I. MANY are the High Encomiums and Glorious Titles which have been given to METAPHYSICKS by those who teach and profess it . They call Her The Queen of Sciences . They tell us that , in regard all other Knowledges do depend for their Certainty and Evidence , on her Sublime Maxims , she is not meerly to be called , in a Common Appellation with the rest , Scientia , a Science ; but Sapientia , or Wisdom ; which carries a kind of Majesty in its Notion above other Endowments of our Understanding . They pretend that she does not only Demonstrate , which every Petty Inferiour Science must , under Penalty of forfeiting her Name and Dignity ; but moreover , that she demonstrates ex Altissimis Causis , by the Highest Mediums or Reasons : In a Word , they make her the Soveraign of all other Sciences ; and give her the Prerogative of Superintending over the rest ; of Assigning to each of them their Province ; of Distributing to each of them their proper Function , and the Matter on which they are to work ; and of Enabling them , by her Supreme Direction and Influence , to Perform what she Enjoyns them ; and much more to that purpose .

II. I do not at all wonder that Learned Men have adorn'd Metaphysicks with these and such like Singular Commendations : They are no more but her Just Due . What I admire at is , how , these things being True , and she being of so Transcendent a Dignity , it comes to pass that she is strangely sunk into such an Undervalue and Contempt in the World , that no Body seems to regard her . If her Influence be so Universal , and her Evidence so Clear , who would not strive in the first place to cultivate his Mind with such an Unparallell'd Perfection ? Why are not Schools and Chairs erected in all Learned Societies meerly to teach Metaphysicks , and large Endowments settled to Encourage the Professors of it ? And yet we hear no News of any such . Certainly , it she does , indeed , carry such a high hand over all other sorts of Knowledge , a great Metaphysician should be lookt upon as a Monster of Learning ; at least such an Extraordinary Person , that all Mankind would most highly caress and value him ; whereas tho' Beggery be the Badge of Poetry ; yet a Metaphysician is in such a mean Repute , that , had he no better Livelihood , he might sue to be Subcizer to a Poetaster , and be glad to feed on his Scraps . Whence we may conclude that there is something very much amiss in the business ; and that either the Writers of Metaphysicks have not done her the Right she deserves ; or else that , thro' the Ignorance of the Mob of Half-witted Readers , a General Outery is made against her ; whence Men have taken a Toy at her , and made , a wrong Apprehension of her as Insipid , Dry , Steril and Insignificant .

III. There is no doubt but Scepticism also has been a great Enemy , as to all other Sciences , so more especially to Metaphysicks ; because she is the most able to shame and confute ▪ the pretence that there is no Certainty or Evidence at all ▪ Fancy , which being of a contrary Genius , has a natural Antipathy against her , is Another Adversary of hers ; and that a most powerful one ; for it is able to bring into the Field a vast Rabble of Nimble-tongu'd Gentlemen , arm'd cap-a-pie with Flouts , Iests and Drollery , which of late have ( I know not how ▪ ) ●ot the Reputation of Wit , and Noise , if finely deliver'd , has a powerful Ascendent over the Generality . It may be fear'd too , that Voluminous School-term-men , whose Productions have been onely Wordish Digladiations and fencing with Distinctions , without any farther Effect , have given , to many , occasion to think that Metaphysicks is nothing but a Mysterious kind of Talk , to make an Exteriour show of Learning , and appear Extraordinary ; and that to write Metaphysicks , is to no more purpose than 't is to plant a Nursery of Bryars to enlarge a Wilderness . For these Men speak as high of Metaphysicks as any : Whence , Men reflecting that these Large Promises vanish into Smoak , and that neither Principles are layd , nor any Useful Demonstrations or Conclusions drawn thence which are found to be Influential to other Sciences ; it is natural for Men to revenge the Defeat of their High Expectations , by exposing those Authors , and disgracing Metaphysicks it self , as Chicanerie , and altogether Fruitless ▪ & unable to make good what the Professors of it did , in such Big Words , pretend . But , leaving those Persons to answer for their own Faults , let us see what more Indifferent Men have objected against Metaphysicks , and what Reasons they alledge for their Aversion from her .

