The First DISCOURSE . What was the true and proper Form of Government observed in the Commonwealth of Rome ; and whether she could be better ordered in Civil affairs , having Armed people on foot .

THere are many , who reflecting upon the Greatness of the Commonwealth of Rome , wonder at her so many prosperities , by which she flourished a long time , and at last obtained the mastery of all other Monarchies : And thinking that it is enough to admire her feats of Arms , and management in Peace , do not care for enquiring into the reason thereof ; so as ballancing thereby every of her several operations , they may know what they were that were truly worth praise and imitation , and what blame-worthy and to be avoided . But certainly these men seem not to know , to how many and how great and various accidents all humane works are subject , and what the true rule and measure is whereby the perfection of States is comprehended : For that is not simply the greatness of an Empire , to which she at the beginning riseth by Fortune , and which is increased by Injustice ; but that may well be said to be the true Form of Government , by which people living in peace and union , may work righteously , and obtain Civil felicity . He therefore who will judge aright of the actions of that Commonwealth , without suffering his eyes to be dazeled wi●h the splendor of the Roman greatness , let him consider them nakedly , as void of that reputation which Antiquity and the power of Empire purchased them , and he will find some things peradventure amongst the many for which she worthily deserved to be cryed up by all men , which are more to be observed for the amendment of present Governments by their example , then for imitation , out of hopes of attaining any true praise or apparent good . But as there is nothing of greater importance in a City , then the Form of Government , by which , as by the soul thereof , every good act is produced ; so of all other observations which may be had of the City of Rome , there is not any more worthy , or of more use , then to examine what was the truest Form of her Government , that we may afterwards see whether she might have been be●ter ordered in Civil affairs then she was , without disordering her Militia ; and whether she could keep together the People armed , and obedient to the Laws . To know then what the condition of her Government was , and thence to comprehend whether that supreme excellencie were in it , as hath been thought by some men ; following the Rule which Philosophy teacheth us , which says , that every Form of Republick is not convenient for every City , but that they must be varied according to the divers natures of the people , and according to other accidents ; we must examine what that State was in it self , and then what proportion it held with that City . But because it would be too difficult a business to assign any certain condition unto her , which may equally correspond to all times , she not having so punctually observed one and the same Form continually , but varied it somewhat accordingly as it inclined more or less to a Popular State ; we must have our eys most fixt upon that Age , whe●ein the glory of that Commonwealth did most flourish ; not so bearing notwithstanding to touch upon such things in other times , as may conduce to our purpose .

He who would diligently consider all the parts of the Republick , will find not only so much diversity , but even contrariety in them , as he will not be able easily to resolve which was her properest Form of Government : For if respect be had to the great Authority of Consuls , especially in Armies , we may , not without reason , believe , that that City under the name of a Commonwealth , was governed with Laws befitting a Kingdom ; since that Form of Magistracie did use such Autho●ity in managing of Arms , in concluding Peace , and in agreeing differences between potent Kings , as one onely Prince could hardly have treated of those thing with more absolute power : differing from Monarchy only in this , that they kept this Authority but for a short time , and did acknowledg it to proceed from the will and favor of the People . But he who will consider what a share of the most important resolutions of the Commonwealth the Senate had , as that which governed the publick Treasury , the chief foundation of a State , and to which the priviledg did belong first to treat of , and then to resolve of such things as were to be propounded to the people , will be of opinion , that such a Commonwealth did lean more towards Aristocracie , then any other Government . Yet passing on to further Considerations , and finding the Authority of Consuls , Senate and Tribunes to be so often baffled and nullified , and the Supreme Magistracies oftentimes contaminated by the meanness of popular men who have had the exercise thereof , will vote otherwise , and think the Government to have been meerly Popular . Wherefore ●olybius being willing , in the sixth Book of his Histories , to assign some certain Form of Government to the City of Rome , would not restrain it under any one particular Form , but called it a mixt Republick , as was that of Sparta . Which opinion is sithence followed by some modern Writers , who treating of the differing Forms of Commonwealths , and particularly of that of Rome , do punctually agree with Polybius . And certainly they were thus far all in the right , to wit , That the divers manners of Rule by which that City was governed , could not be expressed by any one name . For what gives the true Form to a City , but the communication of Government ? which as it is participated by Citizens , makes such alteration or mutation in a State , as the Philosopher was of opinion , that though the City did totally remain the same , the variation of this only was able so to metamorphose it , as it cannot be said to be what it was before : For it is not the Walls , nor the Inhabitants , but the Form of Government which makes it be so . Therefore he who will determine the Form of a City , must have respect to whatsoever doth therein help to the attaining of Magistracie , that he may infold all parts that belong to the managing of a Commonwealth . So as since men of all conditions , according to the divers respects either of Liberty , Nobility , Wealth or Worth , were admitted into Government , these divers communications will not admit the ascription of any peculiar or particular form .

Agreeing therefore herein with Polybius , we will now endeavour to find out what is more hard to know , and is better worth knowledg , to wit ▪ what sort of mixture this was . For though a mixt Commonwealth may be perfect , it follows not , that all mixtures may make her so ; nay rather where several differing parts are wound up together , so as a third kind of nature is produced by their connexion , such a composition will rather increase the imperfection of the State , and be the reason why it cannot long continue under such a disproportionate mixture . And as it falls out in our bodies , which being compounded of four Elements , continue so long in life , as that proportion is maintained , which when it is destroyed , they are likewise wasted and corrupted ; ( For that part which becomes too prevalent , changeth the rest into its self , and dissolves the form which they made when all together : ) So that Commonwealth which is composed of divers parts , may continue in one and the same State , as long as the Authority of Government is proportioned with equal temperament , as it ought to be , to each part . But as soon as any one part begins to domineer too much , it is apparent that she grows towards corruption : For the prevalent part by consuming the rest , doth by little and little reduce them all into its self , and alters the aspect of the City . Therefore such a disposition is required to this Form of Government , as no disorder may be therein found whereby that mixture may be broken or confused . Wherefore as divers Faculties concur together to the forming of Man , but are notwithstanding so well ordered in that union , as all of them partaking of some office or other , they have their several degrees of dignity ; so divers Citizens reduced to live together in one City , though all of them may in some sort participate of Government , yet the ●mployments must be diversly disposed of , so as some of them may hold the first place , and as certain primary Causes , must give motion to other things which are done in the Commonwealth .

