like
Passages
,
but
let
these
suffice
.
When
an
Author
seems
to
Contradict
himself
:
And
Natural
Equity
,
or
a
stronger
Reason
obliges
us
to
reconcile
him
to
himself
;
methinks
we
have
an
infallible
Rule
to
discover
his
true
Opinion
.
For
we
need
but
observe
,
when
he
speaks
according
to
his
own
Light
,
and
when
after
Common
Opinion
.
When
a
Man
Accommodates
himself
to
the
vulgar
way
of
speaking
,
that
is
no
sure
sign
he
is
of
their
Opinion
.
But
when
he
says
positively
the
contrary
to
what
Custom
Authorises
,
though
he
say
it
but
once
,
we
have
Reason
to
conclude
it
his
judgement
,
provided
we
know
he
speaks
seriously
and
with
Mature
deliberattion
.
For
instance
,
when
an
Author
speaking
of
the
properties
of
Animals
,
shall
say
an
hundred
times
over
,
that
Beasts
have
sense
,
that
Dogs
know
their
Master
,
that
they
Love
and
Fear
him
;
and
but
in
two
or
three
places
shall
affirm
that
Beasts
are
insensible
,
that
Dogs
are
incapable
of
Knowledge
,
and
that
they
neither
Love
nor
Fear
any
thing
;
how
shall
we
reconcile
this
Author
to
himself
?
Must
we
make
a
Collection
of
all
his
passages
for
and
against
it
;
and
judge
of
his
Opinion
by
the
greater
number
?
If
so
,
I
conceive
there
is
no
Man
to
whom
,
for
example
,
may
be
attributed
this
Opinion
,
That
Animals
have
no
Soul
.
For
even
the
Cartesians
most
frequently
say
,
that
a
Dogs
feels
when
he
is
beaten
,
and
rarely
it
is
that
they
affirm
he
does
not
feel
.
And
although
I
my self
encounter
a
vast
multitude
of
prejudices
in
this
Treatise
,
yet
many
passages
may
be
gather'd
from
it
,
by
which
,
unless
this
present
Rule
be
admitted
,
it
may
be
prov'd
that
I
confirm
them
all
,
and
even
that
I
hold
the
Opinion
of
the
Efficacy
of
Second
Causes
,
which
I
am
now
refuting
;
or
it
may
be
it
might
be
concluded
that
the
Search
after
Truth
abounds
with
gross
and
palpable
contradictions
,
as
do
some
Persons
who
I
fear
have
not
Equity
,
and
penetration
enough
,
to
set
up
for
judges
of
the
Works
of
others
.
Holy
Scripture
,
and
Fathers
,
and
most
Religious
Men
,
speak
oftner
of
sensible
Goods
,
Riches
,
and
Honours
,
in
the
vulgar
Opinion
,
than
by
the
true
Ideas
they
have
of
them
.
Our
LORD
brings
in
Abraham
saying
to
the
Wicked
Rich
Man
,
Son
,
thou
hast
receiv'd
thy
GOOD
things
in
thy
Life
time
;
that
is
,
to
say
,
Riches
and
Honour
.
What
we
by
prejudice
call
Good
,
our
Good
,
that
is
Gold
and
Silver
,
is
stil'd
in
Scripture
,
in
an
hundred
places
our
Sustenance
,
and
Substance
,
and
even
our
honesty
,
or
that
which
Honours
us
,
Paupertas
&
Honestas
à
Deo
sunt
.
Engl.
Poverty
and
Riches
.
Eccl.
11.14
.
Must
these
ways
of
speaking
us'd
by
the
Holy
Scripture
,
and
the
most
Religious
Persons
,
make
us
believe
that
they
contradict
themselves
,
or
that
Riches
and
Honours
are
truly
our
goods
,
and
worthy
our
Love
and
our
Researches
?
No
,
doubtless
;
Because
the
Modes
of
Speech
,
suiting
with
prejudices
,
signify
nothing
:
And
that
we
see
elsewhere
that
Our
SAVIOUR
has
compar'd
Riches
to
Thorns
,
has
told
us
,
we
must
renounce
them
;
that
they
are
deceitful
,
and
that
all
that
's
great
and
glorious
in
the
World
is
an
abomination
in
the
sight
of
God
.
Therefore
we
must
not
heap
together
the
Passages
of
Scripture
or
the
Fathers
,
to
judge
of
their
Opinions
by
the
greater
number
,
unless
we
will
attribute
to
them
every
Moment
,
the
most
irrational
prejudices
in
the
World
.
This
being
suppos'd
,
't
is
plain
that
Holy
Scripture
says
positively
,
't
is
God
that
makes
all
even
to
the
Grass
of
the
Field
,
that
arrays
the
Lillies
with
such
Ornaments
as
CHRIST
prefers
before
those
of
Solomon
in
all
his
Glory
.
'T
is
not
only
two
or
three
,
but
innumerable
Passages
,
that
Attribute
to
God
the
pretended
Efficacy
of
Second
Causes
;
and
overthrow
the
Nature
of
the
Peripateticks
.
Besides
,
we
are
inclin'd
as
it
were
by
a
kind
of
Natural
prejudice
not
to
think
on
God
,
in
Ordinary
Effects
.
And
to
attribute
force
and
Efficacy
to
Second
Causes
,
for
the
generality
none
but
Miraculous
Effects
can
make
us
think
on
God
as
the
Author
;
and
the
sensible
impression
engages
us
in
the
Opinion
of
Second
Causes
.
The
Philosophers
hold
this
Opinion
,
because
,
say
they
,
the
Senses
evince
it
.
Which
is
their
mightiest
Argument
.
Lastly
,
this
Opinion
is
receiv'd
by
all
that
follow
the
judgment
of
their
Senses
.
The
Language
is
accommodated
to
this
prejudice
,
and
't
is
as
commonly
said
,
That
Fire
has
a
Power
to
Burn
,
as
that
Silver
and
Gold
are
a
Man's
Goods
.
Wherefore
those
Passages
which
the
Scripture
or
Fathers
afford
us
for
the
Efficacy
of
Second
Causes
,
prove
no
more
than
those
;
That
an
Ambitious
or
Covetous
Person
would
choose
for
the
vindication
of
his
Behaviour
.
But
we
are
not
to
say
so
of
those
Expressions
that
may
be
brought
for
the
proof
of
God's
Working
all
in
all
.
For
since
this
Opinion
is
repugnant
to
prejudice
,
the
Passages
that
assert
it
,
are
to
be
interpreted
in
their
utmost
Rigour
:
For
the
same
Reason
that
we
are
to
conclude
it
the
Sentiment
of
a
Cartesian
,
that
Beasts
are
Insensible
,
though
he
should
say
it
but
now
and
then
,
and
should
constantly
in
common
Discourse
say
the
contrary
;
as
that
they
Feel
,
See
,
and
Hear
.
In
the
first
Chapter
of
Genesis
,
God
Commands
the
Earth
to
produce
Plants
,
and
Animals
,
and
Orders
the
Waters
to
bring
forth
Fish
,
and
Consequently
say
the
Peripateticks
the
Water
and
Earth
,
were
indu'd
with
a
competent
Virtue
,
to
produce
these
Effects
.
I
cannot
see
the
certainty
of
this
conclusion
;
nor
any
necessity
of
admitting
this
consequence
,
though
we
were
oblig'd
to
explain
this
Chapter
by
it self
,
without
recourse
to
other
passages
of
Scripture
.
This
method
of
expounding
the
Creation
,
is
adapted
to
our
way
of
conceiving
things
,
and
so
there
is
no
necessity
of
our
taking
it
Literally
,
nor
ought
we
to
lay
it
as
a
Foundation
to
our
prejudices
.
Since
we
see
Animals
,
and
Plants
on
the
Earth
,
Fowls
inhabiting
the
Air
,
and
Fishes
living
in
the
Water
,
God
,
to
let
us
understand
,
that
his
Order
constituted
them
in
these
Places
,
produc'd
them
therein
.
From
the
Earth
he
form'd
Animals
,
and
Plants
,
not
that
the
Earth
was
capable
of
Generating
,
or
as
if
God
had
to
that
intent
given
it
a
force
,
and
Vertue
which
it
retains
till
now
;
(
For
we
are
sufficiently
agreed
that
the
Earth
does
not
Procreate
Horses
and
Oxen
)
but
because
out
of
the
Earth
the
Bodies
of
Animals
were
form'd
,
as
is
said
in
the
following
Chapter
.
Out
of
the
ground
the
Lord
form'd
every
Beast
of
the
field
,
and
every
Fowl
of
the
Air.
The
Animals
were
form'd
out
of
the
gound
,
Gen.
2.19
.
(
formatis
de
humo
animantibus
,
says
the
Vulgar
Latin
)
and
not
produc'd
by
it
.
Therefore
when
Moses
had
related
how
Beasts
and
Fish
were
produc'd
by
Vertue
of
the
Command
which
God
gave
the
Earth
and
Water
to
produce
them
,
he
adds
that
it
was
God
that
made
them
,
Ch.
1.21
.
lest
we
should
attribute
their
Production
to
the
Earth
and
Water
.
