II. If my own particular Mind were my Reason and my Light , my Mind would also be the Reason of all intelligent Beings ; for I am certain , that my Reason enlightens all intelligent Beings . No one can feel my Pain but my self , but every one may see the Truth which I contemplate ; so that the Pain which I feel is a Modification of my own proper Substance , but Truth is a Possession common to all Spiritual Beings .

III. Thus , by the means of Reason , I have , or may have some Society with God , and all other intelligent Beings ; because they all possess something in common with me , to wit , Reason .

IV. This Spiritual Society consists in a participation of the same intellectual Substance of the Word , from which all Spiritual Beings may receive their Nourishment . In contemplating this Divine Substance , I am able to see some part of what God thinks ; for God sees all Truths , and there are some which I can see . I can also discover something of the Will of God ; for God wills nothing but according to a certain Order , and this Order is not altogether unknown to me . It is certain that God loves Things according as they are worthy of Love ; and I can discover that there are some Things more Perfect , more Valuable , and consequently more worthy of Love than others .

V. It is true , indeed , that I cannot by contemplating the Word or consulting Reason , be assur'd whether God doth actually produce any thing out of his own Being or no. For none of the Creatures proceed naturally from the Word ; nor is the World a necessary emanation of the Deity ; God is fully sufficient for himself ; and the Idea of a Being infinitely perfect , may be conceiv'd to subsist alone . The Creatures then suppose in God free and arbitrary Decrees , which give them their Being . So that the Word , as such , not containing in it the Existence of the Creatures , we cannot by the Contemplation of it be assur'd of the Action of God : But supposing that God doth act , I am able to know something of the manner in which he acts , and may be certain that he doth not act in such or such a manner ; for that which regulates his manner of Acting , the Law which he inviolably observes , is the Word , the Eternal Wisdom , the Universal Reason , which makes me Rational , and which I can in part contemplate according to my own desires .

VI. If we suppose Man to be a Rational Creature , we cannot certainly deny him the Knowledge of something that God thinks , and of the manner in which he acts . For by contemplating the substance of the Word , which alone makes me and all other intelligent Beings Rational , I can clearly discover the Relations or Proportions of Greatness that are between the intellectual Ideas comprehended in it ; and these Relations are the same eternal Truths which God himself sees . For God sees as well as I , that twice two is four , and that Triangles which have the same Base , and are between the same Parallels , are equal . I can also discover , at least confusedly , the Relations of Perfection which are between the same Ideas ; and these Relations are that immutable Order which God consults when he acts , and which ought also to regulate the Esteem and Love of all intelligent Beings .

VII . From hence it is evident , that there are such things as True and False , Right and Wrong , and that too in respect of all intelligent Beings ; that whatsoever is true in respect of Man , is true also in respect of Angels , and of God himself ; that what is Injustice or Disorder with relation to Man , is so also with relation to God . For all Spiritual Beings contemplating the same intellectual Substance , necessarily discover in it the same Relations of Greatness , or the same speculative Truths . They discover also the same practical Truths , the same Laws , and the same Order , when they see the Relations of Perfection that are between those intellectual Beings comprehended in the Substance of the Word , which alone is the immediate Object of all our Knowledge .

VIII . I say , when they see these Relations of Perfection or Greatness , and not when they judge of them ; for only Truth or the real Relations of Things are visible , and we ought to judge of nothing but what we see . When we judge before we see , or of more things than we see , we are deceiv'd in our Judgment , or at least we judge ill , tho' we may happen by chance not to be deceiv'd : For when we judge of things by chance , as well as when we judge by Passion or Interest , we judge ill , because we do not judge by Evidence and Light . This is Judging by our selves and not by Reason , or according to the Laws of Universal Reason : That Reason , I say , which alone is superiour to Spirits , and hath a Right to judge of those Judgments which are pronounc'd by them .

IX . The Mind of Man being finite , cannot see all the Relations that the Objects of its Knowledge bear to one another ; so that it may be deceiv'd when it judges of Relations which it doth not see . But if it judg'd of nothing but just what it saw , which without doubt it may do ; certainly , tho' it be a finite Spirit , tho' it be Ignorant , and in its own Nature subject to Error , it would never be deceiv'd ; for then the Judgments fram'd by it would not proceed so much from it self , as from the Universal Reason pronouncing the same Judgments in it .