These considerations being applied to the City of Rome , will make it appear clearly that there was no such equality nor order in her , as is to be desired in a mixt Commonwealth to render it excellent , and long lived . For the immoderate Authority , which was by the Laws granted to divers Magistrates , but much more the extraordinary power which was intrusted in many Citizens , shews how ill that so necessary proportion was observed in her : And on the other side , the Peoples power , and the admittance thereof without any difference to all manner of Negotiations , gives manifest tokens of a confused disposition , all Orders being mixt together without distinction either of Office or Degree , and the baser sort being oftentimes exalted above the more worthy . Hence it was , that amongst such confusion , many customs might be introduced , which were not onely corrupt , but even contrary one to another ; as was that of prolonging the time of Magistrates , which was repugnant to the great Authority which was reserved to the people ; and that other of suffering the wealth of private men to increase to such a height in a City , where there was no prefixt boundeur of wealth appointed by the Laws for being a Citizen : Which Laws or Customs do some of them tend to the power of a few , and other some of them are proper for a Popular State . But if we proceed further , we shall find their disorders so far advanced , as not being able to consist together in one subject , they were the occasion of that Commonwealths dissolution . The confirming of their Authority , whose Magistracy was by the usual time appointed by the Laws exp●red ▪ was introduced at first with some appearance of advantage , but with very bad example , for that having begun important affairs in Countries far off , they might finish them , and weaken the Enemy before their return home . Thus was the charge of the Province lest to Marcus Fulvius , who fought in Asia against Antiochus , after he was out of the Consulship ; the which was done likewise to Gneus Manlius to bridle the daring Aetolians , and to appease the affairs in Greece , and the like upon many occasions was done to divers others , and very long in ensuing times , with very pernicious example , but the disorder ceased not here , for , without need , the City Magistrates were so far prolonged , as the same were seen to return ten times to be the peoples Tribunes . Which made the Citizens infinitely ambitious , and afforded them occasion by being so long in Power , of plotting many things , and of molesting the Common-wealth divers waies by the peoples Insurrections . Nor was it less prejudicial to permit private men to grow to such immoderate riches , as equalling therein the most Potent Kings ; there was a Citizen of Rome who arrived to such greatness , as he said , He ought not to be esteemed rich who could not out of his own Revenue maintain an Army : Whence it arose that the Nobility , being much envied and suspected by the people , the way was opened to the Gracchi to excite those hemous disorders which ended not but with the utter ruin of the Commonwealth .

Provision was long before hand by the Law against such disorders , Licineus the Tribune having instituted , so to curb the Avarice and Ambition of the Nobility , that no Citizen should possess above Five hundred Acres of Land ; But these Orders in Civil Affairs were so weak and imperfect , as one Law might easily be broken , by introducing a contrary custom ▪ The Nobles therefore little esteeming the Licinean Law , did very much increase their wealth , and fraudulently usurping the publick Territories , which were wont to be kept for the benefit of the people , brought in Forainers to manure them ; so as the people being become very poor , and seeing the Nobility injoy all the fruits of the common labor of the Militia , did very unwillingly suffer such an injury , and did very willingly listen and adhere unto any one who would feed them with hopes of bringing things to a just equality ; wherefore such as were seditious took occasion to try Novelties , so as at last in the times of the Gracchi , recourse must be had unto Arms , and civil Differences must be thereby decided : which ( as shall by and by be more clearly shewn ) might have been long before foreseen ; for such Customs did much disorder the Commonwealth , not onely in that they partook not of civil modesty , but by their being clean contrary to the Laws of that City , which lent most towards a Popular State , all Authority being given by them to the People in their suffrages , and also in the most important State-resolutions . So as it seemed respect was only had to the liberty of dividing the Government amongst Citizens : All places of Magistracie were equally common to all , and small means kept not any one far from the Commonwealth ; they might marry togeth●r , Foreiners were easily made Free Denizens ; the Tribunes had power to nominate all Magistrates ; the manner of living was not free , but very licentious : And the supreme Authority of the Tribunes doth of all other things most cleerly shew what that Government was , who being greatly respected and reverenced by all men , and called by the superstitious title of Sacr●sancti , they were so insolent in their office , as a Tyrant could hardly have used more severity in his commands . See how boldly a Tribune of the People made Marius Viola●●● , a Nobleman , be seised on , commanding that he should be suddenly thrown head-long down the Tarpeian Rock , for no other reason , but that in a Speech which he had made , he used some harsh words against the People . But the Tribune Sulpitius using more violence , came one morning into the Piatza with many armed men and driving away the Consuls who would have opposed such an action , made Mar●●● be decreed for the undertaking against Mithridates , not caring though therein he went against the Laws , which not being in any thing observed , all good Institutions were made in vain , whilst the Laws were violated and destroyed by the Tribunes too great power . He then who shall consider these things , will not say that they tended not to the making of a Commonwealth totally Popular ; yet many things were contrary to these , as hath been considered in perpetuating the Government of the Armies , and in the excessive Riches of some Citizens . Some Popular Commonwealths , as that of Athens , used by a quite contrary advice , to ban●sh such Citizens ten years from the City , who did for some excellent quality far exceed the rest ; In some others , because they did in some sort partake of popularity , the equallity of means , or levelling was introduced , so to content , and please the people , as in Sparta ; and certainly to grant but a limited power , and but for a short time , to Magistrates are excellent precepts of such Legislators as will constitute a free City ; For so all the Citizens may have their share of Government , but none freely dispose thereof , to his own proper use , and then indeavour to bring things to an equality , or at least provide so , as they may not increase so immoderately , as any one Citizen may be envied or suspected by the rest , for his too great Power .

It is then no wonder , if Rome were much divided , since these things were not observed in her ; for by such a diversity of Orders she became a Body with two Heads , and of two several shapes , which occasioned continual domestick disorders in her . For the Nobility glorying in the dignity of Consulship , wherein they used great Authority , and which they for the most part kept amongst themselves , and being also proud of their wealth , would usurp all the Government to themselves : And on the other side , the people , bearing so great a sway in all things , and relying much upon the Magistracy of the Tribunes were so insolent , as they would acknowledge no obedience , nor bear any respect to the Laws , or to the Magistrates thereof ; but would resolve all things according to their own fancy , and as made most for their advantage ; which made that City , which was so potent in Military and Foraign Affairs , very weak in such as were Civil and Domestick ; for such a division of power in men of contrary minds , keeps the forces of the City , with much prejudice divided ; whilst the one of them contesting with the other , they hinder the resolutions and executions of important Affairs , as it often fell out in Rome , for necessity urging to list Forces to march against the Enemy , the Tribunes were presently ready to incense the people , so as there was none that would give a name to the Militia , which Insolencies were increased by the peoples being able to do it safely . For , the Tribunes minding nothing else but how to make their Faction powerful , accepted of the Appeals of every popular man , though in unjust causes , to the end that the people might be the more respected by the Nobility , and more ready and bold to raise seditions , whereby they did always increase their power , and had by these means obtained many things from the Senate . The Nobles likewise , no less sollicitous to increase their authority , that they might keep back the Peoples insolencie , sought always to keep them low , and did with like endeavours maintain those of their own Order in all Judgments . So as in punishing or in absolving of faults , it was oftentimes a thing of greater consideration , whether the party concerned were a Nobleman or a Plebeian , then whether he were guilty or innocent : And hence great prejudice arose unto the Commonwealth ; for all Justice was soon corrupted , without which no good Order can be kept ; and each Party , valuing the publick welfare but a little out of a desire of their own greatness , the City was reduced oftentimes into eminent dangers . Thus the Roman Plebeians , thinking almost that they had not a common Country , but that it did only belong unto the Nobility , forsook it , and retired into the Aventine ; valuing more the increase of their own power , by necessitating the Senate to yield to their desires , then their putting the City into such a disorder . The Nobles likewise more sollicitous to abase the People , and to increase their own fortunes , then to preserve peace and union in the City , did nourish Civil discord by usurpi●g the Common goods , and by reducing the People to great Poverty through Usury .