And
God
CREATED
great
Whales
,
and
every
living
Creature
that
moveth
,
which
the
WATERS
BROVGHT
FORTH
abundantly
after
their
kind
,
and
every
winged
Fowl
after
his
kind
,
and
a
little
lower
,
after
he
had
spoken
of
the
formation
of
Animals
,
he
adjoyns
,
And
GOD
MADE
the
Beast
of
the
Earth
after
his
kind
,
and
Cattel
after
their
kind
,
and
every
thing
that
creepeth
on
the
Earth
after
his
kind
.
But
't
is
observable
,
by
the
way
,
That
what
the
Vulgar
Translates
,
Producant
aquae
reptile
animae
viventis
,
&
volatile
super
terram
,
and
our
English
,
Let
the
Water
bring
forth
abundantly
the
moving
Creature
that
hath
Life
,
and
Fowl
that
may
fly
above
the
Earth
,
the
Hebrew
has
it
Volatile
VOLITET
,
Let
the
Fowl
fly
above
the
Earth
:
Which
distinction
shows
,
as
is
evident
from
the
fore-cited
passage
of
the
next
Chapter
,
that
Fowls
were
not
produc'd
from
the
Water
,
and
that
it
was
not
Moses's
design
to
prove
that
the
Waters
were
truly
empower'd
to
produce
Fish
and
Fowl
,
but
only
to
denote
the
respective
place
design'd
for
each
,
by
the
Order
of
God
,
whether
to
live
,
or
to
be
produc'd
in
;
Et
volatile
VOLITET
super
Terram
.
For
commonly
when
we
say
that
the
Earth
produces
Trees
,
and
Plants
,
we
only
mean
to
signifie
that
it
furnishes
Water
,
and
Salts
,
which
are
necessary
to
the
Germination
,
and
increase
of
Seeds
.
But
I
dwell
no
longer
on
the
Explication
of
these
Scripture
Passages
,
which
Literally
taken
,
make
for
Second
Causes
:
For
we
are
so
far
from
being
oblig'd
,
that
it
is
sometimes
dangerous
to
take
Expressions
in
the
Letter
,
which
are
founded
on
common
Opinion
,
by
which
the
Language
is
form'd
.
For
the
vulgar
part
of
Men
speak
of
all
things
according
to
the
Impressions
of
Sense
,
and
the
Prejudices
of
Infancy
.
The
same
Reason
which
constrains
us
to
interpret
Literally
such
Scripture
Passages
,
as
directly
oppose
Prejudices
,
gives
us
Reason
to
believe
the
Fathers
never
design'd
ex
proposito
,
to
maintain
the
Efficacy
of
Second
Causes
,
or
the
Nature
of
Aristotle
.
For
though
they
often
speak
in
a
manner
that
countenances
Prejudices
,
and
the
Judgments
of
Sense
,
yet
they
sometimes
so
explain
themselves
,
as
to
manifest
the
disposition
of
their
Mind
and
Heart
.
St.
Austin
,
for
instance
,
gives
us
sufficiently
to
understand
,
That
he
believed
the
Will
of
God
,
to
be
the
Force
and
Nature
of
every
thing
,
Omnia
quippe
portenta
contra
naturam
dicimus
esse
,
sed
non
sunt
.
Quomodo
enim
est
contra
naturam
,
quod
Dei
fit
voluntate
?
Cum
voluntas
tanti
utique
creatoris
conditae
rei
cujusque
natura
sit
?
Portentum
ergo
fit
non
contra
naturam
,
sed
contra
quàm
est
nota
natura
.
S.
Aug.
de
Civita
.
De
▪
i
l.
21.
c.
8.
when
he
speaks
thus
,
We
are
wont
to
say
,
but
not
truly
,
that
Prodigies
are
against
Nature
;
For
the
Nature
of
every
Creature
being
but
the
Will
of
the
Creator
;
How
can
that
which
is
done
by
the
Will
of
God
be
contrary
to
Nature
?
Miracles
therefore
and
Prodigies
are
not
against
Nature
,
but
against
what
we
know
of
it
.
'T
is
true
,
St.
Austin
speaks
in
several
places
according
to
Prejudices
:
But
I
affirm
that
that
is
no
Argument
;
for
we
are
not
Literally
to
explain
,
but
those
Expressions
which
are
contrary
to
them
;
for
which
I
have
given
the
Reasons
.
If
St.
Austin
in
his
Works
,
had
said
nothing
against
the
Efficacy
of
Second
Causes
,
but
had
always
favour'd
this
Opinion
,
his
Authority
might
be
made
use
of
to
confirm
it
.
But
if
it
should
not
appear
that
he
had
industriously
examin'd
that
Question
,
we
might
still
have
reason
to
think
he
had
no
settled
and
resolv'd
Opinion
about
the
Subject
,
but
was
,
it
may
be
,
drawn
by
the
Impression
of
the
Senses
inconsiderately
to
believe
a
thing
which
no
Man
would
doubt
of
,
before
he
had
carefully
examin'd
it
.
'T
is
certain
for
example
that
St.
Austin
always
speaks
of
Beasts
,
as
if
they
had
a
Soul
,
I
say
not
a
Corporeal
Soul
;
for
that
Holy
Father
too
well
knew
the
distinction
of
the
Soul
and
Body
,
to
think
there
were
Corporeal
Souls
;
I
say
a
Spiritual
Soul
,
for
Matter
is
incapable
of
Sense
.
And
yet
it
would
seem
,
methinks
,
more
reasonable
,
to
employ
the
Authority
of
St.
Austin
to
prove
that
Beasts
have
not
a
Soul
,
than
to
prove
they
have
.
Some
of
St.
Austin's
Principles
are
these
.
What
has
never
sinned
,
can
not
suffer
evil
.
But
according
to
him
,
Pain
is
the
greatest
Evil
,
and
Beasts
suffer
it
.
That
the
more
Noble
cannot
have
the
less
Noble
for
its
end
.
But
with
him
the
Soul
of
Beasts
is
Spiritual
,
and
more
Noble
than
the
Body
,
and
yet
has
no
other
End
.
That
what
is
Spiritual
is
Immortal
,
yet
the
Soul
of
Beasts
,
though
Spiritual
,
is
subject
to
Death
.
Many
such
like
Principles
there
are
in
his
Works
,
whereby
it
may
be
concluded
,
That
Beasts
have
no
such
Spiritual
Soul
as
he
admits
in
them
.
For
from
the
Principles
which
he
has
carefully
examin'd
,
and
strongly
establish'd
,
it
manifestly
follows
they
have
none
,
as
is
shown
by
Ambrosius
Victor
,
in
his
Sixth
Volume
of
Christian
Philosophy
.
But
the
Opinion
that
Beasts
have
a
Soul
,
and
are
sensible
of
Pain
when
we
strike
them
,
being
consonant
to
Prejudices
,
(
for
there
is
no
Child
but
believes
it
;
)
we
have
still
reason
to
believe
that
he
speaks
according
to
Custom
and
Vulgar
Opinion
;
and
that
if
he
had
seriously
examin'd
the
Question
,
and
once
began
to
doubt
and
make
reflexion
,
he
would
never
have
said
a
thing
so
contrary
to
his
Principles
.
And
thus
,
though
all
the
Fathers
had
constantly
favour'd
the
Efficacy
of
Second
Causes
,
yet
,
it
may
be
,
no
regard
were
due
to
their
Opinion
,
unless
it
appear'd
that
they
had
carefully
Examin'd
the
Question
,
and
that
their
Assertions
,
were
not
the
results
of
common
Speech
,
which
is
form'd
and
founded
upon
Prejudices
.
But
the
case
is
certainly
quite
contrary
;
for
the
Fathers
,
and
such
as
were
most
Holy
,
and
best
acquainted
with
Religion
,
have
commonly
manifested
in
some
places
or
other
of
their
Works
,
what
was
their
Disposition
of
Mind
and
Heart
,
in
reference
to
the
present
Question
.
The
most
Understanding
,
and
indeed
the
greatest
number
of
Divines
,
seeing
that
on
one
hand
the
Holy
Scripture
was
repugnant
to
the
Efficacy
of
Second
Causes
,
and
on
the
other
,
that
the
Impression
of
the
Senses
,
the
publick
Vote
,
and
especially
Aristotle's
Philosophy
,
which
was
had
in
veneration
by
the
Learned
,
establish
it
:
For
Aristotle
believ'd
God
unconcern'd
in
the
particulars
of
Sublunary
Transactions
;
That
that
change
was
below
his
Majesty
,
and
that
Nature
which
he
supposes
in
all
Bodies
,
suffic'd
to
produce
all
that
was
done
below
.
The
Divines
,
I
say
,
have
so
equally
balanc'd
these
Two
,
as
to
reconcile
Faith
with
Heathen
Philosophy
,
Reason
with
Sense
,
and
to
make
Second
Causes
ineffective
without
the
additional
concourse
of
God
Almighty
.
But
because
that
immediate
concourse
,
whereby
God
acts
jointly
with
Second
Causes
includes
great
difficulties
,
some
Philosophers
have
rejected
it
,
pretending
that
in
Order
to
their
Acting
,
there
needs
no
more
than
that
God
should
continue
to
them
their
Vertue
he
endow'd
them
with
in
their
Creation
.