X. But God is infallible in his own Nature ; he cannot be subject to Error or Sin , for he is his own Light , and his own Law ; Reason is consubstantial with him , he understands it perfectly , and loves it invincibly . Being infinite , he discovers all the Relations that are comprehended in the intellectual Substance of the Word ; and therefore cannot judge of what he doth not see . And as he loves himself invincibly , so he cannot but esteem and love other things according as they are valuable and according as they are amiable .

XI . It is probable that Angels and Saints , tho' in their own Nature subject to Error , are never deceiv'd ; because the least attention of Mind represents to them clearly the Ideas of things and their several Relations ; they judge of nothing but what they see ; they follow the Light , and do not go before it ; they obey the Law , and do not set themselves above it : In them Reason alone judges definitively and without appeal . But Man , such as I find my self to be , is often deceiv'd , because the labour of Attention is extremely tiresom to him ; and tho' his Application be strong and painful , he hath commonly but a confus'd fight of Objects . Thus being weary and not much enlightned , he reposes himself on probability , and contents himself for some time with the enjoyment of a false Good ; but being soon out of relish with it , he begins his search anew , till being tir'd or seduc'd again he takes some rest , till he be in a condition to begin afresh , tho' weakly , his difficult enquiries .

XII . Since speculative and practical Truths are nothing else but relations of Greatness or Perfection , it is evident that Falshood is not any thing real . That twice two is four , or that twice two is not five is true , because there is a Relation of Equality between twice two and four , and a relation of Inequality between twice two and five . And he that sees these relations , sees Truths , because the relations are real . That twice two is five , or that twice two is not four is false , because there is no relation of equality between twice two and five , nor of inequality between twice two and four . And he that sees , or rather believes he sees these relations , sees Falsities . He sees relations that are not . He thinks he sees , but indeed he doth not see ; for Truth is intelligible , but Falshood in it self is absolutely incomprehensible .

XIII . In like manner , that a Beast is more valuable than a Stone , and less valuable than a Man is true ; because a Beast bears a greater proportion or relation of perfection to a Stone , than a Stone doth to a Beast ; and a Beast hath a less proportion of perfection compar'd to a Man , than a Man hath compar'd to a Beast . And he that sees these Relations , sees such Truths as ought to regulate his esteem , and consequently that sort of Love that is determin'd by esteem : But he that esteems his Horse more than his Coachman , or thinks that a Stone is in it self more valuable than a Flie , or than the very least of organiz'd Bodies , doth not see that which perhaps he thinks he doth ; it is not universal Reason , but his own particular Reason , that makes him judge after that manner : It is not the love of Order , but self-love , which inclines him to love as he doth . That which he thinks he sees , is neither visible nor intelligible ; 't is a false and imaginary Relation : And he that governs his esteem or love by this or the like Relation , must necessarily fall into Error and Irregularity .

XIV . Since Truth and Order are Relations of greatness and perfection , real immutable and necessary relations , relations comprehended in the substance of the Divine Word ; he that sees these relations , sees that which God sees : He that regulates his Love according to these Relations , observes a Law which God invincibly Loves . So that there is a perfect conformity of Mind and Will between God and him . In a word , seeing he knows that which God knows , and loves that which God loves , he is like God , as far as he is capable of being so . So likewise since God invincibly loves himself , he cannot but esteem and love his own Image . And as he loves things in proportion to their being amiable , he cannot but prefer it before all those Beings which either by their nature or corruption are far from resembling him .

XV. See the 3. Discourse of the Treatise of Nature and Grace . Man is a free Agent , and I suppose him to have all necessary assistances : In respect of Truth , he is capable of searching after it notwithstanding the difficulty he finds in Meditation ; and in respect of Order , he is able to follow it , in spite of all the efforts of Concupiscence . He can sacrifice his Ease to Truth , and his Pleasures to Order . On the other side he can prefer his actual and present Happiness before his Duty , and fall into error and disorder . In a word , he can deserve well or ill by doing good or evil . Now God is just ; he loves his Creatures as they are worthy of Love , or as they resemble him . His Will therefore is , that every good action should be rewarded , and every evil one punished ; that he who hath made a good use of his Liberty , and by that means hath render'd himself in part perfect and like God , should be in part happy as he is , and the contrary .

