Observations
UPON
A
TREATISE
CALLED
PATRIARCHA
,
And
several
other
Miscellanies
,
Lately
Published
Under
the
Name
of
Sir
Robert
Filmer
Baronet
.
CHAP.
I.
THE
reason
why
I
chuse
to
begin
these
Observations
with
this
Treatise
of
the
natural
Right
of
Kings
,
rather
than
with
any
of
the
rest
,
though
published
long
before
it
,
is
,
because
being
(
as
I
suppose
)
writ
after
the
rest
,
and
on
purpose
to
assert
Monarchy
to
be
Jure
Divino
,
is
likely
to
contain
the
Authors
most
mature
thoughts
;
and
being
written
with
better
connection
than
his
other
Tracts
,
contains
the
substance
of
them
all
;
which
were
designed
not
so
much
to
establish
an
Hypothesis
,
as
to
observe
the
weakness
of
other
mens
:
and
being
published
at
several
times
,
and
on
divers
occasions
,
give
us
but
the
same
Notions
repeated
,
according
as
the
Tenets
in
the
Authors
he
writ
against
needed
(
as
he
thought
)
a
Confutation
:
Which
how
far
they
do
deserve
it
,
I
leave
to
the
Reader
to
judge
;
and
therefore
shall
not
take
upon
me
to
defend
any
mans
Opinions
,
though
never
so
great
or
learned
,
farther
than
I
conceive
them
agreeable
to
right
Reason
.
Nor
shall
I
trouble
my self
to
criticize
on
every
small
Errour
or
Mistake
in
this
Author's
Writings
,
but
onely
set
my self
to
consider
such
main
Arguments
as
appear
to
be
founded
on
false
or
meer
precarious
Principles
;
not
concerning
my self
with
his
other
Treatises
,
but
as
they
contain
some
other
Reasons
or
newer
Matter
than
I
finde
here
.
Page
2.
The
designe
of
this
Treatise
,
is
against
an
Opinion
maintained
by
some
Divines
,
and
several
learned
men
,
That
Mankind
is
naturally
endowed
and
born
with
Freedom
from
Subjection
,
and
at
liberty
to
chuse
what
form
of
Government
it
please
;
and
that
the
Power
which
any
one
man
hath
over
others
,
was
at
first
bestowed
according
to
the
discretion
of
the
Multitude
.
Page
3.
This
Opinion
,
he
says
,
is
not
to
be
found
in
the
Fathers
of
the
Primitive
Church
:
that
it
contradicts
the
Doctrine
and
History
of
the
Holy
Scriptures
,
the
constant
practice
of
all
ancient
Monarchies
,
and
the
very
Principles
of
the
Law
of
Nature
.
And
upon
this
Doctrine
the
Jesuits
,
and
favourers
of
the
Geneva
Discipline
,
have
built
this
perilous
Conclusion
:
That
the
People
or
Multitude
have
power
to
punish
or
deprive
the
Prince
,
if
he
transgress
the
Laws
of
the
Kingdom
.
And
for
this
quotes
the
Writings
of
divers
Jesuits
.
How
far
this
Tenet
deserves
the
Author's
Censure
,
and
is
liable
to
the
Conclusions
he
says
some
have
drawn
from
thence
,
since
the
truth
or
falshood
of
Propositions
does
not
depend
upon
the
men
that
have
made
use
of
them
,
I
shall
consider
hereafter
;
now
confining
my self
onely
to
examine
the
Reasons
he
brings
either
in
this
or
any
other
of
his
Treatises
to
overthrow
this
Opinion
.
And
if
they
prove
weak
,
and
insufficient
for
the
end
the
Author
designed
them
,
some
Friend
of
his
,
or
his
Tenets
,
had
best
finde
out
others
;
which
if
they
prove
and
appear
evidently
true
,
I
shall
then
rest
satisfied
,
and
acknowledge
my self
absolutely
convinced
.
In
the
mean
time
I
shall
now
give
you
the
Author's
Hypothesis
all
at
once
,
in
his
words
,
that
you
may
judge
whether
I
deal
fairly
with
him
or
no.
P.
5.
To
pass
over
therefore
his
Cautions
(
which
are
honest
and
sober
)
I
shall
come
to
what
he
observes
upon
several
passages
of
Bellarmine
.
And
though
he
does
not
quote
the
places
from
whence
he
took
them
,
yet
I
hope
he
hath
dealt
fairly
with
him
:
Though
I
shall
not
take
upon
me
to
defend
the
contradictions
or
false
consequences
either
of
this
or
any
other
Author
,
since
I
onely
observe
the
onely
Answer
which
(
p.
11.
)
Sir
R.
F.
gives
Bellarmine's
Argument
for
the
natural
Liberty
of
the
People
,
is
out
of
Bellarmine
himself
,
whose
words
are
these
:
If
many
men
had
been
created
together
out
of
the
Earth
,
they
ought
all
to
have
been
Princes
over
their
Posterity
.
In
which
words
(
the
Author
says
)
we
have
an
evident
confession
,
that
Creation
made
Man
Prince
of
his
Posterity
.
And
indeed
not
onely
Adam
,
but
the
succeeding
Patriarchs
had
by
right
of
Fatherhood
,
Royal
Authority
over
their
Children
.
Nor
dares
Bellarmine
deny
this
.
That
the
Patriarchs
(
saith
he
)
were
endowed
with
Kingly
power
,
their
deeds
do
testifie
;
for
as
Adam
was
Lord
of
his
Children
,
so
his
Children
,
under
him
,
had
a
Command
and
Power
over
their
own
Children
:
but
still
with
a
subordination
to
the
first
Parent
,
who
was
Lord
Paramount
over
his
Childrens
Children
to
all
Generations
,
as
being
the
Grandfather
of
his
People
.
Which
conception
of
Bellarmine
,
though
it
may
destroy
his
Argument
for
natural
Freedom
,
yet
I
conceive
that
it
does
not
destroy
the
necessity
of
supposing
all
the
Kingdoms
and
Commonwealths
now
in
being
in
the
world
,
to
have
had
their
beginning
from
Conquest
,
or
else
from
the
Consent
or
Institution
of
the
People
who
began
it
;
as
I
shall
endeavour
to
prove
more
at
large
.
But
from
this
concession
of
Bellarmine's
,
the
Author
taking
this
as
a
yielded
point
,
proceeds
thus
:
P.
12.
I
do
not
see
how
the
Children
of
Adam
,
or
any
man
else
,
can
be
free
from
Subjection
to
their
Parents
:
And
this
Subjection
of
Children
being
the
Fountain
of
all
Regal
Authority
,
by
the
Ordination
of
God
himself
,
it
follows
,
That
Civil
Power
not
onely
in
general
is
by
Divine
Institution
,
but
even
the
Assignment
of
it
specifically
to
the
eldest
Parents
:
Which
quite
takes
away
that
new
and
common
distinction
which
refers
onely
Power
Vniversal
and
Absolute
to
God
;
but
Power
Respective
,
in
regard
of
the
special
Form
of
Government
,
to
the
Choice
of
the
People
.
P.
13.
This
Lordship
which
Adam
by
command
had
over
the
whole
World
,
and
by
right
descending
from
him
,
the
Patriarchs
did
enjoy
,
was
as
large
and
ample
as
the
absolutest
Dominion
of
any
Monarch
which
hath
been
since
the
Creation
.
For
Power
of
Life
and
Death
,
we
finde
that
Judah
the
Father
pronounced
sentence
of
death
against
Thamar
his
Daughter-in-law
for
playing
the
Harlot
;
Bring
her
forth
(
saith
he
)
that
she
may
be
burnt
.
Touching
War
,
we
see
that
Abram
commanded
an
Army
of
318
Souldiers
of
his
own
Family
;
and
Esau
met
his
brother
Jacob
with
400
men
at
Arms.
For
matter
of
Peace
,
Abraham
made
a
League
with
Abimelech
,
and
ratified
the
Articles
with
an
Oath
.
These
Acts
of
judging
in
capital
Crimes
,
of
making
War
,
and
concluding
Peace
,
are
the
chiefest
Marks
of
Soveraignty
that
are
found
in
any
Monarchy
.
And
not
onely
until
the
Flood
,
but
after
it
,
this
Patriarchal
power
did
continue
,
as
the
very
name
Patriarch
doth
in
part
prove
.
The
three
Sons
of
Noah
had
the
whole
World
divided
amongst
them
by
their
Father
;
for
of
them
was
the
whole
World
overspread
,
according
to
the
Benediction
given
to
him
and
his
Sons
:
Be
fruitful
,
and
multiply
,
and
replenish
the
earth
.
Then
he
proceeds
upon
a
vulgar
Opinion
,
p.
14
,
15.
That
at
the
Confusion
of
Tongues
,
there
were
72
distinct
Nations
erected
,
not
as
confused
Multitudes
,
without
Heads
or
Governours
,
but
they
were
distinct
Families
which
had
Fathers
for
Rulers
over
them
:
whereby
it
appears
,
that
even
in
the
Confusion
,
God
was
careful
to
preserve
Paternal
Authority
,
by
distributing
the
diversity
of
Languages
according
to
the
diversity
of
Families
.
And
for
this
he
quotes
the
Text
,
Gen.
10.
v.
5.
Speaking
of
the
division
of
the
Isles
of
the
Gentiles
among
the
Sons
of
Japhet
,
it
follows
,
v.
5.
These
are
the
Families
of
the
Sons
of
Noah
,
after
their
Generations
in
their
Nations
;
and
by
these
were
these
Nations
divided
in
the
Earth
after
the
Flood
.
So
that
though
the
manner
of
this
Division
be
uncertain
,
yet
it
is
most
certain
the
Division
it self
was
by
Families
from
Noah
and
his
Children
.
P.
16.
As
for
Nimrod's
being
King
over
his
own
Family
by
Right
,
and
over
other
Families
by
Usurpation
and
Conquest
,
and
not
by
Election
of
the
People
or
Multitude
,
he
gives
us
Sir
Walter
Rawleigh's
opinion
that
it
was
so
;
(
which
I
think
is
no
better
a
proof
than
if
he
had
given
us
his
own
:
)
but
if
it
were
true
,
it
proves
no
more
,
than
that
this
Patriarchal
Right
could
not
long
continue
,
since
it
was
usurped
in
the
Grandchild
of
Ham
,
the
fourth
discent
from
Noah
.
But
he
proceeds
thus
:
As
this
Patriarchal
Power
continued
in
Abraham
,
Isaac
,
and
Jacob
,
even
unto
the
Egyptian
Bondage
;
so
we
finde
it
amongst
the
Sons
of
Ismael
and
Esau
:
it
is
said
,
These
are
the
Sons
of
Ismael
,
and
these
are
their
names
by
their
Castles
and
Towns
,
Twelve
Princes
of
their
Tribes
and
Families
,
&c.
P.
18.
He
owns
this
Paternal
Government
was
intermitted
during
their
Bondage
in
Egypt
,
because
they
were
in
subjection
to
a
stronger
Prince
:
But
after
the
return
of
the
Israelites
out
of
bondage
,
God
,
out
of
a
special
care
of
them
,
chose
Moses
and
Josuah
successively
to
govern
as
Princes
,
instead
of
the
supream
Fathers
:
And
after
them
,
God
raised
up
Judges
to
defend
his
People
.
But
when
God
gave
them
Kings
,
he
re-established
the
ancient
and
prime
Right
of
Lineal-succession
to
Paternal
Government
:
And
whensoever
he
made
choice
of
any
special
person
to
be
King
,
he
intended
that
the
Issue
also
should
have
the
benefit
thereof
,
as
being
comprehended
sufficiently
in
the
person
of
the
Father
,
although
the
Father
onely
was
named
in
the
Grant
.
P.
19.
The
Author
proceeds
to
obviate
an
Objection
that
he
sees
may
be
made
to
his
Hypothesis
,
That
it
may
seem
absurd
that
Kings
now
are
Fathers
of
their
People
since
Experience
shews
the
contrary
.
It
is
true
(
says
he
)
all
Kings
are
not
the
natural
Parents
of
their
Subjects
,
yet
they
all
either
are
,
or
are
to
be
reputed
the
next
Heirs
to
those
first
Progenitors
who
were
at
first
the
natural
Parents
of
the
whole
People
;
and
so
in
their
right
succeed
to
the
exercise
of
Supream
Jurisdiction
:
and
such
Heirs
are
not
onely
Lords
of
their
own
Children
,
but
of
their
Brethren
,
and
all
others
that
were
Subjects
to
their
Fathers
.
And
therefore
we
finde
that
God
told
Cain
of
his
brother
Abel
,
His
desires
shall
be
toward
thee
,
and
thou
shalt
rule
over
him
.
Accordingly
when
Jacob
bought
his
brothers
Birthright
,
Isaac
blessed
him
thus
:
Be
Lord
over
thy
brethren
,
and
let
the
sons
of
thy
mother
bow
before
thee
.
P.
20.
As
long
as
the
first
Fathers
of
Families
lived
,
the
name
of
Patriarch
did
aptly
belong
unto
them
;
but
after
a
few
Descents
,
when
the
true
Fatherhood
it self
was
extinct
,
and
onely
the
right
of
the
Father
descended
upon
the
true
Heir
,
then
the
Title
of
Prince
or
King
was
more
significant
to
express
the
power
of
him
who
succeeds
onely
to
the
right
of
Fatherhood
which
his
Ancestors
did
naturally
enjoy
.
By
this
means
it
comes
to
pass
that
many
a
Child
,
by
succeeding
a
King
,
hath
a
right
of
a
Father
over
many
a
gray-headed
Multitude
,
and
hath
the
Title
of
Pater
Patriae
.
It
may
be
demanded
,
What
becomes
of
the
Right
of
Fatherhood
,
in
case
the
Crown
does
escheat
for
want
of
an
Heir
;
whether
doth
it
not
then
devolve
to
the
People
?
The
Answer
is
,
It
is
but
the
negligence
or
ignorance
of
the
People
to
lose
the
knowledge
of
the
true
Heir
:
for
an
Heir
there
is
always
.
If
Adam
himself
were
still
living
,
and
now
ready
to
die
,
it
is
certain
that
there
is
one
man
,
and
but
one
in
the
world
,
who
is
next
Heir
,
although
the
knowledge
who
should
be
that
one
man
,
be
quite
lost
.
P.
21.
This
ignorance
of
the
People
being
admitted
,
it
doth
not
by
any
means
follow
,
that
for
want
of
Heirs
the
Supream
Power
is
devolved
to
the
Multitude
,
or
that
they
have
power
to
rule
,
and
chuse
what
Rulers
they
please
.
No
,
the
Kingly
power
in
such
cases
escheats
to
the
Princes
and
independent
Heads
of
Families
:
for
every
Kingdom
is
resolved
into
those
parts
whereof
at
first
it
was
made
.
By
the
uniting
of
great
Families
or
petty
Kingdoms
,
we
finde
the
greater
Monarchies
were
at
first
erected
;
and
into
such
again
,
as
into
their
first
matter
,
many
times
they
return
again
.
And
because
the
dependancy
of
ancient
Families
is
oft
an
obsure
and
worn-out
knowledge
,
there
the
wisdom
of
many
Princes
have
thought
fit
to
adopt
those
for
Heads
of
Families
,
and
Princes
of
Provinces
,
whose
Merits
,
Abilities
,
or
Fortunes
,
have
enabled
them
,
or
made
them
fit
and
capable
of
such
Royal
Favours
.
All
such
prime
Heads
and
Fathers
have
power
to
consent
in
the
uniting
or
conferring
of
their
Fatherly
Right
of
Soveraign
Authority
on
whom
they
please
:
And
he
that
is
so
elected
,
claims
not
his
power
as
a
Donative
from
the
People
,
but
as
being
substituted
by
God
,
from
whom
he
receives
his
Royal
Charter
of
an
Vniversal
Father
,
though
testified
by
the
Ministry
of
the
Heads
of
the
People
.
P.
22.
In
all
Kingdoms
or
Commonwealths
in
the
world
,
whether
the
Prince
be
the
Supreame
Father
of
the
People
,
or
but
the
true
Heir
of
such
a
Father
,
p.
23.
or
whether
he
come
to
the
Crown
by
usurpation
of
the
Nobles
,
or
of
the
People
,
or
by
any
other
way
whatsoever
;
or
whether
some
few
or
a
multitude
govern
the
Commonwealth
;
yet
still
the
Authority
that
is
in
any
one
,
or
in
many
,
or
in
all
these
,
is
the
onely
Right
and
natural
Authority
of
a
Supream
Father
.
There
is
,
and
always
shall
be
continued
to
the
end
of
the
world
,
a
natural
Right
of
a
Supream
Father
over
a
multitude
,
although
by
the
secret
Will
of
God
,
many
do
at
first
most
unjustly
obtain
the
Exercise
of
it
.
To
confirm
this
natural
Right
of
Regal
Power
,
we
finde
in
the
Decalogue
,
that
the
Law
which
enjoyns
Obedience
to
Kings
,
is
delivered
in
the
Terms
of
,
Honour
thy
Father
and
thy
Mother
:
as
if
all
Power
were
originally
in
the
Father
.
If
Obedience
to
Parents
be
due
immediately
by
a
natural
Law
and
Subjection
to
Princes
,
but
by
the
mediation
of
an
humane
Ordinance
,
what
reason
is
there
that
the
Laws
of
Nature
should
give
place
to
the
Laws
of
Men
?
as
we
see
the
power
of
the
Father
over
his
Child
,
gives
place
,
and
is
subordinate
to
the
power
of
the
Magistrate
.
P.
24.
If
we
compare
Rights
of
a
Father
with
those
of
a
King
,
we
finde
them
all
one
,
without
any
difference
at
all
,
but
onely
in
the
latitude
or
extent
of
them
:
As
the
Father
over
one
Family
,
so
the
King
as
Father
over
many
Families
,
extends
his
care
to
preserve
,
feed
,
clothe
,
instruct
,
and
defend
the
whole
Commonwealth
.
His
War
,
his
Peace
,
his
Courts
of
Justice
,
and
all
his
Acts
of
Soveraignty
,
tend
onely
to
preserve
and
distribute
to
every
subordinate
and
inferiour
Father
,
and
to
their
Children
their
Rights
and
Priviledges
;
so
that
all
the
Duties
of
a
King
are
summed
up
in
an
Vniversal
Fatherly
Care
of
his
People
.
I
have
been
so
just
to
the
Author
as
to
transcribe
as
much
of
his
first
Chapter
as
tends
to
prove
the
original
power
of
Kings
,
as
well
that
you
might
see
the
Hypothesis
which
he
builds
his
Divine
Right
of
Absolute
Monarchy
in
his
own
words
,
and
so
be
the
better
able
to
judge
whether
I
understand
and
answer
him
or
not
;
as
because
it
contains
the
substance
and
strength
of
all
that
the
Author
had
to
say
in
defence
of
it
.
So
that
I
shall
now
fall
to
examine
whether
his
Foundations
will
bear
so
weighty
a
Structure
as
he
hath
raised
upon
it
.
His
first
Argument
against
the
natural
Freedom
of
Mankinde
is
drawn
from
Scripture
,
and
from
Bellarmine's
own
Concession
,
That
Adam
was
(
and
consequently
every
other
Father
ought
to
be
)
a
Prince
over
his
Posterity
.
And
as
Adam
was
Lord
over
his
Children
,
so
his
Children
,
under
him
,
had
a
power
over
their
own
Children
,
suberdinately
to
the
first
Parent
,
who
was
Lord
Paramount
over
his
Childrens
Children
to
all
Generations
,
as
being
the
Grandfather
of
his
People
.
So
that
neither
the
Children
of
Adam
or
any
else
,
can
be
free
from
subjection
to
their
Parents
;
and
this
subjection
to
Parents
being
the
foundation
of
all
Legal
Authority
,
by
the
Ordination
of
God
himself
:
therefore
no
man
can
be
born
in
a
state
of
Freedom
or
Equality
.
In
answer
to
which
,
I
shall
not
concern
my self
what
Bellarmine
or
any
other
have
granted
;
but
would
be
glad
to
know
where
and
how
God
hath
given
this
Absolute
power
to
Fathers
over
their
Children
,
and
by
what
Law
Children
are
tyed
to
an
Absolute
Subjection
or
Servitude
to
their
Parents
,
Preface
to
his
Observations
on
Aristotle
's
Politicks
.
since
the
Author
in
another
place
affirms
,
that
at
first
a
Childe
,
a
Slave
,
and
a
Servant
,
were
all
one
without
any
difference
.
I
see
no
divine
Charter
in
Scripture
of
any
such
absolute
despotick
power
granted
to
Adam
or
any
other
Father
.
The
Author
,
in
his
Observations
on
Grotius
de
Jure
belli
,
&c.
founds
this
dominion
of
Adam
over
the
Earth
and
all
Creatures
therein
,
on
Gen.
1.28
.
and
quotes
Mr.
Selden
in
his
Mare
Clausum
;
where
he
says
,
That
Adam
,
by
donation
from
God
,
was
made
the
general
Lord
of
all
things
,
not
without
such
a
private
dominion
to
himself
as
did
exclude
his
Children
,
&c.
From
which
words
I
do
not
conceive
that
Adam's
absolute
power
over
his
own
Off-spring
can
be
made
out
;
for
the
words
are
spoken
as
well
to
the
Female
as
Male
of
Mankind
:
Be
fruitful
and
multiply
,
and
replenish
the
Earth
,
and
have
dominion
over
the
fish
of
the
Sea
,
&c.
and
over
every
living
thing
that
moveth
(
in
the
Original
,
creepeth
)
upon
the
face
of
the
Earth
.
By
which
words
Adam
hath
no
power
conferred
upon
him
over
his
own
Children
(
when
he
should
have
them
:
)
These
words
implying
no
more
than
a
conferring
of
a
power
by
God
on
Mankind
,
under
these
words
of
Male
and
Female
(
and
was
not
at
all
personal
to
Adam
or
Eve
alone
)
whereby
they
might
subdue
or
tame
the
Brute
Creatures
for
their
use
,
not
comprehending
those
of
the
same
kind
with
themselves
;
since
the
general
words
extend
no
farther
than
to
every
living
thing
that
creepeth
upon
the
Earth
:
nor
does
Gods
grant
of
the
Creatures
to
Noah
comprehend
more
than
this
:
Onely
God
there
gives
man
a
priviledge
to
kill
the
Creatures
for
Food
,
which
Adam
had
not
.
Which
shews
that
Adam
was
so
far
from
having
any
such
power
of
Life
and
Death
over
his
own
Children
,
that
he
had
it
not
so
much
as
over
Brute
Creatures
:
Since
if
he
had
this
power
as
a
Monarch
,
it
is
highly
probable
,
that
being
the
Father
of
all
Men
in
the
world
,
and
having
by
the
murder
of
Abel
not
onely
lost
a
Son
but
a
Subject
,
it
had
been
his
Right
alone
to
have
punished
Cain
the
Murderer
:
Whereas
we
finde
Cain
,
Gen.
4.
v.
14.
upon
his
conviction
of
the
Murder
,
telling
God
,
that
every
one
that
findeth
him
,
should
slay
him
;
and
therefore
,
v.
15.
God
set
a
mark
upon
Cain
,
lest
any
finding
him
should
slay
him
.
From
whence
we
may
infer
,
1.
That
it
was
a
Law
of
Nature
then
,
that
Murder
was
to
be
punished
.
2.
That
this
Right
of
punishing
did
not
belong
to
Adam
,
as
a
Father
,
alone
,
so
as
to
have
power
of
Life
and
Death
over
his
Children
,
since
the
Text
does
not
mention
that
he
was
afraid
his
Father
should
put
him
to
death
,
but
every
one
that
met
him
:
Neither
does
God
set
a
mark
upon
him
to
secure
him
from
Adam
,
but
from
any
body
else
that
should
light
on
him
.
From
whence
it
follows
,
that
if
Adam
had
no
more
right
by
Gods
concession
to
take
away
his
Sons
life
for
the
murder
of
his
Brother
,
(
which
is
one
of
the
greatest
offences
he
could
commit
)
than
any
other
of
his
Brethren
or
Kinsmen
;
there
is
no
reason
why
he
should
have
it
in
any
other
case
.
And
as
for
what
the
Author
says
,
That
this
Lordship
which
Adam
had
over
the
whole
World
,
the
Patriarchs
by
a
Right
descending
from
him
,
did
enjoy
;
which
was
as
large
and
ample
as
the
absolutest
Dominion
of
any
Monarch
which
hath
been
since
the
Creation
;
I
cannot
understand
how
this
Right
derives
it self
from
Adam
:
For
he
tells
us
but
a
little
before
,
p.
12.
That
Civil
Power
not
onely
in
general
is
by
divine
Institution
,
but
even
the
Assignment
of
it
specifically
to
the
eldest
Parents
.
Therefore
granting
that
all
the
Patriarchs
from
Abraham
to
Jacob's
twelve
Sons
,
inclusively
,
assumed
a
power
of
Life
and
Death
over
their
own
Families
,
1.
I
desire
to
know
how
this
Right
can
be
derived
from
Adam
:
for
the
Right
of
supream
Monarch
of
the
world
descending
upon
the
eldest
Son
of
Adam
,
whom
we
will
suppose
to
have
been
Seth
(
since
Cain
might
forfeit
his
Birthright
,
)
this
power
of
Life
and
Death
could
onely
be
truly
vested
in
the
eldest
Grandchild
,
or
descendant
from
Seth
;
which
I
suppose
the
Author
means
by
eldest
Parents
,
or
else
he
talks
nonsence
:
And
that
Abraham
was
this
eldest
Grand-son
of
Seth
,
will
be
hard
to
prove
,
since
it
is
not
apparent
from
Scripture
,
whether
Shem
or
Japhet
were
the
eldest
Son
of
Noah
,
or
Abram
or
Nahor
the
eldest
Son
of
Terah
.
And
the
Fathers
and
ancient
Commentators
on
this
place
,
are
divided
in
their
opinions
concerning
this
point
.
And
it
is
plain
from
divers
places
in
Scripture
,
that
the
eldest
Son
is
not
always
first
named
.
But
supposing
that
Shem
was
the
eldest
Son
of
Noah
,
it
does
not
appear
that
Arphaxad
from
whom
Abram
descended
,
was
his
eldest
Son
,
since
the
Scripture
does
not
undertake
to
give
us
the
names
of
all
the
Sons
of
Shem
,
but
onely
of
Arphaxad
,
as
his
name
was
necessary
for
the
deriving
of
the
Genealogy
of
Abraham
the
Ancestor
of
the
Jewish
Nation
.
But
if
any
man
will
answer
(
as
the
Author
does
,
p.
21.
)
that
this
right
Heir
of
Adam
coming
by
length
of
time
to
be
lost
,
this
supream
Kingly
power
became
devolved
to
all
independent
Heads
of
Families
;
then
this
Right
of
Adam
,
as
Lord
and
King
of
the
whole
World
,
as
the
first
man
,
must
certainly
be
extinct
,
since
none
but
the
true
Heir
could
have
a
Right
to
that
(
according
to
the
Author's
principles
:
)
So
that
this
power
of
Life
and
Death
which
the
Author
will
have
the
Patriarchs
to
have
exercised
over
those
of
their
Family
,
must
belong
to
them
either
as
Fathers
,
or
else
as
Masters
,
or
Heads
of
their
particular
Families
;
and
not
as
Heirs
to
Adam
.
But
since
the
Author
seems
to
found
this
Power
of
Adam
upon
Mr.
Hunton's
concession
,
(
See
Anarchy
of
a
limited
Monarchy
,
p.
264.
)
That
it
is
God's
Ordinance
that
there
should
be
Civil
Government
,
because
Gen.
3.16
.
God
ordained
Adam
●o
rule
over
his
Wife
,
and
her
desire
was
to
be
subject
●o
his
;
and
that
as
hers
,
so
all
theirs
that
should
come
●ut
of
her
:
First
,
all
Expositors
look
upon
these
words
●s
respecting
only
a
Conjugal
,
and
not
Filial
Sub●ction
.
Neither
were
they
spoke
in
the
state
of
Na●ure
or
Innocence
,
but
after
the
Fall
.
Neither
for
all
●hat
,
did
Adam
,
or
any
other
Husband
,
by
these
words
●cquire
an
absolute
Authority
over
the
Life
of
his
●ife
,
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
so
that
she
hath
no
●ght
left
her
to
defend
herself
from
the
unjust
violence
〈◊〉
rage
of
her
Husband
.
Therefore
since
this
Power
〈◊〉
Adam
over
Eve
and
her
Children
,
cannot
be
pre●nded
to
belong
to
him
as
a
Father
,
but
as
a
Master
〈◊〉
a
Slave
,
and
those
that
shall
be
descended
from
her
;
〈◊〉
were
worth
while
to
enquire
,
what
Power
a
Father
〈◊〉
Master
of
a
Family
can
claim
separate
from
any
●ommonwealth
,
(
as
we
will
suppose
these
Patriarchs
●ere
.
)
For
this
will
serve
toward
the
solving
those
●xamples
he
puts
of
Abram's
power
of
Peace
and
●ar
,
and
of
Judah's
power
of
Life
and
Death
over
〈◊〉
Daughter-in-law
Thamar
.
We
will
first
then
con●er
the
power
of
a
Father
by
the
Law
of
Nature
●er
his
Children
,
and
then
that
of
a
Master
of
a
Fa●ly
over
his
Wife
,
Servants
,
or
Slaves
.
To
begin
●…th
that
of
a
Father
,
as
the
most
worthy
;
I
shall
deavour
to
search
into
the
Original
of
the
Father's
●wer
over
the
persons
of
his
Children
,
and
how
far
extends
.
It
is
evident
,
that
this
Power
of
Fathers
over
their
●ildren
,
can
only
take
place
in
the
state
of
Wedlock
;
〈◊〉
as
to
Children
got
out
of
Marriage
,
it
is
uncertain
●o
is
their
Father
:
who
can
only
be
known
by
the
declaration
of
the
Mother
;
and
she
sometimes
cannot
certainly
tell
her self
.
So
that
no
man
is
obliged
to
take
care
of
or
breed
up
a
Bastard
,
because
the
Mother
,
if
she
had
her
liberty
of
keeping
what
company
she
pleased
,
can
never
morally
assure
him
that
the
Child
is
his
:
therefore
unless
he
take
upon
him
the
care
and
education
of
this
Child
,
it
belongs
to
the
Mother
,
and
not
to
him
to
provide
for
it
.
So
that
the
Right
of
the
Father
over
his
Child
,
commences
by
vertue
〈◊〉
the
Marriage
,
which
is
a
mutual
Compact
between
a
Man
and
a
Woman
for
their
Cohabitation
,
the
generation
of
Children
,
and
their
joint
care
and
provision
for
them
.
So
that
though
by
the
Law
of
Nature
(
which
is
confirm'd
by
the
Law
of
God
)
the
Woman
as
the
weaker
vessel
,
is
to
be
subject
to
the
Man
,
as
the
stronger
,
stouter
,
and
commonly
the
wiser
creature
,
〈◊〉
whose
care
and
courage
she
must
owe
the
greatest
par●
of
her
provision
and
protection
;
yet
she
is
not
without
an
Interest
in
the
Children
,
since
she
is
under
〈◊〉
obligation
to
perform
her
part
(
and
that
the
most
〈◊〉
borious
and
troublesome
)
in
their
Education
;
thoug●
her
Power
and
Right
in
them
be
still
subordinate
〈◊〉
that
of
the
Man
,
to
whom
by
force
of
the
Marriage
sh●
hath
already
subjected
herself
.
Some
Writers
ther●
fore
think
they
have
done
sufficiently
when
they
〈◊〉
us
,
that
the
Father
hath
an
absolute
Dominion
ov●
his
Child
,
because
he
got
it
,
and
is
the
cause
of
it
being
.
By
this
Argument
the
Mother
hath
great●
Right
over
the
person
of
the
Child
,
since
all
Nat●
ralists
hold
the
Child
partakes
more
of
her
than
of
〈◊〉
Father
;
and
she
is
besides
at
greater
pain
and
troub●
both
in
the
bearing
,
bringing
it
forth
,
nursing
an●
breeding
it
up
.
But
if
it
be
answered
,
that
the
Ma●
being
Master
of
his
Wife
,
is
by
the
Contract
so
lik●
wise
of
her
Issue
:
Then
it
follows
,
that
this
power
〈◊〉
the
Father
does
not
commence
barely
from
Generation
,
but
is
acquired
from
the
Contract
of
Marriage
;
which
(
till
I
meet
with
some
reason
to
the
contrary
)
I
see
not
why
it
might
not
be
so
agreed
by
the
Contracts
,
that
the
Father
should
not
dispose
of
the
Children
without
the
Mothers
consent
:
Since
we
see
it
often
so
agreed
in
the
Marriages
of
Soveraign
Princes
,
Articles
of
Marriage
between
King
Philip
and
Queen
Mary
,
in
Godwin's
Annals
,
An.
1554.
Thuanus
,
Lib.
IX
.
So
likewise
where
a
Subject
marries
his
Queen
,
as
the
Lord
Darnley's
Marriage
with
Mary
Qu.
of
Scotland
,
the
Soveraignty
,
and
consequently
the
Power
over
the
Children
to
be
born
remained
entirely
in
Her
.
who
are
always
supposed
to
be
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
in
respect
to
each
other
.
Yet
though
I
will
not
deny
,
but
some
Gratitude
and
Acknwledgment
is
due
from
Children
to
Parents
,
even
for
this
,
that
they
did
enter
into
the
state
of
Marriage
for
their
generation
,
and
were
the
occasion
of
their
Being
:
Yet
I
do
not
see
,
how
by
this
alone
a
Father
acquires
an
absolute
power
and
dominion
over
the
person
of
the
Child
,
to
dispose
of
it
as
he
thinks
fit
:
Since
Parents
acting
here
only
as
Natural
,
and
not
Moral
Agents
,
they
are
not
the
voluntary
Causes
of
its
generation
:
Therefore
I
cannot
found
so
great
a
Right
as
that
of
an
absolute
perpetual
Dominion
over
the
Children
,
upon
so
slight
a
foundation
.
We
must
therefore
trace
this
Right
of
Fathers
over
his
Children
to
a
more
true
original
than
any
of
these
.
Since
then
all
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
or
Reason
,
are
intended
for
one
end
or
effect
,
viz.
the
common
good
and
preservation
of
Mankinde
;
and
that
Marriage
is
no
otherwise
a
Duty
,
than
as
by
the
propagation
of
our
Species
it
conduces
to
,
without
the
help
and
assistance
of
others
;
and
that
the
Parents
entred
into
this
state
of
Marriage
for
the
procreation
of
Children
:
both
the
Instinct
of
Nature
and
Law
of
Reason
dictate
,
that
they
are
obliged
to
take
care
of
and
provide
for
that
Child
,
which
they
as
subordinate
Causes
have
produced
;
as
being
those
on
whom
God
hath
imposed
this
Duty
,
which
is
much
greater
than
that
of
Generation
:
for
now
the
world
is
sufficiently
peopled
,
it
may
be
doubted
,
whether
any
person
is
obliged
to
Marry
,
further
than
it
may
consist
with
their
conveniency
,
or
course
of
Life
.
But
Parents
,
when
they
are
Married
,
are
tyed
by
the
Laws
of
Nature
to
take
care
of
the
Children
.
Therefore
I
suppose
the
highest
Right
of
Parents
in
their
Children
,
doth
arise
merely
from
their
discharge
of
this
great
Duty
of
Education
,
as
may
appear
from
this
Instance
.
Suppose
the
Parents
not
being
willing
to
undertake
the
trouble
of
breeding
up
the
Child
,
do
either
expose
it
,
or
pass
over
their
Right
in
it
to
another
,
assoon
as
it
is
born
;
I
desire
to
know
if
the
person
that
finds
this
Child
,
or
he
to
whom
it
is
assigned
,
breed
it
up
until
it
come
to
have
the
use
of
Reason
,
what
Duty
this
Child
can
owe
his
Parents
,
if
they
are
made
known
to
him
?
Certainly
,
all
the
obligation
he
can
have
to
them
,
must
be
upon
the
score
of
their
begetting
him
;
which
how
small
that
is
,
you
may
observe
from
what
hath
been
said
before
:
nor
can
the
Parents
claim
any
further
Right
in
this
Child
,
since
by
their
exposing
and
granting
it
away
,
they
renounced
all
the
Interest
they
could
have
in
it
;
so
that
the
Duty
and
Gratitude
he
should
have
owed
them
,
had
they
taken
upon
them
the
care
and
trouble
of
breeding
him
up
,
is
now
due
to
his
Foster-Father
or
Mother
,
who
took
care
of
him
until
he
was
able
to
shift
for
himself
.
From
whence
it
is
evident
,
that
the
highest
Right
which
Parents
can
have
in
their
Children
,
is
not
meerly
natural
,
from
generation
;
but
acquir'd
by
their
performance
of
that
nobler
part
of
their
Duty
.
And
so
the
highest
Obedience
which
Children
owe
their
Patents
,
proceeds
from
that
Gratitude
and
Sense
they
ought
to
have
of
the
great
obligation
they
owe
their
Parents
,
for
the
trouble
and
care
they
put
them
to
in
their
Education
.
Having
now
,
I
hope
,
found
out
the
Original
of
Parents
Right
and
Interest
in
their
Children
,
and
the
chief
ground
of
their
Gratitude
and
Duty
to
their
Parents
;
we
will
now
proceed
to
the
Second
Point
proposed
,
and
consider
what
kinde
of
Right
this
is
,
and
how
far
it
extends
.
Since
therefore
the
Father's
greatest
interest
in
his
Child
proceeds
from
his
having
bred
it
up
,
and
taken
care
of
it
,
and
that
this
Duty
is
founded
on
that
great
Law
of
Nature
,
that
every
Man
ought
to
endeavour
the
common
good
of
Mankinde
,
which
he
performs
,
as
far
as
lies
in
his
power
,
in
breeding
up
,
and
taking
care
of
his
Child
;
it
follows
,
that
this
right
in
the
Child
,
or
power
over
it
,
extends
no
farther
than
as
it
conduces
to
this
end
,
that
is
,
the
good
and
preservation
thereof
:
and
when
this
Rule
is
transgressed
,
the
Right
ceases
.
For
God
hath
not
delivered
one
man
into
the
power
of
another
,
merely
to
be
tyrannized
over
at
his
pleasure
;
but
that
the
person
who
hath
this
Authority
,
may
use
it
for
the
good
of
those
he
governs
.
And
herein
lies
the
difference
between
the
Interest
which
a
Father
hath
in
his
Children
,
and
that
property
which
he
hath
in
his
Horses
or
Slaves
;
since
his
right
to
the
former
extends
only
to
those
things
that
conduce
to
their
Good
and
Benefit
;
but
in
the
other
he
hath
no
other
consideration
,
but
the
profit
he
may
reap
from
their
labour
and
service
,
being
under
no
other
obligation
but
that
of
Humanity
,
and
of
using
them
as
becomes
a
good-natur'd
and
merciful
man
;
yet
still
considering
and
intending
his
own
advantage
,
as
the
principal
end
of
his
keeping
of
them
.
Whereas
in
his
Children
he
is
chiefly
to
design
their
good
and
advantage
,
as
far
as
lies
in
his
power
,
without
ruining
himself
:
and
though
he
justly
may
make
use
of
their
labour
and
service
while
they
continue
as
part
of
his
Family
;
yet
it
is
not
for
the
same
end
alone
that
he
uses
his
Horses
or
Slaves
,
but
that
his
Children
being
bred
up
in
a
constant
course
of
Industry
,
may
be
the
better
able
either
to
get
their
own
living
,
or
else
to
spend
their
time
as
they
ought
to
do
,
without
falling
into
the
Vices
of
Idleness
or
Debauchery
.
So
that
it
is
evident
,
the
Father
has
no
more
right
over
the
Life
of
his
Child
than
another
man
;
being
as
much
answerable
to
God
if
he
abuse
this
Right
of
a
Father
,
in
killing
his
innocent
Son
,
as
if
another
had
done
it
.
Neither
hath
he
from
the
same
Principles
any
right
to
maim
or
castrate
his
Child
,
(
as
this
Author
allows
him
to
do
,
in
his
Directions
for
Obedience
;
)
much
less
sell
him
for
a
Slave
:
Therefore
it
is
no
part
of
the
Law
of
Nature
,
(
unless
he
cannot
otherwise
provide
for
it
)
but
of
the
Roman
,
or
Civil-Law
,
that
a
Father
should
have
power
to
sell
his
Son
three
times
.
For
the
Father
is
appointed
by
God
to
meliorate
the
condition
of
his
Child
,
but
not
to
make
it
worse
;
since
it
is
not
himself
,
but
God
that
properly
gave
him
his
being
.
So
that
I
hope
I
have
sufficiently
proved
there
is
a
great
difference
between
a
Child
and
a
Slave
,
or
a
Servant
for
Life
,
though
this
Authour
will
have
them
in
the
state
of
Nature
to
be
all
one
.
But
,
for
the
better
clearing
of
this
point
,
how
far
the
power
of
Parents
over
their
Children
extends
,
I
think
we
may
very
well
divide
(
as
Grotius
does
)
the
life
of
the
Child
into
three
periods
or
ages
.
De
J.B.
l.
2.
c.
5.
§
2.
The
first
is
the
time
of
imperfect
judgment
,
or
before
the
Child
comes
to
be
able
to
exercise
his
Reason
.
The
second
is
the
period
of
perfect
Judgment
,
yet
whilst
the
Child
still
continues
part
of
his
Fathers
Family
.
The
third
is
after
he
hath
left
his
Father's
,
and
either
enters
into
another
Family
,
or
sets
up
a
Family
himself
.
In
the
first
Period
,
all
the
actions
of
Children
are
under
the
absolute
dominion
of
their
Parents
:
for
since
they
have
not
the
use
of
Reason
,
nor
are
able
to
judge
what
is
good
or
bad
for
themselves
,
they
could
not
grow
up
nor
be
preserved
,
unless
their
Parents
judged
for
them
what
means
conduced
to
this
end
;
yet
this
power
is
still
to
be
directed
for
the
principal
end
,
the
good
and
preservation
of
the
Child
.
In
the
second
Period
,
when
they
are
of
mature
Judgment
,
yet
continue
part
of
their
Fathers
Family
,
they
are
still
under
their
Fathers
command
,
and
ought
to
be
obedient
to
it
in
all
actions
which
tend
to
the
good
of
their
Fathers
Family
and
concerns
;
and
in
both
these
Ages
the
Father
hath
a
power
to
set
his
Children
to
work
,
as
well
to
enable
them
to
get
their
own
Living
,
as
to
recompence
himself
for
the
pains
and
care
he
hath
taken
,
and
the
charge
he
may
have
bin
at
in
their
Education
.
For
though
he
were
obliged
by
the
Law
of
Nature
to
breed
up
his
Children
,
yet
there
is
no
reason
but
he
may
make
use
of
their
labour
,
as
a
natural
recompence
for
his
trouble
.
And
in
this
Period
the
Father
hath
power
to
correct
his
Son
,
if
he
prove
negligent
,
or
disobedient
;
since
this
Correction
is
for
his
advantage
,
to
make
him
more
careful
and
diligent
another
time
,
and
to
subdue
the
stubbornness
of
his
Will
:
But
in
other
actions
the
Children
have
a
power
of
acting
freely
,
yet
still
with
respect
of
gratifying
and
pleasing
their
Parents
,
to
whom
they
are
obliged
for
their
Being
and
Education
,
since
without
their
care
they
could
not
have
attained
to
that
age
.
But
since
this
Duty
is
not
by
force
of
any
absolute
Subjection
,
but
only
of
Piety
,
Gratitude
and
Observance
,
it
does
not
make
void
any
act
,
though
done
contrary
to
those
Duties
,
as
Marriage
,
and
the
like
;
for
the
gift
of
a
thing
is
not
therefore
void
,
though
made
contrary
to
the
Rule
of
Prudence
and
Frugality
.
In
the
third
Period
,
they
are
in
all
actions
free
,
and
at
their
own
dispose
;
yet
still
under
those
obligations
of
Gratitude
,
Piety
and
Observance
toward
their
Parents
as
their
greatest
Benefactors
,
since
if
that
they
have
well
discharged
their
Duty
toward
their
Children
,
they
can
never
in
their
whole
lives
sufficiently
recompence
so
great
benefits
as
they
have
received
from
them
.
But
it
seems
the
Authour
is
not
satisfied
with
these
distinctions
,
He
cannot
conceive
,
how
in
any
case
Children
can
ever
naturally
have
any
power
or
moral
Faculty
of
doing
what
they
please
,
without
their
Parents
leave
;
since
they
are
always
bound
to
study
to
please
them
.
And
though
by
the
Laws
of
some
Nations
,
Children
when
they
attain
to
years
of
discretion
,
have
Power
and
Liberty
in
many
actions
,
yet
this
Liberty
is
granted
them
by
positive
humane
Laws
only
,
which
are
made
by
the
Supreme
Fatherly
Power
of
Princes
,
who
regulate
,
limit
,
or
assume
the
Authority
of
Inferiour
Fathers
,
for
the
publick
benefit
of
the
Commonwealth
:
So
that
naturally
the
Power
of
Parents
over
their
Children
never
ceaseth
by
any
separation
,
but
only
by
the
permission
of
the
transcendent
Fatherly
Power
of
the
Supreme
Prince
,
Children
may
be
dispensed
with
,
or
priviledged
in
some
cases
from
obedience
to
subordinate
Parents
.
For
my
part
,
I
see
no
reason
why
these
distinctions
of
Grotius
may
not
be
well
enough
defended
against
all
the
Reasons
which
the
Authour
gives
us
to
the
contrary
:
For
he
only
tells
us
,
He
cannot
conceive
how
in
any
case
Children
can
ever
naturally
have
any
power
or
moral
faculty
of
doing
what
they
please
,
without
their
Fathers
leave
;
and
that
naturally
the
Power
of
Parents
never
ceaseth
by
any
separation
,
&c.
but
gives
us
no
other
reason
,
than
that
they
are
always
bound
to
study
to
please
them
.
As
if
this
obligation
of
Gratitude
and
Complacency
,
did
likewise
comprehend
a
full
and
perfect
propriety
of
all
Fathers
in
the
persons
of
their
Children
,
and
an
absolute
power
over
them
in
all
cases
whatsoever
,
so
that
Children
shall
have
no
Right
left
to
consult
their
own
good
or
preservation
,
in
any
case
whatsoever
,
But
if
we
consider
what
Bodin
hath
here
said
,
we
shall
finde
every
one
of
his
Suppositions
false
:
For
,
1.
he
supposes
it
to
be
the
Right
of
all
Fathers
,
by
the
Law
of
Nature
,
to
have
an
absolute
power
over
the
lives
and
persons
of
their
Children
.
2.
That
the
Jewish
and
Roman
Law
are
most
agreeable
to
the
Laws
of
Nature
in
this
point
.
3.
That
Fathers
do
seldom
or
never
abuse
this
power
.
4.
That
if
they
do
abuse
it
,
yet
it
is
better
to
leave
it
in
their
hands
,
than
to
abrogate
it
or
retrench
it
.
The
falseness
of
all
which
Assertions
,
I
either
have
already
,
or
else
shall
hereafter
make
manifest
:
Only
I
shall
remark
thus
much
at
present
,
That
upon
Bodin's
principle
,
women
that
murder
their
Bastards
would
have
a
good
time
on
't
,
because
having
no
Husbands
,
they
have
full
power
over
the
Life
of
their
Children
;
and
there
is
no
reason
that
it
should
be
retrencht
by
any
positive
Laws
,
because
some
offend
against
it
.
But
however
,
this
Argument
of
Bodin's
would
do
our
Author's
cause
no
good
:
for
if
Parents
are
to
be
trusted
with
this
absolute
power
over
their
Children
,
because
of
the
natural
affection
they
are
always
supposed
to
bear
them
;
then
Princes
ought
not
to
be
trusted
with
it
,
since
none
but
Parents
themselves
can
have
this
natural
affection
towards
their
Children
;
Princes
(
as
the
Author
grants
)
having
this
power
onely
as
representing
these
Parents
.
Whereas
Parentage
is
a
natural
Relation
,
and
neither
can
be
created
nor
assigned
farther
than
the
Civil
Laws
of
the
Country
have
appointed
;
and
therefore
there
can
be
no
adopted
Son
by
the
Law
of
Nature
,
since
Adoption
arises
chiefly
from
the
promise
and
consent
of
the
person
adopted
,
and
partly
from
the
Authority
of
the
Civil
Law
,
or
Municipal
Law
of
the
Commonwealth
.
So
that
in
relation
to
Princes
,
upon
this
Reason
of
Bodin's
,
cessante
causa
,
cessat
effectus
.
But
indeed
Bodin
never
dreamt
of
this
fine
Notion
of
our
Author's
,
that
all
Monarchs
were
not
onely
Heads
,
but
Fathers
of
their
people
,
or
else
certainly
we
should
have
had
this
as
the
chief
Argument
to
prove
his
French
Monarchy
to
be
Jure
Divino
.
But
I
shall
trouble
my self
no
farther
with
him
at
present
,
but
shall
proceed
to
consider
this
point
of
absolute
Obedience
a
little
farther
.
I
suppose
the
Author
(
as
any
sober
man
else
)
would
grant
,
that
Children
are
not
obliged
so
much
as
to
attempt
to
perform
the
commands
of
their
Parents
,
in
case
they
evidently
appear
impossible
or
extravagant
,
such
as
a
Father
may
give
when
he
is
in
a
fit
of
drunkenness
,
madness
,
or
sudden
rage
,
which
is
all
one
with
madness
;
and
of
this
who
can
judge
,
but
the
Children
who
are
to
perform
these
Commands
?
And
in
this
case
no
man
will
deny
but
it
is
lawful
for
the
Children
to
hold
,
nay
binde
their
mad
or
drunken
Parents
,
in
case
they
cannot
otherwise
hinder
them
from
doing
mischief
,
or
killing
either
themselves
,
their
Mothers
,
or
Brethren
.
So
that
though
they
may
do
this
from
that
natural
love
&
charity
which
all
men
in
the
state
of
nature
ought
to
shew
toward
each
other
,
yet
they
may
likewise
justifie
the
doing
of
it
as
Children
,
who
ought
to
have
a
greater
concern
for
the
good
and
preservation
of
their
Parents
,
than
meer
strangers
,
and
have
therefore
an
higher
obligation
to
prevent
their
doing
any
mischief
either
to
themselves
or
neer
Relations
;
this
being
for
the
Fathers
good
and
preservation
,
and
that
for
which
he
hath
cause
to
thank
them
when
he
comes
to
himself
.
And
if
it
be
said
,
that
the
Son
may
then
refuse
his
Fathers
Commands
,
or
resist
them
,
pretending
he
is
mad
,
drunk
,
or
in
a
rage
,
when
he
really
is
not
,
and
thereby
take
occasion
to
obey
his
Father
no
farther
than
he
pleases
:
to
this
I
answer
,
That
the
Son
is
either
really
perswaded
that
his
Father
is
in
some
of
those
evil
circumstances
before
mentioned
,
or
else
onely
pretends
that
he
thinks
so
,
when
really
he
does
not
.
If
in
the
first
case
he
erre
in
his
judgment
,
and
the
ignorance
did
not
proceed
from
his
own
fault
(
either
of
passion
,
prejudice
,
or
too
slight
an
esteem
of
his
Fathers
understanding
)
he
is
not
culpable
,
though
he
make
such
a
false
judgment
of
his
Fathers
actions
:
for
God
considering
onely
the
sincerity
of
the
heart
,
does
not
require
of
any
man
more
than
he
is
able
to
perform
.
But
if
on
the
other
side
the
Son
play
the
Hypocrite
,
and
refuse
his
Parents
Commands
,
pretending
they
are
mad
or
drunk
,
when
really
they
are
not
,
he
is
without
doubt
doubly
guilty
both
,
of
Hypocrisie
and
Disobedience
.