And
since
this
Opinion
is
exactly
agreeable
with
Prejudice
,
because
of
the
insensible
Operation
of
God
,
in
Second
Causes
,
it
is
commonly
embrac'd
by
the
vulgar
sort
of
Men
,
and
such
as
have
more
studied
Ancient
Naturalists
and
Physicians
,
than
Theology
and
Truth
.
Most
are
of
Opinion
that
God
created
all
things
at
first
,
and
gave
them
all
the
Qualities
and
Faculties
that
were
necessary
to
their
preservation
;
that
he
has
,
for
example
,
given
the
first
Motion
of
Matter
,
and
left
it
afterwards
to
it self
,
to
produce
,
by
the
Communication
of
its
Motions
that
admirable
variety
of
Forms
we
see
.
'T
is
Ordinarily
suppos'd
that
Bodies
can
move
one
another
;
and
this
is
said
to
be
Mr.
des
Cartes's
Opinion
,
though
he
speaks
expresly
against
it
,
in
the
Thirty
Sixth
and
Seventh
Articles
of
the
Second
Part
of
his
Philosophical
Principles
.
Since
Men
must
unavoidably
acknowledge
that
the
Creatures
depend
on
God
,
they
lessen
and
abridge
,
as
much
as
possible
,
that
dependance
,
whether
out
of
a
secret
Aversion
to
God
,
or
a
strange
and
wretched
stupidity
and
insensibility
to
his
Operation
.
But
whereas
this
Opinion
is
receiv'd
but
by
those
who
have
not
much
studied
Religion
,
and
have
preferr'd
their
Senses
to
their
Reason
,
and
Aristotle's
Authority
to
that
of
Holy
Writ
,
we
have
no
reason
to
fear
its
making
way
into
the
Mind
of
those
,
who
have
any
Love
for
Truth
and
Religion
;
for
provided
a
Man
seriously
examin'd
it
,
he
must
needs
discover
its
falsity
.
But
the
Opinion
of
God's
Immediate
Concourse
to
every
Action
of
Second
Causes
,
seems
to
accord
with
those
Passages
of
Scripture
,
which
often
attribute
the
same
Effect
,
both
to
GOD
and
the
Creature
.
We
must
consider
then
,
that
there
are
places
in
Scripture
,
where
't
is
said
that
God
is
the
only
Agent
:
I
am
the
Lord
that
maketh
all
things
,
that
stretcheth
forth
the
Heavens
alone
,
Ch.
44.24
.
2
Mac.
7.22
,
&
23.
that
spreadeth
abroad
the
Earth
by
my self
.
Ego
sum
Dominus
,
says
Isaiah
,
faciens
OMNIA
,
Extendens
coelos
SOLVS
,
stabiliens
Terram
,
&
NVLLVS
Mecum
.
A
Mother
Animated
with
the
Spirit
of
God
,
tells
her
Children
,
it
was
not
her
that
form'd
them
,
I
cannot
tell
how
you
came
into
my
Womb
:
For
I
neither
gave
you
Breath
nor
Life
,
neither
was
it
I
that
form'd
the
Members
of
every
one
of
you
:
But
doubtless
the
Creator
of
the
World
,
&c.
Nescio
qualiter
in
utero
meo
apparuistis
,
singulorum
membra
NON
EGO
IPSA
COMPEGI
,
sed
mundi
Creator
.
Sol
&
homo
generant
●ominem
.
Arist.
Phy.
Ausc.
l.
2.
c.
2.
She
does
not
say
with
Aristotle
,
and
the
School
of
the
Peripateticks
that
to
her
,
and
the
Sun
,
they
ow'd
their
Birth
;
but
to
the
Creator
of
the
Universe
.
Which
Opinion
that
God
only
Works
,
and
forms
Children
in
their
Mothers
Womb
,
not
being
conformable
to
Prejudice
and
Common
Opinion
;
These
Sentences
according
to
the
pre-establish'd
Principle
,
See
St.
Th.
upon
the
Text.
must
be
explain'd
in
the
Literal
Sense
.
But
on
the
contrary
,
the
Notion
of
Second
Causes
falling
in
with
the
vulgar
Opinion
,
and
being
Suited
to
the
sensible
impression
;
the
Passages
which
expresly
make
for
the
separate
Efficacy
of
Second
Causes
,
must
be
reckon'd
invalid
when
compar'd
with
the
former
.
Concourse
therefore
is
insufficient
to
reconcile
the
different
Texts
of
Scripture
;
and
all
Force
,
Power
and
Efficacy
must
be
ascrib'd
to
God
.
But
though
the
immediate
concurrence
of
God
with
Second
Causes
,
were
fit
to
accommodate
the
disagreeing
passages
of
Holy
Writ
,
yet
after
all
it
is
a
question
whether
it
ought
to
be
admitted
.
For
the
Sacred
Books
were
not
compos'd
for
the
Theologists
of
these
times
,
but
for
the
People
of
the
Jews
.
So
that
if
this
People
had
not
understanding
,
or
Subtilty
enough
,
to
imagine
a
Concourse
,
such
as
is
admitted
in
School-Divinity
,
and
to
agree
to
a
thing
which
the
greatest
Divines
are
hard
put
to
,
to
explain
,
it
follows
,
if
I
mistake
not
,
that
the
Holy
Scripture
which
Attributes
to
God
,
and
even
to
God
alone
,
the
production
and
preservation
of
all
things
,
would
have
betray'd
them
into
Error
.
And
the
Holy
Pen-Men
had
stood
chargeable
with
writing
not
only
in
an
unintelligible
,
but
deceitful
Language
.
For
in
saying
that
God
Work'd
all
,
they
would
have
design'd
no
more
than
that
God
assisted
to
all
things
with
his
concourse
,
which
was
not
probably
so
much
as
thought
on
by
the
Jews
;
Those
amongst
them
,
who
were
not
very
great
Philosophers
,
believing
,
that
God
Work'd
all
,
and
not
that
he
concurr'd
to
all
.
But
that
we
may
pass
a
more
certain
judgement
about
this
Concourse
,
it
would
be
requisite
to
explain
with
care
the
different
Hypotheses
of
the
School-Men
upon
it
.
For
besides
,
those
impenetrable
Clouds
,
and
Obscurities
which
involve
all
the
Opinions
,
that
cannot
be
explain'd
and
defended
without
loose
and
indefinite
Terms
;
there
are
upon
this
Matter
so
great
a
variety
of
Opinions
,
that
it
would
be
no
hard
Matter
to
discover
the
cause
of
them
.
But
I
design
not
to
engage
in
a
discussion
that
would
be
so
wearisom
to
my self
as
well
as
the
greatest
part
of
Readers
:
On
the
contrary
,
I
had
rather
try
to
show
that
my
Opinions
may
in
some
thing
accord
with
those
of
the
greater
number
of
Scholastick
Divines
,
though
I
cannot
but
say
their
Language
looks
very
Ambiguous
and
confus'd
.
To
explain
my self
.
I
am
of
Opinion
,
as
I
have
said
elsewhere
,
that
Bodies
for
example
have
no
Force
to
move
themselves
,
and
that
therefore
their
moving
force
is
nothing
but
the
Action
of
God
;
or
not
to
make
use
of
a
Term
which
has
no
distinct
import
,
their
moving
force
is
nothing
but
the
Will
of
God
,
always
necessarily
Efficacious
,
which
successively
preserves
them
in
different
Places
.
For
I
believe
not
that
God
Creates
any
particular
Beings
,
to
make
the
moving
force
of
Bodies
;
not
only
because
I
have
no
Idea
of
such
a
kind
of
Being
,
nor
see
how
they
could
move
Bodies
:
But
also
because
these
Beings
themselves
would
have
need
of
others
to
move
them
,
and
so
in
infinitum
.
For
none
but
God
is
truely
Immoveable
,
and
Mover
altogether
.
Which
being
so
,
when
a
Body
strikes
,
and
moves
another
,
I
may
say
that
it
Acts
by
the
Concurrence
of
God
,
and
that
this
Concurrence
is
not
distinct
from
its
own
Action
.
For
a
Body
meeting
another
moves
it
,
by
its
Action
,
or
its
moving
force
,
which
at
bottom
is
nothing
but
the
Will
of
God
preserving
the
Body
successively
in
different
Places
,
the
translation
of
a
Body
being
not
it's
Action
,
or
moving
force
,
but
the
Effect
of
it
.
Almost
all
Divines
say
too
,
that
the
Action
of
Second
Causes
is
not
different
from
that
of
God's
Concurrence
with
them
.
For
though
they
have
a
various
Meaning
,
yet
they
suppose
that
God
Acts
in
the
Creatures
by
the
same
Action
as
the
Creatures
.
And
they
are
oblig'd
,
if
I
mistake
not
,
thus
to
speak
:
For
if
the
Creatures
Acted
by
an
Action
which
God
Work'd
not
in
them
,
their
Action
,
consider'd
as
such
,
would
no
doubt
,
be
independent
.
But
they
acknowledge
,
as
it
becomes
them
,
that
the
Creatures
depend
immediately
on
God
,
not
only
as
to
their
Being
,
but
likewise
as
to
their
Operation
.
So
likewise
,
in
point
of
free
Causes
,
I
believe
that
God
incessantly
gives
the
Mind
an
Impression
towards
Good
in
General
,
and
that
he
moreover
determines
this
Impression
towards
particular
Goods
,
by
the
Idea's
or
Sensations
that
he
gives
us
,
as
I
have
explain'd
in
the
first
Illustration
;
which
is
the
same
with
what
the
Divines
intend
,
by
affirming
,
That
God
moves
,
and
prevents
our
Wills
.