XVI . See the Remarks upon the seeming efficacy of second Causes , or the 5 and 6 Christian Meditations . It is God alone that acts upon his Creatures ; at least he hath a power of acting on them , and can do what he pleases with them . He hath power therefore to make spiritual Beings happy or miserable ; happy by the enjoyment of Pleasure , and miserable by the suffering of Pain . He can exalt the just and perfect above other Men ; he can communicate his Power to them for the accomplishment of their desires , and make them occasional causes for himself to act by in a Thousand manners . He can pull down the wicked , and make them subject to the action of the lowest Beings : This Experience sufficiently shews , for we all , as we are Sinners , depend upon the action of sensible objects .

XVII . He therefore that labours for his Perfection , and endeavours to make himself like God , labours for his Happiness and Advancement . If he doth that which in some sort depends upon himself , that is to say , if he deserves well by making himself perfect , God will do that which in no sort depends upon him , in making him happy . For since God loves all Beings proportionably as they are amiable , and the most perfect Beings are the most amiable ; the most perfect Beings shall be the most powerful , the most happy and the most contented . He that incessantly consults his Reason , and loves Order , having a share in the Perfection of God , shall have also a share in his Happiness , Glory and Greatness .

XVIII . Man is capable of three Things ; Knowing , Loving , and sensibly Perceiving ; of knowing the true Good , of loving and enjoying it . The knowledge and love of Good are in a great measure in his own power , but the enjoyment of it doth not at all depend upon himself . Nevertheless , seeing God is just , he that knows and loves him , shall also enjoy him . God being just , must of necessity give the pleasure of enjoyment , and by it Happiness , to him that by a painful application seeks the knowledge of the Truth , and by a right use of his Liberty and the strength of his Resolution , conforms himself to the Law of God , the immutable Order , notwithstanding all the efforts of Concupiscence , enduring Pain , despising Pleasure , and giving that Honour to his Reason , as to believe it upon its Word , and to comfort himself with its Promises . It is a strange thing ! Men know very well that the enjoyment of Pleasure and avoiding of Pain do not depend immediately on their Desires : They find on the contrary that it is in their own power to have good Thoughts , and to love good Things , that the light of Truth diffuses it self in them as soon as they desire it , and that the loving and following of Order depends on themselves . * * This Age is so ill-natured or so nice , that there are somethings which it is not sufficient for a Man not to say , but he must also assure the World and , that more than once that he doth not say them . And therefore my Readers must pardon me if I seem to distrust their equity . ( I still suppose those necessary assistances which are never wanting to those who have Faith , but through their own negligence . ) And yet they seek after nothing but Pleasure , and neglect the foundation of their eternal Happiness , that knowledge and love which resemble the knowledge and love of God , the knowledge of Truth and the love of Order ; for as I said before , he that knows Truth and loves Order , knows as God knows and loves as he loves .

XIX . This then is our first and greatest Duty , that for which God hath created us , the love of which is the Mother of all Vertue , the universal , the fundamental Vertue ; the Vertue which makes us just and perfect , and which will one Day make us happy . We are rational Creatures ; our Vertue and Perfection is to love Reason , or rather to love Order . For the knowledge of speculative Truths , or relations of Greatness doth not regulate our Duties . It is principally the knowledge and love of the relations of Perfection , or practical Truths wherein consist our Perfection . Let us apply our selves then to know , to love and follow Order . Let us labour for our Perfection ; as for our Happiness , let us leave that to the disposal of God , on whom it wholly depends . God is just , and necessarily rewards Vertue : Let us not doubt then but that we shall infallibly receive all the Happiness that we have deserv'd .

