Solid philosophy asserted, against the fancies of the ideists, or, The method to science farther illustrated with reflexions on Mr. Locke's Essay concerning human understanding / by J.S.

Solid Philosophy ASSERTED , Against the FANCIES of the IDEISTS : OR , THE METHOD to SCIENCE Farther Illustrated .

WITH Reflexions on Mr. LOCKE's ESSAY concerning Human Understanding .

By J. S.

LONDON , Printed for Roger Clavil at the Peacock , Abel Roper at the Black Boy , both in Fleetstreet , and Thomas Metcalf , over against Earl's - Court in Drury-Lane , 1697.

To the Right Honourable ROBERT , Lord Viscount Dunbar . My LORD ,

HAD I thought that this Piece I here Dedicate to Your Lordship , was not above Your , or any Man's , Patronage , I had shewn less Respects to You in making You so Mean a Present . Were You Monarch of the Universe , TRUTH ( which it Defends ) could receive no Protection from Your Grandeur . Her Genius is so Sublime , and Her self so Nobly-born , that , like Him from whom she descends , she is Beneficial to all , and Incapable of receiving Advantage from any . All Extrinsecal Supports , in stead of Honouring her , Debase her . Her Well-compacted and Indissoluble Fabrick is altogether Divine : Contrary to our Material Structures , it is Built from the Top ; and , its Foundation laid as high as Heaven it self . The GOD of Truth has imprinted all Natural Truths in Created Beings , as in the Footsteps of his Infinite Wisdom ; from whence , by the Vehicles of our Senses , they are Copy'd and Transcrib'd into our Mind ; where , without our Labour , they beget all our Natural Notions ; and , as Speculation , and even Experience , assures us , they do also , at the same time , give us some Knowledge of the Things themselves ; which steadily and distinctly Reflected on , breed in us that best Natural Perfection of our Understanding , SCIENCE ; of which those Notions are , as it were , the Seeds .

Thus was Mankind put into a plain Road-way of gaining Clear Intellectual Light , by the Common Providence of our Good Creatour . To improve in which , and to keep our Thoughts from wandring into Errour , the same Goodness of our Maker endowed us with a Faculty of Reflecting on the Operations of our own Minds ; and , on all the Guilded Train of our Spiritual Conceptions , and of the several Natures and Manners of them ; by which means those who were addicted to Attentive Reflexion , or Speculation , invented a Way , and setled Artificial Rules , how to manage their Notions , Judgments and Discourses . Which Rules laid orderly together , and found by Reason to be Agreeable to the Natures of Things according to the Being they had in the Mind , and , therefore , Solid ; did , in time , compose that excellent and most useful Science call'd LOGICK .

But , my Lord , the Crooked Byass of Men's Wills perverted their Reason , and made them disregard this Well-grounded and Regular Method , given them so freely by the Author of Nature . The Heathen Philosophers of old , whose God was Vanity , affected to set up several Sects , to pride themselves with the Empty Honour of being esteemed their Heads . The Christian Schools succeeded ; who , at first , discours'd gravely on those Subjects which were of a higher Nature ; but , whether the Circumstances did not bend their Thoughts that way , or from what other Reason , they settled no Scientifical Method to attain Philosophical Knowledges . Yet , those who follow'd Aristotle's Principles , ( as the great Aquinas constantly endeavoured ) did generally discourse even in such Subjects , when they had occasion , very solidly . But , afterwards , when School-disputes grew to be the only fashionable Learning , the Multitudes of Combatants increas'd , and the Contests were maintain'd by several Great Bodies ; each of which thought it Creditable to their Party to set up and follow some Eminent Man of their own . Hence this Nature-taught Method came to be much neglected ; and he was thought to win the Prize who was the subtilest and acutest Disputant , and not he who could most solidly Demonstrate Truth . Hence , no Exact and Rational Logick being settled and agreed on , they were apt to take up oftentimes Wrong Principles ; and the several Conceptions of our Mind were mistaken to be so many several Things . Demonstration was rather talk'd of for Form's sake , than pursu'd and practis'd ; and , the the Use of General Maxims , which should establish our Discourses , was scarce once thought on ; without which , Demonstration was Impossible . New Questions in Philosophy , of little or no use , were started ; and bandy'd to and fro by Terms and Words not well understood ; nor their Sense agreed on , by the Contending Parties . The Heat of Opposition fix'd Men in their own Opinions . Innumerable Quaint and Nice , and sometimes Impertinent , Distinctions were invented , to escape their being Entangled by the Arguments of their Adversary . Every man affected to be a Proteus , and took more Care to elude Opposition , than to settle and establish Truth on Immovable Grounds . The true Sense of Aristotle's Doctrine , not being taken from himself or his First Interpreters , but from some Modern Mis-understanders , was lost ; and his Text drawn into several Meanings , to abet Contradictory Tenets . In a Word , nothing was decisively concl●●ed , nor likely to be so , by this way of School-Term-Learning , as things were manag'd by Unmethodiz'd Disputation .

Thus stood the Affair of Philosophy at the beginning of this present Century ; which having been fertile of many Excellent Wits , two of the Chiefest of them , Cartesius in France , and our Ingenious Countryman Mr. Locke , having taken Scandal at these Miscarriages , and an Aversion against that Miracle of Nature , Aristotle , whose Doctrine Schoolmen had ill represented ; and being withal Men of Strong Brains , enabling them to carry their Conceptions through , and to make them Coherent ; they did , out of their Zeal for Truth , undertake to set up New Systems of Philosophy ; tho' Cartesius in some sort , furbish'd up , improv'd , and refin'd upon the old Corpuscularian Way of Democritus and Epicurus ; which I have fully confuted in the Appendix to my Method ; and , I hope , beyond all possibility of Reply . But , these two Gentlemen , being better vers'd in the Mathematicks than in Metaphysicks ; and , thence , not apprehending how Corporeal Natures could get into the Mind , or be there ; nor , reflecting that a Spiritual Nature , being incomparably Superiour in the Rank of Beings to that of Corporeal Things , must , consequently , have naturally and ncessarily a Power to comprehend , after its manner , ( or by way of Knowledge ) that Inferiour one ; they were forc'd , thro' their want of Higher Principles , to build all Knowledge , not upon the Things themselves in their Knowing Power , but upon Ideas or Similitudes of them ; tho' neither of them set themselves to make out or demonstrate how we could possibly have our Notions , or First Notices of the Things by them . Now , these Spiritual Ideas being , most evidently , neither the Things known , nor any Mode or Accident of those Objects ; and , consequently , nothing at all of the Thing in any sort , were manifestly convinced not to be the Productions of Creative Wisdom , in which he had imprinted all Natural Truths , but meer Fancies , coin'd by their Imagination . These Ideas or Fancies then , and only these , they contemplated , and Grounded all Natural Truths , ( which could have no Foundation but only in the Things which the First Truth had made ) upon these Fantastick Resemblances : and , thence , they put all Formal Truths to consist in the Agreement of those Empty Similitudes ; till at length ( as Fancy let loose to fly at its full Random , and driven forward with a quick Wit , does naturally and genuinly lead ) they had introduced a kind of Fanaticism into Philosophy ; built , in the main , or in great part , on a pretended Inward Light by means of those Imaginary and Visionary Ideas .

From this Introversion upon these unsolid Aiery Bubbles , and thence their neglecting the Things themselves , and our Solid Natural Notions , Mr. Locke was brought to Confound Corporeal and Spiritual Natures ; and consequently , ( these two being the Adequate Object of all Philosophy ) all Philosophical Knowledge was rendred impossible . And Cartesius left us no means to know whether Man is One Thing made up of Soul and Body , or Two Things , tack'd together by virtue of some Accident ; which well consisted with their Substantial Distinction . Hence also it came , that GOD was brought in at every Hard Pinch , to act contrary to what the Natures of Things requir'd ; without which , they could not lay their Principles , or make their Scheme cohere ; that is , they would needs make GOD , as he is the Author and Orderer of Nature , to work either Preternaturally or else Supernaturally ; which is a plain Contradiction . Nay , Mr. Locke finding no Fancy in his Imaginative Power that suits with our Notion of [ Thing , ] would perswade the World that no Man living knows what a Thing or Substance is ; that is , that none knows what the Word Thing means ; which is so Evident to our Natural Thoughts , that it is impossible for the rudest Person in the World to be Ignorant of it . In a Word , their Fancy so inveigled their Reason , that they came to deny Self-evident Truths ; and held many other Propositions , which were absolutely Impossible and Contradictory .

Wherefore , seeing Philosophy reduced to this lamentable Condition ; and , that Solid Rationality , and all Truth in Natural Objects , were thus in imminent Danger to be over-run and born down by Imaginary Conceits ; and apprehending that GOD's Providence had fitted and enabled me to redress such great Mischiefs ; I thought it became me to re-instate Reason in her Soveraignty over Fancy ; and , to assert to her the Rightful Dominion Nature had given her over all our Judgments and Discourses . I resolved therefore to disintricate Truth , ( which lay too deep for Superficial Fancy to fathom ) from all those Labyrinths of Errour . I observ'd that Philosophy labour'd and languish'd under many Complicated Distempers , ( all springing from this way of Ideas ) and that they were grown Epidemical ; nor could they be cur'd by the Application of Remedies to this or that Particular Part , or by confuting this or that Particular Errour . Hereupon , having found out the true Cause of all these Maladies of Human Understanding , I saw it was necessary to Stub up by the Roots that Way it self ; and , by Clos● and Solid Reasons , ( the most Decisive Weapons in Tru●●● Armory , ) to break in Pieces the brittle Glassy Essences of those Fantastick Apparitions ; which , if a Right Way of Reasoning be settled , and understood , will disappear , and vanish out of the World , as their Elder Sisters , the Fairies , have done in this last Half Century .

I know , my Lord , Reformation made by a Single Man , tho' but in Philosophy , seldom gains Credit to him who attempts it . And , it must be confess'd , that , to pretend to reform where there is no Necessity , has an Ill Name ; and is justly held to spring from Policy , Interest , Pride , or some such other Sinister Motive . But I am very confident , that whoever peruses this Treatise , nay , but even the Preface , will see , that the Occasion of this Undertaking was not only Expedient , but Cogent . Nor can any Man justly tax him of Arrogance , or of Usurping a Dictature over other Men's Judgments , tho' he opposes Great Multitudes of Speculaters , who offers his Reasons to convince theirs .

To this Necessity , now laid open , of Reforming Philosophy , I shall add another , of a much more weighty Concern ; and which may also rectifie some zealons well-meaning Friends ; who , judging of Things by their own Short Reach , think that the Advancing Truth in Philosophy is little better than Time and Labour lost ; whereas , I , on the Contrary , do really think , that the Supplying what the World most wants , is the Greatest , and most Universal Good I can possibly do . This other Necessity then , of my rectifying our Modern Philosophy , ( which will make others see , how great a Good it is , ) is this : Those Truths which are of a higher , and more Sacred Nature , can never be rightly Explicated , nor consequently ( such Men not valuing Authority ) be duly recommended to those who Dissent from them , unless True Principles of Philosophy be Settled , and Unsound ones Confuted . For , since no Explication of Faith can be made by Faith it self ; all of them must necessarily be made by our Reason , shewing the Conformity they have to our Natural Notions , or to such Knowledges as we had from the Things in Nature ; especially , since Dissenters draw their Chief Objections from the Repugnancy of those Points to our Natural Principles . 'T is a known Truth , that as every Definition must be the Self-same Notion with what is defin'd , so must every right Explication too ; it being , in reality , nothing but the Unfolding what was before wrapt up Closer . Whence follows , that , when he who has the ill Luck to have taken up False Principles , comes to explicate the Trinity , the Incarnation , the Resurrection , or any High Point of Reveal'd Faith ; his Explication must always be Contrary to True Principles of Nature , and perhaps may have twenty real Contradictions in it ; and , so , Common Reason ( as was said ) telling all Sensible Men , that the Explication must be the same Sense with the Point which it Explicates ; the Tenet of Faith will suffer in the Opinion of Witty Men , by such an Untoward and Senseless Explication ; be Ridiculous to Adversaries ; and be held perfect Nonsense and Contradiction . Whereas , if the Philosophy , by which those Tenets are Explicated , be True and Solid ; then , since both Natural and Reveal'd Truths are Children of the same Father , ( the GOD and Author of All Truth , ) who cannot contradict Himself , and therefore those two Sorts of Truths cannot but agree ; it will follow , that the Explication of all Reveal'd Points , made according to True Philosophy , must needs appear to Intelligent Men to be most Rational ; and most Consonant , and not Contradictory , to True Natural Principles : Which will Comfort Faith in those who believe already ; Recommend it to all Ingenuous and Indifferent Seekers ; help to Convert to Christianity those , whose Reason was formerly Dissatisfy'd upon such Sinister Misconceits ; and , Lastly , Confound Adversaries , by putting them past Opposing it by any Principles of True Philosophy , and leave nothing for them to object against it , but Idle and Ill-grounded Fancies , whose weak Attempts are easily defeated . Whence , I could heartily wish , that , were True Philosophy in Fashion , all Sects ( so the State thought fit ) might have Free Liberty to Print the best Reasons they can muster up against Christianity ; Resting confident , that ( in that Happy State of Science , or True Learning ) nothing in the World could gain to Truth a greater Advantage . Till that Desirable Time comes , all I can do , is , to declare here publickly , that I shall take it for a great Favour , if any Learned Socinian , Deist , or Atheist , would please to send me those Reasons they , or their Leaders , judge of most Weight , why they cannot embrace the Doctrine of the Trinity , or Christianity ; which they may do privately , and Unnam'd , to the Stationer who publishes this Treatise ; and I do hereby promise them , I will give their Objections their Full Force , and publish an Answer to them : Onely , I will expect , that their Arguments shall be Intrinsecal ones , or drawn from the Opposition such Reveal'd Articles , as they mislike , are conceiv'd by them to have to some Principles of Logick , Physicks , or Metaphysicks , which are either Self-evident , or which they will undertake to reduce to Evidence : These onely being such Objections as becomes a Christian Philosopher to speak to . For , if they be Extrinsecal ones , and built on Histories , or on Groundless Fancies ; or , if they consist in Glossing Words , in whose Sense we are not Agreed ; it belongs to a Critick , or a Historian , and is not the Proper Employment of a Philosopher .

I would not be thought , by what is said lately , to cast any Reflexions on Cartesius or Mr. Locke , ( whom I join here equally , and indifferently , ) as intending any Diskindness to Christianity by their New Methods of Philosophy : It appears both by their Writings , and by their particular manner of handling their Subjects , that they meant ingenuously and sincerely to follow what they conceiv'd to be True . Onely I must say of both of them , that , if their Way of Philosophizing , and , therefore , their Philosophy it self , be shewn to be far from True and Solid ; then , in case any Chief Christian Tenet should come to be Explicated by their Ways , those Sacred Points themselves must necessarily , for the Reason now given , receive some Taint and Blemish by such Ill-grounded Explications : And the same , for the same Reason , I must say of School-Philosophy too , if it proceeds upon Principles that are not Well-grounded , or Solid .

It remains , my Lord , to give my Reasons why this Common Duty I here perform to the Learned Part of Mankind who are Candidates of Science , comes to be particularly address'd to Your Self : Which , in short , are these . I was much in Debt ; and it was an Honest Man's Part to endeavour to discharge it . I ow'd much to Your Lordship's Father , of Honourable and Pious Memory , who both encourag'd my first Endeavours , and favour'd me with a particular Friendship and Correspondence to His Dying-Day : And , I make account , such kind Obligements , writ in a Grateful Heart , ought to be as Lasting , and as Binding , as those Obligations drawn on Paper ; and , withal , ought to devolve , by a Hereditary Right , to His Immediate Descendent , Your Self . I ow'd very much to Your Lordship 's own Person , for the Kind Respect with which You have been pleas'd to honour me . I ow'd much to all Your Lordship 's Nearest and Noblest Relations , both in the Direct , and in all the Collateral Lines . And , lastly , since every Man who writes for Truth , naturally loves to be Understood , I ow'd it to my Self , to present this Treatise particularly to Your Lordship ; than whom , I know none of our English Nobility more Acutely Intelligent . It is of such a Nature , by its laying the Foundation of Philosophy from the deepest Bottom-Principles , that , to comprehend and penetrate it thorowly , there was requir'd a Judgment both Solid , and Pointed ; both which Perfections meet in Your Lordship's Great Genius , in a High Perfection .

The Diligent Printer has overtaken my Lazy Pen , and stays for this hasty Scribble ; which forces me , with an Unmannerly Abruptness , to write my self ,

My LORD , Your Lordship 's Most Sincere Honourer , and most humbly devoted Servant , J. S.

THE PREFACE , DIRECTED To those Learned Men of both our Universities who have a Due Regard for TRUTH , and a Sincere Desire of KNOWLEDGE . Gentlemen ,

1. AFter I had Publish'd my METHOD to SCIENCE , which I Dedicated to your selves , I came to receive certain Information that very many Students in both the Universities , and not a few of those also who were to instruct others , did apply themselves to the Way of Ideas , in hopes to arrive by that means at Philosophical Knowledge . My best Judgment , grounded on very Evident Reasons , assur'd me , that that Method was far from Solid , and utterly Unable to give you the True Knowledge of any thing in Nature ; being it self altogether Groundless , and meerly Superficial . I saw clearly , that to addict your Thoughts to study Similitudes and Resemblances , ( which , as will be most evidently demonstrated , could not possibly give you any True or Certain Light to know the Things themselves , ) was no better than ( as it is in the Fable ) Vitreum vas lambere , pultem non attingere . It struck me with a very sensible Trouble , that the precious Time and Pains of such great Numbers of Men , who were the Flower of our Nation , who were hereafter to be Guides to others , and whose very Profession , and State of Life , had addicted them wholly to the Pursuit of Knowledge , should be imbued with such Principles as render'd the Attainment of it absosolutely Impossible . I look'd upon my self as one who , having spent near half a Century in Speculative Studies , was capable to avert and redress so great a Harm ; and , thence , I esteem'd my self bound in Duty to make you aware of the Way you have either chosen , or light into for want of a better ; that you might consider seriously whether you ought not to retrieve your Steps ere you had wander'd too far in a Path which could never bring you to the End you aim'd at . This Consideration oblig'd me to strike at the Root , and to overthrow the whole Way of proceeding upon Ideas , by whomsoever advanced ; and to demonstrate by many Clear , and , I hope , Unanswerable Arguments , and Multitudes of Instances , that it was Superficial , Fruitless , Insignificant , and meerly Phantastical .

2. When I had near finish'd my METHOD , I gave a Cursory Look over Mr. Locke's Essay concerning Humane Understanding ; and I hap'd to light on some places , which gave me a high Esteem for it ; insomuch that I began to conceive some Hopes that his Ingenious Thoughts might , with some few Alterations , be reconcil'd to True Philosophy : For , I was at that time far from intending to make any Reflexions upon it , but highly extoll'd it where-ever I came : judging of the Whole , by the Scantlings I had seen of it ( as it were ) accidentally . But , the last September , setting my self to take a nearer and fuller View of the whole Book , I quite lost the Hopes , I had gladly entertain'd formerly , of According it with Philosophical Principles ; and became much concern'd , that so Excellent a Wit should be half lost to the Commonwealth of Learning , by lighting unfortunately into such an Unaccountable Method . For , I saw evidently , that ( besides the Oddness of the Way he took ) his Fancy , the Vivacity of which was very Extraordinary , had , in very many Particulars , got such an Ascendent over his Reason , that , as he was Sceptical in divers Things which were Clearest Truths ; so he seem'd in very many others to be Positive , the Contrary to which was plainly Demonstrable , and in a manner Self-evident . I was heartily sorry , I say , to see so considerable a Writer , whose Comprehensive Genius , and Clear Expression , would have made Truth Irresistible , had he taken her part , mis-led so strangely as to take Fancies for Realities ; and to think that Philosophy , which is the Knowledge of Things , consisted in a perpetual Contemplation of Empty Ideas , or Resemblances .

3. This wrought up my Thoughts higher , and made me conceive a greater Indignation against this New Way of Philosophizing ; and that , very particularly , for his sake ; tho' I saw the Cartesians as much wanted Rectifying in their Grounds , as he , or rather more . Wherefore , to gain such a powerful Assistant over to Truth 's side , ( of which , his Sincere Professions of Ingenuity would not let me despair , ) I resolv'd to lay open those Blemishes of Errours I had observ'd in his Essay , retaining still a due Esteem for the many Beauties it contain'd : For , I do assure him , my Nature leads me , as willingly to acknowledge and give their just Elogiums to his 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , as to discover the 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , he may have fallen into at unawares , as I doubt not but my Readers will see ; and , that ( tho' I declare Open War against the Way it self ) I rather incline to Excuse , than to Aggravate his Faults or Mistakes . Indeed , the Duty I ow'd to Truth oblig'd me to note those Latter with such a Distinction , as I conceiv'd they did more or less injure that Sacred Concern . And , I was the more willing to enter the Lists against such a Champion ; because , if I hop'd to gain any Advantage over him , ( I had rather say , if I had the good Fortune to win him , ) 't is impossible Truth should ever obtain a more clear Victory ; For , no Man , who takes the just Dimensions of Mr. Locke 's Great Wit , can think , that any thing but the Invincible Force of Truth can soil him .

4. I have good Reason to fear , that this Declaring against whole Bodies of Ideists , at once , will be interpreted by some to savour of Singularity : It will be deem'd by others , a high Imprudence to make such a Bold Breach with a World of Acute Speculaters ; with whole Sects of Modern Philosophers , both in two Neighbouring Nations , and in our own Universities ; and , in many Things , with most of the School-men too . Others will think , that I do very unwisely provoke Opposition ; and , by such a brisk Attack , in a manner Challenge all those Great Men who are of a contrary Sentiment . But , what is all this to his purpose , who has devoted himself wholly to promote and defend TRUTH ; and , is sure he does , upon Solid Reasons , judge that to be True which he maintains ? This Objection seems grounded on this False Maxim , which some Men have set up very politickly , to establish their own Reputation with the Vulgar , as Sacred and Inviolable ; viz. that [ The Opinion of a Multitude has the Force of a kind of Authority , to bridle the Understandings of Private Men from Setting up a Contrary Doctrine . ] Now , whatever some Men may think of this Position , I must declare my Sentiment of it , that it is the most pernicious Maxim that could be invented , to hinder the Progress of Rational Nature in that which should most perfect it ; that it puts a stop to the farther Use of their Reason in all future Mankind ; that it makes all Improvement in Knowledge Impossible , and utterly obstructs the Advancement of SCIENCE . No Reasoners , how many , or of how Great Name soever they be , have any Authority at all but by Virtue of the Reasons they produce ; whence , that Single Man , whoever he be , that brings better Reasons , for the Tenet he advances , than all the former World has done for theirs , ought to have more of this ( miscall'd ) Authority , than that whole World of Opposers .

5. But , this postponing the Consideration of the Multitude of Dissenting Speculaters to Evident Reason , is ten times more Justifiable , in case that Opposing Party does not so much as pretend to , much less produce Self-evident Principles , nor Demonstration , to Ground , or Conclude their Tenets ; but builds on Voluntary Suppositions , and makes use of Wit , good Language , and other meerly plausible Ways , to recommend their Conclusions to the Approbation of their Readers . Those who do not so much as pretend to Demonstration and Clear Principles , being unable to offer any Thing that is Certain , ought not ( in my Opinion ) meddle at all with Philosophy ; nor appear before Learned Men with an Expectation their Doctrine should be Embraced ; nor can they , in reason , Assert any thing , but only Propose .

6. But the main Consideration which takes off all Invidiousness from my Carriage in this Particular , is , that in this whole Contest between the Ideists and me , there is Nothing at all that is Personal . 'T is not the Parts or Abilities of the Contenders , but their METHOD which is in Dispute . The Slowest and Lamest Traveller , who can but creep forward in a right Path , shall sooner arrive at his Journey 's End , than Another whose Legs are nimble , and his Pace swift , if he takes a wrong Way at his first setting out . Rather his greater Strength and Agility do , in such a ease , enable him only to run more widely astray ; as the strongest Bow shoots farthest from the Mark , if the Shast be wrong levell'd . Let the Talent of Wit in the Ideists be Incomparable , ( as doubtless that of Cartesius was , to whom I may , with Justice , join Mr. Locke ) if the Methods they take be not proper to attain true Science , their Errours , when they mistake , ( as I am sure they do in their Principles , and , consequently , in most of their Conclusions ) must be to the same Degree more Enormous , as their Fancies are more Ingenious . 'T is their METHOD then , or their Way of Proceeding and Building upon Ideas , which I most blame and oppose . Or rather I deplore the Detriment accruing hence to the Learned Part of the World , that Men , endowed with such an Excellent Genius , did unluckily light into such an Indirect and Perplex'd Path ; seeing what vast Advances Science might have made , had such Men taken up Right Principles , hit upon the Right Way at first , and apply'd their Strong Brains to pursue it . 'T is not then their Endowments which come into Competition , to which I deferr as much as is possible : For , I much more admire the Skill of such Architects as can build a Castle in the Air , and make it hang there by Geometry ( as it were ) than all those common sort of Artists , who can raise such a Structure upon Firm Ground .

7. What our several Methods are , the Title of my Book tells my Reader in short , viz. that , ( as I have hinted in my Dedicatory ) Theirs is to ground all their Discourses on Ideas ; that is , ( as themselves express it , and as the Word [ Idea ] declares , ) on Similitudes or Resemblances ; which Similitudes , ( as is abundantly demonstrated in my three first Preliminaries , ) are meer Fancies : Mine is to build them solely and entirely on the Things themselves , in which , as the Footsteps or Effects of his Essential Verity , the Creative Wisdom of the God of Truth , has planted and imprinted all Created Truths whatever . This Method I observe so exactly throughout my whole METHOD , and this present Treatise , that I disown and renounce any Discourse in either of these Books , which is not built either upon the Things as they are in Nature , or according to the Being they Naturally have in the Understanding : And , I shall owe much to that Man , who will show me that I do any where decline from this solid and well-grounded Method . As for Formal Truths , found in our Judgments or Discourses , I build them on most Evident Principles , or strive to reduce them thither ; and on the Connexion of the Terms found in Propositions , by which only Truth can be express'd ; keeping still an Attentive Regard to the Things themselves . And I desire that the Differences between the Ideists and me may be decided by the Impartial Umpirage of Rigorous Logick . A Test , which , as I am sure their Cause cannot bear , so I am confident they will never accept of or stand to . For , it may easily be discern'd by any serious Reflecter , that their Procedure and manner of Discoursing is not by way of laying Principles , and drawing a Close and well-knit Train of Consequences , as I do in all the main Points of my Method , and in this present Treatise on occasion ; but , by Unproved Suppositions , and Loose Discourses made up of well-express'd Wit , Ingenious Remarks , Quaint Novelties , Plausible Explications , and such other Superficial ways ; which , tho' they take with Vulgar Readers , are ( to speak plainly ) more fit for Flashy Rhetorical Declamation , than for Manly and Solid PHILOSOPHY . Nor do I think it did ever so much as once enter into the Thoughts of the Ideists , much less their Hope , that their Discourse could be reduced to Self-evidence , or to that Artificial Form of Close Discourse call'd a Demonstrative Syllogism ; which is the Touchstone to distinguish what Ratiocinations are truly Conclusive , what Inconclusive or Fallacious . Without which , what do we know ?

8. I am very well aware what Prejudice I bring upon my self , by Addressing you in this Confident manner at the very first Dash of my Pen ; and some well-meaning Friends have advertis'd me , that this Carriage of mine has been reflected on , especially by some meer School-men ; who , tho' they in reality know nothing , are more proud of their Probabilities , than the most Scientifical Man living is of his Demonstrations ; tho' their utmost Performances amount to no more than that of the ridiculous Fortune-tellers of old , — Aut erit , aut non ; Divinare etenim magnus mihi donat Apollo . Whence I do fully expect , that the Humour of our Modern Speculaters will judge this Assuredness of mine to be a high Presumption of my own Performances ; nay , some will think it a proud Disregard of others even to talk of Demonstration . Indeed , I must own I have a high Opinion of my Principles and my Method , which Nature and GOD's good Providence have laid and establish'd . But , as for my Conclusions and Deductions , as I will not justifie them all with the same Firmness as I did the others ; so , I must declare , that did I not really judge them Demonstrative when I call them so , I should not think I ought to propose them as such ; nor at all to the Learned . The World has been sufficiently pester'd already with Books of Philosophy , nay , Volumes , blown up to a vast Bulk with Windy and Frathy Probabilities , and petty Inconclusive Topicks ; which , like Rank Weeds , have over-run that Rich Soil where Science ought to have been Sown ; and I esteem it too poor and mean a Vanity to plant Briar-fields to enlarge a Wilderness . If I overween in calling my Proofs , Demonstrations , I am willing to take the Shame to my self , if it deserves Shame ; tho' perhaps I had been more blame-worthy , if , really judging them Demonstrative , I had minced the Truth , and out of an Affected Modesty , or a Diffidence for which I saw no Ground , I had diminish'd their Force in the esteem of my Readers ; and so hinder'd the Profit , which , startled at the Uncouth Sound of Demonstration , they might otherwise have reap'd by looking into them . For , DEMONSTRATIONS are Strange Rarities in this Sceptical Age ; and when those who are to show them do proclame to the World where they are to be seen , Curious People will run in Flocks to view the Monster .

9. He that knows what Demonstration is , and verily judges his Argument is such , and yet , out of Niaiserie and Shamefastness says at every turn , [ I think , or , perhaps this is true , or may be True ] should , if I might advise him , wear a Mask ; for he does as good as tell his Readers , [ Gentlemen , I offer you an Argument , but I fear 't is not worth your Acceptance . ] A strange Complement from one Philosopher to another ! It was not out of my Natural Humour and Inclination , but perfectly out of Deliberate Design to win my Readers to Attentive Examination , and invite those who were dissatisfy'd to Opposition , ( which is the best means to clear Truth ) that I deliver'd my self with that Bold Assurance . And I did really intend that Sceptical Men should ask , — Quid profert dignum tanto promissor hiatu ? That , setting themselves thence to Sift the Nature of my Method , and the Force of my Arguments more narrowly , they might better sink into their Understandings ; as I am Confident they will , if ever they have perused my Method to Science ; and , by that or any other means , do solidly know what is requisite to a true Demonstration .

10. Another Reason why I put on this Vizard of Confidence , so little suting with my Natural Complexion , was this . The want of true Science , and the Despair of finding any , had brought such a Luke-warm and Indifferent Humour into the World , ( and I wish it were not too common ) that , tho' all Men affect to talk of Truth , and seem in Ordinary Discourse to value and magnifie her ; yet , when it comes to the Point , scarce one Man dares heartily profess himself her Champion , and declare he will defend her Cause with Evident Reason , against all Opposers . For , alas ! how few Men are there , who will profess to Demonstrate in Philosophy , or to reduce their Discourses to Evidence ? Without doing which , and abiding by the Tryal , perhaps there is not one Word of Truth in all Philosophy , nor any thing but Learned Romance in all the Universities of Europe . Many Men , indeed , do make a Profession of Knowledge , because 't is Honourable ; and every Scholar is engag'd to do so , or he will quite lose his Credit . But , when it should come to Performance , not one Man in ten thousand shews that Zeal for the Advancement of Truth as answers to the Profession he made to love and esteem it ; but , tho' he sees Errour and Ignorance , and Probable Talking overspread the Face of Philosophy , and stifle Truth and Knowledge both , he sits still Unconcern'd . Now and then indeed there is a Writer who attempts to confute this or that particular Errour ; some Casual Circumstance addicting him to that Employment : But , what Man sets himself to lay the Ax at the Root , or writes against Uncertain Methods and Groundless Babbling ? What Man goes about to make Mankind aware of the Mischief that comes to Rational Nature by the Sophisticate Ways of talking prettily , neatly , and wittily ; tho' , perhaps , not a Word Groundedly and Solidly ? Nay , what Man is not well-Appay'd and Pleased with a well-penn'd Piece ; tho' , were the Reason in it sifted to the Bottom , perhaps there is not one Evident Ttuth in it to build that Discourse on ; that is , not one Word of Sense in it ; but only such a way of Plausible Discourse or Language-Learning , as may serve equally and indifferently to maintain either side of the Contradiction ?

11. Lastly , ( which is the Chief Point , ) Who is there that applies himself to find out a CERTAIN METHOD to arrive at Truth , and attain Knowledge , without which all our Studies are to no purpose ? Logick is the Proper Art to give us this Method ; and I see Students do generally make use of any Logician , so he but talks d●yly of the Operations of the Understanding ; of Propositions , Syllogisms , and Demonstration ; tho' , perhaps , he gives not one Word of Reason for his Unprov'd Sayings , to enlighten the Understanding of the Learner , or inform him , ( ex Natura rei , ) whence and why this and the other Rudiment , or Rule , must be so : Such an Author may indeed enable a Learner to say as he says , and talk after him in imitation , as it were ; but he can never instruct him to understand what 's True , and why it is True , or to demonstrate himself ; which was the main Design of my METHOD .

12. But my greatest Complaint against others , and my best Excuse for putting my self forwards with such a Confident Ayr , is , that I see not that any Learned Men do endeavour to make Head against Scepticism ; which , thro' this Universal Connivence , or rather Civil and Kind Toleration , and ( in some sort ) Encouragement , creeps by insensible Degrees into even the most Learned Societies , infects the best Wits of our Nation , threatens to bear down all true Philosophy , to extinguish the Natural Light of Men's Understandings , and drown their best Faculty [ Reason ] in a Deluge of Profound Ignorance . For , if this Vogue should obtain still in the World to look upon any loose Discourse for brave Sense , so it be but sprucely dress'd up in neat Language , and Sauc'd with a little Piquancy of brisk Wit ; and let it pass current for True Learning and Knowledge ; Scepticism will not only insinuate it self slily into all sorts of Men , but be recommended to the World by such an Universal Approbation of well-clad gentile Ignorance . Nor does this mischievous Inundation stop its Career in bereaving us of Natural Truths ; but , having once darken'd in us the Knowledge of Nature , it disposes Men to doubt of , and too often to deny the Existence of the Author of Nature himself ; who is best made known to Mankind by Science , or the Exact Knowledge of his Creatures ; from which we glean all the Notions , and , consequently , all the Knowledge , we , by Ordinary Means , have , or ought to have . All these Mischiefs , ( I may add , and all Immorality too , ) are owing to the Insensible Growth of this Lethargy of our Understanding , SCEPTICISM ; which benums and chills our Intellectual Faculties with a Cold Despair of ever attaining Evident Knowledge of any thing ; for which , as its Natural Perfection , our Soul was fitted and ordain'd . I saw this Gloomy Evening overcasting the Clear Sky of Science , and drawing on the Cimmerian Night of Dark Ignorance , and Black Infidelity ; and thence it was , that , to awaken Men's Souls out of this drowzy Sleep and Torpor of their Mind , I did so often , boldly and fearlessly ( tho' as I judg'd , truly , ) declare and proclaim aloud , that Demonstration in Philosophy might be had , and that I had actually Demonstrated in such and such Particulars .

13. Lastly , 'T is for this Reason , and to rescue all Sincere Lovers of Truth from this spreading Contagion of Scepticism , that with an unusual Boldness , I did ( as was said before ) attempt to write a Demonstrative Logick ; to comprehend which , whoever shall bestow half that Pains as Men usually do who study the Mathematicks , ( for such Connected Discourses are not to be perused , with hopes of profiting by them , with a Cursory Application , ) will , I am sure , be able to set all his Natural Notions in a Right and Distinct Order ; know how to connect two of them with one another in a Solid Judgment ; and both of them with a Third to frame a Conclusive Discourse ; and not only have the True Nature of Demonstration knowingly fix'd in his Mind , by comprehending the Reason of it ; but , by having it there , he himself will be enabled to work according to that Nature , or to Demonstrate himself ; without Ability to know or do which , none ought to pretend to be a Philosopher . Lastly , To carry this Good Work forward as far as was possible , I have here , as a Supplement to my METHOD , and an Introduction to my Reflexions , added Five Preliminary Discourses ; shewing the true and solid Bottom-Ground on which all Exact Knowledge , or Philosophy , is built ; and , that the Things themselves , and not Ideas , Resemblances , or Fancies , ( which can never make us know the Things , ) are and must be the only Firm Foundation of Truth , and of our Knowledge of all Truths whatsoever .

14. I must not pass over another Complaint made of me by some of the Cartesian School ; viz. That in the Preface to my METHOD , I so deeply Censure Malbranche as a Phanatick in Philosophy ; nay , the whole Way it self as disposing to Enthusiasm . To the First Part of my Charge , I reply , That I cited that Author 's own Words ; which are such strong Proofs of a Fanatick Genius , that I cannot believe any Arguments of mine can add Weight to the Full Evidence and Force they carry'd with them , to manifest that his Philosophy is built upon Inspiration ; or , as himself expresses it , comes to him by Revelation . And , for my pretending that the whole Cartesian Way of Philosophizing is of the same Leven , I can need no other Compurgatour than that French Author , who with much Exactness wrote the Life of Cartesius , and was his good Friend and Follower . The Book is now made English ; where in the 34th Page he tells us , that To get rid of all his Prejudices , ( that is , to Unlearn , amongst other Things , all that the Clear Light of Nature had taught him ) Cartesius did undergo no less than to UNMAN himself . A pretty Self-denying Beginning ! And Pag. 35 , 36. that he wearied out his Mind to that Degree in his Enquiry after this Happy Means , ( viz. that his Imagination should represent to him his Understanding quite naked ) that his Brain took Fire , and he fell into a Spice of Enthusiasm ; which dispos'd his Mind , already quite spent , in such a manner , that it was fit to receive Impressions of Dreams and Visions . Where we see it confess'd , that his Method of Unknowing all that Nature had taught him , brought him to Enthusiasm , and Enthusiasm to Visions and Revelations ; so that Malbranche did but follow his Masters Example , and copy'd his Method . The Author proceeds . He ( Cartesius ) acquaints us , that on the 10th of November , 1619. laying himself down brimful of Enthusiasm , ( which is little better than stark mad ) and wholly possess'd with the Thoughts of having found that day the Foundation of that Wonderful Science , he had three Dreams presently one after another ; yet , so extraordinary , as to make him fancy they were sent him from Above . He supposed he discern'd thro' their Shadows , the Tracks of the Paths GOD had chalk'd out to him , in his Enquiry after Truth . And is it not a powerful Motive to make all Wits , ( especially , if they be of a Melancholy Temper ) who are enclin'd to embrace his Doctrine , which was first sent from Heaven , to gape after Revelations too , as well as Malbranche did ? He goes on . But the Divine Spiritual Air which he took a Pride to give to those Dreams , was so near a-kin to that Enthusiasm wherewith he believ'd himself to be warmed , that a Man would have believ'd he had been a little Crack'd-brain'd . And , lest any should wrong the Original of his Doctrine , or degrade it from the Honour of being given him by Divine Inspiration , this Author takes off any unfavourable Conjecture of ours , that might make it spring from any Sublunary Cause , in these Words : One would have believ'd he had drunk a Cup too much that Evening before he went to Bed ; but he assur'd us he had been very sober all that Day , and that Evening too , and had not drunk a drop of Wine three Weeks together . This looks as if Cartesius himself , who so cautiously inform'd him of this afterwards , was fond to have it thought that his Doctrine , and especially his Method , ( which was the Minerva of which his Brain was then in Labour , ) had been given him from Above , by Supernatural means .

15. Now , Gentlemen , I beseech you , tell me , in good Sober Sadness ; Can you think GOD ever intended that the onely Method for Men to get Knowledge , should be to lose their Wits first in looking after it ? That , to Unman our selves , so as to seem Crack'd-Brain'd , or Drunk , is the Way to become Soberly Rational ? That , to reduce our selves to perfect Ignorance of all that the Goodness of Nature has taught us , ( which is , in plain Terms , to make an Ass of one's self , ) is the onely Certain Way to become a Philosopher ? Certainly , unless we be all infatuated with Enthusiastick Dreams and Visions , made up of Ideas , we should rather think that it is a far more Solid , and more Natural Way , to begin our Quest of Truth from those Knowledges which are Evident , and such Grounds as are Magis Nota , and thence proceed by our Reason to Minùs Nota , than it is to take our Rise from Affected Ignorance , and Unknowing again all those 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , or Common Notions , which Right Nature had given us to ground all other Knowledges on . No wonder then , this Freakish Method , taken up by Whimsical Fancy , had for its Genuin Effect , Fantastick Dreams , Visionary Madness , and Enthusiastick Folly ; which this Writer of his Life ( who , doubtless , was himself a Zealous Cartesian ) calls here A Happy Means , the Foundation of that Wonderful Science , the Path Chalk'd out by God ; and the Descanting on them , to be done by A Divine Spiritual Air ; tho' he confesses , at the same time , they were Dreams , Visions , and Fits of Enthusiasm : and that they made him that had them seem Crack'd-Brain'd , or Drunk . All these wild Caprichio's of Cartesius , sprung naturally from a Lively and Heighten'd Fancy , screw'd up by frequent Sollicitous and Melancholy Thoughtfulness ; and were the Effects of his Introversion upon his Ideas ; which is quite Opposite to his Regarding the Things in Nature , that are without us . Nor do I doubt , but that all his Followers , did they ( as they ought ) imitate their Master , and follow his Example , in laying aside first all their former Natural Knowledges , would also ( as any Man must who takes that Unnatural Method ) fall into Fits of Enthusiasm , Dreams , and Visions , and Run Mad for Company . For , IDEAS , which , being Similitudes , are no more but Fancies , Appearances , and Representations , are , consequently , far more Proper Materials for Dreams and Visions , and such Roving Flights , than they are for Science , or Solid Philosophy .

16. Tho' I forestall what comes hereafter , I am tempted to annex here , to this Character of the Cartesian Manner of Spirit in Philosophy , a short Passage mention'd by Mr. Locke , Book 4. Chap. 7. §. 17. viz. That he has discours'd with very Rational Men , who have actually Deny'd they were Men. Now , certainly , this is something beyond Enthusiasm , and Extravagant even to Madness , that any Man should deny himself to be what he is : But , 't is Prodigious , that Mr. Locke should give such Men the Elogium of being very Rational . Whence , since he cannot but sincerely judge , that the Way he proposes and maintains in his Essay , is the most Rational of any other ; we are to conclude , that those very Rational Men did follow this Way of his , and were great Ideists ; or else , that Mr. Locke judges that those Men who actually deny'd themselves to be Men , might , for all that , according to his Way of Ideas , be very Rational notwithstanding . 'T is worth our while to observe the Consonant Effect of the Ideal Way , in the Followers of Cartesius and Mr. Locke , and ( in some sort ) in both the Authors of those Philosophical Sects themselves : The One UNMANS himself ; and the Others Deny themselves to be Men , and yet are Character'd by Mr. L. to be , notwithstanding , very Rational : Which are so perfectly Parallel , that I am at a great Loss which to prefer . And , now , do you think , Gentlemen , that , ( besides the Regard we owe to Truth , ) out of the Common Love we ought to bear to Mankind , and to Rational Nature , that it is not high time to look to our Wits , and to make head against this Way of Ideas ; when we find two such Great Men as Cartesius , and Mr. Locke , thro' this Fantastick Method they had chosen , fall into such Incredible Extravagancies , as either ( in a manner ) to Abdicate , by Unmanning one's self ; or , to commend the Abdication of their own Natures ; at least , to think them very Rational that do so ?

17. Far be it from me to judge , that all , or most of the Performances of those two admirably-Ingenious Men , are of this Extravagant Nature . 'T is my sincere Judgment , that Few Men write Like them ; and , None , Better , where their Ill-grounded Methods do not intermingle , and pervert their Reason . And , I freely acknowledge , that Mr. Locke 's ESSAY , on which I make so many Reflexions , contains many Excellent and Uncommon Truths in it : Tho' I do not think he owes any of them to his Way of Ideas ; but , that he proceeded in such Occasions , upon his Natural Notions , in the same manner the Aristotelians do ; and , thence , made Right Judgments and Reflexions upon them by his own Acute Wit. This Unfortunate Choice of their Method did , as I conceive , proceed hence , that such Active and Quick Fancies do not patiently brook the Rains of Logick and Metaphysicks ; the former of which ( much against the Grain ) restrains them from taking their Wild Carreer , by the Discipline of its Artificial Rules ; the other keeps them from Roving , by the Self-evident Maxims it sorces their Understanding to accept of . Whence , if these two do not bridle and keep them in , it is not to be expected in Nature that such High-mettl'd Fancies should be held within strict Bounds , or kept to the Slow and Sober Pace of Solid Reason ; but , that they will take their Vagaries , and run over Hedge and Ditch , whithersoever the Swift Career of that Nimble Faculty hurries them . This Discourse I make the more willingly , that those Students who read this , may clearly discern , that all their Application to gain Knowledge will be purely Lost Labour , and Time thrown away , if their First and Chief Care be not to take a Wise and Solid Method at the Beginning .

Having thus finish'd my long Address , for which I beg your Pardon , I shall now apply my self to make some few Discourses , relating to my following Book .

18. MAN being One Thing , compounded of a Corporeal and a Spiritual Nature , and every Thing acting as it is , it follows , that both those Natures must concurr to every Operation that flows from him , as he is Man ; and , consequently , be produced by some Faculty belonging properly to each of those respective Natures : Nor can it be doubted , but that , as those Faculties , or Powers , which are peculiar to both those Natures , are as different as are the Natures themselves ; so the Immediate Objects peculiar to those Different Faculties , must likewise be as widely Different from one another , as are those Powers to which they belong ; and , consequently , be as vastly Opposite , as the Natures of Body and Spirit can distance them . It being then agreed to by all Parties , that the Faculties or Powers which join in our Production of Knowledge , are those we call the Imagination and the Mind , or the Fancy and the Understanding , I cannot doubt but it may be demonstratively concluded , from the known Nature and Constitution of this Thing called MAN , that , to every Thought or Act of Knowledge we have , ( those being such Operations as properly and formally belong to us as we are Men , ) there must two sorts of Interiour Objects concurr ; whereof , the One is of a Corporeal , the Other of a Spiritual Nature ; and that , otherwise , those Acts could not be said to be Humane Acts , or the Acts of that Suppositum , or Compound Thing , called Man ; but of one of those Natures onely , a-parted from the other as to its Operation , and consequently , as to its Being . Which Supposition is directly contradictory to the Natural Constitution of Man ; as he is distinguish'd , on one side , from a Brute , who has nothing but Material Phantasms , or Ideas ; on the other , from an Angel , or Intelligence ; in whom there is nothing of Matter or Fancy , but all in it is purely Spiritual .

19. The Distinction of these two Objects of the Fancy and of the Understanding being granted , in some manner , by all Sides , I cannot but wonder how it hapt to escape the Thoughts of all the Philosophers both Ancient and Modern , to explicate fully and clearly the Exact Difference between those two Objects of the Fancy and of the Understanding ; there being scarcely any one Point in Philosophy of half that Importance for the attaining of Truth , and avoiding of Errour : For both these being truly in us , whenever we have an Act of Knowledge ; and withall , being as far Removed from one another in their Natures as Body and Spirit are ; if Speculative Men , either thro' mistake , or thro' Inadvertence of this vast difference between them , or out of Loathness to take Pains to look deep into the Intrinsecal Natures of Things , imprinted in their Minds when they have Notions of them , shall happen to mistake what they find Uppermost or most Superficial , and therefore is easiest to their Fancy , ( as Phantasms or Material Representations are ) for Notions ; which , being of a Spiritual Nature , do not make so obvious and familiar an Appearance as those Gay Florid Pictures did , but are to be gather'd by Reason , or made Understood by Reflexion and Study ; such Speculaters , I say , will be at the same loss , and not much wiser than those Birds were that peck'd at Xeuxis 's Grapes to seed themselves ; mistaking the Outward Pourtraiture or Idea for the Inward Nature of the Thing : For , no Knowledge of the Things could ever be expected from Ideas , taken ( as themselves take them ) for Similitudes ; since those Terms or Words , which we use , and must use , when we speak or discourse of any thing whatever , were intended , by the Agreement of Mankind , to signifie the Things themselves about which we are Discoursing , and not to signifie meer Likenesses or Similitudes of them . However this has been neglected by others , I see 't is my Duty to say something of this Distinction of Phantasms from Notions . I have in my 19th Reflexion , § § 9 , and 12. endeavour'd to show it . To which I have here thought fit to annex some few 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , or Distinguishing Marks to know one from the other .

20. My first Criterion shall be the Sensibleness of the former , and Insensibleness of the other . When we shut our Eyes , or walk in the Dark , we experience we have Ideas or Images of our Way , or of other things we have seen , in our Fancy ; and this , without the least Labour of ours , or any Reflexion : And there is also beyond that , something else in the Mind , which tells us of what Nature , or what Things those are , which appear'd superficially to our Fancy ; which costs us Labour and Reflexion to bring it into the view of the Understanding , so that we cannot get perfect Acquaintance with it , unless we define it . Nor is this Sensible , as the other was , but only Intelligible : Not superficial or uppermost ; but hidden , retruse , and ( as we may say ) stands behind the Curtain of the Fancy : Nor easie to comprehend at the first Direct Sight of our Inward Eye , but costs us some Reflexion , or some Pains , to know it expressly and distinctly . Which latter sort , in each of these regards , are those we call Simple Apprehensions , Conceptions , or Notions .

21. The next Criterion shall be this : We find we have in us Meanings ; now the Meanings of Words , or ( which is the same , taking that word objectively , what 's meant by those Words , ) are most evidently the same Spiritual Objects as are our Notions , and 't is Impossible those Meanings should be the same with Ideas or Similitudes , but of a quite different Nature . Let it be as Like the thing as 't is possible , 't is not the Likeness of it which we aim at in our Language : For we do not intend or mean when we speak of any thing , to talk or discourse of what 's Like that Thing , but of what 's the same with it , or rather what that thing it self is ; which the meer Similitude of a thing cannot possibly be . For a Similitude being Related to the Thing , is so far from being that Thing , or the Same as It is , that it is relatively Opposite to it ; that is , quite Distinct from it . Now , that what 's essentially and formally Distinct from a Thing , nay Opposite to it , should of it self , and by it self alone , give us the First Knowledge of It , ( as they put their Ideas to do ; ) or that the Meaning of the one should be the Meaning of the other , is utterly Unintelligible , and against Common Sense . Wherefore the Meaning , which is the Immediate and Proper Object of the Mind , and which gives us , or rather is the First Notice of the Thing , must be of a quite different Nature from an Idea or Likeness of it ; and since there can be no Middle between Like and the Same ; nor any nearer Approach or Step , proceeding from Likeness , towards Unity with the Thing , but it falls into Identity , it must necessarily be more than Like it ; that is , the Same with it ; which an Idea or Likeness cannot possibly be , as was proved lately .

22. The Third Criterion which confirms the other , shall be this : None denies but Brutes have Ideas or Similitudes in their Fancy ; but they can have no Meanings , because they have no Spiritual Part or Mind , only which can mean . Hence , all the Sounds or Noises they make , express only Passion , or some Corporeal Easiness or Uneasiness which they feel , and not their Thoughts or Meaning : As appears by this ; that they can never come to know what the Words we use do mean or signifie ; nor can those of them that can speak , adapt the Words they pronunce to our meaning , nor answer us pertinently ; which Reflexion serves to shew us farther the vast Difference between Ideas and Meanings , or between Phantasms and Notions .

23. My Third Criterion is taken from the Evident Difference between an Idea or Similitude of a Thing , and its Definition ; of which see Method to Science , Book 1. Less . 2. § 24. towards the End .

24. My Fourth Criterion is , That we are as certain we have General Notions , as that we have Particular ones ; nay , we can conceive them as General ; that is , we can conceive their Generality . If then we have an Idea or Likeness of Universality , or Generality , What is it like ? It must either be Like the Thing , or must be like Nothing , and so is no Idea or Likeness at all . But it cannot be like the Thing in any respect , because in the Thing there is nothing that is General or Universal ; but all that is there is Particular and Determin'd ; which is quite Unlike , nay , Opposite to Universality or Generality . 'T is Evident then , that we have no Idea or Likeness of an Universal in our Meaning or Notion , when we use or hear the Words that signifie it . On the other side , we have a Notion of Homo , Animal , and Ens ; and still a Clearer one according as they are more General . Wherefore , 't is likewise evident , that our Notions are of a quite different Nature from Ideas or Similitudes .

25. I shall leave the pursuing this Point any farther , and give the Reader some Taste before-hand of what ( perhaps ) he will be cloy'd with in the following Book ; especially it will be proper to season his Understanding with some few Notions concerning the main Question between the Ideists and me , viz. Whether our Knowledge is made by the Things being in our Mind when we know it , or an Idea or Similitude of it only . In order to which I ask the Ideists , Whether the Modes or Accidents are Distinct Entities from the Substance or Thing ? To which I am sure Mr. Locke will say , They are not . Hence I argue , Therefore , if the Modes or Accidents be not Distinct really from the Substance , the Substance or Thing is not really , ( or in re , ) distinguish'd from the Modes or Accidents : Therefore they are ( as they are in Nature , or in re ) the same Thing , or Identify'd . Therefore they are only distinguish'd by the Understanding conceiving the same Thing diversly ; therefore 't is onely the Conceptions of our Understandings which are Distinct. Therefore taking the word [ Conception ] objectively ; that is , for the Thing Conceiv'd ; all we conceive is still the Thing . Therefore all our Notions , both of the Substance and of its Accidents or Modes , that is , all the Notions we can have , ( they being the same with our Conceptions , ) are nothing but the Thing conceiv'd diversly . Therefore , if that Thing be a Body , all our Notions of it are meerly that Thing call'd Body diversly conceiv'd . Therefore the putting Space , Succession , &c. where there neither is nor can be any Body , is to put Body where there is no Body ; and , is a meer Fancy , and Contradictory . Therefore those Philosophers who proceed upon our Grounds , do still Conceive , Judge and Discourse of the Thing . Therefore the Knowledge they gain by such Notions is the Knowledge of the Thing ; the Judgments they make by connecting those Notions , are Connexions of the thusdistinguish'd Parts ( as it were ) of the Thing ; and the Discourses they make , Discourses concerning the very Thing . Therefore the Philosophy of such Men is truly and entirely the Knowledge of the Things , or True Philosophy . Wherefore those who have only in their Minds SIMILITUDES or IDEAS , and do only Connect or Discourse of them , which Ideas are not the Thing , nor conceiv'd to be It either in whole , or in part , are convinced to build their Discourses ( thus grounded ) upon Nothing . Therefore they have no Solid Knowledge of any Thing . Therefore , in proper Speech , they know Nothing . Therefore all their Philosophy ( thus built ) is purely Fantastick .

I infer farther , that , since this Distinction of the Thing into Substance ( precisely consider'd ) and its Modes or Accidents , is perform'd only by the Understanding ; therefore it is made within the Understanding . Therefore since this Act , that thus Distinguishes them , is not Transitive to the Thing which is out of it , the Thing must be in the Understanding to be there Distinguish'd ; otherwise we should Distinguish we Know not what ; which ( it being done by a Knowing Power ) is impossible , and a perfect Contradiction . Therefore the Thing it self must forcibly be intellectually in the Mind : Therefore , there can need no Ideas or Similitudes to make us know it ; for to be in a Knowing Power is to be known , without more ado .

'T is incredibly Strange , and even Monstrous , that Mr. Locke 's Thoughts and mine , like Antipodes , should move Diametrically Opposit to one another in this Point . He tells us , B. 4. Ch. 23. in his Margin , that there is no Abstract Idea of Substance ; nor can we ( as he there says ) by the Sensible Qualities have any Idea of the Substance of Body , more than if we knew nothing at all . And , the Essences or Entities of Particular Substances ( as clearest Reason demonstrates , ) are incomparably harder to be known , than Substance in the Abstract ; whence we must , consequently , know less than nothing of Them , if we know nothing at all of the other : It being impossible to know what This Thing or This Man is , if we be Ignorant what Thing or Man is . Nor have we any Innate Ideas ( as he confesses ) to make [ Substance ] known . If , then neither Innate nor Acquir'd Ideas can make us know any thing at all of it , and we can know nothing but by Ideas ; 't is plain , we cannot know Thing or Substance at all , and so we must rest contented with knowing Nothing . For , Substance being unknown , 't is impossible to know any Mode or Accident ; they being essentially certain Manners how a Thing is ; and , so , including Substance and Thing in their Definition . Again , Mr. L. holds we can frame no Idea of Substance , or at most but a most blindly Obscure one ; and I hold that the Notion of it is most Clear , nay , the Clearest of any but that of Existence , exprest by the word [ is . ] He thinks that the nature of Accidents is known by themselves , tho' the Substance ly in the dark from us : And I judge it Demonstrable that , as they have no Entity of their own , but by means of the Thing , Ens or Substance , so they can have no Intelligibility ( which is a Property of Ens ) of their own , but meerly by virtue of the Substance or Thing with which they are Identify'd . In a word , He thinks Substance is most Unknown , and I say , 't is self-evidently Known . He says it cannot be known Clearly ; and I say it not only can , but must be known clearly ; nay , that nothing else can be known but It , or by being It.

By this Discourse it appears , that this Point being ( of its own Nature ) of Universal Concern ; and , therefore , drawing Great and most Important Consequences after it , which , acting here as a Philosopher , I do not mention ; either He or I must be in a most Dangerous Errour . Wherefore , being perfectly assured that the Method I take will not permit me to erre Enormously ; and , very certain that I follow very faithfully that Method ; I humbly beg of Mr. Locke , by that Candour and Ingenuity , of which ( I doubt not , sincerely too ) he has made so frequent Professions , that he would please to apply his Thoughts anew ( for if Second Thoughts be Better , the Last may be Best of all ) to review his Way of Ideas ; and , comparing it with what I have propos'd and prov'd in my Method to Science , my Preliminaries , and my several Reflexions on his Essay , he would unbyassedly consider , whether ( since he cannot suspect his own Excellent Parts ) this New Way of Philosophizing be not the Sole Cause of all his Mistakes , and misleads him into all these Great Errours ; to entertain which this Phantastick Method has inveigled his good Reason .

I have no more to Preface , but to beg Pardon for oftentimes repeating the same thing over and over in the ensuing Book , Mr. Locke civilly Apologizes for doing the same ; and my chief Excuse is , that , being to trace and follow his Discourses , I could not well avoid it ; hoping withall , at the same time , to clear the Point better ; either by some New Thought , which then occurr'd , or by giving a better Turn to my former Arguments . Besides , I must confess , that I did now and then affect these Repetitions , to make some Particulars which were of most Weight sink better into the Judgment of my Readers , by re-minding them often of such Important Truths . I am forced to use the Word [ Idea ] often , because Mr. Locke ( with whom I am discoursing ) does so always ; tho' generally I join Notions to it . But , this one Note will keep my true Sentiment from being misunderstood ; that I allow Ideas or Resemblances in the Fancy or Imagination ; but , I absolutely deny there are any Spiritual Ideas or Similitudes in the Mind on which we ground any Truth , or which are the Materials of Knowledge ; but NOTIONS only , or the Things abstractedly or inadequately conceiv'd by the Understanding .

Your Well-wishing Friend and Faithful Servant ,

J. S.

Solid Philosophy ASSERTED . Preliminary Discourses .

Preliminary First .

Of the Impropriety and Equivocalness of of the word [ IDEA . ]

1. THE Author of the Essay concerning Human Understanding , having sincerely levelled the aim of his Endeavours at the attainment of Truth in Philosophy , which can only be had by clearing the way to Science ; hence , this being the sole End we have , both of us , prefixt to our selves , the best Method ( in common ) which I can take in my Reflexions on that Learned Treatise is , to keep my Eye still directed to that end , and to take my measures from the Order and Rapport which our respective Positions , or Discourses , may be conceived to bear to that best Design .

2. This premis'd , my first Preliminary Reflexion shall be upon his making use , throughout his whole Work , of The using the word [ Idea ] in disparate Senses , obstructs the way to Science . the word ( IDEAS ) as the Chief , or rather only Materials , of which , according to him , we are to frame immediately all our Knowledges . Which being so , it follows that , if the sense of that word be not it self Clear , but Equivocal ; and if , as taken in one Sense , it be manifestly nothing at all to Science , nor can be any Material of it ; and , as taken in the other , it may and must conduce to it , nay , be the Sole imediate Ground and Origin of all Science ; I cannot but think , that the promiscuous usage of that Word in such Disparate Senses , ( it being of so general Concern , and running through that whole Book ) must necessarily encumber and perplex in a high Measure the way to Scientifical knowledge .

3. One of his Secondary Designes was ( as he expresses himself in his Epistle to the Reader ) to remove the Rubbish Philosophical Words generally used , not to be laid a side without great Necessity . in order to the building up Science , and to beat down the Vanity and Ignorance of those who have reduced Philosophy , which is nothing but the Knowledge of Things , to insignificant School-Terms . This is certainly a very necessary and a very laudable Design ; it being evident to all ingenuous Lovers of Truth , that never was there more need of a Reformation , than there has been of Philosophy in these last Centuries ; to second him in which I have not failed on my part to contribute my endeavours . Yet , notwithstanding I do not think we ought , without great and necessary occasion , alter those words which have been accepted and used by the Learned World ( such as it was ) hitherto : Especially such words as are proper and Univocal , such I take the word [ Notion ] to be ; much less to substitute another , which I must Much less chang'd for others less proper . think is less proper , and withall highly Equivocal , or Ambiguous , I mean the word ( IDEA . ) I know this ingenuous Author apologizes for his frequent using it ; and I am apt to think he did this out of Civility towards our Modern Philosophers , who have brought it into fashion : For , he gives no reason why he did not rather constantly use the word ( Notion ; ) which , importing a part of Cognition , does most certainly better suit with a Treatise about Human Understanding .

4. As for the Sense in which he takes the word ( IDEA ) he professes that he uses it to express whatever is meant by Mr. L's Acception of the word [ Idea ] very Ambiguous . Phantasm , Notion , Species , or whatever it is that the mind can be employ'd about in thinking . Which manifests that he uses that word very Equivocally : For a Phantasm , and a Notion , differ as widely , as Body and Spirit ; the one being a Corporeal , the other a Spiritual Resemblance ; or rather , the one being a Resemblance , or a kind of Image , or Picture ; the other the thing Resembled , as will be seen hereafter . Again , 't is agreed to by all the World , that Brutes have Phantasms , but they can have no Notions ; for these are the Elements , or Materialls , whose agreeable Connexion furnishes our Mind with Science ; of which Beasts , which have no Mind , are incapable ; and therefore it were both unnatural , and to no purpose , to put Notions ( which are the Primary Affections of the Mind ) in those meer Animals . I am more at a loss to find , that , in the last page but one in his Epistle to the Reader , he seems to contradistinguish Notions to Ideas ; which how it consists with the indifferency he grants the word ( Idea ) here to signify Notions , I cannot at all comprehend .

5. I must confess , it is generally a fruitless contest to dispute about a Word , which is nothing but a Sound , or The Ambiguity of it not clear'd by him . a Character , were but the determinate Meaning of it told us by the user of it : Let it be A , or B , or what he pleases , provided the distinct Sense of it be clearly manifested by the Writer , or Speaker , it were , in that case , Logomachy , and impertinent Cavil , to except against it . But , when the Author 's own Explication of it does , ( contrary to the Nature of Explications ) declare it is used ambiguously , it laies a force on me to remark it ; lest it may lead the Reader , ( as it infallibly must ) into great Errors , unless it 's double Sense be warily distinguisht in the ensuing discourse ; which I have not observed to be done any where by this otherwise accurate Author .

6. From this undistinguish'd Ambiguity of the word ( Idea ) it follows naturally , that even his own excellent Judgment , and consequently , his Reader 's , must necessarily sometimes deviate ; and , tho' his general intention was only to pursue the Knowledge of Things , yet he must needs be sometimes mis●ed at unawares to entertain Fancies for Real Knowledges ; as will occasionally be shown hereafter . For the present I cannot omit one particular , it being of such main importance .

7. The Author believes all sorts of Animals to have , in some degree , Perception . Now Perception ( as I conceive ) The putting Brutes to have Knowledge , associates them with Mankind . signifies Knowledge ; for , under what sort of material Action to rank it , I confess my self at a loss : But , let it be only the first step and degree towards Knowledge , and the in-let of all the Materials of it , still he says , the dulness of the faculties of some Brutes , makes them remote from that Knowledge which is to be found in some Men : So that it seems in other Men there may possibly be no more Knowledge ( at least in some things ) than in Brutes ; nor does he any more than probably conjecture , that Beasts have not the power of comparing , which may be observed in M●n , belonging to general Ideas , and useful to abstract Reasonings . Now , this so jumbles together Spiritual Natures with those which are meerly Corporeal , that , if this be so , we shall be at some loss to know our own Kind , to define what Man is , or to distinguish our selves from our younger Brothers in knowledge , Brutes , or our Souls from theirs : For , if by Ideas there be meant Notions , ( as his Expressions leave it indifferent ) and that a Man's knowledge consists in having these Ideas in him , and Brutes have also such Ideas ; and , that , moreover , they may possibly have also , in some sort , a power to compare those Notions , and both * * Method to Science , B. 2. Less 1. §. 12. judging and discoursing most evidently consist in comparing our Notions , I see no Operations peculiar to a Man , but what Brutes may perform in a lower degree ; and since Degrees do not vary the Species ( for otherwise dull Men would be of another Species from those who have more wit ) we could , consequently , never know what Mankind meant ; or who is a Man , who not , unless in outward appearance ; nor , lastly , how our Souls , or Minds , do differ from their Fancies , or Imaginations . Again , M. L. affirms , B. 2. Ch. 11. §. 11. that it seems as evident to him that Beasts do reason , as that they have Sense ; than which , certainly , nothing in the world can be more evident , or undeniable . Now , if this be so , all those who hold that ( a Rational Animal ) is a proper and adequate Definition of ( Man ) ought to hold Brutes to be Men. Mr. L. will say , that Brutes can only reason in Particulars , having no General Ideas , because they cannot Abstract ; nor do we see they make use of any General Signes to express Universal Ideas : Indeed , they have no such Signes as Words , to notify they have any such Ideas ; but , if we may conclude from their Outward Actions ( on which only Mr. L. seems to ground his good Opinion of them that they have Reason , ) we may as well gather from the same ground that they have General Ideas too . For example , when a Horse sees a Man a far off , he can only have an Idea that it is something ; for the Object cannot , at that distance , imprint a more particular Idea of it self , but that most General one , and therefore 't is evident the Horse must either have a General Idea of it , or none at all ; whereas yet he must have some Idea of it , because he sees it , though confusedly . Coming nearer , the Object imprints a more distinct Idea of a Man ; yet not so distinct , as to represent this Man in particular . At length coming very near , the same Object is apt to imprint an Idea of this particular Man ; which shews plainly , that all those Ideas the Object gave him before were General ones : To proceed , we may observe , that while it appear'd only to be something , which was a very abstract Idea , the Horse carry'd it abstractedly too , and remain'd unconcern'd . When it appear'd to be a Man , it began to be a little concern'd , having to do with such kind of things as us'd to do it either Good or Harm ; and therefore it stares at it ( a common carriage in sheep especially ) as if it study'd , or consider'd , what to make of it , in order to its own Interest , or Self-preservation . But , when the Object imprints an Idea of this particular Man , who either us'd to bring him Provender , or come to catch him to make him work , he either comes towards him , or runs away ; which different behaviour of theirs ( if outward Actions were , in this case , worth building on ) is as good a sign that Brutes have General Ideas , as we can expect from dumb Animals . Besides , when a Cat , or Dog is hungry , and hunts about for Meat , how can Mr. L. imagin they long only for one particular sort of Meat , and not any sort of Meat in common that is agreeable to their nature ? I am sure their indifferency to any such Food ( in case they know at all ) gives us as good ground to think they have a General Idea of such a sort , kind , or species of Food , as it does for any Knowledge they have of particulars . Hence is shown , that Mr. L's Criterion , or distinctive Mark to know them from Men , ( viz. the having General Idea's ) quite failing , we ought to esteem Horses , and other Cattle , to be Four-footed Men , or else Men must be two-legg'd Beasts . Moreover , since he grants here §. 5. they can compare those Ideas they have , tho' imperfectly , and but in some circumstances ; and all Judging , and Discoursing must , by his Doctrine , consist in the comparing Ideas ; he must think there are some of them who are very judicious Gentlemen , and use natural Logick , and , tho' not very artificially , make Syllogisms too . In a word , if we have no pecular Faculties Intrinsecal to our Nature , nor any Primary Operation belonging to it , and it only , to distinguish us from Brutes but Extrinsecal shape only , all Beasts might be Men , and Men Beasts : And then we ought in duty to consider how to correct our Carriage towards our dear Brethren in Nature , Brutes ; which will bring in the Turkish Charity to Dogs , and twenty other Fooleries : And , 't is an excellent Argument to prove the Identity of our Natures , that Mr. L. brings of some Gentlemen he was acquainted with , who deny'd themselves to be Men ; and I wonder he would civilly give them the Lye , by passing upon them the Complement that they were notwithstanding very Rational Men ; for , were it possible any Man could be a Beast , 't is most certain these Men were such . But I wonder not all at such extravagant Conceits ; for as Reason , grounded on our Natural Notions of the Thing , is reduced , if pursued home , to First and Self-evident Principles ; so Fancy , if follow'd close , advances at length to pure Folly , and ends finally in perfect Madness .

8. As for us Men , we can certainly affirm , that we do truly perceive , or know , because we know certainly , by experience , The first consideration pre-requir'd , ere we ought to think that Brutes know . or rather by Reflexion , that we do know ; but we do not thus know that Brutes know ; and whoever thinks he can gather it by Reason , ought , I conceive , er'e he goes about it , to study exactly two previous points . First , he ought to consider very attentively , how , or upon what Grounds he can imagin Particles of Matter , tho' never so subtil and artificially laid together , can be capable of Perception , or Knowledge , or how this Suits with the Nature of meer Body . We can only gather this from Local Motions proceeding from Brutes , with some kind of Regularity : Now an exact Watch ( in proportion to its few parts ) does , by vertue of a Spring within , which is part of its self , afford the same argument to one that is not aware of its contrivance . For , it shews us , and regularly too , the Minutes , Quarters , Half-hours , Hours , Days of the Month , and tells us the time aloud by Striking the Bell : Nay , a Repeating-Clock does , without Missing , or Mistake , answer the Question ( as it were ) which by pulling the String you ask it ; and , tho' you are never so importune in repeating your question often , yet it still answers truth , with more steady exactness than Banks his Horse could , by seeing the Motion of his Masters Eye . Yet , if any Man had drawn thence a Conclusion that those Engins had perciev'd , or known , we are satisfied that he had been perfectly mistaken . An Italian here had an Engine which would both a wake one at the hour he designed to rise , and also strike fire , and light his Candle for him ; which I believe is more than the most docil Brute could ever be taught to perform . The Case had been still more difficult , had this Watch , or Engine , which seemed self moving , been put into all these Motions by Subtil and Indiscernable Agents ; as Iron is by the Effluuiums of a Loadstone , or as Memnons Musical Statue was by the Rayes of the Sun ; for in that Case the Vulgar , discerning no Material Cause that set it on work , would presently have had recourse to some Knowing power in the Engine ; in the same manner as when they hear noises in a House , and cannot find out what caused them , they imediately conclude 't is a Spright . Whence results this plain Rule , that er'e we can with reason conclude , or think any thing , except our selves , has Perception , or Knowledge , by our seeing it perform any Outward Action , we ought first to be certain that we can comprehend all the Operations of Bodies , and all the several Combinations and Contrivances of them ; and that we see that those Actions are impossible to be performed by Bodily parts , laid together by an infinitely wise Artificer ; before we fall to imagin that any meerly Animal Body is more than a Natural Engin ; or that it does any more perceive , think , or know , than does a Watch or Clock .

9. The Second thing necessary to be done er'e we ought to think Brutes have any knowledge , is , to consider The Second consideration prerequir'd . exactly the incredible variety of the several Organical parts , found in the bodies of Animals ; which , with the peculiar Uses of each , and the Contexture of them with the other parts , do swell so many Books of Anatomy already , without any hopes or prospect of reaching them all : And , besides , it is necessary also to weigh attentively the Chymical parts ( if I may be allowed to call them so ) of an Animal , consisting of Blood , the Humours in it , and especially the Spirits ; which last are apt to be moved , upon every occasion , by the least touch of all the Bodies about it , nay , by the most minute particles of them , lodged in the brain and excited there a fresh ; and are withall apt to be carried thence in convenient Vehicles throughout the whole , to set on motion those parts which are more solid : When he has done this , let him Consider all these diverse-natured parts laid together by the All-wise Contriver of Nature , in order to the Animal's pursuing what 's Agreeable to its nature , and avoiding what 's Disagreeable to it : When , I say , all these particulars are well weigh'd , and duely reflected on , I believe we shall be at a loss to pitch upon any outward Notion with such wise Contextures , and the Complexion of such innumerable Material Causes may not naturally produce .

10. To give some ease to our fancy , startled at the Strangeness of many Actions we see done by Brutes , let us reflect That our selves both asleep and awake , do , without Knowledge , perform as strange Operations as Brutes do . on what happens to Men , walking in their Sleep , when the passages to our Knowing Power are intercepted ; and our wonderment will to a great degree , cease . How regularly do the Phantasms at that time , move our Brutal part , the Body : Many Authentick Examples of which I could recount worthy our highest admiration ; they being such as , were we awake , and had our rational fears about us , we neither durst attempt , nor could possibly perform , without extream hazard . But , not to insist on these , let us reflect on our selves , even when perfectly awake , and we shall discover that , however we are set on work by Motives , or Reasons , yet we know not at all how the outward parts of our Body ( only which we experience in Brutes , and ground the conceit of their having Knowledge upon them ) do perform any of their Operations . What Man living , though supposed the wisest ( much less the Generality ) knows how , or by what passages he is to send Animal Spirits into the Muscles ( whence all our Motion proceeds ) or into what Muscles , or what quantity of them is requisit to do such an Outward Action ? What Feats of Activity does a Rope-dancer show us ? How many ways does he distort , wind , turn , poize , stretch , and ply the parts of his Body ? To do which , the Animal Spirits are to be sent now into this , now into that Muscle , to move this or this or that Limb , or Joint ; sometimes great quantity of them to make a vehement , or quick Motion ; sometimes fewer , to move them more moderately ; sometimes none at all into any of them , when he has a mind to surcease all Motion , and sit still . Yet he knows , no more than a Brute , or a Stone does , how he is to do any of this , nor can give the least account how it is done . All this is transacted by the wise Contrivance of the Body ; which is so framed as to be subservient to the Design the Man , as he is Knowing and Rational , had projected . And the same is done in Brutes , when either actual Impressions are made upon them from the Objects ; or those former Impressions are again excited in the Brain ; which done , all the frisking motions of Pursuance and Avoidance which they perform , do follow by a Course of Natural or Material Causes ; and , withal , according to those measures and degrees as are proportioned to the Efficacy of the first impellent Cause , the Object in their Imagination ; the Agreeableness or Disagreeableness of which , to the Nature of the Animal is that which sets all the Engine on work at first .

11. Nor can the Objection bear any force that some Actions of Brutes resemble Reason , even though it seems more The Resemblance of Reason in some Actions of Brutes , no Argument of their Knowledge then is found in Men ; since we experience that a Watch , which is the work of an Artificer , performs the Operations proper to it , and tells us the time of the day with more exactness , than the best Reason we have can do without such helps . So that the Watches acting according to reason , demonstrates indeed there was Reason in the Framer of it , but argues none at all in the Engine it self : Wherefore , however the Actions of some Brutes may bear a show of Reason , this can only argue that they are the workmanship of a Rational , or Wise Maker ; but , not that themselves acted knowingly , or rationally , while they did these Actions : For my self , I must declare , that I have as much admired the wisdom shewn in the Action of a young Vine , exerting and twisting its little Fingers about other things near it , to support it self as it grew up , as ( all the forementioned Circumstances weighed and abated ) at any Operation of a Brute ; and I doubt not but a Campanella ( who maintained that every thing in Nature had perception ) or some such other man of fancy , would discourse , and descant on it thus : " The poor week limber Vine knew , and was well aware , that , not being able to support it self , it would , when it increast in length , fall down flat on the ground , and so be exposed to be trampled under foot , and hurt ; and , therefore , did very prudently cling about other Vegetables , or Poles near it , to sustain it self , and avoid that inconvenience . " And , I dare affirm that we lose the best part of our Natural Contemplation , by putting Brutes to have Knowledge ; for , what wonder is there that such things as have a knowing Power in them should know , or , who admires it in a Man ? Whereas , it justly raises our mind to high Admiration and Adoration of the Divine Artificer , to see things which are made of meer Matter , act with as much Wisdom and Prudence for their own preservation , as the wisest Knower can by his best Wit , of which he is so proud , and sometimes with much more . No doubt but the growth and operations of dull Vegetables , do administer to devout Reflecters occasions of very high Contemplation ; and shall the Operations of sensitive Beings , which are incomparably more excellent , and more admirable , as being the Top and Master-piece of this Material World , afford little , or none at all ? Now , if their Nature be to have Knowledge in them , and it be a thing common to all Creatures , and expected that GOD should give to every thing what is its Nature , there is little or no particular ground for our wonderment . GOD has given Brutes a Knowing Power , and that Power makes them know , and there 's an end of our Admiration , and consequently of our Contemplation , and of that devout Admiration , to which our Astonishment at the several Actions of those Natural Automata would otherwise raise us .

12. I beg pardon for this long digression ; I thought fit to dilate thus largely on this point ; both because it Brutes have Phantasms , but no Notions or Meanings . is a very concerning and useful Preliminary ; as also to manifest how the using the word ( Idea ) hand over head ( as we may say ) and taking it Equivocally and indifferently for Phantasms and Notions , leads this Great Man ( as it must needs have done every Man ) into great mistakes . For Phantasms Beasts may indeed have , they being no more but Effluuiums emitted from other Bodies , and received by the portalls of the Senses into the Brain ; where the Animal Spirits stand readily waiting to move the Brute , according as those Tinctures are agreeable , or disagreeable , to the Compound : but Notions , or ( which is the same ) Meanings , or Apprehensions , they cannot have ; for these being made by Direct Impressions upon our Spiritual part , the Mind , ( only which can mean , or apprehend ) to judge they have any such , would conclude they had a Spiritual , and consequently an Immortal part in them , which I am sure we shall both of us deny . Besides , had they Meanings , or were capable of any , they would be capable of the Meanings of our Words ; at least those amongst them which are most Docil , and could Speak , would not fail , if well taught , and educated , to know much of our Language , and Answer , in some few occasions , Pertinently ; which none of them ever did designedly , and , if they hap to do so by accident , none thinks they meant as they spoke , but all mankind laughs at the odd Chance , as at a pleasant Jest. Those that teach them might point at the things when they pronounce their Names , as Nurses do to little Infants ; and why might not Beasts learn them , as well as Children ; at least learn as much in many years , as they do in two , or three ? Indeed , some Words and Sounds , which are very often used to come into their Brain , accompanied with some pleasing or harmful Phantasm , do , by vertue of that concomitant Phantasm , affect them , and make them act ; not from their knowing what these words , or interjections mean , but by vertue of the Phantasms , or Effluviums , that came along with them , and moves them ; or , because they being lodged together in the Brain , that Word or Sound , or some other Vehement Motion of ours , excites again the same Phantasm which puts them upon acting . Nor can we draw any parallel from some wild and Savage Men , seeming as rude as Brutes ; the Question is of their Nature , not of their Circumstances . Could it be well proved that those Brutish Savages , tho' instructed afterwards , could never be brought to perfom any actions more rationally than Brutes do , nor could ever be taught any Language to a tolerable degree , so as to answer at all Pertinently or Intelligently , the difficulty would be greater ? But this I never heard , or read , asserted by any . Or , conld it be well attested , that Brutes could fancy , or make choise of a Female for being more beautiful , or were taken with the Harmony of Musick , or did comport themselves accordingly , I must confess I should much wonder . I remember that about the year 1663. visiting my Noble Friend Sir Kenelm Digby , he told me he was much surprized , and uneasy at a Relation made him by a Gentleman , whom he could not suspect guilty of that Vanity , as to tell an untruth to make his Story admired ; which was , that he saw Apes dance the Ropes at Southwark Fair ( which was then held ) and that they framed their Gestures and Motions exactly according to the Musick . For ( says he ) this , if true , shows they know Proportion , which argues Reason , and will oblige us to seek for new Principles . At his earnest intreaty I went to examine the business , and found it thus . A fellow stood below on the ground with a String ( which was put about the Ape 's Neck ) in one hand , and a Switch in the other ; who , understanding the Musick , made a little twitch with the String , or a menace with the Switch , when he would have the Ape retire , or advance , to keep time with the Fiddles : Nay , far were those Mock-men , the poor Apes , from being guilty of any thing that Resembled Reason , that , when they made them dance with a lighted Wax-candle in their hand , neither their Tutor's Instructions , nor their own Docility could teach them to hold the lighted end of the Candle upwards , though they often felt the inconvenience : for , the melted Wax scalded their Legs , and made them , in the middle of their dance , steal now and then a little Scratch where it burnt them ▪ which they did with such a Serious and Innocent grace , that it gave much divertisement to the Spectators . This Story I relate the more willingly , to warn others not to give easy credit to particular Men's Narrations , whether Travellers , or others ; much less to suspect their own Principles upon such Sleight Advertisements . I returned to my Friend , and eased him of his Quandary ; for which he was very thankful ; and blamed himself much for giving credit to a Tale , to the prejudice of Evident Reason .

13. To proceed , and pursue my Theme more closely , I would be glad to know , at least in Common , what kind Ideas , if not Spiritual Notions , Inexplicable . of things , in this Author's opinion , those [ Ideas ] are . Are they Corporeal , or are they Spiritual , or under what Head shall we rank them ? If Corporeal , they cannot be in the Mind ; as Accidents , or Modes of it ; the Mind being of a Spiritual nature . If they be Spiritual , Brutes , which have not a Spiritual Nature , can have no Ideas . Perhaps it will be answer'd they are not things , but certain Modes of things : But this satisfies not ; for Modes are Affections of the Thing , or certain Manners how it is ; wherefore they must be sutable to the Nature of the Thing of which they are Modes ; for a Thing cannot be such as it cannot bee : And so the question returns , what that Thing is of which those Ideas are the Modes : Is it Corporeal , or is it Spiritual ? If it be Spiritual , then again Brutes can have no Ideas , because they have no Spiritual Natures in them , and so they can have no Spiritual Modes : If Corporeal , then our Mind , which is Spiritual , can have no Ideas in it ; Corporeal Ideas being improper Modes for a Spiritual Nature . I do chiefly insist upon this Objection , to shew more manifestly that the Word Idea , should have been Distinguish'd at first , and Counterposed to Phantasm , and not confounded with it : Besides , my Genius leads me when I discourse about any thing , even tho' I oppose it , to know distinctly what that thing is , least I oppose I know not what ; and I must declare that I can make no conception of the word Idea by what our Moderns , and particularly this Learned Author , has given me concerning it . For , he abstracts from affording his Reader a distinct and clear view of it ; without which his Book , which runs wholly upon that Word , cannot be perfectly intelligible ; nor , oftentimes , his main Discourses inferr any determinate Conclusions .

14. It may perhaps be replied , That every Man experiences he has those Ideas ; as also that he comes to know , by Experience that we have Ideas , gives no distinct Account what they are . having them in his Mind ; and therefore it is a folly to enquire so scrupulously about such things as are , in some sort , Self-known ; and that it is enough to say they are Resemblances of things , made in us by the Object without us . To which I reply , that we indeed experience the An est of something in our Mind ( and , by the way , of something of another nature in our Fancy too ) by which we know things ; but , whether it ought to be called an [ Idea ] or suits with the proper meaning of this word ; or , after it is called so , the Quid est of that [ Idea ] or what it is ( at least as to the Common Notion or Genus of it ) or what to make of it by the light yet given me by this Author , or any other I have had the good fortune to see , I must profess I am not able to discern . All the knowledge I have of it from him , besides that given above which confounds me , is this , That he calls it frequently a Resemblance , N●r to say , they are Resemblances . Portraiture , Image , Appearanc , and such like ; which still leave me more dissatisfied than ever : For , who can have the first knowledge of a thing by a Picture , or Resemblance of it ? Let any Man see the picture of a Tree , or an Apple , who had never seen those things themselves , nor ever should see them any other ways ; and what knowledge could it give him , but only of things of a far different nature from a Tree , or Apple , viz. a Cloth , Board , or Paper , thus figured and colour'd ? Or , how can any Man know that such things are , or have any being in nature , by a bare similitude of them . I may see the picture of such a shap'd Man , but whether that Man is , or ever was , the picture cannot inform me ; so that it might be some Fancy of the Painter , for ought I know by the Picture . Indeed , had I known such things formerly , then a Resemblance of them might , in that case , revive , and call into my mind the knowledge of them ; but , how it should beget the first knowledge of them , as our late Philosophers put those Resemblances to do , is altogether impossible and inexplicable .

15. Again , since Mr. L. affirms that we know nothing , either by Direct or Reflex Knowledges , but by having To have Ideas of our own Ideas , inexplicable . Ideas of it ; it must follow , that when by a Reflex Act I know my first Idea got by a direct Impression , I must have an Idea of that Direct Idea , and another Idea when I know that Reflex one , of it ; and still another of that ; and so still on , all the time while I go on reflecting upon my former Knowledges . Now , what sense can we make of an Idea of an Idea , or what means a Similitude of a Similitude , or an Image of an Image ? Each succeeding Knowledge must be different from the former , because it has still a different Object to represent , and that Object cannot be known without its proper Idea ; and , it is not only the immediately preceeding Act which must be thus different , but the immediately-preceding Idea too , which is the Object of each succeeding Act ; And , in what shall we conceive the difference of those successive Ideas to consist ? It may perhaps be said , that plain reason tells us it must be so , though we know not the particular manner how it is done . I answer , The same Reason tells us far more plainly , that it looks very untowardly , and aukwardly , it should be so ; or that there should be a Resemblance of a Resemblance : And my advancing this Objection does oblige me to show , in due place , how both our Direct and Reflex Knowledges may be performed after a Connatural manner , without straining either good Sense , or the Nature of Things . Were it a Material Resemblance , it might , by rebounding from one place to another , cause a Resemblance of its self ; but here 't is quite otherwise ; for the first ( Idea ) it coming by a Direct Impression from the Corporeal Object without me , must resemble It ; and the Idea of that Idea ( or else of my First Direct Act ) which is the Object of my First Reflex Act , must be a Similitude of an Idea that came from the Object in Nature , and is like it ; and the second Reflex Idea must resemble an Idea , which was like an Idea that represented a thing of a quite different , or of a Corporeal Nature ; and so endwayes ; which would put all our Reflex Ideas into Confusion , as involving still others in them .