But
this
does
not
hinder
Children
in
the
state
of
Nature
from
judging
of
the
reasonableness
or
lawfulness
of
their
Parents
Commands
,
and
of
the
condition
they
are
in
when
they
gave
them
:
for
otherwise
a
Child
ought
to
be
of
his
Fathers
Religion
,
though
it
were
Idolatry
,
if
he
commanded
it
;
or
were
obliged
to
break
any
of
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
if
this
Obedience
were
absolute
.
And
it
is
a
lesser
evil
that
the
Commands
of
Parents
should
be
disobeyed
,
nay
,
sometimes
their
persons
resisted
,
than
that
they
should
make
a
Right
to
command
or
do
unreasonable
and
unlawful
things
in
a
fit
of
madness
,
drunkenness
,
or
passion
,
destroy
either
themselves
or
others
.
But
it
may
be
replied
,
that
though
Fathers
in
the
state
of
Nature
have
no
Right
to
act
unjustly
or
cruelly
toward
their
Children
,
or
to
command
such
unlawful
or
unreasonable
things
;
yet
however
they
are
onely
answerable
to
God
for
so
doing
;
and
there
is
out
of
a
Commonwealth
no
superiour
power
that
can
question
the
Fathers
actions
:
for
since
his
Children
are
committed
by
God
to
his
care
,
he
onely
is
answerable
for
them
,
and
for
his
actions
towards
them
,
since
no
other
man
hath
any
interest
or
concern
in
them
but
himself
.
So
that
if
he
kill
,
maim
,
abuse
,
or
sell
his
Son
,
there
is
no
man
that
hath
Right
to
revenge
,
punish
,
or
call
him
to
an
account
for
so
doing
;
and
if
no
others
that
are
his
equals
,
much
less
his
Wife
and
Children
,
who
are
so
much
his
Inferiours
,
and
who
ought
in
all
things
to
be
obedient
to
his
Will.
Therefore
this
Power
,
though
it
be
not
absolute
in
respect
of
God
,
yet
is
so
in
respect
of
his
Wife
and
Children
:
and
so
in
all
cases
where
the
Children
cannot
yield
an
active
Obedience
to
their
Fathers
commands
,
they
are
notwithstanding
obliged
(
by
the
Law
of
God
;
See
Ephes.
6.1
.
Colos.
3.20
.
)
to
a
passive
one
;
and
patiently
to
submit
to
whatever
evils
or
punishments
he
pleases
to
inflict
,
though
it
were
to
the
loss
of
Life
itself
.
To
which
I
answer
,
That
though
it
is
true
,
a
Father
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
and
considered
as
the
head
of
a
separate
Family
,
hath
no
Superiour
but
God
,
and
consequently
no
other
person
whatsoever
hath
any
Authority
or
Right
to
call
him
to
an
account
,
and
punish
him
for
this
abuse
of
his
paternal
Power
;
yet
it
doth
not
follow
,
that
such
absolute
submission
is
therefore
due
from
the
Children
,
as
does
oblige
them
either
to
an
active
or
a
passive
Obedience
in
all
cases
to
the
Fathers
Will
,
so
that
they
neither
may
,
nor
ought
to
defend
themselves
in
any
circumstance
whatsoever
.
There
is
a
great
deal
of
difference
(
in
the
state
of
Nature
)
between
calling
a
man
to
an
account
as
a
Superiour
,
and
defending
a
mans
self
as
an
equal
.
For
a
man
in
this
state
hath
a
right
to
this
latter
against
all
men
that
assault
him
,
by
the
principle
of
Self-preservation
:
But
no
man
hath
a
right
to
the
former
,
but
onely
in
respect
of
those
over
whom
he
hath
an
Authority
,
either
granted
him
by
God
,
or
conferr'd
upon
him
by
the
consent
of
other
men
.
So
that
the
evils
which
an
Aggressor
,
or
Wrong-doer
,
suffers
from
him
he
injured
,
though
in
respect
of
God
the
Supreme
Lawgiver
they
may
be
natural
Punishments
ordained
by
him
,
to
deter
men
from
violating
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
yet
they
are
not
so
in
regard
of
the
Person
who
inflicts
them
.
For
God
may
sometimes
appoint
those
for
the
Instruments
of
his
Justice
,
who
otherwise
do
injury
to
the
person
punished
;
as
in
the
case
of
Absalom's
Rebellion
against
his
Father
David
.
So
that
in
this
case
the
evils
the
wrong-doer
suffers
are
not
properly
Punishments
,
but
necessary
Consequences
of
his
Violence
and
Injustice
;
and
in
respect
of
the
Inflicter
,
are
but
necessary
means
of
his
preservation
.
So
that
if
a
Son
have
any
Right
to
defend
himself
in
what
belongs
to
him
from
the
unjust
violence
of
his
Father
,
he
doth
not
act
as
his
Superiour
;
but
in
this
case
as
his
Equal
,
as
he
is
indeed
in
all
the
Rights
of
Nature
,
considered
only
as
a
Man
;
Such
as
are
a
Right
to
live
,
and
to
preserve
himself
,
and
to
use
all
lawful
means
for
that
end
.
Therefore
since
,
as
I
have
already
shown
,
that
a
Father
hath
no
higher
Right
or
Authority
from
God
over
the
person
of
his
Child
,
but
as
it
tends
to
his
good
and
preservation
,
or
as
it
conduces
to
the
great
end
of
Nature
,
the
common
Good
and
preservation
of
Mankinde
:
So
when
the
Father
transgresses
this
Authority
,
his
Right
ceases
;
and
when
that
ceases
,
the
Sons
Right
to
preserve
himself
(
and
in
that
,
to
pursue
that
great
end
)
begins
to
take
place
.
Therefore
out
of
a
Civil
state
,
if
a
Father
will
endeavour
evidently
,
without
any
just
cause
,
to
take
away
his
Sons
Life
,
I
think
the
Son
may
in
this
case
,
if
he
cannot
otherwise
escape
nor
avoid
it
,
and
that
his
Father
will
not
be
pacified
neither
with
his
submission
nor
entreaty
,
defend
himself
against
his
Father
,
not
with
a
design
to
kill
him
,
but
purely
to
preserve
his
own
Life
;
and
if
in
this
case
the
Father
happen
to
be
kill'd
,
I
think
his
Blood
is
upon
his
own
head
.
But
if
any
object
to
me
the
Example
of
Isaac's
submission
to
his
Father
,
when
he
intended
to
sacrisice
him
:
To
this
I
answer
,
that
as
this
act
of
Abraham's
is
not
to
be
taken
as
an
Example
for
other
Fathers
,
so
neither
does
the
Example
of
Isaac
oblige
other
Sons
.
For
as
Abraham
had
no
right
to
offer
up
his
Son
,
but
by
God's
express
Will
;
so
it
is
rational
to
suppose
,
that
Isaac
being
then
(
as
Chronologers
make
him
)
about
nineteen
or
twenty
years
of
Age
,
and
able
to
carry
wood
enough
upon
his
back
to
consume
the
Sacrifice
,
and
of
years
to
ask
where
the
Lamb
was
for
the
Offering
;
was
also
instructed
by
his
Father
of
the
cause
of
his
dealing
so
with
him
:
and
then
the
submission
was
not
paid
to
his
Father's
,
but
to
God's
Will
,
whom
he
was
perswaded
would
have
it
so
.
But
if
any
man
yet
doubts
,
whether
resistance
in
such
a
case
were
lawful
,
I
leave
it
to
his
own
Conscience
,
whether
if
his
Father
and
he
were
out
of
any
civil
estate
,
whose
assistance
he
might
implore
,
he
would
lie
still
,
and
suffer
his
Father
to
cut
his
throat
,
only
because
he
had
a
minde
to
it
,
or
pretended
revelation
for
it
.
So
likewise
if
a
Father
in
this
state
should
go
about
to
violate
his
Sons
Wife
in
his
presence
,
or
to
kill
her
,
or
his
Grandchildren
,
I
suppose
he
may
as
lawfully
use
the
same
means
for
their
preservation
,
(
if
he
cannot
otherwise
obtain
it
)
as
he
might
for
his
own
;
since
they
are
delivered
to
his
charge
,
and
that
he
only
is
answerable
for
them
.
For
since
the
Father
doth
not
acquire
any
property
in
the
Sons
person
,
either
by
begetting
or
educating
him
,
much
less
ought
he
to
have
it
over
those
the
Son
hath
begotten
.
But
though
Children
may
have
this
Right
of
defending
their
own
Lives
,
or
those
of
their
Wives
and
Children
,
from
their
Fathers
unjust
violence
,
when
they
can
by
no
means
else
be
preserved
;
Yet
I
would
not
be
here
understood
to
give
Children
this
right
of
resisting
upon
any
less
occasion
;
as
if
the
Father
should
only
go
about
to
correct
his
Son
,
though
without
just
cause
,
it
were
therefore
lawful
for
him
to
resist
or
beat
his
Father
.
For
we
are
obliged
by
the
Law
of
Christ
to
bear
smaller
Injuries
from
others
,
much
more
from
a
Father
;
neither
yet
would
I
give
them
any
right
to
continue
this
state
of
War
,
and
to
revenge
upon
their
Parents
the
Injuries
they
have
formerly
received
at
their
hands
.
For
all
Revenge
,
taken
in
this
sence
,
as
a
satisfaction
of
the
minde
in
returning
of
an
evil
or
injury
already
received
,
without
any
respect
to
a
mans
own
preservation
,
or
the
good
of
the
person
that
did
the
wrong
,
is
unlawful
even
in
the
state
of
Nature
.
Therefore
this
returning
Evil
for
Evil
,
which
some
improperly
call
Revenge
,
is
only
justifiable
for
one
or
both
of
these
ends
;
either
to
make
the
party
that
hath
done
the
Injury
sensible
of
his
Errour
,
and
seeing
the
Follies
and
Inconveniences
of
it
,
to
alter
his
minde
,
and
resolve
to
do
so
no
more
;
or
as
it
may
conduce
to
a
mans
own
preservation
for
the
future
,
and
be
a
warning
to
others
not
to
injure
him
in
like
manner
,
since
they
see
he
will
not
take
injuries
tamely
.
But
all
this
is
still
left
to
a
mans
own
prudence
,
how
far
he
will
pass
them
by
:
And
he
is
certainly
obliged
to
leave
off
returning
them
,
assoon
as
he
can
be
safe
without
it
;
since
otherwise
quarrels
would
be
perpetual
.
Neither
ought
one
,
who
hath
been
highly
obliged
to
a
man
perhaps
for
his
life
,
to
return
him
evil
for
evil
,
since
scarce
any
Injury
being
great
enough
to
cancel
so
great
an
Obligation
.
Therefore
since
a
Father
,
who
hath
truely
performed
his
Duty
,
is
the
greatest
Benefactor
we
can
imagine
in
this
life
;
so
no
man
ought
to
revenge
an
Injury
,
though
never
so
great
,
upon
him
;
since
it
is
not
only
undutiful
,
but
ungrateful
,
and
cannot
serve
either
of
those
two
ends
for
which
alone
this
returning
evil
for
evil
is
allowable
.
For
first
,
it
cannot
make
the
Father
see
his
fault
;
since
this
correction
being
from
a
Son
whom
he
looks
upon
as
one
highly
obliged
to
him
,
and
so
much
his
inferior
,
will
rather
serve
to
exasperate
than
amend
him
.
Secondly
,
Neither
can
this
bearing
of
the
Injury
encourage
others
to
attempt
doing
the
like
;
since
all
that
know
the
case
,
will
likewise
consider
the
person
that
did
the
wrong
.
So
that
Patience
alone
is
the
only
lawful
means
to
make
the
Father
see
his
Errour
,
and
be
reconciled
to
his
Child
,
who
ought
to
embrace
it
assoon
as
the
Father
offers
it
.
But
as
for
the
places
of
Scripture
brought
for
absolute
Obedience
to
Parents
;
viz.
the
fourth
Commandment
,
Honour
thy
Father
and
thy
Mother
.
Children
,
obey
your
Parents
in
the
Lord
,
Ephes.
6.1,2
.
and
Children
,
obey
your
Parents
in
all
things
,
Col.
3.20
.
God
did
not
intend
here
to
give
us
any
new
Law
or
Precept
concerning
this
Duty
,
but
to
confirm
and
explain
the
fifth
Commandment
;
as
that
was
but
a
confirmation
of
the
Law
of
Nature
,
by
which
men
were
obliged
to
reverence
and
obey
their
Parents
,
long
before
that
Law
was
given
.
Therefore
since
the
Laws
of
Nature
(
which
are
but
Rules
of
right
Reason
for
the
good
of
Mankinde
)
are
the
foundation
of
this
Commandment
,
and
of
all
those
commands
in
the
New
Testament
,
they
are
still
to
be
interpreted
according
to
that
Rule
.
Neither
are
other
places
of
Scripture
understood
in
any
other
sence
;
such
as
are
those
of
turning
the
right
Cheek
,
of
giving
away
a
mans
Coat
to
him
that
would
go
to
Law
,
and
the
like
:
all
which
we
are
not
to
Interpret
Literally
,
and.
Dr.
Hammond's
Annot.
upon
these
places
.
but
according
to
Reason
.
And
so
are
likewise
these
words
of
St.
Paul
to
be
understood
,
Children
,
obey
your
Parents
in
all
things
;
that
is
,
in
all
things
reasonable
and
lawful
.
And
this
sence
must
be
allowed
of
,
or
else
Children
were
bound
to
obey
all
commands
of
their
Parents
,
whether
unlawful
or
lawful
;
being
comprehended
under
this
general
word
All.
Nor
will
the
distinction
of
an
active
or
passive
Obedience
help
in
this
case
;
for
passive
Obedience
cannot
be
the
end
of
the
Fathers
command
,
and
consequently
his
will
is
not
performed
in
suffering
;
since
no
Father
can
be
so
unreasonably
cruel
,
as
to
command
a
thing
meerly
because
he
would
have
occasion
to
punish
his
Son
whom
he
thinks
must
not
resist
him
.
Neither
do
these
places
appoint
a
Son
when
an
infant
,
a
man
of
full
age
,
and
perhaps
an
old
man
of
threescore
,
to
be
all
governed
the
same
way
,
or
that
the
same
Obedience
is
required
of
them
all
.
And
this
brings
me
to
a
fuller
Answer
to
the
Author's
Argument
,
and
to
shew
that
though
Children
are
indeed
always
bound
in
Gratitude
to
please
their
Parents
(
as
far
as
they
are
able
without
ruining
themselves
)
and
to
pay
a
great
reverence
to
them
;
yet
that
this
submission
is
not
an
absolute
subjection
,
but
is
to
be
limited
according
to
the
Rules
of
right
Reason
or
Prudence
.
And
to
prove
this
,
I
will
produce
instances
from
the
case
of
Adam's
Children
,
since
the
Author
allows
no
Father
to
have
had
a
larger
authority
than
himself
:
We
will
therefore
consider
in
the
first
place
,
Adam's
power
as
a
Father
,
in
respect
of
his
Sons
marriage
.
Suppose
then
that
he
had
commanded
one
of
his
Sons
never
to
marry
at
all
,
certainly
this
command
would
have
been
yoid
,
since
then
it
had
been
in
Adam's
power
to
have
frustrated
Gods
Command
to
mankind
of
increase
and
multiply
,
and
replenish
the
Earth
;
which
was
not
spoken
to
Adam
and
Eve
alone
,
since
they
could
not
do
it
in
their
persons
,
but
to
all
mankind
represented
in
them
.
And
likewise
Adam
had
been
the
occasion
of
his
Sons
incontinency
,
if
he
had
lain
with
any
of
his
Sisters
before
marriage
.
Secondly
,
Suppose
Adam
had
commanded
Abel
to
marry
one
of
his
Sisters
(
that
being
the
onely
means
then
appointed
to
propagate
mankind
)
which
he
could
not
love
,
can
any
man
think
that
he
had
been
obliged
to
do
it
?
Certainly
no
:
for
it
would
have
been
a
greater
sin
to
marry
a
wife
he
knew
before-hand
he
could
not
live
with
,
than
to
disobey
his
Father
;
for
else
how
could
this
be
true
,
Therefore
shall
a
man
leave
Father
and
Mother
,
and
cleave
to
his
Wife
?
Since
then
Adam
could
not
force
his
Sons
affections
,
but
onely
recommend
such
of
his
Sisters
as
he
thought
would
best
suit
with
his
humour
,
therefore
if
the
Son
could
not
live
without
marriage
,
and
that
Adam
could
not
force
a
Wife
upon
him
,
it
was
most
reasonable
that
he
should
chuse
a
Wife
for
himself
.
And
to
come
to
that
other
great
point
,
that
the
Son
can
never
separate
himself
from
his
Fathers
Family
nor
subjection
,
as
his
Lord
and
Master
,
without
his
consent
:
Suppose
then
that
Adam
had
been
so
cruel
and
unnatural
(
as
some
Fathers
are
)
and
being
sensible
of
the
profit
he
received
from
his
Sons
labours
,
would
never
have
given
them
leave
to
have
left
his
Family
,
and
have
set
up
for
themselves
,
nor
to
have
had
any
thing
of
their
own
,
but
(
onely
allowing
them
and
their
Wives
a
bare
subsistance
)
have
kept
them
like
slaves
as
long
as
they
lived
;
the
Author
I
suppose
would
reply
,
That
he
might
have
done
so
if
he
had
pleased
;
and
that
the
Sons
had
no
lawful
means
to
help
themselves
,
since
he
onely
was
Judge
when
or
whether
ever
it
was
fit
to
set
them
free
or
no.
But
I
desire
to
know
whether
Adam
had
this
power
by
a
natural
Right
,
or
an
acquired
;
not
by
the
latter
:
for
I
have
already
proved
,
that
neither
Generation
nor
Possession
can
confer
an
absolute
Right
over
the
person
of
another
:
Nor
yet
could
he
have
it
by
the
Sons
consent
;
for
they
would
never
give
their
consent
to
such
an
absolute
slavish
subjection
.
Nor
yet
could
he
have
any
such
Right
by
the
revealed
Will
of
God
,
since
I
have
also
proved
that
such
an
absolute
subjection
is
nowhere
requir'd
by
him
in
Scripture
.
But
now
to
return
to
the
acquired
Right
of
Education
,
neither
can
that
confer
so
absolute
a
power
over
any
mans
person
,
as
that
therefore
he
should
be
a
slave
to
his
Fosterer
as
long
as
he
liv'd
;
since
admitting
that
the
Father
,
or
other
person
that
takes
upon
him
that
care
,
may
perhaps
justly
claim
a
Right
in
the
service
or
labour
of
the
Childe
,
to
satisfie
them
for
their
trouble
and
charge
in
bringing
him
up
:
Yet
it
does
not
therefore
follow
,
that
this
service
is
due
as
long
as
the
Childe
lives
,
but
rather
until
such
time
as
they
can
make
his
labour
satisfie
them
for
their
charge
and
trouble
in
keeping
him
;
which
may
very
well
be
by
that
time
the
Child
attains
to
twenty
five
years
of
age
at
farthest
.
And
there
are
those
that
have
offered
to
breed
up
and
maintain
all
the
Foundlings
and
Bastard-children
in
England
,
if
they
may
be
bound
to
serve
them
until
about
that
age
.
So
that
I
see
no
reason
why
a
few
years
Education
should
give
any
man
a
Right
over
another
person
as
long
as
he
lived
.
But
if
it
be
urged
that
the
Childe
owed
his
life
to
his
Father
or
Fosterer
,
since
without
his
assistance
he
must
have
perisht
,
and
therefore
the
service
of
the
Childs
whole
life
is
but
little
enough
to
recompence
it
;
to
this
I
answer
,
That
the
Parents
are
under
an
absolute
obligation
,
by
the
Laws
of
God
and
Nature
,
to
breed
up
their
Childe
;
and
they
sin
if
they
do
not
perform
it
as
they
ought
:
the
end
of
a
Father
not
being
chiefly
for
the
breeding
up
and
preservation
of
the
Child
,
and
therefore
there
is
no
reason
he
should
acquire
such
a
property
in
him
,
meerly
because
he
did
his
duty
;
and
the
intent
of
a
Father
being
to
better
the
condition
of
his
Son
,
and
not
to
make
it
worse
,
I
doubt
whether
an
absolute
or
perpetual
Servitude
,
or
Death
it self
,
were
the
better
bargain
;
and
if
this
Right
will
not
hold
for
the
Father
himself
,
much
less
will
it
for
a
Fosterer
,
since
he
is
likewise
obliged
by
the
Laws
of
Nature
and
Humanity
,
if
he
be
able
,
to
breed
up
the
Child
he
finds
,
and
not
to
let
it
perish
.
So
that
the
advantage
he
may
make
of
the
Child
ought
not
to
be
the
principal
end
of
his
undertaking
,
but
the
doing
of
good
to
mankind
;
and
the
advantage
is
to
be
considered
onely
as
an
encouragement
,
not
as
the
onely
motive
to
his
duty
,
since
he
is
obliged
to
do
the
same
thing
,
though
he
were
sure
the
Childe
would
either
die
or
be
taken
away
from
him
,
before
it
could
be
with
him
half
long
enough
to
satisfie
him
.
Neither
does
this
reason
hold
true
,
according
to
the
Scripture-rules
of
Gratitude
,
that
a
man
hath
Right
to
exact
of
one
to
whom
he
hath
done
a
Courtesie
,
or
bestowed
a
Benefit
,
a
Return
as
great
as
the
Benefit
bestowed
;
since
this
were
not
beneficence
,
but
meer
bartering
or
exchange
:
And
a
man
who
had
his
life
saved
by
anothers
assistance
(
suppose
by
pulling
him
out
of
the
water
)
was
obliged
by
this
principle
to
leave
his
life
at
his
disposal
ever
after
.
Therefore
I
see
no
reason
,
from
all
that
hath
yet
been
said
,
why
a
Son
when
he
comes
to
be
a
man
able
to
shift
for
himself
,
may
not
in
the
state
of
nature
marry
,
and
separate
himself
from
his
fathers
Family
,
even
without
his
Fathers
consent
,
if
he
cannot
otherwise
obtain
his
liberty
by
his
entreaty
and
all
fair
means
:
Not
but
that
the
Father
may
,
if
he
please
,
disinherit
his
Son
for
so
doing
,
or
for
marrying
without
his
consent
,
since
every
man
is
free
to
dispose
of
his
own
upon
what
conditions
he
thinks
fit
.
And
the
Son
was
to
have
considered
before-hand
which
he
valued
most
,
his
own
Liberty
,
or
his
Fathers
kindness
,
and
the
hopes
of
his
share
of
his
Estate
after
his
death
.
But
I
now
come
to
the
Author
's
main
Argument
from
Scripture-Examples
:
That
the
Patriarchs
,
by
a
Right
derived
from
Adam
,
did
exercise
as
Heads
of
their
respective
Families
,
a
dominion
as
absolute
as
that
of
any
Monarch
:
And
so
instances
in
Thamar
brought
out
to
be
burnt
by
her
Father-in-law
Judah
:
Touching
War
,
Abram
's
commanding
an
Army
of
318
Souldiers
of
his
own
Family
;
Esau
's
meeting
his
Brother
with
400
men
at
Arms
:
For
matter
of
Peace
,
Abram
's
making
a
League
with
Abimelech
:
And
that
these
acts
of
judging
in
capital
Crimes
,
of
making
War
and
Peace
,
are
the
chiefest
marks
of
Soveraignty
that
are
found
in
a
Monarchy
.
All
which
I
shall
endeavour
to
answer
.
First
,
The
instance
of
Judah
rather
makes
against
him
;
for
he
confines
this
power
before
to
the
chief
Father
of
the
Family
,
and
will
never
have
Children
to
be
free
from
subjection
to
their
Fathers
:
whereas
in
this
case
Judah
,
as
Head
of
his
own
Family
,
exercised
an
absolute
power
of
Life
and
Death
,
and
so
was
free
from
subjection
to
his
Father
Jacob
,
who
was
then
living
.
And
suppose
(
as
the
Text
,
Gen.
38.
expresses
)
Judah
went
down
from
his
Brethren
to
a
certain
Adullamite
,
and
there
married
,
and
set
up
a
distinct
Family
;
yet
this
will
not
help
the
Author
,
since
(
p.
33.
)
he
will
not
allow
the
Fatherly
Authority
to
be
confined
to
one
Family
,
if
the
Families
were
at
such
a
distance
as
they
might
receive
their
fathers
commands
;
which
lies
upon
him
to
prove
:
And
therefore
this
subjection
was
not
perpetual
.
Secondly
,
I
shall
shew
by
another
Example
,
that
the
Head
of
a
Family
hath
not
absolute
power
of
the
lives
of
his
Children
and
Grandchildren
;
and
that
is
from
Reuben's
pathetical
Speech
,
Gen.
42.
to
his
Father
Jacob
,
when
he
refused
to
send
Benjamin
with
him
into
Egypt
;
Slay
my
two
sons
(
says
he
)
if
I
bring
him
not
unto
thee
.
Now
if
Jacob
had
this
absolute
power
as
a
Father
,
it
had
been
impertinent
in
Reuben
to
have
spoke
thus
,
since
he
knew
his
Father
had
power
to
slay
his
Sons
,
if
he
thought
fit
,
whether
he
gave
him
such
an
authority
or
not
.
But
if
it
be
replied
,
that
Jacob
when
his
Sons
married
might
set
them
at
liberty
,
and
so
give
them
power
of
Life
and
Death
;
that
is
,
make
them
absolute
in
their
respective
Families
:
This
is
gratis
dictum
,
and
no
proof
brought
of
it
out
of
Scripture
,
and
therefore
may
as
well
be
otherwise
:
Nor
is
it
likely
that
Jacob
should
thus
manumit
his
Sons
,
since
it
is
apparent
they
did
not
then
set
up
distinct
Families
;
for
we
finde
Jacob
still
commanding
them
,
as
Head
of
the
Family
,
to
go
down
and
buy
Corn
in
Egypt
,
saying
,
Go
down
and
buy
us
(
that
is
,
the
whole
Family
,
whereof
they
were
Members
)
a
little
food
.
And
yet
these
Sons
did
not
think
their
Fathers
command
so
absolute
,
but
that
they
tell
him
plainly
,
they
will
not
go
down
unless
he
send
Benjamin
with
them
.
As
for
the
other
Examples
of
Abram's
exercising
the
full
power
of
a
Prince
in
making
War
and
Peace
,
I
will
not
deny
that
the
Heads
of
separate
Families
,
being
out
of
Commonwealths
,
have
many
things
analogous
to
them
,
though
they
are
not
Commonwealths
themselves
:
And
the
reason
why
I
do
not
allow
them
to
be
so
,
is
,
because
the
ends
of
a
Family
and
a
Commonwealth
are
divers
:
and
so
many
parts
of
a
Monarchical
Empire
are
not
to
be
found
in
Families
,
yet
the
Heads
of
such
Families
may
notwithstanding
exercise
a
power
of
Life
and
Death
in
great
Offences
,
and
also
of
making
War
and
Peace
:
And
this
being
for
the
good
of
the
Family
they
govern
,
and
by
their
implyed
consents
,
no
body
will
contradict
him
in
the
exercise
of
this
power
.
But
this
being
matter
of
fact
,
does
not
prove
an
absolute
and
unquestionable
Right
in
the
Father
of
such
a
Family
,
of
doing
whatsoever
he
please
,
and
that
no
Member
of
the
Family
hath
power
in
any
case
to
contradict
his
will
;
for
it
is
rational
to
conceive
that
this
Father
of
a
Family
having
had
an
authority
over
his
Children
and
Servants
(
born
perhaps
in
his
house
)
from
their
very
Infancy
,
and
if
he
be
a
wise
and
a
good
man
,
and
hath
carried
himself
as
a
good
Father
or
Master
ought
to
do
toward
them
,
should
even
by
their
consents
(
as
knowing
none
more
worthy
than
himself
)
retain
the
exercise
of
that
Authority
after
they
are
gown
up
to
be
men
;
in
which
he
cannot
be
contradicted
,
without
disorder
and
mischief
to
the
whole
Family
:
So
that
indeed
this
submission
of
the
Children
and
Servants
,
is
by
a
tacite
consent
to
obey
the
Father
or
Master
in
all
things
tending
to
the
common
good
of
the
Family
.
But
this
proves
not
this
absolute
despotick
power
the
Author
contends
for
,
but
onely
the
most
reasonable
way
of
acting
for
the
Families
good
,
and
whilst
the
Father
exercises
this
Authority
onely
for
that
end
,
which
when
he
transgresses
,
his
Right
to
govern
ceases
:
for
if
this
Author
would
have
but
considered
the
state
of
some
parts
of
Africa
,
he
should
have
found
,
that
where
the
Father
will
exercise
this
absolute
power
,
and
sell
his
Children
for
slaves
,
the
Children
make
as
little
scruple
(
where
they
are
strong
enough
)
to
put
the
same
trick
upon
their
Fathers
:
Nor
can
they
be
justly
blamed
for
so
doing
,
until
any
man
can
shew
me
that
the
Father
hath
some
better
Right
than
meer
Custom
or
Power
.
I
shall
now
proceed
to
the
consideration
of
those
other
places
he
produces
out
of
Scripture
,
for
the
natural
Right
of
Fathers
to
be
Kings
over
their
Descendants
.
Walter
Rawleigh
(
of
which
opinion
the
Author
himself
is
)
will
have
him
to
be
Lord
over
his
own
Family
,
by
Right
of
Succession
;
but
to
enlarge
his
Empire
against
Right
,
by
seizing
violently
on
the
Rights
of
other
Lords
of
Families
.
But
however
,
after
the
confusion
of
Tongues
,
the
Author
will
have
it
revive
again
;
and
the
distinct
Nations
thereupon
erected
,
were
not
confused
Multitudes
without
Heads
or
Governours
,
and
at
liberty
to
chuse
what
Governours
they
pleased
;
but
they
were
distinct
Families
which
had
Fathers
for
Rulers
over
them
:
whereby
it
plainly
appears
,
that
even
in
this
confusion
God
was
careful
to
preserve
the
Fatherly
Authority
,
by
distributing
the
diversity
of
Languages
according
to
the
diversity
of
Families
.
For
so
it
appears
by
the
Text
,
Gen.
10.5.20.22
.
But
these
places
will
not
prove
what
the
Author
quotes
them
for
,
viz.
the
Monarchical
or
Kingly
power
of
Fathers
:
for
neither
does
the
Scripture
or
Josephus
mention
,
that
this
division
of
the
World
by
Noah's
Posterity
was
performed
by
the
Fathers
of
these
Families
as
absolute
Monarchs
;
but
it
rather
seems
that
their
Children
and
Descendants
followed
them
as
Volunteers
,
as
retaining
a
Reverence
and
Affection
to
their
persons
for
their
great
age
,
experience
,
and
care
of
their
Families
:
Which
[
*
](A64092-e13990-b)
*
Sir
Will
.
Temple's
Essay
of
Government
,
p.
67.
an
ingenious
modern
Author
conceives
to
be
the
natural
original
of
all
Governments
,
springing
from
a
tacite
deference
to
the
Authority
of
one
single
person
.
And
of
this
opinion
is
excellent
Pufendorf
.
And
of
this
kind
were
those
first
Kings
which
Aristotle
calls
Heroical
,
whom
the
People
did
obey
of
their
own
accord
,
because
they
deserved
well
of
them
,
and
either
by
teaching
them
Arts
,
or
by
warring
for
them
,
or
by
gathering
them
together
when
they
were
dispersed
,
or
by
dividing
Lands
among
them
.
Secondly
,
If
it
were
true
that
these
Fathers
of
Families
were
so
many
absolute
Kings
,
yet
it
quite
destroys
the
Author's
Hypothesis
,
who
will
have
but
one
true
Heir
to
Adam
,
who
if
he
could
be
known
,
had
a
natural
Right
to
be
Monarch
of
the
whole
world
.
And
though
Kings
now
(
Patriarch
.
p.
19.
)
are
not
the
natural
Parents
of
their
Subjects
,
yet
they
all
either
are
,
or
are
to
be
reputed
Heirs
to
those
first
Progenitors
,
who
were
at
first
natural
Parents
of
the
People
,
and
in
their
right
succeed
to
the
exercise
of
Supreme
Jurisdiction
;
and
such
Heirs
are
not
only
Lords
of
their
own
Children
,
but
also
of
their
Brethren
,
and
all
others
that
were
subject
to
their
Fathers
.
Whereas
we
see
here
no
such
right
of
Eldership
observed
,
neither
among
the
Sons
of
Noah
nor
their
descendants
;
but
every
one
,
as
appears
from
the
words
of
the
Text
,
was
an
independant
Head
&
Leader
of
his
own
Family
:
by
these
were
the
Isles
of
the
Gentiles
divided
,
&c.
and
by
these
,
viz.
the
descendants
of
Shem
,
were
the
Nations
divided
,
&c.
So
likewise
the
other
places
he
brings
concerning
the
Sons
of
Ishmael
and
Esau
,
do
destroy
the
Authours
notion
of
an
Heir
to
the
Authority
of
the
Father
,
or
that
any
Son
is
more
Lord
of
his
Brethren
than
another
.
For
all
the
Sons
of
Esau
and
Ishmael
are
reckon'd
as
so
many
independant
Princes
,
or
Dukes
,
and
Lords
of
distinct
Territories
,
without
any
Superiority
in
the
eldest
Son
,
who
ought
by
the
Authours
Principle
to
have
been
absolute
Lord
over
the
rest
:
And
if
these
could
divide
themselves
into
as
many
distinct
Governments
as
there
were
Sons
,
Why
might
not
they
do
so
in
infinitum
?
And
then
there
could
never
be
any
common
Prince
or
Monarch
set
over
them
all
,
but
by
Force
or
Conquest
,
or
else
by
Election
;
either
of
which
destroys
the
notion
of
the
Natural
Right
of
Eldership
.
And
as
for
the
places
he
brings
to
prove
it
;
1.
Gods
words
to
Gain
concerning
Abel
,
will
not
do
it
,
His
desires
shall
be
subject
unto
thee
,
and
thou
shalt
rule
over
him
.
For
first
,
this
might
be
spoken
only
personally
to
Cain
,
and
not
to
give
a
Right
to
all
Eldest
Sons
.
Secondly
,
the
words
do
not
signifie
an
absolute
Despotick
Power
,
but
a
ruling
or
governing
by
perswasion
or
fair
means
;
as
when
a
man
is
ruled
,
that
is
,
advised
by
another
in
his
concerns
.
Then
as
for
the
blessing
upon
Jacob
by
his
Father
Isaac
,
Be
Lord
over
thy
Brethren
,
and
let
the
Sons
of
thy
Mother
bow
before
thee
,
't
was
never
litterally
fulfilled
.
For
Jacob
was
never
Lord
over
Esau
,
who
was
a
Prince
of
Mount
Seir
in
Jacob's
life-time
,
whilst
Jacob
was
at
best
but
Lord
of
his
own
family
.
And
as
for
bowing
and
other
Rights
of
Superiority
,
we
read
[
Gen.
33.3
.
]
that
Jacob
,
at
his
Interview
with
his
Brother
Esau
,
called
him
Lord
,
and
bowed
seven
times
to
the
ground
before
he
came
to
him
.
So
that
this
Text
is
no
more
than
a
Prophecy
,
to
shew
why
the
Jews
,
or
descendents
of
Jacob
,
should
have
Right
in
After-times
to
rule
over
the
Edomites
,
or
Posterity
of
Esau
.
Lastly
,
this
Example
makes
against
the
Authour
:
for
it
seems
it
is
not
the
Eldest
Son
,
but
whom
the
Father
pleases
to
appoint
,
is
Heir
after
his
death
:
Since
here
Esau
looses
his
Birth
right
by
his
own
act
,
but
chiefly
by
his
Fathers
Will
.
Yet
if
after
all
,
some
will
urge
from
the
Principles
I
have
laid
down
,
that
it
seems
more
to
conduce
to
the
happiness
and
peace
of
Families
,
and
in
that
to
the
great
end
I
have
before
laid
down
,
the
common
good
of
Mankinde
,
rather
to
allow
this
absolute
Power
of
Life
and
Death
to
Parents
over
their
Children
,
and
an
absolute
Subjection
to
them
as
long
as
they
live
;
since
Parents
do
usually
take
that
care
to
breed
up
their
Children
,
and
to
have
that
tender
Affection
towards
them
,
that
they
will
seldom
take
away
their
Lives
,
or
sell
them
for
Slaves
,
or
keep
them
so
themselves
,
unless
there
be
very
great
cause
;
of
which
the
Father
only
ought
to
be
Judge
,
since
it
being
the
nature
of
most
Children
to
be
apt
to
contradict
and
disobey
their
Fathers
commands
,
or
perhaps
resist
them
,
pretending
they
would
kill
them
,
when
they
only
go
about
to
give
them
due
correction
;
And
since
most
young
people
hate
restraint
,
and
love
to
be
gadding
abroad
,
they
having
a
Right
by
these
Principles
to
judge
when
they
are
able
to
shift
for
themselves
,
would
take
any
slight
pretence
to
run
away
from
their
Father
assoon
as
they
were
grown
pretty
big
,
and
so
perhaps
leave
their
Parents
in
their
old
Age
,
when
they
had
no
body
to
take
care
of
them
:
whereby
nothing
but
confusion
and
quarrels
would
happen
in
Families
,
great
mischief
to
the
Parents
,
and
often
ruine
to
the
Children
;
who
being
often
opiniatred
,
and
self-will'd
,
would
think
better
of
their
own
abilities
than
they
really
deserved
.
And
therefore
divers
Nations
seeing
these
great
Inconveniencies
,
did
by
their
Laws
leave
Parents
the
Power
of
Life
and
Death
over
their
Children
.
Such
were
(
those
the
Author
instances
in
)
the
Persians
,
See
Patriarcha
,
p.
38.
chap.
2.
Gauls
,
and
many
Nations
in
the
West-Indies
:
And
the
Romans
even
in
their
Popular
State
had
this
Law
in
force
:
Which
Power
of
Parents
was
ratified
and
amplified
by
the
Laws
of
the
XII
Tables
,
enabling
of
Parents
to
sell
their
Children
three
times
.
And
the
Law
of
Moses
gives
full
power
to
the
Father
to
stone
his
disobedient
Son
,
so
it
be
done
in
presence
of
a
Magistrate
.
And
yet
it
did
not
belong
to
the
Magistrate
to
inquire
and
examine
the
justness
of
the
cause
;
but
it
was
so
ordained
,
lest
the
Father
should
in
his
Anger
suddenly
or
secretly
kill
his
Son
.
To
all
which
I
answer
,
that
since
this
Argument
quits
the
natural
Power
of
a
Father
by
Generation
,
and
only
sticks
to
the
acquired
one
of
education
,
and
appeals
to
the
common
good
of
Mankinde
;
I
do
acknowledge
it
is
a
better
than
any
of
the
rest
.
Yet
I
think
it
is
not
true
,
that
Parents
in
the
state
of
Nature
would
more
seldome
abuse
their
power
,
than
Children
would
this
Natural
Liberty
I
here
allow
them
,
of
defending
and
providing
for
themselves
in
cases
of
extreme
Danger
and
Necessity
.
For
this
Temptation
to
do
ill
is
greater
on
the
Fathers
side
,
than
that
of
the
Children
:
For
they
looking
on
themselves
as
having
an
absolute
and
unquestionable
power
over
them
,
and
that
they
may
deal
with
them
as
they
please
,
are
apt
to
think
themselves
slighted
and
disobeyed
by
their
Children
,
perhaps
on
very
light
occasions
;
and
their
Passion
often
rises
to
that
height
(
as
not
considering
the
Follies
and
Inconsiderateness
of
Youth
)
that
they
may
,
if
Cholerick
or
Ill-natur'd
,
strike
them
with
that
which
may
either
kill
them
,
or
else
cripple
or
maim
them
;
and
perhaps
out
of
an
immoderate
Anger
,
or
being
weary
of
them
,
murder
them
on
purpose
.
And
Fathers
being
more
apt
,
as
having
oftner
occasion
to
be
angry
with
their
Children
,
than
their
Children
with
them
,
it
is
evident
to
me
,
that
in
the
state
of
Nature
(
where
there
is
no
Magistrate
to
keep
the
Father
in
awe
)
Fathers
will
be
as
apt
to
kill
or
maim
their
Children
,
as
Children
their
Parents
.
And
if
the
Fathers
(
as
I
said
before
)
are
intended
for
the
good
and
preservation
of
their
Child
;
and
that
where
their
Right
ceases
,
the
Childrens
Right
to
preserve
themselves
takes
place
:
It
seems
to
conduce
more
to
the
general
good
of
Mankinde
,
that
the
Children
should
make
use
of
this
last
refuge
of
defending
themselves
,
when
they
cannot
otherwise
preserve
their
Lives
and
Members
,
than
that
Fathers
should
have
such
an
absolute
Right
to
deal
with
them
as
they
pleased
,
without
any
power
in
the
Children
to
resist
or
defend
themselves
.
So
likewise
Fathers
being
so
much
older
,
understand
their
own
advantage
better
than
their
Children
;
and
being
somtimes
more
ill-natur'd
,
and
often
(
by
reason
of
their
Age
)
more
covetous
than
they
,
may
be
tempted
to
sell
their
Children
for
Slaves
,
whereby
they
may
fall
into
a
condition
worse
than
Death
itself
;
and
may
not
the
Son
then
endeavour
to
run
away
,
or
use
all
lawful
means
possible
to
escape
so
great
a
misery
?
Or
if
the
Father
will
keep
his
Son
as
a
Slave
all
the
days
of
his
life
,
without
any
hopes
of
ever
being
free
?
For
when
the
Father
dies
,
the
Son
(
according
to
this
Authour
)
is
to
be
Servant
to
his
Eldest
Brother
,
or
to
whomever
else
his
Father
pleased
to
bequeath
him
.
Is
not
the
case
the
same
?
And
as
for
the
quiet
of
the
Family
,
which
is
supposed
to
be
preserved
by
the
Sons
absolute
submission
,
rather
than
his
resistance
in
any
circumstance
,
I
think
it
would
rather
increase
Dissentions
,
by
encouraging
of
Fathers
to
use
their
Power
over
their
Children
,
not
as
Reason
,
but
Drunkenness
or
Passion
may
impel
them
:
Whereas
this
Right
of
Children
in
defending
their
Lives
,
and
not
being
obliged
to
give
them
up
at
their
Fathers
pleasure
,
will
rather
make
Parents
act
moderately
and
discreetly
towards
their
Children
,
when
they
know
they
are
not
obliged
to
stay
or
bear
with
them
upon
other
conditions
,
than
that
they
may
enjoy
their
Lives
in
safety
,
and
the
ordinary
means
thereof
with
some
comfort
.
Not
that
I
give
Children
any
Right
,
as
I
said
before
,
to
disobey
their
Parents
,
or
resist
them
upon
every
slight
occasion
;
but
rather
to
bear
with
their
Infirmities
,
as
far
as
it
is
possible
;
And
to
suffer
divers
Hardships
and
Inconveniencies
from
them
,
rather
than
to
resist
or
leave
them
;
considering
the
great
obligation
they
owe
them
.
So
that
I
do
not
allow
this
Remedy
,
but
in
case
of
extreme
Necessity
,
yet
of
which
the
Sufferer
only
in
the
state
of
Nature
can
be
Judge
;
since
in
that
state
where
there
is
no
Umpire
,
(
without
both
their
consents
)
but
God
only
,
every
man
is
Judge
when
his
Life
is
in
danger
.
And
if
the
Peace
of
Mankinde
were
to
be
procured
merely
by
a
mans
Sufferance
and
Submission
,
without
any
respect
to
this
Right
,
then
it
would
be
his
duty
to
give
himself
up
to
be
robb'd
or
kill'd
by
any
one
who
had
the
wickedness
to
attempt
it
;
because
himself
being
innocent
,
may
go
to
Heaven
;
and
the
other
being
guilty
of
an
intent
to
rob
or
murder
,
may
be
damned
if
he
be
killed
.
And
besides
,
it
would
more
conduce
to
the
preservation
of
Mankinde
,
that
but
one
man
should
be
lost
,
whereas
by
resistance
they
may
both
perish
.
Yet
I
suppose
no
man
is
so
sottish
,
as
to
hold
he
ought
quit
his
own
preservation
in
these
cases
;
or
if
he
do
hold
it
for
discourse
sake
,
I
am
sure
he
would
not
be
so
mad
as
to
observe
it
.
For
this
were
such
an
Argument
,
as
to
hold
,
Because
some
men
may
abuse
that
Law
of
Self-preservation
to
another
mans
destruction
;
Therefore
it
were
unlawful
to
defend
a
mans
self
at
all
.
As
for
the
Examples
of
those
Nations
and
Common-wealths
who
have
permitted
Fathers
to
exercise
a
Despotick
Power
over
their
Children
;
The
Law
of
Nature
or
right
Reason
,
is
not
to
be
gathered
from
the
Municipal
Laws
or
Customs
of
any
particular
Nation
or
Commonwealth
,
which
are
often
different
and
contrary
to
each
other
.
Therefore
as
to
the
Jewish
Law
,
though
I
will
not
say
it
was
contrary
to
the
Law
of
Nature
,
yet
it
was
extremely
rigorous
and
severe
in
all
its
dispensations
,
and
does
not
now
oblige
Christian
Common-wealths
in
this
particular
,
as
in
divers
others
,
much
less
in
the
state
of
Nature
.
And
as
for
the
Romans
,
they
saw
the
inconveniencies
of
this
Absolute
Power
,
and
retrenched
it
by
degrees
,
until
it
came
to
be
no
more
than
now
with
us
,
and
in
most
Countreys
of
Europe
.
So
likewise
the
Arguments
which
Bodin
brings
for
the
absolute
power
of
Parents
over
their
Children
,
depending
upon
the
Roman
and
Jewish
Law
,
may
be
easily
answered
from
these
grounds
.
Having
,
as
I
hope
,
clear'd
this
main
point
of
Paternal
Authority
,
and
of
Natural
Obedience
,
without
giving
an
extravagant
power
to
Parents
on
the
one
hand
to
abuse
their
power
,
or
a
priviledge
to
Children
on
the
other
side
to
be
stubborn
or
disobedient
to
their
Parents
;
If
then
this
Paternal
Authority
extend
farther
than
I
have
seated
it
,
I
shall
own
my self
beholding
to
any
Friend
of
the
Authour
's
,
or
his
Opinions
,
to
shew
me
my
errour
.
But
if
they
cannot
,
I
desire
they
would
consider
,
whether
this
natural
Right
of
Kings
which
the
Authour
asserts
precedent
to
any
compact
or
civil
constitution
,
can
extend
farther
than
the
natural
Authority
of
Fathers
,
from
whom
they
are
supposed
to
derive
it
,
and
on
which
it
is
founded
.
And
if
it
appears
that
Princes
have
such
Power
as
our
Fathers
,
then
all
that
the
Authour
hath
writ
on
this
subject
signifies
just
nothing
.
Therefore
I
shall
now
proceed
to
examine
the
rest
of
his
Principles
;
and
shall
I
hope
prove
,
that
(
supposing
this
Fatherly
Power
as
absolute
as
the
Authour
fancies
)
yet
that
his
Divine
Absolute
Monarchy
cannot
however
be
derived
from
thence
.
The
Authour
seems
to
think
it
a
Question
very
easie
to
be
answered
.
If
any
one
asks
what
comes
of
this
Right
of
Fatherhood
,
in
case
the
Crown
,
Fatherly
power
,
escheat
for
want
of
an
Heir
,
whether
it
fall
to
the
People
,
That
it
is
but
the
Negligence
or
Ignorance
of
the
People
to
loose
the
knowledg
of
the
true
Heir
;
for
an
Heir
there
is
always
.
If
Adam
were
still
living
,
and
now
were
ready
to
die
,
it
is
certain
that
there
is
but
one
Man
,
and
but
one
in
the
world
,
who
is
next
Heir
;
although
the
knowledge
who
should
be
that
one
Man
be
quite
lost
.
So
that
this
fine
Notion
signifies
nothing
now
,
for
Adam
being
dead
,
and
his
right
Heir
not
to
be
known
,
it
is
all
one
as
if
he
had
none
;
since
,
for
ought
I
know
to
the
contrary
,
the
Authors
Footman
may
be
the
Man
.
But
to
help
this
,
the
Author
hath
found
out
a
couple
of
Expedients
,
(
such
as
they
be
;
)
The
first
is
,
That
an
Vsurper
of
this
Power
,
where
the
knowledge
of
the
right
Heir
is
lost
,
being
in
by
possession
,
is
to
be
taken
and
reputed
for
the
true
Heir
,
and
is
to
be
obeyed
by
them
as
their
Father
.
And
if
this
will
not
do
,
he
gives
us
another
,
and
tells
us
,
The
Government
in
this
case
is
not
devolved
upon
the
multitude
;
but
the
Kingly
power
escheats
in
such
cases
to
the
Fathers
and
independent
Heads
of
Families
:
For
every
Kingdom
is
resolved
into
those
parts
of
which
it
was
first
made
.
Each
of
which
we
will
examine
in
their
turn
.
To
begin
with
the
former
,
let
us
see
if
it
be
so
easie
a
thing
as
the
Authour
makes
it
,
to
know
who
was
Adam's
,
or
any
Monarch's
right
Heir
(
setting
the
Municipal
Laws
of
the
Country
aside
;
)
so
that
the
People
cannot
be
excused
of
wilful
Ignorance
or
Negligence
,
if
they
loose
this
knowledg
.
Where
by
the
way
I
observe
,
that
as
easie
a
thing
as
it
was
to
know
who
was
Adam's
right
Heir
,
and
upon
whom
by
the
Laws
of
God
and
Nature
the
Crown
is
to
descend
,
upon
the
Death
of
the
Monarch
;
yet
he
no
where
positively
answers
this
important
Question
:
For
sometimes
he
is
to
claim
by
descent
,
as
in
this
instance
of
the
Heir
of
Adam
;
sometimes
by
his
Father's
last
Will
,
as
in
the
case
of
Noah's
Sons
,
according
as
the
Examples
out
of
Scripture
do
best
serve
his
turn
.
So
that
I
believe
he
did
not
either
negligently
or
ignorantly
avoid
settling
this
point
,
because
he
might
still
have
a
hole
left
to
creep
out
at
,
or
else
because
he
could
do
it
no
better
than
the
Instances
he
brings
would
permit
.
He
says
,
[
Direct
.
for
Obedience
,
pag.
68.
]
A
Son
is
always
to
live
under
the
subjection
of
his
Father
,
unless
by
Gods
immediate
appointment
,
or
by
the
Grant
or
Death
of
his
Father
,
he
become
himself
possess'd
of
that
Power
to
which
he
was
subject
.
By
which
words
he
seems
to
imply
,
that
this
Power
is
to
descend
to
the
Eldest
Son
,
when
his
Father
dies
.
So
likewise
in
this
Treatise
we
are
now
upon
,
[
P.
12.
]
he
says
,
Civil
Power
not
only
in
general
is
by
Divine
Institution
,
but
even
the
assignment
of
it
specifically
to
the
eldest
Parents
.
By
which
words
I
suppose
he
means
,
(
if
any
thing
)
eldest
Sons
;
though
I
know
not
why
he
should
limit
it
to
Parents
:
for
methinks
it
were
very
hard
the
eldest
Son
should
forfeit
his
Right
,
in
case
he
were
not
a
Parent
when
his
Father
died
.
So
likewise
he
tells
us
,
[
P.
19.
]
That
these
Heirs
of
this
Fatherly
Power
,
are
not
only
Lords
of
their
own
Children
,
but
also
of
their
Brethren
,
and
all
others
that
were
subject
to
their
Father
.
Yet
tells
us
not
plainly
which
of
the
Sons
is
Heir
;
only
says
a
little
before
,
That
when
God
made
choice
of
any
special
Person
to
be
King
,
he
always
intended
that
the
Issue
also
should
have
the
benefit
thereof
.
