Imprimatur
.
Guil.
Lancaster
,
R.
P.
D.
Henrico
Episc.
Lond.
à
Sacris
Domest.
Mar.
14.
1691
/
2.
A
BRIEF
DISQUISITION
OF
THE
Law
of
Nature
,
According
to
the
Principles
and
Method
laid
down
in
the
Reverend
Dr.
Cumberland's
(
now
Lord
Bishop
of
Peterborough
s
)
Latin
Treatise
on
that
Subject
.
AS
ALSO
His
Confutations
of
Mr.
Hobbs's
Principles
put
into
another
Method
.
WITH
THE
Right
Reverend
Author's
Approbation
.
LONDON
:
Printed
,
and
are
to
be
sold
by
Richard
Baldwin
,
near
the
Oxford-Arms
in
Warwick-Lane
.
1692.
TO
THE
Right
Reverend
Father
in
GOD
,
RICHARD
,
Lord
Bishop
of
PETERBOROUGH
.
My
LORD
,
HAving
,
many
Years
agon
,
when
your
Learned
and
Judicious
Treatise
of
the
Laws
of
Nature
was
first
published
,
carefully
perused
it
to
my
great
satisfaction
,
I
also
thought
it
necessary
to
make
an
Epitome
,
or
Abridgment
of
it
,
as
well
for
my
own
better
Remembrance
,
as
that
I
believed
it
might
be
also
useful
,
as
an
Introduction
to
Ethicks
,
for
some
near
Relations
of
mine
,
for
whom
I
then
designed
it
.
These
Papers
,
after
they
had
lain
by
me
several
Years
,
I
happened
to
shew
to
some
Friends
of
mine
,
(
and
in
particular
to
the
Honourable
Mr.
Boyle
;
)
who
so
well
approved
of
the
Undertaking
,
that
they
encouraged
me
to
make
it
publick
,
as
that
which
might
give
great
satisfaction
to
those
of
the
Nobility
and
Gentry
of
our
own
Nation
,
(
as
well
as
others
of
a
lower
rank
)
who
either
do
not
understand
Latin
,
or
else
had
rather
read
Epitomes
of
greater
Works
,
than
take
the
Pains
to
peruse
the
Originals
.
Which
Task
,
tho'
not
very
grateful
to
me
,
yet
I
was
prevailed
with
to
undertake
,
and
to
look
over
those
Papers
again
,
and
add
several
considerable
Passages
out
of
the
Treatise
itself
;
and
this
not
for
Fame's
sake
,
or
the
honour
of
being
thought
an
Author
,
since
I
was
satisfied
,
that
nothing
of
that
nature
could
be
due
to
one
,
who
does
not
pretend
to
more
,
than
to
Translate
or
Abridge
another
Man's
Labours
:
Yet
I
am
willing
,
in
pursuance
of
your
Lordship's
Principle
,
to
sacrifice
all
these
little
private
Considerations
to
the
Publick
Good
,
as
being
sensible
,
that
in
the
Trade
of
Learning
(
as
in
other
Trades
)
divers
,
who
cannot
be
Inventors
,
or
chief
Merchants
,
may
yet
do
the
Publick
good
service
by
venting
other
Mens
Notions
in
a
new
dress
;
especially
since
I
have
also
observed
,
that
things
of
this
kind
,
if
well
done
,
(
and
with
due
acknowledgment
to
the
Authors
from
whence
they
are
borrowed
)
as
they
have
proved
beneficial
to
those
whose
Education
,
or
constant
Employments
in
their
own
Professions
,
will
not
give
them
leave
to
peruse
many
Volumes
,
written
perhaps
in
a
Language
they
are
no
great
Masters
of
;
so
also
,
they
have
not
failed
of
some
Commendation
from
all
Candid
Readers
.
Thus
Monsieur
Rohault's
Abridgment
of
Des
Cartes's
Philosophy
,
and
Monsieur
Bernier's
of
Gassendus's
,
(
to
mention
no
more
)
have
been
received
with
general
Applause
,
not
only
by
all
Ingenious
Men
of
the
French
,
but
also
of
our
own
Nation
,
who
understand
that
Language
.
And
the
Learned
and
Inquisitive
Dr.
Burnet
hath
thought
an
Undertaking
of
this
kind
so
useful
for
our
Nobility
and
Gentry
,
as
to
give
us
his
own
elegant
Translations
,
or
rather
Abridgments
in
English
,
of
his
two
ingenious
Treatises
of
the
Theory
of
the
Earth
.
And
I
doubt
not
,
but
your
Lordship
would
have
done
somewhat
in
this
kind
,
with
this
admirable
Work
of
yours
,
had
not
the
constant
Employments
of
your
Sacred
Function
,
as
well
as
your
other
severe
and
useful
Studies
,
hindred
you
from
it
.
But
,
perhaps
,
it
may
be
thought
by
some
,
that
this
Task
hath
been
very
well
performed
already
by
Dr.
Parker
,
late
Bishop
of
Oxford
,
in
his
Treatise
,
entituled
▪
A
Demonstration
of
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
and
therefore
needs
not
be
done
over
again
.
But
to
this
I
shall
only
say
,
that
as
he
hath
borrowed
all
that
is
new
in
that
Work
from
your
Lordship's
Book
,
so
it
is
with
so
slight
an
acknowledgment
of
that
Obligation
,
that
since
he
owns
himself
beholding
to
you
for
no
more
than
the
first
Hint
,
or
main
Notion
,
no
wonder
if
he
hath
fallen
very
short
of
the
Original
from
whence
he
borrowed
it
,
both
in
the
clearness
,
as
well
as
choice
of
the
Arguments
or
Demonstrations
,
and
in
the
particular
setting
forth
of
those
Rewards
and
Punishments
derived
(
by
God's
appointment
)
from
the
Nature
of
Men
,
and
the
Frame
of
Things
;
which
can
only
be
done
according
to
that
exact
Method
your
Lordship
hath
there
laid
down
.
Tho'
,
I
confess
,
there
is
one
thing
that
is
particular
in
that
Authors
Undertaking
,
(
viz.
)
That
excellent
Account
he
there
gives
us
of
the
great
Differences
and
Uncertainties
among
the
most
famous
of
the
Heathen
Philosophers
,
concerning
Mans
Soveraign
Good
,
or
Happiness
,
chiefly
for
want
of
the
certain
belief
of
a
future
state
,
and
that
clear
conviction
we
now
have
,
that
Mens
chiefest
Good
or
Happiness
consists
in
God's
Love
and
Favour
towards
them
:
As
also
his
observation
,
That
,
notwithstanding
all
that
can
be
said
of
the
Natural
Rewards
of
Vertue
,
and
Punishments
of
Vice
,
nothing
but
the
reasonable
hope
and
expectation
of
Happiness
in
a
Life
to
come
,
can
in
all
Cases
bear
us
up
under
all
the
Miseries
,
Sorrows
and
Calamities
of
this
.
And
herein
I
must
own
I
agree
with
him
;
and
therefore
hope
your
Lordship
will
pardon
me
,
if
I
have
in
the
ensuing
Discourse
insisted
somewhat
more
particularly
upon
these
future
Rewards
and
Punishments
,
which
I
doubt
not
may
very
well
be
proved
from
Reason
,
and
the
necessity
of
supposing
them
,
in
order
to
the
asserting
and
vindicating
God's
Justice
and
Providence
:
Tho'
I
grant
,
that
the
Gospel
,
or
Divine
Revelation
,
hath
given
us
more
firm
grounds
for
this
our
Belief
,
than
we
had
before
by
the
mere
light
of
Nature
.
But
supposing
this
Work
of
Bishop
Parker
never
so
well
performed
;
as
I
do
not
deny
,
but
it
hath
all
the
advantages
of
a
Popular
and
Gentile
Stile
,
and
that
neat
Turn
he
gives
to
all
his
Writings
;
and
therefore
I
have
not
scrupled
to
transcribe
,
out
of
his
Discourse
,
one
or
two
Passages
,
where
I
thought
either
his
way
of
urging
your
Lordship's
Arguments
,
or
the
close
summing
them
up
,
was
not
to
be
mended
by
any
other
Pen
:
Yet
since
(
as
I
have
already
observed
)
the
whole
is
not
done
from
your
Lordship's
Work
,
and
is
also
too
concise
,
and
full
of
Digressions
,
and
besides
wants
your
solid
Confutations
of
Mr.
H.'s
Principles
,
it
seems
necessary
,
that
another
Treatise
more
exact
in
the
kind
,
should
be
published
as
more
agreeable
to
your
Lordship's
Original
:
Whether
this
which
I
now
present
you
with
,
be
such
,
I
must
submit
to
your
Lordship's
and
the
Reader
's
judgment
.
But
since
I
have
undertaken
this
difficult
Province
with
your
Lordships
approbation
,
it
is
fit
,
that
I
give
you
,
as
well
as
the
Reader
,
some
account
of
the
Method
I
have
followed
in
this
Treatise
,
and
wherein
it
differs
from
yours
.
First
then
,
to
begin
with
the
Preface
,
The
substance
of
it
is
wholly
yours
,
except
the
Introduction
concerning
the
usefulness
of
the
Knowledge
of
the
true
Grounds
of
the
Law
of
Nature
,
in
order
to
a
right
understanding
of
Moral
Philosophy
,
nay
Christianity
itself
.
But
for
a
Conclusion
to
the
Preface
,
I
have
also
made
some
Additions
,
wherein
.
I
have
shewn
your
Principle
of
Endeavouring
the
Common
Good
,
is
not
a
new
Invention
,
but
that
which
several
Great
Men
had
before
delivered
,
as
the
only
firm
Rule
,
by
which
to
try
not
only
all
our
Moral
Actions
,
but
all
Civil
Laws
,
whether
they
are
right
and
just
;
that
is
,
agreeable
to
right
Reason
,
or
not
.
And
I
have
also
concluded
it
with
a
set
of
Principles
,
very
necessary
to
be
understood
,
for
the
proving
the
Truth
of
all
Natural
Religion
,
and
the
Law
of
Nature
,
tho'
the
two
last
alone
are
the
Subject
of
your
Lordship's
Book
,
as
well
as
of
my
Abridgment
of
it
.
But
to
speak
more
particularly
of
the
Discourse
itself
,
since
I
here
design
no
more
than
an
Epitome
,
I
hope
your
Lordship
will
not
take
it
ill
,
if
I
have
omitted
most
of
your
rare
Instances
and
Parallels
drawn
from
the
Mathematicks
,
many
of
which
are
above
the
capacity
of
common
Readers
,
(
tho'
therein
your
Lordship
hath
shewn
your self
a
Great
Master
)
and
have
confined
my self
only
to
such
plain
and
easie
Proofs
and
natural
Observations
as
Men
of
all
capacities
may
understand
.
So
also
if
in
the
Chapter
of
Humane
Nature
,
I
have
left
out
divers
curious
Anatomical
Observations
,
wherein
the
Structure
of
Mens
Bodies
differs
from
that
of
Beasts
,
if
I
thought
they
were
at
all
questionable
or
doubtful
,
or
such
as
did
not
directly
tend
to
the
proving
,
that
Mens
Bodies
are
fitted
and
ordained
by
God
for
the
Prosecution
of
the
Common
Good
of
others
of
their
own
Kind
,
above
all
other
Creatures
.
I
have
also
made
bold
to
contract
the
Chapters
in
your
Work
,
into
a
lesser
number
,
having
disposed
the
substance
of
them
into
other
places
,
or
else
quite
omitted
some
,
as
not
so
necessary
to
our
purpose
:
As
for
example
,
I
have
placed
most
of
the
Matter
of
the
third
Chapter
,
De
bono
naturali
,
partly
in
the
explanation
of
the
word
Good
,
in
our
Description
of
the
Law
of
Nature
,
in
the
third
Chapter
,
reserving
what
remained
of
it
to
the
second
part
for
the
Confutation
of
that
Principle
of
Mr.
H.
That
no
Action
is
Good
or
Evil
in
the
State
of
Nature
.
So
likewise
for
the
fourth
Chapter
,
De
Dictaminibus
Practicis
,
I
have
set
down
the
Substance
of
it
(
omitting
the
Mathematical
Illustrations
)
in
our
second
Chapter
of
Humane
Nature
.
So
also
the
sixth
Chapter
,
entituled
,
De
iis
quae
in
Lege
Naturali
continentur
.
And
the
seventh
and
eighth
,
De
Origine
Dominii
,
&
Virtutum
Moralium
.
I
have
partly
disposed
the
substance
of
them
into
the
first
Chapter
of
the
Nature
of
Things
,
but
chiefly
into
your
fourth
Chapter
,
reducing
all
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
and
Moral
Vertues
therein
contained
,
into
this
one
Principle
,
of
Endeavouring
the
Common
Good
of
Rational
Beings
.
But
as
for
your
last
Chapter
,
viz.
that
part
of
it
which
contains
the
Consectaria
,
or
Consequences
deducible
from
the
foregoing
Chapters
,
in
relation
to
the
Law
of
Moses
,
and
all
Civil
Laws
;
I
have
made
bold
to
omit
,
since
it
is
plain
enough
,
that
all
the
Precepts
of
the
Decalogue
do
tend
either
(
in
the
first
Table
)
to
the
Honour
and
Glory
of
God
,
in
his
commanding
himself
to
be
the
sole
Object
of
our
Worship
,
and
that
without
any
Images
of
himself
;
or
else
(
in
the
second
Table
)
to
our
Duties
towards
others
,
wherein
the
highest
Vertue
and
Innocence
are
prescribed
.
And
so
likewise
,
that
all
the
Laws
of
the
Supreme
Civil
Powers
have
no
Authority
,
but
as
they
pursue
this
Great
Rule
,
or
Law
of
Nature
,
of
procuring
the
Common
Good
of
Rational
Beings
;
that
is
,
the
Honour
and
Worship
of
God
,
and
the
Peace
and
Happiness
of
their
Subjects
,
and
of
Mankind
in
general
:
And
whereas
your
Lordship
hath
here
also
solidly
and
briefly
confuted
many
Gross
Errors
in
Mr.
H.'s
Morals
,
as
well
as
Politicks
,
some
of
those
Confutations
I
have
made
use
of
in
the
second
Part
,
viz.
those
that
relate
to
that
Author
's
Moral
Principles
,
which
,
if
they
are
false
,
his
Politick
ones
will
fall
of
themselves
.
To
conclude
,
I
must
beg
your
Lordships
Pardon
,
if
I
have
made
bold
to
alter
your
Method
,
as
to
your
Confutation
of
Mr.
H.'s
Principles
.
For
whereas
you
have
thought
fit
to
do
it
in
the
Body
of
your
Work
,
and
as
they
occurred
under
the
several
Heads
you
treat
of
;
since
I
perceiv'd
the
placing
your
Answers
after
that
manner
,
did
disturb
the
Connexion
and
Perspicuity
of
the
Discourse
,
I
thought
it
better
to
cast
those
Answers
into
a
distinct
part
,
digested
under
so
many
Heads
,
or
Propositions
,
in
the
order
in
which
they
stand
in
Mr.
H.'s
Books
,
de
Cive
,
and
Leviathan
,
where
the
Reader
,
if
he
pleases
,
may
compare
what
I
have
quoted
out
of
him
.
And
I
hope
your
Lordship
will
not
take
it
amiss
in
me
,
if
(
to
render
the
Work
more
pleasant
and
grateful
to
common
Readers
,
and
that
it
may
not
look
like
a
bare
Translation
)
I
have
added
several
Notions
and
Observations
,
some
of
my
own
knowledge
,
and
others
out
of
History
,
and
the
Relations
of
Modern
Travellers
,
concerning
the
Customs
of
those
Nations
commonly
counted
Barbarous
,
who
yet
by
their
amicable
living
together
,
without
either
Civil
Magistrates
,
or
written
Laws
,
serve
sufficiently
to
confute
Mr.
H.'s
extravagant
Opinion
,
That
all
Men
by
Nature
are
in
a
State
of
War
.
I
have
likewise
presumed
to
add
those
Aphorisms
of
Good
and
Evil
contained
in
Bishop
Wilkins's
Treatise
of
Natural
Religion
,
and
Dr.
Moor's
Enchiridion
Ethicum
,
that
the
Reader
may
see
them
all
at
once
,
tho'
I
confess
they
are
most
of
them
to
be
found
(
tho'
dispersedly
)
in
your
Lordship's
Work
.
I
have
also
inserted
some
things
,
in
answer
to
the
Objections
at
the
end
of
the
first
Part
,
out
of
that
noble
contemplative
Philosopher
,
Mr.
Lock
's
Essay
of
Humane
Vnderstanding
;
since
he
proceeds
upon
the
same
Principles
with
your
Lordship
,
and
hath
divers
very
new
and
useful
Notions
concerning
the
Manner
of
Attaining
the
Knowledge
of
all
Truths
,
as
well
Natural
,
as
Divine
,
and
the
Certainty
we
have
of
them
.
But
,
I
fear
,
I
have
trespass'd
too
much
upon
your
Lordship's
Patience
,
by
so
long
an
Epistle
,
and
therefore
shall
conclude
with
my
Prayers
for
your
Lordship's
Happiness
and
Health
,
since
I
am
confident
you
cannot
but
prove
more
useful
for
the
common
good
of
our
Church
and
State
,
in
this
high
and
publick
Station
to
which
Their
Majesties
have
thought
fit
to
call
you
,
than
you
could
have
been
in
a
more
private
Condition
:
And
I
hope
your
Lordship
will
look
upon
this
Dedication
as
a
small
Tribute
of
Gratitude
,
which
all
the
World
must
owe
you
for
your
Learned
and
not
Common
Undertakings
,
of
which
Obligation
none
ought
to
be
(
or
indeed
is
)
more
sensible
than
,
My
LORD
,
Your
Lordship
's
most
faithful
and
humble
Servant
,
JAMES
TYRRELL
.
THE
PREFACE
TO
THE
READER
,
By
way
of
INTRODUCTION
.
I
Suppose
you
are
not
ignorant
,
that
the
Study
of
Moral
Philosophy
,
or
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
was
preferred
(
by
Plato
,
Aristotle
,
Socrates
,
and
Tully
,
the
wisest
of
the
Heathen
Philosophers
)
above
all
other
knowledge
,
whether
Natural
or
Civil
,
and
that
deservedly
,
as
well
in
respect
of
its
usefulness
,
as
certainty
,
since
it
was
to
that
alone
(
as
most
agreeable
to
the
Natural
Faculties
of
Mankind
)
that
Men
,
before
they
were
assisted
by
Divine
Revelation
,
owed
the
Discovery
of
their
Natural
Duties
,
to
God
,
themselves
,
and
all
others
:
as
Cicero
hath
shewn
us
at
large
in
those
three
excellent
Treatises
,
De
Officiis
,
De
Finibus
,
and
De
Legibus
.
And
tho'
I
grant
we
Christians
have
now
clearer
and
higher
Discoveries
of
all
Moral
Duties
,
by
the
Light
of
the
Gospel
,
yet
is
the
Knowledge
of
Natural
Religion
,
or
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
still
of
great
use
to
us
,
as
well
for
the
confirmation
as
illustration
of
all
those
Duties
,
since
by
their
Knowledge
,
and
the
true
Principles
on
which
they
are
founded
,
we
may
be
convinced
,
that
God
requires
nothing
from
us
in
all
the
practical
Duties
of
revealed
Religion
,
but
our
reasonable
Service
;
that
is
,
what
is
really
our
own
interest
,
and
concerns
our
good
and
happiness
to
observe
,
as
the
best
and
most
perfect
Rule
of
Life
,
whether
God
had
ever
farther
enforced
them
or
not
by
any
revealed
Law
.
And
tho'
I
do
not
deny
,
that
our
Saviour
Jesus
Christ
hath
highly
advanced
and
improved
these
Natural
Laws
,
by
more
excellent
and
refined
Precepts
of
Humility
,
Charity
,
and
Self-denial
,
than
were
discovered
before
by
the
wisest
of
the
Heathen
Philosophers
,
especially
as
to
the
greater
assurance
we
have
of
that
grand
Motive
to
Religion
and
Vertue
,
the
immortality
of
the
Soul
,
or
a
Life
either
eternally
happy
or
miserable
,
when
this
is
ended
:
Yet
certainly
it
was
this
Law
of
Nature
,
or
Reason
alone
,
by
which
Mankind
was
not
only
to
live
,
but
also
to
be
judged
,
before
the
Law
given
to
Moses
,
and
it
must
be
for
not
living
up
to
this
Natural
Light
,
that
the
Heathens
shall
be
condemned
,
who
never
yet
heard
of
Christ
,
or
of
a
revealed
Religion
,
and
so
cannot
(
as
St.
Paul
expresly
declares
to
the
Romans
)
believe
on
him
of
whom
they
have
not
heard
,
Rom.
10.14
.
And
therefore
the
same
Apostle
,
in
the
first
Chapter
of
the
same
Epistle
,
appeals
to
the
knowledge
of
God
,
from
the
things
that
are
seen
,
that
is
,
the
Creation
of
the
World
,
as
the
foundation
of
all
Natural
Religion
,
and
their
falling
[
notwithstanding
this
knowledge
,
]
into
that
gross
Idolatry
they
professed
,
as
the
only
reason
,
why
God
gave
them
up
to
their
own
hearts
lusts
,
because
that
when
they
knew
God
,
they
glorified
him
not
as
God
,
neither
were
thankful
,
but
became
vain
in
their
imaginations
,
and
their
foolish
heart
was
darkned
,
v
21.
And
so
likewise
in
the
second
Chapter
,
the
Apostle
farther
tells
them
,
that
when
the
Gentiles
,
who
have
not
the
Law
,
do
by
nature
the
things
contained
in
the
Law
,
these
having
not
the
Law
,
are
a
Law
unto
themselves
,
shewing
the
work
of
the
Law
written
in
their
hearts
;
that
is
,
the
Law
of
Nature
or
Reason
,
as
the
main
substance
or
effect
of
the
Mosaical
Law
.
And
that
it
is
by
this
Law
alone
,
that
they
shall
be
judged
,
mark
what
immediately
follows
,
Their
consciences
bearing
witness
,
and
their
own
thoughts
(
or
reasonings
,
as
it
is
rather
to
be
rendred
)
in
the
mean
while
accusing
or
excusing
each
other
.
And
indeed
the
Apostle
supposes
the
Knowledge
of
God
as
a
Rewarder
of
Good
Works
,
as
the
foundation
of
all
Natural
,
as
well
as
revealed
Religion
,
and
the
first
Principle
of
saving
Faith
,
as
appears
in
his
Epistle
to
the
Hebrews
,
Chap.
11.
v.
6.
But
without
faith
it
is
impossible
to
please
him
,
for
he
that
comes
unto
God
must
first
believe
that
he
is
,
and
that
he
is
a
rewarder
of
all
them
that
diligently
seek
him
.
But
I
need
speak
no
more
of
Natural
Religion
,
and
how
necessary
it
is
to
the
true
Knowledge
of
the
Revealed
,
since
the
Reverend
and
learned
Dr.
Wilkins
,
Late
Bishop
of
Chester
,
hath
so
well
perform'd
that
Noble
Vndertaking
,
in
that
excellent
Posthumous
Treatise
,
published
by
the
Reverend
Dr.
Tillotson
,
now
Lord
Archbishop
of
Canterbury
,
to
which
nothing
needs
to
be
added
by
so
mean
a
Pen
as
mine
.
But
since
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
as
derived
from
God
the
Legislator
,
are
the
foundation
of
all
Moral
Philosophy
and
true
Politicks
,
as
being
those
which
are
appealed
to
in
all
Controversies
between
Civil
Soveraigns
,
and
also
are
the
main
Rules
of
those
mutual
Duties
between
Soveraigns
and
their
Subjects
:
It
is
worth
while
to
enquire
how
these
Laws
may
be
discovered
to
proceed
from
God
as
a
Legislator
.
Now
whereas
this
can
only
be
done
by
one
of
these
two
ways
,
(
viz.
)
Either
from
the
certain
and
manifest
Effects
and
Consequences
that
proceed
from
their
observation
;
Or
,
2dly
,
From
the
Causes
from
which
they
are
derived
.
The
former
of
these
hath
been
already
largely
treated
of
by
others
,
especially
by
the
most
learned
Hugo
Grotius
,
in
his
admirable
Work
,
De
Jure
Belli
&
Pacis
.
And
by
his
Brother
William
,
in
that
small
Posthumous
Treatise
,
De
Principiis
Juris
Naturalis
.
And
by
the
Iudicious
Monsieur
Puffendorf
,
in
his
learned
Treatise
,
De
Jure
Naturae
&
Gentium
:
As
also
by
our
own
Countryman
,
Dr.
Sharrock
.
Who
have
all
undertaken
to
prove
their
certainty
from
their
general
belief
and
reception
by
the
wisest
and
most
civilized
Nations
in
all
Ages
.
To
which
we
may
also
add
the
learned
Mr.
Selden
,
in
that
most
elaborate
Work
,
De
Jure
Gentium
juxta
placita
Hebraeorum
.
And
as
I
do
acknowledge
,
that
those
Great
Men
have
all
deserved
very
well
in
their
way
,
so
I
think
none
deserves
greater
commendation
,
than
that
excellent
Work
of
Grotius
the
Elder
,
which
as
it
was
the
first
in
its
kind
,
so
it
is
worthy
of
enduring
as
long
as
Vertue
and
Iustice
shall
be
in
esteem
among
Mankind
.
And
tho'
the
Objections
which
are
wont
to
be
brought
against
this
Method
of
proving
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
are
not
of
so
great
moment
,
as
to
render
it
altogether
fallacious
or
useless
,
as
some
would
have
it
to
be
;
yet
I
freely
acknowledge
they
can
chiefly
serve
to
convince
Men
of
sincere
and
honest
minds
,
and
who
are
naturally
disposed
to
Vertue
and
right
Reason
:
So
that
I
conceive
it
were
more
useful
,
as
well
as
certain
,
to
seek
for
a
firmer
and
clearer
Demonstration
thereof
,
from
a
strict
search
and
inquisition
into
the
Nature
of
things
,
and
also
of
our
own
selves
,
by
which
I
doubt
not
but
we
may
attain
not
only
to
a
true
Knowledge
of
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
but
also
of
that
true
Principle
on
which
they
are
founded
,
and
from
whence
they
are
all
derived
.
But
it
will
not
consist
with
the
narrow
bounds
of
a
Preface
,
to
propose
and
answer
all
the
Objections
that
may
be
made
against
their
Method
of
proving
the
Law
of
Nature
,
from
the
Consent
of
Nations
,
neither
perhaps
can
it
be
done
at
all
to
the
universal
satisfaction
even
of
indifferent
persons
;
since
it
may
be
still
urged
by
those
that
do
not
admit
them
,
that
altho'
some
Dictates
of
Right
Reason
may
be
indeed
approved
of
by
our
Vnderstandings
,
and
are
commonly
received
and
practised
by
most
Nations
for
their
general
usefulness
and
conveniency
:
Yet
it
must
be
acknowledged
,
that
there
is
still
required
the
Knowledge
of
God
as
a
Legislator
,
by
whose
Authority
alone
they
can
obtain
the
force
of
Laws
.
The
Proof
of
which
(
tho'
the
most
material
part
of
the
Question
)
hath
been
hitherto
omitted
,
or
but
slightly
touch'd
,
by
former
Writers
on
this
Subject
.
But
besides
the
Objections
of
some
of
the
Ancients
,
Mr.
Selden
and
Mr.
Hobbs
have
also
argued
against
this
Method
,
tho'
upon
divers
Principles
,
and
from
different
Designs
,
the
latter
intending
,
that
no
body
should
receive
these
Dictates
of
Reason
,
as
obligatory
to
outward
Actions
,
before
a
Supreme
Civil
Power
be
instituted
,
who
shall
ordain
them
to
be
observed
as
Laws
.
And
tho'
he
sometimes
vouchsafes
them
that
Title
,
yet
in
his
De
Cive
,
cap.
14.
he
tells
us
,
That
in
the
state
of
Nature
they
are
but
improperly
called
so
,
and
that
tho'
the
Laws
of
Nature
may
be
found
largely
described
in
the
Writings
of
Philosophers
,
yet
are
they
not
for
this
cause
to
be
called
Laws
,
any
more
than
the
Writings
or
Opinions
of
Lawyers
are
Laws
,
till
confirmed
and
made
so
by
the
Supreme
Powers
.
But
,
on
the
other
side
,
Mr.
Selden
more
fairly
finds
fault
with
the
want
of
Authority
in
these
Dictates
of
Reason
,
(
considered
only
as
such
)
that
he
may
from
hence
shew
us
a
necessity
of
recurring
to
the
Legislative
Power
of
God
,
and
that
he
may
thereby
make
out
,
that
those
Dictates
of
Reason
do
only
acquire
the
force
of
Laws
,
because
all
our
knowledge
of
them
is
to
be
derived
from
God
alone
,
who
when
he
makes
these
Rules
known
to
us
,
does
then
(
and
not
before
)
promulgate
them
to
us
as
Laws
.
And
so
far
I
think
he
is
in
the
right
,
and
hath
well
enough
corrected
our
common
Moralists
,
who
are
wont
to
consider
these
Dictates
of
Reason
as
Laws
,
without
any
sufficient
proof
,
that
they
have
all
the
Conditions
required
to
make
them
so
,
viz.
That
they
are
established
and
declared
to
us
by
God
as
a
Legislator
,
who
hath
annexed
to
them
sufficient
Rewards
and
Punishments
.
But
I
think
it
is
evident
,
that
if
these
Rational
Dictates
can
by
any
means
be
proved
to
proceed
from
the
Will
of
God
,
the
Author
of
Nature
,
as
Rules
for
all
our
Moral
Actions
,
they
will
not
need
any
Humane
Authority
,
much
less
the
Consent
or
Tradition
of
any
one
or
many
Nations
to
make
them
known
to
be
so
:
Therefore
,
tho'
I
grant
this
learned
Author
hath
taken
a
great
deal
of
pains
to
prove
from
divers
general
Traditions
of
the
Iewish
Rabbins
,
that
God
gave
certain
Commands
to
Adam
,
and
after
to
Noah
,
contained
in
these
seven
Precepts
,
called
by
his
Name
;
and
that
those
various
Quotations
this
learned
Author
hath
there
produced
,
do
clearly
prove
,
that
the
Iews
believe
,
that
all
Nations
whatever
,
altho'
they
do
not
receive
the
Laws
of
Moses
,
yet
are
obliged
to
observe
the
same
Moral
Laws
,
which
they
conceive
to
be
all
contained
under
the
Precepts
above
mentioned
;
and
tho'
this
Work
is
indeed
most
learnedly
and
judiciously
performed
,
and
may
prove
of
great
use
in
Christian
Theology
,
yet
I
must
confess
it
still
seems
to
me
,
that
he
hath
not
sufficiently
answered
his
own
Objection
concerning
Mens
Ignorance
,
or
want
of
Discovery
of
the
Law-giver
;
for
altho'
it
should
be
granted
,
that
those
Traditions
they
call
the
Precepts
of
Noah
,
should
be
never
so
generally
or
firmly
believed
by
the
whole
Iewish
Nation
,
yet
are
they
not
therefore
made
known
to
the
rest
of
Mankind
,
and
one
of
them
,
viz.
That
of
not
eating
any
Part
or
Member
of
a
living
Creature
,
is
justly
derided
and
received
with
scorn
by
all
other
Nations
.
So
that
it
seems
evident
to
me
,
that
the
unwritten
Traditions
of
the
learned
Men
of
any
one
Nation
,
cannot
be
looked
upon
as
a
sufficient
promulgation
made
by
God
as
a
Law-giver
,
of
those
Laws
or
Precepts
therein
contained
;
and
that
all
Nations
,
who
perhaps
have
never
heard
of
Adam
or
Noah
,
should
be
condemned
for
not
living
according
to
them
,
especially
when
we
consider
,
that
it
is
but
in
these
latter
Ages
of
the
World
,
that
the
Iewish
Rabbins
began
to
commit
these
Traditions
to
Writing
;
and
that
it
is
most
probable
the
ancient
Iews
knew
nothing
of
them
,
since
neither
Josephus
,
nor
Philo
Judaeus
,
take
any
notice
of
these
Precepts
in
their
Writings
.
Therefore
that
the
Divine
Authority
of
those
Dictates
of
Right
Reason
,
or
Rules
of
Life
,
called
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
may
more
evidently
be
demonstrated
to
all
considering
Men
,
it
seemed
to
me
the
best
and
fittest
Method
to
inquire
first
into
their
Natural
Causes
,
as
well
internal
as
external
,
remote
as
near
,
since
by
this
Series
of
Causes
and
Effects
,
we
may
at
last
be
more
easily
brought
to
the
knowledge
of
the
Will
of
God
,
their
first
Cause
,
from
whose
intrinsick
Perfections
and
extrinsick
Sanctions
,
by
fit
Rewards
and
due
Punishments
,
we
have
endeavoured
to
shew
,
that
as
well
their
Authority
as
Promulgation
is
derived
.
I
know
indeed
,
that
the
greatest
part
of
former
Writers
have
been
content
,
to
suppose
,
that
these
Dictates
of
Reason
,
and
all
Acts
conformable
thereunto
,
are
taught
us
by
Nature
,
or
at
most
do
only
affirm
in
general
,
that
they
proceed
from
God
,
without
shewing
us
which
way
,
or
the
manner
how
.
Therefore
it
seemed
highly
necessary
to
us
,
that
we
ought
to
inquire
more
exactly
how
the
force
of
Objects
from
without
,
and
of
our
own
Notions
or
Idea's
from
within
us
,
do
both
concur
towards
the
imprinting
,
and
fixing
these
Principles
in
our
Minds
,
as
Laws
derived
from
the
Will
of
God
himself
;
which
Work
if
it
be
well
performed
,
we
hope
may
prove
of
great
use
,
not
only
to
our
own
Nation
,
but
to
all
Mankind
;
because
from
hence
it
may
appear
,
both
by
what
means
Men's
Vnderstandings
,
may
attain
to
a
true
,
and
natural
Knowledge
of
the
Divine
Will
,
or
Laws
of
God
;
So
that
if
they
practise
them
not
,
they
may
be
left
without
excuse
:
And
this
Principle
will
likewise
serve
for
a
general
Rule
,
by
which
the
Municipal
Laws
of
every
Common-wealth
may
be
tryed
,
whether
they
are
Iust
,
and
Right
,
or
not
;
that
is
agreeable
with
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
and
so
may
be
corrected
,
and
amended
by
the
supreme
Powers
,
when-ever
they
have
deviated
from
this
great
End
of
the
common
Good
.
And
from
hence
may
also
be
demonstrated
,
that
there
is
somewhat
in
the
Nature
of
God
,
as
also
in
our
own
,
and
all
other
Men's
Natures
,
which
administers
present
Comfort
and
Satisfaction
to
our
Minds
,
from
good
Actions
,
as
also
firm
Hopes
,
or
Presages
of
a
future
Happiness
,
as
a
Reward
for
them
when
this
Life
is
ended
;
whereas
on
the
other
side
the
greatest
Misery
,
and
most
dismal
Fears
,
do
proceed
from
wicked
,
or
evil
Actions
,
from
whence
the
Conscience
seems
furnished
,
as
it
were
with
Whips
,
and
Scorpions
to
correct
and
punish
all
Vice
,
and
Improbity
:
So
that
it
may
from
hence
appear
,
that
Men
are
not
deluded
in
their
moral
Notions
,
either
by
Clergy-men
,
or
Politicians
.
I
grant
,
the
Platonists
undertake
to
dispatch
all
these
Difficulties
a
much
easier
way
,
only
by
supposing
certain
innate
Idea's
of
moral
Good
,
and
Evil
,
imprest
by
God
upon
the
Souls
of
Men.
But
I
must
indeed
confess
my self
not
yet
so
happy
,
as
to
be
able
thus
easily
to
attain
to
so
great
a
Perfection
,
as
the
Knowledge
of
the
Laws
of
Nature
by
this
natural
Instinct
,
or
Impression
:
And
it
doth
not
seem
to
me
either
safe
,
or
convenient
to
lay
the
whole
Stress
of
Natural
Religion
,
and
Morality
upon
an
Hypothesis
,
which
hath
been
exploded
by
all
Philosophers
,
except
themselves
,
and
which
can
never
alone
serve
to
convince
those
of
Epicurean
Principles
,
for
whom
we
chiefly
design
this
Work
:
But
whosoever
will
take
the
Pains
to
peruse
,
what
hath
been
written
,
against
these
innate
Idea's
by
the
inquisitive
,
and
sagacious
[
*
](A64084-e1460-b)
*
Dr.
Ioh.
Lock
.
Author
of
the
late
Essay
of
humane
Understanding
,
will
find
them
very
hard
,
if
not
impossible
to
be
proved
to
have
ever
been
innate
in
the
Souls
of
Men
,
before
they
came
into
the
World
:
Therefore
as
I
shall
not
take
upon
me
,
absolutely
to
deny
the
Being
,
or
Impossibility
of
such
Idea's
,
so
I
shall
not
make
use
of
any
Arguments
drawn
from
thence
in
this
Discourse
,
Though
I
heartily
wish
that
any
Reasons
,
or
Motives
,
which
may
serve
to
promote
true
Vertue
,
and
Piety
may
prevail
as
far
as
they
deserve
,
with
all
sincere
and
honest
Men.
And
the
same
Reasons
,
which
deterred
me
from
supposing
any
natural
Laws
innate
in
our
Minds
,
have
also
made
me
not
presently
suppose
,
as
many
do
(
without
any
due
proof
)
That
such
Idea's
have
existed
in
the
Divine
Intellect
from
all
Eternity
.
And
therefore
I
looked
upon
it
as
more
proper
,
and
necessary
to
begin
from
those
things
,
which
are
most
known
,
and
familiar
to
us
by
our
Senses
,
and
from
thence
to
prove
that
certain
Propositions
of
immutable
Truth
prescribing
our
Care
of
the
Happiness
,
or
common
Good
of
all
rational
Agents
considered
together
,
are
necessarily
imprinted
upon
our
Minds
from
the
Nature
of
things
,
and
which
the
first
Cause
perpetually
determines
so
to
act
upon
them
:
And
that
in
the
Terms
of
these
Propositions
,
are
intrinsecally
included
an
evident
Declaration
of
their
Truth
,
and
certainty
,
as
proceeding
from
God
the
first
Cause
in
the
very
intrinsick
Constitution
of
things
:
From
whence
it
will
be
also
manifest
,
that
such
practical
Propositions
are
truly
and
properly
Laws
,
as
being
declared
,
and
established
by
due
Rewards
,
and
Punishments
annexed
to
them
by
him
,
as
the
supreme
Legislator
.
But
after
it
shall
appear
,
that
the
Knowledge
of
these
Laws
,
and
a
Practice
conformable
to
them
are
the
highest
Perfection
,
or
most
happy
State
of
our
Rational
Natures
:
It
will
likewise
follow
,
that
a
Perfection
Analogous
to
this
Knowledge
,
and
a
Practice
conformable
to
these
Laws
,
must
necessarily
be
in
the
first
Cause
;
from
whence
proceeds
,
not
only
our
own
Natural
Perfections
,
but
also
the
most
wise
Ordination
of
all
Effects
without
us
,
for
the
common
Conservation
,
and
Perfection
of
the
whole
Natural
System
,
or
Vniverse
,
which
our
Eyes
daily
behold
:
For
that
is
look'd
upon
by
me
among
the
things
most
certainly
prov'd
,
That
it
must
be
first
known
,
what
Iustice
is
,
and
what
those
Laws
enjoyn
,
in
whose
Observation
all
Iustice
consists
,
before
we
can
distinctly
know
,
that
Iustice
is
to
be
attributed
to
God
,
and
that
his
Iustice
is
to
be
considered
by
us
as
a
Pattern
,
or
Example
for
us
to
imitate
.
Since
we
do
not
know
God
by
an
immediate
Intuition
of
his
Essence
,
or
Perfections
,
but
only
from
the
outward
Effects
of
his
Providence
,
first
known
by
our
Senses
,
and
Experience
:
Neither
is
it
safe
to
affix
Attributes
to
him
,
which
we
cannot
sufficiently
understand
,
or
make
out
from
things
without
us
.
Having
now
shewn
you
in
general
,
the
difference
between
our
Method
,
and
that
which
others
have
hitherto
followed
,
it
is
fit
we
here
declare
,
in
as
few
words
as
we
can
,
the
chief
Heads
of
those
things
which
we
have
delivered
in
this
Treatise
.
Supposing
therefore
those
natural
Principles
concerning
the
Laws
of
Motion
,
and
Rest
sufficiently
demonstrated
by
Naturalists
(
especially
such
as
depend
upon
Mathematical
Principles
)
since
we
have
only
here
undertaken
to
demonstrate
the
true
Grounds
of
Moral
Philosophy
,
and
to
deduce
them
from
some
supposed
Knowledge
of
Nature
,
and
as
they
refer
to
our
Moral
Practice
;
I
have
here
therefore
supposed
all
the
Effects
of
corporeal
Motions
,
which
are
natural
and
necessary
,
and
performed
without
any
Intervention
of
humane
Liberty
,
to
be
derived
from
the
Will
of
the
first
Cause
.
And
,
2dly
.
(
which
Mr.
H.
himself
likewise
in
his
Leviathan
admits
)
that
from
the
Consideration
,
and
Inquisition
into
these
Causes
,
and
from
the
Powers
,
and
Operations
of
natural
Bodies
,
may
be
discovered
the
Existence
of
one
Eternal
,
Infinite
,
Omnipotent
Being
,
which
we
call
God
.
So
that
every
Motion
impress'd
upon
the
Organs
of
our
Senses
,
whereby
the
Mind
is
carried
on
to
apprehend
things
without
us
,
and
to
give
a
right
Iudgment
upon
them
,
is
a
natural
Effect
;
which
by
the
Mediation
of
other
inferiour
Causes
,
owes
its
Original
to
the
first
Cause
.
From
whence
it
follows
,
that
God
by
these
natural
Motions
of
Causes
,
and
Effects
delineates
the
Idea's
,
or
Images
of
all
natural
and
moral
Actions
on
our
Minds
;
And
that
the
same
God
,
after
he
hath
thus
made
us
draw
various
Notions
,
from
the
same
Objects
,
does
then
excite
us
to
compare
them
with
each
other
,
and
then
joyn
them
together
,
and
so
determines
us
to
form
true
Propositions
of
the
things
,
thus
singly
received
and
understood
.
So
that
sometimes
a
thing
is
exposed
whole
,
and
all
at
once
to
our
View
,
and
sometimes
it
is
more
naturally
considered
successively
;
or
according
to
its
several
parts
;
And
the
Mind
thereby
perceives
that
the
Notion
of
awhole
,
signifies
the
same
,
with
that
of
all
the
several
Idea's
of
the
particular
parts
put
together
,
and
so
is
thence
carried
on
to
make
a
Proposition
of
the
Identity
of
the
whole
,
with
all
its
parts
.
And
can
truly
affirm
,
that
the
same
Causes
,
which
preserve
the
whole
,
must
also
conserve
all
its
constituent
parts
;
and
then
from
a
diligent
Contemplation
of
all
these
Propositions
,
(
which
may
justly
challenge
the
Title
of
the
more
general
Laws
of
Nature
;
)
we
may
observe
,
that
they
are
all
reduceable
to
one
Proposition
;
from
whose
fit
,
and
just
Explication
,
all
the
Limits
,
or
Exceptions
,
under
which
the
particular
Propositions
are
proposed
,
may
be
sought
for
,
and
discovered
,
as
from
the
Evidence
of
that
one
Proposition
,
which
may
be
reduced
into
this
,
or
the
like
Sence
,
(
viz.
)
The
endeavour
as
far
as
we
are
able
of
the
common
good
of
the
whole
System
of
Rational
Beings
conduces
,
as
far
as
lies
in
our
Power
to
the
good
of
all
its
several
Parts
or
Members
,
in
which
our
own
Felicity
is
also
contained
as
part
thereof
;
Whereas
the
Acts
opposite
to
this
Endeavour
,
do
bring
along
with
them
Effects
quite
opposite
thereunto
,
and
will
certainly
procure
our
own
Ruine
,
or
Misery
at
last
.
Therefore
the
whole
Summ
of
this
Proposition
,
may
be
reduced
to
these
three
Things
.
1.
That
which
concerns
the
Matter
of
it
,
to
wit
,
the
Knowledge
of
its
Terms
drawn
from
the
Nature
of
Things
.
2.
It
s
form
,
(
viz.
)
the
Connexion
of
those
Terms
contained
in
this
practical
Proposition
,
and
particularly
such
,
which
because
of
the
Rewards
,
and
Punishments
annexed
to
them
,
may
make
it
deserve
to
be
called
a
Divine
,
Natural
Law
,
as
proceeding
from
God
the
Authour
of
Nature
.
Or
,
3.
The
Deduction
of
all
other
natural
Laws
from
this
,
as
their
Foundation
,
and
Original
,
from
that
Respect
,
or
Proportion
they
bear
to
the
common
Good
,
or
happiest
State
of
the
whole
aggregate
Body
of
Rational
Beings
.
But
as
to
the
Explication
of
the
Terms
of
this
Proposition
:
I
hope
the
Reader
will
not
be
scandaliz'd
,
that
we
attribute
Reason
to
God
,
and
have
reckoned
him
as
the
Head
of
Rational
Beings
,
since
we
do
not
thereby
mean
,
that
Sort
of
Reason
which
consists
in
deducing
Conclusions
from
prior
Propositions
,
but
rather
that
absolute
Omniscience
,
and
perfect
Wisdom
,
which
we
understand
to
be
in
God
,
which
Cicero
himself
could
not
better
describe
,
than
by
the
Name
of
Adulta
Ratio
;
or
,
the
most
perfect
Reason
.
And
if
we
Mortals
can
know
,
or
apprehend
any
aright
,
thing
of
him
,
it
is
as
we
do
partake
of
some
part
,
though
in
an
infinitely
lower
Degree
of
that
only
true
Knowledge
,
and
Vnderstanding
.
So
that
if
we
can
once
rightly
judge
,
that
the
common
Good
of
Rational
Beings
,
is
the
greatest
of
all
others
;
it
is
no
doubt
true
,
and
no
otherwise
true
,
than
as
it
is
so
apprehended
by
the
Divine
Intellect
;
As
when
it
is
demonstrated
to
us
,
that
the
three
Angles
of
a
Triangle
,
are
equal
to
two
right
ones
,
no
doubt
,
but
the
Deity
it self
,
had
before
the
same
Idea
of
it
.
So
likewise
if
we
have
affirmed
,
that
we
can
contribute
any
thing
to
the
good
,
and
happiness
of
rational
Beings
,
by
our
Benevolence
towards
them
,
and
so
may
seem
to
suppose
,
that
there
is
a
certain
good
common
to
us
,
and
the
Deity
▪
and
which
we
may
some
way
serve
to
promote
:
We
desire
to
be
understood
not
as
if
we
imagin'd
,
that
by
our
testifying
our
Love
,
and
Honour
towards
God
,
in
any
internal
,
or
external
Acts
of
Worship
;
we
could
add
,
or
contribute
any
thing
to
his
infinite
Happiness
,
and
Perfections
;
but
only
as
judging
it
more
gratefull
,
and
agreeable
to
his
Nature
,
if
by
our
Deeds
we
express
our
Gratitude
and
Obedience
to
him
,
by
imitating
him
in
our
Care
of
the
common
good
of
Mankind
,
than
if
we
deny
his
Being
,
or
blaspheme
his
Attributes
,
and
violate
,
or
contemn
his
Laws
:
So
likewise
,
if
in
our
Thoughts
,
Words
and
Actions
,
we
express
our
Worship
,
and
Love
towards
him
,
we
doubt
not
but
it
is
more
pleasing
,
and
agreeable
to
his
Divine
Nature
,
than
if
by
the
contrary
Actions
we
should
signifie
our
neglect
,
or
hatred
of
him
.
For
if
we
abstractively
compare
any
two
rational
Natures
together
,
we
must
acknowledge
a
greater
Similitude
,
when
one
of
them
agrees
,
and
co-operates
with
the
other
,
than
if
we
should
suppose
a
Disagreement
or
Discord
between
them
,
or
that
the
End
or
Design
intended
by
the
one
should
be
crossed
,
or
opposed
by
the
other
.
Neither
do
I
see
what
can
hinder
,
but
that
the
same
may
be
affirmed
,
if
one
of
these
rational
Natures
be
supposed
to
be
God
,
and
the
other
only
Man
.
Therefore
,
as
it
is
known
by
our
common
Sense
,
that
it
is
more
gratefull
to
any
Man
to
be
beloved
,
and
honoured
,
than
to
be
hated
,
and
contemned
.
So
it
may
be
found
by
a
manifest
Analogy
of
reason
,
that
it
is
more
gratefull
to
God
,
the
Head
of
rational
Beings
to
be
belov'd
,
and
honour'd
by
the
Service
and
Worship
of
us
Men
,
than
to
be
hated
,
and
contemned
.
For
as
the
Desire
of
being
beloved
argueth
no
Imperfection
in
us
;
so
likewise
in
God
,
it
is
so
far
from
giving
the
least
Suspicion
thereof
,
that
on
the
contrary
,
it
rather
argues
his
Goodness
,
since
our
Natures
are
perfected
,
to
the
highest
Degree
they
are
capable
of
,
by
our
Love
to
him
,
and
Obedience
to
his
Commands
.
So
that
,
when
we
speak
of
any
Good
,
common
to
us
with
the
Divine
Nature
,
it
is
only
to
be
understood
Analogically
;
for
those
things
which
we
perceive
to
conserve
,
or
perfect
our
own
Nature
we
call
gratefull
to
us
,
that
is
,
as
they
render
the
Mind
pleased
,
and
full
of
Ioy
,
Pleasure
,
and
Satisfaction
:
And
though
we
confess
we
cannot
contribute
any
thing
to
the
infinite
Perfection
of
the
Deity
,
Yet
since
this
Ioy
,
or
Complacency
proceeding
from
our
Love
,
and
Service
towards
him
may
be
conceived
without
any
Imperfection
,
they
I
think
may
be
safely
attributed
to
his
Divine
Nature
,
and
look'd
upon
as
a
sort
of
good
endeavoured
by
us
for
him
,
since
God
esteems
our
Love
,
and
Service
as
the
only
Tribute
we
can
pay
him
,
and
therefore
he
hath
inseparably
annexed
the
highest
Rewards
to
this
Love
of
himself
(
as
shall
be
proved
in
this
following
Discourse
)
which
certainly
he
would
never
have
done
,
unless
it
had
been
his
Will
,
that
we
should
thus
love
,
and
worship
him
.
So
that
though
I
grant
,
that
the
Divine
Good
or
Happiness
is
not
at
all
advanced
by
our
Worship
of
him
;
yet
will
not
this
at
all
derogate
from
our
definition
of
endeavouring
the
Common
good
of
Rational
Beings
,
which
may
be
made
out
by
these
following
Considerations
.
1.
That
all
Rational
Beings
,
or
Agents
are
,
and
must
be
considered
together
,
as
naturally
,
and
necessarily
constituting
one
intellectual
System
,
or
Society
;
because
they
agree
together
,
to
prosecute
one
chief
End
,
Viz.
The
good
of
the
Vniverse
,
or
World
,
especially
of
that
intellectual
System
;
by
the
fittest
Means
applicable
to
that
End
since
,
whilst
they
are
truly
rational
,
they
cannot
differ
in
judging
what
is
that
best
End
;
nor
avoid
chusing
the
same
necessary
Means
,
leading
thereunto
.
2.
That
although
God
,
the
Head
of
this
intellectual
System
,
be
indeed
uncapable
of
any
Addition
to
his
infinite
Happiness
,
and
Perfection
,
yet
the
whole
System
(
in
as
much
as
it
includes
all
finite
rational
Beings
)
is
capable
of
Improvement
in
these
its
finite
parts
,
which
Improvement
God
cannot
only
desire
,
but
ever
did
,
and
will
promote
both
by
his
own
Power
,
as
also
by
that
of
all
subordinate
voluntary
Agents
,
whereby
God's
Essential
Goodness
becomes
manifest
to
us
:
And
the
good
of
the
whole
System
may
reasonably
be
judged
as
grateful
,
or
pleasing
to
God
the
head
thereof
,
although
it
can
add
nothing
to
himself
:
thus
in
Embryons
all
the
other
Members
daily
grow
,
and
improve
,
after
the
Head
or
Brain
is
supposed
to
have
attained
its
full
bigness
.
These
voluntary
,
or
free
Actions
of
the
subordinate
Agents
,
when
they
concur
with
God's
wisdom
and
goodness
,
are
naturally
and
evidently
known
to
be
more
pleasing
(
as
being
rewarded
by
him
)
than
malevolent
Actions
opposite
to
this
chief
end
,
which
fight
both
against
God
and
Men
;
nor
does
the
consideration
of
God's
rewarding
such
good
Actions
,
imply
any
addition
to
his
Divine
Perfections
.
So
that
our
Benevolence
towards
God
,
and
consequently
,
our
worship
of
him
,
is
but
our
free
acknowledgment
,
that
he
naturally
,
and
essentially
is
(
what
he
ever
was
and
will
be
)
the
same
infinite
,
good
,
and
wise
Disposer
,
and
Governour
of
the
whole
System
of
rational
Beings
;
and
this
our
benevolence
by
giving
him
Glory
,
Love
,
Reverence
,
and
Obedience
fulfils
all
the
Duties
of
humanity
towards
those
of
our
own
kind
,
which
answers
both
the
Tables
of
the
moral
,
or
natural
Law
;
and
in
this
consent
of
our
minds
with
the
divine
Intellect
,
consists
that
compleat
harmony
of
the
Vniverse
of
intellectual
Beings
.
The
great
influence
of
these
Principles
upon
all
the
parts
of
natural
Religion
,
may
be
more
fully
express'd
and
made
out
;
by
these
following
considerations
.
1.
The
voluntary
acknowledgment
and
consent
of
our
minds
to
the
Perfections
of
the
divine
Nature
and
Actions
,
include
the
agreement
,
and
concurrence
of
our
chief
Faculties
,
viz.
The
understanding
,
and
will
,
therewith
;
and
moreover
,
naturally
excite
all
our
Affections
to
comply
with
them
,
and
so
strongly
dispose
us
in
our
future
Life
,
and
Actions
,
to
compose
our selves
to
the
imitation
thereof
,
to
the
utmost
of
our
Abilities
;
particularly
these
Principles
naturally
produce
in
us
.
First
,
Praises
,
and
Thanksgivings
to
God
,
private
and
publick
,
for
goods
already
done
to
our selves
,
or
others
,
wherein
the
Essence
of
Prayer
is
contained
.
2.
Hence
also
arise
Hope
,
Affiance
,
or
Trust
in
God
,
which
I
willingly
acknowledge
is
fullest
of
assurance
,
when
founded
not
only
on
observations
,
or
past
experience
of
Providence
;
but
hath
also
revealed
promises
annex'd
,
relating
to
future
Good
.
3.
To
conclude
,
when
our
Acknowledgment
,
and
high
esteem
of
the
divine
Attributes
move
us
to
the
imitation
thereof
,
we
must
needs
thereby
arise
to
those
high
degrees
of
Charity
,
or
the
endeavour
of
the
greatest
publick
good
which
we
observe
in
God
to
prosecute
,
and
such
Charity
imports
not
only
exact
Iustice
to
all
,
but
that
overflowing
bounty
,
tenderness
and
sympathy
with
others
,
beyond
which
humane
Nature
cannot
arrive
;
because
these
not
only
harmoniously
consent
with
the
like
Perfections
in
God
,
but
also
co-operate
with
him
,
to
the
improvement
of
the
finite
parts
of
the
rational
System
,
whereof
he
is
the
infinite
,
yet
Sympathizing
head
,
who
declares
he
takes
all
that
is
done
to
the
Members
of
this
intellectual
Society
,
as
done
to
himself
.
Nevertheless
,
I
profess
my self
to
understand
this
Sympathy
,
or
compassion
in
God
in
such
a
Sence
only
,
as
it
is
understood
in
Holy
Writ
,
for
that
infinite
concern
for
the
good
of
his
best
Creatures
,
which
is
contained
in
his
infinite
goodness
,
and
is
a
real
perfection
of
his
Nature
,
not
implying
any
mistake
of
others
for
himself
,
nor
any
capacity
of
being
lessened
or
hurt
by
the
power
of
any
mans
malice
,
but
yet
fully
answers
,
(
nay
infinitely
exceeds
)
that
solicitous
care
,
and
concern
for
the
good
of
others
,
which
Charity
and
Compassion
work
in
the
best
of
men
.
In
short
,
if
the
Reader
will
take
the
pains
to
peruse
the
Three
first
Chapters
of
this
Discourse
,
he
will
find
,
that
we
have
,
in
explaining
the
terms
of
this
Proposition
,
not
only
given
a
bare
interpretation
of
Words
,
but
also
have
proposed
the
true
Notions
,
and
Natures
of
those
things
,
from
whence
they
are
taken
;
as
far
as
is
necessary
for
our
purpose
,
and
may
observe
that
by
one
,
and
the
same
labour
we
have
directly
,
and
immediately
explained
the
Power
,
and
necessity
of
those
humane
Actions
,
which
are
required
to
the
common
Happiness
of
all
men
,
and
also
to
the
private
good
,
and
necessity
of
particular
Persons
.
Altho'
it
seemed
most
convenient
to
use
such
general
words
,
which
may
in
some
Sence
be
attributed
to
the
Divine
Majesty
,
and
to
have
done
it
with
that
Design
,
that
by
the
help
of
this
Analogy
thus
supposed
,
not
only
our
obligation
to
Piety
and
Vertue
,
but
also
the
Nature
of
Divine
Iustice
,
and
Dominion
may
be
from
hence
better
understood
.
But
as
for
what
concerns
the
form
of
this
Proposition
it
is
evident
,
that
it
is
wholly
practical
,
as
that
which
determines
concerning
the
certain
effects
of
humane
Actions
.
But
it
is
also
to
be
noted
,
that
altho'
the
words
,
conduces
,
or
renders
,
in
either
of
these
Propositions
,
are
put
in
the
present
Tense
;
Yet
it
is
not
limited
to
any
time
present
,
but
abstracts
from
it
:
And
because
its
truth
doth
chiefly
depend
upon
the
Identity
of
the
whole
,
with
the
parts
;
it
is
as
plainly
true
of
all
future
time
,
and
is
as
often
used
by
us
in
this
Discourse
with
respect
to
future
,
as
well
as
present
Actions
.
And
therefore
this
Proposition
is
more
fit
for
our
purpose
,
because
built
upon
no
particular
Hypothesis
;
for
it
doth
not
suppose
men
born
in
a
Civil
State
,
nor
yet
out
of
it
,
neither
see
any
Kindred
or
Relation
to
be
among
men
,
as
derived
from
the
same
common
Parents
,
as
we
are
taught
by
the
Holy
Scriptures
;
since
the
obligation
of
the
Laws
of
Nature
is
to
be
demonstrated
to
those
who
do
not
yet
acknowledge
them
:
Neither
on
the
other
side
doth
it
suppose
,
(
as
Mr.
H.
doth
in
his
de
Cive
)
a
great
many
men
already
grown
,
and
sprung
up
out
of
the
Earth
like
Mushrooms
;
But
our
Proposition
,
and
all
those
things
which
we
have
deduced
from
it
,
might
have
been
understood
,
and
acknowledged
by
the
first
Parents
of
mankind
,
if
they
had
only
considered
themselves
together
with
God
,
and
their
Posterity
which
was
to
come
into
the
world
.
Neither
may
it
less
easily
be
understood
and
admitted
by
those
Nations
,
which
have
not
yet
heard
of
Adam
and
Eve
.
Neither
may
it
be
amiss
to
observe
,
concerning
the
Sence
of
this
Proposition
,
that
in
the
same
words
in
which
the
Cause
of
the
greatest
,
and
best
effect
is
laid
down
,
there
is
also
delivered
in
short
the
means
to
the
chiefest
end
,
because
the
effect
of
a
rational
Agent
,
after
it
is
conceived
in
its
mind
,
and
that
it
hath
determined
to
bestow
its
endeavours
in
producing
it
,
is
called
the
End
,
and
the
Acts
,
or
Causes
by
which
it
endeavours
to
effect
it
,
are
called
the
means
;
and
from
this
observation
,
may
be
shown
a
true
method
of
reducing
all
those
things
which
Moral
Philosophers
have
spoken
about
the
means
to
the
best
end
,
into
natural
Theorems
concerning
the
Power
of
humane
Actions
,
in
producing
such
Effects
;
and
in
this
form
,
they
may
more
easily
be
examined
whether
they
are
true
,
or
not
,
and
may
be
more
evidently
demonstrated
so
to
be
;
and
also
we
may
hence
learn
by
the
like
Reason
,
how
easily
all
true
knowledge
of
the
force
of
those
natural
Causes
,
which
we
may
any
way
apply
to
our
use
,
does
suggest
fit
Mediums
for
the
attaining
of
the
end
intended
,
and
so
may
be
applyed
to
Practice
according
to
occasion
:
Lastly
,
from
thence
it
appears
,
that
either
of
these
Propositions
,
which
we
have
now
laid
down
,
do
so
far
approach
to
the
nature
of
a
Law
,
as
they
respect
an
end
truly
worthy
of
it
,
viz.
The
common
good
of
all
rational
Beings
;
or
else
(
if
you
please
to
word
it
otherwise
)
the
Honour
,
or
Worship
of
God
,
conjoyned
with
the
common
Good
,
and
Happiness
of
mankind
.
And
tho'
it
doth
not
yet
appear
,
that
this
Proposition
is
a
Law
,
because
the
Lawgiver
is
not
yet
mentioned
,
nevertheless
I
doubt
not
but
you
will
find
in
the
Body
of
this
Discourse
,
that
it
hath
all
things
necessary
to
render
it
so
,
viz.
God
,
considered
as
a
Legislator
,
and
his
Will
or
Commands
sufficiently
declared
to
us
,
as
a
Law
from
the
very
constitution
of
our
Natures
,
as
also
of
other
things
without
us
;
and
likewise
established
by
sufficient
Rewards
,
and
Punishments
both
in
this
life
,
and
the
next
;
neither
do
we
suppose
it
can
be
more
evidently
proved
,
that
God
is
the
Author
of
all
things
,
than
that
he
is
also
the
Author
of
this
Proposition
,
concerning
the
common
good
of
rational
Beings
,
or
concerning
his
own
Honour
,
and
Worship
conjoyned
with
the
common
Good
of
mankind
:
And
tho'
I
confess
we
have
been
more
exact
,
and
have
dwelt
longer
upon
the
Rewards
,
that
we
may
expect
from
the
observation
of
this
Law
,
than
upon
the
Punishments
,
which
are
appointed
for
the
breach
of
it
;
and
tho'
I
know
the
Civilians
have
rather
placed
the
Sanction
of
Civil
Laws
in
Punishments
,
than
Rewards
;
yet
I
hope
we
have
not
offended
,
tho'
we
a
little
deviate
from
their
Sense
,
and
make
it
part
of
the
Sanction
of
this
Law
,
that
it
is
established
by
Rewards
,
as
well
as
Punishments
;
since
it
seems
more
agreeable
to
the
Nature
of
things
,
whose
foot-steps
are
strictly
to
be
followed
,
to
consider
the
positive
Idea's
of
Causes
,
and
Effects
in
our
minds
,
and
which
do
not
receive
either
Negations
,
or
Privations
by
our
outward
Senses
;
and
our
Affections
ought
rather
to
be
moved
by
the
Love
,
or
Hopes
,
of
a
present
,
or
future
Good
;
than
by
the
Fear
,
or
hatred
of
the
contrary
Evil
:
For
as
no
man
is
said
to
Love
,
Life
,
Health
,
and
those
grateful
motions
of
the
Nerves
,
or
Spirits
which
are
called
corporeal
Pleasures
,
because
he
may
avoid
Death
,
Sickness
,
or
Pain
;
but
rather
from
their
own
intrinsick
Goodness
,
or
Agreeableness
with
our
humane
Natures
;
so
likewise
no
rational
Man
desires
the
Perfections
of
the
mind
,
to
wit
,
the
more
ample
and
distinct
knowledge
of
the
most
noble
Objects
,
the
most
happy
State
of
rational
Beings
,
can
only
give
him
;
and
all
this
,
not
only
that
he
▪
may
avoid
the
mischiefs
of
Ignorance
,
Envy
,
and
Malevolence
;
but
because
of
that
great
Happiness
,
which
he
finds
by
experience
to
spring
from
such
vertuous
Actions
,
and
Habits
,
and
which
render
it
most
ungrateful
to
us
,
to
be
deprived
of
them
;
and
so
the
Causes
also
of
such
Privations
are
judg'd
highly
grievous
,
and
troublesome
:
From
whence
it
also
appears
,
that
even
Civil
Laws
themselves
,
when
they
are
established
by
Punishments
,
(
e.
g.
)
by
the
fear
of
Death
,
or
loss
of
Goods
,
(
if
we
consider
the
thing
truly
)
do
indeed
force
men
to
yield
obedience
to
them
from
the
love
of
Life
,
or
Riches
;
which
they
find
can
only
be
preserved
by
their
observation
.
So
that
the
avoiding
of
Death
,
and
Poverty
is
but
in
other
words
,
love
of
Life
,
and
Riches
;
as
he
who
by
two
Negatives
would
say
he
would
not
want
Life
,
means
no
more
,
but
that
he
desires
to
enjoy
it
:
To
which
we
may
likewise
add
,
that
Civil
Laws
themselves
ought
to
be
considered
from
the
end
which
the
Law-makers
regard
in
making
them
,
as
also
which
all
good
Subjects
design
in
observing
them
;
to
wit
,
the
publick
Good
of
the
Commonwealth
(
part
of
which
is
communicated
to
all
of
them
in
particular
,
and
so
brings
with
it
a
natural
Reward
of
their
obedience
,
)
rather
than
from
the
Punishments
they
threaten
,
by
whose
fear
some
only
are
deterred
from
violating
them
;
and
those
of
the
worst
,
and
most
wicked
sort
of
Men.
But
tho'
we
have
shewn
,
that
the
Sum
of
all
the
Precepts
or
Laws
of
Nature
,
as
also
of
the
Sanctions
annexed
to
them
,
are
briefly
contained
in
this
Proposition
;
yet
it
s
Subject
,
is
still
but
an
endeavour
to
the
utmost
of
our
Power
,
of
the
common
Good
of
the
whole
System
of
rational
Beings
,
this
limitation
of
the
utmost
of
our
Power
implies
,
that
we
do
not
think
our selves
capable
of
adding
any
thing
to
the
Divine
Perfections
which
we
willingly
acknowledge
to
be
beyond
our
Power
.
So
that
here
is
at
once
exprest
both
our
Love
towards
God
,
and
Good
will
to
mankind
,
who
are
the
constituent
parts
of
this
System
.
But
the
Predicate
of
this
Proposition
is
,
that
which
conduces
to
the
good
of
all
its
singular
Parts
,
or
Members
,
and
in
which
our
own
Happiness
,
is
contained
as
one
part
thereof
.
Since
all
those
good
things
,
which
we
can
do
for
others
,
are
but
the
Effects
of
this
endeavour
:
so
that
the
Sum
of
all
those
Goods
(
of
which
also
our
own
Felicity
consists
)
can
never
be
mist
of
either
in
this
Life
,
or
a
better
,
as
the
Reward
of
our
obedience
thereunto
.
So
to
the
contrary
Actions
,
Misery
in
this
Life
,
or
in
that
to
come
,
are
the
Punishments
naturally
due
.
But
the
Connexion
of
the
Predicate
with
the
Subject
,
is
both
the
Foundation
of
the
truth
of
this
Proposition
;
and
also
a
Demonstration
of
the
natural
Connexion
,
between
this
obedience
,
and
the
Rewards
,
as
also
between
the
Transgression
,
and
the
Punishments
.
From
whence
the
Readers
will
easily
observe
,
the
true
Reason
for
which
this
practical
Proposition
,
and
all
others
which
may
be
drawn
from
thence
,
do
oblige
all
rational
Creatures
to
know
,
and
understand
it
;
whilst
other
Propositions
(
suppose
Geometrical
ones
)
tho'
found
out
by
right
Reason
,
and
so
are
Truths
proceeding
from
God
himself
,
yet
do
not
oblige
men
to
any
Act
,
or
Practice
pursuant
to
them
;
but
may
be
safely
neglected
by
most
Men
,
to
whom
the
Science
of
Geometry
may
not
be
necessary
;
whereas
the
Effects
of
the
endeavour
of
the
common
Good
,
do
intimately
concern
the
Happiness
of
all
mankind
,
(
upon
whose
joynt
or
concurrent
Wills
,
and
Endeavours
,
every
single
mans
Happiness
doth
after
some
sort
depend
)
so
that
this
Endeavour
,
can
by
no
means
be
neglected
without
endangering
the
losing
all
those
hopes
of
Happiness
,
which
God
hath
made
known
to
us
,
from
our
own
Nature
and
the
Nature
of
things
;
and
so
hath
sufficiently
declared
the
Connexion
of
Rewards
and
Punishments
,
with
all
our
Moral
Actions
,
from
whose
Authority
,
as
well
this
general
Proposition
,
as
all
others
,
which
are
contained
in
it
,
must
be
understood
to
become
Laws
.
So
that
from
the
terms
of
this
Proposition
,
it
is
apparent
,
that
the
adequate
,
and
immediate
effect
of
our
thus
acting
,
and
concerning
which
this
Law
is
established
;
is
whatever
is
grateful
to
God
,
and
beneficial
to
Men
,
that
is
,
the
natural
Good
of
all
the
parts
of
the
whole
System
of
rational
Beings
;
Nay
further
,
is
the
greatest
of
all
Goods
,
which
we
can
imagine
,
or
perform
for
them
;
since
it
is
greater
than
the
like
good
of
any
particular
part
,
or
Member
of
the
same
System
.
And
farther
,
it
is
thereby
sufficiently
declared
,
that
the
Felicity
of
particular
Persons
,
is
derived
from
this
happy
State
of
the
whole
System
;
as
the
Nutrition
of
any
one
Member
of
an
Animal
is
produced
by
a
due
Distribution
of
the
whole
Mass
of
Blood
diffused
through
all
the
parts
of
the
Body
.
From
whence
it
appears
,
that
this
Effect
must
needs
be
the
best
,
since
it
shews
us
,
that
not
the
private
Felicity
of
any
single
Man
is
the
principal
end
of
God
the
Legislator
,
or
ought
to
be
so
of
any
one
,
who
will
truly
obey
his
Will
;
and
by
a
Parity
of
reason
it
also
appears
,
that
those
humane
Actions
,
which
from
their
own
natural
force
,
and
Efficacy
are
apt
to
promote
the
common
Good
,
are
certainly
better
,
than
those
which
do
only
serve
the
private
Good
of
any
one
Man
,
and
that
by
the
same
proportion
,
as
a
common
Good
is
greater
than
a
private
:
So
likewise
those
Actions
,
which
take
the
nearest
way
to
attain
this
effect
as
an
End
,
are
called
Right
,
because
of
their
natural
Similitude
with
a
right
or
straight
line
,
which
is
always
the
shortest
between
the
two
Terms
.
But
the
same
Actions
,
when
compared
with
a
Natural
,
or
positive
Law
,
as
a
rule
of
Life
,
or
Manners
,
and
are
found
conformable
to
it
,
are
called
morally
good
,
and
also
right
;
that
is
,
agreeable
to
the
Rule
,
but
the
Rule
it self
is
called
right
,
or
straight
,
as
it
shews
the
nearest
way
to
the
End
.
But
I
shall
referr
you
for
the
clearer
Explication
of
these
things
,
to
what
we
have
farther
said
concerning
them
in
the
Discourse
its
self
,
especially
in
the
Second
part
,
wherein
we
prove
against
Mr.
H's
Principle
,
that
there
is
a
true
Natural
,
and
Moral
Good
antecedent
to
Civil
Laws
.
But
however
,
it
may
not
be
amiss
to
give
you
in
short
the
method
which
we
take
to
prove
,
that
this
Law
of
endeavouring
the
common
Good
,
is
really
and
indeed
,
and
not
Metaphorically
a
Law
.
1.
This
general
Supposition
being
premised
,
That
all
particular
Persons
who
can
either
promote
or
oppose
this
common
Good
are
parts
of
that
whole
Body
of
mankind
,
which
is
either
preserved
,
or
prejudiced
by
their
endeavours
.
We
shall
not
now
descend
to
the
particular
Proofs
as
they
are
drawn
from
the
Causes
of
such
Actions
of
which
we
have
partly
treated
in
the
Chapter
of
humane
Nature
,
and
partly
from
their
natural
Effects
and
Consequences
,
of
which
we
have
largely
discoursed
,
in
the
Chapter
of
the
Obligation
of
the
Law
of
Nature
;
as
also
in
the
Second
part
in
our
Observation
on
Mr.
H's
Principles
;
all
which
may
nevertheless
be
reduced
to
these
plain
Propositions
.
1.
As
I
have
observed
it
is
manifest
,
that
our
Felicity
,
or
highest
Reward
is
essentially
connected
by
God
the
Legislator
,
with
the
most
full
,
and
constant
exercise
of
our
natural
Powers
employed
about
the
noblest
Objects
,
and
greatest
Effects
they
can
be
capable
of
as
proportioned
to
them
;
from
whence
it
may
be
gathered
,
that
all
men
endued
with
these
Faculties
are
naturally
obliged
under
the
penalty
of
losing
,
or
missing
of
this
their
Happiness
,
to
exercise
those
Powers
about
the
worthiest
Objects
,
(
viz.
)
God
,
and
Mankind
.
Nor
can
it
be
long
doubted
,
whether
our
Faculties
may
be
more
happily
exercised
in
maintaining
Friendship
,
or
Enmity
with
them
;
for
I
,
think
it
is
certain
,
there
can
be
no
Neutral
State
in
which
God
and
Men
,
can
neither
be
beloved
,
nor
hated
;
or
in
which
we
can
stand
so
far
Neuters
,
as
neither
to
do
things
gratefull
,
nor
ungratefull
to
them
.
But
if
it
be
granted
,
that
there
is
a
manifest
Necessity
(
if
we
will
be
truly
happy
)
of
preserving
Amity
both
with
God
and
Men
,
here
is
thereby
presently
declared
the
Sanction
of
this
general
Law
of
Nature
,
which
we
are
now
enquiring
into
,
for
this
alone
establishes
all
Natural
Religion
,
and
also
all
those
things
,
which
are
necessary
to
the
Happiness
and
preservation
of
Mankind
,
which
are
,
besides
Piety
towards
God
,
1.
A
peaceable
Commerce
and
Agreement
of
divers
Nations
,
which
are
treated
of
by
the
Law
of
Nations
,
which
is
but
a
Branch
or
subordinate
Member
of
this
great
Law
of
Nature
.
2.
The
Constitution
,
and
Conservation
of
a
Civil
Society
,
or
Common-wealth
,
which
is
the
Scope
of
all
Civil
Laws
.
And
,
3.
The
Continuance
of
Domestick
Relations
,
and
private
Friendships
,
concerning
which
the
general
Rules
of
Ethicks
,
as
also
the
more
particular
ones
of
Oeconomies
do
prescribe
.
And
therefore
,
we
have
put
together
many
things
in
the
Chapter
of
humane
Nature
,
by
which
all
particular
Persons
of
sound
Minds
are
some
way
rendred
capable
of
so
large
a
Society
,
and
are
either
more
nearly
,
or
remotely
disposed
to
it
.
And
we
do
here
intreat
the
Reader
,
that
he
will
not
consider
those
things
,
each
of
them
singly
,
or
apart
,
but
all
together
;
since
from
all
of
them
conjoyned
,
he
may
raise
a
sufficient
Argument
to
prove
the
Existence
,
and
evince
the
Sanction
of
this
most
general
Law
of
Nature
,
and
that
Men
will
necessarily
fail
of
their
Happiness
,
which
chiefly
consists
in
the
Adequate
,
or
proper
Exercise
of
their
rational
Faculties
,
unless
they
will
exercise
them
in
cultivating
this
Amity
,
or
Love
both
with
God
,
and
Men
;
to
which
Ends
they
are
before
all
other
Animals
particularly
adapted
.
But
from
the
Effects
of
such
Actions
conducing
to
the
Common
good
of
Rational
Beings
,
we
have
also
further
shewn
in
the
Chapter
of
the
Obligation
of
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
that
this
Sanction
by
sufficient
Rewards
,
and
Punishments
,
is
most
commonly
connected
with
such
Actions
.
And
it
is
manifest
,
that
in
the
first
place
God
,
as
the
best
and
wisest
of
Rational
Beings
is
to
be
loved
,
and
honoured
by
such
Actions
or
Endeavours
,
as
that
the
Goods
,
and
Fortunes
of
all
innocent
Persons
of
what
Nation
soever
,
are
thereby
secured
as
far
as
lies
in
our
Power
,
and
all
things
profitable
for
particular
Persons
,
procured
according
to
the
Proportion
they
bear
to
the
good
of
the
whole
Body
of
Mankind
;
so
that
this
Law
will
not
permit
any
thing
to
be
done
,
which
the
Care
of
the
whole
doth
not
allow
:
Nor
can
any
thing
be
supposed
more
worthy
a
rational
Creature
,
and
from
whence
greater
Effects
can
proceed
,
than
a
Will
always
propeuse
towards
the
good
of
this
whole
Body
governed
by
the
Conduct
of
a
Right
Vnderstanding
.
Therefore
,
since
it
can
certainly
be
foreknown
,
that
such
Effects
will
follow
from
this
Endeavour
,
no
Man
can
be
ignorant
that
all
the
Ioys
,
and
present
Comforts
of
true
Piety
,
are
therein
contained
,
together
with
the
hopes
of
a
blessed
Immortality
,
besides
those
many
Conveniencies
of
Peace
,
and
commerce
with
those
of
other
Nations
,
and
all
those
Emoluments
both
of
Civil
,
and
Domestick
Government
,
and
private
Friendships
which
are
connected
with
this
Endeavour
,
as
the
common
Rewards
thereof
,
and
which
cannot
by
any
Means
within
our
Power
be
otherwise
obtained
.
So
that
,
he
who
neglects
the
Care
of
the
Common
good
,
doth
also
reject
the
true
Causes
of
his
own
Felicity
,
and
embraces
those
of
his
Misery
,
as
a
Punishment
due
to
his
Folly
.
In
short
,
since
it
is
manifest
from
the
Nature
of
things
,
that
the
highest
Happiness
which
we
can
procure
for
our
selves
,
proceeds
from
our
Care
both
of
Piety
to
God
,
and
Love
and
Peace
with
Men.
And
that
the
Endeavour
of
these
can
only
be
found
in
his
Soul
,
who
truly
studieth
the
common
Good
of
all
Rational
Beings
,
it
is
also
evident
,
that
the
greatest
Rewards
,
that
any
one
can
acquire
,
are
necessarily
connected
with
this
Endeavour
,
and
that
the
Loss
,
or
Deprivation
of
this
Felicity
,
doth
necessarily
adhere
as
a
Punishment
to
the
opposite
Actions
.
The
former
of
these
,
which
declares
the
true
Causes
of
all
that
Felicity
,
which
particular
Persons
can
thereby
obtain
,
we
have
proved
from
Natural
Effects
found
by
Experience
.
The
latter
,
(
viz.
)
that
Piety
to
God
,
and
Charity
or
Benevolence
towards
all
Men
,
are
contained
in
the
Endeavour
of
the
common
Good
;
and
we
have
also
proved
in
the
fourth
Chapter
,
that
all
Vertues
,
both
private
and
publick
,
are
contained
in
this
Endeavour
.
But
because
the
Connexion
of
Rewards
and
Punishments
,
which
follow
those
Acts
which
are
for
the
common
Good
,
or
opposite
to
it
,
is
something
obscured
by
those
Evils
which
often
befall
good
Men
,
and
those
good
Things
which
too
frequently
happen
to
Evil
ones
,
it
is
enough
to
our
Purpose
to
shew
,
that
notwithstanding
all
these
the
Connexion
between
them
is
so
sufficiently
constant
,
and
manifest
in
the
Nature
of
things
,
that
from
thence
may
be
certainly
gathered
the
Sanction
of
the
Law
of
Nature
,
commanding
the
former
,
and
prohibiting
the
latter
Actions
.