16. 'T is yet as great a difficulty , if not greater , how the Soul should have a power in its self ( as Mr. L. conceives ) No Operation internal or external begins from the Soul alone . to reflect upon its own Actions , that is , to form Ideas of its former Ideas ; it being ( as I verily judge ) metaphysically demonstrable , that an indivisible Nature cannot work upon it self , or produce in its self a new Act , or a new Idea by its own single power ; or , by it self , move the Body at pleasure , as we seem to experience in those motions we call Voluntary ; or so much as have any succession of Acts , but by means of the Body ; only which ( and not the Soul ) is Quantitative , and , consequently , of it self , capable of succession . The farther explicating and elucidating which Points , are reserved to their proper places .

17. Many other Arguments against these Ideas , will , I believe , occurr hereafter , which I at present omit , because Mr. L. not only , nor directly oppos'd by this Discourse . I would not fore-stall . But , e're I leave this point , I must do the right to this ingenuous Author to d●clare , that it was besides his intention in his Treatise to discourse particularly about the nature of his Ideas , and therefore I cannot be said properly to confute , or over-throw , what he never went about to advance , or establish : Though I cannot but judge , that it had been far more satisfactory to his acute Readers , and most highly important to Science , To ground all Knowledge on Ideas not distinguish'd from Phantasms , makes Science impossible . to have done so ; and most necessary for his Book , since without distinguishing his Ideas from Phantasms , and letting us know distinctly what his Ideas are , his whole Essay is unintelligible , and all his Discourses built on the ambiguous word [ Idea ] are inconclusive . And , had his penetrating Wit set it self to that study , I doubt not but it would have exceedingly conduced both to clear his own thoughts , and to have enlightned others . I desire then it may be understood , that it is not in order to him only I have enlarged on this point , but to meet with the mistakes of others also , who do customarily use the word [ Idea , ] and yet , as I have good reason to fear , do not perfectly understand their own meanings . Lastly , I thought it fit to dilate first on this point , that I might prepare the way to my next Discourse , to which it naturally leads .

COROLLARY .

FRom this whole Discourse collected into a Summary , I deduce this Corollary , that , since the word IDEA , according to this Author , signifies a Resemblance , Similitude , or Image , and , consequently is indifferent to Corporeal and Spiritual Resemblances , that is , to what 's in the Mind , and what 's only in the Fancy ; and that , only that which is in the Mind can be the proper Material of all our Knowledges ; hence that word is most improper to be used in Philosophy , which is the Study of Knowledge . Also , that as taken thus undistinguisht , it does in another regard highly prejudice all true Knowledge of Things , or Science ; in regard it confounds Corporeal and Spiritual Natures , which contain the two General Objects of all our Knowledges ; and are , besides , most vastly disparate .

PRELIMINARY Second .

That the Elements , or Materials , of all our Knowledges are properly to be called . NOTINOS ; and what those Notions are .

1. BUT , if the word [ IDEA ] be Equivocal and Improper to be used in Philosophy , as being unfit That the Elements or Materials of our Knowledges are properly to be called [ NOTIONS . ] to signify the first Conceptions of our Mind , ( which are , as Mr. L. says well , the Materials of Science ) and consequently , are apt to make us entertain Erroneous Fancies for Real Knowledges ; it will be be ask'd what other word we can invent which is Univocal , Proper , and not liable to signify a Superficial Resemblance , nor dangerous to seduce us by taking Fantastical Appearances for the true Knowledge of the Things ; but is , of its own Nature , fit to express distinctly those Solid Materials , by the Composition of which the Structure of Science is to be raised ? I reply , the word [ Notions ] is such , and answers all these Intentions ; and therefore this is the only word to be made use of by Philosophers , who seriously and sincerely pursue the Knowledge of Things , and not their own witty Conceits , or Imaginations . 'T is Univocal and Unambiguous , because Men of Art , or Philosophers , who are the best Reflecters on the Operations of our Mind , and have the truest Right to express those Thoughts their Art has given them , have constantly used it hitherto to signify our simple Apprehensions , or the first Operation of our Understanding ; and never to signify Material Resemblances , or Phantasms : Whence also it claims to be Proper . And , indeed , it has title to be such even from its very Origin and Derivation : For , none can doubt , or ever question'd , but that the Compound word [ Cognition ] does properly signify True [ Knowledge , ] and therefore the Simple word [ Notion ] must most properly signify those simple Parts , Elements , or Materials ; the orderly putting together of which in a Knowing Power does compound , or make ( Cognition , ) Whereas the particular Sense or Meaning of the word [ Idea ] which denotes a Resemblance , or Similitude , does not , in its immediate and proper Sense , in the least intimate any Order to Knowledge at all ; nor any Material , Part , or peculiar Object of it . Nor , lastly , does the word [ Notion ] signify a bare Similitude , or Resemblance , which can be , and usually is , in the Fancy ; but ( as will be seen shortly ) the very thing it self existing in our Mind ; which is most undoubtedly a Solid Material , or Firm Ground to build the Knowledge of Things , or Science upon it .

2. I hope I shall have candid Readers , and therefore I am not apprehensive that any will be so captious as to object , The word [ Notion ] and [ Cognition ] are taken here Objectively . that I do here use an Equivocal word , as well as others , by taking [ Cognition ] which signifies an Act of Knowledge , for the Object of that Act. 'T is a Fate , to which all words are obnoxious , to have some Ambiguity , or double sense one way or other . Thus we call in our common Speech a Parchment by which we hold our Estates [ A Writing , ] and a Sentence of Seneca , his , [ Saying ] ; and so take those words for the thing Written , or Said ; tho' they may also signifiy the Acts of writing , or saying . But , this is not such an Equivocalness as breaks squares between me and the Ideists , or that on which my Exception proceeds . The Univocalness which I assert to the word [ Cognition ] and [ Notion ] is such a one as is taken from their Radix , [ Nosco ] which , notwithstanding little Gramatical variations , does still import some Knowledge , or an Order to it ; and the genuin signification of those words , thus varied or declined , is still kept within that same Line . Quite otherwise than is found in the word [ IDEA ] which is Indeterminate to those vastly different Lines of Corporeal and Spiritual , ( which makes it highly Equivocal ; ) besides that it has no Rapport at all to the Line of Knowledge from its Radix , or Original Sense . To clear then the meaning of the word [ Notion , ] as 't is used here from this Sleight , and ( in our case ) Unconcerning Ambiguity , I declare , that , there being two Considerations in Knowledge , viz. the Act of my Knowing Power , and the Object of that Act , which , as a kind of Form , actuates and determins the Indifferency of my Power , and thence specifies my Act ; I do not here take the word [ Notion ] for my Act of Simply Apprehending ; but for that Object in my mind which informs my Understanding Power , and about which that Power is Employed ; in which Objective meaning I perceive Mr. Locke does also generally take the word [ IDEA . ]

3. Since I have formerly blamed the Ambiguous explication of the word [ IDEA , ] 't is but just it should be required What Notions are . of me to give a more Determinate and Distinct one of the word [ Notion , ] which I shall do in blunt Terms thus ; [ A Notion is the very thing it self existing in my understanding . ] I expect at the first hearing such a monstrous Position , which seems to the Antiperipateticks something above Paradox , and as Mysterious as a Supernatural Point of Revealed Faith , it will be entertained by some of them with a kind of Amazement , by others with a Smile . On the other side , I am so little concerned how any receive it , that I must resolutely declare that , unless this Thesis be as True as it is Strange , it is impossible any Man living should know any thing at all . By which the Reader will see that the Credits of the Aristotelians , and their Adversaries , as to their being held Solid Philosophers , does entirely lie at Stake upon the decision of this main point . Which therefore must crave the Attention , and Soberest Consideration of those persons , who take themselves to be concerned in the affair of Science , or in the Search after Truth .

4. Er'e I address my self to prove my Position , I must bespeak my Reader 's Consideration , that , in a Question of Fancy is to have no hand in discoursing about Spiritual Conceptions . this Nature , which depends upon our Reflexion on what is , or is not in our Spiritual part , the the Soul , he must lay aside his pleasing Phantasms , and all the Imagery , which with such a fine Raree-show uses to entertain and delight his Fancy . The point is of a higher Nature than to managed by such Familiar Appearances . The Ideas of Figure , Colour , nay , of Quantity it self must sit out as Bunglers , when such a Game is to be played , in which they have no Skill . This Contest must be carried on by Means as Spiritual , as is the Subject of it ; that is , by exact Reason , or severe Connexion of Terms . And , to think to draw Intrinsecal Arguments ; or to frame pertinent Answers to them , from what we find in Material Imaginations , when the Question belongs to that part of Metaphysicks which treats of Spiritual Natures , and their Operations , is as absurd , as 't is to contend that the Knowledge of a Man is Great , or Little , because his Body is Bigg , or Dwarfish ; or to fancy that Science is to be measured by Yards , or Inches . And , tho' I cannot fear any such Rational kind of attacque as Close Connexion of Terms , for the Negative , yet I grant my self obliged to produce no less than Clearest Evidence for the Affirmative ; provided we rate Evidence , not from what seems easiest to Fancy , but from the said Connexion of Terms ; only which can establish our Judgments .

5. I am to note first , that , as the Moderns grant we know nothing without having [ Ideas ] of them within The Question about Notions Stated . our minds ; so I willingly acknowledge , that we cannot know any thing that is without us , but by having in our understanding Notions of those things . Now , say I , those Notions must be the very things themselves ( as far as they are known ) in our Soul ; which they deny , as incredible and Monstrous . I note , secondly , that in my Thesis , I take the word [ Thing ] in the largest Signification , as it comprehends not only Substances , which only are properly Things ; but also all the Modes , or Accidents of Substance , which are improperly such . These Notes premised , I come to my Proof :

6. First Argument . When I simply apprehend the Thing , or any Mode or Accident of it , this Operation of my A Notion is the Thing it self in our Understanding ; Proof 1. Because Knowing is an Immanent Act. Understanding is within my Mind , and compleated there ; therefore the Thing Apprehended , which is the Object of that Operation , must be there likewife : For , otherwise , this Operation of my Mind , it being Immanent , and not Transient , or passing out of my Mind to the Thing without me , cannot be employed about that Thing , contrary to the Supposition . Nor could the Thing be truly said to be Apprehended , unless this Operation , called my Apprehension , had the Thing for its Object ; and this within my Understanding , it being an Internal Operation . But , that which is within me when I know it , is the Notion of it : Therefore the Notion of it ( taken , as is declar'd above , objectively ) is the Thing it self in my Understanding .

7. Second Argument . I know the very Thing ; therefore the very Thing is in my Act of Knowledge : But my Act Proof 2. Because the Thing Known must be in our Knowing Power . of Knowledge is in my Understanding ; therefore the Thing which is in my Knowledge , is also in my Understanding .

8. Tho' I will not allow it to be any way an an Answer to these Arguments , to alledge , that 't is sufficient that Proof 3. Because a Resemblance is not the Object of Knowledge , nor sufficient to cause it . the [ Idea ] or Resemblance of the Thing be in my Mind , because it does not in the least shock the Connexion of its Terms , or shew them Incoherent ; but is a mere shuffling Pretence , thrown in to avoid their Force : Yet I shall condescend to shew it impertinent , and I argue against it thus .

9. Third Argument . That only is Known , which I have in my Knowledge , or in my Understanding ; for , to know Otherwise , Ideas only could be said to be known . what I have not in my Knowledge , is a Contradiction : Therefore , if I have only the Idea , and not the Thing , in my Knowledge or Understanding , I can only know the Idea , and not the Thing ; and , by Consequence , I know nothing without me , or nothing in Nature . Again ,

10. Fourth Argument . Philosophy is the Knowledge of Things : But if I have nothing but the Ideas of Things Proof 4. Because , otherwise , all Philosophy would be destroy'd . in my Mind , I can have Knowledge of nothing but of those Ideas . Wherefore , either those Ideas are the Things themselves , as I put Notions to be , and then I have gain'd my Point ; or else they are not the Things , and then we do not know the Things at all ; and so adieu to the Knowledge of Things , or to Philosophy .

11. I expect not any direct Answer to these Reasons , yet I doubt not but Wit and Fancy will furnish a prejudiced Proof 5. Because Similitudes cannot possibly give us the First Knowledge of Things . Person with Evasions ; and the next will , possibly , be this , that we know the Things that are without us , by means of the Ideas or Resemblances of them which are within us . To overthrow which Pretence , I argue thus :

12. Fifth Argument . We cannot have the First Knowledge of any thing by a Picture , or Resemblance , as was As was prov'd formerly . shewn , Preliminary 1. § . 14. Wherefore , Notions , or Simple Apprehensions being the First Notifications of the Things to our Mind , we cannot know the Thing by their means , as is pretended , were they not more than Resemblances ; that is , were they not the very Thing .

To overthrow this Pretence utterly , and withall , to uphold and fortifie this last Argument , I advance this :

13. Sixth Argument . We cannot possibly know at all the Things themselves by the Ideas , unless we know certainly Proof 6. Because , ere we can know the Idea resembles the Thing right , both of them must be in the Mind , to be there Compar'd . those Ideas are Right Resemblances of them . But we can never know ( by the Principles of the Ideists ) that their Ideas are Right Resemblances of the Things ; therefore we cannot possibly know at all the Things by their Ideas . The Minor is proved thus ; We cannot know any Idea to be a Right Resemblance of a Thing , ( nor , indeed , that any thing whatever resembles another rightly , ) unless they be both of them in our Comparing Power ; that is , in our Understanding or Reason , and there view'd and compar'd together , that we may see whether the one does rightly resemble the other , or no. But , this necessitates that the Thing it self , as well as the Idea , must be in the Understanding , which is directly contrary to their Principles ; therefore by the Principles of the Ideists , we cannot possibly know that their Ideas are Right Resemblances of the Thing . Now , if the Thing it self be in the Understanding , there needs no Idea of it ; for to be there , or to be in a knowing Power , is to be known . Again ,

14. Seventh Argument . No Relation can be known without Knowing both the Correlates : Therefore no Proof 7. Because both the Correlates must be in the Understanding . Idea , which being a Resemblance of the Thing must necessarily be related to it , can be known without knowing also the Thing to which 't is related as that which is resembled by it . Therefore the Thing resembled must be known , not only besides the Idea , but by other means than by it ; which can be no way but by the thing it self existing , in the understanding . Which Argument is enforced by this Consideration , Proof 8. Because the Prototype , must be first known . that when the One of the two things that are Related , or Alike , is the Prototype , the other taken from it , or ( as it were ) drawn by it ; the Prototype must be first known ere we can judge that the other is like it . But the Prototype in our Case is the Thing without us , therefore the Thing without us must first be in our mind er'e we can judge of the other 's resembling it .

15. Ninth Argument . Notions are the Meanings , or ( to speak more properly ) what is meant by the words we Proof 9. Because Notions are what 's meant by Words . use : But what 's meant by the words is the Thing it self ; therefore the Thing it self is in the Meaning ; and consequently in the Mind ; only which can mean .

16. It may be perhaps replied , that the Ideas are only meant by the Words ; because when we speak , we intend Proof 10th . Because when the thing it self is intended to be made known , the Thing it self is the first meaning , or what is first meant by the words . to signify our Thoughts . I answer , that , however it may be pretended that what is meant immediately by the words , is our Thoughts , when our own Thoughts or Judgments about any matter , are the things desir'd to be known ; yet , when the Things are the Objects enquired after , as , when a Master teaches a Scholler Natural Philosophy , or any other Truth , the Intention of the Speakers does primarily aym and mean to signify the Things or Truths themselves ; and not our Thoughts concerning them ; and , therefore , the Things themselves are in the Intention and Mind , or are the Meanings of the Speakers , or Discoursers . And this passes generally in all other occasions , except only when the Knowledge of our Interiour Thoughts is ultimately aymed at . Thus , when a Gentleman bids his Servant fetch him a Pint of Wine ; he does not mean to bid him fetch the Idea of Wine in his own head , but the Wine it self which is in the Cellar ; and the same holds in all our Commerce and Conversation about things without us .

17. Eleventh Argument . Our Words are ad placitum , and have no Natural Connexion with the Things they signifie , Proof 11. Because the Ideas cannot be fore-known to our Agreement what Words are to signifie , but the Things only . but are order'd to express them by the Agreement of Mankind : Therefore what 's signified by them , must be fore-known to that Agreement . But the Ideas , or Resemblances we have , cannot be foreknown to this Agreement , since they could not be at all known , ( being in the Mind , ) but by the Words ; which , not being yet agreed on , can make known , or signifie nothing . Therefore the Things which we had naturally Fore-knowledge of , and not the Ideas , are that which is signified by Words . On the other side , since 't is no less certain that the Words do signifie what 's in the Mind of the Speaker , or his Notions , they must signifie the Thing in the Mind ; and , consequently , also the very Things which are without us , and which were known to us before the Agreement about the Words , were in our Mind , when we went about to name them : And , were not this so , Words could signifie nothing , which is a Contradiction .

Corollary I. Hence that great Contest in the Schools , whether our Words do immediately signifie our Conceptions , Hence the Question , Whether the Things , or our Notions , are immediately signified by Words , is Frivolous . or the Things in re , ( as they phrase it , ) is put past all Dispute . For , if the Objective Part of our Conceptions , which are our Notions of the Thing , be the self-same with the Thing in re , neither the one , nor the other , is immediately signified ; because there is no one , and other , but the same . And if the Question be put of the Thing as in re , and as in the Understanding ; 't is answer'd , This Question takes in those several Manners of Existing , which enters not into the Objective Notion , nor prejudices the Identity of the Thing under either State ; and so the Question is again frivolous .

18. Twelfth Argument . The same is evinced from the Verification of our Words ; as , when I say [ The Glass is in the Proof 12. From the Verification of Propositions . Window , ] the Word [ the Glass ] must mean the very Substance of that Glass existent without us , and not the Idea of that Glass ; for it would be False to say , the Idea of the Glass is in the Window . Therefore the very Glass it self which is in the Window , must be also in my Mind .

19. Thirteenth Argument . But , because Resemblances and Likenesses please them so well , we will try what Proofs Proof 13. Because what 's perfectly like , is the same . may be drawn from those very Words which themselves do most affect . They hold , the Idea , or Likeness of the Thing is in the Mind . Let us consider then the Likeness of a Man in the Understanding ; or rather , because we both agree that we have no Compleat Ideas or Notions of any Suppositum , let us take one of Mr. Locke's Simple Ideas , v. g. Extension . I ask , Is the Idea of Extension , as to its Representation , in all Respects like that Mode as it is in the Thing ; or is it not ? If not , then we can never know that Mode ( at least , not clearly and fully ) by that Idea ; which yet we must do , ere we can discourse of it as a Simple Idea . And , if it is perfectly , or in all respects , like it ; then 't is in no Respect unlike it ; and , by Consequence , in no Respect Different from it , ( for that Difference would be an Unlikeness ; ) and , if it be in no respect Different , it follows , out of the very Terms , that it is the very same , in the Mind , and out of the Mind , which is so much boggled at in our Notions : So that , at unawares , the Explicaters of Ideas by Resemblances , must be forced to come over to our Position , even while they would avoid it .

20. Fourteenth Argument . To make this yet Clearer , and to set it above all possible Confute , let us take the Word , Proof 14. This last Reason maintain'd by the Instance of the Notion of Existence [ Existence , ] or Actual Being . They know what that Word means , and consequently , they they have an Idea of it in their Understanding ; for 't is this which they say Words signifie . This Idea then must either be in all respects like to Existence , or in some respects ; that is , in part only : Not in part ; for Existence has no imaginable Parts in it , nor any divers Respects or Considerations ; no , not even those Parts made by the nicest Metaphysical Abstraction of our Mind , called Act and Power ; but 't is One , most Simple , Indivisible , and most Absolute Act ; and thence 't is called by the Schools an Actuality , as if it were the very Nature of Act it self , without the least Alloy of the more imperfect Notion of Potentiality , or Power . Wherefore the Idea of Existence must either be in all respects Like Existence , or not at all Like it ; if not at all Like it , then , having no Idea or Resemblance of it , we can never know what the Word Existence means : If it be in all respects Like it , then , by our former Discourse , 't is in no respect Unlike it ; and therefore , in no respect Different from it ; and therefore 't is the very same with it .

21. Fifteenth Argument . It may , perhaps , look like an Amusement , or Surprize , to pretend the Thing is the same , Proof 15. The same Reason ab●tted by the Natural Sayings of Mankind . when 't is perfectly like ; for I do not expect that every Reader will speculate so deep , as to see that all Likeness is Unity of Form as far as the Likeness reaches . Wherefore , to put them out of this Mis-conceit , we will endeavour to convince them that this Position is not a Trick of Art , but plain honest Nature : It has been still my usual Method to shew , that the highest Speculations I advance , are abetted by the natural Notions , Sentiments , and Sayings of Mankind ; nor will I decline to bring my present Position to be tried by the same Test. Let us take then two Quantities , ( Yards for Example ; ) in case we find them perfectly Alike under the Notion or Respect of Quantity , we make account we can in true Speech say they are the same Quantity . Or , take two Pieces of Cloth , of such a Colour ; and , if they be exactly alike in that respect , unprejudiced Nature obliges us to say they are of the same Colour ; and the same holds in all Substances and Modes whatever . Since then the Ideists must grant that their Ideas are perfectly like that which they know by them , ( as they must be , as far as the Thing is known by them , because the Thing is known only by their Resembling , or being like it , ) it follows from the Consent of Mankind , that those Ideas must , consequently , be the same with the Things out of the Mind which are known by them ; which is what we put our Notions to be . Wherefore , the Notion we have of the Thing , must be the self-same with the Thing known .

22. It may be replied , that the Notion of a Thing ( a Stone , for Example ) has a Spiritual Manner of Being The Difference in the Manner of Existing prejudices not the Identity of the Notion and the Thing . in the Mind ; whereas the Thing , or Stone , out of the Mind has a Corporeal Manner of Being , and therefore 't is in some respect Different from the Thing ; and , consequently , not perfectly the same with it ; and so can only be barely like it , or resemble it . I answer , 'T is granted that it is Unlike it , and so Different from it , and therefore not the same with it , as to the Manner of Existing ; but I deny that either its Existing , or Manner of Existing do enter into the Notion , ( except in the Notion of God , to whom Existence is Essential , ) or do at all belong to it , or the Thing either ; but that the Notion is the Thing , precisely according to what is Common to it both in the Understanding , and out of it , abstractedly from both those Manners of Existing . To explicate which , we may consider , 1. That no created Thing , nor consequently , Mode or Accident of it , has , of its own Nature , any Title to be at all , ( much less to be after such or such a Manner ; ) for then Being would be Essential to them , and not the Gift of their Creator ; whose Prerogative of Self-being , or Essential Being , is Incommunicable to his Creatures . 2. Hence the Things , and consequently their Modes , do perfectly abstract from being , and not being , much more from all Manners of being . 3. This appears evidently by those Words which signifie them , the Meaning of which Words is the same with our Notions . For Example , Take Gabriel , Peter , Bucephalus , an Oak , a Stone , a Yard , Whiteness , or what other Thing , or Mode of Thing we please ; 't is evident that the Sense of them ( which is the same with our Notion of them ) does not at all include , hint , or intimate Existence , or Non-Existence . Wherefore , 't is set above all farther Dispute , and ( as far as I can fore-see ) beyond all imaginable Objection , that our Notion of the Thing is the self-same with the Thing in Nature which is conceived by us . Q. E. D.

23. Now , if our Soul , when it knows any Thing has the very nature of that Thing in it , and therefore is The Eminency of the the spiritual Nature of the Soul , gives her a Power to be all Things intellectually . intellectually that thing ( for to be such a thing is nothing but to have the Nature of such a thing in it ) it follows that , considering her precisely as knowing a Stone , a Tree , Fire , &c. she is that Stone , Tree and Fire intellectually , Whence we may discover how Rational , and how Necessary and Important a Truth that saying of Aristotle is , that Anima intelligendo fit omnia . In a word , 't is due to the Nature of our Soul , as it is Spiritual , and to the Eminency of her Essence , to comprehend after her manner the whole Inferiour Nature of Bodies , ( and much more ) or to be an Intellectual World , as soon as she is her self , and depur'd from her dull Material Compart , as is shown in my * * B. 3. L. 4. §. 14. Method . Nor can this making the Soul to know so much ( nay , much more ) be deemed an Extravagant Conceit , or too high a Privilege for her , by any well instructed Christian , who reflects , ( as is also clearly Demonstrable in Metaphysicks ) that she is made for , or is capable of a Knowledge infinitely higher , viz. the beatifying Sight of GOD ; in comparison of which the Knowing the whole Universality of Creatures is but a meer Trifle .

24. I much fear that such Readers , who are not raised above Fancy , and have not well reflected how all Truths , Shown that Things may have two different Manners of Existing . and all our Judgments and Discourses that are rightly made , do consist in the Connexion of Terms , will look upon all Efforts of Close Reason , as Chimerical , and think them to be only a kind of Chiquaning , and little Tricks of Logick . Wherefore , to comfort the uneasy Fancies of such weak Speculaters , I desire them to consider how all things were in the Divine Understanding before they were Created , and are still there ; and how their Ideas , that is , their Essences , had there another , ( and that a more incomparable manner of being ) then they had in themselves afterwards . From which Divine Archetypes they were copied into Nature , and thence transcribed , by Impressions on our Senses , into Human Understandings . This Reflexion will ( I hope ) let them see how it is not impossible , but Consonant to Reason , that the self-same thing may have both a Natural , and an Intellectual manner of Existing . I note by the way , that , whereas I have insisted so much on the Impropriety and Novelty of the word [ Idea , ] our Modern Ideists will alledge that Plato did make use of that word before them , and that they do but eccho him , while they use it after him . But , I believe they will find upon Examination , that Plato meant by that word the Essences , or Natures of Things ; and , in likelihood , those very Essences in the Divine Understanding ; however some thought he misapplied it to Universal Ideas , or Essences , subsisting alone , and not in the Individuals . Now , did our Moderns take it in the same Sense he did , that is , for Essences , and not for Resemblances only , I should not except against them as to that particular ; but , to use his word , and affix another Sense to it , is , as I conceive , to abuse it .

25. Corollary II. From this whole discourse , and the many several Arguments in it , it appears evidently , that No Solid Philosophy can be built on Ideas . unless the word [ Idea ] be taken as we take the word [ Notion , ] that is , unless Ideas , or Notions , or whatever else we please to call them , be the very things in our understanding , and not meer Resemblances of them , they can never reach or engage the Thing it self , or give us Knowledge of it ; that is , they can never make us know any thing ; any more than a Picture can make us know a Man we never saw , nor ever shall or can see but by means of that Picture ; that is , not at all . And therefore , as I cannot but judge what I here advance to be True , and withall most necessary to be told , so I am obliged , without asking leave of any , to do that Right to Truth as to declare that those many Schems of Doctrine , woven upon such Ideas as their Groundwork , tho' they be never so Ingenious and coherent within themselves , and may be of some use in Logick to distinguish our Notions , are both meerly Superficial , and perfectly useless in Philosophy , which is the Knowledge of Things ; and can only serve to please the Daedalean Fancies of the ingenious Contrivers and witty Descanters upon them ; but can never bring us to the Solid Knowledge of any one Thing in Nature , nor verify any one Predication , or Judgment we make ; nor enable us in our Speculative , or even Common , Discourses about any Thing , to speak one word of good Sense . Not that I think that Mr. Locke does still take the word [ Idea ] in that unaccountable meaning ; but , that the acuteness of his Natural Genius does generally carry him ( perhaps unreflectingly ) to mean by that word the same I mean by Notion ; tho' , to say the truth , he totally abstracts from meddling designedly with this abstruse point .

26. Corollary III. Hence also we may gain some light what Knowledge is . For , it has been demonstrated that our 1. What Knowledge is . Notions , on which all our Knowledges are grounded , and of which they are Compounded , are the very Natures of the thing known ; and , consequently , that our Soul , considered precisely as knowing those Natures , or having them in her , as in their Subject , is , as such , those very Things which are constituted by those Natures . Wherefore , our knowing that those things are , or are such or such ( which is Compleat Knowledge ) is the having those things and their Predicates of Existent , or of their being affected with such or such Accidents , so in the Judging Power as they are in the things without ; that is , the things within her must be as the things in Nature are . Wherefore , when the Soul knows any thing in Nature she must be that thing as it is Another thing distinct from her ; So that in a word , To know is Esse aliud ut aliud ; To be another thing , as it is another . For Example ; To know the Bell is in the Steeple , she must not only have the Bell existent in the Steeple within her , but also that the Bell in the Steeple is without her ; or is in her as another thing , which is neither her , nor any Thing or Mode belonging to her . To explicate which hard point we may reflect , that all the Essential Notions of a Thing ( were it possible to comprehend them all ) of a Body for example , are Intrinsecal to it ; as also all those Modes or Accidents of it , the Complexion of which does constitute the Essence of that Body ; and even taking them singly , as meer Accidents , they depend for their being on that Body as on their Substance ; But it is not so with the Natures of those Bodies , or their Modes or Accidents , as they are in the Soul . For , they are no Determinations or Modes suitable or belonging to her Nature as 't is Spiritual , nor depend Solely on her as on their Subject for their Existence , as all Modes in their Natural Subjects do . Whence follows , that when she knows them , they are purely in her as Extrinsecall to her , or as other Things ; and as having their genuin Existence elsewhere , or out of the Mind . And , in this consists the Excellency of a Spiritual Nature , ( from which we may demonstrate her Immateriality , and , by Consequence , her Immortality ) that by reason of the Superlative Nobleness of her Essence she can comprehend the whole Nature of Bodies ( tho' she may know other higher Natures also ) all its Accidents , its Existence without us , and whatever can belong to it ; and yet so as to stand a-loof from it , and preserve her Distance and Height above it ; and is withall through the Amplitude of her Nature , able to engraft on her infinitely capacious Stock of Being all other things ; and give them , besides their own , ( if they be inferiour Natures or Bodies ) a far Nobler Existence in her self . This Definition of Knowing will , I doubt not , look like Gibberish to short-sighted Speculaters , who have not reflected steadily on the Souls Spiritual Operations , and on what Manner things are in the Mind : But , if each step to it be ( as I cannot doubt but it is ) demonstrable , the Evidence of the Premisses , and the Necessity of the Consequence ought to obtain of every Learned Man not be startled at the Strangeness of the Conclusion , because Fancy is dissatisfyed . That Inferiour Faculty is to be curb'd and kept within its own narrow Sphere ; and forbid to meddle with Spiritual Subjects which are beyond its reach and Skill ; and are only manageable by Reason grounding it self on such Notions as are above Matter . And , if it appears by this Rigorous Test that our Notions are the very things as distinct from us , all the rest of it will follow of Course by a Natural and Necessary Consequence .

PRELIMINARY Third .

That all our Science is grounded on the Things themselves ; and How this is performed .

1. BUT how can the Things be in our Understanding ? since the [ Thing , ] in its first and proper signification , An Objection against the Possibility of the whole Thing being in one mind , cleared . being an Individual Substance , is the subject of Innumerable Modes , or Accidents , which we can never reach , or comprehend ; and therefore it can never be known by us compleatly , as Mr. Locke has very elaborately demonstrated at large ; and , as my self have also proved in my * * B. 1. L. 2. § 7. Method . This being so clear and confess'd a Truth , it seems to follow hence against us both , that neither the Ideists have any Idea of it Resembling it fully , nor we any Notion of it , which is truly and entirely the same with it intellectually ; and so neither of us can , properly speaking , pretend to know any Thing as we ought .

2. To clear this important Difficulty , on which the whole Affair of Science , and the Confutation of Scepticism , Some Notes premis'd to clear this Objection . seems mainly to depend , it is to be noted .

3. First , That the Notion of the Individuum , Thing or Suppositum , can never , for the Reason now given , be Distinct Our Knowledge is such as our Notions are . and Compleat , but Confused and Imperfect . For , let us take any Individual thing , v. g. a Stone , we shall find that it has in it what answers to the Notion of a Thing , ( or what has Being ) as also of Extended , Dense , Hard , Opacous , Dinted , &c. it is Divisible into innumerable Particles ; its peculiar Mixture consists of many diverse-natured Parts , with such an Order or Position amongst them , &c. of all which our Senses , with their best Assistances , can not afford us clear Knowledge ; nor , consequently , imprint any Clear Notion of that whole Thing in our Mind .

4. Secondly , That , since to know a Thing , is to have the Notion of it in our Mind , our Knowledge must be such We can have such a Notion of a Thing ( or Essence ) as distinguishes it from all other things . as the Notion is : If the Notion be Clear , Intire and Distinct , our Knowledge too is such ; and , if the Notion be Obscure , Partial and Confused , our Knowledge must be Obscure , Partial , and Confused likewise .

5. Thirdly , We can have such a Notion of every Individual thing , if it be not ( as the smallest Atoms are ) too Confused Notions suffice for a Remote Ground of Science . little to be perceptible by our Sense , as ( tho' it be Confused as to it self ) may serve to distinguish it from all other Things , and to make us know it Exists separately from all others , and independently on them ; Moreover , that it is the Suppositum , or Subject , which has its own Nature or Essence in it , and also all the Modes or Accidents belonging to it . Thus , when we see a Bag of Sand , or Wheat , poured out , our Senses acquaint our Mind , pre-imbued by some common Notions , that each Grain can exist separate ; and has , sustains , or gives Being to its own Accidents , without the Assistance of any of its Fellow-Grains .

6. Fourthly , This Confused Knowledge of the Thing , in gross , is sufficient for such a Degree of Science of it , as Only Distinct or Abstracted Notions are the Immediate Ground of Distinct Knowledge or Science . we can have in this State . For tho' we cannot have a distinct Knowledge of it all , taken in the Lump , and therefore do not pretend to have Science of it thus considered , nor of each Considerability in it taken by Detail ; yet , we know that Confusedly it contains in it self what answers to all the many distinct Conceptions we make of it , which are the Ground of all the Science we have ; they being all stored up and amassed in the Thing , and apt to be drawn or parcell'd out thence by our Abstractive Considerations of it .

7. Lastly , That our Distinct Knowledge ( or Science ) is built on our Distinct Notions of the Thing fram'd in Science thus grounded , is truly called , The Knowledge of the Thing . our Minds by Impressions on the Senses , which are many , and the Manners of their affecting us also manifold . Hence our Soul , in this State , can have no Distinct or Clear Knowledge of the Thing , but by piece-meal , or by Distinct , Different , Partial , Inadequate , or ( as they are generally and properly called ) Abstract Notions ; as Mr. Locke has frequently and judiciously exemplify'd in the several Conceptions or Notions we have of Gold ; which we may consider , as yellow , heavy , solid , malleable , dissolvable in aqua Regia , &c. Whence , tho' it be , perhaps , impossible for us to reach all the Considerabilities that may be found in it , which ground our Different Notions ; yet each Notion we have of it , being Distinct from all the rest , and being truly the Thing , as far as 't is thus Consider'd ; hence we can have Science of the Thing , tho' confusedly of the whole , yet Distinctly of it in part , by such a Notion , as far as it is conceived by that Notion ; notwithstanding our Ignorance of other Considerations of it ; those Abstract Notions being in our Mind , ( unless they hap to be Subordinate , as General and Particular ones are , ) perfectly Distinct from , and Exclusive of one another . Thus we can have Abstract Notions of Length , Breadth and Thickness in Bodies ; or ( which is the same ) we can conceive Bodies precisely as they are Long , Broad and Thick ; and Mathematicians can frame many Sciences of Bodies , as thus conceived ; and discourse Orderly and Clearly of each of those distinct Notions , that is , of the Thing , as precisely such ; without meddling with Rarity , Density , Solidity , Fluidity , Heat , Cold , Moisture , Dryness , or any other Physical Consideration found in the same Body : Tho' each of these last also may , for the same Reason , ( viz. their Clear Distinction from all the rest , ) be discours'd of with equally Clear Evidence ; and ground as many several Subordinate Sciences in Physick , as the other did in Mathematicks .

8. By what 's said , it appears , that all Science , or all Philosophy , being grounded on these Abstract or Distinct Abstracted Ideas , tho' Exclusive of one another , do include or connocate the Thing . Notions of the Thing , it can be truly said to be the Knowledge of Things ; and that unless this be so , there can be no Philosophy . This Position Mr. Locke has ingenuously asserted : Whether he holds to it exactly , or no , will be seen shortly . Tho' , in case he should be found to deviate from it , 't is not peculiar to him , but a far more Common Errour in our Modern School-Philosophers ; and , I fear , in all the Ideists : For these Gentlemen , as soon as they have got such Ideas into their Heads , and express'd them by Abstract Words , as Rationality , Extension , Roundness , Length , &c. they , finding this Abstract Conception in their Minds , and experiencing that they can discourse about it Scientifically , do presently begin to imagine that those Ideas have got rid of the Thing , and hover in the Air ( as it were ) a-loof from it , as a little sort of shining Entities ; and thence have of themselves a Title to be a Competent Ground-work to build Science on . They Character them to be Resemblances , which is a Conceit easie to Fancy ; and so they set themselves to contemplate them , and employ their Wits to descant on them . They discourse of them , and them only ; for they do not endeavour to shew clearly how those Ideas do engage the solid Nature of the Thing . Whence it must needs happen , that in case those Ideas chance to be meer Material Resemblances , or Phantasms , the Knowledge built on them is purely Superficial and Imaginary ; nor can have any more TRUTH in it , than a Looking-glass , which represents to us a well-proportioned Edifice ; or a Dream , which ( as it sometimes lights ) is composed of Fancies pretty well Coherent with one another . Lastly , which is worst of all , they make Truth , which can have no Foundation , but in the Things which Creative Wisdom or Essential Truth has made and establish'd , to consist in the meer Agreement of those Ideas . Whereas they ought to make it consist in this , that those Abstracted Conceptions , or Notions of ours , are the Thing it self thus partially consider'd ; and also , that our Judgments or Discourses of them , and all Truths whatever , do wholly consist in this , that those Partial Conceptions of ours are found to be Identify'd in the Thing we Judge or Discourse of . 'T is the Thing we divide , ( as it were , ) or take in pieces by those Abstract or Partial Notions of it ; and , therefore , 't is the Parts ( as it were ) of the same Thing we put together again , and Identify when we compound Propositions or Judgments .

9. In a word , They make the Abstractedness of those Ideas to be Exclusive of the Subject or Thing ; whereas I This Point farther explicated , and enforced . make it only Exclusive of other Notions , but to Include and signifie the Thing or Subject , according to some Consideration , or ( as it were ) Part of it ; in the same manner ( to use a grosser Example ) as the Hand or Foot signifie the Man or Thing to which they belong , according to his Power of Handling , or Walking . Hence I hold , that Whiteness , Breadth or Hardness in the Wall , do signifie and import the Wall it self , precisely quatenus , or as it is White , Broad and Hard. Whence I affirm , that all Science , which consists of those Abstract and Mutually-distinct Notions , as of its Materials , is truly a Solid ( tho' inadequate ) Knowledge of those very Things ; and not of Notions , or Ideas , aparted from them really , or as Distinct kinds of Beings Existing separately from it : Which if they were , we should be never a Jot the wiser for knowing all the Ideas in the World , nor ever arrive at true Philosophy , it being the Knowledge of Things , and not of Resemblances : Especially , since ( as was demonstrated in my former Section ) those Resemblances can never give us Knowledge of the Things themselves .

We may draw farther Arguments to prove our Position , that all our most Abstract Notions do include or connotate the Thing or Subject , from all our Abstract Notions or Ideas , whether they be Essential , or Accidental . To begin with the former .

10. Arg. 1. 'T is impossible to conceive Humanity , for Example , without connotating Homo its Suppositum ; therefore Prov'd , because Abstract Notions , if Essential , do evidently include the Thing . that Abstract Idea , [ Humanity , ] must signifie the Thing , or [ Homo , ] according to what 's his Essential Constitutive . The Antecedent is prov'd . The Notion or Idea of the Definition is the very Notion or Idea of the Thing defined ; but the Definition of Humanity , viz. the Compleat Essence of a Man , includes Man in its Notion ; therefore [ Humanity , ] which is the Thing defined , does also include the Thing , or [ Man , ] in its Notion . Wherefore [ Humanity , ] tho' express'd abstractedly , because 't is but one Part , as it were , of the Entire Suppositum , ( though it be the principal part of it , ) does signifie the Thing , or Man , according to his Compleat Essential Form or Constitutive . The same Argument may be made of any other Essential Idea . Let us examine next the Ideas or Notions of the Modes or Accidents of Things , and try whether they exclude the Thing , or include it .

11. Arg. 2. The Idea or Notion of [ Modes , ] is , that they are the Manners how a Thing is ; and of [ Accidents , ] Prov'd , because all Modes do the same . that they are those which do advene to the Thing , or ( if I may be permitted to strain a Word , to express properly and fully my meaning ) Accidents are Unessential Conceptions of the Thing . Wherefore , the Idea of both of them do include the Thing in their Explications , and consequently in their Notions , and not exclude it . Or thus , There can be no Modes of a Nothing ; therefore the Notion or Idea of a Mode involves essentially the Thing of which it is a Mode , and to which , as such , it relates . Wherefore , the Material Part of it is the Thing , the Formal Part [ as thus modify'd ] or [ as existing thus ] or ( which is the same ) as thus conceiv'd .

12. Arg. 3. This is confirm'd , because Modes are justly conceiv'd to have no Being of their own , but to Exist As having no Being of their own . by the Existence of their Subject : But , when we have a Notion of any Mode in Nature , we conceive it as some way or other Existing ; therefore their Notion must connotate the Subject or Thing by whose Existence only they do Exist .

13. It would not be hard to multiply Arguments to prove this nice Point , fetch'd both from Metaphysicks , This makes or shews Philosophy to be the Knowledge of Things . and also from Logick , and the Verification of all Propositions , did I conceive it to be needful . But , I see plainly , that all the Arguments in my former Preliminary do conspire with their united Force , to make good this Fundamental Position . For , if this Truth be once firmly establish'd , that our Notions are the Things themselves , as far as they are conceiv'd by us , it must follow , that all our Science being built on those Notions , has for its Solid Basis the very Thing it self , and not any other Things or Nothings , distinct from the Thing known ; such as are their pretty Spiritual Looking-Glasses , those Unaccountable , Inexplicable , Unnecessary , and Useless Things , called Ideas . And , I hope I may rest confident that those Proofs of mine will abide the Shock of the most Strenous Opposition ; since , unless that Grand Leading Truth be Certain , 't is demonstrable that no Man living can know any thing at all . For , 't is confess'd , that nothing can be known , but by the Means of those Ideas or Representations of it : And those Arguments evince , that unless the Thing it self be in our Mind first , those Ideas , or Resemblances cannot possibly give us any Notice , or Knowledge of it .

14. Note First . On this Occasion we may reflect on the Sagacity of that great Speculater and Observer of Nature , Hence Aristotle expresses the Modes or Accidents , by Concrete Words Aristotle ; and may gather , at the same time , his true Sentiments in this Particular ; that , when he came to range all our Natural Notions into his Ten Common Heads , he did not express the Modes or Accidents by Abstract Words , but Concrete ones ; lest his Scholars should hap to think they were certain Kinds of Entities Distinct from the Subject : whereas they were Nothing but the Subject or Substance it self , considered as thus affected , or thus modify'd : For , he does not call them 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , Quantitas , Qualitas , as we do ; but 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , Quantum , Quale ; nor 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , Relatic , but 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , Relata ; or more simply , 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , Ad aliquid : Which last is abetted by our Common Language ; as , when we ask , [ What is he to me ? ] the Answer is , [ Your Friend , ] your Father , &c. Where the Words [ to me , ] express formally what we call Relation ; and the Words [ is he , ] both signifie that the Relation is a Mode or Accident intrinsecal to the Subject , however it be Consider'd in order to another ; and withall , that it has no Being , but that of the Thing or Subject signify'd by the Pronoun [ He : ] Which amounts to this , that what we call in an Abstract Word [ Relation , ] is nothing in reality , but the Thing Considered thus , or in order to another Individuum , which we call to be thus Modified , or conceived to be according to such a manner Related . The same is observable in the rest , 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , Agere , Pati , Habere , 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , quando , ubi , which have the Force of Concretes ; for 't is only the Subject that can be conceived or said to Act , Suffer , be in such a Place or Time , or have such a kind of Habiliment : Whereas , were it not for that reason , he could have express'd them in Abstract Terms , ( perhaps more handsomly ; ) as , 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , Tempus , Lecus , Actio , Habitus , had it not been his Intention to avoid Abstract Terms , lest the manner of Expression should represent it as a kind of Thing , Distinct really from the Subject , and so lead Men to take a Fancy for a Reality , as it happens in the Mis-acception of the Word [ Space , ] which breeds the Conceit of Vacuum . And , he was less sollicitous to do this in the first Predicament , call'd by him 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , because there was no Danger Men should take the Essence of the Thing to be a distinct Thing from the Thing it self , as there might be in the others ▪ So that this ought to be embrac'd and establish'd , as a most certain and most Fundamental Maxim by all who pretend to true Philosophy , that Whatever Conception of ours has not the Thing , or Res , ( either consider'd in part , or in whole , ) in its Notion , has no Reality in it , and is a meer Fancy .

Note Second , Hence we may gather the proper manner of Signifying , found in Abstract and Concrete Words , as The Point elucidated by Abstract and Concrete Words . such , viz. that the Concrete Word ( Album for Example ) signifies directly the Subject , and indirectly the Form or Mode conceived to be in it : And the Abstract Word Albedo signifies directly the Form or Mode , and indirectly the Subject ; which indirect manner of signifying is properly called Connotating .

15. This uncommon Doctrine might , perhaps , sink better into the Reader 's Consideration , if it were illustrated Hence Space without Body , or Vacuum , is a Contradiction . by an Instance . We will take then Mr. Locke's Position of an Infinite Imaginary Space , or Vacuum . To make good which Tenent , he imagins that Vacuum signifies a Space without Body : Which , to my Judgment , is as much as to say , it signifies a Contradiction , or Chimera . For , I positively deny we can have any Notion of Space , without including Body , however we may have a Fancy of it : And I as positively affirm , that Space can signifie nothing but Body , according to such a Mode called Space , or Quantity . For ( to wave my former Proofs ) I ask him whence he had first the Notion or Idea of Space ? He is too acute to hold Innate Ideas : It was Acquir'd then , or wrought in him ; And by what , but by the Thing , that is , by the Body ? It was the Body then which he saw ; it was the Body thus modify'd , that imprinted it self thus on his Senses , and caused such a manner of Idea in his Mind . Wherefore , to conceit that we can have an Idea of Space without Body , whereas he never had an Impression or Idea of Space , but what was in Body , and a Mode of it ; and so Identify'd with it , is to relinquish our Solid Natural Conceptions , and run to Fancies ; to abandon the Firm Ground of all our Knowledge , the Thing , and to pursue instead of it an Aiery Nothing ; ( for Modes or Manners , without the Thing of which they are Modes , signifie a meer Nothing , and can be Nothing else ; ) or , ( which is the same ) 't is to discard our well-grounded Notions , and to entertain in their Room meer Phantastick Resemblances . The Notion of Space then being an Impression of and from the Thing , is the Thing or the Body conceived according to that abstracted Respect or Mode , called Space ? Wherefore , to put Space beyond all Bodies , or where there is no Body , is a plain Trucking our Natural Notions , for Appearances that are Groundless , and coined by our Imagination . Perhaps he will say , we can clearly Abstract the Idea of Space from that of Body ; which is so far true , that our Precise and Formal Notion of the Body , as it is precisely a Thing , or Capable of Existing , is not the Notion of Space , which is a Mode of the Thing . But , why must it therefore be Nothing of Body , when 't is evidently one kind of Conception or Consideration of it ; that is , when 't is nothing but Body , as grounding the Notion of Space ? In a word , Since Space is not of it self A Thing , or Res , it must and can only be Modus Rei ; and therefore , to Fancy an Idea of it , which excludes Body , is to make it a Mode of Nothing , and consequently no Mode ; which is to destroy the Notion of Space , while he goes about to refine it . This for the present , till we come to reflect farther upon that Tenet in its proper Place .

PRELIMINARY Fourth .

Of the Particular Manner how all sorts of Notions are bred in us ; and by what way those Elements of Knowledge do first come into the Soul .

1. THE former Grounds being laid , shewing what Knowledge is , and in what it consists ; the next thing The State of the Question . that comes to be consider'd is , to shew , in particular , the Manner how we come to know at first ; or , by what Connatural Steps , the Things , or ( which is the same ) our Notions of them , which are the Materials of Knowledge , are introduced into our Minds . And , let it be noted , that it is not my Intention here to shew , what compleat Knowledges , or Judgments , are in our Soul before others in Priority of Nature ; which I have already done in my Method , Book 2. Lesson 4. What I aim at here is , to acquaint the Reader very particularly with my Thoughts how our Mind comes first to be imbu'd with both Direct and Reflex Notions , which are the Elements or Materials , of which our Compleat Knowledges or Judgments are compounded .

2. The Difficulty of conceiving how Corporeal Things that are without us , could get into our Soul which is Spiritual , Aristotle neglects to shew particularly how Knowledge was made . and affect it , was so puzzling to the Greatest Philosophers hitherto , that it has made them rack their best Wits to invent some congruous Way how this could be performed . Aristotle , who ought to have done this , since he advanced that Position above-mentioned which required it should be done , gives us no particular Account of it ; but being resolved , it seems , to follow the sullen Principle he had taken up , viz. Acroases ita esse edendas ut non sint editae , left it to Posterity to find it out . Which affected Humour of his , whether it proceeded from Envy of Knowledge to the World ( an unpardonable Fault in a Professor of Knowledge ) or from Vanity , or out of Policy to bring more Scholars to his walking School , has certainly brought much Disparagement to his Doctrine , hindred its Currency , and help'd forward by the Schools , ( who undertook to explicate him , and did it untowardly ) has pester'd the World with diverse Schemes of Philosophy , either newly invented or furbish'd up afresh . Whether he did explain after what manner we come to know , to his Scholars , I know not ; only it may seem wonderful , if he had done it , that none of them should have deliver'd it down to us . But , letting Aristotle alone with his Faults , which blemish'd his other great Vertues , and come to the other Philosophers since his time .

3. These Learned Men saw clearly , that all Corporeal Agents work by Local Motion , and that no Operation Later Philosophers were at a great puzzle about it . of theirs could be transacted without such Motion , at least accompanying all their Actions , they being all of them Successive or Quantitative ; and they could not conceive how Local Motion should be received or wrought in a Soul , whose Nature , ( it being Spiritual ) is incapable of it . For , it must ( as the very Notion of it imports ) be made first in one part of the Subject , afterwards in another ; which can with no Sense be apply'd to the Soul , which ( it being Indivisible ) has no Parts at all . They were not so well skill'd in Metaphysicks , as to reflect , that it was very congruous to Reason to affirm , That the Notion or Nature of Things ( speaking of Created Beings ) did abstract from all Existence ; and therefore , that the same thing might have different manners of Existing , and be in our Soul Spiritually , tho' out of it Corporeally : And , those few who did apprehend the thing might thus exist in the Soul when in it , were still at a Nonplus how it could get into it . Perhaps the Difficulty of explaining this , might be one Reason , why Cartesius , not knowing how to give an Account of this , thought fit rather to study , how he might avoid giving any Account at all of it , and thence recurr'd to the Position of Innate Ideas . At least , this is the best Excuse I can make in his behalf , for embracing a Tenet so totally praeternatural ; in case ( as his Words give us just occasion to think ) it were really his Doctrine .

4. The Schoolmen , whose way it is , when they are at a Plunge how to find out a Reason for any difficult How the Schools explicated this Point . Point , to create some Entity which God and Nature never made , and then to alledge 't was that Entity which did the business ; invented their Species Intentionales ; which , if they were not the same with our Notions , or the Things in our Knowledge , were meer Resemblances coined by Fancy , as our Modern Ideas generally are . But this raised a new Difficulty , instead of laying the old one : For , besides that those Species were such unaccountable things , that none knew what to make of them , or under what Head to rank them , they could do the Question no Service at all : For , if they were Corporeal , they could only affect the Soul by way of Local Motion ; of which , being Spiritual , she is not capable . And , if they were Spiritual , it will be ask'd , How they came to be such , being caused by a Corporeal Agent ; as also , how , being sent from a Body , they could get into the Soul , or by what Vehicle ? Being thus at a Loss , they invented another Entity , called Intellectus Agens ; whose Office it was to depure the Phantasms from their Dross of Materiality , that they might become fit , thus refined , to be receiv'd in the Soul . But this still multiply'd more Difficulties , and solv'd none . For , First , What other Reason had they from Nature to put such a Power in the Soul ? Or what other thing was it good for , but to purifie the Species ? If it had no other Office , nor served for any thing but to do this Job , 't is manifest 't was invented gratis , to get rid of the Difficulty that stunn'd them , and taken up for an Asylum Ignorantiae , when they were hard put to it , and wanted something else to say . Secondly , Were those Phantasms , before they were Spiritualiz'd , in the Soul , or Intellectus , or out of it ? If in it , the old Question returns , How got they thither ? If out of it , How could the Soul's Acts of Understanding , which are Immanent Acts , become Transitive , and affect a Thing which is without her ? Thirdly , Since the Understanding , or this Intellectus Agens , can only work by Knowledge , how could it have this Power to alter the Natures of things , or turn them from Corporeal into Spiritual , when as yet it had no Knowledge at all in it , as before those Species were refined and fitted to be received in it , it had none ? Lastly , Are those Species they put , when purify'd , perfectly like the Thing , or imperfectly ? If perfectly like , then they are the same with it , as our Notions are ; and so , the Thing it self is in the Soul , and then those Species of theirs are to no purpose ; for the Thing being there in Person ( as it were , ) there can need no Proxy of Species to stand for it ; nor can it bear any Sense to call the Thing a Species of it self . If they be imperfectly like the Thing , they are no more but Resemblances of it ; and then , 't is already abundantly demonstrated , that the Thing can never be known by them : So that they could make nothing cohere how our first Rudiments or Materials of Knowledge could get into the Soul , or how the Thing could come to be known by them .

5. The Ideists , on this Occasion ; have taken two ways , and both of them very short ones ; which is to skip over How the Ideists behav'd themselves as to this Point . all those Difficulties at one Leap . The Cartesians tell us in one Word , That God gave the Soul her Ideas ( or , as some of them say , some of them ) at the same time he gave her her Being ; and that , by having those Ideas in her , she comes to know ; and , so , by making this quick work , the Question is at an End . This is soon said , but not so easily proved . Some Rubs I have put in the way of this Pretence , to hinder its Currency , in the Preface to my Method , and in the Book it self , as Occasion presented ; and shall add many more , in case their Opposition shall invite me to it . But ; what needs any more , since Mr. Locke has already Confuted that Position beyond possibility of any Rational Reply ? Other Ideists there are , who think it their best Play to abstract totally from that hard Question ; and , finding , by Experience , that they have Ideas and Resemblances in their Head when they know , they content themselves with That , without proceeding to examin distinctly what they are , or how they bring us to the Knowledge of the Things in Nature . These Men do certainly act more prudently than the former ; for , 't is much more wise and safe , in order to the Common Good of Learning , to wave an obscure Point totally ; than , by advancing false Positions , in a matter of universal Concern in Philosophy , to affirm what cannot be maintain'd . Tho' I must declare , that I cannot see but that such a Fundamental Point , which influences the whole Body of Science , ought not to be pretermitted . For which reason I have thought fit to lay the Grounds for it in the two first Lessons of my Method , reserving a more particular Account of it till further Occasion should be presented ; which seems to offer it self at present .

6. Yet I do not judge this Opportunity so pressing or proper , as to oblige me to treat such a large Point fully , or How far the Author engages to clear this Difficulty . to set my self to demonstrate and smooth every Step I take in this untrodden and rugged way . This of right belongs to that part of Metaphysicks that treats of the Nature of the Soul ; and , particularly , as it is the Form of such an Animal Body ; which may not improperly be called Physicks ; or Animasticks . Besides , it were too great a Boldness to pretend to pursue such an abstruse Point quite thorough with Evident Demonstration . Yet I think I may promise my Readers , that the Positions I shall lay down orderly to clear it , will have that Coherence amongst themselves , and be so Agreeable to the Natures of Things , and to the Maxims of divers other Sciences ; that it will be hard , in just Reason , to find any considerable Flaw in it . I take my Rise from the remotest Principles that can concern that Point , and these are my Thoughts .

7. It belongs to the Divine Wisdom to carry on the Ordinary Course of his World by Causes and Effects ; and , The First Cause carries on the Course of Second Causes by Immediate Dispositions . on the Matter 's side , by Dispositions to further Productions . Thus Wood is heated by Degrees , e're it becomes Fire , and breaks out into a Flame ; and , in the Generation of every thing in Nature , there are are many Previous Alterations of the Matter , ere it acquires Another Form , or becomes Another Thing .

8. Wherefore it belongs also to the same Wisdom and Goodness of God , as he is the First Cause , that if , in the And therefore he assists Nature , if Dispos'd , when it cannot reach . Ordinary Course of the World , the Subject be dispos'd for something that cannot be compassed by the Power of Second Causes , to step in to Nature's Assistance , and help her immediately by his own Hand . Thus , when the Individuality is compleated , that is , when the Potentiality of the Matter is Ultimately Determin'd and Particulariz'd by Second Causes , so that it is become distinct from all other Entities , or apt to be This , and so fitted for Existence ; which Existence , Second Causes cannot give : God , whose Generous Bounty stands ever ready to bestow unenviously on his Creatures all the Good they are capable of , does give them Existence immediately by himself .

9. Therefore , if there can be such a Disposition in the Brain of an Embryo , that ( grown riper ) it is apt , as Therefore , if the Matter can be Dispos'd for a Rational Soul , GOD will give it . far as is on the Matters side , to act Comparatively , which is the Disposition for Rationality : And that this cannot be done , but by having a Form in it of a Superior or Spiritual Nature , which Second Causes cannot produce ; it is certain , God will , by himself , assist it , by infusing such a Form .

10. There can be such a Disposition in the Brain of an Embryo to work Comparatively , that is , to Judge and Discourse ; There can be such a Disposition in Matter . since we experience that we do this actually now , in part , by the means of the Brain , or something that 's near it , or belongs to it .

11. Wherefore , since this cannot be done without having those Materials in us , of which , Compounded or Compared , Therefore , some Material Part , by which immediately the Soul has Notions from the Object . we are to Judge and Discourse , which we call Simple Apprehensions , or Notions ; it follows that there must be such a Disposition in some Bodily Part , as to convey into the Soul such Notions .

12. Wherefore , since Bodies , in their whole Quantity , or Bulk , cannot be convey'd by the Senses into the Brain , Therefore Effluviums are sent from Bodies , to that Part. the Author of Nature has order'd that all Bodies , upon the least Motion of Natural Causes , Internal or External , ( which is never wanting ) should send out Effluviums , or most minute and imperceptible Particles ; which may pass through the Pores of those Peruious Organs , called the Senses ; and so , be carried to the Brain .

13. This Natural Compound , called [ Man , ] is truly One Thing , and not aggregated of more Things Actually Therefore Man is truly One Thing , which is Corporeo-Spiritual . Distinct ; since the Form , called the Soul , did ( tho' not so Naturally , yet ) as necessarily follow out of the Disposition of the Matter , ( taking it as Seconded , and its Exigency and Deficiency supply'd by the First Cause , ) as the Form of Fire , or of any other Body in Nature , does out of the Dispositions properly Previous to that Form : And , therefore , does as truly ( by Informing that Matter ) Make or constitute the Man One Thing , as any other Corporeal Form does any Body in Nature .

14. Therefore there must be some Chief Corporeal Part in Man , which is immediately united with the Soul , as Therefore some Chief Part in him which is primarily Corporeo-Spiritual , or has both those Natures in it . the Matter with its Form , and , therefore , is Primarily Corporeo-Spiritual , and includes both Natures . Whence , when that Part is affected , after its peculiar Nature , Corporeally ; the Soul is affected after its Nature , that is , Spiritually , or Knowingly ; which Part Cartesius thinks is the 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , or Glandula Pinealis .

15. Therefore the Manner how , and the Reason why those Corporeal Effluviums do come to affect the Soul , Which is affected according to both those Natures , because of their Identification in that Part. and cause in her Spiritual Notions of the Thing , is because of the immediate Identification of the Matter and Form , in that part ; whence follows , that the one cannot be affected , but the other must be affected too after its Different manner , proper to its Distinct Nature . In the same manner ( abating the Diversity peculiar to each of those Natures ) as , when the Matter of Wood is wrought upon , the Form of it , or the Complexion of Accidents , ( making up one Thing with it , ) does also suffer Change . Whence , by the way , is seen the Reason of that received Maxim , that Actiones & Passiones sunt suppositorum : So that 't is the whole Thing which acts or suffers , tho' according to this or that Part of it ; and hence it is that the Whole Thing is conceiv'd , tho' by an Inadequate Notion we conceive but but one Part of it ( as it were ) distinctly .

16. This Part immediately inform'd by the Soul as 't is Spiritual , ( which we will call the Seat of Knowledge , ) must , The Peculiar Temper of that Part consists in Indifferency . whatever it is , be of a Temper the most Indifferent to all Bodies , and to their several Modes as can be conceived ; and ( as far as Matter can bear ) Abstract from them all ; both that it may be connaturally more sensible of the Different Effluviums by which their several Natures are to be understood ; as also more fit to beget in the Soul Universal Notions , such as are those of Ens , or Being ; by which all the Negotiation of our Interiour Acts of Judging and Discoursing is managed . Tho' I am apt to judge that those General Notions are also caus'd when the Impression is Confused or Indistinct , as those of Ens or Being are ; and the same is to be said of the Rest in proportion . Thus , when we see a Thing a-far off , and have but a Confused View of it , it only appears to us to be something , we know not , particularly what , or A Thing ; without making us know in the least , what Kind of Thing or Body it is . Afterwards , coming nearer , we discern it moves it self ; whence we gain the Notion of a Living Thing : Then , approaching still nearer , we , by a more distinct Impression , know 't is a Horse . And , lastly , when it is within convenient Distance to give us a perfectly Distinct View of it , we know 't is such a Particular Horse of our own .

17. That Part , called the Seat of Knowledge , must , moreover , be the most Sensible , and the most Tender that can That Part very Tender and Sensible , yet not Tenacious . be imagin'd , that ( as was said ) the least Effluviums may affect it : And yet it must not be of a Glutinous Nature , so as to entangle them , and make them stick there ; but that , reverberated thence , they may light in some near adjacent place , to serve , by their renewed Impulses afterwards , for the Use of Memory , and to excite again former Knowledges ; as also , ( as will be shewn , ) to cause Reflex Acts. That it must not be in the least Glutinous , appears hence evidently , that , did the Effluviums stick there , we should , whether we would or no , perpetually contemplate or think of those Objects ; which would also hinder our Perception of others , by mingling the former Effluviums with those which supervene .

18. The orderly disposure of the world , by Gradual steps arising from less perfect Natures to those which That part the most Noble of all Material Nature . are more Noble , and more Perfect , does evince that this Part call'd the Seat of Knowledge , is the most Supremely Noble production of Material things , and nearest ally'd ( as it were ) to Spiritual Nature that can be imagin'd ; so that all the best Perfections that are to be found in Corporeal things , are center'd in it . Whence , tho' it is too rude to affirm with a certain learned Physician , that the 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , is a baser part of Man's Body than the Intestinum Rectum ; yet I cannot approve of Cartesius his Conceit , that it is a Glandule ; which is one of the Ignoblest parts we have ; but judge it has a peculiar Temperature of its own ; not only specifically distinct from other parts , but that they are scarce in any degree to be parallell'd to it .

19. Whether amongst its other Special Qualities it partakes of the Nature of those Bodies which in the dark Perhaps 't is Reflexive of Light , or Lucid. do reflect Light ; and that the Glossy and Lively Appearances and Resemblances , which we call Fancies , or Phantasms , do spring thence , I leave to others to determin . I think it is the Interest of those who make the Septum Lucidum to be the Seat of Knowledge , to embrace that Opinion .

20. Those Effluviums sent out from Bodies , have the very Natures of those Bodies in them , or rather are themselves The Effluviums have in them the Naturee of the Bodies whence they are sent . Lesser Bodies of the Self-same Nature , ( as the smallest imperceptible parts of Bread and Flesh , are truly Bread and Flesh ) which are cut off by Natural Agents from the great Lump ; and , therefore , by Application of themselves , they imprint the very Body it self , or a Body of that Nature , on that material part which is the Seat of Knowledge . Whence the Soul being , at the same time , affected after her manner ( or Knowingly ) as that part was affected , she has also the very Nature of that Body ( as far as the Sense exhibits it ) put in her by that conformable Impression , when she has a Notion of it .

21. Therefore those Effluviums striking the Seat of Knowledge , and immediately ( as has been said ) falling off from They affect that Part , as Things Distinct from the Man . it , do affect it as a Thing distinct from the M●n . For they are not there as belonging at all to the Intrinsecal Constitution of the Body , but as meer strangers to it : Whence the Soul has the Nature of that Body in her ( and consequently is that Body ) as 't is another Thing from her , which illustrates the Explication of knowing given formerly ; and that 't is to be another thing as it is another .

22. The Reason why those Effluviums , containing the Essence or Nature of the Bodies whence they flow , do not Why they imprint Abstract Notions . breed a Notion in the Soul of their whole Essences is , because they are convey'd to that part by many different Conduits the Senses ; which being diverse , and each of them ( according to their circumstances ) apt to be affected diversely , do therefore receive and imprint them after a different Manner . For example , those which , by the smart motion of the Ayr , do come in thro' the Drum of the Ear ; and consequently by the Auditory Nerve which is joined to it , and immediately conveys them to the Seat of Knowledge ; do affect it with a kind of Vibration , or ( as we may say ) Soundingly . Those which come in by the Eye , affect it Luminously , or as accompany'd with Light , and so of all the rest ; whence are caused in our Soul all our Distinct , or Abstracted Notions of the Thing , or ( which is the same ) of the Nature of the Thing , in part , or according to such a Consideration of it ; on which , because of the Distinctness , and consequently Clearness of those impressions , all the Science we have of the Thing is grounded .

23. There is , moreover on the Soul's side , which is the Subject The Peculiar Nature of our Soul , renders those Notions perfectly distinct and Indivisible . that receives those Impressions , another thing highly conducing to make our Notions yet more Clear and perfectly Distinct , which deserves our best Reflexion . 'T is this , that , the Nature of our Soul being Indivisible , it gives an Indivisibility to all those Notions , or Natures in her ; which , as they existed without her , and were convey'd into her by Effluviums , being Corporeal , were Divisible , and therefore something Indistinct and Confus'd : This appears clearly in most of the Objects about which the Soul is conversant , perhaps , in all ; viz. in Figures , Points , Lines , Superficies , Instants , Measures , Comparisons , Predications , Respects , Negations , Denominations , Relations , &c. For example , There is not , perhaps , in all Nature any Body Perfectly , or Mathematically , Flat , Sphaerical or Triangular ; or just a yard , nor any Duration mark't out to be just an Hour ; but , by reason that Bodies are affected with quantity , which is perpetually variable by a world of Agents of diverse Figures assaulting it ; as also because of the Divisibility of Quantity in infinitum , it is warpt from those Exact Figures , or deviates from those Just Measures : Whereas , on the contrary , those things , as they exist in the Soul , are adjusted and Stinted even to an Indivisible ; so that the very least imaginable Consideration , added or detracted , quite alters the Notion to another Species , Now , nothing can be so concisely Distinct from another , or more impossible to be Confounded with it , than what is so comprized within its own Bounds , as to be This and no other , or so much and no more , even to an Indivisible . Whence 't is demonstrable that the Thing , as in our Soul , or as standing under our Notion , or Conception , is a most Proper Ground for that Distinct and Clear Knowledge called Science . This is evidently seen throughout the whole Body of the Mathematicks ; and the same will be found by Reflexion in all other Sciences whatever .

I note here on the by , that this Power or Faculty of the Soul , which is so proper and so natural to her , of Reducing all things in her from the Indistinctness found in them , as they stand in Nature , or from Divisibility to Indivisibility , does ground most evident Demonstrations of her Immateriality , and consequently , of her Immortality , were it pursu'd home .. But this is not my business at present .

24. That Part , called the Seat of Knowledge , can be affected with many coherent Impressions at once , which Whence Complex Notions come . cause in the Soul Complex , or Compounded Notions . This is too evident to need any Dilating on it , I call those Impressions coherent , which are caused by Effluviums making singly different Impressions either from the same Thing , or the same sort of Thing . But , it is on this occasion to be well noted , that , lest our Knowledges or Discourses be lost in a Croud , or run astray in a pathless Wood of Notions disorderly aggregated , the Art of Logick is absolutely necessary , to range and distinguish our Notions into Common Heads , and to descend from those General Heads all along by Intrinsecal Differences * * Method to Science , Book 1. Less . 3. § 2. ; that is , to divide them by more and less of the Common Notion , so to keep them still within that Line or Head ; without which they must needs interfere and breed Confusion . This Method of Distinguishing and keeping distinct our Notions , is as necessary for Scientifical Discourses , as 't is for an Army to be Marshalled in Rank or File ; without which 't is but a Medly or Confused Multitude . Whence , those who slight this Methodizing their Notions , must necessarily , in rigorous Reason , talk Ramblingly ; tho' perhaps ingeniously , according to such a sort of Wit as Men use when they would maintain Paradoxes ; or , as Erasmus us'd to praise Folly .

25. It being demonstrable in Metaphysicks , that whatever is only in Power to have a new Act , cannot of it The Soul cannot Alone produce any New Act in her self , self produce that Act in it self , unless it be wrought upon first by some other Agent which is in Act ; and much less can such a Power do this , as is of an Indivisible or Spiritual Nature , in regard it has no Parts , one whereof being in Act it self , may produce an Act in the rest ; as it happens in the Wheels of a Watch , or in our Bodies , when one part of them moves another : It follows hence , that our Soul can produce no new Act , either of Memory , or of Reflexion upon her own former Acts , nor of Thinking or Willing , &c. without being first affected by some Object without her , or anew by some Part or Particle within the Man ; which , being in Act it self , may cause those new Acts of Knowledge in her .

26. The Effluviums , which , by affecting the Seat of Knowledge , gave her to know at first , are the properest But by the Phantasms exciting her anew . Agents to produce connaturally these new Acts of Reflexion or Memory ; in case it can be found that they are duely qualify'd for such an Efficiency .

27. Those Effluviums ( as was prov'd above ) not sticking on that part which is the Seat of Knowledge , do consequently How Reminiscence is made . fall off from it , and are lodged near it ; whence 't is consonant , that That Part also having its Effluviums when thus sollicited by the Impulse of those Atomes sent from without ; and therefore ( all Natural Action causing Reaction ; ) when they rebound thence , they carry away some minute Particles of the said Part. Wherefore these Outward Effluviums , thus imbu'd , and qualify'd with some tang of the Seat of Knowledge , when they come to be Excited again by some Exteriour or Interiour Causes , must affect it afterwards accordingly ; and thence they become duely qualify'd to cause a Notion of it as Fore-known , which we call , to reflect upon it , or remember it . By which we see how Reflexion and Reminiscence are caused by the new Impulse of those former Atoms to the Seat of Knowledge , tinctur'd with some Particles of that Part it self . For which Reason , the oftner this is done , the Memory of it is more Easie and Lively . Whence is seen , that there is no need of multiplying succeeding Ideas , to know the preceding ones , when we have Acts of Reflexion ; a new Impression of the Effluviums or Phantasms , thus qualify'd , repeating still the same former Notion with the Connotate of Foreknown .

28. Memory and Remembrance are inexplicable , without putting those first-imprinted Atoms to reside still in Memory and Reminiscence , inexplicable , unless Phantasms remain in the Brain the Brain , and to be excited there anew . For , were this put to be perform'd by a meer Motion upon the Nerve ( as most of our Modern Philosophers think , ) the Object being gone , that Motion would quickly cease . Nor could the same Motion be connaturally reviv'd but by the same Object , which is seldom at hand to make it again as oft as we have occasion to remember , as Experience shows us . Much less could the Remembrance of Sounds or Tunes , in Man or Birds , be possibly explicated , unless those repell'd Atoms , lying in Order , and striking afresh the Auditory Organ , did repeat the same Impression they had formerly . For , to put Millions of Motions to continue perpetually playing in the Fancy , and ( as they needs must ) interfering with one another , would destroy all Harmony , and breed a strange jarring Confusion .

Note , that Reminiscence is oft-times made in us by using our Reason , gathering or recollecting former Notions The manner how Reminiscence is made in Brutes by others that orderly succeeded them ; in the same manner as we investigate Causes from their Effects : Whereas in Brutes it is performed meerly by a new Appulse of the former Atoms to that part in which the Imagination consists ; which being the most supreme in the Animal , has a Power to Agitate the Animal Spirits , and move the Body agreeably to those Impressions ; as is found also in Man .

29. The same Excitation of those particles thus imbu'd , causes also Reflex Knowledge of our former Operations . How Reflexion is connaturally made . And indeed Reflexion on our past thoughts is the same as Remembrance of them ; for we can neither Reflect on a Thing without Remembring it , nor Remember it without Reflecting on it . But this Reflexion , for the reason lately given , must proceed from some Object or Cause Extraneous to the Soul ; that is from Effluviums in the Memory thus reexcited . For it is to be noted that as Divines ( or rather Christian Faith ) tell us , that Christ having two distinct Natures in the same Suppositum , all his Operations proper to him as such , were therefore Theanthropicae , or such as were agreeable and belonging to both the Divine and Humane Natures : So Man , consisting of both a Corporeal and Spiritual Nature , and thence being a Corporeo-Spiritual Thing , all his Operations , for the same Reason , must be Corporeo-Spiritual . Whence he has no Act purely Spiritual , or uncompounded with the Co-operation of that Corporeal Part , which receives those Effluviums ( call'd by us Fancy ) or without it's Concurrence . Which gives us farther Light , to see how our Soul cannot reflect on her own Operations , but the Fancy must go along ; and , by what 's said , it will be easie to conclude from which of those parts the Operation must begin anew , viz. from that part from which it did begin at first . Hence came that Saying of the Schools , That the Soul has Notions , or knows , Speculando Phantasmata : which are pretty Fanciful Words ; and , tho' they may perhaps have a good Meaning , yet 't is very unphilosophically express'd : For it makes the Soul to speculate , which ( if it have any Sense at all ) signifies to know the Phantasms or Ideas in the Imagination , when as yet she has no Knowledge in her at all . All her Notions , which are the first Elements of Knowledge , being caus'd in her by those Effluviums , previously to her Knowing either them , or any thing else .

13. From what 's said above , 't is seen that those Direct Notions , which are thus naturally imprinted , are Direct Notions , common to all Mankind , and their Words Proper ; Reflex ones Improper , and their Words Metaphorical . Common to all Mankind in the main , ( however they may in each Man differ in some Degree ) and consequently , the Words we agree on to express those Natural Notions are , for the same reason , Proper Words ; whereas those Notions made by meer Reflexion , as are those of Spiritual Natures , are therefore Improper , as having no proper Phantasms to imprint them connaturally on the Mind : whence also the Words that express them , are such as are taken or Translated from Natural Objects ; and therefore they are Improper or Metaphorical .

31. From this exact Distinctness of our Notions , even to an Indivisible , or from this , that one of them is not another , Whence we come to have Negative Notions . our Mind has an Appendage of a Negation tack'd to every Notion , so that it becomes very familiar to her : whence she can have a Negative Notion of every thing she conceives , while the considers it as limited , or reaching thus far , and no farther ; or being This , and no other . Of which Nature are all the Modes of Ens , they being limited Conceptions of it ; no Notion being perfectly Positive but that of Ens or Being .

32. Hence the Soul can have also the Notions of Indivisibility , Immortality , Immensity , and innumerable such But Negative Notions , as they are Negative , do not abstract from the Subject . like . But , it is very specially to be remark'd , that we can have no Notions of those Negatives as taken abstractedly from the Thing or Subject ; for , otherwise , Non Entities ( formally as such ) might be the Object of the Understanding ; which is impossible ; for [ Nothing ] formally as such ( I add , nor Vacuum ) can have no Effluviums sent from it to the Brain , nor consequently any Intelligibility ; nor can any possible Notion be fram'd of it . Wherefore Baldness signifies the Head , quatenus having no Hair on it ; Blindness , the Eye , quatenus having no Sight ; Immensity , the Thing , quatenus not capable to be measured , &c. Hence

33. The Notion we have of [ Nothing ] or Non Ens , is only that of Ens in it's whole Latitude , with a Negation How we come to have a Notion of [ Nothing . ] annexed to it ; in the same manner as in particular Entities , [ Incorporeal ] signifies [ non Corpus ] or as [ Indivisible ] signifies [ Non-Quantum ] &c.

24. Hence it is that we come to conceive , and sometimes express Non Ens as an Ens ; as Grammarians do when Hence great Care is to be had , lest we take Non-Entities , or Nothings , for Things . they define a Noun to be the Name of a Thing , and yet make Nihil ( which signifies Nothing ) a Noun Subjective , and put Adjectives to it . Whence Philosophers must take very great Care , lest , seduced by our manner of Conceiving Non-Ens as a Thing , they come to fancy , or judge it to be formally something ; as do the Asserters of Vacuum , and too many others in like Occasions . For then ( I beg their Pardon for my Plainness ) their Discourses upon it can be no wiser than are those Ingenious Verses , made to shew how rare a Thing Nothing is ; nor , indeed , so wise : For those Poets did this Ludicrously , to shew their Wit ; but these do it Seriously , and make account , that , in doing so , they shew their Skill and Wisdom ; which I must think is meer Folly .

35. The Notions of Genus , Species , Subject , Predicate , and generally of all Terms of Art which are not Fantastick , Logical Notions are Real ones . but wisely conducing to clear and range our Notions in Order , to gain Science , are Nothing but several Abstract Notions of the Thing , precisely considered according to some Manner of Being it has in our Understanding . For Animal and Homo are evidently Abstract or Inadequate Notions of Peter , taking him as he exists in Nature : But , when we call Animal a Genus , or , Homo a Species ; or , when , in this Proposition , [ Petrus est Homo , ] we say Petrus is the Subject , and Homo the Predicate , we speak of them precisely , as they exist in the Understanding ; For , in Nature , or out of the Understanding , there can be no Universals , but only Individuals , none else being determin'd to be This or That Ens , or capable of Existing : Nor can Propositions be any where , but in the Mind . Whereas , in the Understanding , the Notion of [ Animal ] is really larger , and that of [ Homo ] narrower ; which Artists call Genus and Species . And , in the foresaid Proposition , Petrus and Homo , which are its Parts , are as truly in our Mind the Subject and Predicate , as that Proposition it self is there ; or as the Thing , as existing in Nature , is White or Black .

36. This then is the Test to try all the Speculations made by Logicians , and other Reflecters or Artists , viz. The Test to try Artificial Notions . to examin whether they suit with , and are built on the Natures of the Things themselves , as they exist in our Mind ; that they conduce to order our Notions so , as may clear the Way to Science ; and that they be not meerly Impertinent and shallow grounded Fancies , as they too frequently are ; particularly , the * * See Method to Science , B. 1. L. 7. §. 13 , 14. Entia Rationis , which make such a Noise in the Schools .

Corollary II. Whence , upon the main , is clearly discovered , how all true Philosophy is nothing but the Knowledge Hence all Philosophy is Real Knowledge . of Things ; either as they have their Being in Nature , which is done by Direct Acts ; or else in the Understanding only , which are known by Reflex ones .

37. Besides those Impressions which cause our Direct and Reflex Acts , there are others which breed meer Whimsies How our Soul comes to have Phantastick Notions , or ( as we call them ) Fancies . coin'd by the Fancy , and are purely Chimerical . For our Fancy having Innumerable Effluviums , or Atomes in it , of many Sorts , which are oft-times agitated disorderly ; hence it comes , that it conjoins and imprints Incoherent Phantasms on the Seat of Knowledge , and so makes Apprehensions of them in our Minds ; such as are those of a Golden Earth , a Hircoceruus , an Elephant supporting the World , a Chimera , and such like . This most commonly happens in Dreams , conceited Prophesies , and Enthusiastick Revelations ; especially those caused by the Spleen . Nor is groundless Speculation , exempt from this Enormity . Generally this happens when our Thoughts are Unattentive to the Things in Nature , whose Direct Impressions keep our Fancy Orderly , and Firm. Now , there is little Harm in our apprehending those extravagant Connexions ; the Danger is , lest Speculaters , seduced by Imagination , do come to Judge that the Things are so in Nature as they fancy them ; which must necessarily fill their Minds with Caprichio's , and Frantick Conceits . The Ways to avoid these Inconveniences , How to avoid being deluded by them . are , First , To attend heedfully to the Direct Impressions from the Things without us ; and to examine whether the Connexion of those Fancies be agreeable to their Natures , or no. Secondly , To make Right and Strong Judgments concerning those common Notions we had from Nature , which keep our Thoughts and Discourses Steady and Solid ; especially , to keep an Attentive Consideration , that , as all these Notions came from the Thing , so they are still the Thing , conceiv'd according to somewhat that is in it ; and to take care we do not make them forget their Original , nor disown the Thing , from whence only , as being Modes meerly depending on it , they had any kind of Being at all ; nor , consequently , Intelligibility . Thirdly , To observe the Methodical Rules and Maxims of True Logick , which teach us how to distinguish our Notions exactly , and to keep them distinct , lest we blunder in our Discourses ; and which do withall shew us what are the Ways how to frame true Connexions , or right Judgments and Discourses . But , the last and best Means to keep us from being mis-led by Fancy , or following its Vagaries , is , the Study of Metaphysicks ; which , being built on the Highest , Steadiest and Clearest Principles , abstract from all Fancy , and will scarce ever permit those who who are well vers'd in it , to fall into Errour . And , let it be observ'd , that nothing in the World more perverts all true Science , than does the admitting those disorder'd Fancies because , being cleanly express'd , they have sometimes a Lively Appearance , for Solid Truths ; nay , laying them often for Grounds , and Self-evident Principles . This , this , I say , is the main Source of all Hypothetical Philosophy , and of all Erroneous Schemes of Doctrine , not grounded on the Natures of the Things ; which , therefore , must needs be , at best , Shallow , and Superficial ; and , if pursu'd home to their Principles , plain Nonsence , the usual and proper Effect of Ungovern'd Fancy .

38. Of those Things that do not come in by our Senses , as Bodies do , but are of a different or opposite Nature ; How we may discourse evidently of those Natures , of which we have no Proper Notions . of which therefore we can have no Notion but by joining a Negation to the Notion of Body , ( such as are Indivisible , Incorporeal , Immaterial , Immortal , and , in general , all Spiritual Things , and their proper Modes , ) we can have no proper Effluviums , or Phantasms , as is evident . Wherefore also , the Notions we have of them , and , consequently , the Words by which we express them , are all Improper , or Metaphorical ; which , if not reflected on , will breed Innumerable Errours . The best Notion we can frame of them , is that of Thing , with a Negation of Body , and of all the Modes of Body joined to it ; which does not so much tell us what it is , as what it is not ; or rather , it gives us a Blind , but Certain Knowledge of what kind of Nature it must be , because it tells us of what kind of Nature it cannot be ; the Differences which constitute that Nature , and its Opposite , being contradictory , which forces it to be either of the One or of the other . Yet this hinders not , but we may discourse consequently , or Scientifically , of those Things that connotate the Negation of Body , full as well as of the Bodies themselves : For , as we can conclude evidently from the Notion of Body , that it is Divisible , Changeable , Placeable , Moveable , thus or thus Qualify'd , &c. so we may conclude , with Equal Evidence , from the Notion of a Thing which is not a Body , that it is not Divisible , not Extended , not Moveable , not Placeable , not affected with any Physical Qualities , &c.

39. Lastly , As for the Notion we have of God , however the An Est of such a Supreme Being be many We can have no Proper Notion of GOD's Essence . ways Evident and Demonstrable ; yet the Notion of the Quid est of such a Being is the most Obscure that can be imagin'd . For , First , Since he must have Innumerable Perfections in his Nature , and the Notion we have of every ordinary Suppositum in Nature is therefore Confused , and Obscure , because it grounds many Notions which we cannot clearly conceive at once , or have a Distinct Apprehension of them ; it follows , that much less can the Divine Nature be clearly conceived by us in this State , which comprehends all the best Perfections found in the whole Universality of Creatures , and infinitely more . Secondly , 'T is yet harder to frame a Notion of a Being , in which those Innumerable Perfections are not found Single , but are all of them center'd in one most Simple , and most Uncompounded Formality ; which contains in it self eminently all the Excellencies that can possibly be conceived in Creatures , and Millions of times greater , and more . Thirdly , As we can have no Notion of a Created Spiritual Nature , but by a Negation of what 's Proper to Body ; so we can have no Notion of the Divine Nature , but by Denying of him all that belongs properly to the Natures of such a Body and Spirit both ; and by acknowledging them infinitely short of resembling , or even shadowing him . Lastly , We have no Notion , or Expression , that can sute with him ; no , not even the most Metaphysical ones . Ens includes Potentiality to Existence ; and , all Potentiality signifying Imperfection , must be utterly denied of him . Existence seems to come nearer ; yet , because it signifies a Formality supervening to Ens , as 't is Existent ; and so is , as it were , a kind of Compart , it cannot be Proper for his infinitely - Simple Being . And even Self-existence signifies a kind of Form or Mode of the Subject that Self-exists . So that we have no kind of Notion or Expression , that can perfectly agree to God's Infinite Essence ; but we are forc'd to content our selves to make use of sometimes one Attribute , sometimes another , that signifies some Perfection , with [ Infinite ] annex'd to it , which is not found in Creatures , or which is denied of them , or is Incommunicable to them . Whence comes that Maxim of the Mysticks , that God is better known by Negations , or by affirming he is none of those Positive Perfections we find in Creatures , than by applying any of our Positive Notions to him . And this is all we can do in this State , till Grace raising us up to Glory , we come to know his Divine Essence , as it is in its Self ; ( or , as we phrase it , See him Face to Face ; ) in contemplating which , consists our Eternal Happiness .