Though
this
general
Rule
was
false
in
the
case
of
Saul
,
whose
Children
were
disinherited
by
God
to
establish
the
Crown
upon
David
and
his
Line
.
So
uncertain
things
are
Instances
drawn
from
Scripture
without
any
due
consideration
of
the
Reason
of
them
.
But
to
return
to
the
subject
:
I
grant
that
it
is
not
impossible
but
from
the
command
of
a
Father
of
a
Family
,
who
hath
divers
other
Families
under
him
,
there
may
spring
a
Civil
Government
,
though
the
Fatherly
Authority
doth
properly
regard
the
Education
of
the
Children
,
and
the
Masterly
Power
to
encrease
Riches
:
And
though
it
is
not
changed
barely
by
the
great
number
of
Children
or
Servants
;
yet
the
difference
between
them
is
not
so
wide
,
that
there
can
be
no
transition
from
one
to
the
other
,
unless
a
new
Right
of
Soveraign
Majesty
be
produced
by
God
.
For
if
a
Father
of
a
Family
being
provided
of
a
great
stock
of
Children
and
Slaves
,
will
by
way
of
Manumission
permit
them
to
enjoy
their
own
Goods
and
Families
apart
,
on
that
condition
that
they
submit
to
his
Government
for
their
common
Security
;
I
do
not
see
what
is
wanting
to
the
making
him
a
Prince
,
if
he
have
strength
sufficient
to
perform
the
ends
of
a
Commonwealth
.
But
he
dying
,
and
nominating
a
Successour
,
if
his
Sons
will
consent
to
him
,
and
confirm
his
Will
,
they
may
if
they
please
;
if
not
,
all
of
them
,
as
in
an
Interregnum
,
may
appoint
what
sort
of
Government
they
will
have
for
the
future
.
Nor
will
the
Law
of
Nature
be
violated
,
if
the
youngest
Son
,
having
most
Votes
,
should
be
elected
in
his
Fathers
stead
.
I
should
be
glad
any
man
could
demonstrate
to
me
from
the
Laws
of
God
and
Nature
,
that
Adam's
eldest
Son
was
by
the
Right
of
Eldership
to
be
Lord
over
his
Brethren
,
without
their
Election
or
Consent
,
when
their
Father
died
.
Indeed
the
Jewish
Law
allow'd
a
preheminence
to
the
Elder
Brother
,
and
that
he
should
have
a
double
portion
,
and
be
reverenced
by
all
his
Brethren
,
exprest
by
this
Phrase
of
,
Let
thy
Mothers
Sons
bow
before
thee
:
But
this
proves
not
that
as
Eldest
Son
he
had
therefore
a
Right
of
exercising
all
that
Authority
,
upon
the
Death
of
their
Father
,
over
his
Brethren
,
which
his
Father
had
before
:
Neither
had
Jacob
any
such
Right
over
Esau
,
though
he
sold
his
Birthright
,
or
the
eldest
or
any
other
Son
of
Jacob
any
such
Right
over
his
Brethren
;
for
certainly
God
would
not
have
abrogated
it
if
they
had
.
So
that
Jacob's
Authority
as
a
Father
,
ended
with
his
Life
:
and
for
any
Despotick
Propriety
or
Dominion
over
them
,
I
have
already
proved
that
the
Father
has
none
in
the
state
of
Nature
.
Yet
admitting
he
had
,
the
Children
notwithstanding
would
have
been
free
at
his
Death
.
For
Servitude
being
a
mere
personal
Duty
,
due
only
to
the
person
of
him
that
acquired
this
Slave
;
when
the
person
dies
to
whom
he
owed
this
subjection
,
the
Slave
is
free
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
unless
the
Lord
of
this
Slave
transferr'd
his
Right
in
him
to
another
in
his
life-time
;
a
mans
Person
not
being
like
a
brute
beast
,
to
be
seiz'd
by
whoever
can
lay
hold
of
him
;
he
hath
no
longer
any
obligation
to
serve
his
Children
,
(
unless
he
will
make
himself
their
Slave
of
his
own
accord
.
)
But
if
it
be
answered
,
that
the
Father
may
bequeath
this
Right
of
Dominion
over
his
Children
at
his
Death
,
by
his
Will
,
to
which
of
his
Sons
he
pleased
;
and
that
he
that
is
so
constituted
by
their
Father
,
is
Lord
over
all
the
rest
of
his
Brethren
;
and
endeavour
to
prove
this
from
Genesis
the
9.
vers.
25
,
26
,
27.
where
Noah
cursing
Canaan
,
because
Ham
his
Father
had
derided
his
nakedness
,
says
,
He
shall
be
a
Servant
unto
his
Brethren
:
I
desire
you
would
take
notice
,
that
this
Answer
quite
gives
up
the
Natural
Right
of
the
Heir
,
or
Eldest
Son
.
2.
I
suppose
this
rather
was
a
Prediction
or
Curse
to
be
fulfilled
in
Canaan's
Posterity
,
than
upon
himself
.
For
first
,
this
Right
was
not
given
,
as
it
ought
to
have
been
,
over
the
Person
of
Ham
the
Offender
,
Observat
.
on
Grotius
,
p.
49
,
50.
whom
this
Authour
allows
to
have
had
an
equal
share
with
his
Brethren
in
the
division
of
the
World
,
and
so
to
have
been
in
all
Prerogatives
equal
with
them
.
Neither
doth
he
give
this
Right
to
one
of
them
,
b●…
to
both
alike
;
saying
both
of
Shem
and
Japhet
,
that
Canaan
should
be
their
Servant
:
which
could
not
be
meant
of
his
person
,
since
that
could
not
be
divided
by
them
both
,
who
were
like
to
live
at
so
great
a
distance
;
therefore
it
can
onely
signifie
,
that
his
Descendants
should
be
slaves
to
the
others
.
And
several
Commentators
upon
this
place
,
do
suppose
that
Moses
related
this
Curse
of
Noah
upon
Ham
,
onely
to
shew
the
Jews
the
Right
they
had
to
make
slaves
of
the
Canaanites
,
because
they
were
descended
from
Canaan
.
And
as
for
the
Right
of
bequeathing
slaves
by
Testament
,
it
is
much
disputed
whether
by
the
Law
of
Nature
Testaments
have
any
force
in
this
case
;
those
that
have
written
of
it
,
being
much
divided
about
it
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
since
all
Propriety
in
that
state
being
but
Occupancy
or
Possession
,
which
ceases
with
the
life
of
the
Occupant
.
Therefore
since
a
Testament
commences
onely
from
the
Testators
death
,
who
as
soon
as
he
died
,
lost
his
Right
in
the
Goods
bequeathed
,
since
the
dead
can
have
no
interest
in
any
thing
;
neither
can
the
Legatee
sustain
the
person
of
the
Testator
,
since
this
Right
ceased
before
that
of
the
Legatees
could
begin
.
So
that
it
seems
to
me
at
present
,
that
the
power
of
bequeathing
either
the
persons
of
men
or
goods
,
was
but
a
consequence
of
an
absolute
Propriety
in
things
which
arises
from
Compact
in
a
Common-wealth
,
as
I
shall
hereafter
prove
.
Therefore
out
of
this
State
,
a
Will
cannot
bind
the
persons
of
the
Children
or
Servants
so
bequeathed
:
And
for
this
cause
we
find
Abraham
,
Gen.
24.
v.
2
,
3.
binding
his
Servant
that
ruled
over
his
House
,
with
an
Oath
not
to
take
a
Wife
for
his
Son
of
the
Daughters
of
the
Land
.
And
Gen.
49.
v.
29.
Jacob
taking
an
Oath
of
Joseph
not
to
bury
him
in
Egypt
;
because
they
doubted
whether
they
could
oblige
them
to
do
it
by
their
Testament
.
But
as
for
the
Right
of
bequeathing
Crowns
or
Kingdoms
by
Testament
,
as
I
will
not
deny
but
that
some
Kingdoms
may
have
been
so
bequeathable
by
their
Constitution
,
and
others
become
so
by
Custom
;
yet
I
cannot
grant
that
this
Right
belonged
to
the
Prince
or
Monarch
by
the
Law
of
God
or
Nature
,
but
proceeds
purely
from
a
continued
Custom
of
the
Kingdom
,
or
Civil
Law
thereof
;
else
why
had
not
Henry
VIII
,
or
Edward
VI
,
power
to
limit
or
bequeath
the
Crown
to
whom
they
pleased
,
as
well
as
William
the
Conquerour
?
And
to
look
into
other
Countries
,
what
now
renders
Women
uncapable
of
succeeding
to
the
Crown
of
France
,
yet
capable
of
inheriting
that
of
England
,
Spain
,
and
divers
other
Kingdoms
of
Europe
,
but
the
Customs
or
particular
Constitutions
of
the
Estates
of
these
Kingdoms
?
which
no
Will
or
Testament
can
alter
.
What
else
hinders
the
Grand
Seignior
,
that
he
cannot
disinherit
his
eldest
Son
if
he
survive
him
,
Mezeray
Abregé
Chron.
An.
1317.
Phil.
le
Long.
but
the
Custom
of
the
Ottoman
Empire
?
And
what
is
this
Custom
,
but
(
as
the
Author
himself
acknowledges
in
the
case
of
England
)
the
Commom
Law
of
the
Country
,
Freeholders
Inquest
.
p.
62.
which
is
said
to
be
Common
Custom
?
Thus
to
protect
the
Customs
which
the
Vulgar
shall
chuse
,
is
to
protect
the
Common
Laws
of
England
.
So
that
it
was
the
Will
of
the
People
,
and
not
the
Prince
alone
,
that
made
this
a
Law
:
for
if
this
Law
of
the
Succession
of
the
Crown
depended
upon
his
Will
,
then
if
he
be
an
absolute
Monarch
,
that
(
when
sufficiently
declared
)
being
the
onely
Law
,
might
alter
it
when
he
would
〈◊〉
and
so
he
might
bequeath
the
Crown
to
whom
he
pleased
.
But
every
one
that
understands
the
present
Laws
of
Descent
of
the
Crown
of
France
,
or
the
manner
of
Succession
in
the
Ottoman
Empire
,
knows
that
i●
the
King
of
France
or
Grand
Seignior
(
as
absolute
as
they
are
)
should
bequeath
their
Kingdoms
to
any
other
than
the
right
Heir
,
this
Will
would
signifie
nothing
,
and
no
body
would
obey
this
Successor
of
their
appointing
.
And
if
any
man
think
to
evade
this
,
by
saying
,
That
the
Succession
of
the
Crown
is
a
Fundamental
Law
of
the
Government
,
and
that
a
Prince
may
be
Absolute
,
and
yet
not
have
a
power
to
alter
that
as
he
may
every
thing
else
;
I
would
ask
him
who
made
this
a
Fundamental
Law
at
first
,
whether
the
King
then
in
being
,
or
the
King
with
the
Consent
of
the
People
,
upon
the
first
institution
of
the
Government
?
If
the
King
made
it
alone
,
since
he
is
supposed
to
have
made
it
at
first
for
the
good
of
the
People
,
of
which
he
is
the
Judge
(
and
is
supposed
in
Law
never
to
die
)
why
then
is
not
he
as
competent
a
Judge
of
what
is
good
for
the
People
now
,
as
a
King
that
lived
a
thousand
years
agone
was
what
was
fit
for
the
People
then
?
and
consequently
hath
as
much
Right
of
altering
the
Succession
for
the
Peoples
benefit
,
as
he
that
established
it
at
first
,
since
every
Law
may
be
altered
by
the
same
Power
that
made
it
?
But
if
he
say
it
is
a
Fundamental
Law
,
because
long
custom
hath
made
it
so
,
then
it
is
apparent
such
a
Law
hath
its
force
from
the
Consent
of
the
People
at
first
or
since
,
Custom
being
nothing
else
.
Or
lastly
,
if
he
will
acknowledge
that
the
Consent
of
the
People
was
necessary
to
make
this
a
Fundamental
Constitution
,
then
it
can
neither
be
altered
without
their
Consent
;
and
so
consequently
no
Princes
Testament
is
good
as
to
that
,
farther
than
the
People
or
their
Representatives
give
their
assent
thereunto
:
And
the
same
Law
holds
in
the
Father
of
a
Family
,
since
this
Author
will
have
no
difference
between
him
and
a
King
,
but
onely
secundum
Magis
&
Minus
.
If
then
there
be
no
Right
in
the
state
of
Nature
for
a
Father
to
bequeath
his
Dominion
over
his
Children
by
his
Testament
,
let
us
return
again
to
that
of
Descent
,
and
see
if
that
will
prove
a
better
foundation
to
build
this
natural
Right
of
Princes
upon
.
For
my
part
,
I
think
that
it
is
not
onely
impossible
to
know
who
was
Adam's
right
Heir
of
his
Fatherly
Power
now
,
after
five
or
six
thousand
years
,
but
might
likewise
be
as
uncertain
,
as
soon
as
ever
the
breath
was
out
of
his
body
:
For
supposing
Eve
survived
him
,
why
should
not
her
natural
Right
of
governing
the
Children
which
she
her self
brought
forth
(
and
which
out
of
Wedlock
would
have
belonged
to
her
)
revive
and
take
place
before
any
Right
of
her
eldest
Son
;
to
whom
upon
this
ground
she
must
have
become
subject
,
if
she
would
continue
part
of
the
Family
or
natural
Commonwealth
,
(
which
she
could
not
avoid
,
there
being
none
but
her
Children
or
Grandchildren
in
the
world
)
and
it
being
against
the
nature
of
Government
to
allow
two
Absolute
Heads
in
the
same
Family
or
Commonwealth
?
So
that
for
ought
I
see
,
the
Mother
of
the
Family
hath
the
best
Right
to
the
Government
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
after
the
Husbands
death
,
upon
the
Authors
own
grounds
:
For
if
the
Commandment
of
Honour
thy
Father
and
thy
Mother
,
signifie
more
than
bare
Reverence
and
Respect
,
as
appears
by
the
Apostles
Exposition
of
this
Commandment
,
Ephes.
6.
v.
1.
Children
,
obey
your
Parents
in
the
Lord
,
which
he
makes
the
same
with
Honour
thy
Father
and
thy
Mother
;
then
this
Obedience
which
was
due
to
the
Father
,
belongs
likewise
to
her
when
his
power
ceases
.
But
passing
over
this
difficulty
,
and
allowing
this
Fatherly
Authority
to
descend
to
Adam's
next
Heir
,
it
might
have
been
a
great
Question
,
who
this
next
Heir
was
,
supposing
Cain
to
have
been
disinherited
for
the
murder
of
Abel
,
and
to
have
gone
away
and
built
a
City
,
and
set
up
a
Government
by
himself
?
Yet
let
us
suppose
Abel
left
a
Son
behind
him
,
who
survived
Adam
his
Grandfather
;
which
he
might
very
well
do
,
and
yet
the
Scripture
be
silent
in
it
,
since
the
intent
of
Moses
in
his
Genealogies
being
onely
to
give
us
the
Pedigree
of
the
Jews
,
and
therefore
says
little
of
his
other
Children
but
by
the
by
.
I
would
ask
the
Author
or
any
man
else
,
who
was
Adam's
Heir
after
his
death
,
whether
this
Son
of
Abel
or
Seth
;
(
whom
we
will
suppose
likewise
to
have
survived
his
Father
?
)
If
he
say
that
Adam
might
leave
it
to
Seth
by
Will
,
this
is
gratis
dictum
;
and
it
lies
upon
him
to
prove
that
Adam
made
a
Will
;
or
if
he
did
,
how
it
could
bind
his
true
Heir
.
If
he
say
that
Seth
ought
to
succeed
and
govern
his
Brethren
,
as
being
nearer
in
bloud
to
Adam
,
what
reason
was
there
that
the
eldest
Son's
son
should
be
punished
and
lose
his
Birthright
for
that
which
was
not
his
fault
,
but
misfortune
,
viz.
that
his
Father
was
murdered
before
his
Grandfather
died
?
Nor
could
Seth
claim
,
being
elder
and
consequently
wiser
than
his
Nephew
:
for
his
Nephew
must
be
older
,
since
Seth
was
not
born
until
after
Abel
was
killed
.
But
if
it
be
affirmed
,
that
the
eldest
Son
of
Abel
ought
to
succeed
and
represent
his
Father
;
I
ask
,
by
what
Law
?
If
it
be
replied
,
that
it
is
to
be
supposed
that
Adam
,
if
he
had
made
a
Will
,
would
rather
have
had
his
Grandson
succeed
him
than
his
younger
Son
;
this
is
gratis
dictum
,
and
were
to
affirm
that
the
Right
of
governing
is
bequeathable
;
which
I
have
already
confuted
.
But
if
it
be
said
,
that
this
Son
of
Abels
should
succeed
because
he
represents
his
Father
;
I
would
ask
them
,
by
what
Law
this
Right
of
Representation
should
take
place
before
propinquity
of
Bloud
?
or
how
could
the
Fathers
expectation
onely
confer
a
Right
to
his
Son
,
in
that
which
the
Father
was
never
possessed
of
?
So
that
there
being
equal
Reasons
on
both
sides
,
and
neither
Law
nor
Precedent
in
the
case
,
there
remained
no
way
to
decide
this
Controversie
,
but
either
Combate
,
or
the
Judgment
or
Arbitration
of
the
rest
of
Adam's
Descendants
.
I
suppose
the
Author
will
not
allow
the
former
sufficient
to
confer
a
good
Title
,
since
the
best
Title
might
have
the
worst
success
in
that
Appeal
to
the
Sword
.
If
he
allows
the
latter
,
then
this
hereditary
Monarchy
of
Adam
became
Elective
,
and
depended
upon
the
Will
of
all
the
Heads
of
the
Families
which
descended
from
Adam
:
(
For
it
is
not
likely
in
so
doubtful
and
material
a
point
as
who
should
govern
,
any
of
them
would
lose
the
priviledge
of
giving
his
Vote
.
)
And
if
so
,
this
Right
of
Succession
depended
upon
their
Wills
,
which
might
give
it
to
which
of
the
two
Competitors
they
liked
best
;
and
this
being
once
done
,
might
for
quietness
pass
into
a
Custom
or
Law
for
the
future
.
And
that
this
Right
of
Representation
,
where
the
Son
dies
before
his
Father
,
cannot
be
decided
by
the
Law
of
Nature
or
Reason
alone
,
is
evident
,
in
that
divers
Nations
or
distinct
Tribes
of
People
have
had
different
Customs
about
it
,
and
have
established
this
Right
of
Succession
divers
ways
:
For
though
the
Roman
or
Civil
Law
allow
of
this
Right
of
Representation
,
yet
the
Germans
and
all
Nations
descended
from
them
,
did
not
admit
it
until
very
lately
;
Grotius
de
J.
B.
Li.
cap.
7.
which
shews
there
is
nothing
but
Custom
in
the
case
.
And
upon
this
pretence
the
League
in
France
admitted
the
Cardinal
of
Bourbon
King
,
by
the
name
of
Charles
the
X
,
before
his
Nephew
the
King
of
Navar
,
his
elder
Brothers
Son
,
who
died
before
him
.
And
that
this
difficulty
who
shall
succeed
,
the
Uncle
or
the
Nephew
,
hath
still
perplext
mankind
in
all
Countries
where
the
Succession
hath
not
been
settled
by
positive
Laws
or
long
Custom
,
(
which
is
but
the
continued
Will
of
the
People
)
may
appear
by
those
different
Judgments
that
have
been
in
all
Ages
made
on
this
matter
:
for
when
there
arose
a
Controversie
between
Areus
,
Son
of
Acrotatus
,
eldest
Son
to
Cleomenes
King
of
Lacedaemon
,
and
Cleomenes
the
second
Son
of
the
said
Cleomenes
,
the
Senate
adjudged
the
Royalty
for
Areus
against
Clomenes
.
But
in
Spain
,
Ferdinand
de
la
Cerda
the
Grandson
to
the
late
King
by
his
eldest
Son
,
though
he
had
the
Crown
left
him
by
his
Grandfathers
Will
.
And
when
Charles
the
II
,
King
of
Sicily
died
,
Vicerius
in
Vita
Henry
7.
and
left
a
Grandson
behind
him
by
his
eldest
Son
,
surnamed
Martel
,
and
a
younger
Son
called
Robert
;
the
matter
being
referred
to
Pope
Clement
V
,
he
gave
judgment
for
Robert
the
younger
Son
of
Charles
;
who
was
thereupon
proclaimed
King
of
Sicily
.
And
it
seems
Glanvil
,
who
was
Lord
Chief
Justice
under
Henry
II
,
makes
it
a
great
Question
who
should
be
preferred
to
the
Crown
,
the
Uncle
or
the
Nephew
.
So
that
it
was
no
strange
thing
for
King
John
to
make
himself
King
before
his
Nephew
Arthur
,
since
it
was
a
moot
point
among
the
Lawyers
of
that
Age
,
who
ought
to
succeed
.
And
where
no
Power
could
intervene
,
it
was
decided
by
War
,
and
sometimes
single
Combats
,
which
Historians
mention
to
have
been
waged
between
Uncles
and
Nephews
contending
for
the
Principality
;
and
not
onely
in
this
case
,
but
in
all
others
where
the
Succession
of
the
Empire
is
not
settled
by
such
Laws
or
Customs
,
it
lies
continually
liable
to
be
disputed
between
the
Sons
or
Grandsons
of
the
last
Prince
,
nor
can
ever
be
decided
but
by
the
Sword
:
Of
which
there
is
an
Example
in
one
of
the
greatest
and
most
absolute
Monarchies
in
the
world
,
viz.
the
Empire
of
the
Mogul
,
where
for
want
of
settling
the
Succession
at
first
by
a
positive
Law
,
Raias
,
Omrahs
,
or
great
Lords
give
their
consent
to
it
,
and
swear
to
observe
it
,
and
so
have
made
and
ascertained
it
as
an
inviolable
Custom
(
as
it
is
in
the
Ottoman
Empire
;
)
now
upon
the
death
of
an
Emperour
,
though
he
declare
by
his
Will
who
shall
be
his
Successor
,
yet
the
Grandees
(
who
are
so
many
petty
Princes
,
and
lead
the
People
under
their
Command
after
them
as
they
please
)
do
not
think
themselves
at
all
obliged
to
observe
it
,
much
less
to
set
the
Crown
upon
the
eldest
Sons
head
;
but
every
man
is
for
that
Son
of
the
last
Mogul
whom
they
like
best
,
that
is
,
him
they
conceive
will
suit
best
with
their
interests
and
designes
:
Nor
do
the
Brothers
think
themselves
at
all
obliged
to
yield
to
their
eldest
Brother
,
whom
they
are
assured
will
put
them
to
death
,
or
make
them
perpetual
Prisoners
.
So
that
every
one
provides
for
himself
,
and
makes
his
Party
as
strong
as
he
can
by
Gifts
and
Promises
among
the
Grandees
,
against
his
Fathers
death
.
Nay
,
lately
this
prize
hath
been
played
among
the
Sons
even
in
their
Fathers
life-time
,
as
in
the
case
of
the
late
Sha-Jehan
,
who
lived
to
see
all
his
Sons
killed
,
and
his
person
made
a
prisoner
by
his
youngest
Son
Aureng
Zebe
,
who
is
for
ought
I
know
,
Mogul
at
this
day
.
And
if
any
man
thinks
this
onely
an
Evil
peculiar
to
this
Empire
,
and
not
to
others
,
let
him
but
read
the
Histories
of
the
several
Revolutions
and
Changes
in
all
Moorish
and
Eastern
Monarchies
,
and
he
shall
find
them
managed
much
after
the
same
rate
.
Nor
hath
these
differences
onely
divided
these
Monarchies
where
the
Succession
was
never
well
settled
at
first
,
but
even
those
that
have
been
better
constituted
,
and
where
one
would
belieev
the
Discent
of
the
Crown
had
been
sufficiently
settled
by
a
long
Discent
of
Kings
for
many
hundreds
of
years
.
And
of
this
,
Scotland
hath
been
a
famous
Example
;
where
after
the
death
of
King
Alexander
III
,
and
his
Grandaughter
Margaret
of
Norway
,
two
or
three
several
Competitors
claimed
a
Right
to
succeed
:
But
omitting
others
,
it
was
agreed
that
it
lay
between
John
Baylliol
,
and
Robert
Bruce
Earl
of
Carick
;
both
of
them
drawing
their
Discent
from
David
Earl
of
Huntingdon
,
Great
Uncle
to
the
last
King
(
in
whom
they
all
agreed
the
Right
to
the
Crown
would
have
been
,
had
he
survived
.
)
Baylliol
claimed
,
as
eldest
Son
to
Dornagilla
,
Grandaughter
to
Margaret
the
eldest
Daughter
of
the
said
Earl
David
.
Robert
Bruce
claimed
,
as
eldest
Son
of
Isabel
the
second
Daughter
of
the
said
David
.
So
that
if
Baylliol
alledged
his
Discent
from
the
eldest
Daughter
,
Bruce
was
not
behind-hand
;
but
pleaded
,
though
it
was
true
he
was
descended
but
from
the
second
Daughter
,
yet
he
being
a
Grandson
,
and
a
degree
neerer
,
ought
to
succeed
;
(
whereas
Baylliol
was
but
great
Grandson
to
Earl
David
:
)
And
though
Dornagilla
,
Baylliol's
Mother
,
was
in
the
same
degree
with
himself
,
yet
he
being
a
man
,
ought
to
be
preferred
before
a
woman
in
the
same
Line
;
and
that
if
the
Laws
of
Scotland
would
have
given
it
to
Dornagilla
,
if
it
had
been
an
ordinary
Inheritance
,
yet
Discent
of
the
Crown
was
not
to
be
ruled
by
the
Common
Laws
of
other
Inheritances
.
In
short
,
this
Dispute
did
so
divide
the
Nobility
into
Factions
,
and
puzzle
the
Estates
of
the
Kingdom
,
that
not
being
able
to
decide
it
,
they
and
all
the
Competitors
agreed
to
refer
the
Controversie
to
Edward
I.
King
of
England
,
one
of
the
wisest
and
most
powerful
Princes
of
his
time
;
who
upon
long
advice
and
debate
with
twelve
of
the
learnedest
men
of
both
Kingdoms
,
at
last
adjudged
the
Crown
to
Baylliol
;
or
,
as
the
Scotch
Historians
relate
,
because
he
would
do
him
Homage
for
it
:
which
,
Bruce
being
of
a
higher
spirit
,
refused
.
Yet
this
did
not
put
an
end
to
this
great
Controversie
;
for
though
Baylliol
was
thereupon
admitted
King
,
yet
falling
out
not
long
after
with
King
Edward
,
to
whom
he
owed
all
his
greatness
,
and
having
the
worst
of
it
,
the
Nobility
and
States
of
Scotland
revived
Bruce's
Title
,
and
declared
him
King
;
who
after
a
long
War
with
England
,
enjoy'd
the
Crown
quietly
at
last
,
and
left
it
to
his
Issue
,
whose
Posterity
(
in
our
present
King
)
enjoy
it
to
this
day
.
To
this
I
shall
adde
one
Example
more
from
Portugal
within
these
hundred
years
.
King
Henry
called
the
Cardinal
dying
without
Issue
,
there
was
a
great
Controversie
who
should
succeed
;
(
for
he
died
suddenly
just
as
the
States
of
the
Kingdom
were
assembled
to
settle
the
Succession
,
for
he
declared
himself
unable
to
decide
it
:
)
So
that
he
onely
left
by
his
Will
twelve
Governours
of
the
Kingdom
,
who
should
govern
during
the
interregnum
,
but
that
the
Crown
should
descend
to
him
that
should
appear
to
them
to
have
the
best
Title
.
Four
eminent
Competitors
put
in
their
claims
:
1.
Antonio
called
the
Bastard
,
who
nevertheless
pretended
that
he
was
lawful
Son
to
Don
Lewis
,
second
Brother
to
Henry
the
last
King
:
So
that
he
had
no
more
to
do
but
to
prove
himself
Legitimate
.
2.
Alexander
Duke
of
Parma
,
who
claimed
as
Grandson
to
Mary
,
eldest
Daughter
to
Don
Duarte
,
youngest
Brother
to
the
last
King
Henry
,
and
Son
to
King
Emanuel
.
3.
The
Duke
of
Braganza
,
who
claimed
as
Son
to
Katherine
,
second
Daughter
of
the
said
Don
Duarte
,
yet
alledged
his
Title
to
be
best
,
because
he
was
the
next
of
the
Bloud-Royal
who
was
a
Native
of
Portugal
(
as
the
Heir
of
the
Crown
,
as
he
pretended
,
ought
to
be
by
a
Fundamental
Law
of
that
Kingdom
:
)
yet
it
seems
that
Law
was
not
then
so
well
known
,
or
otherwise
there
was
no
reason
why
these
Governors
should
not
have
admitted
him
King
as
soon
as
ever
they
met
.
4.
Philip
the
second
,
King
of
Spain
,
who
claimed
as
Son
to
Isabella
Daughter
of
Emanuel
King
of
Portugal
,
and
so
a
degree
nearer
than
the
rest
to
Henry
the
last
King
.
The
States
and
Governours
differing
,
the
States
were
dissolved
;
and
during
their
recess
,
the
Governours
not
agreeing
among
themselves
,
the
King
of
Spain
raised
an
Army
,
and
entering
Portugal
,
seiz'd
the
City
of
Lisbon
,
and
consequently
all
the
rest
of
the
Kingdom
submitted
to
him
,
and
so
made
himself
King
by
force
.
And
yet
we
have
seen
in
his
Grandson's
time
,
the
Estates
of
Portugal
declare
this
Title
void
,
and
the
Crown
setled
in
the
Posterity
of
the
Duke
of
Braganza
,
who
still
enjoy
it
by
vertue
of
this
Fundamental
Law
.
And
that
this
Fundamental
Law
could
not
be
altered
but
by
the
consent
of
the
Cortes
or
States
,
appears
by
the
late
Alteration
of
this
Constitution
upon
the
Treaty
of
Marriage
of
the
present
Prince
Regents
Daughter
with
the
Duke
of
Savoy
.
And
how
much
even
Kings
themselves
have
attributed
to
the
Authority
of
their
Estates
,
appears
by
the
League
made
between
Philip
the
Long
King
of
France
,
and
David
King
of
Scots
;
wherein
this
Condition
was
exprest
,
That
if
there
should
happen
any
difference
about
the
Succession
in
either
of
these
Realms
,
he
of
the
two
Kings
which
remained
alive
,
should
not
suffer
any
to
place
himself
on
the
Throne
,
but
him
who
should
have
the
Judgment
of
the
Estates
of
his
side
;
and
then
he
should
with
all
his
power
oppose
him
who
would
after
this
contest
for
the
Crown
.
So
that
our
Author
,
without
cause
,
lays
the
fault
upon
the
wilful
ignorance
of
the
People
in
not
remembring
or
acknowledging
the
right
Heir
of
the
Crown
;
when
the
ablest
and
wisest
men
of
the
Age
they
lived
in
could
not
by
the
meer
Laws
of
Nature
and
Reason
,
determine
which
was
he
:
And
our
Author
should
have
done
well
to
have
set
down
some
certain
Rules
,
how
the
People
might
be
assured
,
without
a
positive
Law
before
made
,
that
they
acknowledge
the
right
Heir
,
and
not
an
Usurper
to
his
prejudice
.
CHAP.
II.
Observations
on
the
Directions
for
Obedience
in
doubtful
times
,
and
other
places
of
his
Patriarcha
,
and
other
Treatises
.
BUT
since
this
Author
,
rather
than
the
disposal
of
a
Crown
shall
fall
to
the
decision
of
the
People
,
or
States
of
the
Kingdom
,
will
give
an
Usurper
a
good
Right
to
it
against
all
persons
but
him
that
hath
the
Right
;
we
will
now
examine
how
much
of
that
is
true
which
he
lays
down
in
his
Directions
for
Obedience
to
Governours
in
doubtful
times
,
and
how
far
men
are
bound
in
Conscience
to
obey
an
Usurper
,
whilst
he
that
hath
Right
is
kept
out
by
him
.
First
,
he
takes
it
for
granted
,
that
all
those
that
so
eagerly
strive
for
an
original
Power
to
be
in
the
People
,
do
with
one
accord
acknowledge
that
originally
the
Supream
Power
was
in
the
Fatherhood
,
Mezeray
Abregé
Chron.
An.
1318.
and
that
the
first
Kings
were
Fathers
of
Families
;
which
if
granted
,
yet
will
not
prove
that
this
proceeded
from
that
natural
perpetual
subjection
which
Children
owe
their
Parents
;
or
that
because
they
are
Parents
,
they
are
therefore
Lords
and
Kings
over
them
:
So
that
this
being
the
Groundwork
of
whatever
he
says
in
this
Discourse
,
p.
67.
if
this
be
faulty
(
as
I
hope
I
have
proved
it
to
be
)
all
that
he
builds
upon
this
foundation
,
signifies
nothing
.
Secondly
,
he
assumes
that
this
Paternal
power
cannot
be
lost
;
it
may
be
transferr'd
or
usurped
,
but
never
lost
,
or
ceaseth
—
But
as
the
power
of
the
Father
may
be
lawfully
transferred
or
aliened
,
so
it
may
be
unjustly
usurped
;
and
in
Vsurpation
the
Title
of
the
Vsurper
is
before
and
better
than
the
Title
of
any
other
than
him
that
had
a
former
Right
:
for
he
hath
a
possession
by
the
permissive
Will
of
God
,
which
permission
how
long
it
will
last
,
no
man
ordinarily
knows
;
every
man
is
to
preserve
his
own
life
for
the
service
of
God
,
and
of
his
King
or
Father
:
and
is
so
far
to
obey
an
Vsurper
,
as
may
tend
not
onely
to
the
preservation
of
his
King
and
Father
,
but
sometimes
even
of
the
Vsurper
himself
,
when
probably
he
may
he
thereby
preserved
to
the
correction
or
mercy
of
his
true
Superiour
.
And
though
by
humane
Law
a
long
Prescription
may
take
away
a
Right
,
yet
divine
Right
never
dies
,
nor
can
be
lost
or
taken
away
.
The
same
he
says
p.
70.
That
in
Grants
and
Gifts
that
have
their
original
from
God
or
Nature
(
as
the
power
of
the
Father
hath
)
no
inferiour
power
of
man
can
limit
nor
make
any
Prescription
against
them
.
Vpon
this
ground
is
built
that
Maxime
,
That
Nullum
tempus
occurrit
Regi
,
no
time
bars
a
King
.
Which
second
assumption
is
likewise
false
:
for
I
have
already
proved
that
all
Fatherly
power
ceases
with
the
life
of
the
Father
,
as
Motherly
power
with
the
life
of
the
Mother
;
or
else
in
the
state
of
Nature
a
man
must
be
left
like
other
Cattle
,
to
be
pickt
up
and
markt
by
whoever
can
first
seize
him
.
And
secondly
,
that
it
is
false
that
this
power
and
authority
of
a
Father
can
be
transferred
to
,
or
usurped
by
another
;
or
that
the
Son
owes
the
person
to
whom
his
Father
transfers
or
sells
him
,
any
other
duty
than
as
his
Assignee
performs
the
Office
of
a
Father
towards
him
.
Much
less
that
an
Usurper
acquires
any
Right
over
the
person
of
the
Son
in
the
state
of
Nature
:
for
otherwise
if
a
Thief
should
procure
strength
enough
to
drive
a
Master
of
a
separate
Family
out
of
doors
,
and
so
this
Rogue
could
subdue
the
whole
House
,
and
set
up
for
Lord
and
Master
of
it
,
that
then
the
Wife
,
and
Children
,
and
Servants
,
were
immediately
bound
to
obey
him
,
because
he
hath
a
possession
,
and
is
in
by
the
permissive
Will
of
God
,
and
so
hath
a
better
Right
than
any
body
else
,
but
the
Master
himself
.
It
is
true
indeed
,
in
this
case
every
Member
of
this
Family
is
bound
to
preserve
his
own
life
,
and
may
yield
a
passive
Obedience
to
this
Rogue
,
for
fear
of
his
power
,
and
as
far
as
he
thinks
it
will
conduce
to
his
preservation
;
but
I
do
not
see
any
obligation
he
hath
from
Conscience
or
Reason
,
to
obey
this
Robber
farther
than
as
he
cannot
help
it
,
but
may
take
the
first
opportunity
to
drive
him
out
of
the
House
,
and
call
in
his
true
Father
or
Master
;
unless
he
hath
made
him
any
promise
to
be
quiet
and
not
assault
him
,
for
then
he
is
in
the
same
state
with
a
Prisoner
upon
parol
:
for
all
Writers
on
this
subject
,
hold
that
nothing
but
a
lawful
War
can
give
any
man
a
Right
over
the
person
of
another
,
unless
he
become
his
Servant
by
some
voluntary
act
of
his
own
;
or
otherwise
the
Slaves
taken
by
the
Argter-Pyrates
were
in
a
sad
case
,
for
they
were
bound
in
Conscience
never
to
escape
,
without
the
consent
of
their
Masters
.
Nor
upon
the
Authors
principles
,
is
there
any
difference
between
a
Father
of
a
Family
,
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
and
a
Prince
,
since
he
tells
us
more
than
once
,
that
a
Kingdom
is
but
a
large
Family
:
And
consequently
no
difference
between
an
Usurper
of
the
Fatherly
power
,
and
that
of
a
Monarch
;
onely
the
Rogue
that
usurped
the
one
,
could
call
himself
but
Master
of
the
Family
;
but
the
other
would
stile
himself
King
,
Emperour
,
o●
Protector
.
Nor
will
the
place
of
St.
Paul
,
Rom.
13.
v.
1.
oblige
any
man
in
this
case
:
for
though
it
is
said
,
that
St.
Paul
wrote
this
Epistle
,
Nero
an
Usurper
being
Emperour
of
Rome
;
I
deny
that
Nero
was
an
Usurper
:
for
though
it
is
true
that
Claudius
left
a
Son
,
yet
since
by
the
Roman
Law
a
man
might
make
whom
he
pleased
his
Son
by
Adoption
,
which
Son
so
adopted
was
in
all
respects
looked
upon
as
the
true
Heir
of
the
adopting
Father
,
and
Nero
was
so
adopted
by
Claudius
;
and
so
being
elder
than
his
own
Son
Germanicus
,
would
succeed
before
him
.
That
Vsurpers
have
such
a
qualified
Right
to
govern
,
as
is
in
Thieves
who
have
stolen
Goods
,
and
during
the
time
they
are
possessed
of
them
,
have
a
Title
in
Law
against
all
others
but
the
true
Owners
;
and
so
such
Vsurpers
,
to
divers
intents
and
purposes
,
may
be
obeyed
:
For
first
,
this
is
no
Law
of
Nature
or
Reason
,
but
onely
a
positive
Law
of
England
;
where
,
for
the
avoiding
of
perpetual
violence
and
strife
,
and
for
the
better
securing
of
Property
,
they
have
made
possession
even
in
Thieves
to
confer
a
Temporary
Right
against
all
but
the
true
Proprietor
:
Whereas
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
a
Thief
by
invading
another
mans
Goods
unjustly
,
and
taking
them
away
by
violence
,
becomes
an
Enemy
to
all
Mankind
;
and
so
may
lawfully
be
killed
,
or
have
what
he
hath
so
possessed
taken
from
him
by
any
other
.
Secondly
,
Neither
does
the
parallel
between
the
possession
of
Goods
,
and
that
of
a
Kingdom
,
hold
:
for
Goods
may
be
possessed
by
the
first
Occupant
;
but
Government
,
which
is
an
Authority
over
the
person
of
a
man
can
never
be
seized
,
since
a
man
without
his
own
act
or
consent
can
never
lawfully
fall
into
the
power
or
possession
of
another
(
as
I
have
already
proved
:
)
So
that
I
know
not
to
what
purpose
this
Treatise
of
the
Authors
could
serve
,
but
to
make
all
men
obliged
in
Conscience
to
yield
not
onely
a
passive
but
an
active
Obedience
to
all
the
Commands
of
Cromwel
and
the
Rump
,
not
onely
in
things
lawful
and
necessary
,
but
indifferent
ones
too
,
p.
74.
in
which
consists
all
Obedience
,
since
all
the
Authority
,
even
of
lawful
Powers
,
extends
onely
to
indifferent
things
;
all
other
actions
being
sufficiently
setled
by
the
Law
of
God
or
Nature
.
But
the
Author
perceiving
this
difficulty
,
endeavours
to
extricate
himself
,
by
saying
,
p.
75.
That
though
granting
in
things
indifferent
,
an
Vsurper
may
be
obeyed
as
well
as
a
lawful
Prince
,
yet
that
it
does
not
therefore
follow
that
there
is
as
much
Obedience
due
to
an
usurped
Power
as
a
lawful
;
but
that
herein
lieth
a
main
difference
between
them
,
that
some
things
are
indifferent
for
a
lawful
Superiour
,
which
are
not
indifferent
but
unlawful
for
an
Vsurper
to
enjoyn
.
Vsurpation
is
the
resisting
and
taking
away
the
Power
from
him
who
had
such
a
former
Right
to
govern
the
Vsurper
,
as
cannot
lawfully
be
taken
away
.
So
that
it
cannot
be
just
for
an
Vsurper
to
take
advantage
of
his
own
unlawful
act
,
or
create
himself
a
Title
by
continuation
of
his
own
Injustice
.
And
if
it
c●…
never
be
an
act
indifferent
for
the
Vsurper
to
disobey
his
lawful
Soveraign
,
much
less
can
it
be
indifferent
for
him
to
command
another
to
do
that
to
which
he
hath
no
Right
himself
.
It
is
onely
then
a
matter
indifferent
for
an
Vsurper
to
command
another
when
the
actions
enjoyned
are
such
as
the
lawful
Superiour
is
commanded
by
the
Law
of
God
to
provide
for
the
benefit
of
his
Subjects
,
by
the
same
or
the
like
restrictions
of
such
indifferent
things
;
and
it
is
to
be
presumed
,
if
he
had
not
been
hindered
,
would
have
commanded
the
same
or
the
like
Laws
.
Let
us
now
see
how
far
this
distinction
will
serve
his
turn
.
I
should
in
the
first
place
be
glad
to
know
what
he
means
by
these
words
,
lawful
Soveraign
or
Superiour
:
If
he
means
such
a
Superiour
who
was
particularly
appointed
by
God
,
God
never
since
David
and
Solomon
expresly
appointed
a
King
in
any
Nation
.
Secondly
,
If
one
who
was
elected
by
the
People
,
or
whose
possession
is
confirmed
by
their
acknowledgement
publickly
declared
,
and
so
passed
into
a
Law
;
this
were
to
set
up
what
he
so
much
abhors
,
an
elective
King
,
who
must
claim
by
Law
.
If
by
lawful
,
he
means
such
a
one
who
upon
a
bare
possession
,
hath
by
his
own
power
alone
made
a
Law
declaring
himself
to
be
the
lawful
Superiour
;
this
Law
is
unlawful
for
him
to
make
,
or
for
the
Subjects
to
obey
:
And
if
it
be
such
a
one
to
whom
possession
gave
a
Right
(
as
he
will
have
it
)
being
in
possession
by
the
permissive
Will
of
God
,
though
at
first
an
Usurper
;
Why
hath
not
this
second
Usurper
as
good
a
Title
to
take
the
Government
from
the
former
,
as
he
or
his
Ancestors
had
to
take
it
from
him
that
had
it
before
?
But
indeed
Occupancy
onely
confers
a
Right
in
the
state
of
Nature
to
such
things
as
are
meerly
necessary
for
a
mans
subsistence
;
but
Government
is
an
Office
of
Trust
and
Power
,
and
which
the
Usurper
might
very
well
have
lived
without
:
And
why
should
a
bare
possession
of
this
,
though
of
three
or
four
hundred
years
,
confer
a
better
Right
than
that
of
a
year
or
two
?
for
this
last
possession
seems
,
according
to
the
Authors
principles
,
to
be
the
better
Title
.
For
he
says
,
a
little
before
,
p.
69.
That
the
first
Usurper
hath
the
best
Title
,
being
now
in
by
the
permissive
Will
of
God
:
And
if
so
,
may
not
the
last
Usurper
use
the
like
Argument
,
since
he
tells
us
,
p.
67.
That
this
last
Vsurper
hath
a
better
Title
than
any
other
,
except
him
who
had
a
former
Right
;
for
he
hath
a
possession
by
the
permissive
Will
of
God
:
which
permission
how
long
it
may
endure
,
no
man
ordinarily
knows
?
Now
which
is
best
,
a
Right
which
once
a
man
onely
had
by
the
permissive
Will
of
God
,
but
is
now
ended
(
God
having
otherwise
declared
himself
,
)
or
a
present
possession
which
he
hath
by
the
same
permissive
Will
;
which
when
it
will
have
an
end
,
no
body
knows
?
But
if
he
answers
,
as
he
does
,
p.
69.
That
this
Vsurper
is
onely
then
to
be
obeyed
and
reputed
by
the
Subjects
for
the
true
Heir
,
where
he
hath
continued
so
long
that
the
knowledge
of
the
right
Heir
is
lost
by
all
the
Subjects
;
for
no
man
hath
an
infallible
certainty
,
but
only
a
moral
knowledge
,
which
is
no
other
than
a
probable
Perswasion
grounded
on
a
peaceable
Possession
;
which
is
a
Warrant
for
Subjection
to
Parents
and
Governours
:
I
know
not
what
the
Author
means
here
by
true
Heir
,
and
as
little
when
he
will
have
this
knowledge
to
be
lost
.
If
he
means
by
right
Heir
,
the
Son
or
descendant
of
the
first
Usurper
,
I
should
be
glad
to
know
how
he
that
had
no
Right
himself
,
could
confer
a
Title
upon
another
;
or
by
what
Law
his
Son
had
a
Right
to
succeed
him
?
If
by
the
consent
of
the
People
,
this
were
to
grant
that
which
he
before
denies
as
at
all
necessary
to
any
Princes
Title
.
If
because
he
or
his
Descendants
have
an
uninterrupted
long
possession
,
the
difficulty
still
remains
,
how
this
long
possession
can
confer
a
Right
,
for
the
Reasons
already
given
.
But
if
it
be
said
that
the
Heir
of
this
Usurper
hath
a
better
Right
than
any
body
else
,
as
having
possession
,
and
that
it
were
destructive
to
the
Peace
of
the
Commonwealth
to
put
him
out
,
after
so
long
an
enjoyment
of
the
Crown
:
it
's
true
,
this
were
a
good
Argument
not
to
make
any
alteration
in
the
Government
,
as
it
is
setled
;
but
they
must
likewise
consider
,
that
the
same
may
be
as
well
made
use
of
by
the
last
Usurper
and
his
Party
,
since
he
having
now
the
possession
in
as
full
a
manner
as
he
that
had
it
before
,
cannot
perhaps
be
put
out
of
it
,
without
involving
the
Nation
in
a
tedious
bloudy
War
.
It
is
likewise
as
uncertain
,
when
the
knowledge
of
this
right
Heir
of
the
first
Usurper
shall
be
said
to
be
lost
by
all
the
Subjects
.
If
he
means
personal
knowledge
,
when
all
the
people
that
could
remember
the
Prince
that
was
turned
out
are
dead
,
and
none
left
alive
that
certainly
know
who
is
his
next
Heir
,
the
Right
of
this
true
Heir
will
quickly
be
lost
in
one
Generation
:
but
if
he
means
a
traditional
moral
knowledge
(
as
he
seems
to
do
)
then
this
can
never
be
lost
as
long
as
there
is
any
Authentick
or
Historical
Tradition
of
the
Descent
of
this
Heir
;
which
Tradition
may
be
continued
for
a
thousand
years
together
:
during
all
which
time
,
the
Princes
that
succeed
being
Heirs
of
such
Usurpers
,
can
never
require
a
perfect
Right
to
their
Crowns
,
the
Author
holding
it
an
undoubted
truth
,
p.
60.
That
though
Prescription
may
take
away
a
common
Right
,
yet
divine
Right
(
or
that
to
a
Crown
)
never
dies
,
or
can
be
taken
away
thereby
.
And
upon
this
ground
the
common
Maxime
is
built
,
Nullum
tempus
occurrit
Regi
.
So
that
as
long
as
this
kind
of
moral
knowledge
of
this
right
Heir
can
be
had
from
any
Authentick
History
or
Record
,
the
Prince
in
being
hath
onely
a
Right
from
Possession
,
and
can
never
create
himself
a
Title
by
the
continuation
of
his
own
Injustice
,
or
command
any
of
his
Subjects
to
fight
against
this
true
Heir
,
since
they
are
to
obey
this
Vsurper
,
(
p.
72.
)
or
his
Heirs
,
onely
in
such
things
as
tend
to
their
own
preservation
,
and
not
to
the
destruction
of
the
true
Governour
.
By
which
Principle
,
the
Author
at
once
renders
the
Titles
of
all
the
Crowns
in
Europe
disputable
,
and
all
Allegiance
uncertain
and
questionable
by
their
Subjects
;
as
I
shall
shew
in
several
instances
,
as
I
shall
prove
from
Histories
of
unquestionable
credit
.
I
shall
begin
with
our
own
Country
,
England
.
If
therefore
,
as
the
Author
will
have
it
,
p.
69.
the
Usurper
is
onely
then
to
be
taken
for
the
true
Heir
,
when
the
knowledge
of
the
right
Heir
is
lost
by
all
the
Subjects
;
it
will
follow
,
that
all
the
Kings
and
Queens
that
reigned
in
England
until
the
coming
in
of
K.
James
,
were
Usurpers
:
for
the
Right
of
Succession
to
the
Crown
of
England
,
could
not
be
obtained
by
Conquest
alone
.
(
And
I
suppose
this
Authour
does
not
allow
it
to
be
bequeathable
by
Will
)
as
long
as
the
right
Heir
was
in
being
,
and
could
be
known
from
authentick
Histories
and
Traditions
.
Now
the
Right
of
the
Crown
by
Descent
belonging
,
after
the
death
of
Edward
the
Confessor
,
to
Edgar
Atheling
his
Cousen
;
he
dying
without
Issue
,
the
Right
fell
to
Mawd
his
Sister
,
who
married
Malcolm
III
,
Buchanan
de
Rebus
Scoticus
,
lib.
7.
King
of
Scotland
;
and
though
her
Daughter
Mawd
was
married
to
Henry
the
first
,
King
of
England
,
from
whom
all
our
Kings
are
descended
,
yet
the
Right
was
not
in
her
,
but
in
Edgar
King
of
Scotland
,
her
Brother
,
from
whom
all
the
Kings
of
Scotland
to
King
James
were
descended
.
It
is
true
,
the
Kings
of
Scotland
were
too
wise
ever
to
set
up
this
Title
,
because
they
knew
the
Norman
Race
were
quietly
possessed
of
the
Throne
,
and
had
been
admitted
and
confirmed
for
lawful
Kings
by
many
great
Councils
or
Assemblies
of
the
Clergy
,
Nobility
,
and
People
:
yet
did
not
this
absolve
the
People
,
who
might
very
well
retain
the
traditional
knowledge
of
this
right
Heir
;
For
divine
Right
never
dies
,
nor
can
be
lost
or
taken
away
,
or
barr'd
by
Prescription
.
So
that
all
Laws
which
were
made
to
confirm
the
Crown
either
to
Henry
I.
or
any
of
his
Descendants
,
were
absolutely
void
and
unlawful
,
by
our
Authors
principles
;
and
so
likewise
all
Wars
made
against
the
King
of
Scotland
in
person
,
were
absolutely
sinful
and
unlawful
,
since
(
according
to
this
Authors
principle
)
the
command
of
an
Usurper
is
not
to
be
obeyed
in
any
thing
tending
to
the
destruction
of
the
person
of
the
true
Governour
.
So
by
the
same
Principle
,
all
Laws
made
in
France
about
the
Succession
of
the
Crown
,
are
absolutely
void
:
and
it
would
be
a
mortal
sin
in
the
French
Nation
to
resist
any
King
of
England
of
this
Line
,
if
he
should
make
War
in
person
upon
the
French
King
then
in
being
,
since
according
to
the
ancient
Laws
of
Descent
in
that
Kingdom
,
he
is
true
Heir
of
the
Crown
of
France
.