And
we
may
suppose
those
Punishments
to
suffice
for
its
Sanction
,
which
,
(
all
things
rightly
weighed
)
much
exceed
the
Gain
that
may
arise
from
any
Act
done
contrary
to
this
Law
.
But
in
comparing
of
the
Effects
which
do
follow
good
Actions
on
one
hand
,
and
Evil
ones
on
the
other
those
good
,
or
evil
Things
ought
not
to
be
reckoned
in
to
the
Account
,
which
either
cannot
be
acquired
,
or
avoided
by
any
humane
Prudence
,
or
Industry
;
such
as
are
those
which
proceeding
from
the
Natural
Necessity
of
External
Causes
,
may
happen
to
any
one
by
mere
Chance
,
which
are
wont
to
fall
out
alike
,
both
to
good
and
bad
.
Therefore
we
shall
only
take
those
into
our
Account
,
which
may
be
foreseen
and
prevented
by
humane
Foresight
,
as
some
way
depending
upon
our
own
Wills
or
Acts.
But
I
must
also
acknowledge
,
that
these
Effects
do
not
all
depend
upon
our
own
particular
Powers
,
but
many
of
them
do
also
proceed
from
the
good
Will
and
Endeavours
of
other
Rationals
;
yet
since
it
may
be
known
from
their
Natures
,
as
they
are
,
is
agreeable
to
our
own
,
that
the
common
Good
is
the
best
,
and
greatest
End
which
they
can
propose
to
themselves
,
and
that
their
Natural
Reason
requires
that
they
should
act
for
an
End
,
and
rather
for
this
than
any
other
less
good
,
or
less
perfect
:
And
that
it
is
moreover
known
by
Experience
,
that
such
Effects
of
Vniversal
Benevolence
,
may
be
for
the
most
part
obtained
from
others
,
by
our
own
benevolent
Actions
;
it
is
just
that
those
Effects
should
be
numbred
or
esteemed
among
those
Consequences
,
which
do
for
the
most
part
so
fall
out
,
because
every
Man
is
esteemed
able
to
do
whatever
he
can
perform
,
or
obtain
by
the
Assistance
of
others
.
So
that
the
whole
Reward
which
is
connected
to
good
Actions
,
by
the
natural
Constitution
of
Things
,
is
somewhat
like
those
Tributes
of
which
the
publick
Revenues
consist
,
which
do
not
only
arise
out
of
constant
Rents
,
but
also
out
of
divers
contingent
Payments
,
such
as
Custom
,
or
Excise
upon
Commodities
,
whose
value
,
although
it
be
very
great
,
yet
is
not
always
certain
,
though
they
are
often
farmed
out
,
at
a
certain
Rate
.
Therefore
in
the
reckoning
up
of
these
Rewards
,
not
only
those
parts
thereof
ought
to
come
into
Account
,
which
immutably
adhere
to
good
Actions
,
such
as
are
that
Happiness
,
which
consists
in
the
Knowledge
and
Love
of
God
,
and
good
Men
,
the
absolute
Government
of
our
Passions
,
the
sweet
Harmony
,
and
Agreement
betwixt
the
true
Principles
of
our
Actions
,
and
all
the
parts
of
our
Lives
,
the
Favour
of
the
Deity
,
and
the
Hopes
of
a
blessed
Immortality
proceeding
from
all
these
:
But
there
ought
also
to
be
taken
into
the
Account
,
all
those
Goods
,
which
do
,
(
though
contingently
)
adhere
to
them
,
and
which
may
either
happen
to
us
from
the
good
Will
of
others
,
or
flow
from
that
Concord
,
and
Society
,
which
is
either
maintained
between
divers
Nations
,
or
those
of
the
same
Common-wealth
;
and
which
we
do
as
far
as
we
are
able
,
procure
for
our selves
by
such
benevolent
Actions
.
And
by
the
like
Reason
,
we
may
also
understand
of
what
particulars
all
that
Misery
,
or
those
Punishments
may
consist
,
which
is
connected
with
those
Acts
,
that
are
hurtfull
to
the
common
Good
.
So
that
all
of
us
may
learn
from
the
Necessity
of
the
Condition
in
which
we
are
born
,
and
live
,
to
esteem
contingent
Goods
;
and
to
be
drawn
to
act
by
the
Hopes
of
them
;
for
the
Air
it self
,
which
is
so
necessary
for
our
subsistence
,
and
Preservation
doth
not
always
benefit
our
Bloud
,
or
Spirits
,
but
is
sometimes
infected
with
deadly
Steams
,
and
Vapours
:
Nor
can
our
Meat
,
Drink
or
Exercise
always
preserve
our
Lives
,
but
do
often
generate
Diseases
.
And
Agriculture
it self
doth
not
always
pay
the
Husband-man's
Toyl
with
the
expected
Gain
,
but
sometimes
he
even
loses
by
it
.
And
sure
we
are
not
less
naturally
drawn
to
the
Endeavour
of
the
common
Good
,
than
we
are
to
such
natural
Actions
from
the
Hope
of
a
Good
,
that
may
but
probably
proceed
from
them
.
But
how
justly
we
may
hope
for
a
considerable
Return
from
all
others
,
joyntly
considered
,
for
all
our
Labours
bestowed
upon
the
common
Good
;
we
shall
be
able
to
make
the
best
Account
of
,
when
we
consider
what
our
own
Experience
,
and
the
History
of
all
Nations
for
the
time
past
,
may
teach
us
to
have
befallen
those
who
have
either
regarded
,
or
despised
this
great
End
.
But
because
the
whole
Endeavour
of
this
common
Good
,
contains
no
more
but
the
Worship
of
the
Deity
,
the
Care
of
Fidelity
,
Peace
,
and
Commerce
betwixt
Nations
,
and
the
instituting
,
and
maintaining
Government
both
Civil
and
Domestick
,
as
also
particular
Friendships
,
as
the
parts
thereof
taken
together
,
it
is
manifest
,
that
the
Endeavour
thereof
exprest
by
a
mutual
Love
and
Assistance
must
in
some
Degree
be
found
among
all
Nations
,
as
necessary
to
their
own
Happiness
and
Preservation
:
Nay
,
it
seems
farther
manifest
to
me
,
that
those
who
attain
but
to
the
Age
of
Manhood
do
owe
all
those
past
Years
,
much
more
to
the
Endeavour
of
others
bestowed
upon
the
common
Good
,
than
to
their
own
Care
,
which
in
their
tender
Age
was
almost
none
at
all
.
For
we
then
do
altogether
depend
upon
,
and
owe
our
Preservation
to
that
Obedience
,
which
others
yield
as
well
to
Oeconomical
Precepts
,
as
to
all
Laws
both
Civil
and
Religious
,
which
do
wholly
proceed
from
this
Care
of
the
common
Good
.
Whereas
it
is
certain
,
that
if
afterwards
we
expose
our
Lives
to
danger
,
Yea
,
if
we
lose
them
for
the
publick
Good
,
we
should
lose
far
less
for
its
sake
,
than
we
did
before
receive
from
it
;
for
we
do
then
only
lose
the
uncertain
Hopes
of
future
Enjoyments
,
whereas
it
is
certain
that
scarce
so
much
as
the
Hope
of
them
can
remain
to
particular
Persons
where
the
common
Good
is
destroyed
,
for
we
have
thence
received
the
real
Possession
of
all
those
Contentments
of
Life
,
with
which
we
are
blest
:
And
therefore
we
are
bound
in
Gratitude
,
as
well
as
by
Interest
,
to
return
those
again
whenever
they
are
lawfully
required
of
us
;
though
I
grant
(
for
the
Honour
of
the
Gospel
)
that
the
firmest
Encouragements
,
and
greatest
Reward
we
Men
can
have
for
exposing
,
nay
,
losing
our
Lives
for
the
Benefit
,
or
Service
of
the
Common-wealth
,
is
that
Happiness
we
may
justly
expect
in
another
Life
after
this
.
These
things
seem
evident
to
us
,
as
resembling
that
Method
whereby
we
are
naturally
taught
,
that
the
Health
,
and
Strength
of
our
whole
Body
is
preserved
by
the
good
Estate
of
its
particular
Members
,
in
its
receiving
Food
,
and
Breath
:
Although
sometimes
Diseases
may
breed
within
the
Body
,
or
divers
outward
Accidents
(
as
Wounds
,
Bruises
,
and
the
like
)
do
happen
to
it
from
without
,
which
may
hinder
the
particular
Members
from
receiving
that
Nourishment
,
which
is
necessary
for
them
:
And
we
are
taught
after
the
same
Manner
by
the
Acts
,
immediately
promoting
the
common
good
,
that
the
Happiness
of
particular
Men
,
(
which
are
the
Members
of
this
natural
System
)
may
no
less
certainly
be
expected
,
nor
are
less
naturally
derived
from
thence
,
than
the
Strength
of
our
Hands
doth
proceed
from
the
due
State
of
the
whole
Mass
of
Bloud
,
and
nervous
Iuice
:
Though
we
confess
that
many
things
may
happen
,
which
may
cause
this
general
Care
of
the
whole
Body
of
Mankind
,
not
always
to
meet
with
the
good
Effect
we
desire
;
so
that
particular
Persons
may
certainly
,
infallibly
enjoy
all
the
Felicity
they
can
hope
for
,
or
expect
:
Yet
this
is
no
Argument
against
it
,
any
more
than
that
the
taking
in
of
Air
,
and
Aliments
,
(
however
necessary
for
the
whole
Body
)
should
prevent
all
those
Accidents
,
and
Distempers
it
is
subject
to
,
since
it
may
happen
as
well
by
the
violent
,
and
unjust
Actions
of
our
fellow
Subjects
,
(
like
the
diseased
Constitution
of
some
inward
part
)
or
by
the
Invasion
of
a
foreign
Enemy
(
like
a
Blow
,
or
other
outward
Violence
)
that
good
Men
may
be
deprived
in
this
Life
of
some
Rewards
of
their
good
Deeds
,
and
may
also
suffer
divers
outward
Evils
;
Yet
since
these
are
more
often
repelled
by
the
Force
of
Concord
,
and
Civil
Government
,
or
are
often
shook
off
after
some
short
Disturbances
,
either
by
our
own
private
Power
,
or
else
by
that
of
the
Civil
Sword
,
as
Diseases
are
thrown
off
by
a
healthfull
Crisis
,
or
Effort
of
Nature
.
So
that
notwithstanding
all
these
Evils
,
Men
are
more
often
recompenced
with
greater
Goods
,
partly
from
the
Assistance
of
others
,
but
chiefly
from
that
of
Civil
Government
,
or
else
of
Leagues
made
with
Neighbouring
States
:
From
whence
it
is
that
Mankind
hath
never
been
yet
destroyed
;
notwithstanding
all
the
Tyranny
and
Wars
,
that
Men's
unreasonable
Passions
have
exercised
,
and
raised
in
the
World
,
and
that
Civil
Governments
,
or
Empires
,
have
been
more
lasting
than
the
most
long
lived
Animals
.
From
all
which
it
is
apparent
,
that
the
deprived
Appetites
of
divers
Men
,
or
those
Passions
which
do
often
produce
Motions
so
opposite
to
the
common
Good
,
ought
no
more
to
hinder
us
from
acknowledging
the
Natural
Propensions
of
all
the
rest
of
Mankind
(
considered
together
)
to
be
more
powerfully
carried
towards
that
which
we
every
Day
see
may
be
procured
thereby
,
(
viz.
)
The
Conservation
and
farther
Perfection
of
the
whole
Body
of
Mankind
,
than
that
divers
Diseases
breeding
in
the
parts
of
Animals
,
or
any
outward
Violence
should
hinder
us
from
acknowledging
,
that
the
Frame
of
their
Bodies
,
and
the
Natural
Function
of
their
parts
are
fitted
,
and
intended
by
God
,
for
the
Conservation
of
Life
,
and
the
Propagation
of
their
Species
.
But
that
we
may
carry
on
this
Similitude
,
(
between
a
living
Body
and
its
particular
Members
,
with
the
whole
Body
of
Mankind
,
and
all
the
Individuals
contained
under
it
,
)
a
little
farther
,
I
will
here
give
you
Monsieur
Pascal's
Excellent
Notion
concerning
this
common
Good
,
as
it
is
published
in
those
Fragments
,
Chap.
des
Pensees
Morales
.
Entituled
,
Les
Pensees
de
Monsieur
Pascal
,
since
it
both
explains
and
confirms
our
Method
.
He
there
supposes
,
That
God
having
made
the
Heavens
,
and
the
Earth
,
and
divers
other
Creatures
,
not
at
all
sensible
of
their
common
Happiness
,
would
also
make
some
rational
Beings
which
might
know
him
,
and
might
make
up
one
Body
consisting
of
rational
Members
;
and
that
all
Men
are
Members
of
this
Body
,
so
that
it
is
necessary
to
their
happiness
,
that
all
particular
Men
,
as
Members
of
this
Body
,
conform
their
particular
Wills
to
the
Vniversal
Will
of
God
,
that
governs
the
whole
Body
,
as
the
Head
or
Soul
thereof
.
And
though
it
often
happens
,
that
one
Man
falsly
supposes
himself
an
independent
Being
,
and
so
will
make
himself
the
only
Centre
of
all
his
Actions
;
yet
he
will
at
last
find
himself
whilst
in
this
State
,
(
separated
from
the
Body
of
rational
Beings
,
and
who
not
having
any
true
Principle
of
Life
,
or
Motion
,
doth
nothing
but
wander
about
)
distracted
in
the
uncertainty
of
his
own
Being
;
but
if
ever
he
comes
to
a
true
knowledge
of
himself
,
he
will
find
,
that
he
is
not
that
whole
Body
,
but
only
a
small
Member
of
it
,
and
hath
no
proper
Life
,
and
Motion
,
but
as
he
is
a
part
thereof
:
So
that
to
regulate
our
Self-love
,
every
Man
ought
to
imagine
himself
,
but
one
small
part
of
this
Body
of
Mankind
,
composed
of
so
many
intelligent
Members
,
and
to
know
what
Proportion
of
Love
every
Man
oweth
himself
,
let
him
consider
what
Degree
of
Love
the
Body
bears
to
any
one
small
single
part
,
and
so
much
Love
,
that
part
(
if
it
had
sense
)
ought
to
bestow
upon
it self
,
and
no
more
:
All
Self-love
that
exceeds
this
is
unjust
.
So
far
this
sagacious
contemplative
Gentleman
thought
long
since
,
though
I
confess
he
doth
not
proceed
to
shew
in
what
manner
the
Good
of
every
individual
Person
depends
upon
the
Happiness
of
the
whole
Body
of
Mankind
,
as
our
Author
hath
here
done
;
though
no
doubt
,
he
was
excellently
well
fitted
to
do
it
,
if
he
had
lived
to
reduce
those
excellent
Thoughts
,
into
a
set
Discourse
.
We
have
delivered
in
this
Epitome
the
Summ
of
that
Method
,
by
which
we
have
enquired
into
the
Sanction
of
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
in
which
we
have
considered
all
the
Felicity
naturally
flowing
from
good
Actions
,
as
a
Reward
annexed
to
them
by
God
the
Author
of
Nature
,
and
their
Loss
,
or
contrary
Evils
that
follow
them
,
as
a
Punishment
naturally
flowing
from
their
Transgression
:
And
indeed
,
our
Method
seems
very
much
confirmed
from
the
common
Consent
of
Mankind
,
since
all
Men
,
of
however
different
Opinions
concerning
moral
Principles
,
do
yet
agree
in
this
,
that
good
Actions
ought
still
to
be
encouraged
by
Rewards
,
and
evil
ones
to
be
restrained
by
Punishments
;
in
this
all
Sects
of
Philosophers
,
however
quarrelling
among
themselves
,
do
agree
;
As
also
the
Founders
of
all
Religions
,
and
the
Makers
of
all
Civil
Laws
,
have
made
this
their
main
Foundation
;
Nay
,
those
,
who
would
seem
most
to
neglect
all
Rewards
,
and
would
deduce
all
Vertues
from
Gratitude
alone
,
yet
find
it
necessary
to
acknowledge
this
Gratitude
to
proceed
from
the
Memory
of
Benefits
receiv'd
:
But
sure
it
still
argues
as
much
Love
towards
ourselves
,
when
we
are
persuaded
to
do
our
Duty
by
a
Consideration
of
Benefits
already
received
,
as
when
we
do
it
for
the
same
things
to
be
received
hereafter
;
yea
,
he
seems
to
act
more
generously
,
who
is
moved
to
act
for
a
good
only
in
expectation
,
than
he
who
doth
as
much
for
the
like
good
things
,
which
he
already
enjoys
.
But
this
Method
which
we
have
here
taken
to
reduce
all
the
Laws
of
Nature
to
this
single
Proposition
of
endeavouring
the
common
Good
,
seems
the
more
convenient
,
because
its
proof
is
more
easie
,
and
expedite
than
that
of
so
many
Rules
,
which
are
wont
to
be
proposed
by
Philosophers
,
and
the
Memory
will
be
less
burdened
by
the
daily
Remembrance
of
this
one
Proposition
,
than
of
many
;
especially
when
we
are
directed
to
it
from
the
Nature
of
this
common
Good
,
as
a
Measure
whereby
the
Iudgment
of
any
considering
Man
,
may
put
Bounds
to
his
own
Actions
,
and
Passions
,
in
the
doing
of
which
all
Moral
Virtue
consists
.
And
this
Work
Aristotle
hath
recommended
to
the
Iudgment
of
every
rational
Man
in
his
Definition
of
Vertue
,
though
he
hath
not
indeed
shewn
us
the
Rule
of
making
this
Iudgment
;
whereas
our
Proposition
teacheth
us
,
that
the
Rule
is
to
be
taken
from
the
Nature
of
the
best
,
and
greatest
End
;
that
is
,
Respect
being
had
to
all
the
parts
of
the
whole
System
of
rational
Beings
,
or
of
that
Common-wealth
of
which
God
is
the
Head
,
and
all
the
Members
are
his
Subjects
.
And
from
this
Principle
is
also
to
be
derived
that
Order
,
or
Preference
among
all
the
particular
Laws
of
Nature
,
according
to
which
,
the
former
doth
still
retain
,
or
limit
the
latter
,
which
Dr.
Sharrock
hath
prudently
,
and
solidly
observed
in
his
Book
De
Officiis
,
Chap.
10.
As
for
Example
,
that
there
is
a
Prior
Reason
for
abstaining
from
invading
that
which
is
anothers
,
than
of
observing
Promises
;
and
likewise
there
is
a
greater
Account
to
be
made
of
Faith
once
given
,
than
of
returning
Benefits
,
&c.
But
the
true
Ground
of
all
these
Rules
is
only
to
be
found
in
our
Principle
,
because
it
more
conduces
to
the
common
Good
,
that
a
Prior
Law
of
Nature
concerning
making
,
and
preserving
Properties
should
not
be
violated
by
the
Invasion
of
another's
Right
,
than
that
any
one
should
observe
a
Compact
,
or
Promise
,
when
it
cannot
be
done
without
such
an
Invasion
;
and
there
is
the
like
Reason
in
observing
those
other
Laws
,
which
we
have
reckoned
up
in
the
following
Discourse
,
according
to
their
due
Order
and
Dignity
:
so
that
indeed
no
Man
ought
to
wonder
,
that
we
have
so
positively
asserted
,
that
no
Vertue
can
be
explained
without
a
Respect
to
the
State
of
all
rational
Beings
,
or
of
the
whole
intellectual
World
;
for
we
see
in
Natural
Philosophy
,
that
the
Accidents
of
Bodies
daily
obvious
to
our
Senses
,
such
as
are
the
communication
of
Motion
,
Gravitation
,
and
the
Action
of
Light
and
Heat
,
Firmness
and
Fluidity
,
Rarefaction
and
Condensation
,
can
never
be
explained
,
without
a
Respect
to
the
whole
System
of
the
corporeal
World
,
and
the
Motion
therein
to
be
preserved
:
Lastly
,
from
this
order
among
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
whereby
all
the
special
ones
are
still
made
subordinate
to
this
general
one
of
the
common
Good
,
and
the
lowest
of
them
to
the
highest
,
it
may
easily
be
shewn
that
God
never
dispenses
with
them
,
unless
in
those
Cases
,
in
which
the
Obligation
of
a
lower
,
or
less
Law
,
may
seem
to
be
taken
away
,
and
the
nature
of
the
Action
so
changed
,
as
that
there
may
be
only
place
left
for
the
Observation
of
the
higher
.
To
conclude
,
we
have
here
likewise
shewn
,
that
the
Generation
of
all
Commonwealths
is
to
be
deduced
from
these
two
Principles
,
tending
to
this
great
End
of
the
common
Good
of
Rationals
,
viz.
first
;
from
that
which
Commands
the
Constitution
of
a
distinct
Property
in
things
,
and
in
the
labours
,
or
endeavours
of
Persons
,
whereby
no
such
Property
is
yet
instituted
,
and
where
it
is
found
to
be
so
,
to
preserve
it
inviolate
,
as
the
chief
and
necessary
Medium
to
this
common
Good
.
2.
From
that
Law
which
Commands
a
peculiar
Love
,
or
Benevolence
of
Parents
towards
their
Children
;
for
this
could
never
have
exerted
it self
,
unless
our
first
Parents
had
permitted
their
Children
when
grown
up
,
to
enjoy
a
part
of
those
necessaries
of
Life
,
which
were
needful
for
their
future
Subsistance
,
and
so
from
many
such
Fathers
of
Families
joyning
together
by
mutual
Compacts
for
common
Defence
,
might
arise
the
first
Governments
in
the
World
,
of
whatsoever
kind
you
please
to
suppose
.
But
in
the
following
Discourse
,
we
have
thought
it
best
to
confine
our selves
within
the
bounds
of
Philosophy
,
and
have
wholly
abstained
from
Theological
Questions
:
And
therefore
we
have
not
said
any
thing
concerning
Good
,
or
Evil
Spirits
,
or
Angels
,
or
taken
in
their
Good
or
Happiness
,
into
our
Hypothesis
;
for
tho'
I
doubt
not
of
the
Existence
of
such
intelligent
Beings
,
yet
it
is
certain
,
all
we
can
understand
of
them
proceeds
wholly
from
Divine
Revelation
,
or
humane
Tradition
,
neither
of
which
are
true
means
of
obtaining
Philosophical
,
or
natural
Knowledge
.
As
for
the
Second
part
of
this
Treatise
,
in
which
is
contained
the
Confutations
of
some
of
Mr.
H's
Principles
,
or
Arguments
;
since
the
First
part
is
entire
without
it
,
and
that
the
truth
is
a
sufficient
Proof
to
its
self
,
I
leave
it
to
the
discretion
of
the
Reader
,
whether
he
will
trouble
himself
to
peruse
it
,
or
not
,
since
all
Men's
tempers
,
do
not
alike
suit
,
with
the
study
of
Controversies
;
but
it
was
necessary
not
only
to
lay
a
Foundation
of
better
moral
Principles
,
but
also
to
shew
the
Falshood
,
and
Vanity
of
those
he
hath
laid
down
;
since
otherwise
it
might
have
been
thought
by
some
▪
that
they
were
altogether
unanswerable
:
Yet
I
hope
we
have
performed
that
unpleasant
Task
,
without
reflecting
upon
the
Memory
of
the
dead
,
and
disturbing
the
Ashes
of
a
Person
,
who
whilst
he
lived
,
was
(
as
must
be
acknowledged
)
even
by
his
Enemies
,
considerably
famous
,
both
for
Wit
and
Learning
.
I
have
little
more
to
add
,
but
that
I
doubt
not
,
but
our
learned
Author
(
whose
work
I
have
now
abridged
)
hath
hit
upon
that
true
method
of
proving
the
Law
of
Nature
,
which
the
Lord
Bacon
in
his
Advancement
of
Learning
,
real
Character
,
or
Idea
of
that
which
is
truly
just
;
by
which
general
Mark
,
he
that
will
bend
his
study
that
way
,
and
examine
the
Grounds
,
or
endeavour
the
Amendment
of
the
Laws
of
particular
Kingdoms
,
or
States
,
may
be
truly
guided
in
this
noble
Vndertaking
;
And
he
there
proceeds
to
give
some
general
Aphorisms
,
which
he
calls
the
Idea's
of
Vniversal
Iustice
,
and
his
Fifth
Aphorism
is
very
home
to
our
purpose
,
for
he
there
tells
us
,
that
the
main
End
to
which
all
Laws
should
tend
,
and
whereunto
they
should
direct
their
Decrees
,
and
Sanctions
,
is
only
the
common
Good
,
or
Felicity
of
the
People
:
And
sure
this
could
have
no
Foundation
,
but
as
the
Felicity
of
any
particular
People
,
or
Nation
is
contained
in
general
,
or
the
common
Good
,
and
Happiness
of
rational
Beings
.
And
tho'
I
grant
that
our
Faculties
are
not
fitted
to
pierce
into
the
internal
Fabrick
,
and
real
Essences
of
Bodies
as
the
above-mentioned
Author
of
the
Essay
of
humane
Understanding
,
hath
very
well
observed
:
Yet
in
the
same
place
he
also
grants
,
That
the
Knowledge
we
have
of
them
,
is
sufficient
to
discover
to
us
the
Being
of
a
God
,
and
of
a
Divine
Providence
,
and
that
the
Knowledge
of
our selves
,
and
the
Nature
of
other
things
are
sufficient
to
lead
us
into
a
full
,
and
clear
Discovery
of
our
Duty
towards
him
,
as
being
the
great
Concernment
of
our
Lives
,
and
that
it
becomes
us
as
rational
Creatures
to
employ
our
Faculties
about
what
they
are
most
adapted
to
,
and
follow
the
direction
of
Nature
,
where
it
seems
to
point
us
out
the
way
.
So
that
it
is
highly
reasonable
to
conclude
,
that
our
proper
Employment
lies
in
moral
,
rather
than
natural
Truths
:
And
therefore
the
same
Author
hath
in
his
Fourth
Book
,
and
Third
Chapter
,
pag.
274.
this
Passage
:
The
Idea
of
a
supream
Being
,
infinite
in
Power
;
and
Wisdom
,
whose
Workmanship
we
are
,
and
on
whom
we
depend
,
and
the
Idea
of
our selves
as
understanding
,
rational
Creatures
,
being
such
as
are
clear
to
us
,
these
would
,
I
suppose
,
if
duly
considered
,
and
pursued
,
afford
such
Foundations
of
our
Duty
,
and
rules
of
Action
,
as
might
place
Morality
amongst
the
Sciences
capable
of
Demonstration
;
wherein
I
doubt
not
,
but
from
Principles
as
incontestable
as
those
of
the
Mathematicks
,
by
necessary
Consequences
,
the
measures
of
Right
and
Wrong
might
be
made
out
to
any
one
that
will
apply
himself
with
the
same
indifferency
and
attention
to
the
one
,
as
he
doth
to
the
other
of
these
Sciences
:
And
in
the
Twelfth
Chapter
of
the
same
Book
,
he
saith
,
p.
325.
This
gave
me
the
Confidence
to
advance
that
Conjecture
,
which
I
suggested
Chap.
3.
viz.
That
Morality
is
capable
of
Demonstration
as
well
as
Mathematicks
;
For
the
Idea's
that
Ethicks
are
conversant
about
,
being
all
real
Essences
;
and
such
as
I
imagine
have
a
discoverable
Connexion
,
and
Agreement
one
with
another
:
So
far
as
we
can
find
their
Habitudes
,
and
Relations
,
so
far
we
shall
be
possessed
of
certain
,
real
,
and
general
Truths
;
And
I
doubt
not
,
but
if
a
right
method
were
taken
,
a
great
part
of
Morality
might
be
made
out
with
that
clearness
that
could
leave
to
a
considering
Man
,
no
more
reason
to
doubt
,
than
he
could
have
to
doubt
of
the
Truth
of
any
Propositions
in
Mathematicks
which
have
been
demonstrated
to
him
.
And
I
am
confident
our
Author
hath
found
out
this
only
right
method
;
and
made
use
of
the
fittest
Demonstrations
for
the
Proof
of
this
Principle
of
the
common
Good
of
rational
Beings
,
as
the
Sum
of
all
natural
Laws
;
so
that
I
hope
you
will
have
no
cause
to
doubt
,
but
that
he
hath
as
fully
demonstrated
it
to
be
so
,
as
if
he
had
given
us
so
many
Mathematical
Demonstrations
of
it
.
But
since
as
in
the
Mathematicks
,
there
are
required
certain
Principles
,
or
Postulatums
,
which
must
be
taken
for
granted
,
before
its
professors
are
able
to
demonstrate
any
thing
from
them
;
so
we
shall
reduce
all
we
have
to
say
on
this
Subject
,
into
Six
plain
Postulata
;
the
Three
first
of
which
having
been
already
made
out
by
others
both
in
Latin
and
English
;
I
shall
wave
the
Proof
of
them
,
and
shall
confine
my self
wholly
to
the
Three
last
:
The
Propositions
are
these
,
1.
That
there
is
one
Infinite
,
most
powerful
,
intelligent
Being
,
which
we
call
God
,
who
is
the
Author
,
and
Creator
of
the
Vniverse
,
or
World
.
2.
That
God
as
he
hath
created
,
so
he
likewise
governs
,
and
preserves
this
World
,
consisting
of
Bodies
and
Spirits
,
by
certain
corporeal
Motions
,
and
Dictates
of
Reason
,
by
which
Spirits
act
as
the
chief
Instruments
of
his
Providence
.
3.
That
God
,
thereby
maintains
,
and
preserves
all
his
Creatures
,
and
farther
designs
the
Happiness
,
and
Preservation
of
such
of
them
as
are
sensible
,
as
far
as
their
frail
,
and
mortal
Natures
will
admit
,
and
that
Power
which
God
hath
given
to
mankind
over
them
.
4.
That
of
all
Animate
,
or
sensible
Creatures
,
God
hath
made
Man
alone
to
be
conscious
of
his
own
Existence
;
and
also
that
it
is
more
particularly
his
Duty
,
to
act
as
his
subservient
Instrument
;
not
only
for
his
own
private
Good
,
and
Happiness
,
but
also
for
the
common
Good
of
all
rational
Beings
.
5.
That
this
knowledge
of
God's
Will
,
as
our
Duty
,
is
plainly
discovered
to
us
,
from
the
Being
and
Nature
of
God
,
as
also
of
our selves
,
and
of
those
things
without
us
,
which
he
hath
made
necessary
for
our
use
,
and
Preservation
.
6.
That
these
Dictates
,
or
Conclusions
of
right
reason
,
all
tending
to
one
great
End
,
viz.
the
common
Good
of
rational
Beings
(
in
which
our
own
is
contained
)
being
given
us
by
God
as
a
Legislator
for
the
well
governing
,
or
right
ordering
of
our
Actions
to
this
End
,
constitute
the
Law
of
Nature
;
as
being
established
by
sufficient
Rewards
and
Punishments
,
both
in
this
Life
,
and
in
that
to
come
.
TO
THE
BOOKSELLER
.
THE
Learned
Authour
of
this
Treatise
sent
it
to
me
(
then
being
in
a
Private
Station
)
above
a
year
ago
,
but
then
concealed
his
Name
from
me
,
either
through
his
great
Modesty
,
or
because
in
his
Prudence
he
thought
that
if
I
knew
him
,
I
might
be
biassed
in
my
judgment
,
by
the
Honour
which
I
am
obliged
to
have
to
his
Family
,
and
especially
to
his
Grandfather
by
his
Mother's
side
,
the
most
Learned
Primate
of
Ireland
.
Wherefore
I
read
the
Book
without
any
respect
to
the
unknown
Writer
,
and
considered
only
the
Merits
of
the
Performance
.
Thus
I
found
that
he
had
not
only
well
translated
and
epitomized
in
some
places
what
I
had
written
in
Latin
,
but
had
fully
,
digested
the
chief
things
of
my
Design
in
a
well
chosen
Method
of
his
own
,
with
great
Perspicuity
,
and
had
added
some
Illustrations
of
his
own
,
or
from
other
Learned
Authours
,
with
a
Philosophical
Liberty
,
which
I
must
needs
allow
.
For
this
Reason
I
judged
that
the
then
unknown
Authour
had
give
too
low
a
Title
to
his
Book
;
and
that
I
was
to
esteem
him
a
good
Hyperaspistes
,
or
able
Second
,
in
this
Combat
for
Truth
and
Justice
,
rather
than
a
Translater
or
Epitomizer
of
what
I
had
written
.
This
obliged
me
to
enquire
diligently
after
the
Authour's
Name
and
Quality
,
and
then
I
soon
obtained
the
Favour
and
Honour
of
a
more
intimate
Conversation
with
him
.
Hereby
I
soon
found
that
I
might
safely
leave
the
Maintenance
of
that
good
Cause
in
which
I
was
engaged
,
to
his
great
Abilities
and
Diligence
.
And
I
hope
that
since
this
Learned
Gentleman
hath
conquer'd
the
Difficulties
of
the
Search
into
the
Rise
of
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
now
many
of
our
younger
Gentry
will
be
encouraged
to
follow
him
in
the
way
which
this
his
Treatise
makes
plain
before
them
.
For
from
thence
they
may
receive
assistance
,
not
only
to
discern
the
Reasonableness
of
all
Vertue
and
Morality
,
which
is
their
Duty
and
Ornament
as
they
are
Men
,
but
also
they
may
here
see
the
true
Foundations
of
Civil
Government
and
Property
,
which
they
are
most
obliged
to
understand
,
because
,
as
Gentlemen
,
they
are
born
to
the
greatest
Interest
in
them
both
.
I
need
add
no
more
to
give
you
Assurance
that
I
freely
consent
to
your
Printing
of
this
Book
,
and
am
,
Your
affectionate
Friend
,
Ric.
Peterborough
.
The
Contents
of
the
First
Chapter
.
A
Brief
Repetition
of
the
Preface
;
That
the
Law
of
Nature
can
only
be
learnt
from
the
Knowledge
of
a
God
,
and
from
the
Nature
of
Things
,
and
of
Mankind
in
general
,
§
1.
A
state
of
the
Question
between
us
and
the
Epicureans
and
Scepticks
,
§
2.
The
method
proposed
,
in
what
manner
we
are
to
enquire
into
the
Nature
of
things
,
and
of
mankind
,
in
order
to
prove
certain
general
Propositions
,
that
shall
carry
with
them
the
Obligation
of
Natural
Laws
,
§
3.
The
Soul
supposed
to
be
rafa
Tabula
,
without
any
innate
Idea's
.
Our
method
proposed
of
considering
God
as
the
Cause
of
the
World
,
and
all
Things
and
humane
Actions
,
as
subordinate
causes
and
effects
,
either
hindring
,
or
promoting
our
common
Happiness
and
Preservation
,
§
4.
All
the
Laws
of
Nature
deduceable
from
hence
,
as
so
many
practical
Propositions
,
and
all
our
observations
or
knowledge
of
it
reduceable
to
one
Proposition
,
of
the
highest
Benevolence
of
rational
Beings
towards
each
other
;
as
the
summ
of
all
the
Laws
of
Nature
;
and
what
is
meant
by
this
Benevolence
,
§
5.
What
things
are
necessary
to
be
known
or
supposed
,
in
order
to
the
knowledge
of
this
universal
Benevolence
,
§
6.
The
Connexion
of
the
Terms
of
this
Proposition
proved
,
and
what
is
to
be
collected
from
thence
;
The
true
happiness
of
single
Persons
inseparable
from
that
of
Mankind
;
The
general
Causes
of
its
Happiness
to
be
considered
in
the
first
place
,
§
7.
Therefore
no
Man's
particular
Happiness
can
be
opposed
,
or
preferred
before
the
Happiness
of
all
other
rational
Beings
;
The
contrary
practice
unreasonable
and
unjust
,
§
8.
Yet
that
this
Proposition
cannot
be
of
sufficient
efficacy
,
till
we
have
proposed
the
Common
Good
of
Rationals
for
the
great
End
of
all
our
Actions
,
§
9.
The
Effects
of
this
Proposition
not
prejudiced
by
the
ill
use
of
Men's
Free-wills
,
§
10
,
11.
By
what
steps
and
degrees
the
Knowledge
of
this
Common
Good
comes
to
be
conveyed
into
our
minds
from
the
nature
of
things
,
§
12.
First
Natural
Observation
that
in
our
free
use
and
enjoyment
of
all
the
outward
Necessaries
of
Life
,
and
in
our
mutual
administring
them
to
each
other
,
consists
all
men's
happiness
and
preservation
,
from
whence
also
proceeds
a
Notion
of
the
Common
Good
of
Rationals
,
§
13.
That
Men
are
able
to
contribute
more
to
the
good
and
happiness
of
those
of
their
own
kind
,
than
any
other
Creatures
,
§
14.
Nothing
a
surer
help
and
defence
to
Mankind
,
than
the
most
sincere
and
diffusive
Benevolence
,
§
15.
Nor
any
thing
more
destructive
to
it
,
than
their
constant
Malice
and
Ill-will
,
§
16.
That
these
Principles
are
as
certain
as
any
in
Arithmetick
and
Geometry
,
notwithstanding
the
supposition
of
Men's
free-will
,
§
17.
Yet
that
they
are
only
Laws
as
proceeding
from
God
the
first
Cause
,
and
as
establish'd
with
fit
Rewards
and
Punishments
,
§
18.
That
from
these
natural
and
general
Observations
we
attain
to
a
true
knowledge
of
the
Causes
of
all
Men's
happiness
,
and
that
by
the
Laws
of
Matter
and
Motion
these
Causes
act
as
certainly
as
any
other
,
§
19,20
.
Hence
arises
a
true
notion
of
things
naturally
and
unalterably
good
or
evil
,
§
21.
That
Men's
natural
Powers
,
and
the
things
necessary
for
life
,
can
neither
be
exerted
nor
made
use
of
contrary
to
the
known
rules
of
Matter
and
Motion
,
§
22.
Some
Conclusions
deduceable
from
hence
,
as
that
we
chiefly
concern
our selves
about
those
things
and
actions
that
are
in
our
Powers
,
§
23.
No
man
self-sufficient
to
procure
all
things
necessary
for
his
own
preservation
and
happiness
,
and
therefore
needs
the
good-will
and
assistance
of
others
,
§
24.
None
of
these
necessaries
for
Life
can
produce
the
Ends
design'd
,
but
as
they
are
appropriated
to
Man's
particular
uses
and
necessities
for
the
time
they
make
use
of
them
,
§
25.
From
whence
arises
the
Right
of
Occupancy
or
Possession
,
which
may
be
exercised
even
during
a
natural
Community
of
most
things
,
§
26.
That
as
this
natural
Division
and
Propriety
in
things
is
necessary
to
the
preservation
of
particular
Persons
,
so
it
is
also
of
Mankind
considered
as
an
aggregate
Body
,
§
27.
That
these
Principles
destroy
Mr.
H's
Hypothesis
of
the
Right
of
all
Men
to
all
things
in
the
state
of
nature
,
§
28.
The
necessity
of
a
farther
Division
and
Appropriation
of
things
now
Mankind
is
multiplyed
on
the
Earth
,
§
29.
No
Man
hath
a
Right
to
any
thing
any
farther
than
as
it
conduces
or
at
least
consists
with
the
common
good
of
rational
Beings
,
§
30.
The
knowledge
of
these
natural
Causes
and
Effects
alike
certain
in
a
natural
as
civil
State
,
with
a
brief
Recapitulation
of
the
Grounds
and
Arguments
insisted
on
in
this
Chapter
,
§
31.
The
Contents
of
the
Second
Chapter
.
MAN
to
be
considered
as
a
natural
Body
,
as
an
Animal
,
and
also
as
a
rational
Creature
.
Some
Observations
from
the
first
of
these
Considerations
,
as
that
humane
Bodies
and
Actions
are
subject
to
the
same
Laws
of
Matter
and
Motion
with
other
things
,
§
1
,
2.
No
Actions
or
Motions
more
conducive
to
Man's
happiness
,
than
what
proceed
from
the
most
diffusive
Benevolence
,
§
3.
Mankind
considered
as
a
System
of
natural
Bodies
,
doth
not
make
any
considerable
difference
between
them
,
when
considered
as
voluntary
Agents
endued
with
sense
,
but
that
they
rather
act
more
powerfully
thereby
,
§
4.
Men's
greatest
security
from
Evils
,
and
hopes
of
obtaining
Good
,
depends
upon
the
good-will
and
voluntary
Assistance
of
others
,
§
5.
Several
natural
Conclusions
drawn
from
these
Observations
,
§
6.
The
like
being
found
true
in
animate
as
well
as
inanimate
Bodies
,
will
make
us
more
sollicitous
towards
the
general
good
of
those
of
our
own
kind
,
§
7.
That
loving
or
benevolent
Actions
towards
each
other
constitute
the
happiest
state
we
can
enjoy
;
and
also
it
is
ordained
by
a
concourse
of
Causes
,
that
all
rational
Beings
should
be
sensible
of
these
Indications
,
§
8.
This
proved
from
several
natural
Observations
,
as
,
1.
That
the
bulk
of
the
Bodies
of
Animals
being
but
narrow
,
the
things
necessary
for
their
preservation
can
be
but
few
,
and
most
of
them
communicable
to
many
at
once
,
and
so
requires
a
limited
self-love
consistent
with
the
safety
and
happiness
of
others
,
§
9.
2.
That
Creatures
of
the
same
kind
cannot
but
be
moved
to
the
like
affections
towards
others
,
as
towards
themselves
,
from
the
sense
of
the
similitude
of
their
natures
,
§
10.
Animals
do
never
deviate
from
this
natural
state
,
but
when
they
are
seized
with
some
preternatural
Disease
or
Passion
,
which
as
oft
as
it
happens
are
absolutely
destructive
to
their
natures
,
§
11.
All
Creatures
express
a
delight
in
the
society
of
others
of
the
same
kind
;
some
cases
or
intervals
wherein
Nature
seems
to
act
otherwise
,
no
contradiction
to
this
general
Rule
,
§
12.
All
Animals
impelled
by
the
natural
Constitution
of
their
parts
to
a
Love
of
those
of
a
different
Sex
,
and
to
a
natural
Affection
to
their
Offspring
,
§
13.
All
Animals
take
delight
in
the
sweeter
Passions
of
Love
,
Ioy
,
Desire
,
&c.
as
helpfull
to
their
natural
Constitution
;
whereas
the
contrary
Passions
,
when
inordinate
,
are
highly
destructive
to
it
,
§
14.
Mr.
H.
cannot
deny
these
natural
Propensions
,
and
therefore
is
forced
to
suppose
somewhat
in
Man's
nature
that
renders
him
more
unsociable
than
Brutes
,
§
15.
Other
peculiar
Observations
relating
to
Man
,
whereby
he
is
made
more
capable
of
promoting
the
common
good
;
as
first
,
from
the
greater
quantity
of
Brains
in
Men
,
than
in
Brutes
,
§
16.
2.
From
the
natural
Constitution
of
their
Bloud
,
and
Spermatick
Vessels
,
from
whence
arises
a
Necessity
of
Marriage
,
and
of
a
more
constant
and
lasting
Love
to
their
Offspring
,
§
17.
3.
From
the
wonderfull
structure
of
Men's
hands
it
is
proved
,
that
this
Instrument
was
given
us
,
for
some
more
noble
use
than
bare
self-preservation
,
§
18.
Lastly
,
From
the
upright
posture
of
Men's
bodies
,
and
way
of
motion
,
§
19.
The
next
Set
of
Observations
tending
to
prove
Men
more
fitted
for
the
promoting
of
this
common
good
,
is
taken
from
the
natural
and
peculiar
faculties
of
Men's
Souls
above
those
of
Brutes
:
And
,
1.
from
that
of
deducing
effects
from
their
Causes
;
and
vice
versa
;
especially
in
that
of
distinguishing
of
real
or
natural
,
from
apparent
Goods
,
§
20.
What
is
understood
by
us
,
by
a
natural
or
moral
Good
or
Evil.
Certain
Axioms
for
the
plainer
understanding
their
Nature
and
Degrees
,
§
21.
How
we
arrive
to
an
Idea
of
a
species
or
kind
of
Creatures
,
and
also
to
a
notion
of
the
general
or
common
good
of
Mankind
,
§
22.
Speech
and
the
Invention
of
Letters
peculiar
faculties
of
Man's
nature
,
§
23.
And
the
great
Benefits
arising
from
thence
in
order
to
the
common
good
,
§
24.
Men
do
infinitely
exceed
Beasts
in
their
discursive
Faculties
,
as
also
in
the
knowledge
and
use
of
Numbers
,
§
25.
As
also
in
the
Power
of
Vnderstanding
the
different
Quantities
and
Proportions
between
Bodies
,
which
we
call
Geometry
,
§
26.
The
two
great
remaining
Prerogatives
of
humane
Souls
,
Freedom
of
Will
as
to
moral
Actions
,
and
the
Knowledge
of
a
God
,
§
27
,
28.
What
knowledge
we
can
have
of
his
Attributes
▪
which
can
never
be
truly
understood
,
but
with
respect
to
their
great
End
,
the
Prosecution
of
the
common
good
of
the
Vniverse
,
§
29.
The
Contents
of
the
Third
Chapter
.
A
Brief
recapitulation
of
the
former
Chapters
,
and
a
summing
up
all
those
Observations
into
a
general
Proposition
of
God's
Willing
and
Commanding
the
Common
Good
of
rational
Beings
,
as
the
main
End
of
all
our
Actions
,
§
1.
A
brief
Explanation
of
the
Terms
of
our
Description
of
the
Law
of
Nature
,
and
that
words
are
not
always
essential
to
Laws
,
§
2.
That
all
moral
Truths
or
Duties
as
declared
by
God
,
are
contained
in
this
one
Proposition
of
Endeavouring
the
common
good
;
certain
Principles
laid
down
for
the
proving
it
,
§
3
,
4
,
5
,
6.
That
this
being
once
discovered
to
us
,
we
lie
under
a
sufficient
Obligation
to
observe
this
Proposition
,
as
a
natural
Law
,
with
the
Explanation
of
the
Term
Obligation
,
and
who
hath
Authority
to
oblige
us
,
§
7
,
8
,
9.
Yet
that
this
Obligation
may
well
consist
with
the
freedom
of
our
wills
;
the
difference
between
a
mere
animal
,
and
a
rational
or
natural
Good
,
the
neglect
of
which
distinction
is
the
Cause
of
Epicurus
and
Mr.
H's
Errors
,
§
10.
The
last
part
of
the
Obligation
to
this
Law
,
viz.
its
Sanction
by
Rewards
and
Punishments
;
certain
Axioms
necessary
to
be
known
in
order
to
the
right
understanding
the
true
nature
of
a
moral
Good
or
Evil
;
and
of
Man's
true
happiness
and
perfection
,
with
its
difference
from
that
of
other
Beings
,
§
11.
That
though
all
moral
Obligation
does
not
consist
in
Rewards
or
Punishments
;
Yet
that
by
reason
of
the
weakness
of
humane
Nature
,
it
is
insignificant
without
them
;
with
a
Scale
of
Nature
,
shewing
the
difference
between
Vegetables
and
inanimate
Bodies
,
and
between
Men
and
Brutes
,
§
12.
The
strictest
Sanction
,
and
consequently
Obligation
to
all
Laws
consists
in
Rewards
and
Punishments
duly
distributed
;
God's
right
of
Dominion
not
to
be
resolved
into
his
irresistible
Power
,
§
13.
The
internal
Rewards
ordained
by
God
in
Nature
,
are
,
first
,
the
inward
satisfaction
of
the
Soul
,
and
also
the
pleasure
all
men
take
in
the
exercise
of
the
sweeter
passions
of
Love
,
&c.
§
14
,
15.
The
external
Rewards
are
all
the
like
returns
of
this
Benevolence
from
others
,
with
the
praise
or
commendation
of
all
good
men
,
together
with
the
peace
and
protection
of
the
civil
Government
,
§
16
,
17.
Lastly
,
from
God
,
Soundness
of
mind
and
body
,
with
all
those
outward
blessings
he
usually
bestows
on
the
peaceable
and
vertuous
;
with
a
Solution
to
the
difficulty
,
why
God
often
afflicts
Good
men
,
§
18.
The
internal
Punishments
ordained
by
God
for
the
transgression
of
this
Law
,
are
,
the
absence
or
privation
of
the
former
good
things
,
which
is
,
an
Evil
and
a
Punishment
,
§
19.
Errour
,
and
being
governed
by
the
Passions
,
a
real
Evil
,
and
an
internal
Punishment
,
§
20.
3.
That
such
evil
Actions
cannot
but
be
often
displeasing
to
the
Person
that
doth
them
,
§
21.
4.
That
Vices
and
Crimes
seldom
come
alone
,
but
let
in
a
train
of
others
of
the
same
kind
,
or
worse
,
along
with
them
,
§
22.
5.
That
such
an
Offender
cannot
get
out
of
this
state
when
he
will
,
at
least
not
without
the
trouble
of
Repentance
,
§
23.
6.
The
fear
of
Punishment
both
from
God
and
Man
,
§
24.
The
external
Punishments
are
,
1.
The
Evils
thot
happen
to
the
body
from
violent
and
unsociable
Passions
,
§
25.
The
2d
.
Those
returns
of
hatred
or
contempt
which
all
such
men
must
expect
from
others
,
§
26.
The
3d.
Returns
of
revenge
from
those
they
have
injured
,
§
27.
Lastly
,
Those
Punishments
which
are
often
inflicted
by
the
civil
Powers
;
all
which
natural
Punishments
Mr.
H.
himself
acknowledges
to
be
ordained
by
God
,
§
28.
That
where
these
Punishments
fail
in
this
Life
,
they
will
be
supplied
by
others
infinitely
more
grievous
and
durable
in
that
to
come
,
§
29.
A
brief
recapitulation
of
this
Chapter
,
that
this
Proposition
of
our
Endeavouring
the
common
good
,
&c.
is
truly
a
Law
,
as
containing
all
the
Conditions
requisite
thereunto
,
§
30.
The
Contents
of
the
Fourth
Chapter
.
A
Brief
repetition
of
what
hath
been
said
in
the
first
Chapter
,
That
no
man
can
have
a
right
to
preserve
his
own
Life
,
but
as
it
conduces
to
the
common
good
,
&c.
That
in
all
Societies
the
good
of
the
lesser
part
must
give
place
and
be
subordinate
to
that
of
the
greater
,
§
1.
That
a
due
consideration
of
this
Law
will
lead
us
to
a
knowledge
of
the
reason
and
grounds
of
all
the
particular
Laws
of
nature
,
§
2.
And
also
that
all
moral
Vertues
are
contained
under
this
one
Law
of
endeavouring
the
common
good
.
That
Prudence
is
nothing
but
the
knowledge
of
our
duty
,
in
order
to
the
graet
End
,
the
Common
Good
,
as
Constancy
in
the
prosecution
of
it
,
is
therefore
true
fortitude
,
§
3.
That
Temperance
or
Moderation
in
all
corporeal
Pleasures
is
no
otherwise
a
Vertue
,
than
as
it
conduces
to
the
happiness
and
preservation
of
Mankind
;
That
under
Love
and
Benevolence
are
contained
the
Vertues
of
Innocence
,
Meekness
,
&c.
§
4
,
5.
Equity
a
Vertue
as
it
promotes
the
common
good
of
mankind
,
§
6.
The
same
proved
likewise
of
Iustice
,
since
nothing
can
be
called
ours
,
either
by
natural
or
civil
Laws
,
but
as
it
conduces
to
this
great
End
,
and
a
natural
and
civil
Property
necessary
thereunto
;
the
one
in
a
natural
state
,
the
other
in
a
civil
society
,
§
7.
From
Property
arises
the
necessity
of
Contracts
,
Promises
,
Gifts
,
&c.
all
which
are
still
to
be
governed
by
this
great
Law
,
§
8.
From
this
natural
Property
arises
the
Vertue
of
Moderation
,
setting
bounds
to
inordinate
self-love
in
order
to
the
common
good
;
Frugality
no
otherwise
a
Vertue
,
than
as
it
renders
us
not
burthensome
,
not
injurious
to
others
,
§
9.
The
natural
Love
of
Parents
to
their
Children
to
be
exercised
and
limitted
with
respect
to
the
common
good
,
§
10.
All
the
rest
of
the
moral
Vertues
,
such
as
Temperance
,
Frugality
,
&c.
more
particularly
explained
to
proceed
from
the
same
original
,
and
not
to
be
understood
without
it
,
§
11.
The
same
more
particularly
applyed
,
and
made
out
in
every
particular
Vertue
,
which
constitutes
Iustice
,
§
12.
All
the
homolitical
Vertues
,
i.
e.
such
as
respect
conversation
,
or
the
due
use
of
speech
,
explained
after
the
same
manner
,
with
a
like
respect
to
the
common
good
,
§
13
,
14
,
15.
Self-love
and
Self-preservation
only
lawfull
in
order
to
this
End
,
§
16.
Some
farther
Explanations
of
the
nature
of
Temperance
,
and
wherein
it
consists
,
§
17.
That
part
of
it
called
Chastity
,
a
Vertue
only
as
it
tends
to
the
good
and
propagation
of
mankind
,
§
18.
Another
part
of
it
,
viz.
Modesty
in
seeking
of
riches
,
honour
,
&c.
Vertues
only
as
they
limit
our
self-love
from
pretending
to
more
than
we
have
need
of
,
or
deserve
in
order
to
the
common
good
,
§
19.
That
a
regard
to
this
great
Rule
runs
through
all
the
moral
Vertues
,
which
are
all
of
them
contained
under
the
most
diffusive
Benevolence
towards
rational
Beings
,
§
20.
Right
Reason
explained
to
be
only
a
due
consideration
of
this
End
in
all
moral
actions
towards
God
or
Men
;
and
that
the
knowledge
of
these
moral
rules
is
as
certain
as
that
of
the
knowledge
of
any
other
natural
causes
and
effects
concerning
the
preservation
of
Animals
,
§
21.
And
that
from
their
true
understanding
proceeds
all
the
certainty
we
can
have
of
natural
Laws
,
notwithstanding
there
may
be
a
sufficient
latitude
left
us
for
indifferent
actions
,
§
22.
The
Common
Good
as
it
is
a
collection
of
all
other
goods
,
so
it
is
a
true
standard
,
or
measure
of
them
,
as
shewing
what
goods
are
to
be
sought
for
or
desired
before
others
,
§
23.
It
is
only
to
be
learnt
from
hence
,
what
degrees
of
passions
or
affections
are
lawfull
,
that
is
,
consistent
with
the
Common
Good
,
and
consequently
thereby
to
judge
of
the
several
degrees
and
proportions
of
goodness
and
happiness
,
§
24.
Piety
towards
God
a
Vertue
,
as
it
conduces
to
the
common
good
and
happiness
of
rational
Beings
,
§
25.
Nothing
a
Good
,
but
as
it
contributes
to
this
great
End
,
§
26.
The
reason
of
this
disquisition
into
the
true
grounds
of
Good
and
Evil
,
as
being
that
which
makes
all
moral
Philosophy
a
practical
Science
,
and
not
merely
speculative
,
like
that
of
the
Stoicks
,
§
27.
A
brief
Conclusion
out
of
Dr.
Parker's
Demonstration
of
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
§
28.
The
Contents
of
the
Fifth
Chapter
.
THE
Objections
of
two
sorts
of
Men
,
Platonists
and
Epicureans
,
against
this
Notion
of
the
Common
Good
;
the
Objections
of
the
former
to
be
first
considered
;
their
first
Objection
,
That
it
is
more
suitable
to
God's
goodness
to
imprint
certain
Innate
Idea's
of
good
and
evil
on
our
minds
,
§
1.
Answer
thereunto
out
of
Mr.
Lock
's
Essay
,
&c.
§
2.
A
farther
Answer
from
St.
Paul
,
That
the
visible
things
of
the
Creation
are
a
sufficient
proof
of
the
Being
of
a
God
,
and
of
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
§
3.
The
laboriousness
of
our
Method
no
material
Objection
,
§
4.
An
explicit
Idea
of
this
Common
Good
,
not
always
necessary
to
its
observation
,
§
5.
Another
Objection
against
our
Method
,
That
it
makes
every
man's
obligation
to
endeavour
this
Common
Good
,
to
arise
from
its
being
chiefly
good
to
himself
.
Answer
,
That
this
,
if
it
be
considered
,
will
prove
a
mistake
;
though
I
grant
our
Obligation
to
it
as
a
Law
cannot
extend
farther
,
than
as
it
concerns
our
happiness
or
misery
,
§
6
,
7.
A
Reply
to
the
Objections
of
the
Epicureans
;
The
first
Objection
,
That
it
seems
not
suitable
to
God's
goodness
,
&c.
to
permit
this
great
End
of
the
Common
Good
to
depend
upon
the
unreasonable
Passions
and
Lusts
of
mankind
.
Answ.
That
God
intended
Man
for
a
voluntary
Creature
,
to
be
moved
by
moral
Evil
,
as
well
as
Good
;
and
that
God
notwithstanding
all
this
restrains
his
Actions
by
his
infinite
Power
and
Providence
,
§
8
,
9.
Second
Objection
,
If
this
Law
of
Nature
is
so
easie
to
be
known
,
how
comes
it
to
pass
,
that
so
many
Nations
seem
wholly
ignorant
of
it
,
many
living
without
any
knowledge
of
a
God
,
or
of
a
moral
Good
or
Evil
?
§
10.
Answer
.
This
Objection
is
of
no
more
weight
against
the
Certainty
of
this
Law
,
than
it
is
against
that
of
Arithmetick
and
Geometry
,
but
that
if
they
are
guilty
of
this
ignorance
,
it
proceeds
either
from
the
Loss
of
the
Tradition
of
the
Creation
,
or
else
from
want
of
time
or
opportunities
to
consider
these
things
,
§
11.
Men's
not
making
a
due
use
of
their
faculties
in
discovering
these
Truths
,
no
objection
against
their
certainty
,
§
12.
The
last
Objection
,
That
this
Notion
of
the
Common
Good
,
is
a
mere
Platonick
Idea
,
without
any
reality
in
Nature
,
§
13.
This
Objection
in
vain
,
if
it
be
considered
,
That
this
Notion
of
the
Common
Good
is
made
up
of
particulars
,
and
that
from
thence
arises
an
Idea
of
a
common
or
general
Good
,
which
though
a
complex
one
,
is
as
true
and
real
as
any
other
,
and
as
agreeable
to
the
Nature
of
things
,
farther
proved
from
Lock
's
Essay
;
and
that
Mr.
H.
himself
cannot
deny
the
Truth
of
this
Notion
,
§
14.
Mr.
H's
great
Rule
of
doing
as
you
would
be
done
by
,
signifies
nothing
without
respect
to
the
Common
Good
of
Mankind
,
§
15.
So
neither
that
of
preserving
a
Man's
self
,
or
any
other
innocent
person
,
unless
as
it
conduces
to
the
Common
Good
of
Mankind
,
§
16.
Not
only
the
whole
Law
of
Nature
,
but
the
revealed
Law
of
Moses
,
and
the
Gospel
of
Jesus
Christ
reducible
to
this
one
Proposition
,
of
Endeavouring
the
Common
Good
,
and
that
this
was
the
great
design
of
Christ's
coming
into
the
World
,
§
17
,
18.
A
Conclusion
of
the
whole
,
§
19.
TO
THE
BOOKSELLER
.
THE
Learned
Authour
of
this
Treatise
sent
it
to
me
(
then
being
in
a
Private
Station
)
above
a
year
ago
,
but
then
concealed
his
Name
from
me
,
either
through
his
great
Modesty
,
or
because
in
his
Prudence
he
thought
that
if
I
knew
him
,
I
might
be
biassed
in
my
judgment
,
by
the
Honour
which
I
am
obliged
to
have
to
his
Family
,
and
especially
to
his
Grandfather
by
his
Mother's
side
,
the
most
Learned
Primate
of
Ireland
.
Wherefore
I
read
the
Book
without
any
respect
to
the
unknown
Writer
,
and
considered
only
the
Merits
of
the
Performance
.
Thus
I
found
that
he
had
not
only
well
translated
and
epitomized
in
some
places
what
I
had
written
in
Latin
,
but
had
fully
digested
the
chief
things
of
my
Design
in
a
well-chosen
Method
of
his
own
,
with
great
Perspicuity
,
and
had
added
some
Illustrations
of
his
own
,
or
from
other
Learned
Authours
,
with
a
Philosophical
Liberty
,
which
I
must
needs
allow
.
For
this
Reason
I
judged
that
the
then
unknown
Authour
had
given
too
low
a
Title
to
his
Book
,
and
that
I
was
to
esteem
him
a
good
Hyperaspistes
,
or
able
Second
,
in
this
Combat
for
Truth
and
Justice
,
rather
than
a
Translater
or
Epitomizer
of
what
I
had
written
.
This
obliged
me
to
enquire
diligently
after
the
Authour's
Name
and
Quality
,
and
then
I
soon
obtained
the
Favour
and
Honour
of
a
more
intimate
Conversation
with
him
.
Hereby
I
soon
found
that
I
might
safely
leave
the
Maintenance
of
that
good
Cause
in
which
I
was
engaged
,
to
his
great
Abilities
and
Diligence
.
And
I
hope
that
since
this
Learned
Gentleman
hath
conquer'd
the
Difficulties
of
the
Search
into
the
Rise
of
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
now
many
of
our
younger
Gentry
will
be
encouraged
to
follow
him
in
the
way
which
this
his
Treatise
makes
plain
before
them
.
For
from
thence
they
may
receive
assistance
,
not
only
to
discern
the
Reasonableness
of
all
Vertue
and
Morality
,
which
is
their
Duty
and
Ornament
as
they
are
Men
,
but
also
they
may
here
see
the
true
Foundations
of
Civil
Government
and
Property
,
which
they
are
most
obliged
to
understand
,
because
,
as
Gentlemen
,
they
are
born
to
the
greatest
Interest
in
them
both
.
I
need
add
no
more
to
give
you
Assurance
that
I
freely
consent
to
your
Printing
of
this
Book
,
and
am
,
Your
affectionate
Friend
,
Ric.
Peterborough
.
OF
THE
Law
of
NATURE
,
And
its
OBLIGATION
.
CHAP.
I.
Of
the
first
Means
of
discovering
the
Law
of
Nature
;
(
viz.
)
the
Nature
of
Things
.
§
1.
HAving
,
in
the
Introduction
to
this
Discourse
,
shewn
you
those
several
Methods
,
by
which
divers
Authors
have
endeavoured
to
prove
a
Law
of
Nature
;
and
having
also
given
my
Reasons
,
(
tho'
in
short
)
why
I
cannot
acquiesce
in
any
of
them
,
as
laying
too
weak
Foundations
whereon
to
raise
so
great
and
weighty
a
Building
;
and
having
likewise
given
you
the
only
true
Grounds
,
by
which
it
can
,
as
I
suppose
,
be
made
out
,
(
viz.
)
from
the
Existence
of
a
GOD
declaring
his
Will
to
us
;
from
the
Frame
of
the
World
,
or
by
the
Nature
of
all
Things
without
us
;
as
also
from
our
own
Natures
,
or
that
of
Mankind
in
general
,
we
,
by
the
Power
of
our
natural
Faculties
,
or
Reasons
,
drawing
true
Conclusions
from
all
these
.
This
being
premised
,
I
shall
now
proceed
particularly
to
declare
,
in
the
first
place
,
what
I
understand
by
the
Frame
of
the
World
,
or
Nature
of
Things
,
in
order
to
the
proving
the
Existence
and
Obligation
of
the
Law
of
Nature
,
and
that
it
is
really
and
truly
a
Law
obliging
all
Persons
of
Years
of
Discretion
and
sound
Minds
,
to
its
Observation
:
Which
being
performed
,
I
shall
then
proceed
to
our
own
Nature
,
as
included
in
that
of
all
Mankind
.
§
.
2.
But
though
the
ancient
,
as
well
as
modern
Scepticks
and
Epicureans
,
have
of
old
,
and
do
still
at
this
day
,
deny
the
Existence
of
any
Law
of
Nature
,
properly
so
called
;
yet
,
I
suppose
,
that
we
are
both
sufficiently
agreed
what
we
understand
by
this
Term
,
since
we
both
thereby
mean
certain
Principles
of
immutable
Truth
and
Certainty
,
which
direct
our
voluntary
Actions
concerning
the
election
of
good
,
and
the
avoiding
of
evil
Things
,
and
so
lay
an
Obligation
,
as
to
our
external
Actions
,
even
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
and
out
of
a
Civil
Society
,
or
Common-weal
.
That
such
eternal
Truths
are
necessarily
and
unavoidably
presented
to
,
and
perceived
by
Men's
Minds
,
and
retained
in
their
Memories
,
for
the
due
ordering
or
governing
of
their
Actions
,
is
what
is
here
by
us
affirmed
,
and
by
them
as
confidently
denied
.
And
I
farther
conceive
,
That
the
Actions
so
directed
and
chosen
,
are
first
known
to
be
naturally
good
,
as
productive
of
the
greatest
publick
Benefits
;
and
afterwards
are
called
morally
Good
,
because
they
agree
with
those
Dictates
of
Reason
,
which
are
here
proved
to
be
the
Laws
,
or
Rules
,
of
our
Manners
,
or
voluntary
Actions
:
So
also
the
Evil
to
be
avoided
,
is
first
the
greatest
natural
Evil
,
which
afterwards
for
the
like
Reason
is
called
Moral
.
§
.
3.
Therefore
that
the
Existence
of
such
Propositions
may
more
plainly
appear
,
and
be
demonstrated
to
the
Understandings
of
all
indifferent
Readers
,
it
is
necessary
that
we
first
carefully
consider
the
Nature
of
divers
Things
without
us
,
as
also
that
of
Mankind
;
and
what
we
mean
by
Good
and
Evil
,
whether
Natural
or
Moral
.
Lastly
,
we
shall
shew
what
those
general
Propositions
are
,
which
we
affirm
carry
with
them
the
Force
or
Obligation
of
Natural
Laws
,
as
declaring
their
Exercise
or
Performance
necessary
to
the
compassing
of
an
End
,
that
ought
to
be
endeavoured
or
sought
after
,
in
order
to
our
true
and
greatest
Happiness
.
§
.
4.
Nor
let
it
seem
strange
,
that
I
suppose
the
Nature
of
divers
Things
,
about
which
we
are
daily
conversant
,
ought
first
to
be
looked
into
,
and
considered
:
For
I
will
here
suppose
the
Soul
,
or
Mind
of
Man
,
to
be
at
first
,
rasa
Tabula
,
like
fair
Paper
,
that
hath
no
connate
Character
or
Idea's
imprinted
upon
it
(
as
that
noble
Theorist
Mr.
Humane
Vnderstanding
,
Book
I.
Chap.
11.
Lock
hath
,
I
suppose
,
fully
proved
)
and
that
it
is
not
sensible
of
any
thing
at
its
coming
into
the
World
,
but
it
s
own
Existence
and
Action
;
but
receives
all
its
Idea's
afterwards
,
from
such
Objects
as
it
hath
received
in
by
the
Senses
:
So
that
our
Understandings
being
naturally
destitute
of
all
Notions
or
Idea's
,
we
cannot
comprehend
how
they
can
operate
,
unless
they
be
first
excited
by
outward
Objects
.
And
indeed
how
can
we
understand
what
may
be
helpful
and
agreeable
,
or
else
hurtful
and
destructive
to
Men's
Minds
and
Bodies
,
unless
we
first
consider
(
as
far
as
we
are
able
)
all
the
Causes
,
as
well
near
as
remote
,
which
have
made
,
constitute
,
and
still
preserve
Mankind
,
or
else
may
tend
to
its
destruction
,
either
for
the
time
present
,
or
to
come
?
Nor
indeed
can
it
be
understood
what
is
the
fittest
and
best
Thing
,
or
Action
,
any
Person
can
perform
in
a
Case
proposed
,
unless
first
all
those
Effects
which
may
proceed
from
it
,
in
all
its
various
Circumstances
,
be
duly
considered
and
compared
together
.
So
that
the
Contemplation
both
of
the
Causes
on
which
Men's
Safety
and
Happiness
depends
,
as
also
of
the
Effects
which
may
be
produced
by
their
joint
or
concurring
Forces
and
Endeavours
,
must
necessarily
lead
our
Minds
,
first
to
the
Consideration
of
all
other
Men
,
and
next
of
our selves
,
as
a
very
small
part
of
Mankind
.
And
in
the
next
place
,
that
we
proceed
to
contemplate
this
System
of
Things
,
called
the
Visible
World
,
but
more
especially
GOD
,
as
its
Creator
and
Governour
,
according
to
the
Method
laid
down
in
the
Introduction
to
this
Discourse
;
the
Idea's
of
which
being
duly
considered
and
digested
in
our
Minds
,
we
may
draw
from
thence
certain
Conclusions
,
by
which
we
may
judge
or
determine
what
Humane
Things
and
Actions
are
certainly
and
necessarily
conducing
to
the
Common
Good
and
Happiness
of
all
Rational
Beings
,
and
in
which
every
particular
Person
's
Felicity
or
Well-being
is
contained
,
as
a
part
thereof
;
and
in
which
Rational
Dictates
,
or
Conclusions
,
I
shall
hereafter
prove
this
Law
of
Nature
to
consist
.
§
.
5.
No
body
,
I
suppose
,
will
think
it
necessary
to
the
matter
in
hand
,
that
I
should
here
make
Physical
Disquisitions
into
the
Natures
of
all
Things
that
are
the
Objects
of
our
Senses
,
that
being
the
Business
of
profess'd
Naturalists
:
It
is
sufficient
for
us
to
shew
,
That
all
the
Rules
of
Moral
Philosophy
,
and
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
may
be
at
last
resolved
into
certain
natural
and
easie
Observations
,
gathered
from
common
Experience
;
or
else
into
certain
Conclusions
,
established
upon
the
known
Principles
of
Mathematicks
and
Physicks
;
by
which
,
I
do
not
only
mean
all
those
natural
Laws
of
Matter
and
Motion
in
Bodies
,
but
also
the
Operations
of
our
own
Souls
,
as
far
as
we
are
able
to
know
or
enquire
into
them
.
From
all
which
,
by
the
Order
of
Natural
Causes
,
we
may
be
led
to
the
Knowledge
of
GOD
their
Creator
and
Ordainer
,
and
so
may
acknowledge
Him
as
the
only
Cause
of
all
these
excellent
Effects
,
since
this
Nature
of
Things
doth
as
well
suggest
to
our
Minds
the
Idea
of
a
Creator
,
as
of
the
Things
created
;
and
so
supplies
us
with
sufficient
matter
from
which
we
may
deduce
all
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
as
so
many
true
Practical
Propositions
,
though
it
is
only
the
Knowledge
of
the
First
Cause
,
or
Creator
,
that
can
stamp
any
Authority
or
Obligation
upon
them
.
Now
although
there
may
be
many
Things
collected
from
our
Knowledge
of
several
Beings
in
the
World
,
that
may
serve
for
our
Moral
Instruction
,
and
the
cultivating
of
our
Manners
;
yet
I
shall
,
for
Brevity's
sake
,
only
select
some
of
the
most
material
of
them
,
and
such
as
may
serve
to
explain
our
short
account
of
the
Law
of
Nature
,
which
(
notwithstanding
several
Authors
have
so
much
enlarged
upon
it
)
I
think
may
very
well
be
reduced
to
this
single
Proposition
,
viz.
The
most
universal
Love
,
or
most
diffusive
Benevolence
of
all
Rational
Beings
towards
each
other
,
constitutes
the
happiest
State
they
can
be
capable
of
:
So
that
their
Endeavour
of
the
Common
Good
by
this
Benevolence
,
is
the
sum
of
all
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
and
in
which
they
are
all
contained
.
Note
,
That
by
this
Love
or
Benevolence
,
I
do
not
mean
only
a
fruitless
Desire
,
or
Well-wishing
,
but
an
active
Affection
,
exerting
it self
in
all
the
Acts
of
Piety
towards
God
,
Duty
towards
Parents
,
Kindness
and
Gratitude
towards
our
Country
,
Friends
,
and
Relations
,
and
of
Charity
and
Humanity
towards
all
the
rest
of
Mankind
,
as
often
as
any
opportunity
offers
it self
.
§
.
6.
In
the
making
out
of
which
Description
of
the
Law
of
Nature
,
it
is
here
needless
to
inquire
into
the
Nature
of
our
Souls
,
and
the
manner
of
our
Knowledge
and
Understanding
;
since
the
former
hath
been
so
Learnedly
perform'd
by
the
Reverend
Dr.
Ward
late
Bishop
of
Salisbury
,
and
the
latter
so
exactly
done
already
in
English
by
the
above
mentioned
Author
of
the
Essay
of
Humane
Vnderstanding
.
I
shall
only
briefly
suppose
upon
his
Principles
,
that
our
Souls
do
,
1.
From
the
very
birth
,
by
degrees
,
receive
Idea's
drawn
from
outward
Objects
by
our
Senses
.
2.
That
it
is
their
faculty
from
divers
single
Notions
,
or
Idea's
put
together
,
to
come
to
make
complex
ones
,
that
is
,
to
make
divers
Propositions
or
Conclusions
;
not
only
concerning
their
own
inward
Actings
,
but
also
about
all
those
outward
Objects
,
with
which
they
are
daily
conversant
,
and
which
may
tend
to
the
finding
out
the
readiest
means
of
attaining
to
,
and
preserving
themselves
in
the
happiest
State
and
Condition
they
are
able
to
acquire
.
These
things
being
suppos'd
,
it
were
needless
to
trouble
you
with
any
farther
descriptions
of
this
Love
,
or
Benevolence
,
since
every
Person
cannot
but
be
sufficiently
sensible
of
its
Nature
,
Degrees
,
and
various
Operations
,
that
will
but
make
any
Self-reflection
upon
his
own
Inward
Affections
.
§
.
7.
But
as
for
the
due
Connexion
of
the
Terms
of
this
Proposition
,
in
which
its
Truth
does
chiefly
consist
,
it
seems
to
me
plain
enough
:
It
being
no
more
than
to
affirm
,
That
our
endeavour
of
procuring
all
the
good
things
in
our
Power
,
and
which
are
most
conducing
to
our
own
preservation
and
Happiness
,
and
of
all
other
Rational
Beings
,
is
the
best
,
or
chiefest
thing
that
all
Persons
can
do
,
to
render
both
themselves
,
and
all
others
,
as
happy
as
their
Natures
will
permit
or
can
require
;
and
that
there
is
no
surer
,
or
more
powerful
means
to
be
discovered
by
us
,
whereby
we
may
obtain
a
full
enjoyment
of
all
the
good
things
of
this
Life
,
and
the
hopes
of
that
to
come
,
than
by
endeavouring
our
own
Felicity
in
Conjunction
with
that
of
others
So
that
from
what
I
have
already
advanced
,
the
Reader
may
Collect
these
two
Propositions
,
1.
That
the
Foundation
of
all
our
Natural
Happiness
consists
in
an
habitual
determination
of
the
Will
to
the
utmost
of
its
Ability
and
Perfection
,
whereby
we
may
be
always
ready
and
prepared
to
endeavour
this
Common
good
of
Rationals
.
2.
That
the
true
Happiness
of
each
Individual
Person
,
cannot
be
separated
from
that
of
other
Rationals
,
since
the
whole
doth
not
differ
from
all
its
parts
taken
together
;
so
that
this
Proposition
,
concerning
this
general
or
diffusive
Benevolence
,
is
thus
to
be
understood
;
viz.
Not
to
mean
,
or
only
intend
,
what
any
single
,
or
a
few
Persons
may
perform
towards
the
procuring
of
their
own
private
Happiness
,
or
that
of
their
own
Party
or
Faction
,
distinct
from
that
of
the
rest
of
Mankind
;
but
what
all
particular
Persons
may
jointly
contribute
to
render
themselves
and
others
happy
;
that
is
,
what
each
of
them
may
rationally
perform
towards
the
obtaining
this
Common
Felicity
.
For
it
ought
first
to
be
known
in
general
what
all
Men
are
able
to
do
,
or
not
to
do
,
towards
any
common
end
,
(
such
as
is
the
common
happiness
of
Rationals
)
and
then
what
it
is
possible
for
any
particular
Person
in
this
or
that
Case
to
perform
;
for
example
,
towards
his
own
private
happiness
,
as
separate
from
that
of
all
others
;
though
such
cases
being
Indefinite
,
cannot
be
certainly
or
distinctly
known
.
§
.
8.
But
indeed
the
care
of
any
particular
Persons
,
or
a
few
Men's
happiness
is
rendred
useless
for
the
present
,
nor
can
be
hoped
for
the
future
,
if
it
is
sought
by
opposing
,
or
postponing
the
happiness
of
all
other
Rationals
;
because
the
mind
being
thus
affected
,
a
main
,
and
essential
part
of
its
own
felicity
must
needs
still
be
wanting
;
(
viz.
)
That
inward
Peace
of
Conscience
proceeding
from
a
solid
Reason
,
and
true
Prudence
,
always
constant
and
agreeable
to
it self
.
For
whilst
such
a
Person
resolves
to
act
by
one
rule
towards
himself
,
and
by
another
towards
all
others
,
who
are
of
the
same
Nature
,
and
therefore
need
and
require
the
same
things
with
himself
,
he
must
needs
contradict
his
own
Reason
,
and
so
wants
that
true
Joy
and
Satisfaction
constantly
springing
in
the
mind
of
a
Just
,
Benevolent
,
and
Good-natur'd
Person
,
from
the
sense
of
another's
good
and
happiness
when
promoted
,
or
procured
by
himself
:
So
that
it
is
impossible
for
any
Man
to
be
truly
happy
,
who
not
only
neglects
the
necessary
causes
thereof
;
God
,
and
all
other
Men
,
(
on
whose
Help
and
Assistance
his
true
Happiness
,
and
Well-being
wholly
depends
)
but
also
provokes
them
to
his
certain
ruine
and
destruction
;
so
that
there
is
no
surer
way
,
which
can
bring
any
Man
to
the
attaining
his
own
particular
Happiness
,
but
that
which
leads
him
also
to
endeavour
the
Common
Good
of
all
other
men
,
as
well
as
his
own
.
§
.
9.
But
I
here
acknowledge
,
that
this
Proposition
concerning
Universal
Benevolence
,
cannot
be
of
sufficient
efficacy
for
the
due
ordering
our
Actions
,
and
correcting
our
Manners
,
until
we
have
first
propos'd
to
our selves
this
Common
Good
of
Rational
Beings
;
(
viz.
)
Our
own
Felicity
(
in
conjunction
with
that
of
others
)
as
our
main
end
,
and
that
we
are
convinced
that
the
various
Acts
contain'd
under
this
general
Love
,
or
Benevolence
,
are
the
only
true
means
to
procure
it
:
The
truth
of
which
Proposition
,
is
,
in
the
first
place
,
to
be
made
manifest
to
us
;
in
the
next
all
those
other
Propositions
that
can
be
deduced
from
thence
;
such
as
are
those
less
general
ones
,
which
determine
concerning
the
Natural
Power
of
Fidelity
,
Gratitude
,
Paternal
and
Filial
Affection
,
as
also
of
all
other
particular
Vertues
,
necessary
for
the
obtaining
any
part
of
this
humane
Felicity
;
for
as
well
the
whole
truth
of
this
Proposition
,
as
of
all
those
which
follow
from
thence
,
depend
upon
the
Natural
,
and
Necessary
Power
of
such
Actions
,
as
real
Causes
producing
such
Effects
.
§
.
10.
And
though
perhaps
it
may
at
first
sight
seem
to
detract
from
their
certainty
,
that
they
depend
upon
such
an
uncertain
Cause
as
Man's
Will
.
Yet
however
it
suffices
,
for
their
truth
and
certainty
,
that
whenever
such
voluntary
Causes
shall
exert
themselves
,
such
Effects
will
certainly
be
produced
.
Thus
in
Arithmetick
we
freely
Add
and
Subtract
;
that
is
,
we
can
choose
whether
we
will
perform
those
Operations
or
not
;
but
if
we
reckon
truly
,
we
shall
always
find
the
Total
,
equal
to
all
the
particulars
either
Added
or
Subtracted
.
And
there
is
a
like
certain
,
and
true
Connexion
between
all
the
Causes
and
Effects
,
which
can
be
known
in
any
other
Science
.
And
this
I
have
likewise
imitated
in
this
Treatise
of
Moral
Philosophy
,
by
reducing
all
the
parts
,
of
which
it
consists
,
to
this
one
Head
or
Summ
,
(
viz.