40. Thus much of our Notions , which we call the First Operations of our Understanding , and how they The Author speaks not here of Comparing Notions , or of Judgments . are caused in our Soul . How our Judging and Discoursing ( which are the other two ) are made in it , is shewn at large in the Second and Third Books of my Method to Science .

41. If any Learned Man is dis-satisfied with this Discourse , or has a mind to oppose it , I think I have Right to require of him two Things : The Author's Apology for this Discourse ; and what can be the only way to go about to confute it . First , That he would not object his own Fancies or Dis-like of it , or think that this is sufficient to invalidate it ; but , that he would go to work like a Man of Reason , and shew that This or That part of it does contradict Such and Such a Principle in Logick , Physicks , or Metaphysicks . This is the only Solid Way of Objecting , all other being but Empty Talk , and Idle Cavil . Next , I think I have Right to demand , ( since it is fundamentally necessary to Philosophy that this Point be clear'd , ) that he would set himself to frame some Orderly and Coherent Discourse of his own , built upon Evident Principles , how , or by what particular Means , the first Knowledge of the Things without us , comes into our Soul . In doing which , he will oblige the World very highly , and my self very particularly : And , unless he does this , he will be convinced to find fault with what himself cannot mend : Which will manifest that he either wants true Knowledge , or ( which is a far greater Defect ) Ingenuity .

PRELIMINARY Fifth .

Of the Proper and Genuine Signification of those Words which are of most use in Philosophy .

1. THE main Hindrance of Science , viz. The Mistake of Fancies for Realities , or of meer Similitudes The Design of the Author here . for Notions , being provided against ; the other Grand Impediment to true Knowledge , which is the taking Words , us'd in Philosophy , in an Ambiguous or wrong Sense , is to be our next Care . The Inconveniences which arise hence , and the ways how to detect and avoid Equivocation , are in my * * Book 1. Less . 11. Method discours'd of in common ; and I have here in my Second Preliminary clear'd also in common the Signification of all Abstract Words , and shewn , that they mean the thing it self , quatenus such or such ; or , according to such or such a Consideration of it as is express'd by that Word . My present Business , to which my Circumstances oblige me , is to clear , in particular , the Notion or Meaning of those most Important Words , which being made use of by Learned Men , and taken by them often-times in different Senses , do so distract them in their Sentiments ; and , by drawing their Intellectual Eye , now to one side , now to the other , make them so frequently miss the Mark while they aim at true Science . Not that my Intention in this Preliminary is , to pursue the Mistakes of others , but only to settle the True and Genuine Sense of such Words , to be applied afterwards to the Mis-accepters of them , as occasion requires ; tho' I may hint now and then some Abuses of them , that so I may the better clear their proper Signification .

2. I begin with [ Existence ] express'd by the Word [ is ] which is the Notion of the Thing , precisely consider'd The Meaning of the word [ Existence . ] as it is Actually Being . This is the most simple of all our Notions , or rather indeed the * * Method . 1. B. 1. L. 2. § 14. only Simple Notion we have , all the rest being but Respects to it . For , it has no kind of Composition in it , not even that Metaphysical one , of grounding divers Conceptions or Considerations of it , as all others have . Whence all Notions being , by their Abstraction , Distinct and Clear ; this most Abstracted Notion is so perfectly clear and self-evident , that , as it cannot need , so it cannot admit any Explication . They who go about to explain it , show themselves Bunglers , while they strive to approve themselves Artists . For , by telling us , that 't is Esse contra Causas , they put [ Esse , ] which is the Notion defin'd , in the Definition ; which is most absurd , and against all Art and Common Sense : Nay , they make it more obscure than it was before , by adding [ Extra Causas ] to it , which are less clear than it self was . By the Word [ Causes , ] I suppose , they mean Natural ones ; and so , tho' it gives no Clearness to the Signification of the Word [ Esse , ] yet it may at least consist with good Sense ; and may mean , that the Thing was , before , or while it was not yet produced , within the Power of those Causes , or in the State of Potentiality ; and that Existence is that Formality , or most formal Conception , by which the Thing is put out of that imperfect State , of having only A Power to be , and is reduced to the perfecter State of Actuality , or Actual Being .

3. As it is impossible to misconceive this self-evident Notion , so 't is equally impossible to mistake the meaning The Extreme Danger of Misconceiving it . of the word [ Existence ] which properly expresses that Notion ; for , if they take the word [ is ] to have any meaning , relating any way to the Line of [ Ens , ] or any Signification at all that is , of its Nature , purely Potential , they quite destroy it's Notion : And , if they take it , in any Sense , for an Actuality not belonging to the Line of Ens , they must necessarily take it to mean [ is not , ] there being no Third or other such Notion to take it for ; in the same manner , as if one takes not Ens to mean A Thing , he must take it to mean Nothing . Now , tho' the Goodness of Humane Nature , which abhors Contradiction , reclaims vehemently against such an unnatural Depravation of Common Sense , as to take [ is , ] while thus express'd , for [ is not ; ] yet , taking the meaning of the Word [ Existence ] as it is disguised by another Word , which is , by consequence , Equivalent to it ; those Deserters of Humane Nature , the Scepticks , do take occasion from the altering the Expression , to misapprehend even what is Self-evident . For 't is the same Sense , ( when we speak affirmatively ) to say a thing is True or Certain , as to say it is ; since nothing can be True or Certain that is not ; and , therefore , when these Men talk of Moral and Probable Truth , and Probable or Moral Certainty , which mincing Expressions mean [ possible not to be so ] they in effect say , that [ what is , may , whilst it is , possibly not be ; ] Which manners of Expression , tho' they may seem to some but a meer Unconcerning School-Speculation ; and Unreflecting Men may think it deserves no other Note , but that of being Ridiculous ; yet , I judge my self obliged to declare , that it is moreover most enormously Mischievous ; and that it quite perverts and destroys ( by a very immediate Consequence ) the Nature and Notion of all Certainty and Truth whatsoever , and of Being too ; and quite overthrows all possibility of Knowing any thing at all . Had they said [ I think it true or certain ] none would blame them ; rather 't is a Credit for such Men even to think heartily there is any Truth or Certainty at all in Philosophy ; but to joyn ( as they do ) Moral or Probable , to Truth and Certainty , as a kind of Mode affecting them , is to clap these most unconsociable Things , Light and Darkness , into one Dusky Compound , to abet Nonsense , and palliate Ignorance .

4. The Notion immediately next in order to Existence , as that which has the very least Potentiality that can be The meaning of [ Ens ] or [ Thing . ] in the Line of Being , is that of Ens , or Thing . Wherefore the meaning of that word can be no other but that of [ Capable to be ] for , no Created Thing has Actual Being , or Existence , in its Essential-Notion , but of its own Nature may be or not be ; as , besides what 's proved in my * * B. 3. L. 7. Method , is seen in the very Notion of Creature ; which signifies That which has its Being from Another ; which , therefore , can , of its self , be only Capable of Being . That the Notion of Ens is distinct from that of Existence is demonstrated * * Ibid. elsewhere , and is farther evident hence , that the Notion of what has Existence must be different from what 's had by it , or from Existence it self . All Mankind has this Notion of Thing in them ; for they experience that every Thing can exist , by seeing it does so ; and they know also they are not of themselves , whether they hold a first Being , or no ; because they do generally see that Causes produced them . Wherefore all that can be said , or thought of the word [ Ens ] is , that it signifies the Thing precisely , as 't is Capable of Being .

5. Whence follows , that the Abstract Terms , [ Entity ] or [ Essence ] do properly signify [ A Capacity of Being , ] The Meaning of [ Entity ] or [ Essence . ] which is the Abstract Term of [ Capable of Being . ] Tho' Entity is often us'd as a Concrete for the Thing it self . Moreover , Essence is the Total Form of Ens its Suppositum , or Subject , which adequately and intirely constitutes it such ; as Humanitas is the Total Form of Homo . I call it the Total Form , to distinguish it from the Partial Form of Body ; which , with the Matter , its compart , do compound the entire Notion , or Total Form of Corporeity .

6. To understand which more clearly we are to Note that the Notion and Signification of the word [ Matter ] The Meaning of [ Matter ] and [ Form ; ] or of [ Power ] and [ Act. ] signifies the Thing , or Body precisely , as it is a Power to be a Thing ; and Form signifies the same Thing , according to that in it which determins it to be a Thing Actually . We are to reflect too , that Power and Act , considered in the Line of Being , are the same as Matter and Form ; only the Former words are purely Metaphysical , because they express the parts of Ens as Ens ; in regard no other conceptions in the Line of Being can possibly be framed of a Body , but as it is Determinable , or Determinative , which are the very Notions of Power and Act ; whereas Matter and Form , tho' in Bodies they signify the same as the former , seem rather to incline to the parts of such an Ens , or Body , Physically consider'd .

7. To show literally what 's meant by this saying , that Matter and Form constitute the compleat Ens , or make What 's meant literally by the common saying , that Matter and Form compound Body . the Subject capable of Existing , I discourse thus . Nothing as 't is Indeterminate or Common to more can be ultimately Capable to be : v. g , neither a Man in Common , nor a Horse in Common , can possibly exist , but This Man , or This Horse : Whatever therefore does determin the Potentiality , or Indifferency of the Subject as it is Matter , or , which is the same , a Power to be of such or such a Nature , ( which is what we call to have such a Form in it ) does make it This or That , and , consequently , disposes it for Existence . Wherefore since the particular Complexion of the several Modes and Accidents do determin the Power or Matter , so as to make it Distinct from all others , it does by Consequence determin it to be This , and , so , makes it Capable of Existing ; that is , an Ens or Thing . I enlarge not upon this Point , because I have treated it so amply in the Appendix to my Method to Science .

8. Hence is seen what is , or can , with good Sense , be meant by that Metaphysical , or Entitative part called The Literal Meaning of Substantial or Essential Forms . by the Schools , the Substantial or Essential Form ; which they say , does , with the Matter , make up that compound Ens , call'd Body ; and that , in Literal Truth , it can be nothing else but that Complexion of the Modes , or Accidents , which conspire to make that peculiar or primigenial Constitution of every Body , at the first Instant of its being thus ultimately Determin'd to be This. For , this Original Temperature of the Mixt or Animal , being once settled by the Steady Concurrence of its Causes ; whatever Particles or Effluviums , or how many soever , which are Agreeable to it , do afterwards accrue to it , are so digested into , or assimilated , to its Nature , that they conserve , nourish and dilate , and not destroy it . Whereas , if they be of an opposit Nature , they alter it from its own temperature , and in time quite destroy and corrupt it . To explicate which more fully , let us consider how the Causes in Nature , which are many times of a Different , sometimes of a Contrary Temper to the Compound , do work upon a Body ; and how they make ( as they needs must ) preternatural Dispositions in it ; till , when those Disagreeable Alterations arrive to such a pitch , as quite to pervert the former Complexion of Accidents , which we call its Form ; a new Form , or new Complexion succeeds , determining the Matter to be Another Thing ; till it self also , wrought upon in the same Manner , comes to be Corrupted , and so makes way for a New Off-spring . To which , in the very Instant it is ultimately Determined to be This , the First Being , whose overflowing Goodness stands ever ready to give his Creatures all that they are Disposed or Capable to have , does , with a steady Emanation of Being , give his Peculiar Effect , Existence .

Corollary . The Reason why our Moderns do so oppose Substantial or Essential Forms , are reduced to two Heads : The Reason why some Moderns oppose Substantial or Essential Forms . First , Because they conceited the Form was a kind of Distinct Thing , or at least a part of a Thing Supervening to the Marter , its Compart , and Compounding the Ens , after that gross manner as Two Things in Nature do Compound a Third : Whereas , in reality , they are nothing but divers Notions or Considerations of the Thing , formally , as it is a Thing . Wherefore , to say , a Body is Compounded of Matter and Form , is no more , in Literal Truth , than to say that there can be no more Considerations of a Body , taken formally , as it is a Thing ; or taking it in the Line of Ens precisely , but of a Power to become such a Thing ; and of the Act or Form , Determining that Power : However the Thing may have in it what grounds the Notions of many Modes or Accidents ; which are also the Thing materially , tho' not Formally according to the Notion of Ens. Nor let any object , that this is to maintain that Things are compounded of Notions , as some may mis-understand us ; for , let it be remember'd ( as is demonstrated above , ) that the Notion is the very Thing , as it is in our Understanding , according , or as far as it is conceiv'd by us ; that is , 't is the very Thing , partially Consider'd . The other Reason which the Moderns had for this Mis-conceit , was , because the Schools generally explain'd themselves very ill , by making a new Entity of every different Conception ; not comprehending well the Difference between Metaphysical Composition and Divisibility , and The Meaning of Metaphysical Composition and Divisibility . Physical , or rather Artificial ones ; such as Apothecaries use when they put many Ingredients into a Pill ; or Carpenters , when of Many divers Materials they compound a House ; which is the applying , outwardly or inwardly , more Things ( properly so called ) together : Whereas Metaphysical Divisibility is never reduced to Act , but by our Understanding framing Distinct or Abstract Notions of one and the same Thing . And Metaphysical Composition is no more , but that there is found in the Thing ( though Physically and Entitatively one , and uncompounded ) what grounds those distinct Notions ; which being but divers Respects or Considerations , it follows , that the Thing in Nature may , without any Contradiction , ( or Possibly , ) be Chang'd according to One of them , and not according to Another .

9. Hence , Lastly , is clearly seen what is the Principle of Individuation , about which there have been such warm What is the Principle of Individuation . Disputes , viz. That 't is nothing but that Comploxion of Modes or Accidents , which make up the peculiar Constitution of a Body at the first Instant of its being such an Ens or This , as is explicated at large , § 8. by which 't is , consequently , fitted for such a particular Operation in Nature .

10. Ens or Thing has many other Names , tho' all of them less proper . As , First , [ Substance , ] which , coming from The Meaning of the word [ Substance . ] The word Improper . the Verb [ Substare , ] respects only its Modes and Accidents , and not what concerns its self , or its own Order or Capacity to Existence . Wherefore , 't is very Improper ; and , unless the common Usage of it make some Amends for the Impropriety of the Expression , certainly it is most highly Unfit . Aristotle calls it 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , which coming from 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , keeps it within the Line of Being . As I remember Boetius was the first who render'd 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 by Substantia . The Schools either us'd it in Imitation of him , or else they took it up when they were to treat of the Ten Predicaments ; and , Nature instructing them that the last Nine had no Order to Being in their Signification ; and so , as taken in their peculiar Notions , could not exist alone , without needing a kind of Support ( as it were : ) hence they call'd this Support , by a Name suitable enough to their Thoughts , Substance ; and the others , that had not Being in their Notion , and so had no Title to Being by their own Merits , or to uphold themselves in being , Accidents ; of the Impropriety of which Word more hereafter . I wish there were no worse in it ; and that , they did not fancy all those abstract Notions , which are only the Thing in part , to have in them the Notion of Things too , or to be so many Intire Things ; tho' they were Feebler and the other Stronger . However it were , they went to work Illogically : For , they should have considered , that all of them ( taking them as they were Distinct from the Notion of Thing ) could be nothing but several Conceptions of ours , or ( which is the same ) the Thing as diversly considered ; and then they might have easily reflected , that we could not ( in general ) have more Conceptions than those of Res and Modus Rei ; that is , of the Thing , and of the several Manners how a Thing is ; which would have clear'd this Truth to them , that the Manner or the How a Thing is , is nothing without the Thing , as is deduced formerly . However , the Word [ Substantia ] with a sound Explication , may pass , since Use will have it so ; and will do little Harm , so it be but rightly understood to mean what we properly call Ens , Res , or Thing .

11. On this Occasion , 't is my Opinion , that both Mr. Locke and my self should not be too severe against the Modern That the words [ Supporting ] and [ Inhering ] taken metaphorically , may be allow'd , and ought not to be Ridicul'd . School-men , for using the Words [ Substantia ] and [ Inhaerentia ; ] or , as he ingeniously ridicules it , [ Sticking-on and underpropping . ] The manner how the Thing and its Modes do relate to one Another ; being only found in our Mind , and according to the Being they have there ( for out of it there is no Distinction at all of the Thing from its Modes ) is Spiritual ; and so , can no other way be express'd , but metaphorically ; and our selves do and must , in such a case , frequently use such Metaphors to express our Conceptions ; which a Critick might banter sufficiently , by taking them Literally . Indeed , if those School-men did understand them in that crude Literal Sense , ( as I fear many of them did ) from which Apprehension , I believe , his Zeal against them proceeded , they deserve to be the Sport and Laughter of all Men of Sense ; for I know nothing else they are good for . Now the Truth is , there is a kind of Natural Order in our Notions , tho' taken from the same Thing ; so that we have the Notion of Res or Thing antecedently ( in Priority of Nature ) to Modus Rei , or the Accidents ; and we conceive the Mode or Manner to presuppose the Notion of the Thing , and to have no Being but as it is in it and affects it . Whence , being conceiv'd to be in it , and to have no Being by any other means , we may , by a Metaphor not much strain'd , say it does , as it were , Inhere in it ; and that the Thing supports its Modes in their Being . Nor will it do us any Harm loqui cum vulgo , to speak as vulgar Philosophers use ; provided we do Sentire cum doctis , or make wiser Judgments of the Literal Sense of those Words , than they perhaps ever meant .

12. The word [ Suppositum ] is another Name of Ens or Thing , in a manner , ( tho' not altogether ) the same The meaning of Suppositum or Hypostasis . with Substance . For [ Substance ] is , I conceive , meant for the Essential Notion of the Thing , as it is contradistinguisht from Accidental , or Unessential ones ; and Suppositum does , over and above , relate also to the very Nature of the Thing , ( or to the Complexion of Accidents which constitutes its Essence ) and not only to the Modes , as each of them singly is a meer Accident , and had Being by it or in it . Whence the Notion of Suppositum is the most Confused of any other ; and signifies that which has all the Forms in it Whatever , whether they be Essential ones or Accidental ; and not only those Modes ( or Accidents ) which naturally belong'd to it at first as Properties , ( or inseparable Accidents ) but those also which accru'd to it since , and are meerly Accidental to it .

13. Hence there can be no difficulty in the meaning of the word [ Suppositality ] which is the Abstract of the The Meaning of [ Suppositality . ] Suppositum : For , it signifies manifestly the Thing according to the precise Notion of the Suppositum , or of what has all the aforesaid Forms in it : How agreeable this discourse is to Christian Language and Principles , will easily appear to Solid Divines .

14. The word [ Individuum ] which is another name of Ens , us'd by the Learned , and , as is seen in those usual The Meaning of the word [ Individuum . words [ the same Individual thing , ] is got into our vulgar Language , is a Logical Expression ; distinguishing the Notion of a Particular , ( only which is properly a Thing ) from the Generical and Specifical Notions ; in regard both these latter do bear a Division of their Notions into more Inferiour ones ; and so , that each of the Inferior ones contains the whole Superiour Natures in it which the others do signify ; as the whole Definiton , Notion or Nature of an [ Animal ] or of [ a Sensitive Living Thing ] is found in Man , and also in Brutes ; and the whole Definition or Notion of Man , is found in Socrates and Plato . But , the particular Natures of Socrates and Plato ( which are signify'd by those words ) and their Definitions , could they bear any , cannot be divided into more which have the particular Natures of Socrates and Plato in them : And , therefore they are called Individuums ; that is , such as cannot be divided into more , which have the Natures signified by those words in them , as could the Generical and Specifical Notions of Animal and Homo ; whence Individuums are the Lowest and Narrowest Notion that can possibly be in the Line of Ens.

15. The Individuum , is call'd by the Latin Schools [ Substantia prima ] and the Superiour Notions in the The Meaning of [ Substantia Prima ] and [ SubstantiaSecunda ] Line of Ens. [ Substantiae Secundae ] which signifies that only Individuums are in propriety of Speech Entia or Capable of Existing ; For , since , ( as was shown above ) nothing that is Common or Undetermined can exist , none of the others can have any Actual being at all but in the Individuum , as a kind of Metaphysical Part of its Intire Notion ; and a Part ( in what Sense soever that word be taken ) can not possibly be but in the whole . If this then be their meaning , as I believe it is , nothing can be more true and Solid . Only I must note that it is less properly and less Logically exprest ; and that Aristotle speaks more exactly when he calls the Former 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , or primò Substantia , and the latter 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , or Secundò Substantia ; which words denote , that the former is Ens in its Primary and Proper signification of that word , and the latter only Analogically , that is in a Secondary and improper Sense ; which prima and Secunda Substantia do not express : For , both these may be properly Entia still , for any thing those words tell us , tho' one of them may have an Order of Priority to the other as Prima and Secunda ; in some such Sense as we call God the Primum Ens , considering him in order to Creatures .

16. From Words used by Philosophers which belong to the Line of Ens , we come to those which are made The Word [ Accidents ] is improper . use of to express the Modes or Manners how a Thing is ; which , in a generall Appellation , the Schools have call'd Accidents . This Word is , certainly , very improper : For , who can think that Quantity or ( as they will needs call it ) Extension , is Accidental to Body , or ( as some may take that Equivocal Word ) that 't is but by Chance , or by Accident , that Bodies have any Bigness in them at all ? The best Sense I can give it , in pursuance to my own Grounds , is this , that [ Accidental , ] which is the Denominative from [ Accident , ] may mean such Notions as are Not Essential ; or ( which is the same ) they may mean the Thing consider'd as to that in it which has no ways any Order to Being , nor expresses any such Order by the Word which signifies its Notion . And , were this Sense universally accepted , and attributed to the Word [ Accidents , ] it would be a True and Solid one : For , 't is evident , that none of the Words that signifie any of those Accidents , does in the least import in its Signification either Being , or any Respect or Order to it , as does Ens , and all those Words which do formally and properly express it , or belong to it . Whence the Notions signify'd by such Words , are not Essential ones , or relating properly and precisely to the Essence ; but Modish , ( as we may term it , ) or expressing some Manner [ How ] the Thing is ; which is a quite different Notion from that of Ens , or Thing , or of what formally is found in that Line . I do believe that divers of the Wisest , and most Learned School-men did take the Word [ Accidents ] in this Sense , tho' the Propriety of that Word , fetch'd from its Radix , did not invite , much less oblige them to do so . I doubt also , that the Usage of that Word in that warrantable Sense I have now assign'd , was not so Common , and universally Current , even among the School-men , as to force it to bear that Sense ; as appears by their thinking that Accidents were certain kinds of little Adventitious Entities ; much less among the Modern Ideists ; who ( through their Shortness in Logick and Metaphysicks ) do make Quantity , or Extension , the Essential Form of Body ; which is , to put Bigness in the Line of Being ; or , to make Bigness and Being , or the Mode and the Thing , to be in the same Line of Notions , and Intrinsecal to one another : Whereas , a Thing must first be conceiv'd to be , e'er it can be after such a Mode , or Manner .

17. For the Reason lately given , I cannot but judge , that the Word [ Mode , ] or ( as some call it ) [ Modification , ] The Word [ Mode ] more proper . is far more proper than the Word [ Accidents , ] to signifie those last Nine Common Heads of our Natural Notions , Which Impartiality of mine , on this , and other Occasions , giving some Advantage to the Cartesians , and other Moderns , over other Philosophers , who call themselves Aristotelians , will , I hope , obtain their good Opinion of me , that I do sincerely follow my best Reason , and not Pique or Prejudice , while I oppose them in other Things : And I am sure , 't is my own Reason I ought to follow , till clearer Reasons of theirs shew mine to be none ; which I have no Reason to fear ; for , I hope , it will appear to every Acute and Ingenuous Examiner , that no Writer ever distinguish'd his Notions more Exactly and Clearly , or Connected them more Closely and Immediately .

18. The Primary Mode of all those Things we converse with , or Bodies , is call'd Quantity . This Word is very The Word [ Quantity ] is very Proper . Proper , and fully Significant ; for , all the Bodies in Nature have some Quantity or Bigness in them , more or less : Nay , even the least Atome , or Effluvium , that can be conceiv'd , has Bigness in it , as well as the greatest Body , nay , as the whole World ; tho' not so much , or so great a Degree of it . Wherefore , this Word [ Quantity ] is Comprehensive ; and so , fit to signifie the Commonest Affection of Body : But , this is not enough ; 't is withal , very Simple , or Uncompounded : Moreover , the Word it self has , on its side , no kind of Equivocalness , taking it as it is applied to Body in Common ; which Requisites are not found in any other Word used by us , to express that Mode . Only we are to note , that Bigness , or Bulk , is only proper to Body , as it has in it all the three Dimensions ; whereas , Quantity reaches to how Long , or how Broad , as well as how Thick : And therefore Quantity is absolutely the properest Word to express this Primary Mode : However , it is much neglected by our Moderns , who are grown strangely fond of Extension .

19. The Word [ Extension ] is very improper to signifie it : For , Extension properly denotes the Action of Extending ; The Word [ Extension ] very improper . to which is directly opposit , in our usual Speech , that Action , call'd Contraction . Or , if it be taken for the being Extended , still its proper Signification must be a Passion caus'd by the Action of Extending ; which cannot sute with that Simple and Primary Mode we call Quantity ; which is Naturally Antecedent to , and Independent of those Subsequent Modes called Action , and Passion . Again , All Intrinsecal Modes are conceiv'd to be certain kinds of Forms affecting Body , as their Subject ; and Forms are very ill express'd by a Substantive deriv'd from a Verb ; and by such an one especially , as must necessarily ( at least ) Connotate Action or Passion , if it does not rather directly , or most properly signifie them . Moreover , let them take Extension , Stretching out , or Exporrection how they will , still Common Sense teaches us , that we may take Contraction or Straitning in the same manner as they do it : Whence follows , that if Extension means or implies Impenetrability of Parts , Contraction must mean Penetrability of Parts ▪ Which Notion none of us will admit to have any Ground in Nature , tho' the Maxim tells us , that [ Contraries are employ'd about the same Subject . ] Now , the Word [ Quantity ] is not entangled with any of these Inconveniences , but freed from them all , as will appear to any Sober Reflecter . And , on this Occasion , I beg Leve of our Ideists , to tell them , that it is not safe , nor prudent , to leave off an Old and us'd Word , till they are sure they have found Another which is better , or more proper . Cartesius made choice of [ Extension ] wittily , that he might thus more cleaverly bring all Physicks to Mathematicks ; and others ( perhaps , ut est Natura hominis , fond of a Novelty ) follow'd him unadvisedly ; tho' they were not guilty of any such Design of their own , or aware of his . And I am sorry Mr. L. affects only the Improper Word [ Extension , ] and quite neglects that more Proper Word [ Quantity . ]

20. Many other Names , at least Attributes , are given to Quantity ; such as are Divisibility , Impenetrability , Space , The Meaning of Divisibility , Impenetrability , Space , and Measurability . and Measurability ; the former of which signifies it in Order to Natural Action and Passion , and respects properly the Parts into which it may be divided ; or , which is the same , its Potential Parts ; in which , perhaps , the Nature of Quantity would be found to Consist , were I here to treat of the Nature of those Modes , and not only of the Names us'd in Philosophy . Impenetrability properly signifies such an Order or ( as it were ) Situation of those Parts , as that one of them is without , and not within another ; which grounds that Secondary Notion , which some do improperly call Extension ; and Extension or Quantity , if of any considerable largeness in respect of the Body it contains , is call'd Space ; which differs from the Notion of Place in this , that Place ( if properly such ) is just as much Quantity as contains the Thing placed , and has a respect to some determinate and known Points : Whereas Space has not in its Notion to be adjusted to the Body that is in it , not restrain'd to any set Distance . So that Space is Place at large , and Place is Space restrain'd . Measurability grounds the Reckoning or Computing how many of such a Standard of Quantity as we had design'd in our Thoughts , would , if repeated , equal the whole of which we intend to take a Survey .

21. Now , Quantity being the most Common of all Corporeal Modes , and which Antecedes and grounds all the A Short Explication , what Quantity , Quality , and Relation are . others , it cannot , for that very Reason , be properly defin'd ; so that ( as Mr. Locke acutely observ'd ) we know such things before we are ask'd , better than we do after ; for the Asking puzzles our Natural Thoughts , which were Clear enough before of themselves ; and Reflexion , which , when there is occasion , is wise , and enlightens us , does but serve to blunder us when there is no need or occasion for it . Notwithstanding , I have , in my Method , endeavour'd to give it some kind of Explication , by differencing it from all other Intrinsecal Modes , ( which are its Genus , as it were , or rather , a Transcendent Notion to all such Accidents , ) in this , that it tells How the Thing is , according to some Common Consideration , in which All Things we converse with do agree . By which 't is distinguish'd from Quality , which acquaints us How a Thing is as to what respects its own peculiar Nature ; and from Relation , which expresses how one Individuum respects another Individuum . But this ( as was said ) is out of my present Business in this Preliminary , which is only to shew what Names are Proper , or Improper ; and not to treat of the particular Nature of each Mode , of which I have , in their due places , sufficiently discours'd in my Method .

22. These , as far as occurrs to my Memory , are the Chiefest Words used by Philosophers , whose Proper or What [ Transcendents ] are . Improper Acception has most Influence upon the Advancement or Hindrance of Science . Notwithstanding , there are others far more Equivocal than any of the rest , called Transcendents , or Words Applicable to all , or many of the Common Heads of our Natural Notions ; which are hardest of all to explicate , as wanting any Common Genus , or any thing like it , to explicate them by . I intended once to dilate upon them in this Preliminary , as being a Subject very worthy of our Reflexion , and yet scarce treated on by any as they deserve : But , seeing , upon Review , how Prolix I have been already in my Preliminaries , I am forced to content my self with Noting them in short ; leaving it to others to enlarge upon them . They are these , distributed into their several Ranks .

23. First , Ens , taken , in its whole Latitude , for the Thing , and its Modes . Secondly , The Properties of Ens , taken in The Five Sorts of Transcendents . that large Signification ; such as are Unum , Verum , Bonum , and their Opposites , Non-Unum , or Divisum , Falsum , and Malum . For , the Notions of all the Modes being improperly Entia , have , by Consequence , only improper Essences , or Entities of their own ; and , consequently , Properties of those Improper Essences . Thirdly , Idem , Diversum , and , in general , Relatum ; taking this last Word in the largest Sense , for all kinds of Respects whatsoever . In which Signification , all Things , or properly called Entia , do relate to Existence ; and all their Modes or Accidents do respect them diversly , as certain Manners how they are . Of which Nature also are the aforesaid Common Words , [ Mode , ] and [ Accident , ] which are Transcendents in respect of the Nine last Predicaments . Fourthly , Completum , Incompletum , Partial and Total , Generical and Specifical , Superior and Inferior , Simple and Compound , and such like . Most of which kind of Transcendents seem rather to respect the Manner of Being which Things have in our Understanding , than the Manner of Being they have out of it . Of the last Sort are , Which , What , That which , Something , Somewhat , &c. which are the most Confused Words imaginable , and signifie any Notion , but that of meer Nothing . By these we make a Bastard or Illegitimate Definition of Ens ; and say , that a Thing is [ That which is capable of Existing , &c. ] I call it an Illegitimate or Improper Definition , because the Notion of the Genus ( which is one part of a proper one ) has a Determinate Sense : Whereas [ That which , ] which , for want of a better , supplies the place of the Genus , has none . For ,

'T is to be noted , that in all Transcendents , ( unless ▪ perhaps , some of those of the Fifth Sort , which have a kind of blind , Confused Sense , ) the Name only is Common or Applicable to more , and not the Notion ; for , having no one Notion that is Common to all those Common Heads , they have none till it be Determin'd ; since no Notion can exist in the Mind , unless it be This , or That , or one , any more than a Thing can exist in Nature , unless it be determin'd to be such a Particular or Individual Thing . Much less has any of them proper Differences , dividing them by more and less of the Common Notion , as every Notion that is truly Common to more , may , and must have .

23. Whence extreme Care must be taken , how Students in Philosophy do use these Transcendent Words ; and Great Care to be had , that Transcendent Words be not held Univocal . that they do distinguish their Sense most exactly , when they have Occasion to make use of them . For , they having an Indifferency to many Senses , and those as vastly disparate as the Common Heads themselves are ; that is , ( as the Schools properly phrase it ) Senses differing toto Genere , ( I may add , Generalissimo ) it must follow , that every time they do use them confusedly , or with a Conceit that they are Univocal , their Discourse must needs straggle widely , now one way , now another , and thence confound all our Commonest Notions , which , of all others , ought to be kept Distinct ; the want of doing which , hinders all Coherence or Connexion of Terms , in which only Science consists , and breeds innumerable , and most Enormous Errours . It would be tedious , I doubt , to my Readers , tho' perhaps not hard for me , to show what Prodigious Inconveniences do arise from the Mis-acceptions of one of those many Different Senses such Words may bear , for Another , I will only bring one Instance ; hoping that by this , as by a Sea-mark , my Readers may avoid the Shoals and Rocks of Errors in other like Occasions .

25. The Word [ Compounded ] may either mean the Composition of Matter with its Essential Form ; or , that of the What great Errors spring thence shown in the Univocal Acception of the Transcendent word [ Compounded . ] Essence with its Suppositum , which is conceived to have the Essence in it : or , of the Superiour Notions of Ens with the Individuum ; All which are Compositions belonging to the Line of Ens. Coming next to the Modes or Accidents , the whole Ens or Suppositum may be considered as Compounded with its Primary Mode called Quantity ; or with some Quality , or Relation . Or , with some Action or Passion , Time , Place , Situation , or Habit. Whence accrues to the Subject the Denominations of Agent , Patient , Living , or being at such a time , or in such a Place , Sitting , Armed , &c. All which Nine last Compositions are Modifying or Accidental ones , and not Essential , or such as concern directly and precisely the Notion of Thing or Being , as did those of the first sort . Now come Cartesius and his Followers , who , loath to say the Body and Soul are two Suppositums ; and , wanting Skill in Metaphysicks to comprehend what the Union of Entitative Parts is , or how made , ( which are Points too hard for Mathematicians , and of which de la Forge , tho' he talks prettily , can make nothing at all ) they would have the Soul and Body compound One Thing , because they Act together , or assist one another mutually to produce some sorts of Actions . Whereas Action being only a Mode , and so presupposing the Res , or Thing , which it modifies , can only determin and denominate its Subject to be Acting ; and therefore Joint-acting can only constitute and denominate the Soul and Body Co-Acters ; which is a vastly disparate Notion from the Constituting and Denominating them One Thing , as common Sense informs us . We will put an Instance : My Hand and my Pen do both of them concur to the Action of Writing , and so compound one Joint-Acter ; nay , they depend mutually on one another as to the producing this Action : For the Hand cannot write without the Pen , nor the Pen without the Hand : Besides , they are in some sort fitted to one another , in order to perform this Action ; for , the Fingers are so fram'd , as to hold and guide the Pen very commodiously ; and the Pen ( taking in its Handle and the Nib-end too ) is fitted very commodiously to be held and guided by my Hand , so as to draw the Letters such as they ought to be . Lastly , which is much more , and a Parallel very agreeable to the Co-action of Soul and Body , they both of them do modifie each other's Action . For , the best Scrivener writes but scurvily with a Bad Pen , and the Best Pen writes but scurvily in an unskilful Hand . And yet the Hand and the Pen are not one Jot the nearer being one Thing , notwithstanding their Concurrence to this Joint-Action ; tho' it be qualify'd with Mutuality , Fitness of the Co-Agents , and the Modification which the Action receives from both of them jointly , and each of them severally . Besides , they put the Cart before the Horse , while they pretend that the Acting as one Thing is to make them one-Thing . For since the Res is , in Priority of Nature and Reason , before Modus rei ; and Being before Acting ; and that nothing can Act otherwise than it is ; 't is Evident from plainest Principles , and even from the very Terms , that they must first Be one Thing , e'er they can Act as one Thing , or Be such a Compound , before they can Act as such a Compound . And so , the Point sticks where it was , viz. How the Soul and Body come to be thus Compounded into one Ens ; of which I have given some Account , Preliminary 4. § 8 , 9 , 10 , 13.

26. On this Occasion I cannot but Reflect , that the Cartesians were very Unadvised to meddle with such a Point , The Cartesians unadvis'd , in going ultra Crepidam as puts them quite past their Mathematicks ; as likewise , that tho' they have fram'd a Logick or Method suitable to explicate their Mathematical Philosophy , yet they are but very bad Distinguishers of our Natural Notions into Common Heads , which is one Principal Part of true Logick ; as appears by their rambling so irregularly from one to the other , as has been shewn elsewhere , in their making Extension or Quantity , which is a Mode , the Form which is Essential to their First Matter ; and here , in putting Composition according to the Notion of Action , to be Composition according to the Notion of Ens. And whoever impartially Examins the Distribution of their Notions into Heads , will find it not to be such as Reason naturally forced , ( as ours is , ) but such as Design voluntarily and ingeniously invented .

REFLEXIONS ON Mr. LOCKE's ESSAY CONCERNING Humane Understanding .

REFLEXION First , ON The FIRST BOOK .

1. THIS Book gives me little Occasion to make any Reflexions , but such as I The Excellent Wit , and Unbyassed Ingenuity of the Author of the Essay acknowledged . must be forced to make through his whole Essay ; which is , on the Penetrative and clear Wit , and happy Expression of its Author , in his pursuing the Design which he had prefix'd to himself . I could wish , indeed , that he had thought fit to take his Rise higher , or ( to speak more properly ) had laid his Grounds deeper . But , it is to be expected , that every Author should write according to those Thoughts or Principles with which the Casual Circumstances of his fore-past Life had imbu'd him , or as his Natural Genius leads him . His steering such an Impartial Mean between Scepticism and Dogmatizing , does certainly argue a very even Temper of Judgment , and a Sincere Love of Truth . And , I shall hope , that , whoever peruses attentively my Method , ( B. 1. Less . 2. from §. 5. to §. 11. ) will discern that I have so exactly measur'd out the Pitch of Knowledge attainable by us in this State , that I am as little a Friend to Over-Weening , as I profess my self a Declar'd Enemy to Scepticism .

2. I am a little apprehensive , from some Words in his Introduction , expressing his Dis-like that Men 'T is Probable he has taken a Prejudice against Metaphysicks . let loose their Thoughts into the vast Ocean of Being ; and his Conceit that this brings Men to Doubts and Scepticism , that he has taken a Prejudice against Metaphysicks ; whose proper Object is , those Notions of the Thing which abstract from Matter and Motion , and concern Being only . Were I assur'd that I did not mistake him , I would , for his sake , enlarge on that Point , and display fully the Excellency of that most Solid , most Clear , and most Incomparable Science ; which I shall only touch upon at present , by giving my Reader a Summary of its Principal Objects .

3. It treats of the Formal or Essential Parts of Physical Entities , or Bodies , in Common , and in Specie ; Of the Essential The Incomparable Excellency of the Science of Metaphysicks , shewn from the Objects it treats of . Unity and Distinction of them , and whence 't is taken ; particularly , of the Essential Constituents of Elements , Mixts , Vegetables and Animals ; and when , and how , they come to be Essentially , or Individually Chang'd : Thence , advancing to the Chief Animal , Man , he treats of his Form , the Soul , and of its Proper Action : Of the Superior Part of it , the Mind ; and , of its Progress towards its last End , or its Declension from it . Thus far demonstrated , it proceeds to treat of the Separation of the Soul from the Body ; and , to shew evidently its Immateriality , and , consequently , its Immortality . Of the Science of a Soul separated , and the Eminency of her Acts in that State , above what she had in the Body ; and , lastly , of the Felicity and Infelicity connaturally following out of her Actions here , and the Good or Bad Dispositions found in her at her Separation ; as also , of the Immutability of her Condition afterwards . It treats of the Notion or Nature of Existence , and how 't is Accidental or Unessential to the Natures of every Created Being ; and thence demonstrates a First Being , or a God , to whom 't is Essential to be ; that is , whose Nature is Self-Existence . Whence follows , by necessary Consequence , that his Nature is Infinitely Pure or Simple , Eternal , Infinitely Perfect and Immutable , All-knowing , Willing ever what 's most Wise , and therefore most Free in all his Actions ; and that the Divine Essence is Unconceivable by any Notion we can frame or have of it ; and Unexpressible by any Name we can give it which is Proper , and not most highly Metaphorical . Lastly , It demonstrates , there are Pure Spiritual Beings , which have no Matter or Potentiality in them , call'd Intelligences , or Angels ; and likewise , ( in Common , ) of their Number , Distinction , and Subordination ; as also , of their Proper Operations , both Internal and External .

4. These , and such as these , are the Objects proper to that Supream Science , Metaphysicks ; which any Man And from the Manner by which it handles them . of Sense would think ought to make it deserve the Esteem of the Best , and most Elevated Portion of Mankind ; and not to be ridicul'd by Drollish Fops , who turn all they understand not into Buffoonery . All these high Subjects it treats of , I say , if possible , ( as I believe it is , ) with more Close , more Necessary , and more Immediate Connexion , than the Mathematicks can pretend to ; since the Evidence and Certainty of the Principles of this Science ( as also of Logick ) do depend on , are subordinate to , and are borrow'd from the Principles of the other ; which is the Sovereign and Mistress of all other Sciences whatever .

5. It will , I doubt not , be apprehended , that such High Knowledges are above our reach , and Impossible to be The Knowledge of these high Objects attainable by Natural Reason . attain'd by us , in this State . They are , indeed , above Fancy ; and , I believe , this Objection is made by Fancy , or by Men attending to the Resemblances of Fancy , which fall short of representing to us such Sublime Objects . But , why they should be above our Reason , I cannot imagin ; or , why they should be deem'd so Mysterious , as not to be Knowable without a Divine Revelation . It is manifest , that we can have Abstract Notions of Existence , Thing , Immaterial , Incorporeal , Knowledge , Will , Operation , &c. that is , we can Consider the Common Subject [ Thing ] as Existent , Capable of Being , and ( if it be a Spirit ) as Immaterial , Incorporeal , Knowing , Willing , and Operating , &c. as well as Mathematicians can a Body , as Extended , Round , or Triangular , &c. And , then , I would know why we cannot , by attentive Consideration , and due Reflexion on those Things , as thus conceiv'd by us , frame a Science grounded on the Things thus apprehended , as well as Mathematicians can upon a Body consider'd as grounding their proper Objects ; or , as grounding their Notions of such and such Modes of Quantity ; such as are the Degrees , Proportions , or Figures of it . Let us not Blaspheme in our Thoughts the Bounty of Infinite Goodness . It was the Devil's first Calumny against God , that he envy'd Manking Knowledge : Let not us carry it on , by entertaining such an unworthy Conceit of Essential Goodness ; but , dispose our selves by seeking a Right Method to Knowledge , and pursuing it with Industrious Study , and we may be Certain of Success . While I was writing my Method to Science , the Attempt to shew the Reason all along , for such Notions as were taken from the Thing , according to the manner of Being it had in my Understanding , and , therefore , was to be carried through with perpetual Reflexion on the Things there , did appear so discouraging , that I was sometimes half sorry I had undertaken it : But I saw the World needed it , and knew all Truths were Connected , and therefore was confident of God's Assistance in such a necessary and useful Occasion . Indeed , Providence has left us no Means to know what is done in the Moon , or other Stars , ( tho' , perhaps , they are as busie there , as we are in this Sublunary Planet , the Earth , ) because it is not to our purpose to know such Things . But , whoever considers those Metaphysical Objects , will , at first sight , discover how Useful the Knowledge of them is , both in regard of their Influence upon all Inferior Sciences , and to raise us to Contemplation ; as also , to Explicate , Establish , Defend and Comfort Christian Faith . For , there is a Gradation of Truths , as well as a Connexion of one Truth with another . The Natural are Foundation-Stones , To bear the Supernatural ones ; Which , tho' they to Heaven's Top aspire , 'T is the same Ground , rais'd Stories higher . Bless'd Soul ! which , to the Throne Divine , Winds it self up by its own Line !

All these high Encomiums of Metaphysicks , if it shall please God to protract my Span of Life some few Inches longer , I doubt not but to shew , are no more but its just Due ; and , amongst the rest , its Clearest Demonstrative Evidence and Certainty : Particularly , that the Study of that Science is so far from increasing Doubts , or leading to Scepticism , ( as , perhaps , Mr. L. may apprehend , ) that , on the Contrary , the Knowledge of it is the most effectual Means imaginable to settle all Doubtfulness , and to Convert or Confound the greatest Scepticks .

6. Mr. Locke's Tenet of no Innate Notions , nor , consequently , Innate Principles , does perfectly agree with my Sentiments ; Mr. Locke's Tenet of no Innate Ideas , Solidly Grounded , and Unanswerable . both as to the Thesis it self , and the Reason for it ; which is , that God has laid Connatural Causes , to give us our Notions ; and , therefore , it did not become his Sovereign Wisdom to do such a needless Action , as to ingraft them by his own Hand immediately . Besides which , that Judicious Author Accumulates so many other Pregnant and Solid Reasons , to fix that Position of ours in an Immoveable Certainty , that I see not but it may , for the future , deserve the Repute of An Establish'd and Leading Maxim in Philosophy .

REFLEXIONS ON THE SECOND BOOK .

REFLEXION Second , ON The First CHAPTER .

1. I Agree perfectly with this Learned Author , That our Observation employ'd either about External Sensible Objects , or about the Internal Operations of our In what the Author agrees and disagrees with Mr. Locke . Minds , perceived and reflected on by our selves , is that which supplies our Understandings with all the Materials of Thinking . As also , that a Man first thinks when he begins to have any Sensations . That the Impressions made on the Senses are the Originals of all Knowledge . That the Mind is of its own Nature fitted to receive those Impressions . That in receiving Ideas or Notions at first the Mind is Passive . That 't is all one to say , the Soul and the Man thinks . And , Lastly , That Men do not always think ; which last Thesis he confutes here very elaborately : But , I cannot at all agree to some Positions he makes use of to oppose this last Tenet , and , indeed , needlesly ; for he produces good store of solid Arguments sufficient to confute it .

2. For First , He makes the having Ideas and Perception to be the same thing . I apprehend he means , that when We may have Notions , without perceiving we have them . we have Ideas , we must perceive we have them ; because he says afterwards , that the Soul must necessarily be conscious of its own Perception . Indeed had he said the Having Ideas , when he is Awake , and Attentively reflects on those Ideas , it had been a Certain and Evident Truth : Otherwise , 't is manifest that we retain or have our Ideas or Notions in our Mind when we are soundly asleep , ( it being a strange and extravagant Paradox to say , that we get them all again as soon as ever our Eyes are open ; ) and yet we do not then know them ; and , to say we do , is to come over to his Adversary , and grant the Thesis he is Impugning : For , if a Man does think when he is sound asleep , 't is without Question that he may think always .

3. Next , I must utterly deny his Position , that We cannot think without being sensible or conscious of it . To disprove We may Think , without being Conscious that we Think . which I alledge , that when a Man is quite absorpt in a serious Thought , or ( as we say ) in a Brown Study , his Mind is so totally taken up with the Object of his present Contemplation ( which perhaps is something without him ) that he can have no Thought , at that very Instant , of his own Internal Operation , or that he is Thinking , or any thing like it . I have been call'd sometimes from my Study to Dinner , and answered , I am coming . Upon my Delay , they call'd me again , and ask'd , Why I came not , having promis'd it ? I deny'd I heard , or saw , or answered them ; yet , upon Recollection , I remember'd afterwards that I did . I knew then that they call'd me , since I understood their Words , and answered pertinently ; yet , it is most manifest , that I did not at the Time of the first Call understand that I understood it , or know that I knew it , since it came only into my Mind afterwards by Reminiscence or Reflexion ; which argues I had the Knowledge of it before by a Direct Impression , otherwise I could not have remember'd it .

4. Tho' this Thesis of Mr. Locke's is mention'd hereafter , it were not amiss to speak my Sense of it where I first 'T is impossible to be Conscious , or know we know , without a new Act of Reflexion . meet it . He judges , that we know our own Thoughts , ( which are Spiritual ) by Experience ; And I deny we have any Experience but by Direct Impressions from sensible Objects , either coming from them at first , or re-excited . He thinks it impossible to know , but we must at the same time be Conscious , or ( which is the same ) know we know : And , I judge it impossible we should know we know at the same time we have that Act only , till afterwards we come to reflect upon it by a new Act ; which is to know it , not by Experience , but by Reflexion . My Reason why I am so positive in my Assertion , is this : Nothing can be known by any Act of Knowledge but the Object of that Act : For the Object of Knowing , and the Thing known , are the same almost in the very Terms , and perfectly the same in Sense . Put case then I know by a Direct Impression what we call Extension ; in this case Extension is the sole Object of that Act of Knowledge , and not my Act of Knowledge it self ; therefore I am not conscious I know ; that is , I do not know I know when I have the Act of knowing Extension : For , were it so , Extension would not be the Sole Object of that Act , but the Complex made up of Extension , and the Act it self by which I know Extension : which Objects being of Disparate Natures , ought to be the Objects of Different Acts. Besides , this would hinder any External Object , or Corporeal Mode to be known Distinctly ; for the Idea of it would be Confounded and Mingled with a kind of Spiritual Compart , viz. my very Act it self ; for this Act being known ( according to him ) at the same time with Extension , must needs make up part of the Object of this Act. Lastly , If we know our own Act Experientially , we should confound Direct Knowledges with Keflex ones . For ( if I understand Mr. Locke rightly ) he with good Reason makes the Internal Operations of the Mind to be the proper Objects of the Reflex Acts ; and , that the genuin Difference of those two sorts of Acts does consist in this ; that by Direct ones , we know the Objects which are in Nature , or without us ; and by Reflex ones , what 's in the Soul , or her Operations ; and not the Things in Nature , otherwise than as they are in that Act : But if I be Conscious , or know that I know when I know the Object without me , I must by the same Act know what 's within me and what 's without me both at once ; and so my Act of Direct Knowledge would be Reflex ; or rather , that one Act would be both Direct and Reflex , which makes it Chimerical .

5. The same Argument demonstrates , that we cannot be Conscious of our Reflex Acts at the very time we produce 'T is impossible to be Conscious of , or know our present Reflex Act , but by a new Reflex one . them . For , my First Reflex Act has for its sole Object that Operation of the Mind , which I had immediately before by a Direct one ; and my Second Reflex Act has for its Object the First ; and in the same manner , each succeeding Reflexion has for its Object that Act which immediately preceded . Wherefore , if the First Reflex Act had for its Object , at the same time , both the Direct and it self too ; that is , did we , when we first Reflected , know by that very Act it self that we did thus reflect , then the Second Reflex Act would be forestall'd , and have no Proper Object left for it . To clear this better , let us assign one Reflexion to be the Last : It were not the Last Reflexion , unless the Object of it were that Reflexion which was the last but one . Wherefore , unless that Reflexion that went last before was known by that Act , and the last of all remain'd unknown , the Last would have two Objects , viz. The Preceding Reflexion and its self too . This seems to me as plain Reason as plain can be ; and , I believe , Mr. Locke's Different Thoughts proceeded , from not adverting with what Incredible Celerity our Reflex Thoughts do generally succeed the Direct ones , and one another . Whence it comes , that , not aware of the imperceptible Time between them , we are apt to conceit , that the Reflex Act is experientially known by the very Act it self . Since then , nothing can be known by any Act but the Object of that Act , and , ( as might easily be shown ) it would Confound our Natural Notions Hence , we can never come to know our last Reflexion . strangely , to say , the Act is its own Object ; it follows , that it cannot be known by its self , but must be known ( if at all ) by the next Reflexion . Whence results this Certain and Evident Corollary , that , It is impossible we should ever come to know our last Reflexion .

6. These are my Reasons why I recede from Mr. Locke in his Opinion , that A Man cannot think without being 'T is utterly deny'd that Consciousness causes Individuation . Conscious of it . But , the Consequence he seems to draw thence , that therefore Consciousness is that which causes Individuation , I must absolutely deny ; and cannot but judge , that it draws after it a Train of farther Consequences , which are altogether Extravagant . Of which more , when we come to examin his Principle of Individuation .

As for the Position , [ That Men do always think ] which he impugns , and , in my Judgment , quite overthrows , I The Unreasonableness of the Opinion , that Men do always think cannot but wonder what the Asserters of it mean . They grant the Soul has Modes and Affections peculiar to her own Nature ; and , consequently , of which she is properly the Subject : Why she may not therefore retain them in her habitually ( as it were ) without exerting or exercising them , as well as the Body may those proper to its Nature , is altogether Unconceivable . Indeed , were the Soul , in this condition she has here , a Pure Act , as Angels are , it would consist with good Reason ; but being here in a Potential State , ( as appears by her being Capable still of New Knowledges , and her being but a Part of that one Actual Thing call'd Man , and depending on the Material Compart in her Operations ) I cannot see on what Principle , either Physical or Metaphysical , they can pretend to ground such a Paradox . This makes me fear , that this Tenet savours strongly of that odd Opinion , That the Soul here is a Pure Act as the Angels are , or a Distinct Thing from the Body ; that is , a Forma Assistens , and not Informans ; tho' they are loath to own it barefacedly , but shift it off with witty Explications of their own Doctrine ; which , when brought to the Test of Close Reason , vanish into Air ; at which ingenious ways of Evasion it must be confess'd they are very great Artists .

REFLEXION Third . ON The Second , Third , and Fourth , CHAPTERS .

1. I Must except against his making , or naming the Objects of our Senses , simple Ideas , having already prov'd No Notion Simple but that of Existence . that the only absolutely simple Idea or Notion , is that of Existence : To which are Respective ( which argues some Complexion or Composition ) one way or other , all our other Notions of the Thing which we have , or can have ; as is shown in my Method , B. 1. Less . 2d . from § 14. to § 20. I could wish he had taken the Distinction and Order of his Notions from Nature ; which Teaches us that the Notion of [ Res ] is before [ Modus Rei ; ] and that the Consideration or Notion of [ Thing ] is more Knowable than that of any Mode ; and the Mode of quantity is that which naturally antecedes , and grounds , all the The Order of our Notions is to be taken from Nature . other Modes that can be conceiv'd belonging to Body . Nor will it excuse this Deviation from Nature , that we have no exact Notions of Individuals ; since we can abstract the Notion of Entity or Capacity of Being from the Thing , as well as we can its Solidity , or any of the rest . And certainly , that Notion which Expresses Reality , or an Order to Being , should claim a Right to be consider'd in the first place : I cannot but judge that the Methodizing of his Ideas on this manner , would certainly have made his ensuing Discourses more Orderly , and consequently more Clear . But , every Man is Master of his own Thoughts , and of his own Method . Nor did Mr. Locke intend to write an Exact Logick , which is what I aym'd at ; and therefore took that way that best suted with his own ingenious Conception ; which was , that , as all our Notions ( as we both of us hold ) come into our Mind by our Senses , so he apprehended it the properest way to treat of them as they are the Objects of This or That , or many different Sensations .

2. His 4th . Chapter of Solidity gives me Occasion of making some few Reflexions ; which I shall touch on slightly , or omit , because they recurr hereafter .

First , His using the word [ Solidity ] in his New Sense seems very Improper . For , all our Words do either Signify The Word [ Solidity ] arbitrarily and abusively taken by M. L. our Natural Notions , which are Common to all Mankind , whose Meaning therefore is to be taken from the Usage of the Vulgar ; or else Artificial ones , invented by Artists to express the Notions they are Conversant about : Whereas the Word [ Solidity ] taken as it is here , seems to agree to neither . I do not remember it is ever us'd in an Artificial Sense but by Mathematicians , who signify by it the Triple Dimension of Quantity ; which is quite different from his Sense of it : And the Vulgar Understand and Use the Word [ Solid ] as opposit to [ Fluid ; ] and say that the Earth is Solid , or Firm , and the Water Fluid , or apt to be Diffus'd ; both which Senses are vastly different from Impenetrability of the Potential parts of Quantity ; which is the meaning he gives it : So that , as far as I have read , no Man ever used the Word [ Solidity ] in his Sense but himself ; and it is not at all allowable to Him , Me , or any Man , to give a new Sense to any Word not given it before . For , this discourse of mine shows it can have no Proper Sense at all ; and on the other side he does not take it in a Metaphorical Sense , as we use to do when we transferr it to Spiritual Things , and call a Notion or a Discourse Solid . All Words are indeed Ad placitum ; but 't is Mankind that must please to agree in their Signification ; nor must they be at the Beneplacitum of Particular Men , or Private Authors .

3. He declines , with some reason , the Word [ Impenetrability ] because it is Negative : But why might not then His Solidity not at all Essential to Body . Extension have serv'd , which bears the same Sense ? For that , whose Notion or Nature it is to have its parts without one another , cannot bear the having them within one another , or their being Penetrated within themselves ; which is his Notion of the Word [ Solidity . ] He conceives his Solidity to be most intimately connected with , and Essential to Body , and no where to be found or imagin'd but only in Matter , But why his Solidity should be deem'd Essential to Body at all , he gives no reason , and I am well assur'd no Man living can give any ; For it confounds the Line of Substance or Ens , with that of Quality ; which jumbles all our Commonest Notions together , by making the Thing and its Mode to be the same Essential Notion . Nor is it Solidity only that is necessarily found in Matter ; for neither can Extension , Divisibility , Measurability , Space , Impenetrability , &c. be found any where but in things made of Matter , But , what I most wonder at , is , why [ Quantity ] should be totally wav'd and neglected , That Word having been used by all the Learned World , till of late , is ( as has been shown , Preliminary 5th . §. 18. ) most Proper ; and , either directly , or by Immediate consequence , involves all the rest in its Signification . For , if a Body have Bigness or Quantity in it , it must be Extended , and cannot be Contracted into a Point , Line or Surface . It must be Divisible , or One in the Notion of Quantity . And , if it must be Extended and cannot be crampt into an Indivisible , its parts cannot be penetrated within one another ; however it may be pierced or Divided by another Body , by shoving its potential parts towards either side . Lastly , it must be Measurable , or Proportionable to a Body of the same Quantity . So that I see not what imaginable Priviledge can accrue to Solidity above the rest : And , it seems to me a New and Groundless assertion , that Impenetrability ( tho' we abate the Negative manner of Expression ) is Essential at all to Body , more than any of the rest ; that is , not at all .

4. This acute Writer , in pursuance of his Doctrine about Solidity , proceeds to prove there may be Pure Space , Space without Body , or Vacuum , is a meer Groundless Fancy . or Vacuum ; because we can have an Idea of Space left by a Body without the Idea of another Solid Thing , or a Body , coming in its Room . I Answer , we may Indeed have a Fancy of such a Thing , as we may of many other Contradictions , so they be not exprest in directly opposit Terms , v. g. of a Golden Animal , or a Chimera , &c. But , I utterly deny that we can have a True and Solid Notion of it , taken from the Thing it self ; as all Ideas must be , that are not Phantastick . He thinks there is no Necessity , one Body should follow another that is moved from such a Space ; and that the Maintainers of it do build their Assertion on the Supposition that the World is full . What other Men hold of the World 's being Full , I know not , nor what they mean by it ; but I will candidly deliver my Sentiment , and the Demonstration for it a priori , which is this : I take my Notion of Quantity from the Thing , or Body ; and , I have shewn above , that that Notion is the Nature of the Thing , as 't is Quantitative , or Affected with such a Mode . Here is my firm Ground , and here I fix my Foot .

5. Proceeding hence , and reflecting on this Nature of Quantity in my Mind ; I discourse it thus : I am to find The Contrary to that Tenet Demonstrated . out in what its ( Analogical ) Essence or Entity consists ; and I discover , it must be in that which expresses its proper Unity : Seeing then Divisibility best expresses its Unity , ( for , what is Divisible , or Capable to be more , is , eo ipso , One , ) I have found out the Essential Notion or Nature of Quantity ; and , since what is Divisible , or not yet Divided , is Continued ; and what is Continued as to its Quantity , is not Discontinued or Divided according to its Quantity ; therefore Continuity is its proper Unity ; which consists in being Indivisum in se , or within its own Notion , and Formally constitutes its Subject such . Wherefore , since the Essence of Quantity is the Commonest Affection of Body , taken in its whole Latitude , as including all Bodies , it follows , that Continuity , which is its Unity , must be found in them all likewise ; that is , all Bodies , or the whole Nature of Body , that is , the Entire Bulk of Body , must be Continued . And therefore , 't is as great a Contradiction , that some Bodies , or some Parts of Body , should not be Continued , ( or , which is the same , that there should be a Vacuum , ) as that Triangularity should be in some one Body , and yet it should not be Triangular ; that Whiteness should be in a Wall , and yet it should not be White ; or Unity in a Thing , and yet it self should not be Unum . This is my Way of Demonstrating against Vacuum within the World , to prove , and not suppose , the World Full , or Continued ; which I draw out of the Abstract Notion of Quantity , or of Body consider'd as Quantitative ; and out of those Notions , most Intimately and Essentially Connected with it . Which , why it should not be as Evident as any Demonstration in Mathematicks ; or why we cannot draw as clear a Demonstration from the Nature of Quantity in Common , as we can from the Nature of such a Quantity , I desire any Man , who is so wise as to know that all Science and Demonstration do consist in the Connexion of Terms , to inform me . I say , any such Man ; for , if he knows not This , it is Impossible he should know any Thing at all in Philosophy , or even in Logick ; and so he is not worth discoursing with .

6. Hence is seen , that it is impossible Therefore 't is impossible there should be any True Experiment to prove a Vacuum . that a Sucker in a Pump may draw up Water , and yet the next Body not follow . We may Fancy it if we please ; but our Fancy cannot change the Natures of Things : It cannot make Continuity not to be Continuity ; Quantitative Unity , not to be such an Unity ; nor Quantity , not to be Quantity ; any more than his Solidity can be Non-Solidity , or the Parts of Body penetrate one another . Had Mr. Locke had a Notion of Space , taken indifferently from Body , and something that 's not Body , as we have of Sensitiveness from Man and Brute ; he might , in that Case , have fram'd an Abstract Notion of it , Common and Indifferent to Body and Vacuum ; for , then , it had been grounded on the Thing , and had been a solid and true Notion ; but , since he had the Idea , or Notion of Space from Body only , and therefore ( as was largely prov'd above ) it could be of nothing else , but of Body thus Modified , it must be confin'd to Body , with which ( as all Modes are ) it is Identified ; and therefore , the Idea , or Notion of it , can never be applicable to what is not a Body .

REFLEXION Fourth , ON The Seventh and Eighth CHAPTERS .

1. HAving * * Method to Science , B. 1. L. 2. §. 14. already shewn , Mr. Locke's First Chapter commendable . that our only Simple Notion is that of Existence , I have no Occasion to make any Remarks on his 7th Chapter , but that 't is highly Commendable in the Author , to reduce his Speculations to Piety and Contemplation : This being not only our Duty , but that Best End , to which all Solid Speculation naturally leads us .

2. As for his 8th Chapter , I grant , that all the Ideas , or Notions , we have , are Positive in the Understanding , ( at Privative Notions must Connotate the Subject . least , in part ; ) but the Reason of it is , because they do , all of them , include the Thing , as 't is thus consider'd ; without which , we could have no Ideas of Privations or Negations at all : For , Non-Ens , formally as such , or as totally Excluding Ens , can have no Intelligibility , nor , consequently , any Notion , by which we can understand it : And Privations differ from Negations only in this , that they include in their Notion a Capacity of the Subjects having such or such a Mode , annex'd to its not having it ; which Capacity clearly Connotates the Thing , since there cannot be a Capacity , without some Thing that is Capable , or has that Capacity . Add , that I see not how , Ideas being Resemblances , an Idea , consider'd by us as a Positive real Being , can ever resemble or represent Privations , they being of ( at least ) Subcontrary Natures . What I hold , is , that , when we conceive a Thing , as having some Privation in it , the Idea of it is partly Positive , partly Privative ; and the Material Part of it is the Thing ; the Formal , as Privative , or , as thus Modify'd . For , Ideas , I mean , Notions of Privations , without including the Thing , are Unconceivable , and Impossible ; as whoever looks into their * * See Prelim. 3. §. 9 , 10 , 11. Definition , will discern clearly . Of this Nature ( in Common ) are all the Notions we have of the Modes , or Accidents ; no Notion being truly or perfectly Positive , but that of Ens , or Thing .

I cannot grant that our Ideas , or Notions , ( or even Phantasms , ) are caus'd in us by meer Motions , continued from Meer Motions made upon the Senses , Insufficient to give us Knowledge of the Objects . our Senses , to the Brain , or the Seat of Sensation ; but must judge , for the Reasons alledg'd * * Prelim. 4. §. 26 , 27 , 28 , &c. above , that this is perform'd by those Imperceptible Bodies there spoken of , or by the Effluviums themselves convey'd thither , and afterwards lodged there . In embracing which Opinion , of our Knowledge being wrought by meer Motions made by the Objects , his Excellent Wit suffers it self to be led astray by our Moderns . His Reason ( which I conceive is also theirs ) is , because it is not more impossible to conceive , that God should annex such Ideas to such Motions , than Pain to a piece of Steel dividing the Body , with which that Idea has no Resemblance . How unlike a Reason this is , appears at first fight ; and , I am sure this Parallel has no Resemblance at all with the Thing it is brought for . I know of no Annexing the Idea of Pain to a piece of Steel ; but , must think 't is a most highly extravagant Conceit . The Business passes thus in Nature . A piece of Steel being Denser , and withall sharp , is a proper Cause of Dividing the Body ; the Dividing of it , is a proper Cause of its being disorder'd , and render'd unable to assist the Soul , or the Man , in his necessary Operations : This breeds naturally a Conception in the Soul , or the Man , that he is hurt ; which Naturally produces in the Knower , who is highly concern'd in it , Grief or Pain : So that all is here carry'd on by a Train of proper Causes , to proper Effects ; and needs no Annexing by God , more than to conserve the Order of Second Causes which himself has establish'd . On the other side , there is no Natural Resemblance of such a Motion to such an Idea , as is confess'd ; nor is the former a Proper Cause of the other ; which puts them to have recourse to this Voluntary Annexion to them by God . Add , that it is an odd kind of Argument , to alledge , that it is not impossible to conceive that God may do this , or that , without proving he has done it : Nor is it at all allowable in Philosophy , to bring in a Deus è Machinâ at every turn , when our selves are at a loss to give a Reason for our Thesis . Nor is it to be expected , that God will alter the Nature of Things , for the Interest of any Man's Tenet ; but , since his Wisdom , in his Ordinary Government of the World , carries on the Course of it according to the Nature of Second Causes , it must first be prov'd , that what we maintain , is Agreeable to the Course of Natural Causes , e'er we ought to think or imagin that God will have any hand in it : And , if we can prove this , we need no Immediate or particular Recourse to God's favouring us , by doing This , or That , to make good our Argument .

4. I must deny too , consequently to my former Doctrine , that Sensible Qualities are nothing in the Objects , but Sensible Qualities are the same in the Objects , as in the Mind . Powers to produce various Sensations in us ; unless it be meant , that they have Powers to send out such Effluviums into the Brain , by the Senses , as imprint their very Natures in our Mind ; and not barely to produce Motions in our Nerves . Nor can I conceive why the Ideas of the Secondary Qualities should have nothing like them , existing in the Bodies themselves ; nor be Resemblances of them . If this be true , why are they call'd [ Ideas , ] which either signifies Resemblances , or Nothing ? Again , since the Bodies are put to cause them , how can we think they are nothing like them ? Can any Man think the Effect is nothing like the Cause , when every Effect can be nothing but a Participation of the Cause , or something coming into the Subject from the Efficient , which was in it some way or other before ? Lastly , If these Secondary Qualities be compounded of the Primary ones , ( viz. of Solidity , Extension , Figure and Mobility ) in our Understanding , why should not those Primary Qualities in re , as well compound those Secondary ones in the Thing , or out of our Understanding ? And , if they do , ( as 't is evident they must , since they are all there , ) then , why are not those Secondary Ideas full as like those Secondary or Compounded Qualities found in the Thing , as the Primary Ideas were like the Primary Qualities in the same Thing ; and , consequently , resemble them , as well as the others did their proper Originals ? I much doubt , that the Author rather consulted his Fancy in this particular , than his good Reason : And , because those Effluviums , or the Figures of Parts , which cause our Sensations , are too Subtile and Indiscernable to cause Distinct Phantasms of themselves , as the Primary ones did , but are of a Confus'd Uniformness in Appearance , he judges hence , they are Nothing like the others : Whereas , Reason will inform Reflecters , that , since Colour is nothing but the Surface of a Body , as 't is apt to reflect Light ; the manner of Reflexion found in the Surface of a White Thing , which is apt to reflect much Light , is , to our Reason , and in our Notion , such as it was in the Thing imprinting it ; and , consequently , ( every thing Acting as it is , ) such as came from it . Whence , those who , by Reflex Thoughts , and using their Reason , do go about to explain or define the Nature or Notion of Whiteness , do make it consist in such a Reflexion of Light , bringing Effluviums with it from a Surface so advantagiously Figur'd : And so , the Notion of Whiteness is the same in the Thing , and in the Understanding ; viz. those Effluviums thus Figur'd , or Modified , however , the Appearance of it in the Fancy reaches not the true Nature of the Thing , as 't is White ; which , indeed , Fancy never does .

5. The Reason why the Pain , which we feel , is not in the Thing that Caus'd it , and Sensible Qualities are so , is , The Pretence of GOD's Voluntary Annexing Improper Causes to Effects , is Unphilosophical . because these last are Proper , Univocal , and Immediate Effects of Bodies sending out Effluviums of their own Natures ; but Pain , being an Affection of the Soul , springing from a Perception that its dear Compart is hurt , and disorder'd , is an Improper , Remoter , and Equivocal Production . The Altering , Disordering , or Spoiling the Temperature or Continuity of the Bodily Parts due to their Nature , is , ( as was shewn , ) the Immediate and Proper Effect of those Offensive Agents ; but 't is Accidental to their manner of Operating , that they cause Pain , or Pleasure , even remotely ; and , it lights only , that sometimes they do this , because the Subject , or the Body , in which they produce these their proper Effects , haps to be Identified with a Knowing Nature , only which is properly capable to Grieve , or be Delighted when a Harmful or Pleasing Impression is made on the Body , which is Part of the Man , and , in some sort , himself . The like is to be said of Manna , and other such Instances . The Alterations or Disorder made in the Guts and Stomach , are Natural , Proper , and Immediate Effects of it ; but the Pain ensuing thence , which is a Spiritual Disposition of the Mind , is a Remote , Accidental , and Improper Effect of it .

6. By this Time Mr. Locke sees The Power in the Object to cause Sensation and Knowledge , is Improperly such . that I agree with him , that the Bodies in Nature have a Power in them to cause our several Sensations ; and , that this Power is that which we call such a Quality of it . But I disagree with him , that they are only Powers to cause such a Motion ; and affirm , it is a Power , when duly Circumstanced with other Requisites , ( as , with Light , to convey Visible Qualities ; Moisture , Gustable ones , &c. ) to send out Effluviums , of their own Nature , to the Brain ; ( which , therefore , are Inherent in , and Proper Parts of those Objects , ) whether they cause Actual Sensation , or no. The Sun sends out his Beams , which , scatter'd thinly , at this remote distance from the Fountain , are therefore one of Mr. Locke's Secondary Qualities , which we call Light ; yet , contracted by a Burning-Glass , they perform the Proper Effect of Fire , Burning ; whence we ought to conclude , they are of the Nature of Fire . Can we then deny , or doubt , but that the Body of the Sun , which communicates , or sends them out , is it self Fire ; or , that , being such , those Rays , and the Sun , have no Similitude with one another ? Or , that , when they strike the Eye , they stop there , and are not carry'd into the Brain ? Hippocrates tells us , that Omnes partes corporis sunt permeabiles ; meaning , that they are pervious to the Humours ; which are gross Things , in comparison of the Sun-Beams . How can it then be doubted , but that they reach the Fancy ; and thence , the Soul ; and imprint their Notions or Natures there : And , tho' some may deny they are the same in the Mind , as they are in Nature ; yet can it , with any Shew of Reason , be deny'd they are at all like the Cause that produced them ? The like Discourse holds in all other Sensible Qualities , to what Sense soever they belong .

7. To close this Discourse , I am apt to think , that Mr. Locke intended to oppose those who hold , that the Sensible Qualities are a little kind of Distinct Entities . Next , I declare , that , tho' the Thing has accidentally a Power in it , to make it self perceiv'd ; yet , taking the Thing as an Object , ( as he does , ) it is but Improperly called a Power ; and not Properly , as are our Powers , or Faculties , of Seeing , Hearing , Knowing , &c. are : For , the Act being the End for which the Power was given , the Faculties , or Powers , are better'd , and perfected , by being reduced to Act ; and so there is a real Ground for their being Related to the Object : Whereas , neither the Object , or Thing , nor any Sensible Quality in it , is a Jot the better , or any way Alter'd , by being perceiv'd , or known ; any more than a Cart rolling through the Street , is the better , or otherwise than it had been , because the Effluviums it sends out do make a Representation of it in a Shop full of Looking-Glasses , as it passes by . Whence Logicians say , that there is no Real Relation of the Object to the Sense , or Intellect ; because there is no Real Ground for such a Relation , nor any Dependence of the Object on those Powers , in any kind ; * * B. 1. L. 7. §. 9 , 10 , 11. as is shewn in my Method .

REFLEXION Fifth , ON The Tenth CHAPTER .

PAssing over this Ninth Chapter about Perception , I confess my self at a great Loss how to understand divers Passages in his Tenth , which treats of Retention , Ideas or Notions are not Actual Perceptions , but the Object perceiv'd , and durably remaining . or how to make him coherent with himself . For , First , he tells us our Ideas are nothing but Actual Perceptions of the Mind . By which Words he seems to make no kind of Distinction between the Act of Perception and the Object of it ; whereas the Act is the Exercise of our Power of Perceiving , actuated by the Object about which it is then employ'd ; which Object determins the Indifferency of the Power to this or that Act in particular ; which the Schools call Specifying the Act : But the Object is the Thing known by the Act ; and 't is a strange Paradox to say , that the Act of Knowledge and the Object or Thing known are the same ; especially , if the Thing known be something without us : Next , I cannot reconcile his making our Ideas to be nothing but Actual Perceptions , with his making our Ideas , quite through his Book , to be the Object of our Thoughts , and expresly stating them to be such in the beginning of it , Chap. 1. § 8. Secondly , he says , That those Ideas cease to be any thing , when there is no Perception of them . If so , why does he put us to have Memory or Retention , if , after the Act is past , there be nothing to keep in Memory or Retain . Thirdly , in Consequence It destroys the Nature of Memory , to make it consist in the Reviving Ideas . of this his Ground , he affirms , that this laying up Ideas in the Repository of his Memory , signifies no more , but that the Mind has in many Cases a Power to Revive Perceptions , with a Connotate annext , of having had them before . Certainly , this Signification of the word [ Memory ] is peculiar to himself , and contrary to the Sentiments of all Mankind ; who , were they examined by the Poll , would , I believe , unanimously declare , that by laying up a Thing in Memory , they meant , ( as the Words naturally import ) the Retaining something which has its being yet within us , and may be brought into play again upon occasion . Can the Memory be said to Retain what is not ? Or can there be a Repository of Nothing ? Is Reviving the Notion of Retaining , they being rather of a Contrary Sense to one another ? Or can Remembring be conceived to be the same Notion with Reproduction ? These seem to me such monstrous Abuses of Words , that I would willingly think my self mistaken , rather than to father them on so Learned an Author , did not my Eyes assure me I do not dream or oversee . Nor can the same Individual Act ever be reviv'd ; it depending on many Circumstances , determinable to such a Time or Place ; the former of which can never recur , or be reproduced . Lastly , What means this Power in the The Mind cannot revive Perceptions . Mind to revive Perceptions ? The Man , indeed , has a Power , when re-excited by outward Objects like the former , or by Passion , Disease , or by some other Casual Circumstances , to rummage the Ideas lodged in the Brain ; and , so , by their new Impression on the Seat of Knowledge , to cause such an Act , as by it to know the same Thing again ; as also to know it was foreknown , as was explicated * * Prelim. 4. § 26 , 27 , 28. above : But to put the Soul to revive Ideas , or even to act , so that the Action shall begin from her peculiar Nature , is Praeternatural to her Condition , to her Manner of Existing , and consequently , to her manner of Operating here ; which , as it must be ever with the Bodily part or the Fancy , so it must begin still from it , as it did at first ; with this only Difference , that in the first Impressions made on the Sense , and thence on the Seat of Knowledge , the Man ( and particularly as to his Soul ) is perfectly Passive ; whereas afterwards by vertue of those Phantasms , and their former Impression , which have already affected the said Seat of Knowledge , ( which is part of himself ) and have been re-affected by it , the Man is partly Passive , partly Active in remembring ; as Mr. Locke does , I think , also acknowledge ; tho' he explicates it otherwise than I do , viz. By the Mind's setting it self on work , which I judge , and have shewn to be Impossible , Prelimin . 4. § 25 , 26 , 27.

2. I must not omit here to remark , that when Mr. Locke says , that Ideas fade in the Memory ; or , ( as he ingeniously Ideas in the Fancy may fade , but Notions are never blotted out of the Soul . expresses it ) that [ the Pictures drawn in our Minds are laid in fading Colours ] he most evidently discovers , that by Ideas here he means material Representations or Phantasms , and not those Spiritual Objects of our Understandings , Notions . For , there is no doubt but that Phantasms , they being only Imperceptible Particles , of the same Nature with the Corporeal Agents whence they are sent , do follow , ( and that very easily ) the Fate of their Originals ; and are liable to be defaced , alter'd or corrupted , as these are : Whereas it is impossible , that Ideas or Notions , which have a Spiritual Being in our Mind , should be liable to any such Decay , Corruption or Mutation . If any thing could prejudice , destroy or efface them , it must in all Reason be thought that their Contraries would do it : Whereas clear Reflexion tells us , that Contraries in the Mind are so far from Expelling , Blurring , or Altering one another there , that they not only very Friendly dwell together , but moreover that , by their Co-habitation there , they make one another magis elucescere , and Establish one anothers Natures . Hot and Cold , Moist and Dry , which are perpetually fighting , and make such Bustles and Turmoils in the Material World , are very consistent , and agree amicably in the Soul . The Corporeal Instruments which brought our Notions thither may perish ; but when they are once in her , they are as Immutable and Immortal as her self . So that the Pictures in our Minds are so far from being drawn in fading Colours , that they should rather be said ( if we would use a Metaphor to express their Durableness ) to be engraved in Brass , Marble , or Adamant ; being as lasting as Eternity . Which Tenet , were I writing Metaphysicks , I should not doubt but to demonstrate ; and withal to show how useful it is to explicate Christian Faith : Particularly those Points of laying open the Book of Conscience at the last day ; when , as the Sybil sings , [ Cunctaque cunctorum cunctis arcana patebunt . ] And how Infants are connaturally saved by virtue of Baptism .

REFLEXION Sixth . ON The Eleventh and Twelfth CHAPTERS .

1. THE 11th . Chapter gives me no occasion to make any Reflexions , but only on his attributing Knowledge to Brutes ; about which I have been too large If Brutes can know , they may have General Notions , and Abstract , and Compare too . already . He denies indeed that they have the power of Abstracting , or of having General Ideas . But , if they have true Knowledge , or any more than King David meant , when he says , The Sun knows his going down , I see no reason why they may not have General Notions , and Abstract , and Compare too . For , if they have any Degree of Reason , as he grants they have , they may do all this ; and I am sure , and have already shown , their Outward Actions do as much countenance their having Reason , as any signs they give us do shew that they cannot Abstract , or have General Ideas ; since General Ideas ( as every good Reflecter may observe ) are nothing but Imperfect Ideas of the Thing ; and in a Thousand occasions , the Object or Thing affords them no more , but Imperfect or General Ideas , and therefore they must have them . I am much pleased with his Distinction between Wit and Judgment ; and I could wish that our Men of Fancy , who affect to bring Religion , and all they understand not , to Drollery , would apply it to themselves .

2. The Author discourses very acutely , how our Reason and Judgment are misguided by our not distinguishing The distinguishing our Notions guides our Reason and Judgment right . our Notions exactly ; whence we may inferr , that that part of Logick which teaches us how to distinguish them accurately , and to keep them distinct , is of exceeding great use ; and that the Study of it is to be earnestly pursu'd by all Pretenders to Science ; especially by new Beginners : Of which , I hope , I have elaborately treated in the First Book of my Method .

3. In order to the 12th . Chapter ; there is no doubt but that we can unite several simpler Ideas or Notions into one , All Complex Ideas , or Notions , must consist of simpler ones , united in the Thing . and signify them by one Name ; but I deny that , if we conjoin them otherwise than as they are , or may be , united in External Objects , or in the Thing , we can have any Complex Notions , tho' we may have a Fancy , of them , or a kind of Imitation of some thing which once affected our Senses . For , since I cannot but think I have demonstrated that our Notion is the Thing as conceiv'd by us , or the Thing existing in the understanding ; If I have any Complexion of more Simple Notions in my Mind , not found to be united in the Thing ; the Idea in my Mind is not conformable to the Thing it self , nor is it , as I have prov'd it to be , that Thing ; and then to what end should I have such an Idea , as if I come to predicate it of the Thing , the Proposition would be False , which consequently would fill our mind with Falshoods . Next , as has been often prov'd formerly , I deny the Soul can Unite or Act of her self , or by her peculiar power ( tho' the Man may ) but is oblig'd to take what 's given her by Impressions on the Seat of Knowledge . In which case , what the Thing or Object , by a Genuin Impression , gives her , is Orderly , Solid , and a Seed of true knowledge or Science ; but that which the Fancy gives her , otherwise than as the Thing did directly imprint it , is Disorderly , Superficial , and a Ground of Errour . Indeed , she is forc'd to apprehend , whenever the Phantasms strike the Seat of Knowledge , tho' their Motions and Complexions be never so Disorderly , or even Monstrous . Now , whenever this is done , Judicious Men direct their Eye to the Thing , and examine whether the Conjunction of such or such Ideas , is truly found in re ; or is agreeable to those Direct Impressions it had received thence ; which if it be , the Soul entertains it , after Examination , and lets it sink into her ; it being the true nature of the Thing , and so a Ground to Truth , to see which her Essence was made ; If it be not , she rejects it ; for it grounds a Contradiction to the Nature of the Thing , which is the only Ground of Truth ; and makes or counterfeits it to be what it is not ; and it is directly against her Nature to admit Contradictory Judgments . Now , what Judicious Men , by their recourse to the Thing , thus reject , those Unskilful Thinkers , who are led by Fancy , do admit ; and by this means their Souls become full of Phantastick Conceits which never can be brought to any Coherence or Connexion of Terms . For no Terms can Cohere , unless the Notions meant by each of them be really in the Thing it self ; and those Coherences made in the Mind by any other way , or of any other Materials , are far from Solid or True , as we experience in People that are Splenetick or Enthusiaistck .

4. Wherefore , whenever the Ideas are connected otherwise than they are or may be in re , the Object of that Otherwise they are Groundless Fancies . Act can have no Metaphysical Verity , Unity , nor consequently Entity in it ; the two former of which , being Properties of Ens , cannot be where Ens or Thing is not . Whence the Objects of those Fantastick Acts is some non-Ens taken for an Ens ; which , if pursu'd home by a good Logician , must end in a Contradiction . For example , I can have Notions of Hircus and Ceruus aparted from one another ; but , if I will unite them in my Mind otherwise than Nature exhibited them , and take them conjoyntly , ( as Fancy may ) and frame a a Complex Idea of a Hirco-Ceruus , or Goat-Stag , it must needs be perfectly Fantastical and Chimerical . This will farther appear , if we take one of Mr. L's Complex Ideas , viz. Beauty , consisting of a certain Composition of Figure and Colour . Now , if such Figure and Colour had not been found , or might not be found united by Nature in the same Thing , the Idea of it could not have been conformable to what 's in Nature , or the Idea of any Reality , but purely Fantastical and Counterfeit . The same may be said of his Idea of Lead , with its proper Qualities ; or of the Ordinary Idea of a Man , describ'd here to be a Substance or Thing with Motion , Thought and Reasoning join'd to it : Which Qualities , were they not join'd in the Thing they belong to , or identify'd with it , the Complex Ideas of them would be nothing but meer Groundless Fancies .

This Point is so Important , that it will deserve to be clear'd as perfectly as possible : I shall therefore allow it a more elaborate Explanation , tho' I spend less Pains and Time in my other Reflexions .