XX. The Obedience which we pay to Order and submission to the Law of God , is Vertue in all Senses . Submission to the divine Decrees , or to the power of God is rather Necessity than Vertue . A Man may follow Nature , and yet walk irregularly , for Nature it self is irregular . On the other side , he may resist the action of God , without opposing his Orders ; for oftentimes the particular action of God is so determin'd by second or occasional Causes , that it is not conformable to Order . It is true indeed that God wills nothing but according to Order ; but he often acts contrary to it : For Order it self requiring , See the 7 and 8 Christian Medit. that God as the general cause , should act in a constant and uniform manner according to certain general Laws which he hath establish'd , the effects of that cause are many times contrary to Order . He forms Monsters , and is subservient as it were to the Wickedness of Men in this World , by reason of the simplicity of those ways by which he executes his Designs . So that he who should think to obey God , in submitting to his Power , and in following and observing the course of Nature , would offend against Order , and fall into Disobedience every Moment .

XXI . If all the motions of Bodies were caus'd by particular acts of the Will of God , it would be a sin to avoid the Ruins of a falling House by flight ; for we cannot without injustice refuse to render back to God that Life which he hath given us , when he requires it again . At this rate it would be an Affront to the Wisdom of God , to alter the course of Rivers , and to turn them to Places that want Water ; we should follow the Order of Nature and be quiet . But since God acts in consequence of certain general Laws , we correct his Work , without injuring his Wisdom : We resist his action , without opposing his Will ; because he doth not will positively and directly every thing that he doth . For example , he doth not directly will unjust Actions , tho' he alone gives motion to those that commit them : And tho' it be only he who sends Rain , yet every Man hath a liberty to shelter himself when it Rains . For God doth not send Rain but by a necessary consequence of general Laws ; Laws which he hath establish'd , not that such or such a Man should be wet through , but for greater ends , and more agreeable to his Wisdom and Goodness . If the Rain fall upon Men , upon the Sea , or upon the Sand , it is because he is not oblig'd to alter the uniformity of his Conduct , for the uselessness or inconvenience of the consequences of it .

XXII . The case is not the same between God and Men , between the general cause and particulationes . When we oppose the action of Men , we offend them ; for since they act only by particular motions of the Will , we cannot resist their action without opposing their Designs . But when we resist the action of God , we do not at all offend him , nay we often promote his Designs : For since God constantly follows those general Laws which he hath prescrib'd to himself , the combination of those effects which are the necessary consequences of them , cannot always be conformable to Order , nor proper for the execution of his Work . And therefore it is lawful for Men to divert these natural effects , not only when they may be the occasion of their Death , but also when they are inconvenient or disagreeable . Our Duty then consists in submitting our selves to the Law of God , and following Order : For to submit to his absolute Power is necessity . This Order we may know by our union with the Word ; so that the immutable Order may be our Law and our Guide . But the Divine Decrees are absolutely unknown to us : And therefore let us not make them our Rule . Let us leave that chimerical Vertue of following God or Nature , to the Sages of Greece and the Stoicks . But let us consult Reason , let us love and follow Order in all things ; for then we truly follow God , when we submit to a Law which he invincibly loves .

XXIII . But tho' the Order of Nature be not precisely our Law , and a submission to that Order be by no means a Vertue , we must observe nevertheless that we ought oftentimes to have a regard to it : Yet still this is because the immutable Order so requires , and not because the Order of Nature is an effect of the Power of God . A Man that suffers Persecution , or rather one that is tormented with the Gout , is oblig'd to bear it with Patience and Humility , because being a sinner , Order requires that he should suffer , besides other Reasons which need not here be produc'd . But if Man were not subject to Sin , and the immutable Order did not require that he should suffer to deserve his Reward , certainly he might , nay and ought to seek his ease , and avoid all sorts of inconveniences , tho' he were persecuted , if that were possible , by the inclemency of the Seasons , and by the Miseries which Sin hath brought into the World . And a Man , tho' he be a sinner , may shelter himself from the Rain and the Wind , and avoid the action of an avenging God ; because Order requires that he should preserve his Strength and Health , and especially the liberty of his Mind , to think upon his Duty , and search after Truth : And because Rain and Wind being consequences of the general laws of the Order of Nature , it doth not plainly appear that it is the positive Will of God that he should suffer that particular inconvenience . For it would be a hainous Crime in us to avoid the Rain , if God should make it Rain on purpose to wet and punish us : As it was in our first Parent to eat of a Fruit , because of the express Prohibition , and his formal Disobedience . But if Vertue consisted precisely in living in that condition wherein we are plac'd in consequence of the Order of Nature , he that is born in the midst of pleasure and abundance , would be vertuous without pain ; and Nature having been happily favourable to him , he would follow it with pleasure . But Virtue must be painful at present , that it may be generous and meritorious . A Man ought to sacrifice himself for the possession of God : Pleasure is the Reward of Merit , and therefore cannot be the foundation of it , as I shall shew hereafter . In a Word , Truth it self informs us of one that was commanded to sell his Goods , and distribute them to the Poor , if he would be perfect ; which was to change his state and condition . Perfection then or Vertue doth not consist in following the Order of Nature , but in submitting wholly to the immutable and necessary Order , the inviolable Law of all intelligent Beings .