Thus
the
Force
which
puts
our
Minds
in
Motion
,
is
the
Will
of
God
,
which
Animates
us
,
and
inclines
us
towards
Good
.
For
God
Creates
not
Beings
to
constitute
the
moving
force
of
Minds
,
for
the
same
Reason
that
he
Creates
none
to
be
the
moving
force
of
Bodies
.
The
Wills
of
God
being
of
themselves
Efficacious
,
He
need
but
Will
,
to
do
.
And
we
ought
not
to
multiply
Beings
without
necessity
.
Besides
,
whatever
is
real
in
the
determinations
of
our
Motions
,
proceeds
likewise
from
the
Action
of
God
in
us
,
as
appears
from
the
first
Illustration
.
But
all
we
Act
or
produce
,
is
by
our
Wills
,
that
is
,
by
the
Impression
of
the
Will
of
God
,
which
is
our
moving
force
.
For
our
Wills
are
Efficacious
no
farther
than
they
are
of
God
,
as
mov'd
Bodies
impel
not
others
,
but
in
as
much
as
they
have
a
moving
force
that
translates
them
;
which
is
no
other
than
the
Will
of
God
,
which
Creates
or
preserves
them
successively
in
different
places
.
Therefore
we
Act
no
otherwise
than
by
the
Concourse
of
God
;
V.
Suarez
l.
1.
de
concursu
Dei
cum
voluntate
.
and
our
Action
consider'd
as
Efficacious
,
and
capable
of
producing
any
Effect
,
differs
not
from
his
,
but
is
,
as
say
most
Divines
,
the
self
same
Action
,
eadem
numero
actio
.
Now
all
the
Changes
which
arrive
in
the
World
have
no
other
Natural
Cause
,
than
the
Motions
of
Bodies
,
and
Volitions
of
Minds
.
For
,
First
,
by
the
General
Laws
of
the
Communications
of
Motions
,
the
invisible
Bodies
which
surround
the
visible
,
produce
,
by
their
various
Motions
,
all
these
divers
Changes
,
whose
Cause
is
not
apparent
.
And
,
Secondly
,
by
the
Laws
of
Union
of
our
Soul
and
Body
,
when
circumambient
Bodies
Act
upon
our
own
,
they
produce
in
our
Soul
a
multiplicity
of
Sensations
,
Idea's
,
and
Passions
.
Thirdly
,
Our
Mind
,
by
its
Volitions
,
produces
in
it self
infinite
different
Idea's
;
for
they
are
our
Volitions
,
which
as
Natural
Causes
intend
,
and
Modifie
our
Mind
:
Their
Efficacy
,
nevertheless
,
proceeds
from
the
Laws
which
God
has
establish'd
.
And
,
Lastly
,
when
our
Soul
acts
upon
our
Body
,
she
produces
several
Changes
in
it
,
by
vertue
of
the
Laws
of
her
Union
with
it
;
and
by
means
of
our
Body
she
effects
in
those
about
it
abundance
of
Changes
,
by
vertue
of
the
Laws
of
Communication
of
Motions
.
So
that
the
Motions
of
Bodies
and
the
Volitions
of
Minds
,
are
the
only
Natural
,
or
Occasional
Causes
of
Natural
Effects
,
which
no
Man
will
deny
who
uses
any
Attention
;
supposing
only
,
he
be
not
prepossest
by
those
who
understand
not
what
they
say
,
who
fancy
perpetually
to
themselves
such
Beings
as
they
have
no
clear
Idea's
of
,
and
who
offer
to
explain
things
which
they
do
not
understand
,
by
others
absolutely
incomprehensible
.
Thus
having
shown
that
God
by
his
Concourse
,
or
rather
by
his
Efficacious
Will
,
performs
whatever
is
done
by
the
Motions
of
Bodies
,
and
the
Wills
of
Minds
,
as
Natural
or
Occasional
Causes
,
it
appears
that
God
does
every
thing
by
the
same
Action
of
the
Creature
.
Not
that
the
Creatures
have
of
themselves
any
Efficacious
Action
,
but
that
the
Power
of
God
is
in
a
manner
Communicated
to
them
,
by
the
Natural
Laws
which
God
has
establish'd
on
their
account
.
This
then
is
all
that
I
can
do
to
reconcile
my
Thoughts
to
the
Opinion
of
those
Divines
,
who
defend
the
necessity
of
immediate
Concourse
,
and
hold
that
God
does
All
in
all
things
by
an
Action
no
ways
differing
from
the
Creatures
.
For
,
as
to
the
rest
of
the
Divines
,
Durand
.
in
2
dist.
Qu.
5.
&
Dist.
37.
De
Genesi
ad
li●eram
l.
5.
c.
20.
I
think
their
Opinions
utterly
indefensible
,
and
especially
that
of
Durandus
,
together
with
the
Sentiments
of
some
of
the
Ancients
,
refuted
by
St.
Austin
,
who
absolutely
deni●d
the
necessity
of
God's
Concurrence
,
pretending
,
that
Second
Causes
did
all
things
by
the
Power
which
God
in
their
Creation
gave
them
.
For
though
this
Opinion
be
less
intricate
and
perplex'd
,
than
that
of
other
Divines
,
yet
to
me
it
seems
so
repugnant
to
Scripture
,
and
so
suitable
to
Prejudices
,
to
say
no
worse
of
it
,
that
I
think
it
altogether
unwarrantable
▪
I
confess
that
the
School-Men
,
who
make
God's
immediate
concourse
to
be
the
same
Action
with
that
of
the
Creatures
,
do
not
perfectly
agree
with
my
Explication
;
and
all
those
that
I
have
read
,
In
4
Sent.
Dist.
1.
q.
1.
D
Aliaco
ibid.
except
Biel
and
Cardinal
d'
Ailly
,
are
of
Opinion
,
That
the
Efficacy
which
produces
Effects
proceeds
from
the
Second
Cause
as
well
as
the
First
.
But
as
I
make
it
indispensable
for
me
to
speak
nothing
but
what
I
clearly
conceive
,
and
always
to
take
the
side
that
best
comports
with
Religion
,
I
think
I
am
not
liable
to
blame
,
for
deserting
an
Opinion
which
to
many
Men
seems
still
more
inconceiveable
,
as
they
strive
more
to
comprehend
it
;
and
for
establishing
another
,
which
agrees
perfectly
not
only
with
Reason
,
but
also
with
the
Sacredness
of
our
Religion
,
and
Christian
Morality
,
which
is
a
Truth
already
prov'd
in
the
Chapter
that
's
the
Subject
of
these
Reflexions
.
However
't
is
not
inconvenient
to
say
something
to
it
,
that
I
may
fully
verifie
what
I
have
said
upon
the
present
Question
.
Both
Reason
and
Religion
evince
,
That
God
will
be
Lov'd
,
and
rever'd
by
his
Creatures
:
Lov'd
as
Good
,
and
Rever'd
as
Power
.
Which
is
such
a
Truth
as
it
would
be
Impiety
and
Madness
to
doubt
of
.
To
love
God
,
as
he
requires
and
deserves
,
we
must
,
according
to
the
First
Commandment
,
both
of
the
Law
and
Gospel
,
and
by
Reason
it self
,
as
I
have
[
](A51674-e129330-b)*
*
Book
4.
c.
1.
somewhere
shown
,
Love
Him
with
all
our
Strength
,
or
with
the
whole
extent
of
our
Loving
Capacity
.
'T
is
not
sufficient
to
prefer
Him
before
all
things
,
unless
we
moreover
Love
Him
in
all
things
.
For
otherwise
our
Love
is
not
so
perfect
as
it
ought
to
be
,
and
we
return
not
to
God
all
the
Love
that
he
gives
us
,
and
gives
us
only
for
Himself
,
in
whom
every
one
of
His
Actions
Center
.
So
to
render
to
God
all
the
Reverence
that
is
due
to
Him
;
't
is
not
enough
to
adore
Him
,
as
the
Supreme
Power
,
and
fear
Him
more
than
His
Creatures
;
we
must
likewise
fear
and
adore
Him
in
all
His
Creatures
;
all
our
respects
must
perpetually
tend
towards
Him
,
to
whom
alone
Honour
and
Glory
are
to
be
ascrib'd
:
Which
is
what
God
Commands
us
in
these
Words
:
Deut.
c.
6.
Thou
shalt
Love
the
Lord
thy
God
,
with
all
thy
Heart
,
and
with
all
thy
Soul
,
and
with
all
thy
Strength
.
And
in
these
:
Thou
shalt
fear
the
Lord
thy
God
,
and
Him
only
shalt
thou
serve
.
Thus
the
Philosophy
that
convinces
us
that
the
Efficacy
of
Second
Causes
is
a
Fiction
of
the
Mind
,
that
the
Nature
of
Aristotle
,
and
some
other
Philosophers
,
is
a
Chimera
,
that
none
but
God
is
Strong
and
Powerful
enough
,
not
only
to
Act
on
our
Soul
,
but
even
to
give
the
least
Motion
to
Matter
.