)
Love
or
Benevolence
;
which
Idea
I
shall
improve
by
enquiring
into
its
several
Kinds
,
and
shewing
the
necessary
Connexion
of
this
,
or
that
particular
Action
,
with
the
Common
Good
of
Rationals
,
which
ought
to
be
the
great
end
sought
for
by
us
.
§
.
11.
But
since
our
voluntary
Actions
alone
can
be
govern'd
by
Reason
,
and
those
only
which
concern
intelligent
Agents
,
are
to
be
considered
in
Morals
;
it
is
evident
,
that
from
none
of
all
these
Actions
we
can
frame
a
higher
,
or
more
comprehensive
Idea
,
than
this
of
Universal
Benevolence
,
which
comprehends
the
willing
,
and
endeavouring
of
all
good
things
,
and
the
removal
,
or
hindring
of
all
evil
ones
,
from
those
Objects
about
which
it
is
conversant
:
And
this
Benevolence
extends
its
self
to
all
Moral
Actions
,
as
well
those
of
considering
,
and
comparing
divers
goods
with
each
other
,
as
of
inquiring
into
the
means
by
which
they
may
be
produced
;
nor
is
it
more
certainly
true
,
that
the
Addition
of
several
numbers
makes
a
Summ
Total
,
than
that
this
Benevolence
produces
a
general
good
effect
to
all
those
towards
whom
we
exert
it
.
Thus
it
is
as
certain
,
that
Piety
,
Fidelity
,
Gratitude
,
paternal
and
conjugal
Affection
,
together
with
filial
Duty
,
make
up
the
chief
and
constituent
parts
of
this
Benevolence
,
as
that
Addition
,
Substraction
,
Multiplication
and
Division
,
are
several
parts
of
Arithmetick
;
so
that
it
is
no
material
Objection
,
That
this
Universal
Benevolence
may
be
prejudiced
or
lessened
by
the
wickedness
or
ill-nature
of
Men.
So
that
the
great
end
,
or
Summ
of
the
Law
of
Nature
,
cannot
be
thereby
generally
obtain'd
as
it
ought
,
any
more
than
it
is
an
Objection
against
the
certainty
or
usefulness
of
Arithmetick
,
or
Geometry
,
that
some
Men
should
through
Lazyness
and
Inadvertency
,
altogether
neglect
their
Rules
,
or
make
false
Conclusions
from
those
Sciences
,
or
should
through
Ignorance
or
prejudice
,
deny
their
certainty
.
So
likewise
it
is
in
the
Science
of
Morality
,
as
contain'd
in
the
Law
of
Nature
,
which
is
chiefly
imploy'd
in
weighing
,
and
taking
a
true
account
of
those
humane
Powers
,
that
contribute
to
the
Common
Good
of
Rational
Beings
;
which
since
they
may
vary
somewhat
in
so
great
a
variety
of
possible
Cases
,
he
may
be
said
,
(
and
that
deservedly
)
to
have
well
performed
this
task
,
who
first
affirms
in
general
,
that
all
those
Powers
are
comprehended
under
the
most
general
and
diffusive
Benevolence
;
though
he
may
be
able
afterwards
more
particularly
to
demonstrate
;
that
a
just
division
of
things
,
Fidelity
,
Gratitude
,
and
all
the
other
vertues
are
contain'd
under
it
,
and
also
shew
in
what
Cases
they
become
useful
to
this
end
;
by
which
means
Religion
,
and
humane
Society
,
with
all
other
things
which
may
render
Men's
lives
happy
and
safe
,
will
be
certainly
improved
and
advanced
.
And
herein
consists
the
Solution
of
that
most
useful
Problem
concerning
the
Common
good
of
Rationals
,
procur'd
by
the
most
diffusive
Benevolence
,
which
Moral
Philosophy
teaches
us
to
search
after
.
Nor
is
the
truth
or
authority
of
such
Precepts
at
all
prejudic'd
or
diminisht
,
though
very
many
Persons
will
not
obey
them
,
or
will
set
themselves
to
oppose
them
;
since
this
only
can
be
the
consequence
of
it
,
That
they
will
thereby
lose
their
own
happiness
,
and
perhaps
may
draw
others
by
their
false
reasons
into
the
same
misery
:
and
so
I
doubt
not
on
the
other
side
,
but
that
Men
would
think
themselves
oblig'd
to
perform
all
the
Acts
that
constitute
this
Benevolence
,
if
they
were
but
once
convinced
that
so
great
and
noble
an
end
,
as
the
Common
Good
of
Rational
Beings
,
(
and
in
which
their
own
happiness
is
likewise
contained
)
will
be
certainly
procured
thereby
,
and
cannot
be
had
by
any
other
or
contrary
means
.
§
.
12.
I
come
now
to
consider
,
that
together
with
the
knowledge
of
this
visible
World
,
(
of
which
our selves
make
but
a
small
part
)
there
is
likewise
convey'd
into
our
minds
by
our
Senses
a
certain
knowledge
,
1.
Of
divers
natural
outward
goods
.
2.
And
those
not
only
peculiar
to
our selves
alone
,
but
common
to
all
those
of
our
own
kind
.
3.
Of
which
goods
some
are
greater
than
others
,
and
that
good
which
hath
none
that
we
know
excels
it
,
we
may
call
the
greatest
or
highest
.
4.
Also
of
those
,
some
are
commonly
in
our
Power
,
others
we
understand
to
exceed
the
narrow
limits
of
our
humane
forces
;
but
since
the
Nature
of
these
things
is
by
two
several
ways
discovered
to
us
,
either
more
confusedly
by
common
experience
and
daily
Observation
,
or
else
more
distinctly
from
experimental
Philosophy
,
and
the
Mathematicks
;
the
former
of
these
methods
being
easie
,
and
obvious
to
every
one
,
I
shall
rather
make
use
of
that
;
whereas
the
other
would
be
only
proper
for
Philosophers
and
Mathematicians
,
since
the
Grounds
or
Principles
of
the
Law
of
Nature
,
ought
to
be
alike
evident
to
the
Illiterate
as
well
as
to
the
Learned
,
for
all
are
under
the
like
obligation
to
observe
them
;
and
therefore
I
shall
only
put
you
in
mind
of
such
vulgar
and
easie
Observations
,
which
no
Rational
Man
can
dispute
,
or
deny
:
and
such
,
as
from
which
I
undertake
to
prove
,
that
the
Knowledge
and
Coherence
of
the
Terms
of
this
Proposition
may
evidently
be
deduced
.
§
.
13.
Our
first
Natural
Observation
therefore
is
,
that
by
our
free
use
,
and
enjoyment
of
those
products
of
the
Earth
,
that
come
under
the
general
Titles
of
Food
,
Clothing
,
Houses
,
&c.
and
also
by
that
help
or
assistance
,
which
one
or
more
Persons
can
afford
each
other
;
Men
may
be
preserved
,
and
live
as
happily
and
contentedly
for
several
years
,
as
their
frail
Nature
will
permit
.
And
in
the
next
place
,
that
these
effects
being
not
only
agreeable
,
but
necessary
to
our
Natures
,
are
naturally
good
,
as
tending
to
their
Preservation
or
Perfection
;
and
therefore
by
the
same
reason
,
Men's
affections
,
from
whence
these
outward
things
and
acts
do
proceed
,
and
which
produce
all
these
good
effects
,
are
conceiv'd
under
the
notion
of
good
Will
,
or
Benevolence
,
which
must
be
also
good
;
since
whatever
goodness
is
contain'd
in
the
effects
,
must
be
likewise
in
the
cause
.
And
we
are
also
sensible
,
that
by
this
Benevolence
,
we
are
not
only
able
to
help
our selves
,
or
some
few
Persons
,
but
many
others
,
as
well
by
our
advice
,
as
by
our
strength
and
industry
;
especially
when
we
see
divers
others
of
our
own
kind
who
are
able
,
and
seem
also
willing
to
requite
us
in
the
like
manner
.
So
that
each
of
us
in
particular
,
may
be
provided
with
a
sufficient
stock
of
all
the
necessaries
of
Life
,
by
our
mutual
help
and
assistance
,
all
which
would
not
only
be
wanting
to
us
,
but
we
should
be
expos'd
to
innumerable
mischiefs
and
hazards
,
as
also
to
a
great
want
even
of
necessaries
,
if
all
Persons
looking
only
to
themselves
,
should
always
shew
themselves
ill-natur'd
,
malevolent
,
and
enemies
towards
other
Rational
Beings
;
whereas
the
contrary
endeavours
being
thus
helpful
,
and
necessary
to
so
many
others
,
may
easily
and
naturally
produce
in
our
minds
a
notion
of
this
Common
good
of
Rationals
,
which
from
the
obvious
Similitude
of
Rational
Beings
to
each
other
,
must
equally
respect
all
those
,
which
we
have
opportunity
or
occasion
of
knowing
,
or
conversing
with
,
as
also
those
with
whom
we
have
not
.
§
.
14.
And
I
may
add
farther
from
constant
experience
,
that
we
are
able
to
contribute
more
to
the
good
,
and
assistance
of
those
of
our
own
kind
,
than
any
other
Creatures
,
because
their
Nature
(
and
consequently
what
is
good
,
or
destructive
to
it
)
is
more
evident
to
us
from
the
knowledge
we
have
of
our selves
,
than
of
other
Creatures
.
For
as
our
Nature
is
capable
of
more
,
and
greater
goods
than
they
,
and
in
the
attaining
of
which
we
can
better
assist
each
other
;
so
we
must
also
confess
it
to
be
liable
to
greater
Dangers
and
Calamities
;
for
the
declining
and
removing
of
which
,
God
hath
appointed
our
mutual
Benevolence
expressed
by
our
endeavours
,
and
assistance
of
each
other
,
as
the
most
suitable
and
necessary
means
thereunto
.
§
.
15.
And
we
may
also
observe
,
that
by
our
Advice
and
Counsel
,
communicated
by
apt
Signs
or
Words
,
we
are
able
to
contribute
many
helps
and
conveniencies
of
Life
to
those
of
our
own
kind
,
of
which
other
Animals
are
altogether
uncapable
either
of
acting
or
receiving
.
And
farther
,
because
of
the
Similitude
of
those
of
our
own
kind
with
our selves
,
we
cannot
but
think
it
agreeable
to
our
Rational
Natures
to
do
,
or
to
procure
the
like
things
for
them
,
as
for
our selves
,
and
can
also
be
sensible
of
greater
Motives
to
benefit
Men
,
than
other
Creatures
;
since
we
have
all
the
reason
to
hope
,
that
those
we
have
thus
done
good
to
,
or
obliged
,
being
moved
by
our
benefits
,
will
make
us
a
suitable
return
whenever
it
lies
in
their
power
,
and
that
they
may
one
time
or
other
,
in
the
like
,
or
some
other
way
oblige
us
.
So
that
it
is
evident
from
Common
Experience
,
that
there
can
be
no
larger
Possession
,
nor
any
surer
defence
for
Mankind
,
than
the
most
sincere
Piety
towards
God
,
the
Head
of
Rational
beings
,
and
the
most
diffusive
Love
,
and
sincere
Benevolence
of
all
Persons
towards
each
other
;
since
if
they
prove
malevolent
,
or
ill-natur'd
,
they
may
easily
bereave
us
of
all
things
we
enjoy
,
together
with
our
Life
it self
:
nor
can
the
Love
or
Good-will
of
others
,
be
obtained
by
any
more
certain
or
powerful
means
,
than
that
every
one
should
shew
himself
so
affected
in
his
Actions
towards
others
,
as
he
desires
they
should
be
towards
himself
;
That
is
,
Loving
and
Benevolent
upon
all
occasions
,
though
more
particularly
to
those
to
whom
we
are
obliged
by
Friendship
or
Relation
.
§
.
16.
Last
of
all
,
the
same
Experience
that
demonstrates
the
mutual
Benevolence
of
particular
Persons
to
be
the
most
powerful
Cause
of
their
Felicity
,
does
as
necessarily
teach
us
from
a
like
parity
of
Reason
,
that
the
Love
,
or
Good-will
of
any
greater
number
of
Men
,
towards
any
the
like
number
,
hath
a-like
proportionable
effect
;
so
on
the
other
side
,
the
constant
Malice
or
Ill-will
of
all
Men
towards
all
,
express'd
by
suitable
Actions
,
would
soon
bring
destruction
to
the
whole
Race
of
Mankind
,
since
it
would
soon
destroy
all
the
Causes
requisite
to
their
Happiness
,
and
Well-being
,
and
introduce
a
perpetual
Enmity
and
War
,
which
are
the
certain
Causes
of
the
greatest
Miseries
and
Calamities
,
which
can
befall
Mankind
:
all
which
,
though
Mr.
H.
himself
acknowledges
,
yet
he
will
not
own
the
necessity
of
Men's
mutual
Love
and
Concord
,
to
be
also
as
necessary
to
their
Preservation
.
But
why
the
Causes
of
Men's
Preservation
and
Happiness
,
as
being
Prior
in
Nature
,
should
not
be
more
evident
than
those
of
their
Destruction
;
since
the
one
is
altogether
as
evident
and
necessary
,
and
may
be
as
easily
foreseen
and
prevented
,
as
the
other
,
I
can
see
no
reason
;
and
I
should
be
glad
if
any
of
Mr.
H's
Disciples
could
shew
us
any
sufficient
Reason
for
that
Opinion
.
§
.
17.
So
that
these
things
which
I
have
now
laid
down
concerning
the
Natural
means
of
Men's
happiness
,
do
appear
so
evident
from
our
common
Reason
,
and
daily
Experience
,
that
they
are
of
like
certainty
with
the
Principles
of
Arithmetick
and
Geometry
,
in
all
whose
Operations
,
there
are
still
supposed
certain
Acts
depending
upon
our
free
,
humane
,
Faculties
;
and
yet
neither
of
these
Sciences
are
rendred
the
more
uncertain
,
from
the
supposition
of
Men's
Free-will
,
whether
they
will
draw
Lines
,
or
cast
up
Sums
,
or
not
;
since
it
suffices
for
their
truth
and
certainty
,
that
there
is
an
inseparable
Connexion
between
such
Acts
,
which
are
supposed
to
be
in
our
Power
to
exert
,
and
all
the
effects
sought
for
;
To
the
finding
of
which
,
both
the
pleasure
annexed
to
their
Contemplation
,
and
the
various
uses
of
Humane
Life
do
at
once
invite
us
.
And
in
the
like
manner
,
the
truth
of
all
Moral
Knowledge
is
founded
in
the
Immutable
Coherence
between
the
highest
Felicity
,
which
Humane
Power
can
attain
to
,
with
those
Acts
of
universal
Benevolence
,
that
is
of
Love
towards
God
and
Men
,
and
which
exerts
it self
in
all
the
particular
moral
Vertues
;
yet
in
the
mean
time
,
these
two
things
are
still
supposed
,
That
Men
desire
,
and
seek
the
highest
Felicity
they
are
capable
of
;
and
also
,
That
they
are
able
to
exercise
this
Benevolence
,
not
only
towards
themselves
,
but
God
and
Men
,
as
partakers
with
them
of
the
same
Rational
,
or
Intelligent
Nature
.
This
I
have
thought
fit
to
add
,
to
prevent
all
those
Cavils
which
Mr.
H's
Disciples
are
used
to
make
against
Morality
,
from
the
necessity
of
our
Wills
.
§
.
18.
But
before
I
proceed
farther
to
inquire
into
the
Nature
of
things
,
I
desire
you
to
remember
what
I
have
already
hinted
in
the
Introduction
to
this
Discourse
,
That
this
truth
concerning
the
efficacy
of
Universal
Benevolence
,
for
the
Preservation
and
Happiness
of
Rational
Beings
,
as
also
all
other
Propositions
alike
evident
,
and
contained
under
it
,
do
all
proceed
from
God
,
as
the
first
Cause
,
and
Ordainer
of
all
things
;
and
consequently
of
our
Humane
Understanding
,
and
of
all
truths
therein
contained
.
And
since
these
Rules
drawn
from
the
Natures
of
things
,
tend
to
the
procuring
God's
End
and
Design
,
viz.
The
Preservation
,
and
Happiness
of
Mankind
;
and
also
that
it
hath
pleased
Him
to
annex
certain
natural
Rewards
,
to
the
Observation
of
these
Dictates
of
Reason
,
and
Punishments
to
their
Transgression
;
so
that
they
thereby
becoming
apt
,
and
sufficient
for
the
due
ordering
of
our
Thoughts
,
and
governing
our
Actions
towards
God
,
our selves
,
and
all
others
,
(
as
I
shall
farther
make
out
in
this
Discourse
)
I
see
nothing
wanting
to
give
it
the
Essence
,
and
Vigour
of
a
Law
.
And
I
shall
farther
shew
before
I
have
done
,
that
under
this
general
Rule
of
endeavouring
the
Common
Good
of
Rational
Beings
,
or
Universal
Benevolence
,
is
contained
Piety
towards
God
,
and
the
highest
Good-will
or
Charity
towards
Men
,
and
is
the
Summ
both
of
the
Moral
Law
of
Moses
,
and
of
the
Gospel
of
our
Saviour
Iesus
Christ
.
§
.
19.
These
Things
being
thus
proposed
in
general
,
I
come
now
more
particularly
to
shew
,
that
a
due
Observation
and
Knowledge
of
these
natural
Things
without
us
,
will
truly
and
clearly
teach
us
what
Operations
or
Motions
of
them
are
good
,
or
evil
,
for
all
other
Men
,
as
well
as
our selves
;
and
also
shew
us
how
necessarily
and
unalterably
all
these
Things
are
produced
;
for
Natural
Knowledge
searches
into
the
true
Causes
of
that
Generation
and
Corruption
which
daily
happens
to
all
Natural
Bodies
,
and
especially
to
Men
,
and
so
can
demonstrate
the
necessary
coherence
of
these
Effects
,
with
their
Causes
;
and
therefore
those
Causes
that
help
to
generate
or
preserve
Men
,
and
that
make
them
live
happily
in
this
Life
,
are
Natural
Goods
,
as
the
Causes
of
their
Misery
and
Dissolution
are
Natural
Evils
:
And
it
then
as
plainly
follows
,
That
by
this
Knowledge
we
can
as
certainly
demonstrate
and
foretell
what
Things
are
naturally
Good
,
or
Evil
,
for
all
Mankind
,
as
for
any
single
Person
.
§
.
20.
Therefore
we
may
truly
conclude
,
That
the
Knowledge
of
all
these
Effects
,
which
either
Nature
or
Humane
Industry
can
produce
for
Men's
Food
,
Clothing
,
Habitation
,
and
Medicine
,
is
part
of
this
Natural
Knowledge
:
To
which
we
may
also
add
the
understanding
of
all
other
Humane
Operations
,
and
of
the
Effects
proceeding
from
thence
,
for
the
Uses
of
Humane
Life
.
For
although
the
voluntary
Actions
of
Men
,
as
they
exert
themselves
towards
Things
without
them
,
do
not
work
exactly
after
the
same
manner
as
meer
Mechanick
Motions
,
viz.
from
the
Pulsion
or
Motion
of
other
Bodies
,
but
either
from
their
Reasons
,
or
Wills
;
yet
since
all
the
outward
Motions
we
exert
,
receive
their
Measure
and
Force
from
the
Natural
Powers
of
Humane
Bodies
,
which
are
of
the
same
Nature
with
others
,
and
so
must
perform
their
Natural
Functions
,
as
they
are
regulated
by
the
necessary
Laws
of
Matter
and
Motion
,
much
after
the
same
manner
as
other
Natural
Motions
,
it
is
evident
,
that
these
voluntary
Actions
,
whenever
they
are
thus
exerted
,
are
regulated
by
the
same
Natural
Laws
:
And
it
is
commonly
known
how
much
Men's
Industry
,
by
the
various
Motions
of
their
Bodies
(
which
a
Philosopher
can
easily
resolve
into
mechanick
ones
)
,
does
contribute
to
their
own
and
other
Men's
Preservation
,
by
providing
and
administring
Victuals
,
Cloths
,
Physick
,
Houses
,
&c.
In
performing
which
Effects
,
Men's
Strength
,
and
Skill
in
Husbandry
,
Building
,
Navigation
,
and
other
manual
Trades
,
are
chiefly
employ'd
.
Nor
are
the
Liberal
Arts
absolutely
free
from
these
Laws
of
Motion
,
since
by
the
help
of
certain
sensible
Signs
,
and
articulate
Notes
,
or
Marks
,
as
Words
,
Letters
,
or
Cyphers
,
the
Minds
of
Men
come
to
be
endued
with
Knowledge
,
and
directed
in
most
of
their
Civil
and
Moral
Duties
.
I
have
only
thought
fit
to
hint
thus
much
concerning
Humane
Actions
,
considered
as
meer
Natural
Things
existing
without
us
;
but
I
shall
treat
more
fully
of
them
in
the
next
Chapter
,
when
I
come
to
treat
of
the
Nature
of
Man
,
considered
as
a
voluntary
Agent
.
§
.
21.
Hence
it
plainly
appears
,
That
all
these
Natural
Things
,
and
the
mutual
Helps
by
which
they
are
procured
,
may
be
certainly
known
,
and
foreseen
by
us
,
to
be
naturally
and
unalterably
Good
;
that
is
,
tending
to
the
Preservation
and
Happiness
of
Mankind
.
And
for
the
same
Reason
all
those
contrary
Causes
,
or
Motions
,
by
which
Men's
Bodies
are
weakened
or
destroyed
,
by
lessening
or
taking
away
the
Necessaries
and
Conveniences
of
Life
,
such
as
Food
,
Rayment
,
Liberty
,
Quiet
,
&c.
And
also
those
Actions
by
which
Vertue
and
Knowledge
may
be
rooted
out
of
Men's
Minds
;
and
Errours
,
and
unbridled
Passions
,
destructive
to
the
Common
Good
of
Mankind
,
introduced
into
their
Rooms
,
are
necessarily
and
in
their
own
Nature
Evil.
Therefore
when
we
determine
of
Natural
Goods
,
or
Evils
,
according
to
the
Law
of
Nature
,
we
are
not
only
to
consider
the
Preservation
of
a
few
particular
Persons
,
since
the
Punishment
;
nay
,
Death
of
these
,
may
often
conduce
to
the
Common
Good
;
but
rather
that
of
the
aggregate
Body
of
Mankind
,
subordinate
to
GOD
,
as
the
Head
of
Rational
Beings
,
in
this
Natural
System
or
Commonweal
,
establish'd
by
Natural
Laws
:
For
the
good
of
an
aggregate
Body
,
is
nothing
else
but
the
Chiefest
Good
that
can
accrue
to
all
its
Parts
,
or
the
Individual
.
§
.
22.
Having
now
found
out
from
the
Nature
of
Things
,
by
what
means
our
Minds
can
receive
the
Idea's
of
a
Common
Natural
Good
,
and
Evil
,
and
these
no
less
certain
and
stable
,
than
those
by
which
the
Causes
of
Generation
and
Corruption
are
exhibited
to
them
;
I
come
next
to
consider
,
That
that
Matter
and
Motion
,
in
which
the
Powers
of
Humane
Bodies
(
as
well
as
other
Parts
of
this
Visible
World
)
consist
,
and
exert
themselves
after
a
limitted
manner
,
and
have
a
finite
Quantity
,
and
certain
Bounds
,
beyond
which
,
they
cannot
act
;
from
which
Principles
,
flow
those
known
Laws
of
Natural
Bodies
,
as
that
they
cannot
be
at
once
in
divers
Places
,
and
therefore
cannot
be
moved
towards
contrary
Points
,
at
the
same
time
;
or
so
as
to
be
subservient
to
the
contrary
Wills
of
divers
Persons
,
at
once
;
but
are
so
bounded
and
determined
in
their
Natures
,
as
to
be
only
ordered
or
disposed
of
,
according
to
the
Will
of
one
Person
alone
,
or
else
of
divers
consenting
or
conspiring
to
the
same
End
,
or
Design
.
For
if
Men
should
think
thus
to
make
use
of
them
,
they
would
be
so
far
from
conducing
to
their
Benefit
,
or
Preservation
,
that
they
would
only
tend
to
their
Hurt
,
and
Destruction
;
since
if
the
Stronger
had
a
Right
to
take
from
the
Weaker
by
Strength
,
and
the
Weaker
from
the
Stronger
by
Cunning
and
Surprize
,
any
of
these
Necessaries
of
Life
,
which
he
was
once
possessed
of
;
yet
when
he
had
them
,
he
could
be
no
more
assured
that
he
should
keep
them
,
than
he
was
that
last
possessed
them
,
since
one
Stronger
,
or
more
Cunning
than
himself
,
may
yet
come
,
and
serve
him
as
he
had
done
the
other
before
;
and
so
on
,
'till
all
Men
that
enjoy'd
them
should
be
destroy'd
,
and
the
Things
contended
for
,
perish
without
use
:
So
that
there
could
remain
neither
any
Owner
,
nor
Thing
to
be
owned
.
§
.
23.
From
all
which
that
hath
been
now
laid
down
,
I
shall
draw
some
Conclusions
of
great
moment
to
our
Subject
;
as
,
(
1.
)
From
this
Knowledge
of
the
Nature
of
Things
,
(
and
especially
of
our
own
Humane
Nature
)
we
may
learn
that
somuch
celebrated
Distinction
of
the
Stoicks
,
between
the
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
(
i.
e.
)
those
Things
which
are
in
our
own
Power
and
Disposal
,
such
as
are
the
voluntary
Motions
and
Inclinations
of
our
Bodies
and
Minds
;
and
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
(
i.
e.
)
the
Things
out
of
our
Power
,
such
as
are
those
Corporeal
Motions
,
so
violent
and
irresistible
,
which
we
daily
observe
to
proceed
from
the
Nature
and
Frame
of
the
World
,
which
we
weak
Creatures
are
not
able
to
resist
,
and
from
whose
irresistible
Force
,
all
things
here
below
are
in
a
perpetual
flux
;
whence
also
there
happens
to
us
Men
,
a
perpetual
vicisfitude
of
Things
,
as
well
Adverse
as
Prosperous
,
as
also
of
Maturation
,
Decay
,
and
Dissolution
:
So
that
this
Distinction
(
if
duly
observed
)
will
be
of
singular
use
,
as
well
in
forming
our
Manners
,
as
governing
our
Affections
:
For
from
hence
we
are
taught
not
to
expect
any
other
or
greater
Happiness
,
as
a
Reward
of
all
our
Labours
and
Endeavours
,
than
what
may
proceed
from
a
prudent
Management
of
our
Rational
Faculties
,
and
from
those
External
Helps
which
we
may
expect
Divine
Providence
will
afford
us
,
in
its
governing
the
World
;
by
which
means
we
may
befreed
from
those
fruitless
Labours
and
Endeavours
,
to
which
Men's
vain
Fears
,
and
groundless
Hopes
,
so
often
transport
them
:
Nor
shall
we
too
much
afflict
our selves
for
those
Evils
,
which
either
do
now
,
or
may
hereafter
,
without
our
own
Faults
,
inevitably
befal
us
,
whence
the
greatest
part
of
those
Troubles
and
Molestations
,
which
are
wont
to
proceed
from
Grief
,
Anger
,
and
Discontent
at
our
present
Fortunes
,
or
Conditions
,
may
,
by
our
Prudence
,
or
Patience
,
be
prevented
:
Neither
are
we
hereby
only
directed
to
the
avoiding
of
Evils
,
but
here
is
also
chalked
out
to
us
,
a
more
short
and
compendious
method
,
by
which
we
may
,
by
degrees
,
attain
to
those
two
greatest
Blessings
which
can
be
enjoyed
by
us
in
this
Life
;
the
Culture
of
our
own
Minds
,
and
the
Government
of
our
Passions
.
§
.
24.
I
need
not
prosecute
this
Subject
any
farther
,
but
shall
proceed
to
take
notice
of
those
obvious
Observations
to
our
Purpose
,
viz.
That
it
is
evident
from
common
Experience
,
That
the
natural
Forces
,
or
Powers
,
of
any
one
Person
,
are
too
weak
,
scanty
,
and
inconsiderable
,
towards
the
obtaining
all
that
Happiness
he
desires
and
is
capable
of
;
to
procure
which
,
he
still
wants
the
Help
and
Assistance
of
many
other
Persons
and
Things
,
to
render
his
Life
safe
,
pleasant
,
or
contented
:
And
,
further
,
that
it
is
in
the
Power
of
any
one
of
us
,
to
contribute
many
Things
towards
the
use
of
others
of
our
own
kind
,
which
we
do
not
need
our selves
;
and
which
though
of
no
use
to
us
,
yet
may
be
of
singular
use
to
their
Happiness
,
or
Preservation
.
But
since
we
are
certain
,
from
those
known
Bounds
of
our
Power
,
that
we
are
not
able
to
compel
all
those
by
force
,
whose
Assistance
we
stand
in
need
of
,
to
co-operate
with
us
,
towards
this
our
main
End
and
Design
,
viz.
Happiness
;
there
can
be
no
surer
Means
,
or
safer
Defence
left
us
,
than
that
by
a
constant
offering
and
affording
those
Necessaries
of
Life
,
together
with
our
Assistance
to
others
,
as
often
as
it
lies
in
our
Power
;
we
may
thereby
probably
render
them
likewise
Benevolent
and
Helpful
to
us
in
the
like
Necessities
,
or
Occasions
:
So
that
this
Benevolence
,
or
Charity
,
is
only
a
constant
Will
and
Endeavour
of
acting
thus
sincerely
and
diffusively
,
whenever
any
Opportunity
offers
it self
;
and
that
even
in
those
Cases
,
in
which
it
may
oftentimes
be
probably
foreseen
,
that
no
return
can
be
immediately
expected
from
the
Person
to
whom
the
Benefit
is
done
;
since
,
however
,
it
still
contributes
to
the
general
Good
of
Mankind
,
of
which
that
Person
we
so
benefit
is
a
Member
:
Which
general
Benevolence
doth
not
yet
hinder
,
but
that
we
may
bestow
and
exercise
a
larger
share
,
and
higher
degrees
thereof
,
towards
those
from
whom
our
own
long
Acquaintance
,
and
nearer
Relation
,
may
persuade
us
to
hope
for
larger
Returns
of
Friendship
.
§
.
25.
Whence
we
may
,
in
the
next
place
,
observe
,
That
if
our
Assistance
,
and
other
Things
in
our
Power
,
certainly
contribute
to
the
Use
,
or
Benefit
of
others
,
they
can
only
perform
this
,
as
they
are
assign'd
,
or
appropriated
,
to
the
particular
Persons
,
that
are
to
make
use
of
them
,
according
to
some
certain
time
and
place
.
So
that
if
Right
Reason
prescribe
a
Use
of
Things
,
and
Humane
Helps
,
as
necessary
for
the
Happiness
and
Preservation
of
Mankind
,
it
,
as
necessarily
,
prescribes
,
that
this
Use
of
these
Things
,
should
be
appropriated
to
them
,
that
are
thus
to
use
them
,
for
the
time
they
stand
in
need
of
them
,
and
according
to
the
place
in
which
they
are
to
be
used
.
The
Consequence
is
evident
,
because
Right
Reason
can
only
prescribe
that
to
be
done
,
which
will
consist
with
the
nature
of
the
Things
that
are
to
be
used
,
and
the
Persons
that
are
to
use
them
.
So
that
it
is
evident
,
a
Division
,
or
Appropriation
of
Things
,
and
Humane
Assistances
and
Labours
,
is
absolutely
necessary
for
the
Subsistence
and
Happiness
of
all
Men
;
whence
it
also
follows
,
That
this
necessary
Limitation
,
or
Appropriation
of
any
of
these
Things
to
particular
Persons
,
for
the
time
they
stand
in
need
of
them
,
is
a
natural
Separation
of
them
,
from
the
use
of
all
others
,
during
the
time
they
are
so
made
use
of
.
By
One
Thing
,
I
mean
such
single
Things
as
are
uncapable
of
division
;
and
to
make
use
of
which
,
it
is
absolutely
necessary
that
it
be
possessed
whole
and
entire
,
such
as
are
Food
,
Cloths
,
and
the
like
;
for
there
are
other
Things
which
are
likewise
called
One
,
as
one
Island
,
one
Field
,
and
the
like
,
which
may
very
well
serve
for
the
Use
of
divers
Persons
at
once
,
and
whose
Division
arising
from
the
positive
Consent
of
Men
already
entred
into
Civil
Societies
,
or
Commonweals
,
I
need
not
now
treat
of
.
§
.
26.
But
from
this
natural
Division
,
or
Appropriation
of
Things
,
and
its
Necessity
for
the
Preservation
of
Mankind
,
arises
that
Natural
and
Primitive
right
proceeding
from
Occupancy
,
which
both
Philosophers
and
Civilians
grant
to
have
place
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
supposing
a
Community
of
most
Things
:
For
Right
is
but
a
certain
Faculty
,
or
Power
of
Acting
,
or
enjoying
any
thing
granted
us
by
a
Law
;
but
in
this
state
,
there
is
no
other
Law
but
that
of
Right
Reason
,
given
by
GOD
,
concerning
such
Actions
as
are
necessary
for
the
Common
Good
of
Rational
Beings
.
Therefore
since
Right
Reason
requires
a
separate
use
of
particular
Things
,
and
Humane
Assistances
,
as
necessary
and
conducing
to
this
End
,
there
must
needs
follow
from
thence
,
a
Right
to
the
Use
and
Enjoyment
of
any
particular
Thing
,
during
the
time
the
Possessor
so
makes
use
of
it
;
for
a
Man
hath
the
same
Right
to
live
tomorrow
,
as
he
hath
to
day
;
and
consequently
hath
the
same
Right
to
all
the
Means
which
are
necessary
for
his
Preservation
:
Therefore
if
this
House
,
Servant
,
or
any
thing
else
that
I
am
now
possessed
of
,
be
necessary
for
my
Happiness
or
Preservation
to
day
,
I
shall
have
also
a
like
Right
to
it
for
the
future
as
long
as
it
continues
thus
necessary
:
And
in
this
state
,
there
being
no
other
Judge
of
the
Means
of
my
own
Preservation
but
my self
,
I
shall
have
a
Right
to
it
as
long
as
I
live
,
for
the
same
Reason
for
which
I
had
a
Right
to
it
at
first
.
So
that
unless
,
the
Use
or
Necessity
ceasing
,
I
alter
my
Mind
concerning
it
,
or
assign
my
Interest
in
it
to
another
,
I
have
a
perpetual
Right
in
it
,
excluding
that
of
any
other
,
during
the
time
that
I
am
thus
possessed
of
it
:
Not
that
I
hereby
grant
every
Man
a
Right
,
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
to
all
Things
which
his
unreasonable
Passions
,
or
Appetites
,
shall
fansie
to
be
necessary
for
his
own
Preservation
,
or
Happiness
,
but
only
to
so
much
of
the
Means
conducing
thereunto
,
as
any
Man
,
whilst
he
judges
according
to
Right
Reason
,
or
Equity
,
and
the
natural
Necessities
of
himself
and
Family
,
shall
rightly
so
determine
,
without
arrogating
,
or
assuming
to
himself
more
than
is
really
necessary
for
those
Ends
,
and
without
robbing
others
of
what
is
also
necessary
for
them
,
which
is
down-right
Violence
and
Injustice
.
§
.
27.
Whence
it
plainly
appears
,
That
this
natural
Division
,
or
Property
in
Things
,
first
proceeding
from
Occupancy
and
Possession
,
as
it
is
necessary
for
the
Preservation
of
all
particular
Persons
,
so
it
must
be
likewise
for
that
of
Mankind
,
considered
as
an
aggregate
Body
,
consisting
of
divers
Individuals
,
the
same
Means
being
necessary
for
the
preservation
of
the
whole
,
as
are
requisite
to
all
its
constituent
Parts
or
Members
,
though
this
kind
of
Property
may
very
well
consist
with
Community
,
as
at
Ord'naries
and
Theatres
,
every
one
that
pays
his
Money
hath
a
Right
to
his
Dinner
,
or
Place
;
yet
none
can
tell
which
it
is
,
or
where
it
shall
be
,
'till
he
hath
it
on
his
Plate
,
or
is
actually
seated
in
it
.
§
.
28.
Whence
it
may
appear
,
That
these
Principles
being
truly
drawn
from
the
Nature
of
Things
,
will
,
without
any
more
ado
,
destroy
Mr.
H.'s
wild
Hypothesis
,
concerning
the
Natural
Right
of
all
Men
to
all
Things
,
that
he
may
thereby
prove
a
Right
,
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
in
all
Men
▪
of
doing
whatsoever
they
please
towards
others
,
necessary
to
their
Preservation
;
so
that
thence
may
arise
a
natural
state
of
War
of
all
Men
against
all
.
And
hence
it
likewise
appears
upon
what
grounds
every
Man
hath
a
Right
to
his
own
Life
,
Limbs
,
and
Liberty
,
viz.
because
they
are
the
natural
Means
by
which
we
are
enabled
to
serve
GOD
,
and
assist
Mankind
;
in
doing
which
,
we
prosecute
the
Common
Good
of
Rational
Beings
.
And
from
these
Principles
here
laid
down
,
it
clearly
appears
,
That
Mr.
H.'s
Doctrines
concerning
the
Law
of
Nature
,
and
Dominion
,
are
not
only
precarious
,
but
manifestly
false
;
which
,
first
,
suppose
(
without
any
sufficient
Proof
)
an
unlimitted
Right
of
all
Men
to
all
Things
,
to
be
necessary
to
their
Preservation
,
as
the
Foundation
of
all
Natural
Laws
,
and
Civil
Societies
.
For
the
proving
of
which
,
he
only
makes
use
of
some
false
and
specious
Arguments
,
as
I
hope
I
have
sufficiently
made
appear
in
the
Second
Part
of
this
Treatise
.
§
.
29.
Having
now
established
a
Natural
Property
in
such
Things
,
and
Humane
Helps
,
or
Assistances
,
as
are
necessary
for
Men's
Happiness
and
Preservation
,
in
order
to
the
Common
Good
,
I
shall
not
concern
my self
to
prove
the
Convenience
of
Civil
Property
,
as
now
established
in
most
Commonweals
;
nor
shall
now
trouble
you
with
those
Mischiefs
,
which
Aristotle
,
in
his
Politicks
,
hath
very
well
proved
,
would
follow
from
a
Community
of
Things
,
from
those
unavoidable
Strifes
and
Contentions
,
which
would
daily
arise
from
our
using
the
Fruits
of
the
Earth
in
common
:
Only
I
think
I
may
say
thus
much
,
That
since
Mankind
is
so
multiplied
in
well-inhabited
Countries
,
that
there
is
not
Land
sufficient
to
be
divided
amongst
all
the
Inhabitants
,
so
as
to
serve
for
each
Person
's
comfortable
Subsistence
without
foreign
Trade
,
or
mechanick
Employments
,
there
must
necessarily
follow
a
more
full
and
exact
Division
and
Appropriation
of
the
Necessaries
of
Life
,
such
as
are
Land
,
or
the
Use
and
Products
thereof
;
as
,
Corn
,
Cattel
,
and
the
like
,
in
order
to
the
Preservation
and
Happiness
of
that
Nation
,
or
Civil
Society
,
by
whose
Consent
such
a
Division
and
Appropriation
of
these
Things
were
at
first
introduced
;
which
being
once
setled
by
Civil
Laws
,
there
is
the
like
Reason
for
its
continuance
;
and
Men
have
as
much
Right
to
those
Things
they
thus
enjoy
,
by
the
particular
Laws
of
the
Countries
where
they
live
,
as
they
had
before
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
to
whatever
they
could
possess
by
the
Right
of
Occupancy
,
or
Possession
;
since
it
is
evident
,
That
this
more
exact
Property
,
or
Dominion
,
consisting
in
a
stricter
and
more
limitted
use
of
these
Things
,
hath
a
greater
efficacy
in
order
to
the
Happiness
and
Preservation
of
that
Nation
,
or
part
of
Mankind
,
which
have
thus
agreed
to
it
,
than
the
bare
Occupancy
,
or
Possession
of
these
Things
had
before
such
a
Division
made
,
or
agreed
upon
;
nor
can
it
now
be
altered
,
however
,
perhaps
,
hard
and
unequal
it
may
prove
to
some
particular
Persons
,
since
it
will
always
conduce
to
the
Happiness
and
Tranquility
of
each
particular
Civil
Society
,
or
Commonweal
,
that
it
should
continue
as
it
doth
,
than
it
should
be
still
altered
,
according
to
every
Man
's
particular
Fancy
,
or
Interest
,
since
such
a
Change
can
never
be
made
,
without
inconceivable
Discontents
,
and
Civil
Dissentions
,
which
would
quickly
end
in
open
Violence
and
Hostility
.
§
.
30.
So
that
from
these
Principles
here
laid
down
,
there
is
no
Right
conferred
upon
any
Man
,
of
doing
whatever
his
own
wild
Fancy
,
or
unbounded
Appetite
may
prompt
him
to
,
but
only
,
what
he
shall
,
according
to
right
Reason
,
truly
judge
necessary
to
his
own
,
or
Family's
Happiness
and
Preservation
,
in
order
to
the
Common
Good
of
Mankind
.
Therefore
I
here
desire
you
to
take
notice
,
that
whatever
Right
we
enjoy
,
even
to
the
things
most
necessary
for
our
Preservation
,
it
is
founded
,
if
not
in
the
Precept
,
yet
at
least
permission
of
this
great
Law
of
Nature
,
of
endeavouring
the
Common
Good
of
Rational
Beings
,
when
we
truly
judge
according
to
the
Nature
of
things
,
concerning
the
means
necessary
,
and
conducing
to
this
great
End
;
so
that
it
can
never
be
proved
,
that
any
one
hath
a
right
of
Preserving
himself
,
unless
it
be
first
made
out
,
how
this
Right
of
Self-preservation
,
conduces
to
,
or
at
least
consists
with
this
Common
Good
.
Since
no
Rational
Man
can
ever
believe
,
that
God
intended
the
Preservation
,
much
less
the
Sensual
Pleasures
of
any
one
Man
,
as
the
Sole
End
of
His
Creation
.
Which
Principle
being
once
established
,
as
the
Foundation
and
Original
of
all
the
Natural
,
or
Civil
Rights
we
enjoy
;
our
own
natural
Powers
and
Rights
,
will
appear
so
limitted
thereby
,
that
we
cannot
without
injury
,
and
injustice
,
violate
or
invade
the
Rights
of
others
,
much
less
break
out
into
open
War
against
them
without
just
Cause
;
nay
all
those
Arguments
by
which
any
one
Man
can
assume
a
Right
to
Preserve
himself
by
the
Law
of
Nature
,
will
likewise
be
of
the
same
force
to
prove
,
that
he
ought
to
Preserve
others
also
;
and
that
it
can
never
become
lawful
for
us
in
any
State
,
to
rob
Innocent
Persons
of
what
is
necessary
for
their
Well-being
and
Preservation
;
but
rather
on
the
contrary
,
that
all
Men's
natural
Rights
,
should
be
secured
from
the
mischiefs
of
unreasonable
Violence
,
and
War
,
and
Contention
;
which
natural
Security
in
a
Civil
State
or
Commonweal
,
is
highly
improved
and
encreased
by
the
Assistance
of
Humane
Skill
and
Industry
,
according
to
the
established
Laws
of
Property
or
Dominion
.
§
.
31.
I
have
spoken
thus
much
concerning
the
necessary
Connexion
between
the
particular
Actions
above
mentioned
,
and
the
Common
Good
of
Mankind
,
that
by
considering
their
relation
to
this
Great
End
,
the
Nature
of
all
Humane
Actions
may
more
certainly
be
known
and
predetermined
.
Since
the
Dependance
of
natural
Effects
on
their
Causes
,
are
absolutely
necessary
and
immutable
;
for
as
well
in
the
state
of
Nature
or
Community
,
as
of
Civil
Society
,
or
separate
Property
,
those
Humane
Actions
which
cause
,
or
procure
,
that
the
minds
of
all
other
Persons
should
not
be
prejudiced
by
Errors
,
Lyes
,
or
Perfidiousness
;
nor
their
Bodies
hurt
,
nor
their
Lives
,
Goods
,
Fames
and
Chastities
violated
,
or
taken
away
,
and
also
by
which
a
grateful
return
is
rendred
to
those
that
have
done
us
good
;
or
in
short
,
all
those
Actions
by
which
the
true
happiness
of
any
one
Man
,
or
more
is
procured
,
without
injury
to
others
,
as
they
always
were
,
so
they
ever
will
be
the
certain
Causes
of
the
Common
Good
,
and
Happiness
of
Mankind
,
and
are
therefore
distinguished
by
the
Titles
of
moral
Vertues
,
as
I
shall
more
at
large
demonstrate
in
this
Discourse
,
when
I
come
to
shew
how
all
moral
Vertues
are
derived
from
,
and
at
last
resolved
into
this
Principle
of
the
Common
Good
of
Rational
Beings
.
But
least
the
variousness
of
the
Observations
treated
of
in
this
Chapter
,
and
their
Independance
upon
each
other
,
should
render
them
perplext
,
and
consequently
unconvincing
to
Common
Readers
,
who
may
not
be
able
to
carry
so
long
a
train
of
consequences
in
their
minds
;
I
shall
contract
what
hath
been
now
said
into
these
few
plain
Propositions
.
1.
That
though
all
particular
men
are
mortal
,
and
but
of
a
short
duration
,
yet
that
God
hath
still
preserved
mankind
without
any
sensible
failure
or
decay
.
2.
That
in
Order
to
this
,
God
hath
made
man
to
be
propagated
by
Generation
,
and
also
to
be
preserved
by
divers
outward
means
,
which
we
call
necessaries
of
Life
.
3.
That
these
Natural
means
can
no
way
answer
this
End
,
but
as
they
are
allowed
,
or
appropriated
to
the
uses
and
occasions
of
particular
Persons
,
during
the
time
they
stand
in
need
of
them
,
and
so
cannot
at
the
same
time
answer
the
different
or
contrary
desires
,
and
necessities
of
divers
men
,
endeavouring
to
use
these
things
after
contrary
or
different
manner
.
4.
That
the
taking
away
those
necessaries
of
Life
,
which
another
is
rightly
possessed
of
,
doth
not
only
cause
the
ruine
and
destruction
of
that
Person
and
his
Family
,
who
were
thus
possessed
of
them
;
but
by
causing
a
perpetual
strife
among
Mankind
,
will
render
these
things
uncapable
of
being
made
use
of
at
all
for
their
Common
Good
and
Preservation
.
5.
That
such
a
Strife
,
if
prosecuted
to
the
utmost
,
will
certainly
end
in
the
destruction
,
not
only
of
particular
Persons
and
Nations
,
but
of
all
mankind
contrary
to
God's
design
.
6.
From
all
which
we
may
Rationally
collect
,
that
God
designs
the
Preservation
and
Happiness
of
Mankind
,
as
also
of
all
Individual
Persons
as
parts
of
it
,
as
far
as
their
frail
and
mortal
Natures
will
permit
,
and
in
subordination
to
the
good
of
the
whole
body
thereof
.
7.
That
therefore
there
are
no
surer
means
to
procure
this
great
End
of
the
Common
Good
of
Mankind
,
than
an
Universal
Benevolence
towards
Rational
Beings
;
consisting
,
First
,
in
Divine
Love
or
Piety
towards
God
,
and
in
Respect
of
Men
,
not
only
in
permitting
each
other
quietly
to
enjoy
all
the
necessaries
of
Life
,
but
also
in
making
a
settled
division
of
them
to
others
,
so
as
to
be
appropriated
to
several
mens
uses
or
occasions
;
which
dictates
being
given
us
by
God
as
a
rule
of
all
our
moral
Actions
,
(
in
the
exercise
of
which
is
contained
our
truest
Happiness
,
as
in
its
violation
,
our
greatest
Misery
)
is
therefore
truly
and
properly
a
Law
,
and
indeed
the
Summ
of
all
the
Laws
of
Nature
.
CHAP.
II.
Observations
and
Conclusions
,
drawn
from
the
consideration
of
Humane
Nature
and
Right
Reason
,
as
also
from
the
Nature
of
God
.
§
.
1.
HAving
in
the
former
Chapter
drawn
such
easie
and
obvious
Observations
,
from
the
Nature
of
those
things
without
us
,
which
we
daily
stand
in
need
and
make
use
of
,
as
may
serve
to
prove
,
after
what
manner
we
ought
to
make
use
of
them
,
and
whence
that
Right
arises
we
have
to
them
.
I
come
now
to
make
the
like
Observations
from
the
Nature
of
Mankind
,
in
order
to
the
proving
,
that
we
are
designed
by
God
for
the
Good
and
Preservation
of
others
besides
our selves
,
and
that
in
the
doing
of
this
,
we
procure
(
as
far
as
lies
in
our
Power
)
the
Good
and
Happiness
of
all
Rational
Beings
,
in
which
our
own
is
likewise
included
.
To
perform
this
task
,
I
shall
first
take
notice
of
those
Qualities
or
Properties
that
belong
to
man
(1)
as
a
meer
Natural
Body
,
(2)
such
as
belong
to
him
as
an
Animal
,
(3)
such
as
are
peculiar
to
him
as
a
Rational
Creature
,
endued
with
a
higher
and
nobler
Principle
than
Brutes
,
viz.
an
Immortal
Soul
.
§
.
2.
To
begin
with
the
first
of
these
,
it
is
evident
,
that
as
a
Natural
Body
,
he
is
endued
with
these
Properties
common
to
all
other
Natural
Bodies
.
First
,
that
all
his
motions
,
in
which
his
Life
,
Strength
,
and
Health
consist
,
do
all
proceed
from
God
,
the
first
and
Original
,
or
Cause
of
them
,
and
are
necessarily
complicated
with
,
and
depend
upon
the
motions
of
innumerable
other
Bodies
,
among
which
the
Corporeal
motions
of
others
,
(
which
do
often
limit
and
restrain
our
own
)
are
first
and
chiefly
to
be
considered
.
(2)
That
from
them
,
as
from
other
Bodies
,
motion
may
be
propagated
Indefinitely
,
and
which
does
not
perish
,
but
concur
with
other
motions
to
perpetuate
the
Succession
of
things
,
that
is
,
contribute
to
the
conservation
of
the
Universe
;
and
as
the
former
teaches
us
,
that
a
particular
end
,
viz.
our
own
Preservation
,
depends
upon
our
Common
or
joynt
Forces
,
or
Natural
Powers
;
so
this
latter
instructs
us
,
that
such
Powers
and
motions
of
particular
Persons
,
are
often
most
Beneficial
,
and
conducing
to
the
Common
Good
of
all
men
.
The
first
of
these
Conclusions
forbids
us
to
hope
for
,
or
endeavour
our
own
private
Good
or
Happiness
,
as
separate
and
distinct
from
that
of
all
others
,
and
so
excites
us
to
seek
the
Common
Good
of
Rationals
,
as
the
Original
of
our
own
particular
Happiness
.
The
other
Conclusion
shews
,
that
this
endeavour
of
the
Common
Good
can
never
prove
in
vain
,
or
to
no
purpose
,
since
it
concurrs
with
the
Will
of
God
,
and
conduces
to
the
Preservation
of
the
Universe
,
and
of
all
Humane
Creatures
therein
contain'd
;
and
farther
,
that
in
each
complicated
motion
,
as
well
in
that
,
towards
which
divers
Causes
concurr
for
the
Preservation
of
any
Body
for
a
certain
time
,
as
also
in
that
,
whereby
each
particular
Body
concurrs
to
the
Conservation
of
the
whole
System
.
There
is
a
certain
order
still
observed
,
whereby
some
motions
are
necessarily
determined
by
others
in
a
continual
Series
,
or
Succession
,
all
which
are
yet
governed
or
over-ruled
,
by
the
motion
of
the
whole
System
of
Natural
Bodies
.
And
although
this
sort
of
Contemplation
,
may
seem
remote
from
common
use
,
yet
is
it
not
to
be
contemned
as
altogether
unprofitable
in
Humane
Affairs
;
for
it
makes
us
more
distinctly
perceive
from
some
certain
general
Principles
,
how
necessary
a
constant
and
certain
order
is
amongst
those
Causes
,
that
Act
from
Corporeal
forces
;
so
that
many
of
them
,
may
each
in
their
order
Successively
concurr
to
an
effect
foreseen
,
or
designed
by
us
;
and
farther
shews
us
a
rule
how
we
may
certainly
judge
,
what
Cause
does
more
or
less
contribute
to
the
Effect
sought
for
,
or
desired
;
so
that
from
the
Natural
Power
of
these
Causes
,
their
Order
,
Dignity
or
Power
,
in
respect
to
each
Effect
,
are
to
be
determined
and
judged
of
;
and
we
are
taught
from
the
Nature
of
things
,
as
well
what
Causes
are
to
be
most
esteemed
for
those
good
Effects
they
have
,
or
may
produce
,
as
also
which
are
most
diligently
to
be
sought
,
for
the
obtaining
those
ends
which
we
desire
,
and
by
which
means
it
may
be
also
known
;
that
those
Causes
which
Philosophers
call
Universal
,
viz.
God
the
first
Cause
,
and
the
motion
of
the
Celestial
Bodies
as
proceeding
from
Him
,
are
the
Original
Causes
of
the
Common
Good
or
Happiness
of
Mankind
,
a
part
of
which
we
either
always
do
actually
,
or
can
hope
to
enjoy
.
§
.
3.
But
omitting
those
Motions
which
are
not
in
our
Power
to
influence
or
alter
,
it
is
certain
,
that
among
the
things
which
are
in
either
our
Power
to
do
or
forbear
;
those
voluntary
Humane
motions
proceeding
from
an
Universal
Benevolence
of
all
Men
towards
all
others
,
are
the
principal
Causes
of
their
Common
Happiness
,
and
in
which
every
one's
private
Good
is
included
.
Since
from
this
source
proceed
all
those
Actions
,
by
which
Men's
Innocence
and
Fidelity
towards
each
other
are
preserved
;
as
also
by
which
Humanity
,
Gratitude
,
and
almost
all
the
other
Vertues
are
exerted
and
performed
,
after
as
certain
a
manner
,
as
the
Natural
motions
of
the
Spirits
,
Bowels
,
Nerves
,
and
Joynts
in
an
Animal
,
do
wholly
proceed
from
the
motion
of
the
Heart
,
and
Circulation
of
the
Blood
:
which
judgment
or
determination
,
being
taken
from
the
Nature
of
things
duly
considered
,
should
,
without
doubt
,
cause
us
to
yield
Obedience
to
all
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
as
contributing
to
this
Common
Good
of
Rational
Agents
,
and
may
make
us
also
diligently
to
take
care
,
that
the
same
be
observed
by
others
,
so
that
there
may
be
nothing
wanting
that
can
be
done
by
us
,
whereby
we
may
not
be
rendered
as
happy
as
our
frail
Natures
in
this
will
allow
;
since
right
reason
can
propose
no
higher
or
nobler
End
,
than
this
of
all
our
moral
Actions
.
§
.
4.
Yet
whilst
we
compare
the
Aggregate
Body
of
mankind
,
(
as
far
as
we
can
Act
by
Corporeal
force
)
with
the
Natural
Systems
of
other
Bodies
.
I
am
not
unmindful
of
the
manifest
difference
there
is
between
them
,
viz.
That
all
the
Effects
of
meer
Corporeal
Systems
,
are
produced
by
the
Contiguity
,
and
immediate
Operation
of
Bodies
,
moving
upon
others
that
are
to
be
moved
by
them
;
without
any
Sense
,
Deliberation
,
or
Liberty
,
which
are
only
to
be
found
in
Humane
Actions
,
in
whose
Motions
and
Operations
on
each
other
,
though
a
great
difference
often
intervenes
;
yet
for
all
that
,
it
is
evident
,
that
the
Corporeal
Powers
of
Men
when
exerted
,
are
subject
to
the
same
Laws
of
motion
with
other
Bodies
,
and
that
divers
Men
may
often
cooperate
to
one
certain
Effect
,
relating
to
the
Good
or
Hurt
of
others
,
so
that
there
is
the
same
necessity
of
a
Subordination
between
Humane
motions
,
as
there
is
between
those
of
other
Bodies
.
And
I
must
here
farther
take
notice
,
that
Men
have
frequent
opportunities
of
meeting
together
,
and
also
many
other
means
by
which
they
may
hurt
or
help
each
other
,
by
Words
,
Writing
,
or
other
Actions
.
So
that
,
if
we
consider
the
Nature
of
Mankind
,
in
the
whole
course
of
their
Lives
,
it
ought
to
be
considered
as
one
entire
System
of
Bodies
,
consisting
of
several
particular
parts
;
So
that
nothing
almost
can
be
done
in
Relation
to
any
Man's
Life
,
Family
,
or
Fortune
,
which
doth
not
some
way
or
other
,
either
benefit
or
prejudice
,
those
things
which
are
most
dear
to
others
also
:
as
the
motion
of
any
one
Body
in
the
System
of
the
World
,
Communicates
it self
to
many
others
.
For
that
great
Prerogative
of
Knowledge
and
Understanding
,
with
which
Man
is
endued
,
supplies
the
Contiguity
required
for
motion
in
other
Bodies
.
Men
being
often
excited
to
Action
,
by
certain
Arbitrary
signs
or
words
,
by
which
they
understand
,
what
hath
been
done
by
others
in
places
far
distant
.
So
also
our
Intellect
apprehending
a
likeness
of
Desires
and
Aversions
,
between
those
of
the
same
Species
with
it self
,
as
to
things
necessary
or
hurtful
to
Life
,
as
also
being
able
to
remember
other
Men's
Actions
towards
themselves
,
or
those
they
love
,
are
from
thence
excited
to
hope
for
,
or
expect
the
like
things
from
them
,
and
are
also
provoked
to
a
requital
when
occasion
is
offered
.
Such
Properties
being
plainly
Natural
,
and
constant
in
Humane
Nature
,
are
no
less
efficacious
to
excite
Men
to
such
Actions
or
motions
,
than
a
mutual
contact
between
Bodies
,
is
to
Communicate
motion
between
all
the
parts
of
any
Corporeal
System
.
§
.
5.
From
which
Natural
Observations
it
is
plainly
manifest
,
that
particular
Men
may
hence
Learn
,
that
both
their
greatest
Security
from
Evil
,
and
all
their
hopes
of
obtaining
any
Good
or
Assistance
from
others
,
towards
making
themselves
Happy
,
doth
truly
and
necessarily
depend
upon
voluntary
Actions
,
proceeding
from
the
Benevolence
of
others
,
who
do
likewise
themselves
stand
in
need
of
the
like
means
for
their
Happiness
and
Safety
.
From
whence
we
easily
perceive
,
that
these
mutual
Helps
and
Assistances
of
Men
towards
each
other
,
are
highly
beneficial
to
all
of
them
,
and
answer
that
Concourse
of
Natural
Bodies
,
and
that
Cession
or
giving
place
to
each
other
,
which
is
so
necessary
for
the
performance
of
their
motions
.
So
that
from
this
necessity
of
these
mutual
helps
,
it
as
necessarily
follows
,
that
he
who
would
consult
his
own
Happiness
and
Preservation
,
should
procure
(
as
far
as
he
is
able
)
the
Good
will
and
Assistance
of
others
,
since
he
cannot
but
be
sensible
,
that
he
is
able
to
afford
and
perform
to
others
,
divers
like
Offices
of
kindness
,
and
so
is
able
to
conspire
with
the
whole
System
of
Rational
Beings
,
towards
the
same
End
,
(
viz.
)
the
Common
Good
of
Rational
Beings
:
and
that
on
the
contrary
,
the
weak
and
inconsiderable
forces
of
any
one
Man
,
are
not
sufficient
to
compel
so
many
others
,
each
of
them
equal
(
if
not
Superiour
)
to
himself
,
both
in
Wit
and
Power
,
to
yield
him
their
help
and
assistance
,
to
their
own
prejudice
,
whether
they
will
or
no
;
which
would
prove
as
impossible
,
as
that
a
hundred
pound
weight
placed
in
one
Scale
of
a
Balance
,
should
bear
down
several
other
hundred
weights
,
put
on
the
opposite
Scale
:
So
likewise
the
force
and
cunning
,
of
any
single
Person
,
is
of
no
sufficient
Power
or
Force
,
against
the
several
Necessities
,
Counsels
,
and
Endeavours
,
of
innumerable
others
towards
their
own
,
and
the
Common
Good
,
without
any
consideration
of
his
particular
Happiness
alone
.
Therefore
it
is
manifest
from
this
natural
Balance
of
Humane
Powers
,
that
men
may
be
more
certainly
induced
by
our
Benevolence
,
or
Endeavour
of
the
Common
Good
,
to
yield
us
those
things
and
assistances
we
stand
in
need
of
,
than
by
using
force
or
deceit
,
which
Mr.
H.
[
*
](A64084-e6980-b)
*
Vide
,
The
Preface
to
De
Cive
.
supposes
,
even
the
Good
and
Vertuous
may
lawfully
exercise
in
the
State
of
Nature
,
as
the
only
natural
means
of
Self-preservation
,
in
his
Imaginary
State
of
Nature
.
§
.
6.
So
that
from
these
Natural
Observations
,
concerning
all
the
means
necessary
to
the
Conservation
of
the
Corporeal
Universe
,
and
of
the
several
sorts
of
Beings
therein
contained
,
we
may
draw
these
conclusions
.
1.
That
all
things
are
so
disposed
,
that
not
the
least
quantity
of
matter
and
motion
,
can
ever
be
lost
;
but
the
same
Species
of
Animals
,
are
still
continued
,
and
are
rather
encreased
than
lessened
,
notwithstanding
all
the
opposition
of
the
cruel
Passions
,
and
unruly
Appetites
of
some
other
Animals
,
so
that
in
this
perpetuity
of
matter
and
motion
,
by
a
continual
succession
of
things
,
the
Natural
Good
,
or
Conservation
of
the
Corporeal
Universe
consists
,
and
towards
which
it
is
carried
according
to
the
immutable
Laws
of
motion
;
nor
can
there
be
any
sufficient
reason
given
,
why
the
Conservation
of
Mankind
may
not
be
looked
upon
as
established
by
as
certain
and
natural
a
Power
of
Causes
,
as
the
Successive
Generations
of
any
other
Creatures
,
since
they
depend
alike
upon
the
lasting
Nature
of
the
Corporeal
Universe
;
and
agree
in
all
the
Essentials
of
Animals
.
And
certainly
the
Addition
of
a
Rational
Soul
to
our
Bodies
,
does
very
often
put
us
in
a
better
Condition
than
that
of
Brutes
,
but
can
never
make
us
in
a
worse
;
which
will
be
evident
to
any
Man
that
considers
the
benefits
,
which
accrew
to
our
Bodies
from
the
Government
of
our
Reason
,
and
which
do
abundantly
recompense
some
inconveniencies
which
may
happen
to
them
from
the
errours
of
our
minds
.
Nay
,
it
is
most
certain
,
that
its
errours
concerning
Food
,
Pleasure
,
and
other
things
which
concern
the
Preservation
of
our
Bodies
,
proceed
from
the
Soul
's
yielding
,
against
the
Admonitions
of
Reason
,
to
Carnal
Appetites
,
and
Corporeal
or
Animal
Passions
.
2.
That
the
matter
and
motion
of
all
Bodies
,
as
also
of
Men
(
considered
only
as
such
)
do
Mechanically
,
or
whether
they
will
or
no
,
promote
the
motion
of
that
of
the
Corporeal
Universe
,
since
the
motion
of
all
particular
Bodies
is
determined
,
by
the
general
motion
of
the
whole
System
.
In
short
,
our
Judgments
concerning
the
necessary
means
of
the
Happiness
of
Mankind
,
may
be
convinced
from
these
Natural
causes
operating
after
the
same
manner
,
and
by
the
same
Natural
Laws
,
by
which
the
Corporeal
Universe
is
preserved
,
since
they
consist
in
these
two
Rules
:
1.
That
the
endeavours
of
particular
Persons
towards
their
own
Preservation
,
are
as
plainly
necessary
for
the
Conservation
of
the
whole
Species
of
Mankind
,
as
the
mechanick
motions
of
particular
Bodies
,
are
to
the
general
motion
of
the
whole
Corporeal
System
.
2.
That
the
Powers
of
particular
Persons
,
by
which
they
defend
themselves
against
the
force
of
others
,
should
be
so
equally
Balanced
,
as
that
(
like
the
motion
of
other
Bodies
)
none
of
them
should
be
destroyed
or
lost
,
to
the
Prejudice
or
Detriment
of
the
whole
.
Somewhat
like
which
,
is
seen
in
all
the
motions
of
the
Corporeal
System
of
the
World
,
which
proceed
from
its
Plenitude
,
and
the
mutual
Contact
of
Bodies
,
and
so
extend
themselves
through
the
whole
mass
of
matter
;
but
it
is
the
proper
Talent
of
Humane
Reason
and
Understanding
,
to
observe
that
each
Man
's
particular
Happiness
,
does
depend
upon
the
voluntary
Actions
of
other
Rationals
,
after
a
much
nobler
manner
,
even
when
they
are
far
distant
,
and
can
therefore
take
care
that
all
Humane
Actions
may
in
like
manner
conduce
to
the
Common
Good
of
Rational
Agents
,
as
the
motions
of
all
Bodies
,
do
to
the
Conservation
of
the
whole
Corporeal
System
;
which
will
be
truly
performed
,
if
in
all
voluntary
Actions
which
respect
others
,
those
two
Rules
aforegoing
be
observed
.
So
that
we
are
taught
from
the
real
Natures
of
things
,
as
well
as
that
of
Inanimate
Bodies
,
after
what
manner
,
and
to
what
Degree
we
ought
to
pursue
our
own
particular
Happiness
,
that
is
,
only
as
it
conduces
to
,
and
is
included
in
that
of
the
Common
Good
of
Rational
Agents
.
So
we
are
hence
also
instructed
,
what
Actions
are
prescribed
,
or
forbid
by
the
Laws
of
Nature
;
since
such
Actions
only
are
thereby
commended
,
as
promote
this
great
End
,
and
the
contrary
Actions
forbidden
,
which
disturb
or
hinder
it
;
which
is
also
supposed
by
all
Princes
and
States
in
their
Deliberations
and
Treaties
of
Peace
,
it
being
that
,
in
which
they
all
agree
,
as
contributing
to
their
Common
Safety
and
Preservation
,
(
viz.
)
That
the
Powers
of
all
the
several
states
concerned
,
should
be
so
justly
moderated
and
equally
balanced
,
that
none
may
destroy
or
oppress
each
other
.
Thus
between
neighbouring
Nations
,
not
Subject
to
the
same
Common
Power
;
it
is
chiefly
provided
in
all
their
Leagues
and
Treaties
,
that
the
Forces
of
each
particular
Common-wealth
,
should
be
so
equally
balanced
by
the
Assistance
,
and
Support
of
their
Consederates
and
Allies
,
that
it
should
be
impossible
for
any
one
of
them
to
swallow
up
,
or
destroy
another
;
but
that
there
should
be
still
left
to
each
of
them
Power
,
and
means
sufficient
to
preserve
themselves
,
and
their
Subjects
in
Peace
and
Safety
,
as
being
the
main
ends
,
for
which
they
were
at
first
ordained
by
God
,
and
Instituted
by
Men.
§
.
7.
And
as
it
is
proper
to
all
Natural
Bodies
,
that
whilst
they
persevere
in
their
own
motion
,
there
is
likewise
a
necessity
they
should
also
contribute
,
and
be
subservient
to
the
motions
of
innumerable
other
Bodies
,
from
the
general
Laws
of
motion
,
for
the
Conservation
of
the
Universe
,
and
which
Rule
being
also
found
true
in
Animals
;
it
seems
to
admonish
us
,
not
only
as
meer
Animals
,
but
rational
Agents
,
that
we
contribute
our
particular
endeavours
towards
the
general
Good
,
or
Preservation
of
all
those
of
their
own
Kind
,
since
it
is
not
only
a
possible
effect
,
but
also
such
a
one
,
as
depending
upon
Causes
so
perfect
and
certain
,
we
may
with
reason
believe
,
that
it
will
endure
to
the
end
of
the
World
.
But
if
we
farther
add
to
these
Observations
,
those
things
that
distinguish
Animate
from
Inanimate
Bodies
,
they
will
yet
more
strongly
convince
us
,
and
make
us
see
more
sufficient
reasons
,
wherefore
(
not
so
much
concerning
our selves
with
other
Corporeal
Beings
)
we
should
be
chiefly
sollicitous
in
giving
our
assistance
to
those
of
our
own
Kind
:
First
,
then
the
Nature
of
Animate
is
distinguished
from
that
of
Inanimate
Bodies
,
by
such
a
fit
disposition
of
parts
,
and
an
apt
conformation
of
their
Natural
Organs
,
as
suffices
for
their
Generation
,
Sensation
,
Imagination
,
Affections
,
Nourishment
,
and
also
all
spontaneous
motions
.
And
it
is
by
these
Actions
,
that
all
sorts
of
Animals
endeavour
their
Conservation
,
and
Happiness
for
the
time
that
is
appointed
them
,
and
thereby
procure
the
Preservation
of
the
whole
Species
.
§
.
8.
But
I
shall
not
dwell
too
long
upon
these
common
obvious
things
,
which
are
so
evident
in
themselves
,
but
shall
from
hence
deduce
something
more
material
to
our
purpose
,
(
viz.
)
that
from
the
same
intrinseck
Constitution
of
all
Animals
,
whereby
they
are
determined
to
this
Endeavour
of
Preserving
themselves
,
there
are
besides
given
manifest
Declarations
,
that
Loving
and
Benevolent
Actions
towards
those
of
their
own
Kind
,
are
also
necessary
for
their
own
defence
,
and
constitute
the
happiest
State
of
Life
they
can
enjoy
.
And
likewise
that
it
is
farther
ordained
from
the
same
concourse
of
External
and
Internal
Causes
,
that
all
Rational
Agents
cannot
but
be
sensible
,
or
mindful
of
these
Indications
.
The
first
of
these
Conclusions
contains
the
Sense
,
and
Sanction
of
the
Law
of
Nature
,
as
the
latter
regards
its
Promulgation
,
or
the
manner
whereby
it
comes
to
be
made
known
to
us
.
I
shall
explain
each
of
them
in
their
order
.
§
.
9.
It
is
therefore
first
to
be
observed
,
That
the
corporeal
Bulk
,
even
of
the
largest
Animals
,
is
contained
within
a
small
and
narrow
compass
;
as
also
that
the
space
of
Time
wherein
they
can
live
,
or
be
preserved
,
is
not
long
:
From
whence
it
follows
,
That
but
a
few
Things
,
and
a
small
quantity
of
them
,
are
really
necessary
for
their
Nourishment
and
Preservation
;
or
where
there
is
need
of
a
Concurrence
of
more
of
them
,
they
are
only
such
as
may
be
freely
communicated
to
many
at
once
;
whence
they
are
naturally
led
to
desire
but
a
few
particular
Things
,
but
daily
stand
in
need
of
divers
others
in
common
,
whose
use
may
yet
be
well
communicated
to
many
at
once
,
without
exhausting
their
store
;
such
as
are
the
free
Enjoyment
of
Air
,
Light
,
Fire
,
Water
,
&c.
And
farther
,
if
we
consider
the
Structure
of
their
Bodies
,
we
may
observe
,
That
the
same
superficies
of
the
Skin
which
hinders
the
effusion
,
governs
also
the
Circulation
of
the
Blood
,
and
does
at
the
same
time
fix
bounds
to
those
Appetites
and
Necessities
by
which
they
are
urged
to
seek
their
own
Preservation
:
So
that
those
few
Things
that
suffice
to
repair
the
vital
Flame
which
daily
consumes
,
are
likewise
sufficient
not
only
for
the
Conservation
of
their
life
,
and
natural
strength
,
but
also
for
inabling
them
to
contribute
their
Help
and
Assistance
to
others
of
the
same
kind
.
And
,
lastly
,
the
Structure
and
Capacity
of
the
Vessels
,
in
which
their
Aliment
is
digested
,
and
of
those
that
convey
the
Chyle
,
as
also
of
the
Veins
and
Arteries
that
receive
it
,
being
but
narrow
,
require
but
a
small
quantity
to
fill
them
.
So
that
I
think
no
Brute
can
be
guilty
of
Mr.
H's
Errour
,
of
judging
or
desiring
all
Things
whatever
,
as
necessary
for
its
own
Preservation
;
since
from
the
intrinseck
and
constituent
Parts
of
all
Animals
,
it
plainly
appears
,
That
but
a
few
Things
suffice
to
allay
their
Hunger
and
Thirst
,
and
to
prevent
the
Injuries
of
the
Weather
.
And
if
,
so
few
Things
are
necessary
for
their
Happiness
and
Preservation
,
they
may
very
well
leave
the
rest
of
those
Products
which
the
Earth
so
plentifully
brings
forth
,
to
be
enjoyed
by
others
of
their
own
kind
,
since
the
finite
quantity
of
their
Bodies
limitting
their
Appetites
to
the
desiring
,
and
their
Powers
only
to
the
using
a
few
necessary
Things
:
From
this
Use
and
Necessity
,
there
arises
a
natural
Division
or
Appropriation
of
Things
,
amongst
divers
Animals
of
the
same
kind
(
as
I
shewed
before
in
the
last
Chapter
.
)
The
allowance
or
permission
of
which
Distribution
,
is
the
Foundation
of
all
that
mutual
Concord
and
Benevolence
amongst
them
,
and
which
their
Nature
requires
for
their
Preservation
:
So
that
if
this
innate
Love
,
or
Desire
of
Self-preservation
in
Animals
,
be
limited
after
the
manner
we
have
now
described
,
this
once
satisfied
,
there
can
be
no
Reason
why
they
should
withstand
,
or
obstruct
the
Conservation
of
others
of
the
same
kind
,
either
by
hindring
their
Enjoyment
of
those
Things
which
they
themselves
do
not
need
,
or
in
refusing
to
lend
them
their
Help
and
Assistance
,
when
there
is
occasion
,
and
that
it
is
not
needful
for
themselves
.
§
.
10.
The
next
Observation
we
make
,
is
from
the
Effects
of
the
Senses
,
as
also
the
Imagination
and
Memory
in
Animals
when
they
are
taken
up
,
and
employed
about
others
of
the
same
kind
:
For
since
from
the
Impressions
made
on
their
Organs
of
Sense
,
they
cannot
but
perceive
,
that
such
Creatures
are
of
the
same
Nature
with
themselves
;
such
Notions
must
,
from
the
Constitution
of
their
Nature
,
move
them
to
somewhat
a
like
affection
towards
them
as
towards
themselves
.
But
I
shall
here
avoid
all
Controversies
concerning
the
Knowledge
of
Brutes
,
or
which
way
their
Affections
are
moved
by
their
Imaginations
;
and
shall
only
suppose
,
That
their
Imagination
excites
their
Passions
,
and
that
these
Passions
do
likewise
often
produce
the
like
Motions
,
or
Inclinations
,
in
their
fellow
Animals
:
From
whence
I
collect
,
That
this
Similitude
of
Nature
does
highly
conduce
to
the
procuring
of
Benevolence
,
or
Concord
,
amongst
those
of
the
same
kind
,
unless
there
be
some
unaccountable
Antipathy
,
or
Dissimilitude
of
Disposition
,
which
may
happen
to
excite
Enmity
,
or
Discord
between
them
;
which
yet
not
often
happens
:
Whence
it
follows
,
That
Animals
,
as
long
as
they
are
in
their
Right
Senses
,
and
are
mindful
of
themselves
,
cannot
forget
others
of
the
same
kind
,
since
under
the
same
Idea's
by
which
they
conceive
their
own
Nature
,
and
the
Necessities
thereof
,
they
cannot
but
have
an
Idea
of
that
of
others
of
the
same
Species
with
themselves
;
and
must
also
be
sensible
,
that
such
Animals
,
being
urged
by
the
like
Appetites
of
Hunger
and
Thirst
as
themselves
,
are
thereby
moved
to
seek
Food
when
hungry
or
thirsty
;
and
cannot
but
be
also
sensible
,
that
it
is
highly
grateful
to
them
,
when
the
use
of
these
Necessaries
is
left
free
and
undisturbed
,
or
else
is
administred
to
them
by
others
,
or
that
they
are
any
ways
assisted
by
them
in
the
obtaining
them
.
§
.
11.
But
since
Idea's
of
this
sort
do
constantly
spring
in
the
Minds
of
Animals
,
as
also
produce
perpetual
motions
to
love
or
Good-will
,
arising
necessarily
from
this
similitude
of
Nature
;
it
also
follows
,
that
they
never
so
far
deviate
from
their
natural
state
,
as
when
,
through
Madness
,
or
any
other
violent
Appetite
,
or
Passion
,
they
act
contrary
to
these
first
and
most
natural
Dictates
;
as
all
Men
grant
it
to
be
a
preternatural
Disease
in
a
Dog
,
when
seized
with
Madness
,
he
bites
all
other
Dogs
he
meets
with
;
or
when
a
Sow
,
through
a
depraved
Appetite
,
eats
her
own
Pigs
.
Nor
indeed
can
I
see
any
reason
why
all
other
kinds
of
inordinate
Passions
,
which
disturb
the
natural
Disposition
of
an
Animal
,
so
as
to
make
it
do
extravagant
Actions
,
and
hurtful
to
its
own
Species
,
without
any
just
Cause
,
(
such
as
Anger
,
and
vehement
Envy
often
times
produce
)
may
not
be
justly
esteemed
as
preternatural
Distempers
of
the
Blood
,
or
Brain
,
very
like
to
that
of
a
mad
Dog
;
for
there
often
appears
in
those
that
are
transported
with
these
Passions
,
all
the
Symptoms
of
those
Diseases
that
proceed
from
an
overflowing
of
Choler
,
or
a
violent
effervescence
of
the
Blood
,
such
as
an
icterial
blackness
of
the
Face
,
paralytick
Tremblings
,
and
other
Signs
well
enough
known
to
Physicians
.
Nor
is
an
immoderate
needless
Fear
of
Animals
of
the
same
kind
,
to
be
less
reckoned
among
such
Diseases
,
since
it
is
not
only
preternatural
,
or
besides
their
Constitution
when
in
Health
,
but
doth
likewise
,
as
well
as
other
Diseases
,
destroy
the
Body
,
by
driving
them
into
an
immoderate
Sadness
,
unseasonable
Solitude
and
Watchings
,
with
other
Symptoms
of
predominant
Melancholy
,
whence
an
untimely
Death
is
often
accelerated
.
Neither
can
there
be
any
Mean
,
or
End
,
put
to
this
unreasonable
Fear
,
when
once
the
Mind
is
touch'd
and
infected
with
a
false
Imagination
,
that
all
other
Men
design
to
kill
and
destroy
them
;
which
Madness
is
very
like
that
of
those
,
who
being
bitten
by
a
mad
Dog
,
are
afraid
of
Water
,
and
all
Liquids
,
though
they
cannot
live
without
them
,
of
which
I
have
met
with
a
famous
Example
in
the
French
Chronicles
of
King
Charles
VI.
§
.
12.
And
it
is
evident
(
and
Mr.
H.
himself
confesses
it
)
that
Men
,
as
well
as
other
sociable
Animals
,
do
more
or
less
delight
in
the
society
of
each
other
of
the
same
kind
,
as
may
be
observed
from
those
signs
of
Joy
and
Satisfaction
which
they
express
when
they
meet
after
any
long
absence
:
But
since
it
is
as
plain
,
that
the
Causes
of
this
Association
and
Agreement
,
proceed
from
the
intrinseck
Nature
of
the
Creatures
,
and
are
no
other
than
those
by
which
the
Blood
,
Spirits
,
and
Nerves
are
continued
and
preserved
,
in
a
due
and
healthy
state
;
it
as
evidently
follows
,
That
the
Safety
and
Preservation
of
each
of
them
,
cannot
be
separated
from
a
Propension
,
at
least
,
to
a
friendly
Association
with
those
of
their
own
kind
;
so
that
though
they
sometimes
quarrel
about
the
same
Meat
,
or
Female
,
yet
this
does
not
any
ways
cross
or
contradict
this
great
End
of
Nature
,
of
procuring
the
Common
Good
of
the
Universe
;
but
is
rather
in
order
to
it
,
viz.
when
the
Desire
of
Food
,
in
order
to
their
own
Preservation
,
or
Lust
,
to
propagate
their
Species
,
prompts
them
to
fight
,
and
sometimes
to
destroy
each
other
;
the
time
of
which
Contention
,
is
yet
but
small
,
in
comparison
of
the
greater
part
of
their
Lives
,
in
which
they
are
observed
to
live
in
peace
:
And
that
all
Animals
are
determin'd
by
Nature
,
to
prosecute
and
endeavour
the
Common
Good
of
their
own
Species
,
by
the
same
Causes
that
preserve
the
Lives
of
each
of
them
in
particular
,
appears
from
the
great
Love
and
Kindness
,
which
Creatures
of
the
same
Species
,
but
of
different
Sexes
,
express
towards
each
other
,
and
by
virtue
of
which
,
they
perform
the
Act
of
Generation
,
so
highly
grateful
and
pleasing
to
each
other
,
and
thereby
propagate
their
Off-spring
;
which
when
brought
forth
,
they
love
and
defend
,
as
part
of
themselves
,
unless
some
unusual
Distemper
intervene
,
which
may
sometimes
disturb
or
change
these
natural
Propensions
;
as
when
Sows
or
Rabbets
eat
or
destroy
their
young
ones
;
which
happening
but
seldom
,
is
rather
to
be
accounted
among
the
Diseases
of
the
Brain
,
or
Distempers
of
the
Appetite
,
than
to
be
ascribed
to
their
natural
State
,
or
Constitution
;
and
does
no
more
contradict
this
general
Law
of
Nature
,
than
the
ascent
of
Water
in
a
Pump
,
does
oppose
that
general
Rule
of
the
constant
descent
of
heavy
Bodies
.