By this discourse it may be comprehended , how badly proportioned the Orders were in that mixt Government : But it may be more cleerly seen , by comparing this Commonwealth with that of Sparta , which proved more excellent then any other in that mixt Government , and preserved it a long time free from all discord , by vertue of her most excellent Laws . In Sparta , the Princes power ended not but with his life , to the end that he being preferred before all others for making the Laws be observed , he might the better do it , being detained by no self-respect from deposing of Magistrates , or from being judged by the People . But his Authority was notwithstanding so limited , as he was rather a Custos of the Common Liberty , then a true Prince in the City . The People had as great a share in Government , as their condition required : For it being they who were to make use of the Magistrates , it seemed they might better know their abilities ; as we see it falls out in other Trades , that the excellencie of the work is better known by him that is to use it , then by the maker thereof . The People had the power given them of choosing and of correcting Magistrates ; but greater authority was granted to the Senate , which was placed as in the midst to defend the Commonwealth from the Princes power , and from the peoples insolencie , to the end that thereby it might the better temper the one and the other . Now let us see how in the joint union of these three Governments , certain Conditions were appropriated unto every of them ; but neither so many , nor yet such as made them of clean contrary qualities , but so as they might very well be united in one and the same person . The Prince had perpetuity of power ; but this stood so corrected by the Laws , as it might easily consist with the other States . The Senate , which was made up of Forty eight of the prime Citizens , represented a true Aristocratical Commonwealth ; but because they acknowledged their Dignity from the People , their power was not such as bereft others of their Liberty . But the Peoples authority in ordering rewards and punishments , as it was not dangerous , so it afforded place for a modest Popular State , and rendred that Government more perfect , by mixture of all the three best . But above all things else , there was a miraculous proportion observed in Sparta , in sharing out those things , which use to cause Civil dissentions amongst Citizens : For the Noblemen had the greatest part in Honors , but the People were equal to them in Wealth , all the Revenues being in common ; so as the ambition of the one , and the necessities of the other were satisfied , and all of them being content , they enjoyed much Peace and Tranquility , so as that Commonwealth may endure longer then any of the antient Reipublicks . And if at the first she had been a little more large in communicating her Government , by encreasing the number of her Senators , so as there had been no occasion in Theopompus his time , for the better regulating their too great Authority , of introducing the Magistracy of the Ephori , whereby the City began to be a little too popular , and leaving Licurgus his antient Institutions , gave it self over to licentiousness , nothing could have been desired in that City to have reduced her to the highest p●tch of perfection . Therefore as far as the Roman Government differed from this , it must be confest it fell so far short of true excellencie . The Consuls of Rome had great Authority , and it may be more free then became any Magistracy in a Commonwealth , but the little durance thereof made it less beneficial to the the Republick : For their Power being soon to be given over , made them less diligent , and less bold in undertaking Publick Affairs : For Consulship being laid aside , the way was opened of revenging private 〈◊〉 by the Tribunes . So Cicer● , who freed his Country from Catalius Conspiracy , when he was out of Place , was banished . But the Senate , because it had not any Ordinary Magistracy , from whence no Appeal might be made , by which is might curb the Peoples Insolency , had not that respect given to it , by which the ignorant common people is Governed : So as the people , not being held back by this Bridle , ran into such l●centiousness , as they dared to commit divers Indignities even against the chief Magistracy of Counsulship ; as they did when they plucked the Consul Camillus Hestare from the Tribunal , that they might by force ob●a●● admittance to that Supream Magistracy . The weakness of the Senate was likewise the occasion of the increase of the power of some Citizens , for the peoples resolutions prevailing over the like of the Senate , the way of ariving at great power by the favour of the people , in despite of the Senate , was opened to such as were ambitious . Thus did Marius cause himself to be declared Consul , contrary to the Laws , and Caesar to be confirmed in his Province : And to suppress these mens immoderate greatness , which tended towards Tyranny , it was requisite ( since the Commonwealth had no usual means to do it ) to prefer other Citizens of the Nobilities side , whose greatness proved afterwards no less pernic●ous , then that of those whom they thought through their Authority to suppress , wherefore the City became wholly divided ; so that private injuries were with horrid cruelties revenged by Sylla , though he professed to vindicate the Common welfare : And Pompey , to maintain his Greatness put rubs in the Treaty of Agreement with Caesar : Wherefore betaking themselves to Arms , the Commonwealth could not at last but fall .

These disorders were occasioned through the weakness of the Senate : But the people , possessing themselves of other mens Places , usurp● the best imployments of the Commonwealth , and being equall to the Nobility in p●●nt of liberty , would without any respect to other things purtake equally of Government . So the right disposure of the Honors and Orders of the City were confused , which require Geometrical , and not Arithmetical proportion , in such sort , as the same things be not granted to all men , but to every one that which is most convenient for him . And certainly to constitute a City of that form , as all her Citizens should be equal , would be no better then to make a Consort of Musick consisting all of the same voyces ; for as the latter produceth no true Harmony , so doth no good concord result from the former . Therefore care must be had , that every Order may keep its own state , and be neither too much exalted , nor too much abased , lest the too 〈◊〉 , or too sharp Tone occasion diss●nance , as it was seen to fall out in Rome , where this just proportion was but badly kept , people of unequal condition and worth , being oft times made equal in Dignity , which caused a Government full of confusion and disorder , not bounded in any one Form , but disposed to receive all Forms .