IV. First then 't is objected that Metaphysicks is an Abstruse and Crabbed kind of Study , and scarce Intelligible without Revelation ; so that a Man may break his Teeth with cracking the Shell ; and , when he has done , he will find never a Kernel . Secondly , that it is Aiery , Superficial , and meerly Wordish ; and not handsomely worded neither , but scurvily Barbarous . Thirdly , that it was never yet seen how it influenc'd any other Sciences at all ; as is Pretended . Lastly , that it has no Influence at all upon Men's Manners , nor conduces , in the least , to make them live better . These are the Faults generally imputed to Metaphysicks , which we will consider in their Order . Premising first that I have Reason to hope that whoev●● pleases to peruse attentively our Ensuing Metaphysicks , will see that they are already answer'd to his hand .

V. The first Objection is so perfectly Groundless , that the Direct Contrary is most Evident . The Object of Metaphysicks is our most Generall Notions , of Ens or Being : Which an easy Reflexion will tell us , are , of all others , the ●…t Clear and Evident . For , an Individual 〈…〉 ( v. g. Peter ) being constituted by such ● Complexion of Innumerable Accidents as ●s found in no other Thing ; hence , our Knowledge of it is so Confus'd , that , however we can distinguish it , as far as concerns our Use , by Time , Place , and oft-times by some outward ●…dents ; yet the Intrinsecal Essence and ●●ture of that Body is so intricately woven ; ●…omprizes in it the Grounds of such numberless Considerations we may make of it , that 't is impossible to frame any one Distinct Conception or Notion of it . Homo , has fewer ; whence it is more Clear , so that we are now able to frame a Definition of it , which we could not of the Individuum : Yet , because it comprehends in it the Natures or Notions of Animal , Vegetative , Mixt , Body and Ens ; 't is still very Confus'd , and therefore less Clearly Intelligible . Animal is less Confus'd , because it contains fewer Superiour-notions or Natures in it . Vegetative is still less Confus'd than Animal ▪ for the same reason . Mixt is less Confus'd than Vegetable ; Body than Mixt. And lastly , Ens is the least Confus'd of any of the Other ; and , therefore the Clearest of any o● them ; as having no Superiour Notion in it ●● all : Whence all the Composition , and , consiquently , Confusion it has , is that it confound in it the Notions of its own Metaphysical Parts which its Definition [ viz. That which is Capable to bee ] gives us ; which contains onely the Notions of the Power , and of the Act ( viz. Existence , ) to which it is a Power : The Sense● of which Words is so Obvious and Easy , the 't is impossible the rudest Vulgar should be Ignorant of them .

VI. Still it will be objected that such Abstracted Words as [ Power ] and [ Act ] ●● Unusual to Mankind , and seem to hover in t● Air , so that no Man can make any Fancy of them . And ; it must be confest they sute not with Fancy at all ( for Brutes have none such , ) nor ought they to sute with it ; for 't is impossible for us to have any Proper or Express I hantasm● of Abstracted Universal Conceptions , because ( as they are such ) they never enter'd into our Senses , nor have any Being but in our Understanding . But , why are not those Notions or Conceptions of [ Power ] and [ Act ] Easy 〈…〉 Can any Man living be ignorant of the Meaning of these Words [ such a thing can be , or may be ? ] 'T is impossible ; nor was there ever any that came to the use of ordinary Knowledge , but understands them - ▪ Now , the Word [ can ] signifies that which we call Power ; and the Word [ Bee , ] that which is the Act of that Power ; only they are put into a manner of Expression● Proper to Abstract Words . Nor can this breed any difficulty : For , he who knows what it is to love , cannot but know what the Noun Substantive [ Love ] means : Nor , was ever any Man who knows what [ White ] and [ Round ] mean , so dull as to be pazzled in knowing the meaning of [ Whiteness ] and [ Roundness . ] Yet the Reader may observe that the main Body of my Metaphysicks is built on the Self-evident Notions or Meanings of those Words , Power and Act , or the different Kinds of them . Whence , were I to begin to teach a Philosophy-School , I should think it best to take this Method ; viz. that , after my Schollers had perfectly learnt the Doctrine of the Ten Predicaments so as to distinguish exactly our Natural Notions , got knowledge of the necessary Laws of Predicating , and how to place the Terms best in order to conclude evidently , I should begin with teaching Metaphysicks : Not at all doubting but that any Man of a good Natural Mother-wit , would perfectly comprehend it ; and , thence , become excellently dispos'd to demonstrate a priori , which is the most Effectual and Best way to attain True Science ; and to branch out his Knowledge of Principles to an incomparably greater Number of Particular Conclusions than he could by Demonstrating a posteriori . Besides , all Inferiour Objects would far more easily , and connaturally , open themselves to his View , after he had once taken a Distant Sight of them from the higher Ground of their Causes and Principles .