When I consider an Individual Thing in Nature , ( v. g. A Man ) according to the Notion of Being , I have The Manner how all Complex Ideas or Notions are made , elaborately explain'd . two Notions of him , viz. That he is capable of Existing , and that he actually Exists ; the former of which he has by means of Second Causes , which , by Determining the Matter , gives him his Determinate Nature or Essence . The other he has immediately from the First Being ; and I have a Complex Notion of him accordingly . Next , considering the same thing precisely as a Body , or such an Ens as we call by that Name ; I find in it somewhat by which it is Corruptible , or Changeable into another , and somewhat by which it is Determin'd to be This sort of Thing , or Body , or to be what it is : And , I conceive and call Body according to the former of these Considerations Power or Matter ; and , according to the later , Act or Form ; and I frame a Complex Idea of it , as 't is a Body accordingly . Hitherto I treat of the Thing as a Metaphysician , and regard it only according to some Order it has to Being . Proceeding further on , and dividing still the common Line of Ens , or ( what I am now arriv'd at ) [ Body ] by Intrinsecal Differences , or by more and less of the Generical Notion , of which Quantity or Divisibility is the Primary Affection , or that of which all the other Modes are made ; I find that some Bodies must be more Divisible or Rare , other less Divisible or Dense ; and by this means we approach something nearer to Natural or Physical Considerations of that thing as 't is call'd Body ; and the Science that treats of it , as being immediately under Metaphysicks , and immediately above Physicks , may not unfitly be called Archi-Physical ; as giving the immediate Principles to Physicks ! This way of Considering Body grounds the Notions of Simple Bodies , called Elements ; which differ in Nothing but Rarity and Density ; and also , the Notions of Compound Bodies made up of those Simple ones . So that now my former Complex Notions of Capable to be and Actual Being ; and , of having Determinate and Indeterminate Respects to that Ens as it is Body , call'd Form and Matter , has annext to it in the Thing many Secondary Qualities , made up of those Primary ones ; such as are , Heat and Cold , Moisture and Driness , &c. and so we are come to that Science call'd Physicks or Natural Philosophy ; and my former Complex Notion of such an Individuum , takes in these Second Qualities , over and above what it contain'd before . Advancing farther , we come to consider this Thing or Body with its Parts so diversify'd by those First and Second Qualities , or so Organiz'd , that one part ( the common Causes of the World suppos'd ) is able to work on another ; which kind of Thing we call Self-moving or Living . And , still proceeding on by a f●rther Complexion of such Parts , we come to a Thing that is Sensitive , or Moving it self by the least Effluviums affecting those tender Organs call'd the Senses . All which give so many New Additions to my former Notion of that Individuum , and make it more Complex . Moreover , we can find in this Sensitive Thing , or this Animal now spoken of , both as to its peculiar Matter and Form , a Disposition to work comparatively ; that is to judge , and reason or discourse ; and , consequently , to have in it a Knowing Power , which is to be a Man : And , Lastly , Such a peculiar Degree of this Power of Comparing , which restrains the Specifick Notion of Man to be this Individual Man . So that , by this time , such a Vast Assembly of Modes or Accidents ( the Croud of which make that most Complex Notion , call'd the Suppositum , so blindly confused ) do meet in my Complex Idea of this Individual Man , that , tho' I see he is a Thing ; and a Distinct Thing , because I see he exists and operates Independently of all other Things ; yet , I can have no Distinct and Clear Notion of his Essence , but by taking it in pieces , ( as it were , ) both as to those several Considerations belonging to him , according to the Line of Being , as was now explain'd ; and also , as to those Conceptions I make of him , according to all the Physical Modes or Accidents which are in him : Which Modes , so to gain an exacter Knowledge of him , as Affected with those Modes , ( and the same may be said of all other Things , ) we divide , and sub-divide , as we see agreeable to their Distinct Natures or Notions .

This Discourse may , if well weigh'd , be , perhaps useful for many Ends. But , to apply it to our present purpose : All this Multitude of less Complex , or more simple Ideas , belonging to the Line of Substance , are found Connected in this Individuum ; and , did we add the least of them by our Mind , which was not found Conjoin'd in the Thing , my Notion or Idea of him would , so far , be Fantastick , and False ; because there was nothing found in the Thing that answers to such a Complexion , ( only which can make it Real , ) but only in my Fancy , counterfeiting such a Complexion , and mis-informing my Understanding ; as it happens in the Illusive Representations , made in those who are troubled with the Spleen , Melancholy , or Phrenzy ; as likewise , in timerous People , when they think they see Sprights ; or in Horses , when they boggle . Add , that the Mind cannot , of its self , begin to act , ( as was proved formerly : ) but all New Acts , or Excitation of Former Notions in her , are the Acts of the whole Man , and must naturally arise first from the Bodily Part , or the Fancy ; either Imprinting Phantasms , which it receives from the Objects , orderly and genuinly , on the Seat of Knowledge ; or Disorderly , as its Irregular and Extravagant Motions happen to conjoyn them . Whence we say that a Man who does not correct such incoherent Connexions by Judgment , is led by Fancy , or Caprichious .

6. While we are discoursing about the manner how we come by all our Ideas whether Simple or Complex , it How the Doctrine of Cartesius , Mr. Locke , and J. S. differ , as to this point . would not perhaps be improper to set before the Reader 's view , what is my Tenet , the Cartesians and Mr. Lockes , and how we differ . The Cartesians do not own themselves at all beholding to outward Objects for their Ideas ( as least , as some of them say , for the chiefest ones ) but they say they are Innate , or imprinted on the Soul by Gods immediate hand ; tho' some of them ( which makes the matter much worse ) chose rather to say they are Elicited or produced by the Soul it self , upon such a Motion from without ; as also , that they are re-excited by such Motions ; in which last Tenet Mr. Locke seems to agree with them . But this Learned Author denies all Innate Ideas ; and holds that the Simple ones ( at least ) are caused by the Objects , whether they be Internal or External ; but , that the Complex Ideas are framed by the Mind , which he conceives to have a virtue of Compounding them as she pleases . Whereas , my Principles force me to oppose them both , and to hold That all Ideas , whether Simple , or Complex ( provided that by Ideas be meant Notions , and not Imaginations ) are to be taken intirely from the Objects or Things in Nature ; as also that , when we excite them a new , something that is in Act it self must cause that Action ; because a meer Power to do any Thing , ( whether in the Soul or out of it ) cannot determin it self to any Action in particular . And , if I may freely and impartially pass my Verdict between them , I should frankly declare , that Mr. Locke's way has far more of Nature in it , and consequently is more Solid than the Cartesian ; in regard he holds all our Ideas are originally taken from the Outward Objects , either emmediately , as to his Simple Ideas ; or mediately , as to those which are compounded of them by the Soul : Whereas the Cartesians cannot pretend to know any thing in Nature , unless they can solidly prove these three Previous Points : First , That their Ideas are Innate , or else produced by the Soul ; neither of which I am certain they can ever prove . Secondly , What those Ideas are , or that they are not meer Fancies . Thirdly , If they put them to be meer Representations , and not the Thing , or Object it self , how we can be certain that we must by them know the Things without vs , notwithstanding all that I have alledg'd to demonstrate the contrary in my Second and Third Preliminaries . If these Points , which are the main Hinges that open us the way into Philosophy , or the Knowledge of Things , be not first firmly establish'd , all their Discourses , tho' they be never so ingenious , must be hollow and superficial for want of Solid Ground . These three Points , I say , they must either show to be self-evident , or they must make them Evident by Demonstrating them ; or else , I am sure , 't is most Evident , that all their Superstructures are Ruinous for want of a Firm Foundation . I would not misunderstand them , when they explain to us what their Ideas are ; and yet they have such a peculiar Talent of speaking Ambiguous Sense in seemingly plain Words , that I cannot for my Heart comprehend their Meaning . They tell us sometimes they hold the Idea , consider'd Objectively , to be the Res or Thing itself ; but when they add , that it is the Res or Thing [ quatenus representata ] they seem to deny it again ; for the Words [ quatenus representata ] signifie , in true Logick , the bare Representation of the Thing ; as [ Paries quatenus Albus , ] means [ Albedo ; ] the restrictive Word [ Quatenus ] cutting off the precise Notion to which it is annex'd , from all others . And how odd a piece of Chiquanery it is to say , that the Picture or Resemblance of Caesar , is Caesar himself , quatenus representatus , I leave it to others to judge . Besides , if the thing it self be really there , or in the Knowing Power , it may be known without more ado , or without needing those little Spiritual Epicycles , ( if I may so call them ) those useless Ideas . Mr. Locke , I must confess , began at first to build Solidly on the Things ; but , he is so very acutely and speculatively attentive to the Ideas in his own Thoughts , and so wholly taken up with Contemplation of them , that he seems sometimes to over-run his own Principles , ( which only at first he intended to pursue ) and quite to lose Sight of the Things . Whereas I bend my whole Endeavour to keep my Eye steadily upon them through the whole Course of my Doctrine , without intermingling any gratuitous Suppositions , or suffering my self to be led astray from the Natures of the Things by any ill-grounded Fancies of my own , which would court and debauch my Reason , tho' they seem never so Ingenious .

REFLEXION Seventh . ON The Thirteenth CHAPTER .

1. IF , as Mr. Locke says , we get the Simple Idea of Space by our Sight and Touch , then Nature gives us no Idea of a Space , which is not Visible and Tangible ; Extension not well Explicated . whence follows , that the Idea of such a Space as Vacuum , which is neither the Object of one of those Senses , nor of the other , is Unnatural and Fantastical . The Notion of Distance is well explain'd ; but I cannot discern why Length , Breadth and Thickness should be called Capacity : For , these three Modes ( as all Modes do ) express the manner how they Intrinsecally affect their Subject , Body ; whereas , Capacity signifies the Respect to something Extrinsecal to the Body thus affected , or a Power to contain Another Thing . Much less can Extension be character'd A Capacity of Space , with something between the Extremities , which is Solid , Moveable and Tangible ; for , tho' Matter were suppos'd to have no Extremities at all , but to be Infinite , it would not be less Extended , but more : And were the Air supposed to be neither Solid , Moveable or Tangible , yet still it might be conceiv'd to be Extended . Again , What means it , that Extension is a Capacity of Space , whereas Space is rather a Capacity of what is Extended . I wish I knew from what Rule or Ground Mr. Locke takes the Proper Meaning of the Words he uses ; for it seems evident to me , that this Explication of Extension is meerly Voluntary and Preternatural ; and seems ( tho' perfectly Groundless it self ) to be laid as a Ground for Vacuum ; and , therefore , his Consequences drawn thence , want Premisses . Nor need we take such Pains by Repeating our Ideas , to gain the Notion of Immensity worse . Immensity ; it is but putting a Negative to the plain Notion of [ Measurable , ] and the Deed is done . Rather , 't is perfectly Demonstrable , that the Adding or Repeating our Ideas , cannot possibly give us the Notion of Immensity ; for , we have no Ideas , but of Finite Quantities ; and the Number of the Times we can repeat them , can be but Finite ; which the very Terms tell us , can never give us a Notion of an Infinite Quantity , or of Immensity . When he says , the Mind can repeat , double , or join Ideas , I must deny it , as impossible , unless , by the Word [ Mind , ] he means the Man . The Mind has no distinct Shop of her own , to work in a-part ; nor can she work without her Tools , or her Conjoin'd Instrument , the Body , as is prov'd above .

2. Nothing can be more solid , ingenious , or better express'd , than are his Discourses here about Place : In Place well explicated . which , he , in great part , observes the Sayings , and Common Language of the Vulgar ; which is the most Natural Way to explain those Notions which are Vulgar ones , and Common to all Mankind . Whence , when we will needs affix Significations , to the Words which are generally used to express those Notions , by our own Conceits , it will most certainly lead us into very great Errours . He only seems not to reflect upon the Common Saying of the Vulgar , that [ Things are in such or such a Place ; ] which shews , that their Notion of Place is to be a Container , and consequently , Extended ; the Body Contain'd , to which it is adjusted , being such .

3. He argues well ad hominem , against those who make Body and Extension the same Thing : I suppose , he and they Body and Extension not the same Notion . both mean , the same Idea ; for , the latter is not a Thing distinct from the Substance in which it is ; and the Ideas do most evidently differ , toto genere . Those Men's Way of Arguing from Ideas including one another , is purely Fantastical , unless those Ideas be Notions , or the Thing , as thus or thus conceiv'd ; which , like a kind of Parts , are in the whole Ens , and so may be said to be in it , or Predicated of it .

4. I have already prov'd , that Space is ( materially ) nothing else but Body , consider'd according to its Quantity ; Space cannot be without Extension . and those Preliminary Discourses , which pretend to demonstrate it , must either be confuted , or else it must follow , that ( whatever we may fancy ) the Parts of Space are both Separable , Moveable , and do resist Motion . Farther , to imagine Space , that is not Extended , is a perfect Contradiction , tho' not in the very Terms , yet by an Easie and Immediate Consequence . For , putting a Body to be in such a Space , it must be commensurate to such a Part of it ; otherwise , that Body might take up all Space ; and must do so , were it not Commensurate to some part of it only : And to fancy a Thing Commensurate to the Parts of what is extended , and it self not to be Extended likewise , is a most extravagant Conceit , and a plain Contradiction . Again , If a Body take up but one part of Space , and not another part of it , ( v. g. that part which is next it , or in which it is , ) Space must not only have Parts , but also one Part without Another ; which is the very Notion of Extension . Lastly , Since Imaginary Space is put to be Vast , and even Infinite , it cannot consist in an Indivisible ; wherefore , it must necessarily be Divisible and Diffused , that is , Extended : Whence follows , that , to fancy Body to be put in such a Space , or Place , ( for he grants here , §. 11. that these two Ideas differ but in a certain Respect , ) and yet not shove aside or remove those Extended Parts out of that Space , is to make the Extended Parts of that Space , and of the Body in it , to be within one another , or penetrated ; which implies a Contradiction . Now , if they be not Penetrated , one of them must necessarily drive the other out of the Space it occupates ; and therefore , the Parts of that Space must be Separable , Moveable , and Resistent , as those of Body are ; they being , in very deed , the self-same .

5. Hence is seen , that in all this Discourse about Pure Space , or Vacuum , Mr. Locke consulted his Fancy , Extension and Space differ only Formally , or in some nice respect . and not his good Reason attending to the Things as they are in Nature . That which mis-led him seems to be this , because he finds not in his Idea of Space , formally consider'd , the Notion of Divisibility , Separability , nor Resistance ; but that it abstracts from them all , as to the Formal Part of its Conception , by which 't is distinguish'd from those others . But , this is not peculiar to Space ; nor bears it any Shew of being a solid Ground for the Existence of Space separately from Body . For , Figure has not , in its Formal Notion , Quantity ; and yet 't is nothing but Quantity thus terminated . How many Notions have we of Quantity , and several other Modes , formally Distinct , which yet are nothing else , really and materially , but Quantity it self . Take Divisibility , Extension , Measurability , Proportionability , Impenetrability , Space , Place , &c. They have , all of them , some nice Formality , or different Respect , which distinguishes them ; and makes the Ideas or Notions of them , as such , to be Formally Exclusive of one another . Divisibility speaks the Unity of the Potential Parts of Quantity : Measurability , the Respect they have to some determinate Quantity stated by our Mind : Proportionability , such a Degree of Equality or Inequality to another Thing , or to their own Parts : Impenetrability and Extension , the Order or Situation of the same Potential Parts : Space , the same Quantity , precisely and formally , as it is a Capacity or Power to contain a Multitude of Things , without any Determination or Adjustment of the Space , to the Things contain'd in it ; so that the Notion of Space is the self-same as that of Room : And Place signifies the same Quantity , as having a Power to contain them Limitedly , and Determinately : Yet , notwithstanding , none ever conceited , that , because they were apprehended as formally distinct , they could therefore exist separately , without Quantity , or without one another , ( as he puts Space to exist without Body and Extension , ) tho' all their Ideas are thus formally Distinct : Nor , consequently , can Space , for the same Reason , exist without Extension and Body ; which seems to be his Ground , built on the distinct Formal Idea he has of Space , why he thinks there may be a Vacuum : Or else , his Ground is only a roving Imagination of a Vast Nothing beyond the Universality of Things , fancy'd by him to be a Thing he knows not what , nor of what Sort or Kind . But , enough of this formerly .

6. The Notion of Extension stands in his way , and therefore he endeavours to make it Unintelligible , and Inexplicable . The Common Explication of Extension defended . He objects , that , to say that to be Extended is to have partes extra partes , is the same as to say Extension is Extension . First , If it were the same in Sense , where 's the Harm ? so it be only meant , that it is the same in re ; or in the Formal Notion , as long as the Expression is Different , and not formally Identical . At this rate we may ridicule all Definitions : For , to say , [ Homo est Animal Rationale , ] is the same in reality , as to say , Homo est Homo . Next , I deny they are formally the same : Divisibility , which is the Notion of Quantity , expresses only , that the Body it affects , has Potential Parts ; and Extension expresses the Manner how it has those Parts ; viz. not Penetrated , or one within another , but without one another ; which adds a new Formality to the bare Notion of Quantity : And this is a fair Explication for such a most Common and General Notion ; which having no Proper Genus , but a Transcendent , can bear no exact Definition .

7. To our Objection , that if Pure Space or Vacuum be not really a Body , it not being pretended to be a Spirit , Ens adequately divided into Body and Spirit . it must be a meer Nothing , and so cannot exist ; he replies , ( if I understand him , ) that there may be a Thing that is neither Spirit , nor Body ; and he asks who told us there may not be such a Third Thing ? I answer , Our evident Reason told it us , by dividing Ens into Divisible and Indivisible ; which dividing Members , being Contradictory , allow no Third Thing which is neither the one , nor the other . Since then he must not say , that such a vast Expansion as Vacuum beyond all Bodies is Indivisible , either Mathematically , as a Point is , or Physically , as those Things are which are insuparably Hard ; it must be Divisible , and consequently Extended , Separable , &c. as a Body is . But this also he denies it to be ; and therefore 't is evidently concluded , that 't is a meer Nothing .

8. Nor will he acquaint us with his Thoughts , whether Vacuum be a Substance , or Accident , till we shew him a distinct Vacuum must either be Res , or Modus Rei ; otherwise , we can have no Notion of it . Idea of Substance : Which seems to me a witty avoiding the Question , rather than a Pertinent Answer . Indeed , we have no Distinct and Compleat Notion of a Suppositum , or Individual Substance , because it involves many distinct Notions or Considerabilities in it , as their Ground . But , of Substance it self , or , which is the same , of what is meant by the Word [ Thing , ] 't is scarce possible to be Ignorant , or to want a Distinct Idea of it : For , there is nothing from which we need or can distinguish the Notion of Substance , or Ens , and so to gain a Distinct Conception of it , but either Non-Ens , or Modus Entis ; from both which , honest Nature , if we attend to It , and not to Preter-natural Fancies , teaches us to distinguish it . I should put the Argument thus : Vacuum , if any Thing , must be either Res , or Modus Rei ; for we have no other Notions : But Vacuum is neither ; therefore it is pure Nothing . I believe Mr. Locke had the worst of the late School-men in his Eye , when he gave this Answer ; who , talking Metaphorically of Standing under , and Inhering , left their Readers in the dark , as to what they meant Literally . How God is Metaphorically called a Substance ; and how all our Notions and Words fall infinitely short of conceiving him as he is in himself , or of expressing him Literally , I have discoursed * * Preliminary 4. §. 39. above .

9. 'T is almost insuperably hard for those who are more vers'd in Mathematicks than in Metaphysicks , to get above The Extravagant Arguments for Vacuum refuted . Fancy , especially in this Particular of Vacuum , or Imaginary Space ; because , tho' plain Reason tells them that all Created Things are limited , both in their own Natures , and consequently in their Modes or Accidents ; yet , because they can fancy something beyond Bodies , they will needs conceit there is some Ultra-mundane kind of Thing existent out of the World , tho' it costs them that highest Absurdity of putting Non-Ens to be Ens , or Nothing to be Something . And the same Fancy furnishes them with plausible Apprehensions , which serve them for Arguments . So , Mr. Locke asks , If God should place a Man at the Extremity of Corporeal Beings , whether he could not stretch out his Hand beyond his Body ? I answer , that , in all Probability , he could neither stretch out his Hand , nor so much as live in a Region so remote from the Habitation of Mortals : Nor , did he live , how knows he but the Outmost Surface of the World is insuperably Solid and Hard ; as 't is likely it is , so to keep the World Compacted , Close and Tight ? Next , to put God ; at every turn , ( with all Reverence to his Divine Majesty be it spoken , ) to shew Tricks , meerly for the Interest of Their Tenet , ( as our Moderns use , ) is very Unphilosophical . He will say , it is only a Supposition ; which , even , tho' impossible , is sometimes allowable to put , that we may clear a farther Point . Nor do I look upon it to be any other but a Supposition ; only , I judge it to be a very Extravagant one , and Contrary to the Natures of Things . God's Infinite Wisdom has so contriv'd the World , ( * Omnia in sapientia fecisti Psal. 103. v. 24. Domine , ) that Created Things should be the Ground of Truth ; therefore , whatever Supposition or Position draws after it a Contradiction , is as Impossible , as that Two and Three should not make Five ; or that a Thing can be and not be at once . And , as it has been demonstrated , that when the Sucker in a Pump is drawn up , the Water must needs follow ; because , otherwise , it would violate the Natures or Essences of Things : And therefore , Vacuum , within the World , is impossible ; so no Force in Nature can make any Protuberancy in the World's Surface , because it would induce a formal Effect , viz. Distance , and yet Nothing to make that Distance formally . A Position as contradictory , as 't is to say a Thing is round , and yet no Mode or Accident of Roundness is in it , which is the Formal Cause of it as 't is Round . 'T is his Opinion , that they who deny Vacuum , must hold Body to be Infinite : Whereas , I hold it demonstrable that there is no Vacuum , nor Infinity of the World neither ; nor can I see any Dependence one of those Tenets has upon the other .

16. He conceives , that no Man can , in his Thoughts , set any Bounds to Space , more than to Duration . I ask , whether , We can set Bounds to Space , Time , and to all Duration but GOD's . by his Thought , he means his Judgment ? For , 't is evident , that he that can demonstrate , that the Mode or Accident cannot exist , where the Body or Thing , of which it is a Mode , is not ; or , that both the Extent of the World has , and its Duration will have an end ; can , and must , in his Judgment , set Bounds to both of them ; however his Fancy rambles and roves beyond his Judgment . Or , if he means , he cannot have a Notion of any thing so great , but a greater may be still conceiv'd ; then I answer , First , That our Conception cannot make or prove that to be , which is not . Secondly , That none can , indeed , possibly have such a Notion ( by his way ) of either of them ; but by our way very easily ; for , by adding a Negation to Finite , as 't is manifest we may , we may have a Notion of Infinite , which sets Bounds to all Imaginable Quantities , since none can pretend to imagine any thing beyond Infinity . The same way gives us the plain Notion of Immensity , by joining a Negation to Measurableness . Indeed , the Notion of Eternity can be explicated neither way ; neither by repeating or adding Ideas , nor by a Negation of Finite Time , compounding an Infinite Time , to which it may be conceiv'd Commensurable : For , to Endure , is to be ; and , tho' our Duration , which is accompany'd with perpetual Alterations and Changes , is therefore subject to Time , and Commensurable to such and such Portions of it ; yet God's Duration is of a far more Sovereign Nature . Let us reflect , when we say , God was from all Eternity , what those Words can mean . Infinite Time neither was , nor can be ; and therefore , to explicate Eternity by what neither was , nor can be , is to explicate it by an Impossibility , which is to make it Inexplicable . Time was not before the World , in re ; nor in our Understanding , for we were not yet ; nor in God's , for he , being Truth it self , cannot know any thing to be actually , when as yet it was not . Wherefore , since Eternity cannot be explicated by any Regard to possible Time , it is left that it must be explicated by what the Word [ Duration ] imports , viz. by Being ; and so it must consist in the highest Impossibility of Not Being , which naturally follows from the Notion of Self-Existence . Tho' I doubt not but those who are not got above Fancy , are as hard put to it , not to imagine a long Flux of Time before the World ; as they are , not to imagine a vast Expansion of Empty Space beyond the World . And so it must happen , till Connexion of Terms ( in which only , and not in the Fancy , Truth is to be found ) comes to govern Men's Thoughts , and establish their Judgments .

11. But , to leave these little Sallies and Inroads into Metaphysicks , and return to Annihilation implies a Contradiction , and is not an Act of Omnipotency , but of Impotency . to our Business : The next Argument is drawn from God's Power to Annihilate a Part of Matter , and keep the next Bodies from closing ; in which Case , a Vacuum between them is unavoidable . In Answer ; First , I ask how he knows God would keep the next Bodies , in that Case , from Closing ? If it be against the Nature of Things , he will not do it : And if it be a plain Contradiction , as we contend it is , Mr. L. himself will not say he can do it . Secondly , I fear it would look like a wild Paradox , and little less than Blasphemy , if I should deny that God can annihilate ; and yet , out of the profound and dutiful Reverence I bear to his Wisdom , Goodness and Power , I must declare , it is my Tenet , that he cannot ; any more than he can witness a Falshood , or be liable to any other Imperfection . It will be thought this limits , and consequently takes away his Omnipotency : And I , on the contrary , think I have far more Reason to judge , that the other Opinion argues Impotency , and ours settles his Omnipotency . Common Sense seems to tell us , that Omnipotency is a Power of doing all things , and not of doing Nothing . To Act , is to do something ; and therefore , to do Nothing , or make a Nothing , ( which the Sense of Annihilation , ) is , not to do : And , 't is a strange Notion of Omnipotency , which puts it to consist ( in such an Occasion ) in not doing . I wonder what Conceit such Discoursers make of the Divinity . What I am forc'd to conceive of him , as Essential to him , is , that he is a Pure Actuality of Being , ( as far as is on his part , ) actually , and ever exercised ; that he has no Power in him Undetermin'd to act , as we have ; which argues some Potentiality , or Imperfection in us . That , Actual Existence being Essential to him , his Peculiar Effect is , to give Existence , or to Create Things ; and to Conserve them in Being , which is a perpetual Creation , or Creation continued ; and , therefore , that 't is more Diametrically opposite to his Nature , to cause Not being , than it is for Light to cause Darkness . Whence follows , that whatever his Creatures are naturally disposed for , he is actually bestowing it upon them . Since then the Essences of all Creatures are Capacities of Being , the same Goodness that makes the Sun shine on the Just and Unjust , must give them continually to be actually . The Place is not proper to prove this Point at large ; but , were I writing Metaphysicks , and were oblig'd to handle it throughly , I should not doubt , but to demonstrate from the Natures of Action , Effect , Causality , the Specification of Action , from the Natures of Creatures , and almost each of God's Infinite Attributes , that Annihilation is both Impossible , and also most unworthy the Divine Nature . Some Witty Men think that Annihilation does best sute with God's Justice ; and thence conceit , that Eternal Damnation is nothing else but to be Annihilated . Whereas , indeed , this Tenet violates that Attribute in the highest Degree : For , to punish a Sinner without inflicting something upon him that is penal , is Nonsense : And , what Pain can a Sinner feel when he is Nothing , or is not ?

12. Indeed , Mr. Locke , §. 22. argues strongly , and ( as far as I can judge ) unanswerably , against the Cartesians ; The Cartesians can hardly avoid Vacuum . who make the innumerable Particles of their Aether , tho' jumbled together confusedly , still light so exactly , as to fill every little Interstice . Did they put them to be Fluid , and of a very Rare Nature , and so , easily Pliable , they might make some Sense of it : But they make them Solid , Dry , and of a Firm Consistency ; for , otherwise , the Particles of their Elements could not be made by Attrition of other Parts of their Matter ; of which , one of them is ( as it were ) the Dust. Nor can it avail them to say , those Particles are less and less indeterminately ; for , every Thing ( and Mode too ) in Nature ( especially if Consistent ) is determin'd to be particularly what it is , and as it is . Nor can there be any Thing of an Indeterminate Quantity , any more than there can be a Man in Common , who is Indeterminate and Indifferent to be This or That Man .

13. As for his alledging that Men have an Idea , of Vacuum , distinct from the Idea of Plenum , 't is true , indeed ; and The having an Idea of Vacuum , distinct from that of Plenum , no Argument to prove it . it means the same as Non Corpus , and consequently Non Quantum , Non Quale , &c. and is of the same Nature as is Chimaera , which means Non Ens. But , how does it follow hence , that it does or can exist , or that ( as he phrases it ) there is an Incomprehensible Inane ; unless , with the Vulgar Schools , we will make every Distinct nice Conception of ours to be a particular Entity , and capable of Existing a-part ; which I do not think Mr. Locke's good Judgment will allow of .

REFLEXION Eighth , ON The Fourteenth CHAPTER .

THis Chapter affords much Matter for Reflexion , which to do as briefly as I can , I will put my respective Negatives to Mr. Locke's Affirmatives , giving my Reasons for them , and invalidating his .

I deny , that the Notion of Time is so abstruse as he conceives it . The Word is used commonly by the Vulgar to The plain Sense of the Vulgar gives us the true Notion of Time . express what they mean by it , and their usual Meaning is the Notion or Nature of it . No Clown can be ignorant of it , if he ever read an Almanack , or saw a Sun-dial ; unless some witty Man comes to puzzle him with Doubts and Questions ; which he may even in things the Vulgar , and all Men living , know very perfectly . He knows , tho' not to a Mathematical Exactness , ( which is not requisite to our Time , or our Use of it ) that the Year begins on New-years Day , and that the Sun 's Diurnal Motion , till he returns to the same Line or Point , makes what we call a Day , and that a Day is divided into 24 Hours . He knows how many Days make a Month , how many Months a Year , &c. He esteems all these , however he divides them into lesser , or by Addition augments them into greater , to be Parts of Time ; and , consequently , Parts of the Sun's Motion , as well as he knew that a Day was such . If then they know that all particular Parts of the Sun's Motion are particular Parts of Time , let us abstract from all these Particulars , and the Motion of the Sun , in Common , is the Common Notion of Time it self in reality ; however the Formal Notion of Time consists in this , that it be Known and Regular , ( as the Sun's Motion is , as far as they can discern , ) so that they can measure and adjust all their Actions by it , which 't is evident they may . And this Formality of Time they do know too ; as appears by using or applying Hours , Days , Months , &c. to measure and adjust all their Motions or Actions by them . So that this whole Discourse of mine , Answering the Niceties objected , which escap'd the Observation of the Vulgar , seems to be built on that Solid Maxim , that The true Signification or Sense of the Words is to be taken from the Common Usage of them . If Mr. Locke pleases ( as I think he will not ) to coin Another Idea of it , and call it Time , he may if he pleases ; but it will not be the Notion of Time which Men have had hitherto ; nor will his new Notion sute with the Sense of Mankind ; nor is it possible the Signification he imposes upon that Word can ever obtain Acceptation in the World , unless some Supreme Authority , which commands all the World , should enjoin , under great Penalties , that such a Word be taken in that new Sense , and no other ; and even that will never be ; for all Mankind will never be under any such Authority .

2. I deny that Duration ought to be call'd Succession , unless restrain'd to Corporeal Duration is not Succession , but rather opposit to it . Duration , which is the least worthy that Name . For to endure is to be , which has Steadiness and Permanency in its Notion ; whereas Succession is essentially Change , and so rather opposit to Duration or Being . Nor is any thing said to Endure because it succeeds , but because it is all the while other things succeed ; or rather , while it self undergoes some Accidental Change . Whence our Being is not Commensurate to Succession as it is Being , but as it is Changeable one way or other ; which Changes being accompany'd with Motion , must consequently be Successive as it is . Angels and Pure Spirits have Duration , tho' they are Unchangeable , and therefore Unsuccessive ; having no Parts or Vicissitudes in their Natures or Operations , as Material and Quantitative Things , or Bodies , have . Moreover , the Notion of meer Being is Indivisible , whereas the Notion of Suceession is essentially Divisible ; whence they can have no Commensuration to one another . For which Reason , before ( as we apprehend it ) Motion or Succession begun , or after it is ended , the things afford us no Ground to conceive any thing like before or after , but only one Ever-standing or Unchangeable and Indivisible Instant ; which better expresses our Eternity , or constantly being ever , than any Correspondence to Succession or Motion can ; whose Natures are Finite in Duration , and so can never reach Infinite Duration , or that ever-constant Being call'd Eternity .

3. I deny absolutely , That the Notion of Succession ought to be taken from the Train of Ideas running in our 'T is a strange Paradox to say , the Notion of Succession or Duration is to be taken from the Train of Ideas in our Head . Heads , but from the Things in Nature ; and Mr. Locke , ( Chap. 5. ) makes Motion , which is the same with Succession , one of his Simple Ideas which comes into the Mind by divers Senses from Outward Objects . Which how to reconcile with his Doctrine here , I am at a Loss : Nor can I see why the Rowling of a Cart-wheel in the Street , or the Flying of a Bird in the Air , should not more naturally and more solidly give us the Idea of Succession , than our observing the Gliding of Ideas in our Fancy , or Mind .

4. I deny that his Argument , drawn from our not perceiving Duration when we sleep , does conclude that this Our not Perceiving Duration when we Sleep no Argument for it . Successive Train of Ideas gives us , or is the Notion of our Duration . For , none can think he endures not , whether he perceives it or no ; or that our Duration ceases , or is interrupted , tho' he thinks not of it ; or that its being longer or shorter depends on our having Attention to those Ideas , but on its Correspondence to more or less of the Sun's Motion : Nor , had we endur'd more or less , or been a Jot more or less Old , whether we had wak'd or slept all our Life-time . Nor , is this peculiar to the Idea of Duration , that we have no Perception of it in our Sleep ; but common to Extension , and all other Modes whatever ; which , nevertheless , are , or continue in being , after their manner , whether we perceive them or not . Wherefore his Notion of Duration taken from our Co-existence to such a Train of Ideas , is ill-grounded , as not having any the least Foundation in Solid Nature , but in Witty Fancy .

5. I deny also , that the Idea or Notion of Succession comes by Reflexion on our Train of Ideas : Because Experience This Tenet is against Experience . tells us it comes naturally by a Direct Impression from Outward Objects , which we see move or succeed .

6. I deny absolutely , that , tho' all that 's said be wav'd , a Train of our Ideas can either be a proper Cause of the Notion And against the Nature of Things , and of Resemblances too . of Succession , or represent it : For Succession or Motion has , of it self , no distinguishable , much less Actually distinct Parts , any more than Permanent Quantity , or Extension has any Nicks or Notches to butt , bound , determin or distinguish it here and there ; but they both proceed in one Even , Confus'd and Undistinguishable Tenour ; whereas in the Train of Ideas , each Idea is actually Distinct from the other . Whence the Notion of such a Succession ought to be One continued Idea , or the Idea of a Continuance , or else it resembles not the Thing as it is in Nature ; nor consequently , is it a Similitude or Idea of the Thing , or outward Object ; that is , 't is no Idea at all , nor so much as a good Phantasm ; much less is it a Notion , or the Thing so in the Understanding , as it is out of it . Whence I must utterly deny what he says here , §. 6. that Motion produces in the Mind an Idea of Succession , any otherwise , than as it produces there a continued train of Distinguishable Ideas . For , Distinction can never represent that which is essentially Indistinct , as Succession is : Or , if he means the Interval's between the Appearances of one Idea , and another are Indistinct and Confused , it will be ask't by what Idea this Indistinct Interval is made known to us ; and why the same Idea may not as connaturally be imprinted by the Motion of Bodies in Nature ; the Succession of which our Eyes , Ears , and Touch , do testify ?

7. I must deny too that Duration ( as he takes it ) and Succession cannot one of them be a Measure to the other . One Motion , if Known and Regular , may and must be a Measure to another . For , all that can be conceiv'd of the Notion of Duration ( besides Being ) fitting it to be a Measure , is some Designed Part of Motion or Succession : And , when two things move , that which moves more regularly ( provided it be evidently knowable , and its Quantity some way or other Determin'd ) is in all points fitted to be the Measure of the others Motion . Nor is it more difficult to measure the less Regular Motion by the More Regular one , if the other requisites be not wanting , than 't is to measure the Extended Quantity of a Permanent Body , v. g. a Yard of Cloth ( which as found in the Piece is Undetermin'd ) by a yard-wand , whose Quantity is Stated and determin'd . For Example , when I write or walk an hour , the Motion of Sand in an Hour-glass , which is more known and Determinate , measures the Motions of my Pen or Legs , whose Successive Quantity or Motion is less certainly known or Determinate than the other is . And , as that Determinate Motion measures the other , so the Motion of the Sun , which is knowable to all mankind ( which the Glass was not ) and , to their apprehension , Regular , brought to Proportionate and Determinate parts by help of our Understanding , is apt to measure all our Motions whatever ; which Measure we call Time , as I think , Mr. L. grants . Whence I deny that Time is measur'd by the Motion of the Sun ( as Mr. L. objects , and justly wonders at ) for it is that very Motion , fitted , as is now said , to be a Common Measure to all others . He mentions many other Signes or Marks of Periods supposed Equidistant , as the Returning of Birds at such Seasons , the Ripening of Fruit , or Fire lighted up at the same distance of Time , increast in Heat , &c. but what must measure the distance between those Periods ? Or , what 's this to our Time as it is now . St. Austin was puzzled to know , whether , if Rota figuli moveretur , and all things else stood still , there would in that Case be Time or no. But all these Extravagant Suppositions are frivolous . Mankind takes their Notions from things as they are , and as they work upon their Senses ; which , in our case , is the Regular and Known Motion of the Sun ; and they take the Notions of its parts , from the Designation , Division and Multiplication , made by our Understanding ; and not from wild Suppositions , which neither come home to the Point , nor are , ever were , or shall be ; nor are , or could be so Regular and Knowable to all Mankind , as this Motion of the Sun is .

8. I must absolutely deny , and moreover think it a most Extraordinary position , to affirm that we must not judge There is no shew of Reason that the Equality of the Periods of Duration can possibly be taken from the Train of our Ideas . that the Periods of Duration are equal , by the Motion of the Sun , but by the Train of Ideas that passed in Men's minds in the intervals ; which , I conceive , is the Sense of his §. 21. and §. 12. and of the Tenour of his Discourse in divers places . For , first , how does it appear that the Motion of the Train of those Ideas is it self Equal , or near Equal , in any one or the same Man at all times ; without which we cannot know by their Equal succession that the Periods which they are to measure are Equal , When a Man is in a stupid Humour , his Thoughts play very little and slowly ; when he is sound a-sleep , not at all ; when Awake and Brisk , or agitated by some great Passion , they move very swiftly ; when sedate and compos'd , more moderately ; so that 't is impossible to fix the succession of those Ideas in any Regularity . Next , how can we know that those Ideas move regularly , and not rather very differently , in diverse Men ? Contemplative , Melancholly and Dull Men use to fix their Mind long upon one Thought ; and , consequently , upon one Object of their Thought , or one Idea : Whereas those who are endow'd with Gayity of Wit , ( which is defin'd C●ler motus Intellectûs ) and those who are possest with Phrenzy or Madness have their Ideas succeeding one another very Swiftly : When we Judge , we fix our thought ; when we Invent , we muster up whole Armies of them on a Sudden . 3ly , Let any Man consult his own Interiour , and examin with the most exact Reflexion , whether his Ideas have mov'd Swiftly , or Slowly , the last hour , he will find himself at a loss to give any good account of them ; much more to assure himself , or ascertain others that they moved regularly : Wherefore the Train of Ideas ( and the same may be said of his other Imaginary Measures , §. 19. ) are quite destitute of that Chief Property of a Measure , viz. that it self be Regular ; and , if it concerns all Mankind , most Notorious to all who need it . For want of which , and for the Reasons lately given , perhaps no two Men in the World could agree , or come to a right Understanding with one another , about the Time of their Actions , which would put all the World in Confusion about their Common affairs . Lastly , Mr. L. assignes no Reason to evince the Regular succession of his Ideas in his §. 9. which seems the proper place to assert that Principal Point upon which all his Discourse depends ; and he only says , that he guesses that the Appearance of the Ideas vary not very much in a waking Man ; and that they seem to have certain Bounds in their Quickness and Slowness . And the Reason he gives afterwards , §. 10. for this ( as he calls it ) odd conjecture , is easy to be solv'd by our Principles : For , there is no doubt but that some short time must be allow'd for the coming of Impressions from without , for the ferrying them over the Medium , and the Re-exciting them in the Fancy , by which Notions are bred in our Mind ; which a very quick Motion of the Outward Object may prevent , as in a Brand whirl'd round , &c. and there must be also some Marks to make us observe too slow Motions ; Yet , between those two Extremes , there are so many Degrees , and such Variety intervene , that the Succession of those Ideas may nevertheless be very Uneven and Irregular . Rather , I may with better Reason , affirm that it is impossible it should be any way Regular at all ; since their Succession depends on the Fancy ( the most Irregular and Unconstant Faculty we have ) applying the Material Ideas or Phantasms a-new to the Seat of Knowledge ; which Application thousands of Causes may retard , or accelerate . His Objections against the Regularity of the Sun's Motion not being Mathematically such , is of no force . 'T is sufficient that it be so Regular as serves our use to measure , and adjust our Actions by it ; and the same may be Objected against one measuring Cloth by a Yard-wand , whose length is never Mathematically Exact .

9. Wherefore , Notwithstanding the respect I have for Mr. L. I cannot but think that such quivering Grounds as This odd Tenet not positively asserted by Mr. L. these can never support his most unaccountable Opinion , §. 12. that The Constant and Regular Succession of Ideas in a Waking Man , are , as it were , the Measure and Standard of all other Successions . His own good Judgment saw well the weakness of his grounds ; wherefore his clear Sincerity , and usual Modesty would not suffer him to deliver assertively , and assuredly , what he saw was Uncertain ; and therefore he propos'd it rather as a Paradox , or ( he calls it ) an odd Conjecture , than maintain'd it as a Position ; however , the Conception being so New , he was tempted not to pretermit it wholly : In doing which too , I believe , he not so much gratify'd himself , as the Humor of most late Philosophers ; who are far more addicted to value what 's Quaint than what 's Solid .

REFLEXION Ninth , ON The Fifteenth CHAPTER , Of Duration and Expansion consider'd together .

1. I Have already said enough of Imaginary Space , Imaginary Time , and of the true Notion of Eternity . Philosophers must speak of Things as they are , if they mean ImaginaryTime before the World , a meer Illusion of Fancy . to speak Truth ; and , therefore , the applying our Idea of Duration , which is a Mode of Ens , to Imaginary Time before the Creation , when as yet there was no such Ens as was Capable of such a Mode , is evidently against the First Principles of our Understanding ; and the same Illusion of Fancy that induced Mr. L. to put Space ( which is a Mode of that Ens called Body , and neither has , or ever had any Being but its , nor Power to beget any Idea at all in the Mind , but by being It ) beyond the World , that is , beyond the Universality of Things ; where there can only be pure Nothing . When we relinquish the Things on which only Truths are grounded , all the Ideas we pursue and substitute in their Rooms must necessarily be meer Fancies , and inevitably plunge us into Contradictions and Absurdities . Wherefore , I have no Occasion to make any further Reflexions upon the Grounds of this present Discourse , the Foundation of it being , I hope , overthrown in my Preliminaries , and divers other places ; yet , upon his Manner of his carrying it on , I must a little Reflect . As ,

2. First , That they who endeavour to introduce Opinions Inconsistent with our Natural Notions , must be They who advance Tenets against Nature , must alter the Meaning of those Words that express our Natural Notions . forced to change the Common Signification of Words , lest they cross them in their Discourses , and in the Explication of their Tenet . Hence ( as I have noted above ) Mr. L. alter'd the Signification of the Word [ Solidity , ] to make way for an Unsolid Being , or an Empty Space , as also , the meaning of the Word [ Extension , ] which he would confine to Material Beings ; and chose to make use of the Word [ Space , ] because it seem'd less to connotate the Notion of Body , than Extension did . And , here , he rather chuses to make use of the Word [ Expansion , ] as if it were better , that is , Different from Extension . The Word is proper enough , for which I do not much blame him : Only , I must affirm , that no Wit , nor even Fancy of Man , can conceive or imagine any thing , existing any where but in the Imagination , ( or , even scarcely there , ) to be Expanded , but it must also be really Extended ; nor to be Extended , but it must be Divisible ; and , therefore , its Parts Separable by the intervening Body , ( which he denies of his Inane , ) unless we put them to be insuperably Hard , Solid , or Infractil , as Epicurus did his Atoms ; or that , if they be thus Extended , and yet the Parts of the Inane do not separate , and give way to a new-come Body , there must not inevitably follow a Penetration of Extended Parts ; that is , those Parts that must be without one another , must be at the same time within one another ; which is a direct Contradiction .

3. Secondly , I cannot but specially remark , to what incredible Extravagancies Fancy , if not check'd by Reason , God's Immensity not Commensurate to an Infinitely Expanded Space . transports Men , tho' otherwise of the greatest Parts ; even so far as to conceit that God's Immensity consists in a kind of Quantitative Diffusion of his Essence , or in the Commensuration of it to an Infinite Expansion . For , what else can his Argument here , §. 2. for his Infinitely Expanded Inane mean , couch'd in these Words , [ Unless he ( viz. the Denier of such a Vacuity ) will confine God within the Limits of Matter . ] What , I say , can this mean , but that he apprehends God's Unconfin'd or Infinite Being , would be Confin'd , Finite , and consequently Lost , unless there were an Infinite Quantity of Imaginary Space answerable to it in Extent or Expansion . A Conceit certainly most unworthy the Divinity , whose Essence was equally Immense ere any Creatures were made : Nor can any of his Essential Attributes be taken in order to them ; for , this would give his Essence some kind of Dependence on his Creatures . This is something like ( but much worse than ) the Opinion of those Ancients , who thought God to be the Soul of the World . — Penitúsque infusa per Artus Mens agitat molem , & magno se corpore miscet . Which Whimsy making God a kind of Compart with Matter , is long since exploded out of the Schools by the solid Principles of Christian Faith . God is not in his Creatures by any Co-extension to them , or any other way than by giving them Being ; and his Immensity , which is Essential to him , consists in this , that , did an Infinity of Creatures exist , he would be Intrinsecally , and of himself , able to give , or rather , actually giving Being to them all . Or else , [ Existence ] being the least Improper Notion we can attribute to God , he is said to be Immense , because his Existence is Illimited , or Infinite .

4. Thirdly , I much wonder what those Words should mean , [ And he , I think , very much magnifies to himself the We can have no Notion of a Vacuum , but a Fancy only . Capacity of his own Understanding , who persuades himself that he can extend his Thoughts farther than God exists , or imagine any Expansion where he is not . ] For , First , I deny any Understanding can conceive or have any Notion of a Vacuum , tho' he may have a Fancy of it ; the Notion being the Thing it self in our Understanding , imprinted by Outward Objects , by means of the Senses ; whereas , his Inane never made , nor can make any Impression upon the Senses at all . Next , For the same reason , I deny our Thoughts are extended to Imaginary Space , if by Thoughts he means Notions , or Judgments built on them . Lastly , I see not why our Fancy may not extend it self farther than God Exists ; that is , ( as is lately explicated , ) gives Being to Creatures ; as well as Fancy can extend it self farther than God's Omnipotency can act . Splenetick or Maniacal Men can fancy they are made of Glass ; that , if they make Water , they shall drown all the World ; that , tho' standing on the Ground , they touch the Moon ; that their Nose , tho' but an Inch and an half long , touches and feels the opposite Wall , tho' perhaps a Furlong distant : The Quaker fancy'd he was a Grain of Wheat ; and , when any Pidgeons flew over his Head ; fell down in a marvellous Fright , lest they should peck him up , and fly away with him , &c. Now , none of these are a possible Object of the Divine Omnipotence , which is employ'd in making Things , which are the Ground of Truth ; and not in making Nothings , or undoing the Natures of Things , ( as Fancy does , ) and so laying a Ground for Falshood and Contradiction .

5. Fourthly , I remark , that the Texts of Holy Writ , which speak humano more , or in Accommodation to our Scripture-Texts the worst sort of Arguments for Philosophers , unless they be most Plain , and Literally meant . low Fancies and Conceptions , are the worst sort of Arguments imaginable , and most unfit to be alledg'd for such by a Philosopher ; being apt to lead us into a Thousand Enormous Errours . For , if they be taken in a Literal Rigour , ( as Philosophical Arguments ought , ) they would make God no better than his poor Changeable Creatures . They would make him , at every turn , Angry , Sorry , Repentant , Subject to all , or most Passions ; Moving from this place to that ; and liable to Innumerable Imperfections . All which are opposite to the Unchangeable Nature of the Divinity ; and therefore ought to be remov'd from him , as far as our Thoughts can distance them .

6. The Divine nature is Essentially Actual Being ; and he goes below his Soveraign Excellency who conceives any Only Self Existence , and what flows from that Notion , is Peculiar to GOD. thing of it by any other Notion , or Speaks of it by any word that is in the least Potential , or comes not up to Actual and Essential Existence . All his Attributes , as Metaphysicks demonstrate , do flow or follow from that infinit Source of all Perfection , Self-Existence ; or rather , are nothing but It diversly conceived by us ; and , therefore , cannot , according to Literal Truth , be any other way rightly explicated but by Being . Much more then are all the Modes of Ens , founded in Creatures , especially those belonging to the basest of all other Entities , Corporeal Things , ( such as are Diffusion , or Commensuration to Space or Quantity ) most highly Derogatory to that most Simple and All-comprehending Mind , which eminently and actually contains them all , and concenters in its self all Possible Being . Creatures are no more but [ Rags of Being , torn into thin Formalities ; ] Whereas the Divinity is the Inexhausted Source of Existence or Being it self in the most Full , Compleat , and Intire Latitude its vast Notion can bear .

7. I should think my self very happy , if I could correct this Influence of Fancy over Men's Thoughts , when they Our Natural Notions assure us , that 't is meer Fancy to explicate GOD's Attributes by respect to Corporeal Natures . speak of Spiritual Natures , without making long Excursions into Metaphysicks ; and , perhaps , this plain Discourse may help much towards it ; it being fetch'd from our most Natural Notions , and known to us ( as it were ) by a kind of Experience . Let us take then any Spiritual Mode or Accident , a Virtue for Example , and let it be that of Temperance ; which done , let us ask our Natural Thoughts , how Long , Broad , or Thick that Virtue is ? Is it as little as a Barly-corn , or as big as a House ? Is it a Yard in Length , or but an Inch ? Is it as Thick as a Wall , or as Thin as a Wafer ? &c. And , Honest Nature would answer for us , that 't is Nonsense to ask such a Question ; its nature being perfectly of another kind , and utterly disagreeable to any of these Accidents . Again , Let us ask what Colour or Figure it is of ? Is it Blew , Green , or Yellow ? Is it Round , Four-square , or Triangular ? Is it Rare or Dense , Hot , Cold , Moist , or Dry ? And we shall discover that the Asker , if serious , would be look'd upon by all Mankind as a Fool or a Mad-man ; such Qualities as these being as much Disparate from the Subject we are Enquiring about , as Knowledge is to a Beetle , or Science to a Mushrom . And yet , it would not be wonder'd at , that such Questions as these should be ask'd of any Body whatever . And what does this amount to , but that Nature assures us , by her free and sober Acknowledgment of it , that this Spiritual Mode , call'd Virtue or Temperance , is quite different from the whole Nature of Body , and from any Corporeal Thing that by our Senses ever enter'd into our Fancy . Since then this Spiritual Mode or Accident has nothing at all to do with Body or its Modes , it is clearly evinced by the Ingenuous Confession of Unprejudiced Nature , that the Subject of it , which we call a Spirit , is so vastly removed from all we can say of Body ( Being only excepted ) that 't is perfect Nonsense to attribute any thing to it which we find in Corporeal Natures . Since then we can truly say of Corporeal Natures , that they are Long , Short , Diffus'd , Extended , Commensurate to one another in their Bulk , Motion , Duration , &c. we must be forced to deny all those of Spirits ; and to Judge that they have nothing to do with any of these , nor can bear the having such Modes apply'd to them , or said of them , under Penalty of forfeiting our plainest Reason , and contradicting Common Sense . And , if it be such an Absurdity to apply them to Created Spirits , how much more absurd must it be to explicate God's Eternity , Infinity , or Immensity by such gross Resemblances , or an Imaginary Order to the Short and Fleeting Natures of Corporeal Creatures ?

8. Lastly , to sum up all , I deny that the Notion of Motion is taken from the continu'd Train of Distinguishable Ideas ; and I affirm that it is Imprinted by the Object without me , and is one continually successive and undistinguish'd Mode there as it is in the Thing . I deny too , that Duration is Motion or Succession , but only Being ; tho' our Being ( it being Unconstant and Fleeting ) is accompany'd with Succession , and subject to Motion and Time ; and commensurate to them , only ( not as 't is Being , but ) as 't is Fleeting , or perpetually Changing some way or other . I deny it also , as the most prodigious Enormity a Rational Soul could be liable to , thro' its giving up the Reins of Reason to wild Fancy , to say , that our Measure of Time is applicable to Duration before Time . For Mr. Locke makes Duration inconceivable without Succession , and there could be no Succession before the World , when there was only one Unchangeable God , in whom is no Shadow of Vicissitude or Succession . Does not the plainest Sense tell us , that we cannot apply one thing to another , but there must be One and Another ; and where 's that Other Duration or Succession before Time , or before the World , whenas 't is confess'd there was none . Can any Man apply a Mode of Thing to Nothing , which yet must be avowed by this Author ; for before the World there was nothing but God ; to whom it could not be apply'd , and therefore there was nothing for Mr. L. to apply it to . But this is parallel to that seducing Fancy that inveigled his Reason to hold a Vacuum ; he took the Notion of Space from Body , and then apply'd it to what was neither Spirit nor Body , but meer Nothing ; and , here , he took his Notion of Duration , or Succession from Bodies moving ; and when he has done , he would apply it to what 's not Body ( nor Spirit neither ) nor Motion , nor like it , but contrary to it ; that is , he would apply it to meer Nothing . I desire he would please to consider , that the Thing to which Another is Apply'd must exist as well as that which is Apply'd to it ; and this antecedently to his Application of one to the other . Wherefore both Space and Duration being both Modes or Accidents , he must first prove , there is something beyond the World to which he can apply the Mode of Space ; or something before the World , to which he can apply the Mode of Successive Duration , or it is perfect Nonsense even to talk of Applying one to the other . But this he has not done , and his way of attempting to do it seems to be this ; first , he fancies he can apply those Modes to something there , and then ; and thence concludes , there must be Things there to which they may be apply'd ; as if his Fancy could create Entities at Pleasure , or to please her Humour . Nor matters it that we can apply stated Measures of Duration , and thence imagin Duration where nothing does really endure or exist , or by this means imagin to morrow , next Year , or seven Years hence ; for we cannot apply them by our Reason , but only upon Supposition that they will exist , and then there will be also some Thing or Subject supposed fit for them to be apply'd to ; whereas an imaginary Space beyond the World , or imaginary Time or Succession before or after the World , neither is now , nor can there ever be any possible Subject to which they can be Apply'd ; and so the Application of them can bear no manner of Sense . I must confess the word [ imagin ] which Mr. L. uses , cap. 14. § 32. is very fit for his purpose , and gives the greatest Semblance of Truth to his Discourse . But , by his Leave , our Imagination cannot create Entities , nor make Things , to which he is to apply his Ideas , to exist when they do not , nor ever will exist ; and , unless it can do this , his Application is no Application ; for to apply a Thing , or Mode of Thing , to Nothing , is no Application at all . Both Space and Successive Duration are Modes Proper to Body , whence only we had them ; and , a Mode without the Thing of which 't is a Mode ( Modes having no Entity of their own ) is a meer Nothing . Let him prove then first , that there are beyond or before the World any Thing to which they can be apply'd ; otherwise he will be convinced to ground all his Discourse on this Principle , [ Whatever we can imagin , is . ] Which Maxim being utterly deny'd , he must make it Evident by Proof . Which if he does , it will do his Book more Service , than any Principles taken from all the Sciences in the World ; for all these are as much opposite to Him , as he is to Them .

REFLEXION Tenth , ON The 16th and 17th CHAPTERS .

1. I have little to except against his 16th Chapter , of Number . Nothing , certainly , could have been deliver'd more solidly , or more ingeniously . I only Endless Addition of Numbers can never give us the Notion of Infinity . reflect on the last Words in it ; viz. That the Endless Addition of Numbers , so apparent to the Mind , is that , I think , which gives us the clearest and most Distinct Idea of Infinity . For , since it is granted that all we do actually conceive , how much soever it be , is Finite ; and all our Ideas are of what we do actually conceive ; I cannot comprehend how that which is Finite can give us the Idea of Infinite . It may be said , that our Reflecting that we can still add more Endlesly , is that which gives us the Notion of Infinity . I reply , that , were this Addition of Numbers taken from the Objects side , so that we saw that by such an Addition , Number might at length arrive to be truly or actually Infinite ; then , indeed , that Object ( viz. Number ) thus consider'd , or reflected on , might beget in us the Idea or Notion of Infinite : But , 't is taken only from our side , who are the Adders , or Multipliers ; and so , means only that we can never come to take so much of it , but more may by us be still taken ; whence , since all we can possibly take of it ( our Term of Life , and consequently , our Additions being stinted and Limited ) must still be Finite ; this may , indeed , furnish us with an Idea or Notion of a very great Number , and by us Incomputable ; which notwithstanding , for any thing we can thence gather , may be of it self Finite , tho' our Additions can never de facto reach its by-us-Innumerable Total . Now , how a Finite Number , a finite Number of Times repeated , tho' we called in Algebraical Multiplication to our Assistance , can give us the Notion of Infinite , which is contradictory to it , surpasses all Imagination . And , instead of shewing how it does so , Mr. Locke tells us here , that we must Suppose an Inexaustible Remainder beyond the Finite Idea , and that Infinity consists in a Supposed Endless Progression ; which is , in a manner , to suppose or beg the whole Question : For , if this Inexhaustible Remainder be still actually Finite , ( especially , if held by us to be such , ) it can never give us the Idea of Infinite Actually , which only is the true Idea of Infinite ; a Potential Infinity , or a meer Power to be Infinite , rather signifying not to be Infinite ; for , nothing is , what it is only a Power to be , especially such a Power as is never Reducible to Act : Wherefore , this Inexhaustible Remainder must be supposed more than Potentially , that is , Actually Infinite ; which is the Thing in Question . Or , if he says , this Remainder is only a Power to be still greater , but is Impossible ever to be actually Infinite , then how can it ever , possibly , beget in us an Idea of True or Actual Infinity ?

2. I have explicated above , by how plain and easie a Method we come to have our Notion of Infinity ; which is , How we come to have that Notion , * * Prelim. 4. § 31 , 32. by joining the Sense of the Adverb [ Non ] to that of [ Finis : ] And Mr. Locke , Ch. 17. §. 8. seems to come over to my Thoughts ; where he says , that the Idea of Infinity seems to be pretty Clear , when we consider nothing in it but the Negation of an End . Whereas , on the other side , he grants , that the Idea of an Infinite Space or Duration is very Obscure and Confused . Now , if the Clearness of an Idea be the greatest Perfection it can have , it follows , even from his own Concession , that the Idea of Infinity ought rather to be taken from the Negation of Finiteness , than from this Confus'd Way of Adding and Repeating more and more of Space or Duration . Add , that ( as was said ) this way can only give us the Idea of a Potential Infinity ; nor that neither well , unless that Power to be Infinite could ever be reduc'd to Act , which is impossible it should : Now , the Negation of Finiteness fully reaches an Actual and Absolute Infinity ; and is applicable , and truly to be Predicated of God himself , and all his Intrinsecal Attributes , as Being , Duration , Power , Wisdom , &c. without needing any Recourse to the transitory and limited Natures or Modes of Creatures to explicate it . Whereas , Mr. Locke's Idea of Infinite cannot be predicated of God , or his Attributes , at all : Nor can we say that God is Infinite , in his Sense of that Word ; in regard he says , that our Idea of Infinity is ( as he thinks ) an Endless Growing Idea ; For , the Infinity of God , and of all that can be conceiv'd to belong to him , is incapable of Growth , Degrees , or Additions ; but is one Indivisible Being , without any possibility of our conceiving more or less in it , if we conceive it as we ought .

3. On the other side ; How facil and natural is my Way of our gaining an Idea or Notion of Infinite ? We see And with what Ease . most Things we converse with to be Limited , or Finite ; wherefore , the Notion of the Thing as 't is limited , or ( which is the same ) the Notion of Limitation or End , is very familiar and obvious to our Thoughts . Since then Experience teaches us that we can very easily join a Negation to Finiteness or End when-ever we please , as well as we can to any other Notion ; and , thence , have a kind of Complex Notion of Infinite , as well as we can of Immortal , Immense , Immaterial , Incorporeal , Indivisible , &c. We have the Notion of Infinity given to our hands , without more ado ; or without perplexing our selves with making use of those ●ame Helps of Adding or Repeating those stinted Measures of Corporeal Modes or Accidents , whose very Natures ( besides the Finite Number of Times we can only repeat them ) do make them utterly Incapable ever to reach Actual , that is , True Infinity .

4. As for the Question he introduces here , viz. Whether the Idea of Infinite be Positive , or Negative , or includes The Notion of [ Infinite ] is most perfectly Positive . something of both ; my firm Opinion is , That , however the Gramatical way of expressing that Conception seems to be Negative , yet the Notion it self meant by that Word , is altogether Positive . My Reason is , because the Idea or Notion of Finis or Limit ( in what kind soever it be ) does formally signifie [ no farther in that kind , ] which is perfectly Negative : Wherefore , the Negation added to Finite , in the Word [ Infinite , ] quite taking off that Negative Sense which did before belong to the Word [ Finite , ] gives the Word [ Infinite ] a Sense purely Positive . Again , we can have no Direct Impression from the Thing ; nor , consequently , Direct Notion of [ Infinite , ] nor , consequently , any Reflex Notion of it ; for , all Reflex Notions have for their proper Object , the Direct ones which are already in our Minds : Wherefore , if the Notion of [ Infinity ] can be had any other way than by adding [ Non ] to [ Finite , ] it must come from our Reason finding out by Discourse , that there is a First and Self-existent Being , whose Essence and Attributes are beyond all Limits , or actually Infinite . Whence follows , that , since clear Reason demonstrates , that all Created Entities , and consequently , all the Modes belonging to them , are Finite , and only God is Infinite in his Essence , and in all his Intrinsecal Attributes : And Reason also tells us , that all which is in God , ( to whom only the Notion of Infinite can belong , ) is most highly Positive ; the same Reason teaches us to correct in our Thoughts the Grammatical Negativeness of the Word [ Infinite , ] which can only be apply'd to Him ; and to look upon it , and esteem it , as most perfectly Positive .

5. I cannot pass by , unreflected on , a Passage , §. 16. in which Mr. Locke's Fancy imposes strangely upon his Duration easily conceivable , without Succession . Reason : He says , that Nothing is more unconceivable to him , than Duration , without Succession . What thinks he of the Duration of God , in * * James 1. 17. whom is no Vicissitude , or Shadow of Change ; ( which Text , I believe , no Man , at least , no Christian , but holds to be Plain , and Literally True ; ) whereas , Succession is essentially perpetual Change ? Let him please to reflect , that [ To Endure so long , ] is nothing else but [ to be so long ; ] which done , by cutting off [ so long ] in both those Sayings , he will sind , that [ To Endure , ] is neither more , nor less , but simply [ To be . ] Whence his Conceit is so far from being True , that Nothing more wrongs Duration , or Being , than does Succession , or Motion . And , therefore , our Duration here , which is Unsteady , Unconstant , and Transitory , is justly reputed to be the worst sort of Duration , or Being ; and the next to Not-Being , or Not-Enduring at all . Again , Common Sense tells us , that nothing moves meerly for Motion's sake ; and , therefore , that all Motion is , to attain something which is Not-Motion , but the End of it , that is , Rest. Wherefore , Eternal Rest , or that Duration called Eternity , is the End of all the Motion of the whole World ; conformably to what the Holy Scripture , speaking of the State of Eternity , tells us , that , * * Apocal. cap. 1. v. 7. Tempus non erit amplius ; Time ( nor , consequently , Succession ) shall be no more . Wherefore , since , taking away Motion and Succession , 't is impossible to imagin any thing in Duration , but only Being ; and Eternity is an infinitely better Duration , or State of Being , than this Transitory one , which is Successive ; it follows , that Eternal Rest , in which we have all we can have , or could acquire by Motion , at once , is the only true Duration , and our Duration here only the way to it . So far is Duration from being Unconceivable without Succession , if we guide our Thoughts by Principles , and not by meer Fancy .

REFLEXION Eleventh . ON The Eighteenth , Nineteenth , and Twentieth CHAPTERS .

1. THE three next Chapters of Simple Modes , are very suitable to Mr. Locke's Doctrine delivered formerly , and almost all of them agreeable to Nature ; Thoughts are not to be call'd Sensations . particularly the 20th , which gives us more genuin Definitions of the several Passions ; and more aptly , in my Judgment , expresses them than Mr. Hobbes has done ; tho' he is justly held to have a great Talent in delivering his Conceptions . But , I must deny that the Perception or Thought , made by Impressions on the Body , by Outward Objects , is to be called Sensation . For if Thoughts be Sensations , then the Sense can Think ; which being the proper Act of the Mind , I believe none will say if he reflects that our Soul is of a Spiritual Nature . Nor are the Modes of Thinking at all proper to the Senses . The Truth is , that Man having two Natures in one Suppositum , all the Impressions upon him as he is an Animal , do also at the same time ( I may say the same Instant ) affect him also as he is Spiritual ; whence they are to be called Sensations , as they are receiv'd in that material Part called the Seat of Knowledge ; and the same Direct Impressions , as they proceed farther , and affect his Soul , are call'd Notions , or Simple Apprehensions . Wherefore , as the two Natures in Man are Distinct , and have their Distinct Properties and Modes ; so the Words , that are to express what 's peculiar to each of those Natures , are to be Distinguish'd too , and kept to their proper Signification ; which cannot be , if Thought , which is peculiar to the Mind , be confounded with Sensation , which properly belongs to the Corporeal part . But I suspect the Printer may be here in the Fault , and not the Author ; the Sense in this place being something imperfect .

2. To the Question proposed , ( Cap. 19. § 9. ) Whether it be not probable , that Thinking is the Action , and not the Thinking is the Action , and not the Essence of the Soul . Essence of the Soul ? I answer , That 't is more than probable ; for 't is Demonstrable , that 't is only the Action , and not the Essence of it . For , in such Natures as are potential , or apt to receive Impressions from other things , ( as the Soul is in this State ; ) and therefore their Essence does not consist in being Pure Acts ( as Angels are , ) Being must necessarily be presuppos'd to Operating ; especially , when their first Operation ( as Thinking is to the Soul ) is a meer Passion , caus'd by Impressions from another thing ; which are therefore purely Accidental to the Subject that receives them . And I wonder Mr. Locke would even propose this as a Question to be yet decided , or think it but Probable ; since he has formerly maintain'd assertively , That Men do not always think : For if it be not certain that Thinking is not the Essence of the Soul , it follows necessarily , that Men must always think ; since the Soul can never be without her Essence , or what 's Essential to her .

3. His Position , that Things are Good or Evil only in reference to Pleasure or Pain , however it may hap to be misunderstood Mr. L.'s Position , that Things are Good or Evil only in reference to Pleasure or Pain , is True and Solid . by some well-meaning Bigots , is a most solid Truth ; and is exceedingly useful to explicate Christian Principles , and to shew God's Wisdom and Goodness in governing Mankind Connaturally . He proposes to him Fulness of Joy , and Pleasures for evermore ; and such as , being Spiritual and most Agreeable to the Nature of the Soul , are Pure , Durable , and filling the whole Capacity of its boundless Desire ; not Transitory , Mean , and Base ; which , tho' they cloy , never satisfie . Heaven would not be Heaven , if it were not infinitely Pleasant and Delightful ; nor would Hell be Hell , if it were not Penal . And in case that Explication of Epicurus his Tenet , which is given it by some of his Followers , be truly his , which makes Man's Summum Bonum consist in Pleasure at large , and chiefly in the best Pleasures of the Mind , it would not misbecome a Christian Philosopher . Whence results this Corollary , that The whole Body of Christian Morality depends , as on its Practical Principle , upon our making a wise Choice of the Pleasures we pursue here . For , the Object of our Will , and consequently , of its Acts of Love , is an Appearing Good , and the Lively Appearance of that Good is that which makes the Will prompt to act effectually ; whence , since that which breeds Pleasure in us , must needs appear Lively to be a Good to us , there needs no more but to chuse wisely what is most Pleasant , or most Agreeable to our True Nature , Reason ; ( such as the best Spiritual Goods are ; ) and we may be sure by such a well-made Choice to arrive at that Best , Greatest , and Purest Pleasure , Eternal Glory .

REFLEXION Twelfth . ON The 21th . CHAPTER .

1. IN this Chapter of Power , I find more to admire than confute . The Author always Ingenious , even when he errs , has here much out done his former The due Commendation of Mr. L's Doctrine in this Chapter of Power . self . Particularly , his Explication of Freewill , is ( generally speaking ) both Solid and Acute ; and his Doctrine that Liberty is consistent with a perfect Determination to Goodness , and Virtue is both Learned and Pious . Yet I am forced to disagree with him in some particulars : In giving my Thoughts of which I will imitate Mr. Locke's laudable Method ; in making my Discourses Subservient , and in shewing them to be Agreeable , to Christian Principles .

2. 'T is an excellent Thought , that The Clearest Idea of Active Power is had from Spirit . For Bodies can act no otherwise , That some Spiritual Agent is the First Mover of Bodies . than as they are acted on themselves ; nor can the first mov'd Body that moves the rest , push others forwards farther than it self is moved by something that is not Body , or by some Spiritual Agent ; which therefore has the truest Notion of Agency in it , without any Mixture of Patiency ; because the Body mov'd cannot react upon it . Tho' therefore we may have by our Senses the Idea of Action and Passion , from the Effects we see daily wrought by Natural Causes on fit Subjects ; yet the Clearest Idea of Action , is given us by our Reason , finding out that the Beginner of Corporeal Action is a Separated Spirit , or pure Act ; and therefore not at all Passive from any other Creature , nor from the Body it operates on , by Reaction , as is found in Corporeal Agents . And , our Reason gives us this Idea , ( as it does many other Reflex ones ) by seeing clearly that neither can there possibly be Processus in infinitum amongst Corporeal Agents ; nor can they , of themselves alone , begin to move themselves , nor move one another Circularly ; and therefore the First Corporeal Motion must necessarily be Originiz'd from some Pure Spirit or Angel . Now , Mr. Locke conceives that the Soul , according The Will cannot move our Bodies . to her Faculty call'd [ Will ] moving the Body , gives him this clearest Idea of Active Power ; which Tenet I have in diverse places disprov'd * * Preliminary 4. §. 25. 26. Refl . 5. §. 1. formerly ; and shown that the Soul , by reason of her Potential State here , cannot principiate any Bodily Action ; nor the Man neither , unless wrought upon by some External or Internal Agent , which is in act it self .

3. He Judges with good reason , that the Vulgar mistake of Philosophers , in making every Faculty or Power a Distinct The Understanding and Will , not Distinct Powers . Entity , has caus'd much Obscurity and Uncertainty in Philosophy ; which humour of Multiplying Entities , I am so far from abetting that perhaps he will think me to err on the other hand , in making the Understanding and Will to be one and the same Power , and affirming that they only differ , formally , in Degree . He shows clearly how , in proper Speech , the Will is not Free but the Man ; unless it be signified with a Reduplication , that by the Word [ Will ] is meant Man , according to that Power in him call'd the Will. For Powers ( as he discourses well ) belong only to Agents , and are Attributes only of Substances , and not of the Powers themselves . Perhaps this reason of his will abet my position , that the Understanding and Will are the same Power . Those who make them two , do this because they find in the Notion of [ Will ] only a Power of Acting , and not of knowing ; and in the Notion of [ Understanding ] only a Power of knowing , and not of Acting : But the same Men make the Understanding direct the Will , which they call a Blind Power ; by which they make one of those Powers , formally as such , to work upon the other , as if the former were an Agent , and the latter a Patient . I add , moreover , that they do this with the worst Grace that is possible ; for what avails it the Will , to be directed by the Understanding , if it does not know how the Understanding directs it ? And to make the Will to know , is to make it a knowing Power , which is to make the Will ( tho' they never meant it ) to be the Understanding . Not reflecting in the mean time when our Understanding is full of any Apparent Good , the Man pursues it , and so becomes , or has in him a Principle or Power of Acting ; which is what we call Will .

4. Perhaps a Philosophical Discourse , beginning from the Principles in this affair , if exprest Literally , and pursu'd Man's Freedom , or Self determination , deduced from Principles . home by Immediate Consequences , may set this whole business in a Clearer Light ; and show us very evidently how Man determins himself to Action ; and therefore is Free ; as also how he is Predetermin'd to determin himself , than any particular Reflexions on our own Interiour : Which , tho' they may oftentimes have some Truth in them , yet , not beginning from the bottom-Truths that concern the point in hand , they can never be steady , but are now and then liable to some Errours .

5. Beginning then with the Animal part in Man , and considering him barely as an Animal , and wrought upon as The Difference between Man and Brutes in their Determination to Action . other Animals are , I discourse thus . Particles , agreeable to the Nature of the Animal , being by the Senses convey'd into the Brain , do , if they be but Few , lightly affect it ; and work no other effect but a kind of small Liking of it ; If more , they make it ( as we say ) begin to Fancy it : But , if they be very many , and sent from an Object very Agreeable or Good to such a Nature ; they will in proportion to their Multitude and Strength , cause naturally a Tendency towards it , and powerfully excite the Spirits , so as to make the Animal pursue it ; that is , they will become such a Principle of Action ; which in meer Animals we call Appetite . To which Action that meer Animal is not carry'd thro' Choice , or Freely , but is naturally and necessarily Determin'd to Act for the Attainment of that Good , in the same manner as Iron follows the Load-stone . But , if we consider this Animal , as having now a Rational and Knowing Compart join'd to it , things will be order'd after another manner : For , those Impressions are carry'd farther than the Region of the Brain , even into the Soul it self , which is endow'd with a Faculty of Reflecting upon those her Notions , whence she gains exacter Knowledge of those Bodies that imprinted them . Nor only so , but she can reflect upon her own Operations too , and know that she knows them ; by which means she comes acquainted with her own Nature , and comes to see that Knowledge and Reason is that Nature of hers ; which she finds is a Nobler part of the Man , than is the Body ; because by it she excels and governs Beasts ; and , in great part , under God , manages Corporeal Nature . Moreover , she can discourse her Thoughts , compare the Objects , or the Goods they propose , and gather the Preference some ought to have above others .

6. Things standing thus with the Man , it is evident that he has now not only that Nature called the Body , to Man naturally pursues what is according to Reason , or Virtuous . provide for ; but another , and that a Spiritual , and much better Nature , to look to , and to procure for it all the Good he can , and such Goods as are Agreeable to it . He finds evidently , that no Corporeal Things can be its Proper Good , taking it as 't is Distinct from the Body . He may easily discern , that its Distinct Nature being Knowing , or Rational , nothing can perfect it but what is according to Reason , or improves Knowledge ; and that the Acquisition of Science does perfect it in the latter Regard , and Virtue in the Former ; Virtue being nothing but a Disposition to act according to Right Reason in such and such Matters , or in such and such Occasions . Reason therefore is the Ground of all true Morality ; and , to act according to Reason , is to act Virtuously : Wherefore , to act Virtuously would be most Natural to Man , if his True Nature be not depraved ; which it cannot , without Impiety , be thought to be , if we consider it as it came immediately from God's Hand . Wherefore , if it be not so now , but be blinded and mis-led from Reason and Virtue , by Passion and Vice , ( as we experience it is , ) it is demonstrable hence , a posteriori , that it has been Therefore his Nature has been perverted since his Creation . some way or other perverted since its Creation ; which Christianity tells us , has happen'd thro' Original Sin , transfus'd from Adam . Moreover , as the Sense of Corporeal or Sensible Pleasure or Pain invites the Man to pursue what is for the Good of the Body , and makes him tend towards what 's Agreeable , and eschew what 's Harmful to it ; so , in Man , as he is Rational , there is , or ought to be , answerable to those , a Spiritual Pleasure and Pain , viz. the Satisfaction and Dis-satisfaction of Mind , which we call Conscience , or the Law of Nature , annex'd to all our Actions ; our Thoughts ( as St. Paul says ) accusing or excusing one another ; so to keep us from Unreasonableness , or Vice , and make us more pliable to follow Reason or Virtue . For , as Grief or Pain is caus'd in us by our Knowing that our Bodies , for which we have a great Concern , is Disorder'd ; so the Stings of Conscience ( as far as they proceed from Nature ) come from our Knowing that our better part , our Soul , for which we ought to have an incomparably higher Concern , is wounded or disorder'd in her Rationality , which is her Essence .

7. Hence is seen , that Man is apt to be wrought upon by two several sorts of Motives , viz. those which are sutable Therefore Supernatural Motives are added , to strengthen Man's weaken'd Nature , or Reason . to the Good of the Body , and those which are agreeable to the Good of the Soul . Now , were not Humane Nature ( as was said ) perverted , these two could not clash ; nor would there be any Inclination in the Man to do any thing which could prejudice his Superior Part , Reason ; to which the Inferior , the Body , is naturally Subservient . But , Man's Nature being poison'd in the Spring-head , the Motives of the First Kind did hazard quite to over-bear the Motives of the Second Sort ; and so Mankind became liable to act , in a manner , perpetually against Reason , or , ( to express it in Christian Language , ) all his Actions might have been Sinful , and himself a Slave to Sin . Wherefore , to obviate the violent Impulses of Passion , and to strengthen our Reason against its Assaults , God's Wisdom , Goodness and Mercy took care to give us a Doctrine full of Supernatural Motives , and those the most powerful ones that could be conceiv'd ; taught us by a Divine Master , and ascertain'd after the best Manner ; so to make the Appearance of the Eternal Goods it proposed ( if reflected on ) Lively ; which might keep us upright , and move us effectually to follow our true Nature , Reason ; and so pursue our true Last End , by the Practice of Virtue .

8. Now , there can be no Question but that , both in the State of Pure and Uncorrupted Nature , as also in the Supernatural Motives being the stronger , would always prevail , were they duly Apply'd to a Subject dispos'd . Corrupted State of it , thus powerfully assisted , the Innate Propension of the Will tending strongly to Good or Happiness ; and [ Good ] and [ Motive ] being in our Case the same , Eternal Goods would most strongly carry the Will , and prevail over Temporal ones ; as certainly as Heat ut octo would prevail over Heat ut duo , were there the same Application of one as of the other to the same Object equally well Dispos'd ; in case the Proposal or Appearance of both these Goods were but Equal .

9. Both these Motives , Natural and Supernatural , have their several Species or Phantasms beating upon the Why the Understanding and Will must be the same Power substantially . Seat of Knowledge ; with this difference , that the Natural Phantasms , being directly imprinted , are Proper ones ; but those Reflex ones , being of Spiritual Natures ( as the Words and Language they are express'd in do testifie ) are Metaphorical and Improper . As then , when in a meer Animal a Sensation is made by a small Number of Agreeable Effluviums they make only a slight Fancy , Imagination or Representation of it ; but when an Impression is made by a great Multitude of them , the Animal is Naturally ripe for Action , and is Enabled , or has a Power to act , which Power , thus prompt to act , we call Appetite : So ( as was said above ) in a Rational or Knowing Animal , a small Quantity of Reflex Notions may serve to give it a speculative Knowledge of the Object proposed : But , when those Reflex Impressions are many , and of such Objects as , being very Agreeable or Good to our true Nature , are therefore highly concerning us to have them ; the Appearance of them is so Lively , and the Strength of their Motive Force is so great , that the Man becomes fit to act for them ; which Principle of Action we call Will . So that Knowledge and Will differ but in Degree , as did Fancy and Appetite in a meer Animal . By which Explication are avoided all the Incoherent Positions about this Subject ; such as are , that the Understanding directs the Will ; that the Will knows ; that one Power works upon another , &c. Whence is seen ,

10. First , That the way to conquer in our Spiritual Warfare , is , to strive to Multiply and Strengthen those Reflex How to conquer in our Spiritual Warfare . Thoughts , especially those given us by Supernatural Motives ; and to make their Appearance Lively in the Soul ; that so it may be able to beat down and overcome the opposite Band of Impressions from Corporeal Objects which assault it : Which I conceive to be what is Literally meant by a Lively Faith working in us that best Virtue , Charity . Next , in order to the same End , we must endeavour , by a cautious and prudent Avoidance , to lessen and weaken the Impressions from Corporeal Objects ; which is done by that Virtue which we call Temperance , or ( when 't is to some high degree ) Mortification ; and , by that means to dim the Appearance those Objects would otherwise make ; lest , if it be too Lively , they should overcome the Motive Force of those Objects which are Spiritual . But , it is to be noted , that the multiplying , or frequently repeating those Reflex Impressions , are not so necessary to every Person , nor always the best . For , a Wise , Judicious Christian , who , out of a Clear Sight of Spiritual Motives , has ( by a thorow-Penetration of their Excellency and Preferribleness ) his Speculative Thoughts so Lively , that they fix his Interior Practical Judgment to work steadily for the Attainment of Eternal Happiness , is a far more Manly and Strong Christian , than those who arrive at a high Pitch by the frequent Dints of Praying , or other good Exercises , almost hourly continued : For , those Well-knit Thoughts , and Rational Judgments , are ( as it were ) an Impenetrable Phalanx ; and being Connatural to our Reason , no Assault can shock or break their Ranks . Yet , even in those firmest Souls , Christian Discipline and Vigilance must be observ'd ; lest , not having those strong Thoughts or Judgments still in readiness , they be surprized by their Ghostly Enemy ; which I take to have been King David's Case , when he first sinn'd .

11. Secondly , It is seen hence , that Man determines himself to Action , or is Free . For , 't is evident , both to Reason 'T is evident , that Man determines himself to Action , and Experience , that all those Thoughts , Discourses , Judgments and Affections , he had in him before , naturally , or supernaturally , are the Causes of the Determination of his Will. Wherefore , all these being Modes or Accidents belonging to him , and Modes not being Distinct Entities from the Thing to which they belong , but the Thing it self , ( or , the Man thus modify'd ; ) it follows , that Man determines himself to Action ; or , is a Free Agent .

12. Thirdly , Since Man has neither his Being , his Powers , his Actions , nor consequently , the Circumstances by Yet , as Predetermin'd by GOD. which he came to be imbu'd with his good Thoughts ( from whence he has the Proposals of his true Good , and of those incomparable Motives to pursue it ) from Himself ; but had all these from the Maker and Orderer of the World : And , since this Series of Internal and External Causes ( called , in Christian Language , God's Grace ) did produce this Determination of himself , 't is manifest , that he was Predetermin'd by God , the First Cause , thus to Determine himself , as far as there was Entity or Goodness in his Action .

13. Fourthly , Since all our Powers are , by the Intent of Nature , ordain'd to perfect us , and that Power , called Determination to Virtuous Action does perfect , and not destroy Freedom . Freedom , does not perfect any Man while he determines himself to that which will bring him to Eternal Misery ; it follows , that the more he is Determin'd to Virtue and true Goodness , the more Free he is . Again , Since a Man is Free when he acts according to the true Inclination of his Nature ; and the true natural Inclination of a Man is to act according to Right Reason , that is , Virtuously ; it follows , that Freedom is then most truly such , and the Man most truly Free , when he is Determin'd to Virtuous Actions . Whence Irrationality , or Sin , is by the Holy Ghost called Slavery , which is opposite to Freedom . From which Slavery , the Mercy of God , meerly and solely through the Merits of his Son , our Redeemer , has freed us .

14. Fifthly , We Experience , that the Lively Proposal of Temporal and Eternal Goods , when it arrives to that Good , if evidently Appearing such , does certainly determine the Will. pitch , that there is hic & nunc , such a Plenitude ( ex parte Subjecti ) of such Objects or Motives , that it hinders the Co-appearance , Co-existence , and much more the Competition of the Contrary Motives , does always carry the Will , or the Man , along with it . For , the Object of the Will being an Appearing Good , and no other Good , in that Juncture , ( at least , Considerably , ) appearing , because the Mind is full of the other ; it follows , that the Inclination of the Will to Good in Common , which Man is naturally determin'd to , must needs carry the Soul ; no other ( as was said ) then Appearing . Whence , Mr. Locke's Position , that Uneasiness alone is present ; and his Deduction thence , that therefore nothing but Uneasiness determines the Will to act , is shewn to be Groundless : For , an Appearing Good cannot but be always Present to the Soul ; otherwise , it could not appear , or be an Appearing Good .

15. Sixthly , Hence wrong Judgments arise , either thro' Want of Information , as , when Men are not imbu'd How Wrong Judgments come . with sufficient Knowledge of Eternal Goods ; or else , thro' Want of Consideration ; whence , by not perfectly weighing and comparing both , they come to prefer Temporal Goods before Eternal ones .

16. Lastly , 't is to be noted , that Sin does not always spring from False Speculative Judgments , but from their Sin generally springs from True but Disproportionate Judgments . being Disproportionate . For , 't is a Truth that Temporal Goods are in some sort Agreeable to us ; nor would they hurt us for loving them as far as they merit to be lov'd , provided we did but love Eternal Goods as much as they deserve to be loved too . Sin therefore is hence occasion'd , that thro' too close and frequent a Converse with them , we too much conceit , and make vast Judgments of these Temporal Goods in proportion of what we make of Eternal ones . And , were not this so , no Sin would remain in a bad Soul when separate , or in a Devil ; nor , consequently , the proper Punishment of Sin , Damnation , because they know all Truths Speculatively . Wherefore , their Inordinate Practical Judgments ( in which Sin consists ) springs hence , that they do not conceit , or ( as we say ) lay to heart the Goodness of True Felicity , because they over-conceit or make too-great Judgments of the Goodness found in some False Last End , which they had chosen . Yet these Disproportionate Judgments , tho' Speculatively True , are apt to beget wrong Practical Judgments , and wrong Discourses or Paralogisms in the Soul of a Sinner , to the prejudice of his Reason ; as has been shown in my METHOD , Book 3 , Less . 10. §. 18.