So
that
we
may
,
for
all
that
,
affirm
,
That
the
Procreation
of
their
young
,
and
that
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
or
natural
Affection
they
have
for
them
,
and
desire
of
breeding
them
up
,
'till
they
are
able
to
shift
for
themselves
,
are
seldom
or
never
separated
;
for
Preservation
is
but
,
as
it
were
,
the
Generation
of
the
same
Creature
still
continued
.
So
that
the
same
natural
Causes
excite
Animals
to
the
one
,
as
well
as
the
other
.
But
it
is
evident
,
That
their
Off-spring
can
neither
be
generated
,
or
preserved
,
unless
those
of
different
Sexes
do
,
for
some
time
,
maintain
Peace
,
and
a
Co-habitation
with
each
other
,
which
in
many
others
of
them
,
continues
much
longer
than
the
bare
time
of
Generation
,
(
viz.
)
for
the
whole
season
of
Coupling
and
Breeding
up
of
their
young
ones
;
and
in
divers
others
,
as
Doves
,
Pigeons
,
&c.
This
Affection
continues
(
like
Marriage
)
as
long
as
their
Lives
.
And
that
Creatures
are
excited
to
generate
their
like
,
from
the
same
natural
Causes
for
which
their
own
Preservation
is
procured
,
appears
from
this
anatomical
Observation
,
that
part
of
the
same
nutritious
Juice
passes
into
the
Nourishment
of
the
Body
,
and
the
rest
to
the
Propagation
of
Seed
;
and
the
whole
Circulation
of
the
Blood
,
with
the
Causes
that
produce
and
promote
it
,
as
the
muscular
force
of
the
Heart
,
and
that
strange
and
wonderful
Artifice
of
the
Valves
in
the
Veins
,
do
by
one
and
the
same
Action
,
serve
for
the
particular
Nutrition
of
the
Animal
,
and
also
perform
the
more
publick
Duty
of
Propagation
of
the
Species
,
whilst
it
does
,
at
the
same
time
,
send
down
part
of
that
matter
to
the
Spermatick
Vessels
out
of
which
the
Seed
is
produced
.
§
.
13.
But
leaving
the
nicer
Disquisition
of
these
anatomical
Observations
to
Naturalists
and
Physicians
,
I
shall
only
add
this
one
Observation
,
That
it
is
evident
that
all
Animals
are
,
by
these
means
,
impelled
to
the
Love
of
those
of
a
different
Sex
,
and
also
of
their
own
Off-spring
,
and
so
are
brought
to
impart
some
of
that
Self-love
,
with
which
they
are
first
endued
,
to
others
of
their
own
kind
,
from
an
irresistible
instinct
of
Nature
:
And
hence
it
is
truly
observed
of
Men
,
That
after
they
are
married
,
and
have
got
Children
,
they
are
more
prone
to
,
and
sollicitous
after
Peace
than
before
;
but
that
this
desire
of
Propagation
,
disposes
Men
to
a
greater
Affection
towards
those
of
the
Female
Sex
,
is
so
evident
,
that
it
needs
no
proof
.
But
since
Mr.
H.
and
others
of
his
Opinion
,
do
grant
these
Observations
,
concerning
the
natural
Propensions
of
Creatures
to
be
true
,
but
are
wont
to
evade
them
,
by
affirming
,
That
they
only
proceed
from
the
sole
Love
of
their
own
Pleasure
and
Satisfaction
;
and
that
all
the
Actions
proceeding
from
thence
,
tend
to
no
higher
end
than
the
Love
and
Preservation
of
themselves
;
as
I
do
not
in
this
part
of
the
Discourse
,
intend
to
dispute
,
so
have
I
not
omitted
to
answer
this
Objection
in
the
last
Chapter
,
which
is
designed
on
purpose
for
answering
all
those
Objections
that
can
well
be
made
against
our
Definition
of
the
Law
of
Nature
.
§
.
14.
The
last
general
Observation
to
be
drawn
from
the
Nature
of
Living
Creatures
,
may
be
taken
from
that
Sweetness
and
Pleasure
they
take
and
enjoy
in
those
Actions
and
Passions
that
tend
to
the
Common
Good
of
their
own
Kind
,
since
it
is
very
well
known
to
Naturalists
,
that
in
those
sweeter
Passions
of
Love
,
Desire
,
Hope
,
Joy
,
(
especially
when
employed
about
any
great
Good
towards
others
)
the
vital
Motions
of
the
Blood
and
Heart
are
then
highly
helped
and
promoted
.
So
that
the
Veins
and
Arteries
are
filled
with
a
milder
and
nobler
Juice
,
whilst
brisker
and
more
active
Spirits
are
thereby
generated
,
and
the
Circulation
of
the
Blood
,
and
consequently
all
the
other
animal
Functions
,
are
more
easily
and
nimbly
performed
.
So
that
by
those
very
Affections
by
which
they
do
good
to
Animals
of
their
own
Kind
,
they
themselves
are
also
satisfied
and
delighted
,
and
as
far
as
they
feel
this
naturally
rooted
in
their
very
Natures
,
they
must
needs
incline
to
these
Affections
so
highly
conducing
to
their
own
Happiness
and
Preservation
;
whereas
,
on
the
contrary
,
in
Hatred
,
Envy
,
Fear
,
and
that
Sadness
and
Ill-humour
which
necessarily
springs
from
those
sour
and
immoderate
Passions
;
the
Circulation
of
the
Blood
is
obstructed
,
and
the
Heart
rendred
more
heavy
,
and
unapt
to
motion
.
So
that
it
thereby
expels
the
Blood
with
greater
difficulty
in
its
Systole
,
from
whence
proceeds
meagerness
and
paleness
of
the
Countenance
,
with
innumerable
Inconveniencies
to
the
whole
Oeconomy
of
the
Body
,
but
chiefly
in
the
Functions
of
the
Brain
and
Nerves
,
such
as
are
those
Diseases
which
are
attributed
to
the
Spleen
,
deep
Melancholy
,
and
Discontent
.
But
these
things
being
rather
of
a
medicinal
Consideration
,
I
shall
but
only
just
mention
them
,
though
the
Writings
of
Physicians
may
yield
us
divers
Examples
of
such
who
have
hastened
their
own
Fate
,
through
immoderate
Envy
and
Regret
,
that
they
could
not
satisfie
their
Malice
or
Revenge
;
of
which
I
may
chance
to
give
you
a
taste
when
I
come
to
consider
the
Sanction
of
the
Law
of
Nature
by
Punishments
,
proceeding
from
the
undue
and
immoderate
exercise
of
those
Passions
.
§
.
15.
But
as
Mr.
H.
and
his
Disciples
cannot
deny
these
Natural
Propensions
in
Brute
Creatures
towards
mutual
Concord
,
so
they
have
no
other
way
to
evade
these
Instances
,
but
by
supposing
some
things
in
Man's
Nature
,
that
render
him
worse
Natur'd
,
and
more
unmanageable
than
Bears
,
Wolves
,
&c.
That
so
being
naturally
in
a
perpetual
state
of
War
,
they
can
no
way
be
kept
from
destroying
each
other
,
but
by
some
Common
Supreme
Power
set
over
them
to
keep
them
all
in
awe
;
which
Arguments
,
and
the
Answers
to
them
,
since
by
their
length
they
would
too
much
perplex
the
Connexion
of
this
Discourse
,
I
shall
refer
you
to
the
Second
part
,
wherein
I
hope
I
have
made
it
appear
,
that
there
is
nothing
in
Man's
Nature
considered
as
an
Animal
,
that
ought
to
be
governed
by
right
Reason
,
(
and
in
which
alone
he
excels
other
Creatures
)
that
can
lay
any
necessity
upon
him
of
being
more
fierce
,
and
unsociable
than
Brutes
.
§
.
16.
Having
now
dispatched
these
common
and
easie
Observations
concerning
Man
,
considered
as
a
meer
Body
,
and
also
such
as
concern
his
Nature
as
an
Animal
,
tending
to
prove
,
that
the
endeavour
of
the
Common
Good
of
his
own
Species
,
was
one
great
End
and
Design
of
God
in
His
Creation
.
I
come
in
the
next
place
to
consider
those
particulars
,
in
which
the
Nature
of
Man
excels
that
of
Brutes
,
and
whereby
he
is
rendred
much
more
capable
than
they
of
promoting
,
and
performing
this
great
End
,
viz.
the
Common
Good
of
Rational
Agents
:
which
I
shall
divide
into
two
Heads
,
either
those
belonging
to
the
Body
,
or
else
to
the
Soul
or
Mind
;
as
to
the
former
,
though
there
are
divers
Anatomical
Observations
,
made
by
curious
Anatomists
and
Learned
Physicians
,
concerning
the
differences
between
the
Constitution
of
the
inward
parts
,
or
vessels
in
Men
and
Brutes
;
yet
I
shall
take
notice
of
no
more
,
than
what
are
absolutely
necessary
to
our
purpose
,
and
which
may
serve
to
shew
,
what
are
the
natural
Causes
of
that
Excellency
and
Superiority
,
that
is
commonly
found
in
Humane
Intellects
,
above
those
of
Brutes
.
The
first
of
which
Observations
may
be
drawn
from
the
large
quantity
of
brains
which
is
found
in
Humane
Bodies
,
and
which
bears
a
much
greater
proportion
in
respect
of
their
bulk
,
than
in
any
other
Creatures
;
for
though
the
weight
of
an
ordinary
Humane
Body
,
does
seldom
exceed
above
a
fourth
part
of
that
of
a
Horse
or
Bull
;
yet
for
the
motion
and
government
of
so
much
a
smaller
Body
,
Nature
hath
allowed
him
near
double
the
quantity
of
brains
,
viz.
about
the
weight
of
four
or
five
pounds
,
so
that
there
is
eight
times
as
much
brains
,
appointed
for
the
government
of
the
like
bulk
in
a
Man
,
as
in
an
Ox
or
Horse
.
And
though
the
Carcases
of
the
largest
Sheep
and
Hogs
,
do
often
weigh
near
as
much
as
a
Humane
Body
:
yet
their
brain
is
not
above
an
eighth
part
of
the
weight
in
proportion
to
ours
;
which
seems
to
be
thus
ordain'd
by
Nature
,
that
by
reason
of
the
greater
largeness
of
the
Vessels
,
the
Animal
Spirits
should
be
prepared
in
greater
plenty
,
and
also
have
more
room
to
work
,
and
so
should
become
more
lively
and
vigorous
in
Man
,
than
in
other
Creatures
;
since
all
the
Nerves
do
either
spring
from
the
brain
,
or
else
from
the
Spinal
Marrow
which
is
continuous
,
and
of
the
same
substance
with
it
;
whence
it
may
follow
that
this
larger
quantity
,
and
consequently
greater
strength
of
brain
in
a
Man
above
other
Creatures
,
was
intended
to
serve
him
to
direct
,
and
govern
that
greater
variety
of
Motions
and
Actions
depending
thereupon
,
with
a
more
exact
care
and
deliberation
.
§
.
17.
A
second
Observation
to
prove
,
that
Man
is
a
Creature
ordained
by
God
for
a
fuller
and
more
constant
Association
with
those
of
his
own
Kind
,
(
which
also
tends
to
the
promoting
of
the
Common
Good
of
his
Species
)
than
other
Creatures
,
may
be
taken
from
the
natural
Constitution
of
his
Blood
,
and
Spermatick
Vessels
,
by
which
his
Appetite
to
Copulation
is
not
confined
(
as
in
most
other
Creatures
)
to
some
certain
times
,
but
are
equally
the
same
at
all
seasons
of
the
Year
;
from
whence
proceeds
a
desire
of
Marriage
,
or
a
constant
Cohabitation
with
one
,
or
more
Women
,
from
whence
must
likewise
follow
a
more
constant
generation
of
their
Off-spring
,
and
a
more
lasting
care
of
them
when
generated
and
brought
forth
.
For
whereas
Brutes
quit
the
care
of
their
Young
,
and
drive
them
away
from
them
as
soon
as
ever
they
are
able
to
shift
for
themselves
;
Man
alone
loves
and
cherishes
his
Off-spring
,
and
continues
his
love
and
care
of
them
as
long
as
they
Live
,
and
still
loves
them
the
more
the
longer
they
have
continued
with
them
,
and
the
more
care
and
pains
they
have
bestowed
on
their
Education
:
and
so
likewise
Man
is
the
only
Creature
we
know
of
,
that
makes
any
returns
for
this
care
,
by
Acts
of
Duty
and
Gratitude
towards
his
Parents
;
for
as
for
the
Gratitude
of
Storks
to
their
Sires
or
Dams
when
old
,
I
look
upon
it
as
an
old
Fable
.
§
.
18.
Lastly
,
I
shall
consider
the
wonderful
Frame
and
Structure
of
the
Hand
in
Man
,
which
though
I
grant
it
not
peculiar
to
him
alone
;
all
Creatures
of
the
Ape
or
Monky
kind
,
having
their
fore-paws
very
like
it
,
and
in
many
Actions
using
them
to
the
same
ends
,
both
in
feeding
themselves
,
and
carrying
their
Young
ones
;
yet
since
we
see
our
Hands
were
not
given
us
instead
of
Feet
to
go
upon
,
(
as
in
them
)
we
may
justly
conclude
,
that
they
were
Fram'd
for
some
Higher
and
Nobler
Use
,
than
our
bare
Preservation
,
or
the
hurting
or
destroying
of
others
.
Since
if
God
had
ordained
them
only
for
this
end
,
sharp
Teeth
,
Claws
and
Horns
,
would
have
done
much
better
,
and
would
have
saved
us
the
trouble
of
making
Swords
,
Spears
,
and
such
like
Instruments
,
not
only
of
self-preservation
but
destruction
;
whereas
we
find
that
by
the
help
of
our
Hands
,
directed
by
our
reason
,
we
are
able
to
do
much
more
than
any
of
those
weak
silly
Animals
can
do
with
their
Paws
,
since
they
cannot
serve
them
to
make
any
of
those
ordinary
Instruments
,
or
Utensils
of
Life
,
which
even
the
most
Barbarous
Nations
cannot
be
without
;
or
so
much
as
to
administer
to
each
other
,
many
of
those
ordinary
helps
and
assistances
,
which
Men
by
means
of
their
Hands
do
daily
afford
each
other
.
So
that
if
we
consider
the
Ordinary
use
of
these
Members
,
especially
in
labouring
Men
and
Mechanicks
,
we
shall
find
,
that
they
do
not
only
serve
for
their
own
Sustenance
and
Preservation
,
but
also
for
the
benefit
and
maintenance
of
many
others
of
their
own
kind
,
who
cannot
well
Subsist
without
the
manual
Labour
of
others
.
And
though
I
grant
this
noble
Instrument
the
Hand
,
is
often
abused
by
wicked
and
violent
Men
,
to
make
unjust
Wars
,
and
commits
Murders
and
Robberies
,
and
by
lesser
Thieves
to
pick
Pockets
,
Pilfer
,
&c.
and
that
without
this
they
could
never
commit
such
Villainies
;
yet
doth
it
not
follow
,
that
their
Hands
were
bestowed
upon
them
by
God
for
that
end
.
Since
if
He
intended
the
Common
Good
and
Happiness
of
Mankind
,
as
His
great
end
,
He
never
could
intend
that
these
Instruments
should
be
made
use
of
to
a
quite
contrary
design
,
viz.
their
Ruine
and
Destruction
.
So
that
whoever
will
but
strictly
consider
all
this
,
cannot
but
confess
,
that
we
are
made
and
ordained
to
depend
upon
each
others
assistance
,
and
that
Man
was
Created
for
a
higher
purpose
than
his
own
single
Self-preservation
.
§
.
19.
Which
may
be
farther
made
out
from
the
natural
Constitution
of
Humane
Nature
,
as
that
no
Man
is
born
Self-sufficient
,
or
able
to
procure
all
things
necessary
for
his
bare
Subsistence
,
much
less
for
a
quiet
or
pleasant
Life
,
but
needs
the
Assistance
of
others
to
breed
him
up
whilst
an
Infant
,
or
to
tend
him
when
he
is
sick
,
old
,
or
unable
to
help
himself
;
or
if
it
be
sometimes
possible
for
a
time
,
yet
it
must
be
with
great
hardship
and
scantiness
,
that
any
Man
's
own
single
Labour
,
unassisted
with
the
Help
of
others
,
can
provide
himself
all
the
Necessaries
of
Life
.
Whence
first
arises
another
necessity
of
Marriage
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
which
is
the
Contract
of
a
Man
and
a
Woman
to
live
together
,
for
the
propagation
of
their
Species
,
and
breeding
up
of
their
Off-springs
,
and
also
for
mutual
Help
,
and
a
joint
Provision
of
the
Necessaries
of
Life
for
themselves
and
them
.
And
,
secondly
,
a
necessity
of
a
Man's
living
in
concord
,
or
society
,
with
all
other
Men
,
especially
those
of
his
own
Nation
,
or
Commonwealth
.
So
that
it
is
evident
,
the
chief
Happiness
and
Well-being
of
Mankind
,
depends
upon
their
mutual
administration
of
these
Things
,
as
often
as
need
shall
require
;
that
is
,
upon
Acts
of
the
highest
Love
and
Benevolence
,
in
order
to
the
Common
Good
.
To
all
which
may
be
added
another
Observation
,
of
the
great
difference
in
the
Frame
of
Men's
Bodies
from
those
of
Brutes
,
in
the
upright
posture
of
their
progressive
motion
;
Man
alone
going
upon
two
Legs
,
whereas
most
other
terrestrial
Animals
go
upon
all
four
,
whereby
Men
have
the
constant
use
of
their
Hands
,
both
to
help
and
assist
themselves
and
others
,
to
a
much
greater
degree
,
and
in
a
much
more
powerful
manner
than
what
Brutes
are
able
to
perform
.
But
whereas
some
Atheists
have
alledged
,
That
this
Posture
proceeds
rather
from
Custom
and
Example
than
Nature
;
I
desire
them
to
shew
me
any
Nation
in
the
World
so
barbarous
,
that
doth
not
go
upon
two
Legs
as
well
as
we
:
And
though
Children
,
't
is
true
,
before
they
can
go
,
must
crawl
;
yet
it
is
not
upon
their
Hands
and
Feet
,
but
Knees
:
For
a
Man's
Legs
(
as
is
notorious
to
Anatomists
)
are
so
much
longer
than
his
Arms
,
and
are
likewise
so
set
on
,
that
they
cannot
be
brought
to
move
in
Right-Angles
with
the
Arms
,
or
Fore-legs
,
as
in
Brutes
:
And
though
I
grant
that
some
Beasts
,
as
Apes
,
Monkeys
,
and
Bears
,
can
sometimes
go
upon
their
Hind-feet
,
yet
is
not
this
constant
;
but
as
soon
as
the
present
Necessity
is
over
,
they
soon
return
to
their
natural
posture
.
To
conclude
,
I
think
I
may
leave
it
to
any
indifferent
Reader
to
judge
,
whether
from
all
these
natural
Observations
from
the
Frame
of
Humane
Bodies
,
and
the
Nature
of
their
Passions
,
it
doth
not
evidently
appear
,
That
Man's
Happiness
and
Subsistence
in
this
Life
,
was
not
designed
by
GOD
to
depend
upon
his
own
particular
sensual
Pleasure
,
or
the
meer
satisfaction
of
his
present
Appetites
and
Passions
,
restrained
to
himself
,
without
any
Consideration
of
others
of
his
own
Kind
,
but
was
rather
intended
for
the
Common
Good
and
Preservation
of
the
whole
Species
of
Mankind
.
§
.
20.
Having
now
dispatched
those
natural
Observations
that
may
be
drawn
from
the
Constitution
or
Frame
of
Man's
Body
,
in
order
to
the
rendring
him
capable
of
serving
the
Common
Good
in
the
propagation
of
his
Species
,
I
shall
proceed
to
the
next
Head
before
laid
down
,
(
viz.
)
those
Excellencies
,
or
Prerogatives
,
of
the
Humane
Soul
,
or
Mind
;
and
in
which
he
excels
all
other
Creatures
:
And
,
in
the
first
place
,
Mr.
the
Antecedence
and
Consequence
.
Whence
he
certainly
must
be
endued
with
a
larger
Capacity
,
for
observing
the
natures
of
Things
without
himself
;
and
is
also
able
to
make
more
curious
and
exact
Searches
into
their
Causes
and
Effects
,
than
the
most
sagacious
Brutes
;
who
though
they
are
endued
with
some
few
Appetites
,
or
Inclinations
,
towards
those
Things
that
are
necessary
for
their
Preservation
,
and
an
Aversion
for
others
that
are
hurtful
to
them
;
yet
this
seems
to
proceed
from
some
natural
instinct
,
or
impression
,
stampt
by
GOD
on
their
very
Natures
,
and
not
from
Reason
or
Deliberation
:
As
,
young
Wild-Ducks
(
they
say
)
will
run
away
from
a
Man
,
as
soon
as
they
are
hatch'd
;
and
Chickens
know
the
Kite
,
though
they
never
saw
her
before
;
and
this
not
from
any
Experience
or
Rational
Deduction
.
But
as
for
Man
,
it
is
his
Faculty
alone
,
to
proceed
from
some
known
Principles
,
to
draw
Rational
Deductions
,
or
Conclusions
,
which
were
not
known
before
:
The
exercise
of
which
Faculty
,
we
call
Right
Reason
,
or
Ratiocination
;
which
though
I
grant
is
not
born
with
him
,
and
so
is
not
a
Property
belonging
to
him
as
a
meer
Animal
(
since
we
see
Children
,
'till
they
come
to
some
Years
,
and
Fools
,
and
mad
Folks
act
without
it
so
long
as
they
live
)
yet
is
it
not
therefore
Artificial
,
(
as
some
would
have
it
)
since
all
Persons
of
Years
of
Discretion
,
and
who
will
give
themselves
leisure
to
think
,
may
attain
to
a
sufficient
degree
of
it
,
for
the
well-Government
of
their
Actions
,
in
order
to
their
own
Preservation
,
and
the
discovering
that
Duty
they
owe
to
GOD
and
the
rest
of
Mankind
:
Which
Notions
being
peculiar
to
Man
,
and
also
common
to
the
greater
part
of
Mankind
,
either
from
Men's
own
particular
Observations
,
or
Rational
Deductions
;
or
else
from
the
Instructions
of
others
,
who
themselves
first
found
out
such
Rational
Conclusions
,
and
taught
them
to
their
Children
,
or
Scholars
,
with
their
first
Elements
of
Speech
,
come
,
in
process
of
time
(
having
forgot
when
those
early
Notions
were
first
instill'd
into
them
)
to
be
taken
for
connate
Idea's
:
So
that
I
doubt
they
have
been
,
by
too
many
,
(
who
have
not
well
considered
their
Original
)
mistaken
for
Idea's
,
or
Notions
impressed
by
GOD
upon
their
Souls
.
But
leaving
this
,
of
which
others
have
said
enough
,
it
cannot
be
denied
but
that
from
this
Faculty
of
deducing
Effects
from
their
Causes
,
Man
hath
been
always
able
to
find
out
sufficient
Remedies
for
his
own
natural
Weakness
,
by
the
Invention
of
several
Arts
,
such
as
Physick
and
Chyrurgery
for
his
Preservation
and
Cure
,
when
sick
or
hurt
:
And
also
those
of
a
more
publick
Nature
,
such
are
the
Knowledge
of
Policies
,
or
the
well-Government
of
Common-weals
,
of
Navigation
,
Warfare
,
or
the
Art
Military
,
for
his
Happiness
and
defence
,
as
a
Sociable
Creature
.
So
that
,
though
Man
is
born
naked
,
and
without
those
natural
defences
and
Weapons
,
with
which
divers
Brutes
are
furnished
by
Nature
;
yet
by
the
power
of
this
Faculty
,
he
is
able
,
not
only
much
better
to
secure
himself
from
the
violence
and
injury
of
the
Weather
,
by
providing
himself
with
Cloths
,
Houses
,
and
Victuals
before-hand
,
since
Nature
hath
not
made
him
to
live
like
Beasts
upon
those
Fruits
of
the
Earth
,
which
it
spontaneously
produces
,
but
can
also
tame
,
subdue
,
and
kill
the
strongest
,
fiercest
,
and
cunningest
Brutes
,
and
make
them
subservient
,
to
those
Ends
and
Designs
for
which
he
pleases
to
employ
them
:
So
likewise
from
this
Faculty
of
Judging
of
Consequences
from
their
Antecedents
,
and
foreseeing
the
Probability
or
Improbability
of
future
Events
,
he
thereby
distinguishes
between
real
and
apparent
Goods
;
that
is
,
between
such
Things
that
may
please
for
the
present
,
and
do
afterwards
hurt
him
;
and
those
which
though
they
may
seem
displeasing
for
a
time
,
yet
may
after
do
him
a
greater
Benefit
;
which
Principles
,
since
they
contain
Foundations
of
all
Morality
,
and
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
which
we
now
treat
of
,
it
will
not
be
amiss
here
particularly
to
set
down
,
as
the
Grounds
of
what
I
have
to
say
on
this
Subject
.
§
.
21.
First
,
It
hath
been
already
proved
,
That
every
Animal
is
endued
with
a
Natural
Principle
,
whereby
it
is
necessarily
inclined
to
promote
his
own
Preservation
and
Well-being
(
yet
not
excluding
that
of
others
of
their
own
Kind
)
that
therefore
which
most
conduces
to
this
end
,
is
called
a
natural
Good
;
and
,
on
the
contrary
,
that
which
is
apt
to
obstruct
and
hinder
it
,
is
evil
.
Among
which
Goods
and
Evils
,
there
are
several
kinds
or
degrees
,
according
as
Things
are
endued
with
more
or
less
fitness
or
power
to
promote
or
hinder
this
End
.
All
which
,
may
be
reduced
to
these
plain
Maxims
,
or
Propositions
,
as
I
have
taken
them
out
of
Dr.
Moor's
Enchiridion
Ethicum
;
so
that
I
have
collected
these
Axioms
,
and
put
them
together
in
this
method
,
as
they
are
represented
by
those
excellent
Authors
above-mentioned
,
that
you
may
see
them
all
at
one
view
;
though
I
grant
there
are
many
other
natural
Truths
,
which
are
also
useful
to
prove
what
Actions
are
productive
of
the
Common
Good
,
divers
of
which
we
have
given
you
dispersedly
in
these
two
Chapters
.
Principle
I.
THe
lessening
or
escaping
of
an
Evil
,
is
to
be
reckoned
under
the
Notion
of
Good
.
Principle
II.
The
lessening
or
loss
of
Good
,
is
to
be
reckoned
under
the
Notion
of
Evil.
Principle
III.
That
which
is
Good
,
is
to
be
chosen
;
that
which
is
Evil
,
to
be
avoided
.
Principle
IV.
The
greater
Good
is
to
be
preferred
before
the
less
;
and
a
less
Evil
to
be
endured
,
rather
than
a
greater
.
Principle
V.
Such
Things
,
or
Events
,
whether
Good
or
Evil
,
as
will
certainly
come
to
pass
,
may
fall
under
Computation
,
and
be
estimated
according
to
their
several
Degrees
as
well
as
Things
present
:
And
the
same
likewise
is
for
such
Things
as
may
probably
come
to
pass
,
though
this
Probability
may
be
somewhat
remote
,
as
it
is
counted
a
valuable
Thing
,
and
may
be
estimated
at
a
certain
rate
;
for
a
Man
to
be
one
amongst
four
or
five
equal
Competitors
for
an
Office
,
or
to
be
the
fourth
or
fifth
Expectant
of
an
Inheritance
;
and
though
in
such
Cases
there
may
be
the
odds
of
three
or
four
to
one
,
yet
the
Price
that
is
set
upon
this
,
may
be
so
proportioned
,
as
either
to
reduce
the
Purchase
to
an
equality
,
or
make
it
at
least
a
very
advantageous
Bargain
.
Principle
VI.
A
present
Good
may
reasonably
be
parted
with
,
upon
a
probable
Expectation
of
a
future
Good
,
which
is
much
greater
,
and
more
excellent
.
Principle
VII
.
A
present
Evil
is
to
be
endured
,
for
the
avoiding
of
a
probable
future
Evil
which
is
far
greater
.
Principle
VIII
.
The
greater
the
Evil
,
the
more
reason
there
is
to
venture
the
loss
of
a
greater
Good
,
or
the
suffering
of
a
less
Evil
for
the
escaping
it
.
Principle
IX
.
It
is
better
to
be
without
any
Good
,
than
by
the
enjoyment
of
it
to
endure
an
Evil
,
as
great
or
greater
than
that
Good
comes
to
.
And
these
last
Principles
respecting
our selves
,
may
serve
to
produce
Prudence
,
Temperance
,
and
Fortitude
in
our
Minds
;
the
rest
that
follow
,
respect
our
Duty
towards
others
,
and
are
the
Foundation
of
all
Right
and
Wrong
among
Men.
Principle
X.
We
ought
to
pursue
the
Chiefest
,
or
Common
Good
,
with
the
highest
;
and
all
less
or
subordinate
Goods
,
with
a
less
Affection
,
or
Desire
:
Neither
ought
we
to
make
the
Highest
,
or
Common
Good
,
subordinate
to
the
Meaner
,
or
middle
Goods
,
or
the
middle
Goods
to
the
least
.
Principle
XI
.
Whatsoever
Good
you
would
have
done
to
your self
,
in
such
and
such
Circumstances
,
you
ought
to
do
the
same
to
another
,
in
the
same
or
like
Circumstances
,
as
far
as
may
be
,
without
prejudicing
the
Community
.
Principle
XII
.
Whatsoever
Evil
you
would
not
have
done
to
your self
,
you
ought
to
abstain
from
doing
that
to
another
.
Principle
XIII
.
Good
is
to
be
recompenced
with
Good
,
and
not
with
Evil.
Principle
XIV
.
It
is
good
for
a
Man
to
enjoy
all
the
Means
wherewith
he
may
live
happily
.
Principle
XV.
It
is
better
for
the
Publick
,
or
Common
Good
,
that
one
Man
should
not
live
voluptuously
,
than
that
another
should
thereby
live
miserable
.
Principle
XVI
.
If
it
is
a
Publick
,
as
well
as
a
Private
Good
,
for
any
one
to
have
enough
wherewith
to
live
happy
;
it
follows
from
the
same
Rule
,
That
it
is
doubly
better
,
when
there
is
sufficient
for
two
Men
;
and
by
the
same
Rule
of
Proportion
,
a
thousand
times
better
if
there
be
sufficient
for
a
thousand
to
live
happy
:
So
that
at
last
,
from
the
same
Principle
,
it
must
be
confessed
,
That
if
all
the
Men
in
the
World
,
or
all
Mankind
,
could
live
happily
,
it
were
the
greatest
Good
we
could
suppose
them
capable
of
.
Principle
XVII
.
It
is
necessary
to
the
Publick
Good
,
That
every
Man's
Right
and
Property
be
allowed
him
,
and
its
free
Vse
or
Possession
be
likewise
permitted
him
,
without
any
Injury
or
Molestation
from
others
,
though
it
must
be
granted
,
that
a
Man
may
so
behave
himself
,
as
whatsoever
is
his
,
whether
by
Possession
,
Gift
,
or
Purchase
;
may
lawfully
cease
to
be
so
,
as
a
Punishment
for
his
Crimes
,
in
transgressing
this
great
Law
of
Nature
,
of
endeavouring
the
Common
Good
.
Principle
XVIII
.
It
is
better
to
Obey
God
,
declaring
His
Will
to
us
by
the
true
Principles
of
Natural
Reason
,
than
our
own
unreasonable
Lusts
and
Passions
,
or
the
wicked
desires
or
Commands
of
Men.
These
and
the
like
Principles
may
fitly
be
called
Natural
,
as
well
as
Moral
Axioms
,
as
being
the
true
results
of
Natural
Reason
,
and
are
so
clear
and
manifest
of
themselves
,
that
if
any
one
will
consider
them
without
prejudice
,
or
being
byass'd
by
Passion
,
or
too
much
Self-love
,
they
will
not
need
a
long
train
of
Arguments
to
prove
them
;
since
they
appear
true
and
evident
at
the
first
Proposal
.
So
also
these
Moral
Principles
,
considered
as
Propositions
declaring
the
Connexion
of
all
Humane
Actions
,
with
the
Natural
effects
that
depend
upon
them
;
as
for
example
,
when
they
shew
us
any
Action
which
will
most
certainly
conduce
to
our
own
,
and
all
others
happiness
,
and
that
it
appears
to
be
not
only
our
Duty
but
Interest
to
perform
them
.
These
Principles
thus
considered
,
with
relation
to
our
future
Actions
,
may
be
called
Practical
Dictates
,
since
they
do
not
only
shew
us
the
highest
End
we
can
propose
to
our selves
,
in
order
to
our
present
and
future
happiness
;
but
do
also
direct
us
to
the
choice
of
the
fittest
means
to
attain
it
.
But
I
think
it
doth
sufficiently
appear
,
that
we
are
not
only
able
to
form
a
complex
Idea
of
this
Common
Good
of
Rational
Beings
;
but
also
from
the
faculty
of
comparing
the
likeness
of
our
own
Nature
with
that
of
all
other
Men
,
can
also
frame
an
universal
or
complex
Idea
of
a
Species
,
or
kind
of
Creatures
agreeing
in
the
same
natural
Properties
,
and
requiring
the
same
things
for
their
Happiness
and
Subsistence
as
himself
.
Note
that
I
do
not
mean
by
this
,
any
adequate
Idea
of
the
true
Physical
Nature
of
Mankind
,
since
of
this
(
as
of
all
other
substances
)
we
have
no
other
knowledge
but
by
their
sensible
qualities
,
therefore
I
mean
only
here
an
Idea
fori
,
or
such
a
common
and
inadequate
Idea
of
the
Nature
of
Man
,
as
serves
us
for
all
the
moral
Rules
of
Life
,
which
Idea
he
can
give
a
name
to
,
and
call
mankind
,
and
so
comes
to
consider
,
and
understand
all
the
Causes
and
means
,
not
only
of
his
own
Preservation
and
Happiness
,
but
that
of
all
other
men's
,
considered
as
an
aggregate
Body
.
And
from
thence
is
able
to
draw
divers
Conclusions
concerning
the
proportion
,
and
degrees
of
men's
natural
Good
or
Happiness
,
according
to
the
Principles
before
laid
down
;
till
he
at
last
arrive
at
this
Universal
Idea
of
the
Common
Good
of
Rational
Beings
,
as
the
highest
and
noblest
that
he
can
attain
unto
,
and
which
is
most
inseparably
conjoyned
with
his
own
particular
Conservation
and
Happiness
.
But
whereas
God
hath
Created
other
Creatures
to
act
for
their
own
present
Satisfaction
and
Preservation
,
without
any
consideration
of
that
of
others
:
He
hath
made
man
alone
,
not
only
able
to
contribute
to
the
good
and
Preservation
of
his
own
kind
,
but
hath
also
made
him
sensible
of
this
Ability
:
and
I
shall
farther
shew
in
this
Discourse
,
that
he
hath
laid
a
sufficient
Obligation
on
him
to
exert
it
.
§
.
22.
Another
faculty
of
the
Rational
Soul
,
and
only
proper
to
Man
as
a
sociable
Creature
,
is
,
That
of
Speech
,
or
expressing
our
Notions
by
significant
Words
or
Sounds
;
which
though
it
be
not
born
with
us
,
yet
however
may
be
reckoned
amongst
the
Natural
faculties
of
Mankind
,
as
well
as
going
with
two
legs
;
since
we
find
no
Brute
Creatures
capable
of
it
,
though
divers
of
them
are
endued
with
Tongues
like
ours
,
and
that
divers
Birds
can
pronounce
whole
Sentences
,
yet
have
they
no
notion
of
what
they
say
:
whereas
there
is
no
Nation
,
though
never
so
Barbarous
,
but
hath
the
use
of
Speech
.
And
to
shew
you
farther
,
how
natural
some
sort
of
Speech
is
to
Mankind
,
I
have
heard
of
two
young
Gentlemen
that
were
Brothers
,
(
and
I
knew
one
of
them
my self
)
who
though
born
deaf
,
and
consequently
dumb
;
yet
by
often
and
long
Conversation
with
each
other
,
came
to
frame
a
certain
Language
between
themselves
,
which
though
it
seemed
perfect
Gibberish
to
the
standers
by
,
yet
by
the
sole
motion
of
their
Lips
and
other
signs
,
they
perfectly
understood
each
other
;
which
was
likewise
evident
from
this
,
that
in
the
dark
they
were
not
able
to
converse
at
all
.
So
that
this
faculty
seems
to
have
been
bestowed
by
God
on
Mankind
,
not
for
his
Preservation
as
a
meer
Animal
,
Since
divers
Brutes
are
able
to
subsist
for
more
years
without
it
;
and
therefore
seems
to
be
intended
to
render
Man
a
Sociable
Creature
,
and
who
was
by
this
Faculty
to
benefit
others
of
his
own
kind
,
as
well
as
himself
;
for
we
are
not
only
hereby
able
to
impose
certain
Arbitrary
names
to
particular
things
;
but
having
first
framed
Universal
Idea's
,
can
likewise
give
names
to
them
,
as
to
this
general
Idea
applicable
to
all
particular
Men
in
the
World
,
we
can
give
the
name
of
Man
;
and
herein
consists
the
main
difference
between
Men
and
Brutes
,
and
not
in
Ratiocination
alone
.
Since
I
suppose
even
Brutes
have
right
Idea's
of
those
Objects
they
have
received
by
their
Senses
;
and
can
likewise
inferr
,
or
reason
right
about
them
:
As
when
a
Dog
by
often
seeing
his
Master
take
down
his
stick
before
he
goes
abroad
,
does
thence
argue
when
ever
he
does
so
,
that
his
going
abroad
will
follow
,
expressing
his
Joy
by
barking
and
leaping
:
yet
we
cannot
find
that
Brutes
have
any
general
or
complex
Idea's
,
much
less
names
for
them
,
having
no
more
but
a
few
Ordinary
signs
,
whereby
to
express
their
present
Appetites
and
Passions
;
but
the
main
benefit
of
Speech
seems
to
respect
others
more
than
our selves
,
since
we
are
hereby
able
to
instruct
them
in
many
Arts
and
Sciences
,
necessary
for
their
Happiness
and
Preservation
,
and
also
to
advise
and
admonish
them
in
all
Civil
and
Moral
Duties
;
and
there
is
scarce
any
one
so
Brutish
,
who
is
not
sensible
that
in
the
exercise
of
this
Faculty
,
consists
one
of
the
greatest
pleasures
of
Humane
Life
,
(
viz.
)
Conversation
:
and
supposing
Men
in
a
state
of
War
,
I
do
not
see
how
they
could
ever
well
get
out
of
it
again
,
were
it
not
for
Treaties
and
Articles
of
Peace
;
but
must
(
like
game
Cocks
and
Bulls
)
fight
it
out
,
till
one
side
were
either
quite
destroyed
,
or
forced
to
run
away
,
and
quit
that
Territory
or
Country
where
they
Liv'd
.
§
.
23.
Nor
can
we
omit
another
great
benefit
we
receive
from
Speech
,
(
viz.
)
the
Invention
of
Letters
,
by
which
we
are
not
only
able
to
Register
our
present
Thoughts
for
our
own
remembrance
;
but
can
likewise
Profit
and
Instruct
,
not
only
the
present
,
but
also
all
future
Generations
;
by
Books
or
Writings
,
as
we
do
now
make
use
of
the
Knowledge
and
Experience
of
those
who
dyed
,
some
Thousands
of
Years
before
we
were
born
.
But
since
Mr.
H.
and
others
,
have
made
some
Objections
against
the
benefit
of
Speech
and
Letters
,
as
that
they
tend
oftentimes
to
promote
false
Opinions
,
and
War
amongst
Mankind
.
Granting
it
to
be
so
,
it
is
no
more
an
Objection
against
the
benefits
we
receive
by
them
,
than
it
were
to
say
,
that
the
Air
,
Water
,
or
Food
,
(
the
only
means
of
Life
)
are
hurtful
to
Mankind
;
since
by
the
necessary
course
of
Nature
,
or
else
our
own
Intemperance
,
they
often
become
the
causes
of
Plagues
,
Surfeits
,
and
divers
other
diseases
,
whereby
Mankind
is
destroyed
.
Yet
since
that
Author
hath
made
the
use
of
Speech
,
one
great
Reason
why
Men
cannot
live
so
peaceably
as
Brutes
,
and
therefore
fansies
they
must
be
in
a
Natural
state
of
War
:
I
shall
therefore
referr
the
Answering
it
to
the
Second
Part
,
since
my
Intention
is
not
here
to
Argue
,
but
Instruct
.
§
.
24.
Men
do
also
far
exceed
Brutes
in
their
Rational
or
discoursive
Faculty
,
as
appears
in
the
Knowledge
of
Numbers
,
or
Collecting
divers
single
things
into
one
Total
Summ
,
which
we
call
Arithmetick
;
so
necessary
for
all
Affairs
of
a
Civil
Life
,
and
the
Duties
of
distributive
Justice
.
And
though
I
grant
it
is
an
Art
,
and
that
divers
Barbarous
Nations
want
that
exact
knowledge
of
it
which
we
have
;
yet
by
reckoning
upon
their
fingers
they
have
a
sufficient
use
of
it
,
as
much
as
is
necessary
for
their
purpose
or
business
;
and
if
they
did
but
apply
their
Minds
to
it
,
I
doubt
not
but
that
they
would
arrive
to
the
same
perfection
in
Arithmetick
as
we
do
.
But
I
look
upon
this
Faculty
as
peculiar
to
Mankind
,
since
we
cannot
perceive
Brutes
to
have
any
knowledge
of
it
.
Thus
if
from
Bitches
or
Sows
,
you
take
away
never
so
many
of
their
Young
ones
;
yet
if
you
leave
them
but
one
or
two
,
they
do
not
miss
the
rest
;
which
shews
that
they
have
no
Idea's
of
Numbers
,
whatever
they
may
have
of
Quantity
.
§
.
26.
To
this
Observation
may
likewise
be
added
as
a
Consequence
thereof
,
that
Faculty
so
proper
to
Mankind
,
of
measuring
the
quantities
of
Bodies
,
the
distances
between
them
,
and
the
Proportions
they
bear
to
each
other
,
which
Science
we
call
Geometry
or
Mathematicks
;
which
Arts
were
certainly
invented
by
Man
,
as
a
Creature
intended
for
a
Sociable
Life
;
since
on
some
of
these
depend
most
Trades
,
all
Commerce
,
Architecture
,
Navigation
,
and
most
of
the
Rules
of
distributive
Justice
,
with
other
Arts
needless
here
to
be
set
down
.
So
that
whoever
will
but
seriously
reflect
upon
the
excellency
of
these
Sciences
,
as
well
in
the
certainty
of
their
Demonstrations
,
as
in
the
vast
and
Stupendious
effects
they
produce
;
cannot
but
acknowledge
that
our
Rational
Faculty
,
exceeds
that
of
Brutes
by
many
degrees
.
§
.
27.
But
there
yet
remain
behind
two
of
the
greatest
Prerogatives
of
Man's
Soul
,
and
in
respect
of
which
alone
he
is
made
a
sit
Subject
of
the
Law
of
Nature
.
The
first
is
freedom
in
Actions
,
or
the
power
of
doing
or
forbearing
any
Action
;
which
does
not
only
consist
in
indifferent
things
,
as
when
a
Man
of
two
different
Objects
,
chuses
which
of
them
he
pleases
;
but
is
also
able
to
chuse
a
greater
Good
,
before
a
less
,
and
does
likewise
often
preferr
(
though
unjustly
)
a
present
less
Good
grateful
to
his
Senses
,
before
a
greater
Good
approved
of
by
his
Reason
;
yet
however
it
cannot
be
denyed
,
but
that
Man
by
the
power
of
his
Reason
,
is
able
to
move
and
excite
his
Passions
of
Love
and
Pity
,
when
he
sees
Objects
that
require
his
help
and
assistance
:
Nay
,
can
also
by
deliberation
,
command
and
over-rule
those
domineering
Passions
of
Lust
,
Anger
,
and
Revenge
,
&c.
When
they
happen
to
prompt
him
to
Actions
that
are
contrary
to
his
own
true
Good
,
and
that
of
the
rest
of
Mankind
.
And
lastly
,
Man
being
capable
to
comprehend
all
particular
goods
,
and
to
add
them
together
into
one
Sum
,
viz.
the
Common
and
General
Good
of
Rationals
,
as
the
best
and
most
noble
End
he
can
imploy
himself
about
,
is
also
able
to
divert
his
thoughts
from
his
own
private
pleasure
and
profit
alone
;
and
fix
them
upon
the
care
of
his
Relations
and
Friends
,
or
the
more
publick
Good
of
his
Country
.
And
though
I
grant
it
is
difficult
,
exactly
to
explain
after
what
manner
we
exert
this
Faculty
,
since
the
Nature
and
Actings
of
the
Rational
Soul
,
are
very
abstruse
;
yet
I
appeal
to
every
Man
's
own
Heart
,
whether
he
does
not
find
in
himself
,
not
only
a
Liberty
to
do
or
forbear
indifferent
Actions
,
such
as
going
abroad
or
staying
at
home
;
but
likewise
such
as
are
certainly
better
by
a
Rational
estimate
,
if
he
will
but
give
himself
time
to
consider
,
and
weigh
the
Nature
and
Consequence
of
them
,
or
else
to
what
purpose
is
he
sorry
?
Or
why
does
he
repent
the
having
done
any
foolish
,
wicked
,
or
rash
Action
?
Since
if
all
Actions
were
absolutely
necessary
,
it
were
as
idle
and
insignificant
as
if
he
should
be
sorry
,
that
he
were
not
made
a
Prince
,
rather
than
a
private
Person
;
or
instead
of
a
Prince
that
he
was
not
an
Angel
.
So
that
certainly
,
God
would
not
then
have
endued
Man
with
these
two
Properties
peculiar
to
him
,
viz.
That
of
Conscience
,
or
a
Reflection
upon
the
Good
or
Evil
of
his
own
Actions
,
and
that
of
Repentance
or
Sorrow
,
for
having
done
amiss
,
altogether
in
vain
,
since
both
were
needless
,
if
all
Actions
were
a-like
necessitated
.
§
.
28.
But
the
last
and
highest
Faculty
,
and
whereby
Man's
Nature
is
chiefly
distinguished
from
that
of
Brutes
,
is
,
when
by
the
force
of
his
Reason
,
(
acting
by
the
method
and
means
here
describ'd
)
he
becomes
sensible
of
the
existence
,
Providence
,
and
other
Perfections
of
the
Deity
;
from
whence
we
may
inferr
,
that
it
is
highly
improbable
,
if
not
impossible
,
that
this
most
Wise
and
Powerful
Being
,
which
we
call
God
,
should
have
Ordained
any
Power
or
Faculty
in
Man's
Soul
to
no
purpose
.
If
therefore
He
hath
Endued
Man
alone
of
all
his
Creatures
,
with
the
Knowledge
of
his
own
Existence
and
Attributes
,
as
far
as
is
necessary
for
us
Finite
Creatures
to
conceive
of
them
;
since
I
grant
we
are
not
able
to
comprehend
Infinite
Perfections
,
it
is
not
likely
,
that
God
should
endue
Man
alone
with
this
so
excellent
a
Knowledge
,
for
so
useless
an
End
as
bare
Speculation
;
which
alone
is
of
no
great
Use
or
Benefit
,
either
to
himself
,
or
the
rest
of
Mankind
,
whose
Good
and
Happiness
God
chiefly
intended
in
their
Creation
:
So
that
indeed
we
cannot
apprehend
any
End
more
worthy
his
Divine
Wisdom
and
Goodness
,
in
Creating
us
capable
of
these
Idea's
,
than
what
is
Practical
,
that
is
,
as
it
some
way
serves
to
direct
our
Actions
,
as
free
and
voluntary
Agents
towards
the
obtaining
our
own
Good
and
Happiness
,
Conjoyn'd
with
that
of
other
Rational
Beings
.
Nor
can
any
Actions
render
us
more
Happy
,
than
those
that
testifie
our
high
Veneration
of
God's
Infinite
Perfections
,
and
a
deep
Sense
of
his
Goodness
towards
us
,
and
whereby
we
may
be
disposed
to
an
entire
Obedience
to
his
Laws
,
whether
Natural
or
Reveal'd
,
whenever
they
are
made
known
to
us
;
so
that
if
it
can
be
prov'd
,
that
these
Dictates
of
right
reason
,
called
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
derive
their
Authority
from
God
as
a
Law-giver
,
and
were
intended
by
Him
for
the
Happiness
and
Preservation
of
Mankind
,
and
as
Rules
whereby
he
would
have
us
direct
all
our
Actions
to
this
great
End
;
there
can
be
no
doubt
but
we
lie
under
a
sufficient
Obligation
to
observe
them
;
and
to
prove
this
,
will
be
the
next
and
greatest
part
of
our
task
.
§
29.
But
before
I
undertake
this
,
it
will
not
be
amiss
to
Treat
a
little
,
concerning
those
Attributes
of
the
Deity
,
as
far
as
we
can
have
any
Idea's
of
them
;
since
from
the
consideration
of
the
Nature
of
things
,
and
also
of
our
own
Humane
Nature
,
we
cannot
but
be
carry'd
on
to
consider
the
Nature
of
God
Himself
;
and
if
from
the
Creation
of
the
Universe
,
we
cannot
but
conceive
Him
of
Infinite
Power
;
so
from
His
Acting
and
Ordaining
all
things
,
for
the
best
and
Worthiest
End
,
we
may
likewise
affirm
Him
to
be
also
Infinitely
Wise
and
Good
;
so
that
His
Infinite
Power
always
Acting
for
the
best
and
wisest
Ends
,
is
still
so
limitted
by
His
Infinite
Wisdom
and
Goodness
,
that
it
cannot
Act
any
thing
destructive
to
the
Common
Good
of
Rational
Beings
,
of
which
Himself
is
the
chief
;
and
from
hence
proceeds
the
certainty
of
the
Law
of
Nature
,
as
also
our
perpetual
Obligation
to
it
.
For
as
I
will
not
affirm
that
God
could
not
have
made
the
World
,
and
the
Things
therein
,
after
another
manner
than
He
hath
done
;
so
since
He
hath
made
it
in
the
Order
we
now
find
it
,
this
great
Law
of
Nature
,
of
endeavouring
and
procuring
the
Common
Good
of
Rational
Beings
,
is
of
the
same
Duration
with
that
of
the
Universe
it self
;
and
so
consequently
of
constant
and
perpetual
Obligation
in
respect
of
Himself
,
and
all
those
whom
He
hath
Ordained
to
be
His
Subordinate
means
,
or
Instruments
to
procure
it
,
especially
as
Men
,
whom
He
hath
made
Conscious
of
our
Duty
,
and
able
to
Co-operate
with
Him
for
this
Great
and
Excellent
End
.
CHAP.
III.
Of
the
Law
of
NATURE
,
and
that
it
is
reducible
to
one
single
Proposition
,
which
is
Truly
and
Properly
a
LAW
,
as
containing
all
things
necessary
thereunto
.
§
1.
HAving
already
in
the
Two
former
Chapters
from
the
Great
Book
of
Nature
,
(
that
is
,
as
well
that
of
things
without
us
,
as
of
our selves
in
particular
,
and
of
Mankind
in
general
)
made
several
Observations
for
the
proving
of
this
Proposition
,
That
Man
was
Ordain'd
by
God
for
a
Sociable
Creature
,
whose
Being
,
Preservation
and
Happiness
,
was
to
depend
upon
the
Assistance
and
Good-will
of
God
his
Creator
,
as
also
those
of
his
own
kind
;
I
come
in
the
next
place
to
shew
,
That
every
one
is
oblig'd
to
a
return
of
the
like
Benevolence
to
others
;
for
we
can
by
no
means
be
better
assured
of
the
like
Good-will
from
them
,
than
by
doing
them
the
same
good
Offices
,
as
often
as
it
lies
in
our
Power
,
which
we
desire
they
should
do
for
us
,
and
that
this
constitutes
the
happiest
state
Men
are
capable
of
in
this
Life
,
viz.
Peace
and
Concord
,
not
only
among
particular
Men
,
but
also
between
all
Common-wealths
and
Nations
,
of
which
the
whole
body
of
Mankind
consists
,
so
that
it
evidently
appears
,
that
the
true
and
Natural
state
of
Mankind
,
is
,
That
of
Peace
,
Love
,
or
mutual
Benevolence
,
and
which
indeed
would
require
no
other
Rewards
,
than
what
proceeds
from
it self
,
(
were
Man
a
Creature
always
governed
by
right
reason
and
his
own
true
Good
)
Rewards
and
Punishments
being
Ordained
for
Men
,
as
too
often
govern'd
by
their
Passions
and
Sensual
Appetites
,
and
not
according
to
the
perfection
of
their
Rational
Nature
.
Yet
since
it
pleased
God
,
to
Create
Man
a
mixt
Creature
,
consisting
of
a
Body
and
a
Soul
,
and
being
too
often
drawn
aside
by
Passions
,
not
directed
by
right
reason
,
and
to
stand
in
need
of
Punishments
as
well
as
Rewards
,
to
keep
him
to
his
duty
;
thence
arises
a
necessity
of
His
dealing
with
Man
as
a
Legislator
,
and
of
giving
him
certain
natural
Laws
or
Rules
,
whereby
to
govern
his
Actions
,
with
certain
Penalties
and
Rewards
annext
to
them
;
which
Laws
may
be
very
well
contracted
into
one
single
Proposition
,
or
practical
Conclusion
drawn
from
the
Nature
of
God
,
our
own
Nature
,
and
that
of
things
without
us
,
by
the
Observations
already
laid
down
,
viz.
That
God
wills
or
commands
,
that
all
reasonable
Persons
should
endeavour
the
Common
Good
of
Rational
Beings
,
as
the
great
End
for
which
they
were
Created
,
and
in
pursuance
of
which
,
consists
their
own
true
Good
or
Happiness
,
as
in
its
neglect
or
violation
,
their
greatest
Misery
.
§
.
2.
Having
given
you
this
summary
description
of
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
as
coming
from
its
first
Cause
,
God
,
I
shall
now
explain
the
terms
therein
contain'd
,
to
avoid
all
Ambiguity
and
Exception
.
(1)
By
Wills
and
Commands
,
I
do
not
mean
any
Commands
by
Words
,
that
being
the
method
of
God's
Revealed
,
and
not
Natural
Will
,
and
so
is
not
the
Subject
of
this
Discourse
;
and
therefore
I
do
here
only
understand
that
Will
or
Command
of
God
,
which
is
to
be
learned
from
the
Consideration
of
his
Divine
Nature
,
our
own
,
and
that
of
all
other
things
,
consisting
not
in
Words
,
but
in
Idea's
;
that
is
true
Conclusions
drawn
from
right
Reason
;
but
that
words
are
not
always
Essential
to
a
Law
,
or
that
it
cannot
be
made
known
to
the
Subjects
,
without
some
set
form
of
Speech
,
may
appear
by
Persons
born
Deaf
and
Dumb
,
whom
we
often
find
to
have
Notions
of
a
God
,
and
a
Law
of
Nature
,
though
they
were
not
convey'd
in
their
Minds
by
Words
or
Writing
,
for
it
is
sufficient
if
the
Will
of
the
Legislator
may
be
discovered
by
any
other
sit
means
or
signs
,
especially
when
(
as
in
this
Law
we
now
treat
of
)
there
are
such
certain
Rewards
and
Punishments
,
annexed
to
their
Observation
or
Transgression
,
as
may
make
it
their
Interest
,
rather
to
observe
than
transgress
them
;
which
is
not
only
visible
in
Men
but
Brutes
.
Since
we
see
,
that
by
certain
Signs
imprinted
in
their
Minds
,
by
the
means
of
fit
Rewards
and
Corrections
;
Elephants
,
Horses
,
Dogs
,
&c.
are
made
Susceptible
of
Humane
Commands
,
(
and
as
far
as
their
Natures
permit
)
are
governable
by
Laws
of
our
Prescribing
;
For
we
can
shew
them
by
such
signs
,
what
Actions
are
to
be
done
or
omitted
by
them
;
and
certainly
God
hath
not
left
us
less
plain
demonstrations
of
his
Will
,
in
reference
to
our
Duty
towards
him
,
from
that
Knowledge
he
hath
given
us
of
his
Existence
,
as
also
of
our
own
Nature
,
as
I
shall
farther
prove
in
this
Discourse
.
By
Rational
Persons
,
I
mean
,
all
those
,
though
of
never
so
mean
a
Capacity
,
who
are
able
to
make
such
easie
and
natural
Observations
and
Conclusions
,
as
I
have
already
laid
down
:
And
therefore
Children
,
under
the
Years
of
Discretion
,
Idiots
and
Mad-folks
,
are
still
to
be
excepted
from
this
Law
,
who
not
having
the
actual
use
of
right
reason
,
are
not
able
to
draw
those
Observations
and
Consequences
from
the
Nature
of
things
,
as
are
already
laid
down
,
and
which
are
necessary
for
the
right
understanding
thereof
.
By
Endeavour
,
I
mean
all
such
voluntary
Actions
,
which
Persons
of
sound
Minds
can
knowingly
,
and
deliberately
perform
towards
the
good
of
others
,
without
destroying
or
hurting
their
own
true
Happiness
;
which
endeavours
,
though
(
by
many
unforeseen
accidents
in
the
Course
of
Nature
)
they
may
be
often
frustrated
,
and
so
fail
of
their
intended
design
:
yet
when
we
have
done
the
utmost
we
are
able
,
we
have
sufficiently
perform'd
our
Duty
,
since
no
Laws
require
the
performance
of
more
,
than
is
in
our
Power
to
perform
.
By
the
Common
Good
of
Rational
Beings
,
I
understand
the
collective
Happiness
of
the
Deity
,
as
the
head
of
them
,
and
that
of
all
the
individual
Persons
of
Mankind
,
existing
together
with
us
,
as
the
constituent
parts
or
members
;
and
in
which
each
Man
's
particular
Good
and
Happiness
is
included
;
since
it
is
impossible
to
endeavour
the
Happiness
of
others
,
as
voluntary
Agents
,
unless
each
particular
Person
whose
duty
it
is
so
to
do
,
have
first
a
right
to
preserve
,
and
make
himself
happy
,
jointly
with
others
in
his
Proportion
,
to
the
whole
Body
of
Mankind
.
By
true
Good
or
Happiness
,
I
mean
,
all
those
Goods
whether
of
Body
or
Mind
,
by
which
Men
may
be
rendred
truly
Happy
,
and
contented
in
this
Life
,
and
in
that
to
come
;
but
in
which
,
whenever
the
former
stand
in
Competition
with
the
latter
;
the
Goods
of
the
Soul
are
to
be
preferred
;
that
is
,
the
good
of
our
better
or
Eternal
part
,
before
that
of
our
Body
,
which
is
less
valuable
and
temporal
.
But
I
need
add
nothing
here
to
prove
,
That
God
is
the
Head
of
all
Rational
Beings
,
and
in
what
Sence
we
may
be
said
to
procure
or
endeavour
his
Good
and
Happiness
,
since
I
have
spoken
so
largely
of
that
in
the
Preface
to
this
Discourse
;
and
as
for
the
difference
between
Natural
and
Moral
good
,
I
have
said
so
much
concerning
it
in
the
Second
Part
,
in
the
Confutation
of
Mr.
H's
Sixth
Principle
,
that
by
Nature
nothing
is
Good
or
Evil
;
that
it
would
be
impertinent
to
repeat
it
here
.
I
shall
now
prove
,
that
this
Proposition
,
containing
this
Description
of
the
Law
of
Nature
is
true
,
that
is
,
agreeable
to
the
Will
of
God
,
as
far
as
it
is
declared
to
us
;
by
what
we
are
able
to
know
of
His
Divine
Nature
,
or
can
collect
from
our
own
,
and
the
Natures
of
all
things
without
us
,
and
that
all
the
Moral
Duties
we
owe
,
either
to
God
,
ourselves
,
or
others
,
are
contained
in
,
or
may
be
reduced
to
this
one
Proposition
,
Of
our
endeavouring
the
Common
Good
of
Rationals
;
in
order
to
which
,
I
shall
lay
down
these
Propositions
.
§.
3.
1.
That
God
in
the
first
place
Wills
and
Intends
His
own
Glory
and
Service
,
and
in
the
next
,
the
Good
and
Preservation
of
all
Mankind
,
and
of
all
particular
Persons
therein
contain'd
,
as
far
as
consists
with
that
frail
and
Mortal
state
wherein
He
hath
Created
them
.
This
Proposition
hath
already
been
made
out
in
the
First
Part
of
this
Discourse
;
wherein
I
have
proved
,
that
the
Preservation
and
continuance
of
all
the
Species
of
Creatures
,
(
and
consequently
of
Mankind
as
one
of
them
)
does
wholly
depend
upon
God's
Providence
.
And
as
for
the
Individuals
,
or
particular
Persons
,
since
God's
Knowledge
is
Infinite
,
and
extends
even
to
the
least
things
;
and
also
that
of
these
Particulars
,
each
Species
of
Creatures
is
made
up
,
and
consists
.
It
is
likewise
as
evident
,
that
God
designs
their
Good
and
Preservation
,
as
well
as
that
of
the
whole
kind
;
though
I
grant
He
prefers
the
Good
of
the
whole
Species
,
before
that
of
the
Individuals
.
2.
It
is
the
Will
of
God
that
all
Men
of
sound
Minds
,
should
be
made
conscious
of
this
His
intention
of
the
Good
and
Preservation
of
Mankind
,
and
that
they
should
operate
as
His
Subordinate
means
,
or
Instruments
towards
this
great
End
.
Which
I
shall
prove
thus
:
1.
It
is
evident
that
all
Men
of
sound
Minds
,
have
a
notion
of
the
Good
and
Happiness
of
others
as
well
as
of
themselves
.
2dly
.
That
this
Notion
or
Idea
,
when
truly
pursued
,
will
at
last
extend
it self
to
all
Mankind
;
for
it
can
never
stop
short
of
it
,
as
long
as
it
may
still
proceed
farther
,
and
find
new
and
fit
Objects
to
work
on
;
every
Individual
Member
of
Mankind
making
a
part
of
this
Universal
Idea
.
3.
That
this
Notion
of
endeavouring
the
Common
Good
of
Rational
Beings
,
is
not
only
possible
to
be
performed
,
but
is
also
highly
Rational
,
and
the
greatest
and
noblest
End
we
can
imagine
or
propose
to
our selves
,
as
comprehending
the
Good
and
Happiness
of
the
whole
System
of
Rational
Beings
,
and
is
also
true
,
i.
e.
agreeable
with
the
Divine
Intellect
:
which
I
thus
make
out
,
these
grounds
being
supposed
.
§
.
4.
First
,
It
is
certain
,
that
all
the
truths
our
Minds
are
endued
with
,
or
capable
of
,
are
from
God
,
since
whatever
perfection
is
found
in
the
effect
,
must
needs
have
been
first
more
eminently
in
its
Cause
.
Therefore
if
the
Knowledge
of
Truth
be
a
perfection
,
(
as
doubtless
it
is
)
it
must
be
much
more
so
in
God
,
the
Original
Cause
thereof
,
so
that
if
this
Idea
of
the
Common
Good
of
Rational
Beings
,
as
the
highest
Good
we
Men
are
capable
of
knowing
,
it
being
a
clear
and
perfect
(
though
complext
)
Idea
,
drawn
from
the
Nature
of
God
and
all
other
things
;
and
being
a
Collection
of
the
Good
and
Happiness
of
the
Deity
,
and
of
all
other
Rational
Agents
;
it
must
be
true
,
and
consequently
from
God
.
And
the
Divine
Intellect
,
doth
as
certainly
agree
with
our
Idea's
concerning
it
,
as
it
doth
when
we
judge
,
that
the
Base
of
an
Equilateral
Triangle
,
is
equal
to
either
of
the
Crura
or
Legs
.
Therefore
this
Idea
of
the
Common
Good
is
true
,
and
that
it
is
also
certain
,
that
all
Truth
is
from
God
,
as
likewise
that
He
hath
made
us
truly
to
understand
,
that
he
Wills
the
Good
and
Happiness
of
Mankind
;
it
is
likewise
as
certain
,
that
he
would
have
us
act
as
Rational
Agents
,
conscious
of
this
His
great
design
.
§
.
5.
The
Second
Part
of
this
Proposition
(
viz.
)
That
God
would
have
us
Operate
as
his
Instruments
to
this
End
;
will
be
likewise
as
clear
when
you
consider
what
I
have
already
said
,
That
God
who
hath
made
nothing
in
vain
,
would
not
have
endued
us
with
an
Idea
of
this
Common
Good
,
as
the
greatest
End
we
can
propose
our selves
,
for
mere
Speculation
,
but
rather
for
some
practical
End
,
in
order
to
our
own
Good
and
Happiness
,
with
that
of
others
;
especially
since
God
hath
placed
it
so
much
in
our
Power
to
promote
and
procure
this
Common
Good
,
since
as
far
as
we
endeavour
the
Good
and
Happiness
of
particular
Persons
,
we
do
so
far
contribute
our
share
to
that
of
Mankind
,
considered
as
one
aggregate
Body
.
Thus
whatsoever
does
good
to
any
one
Member
,
does
so
far
benefit
the
whole
Body
;
and
the
Good
and
Happiness
of
an
aggregate
Body
consisting
of
divers
distinct
Members
,
consists
in
that
of
each
of
its
parts
.
So
then
,
if
God
intends
the
End
,
(
viz.
)
the
Common
Good
of
Mankind
,
(
as
I
have
already
proved
)
he
designs
likewise
the
means
to
produce
it
:
Nor
can
there
be
any
better
means
,
or
fitter
Instruments
for
this
End
,
than
the
joint
Endeavours
of
all
Men
,
expressed
by
all
the
Acts
of
Benevolence
and
Kindness
towards
each
other
;
since
it
is
certain
(
as
I
said
before
)
that
Men
can
contribute
more
to
the
Hurt
,
or
Benefit
,
of
each
other
,
than
all
the
rest
of
the
Creatures
put
together
.
Therefore
as
God
hath
designed
the
End
,
and
ordained
sufficient
means
to
produce
it
,
(
viz.
)
Men's
kind
and
benevolent
Actions
;
so
it
is
as
evident
,
That
he
will
make
use
of
Men
,
as
the
necessary
means
for
this
End
.
Tho'
I
grant
he
hath
ordained
us
to
operate
,
not
only
as
mechanick
Causes
,
but
rather
as
free
and
voluntary
Agents
to
produce
it
;
that
is
,
as
true
Subjects
to
this
Law
of
Nature
.
[
*
](A64084-e8490-b)
*
Vid.
Dr.
Parker's
Demonstration
of
the
Law
of
Nature
,
pag.
24.
Thus
by
the
same
steps
that
we
arrive
at
the
knowledge
of
God
the
Supreme
Being
,
we
are
likewise
brought
to
an
acknowledgment
of
this
his
great
Design
,
of
the
Common
Good
of
Rational
Beings
.
And
if
from
all
the
wonderful
Observations
,
and
curious
Contrivances
(
observed
in
this
last
Chapter
)
drawn
from
the
Nature
of
Things
,
and
Mankind
,
we
cannot
but
conclude
,
That
they
were
so
disposed
by
a
most
Wise
,
Intelligent
Being
,
towards
this
great
End
:
And
the
very
same
appearances
that
discover
these
Things
,
must
likewise
declare
his
Intention
of
making
use
of
us
men
,
as
necessary
means
thereunto
.
§
.
7.
The
last
Proposition
for
the
proving
this
Description
of
the
Law
of
Nature
to
be
true
,
is
this
:
That
GOD
having
made
this
Discovery
of
his
Will
unto
us
,
we
thereupon
lie
under
a
sufficient
Obligation
,
to
observe
this
great
Law
of
endeavouring
this
Common
Good
:
To
prove
which
,
I
first
suppose
that
Obligation
to
an
Action
enjoyned
by
the
natural
Law
,
is
the
necessary
and
constant
effect
thereof
,
upon
every
Person
subject
to
it
;
and
that
this
immediately
results
from
its
own
Nature
,
this
Law
being
always
just
and
right
as
the
Will
of
GOD
,
the
Legislator
is
,
from
whence
it
proceeds
:
So
that
I
understand
Obligation
to
Active
Obedience
to
be
the
immediate
effect
of
this
Law
,
yet
that
it
primarily
flows
from
that
Will
of
GOD
,
which
ordained
this
Law
,
and
made
Man
a
Creature
subject
to
it
;
as
Heat
in
us
is
the
immediate
Effect
or
Action
of
Fire
upon
us
,
but
originally
both
the
Fire
and
Heat
is
from
the
first
Cause
.
Now
there
is
no
legal
Liberty
left
us
in
the
case
of
natural
Laws
,
to
chuse
whether
we
will
be
obliged
to
the
Actions
therein
commanded
,
or
rather
will
submit
to
the
Punishment
attending
the
Violation
thereof
;
and
although
our
natural
Liberty
of
Will
be
not
destroyed
thereby
,
yet
we
have
no
Right
left
us
to
determine
our selves
otherwise
than
natural
Law
directs
,
because
all
Moral
Truth
,
or
Rectitude
,
is
comprehended
within
that
Law
.
But
in
Humane
Laws
,
because
they
may
enjoyn
something
amiss
,
there
a
Right
is
often
left
to
us
to
chuse
rather
to
bear
the
Penalty
,
than
to
obey
them
,
(
because
we
are
obliged
rather
to
obey
GOD
than
Man
)
in
case
they
command
any
Action
contrary
to
the
Divine
Law
,
whether
Natural
or
Revealed
.
§
.
8.
For
the
further
clearing
of
this
,
I
shall
premise
somewhat
to
explain
this
Word
Obligation
,
which
the
Civilians
thus
define
:
Obligatio
est
vinculum
Iuris
,
quo
quis
astringitur
debitum
persolvere
.
That
is
,
an
Obligation
is
that
Bond
of
Law
,
whereby
every
one
is
obliged
to
pay
his
Debt
,
or
Due
:
Which
Definition
doth
well
include
all
sorts
of
Obligations
,
if
by
the
Word
Ius
,
or
Law
,
we
understand
that
Law
whose
Obligation
we
propose
to
define
.
So
that
by
vinculum
Iuris
in
this
Definition
,
we
understand
that
Bond
,
or
Tye
,
of
the
Law
of
Nature
,
by
which
every
one
is
obliged
to
pay
this
natural
Debt
,
i.
e.
to
perform
that
Duty
which
he
owes
to
GOD
his
Creator
,
by
reason
of
his
own
Rational
Nature
,
or
else
to
undergo
those
Punishments
which
are
ordained
for
his
Disobedience
or
Neglect
.
So
that
there
is
a
twofold
Tye
,
or
Obligation
,
in
all
Laws
;
the
one
active
in
the
Debt
,
or
Duty
;
the
other
passive
,
in
a
patient
submission
to
the
Punishment
,
in
case
of
any
wilful
neglect
,
or
omission
thereof
:
Of
both
which
,
we
shall
speak
in
their
order
.
§
.
9.
But
you
are
first
to
take
notice
,
That
none
can
oblige
us
to
do
,
or
forbear
any
Action
,
but
such
who
have
a
right
to
Command
us
:
So
that
this
Obligation
proceeds
from
that
just
Right
of
Dominion
,
which
a
superiour
Power
hath
over
us
and
our
Actions
;
and
as
far
as
we
are
subject
to
others
,
we
are
so
far
under
an
Obligation
to
their
lawful
Commands
,
which
obliges
us
to
a
discharge
of
that
Debt
,
or
Duty
,
we
owe
them
;
that
is
,
when
we
are
obliged
to
do
,
or
forbear
any
Action
from
the
Will
,
or
Command
of
a
Supreme
Power
,
or
Legislator
,
to
whom
,
when
sufficiently
made
known
to
us
,
we
are
bound
to
yield
Obedience
to
the
utmost
of
our
Power
:
And
herein
consists
the
Obligation
,
or
Duty
,
(
viz.
)
in
the
Conformity
of
our
Actions
to
a
Rule
,
such
as
is
declared
by
the
Will
of
the
Legislator
.
So
that
all
our
Obligation
to
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
is
at
last
resolved
into
that
absolute
Dominion
,
which
GOD
,
as
he
is
the
Great
Creator
and
Preserver
of
Mankind
,
hath
over
us
:
For
I
cannot
understand
a
Right
(
especially
of
Dominion
)
to
be
invested
or
seated
in
any
Supreme
Power
,
but
by
virtue
of
something
which
may
be
called
(
at
least
analogically
)
a
Law
.
2.
That
every
Dictate
of
the
Divine
Wisdom
,
concerning
Matter
fit
to
be
established
by
a
Law
,
is
such
a
Law
:
And
so
Cicero
(
the
best
Master
of
Language
)
speaks
,
towards
the
end
of
his
First
Book
de
Legibus
.
3.
That
the
Eternal
Wisdom
of
GOD
,
contains
eminently
,
or
analogically
,
in
it
,
all
that
we
can
know
to
be
Natural
Law
.
4.
But
to
know
that
it
is
Natural
Law
,
or
the
Dictate
of
true
Reason
,
concerning
the
fittest
means
to
the
best
End
,
or
greatest
Good
,
it
is
necessary
to
this
purpose
,
That
the
Supreme
Government
of
all
Things
(
and
especially
of
Rational
Creatures
)
should
be
in
him
,
who
is
most
able
and
willing
to
pursue
and
attain
that
greatest
End
;
that
is
,
it
must
be
setled
in
GOD.
5.
So
that
by
this
Dictate
of
Eternal
Wisdom
,
or
of
performing
all
Things
for
the
best
End
,
the
Soveraignty
becomes
his
Right
;
and
our
Knowledge
that
this
Dictate
of
Eternal
Wisdom
is
in
him
,
assures
us
,
That
this
Right
is
immutably
fix'd
and
vested
in
him
.
6.
Although
in
the
method
of
investigating
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
as
they
subsist
in
our
Minds
,
the
first
Law
respects
the
End
,
and
this
concerning
the
Means
,
comes
in
the
second
place
:
Yet
in
our
Thoughts
concerning
GOD
,
we
know
that
infinite
Wisdom
comprehends
all
these
Dictates
together
;
and
therefore
that
the
Dictate
,
or
Law
,
setling
Universal
Dominion
in
GOD
,
is
co-eternal
with
him
;
and
so
is
as
early
in
his
Nature
,
as
the
first
Natural
Law
;
the
Obligation
of
which
,
we
are
establishing
in
this
Chapter
.
And
here
arises
the
difference
between
a
Moral
Obligation
(
which
is
that
we
now
treat
of
)
and
a
Civil
one
,
or
that
by
which
we
are
obliged
to
Laws
in
Civil
Governments
,
the
former
being
in
respect
to
GOD's
immediate
Will
,
as
the
Supreme
Legislator
;
whereas
all
the
Duty
we
owe
to
our
Civil
Magistrates
,
Parents
,
and
Masters
,
&c.
is
only
in
subordination
to
GGD's
Will
so
declared
unto
us
,
and
who
hath
ordained
this
Obedience
for
his
own
Worship
and
Glory
,
and
in
order
to
the
Common
Good
of
all
Humane
Societies
and
Commonwealths
,
that
is
,
of
Mankind
in
general
.
§
.
10.
Yet
I
think
notwithstanding
all
we
have
said
of
the
Force
and
Nature
of
this
Obligation
,
it
may
well
enough
consist
with
the
natural
Freedom
of
Man's
Will
,
since
all
these
Considerations
do
still
but
excite
,
not
necessitate
Him
to
act
one
way
or
other
:
For
it
is
still
left
in
his
Power
either
to
chuse
that
which
is
absolutely
the
best
in
obeying
this
Will
of
God
,
or
else
to
preferr
a
less
present
Good
before
it
,
in
the
satisfaction
of
his
Appetites
,
or
Passions
:
And
herein
likewise
consists
the
difference
between
an
Animal
Good
,
or
Evil
,
and
a
Moral
one
;
the
former
being
those
natural
Means
conducing
to
each
Man's
preservation
,
or
destruction
,
considered
as
a
mere
Animal
,
without
any
respect
to
God
as
their
Author
,
or
the
Common
Good
of
Rationals
as
their
Rule
.
The
latter
,
that
is
of
all
Humane
Moral
Actions
,
or
Habits
,
considered
as
agreeable
,
or
disagreeable
unto
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
ordained
by
God
as
a
Legislator
,
and
made
known
to
Man
,
in
order
to
the
Common
Good
of
Rational
Beings
;
so
that
they
are
thus
morally
Good
,
or
Evil
,
only
in
respect
of
their
Conformity
,
or
Disagreement
with
the
Will
of
God
;
and
as
their
Observance
,
or
Neglect
,
brings
either
Good
,
or
Evil
(
that
is
,
Happiness
,
or
Misery
)
upon
us
in
this
Life
,
or
in
that
to
come
.
From
whence
you
may
observe
the
necessity
of
putting
God
,
in
all
our
descriptions
,
or
definitions
of
the
Law
of
Nature
,
as
the
Author
thereof
:
For
were
it
not
for
his
existence
,
in
whose
divine
Intellect
the
Idea's
of
Moral
Good
,
and
Evil
,
are
eternally
established
,
and
into
whose
will
so
ordaining
them
,
they
are
ultimately
to
be
resolved
.
Mr.
H.'s
(
or
rather
Epicurus's
Assertion
)
would
certainly
be
true
,
That
there
is
nothing
morally
Good
,
or
Evil
,
in
its
own
Nature
.
And
it
may
here
be
also
observed
,
That
the
great
omission
of
divers
Writers
on
this
Subject
,
in
not
placing
God
as
the
Cause
,
or
Author
of
the
Law
of
Nature
,
in
their
definitions
,
hath
been
perhaps
the
main
,
if
not
only
Reason
of
that
false
Assertion
,
That
the
Laws
of
Nature
are
not
properly
so
,
'till
they
are
established
by
the
Authority
of
the
Supreme
Civil
Power
;
so
on
the
other
side
,
if
it
be
made
evident
,
That
God
Wills
,
or
Commands
,
all
Men
should
endeavour
the
Common
Good
of
Rationals
,
as
the
greatest
they
are
capable
of
;
it
must
necessarily
follow
,
That
we
lie
under
a
sufficient
Obligation
,
by
all
the
Tyes
of
Duty
and
Gratitude
,
to
concurr
with
God's
Will
and
Design
,
in
pursuing
and
endeavouring
this
great
End
.
§
.
11.
But
since
God
hath
thought
fit
to
make
Man
a
Creature
consisting
of
two
different
and
distinct
Parts
,
or
Principles
,
a
Soul
and
a
Body
,
both
capable
of
Good
and
Evil
,
i.
e.
of
Rewards
and
Punishments
;
I
come
now
to
the
other
part
of
this
Duty
,
or
Obligation
,
by
which
we
are
bound
,
by
all
the
Rational
Motives
,
or
Rewards
,
that
Man's
Nature
is
capable
of
,
to
observe
this
great
Law
;
and
deterred
by
all
the
contrary
Evils
,
or
Punishments
,
from
neglecting
or
transgressing
it
:
In
order
to
which
,
I
shall
lay
down
these
plain
Axioms
,
drawn
from
the
Nature
of
Moral
Good
and
Evil
,
which
you
may
find
in
the
Learned
Bishop
Wilkin's
excellent
Discourse
of
Natural
Religion
.