But if we will assign any particular State to the mixt body of this City , as predominate over the rest , there can be none more properly given her then popularity . Which though it may be already comprehended , yet it will be better known by passing to some other more particular considerations . The state of the Commonwealth is known by observing in whom the chief command is found , but the majesty thereof appears clearly in the creating of Magistrates , in making new Laws , or repealing old ones , in making War , in disposing of Rewards or Punishment : All which things being by many examples seen to lie in the power of the People , do evidently witness that the State of this Commonwealth was Popular . The People were they who gave authority to Magistrates , nay even to the Senate it self , by authenticating and invigorating the Resolves thereof ; and as the soul of that Government , they did in divers manners move the other parts of the Commonwealth in their operations . So as her truest and properest Form can only be taken from them ; nay , it was seen that the resolutions of the Republick did bind the Senate , and were of equal force with the Peoples commands , prolonging Magistrates in their places , and by the authority thereof putting a period to begun Wars . Wherefore the corruption of a Popular State may be further seen , by the immoderate power of the meanest Citizens .

Let us next view the ultimate end of that Commonwealth , which by a certain ordinary , and as it were natural change of condition , will shew us what her first Form was . For it being changed into Tyranny , which usually ariseth from a Popular State , it appears that that City was formerly governed by the People , and had by corrupt manners opened the way to Tyranny ; so as this Transition was easily made by the likeness of State : For , that City where the People commands with licence , may be said to be subject to many Tyrants ; nor admits it of any change , saving that one man becomes the master of those disorders , which a multitude were masters of . There were likewise always many popular Pick-thanks in Rome , who , like the Flatterers of Tyrants , tracing the People in their humors , went a birding after favors , whereby they won credit and preferment . Which , as the Philosopher says , is a manifest sign , that in such a City the People command , not the Laws . Which is seen by many experiences , of which Marius was an evident example ; who being born of very mean parents , and appl●ing himself from the begining to the Government of the Commonwealth , not guided by the glory of his Predecessors , or any noble action of his own which might first introduce him thereinto , but confiding in a certain greatness of spirit , began to think of acquiring great power , so as being become Tribune of the People he betook himself wholly to abase the authority of the Nobles , as he did in publishing the Law of Suffrages , threatening Consul Cotta to imprison him , if he forbare not to oppose him . By which boldness he won so much favor with the People , as he was able to dispose of them afterwards as he listed in any affair , how unjust soever , or in working revenge upon his Enemies ( as he did in banishing innocent Metellus ) or to aggrandise himself ; insomuch as he , contrary to the Laws , was created Consul , against the Cimbrians , being absent , and in a contumacious time ; and lastly in making the Province be assigned unto him , which belonged to Sylla . By such means the way was opened to the immoderate power of Citizens , which in the height of their prosperity brought that Commonwealth to its final ruine . For these disorders being long before begun , were afterwards by the spaciousness of the City so in●●eased , as the People being become powerful by reason of the numerousness of the Citizens , and growing more free and bold by their so many prosperities , not content to be equal to the Nobility , would become greater then the Laws . They banish'd many Citizens without hearing the cause ; they granted places of Magistracie before the usual time ; they confirm'd the Authority of those that were already out of it , and disposed of all things , not according to civil equity , but as they liked best . Which things do sufficiently manifest the imperfections of that Government : For the Philosopher says , that that State where the People command , and not the Laws , is so corrupt , as it deserves not the name of a Commonwealth , no sort of Government being to be thereunto assigned . Which easily happens in Cities which are very great and powerful , as was that of Rome . But i● we shall then consider the Conditions of those men into whose hands that Government was put , we shall thereby likewise find , that amongst the several Forms of Popular States , this may be thought the most corrupt , as that whereinto even Artificers were admitted : which being usually but ill conditioned , and frequenting Assemblies only that they may talk together , do constitute an imperfect State , and subject to alterations . And hence it may be deduced , that this part being most prevalent in that so corrupt and imperfect Commonwealth , the others must partake of the same imperfection : For no such union can be framed out of two good Governments , and one very bad one , as is requisite to give form to a good Government ; neither could they continue together for never so small a time . Whence it may be likewise inferred , that those other parts of the Commonwealth , which may seem to resemble Monarchy and Aristocracy , as the Consuls and Senate , came short of such perfection as is proper to those States , declining to the contrary party For many things may be observed to have been done by Consuls with more authority and boldness , then what became a Commonwealth . To pass by many other examples , Caesar being confirmed in that power which he had received as Consul , usurped the Liberty of the Commonwealth . There were likewise many corruptions in the Senate , which shew how subject that part was likewise to various disorders : For when the Commonwealth was at the very height of her perfection , Senators were become so mercenary , as Iugurth having corrupted many of them , and purchased his own sa●ety by monies , it may well be said , that the Citizens of Rome would have sold their City , if they could have met with a Chapman for it . Another Consideration may be added , to wit , That that Commonwealth cannot be said to be well ordered even in the very Popular State which she so much affected : For it is easie to frame any Government for a short time in any whatsoever Estate ; but the sufficiencie of a Law-maker , and the excellencie of Laws , is found by the long continuance thereof , Therefore those Orders by which the Peoples authority was too much increased , cannot be said to be truly Popular ; but such may be so esteemed , whereby the State is long preserved . Wherefore many things being ordered in Rome without this temperance , in favor of the People , they of themselves bereft the State of all solidity . Thus Licentiousness of living , frequent Meetings , Appeals to the Tribunes . Freedom in accusing , and other such things as seemed to be done in favor of the People , served for the building up of Tyranny , and wrought Romes final ruine . Which was formerly seen in Athens ; which being constituted by Solon in a too Popular condition , soon lost her Liberty , and was possest by a Citizen of hers named Pisistratus , who followed the same way which the Legislator himself had opened unto him , by attributing too much to the People . So what is intended for good , proves often , fatal , if not well understood .