17. Mr. Locke's Discourse about Uneasiness , lies so cross to some part of this Doctrine , that it obliges me to examin Of Uneasiness , and Mr. L's discourse concerning it . it . He endeavours to shew that Uneasiness alone and not Good or the Greater Good , determines the Will to Act. His Position , tho' new , and Paradoxical , is very plausible ; and , taking it in one Sense , ( viz. that there is always some Uneasiness when the Will is Alter'd in order to Action , ) has much Truth in it ; and it seems to have much Weight also , by his pursuing it so ingeniously : Yet there is something wanting to render his Discourse Conclusive . For ,

18. First , If we look into Grounds and Principles , they will tell us , that 't is the Object of any Power , which Good is the only Determiner of the Will ; and not Uneasiness . actuates , or determines it ; and the Object of the Will cannot be Uneasiness : All Uneasiness being evidently a Consequence , following either from the not yet attaining the Good we desire , and hope for ; or from the Fear of Losing it . And , if we should ask whether Uneasiness does affect the Will , otherwise than sub ratione mali , or , because it is a Harm to the Man ; and Ease otherwise affect it , than sub ratione Boni , ( that is , because it is Good to him ; ) I believe it is impossible , with any Shew of Reason , to deny it . Now , if this be so , it will follow , that 't is Good only which is the Formal Motive of the Will ; and Ease , no otherwise than as it is Good .

19. Secondly , All that we naturally affect being only to be Happy , or to be well ; it follows , that Good only is that Prov'd from our Natural Desire of Happiness . which our Rational Appetite , the Will , strives to attain ; or pursues , and acts for .

20. Thirdly , Appearing Good being held by all , to be the Object of the Will , ( for none hold , that Good will The Appearance of the Good is of greatest weight , but , in a manner , disregarded by Mr. Locke . move it , unless it appears such ; ) and the Greater Appearance of it having a greater , and sometimes the Greatest Power to move it , I observe , that tho' Mr. Locke does now and then touch slightly at the Appearance of the Good proposed to the Understanding ; yet , he no where gives the full Weight to the Influence the several Degrees of this Appearance have over the Understanding , to make the Man will it ; but only denies that Good , or the Greater Good , in it self , determines the Will. Whereas , even the Greatest Good , ●dimly appearing such , may not , perhaps , out-weigh the least Good , if it be very Lively represented , or Apply'd close to our view , by a Full Appearance of it . Hence , his Argument , that [ Everlasting Unspeakable Goods do not hold the Will ; whereas , very great Uneasiness does , ] has not the least Force ; because he still leaves out the Degree of their Appearing such to us . For , since ( especially in our Case ) eadem est ratio non entium , & non apparentium ; and no Cause works its Effect , but as it is Apply'd ; he should either have put an Equal Appearance of the two Contesting Motives , or nothing will follow .

21. Fourthly , This Equal Appearance put , his Argument is not Conclusive , but opposes himself . For , the Putting this Appearance , his Reasons do not conclude . prodigious Torments inflicted by the Heathen Persecuters , upon the Primitive Martyrs , were , doubtlesly , the Greatest present Uneasiness Flesh and Blood could undergo ; yet the Lively Appearance of their Eternal Happiness , ( tho' Distant , and Absent , ) which their Well-grounded Faith , and Erected Hope assur'd them of , after those Short , tho' most Penal Sufferings ; overcame all that Inconceivable Uneasiness they suffer'd at present .

22. Lastly , How can it be thought , that the getting rid of Uneasiness , or ( which is the same ) the Obtaining Prov'd , because Ease is not the Perfection of a Soul . of Ease , can be the Formal and Proper Object of the Will. Powers are ordain'd to perfect the Subject to which they belong ; and , the better the Object is which they are employ'd about , so much , in proportion , the Man is the Perfecter , who applies that Power to attain it . It cannot then be doubted , but True Happiness being the Ultimate Perfection Man can aim or arrive at , which is only attainable by Acts of his Will ; that Power was naturally ordain'd to bring Man to his highest State of Perfection by such an Acquisition ; or , by loving above all Things , and pursuing that Object ; and , consequently , since this consists in obtaining his Summum Bonum , 't is the Goodness of the Object , apprehended and conceited such , which determines the Will ; and , therefore , the Straining after Greater , and even the Greatest Goods , and being Determin'd to them , is what , by the Design of Nature , his Will was given him for . Now , who can think , that meerly to be at Ease , is this Greatest Good ; or the Motive , Object , End , or Determiner of the Will ? Ease , without any farther Prospect , seems rather to be the Object of an Idle Drone , who cares not for perfecting himself at all ; but sits still , satisfy'd with his Dull and Stupid Indolency . It seems to destroy the Acquisition of all Virtue ; which is Arduous , and not perform'd but by Contrasting with Ease , and present Satisfactions . It quite takes away the very Notion of the Heroick Virtue of Fortitude ; whose very Object is the Overcoming Ease , and attempting such Things as are Difficult , and Inconsistent with it . I expect , Mr. Locke will say , that all these Candidates of Virtue had not acted , had they not , according to their present Thoughts , found it Uneasie not to act as they did . But I reply , that Uneasiness was not their Sole Motive of Acting , nor the only , or Formal Determiner of their Will : For , in that case , if meerly to be rid of Uneasiness had mov'd them to act , meer Ease had satisfy'd them . Whereas , 't is Evident , they aim'd at a Greater Good than meerly to be at Ease . In a Word ; Ease bears in its Notion , a Sluggish , Unactive , and most Imperfect Disposition : It seems to sute only with the 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , or Insensibility of a Stoick . Pleasure and Joy have some Briskness in their Signification : Desire is Active , and implies a Tendency to some Good we affect : But the meer being at Ease denotes no more but a Stupid Indisturbance ; which Noble Souls hate , as mean , and are weary of it : And , if Ease be the proper Motive and Determiner of the Will ; and the Greatest Good the Will can have , or wish , is Eternal Glory ; it would follow , that the Glory of the Saints and Angels in Heaven is nothing but being in the best manner at Ease ; which is far from Elevating the Soul to the highest Degree of Perfection , as Glory , or the Beatifying Sight of God does ; and only signifies , she is , when in Heaven , securely out of Harm's way , or free from being disturb'd ever after : By which , no great Good accrues to her , but only a kind of Neutral State , in which she shall receive no Hurt .

23. The true Point then seems to me to stand thus ; The Object of the Will , an Appearing Good , works many The Truth of this Point stated . Effects immediately consequent to one another . First , When the Appearance is but slight , it begets a Liking of it ; when Lively , a Love of it , which determines the Will to it ; to which , if Great , follows an Effectual Tendency towards it , called Desire of it . Desire not satisfy'd , troubles us , or makes us Uneasie : Uneasiness makes us strive to change our Condition , to get Ease . This makes us to cast about , and Consider how to find Means to do it : Means found , we make use of them , and actually go about to rid our selves of what was Uneasie to us . Now , tho' some of these are nearer to our Outward Action than others , yet the Appearing Good in the Object is the Common Cause which produces all those Orderly Dispositions ; in virtue of which , as the First Motive , they do all Act , Assist and Concurr to determine our Will to go about the Outward Action with Vigour .

24. Ere I part with this Chapter of Power , I am to observe , that Mr. Locke has not any where so much as Mr. L. omits here the Idea of Power to be a Thing , tho' Nature suggests i● touch'd at the Power to be a Thing ; tho' Nature gives us as Clear a Notion of it , as of any other Power whatever . For , as oft as we see one Thing made of Another , which we know is not Created anew , so often our Natural Reason forces us to acknowledge that somewhat of the former Thing could be made another Thing ; and this , as evidently as when we see a Thing Act , which did not Act before , we must acknowledge it had antecedently a Power to Act ; and thence we frame an Idea or Notion of such a Power accordingly . But of this Power , called Matter , and of its Metaphysical Compart , the Form or Act , I have treated largely already in my Appendix to my Method , to which I refer my Reader ; as also here , Preliminary 5. §. 6 , 7. I note , by this Omission of the Notion of Metaphysical Power , or Matter , that Mr. L. holds so rigorously to his First Ground , that all our Notions are got by Sensation and Reflexion , that he seems to make account , that , by working upon these , we do not gain other Notions by using our Reason ; in which Sense , I must deny that Ground of his . Or else , he omits this , and other Notions , ( especially Metaphysical ones , ) because he finds no Proper or Formal Similitudes for them in his Fancy ; which makes it still more Evident that he too much consults his Imaginative Faculty , to the Prejudice of his Reason ; and , too frequently , means by his Ideas , meer Fancies . Which also is the reason why he blunders so about the Notion of Substance .

REFLEXION Thirteenth , ON The Twenty Second and Twenty Third CHAPTERS .

1. I Find nothing in Chap. 22th , [ Of Mixed Modes ] to reflect on , but what has been spoke to already . The Author pursues with much Accuracy his Our Mixture of our Notions is Regular , Mr. L.'s Irregular and Disorderly . own Method of shewing how his Ideas of Mixt Modes are made up of Simple ones . Which , in a manner , falls into the same , as does our way of ranging all our Notions into the Common Head of Substance and its . Modes , and then compounding them as Use and Occasion invites us , or rather as Nature forces us . Nor do I see how the Name ties ( as Mr. Locke fancies ) the several Ideas together , more than barely by signifying the Combination of them made before-hand in our Minds . The different Method in this Point , taken by Mr. Locke and us , seems to be this . That We , by distributing our Ideas or Notions into Ten Common Heads , do know at first view in which Box to look for them ; and , this discover'd , we find also all our Particular Notions , that are within the Precincts of each Head , by Dividing the Head it self by Intrinsecal Differences , or more and less of it ; which done , the Mixture of that Compounded Notion is Close and Compacted ; each Part of it , if in the same Branch of that Division , being Essential to the other . And , if some Part of the Compound Notion be taken from other Heads , we , by looking into their Notions , and Comparing them by our Reason , know how much , and what Share of that Notion is borrow'd from others , and belongs or not belongs to it ; and in what manner it belongs to it : Which teaches us how to predicate diversly ; and instructs us how the Terms of our Propositions are connected , and whether they be connected at all . Which exceedingly conduces to Science , and ( as we conceive ) is hardly performable by his way , but rather is Inconsistent with it . Again , while we Divide those Common Heads , in case our Division be rightly made , we , with the same labour , frame Genuin and Proper Definitions of each Notion under each respective Head . Whereas , we conceive , his way of Mixing his Ideas wants the Beauty of placing their Parts orderly , which the Process from Superiour to Inferiour Notions has ; and his Mixt Ideas , if he goes about to explain and compound them , have so Ragged , Shatter'd , and Dishevell'd an Appearance , that 't is hard to determin which of his Simple Ideas that makes this Mixture , ( much more which of his Compounded ones ) is to be the First , Second , Third , &c. So that the Definitions of his Ideas do more resemble a Confused Heap than a Regular Building ; as will be observ'd by any Man who reflects on those Definitions and Explications of his Ideas he now and then gives us . In which , however it may be pretended , that his Materials are oft-times proper , and the same with ours , yet it will be impossible to shew , that his way of laying those Materials together is Regular , Artificial , or Handsome . He speaks of the Combinations , Compositions , and Mixtures of his Ideas ; but I do not remember he ever tells us , much less maintains , their Regularity , or the Order in which his several Ideas , or the Words which express them , are to be placed ; which must necessarily leave his Reader 's Thoughts in much Confusion . Indeed , it seems not to have been his Intention in this Treatise to observe the Rules of Art , but only to give us our Materials ; wherefore , as I do not object , or much impute this Deficiency , so I thought it not amiss to note it .

2. While I perused Mr. Locke's 23th Chapter , of the Idea of Substance , I was heartily grieved to see the greatest Without knowing what Substance or Thing is , we cannos pretend to Philosophy . Wits , for want of True Logick , and thro' their not lighting on the right way of Philosophizing , lay Grounds for Scepticism , to the utter Subversion of all Science ; and this , not designedly , but with a good Intention , and out of their Sincerity and Care not to affirm more than they know . He fancies that the Knowledge of Substance and Extension are absolutely Unattainable . Now , if we be altogether Ignorant what Substance or Thing means , we must bid Adieu to all Philosophy , which is the Knowledge of Things , and confess that we talk all the while of we know not what : And , if we be invincibly Ignorant of what Extension is , farewell to all the Mathematical Sciences ; which , ( those that treat of Number , or Arithmetick , excepted ) do all of them presuppose our Knowledge of Extension , and are wholly grounded on that Knowledge . Wherefore , that I may perform the Duty I owe to Science and Truth , I judge my self obliged first to establish the Literal Truth in this Point ; and , next , to satisfie his Scruples and Difficulties . In order to which I discourse thus .

3. We can have no Knowledge of a Nothing , formally as such ; therefore all our Knowledge must be of Things one All our Notions , and , amongst them , that of Substance or Res is taken from the Thing . way or other ; that is , all our Knowledge must either be of the Res or the Modus rei ; or , ( as the Schools express it ) of Substance or Accidents ; for , other Notions we cannot have . Again , Since Mr. Locke grants the Accidents or Modes are not distinct Entities from the Thing ; they can only differ from it Notionally ; or , as divers Notions , Considerations , Respects , or Abstracted Conceptions , which our limited Understanding ( not able to comprehend at once the whole Thing , and all that belongs to it , in the Bulk ) has of the Thing , which grounds them all . Hence all our Knowledge of Quantity , ( under what Name , or in whatever Formality we take it ) is of the Thing as 't is Big , Divisible , or Extended : Our Knowledge of Quality , is of the Thing consider'd according to what renders its particular Nature Perfect or Imperfect . Relation is still the Thing , according to that in it which grounds our comparing it to others . Now , as we can consider the Thing according to its Modes or Accidents , so we can have another Notion or Consideration of the Thing as to its own self ▪ abstracting from all these former Considerations ; or a Notion of the Thing , ( not according to any Mode it has , but ) precisely according to its Thingship ( as we may say ) or Reality ; that is , in order to Being ; or ( which is the same ) we can consider it precisely and formally as an Ens , Res , Substance or Thing ; and all we can say of it , thus consider'd , is , that 't is capable to be actually . For , since we see Created Things have Actual Being , yet so that they can cease to be ; all that we can say of them , ( thus consider'd ) is , that they are Capable to be . Besides , since we see they have Being , were this Actual Being or Existence Essential to them , they would be of themselves , and so could not but be ; and , consequently , must always be ; which our common Reason and Experience contradicts ; in regard we know them to have been made ; and we see many of them daily Produced , and others Corrupted . This Discourse is built on this Principle , that all our Ideas or Notions ( and amongst them the Notion of Substance or Thing ) are but so many Conceptions of the Thing ; or which ( taking the Word [ Conception ] objectively ) is the same , the Thing thus or thus conceiv'd ; which , besides what 's said here , is prov'd at large in my Second and Third Preliminaries .

4. Now , according to this Explication , which when we are distinguishing the Notion of Thing or Substance We cannot be Ignorant of the Notion of Substance or Thing . from its Modes ( as both of us are here ) is evidently true ; it is so far from being Impossible to know , even distinctly , what the Word [ Substance ] or , which is the same [ Thing ] means , or what Substance is , that it is impossible to be ignorant of it . For , every one must needs know what it is to be ; since without knowing this , we could not understand any thing another says , nor what our selves think ; for all this is perform'd by Affirming or Denying , express'd by [ is ] or [ is not , ] which speak Actual Being , or not Being . And 't is in a manner Equally Impossible not to know what [ Capacity ] or [ Power ] means ; which are the only Ingredients of [ Capable to be , ] which is the very formal Conception of Ens , as 't is precisely Ens ; or , of the Thing according to the meer Notion of Substance , taking that Word in a Logical Sense , as 't is distinguish'd from Accidents ; and not in a Grammatical one ( as it were ) for a Supporter of the Accidents ; for , this is a Secondary Sense of [ Thing , ] and does not signifie what it is in it self , or according to its Primary and precise Notion , as is noted above ; but , according to what Respect or Consideration it bears to others , or other Notions .

5. Thus far concerning the Idea or Notion of Substance in Common , or taken as abstracted from its Modes or Accidents . We know the more Inferiour Notions of Things less perfectly ; Descending thence to such and such sorts of Substances , and keeping still in that Line , 't is plain that there goes more to their Composition , than there did to constitute the bare Notion of Substance it self ; and therefore the Modes or Accidents must be taken in ( for there is nothing else in Nature imaginable ) to constitute them such and such : Wherefore , the Complexion of those Accidents which constitutes them of such or such a Nature , and nothing else , is ( as the Schools phrase it ) their Substantial or Essential Form . And , if we go yet lower , there will need still a greater Complexion , or a Decomposition of Accidents for the same Reason ; and so still more , till we come to an Individual Thing ; or , as they call it , the Substanstantia Prima ; which , only , is in proper Speech , A Thing , because And the Individual Essence least of all . It only is Capable of Existing . But , when we are got to this lowest Step in the Climax of Substance , I mean to the Individuum or Suppositum , which includes in it all the Modes that constituted the Superiour and Inferiour Natures above it , and those innumerable Accidents over and above , which distinguish it from all other Individuums of its own kind , and by which it is perfectly determin'd to be This in particular , and no other ; then , 't is no wonder our bewilder'd Thoughts are lost in a Wood ; it being impossible for us to conceive , find out , much less to know distinctly the confused Medley of those Numberless Accidents or Modifications found in the Suppositum , which do compleatly constitute its Individual Essence .

6. And hence arises Mr. Locke's first Difficulty , and his Apprehension that we can make nothing of the Idea of Substance . To gain a Distinct Notion of Substance or Thing , me must consider it abstractedly from its Modes , singly consider'd . But , he may please to reflect , that we ought to distinguish between the Notion of a Thing or Substance taken as Involving all the Modes aforesaid ; and the Notion of Thing , as Excluding , Abstracting from , and Contradistinguish'd to to them all ; in which later Sense I take it here , and himself too , as appears by his Considering it as a Supporter to the Accidents . Which done , I am confident his Difficulty will be at an End : For this is as easie to be done , as 't is to see the Difference between the meer Notion of Thing , ( or what 's Capable to be ) and such a Thing , or Capable to be of such or such a Nature . Next , he thinks that all we can make of the Idea of Substance is , that it is a Substratum , or Supporter of the Accidents . To whch I Answer , that if we consider Substance in reference to its Modes , we do indeed make such a Metaphorical Conception of it ; but not , if we do ( as we ought when we consider it singly ) conceive it as 't is in its self , or as to its own precise Notion , or Idea . 'T is partly the Impropriety and Unfitness of the Word [ Substance ] ( as I have noted Preliminary 5. § 10 , 11. ) and partly the Blundering Explication of the Common School-men , which breeds all this perplexity . And , indeed , 't is no wonder , if , when we take Metaphorical Words Literally , we find our selves at a loss , and that our Thoughts ramble into Extravagancies . The Literal Truth of the whole business is this in short , which who ever does not well reflect on , and carry along with him , ( the Distinction of our Notions depending on it , ) I dare confidently affirm must necessarily discourse Confusedly , and Incoherently .

7. The Thing , or Individuum , as it stands in Nature , does ( as was said ) contain in its self what grounds , corresponds The Literal Truth how Substance and its Accidents , or the Thing and its Modes are distinctly known . to , and verifies thousands of Different Notions or Conceptions which we may make of it . We cannot , as Experience teaches us , weild or manage all or more of those Notions at once ; and , therefore , our Knowledge of it ( taken as it is in Nature , or in the Bulk ) is so Confused , that we know not distinctly what it is , more than to see and experience that it is , and is Distinguish'd from all others . The only way then to gain a Clear and Distinct Knowledge of it , is to take it in pices ( as it were ) by our various Considerations of it , and frame many Partial , Inadequate or Abstracted Notions of it . All these Notions , how many soever they be , are either of Res , or of Modus rei ; that is , either they must be the Notions or Natures of Thing , or of such a Thing ; and both the first of them , and also all the rest , are nothing but the Thing diversly Consider'd . The Conceptions , or Notions of the Modes or Accidents are innumerable ; but there is only One which is the Conception of Thing it self , which we find to be this , that 't is Capable to be or exist ; and , this Notion , or ( which is the same ) the Object thus consider'd , we call Ens , Res , Substance or Thing . The other Notions we have of it , such as are Big , Qualify'd , Related , &c. have neither Being , nor any Order to Being in their signification , or peculiar Notion , as had the other . Wherefore , since Nature tells us that we must first conceive the Thing to be , ere we can conceive it to be after such and such a manner ; nor can the Mode or Manner be apprehended to be of its single self capable to be , otherwise than as it is annext to what 's Capable to be by its self , or by its own peculiar Nature , that is , as it is identify'd with it ; therefore no Mode or Accident can exist by Virtue of its own Idea or Notion , but in Virtue of the Notion of Thing or Substance ; with which , therefore , tho' formally Different , they are all materially Identify'd . Or thus , more briefly : Had not the Thing somewhat in it which grounds this true Conception of it , that 't is Capable to be ; none of the Accidents ( they all wanting in their Notion any Order to Being ) could be conceiv'd to be at all . And this , in Literal Truth , is the great Mystery of those Positions , about which Disputants in the Schools , blinded with their own ill-understood Metaphors , have so long , like Andabatae , fought in the dark about such Questions as these , viz. Whether the Essence of the Accidents is their Inexistence , or Inherence in the Substance ; Whether the Substance supports them in Being : Is their Substratum , or the Subject , in which , those Accidental Forms , do Inhere ? Then , in pursuance of their Fanciful Metaphor , some of them begin to cast about how those Forms are United to the Subject or Substance , or come to be received in it ; in order to which , and that nothing may be wanting to do the work thorowly , they coyn a new connecting little Entity , call'd an Union , to soder them together , and so , instead of making it One Entity , they very wisely make Three . All which Conceits , if we look narrowly into them , have at the bottom this mistake , that all our several Conceptions have so many distinct Entities in the Thing corresponding to them . Which vast Errour both perverts all true Philosophy , and is against a First Principle in Metaphysicks , by making Unum to be Divisum in se , or One Entity to be Many . Now , if these Modes be Things , or ( to speak more properly ) if the Notion of every manner of a Thing be the formal Notion of the Thing it self , or of what 's Capable of Existing ; first , the Nature of Modes is destroy'd ; for they will be no longer the [ How , ] but the [ What ; ] and the Nature or Notion of Substance , or Ens , is lost too ; for , if all the Modes are Distinct Entities , or Capable of Existing , they must all be Substances ; which blends all the Notions Mankind has , or can have , ( on the perfect Distinction of which , all Science is grounded , ) in a perfect Confusion ; and , consequently , reduces all our Knowledge to a Chaos of Ignorance .

8 But I wonder most , how this Learned Man can think none knows what Extension is . We cannot open our 'T is impossible not to know Extension , is being , in a manner , Self-evident . Eyes , but they inform us , that the Air , and other Bodies which which we see , are not cramp'd into an Indivisible , but are vastly Expanded , or ( which is the same ) Extended . May we not as well say we may see Light , and yet have no Notion of it ? And , does not himself make Extension to be one of his Simple Ideas , the Knowledge of which goes along with all the Knowledges we have of Bodies ; and , withall , resembles the Thing ; For what , thinks he , serves an Idea , but to make Men Know by it what it represents ; or , consequently , an Idea of Extension , but to make us know Extension ? Perhaps he may think we cannot know it , because we cannot define or explicate it , but in Words Equivalent to it . But , first , this Objection has no Ground ; because all Definitions and Explications in the World are the same Sense with the Notion they Define and Explicate ; and , were it not so , they would be no Definitions nor Explications of that Notion ; for they do no more but give us all the Parts of the Entire Notion , and all the Parts are the same as the Whole . Next , how does it follow , that , because we cannot explicate it , we do not know it ? Whereas , the direct contrary follows in our present Case : For , the commonest Notions can the worst be defin'd . because they least need it , being Self-known , or Self-evident . Not all the Wit of Man can Define and Explicate what it is to be ; and , yet , all Mankind knows it perfectly , or else it is impossible they , not knowing what the Copula means , should know the Truth or Falshood of any Proposition whatever . Thirdly , He seems to think that ( as some of the School-men do imagin ) Contradictory Positions may follow out of the Notion of Extension ; else , why should he imagin the Difficulties concerning it are Inextricable : Which I must declare against , as the the worst piece of Scepticism , next to the denying all First Principles . For , if Contradictory Positions may follow out of any Notion taken from the Thing , then that Notion , and consequently the Thing it self , would not have any Metaphysical Verity in it , but be purely Chimerical . Add , that the learned Thomas Albius , in his Excellent Preface before the Latin Edition of Sir Kenelm Digby's Treatise of Bodies , has clearly solv'd those Imaginary Contradictions .

9. To shew the Difficulty of Knowing Extension , he objects , that no Reason can be given for the Cohesion of The Cohesion of Extended Parts is above Physical Proofs , and can only be known by Metaphysicks . the Parts of Extended Matter . If he means , that we can give no. Physical Reason for it , or such an one as fetch'd from the Qualities or Operations of Bodies , I grant it ; for all those Qualities and Operations are Subsequent to the Notion of Extension , and Grounded on it : But , if he thinks there cannot be a far Better and Clearer Reason given from the Supream Science , Metaphysicks , I deny it . I explain my self ; All Positions that concern the Essences of Things , or Modes either , do belong to the Object of Metaphysicks ; so that , whoever makes the Natures or Essences of any of these [ not to be what they are , ] is most clearly convinced , by his violating that Metaphysical First Principle , [ A Thing is what it is , ] to maintain a clear Contradiction . If then Divisibility be the Essence of Quantity , and Divisibility signifies Unity of the Potential Parts of Quantity ; and Continuity ( as making those Parts formally Indivisas in se ) be evidently the Unity proper to those Parts ; it follows , that Quantity being the Common Affection of Body , does formally , and as necessarily , make its whole Subject , that is , all its parts , Continued , or Coherent ; as Duality does make a Stone and a Tree formally Two ; or Rotundity in a Body makes it Round ; or any other Formal Cause is engag'd by its very Essence to put its Formal Effect , which would induce a Clear Contradiction if it should not .

10. 'T is not in this Occasion only , but in many others too , that Great Scholars puzzle their Wits to find out Whence 't is in vain to seek for Natural Efficient Causes for those Effects that depend on Formal Causes . Natural Causes for divers Effects , the true Reason for which is only owing to Trans-natural ones , or from these Altissimae Causae , which only Metaphysicks give us ; and it happens also , not seldom , that Men beat their Brains to find out Efficients for that which depends only on Formal Causes ; whose most certain Causality depends on no Second Causes , but only on the First Cause , God's Creative Wisdom , which establish'd their Essences to be what they are . Let any one ask a Naturalist , why Rotundity does formally make a Thing Round , and you will see what a Plunge he will be put to , not finding in all Nature a Proper Reason for it . The same , in other Terms , is the Ground of Mr. Locke's Perplexity how Extended Parts do cohere ; to which , the properest and most Satisfactory Answer is , because there is Quantity in them , which is Essentially Continued ; and , so does Formally give Coherence of Parts to Body , its Subject . By the same means we have a Clear Reason afforded us , why Bodies impell one another ; which Mr. Locke thinks is Inexplicable . For , putting one Body to be thrust against another , the Body that is Passive must either be shov'd forwards , or there must necessarily be Penetration of Parts ; unless , perhaps , at first , the Impulsive Force be so slight and leisurely , that it is able to cause only some Degree of Condensation . Every thing therefore acting as it is , if the Body , or the Quantity of it , be Extended , or have one Part without the other , and , therefore it be impossible its Parts should be penetrated , or be one within the other , the Motion of the Passive Body must necessarily ensue .

11. To proceed : Mr. Locke makes account we have as clear a Knowledge of Spirits , as we have of Bodies ; and We may have Clear Knowledge of Spiritual Natures by Reflexion . then argues , that we ought no more to deny the Existence of Those , than of These . Which I should like well , did he maintain and prove first , that the Nature of Bodily Substances is clearly Intelligible : But , to make those Notions which are most Essential and Proper to Bodies , and most Obvious of all others , viz. their Entity or Substance , and their Extension , to be Unintelligible , and then to tell us , that The Idea of Spiritual Natures are as Clear as that of Bodily Substance , which he takes such pains to shew is not Clear at all , is , as I conceive , no great Argument for their Clearness , nor their Existence neither ; but rather , a strong Argument against both : The Parallel amounting to this , that we know not what to make either of the one , or of the other .

12. As for the Knowledge we have of Spiritual Natures , my Principles oblige me to discourse it thus : We can have The Reason Why ; and the Manner How . no Proper or Direct Notions of Spiritual Natures , because they can make no Impressions on our Senses ; yet , ( as was shewn * * Reflex . 9. §. 7. above , ) our Reflexion on the Operations , and Modes which are in our Soul , make us acknowledge those Modes are not Corporeal ; and therefore , that the Immediate Subject of those Modes ( our Soul ) is not a Body , but of another nature , vastly different , which we call Spiritual . Our Reason assures us also , * * See Method to Science , B. 4. C. 6. §. 18. by demonstrating that the first Motion of Bodies could neither proceed immediately from God , nor from our Soul , ( which presupposes both that , and many other Motions , to her Being , ) that there must be another sort of Spiritual Nature , distinct from our Soul , from which that Motion proceeds ; which therefore being Active , and so in Act it self , is not a Compart , but a Whole , and Subsistent alone ; which we call Angels : Their Operations prove they have Actual Being , and therefore a fortiori they are capable to be , or Things . Whence we must correct our Negative Expressions of them by our Reason ; and hold , they are Positive Things ; all Notions of Thing being Positive . Farther , we can as evidently discourse of those Beings , or Things , tho' Negatively express'd , as we can of any Body : v. g. if an Angel be Non-quantus , we can demonstrate it is Non-extensus , Non-locabilis , &c. and , from its having no Matter , or Power , which is the Ground of all Potentiality and Change , 't is hence collected , that 't is a Pure Act ; and , therefore , that once Determin'd , it is Immutable , at least Naturally . Lastly , I affirm , that , this presupposed , we can discourse far more clearly of Spirit , than of Bodies : For , there are thousands of Accidents belonging , intrinsecally or extrinsecally , to every Individual Body , whence all our Confusion , and Ignorance of it comes ; whereas , in a Pure Spirit , there are only three or four Notions , viz. Being , Knowledge , Will and Operation , for us to Reflect on , and Manage ; and , therefore , the Knowledge of them is ( as far as this Consideration carries ) more Clearly attainable , than is the Knowledge of Bodies .

REFLEXION Fourteenth , ON The 24th , 25th , 26th , and 27th CHAPTERS .

1. THE 24th Chapter [ Of the Collective Ideas of Substance ] gives me no Occasion to reflect . Only when he lays ( as it were ) for his Ground , that the The Mind alone does not collect Notions , or compare them . Mind has a Power to compare , or collect many Ideas into one , I am to suppose he means , that the Mind does not this of her self alone , without the Joint-acting of the Body , as has been often prov'd above ; for , otherwise , the whole , or the Man , cannot be said to be the Author of that Action .

2. The 25th Chapter gives us the true Notion of Relation , and very clearly express'd ; which he seconds with Verbal Relations come not from Defect in our Language , but for want of a Real Ground . divers other Solid Truths , viz. That some Terms which seem Absolute are Relatives ; that Relation can be only betwixt two Things ; and that All things are capable of Relation . What I reflect on is , that he gives us not the true Difference between Real and meerly Verbal Relations ; nor the true Reason why some Relative Terms have , and others have not Correlates He thinks the Reasons why we call some of them ExtrinsecalDenominations ( which is the same with Verbal Relations ) proceed from Defect in our Language , or because we want a Word to signifie them : Whereas , this matters not a Jot ; since we can have the Idea or Notion of Relation in our Minds , if we have good Ground for it , whether we have a Word to signifie it or no ; or rather , if we have a Real Ground for it , we shall quickly invent either some one Word , or else some Circumlocution to express it . Let us see then what our Principles in this Affair say to us .

3. Relation is not here taken for our Act of Relating , ( for then it would belong to another common Head of Notions , call'd Action ) but for the Thing as it is referred by our Comparative Power to another ; Wherefore , there must be some Ground in the Thing for our thus referring in ; and , consequently , if the Relation be new , or such a one as before was not , there must be some Novelty in the Thing it self to ground it . Whence follows that , if there be such a Real Ground on the one side only , and no Real Ground on the other , there will be a Real Relation on the one side , and no Real Relation on the other , but only a Verbal one , or an Extrinsecal Denominatien ; Answering , or ( as it were ) Chiming Grammatically to the Term which is really Relative , v. g. Our Powers of Seeing or Understanding any thing , have a Real Relation to their proper Objects ; both because such Objects Specifie the Power , or make it such a Power , that is , give it its peculiar or distinct Essence ; as also , because the Power is by the Object actuated and determin'd to act ; that is , the Power is intrinsecally Chang'd , or otherwise than it was , by means of the Object ; but the Object suffers no kind of Change , nor is it at all Alter'd , or otherwise than it was by being known or seen . Whence the Intellective or Visive Powers are really Related to the Object ; but the Objects , for want of a Real Ground , are not really Related back to the Powers ; however the Words [ Understood ] or [ seen , ] do Verbally answer to the Acts of Understanding and Seeing ; which is , therefore , call'd by the Schools in their barbarous Language [ Relatio dedici ] or an Extrinsecal Denomination . For farther Light in this very necessary Particular , I refer my Reader to my Method , Book 1. Less . 7. where , if I flatter not my self , he will find the Notion of Relation treated of very fully and clearly . Especially I recommend to his Perusal the 9th , 10th , 11th , and 12th Section , where I discourse of that Unmutual Relation of the Measure to the Thing measured ; the exact Knowledge of which is far more useful than any other piece of this Subject ; however it lay out of Mr. Locke's Road to take notice of such Speculations as regard , or not regard , the Thing as their Ground .

3. Reviewing his 26th Chapter , ( of Cause and Effect , &c. ) I found that he acquaints us very exactly , how we What Causality is , and what grounds the Relations of Cause and Effect . gain the Ideas of them by our Senses ; but he proceeds not to show us , ( which yet he often does in other occasions ) in what the nature of Causality consists , which is of the Chiefest use in Philosophy . For , what is the Learned part of the World the better , for having those rudest Draughts , or ( as Mr. L. well calls them ) materials of Knowledge , Ideas or Notions , or for knowing how we come by them , ( in which he very frequently terminates his Enquiries , ) if we do not by Reflexion and Reason , polish and refine them , and thence attain to true Knowledge of the Things , from which we glean'd them ; or by what virtue they come to be Causes of such Effects ? What I conceive of Causality is , that 't is the Power of Participating or Communicating some Thing , or some mode of Thing , to the Patient , which was before some way or other , in the Thing that caus'd it : On which point I have no occasion to to dilate here particularly . Only , which concerns our present purpose , I am to note , that that which is thus communicated is the Real Ground on which the Real Relation of the Effect to its Cause is founded . Whence follows , that the Cause also , when it has some Real Change , by being reduced from the Imperfecter State of meer Power , to the Perfecter one of Act , or ( as we say ) gets something by producing such an Effect , will have a Real Ground , and Consequently a Real Relation to the Effect , and not otherwise . And hence it is that God , our Creatour , has no Real Relation to his Creatures , tho' they have many to him ; because he is no otherwise , nor better , in the least , by Creating them , than he had been in Case he had not Created any thing at all ; and therefore there is no Ground in Him of a Real Correlation to them .

4. The 27th Chapter ( of Identity and Diversity ) requires a deeper Consideration . In order to which , I know no The Knowing the Principle of Individuation , must anteceede the Knowledge of Identity and Diversity . more Compendious way to clear the Point in dispute between us , than to fetch my Discourse from those Principles that concern it . The Subject does , indeed , properly belong to Metaphysicks ; but I will endeavour to do what I can , to avoid those Abstracted Mediums , which are made use of in that Supreme Science . And , first , as the Ground work of my Discourse , I am to settle the Principle of Individuation , or how a particular Thing or Substance , comes to be what it is ; for , this done , it will be easily seen whence we are to take our Measures , to judge when it continues the same , and when it is to be another , or a Different Thing from its former self . I discourse thus ; nor will it be Tedious I hope to repeat often , what is so Useful to be remember'd , as being the sure Ground of all our Knowledge .

5. All our Conceptions , by which only we can discourse of Things , are either of Res or Modus rei ; that is , they What gives the Ground to Specify all Notions . are either the Notions of Substance or Thing precisely ; or else , the Notions of Accidents . Of these the Word [ Thing ] has a very Abstracted Notion , and is perfectly Indifferent and Indeterminate to all Particulars : Wherefore the Notion of such a Species or sort of Thing , being ( as was said above ) more Determinate , must have something superadded to it to determin it , and compound or constitute it of such a Species ; which can be nothing but such a Complexion of Accidents or Modes ; there being ( as was said ) nothing else imaginable that can be added to the Notion of Thing . Now , Philosophers agreeing to call that which determins the common Notion of thing ; and so , constitutes such and such Species or Kinds of Things [ A Substantial or Essential Form ; ] hence , the Substantial Form of all the Sorts , Kinds , or Species of Natural Bodies can be nothing else but such a Complexion of Accidents , as fit the Thing for such a kind of Operation in Nature . And , hitherto , if I mistake not , Mr. Locke and I may agree in the main , however we may differ in the manner of Explicating our selves .

6. Descending then to the Individuals , it is evident , that a Greater Complexion of Accidents is necessary to What gives the Ground to our Notions of the Individuum . determine and constitute the several Individuums , than would serve to constitute the Species ; for , the Species or Kinds of Things are but few , but the Individuums under those Kinds are Innumerable ; and , therefore , more goes to distinguish these from one another , than was needful to distinguish or determine the other : Whence it comes , that we can never comprehend or reach all that belongs to the Suppositum , or Individuum . Wherefore , it being a certain Maxim , that [ what distinguishes , does constitute , ] this Medly of Innumerable Accidents , which differences or distinguishes each Individuum from all the rest , does also intrinsecally constitute those Individuums ; or , is the Intrinsecal or Formal Principle of Individuation . Moreover , since nothing in Common , or not ultimately determin'd to be This or That , is capable of Existing ; nor , consequently , in proper Speech , a Thing ; it follows again , that that Complexion of Acccidents , which gave the Thing its Primigenial Constitution in the very first Instant it was thus ultimately Determin'd to be This , ( or Different from all others of the same Kind , ) did truly and properly Individuate it . Note , that this Discourse holds equally in Elementary , Mix'd , Living , Vegetable and Animal Individuums ; allowing only for the smaller or greater Number of Accidents , which goes to the constituting each of them respectively . Why Mr. Locke , who allows the Complexion of Accidents to constitute the Specifick Nature , should not follow the same Principle , in making a greater Complexion of the Modes Intrinsecally distinguish the Individuum from all others , and so constitute It , I cannot imagin ; it being so perfectly Consonant , and necessarily Consequent to his own Doctrine , and agreeable to Evident Principles .

7. Applying then this Discourse to Man : Since it is the constant Method of God's Wisdom , as he is the Author of How Individual Men are constituted . Nature , to carry on the Course of it by Dispositions on the Matter 's side ; and , therefore , to adjust and fit that which Supervenes to what Pre-exists ; and , especially , to sute the Form to the Matter ; and , since 't is evident that the Embrio pre-exists to the Infusion of the Soul , as the peculiar Matter to its Form ; it follows , that the Soul is adjusted to the Bodily or Animal Part ; and , according to the Degree , that part of it , call'd the Fancy , is better or worse fitted ( as far as is on its side ) to perform such Actions , when it is ripe ; or , more or less fit to work comparatively , ( in which all Judging and Discoursing * * Method to Science , B. 2. L. 1. §. 10. consists , ) there will be infused a Soul apt to judge and discourse more perfectly , or less perfectly , according as the Matter requires . And , were it otherwise , so that the Soul were apt to work more perfectly than the Body were able to go along with it ; first , that greater Degree of Rationality in the Soul would be lost , and in vain ; and next , the Man , God's Workmanship , would be disproportion'd , and , in a manner , Monstrous in his most Essential Parts . Putting then those Parts orderly fitted to one another , which can only be done ( as was shewn ) by suting the Supervening Part to that which pre-existed , it follows necessarily , that as the Bodily or ( meerly ) Animal Matter of Man , the Embryo , was , in the Instant before the Soul was infused , ( and the Man made , ) individually different from all of the same Kind , or from all other Embryo's ; and so , was , consequently , just to such a Degree , fit , by the peculiar Disposition of its Brain , ( as it s conjoin'd Instrument , ) to act with the Soul comparatively ; so , it is impossible ( the Soul being proportion'd to that Matter , as its Form ) that any two Souls should be perfectly Alike , or Equal in Rationality ; or rather , that any Two Men should have a Capacity of Knowing , or Reasoning , to the self-same Degree : For , were they equally Rational , those two Men would be but one and the same Man Essentially , or under the Notion of such a Species ; in regard that , tho' they might have many Accidental Differences , yet they would have nothing in the Line of such a Rational Ens , or Man , to distinguish them Essentially , or make and constitute them formally Two such Entities , or Things , as we call Men , or Rational Animals .

8. This premis'd , I come to examin Mr. L's Discourses upon this Subject . He imagins Existence is the Principle Existence cannot possibly be the Principle of Individuation . of Individuation ; which can consist with no show of Reason . For , since Thing in Common cannot exist , and therefore what 's Ultimately determin'd to be this Thing , or an Individuum , can only be capable of Actual Being ; 't is evident that the Individual Thing must , ( in priority of Nature or Reason ) be first constituted such , ere it can be capable of Existence . Wherefore 't is impossible that Existence , consider it how we will , can be in any manner the Principle of Individuation , the constitution of the Individuum being presupposed to it . Again , since , as has been shown above , the Notion of a Thing , or an Individuum , ( speaking of Creatures ) is [ Capable to be ] 't is impossible that Actual Being , or Existence , should constitute the Potentiality or Capacity of Being , any more then the meer Power of walking can constitute or denominate a Man Actually walking . Besides , both Logick and Metaphysicks demonstrate that , Existence , it being the immediate Effect of the first Cause , who is Essentially an Infinitly-Pure Actuality of Being , is therefore the most Actual of any Notion we have , or can have . Wherefore , since whatever does difference or distinguish Another , must necessarily be more Actual than the Notion Distinguish'd ; it follows , that Existence is of its own Nature a most perfectly uniform and Undistinguishable Effect , that is one and the same in all Creatures whatsoever , as far as concerns its own precise Nature or Notion : For Reflexion will inform us clearly , that whatever Notion is Distinguishable is Potential ; and that the Distinguishing Notion is more Actual than it . Since then no Notion can be more Actual than is that of Existence ; it follows , it cannot possibly be Distinguish'd at all . Whence follows this Unexpected , tho' Clear , Consequence , that , if Existence does constitute the Individuality , all the Individuums in the world , as having one and the Self-same Constituter , would be but one Individuum .

9. Next , Mr. L. fancies , that the Existing of a Thing in the same Time and Place , constitutes the Identity of a Thing ; The Outward Circumstances of Time and Place cannot conduce to constitute the Individual Essences . and the being in several Times and Places constitutes its Diversity . By which 't is easy to discern , that he distinguishes not between the Extrinsecal Marks and Signes by which we may know the Distinction of Individuals , and what Intrinsecally and Essentially constitutes or makes them differeut Things . Who sees not that Time and Place are meerly Extrinsecal to the Notion of Substance , or rather toto genere different from it , as belonging to other Common Heads ? And therefore they are too Superficial Considerations for their Identity and Diversity ( which are Relations grounded on their Essence ) to consist in them . Besides Time and Place are evidently no more , but Circumstances of the Thing ; wherefore , that very word ( Circumstance ) shows plainly that they cannot be Intrinsecal , much less Essential to it ; and it evidences moreover that they suppose the Thing already constituted , to which they are annext . Tho' then Practical men may have light thence to distinguish Individuums ; yet , it is very Improper for Philosophers , or Speculative Reflecters , to make the Entity of Things , which grounds the Relations of Identity and Diversity , to consist in these Outward Signes and Circumstantial Tokens .

10. This Learned Gentleman conceives there must be a Different Reason for the Individual Identity of Man . An Individual Man is formally an Individual Thing of that Kind , and an Individual Person too . To make way to which he premises , and would perswade us gratis , that it is one thing to be the same Substance , another the same Man , and a third to be the same Person . But , I must forestall all his Subsequent Discourses by denying this Preliminary to them . For , speaking of one and the same Individual Man , as he does , I must affirm that 't is all one , nay , the same Formal Conception of him , to be the same Substance , Man and Person , For Example , 't is evident that Socrates is one Thing under the Common Head of Substance , or Ens , descending by the Genus of Animal , and Species of Homo ; whence this One Thing or Substance is not only Necessarily , but Formally one Man , because he is formally a a Thing , or Substance , under the Kind or Species of Man ; and 't is impossible he can be under any other . Again [ Man ] bearing in its Essential Notion that he is an Intelligent Being , he is Essentially and Formally one Person too . Nor can we separate , even by our thought , one of those Considerations from another , unless we take the word [ Substance ] or [ Man ] in a Generical , or Specifical Meaning for Substance , and Man in common ; which we are forbid to do by our very Subject in hand , which is about the Principle of Individuation ; or else , unless he takes Substance for Parts of Matter , with their Quantity and Figure acceding and deceding to the Individuum ; which Things are not Essential to Man , nor fit him for his Primary Operation ; which Position follow'd home , would , perhaps , make the Individuality of Man , and of all Things else , alter every Moment . So that Mr. Locke , led by the different Sound of Words , makes Three Notions of One ; and then racks his Wits to shew how this One Notion , made into Three , is distinguish'd ; which we may easily foretell must render his Discourse very Extravagant , as will be seen shortly .

11. Perusing his 8th Section , I much fear that his Tenet , that Brutes are knowing and rational , does influence The Essence of Things not to be taken from the Judgment of the Vulgar , nor from Extravagant Suppositions . his Thoughts strangely on this Occasion , and makes him dislike the Definition of Man , [ viz. a Rational Animal ; ] and he seems here not only to take the Idea of Individuation , but of his very Nature and Kind too from his Make and Shape ; and then he discants on what People would think of a Thing in the Shape of a Man , which never used Reason any more than a Cat or Parrot ; or , of a Cat or Parrot that could Discourse or Philosophize ? I answer , I will tell him my Mind when it shall please God to do Miracles to help out our want of Principles ; and , in the mean time , that I think such Extravagant Suppositions , perverting the Course of Nature , should not be heard amongst Philosophers ; much less be brought instead of , or to Abett , Arguments . It would be more to purpose , if he could convince Men of Sense by Conclusive Reasons , that it is possible that Knowledge should be made by Artificial laying together Particles of Matter ; or else , if it cannot , to prove that Srutes have Spiritual Natures in them : For , one of these two must necessarily be first made good , ere we can with Reason affirm , that ●●●●●s have , or can have Knowledge . 'T is Principles and not Fancies which must guide our Thoughts in such concerning Points . What I conceive Sober Men , and even the Generality , would think of such Irrational Men and Rational Brutes is this : They would think the former , if they could never be made to understand , or answer pertinently in their whole Lives , ( notwithstanding their Make , ) to be no Men ; and the Later , I mean those Philosophizing Brutes to be either Devils , or Engins acted and animated by them : So far are such wild Suppositions from giving us the Notions of Things . But the main Point ( in which Mr. Locke frequently mistakes ) is , that it matters not at all what People think or judge . We are indeed to take the Meanings of Words which express our Natural Notions , or Simple Apprehensions , from the Users of them , the Populace ; but , the Applying , or Joining those Words or Notions to one another , in order to the framing Thoughts or Judgments of such Connexions , we are to take only from the Learned , or from the Principles belonging to the Sciences that treat of such Subjects , and not at all from the Vulgar ; which if we did , we must judge , as many of them doubtlesly do , that the Moon is no bigger than a great Cheshire Cheese ; nor one of the Fixed Stars so big as a Brands-end , or a Beacon on Fire .

12. The former Distinction forelaid , he proceeds to make Personal Identity in Man to consist in the Consciousness Consciousness cannot constitute Personal Identity . that we are the same thinking Thing in different Times and Places . He proves it , because Consciousness is Inseparable from Thinking , and as it seems to him , Essential to it . Perhaps he may have had Second Thoughts since he writ his 19th Chapter , where , § 4. he thought it probable that Thinking is but the Action and not the Essence of the Soul . His Reason here is , Because 't is impossible for any to perceive , without perceiving that he does perceive . Which I have shewn * * Reflex . 2. § 2 , 3 , 4 , 5. above to be so far from Impossible , that the Contrary is such . But , to speak to the Point : Consciousness of any Action or other Accident we have now , or have had , is nothing but our Knowldge that it belong'd to us ; and , since we both agree that we have no Innate Knowledges , it follows , that all both Actual and Habitual Knowledges which we have , are Acquir'd or Accidental to the Subject or Knower . Wherefore the Man , or that Thing which is to be the Knower , must have had Individuality or Personality from other Principles , antecedently to this Knowledge call'd Consciousness ; and consequently , he will retain his Identity , or continue the same Man , or ( which is equivalent ) the same Person , as long as he has those Individuating Principles . What those Principles are which constituted this Man , or This Knowing Individuum , I have shewn above , § § 6 , 7. It being then most evident , that a Man must be the same , ere he can know or be Conscious that he is the same ; all his Laborious Descants , and Extravagant Consequences , which are built upon this Suppositions , that Consciousness individuates the Person , can need no farther Reflexion .

13. Yet it is a great Truth , that Consciousness of its own Actions is Inseparable from a Knowing Individual Substance , That Consciousnes is Inseparable from every Individual Man . or Person , and remains with it eternally ; and ( which will justifie the Forensick Consideration he mentions ) will Acquit or Condemn him when he appears before God's Dread Tribunal ; not because it constitutes its Personality , but because nothing we once knew , or knowing , did , is possible to be ever blotted out of the Soul . Whence it comes , that a Soul not only knows her self as soon as separated , ( or rather , is then her own First , and most Immediate , and Ever-most-present Object , ) but also , because , she then knowing all the Course of the World , and , consequently , all the Actions of her past Life , both Good and Bad , is disposed , by the Knowledge of the former , and by the Consequences of them , laid by God's Mercy or Justice , to erect her self by Hope to an Ardent and Over-powering Love of her true Last End , which will save her ; or , by her Knowledge , or the Consciousness of the Latter , to sink into Despair , which will plunge her into a Hell of Endless Misery . It is also true , that we are Conscious here of any perceptible Good or Harm that happens to our Person ; because we cannot but Reflect on what concerns any part of our Individuum , which is our Self ; which , yet , is so far from proving that our Personality consists in this Consciousness , that it proves the direct contrary : For , it shews that our Person , or Individual Self , affected thus agreeably , or disagreeably , is the Object of that Consciousness ; and Objects must be antecedent and pre-supposed to the Acts which are employ'd about them , because the Objects are the Cause of those Acts. Nor is there any farther Mystery in the Word [ Self ; ] for it means no more but our own same Intelligent Individuum , with which we are well acquainted , partly by Direct , partly by Reflex Knowledges .

14. It looks so very odly to say , that one of our own Acts should constitute our own particular Essence , Yet Angels , who are Pure Acts , are constituted , in part , by the Act of Knowing themselves . ( which it must do , if our Personal Identity consists in our Consciousness , ) that I am apt to think that Mr. Locke's great Wit aim'd at some other Truth , tho' he hap'd to mis-apply it . I can but guess at it ; and perhaps 't is this : 'T is , without doubt , true , that the Essence of Subsistent Spiritual Natures , which ( as having no manner of Potentiality in them ) are Pure Acts , ( I mean Angels , ) consists in Actual Knowledge ; which Act is first of themselves . And , if so , why may not this Act of the Soul , call'd Consciousness , employ'd about her self , or her own Actions constitute the Soul , or the Man's Personality . But , the difference lies here , that those Pure Spirits having no Matter or Potentiality in them , Annex'd to , much less Identify'd with their Natures , their Essence is formally constituted by their being in Act according to their Natures ; that is , by being Actually Knowing : Whereas , the Soul , in this State , being immers'd in Matter , and Identify'd , or making One Thing with her Bodily Compart , and needing to use it as her Conjoin'd Instrument ( as it were ) to attain Knowledge , is therefore in a State of Potentiality ; whence she has no Innate Notions , ( much less Principles , ) but is meerly Passive in acquiring those First Rudiments of Knowledge : However , after she is thus pre-inform'd , she ( or rather , the Man , according to his Spiritual Part ) is , in part , Active , when he improves those Knowledges , or ripens them to Perfection , by his Reflexion and Reason , as both of us hold .

15. I see no Necessity of making any farther Remarks upon this Chapter , after I have noted some other ill-laid , No Soul is Indifferent to any Matter . and wrongly supposed Grounds , which occasion'd his Mistakes . As , First , That the Soul of a Man is indifferently alike to all Matter . Whereas , each Soul not being an Assistant , but an Informing Form ; and , withall , being but the Form of one Particular , and therefore fitted ( as was lately proved ) to the Disposition of the particular Pre-existent Embryo ; it can be receiv'd in no Matter , but that which is individually determin'd in it self , as to its Animality ; and therefore it requires a Form distinct from all others , or as the Individual Constitution of the Embryo was . Secondly , §. 28. he makes account , the Specifick Idea , if held to , will make clear the Distinction of any Thing into the same , and Diverse : Whereas , our Subject ( as I suppose ) being about Individual Identity , and Diversity ; how the holding to the Specifical Idea , in which all the Individuums under it do agree , and which makes them one in Nature , should clear the Distinction of Individuals , is altogether inexplicable . It must then be only the Individual Idea , or Notion , as far as we can reach it , ( to which there go more Modes , than to the Specifical , ) and its Intrinsecal Composition , which can diversifie Things Really , or make them to be Really the same , or Divers : However , some Outward Circumstances can do it , quoad nos . I am not much surpriz'd , that Mr. Locke , led by the Common Doctrine , does think there are no The Notion of the Individuum is Essential . Essential Notions under that which Logicians call the Species : Whereas , all Individuals being most properly Distinct Things , must have also ( Essence being the Formal Constitutive of Ens ) Distinct Essences , and so be Essentially Distinct. But of this , enough in my Method , Book 1. Less . 3. §. 11. &c. His Proof of it is very plausible : But the Reader may observe , that while , §. 29. he uses the Word [ that Rational Spirit , that Vital Union , ] he supposes it That ; that is , Individually the same ; instead of telling us what makes it That . Besides , that he throughout supposes Existence to individuate ; which is already confuted . Lastly , I observe , that , to make good his Distinction of [ Person , ] from the Individual Substance , and Individual Man , he alledges , that a Hand cut off , the Substance is vanish'd . By which 't is manifest , that he takes [ Substance , ] The Substance is the same , tho' some Quantity of the Matter does come and go . not for the Thing , called Man , constituted by a Soul , as its Form ; but , for the Quantity of the Matter , or the Figuration of some Organiz'd Part : Whereas , taking the Word [ Substance , ] as he ought , for Ens , or Thing , no Alteration or Defalcation of Matter , Quantity , or Figure , &c. makes it Another Substance , or Another Thing ; but such a Complexion of Accidents , or such a New Form , as makes it unfit for its Primary Operation , to which it is ordain'd , as it is a Distinct Part in Nature . Nor can this argue in the least , that Consciousness constitutes Personality ; because this happens not only in Men , or Persons , but also in Trees and Dogs ; which , if they lose a Branch , or a Leg , are still the same Substance , or Thing ; that is , the same Tree , and the same Dog , as all the World acknowledges .

REFLEXION Fifteenth , ON The 28th , 29th , 30th , 31th , and 32th CHAPTERS .

1. THE 28th Chapter [ Of other Relations ] is very Ingenious , and consonant to his his own Principles . It might ; indeed , shock a less attentive Reader That is only true Virtue , which is according to Right Reason . to see Virtue and Vice rated , or even so much as named so , from the Respect they have to the Lesbian Rule of Reputation or Fashion , call'd in Scripture Consuetudo Saeculi , which the more Libertine Part of the World would set up and establish as a kind of Law . And this , I suppose , was the Occasion that made that very Learned and Worthy Person , Mr. Lowde , except against it . But the Author has clear'd that Point so perfectly in his Preface , that none can now remain dissatisfy'd : For who can hinder Men from fancying and naming things as they list .

2. I take leave to discourse it thus : The word [ Virtue ] both from its Etymology and true Use , signifies Manly , or becoming a Man , taking him according to his Genuin and Undeprav'd Nature given him by God ; that is , Right Reason . This Reason , if we use it and attend to it , will give us the Knowledge of a Deity : In Speculative Men , by way of Demonstration ; in others , by a kind of Practical Evidence , from their observing the Regular and Constant Order of the World , especially of the Celestial Bodies ; as likewise by their Scanning , according to their different Pitch , the Solid Grounds of the Christian Religion Reveal'd to us by God , viz. The certain Testimony of the Miracles , and other Supernatural ways by which it was introduced and recommended . This Right Reason convinces us we are to Adore this Supreme Being and Great Governour of the World , and to Obey him in those things he has manifested to us to be his Will. This assures us that he governs his Creatures according to the Natures he has given him ; and , therefore , that he governs Mankind according to his True Nature , Right Reason ; and consequently , that the Rule of Living , or the Law he has given us , is absolutely the Best for the Universal Good of the World , which Right Reason teaches us is be observ'd ahd preferr'd before the Satisfaction of our own private Humour or Appetite ; and therefore this Rule , call'd the Decalogue , or Ten Commandments , is most Rational . Whence , from its being most Agreeable to Man's true Nature , Reason , 't is hence styled Jus Divinum Naturale , or the Law writ in Men's Hearts . This shews how compleat a Summary of our Comportment with all others of our own kind , that Incomparable Precept is , [ Do the same to others as you would they should do to you ] and that a Rule so short and plain in Words , and so comprehensive and universally Beneficial in Sense , could only be dictated by a Divine Master . This assures us that , if this Infinitely Great and Good Governour does , to elevate and perfect Souls , oblige them to believe any other and higher Points , especially such as are Uncouth to the Course of the World , or to Natural Reason , he will , out of his Wisdom and Goodness , give us such Convincing Grounds for our Belief of them , as shall overpower the Repugnance of our Fancies , and oblige us according to Principles of Right Reason to assent to them as Truths . This tells us also , thro' our Reflexion on the Goodness , Piety and Peaceableness of Christian Doctrine , that the Principles of it ( that is , the Doctrine it self ) are True and Sacred ; and lets us see how infinitely we are bound to his Favour , and Merciful Kindness , for enlightning us with so Sacred a Law , and so every way conformable to Right Reason . And , if any Company or Sort of Men have , out of the Depravedness of their Nature , fram'd to themselves , and introduced any other Rules of Manners , grounded upon Vain-Glory , False Reputation , or any other new-fangl'd Conceits of their own Invention ; v. g. if they would strive to Legitimate , and make pass for Current and Unblameable Morality , Duelling , Excessive Drinking , Swearing , Whoring , Cheating , &c. This tells us how Unmanly , and far from Right Reason , those Actions are ; and how the World could not long subsist , did Men take their private Revenge , besot their Brains continually with Excess ; Blaspheme , or needlesly and carelesly ( that is , irrevently ) slubber over God's Holy Name , which alone gives Majesty and Authority to all those Sacred Laws ; or , did they live promiscuously with Women , or take away all they could get from other Men. This Right Reason , abetted by Costly Experience , shews us what pernicious Consequences , and Inconveniencies of many kinds , do attend the Breach of those Laws , instituted for the Universal Good of the World ; and , how all the Course of our Life is dis-jointed , and out of Frame , when we once yield the Conduct of it to Passion and Vice . Lastly , 'T is this Light of True Reason , which makes those who are conscious to themselves that they have deviated enormously from this Rule , look upon themselves as Debauchers and Deserters of their Reason , which is their Nature ; as Breakers and Contemners of the Law ( not of the Land , but ) of the World , and Disregarders of the Law-giver himself ; as Base , Mean , Corrupted , and Rotten at the Heart , Degenerate from their own true Nature ; and , therefore , ( unless they reform themselves , ) utterly uncapable of being promoted to that Perfection and Happiness , to which the ever ready Generosity of their Infinitely-Bountiful God and Maker , would otherwise advance them ; and , moreover , as Liable to all those most Dreadful Punishments , which the Anger of so great a Majesty , justly provok'd , will certainly inflict on them . Whence ensues Interior Heart-gnawing Sorrow , and Stings of Conscience ; and , if they persist , Despair and Damnation . These Things consider'd , and Virtue being Nothing but Right Reason ( Man's true Nature ) employ'd about Fitting Objects , in Fitting Occasions , I do not think we are to attend to what Irrational Men , Libertines , or Humourists call Virtue or Vice , and esteem Laudable or Blameable ; but to what Right Reason , the only Establish'd and Impartial Standard in this Case , teaches us to be truly such : And , I think it had been better , and more unexceptionable , to have called such good and bad Dispositions [ Reputed Virtues and Vices , ] than to join those Qualities in an Univocal Appellation with those Rational or Irrational Habits , which only , in proper Speech , are truly such .

12. As to the 29th Chapter , [ of Distinct and Confused Ideas , ] I cannot think that the Confusion of Ideas , is in reference How we come to have Confused Ideas , or Notions . to their Names ; but springs mostly from the Reasons assign'd by himself , § . 3. For , what are Names , but the Words which signifie those Ideas ? The Idea , then , is in my Mind , what it is , and such as it is , independently of those Names ; as being there before I named it . And the same Reason holds , for keeping up the Distinction of those Ideas ; for the Notions will be still what they were , whether one Name or Another be imposed on them : And , I think Mr. Locke agrees with me , that they are like Figures , which , the least detracted , or added , makes the Idea be quite another . If one talks to me of a Mufti , and I take that Word to signifie a Rat-catcher , my Idea of a Rat-catcher is the same as if the Word [ Rat-catcher ] had been used , tho' the Reference of the Idea to that Name be as wrong as may be . Or , if I speak of an Individuum , called Longinus , and another takes that Word to signifie a Yard ; my Idea is confused , being of an Individuum ; and his Distinct , tho' the Word be the same . So if the same Person , rectify'd as to the Meaning of any Word , takes it now in a different Sense than he did formerly , then he has another Idea by it than he had ; but yet , both his former , and his New-got Idea are still unalterably and perfectly distinct . But , I observe , that Mr. Locke attributes many Things to Words and Names ; which , whether it be his Over-acuteness , or my Dulness , I can make nothing of . What I conceive of Confus'd Ideas , is this : In two Cases chiefly they are Confus'd , viz. when there is a Confusion in the Things themselves from which they are taken , and to which they Correspond ; as , when too many Considerabilities are blended together ( as it were ) in the same Suppositum , or Individuum ; or , that the Object it self consists of Many Things ; as , a Heap , an Army , a Sack of Wheat , &c. Or else , when the Object is not well represented , either by Defect of the Organ , the Distance of the Object , or the ill Disposition of the Medium . To this latter sort belongs the Imperfection of our Understanding ; which , not able to comprehend the whole Thing , is forced to make many Inadequate Ideas or Notions of it ; which , not reaching to particularize the Thing , must therefore be Common , or General , as containing more under them Indeterminately , that is , Confusedly . In two Cases also , Names seem to cause in us Confused Ideas : One , when the Word is perfectly Equivocal , and signifies neither Sense determinately . The other , when a Multitude of Words are huddled together inartificially , or stammer'd out unintelligibly ; to which we may add , our not understanding the Language thorowly . In which Cases , we have either no Notion at all , or , if any , a very Confused one . And these seem to me the only solid Ways to breed Confused Ideas , as being taken from the Nature of the Things , and of their Circumstances ; and from the Nature of the Words , as Words ; that is , from their Significativeness . As for the Secret and Unobserved References , the Author speaks of , which the Mind makes of its Ideas to such Names , I must confess , I know not what it means , more than that the Understanding knows perfectly , or imperfectly , what the Word stands for , or ( which is the same ) what is its true and proper Meaning . Concerning Infinity , of all sorts whatever , I have said enough formerly , on divers Occasions .

3. The 30th Chapter needs no New Reflexion . The 31th , [ Of Adequate and Inadequate Ideas , ] has in it much The whole Thing , as it needs not , so it cannot be known clearly . of true Philosophy ; especially , where he makes the Essences of Things consist in the Complexion of the Modes or Accidents . I grant , that whole Complexion is not knowable by us in this State : But , why have not we as much Knowledge of them as is necessary for us ? Or , why must we think we know Nothing of them , unless we have ( over and above our Use ) all those superfiuous Degrees of the Knowledge of Things , as may satisfie also our Curiosity , or Humour ? By those Accidents of Gold , which we know , we can discern Gold , Ordinarily , from other Metals : Or , if any Cunning Fellow would impose upon Nature and us , and undermine that slighter Knowledge of the Generality , to cheat them ; God has furnish'd us ( especially those whose peculiar Concern it is ) with Means to countermine their Sophisticating Arts. I grant too , that our Idea of Individual Substances is not Adequate ; but , if an Imperfect Notion of them be sufficient for our purpose , and withall , most sutable to our Imperfect Understanding , why should we desire more .

4. Moreover , there is another Reason , of a higher Nature , and most Supreamly Wise , grounded on what the The Metaphysical Reason why this Complexion of Accidents which constitutes Individuums , should be almost infinitely various . Metaphysicians term Altissimae Causae , which we call First Principles , why this Complexion of Accidents should be so Numerous , and Millions of Ways variable . It becomes the God of Truth , so to order his World , that Things should be a Ground for Truth . Now , had there not been almost as Infinite Variety of those Modes which constitute , and , consequently , distinguish , every Individuum ; it might happen , there being such an innumerable Multitude of those Individual Things , that some Two of them , which , by being Two , must be Different , would yet differ in nothing , or in no respect , or Mode ; and so , they would be One , and not One ; which is a Contradiction . Nay , not only divers Things , but each Discernable and Divisible Part of the same Thing , however seemingly Uniform , must have a various Complexion of those Modes , to distinguish them . For Example ; Let a 20s . Piece of Gold be divided into Forty Parts ; each Part , after Division , being now a Whole , and a Distinct Thing from all the rest , must either have some Distinct Modes in it , to distinguish it from all the others , or it would be Distinct , and yet Not distinct , ( having nothing to distinguish it ; ) that is , it would be One Thing , and yet Not one Thing ; or rather , the same Part , and yet Not the same Part ; and this in the same respect , ( viz. under the Notion of Substance , Thing , or Part ; ) which is a perfect Contradiction . Wherefore , the God of Nature , who is always Essential Truth , has so order'd it , that Things , and each part of Things , how minute soever , should have a Ground in them of differing from one another , as whoever is used to Microscopes , will easily discover . As for what concerns us , this Inconceivable Variety tasks our Industry , employs our Speculation , and raises our Contemplation , by making us see that God's Wisdom is infinitely exalted in the least of his Creatures ; and by obliging us to break out into Transports of Admiration , * * Job 36. 26. Ecce , Deus magnus vincens Scientiam nostram .

5. Since then we see and experience that Things do exist , and therefore ( nothing being Able to do what We can sufficiently know Things without comprehending fully this C●mplexion . 't is not Capable to do ) are Capable of Being Actually , or Existing ; since we know they existed not of themselves , or by virtue of their Own Essence ; and therefore , that to be meerly or purely Capable of Existing , is the very Nature or Notion of Created Things , considering them precisely according to the Notion of Thing or Substance . Since we know the Last Distinction , or Individuation , of Things thus consider'd , consists intrinsecally in the Complexions of Modes or Accidents , which ultimately determins them to be this ; and since , withall , we have such Outward Marks and Signs of their Individuality , from their Existing in the same Time and Place , and other such like Circumstances , ( in which Sense , and not in making them intrinsecally constitute the Individuum , Mr. Locke's Doctrin in this Point is admitted . ) Lastly , Since there are the highest Reasons imaginable , that this Individual Complexion of Accidents should be impossible to be comprehended by us in this State ; let us content our selves with this sufficient Knowledge which we have of them , without grasping foolishly at more than we are able to fathom .

6. In my Judgment this Acute Author might have excused this 32th Chapter , [ Of True and False Ideas . ] He No Formal Truth or Falshood in Ideas or Notions . grants they cannot properly be True or False in themselves ; and Ideas or Notions , being nothing but the Nature of the Thing ( as thus or thus conceiv'd ) in our Minds , can have no Consideration belonging to them , but what they are in themselves , or that they are what they are , which is called their Metaphysical Verity ; and therefore ( as he says well ) they can no more be True or False , than a single Name can be said to be such . The Improper Truth or Falshood which he seems willing to attribute to them , belongs ( as he also intimates ) to Judgments ; that is , to the Connexions of his Ideas , and not to the Ideas or Notions themselves , which are the Parts that are capable to be connected . But , if This Truth or Falshood ( which Mr. Locke would force his Reason to shew , ) can any way belong to them , it will not be Improperly but Properly such ; for Truth and Falshood are most properly found in Judgments , and only in them . Wherefore , either no Formal Truth or Falshood at all can belong to Ideas , or it must be Proper Truth or Falshood ; which is what the Author denies , as contrary to his Intention .

REFLEXIONS ON THE THIRD BOOK .

REFLEXION Sixteenth , ON The Subject of this whole Book .

1. IN the 5th Section of the First Chapter , the Grounds are well laid to shew how Metaphorical and Improper Conceptions and Names come ; and how Whence Proper and Metaphorical Notions and Words have their Origin . they are Translated from those Notions which arise from Impression on the Senses . For , to have Senses being common to all Mankind ; and , withall , they being , ( with a very small difference ) apt to be affected by Objects after the same manner , the Notions thus imprinted are Natural and Common ; and , therefore , the Words that Men agree on , or by Use establish , to signifie such Notions , are Proper ; the Universal Use of them , and the General Consent that they should signifie those Natural Notions , making them current , and giving them this Propriety . Whereas , the Notions we have of Spiritual Natures , and of the Operations of our Mind produced by it , not being imprinted Naturally , but got by Reflexion , have no Words or Names which Mankind agrees to call them by . Whence we are forced to make use of our Natural Notions and Expressions , ( with some Additions annex'd , to shew their Difference ) to signifie our Reflex Ideas ; and , therefore , the Conceptions we have of such Natures , and consequently the Names by which we signifie them , being Transferr'd from the Natural ones to them , are called Metaphorical .

2. As for Rules to know the right Sense of Words , as far as relates to Philosophy , there can be but Two in The General Rules to know the right Sense of Words . General , viz. that the Sense of Those Words or Names which express our Natural Notions , which are common to all Mankind , is to be taken from the Vulgar ; and , the Sense of Artificial Words from the Masters in those respective Arts ; these Two sorts of Men being the Framers and Authors , as it were , of those two sorts of Language ; and who , by their Imposing , Accepting , or Using of them in such a Sense , have stamp'd upon them their Proper Signification , and given it to be Sterling and Current ; in which , and not in Etymologies or Criticisms only , consists the Propriety of Words . Nor can I see ( Care being taken to avoid Equivocalness ) what further Inspection into the Nature of Words can be needful for a Philosopher . I say , in this Designation , Agreement , and Usage of the Word , and only in this , consists all the Connexion or Tying the Ideas to the Words , and those Secret References of the former to the other , of which Mr. Locke speaks so often in his Second Chapter , and other places ; nor can it consist in any thing else .

3. Indeed those Words which express Artificial Notions are most liable to be mistaken ; because Artists have the Words of Art most liable to be mistaken . Prerogative of Coining their own Words , and of Affixing to them what Signification they please . Whence , if their Thoughts differ , the Words that express them must needs be Equivocal or Double-sensed . For all Art being nothing but Reflexion on Nature , polishing and perfecting those rude Draughts given us by our Mother-wit to an Exactness , and Reflexions being Various in divers Men , according to their Degree of Skill , and their Talent of Penetrating the Nature of the Object they are employ'd about ; the same Univocalness of Signification is not to be expected in those Words that express our Reflex Thoughts , as in those by which we notifie our Direct ones , in which all Mankind ( as was shewn ) do agree . This chiefly happens in many Logical Words ; for the Notions that Art makes use of , being wholly built on the manner of Existing the Thing has in our Understanding , which none but Steady , Solid and Acute Reflectcters can perfectly discern ; hence , those Reflex Notions , and consequently the Names which are to signifie them , become liable to Ambiguity ; which has , doubtless , been the Occasion of many fruitless Contests ; which end ( if they ever end at all ) in Word-Skirmishes .

4. Yet , it will not be hard to prevent , or avoid , all Mistake even in these , if we do but attend heedfully to the The way how to avoid being mistaken in Words of Art . Manners by which those things exist in our Minds , and take the Sense of those Words from the ablest Artists , or best Reflecters . For Nature ( if we do not relinquish it ) and familiar Explications , will make them easy to be understood . For example , let it be told us by a Logician , that the Species is the lowest and Narrowest sort of Common Notions , that have none under them but Individuals ; and it will be presently seen that the Conception we call [ Man ] ( thus apprehended and exprest ) is a Specifical Notion . Let it be told us again , that a Genus is a Larger Notion which has divers Species or Sorts under it ; and , it will quickly appear that [ Animal ] is a Generical Notion ; Or , if a Logician acquaints us , that a Proposition is a Speech which affirms or denies ; and that that part of it which is affirm'd ( or Deny'd ) is call'd by Men of Art the Predicate , and that part of which 't is affirm'd or deny'd , is the Subject ; and that which expresses the Affirmation or Negation is the Copula ; and there can be no difficulty to know that this Speech ( A Stone is hard ) is a Proposition ; that [ Stone ] is the Subject , [ Hard ] the Predicate , and [ is ] the Copula ; and so in all the rest , if a Right Reflecter have the management of them . But , care is to be taken that we do not pin our belief upon Authors , who frame Artificial Notions out of their Imagination , without regard to the Thing as 't is conceived by our Understanding , or according to the Manner it is there ; for , then , we shall quite lose the solid Grounds of Nature , and let our Wits loose to follow their Butterfly Fancies ; For , that Thing call'd [ Man , ] as thus conceived , is as truly a Species , and [ Animal ] a Genus , considering it as it is in our Understanding with such a degree of Abstraction , as an Individual Man , as existing in re , or out of the Understanding , is Two-legg'd , or a Horse four-footed . And , for the same Reason , 't is as evident to true Logicians , or right Reflecters , that in the Proposition now mentioned , there are as truly , really , necessarily and essentially those Three parts lately spoken of , as 't is to a Mathematician , that there are three Corners in a Triangle : The same Reason , I say , holds for both ; for the Soul is as really a Thing , as the Bodies in Nature ; and her Modes , or Accidents , and their Manners of Existing , are as Real , as those of any Bodies are , or can be , perhaps more . Whence 't is Evident also that , in the Proposition now mentioned , the Thing diversly conceiv'd , or its Modes , are truly and really Subject , Predicate and Copula in the Mind ; and that , tho' they be exprest in Logical Terms , they do not put off their Natures , or Notions , which were directly and Naturally imprinted on the Understanding ; but are only super-vested with an Artificial Dress , thrown over them by our Reflexion : For , otherwise , we could not say the Thing call'd [ A Stone ] is hard , but we must withal mean and say [ the Subject is the Predicate ] in case not the Natural Notion of the Thing , but only the Logical Notion were predicated ; Nor could the former of these two Propositions be True , the Later , False , if the Thing it self , or its Modes were not the Materials that Compounded it .

5. Wherefore , this is to be establisht as a certain Maxim , and a necessary Preliminary to all Philosophy whatever , Even in Terms of Art the Thing is chiefly signify'd . that 't is the Thing in our mind that gives Solidity and Steadiness to all our Judgments and Discourses ; for all these are made up of Notions , that is , of the very Thing it self in our Mind , Inadequately and Diversly conceiv'd : Wherefore That is still the Ground-work , however it be wrought upon , order'd and postur'd by Reflexion and Art . From default of this Consideration springs all the Wordishness , and empty Disputes among trivial Philosophers ; of which Mr. L. does , with good Reason , so often Complain . I wish he could as well give us an account , that the Ideas he and others speak of are the Thing it self , inadequately conceiv'd by us , and not meer Representations of it ; for , this done , we might hope for true Philosophy from the Principles of the Ideists . Which they cannot pretend to show , or to give us this Hope , till a solid Answer be given to what 's alledg'd against them in my Second and Third Preliminaries ; where I undertake to demonstrate that 't is impossible .

6. I am not of Mr. L's mind , that Metaphysical Words ( however Logical ones may be ambiguous ) are so unintelligible , Metaphysical Words not Unintelligible , but most Clear . or in fault . For those words that signify Being , or what nearly relates to it ( which are the Chief Objects of that Queen of Sciences ) are absolutely the Clearest that Mankind ever uses , or can use ; so that , whoever abuses or misaccepts them , must needs be a Deserter of Common Sense . Notwithstanding , in regard some pretended Schollers have on divers occasions us'd Philosophical , and even Common Words variously , I have thought fit to add a Fifth Preliminary , to show what Sense the Chief Words us'd in Philosophy must have ; and that they can signify no other . Lastly , I have shown at large in my Method , B. 1. Less . 10th . how Equivocalness springs , and how it may be detected and avoided .

7. This Learned Authour having most elaborately , largely and acutely prosecuted in his former Book the This Third Book concerning Words seems Unnecessary . Distinction of his Ideas , and the whole Duty of Words being to signify our Thoughts to others , I cannot discern what need there could be to take such pains about those Outward Signes . Many curious Remarks do indeed embellish his Discourses , which show that his Exuberant Wit , can make good work of the dryest Subject , and raise elegant Structures out of the Sleightest Materials : Yet , notwithstanding , I see not how they conduce to promote the Solid Knowledge of Things . The very Essence , I say , and the Nature of Words being to Signify our Notions , or to impart the Knowledge of the Things in our Mind to others ; their Sense must either be suppos'd to be Agreed on , and Foreknown to the Speakers and Hearers , or they will scarce be allow'd worthy to be call'd Words but rather Empty and Insignificant articulate Sounds . Wherefore , if the Idea or Notion of the Speakers be Clear , or Obscure ; Distinct , or Confus'd ; Adequate or Inadequate , &c. The Word must either express it accordingly , or it is not the Name of such an Idea or Notion , nor a Word ▪ sit for it , and much less for any thing else ; and therefore 't is good for nothing at all . This makes me wish Mr. L. had rather thought fit to take particular Notice of those Words , which have been Abus'd or Misaccepted by Trivial Philosophers ; and had clear'd their Ambiguity , rectify'd their Impropriety , and Substituted ( if need were ) others more Proper in their stead ; which must certainly have had great Influence upon the Advancement of Science . Nor need he much wonder that Dull or Hasty Men , who either are not capable of much Sense , or will not take pains to reflect on their Natural Notions , or ( which is the same ) on the meanings of their Words , do make use of them , and yet talk by rote all the while ; following the Track of others whom they have heard speak them , or the Jargon of their Masters ; who breed their Schollers to stick to their Words , as unalterably as if they were Principles ; tho' perhaps neither of them were so Wise as to know , or so Prudent as to regard much their determinate Meaning .

8. Things standing thus , and my Intention , in this whole Treatise , being only to carry on my Method to Science , Whence J. S. is not much concern'd to reflect on it . and to reduce to Solidity , those Discourses which I conceive have too much of Fancy in them , I have no more to do , as to this Third Book , but to note by the way some particulars that occurr , and which , as I judge , do by ass from true Philosophy .

9. The Author seems to dislike our way of Defining by a Genus Nature teaches us to define by a Genus and a Difference . and its Difference , and to think it may be better perform'd by enumerating some certain Ideas , which , put together , do make up the Sense of the Notion defin'd . To abett which Doctrine , he gives us this Definition of a Man , viz. A Solid Extended Substance , having Life , Sense , Spontaneous Motion , and the Faculties of Reasoning . I discourse thus : What best sutes with the Vulgar is one thing , what becomes Men of Art , another . It will serve the Common People well enough to declare their Thoughts by huddling together many particular Considerations ; nay , they will define even Individuums ( if such as these may be call'd Definitions ) by this Method , as Homer did Thersites . But the Point is , how Art , which is to perfect and polish the Rudeness of raw Undisciplin'd Nature , ought to behave it self . Reflexion , the Parent of all Arts , teaches even Housewives and Lawyers , that 't is very convenient for the one to put such and such Linnen into distinct Drawers ; and , for the other to distribute all those Writings that concern different Businesses into distinct Boxes : And the same Faculty teaches Logicians also to range all their Notions ( the Materials they are employ'd about ) into distinct Common Heads , so to gain a Distinct Knowledge of each ; which , they being innumerable , would otherwise lie mingled confusedly . This perform'd , what are they to do next ? Must they hover still in these few common Heads of Notions ? No , certainly ; for , then , they would not have enow of such more-particular Notions as are needful for Discourse . They must descend therefore from those Common Notions to more-particular ones under each of them ; and this , as Plain Reason tells us , gradually : that is , they must divide those Common Heads by Immediate Distinctive Notions , call'd Differences : for , were they not Different , the Product of that Division could not be more Notions ; whereas Division must ( at least ) make Two of One. And , whence must we take those Differences ? From other Common Heads ? No surely ; for this would confound all our Notions again , which we had taken such Care to distinguish into those Heads , in case the more particular ones , or the respective Species , were made up of one Notion found in one Line , and of another found in another . Those Differences then that divide each Common Head , must be found within the same Head , or ( as we use to call them ) must be Intrinsecal ; which ( * * B. 1. L. 3. § 2. as is demonstrated in my Method ) can be no other but more and less of the immediate Superiour Notions . The First two Differences ( of Ens , for Example ) join'd with the Common Head it self , gives us the Definitions of the two first Subaltern Genera ; and each of those two ( and of the inferiour ) Genus's being for the same Reason divided after the same manner , do still give us naturally ( as it were ) the Definitions of the next two Members immediately under them ; and so still endways , till we come at the Individuums ; each of which being constituted by an innumerable Multitude of Accidents , we are , when we come there , lost in a pathless Wood ; and can no longer Define or give a clear and entire Account of the Intrinsecal Dictinction of those Particulars , but are forced to content our selves with some few Notions belonging to them , which distinguish them from others ; or to describe them by Outward Signs and Circumstances for our Use and Practice ; our Speculation being here Nonplust .

10. When Mr. Locke shall have leisurely consider'd each Step of this short Discourse , he will find that Nature Those who oppose this Method must be forced to use it . forces us upon this Method of Defining by a Genus and a Difference ; that Art , ( which is nothing but Nature well reflected on ) shews us it must be so ; and that his own Definition of Man will oblige him , even while he opposes this Method , to have recourse to it for Refuge . For , when he puts Man to be a Solid Extended Substance , should it be deny'd , because there is but one part of Man ( his Body ) that is Solid and Extended , and not his Spiritual part , the Soul ; his only Defence can be this , that those Words were meant only for the General Notion , or what was Common to Man and all other Bodies , ( for which Reason , Substance there is the Highest Genus ; ) and that which follows is meant to difference or distinguish him from them . Next , it will be unanswerably objected , that Man being a Thing , or ( which is the same ) a Substance , which signifies meerly what 's capable to be , and a Definition telling us the Essence of the Notion defin'd , he deviates manifestly from the Fundamental Laws of Art , by taking in such Differences to distinguish Substance , viz. Solidity and Extension , which are Foreign to this Common Head of Being or Thing , and belong to other Common Heads , which are only Modes of Thing , viz. those of Quantity and Quality . Add , That this seems also to contradict his own Doctrin , ( B. 2. Chap. 13. § 11 , 12. and B. 3. Chap 6. § 21. ) where he makes Extension and Body not to be the same . I suppose he means in part ; which , were Extension a Proper and Intrinsecal Difference of Substance , constituting the Essence of Body , could not be said . Now , as was lately shewn , all these Rubs are avoided if we separate our Notions into Common Heads ; and , by dividing those Heads by Intrinsecal Differences , at the same time make our Definitions of each Inferior Notion . Nor can it be objected , that we also use Extrinsecal Differences , while we divide Substance by Divisible and Indivisible , and yet make Divisibility the Notion of Quantity ; for , all such Exceptions are fore-stall'd in my Method , B. 1. Less . 3. and particularly , §§. 5. and 6.

11. The like Errour , and no less Fundamental , is his Assertion , Chap. 3. L. 11. that Generals and Universals belong The Mind does not frame Universal Notions designedly ; but as forced to it by Nature . not to the Real Existence of Things , but are the Inventions and Creatures of the Understanding , made by it , for its own Use , and concern only Signs , whether Words , or Ideas . Had he said , that Universals belong not to the Existence of Things , as they are in Nature ; or , that Universals , as such , are not capable of Existing there , I could understand him : But , if he means , they do not belong to the Existence of Things in the Understanding , or , that they are designedly invented , or fram'd , or made use of by it , for its own Convenience , I must utterly deny it . For , it is as evident that Nature makes them in our Mind , as it is that because we cannot here comprehend Individuals , therefore Nature , by imprinting Objects diversly in us , and by different Senses , forces the Mind to have Partial or Inadequate Notions of it . Now , every Inadequate Notion , in what Line soever , is an Universal Notion ; as will appear to any Man who reflects upon the Ideas or Notions of Ens , Corpus , Vivens , Animal , Homo ; all which are Inadequate ( and withall , Universal ) Notions , in respect of the Individuum . When I see a Thing a-far off , so that I can yet make nothing of it , but that 't is something , or some Body , 't is evident that I have only an Universal Notion of it , since I know not yet what it is in particular ; and , that this General Notion is not Invented or Created by my Mind , but given me by Nature . The like happens when I hear one knock at the Door , without knowing who it is in particular ; and in a Hundred such like Occasions . So that the Mind , and it only , is indeed Capable of Universal Notions ; but , 't is only Nature , and not her self , which begets in her those Notions . Her only Work is , to Compare , or Discern the Identity or Diversity of those Notions ; but Nature gives her those Objects , or Materials , on which she thus works . Thus , when we see two or many Things agree , 't is those Natural Objects , that have in them something Agreeing to both , which causes in me a Common Notion , called Animal , or Homo ; and the mind lends nothing but her Comparing Nature , to make those Common Notions ; which Artificial Reflecters , designedly re-viewing , call them Genus and Species . Let us hold to the Things in Nature . Our Mind ( as was often said ) is not here in an Actual State , but in a Potential one ; and , therefore , when we ascribe to her singly any Activity , we make her do what she cannot do ; and , so , missing the true Causes of such Effects , we fall into great Errours .