This
Philosophy
,
I
say
,
perfectly
Accommodates
with
Religion
,
whose
end
is
to
Unite
us
to
God
in
the
strictest
Bonds
.
'T
is
Customary
with
us
to
Love
only
those
things
which
are
capable
of
doing
us
some
Good
.
This
Philosophy
therefore
Authorises
only
the
Love
of
God
,
and
Condemns
the
Love
of
every
thing
else
.
We
ought
to
fear
nothing
but
what
is
able
to
do
us
some
Evil.
Therefore
this
Philosophy
approves
the
fear
of
God
,
and
absolutely
Condemns
all
other
:
Thus
it
justifies
all
the
just
and
Reasonable
Motions
of
our
Soul
,
and
Condemns
all
those
that
are
contrary
to
Reason
and
Religion
:
For
we
can
never
justifie
the
Love
of
Riches
,
the
desire
of
Greatness
,
the
Extravagance
of
Debauchery
by
this
Philosophy
,
by
the
Principles
whereof
,
the
Love
for
Bodies
is
absurd
and
ridiculous
.
'T
is
an
indisputable
Truth
,
't
is
a
Natural
Opinion
,
't
is
even
a
Common
Notion
that
we
ought
to
Love
the
cause
of
our
Pleasure
,
and
to
Love
it
proportionably
to
the
Felicity
it
either
Actually
does
,
or
is
able
to
possess
us
with
.
'T
is
not
only
just
,
but
as
it
were
necessary
that
the
cause
of
our
happiness
,
should
be
the
Object
of
our
Love
.
Therefore
this
Philosophy
will
teach
us
to
Love
God
only
,
as
being
the
only
Cause
of
our
Felicity
:
That
surrounding
Bodies
cannot
Act
upon
that
we
Animate
;
and
consequently
much
less
upon
our
Mind
.
That
't
is
not
the
Sun
which
enlightens
us
,
and
gives
us
Life
and
Motion
:
Nor
that
fills
the
Earth
with
Fruits
,
and
Beautifies
it
with
Flowers
,
and
supplies
us
with
Food
and
Nourishment
.
This
Philosophy
seconding
the
Scripture
,
[
](A51674-e129590-b)*
*
Acts
14.15.16
.
teaches
that
't
is
God
alone
who
gives
us
Rain
,
and
Regulates
the
Seasons
,
that
fills
our
Bodies
with
Food
,
and
our
hearts
with
Joy
,
that
he
alone
is
able
to
do
us
good
;
and
thereby
has
given
a
perpetual
Testimony
of
what
he
is
;
though
in
the
ages
passed
he
suffer'd
all
Nations
to
walk
in
their
own
ways
.
According
to
the
Language
of
this
Philosophy
,
we
must
not
say
that
't
is
Nature
that
fills
us
with
good
;
nor
that
it
is
Ergo
nihil
agis
,
ingratissime
mortalium
,
qui
te
negas
Deo
debere
,
sed
naturae
:
quia
nec
naturae
Deo
est
,
nec
Deus
sine
natura
,
sed
idem
est
utrumque
,
nec
distat
.
Officium
si
quod
a
Seneca
accepisses
,
Annaeo
diceres
te
debere
,
vel
Lucio
:
Non
creditorem
mutares
,
sed
nomen
.
Sen.
l.
4.
de
Benef.
God
and
Nature
together
:
But
that
it
is
God
alone
,
speaking
thus
without
Ambiguity
,
for
fear
of
deceiving
the
Ignorant
.
For
we
must
distinctly
acknowledge
one
cause
of
our
happiness
,
if
we
we
make
it
the
only
Object
of
our
Love
.
'T
is
likewise
an
undeniable
Truth
,
That
we
ought
to
fear
things
that
are
able
to
harm
us
,
and
to
fear
them
,
in
Proportion
to
the
Evil
they
can
do
us
.
But
this
Philosophy
teaches
us
that
God
only
can
do
us
evil
;
that
't
is
he
,
as
says
Isaiah
,
who
forms
the
Light
and
creates
Darkness
,
who
makes
Peace
and
creates
Evil
;
Isa.
45.7
.
Amos.
3.6
.
and
there
is
no
Evil
but
what
he
does
,
as
says
the
Prophet
Amos.
Therefore
it
is
he
only
that
is
to
be
fear'd
.
We
must
not
fear
either
Plague
or
War
,
or
Famine
,
or
our
Enemies
,
or
even
Devils
themselves
:
But
God
alone
.
We
ought
to
shun
the
Sword
,
when
we
see
a
Blow
a
coming
,
we
are
to
fly
the
Fire
,
and
avoid
a
ruinous
House
that
's
ready
to
crush
us
;
but
we
must
not
fear
these
things
.
We
may
fly
from
those
Bodies
which
are
the
Occasional
or
Natural
Causes
of
Evil
,
but
we
must
fear
God
as
the
true
Cause
of
all
the
misfortunes
of
Sinners
;
and
hate
only
Sin
which
necessarily
provokes
the
cause
of
our
Happiness
to
become
the
Cause
of
our
Misery
:
In
a
Word
all
the
Motions
of
our
Mind
,
must
center
upon
God
,
since
he
alone
's
above
it
,
and
the
Motions
of
our
Body
may
relate
to
the
Bodies
round
it
.
This
is
what
we
learn
from
that
Philosophy
that
admits
not
the
Efficacy
of
Second
Causes
.
But
this
Efficacy
being
suppos'd
,
I
cannot
see
but
we
have
reason
to
fear
and
Love
Bodies
;
and
that
to
regulate
our
Love
by
Reason
,
we
need
but
prefer
God
before
all
things
;
the
First
and
Vniversal
,
to
every
Second
and
Particular
Cause
.
We
can
see
no
need
of
Loving
him
with
all
our
Strength
;
Ex
totâ
mente
,
ex
toto
corde
,
ex
totâ
animâ
,
ex
totis
viribus
,
as
says
the
Scripture
.
Yet
when
a
Man
contents
himself
in
preferring
God
to
all
things
,
and
adoring
him
with
a
Worship
,
and
a
Love
of
Preference
,
without
making
a
continual
Effort
to
Love
and
Honour
him
in
all
things
:
It
often
fortunes
that
he
deceives
himself
,
that
his
Charity
vanishes
,
and
is
lost
:
And
that
he
is
more
taken
up
with
sensible
than
the
supream
Good
.
For
should
it
be
demanded
of
the
greatest
Sinners
,
and
even
Idolaters
,
whether
they
preferr'd
the
universal
to
particular
Causes
,
they
would
make
no
scruple
to
answer
amidst
their
Debauches
,
Errours
and
Extravagance
;
that
they
are
not
wanting
to
their
essential
Duty
,
and
that
they
are
very
sensible
of
what
they
owe
to
God
.
'T
is
acknowledg'd
that
they
are
deceiv'd
.
But
take
away
the
Efficacy
of
Second
Causes
,
and
they
have
no
probable
Pretext
left
to
justifie
their
Conduct
and
Behaviour
;
whilst
if
it
be
granted
them
,
they
will
think
and
Discourse
with
themselves
in
the
following
manner
,
when
blinded
by
their
Passions
,
and
attentive
to
the
Testimony
of
their
Senses
.
I
am
made
for
Happiness
:
Neitheir
can
I
,
nor
indeed
ought
I
,
to
supersede
my
Love
and
Respect
,
for
whatever
can
be
the
Cause
of
my
Felicity
:
Why
then
must
not
I
Love
and
respect
sensible
Objects
,
if
they
be
the
true
Causes
of
the
Happiness
I
find
in
their
Enjoyment
?
I
acknowledge
the
Sovereign
Being
as
only
worthy
of
Sovereign
Worship
,
and
I
prefer
Him
before
all
the
World
,
But
since
I
see
not
that
He
requires
any
thing
from
me
,
I
enjoy
the
Goods
he
affords
by
Means
of
Second
Causes
,
to
which
he
has
subjected
me
:
And
I
pay
not
my
Gratitude
to
him
,
which
perhaps
would
be
to
his
Dishonour
.
As
he
gives
me
no
Blessing
,
immediately
and
by
himself
,
or
at
least
without
the
Assistance
of
his
Creatures
,
't
is
a
Sign
he
requires
not
the
immediate
Application
of
my
Mind
and
Heart
;
at
least
,
that
he
desires
the
Creatures
should
partake
with
him
,
in
the
Acknowledgments
and
Resentments
of
my
Heart
and
Mind
.
Seeing
he
has
communicated
Part
of
his
Power
and
Glory
to
the
Sun
,
has
environ'd
him
with
Splendour
and
Majesty
,
and
has
given
him
the
Supremacy
in
all
his
Works
;
and
seeing
from
the
Influence
of
this
great
Luminary
,
we
receive
all
the
necessary
Blessings
of
Life
;
Why
should
we
not
employ
a
part
of
this
indebted
Life
,
in
rejoicing
in
his
Light
,
and
testifying
the
Sense
we
have
of
his
Greatness
and
his
Benefits
?
Wou'd
it
not
be
the
most
shameful
Ingratitude
,
to
receive
from
that
excellent
Creature
abundance
of
all
things
,
and
yet
to
shew
no
Sense
of
Gratitude
to
him
for
them
?