But having discoursed sufficiently of the Form of the Government , it will not be amiss to examine some other more general Conditions , by which the perfection of every State may be the better known . In ordering a City , respect is to be had to two things ; to what belongs to War , to what belongs to Peace ; to the end that she may not be governed by Chance in either of them , but by certain Laws , and may be equally preserved from forein plots , and from home discords ; and to endeavour , that as she cannot always enjoy Peace , so she should not be continually molested with War . But he who will consider the Actions of the Romans , and the Institutions of their City , will find them so seriously addr●st to Military affairs , as he may easily judge that they proposed no other things to themselves , then how to increase Empire , by making one War beget another ▪ wherefore many Armies were instituted , and many rewards for military valor , to make men bold and valiant against the Enemy ; but not any thing wereby to accustom them to Justice , Temperance , and to other civil vertues , whereby the City might be maintained in peace and unity . 'T is therefore no wonder if that Commonwealth won so much Empire , and such Glory in times of War ; and in times of Peace , like rusty Iron , lost all her lustre : So as troubles from Enemies abroad were no sooner ceased , but much greater were excited at home by dissentions amongst the Citizens , which did not terminate till things were recalled by occasion of War to the same Warlike order and discipline in which the City was excellently well instituted : Which might for a while preserve her ; but when through the want of occasion of War , she could not by that means correct her many disorders , nor reduce herself to any setled condition for any space of time , being still agitated by storms of Civil sedition , she must at last be miserably lost , when it was time to begin to enjoy her greatness and prosperity . For this cause Scipio Nasica , a very wise man , would not consent to the destruction of Carthage , knowing that that Commonwealth which was ordered onely for war , could not last long in idleness . How can that Government then be termed good , which is so ill disposed towards the attainment of a Cities chief end ? And who can doubt but that the true end of a City is to have her Citizens live vertuously , not the inlarging of her Empire ? Therefore the Philosopher said well ; That true civil Felicity was not to be expected from astions which relate to things abroad , but from those which are used amongst Citizens . It argues not then an excellent Government in that Commonwealth , that she overcame the whole world , since the perfection of Government lies in making a City vertuous , not in making her Mistress of many Countries . Nay the increasing of Territories , as it is commonly coupled with some injustice , so is it remote from the true end of good Laws , which never part from what is honest . Governments which aim at Empire are usually short lived ; which denotes their imperfection : Which happens not onely because they were not better accommodated in times of Peace , but that for the great inlarging of Confines , it is necessary to nourish ambitious thoughts in Citizens , and such as are too desirous to domineer , which are easily turned to the prejudice of the Commonwealth its self . For it is not to be affirmed that the same thing can be good in respect of the publick , and bad in private Affairs . For the general felicity of the whole City , and the particular good of every Citizen , is one and the same thing , they onely differ in some certain respects . Then taking ones argument from these things , the end of this great Commonwealth might easibly be conjectured , which ( as one said well ) was overthrown by the wait of its own bulk . But grant , that the lives of such States may be prolonged , it cannot certainly be done without falling upon many other troubles and dangers . Let Marius his example serve us to see what advantage Citizens got by the immoderate desire of Glory and Dominion ; who being alwaies bred up in Arms , and having wone Credit and Preferment thereby , finding that his antient Reputation began to fail by ensuing Peace , raised Mithridates King of Pontus , against the Commonwealth , to the end , that being to make use of his Vallor , he might recover his former Repute . Thus Athens who once in●oyed a peaceful condition , under Pericles his good Government , when she turned her endeavours of Peace and Quiet , to Arms and Dominion , and would change her manner of life , she reaped the like Fruits of Ambition , which by such Orders she had sowed in the minds of her Citizens . For Alcibiades out of too immense a desire of Glory , was he , who of himself did incite the Lacedemonians against his Country , by whom she was afterwards robbed of her Liberty and Empire . For all this , you hear me not say , that the study of Arms ought to be neglected , which are very necessary in what soever State , to defend ones self against the Injuries of Neighbors , and to preserve Freedom and Liberty : Nay , Aristotle reprehends Plato , for that he thought Cities had no need of Arms at the first ; but onely when they began to have Dominion . But though they may be useful for some other respects , Citizens ought not to fix their studies so much upon Military Exercises , as not to know nor value any other praise but that of the Militia , and to place their greatest and chiefest Good , and the welfare of their City therein ; But they must know , that a man must travel further to find out felicity , which is derived onely from vertuous actions , reserved in Peace , as the true fruits of the labours of War . Let us then conclude , that this part which was very excellent in Rome , lost much of that praise , which otherwise it might have deserved for the exquisiteness of its Orders , because true use was not made thereof , as a means to obtain the true intent of the City . For if Aristotle laught at those who praised the Lacedemonian Commonwealth , because she had made her Citizens so valiant in War , by her excellent Military Discipline , because she exceeded the other Cities of Greece in the largeness of her Confines ; What would he have said of the Commonwealth of Rome , where certainly Military Exercises were studied much more , to the end , that she might vanquish the furthest distant Nations : For in Sparta , too boot with such Institutions as appertained to the Militia , there were excellent customs for the breeding of Citizens in Civil Vertues : And it is seen that Licurgus his intention aimed not so much at Empire , as did that of Romulus ; the former much more respecting the peace of the City , and the agreement among Citizens , minding Military Affairs onely so far forth as they are necessary for the preservation of Liberty against Forreign Forces . Another consideration to be had , in regard no less then these , is , that in a well-ordered City , the Laws ought to be confirmed by the Manners and Educations of the Citizens , the which is of more force to make men honest , then is the fear of punishment ; nay , from hence Actions arise according to true Honesty and Vertue ; for they proceed from a vertuous Habit , which is only acquired by Exercise . Therefore where good Institutions of life are wanting , the severity of Magistrates is not sufficient to make Citizens obedient to the Laws . For when the appetite hath already gotten power , and is accustomed to vice , 't is too hard a matter to overcome her by force . Therefore Aristotle said , That Laws , though very useful , do but little good , if men be not endued with such Customs and Discipline as fits with the state of the City . Wherefore teaching in the eighth of his Politicks , how Citizens are to be made good and honest , he proposed three things requireable , joyning Reason and Custom to Nature . But Custom may be thought so much more necessary then the other two , as that a mans natural inclination to Vertue , makes him not vertuous , unless he confirm his natural disposition by habit , accustoming himself to do well . Nor can Reason force Appetite , but must first find it well reduced by good Education , if she will make use thereof in vertuous operations . As much more then , as this part is necessary , so much more failing will be found in that Commonwealth , where such orders were not taken by a civil way , for the good Education of Citizens : Whence it arose that their Laws met not with such due observance , as did them of Sparta , not written in paper , but ( as it were ) ingraven in the hearts of every one by the force of custom ; wherefore she proved truly miraculous , by reason of the excellent customs introduced by Lycurgus , to breed up Citizens in a vertuous and civil life . Therefore Plutarch comparing Lycurgus with Numa , preferred Lycurgus , for that his having confirmed Citizens by good customs in those orders which he had introduced into the City , was the reason why they were long observed ; Whereas Numa , contenting himself with bare written Laws , though good , and tending to peace , not taking any further care for the education of Citizens , could not make them be observed for so short a time , but that they terminated together with his life . And it is found by experience , that Lycurgus his Orders were of such force , as they preserved the Liberty of Sparta longer then the like of any other of the antient Commonwealths . Wherefore Philopomenes having overcome the Lacedemonians , yet would he not totally tame them , and reduce them under the Achaean Commonwealth , till he had cancelled all the antient Institutions of their City , wherein whilst young , they were so bred up to Liberty , as they could by no means be brought to undergo servitude .