12. As for that Catachresis of Nominal Essences , which answer to those few Abstract Notions we have Actually of Nominal Essences Groundless , and Catachrestical . the Things , when we name them , making a Complex Idea , I deny we have any such Intention as he speaks of , in naming any Thing : For , tho' at that time we do actually know but Few of those Accidents , whose Complexion does , indeed , go to the whole Essence ; yet , being pre-assur'd the Thing has more Modes in it than we know or think of , we do not nominate them precisely according to what we do then actually know , exclusively of all others , but including them confusedly . Rather , otherwise , we cannot know the Thing at all , because it involves confusedly all the Modes that are in it , Known or Unknown , as their Subject : For , tho' we should afterwards discover more particular Accidents in Gold than we did formerly , yet , we should not alter the Name which signifies its Substance , or Essence ; nor would call it any thing but Gold still ; however the newly discover'd Mode gave us a new Idea of it self , Annex'd to that of Substance . The Essences are no otherwise Ingenerable , but as they are from Eternity in the Divine Ideas ; nor Incorruptible , but as they are either there , or else in some Humane or Angelical Understanding , out of which they can never be effaced . Lastly , What have Names or Words , which are nothing but Articulate Air , or Figur'd Ink , ( excepting what is Annexed to them by our Minds , ) to do with the Intrinsecal Natures of Things , that they should be one Sort or Kind of Essences .

13. This Learned Author justly complains that we have so few Definitions ; and my self have both resented it in Aristotle's Definition of Motion defended . my Preface to my Method , and have also excited and encourag'd Learned Men to make good that Defect . But , till the Best , and only Proper Way ( which I mention'd lately ) to make Definitions be allow'd and taken , I am sure there will be no new ones made that will deserve that Name ; and those Few that are already made , will still be exposed to the baffling Attacks of Fancy . Aristotle was , certainly , the best Definer of any Philosopher yet extant ; yet , his Definitions are excepted against by Witty Men ; and ( which is worse ) for no other Reason , but because they are too Learned , that is , too Good . Mr. Locke expresses here great Dis-satisfaction at two of them ; which , to my best Judgment , not all the Wit of Man can mend . The First is . of Motion ; which Aristotle defines to be Actus Entis in potentia , quatenus in potentia . Now , I wonder not that Mr. Locke , who , in his large Chapter of Power , never so much as mention'd the Idea of Power to be a Thing , nor the Power to have such an Accident , or Mode ; nor , consequently , the Idea of an Act answering to such a Power , should conceit this Definition to be Gibberish . However he came to pretermit them , it is most manifest that we have Natural Ideas or Notions of both these . We cannot see a Thing made actually of Another , or Alter'd to be any way otherwise than it was ; but Nature obliges us to see , and say , that that Thing , of which the new one was made , could , or had a Power to be , It , or have Another made of it . Or , when we see 't is anew made Hot , Cold , Round , White , Moved , Placed , &c. but that it could , or had a Power to become such , ere it was Actually such . These Ideas then of Act and Power are so Natural , that Common Sense forces us to acknowledge them , and Common Language must use them : And 't is a strange Fastidiousness , not to allow those Transcendent ( that is , most Common , and most Clear ) Words in Definitions , whose Notions or Meanings Nature gives us ; and which Words , or Equivalent Expressions , Common Discourse forces us to use . Yet , in the Uncouthness of these Words to some Men's Fancies , consists all the Difficulty which they so boggle at in this Definition . The Ens , or Body , was only Capable , or had a Power to be moved ere Motion came ; and , now , by Motion it is Actually moved . It is evident then that Motion is the Act , or ( which is the same ) the Formal Cause , which reduced that Power into Act , or formally denominated it moved Actually . Act then , was a Proper Genus , as far as those most Common Notions can have one . Now comes the Difference [ in potentia , ] which is , to determine what kind of Act Motion is . To understand which , we may reflect , that a Body has many other Acts or ( as we conceive and call them ) Forms in it , such as are Quantity , Figure , and all Qualities whatever ; as , Roundness , Length , Breadth , Health , &c. But they are not Acts of that Body , as 't is in power to be otherwise than it is , but as 't is actually such or such : For , they truly denominate it to be actually Round , Long , Healthful , &c. Whereas , Motion , being formally a meer Tendency to an Effect not yet produced , constitutes and denominates a Body to be only in power to be what by that Motion it is to be afterwards . For , reflecting on all Motions whatever , v. g. Generation , Alteration , Augmentation , Sanation , &c. none of them affect the Subject , or Body , in order to what it has already fixedly ; but in order to a newly generated , or rather , producible Thing , Quality , Quantity , Disposition , Health , &c. which the Matter or Subject has only a Power to have or acquire by means of those respective Motions . The last Words , [ quatenus in potentia , ] signifie , that the Thing , as affected with Motion , is formally and precisely consider'd to be in power to be such or such , and not at all as actually so . Matter has the Notion of Power to be another Thing ; but in regard it is a kind of Compart , constituting actually the stable and entire Ens , the Thing , or Body , which has Matter in it , cannot be said to be meerly in power to have Matter which it has Already . Whereas , by having Motion in it , which is only the Way or Means to attain what Nature aims to produce , it must be thus meerly and formally in Power to that to which it is Tending . Wherefore , this Definition most appositely fits the Notion of Motion , by distinguishing it most perfectly from all other Sorts of Acts whatever ; without a Tittle conceivable in it that is Defective , Superfluous , or Disparate . Yet , this is here character'd to be Exquisite Jargon , and a Famous Absurdity . I should be glad to see how one of our new Philosophers would define Motion : I doubt he would find it a puzzling Task to explicate its Formal and Proper Nature ; in regard that , besides its being very General , it is the Blindest and * * See Method to Science , B. 1. L. 8. §. 2. most Imperfect Notion we have , and most approaching to Non-Entity ; being neither the Thing as it is in it self , nor as it is yet another , but hovering ( as it were ) between both . And I am certain , it is impossible to perform it , without varying the Words used by Aristotle , to others of the same Sense ; or , even to give some tolerable Explication of it , which can sute with its Formal Notion .

14. The other Definition which Mr. Locke mislikes , is , that of Light ; which he says Aristotle defines , The Act Aristotle's Definition of Light , most Proper . of a Perspicuous Thing , as it is Perspicuous . Now , tho' Light be Fire , were the Particles of it contracted into one closer Body , as it is by a Burning-Glass ; yet , the Rays of it , thinly scatter'd , have , like all other Effluviums , the Notion of a Quality or Mode of the Body they are receiv'd in ; and Modes or Accidents have their Analogical Essences from the manner they affect their Subjects . The Question then is , What is the Proper Subject of Light ? Mr. Locke's Principles deny the Sun is the Subject ; and put it to be onely the Cause of it : Nor can an Opacous Body be the Subject of it ; for it affects not that Body it self , but the Surface which reflects it ; and then it has the Notion of Colour . 'T is left then , that the Proper Subject of Light must be a Medium , which is Perspicuous , or which has a Power in it to let it pass through it , to our Eyes ; and , therefore , onely Light is , properly and formally , the Act which informs or actuates that Power ; which cannot possibly be express'd better than by these Words , The Act of a Perspicuous Body , as it is Perspicuous . For , putting the Air , or the Water , to be that Medium , those Bodies may have many other Acts or Accidental Forms in them ; as , Rarity , Fluidity , Humidity , Coldness , &c. yet , according to none of these , is Light the proper Act of either of them ; but as they are Pellucid , or Perspicuous ; because , whatever other Qualities or Powers they may have , if they had not that called Perspicuousness , it could not affect those Bodies at all . I observe by Mr. Locke's Discourse here , that he makes account Definitions are made for the Vulgar : Whereas , they are only fram'd by Art , for Men of Art , or Philosophers . But , surely he is pleasant , and cannot mean seriously , when he finds fault with this Definition , as Useless , and Insignificant , because it will not make a Blind Man understand what the Word [ Light ] means . The Meaning of the Word , is the Notion of it in our Mind ; and our Notions , or Ideas , ( as both of us hold , ) come in by Impressions from the Object upon our Senses . If , then , Blind Men could have no sensible Impression of Light , 't is impossible they should have any Idea or Notion of it , let the Definition be never so good . Definitions are the Work of Reflexion , and are to suppose our Natural Notions , which are the Rough Draughts of Knowledge , Common to us , and to the Vulgar : Art is to polish our Notions , and bring them to Exactness and Concinnity , by Defining them ; and not to imbue us with them , when Nature never gave them : And 't is a hard Case , if Aristotle's Definitions must be Useless and Insignificant , unless they work Miracles .

15. I agree with him that the Definition of Motion , which he says is that of the Cartesians , [ viz. That 't is the The Cartesian Definition of Motion , Faulty . Successive Application of the Parts of the Superficies of one Body to those of another ] is Faulty . Whether it be theirs or no I know not , I think they give another : Yet , I doubt not but Mr. Locke has his Reasons why he dislikes it . Mine is this ; because Successive Quantity and Motion are the self-same Formal Notion ; and , so , the Definitum is as plain as the Definition which should explain it . Besides that , [ Application ] is one sort of Motion , and therefore is harder to be understood than Motion it self , which is the Genus to it . All which Absurdities , and others such , Aristotle wisely avoids , by using the Transcendent , or more Common Notions of Act and Power .

16. I pardon Mr. Locke's Opinion , That nothing is Essential to Individuums ; because this Error is Common , Individuums under the same Species differ essentially . or rather Epidemical , amongst the Modern Schools ; and springs hence , that those Authors do not distinguish between what serves for Logical Speculations , and what is the Real Constitution of Things in Nature : For , what can the word [ Essentia ] of which Essential is the Denominative , possibly mean , but that formal Notion quâ Ens est Ens. Since then the Notion of Ens or Thing is only Proper to the Individual Substance , as being its First Analogate ; it follows that , if they be divers Entia or Things , they must have divers Formal Constituents , or divers Essences . Nay more , it follows that [ Ens ] being only properly spoken of Substantia Prima or the Individuums , and Improperly of Substantiae Secundae , and much more of the Modes or Accidents ; therefore , Essence ( the Formal Constituent of Ens ) can only be properly said of the Essences of Individuals , and improperly of any other Essences : So that only divers Individuals , in proper Speech , do differ Essentially , or have Essential Differences belonging to them . But , of this enough in my * * B. 1. L. 3. § 11. Method . I only remark how odd it is to say , that Two Men are Two Things , and yet do not differ under the Notion of Thing , but only Accidentally ; or , according to the Notion of some Mode or Accident ; which is perhaps as much as my self now do differ from my self a Year ago , and yet I am the same Thing now I was then . But , I have said enough above of what Intrinsecally Constitutes divers Entities or Individuums ; and how we sufficiently know them , tho' we comprehend not the whole Complexion of Accidents that constitutes their Individual Essences , on which a good part of this 6th Chapter proceeds .

17. The two last Chapters contain many various Observations in them ; and such as may both delight , and in some sort Whence we must take our Measure of Simple and Compound Notions . profit inquisitive Wits : Yet they touch upon some difficult Points , which are contrary to my Sentiments , and cannot well be solv'd without first laying my Grounds ; especially that about the Unknowableness of Real Essences . To clear which farther , and withall to meet with other Difficulties that may occur , it will be necessary to lay , or repeat , for the Foundation of my future Discourses , some few Principles .

I have , I hope , demonstrated in my Preliminaries , that all our Ideas , or Notions , which are Solid , and not Fantastick , are nothing but several Conceptions of the Thing ; or , which is the same ( taking the Word [ Conception ] for the Object , and not for the Act of Conceiving ) the Thing diversly conceiv'd . Hence all our Conceptions , or Notions , are Inadequate , especially if they be Distinct , and not Confused . Hence the most abstracted Notion we have , or can have , let it be Figure , Colour , Existence , or what other we please , even tho' signify'd by the most Abstract Term , is still the Thing consider'd precisely as having those Modes in it ; in regard that , as those Modes , or Accidents , have no Entity of their own , but meerly that of the Thing which they affect , so they can have no Intelligibility , or Knowableness , ( which is the Property of Entity ) but as they are conceiv'd to belong to the Thing , or to be It : So that , ( Hardness being that by which a Thing is formally Hard ) neither would Hardness be Hardness , nor would Existence be Existence , if they were the Hardness or Existence , of Nothing ; for Nothing can neither be hard , nor exist , nor have any other Affections belonging to it . Again , 't is evident we can have no distinct Notion of the whole Ens , or Individuum ; nor consequently of the Essence , ( properly such ) which is the Form that Constitutes the whole Ens : For this contains in it what grounds or Corresponds to great multitudes of Inadequate , or Partial Notions , and contains them blended ( as it were ) in the Thing as in their Root ; and this so Confusedly and inseparably , that only that most acute Divider , call'd Acies Intellectus , can take them a sunder , or separate them . Moreover , there are not only Confus'd and Distinct Ideas , as Mr. L. acknowledges , but also ( which I remember not he takes notice of , ) Notions or Ideas which are more and less Confused or Distinct ; or partly one , partly the other , and this with very great variety ; as is seen in his Example of Gold , of which ( and the same may be said of all other Bodies , ) some Men gain by Degrees more distinct Knowledges than others do . To proceed , 't is evident that , of all other Notions , that of Existence has the least Composition in it that can be . Whence all Clearness of our Notions coming from their Distinctness , and their Distinctness Springing from their Simplicity , the formal Notion of Existence is the most Clear ; that is , self-evident , and therefore Inexplicable ; all Explications being of those Notions that can need it . The Notion of Ens , which signifies Capable to Exist , has but a very little Composition , and Consequently , Confusion in it , as consisting of Actual Being , and the Power to it , For the same Reason Corpus has more of Composition or Confusion in it , than Ens ; Vivens than Corpus ; Animal than Vivens ; Homo than Animal ; and Socrates , or the Individuum , most of all ; There going still ( as was shown above ) more Notions to constitute and Compound each inferiour Notion than there does to constitute those above it ; whence , still as they are more Compounded , they are proportionably more Confus'd , that is , less Distinct , or less Clear . The Ideas , or Notions , of Individuals therefore , or of particular Things , are for the reason now given the most Unintelligible ; meaning by that Word , the most impossible to be comprehended all at once . This reflected on , and it being shown above , that both Nature and Art instruct us to divide our Notions into Common Heads , and to proceed thus gradually to Inferiour ones ; 't is most evident that the only Proper and Natural way of distinguishing our Notions into Simple and Compounded , is to be taken ( not from our Fancy , what Ideas seem most Clear to us ) but from this Gradual Progression from Superiour to Inferiour Notions ; in regard there goes still more to compound the Inferiour Notions , than there does to compound the Superiour . Whence follows out of the very Terms that those must be more Compounded , or less Clear , these more Simple , and more Clear .

18. The same Rule holds , and for the same Reason , in all the Common Heads of the Modes or Accidents . The The same Rule holds in Accidents as well as Substance . Notion or Idea of the Supreme Genus has no Composition but that noted above , which is common to them all , of Connotating the Subject . Whence , it is the Simplest or least Compounded , as involving both that of the Common Head and that of the Difference , superadded to it . Hence neither the Ideas of Motion nor Extension , if by this Latter be meant ( as by distinguishing it from Motion it should seem ) Permanent Quantity , are Simple Ideas ; but the Idea of Quantity is the Simple one ; and they , being evidently such Kinds of Quantity , viz. Permanent , and Successive , are clearly Compounded of Quantity and of the two Different Ideas which make them those two several sorts of it . Much less is the Idea or Notion of Number or Figure Simple ones ; for the former is compounded of the Idea of Meer Quantity and of [ Discrete ; ] and the later of the Idea of Quantity , and of such or such a manner of Terminating it . And , the same may be easily shown of all the rest of his Simple Ideas whatever , excepting only that of Existence . From these Principles I make the following Reflexions .

19. First , That the Ideas can never be in fault when we name things wrong , but our own heedlesness or Disagreement The Idea or Notion can never be in Fault when we Name things wrong . about the Meanings , for which such Words stand . For , our Common Notions are wrought by Natural Causes upon the same-natur'd Patients , the Senses , and thence upon the Soul . Whence Notions are what they are invariably , without their meddling or being concern'd with our Signifying them , or applying them to these or these Words . We have them from Nature ; the Signifying them by such and such Words , comes from our Voluntary Designation ; and that is all can be said of them ; as Mr. L. has shown B. 2. Ch. 32. § 2.

20. Secondly , Confused Ideas , they being all Compounded , may have fewer or more Distinct Ideas annext to their Confused Notions may have more Distinct ones Annext to their Subject . Subject , according as we gain a farther Distinct Knowledge of the Object , as is exemplified in Mr. L's frequent Instance of Gold . In which case , it is not a new Specifical Notion , nor so much as a new Nominal Essence , as Mr. L. calls it : ( for , let us discover never so many New Qualities in Gold , every Man will call that Thing Gold still ) but the Additions or Appendages of New Distinct Notions , tack't as it were to the Confused one ; or new Inadequate Notions , approaching so many little steps nearer to the making it an Adequate one .

21. Thirdly , Since we know before-hand , that every Thing has a Distinct Nature or Real Essence peculiar to its self , Confused Notions do not exclude , but include those distinct ones which are yet Undiscover'd . we take those most Remarkable Accidents intrinsecally belonging to it , to be that Essence ; especially if they do sufficiently distinguish it from all other Natures ; and , when we find they do not , we acknowledge our Judgment may be false , we strive to correct it , and suspend till we gain better Light ; yet still our Notions are inerrably what they are , and faultless , however it fares with our Judgment . Nor does our Judgment exclude the yet-undiscover'd Modes from the Notion of the Thing ; but , we include them all in the Lump or Confusedly . Whence 't is the Real Essence of the Thing which is known , tho' Imperfectly and Inadequately . Thus we know a Man and a Horse to be two Things of different Species by divers manifest Qualities which never agree to both of them , and therefore distinguish them ; and , tho' 't is the whole , or rather a Greater Complexion of Accidents which does constitute the Specifick Difference ; yet even that is known truly , ( tho' imperfectly ) when we know it but in part , especially ( as was said ) when it is sufficient to distinguish one from the other : In the same manner as when I see but a Man's Hand or Face , I am truly said to see the Man , tho' [ Man ] signifies the whole , which I see but in part . The solid Reason of which is this Great Truth , that [ There are no Actual Parts in any Compound whatever . ] Whence follows , that every Part is the Whole in Part , or according to such a Part ; which is one of the Chiefest Principles that gives Grounds to the Science of Physicks , and therefore is Demonstrable by the Superiour Science , Metaphysicks .

22. Fourthly , Our former Discourse being well reflected on , which shews that the most solid and certain way of We must not judge which Notions are Simple , which Compounded , from the Clear or Obscure Appearances they make to our Fancy , but from the R●le given above , § 18 , 19. Knowing which Notions are Simple , which Compounded or Complex , is not to be taken from the Easie Appearances to our Fancy , or from seeming Experience , but from their being more General or more Particular ; we may farther learn what Notions are Clear and which Obscure , and how or why they are so . For , 't is manifest that all Confusion and Obscurity springs from Composition , or the Involving many Notions , as is evidently seen in Particular or Individual Bodies ; and all Distinctness or Clearness in our Notions from their involving few or none , as is found in the most General Notions . Add , that , if this Rule be observ'd , the Order in our Complex Notions will be more Regular . Whereas the other unmethodical way of making so many Simple Ideas , places those Ideas at random , or hap-hazard . Lastly , If our Method be observ'd , Complex Ideas cannot be taken for Simple ones , as has been shewn Mr. Locke does in most of his .

23. Fifthly , That the Distinction of Simple and Complex , Clear and Obscure Notions , is not to be taken from Shown hence , because th●se Men conceit that Metaphysical Notions , are Obscure , whereas they are evidently the Clearest . Appearances to our Fancy , but from the solid Grounds now spoken of , is seen farther by this Instance , that many Men are much distasted at the Notions belonging to Metaphysicks , such as are Being , Ens , Essence , Act , Power , and such like . The Reason of which is , that we do customarily reflect upon our Notions , and endeavour to define or explain them . Whence , in Metaphysical ones , finding this to be very Difficult , and in many of them Impossible , hence Men fancy them to be Inconceivable and Incomprehensible ; and thence they take a Toy at Metaphysicks , and pretend it insuperably hard and mysterious . Now it passes with these Reflecters , as it does with those that would look stedfastly on the Sun at Noon-day ; they find a kind of Cloud hovering before their Eyes , and seem bedarken'd with too much Light . The Test to stick to in such Cases is , to set themselves to define or explicate their Notions ; which done , if they find they can invent no Notions more Clear than those Notions themselves are , they may be sure they are self-evident , and may safely look upon them as such ; and , if they find they can be defin'd or explain'd , they may be sure there will be found in their Definition or Explication more Notions equivalent to that one ; and thence they may be assur'd also that the Notion Defin'd or Explicated , has more Parts , or Composition in it ; and , therefore , is not Simple nor perfectly Clear , since it needs to be made Clear by others , which therefore must be more Simple and Clearer than It.

24. Sixthly , It appears from what is said , that 't is not to avoid different Significations of Words , that Men suppose Not the Design of avoiding different Signification of Words , but plain Nature , forces us to ●put Real Essences . a Real Essence belonging to each Species ; but because 't is impossible there should be any Individual Thing , but it must have Superior Notions , or ( which is the same ) it must be of some sort or other in Nature ; and , the Notion of this Sort , or Species , must be an Essential and main Part of the Individual Essence . For , 't is evident , that Nature forces us to have both the one , and the other Notion , without any form'd Design of ours ; and Words have nothing to do but to signifie them .

25. Lastly , Hence it appears , that Words do not therefore become Ambiguous , because they have no Settled Standards Words are not Ambiguous for want of setled Standards in Nature . in Nature ; as Mr. Locke apprehends in Mix'd Modes , especially in Moral ones . For , all Virtues and Vices being nothing but Dispositions to act according to Right Reason , or contrary to it , have as fixed Standards in Nature , as Reason it self has ; taking [ Nature ] for the Reflexions we naturally have upon the Operations of our Soul , and for what is Agreeable or Disagreeable to its true Nature ; as also , on the Subjects and Circumstances , about which , and in which it is employ'd . Hence , the Words which he instances in , viz. Sham , Wheedle , Banter , are evidently Deviations from Right Reason in our Just and Civil Comportments with other Men ; and all the Notions that go to their Definitions , are as much Connected as any other Genus and Difference are in any other Definition whatever . So likewise , his Mixed Modes , Murther and Sacrilege , are defin'd ; The Killing a Man lawlesly , and the Taking to our selves lawlesly , or Abusing Holy Things ; and have the same Solid Connexion , as any other Notions ; which consists in this , that the one of them is Common or Determinable properly by the other , and the other is Particular or Determinative of it , which makes them Cohere together in good Sense . As for our Soul 's Connecting them at pleasure , it is quite otherwise : She has Notions of each Common Head naturally ; and Nature and Art do both of them conspire to oblige us to divide those Heads by Intrinsecal Notions , called Differences ; and , it is not at her Pleasure and Choice , what Differences shall be Proper , what Disparate . Nature has settled the Agreeableness of one of these Notions to the other ; so that , should we put a Difference to a Generical Notion , which is Inconsistent with it , the Notion thus defin'd would be Nonsence , and Chimerical ; and no Wiser than Green Scarlet , or a Four-square Triangle .

26. Let the Obscurity and Ambiguity of Words spring from what Causes Mr. L. pleases , concerning which he is The Thing signify'd is not to be blam'd for the Abuse of Words ; but their Ambiguity , ill Contexture , or Mis-application . very Acute in his 10th Chapter , it is to me very evident , that the Thing signify'd is not to be blam'd for the Abuse of Words , and , that this Abuse of them must spring from one of these three Heads , viz. Ambiguity of Single Words , the ill Contexture of them , and their Mis-application . Artificial Words are , indeed , ( as was said , ) more liable to Obscurity ; and , perhaps , Logical ones most of all . But , since the Users of those Words do pretend to Learning , let them define their Terms of Art , and it will quickly appear whether they agree in the Notion of those Terms , or no ; and , by declaring what the Notion meant by that Term is useful for , it will appear which of the Definitions agrees truly to that Notion , and which does not .

27. Tho' then some Men have the Knowledge of more Accidents in the same Thing , or in the same Essence , Imperfect Knowers agree in the Thing , and not in the Name only . than another Man has , yet it does not follow they agree in nothing but the Name , or that they substitute the Name for the Thing ; for they do both of them acknowledge and agree that they speak of the same Thing , or of the same Essence , notwithstanding this more particular Knowledge which one of them has of it above the other . In the same manner as divers Persons may know , or discourse of the same Individual Man , Socrates , ( tho' the Complexion of Accidents which constitute the Individuum be far greater than that which constitutes the Specifick Notion ; ) notwithstanding that , one of them better knows his Humour , Temper , Constitution , Science , Virtue , and his Degree of Rationality , ( which is most Essential to him , as he is This Man , ) than the other does . Whence this Position does not only make all Philosophy , or Knowledge of Things ( which are not such , but by their Real Essence which formally makes them such ) to be impossible ; but , it makes even our Ordinary Communication amongst Men unintelligible , because we should still speak of Divers Things , and not of the same : For , Divers they must be , if they have Divers Essences , which formally constitutes them such . Yet , I must declare , that I verily judge this Learned Author delivers this Doctrine out of his Sincerity , without intending to do any Favour to the Scepticks ; and that he is not aware how much this leans to that Maxim of the Pyrrhonians , viz. that [ Nothing can be known , unless it be known perfectly ; ] which is sufficiently confuted by this Evident Reflexion , that our Soul works by Inadequate Notions , and builds her Knowledge on those Partial Notions ; that is , we can truly know that Thing , though we know it but imperfectly , or in part .

28. And , where 's the Harm to this Acquir'd Knowledge , called Science , tho' we know the Thing , or its Essence , The Knowing Things by Abstract Notions promotes , and not hinders Science . only imperfectly , by those Partial Notions ; since Science has not for its Object the whole Thing in the Bulk , nor its whole Essence neither , but only Abstracted Conceptions of it ? Cannot a Mathematician discourse Scientifically of Wood , as 't is Long , Broad , or Solid ; or a Carpenter or Carver know it to be Wood really , or to have the real Essence of Wood , and such a Sort of Wood , by its Colour , its Degree of Hardness , its Aptness to be Cut , or its being more easie to do so if one goes according to the Grain , and such like ; unless he knows all those Innumerable Accidents found in its Entire and Exact Composition ? Or , cannot ( I may say , do not ) we all agree to call its Real Essence [ Lignea , or Woodish , ] without abusing the Word ; because one of us penetrates the Nature , or Real Essence of it , more than the other does ? I suppose , Mr. Locke's laudable Zeal against some pretended Philosophers , did , on this occasion , something byass his good Reason , that he might better oppose them . And , certainly , it must be acknowledg'd , that , never were Words more abusively used , to the prejudice of good Sense , than those by which they express their Essences , and their Specifick and Essential Forms ; so that , for want of some Determinate and Literal Intelligible Meaning , which could give a Philosopher any Light what to make of them , they seem'd nothing but meer Words , obtruded upon us for the only Truths ; and so tended to reduce Science to Mysterious Nonsence , and Unintelligible Cant. But , I could wish , notwithstanding , that Mr. Locke had not over-strain'd some Points , to baffle their Insignificant Talk . I hope his discerning Judgment will distinguish me , and all true Aristotelians , from the Abetters of their Folly ; and let them answer , if they can , for themselves .

20. His last Chapter is , about Remedying the Abuses of Words . Wherefore , since divers of those Abuses are By Mr. Locke's Principles , there is no Way to remedy the Abuse of Words . conceiv'd by him to spring from our Names given to Real Essences , and 't is impossible , he says , to know fully what those Real Essences are ; I should be glad he would put us into a Way to do an Impossibility , and Comprehend them fully ; otherwise , since name them we must , we shall , according to his Discourse , be necessarily inforc'd to the Abuses of Words , without any possible Remedy ; which is something too hard a Case .

31. I am a little apprehensive , that I do not perfectly hit Mr. Locke's true Meaning in some Passages here , Mr. Locke's Sentiments , after all , Ambiguous . and elsewhere ; finding his Discourse in other Places Sub-contrary to what I took to be his Thoughts . For example ; Speaking here , §. 19. of Shewing and Defining Substances ; all which being Entities , must have Real Essences in them ; he has these Words : [ For , there being ordinarily in each Sort some Leading Qualities , to which we suppose the other , which make up the Complex Idea of that Species , annex'd ; we give the Name to that Quality or Idea which is the most observable , and we take to be the most Distinguishing Idea of that Species . ] Where , if , instead of the Words [ to that Quality , ] be put [ the Subject of that Quality , ] to which subject we suppose the rest of its proper Complexion of Accidents annex'd ; it will be perfectly Co-incident with my Thoughts as to this Point . Only , I wonder why he pitches upon some one Quality ; as also , why he says not a Word of the Matter , which , ( in all Bodily Substances , ) determin'd by this Complexion of Accidents , makes up the Thing . This manner of Expression makes him seem to discourse all along as if this Complexion of Accidents , abstractedly consider'd , without any Regard to the Matter , did make the Essence ; whereas , they cannot do this at all , unless by their Determining the Potentiality of the Matter to be This , and as including that Determination of it ; that is , as including the Matter thus Determin'd .

Of the Equivocalness in Words , the several Sorts of it , how it comes , and of the Way how to detect it ; as also , of the Means how we may arrive at their True and Proper Signification in several Subjects , I have treated in my Method to Science , Book 1. Less . 11.

REFLEXIONS ON THE FOURTH BOOK .

REFLEXION Seventeenth , ON The First Three Chapters .

1. THis Learned Author having , with much Exactness , treated of all that can belong to his Ideas , the being affected with which is called the First Of the Second Operation of our Understanding . Operation of our Understanding , or Simple Apprehension ; he advances to the Second [ Judgment , ] which is express'd by a Proposition . 'T is by this that we have Compleat Knowledge or Cognition ; which ( as the Word it self imports ) is the putting together of Notions in the Understanding after its manner ; that is , in order to the seeing them connected , or knowing they are so . The First Chapter is both comprehensive of his Subject , and has much Truth in it . Whether it goes to the bottom , and does not require some Deeper Truths to explicate the Point fully , is now to be examined .

2. He defines Knowledge to be The Perception of the Connexion and Agreement , or of the Disagreement and Repugnancy Mr. L.'s Definition of Knowledge in many respects Faulty . of any of our Ideas . My Exceptions against this Definition are : 1. That [ Perception ] being the Act of a Knowing Power , can mean nothing but Knowledge ; and , therefore , to define Knowledge by Knowledge seems Inartificial and Preternatural : For , it will still be ask'd , what this Knowledge he calls Perception is ? 2. Mr. Locke granting Perception to Brutes , he must necessarily allow them Ideas , and that they can connect them too . Wherefore his Book being Entituled , An Essay concerning Humane Understanding , it is needful we know what kind of Ideas We have , what Brutes have ; and , ( not to speak of our or their Perception ) whether they do connect them as we Men do . For , this Concession makes Perception to be the Genus in this Definition ; and , therefore , to appropriate it to Humane Knowledge , the large Signification of it ought to be restrain'd to such a Perception as is peculiar to Man . But , what I most dislike is the word [ Ideas , ] in our perceiving the Agreement or Disagreement of which he puts Knowledge to consist . Philosophy is the Knowledge of Things ; wherefore , unless those Ideas be the Thing it self in our Understanding ; or , if they be not , but Similitudes only ( as the Word imports ) unless it be well made out that those Similitudes do give us the Knowledge of the Thing it self , ( which I have demonstrated in my Preliminaries they cannot ) 't is impossible we should ever arrive at true Philosophy , tho' we did perceive the Connexion of all the Ideas in the World . Nay , unless they be the Thing it self ( in part , ) no Predication we make can be True .

3. To shew this more fully , I intreat Mr. Locke to consider , that this Connexion of Ideas he speaks as necessary to Knowledge cannot consist in the Connexion or Disagreement of Ideas . Knowledge , is that which is signify'd by the Word [ Est ; ] which being so , in this Proposition , [ Sugar is sweet , ] the Word [ Est ] must according to him , if only Ideas must be connected , naturally and genuinly affirm , that one of those Ideas is the other Idea , or that the Idea of Sugar is the Idea of Sweet ; which is evidently False . For those Ideas differ toto genere ; the former belonging to the Common Head of Substance , the other of Quality ; and besides , 't is perfectly contradictory to Mr. Locke's avowed Doctrine , that each Idea has its peculiar Metaphysical Verity , or is what it self is , and is distinct from any other Idea , and therefore is to be Deny'd of it . Whence follows , that it is not in seeing the Connexion or Disagreement of the Ideas themselves that Knowledge can consist ; for they are , as to themselves , always Distinct , and therefore Unconnected ; so that we can never say one of them is the other , which yet we do in all our Affirmative Propositions ; whence follows , that all our Affirmative Propositions would be false . It follows then , that it is the Subject or Thing inadequately conceiv'd by our Understanding , which is said by the Copula [ Est ] to be Identity'd really and Materially with it self as conceiv'd by another Inadequate Notion ; and , that [ Est ] speaks their being united in the same Ens , or ingrafted on the same Stock of Being . And , certainly , it appears , at first Sight , to be an odd Explication of Knowledge and Philosophy , to maintain , that they consist in seeing the Connexion or Disagreement of Similitudes .

4. Wherefore , I should rather think , that , as Notions are defin'd , The Thing in the Understanding inadequately conceiving The true Definition of Knowledge . it , ( which has been abundantly prov'd , ) so Knowledge ought to be Defin'd , The Inadequate Notions of the Thing , existing in the Understanding , so connected there , as they are in the Thing in Nature . To make good my Definition , I discourse thus : First , It has been prov'd by many Arguments , that all our Notions are Partial Conceptions of the Thing ; or , which is the same , ( if we take the Word [ Conception ] for the Object , and not for the Act of Conceiving , ) they are the Thing inadequately conceived . And , I dare be confident , those Arguments are unanswerable ; and that no true Reason , or Connexion of Terms , can ever shock them : However , I may expect much Repugnance of Fancy , ere that Point be admitted . Secondly , All our Distinct Notions being Inadequate , and consequently , ( as it were , ) Parts of the Thing , as 't is Knowable by us ; it follows , that ( according to our Doctrine ) the Immediate Object of all our Knowledge , being somewhat of the Thing , is wholly built on the Thing it self , and therefore Solid . Thirdly , Those several Notions , however Inadequate taking them Abstractedly , yet they do connotate the whole Thing ; since no Part can be conceiv'd , but in reference to the whole , or as in it , it being impossible the former can be apprehended to be a Distinct Thing from the latter ; because , if it were of it self a Distinct Thing , it would be of it self a Whole , and not a Part. Fourthly , The Copula [ Est ] speaks the Identity of those Parts with the Whole ; for , they can onely be Identify'd , as they are One with the whole Thing materially ; since formally , as Parts , they are contradistinguish'd from one another . And , were it not so , few Propositions ( as was lately prov'd ) could be True . Whence , let us take any Proposition , v. g. [ Socrates is wise ; ] the true Sense of it is , that the Individual Substance , called Socrates , is the same Thing , Materially , or Really , with that which is Wise ; or , that , what answers to Socrates , and to Wise , are found in the same Thing . Fifthly , In regard Parts , as such , are distinguish'd formally from one another ; therefore , we cannot say that any Partial Notion , express'd formally as a Part , is Another . Whence we cannot say [ Petreitas est sapientia , ] tho' we can say [ Petrus est sapiens ; ] in regard those Abstract Words do formally signifie such a Partial Notion of the whole Thing , or a kind of Part of it . And , tho' each of them does connotate the whole Thing , yet , with a Quatenus , ( to which that Abstract manner of Expression is Equivalent , ) they cut off such a precise Considerability , or Notion of it , from all others ; and therefore , such Words can onely signifie that precise Notion , or ( as it were ) Part , and no other . Lastly , Hence it is , that we cannot predicate a Concrete of an Abstract , nor an Abstract of a Concrete ; because the Abstract signifies , distinctly and formally , only a Part , and the Concrete the whole , ( tho' confusedly , ) and not any distinct Part of it . But I expatiate too much into the Subject of Predication , and shall pursue it no farther at present .

5. To come closer to the Business in hand ; It appears by what is here said , that it is not enough for Knowledge , Our Definition of Knowledge farther maintain'd . nor answers the true Notion of Philosophy , that Ideas be predicated of other Ideas , or Similitudes of Similitudes ; nor ( which is the same ) that we see they agree or disagree with one another ; but it is necessary , that the Ground of our Knowledge , and of our Predications , be taken from the Thing it self , as is express'd in our Definition . I produce not here the Definition of Knowing which I gave in my Preliminaries , because it is not yet granted by those with whom I am discoursing , that our Notions are the Things in our Understanding ; tho' ( one Consideration , which is brought there , being added ) these two Definitions are Co-incident : But I accommodate my self to Mr. Locke's Words , as far as they will bear , that the Difference between us may be made more apparent .

6. Hence , whereas Mr. Locke makes Four Sorts of Connexions of our Ideas , in which Knowledge is found , viz. 1. Of Hence , there is but One Sort of Connexion , in which Knowledge consists : viz. that of Co-existence . Identity , or Diversity : 2. Of Relation : 3. Co-existence : 4. Real Existence ; I must , in pursuance to the Grounds now laid , affirm , and maintain , that there is but one Sort of Intellectual Connexion of our Notions , viz. that of the Co-existence of what is meant by the two Terms in the same Thing ; and , that ( there being but one Copula [ Est , ] all the other Sorts of Connexion are co-incident with this one . For , the First consisting in this , that each Idea , or Notion , is its Self , and not Another , signifies no more but what we express by this Identical Proposition , [ The Thing as thus conceiv'd , is the Thing as thus conceiv'd ; or , not as otherwise conceiv'd . ] Whence it is Self-evident , because the Terms being every way the self-same Notion , are as closely connected as perfect Identity can express them ; whence they can admit no Middle Term to come between them , and make the Proposition Evident , or prove it : But their Evidence is entirely grounded on this first Metaphysical Principle , [ Every Thing ( whether Substance or Accident ) is what it is ; or , is Indivisum in se , and Divisum a quolibet alio ; ] that is , in plain terms , One . The Second , [ Relation ; ] taking it not for the Act of our Mind , comparing or connecting it to another ; but for the Ground of it in the Thing , which obliges our Comparing Power , when it is in it , to refer it actually ; is still the Thing it self , inadequately conceiv'd to be Connected with , or agreeing to the same Thing in part , as is explicated above . V. g. Master and Scholar are grounded on the Actions and Passions of Teaching , and being Taught , which are Inadequate Conceptions , Co-existing in those two Persons , and Identify'd materially with those Subjects : And the same is found in all others , which are thus Connected . And the Last , Of Real Existence ; As , when we say , [ Peter is , ] clearly imports , that what is meant by Peter , the Subject ; and by Existent , which is the Predicate , ( imply'd there in the Word [ is , ] ) are Co-existent ; or , are found in the same Thing . But , more of this when we come to consider his 4th Chapter , Of the Reality of our Knowledge .

7. His Second Chapter , Of the Degrees of our Knowledge , distinguishing it into Intuitive , Demonstrative , and Sensitive , The Degrees of our Knowledge assign'd by Mr. L. very Solid . is admirably Solid , Clear , and Rational throughout . The First of these is proper to Principles , the Second to Proofs , the Last to the Knowledge of Particular Things or Modes by the way of Experiments . Indeed , Intuitive Knowledge is proper to Pure Spirits , call'd Intelligences or Angels ; which , because they do not glean their Knowledge from various Impressions on the Senses , consequently they do not divide the thing into Parts , by Inadequate Notions , when they come to know it ; nor compound those Notions again into Propositions , as we do ; but , at one direct and full View , call'd Intuition , they comprehend the whole Thing , and all that belongs to it , at once . Whence it seems not so proper to attribute Intuition to us Mortals , who are but poor Retailers of our Imperfect and short Notions ; which we spell ( as it were ) and put together as Children do Letters , when they are , otherwise , not able to read whole Words currently . But this is very pardonable in Mr. Locke ; for , to say true , 't is very hard to find another Word which fits our Knowledge of First Principles much better ; tho' I think [ Self-evidence ] might serve . My self have long ago had such a Thought , tho' I express'd it warily in these words : " There is nothing in all our Knowledges , that , in the manner of it , comes so near the Angelical Intuition as does our Knowledge of Self-evident Principles , express'd by Identical Propositions . It divides as little as is possible for us in this State ; for it predicates the same of the same ; nay , the whole of the whole ; and , for the same Reason , it as little compounds again . Whence , it resembles it not a little in its Absolute Evidence and Immovable Firmness ; and is the nearest Approach possible to Simple Intuition . That so , as the Order of the World requires , the Supremum infimi may immediately confine upon the Infimum Supremi . "

8. I was much pleased to see Mr. Locke declare , that upon this Intuition depends all the Certainty and Evidence we have Every Step we take in Demonstrative Knowledge , or every Consequence , must be grounded on Self-evidence of our Knowledge , and particularly , that , in every Step Reason makes in Demonstrative Knowledge , ( that is , in every Consequence we deduce ) there is an Intuitive Knowledge of the Agreement or Disagreement of the next intermediate Idea . I add , Upon which Agreement all the Force of Consequenee , that is , all our Reasonings are grounded . The Evident Proof he gives for it here , is worthy the attentive Consideration of his Learned Readers . 'T is not in this occasion only , but in divers others , tho' I have not always noted them , that Mr. Locke and my self have , without design'd Confederacy , agreed in Positions of great Moment ; which , I know not how , have escap'd the Thoughts of all other Authors I have seen . The Reader may please to review my Method to Science , B. 3. Less . 1. §. 3. where I discourse thus : " Wherefore , since , if the Consequence , in which consists the Essence , and all the Force and Nerves of Discourse , be not Clear and Evident , there could be no Certainty or Evidence of any thing that needs to be made known or Concluded ; and so our Faculty of Exact Reasoning would have been given us to no purpose ; hence , 't is manifest , that however one Proposition may be made known by other Propositions that are connected and consequential to one another ; yet the Consequence it self cannot be proved by Another Consequence . For , the Question would still return how , and in virtue of what , that Consequence which made the other Evident , is Evident it self , and so in infinitum . Whence it follows , that the Evidence of all Consequences whatever , must be built on something in a higher manner Evident than any Consequence or Proof can otherwise make it ; that is , on a Self-evident Proposition . ] " The certain Knowledge of which kind of Propositions , as Mr. Locke holds , is to be had by Intuition .

9. I have been larger upon this Point , and do most especially recommend it to the best Reflexion of our Readers ; The great Usefulness of this last Position . because it is not only the Deepest and Firmest Ground , but also the very best Test of all Argumentation ; and therefore the main Hinge on which all Science turns . I must confess , for all that , I cannot see why , since all Self-evident Truths can only be express'd by Identical Propositions , this Learned Gentleman is so shy to use those Words , since the Sense he brings on this Occasion , is clearly Equivalent to those Identical Forms of Speech ; nor , if put into Propositions , can be express'd by any other . I think we should not be asham'd of them , or think them Trifling , because some Men of Fancy , who never set their Thoughts to trace Evidence and Truth to their Originals , are pleased to make themselves Sport with them ; nor because their Terms are too closely connected ; For , they must be so ; and , were they not so , they would be unworthy the Name of First Principles , nor do us any Good when we come to reduce other Truths into them ; which is the best Way of Demonstrating .

10. The Extent of Humane Knowledge , of which he treats in his 3d Chapter , is a very Excellent Subject . Science Scepticism and Dogmatism are , both of them , highly prejudicial to Science . has two Capital Enemies , Scepticism , and Dogmatism : The one will allow very little , or Nothing at all , to be known ; the other pretends to know too much . The former , by breeding a perfect Despair of Knowledge , discourages the Industry of the best Wits ; and makes them , since Truth cannot be found , to addict themselves only to Wordish Talk and Declamation : To which contributes not a little , that many who have incomparable Fancies , have oftentimes the worst Judgments ; especially , if they have let their Wits loose to Raillery , and Drollery : For , such Persons , proud of their Joking Talent , do think they answer a Demonstration , if they can but break a Jest upon it . And , besides , they have the Faculty of cutting Capers beyond the Moon , and raising Objections at random . The Latter does , perhaps , as much Harm , by Presuming to demonstrate every Thing : And the Over-weening of these Men is the more pernicious , because they make a Shew of a great Friendship and Zeal for Science ; and yet , by falling short of their Extravagant Pretensions , they throw a Scandal upon her ; and make weak Distinguishers apprehend there is no Science at all . The One deviates from Zeal for Truth , in Excess ; the Other , in Defect : And the Judicious Decision of this Point , [ Of the Extent of our Knowledge , ] settles the Golden Mean between both . I have endeavour'd , in my Method , B. 1. Less . 2. to §. 12. to establish from Clear Grounds , the Just Pitch of our Knowledge in this State : Mr. Locke does , with his usual Candour , attempt to do the same in his Way ; Concerning which , I am to give him my Thoughts ; which are these .

11. There is no doubt but we have less Knowledge than we might have had , through our Want of some Notions ; We have Sensitive Knowledge of other Notions , besides Existence . as also , for want of discerning the Agreement or Disagreement of them in the same Thing . No doubt too , but Intuitive Knowledge , which is only of Self-evident Truths , cannot reach to all that belongs to our Notions , or Ideas ; and , that we too often want proper Mediums to connect those Notions , in order to Demonstration : As also , that our Sensitive Knowledge ( I suppose he means that which is had by Experiments ) does not reach very far ; otherwise , our Senses giving us ( as we do both of us hold ) all the First Natural Notions we have , I believe it cannot be deny'd , but that they give us withall the Ground of all our Knowledge . Whence I cannot see , why he limits Sensitive Knowledge to the Notion of Existence onely ; or , that our Senses do make us know onely that a Thing is : For , certainly , our Senses do as well tell us the Wall is white , as that the Wall is ; tho' , in proper Speech , it does neither , but by means of our Mind , comparing the Notions of the two Terms , given us by the Object , in order to the seeing their Co-existence in the Thing . All they do , is , to give us our Notions ; which the Soul ( that is , the Man , according to his Spiritual Part ) compounds into a Proposition ; and so frames a Judgment of the said Co-existence ( or Inconsistency ) of those Terms , or ( which is the same ) of what is signify'd by them , in the same Thing . Nor do I think Mr. Locke will much deny any of this , however we may express our selves diversly .

12. 'T is very true that our Experience gives us some Light to know what Qualities do belong to such Substances ; Onely Principles and Demonstration and not Experiments , can give us any Intelligible Explication of Natural Qualities . yet , I cannot think it impossible to know this very often a priori , by Demonstrative Reason , tho' we do not know the Constitution of the Minute Parts , on which those Qualities do depend ; much less do I judge , that , tho' we did not know them , yet we could not discover any necessary Connexion between them and any of the Secondary Qualities ; he means , those Qualities which are the Objects of our Senses . Nor do I wonder Mr. Locke thinks thus , because he does , all along , pitch his Thoughts on the Corpuscularian Hypothesis , as on that which , in some Men's Opinion , goes farthest in an Intelligible Explication of the Qualities of Body . Now , my Judgment is , that 't is demonstrable , that the Principles of the Corpuscularians cannot possibly give Account of the Constitution either of the Minute Parts , or of the least Atom , nor , consequently , of any Body in Nature ; or ( which is the Proper Work of a Philosopher ) refund any Quality into its Proper Causes ; I mean , such Causes as they can prove to be such , or must be such ; however , they may fancy them to be such , by allowing to themselves Voluntary Suppositions for Principles . I have shewn in my Appendix to my Method , that the most Celebrated of the Corpuscularian Philosophers , the Cartesians , cannot know the Constitution of the most minute Part of any of their Elements , since they can never tell us by their Grounds , the Primary Qualities of their First Matter , of which their three Elements , and , consequently , all Natural Bodies are made . To shew we can , I will give a short Summary of the Aristotelian Doctrine in this particular , truly represented , and cleared from the Mis-conceits of some late School-men .

13. 'T is confess'd , and Evident , that Quantity is the Primary Affection of Body ; of which , re-modify'd , ( as I Short Hints of the true Aristotelian Grounds . may say , ) all Qualities are made . We can shew , that by it Body is Divisible ; and , therefore , Quantity ( for that , and and many other Reasons ) is Divisibility , especially , taking it as consider'd Physically : however , taking it as capable to be Measur'd , Proportion'd , and Figur'd , ( as Mathematicians do , ) it may not very unfitly be called Extension . But , take it , ( as I said , ) as affecting Bodies , in order to Natural Action and Passion , in which the Course of Nature consists , ( as a Natural Philosopher ought to consider it , ) and 't is Divisibility , or a Capacity to be divided by those Causes . Nor can the Greatest Cartesian deny this , since he grants , that the First Operation in Nature , is , the making their three Elements , by Grinding ( as it were ) or dividing their First Matter . Proceeding by immediate Steps , we are to seek out the first Sorts of this Divisibility ; and this must be done by finding the most Simple Intrinsecal Differences of that , or any other Notion , which can only be more and less of the Common Notion . Now , more and less of Divisibility Consider'd , in order to Natural Agents , is the same as to be * * See Method to Science , B. 1. L. 3. § §. 1 , 2. more easily , and less easily Divisible by by those Agents , which we call to be Rare , and Dense . Rarity therefore , and Density do constitute the Simplest Sorts or Kinds of Bodies . And , since it is inconceivable that Matter should be divided at all by Second Causes , but the Divider must be more Dense , or more able to divide , than the Matter that is to be divided by it ; it follows , that Rare and Dense Bodies were originally such ; or , that there were Created at first some sorts of Bodies that are more , and others that were less divisible ; as is clearly express'd in the two first Verses of Genesis . And Reason abets it ; for , otherwise , the Course of Nature , consisting in Motion , could never have been Connaturally made ; because , had all the Parts of Matter been equally Divisible , there could be no Reason why one part of the Matter should be the Divider , rather than the other ; and so there could have been no Motion , nor , consequently , any Course of Nature at all .

14. By the Division of Rare Bodies by Dense ones , and the Division of their first Compounds , the Number of How all Secondary Qualities come to be made . Parts increasing , there naturally follow'd the various Size , and the Grossness and Minuteness of those Parts ; as also , their various Figures , Situations , &c. All which contribute to compound the Species and Individuums . Of these , variously mingled and remingled , all the rest are made . From Simple Division , two Things are made of one ; whence follows the Individual Diversity of Bodies , according to the Notion of Substance , or Ens. More Accidents are ( as was said before ) still taken in , to make the Subaltern Genera and Species , even to the lowest Sort , or Kind ; and innumerably more of them , to distinguish and constitute Individual Bodies .

15. To come a little nearer our main Point : unless those Qualities , Rarity and Density , which are the Primary The Course of Nature is fundamentally built on the Admission of Ratity and Density . ones , be admitted , the World could never have been form'd connaturally ; nor the Course of Nature carried on ; because , ( as was now shewn , ) in that Supposition , there would have been no Motion . For , Motion of Material Entities is perform'd by the Intervening of the Parts of the one between the Parts of the other , and , so , Dividing it ; which is impossible , unless the one had been Rarer , or more yielding ; the other Denser , or less yielding . But , this once settled , 't is evident from the very Terms , that there are Proper Causes , both on the Agent 's and Patient's Side , for the one's Dividing , and the other's being Divided . For , the Rare being more Divisible than the Dense , 't is demonstrable , that the Dense being impell'd against the Rare by Motion , ( which comes from a Superior Agent , ) the Rare being more Divisible , will give way , and be divided by the Dense ; which is clearly impossible in the Corpuscularian Hypothesis ; which puts all Parts of their Matter to be equally Rare , or Dense ; or rather , ( as the Cartesians do , ) neither Rare , nor Dense ; all Qualities , according to them , being made by mingling their three Elements ; which Elements are themselves made by , and presuppose , the Motion of their First Matter . Whereas , yet , it is impossible to conceive , but those Parts of that Matter must be either Rare , or else Dense , at least to some Degree . And , as denying the Rarity and Density in the First Bodies does , by making Motion impossible , put the Course of Nature out of Frame , both in its Beginning and Progress ; so it utterly destroys all Demonstration in Physicks , which is grounded on Mediums from Proper Causes , and Proper Effects .

16. Passing over many Immediate Steps , which shew how those Four Principal Qualities , Heat , Cold , Moisture , That by these Grounds , the Nature of Secondary Qualities is Demonstrable . and Driness , are made of Rarity and Density , acted upon by the common Causes in Nature ; we come to shew how these two Primary Qualities do constitute many Secondary ones ; and how these last are refunded into the other , as their Proper Causes ; and , therefore , are Demonstrable by them , as by their Proper Mediums . A few Instances may serve , as Hints , to explicate others . That great Pellucidity in the Air is necessarily , and properly refunded into its extream Divisibility , or Rarity ; by which it becomes easily penetrable in all its Parts , by those Spicula Ignea , the Rays of the Sun ; and Opacity , for the same Reason , is the Proper Effect of Density ; which hinders its Subject from being penetrated , or Divided by them ; whence also it is a Proper Cause of Repelling , or Reflecting them . Again ; Who sees not that Liquidity , which makes its Subject easily yielding to be flatted evenly , as we see in Ponds ; or driven to run into Cavities , by the common Motion of Gravitation , is a proper Effect of Rarity , as Consistency is of Density ? Spissitude is a Constipation of Dense Parts , or the Want of Pores to admit the Ingress of other Bodies . Grossitude is clearly nothing but Density , in a bigger Quantity of its Parts . Friability is refunded into great Dense Parts , and very large Rare ones : Whence , those Rare Parts , which , were they less , would better cement those Parts together , being now very large , and , withal , very Divisible , are easily divided ; and , consequently , the Body is soon shatter'd : As we find in Dry Clods , out of which , ( while they were yet Wet Dirt , ) those Parts which were Watry , being drawn by Heat , large Cavities are left , which the Air now possesses . On the other side , Ductility and Malleability are the Effects of the very smallest Rare Parts , finely compacted with the minutest Dense ones . Those Small Dense Parts , so closely woven , and , in a manner , Contiguous , keep the Rare from evaporating ; and the Rare , by being such , and interwoven with the Dense all over , make the Compound yield to Expansion , without Breaking ; being very small , are not easily separable ; and yet , tho' rarify'd farther by the subtilest Agent , Fire , they render it Fusible .

17. Were these Principles which I rawly and briefly touch on here , pursu'd by Learned Men with Immediate The true Reason why some Men think them Inexplicable . Consequences , which , true Logick assisting , is far from impossible ; the Nature of those first-mixt Qualities , and by their means of many others , would not be very hard to explicate . But , if Men are resolv'd to neglect all Natural Principles , and the Intrinsecal Constitution of the First Bodies in Nature , and will needs run upon nothing but Mathematical Notions , which pre-suppose those Principles ; nor could be found in Nature , unless the other be first admitted , or Division made Possible ; ( for neither Parts , nor consequently Figures of Parts , could be made without Division , nor Division unless some Bodies were naturally apt to divide , others to be divided , that is , unless some were Rare , others Dense ) or , if , instead of demonstrating their Natural Principles by the Superiour Science , they will needs have recourse to Voluntary Suppositions ; and violate the Nature of Causality , and of the Deity it self , by making him whose Proper Effect ( he being Essentially Self-existence ) is to give Existence , or create , to be the Proper and Immediate Cause of Motion ; and go about to prove Ignotum per Ignotissimum , by supposing ( as they sometimes do ) that God wills this or that , which is for the Interest of their Tenet , and too hard to prove : If , I say , Men are resolv'd to follow such Untoward Methods , 't is no Wonder Science does not advance , but the World is detain'd in Ignorance of many things , which otherwise it might know . Did Learned Men set themselves to carry forwards the Grounds of Nature in Euclides Physicus ( where they will find Demonstrations enow ) to farther Conclusions , with the same Zeal as they do the Mathematicks ; I doubt not but the Evident Truths , which would by Degrees disclose themselves , would both encourage , and enable them , to make a farther Progress in Knowledge ; nor would the Science of Second Qualities , ( about which Physical Demonstrations ought in great part be employ'd ) be held so Desperate . But to leave these Discourses , and apply my self to Mr. L. I cannot but wonder , that amongst all his Ideas of Qualities , he not so much as once mentions ( as far as I remember ) those two Chiefest ones of Rarity and Density ; tho' nothing is more obvious in the whole Course of Nature than these are . Which , with many other Reasons , makes me think he had not seen , or at least well weigh'd the true Aristotelian System , ( which he might have seen in Sir Kenelm Digby's Treatise of Bodies , and its Latin Preface ; as also in Institutiones Peripateticae ; ) but took it as represented by the Modern Schools . For my self , I must declare I verily judge , that the Grounds I here insist on , are the only true ones that a Natural Philosopher can have ; that they are Demonstrable ; and I do offer my self to maintain them to be such , if it shall please any Learned Objector to attempt to show these Principles Faulty ; or that we build on any Supposition at all , and not on what 's either Self-evident , or easily and immediately Reducible to Self-evidence . Which , I believe , no other Sect of Philosophers did ever so much as pretend to .

18. To come to those Qualities , which are the Formal Object of our Senses , called by Mr. Locke Secondary The Possibility of demonstrating them shewn by the Instance of Colour . Qualities , I have shewn already that divers of them are Intelligible and Explicable by Rarity and Density ; only certain little Respects are added to them , which too lie in our Ken : Nor do I doubt but most of the others may be clearly and distinctly known by the same Grounds . Indeed , divers of them depend on the Figure and Texture of Parts ; which , tho' we can never know with a Mathematical Exactness , yet I see not why we may not demonstrate the Natures or Kinds of each Quality , so far as to distinguish them from others , and refund them into their Proper Causes ; which is enough for our purpose , and most proportionable to our State . For Example , Light brings from the Wall into the Eye , and so into our Knowing Power , the Notion of Whiteness , and of other Colours from other Objects . It cannot be doubted then , ( since Light of its self is Uniform ) but that there is some Disposition in the Surface of the Object , or the Figure of its outmost Parts , which reflects Light after a different manner , and affects the Seer accordingly . Nor is it hard to conceive , but very Evident , that a very smooth Surface , as having fewest Pores in it , will reflect more Light , and so make it more Visible ; especially if those Outmost Parts be Roundish , which reflect Light every way , or towards all sides . It is manifest then that , that Quality which is most Visible of all others being that which we call Whiteness , the Proper Causes of that Quality may be found out . Which will further appear hence , that if , on the contrary , the Surface have Small-pointed Parts and Large Pores , much of the Light will be lost in those shady Grotts , and scarce any Beam of it reflected ; which therefore is the Proper Cause of that Lightless Appearance call'd Blackness ; which is the Reason why , when there is no Light at all to be reflected , all things seem Black . If we hold a Thousand Needles Points towards our Eye , they appear Black , because of the vastness of the Interstices or Cavities in proportion to the extant Parts which should have reflected the Light : Whereas , were the Object a polish'd Plate of Steel , the Interstices or Pores being less , it appears more luminous and whitish ; which may give us some faint , but sure , Light , how this Colour is made . The Intermediate Colours are made by the Mixture and Demixture of those Extreams ; whence , out of the Degrees of their partaking those , Contrary or Subcontrary Qualities are framed , as Blue , Green , Yellow , and all other Colours . Nor is this Degree , constituting each of those Species , Unknowable . A Picture-drawer can tell us what Proportion of his Paint of such a Colour he adds to that of another Colour , to make what Third Colour he pleases . We see then , that the Secondary Quality of Colour , may come within the Compass of our Knowledge . Nor do I see why the rest of them may not become equally Intelligible , did we seriously set our Reflex Thoughts on work to study them ; especially Experimental Knowledge assisting , by hinting to us such Matters of Fact as give Light to our Reason , ( when furnish'd with , and attentive to , true Natural Principles ) how it may reduce those Qualities unto their Proper Causes , which is the only Work of Science .

REFLEXION Eighteenth , ON The 4th and 5th CHAPTERS .

1. I Come now to a nearer view of the 4th Chapter , Of the Reality of Knowledge , the main point in which the whole Doctrine of the Ideists is concern'd . The State of the Question . To State it rightly , I do not doubt ( as I have exprest my self formerly ) but that the Ideists have many true Notions of the Things ; that is , the Things themselves in their Minds , after a Natural Manner , as well as their Opposers have , notwithstanding their ill Speculation ; and thence oftentimes discourse right ; for the same Reason that , tho' some Philosophers held that the Eye sees per Emissionem , others per Receptionem Radiorum , yet they naturally saw both a like , however their Speculative thoughts , disfer'd about the manner how Seeing was made . Wherefore the true State of the Question is , whether they can have any Real Knowledge of the things in Nature , according to the Principles of the Ideists ; or , by their puting our Notions , which are the Ground and Materials of our Knowledge , to be onely Likenesses , Appearances , Similitudes , Resemblances , Pourtraitures , or Pictures of the Things , ( which are the names they give them ) and not the Things themselves in our minds : For , if they can have no Real Knowledge , or Knowledge of the Thing , by such meerly representing Ideas , then it must be said that those Ideas , being confessedly the First and onely Materials of their Knowledge , the Ideists will become oftentimes liable to deviate from Nature , and fall into Errour by adhering to such Groundless Principles , as is the Substituting very often Empty Resemblances , or Fancies , for the Things themselves ; nor can they ever be able to give a Solid Account by their Principles , that they know any thing .

2. Now , it seems to me ( tho' I should wave those many pregnant Arguments brought against them , in my How we know the Things by means of Ideas , Inexplicable . three first Preliminaries ) that the very Position of the Ideists , does decide the Question , and confute themselves . For , if we may trust their words , they agree that we know the Things as well as the Ideas , and onely differ in the manner how : Of which Mr. L. tell us here § 3. 'T is Evident the mind knows not Things immediately , but onely by the Intervention of the Ideas it has of them . Whence I much fear that by Ideas he means Phantasms , or Material Pictures in the Imagination ; by whose Intervention 't is indeed confest we know . For , otherwise , it is far from Evident , that we know them by means of those Spiritual Conceptions , we call Notions ; since we bring many close Arguments , fetcht from the Nature of the Thing , to prove that there is perfect Evidence of the Contrary : For , those Ideas or Notions being held and shown by us , to be the Things in our Mind , their very being there , or in a Knowing Power , is to be known : Nor can they be held by us to be the means to know themselves ; for , so the same would be the Means and End both , which is a Contradiction . But , let us consider his words . The mind , he says , knows the Things by the Intervention of Ideas . The Question then is what the Idea does , and what the word [ Intervention ] means . Does the Mind see the Thing without , by sending out her Rayes of Knowledge to it ? This cannot be said , in regard all the Acts of Knowledge which the Mind has , are Immanent ones , and are receiv'd in that which produced them , as in their onely Subject . Does then the Thing that is without , send its beams by the Ideas , as by a kind of Spiritual Optick-glass , to which the mind lays her Intellectual Eye ? Neither can this be said , for the Mind could see or know the Thing it self were it in it , else how could it know the Ideas ? Rather , were the Thing in the Understanding , it could not but be known , whether there were any Similitude , besides , in it , or no. It may be said that the Mind knows the Thing by the Idea because it is a Picture or Similitude that represents it . But I way walk in a Gallery , and see a Hundred Pictures in it of Men , and many other Things in Nature ; and yet not know one jot the better , any one of the Things represented , unless I had know them formerly , tho' Apelles himself had drawn them . I may remember them again , indeed , if I had known them before ; which cannot be said in our case , because those Ideas of theirs are to give them the First Knowledge of the Thing .

3. Being thus at a loss to explicate [ Intervention ] or to know The Ideists must be forced to grant that the Thing known is in the Mind . what It , or the Idea or Representation serves for , we will reflect next upon the Word [ know ] which Mr. Locke applies ( tho' not so immediately , yet ) indifferently , to the Thing and to the Idea . Now , if this be so , and that to to be known agrees to them both ; then , as the Idea is in the Mind when it is known , so the Thing , when known , should be in the Mind too , which is our very Position , thought by the Ideists so Paradoxical , and yet here forcibly admitted by themselves . And , if neither the Idea brings the Thing into the Knowing Power , or ( which is the same ) into the Mind ; nor the Mind , or Knowing Power goes out of the Soul to it , I know not how they can pretend to show how the Knowing Power , and the Thing known , can ever come to meet , as they must when ever an Act of Knowledge is made . 'T is to no purpose then , to alledge that the Thing comes into the mind , or is brought thither by means of the Idea ; for , if it comes or is brought thither , let it be by what means it will , 't is most incontestably Evident that , after it is come or brought thither , it is there . Nor can all the Wit of Man avoid this Consequence , unless plain words must lose their Signification . Wherefore Mr. L. in pursuance of his own Principles should not have said that the Mind does not know Things immediately , but by means of the Ideas ; but , that it does not know them at all , neither mediately nor immediately ; for if the Thing be in the Knowledge at all , they must be in the Mind , where onely the Knowledge is ; which comes over ( thus far ) to our Position .

4. It must be confess'd , that Mr. Locke has here , §. 3. put the Objection against the Ideists as strongly , and home , The Necessity of the Thing 's being in our Mind , farther inforced . as it is possible : But I must still persist , and avow , that neither his own excellent Wit , ( which , had he light on right Principles , could reach to any thing that is within the Compass of Possibility , ) nor all the World joining in his Assistance , can clear that Objection , so as to satisfie any Intelligent Man , who is true to his Reason guiding it self ( as it ought ) by Connexion of Terms , and not by Fancy ; nor shew , that by his Ideas any Knowledge at all of the Thing can be possibly had . First , He alledges the Agreement or Conformity of the Things with his Simple Ideas . And I reply , that he cannot , by the Principles of the Ideists , sh●w that the Things do agree or disagree with his Simple Ideas at all . To demonstrate which , I argue thus : Ere he can know that the Representation and the Thing represented do agree , Common Sense tells us , he must have both the Idea and the Thing in his Comparing Power , that is , in his Mind ; that so he may take a View of both of them , and consider them in order to one another ; and , by doing this , see whether the one does truly resemble the other , or no. But , this is directly against the Principles of the Ideists , who do not allow that the Thing can be in the Mind , but the Idea only . Next , he alledges , that his Complex Ideas are Archetypes ; and not Conformable to the Things , as the others were , but to themselves only ; and , therefore , he says , they cannot lead us into Errour , because they cannot but represent themselves . I pass by the Oddness of the Position , that the Idea , which is a Picture , should be a Picture of it self , or represent it self : I only note , that this Allegation which should clear the Point , quite loses it , and gives it up . For , the Question is , whether his Ideas do give us the Knowledge of the Things in Nature ; and 't is evident , and confess'd they cannot give us this Knowledge of them , but by representing them : Now , he tells us , that his Complex Ideas are not Copies of the Things , nor represent them , but themselves only . Whence is evidently concluded , that we are never the nearer to the Knowing of Things by them ; no , not obliquely , and at Second hand , or by the Intervention of those Ideas , or Similitudes representing them , as was pretended formerly . Whence , for any thing he has produced , we may justly doubt whether such Ideas are not Whimsical Fancies , without any Reality at all ; since he will not allow them even that slightest Relation to the Things , of so much as representing them . But , which is much worse , he affirms , §. 5. that those Ideas themselves are consider'd as the Archetypes ; and the Things no otherwise regarded , but as they are conformable to them . Now , this seems to me a strange way of proving the Reality of our Knowledge , by Ideas , to affirm , that we are not to regard the Things , but as conformable to our Ideas . Is not this to make Philosophy not the Knowledge of Things , but of Ideas only ; and to pretend , that the Thing must only be held True , if it be Conformable to our Ideas ? He might as well have said Fancies ; for , he expresly says , these Complex Ideas are made by the Mind , and not taken from the Thing , nor like it : And , whatever is neither the Res , nor so much as like it , can neither have Reality , nor Shew of Reality ; and therefore , must be a meer Fancy . Now , these Complex Ideas reach much farther than all the others do ; viz. to Modes , Substances and Relations ; as is seen , Book 1. Chap. 12. So that this Discourse of his destroys the Reality of our Knowledge in almost all the Things we are to know . He will , perhaps , say , those Complex Ideas are the Effects of certain Powers to Cause them , found in the Thing ; and , by this Means they bring the Things , as being their Causes , into their Mind . But the Argument returns still with the same Force ; for , if they bring the Thing into the Mind , then the Thing is in the Mind when it is brought thither . Add , that this makes them Resemblances of the Thing , which he denies ; for , the Effect , being a Participation of the Cause , must necessarily resemble it ; especially , if it be a Natural Effect . Nor can he say they make us know the Thing , because they are made up of Simple ones : For , as the Simple Ideas only made us know the Thing by representing it , so these other not representing It , have lost the Power of making us know it at all . So that , let them turn which way they will , either the Thing is never brought into the Knowledge , or the Mind ; and then it can never be known : Or , it is brought thither , and then it must be there ; which is our Position , and deny'd by the Ideists .

5. I have shewn above , that all Mathematical Knowledges , tho' they are never so abstractedly express'd , are Mathematical and Moral Knowledges are grounded on the Thing in the Mind . grounded on the Thing , or on Body ; and Moral ones , ( which two he here mentions , ) on the Nature of Man , or Reason ; which , I suppose , none will say are Nothings ; and , therefore , they are , both of them , true Knowledge of the Thing , consider'd in part , or inadequately .

6. In his 8th Section , he defends himself for having so little regard ( as it may seem ) to the Real Existence of All Essential Predicates , and Accidental ones too , are truly the Thing , and the whole Thing , imply'd consusedly . Things . I discourse thus : We have more Real Notions of the Thing , than barely Existence ; for , every Notion that belongs to the Line of Thing or Substance , whether Inferior or Superior ; nay , every Mode or Accident that does belong , or ever did belong to the Thing , either Intrinsecally or Extrinsecally , are all of them Real ; so that he needs not be sollicitous any should object , that his Ideas have no Reality in them , because he regards not their Existence onely . And , were such an Objection made , or had it any force , he might also reply , that in every part of his Discourse , he does regard Existence , and cannot do otherwise ; unless any Objecter should be so weak as to alledge , that what exists in the Mind , does not exist at all . For , if he had once his Notions from the Thing , they would be still the Thing in the Mind , and Real , tho' the Individual Objects , whence they were taken , be perish'd . Nay , more ; those Things would have a Better , a more Durable , and more Noble Existence in the Mind , than they had in Nature . I say , [ those Things ; ] not fearing that any should object , that Thing signifies the whole ; which may seem contrary to my former Doctrine , that the Thing is only in the Mind by Inadequate Notions , or in part . For , tho' the Formal Conception be onely of some Quality of it , expresly and distinctly , yet it implies or connotates the Knowledge of the whole Thing confusedly ; it being most clearly demonstrable in Metaphysicks , that there are no Actual Parts in any Compound whatever : So that 't is still the whole Thing that is known , tho' onely a Part ( as it were ) of it be known distinctly . Upon this Evident Principle , that there are no Actual Parts , is grounded that Solid and most approved Maxim , that Actions and Passions are of the Suppositum , or Individual Thing . Thus , when the Hand strikes or wounds a Man , 't is truly said , that the Man ( which signifies the whole Thing ) did it , and is answerable for it ; and , if he kills the Person he struck , the whole Man will be hang'd for it , tho' the Hand onely , and not the Legs , Head , Neck , &c. gave the Blow . Now , this could neither be said with Truth , nor that Punishment be inflicted by Justice , if the Word [ Hand ] did not signifie , and truly were the whole Man , according to his Faculty of Handling or Striking , or according to that Part which immediately did that Action . The self-same is to be said , and for the self-same Reason , of our Inadequate Notions ; and , that each of them implies , or connotates ( that is , materially and entitatively is ) the whole Thing , tho' formally or precisely but a Part of it , as it were ; or the Thing according to such a particular Considerability , found in it , or Identify'd with it . Whoever shall weigh attentively the Force and Coherence of this Discourse , will clearly discern how entirely all our Philosophy is built on the Things , and is the Knowledge of them ; and how far the Ideists fall short of having that Solid Ground for the Basis of their Discourses : But , especially , this Tenet , which puts their Complex Ideas not onely not to be the Thing , ( which it must be some Way , or to some degree or other , if it be not a meer Fancy , ) but , not to be so much as a Copy or Resemblance of it , which ( as was said ) is the slightest and least Relation it can possibly have to it .

7. I would have none think , that , by this Discourse I deny Complex Notions , or Ideas . The Ten Common Heads That our Complex Notions are Regular , and well grounded ; Mr. L's , not so . are the Simpler ones ; which when we divide by Differences , each Inferior Genus and Species , ( they being made up of the Superior Notions , and those Differences , ) are Complex Notions , as their very Definitions tell us . Whence Mr. Locke's Complex Idea of Murther , Sacrilege , or whatever else they be , are given us by the same Method . And , the difference between him and me in this Point , is this ; that we complicate our Ideas regularly , and according to the exact Rules of Art ; and he seems to make his voluntarily , or else by Reflexion on his own Interiour , and what he experiences in himself ; which I take to be a very fallacious way , because very few can distinguish well between a Phantasm in the Imagination , which is a Material Faculty in us ; and a Notion , which is Spiritual , tho' they be both of them Interiour , or within us . To shew the Difference between which , I have given a short Hint in my Method , Book 1. Less . 2. §. 24. and much more here , in my Preface .

8. It is very hard , when two Writers go upon different Principles , not to mistake now and then one the others In what manner we compound such Notions . Meaning ; and I would be loath to wrong so Ingenuous an Author . Sometimes he seems to mean no more by his Complex Ideas , but either those Compound Notions which are made up of the Simpler Notions of the Genus and Difference , as we descend downwards in the same Line ; or else , of those in divers Lines ; and , I am sure , let him discourse them as he will , they can be compounded of nothing else ; those Common Heads comprizing all the Natural Notions we can have . It is no less certain too , that we can put together ( as he says ) Simple Notions as we please , which we have not observ'd thus put together in things that actually exist . But then we must be wary , while we do this , that our Reason joins them by seeing them Consistent and Compossible : For , our Fancy will put together Ideas which are utterly Repugnant to one another , and are altogether Chimerical . Now , if the Notions , thus join'd by us , be Consistent , the Nature or Thing suppos'd to be the Ground of those Notions is possible to be ; which being the Notion of Ens , hence they are conceiv'd as a kind of Intellectual Entity , created ( as it were ) by the Mind , and thence have an Intelligibility , which is a Property of Ens ( Non-Entities and Chimaeras being Unintelligible ) and we can have a kind of Counterfeit , or Artificial , Notion of them as Entities , tho' such a thing never existed in the World that we know of ; tho' , I believe , ' tit hard to conceive , that we can frame a Complex Notion of a Nature that is Capable to be , but it exists somewhere in the Universality of Creatures , here , or elsewhere . How the Mind , using the Fancy , can do this , cannot , I think , be better elucidated , than by reflecting on what those , who write of the Excellency of Poesie and Poets , use to say in Commendation of those Daedalean Artists . They tell us that a Poet has that Name from the Greek Noun 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , which signifies A Maker . The Reason they give for this Appellation is , that whereas other Artists have their Materials given to their Hands to work upon , by shaping it into an Artificial Form ; the Poet alone is the Maker as well of his Matter , as the Contriver of its Form . So that the Ideas he has in his Head of his Heroes , his Lovers , his Ladies , and of Virtuous Persons , are indeed ( as Mr. Locke calls his ) Archetypes , and regard not whether such Incomparable Patterns he has invented did ever exist in Nature , or no ; nor is it to his purpose . Yet still ( as Mr. Locke says well ) that his Complex Ideas are made of Simple ones , so ( by the leave of those Self-magnifiers ) the Poet could never have had those Excellent Ideas of his Heroes , or their great Actions , had he not been pre-imbu'd with Natural Notions ; which he joins together ingeniously , and exalts them to a high Pitch , so to make them Exemplars for others to imitate . Rather , he only adds Superlative or Extraordinary Degrees to what he finds in Nature . Whence 't is manifest , he regards not what is , but what should be ; quite contrary to the Duty of a Philosopher , who is to take his Complex Notions from Things , just as he finds them complicated in Nature , and then discourse upon them by his Reason ; and not to stand coining new Complex Ideas which Nature never gave him . What therefore I most dislike here in Mr. Locke is , that he seems not to reflect on what it is which makes some Ideas or Notions more Simple than others , viz. Their being more Abstracted or Universal ; for this frees them from the Partnership of more-compounded Differences , and the Complexion of Multitudes of Accidents ; ( which , still , as they descend lower , are requisit to distinguish the Kinds of Things ; ) by which means they become more Simple or less compounded ; whence , the Supreme Heads of the Ten Predicaments are the Simplest Notions of all others , except that of Existence . Did Mr. Locke rate the Simplicity and Complexion of his Ideas from this certain and well-grounded Rule , there might an easie Accomodation be made between his Doctrin and mine as to this Particular . But his Zeal against the Cobweb Schemes some Modern School-men had woven , transported him to ravel that Excellent Frame of Notions , which both Nature and Art had given us ; and , ( as Cartesius and others have done ) to model all Philosophy upon a new , tho' less Solid , or rather far from Solid , Foundation .

9. That I may say as much as I can in behalf of the Ideists , it may be alledg'd , that they find by Experience Things All Pleas fail the Ideists , unless they perfectly distinguish Phantasms from Notions . are as their Ideas do represent them , and that they Succeed as we by means of our Ideas do Forecast them : Therefore Real Knowledge may be had by means of Ideas . I answer , First , That this Agreement they have between what 's in the Mind and out of it , would equally , nay better , be explicated , were the Things themselves in the Mind , and not the Ideas ; and , therefore , it can be no Argument for the Reality of their Knowledge by Ideas only . Besides , I deny that when their Ideas are not true Natural Notions but Fancies , they experience them , or any Effect of them ; as in Vacuum , or Duration before or after the World . Secondly , I answer , That Experience only helps them by giving them Knowledge ; and Knowledge , according to them , can only be had by means of Ideas ; wherefore they must either prove , by other Grounds , that Similitudes can give us Knowledge of the Things , or they do petere Principium , beg the Question , and prove idem per idem . For , if meer Representations can give us no true Knowledge , Experience , which only assists us by giving us Ideas , is quite thrown out of doors , and may all be Fantastical . All is wrong and falls short , if the First Ground of our Knowledge be Incompetent and Insignificant . Besides , Experience gives us both Phantasms , which are Material Representations ; and our Notions too , which are Spiritual ; but Experience is not duely qualify'd to tell us which is the one , and which is the other ; tho' this be of the highest Concern in our Case : All it can do is to inform us , that we are affected by some Agent working on our Senses . Nay , of the two , it more inclines us to embrace Phantasms for Notions ; for those do make upon us the more Sensible Impression , and cause a more lively Representation . To distinguish perfectly between this False and True Ground of Knowledge , is of the most weighty Importance of all other Points of Philosophy whatsoever ; and yet I must complain , that not the least Care ( as far as I have observ'd ) is taken any where in this Treatise to distinguish them ; and particularly , not in this Chapter , which had been the proper Place to treat of that Subject : But , on the contrary , ( as I have shewn above ) they are carelesly Confounded . And I must declare , that without settling this Point well , we can never have any Certainty what Knowledge is Real , what Fantastick : Or , when we do truly know , when onely seem to know : But , there is not a Word here to that purpose .

10. As for the Monsters and Changelings here spoken of , I think Philosophers should have nothing to do with Odd Miscarriages of Nature ought not to shock Natural Principles . Lusus Naturae , or 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , which are besides the ordinary Course of Nature ; but with the Common Course of Causes , or Nature it self . My Judgment is , too , that People should be very wary in Killing any Monsters that approach to Humane shape ; and , that it were fitter there should be Hospitalls to breed them , till perfect Observations were made concerning them . The Novelty of the sight , would invite Spectators , and bear their Charges : Unless perhaps there may be danger , lest the Imaginations of the Apprehensive Sex , who see such Uncouth Shapes , or hear frequent Talk of them , should , by that occasion , breed more of them . What concerns us is to look to our Principles , and not to be misled from them , by reflecting on such odd preternatural Productions ; as I must think Mr. Locke is , when he thinks Changelings to be something between a Man and a Beast . The Division of Animal into Rational and Irrational is made by such Differences as are perfectly Contradictory to one another ; between which there can no more be any Third or Middle , than there can be a Medium between is and is not . If then that odd Birth be Rational , let the shape be as Distorted as it will , it is truly a Man ; if it be not , let it look never so like a Man , 't is a Brute . When 't is the one , when the other , may hap in some odd cases to be Doubtful ; and then it belongs to the Prudence of Intelligent Men to decide it ; or , if they cannot , it becomes us in Christian Prudence to act warily . Indeed , if the Definition of Man , viz. Rational Animal , be questionable , we shall ( as I said above ) be at a great Loss to know our own Kind ; which would be but a melancholy Business . And , if we forego our Principles , distinguishing between Corporeal and Spiritual Natures , we may perhaps grow in time no wiser than the Common People amongst the Portugueses in Brazil , who conceit the Apes and Monkies there have as much Wit as themselves have , and could speak well enough too if they would ; but that , out of a deep Reach of Policy , they counterfeit themselves dumb , and not to understand the Language , lest they should be forced to work .

Corollary I. From this Discourse , and the Evident Grounds of it , all possibility of Vacuum is clearly confuted . Hence , no Vacuum . For , if the Idea or Notion of Space be only an Inadequate Conception of Body , whence 't is evidently taken , or Body conceived according to such a Mode of it ; then to put Space without Body , or where there is no Body , is a perfect Contradiction . Corallery II. Hence also , tho' the Cartesians could demonstrate there are Innate Ideas , ( which I judge impossible ) The Cartesians are concluded against by J. S. as well as other Ideists , or rather more . yet , unless they declare and prove , by their Principles , that those Ideas are the things themselves in our Understanding , and not Resemblances onely , the same Arguments I have used against others will have equal , or rather a far greater Force against them ; and conclude , that they cannot , by their Principles , have Knowledge of any Thing , but that they know Nothing . And , how they should pretend they are the Things themselves , if they do not so much as allow them to be taken from the Things , is altogether Inconceivable .

11. Concerning Truth in General , of which Mr. Locke treats in his 5th Chapter , no more can be said ( speaking All Truth consists in Joining or Separating Partial Conceptions of the Things ; and not in Joining or Separating Ideas . of Natural Truths ) but that it is , the Things Existing such in our Minds as they exist in themselves . For , this put , our Minds will be conformable to the Things , whose Metaphysical Verity fixes them to be what they are , or ( if we speak of them as affected with any Mode ) as they are : Whence our Judgments concerning them , being thus grounded , cannot but be True . What Mr. L.'s Joining or Separating of Signs , &c. has to do with Truth , is beyond my Skill to comprehend ; for Signs are no more Truth , than the Bush at the Door is the Wine in the Cellar . I have demonstrated over and over , that Ideas , which he makes here one sort of Signs , and are meer Similitudes , can never give us Knowledge of Things ; much less can Truth , which is the Object of Knowledge , consist in conjoining or separating them ; and , least of all , can Truth consist in the Joining or Separating the other sorts of Signs , viz. of Words without the Ideas or Notions ; for , thus consider'd , they are no more but Sounds or Characters . To discourse this Point from its Fundamental Ground , and declare it Literally : The Metaphysical Verity of the Thing , which , put into a Proposition , predicates the whole Thing ( or Mode ) of it self , and affirms that the Thing is what it is , gives us our First Truths , or First Principles . And all other Truths consists in this , that Inadequate , or Partial Notions or Conceptions of the Thing , either as to what is Intrinsecal or Extrinsecal to it , are predicated either of the Thing as in it self , that is , according to the Line of Substance , which are call'd Essential Predicates ; as , when we say , Petrus est Animal ; or , as it is affected with some Mode consistent in the same Subject ; as when we say , Petrus est Albus , Pater , Locatus , Galeatus , Album est Dulce , &c. and it is impossible there can be any more sorts of Formal Truths but these two : For all Predication is made by some kind of Identification , as is plainly signify'd by the Copula [ is , ] and there cannot possibly be any other sorts of Identification , but either in the whole , or not in the whole ; that is , in part , or according to Partial Conceptions of the same Thing ; nor can there be any Identification at all of Ideas ; Mr. Locke confessing , that each of them is what it self is , and no other .

12. I take it to be a strange kind of Catechresis to make two sorts of Truth , Montal and Verbal , and we may with as The Distinction of Truth into Mental and Verbal Extravagant , and the Parts of it Coincident . good Sense say , that a Tavern has two sorts of Wine ; one in the Cellar , the other in the Bush at the Door ; for Words are good for nothing in the World but meerly and purely to Signifie : So that when we say a Man speaks True , the Sense of those Words can be only This , that the Proposition he speaks does signifie such a Thought or Judgment in his Mind as is really Conformable to the Thing he thought or spoke of : And I wonder this Great Man can imagin that , in our more Complex Ideas , we put the Name for the Idea it self ; for then that Name would signifie Nothing at all , if neither the Thing nor the Idea be signified by it , as he seems to hold . Again , Words differ from meer Sounds in this , that they have some Sense or Meaning in them , and Meanings are the very Notions we have in our Minds : Wherefore the Parts of this Distinction of his would be coincident , because all Verbal Truths ( were the Expression proper ) would necessarily be Mental ones ; and Mr. Locke seems to say the same , § 8. where he makes those Truths which are barely Nominal to be Chimerical . I grant too , that Truths may be distinguish'd , according to their several Subjects , into Moral , Physical , Metaphysical , &c. But I must severely reflect on his describing Moral Truths , § 11. to be the Speaking Things according to the Perswasion of our own Minds , tho' the Proposition we speak does not agree to the Reality of Things : For , since it is most Evidently known , that the Perswasions of Men's Minds not onely may , but do frequently contradict one another ; by this Definition of Moral Truth both Sides of the Contradiction may be True ; which destroys Truth by confounding it with Falshood ; and makes the Art of Distinguishing ridiculous , by making Truth a Genus to some sort of Falshood , or not-Truth to be one kind of Truth . 'T is a very dangerous thing in Philosophy to bring Distinctions , unless each Member of the Notion divided includes the Notion of the Genus . They were invented for clearing Truth ; but , if ill made , or ill-manag'd , nothing in the World breeds greater Error and Confusion . Corruptio optimi pessima .