VII . The Second Objection is grounded on a Gross misunderstanding of the main Fundamental of all True Philosophy ; which I most religiously observe in all my Discourses ; and which , if neglected or not well attended to , brings every thing into Wrangle and Confusion ; which is , that all our Abstracted Conceptions , ( without which we cannot possibly Apprehend , nor consequently Discourse of any thing Distinctly and Clearly ) are of the Things themselves consider'd according to such or such a Respect . This is the Basis of all the Aristot●lian Philosophy ; however there be too Few that exactly attend or hold to it . For example . That Great Man , when he was Distinguishing all our Natural Notions into Ten several Heads , call'd the Second ▪ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and the Third 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , Quantum and Quale : Now these Words being Concretes of a Thing ( or Substance ) and an Accident , if they be not taken Formally or with a ●eduplication , for the Thing as it is Big , or Qualify'd , would Confound Substance and each of those Accidents , into one Compound Notion ; which being quite contrary to his Intention , which was to distinguish them , we must conclude that he took those words , as we take our Abstract words Quantitas , & Qualitas , in a meer Formal Sense , for the Thing quatenus Quanta , and Quatenus Qualis or Qualify'd ; which word [ Quatenus ] cuts off that precise Consideration or Notion from any other ; which done , their Perfect Distinction is Evident . The Objecter then , may please to reflect that we ( following the same Method ) do mean , by all those Abstract Words , the very Thing it self , Consider'd or Conceiv'd according to such a precise Respect , and no other : So that , when we speak of Power , Act , Essence , Existence , Ens , Suppositum , Person , Bigness , Quality , Relation , &c. we mean still the Thing , apprehended according to such a Formal Consideration ; nor can we , with any Sense mean any thing else . Whence we , building all our Discourses on our Natural Notions , each of which is the Thing it self Conceiv'd thus and not otherwise , do by consequence , ground all our Philosophy on the Things themselves ; which being Establisht in their Essences by GOD'S Creative Wisedom , must be acknowledg'd to be the most Solid Ground imaginable . Wherefore there can be no show of Reason in objecting to us that our Discourses , thus Grounded , are Aiery or Superficial ; whereas it is an Unanswerable Objection against those who build their Philosophy on Ideas ; which they confess not to be the Things , but Distinct from them .

To give an Instance what Mistakes arise when Writers do not exactly Distinguish their Abstracted Notions , it would not be much a miss to take notice of the famous Controversie between the late Bp. of Worster and Mr. Locke , which might have been prevented , had this Method of Distinguishing our Conceptions been accurately observ'd . The former of these being worthily Sollicitous , lest the Mystery of the B. Trinity ( which he was then Explicating ) should receive any Prejudice , did check at Mr. Lockes denying he had any Clear Idea of Substance . Now , had Mr. Locke declar'd himself to take the Word [ Substance ] to signifie the Abstracted Notion or Conception he had of the Thing , as it is Distinct from that of the Modes or Accidents , or declar'd it to signifie the Conception of a Thing as it is Capable of Existing ▪ ( which is the First and Proper Notion of a Created ▪ Being ) he might by depuring it first of its Imperfection , necessarily annex● in all Creatures , have Transferr'd it to GOD , and ●● it had been not Injurious but Serviceable to the Explication of that Mystery : ) But he , having in his Eye the words of some Scholas●ic●s , who fail'd of thus Distinguishing it ; and , besides ▪ did not explain it Literally , but call'd it in a Metaphorical Expression , Supporter of the Accidents , had good reason to say that such a Notion of Substance , no farther nor better explicated , was very Obscure ; especially , if they made it a kind of Entity supporting other feebler Entities , as some of them did .