From this discourse it may then be concluded , That the Government of the Roman Commonwealth was of a mixt Form , but ill proportioned within its self , too much inclining towards the corruption of a Popular State ; and that she came short of the Spartans in three things : In the excellencie of Government , in the endeavours of Peace , and in good Customs . The other part remains now to be discussed ; Whether the City of Rome might have received a better Form of State ? For the good Orders of a City depend not always upon the Legislators wisdom , but upon many other joint Accidents . The first thing to be had in respect , is the Nature of the People , with which the Form of Government ought to have a just proportion . Wherefore Polititians say , that the Legislator ought not only to consider which is the best Form of Government , but what best befits every City , and such other Accidents which make so many alterations in States , as it cannot be denied but that Fortune hath a share therein . Lycurgus was justly esteemed an excellent Legislator ; but many things concurr'd in him which helped him very much to put his thoughts in effect : He was a King , and using force at first , as it was fit to do , he might introduce such a Form of Government as would bridle the Peoples insolencie , and increase the au●hority of the Senate ; it made likewise much for his purpose , that wealth of the City lay but in a few mens hands , so as by bestowing Honors upon them , he could as it were by the way of bartering the easilier dispose them to content themselves with an equality of Goods , whereby he satisfied the people of Sparta's desire , who were but few in number , and consequently but weak , and the more easie to be ordered in any sort of Government . Hence it was that the Legislators of other Cities , though they were wise men , could not notwithstanding form a Republick throughout so well ordered as did Lycurgus , because they found not a Subject apt to receive such a Form , and because they wanted that authority and power which was thereunto needful , or for other such like accidents , which did not correspond well with what they did . Therefore Solon , though he had had the same intents , could not have introduced such a Government in Athens ; because he was a private Citizen chosen by the Nobility , and consent of the People , to reform the City ; so as it behoved him to comply in many things with the one and the other , and his small Authority took much of that respect and reverence from the Laws ordained by him , which ought to have been given them . Wherefore many blamed him and his Institutions ; so as at last , to shun such ve●ation , he was forced to part from his ungrateful Country . He met also with another difficulty ; He found the City divided , the People much accustomed to enjoy Liberty , and at that time much incensed against the Nobility by the oppressions of Usury under which they suffered ; so as he was compell'd , to the end that they might rest content with their new Government , to ease them in their Debts , and give them a share in the Government ; which he could not do without much injury to the Nobility .

The Commonwealth of Venice hath gotten an excellent Government ; but was not at first governed by those Laws which she now is : But diversity of Occasions have opened the way to the wisdom of many of her Citizens , who adding new Orders to the old , have brought her to such a height of perfection . Which might the easilier be done , because that City was free-born , and was from the very beginning ordered according to the true Civil end , to wit , to Peace and Concord , and to the Union of her Citizens . But on the contrary , other modern Republicks , the Cities wherein such Governments were formed , having been formerly long accustomed to obey Emperors , since they got their Liberty by many Accidents , they knew not , as not being well acquainted therewith , how to use it , by reason of the Citizens various dispositions of mind : So as wheeling often about with an uncertain Form of Government , they in process of time return'd under the command of one .

These Considerations being applied to the City of Rome , will prove that the prudence of her Citizens , though they were very wise and valiant men , was not sufficient to reduce her to a perfect Form of Commonwealth ; but they might have amended many great disorders in her , which did much shorten her life . For he who will consider the conditions of the people of Rome , will find them to be such , as no Form of Government could better agree with them then a Popular State ; for they were all warlike men , bred up even from the very first foundation of the City in the exercise of Arms. And though a Commonwealth may be formed amongst these , which may have a certain similitude to an Aristocratical State , when the Citizens being governed by certain Laws , partake every man more or less of that Government according to their worth ; ( For , Military discipline hath a certain species of Vertue , though it be none of those that do immediately serve to purchase the ultimate end of a City ) yet this Government is very seldom met with ; and though it want the true and proper Form , is commonly called by the usual name of a Commonwealth . So as though at first the City of Rome leaned much thereunto , in a short time the People had a great share therein ; who not knowing how to moderate themselves , made it grow licentious . But he who will look back even to her first beginning , will find that the Peoples authority did thereby ever increase together with the City : For the Peoples power and liberty was great not only after the driving out of the Tarquins , but even when it was commanded by Kings ; that City seeming even from that time to be naturally more disposed to the Form of a Commonwealth , then of a Kingdom . For , after the death of Romulus , the People being powerful , as having the weapons in their hand , and as being the first Founders of that City , usurped the authority of choosing Kings : who on the contrary side , that they might the better confirm themselves in their new Kingdom , endeavoured to accommodate themselves to the nature of the People , and to purchase their love by granting them many considerable things . So as even under the Kingly government it had the power of Appeals , as appeared in Horatius his case , who being condemned by the Magistrates for his Sisters death , appealed to the People , and was by them freed . In favor of them likewise the City was divided into Centuries , with a certain Order of a very small Tax , according to which the Degrees of the Militia , and the Authority of the Publick Courts ( things which did all of them appertain to a Popular State ) were to be distributed .

To boot with these Laws , the great number of Citizens , which did even then arise to One hundred and thirty thousand , made the Peoples party very powerful ; as also their having been so ready and so successful in engaging themselves in so many enterprises for the Commonwealth , without receiving any pay for their pains . But the Nobility was a long time very weak , and in but little esteem : For the first Founders of the City being Shepherds , and all of the same condition , there was no distinction of degree amongst them , save what was soon after brought in 〈◊〉 Romulus ; who choosing the Senate out of all that former number , that they might be assistant to the King in providing for things requisite for the State , by this order he divided some of the worthiest of the People in this new City from the rest , who gave the rise to the Roman Nobility . But even this Order was very weak ; for it was at first instituted by Romulus but of a small number of men ; and though others were afterwards added thereunto , yet till such time as the City got her liberty , 〈◊〉 never exceeded the number of Two hundred Senators ; nay , even these were much lessened by the cruelty of Tarquinius Superbus , and their Authority narrowly bounded by the Counterpoise of Regal power . So as when the City put herself into Liberty , there were not Noblemen enough to form a State of Optimati : in this case did Publius Valerius find the City of Rome , after the driving out of the Tarquins , when he through Brutus his death , rema●ning sole Consul , was to constitute Laws , and new mould the Commonwealth . Wherefore desirous to introduce a State differing from the former , under the name of Liberty , it behoved him not to lessen , but to encrease the Authority of the People : For else they would not have indured it ; and by fiding with the Tarquins , they might easily have confounded that Government , and reduced the City again under the power of Kings . For which reason also , Brutus , though he was first created Consul , not willing to lose the favor and assistance of the people , without which he thought the new Orders of the City could not be well established , perswaded his Colleague Tarquinius Collatinus , that to give satisfaction to the People , to whom the name of Tarquin was become odious , and suspitious , to lay down his Consulship : By these Reasons it appears , that Valerius was compelled to ordain many things in favour of the People , as were the Appeals from the Consuls ; The order , that upon pain of death no man should enter into any place of Magistracy without the Peoples approbation ; the petty punishment appointed for them who should not obey the Consuls commands , which was no more but to pay five Oxen and two Sheep . Moreover he eased the poor of many grievances , and made many other very Popular Laws , whence he purchased the name of Publicola .