Nor
can
the
French
here
plead
ignorance
,
since
there
is
scarce
a
Peasant
there
but
knows
our
King
stiles
himself
King
of
France
,
and
quarters
the
Arms
of
that
Kingdom
;
and
so
ought
to
understand
the
justness
of
his
Title
.
So
likewise
in
Spain
,
Mariana
de
Rebus
,
Hisp
.
lib.
13
,
cap.
7.
all
the
Kings
of
Castile
are
likewise
by
this
Rule
Usurpers
,
since
the
time
of
Sancho
III
,
who
succeeded
to
the
Crown
after
the
death
of
Alphonso
V
his
Father
,
who
had
bequeathed
it
to
Alphonso
and
Ferdinand
de
la
Cerda
,
his
Grandsons
by
Ferdinand
his
eldest
Son
,
who
died
before
him
:
Yet
notwithstanding
this
Testament
,
and
their
Right
,
as
representing
their
Father
the
elder
Brother
,
Sancho
their
Uncle
was
admitted
as
King
by
the
Estates
of
Castile
;
and
his
Descendants
hold
that
Kingdom
by
no
better
Right
to
this
day
.
Nor
is
this
a
thing
stale
or
forgotten
;
for
the
Dukes
of
Medina
Coeli
,
on
whom
(
by
Marriage
of
the
Heiress
of
the
House
de
la
Cerda
)
the
right
descends
,
do
constantly
put
in
their
Claim
upon
the
death
of
every
King
of
Spain
;
and
the
answer
is
,
The
place
is
full
.
Nor
can
those
of
this
Author's
opinion
plead
possession
,
or
the
several
Laws
that
have
been
made
to
confirm
the
Crown
to
the
first
Usurpers
and
their
Descendants
:
for
it
will
be
replied
out
of
this
Author
,
p.
70.
That
the
right
Heir
having
the
Fatherly
Power
in
him
,
and
so
having
his
Authority
from
God
,
no
inferiour
Power
can
make
any
Law
of
Prescription
against
him
,
and
Nullum
tempus
ocurrit
Regi
:
And
this
were
to
make
the
Crown
elective
and
disposable
according
to
the
Will
of
the
Estates
or
People
.
I
shall
now
return
to
the
Author's
distinction
,
and
shew
that
his
distinguishing
the
Laws
or
Commands
of
Usurpers
into
indifferent
or
not
indifferent
,
signifies
nothing
:
for
suppose
that
an
Usurper
,
as
several
have
been
in
England
and
other
Kingdoms
,
either
dares
not
,
or
thinks
it
not
for
his
interest
to
alter
the
form
of
the
Government
,
but
is
contented
for
his
own
safety
to
govern
upon
the
same
Terms
his
Predecessors
did
,
and
so
will
not
raise
any
Money
,
or
make
new
Laws
without
the
consent
of
the
Estates
,
whom
he
summons
for
that
purpose
;
Now
they
must
either
obey
his
Writs
of
Summons
,
or
they
must
not
:
if
they
do
not
obey
them
,
he
will
perhaps
be
encouraged
to
take
their
Goods
by
force
(
perhaps
by
a
standing
Army
which
he
may
have
ready
in
pay
)
and
then
say
it
is
long
of
their
own
stubbornness
,
who
would
not
give
it
him
freely
when
they
might
have
done
it
;
and
they
shall
likewise
be
without
these
good
Laws
the
Author
supposes
he
may
make
:
but
if
they
meet
,
he
will
not
let
them
sit
,
unless
they
first
by
some
Oath
or
Recognition
acknowledge
his
Title
to
be
good
,
and
own
him
as
their
lawful
Prince
.
Now
what
shall
they
do
in
this
case
?
they
must
either
lose
their
Liberties
,
and
alter
the
form
of
the
Government
,
or
acknowledge
him
to
the
prejudice
of
their
lawful
Prince
.
But
if
the
Laws
are
once
made
,
and
they
appear
evidently
for
the
good
of
the
Commonwealth
,
they
then
are
no
longer
indifferent
,
since
all
private
Interests
are
to
give
place
to
the
publick
Good
of
the
Commonwealth
;
since
in
the
instance
before
given
of
the
Father
of
a
Family
's
being
driven
out
of
doors
by
a
Robber
,
no
doubt
but
every
Member
of
the
Family
ought
to
obey
this
Rogue
in
case
the
house
should
be
on
fire
or
ready
to
fall
,
and
he
would
take
upon
him
to
give
orders
for
the
quenching
or
securing
it
from
falling
;
for
they
did
this
not
to
own
his
Authority
,
but
from
the
obligation
they
owe
to
their
Father
or
Master
,
who
would
have
done
the
same
,
had
he
been
at
home
.
So
to
obey
Laws
made
by
an
Usurper
that
tend
to
the
apparent
benefit
of
the
Commonwealth
,
is
not
to
acknowledge
these
usurped
Powers
as
lawful
.
I
do
less
understand
the
force
of
another
distinction
he
makes
use
of
,
p.
155.
That
an
Vsurper
is
so
far
to
be
obeyed
,
as
may
tend
to
the
preservation
of
a
mans
King
and
Father
,
nay
sometimes
even
to
the
preservation
of
the
Vsurper
himself
;
when
probably
he
may
thereby
be
reserved
to
the
correction
or
mercy
of
his
true
Superiour
.
For
how
Obedience
to
an
Usurper
can
tend
to
the
preservation
of
the
lawful
Prince
,
I
understand
not
.
And
as
for
the
other
instance
of
preserving
the
person
of
the
Usurper
for
the
mercy
or
correction
of
the
true
Superiour
,
it
had
been
a
very
good
pretence
for
Obedience
to
Cromwel
and
the
Rump
;
nay
,
to
fight
for
them
,
since
this
was
but
to
preserve
them
for
his
Majesties
mercy
or
correction
another
time
,
though
their
Power
might
have
continued
until
now
;
since
they
had
a
Possession
by
the
permissive
Will
of
God
,
which
how
long
it
would
endure
,
no
body
could
tell
.
Such
untoward
things
are
Arguments
drawn
from
false
Principles
,
that
they
flie
in
the
faces
of
those
that
make
use
of
them
,
and
will
either
reduce
them
to
absurdities
,
or
else
prove
weapons
against
themselves
.
But
I
shall
now
come
to
his
last
Refuge
,
when
he
can
no
longer
evade
,
but
that
by
the
Peoples
ignorance
of
Adam's
right
Heir
,
or
of
the
Heirs
to
the
last
Prince
,
the
supreme
Power
is
devolved
upon
the
People
,
who
may
chuse
what
kind
of
Government
they
please
,
(
Patriarch
.
p.
21.
)
This
he
denies
,
saying
,
[
That
in
such
cases
the
Kingly
Power
escheats
to
the
Fathers
or
independent
Heads
of
Families
.
The
same
Answer
he
gives
to
this
Objection
in
his
Anarchy
of
a
limited
Monarchy
,
p.
272.
where
he
replies
(
very
pleasantly
)
That
no
King
can
die
without
an
Heir
,
as
long
as
there
is
one
man
living
in
the
world
;
it
may
be
the
Heir
may
be
unknown
to
the
People
,
but
that
is
no
fault
in
Nature
,
but
the
negligence
of
the
People
whom
it
concerns
.
]
So
that
it
seems
the
next
Heir
being
often
not
to
be
known
,
any
man
,
when
the
Prince
dies
,
may
step
into
the
Throne
;
and
if
he
have
Power
enough
,
is
next
Heir
:
for
a
King
can
never
die
without
an
Heir
,
as
long
as
any
one
man
is
left
alive
in
the
world
;
and
who
can
disprove
him
that
he
is
not
the
man
?
So
that
the
power
he
hath
given
to
his
Masters
of
Families
to
chuse
an
Heir
,
or
one
to
ease
them
of
their
Fatherly
Power
,
signifies
nothing
:
For
this
Usurper
that
can
first
seize
it
,
may
be
right
Heir
to
Adam
for
ought
any
body
knows
.
And
certainly
having
Possession
,
which
is
the
permissive
will
of
God
,
he
hath
a
better
Right
than
any
other
,
as
we
have
often
heard
before
:
And
are
told
farther
in
the
Anarchy
of
a
limited
Monarchy
,
p.
273.
That
if
the
true
Heir
of
the
Crown
come
to
be
dispossessed
,
in
such
cases
the
Subjects
Obedience
to
the
Fatherly
Power
must
go
along
and
wait
upon
Gods
Providence
;
who
onely
hath
Right
to
give
and
take
away
Kingdoms
,
and
thereby
adopt
Subjects
into
the
Obedience
of
another
Fatherly
Power
.
So
that
Man
is
not
onely
a
Creature
who
is
his
Goods
that
can
first
catch
him
,
but
,
according
to
this
Author
,
is
in
a
worse
condition
than
Brutes
:
for
whereas
if
a
Dog
be
taken
up
by
a
Stranger
,
and
a
Collar
clapt
about
his
neck
,
and
so
led
away
,
it
is
left
to
Jowler's
discretion
how
far
he
will
obey
his
new
Master
;
and
as
he
may
either
stay
with
him
,
if
he
likes
his
Quarters
,
&
finds
himself
well
used
,
so
surely
he
may
without
any
sin
,
knaw
his
halter
(
nay
bite
the
fingers
of
this
Usurper
of
his
Liberty
)
and
run
away
.
But
poor
Man
does
not
onely
fall
to
the
first
Occupant
,
whom
he
may
not
either
obey
or
disobey
,
as
he
finds
it
most
conduce
to
his
interest
and
preservation
,
but
is
peg'd
down
to
an
absolute
Obedience
,
and
obliged
in
Conscience
to
obey
this
Usurper
(
let
him
use
him
well
or
ill
)
with
the
same
respect
and
duty
as
if
he
were
his
Father
:
Which
I
think
God
was
a
better
friend
to
Mankind
than
ever
to
intend
.
But
to
return
to
the
subject
from
whence
we
digressed
,
our
Author
,
for
fear
he
should
seem
by
admission
of
a
Power
in
Fathers
of
Families
to
chuse
a
Head
or
Prince
over
them
,
Anarchy
of
limited
Monarchy
,
p.
272.
and
to
have
granted
it
to
them
as
the
whole
People
,
he
distinguishes
,
saying
,
It
does
not
escheat
to
the
whole
People
,
but
onely
to
the
supream
Heads
and
Fathers
of
Families
;
not
as
they
are
the
People
,
but
quatenus
Fathers
of
the
People
,
over
whom
they
have
a
supreaem
Power
devolved
unto
them
after
the
death
of
their
Soveraign
.
Chief
Fathers
in
Scripture
are
accounted
all
the
People
,
as
all
the
Children
of
Israel
,
as
all
the
Congregation
,
as
the
Text
plainly
expounds
it self
,
2
Chron.
1.2
.
where
Solomon
speaks
to
all
Israel
,
that
is
,
to
the
Captains
,
the
Judges
,
and
to
every
Governour
,
the
chief
of
the
Fathers
;
and
so
the
Elders
of
Israel
are
expounded
to
be
the
Chief
of
the
Fathers
of
the
Children
of
Israel
,
1
King
.
8.1
.
and
2
Chron.
5.2
.
By
all
which
it
appears
,
that
the
Author
allows
in
this
case
the
Government
escheats
to
part
,
but
not
to
all
the
People
,
or
whole
multitude
of
Men
,
Women
,
and
Children
taken
together
,
to
chuse
what
Government
they
please
.
And
indeed
in
this
sence
there
was
never
any
Democracy
or
Government
of
the
People
in
nature
:
for
though
a
Democracy
may
be
defined
to
be
that
kind
of
Government
where
the
supream
Power
is
in
a
Council
or
Assembly
consisting
of
all
the
Citizens
:
And
although
it
does
not
less
concern
the
Women
and
Children
in
that
kind
of
Government
to
be
happier
than
in
others
,
yet
who
ever
thought
it
a
new
sort
of
Commonwealth
,
and
not
a
perfect
Democracy
,
though
Women
,
Children
,
and
Slaves
were
excluded
the
publick
Councils
and
Assemblies
?
And
therefore
if
it
be
esteemed
a
perfect
Democracy
(
and
was
so
at
Athens
,
which
all
must
grant
to
have
been
so
)
where
onely
Free
men
,
or
at
their
own
dispose
,
and
such
who
were
supposed
at
first
to
have
by
their
meeting
together
instituted
this
Government
,
which
is
likewise
continued
by
those
who
have
succeeded
into
their
Places
and
Rights
:
I
see
no
reason
why
these
should
not
be
looked
upon
as
representing
the
whole
promiscuous
body
of
the
People
,
to
whom
the
Power
devolves
upon
the
want
of
a
Successour
.
For
it
is
likely
that
Commonwealths
were
first
instituted
by
Fathers
of
Families
,
having
Wives
,
Children
,
and
Slaves
under
their
Domestick
Government
;
whom
nevertheless
they
would
neither
equal
with
themselves
,
by
admitting
them
to
a
Vote
in
the
Government
,
neither
yet
would
abdicate
their
power
over
them
.
But
then
the
Author
urges
,
Anarchy
of
a
limited
Monarchy
,
p.
270
,
271.
If
Infants
and
Children
be
concluded
by
the
Votes
of
their
Parents
,
this
destroys
the
whole
Cause
:
for
if
it
be
allowed
that
the
Acts
of
Parents
bind
their
Children
,
then
farewel
the
Doctrine
of
the
natural
freedom
of
Mankind
.
Where
subjection
of
Children
to
Parents
is
natural
,
there
can
be
no
natural
freedom
:
and
if
any
reply
,
that
all
Children
shall
not
be
bound
by
their
Parents
consents
,
but
onely
those
that
are
under
age
;
it
must
be
considered
,
that
in
Nature
there
is
no
Nonage
.
If
a
man
be
not
born
free
,
she
doth
not
assigne
him
any
othere
time
when
he
shall
attain
his
freedom
:
or
if
she
did
,
then
Children
attaining
that
age
,
should
be
discharged
of
their
Parents
contract
.
So
that
in
conclusion
,
if
it
be
imagined
that
the
People
were
but
once
free
from
subjection
by
Nature
,
it
will
prove
a
meer
impossibility
ever
lawfully
to
introduce
any
kind
of
Government
whatsoever
,
without
apparent
wrong
to
a
multitude
of
People
.
It
is
farther
observable
,
that
ordinarily
Children
and
Servants
are
a
far
greater
number
than
Parents
and
Masters
;
and
for
the
major
part
of
these
to
be
able
to
vote
and
appoint
what
Government
or
Governours
their
Fathers
and
Masters
shall
be
subject
to
,
is
most
unnatural
,
and
in
effect
to
give
the
Children
the
government
over
their
Parents
.
To
which
Objection
I
reply
,
1.
That
the
Author
is
here
mistaken
,
and
that
there
is
really
an
Age
of
Nonage
in
nature
(
as
hath
been
already
proved
)
in
which
though
the
Child
be
indeed
free
,
yet
(
by
reason
of
his
own
want
of
strength
and
discretion
to
judge
what
is
necessary
for
his
own
good
and
preservation
)
is
obliged
to
submit
himself
to
his
Parents
judgment
in
all
things
conducing
to
that
end
.
2.
That
Children
,
neither
Infants
or
others
,
are
obliged
to
the
Acts
or
Agreements
of
their
Ancestors
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
farther
than
it
conduces
to
their
benefit
or
preservation
.
So
that
if
a
married
man
out
of
a
Common-wealth
,
should
sell
or
yield
himself
to
a
Master
of
a
Family
for
a
Slave
,
upon
condition
that
his
Master
should
provide
him
all
the
necessaries
of
life
(
without
which
such
a
grant
or
sale
of
a
mans
self
cannot
be
supposed
good
)
certainly
if
he
had
then
no
Children
,
this
could
not
bind
his
Issue
that
was
to
be
born
,
so
that
they
should
be
perpetual
Slaves
to
all
Generations
;
since
natural
Equity
,
and
the
favour
of
Liberty
,
will
interpret
,
that
the
Aliment
which
the
Master
affords
the
Children
of
this
Slave
,
are
understood
to
be
contained
under
that
provision
which
the
Master
is
obliged
to
make
for
him
and
his
,
by
vertue
of
their
Contract
.
Or
admit
that
there
was
no
express
provision
made
in
the
Conditions
for
the
maintenance
of
the
Children
,
yet
in
this
case
,
I
see
no
Right
the
Master
can
claim
in
the
persons
of
these
Children
,
longer
than
'till
he
hath
satisfied
himself
out
of
their
labour
for
the
charges
he
hath
been
at
in
feeding
and
providing
for
them
;
which
may
very
well
be
by
twenty
five
years
of
age
(
as
I
have
already
proved
.
)
So
that
about
that
time
I
see
no
reason
why
such
Children
may
not
lawfully
shift
for
themselves
,
if
they
do
not
like
their
Master
.
And
if
any
Friend
of
theirs
undertake
to
satisfie
their
Master
before
that
time
,
I
think
they
are
free
,
though
he
should
refuse
to
accept
it
,
since
it
was
lawfully
tendered
.
Indeed
for
Slaves
taken
in
a
just
War
,
there
may
be
some
appearance
of
reason
,
why
their
Children
should
also
be
Slaves
,
since
the
Parents
accepted
of
their
lives
upon
that
condition
that
they
should
live
in
perpetual
servitude
,
and
their
Master
undertook
to
maintain
them
upon
no
other
consideration
:
So
that
these
Children
do
implicitely
owe
their
lives
to
their
Master
,
since
he
might
by
the
Laws
of
War
have
slain
their
Parents
,
and
so
they
could
never
have
been
born
.
But
I
will
not
assert
,
that
even
this
slavery
is
perpetual
in
relation
to
the
Children
:
But
as
for
Subjects
,
though
they
are
not
directly
or
expresly
bound
by
the
Acts
or
Consents
of
their
Ancestors
,
who
first
instituted
the
Government
,
yet
indirectly
or
consequentially
they
are
obliged
to
stand
to
what
their
Ancestors
have
done
;
For
since
,
as
I
said
before
,
no
man
will
deny
to
accept
of
the
Promise
or
Conditions
of
his
Ancestor
,
if
it
be
for
his
advantage
,
and
since
the
Institution
of
Government
was
for
the
common
good
of
mankind
in
general
;
so
this
or
that
particular
Government
being
for
the
preservation
and
security
of
every
Subject
that
enjoys
the
priviledges
thereof
,
no
man
can
believe
that
the
Posterity
of
those
that
first
instituted
this
Government
,
will
go
about
to
undo
what
their
Ancestors
have
done
so
much
for
their
benefit
,
and
reduce
all
things
to
the
state
of
Nature
again
.
So
that
as
long
as
they
submit
to
,
and
enjoy
the
benefits
of
the
Government
which
was
first
establisht
by
the
consent
of
their
Forefathers
,
they
are
supposed
to
yield
a
tacite
Assent
to
those
Compacts
which
they
long
since
made
,
and
implicitely
become
Subjects
to
that
Government
under
which
they
were
born
.
So
that
those
that
first
instituted
Government
in
any
Country
,
have
no
necessity
expresly
to
promise
or
engage
for
the
Subjection
and
Obedience
of
their
Children
,
or
those
who
should
succeed
them
.
And
if
any
private
persons
will
not
own
this
Government
,
and
so
take
upon
to
resist
it
,
pretending
they
are
not
obliged
by
the
Compacts
of
their
Forefathers
to
obey
it
as
established
by
them
;
such
persons
,
if
they
enter
into
a
state
of
War
,
or
make
Confederacies
to
that
end
,
may
justly
be
looked
upon
as
Enemies
to
the
Government
,
and
punished
accordingly
,
since
they
will
go
about
to
disturb
the
common
Peace
and
Tranquility
of
the
Nation
for
their
own
private
Discontents
or
Advantage
:
for
the
People
being
once
entred
into
Society
,
can
never
be
supposed
to
alter
their
Judgments
all
at
once
without
very
good
cause
,
much
less
to
die
,
though
the
particular
persons
that
constituted
it
do
:
for
as
a
River
is
still
esteemed
the
same
as
long
as
the
water
runs
in
the
same
Channel
,
though
the
same
individual
water
never
stays
in
the
same
place
,
but
one
part
still
pushes
out
another
;
so
those
are
not
less
to
be
esteemed
in
the
politick
capacity
(
of
a
Civil
State
)
the
same
people
,
than
those
by
whom
the
Commonwealth
was
at
first
founded
.
And
though
it
is
true
that
Governments
may
have
been
at
first
begun
by
Fathers
of
Families
and
other
Freemen
,
who
first
submitted
their
Wills
to
that
of
one
person
or
more
,
and
so
the
Women
,
Children
,
and
Servants
,
who
had
had
no
Votes
in
its
Institution
,
might
be
supposed
as
represented
by
their
Husbands
,
Fathers
,
and
Masters
:
And
since
they
enjoy
all
the
common
benefits
of
the
Commonwealth
,
and
are
likewise
capable
of
enjoying
all
those
priviledges
and
advantages
which
are
proper
and
peculiar
to
Free
Subjects
,
whenever
they
come
to
be
at
their
own
disposal
,
and
that
they
owe
their
breeding
up
and
preservation
to
its
protection
;
they
may
well
be
lookt
upon
as
under
an
higher
Obligation
in
Conscience
and
Gratitude
to
this
Government
,
than
Strangers
of
another
Country
,
who
onely
staying
there
for
a
time
to
pursue
their
own
Occasions
,
and
having
no
Right
to
the
same
priviledges
and
advantages
of
the
Commonwealth
,
do
onely
owe
a
passive
obedience
to
its
Laws
.
But
to
let
you
see
more
plainly
,
that
upon
such
a
devolution
of
the
Government
as
the
Author
grants
,
not
onely
the
Masters
of
Families
,
as
Fathers
,
ought
to
have
Votes
,
but
all
others
that
are
at
their
own
dispose
;
I
will
ask
any
of
his
opinion
,
what
he
thinks
of
a
single
man
living
in
a
house
alone
,
or
with
a
Wife
,
without
either
Children
or
Servants
,
or
perhaps
boarding
in
another
mans
house
for
their
money
,
why
they
should
not
have
Votes
as
well
as
those
that
are
his
independant
Fathers
and
Masters
?
I
can
see
no
reason
,
nor
I
believe
they
neither
.
So
though
the
Author
by
the
words
Supream
and
Independant
Heads
of
Families
,
seems
to
exclude
all
Sons
from
having
Votes
whilst
their
Fathers
are
alive
,
although
they
are
married
,
and
have
separated
into
distinct
Families
;
yet
since
I
have
proved
that
neither
Paternal
Authority
nor
Filial
Subjection
is
absolute
or
perpetual
in
the
state
of
Nature
(
into
which
the
Commonwealth
is
by
the
death
of
the
Prince
now
supposed
to
be
resolved
)
and
if
it
were
otherwise
,
yet
unless
they
will
void
all
those
Laws
and
Constitutions
that
have
been
before
settled
both
for
descent
of
Inheritances
,
and
the
distinguishing
of
Property
.
So
that
if
these
Laws
stand
in
force
during
this
interregnum
(
unless
they
will
fall
to
absolute
confusion
)
these
Sons
so
making
divers
Families
,
and
having
Estates
distinct
from
their
Fathers
,
ought
likewise
to
have
Votes
in
the
Government
,
upon
the
Authours
own
principles
,
since
the
Laws
of
the
Country
have
set
them
free
from
all
Paternal
subjection
,
more
than
what
the
Rules
of
Piety
and
Gratitude
oblige
them
to
.
And
as
for
such
Sons
as
(
though
of
mature
age
,
yet
)
remain
as
Servants
in
their
Fathers
Families
,
and
so
are
under
a
greater
subjection
than
those
that
are
separated
from
it
;
I
see
no
reason
why
they
may
not
appoint
their
Father
,
as
him
they
could
best
trust
,
to
vote
for
them
,
and
represent
them
in
the
choice
of
a
Governour
;
and
then
they
are
as
much
obliged
as
any
man
can
be
by
the
act
of
a
person
whom
he
hath
impowered
to
act
for
him
,
or
as
these
Fathers
of
Families
would
be
by
Representatives
of
their
own
chusing
:
it
being
morally
impossible
,
if
this
devolution
of
the
Government
should
happen
in
a
populous
Country
,
for
all
the
Authors
independent
Heads
or
Fathers
of
Families
,
ever
to
meet
in
Person
to
chuse
a
King
;
these
being
vastly
numerous
,
and
divided
from
each
other
at
great
distances
.
Anarchy
of
a
mixt
Monarch
.
p.
269
So
that
all
the
Author's
Objections
against
a
mixt
Popular
Election
will
prove
as
strong
against
this
of
Fathers
alone
:
For
how
,
except
by
some
secret
miraculous
instinct
,
should
they
all
meet
at
one
time
and
place
?
What
one
Head
of
a
Family
or
Company
,
less
than
the
whole
Body
of
these
Fathers
of
the
People
,
can
have
power
to
appoint
either
time
or
place
of
Election
,
where
they
are
all
free
and
independant
by
Nature
?
and
without
a
lawful
Summons
,
it
is
most
unjust
to
binde
those
that
are
absent
.
So
neither
can
the
whole
Body
of
the
Fathers
of
Families
summon
it self
:
One
man
is
sick
,
another
is
lame
,
a
third
is
aged
,
and
a
fourth
(
though
a
Father
of
a
Family
,
may
be
under
years
of
discretion
,
or
not
in
his
right
senses
)
and
many
more
may
have
business
of
their
own
which
they
cannot
leave
,
to
run
two
or
three
hundred
miles
up
to
the
chief
City
to
chuse
a
King
.
So
that
either
the
People
may
elect
,
or
else
his
Fathers
of
Families
cannot
,
for
the
same
reasons
.
And
if
the
major
part
of
these
Fathers
should
agree
to
chuse
Representatives
,
how
can
this
Agreement
of
the
major
part
bind
the
minor
that
did
not
consent
,
Where
the
Arguments
against
Elections
by
a
major
part
,
are
proposed
at
large
.
since
according
to
the
Authors
principles
,
in
Assemblies
that
take
their
original
from
the
Law
of
Nature
,
no
one
man
or
multitude
can
give
away
the
Right
of
another
?
So
that
though
the
Author
seems
to
have
been
so
good-natured
as
to
have
given
these
independent
Fathers
of
Families
a
Power
in
this
case
of
Escheat
to
chuse
a
Governour
,
yet
all
this
signifies
nothing
,
since
they
can
never
all
meet
or
agree
to
chuse
Representatives
:
They
are
still
like
to
be
his
Slaves
who
can
make
a
Party
strong
enough
to
seize
the
Government
,
and
usurp
an
Authority
over
them
:
Whom
yet
they
must
obey
,
since
he
either
is
or
represents
the
right
Heir
of
Adam
;
and
so
no
body
hath
a
better
Right
than
himself
,
who
is
in
by
the
permissive
Will
of
God
;
which
how
long
it
will
last
,
no
body
can
tell
.
And
God
does
but
adopt
Subjects
into
the
obedience
of
another
Fatherly
Power
,
or
else
they
must
fall
into
a
down-right
Anarchy
,
and
every
Father
of
a
Family
may
set
up
for
an
absolute
Prince
.
But
to
return
whither
we
have
digressed
;
for
I
have
said
this
,
onely
to
shew
that
this
Authors
principles
(
as
well
as
those
of
others
)
contradict
themselves
in
this
subject
;
and
either
these
Fathers
of
Families
are
the
People
,
and
consequently
cannot
,
according
to
this
Authour
,
ever
meet
or
agree
to
chuse
a
Prince
;
or
else
the
whole
People
may
as
well
.
But
since
it
may
be
objected
,
that
it
does
not
serve
to
find
out
truth
,
or
settle
the
Question
in
hand
,
barely
to
recriminate
and
shew
the
same
flaws
in
his
Principles
as
he
finds
in
those
of
others
;
If
their
meaning
be
,
that
there
is
but
one
and
the
same
Power
in
all
the
People
of
the
World
,
so
that
no
Power
can
be
granted
,
except
all
the
men
upon
the
Earth
meet
and
agree
to
chuse
a
Governour
?
To
which
Suarez
answers
,
That
it
is
scarce
possible
,
nor
yet
expedient
,
that
all
the
men
in
the
world
should
be
gathered
together
into
one
Community
.
It
is
likelier
that
either
never
,
or
for
a
very
short
time
,
this
Power
was
in
this
manner
in
the
whole
Multitude
of
men
collected
together
;
but
a
little
after
the
Creation
men
began
to
be
divided
into
several
Commonwealths
,
and
this
distinct
Power
was
in
each
of
them
.
To
which
our
Author
replies
,
That
this
Answer
of
scarce
possible
,
nor
yet
expedient
,
&c.
begets
a
new
doubt
how
this
distinct
Power
comes
to
each
particular
Community
,
when
God
gave
it
to
the
whole
Multitude
onely
,
and
not
to
any
particular
Assembly
.
Can
they
shew
or
prove
,
that
ever
the
whole
Multitude
met
,
and
divided
this
Power
which
God
gave
them
in
gross
,
by
breaking
it
into
parcels
,
and
by
appointing
a
distinct
Power
to
each
Commonwealth
?
Without
such
a
Compact
,
I
cannot
see
(
according
to
their
own
Principles
)
how
there
can
be
an
Election
of
a
Magistrate
in
any
Common-wealth
,
but
a
meer
Vsurpation
upon
the
Priviledge
of
the
World
.
If
any
think
that
particular
Multitudes
at
their
own
discretion
had
power
to
divide
themselves
into
several
Commonwealths
,
those
that
think
so
,
have
neither
Reason
nor
Proof
for
so
thinking
:
and
thereby
a
Gap
is
opened
for
every
petty
factious
Multitude
to
make
more
Commonwealths
than
there
be
Families
in
the
world
.
In
which
Dispute
I
conceive
the
Jesuit
hath
gone
too
far
,
in
asserting
an
undivided
Soveraignty
in
the
whole
Multitude
collected
together
before
any
Civil
Government
instituted
;
That
being
onely
the
Compact
or
Agreement
of
those
that
entred
into
it
,
and
binding
none
else
at
first
.
So
likewise
this
is
a
meer
Chimera
of
the
Author's
,
that
Adam
or
Noah
were
absolute
Monarchs
and
Heirs
of
the
World
,
so
that
no
man
could
withdraw
themselves
from
the
Obedience
of
their
right
Heirs
,
without
being
guilty
of
Rebellion
.
Whereas
I
have
already
proved
,
that
all
the
Sons
of
Noah
,
and
their
Descendants
,
were
independant
Governours
of
their
Families
,
without
any
subordination
to
the
eldest
Son
or
Heir
.
And
if
every
Brother
had
a
Right
to
set
up
an
Independant
Family
or
Principality
distinct
from
that
of
the
eldest
,
I
would
fain
know
what
became
of
this
absolute
Right
of
Adam
or
Noah
,
and
by
what
authority
this
undivided
Soveraignty
which
God
had
conferred
on
Noah
,
was
thus
crumbled
into
parcels
.
If
by
Gods
appointment
,
then
it
seems
God
did
not
countenance
this
notion
of
the
right
Heir
of
the
world
:
If
they
did
it
of
their
own
heads
,
then
all
the
ancient
Patriarchs
,
or
first
Peoplers
of
the
world
,
were
guilty
of
Rebellion
and
Usurpation
against
their
elder
Brother
and
his
Descendants
.
But
if
the
Author's
Friends
think
he
hath
the
advantage
,
because
I
grant
that
the
World
was
peopled
after
the
Flood
under
the
conduct
or
government
of
distinct
Heads
or
Fathers
of
Families
;
this
does
not
grant
any
natural
Right
in
those
Heads
of
Families
to
have
an
absolute
power
over
their
Descendants
,
since
perhaps
God
divided
the
Language
of
the
World
by
so
many
Tribes
or
Families
,
for
the
better
conservation
of
the
mutual
Love
and
Concord
of
neer
Relations
,
since
men
would
more
readily
obey
their
Ancestor
or
common
Father
,
than
a
meer
stranger
;
or
for
other
reasons
best
known
to
his
infinite
Wisdom
.
So
that
there
was
a
necessity
that
those
of
the
same
Stock
should
upon
the
dispersion
march
off
together
,
since
none
else
understood
one
another
.
Yet
the
Scripture
does
not
tell
us
whether
in
this
division
and
plantation
of
the
World
,
the
Headship
of
these
Families
was
according
to
eldership
of
birth
,
or
whether
they
elected
the
fittest
man
of
their
Tribe
or
Family
to
be
their
Leader
:
And
if
the
eldest
were
the
man
,
it
was
not
from
any
Right
over
them
,
but
either
of
reverence
to
his
Wisdom
,
or
to
avoid
the
Dissentions
that
might
arise
by
other
kind
of
choice
on
Eldership
;
though
indeed
it
confers
no
Right
of
it self
,
yet
is
often
preferred
as
a
kind
of
natural
Lot
.
So
that
every
one
of
these
Heads
of
Families
being
independant
from
each
other
,
they
could
never
agree
upon
a
Ruler
over
them
,
but
by
Compact
among
themselves
:
And
if
so
,
he
was
their
Leader
that
all
the
rest
liked
and
agreed
upon
.
So
that
there
needed
no
Compact
of
all
the
People
of
the
world
,
since
every
Father
of
a
Family
being
independant
upon
any
man
else
,
had
a
power
to
confer
his
Authority
of
governing
himself
and
his
Family
upon
whom
he
pleased
:
which
Power
,
whether
,
and
how
far
it
was
from
God
,
and
what
kind
of
Authority
it
was
,
we
shall
examine
hereafter
.
So
that
though
I
grant
all
Government
might
be
at
first
instituted
by
Fathers
of
Families
,
yet
this
does
not
prove
any
despotick
Power
that
such
Fathers
had
over
their
Children
or
Descendants
;
and
so
consequently
could
confer
no
such
Authority
over
them
.
So
that
all
the
rest
of
the
Authors
Queries
about
the
distinct
power
of
the
Multitude
vanish
,
since
though
there
never
was
any
Government
where
all
the
promiscuous
Rabble
of
Women
and
Children
had
Votes
,
as
being
not
capable
of
it
,
yet
it
does
not
for
all
that
prove
all
legal
.
Civil
Government
does
not
owe
his
Original
to
the
consent
of
the
People
,
since
the
Fathers
of
Families
,
or
Freemen
at
their
own
dispose
,
were
really
and
indeed
all
the
People
that
needed
to
have
Votes
;
since
Women
,
as
being
concluded
by
their
Husbands
,
and
being
commonly
unfit
for
civil
business
,
and
Children
in
their
Fathers
Families
being
under
the
notion
of
Servants
,
and
without
any
Property
in
Goods
or
Land
,
had
no
reason
to
have
Votes
in
the
Institution
of
the
Government
.
So
likewise
all
the
Authors
Objections
and
Cavils
,
p.
44.
how
the
greater
part
of
a
Multitude
could
over-rule
the
rest
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
signifie
nothing
;
since
if
many
men
meet
to
chuse
a
Governour
,
the
first
Question
must
be
,
whether
the
Votes
of
the
major
part
shall
not
conclude
the
rest
;
and
then
all
that
agree
that
they
shall
,
are
bound
by
their
own
consent
;
and
those
that
will
not
agree
to
it
,
are
still
in
the
state
of
Nature
toward
all
the
rest
,
and
are
free
to
go
and
set
up
a
Government
by
themselves
,
that
they
all
can
agree
to
Nemine
Contradicente
.
And
if
they
disturb
those
that
have
agreed
,
that
they
will
be
concluded
by
the
majority
,
they
may
be
lawfully
used
as
Enemies
.
And
for
Proxies
or
Representatives
,
though
the
beginnings
of
most
Kingdoms
and
Commonwealths
,
like
the
head
of
Nilus
,
are
hard
to
be
traced
up
to
their
Heads
or
Fountains
,
and
no
man
can
positively
tell
the
manner
of
their
beginning
;
yet
if
they
began
from
some
small
quantity
of
men
collected
into
one
Army
or
City
,
there
needed
no
Proxies
at
all
,
since
every
man
might
give
his
Vote
himself
.
But
since
the
Author
puts
me
to
name
any
Commonwealth
out
of
History
,
where
the
Multitude
,
or
so
much
as
the
greatest
part
of
it
ever
consented
,
either
by
Voice
or
Proxies
,
to
the
election
of
a
Prince
;
I
will
name
him
two
Commonwealths
:
The
first
was
Rome
,
where
all
the
People
or
Freemen
consented
to
the
election
of
Romulus
,
being
formerly
proposed
.
See
Dionysius
Halicarnasseus
,
lib.
3.
And
the
second
shall
be
that
of
Venice
,
where
though
it
is
true
the
whole
promiscuous
Rabble
did
not
chuse
a
Prince
,
yet
all
the
Masters
of
Families
,
or
Freemen
at
their
own
dispose
,
had
a
Vote
in
the
choice
of
the
first
Duke
and
Senate
;
which
plainly
proves
some
Governments
to
have
had
their
beginning
by
the
consent
of
the
People
.
And
though
some
Governments
have
begun
by
Conquest
,
yet
since
those
Conquerours
could
never
perform
this
without
men
over
which
they
were
not
always
born
Monarchs
,
it
must
necessarily
follow
,
that
those
Souldiers
or
Volunteers
had
no
obligation
to
serve
them
,
but
from
their
own
agreements
with
their
General
,
and
for
those
advantages
he
proposed
to
them
in
the
share
of
those
Conquests
they
should
make
.
Read
likewise
our
Historians
of
the
manner
of
Will.
the
Conquerors
coming
over
,
and
you
will
finde
those
that
helped
him
in
that
expedition
were
Volunteers
,
to
whom
he
promised
a
share
of
his
Conquests
;
which
he
after
made
good
to
them
.
Thus
were
the
Goths
,
Vandals
,
and
our
Saxon
Kingdoms
erected
by
such
Generals
of
Armies
,
who
not
being
Kings
at
home
,
nor
able
to
subsist
there
,
were
forced
to
seek
their
fortunes
abroad
;
which
when
they
had
obtained
,
they
could
have
no
farther
Right
over
the
men
they
brought
with
them
,
than
what
sprung
from
their
mutual
Compacts
and
Consents
.
And
as
for
Proxies
,
as
there
was
no
need
of
them
in
the
instituting
of
those
Commonwealths
we
read
of
,
since
taking
their
Original
from
all
the
People
of
one
City
or
Army
,
they
might
easily
give
their
Votes
themselves
;
but
where
the
People
or
Masters
of
Families
are
more
numerous
and
dispersed
than
can
well
meet
all
together
,
it
is
impossible
,
upon
the
Authors
Concession
of
an
Escheat
of
the
Crown
,
that
ever
a
new
Monarch
can
be
chosen
without
their
making
Representatives
.
As
for
what
he
says
about
the
silent
Acceptation
or
tacite
Consent
(
or
non-contradiction
)
of
the
People
,
no
man
will
say
that
it
alone
confers
a
Right
,
where
there
was
none
before
;
as
in
the
case
of
Conquerours
or
Usurpers
,
whom
perhaps
People
dare
not
speak
against
:
So
likewise
a
tacite
Consent
to
a
Government
,
whether
Paternal
or
Civil
,
justly
instituted
,
does
confer
a
Right
,
as
I
have
already
granted
,
and
shall
now
farther
shew
in
answer
to
the
Authors
Objections
.
The
Author
urges
farther
,
That
if
Children
under
years
of
discretion
,
and
Servants
,
are
not
absolutely
and
in
Conscience
obliged
to
submit
to
the
Votes
of
their
Fathers
and
Masters
in
the
choice
of
the
Government
,
farther
than
they
receive
benefit
and
advantage
by
it
;
then
every
man
is
at
liberty
that
does
not
like
the
Government
,
Anarchy
of
a
mixt
Monarchy
,
p.
268.
to
be
of
what
Kingdom
he
pleases
:
and
so
every
petty
Company
hath
a
Right
to
make
a
Kingdom
by
it self
;
and
not
onely
every
City
,
but
every
Village
,
and
every
Family
,
nay
,
and
every
particular
man
would
have
a
liberty
to
chuse
himself
to
be
his
own
King
if
he
pleased
;
and
he
were
a
madman
,
that
being
by
Nature
free
,
would
chuse
any
man
but
himself
to
be
his
Governour
;
and
so
no
man
would
be
tyed
to
obey
the
Government
farther
than
he
found
it
for
his
interest
and
advantage
,
and
consequently
would
think
he
might
lawfully
resist
it
whenever
he
found
it
impose
upon
him
what
he
did
not
like
,
or
was
contrary
to
his
interest
.
In
answer
to
which
,
I
grant
,
first
,
That
every
Possessor
of
a
propriety
in
Land
or
Goods
in
any
Government
,
is
not
onely
bound
to
obey
,
but
likewise
to
maintain
it
;
since
those
that
first
instituted
the
Government
,
did
likewise
tye
themselves
and
all
those
that
should
at
any
time
possess
those
Lands
or
Goods
,
to
the
maintenance
of
the
Government
which
they
had
establisht
:
And
it
is
just
and
reasonable
,
that
those
that
claim
under
such
first
possessors
,
should
,
if
they
like
to
enjoy
the
Lands
or
Goods
,
perform
the
Conditions
annexed
to
them
;
since
men
may
by
their
own
private
Deeds
,
much
more
by
a
common
consent
,
change
their
Estates
with
what
Conditions
they
please
;
which
those
that
afterwards
come
to
enjoy
the
same
under
their
Title
,
are
certainly
bound
in
Law
and
Conscience
to
make
good
.
Secondly
,
As
for
all
others
who
possessing
no
share
in
the
Lands
or
Goods
of
a
Kingdom
,
yet
enjoy
the
common
benefits
of
the
Government
,
I
conceive
they
are
likewise
bound
to
obey
and
maintain
it
as
first
instituted
,
for
the
reasons
before
given
.
So
on
the
other
side
,
if
they
do
not
like
the
Government
they
live
under
,
the
world
is
wide
enough
,
and
they
may
remove
themselves
elsewhere
:
for
I
cannot
think
that
the
positive
Laws
of
any
Government
do
oblige
any
man
in
Conscience
(
who
is
not
a
slave
by
his
own
act
or
fault
)
never
to
go
out
of
the
Country
where
he
was
born
,
or
can
oblige
him
to
return
again
if
he
once
go
out
of
it
,
or
can
hinder
him
from
becoming
a
Subject
to
another
Prince
or
Common-wealth
,
unless
he
have
taken
an
Oath
of
Allegiance
to
the
Prince
where
he
was
born
,
and
then
he
is
tyed
by
his
Oath
not
to
act
any
thing
contrary
thereunto
:
And
if
one
man
may
do
this
,
why
not
more
,
and
so
on
to
an
indefinite
number
?
But
if
any
Lawyer
tells
me
there
is
a
native
Allegiance
due
by
the
Laws
of
divers
Countries
precedent
to
any
Oath
,
and
that
in
some
Countries
(
as
anciently
in
England
,
and
in
Russia
at
this
day
)
there
are
Laws
that
no
man
shall
travel
out
of
the
Kingdom
without
leave
;
I
suppose
these
are
but
positive
Laws
,
and
as
such
bind
onely
to
a
submission
to
the
punishment
as
to
forfeiture
of
Estate
,
or
the
like
,
but
do
not
bind
the
Conscience
to
observe
them
farther
than
as
it
is
convinced
the
thing
commanded
is
more
than
indifferent
in
its
own
nature
,
and
conduces
to
the
good
of
Mankind
in
general
,
or
of
the
whole
Commonwealth
in
particular
.
Nor
indeed
was
this
notion
of
a
native
Allegiance
known
to
our
Saxon
Ancestors
,
since
they
counted
no
man
an
absolute
Subject
until
he
was
sworn
in
the
Tourn
or
Court
of
Frankpledge
,
and
was
entred
into
a
decenary
or
Tything
.
And
if
it
be
objected
,
that
upon
these
Terms
the
major
part
of
a
people
may
go
away
and
leave
the
Government
without
defence
;
that
is
not
likely
,
nor
so
much
as
to
be
supposed
,
as
long
as
the
Country
continues
habitable
,
and
the
Government
tolerable
for
the
Subjects
to
live
under
:
which
if
it
prove
otherwise
,
I
see
no
reason
that
God
should
have
ordained
any
Country
for
a
common
Bridewel
,
where
men
should
be
obliged
in
Conscience
to
drudge
,
be
oppressed
,
and
ill-used
all
days
of
their
lives
without
remedy
.
And
as
for
the
other
part
of
the
bad
consequences
the
Author
insists
will
follow
,
if
this
natural
freedom
of
Mankind
be
allow'd
,
for
which
you
may
consult
his
Anarchy
of
a
mixt
Monarchy
,
where
you
will
see
them
at
large
,
p.
268
,
269.
Every
petty
Company
hath
a
Right
to
make
a
Kingdom
by
it self
,
&c.
I
shall
answer
him
as
briefly
as
I
can
.
The
Author
discourses
after
that
rate
,
that
one
would
think
,
if
it
were
not
for
his
Principle
of
Patriarchal
Power
,
men
could
not
subsist
,
his
being
the
foundation
of
all
Civil
Government
and
Property
.
As
for
the
first
absurdity
that
will
follow
upon
the
supposal
of
the
Peoples
power
,
That
any
man
might
be
his
own
King
;
I
would
ask
the
Author
,
What
if
any
man
,
being
weary
of
the
world
,
will
withdraw
into
some
Desert
?
I
think
he
hath
then
no
other
Governour
than
Adam
had
:
Nor
is
this
unlawful
;
or
else
all
the
ancient
Hermits
,
who
in
times
of
persecution
retired
into
Deserts
,
sinn'd
in
so
doing
.
But
for
the
absurdities
that
follow
the
supposal
of
a
natural
state
of
Freedom
,
As
that
every
particular
City
or
Family
may
chuse
what
Government
they
please
,
if
they
do
not
like
what
is
already
established
;
I
have
already
granted
,
that
where
a
Commonwealth
is
established
,
and
men
are
come
out
of
the
state
of
Nature
,
and
constitute
one
Politick
Body
,
all
the
Members
of
it
are
obliged
in
Conscience
to
maintain
this
Government
according
to
its
first
Institution
.
But
if
it
be
to
be
constituted
anew
,
as
upon
his
Escheat
of
the
Crown
among
the
Fathers
of
Families
,
Who
are
to
chuse
one
?
who
must
take
upon
him
this
Fatherly
Power
over
them
?
The
inconvenience
will
be
the
same
upon
his
own
Principles
:
For
all
Cities
,
Towns
,
and
Families
consting
of
so
many
independant
Heads
of
Families
,
if
the
major
part
of
an
Assembly
cannot
conclude
the
minor
(
as
this
Author
supposes
)
then
though
all
the
Fathers
of
Families
in
a
Nation
should
agree
in
the
choice
of
a
King
,
and
but
those
of
one
Town
or
Family
dissent
,
these
Dissenters
,
if
they
do
not
like
the
Prince
the
rest
have
elected
,
may
certainly
(
if
they
are
able
)
divide
from
them
,
and
set
up
a
distinct
Government
of
their
own
;
since
all
these
Fathers
of
Families
being
alike
free
and
independant
,
can
in
the
state
of
Nature
claim
no
Superiority
over
each
other
.
So
that
the
Author
,
from
his
own
Principles
,
falls
into
the
same
inconveniencies
which
he
finds
fault
with
in
those
of
others
;
whereas
indeed
there
is
no
absurdity
in
this
Supposition
.
I
shall
now
consider
in
the
last
place
that
part
of
his
Hypothesis
(
Patriarch
.
p.
21.
)
where
he
supposes
,
That
all
such
prime
Heads
and
Fathers
of
Families
have
power
to
consent
in
the
uniting
or
conferring
their
Fatherly
Right
of
Soveraign
Authority
on
whom
they
please
;
and
he
that
is
so
elected
,
claims
not
his
Power
as
a
Donative
from
the
People
,
but
as
being
substituted
properly
by
God
,
from
whom
he
receives
his
Royal
Charter
of
an
universal
Father
,
though
testified
by
the
ministry
of
the
Heads
of
the
People
.
I
have
already
pull'd
up
the
foundations
of
this
Notion
in
the
beginning
of
these
Observations
,
by
shewing
that
God
hath
not
ordain'd
or
conferred
any
such
Power
on
any
particular
Father
or
other
Relation
,
and
therefore
neither
on
all
the
Fathers
of
Nations
or
Countries
taken
together
,
they
not
having
any
Ownership
or
Property
in
their
Childrens
persons
,
but
a
Right
to
govern
and
direct
them
for
their
benefit
and
preservation
;
which
Fatherly
Right
cannot
be
transferred
to
another
,
much
less
survive
his
person
,
as
I
have
already
proved
.
Yet
to
render
this
as
clear
as
may
be
,
granting
him
what
he
contends
for
,
that
this
Fatherly
Power
may
be
transferred
to
another
;
I
should
be
glad
to
know
,
though
the
Monarch
so
nominated
by
them
may
have
a
supreme
Power
over
all
their
Children
and
Servants
,
yet
whence
does
he
derive
this
Right
of
commanding
absolutely
over
the
Persons
and
Estates
of
these
Fathers
of
Families
themselves
:
Not
from
succession
from
Adam
;
for
his
right
Heir
cannot
now
be
known
:
nor
from
their
transferring
the
power
of
governing
their
own
persons
upon
him
;
for
then
this
Right
commences
from
their
own
Act
or
Election
,
and
not
from
the
Fatherly
power
supposed
to
be
at
first
conferred
on
Adam
.
And
if
they
transfer
onely
their
Fatherly
or
Masterly
Authority
upon
this
new
Monarch
,
then
he
hath
onely
a
Right
to
govern
their
Children
and
Servants
,
the
Persons
and
Estates
of
these
Fathers
not
being
included
in
this
Grant
.
And
again
,
if
this
Election
in
the
state
of
Nature
could
confer
a
Right
,
then
this
Monarch
must
owe
his
Power
to
these
Fathers
of
Families
;
and
so
these
being
(
as
I
have
already
proved
)
the
representative
Body
of
the
People
,
he
must
receive
his
Authority
as
a
Donative
from
them
;
which
he
will
by
no
means
admit
of
.
But
since
he
will
have
him
properly
and
immediately
substituted
by
God
,
from
whom
he
receives
his
Power
of
an
universal
Father
,
then
these
Fathers
of
Families
do
not
create
or
constitute
the
Monarch
,
but
onely
are
Instruments
or
Ministers
to
put
him
in
possession
:
and
if
so
,
it
is
the
possession
of
the
Crown
,
and
not
their
Election
,
that
gives
him
this
Right
.
But
(
as
the
Author
words
it
)
He
receives
from
God
this
Charter
of
an
universal
Father
.
Upon
which
Principle
,
see
not
to
what
purpose
this
Nomination
or
Election
●rves
;
for
if
any
body
during
this
interregnum
,
can
by
●rce
or
fraud
slip
into
the
Throne
,
he
is
more
pro●rly
Gods
Substitute
,
and
to
be
obeyed
accordingly
,
●an
if
he
had
come
in
by
their
Nomination
or
Ele●ion
,
since
he
is
in
possession
by
the
immediate
Will
〈◊〉
God
,
and
declared
by
the
success
.
So
that
these
●athers
are
in
a
fine
case
,
after
all
their
Priviledge
to
●ect
,
since
whoever
can
usurp
this
Authority
over
●…em
,
must
immediately
be
their
Father
and
Master
,
●hether
they
ever
give
their
consents
or
not
:
For
●is
Author
says
,
Obedience
to
Government
,
p.
66
,
67.
Paternal
Power
cannot
〈◊〉
lost
;
it
may
be
either
transferred
or
u●rped
,
but
never
lost
.