Axiom
1.
That
which
is
morally
good
,
(
i.e.
)
agreeable
to
the
Will
of
God
,
is
to
be
desired
and
prosecuted
;
and
that
which
is
evil
,
i.
e.
contrary
to
his
Will
,
is
to
be
avoided
.
Ax.
2.
The
greater
congruity
there
is
in
any
thing
to
the
Reason
of
Mankind
,
and
the
greater
tendency
it
hath
to
promote
or
hinder
the
Perfection
of
Man's
Nature
,
in
the
endeavour
of
the
Common
Good
;
so
much
greater
degrees
it
hath
of
moral
Good
,
or
Evil
;
and
according
to
which
,
we
ought
to
proportion
our
Inclinations
,
or
Aversions
thereunto
.
Ax.
3.
So
that
it
is
suitable
both
to
the
Reason
and
Interest
of
Mankind
,
that
all
Persons
should
submit
themselves
to
God's
Will
,
upon
whom
they
depend
for
their
Happiness
and
Well-being
,
by
doing
such
Things
as
may
render
them
acceptable
to
Him
,
and
avoiding
those
contrary
Actions
which
may
provoke
his
Displeasure
,
that
is
,
in
short
,
in
prosecuting
the
Common
Good
of
Rational
Beings
.
Ax.
4.
Hence
the
Rational
Nature
,
and
the
Perfections
belonging
to
it
,
being
more
Noble
than
the
Sensitive
,
a
moral
Good
is
to
be
preferred
before
an
animal
Pleasure
;
and
that
which
is
morally
evil
,
is
more
to
be
avoided
,
than
that
which
is
merely
animal
.
Ax.
5.
A
present
animal
Good
may
be
parted
with
,
upon
a
probable
Expectation
of
a
greater
future
moral
Good
.
Ax.
6.
A
present
Evil
is
to
be
endured
,
for
the
probable
avoiding
of
a
greater
,
though
future
Evil.
But
since
all
the
Rewards
which
God
can
bestow
upon
us
,
for
our
observing
this
fundamental
Law
,
of
endeavouring
the
Common
Good
of
Rationals
,
does
only
amount
to
the
truest
and
highest
Happiness
that
Man's
Nature
is
capable
of
;
it
is
fit
that
we
sufficiently
state
that
Happiness
,
and
wherein
it
consists
:
For
the
clearing
of
which
,
I
shall
lay
down
these
two
plain
Propositions
.
§
.
12.
Prop.
1.
That
which
gives
,
or
constitutes
the
Essence
of
any
thing
,
and
distinguisheth
it
from
all
other
things
,
is
called
the
essential
form
of
that
thing
.
Prop.
2.
That
State
,
or
Condition
,
by
which
the
Nature
of
any
thing
is
advanced
to
the
utmost
perfection
which
it
is
capable
of
,
according
to
its
kind
,
is
called
the
Chief
End
,
Good
,
or
Happiness
of
such
a
Being
:
Thus
,
for
Example
,
(
to
give
you
a
Scale
,
drawn
from
the
Nature
of
those
Beings
we
know
to
be
endued
with
Life
or
Motion
)
1.
The
Nature
of
Plants
consists
in
having
a
vegetative
Life
,
by
which
they
receive
Nourishment
and
Growth
,
and
are
enabled
to
multiply
their
kind
.
The
utmost
Perfection
which
this
kind
of
Being
is
capable
of
,
is
to
grow
up
to
a
state
of
Maturity
,
to
continue
unto
its
natural
Period
,
and
to
propagate
its
kind
.
2.
The
Nature
of
Brutes
(
besides
what
is
common
to
them
with
Plants
,
consists
in
their
being
endued
with
Faculties
,
whereby
they
are
capable
of
apprehending
external
Objects
,
and
of
receiving
Pain
or
Pleasure
from
them
,
in
order
to
their
own
Preservation
,
and
the
propagation
of
their
Species
.
The
utmost
Perfection
of
these
,
consists
in
mere
sensitive
Pleasures
;
i.
e.
of
doing
and
enjoying
such
Things
as
are
grateful
to
their
Appetites
and
Senses
.
But
the
Nature
of
Man
,
(
besides
what
is
common
to
him
with
Plants
and
Brutes
,
both
in
the
vegetative
and
sensitive
Life
)
consists
in
the
Faculty
of
Right
Reason
,
whereby
he
is
made
capable
of
understanding
the
Law
of
Nature
,
and
of
its
Rewards
and
Punishments
,
either
in
this
Life
,
or
that
to
come
,
to
induce
him
to
their
Observation
,
and
deterr
him
from
the
transgression
of
them
:
Which
Sentiments
,
as
no
Creature
in
this
visible
World
,
except
Man
,
does
partake
of
;
so
his
Chief
Good
,
or
Happiness
,
consists
in
the
improvement
and
perfection
of
this
Faculty
;
that
is
,
in
such
Actions
as
are
most
agreeable
to
Right
Reason
,
and
as
may
best
entitle
him
to
the
Divine
Favour
,
and
afford
him
the
greatest
Assurance
of
a
lasting
Happiness
,
both
in
this
Life
,
and
after
it
is
ended
.
So
that
all
the
Actions
of
Man
,
considered
as
voluntary
and
subject
to
the
Law
of
Nature
,
and
thereby
capable
of
Rewards
and
Punishments
,
are
called
Moral
,
as
being
directed
by
God
the
Supreme
Legislator
,
to
the
greatest
and
most
excellent
End
,
viz.
the
Common
Good
of
Rational
Beings
.
§
.
13.
Having
laid
down
these
Principles
of
moral
Good
and
Evil
,
in
order
to
the
setling
and
clearing
the
Nature
of
this
Obligation
,
and
wherein
it
consists
;
I
shall
,
in
the
next
place
,
particularly
declare
the
Sanction
of
this
Law
,
(
viz.
)
those
Rewards
which
God
hath
ordained
for
the
Observation
of
this
Law
of
Nature
,
of
endeavouring
the
Common
Good
,
and
those
Punishments
he
hath
appointed
for
its
Breach
,
or
Transgression
.
But
I
have
already
laid
down
,
That
all
Obligation
upon
the
Soul
of
Man
,
arises
properly
from
the
Commands
of
some
rightful
Superior
Power
;
that
is
,
such
a
one
who
hath
not
only
force
sufficient
to
inflict
what
Evils
he
pleases
upon
the
Disobedient
;
but
,
who
hath
also
given
us
just
Grounds
,
or
Reasons
,
wherefore
he
requires
us
to
determine
the
natural
Liberties
of
our
Wills
,
according
to
his
Pleasure
;
both
which
,
whenever
they
meet
in
any
Supreme
Power
;
and
that
he
hath
once
signified
his
Will
to
us
,
ought
to
produce
in
our
Minds
not
only
fear
to
offend
,
but
also
a
love
of
,
and
obedience
to
his
Commands
.
The
former
,
from
the
Consideration
of
his
irresistible
Power
:
The
latter
,
from
their
own
intrinseck
Goodness
,
as
also
from
all
those
Motives
which
ought
to
persuade
us
to
perform
his
Will.
For
as
one
who
hath
no
other
Reason
than
down-right
force
,
why
he
will
have
me
perform
and
submit
to
his
Commands
,
whether
I
will
or
no
,
may
indeed
so
far
terrifie
me
,
that
to
avoid
a
greater
Evil
,
I
may
think
it
best
to
obey
him
;
yet
that
fear
once
removed
,
there
will
then
remain
nothing
that
can
hinder
me
from
acting
according
to
my
own
,
rather
than
his
Will
,
or
Humour
:
So
on
the
other
side
,
he
who
can
give
me
never
so
good
Reasons
why
I
ought
to
obey
him
;
yet
if
destitute
of
Power
,
to
inflict
any
Punishment
upon
me
for
my
Disobedience
,
such
his
Commands
may
,
without
any
outward
inconvenience
,
be
neglected
by
me
,
if
I
think
fit
,
unless
he
is
endued
with
sufficient
Power
to
vindicate
the
Neglect
,
or
Contempt
,
of
his
Authority
.
Therefore
the
strictest
Sanction
which
any
Soveraign
Power
can
give
unto
its
Laws
,
is
,
when
it
is
not
only
able
,
but
hath
also
sufficiently
declared
,
That
it
will
conferr
a
sufficient
share
of
good
Things
,
or
Rewards
,
for
so
doing
;
and
of
Evils
,
or
Punishments
,
upon
any
breach
,
or
neglect
of
its
Commands
:
So
though
I
grant
the
whole
force
of
this
Obligation
is
properly
resolved
into
the
Will
of
the
Legislator
,
or
those
to
whom
the
Custody
of
these
Laws
are
committed
;
all
which
,
are
included
in
this
Law
of
Nature
,
since
we
find
God
commanding
it
,
to
whom
we
ought
to
yield
absolute
Obedience
;
though
not
in
Right
of
his
irresistible
Power
alone
,
but
rather
as
he
hath
,
by
his
Eternal
Wisdom
and
Goodness
,
in
his
Creation
and
Preservation
of
us
,
an
absolute
Dominion
over
,
and
an
undoubted
Right
to
Command
us
;
and
consequently
we
are
obliged
to
yield
Obedience
to
his
Laws
,
as
they
are
not
only
highly
reasonable
,
(
being
ordained
for
the
Common
Good
of
Rationals
)
but
are
also
established
by
sufficient
Rewards
and
Punishments
.
But
since
the
former
seem
more
plainly
declared
to
Mankind
,
and
are
likewise
more
agreeable
to
our
Rational
Nature
,
which
should
rather
delight
to
be
allured
by
Rewards
,
than
terrified
by
Punishments
;
I
shall
first
begin
with
the
natural
Rewards
annexed
to
the
Observation
of
this
great
Law
of
Nature
,
of
endeavouring
the
Common
Good
:
Which
may
be
divided
into
Internal
,
or
External
;
that
is
,
either
in
relation
to
the
Soul
alone
,
or
to
the
Body
and
the
Soul
joyntly
considered
.
judice
to
his
Health
,
do
so
much
indulge
his
Genius
,
as
to
keep
a
Table
above
his
Estate
,
and
thereby
become
unable
to
provide
for
his
Family
,
or
to
contribute
to
the
publick
charges
of
the
Commonweal
,
he
is
highly
guilty
of
Intemperance
,
though
perhaps
he
may
do
it
without
any
prejudice
to
his
Health
.
§
.
18.
And
as
for
that
other
sort
of
Temperance
,
called
Chastity
,
or
Continence
,
I
need
not
farther
to
declare
how
much
the
Common
Good
and
Happiness
of
Mankind
depend
upon
it
,
having
already
shewn
divers
of
those
Evils
,
and
Inconveniencies
,
that
do
necessarily
follow
the
contrary
Vices
:
I
shall
only
add
,
That
it
is
sufficient
that
the
commission
of
this
Offence
of
Incontinence
,
makes
a
Man
guilty
of
another's
Sin
,
as
well
as
his
own
:
Therefore
I
define
Chastity
to
be
the
abstaining
from
all
inordinate
,
or
forbidden
Lusts
,
in
order
to
the
Common
Good
,
or
for
the
propagation
of
Mankind
;
and
therefore
is
not
only
confined
to
the
bare
forbidding
of
Fornication
,
but
also
extends
it self
to
that
moral
Obligation
,
or
Contract
,
which
we
call
Marriage
:
So
that
out
of
a
consideration
of
this
great
End
,
those
promiscuous
Copulations
between
Brothers
and
Sisters
,
and
divers
other
near
Relations
,
which
upon
the
first
Peopling
of
the
World
were
lawful
because
then
necessary
for
the
propagation
of
Mankind
,
are
now
,
for
the
same
Reason
,
become
unlawful
;
since
without
an
abhorrence
of
this
Copulation
between
Brothers
and
Sisters
,
it
were
hard
,
if
not
impossible
,
that
the
Chastity
of
such
young
Persons
,
conversing
so
constantly
and
intimately
together
from
their
youth
,
should
be
otherwise
preserved
,
without
an
early
prepossession
of
the
horrour
of
such
promiscuous
Copulations
.
And
hence
also
I
suppose
,
That
Natural
Reason
taught
most
Nations
,
after
Mankind
began
to
be
multiplied
upon
the
Earth
;
and
the
memory
of
their
first
original
Relation
they
had
to
each
other
,
to
be
forgotten
,
to
prohibit
Marriage
between
near
Relations
,
that
by
this
means
new
Friendships
,
and
stricter
Bonds
of
Amity
,
should
be
contracted
between
Families
and
Persons
not
nearly
related
in
Blood
;
from
whence
a
larger
diffusion
of
Friendship
and
Kindness
,
proceeding
from
this
Relation
,
might
be
spread
amongst
Persons
not
only
of
the
same
Commonweal
,
but
of
divers
Nations
;
and
also
that
those
Factions
,
and
Enmities
,
which
would
often
happen
between
particular
Men
,
and
Families
,
were
they
only
to
marry
into
their
own
Clan
,
or
Tribe
,
may
be
prevented
;
or
if
begun
,
may
,
by
fresh
Alliances
,
be
reconciled
and
taken
away
.
So
that
it
is
evident
,
That
the
Reason
of
this
Vertue
of
Chastity
,
or
Continence
,
can
no
way
be
truly
explained
,
or
understood
,
without
a
true
knowledge
of
the
End
for
which
it
was
ordained
,
viz.
the
Common
Peace
,
Happiness
,
and
Preservation
of
Mankind
.
§
.
19.
I
shall
only
add
somewhat
more
concerning
that
other
sort
of
Temperance
,
relating
to
our
seeking
after
,
and
acquiring
those
outward
Goods
often
conducing
,
though
not
absolutely
necessary
,
to
our
Well
being
,
(
viz.
)
Riches
and
Honour
;
and
therefore
the
same
general
Law
which
limits
our
Love
towards
our selves
,
in
order
to
the
Common
Good
,
ought
also
,
from
the
same
Consideration
,
to
limit
and
regulate
our
Desires
,
both
in
acquiring
and
keeping
these
Advantages
;
and
therefore
they
are
to
be
sought
for
to
no
other
End
,
than
as
they
may
render
us
more
capable
of
promoting
the
great
End
above-mentioned
,
and
to
which
they
ought
always
to
be
subordinate
.
The
former
of
these
Vertues
relating
to
Riches
,
is
called
Moderation
,
which
is
a
limitted
Care
in
acquiring
and
keeping
Riches
;
of
which
I
need
speak
no
farther
,
having
sufficiently
shewn
the
Measure
and
Reason
of
it
,
when
I
defined
Liberality
and
Frugality
,
with
their
opposite
Vices
:
The
other
sort
of
Temperance
relating
to
Honours
,
is
called
Modesty
,
and
may
be
defined
a
Justice
towards
our selves
,
in
a
reasonable
Desire
of
Honours
,
in
order
to
the
Common
Good
;
and
therefore
consists
in
a
due
Mediocrity
,
as
well
in
desiring
Honours
,
as
avoiding
Infamy
;
and
this
Vertue
,
as
it
curbs
the
Desire
from
seeking
higher
Things
than
the
Person
really
deserves
,
or
may
well
pretend
to
,
in
order
to
this
great
End
,
is
called
Humility
;
which
is
a
low
or
true
esteem
of
a
Man's
self
,
or
personal
Merits
.
But
as
this
Desire
of
the
Common
Good
,
often
elevates
the
Mind
to
the
performing
of
great
and
noble
Actions
,
whereby
he
may
acquire
the
highest
Honours
,
it
is
then
called
Magnanimity
;
and
therefore
the
Magnanimous
is
still
supposed
to
be
endued
with
perfect
Vertue
,
and
a
most
large
Desire
of
the
Common
Good
of
Mankind
,
as
believing
he
hath
reason
to
judge
himself
worthy
of
any
Honour
that
he
can
justly
pretend
to
:
And
I
suppose
every
Man
is
sensible
,
That
it
is
a
part
of
the
same
Vertue
,
not
only
to
seek
for
true
Honour
,
but
also
to
take
care
to
preserve
it
,
when
it
is
obtained
:
And
from
the
Consideration
of
these
Vertues
,
the
contrary
Vices
are
more
easily
understood
;
for
Pride
is
directly
opposite
both
to
Magnanimity
,
and
Humility
shewing
it self
in
a
preposterous
Ambition
,
foolish
Arrogance
,
or
Vain-glory
;
and
so
Pusillanimity
,
or
meanness
of
Spirit
,
is
directly
contrary
to
Magnanimity
.
§
.
20.
Thus
we
have
run
through
almost
all
the
particular
Vertues
,
and
do
still
find
in
each
of
them
a
constant
Respect
,
or
Tendency
,
to
the
Common
Good
of
Mankind
:
So
that
whether
they
regard
our selves
or
others
,
the
same
great
End
is
still
intended
by
God
,
the
most
Wife
Legislator
:
And
this
Law
being
thus
established
,
there
is
therein
contained
the
largest
and
most
diffusive
Society
between
divers
Nations
,
or
Commonweals
,
and
the
truest
Love
and
Benevolence
between
all
the
Members
of
the
same
Commonweal
,
as
also
between
particular
Families
:
So
that
there
may
be
hence
demonstrated
and
determined
the
certain
Rules
and
Measures
of
true
Piety
towards
God
,
as
distinguish'd
from
Impiety
and
Superstition
;
and
also
of
all
other
Vertues
towards
Men
,
which
must
be
first
truly
known
,
and
applied
to
their
right
Objects
,
that
the
Names
of
these
Vertues
,
when
falsly
imposed
on
Actions
contrary
to
the
Laws
of
God
and
Nature
,
may
not
deceive
us
:
For
it
is
hence
evident
,
That
all
the
parts
of
universal
Justice
and
Benevolence
,
(
viz.
)
all
the
particular
Vertues
contained
under
them
,
are
only
commanded
in
order
to
this
Common
Good
;
because
it
is
manifest
by
Experience
,
That
such
Just
and
Benevolent
Actions
,
are
always
endued
with
a
natural
Power
of
procuring
and
promoting
the
Common
Peace
and
Happiness
of
divers
Nations
and
Commonweals
,
as
also
of
lesser
Societies
and
particular
Persons
;
of
all
which
,
considered
in
their
due
order
and
subordination
to
each
other
,
this
Common
Good
of
Mankind
is
made
up
,
and
consists
.
§
.
21.
And
,
farther
,
it
may
be
hence
clearly
shewn
what
is
that
Right
Reason
,
by
which
every
prudent
Man
ought
to
prescribe
to
himself
a
just
Mediocrity
in
all
his
moral
Actions
;
for
it
only
consists
in
practical
Propositions
,
proposing
or
declaring
to
us
this
great
End
;
and
also
shewing
us
all
the
means
in
our
Power
whereby
we
may
attain
it
;
which
are
those
that
,
in
the
first
place
,
prescribe
the
Rules
of
Piety
,
and
Divine
Worship
,
both
private
and
publick
.
(
2.
)
Those
that
concern
the
Society
and
Commerce
of
divers
Nations
and
Commonweals
.
(
3.
)
All
positive
Laws
,
whether
Civil
or
Domestick
,
tending
to
the
Good
of
the
Civil
Society
wherein
we
live
.
(
4.
)
True
and
rational
Conclusions
,
drawn
from
Knowledge
,
or
Experience
,
either
of
our selves
,
or
others
,
concerning
the
natural
Efficacy
of
Things
and
Actions
,
all
which
are
at
last
resolved
into
the
natural
Power
of
such
Humane
Actions
,
as
may
either
benefit
,
or
hurt
Mankind
,
considered
apart
,
or
in
an
aggregate
Body
,
as
in
a
Family
,
or
Nation
;
since
Experience
doth
not
with
less
certainty
teach
us
,
what
kind
of
Actions
are
beneficial
,
or
hurtful
to
Mankind
;
then
it
shews
what
sort
of
Diet
will
either
nourish
,
or
destroy
us
:
Nor
is
it
more
difficult
to
understand
the
Truth
of
this
Proposition
,
That
a
right
,
or
equal
Distribution
of
all
Things
necessary
for
Life
,
is
requisite
to
the
Common
Good
and
Happiness
of
Mankind
,
than
it
is
to
know
in
Physick
,
That
it
is
necessary
for
the
Life
and
Health
of
an
Animal
,
that
a
due
proportion
of
Nourishment
be
equally
distributed
to
all
its
Parts
,
or
Members
;
both
which
Truths
,
are
grounded
on
the
same
natural
Principles
,
(
viz.
)
That
the
same
Things
which
preserve
the
whole
,
do
also
preserve
all
its
parts
;
and
,
vice
versa
,
the
same
Things
which
preserve
all
the
Parts
,
or
Members
,
do
likewise
serve
to
the
Conservation
of
the
whole
;
which
being
evident
from
true
Principles
,
is
a
Science
taught
by
Experience
,
drawn
from
the
Nature
of
Things
.
§
.
22.
And
th●●
from
the
immutable
Efficacy
of
Corporeal
Causes
of
this
sort
;
for
the
production
of
their
Effects
on
all
Humane
Bodies
▪
depends
all
the
Certainty
and
Knowledge
of
Natural
Philosophy
and
Physick
:
So
likewise
from
their
immutable
Influence
,
or
Powers
on
Humane
Actions
,
for
the
Conservation
of
particular
Persons
,
Families
,
and
Commonweals
,
proceeds
all
the
Certainty
of
those
practical
Propositions
,
called
Natural
Laws
,
which
constitute
Moral
Philosophy
,
shewing
and
determining
the
Nature
of
all
Vertues
and
Vices
:
Nor
is
that
variety
of
Actions
,
which
may
be
prescribed
to
Persons
in
distinct
Families
,
or
Commonweals
,
and
under
various
Circumstances
of
Life
,
more
repugnant
to
the
constant
Care
of
preserving
all
the
Parts
,
or
Members
,
which
contribute
to
this
great
End
,
than
the
diversity
of
Diety
,
and
ways
of
living
peculiar
to
divers
,
Climates
,
Ages
,
or
Constitutions
of
Men's
Bodies
,
are
to
the
constant
Care
that
all
Men
have
of
preserving
their
own
Lives
and
Healths
,
according
to
the
several
Necessities
of
their
Natures
:
For
as
in
these
we
cannot
,
by
doing
whatever
we
will
,
promote
this
End
;
but
Nature
hath
put
some
limits
thereunto
,
although
our
weak
Understandings
cannot
attain
to
a
nice
,
or
mathematical
exactness
in
assigning
them
,
as
we
may
live
long
and
healthfully
enough
,
without
weighing
our
Meat
and
Drink
,
like
Lessius
;
so
we
may
likewise
procure
the
Common
Good
,
as
far
as
lies
in
our
Power
,
although
we
do
not
always
perform
that
which
is
absolutely
or
simply
best
in
all
Cases
;
it
is
as
much
as
God
the
Legislator
requires
,
if
we
truly
endeavour
it
,
and
contribute
as
far
as
we
are
able
unto
this
great
End
.
§
.
23.
In
the
last
place
,
I
shall
here
repeat
what
I
have
before
laid
down
,
That
this
Common
Good
of
Rationals
,
as
it
is
a
Collection
of
all
natural
Goods
(
and
the
greatest
of
all
others
)
so
it
is
the
true
Standard
of
all
other
Goods
,
either
natural
,
or
moral
:
So
that
by
our
comparing
them
with
this
,
we
may
truly
determine
whether
they
are
greater
,
or
less
than
each
other
;
and
so
whether
they
are
principally
to
be
desired
and
sought
after
,
or
to
be
postponed
to
other
greater
Goods
.
Likewise
the
same
measure
where
the
proportion
of
these
Goods
is
taken
,
gives
us
a
true
estimate
of
all
the
contrary
Evils
,
and
so
shews
us
what
is
more
,
or
less
to
be
avoided
,
or
repented
of
.
§
.
24.
We
may
also
hence
learn
what
degrees
of
Passions
,
or
Affections
are
lawful
;
for
it
is
certain
,
That
only
such
a
proportion
of
Affections
are
required
,
as
are
congruous
to
our
Rational
Nature
,
and
exactly
answering
the
true
Estimate
of
those
good
,
or
evil
Things
by
which
they
are
excited
;
but
since
the
Government
of
our
Appetites
and
Passions
,
is
a
thing
of
so
great
moment
,
as
that
on
which
all
our
Vertue
and
Happiness
(
as
far
as
it
is
in
our
Power
)
depends
;
which
Government
proceeds
from
our
knowledge
of
a
true
measure
of
all
Goods
,
and
Evils
,
according
to
which
they
are
to
be
judged
;
therefore
I
shall
be
the
larger
in
explaining
what
I
have
a
little
before
laid
down
,
(
viz.
)
That
the
Common
Good
ought
to
be
the
Standard
of
all
our
Affections
and
Passions
,
as
being
so
ordained
by
God
,
and
determined
by
the
Nature
of
Things
;
which
is
evident
,
in
that
we
have
demonstrated
this
Common
Good
,
to
be
that
great
End
,
to
whose
prosecution
all
Men
are
naturally
obliged
,
by
the
Will
of
God
,
as
a
Legislator
,
who
must
have
given
us
the
knowledge
of
any
thing
as
Good
,
or
Evil
,
to
little
purpose
,
unless
he
had
also
given
us
a
Rule
by
which
we
might
judge
of
the
several
measures
,
or
degrees
of
this
Goodness
:
So
that
this
Common
Good
being
once
established
as
a
certain
Measure
,
or
Standard
for
this
End
,
the
Good
of
each
particular
Person
will
bear
such
a
proportion
to
that
of
the
whole
Body
of
Rationals
,
as
the
Soundness
of
any
one
Member
,
does
to
the
Health
of
the
whole
Body
.
So
from
the
knowledge
of
this
Order
of
divers
subordinate
Goods
,
and
the
proportion
which
any
one
of
them
bears
to
the
Common
,
or
Greatest
Good
,
may
easily
be
deduced
how
much
the
Well-being
,
or
Happiness
of
every
single
Person
,
may
contribute
to
that
of
the
whole
Family
;
the
Felicity
of
a
Family
,
to
that
of
a
Commonwealth
;
that
of
a
Common-weal
,
to
the
Happiness
of
all
Nations
;
and
of
all
these
considered
together
,
what
proportion
they
may
bear
to
the
Common
Felicity
of
Mankind
.
So
that
hence
you
may
be
easily
satisfied
how
much
the
knowledge
of
this
one
Truth
,
conduces
to
our
right
prosecution
of
this
great
End
,
and
,
indeed
,
Sum
of
all
the
Laws
of
Nature
.
§
.
25.
Lastly
,
(
which
yet
ought
rather
to
have
been
put
in
the
first
place
of
all
)
let
us
consider
the
chief
and
principal
of
all
the
moral
Vertues
,
Love
,
or
Piety
towards
God
,
expressed
in
all
the
Acts
of
Divine
Worship
,
as
Prayer
,
Praise
,
Thanksgiving
,
&c.
This
must
needs
be
a
Vertue
,
since
it
does
that
which
is
highly
grateful
and
pleasing
to
God
the
Head
of
all
Rational
Beings
,
and
speaking
after
the
manner
of
us
Men
,
performing
somewhat
Good
,
and
agreeable
to
his
Divine
Nature
;
and
which
also
in
respect
of
our selves
,
makes
us
most
happy
,
not
only
by
rendring
the
Deity
propitious
to
us
,
but
also
by
a
nearer
spiritual
approach
and
conversation
with
it
,
in
those
holy
Exercises
,
it
puts
us
in
the
happiest
state
we
can
be
capable
of
in
this
mortal
Life
,
and
so
makes
us
more
able
to
perform
the
great
End
of
our
Creation
,
(
viz.
)
Our
contributing
to
the
Common
Good
of
Rational
Beings
.
§
.
26.
I
have
been
the
larger
in
laying
down
,
and
explaining
this
Law
,
as
a
Measure
,
or
Standard
of
all
good
Actions
,
to
the
end
that
we
should
esteem
all
Good
,
or
Evil
,
not
as
it
more
or
less
profits
or
hurts
our
own
particular
Bodies
alone
,
but
as
it
may
more
or
less
add
to
,
or
detract
from
this
Common
Good
:
So
that
in
comparing
of
all
Goods
together
,
whether
Natural
or
Moral
,
we
ought
still
to
look
upon
that
as
the
greatest
Good
which
conferrs
most
;
and
that
to
be
the
least
,
which
contributes
least
to
this
great
End
,
which
is
therefore
to
be
desired
,
or
prosecuted
by
us
with
proportionable
Affections
and
Endeavours
:
From
whence
also
may
be
drawn
a
general
and
powerful
Remedy
,
against
all
those
inordinate
Passions
proceeding
from
excessive
Self-Love
,
by
which
Men
are
most
commonly
drawn
to
hurt
or
injure
others
:
For
a
Man
who
thus
governs
himself
,
will
not
extravagantly
desire
any
of
these
outward
Things
,
nor
suffer
his
Soul
to
be
disturbed
by
the
consciousness
of
any
Crime
,
who
judges
nothing
truly
Good
,
but
what
really
conduces
to
the
common
Good
of
Rationals
.
§
.
27.
Thus
I
hope
I
have
demonstrated
the
true
Reasons
and
Grounds
of
Moral
Good
and
Evil
,
or
of
Vertue
and
Vice
;
and
have
endeavoured
to
render
Moral
Philosophy
(
or
the
true
Knowledge
of
the
Laws
of
Nature
)
a
practical
Science
,
and
not
merely
Speculative
,
or
Notional
,
like
that
of
the
Stoicks
;
who
whilst
they
allowed
nothing
to
be
really
good
,
but
Vertue
;
or
Evil
;
except
Vice
;
and
kept
such
a
pother
to
extol
the
real
Good
of
the
former
,
and
declaim
against
the
certain
Evil
of
the
latter
;
yet
by
not
giving
us
the
true
Reasons
,
or
Grounds
,
why
Vertue
should
be
embraced
,
and
Vice
avoided
,
they
rendred
their
Philosophy
merely
speculative
,
and
only
fit
for
those
idle
Porches
in
which
they
declaimed
,
scarce
having
any
farther
influence
upon
the
Actions
of
Life
,
when
either
their
own
Affections
,
or
any
powerful
outward
Temptation
,
did
at
any
time
prompt
them
to
act
contrary
thereunto
:
For
Vertue
is
only
to
be
esteemed
as
the
highest
or
most
perfect
Good
;
not
as
it
is
a
well-sounding
Word
,
or
that
fills
our
Minds
with
some
vain
empty
Notions
,
but
as
it
determines
our
Actions
to
their
utmost
influeence
upon
the
Common
Good
of
Rational
Beings
,
which
is
the
only
true
Piety
,
as
consisting
in
the
Performance
of
the
Commands
and
Will
of
God
,
by
the
imitation
of
his
Divine
Goodness
and
Beneficence
.
§
.
28.
So
that
I
shall
conclude
this
Chapter
with
Dr.
Parker's
excellent
Consideration
on
this
Subject
;
and
which
being
better
than
any
thing
that
I
can
now
think
of
,
I
shall
make
bold
to
give
it
you
almost
in
his
own
Words
,
&c.
pag.
23.
with
a
little
alteration
.
So
that
it
is
now
demonstratively
certain
by
induction
of
Particulars
(
according
to
the
method
we
have
now
taken
)
that
every
Vertue
hath
some
natural
Efficacy
to
promote
the
Common
Good
of
Rationals
;
and
is
no
otherwise
a
Vertue
,
but
as
it
contributes
to
this
great
End
,
and
that
each
Man
's
true
private
Interest
and
Happiness
,
is
therein
contained
,
and
inseparably
connected
with
it
,
by
the
necessary
order
of
Nature
,
i.
e
by
the
Contrivance
and
Wisdom
of
Divine
Providence
:
So
that
nothing
can
be
more
evident
,
than
that
its
Author
commands
all
his
Rational
Creatures
,
that
are
capable
of
any
knowledge
of
his
Will
,
and
sence
of
their
Duty
,
to
act
suitably
to
that
Order
of
Things
which
he
hath
established
in
the
World
,
and
to
that
Declaration
of
his
Will
,
which
he
hath
made
by
that
Establishment
,
in
order
to
the
bringing
about
this
great
End
of
the
Common
Good
of
Rational
Beings
.
CHAP.
V.
Containing
an
Answer
to
such
Objections
as
may
be
made
against
the
Law
of
Nature
,
thus
explained
and
reduc'd
into
this
Proposition
,
Of
Endeavouring
the
Common
Good
of
Rational
Beings
;
with
a
Conclusion
,
proving
this
to
be
the
sum
of
all
Laws
,
whether
Natural
or
Revealed
.
§
.
1.
SInce
there
are
two
sorts
of
men
,
who
according
to
their
several
Principles
,
and
Inclinations
,
may
make
different
Objections
against
this
our
Method
of
proving
,
and
deducing
the
Law
of
Nature
,
and
contracting
it
into
this
sing'e
easie
Proposition
,
of
our
endeavouring
the
common
good
of
Rational
Beings
;
I
shall
therefore
divide
them
into
Platonists
,
or
Epicureans
.
Those
who
put
the
whole
stress
of
their
belief
of
the
Laws
of
Nature
upon
innate
Ideas
,
or
Principles
of
Moral
Good
and
Evil
imprest
by
God
upon
mens
Souls
;
and
who
,
I
doubt
not
,
may
have
a
true
zeal
(
though
without
knowledge
)
for
this
Common
Good
;
which
is
more
than
I
can
promise
for
those
,
who
fal●ing
into
the
other
extream
,
will
not
acknowledge
that
we
can
have
any
true
or
certain
notion
,
or
idea
,
of
this
Common
Good
,
so
as
to
make
it
the
main
end
of
all
our
Actions
.
I
shall
therefore
in
the
first
place
consider
those
Objections
that
may
be
made
by
the
former
sort
of
Men
;
whose
first
Objection
may
be
this
,
That
it
is
most
suitable
to
the
goodness
of
God
to
imprint
upon
the
minds
of
men
certain
Characters
and
Notions
of
himself
,
and
also
of
those
Moral
Duties
which
he
requires
of
them
;
and
not
to
leave
them
in
the
dark
,
and
in
doubt
about
things
of
so
great
a
Concernment
to
them
;
since
by
that
means
he
would
not
only
have
secured
himself
of
that
Worship
and
Veneration
which
is
due
from
so
Intelligent
a
Creature
as
Man
,
but
would
also
with
great
ease
and
certainty
have
taught
him
his
duty
towards
himself
,
and
others
,
without
puting
him
to
the
trouble
and
pains
of
discovering
his
Existence
,
and
all
those
Moral
Duties
that
depend
upon
it
,
by
so
tedious
a
Method
as
I
have
here
proposed
;
which
every
man
hath
not
time
to
inquire
into
,
nor
perhaps
Faculties
strong
enough
to
make
such
rational
Conclusions
or
Deductions
from
the
Nature
of
God
,
and
other
things
,
for
the
understanding
of
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
as
we
have
here
laid
down
:
and
therefore
,
that
God
(
who
doth
all
things
by
the
best
and
easiest
means
)
hath
imprest
all
the
Notions
or
Ideas
of
Good
and
Evil
upon
mens
Souls
.
§
.
2.
To
which
Objection
I
need
return
no
other
Answer
than
what
is
already
made
by
the
Author
of
the
Essay
concerning
Human
Vnderstanding
(
so
often
cited
by
me
)
;
I
shall
therefore
give
it
to
you
in
his
own
words
,
Book
I.
chap.
4.
§
.
12.
This
Argument
,
if
it
be
of
any
force
,
will
prove
much
more
than
those
who
use
it
in
this
case
expect
from
it
;
for
if
we
may
conclude
,
That
God
hath
done
for
men
,
all
that
men
shall
judge
is
best
for
them
,
because
it
is
suitable
for
his
Goodness
so
to
do
;
it
will
prove
not
only
,
that
God
hath
imprinted
on
the
minds
of
men
an
Idea
of
himself
;
but
that
he
hath
plainly
stamped
there
,
in
fair
Characters
,
all
that
men
ought
to
know
or
believe
of
him
,
and
all
that
they
ought
to
do
in
obedience
to
his
Will
;
and
that
he
hath
given
them
a
Will
and
Affections
conformable
to
it
.
This
no
doubt
every
one
will
think
is
better
for
men
,
than
that
they
should
in
the
dark
grope
after
Knowledge
,
as
St.
Paul
tell
us
,
all
Nations
did
after
God
,
Acts
VIII
.
27
,
or
than
that
their
Wills
should
clash
with
their
Vnderstandings
,
and
their
Appetites
cross
their
Duty
.
The
Romanists
say
,
'T
is
best
for
men
,
and
so
suitable
to
the
Goodness
of
God
,
that
there
should
be
an
Infallible
Iudge
of
Controversies
on
Earth
,
and
therefore
there
is
one
:
And
I
by
the
same
reason
say
,
'T
is
better
for
men
that
every
man
himself
should
be
infallible
.
I
leave
them
to
consider
,
whether
by
the
force
of
this
Argument
they
shall
think
that
every
man
is
so
.
I
think
it
a
very
good
Argument
to
say
,
the
infinitely
Wise
God
hath
made
it
so
,
and
therefore
it
is
best
.
But
it
seems
to
me
a
little
too
much
confidence
of
our
Wisdom
,
to
say
,
I
think
it
best
,
and
therefore
God
hath
made
it
so
;
and
in
the
matter
in
hand
,
it
will
be
in
vain
to
argue
from
such
a
Topick
,
that
God
hath
done
so
,
when
certain
Experience
shews
us
that
he
hath
not
.
But
the
Goodness
of
God
hath
not
been
wanting
to
men
,
without
such
original
impressions
of
Knowledge
,
or
Ideas
stamped
on
the
mind
,
since
he
hath
furnished
man
with
those
Faculties
which
will
serve
for
the
sufficient
discovery
of
all
things
requisite
to
the
end
of
such
a
Being
:
And
I
doubt
not
but
to
shew
,
that
a
man
by
the
right
use
of
his
natual
Abilities
may
,
without
any
innate
Principles
,
attain
to
the
knowledge
of
a
God
,
and
other
things
that
concern
him
:
God
having
endued
man
with
those
faculties
of
Knowledge
which
he
hath
,
was
no
more
obliged
by
his
Goodness
to
implant
these
innate
Notions
in
his
Mind
,
than
that
having
given
him
Reason
,
Hands
and
Materials
,
he
should
also
build
him
Bridges
,
or
Houses
;
which
some
People
in
the
World
,
however
of
good
natural
parts
,
do
either
totally
want
,
or
are
but
ill
provided
of
as
well
as
others
are
,
(
perhaps
)
wholly
without
Ideas
of
God
,
and
Principles
of
Morality
,
or
at
least
have
but
very
ill
ones
.
The
reason
in
both
Cases
being
this
,
That
they
never
employed
their
Parts
,
Faculties
and
Powers
industriously
that
way
,
but
contented
themselves
with
the
Opinions
,
Fashions
,
and
things
of
their
Countrey
,
as
they
found
them
,
without
looking
any
farther
.
So
far
this
Learned
Author
.
§
.
3.
And
as
for
what
is
farther
urged
,
the
difficulties
of
the
coming
to
the
knowledge
of
the
Being
of
a
God
,
by
the
method
we
propose
,
if
this
were
not
plainly
to
be
read
from
the
great
Book
of
the
World
,
St.
Paul
had
in
vain
accused
the
general
corruption
of
the
Gentiles
,
and
their
loss
of
the
knowledge
of
the
true
God
,
as
he
doth
in
the
1st
of
the
Romans
,
v.
19
,
20.
Because
that
which
may
be
known
of
God
is
manifest
in
them
,
for
God
hath
shewed
it
unto
them
:
For
the
invisible
things
of
him
from
the
creation
of
the
world
are
clearly
seen
,
being
understood
by
the
things
that
are
made
,
even
his
eternal
power
,
and
Godhead
:
so
that
they
are
without
exaus
.
Where
you
may
observe
,
the
Apostle
here
appeals
to
the
common
Reason
of
Mankind
,
guided
by
things
without
us
,
for
the
proof
of
the
Existence
of
a
Delty
,
that
they
may
be
left
without
all
excuse
for
this
their
wilful
ignorance
and
neglect
.
§
.
4.
And
as
for
the
other
part
of
the
Objection
,
concerning
the
difficulty
and
laboriousness
of
the
Method
we
have
here
proposed
,
for
the
discovery
of
the
Law
of
Nature
,
and
the
weakness
of
mens
Faculties
,
for
the
making
such
rational
Conclusions
from
the
Nature
of
Things
;
I
think
that
will
signifie
much
less
than
the
former
,
if
those
that
make
this
Objection
will
please
to
consider
how
obvious
such
Conclusions
are
,
and
how
easily
made
out
,
in
the
Third
Chapter
of
this
Discourse
;
where
I
particularly
treat
of
the
Natural
Power
of
mens
Minds
,
in
making
Observations
from
the
Nature
of
Things
,
and
reducing
them
into
certain
practical
Propositions
,
in
order
to
their
own
future
happiness
,
in
conjunction
with
that
of
others
:
So
that
I
think
I
may
safely
affirm
,
that
those
who
are
not
of
Natural
Parts
sufficient
to
discover
the
Being
of
a
God
,
and
a
Providence
;
as
also
to
understand
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
which
depend
upon
that
Knowledge
:
If
they
did
but
duly
apply
their
Minds
to
think
upon
their
own
Original
,
and
that
of
the
World
,
by
true
Principles
of
Reason
,
must
be
either
Fools
or
Madmen
,
and
so
not
capable
Subjects
of
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
as
not
being
to
be
reckoned
amongst
rational
Creatures
;
or
else
,
which
is
worse
,
are
down-right
Atheists
;
who
,
to
indulge
their
own
unreasonable
Lusts
and
Passions
,
do
absolutely
deny
all
those
clear
Demonstrations
from
Natural
Things
,
which
are
brought
for
the
proof
of
a
Deity
,
and
of
their
Duty
towards
it
.
§
.
5.
And
tho
I
grant
that
all
men
do
not
ordinarily
reduce
all
the
Laws
of
Nature
into
this
one
single
Proposition
,
of
endeavouring
this
common
good
of
Rational
Beings
,
or
may
not
have
an
explicite
Notion
of
it
;
Yet
this
will
not
hinder
,
but
that
they
may
for
all
that
really
pursue
it
,
tho'
they
may
not
have
so
large
and
perfect
a
knowledge
of
the
grounds
of
their
Duty
,
as
they
would
have
if
they
were
sensible
of
this
Idea
:
For
if
a
man
be
but
throughly
convinced
that
he
is
not
made
for
himself
alone
,
but
that
he
ought
to
mind
the
good
and
preservation
of
others
besides
himself
;
and
that
he
doth
truly
observe
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
towards
himself
,
by
a
temperate
and
a
rational
Life
:
As
also
,
towards
his
Neighbour
,
by
observing
that
great
Rule
,
of
doing
as
he
would
be
done
by
,
in
all
cases
towards
others
.
I
say
,
such
a
man
,
tho'
never
so
simple
and
ignorant
in
other
things
,
doth
really
contribute
his
share
of
endeavour
towards
procuring
the
common
good
:
And
tho'
he
may
not
distinctly
know
all
the
true
reasons
and
grounds
of
his
own
Actions
;
yet
if
he
thus
lead
his
Life
,
and
observe
all
these
Rules
tending
to
this
End
,
I
doubt
not
but
that
he
will
meet
with
all
those
Rewards
intended
by
God
for
Vertuous
Actions
;
provided
he
have
never
heard
of
,
or
at
least
wilfully
refused
the
more
perfect
Law
of
the
Gospel
,
delivered
by
our
Saviour
Jesus
Christ
,
when
duly
proposed
to
him
.
Thus
a
Countrey
Carpenter
may
deserve
sufficient
Wages
,
and
Commendation
,
if
he
can
build
a
House
,
and
honestly
perform
his
Work
,
according
to
those
few
practical
Rules
he
hath
learnt
,
tho'
he
doth
not
understand
all
the
Principles
of
Geometry
,
or
Architecture
,
according
to
which
,
all
that
he
hath
wrought
may
easily
be
demonstrated
to
him
,
if
he
will
but
take
the
pains
to
understand
them
.
§
.
6.
There
is
another
Objection
which
this
sort
of
men
may
make
against
our
Method
of
finding
out
,
and
demonstrating
this
great
Law
of
Nature
,
in
that
I
make
every
man's
obligation
to
endeavour
it
,
to
arise
from
its
being
good
or
evil
to
himself
alone
;
whereby
it
may
seem
,
as
if
we
supposed
the
honour
of
God
,
and
the
common
good
of
mankind
were
to
be
postponed
▪
and
made
subservient
to
the
happiness
of
any
particular
person
.
To
satisfie
which
Scruple
,
I
do
in
the
first
place
affirm
,
that
we
do
not
intend
any
such
thing
,
since
we
have
all
along
endeavoured
to
establish
the
quite
contrary
Doctrine
;
For
I
assert
,
that
no
man
hath
any
Right
,
properly
so
called
,
to
his
own
Life
or
Being
,
but
in
order
,
and
as
it
conduces
to
the
honour
and
service
of
God
,
and
the
common
good
of
mankind
.
I
shall
therefore
now
more
distinctly
declare
how
these
(
tho'
some
may
think
them
contrary
to
each
other
)
do
very
well
consist
.
In
the
first
place
therefore
I
desire
you
to
take
notice
,
that
our
Natural
Obligation
to
this
Law
is
not
discovered
by
us
in
the
same
order
and
method
,
as
it
is
constituted
by
God
in
the
nature
of
Things
;
for
our
weak
finite
Understandings
,
when
acting
without
the
assistance
of
Divine
Revelation
,
do
slowly
enough
at
first
,
attain
to
the
knowledge
of
Individual
,
or
Single
Things
;
and
thence
taking
rise
from
such
common
effects
as
are
most
obvious
to
our
Senses
,
proceed
to
their
more
obstruse
Causes
,
until
at
length
discovering
one
Infinite
Being
,
called
God
,
to
be
the
first
Cause
and
Creator
of
all
things
.
We
from
thence
collect
not
only
what
is
his
Nature
,
but
also
what
is
his
Will
;
whereby
we
do
not
only
find
that
he
is
the
best
,
and
most
perfect
Being
;
But
that
as
such
,
he
willeth
and
procures
the
good
and
preservation
,
not
of
some
few
Singulars
alone
,
but
of
the
whole
Species
of
Mankind
.
And
lastly
,
that
he
would
have
us
men
cooperate
,
as
subordinate
,
(
tho
free
Agents
)
to
this
End
,
as
the
greatest
and
worthiest
we
can
undertake
:
Which
tho'
it
be
the
last
thing
we
come
to
the
knowledge
of
,
yet
is
that
which
is
first
and
chiefly
intended
by
God
,
as
the
principal
object
of
our
Knowledge
,
and
the
main
End
of
all
our
Moral
Actions
.
So
that
it
seems
evident
,
this
knowledge
of
our selves
,
and
of
things
thus
learnt
from
experience
and
observation
,
was
intended
by
God
,
only
to
serve
as
steps
to
raise
us
to
that
larger
knowledge
,
and
nobler
desire
of
pursuing
the
common
good
of
Rationals
,
as
the
sum
of
all
our
Moral
Duties
.
And
that
our
Wills
and
Affections
towards
this
end
,
are
not
to
be
regulated
or
directed
in
the
same
order
,
by
which
this
common
good
comes
to
be
discovered
;
i.
e.
(
with
a
respect
to
our selves
alone
)
;
but
from
a
true
judgment
concerning
the
measures
of
that
natural
good
and
perfection
therein
contained
.
So
that
tho'
we
are
at
first
indeed
excited
to
the
procuring
our
own
happiness
,
as
the
prime
and
most
natural
motive
of
all
our
Actions
;
yet
we
come
at
last
upon
better
consideration
to
discover
,
that
this
happiness
of
ours
is
contained
in
our
endeavours
of
the
Common
good
of
Rational
Beings
,
and
is
inseparable
from
it
,
as
the
conservation
of
any
of
our
particular
Members
is
contained
in
the
health
and
preservation
of
the
whole
Body
.
§
.
7.
And
this
Proposition
,
that
every
single
man's
good
is
contained
in
the
common-good
,
proves
indeed
,
that
the
sanction
of
this
general
Law
,
is
by
rewards
and
punishments
to
Every
single
man
:
But
that
Every
is
not
to
be
restrained
to
my self
,
or
any
one
man
alone
,
but
extends
alike
to
each
other
man
,
or
all
men
:
Since
it
is
evident
,
that
these
words
(
Every
man
)
collectively
taken
,
amount
to
all
men
;
as
every
part
collectively
taken
signifies
the
whole
.
And
tho'
the
main
end
intended
by
God
,
the
Legislator
,
from
such
Rewards
and
Punishments
,
are
obedience
to
his
Laws
,
and
the
preservation
of
Mankind
,
as
his
Subjects
(
which
are
indeed
of
much
greater
value
to
him
,
than
the
happiness
of
any
one
single
person
)
;
Yet
will
it
not
detract
from
the
perfection
or
sincerity
of
this
obedience
,
if
from
the
consideration
of
a
man
's
own
particular
happiness
or
misery
,
he
thereby
comes
to
consider
and
understand
,
that
God
hath
commanded
him
to
pursue
an
higher
and
nobler
end
than
that
alone
;
yet
to
which
his
own
happiness
or
misery
are
inseparably
connected
.
§
.
8.
I
come
in
the
last
place
to
these
objections
,
that
may
be
made
by
men
of
quite
contrary
Principles
;
and
who
will
not
acknowledge
,
that
we
either
can
,
or
ought
to
propose
this
common
good
,
as
the
Sum
of
all
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
and
the
main
end
of
all
our
Moral
Actions
.
Their
first
objection
may
be
this
;
That
it
seems
not
suitable
to
God's
Infinite
Goodness
,
and
Power
,
and
Wisdom
,
in
the
Government
of
Mankind
,
if
he
did
really
intend
its
good
and
happiness
(
as
we
here
suppose
)
to
permit
so
great
a
Design
to
be
so
often
disturbed
,
if
not
quite
frustrated
,
in
divers
parts
of
the
World
,
by
the
various
Passions
,
and
unreasonable
Appetites
,
of
so
many
violent
,
wicked
and
unjust
men
;
which
,
if
Mankind
is
well
considered
,
do
make
up
the
greatest
part
of
this
Aggregate
Body
.
In
answer
to
this
objection
,
I
might
tell
those
that
make
it
,
that
the
true
original
of
that
depraved
State
of
Mankind
,
and
from
which
all
that
Disorder
,
which
we
now
find
in
Humane
Nature
is
derived
,
was
the
Fall
of
Adam
,
the
first
Father
of
Mankind
;
who
thereby
conveyed
a
weakness
of
Reason
,
and
that
prevailing
Power
which
we
feel
in
our
sensual
Appetites
and
Passions
to
all
his
Posterity
,
whereby
man
is
become
very
prone
to
Evil
,
and
too
apt
to
transgress
the
Laws
of
Nature
.
But
I
shall
not
insist
upon
this
,
because
the
Gentlemen
with
whom
I
have
to
do
,
may
laugh
at
all
Divine
Revelation
,
not
accept
of
any
Proofs
as
sufficient
,
but
what
can
be
brought
from
meer
Natural
Reason
,
I
shall
therefore
answer
them
in
their
own
way
;
and
shall
first
of
all
grant
;
That
God
might
,
if
he
had
thought
fit
,
have
created
Man
without
any
possibility
of
sinning
,
and
have
determined
him
only
to
that
which
is
morally
good
.
But
then
God
hath
not
created
a
Man
,
but
quite
another
Creature
:
For
he
having
made
Man
to
consist
of
two
different
Principles
,
a
Body
and
a
Soul
;
the
one
to
be
driven
on
by
Sensual
Appetites
and
Passions
;
the
other
to
be
governed
by
Reason
:
It
was
necessary
that
he
should
be
carried
towards
Good
or
Evil
,
as
one
or
other
of
these
should
prevail
.
So
that
considering
what
sort
of
Creature
God
hath
made
us
,
he
hath
done
all
he
needed
to
do
towards
the
good
and
happiness
of
Mankind
;
Supposing
that
he
hath
created
us
,
and
deals
with
us
as
free
,
voluntary
Agents
,
endued
with
a
freedom
of
choice
,
either
to
deliberate
upon
the
consequence
and
nature
of
all
our
Moral
Actions
before
we
do
them
;
and
either
to
act
according
to
the
Rules
of
Right
Reason
,
or
else
clean
contrary
thereunto
,
that
is
,
wholly
at
random
,
or
by
chance
,
which
is
unworthy
our
Rational
Nature
.
§
.
9.
So
that
God
having
thus
left
the
greatest
part
of
man's
happiness
in
his
own
power
,
either
to
be
obtained
by
endeavouring
this
common
good
;
or
else
missed
of
,
or
lost
by
his
own
neglect
of
it
.
It
is
not
to
be
wondered
,
if
mens
unreasonable
Appetites
and
Passions
,
looking
no
farther
than
their
present
Pleasures
,
or
outward
Advantages
,
do
often
carry
them
away
without
any
consideration
of
those
future
,
but
as
certain
and
greater
evils
which
may
follow
them
in
the
whole
course
of
their
lives
.
By
which
abuse
of
mens
natural
Freedom
,
I
grant
the
good
and
happiness
of
Mankind
is
very
much
disturbed
and
diminished
:
Therefore
it
is
no
wonder
,
that
(
tho'
God's
will
be
sufficiently
declared
against
such
Actions
,
)
it
is
not
more
often
observed
and
followed
;
nor
could
God
have
ordered
things
better
or
otherwise
than
they
are
;
unless
he
should
have
made
man
with
out
all
freedom
of
choice
,
and
have
determined
his
Will
only
to
one
sort
of
Actions
;
which
had
rendered
him
quite
another
Creature
,
and
incapable
of
those
rewards
and
punishments
,
which
are
absolutely
necessary
for
the
government
of
man
,
as
he
is
made
by
God
,
a
free
,
voluntary
Agent
.
Secondly
,
Tho'
God
hath
thus
made
us
free
Agents
,
but
that
by
the
ill
use
of
our
Faculties
,
we
become
more
prone
to
evil
Actions
than
good
ones
;
Yet
it
must
still
be
acknowledged
,
God's
Infinite
Power
and
Providence
hath
set
such
limits
to
the
unruly
Appetites
and
Passions
of
wicked
men
,
that
tho'
it
must
be
confessed
,
that
by
private
Violence
,
Wars
and
Persecutions
for
Religion
,
they
do
more
mischief
to
Mankind
than
all
the
Savage
Beasts
,
Earthquakes
or
Plagues
in
the
World
ever
did
:
Yet
this
is
but
in
some
few
particular
Places
or
Countries
at
a
time
;
and
God
hath
so
restrained
these
Passions
and
Lusts
,
not
only
by
Natural
,
Divine
and
Civil
Laws
;
but
also
by
necessary
ill
consequences
that
follow
such
Actions
;
that
it
is
not
often
that
such
men
can
accomplish
their
wicked
designs
with
that
success
and
pleasure
they
propose
to
themselves
.
And
in
those
Countries
where
these
Violences
are
acted
,
the
Scene
often
alters
:
And
in
those
Countries
where
Civil-Wars
and
Persecution
for
Religion
,
have
not
only
very
much
disturbed
the
Common
Peace
and
Happiness
,
but
also
diminished
the
number
of
the
Inhabitants
,
God
doth
often
think
fit
,
either
through
mens
weariness
of
Wars
,
or
by
the
sudden
death
of
a
Cruel
and
Ambitious
Prince
(
who
was
the
chief
cause
of
it
)
again
to
restore
peace
and
happiness
to
these
Kingdoms
or
Countries
where
Civil-Wars
and
Persecutions
had
before
so
cruelly
raged
,
and
so
long
prevailed
.
So
that
notwithstanding
all
that
can
be
objected
,
against
God's
intending
the
good
and
happiness
of
Mankind
;
it
is
certain
,
that
from
the
beginning
of
the
World
to
this
day
,
he
hath
preserved
it
in
the
same
State
;
as
he
hath
also
done
all
other
Species
of
Creatures
.
So
that
we
may
boldly
affirm
,
the
number
of
men
in
the
world
rather
increases
than
diminishes
;
tho'
it
may
please
God
,
for
the
correction
or
extirpation
of
some
extremely
wicked
,
and
incorrigible
Nations
,
to
permit
them
to
be
oppressed
,
diminished
,
or
quite
destoyed
by
Forreign
Force
,
Civil
Wars
,
or
Domestick
Tyranny
.
§
.
10.
A
Second
Objection
that
may
be
brought
by
those
of
Epicurean
Principles
,
is
,
That
if
the
Being
of
a
God
,
and
the
certainty
of
the
Laws
of
Nature
be
so
easy
to
be
found
out
,
and
discovered
by
mens
Natural
Reasons
and
Observations
;
how
it
comes
to
pass
that
there
are
some
whole
Nations
in
the
World
,
who
have
(
as
we
know
of
)
no
Notions
at
all
of
a
God
,
or
a
Moral
Good
or
Evil
;
as
Travellers
report
of
those
Negroes
,
who
inhabit
near
the
Bay
of
Soldania
,
not
far
from
the
Cape
of
Good-Hope
;
who
also
fell
their
Children
for
Slaves
,
to
those
that
will
give
most
for
them
:
As
also
others
in
the
West
and
East-Indies
;
that
make
War
upon
,
and
devour
all
Strangers
they
can
take
Prisoners
Others
,
as
in
the
Isle
of
Formosa
,
rendring
abortive
all
Children
that
the
Mothers
conceive
,
before
they
are
thirty
years
old
.
Others
in
the
West-Indies
,
and
in
Africa
,
stealing
from
Strangers
whatsoever
they
can
lay
their
hands
on
.
It
were
tedious
to
relate
all
the
particular
Instances
of
this
kind
.
Whosoever
desires
to
see
more
of
them
.
may
consult
the
Learned
Author
of
the
above-mentioned
Essay
of
Human
Understanding
,
Book
the
I.
Chap.
III.
§.
9.
besides
what
he
may
himself
collect
from
his
own
reading
,
or
observation
.
So
that
it
may
be
urged
,
that
if
these
People
are
part
of
Mankind
,
and
therefore
Rational
Creatures
,
how
it
comes
to
pass
that
they
should
not
be
able
,
as
well
as
we
,
to
come
to
the
knowledge
of
a
God
,
and
of
those
Natural
Laws
,
which
we
suppose
to
be
given
to
Mankind
?
§
.
11.
To
all
which
I
shall
reply
,
not
by
denying
,
as
some
do
,
the
matters
of
Fact
themselves
,
which
is
an
easy
,
but
too
positive
a
way
of
confutation
;
but
shall
take
them
at
present
for
granted
,
since
they
are
delivered
to
us
by
many
Authors
of
sufficient
credit
.
And
therefore
,
first
of
all
,
I
think
I
may
safely
affirm
,
That
tho'
these
Instances
may
be
of
considerable
weight
,
against
those
who
found
all
our
Knowledge
of
the
Laws
of
Nature
upon
certain
Innate
Principles
,
or
the
common
consent
of
Mankind
:
Yet
they
will
prove
nothing
against
us
,
who
have
,
I
hope
,
made
out
the
certainty
and
obligation
of
this
Law
,
from
more
evident
Principles
:
So
that
the
contrary
belief
or
practice
of
divers
Nations
in
the
World
,
is
no
more
an
Argument
against
the
Being
of
a
God
,
or
of
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
than
their
ignorance
in
Arithmetick
and
Geometry
,
is
against
the
certainty
or
usefulness
of
those
Sciences
;
these
people
,
being
most
of
them
not
able
to
reckon
beyond
their
ten
Fingers
.
Now
setting
aside
Innate
Ideas
,
and
Consent
of
Nations
,
as
proofs
of
the
Laws
of
Nature
;
what
other
means
do
there
remain
;
but
the
uncertain
Tradition
of
a
God
,
and
these
Moral
Laws
from
their
Parents
,
or
Ancestors
;
or
else
to
discover
them
by
Reason
,
and
taking
observation
from
the
Nature
of
things
,
according
to
the
method
here
laid
down
.
The
former
of
these
(
if
they
had
ever
any
such
thing
)
it
is
certain
that
they
have
now
quite
lost
so
that
no
Footsteps
of
it
now
remains
among
them
.
And
as
for
the
latter
,
these
ignorant
and
barbarous
Nations
,
being
wholly
taken
up
,
through
the
whole
course
of
their
lives
,
either
in
procuring
for
themselves
the
common
necessaries
for
life
,
or
else
in
brutish
and
sensual
Lusts
and
Pleasures
;
it
is
no
wonder
that
they
give
themselves
no
time
or
opportunity
to
think
of
these
things
,
nor
yet
employ
their
thoughts
,
in
considering
the
cause
of
their
Being
,
or
for
what
end
they
came
into
the
World
.
So
that
it
is
not
strange
that
they
should
be
so
little
sensible
of
the
Being
of
a
God
,
and
what
Worship
or
Duties
he
requires
of
them
:
Nor
can
I
give
a
better
account
of
this
ignorance
,
than
what
you
may
find
in
the
Author
last
mentioned
,
who
thus
concludes
his
Paragraph
against
the
necessity
of
Innate
Principles
(
already
cited
in
the
beginning
of
this
Chapter
.
)
Had
you
or
I
been
born
(
says
he
)
at
the
Bay
of
Soldania
,
possibly
our
Thoughts
and
Notions
had
not
exceeded
these
brutish
ones
of
the
Hoteutots
that
inhabit
there
:
And
had
the
Virginian
King
,
Apochancana
,
been
educated
in
England
,
he
had
perhaps
,
been
as
knowing
a
Divine
,
and
as
good
a
Mathematician
as
any
in
it
.
The
difference
between
him
,
and
a
more
improved
English-man
,
lying
barely
in
this
,
That
the
exercise
of
his
Faculties
was
bounded
within
the
Ways
,
Modes
and
Notions
of
his
own
Countrey
,
and
was
never
directed
to
any
other
,
or
farther
Enquiries
:
And
if
he
had
not
any
Idea
of
a
God
,
as
we
have
,
it
was
only
because
he
pursued
not
those
Thoughts
that
would
certainly
have
led
him
to
it
.
§
.
12.
Which
account
,
tho'
it
were
sufficient
alone
to
take
off
this
difficulty
,
yet
I
shall
farther
add
;
That
altho
it
is
true
the
Existence
of
a
God
,
and
the
Laws
of
Nature
are
to
be
discovered
by
Natural
Reason
;
yet
this
must
be
exerted
,
and
made
use
of
according
to
a
right
Method
,
and
is
like
the
Talent
in
the
Gospel
,
either
to
be
infinitely
increased
,
or
else
may
be
buried
,
without
ever
being
made
use
of
as
it
ought
.
So
that
mens
not
making
use
of
their
Reason
,
and
those
Faculties
which
God
hath
given
them
,
is
no
more
an
Argument
against
God
's
not
having
given
men
sufficient
Means
and
Faculties
to
attain
to
the
knowledge
of
these
things
,
than
if
a
man
,
who
by
perpetual
sitting
still
,
should
have
lost
the
use
of
his
Legs
,
had
reason
to
find
fault
with
God
,
for
not
giving
him
sufficient
means
of
going
,
and
helping
himself
.
So
that
it
seems
evident
to
me
,
that
it
is
left
in
most
mens
power
,
whether
they
will
by
a
due
use
of
their
Reason
,
raise
themselves
to
the
highest
perfection
and
happiness
that
thei
human
nature
is
capable
of
;
or
else
by
employing
their
minds
about
meer
sensual
objects
and
carnal
enjoyments
,
debase
themselves
into
the
state
of
Brutes
:
For
I
am
satisfied
,
that
it
is
not
reasoning
about
common
and
outward
things
,
that
constitutes
the
only
difference
between
us
and
them
;
since
they
reason
right
about
those
things
that
are
the
objects
of
their
Senses
;
but
that
it
rather
consists
in
the
more
excellent
Faculties
of
framing
Universal
Ideas
,
and
by
a
due
enquiry
into
the
causes
and
nature
of
things
,
of
coming
to
the
knowledge
of
God
,
and
of
his
Will
,
either
naturally
declared
,
according
to
the
method
here
laid
down
;
or
else
supernaturally
revealed
in
the
Holy
Scripture
.
And
indeed
,
I
think
,
a
Dog
or
a
Horse
,
to
be
a
much
better
Creature
than
a
Man
,
who
hath
never
had
,
or
else
hath
totally
extinguished
the
belief
of
a
God
,
and
of
his
Duty
towards
him
;
for
the
one
lives
according
to
its
nature
,
and
those
Faculties
God
hath
given
it
:
But
a
Man
,
who
wants
the
knowledge
of
God
,
and
of
his
duty
towards
him
,
by
neglecting
the
chief
end
of
his
Creation
,
and
by
giving
himself
wholly
up
to
the
government
of
his
Passions
,
and
unreasonable
Appetites
,
debases
his
nature
,
and
so
becomes
,
by
his
own
fault
,
like
a
Brute
.
§
.
13.
The
last
Objection
that
I
can
think
of
,
and
which
may
be
also
made
by
Mr.
Hobs's
Disciples
,
is
;
That
they
look
upon
this
endeavour
of
the
Common
Good
of
Mankind
,
as
a
meer
Platonick
Idea
,
or
Term
of
Art
,
without
any
reality
in
nature
to
support
it
.
Of
which
opinion
Mr.
Hobs
seems
to
be
,
when
he
tells
us
,
in
his
Leviath
.
Book
I.
chap.
4.
That
of
Names
,
some
are
proper
and
singular
to
ore
only
thing
,
as
Peter
,
John
,
This
Man
,
this
Tree
;
and
some
are
common
to
many
things
,
as
Man
,
Horse
,
Tree
,
every
of
which
,
though
but
one
name
,
is
nevertheless
the
name
of
divers
particular
things
,
in
respect
of
all
which
together
it
is
called
an
universal
,
there
being
nothing
in
the
World
universal
,
but
Names
.
For
the
things
named
are
every
one
of
them
individual
and
singular
.
So
that
on
these
Principles
we
can
have
no
knowledge
of
any
common
good
out
of
a
Commonwealth
,
where
it
arises
merely
from
Compacts
;
every
man
being
naturally
determined
to
seek
his
own
particular
preservation
and
satisfaction
,
without
the
least
consideration
of
any
thing
else
.
§
.
14.
In
answer
to
which
Objection
,
I
desire
you
to
take
notice
,
That
if
in
our
Description
of
the
Law
of
Nature
,
or
Explication
of
it
,
we
had
any
where
supposed
,
that
in
this
endeavour
of
the
common
Good
,
a
Man
either
could
,
or
ought
to
neglect
his
own
preservation
,
and
true
happiness
,
there
might
have
been
some
reason
for
this
Objection
;
But
since
I
have
proved
,
that
the
true
good
and
happiness
of
every
particular
person
is
included
in
the
Common
Good
of
Rationals
,
and
depends
inseparably
upon
it
;
though
I
grant
every
man
's
own
happiness
and
misery
is
a
main
motive
of
his
acting
to
this
end
,
and
also
consists
in
a
right
endeavour
of
it
;
which
if
it
be
so
,
this
part
of
the
Objection
falls
of
it self
,
unless
they
will
affirm
,
That
a
Man's
self-preservation
and
happiness
only
consists
in
the
present
satisfaction
of
his
own
sensual
Appetites
and
Passions
,
let
what
will
be
the
consequence
;
which
how
false
and
unreasonable
a
thing
it
is
,
any
rational
Man
may
judge
.
2dly
,
We
have
also
sufficiently
made
out
,
that
there
is
an
unalterable
Common
Good
and
Evil
established
by
God
in
the
nature
of
things
,
necessary
for
the
preservation
,
or
tending
to
the
destruction
,
not
only
of
this
,
or
that
particular
man
,
but
for
all
the
men
in
the
World
,
conceived
under
the
collective
Idea
of
Mankind
,
and
that
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
and
out
of
a
Civil
State
or
Common-wealth
:
Since
by
comparing
our
own
particular
Natures
with
those
of
all
other
men
,
and
finding
them
to
agree
in
the
same
Wants
,
general
Properties
,
and
desires
of
like
things
necessary
for
life
,
and
an
aversion
to
others
destructive
to
it
,
we
can
thereby
certainly
determine
what
Things
or
Actions
will
conduce
not
only
to
our
own
happiness
and
preservation
,
but
to
all
others
of
our
own
Kind
.
From
whence
there
arises
a
clear
Idea
of
the
Common
Good
of
Mankind
,
since
(
as
I
have
already
proved
)
one
peculiar
Faculty
of
human
Nature
different
from
that
of
Beasts
,
is
,
to
abstract
universal
Ideas
from
particular
things
,
and
then
to
give
general
Names
to
those
Ideas
,
which
though
they
are
but
Creatures
of
our
own
understanding
,
and
not
existing
out
of
our
own
Brains
;
yet
are
for
all
that
true
Ideas
of
the
general
Natures
of
those
things
from
whence
they
are
taken
;
and
as
for
the
general
Names
of
them
,
if
there
were
not
real
notions
in
our
minds
,
agreeable
to
the
nature
of
those
things
from
whence
they
were
taken
,
and
that
before
any
Names
imposed
upon
them
,
they
would
indeed
be
non-sense
,
or
meer
empty
Sounds
,
without
any
Ideas
to
support
them
:
But
the
before-cited
Author
of
the
Essay
of
Humane
Vnderstanding
,
Book
II.
Chap.
24.
grants
,
That
the
Mind
hath
a
power
to
make
complex
,
collective
Ideas
of
Substances
,
which
he
so
calls
,
because
such
Ideas
are
made
up
of
many
particular
Substances
,
considered
together
as
united
into
one
Idea
,
and
which
so
joined
,
are
looked
on
as
one
;
v.
g.
the
Idea
of
such
a
collection
of
men
as
make
an
Army
,
though
consisting
of
a
great
number
of
distinct
Substances
,
is
as
much
one
Idea
as
the
Idea
of
a
Man
.
And
the
great
collective
Idea
of
all
Bodies
whatsoever
,
signified
by
the
name
World
,
is
as
much
one
Idea
,
as
the
Idea
of
any
the
least
particle
of
matter
in
it
;
it
sufficing
to
the
unity
of
any
Idea
,
that
it
be
considered
as
one
Representation
,
or
Picture
,
tho
made
up
of
never
so
many
particulars
.
And
he
likewise
farther
grants
,
That
it
is
not
harder
to
conceive
how
an
Army
of
Ten
thousand
men
should
make
one
Idea
,
than
how
a
Man
should
make
one
Idea
;
it
being
as
easie
to
the
mind
to
unite
into
one
the
Idea
of
a
great
number
of
men
,
to
consider
it
as
one
,
as
it
is
to
unite
into
one
particular
all
the
distinct
Ideas
that
make
up
the
composition
of
a
Man
,
and
consider
them
altogether
as
one
.
Therefore
I
can
see
no
reason
,
why
any
man
by
considering
the
nature
of
all
the
Men
in
the
World
,
may
not
only
have
a
true
Idea
of
all
Mankind
,
but
also
of
the
things
or
means
that
may
produce
their
common
good
,
or
happiness
,
as
well
as
a
General
of
an
Army
of
100000
men
can
have
a
true
Idea
of
that
collective
Body
of
Men
,
and
order
all
things
necessary
for
their
common
safety
and
preservation
;
And
if
Mr.
Hobs's
Assertion
be
true
,
That
there
is
nothing
universal
but
Names
,
his
beloved
Sciences
of
Arithmetick
and
Geometry
would
also
be
false
and
uncertain
;
since
they
only
considering
Numbers
,
Lines
and
Figures
in
general
,
and
collecting
universal
Ideas
from
thence
,
do
raise
true
Rules
or
Axioms
in
those
Sciences
from
those
universal
Ideas
,
though
there
be
nothing
really
existing
in
Nature
out
of
our
own
Brains
,
but
Units
and
single
bodies
.
And
therefore
Mr.
H.
is
mistaken
,
when
he
will
have
nothing
to
have
any
real
Existence
in
nature
but
single
things
,
as
if
our
abstract
Idea's
of
Universals
were
Nothing
,
because
they
are
not
Bodies
:
But
if
these
general
Idea's
are
true
,
as
agreeing
with
the
things
from
whence
they
are
taken
,
it
will
also
follow
,
that
they
have
a
real
existence
,
and
consequently
may
have
Names
given
them
,
whereby
to
signifie
and
represent
them
to
our
own
minds
,
and
those
of
others
we
converse
with
.
So
that
whatsoever
we
find
to
contribute
to
the
Preservation
,
Happiness
and
Perfection
of
all
the
men
we
know
,
or
have
heard
of
,
we
may
as
certainly
conclude
to
be
naturally
good
for
all
Mankind
,
and
so
a
much
greater
good
than
that
of
any
one
particular
Person
;
which
Mr.
H.
himself
acknowledges
in
his
Treatise
De
homine
,
Chap.
11.
§.
14.
where
treating
of
the
Degrees
of
Good
,
which
of
them
are
greater
or
less
he
plainly
declares
,
that
to
be
a
greater
good
(
coeteris
paribus
)
which
is
so
to
more
men
,
than
that
which
is
so
to
fewer
.
So
that
if
the
Rational
and
free
use
of
a
man's
Will
consists
in
its
consent
with
that
true
judgment
the
Understanding
makes
,
concerning
those
things
that
agree
in
one
Common
Nature
;
and
if
we
can
thereby
truly
judge
or
determine
what
things
are
necessary
,
or
beneficial
for
the
Natures
of
all
other
men
,
as
well
as
our
own
;
I
see
no
reason
why
we
may
not
desire
,
that
they
should
also
enjoy
the
like
good
things
with
our selves
,
and
likewise
endeavour
(
as
far
as
lies
in
our
power
)
to
procure
it
for
them
;
since
it
is
also
a
Duty
imposed
upon
us
by
God
;
and
that
we
lie
under
sufficient
obligations
to
do
it
,
we
have
already
proved
.
In
short
,
This
Common
Good
of
Rationals
,
being
thus
made
known
to
us
,
may
very
well
be
proposed
as
the
end
of
all
our
Moral
Actions
,
and
being
the
greatest
we
can
desire
or
imagine
,
the
Understanding
judging
aright
,
cannot
but
determine
,
that
this
Knowledge
and
Desire
will
more
conduce
to
the
Happiness
and
Perfection
of
our
Human
Nature
,
than
that
of
any
lesser
Good
:
So
that
if
this
be
greater
than
any
other
Good
we
can
come
to
the
knowledge
of
,
it
will
likewise
prove
to
be
the
greatest
and
noblest
end
men
can
propose
to
themselves
.
And
Mr.
H.
himself
is
also
sometimes
sensible
of
this
Common
Good
,
when
in
the
31
Chap.
of
his
Leviathan
,
in
the
last
Page
,
he
hath
made
in
his
Latin
Translation
,
this
Addition
.
That
he
doth
not
despair
that
this
Doctrine
of
his
being
become
more
acceptable
by
custom
,
will
at
length
be
received
bono
publico
,
for
the
Common
Good
.
So
that
it
seems
he
presages
his
Doctrine
will
come
one
day
to
be
beneficial
not
only
to
one
particular
State
,
or
Commonwealth
,
but
for
the
Common
Good
of
all
men
,
who
are
with
him
yet
in
the
State
of
Nature
:
And
if
Mr.
H.
hath
so
perfect
a
Notion
of
the
Common
Good
of
all
Nations
,
I
think
there
will
be
no
great
difference
but
in
Words
,
between
that
and
the
Common
Good
which
we
maintain
.
§
.
15.
But
to
come
to
a
conclusion
;
I
hope
,
notwithstanding
all
that
hath
been
objected
to
the
contrary
,
it
hath
been
sufficiently
made
out
,
that
not
only
all
the
Moral
Virtues
are
contained
in
,
and
may
be
reduced
to
this
one
Principle
,
Of
endeavouring
the
Common
Good
of
Rational
Beings
;
But
that
likewise
all
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
(
which
are
but
the
Exercise
or
Practice
of
these
particular
Vertues
upon
their
due
Objects
,
may
be
also
reduced
into
this
single
Proposition
;
since
they
all
of
them
respect
either
a
man's
Duty
towards
God
,
by
a
dué
worship
of
him
,
or
else
towards
himself
,
in
the
exercise
of
Temperance
,
&c.
or
else
by
the
due
observation
of
Justice
and
Charity
,
or
the
most
diffusive
Benevolence
towards
others
of
our
own
Kind
;
according
to
the
Order
we
have
already
laid
down
in
the
former
Chapter
.
All
which
is
but
our
endeavouring
to
procure
(
as
far
as
we
are
able
)
this
Common
Good
of
Rational
Agents
.
'T
is
true
Mr.
H.
in
his
Lev.
Chap.
13.
contracts
all
the
Laws
of
Nature
into
this
short
and
easy
Rule
which
he
says
is
intelligible
even
by
the
meanest
capacities
(
viz.
)
Do
not
that
to
another
,
thou
wouldest
not
have
done
to
thy self
.
Which
Rule
,
tho'
very
true
,
and
the
same
in
effect
,
which
was
given
by
our
Blessed
Saviour
himself
;
yet
without
the
consideration
of
the
Common
Good
of
Mankind
,
would
too
often
fail
.
For
if
this
Rule
were
strictly
and
literally
to
be
understood
,
no
Prince
,
Judge
,
or
other
Magistrate
,
could
condemn
a
Malefactor
to
death
;
for
in
so
doing
,
he
did
that
to
another
,
which
he
would
not
have
done
to
himself
,
in
the
like
State
:
Since
he
himself
,
as
well
as
the
Criminal
he
condemns
,
would
then
desire
to
be
pardoned
if
he
could
.
But
indeed
the
reason
why
all
Judges
,
and
other
inferior
Officers
of
Justice
,
are
excused
from
the
observation
of
this
Rule
,
in
their
publick
Capacities
,
is
,
Because
they
do
not
then
act
as
private
persons
,
but
as
publick
Representatives
,
or
Trustees
,
with
whom
the
Common
Good
and
Peace
of
the
whole
Kingdom
or
Commonwealth
is
intrusted
;
which
(
as
I
have
already
shewn
)
makes
but
a
small
part
of
the
Common
Good
of
all
Rational
Agents
.
§
.
16.
There
are
likewise
others
who
reduce
the
Laws
of
Nature
into
this
single
Rule
or
Precept
,
Preserve
or
do
good
to
thy self
,
and
any
other
innocent
persons
as
to
thy self
:
Which
tho'
I
grant
to
be
a
true
Rule
,
as
containing
our
Saviour's
Epitome
of
the
Commandments
of
the
Second
Table
,
Love
thy
Neighbour
as
thy self
:
Yet
doth
it
not
express
the
Reason
or
Principle
on
which
it
is
founded
;
for
we
have
no
reason
to
love
our
Neighbour
,
but
as
they
partake
of
the
same
Common
Rational
Nature
with
our selves
;
and
that
our
doing
them
good
,
doth
conduce
to
the
preservation
and
happiness
of
the
whole
Body
of
Mankind
;
of
which
that
person
,
as
well
as
our selves
,
are
but
small
parts
,
or
Members
:
Nor
have
we
any
particular
obligation
to
endeavour
our
own
particular
Good
,
but
as
it
conduces
to
,
and
is
part
of
the
Common
Good
of
Mankind
.
§
.
17.
And
as
the
whole
Law
of
Nature
,
so
likewise
the
Revealed
Law
,
given
from
God
by
Moses
to
the
Iews
,
and
intended
in
due
time
to
be
made
known
to
all
Mankind
;
tends
to
no
other
end
,
than
this
great
Law
of
endeavouring
the
Common
Good
of
Rational
Agents
.
For
all
the
Precepts
of
the
First
Table
of
the
Decalogue
,
which
prescribe
our
Duty
towards
God
,
and
which
our
Saviour
hath
so
excellently
well
contracted
into
this
single
Precept
,
Thou
shalt
love
the
Lord
thy
God
with
all
thy
heart
,
and
with
all
thy
soul
,
and
with
all
thy
strength
,
&c.
contain
nothing
more
than
this
great
Rule
.