But which 't is understood , that in ordering of the Commonwealth , respect was to be had in many things to necessity and to the condition of those times : yet if we shall consider other Accidents , we shall find them much contrary to such a necessity ; for the new Legislator was not Prince , as was Licurgus , but possest a place of Magistracy for a short time , the Authority whereof was hardly yet well known , and not much valued : So as he could not use force to withdraw the people from a Popular State , as it would have been needful , finding the People so disposed , as hath been said . Therefore the City being after a while to be reformed again , the Magistracy of Ten was chosen , with greater Authority then was that of the Consuls , which took away all Appeals , to the end that being more feared and reverenced by all , it might without any respect constitute new Laws with great firmness . And if Appius his ambition had not ruined the business , that Commonwealth might perhaps have been reduced to some better condition : but yet not to any very perfect one , it being too hard a thing to order Cities well , which are already much augmented ; just as we see it falls out in every particular man , who in his tender years may be easily made to undertake any manner of life , but when by practise he is settled in , as it were , a certain proper nature of his own , he cannot easily be altered from it . And if there have been any one , who hath been able to order a City already well grown , yet we shall find that that City was not so great nor potent , as was the City of Rome , at this time of the new Reformation ; and therefore the difficulties were much less , it being a very hard thing , and which , as saith the Philosopher , 〈◊〉 almost exceed humane power , to dispose of a great multitude in an excellent 〈◊〉 of Government . Then as these things were the reason why this Common-wealth was not well ordered at first , so did they in time bring her to great disorders and seditions , and finally to her destruction . For it is usual , that the further he advanceth that is once out of the way , so much doth he return backwards , is so much the more pusled , and the further from the place he intended to go to . So the Authority of the people being by these new Institutions alwaies to increase together with the greatness of the City , she swarved the further from the end , true Liberty , to which she seemed to address her self . And because this Common-wealth was born with this infirmity , the worth of none of her Citizens , though it were never so great , was sufficient to cure her thereof , or to prolong her life , As it happens in our humane bodies , which contracting some ill disposition of humours at their first entring into the World , are soon thereby opprest and brought to death , no natural vertue , though of force for other things , being able to afford any cure . 'T is notwithstanding very true , that though such like accidents rendred the City uncapable of any excellent Government , by inclining her to a Popular State , yet had they not so determinately disposed of her , but that she might have freed her self of many of her bad qualities , had not the ambition of her Citizens by increasing these her natural imperfections , made her fall into greater disorders .

Let us begin to consider what Publicola's actions were from the very beginning of the Commonwealth , and we shall easily discover his ambitious thoughts by which he was moved to study so over-much how to please the peoples appetite in every thing . These his intentions were apparently seen , by taking his being refused in the Election of the Consuls so heinously , as that he kept a good while from the Republick , as if he had put his hand to the Government , for his own Greatness , not for the common Good : But much more for that having compast that Degree , and finding the People jealous of him , for having built his house in a high and strong scituation , fearing lest together with the Peoples Love he might loose his own Authority and Power , he chose so to humble himself , as forgetting the dignity which belonged to the Supreme Magistrate of so great a City ; he made the Fasces , the ensigns of Consulship , be held in a posture of Homage , whilst he made his Oration , to shew , ( as he himself said ) That the Authority of the Consuls was subject to the Authority and Dignity of the People . This his desire of being esteemed Popular , was the reason why in this new Reformation , he went not about to what was very necessary ; to amend in part those defects which could not totally be taken away ; to wit , to give a just counterpoise to the Authority of the people , tempering it with that of the Senate , by very much increasing the number of the Senators , and by apropriating the weightiest affairs of State , to that Order , which how necessary it was , was afterwards seen , but too late put in execution ; to wit , in Sylla's time , by whom the first number of Senators was doubled , yet but to little purpose , the Peoples Authority being already too mightily increased , and many seeds of corruption being by this means sown abroad in the minds of the people . But Valerius added but one hundred to the uumbea of the Senate , neither did make any Law in savour of them , both of which he might at that time easily have done . For being at the time of the new Reformation to chuse new Senators of the Equestral Order , or of some other of the people , he would not onely have been content , but would have wone much honour , by exalting many of his Friends to that Dignity , as it was seen he did by those few that were chosen : And the People would have had sufficient power in the Commonwealth , if without communicating the weightiest Affairs of the Kingdom unto them , the indemptnity of chusing and of correcting Magistrates had been reserved to them : And then that Appeals might have been granted them , by which means they would not onely have had a hand in the City Affairs , but likewise they might have secured themselves from being injured by the Nobility ( a thing much desired by the People ) and from danger of loosing their Liberties . And the Authority and Reputation of the Senate being by this means augmented , the Peoples Insolency might the more easily have been moderated in those accidents which afterward happened . Which though it seemed ( as hath been said ) more harder to have been done in that City , for another respect , yet the revolutions of Government in the first birth of this Republick , did a little lessen ordinary Difficulties . For passing from Monarchy ( which in the Tarquins time was almost become Tyranny ) to a new condition ▪ the L●gislator might have made it an Aristocracie ; it being as it were natural in the change of States , that the Government which had wont to be in the power of a Tyrant , passes into the hands of the Nobility , who are usually the first who lay hold in pulling down Tyranny , as in Rome , where Tarquin and Brutus were the first Founders of Liberty .

Therefore if the People deserved to be made partaker in the new Government , for having assisted herein , much more ought the Nobility to have their dignities and priviledges increased , this common benefit of the City having had its chief rise from them ; nor would the People have had any reason to complain thereof . But Publicola , in stead of increasing the honor of the Senate , introduced by a very pernicious example , small respect to the Magistracie of Consuls ; which occasioned many disorders , which might easily have been corrected by a just fear , as is cleerly seen by many examples , but chiefly by this ; that the People being in insurrection , and contumacious against the power of Consulship , the creating of a Dictator , a Magistracie of supreme authority and reverence , proved a sure remedy to asswage the Tumult . And what more manifest sign could there be given , that the people might have been tamed and made obedient by fear and by respect unto the Magistrates , then that which was given upon the occasion of Appius his Decemvirate ? For being so ill dealt with by him and by his Colleagues , as they wanted not reason to apprehend Tyranny ; yet the authority of this Magistracie , from which there was no Appeal to be made , and the severity wherewith it was administred ▪ did so bridle the people , as they patiently endured all injuries ; nor durst they go about to shake off that slavery , till the Senate interposed it self , and that Horatius and Valerius declared themselves Heads of the Insurrection against the Decemviri . There ought therefore either greater respect to have been given to the Consulary Authority ; or else , if the more severe and free power of an ordinary Magistrate seemed not to be convenient for the state of that Commonwealth , the respect and reverence due to the person of the Magistrate ought to have been transferred to the authority of certain Laws , of which the Magistrate should have been chief Guardian , inflicting severe punishment upon the not observers thereof : For by this means the People would have had no occasion to be off●nded with the Nobles , when their insolencie should be punished by vertue of the Laws ; this arising amongst many other be●efits from the Laws , that he who is punished for his faults cannot complain of any one , being condemned by order of Law , not by the Judge his will .