But
I
have
suf●…ciently
exposed
the
absurdity
of
this
●otion
before
,
in
what
I
have
said
about
Obedience
〈◊〉
Usurpers
,
and
shall
lay
it
more
open
when
I
come
〈◊〉
shew
in
what
sence
Princes
owe
their
Authority
to
God
.
Therefore
,
since
these
Fathers
of
Families
had
in
the
●ate
of
Nature
an
absolute
Power
of
governing
themselves
,
I
shall
now
enquire
in
the
next
place
,
Whether
●…ey
may
not
pass
over
this
Power
upon
some
certain
Conditions
,
and
reserving
some
Rights
and
Priviledges
〈◊〉
themselves
and
Children
,
upon
the
making
of
the
Compact
with
their
new
Prince
.
Secondly
,
How
the
per●n
so
elected
owes
his
Authority
to
them
,
and
in
what
●ense
to
God
.
As
to
the
first
,
I
see
no
reason
but
that
●hese
Fathers
of
Families
may
,
if
their
number
be
not
●oo
great
,
agree
to
govern
all
alike
together
;
and
that
whoever
is
a
Master
of
a
distinct
Family
,
or
a
single
●…an
at
his
own
dispose
,
and
not
a
Servant
,
shall
have
〈◊〉
Vote
in
the
Government
,
and
that
the
major
part
of
●he
Votes
shall
conclude
all
the
rest
,
and
then
it
will
be
●s
perfect
a
Democracy
as
ever
was
;
since
,
as
I
have
granted
already
,
there
was
never
such
a
Governmen●
where
all
Women
and
Children
promiscuously
ha●
Votes
with
their
Husbands
,
Fathers
,
or
Brothers
.
S●
that
if
ever
there
was
any
such
thing
as
a
Democrac●
in
the
world
,
this
would
be
one
.
Or
lastly
,
if
they
ma●
all
govern
themselves
,
they
may
as
well
agree
to
chus●
a
certain
number
of
their
own
Body
to
represent
them
and
to
meet
in
a
common
Council
or
Assembly
,
an●
to
govern
them
either
for
life
or
yearly
,
as
they
sha●…
make
the
Conditions
with
them
;
and
then
this
Government
will
become
an
Aristocracy
,
where
a
few
o●
those
that
are
reputed
the
best
do
govern
,
though
by
a●
Power
derived
from
these
Fathers
of
Families
.
An●
if
they
may
bestow
this
Power
upon
more
than
one
under
certain
Conditions
,
I
see
no
reason
why
they
may
not
do
the
same
,
if
they
confer
it
upon
one
man
after
the
same
manner
,
either
by
making
a
Compact
with
him
upon
his
accepting
the
Government
,
how
much
〈◊〉
this
Power
he
shall
exercise
,
and
how
much
they
wil●
reserve
to
themselves
.
If
they
agree
that
he
shall
have
no
more
but
a
Presidency
in
their
Council
in
time
o●
Peace
,
and
shall
not
have
any
power
more
than
that
,
unless
in
time
of
War
;
he
then
is
the
Mouth
of
the
Senate
in
time
of
Peace
,
and
their
General
in
War
.
And
of
this
kind
was
the
Lacedemonian
King
:
And
in
modern
times
the
ancient
Dukes
of
Venice
,
when
they
went
out
to
War
:
And
so
are
those
Caciques
that
the
Indians
in
the
Caribbeé
Islands
and
Brasile
chuse
to
be
their
Leaders
in
War
,
but
in
Peace
have
little
or
no
power
.
So
likewise
these
Masters
of
Families
or
Freemen
agreeing
with
him
that
they
would
chuse
for
their
Prince
,
what
Power
he
should
exercise
or
they
would
confer
upon
him
;
as
suppose
that
he
should
not
condemn
any
of
them
to
death
,
unless
many
of
the
same
condition
with
himself
find
him
guilty
;
or
that
he
should
not
make
any
Laws
or
levie
Taxes
for
the
publick
Charges
of
the
Commonwealth
,
but
what
●hey
propose
to
him
;
and
that
he
swear
for
himself
●nd
his
Posterity
to
observe
these
Conditions
:
There
will
then
be
produced
a
Limited
Kingdom
,
consisting
●f
a
Prince
as
the
Head
of
all
Civil
Power
,
and
of
an
Aristocratical
or
Democratical
Council
,
according
as
that
Assembly
consists
either
of
the
whole
,
or
but
of
the
People
.
And
that
such
a
Government
is
no
Soloecism
in
Politicks
,
I
shall
prove
farther
when
I
come
to
make
some
Observations
upon
this
Authors
Treatise
of
the
Anarchy
of
a
mixt
Monarchy
.
Nor
can
any
man
imagine
from
the
Priviledges
of
the
Nobility
and
People
that
●re
found
to
have
been
almost
the
same
in
all
these
Northern
Kingdoms
of
Europe
,
as
ancient
as
the
Government
,
could
ever
have
owed
their
Original
to
any
other
Cause
than
the
Original
Constitution
of
the
Government
.
And
if
these
Fathers
of
Families
may
●imit
the
power
they
confer
upon
their
new
Prince
,
upon
this
Escheat
of
the
Soveraign
Power
,
and
retain
some
of
it
to
themselves
;
they
might
do
the
same
upon
the
first
institution
of
the
Government
,
either
as
when
so
many
Masters
of
Families
who
had
before
lived
apart
and
without
any
dependance
upon
each
other
,
did
agree
in
the
state
of
Nature
to
erect
a
Civil
Government
among
them
;
or
else
when
a
Colony
or
Army
of
men
was
led
out
by
some
particular
Captains
or
Leaders
for
the
conquest
of
a
foreign
Country
,
which
when
conquered
and
settled
,
every
free
Souldier
in
the
Army
would
certainly
have
as
good
a
Vote
in
the
crcating
of
their
General
to
be
their
King
,
as
their
Captain
or
Colonel
;
since
they
all
were
at
first
but
Volunteers
,
and
followed
these
Captains
not
from
any
Civil
Authority
they
had
over
them
,
but
by
their
own
consent
.
But
since
the
Author
will
by
all
means
have
it
,
that
these
Fathers
of
Families
must
needs
transfer
their
power
upon
one
man
absolutely
,
who
must
be
endued
with
all
this
power
,
without
any
reservation
;
I
shall
now
give
you
his
best
Arguments
for
this
absolute
Monarchy
,
and
try
whether
they
are
unanswerable
or
not
.
Patriarch
.
p.
49.
His
first
reason
for
it
,
is
built
upon
Bellarmine's
Concession
,
That
God
when
he
made
all
mankind
of
one
man
,
did
seem
openly
to
signifie
,
that
he
rather
approved
the
government
of
one
man
than
of
many
.
This
had
been
somewhat
of
an
Argument
,
if
Adam's
power
had
been
purely
Monarchical
over
Eve
and
all
his
Children
and
Descendants
,
as
it
was
not
;
but
if
it
had
,
Gods
bare
Approbation
lays
no
Obligation
for
all
mankind
to
practise
it
now
,
any
more
than
it
is
a
good
Argument
to
say
,
that
it
is
now
not
onely
lawful
,
but
necessary
for
men
to
marry
their
Sisters
,
because
God
approved
of
that
way
of
propagation
of
mankind
at
first
.
Secondly
,
God
declared
his
Will
,
when
he
endues
not
onely
Men
,
but
all
Creatures
with
a
natural
Propensity
to
Monarchy
;
neither
can
it
be
doubted
but
a
natural
Propensity
is
to
be
referred
to
God
,
who
is
the
Author
of
Nature
.
What
he
means
by
a
Propensity
in
all
Creatures
to
Monarchy
,
I
understand
not
;
neither
know
I
any
Monarchy
among
Brutes
,
besides
that
of
the
stronger
over
the
weaker
;
and
in
that
Authors
sence
,
the
master-Buck
in
a
Herd
of
Deer
,
the
master-Bull
in
that
of
Cows
,
and
the
Bell-weather
of
the
Flock
,
are
all
of
them
so
many
Monarchs
,
endued
with
Fatherly
Authority
over
the
Herd
;
or
else
,
which
is
as
good
,
are
Usurpers
of
that
Authority
,
and
so
the
Herd
are
all
bound
in
Conscience
to
submit
to
them
.
As
for
the
Monarchical
Government
of
Bees
,
whether
under
a
King
or
Queen
,
I
doubt
it
would
pose
even
those
Vertuosi
who
have
glass-Hives
,
to
prove
their
Government
an
absolute
Monarchy
both
in
War
and
Peace
;
and
that
none
of
the
Princes
of
the
Bloud
or
other
Bee-grandees
have
any
share
in
it
;
or
that
never
a
Bee
in
the
Hive
dare
place
any
Honey
in
the
Combs
,
or
eat
a
drop
of
what
●e
hath
gathered
her self
,
without
the
Queens
orders
.
●ut
if
the
Government
of
Bees
be
Monarchical
,
and
that
●ere
a
good
Argument
for
Monarchy
,
then
that
of
●mmets
might
be
so
for
a
Democracy
,
since
most
Na●uralists
not
being
able
to
distinguish
any
Kings
or
●rinces
in
the
Ant-hill
,
do
suppose
them
to
be
a
Com●onwealth
.
But
Raillery
apart
,
I
would
be
glad
to
●e
fully
satisfied
whether
Mankind
naturally
incline
to
●e
governed
by
an
absolute
Monarchy
.
It
is
true
,
the
●reatest
part
of
the
Eastern
Governments
in
the
world
●e
absolute
Monarchs
;
but
the
Author
cannot
bring
his
as
an
Argument
of
any
Propensity
,
according
to
his
●rinciples
:
For
if
all
of
them
were
founded
upon
the
●ight
of
Fatherhood
,
or
else
the
Vsurpation
of
that
Right
;
his
proves
rather
a
natural
Obligation
to
this
kind
of
●overnment
,
than
a
Propensity
:
for
an
Obligation
●nnot
be
drawn
from
a
bare
Propensity
;
Since
then
〈◊〉
man
would
have
an
Obligation
to
drink
Wine
,
be●use
as
soon
as
he
tasts
it
he
hath
a
Propensity
to
it
,
●nd
perhaps
may
take
so
much
of
it
until
he
be
drunk
,
●nd
then
sick
,
and
so
this
Propensity
may
turn
to
a
●urfeit
.
So
some
Nations
(
as
Rome
for
example
)
●aving
taken
a
Cup
too
much
of
Monarchy
,
this
Sur●it
produced
an
absolute
aversion
,
hatred
,
and
a
pro●ensity
to
the
contrary
extream
.
But
as
the
Eastern
●ations
have
inclined
to
an
Absolute
,
so
have
the
We●ern
either
to
Commonwealths
or
limited
Kingdoms
.
●itness
the
Grecians
of
old
,
and
the
modern
Kingdoms
●f
the
Gothick
Model
;
as
also
those
petty
Governments
●f
several
Nations
in
America
.
His
third
Reason
is
,
●hat
God
confirmed
Monarchy
to
be
the
best
Government
,
〈◊〉
that
Commonweal
which
he
instituted
among
the
He●rews
;
which
was
not
Aristocratical
(
as
Calvin
saith
)
●ut
plainly
Monarchical
.
If
the
Author
here
means
be●re
they
desired
a
King
,
it
is
true
that
God
himself
was
their
King
,
and
govern'd
them
upon
extraordinary
occasions
,
by
men
divinely
assisted
or
inspired
〈◊〉
and
such
were
the
Judges
whom
God
raised
up
to
deliver
them
from
the
slavery
and
oppression
of
their
Neighbours
;
and
being
looked
upon
as
having
a
great
portion
of
the
Spirit
of
God
,
did
likewise
judge
the
People
,
that
is
,
decide
difficult
Cases
by
way
of
Appeal
in
time
of
peace
.
But
that
the
Government
was
purely
Aristocratical
,
this
Author
himself
confesses
even
when
he
denies
it
:
He
tells
us
,
p.
50.
at
the
time
when
Scripture
saith
,
There
was
no
King
in
Israel
,
but
that
every
man
did
that
which
was
right
in
his
own
eyes
,
even
then
the
Israelites
were
under
the
Kingly
Government
of
the
Fathers
of
particular
Families
:
for
i●
the
consultation
for
providing
Wives
for
the
Benjamites
,
we
find
the
Elders
of
the
Congregation
bare
the
onely
sway
,
Judg.
21.16
.
Now
what
is
an
Aristocracy
,
if
this
be
not
?
viz.
an
Assembly
of
the
Elders
or
chief
of
the
Fathers
(
that
is
,
the
best
men
)
meeting
,
consulting
and
resolving
of
publick
business
.
What
power
these
Fathers
of
Families
had
at
home
,
is
not
declared
,
whether
it
was
independant
,
or
else
did
submit
to
the
government
of
its
own
Tribe
:
But
that
it
was
Aristocratical
,
is
apparent
,
if
Josephus
understood
any
thing
o●
the
History
or
Antiquities
of
his
own
Country
,
which
he
undertook
expresly
to
write
of
:
For
Antiq.
lib.
4.
cap.
he
brings
in
Samuel
speaking
to
this
effect
to
the
People
(
desiring
a
King
)
An
Aristocracy
is
the
best
Government
,
neither
should
you
require
any
other
sort
of
Government
.
But
as
for
the
Kings
which
God
gave
them
afterwards
,
there
is
nothing
to
be
drawn
from
thence
for
this
Authors
advantage
;
for
he
himself
tells
us
,
there
is
no
use
to
be
made
of
it
:
His
Observations
upon
Milton
,
p.
20.
For
speaking
against
Milton's
sence
of
the
words
in
Deut.
17.14
.
he
says
,
Can
the
foretelling
or
the
forewarning
the
Israelites
of
a
wanton
wicked
desire
of
theirs
(
i.
e.
of
a
King
)
which
God
himself
condemned
,
be
an
Argument
that
God
gave
or
granted
them
a
Right
to
do
such
a
wicked
thing
?
Or
can
the
narration
and
reproving
of
a
future
Fact
,
be
a
donation
and
approving
of
a
present
Right
?
or
the
permission
of
a
sin
be
made
a
commission
for
the
doing
of
it
?
So
that
it
seems
sometimes
when
it
makes
against
the
Author's
sence
,
God
is
so
far
from
approving
Kingly
Government
,
that
it
is
a
sin
for
the
People
so
much
as
to
desire
it
.
But
it
is
likewise
as
great
a
Question
,
whether
after
Kingly
Government
was
established
,
it
was
likewise
absolute
,
so
that
the
King
might
put
any
body
to
death
,
right
or
wrong
:
For
we
find
,
1
Sam.
14.45
.
the
People
rescued
Jonathan
out
of
the
hands
of
his
Father
Saul
,
and
would
not
permit
him
to
be
put
to
death
for
his
breach
of
the
rash
Vow
which
Saul
had
made
;
nor
is
it
imputed
to
the
People
,
that
is
,
the
Army
,
for
a
sin
.
Neither
could
Ahab
take
away
Naboth's
Vineyard
and
his
Life
together
,
but
by
colour
of
Law
,
and
a
legal
Tryal
.
Neither
could
King
Zedekiah
save
Jeremy
the
Prophet
from
the
power
of
the
Princes
who
cast
him
into
the
Dungeon
:
for
Jer.
38.
v.
5.
Zedekiah
said
,
Behold
,
he
is
in
your
hand
;
for
the
King
is
not
he
that
can
do
any
thing
against
you
.
His
fourth
reason
is
,
that
God
in
Scripture
mentions
not
,
nor
takes
notice
of
any
other
Government
than
Monarchical
.
This
is
but
a
Negative
Argument
at
best
,
the
Scriptures
not
being
written
to
teach
us
Politicks
,
but
to
declare
God's
Will
,
and
to
shew
us
his
merciful
and
gracious
dealing
with
the
Jews
,
notwithstanding
all
their
backslidings
,
and
rebellions
against
his
Commandments
.
His
fifth
reason
is
,
that
Aristotle
saith
in
his
Ethicks
,
chap.
11.
That
Monarchy
is
the
best
form
of
Government
,
and
a
Popular
Estate
the
worst
:
The
words
are
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
.
Which
,
though
true
,
does
not
enforce
any
Obligation
to
the
one
more
than
the
other
:
for
though
a
man
be
obliged
to
his
own
preservation
,
yet
he
himself
is
the
onely
Judge
of
the
means
;
and
if
he
erre
,
and
use
the
worst
means
for
the
best
,
they
are
not
in
fault
if
they
acted
as
well
as
they
could
,
and
to
the
best
of
their
knowledge
,
for
that
end
.
Neither
does
it
follow
,
that
there
are
no
more
sorts
of
Government
than
these
two
to
be
chosen
.
Nor
is
it
any
better
Argument
,
that
the
world
for
a
long
time
knew
no
other
sort
of
Government
but
onely
Monarchy
;
and
that
the
Platforms
of
Commonwealths
were
hatched
amongst
a
few
Cities
in
Greece
,
and
that
they
were
first
governed
by
Kings
,
until
the
wantonness
,
ambition
,
or
faction
of
the
People
made
them
attempt
news
kinds
of
Regiment
.
But
let
any
one
read
the
Greek
Histories
,
and
he
will
find
the
cruelty
and
tyranny
of
Kings
did
more
frequently
give
occasion
to
the
People
to
run
into
Commonwealths
,
than
either
the
ambition
or
faction
of
the
People
.
And
as
for
the
antiquity
of
Monarchy
,
the
alteration
of
it
rather
makes
against
him
,
since
the
whole
Body
of
a
People
seldom
alter
a
Government
,
unless
they
find
themselves
hurt
by
it
,
and
that
it
proved
inconvenient
for
them
.
I
shall
not
dispute
which
is
the
better
Government
,
Monarchy
or
Commonwealth
,
since
in
my
own
judgment
I
incline
to
the
former
,
where
the
Monarch
is
good
.
And
though
I
will
not
affirm
,
as
the
Author
does
,
Directions
for
Obedience
,
p.
71.
That
even
the
Power
which
God
himself
exerciseth
over
mankinde
,
is
by
the
Right
of
Fatherhood
,
as
he
is
both
King
and
Father
of
us
all
:
Since
besides
his
absolute
power
,
and
his
being
the
sole
cause
of
our
production
,
he
is
also
endued
with
that
infinite
Wisdom
and
Goodness
,
that
he
still
orders
all
things
for
the
good
of
his
Subjects
,
and
so
hath
besides
his
Power
,
the
highest
Right
to
govern
,
as
the
best
and
most
perfect
being
:
So
likewise
Monarchs
,
as
far
as
they
imitate
the
divine
Wisdom
and
Beneficence
,
have
the
like
Right
to
be
called
Gods
Lieutenants
.
Nor
shall
I
trouble
my self
,
as
the
Author
does
,
(
p.
67.
and
so
on
to
73.
)
to
compare
the
Mischiess
and
Inconveniencies
that
have
been
found
in
absolute
Monarchical
and
Popular
Government
,
there
being
various
Examples
both
of
Cruelty
and
Injustice
in
both
;
and
I
think
they
are
both
the
aptest
of
any
sorts
of
Governments
to
run
into
Extreams
:
and
I
know
not
whether
there
have
not
been
found
out
a
Regal
Government
mixt
with
somewhat
of
an
Aristocracy
or
Democracy
,
which
if
truely
observed
,
were
freest
from
the
inconveniencies
of
either
.
But
this
Author
is
so
full
of
the
mischiefs
of
Commonwealths
,
that
he
sometimes
mistakes
in
History
,
and
makes
those
Disorders
to
arise
from
the
faults
and
licentiousness
of
the
People
,
which
proceeded
indeed
from
the
Usurpation
of
their
Power
.
Thus
he
makes
it
the
height
of
the
Roman
Liberty
,
that
its
Subjects
might
be
killed
by
those
that
would
;
and
sets
forth
the
Tyranny
of
Sylla
as
an
effect
of
the
Roman
Freedom
,
when
indeed
it
was
rather
an
effect
of
the
absolute
Monarchy
usurped
by
Sylla
during
his
Dictatorship
.
So
that
Dionysius
Halicarnasseus
gives
us
his
judgment
of
those
actions
of
Sylla
,
in
these
words
:
I
would
onely
shew
,
that
for
these
wickednesses
the
name
of
Dictator
became
hateful
:
for
all
things
seem
good
and
profitable
onely
whilst
they
are
well
used
,
which
if
they
come
to
be
depraved
by
those
that
are
in
power
,
the
same
things
are
counted
wicked
and
unprofitable
.
So
likewise
(
p.
73.
)
he
makes
the
Multitude
or
People
of
Rome
to
have
elected
Nero
,
Heliogabalus
,
Otho
,
and
Vitellius
for
Emperours
,
and
to
have
murdered
Pertinax
,
Alexander
Severus
,
Gordiun
,
and
the
rest
there
named
;
whereas
whoever
reads
the
Historians
of
those
times
,
will
find
it
was
not
the
People
or
Senate
,
but
the
Army
that
either
elected
or
murdered
Emperours
:
And
as
for
Nero
,
the
Senate
had
never
dared
to
have
declared
him
a
publick
Enemy
,
had
he
not
become
so
odious
and
intolerable
,
that
nobody
would
take
Arms
for
him
;
and
that
the
Army
under
Galba
,
which
had
revolted
and
chosen
him
Emperour
,
was
then
marching
to
Rome
.
So
that
indeed
these
Emperours
were
torn
in
pieces
by
the
Dogs
they
themselves
fed
,
and
kept
constantly
in
pay
to
prevent
the
People
,
who
had
not
yet
quite
forgot
their
former
Liberty
,
from
recovering
it
again
.
And
the
People
of
Rome
had
just
as
great
a
hand
in
the
setting
up
and
putting
down
Emperours
,
as
those
of
Stambola
have
had
in
the
deposing
or
setting
up
those
Grand
Seigniors
which
the
Janizaries
(
their
Guards
)
have
strangled
of
late
years
,
setting
up
their
Uncles
or
Brothers
in
their
rooms
;
or
as
the
People
of
England
had
in
setting
up
either
Oliver
or
his
Son
Richard
for
Protectors
.
But
leaving
these
lesser
Mistakes
,
which
I
look
upon
onely
as
the
Transports
of
the
Author's
Resentments
against
Popular
Government
,
in
which
I
shall
not
contradict
him
in
the
main
;
onely
I
would
fain
lay
the
Saddle
upon
the
right
Horse
,
and
not
blame
them
for
the
faults
committed
by
a
standing
Army
which
in
those
times
domineer'd
over
both
Emperour
and
the
People
of
Rome
,
and
imposed
upon
them
what
Emperour
they
pleas'd
,
though
never
so
base
and
unworthy
.
I
shall
therefore
in
the
last
place
come
to
the
second
point
I
before
proposed
,
whether
the
person
on
whom
the
Fathers
of
Families
upon
this
Escheat
of
the
Crown
confers
their
Authority
,
owe
the
same
to
them
,
or
else
immediately
to
God
.
The
Author
(
in
the
passage
before
cited
)
will
by
no
means
grant
,
That
the
person
so
elected
claims
his
Power
from
the
People
,
but
as
being
substituted
properly
by
God
,
from
whom
he
receives
his
Royal
Charter
of
an
universal
Father
,
though
testified
by
the
Ministry
of
the
Heads
of
the
People
.
Which
Assertion
is
built
upon
grounds
altogether
false
and
precarious
,
as
I
have
already
proved
:
For
first
,
he
here
supposes
,
That
God
hath
given
by
divine
grant
,
all
Fathers
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
an
absolute
despotick
power
over
the
persons
of
their
Sons
,
so
that
they
may
sell
or
otherwise
transfer
this
Fatherly
power
to
whom
they
please
.
And
secondly
,
That
the
Children
are
as
much
obliged
to
obey
those
to
whom
the
Fathers
transfer
this
Right
,
as
they
were
their
Fathers
themselves
.
Thirdly
,
That
this
Power
so
transferred
,
does
not
properly
derive
it self
from
the
Fathers
who
so
pass
over
their
Fatherly
power
,
but
to
God
,
who
conferred
it
on
them
at
first
.
In
which
Hypothesis
every
one
of
the
Propositions
are
false
:
For
,
first
,
I
have
proved
that
no
Father
hath
by
any
divine
Grant
or
Charter
,
an
absolute
despotick
power
over
the
person
of
his
Son
:
Or
,
secondly
,
that
God
hath
given
Fathers
a
power
to
bequeath
or
transfer
their
Authority
to
another
,
so
that
the
Grantee
should
by
this
Assignement
succeed
to
all
the
Rights
of
a
Father
:
and
therefore
the
two
former
being
false
,
the
last
of
Princes
receiving
their
power
immediately
from
God
,
which
is
built
upon
them
,
must
be
so
too
.
And
besides
,
it
is
evident
,
that
these
Fathers
do
not
onely
here
pass
over
a
Fatherly
power
of
governing
of
their
Wives
and
Children
,
but
likewise
that
of
governing
themselves
,
not
as
Fathers
,
but
as
men
;
since
they
must
transfer
this
power
,
whether
they
had
Wives
or
Children
or
not
,
else
they
might
onely
pass
over
to
this
new
Monarch
their
power
over
their
Wives
and
Children
,
and
reserve
the
power
of
governing
themselves
still
:
So
that
it
is
plain
,
there
is
a
power
different
from
that
of
a
Father
,
to
be
transferred
.
But
if
it
may
be
replyed
,
They
may
chuse
themselves
a
Father
if
they
please
;
indeed
I
have
heard
of
a
mans
adopting
of
a
Son
,
which
still
must
be
by
this
Son
's
own
consent
;
yet
I
never
heard
of
a
Son
's
adopting
himself
a
Father
,
or
that
a
Father
,
which
is
a
natural
Relation
,
can
be
created
at
mans
pleasure
:
it
is
true
,
a
Lord
or
Master
may
,
but
he
cannot
thereby
challenge
that
natural
Reverence
and
Gratitude
due
onely
to
a
Father
.
So
that
if
Fathers
have
a
power
of
governing
themselves
and
their
actions
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
and
that
they
can
confer
this
Right
on
any
other
,
it
is
evident
they
do
not
confer
this
as
a
Paternal
power
on
their
Monarch
,
which
the
Author
supposes
to
be
granted
by
God
to
all
Fathers
.
We
shall
now
come
to
the
second
Head
at
first
proposed
,
and
examine
what
power
a
Master
of
a
separate
Family
hath
over
his
Slaves
or
Servants
in
the
state
of
Nature
.
First
,
As
for
hired
Servants
,
though
it
is
true
they
may
submit
themselves
to
the
will
and
disposal
of
another
what
Diet
they
shall
eat
,
and
what
Clothes
they
shall
wear
,
what
work
they
shall
do
,
and
what
hours
of
rest
or
sleep
they
shall
have
to
themselves
;
and
that
the
Master
may
beat
or
correct
him
if
he
do
amiss
,
and
through
wilfulness
or
negligence
disobey
his
Masters
commands
;
and
that
these
are
the
Conditions
that
most
hired
Servants
,
being
part
of
their
Masters
Family
,
do
serve
upon
:
yet
is
this
not
so
properly
an
absolute
Obedience
,
as
a
duty
of
Truth
and
Honesty
in
the
Servant
;
since
as
he
is
bound
to
perform
his
part
of
the
Contract
,
so
likewise
is
the
Master
to
perform
what
he
hath
promised
them
,
since
this
service
is
neither
absolute
nor
perpetual
:
so
that
when
his
time
is
out
,
he
is
free
of
course
.
And
if
in
the
mean
time
the
Master
does
not
allow
him
sufficient
Food
,
Clothes
,
or
hours
of
rest
,
so
that
he
may
be
able
to
perform
his
work
,
this
Servant
in
the
state
of
Nature
(
if
he
cannot
perswade
his
Master
to
use
him
better
)
may
without
doubt
quit
his
service
as
soon
as
he
can
;
since
he
was
to
yield
his
Master
his
Labour
upon
certain
Conditions
,
which
not
performed
on
the
Masters
part
,
the
Servant
is
not
obliged
any
longer
to
perform
his
part
of
the
Bargain
,
in
living
with
him
or
serving
him
.
And
as
for
those
that
have
sold
or
yielded
themselves
up
as
absolute
perpetual
Servants
or
Slaves
to
the
government
of
another
,
I
see
no
reason
why
they
may
not
in
this
state
of
Nature
make
certain
Conditions
with
their
Master
,
before
they
will
give
themselves
up
to
him
,
since
if
a
man
may
covenant
with
another
upon
what
condition
he
will
serve
him
for
seven
years
,
why
may
he
not
do
the
same
for
his
whole
life
?
So
that
upon
the
non-performance
of
these
Conditions
,
this
kind
of
Servant
hath
the
same
remedy
against
his
Lord
as
an
hired
Servant
may
have
.
And
of
this
sort
were
our
ancient
English
Villains
,
who
though
they
could
claim
no
property
against
their
Lords
,
either
in
Goods
or
Lands
;
yet
if
the
Lord
killed
his
Villain
,
the
Wife
had
an
Appeal
of
Murder
of
the
death
of
her
Husband
.
Since
no
man
can
be
supposed
so
void
of
common
sense
(
unless
an
absolute
Fool
,
and
then
he
is
not
capable
of
making
any
Bargain
)
to
yield
himself
so
absolutely
up
to
anothers
disposal
,
as
to
renounce
all
hopes
of
safety
or
satisfaction
in
this
life
,
or
of
future
happiness
in
that
to
come
.
So
that
I
conceive
that
even
a
Slave
(
much
more
a
Servant
hired
upon
certain
Conditions
)
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
where
he
hath
no
civil
power
to
whom
to
appeal
for
Justice
,
hath
as
much
Right
as
a
Son
or
Child
of
the
Family
,
to
defend
his
life
,
or
what
belongs
to
him
,
against
the
unjust
violence
or
rage
of
his
Master
.
Nor
do
I
think
any
places
of
Scripture
,
if
well
considered
,
command
the
contrary
:
For
as
for
the
places
in
St.
Paul's
Epistles
,
Ephes.
6.5
.
Servants
,
be
obedient
to
them
that
are
your
Masters
according
to
the
flesh
,
with
fear
and
trembling
.
And
Coloss.
3.22
.
Servants
,
obey
in
all
things
your
Masters
,
&c.
does
not
extend
to
all
things
that
are
,
but
only
to
things
lawful
for
them
to
do
,
that
is
,
that
were
not
against
the
Principles
of
Christian
Religion
.
And
in
this
it
is
that
St.
Peter
,
1
Pet.
2.18,19
.
commands
Servants
or
Slaves
(
which
there
were
all
one
)
to
be
subject
to
their
Masters
,
not
onely
to
the
good
and
gentle
,
but
also
to
the
froward
.
For
this
is
thank-worthy
,
or
grateful
,
if
a
man
for
conscience
towards
God
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
endure
grief
,
or
trouble
,
suffering
wrongfully
.
Which
words
seem
to
import
,
that
Servants
ought
to
bear
with
a
great
deal
of
bad
usage
from
their
Masters
;
but
does
not
command
them
in
the
state
of
Nature
to
give
up
their
Lives
or
Goods
to
their
Masters
,
without
any
resistance
.
But
if
any
shall
urge
the
Example
of
Christ
alleadged
in
the
third
verse
,
who
suffered
(
even
to
death
)
for
us
;
I
conceive
that
does
not
extend
to
a
suffering
or
submission
unto
all
things
,
but
to
such
things
for
which
Christ
himself
suffered
,
viz.
for
Conscience
toward
God
,
that
is
,
for
matters
of
Religion
;
which
is
likewise
most
agreeable
to
the
sence
of
the
words
that
follow
:
For
what
glory
is
it
,
if
when
you
are
beaten
for
your
faults
,
you
take
it
patiently
?
but
if
when
you
do
well
,
and
take
it
patiently
,
&c.
Now
who
ever
can
imagine
a
Servant
to
be
beaten
for
doing
his
duty
?
Therefore
doing
well
,
here
,
signifies
the
profession
of
Christianity
;
which
they
were
not
to
deny
,
though
they
had
unbelieving
Masters
.
Therefore
since
no
interpretation
of
Scripture
ought
to
be
against
Reason
,
that
can
never
tell
a
man
that
he
ought
to
yield
up
himself
so
wholly
to
anothers
disposal
,
as
to
give
his
Master
an
absolute
right
and
power
over
him
to
kill
or
maim
him
without
cause
,
or
to
be
so
basely
and
penuriously
used
as
perpetually
to
suffer
hunger
,
cold
,
and
nakedness
,
or
the
like
;
so
that
his
life
should
rather
become
a
burden
and
a
punishment
,
than
a
satisfaction
.
For
since
we
have
no
notions
of
happiness
but
in
life
,
nor
in
that
farther
than
it
is
accompanied
with
some
contentment
of
mind
,
no
rational
man
can
be
supposed
to
consent
to
renounce
all
the
pleasures
and
ends
thereof
,
(
and
which
onely
make
life
desireable
)
much
less
the
Right
of
living
and
preserving
himself
.
So
that
even
such
a
Slave
may
without
doubt
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
run
away
from
his
Master
,
and
set
himself
at
liberty
if
he
can
,
since
his
Master
hath
not
performed
his
part
of
that
tacite
condition
of
his
Service
;
which
was
,
that
this
Master
should
for
his
Labour
provide
him
all
the
necessaries
of
life
,
and
suffer
him
to
enjoy
the
ordinary
satisfactions
of
it
.
Nor
is
the
worst
of
Slaves
,
that
is
,
one
taken
in
War
,
so
absolutely
at
his
Masters
dispose
,
as
that
because
he
hath
him
in
his
power
,
he
hath
therefore
a
Right
to
use
him
as
he
will
:
For
first
,
as
long
as
the
Conquerour
keeps
his
Slave
as
a
Prisoner
,
and
makes
him
work
in
Fetters
,
though
he
hath
given
him
his
life
for
the
present
,
yet
there
does
not
thence
arise
any
Obligation
in
the
Slave
to
Obedience
;
so
that
the
Slave
may
yet
run
away
if
he
can
,
nay
,
kill
his
Conquerour
,
unless
he
will
come
to
other
Terms
with
him
,
and
make
him
promise
him
his
Service
and
Obedience
upon
the
granting
him
his
Liberty
and
enjoyment
of
the
ordinary
Comforts
of
Life
:
And
if
he
cannot
enjoy
these
,
I
believe
there
is
no
sober
Planter
in
Barbadoes
(
who
are
most
of
them
the
Assignees
of
Slaves
taken
in
War
)
but
will
grant
such
a
Slave
may
lawfully
run
away
if
he
can
.
Therefore
it
is
not
true
what
Mr.
Hobbes
says
,
That
no
injury
can
be
done
to
a
Slave
:
for
his
reason
is
not
valid
,
that
because
a
Servant
hath
absolutely
subjected
his
will
to
that
of
his
Lords
,
therefore
whatever
he
does
,
he
does
it
by
his
Master's
will
,
in
which
his
own
is
included
,
so
that
volenti
non
fit
injuria
:
this
proves
no
more
than
that
the
Slave
hath
no
just
reason
of
complaint
though
his
Master
give
him
Victuals
that
does
not
suit
with
his
palate
,
orprescribe
him
Work
which
may
not
please
his
humour
.
So
on
the
other
side
,
what
rational
man
will
affirm
,
that
this
Slave
hath
given
up
the
natural
Rights
of
living
,
and
being
preserved
as
a
man
,
but
that
injury
may
be
done
to
this
Slave
as
any
other
Servant
,
if
the
Task
imposed
upon
him
be
beyond
his
strength
to
perform
,
or
if
he
be
beaten
or
like
to
be
put
to
death
without
cause
,
or
that
he
hath
not
Food
sufficient
to
enable
him
to
do
his
work
?
for
he
may
still
require
at
his
Masters
hands
the
usage
of
a
man
,
and
of
a
rational
Creature
.
So
likewise
though
this
property
in
the
person
of
a
Slave
taken
in
War
,
may
be
assigned
over
to
another
,
yet
the
Right
of
commanding
a
Slave
by
his
own
consent
,
cannot
be
so
,
farther
than
it
was
agreed
upon
in
the
Bargain
between
him
and
his
Lord
:
for
if
he
convenanted
to
be
a
Slave
onely
to
his
Lord
and
no
man
else
,
the
Lord
cannot
in
justice
assigne
nor
sell
him
to
another
,
without
his
consent
,
nor
leave
him
to
his
Heirs
;
since
there
might
be
certain
peculiar
reasons
wherefore
a
man
might
subject
himself
to
this
man
,
and
not
to
another
.
So
likewise
in
absolute
Empires
which
began
purely
from
Conquest
,
though
it
is
taken
for
granted
that
they
may
be
aliened
at
the
Will
of
the
Conquerour
,
yet
it
is
otherwise
in
Subjects
who
have
submitted
themselves
upon
certain
Conditions
,
and
who
have
some
Liberties
remaining
to
them
;
and
much
more
in
those
Kingdoms
which
are
limited
by
their
Institution
:
for
there
,
not
properly
the
Persons
of
the
men
,
but
the
Right
of
governing
them
,
is
said
to
be
transferred
as
far
as
it
is
accompanied
with
the
Honours
and
Profits
annexed
to
it
.
For
although
a
Prince
may
say
of
his
Subject
,
He
is
my
Man
,
yet
this
Property
in
him
is
much
different
from
that
whereby
a
Prince
calls
his
Horse
his
own
:
for
in
the
first
sence
he
means
no
more
than
that
the
Right
of
governing
this
man
belongs
to
me
,
and
not
to
another
,
yet
cannot
be
extended
as
far
as
he
pleases
;
but
that
Property
which
is
attributed
to
a
Beast
or
other
Goods
,
includes
a
Right
of
using
or
consuming
that
thing
as
he
will
himself
,
without
any
other
reason
than
that
it
is
his
own
.
But
although
the
Laws
of
Humanity
do
not
permit
,
that
however
a
man
hath
carried
himself
towards
us
,
all
Remains
of
that
Primitive
Equality
between
men
should
be
quite
extinguished
towards
him
;
and
after
a
man
hath
entered
into
a
state
of
Peace
with
us
,
that
he
should
be
dealt
with
as
a
Brute
or
inanimate
thing
:
though
it
is
true
that
the
Cruelty
and
Avarice
of
divers
Nations
hath
proceeded
so
far
,
that
Slaves
are
reckoned
amongst
Houshold-goods
,
and
are
ordered
not
so
much
by
Command
,
as
by
the
force
of
an
absolute
Dominion
and
Property
;
yet
this
is
not
from
the
Law
of
Nature
,
but
the
Civil
Law
of
that
particular
Common-wealth
.
So
that
though
I
grant
by
the
Roman
Civil
Law
,
a
man
might
have
said
of
a
Slave
in
the
same
sence
as
of
a
Beast
,
This
is
mine
;
yet
this
was
not
from
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
but
Custom
of
that
Empire
,
who
taking
many
Captives
in
the
Wars
,
almost
all
their
Servants
consisted
at
first
of
such
:
Yet
this
is
not
allowed
of
in
our
Law
,
nor
yet
in
France
and
other
Countries
.
And
this
will
serve
to
demonstrate
what
this
Author
lays
down
in
his
Preface
to
his
Observations
on
Aristotle's
Politicks
to
be
false
,
That
Adam
was
a
Father
,
King
,
and
Lord
over
his
Family
,
and
that
a
Son
,
Subject
,
and
Slave
,
or
Servant
,
were
all
one
at
first
;
since
it
may
hereby
appear
that
there
is
a
real
difference
in
Nature
between
every
one
of
them
.
And
though
the
express
names
of
Subject
,
Tyrant
,
and
Slave
,
be
not
found
in
Scripture
,
yet
the
things
are
,
and
that
as
plainly
described
as
if
they
had
been
called
so
;
though
the
Hebrew
being
a
barren
Language
,
hath
not
distinct
words
for
them
,
without
Epithites
or
Circumlocutions
:
For
(
1.
)
As
to
Servants
,
it
is
apparent
out
of
the
Law
of
Moses
,
Exod.
21.
v.
2.
Levit.
25.39.44
.
Deut.
15.12
.
there
is
a
vast
difference
between
Hebrew
Servants
and
those
that
were
of
other
Nations
;
these
latter
onely
being
called
Bondservants
,
whose
service
was
perpetual
,
and
who
were
as
a
Possession
and
Inheritance
to
their
Lords
;
whereas
the
former
were
not
to
be
made
to
serve
with
that
Rigour
,
but
onely
as
hired
Servants
to
be
set
free
in
the
seventh
or
Sabbatical
year
.
And
it
is
frequent
in
the
Law
as
well
as
Prophets
,
to
make
mention
of
the
Wages
of
an
Hireling
.
So
that
nothing
is
plainer
,
than
that
even
among
the
Jews
,
there
was
a
difference
between
hired
Servants
,
Hebrew
Servants
for
years
,
and
forreign
Slaves
for
ever
.
And
before
that
,
when
Jacob
served
Laban
for
his
two
Daughters
,
it
is
evident
that
there
was
then
a
distinction
between
an
hired
Servant
and
a
Slave
,
since
there
was
a
Contract
for
what
Wages
Jacob
should
serve
him
:
And
though
Laban
,
for
ought
appears
,
according
to
the
custom
of
those
times
,
was
an
Independant
Father
of
a
Family
,
as
well
as
Jacob
was
afterwards
,
and
consequently
a
Prince
,
as
this
Author
needs
will
have
it
;
yet
we
do
not
finde
it
charged
upon
Jacob
as
a
Crime
,
no
not
by
Laban
himself
,
but
onely
as
a
matter
of
unkindness
,
that
he
had
stolen
away
from
him
with
his
Daughters
and
the
Goods
he
had
yearned
in
his
service
.
So
likewise
,
though
the
word
Tyrant
is
not
found
expresly
in
Scripture
,
yet
the
thing
it self
is
,
if
a
Tyrant
be
one
who
abusus
his
Kingly
Power
to
the
Oppression
of
his
Subjects
;
or
else
Pharaoh
in
Egypt
,
and
those
Kings
who
after
the
Israelites
coming
out
of
Egypt
so
cruelly
oppressed
them
,
were
all
good
and
lawful
Monarchs
,
and
had
as
much
Authority
as
their
own
Princes
which
God
set
over
them
:
and
it
had
been
a
wicked
thing
in
them
to
have
resisted
them
and
driven
them
out
as
they
did
,
whenever
they
were
able
;
since
they
were
in
possession
,
according
to
this
Author
,
by
the
permissive
Will
of
God
.
Having
now
shewn
the
difference
of
the
Power
of
a
Master
of
a
Family
,
from
that
of
a
Father
,
and
that
the
Right
which
a
Father
hath
in
his
Children
,
is
divers
from
that
which
he
hath
in
his
Servants
or
Slaves
;
I
will
now
consider
in
the
last
place
the
Power
which
Adam
had
,
or
any
other
Husband
now
hath
over
his
Wife
in
the
state
of
Nature
.
I
have
already
proved
that
the
Authority
of
the
Husband
over
the
Wife
,
commences
from
that
Contract
we
call
Marriage
;
and
though
by
the
Word
of
God
the
Woman
is
made
subject
to
the
Man
,
yet
the
reason
of
that
subjection
naturally
depends
upon
the
Mans
being
commonly
stronger
both
in
body
and
mind
than
the
Woman
;
and
where
that
ceases
,
the
subjection
will
likewise
of
course
cease
,
even
amongst
us
:
For
we
see
that
if
a
Husband
be
a
foolish
or
a
careless
man
,
and
either
cannot
or
will
not
govern
his
Family
and
Estate
,
the
Wife
may
and
does
,
and
oftentimes
him
into
the
Bargain
:
Nor
does
any
one
finde
fault
with
her
for
so
doing
,
since
somebody
must
govern
the
Concerns
of
the
Family
;
and
if
the
man
either
cannot
or
will
not
,
who
hath
more
Right
or
Interest
to
do
it
,
than
her
,
who
hath
an
equal
share
in
the
happiness
and
well-being
of
her
Family
and
Children
?
Neither
can
there
be
at
once
two
absolute
Heads
in
the
same
house
commanding
contradictory
things
,
without
confusion
,
since
the
Children
and
Servants
could
never
tell
whom
to
obey
.
So
that
even
this
subjection
of
the
womans
will
to
the
mans
,
commanded
by
Scripture
,
is
still
with
a
supposition
that
the
man
is
capable
or
willing
to
govern
:
for
if
he
be
not
,
he
loses
this
Prerogative
of
course
.
But
suppose
he
is
able
to
govern
her
and
the
Family
,
the
Question
is
,
What
kind
of
Power
he
hath
over
her
,
as
a
Husband
,
in
the
state
of
Nature
?
I
grant
,
that
if
she
made
it
part
of
her
Bargain
to
be
so
absolutely
subject
to
him
as
that
he
might
command
her
in
all
things
as
a
Slave
,
and
make
her
do
what
work
he
pleased
to
appoint
,
and
that
he
may
either
turn
her
away
,
or
put
her
to
death
,
if
he
find
her
imbezilling
his
Goods
or
committing
Adultery
;
the
woman
in
this
case
is
bound
by
her
Contract
,
as
another
Servant
,
who
makes
her self
so
by
her
own
act
or
consent
.
But
this
is
not
the
Question
,
but
what
power
the
man
hath
naturally
over
his
Wife
,
as
a
Husband
,
supposing
no
such
Conditions
or
Bargain
were
made
at
the
Marriage
.
It
is
true
indeed
that
the
Wife
ought
to
be
subject
to
the
Husband
in
all
things
tending
to
the
good
and
preservation
of
her
Children
and
Family
,
or
else
the
Family
would
have
two
Heads
(
as
I
said
before
.
)
But
it
does
not
therefore
follow
,
that
he
hath
such
a
despotick
power
over
her
,
that
she
may
in
no
case
judge
when
he
abuses
his
Fatherly
or
Husbandly
power
:
For
suppose
the
Father
of
a
Family
,
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
should
in
a
mad
or
drunken
fit
go
about
to
kill
or
maim
herself
or
one
of
his
innocent
Children
,
can
any
body
think
this
were
Rebellion
against
the
Monarch
of
the
Family
,
for
the
Wife
to
rescue
her
innocent
Child
or
self
out
of
his
hands
by
force
,
if
she
could
not
otherwise
make
him
be
at
quiet
?
Or
suppose
the
Husband
in
such
a
fit
should
command
his
Wife
to
deliver
him
a
sum
of
money
which
she
had
in
her
keeping
,
when
she
was
morally
sure
that
he
would
presently
play
it
or
otherwise
squander
it
away
;
will
any
rational
man
affirm
that
a
Wife
may
not
deny
to
deliver
her
Husband
his
own
money
in
such
circumstances
?
So
that
it
is
evident
,
she
never
so
absolutely
submitted
her
will
to
his
,
as
not
to
reserve
to
her self
the
faculty
of
a
rational
woman
,
as
not
to
judge
when
her
Husband
would
evidently
destroy
her self
or
Children
,
or
absolutely
ruine
the
Family
,
when
he
was
not
in
a
capacity
●o
govern
himself
.
So
likewise
if
the
Husband
command
her
to
do
any
thing
against
her
Conscience
,
or
●he
Laws
of
Nature
,
she
is
not
obliged
to
obey
him
:
For
though
the
Wife
in
all
matters
peculiar
to
the
Marriage-bed
,
and
in
all
other
things
that
relate
to
the
●ell-ordering
the
Family
,
is
obliged
to
submit
her
will
●o
that
of
her
Husband
;
yet
it
does
not
therefore
fol●ow
that
she
is
an
absolute
Slave
,
to
be
commanded
or
●ompelled
in
all
actions
not
tending
to
this
end
.
And
〈◊〉
it
be
objected
,
that
as
Commonwealths
cannot
be
●overned
without
some
coactive
Empire
,
so
Marriage
●annot
well
subsist
by
a
bare
Compact
,
or
the
power
●f
Friendship
alone
,
to
oblige
the
Wife
to
her
duty
,
in
●ase
she
prove
disobedient
.
As
I
do
not
deny
but
persaps
it
may
be
lawful
for
the
Husband
,
as
Head
of
the
●amily
,
in
some
cases
,
if
the
Wife
prove
palpably
ob●inate
and
disobedient
to
his
reasonable
commands
,
●nd
will
not
hearken
to
Reason
,
to
compel
her
by
cor●ection
;
and
the
rather
,
since
Christ
hath
taken
away
●he
liberty
of
Divorce
,
whereby
a
man
might
be
rid
of
〈◊〉
cross
Wife
(
as
of
an
ill
Servant
)
if
she
did
not
●nend
her
manners
;
and
therefore
he
hath
no
way
else
●…
mend
her
,
if
she
will
not
do
her
duty
by
perswasion
●nd
fair
means
:
Yet
this
Power
is
very
rarely
to
be
●sed
,
since
it
is
onely
some
women
that
either
need
or
●ill
endure
to
be
so
handled
;
and
all
discreet
and
ra●onal
Wives
,
as
well
as
Servants
,
will
do
their
duty
●ithout
it
.
Yet
this
Example
of
the
absolute
Obedi●ce
of
Subjects
in
a
Commonwealth
,
does
not
agree
with
that
of
a
Wife
to
her
Husband
,
as
Head
of
the
●amily
;
since
Families
(
especially
those
who
consist
●f
a
good
number
of
Children
and
Servants
)
may
●ave
a
twofold
end
:
the
one
peculiar
to
it self
,
the
o●her
common
with
that
of
Civil
Governmments
.
The
●ommon
end
is
considered
in
that
defence
and
security
,
resulting
from
the
conjunction
of
many
into
one
Body
;
in
which
,
although
an
absolute
Empire
be
necessary
,
yet
since
the
Wife
being
but
one
weak
woman
,
can
contribute
but
very
little
to
this
end
,
it
may
very
well
suffice
to
the
peace
and
unity
of
the
Family
,
if
she
be
tyed
to
her
Husband
onely
by
a
simple
Compact
by
way
of
Friendship
,
without
any
despotick
power
over
her
.
But
the
peculiar
ends
of
Matrimony
,
which
are
the
procreation
and
breeding
up
of
Children
,
and
providing
things
necessary
for
the
Family
,
may
well
enough
be
obtained
,
although
the
Husband
be
not
invested
with
this
despotick
power
(
which
supposes
that
of
life
and
death
,
or
other
grievous
punishments
)
and
though
the
Wife
be
tyed
by
her
Compact
only
and
the
Bonds
of
Amity
;
of
which
Compact
the
Husband
being
the
Principal
,
does
imitate
that
of
an
unequal
League
between
Civil
States
,
in
which
the
Husband
being
the
Head
,
the
Wife
owes
him
all
due
respect
and
observance
;
and
he
on
the
other
side
owes
her
maintenance
and
protection
.
Therefore
I
am
not
of
the
opinion
of
some
,
who
will
have
the
Husband
,
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
to
be
endued
with
an
absolute
power
of
life
and
death
over
his
Wife
;
and
that
in
this
consists
the
very
quintessence
of
Marital
power
,
because
,
forsooth
,
that
all
Empire
,
when
it
is
in
its
proper
subject
,
and
neither
is
exercised
precariously
by
any
man
,
nor
circumscribed
by
any
superiour
Power
,
does
always
import
jus
vitae
&
necis
over
the
Subject
.
But
this
is
not
so
:
for
a
man
,
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
may
become
part
of
anothers
Family
,
and
yet
make
i●
in
his
Bargain
that
the
Master
of
this
Family
shall
not
put
him
to
death
or
misuse
,
unless
it
be
for
Crimes
that
deserve
death
by
the
Law
of
God
or
Nature
,
or
become
a
publick
Enemy
.
And
the
Supposition
is
false
,
which
first
supposes
such
an
absolute
Empire
to
be
in
the
Husband
,
as
in
the
proper
Subject
;
neither
is
there
any
absolute
power
of
life
and
death
necessary
to
the
ends
of
Marriage
:
for
if
the
woman
commit
small
faults
,
and
will
not
be
amended
,
the
Husband
may
correct
her
;
if
greater
(
as
suppose
Adultery
)
he
may
put
her
away
,
and
likewise
chuse
whether
he
will
provide
for
the
Children
which
he
hath
reason
to
believe
he
did
not
get
himself
.