For
as
God
,
before
he
thought
fit
to
create
the
World
,
and
whilst
there
was
yet
no
Creature
to
worship
or
serve
him
,
was
not
then
less
happy
or
perfect
;
so
neither
now
he
hath
created
them
is
he
the
happier
,
if
we
worship
him
,
or
the
more
unhappy
,
if
we
omit
it
.
For
man
being
created
as
an
Object
for
the
Divine
Goodness
to
exert
it self
upon
,
it
must
necessarily
follow
,
that
all
the
Precepts
of
the
First
Table
,
as
well
as
of
the
Second
,
are
in
some
sort
intended
for
Man's
Good
and
Happiness
,
as
well
as
God's
Honour
and
Service
.
So
that
even
that
Great
Commandment
of
keeping
holy
the
Seventh
day
,
which
most
chiefly
respects
God's
own
Glory
and
Service
,
did
also
promote
the
Good
and
Happiness
not
only
of
the
Iews
,
God's
particular
Subjects
,
but
also
of
all
Mankind
,
whensoever
this
Law
should
be
discovered
to
them
.
So
that
tho'
it
commands
the
dedicating
of
that
day
to
the
Worship
and
Service
of
God
,
and
is
observed
in
obedience
to
his
Commands
;
Yet
even
in
this
,
he
does
not
design
his
own
Glory
and
Honour
alone
;
(
nay
,
according
to
Saint
Austin
,
Our
Good
only
)
but
also
our
Good
and
Happiness
;
De
Civit.
Dei
Lib.
X.
Cap.
5.
which
is
then
most
perfect
and
compleat
,
when
we
bestow
our
time
in
the
contemplation
of
his
Infinite
Perfections
and
Goodness
towards
us
,
and
in
rendring
him
thanks
for
his
unspeakable
Benefits
.
So
that
though
I
grant
he
hath
made
and
ordained
us
for
his
Service
;
yet
he
hath
so
constituted
our
Nature
,
as
to
make
our
highest
happiness
inseparably
connected
with
all
the
particular
Acts
of
his
Worship
.
And
therefore
our
Saviour
reproves
the
Iews
,
when
they
found
fault
with
him
,
for
suffering
his
Disciples
to
pluck
the
Ears
of
Corn
on
the
Sabbath
day
,
expresly
telling
them
,
That
if
they
h●d
known
what
this
means
,
[
i.
e.
not
Christ
alone
,
but
every
Christian
]
is
Lord
even
of
the
Sabbath-day
:
And
in
St.
Mark
,
That
the
Sabbath
was
made
for
man
,
and
not
man
for
the
Sabbath
.
Thereby
teaching
us
,
that
the
Sabbath
it self
was
also
instituted
for
Man's
sake
;
and
that
in
cases
of
necessity
,
he
is
Master
of
it
.
And
so
likewise
our
Saviour
himself
,
by
chusing
to
do
his
greatest
Miracles
of
healing
on
the
Sabbath-day
,
hath
taught
us
,
that
the
performance
of
acts
of
Charity
and
Mercy
on
that
Day
,
is
a
great
and
necessary
part
of
God's
Service
.
§
.
18.
But
as
for
the
Precepts
of
the
Second
Table
,
I
need
not
insist
upon
them
;
because
our
Saviour
himself
hath
contracted
them
all
,
(
even
that
of
honouring
our
Parents
)
into
this
short
Precept
,
Thou
shalt
love
thy
neighbour
as
thy self
:
Which
is
no
more
than
to
bid
us
endeavour
the
common
good
of
Mankind
,
to
the
utmost
of
our
power
.
So
that
as
this
Law
of
the
most
diffusive
Benevolence
of
Rational
Agents
,
contains
the
Sum
of
all
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
as
also
of
the
Moral
Law
,
contained
in
the
Ten
Commandments
;
so
likewise
is
it
the
Sum
of
the
whole
Gospel
delivered
by
our
Saviour
Christ
,
and
his
Apostles
.
For
as
one
great
design
of
our
Saviour's
coming
into
the
World
,
was
by
his
most
excellent
Precepts
and
Examples
,
to
exalt
the
Law
of
Nature
to
a
higher
perfection
,
than
what
Men
,
by
the
common
use
of
Reason
,
could
generally
attain
to
;
so
likewise
was
it
one
of
the
main
designs
of
his
coming
,
to
restore
the
Law
of
Moses
to
its
Primitive
Purity
and
Perfection
;
and
to
free
it
from
those
false
Interpretations
and
Traditions
,
with
which
the
Pharisees
had
corrupted
it
.
For
whereas
they
had
confined
the
observation
of
that
Command
of
loving
our
Neighbours
,
only
to
outward
Acts
,
or
at
least
,
restrained
it
only
to
those
of
their
own
Nation
or
Religion
;
our
Saviour
Christ
commands
a
greater
perfection
,
and
forbids
even
so
much
as
the
thoughts
or
desires
of
Murder
,
Adultery
,
&c.
And
whereas
the
Iews
did
suppose
,
that
they
were
not
obliged
to
shew
Acts
of
Charity
or
Mercy
,
to
those
of
a
different
Religion
from
themselves
,
Go
thy
ways
,
and
do
thou
likewise
.
By
which
he
plainly
intimates
;
That
we
ought
to
do
all
Acts
of
Charity
and
Benevolence
,
to
all
persons
that
stand
in
need
of
them
,
let
their
Nation
or
Religion
be
never
so
different
from
our
own
.
So
that
whosoever
will
but
seriously
consider
the
great
end
of
our
Saviour
Christ's
coming
into
the
World
,
and
also
the
whole
scope
and
design
of
his
Doctrine
;
will
find
,
that
it
was
only
to
procure
,
as
well
by
his
Example
as
Precepts
,
the
good
and
happiness
of
all
Mankind
.
For
to
what
end
else
did
he
take
upon
him
the
Form
of
a
Servant
,
and
endured
a
poor
and
miserable
life
,
with
an
ignominious
Death
,
but
to
procure
everlasting
happiness
for
all
those
that
should
truly
believe
in
him
?
Or
to
what
other
end
were
all
those
excellent
Precepts
,
so
often
given
by
Christ
and
his
Apostles
,
of
loving
one
another
?
And
therefore
St.
Paul
tells
the
Romans
,
Chap.
13.
v.
8.
that
he
that
loveth
another
,
hath
fulfilled
the
Law
:
And
more
fully
in
the
last
Chapter
to
the
Galatians
,
v.
14.
For
the
Law
is
fulfilled
in
this
one
word
,
even
in
this
,
Thou
shalt
love
thy
neighbour
as
thy self
.
And
in
his
First
Epistle
to
the
Corinthians
,
Cap.
13.
he
is
very
large
and
particular
in
setting
forth
the
necessity
,
and
exalting
the
excellency
of
Charity
,
above
all
the
other
Spiritual
Graces
;
without
which
,
he
tells
them
,
If
he
had
Faith
so
as
to
remove
Mountains
;
yet
,
if
he
had
not
Charity
,
he
were
nothing
.
Now
what
is
this
Charity
,
but
an
unfeigned
love
and
good-will
to
all
Mankind
?
Ch.
2.17
.
And
St.
Iames
tells
us
,
That
Faith
without
Works
is
dead
,
being
alone
.
And
St.
Iohn
in
his
First
Epistle
,
makes
the
love
of
our
Brethren
,
(
that
is
of
all
men
)
the
great
sign
and
demonstration
of
our
love
to
God
,
when
he
tells
them
,
that
if
a
man
says
,
I
love
God
,
and
hateth
his
Brother
,
he
is
a
lyar
;
for
he
that
loveth
not
his
Brother
,
whom
he
hath
seen
,
how
can
he
love
God
,
whom
he
hath
not
seen
.
And
this
Commandment
we
have
from
him
,
That
he
who
loveth
God
,
love
his
Brother
also
.
So
that
whoever
will
but
consider
what
hath
here
been
said
,
cannot
but
acknowledge
,
that
this
excellent
Doctrine
of
the
Gospel
,
concerning
the
most
intense
love
towards
God
,
and
the
most
diffusive
Charity
towards
Men
,
doth
not
only
far
exceed
all
the
Precepts
of
Philosophers
,
but
also
the
Revealed
Law
of
Moses
it self
.
Now
what
can
be
the
design
of
all
these
excellent
Precepts
?
but
by
all
the
Commands
and
Perswasions
imaginable
,
and
by
all
the
Promises
of
the
most
glorious
Rewards
and
Threatnings
of
the
most
terrible
and
lasting
Punishments
,
to
advance
the
Glory
of
God
,
and
to
procure
the
Welfare
and
Happiness
of
the
whole
Race
of
Mankind
.
§
.
19.
To
conclude
;
Though
I
suppose
the
Law
of
Nature
,
if
duly
observed
,
where
it
hath
pleased
God
to
give
men
no
other
knowledge
or
discovery
of
his
Will
,
may
yet
give
them
a
rational
share
of
happiness
,
not
only
in
this
Life
,
but
in
that
to
come
;
yet
I
hope
no
indifferent
or
rational
Man
,
but
upon
due
consideration
of
the
lapsed
and
depraved
state
of
Humane
Nature
,
and
how
prone
it
is
to
be
carried
away
by
exorbitant
Lusts
and
Passions
,
contrary
to
the
Dictates
of
right
Reason
,
and
his
own
Conscience
,
but
must
also
acknowledge
,
that
it
was
a
great
demonstration
of
God's
Goodness
and
Mercy
,
to
give
us
the
most
Glorious
Light
of
his
Gospel
;
and
to
send
his
Blessed
Son
,
not
only
to
instruct
us
,
but
also
to
die
for
us
.
Which
great
Mystery
,
that
in
God's
due
time
,
and
according
to
his
Promise
,
may
be
speedily
revealed
to
all
Mankind
,
we
ought
daily
to
make
it
our
hearty
Prayers
to
his
Divine
Majesty
,
That
every
Heart
may
know
,
and
every
Tongue
confess
,
That
Iesus
is
both
Lord
and
Christ
;
who
hath
brought
Life
and
Immortality
to
light
,
through
the
Gospel
.
The
End
of
the
First
Part.
The
Second
Part
:
Wherein
the
Moral
Principles
of
Mr.
Hobbs's
De
Cive
&
Leviathan
,
are
fully
Considered
,
and
Confuted
.
INTRODUCTION
.
§.
1
THough
perhaps
it
may
not
seem
unnecessary
,
after
so
much
as
hath
been
said
,
to
prove
the
certainty
,
and
constant
obligation
of
the
Law
of
Nature
,
of
endeavouring
the
Common
Good
of
all
Rational
Bei●gs
;
more
particularly
to
confute
the
Principles
of
Epicurus
,
and
his
Follower
Mr.
H.
it
being
a
true
Maxim
in
other
Sciences
,
as
well
as
Geometry
,
Rectum
est
Index
sui
,
&
obliqui
:
Yet
since
those
Authors
have
not
only
poisoned
the
World
with
their
pernicious
Tenets
,
but
have
also
endeavoured
to
support
them
with
the
specious
appearances
of
Reason
and
Argument
;
it
may
be
expected
,
that
we
should
say
somewhat
in
answer
to
these
Reasons
and
Arguments
Mr.
H.
the
Reviver
of
those
Principles
in
this
Age
,
hath
brought
in
his
Book
De
Cive
&
Leviathan
,
to
maintain
and
support
them
.
And
therefore
I
have
thought
fit
to
add
some
Considerations
,
and
Confutations
of
them
,
as
far
as
they
contradict
the
Principles
we
have
here
laid
down
;
and
rather
to
put
them
here
all
together
at
the
end
,
than
in
the
Body
of
our
Treatise
of
the
Law
of
Nature
;
since
there
they
would
not
only
have
interrupted
the
Coherence
of
the
Discourse
it self
,
but
would
have
also
disturbed
,
and
taken
off
the
minds
of
the
ordinary
Readers
(
for
whom
I
chiefly
intend
it
)
from
a
due
consideration
of
the
truth
and
connexion
of
the
things
therein
contained
.
And
therefore
I
have
thought
fit
rather
to
cast
them
all
together
into
a
distinct
part
by
themselves
;
since
if
you
are
Master
of
that
former
Part
of
this
Discourse
,
you
will
easily
perceive
,
not
only
the
Falshood
and
Absurdity
of
Mr.
H's
Principles
,
but
that
it
was
from
his
Ignorance
,
or
Inconsideration
of
this
great
Principle
of
the
Common
Good
of
Rational
Beings
,
that
he
first
fell
into
those
Errors
,
and
made
private
Self-preservation
not
only
the
first
motive
(
which
had
been
true
enough
)
but
also
the
sole
end
of
all
Moral
Actions
,
which
is
altogether
false
,
and
below
the
dignity
,
not
only
of
a
Philosopher
,
but
a
Man
.
I
have
therefore
gone
through
all
his
Moral
Principles
in
order
;
and
as
for
his
Politick
ones
,
if
these
are
false
,
they
will
need
no
other
Confutation
;
and
I
have
reduced
them
into
certain
Heads
,
or
Propositions
,
and
have
truly
given
you
this
Sum
of
Arguments
,
that
no
man
may
find
fault
with
me
for
misrepresenting
his
Opinions
.
PRINCIPLE
I.
Man
is
not
a
Creature
born
apt
for
Society
.
§
.
1.
MR.
H.
in
his
Philosophical
Elements
,
or
Treatise
De
Cive
,
Chap.
1.
§.
2.
lays
down
,
and
maintains
this
Principle
,
and
gives
certain
specious
Reasons
for
it
;
which
because
they
are
somewhat
tedious
,
and
divers
of
them
very
trivial
,
I
shall
rather
chuse
to
contract
them
,
than
be
at
the
trouble
of
transcribing
all
that
he
hath
loosely
enough
laid
down
for
the
maintenance
of
this
Assertion
;
referring
you
,
if
you
doubt
whether
I
rightly
represent
his
meaning
,
to
the
Author
himself
in
the
place
above-cited
.
He
there
in
the
first
place
supposes
,
that
Man
is
not
a
Sociable
Creature
,
because
it
could
not
be
otherwise
in
Nature
,
but
only
by
accident
;
for
if
Man
loved
Man
naturally
,
there
could
be
no
reason
given
why
every
one
should
not
love
every
one
alike
,
as
being
alike
Man
;
or
why
he
should
rather
frequent
those
in
whose
Society
Honour
and
Profit
is
conferred
,
rather
on
himself
,
than
others
.
Therefore
we
do
not
by
nature
seek
Companions
,
but
to
be
either
honoured
,
or
profited
by
them
.
These
in
the
first
place
;
but
those
in
the
second
;
And
this
he
thinks
he
hath
sufficiently
proved
,
by
shewing
us
for
what
end
men
herd
together
,
and
what
they
do
when
they
are
met
;
for
if
they
come
together
for
Commerce-sake
,
every
one
minds
not
his
Companion
's
,
but
his
own
Interest
.
If
for
Publick
Affairs
,
there
arises
a
certain
Court-friendship
,
having
more
of
mutual
fear
than
love
;
from
whence
often
Faction
,
but
never
Good-will
is
produced
.
If
for
the
sake
of
Mirth
and
Pleasure
,
every
one
is
wont
to
please
himself
in
those
things
which
raise
laughter
;
from
whence
he
may
(
as
it
is
the
nature
of
what
is
ridiculous
)
by
the
comparison
of
another's
weakness
or
infirmity
,
become
more
acceptable
to
himself
:
And
he
there
proceeds
to
shew
from
several
Observations
he
had
made
in
the
Companies
he
had
kept
,
That
all
men
that
converse
together
either
for
the
sake
,
or
the
instruction
of
others
,
do
only
seek
Company
for
their
own
profit
,
or
glory
,
and
not
the
good
of
others
;
that
is
,
for
the
love
of
himself
,
not
of
his
Companions
:
And
therefore
since
Man
can
never
seek
Civil
Society
,
only
out
of
a
desire
of
glory
;
and
although
the
Profits
and
Conveniences
of
life
may
be
encreased
by
mens
mutual
assistance
,
yet
since
that
may
be
much
better
procured
by
a
dominion
over
others
,
than
by
their
Society
,
no
body
can
doubt
,
but
that
men
are
more
vehemently
carried
by
their
Nature
,
when
fear
is
removed
,
to
dominion
,
than
Society
;
therefore
it
is
to
be
laid
down
for
a
Principle
,
That
the
original
of
all
great
and
lasting
Societies
did
not
proceed
from
the
mutual
Benevolence
of
Men
,
but
their
mutual
Fear
;
And
by
Fear
,
as
he
tells
us
in
the
Annotation
to
this
Paragraph
,
he
doth
not
mean
only
to
be
frightned
,
but
under
that
word
Fear
,
he
comprehends
any
prospect
of
a
future
Evil
,
as
to
distrust
,
suspect
,
beware
,
and
to
provide
that
they
may
not
fear
,
to
be
also
the
part
of
those
who
are
afraid
.
§
.
2.
Having
given
you
the
Author's
Sense
,
and
in
great
part
his
own
words
;
I
shall
now
proceed
to
make
some
Observations
upon
them
;
and
in
the
first
place
must
observe
,
That
the
main
strength
of
his
Arguments
consists
in
the
ill
,
or
false
use
of
these
words
,
unapt
for
Society
.
For
if
he
only
understands
by
them
,
that
Men
are
born
actually
unapt
for
Civil
Society
,
because
they
are
Infants
,
or
else
unexperienced
of
the
Evils
proceeding
from
the
Wants
thereof
;
this
is
indeed
a
great
discovery
,
and
worthy
a
Philosopher
,
that
Children
,
or
People
without
experience
,
are
not
able
to
understand
the
meaning
or
force
of
Compacts
;
or
are
unable
immediately
to
enter
into
a
Civil
State
.
Nor
is
his
Reason
any
better
;
That
though
Infants
and
persons
of
full
Age
,
though
unexperienced
,
partake
of
Human
Nature
;
yet
being
thus
unapt
for
Society
,
Man
is
not
made
fit
for
it
by
Nature
,
but
Discipline
.
§
.
3.
From
whence
I
observe
,
That
he
only
takes
the
measure
of
Humane
Nature
,
from
those
Passions
which
precede
the
use
of
Reason
,
Experience
,
and
Discipline
.
And
as
they
first
and
chiefly
shew
themselves
in
Children
and
Fools
;
or
persons
unexperienced
.
Whereas
,
according
to
the
Opinion
of
the
best
Philosophers
,
we
suppose
the
truer
nature
of
Man
,
ought
rather
to
be
taken
from
his
utmost
Perfection
,
viz.
his
Reason
,
or
the
power
of
deducing
Effects
from
their
Causes
;
by
which
alone
,
he
is
distinguished
from
Brutes
:
And
so
the
Will
may
incline
us
to
those
things
,
which
Reason
shall
judge
most
fit
and
convenient
for
our
Natures
.
And
therefore
Mr.
H.
doth
very
absurdly
,
to
oppose
Experience
,
and
Discipline
,
to
Nature
;
since
whatever
men
learn
by
either
of
these
,
they
must
still
attain
to
it
by
the
force
of
their
Rational
Natures
,
and
those
Faculties
of
Reason
and
Speech
,
which
Brutes
are
not
capable
of
:
And
therefore
the
nature
of
a
Creature
is
best
judged
of
from
the
utmost
Perfection
it
attains
to
:
As
the
Nature
of
a
Plant
is
not
to
be
taken
from
its
first
appearance
,
or
as
soon
as
ever
it
peeps
out
of
the
Earth
,
but
from
its
utmost
state
of
perfection
,
when
it
comes
to
bear
Flowers
,
Seed
,
or
Fruit.
And
even
that
Experience
,
to
which
Mr.
H.
attributes
all
our
Reason
,
he
himself
grants
to
be
a
natural
,
and
not
acquired
Power
:
See
his
Leviathan
,
Chap.
8.
where
treating
of
Intellectual
Vertues
,
he
hath
these
Words
;
The
Intellectual
Vertues
are
of
two
sorts
,
Natural
,
and
acquired
.
By
Natural
,
I
mean
not
that
which
a
man
hath
from
his
Birth
,
for
that
is
nothing
else
but
sense
,
wherein
men
differ
so
little
from
one
another
,
and
from
brute
Beasts
,
as
it
is
not
to
be
reckoned
amongst
the
Virtues
.
But
I
mean
that
Wit
,
which
is
gotten
by
use
only
,
and
experience
,
without
method
,
culture
,
or
Instruction
.
§
.
4.
To
conclude
this
Head
,
I
desire
those
Gentlemen
of
his
Opinion
,
to
take
notice
,
That
all
Philosophers
,
and
Writers
of
Politicks
,
as
well
as
Mr.
H.
were
not
ignorant
how
unfit
Infants
,
and
Grown
Persons
,
without
experience
,
or
labouring
under
any
unruly
Passion
,
were
to
enter
into
Leagues
,
or
Compacts
;
or
to
perform
any
of
the
Duties
of
a
Civil
Society
:
But
yet
for
all
that
,
they
supposed
man
to
be
born
for
those
ends
;
which
by
the
force
of
his
Rational
Nature
,
he
may
at
last
attain
to
,
unless
something
preternatural
(
such
as
are
those
disorderly
Passions
,
or
Diseases
of
the
Mind
)
intervene
:
And
Iuvenal's
Saying
is
as
old
as
true
;
Non
aliud
Natura
,
aliud
Sapientia
dictat
.
And
sure
it
is
a
childish
Inference
,
and
favours
more
of
Sophistry
,
than
true
Philosophy
,
to
say
,
Men
are
born
Infants
,
and
therefore
unapt
for
Civil
Society
.
Since
any
Country
Fellow
could
have
taught
him
better
,
who
thinks
his
Son
born
apt
to
be
a
Plough-man
,
or
a
Grasier
,
though
he
knows
he
will
not
be
able
to
hold
the
Plough
,
until
he
is
twelve
or
thirteen
years
of
age
▪
Nor
yet
to
understand
Grazing
,
until
he
is
able
to
ride
and
go
to
Market
.
§
.
5.
But
let
us
now
more
particularly
examine
the
Reasons
this
Author
there
gives
us
,
why
Man
is
a
Creature
naturally
unapt
for
Society
,
which
he
will
have
to
be
only
by
accident
;
Because
if
one
man
loved
another
naturally
as
man
,
there
could
be
no
reason
why
every
man
should
not
love
every
man
alike
;
or
wherefore
he
should
rather
frequent
those
in
whose
company
he
is
most
likely
to
get
Honour
and
Profit
.
Therefore
we
do
not
naturally
seek
Companions
,
i.
e.
for
their
own
sakes
;
but
either
to
gain
Honour
or
Prosit
by
them
:
These
in
the
first
place
;
but
those
in
the
Second
,
&c.
In
answer
to
which
,
I
grant
indeed
,
that
particular
persons
,
when
they
joyn
with
others
,
in
any
Society
or
Company
,
do
usually
consider
some
peculiar
end
,
either
of
Profit
or
Pleasure
;
which
may
thence
redound
to
themselves
.
Yet
doth
it
not
therefore
follow
that
Man
is
not
a
Creature
designed
by
God
for
Society
;
or
that
he
is
not
obliged
by
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
or
right
Reason
to
be
friendly
and
sociable
even
to
those
from
whom
no
present
advantage
can
be
expected
.
For
tho'
it
be
granted
,
that
men
either
from
a
peculiar
agreement
of
dispositions
,
or
that
they
suppose
they
can
sooner
obtain
some
particular
end
or
advantage
,
in
some
mens
Conversation
than
others
;
and
do
therefore
prefer
such
mens
Company
before
others
;
yet
does
not
this
prove
,
That
man
is
not
naturally
a
Sociable
Creature
:
Since
he
himself
grants
,
That
men
can
neither
live
comfortably
,
nor
be
so
much
as
bred
up
,
or
preserved
,
without
the
help
and
society
of
others
.
Therefore
if
he
is
determined
to
the
end
,
viz.
happiness
,
and
self-preservation
,
he
is
likewise
as
necessarily
determined
to
the
means
,
(
viz.
)
Society
.
And
his
inclination
to
this
or
that
man's
company
more
than
others
,
is
no
more
an
Argument
against
our
Natures
requiring
Society
,
than
if
I
should
argue
▪
That
because
I
love
Mutton
better
than
Veal
▪
therefore
it
is
not
from
my
nature
,
but
only
by
accident
,
that
I
am
ordained
to
preserve
my
life
by
eating
.
And
as
for
the
instances
which
he
gives
,
to
let
us
see
with
what
intent
men
meet
together
,
from
what
men
do
when
they
are
met
.
It
is
plain
that
Mr.
H.
here
confounds
that
natural
Society
,
which
is
absolutely
necessary
for
man's
preservation
,
with
these
particular
Clubs
or
Companies
,
which
men
keep
for
their
greater
pleasure
or
advantage
▪
And
though
I
have
already
granted
,
that
some
mens
particular
profit
or
pleasure
may
be
promoted
or
increased
,
by
frequenting
some
mens
Companies
,
rather
than
others
;
as
suppose
there
be
a
greater
agreement
of
Dispositions
;
or
that
we
have
been
more
used
to
this
or
that
man's
Company
by
Education
,
or
long
acquaintance
,
&c.
And
though
it
be
likewise
granted
,
that
a
man
does
more
frequent
their
Company
,
among
whom
he
finds
most
honour
and
profit
.
Since
every
man
may
lawfully
pursue
his
own
pleasures
and
advantages
(
if
he
knows
rightly
how
to
judge
of
it
.
)
Yet
this
doth
not
at
all
contradict
man's
sociable
nature
,
provided
the
Common
Bonds
of
Society
be
not
broken
and
disturbed
,
by
any
mans
more
particular
Interests
or
Inclinations
;
and
God
has
not
so
designed
us
to
good
for
others
,
as
that
we
should
neglect
all
care
of
our selves
;
but
that
this
sociableness
is
therefore
to
be
observed
by
mankind
,
that
by
a
mutual
communication
of
humane
assistances
,
and
other
natural
goods
,
between
divers
persons
,
we
may
more
conveniently
promote
our
own
pleasure
or
advantage
jointly
with
that
of
others
;
Since
a
mutual
love
and
benevolence
,
is
to
be
observed
among
men
,
though
not
otherwise
related
to
each
other
,
than
by
the
common
relation
of
Humanity
,
and
with
whom
we
may
preserve
a
sufficient
concord
,
by
doing
them
good
,
rather
than
hurt
,
whenever
it
lies
in
our
power
.
And
though
a
man
,
when
he
joyns
himself
with
some
particular
Company
,
will
in
the
first
place
consider
his
own
pleasure
or
profit
,
before
that
of
his
Companions
:
Yet
ought
he
not
so
to
consult
his
private
advantage
,
as
that
the
good
of
the
Civil
Society
,
or
of
Mankind
in
general
,
be
thereby
prejudiced
,
by
injuring
any
of
its
particular
Members
:
And
a
man
as
well
in
Natural
,
as
Moral
and
Civil
Actions
,
may
propose
his
own
pleasure
or
profit
,
in
the
first
place
,
though
he
may
also
intend
some
higher
or
nobler
end
of
his
thus
acting
.
Thus
a
man
who
intends
to
marry
,
may
lawfully
propose
to
himself
his
own
pleasure
and
satisfaction
;
though
the
great
end
of
Marriage
,
(
and
which
he
may
also
chiefly
intend
)
be
the
propagation
of
Mankind
.
So
likewise
a
Master
or
Tutor
that
instructs
others
,
may
lawfully
propose
to
himself
his
own
profit
or
advantage
thereby
;
though
he
may
also
ultimately
intend
the
instruction
of
his
Scholars
,
or
Pupils
(
that
is
,
the
Common
Good
of
Mankind
)
as
the
great
end
of
his
taking
that
Profession
.
So
likewise
in
Civil
Societies
or
Commonwealths
,
a
man
may
propose
to
himself
his
own
Security
,
Profit
,
or
Honour
,
as
a
reason
why
he
bestows
his
time
and
labour
,
or
ventures
his
life
in
the
service
of
the
Publick
:
And
yet
he
may
farther
propose
to
himself
the
love
of
his
Countrey
,
or
the
good
of
the
Common-wealth
,
as
the
great
End
of
his
Actions
.
§
.
6.
So
that
it
is
to
little
purpose
,
which
Mr.
H.
alledges
,
That
the
original
of
the
greatest
and
most
lasting
Societies
,
to
wit
,
Commonwealths
,
did
not
proceed
from
mutual
Good-will
,
but
mutual
Fear
;
(
the
Word
Fear
being
used
for
any
fore-sight
,
or
precaution
of
a
future
Evil.
)
For
we
are
not
here
considering
the
original
of
Civil
Societies
,
but
of
that
natural
sociableness
among
men
,
which
we
look
upon
as
most
necessary
and
agreeable
to
the
nature
of
man
;
though
some
particular
men
being
also
sensible
how
obnoxious
they
were
to
the
Injuries
of
those
who
sought
their
own
pleasure
or
profit
,
without
any
consideration
of
the
interest
or
good
of
others
,
did
,
to
prevent
them
,
unite
themselves
together
in
that
stricter
League
of
Amity
,
called
Civil
Society
.
So
that
this
Common
Amity
or
Benevolence
,
cannot
be
omitted
to
be
first
supposed
,
even
in
the
very
constitution
of
Common
wealths
:
Since
those
who
founded
them
,
must
have
been
before
united
,
either
by
some
natural
relation
;
and
a
mutual
confidence
in
,
or
benevolence
towards
each
other
;
although
perhaps
,
others
might
afterwards
,
out
of
fear
of
their
Power
,
or
a
liking
of
their
Government
,
be
compelled
or
allured
,
to
joyn
or
associate
themseves
with
them
.
§
.
7.
But
as
for
those
Instances
Mr.
H.
gives
us
of
those
that
seek
Society
only
to
censure
the
Lives
and
Actions
of
other
men
;
thereby
to
gain
Glory
to
themselves
,
from
the
Follies
or
Infirmities
of
those
they
converse
with
;
Such
sort
of
Conversation
,
consisting
for
the
most
part
of
some
idle
ill-natured
men
,
who
count
themselves
Wits
,
and
have
little
else
to
do
,
but
to
speak
ill
of
,
and
censure
others
,
does
not
concern
the
major
part
of
Mankind
;
who
needing
each
others
Society
,
for
more
necessary
occasions
,
have
commonly
other
Business
to
discourse
of
,
when
they
meet
.
§
.
8.
As
for
the
rest
of
those
things
he
says
,
That
the
Necessaries
of
life
may
be
much
better
procured
by
dominion
over
,
than
by
the
Society
of
others
,
that
is
altogether
false
,
and
precarious
;
since
no
man
by
his
own
single
strength
,
and
without
the
voluntary
help
or
society
of
others
,
could
ever
yet
subdue
,
and
make
Slaves
of
all
other
men
he
met
with
:
And
therefore
if
any
man
ever
increased
his
natural
power
or
advantage
over
others
,
it
was
not
by
vertue
of
his
own
sole
power
or
strength
,
but
by
mens
deference
to
his
Valour
,
or
Vertue
,
when
they
chose
him
for
their
Head
,
or
Leader
;
or
else
that
they
followed
him
,
and
obeyed
his
Commands
as
their
Father
,
or
Grandfather
,
out
of
reverence
to
his
Wisdom
,
or
Gratitude
for
his
Benefits
.
§
.
9.
To
conclude
,
He
himself
there
objects
,
that
men
cannot
grow
up
,
or
live
contentedly
without
the
society
and
assistance
of
others
:
And
therefore
cannot
deny
,
but
men
desire
the
society
of
each
other
,
their
Nature
compelling
them
thereunto
.
But
to
come
off
from
this
Objection
,
he
will
have
nothing
called
Society
,
but
Commonwealths
;
which
,
says
he
,
are
not
meer
Meetings
,
but
Leagues
,
for
making
of
which
Compacts
are
necessary
.
And
therefore
still
argues
,
that
Infants
,
and
those
that
are
unexperienced
,
are
uncapable
of
them
,
&c.
Upon
which
I
shall
only
observe
,
That
Mr.
H.
imposes
upon
himself
,
and
others
,
by
confounding
that
first
,
and
most
natural
amity
,
and
sociableness
of
Persons
of
one
and
the
same
Family
,
as
of
Husband
and
Wife
,
Parents
and
Children
,
&c.
towards
each
other
,
with
that
artificial
Society
,
which
proceeding
wholly
from
Compacts
,
we
call
a
Commonwealth
:
So
likewise
he
imposes
on
his
Readers
in
the
use
of
the
words
Nature
,
and
Natural
(
as
I
have
partly
shewn
already
)
for
by
these
words
is
commonly
understood
,
either
something
that
is
by
Nature
inseparably
proper
to
its
subject
,
as
to
a
Fish
to
swim
;
and
other
things
are
natural
and
proper
to
a
Creature
,
not
as
a
meer
Animal
,
but
as
of
such
a
Species
,
and
at
such
an
Age
;
as
for
a
Man
to
go
upon
two
Legs
,
and
speak
.
Lastly
,
It
sometimes
signifies
an
aptness
in
a
Subject
to
receive
some
farther
perfection
by
culture
and
discipline
,
with
which
Nature
intended
it
should
be
endued
.
So
the
Earth
is
intended
by
Nature
for
the
production
of
Vegetables
;
yet
it
doth
not
naturally
bring
forth
all
Plants
in
all
places
alike
,
without
Plowing
,
or
Setting
;
yet
are
not
these
Plants
so
sown
,
or
set
,
less
natural
for
all
that
:
So
likewise
I
have
already
proved
,
that
whatever
perfection
we
attain
to
by
the
power
of
our
Reason
or
Experience
,
it
is
not
less
natural
notwithstanding
.
PRINCIPLE
II.
All
Men
by
Nature
are
equal
.
§
.
1.
WHich
he
thus
undertakes
to
make
out
in
the
Chapter
last
cited
,
§
.
3.
The
cause
of
mutual
Fear
consists
partly
in
mens
natural
equality
,
partly
in
their
mutual
Will
of
hurting
;
from
whence
it
happens
,
that
we
are
neither
able
to
expect
security
from
others
,
nor
yet
afford
it
to
our selves
;
For
if
we
consider
Men
grown
up
,
and
take
notice
how
frail
the
Frame
of
a
Man's
Body
is
(
which
failing
,
all
his
force
,
strength
and
wisdom
fails
together
with
it
)
and
how
easie
it
is
for
any
the
most
weak
,
to
kill
the
strongest
Man
;
there
is
no
reason
,
that
any
man
trusting
in
his
own
strength
,
should
suppose
himself
superior
by
Nature
to
others
.
For
those
are
equal
,
who
are
able
to
do
the
like
things
against
each
other
;
but
those
who
can
do
the
greatest
thing
,
that
is
,
take
away
life
,
are
able
to
do
like
,
or
equal
things
to
each
other
;
therefore
all
men
are
by
nature
equal
,
that
unequality
which
now
is
,
being
introduced
by
Civil
Laws
.
§
.
2.
Before
I
answer
which
,
I
shall
first
make
these
Concessions
and
Limitations
:
First
,
I
grant
,
That
all
Civil
unequality
of
●●rsons
is
introduced
by
Civil
Laws
.
2dly
,
●●at
there
is
also
such
a
natural
equality
among
Men
,
that
there
is
nothing
which
one
man
can
arrogate
to
himself
as
a
Man
,
but
by
the
same
reason
which
he
judges
it
fit
or
necessary
for
himself
,
he
must
also
judge
it
alike
fit
and
necessary
for
another
man
,
who
stands
in
like
need
of
it
.
Thus
if
Victuals
,
Cloaths
,
and
Liberty
,
are
things
necessary
for
his
own
being
,
and
preservation
,
they
are
likewise
equally
necessary
for
the
well-being
and
preservation
of
all
other
men
,
and
consequently
that
they
have
a
like
right
to
them
;
from
which
natural
equality
proceeds
that
great
Rule
of
the
Law
of
Nature
,
To
do
to
others
,
as
we
would
have
others
do
to
us
:
And
in
this
sense
I
agree
with
him
,
that
all
men
are
equal
;
so
that
in
this
sense
it
is
so
far
from
being
a
cause
of
war
,
or
dissention
among
men
,
that
it
rather
perswades
to
amity
and
concord
:
Yet
doth
not
this
equality
hinder
,
but
that
there
is
notwithstanding
a
natural
unequality
of
strength
or
power
amongst
men
,
both
in
body
and
mind
;
since
any
man
,
that
doth
but
observe
the
great
difference
there
is
in
both
the
strength
and
understanding
of
some
persons
above
others
,
but
will
grant
,
that
there
is
as
great
,
or
greater
difference
between
some
men
and
others
,
than
there
is
between
some
Brutes
(
supposing
Apes
,
or
Elephants
)
and
men
,
in
understanding
:
Yet
does
there
not
any
natural
equality
follow
from
the
Reason
Mr.
H.
here
gives
us
,
That
those
are
equal
,
that
are
able
to
do
the
like
things
to
each
other
,
to
wit
,
take
away
their
lives
:
For
besides
that
,
there
are
some
born
maimed
,
and
cripled
,
or
else
so
void
of
understanding
,
as
not
to
have
either
the
will
or
ability
to
hurt
or
kill
others
;
and
if
a
Coward
and
a
stout
man
are
to
fight
,
or
a
very
weak
man
and
a
strong
,
will
any
man
say
that
they
are
an
equal
match
?
And
this
Mr.
H.
tells
us
,
That
it
is
easie
for
the
weakest
to
kill
the
strongest
man
;
he
grants
it
must
either
be
by
chance
,
cunning
,
or
surprize
.
I
grant
indeed
it
may
happen
by
chance
,
and
yet
this
will
not
make
the
match
to
be
equal
;
any
more
than
it
is
in
Cockfighting
,
where
the
Gamesters
will
lay
five
to
one
on
such
a
Cock's
side
against
another
set
down
to
fight
with
him
;
and
though
perhaps
the
weaker
Cock
may
happen
to
kill
the
stronger
by
a
chance
stroke
,
yet
no
man
will
therefore
affirm
,
that
both
these
Cocks
were
equal
by
nature
;
the
same
may
be
said
of
Men.
But
it
may
be
replied
,
That
there
is
a
great
difference
between
Men
and
Beasts
,
since
though
Brutes
cannot
,
yet
a
Man
weaker
in
body
or
mind
than
another
he
would
be
revenged
of
,
may
join
,
or
combine
with
one
as
wise
and
strong
as
his
Adversary
,
and
then
they
will
be
an
equal
Match
in
point
of
strength
.
If
this
were
a
good
Argument
,
it
would
prove
more
,
or
rather
contrary
to
that
for
which
it
is
designed
;
for
this
weaker
man
may
combine
with
one
as
strong
and
wise
as
the
other
,
and
then
the
odds
will
be
apparently
on
the
weaker
man's
side
:
But
if
I
should
grant
the
utmost
that
can
be
asked
,
that
both
these
mens
wit
and
strength
taken
together
,
are
still
but
an
equal
match
to
the
other
,
may
not
this
wiser
and
stronger
man
as
well
also
combine
with
others
as
wise
and
strong
as
himself
,
and
then
will
not
the
unequality
be
much
greater
than
it
was
before
?
And
as
for
cunning
,
or
surprize
,
it
signifies
as
little
,
since
the
stronger
man
may
be
as
cunning
as
the
other
,
and
may
have
also
as
good
luck
in
surprising
him
at
unawares
;
but
it
is
indeed
a
very
trivial
Argument
to
prove
this
natural
equality
,
because
those
are
equal
that
are
able
to
do
the
like
things
to
each
other
;
since
this
were
to
level
Man
with
the
most
despicable
Creatures
;
For
there
is
scarce
any
Beast
,
nay
Insect
,
so
weak
,
but
may
sometime
or
other
destroy
a
man
by
force
,
or
surprize
;
and
we
read
of
a
Pope
who
was
choaked
by
swallowing
of
a
Fly
in
his
Drink
,
which
if
it
could
be
supposed
to
be
done
by
the
Fly
on
purpose
,
would
make
the
Fly
and
the
Pope
to
be
equal
by
Nature
.
PRINCIPLE
III.
That
there
is
a
mutual
will
or
desire
in
all
men
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
of
hurting
each
other
.
§
.
1.
WHich
Mr.
H.
thus
endeavours
to
prove
in
the
same
Chapter
of
his
De
Cive
.
There
is
a
will
(
says
he
)
indeed
in
all
men
of
doing
hurt
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
but
not
from
the
same
cause
,
nor
alike
culpable
.
For
one
man
,
according
to
a
natural
equality
,
allows
to
others
all
the
same
things
as
to
himself
,
which
is
the
part
of
a
modest
man
,
and
of
one
that
rightly
measures
his
own
strength
;
another
esteeming
himself
superior
to
others
,
will
have
all
things
to
be
lawful
for
himself
only
,
and
arrogates
an
honour
to
himself
above
others
,
which
is
the
part
of
a
proud
disposition
;
therefore
the
will
of
hurting
is
in
this
man
from
a
vain
glory
;
and
a
false
esteem
of
his
own
power
,
as
it
is
in
the
other
from
a
necessity
of
defending
his
own
Goods
and
Liberty
against
the
other's
violence
.
Besides
,
since
the
strife
of
wit
is
the
greatest
amongst
men
,
it
is
necessary
that
very
great
discord
should
arise
from
that
Contention
;
for
it
is
not
only
odious
to
contradict
,
but
also
not
to
consent
;
for
not
to
consent
to
another
in
a
thing
,
is
tacitly
to
accuse
him
of
error
in
that
matter
;
so
likewise
to
dissent
in
very
many
things
,
is
as
much
as
to
count
him
a
Fool
;
which
may
appear
from
hence
,
that
no
Wars
are
more
sharply
prosecuted
,
than
between
different
Sects
of
the
same
Religion
,
and
the
Factions
of
the
same
Commonwealth
,
where
there
is
a
strife
concerning
Doctrine
,
or
Civil
Prudence
.
But
since
all
pleasure
and
satisfaction
of
mind
consists
in
this
,
That
a
man
may
have
somewhat
,
by
which
,
comparing
himself
with
others
,
he
may
think
highly
well
of
himself
;
it
is
impossible
but
that
they
should
shew
their
mutual
hatred
and
contempt
sometimes
,
either
by
laughter
,
words
or
gestures
,
or
by
some
outward
sign
,
than
which
there
is
indeed
no
greater
vexation
of
,
mind
,
neither
from
which
a
greater
desire
of
hurting
can
arise
.
But
the
most
frequent
cause
why
men
desire
to
hurt
each
other
,
arises
from
hence
,
that
many
desire
the
same
thing
at
once
;
yet
(
which
very
often
happens
)
they
neither
may
,
nor
can
enjoy
it
in
common
,
nor
will
yet
divide
it
;
from
whence
it
follows
,
that
it
must
be
given
to
the
stronger
;
but
who
is
the
stronger
,
can
only
be
known
by
fighting
.
§
.
2.
From
which
,
I
shall
first
observe
,
That
it
is
not
true
,
that
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
there
is
in
all
men
a
like
will
of
hurting
each
other
:
For
in
this
State
,
the
first
,
and
most
natural
condition
to
be
considered
is
,
when
men
have
not
as
yet
at
all
provoked
each
other
,
nor
done
them
either
good
or
harm
.
And
in
this
condition
,
none
but
a
Fool
,
a
Wicked
man
,
or
a
Mad-man
can
have
any
desire
to
hurt
another
,
who
hath
given
him
no
provocation
for
it
:
Though
I
grant
,
that
there
are
too
many
men
(
such
as
Mr.
Hobbs
describes
)
who
will
arrogate
more
things
to
themselves
,
than
they
either
deserve
,
or
really
need
;
yet
even
in
these
men
,
there
is
not
a
will
to
hurt
every
man
alike
,
but
only
those
who
stand
in
their
way
;
and
whose
Goods
,
or
other
things
,
they
may
think
may
be
useful
for
themselves
.
Nor
yet
are
these
all
Mankind
,
since
he
grants
there
are
some
,
and
perhaps
as
many
,
or
more
;
who
,
according
to
natural
equality
,
will
allow
to
others
all
the
same
things
,
as
to
themselves
,
which
he
grants
is
the
part
of
a
modest
man
,
and
who
makes
a
true
estimate
of
his
own
strength
.
And
certainly
,
if
this
modest
man
judges
according
to
right
reason
,
who
allows
to
others
the
same
things
,
as
to
himself
;
this
violent
or
proud
man
(
he
here
describes
)
cannot
acquire
any
right
to
the
liberty
or
goods
of
others
,
from
his
own
unreasonable
judgment
,
and
false
estimation
of
his
own
strength
or
merit
:
Nor
is
this
self-defence
,
of
the
modest
or
honest
man
,
properly
a
desire
to
hurt
the
other
,
but
only
a
necessity
to
defend
himself
against
his
assaults
,
since
he
had
no
intention
to
hurt
him
,
before
this
violent
man
gave
him
a
just
provocation
.
§
.
3.
As
for
that
strife
of
Wit
,
which
(
as
he
says
)
is
the
greatest
among
men
;
though
there
may
be
some
difference
in
Opinions
,
and
Contentions
arise
from
thence
;
Yet
doth
it
not
therefore
follow
,
that
there
must
from
thence
necessarily
arise
a
desire
in
all
men
,
of
hurting
or
destroying
others
:
For
there
are
many
of
so
equal
and
reasonable
a
disposition
,
that
they
can
find
no
cause
of
hating
,
much
less
of
hurting
others
;
though
they
often
differ
from
them
in
opinion
;
or
that
they
must
take
all
others
for
fools
,
if
they
prefer
their
own
Judgment
before
another
Man's
.
And
as
for
Mr.
H's
Instances
,
that
there
are
no
Wars
more
sharp
than
those
between
the
different
Sects
of
the
same
Religion
,
or
the
Factions
of
the
same
Commonwealth
,
these
Examples
will
not
make
out
that
for
which
he
produces
them
;
Since
he
grants
,
Wars
about
Religion
do
seldom
happen
,
but
amongst
those
of
different
Sects
in
the
same
Religion
;
which
shews
it
doth
not
proceed
from
the
Natural
State
of
Mankind
,
which
ought
to
be
governed
by
Reason
,
not
Superstition
;
much
less
from
natural
Religion
,
but
from
an
unreasonable
Superstition
,
or
blind
Zeal
,
too
often
inflamed
by
the
Priests
of
either
Party
;
making
it
not
their
own
,
but
God's
Cause
,
or
Glory
,
(
as
they
call
it
)
for
which
they
would
have
them
fight
,
persecute
,
and
destroy
each
other
.
And
as
for
the
Wars
and
Contentions
between
the
different
Factions
of
the
same
Commonwealth
;
it
is
apparent
they
have
no
place
in
the
meer
state
of
Nature
;
since
they
are
produced
by
mens
entring
into
Civil
Society
;
aud
therefore
they
are
not
fairly
urged
by
Mr.
H.
as
an
Instance
of
their
desire
to
hurt
each
other
in
the
state
of
Nature
.
§
.
4.
In
answer
to
his
Assertion
,
That
all
satisfaction
of
the
mind
is
placed
in
something
,
by
which
a
man
comparing
himself
with
others
,
may
thereby
think
highly
well
of
himself
:
And
therefore
it
is
impossible
but
they
must
declare
their
hatred
and
contempt
of
each
other
,
sometimes
either
by
laughter
,
&c.
than
which
there
can
be
no
greater
vexation
,
neither
from
which
a
greater
desire
of
revenge
doth
usually
arise
.
I
thus
reply
:
First
,
Neither
does
this
Observation
reach
,
so
that
they
must
needs
take
pleasure
in
puting
a
higher
value
upon
themselves
,
than
they
deserve
;
or
that
right
Reason
,
or
Prudence
,
should
perswade
them
to
affront
others
,
either
by
Words
or
Actions
:
Neither
yet
to
take
for
Affronts
,
and
mortal
Injuries
,
all
those
things
,
which
any
silly
,
ill-bred
Fellow
may
happen
to
do
:
Since
such
quarrels
do
not
proceed
either
from
Nature
,
or
Reason
,
but
from
foolish
Customs
,
and
bad
Education
;
as
appears
in
making
,
giving
the
lie
,
an
affront
,
which
was
not
so
,
till
about
an
Age
agone
;
neither
is
among
other
Nations
,
but
us
Europeans
,
any
occasion
of
a
Quarrel
:
Nor
yet
is
there
any
necessity
,
but
that
men
may
,
and
often
do
differ
from
each
other
,
in
opinion
and
words
too
,
without
giving
one
another
the
lie
,
or
any
just
occasion
of
offence
:
And
therefore
these
are
no
sufficient
grounds
to
raise
a
general
Rule
of
the
Natural
state
of
all
Mankind
,
from
the
indiscretion
,
or
ill
manners
of
some
,
nay
many
men
.
§
.
5.
As
for
his
last
Reason
,
from
the
desire
of
divers
men
at
once
to
the
same
thing
,
which
cannot
be
decided
without
fighting
.
In
answer
to
this
,
I
grant
this
may
be
true
amongst
Brutes
;
as
also
amongst
brutish
and
unreasonable
men
:
But
since
God
hath
endued
men
with
Reason
,
either
to
divide
the
thing
,
if
it
be
capable
of
division
;
or
else
to
use
it
by
turns
,
where
it
is
not
,
where
divers
have
an
equal
right
in
it
;
or
else
to
leave
it
wholly
to
the
first
occupant
;
since
every
man
hath
a
natural
right
to
what
he
thus
acquires
,
as
is
fully
proved
in
the
precedent
discourse
.
Therefore
granting
mens
Lusts
and
Passions
do
often
encline
them
to
War
and
contention
,
yet
are
not
they
therefore
determined
,
or
necessitated
thereunto
;
seeing
God
hath
given
Man
Reason
to
foresee
,
as
also
to
prevent
the
evils
of
War
;
and
has
likewise
endued
them
with
as
strong
Passions
(
as
Mr.
H.
acknowledges
)
to
incline
them
to
peace
;
as
hath
been
more
fully
made
out
,
when
we
speak
of
the
Natural
State
of
Mankind
:
Neither
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
hath
God
made
so
niggardly
a
distribution
of
things
,
that
no
man
can
desire
;
or
make
use
of
any
thing
necessary
for
life
,
but
presently
another
must
start
up
to
be
his
competitor
for
it
:
Since
if
men
lived
according
to
right
Reason
,
and
the
necessities
of
Nature
,
and
still
used
the
Fruits
of
the
whole
Earth
in
Common
,
there
would
be
yet
left
a
sufficient
stock
to
supply
the
Necessities
of
them
all
,
without
coveting
the
Goods
of
others
,
or
taking
away
that
they
are
already
possessed
of
.
PRINCIPLE
IV.
That
Nature
hath
given
to
every
one
a
right
to
all
things
.
De
Cive
.
C.
1.
§.
10.
§
.
1.
THAT
is
(
as
he
explains
it
)
in
a
meer
natural
state
,
or
before
men
were
obliged
to
each
other
by
any
Compacts
,
it
was
lawful
for
every
one
to
do
all
things
whatsoever
,
and
against
whomsoever
it
pleased
him
so
to
do
;
and
to
possess
,
use
,
and
enjoy
all
things
,
which
he
would
or
could
;
but
Since
whatsoever
things
any
one
would
have
,
they
either
seemed
good
for
himself
,
because
he
desires
them
,
and
do
either
conduce
to
his
own
preservation
,
or
at
least
may
seem
to
conduce
to
it
:
But
whether
those
things
do
really
conduce
to
this
end
,
he
supposes
he
hath
in
the
former
Article
proved
the
Person
himself
to
be
sole
judge
.
So
that
those
must
be
counted
as
necessary
means
,
which
he
judges
as
such
:
And
by
the
7th
Article
aforegoing
,
those
things
are
done
and
enjoyed
by
the
right
of
Nature
,
which
do
necessarily
conduce
to
the
preservation
of
his
own
life
and
members
:
Whence
it
follows
,
to
have
and
do
all
things
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
is
lawful
for
all
men
;
and
this
is
what
is
commonly
said
,
That
Nature
hath
given
all
things
to
all
men
:
From
whence
also
it
is
understood
,
that
in
the
state
of
nature
,
Profit
or
utility
,
is
the
measure
of
Right
.
Which
Argument
in
his
Annotations
to
this
Article
,
he
thus
explains
and
contracts
.
This
is
so
to
be
understood
,
that
that
which
anyone
may
do
,
in
a
meer
natural
state
,
is
injurious
to
no
man
:
Not
that
in
such
a
state
it
is
impossible
to
sin
against
God
,
or
to
violate
the
Laws
of
Nature
;
but
injustice
towards
men
supposes
Human
Laws
,
which
are
not
in
the
state
of
Nature
▪
But
the
truth
of
the
proposition
so
understood
,
is
demonstrated
to
the
mindful
Reader
,
in
the
foregoing
Paragraphs
:
But
because
in
some
cases
,
the
hardness
of
the
Conclusion
drives
out
the
memory
of
the
Premises
,
he
contracts
the
Argument
,
and
lays
it
thus
to
be
seen
at
once
;
By
Art
,
the
7th
it
is
proved
,
that
every
one
hath
a
right
of
preserving
himself
;
and
by
Art.
the
8th
.
Therefore
the
same
person
hath
a
right
to
use
all
means
necessary
thereunto
.
But
by
Art.
the
9th
,
Those
means
are
necessary
,
which
he
shall
judge
to
be
so
.
Therefore
the
same
person
hath
a
right
to
have
,
and
possess
all
things
which
he
shall
judge
necessary
for
his
own
preservation
:
Therefore
in
the
judgment
of
the
doer
,
that
which
is
done
,
either
by
Right
,
or
by
Injury
.
Therefore
it
is
done
by
Right
,
because
in
the
state
of
Nature
nothing
is
injurious
.
I
have
made
bold
to
add
this
last
Clause
from
what
went
before
,
because
otherwise
the
Argument
is
imperfect
.
Therefore
it
is
evidently
true
,
That
in
a
mere
natural
State
,
every
man
hath
a
right
to
all
things
.
§
.
2.
For
the
destroying
of
which
Principle
,
as
also
for
the
answering
the
Arguments
which
he
brings
to
support
it
,
I
shall
in
the
first
place
observe
,
That
the
Author's
Conclusion
▪
which
he
makes
from
his
Premises
in
his
Annotations
,
viz.
That
every
man
hath
a
right
to
do
,
and
possess
all
things
which
himself
shall
judge
necessary
for
his
own
preservation
,
is
not
the
same
which
he
draws
from
the
same
Premises
in
the
Text
,
(
viz.
)
That
every
man
hath
a
right
to
have
,
and
do
all
things
in
the
state
of
Nature
.
For
indeed
from
his
own
Principles
no
other
Conclusion
can
follow
,
than
what
he
hath
now
drawn
from
thence
in
his
Annotation
;
for
no
man
in
his
right
Senses
ever
yet
judged
,
that
to
have
,
and
do
all
things
whatever
,
was
absolutely
necessary
for
his
preservation
;
only
that
he
had
a
right
indefinitely
to
as
many
of
them
as
he
should
judge
necessary
for
this
End
.
2dly
,
Neither
ought
a
man
in
the
state
of
Nature
to
propose
the
bare
preservation
of
his
own
Life
,
and
Members
,
as
the
only
end
of
living
,
since
that
may
be
enjoyed
by
those
who
are
really
very
miserable
,
as
may
be
observed
in
such
as
labour
under
tedious
and
constant
Infirmities
,
or
are
condemned
to
the
Mines
,
or
Gallies
,
or
suffer
themselves
to
be
carried
away
by
any
domineering
,
or
irrational
Appetite
or
Passion
▪
And
if
the
preservation
of
a
man's
Life
and
Members
,
were
the
only
ends
of
life
;
then
if
another
in
the
state
of
Nature
should
threaten
to
kill
or
maim
him
,
unless
he
would
deny
,
or
blaspheme
God
,
or
murther
his
Father
,
it
were
upon
this
Principle
lawful
,
nay
necessary
for
him
so
to
do
;
it
being
the
only
means
by
which
he
could
preserve
his
life
and
Limbs
.
3dly
,
Neither
doth
any
man's
rash
or
false
judgment
,
that
such
a
thing
is
necessary
for
his
own
preservation
,
confer
on
him
a
right
to
that
thing
;
for
then
God
had
given
him
a
right
to
all
things
they
should
in
any
passion
,
or
rash
and
inconsiderate
humour
fancy
necessary
for
that
end
,
tho
it
really
tended
to
their
destruction
,
or
that
of
other
innocent
men
;
So
that
if
a
man
should
think
the
blood
of
his
dearest
Friend
would
cure
him
of
some
Distemper
he
lay
under
,
he
might
lawfully
upon
this
Principle
murther
him
(
if
he
could
do
it
safely
)
;
And
then
God
should
have
given
men
a
right
of
destroying
themselves
and
others
,
whenever
they
thought
(
though
falsly
)
that
it
conduced
to
their
preservation
,
the
satisfaction
of
their
unreasonable
Appetites
or
Humours
:
since
such
an
unlimited
Right
,
or
rather
License
,
can
be
so
far
from
conducing
to
any
man's
preservation
,
that
if
any
men
should
ever
have
gone
about
to
put
it
in
practice
,
it
would
have
long
since
produced
not
only
their
own
destruction
,
but
that
of
all
Mankind
.
§
.
3.
And
if
Mr.
H.
his
own
definition
of
right
Reason
be
true
,
Art.
7th
of
this
Chapter
,
That
it
is
a
liberty
of
using
a
man's
Faculties
according
to
right
Reason
;
then
certainly
right
Reason
can
never
judge
contradictory
Propositions
to
be
true
,
as
that
I
should
in
the
state
of
Nature
have
a
right
to
all
things
my
Neighbour
was
possessed
of
,
and
his
life
into
the
bargain
,
if
I
thought
it
might
conduce
to
my
self-preservation
;
and
that
this
should
be
likewise
as
true
,
and
rational
a
conclusion
,
that
he
should
have
the
like
right
against
me
;
since
the
word
right
is
never
used
by
any
Writers
of
this
Subject
,
but
with
respect
to
some
Law
,
either
Natural
,
or
Civil
,
which
Mr.
H.
acknowledges
in
the
next
Chapter
,
Art.
1st
,
in
these
words
.
But
since
all
do
grant
that
to
be
done
by
Right
,
which
is
not
done
contrary
to
right
Reason
,
we
ought
to
suppose
that
done
by
Injury
,
which
is
repugnant
to
right
reason
;
or
which
contradicts
some
truth
collected
from
true
Principles
by
right
Reason
;
but
that
is
done
by
Injury
,
which
is
done
against
some
Law
,
therefore
right
Reason
is
a
certain
Law
,
which
is
called
natural
,
since
it
is
not
less
a
part
of
Humane
Nature
than
any
other
Faculty
or
Affection
of
the
Mind
:
as
Mr.
H.
himself
confesses
in
this
2d
Chapter
of
this
Treatise
De
Cive
,
§.
1.
tho
he
strives
to
avoid
the
force
of
it
in
his
Annotations
to
this
Article
;
where
,
by
right
Reason
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
he
tells
us
,
He
does
not
thereby
understand
(
as
many
do
)
any
infallible
Faculty
in
men
,
but
the
Act
of
Ratiocination
;
that
is
,
every
man
's
own
true
reason
concerning
his
own
Actions
,
as
they
may
redound
to
the
profit
or
hurt
of
himself
,
or
other
men
;
and
the
reason
why
he
calls
it
a
mans
own
Reason
,
is
,
that
though
in
a
Commonwealth
the
reason
thereof
,
that
is
,
the
Civil
Law
,
is
to
be
taken
as
right
by
all
the
Subjects
;
yet
out
of
a
Common-wealth
,
where
no
man
can
distinguish
right
Reason
from
false
,
but
by
comparing
it
with
his
own
,
every
man
's
own
Reason
is
not
only
to
be
taken
for
the
Rule
of
his
own
Actions
,
but
also
in
his
own
Affairs
,
for
the
measure
of
all
other
mens
Reason
:
But
how
this
will
agree
with
what
follows
,
I
cannot
tell
;
When
he
calls
right
Reason
that
which
concludes
from
true
Principles
;
because
that
in
false
ratiocination
,
or
in
the
folly
of
men
not
observing
those
duties
towards
others
which
are
necessary
to
their
own
preservation
,
consists
all
the
violation
of
natural
Laws
.
But
how
false
ratiocination
,
or
folly
,
should
give
them
a
right
to
all
they
have
a
mind
to
act
thus
towards
others
,
I
cannot
apprehend
;
but
from
these
words
of
Mr.
H.
I
shall
only
observe
,
That
though
I
do
not
suppose
Reason
to
be
any
infallible
Faculty
,
any
more
than
the
casting
up
of
an
Account
into
a
Sum
total
,
though
false
,
to
be
right
Arithmetick
,
or
true
Counting
;
yet
by
right
Reason
,
when
it
is
not
erroneous
,
is
to
be
understood
the
true
exercise
of
that
Faculty
;
not
erroneous
in
its
judgments
,
and
therefore
doth
not
consist
in
the
bare
act
of
Ratiocination
,
but
in
its
true
effects
;
that
is
,
when
true
Propositions
,
or
Premises
,
being
laid
up
in
the
memory
,
those
Conclusions
are
drawn
from
thence
,
which
when
they
are
practical
,
and
contain
true
moral
Rules
of
life
,
are
called
Laws
of
Nature
.
§
.
4.
And
therefore
it
is
not
true
,
that
in
a
Commonwealth
the
publick
Reason
,
or
Law
thereof
,
are
to
be
always
taken
for
Right
;
for
then
if
the
Laws
of
the
Common-wealth
should
enact
Parricide
,
Ingratitude
,
and
breach
of
Faith
,
to
be
exercised
as
Vertues
,
and
to
conduce
to
the
good
and
preservation
of
Mankind
,
they
would
presently
become
so
;
which
,
I
suppose
,
neither
this
Author
,
nor
any
rational
Man
would
affirm
.
Nor
is
his
other
Proposition
any
truer
,
that
out
of
a
Commonwealth
,
no
man
can
distinguish
right
Reason
from
false
,
but
by
comparing
it
with
his
own
;
and
therefore
that
must
be
the
measure
of
all
his
Actions
,
from
whence
he
deduces
the
right
of
all
men
to
all
things
;
which
Argument
I
shall
reduce
into
the
form
of
a
Syllogism
,
that
you
may
the
better
judge
of
its
truth
.
It
is
lawful
in
the
state
of
Nature
for
every
one
to
possess
all
things
,
and
to
do
all
things
towards
all
men
,
which
some
Iudge
shall
judge
necessary
for
the
preservation
of
his
own
life
and
Members
:
But
those
things
that
every
man
himself
shall
judge
to
be
necessary
to
his
preservation
,
those
the
only
Iudge
in
this
case
judges
to
be
necessary
for
this
end
;
(
for
he
had
proved
before
,
that
himself
is
the
only
Judge
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
what
things
are
necessary
for
his
preservation
;
)
therefore
to
have
,
and
do
all
things
,
&c.
is
necessary
for
a
man
's
own
preservation
.
In
which
Syllogism
the
major
is
certainly
false
,
because
though
a
man's
self
be
the
sole
Judge
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
yet
he
may
give
a
false
Sentence
,
and
suppose
those
things
to
be
necessary
for
his
preservation
which
really
are
not
;
neither
is
there
any
reason
that
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
any
more
than
in
a
Civil
State
,
the
bare
Sentence
of
a
Judge
should
confer
a
true
and
equitable
Right
on
any
man
to
an
Estate
,
if
the
Judge
determines
contrary
to
all
the
Rules
of
Law
and
Equity
.
So
likewise
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
a
man
's
own
judgment
can
confer
no
Right
upon
him
,
when
he
quits
the
only
true
Rules
of
his
Judgment
,
which
in
this
State
can
only
be
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
or
right
Reason
,
and
the
nature
of
things
,
and
Mankind
,
from
whence
only
they
are
drawn
.
Nor
can
there
be
any
State
supposed
,
either
Natural
,
or
Civil
,
in
which
there
is
no
Rule
of
Humane
Judgment
,
or
that
whatsoever
a
man's
mind
shall
rashly
suppose
things
to
be
,
that
they
must
presently
become
such
as
he
hath
fancied
them
:
Since
the
utility
of
things
necessary
for
the
preservation
of
Humane
Nature
depend
not
upon
mens
rash
judgments
,
but
upon
the
force
of
their
natural
Causes
;
and
a
man
by
thus
falsly
judging
,
that
he
had
a
right
to
all
things
that
he
hath
a
mind
to
,
and
that
they
are
absolutely
necessary
for
his
preservation
,
can
no
more
make
them
become
so
,
than
if
he
should
judge
that
Ratsbane
were
Sugar-candy
,
it
would
be
thereby
presently
turned
into
wholsome
Food
:
So
likewise
those
general
,
and
universal
Causes
,
which
procure
the
preservation
,
or
mischief
of
Mankind
,
do
depend
upon
such
fixt
Principles
in
Nature
,
as
are
not
to
be
altered
by
the
judgment
of
any
Judge
,
whether
he
be
a
single
man
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
or
the
Supream
Powers
in
a
Commonwealth
.
§
.
5.
But
this
Error
of
Mr.
H.
concerning
the
force
of
his
Sentence
,
which
thus
falsly
pronounces
an
absolute
Dominion
over
all
men
,
and
all
things
,
to
be
necessary
for
his
preservation
,
and
thereby
to
confer
a
Right
thereunto
;
seems
to
proceed
from
hence
,
That
he
having
observed
in
a
Civil
State
the
Sentence
of
the
Supream
Magistrate
,
or
Judge
,
had
that
force
with
the
Subjects
,
that
whether
his
Sentence
were
according
to
the
Rules
of
Law
,
or
natural
Equity
,
or
not
,
it
was
nevertheless
to
be
obeyed
,
and
submitted
to
:
Whereas
this
Submission
proceeds
wholly
from
their
Consents
who
instituted
the
Commonwealth
,
in
order
to
the
publick
Good
,
and
for
the
putting
some
end
to
Controversies
;
since
all
the
Subjects
must
submit
to
the
Judgment
of
the
Supream
Power
,
or
Magistrate
,
whether
it
be
right
or
wrong
;
because
they
are
all
satisfied
,
that
it
conduces
more
to
their
common
quiet
and
safety
,
that
some
few
should
sometimes
suffer
through
an
unjust
Judgment
,
than
that
Controversies
should
be
endless
,
or
at
least
not
without
Civil
Wars
,
or
Disturbances
.
So
that
it
is
evident
,
That
it
is
only
from
a
greater
care
of
the
Common
Good
,
than
of
the
Lives
or
Estates
of
any
particular
person
that
lays
a
foundation
for
this
Prerogative
,
which
though
I
grant
belongs
to
all
Supream
Powers
,
yet
if
this
once
come
to
be
generally
and
notoriously
abused
by
constant
course
of
wilful
Violence
,
Oppression
and
Injustice
,
so
that
the
Subjects
cannot
longer
bear
it
,
they
will
quickly
make
their
appeal
somewhere
else
,
unless
they
are
hindred
by
some
predominant
Power
,
or
Force
over
them
.
§
.
6.
But
on
the
other
side
it
is
certain
,
That
men
in
the
state
of
Nature
cannot
admit
of
any
final
Judgment
,
or
determination
of
a
doubt
or
difference
,
besides
an
evidence
either
from
the
things
themselves
,
or
from
that
trust
or
credit
they
place
in
some
mens
either
Judgment
or
Testimony
,
whereby
all
manner
of
doubt
or
scruple
is
clearly
removed
out
of
the
minds
of
the
Parties
concerned
;
and
that
it
appears
evident
to
them
,
that
they
are
not
imposed
upon
;
neither
can
there
be
any
end
of
debates
amongst
divers
Pretenders
,
unless
one
Party
being
convinced
by
the
strength
of
the
other's
Reasons
,
come
over
to
his
,
or
their
Opinion
;
or
else
being
satisfied
of
the
Knowledge
and
Integrity
of
some
third
Person
,
as
an
Arbitrator
,
do
willingly
submit
to
his
Sentence
.
§
.
7.
For
Humane
Nature
will
ever
acknowledge
a
difference
between
right
Reason
,
and
false
;
and
between
a
just
,
and
an
unjust
Judgment
;
and
't
is
only
Truth
and
right
Reason
that
have
this
Prerogative
,
that
they
can
confer
a
right
on
us
of
doing
those
things
which
they
prescribe
.
For
even
Mr.
H.
in
his
definition
of
Right
,
acknowledges
,
that
it
is
only
a
liberty
of
using
our
Faculties
according
to
right
Reason
;
whereas
all
Error
,
or
false
Judgment
,
whether
it
be
concerning
Necessaries
for
the
preservation
of
Life
,
or
in
any
other
practical
matter
,
can
give
no
man
a
right
of
doing
that
which
he
then
falsly
judges
necessary
for
his
preservation
.
And
therefore
Mr.
H's
Conclusion
,
where
he
acknowledges
at
last
,
That
right
Reason
is
that
which
concludes
from
true
Principles
;
and
likewise
that
in
the
false
reasoning
,
and
folly
of
men
,
in
not
understanding
their
Duties
towards
other
men
,
consists
all
the
violation
of
the
Laws
of
Nature
;
grants
as
much
as
I
can
desire
;
but
how
this
will
agree
with
that
loose
definition
of
Reason
,
where
he
supposes
every
man's
reason
to
be
alike
right
,
I
desire
any
of
his
Disciples
to
shew
me
.
Therefore
to
conclude
,
I
can
only
allow
that
to
be
practical
right
Reason
,
which
gives
us
leave
to
undertake
things
reasonable
and
possible
,
and
that
forbids
a
man
to
arrogate
to
himself
alone
a
dominion
over
all
men
,
and
all
things
,
which
is
needless
and
impossible
,
indeed
wholly
pernicious
to
his
preservation
.
§
.
8.
But
to
avoid
this
difficulty
,
Mr.
H.
and
his
Followers
fly
to
the
Subterfuge
of
a
natural
necessity
in
men
,
that
so
judge
thus
falsly
,
and
act
contrary
to
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
or
Reason
:
And
therefore
in
his
Preface
to
this
Treatise
,
he
supposes
all
men
to
be
evil
by
Nature
,
and
makes
them
necessarily
determined
by
their
Appetites
and
Passions
(
before
they
are
endued
with
Reason
and
Discipline
)
to
act
mischievously
,
and
unreasonably
;
and
therefore
tells
us
,
that
Children
,
unless
you
give
them
every
thing
they
desire
,
cry
,
and
are
angry
,
and
will
strike
their
very
Fathers
and
Mothers
;
and
it
is
by
nature
they
do
so
,
and
yet
are
blameless
;
as
well
because
they
cannot
hurt
,
as
also
that
wanting
the
use
of
Reason
,
they
are
yet
free
from
all
its
Duties
:
But
the
same
persons
,
when
grown
up
,
and
having
got
strength
enough
to
hurt
,
if
they
hold
on
to
do
the
same
things
,
they
then
begin
both
to
be
,
and
to
be
called
evil
.
So
that
a
wicked
man
is
almost
the
same
thing
,
as
an
overgrown
Child
,
or
a
man
of
a
childish
disposition
,
because
there
is
the
same
defect
of
Reason
at
that
age
,
in
which
by
Nature
,
improved
by
Discipline
,
and
experience
of
its
inconveniencies
,
it
commonly
happens
to
be
amended
.
So
likewise
the
Author
of
Tractatus
Theologico
Politicus
,
who
more
openly
than
Mr.
H.
(
but
upon
the
same
Principles
)
endeavours
to
destroy
all
Religion
,
both
Natural
,
and
Revealed
;
argues
to
this
purpose
,
in
the
16th
Chap.
of
the
said
Treatise
.
First
,
By
the
Law
of
Nature
,
He
understands
nothing
but
the
Nature
of
every
Individual
;
according
to
which
,
we
conceive
each
of
them
naturally
determined
to
exist
after
a
certain
manner
.
Thus
Fishes
are
ordained
to
swim
,
and
the
great
ones
to
devour
the
less
:
Therefore
Fishes
live
in
the
Water
,
and
devour
each
other
by
the
highest
Right
:
For
Nature
considered
simply
,
hath
a
right
to
all
things
it
can
do
,
or
its
right
extends
it self
,
as
far
as
its
power
;
Since
the
power
of
Nature
is
but
the
power
of
God
,
who
hath
the
highest
right
to
all
things
.
But
because
the
power
of
Vniversal
Nature
,
is
nothing
but
the
power
of
all
the
Individual
Creatures
together
,
it
follows
that
every
Individual
hath
the
highest
right
to
all
things
it
can
do
;
that
is
,
it
extends
it self
as
far
as
its
power
.
And
since
it
is
the
first
Law
of
Nature
,
that
every
thing
should
endeavour
,
as
far
as
it
is
able
,
to
preserve
it self
in
its
Natural
State
:
and
that
,
without
any
consideration
of
other
Creatures
,
but
only
of
it self
:
Therefore
it
follows
,
that
every
Individual
hath
the
highest
right
to
exist
,
and
operate
,
as
it
is
thus
naturally
determined
:
Nor
will
he
allow
any
difference
,
by
Nature
,
between
men
and
other
Creatures
;
neither
between
men
endued
with
Reason
,
and
those
that
have
not
yet
attained
the
use
of
it
;
neither
between
Fools
and
Madmen
,
and
others
that
are
of
sound
Vnderstanding
;
and
his
Reason
is
this
,
For
whatever
any
Creature
doth
by
the
force
of
its
Nature
,
it
doth
it
by
the
highest
Right
,
viz.
because
it
acts
as
it
is
by
Nature
determined
,
neither
is
it
able
to
act
otherwise
:
Therefore
among
men
,
whilst
considered
as
living
under
the
meer
Empire
of
Nature
,
as
well
he
that
doth
not
yet
understand
Reason
,
or
hath
not
acquired
a
habit
of
Virtue
,
lives
by
the
highest
Right
,
according
to
the
Laws
of
his
own
Appetite
,
as
well
as
he
that
directs
his
Life
according
to
the
Rules
of
Reason
.
So
that
as
a
Wise-man
hath
a
Right
to
all
things
that
Reason
dictates
,
or
of
living
according
to
its
Rules
:
So
likewise
the
ignorant
and
foolish
hath
a
like
right
to
all
things
which
their
Appetites
desire
.
So
that
every
man's
Natural
Right
,
is
not
determined
by
Right
Reason
,
but
by
Power
and
Appetite
.
For
all
men
are
not
naturally
ordained
to
operate
according
to
the
Laws
of
Reason
,
but
on
the
contrary
are
born
ignorant
of
all
things
;
and
before
they
come
to
know
the
true
Rules
of
life
,
or
acquire
a
habit
of
Vertue
,
a
great
part
of
their
life
slips
away
,
tho'
they
are
never
so
well
educated
:
And
therefore
he
concludes
,
that
whatever
any
one
does
in
order
as
he
thinks
to
his
own
preservation
,
or
the
satisfaction
of
Sensual
Appetites
,
whilst
he
is
in
this
meer
state
of
Nature
,
it
is
lawful
,
because
the
only
Rule
he
hath
to
act
by
.
§
.
9.
Having
given
you
all
that
can
be
said
for
this
wicked
,
as
well
as
foolish
Opinion
,
in
their
own
words
;
I
shall
now
endeavour
to
confute
it
.
In
the
first
place
therefore
I
observe
,
that
this
which
they
call
the
right
of
Nature
,
and
which
Mr.
H.
defines
to
be
a
state
of
perfect
Liberty
,
is
in
their
sense
no
other
than
that
of
absolute
necessity
:
And
therefore
I
shall
leave
it
to
the
Reader
to
judge
how
properly
this
word
Right
belongs
to
Brutes
,
Infants
,
and
Fools
.
For
the
Word
Right
is
used
by
those
that
treat
of
Ethicks
,
only
in
respect
of
reasonable
men
,
as
capable
of
deliberation
and
judgment
,
and
endued
with
freedom
of
Action
,
and
so
subject
to
Laws
.
For
to
call
that
necessity
,
by
which
Fishes
devour
each
other
,
and
Mad-men
beat
their
Keepers
,
a
Right
,
were
as
proper
to
talk
of
a
Right
of
Stones
to
fall
downwards
:
no
Philosophers
but
these
,
ever
using
the
word
Right
for
necessity
,
but
a
liberty
left
by
the
Law
of
Nature
,
of
acting
according
to
Reason
:
2ly
,
The
last
Author
confounds
the
nature
of
Beasts
,
Fools
and
Mad-men
,
who
have
no
knowledge
of
a
God
,
or
sense
of
a
Moral
Good
and
Evil
,
with
that
of
rational
Creatures
,
who
are
ordained
for
greater
ends
,
and
to
be
governed
by
a
higher
Law
,
than
that
of
meer
Appetite
or
Passion
:
And
I
desire
these
Gentlemen
to
shew
us
,
that
such
unreasonable
Appetites
and
Passions
do
necessarily
and
unevitably
carry
men
to
act
constantly
according
to
them
;
so
that
the
men
had
then
no
power
left
,
to
oppose
,
resist
or
restrain
them
:
and
tho'
we
grant
that
Children
are
not
yet
sensible
;
and
Fools
and
Mad-men
are
never
perhaps
capable
of
the
Laws
of
Reason
or
Nature
,
and
so
cannot
be
subject
to
them
,
nor
are
to
be
esteemed
amongst
voluntary
Agents
:
Yet
doth
it
not
follow
,
that
those
that
are
of
Mature
Age
,
and
sound
Minds
,
and
so
cannot
plead
invincible
ignorance
of
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
but
out
of
their
own
wilful
humour
,
or
unreasonable
Appetites
,
neglect
to
know
or
learn
,
or
through
wilful
ignorance
transgress
it
,
should
claim
the
like
exemption
.
For
though
we
are
not
angry
with
Children
,
or
natural
Fools
,
if
they
cry
for
,
or
take
away
any
thing
they
see
,
and
pity
mad
people
,
even
while
they
are
outragious
with
those
that
tend
them
:
Yet
have
we
not
the
same
forbearance
and
pity
for
men
of
sound
Minds
,
and
mature
Age
,
if
they
do
the
like
unreasonable
things
,
and
govern
themselves
by
no
other
Law
,
but
their
own
unreasonable
Appetites
and
Passions
;
Since
it
was
in
their
power
both
to
have
known
and
acted
otherwise
;
and
to
have
deliberated
and
judged
,
whether
it
were
not
better
for
them
to
forbear
such
evil
Acts
,
than
to
do
them
.
§
.
10.
Neither
can
invincible
ignorance
be
any
excuse
as
to
them
;
for
though
perhaps
they
may
not
have
Brains
fit
for
the
Mathematicks
,
or
are
not
able
to
deduce
all
the
Laws
of
Nature
from
their
true
Principles
;
yet
by
the
Precepts
of
others
,
as
well
as
their
own
Reason
,
and
the
observation
of
their
own
Natures
,
as
well
as
other
mens
,
they
might
easily
have
learnt
all
the
Duties
of
an
honest
man
;
that
is
,
their
Duty
towards
their
Neighbour
,
by
that
Golden
Rule
,
of
doing
as
they
would
be
done
by
:
And
their
Duty
towards
themselves
,
by
endeavouring
their
own
true
happiness
and
preservation
,
by
the
only
means
tending
thereunto
,
viz.
Without
injuring
others
;
and
doing
their
Duty
towards
God
,
in
reverencing
him
,
and
obeying
his
Will
,
when
discovered
to
them
;
also
in
endeavouring
,
to
the
utmost
of
their
power
,
the
Common
Good
of
Mankind
;
and
all
which
Principles
have
been
ever
so
natural
to
men
,
that
they
have
in
all
Ages
acknowledged
them
to
have
still
remained
the
same
.
Therefore
Mr.
H.
as
also
the
Author
of
the
Treatise
last
mentioned
,
are
very
much
mistaken
,
so
directly
to
oppose
our
knowledge
of
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
to
the
Rational
Nature
of
Man
;
as
if
he
were
so
much
beholden
to
Art
for
them
,
that
he
could
never
have
acquired
them
himself
,
without
teaching
;
which
were
all
one
as
to
say
,
That
because
most
men
learn
Arithmetick
.
,
therefore
it
is
so
absolutely
besides
,
or
above
Nature
,
that
no
man
ever
attained
it
of
himself
,
which
is
contrary
both
to
Reason
and
Experience
,
since
both
Arithmetick
and
Geometry
,
as
also
Ethicks
,
must
have
been
natural
to
those
that
first
taught
them
.
But
I
have
already
sufficiently
proved
by
Mr.
H's
own
Concession
,
That
Reason
and
Experience
are
as
natural
to
Humane
Nature
,
as
Hunting
is
to
Dog
's
,
tho
in
both
of
them
there
is
required
both
Exercise
and
Experience
to
learn
it
.