And
should
we
not
be
unspeakably
blind
and
stupid
,
to
be
unmov'd
with
Fear
and
Veneration
in
Respect
of
him
,
whose
Absence
freezes
us
to
Death
,
and
whose
too
near
Approach
can
burn
and
destroy
us
?
I
say
it
again
,
that
God
is
preferable
to
all
things
,
and
infinitely
more
estimable
than
his
Creatures
:
But
we
are
to
fear
and
Love
his
Creatures
also
.
For
hereby
we
pay
Legitimate
Honour
to
their
Creatour
;
Merit
his
good
Graces
,
and
oblige
him
to
shower
new
Benefits
upon
us
.
'T
is
manifest
,
he
approves
of
the
Honour
that
is
given
to
his
Creatures
;
since
they
partake
of
his
Power
,
and
all
Power
deserves
to
be
honour'd
.
But
because
Honour
ought
to
be
Proportion'd
to
Power
,
and
that
the
Power
of
the
Sun
,
and
all
other
sensible
Objects
,
is
such
,
as
derives
to
us
all
sorts
of
Goods
,
't
is
reasonable
we
should
Honour
them
with
all
our
Strength
,
and
,
next
to
God
,
Consecrate
to
them
all
our
Being
.
These
are
the
Natural
Reasonings
a
Man
would
fall
into
,
that
should
ground
upon
the
Prejudice
of
the
Efficacy
of
Second
Causes
;
and
probably
such
was
the
Arguing
of
the
first
Founders
of
Idolatry
.
Take
here
his
Sense
of
it
,
who
passes
for
the
most
Learned
of
all
the
Jews
:
He
Prefaces
a
a
Treatise
he
wrote
about
Idolatry
with
these
Words
.
In
the
days
of
Enos
Men
fell
into
strange
Illusions
,
●
.
Moses
Maimonid
.
and
the
Wise
Men
of
that
Age
quite
lost
their
Sense
and
Reason
.
Enos
himself
was
one
of
those
deluded
Persons
,
whose
Errours
were
these
.
Since
God
,
said
they
,
has
created
the
Heavens
and
Stars
to
govern
the
World
,
has
constituted
them
on
●igh
,
and
invested
them
with
Glory
and
Lustre
,
and
employs
them
in
executing
his
Commands
,
't
is
just
that
we
should
honour
them
,
and
pay
them
our
Deference
and
Homage
.
'T
is
the
Will
of
our
God
,
that
Honour
should
be
given
to
those
whom
he
has
exalted
and
enthron'd
in
Glory
;
as
a
Prince
requires
that
his
Ministers
should
be
●onour'd
in
his
Presence
,
because
the
Honour
which
is
given
to
them
redounds
to
himself
.
Vide
Vossium
,
lib.
2.
de
Idololatri●
.
When
once
this
Notion
had
entred
their
Head
,
they
fell
to
building
Temples
in
Honour
of
the
Stars
,
gave
them
Sacrifice
and
Praises
,
and
even
prostrated
themselves
before
them
;
thereby
imagining
to
purchase
the
favour
of
Him
that
created
them
:
And
this
was
the
Original
of
Idolatry
.
It
is
so
Natural
and
just
to
have
grateful
Resentments
in
Proportion
to
the
Goods
we
receive
,
that
almost
all
Nations
have
ador'd
the
Sun
,
because
they
all
concluded
him
the
Cause
of
the
Blessings
they
enjoy'd
.
And
if
the
Aegyptians
ador'd
not
only
the
Sun
and
Moon
,
and
River
Nile
,
Ipsi
qui
irridentur
Aegyptii
,
nul●am
belluam
nisi
ob
aliquam
〈◊〉
quam
ex
ea
caperent
,
consecr●v●rant
.
Cic.
l.
1.
de
N●tura
Deorum
.
because
its
overflowing
caus'd
the
Fertility
of
their
Country
,
but
even
the
vilest
of
Animals
:
'T
was
(
as
Cicero
relates
)
from
the
Emolument
they
receiv'd
from
them
.
Therefore
,
as
we
cannot
,
and
indeed
ought
not
to
Extirpate
from
Men's
Minds
,
their
Natural
Inclination
for
the
true
Causes
of
their
Happiness
,
't
is
evident
there
is
at
least
some
danger
in
ascribing
Efficacy
to
Second
Causes
,
though
we
conjoyn
the
necessity
of
an
immediate
Concourse
,
which
has
,
methinks
,
I
know
not
what
of
incomprehensible
purport
,
and
which
strikes
in
as
an
after-game
to
justifie
our
imbib'd
Prejudices
,
and
Aristotle's
Philosophy
.
But
there
's
no
danger
in
speaking
only
what
we
see
,
and
of
Attributing
only
to
God
Efficacy
and
Power
,
since
we
see
nothing
but
His
Wills
,
which
have
an
absolutely
necessary
and
indispensible
connexion
with
Natural
Effects
▪
I
own
that
now
adays
,
Men
are
Wise
enough
to
avoid
those
gross
Errors
of
Heathens
and
Idolaters
;
but
I
fear
not
to
say
,
our
Mind
is
still
dispos'd
,
or
rather
our
Heart
is
often
bent
like
that
of
the
Heathens
;
and
that
there
will
ever
be
in
the
World
some
kind
of
Idolatry
,
until
the
Day
in
which
JESUS
CHRIST
shall
restore
up
His
Kingdom
to
God
his
Father
,
having
first
destroy'd
all
Empire
Dominion
and
Power
,
that
God
may
be
All
in
all
.
For
is
it
not
a
kind
of
Idolatry
,
to
make
a
God
of
ones
Belly
,
as
speaks
S.
Paul
?
Phil.
3.9
.
[
](A51674-e130050-b)*
*
No
Whoremonger
nor
unclean
Person
,
nor
covetous
Man
,
who
is
an
Idolater
,
Eph.
5.5
.
Is
not
he
an
Idolater
to
the
God
of
Riches
,
who
labours
Night
and
Day
to
acquire
them
?
Is
this
to
render
to
God
the
Worship
we
owe
Him
?
Is
this
to
adore
Him
in
Spirit
and
in
Truth
,
to
have
our
Hearts
fill'd
with
some
sensible
Beauty
,
and
our
Mind
struck
and
dazled
with
the
Lustre
of
some
imaginary
Grandeur
?
[
](A51674-e130070-b)†
†
They
that
worship
him
,
must
Worship
him
in
Spirit
and
in
Truth
,
Joh.
4.24
.
Men
fancying
to
themselves
,
that
Circumambient
Bodies
afford
the
pleasures
they
enjoy
in
the
use
of
them
,
Unite
to
them
with
all
the
Powers
of
their
Soul
;
and
thus
the
Principle
of
their
Corruption
lies
in
the
sensible
Conviction
of
the
Efficacy
of
Second
Causes
.
'T
is
only
Reason
that
assures
them
none
but
God
Acts
in
them
.
But
besides
that
,
this
Reason
speaks
so
low
that
it
is
scarce
Audible
,
and
that
the
Contradicting
Senses
cry
so
loud
,
that
their
Clamour
Stunns
and
Stupefies
them
,
they
are
yet
farther
confirm'd
in
their
Prejudice
,
by
Reasons
and
Arguments
that
are
so
much
dangerous
,
as
they
have
more
External
Characters
and
sensible
marks
of
Truth
.
The
Philosophers
,
but
especially
the
Christian
Philosophers
,
ought
to
wage
an
uninterrupted
War
with
Prejudices
,
or
the
Judgements
of
their
Senses
,
and
particularly
those
of
so
dangerous
importance
,
as
that
of
the
Efficacy
of
Second
Causes
.
And
yet
there
are
Men
,
whom
I
extremely
honour
,
(
as
I
have
just
Reason
)
who
from
I
know
not
what
Principle
endeavour
to
confirm
this
Prejudice
,
and
to
make
so
holy
,
so
pure
and
solid
a
Doctrine
as
this
,
which
owns
no
other
true
Cause
than
God
,
pass
for
Superstitious
and
Extravagant
Opinion
.
They
will
not
have
us
to
Love
and
Fear
God
in
all
things
,
but
to
Love
and
Fear
all
things
with
reference
to
God
.
We
ought
,
say
they
,
Nos
si
hominem
patrem
vocamus
honorem
a●a●i
deferimus
,
non
Authorem
vitae
nostrae
ostendimus
.
Hier.
in
c.
33.
Matth.
1
Cor.
9.22
.
&
10.33
.
Eph.
6.6
.
Col.
3.22
.
to
Love
the
Creatures
,
since
they
are
good
;
to
Love
and
respect
our
Father
▪
to
give
Honour
to
our
Prince
and
Superiours
,
since
God
Commands
it
.
Nor
do
I
deny
it
;
but
I
deny
that
we
are
to
Love
the
Creatures
as
our
Goods
,
though
they
be
good
or
perfect
in
themselves
.
I
deny
that
we
are
to
pay
service
and
respect
to
Men
as
to
our
Masters
.
Or
,
to
explain
my self
more
clearly
,
I
say
,
we
must
not
serve
our
Master
,
obey
our
Father
,
or
Prince
,
with
any
other
design
than
to
serve
and
obey
God
.
S.