IX . Now , to supply their defect , and give the Literal Meaning of that Metaphorical Word [ Supporting , ] the onely good Sense can be made of it is clearly This. The Proper and Precise Notion of Substance as 't is Distinguish from all other Abstracted or Inadequate Notions we make of a Thing or Individuum , is This , that it is Capable of Existing ; which , as 't is thus Conceiv'd , is its Definition : Whereas , let us Define Quantity , Quality , Relation , &c. We find that they do not at all imply in their Notion , that is , in the precise Signification of those Words , any Capacity of Being at all , as did the Other most expresly ; but of Modifying or Determining , after their several Ways , the Thing which is Capable of Being ; because in our Mind we must first conceive the Thing Capable to Bee , ere we can conceive it Capable to be Modify'd . Since then we see Accidents are , and yet out of their own precise Notion are not Capable to bee , they must be conceiv'd to Bee , by Virtue of the Notion of Substance , which is of its own Notion , ( or as signify'd by that Word ) Capable of Being ; whence they are said , by a Metaphorical Expression , to be Supported in Being by Substance . Which also is the true Sense of those Sayings [ Accidentis Essentia est Inhaerentia ; Accidentis Existentia est Inexistentia ] and such like ; which sutes with the Natural Notions of Substance and Accidents both , if Bad Art does not make Disagreement between them . Whence 't is to be noted , that this Supporting here explicated , must signifie the Priority and Dependence one Notion has to the other in our Minds , or , ( which is the same ) which the Thing as thus Conceiv'd , has to the same Thing as otherwise Conceiv'd ; there being a Natural Order or Priority of one Notion to Another in our Mind ; and , consequently , a Dependence on one another ▪ for to think there is a Priority or Dependence on one another in re , as two Things in Nature , of which one is Stronger , the other Feebler , ( which I doubt too many , led by the Sound of Words , imagin ) is most ridiculous Nonsence . Unity , or indivision within its self is the Property of every Ens , or Individual Thing ; and therefore it remains , as in its self , One or Undivided , till our Understanding comes to divide it , after its Fashion , into more Formal , or ( as we call them ) Metaphysical Parts , by her Abstractive Way of Conceiving it by Inadequate Notions .

For Answer to the Third Objection , I refer my Reader to the Close of my last Reflexion in Solid Philosophy Asserted ; where this Objection is Clear'd even to the Weakest Understanding .

X. Lastly , as to the pretended Uselesness of Metaphysicks , I cannot but admire at the short Speculation of those who object it . Is it of no Use to settle all the First Principles of our Understanding , without which ( as I have Demonstrated in my Non ▪ ultra ) we could know nothing ? Is it of no Use to acquaint us with the Essences of all Beings , whence proceed all the Common sorts of their several Operations ; And to give us , amongst the rest , the Essence of Man , and , consequently , shew what Actions are becoming or misbecoming a Being of such a Nature ? Is it to no Use or Purpose to Demonstrate the Immortality of the Soul , a Tenet upon which all Religion depends ; How it will fare with her when she is Separated from the Body ; or What Dispositions in her when the Man dies will make her Eternally Happy , or most Miserable ? Is it of no Use to Christian Life , or the Good of our Neighbour , to stand up for God's Honour , and preserve others from the damnable Tenet of Atheism , by Demonstrating that there is a Great GOD who governs the World ; who is All-powerful , and Infinitely Iust , Good , Merciful , &c. Is it of no Use to demonstrate the Existence , Essence and Operations of Angels ; and how , by their Means , and the Virtue of other Second Causes , GOD's Wisdom administers the World in the Best and most Providential manner ; and that , therefore Things are not Govern'd by Chance , nor by the Stoical Fatality ? Lastly , is it of no Use to explicate the Mystery of the most B. Trinity ( and other Articles of Christian Faith , ) so clearly , as to show they are perfectly Agreeable to our Natural Notions , and to all the Maxims of True Reason ; which wipes off the Scandal with which Atheists , Deists , and Anti-trinitatians bespatter them , as Perfect Contradictions , and meer Nonsense ; on the Verity of which Tenets ( as will be shown ) depend all the most Effectual motives to Raise Mankind to Heaven , and dispose them for Eternal Happiness ; in Explicating and Defending which Fundamental Articles of Christian Faith Metaphysicks has the Chief Hand ? Certainly , if these things be of no Use , it may certainly be concluded , that no part of Knowledge ( Theology excepted , which also depends , in great part , on Metaphysicks ) is Useful . But , these Objectors discourse as if there were no Use at all to be made of any Science or Art whatever , but of Handicrafts , Agriculture , and such like : As if they had forgot there was any such Thing as Virtue , Truth , Religion , Faith , Soul , Salvation , or even GOD Himself , that deserves to be heeded or regarded . To obviate this Calumny , I have added Meditations at the End of each Chapter ; to show ( as the Matter would bear ) how Applicable and Useful the foregoing Speculations ▪ are to the Improvement of our Mind in Virtue . And I hope , I may , without Immodesty , say thus much for my Metaphysicks , that there never was yet any Speculative Piece written , that makes Reason more Subservient to Faith , nor Philosophy more serviceable to True Divinity than it does . I wish the Example may propogate to others .