If
she
murder
her
Children
,
or
commit
any
other
abominable
sin
against
Nature
,
she
may
justly
be
cut
off
from
the
Family
,
and
punisht
as
a
common
Enemy
to
Mankind
;
and
so
she
might
be
if
she
had
not
been
his
Wife
;
but
Servant
,
or
other
Member
of
the
Family
.
Yet
I
do
not
affirm
,
that
this
despotick
Empire
,
or
power
of
life
and
death
,
is
against
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
or
inconsistent
with
the
state
of
Matrimony
,
any
more
than
the
absolute
power
of
a
good
Prince
should
destroy
the
love
of
his
Subjects
towards
him
,
or
the
reverential
fear
we
ought
to
have
of
God
,
destroy
our
love
of
him
.
Therefore
as
I
have
allowed
that
the
woman
may
confer
such
a
power
on
her
Husband
over
her self
,
in
the
state
of
Nature
;
so
I
grant
this
absolute
power
may
likewise
be
conferred
on
Husbands
by
the
Civil
Laws
of
particular
Common-wealths
.
Thus
it
is
murder
for
a
man
in
England
to
kill
his
Wife
taken
in
the
very
act
of
Adultery
;
but
it
is
not
so
in
Spain
,
Italy
,
and
most
other
Countries
,
if
he
kill
his
Wife
if
he
find
her
alone
in
another
mans
company
,
though
it
cannot
be
proved
they
have
done
any
thing
clse
to
deserve
it
.
Having
now
gone
over
the
whole
power
of
the
Head
of
a
separate
Family
,
as
a
Father
,
Husband
,
and
Master
,
and
proved
that
no
man
is
a
Slave
by
Nature
,
or
without
his
own
Consent
(
as
a
Slave
by
Compact
)
or
without
his
fault
,
as
a
Slave
taken
in
a
just
War
;
and
that
no
Master
of
a
Family
hath
such
Right
in
the
person
of
one
of
these
,
but
that
he
may
do
him
injury
if
he
take
away
his
life
,
or
punish
him
without
cause
;
and
that
such
even
such
,
a
Slave
may
lawfully
set
himself
free
,
if
the
Master
do
not
perform
his
part
of
the
Bargain
.
And
having
in
the
last
place
shewn
what
power
a
Husband
hath
over
his
Wife
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
and
from
whence
it
takes
its
Original
;
it
is
now
time
to
answer
those
Arguments
and
Objections
made
by
this
Author
and
others
,
That
the
Prince
or
Governour
so
elected
by
the
Fathers
of
Families
,
or
Frcemen
at
their
own
dispose
(
which
I
hold
to
be
equivalent
to
the
whole
People
)
hath
not
onely
his
Nomination
from
them
,
but
that
it
is
from
God
alone
that
he
derives
his
Soveraign
Power
and
Authority
,
with
which
he
is
endued
upon
his
first
acceptance
of
the
Supreme
Power
;
and
if
he
should
accept
it
with
any
limitation
,
it
were
to
restrain
that
Power
which
God
hath
conferred
upon
him
by
his
being
made
the
Supreme
Magistrate
,
and
would
hinder
him
from
performing
that
great
Duty
as
he
ought
.
In
answer
to
which
I
have
already
proved
,
that
no
such
unlimited
Power
was
conferred
by
God
to
any
private
man
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
as
a
Father
,
Husband
,
or
Master
;
and
therefore
could
not
be
given
to
any
Civil
Soveraign
,
who
is
supposed
to
have
no
more
power
than
the
Father
of
the
Family
had
before
.
A
second
Objection
is
,
That
no
particular
man
hath
in
the
state
of
Nature
any
power
over
his
own
life
,
and
therefore
cannot
have
any
over
the
life
of
another
man
;
and
if
one
man
hath
not
this
power
,
neither
have
the
People
(
which
is
but
a
universal
consisting
of
singulars
)
any
such
power
,
and
consequently
cannot
confer
it
on
any
other
man
:
therefore
every
Prince
must
have
this
Soveraign
Power
of
life
and
death
,
not
from
the
People
,
but
from
God
.
In
answer
to
which
,
I
shall
first
of
all
deny
the
consequence
,
that
because
God
hath
not
given
a
man
a
power
over
his
own
life
,
therefore
he
can
have
none
over
the
person
of
another
.
For
God
gave
man
a
Right
to
preserve
,
but
not
to
destroy
himself
,
and
so
cannot
dispose
of
his
own
life
whenever
he
is
weary
of
it
.
Therefore
since
the
first
Law
of
Nature
is
Self-preservation
,
it
is
lawful
for
a
man
to
use
all
means
conducing
to
this
end
,
that
do
not
prejudice
another
mans
Right
in
his
particular
life
or
happiness
;
so
that
if
any
man
assault
me
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
I
may
defend
my self
,
and
consequently
kill
the
Assailant
,
if
I
cannot
otherwise
escape
.
But
perhaps
it
will
be
replyed
,
that
the
intention
here
is
not
principally
to
kill
the
man
,
if
it
may
be
otherwise
avoided
;
and
that
this
Right
is
given
men
onely
to
preserve
their
lives
from
being
taken
away
at
another
mans
pleasure
,
but
that
no
private
man
hath
power
to
revenge
an
injury
done
to
another
or
ones
self
,
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
with
death
,
but
God
,
or
him
to
whom
God
hath
committed
this
power
,
according
to
St.
Paul
,
Rom.
12.19
.
Dearly
beloved
,
avenge
not
your selves
,
&c.
I
shall
prove
that
this
place
does
not
destroy
that
which
I
maintain
:
for
I
grant
that
all
Revenge
taken
,
as
the
satisfaction
some
men
take
in
the
very
doing
evil
or
prejudice
to
another
,
is
unlawful
,
even
by
the
light
of
Nature
.
Secondly
,
Likewise
where
Magistracy
is
instituted
,
who
is
to
bear
the
Sword
for
the
punishment
of
evil
doers
?
I
grant
all
return
of
like
for
like
to
be
unlawful
,
since
he
is
appointed
as
a
publick
Judge
to
right
those
that
are
injured
,
and
maintain
the
common
Peace
.
But
no
Text
forbids
men
to
punish
injuries
done
either
to
themselves
or
those
they
have
a
concern
for
,
in
the
state
of
Nature
;
for
this
is
not
Revenge
,
but
a
natural
Punishment
to
deter
men
from
committing
violent
and
unjust
actions
that
disturb
the
peace
of
humane
Society
,
since
the
wrong
doer
declares
himself
thereby
a
publick
Enemy
to
all
Mankind
.
And
on
this
account
Cain
feared
that
(
not
his
Father
onely
,
hut
)
every
one
that
met
him
,
would
slay
him
,
that
is
,
punish
him
for
the
death
of
their
Brother
or
Kinsman
.
And
if
this
were
unlawful
,
then
all
War
must
be
so
in
the
state
of
Nature
;
and
Princes
being
always
in
that
state
in
respect
of
each
other
,
could
never
make
any
War
for
the
gaining
of
Rights
usurped
,
or
to
punish
for
Injuries
received
.
So
that
this
power
which
a
man
in
some
cases
hath
over
the
life
of
another
,
is
onely
given
him
by
God
for
the
common
good
and
preservation
of
Mankind
,
of
which
every
particular
person
is
a
part
:
and
so
this
power
conferred
upon
the
supreme
Magistrate
is
no
more
,
nor
extends
higher
than
that
,
though
there
are
more
things
requisite
to
the
publick
peace
and
safety
of
a
Civil
Government
,
than
are
to
humane
Society
in
the
state
of
Nature
:
And
from
hence
do
supreme
Powers
derive
their
Right
of
making
positive
Laws
,
and
ordaining
higher
Punishments
for
Offences
than
the
Laws
of
God
or
Nature
do
expresly
appoint
,
as
for
Thest
,
Coining
,
and
the
like
.
Nor
is
the
Antecedent
true
,
that
no
man
in
the
state
of
Nature
hath
a
power
to
dispose
of
his
own
life
.
For
though
it
may
be
true
that
no
man
hath
a
Right
to
make
away
himself
whenever
he
dislikes
his
being
here
;
yet
it
does
not
therefore
follow
,
but
that
for
a
greater
good
to
the
publick
,
any
man
,
nay
a
Prince
himself
may
lay
down
his
life
for
his
Peoples
good
:
And
therefore
I
doubt
not
but
the
Example
of
Codrus
the
Athenian
King
was
not
onely
lawful
,
but
highly
commendable
,
in
facrificing
his
life
for
the
good
and
safety
of
his
People
,
supposing
that
all
their
Estates
and
Liberties
depended
upon
that
one
Battel
;
much
more
for
a
private
man
to
lay
down
his
life
to
save
some
publick
person
highly
useful
to
humane
Society
.
And
this
much
does
the
Apostle
Paul
himself
seem
to
admit
,
Rom.
5.7
.
when
he
says
,
For
scarcely
for
a
righteous
man
will
one
die
:
yet
peradventure
for
a
good
man
some
would
even
dare
to
die
.
Where
by
a
righteous
man
,
Expositors
understand
one
who
had
sufficiently
done
his
duty
in
an
ordinary
private
capacity
,
yet
contributed
little
to
the
publick
good
;
whereas
by
a
good
man
,
is
understood
some
person
highly
useful
and
beneficial
to
others
;
and
for
such
a
one
a
man
may
not
onely
dare
to
die
,
but
actually
lay
down
his
life
if
occasion
be
.
A
second
Objection
is
,
That
if
the
supreme
Magistrates
Authority
be
derived
from
the
People
,
then
this
Authority
must
be
either
inferiour
or
superiour
to
it
:
If
inferiour
,
how
can
the
People
be
commanded
or
governed
by
that
which
is
inferiour
to
its
self
?
If
superiour
,
how
can
the
Effect
be
more
noble
than
the
Gause
,
since
neither
any
particular
Person
nor
the
whole
Multitude
had
Soveraign
Authority
,
and
therefore
could
not
confer
it
upon
others
.
To
this
I
answer
,
That
this
Soveraignty
being
but
the
submission
of
the
Wills
of
the
Persons
that
institute
it
to
the
Will
of
him
on
whom
they
confer
it
,
that
he
should
thereby
make
use
of
all
their
Powers
for
the
common
good
of
them
all
;
and
being
therefore
not
any
physical
but
moral
Quality
,
may
be
produced
in
another
by
their
Compact
,
who
had
it
not
formally
in
themselves
before
:
As
from
the
Voices
of
divers
men
singing
together
,
there
may
arise
a
Harmony
which
was
not
in
their
particular
Voices
alone
,
though
each
of
these
Voices
must
be
musical
to
produce
it
.
So
every
particular
person
having
before
,
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
a
Right
to
preserve
himself
and
to
govern
his
own
actions
,
when
many
men
joyn
together
to
confer
this
care
upon
one
or
more
,
there
arises
a
Political
Power
indeed
more
noble
,
yet
of
the
same
kind
with
the
other
:
for
if
the
singulars
had
it
not
before
in
some
measure
,
the
universal
could
not
have
it
all
.
So
that
it
is
absurd
to
alleadge
,
that
Soveraignty
is
not
derived
from
men
,
because
it
cannot
be
found
among
a
mans
natural
powers
or
faculties
in
the
same
manner
,
as
it
is
in
the
supreme
Magistrate
,
as
if
there
were
no
other
than
Physical
Qualities
in
nature
;
yet
even
in
Physicks
,
admitting
Epicurus
Hypotheses
of
Atomes
to
be
true
,
there
will
arise
from
their
conjunction
that
quality
in
bodies
which
we
call
divisibility
,
and
yet
each
particular
Atome
considered
apart
,
being
indivisible
,
had
it
not
alone
.
But
to
answer
a
distinction
they
use
in
this
matter
between
the
immediate
efficient
and
the
immediate
constituent
modus
of
Soveraignty
;
they
confess
indeed
,
That
by
this
Election
and
Transferring
of
the
Power
of
the
Fathers
of
Families
,
the
Civil
Soveraign
is
declared
,
but
that
it
is
from
God
alone
that
he
receives
his
Soveraign
Authority
.
If
they
mean
by
this
transferring
of
Fatherly
Power
,
any
absolute
Power
which
God
hath
by
any
Law
divine
or
natural
,
conferred
upon
the
Fathers
over
their
Children
and
Families
;
I
have
already
proved
,
that
this
Fatherly
power
is
neither
absolute
,
nor
assigneable
to
another
.
If
they
mean
any
other
Soveraignty
distinct
from
this
,
then
they
must
needs
conceive
this
as
an
abstracted
Ens
,
or
Physical
quality
,
which
is
immediately
produced
by
God
,
and
conferred
upon
the
person
of
the
Soveraign
at
his
Election
or
Declaration
:
but
I
see
no
reason
of
constituting
here
more
Causes
than
needs
(
as
one
efficient
,
and
the
other
secundary
)
or
why
God
should
do
that
by
an
extraordinary
unintelligible
way
of
acting
,
which
he
may
perform
by
a
plain
and
easie
one
,
since
it
is
contrary
to
his
other
methods
of
acting
in
the
course
of
Nature
:
For
frustra
fit
per
plura
,
quod
potest
fieri
per
pauciora
;
and
supposing
as
I
have
already
proved
(
and
as
divers
who
are
sufficiently
for
Kingly
Power
do
admit
)
that
the
People
or
Heads
of
Families
have
a
freedom
of
setting
up
what
kind
of
Government
they
please
,
either
Monarchical
or
other
;
and
if
there
were
none
other
but
Aristocracies
or
Democracies
in
the
world
,
I
would
fain
know
what
then
would
become
of
this
notional
Majesty
or
Soveraignty
?
Now
if
any
man
should
ask
them
where
this
abstracted
Soveraignty
exists
before
it
finds
a
King
to
settle
upon
,
and
whether
it
be
a
Substance
or
an
Accident
:
if
the
latter
,
how
it
can
subsist
without
its
Subject
?
or
if
the
former
,
when
it
was
created
whether
it
was
at
the
beginning
of
the
world
,
or
like
the
Souls
of
men
,
creando
infunditur
,
&
infundendo
creatur
?
or
whether
there
be
one
single
Soul
of
Soveraignty
diffused
all
over
the
world
,
which
being
distributed
,
does
,
as
it
were
,
animate
so
many
Kings
?
Also
whether
this
Majesty
dies
with
the
Monarch
,
or
else
survives
him
as
the
Soul
does
the
Body
,
and
by
a
new
Metempsychosis
immediately
transfuses
it self
into
his
Successour
.
If
the
Gentlemen
of
this
Author's
Principles
please
but
to
consider
these
difficulties
,
I
'll
undertake
they
will
finde
them
as
hard
to
be
resolved
as
any
the
Author
hath
proposed
about
all
the
Peoples
agreeing
or
being
the
cause
of
this
Soveraignty
:
But
I
will
not
deny
that
God
is
properly
the
original
and
efficient
Cause
of
Soveraignty
as
of
all
good
things
,
and
particularly
of
that
power
whereby
every
individual
Freeman
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
hath
a
power
to
dispose
of
his
actions
for
his
own
preservation
and
the
common
good
of
mankind
.
And
the
particular
powers
of
many
men
being
put
together
,
constitute
that
which
we
call
a
Politick
or
Civil
Power
.
And
therefore
his
last
Objection
is
easily
answered
,
That
if
the
People
be
any
Cause
of
Soveraignty
or
Civil
Power
,
they
must
have
received
this
power
from
God
,
by
which
they
can
confer
it
on
any
other
:
But
it
can
no
way
be
proved
that
they
received
it
from
God
;
for
God
having
,
as
I
said
,
imprinted
upon
mans
Soul
such
a
tender
care
of
his
own
good
and
preservation
,
and
hath
likewise
enjoyned
him
to
preserve
Peace
and
Order
amongst
men
,
in
order
to
the
common
good
and
preservation
of
mankind
,
and
hath
likewise
given
him
reason
to
find
out
all
means
necessary
for
this
end
,
amongst
which
the
constitution
of
Civil
Government
must
be
reckon'd
as
the
principal
;
who
can
doubt
but
the
faculty
of
constituting
of
Civil
Government
likewise
proceeds
from
God
the
Author
of
Truth
and
giver
of
all
good
things
?
Thus
the
invention
of
Cloaths
,
Fire
,
and
Houses
,
proceed
from
God
,
though
they
were
found
out
by
man
as
his
Instrument
,
for
a
help
to
his
necessities
and
natural
weakness
.
's
History
of
Peru.
And
as
in
some
Countries
there
is
little
or
no
need
of
Cloaths
or
Houses
,
where
the
weather
is
always
warm
and
serene
;
so
likewise
God
hath
not
imposed
upon
any
People
an
absolute
Obligation
of
constituting
any
Civil
Government
at
all
,
if
they
can
live
without
it
,
or
at
least
of
its
exercising
farther
than
they
have
need
of
.
Thus
among
the
West-Indians
,
in
several
parts
of
America
,
History
of
the
Caribbe
Islands
,
lib.
11.
c.
19.
where
they
have
no
distinct
propriety
in
Land
,
more
than
in
their
little
Gardens
,
and
Cabins
,
(
which
in
Countries
so
slenderly
inhabited
as
those
,
where
Land
is
worth
nothing
)
every
man
enjoys
,
by
a
tacite
consent
,
a
living
upon
Venison
,
Fish
,
or
other
Animals
,
and
Fruits
which
the
Woods
produce
;
they
need
no
Chattels
,
nor
Dishes
,
but
a
few
Earthen-pots
or
Cups
of
Calebasses
,
besides
their
Bows
and
Arrows
,
and
Fishing-tackle
,
which
every
man
knows
how
to
make
for
himself
.
So
likewise
having
no
need
of
Clothes
,
and
living
but
from
hand
to
mouth
,
and
taking
care
onely
to
provide
meer
necessaries
of
life
,
as
they
never
have
any
superfluities
,
so
they
have
no
Disputes
about
them
:
and
most
of
their
things
being
easie
to
be
provided
,
they
are
seldom
known
to
steal
them
one
from
each
other
;
and
if
a
man
catch
another
stealing
any
thing
from
him
,
he
will
be
sure
to
beat
the
Thief
soundly
,
or
may
be
mark
him
with
the
sharp
Tooth
of
a
Beast
they
call
an
Agoutye
(
which
is
the
disgracefullest
punishment
any
man
can
suffer
:
)
so
that
one
of
the
main
ends
of
a
supreme
power
among
us
,
viz.
to
decide
Controversies
about
Property
,
and
punish
Thieves
,
are
there
of
no
use
.
And
as
for
other
Injuries
,
such
as
Maims
,
Adultery
,
and
the
like
,
they
have
no
certain
Judges
for
any
of
these
things
;
every
man
that
is
injured
in
any
of
these
cases
,
being
his
own
Judge
and
Executioner
,
observing
that
Law
of
an
Eye
for
an
Eye
,
and
a
Tooth
for
a
Tooth
;
onely
in
Adultery
the
man
hath
power
to
kill
both
his
Wife
and
the
Adulterer
,
if
taken
in
the
act
;
and
in
Murder
,
and
great
Hurts
or
Maims
,
where
the
party
injured
is
not
able
to
revenge
himself
,
his
neer
Relations
will
not
fail
to
do
it
;
and
if
they
should
omit
,
they
would
be
looked
upon
as
Cowards
or
infamous
:
so
that
being
naturally
loving
to
each
other
,
and
having
no
words
of
disgrace
to
quarrel
about
,
and
other
Quarrels
happening
but
seldom
,
and
no
man
maintaining
or
taking
the
part
of
the
wrong-doer
,
or
revenging
the
death
of
a
Murderer
or
Adulterer
,
they
have
lived
many
Ages
without
any
common
Power
to
keep
them
at
peace
among
themselves
;
and
yet
they
have
much
fewer
Crimes
committed
amongst
them
than
us
.
It
is
true
,
they
have
Captains
or
Cacicks
among
them
,
but
they
have
no
power
but
in
time
of
War
;
and
when
the
Expedition
is
ended
,
though
they
pay
them
reverence
and
respect
,
and
make
them
preside
in
all
their
Councils
and
Assemblies
,
yet
they
have
no
Authority
in
time
of
Peace
to
punish
or
question
any
man
.
So
that
if
they
lived
in
Islands
which
were
either
far
distant
from
others
,
or
else
were
inaccessible
,
and
would
make
no
forein
Expeditions
,
they
would
not
need
so
much
as
this
Cacick
,
and
so
could
live
together
without
any
other
Government
than
that
of
the
Fathers
of
Families
over
their
Wives
and
Children
.
But
perhaps
it
will
be
said
,
these
are
Man-eaters
and
barbarous
People
,
and
so
are
not
to
be
quoted
as
Examples
for
the
rest
of
mankind
.
It
is
true
,
the
Brasilians
eat
their
Enemies
taken
in
War
,
but
the
Caribbes
do
not
.
But
as
for
the
Observation
of
the
other
Laws
of
Nature
,
I
will
leave
it
to
any
man
to
judge
which
part
of
mankind
observe
them
best
;
those
that
can
live
peaceably
together
without
either
Judge
or
Gallows
,
or
we
that
can
scarce
be
at
quiet
,
though
we
have
them
.
But
I
have
done
this
,
onely
to
shew
an
intelligent
Reader
what
are
the
true
reasons
of
the
necessity
of
a
Civil
Power
amongst
us
that
have
a
full
propriety
in
all
Lands
and
Goods
by
the
particular
Laws
of
our
Countries
.
Having
now
I
hope
dispatcht
the
first
part
of
my
intended
Task
,
which
was
to
prove
that
the
Author's
Hypothesis
concerning
the
Monarchical
Despotick
Power
of
Adam
over
his
Wife
,
Children
,
or
Descendants
,
is
altogether
vain
,
and
without
just
grounds
either
from
Scripture
or
Reason
;
and
consequently
that
neither
any
Fathers
of
Families
,
nor
the
Princes
as
representing
them
,
can
from
divine
Grant
deduce
any
such
absolute
Power
or
Right
over
their
Children
or
Subjects
:
I
shall
not
trouble
my self
with
the
answering
of
the
rest
of
this
Treatise
,
having
gone
a
good
way
in
the
second
Chapter
,
and
answered
his
most
material
Objections
about
the
Peoples
conferring
Soveraignty
;
so
that
the
rest
is
of
small
consequence
.
I
shall
not
need
to
examine
whether
the
Jews
chose
the
King
,
or
God
,
since
that
Government
being
purely
Theocratical
,
it
concerns
other
Nations
not
at
all
;
much
less
shall
I
vindicate
the
Form
of
the
Roman
Commonwealth
,
or
dispute
whether
they
were
more
happy
under
Kings
or
Emperours
,
or
whether
Democracies
or
Tyrannies
are
best
;
or
affirm
that
the
People
can
correct
their
King
,
or
that
there
e're
have
been
any
Tyrants
in
England
since
the
Conquest
,
since
they
are
all
either
foreign
to
this
purpose
,
or
else
signifie
nothing
when
his
foundations
are
pulled
up
.
As
for
what
he
says
concerning
a
limited
or
mixt
Monarchy
,
I
shall
reserve
all
that
is
needful
to
be
observed
upon
that
subject
,
until
I
come
to
consider
the
Author's
Treatise
called
,
The
Anarchy
of
a
limited
Monarchy
;
where
all
or
the
greatest
part
of
what
he
hath
here
written
,
is
there
repeated
.
As
for
●his
third
Chapter
,
since
Divinity
is
not
my
Profession
,
and
that
the
Texts
of
S.
S.
he
there
quotes
,
have
been
debated
by
so
many
Expositors
both
in
English
and
Latine
,
I
count
needless
to
repeat
out
of
others
what
sense
they
may
bear
,
though
I
do
not
approve
of
the
Author's
interpretation
,
who
would
have
them
applied
alike
to
all
Princes
,
whether
good
or
bad
,
lawful
or
unlawful
;
since
upon
those
Principles
there
can
be
no
difference
between
a
just
Prince
and
a
Tyrant
,
or
between
a
lawful
Monarch
and
an
Usurper
.
Nor
shall
I
meddle
with
what
he
says
concerning
the
Kings
Power
and
Prerogative
,
though
I
think
there
are
divers
things
which
he
there
says
,
that
are
false
and
of
very
ill
consequence
;
yet
since
I
confine
my self
purely
to
the
Laws
of
Nature
and
Reason
,
I
shall
leave
it
to
other
more
able
Pens
,
and
better
skill'd
in
the
Laws
and
Customs
of
this
Kingdom
,
to
give
him
such
an
answer
as
they
deserve
.
Neither
would
I
be
thought
to
encourage
Princes
to
stretch
their
Power
to
the
utmost
limits
,
nor
yet
to
stir
up
Subjects
to
take
Arms
as
soon
as
ever
they
think
themselves
injured
,
since
the
Populace
is
but
too
apt
,
where
they
are
left
to
be
their
own
Judges
,
to
pronounce
Sentence
in
ther
own
favour
.
Therefore
,
quitting
all
these
as
unnecessary
Disputes
,
I
shall
now
proceed
to
take
a
short
view
of
the
rest
of
those
Errors
and
Mistakes
which
remain
yet
to
be
observed
in
his
other
Miscellany-Treatises
first
published
.
CHAP.
III.
I
Desire
the
Reader
in
the
first
place
to
take
notice
that
I
wholly
pass
by
the
first
Treatise
called
,
The
Freeholders
Grand
Inquest
,
since
I
confess
my self
no
Lawyer
verst
enough
in
the
learning
of
Records
,
to
answer
him
in
his
own
way
;
I
shall
therefore
leave
him
to
those
that
have
made
it
their
business
:
And
as
for
great
part
of
it
concerning
the
Antiquity
and
Power
of
the
Commons
in
Parliament
distinct
from
that
of
the
Peers
or
Inheritable
Nobility
,
I
shall
refer
the
Reader
to
Mr.
Petyts
learned
Treatise
of
the
Rights
of
the
Commons
of
England
,
See
likewise
a
late
Treatise
,
intituled
Jani
Anglorum
facies
nova
,
written
by
a
young
Gentleman
of
great
Learning
and
Ingenuity
.
where
all
Objections
against
it
are
in
my
opinion
fully
answered
.
Therefore
I
shall
begin
with
his
Observations
upon
Aristotle's
Politicks
;
which
I
shall
not
dwell
long
upon
,
since
I
look
upon
that
as
one
of
the
confusedest
Pieces
he
hath
written
:
Nor
is
it
my
business
,
as
that
great
Author
said
once
in
the
case
of
Plato
,
to
defend
Aristotle
,
but
Truth
.
I
shall
likewise
pass
by
the
Preface
,
since
it
contains
nothing
considerable
but
his
Hypothesis
of
Adam's
Monarchy
;
of
which
there
needs
no
more
to
be
said
.
And
as
for
the
places
out
of
St.
Paul
and
Peter
,
it
not
being
my
designe
to
write
Divinity-Lectures
,
I
shall
refer
the
Reader
to
the
learned
Commentators
;
onely
I
shall
take
notice
that
his
Assertion
,
That
these
Apostles
wrote
their
Epistles
when
the
name
of
the
Authority
and
People
of
Rome
was
still
in
being
,
though
the
Emperours
had
usurped
a
Military
Power
:
and
yet
though
the
Government
was
for
a
long
time
,
in
most
things
,
in
the
Senate
and
People
of
Rome
;
yet
for
all
this
,
neither
of
the
two
Apostles
take
notice
of
any
such
Popular
Government
;
and
our
Saviour
himself
divides
all
between
God
and
Caesar
,
and
●llows
nothing
to
the
People
.
All
which
,
though
but
a
Negative
Argument
against
Popular
Government
,
and
●o
not
conclusive
,
yet
the
foundation
of
it
is
not
true
:
For
though
in
Rome
there
remained
a
shadow
of
the
Power
in
the
Senate
,
yet
it
was
onely
in
such
cases
as
●he
then
Emperours
committed
to
their
judgment
(
as
●he
Kings
of
France
do
now
make
use
of
the
Parliament
of
Paris
)
onely
to
ease
themselves
of
divers
troublesome
Causes
,
or
to
take
off
the
odium
from
themselves
,
as
in
the
condemnation
of
Sejanus
and
divers
other
Conspirators
against
them
;
and
yet
they
reserved
the
last
Appeal
to
themselves
in
Cases
both
Civil
and
Capital
,
as
may
be
observed
in
St.
Paul's
appeal
to
Caesar
:
and
it
is
certain
that
the
Roman
Emperours
in
those
times
put
men
to
death
as
often
as
they
had
a
mind
to
it
,
by
their
own
power
made
what
Edicts
they
pleased
,
and
appointed
Proconsuls
and
Governours
of
Provinces
as
often
as
they
saw
it
convenient
,
and
had
all
Money
coined
with
their
Image
or
Superscription
,
and
received
and
disposed
of
all
Tributes
&
publick
Taxes
.
And
yet
this
Author
doubts
whether
Tiberius
,
Claudius
,
or
Nero
were
absolute
Monarchs
,
when
they
had
all
the
Prerogatives
that
a
Monarch
could
have
.
I
come
now
to
the
Author's
Observations
on
Aristotle's
Politicks
.
It
will
be
easie
to
prove
that
he
makes
use
of
him
in
all
places
that
make
for
his
Hypothesis
,
but
takes
no
notice
of
those
that
make
against
it
(
a
usual
course
among
Writers
,
especially
in
Politicks
or
Divinity
:
)
Nor
does
he
onely
do
this
,
but
likewise
oftentimes
perverts
Aristotle's
sence
to
make
it
subservient
to
his
own
;
of
which
I
shall
produce
these
instances
.
In
his
first
Quotation
,
p.
3.
he
renders
these
words
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
for
the
eldest
in
every
house
is
King
:
Whereas
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
does
not
here
signifie
to
be
an
absolute
Monarch
,
but
to
govern
as
a
Master
of
a
Family
or
chief
Ruler
;
a
power
fa●
short
of
that
of
an
absolute
Monarch
:
And
so
Lambinus
hath
rendered
it
in
his
Version
.
So
likewise
he
hath
misplaced
these
words
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
and
makes
them
to
come
in
as
a
reason
of
what
he
says
before
concerning
a
perfect
Monarchy
;
whereas
this
sentence
precedes
the
former
,
and
there
are
three
or
four
sentences
between
them
:
and
therefore
it
cannot
serve
for
a
Consequent
,
where
it
is
really
an
Antecedent
.
Nor
is
this
sentence
truely
rendered
by
the
Author
,
For
a
King
according
to
Law
,
makes
no
kind
of
Government
;
whereas
he
should
have
said
,
No
distinct
species
of
Government
:
for
so
are
these
last
words
to
be
rendered
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
or
else
he
would
make
Aristotle
contradict
himself
,
if
after
he
had
spoke
so
much
in
other
[
*
](A64092-e20990-b)
*
Vid.
3
Pol.
c.
14.
Speaking
of
the
ancient
Heroical
Kingdoms
.
places
of
a
King
according
to
Law
,
he
should
make
it
no
kind
of
Government
at
all
.
So
likewise
p.
4.
he
misrenders
these
words
:
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
That
of
all
Governments
Monarchy
is
the
best
,
and
a
Popular
State
the
worst
:
Whereas
any
one
but
meanly
skill'd
in
Greek
,
knows
that
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
does
not
signifie
Monarchy
,
but
Kingship
;
and
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
is
not
a
Popular
Estate
,
but
an
Aristocratical
Commonwealth
,
and
in
the
same
Chapter
put
in
opposition
to
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
.
I
shall
not
trouble
my self
to
inquire
whether
Aristotle
distinguishes
well
between
an
Aristocracy
and
an
Oligarchy
,
or
between
an
Oligarchy
and
a
Democracy
;
or
whether
he
do
well
to
exclude
Artificers
from
any
Vote
in
the
Government
:
These
I
shall
leave
to
be
defended
by
those
that
are
greater
admirers
of
him
than
my self
;
onely
I
will
see
that
(
if
I
can
)
he
have
fair
play
,
and
not
that
sence
put
upon
him
that
he
never
meant
.
And
therefore
I
shall
turn
over
to
p.
12.
where
he
quotes
another
place
out
of
Aristotle's
fourth
Book
,
cap.
13.
That
the
first
Commonwealth
among
the
Grecians
,
after
Kingdoms
,
was
made
of
those
that
waged
War
:
From
whence
he
would
infer
,
That
the
Grecians
,
after
they
left
off
to
be
governed
by
Kings
,
fell
to
be
governed
by
an
Army
:
So
that
any
Nation
or
Kingdom
that
is
not
charged
with
the
keeping
of
a
King
,
must
perpetually
be
at
the
charge
of
paying
and
keeping
of
an
Army
.
Which
,
though
it
happened
true
during
the
corrupt
Oligarchy
of
the
Rump
,
which
was
●ut
an
armed
Faction
contrary
to
the
sense
of
this
Nation
;
yet
is
not
a
necessary
Consequent
of
all
Commonwealths
:
Neither
is
it
the
Author's
sence
in
this
place
,
as
may
appear
by
what
he
says
before
,
and
what
●ollows
these
words
,
That
he
meant
no
such
thing
,
a
standing
Army
in
constant
Pay
being
a
thing
unknown
among
the
Greek
Commonwealths
,
where
every
Freeman
served
in
person
as
a
Horseman
or
on
foot
,
according
to
his
ability
,
as
any
that
reads
those
Histories
may
easily
observe
;
and
a
Guard
of
Strangers
,
or
a
constant
standing
Army
,
was
ever
held
the
Body
of
Tyranny
(
as
it
still
continues
in
all
absolute
Monar●hies
from
France
to
China
.
)
But
to
return
to
Aristle
in
the
place
before
cited
by
the
Author
,
where
speaking
just
before
of
the
Government
of
the
Maleans
and
other
Greek
Commonwealths
,
he
says
,
That
their
Government
consisted
not
onely
of
those
Footmen
that
bore
Arms
,
but
of
those
that
had
served
in
the
Army
:
And
then
follows
these
words
quoted
by
the
Author
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
.
So
the
words
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
are
not
well
rendered
by
those
that
waged
War
,
since
they
should
rather
be
rendered
by
those
that
went
to
the
Wars
;
this
Force
not
being
to
defend
them
from
their
own
Citizens
,
but
Neighbours
with
whom
they
were
still
at
Wars
:
for
it
appears
that
not
onely
those
had
a
share
in
the
Government
who
were
actually
in
Arms
,
but
those
also
that
had
served
in
the
Army
;
for
Aristotle
says
immediately
after
,
That
their
Strength
consisted
chiefly
at
first
of
Horsemen
,
and
that
as
the
Common-wealths
increased
in
the
strength
and
number
of
them
that
were
of
ability
or
substance
to
bear
Arms
,
the
Administration
of
the
Commonwealth
was
communicated
to
more
.
From
whence
it
appears
,
that
(
as
also
at
first
among
the
Romans
)
they
onely
had
a
Voice
in
their
Councils
or
Assemblies
,
who
were
able
to
maintain
themselves
in
the
Wars
at
their
own
charge
:
As
amongst
us
none
have
a
Vote
to
chuse
Parliament-men
,
but
Freeholders
;
or
as
in
old
times
,
none
but
those
who
served
in
the
Wars
in
person
,
had
Votes
in
the
Withena
Gemote
,
or
Great
Council
:
And
yet
this
was
no
standing
Army
no
more
than
those
in
Greece
.
So
likewise
neither
are
these
words
fairly
rendered
in
the
same
page
,
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
(
and
that
in
a
Popular
State
)
The
Soveraign
Power
is
in
the
Sword
,
and
those
that
are
possessed
of
the
Arms
;
but
are
thus
to
be
rendered
,
In
this
kind
of
Government
(
i.
e.
Popular
)
those
govern
and
have
greatest
Power
,
who
bear
Arms
and
fight
for
the
rest
(
which
is
but
reasonable
.
)
I
shall
not
trouble
my self
with
the
rest
of
those
Contradictions
and
Faults
he
find●
with
Aristotle
,
since
I
look
upon
this
Treatise
of
Politicks
as
the
most
confused
he
hath
writ
;
onely
it
seems
this
Author
did
but
skim
over
Aristotle
,
when
he
so
confidently
asserts
,
That
the
natural
Right
of
the
People
to
found
or
elect
their
own
kind
of
Government
,
is
not
once
disputed
by
him
.
which
whether
he
asserts
or
no
,
let
these
words
judge
,
lib.
5.
Pol.
cap.
10.
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
.
Which
may
be
thus
Englished
:
But
of
Kingdoms
by
discent
,
this
may
be
supposed
the
cause
of
their
dissolution
,
besides
those
al●
ready
mentioned
,
viz.
when
it
happens
to
many
of
them
,
who
not
being
endued
with
the
power
of
a
Tyrant
,
but
onely
with
a
Kingly
Authority
,
become
contemned
whilst
they
will
unjustly
abuse
their
Subjects
;
for
then
there
is
an
easie
dissolution
of
the
Government
;
for
he
is
not
a
true
King
over
those
that
like
not
his
Government
,
but
a
Tyrant
.
P.
20
,
&
21.
He
finds
fault
with
Aristotle
for
making
the
main
distinction
between
right
Forms
of
Government
,
and
those
that
are
imperfect
or
corrupt
,
to
consist
solely
in
this
,
That
where
the
profit
of
the
governed
is
respected
,
there
is
a
right
Government
;
but
where
the
profit
of
the
Governours
is
onely
regarded
,
there
is
a
corruption
or
transgression
of
Government
.
By
this
it
is
supposed
by
Aristotle
that
there
may
be
a
Government
(
which
he
calls
a
Tyranny
)
onely
for
the
benefit
of
the
Governour
.
That
this
Supposition
is
false
,
may
be
proved
from
Aristotle
himself
,
to
instance
in
the
point
of
Tyranny
.
And
therefore
the
Author
endeavours
to
make
him
contradict
himself
thus
:
Tyranny
(
saith
Aristotle
,
lib.
3.
cap.
7.
)
is
a
Despotical
or
Masterly
Monarchy
,
Now
he
confesseth
,
l.
3.
c.
6.
That
in
truth
the
Masterly
Government
is
profitable
both
to
the
Servant
by
nature
,
and
the
Master
by
nature
:
And
he
yields
a
solid
reason
for
it
,
viz.
It
is
not
possible
,
if
the
Servant
be
destroyed
,
the
Mastership
can
be
saved
.
Whence
it
may
be
inferred
,
That
if
the
Masterly
Government
of
Tyrants
cannot
be
safe
without
the
preservation
of
them
whom
they
govern
,
it
will
follow
,
That
a
Tyrant
cannot
govern
for
his
own
profit
onely
.
And
thus
his
main
definition
of
Tyranny
fails
,
as
being
grounded
on
an
impossible
Supposition
.
By
his
own
confession
,
no
Example
can
be
shewn
of
any
such
Government
that
ever
was
in
the
world
,
as
Aristotle
describes
Tyranny
to
be
:
for
under
the
worst
of
Kings
,
though
many
particular
men
have
unjustly
suffered
,
yet
the
Multitude
,
or
People
in
general
,
have
found
benefit
and
profit
by
the
Government
.
If
Aristotle
were
alive
,
I
doubt
he
would
say
this
Author
plaid
the
Sophister
with
him
,
and
did
not
onely
misquote
his
words
,
but
pervert
his
meaning
.
For
first
,
Aristotle
does
not
say
in
that
place
he
quotes
,
(
or
in
any
other
that
I
know
of
)
That
Tyranny
is
a
Despotical
or
Masterly
Monarchy
:
And
therefore
all
he
builds
upon
this
Concession
is
false
.
It
is
true
indeed
,
Aristotle
says
,
That
the
Government
of
the
Master
is
profitable
both
to
the
Servant
by
nature
,
and
the
Master
by
nature
,
(
that
is
,
upon
his
supposition
that
they
are
either
so
by
nature
.
)
But
the
Author
omits
what
immediately
follows
,
because
it
would
vindicate
Aristotle's
true
meaning
:
for
his
next
words
are
,
Nevertheless
it
(
i.
e.
the
Masterly
power
)
regards
chiefly
the
profit
of
the
Master
,
and
of
the
Servant
but
by
accident
;
but
Oecumenical
Government
,
or
that
of
a
Master
over
the
Wife
,
Children
,
and
Servants
,
is
for
their
sakes
whom
he
governs
,
and
for
the
common
good
of
them
all
.
Hence
it
appears
plainly
,
that
Aristotle
,
when
he
says
that
a
Tyranny
is
for
the
benefit
of
the
Governour
alone
,
he
does
not
mean
that
the
Subjects
can
have
no
benefit
at
all
by
it
,
since
it
is
the
Tyrants
interest
they
should
live
and
get
Children
,
or
else
he
would
quickly
want
Subjects
.
Thus
the
Children
of
Israel
,
under
the
Tyranny
of
Pharaoh
,
had
Meat
,
Drink
,
and
Cloaths
,
and
were
not
so
low
kept
but
they
got
Children
apace
;
and
yet
we
find
God
thought
them
opprest
,
and
heard
their
cry
.
But
Aristotle
clears
the
point
,
when
he
distinguishes
an
absolute
Masterly
power
over
a
Slave
,
from
that
of
a
Father
of
a
Family
;
the
Master
in
the
former
considering
onely
his
own
profit
,
and
the
preservation
of
the
Slave
but
by
accident
;
and
so
an
ill-natured
brutish
Master
takes
care
of
the
life
of
his
Slave
that
works
in
the
Mines
or
Sugar-works
in
the
Indies
,
not
out
of
any
love
to
the
person
of
the
Slave
,
but
because
he
cannot
subsist
without
him
.
So
a
Grasier
or
Butcher
takes
care
of
his
Cattel
that
they
thrive
and
do
well
(
as
they
call
it
)
yet
every
body
knows
that
they
take
this
care
onely
for
their
Carcasses
,
which
yield
them
so
much
ready
money
at
the
Market
.
So
that
indeed
a
Tyrant
onely
considers
his
own
good
in
the
welfare
of
his
Subjects
,
and
looks
upon
them
as
no
better
than
brute
Beasts
,
in
which
he
hath
an
absolute
property
to
shear
or
kill
,
as
he
thinks
it
most
conduces
to
his
own
profit
;
without
considering
to
what
end
he
is
set
over
them
:
As
the
Grand
Seignior
makes
use
of
the
bodies
of
his
poor
Christian-slaves
(
for
Subjects
I
cannot
call
them
)
to
fill
up
Ditches
,
and
to
blunt
the
edge
of
his
Enemies
Swords
.
But
that
all
Kings
are
bound
to
preserve
the
Lands
,
Goods
,
and
Lives
of
their
Subjects
,
the
Author
himself
confesses
,
(
Patriarcha
,
p.
94.
)
Though
not
by
any
municipal
Law
,
so
much
as
the
natural
Law
of
a
Father
,
which
binds
them
to
ratifie
the
Acts
of
their
Forefathers
and
Predecessors
in
things
necessary
for
the
publick
good
of
their
Subjects
.
So
then
I
hope
there
is
some
difference
between
the
Government
of
a
Father
over
his
Children
,
and
that
of
an
absolute
Lord
over
his
Slaves
,
notwithstanding
our
Author's
Quotation
out
of
Aristotle
,
whereby
he
would
make
them
all
one
,
viz.
That
a
Kingdom
will
be
a
Fatherly
Government
:
Which
is
true
,
if
you
take
it
in
the
best
sence
,
for
that
affection
that
Kings
like
Fathers
should
have
for
their
Subjects
:
And
so
it
is
plain
Aristotle
intended
it
,
by
the
words
immediately
foregoing
,
thus
;
For
the
Society
of
a
Father
with
his
Sons
,
has
an
appearance
of
a
Kingdom
;
not
that
it
is
so
indeed
.
But
to
make
an
end
with
Aristotle
,
I
will
give
you
one
place
more
which
the
Author
does
not
quote
fairly
;
Anarchy
of
a
limited
Monarchy
,
p.
294.
where
Aristotle
reckoning
up
the
several
sorts
of
Monarchies
,
The
last
(
says
he
)
is
the
Heroick
,
which
flourished
in
Heroical
times
;
to
whom
the
People
did
[
*
](A64092-e21820-b)
*
The
Greek
word
is
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
of
their
own
accord
.
willingly
obey
,
and
they
were
paternal
and
[
†
](A64092-e21850-b)
†
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
.
Which
confutes
the
Author's
fancy
,
that
a
King
according
to
Law
makes
no
kind
of
Government
.
legal
.
And
then
reckoning
up
the
occasions
&
reasons
of
their
Obedience
,
he
concludes
thus
:
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
,
And
these
were
chosen
Kings
by
the
consent
of
those
that
were
willing
(
Lambinus
renders
it
,
à
voluntariis
)
and
left
the
Kingdom
so
obtained
to
their
Children
.
Which
whole
sentence
is
omitted
by
the
Author
,
because
it
makes
against
his
Hypothesis
,
and
proves
that
the
most
ancient
Kingdoms
began
by
Election
of
the
People
.
So
true
is
that
excellent
Simile
of
the
elder
Dr.
Don's
,
That
Sentences
of
good
Authors
,
whilst
they
remain
in
their
proper
place
,
like
the
hairs
of
an
Horses
tail
,
concenter
in
one
root
of
strength
and
ornament
;
but
pulled
out
one
by
one
,
serve
only
to
make
Snares
.
And
indeed
he
hath
made
use
of
Aristotle
as
Lawyers
do
of
their
Adversaries
Evidence
;
where
it
makes
for
them
they
allow
it
,
and
make
use
of
it
;
but
where
it
is
against
them
,
it
is
false
,
or
signifies
nothing
.
I
shall
now
cursorily
look
over
the
rest
of
this
Discourse
;
where
(
p.
23.
)
though
it
be
true
what
Aristotle
says
,
That
the
People
must
act
as
a
Monarch
,
and
become
as
one
Person
,
before
it
can
govern
:
So
after
they
are
so
united
into
one
Senate
or
Council
,
it
is
no
good
Argument
to
say
,
That
the
whole
Multitude
does
not
govern
where
the
major
part
onely
rules
,
because
many
of
the
Multitude
that
are
so
assembled
,
are
so
far
from
having
any
part
in
the
Government
,
that
they
themselves
are
governed
against
,
and
often
contrary
to
their
wills
;
those
people
(
to
contract
it
)
being
the
major
part
in
one
Vote
,
that
are
perhaps
of
another
opinion
in
another
:
and
so
every
change
of
business
begets
a
new
major
part
.
For
though
it
is
true
,
every
individual
person
does
not
actually
agree
to
every
Vote
,
yet
implicitly
he
does
,
since
at
the
first
institution
of
the
Government
,
the
first
Compact
was
,
That
the
agreement
of
the
major
part
should
conclude
the
whole
Assembly
;
and
whoever
either
then
would
not
,
or
now
refuses
to
be
so
concluded
,
is
still
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
in
respect
of
all
the
rest
,
and
is
not
to
be
lookt
upon
as
a
Member
of
that
Commonwealth
,
but
as
an
Enemy
,
and
a
Covenant-breaker
.
I
shall
not
quarrel
with
the
Author
,
if
he
hold
that
Monarchy
does
most
conduce
to
the
main
ends
of
Government
,
Religion
towards
God
,
and
Peace
towards
men
;
since
I
agree
with
him
,
that
absolute
Monarchy
(
if
a
man
could
be
sure
the
Monarch
would
still
continue
prudent
and
just
)
were
the
best
sort
of
Government
for
mankind
.
Onely
I
cannot
but
smile
to
finde
the
Author
(
p.
27.
)
so
much
admire
the
high
respect
the
great
Turk
pays
the
Mufti
or
chief
Bishop
,
as
he
calls
him
,
(
where
by
the
by
,
I
never
heard
the
Turkish
Church-Government
was
Episcopal
before
)
yet
every
printed
Relation
can
tell
us
,
that
this
wonderful
Reverence
is
but
a
meer
piece
of
Pageantry
,
the
Idol
being
of
his
own
making
,
and
whom
he
again
unmakes
at
his
pleasure
;
a
sort
of
Ordination
I
suppose
the
Author
would
not
allow
to
those
of
an
indelible
Character
.
It
is
true
indeed
what
the
Author
affirms
,
(
p.
29.
)
That
Rome
,
being
in
any
desperate
condition
,
was
still
forced
to
flie
to
Monarchy
,
chusing
a
Dictator
with
absolute
Power
:
Yet
this
was
onely
as
a
General
in
time
of
War
,
or
some
great
civil
Commotion
being
very
near
it
;
where
it
must
be
confest
that
the
absolute
power
of
one
is
best
at
such
times
,
which
needed
a
speedy
Remedy
:
And
argues
no
more
the
Romans
good
opinion
of
Monarchy
,
than
it
does
any
mans
approbation
of
Martial
Law
;
which
though
perhaps
the
best
that
can
be
used
in
War
,
it
will
not
therefore
follow
that
it
were
to
be
chosen
in
times
of
Peace
,
no
more
than
because
Brandy
may
do
a
man
good
when
he
is
sick
in
his
stomach
,
therefore
he
ought
to
drink
it
constantly
.
So
that
as
one
benefit
of
the
Dictatorship
was
the
help
it
gave
them
upon
an
Extremity
,
so
the
next
happiness
they
wisht
for
after
that
was
over
was
,
that
the
Dictator
would
lay
down
his
Office
again
.
And
the
People
of
Rome
were
never
more
tyrannized
over
and
opprest
,
than
when
these
Dictators
held
their
Power
by
force
,
contrary
to
their
Institution
,
and
longer
than
there
was
need
of
them
;
as
may
be
seen
in
the
Examples
of
Sylla
and
Caesar
.
But
the
Consuls
,
though
they
had
in
many
things
(
especially
in
calling
the
Senate
,
and
in
commanding
the
Army
)
a
Kingly
power
,
yet
it
was
not
absolute
,
but
was
liable
to
be
questioned
by
the
Senate
and
People
;
as
any
man
that
reads
the
Roman
History
may
observe
.
[
See
the
Oration
of
Valerius
in
Dionysius
Halicarnassaeus
,
lib.
7.
upon
the
difference
between
the
Senate
and
People
.
]
I
shall
not
now
stay
to
dispute
whether
the
People
of
Rome
did
well
or
ill
in
expelling
Tarquin
;
but
besides
his
personal
faults
,
he
was
never
their
lawful
King
having
ascended
the
Throne
by
the
murder
of
his
Father-in-Law
Servius
Tullius
,
and
kept
it
by
the
power
of
a
standing
Army
,
without
the
due
Election
of
the
Senate
and
People
;
which
was
contrary
to
the
Institution
of
that
Kingdom
,
which
was
Elective
.
The
Author
(
p.
32.
)
makes
a
great
difficulty
to
grant
the
Roman
Commonwealth
to
be
Popular
:
It
is
true
,
it
was
not
so
absolutely
,
but
was
mixt
with
an
Aristocracy
in
the
Government
of
the
Senate
,
and
with
Regal
power
in
the
Authority
of
the
Consuls
;
yet
it
is
plain
,
the
supreme
Power
remained
in
the
Body
of
the
People
:
And
though
by
the
unequal
division
of
the
Centuries
,
it
is
true
,
the
greater
part
of
the
common
People
were
seldom
admitted
to
vote
,
being
concluded
by
the
major
part
of
the
first
97
Centuries
,
who
consisted
of
the
better
and
richer
men
;
yet
this
inequality
begot
the
Tributa
Comitia
,
which
(
with
the
Author
's
good
leave
)
was
more
absolute
than
the
former
Co●itia
Centuriata
:
For
Dion
.
Halicarnas
.
lib.
9.
relating
●he
original
of
these
Tributa
Comitia
,
and
how
they
●iffered
from
the
other
,
says
,
That
the
latter
were
trans●cted
in
one
day
without
any
Auspicia
,
and
could
make
〈◊〉
Law
at
once
without
any
precedent
Senatus
Consul●um
;
which
the
Curiata
Comitia
could
not
.