Paul
,
who
became
all
things
to
all
Men
,
and
was
complaisant
in
all
things
;
for
the
Salvation
of
those
he
Preach'd
to
,
speaks
thus
:
Servants
be
obedient
to
them
that
are
your
Masters
,
according
to
the
flesh
,
with
fear
and
trembling
,
in
singleness
of
your
Heart
,
as
unto
CHRIST
;
not
with
Eye-Service
,
as
Men
pleasers
,
but
as
the
Servants
of
Christ
,
doing
the
Will
of
God
from
the
Heart
,
with
good
Will
doing
Service
,
AS
TO
THE
LORD
,
AND
NOT
TO
MEN.
And
in
another
Epistle
.
Not
with
Eye-Service
,
as
to
MEN
,
but
in
singleness
of
Heart
,
fearing
GOD.
And
whatever
ye
do
,
do
it
Heartily
,
AS
TO
THE
LORD
,
and
NOT
VNTO
MEN.
We
must
therefore
obey
our
Father
,
serve
our
Prince
,
and
Honour
our
Superiours
,
AS
UNTO
GOD
AND
NOT
UNTO
MEN.
This
is
manifest
,
and
can
have
no
Evil
consequences
:
For
hereby
Superiours
would
always
be
more
honour'd
,
and
better
serv'd
.
But
I
think
it
may
be
said
,
That
a
Master
,
who
would
be
honour'd
and
serv'd
,
as
having
in
himself
another
Power
than
that
of
God
,
would
be
a
Devil
;
and
that
those
who
serv'd
him
under
that
apprehension
would
be
Idolaters
;
for
I
cannot
refrain
from
believing
that
all
Honour
and
Love
,
that
have
not
God
for
their
End
,
are
Species
of
Idolatry
.
Soli
Deo
honor
&
gloria
.
THE
ILLUSTRATION
UPON
WHAT
I
have
said
in
the
Fourth
Chapter
of
the
Second
Part
,
concerning
Method
,
and
elsewhere
.
That
God
Acts
always
with
Order
,
and
by
the
simplest
ways
.
'T
IS
thought
by
some
Persons
to
be
too
rash
,
and
venturous
conjecturing
,
and
abusing
loose
and
General
Terms
,
To
say
that
God
always
Acts
with
Order
,
and
by
ways
that
are
most
simple
and
easie
for
the
Execution
of
his
designs
.
Wherefore
it
will
not
be
an
useless
undertaking
to
prove
and
explain
this
Truth
,
since
't
is
of
the
greatest
consequence
,
not
only
to
the
knowledge
of
Nature
,
but
much
more
for
the
knowledge
of
Religion
and
Morality
.
By
the
Word
[
God
]
we
understand
an
infinitely
perfect
Being
,
whose
Wisdom
and
Knowledge
have
no
bounds
,
and
who
consequently
knows
all
the
means
by
which
he
can
execute
his
Designs
.
Which
suppos'd
,
I
say
,
that
God
Acts
always
by
the
shortest
means
,
and
by
the
simplest
ways
.
To
make
my
meaning
better
understood
,
I
take
a
sensible
Example
.
I
suppose
that
God
Wills
the
Body
A
should
strike
the
Body
B.
Since
God
knows
all
,
He
perfectly
knows
that
A
may
tend
to
strike
against
B
by
innumerable
crooked
Lines
,
and
by
but
one
right
.
Now
God
Wills
only
the
impulsion
of
B
by
A
;
and
we
suppose
that
he
only
Wills
the
Translation
of
A
to
B
,
to
effect
this
impulsion
.
A
then
must
be
convey'd
to
B
by
the
shortest
way
,
that
is
,
by
a
right
Line
.
For
if
the
Body
A
were
convey'd
to
B
by
a
crooked
Line
,
that
would
show
either
that
the
conveyer
knew
no
other
way
,
or
that
he
purpos'd
not
only
the
Collision
of
these
Bodies
,
but
also
the
means
of
making
it
,
otherwise
than
by
Relation
to
it
,
which
is
against
the
Supposition
.
There
is
required
so
much
more
Action
to
convey
a
Body
from
A
to
B
,
by
a
curv'd
than
by
a
right
Line
,
as
the
curv'd
is
longer
than
the
right
.
If
therefore
,
God
translated
A
to
B
by
a
curv'd
Line
,
double
to
the
interjacent
right
,
half
of
the
Action
of
God
would
be
intirely
useless
,
and
so
half
his
Action
would
be
produc'd
without
design
and
end
,
as
well
as
without
effect
;
therefore
,
Again
,
Action
in
God
is
Will
;
therefore
more
Will
is
requir'd
in
God
,
to
cause
A
to
be
circulary
than
directly
translated
.
But
we
suppose
that
God
had
no
Will
in
respect
of
the
Motion
of
A
,
but
as
it
relates
to
the
Collision
;
therefore
there
is
not
Will
enough
in
God
to
move
A
by
a
crooked
Line
;
and
consequently
't
is
a
Contradiction
for
A
to
be
so
mov'd
.
Thus
it
is
a
Contradiction
,
that
God
should
not
Act
by
the
most
simple
ways
,
unless
we
suppose
that
God
,
in
the
choice
of
means
he
imploys
for
the
executing
his
designs
,
has
something
else
in
view
than
these
designs
,
which
is
a
Contradiction
in
our
Supposition
.
When
I
say
there
is
more
Will
in
God
to
translate
a
Body
from
A
to
B
,
by
a
crooked
Line
than
by
a
strait
;
it
is
not
to
be
thence
concluded
,
against
the
simplicity
of
God's
Essence
and
Action
.
For
it
must
be
acknowledged
,
That
it
is
not
comprehensible
,
how
either
the
simplicity
of
an
Infinite
Being
,
includes
all
the
different
perfections
of
Finite
Beings
;
or
how
his
Will
continuing
ever
the
same
,
and
always
conformable
to
Order
,
varies
with
reference
to
the
different
Beings
it
produces
,
and
preserves
.
I
speak
but
according
to
our
way
of
conceiving
things
:
Now
,
methinks
,
I
have
a
most
clear
Conception
,
That
when
God
Wills
,
and
Creates
,
for
Example
,
one
cubical
foot
of
Matter
,
He
Wills
another
thing
than
when
He
Creates
two
.
For
nothing
is
plainer
than
that
God
could
not
Create
two
different
things
,
nor
know
whether
he
Created
one
or
two
Cube-feet
of
Matter
,
or
whether
he
convey'd
a
Body
circularly
or
directly
,
if
there
were
not
in
His
Wills
some
difference
,
in
regard
to
Matter
and
its
Motion
,
since
God
sees
no
otherwise
than
in
Himself
,
and
in
his
own
Wills
,
all
the
differences
of
His
Creatures
.
Now
whatever
that
Action
is
in
God
,
which
relates
to
the
different
Beings
produc'd
,
or
preserv'd
by
Him
,
I
call
the
Differences
,
or
Augmentations
and
Diminutions
of
Will
in
God
.
And
in
this
way
of
conceiving
things
,
I
say
that
God
cannot
employ
more
Will
than
is
necessary
to
the
executing
his
Designs
,
and
therefore
Acts
always
by
the
simplest
ways
with
reference
to
them
.
However
I
deny
not
,
but
it
's
possible
for
God
to
have
a
great
number
of
ways
equally
simple
for
the
producing
the
same
effects
,
or
that
He
may
produce
them
by
different
means
:
But
this
I
say
,
that
He
always
brings
them
to
pass
,
by
the
ways
that
are
most
simple
,
provided
they
be
all
of
the
same
kind
;
it
being
a
Contradiction
that
an
Infinitely
Wise
Being
,
should
have
useless
or
disorderly
Wills
.
Now
if
we
bring
home
this
Principle
to
Morality
,
we
shall
see
that
those
ensure
their
Salvation
,
who
so
prepare
themselves
for
Grace
,
by
Self-denial
and
Repentance
,
and
an
exact
Obedience
to
the
Precepts
of
our
LORD
,
as
that
God
Acting
by
the
simplest
ways
,
that
is
,
in
giving
them
but
little
additional
Grace
,
may
Operate
much
in
them
.
For
though
God
would
have
all
Men
saved
,
yet
he
shall
save
none
but
those
that
can
be
sav'd
by
the
most
simple
means
,
which
have
reference
to
his
great
design
of
Sanctifying
through
JESUS
CHRIST
,
a
determinate
number
of
Elect
unto
his
Glory
;
and
he
will
multiply
the
Children
of
Eve
,
till
that
number
be
fulfill'd
.
For
God's
design
of
Sanctifying
us
by
the
simplest
ways
,
made
it
necessary
for
him
,
after
the
Sin
,
to
multiply
the
Children
of
Men
,
that
he
might
fill
up
the
number
of
the
Elect
;
since
there
are
a
great
many
Persons
who
Damn
themselves
,
by
with-drawing
from
the
Order
of
God
.
But
whereas
God
does
not
Work
like
a
Particular
Cause
,
we
ought
not
to
imagine
that
He
has
,
like
us
,
particular
Volitions
for
every
thing
He
produces
:
For
if
it
were
so
,
it
seems
evident
to
me
,
That
the
Generation
of
Monsters
would
be
impossible
,
and
it
would
never
happen
that
one
of
God's
Works
should
destroy
another
.