XI . But , let us suppose that all this which is plainly shewn to the Reader 's Eye , were False ; and that there were no other Good in the Study of M●… physicks , but the Enriching our Minds with Multitudes of High & Solid Truths ; would not this Alone be sufficient to make every Considerate Man apply his Thoughts to that Noblest Science , even tho' it had no farther Effects , nor any Exteriour Use to be made of it ? What is there of more Use than the Mathematicks ? And yet Plutarch tells us in the Life of Marcellus , that Plato was offended with those who did corrupt and disgrace ( as he judged ) the Noble and Excellent Science of Geometry , by making it descend to the contriving Engines , in which the Base and Vile Handy-work of Man was to be Employ'd : And that Archimedes himself esteem'd all his Inventions of Engines but Vile , Beggerly and Dross , in comparison of the Speculative Productions and Demonstrations in that Science . So much were those Great Souls , tho' Heathens , enamour'd with the naked Beauty of TRUTH , for it 's own Sake : So much did they value the Interiour Natural Perfection of their Mind , above the Prospect or Intuitus of any External Use of it , or Profit accruing by it ; which yet is so Unpalatable to our Sceptical Age , I could wish those Noble and Learned Gentlemen , our Modern Virtuoso's , would seriously consider this Temper of those Heroes of Learning in the former World , and think it worthy their Imitation . What excellent Speculative Productions , to the vast Advancement and Progress of True Science , would so many Great wits make in a short time , did they please to think fit to emply their Thoughts in following and carrying on the way of Demonstration . To do which , nothing can more powerfully invite them than to reflect that in so many Years Applying themselves to the way of Induction , they have not been able to establish so much as One Universal Principle in Natural Philosophy , or to gain the Knowledge of any one Scientifical Conclusion : The Impossibility of which by the way of Experiments has been shewn more at large towards the End of the Preface to my Method to Science .

XII . Having thus Defended Metaphysicks against the Calumnies thrown upon her , it remains to inform my Reader of my Conduct hitherto in pursuing the Advancement of TRUTH , the only End I aym'd at . After I had publish't my METHOD to Science , I discover'd that the Chief Remora which had kept back Learned Men in our last Century , from attaining True Science , was the Doctrine or Way of Ideas ; which some very Ingenious Men had taken great pains to set up and improve . I observ'd that , That Way had two Especial Patrons ; Cartesius in France , and Mr. John Locke here in England : Both of them were Men of Excellent Parts ; so that it seemd hard to determin which of them had the Advantage in Wit . But , as for their Productions in Philosophy , if I may be allow'd to judge between them , Mr. Locke did in very many particulars , make far greater Advancements towards Science , and in many things arriv'd at it . Whereas the whole Fabrick of the Cartesian Hypothesis is Aiery and Fantastick ; yet so dextrously Propos'd , and so prettily Compacted within it self ( for I cannot at all Commend it for having any Connexion with Principles ) that it decoyes his Readers , who do not reflect that nothing is to be held True which Evident Principles do not warrant , into a kind of Complaisant Assent to his Doctrine : Much after the same manner as our Judgment is lull'd , and our Passions are carry'd along , with Reading a Romance ; so that we become at unawares highly Concern'd ; 'till , our Reason Awaking out of that Pleasing Dream of our Fancy , our Deliberate Iudgment recovers it self ; and we come to reflect , that it is not a True History , but a meer Fiction contriv'd to amuze our Imagination .

XIII . These two Ingenious Gentlemen did , in proposing to us their Ideas , take several ways in giving us Account of them . That of Mr. Locke is the more Candid , while he calls them Pictures , Similitudes , Pourtraitures , and such like ; which plainly acknowledges , they are not the Things themselves . Whereas , the Followers of Car●sius ( who , should best know his Mind ) shuffle ●etween the two sides of the Contradiction , and ●eem resolv'd not to be understood . For , sometimes they directly avow they are the very Things themselves Conceiv'd by us , or exsting in our Understanding after a Spiritual Manner ; and , sometimes again , they banter ●nd ridicule what Themselves had Granted . ●f which more hereafter .