And
●hough
it
is
true
that
the
power
of
making
War
and
Peace
,
and
creating
of
Magistrates
,
remained
in
the
Comitia
Curiata
,
yet
the
judging
of
great
and
capital
Crimes
,
and
of
altering
and
making
Laws
,
remained
●n
the
Tributa
Comitia
;
as
may
be
observed
in
the
●anishment
of
Coriolanus
,
and
other
punishments
by
●hem
inflicted
;
and
all
Appeals
were
to
this
Assembly
.
Yet
granting
that
the
force
of
the
Government
lay
in
●he
Curiata
Comitia
,
or
better
sort
of
Citizens
,
yet
it
was
still
vertually
in
the
common
People
,
who
resumed
●t
when
they
would
.
And
it
was
to
this
whole
Body
●f
the
People
that
Valerius
Publicola
used
,
when
Con●ul
,
to
make
the
Lictors
abase
his
Fasces
,
and
in
that
sufficiently
acknowledged
where
the
Soveraign
Power
●esided
.
I
shall
not
trouble
my self
farther
to
defend
the
Mo●el
of
the
Roman
Commonwealth
,
which
I
look
upon
●s
one
of
the
most
unequal
and
irregular
that
ever
were
;
and
if
it
had
not
been
for
the
excellent
Temper
,
admirable
Discipline
,
and
exact
Education
of
●hat
People
,
it
was
impossible
it
could
ever
have
lasted
●o
long
:
In
which
when
they
began
to
grow
remiss
●hrough
Riches
and
Luxury
,
their
Commonwealth
soon
fell
to
pieces
,
being
indeed
never
well
compacted
●t
first
.
Much
less
shall
I
take
upon
me
to
defend
a
Popular
Government
,
where
the
mixt
Multitude
,
without
any
Representatives
,
consult
of
Affairs
,
or
make
Laws
.
Any
man
that
will
but
read
Thucydides
and
Livy
,
will
see
enough
of
it
.
As
for
the
Author's
Arguments
against
the
People●
being
able
to
agree
to
institute
any
Government
a●
all
,
they
are
most
of
them
but
meer
Wrangling
,
and
have
been
answered
in
the
foregoing
Observations
,
and
so
need
not
be
repeated
.
I
shall
likewise
pass
by
the
Author's
Directions
for
Obedience
to
Government
in
doubtful
times
,
since
I
have
already
taken
notice
of
all
that
is
considerable
in
it
.
CHAP.
IV.
I
Shall
therefore
in
the
next
place
look
over
his
miscellany
observations
.
(1)
Upon
divers
modern
Authors
.
As
for
Mr.
Hob's
Leviathan
.
I
shall
leave
them
to
decide
the
controversie
as
they
please
,
and
refer
it
to
the
readers
judgment
who
hath
the
better
on
't
:
For
in
many
things
I
think
neither
of
them
are
in
the
right
:
only
it
is
a
hundred
pitties
Mr.
Hobs
did
not
consult
the
Author
,
and
take
in
his
Patriarcal
Hypothesis
,
and
then
all
his
rights
of
exercising
Soveraign
Tyranny
would
have
gone
down
well
enough
.
But
for
my
part
I
neither
like
the
foundation
nor
the
building
which
Mr.
Hobs
hath
set
up
,
and
therefore
shall
here
leave
the
Author
to
build
and
pull
down
as
he
pleases
without
my
intermedling
.
And
less
shall
I
take
upon
me
to
vindicate
Milton
,
since
that
were
at
once
to
defend
downright
Murder
and
Rebellion
.
So
that
I
shall
turn
over
to
his
observations
upon
Grotius
,
an
Author
of
greater
learning
,
and
better
reputation
,
than
either
of
them
.
Where
I
shall
not
trouble
my self
to
defend
the
manifold
distinctions
,
Thomas
Aquinas
may
well
enough
be
defended
,
that
there
is
such
a
thing
too
proved
from
11.
Romans
v.
14
,
15.
For
though
he
doth
not
say
expresly
that
nature
is
a
Law
unto
them
,
but
they
are
a
law
unto
themselves
,
yet
certainly
Saint
Pauls
meaning
is
to
the
same
:
For
if
the
Gentiles
by
nature
did
the
things
contained
in
the
law
,
and
so
were
a
law
unto
themselves
,
I
know
not
what
else
he
can
mean
by
their
doing
by
nature
the
things
contained
in
the
law
,
but
their
living
according
to
the
Laws
of
nature
or
right
reason
,
which
(
all
rational
men
are
sensible
of
as
soon
as
they
come
of
an
age
able
to
exert
this
faculty
and
so
)
becomes
by
nature
a
Law
unto
themselves
;
neither
can
this
be
custom
,
since
Saint
Paul
says
they
do
so
by
nature
&c.
the
things
contained
in
the
Law
.
Neither
do
I
see
any
Reason
why
Grotius
is
to
be
blamed
for
not
taking
his
Hypothesis
concerning
the
Original
of
Mankind
,
of
Dominion
,
and
Property
out
of
Genesis
,
since
writing
of
the
rights
of
Peace
and
War
according
to
the
laws
of
nature
,
and
the
general
consent
of
civilised
Nations
,
and
not
according
to
any
revealed
Will
,
or
Law
of
God
he
was
not
bound
(
nay
it
was
contrary
to
his
purpose
)
to
make
use
of
Scripture
farther
than
to
confirm
what
could
be
made
out
from
natural
reason
alone
,
for
to
have
done
otherwise
had
been
to
have
written
a
treatise
of
cases
of
Conscience
in
Divinity
,
and
not
of
right
and
wrong
by
the
laws
of
nature
.
So
that
though
he
sometimes
make
use
of
Texts
of
Scripture
,
yet
it
is
either
to
strengthen
those
,
or
else
to
answer
some
objections
that
may
be
drawn
from
thence
against
his
conclusions
.
And
therefore
he
was
not
obliged
to
take
notice
,
whether
God
gave
a
begining
to
Mankind
from
one
man
,
or
more
at
once
,
since
it
might
if
he
had
pleased
have
been
either
way
.
Nor
yet
did
he
dream
of
Adams
Monarchy
over
the
whole
Creation
before
he
had
any
Subjects
to
command
,
nor
of
his
being
sole
Lord
Proprietor
and
first
occupant
of
all
the
earth
,
and
of
all
the
Creatures
in
it
,
when
neither
he
,
nor
his
Children
ever
knew
,
nor
made
any
use
of
the
1000.
parts
;
of
them
,
these
were
Notions
too
fine
spun
for
a
man
of
his
solid
judgment
ever
to
light
on
,
so
therefore
we
must
be
beholding
to
our
Author
and
some
English
Divines
for
this
admirable
discovery
.
Yet
as
I
doubt
not
but
if
that
great
man
were
alive
,
he
could
well
enough
defend
himself
by
that
great
reason
,
and
learning
he
was
Master
of
,
against
what
ever
this
Author
or
some
other
lesser
Scriblers
could
reasonably
object
against
a
work
of
that
nature
;
yet
I
doubt
not
but
most
of
those
things
the
Author
observes
as
errors
,
may
be
well
enough
defended
by
one
of
far
meaner
parts
,
and
less
learning
than
Grotius
himself
;
so
that
I
am
not
convinced
that
he
either
forgets
or
contradicts
himself
(
as
our
Author
will
needs
have
him
)
when
he
refers
alieni
abstinentia
or
abstaining
from
that
which
belongs
to
another
,
In
answer
to
which
,
it
will
appear
that
a
Propriety
of
occupancy
or
the
personal
possession
of
things
and
applying
it
to
the
use
of
one
or
more
men
while
they
have
need
of
it
,
may
very
well
consist
with
community
,
and
is
absolutely
necessary
to
the
preservation
of
Mankind
:
As
for
Example
,
a
Theater
is
in
Common
to
all
that
have
a
right
of
coming
thither
,
but
no
man
can
say
that
one
place
in
it
is
more
his
than
anothers
,
untill
he
is
seated
in
it
,
and
then
that
place
is
so
much
his
,
that
whilest
the
Play
lasts
no
man
can
without
injury
put
him
out
of
it
;
so
likewise
supposing
the
Earth
and
fruits
thereof
to
have
been
at
first
bestowed
in
Common
on
all
its
inhabitants
;
yet
since
Gods
first
Command
to
man
was
,
encrease
and
multiply
,
if
he
hath
a
right
to
perform
the
end
,
he
hath
certainly
a
right
to
the
means
of
his
preservation
,
and
the
propagation
of
his
species
,
so
that
though
the
fruits
of
the
earth
,
or
beasts
,
for
food
were
all
in
common
,
yet
when
once
any
man
had
by
his
own
labour
acquired
such
a
proportion
of
either
as
would
serve
the
necessities
of
himself
,
and
Family
,
they
became
so
much
his
own
,
as
that
no
man
could
without
manifest
injustice
rob
him
of
these
necessities
of
life
;
and
this
sort
of
Community
was
most
Primitive
,
and
Natural
,
being
still
retained
among
the
Americans
to
this
day
,
the
rest
of
the
Country
lying
still
in
common
,
neither
can
any
Indian
prescribe
to
this
or
that
Tree
,
that
grows
out
of
his
own
Garden
,
or
to
any
of
the
wild
Beasts
,
that
this
is
his
more
than
anothers
,
until
he
hath
either
gathered
those
or
killed
the
other
,
and
then
all
look
upon
it
as
robbery
to
take
from
each
other
,
what
they
are
once
possessed
of
;
so
likewise
in
this
state
of
Community
,
if
an
Indian
make
a
bargain
with
another
to
give
him
some
of
his
venizon
for
such
a
proportion
of
maiz
or
roots
,
there
is
never
an
honest
Indian
but
will
judge
the
taker
bound
to
make
good
his
bargain
without
any
dispute
;
so
likewise
if
any
two
or
more
of
them
make
a
bargain
to
go
a
hunting
,
or
fishing
together
,
upon
condition
that
the
Venizon
,
or
Fish
that
they
shall
take
be
equally
divided
amongst
them
all
,
I
think
every
one
of
them
will
think
himself
wronged
if
one
of
them
cheat
or
steal
from
the
rest
before
the
quarry
come
to
be
divided
.
So
that
you
may
see
how
true
it
is
which
this
Author
affirms
,
that
if
all
things
were
common
by
nature
there
could
be
no
contracts
,
agreeable
to
which
is
the
Hypothesis
layd
down
by
Grotius
;
‛
that
God
imediately
after
the
Creation
did
bestow
upon
Mankind
in
general
a
right
over
all
things
of
an
inserior
nature
,
from
whence
it
came
to
pass
,
that
presently
every
man
might
take
what
he
would
for
his
own
occasions
,
and
that
such
an
universal
right
was
instead
of
property
,
for
what
every
man
so
took
,
another
could
not
take
from
him
but
by
injury
.
But
it
seems
our
Author
will
have
this
repugnant
to
Scripture
,
‛
supposes
that
Adam
by
donation
from
God
,
Gen.
1.28
.
was
made
general
Lord
of
all
things
,
not
without
such
a
private
dominion
to
himself
as
(
without
his
grant
)
did
exclude
his
Children
;
and
that
by
donation
,
assgnation
,
or
some
kind
of
cession
(
before
he
was
dead
or
left
any
heir
to
succeed
him
)
his
Children
had
their
distinct
territories
by
private
dominion
;
Abel
had
his
flocks
,
and
pastures
for
them
;
Cane
had
his
fields
for
Corn
,
and
the
land
of
Nod
where
he
built
himself
a
City
.
For
the
confutation
of
which
opinion
,
I
have
already
proved
that
Adams
absolute
dominion
over
the
lives
and
persons
of
his
Children
is
not
to
be
deduced
from
that
place
of
Genesis
,
before
cited
by
Mr.
Selden
.
Let
us
now
consider
whether
Adam
had
by
these
words
an
absolute
dominion
over
the
world
and
all
things
therein
,
distinct
from
that
of
his
wife
and
Children
,
the
words
are
Male
and
Female
created
he
them
,
and
God
blessed
them
,
and
God
said
unto
them
,
be
fruitful
and
multiiply
and
replenish
the
Earth
,
and
subdue
it
,
and
have
do
minion
over
the
Fish
of
the
Sea
,
and
over
the
Fowel
of
the
Air
;
and
over
every
living
thing
that
moveth
upon
the
face
of
the
Waters
.
)
From
whence
it
may
be
observed
,
1.
That
though
these
words
are
placed
before
the
making
of
Eve
by
a
Prolepsis
(
very
usual
in
Scripture
)
yet
it
is
apparent
that
they
must
have
been
spoken
after
it
,
by
these
words
male
and
female
created
he
them
,
since
Moses
could
not
speak
of
a
Female
untill
the
woman
was
made
.
2.
That
this
Dominion
over
the
creatures
is
given
unto
them
both
joyntly
,
the
grant
of
the
Dominion
as
well
as
the
blessing
being
given
alike
to
them
.
And
God
blessed
them
,
and
said
unto
them
&c.
3.
That
it
does
not
appear
that
this
Dominion
was
personal
to
Adam
and
Eve
alone
,
exclusivly
to
their
Children
,
and
descendents
,
so
that
none
of
them
could
eat
,
or
dispose
of
any
fruits
of
the
Earth
for
the
supplying
of
the
necessities
of
nature
without
their
leave
,
for
the
words
are
general
,
Male
and
Female
created
he
them
;
and
so
seem
,
though
spoke
to
the
persons
of
Adam
and
Eve
as
the
Protoplasts
of
Mankind
to
relate
to
all
the
Males
,
and
Females
that
ever
should
be
born
.
4.
That
this
Dominion
was
not
absolute
to
dispose
of
the
Creatures
as
they
pleased
,
since
the
previledge
of
using
them
for
food
was
not
given
until
after
the
flood
.
So
if
these
words
in
Genesis
do
not
prove
an
absolute
Dominion
in
Adam
,
over
all
things
,
I
do
not
see
any
other
place
that
can
;
for
though
it
is
true
that
God
after
the
fall
made
the
woman
subject
to
her
husband
;
yet
I
do
not
see
why
she
should
therefore
loose
her
right
of
preserving
her self
by
the
fruits
of
the
earth
,
or
her
using
any
of
the
Creatures
,
suppose
the
milk
of
a
Cow
without
her
husbands
consent
.
For
if
Adam
had
been
at
any
time
in
an
ill
humour
(
all
the
things
in
the
world
being
his
)
should
he
have
but
forbid
her
to
eat
any
of
them
without
his
leave
,
our
great
Grandmother
might
have
starved
without
all
remedy
.
So
likewise
had
he
been
at
any
time
angry
with
any
of
his
Sons
,
and
had
forbid
them
to
touch
so
much
as
an
Apple
,
they
must
either
have
perished
,
or
if
they
had
filled
their
bellys
,
been
at
once
guilty
of
Theft
,
and
disobedience
;
so
that
it
had
been
in
his
power
without
any
violence
to
have
taken
away
their
lives
when
he
pleased
.
But
I
cannot
think
it
rational
,
neither
is
it
consonant
to
Scripture
,
that
God
gave
Adam
such
a
despotick
power
over
all
things
;
for
since
all
the
Children
of
Adam
had
as
much
right
to
their
lives
as
Adam
had
himself
,
it
must
likewise
follow
,
that
they
had
as
good
a
right
to
the
fruits
of
the
earth
,
which
were
then
the
only
means
to
maintain
it
,
and
consequently
might
have
filled
their
bellies
when
they
pleased
with
any
of
the
natural
products
of
the
earth
,
without
their
Fathers
leave
;
for
the
Psalmist
saith
,
God
gave
the
Earth
to
the
Children
of
men
,
that
is
,
not
to
any
one
man
,
nor
yet
absolutely
in
common
,
but
to
be
either
divided
,
or
used
in
common
,
as
they
should
find
it
stand
best
with
their
convenience
and
way
of
living
;
so
that
I
shall
not
much
dispute
with
the
Author
whether
Cain
,
and
Abel
had
their
separate
Pastures
for
their
Flocks
by
the
Assignment
of
their
Father
;
though
I
believe
it
will
be
a
pretty
hard
task
to
prove
that
Cain
,
when
he
ran
away
for
his
brothers
murder
,
enjoyed
the
land
of
Nod
,
where
he
built
a
City
by
his
fathers
settlement
.
But
though
Mr.
Selden
,
and
the
Author
agree
very
well
about
the
distinct
Dominion
of
Adam
,
yet
they
do
not
so
concerning
that
of
Noah
,
and
his
Sons
,
whom
Mr.
Selden
,
(
and
I
think
with
very
good
reason
)
from
Gen.
IX
.
2.
Will
have
to
be
joynt
Commonors
with
their
Father
in
the
dominion
of
the
world
and
all
its
creatures
;
but
the
Author
says
,
that
the
Text
doth
not
warrant
it
.
‛
For
though
the
Sons
are
mentioned
in
the
blessing
,
yet
it
may
be
best
understood
with
a
subordination
,
or
benediction
in
succession
,
the
blessing
might
be
fulfilled
,
if
the
Sons
either
under
or
after
their
Father
enjoyed
a
private
dominion
:
It
is
apparent
that
the
words
rather
warrant
the
contrary
.
For
the
Text
does
not
mention
any
blessing
in
subordination
but
is
alike
in
present
to
Noah
and
his
Sons
,
for
God
spake
to
Noah
and
to
his
Sons
,
and
so
is
their
power
over
the
creatures
:
as
appears
v.
3.
Every
moving
thing
that
liveth
,
shall
be
meat
for
you
;
even
as
the
green
herb
,
that
is
(
the
fruits
granted
to
Adam
before
)
have
I
given
you
(
in
the
plural
number
)
all
things
.
As
for
this
Authors
other
argument
from
the
private
dominion
of
Adam
,
it
might
be
good
against
Mr.
Selden
,
who
had
admitted
it
before
,
but
is
none
against
those
that
do
not
believe
any
such
grant
.
As
for
Noah's
being
sole
heir
of
the
world
,
he
takes
that
for
granted
(
which
is
no
law
of
nature
)
that
in
the
state
of
nature
one
man
is
more
an
heir
to
his
Father
(
or
any
other
relation
)
than
another
;
but
having
confuted
that
opinion
already
,
I
need
say
no
more
of
it
here
.
Mr.
Seldens
account
of
the
original
of
Propriety
,
‛
After
Noah
is
,
that
in
distributing
Territories
,
the
consent
of
Mankind
passing
their
promise
or
compact
(
which
did
also
bind
their
Posterity
)
did
intervene
so
,
that
men
departed
from
their
common
right
of
Communion
of
those
things
,
which
were
so
distributed
to
particular
Lords
and
Masters
.
But
the
Author
replys
,
that
this
distribution
by
the
consent
of
Mankind
we
must
take
upon
trust
,
for
there
is
not
the
least
proof
of
it
out
of
Antiquity
:
If
by
Antiquity
he
means
prophane
Authors
,
all
of
them
;
both
Historians
and
Poets
that
have
writ
of
this
subject
are
for
a
primitive
Community
of
all
things
,
necessary
for
the
life
of
Man
:
As
any
man
that
considers
what
the
Poets
say
concerning
the
golden
Age
,
whose
cheif
happiness
they
place
in
mens
enjoyment
of
the
fruits
of
the
earth
in
Common
,
nor
does
Lactantius
Li.
V.
Inst.
Cap.
5.
one
of
the
learnedst
of
the
Fathers
interpret
those
passages
otherwise
.
If
by
antiquity
he
means
proof
out
of
Scripture
;
that
neither
makes
for
or
against
this
opinion
,
the
Scriptures
not
being
written
to
shew
us
the
originals
either
of
Government
,
or
Propriety
,
any
more
than
to
teach
men
Chymistry
or
Astronomy
,
though
there
be
some
so
sottish
to
think
they
thus
find
some
grounds
for
their
Fancies
in
those
studies
;
yet
it
appears
that
the
land
of
Canaan
was
all
,
or
most
of
it
in
Common
in
Abrahams
time
,
or
else
he
could
never
have
lived
,
and
kept
his
flocks
upon
it
as
a
separate
Master
of
a
Family
,
without
becoming
subject
to
any
other
Prince
.
But
however
I
look
upon
this
Tradition
delivered
by
the
Greek
and
Latin
Authors
every
whit
as
good
as
that
Jewish
one
which
Mr.
Selden
quotes
out
of
Eusebius
,
and
Cednenus
:
though
he
does
not
lay
any
stress
upon
it
.
But
our
Author
admits
it
as
an
undeniable
Record
.
That
Noah
himself
as
Lord
of
all
was
Author
of
the
distribution
of
the
world
,
and
of
all
private
dominion
,
and
that
by
an
appointment
of
an
oracle
from
God
he
did
confirm
this
Distribution
by
‛
his
last
Will
and
Testament
,
which
at
his
death
he
left
in
the
hands
of
Shem
,
his
eldest
Son
,
and
also
warned
all
his
Sons
that
none
of
them
should
invade
any
of
their
brothers
dominions
,
or
injure
one
another
,
because
from
thence
discord
,
and
civil
war
,
would
ensue
.
It
s
not
likely
that
the
Antient
Jews
should
know
any
thing
of
this
Will
of
Noahs
,
for
if
they
had
,
so
diligent
an
Author
,
and
so
well
versed
in
the
Jewish
Antiquities
as
Josephus
,
would
not
have
omitted
so
famous
a
piece
of
history
.
2.
The
Rahbins
themselves
,
and
consequently
our
Fathers
of
the
Church
are
not
agreed
whether
Shem
or
Japhet
were
the
eldest
.
For
though
it
is
true
that
St.
Austin
and
those
Fathers
that
follow
the
vulgar
translation
,
made
Shem
the
eldest
;
yet
St.
Chrysostom
,
and
all
the
Fathers
of
the
Greek
Church
,
who
therein
follow
the
LXX
.
Versior
,
as
of
greater
Antiquity
and
Authority
,
are
for
Japhets
being
the
eldest
brother
:
So
that
this
Testament
being
left
in
Shems
hands
is
a
meer
Rabinical
invention
,
it
being
much
to
be
doubted
whether
Letters
,
much
more
Wills
in
writing
were
in
fashion
,
in
Noah's
days
,
and
if
Noah
left
no
Will
,
which
no
Jury
can
now
decide
)
then
the
world
was
left
to
Noahs
Sons
,
Grand-children
in
Common
to
be
divided
according
to
their
several
occasions
,
since
they
all
three
had
equal
right
to
it
:
But
it
seems
a
weak
Hypothesis
if
it
serve
the
Authors
present
purpose
shall
be
received
,
though
it
contradict
his
other
Principles
:
For
in
his
Patriarcha
and
other
of
his
treatises
he
makes
Adam
sole
Monarch
of
the
World
,
and
that
this
right
descended
wholy
and
entirely
to
Adam's
right
heir
;
But
here
we
find
Noah
turns
the
Propriety
and
Dominion
of
the
world
into
an
absolute
gavel-kind
,
and
distributing
the
Earth
among
his
three
Sons
,
makes
them
all
Heirs
and
Monarchs
alike
,
so
that
Shem
the
elder
is
here
disinhereted
not
only
of
his
entire
Dominion
in
the
world
,
but
also
of
his
natural
right
of
Lording
it
over
the
rest
of
his
bretheren
,
so
that
whereas
the
whole
world
should
have
been
his
,
if
his
Father
had
not
made
this
unlucky
Will
,
he
is
fain
to
be
content
with
a
third
part
.
I
shall
pass
by
other
impossibilities
in
this
fancy
of
Noah's
Will
,
as
how
Noah
should
by
revelation
make
a
distribution
of
the
Earth
among
his
Sons
,
when
he
never
had
discovered
a
hundreth
part
of
it
.
Josephus
,
and
the
Fathers
not
supposing
him
ever
to
have
descended
from
the
Mountains
of
Ararat
into
the
Plains
all
his
life
time
.
But
to
pass
over
such
Romantick
fancies
,
let
us
come
to
the
Authors
more
solid
Arguments
:
Why
Dominion
,
and
Property
could
not
be
introduced
by
the
voluntary
consent
of
Men
,
and
therefore
must
needs
(
P.
70.
)
have
begun
from
Noahs
appointment
.
Toward
the
end
of
these
observations
he
puts
this
Quere
.
‛
If
it
were
a
thing
so
voluntary
,
and
at
the
pleasure
of
men
,
when
they
were
free
,
to
put
themselves
under
subjection
,
why
may
not
they
as
voluntarily
leave
this
subjection
when
they
please
,
and
be
free
again
?
If
they
had
a
liberty
to
change
their
natural
freedom
,
into
a
voluntary
subjection
,
there
is
a
stronger
reason
that
they
may
change
their
voluntary
subjection
into
natural
freedom
,
since
it
is
as
lawful
for
men
to
alter
their
wills
as
their
judgments
.
To
which
it
may
be
●nswered
,
that
the
same
reason
that
made
men
in●itute
civil
Government
,
and
Property
at
first
,
the
●me
likewise
obliges
them
to
maintain
it
,
being
once
●…stituted
in
the
state
in
which
they
find
it
:
For
since
●…e
Common
good
of
Mankind
,
is
the
highest
end
a
●nan
can
propose
to
himself
,
and
the
common
good
●f
the
City
,
or
Commonwealth
where
he
lives
,
the
●reatest
subordinate
end
next
to
that
,
and
that
both
Government
,
and
Property
were
at
first
introduced
●y
common
consent
for
the
good
of
those
humane
●ocieties
that
first
agreed
to
it
,
every
succeeding
member
of
that
Commonwealth
,
or
civil
society
,
●hough
born
never
so
many
ages
after
,
is
as
much
ob●iged
to
the
observation
thereof
,
as
they
that
first
in●tituted
it
;
and
though
some
men
either
by
their
own
fault
,
and
the
carelesness
,
or
prodigality
of
their
Ancestors
,
may
perhaps
be
now
under
such
Circumstances
by
reason
of
their
poverty
,
as
that
civil
Government
may
appear
inconvenient
for
them
,
and
the
Property
now
establisht
contrary
to
their
interests
,
as
having
perhaps
little
share
either
in
lands
,
or
goods
,
he
is
not
therefore
at
liberty
to
resist
the
Government
,
and
to
change
the
course
of
this
Property
already
establisht
;
and
this
is
by
the
laws
of
nature
,
without
any
Divine
revelation
:
since
no
man
can
disturb
the
●general
Peace
of
humane
society
for
his
own
private
●advantage
,
or
security
,
without
transgressing
the
natu●al
laws
of
God
,
by
bringing
all
things
into
as
far
as
●in
him
lies
out
of
the
setled
course
they
now
are
in
,
into
a
state
of
Anarchy
and
confusion
,
which
having
once
●entred
into
War
,
this
violent
usurper
of
another
mans
rights
can
be
no
more
sure
to
keep
what
he
hath
unjustly
gotten
,
than
he
was
,
from
whom
he
took
it
:
and
consequently
can
never
be
in
security
until
he
have
again
entred
into
the
same
compacts
for
establishing
both
Government
and
Propriety
,
which
his
Ancestors
did
at
first
:
So
that
there
can
rationally
no
peace
nor
setled
security
be
expected
as
long
as
he
detains
that
which
he
at
first
took
from
another
by
force
.
As
for
the
other
difficulty
he
makes
,
How
all
the
men
in
the
world
should
agree
in
one
mind
,
and
at
one
instant
of
time
to
change
the
natural
Community
of
all
things
into
a
private
Domminion
,
for
without
such
an
unanimous
consent
,
it
was
not
possible
for
Community
to
be
altered
;
for
if
but
one
man
in
the
world
had
dissented
,
the
alteration
had
been
unjust
,
because
that
man
by
the
law
of
nature
had
a
right
to
the
common
use
of
all
things
in
the
world
;
so
that
to
have
given
a
Propriety
of
any
one
thing
to
any
other
had
been
to
have
rohbed
him
of
his
right
to
the
common
use
of
all
things
:
which
objection
likewise
is
thus
farther
urged
by
another
Author
,
That
the
nature
of
things
in
common
is
such
,
that
there
is
not
the
least
Atome
in
them
,
but
every
member
of
the
Community
hath
a
share
in
it
,
so
that
no
man
could
appropriate
,
or
enclose
any
thing
to
himself
without
a
wrong
to
the
whole
,
or
if
all
the
rest
had
agreed
to
it
,
that
one
man
who
refused
this
enclosure
,
might
have
broken
open
all
theirs
.
Which
had
been
no
difficulty
at
all
,
if
the
Author
had
but
considered
what
kind
of
right
God
had
bestowed
upon
Mankind
at
first
,
which
was
not
an
absolute
positive
,
or
unalterable
communion
of
every
man
pro
indiviso
,
every
blade
of
grass
in
the
world
:
(
for
such
as
a
Fiction
of
our
Laws
suppose
,
among
Tenants
in
common
)
for
then
the
Products
of
the
earth
could
have
contributed
nothing
to
the
ends
for
which
they
were
designed
by
God
viz.
the
preservation
and
Propagation
of
the
species
of
Mankind
,
since
no
man
could
have
eat
any
thing
which
another
might
not
have
pulled
out
of
his
mouth
,
pretending
he
could
not
eat
without
his
leave
,
because
he
had
a
share
in
it
,
and
so
upon
this
principle
,
no
man
now
being
able
to
de●ive
a
title
from
Adam
,
could
at
this
day
possess
any
thing
(
suppose
in
America
)
by
a
right
of
possession
or
occupancy
which
another
might
not
without
any
wrong
or
injustice
take
from
him
;
nor
was
it
a
positive
or
unalterable
community
of
things
;
for
then
if
it
had
been
so
ordained
it
had
been
part
of
the
law
of
nature
,
and
no
Property
could
ever
have
been
introduced
,
though
all
Mankind
had
consented
to
it
.
Therefore
it
follows
that
God
bestowed
no
more
upon
any
particular
man
than
what
would
serve
for
the
preservation
of
himself
,
and
propagation
of
his
species
,
and
only
in
that
manner
as
might
prove
subservient
to
that
design
,
which
being
supposed
it
is
evident
that
before
compacts
there
might
be
a
negative
,
though
not
a
positive
communion
of
things
;
that
is
all
things
being
exposed
to
all
men
(
as
meat
is
at
an
ordinary
)
they
did
not
belong
to
this
person
more
than
to
another
;
for
seeing
things
are
not
of
any
use
or
bene●ice
unless
applyed
to
mens
particular
necessities
,
and
that
this
grant
of
those
things
necessary
for
life
would
prove
altogether
in
vain
,
were
it
lawful
for
others
to
take
from
us
,
those
things
which
we
have
already
seised
on
,
therefore
man
being
a
rational
creature
,
and
being
able
to
foresee
future
inconveniences
,
or
to
draw
a
consequence
from
that
which
he
hath
found
by
experience
,
the
first
natural
law
must
be
the
erecting
of
this
Principle
of
Reason
,
Not
to
do
to
another
that
which
I
would
not
have
done
to
my self
in
the
same
Circumstances
;
Therefore
,
if
it
be
rational
for
me
to
desire
my
own
preservation
,
and
to
enjoy
the
means
to
it
,
it
is
likewise
rational
to
permit
another
man
to
do
the
like
,
since
he
hath
as
much
right
to
his
being
as
I
have
to
my
own
;
so
that
if
a
man
have
already
seised
any
of
those
common
things
for
his
own
use
,
though
he
does
not
actually
then
use
them
,
those
things
cannot
be
taken
from
him
without
injury
;
and
if
any
man
will
call
this
first
principle
of
natural
Justice
,
a
true
agreement
of
Mankind
,
I
shall
not
gainsay
it
,
since
such
an
agreement
is
but
a
rational
assent
of
every
particular
mans
understanding
that
the
abstaining
from
the
doing
such
a
things
is
every
private
mans
interest
,
and
likewise
for
the
good
of
humane
society
.
Thus
among
the
Indians
,
few
or
none
steal
from
each
other
(
though
they
have
no
stone
walls
nor
Locks
to
secure
their
things
in
)
because
they
know
Theft
would
bring
in
perpetual
War
,
and
confusion
among
them
;
and
therefore
it
is
all
their
interests
to
joyn
against
Thest
,
not
only
as
a
breaker
of
the
laws
of
nature
,
but
an
infringer
of
this
tacite
agreement
:
But
that
this
Principle
belongs
to
man
considered
purely
as
a
rational
creature
that
is
able
to
draw
true
conclusions
from
true
Premises
,
appears
from
the
condition
of
Children
,
Fools
,
and
Mad-folks
,
which
though
they
have
in
many
things
an
imperfect
reason
,
and
a
sense
o●
their
present
appetites
,
or
desires
,
yet
not
being
able
to
make
any
judgment
of
the
reasons
or
consequences
of
actions
,
are
not
to
be
reckoned
in
the
rank
of
rational
creatures
,
so
that
it
is
evident
that
God
intended
occupancy
or
possession
should
concern
a
right
among
men
to
things
that
were
before
in
common
〈◊〉
yet
so
,
that
this
occupancy
does
not
give
a
man
a
right
to
more
than
is
really
necessary
,
and
which
he
can
apply
to
the
necessities
of
himself
and
Family
〈◊〉
Therefore
this
natural
Propriety
in
things
much
less
,
that
which
is
introduced
by
Law
,
or
common
consent
,
cannot
exclude
that
natural
right
every
man
hath
to
his
own
preservation
,
and
the
means
thereof
;
so
that
no
man
can
be
obliged
in
Conscience
;
or
commits
a
sin
,
if
in
a
case
of
extream
necessity
,
(
even
ready
to
perish
)
he
makes
use
of
some
of
the
superfluous
necessaries
of
life
which
another
man
may
have
laid
by
for
the
future
uses
of
himself
,
and
Family
,
and
that
were
without
his
consent
,
if
it
can
by
no
other
means
be
obtained
,
〈◊〉
that
the
things
the
necessitous
person
takes
are
not
●…mediately
necessary
for
the
preservation
of
the
lives
of
the
Possessors
,
and
his
Family
;
(
for
in
this
case
this
necessity
is
to
be
preferred
before
all
others
)
therefore
this
right
of
self
preservation
is
still
supposed
in
all
humane
compacts
,
or
laws
about
the
division
,
and
distribution
of
things
;
so
that
when
our
own
and
all
other
laws
are
so
favourable
that
they
do
not
esteem
those
guilty
of
theft
that
take
only
victuals
in
case
of
extream
necessity
,
though
without
the
owner's
consent
,
and
though
the
person
that
takes
them
be
so
poor
that
he
cannot
make
satisfaction
for
what
he
hath
so
taken
,
it
being
sufficient
that
he
is
supposed
willing
to
do
it
if
ever
he
comes
to
be
able
:
So
likewise
since
the
Earth
was
first
Peopled
by
distinct
Families
,
or
companies
of
men
,
all
of
whom
had
a
right
to
the
necessities
of
life
,
(
which
are
indeed
no
other
than
the
products
of
the
Earth
)
these
coming
to
inhabit
such
and
such
tracts
of
ground
,
it
was
in
their
power
,
either
to
live
in
common
upon
such
things
as
the
earth
produced
of
it self
,
or
else
to
divide
to
every
man
his
share
which
another
should
have
no
right
in
:
Thus
the
Indians
in
America
(
as
I
said
before
)
have
all
the
Country
in
common
among
them
(
except
the
sites
of
their
houses
and
Gardens
)
but
our
Planters
rather
chuse
to
allot
every
man
his
share
,
it
being
that
which
suits
best
with
that
way
of
life
they
have
been
used
to
in
their
own
Country
;
and
as
they
think
will
most
conduce
to
their
common
Peace
,
and
advantage
;
not
but
that
they
might
if
they
had
pleased
have
occupied
such
a
tract
of
land
,
which
those
Indians
made
no
use
of
,
in
common
with
them
,
there
being
no
more
Obligation
upon
them
to
come
to
a
more
distinct
division
than
there
does
upon
the
Indians
themselves
;
so
on
the
other
side
after
these
Planters
have
divided
thi●●occupied
land
into
as
many
shares
as
will
serve
t●…●ecessities
of
each
mans
Family
,
It
is
an
injury
not
only
in
any
of
those
that
agreed
to
this
division
,
but
in
any
Indian
who
is
at
peace
with
them
(
that
is
,
hath
never
declared
any
war
)
to
break
up
this
enclosure
,
or
take
away
any
thing
that
is
there
planted
without
the
consent
of
the
owner
.
For
since
the
owner
hath
possessed
himself
of
this
land
,
and
bestowed
his
Labour
and
Industry
upon
it
,
and
that
the
other
hath
no
right
to
any
more
of
the
products
of
the
earth
,
than
that
may
serve
for
the
subsistance
of
himself
and
his
Family
,
and
that
there
is
more
ground
lost
where
he
may
procure
himself
the
like
necessaries
if
he
please
,
he
hath
no
right
to
take
away
this
land
from
the
owner
without
his
consent
,
since
he
hath
the
same
right
to
this
Field
,
as
the
other
hath
to
his
Cottage
or
Garden
.
And
if
such
an
occupancy
will
not
create
a
Propriety
,
certainly
all
the
Nations
in
the
world
are
in
an
ill
condition
;
For
since
none
of
them
can
now
convey
their
Titles
to
the
Country
they
possess
from
any
one
of
Noahs
Sons
if
occupancy
or
possession
be
no
good
Title
,
then
the
rest
of
Mankind
may
upon
the
Authors
own
Principles
come
in
for
a
share
wherever
they
please
;
for
certainly
all
the
land
that
then
remained
undiscovered
(
which
could
not
be
less
than
two
parts
of
three
)
and
consequently
undivided
amongst
Noah's
Sons
,
must
afterwards
fall
either
to
the
first
occupiers
,
or
all
the
rest
of
Mankind
must
still
have
a
right
in
it
.
So
there
is
no
need
either
of
supposing
the
original
of
Property
to
have
proceeded
from
Noah
and
his
Sons
,
or
else
from
the
common
consent
of
all
mankind
at
once
,
since
no
man
hath
a
natural
right
to
any
more
things
than
he
could
make
use
of
,
nor
any
right
at
all
to
those
he
had
no
need
of
,
nor
had
actualy
seised
,
for
his
own
use
:
This
being
I
hope
thus
far
cleared
,
I
will
not
take
upon
me
to
maintain
what
Grotius
asserts
,
that
after
Property
was
once
introduced
,
it
was
against
the
law
of
nature
to
use
community
,
since
neither
community
,
nor
Property
are
by
the
absolute
law
of
nature
,
[
God
having
bestowed
the
fruits
of
the
Earth
on
the
Sons
of
Men
for
their
uses
]
but
as
for
manner
of
using
them
,
whether
in
Propriety
or
in
common
,
he
left
it
to
the
discretions
of
those
several
parcels
of
Mankind
who
agreed
to
live
together
in
civil
society
or
common-wealth
,
as
it
might
either
way
conduce
to
their
particular
way
of
living
,
or
common
safety
and
interest
:
For
as
where
a
Country
is
thinly
peopled
,
and
produces
all
the
necessaries
for
life
only
by
the
labour
of
the
Inhabitants
in
hunting
,
fishing
,
and
the
like
imployments
of
that
life
which
we
call
barbarous
,
because
it
does
not
exercise
it self
in
day
Labour
,
and
that
the
People
do
neither
need
nor
desire
those
superfluous
things
that
others
doe
,
there
is
no
need
of
enclosing
or
appropriating
any
more
Land
than
they
really
make
use
of
,
more
being
but
a
burthen
to
them
,
so
likewise
where
the
People
are
more
than
the
Country
can
well
maintain
from
its
own
Products
,
there
will
presently
arise
a
necessity
of
division
of
lands
in
the
first
place
;
and
of
Trade
abroad
in
the
next
;
or
else
the
People
must
either
discharge
themselves
into
their
neighbours
territories
,
or
live
by
robbing
,
or
playing
the
Pyrates
upon
their
neighbours
,
as
appears
by
Tartars
,
Arabs
and
Algerines
;
and
consequently
when
a
Country
is
once
divided
,
and
a
great
many
are
without
any
share
of
land
,
there
must
b●
laws
made
to
maintain
this
Propriety
,
and
punishments
ordained
for
them
that
disturb
it
;
and
this
i●
the
true
reason
why
there
is
an
absolute
necessity
for
a
division
of
lands
in
Holland
,
but
not
so
in
Surinam
The
nature
and
original
of
Propriety
being
thus
layd
open
,
the
other
small
Objections
against
this
Primitive
Community
which
some
men
draw
out
of
Scripture
will
easily
be
answered
;
as
first
how
Adam's
Children
could
have
any
right
to
any
of
the
things
of
the
world
,
since
that
the
world
and
all
things
in
it
were
given
by
God
to
Adam
and
Eve
,
before
their
Children
were
born
;
and
so
being
born
after
this
grant
,
they
could
have
no
farther
interest
in
any
thing
than
their
Parents
pleased
to
allow
them
,
to
whom
all
things
were
granted
before
:
As
for
this
particular
grant
or
Dominion
of
Adam
,
I
have
all
ready
shewn
its
weakness
,
and
that
the
Grant
was
not
Personal
to
Adam
,
and
Eve
alone
,
but
to
all
Mankind
,
though
made
to
them
as
the
Protoplasts
or
representatives
thereof
;
and
as
for
the
right
of
occupancy
,
I
have
already
layd
down
,
that
no
man
in
the
state
of
nature
,
hath
a
right
to
more
land
or
territory
than
he
can
well
manure
for
the
necessities
of
himself
and
Family
;
that
is
,
can
reduce
into
actual
possession
,
otherwise
a
man
that
first
sets
his
foot
on
an
uninhabited
Island
,
would
have
an
absolute
right
to
the
whole
,
though
it
were
a
Thousand
miles
long
,
or
to
all
the
Territory
he
could
discover
with
his
Eyes
,
so
that
no
man
could
make
use
of
one
foot
of
land
,
in
that
Island
but
by
his
permission
.
But
another
Objection
is
,
That
even
in
the
state
of
Innocency
there
neither
ought
,
nor
could
have
been
such
a
Community
,
because
since
all
order
is
agreeable
to
right
reason
,
and
the
best
order
of
possessing
the
things
,
which
were
granted
by
God
to
Mankind
,
was
only
proper
to
that
●ate
,
in
which
the
abstaining
from
that
which
was
ano●ers
might
best
be
practiced
:
Since
that
Law
must
be
●rit
upon
mens
minds
even
before
the
fall
,
at
least
before
●e
law
given
,
thou
shalt
not
steal
,
by
which
there
is
esta●lisht
a
certain
and
distinct
Propriety
to
every
man
in
the
●ings
he
possesses
.
In
answer
to
which
it
may
be
re●lyed
,
that
no
man
can
tell
what
kind
of
life
men
●ould
have
led
,
had
they
continued
in
the
state
of
●nnocency
;
or
whether
Propriety
or
Community
●ould
have
suited
best
with
their
way
of
life
,
though
rather
encline
to
the
latter
,
since
there
had
been
●o
need
of
enclosure
,
the
Earth
producing
all
things
●eedfull
for
the
life
of
man
without
his
labours
,
●nd
going
naked
,
could
need
no
more
things
than
what
were
meerly
necessary
;
but
after
the
fall
〈◊〉
untill
which
they
needed
no
laws
as
being
unca●able
of
sinning
)
these
Commandments
thou
shalt
●ot
steal
,
nor
covet
thy
neighbours
goods
,
did
take
●lace
even
during
this
Communion
of
things
:
For
●he
same
law
of
Nature
or
Reason
,
that
now
forbids
●en
to
covet
or
take
from
each
other
any
of
those
●hings
which
he
enjoys
by
the
laws
of
the
Common-wealth
where
he
lives
,
does
before
the
institution
●f
the
laws
about
an
absolute
Property
,
likewise
for●id
the
taking
away
from
any
man
those
things
,
which
were
necessary
for
the
subsistance
of
himself
,
●r
Family
,
and
was
either
actually
possessed
●f
,
as
being
in
his
hands
,
or
lying
in
his
pre●ence
,
or
to
such
things
as
he
had
perhaps
laid
by
for
●uture
occasions
;
nor
is
there
any
more
obliga●ion
upon
Mankind
from
these
Commandments
,
●hou
shalt
not
steal
,
thou
shalt
not
covet
,
to
institute
●n
absolute
distinct
Property
in
all
things
,
than
●here
is
that
we
should
still
have
slaves
among
us
,
because
the
Jews
seldom
using
any
other
servants
,
God
commands
them
that
they
should
not
covet
such
〈◊〉
slave
,
any
more
than
his
Ox
,
or
his
Als
:
For
the
Law
was
only
intended
to
take
place
,
as
far
as
the
Subject
was
capable
.
Having
now
answered
all
the
considerable
Arguments
that
can
be
made
against
the
possibility
of
a
primitive
Communion
.
I
hope
this
great
difficulty
which
hath
puzled
some
Divines
,
which
is
prior
in
nature
,
Propriety
or
civil
Government
is
now
cleared
,
since
it
is
apparent
,
Propriety
,
understood
either
as
the
application
of
natural
things
to
the
uses
of
particular
Men
,
or
else
as
the
general
agreement
of
many
men
in
the
division
of
a
Teritory
,
or
Kingdom
,
must
be
before
Government
,
one
main
end
of
which
is
to
maintain
the
Dominion
or
Property
before
agreed
on
.
Having
run
over
all
that
is
most
considerable
in
these
observations
,
both
concerning
the
natural
Dominion
of
Adam
,
and
consequently
shewn
the
original
of
Dominion
and
Property
,
I
shall
concern
my self
very
little
,
in
the
difference
between
the
Author
,
and
Grotius
,
concerning
the
Power
of
the
people
to
resist
and
punish
Kings
,
in
which
I
shall
say
no
more
,
than
that
a
Prince
who
is
subject
to
be
so
punished
,
is
not
really
a
King
,
in
the
sense
that
the
word
King
ought
to
be
understood
,
since
a
King
is
properly
one
that
hath
no
Superior
,
and
consequently
is
not
capable
of
Punishment
;
all
punishments
as
I
said
before
,
being
properly
the
effects
of
a
Superior
,
over
an
Inferior
;
so
that
the
Kings
of
Sparta
were
no
more
than
Generals
of
the
Army
,
and
if
the
Duke
of
Venice
should
have
the
title
of
King
given
him
to
morrow
,
he
would
still
be
but
the
Head
of
the
Senate
,
since
the
one
was
liable
to
be
put
to
death
by
the
Ephori
,
as
the
other
is
still
by
the
Counsel
of
Ten.
But
if
there
are
any
such
desperate
inconveniences
(
as
the
Author
mentions
)
that
attend
this
Doctrine
of
natural
freedom
,
and
Community
of
all
things
,
it
is
more
than
I
can
find
,
or
I
believe
any
man
else
,
that
will
consider
the
nature
of
mankind
;
and
when
that
is
done
,
if
things
are
contra●ry
to
his
notions
of
them
;
it
is
not
his
declaiming
will
alter
mens
Judgements
,
much
less
the
nature
of
the
things
themselves
.
As
for
Grotius's
three
ways
whereby
Supreme
Power
may
be
had
,
Obs.
P.
63.
as
1.
By
full
right
of
Propriety
.
2.
By
an
usufructuary
,
and
3.
By
a
temporary
right
,
I
think
in
most
things
Grotius
may
very
well
be
defended
,
though
not
in
all
.
For
whereas
he
acknowledges
two
ways
,
whereby
a
King
may
obtain
a
full
right
of
Propriety
,
in
a
Kingdom
:
That
is
either
by
a
just
war
,
or
by
donation
from
the
People
.
I
do
not
see
the
Author
finds
fault
with
him
upon
any
just
grounds
,
because
he
hath
not
shewn
how
a
War
can
be
just
without
a
precedent
Title
in
the
Conqueror
,
as
if
no
war
could
be
just
,
nor
no
Conquest
made
without
such
a
precedent
Title
:
For
all
men
know
that
a
war
may
commence
upon
other
scores
,
than
old
Titles
,
and
in
such
wars
the
Prince
,
or
State
that
hath
the
right
of
their
side
,
may
prosecute
this
war
,
either
untill
they
gain
this
first
demand
,
or
else
absolutely
subdue
their
Adversary
.
So
that
he
mistakes
●n
saying
,
that
Grotius
will
have
a
Title
only
to
make
the
War
just
,
so
that
all
he
says
upon
this
false
supposition
signifies
just
nothing
,
but
as
for
what
he
says
about
a
Conqueror's
having
no
new
Title
,
but
being
remitted
to
his
old
one
,
is
true
:
Nor
do
I
see
any
inconvenience
from
it
.
For
if
he
were
an
absolue
Monarch
before
he
were
put
out
,
he
cannot
Attain
more
than
he
had
before
;
so
if
he
,
or
●is
Ancestors
,
had
no
absolute
but
a
limited
Power
;
●e
could
be
restored
to
no
more
than
the
Constitu●ion
of
the
Government
will
allow
him
.
Nor
did
Edward
W.
or
Henry
VII
.
though
they
first
obtain'd
the
Crown
by
War
,
pretend
to
more
Power
than
their
Predecessors
.
I
shall
not
trouble
my self
about
the
reasons
the
Author
gives
for
it
:
But
I
think
he
is
out
in
making
it
seem
impossible
from
what
Grotius
hath
said
,
for
a
Prince
to
gain
a
full
right
of
Propriety
by
a
just
War
,
for
Grotius
says
the
contrary
;
and
allows
that
in
some
cases
a
Prince
may
gain
an
absolute
dominion
by
Conquest
.
But
the
Author
makes
this
Dilemma
to
bring
Grotius
to
an
absurdity
:
That
if
a
King
come
i●
by
Conquest
,
he
must
either
conquer
those
people
that
have
a
Governour
,
or
those
that
have
none
:
If
they
have
no
Governour
,
they
are
a
free
People
,
and
so
the
war
will
be
unjust
to
Conquer
those
that
are
free
.
But
if
the
people
Conquered
have
a
Governour
,
that
Governour
hath
a
Title
or
not
:
If
he
have
a
Title
it
is
an
unjust
War
that
takes
the
Kingdom
from
him
:
If
he
have
no
title
but
only
the
possession
of
a
Kingdom
;
yet
it
is
unjust
for
any
other
man
,
that
wants
a
Title
so
to
Conquer
him
that
is
in
possession
;
for
it
is
a
just
rule
,
that
where
cases
are
alike
,
〈◊〉
that
is
in
possession
is
in
the
better
condition
:
and
for
this
he
quotes
Grotius
himself
,
which
he
need
not
have
done
,
for
he
himself
allows
it
for
truth
,
only
he
will
have
all
Usurpers
whatever
to
have
a
right
,
whether
by
Conquest
or
otherwise
,
which
Grotius
will
not
As
for
the
rest
of
this
argument
,
See
Directions
〈◊〉
Obedience
.
P.
68.
69.
it
i●
drawn
from
Principles
never
laid
down
nor
maintained
by
Grotius
:
For
first
i●
a
People
,
that
have
no
absolute
Governour
(
as
the
Brasilians
,
and
Caraibees
have
non●
as
I
have
already
sayd
)
live
peaceable
and
offen●
no
body
,
I
think
it
unlawful
to
make
war
upon
suc●
a
People
(
as
the
Spaniards
did
)
without
any
cause
b●
to
make
them
slaves
.
But
if
such
a
People
will
joy●
together
as
they
often
do
,
under
a
Carak
or
Captain
created
by
themselves
,
and
make
an
offensive
Wa●
upon
their
neighbours
,
without
just
cause
:
I
think
they
may
justly
be
Conquered
,
and
become
either
slaves
or
subjects
to
the
Conquerer
,
as
well
as
one
single
man
in
the
same
case
,
Li.
III.
Cap.
7.
since
both
Grotius
and
all
writers
allow
the
taking
of
slaves
in
a
just
war
,
but
none
ever
made
it
alike
reasonable
,
to
make
slaves
of
those
that
have
done
them
no
injury
.
As
for
the
other
part
of
the
Dilemma
,
where
the
People
Conquered
have
an
absolute
King
,
or
Government
,
either
by
Title
or
Possession
Grotius
likewise
allows
an
absolute
Conquest
of
such
a
People
,
provided
the
war
were
just
:
Ib.
Cap.
8.