And
since
God
cannot
have
contrary
Wills
,
we
must
have
had
recourse
with
the
Manichees
,
to
a
Principle
of
Evil
,
to
freeze
,
for
Example
,
the
Fruits
which
God
made
to
grow
:
Which
being
so
,
there
is
,
methinks
,
a
necessity
to
conclude
the
establishment
of
some
General
Laws
,
by
which
God
Predestines
and
Sanctifies
his
Elect
in
JESUS
CHRIST
;
which
Laws
are
what
we
call
the
Order
of
Grace
,
as
God's
General
Wills
,
whereby
he
produces
,
and
preserves
all
things
in
the
World
,
are
the
Order
of
Nature
.
I
know
not
but
I
may
be
mistaken
,
yet
I
doubt
not
but
from
this
Principle
might
be
directly
drawn
a
great
many
Consequences
,
which
might
resove
those
difficulties
that
have
been
the
Controverted
Subjects
of
several
Years
.
But
I
do
not
think
my self
oblig'd
to
deduce
them
;
let
every
one
do
it
according
to
his
Light
and
Abilities
;
't
is
more
to
the
purpose
to
say
nothing
,
than
to
say
such
things
as
are
unnecessary
to
be
known
,
and
which
,
it
may
be
,
would
be
easier
agreed
to
some
time
hereafter
than
at
present
.
Only
this
I
would
have
well
understood
,
That
the
simplest
ways
to
our
Sanctification
are
Self-denial
and
Repentance
;
or
at
least
that
it
be
well
consider'd
,
that
since
JESUS
CHRIST
distinctly
knows
the
Laws
of
the
Order
of
Grace
,
we
run
continual
dangers
,
in
not
following
the
ways
he
has
mark'd
us
out
,
not
only
by
his
Words
,
but
all
the
Actions
of
his
Life
.
Yet
since
we
meet
with
such
particular
Occurrences
in
the
course
of
Life
,
as
make
us
dubious
which
way
to
determine
,
because
of
the
contrary
Reasons
that
may
be
brought
for
and
against
certain
Opinions
;
it
will
perhaps
be
time
well
spent
to
show
here
,
by
some
particular
Example
,
that
much
use
may
be
made
of
the
fore-going
Principle
,
viz.
That
God
Acts
always
by
the
simplest
ways
.
Let
us
suppose
,
for
instance
,
that
I
desir'd
to
be
resolv'd
,
whether
I
ought
every
day
to
set
apart
some
Constant
Times
for
Retiring
into
my self
,
for
setting
my
own
Weakness
and
Miseries
before
me
,
and
for
considering
my
Obligations
in
the
presence
of
God
,
and
praying
for
his
Assistance
,
in
Conquering
my
Passions
;
or
on
the
other
hand
,
whether
I
ought
to
wait
for
the
Spirit
of
God
,
which
blows
where
,
and
when
it
pleases
,
to
call
me
from
my self
,
and
my
Ordinary
Employments
,
to
apply
me
unto
Him
.
For
probable
Reasons
may
be
given
both
for
and
against
each
of
these
Opinions
;
and
Men
frequently
take
up
with
probability
on
such
Occasions
,
which
is
the
Reason
that
Religious
Persons
follow
sometimes
a
quite
different
Conduct
,
and
not
always
that
which
is
the
safest
.
I
consider
then
,
That
if
I
stay
for
the
particular
Motions
of
the
Spirit
of
God
,
I
shall
never
pray
unless
I
receive
particular
Illuminations
,
or
preventing
Delights
for
that
intent
.
Now
these
Illuminations
or
Delectations
,
being
produc'd
of
God
by
Wills
more
particular
than
are
those
General
Wills
,
which
constitute
the
Order
of
Nature
,
are
sorts
of
Miracles
.
Therefore
to
rely
upon
God's
Graces
,
which
are
not
always
necessary
,
is
to
suppose
that
He
induces
me
to
pray
by
means
that
are
not
the
most
simple
,
and
in
some
measure
to
tempt
God
,
But
if
I
use
my self
to
a
Custom
of
appearing
,
or
endeavouring
to
appear
in
the
presence
of
God
at
particular
Hours
,
the
sound
of
the
Clock
will
suffice
to
remind
me
of
my
Duty
,
and
there
is
no
need
that
God
should
by
a
particular
will
inspire
me
with
the
Thoughts
of
Prayer
.
The
General
Laws
of
Union
of
my
Body
and
Soul
,
will
make
me
think
of
my
Duty
,
when
the
time
I
have
appointed
for
it
,
by
some
sensible
Notice
makes
it self
remarkable
.
But
as
Self-Examination
and
Prayer
are
necessary
,
and
as
we
cannot
pray
without
having
at
least
the
Thoughts
of
it
;
and
as
we
cannot
have
the
Thoughts
of
it
,
unless
God
gives
them
,
it
is
some
advance
to
Salvation
to
have
these
Thoughts
without
obliging
God
to
give
them
us
by
particular
Wills
,
or
kinds
of
Miracles
.
It
is
possibly
the
want
of
this
first
Thought
of
praying
and
considering
their
Obligation
before
God
,
which
is
the
Origine
of
the
Blindness
and
Delusion
of
many
Men
,
and
consequently
of
their
Eternal
Damnation
.
For
God
Acting
always
by
the
simplest
means
,
ought
not
by
particular
Wills
to
give
them
those
Thoughts
which
they
might
have
obtain'd
by
vertue
of
his
general
Wills
,
if
they
had
once
accustom'd
themselves
,
to
pray
regularly
at
particular
Hours
.
Therefore
,
as
God
Wills
the
Saving
all
Men
by
the
simplest
ways
,
it
is
evident
we
ought
,
as
much
as
possible
,
to
make
the
Order
of
Nature
subservient
to
that
of
Grace
,
and
to
reconcile
,
as
I
may
say
,
God's
Wills
together
,
by
regulating
a
time
which
may
supply
us
at
least
with
the
Thoughts
of
Prayer
.
For
these
Reasons
,
probably
,
God
Commanded
,
heretofore
,
the
Jews
to
write
His
Commandments
upon
the
Doors
of
their
Houses
,
and
constantly
to
carry
some
sensible
Marks
that
might
put
them
in
Mind
of
them
;
which
remitted
God
his
particular
Will
,
if
I
may
so
speak
,
of
inspiring
them
with
these
Thoughts
.
For
Miracles
of
Grace
were
extremely
rare
among
the
Jews
,
the
time
being
not
yet
fullfill'd
when
God
was
to
engrave
his
Law
,
and
infuse
his
Spirit
,
and
his
Charity
in
the
heart
of
Men.
I
acknowledge
that
all
things
we
can
do
,
by
meer
Natural
strength
,
are
insufficient
to
fit
us
meritoriously
for
Grace
,
without
which
all
the
exteriour
show
of
Religion
can
but
feed
and
cherish
our
Pride
and
Self-Love
.
The
Pharisees
were
Vain-Glorious
upon
their
carrying
the
sensible
signs
and
memoratives
of
the
Law
of
God
,
as
our
Saviour
reproves
them
;
and
Christians
often
make
use
of
Crosses
and
Images
,
out
of
Curiosity
,
of
Hypocrisie
,
or
some
other
Motive
of
Self-Love
:
Yet
,
since
these
things
may
put
us
in
Mind
of
God
,
they
may
be
to
good
purpose
imploy'd
;
because
we
ought
to
make
Nature
,
as
far
as
possible
,
instrumental
to
Grace
,
that
God
may
serve
us
by
the
simplest
ways
.
For
though
we
cannot
naturally
fit
and
dispose
our selves
for
Grace
,
yet
we
may
often
contribute
to
make
it
effectual
,
in
as
much
as
we
can
curb
the
eagerness
of
a
Passion
,
by
removing
from
the
Objects
that
cause
it
,
or
by
urging
contrary
Reasons
to
those
of
its
Suggestion
.
Those
who
Watch
more
carefully
than
others
over
the
purity
of
their
Imagination
,
or
give
not
so
much
way
to
be
corrupted
by
the
continual
enjoyment
of
sensible
Pleasures
,
and
Wordly
Commerce
,
make
Grace
efficacious
,
by
taking
away
that
impediment
and
resistance
which
it
finds
in
others
.
In
which
sense
a
Disease
,
a
shower
of
Rain
,
or
any
other
accident
,
that
keeps
us
at
home
,
may
render
Grace
Efficacious
:
For
such
a
degree
of
Grace
as
would
have
been
too
weak
and
ineffectual
for
our
resisting
the
sensible
impression
of
a
present
and
agreeable
Object
,
is
strong
enough
to
make
us
reject
and
detest
the
impure
Thought
,
or
Imagination
of
the
same
Object
.
This
is
all
we
need
to
say
to
make
it
manifest
,
That
the
Counsels
of
the
Gospel
are
necessary
,
in
Order
to
God's
Saving
us
by
the
simplest
means
.
For
't
is
advantageous
to
follow
them
,
not
only
because
when
we
follow
them
by
the
Motion
of
God's
Spirit
,
they
determine
it
by
vertue
of
immutable
Order
,
or
of
the
General
Laws
of
the
Order
of
Grace
,
to
increase
in
us
our
Love
of
Him
;
but
also
,
because
the
practising
these
Counsels
,
may
frequently
render
Grace
Efficacious
,
though
Self-Love
be
the
Motive
,
as
it
may
be
,
on
many
Occasions
.
FINIS
.