§
.
11.
Nor
doth
Mr.
H's
Excuse
,
which
he
gives
us
in
the
13th
Chapter
of
his
Leviathan
,
signify
any
thing
;
(
viz.
)
That
mens
Passions
in
the
state
of
Nature
are
no
Sins
,
nor
the
Actions
which
proceed
from
them
,
as
long
as
they
see
no
Power
which
can
prohibit
them
;
For
neither
can
a
Law
be
known
before
it
be
made
,
neither
can
it
be
made
,
till
they
have
agreed
upon
a
Legislator
.
To
which
may
be
easily
answered
,
that
Mr.
H.
all
along
proceeds
upon
this
False
Supposition
,
That
God
is
not
a
Legislator
without
Divine
Revelation
;
nor
that
the
Laws
of
Nature
are
properly
his
Laws
;
both
which
Assertions
,
if
they
have
been
proved
false
in
the
preceding
Discourse
,
it
will
certainly
follow
,
that
the
Laws
of
Nature
or
Reason
proceeding
from
God
himself
▪
are
truly
Laws
;
and
the
Actions
prohibited
by
them
are
Sins
,
although
men
will
not
through
wilful
Ignorance
discover
this
Legislator
,
nor
will
consent
to
his
Laws
.
And
Mr.
H.
himself
acknowledges
in
his
Chapter
of
Laws
,
that
the
Subjects
lie
under
an
obligation
to
obey
them
,
if
it
can
be
made
appear
to
them
that
the
Legislator
is
endued
with
a
Supream
Power
over
them
,
and
hath
both
sufficiently
established
,
and
promulgated
his
Laws
;
both
which
may
be
truly
affirmed
of
the
Laws
of
Nature
.
§
.
12.
But
indeed
Mr.
H.
and
his
Followers
have
done
very
cunningly
in
taking
away
all
freedom
from
Mankind
,
and
to
suppose
an
absolute
necessity
of
all
moral
Actions
;
since
they
could
not
otherwise
destroy
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
and
equal
Men
with
Brutes
,
but
by
pulling
up
all
the
Foundations
of
moral
Good
and
Evil.
But
I
need
say
no
more
on
this
Subject
to
shew
the
folly
and
unreasonableness
of
this
Opinion
,
than
to
put
down
Mr.
H's
words
on
this
Subject
in
Art.
11.
of
this
Chapter
,
Where
he
confesses
that
this
Right
of
all
men
to
all
things
,
is
absolutely
unprofitable
for
Mankind
,
because
the
effect
of
this
Right
is
all
one
,
as
if
there
were
no
such
Right
at
all
.
For
although
any
man
might
say
of
every
thing
,
This
is
mine
;
yet
could
he
not
use
it
,
because
of
his
Neighbour
,
who
might
by
an
equal
Right
pretend
that
it
was
his
.
Which
is
as
good
as
to
own
,
that
this
right
is
none
at
all
:
For
he
himself
in
the
Article
before-going
,
makes
Utility
to
be
the
measure
of
all
Right
;
but
here
is
a
Right
without
any
Utility
at
all
;
therefore
these
words
Right
and
Vnprofitable
,
are
contradictory
;
for
Right
refers
in
this
definition
to
some
use
or
profit
that
a
man
may
make
of
his
natural
Liberty
;
but
to
be
unprofitable
,
owns
that
there
is
no
use
or
need
of
this
natural
Liberty
in
that
matter
.
PRINCIPLE
V.
That
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
whatsoever
any
one
doth
to
another
,
cannot
be
injurious
to
any
Person
.
§
.
1.
BEcause
,
says
he
,
Injustice
towards
men
supposes
Humane
Laws
,
none
of
which
are
yet
in
being
in
the
meer
state
of
Nature
,
De
Cive
,
Cap.
1.
Annot.
ad
§.
10.
which
he
thus
likewise
endeavours
to
prove
in
his
Leviathan
,
Chap.
13.
Where
there
is
no
common
Power
,
there
is
no
Law
;
where
there
is
no
Law
,
no
Injustice
;
Force
and
Fraud
are
in
War
the
two
Cardinal
Vertues
;
Iustice
and
Injustice
are
none
of
the
Faculties
either
of
the
Body
or
Mind
;
If
they
were
,
they
might
be
in
a
man
that
were
alone
in
the
World
,
as
well
as
his
Senses
and
Passions
:
They
are
all
Qualities
that
relate
to
men
in
Society
,
not
in
Solitude
.
It
is
consequent
also
to
the
same
condition
that
there
be
no
Propriety
,
no
Dominion
,
no
Mine
and
Thine
distinct
,
but
only
that
to
be
every
man
's
that
he
can
get
,
and
for
so
long
as
he
can
keep
it
:
All
which
is
no
more
than
what
Epicurus
long
ago
asserted
,
as
Diogenes
Laertius
hath
told
us
in
the
Account
he
gives
of
his
Life
and
Opinions
;
To
this
effect
,
That
between
those
Animals
which
cannot
be
joined
by
any
Compact
or
Bargain
,
that
they
should
not
hurt
each
other
;
there
is
no
Right
,
or
Injury
:
So
it
is
likewise
amongst
Nations
,
which
either
will
not
,
or
cannot
enter
into
Compact
;
that
they
do
neither
hurt
,
nor
are
hurt
;
For
Injustice
is
nothing
in
it self
;
although
in
some
places
such
a
Bargain
is
made
by
mutual
Compacts
that
they
should
not
hurt
each
other
.
So
that
Injury
is
no
evil
in
it self
,
but
only
consists
in
a
fear
,
or
suspicion
,
lest
it
should
not
be
concealed
from
those
who
are
appointed
Revengers
of
such
Injuries
.
§
.
2.
In
answer
to
all
which
,
I
doubt
not
to
prove
,
that
these
Principles
of
Epicurus
,
as
well
as
of
Mr.
H.
and
his
Disciples
,
are
taken
up
without
any
just
or
solid
grounds
;
for
by
the
dictates
of
right
Reason
,
considered
as
(
they
are
)
the
natural
Laws
of
God
,
a
perfect
Right
is
given
to
every
man
to
his
Life
,
and
all
those
necessary
means
thereunto
,
without
which
he
cannot
subsist
.
For
whatever
a
man
enjoys
by
the
right
of
Nature
,
it
must
needs
be
injury
and
injustice
to
take
it
away
:
for
every
invasion
or
violation
of
another's
Right
or
Property
,
is
Injury
,
by
whatever
Law
he
enjoys
it
:
And
much
more
if
that
Right
be
conferred
upon
him
by
the
Law
of
Nature
,
given
by
God
as
a
Legislator
,
than
if
it
proceeded
from
meer
Humane
Compacts
.
And
though
Mr.
H.
here
asserts
,
That
no
injury
can
be
done
to
any
man
,
with
whom
we
have
made
no
Compact
;
yet
Chap.
2.
Art.
1.
of
his
De
Cive
,
he
says
,
That
since
all
men
will
grant
that
to
be
done
by
Right
,
which
is
not
contrary
to
right
Reason
;
we
ought
to
believe
that
to
be
done
by
Injury
,
which
is
repugnant
to
right
Reason
;
that
is
,
which
contradicts
any
Truth
collected
by
right
Reason
from
true
Principles
:
But
what
is
done
by
Injury
,
we
acknowledge
to
be
done
contrary
to
some
Law
.
So
that
here
he
grants
,
that
an
Injury
may
be
done
contrary
to
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
before
any
Compact
,
or
translation
of
our
Right
to
another
;
and
since
he
there
acknowledges
those
Dictates
of
Reason
to
be
Laws
,
I
would
fain
see
how
those
can
give
any
man
such
a
right
to
invade
,
or
violate
the
Rights
of
another
:
For
Right
(
as
he
himself
well
defines
it
)
being
a
Liberty
granted
by
right
Reason
,
requires
that
men
,
who
pretend
to
act
or
speak
according
to
its
Dictates
,
cannot
act
contradictorily
to
its
other
Principles
,
or
Conclusions
.
And
't
were
to
no
purpose
for
him
to
say
,
that
the
Injury
is
done
to
God
alone
,
when
his
Laws
are
broken
,
unless
he
can
shew
that
those
Laws
of
God
do
not
confer
a
right
on
men
to
their
Lives
,
and
all
the
necessaries
thereof
;
and
do
not
likewise
prohibit
others
from
violating
this
Right
so
granted
.
§
.
3.
But
yet
this
Author
,
when
he
is
prest
hard
,
does
acknowledge
,
that
there
may
be
injury
done
to
another
out
of
Civil
Government
:
For
it
being
objected
,
whether
if
a
Son
should
kill
his
Father
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
he
should
not
do
him
an
injury
;
he
answers
,
That
a
Son
cannot
be
understood
to
be
in
a
natural
State
in
respect
of
his
Parents
,
he
being
as
soon
as
ever
he
is
born
▪
under
their
power
and
command
,
to
whom
he
owes
his
being
and
preservation
.
Yet
sure
a
man's
Parents
,
by
begetting
and
breeding
him
up
,
do
not
thereby
acquire
a
property
or
dominion
over
him
as
long
as
he
lives
;
though
I
grant
Children
,
when
they
either
marry
,
or
otherwise
,
become
lawfully
discharged
from
the
government
of
their
Parents
,
still
owe
a
filial
piety
and
gratitude
to
them
;
and
that
it
is
a
great
impiety
and
injury
in
Children
towards
them
,
to
hurt
or
destroy
them
,
though
they
are
no
longer
under
their
power
and
command
.
So
likewise
the
same
Law
of
Nature
,
which
prescribes
gratitude
to
these
our
natural
Benefactors
,
doth
make
it
injurious
for
any
man
to
hurt
or
kill
any
other
Person
,
who
had
educated
,
or
maintained
him
,
or
otherwise
highly
obliged
him
;
since
the
same
Laws
of
Gratitude
that
make
it
injurious
to
hurt
,
or
murther
his
Father
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
do
also
command
the
like
duty
towards
any
other
Benefactor
.
§
.
4.
But
his
Argument
in
his
Leviathan
is
much
more
false
and
precarious
;
when
he
argues
,
That
where
there
is
no
common
Power
,
there
is
no
Law
;
and
where
there
is
no
Law
,
there
is
no
Injustice
.
All
which
he
brings
to
prove
the
necessity
of
his
natural
state
of
War
.
For
,
first
,
though
I
grant
,
where
there
is
no
Common
Power
,
(
that
is
,
no
Legislator
)
there
is
no
Law
,
yet
that
is
not
true
of
the
Laws
of
Nature
;
since
if
they
proceed
from
God
as
a
Legislator
(
as
I
hope
we
have
proved
in
the
precedent
Discourse
)
they
are
truly
Laws
,
before
any
Civil
Power
was
instituted
to
make
Laws
,
or
to
see
them
observed
;
and
consequently
that
it
is
the
highest
injury
and
injustice
to
take
away
any
thing
from
others
being
innocent
,
and
doing
us
no
hurt
,
that
is
necessary
for
their
Life
,
or
preservation
,
which
they
are
already
possest
of
;
and
though
it
is
true
,
that
Justice
and
Injustice
are
no
natural
Faculties
of
the
Mind
,
yet
right
Reason
is
;
from
whence
all
Justice
is
deduced
,
and
which
a
man
is
always
bound
to
exercise
as
soon
as
he
becomes
capable
of
being
a
Member
of
Humane
Society
:
(
I
do
not
mean
a
Civil
one
)
and
if
there
be
a
natural
Equity
(
as
this
Author
acknowledges
,
De
Cive
,
cap.
14.
§.
14.
)
there
is
likewise
a
natural
Justice
,
and
Injustice
too
:
but
I
shall
say
more
of
this
in
the
next
Principle
.
PRINCIPLE
VI.
That
in
the
state
of
Nature
there
is
nothing
Good
,
or
Evil.
§
.
1.
I
Shall
here
give
you
Mr.
H's
Opinion
,
and
his
Reasons
for
it
,
in
his
own
words
,
as
they
are
in
his
Leviathan
,
cap.
6.
Whatsoever
is
the
object
of
any
man's
Appetite
,
or
Desire
,
that
is
it
which
he
for
his
part
calls
Good
;
and
the
object
of
his
Hate
,
and
Aversion
,
Evil
:
and
of
his
Contempt
,
Vile
and
Inconsiderable
.
For
these
words
of
Good
,
Evil
,
and
Contemptible
,
are
ever
used
with
relation
to
the
Person
that
useth
them
,
there
being
nothing
simply
and
absolutely
so
;
Nor
any
common
Rule
of
Good
and
Evil
to
be
taken
from
the
nature
of
the
Objects
themselves
,
but
from
the
person
of
the
Man
(
where
there
is
no
Commonwealth
)
or
,
(
in
a
Commonwealth
)
from
the
Person
that
represents
it
;
or
from
an
Arbitrator
,
or
Iudge
,
whom
men
by
disagreeing
shall
by
consent
set
up
,
and
make
his
Sentence
the
Rule
thereof
.
He
speaks
to
the
same
effect
in
all
his
other
Works
;
as
in
De
Cive
,
cap.
4.
§.
17.
in
his
De
Homine
,
cap.
11.
which
it
were
tedious
here
to
repeat
;
and
therefore
I
refer
you
to
the
places
I
have
here
cited
.
§
.
2.
But
this
he
endeavours
Physically
to
explain
in
his
little
Treatise
of
Humane
Nature
,
cap.
7.
§
1.
compared
with
Chap.
3.
where
he
supposes
,
That
the
motion
,
in
which
consists
the
conception
of
things
without
any
intervention
of
the
Iudgment
,
passes
from
the
Brain
to
the
Heart
;
and
as
it
there
hinders
,
or
helps
its
vital
motion
,
it
is
said
to
please
or
displease
;
But
that
which
so
pleases
any
one
,
he
calls
Good
:
And
that
which
displeases
him
,
Evil
:
and
hence
from
the
diversity
of
Constitutions
,
or
Temperaments
,
there
are
divers
Opinions
of
Good
that
is
naturally
and
necessarily
so
.
And
in
the
state
of
Nature
unblameably
,
from
his
Opinion
that
judges
it
.
§
.
3.
There
is
nothing
that
Mr.
H.
hath
written
more
loosely
,
and
unlike
a
Philosopher
,
than
these
unstable
Opinions
both
of
natural
and
moral
Good
and
Evil.
And
therefore
it
is
a
matter
of
great
moment
to
have
a
fixed
and
constant
notion
of
Good
;
because
as
long
as
this
is
fluctuating
and
uncertain
,
all
knowledge
of
our
true
Felicity
(
which
is
the
greatest
Good
of
every
man
)
as
also
of
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
and
of
all
particular
Vertues
,
(
which
are
nothing
but
the
means
and
causes
of
obtaining
this
Good
)
will
be
likewise
various
,
wandring
and
uncertain
.
§
.
4.
Therefore
,
although
it
must
be
confest
,
that
because
of
some
peculiarity
in
the
divers
Temperaments
of
men
,
it
sometimes
happens
that
one
sort
of
Diet
,
or
Medicines
,
may
be
hurtful
to
one
,
which
may
not
prove
so
to
another
;
yea
,
which
Experience
hath
approved
,
not
only
to
be
innocent
,
but
wholsome
for
others
:
Something
like
which
may
be
observed
in
the
Genius
and
Manners
of
Nations
quite
different
from
others
,
in
some
particular
Customs
and
Constitutions
;
yet
this
doth
not
any
more
take
away
the
common
Consent
of
Mankind
concerning
the
nature
of
Good
,
and
its
constituent
parts
and
degrees
,
than
the
small
difference
of
mens
Faces
takes
away
the
agreement
between
them
in
their
common
Natures
as
Men
,
or
that
general
likeness
that
is
between
them
,
in
the
conformation
and
use
of
their
principal
Parts
.
For
sure
there
is
no
Nation
so
barbauros
which
will
not
own
,
that
there
are
greater
hopes
and
satisfaction
in
loving
,
and
obeying
God
,
than
in
blaspheming
and
disobeying
of
him
.
There
is
scarce
any
Nation
that
is
not
sensible
,
that
filial
duty
towards
Parents
,
gratitude
to
their
Benefactors
,
love
and
kindness
to
their
Friends
and
Neighbours
,
fidelity
in
their
Promises
and
Agreements
,
are
good
and
necessary
for
their
own
welfare
and
preservation
,
and
consequently
of
Mankind
.
No
difference
of
Temper
makes
any
man
in
his
Senses
not
perceive
it
to
be
good
for
all
men
,
that
the
Lives
,
Liberties
Estates
and
Members
of
all
innocent
Persons
,
should
be
preserved
;
And
therefore
that
the
killing
,
or
robbing
of
them
should
be
every-where
prohibited
under
the
most
severe
Penalties
.
Or
lastly
,
What
peculiar
humour
in
men
can
make
them
not
think
it
good
and
beneficial
for
particular
Families
and
Nations
,
that
the
Conjugal
Fidelity
of
the
Marriage-bed
,
the
Chastity
should
be
preserved
inviolated
.
The
same
may
be
said
concerning
the
right
of
using
and
enjoying
all
those
outward
things
,
that
are
necessary
for
life
,
or
conduce
to
our
health
,
fame
,
honour
,
the
education
of
our
Children
,
and
the
preservation
of
Friendship
,
since
in
their
Judgment
concerning
the
goodness
of
these
things
about
which
the
whole
business
of
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
and
of
most
Civil
Laws
is
taken
up
,
all
rational
men
do
as
equally
agree
in
their
Opinions
as
concerning
the
whiteness
of
Snow
,
or
the
brightness
of
the
Sun
;
Though
I
do
not
lay
the
main
stress
of
their
obligation
to
these
Actions
on
this
general
Agreement
,
since
I
have
laid
down
contrary
Principles
in
the
foregoing
Discourse
.
§
.
5.
But
I
shall
now
proceed
to
give
you
a
more
true
and
setled
Notion
of
Good
and
Evil
,
both
natural
and
moral
:
I
therefore
define
Good
in
general
to
be
,
that
which
preserves
,
encreases
,
or
perfects
the
Faculties
and
Powers
of
one
or
more
things
;
for
by
these
effects
that
peculiar
agreeableness
of
one
thing
with
another
declares
it self
to
us
,
and
which
is
requisite
to
make
any
thing
to
be
truly
called
good
for
the
nature
of
this
Being
before
others
.
Which
effects
likewise
discover
to
us
the
hidden
powers
,
and
intrinsick
natures
of
things
.
These
strike
upon
our
Senses
,
and
beget
a
knowledge
in
us
of
those
things
from
whence
they
flow
;
which
Goods
I
grant
may
be
different
,
according
to
the
divers
natures
of
those
Beings
which
they
respect
.
Thus
a
suitable
Soyl
,
Air
,
and
Moisture
are
naturally
good
for
Plants
,
because
they
are
agreeable
to
their
nature
,
and
are
necessary
for
their
preservation
,
growth
and
perfection
:
So
likewise
convenient
Food
,
Health
and
Liberty
,
are
naturally
good
for
an
Animal
;
since
they
serve
for
their
preservation
and
happiness
as
long
as
they
continue
to
live
.
So
likewise
,
That
is
also
good
for
man
,
which
preserves
and
encreases
the
powers
of
his
Mind
and
Body
,
without
doing
hurt
to
,
or
prejudicing
any
others
of
his
own
kind
;
nor
doth
the
mind
of
Man
make
these
Rules
concerning
the
nature
of
one
,
or
a
few
Creatures
of
a
sort
,
but
is
able
from
the
knowledge
it
hath
of
singulars
,
to
make
certain
general
Propositions
,
or
Conclusions
,
concerning
what
is
good
,
or
evil
,
for
the
whole
Species
,
or
Kind
,
whose
nature
he
hath
enquired
into
;
because
,
since
there
is
the
same
general
nature
in
every
one
of
the
Individuals
of
this
or
that
Kind
,
the
true
happiness
of
one
or
more
of
them
being
once
known
,
it
is
easie
likewise
to
know
what
share
and
kind
of
happiness
is
to
be
desired
by
all
of
them
:
For
it
is
apparent
,
That
the
improvement
of
the
Understanding
in
knowledge
,
and
the
government
of
the
Will
by
sedate
and
regular
Affections
;
as
also
the
health
and
vigour
of
the
Body
,
in
which
the
true
happiness
of
any
particular
man
does
chiefly
consist
,
do
also
comprehend
(
if
universally
considered
)
the
common
happiness
of
all
men
,
that
ever
have
been
,
or
shall
be
born
,
which
also
may
be
affirmed
concerning
the
means
to
these
natural
Goods
,
and
which
are
required
as
necessary
to
all
Mankind
;
such
as
Food
,
Exercise
,
Sleep
,
and
the
like
;
And
this
,
because
of
the
identity
between
the
parts
and
the
whole
;
that
is
,
between
the
nature
of
any
one
,
or
more
men
,
with
that
whole
Systeme
of
Rational
Agents
,
comprehended
under
the
general
Name
and
Idea
of
Mankind
.
From
whence
it
also
follows
,
that
whatsoever
doth
good
to
one
member
,
or
part
of
this
aggregate
Body
,
all
the
rest
being
unhurt
,
or
unprejudiced
,
thereby
may
be
truly
said
to
do
good
to
the
whole
aggregate
Body
of
Mankind
;
which
Consideration
may
excite
us
to
a
due
care
of
our selves
,
provided
it
be
not
prejudicial
to
others
from
a
consideration
of
the
common
Good
of
Mankind
.
Analogically
unto
this
we
may
also
judge
,
that
to
promote
the
efficacy
of
God's
Natural
Right
to
rule
our selves
,
and
all
other
rational
Creatures
,
is
to
perform
a
thing
good
,
or
grateful
to
God
,
as
Supream
Governour
of
the
World
;
and
this
we
do
by
a
due
care
to
promote
obedience
to
his
own
Laws
,
either
in
our selves
,
or
others
.
And
therefore
,
though
we
so
far
agree
with
Mr.
H.
that
that
may
be
called
good
which
is
agreeable
to
any
other
Being
,
and
so
must
be
meant
relatively
;
yet
doth
not
this
always
refer
to
the
Appetite
of
him
that
desires
it
,
nor
yet
to
the
irrational
Opinions
of
any
one
or
more
men
,
if
they
judge
contrary
to
the
Rules
and
Principles
of
Nature
or
Reason
.
And
therefore
,
though
a
Wench
that
hath
the
Green-Sickness
,
by
reason
of
her
depraved
Appetite
,
may
fancy
Tobacco-pipes
,
or
Charcoal
to
have
an
excellent
relish
,
and
so
to
be
good
for
her
;
yet
will
not
her
thinking
so
,
make
them
become
a
wholsome
nourishment
.
The
like
may
be
said
of
any
Actions
,
or
Vices
,
which
a
Vicious
or
unreasonable
man
may
take
pleasure
in
;
such
as
Drunkenness
,
Whoredom
,
&c.
which
howsoever
they
may
please
him
at
the
present
,
yet
will
certainly
in
time
destroy
him
in
this
life
,
or
in
that
to
come
.
And
therefore
it
is
not
true
,
which
Mr.
H.
here
lays
down
,
That
all
Good
and
Evil
is
only
to
be
taken
in
respect
of
him
whom
at
that
time
it
pleases
or
displeases
:
Whereas
every
rational
Man
ought
first
rightly
to
judge
what
things
are
good
,
and
then
to
desire
them
,
because
they
are
really
so
;
that
is
,
because
their
natural
powers
or
effects
are
really
helpful
,
or
agreeable
to
our
Nature
:
And
to
consider
a
private
Good
,
as
that
which
profits
one
person
;
and
a
common
Good
,
as
it
profits
many
.
And
that
not
because
it
is
at
that
instant
desired
,
and
approved
of
out
of
a
depraved
Appetite
,
or
wanton
humour
:
it
being
only
the
part
of
Brutes
,
Mad-men
and
Fools
,
to
measure
the
goodness
of
Things
,
or
Actions
,
by
their
present
Lusts
,
without
any
government
of
Reason
,
or
thoughts
of
the
future
.
§
.
6.
But
Mr.
H.
himself
doth
sometimes
talk
more
soberly
;
and
though
he
doth
here
,
as
also
elsewhere
,
inculcate
,
That
every
thing
is
either
good
,
or
evil
,
according
to
the
opinion
of
the
Person
that
so
judges
it
(
in
the
state
of
Nature
)
or
else
(
in
a
Civil
State
)
of
the
Person
that
represents
the
Common-wealth
;
yet
in
his
Leviathan
,
Chap.
30.
when
he
reckons
up
the
Offices
of
the
Civil
Soveraign
,
he
makes
one
of
the
chiefest
to
be
the
making
of
good
Laws
.
Now
he
there
tells
us
,
A
good
Law
is
that
which
is
needful
for
the
good
of
the
People
,
and
withal
perspicuous
;
and
a
little
farther
he
thus
goes
on
;
And
therefore
a
Law
that
is
not
needful
,
having
not
the
true
end
of
a
Law
,
is
not
good
.
A
Law
may
be
conceived
to
be
good
,
when
it
is
for
the
benefit
of
the
Sovereign
,
though
it
be
not
necessary
for
the
People
;
but
it
is
not
so
:
where
you
see
,
the
good
of
the
People
(
which
is
certainly
that
which
is
common
to
many
)
is
here
acknowledg'd
by
him
,
and
proposed
as
the
main
end
of
the
Legislator's
Duty
:
But
this
end
being
thus
proposed
,
the
true
nature
of
it
is
first
to
be
known
,
and
determined
,
before
the
Law
can
prescribe
what
is
good
or
evil
for
the
People
.
So
likewise
Chap.
14.
§.
4.
of
his
De
Cive
,
speaking
concerning
the
Rules
of
right
Judgment
in
a
Civil
State
,
he
tells
us
;
That
since
it
is
impossible
to
prescribe
any
Vniversal
Rules
whereby
all
Controversies
(
which
will
be
infinite
,
may
be
judged
)
it
is
still
understood
in
every
case
pretermitted
by
the
written
Laws
,
that
the
Law
of
natural
Equity
is
to
be
followed
.
Where
you
see
he
grants
that
the
Laws
of
natural
Equity
may
be
known
,
and
followed
;
And
that
divers
more
Cases
may
be
determined
from
thence
,
than
can
be
by
the
Civil
Laws
themselves
:
but
we
do
only
so
far
contend
with
him
,
that
some
Rules
of
Equity
may
be
so
evidently
and
naturally
known
,
that
all
honest
and
sincere
men
cannot
at
all
differ
about
them
;
though
in
the
mean
time
we
freely
grant
,
That
there
are
divers
things
so
indifferent
,
that
no
human
Reason
can
universally
determine
,
that
it
is
more
necessary
for
the
common
Good
,
that
a
thing
be
done
,
or
a
Case
judged
this
way
,
rather
than
the
other
.
§
.
7.
Having
stated
what
we
mean
by
a
natural
Good
,
and
Evil
;
I
shall
now
give
a
right
notion
of
a
moral
Good
,
and
how
it
differs
from
the
former
.
A
moral
Good
is
those
voluntary
Actions
and
Habits
which
are
conformable
to
the
Law
of
Nature
,
or
Reason
,
considered
as
given
by
God
,
as
a
Law-giver
,
for
a
Rule
of
all
our
Humane
,
or
voluntary
Actions
:
For
there
are
many
natural
Goods
that
conduce
to
a
man's
happiness
,
which
are
not
morally
good
,
nor
are
commanded
by
any
Law
.
Such
as
are
quickness
of
Wit
,
Learning
,
Strength
of
Mind
and
Body
,
&c.
On
the
other
side
,
I
suppose
,
that
no
Action
of
the
Will
can
be
commanded
by
God
,
(
and
so
morally
good
)
which
doth
not
by
is
own
nature
,
as
well
as
from
the
Will
of
God
(
the
Legislator
)
conduce
to
the
happiness
of
Mankind
:
The
not
taking
notice
of
which
distinction
,
between
natural
and
moral
Goods
,
hath
been
the
occasion
of
another
great
Error
in
Mr.
H.
when
he
makes
that
which
seems
good
to
every
man
's
own
self
,
to
be
the
only
object
of
his
desires
,
as
he
doth
in
his
De
Cive
,
Cap.
1.
Art.
2.
which
he
likewise
more
fully
expresses
in
Cap.
3.
Artic.
21.
Every
one
is
presumed
to
seek
that
which
is
good
for
himself
;
but
that
which
is
just
only
by
accident
,
and
for
peace
sake
;
viz.
That
which
is
just
,
he
will
only
have
to
regard
another's
good
;
which
he
supposes
no
man
will
seek
,
unless
it
were
for
fear
of
those
Evils
which
proceed
from
a
state
of
War
:
But
all
he
says
only
tends
to
prove
,
that
men
are
so
framed
,
that
it
is
repugnant
to
their
Nature
,
and
so
absolutely
impossible
for
them
to
mind
,
or
desire
any
thing
,
unless
for
their
own
particular
worldly
profit
,
and
glory
,
as
he
hath
laid
down
in
those
Principles
we
have
already
considered
.
§
.
8.
But
I
cannot
but
take
notice
,
that
Mr.
H.
himself
in
his
Treatise
De
Homine
,
(
published
after
his
De
Cive
)
Cap.
12.
§.
1.
seems
not
at
all
to
approve
of
this
ill
humour
in
men
,
by
these
words
.
We
confess
that
it
may
so
fall
out
through
the
ill
use
of
his
free
will
,
that
a
man
of
a
narrow
Soul
may
consider
nothing
but
himself
,
and
so
may
desire
nothing
but
what
he
judges
for
his
own
private
advantage
.
And
in
the
same
Treatise
,
Cap.
11.
§.
14.
where
he
doth
purposely
consider
which
is
the
greater
,
or
lesser
amongst
Goods
;
he
plainly
confesses
,
That
it
is
a
greater
good
which
benefits
more
persons
,
than
that
which
doth
good
to
fewer
.
§
.
9.
But
giving
him
leave
to
contradict
himself
as
much
as
he
will
,
yet
notwithstanding
all
that
he
hath
said
to
the
contrary
,
I
doubt
not
but
all
rational
and
good
men
are
of
a
more
generous
Spirit
;
who
do
not
only
esteem
that
to
be
good
,
which
is
good
for
themselves
alone
,
but
also
whatsoever
tends
to
the
conservation
,
happiness
and
perfection
of
Mankind
.
And
whatsover
they
thus
esteem
to
be
good
,
that
they
will
also
desire
,
wish
for
,
and
contribute
their
utmost
endeavour
to
procure
for
others
,
as
well
as
themselves
:
Nor
do
I
see
any
reason
to
hinder
,
but
that
whatsoever
I
find
agreeable
to
any
mans
Nature
,
I
may
do
my
endeavour
,
as
far
as
lies
in
my
power
,
that
he
may
obtain
it
;
But
this
much
I
must
freely
confess
,
That
if
men
do
not
propose
to
themselves
one
common
End
,
or
Effect
,
viz.
the
common
good
of
Rational
Agents
,
whose
Causes
(
whether
efficient
,
or
perfective
)
should
be
before-hand
agreed
on
to
be
Good
;
and
those
that
hinder
its
production
,
Evil
;
the
words
Good
and
Evil
will
always
be
equivocal
,
various
,
and
uncertain
;
being
still
to
be
taken
in
as
many
different
Senses
,
as
there
are
particular
Men.
So
that
whatsoever
Action
,
or
thing
,
is
called
good
by
any
one
man
,
because
it
serves
his
turn
;
that
other
men
,
if
it
crosses
their
desires
,
will
be
sure
to
call
evil
,
which
is
incongruous
to
Reason
,
and
to
the
Communication
of
knowledge
among
men
,
which
is
the
main
end
of
Speech
;
Whereas
,
if
the
words
Good
and
Evil
are
applied
to
those
things
which
concern
the
nature
of
Rational
Beings
in
general
,
they
will
have
a
certain
and
determinate
sense
and
signification
,
which
will
not
only
be
constantly
true
,
and
intelligible
,
but
prove
most
useful
and
profitable
to
all
Mankind
;
and
that
we
are
not
only
capable
of
understanding
,
but
also
of
contributing
our
Endeavours
for
the
procuring
of
this
Common
Good
,
and
are
also
under
a
sufficient
obligation
thereunto
,
is
,
I
hope
,
fully
made
out
in
the
Fourth
Chapter
of
the
precedent
Discourse
,
where
we
expresly
treat
of
the
Law
of
Nature
,
and
its
obligation
.
PRINCIPLE
VII
.
That
the
State
of
Nature
is
a
State
of
War
.
§
.
1.
ALL
the
Principles
that
Mr.
H.
hath
hitherto
laid
down
,
have
been
only
in
order
to
the
establishing
this
Darling
Principle
of
the
natural
state
of
War
.
But
since
we
have
already
in
our
Answer
to
his
former
Principles
,
shewn
their
falshood
and
absurdity
;
If
those
Foundations
be
ill
laid
,
the
Superstructure
must
needs
be
infirm
,
and
therefore
I
shall
omit
all
that
he
hath
in
his
De
Cive
inferred
from
those
false
Principles
;
and
shall
only
apply
my self
to
what
he
hath
in
his
13th
Chapter
of
his
Leviathan
,
given
us
a-new
for
the
proof
of
this
Principle
,
and
which
doth
not
depend
upon
the
former
;
For
here
he
derives
this
natural
State
of
War
from
Three
Principal
Causes
in
the
nature
of
Man
.
First
,
Competition
.
Secondly
,
Diffidence
.
Thirdly
,
Glory
.
The
first
makes
man
invade
for
Gain
.
The
second
for
Safety
,
and
the
third
for
Reputation
.
The
first
use
Violence
to
make
themselves
Masters
of
other
Mens
persons
,
Wives
,
Children
and
Cattel
.
The
second
to
defend
them
.
The
third
for
Trifles
;
as
a
word
,
a
smile
,
a
different
Opinion
,
and
any
other
sign
of
undervaluing
,
either
directly
in
their
persons
,
or
by
reflection
on
their
Kindred
,
their
Friends
,
their
Nation
,
their
Profession
,
or
their
Name
.
Hereby
it
is
manifest
,
That
during
the
time
men
live
without
a
Common
Power
to
keep
them
all
in
awe
,
they
are
in
that
condition
which
is
called
War
,
as
is
of
every
man
against
every
man
.
For
War
consists
not
in
Battel
only
,
or
the
Act
of
Fighting
;
but
in
a
tract
of
time
wherein
the
will
to
contend
by
Battel
is
sufficiently
known
.
And
therefore
the
notion
of
time
is
to
be
considered
in
the
nature
of
War
,
as
it
is
in
the
nature
of
Weather
.
For
as
the
nature
of
Foul-weather
lies
not
in
a
shower
or
two
of
Rain
,
but
in
an
inclination
thereto
of
many
days
together
.
So
the
nature
of
War
consists
not
in
actual
fighting
,
but
in
the
known
disposition
thereto
during
all
the
time
there
is
no
assurance
to
the
contrary
.
All
other
is
Peace
.
§
.
2.
In
answer
to
which
,
I
must
first
take
notice
,
That
Mr.
H.
in
his
Leviathan
deduces
this
Right
of
War
of
all
men
against
all
,
from
other
Principles
than
he
doth
in
his
De
Cive
,
Chap.
1.
§.
12.
where
from
the
supposed
right
of
all
men
to
all
things
,
he
deduces
a
war
of
all
men
against
all
,
and
which
renders
it
both
lawful
and
necessary
:
But
in
his
Leviathan
,
in
the
Chapter
here
cited
,
he
first
asserts
the
state
of
Nature
to
be
a
state
of
War
,
and
from
thence
argues
all
things
therein
to
be
lawful
;
as
you
may
see
in
the
Conclusion
of
that
Chapter
,
where
he
tells
us
,
That
by
the
same
right
that
one
man
invades
,
the
other
resists
;
from
whence
arises
a
War
on
both
sides
just
.
So
that
being
not
at
all
sollicitous
about
the
Right
of
making
War
,
he
only
supposes
this
War
must
needs
arise
from
the
nature
of
mens
Passions
,
and
Desires
;
and
this
War
being
once
supposed
,
he
positively
asserts
,
That
it
must
follow
(
though
without
any
proof
)
that
there
is
in
this
State
nothing
just
,
or
unjust
:
Indeed
his
way
of
arguing
in
his
Leviathan
is
more
plausible
,
but
less
close
than
the
former
in
his
De
Cive
;
For
all
Persons
of
sense
must
agree
,
that
a
War
ought
first
to
be
proved
just
,
before
it
can
be
thence
deduced
what
things
are
lawful
therein
,
even
towards
Enemies
:
Neither
doth
himself
suppose
that
all
things
are
lawful
,
even
in
the
justest
War
;
for
in
his
De
Cive
,
Annot.
ad
Art
.
37.
cap.
3.
he
grants
that
Drunkenness
,
and
Cruelty
,
are
not
to
be
practised
even
in
War
;
and
therefore
it
is
necessary
that
some
natural
Principles
,
or
Laws
,
be
first
acknowledged
,
by
whose
command
or
permission
we
may
be
able
to
judge
of
any
War
,
whether
it
be
just
,
or
not
,
or
before
we
can
thence
infer
those
things
to
be
lawful
which
are
acted
therein
;
for
otherwise
even
contradictory
Propositions
may
be
alike
true
;
and
Titius
,
for
example
,
might
have
a
right
to
the
Life
and
Goods
of
Sempronius
,
if
he
thought
them
necessary
for
his
own
Preservation
;
and
so
likewise
Sempronius
would
have
the
same
Right
against
Titius
:
which
would
be
contrary
to
all
the
Rules
of
right
Reason
,
and
Equity
;
and
this
is
so
evident
,
that
Mr.
H.
himself
,
although
in
the
latter
part
of
this
first
Chapter
,
De
Cive
,
he
affirms
,
That
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
there
is
no
difference
between
just
and
unjust
;
yet
in
the
former
part
he
endeavours
to
prove
,
that
this
power
of
making
War
ought
to
be
allowed
to
every
man
in
that
state
as
necessary
to
his
own
preservation
;
which
is
all
one
,
as
if
he
had
affirmed
this
War
to
be
just
and
lawful
on
both
sides
;
which
is
contrary
to
Reason
.
But
whatsoever
proves
any
thing
to
be
just
,
and
lawful
in
any
State
,
must
likewise
suppose
,
that
there
is
a
difference
between
lawful
and
unlawful
in
the
same
State
,
and
must
suppose
some
Law
in
force
,
by
whose
command
or
permission
at
least
,
that
Act
becomes
lawful
:
which
,
as
we
endeavour
to
establish
,
so
doth
Mr.
H.
as
plainly
destroy
it
,
whilst
he
asserts
no
difference
between
just
and
unjust
:
but
with
what
reason
I
shall
leave
it
to
the
indifferent
Reader
to
judge
.
§
.
3.
But
since
I
have
already
answered
those
Preliminary
Principles
which
he
hath
laid
down
in
his
De
Cive
,
to
prove
the
necessity
of
this
state
of
War
,
there
remains
nothing
else
for
us
to
do
,
but
to
examine
those
new
Reasons
Mr.
H.
hath
here
given
us
in
this
Chapter
of
his
Leviathan
to
prove
this
state
of
War
to
be
both
natural
,
and
necessary
;
which
he
here
deduces
from
three
Affections
in
the
nature
of
man
.
1.
Competition
for
the
same
thing
.
2.
Diffidence
of
each
other
.
3.
Glory
to
himself
.
The
first
is
manifest
;
That
during
the
time
men
live
without
out
a
Common
Power
to
keep
them
in
awe
,
they
are
in
that
Condition
which
is
called
War
.
Whence
I
cannot
but
again
observe
,
That
this
Author
takes
the
natural
state
of
Mankind
only
from
their
Passions
,
without
any
consideration
of
Reason
,
or
Experience
;
although
he
hath
already
supposed
both
of
these
to
be
natural
Faculties
of
the
Mind
:
and
the
true
nature
of
a
thing
is
to
be
taken
not
from
its
imperfections
,
or
weaknesses
,
but
from
the
utmost
perfection
that
it
is
by
its
nature
capable
of
;
and
therefore
this
Author
hath
dealt
very
preposterously
to
treat
of
the
natural
State
of
Man
,
as
of
a
meer
Animal
,
only
governed
by
the
force
of
his
Passions
;
whereas
,
the
principal
part
of
Man
,
and
which
ought
to
have
the
government
over
all
the
other
Faculties
,
is
Reason
;
or
that
Faculty
of
the
rational
Soul
,
whose
due
use
and
exercise
ought
not
to
be
excluded
,
but
rather
conjoined
with
the
operations
of
all
the
other
natural
Faculties
,
by
any
Writer
who
will
truly
describe
the
Nature
of
Man
;
nor
yet
are
men
necessarily
impelled
by
these
Passions
,
as
meer
Machines
are
driven
or
moved
by
the
Wind
,
or
Weights
;
but
that
they
may
be
governed
,
and
restrained
by
Reason
,
or
fear
of
future
evil
:
so
that
they
do
not
hurry
men
into
War
by
any
natural
,
or
inevitable
necessity
.
Indeed
those
Ideas
of
the
Mind
,
which
are
necessarily
generated
therein
from
the
impulse
of
outward
Objects
,
are
not
prohibited
by
the
Law
of
Nature
,
because
we
are
design'd
by
God
to
govern
those
Actions
only
which
are
in
our
powers
:
Whereas
these
Passions
and
Ideas
,
from
whence
Mr.
H.
collects
this
state
of
War
to
be
necessary
,
are
of
this
sort
,
since
being
concerning
things
future
,
and
at
a
distance
,
and
depending
upon
mens
reason
,
and
foresight
,
they
may
be
also
governed
thereby
;
and
Mr.
H.
himself
acknowledges
in
his
De
Cive
,
Chap.
3.
§
.
31.
That
though
men
,
because
of
their
different
Appetites
,
cannot
agree
of
the
present
,
yet
they
may
of
the
future
,
and
from
thence
acknowledges
,
that
Peace
is
to
be
sought
as
the
foundation
of
all
natural
Law
.
§
.
4.
And
therefore
I
think
I
shall
be
able
easily
to
shew
,
that
every
one
of
these
three
Master-Passions
,
which
he
hath
here
described
as
the
Causes
of
War
,
ought
(
if
governed
by
Reason
)
to
persuade
the
contrary
.
And
in
the
first
place
,
for
his
Passion
of
Competition
,
That
when
two
men
desire
the
same
thing
,
which
they
cannot
both
enjoy
,
they
become
Enemies
;
and
in
the
way
to
their
end
,
endeavour
to
destroy
,
or
subdue
one
another
.
Now
certainly
Reason
in
this
Case
will
never
incite
a
rational
man
to
enter
into
a
state
of
War
with
another
,
for
the
obtaining
of
that
which
he
hath
a
mind
to
as
well
as
he
.
For
if
it
be
a
thing
the
other
is
already
possessed
of
,
he
ought
by
the
Rules
of
Reason
,
and
Equity
,
to
let
him
enjoy
it
by
right
of
Occupancy
or
Possession
;
it
being
then
necessary
for
his
preservation
,
or
happiness
;
and
he
himself
,
if
possessed
of
the
like
thing
,
would
think
it
reasonable
that
he
should
be
likewise
permitted
quietly
to
enjoy
it
:
So
that
if
he
act
by
one
Rule
in
relation
to
himself
,
and
by
another
in
respect
of
all
other
men
,
in
the
same
Case
,
or
Circumstances
,
this
must
be
altogether
unreasonable
:
And
Mr.
H.
himself
doth
sufficiently
shew
the
grievous
mischeifs
of
such
an
unreasonable
way
of
proceeding
,
when
he
tells
us
,
That
from
hence
it
comes
to
pass
;
That
where
an
Invader
hath
no
more
to
fear
than
another
man's
single
Power
,
If
one
plant
,
sow
,
build
or
possess
a
convenient
Seat
,
others
may
probably
be
expected
to
come
prepared
with
Forces
united
to
dispossess
and
deprive
him
,
not
only
of
the
Fruit
of
his
Labour
,
but
also
of
his
Life
,
or
Liberty
;
and
the
Invader
again
is
in
the
like
danger
of
another
.
To
which
I
may
also
add
,
and
he
again
of
a
third
;
till
at
last
all
the
Owners
of
it
being
successively
destroyed
,
the
House
or
Seat
will
become
void
,
and
no
man
left
to
inhabit
it
;
which
Condition
Mr.
H.
himself
confesses
to
be
so
sad
,
and
deplorable
,
that
he
will
have
Mankind
from
the
Dictates
of
Reason
to
do
all
they
can
to
get
out
of
it
,
by
entering
into
a
Civil
Society
.
But
I
suppose
that
right
Reason
will
rather
hinder
all
rational
men
from
ever
falling
into
this
State
at
all
,
if
they
can
by
any
means
avoid
,
or
prevent
it
;
since
Peace
is
to
be
valued
from
its
own
Conveniences
without
trying
,
or
comparing
it
with
the
Evils
of
War
,
as
Health
is
valuable
for
its
own
agreeableness
to
our
Natures
,
without
trying
by
woful
experience
▪
what
sickness
is
.
§
.
5.
And
as
for
his
next
Passion
,
Diffidence
of
each
other
;
That
there
is
no
way
for
any
man
to
secure
himself
,
so
reasonable
as
Anticipation
;
that
is
,
by
force
,
or
wiles
,
to
master
the
persons
of
all
men
he
can
,
so
long
,
till
he
see
no
other
Power
great
enough
to
endanger
him
.
And
that
this
is
no
more
than
his
own
conservation
requires
,
and
is
generally
allowed
.
Now
can
all
this
reasonably
persuade
a
man
to
put
himself
in
so
hazardous
a
condition
,
as
by
force
,
or
fraud
,
as
to
go
about
to
master
and
subdue
all
those
he
will
be
afraid
of
;
or
to
think
he
is
able
to
do
this
by
his
own
single
strength
till
he
sees
no
other
Power
great
enough
to
endanger
him
?
Since
for
any
man
to
be
able
to
do
this
,
he
must
have
more
cunning
,
natural
Strength
and
Courage
and
Cunning
,
than
ever
Homer
supposed
Vlisses
,
or
Achilles
,
to
have
been
masters
of
;
or
our
Modern
Romance-makers
can
feign
in
their
Heroes
;
Since
upon
these
Terms
of
Self-preservation
,
a
man
(
like
a
Game-Cock
)
would
be
forced
to
fight
a
Battel
,
or
two
,
every
day
whilst
he
lived
,
and
how
long
this
would
last
,
supposing
other
men
of
equal
strength
,
and
as
well
prepared
as
himself
,
I
refer
him
to
the
experiment
of
fighting-Cocks
,
who
seldom
survive
the
twelfth
or
thirteenth
Battel
;
and
though
it
is
true
,
that
there
are
some
that
taking
pleasure
in
contemplating
their
own
Power
in
Acts
of
Conquests
,
which
they
may
pursue
farther
than
their
own
Security
requires
;
yet
this
was
never
known
to
be
performed
by
any
man's
single
strength
,
but
by
a
Combination
with
divers
others
,
who
through
the
esteem
they
had
of
his
Integrity
,
or
Courage
,
chose
such
a
man
to
be
their
Leader
,
or
Prince
,
before
another
:
And
this
Account
,
both
the
Ancient
Historians
,
and
Poets
,
give
us
of
the
Original
of
the
first
Monarchs
,
and
Ancient
Kings
,
in
the
Heroical
Times
;
and
admitting
the
first
Kingdoms
to
have
begun
by
Fathers
,
or
Patriarchs
of
Families
,
as
some
Divines
suppose
,
yet
they
could
never
have
raised
a
sufficient
Force
to
have
conquered
others
,
without
the
Combination
of
the
Heads
or
Fathers
of
other
Families
:
Nor
could
Nimrod
himself
,
(
who
is
supposed
the
first
Tyrant
,
or
Conqueror
,
)
ever
have
enlarged
the
Bounds
of
his
Empire
by
his
own
single
strength
,
or
that
of
his
particular
Family
,
without
such
a
Combination
which
requires
Compacts
between
the
Persons
that
make
it
;
and
when
they
once
do
this
,
they
are
then
no
longer
in
the
meer
state
of
Nature
,
having
set
up
and
acknowledged
a
common
Power
over
them
to
keep
them
in
awe
:
from
whence
it
appears
,
that
it
is
ridiculous
,
nay
absolutely
impossible
,
for
any
single
man
to
take
pleasure
in
contemplating
his
own
Power
in
Acts
of
Conquest
by
his
own
personal
Valour
,
or
Cunning
,
as
Mr.
H.
supposes
a
man
may
do
in
the
state
of
Nature
.
§
.
6.
And
as
for
his
appeal
to
Experience
,
That
when
a
man
taking
a
Iourney
,
arms
himself
;
when
going
to
Bed
,
he
locks
his
Doors
;
when
even
in
his
House
,
he
locks
his
Chests
:
And
asks
what
opinion
he
hath
of
his
Fellow-subjects
,
when
he
rides
armed
,
and
shuts
his
Doors
;
or
of
his
Children
and
Servants
,
when
he
locks
his
Chests
;
And
whether
he
doth
not
thereby
accuse
Mankind
as
much
by
his
Actions
,
as
he
doth
by
his
Words
?
To
all
which
I
answer
,
No
,
he
doth
not
.
For
though
I
grant
it
is
no
fault
to
distrust
,
and
secure
himself
as
well
as
he
can
against
violent
and
unjust
Persons
,
either
upon
the
Road
,
or
in
his
own
House
;
yet
doth
not
this
Diffidence
accuse
all
his
Fellow-subjects
,
or
all
his
Children
,
and
Servants
,
much
less
all
Mankind
,
of
a
design
to
murther
,
or
rob
him
;
or
give
him
any
Right
to
make
War
upon
them
by
way
of
anticipation
;
for
when
he
goes
armed
,
or
locks
his
Doors
,
or
Chests
,
't
is
true
,
he
grants
there
are
some
violent
and
wicked
Persons
,
whom
he
would
secure
himself
against
:
yet
doth
not
this
accuse
all
Mankind
of
this
wicked
Design
,
since
a
man
will
do
all
this
,
if
he
be
satisfied
that
there
are
but
two
or
three
Thieves
between
his
own
House
and
London
;
or
but
one
thievish
Person
in
his
Family
,
which
is
but
a
small
proportion
to
a
whole
Countrey
,
or
Kingdom
,
or
even
to
his
own
particular
Family
▪
much
less
doth
he
thereby
pass
a
Censure
upon
all
Mankind
:
though
it
is
true
,
he
thereby
acknowledges
,
that
there
is
,
and
ever
will
be
,
amongst
men
,
divers
who
are
more
governed
by
their
present
Appetites
and
Passions
,
than
by
Reason
,
or
the
Laws
of
Nature
.
Much
less
doth
such
a
diffidence
give
a
man
a
right
in
the
state
of
Nature
of
setting
upon
,
mastering
,
and
killing
all
Persons
whatsoever
,
that
he
fancies
have
power
sufficient
to
endanger
him
in
his
Life
,
or
Goods
,
before
they
have
given
some
sufficient
signs
that
they
intend
so
to
do
;
for
then
it
might
be
lawful
(
were
it
not
for
the
Laws
)
for
a
man
,
when
he
is
thus
armed
,
to
set
upon
,
not
only
Thieves
,
but
every
man
he
meets
,
for
fear
he
should
set
upon
him
first
;
nay
,
might
likewise
kill
,
or
knock
in
the
Head
,
(
if
he
were
in
the
meer
state
of
Nature
)
any
of
his
Children
,
or
Servants
,
or
even
his
Wife
her self
,
if
he
did
but
fancy
they
went
about
to
murther
,
or
rob
him
;
which
how
wicked
and
unreasonable
a
thing
it
would
be
,
I
leave
to
any
man's
Reason
and
Conscience
to
judge
.
Nor
does
his
comparing
the
state
of
War
to
the
nature
of
Foul-weather
,
at
all
help
him
,
which
he
saith
,
doth
not
lie
in
a
shower
or
two
of
Rain
,
but
in
an
inclination
thereto
of
many
days
together
:
So
the
nature
of
War
consists
not
in
actual
fighting
,
but
in
the
known
disposition
thereto
:
all
which
I
easily
grant
,
but
he
must
likewise
own
that
it
is
never
called
a
Rainy
,
or
foul
Season
,
till
it
hath
actually
rained
;
till
then
we
never
say
it
is
foul
weather
,
though
it
be
never
so
cloudy
;
so
neither
is
this
bare
inclination
to
hurt
,
an
actual
War
,
till
there
hath
been
some
signs
or
tokens
of
hostility
expressed
.
§
.
7.
Yet
he
grants
there
was
never
such
a
condition
of
War
as
this
that
he
describes
generally
all
over
the
World
:
But
that
there
are
many
places
where
men
live
so
now
,
and
Instances
in
many
savage
People
of
America
;
where
,
except
the
Government
of
small
Families
(
the
concord
whereof
depends
on
Natural
Lust
)
they
have
no
Government
at
all
,
and
live
at
this
day
in
that
brutish
manner
he
hath
before
described
:
But
were
it
so
as
he
affirms
that
brutish
way
of
living
,
which
is
in
too
many
Particulars
practised
by
these
Savage
People
,
both
in
Affrica
,
and
America
,
where
they
have
almost
lost
all
knowledge
of
a
God
,
or
of
a
Moral
Good
and
Evil
;
Ought
the
Practice
of
such
Barbarous
People
to
be
of
sufficient
Authority
to
prove
,
that
they
live
according
to
the
true
state
of
Human
Nature
,
or
that
they
have
a
right
to
live
and
act
thus
in
all
things
they
thus
unreasonably
practice
?
But
had
this
Author
read
any
true
or
exact
relations
of
those
Places
in
America
he
mentions
,
he
might
have
found
that
in
many
of
those
Nations
,
as
also
the
French
History
of
the
Caribbè
Islands
.
even
,
where
there
is
no
Civil
Power
to
keep
them
in
awe
,
and
tho'
they
have
no
other
Government
in
time
of
Peace
,
but
that
of
the
Fathers
,
or
Heads
of
Families
:
Yet
doth
not
their
concord
wholly
depend
upon
Natural
Lust
:
For
besides
the
Government
of
Husbands
over
their
Wives
,
and
those
conjugal
Duties
and
Services
which
their
Wives
yield
them
in
these
Places
;
Parents
are
more
fond
of
their
Children
,
and
Children
again
are
more
dutiful
and
kind
to
their
Parents
,
and
take
more
care
of
them
when
they
are
sick
or
old
,
than
they
commonly
do
with
us
:
And
though
there
be
no
Common
Power
to
keep
them
in
awe
,
yet
having
no
Riches
,
but
the
meer
necessary
Utensils
of
Living
,
nor
any
Honours
,
except
Military
,
to
contend
for
,
and
which
are
not
obtained
without
great
hardships
and
sufferings
;
and
having
also
few
Words
of
contempt
,
or
disgrace
among
them
;
whole
Towns
,
nay
Nations
,
have
lived
together
for
many
Ages
in
sufficient
Amity
and
Concord
,
without
ever
falling
together
by
the
ears
.
And
if
there
be
any
Murthers
and
Adulteries
committed
among
them
,
every
particular
person
injured
,
or
else
the
Relations
of
the
Party
slain
,
are
their
own
Judges
and
Executioners
;
the
mutual
fear
of
which
,
joyned
with
the
Natural
Peaceable
Temper
of
the
People
,
causes
fewer
of
those
Crimes
to
be
committed
among
them
,
than
with
us
,
where
there
are
Laws
and
Publick
Officers
appointed
to
punish
all
such
Injuries
:
And
for
the
Truth
of
this
,
I
refer
you
to
two
Authors
of
undoubted
Credit
,
(
viz.
)
Lerius
in
his
History
of
his
Navigation
to
Brazil
,
Chap.
18.
and
the
French
Author
of
the
Natural
History
of
the
Caribbè
Islands
,
Part.
2d
.
Chap.
11.
and
§.
19.
besides
other
Authors
on
this
Subject
,
whom
you
may
consult
in
Purchas's
Pilgrimes
,
in
his
Volume
of
America
.
And
though
these
People
have
often
Wars
with
their
Neighbours
,
yet
is
it
not
with
all
,
but
only
some
particular
Nations
,
with
whom
they
have
constant
Wars
,
and
eat
them
when
they
can
take
them
Prisoners
.
Yet
do
they
at
the
same
time
maintain
Peace
with
all
others
.
So
remote
is
it
from
Truth
,
that
any
Nation
in
the
World
can
live
and
subsist
,
by
maintaining
a
constant
War
against
all
others
.
Nor
did
I
ever
hear
of
any
more
than
one
People
or
Nation
in
the
West-Indies
,
near
Carolina
,
called
the
Westoes
,
that
made
this
Fatal
Experiment
,
by
making
war
upon
all
their
Neighbours
,
one
after
another
,
till
they
were
in
a
short
time
reduced
from
7000
Fighting
Men
,
to
700
,
and
were
afterwards
quite
extirpated
by
those
Nations
they
had
injured
:
Which
Relation
I
receiv'd
from
a
Gentleman
of
Quality
,
who
hath
a
considerable
Interest
in
those
parts
.
So
impossible
a
thing
it
is
,
for
Mankind
to
subsist
,
or
be
preserved
a
year
together
in
Mr.
H's
imaginary
State
of
War
.
§.
8
.
Nor
is
his
other
Instance
from
the
Actions
of
Kings
,
and
Persons
of
a
Soveraign
Authority
,
any
better
,
whom
he
makes
like
Gladiators
,
Having
their
Weapons
pointing
,
and
their
eyes
fixed
on
each
other
;
That
is
,
their
Forts
,
Garrisons
and
Guns
,
upon
the
Frontieres
of
their
Kingdoms
,
and
continual
Spies
upon
their
Neighbours
,
which
is
a
posture
of
War
.
Where
I
may
first
observe
,
that
he
doth
not
directly
affirm
,
That
all
Princes
are
in
a
State
,
but
only
in
a
Posture
of
War
,
which
I
grant
is
both
lawful
and
necessary
:
Since
no
Prince
or
Common-wealth
can
be
secure
,
that
his
Neighbours
will
constantly
observe
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
and
not
invade
his
Territories
,
without
any
just
cause
given
.
Yet
I
think
no
Prince
,
or
other
Supreme
Power
(
whom
he
makes
the
only
Judges
of
Good
and
Evil
)
will
be
so
wicked
or
unreasonable
to
affirm
,
that
they
have
a
natural
right
to
invade
the
Territories
,
Lives
and
Estates
of
all
Neighbouring
Princes
,
and
their
Subjects
;
much
less
,
when
they
have
made
Leagues
or
Compacts
of
Peace
with
each
other
,
that
they
are
not
obliged
to
observe
them
,
only
for
prevention
that
they
may
not
do
the
like
to
them
,
and
break
their
Compacts
first
:
For
that
he
himself
confesses
to
be
absolutely
contrary
to
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
and
of
Right
Reason
.
But
that
upon
Mr.
H's
Principles
such
Compacts
being
made
in
the
meer
State
of
Nature
,
and
without
any
Common
Power
to
see
them
observed
,
do
not
at
all
oblige
,
I
shall
shew
you
more
particularly
by
and
by
.
§
.
9.
I
come
now
to
his
last
Passion
,
(
viz.
)
Glory
,
for
which
he
would
have
all
men
to
be
naturally
in
a
State
of
War
.
But
admitting
that
divers
men
look
that
their
Companions
should
value
them
at
the
same
rate
as
they
do
themselves
;
and
upon
the
least
signs
of
Contempt
,
or
undervaluing
,
naturally
endeavour
as
far
as
they
dare
,
to
extort
a
greater
value
from
their
Contemners
,
which
amongst
them
that
have
no
Common
Power
to
keep
them
quiet
,
may
be
enough
to
make
them
destroy
each
other
.
Yet
doth
not
this
hold
true
in
every
man
;
for
even
among
those
that
labour
under
this
Passion
of
Vain-glory
,
there
are
many
in
whom
fear
of
others
is
a
much
more
predominate
passion
,
and
such
will
rather
take
an
affront
,
than
venture
to
beat
or
kill
another
to
revenge
it
:
Since
the
hazard
is
certain
,
but
the
Victory
(
supposing
the
person
every
way
his
equal
)
uncertain
.
And
if
this
Vain-glory
may
be
so
far
mastered
by
another
stronger
Passion
;
why
may
it
not
also
be
overpowered
by
Reason
?
For
a
rational
man
will
consider
,
that
he
cannot
force
men
to
have
a
better
esteem
of
his
Words
or
Actions
by
fighting
every
one
that
shall
declare
their
dislike
of
them
,
or
else
knows
that
he
is
not
at
all
the
worse
for
the
foolish
censures
of
unreasonable
men
;
or
that
he
is
obliged
to
take
for
an
affront
,
whatsoever
every
scurrilous
impertinent
Fellow
shall
intend
so
:
And
he
himself
doth
here
likewise
suppose
,
that
there
are
other
as
strong
Passions
that
incline
men
to
Peace
,
as
fear
of
Death
,
desire
of
such
things
as
are
necessary
;
commodious
living
;
and
a
hope
by
their
Industry
to
obtain
them
;
from
whence
I
observe
,
that
the
greatest
part
of
these
Passions
which
now
incline
men
to
Peace
,
are
but
the
same
in
other
words
,
which
before
inclined
them
to
War
:
For
what
is
this
Diffidence
of
another
,
and
this
Anticipation
,
which
he
makes
so
reasonable
,
but
a
fear
of
Death
,
or
other
mischief
,
from
those
whom
he
thus
goeth
about
to
prevent
?
And
what
is
this
desire
of
things
necessary
for
life
,
but
a
Branch
of
that
Right
which
he
supposes
all
men
have
to
all
things
?
But
granting
that
the
same
Passions
may
in
some
men
produce
different
effects
;
yet
if
these
Passions
that
incline
men
to
peace
are
more
strong
and
powerful
than
those
that
excite
them
to
War
,
then
certainly
Peace
will
be
their
more
constant
and
Natural
State
:
Since
as
Mariners
relate
the
violent
blowing
of
two
contrary
winds
,
doth
often
in
the
Center
of
their
Motion
produce
a
Calm
.
And
therefore
Mr.
H.
proceeds
very
rashly
,
to
lay
such
a
great
stress
on
those
Passions
,
which
provoke
men
to
War
,
without
also
considering
,
and
putting
into
the
contrary
Scale
all
those
that
incline
men
to
the
contrary
,
which
certainly
are
more
prevalent
in
most
men
:
For
what
can
more
strongly
influence
mens
Actions
,
than
fear
of
Death
,
and
all
those
other
miseries
which
he
himself
so
lively
describes
to
be
the
necessary
Consequences
of
the
State
of
War
:
And
whereas
he
tells
us
,
that
reason
suggesteth
convenient
Articles
of
peace
;
I
think
I
have
sufficiently
proved
,
that
Reason
is
so
far
from
needing
Articles
of
peace
,
that
it
can
never
prompt
considering
men
to
believe
themselves
naturally
in
so
dangerous
and
miserable
a
State
,
as
this
which
Mr.
H.
supposes
;
much
less
to
fall
into
it
on
purpose
,
without
any
just
cause
given
.
But
since
this
Author
undertakes
to
give
us
many
Reasons
why
mens
Passions
will
not
permit
them
to
live
in
peace
as
well
as
divers
other
Creatures
,
whom
he
confesses
can
do
so
without
Laws
;
We
will
a
little
examine
those
Reasons
he
brings
,
Why
mens
Nature
will
not
naturally
permit
them
to
live
in
peace
,
as
well
as
those
brute
Creatures
;
and
therefore
I
shall
put
them
down
in
his
own
Words
,
as
you
may
find
them
in
his
Lev.
Chap.
17.
§
.
10.
It
is
true
,
that
certain
living
Creatures
,
as
Bees
and
Ants
,
live
sociably
one
with
another
(
which
are
therefore
by
Aristotle
,
numbred
amongst
Political
Creatures
)
and
yet
have
no
other
Direction
than
their
particular
Iudgments
,
and
Appetites
,
not
Speech
,
whereby
one
of
them
can
signifie
to
another
,
what
he
thinks
expedient
for
the
Common
Benefit
.
And
therefore
some
men
may
perhaps
desire
to
know
why
mankind
cannot
do
the
same
?
To
which
I
answer
.
First
,
That
men
are
continually
in
competition
for
Honour
and
Dignity
,
which
these
Creatures
are
not
;
and
consequently
amongst
men
,
there
ariseth
from
that
ground
,
Envy
and
Hatred
,
and
finally
War
;
but
amongst
these
not
so
.
To
which
I
reply
,
That
these
Civil
Honours
,
about
which
he
supposes
these
Contentions
do
so
often
arise
amongst
men
,
have
no
place
in
the
State
of
Nature
,
being
not
known
amongst
men
,
before
the
Institution
of
Commonwealths
;
and
therefore
they
cannot
in
this
State
,
which
he
now
treats
of
,
contend
for
them
more
than
Brutes
.
So
that
the
only
true
Glory
and
Honour
which
can
be
found
,
out
of
a
Civil
Government
,
is
as
Cicero
very
well
defines
it
in
his
Tusc.
Quest.
the
agreeing
praise
of
good
men
,
and
the
uncorrupted
Suffrages
of
those
that
rightly
judge
of
excellent
Vertue
.
But
all
the
Vertues
being
contained
under
the
study
of
the
Common
Good
of
Rational
Beings
,
from
thence
alone
can
spring
the
praise
of
good
men
:
And
the
desire
of
such
Honour
,
is
so
far
from
causing
a
War
against
all
men
,
that
as
from
a
contrary
Principle
,
men
may
by
this
be
excited
to
the
exercise
of
all
those
Virtues
,
which
Mr.
H.
himself
allows
,
Lev.
Chap.
15.
to
be
the
necessary
means
of
Common
Peace
and
Safety
.
§
.
11.
His
Second
Reason
is
,
that
amongst
these
Creatures
,
the
Common
Good
differeth
not
from
the
Private
;
and
being
by
nature
inclined
to
their
Private
,
they
procure
thereby
the
Common
Benefit
.
But
Man
,
whose
joy
consisteth
in
comparing
himself
with
other
men
,
can
relish
nothing
,
but
what
is
eminent
.
To
which
we
may
reply
,
that
Mr.
H.
has
done
us
a
Courtesie
,
in
acknowledging
before
he
is
aware
;
that
even
out
of
Civil
Government
,
there
is
some
common
and
publick
Good
,
which
may
be
indeed
procured
even
by
Brutes
themselves
:
And
he
has
elsewhere
also
told
us
(
as
in
his
Treatise
De
Homine
,
Chap.
10.
the
very
last
Words
)
But
we
suppose
the
knowledge
of
the
Common
Good
,
to
be
a
fit
means
to
bring
men
both
to
Peace
,
and
Vertue
;
because
it
is
both
amiable
in
its
own
Nature
,
and
the
surest
defence
of
each
man's
private
Good
.
And
sure
its
difference
in
some
cases
from
the
private
good
of
some
men
,
is
no
sufficient
Reason
why
men
should
rather
fall
out
and
fight
among
themselves
,
than
Bees
or
Ants
,
whose
Common
Good
is
likewise
distinguished
from
the
private
.
But
as
for
what
he
affirms
,
concerning
the
Nature
of
men
,
if
it
be
universally
understood
of
all
men
(
as
his
words
seem
to
intend
)
't
is
false
,
and
spoken
without
all
manner
of
proof
,
unless
we
must
be
sent
back
to
his
general
Demonstration
of
these
things
in
his
Introduction
to
his
Lev.
when
he
advises
every
man
to
this
Rule
,
Nosce
teipsum
;
and
therefore
would
teach
us
from
the
Similitude
of
the
thoughts
any
passions
of
one
man
to
those
of
another
,
thereby
to
know
what
are
the
thoughts
of
all
other
men
,
upon
the
like
occasion
.
Perhaps
Mr.
Hobbs
knew
himself
very
well
,
and
was
sensible
there
was
nothing
more
pleasant
to
him
,
than
comparing
himself
with
other
men
,
and
so
could
relish
nothing
in
himself
,
either
as
his
own
Natural
Endowments
,
or
acquired
Improvements
,
but
what
was
more
eminent
,
and
greater
than
other
mens
;
and
from
thence
gathered
the
same
thoughts
to
be
in
all
others
:
But
he
ought
to
have
shewn
something
in
the
nature
of
man
,
from
whence
it
is
necessary
that
all
men
should
so
judge
;
for
certainly
all
that
are
truly
rational
,
can
know
from
the
true
use
of
things
,
and
from
the
necessity
of
their
own
Natures
,
how
to
judge
concerning
their
own
things
,
whether
they
are
pleasant
or
not
,
and
to
what
degree
they
do
delight
them
,
without
comparing
them
with
those
of
other
men
:
So
that
indeed
none
but
the
foolish
or
envious
can
only
be
pleased
,
as
far
as
their
own
things
exceed
those
of
others
.
But
if
he
would
have
this
censure
,
only
to
concern
such
men
,
it
will
not
then
afford
a
sufficient
cause
of
an
Universal
War
of
all
men
against
all
;
And
though
perhaps
Strife
and
Contention
may
be
begun
amongst
such
envious
,
foolish
People
,
yet
the
strength
or
reason
of
the
more
prudent
and
peaceable
may
easily
restrain
it
,
that
it
shall
never
hurt
,
or
destroy
all
men
,
by
making
them
enter
into
a
state
of
War
against
all
.
§
.
12.
His
Third
Reason
is
,
That
these
Creatures
having
not
(
as
man
)
the
use
of
Reason
,
do
not
see
(
or
at
least
think
they
see
)
any
fault
in
the
administration
of
their
Common
business
:
Whereas
amongst
men
,
there
are
very
many
that
think
themselves
.
Wiser
,
and
Abler
to
govern
the
Publick
,
better
than
the
rest
;
and
those
strive
to
Reform
,
and
Innovate
,
one
this
way
,
another
that
way
,
and
thereby
bring
it
into
Distraction
,
and
Civil
War
.
To
which
we
may
thus
Reply
,
That
this
Reason
offers
nothing
whereby
men
may
live
less
peaceably
among
themselves
,
if
they
were
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
and
Subjects
to
no
Civil
Government
,
than
Brutes
:
But
in
this
state
,
mens
Natural
Propensions
to
universal
Benevolence
,
and
to
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
would
have
some
place
,
notwithstanding
what
he
hath
here
alledged
to
the
contrary
;
as
I
have
sufficiently
proved
in
the
precedent
Discourse
.
Nor
doth
he
here
offer
any
thing
whereby
men
could
less
agree
among
themselves
to
institute
a
Common-wealth
,
for
this
is
the
thing
whose
causes
we
are
now
seeking
for
.
But
he
only
objects
something
,
which
will
hinder
them
from
preserving
it
,
when
it
is
instituted
;
and
therefore
this
will
also
shake
all
the
foundations
of
Peace
,
even
in
a
Commonwealth
,
when
it
is
made
never
so
firm
according
to
his
own
model
.
But
we
do
well
to
consider
,
whether
mens
Reason
does
not
more
powerfully
promote
Peace
and
Concord
,
by
detecting
many
errors
of
the
Imaginations
and
Passions
,
than
it
doth
Discord
,
by
its
fallibility
about
those
things
which
are
necessary
,
being
but
few
,
and
those
plain
enough
.
Besides
,
men
do
not
presently
make
War
,
as
soon
as
they
suppose
they
spy
out
somewhat
they
may
blame
in
the
Administration
of
publick
Affairs
;
for
the
same
reason
which
discovers
the
fault
,
does
also
tell
them
,
that
many
things
are
to
be
born
with
for
Peace
sake
,
and
sugggests
divers
means
whereby
an
emendation
of
that
fault
,
or
miscarriage
,
may
be
peaceably
procured
.
So
that
I
dare
appeal
to
the
Judgment
of
the
indifferent
Reader
,
whether
the
condition
of
Mankind
is
worse
than
that
of
Brutes
,
because
it
is
Rational
;
and
whether
Mr.
H.
doth
not
judge
very
hardly
of
all
men
,
by
making
their
Reason
guilty
of
all
these
miseries
,
which
in
other
places
he
imputes
only
to
the
Passions
;
and
from
this
cause
would
prove
that
men
must
live
less
peaceably
with
each
other
than
Brute
Creatures
.
In
short
,
Mr.
H's
Answer
is
nothing
to
the
purpose
,
for
our
inquiry
is
concerning
the
obligation
of
the
precepts
of
Reason
in
the
state
of
Nature
;
and
his
Answer
is
,
That
most
mens
Reason
is
so
false
,
as
that
it
would
dissolve
all
Commonwealths
already
constituted
.
§
.
13.
His
fourth
Reason
is
,
That
these
Creatures
,
tho
they
have
some
use
of
voice
in
making
known
to
one
another
their
desires
,
and
other
affections
;
yet
they
want
that
art
of
words
by
which
some
men
can
represent
to
others
,
that
which
is
Good
in
the
likeness
of
Evil
,
and
Evil
in
the
likeness
of
Good
;
and
augment
or
diminish
the
apparent
greatness
of
Good
and
Evil
,
discontenting
men
,
and
troubling
their
peace
at
their
pleasure
.
The
force
of
which
Answer
is
no
more
than
this
;
That
because
it
sometimes
falls
out
,
that
the
common
People
are
moved
to
Mutiny
and
Sedition
by
a
specious
,
or
sophistical
Sermon
,
or
Oration
,
that
therefore
men
,
as
having
the
use
of
Speech
,
cannot
maintain
peace
among
themselves
:
which
consequence
is
certainly
very
loose
;
for
he
ought
to
prove
,
that
all
men
do
necessarily
and
constantly
make
such
Speeches
,
tending
to
Civil
War
,
and
Sedition
;
and
also
that
such
Speeches
,
when
heard
,
do
constantly
prevail
on
their
Auditors
,
or
the
most
part
of
them
,
that
they
should
presently
take
up
Arms
:
For
it
may
be
,
that
even
the
Vulgar
may
see
through
such
false
and
specious
Speeches
,
and
may
not
suffer
themselves
to
be
deluded
by
them
.
It
may
also
happen
,
that
they
may
rather
give
credit
to
the
peaceable
Speeches
of
the
more
wise
,
and
moderate
,
as
founded
upon
more
solid
Reasons
:
And
it
may
be
,
that
they
will
rather
consider
the
true
weight
of
the
Arguments
,
than
the
empty
sound
of
the
Words
;
and
certainly
mens
rational
Nature
leads
them
to
do
this
;
for
they
know
they
cannot
be
fed
,
or
defended
by
Words
,
but
by
Actions
proceeding
from
mutual
Benevolence
:
What
then
doth
hinder
,
but
that
the
Eloquence
and
Reason
of
the
Good
and
Peaceable
may
not
often
prevail
,
with
which
both
the
Reason
of
the
Speaker
,
the
true
interest
of
the
Auditors
,
and
the
nature
of
things
do
all
agree
;
But
I
shall
speak
no
more
of
this
Subject
now
,
having
in
the
precedent
Discourse
sufficiently
proved
,
That
men
receive
much
greater
Benefits
from
the
use
of
Speech
(
though
it
may
sometimes
be
the
cause
of
Civil
Discords
,
and
Wars
)
than
they
do
Evils
and
Mischiefs
thereby
.
And
I
suppose
Mr.
H.
himself
(
were
he
alive
)
would
confess
that
Mankind
would
not
be
rendered
more
peaceable
,
or
easie
to
be
governed
,
had
they
been
all
created
dumb
,
or
else
had
all
their
Tongues
been
cut
out
by
the
irresistible
power
of
his
great
Leviathan
,
the
Civil
Soveraign
.
§
.
14.
His
fifth
Reason
is
,
That
irrational
Creatures
cannot
distinguish
between
Injury
,
and
Damage
;
and
therefore
as
long
as
they
be
at
ease
,
they
are
not
offended
at
their
Fellows
:
Whereas
man
is
then
most
troublesome
,
when
he
is
most
at
ease
;
for
then
it
is
that
he
loves
to
shew
his
wisdom
,
and
controul
the
Actions
of
them
that
govern
the
Commonwealth
.
By
which
Antithesis
,
he
would
infer
,
That
men
live
together
less
peaceably
than
Brutes
,
because
they
distinguish
between
Injury
and
Damage
:
But
we
think
much
otherwise
;
and
that
most
men
would
more
willingly
suffer
some
damage
,
even
done
by
other
men
,
so
it
be
not
done
injuriously
.
And
I
acknowledge
that
all
the
distinction
between
these
two
,
is
founded
in
the
knowledge
of
Right
,
and
Law
,
which
indeed
is
only
proper
to
men
.
But
that
this
Knowledge
should
make
them
more
prone
to
violate
the
publick
Peace
,
and
to
trample
upon
the
Laws
and
Rights
of
their
Superiors
,
I
can
by
no
means
admit
;
much
less
,
that
Subjects
that
abound
in
peace
,
and
riches
,
are
more
apt
to
envy
their
Superiors
,
and
to
shew
their
wisdom
in
finding
fault
with
their
Rulers
;
or
that
the
Subjects
of
England
,
for
example
,
who
(
God
be
thanked
enjoy
both
sufficient
peace
,
and
plenty
)
are
more
apt
to
find
fault
with
their
Governors
,
than
those
in
France
or
Turkey
,
where
they
are
poor
and
miserable
by
Taxes
,
and
other
Severities
;
or
that
they
can
even
there
forbear
repining
at
the
cruel
Treatment
of
their
Rulers
,
though
perhaps
their
Spirits
may
be
so
debased
,
and
their
Powers
so
weakned
by
this
oppression
,
that
they
may
not
be
so
able
to
shew
it
by
publick
discourse
,
much
less
by
resistance
;
and
so
free
themselves
from
this
Tyranny
,
as
perhaps
they
would
do
if
they
had
sufficient
Riches
and
Courage
.
And
that
I
conceive
is
the
true
reason
why
this
Author
is
such
an
Enemy
in
all
his
Books
to
the
happiness
and
wealth
of
the
People
,
whom
he
would
all
along
make
Slaves
instead
of
Subjects
.
But
suppose
that
the
lawful
Rights
of
Princes
are
sometimes
violated
by
the
unbridled
Lusts
of
some
evil
men
,
yet
I
do
not
see
how
this
knowledge
of
the
difference
between
those
things
which
are
done
by
right
,
and
those
which
are
done
by
wrong
,
do
render
them
more
apt
to
do
Injuries
to
others
.
But
he
tells
us
,
That
man
is
then
most
troublesome
,
when
he
is
at
ease
.
But
sure
,
it
is
not
without
Injustice
,
that
he
imputes
the
Faults
of
some
men
to
all
Mankind
,
and
that
without
any
proof
;
unless
,
perhaps
,
finding
such
Passions
in
himself
,
he
thence
concluded
that
they
must
likewise
be
natural
to
all
others
,
according
to
the
method
he
makes
use
of
in
his
Introduction
to
this
Book
;
which
I
have
before
taken
notice
of
,
when
he
bids
us
examine
this
similitude
of
Passions
,
and
so
whether
they
do
not
agree
with
his
own
Thoughts
.
But
I
must
freely
confess
they
do
not
agree
with
mine
;
let
me
be
but
happy
,
and
want
nothing
,
and
though
others
may
be
richer
,
or
happier
,
I
shall
not
envy
them
,
nor
am
I
at
all
the
worse
for
it
:
But
indeed
Mr.
H.
does
very
preposterously
to
alledge
this
fault
of
mens
love
to
shew
their
wisdom
,
and
controul
the
Actions
of
them
that
govern
the
Commonwealth
,
against
all
Mankind
;
whilst
he
yet
supposes
men
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
which
sure
(
according
to
his
own
Hypothesis
)
precedes
all
Civil
Government
.
But
we
are
now
come
to
Mr.
H's
last
Reason
;
and
let
us
see
if
he
can
thereby
prove
any
better
,
That
Mankind
is
less
prone
to
Peace
than
Brute
Creatures
.
§
.
15.
Lastly
,
The
agreement
of
these
Creatures
is
natural
,
that
of
Men
is
by
Covenant
only
,
which
is
artificial
;
and
therefore
it
is
no
wonder
if
there
be
somewhat
else
required
,
besides
Covenants
to
make
their
Agreement
constant
,
and
lasting
;
which
is
a
Common
Power
to
keep
them
in
awe
,
and
to
direct
their
Actions
to
the
common
benefit
.