But what hath been noted of Publicola in this first beginning , may also be known at all other times , and in many other of the chief Roman Citizens ; who through ambition siding with the People , were the cause of their pride and insolencie . So the Consuls Valerius and Horatius , not being able to obtain Triumph from the Senate , sought to have it from the People ; and the whole Senate ( not to multiply examples ) by creating a Dictator to suppress the authority of the Consuls Titus Quintus Cincinnatus , and Geneus Iulius Mento , who opposed them therein , had recourse unto the Tribunes , who by threatening imprisonment forc'd them to give way to the resolution : And those Noblemen did usually take another course then what is to be held with the People , with whom grave and severe proceeding doth avail more then humble and mild demeanor . But they were so blinded by Ambition , as not knowing , or not caring for such errors , they strove who should most ingratiate themselvs with the the People , by Presents , Shews , and submiss comportment . And this instruction might be learn'd by the example of the People of Rome themselves : For it was ofttimes seen , that greater respect was given to those few who had known how to use severity to the People , then to those who carried themselves submissly unto them . And certainly , amongst other things , the Judgment which followed upon the cause between Menimiu● and Spurius Servilius , was very remarkable : who being both of them accused of the same fault by the Tribunes , to wit , that being Consuls they had opposed the Agrarian Law ; Menimius , who by intreaties and submiss carriage endeavoured absolution , was condemned ; but Spurius Servilius stoutly withstanding the Tribunes fury , and speaking severely to the People , was acquitted . And Furius and Manilius , who had both of them been Consuls , being not long after accused , the Nobles being willing totally to free them from such danger , kill'd the Tribune in his own house who had impeached them ; which did so affright his Colleagues , and the People , as none of the Tribunes would afterwards reassume the same cause : And all the Insurrections which were then in the City being suddenly appeased , all of them did willingly subscribe the Militia .

Appius Claudius was always very severe against the People ; and amongst other of his actions , the punishment which he took upon the Armies insolencie was very observable , for he made them be decimated , very tenth man be put to death ; which was submitted unto without any the least tumult , by reason of the antient opinion of the Captains severity , and for the fear infused into the Soldiers by the sentence of death against some Centurions who were accused for having been Authors of that Insurrection . Which was sufficient so far to curb them all , as though they were all of them then in Arms , every of them stood peacefully spectators of the death of so many Kinsmen and Friends , and of their own doubtful chance ; and ( which peradventure is a greater wonder , and doth the better confirm this truth ) Appius being accused for this sentence by the Tribunes , after he had laid down the Consulship , using the same severity in defending himself , he was not held less guilty for having been formerly Consul : So as the People neither willing to absolve him , nor daring to condemn him , the cause was put off , and he suffered to depart . And in the latter times , when the Peoples power was greatest , Tiberius Gracchus endeavouring to propound the observance of the Licinian Law , the Nobles , changing their habits , and shewing great humility , labored to win favor from the People ; but since they saw they could do no good by this means , they resolved for their last refuge to use force , and kill'd the Author of those seditions . Which action of theirs did so astonish the People , as they suffered the Tribunes death , whom they had so dearly loved , and who had lost his life in defence of their cause , to go unrevenged . And soon after , Caius Gracchus reassuming the cause which his Brother had in vain endeavoured , the Nobles , using the same cunning , sought first by fair means to deprive him of Popular favor , making use of another Tribune to this purpose , by causing other popular Laws to be propounded by consent of the Senate . But humility avail'd no more at this time , then it had done formerly ; so as it behoving them to betake themselves again to Arms , they slew Caius Gracchus in the Aventine , and after the death of two Brothers , annull'd all the Laws made by them ; nor did the People ever seem to resent it . Which if it might have been done by an usual way of a Magistrate , as hath been touched upon , doubtless these ruder remedies , as better suiting with the infirmities of that Commonwealth , might have freed her from many mischiefs .

This is likewise confirmed by many other experiences : For as long as the Senate kept up the authority thereof , threatening to create a Dictator , it kept the Terentilla Law from being made , of creating a Magistracie of five men , who were to correct the Consuls power . But when it chose to appease the People by giving way to their importunities , it did only invite them to endeavour more novelties ; so as Humility made them not more quiet , but more insolent . Wherefore having obtained Appeals , they would have a Magistrate of their own , endowed with supreme authority ; and having gotten the power of the Tribunes , they could not stop there , but would be admitted into the Consulship , into the Dictatorship , and to all other sort of Dignities ; and having obtained all sort of Honors , they began to aspire to the Estates of the Nobles ; who being too late aware of their Error , to keep themselves from being quite dis-robed of every thing , and not being able to remedy themselves by the Laws , or by Magistracy , they were forced to have recourse to Arms , to moderate the Peoples Insolencie .

Whence it may be concluded that the Romans not having used those means , neither at the first making of their Laws , nor almost at any other time , in any of their Actions , which were proper to overcome certain bad qualities , which they had contracted even from the birth of the Commonwealth , was the reason why , remaining alwaies , as it were a distempered body , wherein ill humours did continually encrease , she was alwaies sickly , perplext by so many civil Discords , and and came to a shorter period of life , then she ought to have done for many other of her most noble conditions . The example of this powerful and famous Republick , if we will well obserserve her civil Orders , and what proceeded from thence , and if they shall be measured by truer and more general Rules , may instruct us excellently well , how to discern the perfections and imperfections of Modern States . And say it will not serve to correct Errors , already too much confirmed by corrupt Customs ; it will at least be of use to know what value ought to be put upon every Government , and what length of daies may in reason be allotted thereunto , holding notwithstanding that Disorder , for a truer Rule then all Orders , which is oft times introduced by various and unthought of Acciden●s upon which our civil Actions do depend , not onely regulated by humane wisdom , but subject ( for ought that appears to us ) in many things to a certain casualty ; though they be indeed directed by assured , though hidden causes , reserved in the bosom of Divine Providence , whereunto our Reason cannot reach . Therefore if following the usual manner of speech , we shall in these our Discourses , make often use of the names of Chance and Fortune , let them be understood in this true and pious manner .