I. THE Love of Order is not only the chief of all moral Vertues , but the only Vertue : It is the Mother Vertue , the fundamental , universal Vertue ; the Vertue which alone makes the Habits or Dispositions of our Minds vertuous . He that bestows his Goods on the Poor out of Vanity or natural Compassion , is not liberal ; because it is not Reason that guides him , nor Order that governs him , it is nothing but Pride or Mechanism . Officers that voluntarily expose themselves to Dangers are not brave , if it is Ambition that animates them ; nor Soldiers , if it is only an abundance of Spirits , and the Fermentation of the Blood . This imaginary noble Ardour , is nothing but Vanity or Clock-work : A little Wine oftentimes is sufficient to produce a great deal of it . He that bears the Injuries that are offer'd him , many times is neither moderate not patient : 'T is his Slothfulness that makes him immoveable , or his ridiculous and stoical Bravery that bears him up , and in imagination sets him above his Enemies : It may be nothing but the disposition of the Machine , want of Spirits , coldness of Blood , Melancholy , and perhaps above all some contagious Distemper of a strong Imagination . The same may be said of all the other Vertues . If the love of Order be not the foundation of them , they are false and vain , and altogether unbecoming a reasonable Nature , which bears the Image of God himself , and hath a communication with him : They derive their Original from the Body only ; they are not form'd by the Holy Ghost , and whoever makes them the Object of his Desires , and the Foundation of his Glory , hath a base and abject Mind , a mean Spirit , and a corrupted Heart . But whatever a rebellious Imagination may think , it is not mean nor servile to submit to the Law of God himself ; nothing is more just than to be conformable to Order ; nothing is more great and noble than to obey God ; nothing is more brave and generous than to follow the Party of Reason with an unshaken Constancy and inviolable Fidelity , not only when one may follow it with Honour , but then more especially when the circumstances of Times and Places are such that one cannot do it without the greatest Shame and Disgrace : For he that passes for a Fool in following Reason , loves Reasom more than himself : But he that follows Order only when it shines and sparkles in the Eyes of the World , seeks only Glory ; and though he may appear very Glorious in the Eyes of Men , he is an Abomination in the Sight of God .

II. I know not whether I may be mistaken or no , but I believe there are abundance of People that do not rightly know what true Vertue is ; and even those that have writ of Morality , do not always speak very clearly and exactly of it . It is certain that all those great Names which they give to Vertues and Vices , produce rather confus'd Sensations in the Mind than clear Ideas : But because these Sensations affect the Soul , and abstracted Ideas , tho' clear in themselves , do not diffuse their Light but in attentive Minds . Men most commonly rest satisfied with these words , which please the Senses , but leave the Mind in the dark . They fancy that a Discourse the more briskly it strikes upon the Imagination , the more Solid it is ; and look upon those exact Reasonings , which disappear when Attention is wanting , as Spectres and Illusions ; like Children , who judging of Objects by the Impression they make on their Senses , imagine that there is more Matter in Ice than in Water ; in Gold , and heavy and hard Metals , than in the Air which surrounds them almost without being felt .