To
which
I
reply
,
That
the
true
natural
Causes
intrinsical
to
Men
as
they
are
Animals
,
and
which
can
bring
them
to
consent
to
the
exercise
of
Peace
,
and
mutual
Benevolence
amongst
themselves
,
are
alike
with
those
that
are
found
in
other
Animals
,
even
the
fiercest
,
and
cruellest
,
suppose
Lions
,
or
Bears
,
(
if
you
will
)
as
I
hope
I
have
sufficiently
proved
in
the
former
part
of
this
Treatise
.
Nor
can
Mr.
H.
shew
any
thing
which
is
wanting
to
man
,
but
yet
is
found
in
Brutes
as
a
cause
of
their
peaceable
agreement
;
for
that
which
he
urges
,
That
the
Agreement
of
these
Creatures
is
natural
,
that
of
men
is
by
Covenant
only
,
and
therefore
artificial
,
may
perhaps
impose
upon
the
Vulgar
,
but
may
easily
be
confuted
by
any
one
that
will
but
consider
to
the
next
Consequence
:
For
those
very
Compacts
or
Covenants
he
mentions
,
are
made
by
the
power
,
as
well
of
mens
Rational
,
as
Animal
Natures
:
And
certainly
if
there
had
been
no
Covenants
made
among
men
,
and
that
they
had
not
the
use
of
Reason
,
yet
the
common
Nature
of
Animals
of
the
same
kind
,
would
have
had
as
much
force
with
them
,
as
with
other
Creatures
,
that
they
should
agree
to
maintain
a
mutual
benevolence
,
as
well
as
Brutes
of
the
same
kind
,
without
destroying
each
other
,
whose
agreement
is
by
him
acknowledged
to
be
natural
:
What
then
hinders
,
but
after
there
is
besides
added
to
Mankind
Reason
,
and
the
use
of
Speech
,
but
that
the
same
natural
agreement
may
still
remain
?
Reason
sure
doth
not
take
away
the
natural
endeavours
,
and
propensions
to
Concord
in
Man
,
more
than
other
Animals
;
neither
is
this
agreement
less
natural
,
or
constant
,
because
it
is
expressed
by
words
:
As
our
Appetite
,
and
taking
in
of
Food
,
do
not
cease
to
be
natural
Actions
in
us
,
although
we
may
express
this
Appetite
by
words
,
or
signs
;
and
may
also
appoint
the
time
,
place
,
and
what
sort
of
Meat
we
will
eat
.
And
Mr.
H.
himself
(
as
well
as
others
)
does
sometimes
acknowledge
Reason
to
be
a
natural
Faculty
,
as
he
does
in
his
De
Cive
,
in
the
place
already
quoted
:
From
whence
it
follows
;
That
this
stricter
Society
or
Agreement
which
Reason
dictates
should
be
established
by
Compacts
,
wholly
proceeds
from
the
rational
Nature
of
Mankind
.
But
it
will
farther
appear
,
That
this
Agreement
proceeding
from
the
use
of
Speech
,
is
therefore
more
fitly
called
natural
,
if
we
consider
our
practical
Reason
to
be
altogether
determined
from
the
nature
of
the
best
End
we
can
foresee
or
propose
;
and
the
best
means
we
can
use
thereunto
.
And
farther
,
there
is
nothing
more
can
be
effected
by
the
utmost
endeavours
of
our
Reason
,
than
that
those
propensions
to
concord
,
with
others
of
our
own
kind
,
(
which
are
so
natural
to
all
Animals
)
should
be
directed
to
their
fit
object
(
viz.
)
all
other
rational
Creatures
,
and
that
all
our
particular
actions
should
be
thence
exerted
according
to
their
due
place
,
time
,
and
other
circumstances
.
So
that
the
very
taking
in
of
Meat
,
and
Drink
,
is
most
natural
,
and
proceeds
from
the
natural
constitution
of
an
Animal
.
Yet
this
in
all
particular
cases
,
is
best
governed
,
and
directed
by
a
man's
Reason
,
taking
care
of
his
own
Health
without
any
irregularities
in
his
Diet
;
whilst
those
precepts
of
thus
regulating
his
Diet
,
whose
force
and
certainty
he
observes
from
the
Nature
of
things
,
and
his
own
particular
Constitution
,
may
very
well
deserve
in
some
cases
,
the
name
of
an
Art
.
Therefore
Mr.
H.
hath
done
very
ill
in
making
that
agreement
among
men
,
which
is
expressed
by
Compacts
,
to
be
so
artificial
,
as
it
must
be
quite
opposed
to
what
is
natural
.
I
shall
not
indeed
deny
,
those
words
by
which
Compacts
are
expressed
,
to
have
proceeded
from
the
Arbitrary
agreements
of
men
:
Yet
that
consent
of
their
minds
,
concerning
the
mutual
offices
of
Benevolence
,
of
which
words
are
only
the
signs
,
is
altogether
Natural
:
For
in
that
consent
of
minds
concerning
the
mutual
commutation
of
Duties
,
consists
the
whole
Nature
of
Compacts
;
as
all
its
obligation
proceeds
from
thence
:
But
the
knowledge
and
will
of
constituting
some
signs
,
either
by
words
or
Actions
,
whereby
this
sort
of
consent
may
be
declared
,
is
so
natural
,
and
easy
to
men
,
without
any
Teaching
,
that
it
may
be
observed
in
persons
born
Deaf
and
Dumb
,
as
I
have
given
some
instances
in
the
foregoing
Discourse
.
In
short
,
this
consent
express'd
by
Compacts
,
concerning
,
these
most
general
acts
of
Benevolence
,
which
may
be
considered
in
any
disquition
concerning
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
is
either
not
to
be
called
Artificial
,
or
if
it
be
so
termed
,
that
Term
is
so
to
be
understood
,
as
it
agrees
with
all
mens
natural
Consents
,
and
not
as
it
may
be
opposed
to
them
;
that
so
it
may
become
thereby
less
firm
and
durable
,
as
Mr.
H.
supposes
it
;
for
the
signification
of
a
natural
Consent
,
constituted
by
words
,
tho
with
some
kind
of
Art
,
doth
not
at
all
diminish
its
firmness
or
duration
;
and
therefore
I
think
it
doth
sufficiently
appear
,
that
Mr.
H.
is
very
much
mistaken
,
when
he
supposes
that
the
agreement
of
Brutes
of
the
same
kind
is
more
constant
and
natural
than
that
among
men
;
and
that
mens
natural
propensions
to
a
Benevolence
towards
others
,
are
not
so
strong
in
men
,
as
in
other
Animals
:
So
that
I
shall
leave
it
to
the
impartial
Reader
,
whether
upon
a
due
consideration
of
his
Answers
,
and
our
Replies
,
he
will
conclude
,
as
this
Author
doth
in
his
Treatise
de
homine
,
chap.
10.
That
men
do
exceed
Wolves
,
Bears
,
and
Serpents
,
in
Cruelty
and
Rapacity
,
who
are
not
rapacious
beyond
hunger
;
which
if
he
had
affirmed
of
some
men
who
are
degenerated
from
all
sentiments
of
humanity
,
had
not
been
much
amiss
;
but
to
affirm
it
of
all
mankind
in
general
,
is
too
severe
and
false
a
censure
to
be
let
pass
:
Whereas
it
must
be
at
the
worst
,
acknowledged
,
That
no
general
Propositions
can
be
made
,
concerning
the
particular
Passions
and
Humours
of
all
men
;
since
there
is
not
only
a
greater
difference
of
Wit
,
but
also
a
greater
variety
of
Passions
and
Inclinations
amongst
men
,
than
brutes
;
and
that
not
only
among
whole
Nations
,
but
particular
persons
:
For
all
the
kinds
of
brutes
have
almost
the
like
Inclinations
,
and
are
governed
by
the
like
passions
and
appetites
;
so
that
if
you
know
one
of
them
,
you
almost
know
them
all
;
but
in
mankind
,
so
many
men
,
so
many
Minds
,
and
so
many
almost
several
Humours
and
Dispositions
:
And
which
is
more
,
the
same
man
doth
not
only
differ
from
others
,
but
also
oftentimes
from
himself
;
and
that
which
at
one
time
he
mightily
loves
and
approves
of
,
at
another
he
abhors
and
condemns
.
§
.
16.
Yet
so
much
I
shall
grant
Mr.
H.
That
men
are
tormented
with
many
Passions
unknown
to
Brutes
,
such
as
are
Coveteousness
,
Ambition
,
Vain-glory
,
Envy
,
Emulation
,
or
Strife
of
Wit
,
with
the
Sense
of
which
Brutes
are
not
at
all
concerned
;
all
which
I
confess
,
do
extremely
hinder
mens
natural
Peace
and
Concord
:
So
on
the
other
side
,
he
hath
not
only
several
other
Passions
,
that
as
strongly
persuade
him
to
seek
and
observe
them
,
yet
God
hath
also
endued
him
with
reason
whereby
from
the
consideration
of
his
own
Nature
,
and
of
other
things
,
he
may
attain
a
knowledge
of
his
Deity
,
and
be
thereby
led
to
discover
,
that
all
the
Laws
of
Nature
are
not
only
bare
dictates
of
Reason
,
but
are
also
Laws
truly
established
by
the
Will
of
God
the
Legislator
,
for
his
own
Honour
,
and
the
Happiness
and
Preservation
of
Mankind
;
but
so
far
I
shall
agree
with
Mr.
H.
,
that
in
any
Country
,
where
men
live
without
any
knowledg
of
a
Law
,
either
natural
or
reveal'd
,
that
in
all
those
places
they
are
in
as
bad
or
worse
state
than
Brutes
can
be
imagined
to
be
.
§
.
17.
To
conclude
,
I
cannot
but
take
notice
,
that
Mr.
H's
Hypothesis
labours
under
these
great
Absurdities
.
First
,
He
supposes
that
in
the
State
of
Nature
a
man's
Reason
tells
him
,
that
his
Self-preservation
cannot
be
obtained
without
this
War
against
all
men
;
but
afterwards
finding
by
experience
the
fatal
Evils
and
Mischiefs
proceeding
from
this
kind
of
Life
,
to
have
also
by
his
reason
found
out
,
and
then
proposed
those
Conditions
of
Peace
,
called
Laws
of
Nature
,
in
order
to
his
own
Happiness
and
Self-preservation
;
as
if
right
Reason
could
ever
dictate
contradictory
or
opposite
means
to
this
same
end
,
such
as
are
a
State
of
War
,
and
a
State
of
Peace
;
a
neglect
and
violation
of
all
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
as
lawful
and
necessary
for
a
man's
safety
in
the
State
of
Nature
,
and
a
strict
observation
of
them
when
once
entered
into
a
Civil
State
,
for
the
same
design
.
Secondly
,
This
Hypothesis
is
highly
derogatory
to
the
Goodness
and
Providence
of
God
;
for
if
he
were
the
Author
and
Creator
of
Mankind
(
as
certainly
he
was
)
then
whoever
believes
this
[
*
](A64084-e18330-b)
*
Vid.
Dr.
Parker's
Ecclesiastical
Policy
,
Chap.
4.
p.
126
,
127.
Hypothesis
,
must
also
believe
that
God
contrived
things
so
ill
,
that
unless
his
Creatures
had
been
more
cunning
and
provident
than
himself
,
they
must
of
necessity
(
like
the
Earth-born
Brethren
in
Ovid's
Metamorphosis
,
have
perished
by
each
others
hands
as
soon
as
they
were
made
.
So
that
the
preservation
and
well-being
of
Mankind
would
be
entirely
attributed
to
their
own
Wit
and
Cunning
,
and
not
to
God's
Goodness
or
Providence
,
who
must
have
sent
his
Creatures
into
the
World
in
such
an
evil
state
as
should
oblige
them
first
to
seek
their
own
mutual
Ruin
and
Destruction
,
as
the
way
to
their
Preservation
.
So
that
Mankind
must
owe
all
the
happiness
and
comfort
of
their
Lives
,
not
to
their
Creator
,
but
themselves
:
since
with
him
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
whereby
they
are
preserved
,
were
not
given
or
established
by
God
their
Legislator
,
but
are
only
so
many
Rules
of
Art
or
humane
Wit
,
like
other
Inventions
of
mens
contriving
,
and
still
suppose
man
to
be
departed
from
that
natural
state
of
War
in
which
God
put
him
,
into
an
Artificial
one
of
Peace
of
his
own
making
:
But
certainly
the
Deity
that
made
us
(
if
we
suppose
him
Good
and
Wise
)
made
us
not
to
be
miserable
(
as
Mr.
H.
himself
confesses
we
must
have
been
)
had
we
continued
in
this
state
of
War
.
So
that
to
suppose
God
made
us
,
and
left
us
in
that
condition
,
it
is
directly
to
deny
our
Creator's
Goodness
.
And
then
if
we
suppose
him
wise
,
we
cannot
imagine
that
he
would
frame
a
sort
of
Creatures
only
to
destroy
themselves
,
unless
we
can
believe
his
only
design
was
to
sport
himself
in
their
folly
and
madness
,
in
beholding
them
by
all
the
ways
and
arts
of
Force
and
Fraud
contriving
their
own
mutual
Destruction
.
And
therefore
if
the
Creation
of
Man
were
the
product
of
the
Divine
Wisdom
and
Goodness
,
his
Natural
State
must
have
been
that
of
Peace
,
and
not
such
a
Condition
as
that
which
this
Author
supposes
.
Lastly
,
Mr.
H.
doth
himself
ingeniously
confess
,
that
he
believes
there
was
never
actually
such
a
state
of
War
,
as
he
supposes
and
describes
:
And
therefore
,
tho
I
grant
it
is
both
lawful
and
usual
for
natural
Philosophers
,
who
not
being
able
through
the
imbecility
of
our
humane
Faculties
,
to
discover
the
true
nature
and
essences
of
Bodies
,
or
other
Substances
,
do
therefore
take
a
liberty
to
seign
or
suppose
such
an
Hypothesis
,
as
they
think
will
best
suit
with
the
nature
of
the
things
themselves
,
of
which
they
intend
to
treat
;
and
from
thence
to
frame
a
body
of
natural
Philosophy
,
or
Physicks
,
as
Aristotle
of
old
,
and
Monsieur
Des
Cartes
,
in
our
age
have
performed
:
Yet
can
we
not
allow
the
same
liberty
in
moral
or
practical
Philosophy
,
as
in
speculative
.
And
therefore
such
a
precarious
Hypothesis
,
as
this
of
a
natural
state
of
War
,
is
by
no
means
to
be
admitted
as
the
necessary
consequence
of
that
natural
Right
,
which
every
man
hath
to
preserve
himself
:
For
whether
we
consider
Mankind
to
have
been
together
with
the
world
,
generated
from
all
eternity
,
as
Aristotle
,
and
the
more
modern
Platonists
did
believe
;
or
else
to
have
sprung
out
of
the
earth
like
Mushrooms
,
as
Epicurus
of
old
,
and
Mr.
H.
in
his
De
Cive
suppose
;
or
else
as
we
(
according
to
the
Divine
Revelation
of
the
holy
Scriptures
)
do
believe
,
That
Mankind
was
at
first
propagated
from
one
Man
,
and
one
Woman
,
created
for
that
purpose
by
God
:
Now
let
us
at
present
suppose
which
of
these
we
please
to
be
the
true
Original
of
Mankind
,
we
cannot
from
thence
with
any
reason
conclude
,
that
it
was
at
any
time
such
a
state
of
War
of
all
men
against
all
;
for
if
,
according
to
the
first
Hypothesis
,
we
suppose
Mankind
to
be
Eternal
,
they
were
likewise
from
all
Eternity
propagated
by
distinct
Families
,
and
divided
into
several
Nations
,
and
Common-wealths
,
as
they
are
at
this
day
:
But
if
it
be
objected
,
that
those
distinct
Nations
or
Commonwealths
,
were
always
such
from
all
Eternity
;
Then
it
will
likewise
follow
,
that
they
were
also
from
all
Eternity
in
the
same
state
they
now
are
;
that
is
,
not
of
War
,
but
Peace
.
But
we
shall
further
shew
the
absurdity
of
that
Supposition
,
before
we
have
concluded
our
Considerations
upon
this
Head
.
So
on
the
other
side
,
if
we
proceed
upon
the
Epicurean
Hypothesis
,
of
Mankind's
springing
out
of
the
Earth
;
if
we
do
not
likewise
suppose
them
to
have
been
made
like
Game-Cocks
,
or
those
Earth-born
men
I
have
already
mentioned
,
who
presently
fell
a
fighting
,
and
destroying
each
other
without
any
Cause
;
it
will
not
do
the
business
:
And
therefore
let
us
now
with
Mr.
H.
suppose
these
men
,
being
all
made
of
equal
strength
,
both
of
body
and
mind
;
it
is
plain
,
that
they
must
be
at
first
in
a
state
of
Peace
,
before
they
could
ever
fall
together
by
the
Ears
;
so
then
the
state
of
Peace
was
Prior
in
Nature
to
that
of
War
,
and
also
more
agreeable
to
Human
Nature
.
2dly
,
Supposing
these
Earth-born
men
to
have
been
all
rational
Creatures
,
and
equal
in
strength
and
cunning
,
they
would
never
have
entered
into
a
state
of
War
,
and
have
fallen
a
cutting
each
others
Throats
without
some
just
Cause
,
or
Provocation
first
given
.
For
if
they
were
all
equal
,
every
man
would
consider
each
of
his
Fellows
as
of
a
like
ability
with
himself
;
and
that
if
he
struck
him
first
without
any
cause
,
he
would
be
as
well
able
to
resist
,
and
make
his
party
good
with
him
,
as
he
could
be
to
hurt
him
;
the
fear
of
which
would
have
rather
caused
Peace
than
War
:
Since
whoever
struck
first
,
could
not
be
sure
of
the
Victory
;
And
if
any
two
should
have
fallen
to
Cuffs
,
this
could
be
no
reason
for
all
the
rest
to
have
also
fallen
together
by
the
Ears
,
since
there
was
no
cause
why
they
should
suppose
a
Will
or
Inclination
in
each
other
to
War
,
till
they
had
expressed
it
by
some
outward
signs
;
so
that
this
natural
Equality
among
men
,
and
mutual
fear
of
each
other
,
which
Mr.
H.
supposes
to
be
the
chief
causes
of
War
,
would
certainly
have
rather
inclined
these
men
to
Peace
.
But
if
we
follow
the
Divine
Authority
of
the
Holy
Scriptures
,
it
is
then
certain
,
That
all
Mankind
being
derived
from
one
Man
,
and
one
Woman
,
their
Children
could
never
be
in
this
state
of
war
towards
their
Parents
,
by
Mr.
H's
own
confession
;
much
less
could
the
Parents
ever
be
so
unnatural
towards
their
Children
,
who
were
made
out
of
their
own
Substance
;
nor
yet
could
the
Brothers
,
or
Sisters
,
who
partake
of
the
same
Human
Nature
derived
from
their
Common
Parents
,
and
who
were
bred
up
together
from
their
Infancy
in
a
state
of
Peace
and
Amity
,
be
rationally
supposed
presently
to
have
fallen
together
by
the
ears
without
any
other
cause
,
or
provocation
given
,
than
Mr.
Hs
Passions
of
mutual
distrust
,
and
desire
of
glory
:
Therefore
when
after
the
Fall
of
Adam
,
man's
Nature
was
degenerated
into
that
state
we
now
find
it
,
wherein
mens
Passions
,
I
own
,
do
too
often
domineer
over
their
Reason
;
and
that
Cain
,
through
Malice
and
Envy
,
slew
his
Brother
,
as
we
read
in
Genesis
.
Of
this
state
of
War
,
as
it
is
the
first
Example
of
man's
Degeneracy
,
so
it
is
also
of
God's
dislike
,
and
punishment
of
this
cruel
Sin
of
Murther
,
which
is
indeed
but
the
effect
of
this
Author's
state
of
War
.
But
I
beg
the
Reader
's
pardon
if
I
have
been
too
prolix
in
the
confutation
of
this
Principle
;
this
being
the
main
foundation
of
all
those
Evil
and
False
Opinions
contained
in
this
Author
's
Moral
and
Political
Works
:
if
therefore
this
is
throughly
destroyed
,
all
that
is
built
upon
it
will
fall
of
it self
.
But
since
Mr.
H.
hath
by
his
Supposition
of
certain
Compacts
,
or
Covenants
,
undertaken
to
shew
a
Method
how
men
got
out
of
this
wretched
state
of
War
;
in
which
let
us
see
whether
his
next
Principle
answers
the
Designs
he
proposes
.
PRINCIPLE
VIII
.
§
.
1.
That
mutual
Compacts
of
Fidelity
in
the
State
of
Nature
,
are
void
,
but
not
so
in
a
Commonwealth
.
WHich
Principle
he
expresses
and
proves
at
large
,
in
his
de
Cive
,
cap.
in
these
words
:
But
those
Covenants
that
are
made
by
Contract
,
where
there
is
a
mutual
Trust
,
neither
party
performing
any
thing
presently
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
if
any
just
Fear
shall
arise
on
either
side
,
are
void
.
For
he
who
first
performs
,
because
of
the
evil
disposition
of
the
greatest
part
of
men
,
only
studying
their
own
profit
,
no
matter
whether
by
right
or
wrong
,
betrays
himself
to
the
lust
of
him
with
whom
he
contracts
:
For
there
is
no
reason
that
any
man
should
perform
first
,
if
it
is
not
likely
that
the
other
will
perform
afterwards
;
which
whether
it
be
likely
or
not
,
he
who
fears
,
must
judge
,
as
it
is
shewn
in
the
former
Chapter
,
Art.
9.
I
say
things
are
thus
in
the
state
of
nature
;
but
in
a
Civil
state
,
where
there
is
one
who
can
compel
them
both
,
he
who
by
Contract
is
first
to
perform
,
ought
first
to
do
it
.
For
since
the
other
may
be
compelled
,
the
reason
ceases
,
for
which
he
feared
the
other
would
not
perform
.
Which
Principle
is
somewhat
otherwise
expressed
in
his
Lev.
chap.
14.
which
since
it
differs
something
from
the
other
,
in
the
manner
of
expression
,
I
shall
likewise
give
in
you
his
own
words
.
If
a
Covenant
be
made
wherein
neither
of
the
Parties
perform
presently
,
but
trust
one
another
,
in
the
condition
of
mere
nature
(
which
is
a
condition
of
War
of
every
man
against
every
man
)
upon
any
reasonable
supposition
,
it
is
void
;
but
if
there
be
a
common
Power
set
over
them
both
,
with
right
and
force
sufficient
to
compel
performance
,
it
is
not
void
;
for
he
that
performeth
first
,
hath
no
assurance
the
other
will
perform
afterwards
,
because
the
mere
bonds
of
words
are
too
weak
to
bridle
mens
Ambition
,
Avarice
,
Anger
,
and
other
Passions
,
without
the
fear
of
some
coercive
Power
,
(
which
in
the
condition
of
mere
Nature
,
where
all
men
are
equal
,
and
judges
of
the
justness
of
their
own
fears
,
cannot
possibly
be
supposed
)
;
and
he
which
performs
first
,
doth
but
betray
himself
to
his
enemy
,
contrary
to
the
Right
(
he
can
never
abandon
)
of
defending
his
life
,
and
means
of
living
.
§
.
2.
You
may
now
more
plainly
see
the
reason
why
he
supposes
in
the
foregoing
Chapter
,
That
all
Kings
and
persons
of
Soveraign
Authority
,
are
always
in
a
posture
,
or
state
of
War
;
which
he
more
plainly
expresses
in
his
de
Cive
,
chap.
10.
§.
17.
in
these
words
;
But
what
are
divers
Commonwealths
,
but
so
many
Garisons
fortified
against
each
other
with
Arms
and
Ammunition
?
Whose
State
,
because
they
are
kept
in
awe
by
no
common
Power
,
(
altho
an
uncertain
Peace
,
or
short
Truces
may
intervene
)
is
yet
to
be
accounted
for
the
state
of
Nature
,
that
is
,
for
a
state
of
War
.
From
all
which
it
is
easie
to
deduce
the
grievous
mischiefs
that
would
thereby
happen
to
mankind
.
For
in
the
first
place
these
Civil
Sovereigns
he
mentions
,
can
never
be
obliged
by
any
Covenants
from
making
War
upon
,
and
ruining
each
other
,
nor
can
be
accused
for
breach
of
Faith
,
or
Infidelity
,
when
they
do
so
;
for
being
still
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
that
will
necessarily
follow
,
which
he
lays
down
at
the
end
of
his
former
Chapter
,
as
the
consequences
of
this
state
:
To
this
War
of
every
man
against
every
man
,
this
also
is
consequent
,
that
nothing
can
be
unjust
.
The
notions
of
Right
and
Wrong
,
Iustice
and
Injustice
,
have
there
no
place
;
where
there
is
no
common
Power
,
there
is
no
Law
;
where
no
Law
,
no
Injustice
.
Force
and
Fraud
are
in
War
the
two
Cardinal
Vertues
.
§
.
3.
So
that
you
see
upon
these
Principles
it
is
altogether
in
vain
for
Princes
to
make
any
Articles
or
Covenants
of
Peace
with
each
other
;
no
,
not
if
they
swear
to
them
never
so
solemnly
;
for
in
the
last
words
of
this
Chapter
he
tells
us
,
That
the
Oath
adds
nothing
to
the
obligation
;
for
a
Covenant
,
if
lawful
,
binds
in
the
sight
of
God
,
without
the
Oath
,
as
much
as
with
it
;
if
unlawful
,
binds
not
at
all
,
tho
it
be
confirmed
with
an
Oath
:
So
that
if
the
Covenant
could
not
oblige
,
the
Oath
will
serve
to
as
little
purpose
:
What
Princes
will
thank
him
for
this
Doctrine
,
I
know
not
;
but
I
hope
it
is
not
an
Apology
for
the
late
actions
of
any
Princes
but
the
Ottoman
Emperor
,
and
our
Christian
Grand
Signior
on
the
other
side
the
water
;
but
if
the
state
of
Princes
towards
each
other
is
so
bad
,
that
of
the
Subjects
is
much
worse
;
for
from
these
Principles
the
safety
of
all
Ambassadors
,
Merchants
,
and
Travellers
in
the
Territories
of
any
Prince
or
State
with
whom
we
are
at
Peace
,
is
thereby
utterly
taken
away
;
nor
can
the
Subjects
be
in
a
better
condition
than
their
Masters
;
for
by
this
Author's
determination
,
they
are
presently
Enemies
as
soon
as
they
come
under
a
Foreign
Power
:
For
such
Princes
being
always
in
the
state
of
Nature
towards
each
other
,
it
is
a
part
of
their
Natural
Right
or
Prerogative
,
to
force
all
those
that
are
weaker
to
give
a
Caution
of
their
future
Obedience
(
and
good
behaviour
)
unless
they
will
rather
suffer
Death
.
For
nothing
can
be
imagined
more
absurd
,
than
that
he
who
being
weak
you
have
in
your
power
,
by
letting
him
go
,
you
may
render
both
strong
,
and
your
Enemy
.
All
which
are
his
own
words
,
in
his
De
Cive
,
Cap.
1.
§
.
14.
Nor
can
I
understand
what
he
means
by
a
future
Caution
of
Obedience
,
but
the
Submission
of
those
who
are
thus
seized
upon
,
and
their
coming
into
the
same
Commonwealth
,
and
subjecting
themselves
wholly
to
their
Empire
,
who
thus
lay
hold
on
them
:
For
he
tells
us
presently
after
,
That
a
certain
and
irresistible
Power
confers
a
Right
of
Governing
and
Ruling
those
,
who
cannot
resist
it
.
So
that
if
this
Doctrine
be
true
,
in
what
an
ill
condition
are
Ambassadors
,
and
other
Strangers
in
foreign
Countries
now
at
League
with
us
,
any
one
may
easily
perceive
.
Well
,
but
suppose
such
Strangers
could
or
would
submit
themselves
absolutely
to
these
Foreign
Powers
,
they
may
yet
chuse
whether
they
will
accept
it
,
since
no
Law
of
Nature
,
according
to
Mr.
H's
Principles
,
can
oblige
Foreigners
to
any
outward
Acts
of
Kindness
or
Mercy
towards
others
,
who
are
not
of
the
same
Commonwealth
,
since
they
may
either
accept
of
this
their
Submission
,
or
else
refuse
it
,
and
put
them
to
Death
,
tho
otherwise
never
so
innocent
.
§
.
4.
But
if
Compacts
with
those
of
different
Commonwealths
,
whether
Princes
or
Subjects
,
are
of
so
little
force
,
let
us
see
whether
they
will
signify
any
more
among
those
,
who
having
agreed
to
renounce
this
State
of
Nature
,
are
willing
to
transfer
all
their
Power
upon
one
,
or
more
Persons
,
and
so
enter
into
his
Commonwealth
.
Where
,
first
,
I
desire
you
to
observe
,
that
these
Pacts
or
Covenants
,
by
which
every
Man
renounces
his
Natural
Right
,
are
still
made
in
the
State
of
Nature
,
in
which
State
,
it
is
lawful
for
any
Man
to
doubt
of
another's
Fidelity
;
but
whether
a
Man
justly
fears
that
another
will
not
perform
his
part
,
he
that
fears
,
is
the
only
Judge
;
and
therefore
Mr.
H.
concludes
,
that
every
man
hath
cause
to
fear
,
whenever
he
is
afraid
.
Which
reason
,
if
it
were
of
any
force
,
would
infer
,
that
not
only
those
Compacts
are
invalid
in
which
nothing
is
performed
on
either
part
;
but
also
those
in
which
any
thing
of
any
moment
remains
yet
to
be
done
by
either
Party
,
for
he
who
will
not
keep
Faith
any
longer
,
may
when
he
pleases
pretend
to
be
afraid
,
lest
the
other
should
break
his
Faith
with
him
,
and
that
very
justly
,
whilst
he
himself
is
the
only
Judge
of
it
;
and
therefore
his
Reason
(
which
is
always
supposed
to
be
right
)
may
not
only
tell
him
,
that
he
need
not
perform
his
part
of
the
Covenant
,
but
also
that
it
is
absolutely
void
,
if
he
thinks
fit
to
make
it
so
.
But
if
any
one
will
say
,
that
he
himself
hath
prevented
this
Objection
by
his
Annotation
to
this
Article
;
as
also
in
his
Lev.
in
this
Chap.
That
the
Cause
of
fear
,
which
makes
such
a
Covenant
invalid
,
must
be
always
something
arising
after
the
Covenant
made
,
as
some
new
fact
,
or
other
sign
of
the
Will
not
to
perform
,
else
it
cannot
make
the
Covenant
void
.
For
that
which
could
not
hinder
a
Man
from
promising
,
ought
not
to
be
admitted
as
an
hindrance
of
performing
.
All
which
,
tho
it
be
very
true
,
yet
if
what
he
hath
already
alledged
in
his
foregoing
Section
be
also
true
,
it
will
not
signify
any
thing
;
because
he
there
tells
us
,
that
whether
it
is
likely
that
he
will
perform
,
or
not
,
he
who
is
afraid
,
is
the
only
Judge
,
(
right
or
wrong
,
it
is
all
one
)
and
therefore
this
fear
of
another
mans
failing
in
his
trust
,
may
either
arise
from
his
calling
to
mind
the
false
and
evil
Disposition
of
all
men
,
which
before
the
Compact
he
had
not
well
considered
,
or
else
he
may
suppose
any
Act
of
the
other
Parties
(
tho
never
so
innocent
)
to
be
a
sufficient
sign
of
his
Will
not
to
perform
his
part
.
Nor
is
there
any
thing
in
the
State
of
Nature
,
which
can
make
such
a
timerous
man
secure
of
the
Fidelity
of
others
,
for
the
performance
of
their
Compact
;
because
as
Mr.
H.
tells
us
in
his
De
Cive
,
Cap.
5.
§.
1
,
2.
Cap.
7.
§
.
27.
All
the
hope
of
security
is
placed
,
in
that
a
man
may
prevent
all
others
,
either
openly
,
or
by
surprise
.
So
,
that
altho
it
appears
that
the
Utility
of
observing
of
Compacts
be
never
so
manifest
,
yet
cannot
it
by
this
Principle
lay
any
firm
Obligation
upon
mens
minds
,
but
that
they
may
depart
from
them
,
whenever
they
will
neglect
or
oversee
this
Utility
,
or
that
they
think
they
may
better
secure
their
own
interest
by
any
other
means
;
since
the
Will
and
Conscience
of
man
can
never
be
so
obliged
by
their
naked
Compacts
,
that
they
may
not
depart
from
,
or
act
contrary
to
them
,
whensoever
they
think
they
may
safely
,
and
for
their
own
private
advantage
do
it
.
For
the
Obligation
will
not
only
cease
,
if
it
shall
please
all
those
who
have
so
covenanted
to
depart
from
their
Covenants
at
once
,
as
when
men
discharge
themselves
of
them
by
mutual
consent
:
But
supposing
also
this
consent
still
to
continue
,
the
force
of
an
Obligation
will
yet
be
wanting
;
for
since
that
dictate
of
Reason
of
keeping
Compacts
,
has
not
as
yet
attained
the
force
of
a
Law
,
as
being
made
(
as
I
have
already
observed
)
in
the
meer
state
of
Nature
;
any
single
Person
,
according
to
his
particular
Humour
,
or
predominant
Passion
of
Fear
,
or
Suspicion
,
or
Self-interest
,
may
depart
from
this
dictate
of
Reason
,
tho
the
rest
do
not
agree
so
to
do
;
because
no
man
according
to
Mr.
H.
in
the
Law
of
Nature
,
can
ever
be
tied
by
any
Compact
to
quit
the
doing
of
that
which
he
judges
necessary
for
his
own
Interest
,
or
Self-defence
.
For
in
the
very
beginning
of
this
14th
Chapter
in
his
Lev.
he
defines
a
Law
of
Nature
to
be
a
Precept
,
or
general
Rule
found
out
by
Reason
,
by
which
a
man
is
forbidden
to
do
that
which
is
destructive
of
his
Life
,
or
takes
away
the
means
of
preserving
the
same
,
and
to
omit
that
by
which
he
thinketh
it
may
be
best
preserved
.
So
that
for
the
preservation
of
a
man's
life
,
or
whenever
he
thinks
those
Compacts
may
take
away
the
means
of
preserving
it
,
he
may
without
crime
fail
in
keeping
his
Compacts
either
for
Publick
Peace
,
or
the
observation
of
Justice
with
his
Fellow-subjects
,
or
of
Fidelity
,
or
of
Obedience
to
his
Civil
Sovereign
;
who
upon
these
Principles
,
is
in
no
better
a
condition
,
nor
so
good
,
as
any
of
his
Subjects
:
Because
Mr.
H.
doth
not
allow
in
his
Leviathan
,
Cap.
18.
of
any
compacts
to
be
made
between
the
Sovereign
,
and
the
Subjects
;
who
only
Covenant
one
with
the
other
,
and
not
with
him
,
to
give
up
their
right
of
governing
themselves
to
this
man
,
or
Assembly
of
men
,
and
that
they
do
thereby
authorize
all
his
Actions
.
So
that
since
this
Compact
is
made
in
the
state
Nature
,
and
that
this
Law
of
keeping
of
Compacts
,
is
only
a
dictate
of
Reason
,
and
no
Law
;
it
can
lay
no
higher
obligation
upon
mens
Consciences
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
than
any
other
Law
of
Nature
,
which
Mr.
H.
plainly
tells
us
Chap.
17.
In
the
state
of
Nature
do
not
oblige
,
nor
can
the
Common
Power
set
over
men
,
lay
any
obligation
in
Conscience
upon
them
,
why
they
should
not
break
these
Compacts
towards
each
other
,
when
ever
they
think
it
convenient
:
For
since
the
Civil
Sovereign
can
only
oblige
them
to
its
outward
observation
by
those
Punishments
as
he
pleases
to
appoint
for
such
offences
as
are
destructive
to
the
Publick
Peace
,
every
man
that
will
venture
the
fear
of
discovery
,
or
being
taken
,
or
whenever
he
thinks
he
can
make
a
Party
strong
enough
to
defend
himself
from
those
that
would
punish
him
for
the
breach
of
them
;
may
safely
,
nay
lawfully
,
transgress
them
,
when-ever
the
awe
,
or
fear
of
the
Civil
Sovereign
ceases
.
So
that
it
is
evident
there
doth
still
need
some
higher
Law
,
or
Principle
than
this
of
meer
Fear
of
the
Civil
Power
to
make
men
honest
,
or
to
keep
their
Compacts
when
they
have
made
them
.
§
.
5.
To
Conclude
,
Mr.
H.
doth
far
exceed
his
Master
Epicurus
in
this
rare
invention
;
for
that
old
Fellow
,
one
would
think
,
had
sufficiently
shaken
the
foundations
of
all
common
Peace
,
and
Justice
,
when
he
laid
down
in
his
ratis
sententiis
or
established
dictates
,
That
there
is
no
such
thing
as
Iustice
between
those
Nations
who
either
could
not
,
or
would
not
enter
into
mutual
Covenants
that
they
should
not
hurt
,
or
be
hurt
by
each
other
;
Yet
however
,
he
thought
fit
to
leave
the
force
of
those
Compacts
unviolated
,
although
there
was
no
common
Power
over
them
,
which
might
keep
those
Nations
in
awe
.
But
Mr.
H.
that
he
might
indulge
as
much
as
he
could
to
his
darling
passion
of
Fear
,
hath
also
allowed
men
this
Liberty
,
That
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
Compacts
of
mutual
Fidelity
may
by
right
be
violated
,
without
any
other
cause
given
than
the
fear
or
suspicion
of
the
Party
afraid
.
PRINCIPLE
IX
.
The
Law
of
Nature
is
not
properly
a
Law
,
unless
as
it
is
delivered
in
the
Holy
Scriptures
.
§
.
1.
WHich
Principle
he
endeavours
to
prove
in
his
De
Cive
Cap.
3.
Art
.
the
last
,
in
these
words
:
But
those
that
we
call
Laws
of
Nature
,
being
nothing
else
but
certain
conclusions
understood
by
reason
concerning
the
doing
of
things
;
(
whereas
a
Law
properly
and
accurately
speaking
,
is
the
word
of
him
that
commands
something
to
be
done
,
or
not
done
by
others
)
;
they
are
not
Laws
,
properly
speaking
,
as
they
proceed
from
Nature
:
Yet
as
far
as
they
are
given
by
God
in
the
Holy
Scripture
,
they
are
properly
called
by
the
name
of
Laws
;
Which
likewise
he
hath
more
briefly
contracted
in
his
Leviathan
,
Cap.
15.
in
these
words
:
These
dictates
of
Reason
,
men
use
to
call
by
the
Name
of
Laws
,
but
improperly
,
for
they
are
but
Conclusions
,
or
Theorems
concerning
what
conduceth
to
the
conservation
and
defence
of
themselves
;
whereas
Law
properly
is
the
word
of
him
,
that
by
right
hath
a
command
over
others
.
But
yet
if
we
consider
the
same
Theorems
as
delivered
in
the
word
of
God
,
that
by
right
commands
all
things
,
then
are
they
properly
called
Laws
.
§
.
2.
The
Reason
for
which
opinion
he
gives
us
in
his
De
Cive
Cap.
5
§.
1
,
2
,
3.
in
these
words
;
It
is
self-manifest
,
that
the
actions
of
men
do
proceed
from
their
Will
,
and
their
Will
from
Hope
and
Fear
:
So
that
as
often
as
it
seems
,
that
a
greater
Good
,
or
lesser
Evil
is
like
to
happen
to
them
,
from
the
violation
of
Laws
,
men
willingly
violate
them
;
therefore
every
man's
hope
of
security
and
preservation
is
placed
in
this
,
that
he
may
be
able
to
prevent
his
Neighbour
either
by
his
own
force
or
art
,
openly
or
at
unawares
.
From
whence
it
is
plain
,
that
the
Laws
of
Nature
do
not
presently
,
as
soon
as
they
are
known
,
give
sufficient
security
to
every
one
of
observing
them
;
and
therefore
as
long
as
no
caution
can
be
obtained
from
the
Invasion
of
others
,
that
Primitive
Right
must
still
remain
to
every
one
,
of
taking
Care
of
himself
by
all
the
ways
that
he
will
,
or
can
;
which
is
the
Right
of
all
men
,
to
all
things
,
or
the
Right
of
War
;
and
it
suffices
for
the
fulfilling
of
the
Law
of
Nature
,
that
any
one
should
be
ready
or
willing
to
have
Peace
when
it
may
be
had
with
security
.
§
.
3.
So
likewise
in
his
Leviathan
,
Chap.
14.
tho
he
grants
that
the
Laws
of
Nature
ought
to
be
observed
,
yet
because
they
are
contrary
to
our
Natural
Passions
,
that
carry
us
to
Partiality
,
Pride
,
Revenge
,
and
the
like
;
and
their
Covenants
without
the
Sword
,
are
but
Words
,
and
have
no
strength
to
secure
a
man
at
all
;
therefore
notwithstanding
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
if
there
be
no
Power
erected
,
or
not
great
enough
for
our
security
,
every
man
will
,
and
may
lawfully
rely
on
his
Strength
and
Art
,
for
caution
against
all
other
men
.
And
in
his
15th
.
Chap.
of
his
Leviathan
,
he
farther
tells
us
,
The
Laws
of
Nature
oblige
in
foro
interno
,
that
is
to
say
,
they
bind
to
a
desire
that
they
should
take
place
:
But
in
foro
externo
,
that
is
,
to
the
putting
them
in
Act
,
not
always
.
For
he
that
should
be
modest
and
tractable
,
and
perform
all
he
promises
in
such
time
,
and
place
,
where
no
man
else
would
do
so
,
should
but
make
himself
a
Prey
to
others
,
and
procure
his
own
certain
Ruin
,
contrary
to
the
ground
of
all
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
which
tend
to
Nature's
Preservation
.
§
.
4.
I
have
been
the
larger
in
giving
you
his
own
words
in
this
place
,
because
I
could
not
well
contract
them
without
spoiling
his
sense
;
and
also
that
you
may
the
better
see
whether
he
be
clearly
answered
,
or
not
.
In
the
First
place
therefore
,
if
it
be
already
made
out
in
the
precedent
Discourse
,
that
in
this
Proposition
of
endeavouring
the
Common
Good
of
Rational
Beings
,
are
contained
all
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
and
that
it
doth
likewise
appear
to
proceed
from
God
,
from
the
Nature
of
things
,
and
those
Rewards
and
Punishments
he
hath
annexed
to
its
observation
and
transgression
:
Then
notwithstanding
what
Mr.
H.
hath
here
said
,
this
Law
of
Nature
is
properly
a
Law
;
as
having
all
the
conditions
necessary
thereunto
:
But
that
which
might
lead
Mr.
H.
into
this
Error
,
was
,
That
all
Writers
upon
this
Subject
,
thought
it
sufficient
to
define
the
Law
of
Nature
to
be
only
a
Dictate
of
right
Reason
,
without
deducing
its
Authority
from
God
,
as
a
Legislator
:
Or
if
they
have
supposed
God
the
Author
of
it
,
as
Suarez
in
his
Book
de
Legibus
;
and
Grotius
in
his
de
Iure
Belli
&
pacis
have
done
:
Yet
they
contented
themselves
with
supposing
,
that
God
had
impress'd
these
Idea's
upon
mens
Souls
,
as
so
many
innate
Notions
,
which
they
call
the
Light
of
Nature
,
without
shewing
us
by
some
more
plain
or
certain
means
(
as
our
Author
hath
done
in
the
preceding
Discourse
)
how
we
may
attain
to
the
knowledge
of
this
Law
.
The
weakness
,
or
precariousness
of
which
Hypothesis
being
discovered
by
Mr.
H.
gave
him
occasion
to
suppose
that
the
Law
of
Nature
was
not
properly
a
Law
,
for
want
of
a
Legislator
;
and
farther
,
they
having
defined
this
Law
of
Nature
to
be
a
dictate
of
right
reason
,
which
seems
only
proper
to
revealed
or
Civil
Laws
,
delivered
in
some
set
form
of
words
,
Mr.
H.
hath
here
also
defined
a
Law
,
To
be
the
Word
,
or
Speech
of
him
who
hath
a
Right
to
Command
a
thing
to
be
done
,
or
not
to
be
done
:
And
so
the
Laws
of
Nature
not
being
delivered
in
any
set
form
of
words
,
cannot
be
upon
these
grounds
properly
Laws
.
§
.
5.
But
I
think
we
have
already
sufficiently
proved
,
that
the
Law
of
Nature
,
being
to
be
collected
from
our
own
Natures
,
and
that
of
other
things
without
us
,
does
not
consist
in
any
set
form
of
words
,
but
in
those
true
Notions
or
Idea's
taken
from
the
things
themselves
:
And
we
have
already
shown
,
that
Persons
born
deaf
or
dumb
;
are
capable
of
understanding
this
Law
,
though
they
have
not
the
use
of
words
.
And
Mr.
H.
himself
before
he
is
aware
,
doth
sufficiently
confess
this
Truth
in
more
places
than
one
of
his
de
Cive
.
For
after
he
hath
in
the
last
Art.
of
his
Third
Chap.
denied
the
Laws
of
Nature
to
be
properly
Laws
,
he
begins
his
4
th
.
Chap.
with
these
Words
.
That
which
is
called
the
Natural
,
and
Moral
,
the
same
is
wont
to
be
also
called
the
Divine
Law
,
nor
undeservedly
;
because
Reason
,
which
is
the
very
Law
of
Nature
,
is
immediately
given
by
God
to
every
man
,
as
the
Rule
of
his
Actions
,
as
also
because
the
Precepts
of
Life
which
are
thence
derived
,
are
the
same
which
are
given
by
the
Divine
Majesty
for
the
Laws
of
his
Heavenly
Kingdom
by
our
Lord
Iesus
Christ
,
and
his
Holy
Apostles
.
Those
things
therefore
which
may
be
before
understood
by
Reason
concerning
the
Law
of
Nature
,
the
same
we
shall
endeavour
to
confirm
from
the
Holy
Scripture
.
So
likewise
in
his
15
th
.
Chap.
Article
3.
he
tells
us
,
That
the
Laws
of
God
are
declared
after
a
Threefold
manner
.
The
First
of
which
is
by
the
Tacit
Dictates
of
Right
Reason
:
From
both
which
places
we
may
plainly
collect
,
That
if
the
Laws
of
Nature
are
Dictates
of
right
Reason
,
and
if
the
Laws
of
God
and
Nature
,
or
Reason
,
are
all
one
and
the
same
,
and
that
Right
Reason
is
the
very
Law
of
Nature
,
and
is
immediately
given
by
God
to
every
Man
as
a
Rule
of
his
Actions
,
it
will
likewise
as
necessarily
follow
,
that
those
Laws
or
Dictates
of
Reason
are
also
Divine
,
since
they
proceed
from
God
as
a
Legislator
.
Nor
will
it
serve
his
turn
to
alledge
,
as
he
doth
in
his
Leviathan
15.
Chap.
That
the
same
Laws
(
viz.
)
of
Nature
,
because
they
oblige
only
to
a
desire
,
and
endeavour
(
I
mean
an
unfeigned
and
constant
endeavour
)
are
easy
to
be
observed
.
For
in
that
he
requireth
nothing
but
endeavour
;
he
that
endeavoureth
their
performance
,
as
far
as
he
can
fulfilleth
them
,
and
he
that
fulfilleth
the
Laws
,
is
just
.
§
.
6.
This
will
prove
a
meer
Evasion
,
if
you
please
to
consider
,
That
unless
the
Laws
of
Nature
regard
the
outward
Actions
of
men
,
they
cannot
partake
of
the
nature
of
Laws
,
nor
do
they
carry
any
obligations
along
with
them
,
because
it
is
impossible
to
seek
Peace
with
others
,
or
to
depart
from
our
natural
Rights
by
any
internal
Act
of
the
Mind
alone
,
without
outward
Actions
,
and
most
of
those
Actions
do
in
their
own
nature
necessarily
regard
,
and
concern
others
besides
our selves
.
But
if
he
should
reply
,
that
such
Actions
are
improperly
called
Laws
,
for
want
of
Rewards
and
Punishments
:
To
this
we
may
likewise
return
,
That
we
have
already
fully
proved
in
this
Discourse
,
that
they
carry
with
them
the
true
force
of
Laws
,
as
containing
all
the
Conditions
necessary
thereunto
.
And
he
himself
in
his
Leviathan
,
chap.
21.
doth
expresly
acknowledge
,
and
set
down
divers
of
those
natural
Punishments
which
are
appointed
by
God
as
natural
effects
of
the
Transgression
or
breach
of
the
Law
of
Nature
.
Which
Passage
,
because
I
have
already
transcribed
it
in
the
Discourse
it self
,
Chap.
3.
I
shall
therefore
refer
you
thither
.
But
in
short
,
If
there
be
no
Laws
of
Nature
properly
so
called
,
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
it
will
likewise
necessarily
follow
,
that
there
is
no
such
thing
as
Natural
Rights
properly
so
called
;
And
so
his
Right
of
all
men
to
all
things
,
and
to
make
war
upon
all
men
,
will
be
very
improperly
called
a
Right
;
for
they
cannot
be
properly
so
,
but
as
they
are
granted
,
or
permitted
us
,
by
some
Laws
properly
so
called
,
which
in
this
state
can
only
be
those
of
God
,
or
Nature
.
§
.
7.
But
we
are
weary
of
such
Contradictions
,
and
therefore
let
us
now
farther
examine
the
only
Reason
he
brings
why
he
denies
their
obligation
to
external
Acts
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
(
viz.
)
Because
we
cannot
be
secured
that
others
will
observe
them
in
those
things
which
are
necessary
to
our
preservation
;
[
and
therefore
infers
]
that
every
man's
hopes
of
his
own
Security
are
placed
in
this
,
That
by
his
own
Force
or
Wiles
he
may
prevent
his
Neighbour
openly
,
or
at
unawares
.
This
is
that
invincible
Argument
which
seems
strong
enough
in
his
Judgment
to
destroy
all
outward
Obligations
to
the
whole
Law
of
Nature
.
Yet
I
think
for
all
that
,
it
is
easy
enough
to
be
answered
.
And
therefore
in
the
first
place
,
we
reply
,
That
there
is
no
need
of
supposing
such
a
perfect
Security
to
be
afforded
by
the
Laws
of
Nature
concerning
other
mens
observing
them
,
as
must
needs
be
free
from
all
Fear
,
before
we
can
be
obliged
to
external
Actions
conformable
to
them
;
for
the
Will
of
God
,
the
first
Cause
,
being
known
,
whereby
he
establishes
these
Laws
,
there
will
arise
a
certain
obligation
to
the
performance
of
such
external
Actions
;
though
some
men
may
be
so
wicked
,
as
to
break
,
or
neglect
them
,
and
to
practice
evil
and
violent
Actions
towards
those
that
would
observe
them
.
But
I
shall
now
farther
prove
(
notwithstanding
this
Objection
)
that
we
are
under
a
greater
obligation
to
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
than
we
are
to
the
Civil
Laws
of
our
Country
,
to
whose
external
obedience
he
will
have
all
men
whatsoever
obliged
.
For
all
Persons
,
although
they
are
not
under
the
same
Commonwealth
,
yet
are
all
Members
of
the
same
more
large
Empire
of
God
himself
.
Now
it
is
most
notorious
,
that
those
that
are
Subjects
to
the
same
Civil
Power
,
cannot
be
perfectly
secure
,
either
that
their
Fellow-subjects
will
observe
all
the
Civil
Laws
,
by
abstaining
from
Murther
,
Robbery
,
or
Rebellion
,
&c.
or
that
the
Civil
Sovereign
can
,
or
will
always
punish
all
the
Transgressors
of
his
Laws
,
especially
where
Factions
are
potent
,
though
he
is
never
so
watchful
over
the
Publick
Good
.
So
that
if
to
these
cautious
Men
of
Mr.
H's
Principles
,
it
seems
a
sufficient
Reason
for
their
outward
obligation
to
the
Civil
Laws
,
if
it
appears
more
probable
that
the
Civil
Sovereign
both
will
,
and
can
take
care
of
the
Authority
of
his
Laws
,
by
protecting
the
Obedient
,
and
punishing
the
Refractory
,
than
that
he
will
forbear
,
or
neglect
so
to
do
;
it
will
likewise
follow
,
That
to
all
men
who
exercise
true
Piety
,
and
Obedience
to
God's
Natural
Laws
,
their
obligation
to
observe
them
will
not
prove
the
more
infirm
,
though
God
doth
not
always
presently
,
and
immediately
punish
all
the
Transgressions
and
Violations
of
his
Natural
Laws
;
it
being
a
sufficient
security
to
them
of
his
Goodness
and
Justice
,
since
he
will
certainly
inflict
more
severe
Punishments
upon
their
Transgressors
,
either
in
this
life
,
or
in
that
to
come
,
than
any
Humane
Power
can
do
upon
Offenders
against
their
Civil
Laws
.
So
that
if
Mr.
H's
Argument
were
valid
,
not
only
the
outward
obligation
of
all
Natural
,
but
also
of
all
Civil
Laws
,
would
be
quite
destroyed
;
since
in
neither
State
we
can
be
perfectly
secure
,
that
all
others
will
observe
them
;
and
indeed
he
demands
that
which
is
altogether
impossible
,
when
he
requires
an
absolute
and
perfect
Security
concerning
future
voluntary
Actions
,
either
in
a
Civil
,
or
a
Natural
State
;
which
as
such
can
be
only
contingent
.
§
.
8.
But
if
he
will
permit
us
to
call
that
a
State
of
security
,
which
is
the
most
free
of
any
from
the
fear
of
future
Danger
,
or
Misery
,
we
assert
,
That
God
has
made
it
manifest
to
all
men
,
by
all
those
signs
,
(
which
we
have
already
shown
to
be
sufficient
to
evince
our
Obligation
)
that
even
out
of
a
Civil
Government
,
he
shall
be
much
more
safe
from
all
sorts
of
Evil
,
who
shall
most
strictly
and
constantly
observe
all
the
Laws
of
Nature
in
his
outward
Actions
,
as
well
as
internal
Inclinations
,
than
he
who
(
according
to
Mr.
H's
Doctrine
)
shall
seek
this
Security
by
endeavouring
to
prevent
,
and
assault
all
other
men
by
force
or
fraud
.
But
it
is
necessary
when
we
compare
the
dangers
,
or
security
of
the
good
or
just
men
,
(
which
are
only
those
who
observe
the
Laws
of
Nature
in
their
outward
Actions
)
as
also
of
the
wicked
or
unjust
,
who
do
otherwise
,
to
make
a
true
Experiment
,
which
of
these
will
give
most
certain
security
;
there
is
not
only
to
be
reckoned
into
this
account
,
those
Evils
which
may
happen
to
them
from
the
Violence
of
other
men
,
but
also
those
,
which
such
wicked
men
bring
upon
themselves
by
their
inconstant
and
unreasonable
way
of
living
,
as
also
by
their
inordinate
Passions
,
such
as
Envy
,
Anger
,
Intemperance
,
&c.
and
moreover
,
all
those
Evils
,
or
Punishments
,
which
may
with
reason
be
feared
from
God
,
both
in
this
Life
,
and
in
that
to
come
;
which
also
are
to
be
compared
not
in
any
one
particular
case
,
or
in
a
few
circumstances
only
,
but
in
all
those
that
may
happen
through
the
whole
course
of
their
Lives
;
for
otherwise
it
is
impossible
,
that
we
should
truly
judge
which
course
of
Life
,
either
that
of
constant
Justice
or
Injustice
would
be
more
secure
.
But
we
have
,
I
hope
already
,
sufficiently
made
out
,
that
their
condition
is
much
more
happy
and
secure
,
who
observe
the
Laws
of
Nature
in
the
whole
course
of
their
Actions
,
than
those
who
act
otherwise
.
To
which
I
shall
only
add
,
That
altho
Mr.
H.
himself
,
when
he
treats
of
the
security
requisite
to
the
outward
Observation
of
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
doth
wholly
insist
upon
a
perfect
security
from
the
Invasion
of
other
men
,
and
affirms
,
Because
it
is
not
to
be
had
in
the
State
of
Nature
,
that
therefore
no
body
is
obliged
in
that
State
to
outward
acts
of
Justice
,
but
hath
still
a
right
to
all
things
,
and
of
making
War
upon
all
Men
;
Yet
in
other
places
of
his
Book
,
as
if
he
had
forgot
himself
,
he
doth
acknowledge
(
altho
but
sparingly
)
that
he
himself
perceived
that
there
was
a
sufficient
Obligation
to
an
external
Conformity
to
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
even
out
of
a
Civil
State
,
lest
we
should
fall
into
other
Evils
besides
those
which
may
be
feared
from
the
violence
of
men
.
As
for
Example
,
when
he
endeavours
to
prove
in
his
De
Cive
,
Cap.
3.
§.
2
,
3.
That
Faith
is
to
be
kept
with
all
men
,
he
fetches
his
reason
from
hence
,
That
he
who
violates
his
Covenant
,
commits
a
Contradiction
,
which
he
acknowledges
to
be
an
Absurdity
in
Humane
Conversation
.
And
therefore
,
if
he
can
admit
in
this
case
,
that
it
is
better
to
observe
,
than
to
violate
our
Covenants
,
lest
we
should
fall
into
a
Contradiction
;
what
reason
is
there
,
why
we
should
not
also
universally
infer
the
same
consequence
from
the
breach
of
every
Law
of
Nature
,
and
consequently
an
Obligation
to
all
their
outward
Actions
?
So
that
it
will
be
better
to
observe
than
to
transgress
them
in
the
State
of
Nature
,
because
their
Violation
doth
still
imply
a
Contradiction
or
Absurdity
in
all
Humane
Society
or
Conversation
;
for
whosoever
will
seriously
consider
the
Nature
of
rational
Agents
,
will
acknowledge
,
that
all
the
Felicity
possible
for
them
,
doth
depend
upon
the
Common
Good
and
Happiness
of
the
whole
System
,
as
its
necessary
and
adequate
Cause
;
and
therefore
every
man
ought
to
seek
both
of
them
together
;
for
whensoever
he
transgresses
any
Law
of
Nature
,
he
then
separates
his
own
private
Good
or
Advantage
,
from
that
of
the
publick
;
which
being
contradictory
ways
of
acting
,
must
needs
raise
a
Civil
War
,
or
Contest
in
a
mans
own
Conscience
,
between
his
Reason
,
and
his
Passions
,
which
must
grievously
disturb
its
Tranquility
;
which
Evil
,
since
it
also
takes
away
his
Peace
and
Security
,
is
no
contemptible
Punishment
naturally
inflicted
by
God
for
such
Offences
.
§
.
9.
I
shall
now
only
propose
two
Reasons
more
,
whereby
I
think
we
may
demonstrate
the
falseness
of
this
Argument
of
Mr.
H.
The
first
is
,
That
Presumption
of
the
Civil
Laws
,
both
in
our
own
,
and
all
other
Kingdoms
,
which
sufficiently
declares
what
Judgment
Civil
Sovereigns
(
whom
this
Author
makes
the
only
Judges
of
right
or
wrong
)
have
made
of
Humane
Nature
;
to
wit
,
that
every
one
is
presumed
to
be
good
,
until
the
contrary
be
proved
by
some
outward
Action
,
and
that
made
out
by
sufficient
Proof
or
Testimony
;
and
therefore
,
if
their
Judgment
be
true
,
he
must
own
all
other
men
ought
not
to
be
esteemed
as
Enemies
,
or
so
wicked
as
he
is
pleased
to
suppose
;
so
that
they
may
be
set
upon
and
killed
,
tho
never
so
innocent
,
for
any
private
mans
security
.
And
this
Presumption
is
more
strong
against
Mr.
H.
because
he
founds
that
Security
,
which
he
acknowledges
to
be
sufficient
in
Commonwealths
,
upon
those
Punishments
by
which
the
Supreme
Powers
can
restrain
all
Invaders
of
other
mens
Rights
;
but
it
is
certain
,
that
no
Punishments
are
inflicted
in
Civil
States
,
unless
according
to
the
Sentence
of
some
Judges
,
who
always
give
Sentence
according
to
this
Presumption
.
This
therefore
is
either
a
true
Presumption
,
and
so
able
to
direct
our
Actions
in
the
State
of
Nature
,
or
else
even
in
Commonwealths
there
is
not
to
be
found
a
sufficient
security
by
the
Laws
made
and
Punishments
inflicted
according
to
this
Presumption
;
and
so
neither
Civil
Laws
themselves
do
oblige
us
to
outward
Acts
,
and
thus
every
Commonwealth
would
soon
be
dissolved
.
But
since
we
are
satisfied
,
that
publick
Judgments
given
according
to
this
Presumption
,
do
for
the
most
part
render
mens
Lives
secure
enough
,
and
certainly
much
more
safe
,
than
if
all
who
are
arraigned
at
the
Bar
were
presumed
to
be
Enemies
,
and
according
to
Mr.
H's
rule
of
prevention
,
should
be
all
forthwith
condemned
to
suffer
as
guilty
;
therefore
it
also
follows
,
that
the
private
Judgments
of
particular
men
concerning
others
,
made
according
to
this
Presumption
,
do
more
conduce
to
the
security
of
all
men
,
than
this
Authors
rash
Presumption
of
the
Universal
Pravity
of
all
men
,
and
would
thence
persuade
us
that
all
others
in
the
State
of
Nature
are
to
be
prevented
,
and
set
upon
by
force
and
fraud
.
§
.
10.
A
second
reason
to
prove
,
that
the
violation
of
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
as
to
outward
acts
,
will
procure
us
less
security
than
their
exact
observation
,
may
be
drawn
from
hence
,
That
Mr.
H.
himself
confesses
,
there
will
thence
necessarily
follow
a
War
of
all
men
against
all
;
which
War
being
once
supposed
,
he
rightly
acknowledges
,
that
all
men
would
become
miserable
,
and
must
presently
perish
:
From
whence
it
appears
,
that
all
security
is
sought
for
in
vain
,
by
this
mad
state
;
so
that
there
can
remain
no
more
hopes
of
it
;
tho
Mr.
H.
teaches
otherwise
in
his
de
Cive
,
cap.
5.
§.
1.
and
Lev.
cap.
13.
viz.
That
in
the
mutual
fear
of
men
,
no
body
hath
a
better
way
of
security
,
than
by
this
anticipation
or
prevention
;
that
is
,
every
one
may
endeavour
so
long
to
subject
all
others
by
force
or
fraud
,
as
he
sees
any
man
left
,
of
whom
he
ought
to
beware
;
that
is
,
as
long
as
there
is
one
man
left
alive
;
and
so
the
whole
earth
would
soon
become
a
desart
,
and
the
common
sepulchre
of
mankind
;
for
no
man
can
provide
any
aid
or
assistance
for
himself
from
other
men
in
this
state
,
because
Covenants
of
mutual
Faith
,
by
which
alone
others
can
be
joined
in
Society
with
him
,
will
not
oblige
to
external
acts
in
this
state
,
as
I
have
shewed
he
acknowledges
;
and
therefore
there
remains
no
security
by
this
way
of
anticipation
:
So
that
if
there
be
any
security
in
Nature
,
I
appeal
to
the
reasons
and
consciences
of
men
,
whether
this
is
not
more
likely
to
be
had
by
the
endeavour
of
the
common
Good
of
Mankind
,
by
doing
good
and
not
evil
to
those
who
have
done
us
no
harm
,
than
by
Mr.
H.'s
method
of
Anticipation
which
can
yield
no
security
at
all
.
PRINCIPLE
X.
That
the
Laws
of
Nature
are
alterable
at
the
Will
of
the
Civil
Soveraign
.
§
.
1.
THis
is
a
natural
consequence
from
what
he
hath
already
laid
down
,
That
nothing
is
morally
good
or
evil
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
before
the
Institution
of
a
Commonwealth
.
Yet
that
you
may
see
that
I
do
not
impose
upon
Mr.
H.
in
this
Assertion
,
I
will
give
you
his
own
words
,
in
his
de
Cive
,
cap.
14.
§.
9
,
10.
But
because
it
arises
from
Civil
Laws
,
that
as
well
every
one
should
have
a
proper
Right
to
himself
,
distinct
from
that
of
another
,
as
also
that
he
may
be
forbidden
to
invade
other
mens
Properties
,
it
follows
that
these
Precepts
,
Honour
thy
Parents
,
Thou
shalt
not
defraud
any
man
in
that
which
is
appointed
by
the
Laws
;
Thou
mayest
not
kill
a
man
whom
the
Laws
forbid
thee
to
kill
;
Thou
shalt
avoid
all
Carnal
Copulation
forbidden
by
the
Laws
;
Thou
shalt
not
take
away
another
mans
Goods
without
his
consent
;
Thou
shalt
not
frustrate
Laws
and
Iudgments
by
false
Witness
,
are
all
Civil
Laws
.
It
is
true
,
the
Laws
of
Nature
prescribe
the
same
things
,
but
immplicity
;
for
the
Law
of
Nature
,
as
is
said
before
,
Cap.
3.
§.
2.
commands
Compacts
to
be
observed
;
and
therefore
,
also
to
yield
Obedience
when
Obedience
was
covenanted
;
and
to
abstain
from
what
is
anothers
,
when
it
is
defined
by
the
Civil
Law
,
what
it
is
;
but
all
the
Subjects
do
Covenant
from
the
Constitution
of
the
Commonwealth
,
to
yield
Obedience
to
his
Commands
,
who
hath
the
supream
Power
,
that
is
to
the
Civil
Laws
.
For
the
Law
of
Nature
did
oblige
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
where
first
of
all
where
Nature
gave
all
things
to
all
men
,
nothing
was
anothers
,
and
therefore
impossible
to
invade
it
;
and
in
the
next
place
,
where
all
things
were
common
;
therefore
also
all
Carnal
Copulations
were
lawful
.
Thirdly
,
Where
there
was
a
state
of
War
,
it
was
then
lawful
to
kill
any
man
.
Fourthly
,
Where
all
things
were
determined
by
a
man
's
own
Iudgment
,
therefore
also
were
the
Honours
and
Duties
due
to
Fathers
.
Lastly
,
Where
there
were
no
publick
Iudgments
,
therefore
there
was
no
need
of
giving
Testimony
either
true
or
false
;
since
therefore
the
Obligation
to
observe
those
Laws
,
is
prior
to
the
Promulgation
of
them
,
as
being
contained
in
the
very
constitution
of
the
Common-wealth
,
by
vertue
of
this
Law
of
Nature
,
which
prohibits
the
violation
of
Compacts
;
the
Law
of
Nature
commands
all
Civil
Laws
to
be
observed
.
For
where
we
are
under
an
Obligation
to
Obedience
,
before
we
know
what
will
be
commanded
,
we
are
there
universally
,
and
in
all
things
obliged
to
obey
;
from
whence
it
follows
,
That
no
Civil
Law
which
is
not
made
in
reproach
to
God
,
(
in
respect
of
whom
,
all
Common-wealths
are
not
at
their
own
Disposals
,
nor
can
be
said
to
give
Laws
)
,
cannot
be
against
the
Law
of
Nature
.
For
altho
the
Law
of
Nature
prohibits
Theft
,
Adultery
,
&c.
Yet
if
the
Civil
Laws
should
command
you
to
take
away
any
thing
from
another
,
or
to
lye
with
any
Woman
;
that
is
not
Theft
,
Adultery
,
&c.
For
the
Lacedemonians
of
old
,
when
by
a
certain
Law
,
they
permitted
their
Boys
privately
to
take
away
other
people's
Goods
;
they
then
commanded
those
Goods
not
to
be
the
Owners
,
but
theirs
who
thus
stole
them
.
And
therefore
such
a
private
taking
,
was
no
Theft
.
In
like
manner
,
the
promiscuous
Copulation
of
Sexes
amongst
the
Heathens
,
according
to
their
own
Laws
,
were
lawful
Marriages
.
§
.
2.
There
is
nothing
that
Mr.
H
hath
written
more
rudely
and
wickedly
,
and
wherein
he
more
contradicts
himself
,
than
in
this
Assertion
,
concerning
the
mutability
of
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
as
to
outward
Actions
;
since
he
himself
tells
us
immediately
after
,
That
the
Laws
of
Nature
are
immutable
and
eternal
;
and
that
Injustice
,
Ingratitude
,
Arrogance
,
Pride
,
Iniquity
,
Acception
of
Persons
,
and
the
like
,
can
never
be
made
lawful
:
for
it
can
never
be
that
War
shall
preserve
life
,
and
Peace
destroy
it
.
But
how
the
Laws
of
Nature
can
be
immutable
,
and
yet
alterable
as
to
outward
Actions
,
at
the
Will
of
the
Civil
Soveraign
,
I
cannot
comprehend
.
But
since
we
have
already
destroyed
those
two
main
Principles
introductive
to
this
,
(
viz.
)
That
no
Action
is
good
or
evil
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
till
either
the
revealed
Law
of
God
,
or
that
of
the
Civil
Soveraign
hath
made
it
so
;
and
also
that
the
Laws
of
Nature
are
not
properly
Laws
in
the
state
of
Nature
;
Let
us
now
examine
the
only
reason
he
here
gives
us
for
this
Assertion
,
which
is
this
;
That
the
Law
of
Nature
which
prohibits
the
violation
of
Compacts
,
commands
all
Civil
Laws
to
be
observed
;
since
our
Obedience
to
the
Supream
Powers
is
one
of
the
first
Compacts
that
men
made
at
the
Institution
of
the
Commonwealth
;
granting
all
which
to
be
true
,
yet
was
it
not
absolutely
,
or
in
all
things
,
that
this
Obedience
was
promised
,
but
only
in
such
as
regard
the
publick
good
of
the
Commonwealth
,
or
tend
to
the
common
Good
or
Preservation
of
Mankind
;
for
if
the
Civil
Soveraign
should
make
a
Law
,
that
every
one
might
knock
his
Father
in
the
Head
,
when
he
came
to
such
an
Age
,
and
marry
his
Mother
,
or
rob
any
other
man
,
tho'
his
dearest
Friend
,
of
all
the
necessaries
of
Life
:
All
these
wicked
Actions
will
become
lawful
to
be
done
,
nay
,
every
man
were
obliged
to
do
them
,
if
the
Law
of
Nature
commanded
all
Civil
Laws
to
be
observed
without
distinction
;
but
he
here
tells
us
,
That
no
Civil
Laws
can
be
against
the
Law
of
Nature
,
which
are
not
made
in
direct
reproach
to
God
.
And
upon
this
Principle
no
Law
can
be
so
,
but
what
directly
denies
his
Existence
;
since
in
his
Leviathan
,
Ch.
—
he
makes
even
Idolatry
lawful
,
if
it
be
once
commanded
by
his
infallible
Leviathan
,
the
Supream
Power
:
But
if
Mr.
H.
had
but
read
and
considered
any
ordinary
System
of
Ethicks
,
he
would
have
found
,
that
it
was
one
of
the
first
Principles
in
that
Science
,
that
the
Laws
of
Nature
(
like
the
moral
Vertues
)
are
so
nearly
linked
,
and
have
such
an
inseparable
dependance
upon
each
other
,
that
the
first
and
prior
Laws
of
Nature
can
never
be
contradicted
by
the
latter
,
or
secondary
.
And
therefore
tho'
it
is
true
,
that
Compacts
are
to
be
observed
by
the
Law
of
Nature
,
and
that
Obedience
to
the
Commands
of
the
Civil
Soveraign
,
is
one
of
those
Compacts
which
men
make
when
they
institute
,
and
enter
into
a
Commonwealth
,
or
Civil
State
;
yet
were
those
Promises
of
Obedience
only
made
concerning
such
things
,
which
the
Laws
of
Nature
have
commanded
,
or
permitted
to
be
done
,
in
order
to
the
common
good
of
rational
Beings
.
I
grant
therefore
,
That
the
Civil
Laws
of
every
Commonwealth
,
as
they
may
appoint
what
outward
Rewards
or
Punishments
they
please
for
the
Observation
or
Transgression
of
the
Law
of
Nature
;
and
also
in
order
to
this
end
may
ordain
what
outward
Acts
shall
be
called
Murder
,
Adultery
,
Theft
,
&c.
yet
doth
it
not
therefore
follow
,
That
they
have
a
Power
to
alter
the
Nature
of
all
moral
Actions
,
and
so
make
a
new
Law
of
Nature
;
tho'
I
own
they
may
enlarge
or
restrain
their
exercise
in
some
particular
Actions
or
Instances
.
But
since
this
is
best
cleared
by
examples
,
I
shall
here
give
you
some
of
each
sort
.
First
,
Therefore
tho'
our
Laws
give
leave
to
men
to
converse
alone
with
married
Women
without
any
Crime
,
yet
in
divers
Countries
it
is
not
so
,
But
whoever
is
found
alone
in
the
Company
of
another
man's
Wife
without
his
leave
,
it
is
lawful
for
the
Husband
to
kill
them
both
;
because
such
private
Congresses
being
esteem'd
as
bad
as
downright
Adultery
,
the
Punishment
of
it
is
left
as
it
was
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
to
the
discretion
of
the
Husband
:
But
doth
it
therefore
follow
,
That
the
Supream
Power
might
make
a
Law
,
whereby
it
may
be
lawful
for
a
Husband
to
kill
every
man
that
should
but
happen
to
look
upon
his
Wife
,
because
he
may
at
the
same
time
commit
Adultery
with
her
in
his
heart
?
So
likewise
by
our
Law
,
the
Husband
is
to
be
esteemed
the
Father
of
all
Children
which
his
Wife
shall
bring
forth
,
if
he
were
within
the
English
Dominions
at
the
time
when
the
Child
was
Begot
,
though
he
were
at
that
same
time
an
Hundred
Miles
off
,
and
though
the
Mother
should
assure
the
Child
,
that
not
her
Husband
,
but
another
man
were
really
his
Father
;
Yet
is
not
such
a
Child
obliged
to
believe
her
,
or
to
pay
any
Duty
or
respect
to
that
Person
,
though
he
be
really
his
Father
:
But
will
it
therefore
follow
,
that
the
King
and
Parliament
may
make
a
Law
,
That
no
Child
whatsoever
should
Honour
and
Obey
his
Parents
.
But
to
come
to
the
Author's
last
instance
of
the
Lacedemonian
Boys
;
I
will
not
deny
but
it
might
be
lawful
for
the
Spartans
(
as
the
Egyptians
likewise
did
)
to
make
a
Law
,
That
private
Thefts
committed
without
discovery
,
or
violence
to
mens
Persons
,
should
not
only
alter
the
Property
in
the
things
stolen
,
bu
also
pass
unpunished
;
since
this
may
very
well
consist
with
the
Publick
Peace
and
safety
of
the
People
,
and
may
also
tend
to
the
Publick
good
of
the
Commonwealth
;
since
it
might
not
only
make
men
more
careful
of
their
Goods
,
but
might
also
serve
to
make
those
Boys
more
crafty
,
secret
,
and
undertaking
in
greater
matters
,
when
they
should
come
to
be
men
;
which
as
Plutarch
tells
us
,
was
the
main
reason
why
Licurgus
made
this
Law
:
But
does
it
therefore
follow
,
that
either
the
Lacedemonians
or
Egyptians
might
have
made
it
Lawful
for
Thieves
and
Robbers
to
assault
all
mens
Persons
,
and
take
away
their
Goods
by
Force
,
or
to
Rob
men
of
those
things
(
such
as
Food
and
Rayment
)
which
are
absolutely
necessary
for
Human
Life
,
or
that
such
a
Law
could
ever
have
been
made
practicable
,
or
have
been
observed
,
without
the
absolute
dissolution
of
the
Civil
Government
?
Whereas
if
Mr.
H.
had
but
considered
the
distinction
between
that
Natural
and
Civil
Property
,
which
we
have
made
out
in
the
first
Chap.
of
the
preceding
Discourse
,
he
had
never
fallen
into
this
Error
,
of
supposing
all
Theft
or
Robbery
whatsoever
to
become
Lawful
,
if
once
ordained
so
by
the
Supreme
Power
.
§
.
3.
I
shall
give
you
but
one
instance
more
from
the
Laws
of
our
own
Kingdom
,
by
which
it
is
enacted
,
That
whoever
shall
relieve
a
way
going
Beggar
,
§
.
4.
But
whether
Mr.
H.
fell
into
this
Error
for
want
of
a
due
knowledge
and
consideration
of
this
great
Law
of
Nature
;
or
else
out
of
a
desire
to
flatter
all
Civil
Sovereigns
,
is
hard
to
determine
;
though
it
be
very
suspitious
,
that
he
did
it
rather
out
of
design
than
ignorance
;
since
he
teaches
us
in
his
de
Cive
,
and
Lev.
That
Princes
being
free
from
all
Promises
and
Compacts
to
their
Subjects
,
may
dispose
of
their
Lives
and
Fortunes
at
their
pleasure
,
and
therefore
can
do
them
no
injury
,
though
they
treat
them
never
so
cruelly
,
because
he
is
in
respect
of
them
still
in
the
state
of
Nature
;
by
which
means
he
at
once
endeavours
to
destroy
all
Virtue
and
Goodness
in
Princes
,
and
all
Reverence
and
Respect
in
the
minds
of
their
Subjects
;
and
makes
no
difference
between
a
Nero
or
Caligula
,
and
a
Trajan
or
an
Antonine
.
And
consequential
to
this
,
he
likewise
makes
the
will
of
the
Supreme
Power
,
though
perhaps
but
one
single
man
,
to
be
the
only
measure
of
Good
and
Evil
,
Just
and
Unjust
:
So
that
whatever
he
Commands
or
Forbids
,
must
immediately
be
look'd
upon
as
Good
or
Evil
,
because
he
hath
Commanded
it
,
or
Forbidden
it
;
by
which
means
,
Princes
would
have
no
other
Rules
left
them
of
their
Moral
,
or
Politick
Actions
,
but
their
own
Arbitrary
Humours
,
or
Wills
:
Which
if
it
were
so
,
men
would
be
in
a
much
worse
condition
under
the
Power
of
this
irresistible
Leviathan
,
than
they
were
in
the
state
of
Nature
;
since
a
man
is
in
more
danger
,
as
to
his
Life
and
Fortune
,
who
is
at
the
Mercy
of
one
Cruel
and
unreasonable
man
,
who
commands
an
Hundred
thousand
men
,
than
he
who
was
before
in
danger
of
the
violence
of
an
Hundred
thousand
single
men
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
since
it
was
Lawful
for
him
to
have
provided
for
his
own
security
by
combination
with
others
,
which
in
a
Civil
state
it
is
upon
his
Principles
unlawful
to
do
;
though
I
confess
,
not
being
true
to
them
,
he
leaves
every
man
a
Right
of
self-defence
,
or
Resistance
,
even
under
a
Civil
Government
whenever
he
is
strong
enough
to
Rebel
,
or
Resist
the
Magistrate
,
by
which
means
he
takes
away
with
one
hand
,
all
that
he
had
before
bestowed
with
the
other
.
§
.
5.
But
I
think
I
have
now
sufficiently
exposed
the
Falseness
,
as
well
as
Wickedness
of
those
Principles
:
And
though
I
will
not
be
so
uncharitable
as
to
affirm
,
that
either
Mr.
H.
,
or
all
his
Followers
,
either
did
,
or
would
always
act
according
to
them
,
(
yet
as
Cicero
long
since
observed
in
his
Offices
)
they
have
more
reason
to
thank
the
natural
goodness
and
generosity
of
their
own
Natures
,
than
the
Doctrines
they
have
embraced
,
if
they
do
not
.
But
if
I
have
been
too
tedious
in
the
performance
,
I
hope
the
Reader
will
pardon
me
,
if
these
pernicious
Principles
are
sufficiently
Confuted
at
last
,
since
it
is
impossible
for
any
man
to
judge
of
their
Truth
or
Falsehood
,
without
first
considering
the
Author's
Opinion
,
in
his
own
words
,
and
then
strictly
examining
the
reasons
he
brings
for
them
;
which
could
not
well
be
contracted
into
a
less
compass
.
But
having
not
only
,
I
hope
,
laid
foundations
for
a
more
solid
building
in
the
precedent
Discourse
;
but
also
cleared
off
that
Rubbish
in
this
second
Part
,
that
might
obstruct
its
Evidence
in
the
minds
of
all
Candid
and
indifferent
Readers
;
I
shall
therefore
beseech
God
,
the
great
Ruler
of
mens
hearts
and
affections
,
That
what
we
have
said
in
this
Treatise
,
may
have
that
good
effect
,
as
if
not
to
produce
,
yet
at
least
to
increase
true
Piety
towards
God
,
and
good
Will
and
Charity
among
men
.
FINIS
.