REFLEXION Nineteenth , ON The 6th , 7th , and 8th CHAPTERS .

1. BY what has been deliver'd in my foregoing Reflexion , my Notes upon his 6th Chapter [ Of Universal Propositions , their Truth and Certainty ] will be Universal Propositions in the Mind are easily Knowable Antecedently to Words . easily understood . But , I am to premise , First , That the Question is not here , what proves the Truth of such Propositions , which is the work of Logick ; but , whether there can be any Truth in them , or Certainty of them at all , or no. Secondly , That the Formal Truth of Propositions can onely be in the Mind ; or , that Mental Propositions onely are capable of Truth or Falslhood ; tho' Words be needful to signify them : And , therefore , I must deny that The Consideration of Words is a necessary part of the Treatise of Knowledge ; meaning by that word , Philosophical Knowledge , as our Circumstance determin us . Let Logicians but take care that the Words be Univocal , and not Equivocal , or double sensed , and all else that can be consider'd to belong to Truth , is to be look'd for in the Mind , and can be no where else . Hence , I cannot admit his Distinction of Certainty of Truth , and Certainty of Knowledge in any other sense than that Knowledge is the Act , and Truth the onely Object of that Act ; since nothing can be known to be what is not ; nor known to be True , which is not True . The Generical Notion [ Certainty , ] should first have been explicated , ere those two sorts of it had been defin'd ; otherwise both those Definitions must necessarily remain Unintelligible . I shall presume that I have in my METHOD shown from its Grounds what Certainty is , viz. The Determination of our Understanding , or Judging Power by the Object 's actuating it , or being actually in it as it is in its self . With which , what his putting together of Words in Verbal Propositions has to do , surpasses my understanding . And , 't is as hard to conceive , that General Truths can never be well made known , and are very Seldom apprehended , but as conceiv'd and express'd in Words . That General Truths cannot be made known to others without Words , is in a manner , as Evident as 't is that we cannot see one anothers Thoughts ; nor is this peculiar to General Truths , for scarcely can Particular ones be made known any other way : But , that they cannot be known or apprehended by our selves ( which seems here to be his meaning ) but as conceiv'd and express'd in Words , is so far from Evident , that the Contrary is such ; for , it is impossible to express them in Words , unless we do first apprehend and conceive them in our Thoughts ; and were not this so , all the while we use Words in speaking of General Truths , we should do nothing but talk of we know not what : For , our Thoughts and Apprehensions are ex Natura rei , presupposed to the Words by which we express them ; and , to do otherwise is to let our Tongue run before our Wit. Whence we account them silly and Senseless people , and Perverters of Nature , who make use of Words before they know their Meaning .

2. I have shown above , that it is not necessary to our being Certain of any Proposition that we know the precise 'T is not necessary to know the precise Bounds and Extent of the Species . bounds and Extent of the Species it stands for ; but that 't is sufficient to know it in part Distinctly ; and the rest of it , or the whole , Confusedly ; provided that part of it , which we know is sufficient to distinguish it from all other Species : And , were not this so , it would follow that we never could know the Truth of any Universal Proposition whatever ; especially when we discourse of the Species Infima , which requires a Complexion of very many Accidents , whose precise Number and Bounds are utterly unknowable by us . A Position which makes Logick useless ; scarce any Conclusion being deducible from Premisses , unless one of them be an Universal ; and quite destroyes all Science which is employ'd about Universal or General Truths . He instances in Man and Gold , and judges that , for want of knowing the Extent of their Species , it is impossible with any Certainty to affirm that all Men are Rational , or all Gold yellow . We cannot indeed know this by considering every Individual Man by the poll : But , if by the word [ Man ] we mean no more but a Rational Animal , it is so far from Impossible to know , and affirm that All Men are Rational , that 't is Impossible not to know it . And , were it a proper place to make good that Definition here , I could demonstrate that it does agree to Man , and can agree to nothing else ; and therefore that Definition is True and Adequate : Nor can the contrary be sustaind any other way , but by unacquainting us with our selves and our own Kind ; and by jumbling together these Species , which are distinguisht by Contradictory Differences , and Confounding the vastly-Distinct Natures and Properties , of Corporeal and Spiritual Beings . As for the Species of Gold , Yellowness ( which he instances in ) is not Essential to it , as Rationality is to Man ; as being but one of those Accidents , by which we distinguish it from other Species of Minerals ; and I have hinted some other formerly , which are more Intrinsecal and Essential to it than its Colour . Again , we are moreover Certain by manifest and daily experience , and by the constant and Common Practise of the World , that Mankind is acquainted with enow of those Accidents to distinguish it . One bespeaks a Golden Cup , and the Goldsmith makes it for him : Nor was it ever heard that any of this Trade , did hope to Cozen a Sensible Man , by obtruding upon the Buyer Brass , or any other Mettal , for Gold ; or , if he did , that Goldsmith's-Hall could not distinguish it : Nay , if it be but a little alloyd , there are ways to find it out ; which shows that Mankind is furnisht with means enow , to distinguish Gold from other Mettals , and for the same reason other things also ; tho' the Extent of all the Species , and their precise bounds , be not exactly known to those Speculaters , who will needs forgo their Natural Knowledge of Things to pursue Scrupulous Fancies : which , let loose to fly at rovers , are too hard for their Reason Unestablish'd by Principles .

3. Hence an Answer is given to Mr. Locke's Acute Difficulty , viz. That 't is impossible for us to know that this or Unnecessary Knowledge not to be coveted , nor the Want of it complain'd of . that Quality , or Idea , has a necessary Connexion with a Real Essence , of which we have no Idea at all ; that is , ( according to his Principles , ) no Knowledge . For , since a Real Essence is that which constitutes such a kind of Ens , or Species ; and what distinguishes an Entity or Species from all others , does also make it this , or that Species ; that is , does constitute it ; it follows , that , since , by my Discourse here , we have such a Degree of Knowledge of that kind of Ens called Gold , as to distinguish it from all others , we have a Sufficient and True ( tho' not an Adequate and Distinct ) Knowledge of its Essence too , that constitutes it such a kind of Ens. Indeed , if nothing will content us but Superfluous Knowledge , for Curiosity sake , of each particular Mode that belongs to that Essence , 't is no wonder if we labour in vain ; and , by over-straining to go beyond our selves in this State , fall short of our Aim . I must confess , that it would concern us much , as we are , to know whether there be any Quality , which we do not yet know in the Thing , inconsistent with those we do know ; for , this would blunder our Notion of it , and make it Chimerical . But , as it is impossible Creative Wisdom should lay Grounds for Contradiction ; so , in case those Qualities be all Consistent , where is the harm not to know them ? And , since Consistency implies some kind of Agreement or Connectedness of the one with the others , who knows how far their Connexion and Dependence may be known in time , if right Principles were taken , and pursu'd ? 'T is a strange dis-satisfy'd Humour in us , to complain we know not all , when we know enough : I know no Man is more free from this Fault than Mr. Locke , or declares more against it formerly . What I dislike in him in this Point is , that , by his too much Introversion , he forsakes Nature ; and , by his too nice Speculation of his Ideas , hazards to breed a Conceit in his Readers , that they know less than they really do ; and , that we are not able to attain half that Knowledge we , in reality , may arrive to ; which , tho' contrary to his Intention , must needs incline Men to be Scepticks as to Essences and Substances .

4. The 7th Chapter , [ of Maxims , ] is admirably Clear , and , in the greatest part of it , very Solid ; abating his Proceeding The Nature and Use of General Maxims , mistaken by Mr. Locke . upon Ideas , and applying his Discourses to his former Hypothesis ; to which Mr. Locke was oblig'd , that all the Parts of his Work might be woven of the same Piece , and Consonant to one another . He explicates very well , how they are Self-evident : Yet , tho' they be such , he has three Exceptions against them ; 1. As not being First known ; 2. As , in a manner , Useless ; and 3. Dangerous . He proves the First , because Particulars are known before Universals . I understand him not . Knowledge may be either consider'd , as instill'd by insensible Degrees , into Infants , or the Ruder Sort ; or , as Reducible to the clearest Grounds , by Men of Art . Now , I cannot think that Mr. Locke imagins , that we , or any Man , hold that Maxims were meant for Infants , or the Vulgar ; or , that either of them ought to be taught General Principles at first , and by them attain to Particular Knowledges ; or , that the Users of Maxims ever intended them for that end . Wherefore , all his Discourses to prove them not to be First-known , may be allow'd to have their full Force , and yet hurt no body , being wronglevell'd . The Point then is , how they may avail Artists , or Speculators : And this leads to his Second Exception , their pretended Uselesness ; which he endeavours to shew , by alledging , that 't is as Evident as any Maxim whatever , that the same Idea , is the same Idea , and no other ; v. g. that the Idea of Yellow is the Idea of Yellow , and not of Blue ; and , therefore , that Maxims serve to little purpose , and are also Innumerable . Now , I grant , indeed , that all such particular Propositions may be Self-evident , and Truths ; as also , that Truths of this kind , which express the Metaphysical Verity and Unity of every Thing , and of every Mode of Thing , are Innumerable . But , I do not think that any Man living thought those to have the Usefulness of Maxims or Principles , which are always General , or Universal : For , the Notion of [ Principles ] super-adds to their being Truths , and Self-evident , that they influence many other Truths that are ( as it were ) under them ; which cannot be said , or thought , of those particular Propositions . For example ; Should any one go about to refund the Verity of this Truth , Yellow is Yellow , and not Blue , into this , because White is White , and not Black , it would look more like a Similitude , than a Reason ; and be ridiculous to alledge the one to be the Cause of the other ; because Yellow is not White ; nor has the Notion of the one any Influence upon , nor any thing to do with the Notion of the other ; in regard both of them stand upon the same Bottom , or on the same Level . But , should any Sceptick ask why the Idea of Yellow is the Idea of Yellow ? tho' 't is foolish to ask it , yet , it would not look so extravagant to answer , because Every thing is what it is : And , I believe , Nature would force Mr. Locke , or any other to give this for his Reason . In like manner , should he ask why a Man is a Man ? It would look preter-natural to answer , because a Tree is a Tree , Whereas , it would look very natural to answer , because Every Thing is it Self , or , is what it is . Which shews to an Acute Reflecter , that this Universal has some kind of Influence upon the Others , which their Fellow-Particulars had not . And , the Reason is , because Universals do engage for all the Particulars under them ; whereas , one Particular owes not this Duty to another Particular , to which it has no such Real Relation as the Notion of an Universal has in the Mind to its Particulars . And , Who sees not , that , from this Proposition , Every Man is Rational , it follows , that Peter , John , and each particular Man , is Rational ? But , from this , that Peter , and a few other Particulars , are Rational , it does not follow , that Every Man is Rational : Wnich shews , that ( as was now said ) the Truth of the Universal engages for the Truth of all Particulars , and not vice-versâ ; nor one of them for another .

5. Another Reason for the Usefulness of Universal Maxims , and , why Artists use to reduce the Truth of Particulars The Terms of General Maxims Clearer than those of Particular Propositions . to them , is , because they are more Self-Evident than the Particular Identicals are . This Position looks something odd ; for , since Self-Evidence is the highest Evidence that can be , to put Degrees of Self-evidence , is to say , there can be something Higher than the Highest ; which looks like a Bull. To clear this Point , I discourse thus : In all Self-evident Propositions whatever , the Terms are so closely Connected , ( being , indeed , the same , ) that no Middle Term can come between them , so to prove them Connected , or make them Evident ; wherefore , they must either not be Evident at all , ( which were shameless to say , ) or they must be Evident of themselves ; that is , Self-evident . And , in this regard , or in the Closest Connexion or Identity of their Terms , all Self-evident Propositions are Equally such . But , there is another kind of Evidence arising out of the Greater Clearness of the Terms themselves . Now , it has been shewn formerly , that all Clearness of our Notions springs out of their Simplicity , and Uncompoundedness ; and all Obscurity out of their Composition , which breeds Confusion : As also , that all General Notions are more Simple , and consequently , more clear than the Particulars are . Whence follows , that the Proposition , which has more-general Terms in it , ( such as all General Maxims are , ) do gain hence a greater Degree of Evidence , and are more Undeniable . For example ; Let Mr. Locke tell a Sceptick , that Yellow is Yellow , and not Blue ; he may answer , that he will yield to neither Proposition ; because , Yellow and Blue are Species of Colour , and ( according to Mr. Locke's Grounds ) he knows not the distinct Bounds , or precise Extent of neither of them ; and therefore , should he grant it , he must assent to he knows not what . Tell him , Mr. Locke speaks of the Ideas of those Colours ; he will ask what an Idea is , and , doubtless , pick new Quarrels at the Definition ; especially , these being the Ideas of Secondary Qualities , which himself says , have nothing Like them in the Thing . But , tell him , it cannot be deny'd , but that they are Something , and not meerly Nothing , in regard we experience we have them ; and , that Every Thing must necessarily be what it is , ( which is one of the Maxims excepted against ; ) he will be put to a Stand , and Nonpluss'd : For , what can he say ? The Identity of the Thing with it self , whether it be a Substance , or an Accident , cannot be deny'd ; nor can he deny , that the same is the same with it self , ( which is another Maxim ; ) for , the Word Thing , signifies , a Supream Generical Notion ; and , the Word Same , is a Transcendent ; which are both of them Clear , because the Latter has no kind of Composition in it , the Other as little as is possible . So that he cannot begin to shuffle here , or press to know the meaning of the Terms , as he did when they were Particulars ; the Universal Terms being far Clearer than those Particulars are .

6. Hence another Usefulness of Self-evident Maxims is discover'd ; which is , not to deduce Conclusions from Such General Maxims are never used to deduce Conclusions from them , but to reduce Inferiour Truths to them . them , as from Premisses , as Mr. L. seems to apprehend ; but , to reduce Inferior Truths , which are less Clear to them . That this can be done , and how it is done , I have shewn in my * * Book 3. Less . 4. Method . And , Mr. Locke's Concession here , § 11. that They are of great Use in Disputes , to stop the Mouths of Wranglers , abets and confirms my late ▪ Discourses : For , Whence could they have this strange Virtue to stop the Mouths of such Unreasonable Men , but because their Evidence is Greater than any others , or than Particular Self-evident Propositions are ? Otherwise , why could not these do it as well as General Maxims ? Now , if this be so , why cannot they satisfie and instruct Rational Men , and conduce to quiet and fix their Judgment , as well as to Nonplus Wranglers ? 'T is the Nature of Evidence , to enlighten and instruct Men of Sense ; and more Proper to it , than to amuse and surprize Sophisters . Let any Learned Man reflect on all the Maxims in Euclid's Elements , in Euclides Physicus and Metaphysicus , or any other Author who pretends to Reasoning with Exact Closeness ; and he will easily see for what they are Useful , and How . Nay , even Mr. L.'s Identicals , [ Yellow is Yellow , and not Blue , ] are useful in their Kind . tho' Mr. Locke does omit to shew they are so : And this Identical Yellow is Yellow , tho' it do not influence other Particulars , as General Maxims do ; ( for which Reason , it does not absolutely deserve the Name of a Principle ; ) yet , both It , ( and such other Particular Identicals , ) is a kind of Principle to all that is , or can be , discoursed about that Particular Colour : For , if any part of that Discourse makes Yellow not to be Yellow , or ( which is all one ) violates that Proposition , [ Yellow is Yellow , ] 't is concluded to be most evidently False ; or , if it agrees with it , to be True . He seems to mislike the Procedure by Praecognita and Praeconcessa ; whereas , his Acute Wit will find , upon Reflexion , that it is impossible we can make an Ordinary , much less any Speculative , Discourse , but the Discoursers must agree in something that is either Foreknown , or ( at least ) Foregranted ; for , if the two Disputants disagree in all their Principles and Grounds , and one of them still denies All the other affirms , 't is impossible they should Discourse together at all .

7. But , passing by all that is said , I alledge farther , that ( not to speak of others ) these two Maxims so The Absolute Necessity of First Principles Asserted . much excepted against , [ What it is ] and [ 'T is impossible the same Thing should be and not be at once , are of such most Necessary and Universal Usefulness , that , without them , we could neither judge , discourse , nor act . Indeed , these Maxims lie retruse in the most Inmost Recesses of our Judging or Intellective Power , and make not their Appearance in Formal Propositions , but only when we have occasion to produce them ; tho' they are still there all the while , and guide all our Thoughts steadily , nay , all our Actions too . In the same manner as when a Musician plays a careless Voluntary upon a Harpsichord , he guides himself all along by the Rules of Musick lodg'd in his Mind ; tho' , they being now familiar to him , he is not so Sensible of those Rules as he was when he first learn'd them . To apprehend more clearly the Usefulness of these two Principles , let us suppose a Man quite Devested of them , and to have neither of them in his Judgment , and then reflect what he is good for . All our Judgments being made by the Copula [ is , ] in case he have not this First Principle in his Understanding , he might take [ is ] for [ is not ; ] or else indifferently for one , and the other too : which , besides the perverting his Judgment quite , would make him utterly unfit for the Conversation of Mankind Again , 't is impossible such a Man should have any Truth at all in his Mind , which is the Natural Perfection of Human Understanding ; but , wanting a steady Ground to fix his Judgment , he might think all things to be Chimerical , embrace every Fancy , and adhere to any Contradiction .

8. To come to the Usefulness of other General Maxims , we may reflect how Mankind do naturally guide their How other General Maxims do govern all our Actions and Sayings . Actions by them . A Country Butcher loses his Knife , and looks all about for it ; in which case 't is usual for such Fellows to say , as the Motive of his continuing to seek it , [ I am sure it must be somewhere or other . ] By which rude Saying 't is evident , that he guides himself all the while by this foreknown General Maxim , [ Every particular Body in the World must be in some place . ] For , had he not had the Knowledge of this Maxim before-hand , that is , did he think it were possible it should be no where , or in no place , he would never have taken such Pains to look for it . We may observe Hundreds of such Natural Maxims as this in the Vulgar , guiding their Actions and Sayings ; and perhaps , it would not be unworthy Speculaters to observe their Behaviour and Words which proceed from Uncorrupted Nature , and retrieve the Genuin Principles and Maxims that naturally produced them . To apply this : The same we may gather from our Speculative Thoughts ; and that the same passes in us naturally as does in the Vulgar . Our First Principles lie habitually laid up in the Closet of our Minds , and govern all our Thoughts as occasion presents ; and , tho' we do not put them into Formal Propositions , till the Circumstance invites ; yet they influence all we do , or say , or think ; as was instanced lately in the unshaken and unalterable Sense of the Copula [ is , ] which verifies all our Propositions .

9. In a Word , it were easie to shew , that this unadvised Degrading of General Maxims , making them in a manner The Discarding General Maxims destroys all Science . Useless for Knowledge , does destroy all Grounds ; which either are such Maxims , or , at least , have no force but by virtue of those Maxims , express'd or imply'd ; unless we will pretend those are Grounds in any Science that want Proof there ; which makes them Conclusions , and no Grounds . Whence , it does also destroy all Science it self , which consists in Universal Knowledges , as Experience does in particular ones ; for such Universal Truths cannot be had , if General Maxims be disallow'd , as Logick demonstrates . This Errour springs from Men's taking wrong Measures in judging what Notions are Clear , what Confused . This Ingenious Author thinks the need of such Maxims might be supply'd by having Clear and Distinct Ideas . Which , rightly understood , comes over to us ; for Art and Nature both inform us , that the Clearness of our Notions consists in their being more General ; and as they approach nearer to the Highest Genus , they are still Clearer . Now , the Metaphysical Verity of a General Idea or Notion , if put into a Proposition , is perfectly Identical , and a General Maxim . Hence appears , that it is a most Fundamental Errour in the Ideists , that they rate the Clearness of their Ideas from the fresh , fair and lively Appearances they make to the Fancy . Whereas only the Definition , by explicating the true Essence of a Thing , shews us Distinctly the true Spiritual Notion of it . The former of these is obvious and sensible . and ( as I may say ) lies and appears uppermost ; and , therefore , is Superficial , and a Material Representation made in the Fancy . The Later is more Retruse , it requires more Reflexion and Labour to attain it , it is Intelligible not Sensible ; but , once gain'd , it is Solid , Durable , and ( being indeed the very Nature of the Thing , ) it is the Ground of all our Discourses about it , and of those several Knowledges concerning it . Hence the Followers of Fancy become liable to take Similitudes for Notions , and Representations for Things ; which makes their Productions very Plausible to other Men's Fancies , ( for as they were the Productions of Fancy , so they sute best with Men of Fancy ) but they fall short of instructing their Judgments . To give an Instance of this Distinction of Notions from Phantasms : They think that the Idea of a Quadrate ( for Example ) or Circle , is very Clear and Distinct ; and that the Idea of Quantity is very Obscure and Confused : Whereas , to the Notion of the two former , there goes the Notion both of Quantity , of the Termination of Quantity , ( or Figure ; ) and , moreover , of such a Figure ; all which being Essentially involv'd in the Notion of a Quadrate or Circle , must needs make their Notions less Intelligible and less Clear than is that of Quantity only : However , the fair Pictures of the former , on Paper , or in the Fancy , enveigles them to think otherwise . Let us but reflect how many Truths are deduced by Geometricians out of the Notions of a Quadrate or a Circle , and what large Treatises of Trigonometry are drawn out of the Notion or Nature of a Triangle ; and we shall discover how Compounded and Confused those Notions are in reality , however we seem , while we mind only the Pictures of them , to have very clear Conceptions of them , and to comprehend them distinctly and fully . Now , all these Truths are involv'd confusedly in the Notion or Nature of these Figures : For all Discourses concerning any Notion whatever , are nothing but running Division ( as we may say ) upon the Nature of that Object as their Ground ; and all Descants upon it are meerly that very Notion Unfolded and Explicated at large , and consider'd on all sides , and throughly : Which , comprising them all in its Bowels , is therefore not so Clear and Distinct as Fancy makes us imagin . Whence is seen evidently , that Fancy , and the first and obvious Appearance , is not to be the Judge or Test of the Clearness or Confusedness of our Notions ; but Reason , reflecting well on the Simplicity or Compoundedness of those Notions themselves , and on the Reasons why they are so .

10. Lastly , 't is objected , That such Maxims are Dangerous ; because , if our Notions be wrong , loose , or unsteady , That not General Maxims , but their Abuse , breeds Danger to Science . General Maxims will serve to confirm us in our Mistakes , and to prove Contradictions . Now , tho' our Judgments may be such , yet I cannot conceive how our Notions can be Wrong , Loose , or Unsteady . They are what they are ; and being the Things in our Understanding , their Existence is fix'd there , and as unalterable as our Soul it self , their Subject , is , Notions are the same as our Meanings of the Words ; and , tho' we may mistake what the Word signifies to others , or to the Generality ; yet , if I , mistaking , or not mistaking , have such a Meaning of it in my Mind , ( which only can mean or apprehend , ) that Meaning is truly in me : Nor , tho' I be rectify'd as to the Common Use of that Word , and put another Name to it ; yet my Meaning , whether properly or improperly signify'd , is still indivisibly and unalterably the same . But , suppose this so ; why must General Maxims be held Dangerous and Faulty , when the Fault Confessedly lies in other Things ? Mr. Locke grants General Maxims to be True , and Self-evident ; and 't is extravagantly odd , to think , that Propositions so qualify'd , can be Guilty of leading Men into Errour . If , then , he only means , that the Mis-application or Abuse of them does great Harm , he magnifies General Maxims , while he intended to disparage them : For , it is generally noted , that those are the Best Things , that , Mis-us'd , do the Greatest Harm . By this Argument , we must lay aside all Religion , as well as General Maxims ; since , not all the Things in the World , put together , have done so great Mischief , as Mis-us'd Religion : Tantum Religio potuit suadere malorum .

11. To show General Maxims , or self-evident Propositions , may demonstrate Contradictory Positions , he instances His Instance that General Maxims are fit to prove Contradictions , shows he quite mistakes the Notion of Body . in Cartestus's making Body to be nothing but Extension ; and in his own Tenet making Body to be Extension and Solidity together : Whence , by this Maxim [ what is , is ] the former may demonstrate there can be no Vacuum , the latter that there may . And , I must , in behalf of Truth , take leave to tell them both , that neither Extension alone , nor Extension and Solidity together , are any more the Notion of Body , than a Horse-shoe is a Pancake . For , Body signifies a Thing , and their Extension and Solidity are onely Modes or Accidents of that Thing ; and , therefore , the Notions of them do differ toto genere ; which is a greater and wider mistake , than to say a Man is a Horse , or an Apple is an Oyster ; these being all comprehended under the same Common Genus . If , out of Aversion to Metaphysicks , and Disregard to true Logick , which teaches us to distinguish our Notions exactly , Learned Men will not be brought to Consider what the Word [ Thing , ] and [ Body ] which is such a Thing , mean , they must necessarily fall into Fundamental Errours ; and , so , stumble every step they take . The Notion of [ Thing ] evidently relates to Being , one way or other : But , it does not formally signify Actual Being , as Existence does ; therefore it can onely consist in this , that is , a Power to be , or is Capable of Being actually . And this Thing call'd Body , since we experience it is alterable and Changeable Substantially , or into another Thing , must necessarily have a Power in it to be Alter'd , or become another Thing ; which Power we call [ Matter ; ] our Common Speech and Common Sense telling us , that when a New Thing is made , 't is not Created or made of Nothing , but of the Matter that pre-existed in the former Compound . But , this Matter alone , since it is a meer Power to be another Thing , being , of its own Notion , utterly Indeterminate , ( which is the true Sense of Aristotle's Description of it , ) is not capable of Existing , or a Thing ; for , nothing in Common can exist , but what is determinately This : Therefore , this Matter , or Power , needs another Compart , conceiv'd to determin it , ( which the Schools call the Form ; ) by which it is made capable to be , or a Thing ; and without which , it cannot be such . It being evident then , that every single Mode or Accident does something distinguish Bodies , therefore such a Complexion of them as so distinguishes Matter , that it makes it differ from all other Bodies , it does consequently determin it to be This , and no other ; and therefore constitutes it such a Thing , or constitutes it Capable to Exist ; which is , to make it this Thing , or an Individuum . Now , if we leave all Consideration of Matter out of the Notion of Body , and make it consist of Modes , or Accidents only , as he seems to tell us that himself and Cartesius do , we must put those Modes to have no possible Subject , but to hover in the Air , none knows how ; and , therefore , we must needs discourse incoherently , and be too hard for our selves , by raising , at every turn , puzzling Difficulties we cannot solve . All our Grounds must fail us , when we do not distinguish between the Mode or Manner how a Thing is , and the Thing it self . Nor do I think Cartesius holds Body to be Extension , but Extended Matter . How Mr. Locke comes not to treat of Matter in his whole Book , I know not ; but I fear it is , because his Fancy cannot frame an Idea or Similitude of it : By which it seems to me Evident , that very many of his Ideas are meer Fancies , coin'd by his Imagination : For , 't is evident he must have a Notion of it , since he very well knows the meaning of those Words , [ A Power to be a Thing , or Matter ; ] which Meaning is the same with our Notion of it . As for Vacuum , which he again mentions here , my Demonstration against it , is , in short , this ; waving many others mention'd above : All our Natural Notions are taken from Body ; and , amongst them , that of Space ; therefore they are nothing but Body inadequately consider'd ; and either Body , or some Mode of Body : Therefore , whatever our Fancy may suggest , it is impossible there should be Space , where there is no Body ; since the Mode , having no distinct Entity of its own , cannot be where the Thing , which gives it Being , is not : Therefore , to put Space where there is no Body , or a Vacuum , is a direct Contradiction . Each Part of which Discourse has been made good in its proper place .

12. In his Second Instance of Man , he seems again , not to distinguish between the Fancy and the Notion of a Ideism is the Genuin Parent of Enthusiasm in Philosophy . Man ; which I have shewn in my Method , Book 1. Less . 2. § . 24. Next , he seems not to reflect , that an Imperfect Conception of the Thing , is of the whole Thing confusedly . Thirdly , 't is evident , that Men do only err , or discourse wrong , by imperfectly conceiving , thro' this Reason ; because they are not so wise as to consider that there may be more Modes wrap'd up in the Thing , than we yet distinctly discover : In which case , they may err by mis-applying their General Maxims ; for which they must blame themselves , and not the Maxim it self . But , I absolutely deny that any Man can possibly have the true and distinct Notion of Man , unless he conceives him to be Rational . As for what he tells us , he has discours'd with very Rational Men , who have actually deny'd they are Men ; I can only say , I wonder how they escap'd Bedlam ; where , I dare say , there are many Men , who are more Rational than they : And , my Opinion is , that those very Rational Men were very high-flown Ideists : For , such Men , by deserting their Natural Notions taken from the Things , and the Conduct of true Logick , and poring perpetually on their own Interiour ; and being withall unable to see the Difference between those Ideas they find there , or to distinguish betwixt Fancies and Spiritual Conceptions ; are ( unless they be otherwise Masters of an Excellent Genius ) connaturally disposed by their Principles to be Fanaticks in Philosophy ; and to entertain as wild Fancies , as the Deepest Enthusiasts . Witness Cartesius his mad Fit of Enthusiasm , which lasted some Days , when he was laying his Principles , ( as is writ in his Life ; ) and those Self-strangers , now spoken of , who actually deny'd they were Men : Whom , ( to requite Mr. Locke with a parallel Story ) I cannot liken so well to any thing , as to a famous Humourist , one John Band , who serv'd my Lady Wootton , in Kent : This Fellow , in the Heat of Summer , going out in a Cart , drawn by two Horses , fell asleep in the Cart : The Horses not hearing any cry Gee , ho , to urge them forwards , took their Opportunity to rest themselves , and stood still : A Companion of his coming by , and seeing how matters stood , under-propp'd the Cart , took out the Horses ; and ; having set them up , return'd , and lay behind the Hedge , to observe how John would behave himself when he miss'd his Horses : Who awaking , got up , rub'd his Eyes , and , in the Dawning of his Reason , broke out , ( to himself , ) in these Words , Either now I am John Band , or I am not John Band : If I am John Band , I have e'en lost two Horses ; But , if I am not John Band , I have found a Cart. So that all John's Hopes were , that he was not himself ; for then he had been on the better hand . I much doubt , that both he , and Mr. Locke's Rational Men , wanted the help of an Identical Proposition ; which ( tho' Mr. Locke holds , they are not in the least Instructive ) would have made them all so wise , as to know that Every Thing is what it is .

13. But , to be serious ; I cannot but admire that this Ingenious Author should , in his 8th Chapter , so ridicule Identical Propositions not to be ridicul'd . Identical Propositions , or esteem them Trifling . He told us in his 2d Chapter , that that Knowledge he calls Intuitive , is of Self-evident Propositions ; and Identical ones are such . He assures us , that in every Step Reason makes in Demonstrative Knowledge , there is an Intuitive Knowledge of the Agreement or Disagreement of our Ideas ; Consonantly to which , I have demonstrated in my Method , Book 3. Liss . 1. §. 3. that all the Force of Consequence , which gives the Nerves to all our Discourse , must be an Identical Proposition . Moreover , he says , Chap. 4. that we know each Idea to be it self , and not another ; and , that no Abstract Idea can be the same with any other , but with it self ; which are perfectly Identical Speeches , and equivalent to these , The same is the same with it self ; or , Every Thing is what it is ; nay , and General Maxims too , against which he shew'd himself much offended in that Chapter . Nor , do I doubt , but that he judges , his Knowledge by Ideas is refunded into those Identicals , as its Ground ; as will be shewn shortly . Now , after all this , to rally Identical Propositions after such a rate , is to me Unintelligible . But , I shall be briefer here upon this Subject , having demonstrated in my Method , Book 2. Less . 2 , and 3. by many Arguments , which , I am very confident , are Unanswerable , that all First Principles must be Identical Propositions : Whence , either those Arguments must be shewn Invalid , or it must be forcibly deny'd by him that there are any First Principles at all ; which all Mankind , unless they be perfect Scepticks , do grant , and Common Sense forces us to acknowledge . For , if there be no Supream or First Principles , 't is impossible there should be any Inferior or Subordinate ones ; and so , Mankind must talk ramblingly , and at random , all their Lives , without any Principles or Grounds at all . But , waving all the other aforesaid Proofs , I would beg of him to consider this one Argument : We may speak of , or ( which is the same ) put into Propositions , all other Considerations or Notions of the Thing , whether they be in the same Line , or be the divers Modes of it ; we can say , without danger of being reproach'd , that Socrates is a Man , an Animal , a Yard high , White , a Father , writing , &c. and 't is a hard Case if we may not be allow'd to say something of the Metaphysical Verity of the Thing , this being that on which all Truth is built ; and without which , all we could say would be False ; and all the World , a Chaos of Chimoera's . And , if we may say any thing of it , I defie all Mankind to shew me , that that Saying can be any other but an Identical Proposition . This being so , I alledge farther , that as all Truths are fundamentally built on the Metaphysical Verity of Things ; so all Formal Truths , or True Propositions , must be grounded on such Propositions as express or signifie that Metaphysical Verity , or , say that a Thing is what it is ; and , consequently , such Propositions , and onely such , can be First Principles . Now , if First Principles , and that which grounds all the Force of Consequence , may be called Trifling , I desire to be inform'd what can be called Solid , Serious and Useful .

14. I perceive , by Mr. Locke's managing his Discourse here , that his Dislike of Identical Propositions springs The right Way how to use them , and that Mr. Locke himself does and must rely upon them . from his Mistake of our Manner of Using them . He seems to imagin that we would place them in Capite Libri , ( as it were , ) and thence deduce Conclusions from them ; or else , that we consider them in their bare selves , without Relation to any thing else : Whence he , with good Reason , affirms , they do not instruct us , or teach us any thing , that there is no Real Knowledge got by them , &c. But the Business is quite otherwise : They are the First , and most evident Truths , fix'd and rivetted by Rational Nature , in our Understanding ; at the Bottom of which they lie , perhaps Unseen , and and Unreflected on ; yet so , that they give the perfect Light to guide all our Thoughts and Discourses . Whence it comes , that Speculaters do by Art , what the See Meth. to Science , B. a. L. 2. § 18 * Vulgar do by Nature ; and make them the Ultimate Ressort of all their Persuasions , and endeavour to Reduce and Resolve all their other Knowledges into them : This will appear evident to any Man who reflects , that , if those be False , or we be not pre-imbu'd with them , we could have no Truth , nor any Knowledge at all . They are such deep-laid Foundations , that all Science is rais'd upon them , tho' they make no Formal Appearance in the Symmetry or Beauty of that Structure : Nay , even those who rally them as Dry , and Useless , must be forc'd , for their own Interest , to have recourse to them : For , unless Mr. Locke does first know , that each Idea he has , is it self , and not another , which is an Identical Proposition , he must confess he could have no Distinct Ideas ; at least , no Knowledge that they are Distinct ; whence , the Fabrick of his whole Book would fall to the Ground . After which Kindness and Support from them , in requital , to call them Trifling , is not so gentile a Return . Hence is seen , that we make no other Use of them , than himself does , and must do , or neither of us can possibly speak one Word of Sense ; for , neither could he , without them , ( suppos'd and held , at least , in his Mind , if not express'd , ) be certain of any Idea ; nor we , of any Notion we have ; nor , consequently , could either of us build any Discourse upon them . Mr. Locke acknowledges , Book 2. Chap. 32. that the Metaphysical Truth of his Ideas do contain a Tacit Proposition : Which being so , what Blame can we deserve for Speaking out , or Writing what is tacitly in our Minds ? The chief Reason why we put those Tacit Propositions into Formal ones , is for the Scepticks sakes ; who , having an utter Aversion against Metaphysicks , would not heed the Metaphysical Verity of Things , unless it were produced , and forced upon them , by putting it into such an undeniable Form of Speech as all Mankind uses , and must grant . Whence , as Mr. Locke confesses that they are very useful to stop the Mouths of Wranglers ; so , Experience teaches us , they are of no less Use to convert or confute Scepticks : Nay , absolutely Necessary for that End ; because Scepticks will not admit any thing to be True , but Identical Propositions onely . For which reason , I have attempted , in my Method , to give some Hints how to reduce all others to them . I once thought to have written a particular Treatise on that Subject ; but , I hope those short Hints I gave there , may excite some other Speculaters to perfect what , having a large Field of Matter to pass thorow , I did there but briefly touch upon . All this while , I am well aware that Mr. Locke , Book 4. Chap. 8. mentions other Self-evident Propositions , which are not Identical ; but then , he acknowledges withall , that unless those Ideas , which make the two Terms of those Propositions , be fix'd in their own Natures to be such , or to be themselves onely , and therefore not to be Another , none of those Propositions could be evident at all . So that Nothing can be known to be True , or be Evident , but by having recourse , finally , to Identical Propositions .

15. Another sort of Trifling Propositions , he says , is when a part of the Complex Idea is Predicated of the Name of Neither Ideas nor Names can be Predicate or Subject ; but the Thing it self , as conceived by us , in whole or in part . the whole ; that is , the Genus or Difference of the Species . I answer ; What have we to do with Ideas when we Predicate ? For Predicating is the Saying something of Another which we call the Subject : If then the Thing it self be not Predicated , then ( to Predicate being to Say ) we do not talk or speak of It , but perhaps of our own Fancies ; especially since Mr. Locke has declared , B. 1. Chap. 2. § 8. that he takes Idea indifferently for what is meant by Phantasm or by Notion . Secondly , What means [ Predicated of the Name of the whole . ] For , if the Name of the Subject have not some Idea , or Notion , or some Thing for its Signification , 't is insignificant , and a meer useless Sound : and , if it have , then the Notion of the Species or Genus is that which is Predicated , and not the Name onely . If Things , ( of which onely , as Philosophers , we ought to speak ) are turn'd into Ideas , Realities into Spiritual Resemblances , and those Empty Resemblances into Emptier Names , Philosophy will be brought to a strange pass . Thirdly , None ever intended to instruct Men by this Proposition [ Homo est Animal ; ] because every Man knows it already , who knows what the Word [ Man ] means ; without knowing which , 't is impossible to know any thing by any Word whatever ; nor are such Propositions as that , which frequently occur in Logicians , meant for any thing but meerly for Examples of such and such Predications : But yet , Nature tells us how Instructive it is on all occasions , to know what sort or kind ( whether General or Specifical ) every thing is , and how it differs from others of the same kind . Now , Mr. Locke , contrary to his Equity in other occasions , will neither allow us to predicate the whole Definition of the Thing defin'd ( as was seen above in the Definition of Extension ) because 't is the same Notion with that which is Defin'd ; nor Part of the Definition , because 't is Part of the same ; and yet Common Reason assures us no Predication is True , unless the Subject and Predicate be , in part or wholly the same ; as the Sense of the Copula [ est ] tells us . I wish Mr. Locke would put Mankind into a wiser Method ; for they have , it seems , done nothing , but perpetually trifled hitherto .

16. Upon the main , he would have nothing that is Essential predicated of Man , or any other Species , ( because Mr. L.'s new Instructive Way is utterly Insignificant . the Word signifies that already ) but only what 's Accidental to him ; and he thinks that then a Proposition is Instructive , when it tells us something not contain'd in the Idea of Man . He instances in this ; [ In whatever Thing , Sense , Motion , Reason , and Laughter are united , that Thing has actually a Notion of God . ] Now this he conceives , does tell us more than barely what the Word [ Man ] means ; and therefore has somewhat of Instruction in it . I much approve his Design of bringing Disparate Notions to close and connect : But yet I must say , that all he can say of Man , or any other thing , must either be taken from the Intrinsecal Nature of the Thing it self , or it can never be Instructive , Solid , or capable of Demonstration . V. g. It is Essential to Man to have Natural Notions , and to connect those Notions orderly by his Reason , and by doing this he may attain to the Knowledge there is a God . Now , all this is contain'd in the Notion of Man ; only it requires a deeper Inspection into that Nature , and a more particular Reflexion upon what the Word [ Man ] signifies . For ( quite contrary to his Sentiment ) 't is the Nature of the Thing , signified by its Name , which only can Instruct us Solidly ; and it instructs us by our Attention to it , and our frequent and penetrative Reflexion on it . Whence I cannot commend his Instance , nor see how the Predicate [ has the Notion of God ] can ever be connected with the Subject he puts , by virtue of any thing found in the Subject it self as he exhibits it . Sense belongs to Man as he is an Animal , Motion as he is a Living thing ; from neither of which Considerations such a Connexion of the Terms are likely to follow . Reason is the most likely ; but since Mr. Locke holds , that Brutes too have some Reason , and yet can have no Notion of God , it cannot be deduced out of the Common Word [ Reason , ] that Man has any such Notion . Laughter there should seem , according to him , to be the most peculiar to Mankind ; for Brutes do not laugh at all ; but this is less likely than the others to be that precise Consideration , by virtue of which Man comes to have the Notion of God . Again , in his Discourse against Innate Principles , he declar'd his Opinion , that there were some Men who had actually no Notion of a God at all ; tho' , no doubt , they had Sense , Motion , Reason , and Laughter too . So that if this Proposition be Instructive , it can ( even according to himself ) instruct us in nothing but an Errour . Lastly , What needs this Circumlocution ? If Sense , Motion , &c. huddled together , be signified by the Word [ Man , ] why could it not as well be said , [ Every Man has a Notion of God ] without more ado ? Since by his Discourse to predicate what the Word [ Man ] signifies , is not Instructive . Or , if they be not signify'd by the Word [ Man , ] how is the Proposition True ? Or what means it to say , he intends [ Man ] by those many Words , and yet would not have it thought so ? Or that no Intrinsecal Predicate instructs , but only what is Extrinsecal to any Nature ? Or , if this be meant for an Instructive Definition , as it must , ( for the Subject in that Proposition agrees to nothing but to Man ) why are the Parts of it so disparate , and so many ? Or rather if so many , why no more ? If we may gain the Knowledge of more Accidents in every Species by degrees , as 't is granted we may ; and that we ought to define those Species , not by the old beaten way of Genus and Difference , but by this new one , of cluttering together confusedly the Multitudes of Accidents we find in them , we may come in time , by finding still more and more , to have Definitions so large , that the whole side of a Leaf cannot hold them , nor Man's Memory retain them ; and then what do they serve for ?

17. Indeed , when Words are taken in divers Significations , if That the Signification of Words is the Meaning of them ; their Meaning is our Notion ; and our Notion is the Thing . Men contentiously adhere to the different Senses themselves give them , it is , as Mr. Locke says well , meer Trifling . But I cannot grant that all Predications of Abstract Words are only Verbal and Trifling . He says , they amount to nothing but Significations of Terms . And is not this enough ? I wish he would consider his own Words . By [ Signification of Terms ] he means , I suppose , the Sense or Meaning of them : Now the Meanings of Words being the same with our Notions , which as has been demonstrated , are the Things themselves , how can those Abstract Terms be meerly Verbal ? Since they as much signifie the Thing as any other Terms whatever ; only they signifie it with a Restriction to such a precise Respect or Considerability found in that whole Ens or Substance .

REFLEXION Twentieth , ON The 9th , 10th , 11th , and 12th CHAPTERS .

1. THis Excellent Author discourses very Solidly , when he says , that Universal Propositions , of which we can have certain Knowledge , do not concern Existence . Universals mnst relate to the Existence they have in the Mind . I add , nor our Notions neither , of which those Propositions do consist , ( and much less Propositions that are Uncertain . ) For , taking the Notion alone , or according to the direct Signification of the Terms , objectively consider'd , they abstract from ( that is , are indifferent to ) all kinds of Existence , whether in the Mind or in Nature . But , when he says that such Propositions do not concern Existence , he means ( I suppose ) Existence in Nature , or out of the Mind ; ( or else not at all ; ) and the Copula [ est ] must necessarily signifie some kind of Existence , as well as Identifie the two Terms in every Proposition ; or otherwise it would be a Sound or no Word . But this Discourse is perhaps needless , being , as I think , in great part granted here . All I intend by it , is to clear the Notion of Existence in the Title , and that it means Existence out of the Mind , by which Things or Individuums are in themselves , whether we think of them or no. I grant too , that we have so certain a Knowledge of our own Existence , that it can need no Proof ; but I deny we have it by Intuition ; and I affirm we got it , and have it , by plain Sensation or Experience , in the same manner as we know the Existence of other Bodies ; as will be shewn , when we come to reflect on the 11th Chapter .

2. His Demonstration of a Deity , Chap. 10th , is very acute , nor does he here affect Recourse to his Ideas , or To put any Knowledge in Brutes is against the Nature of the Thing , and Implicatory . build on them expressly , or ( as he too often does in other places ) take Phantasms for Notions ; which takes off the force of his Reasons . Particularly , he argues so strongly that a Cogitative Being can never be made of meer-Matter , that I do judge it Unanswerable : And , withall , that it necessarily concludes that Brutes can have no Knowledge , without having something in them that is Spiritual ; which I am sure he will not say . I could wish Mr. L. had been steady to this Distinction of those two Natures , of Spiritual and Corporeal , which adequately divide Ens : Which , I think he was not , when he said B. 4. Ch. 3. § 6. that he sees no contradiction in it that God should , if he pleas'd , give to certain Systems of Created Senseless Matter , put together as he thinks fit , some degrees of Sense , Perception and Thought . For , if the Nature of meer Matter , by being Commodiously put together , can bear the having Thoughtfulness ; it is but compounding it more artificially , and it may be as Cogitative as the Wisest Man living ; and so farewell to all Spirituality of our Soul , nay , to all Spiritual Nature whatever : For , to what end should God create the Distinct Nature of Spirits , if Matter wisely orderd could perform all their Operations ? If once we yield that Matter , conveniently contrived , can be capable of any degree of Knowledge , it is but contriving it better and better , ( and who can stint Gods Omnipotency in this , more than in other things ? ) and it may be capable of the highest Degree of Science ; and , consequently , to create Spiritual Nature at all , would be needless , and to no purpose . Besides , if Men and Brutes differ onely in the Degrees of Knowledge , they ought to be of the same Species ; since Magis et minus non variant specïem : For , otherwise , every single Man would make a Distinct Species , which is a plain Contradiction . Against this Position of the possibility of Matters being Cogitative , he argues here very Vigorously § 10. and shows clearly that Incogitative Matter , and Motion , whatever changes it might produce of Figure and Bulk , could never produce Thought . He will say that , tho' it could not do this of it self , yet God could make it do it . But if God cannot contradict himself , or do Unwisely , then , since his Creative Wisdom has Establisht each kind of Nature to be it self and no other ; then , to put in God a Power to confound those Natures again , ( which he does if he should confound the Primary and proper Operation of Spirits , which is Thought , Knowledge or Reason by giving it to Bodies , ) is to put a Power in God to do Contradictions , that is , to do Impossibilities ; for whatever is against the Essence or Nature of any thing , makes that thing not to be it self ; which is against an Identical and self evident Proposition , and a Direct Contradiction .

3. The Clear Distinction of Corporeal and Spiritual Natures , is of that vast importance ; that ( tho' it may Mr. L. confound ; Material and Spiritual Natures . seem a little unseasonable ) I cannot but take this occasion to reflect , once more upon Mr. L's doctrine in this point , apprehending I may not meet with a fitter opportunity hereafter . I have reason to think , that he does not exclude Materiality out of the Idea of Spirit , or at least of the Soul , which all Christian Philosophers and most Heathens too , hold to be of a Spiritual Nature . On the other side he attributes Reason and Knowledge ( in some degree at least ) to Brutes . Now , out of these two positions it follows demonstratively . 1. That the Corporeal and Spiritual Natures are not clearly distinguisht , which utterly destroys all possibility of Truth in Philosophy , and seems to do no small prejudice to Truths of a Higher Concern ; which are left Inexplicable to Men of Sense , if those inferiour Truths , which relate to the Clear Distinction of those two Natures , be violated and render'd Uncertain . For , Corporeal and Spiritual Natures , comprizing , or dividing between themselves , the Objects of all the Sciences a Philosopher can treat of , whether they be Physicks , Ethicks or Metaphysicks , all which must necessarily build their Discourses , and draw their Conclusions from such Notions as are taken from , and do of right belong to those two Distinct Natures ; it follows that , if these two Natures be confounded and jumbled together , and be not clearly Distinguisht , it is impossible any Clear Conclusion can be drawn from either of them , or any Rational Discourse made concerning them . 2. That Mr. L's way of Philosophizing by Ideas , which leads him into such strange Errours , or at least affords him no certain Light to Distingush those Natures , is good for nothing at all . For , if it cannot furnish him with means , to put a Clear Distinction between Natures so widely Distant , and Different from one another ; much less can it assist him to show clearly what Modes , Accidents or Properties belong to one Nature , what to the other ; or to Distinguish those Natures , which are Infericur to those two General ones ; and therefore differ far less from one another than They did . It remains then to show that Mr. L's Doctrine by way of Ideas , does not put a Clear Distinction between the aforesaid Natures , but confounds them together . He holds it not to be Certain that Immateriality , is not included in the Notion of our Spiritual part the Soul ; it may , therefore , be Material , or have Matter in it , for any thing his Way of Ideas tells him ; and therefore since Matter cannot be crampt into an Indivisible , it may be Divisihle or Extended ; and , so , may be Divided or Shatter'd , that is ( its Unity being thus lost , and , consequently , its Entity , ) it may cease to bee , or be Corrupted . Again , if it be Divisible , it must be to some degree , or either more or less , Divisible ; that is , Rare , or else Dense . If Rare , then ( since Passivenes is Essential to the Notion of Matter ) it may by the operation of other Material Causes , which never wants , be Condens'd ; and consequently , become Opacous or Visible ; or , it may by the same Causes become Rarer , and be turn'd into Fire . Also being Divisible , it may have parts of which one must be without the other , that is , it must be Impenetrable as to its own parts , and thence be able to protrude another Material being , and be Solid too ( in his Sense of that Word ) which is the same with Impenetrable . Moreover , since it must be Divisible , it must be Quantitative or Extended , and this not Infinitely but Finitely ; that is , it must be Terminated ; wherefore , Termination of Quantity , being the Notion of Figure , it may have Figure too . In a Word , if it may possibly be Material , there is no Property of Body , but may agree to the Soul ; and therefore , the Soul , tho' Spiritual , may be Corporeal ; and so the Nature of Body and Spirit may be one and the same . But what needs more than meerly his ascribing Materiality to it , at least , permitting it to belong to it ? Our Notion of [ Matter ] is taken from Body , and from nothing else , and therefore can be nothing but Body , consider'd as ( not what it actually is , but ) as 't is Alterable , Changeable , or apt to be another Thing , that is , as 't is Corruptible ; which , I am sure , Mr. L. will not say or think of our Soul . Perhaps he may say , that he only means that it may have Matter annex'd to its Spirituality . But then he must grant , that since this Materiality did not , as an Accident , accrue to the Soul afterwards , she had it from her Nature ; and therefore it must be Intrinsecal to her , and help to constitute her peculiar Nature ; and , if this be so , then , when this Material kind of Compart is dissolv'd or corrupted ( for if Material , it may be Alter'd , wrought upon , and Corrupted as other Material Compounds may ) the Complex or Compound it self is dissolv'd , and so no longer the same , but perish'd . Besides , what should the Soul do with two Material Comparts ; one , Organical ; the other , Inorganical ? Especially , since there are as subtil Parts in this Visible Body of ours , with which , as the Form of the Body , she is united , ( viz. the Spirits ) as any , perhaps , Mr. Locke can conceive to be annex'd to her .

4. To proceed , He does but think it possible , for any thing he knows , that the Soul may have some Materiality ; Mr. L's Principles confound Human and Brutal Natures . but he positively judges , that Brutes have Reason ; nay , that 't is as Evident to him as that they have Sense . Now , if they have Reason , they must know how to draw Consequences , this being Essential to the Notion of Reason , or rather the same Thing in other Words . Again , If they can Reason , they can compare what 's meant by our Terms , and have the Sense of those Sayings we call Propositions in their Knowing Power . And , since that Reason is not given them for nothing , but for their Preservation , they can compare Agreeable and Disagreeable Objects , and pursue , out of that Reason , that which is most Agreeable ; that is , they can Will , Chuse , and Act freely , which are naturally consequent to their gathering by their Reason what is better or worse for them , and thence Determining themselves to it accordingly : I say , themselves ; for , if they have Reason , then Reason is part of Themselves , and not a Distinct Thing from them . Out of which Two Things follow : One , That the Nature of Man and Brute are Confounded ; since all those Chief Operations Proper to Man , are Communicable to Brutes . Secondly , That Mr. Locke will be at a loss to get an Idea of the Spirituality of his Soul , or of other Spiritual Beings , by reflecting on the Operations of his Mind ; since the same may possibly be found in such Beings as are meerly Corporeal . Wherefore , to conclude this Discourse , all our Natural Notions of Body and Spirit , and of all their Operations , must be jumbled together in a kind of Indifferency to either ; and therefore those two Natures must be Confounded , if either the Soul , which is Spiritual , may have Materiality Annex'd to her ; or Brutes , which are material Entities , may have Thought , Knowledge , and Reason Annex'd to them . And since Mr. Locke affirms very rationally , that one of his Ideas is not Another , I cannot but think he becomes the more oblig'd to shew out of the Natures of those two Things , liquidly and precisely , how those two Natures are distinguish'd ; or else his way of Ideas will be conceiv'd to be meerly Phantastick and Unphilosophical ; being most unlike the Ideas in the Divine Understanding , the Original Ground of all Truth , which do not confound Natures , but establish them in a most perfect Distinction to be what they are , and no other . I press not here how no Discourse at all in Philosophy can be Conclusive , unless the Nature of Body and Spirit be perfectly and clearly contradistinguish'd ; nor repeat what I have shewn , Reflex . 9. §. 7. that our Natural Notions teach us to distinguish perfectly between Body and Spirit , which his Ideas do not , but confound them , and thence deprave our Natural Knowledge of Things . I know he says , but proves not , that the having General Ideas , puts a perfect Difference between Brutes and us ; to which I have spoken formerly . I add , that 't is a thousand times easier to have General Ideas , they being but Imperfect Perceptions of the Thing , than to have Reason ; as is easie to be demonstrated , and has been manifested above .

5. As for making something out of Nothing , or Creating ; after we have prov'd that Existence is Essential to God , To create is the Peculiar Effect of Self-existence . and not Accidental to him , which Mr. L. clearly demonstrates ; it follows thence , and out of the Commonest Notion of Causality , that it is not a matter of Wonderment , or hard to believe that he should Create , but that if he pleases to operate ad extra , this is his Peculiar Action ; since nothing is more Evident than that Every Thing acts as it is . Whence , if God's Essence , and his very Nature be Existence or Actual Being , 't is demonstrable that it is not onely as peculiar to him to cause Actual Being or Create , as it is for Fire to heat , or Light to enlighten ; but , moreover , that this is the onely Effect that can immediately or without the intervention of Second Causes , proceed from him .

6. I much fear that it may seem something to weaken the true Argument for the Possibility of Creation , to The Thought cannot move the Body , and why . bring the Instance of our Thought moving our Body ; whence he concludes that Gods Power to do a Thing is not to be deny'd because we cannot comprehend its Operation . For , 1. Mr. Locke thinks he experiences this , viz. that the Soul moves the Body ; whereas we do not experience that God Created any thing . 2. As Mr. Locke has shown very ingeniously , that onely the Man is Free : So I affirm 't is the Man that , wrought upon himself , moves his Body , and not his Thought onely . And , that , as when we gaind our First Notions , the Man was acted upon , both according to his Corporeal and Spiritual Part ; so , every New Act he had afterwards , that proceeded from him as he was Man , is perform'd by the Concurrence of both those Parts . Whence , in every Act of his Soul , he must be re-excited by some Object that is out of the Soul , either striking on his Senses ; or else , by the repeated Strokes of the Material Phantasms , lodg'd within , upon the Seat of Knowledge . These propose a-fresh the Motives , and continue those Impressions all the while he deliberates , compares , discourses , and determins ; and , when the Man , according to that part call'd the Fancy , is full ( as it were ) of those Agreeable Phantasms ; and , consequently , the Soul ( hic est nunc ) is full too of those Notions or Apprehensions of their Agreeableness , the Whole Man acts for them , and moves to attain them . In which Case , what is purely Material in those Actions , or belonging meerly to Corporeal Motion , is refunded into the Stupendious Contrivance of the Body , whose Motions follow connaturally from the Phantasms , in the same way as it does in Brutes ; which is equally wonderful , we knowing no more than they , ( that is , not at all ) how it is done : But , the Manner of the Action , as to its Design , Direction , wise Ordering of it , and its Proceeding from Knowledge , Freedom and Reason , ( all which we know it does , ) springs peculiarly from the Soul , or from Man , according to his Spiritual Part. Now , the Fundamental Ground of my Position is this , Man is not Two Things ; nor ( which is the same ) made up of Soul and Body , as two Actual Parts ; but One Thing , of which , consequently , those two are Potential Parts onely . Wherefore , neither of those Parts is Actually , but the Whole ; and therefore , neither of them alone can Act , because neither of them exists alone ; * the Existence of the Thing being that in which See Method to Science , Book 1. Less . 5. §. 7. its Virtue of Operating consists . But , in truth , his Argument proceeds as well from this Topick , as it does from that of meer Thought moving the Body ; for , we can comprehend as little , how Man , tho' acting with his Phantasms and Thoughts too , does move the Body , and all its Distinct Parts , so variously , as how the Thought alone can do it . Nor , were there some Flaw in this Particular , does it prejudice his main Demonstration of a Deity , they being Distinct Questions . Add , that if we may conjecture from some Expressions of his in other places , he may perhaps be of my Opinion in this Point , and , by the Word [ Mind , ] mean the Man ; tho' in many places he speaks very Ambiguously ; or rather , seems too plainly to maintain the contrary Position .

7. I take leave on this Occasion , to recommend it to Speculative Men , to endeavour to draw all their Demonstrations The Notion or Nature of the Deity being once settled to be Self-existence , all that can be said of it follows Demonstratively . from the Nature of the Thing , ( this being the onely solid way , ) and not from Foreign Topicks . After we have prov'd a Deity , let us next demonstrate that God is Self-existent ; or , that his Essence , or Nature , is Existence ; and then , all that concerns the Deity , or his Immediate Operations , nay , even the Rational Explication of the Trinity it self , will ( if Right Logick and Reflexion be not wanting ) follow more solidly , and more clearly , than the clearest Mathematical Conclusions ; if we rate Clearness and Evidence , ( as we ought , ) not from the Figures on Paper , which make it easie to our Fancy ; but from the greater Simplicity and Clearness of the Notions , and their Terms , and of their equally-evident Connexion ; which , coming nearest to First , and Self-evident Principles , do most firmly establish the Judgment .

8. The 11th Chapter treats Of our Knowledge of the Existence of other Things ; by which words he means , other Things We can know there are Angels , tho' they do not operate'on us . than our selves . He seems to ground his Discourse on this Position , that no particular Man can know the Existence of any other Being , but only when , by Actually operating upon him , it makes it self perceiv'd by him ; which he calls the Way of Sensation , or Experience . Now , if , by the Words , [ any other Being , ] he means Bodies , nothing can be more Solid , or worthy a Philosopher . But , why we may not gather by our Reason , the Existence of Spiritual Beings , or Angels , ( tho' they do not operate upon us actually , ) from some Operation on other Things in Nature that can onely proceed from them , I cannot discern : Rather , I hope I have demonstrated we can , in my Method , Book 3. Less . 6. Thesis 4. Indeed , the Notions of Angelical Natures are not proper ones , as our Natural Notions , which are imprinted by Sensation , are ; which makes our Conceptions , and consequently , the Words which we use when we discourse of them Metaphorical . Nor matters it , that our Expressions concerning them are oft-times Negative , or signifie that they are not such Beings as Bodies are , but Immaterial , Unextended , Indivisible , and , consequently , their Operations Unsuccessive ; in regard we intend all the while to signifie by those Words , a Positive Being , tho' our low Natural Conceptions cannot reach its particular Nature , as in it self : And , if we intend this , then this is the meaning of those Words , or our Notion of them ; Meaning and Intention being all one . Yet , these Predicates , tho' Negative , or Metaphorical , are , notwithstanding , truly said of them ; and , therefore , we can Argue and Discourse as consequently from them , as we can from the most Positive or Proper Notions we have . Indeed , as Mr. Locke says well , §. 12. we cannot know they exist , by the Ideas we have of them in our Minds ; and the Reason is , because those Ideas , or Notions , taking them as ●●stinct , are but Inadequate Conceptions of the Thing ; and , consider'd distinctly , are formally but a part of that Complexion of Accidents that constitute the Individuum , which only is capable of Existing , or the Whole ; because Parts cannot exist out of the Whole : But he is much mistaken if he thinks we can no more know they are Capable of Existing by the Notions we have of them , than we can that Centaurs are : For , the Idea or Fancy of Centaurs involves Inconsistent Notions in its very Nature , ( or rather , No-Nature ; ) which the Notion of a Subsistent Spirit , called an Angel , does not . Add , that Knowing , Willing , and Operating , which we attribute to such Beings , are all Positive Notions ; and Consistent , or capable to meet in a Spiritual Thing .

9. Whereas Mr. Locke says we can onely know the Existence of any Other Thing when it operates upon us , and We know at first our own Existence , in the same manner as we know the Existence of other Things ; i. e. by Sensation , and not by Intuition . therefore we know it is actually by Sensation , I cannot see the least reason why we should not know our own Being by Sensation too , as well as that of other Bodies , without having recourse to Intuition ; which , apply'd to that Case , 't is hard to understand ; or , to know how it differs from the direct Knowledge had by Sensation or Experience . We can hear , see , feel and smell some parts of our own Body , as well as we can those of Others . Indeed , now , when we are ripe for more express Knowledges , those Impressions made by one of our own Parts upon others , do not cause in us the Notion of Existence , ( tho' , perhaps , they may tacitly repeat it , ) because we know already , and before-hand , that we do exist : But , put case we did not , would not these Impressions make us know by Sensation our own Existence , as well as that of any other Body whatever ? I doubt not but Mr. Locke will grant they would . Since then the Embryo in the Womb lies in a Roundish Posture , why may not one part of it , by touching another , or operating upon it , cause in us , as soon as the Soul ( which has a Capacity of Receiving Notions ) is in it , a Notion of our own Existence , by way of Sensation ? Especially , since Operation is nothing but the See Method to Science , Book 1. Less . 8. §. 7. Existence of the Agent Body , press'd or imprinted ( as it were ) upon another , by Motion . Certainly , it becomes us who deny Innate Ideas , to shew how all our First Notions do come into us by Impressions on the Senses ; and , not to say rawly , that some of them come by Intuition ; which is the Way of Knowing Proper to Angels , whose Knowledges are all Innate , and none of them Acquir'd , either by Sense , or Discourse , for they have neither . This , I say , is certainly best for the Interest of our Tenet ; of which , Intuition gives but a slender Account . I believe Mr. Locke proceeds upon this , that he finds he not only does , but must as firmly assent to the Proposition Ego sum , as he does to the most Evident Proposition whatever ; nor can he at all doubt of it , nor can it need Proof . But , my Judgment is , that this Introversion , and Studying our own Interiour , is a very Fallacious Guide , and will often lead us astray , if we keep not a steady Eye , attentively bent to our Principles ; which he seems here to neglect . For , many Positions need no Proof , and force our Assent , and yet their Certainty may depend on Different Causes .

10. The 12th Chapter treats of the Improvement of our Knowledge , which Mr. Locke says , does not depend on Maxims . No Improvement of Science , without fome General Principle . But , First , he mistakes the Use of General Maxims : They are not made for the Vulgar , or Beginners , to gather Knowledge by them ; tho' it may be observ'd , that Men of all sorts do naturally use them when they sute their purpose ; nay , sometimes make Proverbs of them . Nor was this Maxim , [ a Whole is bigger than a Part , ] ever intended for Boys , or to teach them that their Hand is bigger than their Little Finger , or such like ; but , being premised to the ensuing Proofs , they are occasionally made use of by Learned Men , in the Process of their Discourse , to clinch the Truth of the Point , when it needs it , by their Self-Evidence . In the same manner as my self have very frequently had recourse to Metaphysical Principles , and made use of them , in my Preliminaries and Reflexions , as Occasion presented , to make my Discourses Evident ; and , to rivet the Truths I advance , in the Minds of my Readers ; as any Attentive Peruser of them may easily observe . He speaks against our Receiving Principles without Examination , and of Principles that are not Certain ; that is , against such Sayings , as are no Principles ; for , if they can either need , or admit of Examination , or , if they be not Certain , none but meer Fops will let them pass for Prinples . Yet , tho' Mr. Locke does thus oppose Maxims and Principles , 't is , notwithstanding , very evident , that himself must make use of some Maxims and Principles all the while he disputes aganst their Usefulness ; otherwise , he cannot discourse at all ; or , his Discourse can have no Force : In the same manner as he that wrastles with another , must either fix his Foot on some Firm Ground , or he will fall himself , instead of overthrowing his Adversary . Let us then examin his Principles . He alledges , that the Knowledge of the Certainty of Principles Mr. Locke's Principles examin'd . depends only upon the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our Ideas . This , then , is one of his Principles ; both because it runs through good part of his 3d and 4th Books , as also because 't is Equivalent to this Universal , [ All Certainty of Principles depends , &c. ] Now , this is so far from Self-evident , that it needs Examination enough ; and is one of those I judge not Certain ; and , therefore , can be no Ground or Principle at all : Nor is it possible it should , unless the Word [ Idea ] be cleared to mean Spiritual Notions in our Mind , and not meer Resemblances , or Material Representations in our Fancy ; to clear which , ( tho' the whole Treatise needs it , ) no Provision is made ; but , on the contrary , those two vastly different things are rather carelesly confounded ; as is shewn in my First Preliminary . Another Principle seems to be this , [ None ought , with a Blind and Implicit Faith , to Receive and Swallow Principles . ] This is of Universal Influence , and Self-Evident ; and , therefore , in all Points well qualify'd for a Principle . For , Principles were not Principles , if they needed either Faith , or Deductions of Reason , to make them go down , since they ought to be Evident by their own Light . But , what Good can this do to any , but to such as have renounc'd Common Sense , even to Ridiculousness ? And , perhaps Mr. Locke had some such weak Writers in his Eye , when he advanc'd this cautious Position , as a Warning to Learners .

11. Now , the General Maxims and Principles , on which the Learned Part of the World has hitherto proceeded , Mr. Locke's main Principle ; which is to ascertain all other Principles , Inevident . can onely be overthrown ( if they must needs be so ) by other Principles , more Evident than themselves are ; or else it will be but a drawn Match ; and so they may hope still to stand ( as the Lawyers phrase it ) in their full Force , Effect , and Vertue . We are to consider then , what Principle Mr. Locke has substituted in their room , when they are discarded ; for , 't is a very ill Case to be left without any Principles at all . 'T is this , [ All Knowledge of the Certainty of Principles , and consequently , the Way to improve our Knowledge , is , to get , and fix in our Minds , Clear , Distinct and Compleat Ideas , as far as they are to be had , and annex to them Proper and Constant Names . ] Now , if the Ideas must be Clear , the Terms must be very Simple , and consequently ( as was shewn above ) General ones ; and this will force us back upon General Maxims , which it was intended we should avoid , as good for little . To be Distinct , if we go to work like Artists , we must distinguish those General and Common Notions ; which will bring us back into the old Road of those Ten Common Heads , called Predicaments ; and , consequently , of Genus , Species and Differences , which was lately dislik'd ; I suppose , because it was too much travell'd in , and beaten ; tho' , I think , such a Common Path should not be left , because some may have here and there laid a Block or Briar in the way . Lastly , Compleat Ideas ( as he grants ) are not to be had of the Species , much less of the Individuums . And , as for Names ; 't is not we that are to annex them , but the Common Usage of the Vulgar , or of the Generality of Learned Men , ( in case they be Artificial ones ; ) for , these are they who gave them their Constant and Proper Signification . Whence is seen , that so many Difficulties are involv'd in this one Thesis , or Principle , ( besides what is said above , of the Word [ Ideas , ] ) that we can build no Degree of Certainty , nor Improvement of Knowledge upon it ; especially , since Mr. Locke himself ( according to his usual Candour and Modesty ) declares here , he does but think it true . But , which is the hardest Case of all , to embrace this Principle , we must be oblig'd to quit all our Self-evident Maxims , as of little Use , upon which our selves , and all the Learned part of the World , have proceeded hitherto .

12. 'T is a great Truth , that it is a right Method of advancing Knowledge , to Consider our Abstract Notions : But , if What Things hinder the Advancement of Science . these be not the Things , nor ( as Mr. Locke's Complex Ideas are ) so much as like them , I see not but that , let us Consider them as much as we will , we shall be never the nearer attaining any Real Knowledge by such a Consideration . I add , that it is also as necessary to find out Middle Terms , that are Proper ; without which , no Science can be had of any New Conclusion ; nor , consequently , can we , without this , advance one Step in Exact Knowledge . 'T is a certain Truth also , that Morality is capable of Demonstration ; tho' I do not remember that any Author , but Mr. Locke , and my self , have been so bold , as openly to profess it . The Current of Slight Speculaters having long endeavour'd to make it pass for a kind of Maxim , that [ there is no perfect Certainty to be had , but only in Lines and Numbers : ] Whereas , the Principles of Morality are as Evident , and the Notions belonging to such Subjects as Clear , as those in Natural Philosophy , perhaps Clearer ; as this worthy Author has shewn most manifestly . 'T is also True , that Knowledge may be better'd by Experience . But , if he means Scientifical Knowledge , which is the Effect of Demonstration , I must deny it , unless Common Principles of Nature do guide Experience , and give it Light of the True and Proper Causes of what Experience inform'd our Senses ; for , without their Assistance , ( as I have shewn in the Preface to my my Method , ) Experimental Knowledge can never produce any one Scientifical Conclusion . I add , that True Science would be a Thousand times more advanc'd , did Learned Men bend their Endeavours to begin with the Primary Affections of Body , and thence proceed gradually to Secondary , or more Compounded ones : For , this Method would furnish Studious Men with good Store of Proper Middle Terms , to deduce their Demonstrations . Lastly , 'T is true , that we must beware of Hypotheses , and Wrong Principles : But , where shall we find any Sect. of Philosophers , who , for want of Exact Skill in Logick and Metaphysicks , are not forc'd to build upon Hypotheses , ( and those generally False ones too ; ) but our Anti-Ideists , whom I take to be true Followers of Aristotle , in his main Principles , and the only true Understanders of his Doctrine . It being , indeed , scarce possible , that those who are not well qualify'd with those two Sciences , should be capable to Comprehend his True Sense .

13. Mr. Locke judges , that a Man may pore long enough on those Maxims us'd by Euclid , without seeing one jot the more Euclid , and such others , not blameable for laying Principles , or General Maxims . of Mathematical Truths . Self-evident Truths need not be por'd upon at all ; nor were they ever meant for the attaining New Knowledges by poring on those Propositions , singly consider'd : Yet , these Maxims must be pre-supposed to be True , and admitted , or the Arguments would very often want their best Cement , that gives them an evident and necessary Coherence . They are prefix'd by Euclid at first , both because they may often come in play afterwards ; as also , because it would throw off the Tenour of the Discourse , to mention them still expresly every time there needs Recourse to them : Whence it was judg'd fit by him , and others like him , to premise them at first , and then refer to them . Let Men but observe how , and in what Occasions , Euclid makes use of them , and it will then be best seen what they are good for : But , if they are good for nothing at all , I am sure it must be concluded , that both Euclid himself , and such Writers and Users of Maxims , were , all of them , a Company of vain , idle Fops , to amuse their Readers by proposing so solemnly such Ridiculous Trifles ; and dubbing those Insignificant Baubles with the Honourable Titles of Maxims and Principles . To fix which Dis-repute upon him , and his Imitaters , will , I doubt , much Scandalize every True Member of the Commonwealth of Learning .

REFLEXION 21th . ON The Fourteenth , Fifteenth , and Sixteenth CHAPTERS .

1. I Am sorry I must declare , that in Mr. Locke's 14th Chapter , which treats [ Of Judgment ] there is scarce one Line that I can yield to . I discourse thus : Judgment The Point stated . does most evidently import the Fixure of our Understanding in its Assent to the Truth or Falshood of any Proposition . For to say , I judge a thing to be so ; is the same as to say , [ I am fully and firmly persuaded it is so . ] Now , this Fixure of the Mind may arise from two Causes ; Reason and Passion . Under the Word [ Reason , ] taken at large , I comprehend all kind of Evident Knowledge whatever , that can belong to a Rational Creature . To Passion belongs all Precipitancy of Assent , from what Motive or Cause soever it springs . The Former makes us adhere to what we judge , upon such Motives , as by their Evidence do determine the Understanding to Assent , and fix it in that Assent ; which Motives , therefore , can be only such as are purely Intellectual ; or such as , by our Proceeding upon them , we see clearly the Thing must be so , or not so , as we apprehend . The Later springs from the Will , corrupted and byassed by some Interest or Pleasure , which inveigles our Understanding to adhere to it as a Truth , because the Will would have it so . Again , there are two sorts of Objects Man , as having two Natures in him , may be employ'd about , viz. Outward Action and Inward Assent . The former does ( generally ) concern the External Conveniences or Necessities of our Temporal Life here ; the Later , the Interiour and Natural Perfection of our Soul ; which is the Adhering to Truth , and rejecting of Errour . In the Former of these we can have no Clear Evidence , or very seldom ; both because Outward Actions are employ'd about Particulars , of which we can have no Science ; as also , because those Particulars about which we are to Act , are surrounded with almost Innumerable Circumstances which we cannot Comprehend , and way-laid by the Undiscoverable Ambushes of Fortune ; so that we can seldom or never , with absolute Certainty , know whether they may , or may not prove Successful . Notwithstanding which Dangers , when there is Necessity or great Conveniency to Act Outwardly , we may , without disparaging our Reason , fall to acting upon a Probability ; the Necessity obliging us to do so , and the Impossibility of perfect Assurance acquitting us of Imprudence . But , of Assenting , or of Judging Inwardly , that a Proposition is True or False , there can be no Necessity , unless Evidence forces us to it ; in regard God's Goodness has furnish'd us with a Faculty of Suspending our Judgment in such Cases , lest we run into Errour ; which is always prejudicial to our Nature ; and , if the Errour does concern matters of high Moment , pernicious to our Souls Eternal Welfare . This I take to be plain Reason , nor do I doubt but that each Branch of this Discourse may be reduced to perfect Evidence . We come to examin now what Mr. Locke delivers in this most important Point .

2. First , He Confounds Outward Action , of which there is Necessity , and can be no Evidence of Success ; with Mr. L. confounds Outward Action , to which we may proceed upon a Probability , with Inward Assent , to which we may not . Interiour Judging and Assenting , of which there can be no Necessity , if there can be no Evidence ; and of which Evident Knowledge may oftentimes be had ; as also concerning whose Truth or Falshood , till Evidence appear , we may safely and honourably suspend our Judgment ; nay , if , in such a case , we do not , we hazard to do our selves an Injury when we need not . That he thus confounds those two vastly Different , or rather Contrary Considerations , appears hence ; that , § 1. he shews the Unreasonableness of not eating , and of not going about our Business , till we have a Demonstration that the Meat will nourish us , and the Business will succeed ; which Instances evidently relate to Outward Action ; but in § 3. he speaks in the same Tenour of taking the Proposition to be True or False ; which clearly relates to Inward Assent . Secondly , God 's Wisdom has indeed given us , generally , no more but Probability for our Outward Actions doing us good , or succeeding ; but to think our all-wise Maker has given us no better Grounds to make us Assent ; or rather , that he intended we should Assent upon Probabilities , which are still liable to be False ; and , if they be but Probabilities , may all be False , is to think that God meant to expose our Souls to innumerable Errours ; nay , allows and designs we should embrace Errours . For , if ( as Mr. L. says ) God has given as a Faculty to judge that to be True , which , the Reasons for their Truth being but Probable , may not be True ; then , since God has most certainly intended we should make use of the Faculty he has given us , it must follow that God has exposed us to Errour , or design'd we should err ; and that , ( this Faculty , as he says , not being Knowledge ) very frequently . Which is hardly consistent with the Reverence we do both of us owe to our Creatour , who governs his Creatures according to the Nature he has given them ; which , is to avoid Errour , and never ( as will shortly be seen this does ) to admit a Contradiction .

3. What therefore I extremely admire , is , that Mr. Locke should say in express Terms , that Judgment is that Faculty , A strange Character of our Judging Faculty . whereby the Mind takes any Proposition to be True or False , without perceiving a Demonstrative Evidence in the Proofs ; and that this Faculty is given Man by God to enlighten him . For , First , Judgment does not enlighten us at all ; as appears evidently , because False Judgments are Errours ; which are so far from enlightning the Mind , that they manifestly darken it . All that Judgment does , is to Fix the Mind in the Perswasion it has , whether that Persuasion springs from Clear Reason or Dark Passion ; and Mr. Locke seems to make good my Words , while he contradistinguishes Judgment to Knowledge ; which later , and onely which , is our Intellectual Light . Secondly , The Words [ Taking Propositions to be True or False ] must mean Assenting to them as such ; for every Judgment is not only an Assent , but a full and firm Assent . Now , that no Probability can , with Reason , cause Assent , ( and certainly God , who gave us our Reason , has not given us a Faculty to use it against our Reason ) will be seen hereafter . Thirdly , Which is yet worse , by contradistinguishing Judgment and Clear Knowledge , he makes those Assents which spring out of Clear Knowledge to be no Judgments at all ; whereas These are the onely Judgments that we can be sure will do us good , and are according to our True Nature , Reason . He tells us indeed , in the Close , that when we judge as things really are , they are Right Judgments . But , how does this agree with his Contradistinguishing formerly [ Judgment , ] according to its whole Latitude , or in its General Notion , from Knowledge ; unless we should say , that we only do right when we judge at Hap-hazard , or judge Right by Chance . Qui quod aequum est statuit parte inauditâ alterâ , Aequum licet statuerit , haud aequus est tamen : By which Rule , we are ill Men , even tho' we Judge right ; because we precipitate and hazard to embrace Errour when we need not . Besides , Things are so really to us as we know them to be : And , if we do not know them to be such , we cannot with Reason say or judge them to be such ; and , if we do , we act against our true Nature ; to do which God has given us no Faculty . Fourthly , Amongst the Causes mention'd here that make us judge , Necessity is reckon'd as one , when Certain Knowledge is not to be had : But , this can be no Cause at all to make us Judge . For , there can be no possible Necessity , forcing us to judge , but Clear Evidence . This , indeed , obliges us to Interiour Assent , and compels us to judge that the Thing is so as we see it to be . But , if no Evidence can be had , what Necessity is there at all of Judging one way or other ? Cannot we suspend our Judgment till Evidence appears ; or whether it does ever appear , or not ? Why are we in such hast to hazard falling into Error ? Or who bids us Judge at all till we see a good ( or Conclusive ) Reason why ? I am sure , whatever many Men may do out of Weakness , neither God nor Nature ever impos'd upon any such an absurd Duty . Lastly , What means his making it then to be Judgment , when we have no Demonstrative Evidence ? May we not judge a Conclusion that is Demonstrated to be True , because it is Demonstrated ? Or that an Identical Proposition is True , because 't is Self-evident ? Or , rather , ought we not to judge all such Propositions to be True for this very Reason , because we know evidently they are so . So far then is Certain Knowledge from being contradistinguish'd from Judgment , that they are in some manner the same , as I have shewn in my METHOD , B. 2. Less . 1. § 3. where , I hope , I have set the Nature of Judgment in a Clear Light ; as I have that of Assent , Suspense , and Certainty , B. 3. § 9.

4. I should be glad to think my self mistaken in Mr. Locke's Meaning , if his Express Words , the Tenour of That God has provided due Motives of Enjoin'd Assent to all Mankind , if they be not wanting to themselves . his Discourse , and his next Chapter [ Of Probability , ] which runs in the same Strain , would give me leave . Perhaps , he thinks that , since none can embrace Christianity without judging it to be True , and few know it to be so , we should exclude the Generality from the way to Salvation , if we do not allow such a Faculty given us by God , as Judging without Knowing . I Answer , 1. Those Gifts that come from Above , from the Father of Lights , are all Perfect , as being the Endowments of his Infinitely-bountiful Hand ; and , that Men act imperfectly and foolishly , springs from the Limitedness of Creatures . Scarce a Faculty they have but has its Weakness when we come to act , as well as our Reason . When then any one is reduc'd to Christianity upon weak Motives , what 's Good or Sincere in that Action is refunded into God the Author of all Good ; what 's Defective ( as all Inconclusive Reasonings are ) is to be refunded into the Imperfection of Creatures . Indeed , it belongs to God to lay and establish such Motives to embrace High and Concerning Truths , as are of their own Nature apt to convince , not only People of all sorts , but even the most Speculative Wit living ; but it does not belong to him to provide , that every weak Man shall , untaught , penetrate them throughly ; nor every Careless Man make use of them . Rude and Imperfect Motives are sufficient to move Rude and Imperfect Understandings . 2. This notwithstanding , God has furnish'd even the Rudest , who cannot Speculate at all , with a Power to understand such Motives , after some Fashion , called Practical Evidence ; which teaches them , by a common Converse with Natural Things , and with Mankind , to know ( dully at least ) the Force of Witnessing Authority attesting the Miracles that abetted Christianity , and the Books that deliver'd it . But , what I chiefly insist upon is , that it teaches all Men , that the Nature of its Precepts , and of its Morality , is most Agreeable to our Reason ; that it curbs Passion , which breeds such Turmoils in the World ; and that , ( if settled in Men's Lives , ) it would establish all the World in Peace and Concord ; especially , since they cannot but see what Inconveniencies and ill Consequences do ensue the Breach of the Commandments . And this gives an Entire Satisfaction to every Man who is capable of Knowing Common Morality , ( as , who is not ? ) and assures them , that the Doctrine it self is True ; since they experience that Errour puts all into Confusion and Disorder . But , this on the By. In a Word , He must be a mean Speculater , who does not observe that God has laid Motives , and Solid Knowable ones too , for every Man to embrace Christian Faith , of what degree soever he be , if he be but so wise as to doubt , and require a Reason : If those Motives be not apply'd to all , 't is either the Fault of those that do not care to be instructed ; or of those who should inculcate and explicate to them those Motives , and shew how Solid and Clear they are . Let them then bear the Blame ; God's Providence is justify'd , and his Wisdom and Goodness magnify'd , by his making ample Provision for such Negligent and Unworthy Persons . See Method to Science , Book 3. Less . 8. §§. 18 , 19.

5. Hence , I have little to say to his 15th Chapter , which treats of Probability ; * * See Method to Science , B. 3. L. 8. having shewn from the Ground To assent upon a Probability , is against the Commonest Light of Reason . of all Consequence , ( the Connexion of the Middle Term with the two Extreams , ) that , when the Medium is Proper or Immediate , it causes Demonstration , and begets Science ; when Common or Remote , it makes the Thing onely Probable , and begets Opinion ; when Unconcerning , it causes Improbability ; when clearly Repugnant , it breeds Dissent . I am therefore onely to reflect on those Expressions of Mr. Locke that seem to say we may assent , or judge the Thing is so upon Probable Reasons ; or , as Mr. Locke expresses it , assent as firmly as tho' the Thing were infallibly demonstrated , tho' it do but border near upon Certainty . I have shewn in my Method , Book 3. Less . 9. §. 12. that no truly Wise Man does Assent or Judge upon Motives , tho' very highly Probable ; nor can do so , tho' they be never so Probable and Likely , if he sees it but Likely , or Probable : For , all Reasons or Motives that are but Probable , permit that the Thing may not be so , or may not be ; and to assent , or judge the Thing True , is to say in our Mind , that the Thing is : Whence , to Assent the Thing is , upon a Probability , is , equivalently , to hold , that , it is possible the Thing may be , and may not be , at once : It may be , because it is ; and , it may not be at the same time , because the onely Grounds for its Being so , are but Probable . Which , therefore , being against a First , and Self-evident Principle , is the greatest Depravation that a Humane Understanding can be liable to , and ( if put in clear Terms ) absolutely Impossible ; both because Contradictions being repugnant to the Nature of Ens , or Thing , are Unintelligible ; as also , because it would make our Mind , which is Essentially Intellectual , to be not Intellectual , that is , Chimerical . For , 't is impossible it should be Intellectual , if it denies First Principles .

6. This Ground laid , 't is obvious to discern what is to be said to his 16th Chapter , [ Of the Degrees of Assent . ] There cannot be , in proper Speech , any Degrees of Assent . For , 1. I must deny that any Assent at all that the Thing is so , can be built upon the Sandy Foundation of Probability , without a most prodigious Perversion of Humane Understanding . 2. Hence I reflect upon the very Subject or Title of this Chapter ; and I object against it , that it is an Absolute Impossibility there should be , in proper Speech , any Degrees of Assent . To Assent to any Truth , ( as was lately shewn , ) is to say interiourly , the Thing [ is ; ] and to Dissent , is to say the Thing [ is not . ] These two Notions then are evidently the Objects of those two Acts , which give those Acts to be what they are , or ( as the Schools express it ) do specifie them . Wherefore , each of those two Acts consists in an Indivisible , as their Objects do ; and , consequently , there can be no more any Degrees of Assent , than there can be any Middle between is , and is not ; which is neither the one nor the other ; or , in part the one , in part the other ; whereas , being both of them Indivisible , neither of them can have any Parts at all . The Degrees then which can possibly be put in this case , and which I would be willing to think Mr. Locke meant , are the Degrees of Bending or Inclining , more or less , towards Assent or Dissent ; that is , Greater or Lesser Opinions of the Things Being , or not Being . Assent then , and Dissent , or is and is not , in the Judging Power , are the two fixed Butts and Bounds of that large Field , in which Innumerable Swarms of Opinions , Probabilities , Likelihoods , Doubts , Deemings , and Uncertainties reside ; driven perpetually up and down , in a Wild-Goose Chase , by those Unsteady Guides , Probabilities ; now nearer , now farther off from those Immoveable Barriers . But , it is to be noted , that the Degrees of Probability and Likelihood may sometimes be so very great , that they may seem , even to the wisest Men , while they regard them heedlesly , to counterfeit Assent , till they come to take a narrower and stricter Re-view of the Grounds on which they are built ; as I have shewn in my Method , Book 3. Less . 9. § . 2. Mr. Locke enumerates here many Probable Topicks , grounding Opinion ; and I have done the same , in the place now quoted , § . 10. All which do agree in this , that they are Common or Remote Mediums : Whence they are , in true Reason , Inconclusive ; and therefore , utterly unable to cause Assent in a Being that is Rational ; there wanting in them that Visible and Certain Connexion , in which all the Force of Consequence consists , and which Mr. Locke puts to be onely known by Intuition . There may , indeed , be Degrees of Assent taken from the Subject's side , by which the Understanding Assents more or less firmly ; according as the Medium is more or less Evident . Whence , Metaphysical Mediums , which approach nearest to Self-Evidence , cause a firmer Assent , than those which are taken from Inferiour Notions , which depend on the other for their Certainty : And , that Medium taken from the Divine Authority , does rationally beget the Firmest Assent of all : Yet , still , the Object of the Assent or Dissent is [ is , ] or [ is not . ] But this cannot be Mr. Locke's meaning here ; because the least of these Assents is built upon Clear Evidence ; which is impossible to be found , where the Medium is but Probable .

7. I am very apprehensive that this Discourse , and others such like will seem very Uncouth , and be very Displeasing Probable Assent is Nonsense , or Impertinent . to those short-sighted Speculaters , who , either out of Disadvantagious Education , or out of Diffidence that there can be any Certain Method to Science , are Sceptically inclin'd : Especially to those of our Modern Schoolmen ; who , not being accustom'd to demonstrate themselves , think it a Disgrace to them , and Incredible to boot , that any else should do it . One of whom , a Worthy Friend of mine , of an acute Understanding , and very Ingenious , but not yet wean'd from insignificant School-Terms , nor aware of their Trifling way of Distinguishing ; uponmy discoursing with him about this point , did imagin it might all be answered , and over thrown by an easy Distinction of Assent , into Absolute and Probable . Alledging that Absolute Assent had indeed [ is ] for its Object , and so consisted in an Indivisible ; but that Probable Assent did not so ; by which means the imputation of holding a Contradiction is avoyded . Thus he reply'd : Wherefore , it were not amiss for his sake , and others of the same pitch , to lay open the frivolousness of this insignificant Distinction ; that , by reflecting on this , they may correct their carriage in all other like occasions . First then , he seems to join the Epithet of [ Probable ] to the Act of Assenting ; which is perfect Nonsense . For , since every Accident or Mode has its Metaphysical Verity , by which it is what it is , as well as any Substance ; it is equally against the First Principle [ Every Thing is what it is ] to apply that Distinction to any Accident ( of which Assent is one , ) as it would be to apply it to any Substance . Put case then we were discoursing concerning the Nature of a Stone , or of any other Substance or Body ; and were disputing whether its nature were such or such ; and he should go about to elude the whole force of this Discourse , by Distinguishing [ Stone ] into a Probable Stone , and an Absolute Stone , would it not be highly ridiculous : For the same Reason it would be equally Ridiculous to apply [ Probable ] to the Act of Assenting ; since that Act is as absolutely it self , as a Stone is a Stone , or any other Body is what it is . But , that I may not be too severe , let us imagin he meant to apply [ Probable , ] to the Object of the Act or some Proposition , as standing under Motives onely Probable ; whence , 't is equivalent to this Proposition , [ This Tenet is Probable : ] Then , in case the Proof of that Tenet were onely a Probable Medium , that Proposition is a plain Truth , for what is inferr'd by a Probable Medium , is beyond all question , Probable ; and therefore the Assent to that Proposition , ought to be call'd Absolute , and not Probable , which quite spoiles the Distinction by making the two branches of it to be one and the same . 3. Hence , this Contradistinguishing Probable and Absolute , is faulty in another regard , because the two parts of it are not ( some way ) Opposit ; as they ought to be ; because the Defendent in the Schools uses to say , that according to one of them , he grants the Proposition , and according to the other denies it . Now , Absolute and Probable , are not at all proper Opposites : [ Absolute ] signifies Consummate or Perfect in its kind , and relates to the Minds perfectly yeilding or assenting that the Thing is True ; whereas , [ Probable ] must relate to the Motives , or the common Medium under which the Proposition stands , or else ( as was lately shewn ) it is meer Nonsense , and Ridiculous . The Proper Opposite to Probable , is Improbable ; and , what has Improbable to do with Absolute ? Lastly , granting he speaks of the Object or Thesis proposed to our Assent , it will appear evidently that my Assertion will stand good , and that the Formal Object of Assent is what is express'd by the Copula [ is , ] or the Connexion of the two Terms , in which Truth ( which onely is to be assented to ) consists . For example ; When we say that [ A Thesis prov'd onely by a Common Medium , is Probable ; ] the Truth , even of this Proposition , is onely express'd by the Copula [ is , ] and consists in an Indivisible ; so that you no sooner step out of [ is Probable , ] but you must run into its Contradictory , [ is not Probable . ]

8. This Instance will give us occasion to note the Vanity and Folly of Innumerable Distinctions , which pass current What kinds of Distinctions are Disallowable in Disputation . amongst Disputants ; in which , if examin'd strictly , sometimes the two parts of them are not Opposit , but onely oddly Disparate ; sometimes Coincident ; sometimes they are applied to such Terms as are incapable to admit them , without palpable Nonsense ; very often when all is done , they are Impertinent : And , frequently , whereas the Distinction should divide the Notion of the Genus , and include it , one of the Members will perfectly contradict the whole Generical Notion , and pretend to pass for one sort of it , when it is point blank Opposit to it , and to every part of it : For example , I remember an Eminent School Divine , when ( honest Nature putting a scruple into me , when I was young ) I askt him how a Man could say he had done such a thing when he had not done it ; he answerd very Soberly , that he had done it intentionaliter , tho' not realiter : Now , to do it ( as he call'd it ) Intentionaliter , is onely to have an Intention to do it , which signifies not to have done it . So that [ Doing ] is , by virtue of a Distinction , divided into Doing and not Doing ; and not Doing is made one sort of Doing . And I do assure my Friend his Probable Assent is not a jot wiser ; but has more faults in it than had the other , 'T is not enough then , nor at all Satisfactory , to give an Answer fork'd with a Distinction ; but care must be had that the Distinction be Pertinent , and well qualify'd , as is hinted above . See other Distinctions of the same leaven with the former , laid open , Method to Science . B. 3. Less . 9. § § 19. 20.

9. I heartily joyn with Mr. Locke in his Discourse about preserving Mutual Charity , and Forbearance . Tho' Charity to Sincere and Weak Misunderstanders is a Christian Duty . the Demonstrations of Learned Men do much Good , yet I am sure the want of Charity does more Harm . 'T is in the highest manner Preternatural that Rational Souls should be forced , or dealt with any other way than by Reason ; unless they come to wrong Common Morality , or the Peace of the Common wealth in which they live ; both which are so evidently against the Law of Nature , that their Reason must needs see and acknowledge it , unless most wickedly blinded with Passion and Vice . Alas ! what Silly Reasons do good Weak People take for Certain , and are convinced by them as perfectly as we are by the Clearest Demonstration ! And , ( which more obliges us to pity them ) if we propose to them strong Reasons , they are too weighty for their weak Strength to wield ; and their own ridiculous ones do sute better with their Size and Pitch of Wit.

10. I am clearly of Mr. L's Judgment , concerning the Degrees of Probability in several matters ; as also that in Tradition built on meer Hearsay , has little or no Force . Traditional Truths , each Remove weakens the force of the Proof , if it descends meerly ( as he expresses it ) by the way of the Hearsay of a Hearsay . The bare Narative must either be supported by a Consonant , Frequent , Open and Obligatory Practise , and be strengthen'd by the Acknowledged High Concern of Perpetuating the Matter of Fact attested , or it may in time dwindle away into a feeble Tittle-tattle . And , I very much esteem his Remark , as both very Acute , and very Solid , that no Probability in Historical Relation can arise higher than its First Original ; unless that First Original were afterwards abetted and corroborated by other Motives . His Allowance of the Validity of the Testimony for Miracles , is Wise , and Pious ; and his making Divine Revelation to be the highest Certainty , is well becoming a Christian Philosopher : For , all our Knowledge whatever is taken from Things , made and establish'd by God , as the First Cause ; and , therefore , if it be Certain that God's Revelation or Testimony stands engag'd for any Point , the Truth of that Point is prov'd by a Nobler , Stronger and Higher Medium than can be drawn from Physicks , or even Metaphysicks ; that is , from the Soveraign Cause of all those Objects , whence those respective Mediums are taken ; and , by whom onely they they have any Truth at all in them ; no , not so much as their Metaphysical Verity it self .

11. It would not be impertinent on this Occasion , to present Mr. Locke with a short Story . A very A more Firm Assent is due to Points certainly known to be Reveal'd , than to Scientifical Conclusions . Judicious Cantabrigian desir'd to know of me , whether we ought not to assent to a Point of Christian Faith , supposing it was evidently Reveal'd , more firmly than to any Scientifical Conclusion ? I answer'd , that we ought . He ask'd , Why ? Alledging , that , since there could not be any greater Certainty that it was reveal'd than Demonstration , the Assent to the Conclusion could not , in true Reason , be more Firm than that which a Demonstration produces , or than the Conclusion of any Science : For , let the Syllogism be this , [ Whatever God said , is True : But , God said there will be a Resurrection of our Bodies ; Therefore , there will be such a Resurrection : ] None can pretend ( said he ) any greater Certainty than that of Science , for the Certainty of the Authority that gave us the Minor ; therefore , since Conclusio sequitur deteriorem partem , the Assent to the Conclusion can be , in true Reason , no greater than that of Science . I reply'd , that that Saying of the Logicians was meant of the Particularity or Negativeness found in the Premisses , and not of the Force of the Medium . I alledg'd , that the Major had the greater Influence upon the Conclusion , ( whence that Proposition so called , had its Appellation , ) than the Minor ; which was onely an Applier of the Force of the Major to some Particular , or some other Notion , in order to conclude concerning it ; and therefore , the Certainty of the Conclusion was chiefly to be rated from the Force of the Major : Whence , those Enthymems , which have the Major for their Antecedent , are more Natural than those which have the Minor . I insisted , that the Divine Authority being alledg'd for the onely Medium or Motive for all Revealed Points whatever , our Assent to the Verity of all such Points , was onely to be refunded into It ; and , that it lost not its Force by its being apply'd by a weaker Medium to some Particular , provided that Supream Authority's standing engag'd for that Particular , were closely Apply'd to our Mind ; which is done by absolute Certainty and Evidence . To illustrate which , I brought this Instance . Let there be two Agents , whereof the one is Calidum ut octo , the other Calidum ut duo , and both of them apply'd to the same Patient equally ; it will not follow from this Equal Application , that they will have an Equal Effect ; but the Heat produced by the one , will be more Intense than that which was caused by the other . So , supposing two Syllogisms , the Minors of which are both known by Science ; but of the Majors , one is known onely by Science , the other by an infinitely higher Evidence , viz. by the Essential Veracity of the Divine Authority ; it will not follow , from the Equal Application of it , by the respective Minors , to this or that Particular , Subsum'd under them , that the Assent to the two Conclusions , which is the Effect they are to produce in our Minds , will be Equal ; but they will operate according to their Several Forces , provided the Force of both be but Closely apply'd to our Minds , so to make it work its Full Effect ; which is done by seeing both the Minors to be Absolutely Certain and Evident . I have not Time to dilate on this high Point as it deserves , but leave it to the Sober Reflexion of all Judicious Lovers of Truth , who seriously desire that Christian Principles may approve themselves to be , in all respects , perfectly Rational . And 't is a Duty we all owe to our selves , and to the World , to shew that Christian Faith does not pervert or impair , but perfect and exalt our Reason .

REFLEXION 22th . ON The 17th , 18th , 19th , and Last CHAPTERS .

1. THis Learned Author states Reason very right in all its Parts ; but , I believe , he mistakes the right End , Intention and Use of Syllogisms ; and that , How Syllogisms came to be invented at first . while he opposes them , he takes his Measures from the Modern School-way of Syllogistick Arguing , and the little Fruit it has yielded . Such Forms of Reasoning were , certainly , never intended for the Vulgar , as by his Discourse he seems to apprehend ; nor for Men of good Mother-Wits , to attain Ordinary Knowledge , by casting their Thoughts in those Exact Molds . For , Mankind could use their Reason , and improve in it too ; nay , could draw their Consequences ( generally ) very well , before Syllogistick Reasoning came in fashion ; tho' they could not so well make it out to themselves or others , why the Consequence must follow , nor refund it into its Causes , and so set it above Contest , by reducing it to Evidence . Their own Natural Genius taught them to discourse right , very often unreflectingly ; as it does also the Vulgar in Things within their Ken. In process of Time , Reflecters upon Nature , finding ( as it were ) by Experience , that some Discourses were evidently Consequent , some not , they began to cast about and find out by what Virtue some Discourses came to be so evidently Conclusive above others . And , to this end ( Art , if truly such , being nothing but a deep Inspection into Nature ) they set themselves to anatomize and dissect a Rational Discourse , that so they might discover the hidden Nerves and Ligaments that gave Force and Connexion to the whole . They found that such a Discourse did consist of three main Parts , call'd Propositions ; and each of these again , of three lesser parts , called by them Subject , Copula , and Predicate ; all which had Distinct Natures and Offices in the Discourse . They discover'd that the Connexion of the two Terms in the Conclusion , in which consists the Truth of it , depended on their Connexion with a Third or Middle Term in the Premisses ; and that , if they be not connected with it or Immediate , but Remote from it , as all Common Mediums are , which beget Probabilities ; nothing is concluded , and so the Conclusion may , ( for any thing we know ) be False . They observ'd hence , that there could be but Three Terms in such a Discourse ; and that , were they more , it caused a Blunder and Inconsequence . Hence they took Care those three Terms should be so placed , as would render the Connexion of the other Two with the Medium most Clear at First Sight . This done , they treated of each of those Greater and Lesser Parts , that is , of Propositions and Notions singly and apart ; adding such Rules as they saw convenient for each . From these Observations , laid orderly together , sprung the Art of Logick , and all the Rudiments belonging to it . All which have their Force from Nature ; nor ought any thing be esteemed Art , but what has honest downright Nature for its Ground : And , I hope , that in every Tittle of my whole Method , I have not one Argument in those many Trains of Consequences I have drawn there throughout it , that is not taken from the Nature of the Thing in hand . Now , things standing thus , who can think Logick , or Syllogism ( the main End of it , ) are to be slighted as of little or no use ? Can any Man think that Art and Reflexion do add no Advantage to Untaught Nature ? Or that our Rude , Natural , and Common Reason may not be Cultivated and Improv'd , as well as our Natural Voice , Walking and Handling , may be better'd , by being taught to Sing , Dance , or Play on the Lute Artificially .

2. I am very apt to think , that at first the Inventers of Logick and Syllogisms did never intend to use them perpetually The True Use and Abuse of them . themselves , nor to instruct others in any Science by using constantly that Method . Since neither Aristotle , nor any other Author I ever read , Ancient or Modern , ever went about to deliver a Scheme of Doctrine in a Syllogistick way : But that , after they had by Study and Reflexion , found out in what their Evidence lay , they made use of them as Exemplars or Tests , by which they might try whether their Loose and Dishevell'd Discourses had an Evident and Necessary Connexion of Terms at the bottom ; or else , in some Signal Occasions , to confute and convince an Acute or Obstinate Adversary ; especially , if the Auditory and Judges of the Dispute were Men of Learning . For which Reason that way is still continued in Learned Assemblies : Such as the Schools often are , and always should be . But , when at length that way grew too common , and that Sophisters and Bunglers would needs constantly use It , and It only , in their extempore Disputes ; which could be manag'd right , and as they ought , by none but those who were exact Masters of Logick ; it came at length to degenerate into insipid Artless Wrangle and Talking at random . For , the Multitude of ill-understood and barbarous School-terms encreased , frivolous Distinctions ( as I lately instanced ) grew rife ; Principles were either neglected , or else supplied by their Masters 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 ; the Natures of Things , and the Ways dictated by Nature , were left off ; and hence it came , that no Progress was made in Science ; nor any Point decisively concluded .

3. In divers parts of this Discourse I doubt not but Mr. Locke agrees with me : What I disagree with him in is : Objections against Syllogistick Arguing clear'd . 1. I deny that in Learned and Philosophical Discourses , ( for which Syllogisms were intended ) the Mind can perceive the Connexion of the Proofs where it really is , as easily , nay perhaps better , without them . Certainly , the seeing the middle Term placed in the middle , as it ought , will make a Reflecting Man see better the Connexion of the Terms ; whence , besides its own aptness to connect , it comes , even by vertue of its place , to be seen to be Immediate to each of the Extremes ; and , so , more apt to connect them . Again , In a Syllogism there is no Necessary Word left out , nor one Unnecessary Word put in ; whereas in Loose Discourses this last is always wanting : And , can we think it adds no degree of Clearness to the Discourse to keep it from being pester'd with many Unnecessary Words , in many of which there will not want Ambiguity ? Nor is this all , for in Loose Discourses , the fine Language and Plausible Tricks of Rhetorick do too often dazle the Eye of the Mind ; and make that seem excellent Reason , which , brought the Test of a Syllogism , will be seen to be plain Foolery and Ridiculous Nonsense . Lastly , Good Logicians , who are skill'd in the Solid Reasons why the Conclusion follows , do , while they discourse Syllogistically , guide their Thoughts all along by steady and ( generally ) Self-evident Rules ; and see a priori , and this , by the Highest Causes , why , and by what means the Conclusion must follow ; which conduces in a high measure to Demonstration and Science : Whereas , those that have only the Assistance of their Uncultivated Natural Reason , do both want this knowing Satisfaction to themselves , and are utterly Unable to give it to others . I grant then , that the Untaught Vulgar in Common Conversation and obvious Affairs can need no Syllogisms ; and that the Gentlewoman he speaks of , may have Wit enough to avoid catching Cold , tho' neither her self , nor any for her , do put the Reason of it into a Syllogism ; and so does a Milk-maid , without the help of Mathematicks , know certainly that the Diameter of her Pail is Shorter than the Circumference of it ; nay , both of them would be blunder'd , and know those Truths worse , were the true Reasons for them put into the uncouth Garb of a Syllogism ; for Art is not their Talent : But to think that Learned Men and Disputants gain little or no Advantage by them above the Vulgar , is to maintain , that Art , tho' never so Solidly Grounded , is good for nothing .

4. Secondly , To say that Syllogism helps little in Demonstration , is , I am sure , against Reason and Experience both . He Syllogisms are useful for Demonstration . might as well have said in one Word , they are good for nothing at all . For it cannot be thought they are good to know Principles , they being Self-evident ; and , it is manifest they cannot help us in Probabilities ; for a Syllogism that does not conclude is not worth a Straw ; and no Medium that is meerly Probable ( it being a Remote one ) can be connected with the Extremes , nor consequently can it conclude . 'T is left then , that if they help little in Demonstration , they do not help us much in any thing . We need then very strong Arguments to make us yield to such a Paradox . Mr. Locke confesses Syllogism is sometimes good to discover Fallacies : I take leave to say they are always good for that End : And does this help us little in Demonstration ? All Argumentations are either Conclusive or Inconclusive ; Conclusive ones have a middle Term immediately connected with the Extremes ; Inconclusive ones either are aim'd to deceive us , by bringing a Bad Medium , or by using a Bad Form ; and those are the worst sort of Fallacies , or of such Syllogisms as lead us into Errour ; most of those Fallacies noted in common Logick-books , being but Trifles . If then the Syllogistick way discovers Fallacies , it cannot be deny'd but it exceedingly helps Conclusive Argumentation , or Demonstration . He grants too , that it sets the absent Proposition ( and , so , the whole Argument ) before the View in a Clear Light . I infer ; therefore without it , we should not have had so Clear a Knowledge of the Proof , nor consequently of the Conclusion ; and is this nothing ? But he thinks this good is over ballanced by this , that it engages the Mind in the perplexity of Obscure , Equivocal and Fallacious Terms . Let us blame then those Logicians , who multiply Terms and needless Crotchets , ( which I have endeavour'd in my Method , to lop off as Superfluous ) and those Authors who do not define those Terms they use ; and not Syllogism nor Artificial Logick , which tells them they ought to do it . I know no more , properly and peculiarly belonging to Syllogism , but a Middle Term rightly placed ; as is usually done in the First Figure , and according to the First Four Moods . Nor do I see any thing in these that in my Method is not reduced to Clear Evidence . 'T is confest too that it is adapted to the attaining Victory in Disputes . Now , if this be so , then the Champion of Truth , by means of Syllogism , will make Truth Victorious ; and then , how it can be deny'd ( as Mr. Locke does ) that it confirms Truth in fair Enquiries , is to me Unintelligible ; unless by Fair Enquiries he means Loose Discourses , which are not Syllogistical , nor reducible to that Form ; which I think is an Improper and Lukewarm expression ; For , a Philosopher ought to esteem no Discourse Fair , which is not Clear and Conclusive .

5. Indeed Mr. Locke says very well , that Syllogism is of no use at all in Probabilities . And there is very good Syllogisms are of no use in Probable Discourses . Reason why . For Syllogism shows an Infallibly-Certain way of Concluding ; whence nothing can bear that Test but what does Conclude ; Whereas Probabilities being grounded on Common Mediums , do not conclude at all ; and therefore it would do Probability a Great Disservice to bring it to the Touchstone of all True or Conclusive Reasoning , a Syllogistick Form . This would quickly lay open the Incoherence of the Terms , and consequently , show those Men to be less Rational who do Assent , or say interiourly , The Terms do cohere , or the Thing is True , upon a Probable Argument , in which they do not Cohere . 'T is then by Sagacious Prudence , and not by Syllogisms , that the Degrees of Probability are to be weighed and try'd . He grants also that Syllogism serves to fence : And so it does , tho' not in Mr. Lock 's sense of that word . For , as an expert Fencer easily Wounds , and overthrows an Enemy , who is not Skilful in that Art : So a Man who is Skilful in Syllogism , which is the Art of Concluding evidently , will quickly confound and overthrow an Adversary of Truth . But why he should think it does not serve to increase Knowledge , is a strange Riddle ; the whole Design of Artificial , or Syllogistick , Reasoning being to Deduce Conclusions not yet known , from Premisses which are either perfectly Foreknown , or at least better known .

6. Mr. Locke has then good reason to say , that Other Helps should be sought : But , if Syllogism be discarded , where Other Mistakes about Syllogism Clear'd . any other Help can be found to make the force and Clearness of the Consequence better appear , or upon more evident and more Certain Grounds , not the Wit of Mankind can Imagin : And I defy any Man to bring me any Reason , that is a good one , or Conclusive , but I will show him that it is equivalently a Syllogism ; and I will undertake to reduce it to that Form ; and manifest that it has all its Strength and Evidence from the same Principles which give a Syllogism to be clearly Conclusive . I know not what Authors Mr. Locke may have met with , who say we cannot Reason about particulars , or , that No Syllogistick Reasoning can be right and conclusive , but what has at least one General Proposition in it : I am sure I have shown the contrary in my Method . B. 3. L. 2. § 21. Indeed I show § 22. and § 24. that such Syllogisms are not Instrumental to Science , as are those which have one or more , Universal Premisses : For , all Science is of Inadequate or Abstracted Notions , which are Universal ones , and not Particulars ; for who can pretend to have Science of the whole Complexion of Accidents , which constitute any Particulars ? And , to let my Reader farther see , that the Knowledge of Particular Conclusions cannot reach Science , I desire him to reflect , that if a Physician knew onely that this Particular Individual Herb is good for such a Disease , and not that all of that Sort or Kind is so , he could not pretend to have Science of the Nature of Herbs ; or , if a Mathematician knew onely that this Individual Triangle , which he is describing in Paper , has three Angles equal to two Right ones , but knew not that any other , or all , had so , none would much praise him for his Science in Mathematicks . The so much neglected and abus'd Aristotle , who had too much , and too well-grounded Sense to be rightly understood by those who did not much regard Grounds , nor the Highest Causes of Things , told us that Singularia non perficiunt Intellectum ; the Knowledge of Singulars does not perfect the Understanding . Since then Science is a Perfection of our Soul , it must be employ'd about the understanding Universals : Plain Reason abetting his saying , as I have shown Ibid. § 22.

7. I cannot let this Chapter pass , without reflecting particularly on Mr. L's saying , that Inferences or Consequences Inferences and Consequences of Words , abstracting from their Sense , is strangely against all Reason , and Preposterous . in Words , are a great part of Reason , tho' the Agreement , or Disagreement of Ideas be the Principal . Now , it is evident by those expressions that he speaks of Words Abstractedly or Contradistinctly , from the Ideas signify'd by them ; that is , from their Sense ; taking Words in which sense they are no more but meer Sounds . Whence I see not but Black-smiths striking orderly and regularly upon their Anvil , may make as good Consequences , as those he speaks of , and puts them to be a great part of our Reason . I have observ'd that this Acute Author fancies Unintelligible Mysteries in the Annexing Words to his Ideas ; Nay , ( as appears here ) in Words taken without Ideas , or the Sense of them ; that is in Senseless Sounds or Characters . Whereas my weak Speculation , tho' I bend my sight never so strongly , cannot discern any Annexion other than this , that Men have agreed that such Words , shall signify such and such Things or Notions ; all other Annexion being Unaccountable . Nor , can I see how in such sayings as this , Mr. Locke does ( as Philosophers ought ) guide himself by the Natures of the Things in hand , viz. Words , and Reason . For Words , abstracted from his Ideas . which he puts to be signify'd by them , are meer Articulate Sounds , and out of the Mind ; whereas Reason and all its Acts ▪ are compleated in the Mind , and Sense . How then the Consequence of Words ( thus understood ) should be a great part of Reason which is Sense ; or what Reason , which is an Internal and Spiritual Power , has to do with those External and Material Sounds or Motions of the Ayr , more than to know their Signification , and to take care they be not Ambiguous , quite surpasses my Understanding . The Complexion of Ideas , he speaks of , which the Words are to signify , is confessedly made first by the Understanding ; and , the Memory can retain our Notions as well , or better than it can Sounds ; and tho' such Sounds , thro' the use of the Words are apt to re-excite the Memory , yet all this amounts to no more but their Aptness , thro' use , to signify our Notions , let them be what they will : Which is plain Sense and easily Understood ; Whereas the Consequence of Sounds , Abstracted from our Notions , is very Amusing , and utterly Unintelligible .

8. The 18th Chapter [ Of Faith and Reason , and their distinct Provinces ] is admirably Clear , and in great part very What is due to Reason , what to Divine Revelation . solid . I grant no new Simple Ideas , that are proper ones , can he Convey'd by Traditional Revelation . The Author of Nature gave us our Natural Notions ; and the Author of Grace , ( who is the same Person , ) brought no unheard-of Objects of our Senses to increase the Stock , already sufficient for all our Knowledge ; yet , if the Points thus convey'd are Spiritual ones , as most points of the Revealed Faith are , there will be convey'd new Metaphorical Notions , translated from our Natural ones which are Proper . I grant too , that Revelation cannot be admitted against clear Evidence of Reason . I wish , that instead of the word [ Revelation ] he had rather said [ Pretence of Revelation ] for , otherwise , some Readers may hap to take his words in a Dis-edifying sense ; as if it were a possible Case , that Revelation it self may be supposed to be opposit to Clear Evidence of Reason ; and ( which is worse , ) in case they hap to contract , must truckle and submit to it . My Judgment in the Point is this , that supposing the Revelation is grounded on the Means laid by God to assure us he has Reveal'd such and such Points , ( which therefore cannot but be Certain to us , or Evident , at least to those who are Guides to others ) the Case imply'd here is impossible ; because it is impossible that God , who gave us our Nature , should ( as Mr. L. well expresses it ) will us to admit any thing for true , in a direct Contradiction to the Clear Evidence of our Understanding . I add , not to admit it as True , if the Motives be but Probable , or ( which is the same ) if the Thing may be False . What I am here to note , is that , Two Cautions are necessary in this occasion . The one , that since God does nothing The First Caution to be observ'd , in order to this Point . needlessly , therefore the Points Reveal'd by God are such as Humane Reason could not other ways attain to ; whence they being such as those Mr. Locke holds to be above Reason , hence they must oft look very oddly to those Low Conceptions which the Course of Nature affords us : Whereas the Motives laid by God for Mankind , to embrace Christian Faith , do , for that very regard , lie level to our Natural Reason . Wherefore , in our Enquiry what we are to embrace , what not ; we ought not to begin our quest , by scanning the Points propos'd to us as Reveal'd ; but , by examining whether the Motives to judge they are Reveal'd , be Certain or no. Otherwise , we shall Neglect to employ our Reason , in such Things as are suitable to her Capacity , and in which she can have Evidence ; and task it to Consider what 's perhaps above her reach , and of which , consequently , she can have no Evidence ; which way of Proceeding is clearly Irrational . How many are there in the world who are reputed for Learned men , and yet have no Principles which are not taken from Fancy ? Let then such short Speculaters loose , to judge of the Verity of Points ( perhaps ) Incomprehensible to our Natural Reason , they will be apt to fancy twenty Contradictions in the Trinity , the Incarnation , a Virgins Conceiving , the Resurrection , and in many other main Points of Christian Faith : And , were it allowable for any to begin his Search after Truth on this preposterous manner , the Persons must be highly Qualify'd to decide what is a Contradiction , what not , ere their Sentiments can be thought to have any kind of weight . They must be excellent Logicians to know the force of a Consequence , and how many things go to make a Contradiction . They must be acute Metaphysicians to know all the many several Respects belonging to Things ; without which it will be hard to determin certainly what Notions are in all respects Contradictory , which not : And , if they be not thus Qualify'd , their Skill is Incompetent for such a Performance . Again , if the Point do concern the Nature of Body , they must be able to Comprehend the Nature of that Subject . And , in a word , unless they can demonstrate their own Opposit Tenet , plain Terms give it that they can never show the other side to be a Contradiction : For , since both sides of a Contradiction cannot be True , they must demonstrate their Tenet to be True , or they cannot demonstrate the other to be False and Contradictory ; for 't is one labour to do both .

9. The other necessary Caution is , that men do not take the Bad Explications of some weak Divines for the The second Caution to be used in this Point . Point of Faith it self . For , such men , as Mr. L. well notes , being very forward to stop the mouths of all Opponents by crying out such a Position is of Faith ; and , withall , having a high Opinion of their own Sentiments , and Miscall'd Authority ; are apt to fancy that all is of Faith which belongs to their own Explication of it , or seems to them Consequent from it , or Connected with it ; which is no better , in Effect , than to obtrude their own Skill in drawing Consequences upon Men for Divine Revelation . Now , if the Explicater be not truly Learned and Candid , then in stead of showing the Point of Faith , Conformable to Nature , as a Solid Divine ought ; he may hap to represent every Point of Faith so untowardly , that it may have Twenty Contradictions in it . 'T is therefore the Duty of every Ingenuous Man , to distinguish such Explications from the Point it self ; and not to pronounce too hastily of it , till it appears it cannot possibly bear any other Rational Explication , and such a one as is Agreeable and not Contradictory to the true Principles of Reason and Nature . Which I the rather Note , because I have observed that scarce any one point of Faith that is Controverted has escap'd this Misfortune ; nay more , that Metaphorical Expressions have often ( I may say , generally ) been mistaken for Literal ones : In a word , let but the Grounds for GOD's Revealing Christian Faith be held and shown Absolutely Certain ( and the Motives lay'd by GOD to that end , cannot but be such ) and the Divine Authority , thus Evidently Engaged , and closely Apply'd to our Mind , ought to subdue our Understanding to assent , notwithstanding our seeming-Rational Dissatisfactions . I say , Seeming ; For , to put the Grounds and Motives we have to know God revealed it to be thus Certain , and yet that there is Clear Evidence against the Point reveal'd , is to put a perfect Contradiction , or Impossibility . Which makes me something apprehensive that those Authors , who put such a Case ( however their meaning may be good and pious , and they see not the Consequence of it ) do deem that the Grounds we Christians have for GOD's Revealing our Faith , are not altogether Certain , but Probable onely ; which leaves all our Faith in a Possibility of being False for any thing any man living knows ; that is , of being perhaps not True .

10. Hence I think 't is but a very sleight deference to Divine Revelation to affirm , that in Matters where Reason Reason is not to be rely'd on in things beyond its Sphere . cannot judge , or but probably , Revelation is to be hearken'd to : But that in Matters where Reason can afford certain Knowledge , Reason is to be hearken'd to . For , tho' it were so that Reason can do this , yet Experience tells us that Reason does not actually , ( and this very often ) what it can do , or all that lies within the Compass of that power ; but that we may often presume we have certain Knowledge when we have none . Especially since of the two it is far more likely our Reason may discourse wrong of the Points that are Reveal'd , than of the Motives which God has lay'd for Mankind to know they are so ; the later being within its Sphere , the other oft-times not .

11. The 19th Chapter treats of Wrong Assent , or Errour . This Learned Author seems here not to speak constantly The Notion of [ is True , ] must be distinguish'd from the Notion of [ may be true , or may not be true . ] of the same Point . To Assent to any Proposition , is to say interiourly , [ It is True ; ] or , that the Thing is so as the Proposition exhibits it . Now , these Propositions may be of two Sorts : The one is express'd thus , [ The Thing is so , or is True : ] The other thus , [ The Thing is Probable . ] Hitherto , and in some places here , he speaks of the Former , or of Assenting to the Truth of the Thing ; or , of taking the Probable Proposition to be True : In other places here , he seems to speak of the Latter ; as , when , §. 6. he complains that Probable Doctrines are not always receiv'd with an Assent proportionable to the Reasons which are to be had for their Probability : Which clearly makes the Object of Assent to be the Probability of the Thing , or as it stands under such Motives as make it to a higher Degree Probable ; or , ( which is perfectly Equivalent , ) that Propositions to such a Degree Probable , are to be assented to , as to such a Degree Probable . Now , this is an Evident Proposition ; and the Assent to it , most Rational . For , since we call that Probable that stands under Probable Motives , it is as perfect a Truth , and as firmly to be assented to , as 't is to assent , that what 's Probable , is Probable ; or , what 's Probable to such a Degree , is Probable to such a Degree : Both which Propositions being evident , nay , the Terms of it as closely connected as they are in this Proposition , [ What is , is , ] we not onely may , but are forced to assent to them , as being both of them Self-evident . But , I much fear this is not Mr. Locke's meaning ; but , that he means , we must assent to a Thing as True , or that the Thing is , upon a Proof which , of its own peculiar Nature , and as it is distinguish'd from Evidence , is so far from Concluding it is , that it permits and allows it may not be , or be False . In which case , to assent , is both against Clearest Reason , and even ( as was shewn above ) against a First Principle of our Understanding .

12. What confirms me in this Apprehension , is , his making way to his ensuing Discourse with these Words ; Therefore , that no Assent ought to be built on Probable Mediums , is Demonstrable . [ If Assent be grounded on Likelihood , and if the Proper Object and Motive of our Assent be Probability , &c. ] Now , both those Hypothetical Ifs I must Categorically declare against ; and positively affirm and maintain , that Likely Motives can onely , in true Reason , make us assent the Thing is Likely ; and that Motives but Probable cannot , without highly wronging our Reason , cause us to assent the Thing is more than Probable : Lastly , That [ may be , or may not be , ] cannot be a good Argument that the Thing is . I affirm farther , that this Position of mine is clearly Demonstrable : For , all Motives or Proofs affecting the Conclusion , and our Assent to it , according to their Different Nature and Force ; therefore , as Evident Motives make the Thing Evident , so Likely Motives can onely prove the Thing to be Likely ; and Probable Motives can onely prove the Thing to be Probable ; and that , the Proof being the Cause of the Conclusion , and those Proofs being Proper , and adjusted to those respective Effects , 't is as perfect a Demonstration , drawn from the Proper Cause to its Proper Effect , that they can make the Conclusion no more than Probable ; and , consequently , our Assent to it ( if Rational ) no more than that it is onely Probable ; as it is that an Agent which is Hot but to such a Degree , can onely cause Heat to such a Degree ; and this is as Evident , as that no Cause can act beyond its Power to act , or can do what it cannot do ; which is an Identical Proposition , and Self-evident .

13. 'T is in vain then to start this Question , How Men come to give their Assent contrary to Probability , till this All Errour comes by Assenting upon Probability . Question be first satisfy'd , Why Men should assent at all upon meer Probability ? But , this being supposed without any Proof ; and , it being allow'd by me , that Men may assent contrary to Probability all the Ways he assigns , I am not to pursue that Point any farther , because it is quite besides my Aim ; which is , to concern my self onely with what promotes true Science ; with which , Probability , as being both Uncertain , and Inevident , has nothing at all to do , but to Injure it , ( if it meets with Rash Concluders , ) by Ill-grounded Assents . But , casting my Eye on the Title of this Chapter , which is , [ Of Wrong Assent , or Errour , ] I observe , that he has not so much as touch'd upon one main Cause of Errour , which has an unhappy Influence even upon some Wise and Good Men , and oft proves Prejudicial to their best Concerns ; I mean , the Assenting absolutely upon very high Probabilities ; or , ( as Mr. Locke expresses it , ) as firmly , as if they were infallibly demonstrated . We are , indeed , more often deceiv'd by Assenting on slight Probabilities ; but , we are far more grosly deceiv'd , when a very High , and very Likely Probability fails us : Whence , in such occasions , Men use to say , [ Who could ever have thought or imagin'd it ? ] or , [ I was never so abominably deceiv'd in my Life . ] I will explain my self by one Signal Instance , shewing how dangerous it is to yield up our Reason , by Assenting Absolutely upon very Great Likelihoods , and even the Highest Probabilities . Which Discourse may , I hope , edifie some , and thence convince others , that such an Assent is Irrational .

14. A Man who is at this Instant in perfect Health , is apt to assent absolutely , that he shall not die suddenly of The Tenet , that we ought to Assent upon Probability , is highly prejudicial to Piety , and to best Christian Morality . an Apoplexy before Morning ; that a Tile shall not fall from a House , and kill him when he walks the Streets ; that his House shall not fall on his Head , and crush him ; that a Drunken or Quarrelsom Ruffian shall not , without Provocation , run him thorow ; that a Bit of Meat , a Crum , or a Bone , shall not choak him ; or any such sudden Disaster befall him that Day ; and 't is very highly Probable they will not . Now , the greatest Concern we can have in this World , is , to die well prepared for the other . Put case then , a Man of a Loose Life , ( such Men being most apt to presume , and lull themselves in a blind Security , ) assents firmly and absolutely , upon such a high Probability that he shall not be taken off suddenly , but shall have Time to die Penitent , haps to be surpriz'd by some such unlucky Accident , without having any Leisure to repent ; the case of his Soul is very desperate . Now , 't is evident , that that this Eternal Loss of Happiness lights to such Men thro' their acting contrary to their Reason ; and their Assenting , and Relying firmly upon the Frail Assurance of a Probability : For , had they used their Reason right , it would have naturally suggested to them these Thoughts : I can see no Bottom nor Foundation for Assenting so fully that I shall not die very shortly , or suddenly . How many Men , who thought themselves as secure as I do now , have , notwithstanding , been taken away in an Instant ! Every Man living is liable to these , and a Thousand other Unforeknowable Mischances : Nor have I any kind of Privilege above others ; nor know I any reason why those Sinister Chances that happen'd to other Men , may not as well be my Lot . This plain and obvious Discourse , join'd with the Infinite Concern of the Thing , might have conduced to make those carelesly secure Men rectifie their Wanderings , and endeavour to keep a good Conscience , lest they should be suddenly Arrested by Death , with their Debts uncancell'd : Which good Thoughts and Motives they had wanted , had they assented upon a high Probability that they should not die suddenly , as firmly as tho' the Thing were infallibly demonstrated . This Infallible and Irrational Security , I say , would , in all likelihood , have made such weak Souls run on in Sin , defer the Amendments of their Lives , and put it off with a dangerous presuming on Death-bed Repentance . Hence I infer two Things ; one , that our Position , that we ought not to assent upon a high Probability , but to retain some Degree of Suspence , is a Great and very Important Truth , since it has so great an Influence ( not to speak of our many other Concerns ) upon the best and most Important Part of Christian Morality . Errour does not use to be so favourable to Goodness and Piety , no more than Ignorance is the Mother of Devotion ; whereas Truth reduced to Practice , is ever the Genuin Parent of Virtue . The other , that to Judge or Assent without Knowledge , springs from our Weakness , or else from Passion ; and that Judgment taken in this Sense , is not ( as Mr. Locke affirms ) the Gift of God .

15. He proceeds to the Reasons why Men take wrong measures of Probability , and so come to assent wrong or Err. To apply our selves to the Right Method to find out Truth and Science is the onely Antidote against Errour . But , it appears evidently from what 's said , or rather indeed , it is evident out of the very Terms , that all Errour or Wrong Assent , does onely Spring from Assenting at all upon Probable Motives . For , did they Assent onely upon Evidence , it is Impossible they should ever erre ; since Evidence for an Errour is in it self impossible . Or , did they suspend their Assent , or not Assent when the Thing is but Probable , 't is again impossible they should Err ; for , it is impossible they should Err , or Assent wrong , when they do not Assent at all . Whence follows , that ( excepting Invincible Ignorance , which concerns not our Point in hand ) all Wrong Assent , or Errour , springs from our Assenting upon Probability . The Reasons he assigns , why Men take wrong Measures of Probabilities , serve better to shew why Men do not assent upon Evidence ; viz. Doubtful and False Principles , Receiv'd Hypotheses , Predominant Passions , and Authority ; by which last , I suppose , he means , such Authority as may deceive us . All these are so many Remora's to the Advancement of Science , and Motes in our Intellectual Eye , hindring it from seeing Evident Truth . Yet , none of them , but has some kind of Probability , ( as the World goes ; ) or , at least , will furnish Men with probable Arguments : For , a very slight Thing serves to make a Thing Probable . So that the Upshot is , that the Chief , and most Effectual Way for Men to avoid Wrong Assents , or Errours , is to instruct them in the Way how to conclude evidently ; which is the sole End and Aim of my Method to Science ; and , particularly , of that part of it which treats of the Self-evident Conclusiveness of Syllogisms , in which no Man can possibly be deceiv'd . For , this shews , that the Inference or Consequence of the Conclusion , when the Medium is Proper , is as Certain as Self-Evidence can make it ; and , that Common Mediums , ( such as all Probable ones are , ) can never Conclude ; and , therefore , such Conclusions cannot be assented to , or held True , without wronging our Reason . Whence follows , that the Way to avoid Wrong Assent , is , to exclude Probability from having any Title at all to our Assent ; it being highly and manifestly Irrational for any to judge , a Proposition not at all Demonstrated or shewn to be True , should be assented to as firmly as if it were infallibly demonstrated : For , this is directly to judge a Thing to be such as it is not ; which is a manifest Errour , or Untruth . Nor , matters it what most People do out of Weakness : Man's true Nature , which is Rational , is to be rated according to the Conformity we ought to conceive it had from the Idea of it in the Divine Understanding , its true Essence ; where none can doubt but it was Perfect , till it came to be slubber'd and sully'd by the tampering of Second Causes , and their Never-uniform Circumstances . The Natural Perfection , then , of a Rational Creature being to arrive certainly , or without missing , at Knowledge and Truth , which cannot be had without Evidence ; hence , 't is his true Nature to be guided in his Way to acquire those Interiour Perfections of his Mind , onely by Evidence ; without which , he is liable to fall , every Step he takes , into the Precipice of Errour . Nay , 't is so clear a Truth , that Man 's true Nature is onely to be guided in his Interiour Assents by Evidence ; that , even in our Outward Actions , which do not directly concern the perfecting our Soul , and in which we can have no Evidence of their Success , or of the Good they will certainly do us ; yet , still we must ( unless we will incurr the Note of Folly ) have Evidence that it is better to act , or better to venture ; otherwise , we shall clearly act with some Precipitancy , and against our true Nature , Reason .

16. Besides , it is extream hard to take Right Measures of Probability . Every Measure is a Certain Standard ; No possible Way , or Certain Standard , to take the Just Measures of Probabilities . whereas , Probabilities are not capable of any ; but , like desultory Ignes-fatui , whiffle now to this side , now to that ; doubling , and re-doubling ; so that none can take their just Dimension , or Proportion . They vary every Day , oft-times every Hour ; and , what 's more Probable , this Minute , may , by some new Circumstance lately come to our Knowledge , become less Probable ; the next , perhaps , Improbable . Even the Highest Probabilities are not exempt from this Frailty , and Fickleness . I may think my House will certainly stand ; nor do I see any Reason to make the least Doubt of it : A prudent Neighbour , whom I take to be more Judicious than my self in such Things , spies a Flaw , or Crack , near the Foundation , which he thinks weakens it ; which makes it now Improbable it will stand , and Probable it will fall . Hereupon , I send for an expert Master-Builder , who has ten times the Skill of the other ; and he assures me , that late Formidable Crack is nothing at all to the Firmness of the Foundation , and therefore it will certainly stand : Which said , the Motive shifts Faces again , and it becomes very Probable it will not fall . Amongst School-men , some hold , that the Opinion of Three Doctors makes a Point Probable ; some think , the Opinion of Two is sufficient ; some say , One , who has maturely weigh'd the Point , will serve ; and , in the mean time , perhaps it is scarce Probable , at most but Probable , that any of these say True . But then , these Later say , that it is certain that what Seven Learned Men agree in , is Probable : Let then these Seven Learned Men agree that what some One very Learned Man , whom they nominate , says , makes the Thing Probable ; that One Man has the Virtue of all the Seven center'd in him ; and , therefore , that one single Learned Man's Opinion makes it Probable enough in all Conscience . Where then shall we fix the Bounds , or whence take any Certain Measures of Greater and Lesser Probabilities ? Whoever peruses , and considers well the several Sorts of Probable Motives , enumerated in my Method , B. 3. L. 2. §. 10. and by Mr. Locke here , in his 15th and 16th Chapters , will see , ( tho' we have not reckon'd up half of them , ) by reflecting on their Variety , and their Crossness to one another , ( abating the several Degrees of each , ) how insuperable a Task it is to settle any fix'd Limits by which we can be constantly assur'd , which sort of Probability is Greater , or Lesser . 'T is a Thousand times easier to establish absolutely certain Rules of Demonstration , were Men but as zealous to pursue Truth , as they love to talk at random ; either because they think that Noblest Quest not worth their Pains ; or , perhaps , because Palliated Scepticks inveigle them into a Conceit , that Science is unattainable . To obviate which Calumny , has , these Fifty Years , been the Butt of my Endeavours .

17. As for Authority , this one Maxim , pursu'd home , secures us from being deceiv'd by relying on it ; viz. [ No The Certain Rule , not to be mis-led by Authority . Authority deserves Assent , farther than Reason gives it to deserve . ] So that all the Certainty of Authority is to be refunded into Intrinsecal Arguments , taken from the Nature of Mankind , the Attesters ; and the Nature ( I mean , the Notoreity and Concern ) of the Things attested ; and , thence ascertaining the Attesters Knowledge , and Veracity : Which , if they can be demonstrated , or put beyond Probability , ( for , till then , none who are able to raise Doubts , and see the Medium is Inconclusive , can be bound in Reason to assent upon any Testimony , ) even the Wisest Men may rationally Assent to what they attest ; otherwise , not ; tho' weaker Arguments ( as I hinted above ) may suffice for the Vulgar , and for our Outward Actions .

18. To close my Reflexions on this Chapter , I am apt to think that this Learned Author is here drawn aside from Mr. Locke seems to take some Things for onely Probable , which ( or the Authority for them ) are Demonstrable . using his Excellent Reason to his best Advantage , by apprehending some Things to be onely Probable , which ( or the Certainty of the Authority for them ) are perfectly Demonstrable ; as , in particular , that of the Existence of Julius Caesar. The same I judge of these , viz. That Alexander the Great conquer'd Asia ; that there are such Cities as Rome , or Paris ; that the same Chances cannot light often upon a Hundred Dice ; that I shall not think over again , in order , the same Thoughts next Year , as I did this ; and a Thousand such like . Which , perhaps , many will take to be but highly Probable ; whereas I , upon good Reason , cannot but judge they are all of them Demonstrable . But I am weary , and hasten to an End .

19. The last Chapter bears for its Title , [ Of the Division of Sciences . ] The two First General Branches of this Division The Members of Mr. Locke's Division of Sciences are partly Co-incident , partly not belonging to Science at all . are , in my opinion , Co-incident ; as will be seen hereafter . However , the Learned World is much oblig'd to the Author , for putting Ethicks to be capable of Demonstration , and a true Science . But , as to his Third Branch , which he calls 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 , or the Doctrine of Signs , I must confess , I do not well know what to make of it : For , to make the Doctrine of Words to be a Science , or part of Philosophy , is to make Philosophy Wordish . He defin'd Philosophy , in his Preface , to be The Knowledge of Things ; and here he seems to make the Knowledge of Words a part of Science , or Philosophy , taken distinctly from the Knowledge of Things ; which is his First Branch . All Science is Connected Sense , and both Sense and Science are in our Minds . The Common Agreement of Men gives Words to be Signs ; Common Usage shews this Agreement ; Grammar helps them with Congruity ; Critick gathers from Authors , or Derivations , the Genuine Signification of such Words as are not so much worn by Common Use , but mostly used by the Learned : For , when they are thus Common , Critick is Useless . Logick , which is to direct our Reason , and define our Notions , so to keep our Thoughts or Discourses steady , takes care they be not Ambiguous ; or , if they be , gives Rules to detect their Double Sense , lest the Ill-understood Signs lead us astray from the Point . But , all begins and ends in this , that we be sure our Words do signifie our Notions , rightly , and sincerely . Sometimes we have Simple Notions ; and then we use such Words as signifie them : Sometimes we join many Simpler Notions in a Complex one ; and then we make use of such a Word as signifies that Complex Idea , or Notion : Sometimes we connect divers Notions affirmatively , and frame Judgments , or Mental Propositions ; and then , Verbal Propositions signifie that Verbum Mentis , or Interiour Saying . We may fancy that Words do ty together many Simple Ideas in a Complex one ; ( for , there is nothing which Men of Wit , by much bending their Thoughts , cannot fancy ; ) but 't is We who ty our Notions together in our Mind ; nor can meer Articulate Sounds any more Connect Simple Ideas , than they can connect or identifie our Notions which are the Terms of a Proposition : nor can they do this , any more than they can frame a Judgment ; that is , Judge , or Know . We may fancy too , that they record our Thoughts , which otherwise would be lost : 'T is true , that after we have agreed such Words should signifie such Things in our Mind , they have an order to one another , and do ordinarily come together into our Thoughts ; and so the Word infers the Thing ; but so does the Thing infer the Word too , to which we , by our Agreement of its Signification , do relate it ; and , of the two , the Word is sooner lost out of the Memory , and more needs a Recorder , than the Notion does ; especially , when our Memory is of Connected Sense . How often do we remember very well the Sense of an Author we have read , and yet cannot at all call to mind his Words ! My self , when I was young , had Words , and great Variety of them , at my Tongue 's End ; my Expression was Copious , and Florid , and now I am old and past my Autumn , my stile is dry ; and the Flowers and Leaves fall off , when the Fruit is ripe ; and tho' I still retain and increase my stock of Thoughts , I have lost that Multiplicity and Choice of Words I had formerly . But , I must complain that it is a great Injury to that Excellent and most Useful Science , [ Logick ] which treats of the Operations of our Understanding , and of the way how to manage them , to make it nothing but the Doctrine of Signes , or Words ; and to pretend it has its Name thence . As if 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 did not signify Ratio , and Uerbum mentis , as properly as it does Vox ; and 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 far more often [ Rationalis , ] than it does Sermone utens . But , above all , I am sure , 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 is never found to signify the Art or Doctrine of Words , but the Art of Discoursing or Reasoning .

20. I cannot but think that the Subordination of Sciences , is as Useful and Necessary to be known , as their Division or The Connatural way how Sciences are to be Divided , and Subordinated . Distinction , in Philosophy ; they being the Exact Knowledge of Things , taking this last word in its largest sense , as it Comprehends Rem and Modum rei . Also every Notion being the Thing inadequately conceiv'd , and having a kind of Distinct Nature peculiar to it self in our Minds ; and all Sciences ( they being Distinct and not Confused Knowledges , ) having , consequently , for their Object , the Thing as thus Distinctly or Inadequately consider'd , ( by which Objects they are Specify'd and Distinguisht ; ) it follows , that there may be as many Sciences as we have such Distinct Notions of the Thing ; and that each of them is got by looking more penetratively into those Distinct Natures in our Mind , or Distinct Notions : Science being in reality nothing but Descants ( as it were ) on those Notions , and grounded entirely on their Metaphysical Verity . Whence follows likewise that the Subordination of Sciences is grounded on this , that those Notions ( their Objects ) are Subordinate ; or that one of them is more Universal or General , others more Particular . To instance ; The Highest Science in the Line of that General Notion we call Substance , is that which treats of the Supreme Genus , or of Ens as Ens , and of what belongs to it as such ; and this we call Metaphysicks or Trans-natural Knowledge . The imediate Notion under Ens is Corpus ; and this is the Object of Natural Philosophy , or Physicks . Next under That is Vivens ; which ( as its Object ) Constitutes the Science or Knowledge of Living Things , and what belongs to them as such . Under that is Animal , which is the Object of the Science that treats of Sensitive Things , as they are Sensitive , and of what appertains to them , as they are such . The Lowest of our Notions in that Line , which are in any degree Common or General , is that of Homo ; which treats of Humane Nature , of its Operations proper to Man , as Man ; and Chiefly of his Primary Operation Reasoning ; and then , the Science which shows how to order those Operations right that belong to his Understanding , is Logick ; as that Science which shows how to order those Operations right that belong to his Will , is call'd Ethicks . Lower than this , Science proceeds not ; Individuals , by reason of the Complexion of Innumerable Accidents that Constitutes them , not being knowable to us , as such , so as to give us Exact Knowledge of their Singularities .

Corollary I. From what 's said it appears ; that Mr. Locke's two First Branches fall into one . For his First Some very Useful Corollaries concerning that Subject . Branch being [ The Knowledge of Things as they are in their own proper Beings , their Constitutions , Properties and Operations ] and his second , viz. Ethicks , having for its Object the Operations of Mans Will ; and Logick , the Operations of his Understanding , which proceed from him as Man , ( all Outward Actions that proceed not from his Interiour Knowledge and Will , being meerly Animal ; ) it follows that Ethicks , which is his Second Branch , is coincident with his First . For Man is a Thing , and has a Proper Being of his own , and his Understanding and Will are his Properties ; and their Operations are his Operations .

Corollary II. Each of the Subordinant Sciences deduces Conclusions about its Proper Object : Which , tho' Conclusions there , are the Principles to the immediately Inferiour or Subordinate Science : so that none can know exactly what Homo is , who is such an Animal , if he be Ignorant what Animal is ; Nor what Animal , which is such a Living Body , is , if he knows not what Living Body is : Nor what Living Body , which is such a Body , is , if he knows not what Body is ; Nor , what Body , which is such an Ens , is , if he knows not what Ens or Thing is .

Corollaay III. Hence is seen evidently , how Necessary , and according to Nature it is , that those Notions which are most Universal , should be most knowable or Clear ; in regard the Inferiour ones cannot be known but by them ; and that being most Clear , they must ( as was often shown above ) be also most Simple .

Corollary , IV. Hence is seen also how all Sciences conversant about our Gradual Notions in the Line of Substance ( and the same holds in all the other Lines ) come to be connaturally Subordinate to those which have a Superiour Notion for their Object ; and how Perfect Knowledge or Skill in the Inferiour Science , is Unattainable without Knowledge or Skill in the Superiour .

Corollary V. Hence is demonstrated , that Metaphysicks is absolutely the Highest Science ; and that , without Knowledge or Skill in it , none can perfectly understand the Inferiour Sciences , so as to resolve them into their First , and most Evident Principles .

Corollary VI. And , since the Greater Clearness of that Notion , which is the Object of any Science , gives a greater Clearness and Evidence to the Science it self ; and the Greater Clearness of any Notion arises from its being more Simple ; and the more General they are , the more Simple they are ; and the Notion of Ens is Evidently more General than all the rest : It follows demonstratively that the Science of Metaphysicks , which treats of Ens as Ens , is the most Clear of any others ; and , in the Highest Degree , Evident ; and that they who think otherwise do guide themselves by Fancy , to which such very Abstract Notions are Unsuitable .

Corollary VII . And , since Evidence determins our Understanding to Assent , and therefore Certainty which is the Determination of our Judging Power , follows Evidence as its Proper Cause ; it follows , that , as no Inferiour Science can be Evident without Knowledge in Metaphysicks , so neither can our Knowledge of any of them be perfectly , ( or in the Highest Degree , ) Certain , but by virtue of It , or of such Maxims , or First Principles , as belong to It.

Corollary , VIII . The same Discourse that is made here of Objects found in the Line of Ens , and their proper Sciences ; may be made and have Equal force in the Objects belonging to all the Lines of Accidents , and the Sciences Proper to them .

Corollary last . Hence the Doctrine of Words is no part of Philosophy , taking them as aparted from our Notions ; because it has neither for its Object , Rem nor Modum rei ; nor any thing found in Nature , or Belonging to it ; since Words are meerly Signes , appointed by our Voluntary Designation , to assist us in Communicating our Conceptions to others , which can be no part of the Knowledge of Things or true Philosophy ; Words being neither Simple nor Complex , Adequate or Inadequate Notions , nor in any Manner taken from the Things themselves .

FINIS .

THE CONTENTS . Preliminary First . § 1. INtroduction . § 2. The Using the word [ Idea ] in disparate Senses obstructs the way to Science . 3. Philosophical Words generally used , not to be laid aside without great Necessity ; much less changed for Others less proper . 4. Mr. L.'s Acception of the word [ Idea ] very Ambiguous . 5. The Ambiguity of it not clear'd by him . 7. The putting Brutes to have Knowledge associates them with Mankind . 8. The First Consideration pre-requir'd , ere we ought to think that Brutes know . 9. The Second Consideration pre-requir'd . 10. That our selves both asleep and awake , do , without Knowledg , perform as strange Operations as Brutes do . 11. The Resemblance of Reason in some Actions of Brutes , no Argument of their Knowledge . 12. Brutes have Phantasms , but no Notions or Meanings . § 13. Ideas , if not Spiritual Notions , Inexplicable . 14. Experience that we have Ideas gives no Distinct Account what they are . Nor the saying , they are Resemblances . 15. To have Ideas of our own Ideas inexplicable . 16. No Operation , External or Internal , begins from the Soul alone . 17. Mr. L. not only , nor directly oppos'd by this Discourse . 18. To ground all Knowledge on Ideas not distinguish'd from Phantasms , makes Science Impossible . Preliminary Second . § 1. THat the Elements or Materials of our Knowledge are properly to be called NOTIONS . 2. The word Notion and Cognition are taken here objectively . 3. What Notions are . 4. Fancy is to have no hand in discoursing about Spiritual Conceptions . 5. The Question about Notions stated . 6. A Notion is the Thing it self in our Understanding . Proof 1. Because Knowing is an Immanent Act. 7. Proof 2. Because the Thing known must be in our Knowing Power . 8. Proof 3. Because a Resemblance is not the Object of our Knowledge , nor sufficient to cause it . 9. Otherwise Ideas only could be said to be Known . 10. Proof 4. Because otherwise all Philosophy would be destroy'd . 11. Proof 5. Because Similitudes cannot possibly give us the First Knowledge of Things . § 12. As was prov'd formerly . 13. Proof 6. Because ere we can know the Idea resembles the Thing right , both of them must be in the Mind , to be there compar'd . 14. Proof 7. Because both the Correlates must be in the Understanding . Proof 8. Because the Prototype must be first known . 15. Proof 9. Because the Notions are what 's meant by Words . 16. Proof 10. Because , when the Thing it self is intended to be made known , the Thing it self is the First Meaning , or what 's first meant by the words . 17. Proof 11. Because the Ideas cannot be foreknown to our Agreement what the Words are to signifie , but the Things only . Hence the Question , whether the Things or our Notions , are immediately signified by Words , is frivolous . 18. Proof 12. From the Verification of Propositions . 19. Proof 13. Because what 's perfectly Like is the Same . 20. Proof 14. This last Reason maintain'd by the Instance of the Notion of Existence . 21. Proof 15. The same Reason abetted by the Natural Sayings of Mankind . 22. The Difference in the Manner of Existing prejudices not the Identity of the Notion and the Thing . 23. The Eminency of the Spiritual Nature of the Soul gives her a Power to be all Things Intellectually . § 24. Shewn that Things may have two Different Manners of Existing . 25. No Solid Philosophy can be built on Ideas . 26. What Knowledge is . Preliminary Third . § 1. AN Objection against the Possibility of the Whole Thing being in our Mind . 2. Some Notes premis'd to clear this Objection . 3. Our Knowledge is such as our Notions are . 4. We can have such a Notion of a Thing ( or Essence ) as distinguishes it from all other Things . 5. Confused Notions suffice for a Remote Ground of Science . 6. Only Distinct or Abstracted Notions are the Immediate Ground of Distinct Knowledge , or Science . 7. Science thus grounded , is truly called the Knowledge of the Thing . 8. Abstracted Ideas , tho' Exclusive of one another , do Include or connotate the Thing . 9. This Point farther explicated and enforc'd . 10. Arg. 1. Prov'd , because Abstracted Notions , if Essential , do evidently include the Thing . 11. Arg. 2. Prov'd , because all Modes do the same . 12. Arg. 3. As having no Being of their own . 13. This makes , or shews Philosophy to be the Knowledge of Things . 14. Hence Aristotle expresses the Modes or Accidents by Concrete Words . This Point elucidated by Abstract and Concrete Words . 15. Hence Space without Body , or Vacuum , is a Contradiction . Preliminary Fourth . § 1. The State of the Question . 2. Aristotle neglects to shew particularly how Knowledge is made . 3. Later Philosophers were at a great Puzzle about it . 4. How the Schools explicated this Point . 5. How the Ideists behaved themselves as to this Point . 6. How far the Author engages to clear this Difficulty . 7. The First Cause carries on the Course of Second Causes by Immediate Dispositions . 8. And , therefore , he affists Nature , if dispos'd , when it cannot reach . 9. Therefore , if the Matter can be dispos'd for a Rational Soul , God will give it . 10. There can be such a Disposition in Matter . 11. Therefore , some Material Part , by which immediately the Soul has Notions from the Objects . 12. Therefore Effluviums are sent from Bodies to that Part. 13. Therefore Man is truly One Thing , which is Corporeo-Spiritual . 14. Therefore some Chief Part in him which is primarily Corporeo-Spiritual , or has both those Natures in it . 15. Which is affected according to both those Natures , because of their Identification in that part . 16. The peculiar Temper of that Part consists in Indifferency . 17. That Part very tender and Sensible , yet not Tenacious . § 18. That Part the most Noble of all Material Nature . 19. Perhaps 't is Reflexive of Light , or Lucid. 20. The Effluviums have in them the Nature of the Bodies whence they are sent . 21. They affect that Part , as Things Distinct from the Man . 22. Why they Imprint Abstract Notions . 23. The peculiar Nature of our Soul renders those Notions perfectly Distinct , and Indivisible . 24. Whence Complex Notions come . 25. The Soul cannot , alone , produce any new Act in her self ; 26. But by the Phantasms exciting her a-new . 27. How Reminiscence is made . 28. Memory and Reminiscence Inexplicable , unless Phantasms remain in the Brain . The Manner how Reminiscence is made in Brutes . 29. How Reflexion is connaturally made . 30. Direct Notions are Common to all Mankind , and their Words Proper ; Reflex ones , Improper ; and their Words Metaphorical . 31. Whence we come to have Negative Notions . 32. But those Negative Notions do not abstract from the Subject . 33. How we come to have a Notion of [ Nothing . ] 34. Hence great Care to be had , lest we take Non-Entities , or Nothings , for Things . 35. Logical Notions are Real ones . 36. The Test to try Artificial Notions . Hence all Philosophy is Real Knowledge . 37. How our Soul comes to have Phantastick Notions , or ( as we call them ) Fancies . How to avoid being deluded by them . 38. How we may discourse evidently of those Natures of which we have no Proper Notions . § 39. We can have no Proper Notion of God 's Essence . 40. The Author speaks not here of Comparing Notions , or of Judgments . 41. The Author's Apology for this Discourse ; and , what can be the onely Way to go about to confute it . Preliminary Fifth . § 1. THE Design of the Author here . § 2. The Meaning of the Word [ Existence . ] 3. The Extream Danger of Misconceiving it . 4. The Meaning of [ Ens , ] or [ Thing . ] 5. The Meaning of [ Entity , ] or [ Essence . ] 6. The Meaning of [ Matter ] and [ Form ; ] or , of [ Power ] and [ Act. ] 7. What is meant literally by the common Saying , that Matter and Form compound Body . 8. The Literal Meaning of Substantial or Essential Forms . The Reason why some Moderns oppose Substantial or Essential Forms . The Meaning of Metaphysical Composition and Divisibility . 9. What is the Principle of Individuation . 10. The Meaning of the Word [ Substance . ] The Word Improper . 11. That the Word [ Supporting , ] and [ Inhering , ] taken Metaphorically , may be allow'd ; and ought not to be Ridicul'd . 12. The Meaning of [ Suppositum , ] or [ Hypostasis . ] 13. The Meaning of [ Suppositality . ] 14. The Meaning of the Word [ Individuum . ] 15. The Meaning of [ Substantia Prima , ] and [ Substantia Secunda . ] 16. The Word [ Accidents ] is Improper . § 17. The Word [ Modes ] more Proper . 18. The Word [ Quantity ] is very Proper . 19. The Word [ Extension ] very Improper . 20. The Meaning of Divisibility , Impenetrability , Space , and Measurability . 21. A short Explication , what Quantity , Quality , and Relation are . 22. What Transcendents are . 23. The Five Sorts of Transcendents . 24. Great Care to be had , that Transcendent Words be not held Univocal . 25. What great Errours spring thence , shewn in the Univocal Acception of the Transcendent Word [ Compounded . ] 26. The Cartesians Unadvised in going ultra Crepidam . Reflexion First . § 1. THE Excellent Wit , and Unbyass'd Ingenuity of the Author of the Essay acknowledg'd . 2. 'T is probable he has taken a Prejudice against Metaphysicks . 3. The Incomparable Excellency of the Science of Metaphysicks , shewn from the Objects it treats of . 4. And from the Manner , by which it handles them . 5. The Knowledge of these High Objects Attainable by Natural Reason . 6. Mr. Locke's Tenet of no Innate Ideas , Solidly Grounded , and Unanswerable . Reflexion Second . § 1. IN what the Author agrees , and disagrees , with Mr. Locke . 2. We may have Notions , without perceiving we have them . § 3. We may think , without being Conscious that we think . 4. 'T is impossible to be Conscious , or know we know , without a new Act of Reflexion . 5. 'T is impossible to be Conscious of , or know , our present Reflex Act , but by a new Reflex one . Hence , we can never come to know our Last Reflexion . 6. 'T is utterly deny'd that Consciousness causes Individuation . The Unreasonableness of the Opinion , that Men do always think . Reflexion Third . § 1. NO Notion Simple , but that of [ Existence . ] The Order of our Notions is to be taken from Nature . 2. The word [ Solidity ] arbitrarily and abusively taken by Mr. Locke . 3. His Solidity not at all Essential to Body . 4. Space without Body , or Vacuum , is a meer Groundless Fancy . 5. The Contrary to that Tenet demonstrated . 6. Therefore 't is impossible there should be any True Experiment to prove a Vacuum . Reflexion Fourth . § 1. MR. Locke's First Chapter commendable . § 2. Privative Notions connotate the Subject . 3. Meer Motions made upon the Senses , Insufficient to give us Knowledge of the Objects . 4. Sensible Qualities are the same in the Objects , as in the Mind . § 5. The Pretence of God's Voluntary Annexing Improper Causes to Effects , is Unphilosophical . 6. The Power in the Object to cause Sensation and Knowledge , is improperly such . Reflexion Fifth . § 1. IDeas or Notions are not Actual Perceptions , but the Object perceiv'd , and durably remaining . It destroys the Nature of Memory , to make it consist in the Reviving Ideas . The Mind cannot revive Perceptions . 2. Ideas in the Fancy may fade ; but Notions are never blotted out of the Soul . Reflexion Sixth . § 1. IF Brutes can know , they may have General Notions , and Abstract and Compare too . 2. The Distinguishing our Notions guides our Reason and Judgment right . 3. All Complex Ideas or Notions must consist of Simpler ones , united in the Thing . 4. Otherwise , they are Groundless Fancies . 5. The Manner how all Complex Ideas or Notions are made , elaborately explain'd . 6. How the Doctrine of Cartesius , Mr. Locke , and J. S. differ , as to this Point . Reflection Seventh . § 1. EXtension , not well Explicated . Immensity , worse . 2. Place , well Explicated . 3. Body and Extension , not the same Notion . § 4. Space cannot be without Extension . 5. Extension and Space differ onely Formally , or in some nice respect . 6. The Common Explication of Extension defended . 7. Ens adequately divided into Body and Spirit . 8. Vacuum must either be Res , or Modus Rei ; otherwise , we can have no Notion of it . 9. The Extravagant Arguments for Vacuum refuted . 10. We can set Bounds to Space , Time , and to all Durations but God's . 11. Annihilation implies a Contradiction ; and is not an Act of Omnipotency , but of Impotency . 12. The Cartesians can hardly avoid Vacuum . 13. The having an Idea of Vacuum , distinct from that of Plenum , no Argument to prove it . Reflexion Eighth . § 1. THE plain Sense of the Vulgar gives us the true Notion of Time . 2. Duration is not Succession , but rather Opposite to it . 3. 'T is a strange Paradox to say , the Notion of Succession or Duration is to be taken from the Train of Ideas in our Mind . 4. Our not perceiving Duration when we Sleep , no Argument for it . 5. This Tenet is against Experience . 6. And , against the Nature of Things , and of Resemblances too . 7. One Motion , if Known and Regular , may , and must be a Measure to another . 8. There is no Shew of Reason , that the Equality of the Periods of Duration can possibly be taken from the Train of our Ideas . 9. This odd Tenet not positively asserted by Mr. Locke . Reflexion Ninth . § 1. IMaginary Time before the World , a meer Illusion of Fancy . 2. They who advance Tenets against Nature , must alter the Meaning of those Words that express our Natural Notions . 3. God's Immensity not Commensurate to an Infinitely Expanded Space . 4. We can have no Notion of a Vacuum , but a Fancy onely . 5. Scripture-Texts the worst sort of Arguments for Philosophers , unless they be most Plain , and Literally meant . 6. Onely Self-Existence , and what flows from that Notion , is peculiar to God . 7. Our Natural Notions assure us , that 't is meer Fancy to explicate God's Attributes by respect to Corporeal Natures . Reflexion Tenth . § 1. ENdless Addition of Numbers can never give us the Notion of Infinity . 2. How we come to have that Notion . 3. And with what Ease . 4. The Notion of [ Infinite ] is most perfectly Positive . 5. Duration easily conceivable without Succession . Reflexion Eleventh . § 1. THoughts are not to be called Sensations . § 2. Thinking is the Action , and not the Essence of the Soul . § 3. Mr. Locke's Position , that Things are Good or Evil onely in reference to Pleasure or Pain , is True and Solid . Reflexion Twelfth . § 1. THE due Commendation of Mr. Locke's Doctrine , in this Chapter of Power . 2. That some Spiritual Agent is the First Mover of Bodies . The Will cannot move our Bodies . 3. The Understanding and Will not Distinct Powers . 4. Man's Freedom , or Self-Determination , deduced from Principles . 5. The Difference between Men and Brutes , in their Determination to Action . 6. Man naturally pursues what is according to Reason , or Virtuous . Therefore his Nature has been perverted since his Creation . 7. Therefore Supernatural Motives are added , to strengthen Man's Weaken'd Nature , or Reason . 8. Supernatural Motives being the Stronger , would always prevail , were they duely apply'd to a Subject disposed . 9. Why the Understanding and Will must be the same Power Substantially . 10. How to Conquer in our Spiritual Warfare . 11. 'T is evident that Man Determins himself to Action : 12. Yet , as Pre-determin'd by God . 13. Determination to Virtuous Action does perfect , and not destroy Freedom . 14. Good , if evidently appearing such , does certainly Determin the Will . 15. How Wrong Judgments come . § 16. Sin generally springs from True , but Disproportionate Judgments . 17. Of Uneasiness ; and Mr. Locke's Discourse concerning it . 18. Good is the onely Determiner of the Will ; and not Uneasiness . 19. Prov'd from our Natural Defire of Happiness . 20. The Appearance of Good is of Greatest Weight ; but , in a manner , disregarded by Mr. Locke . 21. Putting this Appearance , his Reasons do not conclude . 22. Prov'd , because Ease is not the Perfection of a Soul . 23. The Truth of this Point stated . 24. Mr. Locke omits here the Idea of Power to be a Thing , tho' Nature suggests and forces it . Reflexion Thirteenth . § 1. OUR Mixture of our Notions is Regular ; Mr. Locke's , Irregular , and Disorderly . 2. Without knowing what Substance or Thing is , we cannot pretend to Philosophy . 3. All our Notions , and , amongst them , that of Substance , or Res , is taken from the Thing . 4. We cannot be Ignorant of the Notion of Substance , or Thing . 5. We know the more Inferiour Notions of Things less perfectly . And , Individual Essence , the least of all . 6. To gain a Distinct Notion of Substance , or Thing , we must consider it abstractedly from its Modes , singly Consider'd . 7. The Literal Truth , how Substance and its Accidents , or the Thing and its Modes , are exactly known . § 8. 'T is impossible not to know Extension , it being in a manner , Self-evident . 9. The Cohesion of Extended Parts is above Physical Proofs , and can onely be known by Metaphysicks . 10. Whence , 't is in vain to seek for Natural Efficient Causes for those Effects that depend on Formal Causes . 11. We may have Clear Knowledge of Spiritual Natures by Reflexion . 12. The Reason why , and the Manner how . Reflexion Fourteenth . § 1. THE Mind alone does not collect Notions , or compare them . 2. Verbal Relations come not from Defect in our Language , but for want of a Real Ground . 3. What Causality is , and what Grounds the Relations of Cause and Effect . 4. The Knowing the Principle of Individuation must antecede the Knowledge of Identity and Diversity . 5. What gives the Ground to specifie all Notions . 6. What gives the Ground to our Notions of the Individuum . 7. How Individual Men are constituted . 8. Existence cannot possibly be the Principle of Individuation . 9. The Outward Circumstances of Time and Place cannot conduce to constitute the Individual Essence . 10. An Individual Man is formally an Individual Thing of that Kind , and an Individual Person too . § 11. The Essence of Things not to be taken from the Judgment of the Vulgar , nor from Extravagant Suppositions . 12. Consciousness cannot constitute Personal Identity . 13. That Consciousness is Inseparable from every Individual Man . 14. Yet Angels , who are pure Acts , are Constituted in part , by the Act of Knowing themselves . 15. No Soul is Indifferent to any Matter . The Notion of the Individuum is Essential . The Substance is the same , tho' some Quantity of the Matter does come and go . Reflexion Fifteenth . § 1. THat is onely True Virtue , which is according to Right Reason . 2. How we come to have Confus'd Ideas , or Notions . 3. The Whole Thing , as it needs not , so it cannot be known clearly . 4. The Metaphysical Reason why this Complexion of Accidents , which constitutes Individuums , should be almost infinitely Various . 5. We can Sufficiently know Things without Comprehending fully this Complexion . 6. No Formal Truth or Falshood in Ideas or Notions . Reflexion Sixteenth . § 1. WHence Proper and Metaphorical Notions and Words have their Origin . 2. The General Rules to know the Right Sense of Words . § 3. Words of Art most liable to be mistaken . 4. The Way how to avoid being mistahen in Words of Art . 5. Even in Terms of Art , the Thing is chiefly signify'd . 6. Metaphysical Words not Unintelligible , but most Clear . 7. This Third Book concerning Words seems Unnecessary . 8. Whence J. S. is not much concern'd to reflect on it . 9. Nature teaches us to define by a Genus , and a Difference . 10. Those who oppose this Method , must be forced to use it . 11. The Mind does not frame Universal Notions designedly ; but is forced to it by Nature . 12. Nominal Essences Groundless and Catachrestical . 13. Aristotle's Definition of Motion defended . 14. Aristotle's Definition of Light most Proper . 15. The Cartesian Definition of Motion Faulty . 16. Individuums under the same Species differ Essentially . 17. Whence we must take our Measures of Simple and Compound Notions . 18. The same Rule holds in Accidents as well as in Substance . 19. The Idea or Notion can never be in Fault when we Name Things wrong . 20. Confused Notions may have more Distinct ones annex'd to their Subject . 21. Coofused Notions do not exclude but include those Distinct ones which are yet Undiscover'd . 22. We must not judge which Notions are Simple , which Compounded , from Clear or Obscure Appearances they make to our Fancy , but from the Rule given above , § 18 , 19. §23 . Shewn hence , because those Men conceit that Metaphysical Notions are Obscure , whereas they are evidently the Clearest . 24. Not the Design of avoiding Different Significations of Words , but Plain Nature forces us to put Real Essences . 25. Words are not Ambiguous for want of Settled Standards in Nature . 26. The Thing signify'd is not to be blam'd for the Abuse of Words ; but their Ambiguity , ill Contexture or Misapplication . 27. Imperfect Knowers agree in the Thing and not in the Name only . 28. The Knowing Things by Abstract Notions promotes and not hinders Science . 29. By Mr. Locke's Principles , there is no way to remedy the Abuses of Words . 30. Mr. Locke's Sentiment , after all , Ambiguous . Reflexion Seventeenth . §1 . OF the Second Operation of our Understanding . 2. Mr. Locke's Definition of Knowledge in many respects Faulty . 3. Knowledge cannot consist in the Connexion or Disagreement of Ideas . 4. The True Definition of Knowledge . 5. Our Definition of Knowledge farther maintain'd . 6. Hence , there is but one sort of Connexion , in which Knowledge consists ; viz. that of Co-existence . 7. The Degrees of our Knowledge assign'd by Mr. Locke , very Solid . §8 . Every Step we take in Demonstrative Knowledge , or every Consequence , must be grounded on Self-Evidence . 9. The great Usefulness of this last Position . 10. Scepticism and Dogmatism are , both of them , highly Prejudicial to Science . 11. We have Sensitive Knowledge of other Notions besides Existence . 12. Onely Principles and Demonstration , and not Experiments , can give us any Intelligible Explication of Natural Qualities . 13. Short Hints of the true Aristotelian Grounds . 14. How all Secondary Qualities come to be made . 15. The Course of Nature is fundamentally built on on the Admission of Rarity and Density . 16. That by these Grounds , the Nature of Secondary Qualities is Demonstrable . 17. The True Reason why some Men think them Inexplicable . 18. The Possibility of Demonstrating them shewn by the Instance of Colour . Reflexion Eighteenth . §1 . THE State of the Question . §2 . How we know the Things by Means of Ideas , Inexplicable . 3. The Ideists must be forc'd to grant , that the Thing known is in the Mind . 4. The Necessity of the Things being in our Mind , farther enforced . 5. Mathematical and Moral Knowledges are grounded on the Thing in the Mind . 6. All Essential Predicates , and Accidental ones too , are truly the Thing , and the whole Thing imply'd confusedly . § 7. That our Complex Notions are Regular , and Well-grounded ; Mr. Locke's not so . 8. In what manner we compound such Notions . 9. All Pleas fail the Ideists , unless they perfectly distinguish Phantasms from Notions . 10. Odd Miscarriages of Nature ought not to shock Natural Principles . The Cartesians are concluded against by J. S. as well as other Ideists , or rather more . 11. All Truth consists in Joining or Separating Partial Conceptions of the Things ; and not in Joining or Separating Ideas . 12. The Distinction of Truth into Mental and Verbal , Extravagant ; and the Parts of it Co-incident . Reflexion Nineteenth . § 1. UNiversal Propositions in the Mind are easily Knowahle , Antecedently to Words . 2. 'T is not necessary to know the precise Bounds and Extent of the Species . 3. Unnecessary Knowledge not to be Coveted , nor the Want of it Complain'd of . 4. The Nature and Use of General Maxims mistaken by Mr. Locke . 5. The Terms of General Maxims Clearer than those of Particular Propositions . 6. Such General Maxims are never used to deduce Conclusions from them , but to reduce Inferiour Truths to them . 7. The Absolute Necessity of First Principles Asserted . 8. How other General Maxims do govern all our Actions and Sayings . 9. The Discarding General Maxims destroys all Science . This Errour springs from Men's taking Wrong Measures , in judging what Notions are Clear , and what Confused . § 10. That not General Maxims , but their Abuse , breeds Danger to Science . 11. His Instance , that General Maxims are fit to prove Contradictions , shews he quite mistakes the Notion of Body . 12. Ideism is the Genuin Parent of Enthusiasm in Philosophy . 13. Identical Propositions not to be ridicul'd . 14. The Right Way how to use them ; and that Mr. Locke himself does , and must rely upon them . 15. Neither Ideas nor Names can be Predicate , or Subject ; but the Thing it self , as conceiv'd by us , in whole , or in part . 16. Mr. Locke's new Instructive Way is utterly Insignificant . 17. That the Signification of Words is the Meaning of them ; their Meaning is our Notion ; and our Notion is the Thing . Reflexion Twensieth . § 1. UNiversals must relate to the Existence they have in the Mind . 2. To put any Knowledge in Brutes , is against the Nature of Things , and Implicatory . 3. Mr. Locke confounds Material and Spiritual Natures . 4. Mr. Locke's Principles confound Humane and Brutal Natures . 5. To Create , is the Peculiar Effect of Self-Existence . 6. The Thought cannot move the Body ; and why . §7 . The Notion or Nature of the Deity being once setled to be Self-Existence , all that can be said of it follows Demonstratively . 8. We can know there are Angels , tho they do not operate 〈◊〉 us . 9. We know at first our own Existence , in the same manner as we know the Existence of other Things ; i. e. by Sensation , and not by Intuition . 10. No Improvement of Science , without some General Principles . Mr. Locke's Principles examin'd . 11. Mr. Locke's Main Principle ; which is to ascertain all other Principles , Inevident . 12. What Things hinder the Advancement of Science . 13. Euclid , and such others , not blameable for laying Principles , or General Maxims . Reflexion Twenty First . §1 . THE Point stated . §2 . Mr. Locke confounds Outward Action , to which we may proceed upon a Probability ; with Inward Assent , to which we may not . 3. A strange Character of our Judging Faculty . 4. That God has provided due Motives of Enjoin'd Assent to all Mankind , if they be not wanting to themselves . 5. To Assent upon a Probability , is against the Commonest Light of Reason . 6. There cannot be , in Proper Speech , any Degrees of Assent . 7. Probable Assent is Nonsense , or Impertinent . 8. What Kinds of Distinctions are disallowable in Disputation . §9 : Charity to Sincere and Weak Mis-understanders is a Christian Duty . 10. Tradition built on meer Hear-say , has little or no Force . 11. A more Firm Assent is due to Points certainly known to be reveal'd , than to Scientifical Conclusions . Reflexion Twenty Second . §1 . HOW Syllogisms came to be invented at first . §2 . The True Use and Abuse of them . 3. Objections against Syllogistick Arguing clear'd . 4. Syllogisms are useful for Demonstration . 5. Syllogisms are of no Use in Probable Discourses . 6. Other Mistakes about Syllogisms Clear'd . 7. Inferences and Consequences of Words abstracting from their Sense , is strangely against all Reason , and Preposterous . 8. What is due to Reason , what to Divine Revelation . The First Caution to be observ'd , in order to this Point . 9. The Second Caution to be used in this Point . 10. Reason not to be rely'd on in Things beyond its Sphere . 11. The Notion of [ is True , ] must be distinguish'd from the Notion of [ may be True , or may not be True . ] 12. Therefore , that no Assent ought to be built upon Probable Mediums , is Demonstrable . 13. All Errour comes by Assenting upon Probabilities . 14. The Tenet that we ought to Assent upon Probability , is highly Prejudicial to Piety , and to best Christian Morality . § 15. To apply our selves to the Right Method to find out Truth and Science , is the onely Antidote against Errour . 16. No Possible Way , or Certain Standard , to take the Just Measure of Probabilities . 17. The Certain Rule not to be mis-led by Authority . 18. Mr. Locke seems to take some Things for onely Probable , which ( or the Authority for them ) are Demonstrable . 19. The Members of Mr. Locke's Division of Sciences , are , partly Co-incident , partly not belonging to Science at all . 20. The Connatural Way how Sciences are to be Divided , and Subordinate . Some very Useful Corollaries concerning that Subject . FINIS .

ERRATA .

PAge 6. line 11. which last . l. 19. Notion , which . p. 13. l. ult. poor weak . p. 17. l. 19. so far . p. 28. l. 3. to be . p. 88. l. 28. extra Causas . p. 99. l. ult. Words do . p. 100. l. 1. Definition . p. 115. l. 11. it treats . p. 170. l. 2 , 3. at least . p. 179. l. 16. insuperably . p. 181. l. 8. GOD at . p. 191. l. 25. no otherwise . p. 202. l. 14. found in . p. 212. l. penult. to be so . p. 247. l. 30. as is fetch'd . p. 253. l. 16. the referring it . p. 266. l 2. Supposition . p 272. l. 15. given them . p. 340. l. 22. may walk . p. 348. l. 33. t is hard . p. 393. l. 13. l. 5. or other . p. 432. l. 3. brought to . p. 434. l. 23. Enquiries . p. 439. contrast . p. 451. l. 12 , 13. Probable the next ; perhaps improbable .

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