For
though
the
Governour
,
or
Governours
made
the
war
,
yet
since
the
People
have
transferred
all
their
Power
to
them
,
and
have
agreed
to
authorize
all
their
actions
,
the
subduing
of
the
Forces
,
raised
by
this
Governor
is
a
Conquest
of
the
whole
People
,
Ib.
Cap.
8.
as
Grotius
allows
the
Conquerer
either
to
reduce
them
to
the
condition
of
Slaves
or
Subjects
,
which
he
pleases
;
and
certainly
where
the
Conquerer
had
a
right
to
subdue
,
the
Conquered
have
likewise
an
obligation
to
obey
.
As
for
Possession
it
is
true
,
that
it
is
unjust
for
another
Man
to
Conquer
him
,
that
hath
but
a
Possession
of
a
Kingdom
,
if
that
be
the
only
ground
of
the
quarrel
:
But
neither
Grotius
,
nor
any
reasonable
man
else
,
will
allow
the
Conquerour
of
such
a
Possessor
that
wants
a
Title
,
to
have
gained
an
absolute
right
over
the
People
,
since
the
Usurper
himself
commanded
them
only
by
force
,
and
that
they
never
confirmed
his
Title
by
any
after
consent
.
'T
is
true
Grotius
defines
publick
Subjection
,
to
be
that
whereby
a
People
yeilds
it self
up
to
the
Government
of
any
one
,
or
more
men
,
or
also
to
another
People
:
But
he
limits
this
Subjection
to
that
which
proceeds
from
consent
,
as
he
divides
Subjection
,
from
consent
into
publick
,
Lib.
III.
Cap.
7.
8.
So
that
it
is
evident
that
the
Author
never
read
Grotius
carefully
or
else
misrepresents
his
sence
on
purpose
,
though
I
am
so
charitable
as
rather
to
believe
the
former
,
than
the
latter
.
Obs.
P.
66.
He
likewise
finds
fault
with
Grotius
for
supposing
,
That
some
People
for
avoiding
a
greater
evil
,
do
so
yeild
themselves
into
anothers
power
as
to
except
nothing
;
for
it
would
,
says
he
,
be
considered
how
without
war
,
any
People
can
be
brought
into
such
danger
of
life
,
as
that
because
they
can
find
no
other
way
of
defending
themselves
,
or
because
they
are
so
pressed
with
Poverty
,
as
they
cannot
otherwise
have
means
to
sustain
themselves
,
they
are
forced
to
renounce
all
right
of
governing
themselves
,
and
deliver
it
to
a
King
.
But
since
the
Author
could
not
understand
how
this
can
be
without
an
actual
War
,
I
will
shew
those
of
his
opinion
several
instances
wherein
it
may
and
hath
happend
,
that
the
People
may
renounce
all
rights
of
Property
,
or
of
Government
without
any
war
,
made
upon
them
.
The
first
instance
shall
be
that
of
the
Egyptians
,
(
as
God
knows
after
the
rate
his
power
now
encreases
,
but
that
he
may
be
so
)
he
threaten
to
cut
their
Banks
and
let
in
the
Sea
to
drown
them
,
and
their
Country
,
if
they
will
not
yeild
it
up
to
him
;
may
they
not
if
they
find
they
cannot
resist
him
,
submit
themselves
to
him
,
and
make
the
best
terms
they
can
for
themselves
,
and
are
they
not
then
obliged
by
the
Authors
own
Principles
to
continue
his
Subjects
?
and
yet
here
is
no
actual
War
,
or
inundation
,
but
threats
only
,
to
force
them
to
this
submission
.
So
that
the
Authors
Supposition
is
false
,
that
no
case
can
happen
but
an
actual
War
only
,
which
can
reduce
a
People
to
such
terms
of
extremity
,
as
to
compell
them
to
an
absolute
abnunciation
of
all
Soveraignity
,
and
so
likewise
is
this
consequence
also
which
he
assumes
from
thence
;
then
war
which
causeth
that
necessity
is
the
prime
means
of
extorting
such
Soveraignity
,
and
not
the
free
gift
of
the
People
,
who
cannot
otherwise
chuse
but
give
away
that
Power
,
which
they
cannot
keep
;
for
they
might
either
leave
their
Country
or
bury
themselves
in
it
.
But
it
seems
the
Author
had
forgot
his
Logick
,
or
else
he
would
have
remembred
,
to
distinguish
between
Causa
sine
qua
non
,
and
Causa
efficiens
,
a
cause
which
does
not
properly
give
being
to
a
thing
,
and
yet
without
which
it
could
not
have
been
produced
:
Thus
a
Slave
at
Argiers
though
it
is
the
occasion
of
his
servitude
his
being
taken
Prisoner
,
yet
the
true
Cause
of
his
becoming
a
lawful
Servant
to
his
taker
,
does
not
proceed
from
his
conquering
him
,
but
from
his
coming
to
Terms
with
him
,
that
he
shall
be
dismist
of
his
Fetters
,
or
Imprisonment
,
upon
Condition
he
will
serve
faithfully
and
not
run
away
,
and
all
Moralists
consider
those
actions
they
call
mixt
;
as
when
a
Merchant
flings
his
goods
over
into
the
Sea
to
avoid
being
cast
away
among
the
number
of
the
Voluntary
ones
,
though
they
commenced
from
some
kind
of
force
,
since
in
this
case
the
Merchant
might
if
he
pleased
keep
his
goods
if
he
would
venture
his
life
.
So
in
many
cases
may
a
Conquered
People
,
if
they
have
never
neither
by
themselves
,
or
their
representatives
owned
the
Conquerer
.
But
as
much
as
the
Author
quarrells
at
the
word
usufructuary
Right
in
Grotius
,
as
too
base
to
express
the
Right
of
Kings
,
and
as
derogatory
to
the
dignity
of
Supreme
Majesty
;
yet
the
the
French
are
not
so
scruplous
;
but
in
the
absolutest
Monarchy
of
Europe
,
plainly
declare
that
their
King
hath
but
an
usufructuary
right
to
his
Kingdom
,
and
the
Territories
belonging
thereunto
,
or
that
he
can
any
way
charge
them
with
his
debts
,
or
alienate
,
or
dispose
of
them
;
without
the
consent
of
the
States
of
France
,
in
the
reign
of
this
King
.
1527.
and
was
so
sol●mnly
,
declared
by
that
great
Assemby
des
notables
called
by
K.
Francis
the
First
,
to
give
their
Judgment
of
the
Articles
of
Peace
lately
made
with
the
Emperour
Charles
V.
at
Madrid
,
their
sense
was
,
that
Burgundy
which
by
those
Articles
was
to
be
delivered
up
,
was
an
inseparable
Member
of
the
Crown
,
of
which
he
was
but
the
usufructuary
,
and
so
could
not
dispose
of
the
one
any
more
than
of
the
other
;
nor
was
this
any
new
opinion
,
but
as
old
as
St.
Lewis
,
who
being
desired
by
the
Emperour
Frederic
III.
to
restore
the
King
of
England
his
just
Rights
,
To
which
the
said
King
replyed
,
(
whose
words
I
will
faithfully
translate
(
as
they
are
in
Matthew
Paris
p.
765.
Anno
Dom.
1249.
)
By
the
holy
Cross
with
which
I
am
signed
I
would
willingly
do
it
,
if
my
Counsel
(
i.
e.
the
Estates
)
would
permit
it
,
because
I
love
the
King
of
England
as
my
Cosen
;
but
it
were
hard
at
this
very
instant
of
my
Pilgrimage
(
viz.
for
the
holy
land
)
to
disturb
the
whole
body
of
my
Kingdom
,
by
contradicting
the
Counsels
of
my
Mother
,
and
all
my
Nobles
,
although
the
Intercessors
are
very
dear
to
me
;
neither
is
this
to
make
a
Kingdom
all
one
with
a
Ferm
(
as
the
Author
words
it
)
since
in
the
civil
Law
it
signifies
not
only
one
that
barely
receives
the
rents
,
or
profits
,
but
likewise
enjoys
all
other
Prerogatives
and
advantages
that
may
accrew
to
him
as
the
true
owner
,
though
he
have
not
power
to
sell
or
give
it
away
;
Nor
I
suppose
will
any
French
or
English
Subject
(
unless
such
bigotted
ones
as
the
Author
)
acknowledge
any
Forraign
Prince
,
or
other
Person
can
obtain
an
absolute
Dominion
over
them
by
Conquest
.
I
am
sure
they
were
not
of
that
opinion
between
two
hundred
,
and
three
hundred
years
agoe
,
when
the
King
of
England
brought
a
plausible
Title
into
France
,
and
had
it
backt
by
almost
an
entire
Conquest
of
the
whole
Kingdom
,
and
a
formal
setlement
and
acknowledgment
from
Charles
VI.
then
King
and
the
greatest
part
of
the
Nobility
and
Clergy
of
France
at
Paris
:
and
yet
after
all
this
,
the
French
had
so
little
Conscience
as
to
proclame
Charles
the
Dauphin
King
of
France
,
and
to
drive
the
English
out
of
the
Country
,
and
renounce
their
allegiance
which
they
had
sworn
to
our
Kings
,
Henry
V.
and
VI.
and
yet
the
Author
will
have
it
to
be
but
a
naked
presumption
in
Grotius
to
suppose
The
Primary
will
of
the
People
to
have
been
ever
necessary
,
But
if
the
Author
will
not
be
content
that
Kings
shall
have
any
less
than
absolute
Propriety
in
the
Crown
,
let
us
see
the
consequences
of
this
Doctrine
;
For
the
Crown
must
be
of
England
in
the
nature
of
an
absolute
Fee
Simple
,
and
is
consequently
chargeable
by
any
act
,
or
alienable
by
the
Testament
of
the
King
in
being
:
So
that
then
King
John
had
Power
to
make
this
Kingdom
feudatary
,
and
tributory
to
the
Pope
:
and
so
the
Pope
hath
still
a
good
Title
to
it
.
And
since
Religion
with
these
Gentlemen
diminishes
nothing
from
the
right
,
and
absoluteness
of
Monarchy
;
the
same
King
might
have
made
over
his
Kingdom
to
the
Emperor
of
Moroco
(
as
the
Historians
of
those
times
relate
he
would
)
and
so
the
Sarracen
Prince
might
have
entred
upon
the
non-performance
of
the
Conditions
,
and
have
turned
out
his
Vassal
,
and
been
King
here
himself
;
which
opinion
how
contrary
it
was
to
the
notions
which
Kings
themselves
had
of
the
right
to
dispose
of
their
Kingdoms
,
let
any
man
consult
Matthew
Paris
,
and
he
will
see
there
what
Phillip
Agustus
amongst
other
things
tells
Wallo
the
Popes
Legate
,
Nor
did
the
English
Nobility
think
otherwise
,
since
this
was
one
of
the
causes
of
their
taking
Arms
against
King
John
:
Matt.
Paris
.
1245.
p.
659.
666.
and
afterwards
in
his
Sons
reign
,
we
find
the
Procurators
of
the
Nobility
and
People
of
England
declare
in
the
Council
of
Lyons
,
quod
universitas
Regni
nunquam
(
i.e.
Patres
nobilium
vel
ipsi
)
never
consented
or
would
ever
consent
to
the
tribute
unjustly
extorted
by
the
Court
of
Rome
:
At
which
protestation
his
Holyness
was
so
confounded
,
that
our
Author
tells
us
he
never
lift
up
his
Eyes
,
or
had
a
word
to
reply
.
And
every
Monarch
hath
as
absolute
a
Propriety
in
his
Kingdom
,
as
Noah
had
in
the
World
,
as
our
Author
supposes
,
I
know
no
reason
why
the
King
may
not
bequeath
his
Crown
to
which
of
his
Sons
he
pleases
,
no
matter
whether
lawfully
begot
or
not
,
since
Princes
are
above
all
Terms
,
or
positive
Laws
,
or
he
may
divide
it
among
them
,
as
Noah
did
the
World
to
his
three
Sons
:
So
that
upon
these
grounds
the
Testament
of
Henry
VIII
.
whereby
he
disinherited
the
Line
of
Scotland
;
and
that
of
Edward
VI.
whereby
he
excluded
his
Sisters
from
the
Crown
should
have
been
valid
,
but
the
Loyal
Subjects
of
England
beleived
that
neither
of
those
Kings
could
disinherit
the
right
Heir
of
the
Crown
by
their
Testaments
alone
,
but
acknowledge
them
in
the
persons
of
Queen
Mary
,
and
King
James
notwithstanding
those
pretended
Wills
.
I
have
been
the
larger
upon
this
Subject
that
men
that
do
not
much
consider
,
nor
are
versed
in
these
matters
,
may
see
the
absurd
,
wicked
consequences
of
this
notion
,
of
an
absolute
Propriety
and
Dominion
,
to
be
inseperable
from
Monarchy
:
So
that
I
doubt
not
but
even
those
very
men
who
love
a
smatch
of
arbitrary
Government
,
because
it
best
suits
with
their
tempers
,
or
interests
,
cannot
away
with
it
unmixt
,
when
it
comes
to
exert
all
its
Prerogatives
:
Thus
some
men
think
Musk
,
and
Ambergreece
mixt
whith
other
Ingredients
makes
an
agreeable
Perfume
,
which
if
held
to
their
noses
in
the
Cod
,
or
whole
Lump
,
they
are
so
far
from
thinking
a
good
smell
,
that
they
loath
it
.
I
shall
not
affirm
with
Grotius
That
the
Empire
which
is
exercised
by
Kings
,
doth
not
cease
to
be
the
Empire
of
the
People
:
For
I
suppose
the
People
have
passed
over
all
their
present
interest
in
it
,
to
the
Prince
and
his
heirs
,
and
as
long
as
that
line
lasts
they
have
nothing
to
do
with
it
,
and
consequently
cannot
set
up
another
Family
over
them
;
and
so
on
the
other
side
the
King
hath
no
such
absolute
Property
,
as
that
he
can
alter
the
succession
otherwise
than
the
fundamental
laws
of
the
Monarchy
did
first
appoint
;
which
were
made
by
consent
of
all
the
Estates
,
and
without
which
they
cannot
be
altered
;
nor
is
there
any
fear
of
a
contradiction
,
as
the
Author
supposes
,
[
That
the
Succession
must
either
hinder
the
right
of
Alienation
which
is
in
the
People
,
or
the
alienation
must
destroy
the
right
of
succession
,
which
must
attend
upon
elected
Kings
.
For
we
own
no
right
of
alienation
in
the
People
,
as
long
as
there
is
a
lawful
Heir
remaining
and
succeeding
in
his
right
,
to
whom
the
Crown
was
first
legally
setled
;
nor
yet
does
therefore
the
succession
diminish
the
right
which
the
People
had
at
first
,
but
that
it
may
arise
and
take
place
again
if
the
King
should
die
without
known
heirs
.
Having
done
with
his
observations
upon
Grotius
,
But
it
seems
the
Author
allows
,
But
what
if
one
should
say
that
all
this
is
nothing
but
wrangling
about
words
:
since
why
may
not
he
be
called
a
Monarch
who
hath
the
Supreme
,
though
not
the
only
Power
in
a
Common-wealth
,
if
the
custom
of
that
Country
allow
it
him
,
though
his
Power
be
limited
or
mixt
,
as
well
as
for
the
Romanes
,
to
call
their
Monarch
but
Imperator
,
or
General
:
or
for
the
Florentines
,
or
Russians
to
call
their
Monarch
great
Duke
:
Since
it
is
not
the
names
,
but
the
exercise
of
the
power
that
creates
the
difference
:
Nor
is
it
any
more
a
Bull
,
or
contradiction
than
to
call
that
which
I
now
write
out
of
,
an
Inkhorn
,
though
perhaps
it
is
made
either
of
Glass
,
or
Mettal
;
So
the
first
Monarch
being
absolute
,
the
Title
of
Monarch
,
may
now
be
by
eustom
well
enough
applyed
to
those
that
are
not
absolutely
so
;
but
to
pass
by
such
Grammar
niceties
,
I
shall
endeavour
to
vindicate
the
writer
of
this
Treatise
of
Monarchy
,
whom
the
Author
calls
Mr.
Hunton
,
from
giveing
an
Idea
of
a
Government
,
which
is
nothing
but
meer
Anarchy
and
Fiction
:
and
that
there
hath
been
,
and
yet
is
such
a
kind
of
Government
as
a
limited
Kingship
;
which
if
the
Author
is
so
dogged
,
as
he
will
not
allow
it
the
name
of
a
Monarchy
,
we
cannot
help
it
,
let
his
Friends
give
it
a
more
proper
name
if
they
please
:
As
for
what
he
will
prove
out
of
that
Authors
words
that
every
Monarch
(
even
his
limited
Monarch
)
must
have
the
Supreme
Power
of
the
state
in
himself
,
so
that
his
Power
must
no
way
be
limitted
by
any
power
above
his
:
For
then
he
were
no
Monarch
,
but
a
subordinate
Magistrate
,
is
true
;
yet
I
do
not
see
that
the
Author
contradicts
himself
as
the
observatour
will
have
him
,
when
he
tells
us
in
the
same
Page
,
That
in
a
moderate
,
or
limited
Monarchy
,
the
supreme
power
must
be
restrained
by
some
law
according
to
which
this
power
was
given
,
and
by
direction
of
which
this
power
must
act
:
So
that
he
will
have
his
Supreme
Power
not
limited
,
and
yet
restrained
:
Is
not
a
restraint
,
a
limitation
?
and
if
restrained
,
how
is
it
Supreme
?
and
if
restrained
by
some
law
,
is
not
the
Power
of
that
law
,
and
of
them
that
made
it
above
his
Supreme
Power
?
and
if
by
the
direction
of
such
law
only
he
must
Govern
,
where
is
the
Legislative
Power
,
which
is
the
cheif
of
supreme
Powers
?
when
the
law
must
rule
and
govern
the
Monarch
,
and
not
the
Monarch
the
law
;
he
hath
then
at
best
but
a
gubernative
or
executive
Power
:
and
so
proceeds
to
quote
this
Authors
own
words
at
large
,
if
his
Authority
transcends
his
bounds
,
and
if
it
command
beyond
the
Law
,
and
the
Subject
is
not
bound
Legally
to
subjection
in
such
cases
,
and
if
the
utmost
extent
of
the
Law
of
the
land
be
the
measure
of
the
limited
Monarch's
Power
,
and
Subjects
duty
where
shall
we
find
the
Supreme
,
that
Culmen
,
or
apex
potestatis
that
prime
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
which
the
Author
saies
must
be
in
every
Monarch
,
the
word
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
which
signifies
,
Principality
and
Power
,
doth
also
signifie
beginning
,
which
doth
teach
us
that
by
the
word
Prince
,
or
Principality
,
or
Principium
or
beginning
of
Government
is
meant
;
this
if
it
be
given
to
the
law
,
it
robs
the
Monarch
,
and
makes
the
law
the
Primum
Mobile
;
and
so
that
which
is
but
the
instrument
or
servant
to
the
Monarch
becomes
the
Master
.
In
vindication
therefore
of
Mr.
Hunton
,
on
whom
he
makes
these
remarks
,
I
shall
in
the
first
place
grant
that
he
hath
perhaps
spoke
not
so
properly
,
in
saying
that
the
supreme
Power
must
be
restrained
by
some
law
,
whereas
indeed
he
should
rather
have
sayd
limited
by
some
law
,
since
the
word
restrained
is
of
a
harsh
signification
,
and
denotes
something
of
a
certain
force
,
the
exercise
of
which
this
Author
is
altogether
against
in
his
whole
treatise
of
Monarchy
;
so
that
putting
it
thus
,
that
the
supreme
Power
(
in
a
limited
Monarchy
)
must
be
limited
by
some
Law
,
does
not
therefore
place
any
coercive
power
above
his
,
who
can
call
him
to
an
account
for
his
actions
:
But
a
Power
that
may
remonstrate
to
him
where
he
hath
acted
contrary
to
that
Law
,
and
may
by
that
law
punish
,
not
the
Monarch
,
but
his
Ministers
that
have
dared
to
transgress
those
such
known
laws
.
For
as
for
the
Monarch
himself
,
it
is
still
supposed
that
he
in
his
own
person
can
do
no
injury
:
So
that
he
may
still
be
Supreme
,
and
yet
be
limited
,
not
by
any
power
Superior
to
his
own
,
but
by
his
laws
(
or
declared
Will
)
which
he
himself
hath
made
in
the
Assembly
of
his
Estates
,
and
which
he
can
not
alter
,
but
by
the
same
form
by
which
they
were
constituted
;
and
this
sort
of
limitation
may
very
well
consist
with
a
perfect
Monarchy
.
Thus
the
King
of
the
Medapersians
was
an
absolute
Monarch
,
and
alone
made
laws
,
and
yet
we
find
in
Dan.
XII
.
that
Darius
was
forced
against
his
will
to
cast
Daniel
into
the
Lyons
Den
,
for
transgressing
his
own
Decree
,
because
the
Laws
of
the
Medo-Persians
did
not
alter
,
that
it
could
not
be
dispensed
with
by
the
King
,
when
they
were
once
made
:
Thus
it
is
no
derogation
to
God
himself
to
be
bound
by
his
own
Oath
,
which
from
the
immutability
and
perfection
of
his
nature
he
cannot
afterwards
alter
.
See
Heb.
VI.
from
v.
16.
to
17
,
18.
That
by
two
immutable
things
,
in
which
it
was
impossible
for
God
to
lie
&c.
the
two
immutable
things
are
first
his
own
nature
,
and
then
the
Oath
,
he
sware
by
himself
,
so
that
we
see
this
restriction
of
Gods
power
by
his
Oath
(
which
is
a
law
to
him
)
is
no
derogation
from
his
absolute
Monarchy
or
Omnipotency
;
but
is
consistent
with
it
;
therefore
it
does
not
follow
that
in
all
laws
where
the
law
governs
the
Monarch
,
he
hath
therefore
but
a
Gubernative
power
:
Or
that
if
the
Soveraign
Authority
is
limited
by
Law
,
it
ceases
to
be
Supreme
,
as
I
shall
by
and
by
shew
more
at
large
;
in
the
mean
time
I
shall
not
defend
Mr.
H.'s
opinion
,
when
he
saith
that
in
a
mixed
Monarchy
,
the
Soveraign
Power
must
be
originally
in
all
the
three
Estates
,
or
that
the
three
Estates
are
all
sharers
of
the
Supream
Power
,
only
the
primity
of
share
in
the
Supream
power
is
in
one
:
For
the
Observator
observes
very
well
that
this
contradicts
what
he
before
confessed
,
That
the
Power
of
Magistracy
cannot
well
be
divided
;
for
it
is
one
simple
thing
,
or
indivisible
beam
of
Divine
perfection
;
yet
he
will
for
all
this
allow
his
mixed
Monarch
but
one
share
of
the
Supream
power
,
and
gives
other
shares
to
the
Estates
;
and
so
destroys
the
very
being
of
Monarchy
,
by
puting
the
Supream
power
,
or
a
part
of
it
in
the
whole
body
or
a
part
thereof
;
Therefore
I
am
so
far
of
their
opinion
that
held
,
the
Supream
Power
cannot
well
be
divided
into
several
shares
,
since
there
is
so
great
a
conjunction
between
all
the
parts
of
Soveraign
power
,
that
one
part
cannot
be
separated
from
the
other
,
but
it
will
spoil
the
regular
form
of
the
Government
,
and
set
up
an
irregular
Commonwealth
,
which
will
scarce
be
able
to
hold
well
together
.
And
that
this
will
be
so
in
all
Governments
,
see
what
Mr.
Pufendorf
hath
said
in
that
excellent
work
de
Jure
nature
et
Gentium
discoursed
upon
this
Subject
;
Lib.
IV.
Cap.
7.
§.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
neither
am
I
not
here
of
Grotiu's
mind
,
Lib.
1.
Cap.
3.
§.
9.
17.
Who
supposes
the
Supream
power
to
be
divided
:
if
a
People
yet
free
should
command
its
future
King
per
modum
manentis
praecepti
,
after
the
manner
of
a
lasting
,
or
standing
Precept
or
Command
;
where
it
does
not
appear
,
how
there
can
be
a
lasting
Command
at
that
time
when
no
Person
hath
any
longer
a
power
of
Commanding
:
For
every
Command
supposes
a
coactive
force
,
to
be
exercised
,
when
ever
that
Precept
is
violated
;
therefore
the
People
constituting
a
King
,
must
either
retain
this
power
against
the
King
,
or
may
not
retain
it
;
if
the
former
,
there
will
remain
only
the
empty
name
of
a
King
;
but
the
real
Soveraignty
will
still
remain
in
the
People
;
but
if
the
latter
be
true
,
and
they
do
not
retain
it
;
this
Precept
or
Command
signifies
nothing
.
So
likewise
in
that
same
place
,
If
in
the
conferring
of
the
royal
power
any
thing
be
added
,
by
which
it
may
be
understood
that
the
King
may
be
compelled
,
or
punished
:
For
here
it
is
true
the
Soveraignty
is
not
divided
,
but
the
people
hath
it
indeed
altogether
;
For
if
the
People
have
a
right
of
punishing
the
King
upon
any
pretence
whatever
,
there
is
nothing
conferred
upon
him
,
but
the
office
of
the
first
Magistrate
in
the
Commonwealth
under
the
name
of
King
,
but
the
Royal
Power
will
still
remain
in
the
People
;
because
(
as
I
have
already
laid
down
)
all
punishment
,
quatenus
as
such
,
must
proceed
from
a
Superior
:
But
all
compulsion
is
performed
two
ways
,
either
morally
,
or
Physically
,
that
is
by
way
of
Soveraign
Authority
,
or
by
force
of
Arms
,
or
War
;
for
there
is
no
Authority
can
be
morally
supposed
against
an
Equal
,
considered
as
such
;
therefore
when
Grotius
inferrs
,
that
the
People
may
be
at
least
equal
to
the
King
,
because
in
some
cases
it
may
compel
him
,
he
is
likewise
necessitated
to
grant
that
neither
of
them
hath
any
Authority
over
the
other
,
because
it
contradicts
the
nature
of
a
Commonwealth
:
Though
compulsion
by
force
of
Armes
as
between
Equals
,
or
those
who
have
no
Authority
over
each
other
,
must
be
granted
in
the
state
of
nature
,
in
which
we
will
make
use
of
Grotius's
own
Example
;
that
a
Creditor
hath
naturally
a
right
of
compelling
the
Debtor
to
pay
his
debts
,
although
the
Creditor
hath
no
right
to
exact
this
of
him
by
way
of
any
authority
thereby
vested
in
himself
:
otherways
it
were
necessary
that
every
one
who
owed
another
any
thing
,
must
presently
come
under
his
power
:
therefore
the
Debtor
must
be
compelled
by
the
Creditor
to
pay
his
debt
,
either
by
the
assistance
of
some
Judge
(
which
cannot
be
supposed
between
the
King
and
People
)
or
if
they
live
in
a
natural
liberty
,
by
force
.
But
if
we
should
allow
this
way
of
compulsion
to
the
People
,
it
will
follow
that
both
the
King
and
the
People
do
still
live
in
a
natural
liberty
,
or
meer
state
of
nature
;
that
is
that
the
Commonwealth
,
is
dissolved
:
Yet
we
will
grant
Grotius
this
,
that
in
all
civil
constitutions
there
is
nothing
absolutely
free
from
some
inconveniencies
,
therefore
because
of
the
inconveniencies
that
arise
from
this
divided
Soveraignty
,
it
does
not
presently
follow
that
there
can
be
no
such
Government
or
that
it
must
presently
fall
to
an
absolute
Anarchy
;
for
right
is
not
to
be
measured
from
what
pleases
either
this
,
or
that
Author
,
but
from
his
or
their
will
,
from
whom
this
right
at
first
began
.
So
likewise
on
the
other
side
,
it
must
be
granted
that
if
such
division
of
the
Supreme
Authority
hath
been
instituted
by
any
People
that
people
have
not
constituted
a
Regular
government
but
a
politick
body
subject
to
perpetual
distempers
.
Therefore
supposing
the
most
that
can
be
required
,
that
the
King
in
a
limited
Monarchy
is
he
who
alone
gives
the
Essence
and
Authority
to
the
Laws
,
though
he
can
make
no
other
than
what
are
offered
him
in
the
Assembly
of
his
Estates
;
yet
if
all
Magistrates
that
put
these
Laws
in
execution
are
subordinate
to
him
,
and
depend
upon
him
,
this
takes
away
that
inconvenience
this
Author
objects
against
limited
Monarchs
:
For
he
is
truely
Supreme
,
since
he
makes
the
laws
,
and
is
the
Fountain
of
all
power
in
his
Dominions
;
neither
does
this
derogate
from
the
Supremacy
of
his
Power
that
he
is
obliged
either
by
original
contract
,
or
by
after
promise
,
or
condescent
not
to
make
any
laws
,
or
to
levy
any
mony
,
or
taxes
from
his
Subjects
,
but
what
they
shall
offer
him
in
the
Assembly
of
his
Estates
.
For
since
all
laws
that
are
made
in
a
Monarchy
,
are
but
the
declaration
of
the
Monarchs
will
:
and
that
he
being
but
one
man
cannot
declare
his
will
Physically
to
the
sences
of
all
his
Subjects
,
but
requires
some
politick
form
,
or
manner
of
signifying
this
will
to
all
that
are
to
obey
it
,
which
is
various
according
to
the
several
Customs
,
and
constitutions
of
divers
Kingdoms
;
therefore
as
in
Monarchies
where
there
are
no
use
of
Letters
,
Laws
can
be
no
otherwise
made
,
or
promulgated
,
but
by
signifying
the
Monarchs
will
to
the
subordinate
Magistrates
by
word
of
mouth
,
by
such
Officers
as
must
be
supposed
to
bring
some
sufficient
token
,
that
they
come
immediately
from
them
,
and
are
sufficiently
instructed
in
the
matter
he
will
have
observed
as
a
law
,
which
form
can
depend
upon
nothing
but
Custom
,
or
the
common
consent
of
the
People
to
admit
that
for
Law
which
shall
be
so
promulgated
,
since
they
have
no
infallible
certainty
,
but
that
the
Messenger
may
be
sent
by
some
body
else
that
hath
a
mind
to
make
alterations
in
the
State
without
the
Princes
knowledge
;
or
else
that
the
Messenger
may
mistake
the
Princes
meaning
,
and
report
the
law
wrong
.
So
likewise
in
Kingdoms
where
laws
are
put
into
writing
,
there
must
be
some
form
,
or
rule
agreed
upon
,
both
of
making
,
and
promulgating
Laws
:
So
likewise
in
those
we
call
limited
Monarchies
,
the
Custom
or
form
is
not
to
admit
any
thing
for
a
Law
,
or
the
authentick
will
of
the
Prince
,
but
what
his
Subjects
have
offered
to
him
drawn
up
into
form
,
and
which
he
hath
passed
into
a
Law
,
by
some
token
of
consent
before
instituted
in
the
presence
of
the
general
Assembly
of
the
Estates
of
his
Kingdom
:
which
course
is
absolutely
the
best
both
for
the
Prince
and
People
;
For
since
the
end
of
all
laws
(
as
of
Government
it self
)
are
the
good
of
the
people
;
so
it
is
not
likely
that
the
Subjects
having
the
drawing
up
of
the
Laws
,
will
offer
any
to
the
Prince
that
they
are
not
absolutely
perswaded
are
for
the
benefit
of
the
Commonwealth
,
nor
can
that
be
any
prejudice
to
the
Prince's
power
,
since
no
law
can
be
made
unless
he
give
it
the
stamp
of
his
Royal
Authority
.
Therefore
though
Forms
are
not
essential
to
the
declareing
of
the
will
of
a
private
man
in
the
state
of
nature
,
yet
they
must
be
in
respect
of
that
of
such
a
Prince
,
since
the
power
of
the
former
is
natural
and
can
influence
only
those
that
hear
him
,
but
that
of
a
Prince
is
artificial
,
or
political
as
proceeding
from
compact
,
and
is
to
command
even
those
that
never
saw
him
,
or
are
like
to
come
into
his
presence
;
it
is
requisite
that
the
ways
of
declaring
his
will
be
made
so
certain
,
that
the
Subjects
may
have
no
reason
to
doubt
of
it
:
therefore
there
can
no
way
be
found
out
which
can
more
certainly
assure
all
the
Subjects
both
of
the
benefit
,
and
Authority
of
the
Laws
,
than
when
a
Prince
voluntarily
in
a
general
Assembly
of
all
the
Estates
of
his
Kingdom
,
either
by
pronouncing
of
words
,
or
by
touching
the
Bills
offered
him
with
his
royal
Scepter
,
(
or
any
such
like
Ceremony
)
declares
he
will
have
those
Bills
,
or
Writings
promulgated
and
observed
as
his
Laws
,
or
declared
Will
,
which
being
once
done
in
such
a
solemn
and
publick
manner
,
takes
away
all
suspition
that
the
Prince
was
not
well
advised
when
he
made
them
,
or
wrought
upon
by
the
flateries
or
insinuations
of
Women
or
Favourites
;
Circumstances
which
being
wanting
in
absolute
Monarchies
,
where
the
Prince's
Edicts
are
perhaps
either
given
out
in
hast
,
or
at
second
hand
to
those
who
never
see
him
,
by
Eunuchs
,
or
Officers
;
who
taking
the
Monarch
at
some
advantage
,
and
makes
him
pass
Commands
which
perhaps
he
does
not
remember
or
repents
of
the
next
day
;
whereas
in
such
a
limited
Monarchy
,
a
Prince
does
not
only
appear
with
greater
Splendor
and
Authority
,
when
in
the
face
of
his
Subjects
he
exercises
the
highest
Act
of
Soveraignty
in
making
laws
,
but
likewise
assures
them
that
he
acts
with
an
absolute
freedom
,
when
having
a
liberty
to
deny
,
he
yet
grants
the
desires
of
his
Subjects
;
yet
so
establishes
them
for
Laws
,
that
they
cannot
be
altered
without
their
consents
,
and
by
the
same
means
by
which
they
were
first
made
:
which
being
supposed
may
serve
to
answer
an
Objection
that
some
may
make
,
that
if
this
way
of
passing
of
Laws
,
or
the
Princes
declaring
his
will
after
this
manner
be
but
a
matter
of
form
,
or
Circumstance
,
why
may
not
this
Monarch
alter
it
at
his
pleasure
,
and
declare
for
the
future
(
for
example
)
that
all
laws
shall
be
by
him
passed
in
his
privy
Council
,
and
then
being
openly
proclamed
,
and
Copies
recorded
in
all
Courts
of
Justice
,
shall
be
of
the
same
Authority
as
if
they
had
been
passed
in
the
Assembly
of
Estates
:
To
which
the
answer
is
obvious
,
that
though
it
is
true
the
Monarchs
passing
of
Laws
,
whether
in
the
great
Council
,
or
in
his
privy
Council
be
but
a
matter
of
form
,
if
the
Legislative
power
remain
wholly
in
himself
;
yet
since
even
the
forms
,
and
Circumstances
in
doing
things
are
such
essential
things
without
which
business
cannot
be
done
;
If
therefore
the
people
made
it
part
of
their
original
Contract
with
their
Prince
at
first
,
that
he
should
make
no
laws
,
but
what
should
be
of
their
proposing
,
and
drawing
up
;
and
that
he
might
refuse
if
he
pleased
the
whole
,
but
should
not
alter
any
part
of
it
:
This
though
in
its
self
a
matter
of
form
,
yet
being
at
first
so
agreed
is
indeed
an
original
and
fundamental
constitution
of
the
Government
.
Therefore
the
Author
is
as
much
mistaken
in
his
Divinity
as
his
Law
,
when
Patriarcha
P.
97.
Resolves
the
question
in
the
affirmative
,
Whether
it
be
a
sin
for
a
Subject
to
disobey
the
King
if
he
command
any
thing
contrary
to
his
Laws
,
That
the
Subject
ought
to
break
the
laws
if
his
King
command
him
:
Where
as
as
the
Author
hath
put
it
,
nothing
is
more
contrary
to
Law
and
Reason
,
for
so
it
would
be
no
sin
for
Souldiers
or
others
,
to
give
and
take
away
mens
Goods
by
force
,
or
turn
them
out
of
their
houses
,
if
they
could
produce
the
Kings
Commission
for
it
;
and
consequently
it
was
no
sin
in
those
Irish
Rebells
that
acted
by
a
counterfeit
Commission
under
Sr.
Philim
O
Neal
;
for
though
it
was
forged
(
yet
the
forgery
being
known
but
to
very
few
)
it
was
in
respect
of
those
who
acted
by
vertue
thereof
all
one
,
as
if
it
had
been
true
and
according
to
this
Authors
Divinity
,
by
his
Commission
commanding
a
man
to
serve
him
in
the
Wars
,
he
may
not
examine
whether
the
War
be
just
,
or
unjust
,
but
must
obey
,
since
he
hath
no
authority
to
judge
of
the
causes
of
War
;
which
if
spoken
of
such
Wars
as
a
King
hath
a
right
to
make
,
is
true
;
but
of
all
warin
general
,
nothing
is
more
false
,
as
appears
by
the
instance
before
given
;
nor
are
the
examples
the
Author
there
brings
at
all
satisfactory
,
as
that
not
only
in
humane
Laws
,
but
also
in
Divine
a
thing
may
be
commanded
contrary
to
law
,
and
yet
obedience
to
such
commands
is
necessary
:
the
sanctifying
the
Sabbath
is
a
Divine
law
;
yet
if
a
Master
command
his
Servant
not
to
go
to
Church
upon
a
Sabbath
day
,
the
best
Divines
teach
us
,
that
the
Servant
must
obey
this
Command
though
it
may
be
sinful
,
and
unlawful
in
the
Master
,
because
the
Servant
hath
no
authority
or
liberty
to
examine
or
judge
whether
his
Master
sin
or
no
in
so
commanding
.
Where
if
the
Author
suppose
,
as
I
do
not
,
that
the
Sunday
(
which
he
improperly
calls
the
Sabbath
)
cannot
be
sanctified
without
going
to
Church
,
or
that
going
to
Church
on
that
day
is
an
indispensible
duty
,
the
Master
commanding
the
contrary
ought
no
more
to
be
obeyed
,
than
if
he
should
command
his
Servant
to
rob
,
or
steal
for
him
;
but
if
going
to
Church
be
a
thing
indifferent
,
or
dispensible
at
some
times
then
the
Author
puts
a
Fallacy
upon
his
Readers
,
arguing
from
the
non-performance
of
a
thing
which
is
doubtful
,
or
only
necessary
secundum
quid
,
in
which
case
the
Subject
or
Servant
is
bound
to
obey
Authority
to
a
thing
of
another
kind
which
is
absolutely
unlawful
;
Since
it
is
sinful
,
for
any
Subjects
to
obey
the
King
's
private
or
personal
Commands
in
things
unlawful
,
and
contrary
to
known
positive
laws
:
The
laws
only
seting
the
bounds
of
Property
in
all
Commonwealths
;
so
that
though
it
be
no
sin
in
Turky
or
Muscovy
for
an
Officer
to
go
and
fetch
any
mans
head
by
vertue
of
the
Grand
Seigniors
Commission
,
without
any
trial
or
accusation
;
I
suppose
any
man
that
valued
his
life
,
would
say
it
were
murder
for
any
person
to
do
the
same
by
the
Kings
bare
Commission
in
England
;
and
yet
there
is
nothing
but
the
Laws
and
Customs
of
each
Government
that
creates
the
difference
:
Not
that
I
do
affirm
it
were
a
sin
in
all
Cases
for
a
Subject
to
obey
the
King
though
contrary
to
Law
,
since
there
are
some
Laws
which
the
King
hath
power
to
dispence
with
,
and
others
which
he
hath
not
,
and
others
which
he
may
dispence
with
,
but
yet
only
for
the
publick
good
,
in
cases
of
extreme
necessity
:
But
to
affirm
as
the
Author
does
without
any
qualification
or
restriction
,
that
it
is
a
sin
to
disobey
the
Kings
personal
Commands
in
all
cases
however
issued
out
;
favours
of
Mr.
Hobs
Divinity
as
well
as
Law
;
nor
does
the
Author
himself
when
he
hath
thought
better
on
't
,
Patriark
.
P.
99.
assert
the
Kings
Prerogative
to
be
above
all
laws
but
for
the
good
of
his
Subjects
that
are
under
the
laws
,
and
to
defend
the
peoples
rights
(
as
was
acknowledged
by
his
late
Majesty
in
his
speceh
upon
his
answer
to
the
Petition
of
right
:
So
it
is
true
the
King
hath
a
power
to
pardon
all
Felonies
,
and
Manslaughters
,
(
and
perhaps
Murders
too
)
yet
supposing
this
power
should
be
exerted
but
for
one
year
towards
all
Malefactors
whatsoever
,
any
man
may
easily
imagin
what
such
a
Prerogative
would
produce
;
So
that
the
publick
good
of
the
Kingdom
ought
to
be
the
rule
of
all
such
Commands
,
and
where
that
fails
the
right
of
commanding
ceases
.
(
not
a
breach
of
the
Kings
Preogative
)
but
part
of
the
Common
Law
of
this
Kingdom
,
so
no
man
that
understands
any
thing
of
Law
or
Reason
,
will
affirm
that
it
is
a
Court
of
that
exorbitant
power
,
that
it
is
limited
by
no
rules
or
bounds
,
either
of
Common
,
or
Statute
Law
,
or
of
the
Laws
of
aequum
,
and
bonum
;
or
that
every
thing
that
a
Chancellour
,
who
is
keeper
of
the
Kings
Conscience
,
decrees
,
must
be
well
,
and
truly
decreed
,
since
this
were
to
set
up
an
absolute
Tyrany
.
But
I
shall
now
proceed
to
examine
the
rest
of
the
reasons
the
Author
gives
,
either
in
this
Treatise
,
or
his
Patriarcha
against
the
possibility
of
a
limited
Monarchy
.
He
finds
fault
with
Mr.
H.
‛
For
asserting
that
a
Monarch
can
have
any
limitation
ab
Externo
:
and
that
the
sole
means
of
Soveraignty
is
consent
and
fundamental
contract
,
which
consent
puts
them
in
their
power
which
can
be
no
more
nor
other
than
is
conveyed
to
them
by
such
contract
of
subjection
;
upon
which
our
Author
inquires
thus
,
if
the
sole
means
of
a
limited
Monarchy
,
be
the
consent
and
fundamental
contract
of
a
Nation
,
how
is
it
that
he
saith
a
Monarch
may
be
limited
by
after
condescent
!
is
an
after
condescent
all
one
with
a
fundamentnl
contract
,
or
with
an
original
,
and
radical
constitution
!
why
yet
he
tells
us
it
is
a
secundary
original
constitution
:
A
secundary
original
,
that
is
a
second
first
:
and
if
that
condescent
be
an
act
of
Grace
,
doth
not
this
condesent
to
a
limitation
come
from
the
free
determination
of
the
Monarchs
will
!
if
he
either
formally
,
or
virtually
(
as
the
Author
supposeth
)
desert
his
absolute
or
Arbitrary
power
which
he
hath
by
conquest
or
other
right
.
Which
last
words
of
Mr.
H.
though
I
confess
they
are
ill
exprest
,
yet
I
see
no
down
right
contradiction
in
the
sence
Mr.
H.
meant
them
.
(
if
any
man
please
to
consult
him
he
there
says
)
That
a
Monarch
may
either
be
limited
by
original
constitution
,
or
an
after
condescent
;
therefore
these
words
the
sole
means
of
Soveraignty
is
the
consent
,
and
fundamental
contract
,
is
not
meant
of
a
limited
Monarchy
any
more
than
of
another
,
but
of
any
Soveraignty
whatever
.
So
likewife
though
these
words
,
a
secundary
original
constitution
may
seem
to
be
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
and
to
destroy
each
other
,
yet
as
the
Author
explains
himself
,
you
will
find
they
do
not
in
sense
;
for
he
only
supposes
that
a
Prince
who
hath
an
absolute
Arbitrary
power
,
either
by
succession
,
or
election
,
finding
it
not
so
safe
and
easie
as
he
conceives
it
would
be
for
him
,
if
he
came
to
new
terms
with
his
people
,
would
desert
some
of
that
despotick
power
and
govern
by
let
rules
,
or
Laws
,
which
he
obliges
himself
and
his
Successors
by
Oath
,
or
some
other
conditions
,
never
to
make
,
or
alter
without
the
consent
of
his
Subjects
.
I
see
not
why
this
may
not
in
one
sense
be
called
a
second
original
constitution
;
for
he
was
at
first
an
absolute
King
by
which
was
the
original
constitution
,
and
his
coming
to
new
Terms
with
them
may
be
termed
in
respect
of
this
a
secundary
original
constitution
,
or
agreement
,
of
the
government
though
founded
upon
the
former
old
right
which
the
Monarch
had
to
govern
:
as
for
a
King
by
Conquest
,
it
cannot
indeed
in
respect
of
him
be
properly
called
a
secundary
constitution
,
since
the
Conquerour
had
no
right
to
clame
an
absolute
subjection
from
the
Subjects
until
they
submitted
to
him
,
so
as
that
they
might
not
drive
him
out
again
,
if
they
were
able
,
until
he
came
to
some
Terms
with
them
.
Thus
I
think
no
sober
man
but
will
maintain
,
that
the
people
of
England
might
lawfully
have
driven
out
William
I.
(
called
the
Conquerour
)
supposing
he
had
claimed
by
no
other
title
but
Conquest
alone
,
which
when
he
had
sworn
to
observe
and
maintain
all
the
Laws
,
and
liberties
of
the
people
of
England
,
and
had
been
thereupon
Crown'd
,
and
received
as
King
,
and
had
quitted
his
pretensions
by
Conquest
,
or
force
,
and
had
taken
the
Oaths
and
homage
of
the
Clergy
,
Nobility
and
People
;
they
could
not
then
without
Rebellion
endeavour
to
do
.
And
certainly
had
he
not
thought
his
title
by
Conquest
not
so
good
as
the
other
of
King
Edward's
Testament
;
he
would
never
have
quitted
the
former
and
sworn
to
observe
the
Laws
of
his
Predecessor
;
so
likewise
Henry
I.
(
'
and
indeed
when
Envy
is
removed
from
Kings
)
together
with
excess
of
power
,
it
followed
that
they
had
no
cause
to
fear
that
which
happened
to
the
Kings
of
the
Massenians
,
and
Argives
from
their
Subjects
:
But
because
this
Author
tells
Mr.
H.
that
if
we
should
ask
what
proofs
or
examples
he
hath
to
justify
his
Doctrine
of
a
limited
Monarchy
in
the
Constitution
,
he
would
be
as
mute
as
a
fish
;
we
will
shew
two
or
three
examples
of
the
antiquity
of
such
limited
Monarchies
:
though
they
were
not
of
the
same
model
with
those
that
are
at
this
day
found
among
the
Germanes
,
and
other
northern
Nations
descended
from
thence
.
In
Macedon
the
Kings
descended
of
Caranus
(
as
Callisthenes
says
in
Arrian
)
did
obtain
an
Empire
over
the
Macedonians
,
not
by
force
but
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
by
Law
.
So
Curtius
Lib.
IV.
The
Macedonians
were
used
to
Kingly
Government
,
but
in
a
greater
appearance
of
liberty
than
other
Nations
:
For
it
is
certain
the
lives
of
their
Subjects
were
not
at
their
disposal
:
as
appears
from
the
same
Author
Lib.
VI.
The
Army
by
an
antient
custom
of
the
Macedonians
did
judg
of
Capital
causes
(
i.
e.
in
time
of
War
)
but
in
peace
it
belonged
to
the
People
:
the
power
of
their
Kings
signified
litle
,
unless
his
Authority
was
before
of
some
force
.
And
this
was
by
original
constitution
,
for
we
do
not
find
that
ever
the
Kings
of
Macedon
altered
any
thing
in
their
original
constitution
;
yet
they
had
the
Soveraignty
in
most
things
;
and
their
persons
were
sacred
.
So
likewise
among
the
antient
Romans
,
where
Romulus
from
a
Captain
of
Volunteers
,
became
a
King
.
Dyonisius
Halicar
:
Lib.
II.
Tells
us
that
after
Romulus
had
made
a
speech
to
his
Souldiers
and
followers
to
this
effect
,
that
he
left
it
to
them
to
consider
what
Government
they
would
chuse
;
for
whatsoever
they
pitcht
upon
he
should
submit
to
it
,
and
though
he
did
think
himself
unworthy
the
Principality
;
yet
he
should
not
refuse
to
obey
their
Commands
;
concluding
that
he
thought
it
an
Honour
for
him
to
have
been
declared
the
Leader
of
so
great
a
Colony
,
and
to
have
a
City
called
by
his
name
.
Whereupon
the
people
after
some
deliberation
among
themselves
chose
him
their
King
,
or
limited
Monarch
,
since
both
the
Senate
and
people
had
from
the
very
beginning
their
particular
shares
in
the
Government
,
the
Senates
making
this
great
Counsel
(
which
yet
were
for
the
greater
part
of
them
chosen
out
of
the
Patricians
by
the
Tribes
,
Dyon
.
Hal.
Lib.
11.
and
Curiae
)
with
these
he
consulted
,
and
referred
all
business
of
lesser
moment
which
he
did
not
care
to
dispatch
himself
;
for
be
reserved
to
himself
the
last
Appeal
in
causes
,
and
to
be
Pontifex
Maximus
,
or
Cheif
Priest
,
and
Preserver
of
the
Laws
and
Customs
of
their
Country
,
as
also
to
be
cheif
General
in
War
;
but
to
the
people
were
reserved
these
three
Priviledges
,
to
create
Magistrates
,
to
ordain
Laws
,
and
to
decree
Peace
and
War
,
the
King
referring
it
to
them
;
So
that
the
Authority
of
the
Senate
did
joyn
in
these
things
,
though
this
custom
was
changed
,
for
now
the
Senate
does
not
confirm
the
decrees
of
the
people
,
but
the
people
those
of
the
Senate
:
But
he
added
both
dignity
,
and
power
to
the
Senate
,
that
they
should
judg
those
things
which
the
King
referred
to
them
,
by
Major
part
of
the
votes
.
And
this
he
borrowed
from
the
Lacedemonian
Commonwealth
,
for
the
Lacedemonian
Kings
were
not
at
their
own
liberty
to
do
whatever
they
pleased
,
but
the
Senate
had
power
in
matter
appertaining
to
the
Common-wealth
.
But
because
these
examples
may
seem
too
stale
,
or
remote
,
Let
us
now
consider
all
the
Kingdoms
that
have
been
erected
upon
the
ruins
of
the
Roman
Empire
by
those
Northern
Nations
that
over-ran
it
;
and
see
if
there
were
so
much
as
one
Kingdom
among
them
that
was
not
limited
:
As
for
the
Kingdoms
of
the
Goths
,
and
Vandals
erected
in
Italy
Africk
,
and
Spain
,
the
Author
confesses
they
were
limited
,
or
rather
mixt
,
since
their
Kings
were
deposed
by
the
people
whenever
they
displeased
them
:
So
likewise
for
the
Successors
of
those
Gothick
Princes
in
Castile
,
Portugal
,
Arragon
,
and
Navarre
,
and
the
other
Kingdoms
of
Spain
:
He
that
will
read
the
histories
of
those
Kingdoms
,
will
find
them
to
have
been
all
limited
,
or
rather
mixt
,
and
to
have
had
Assemblies
of
the
Estates
,
Henry
V.
and
Henry
the
VI.
Kings
of
England
made
upon
them
;
Phil.
Com.
Livre
.
VI.
Cap.
7.
to
which
Mezeray
in
his
History
tells
us
,
France
ows
the
loss
of
its
Liberties
,
and
the
change
of
its
laws
:
In
whose
time
they
gave
their
King
Charles
VII
.
a
power
to
raise
mony
without
them
;
which
trick
when
once
found
out
appeared
so
sweet
to
his
Successors
,
that
they
would
never
fully
part
with
it
again
:
and
Lewis
the
XI
.
by
weakening
his
Nobility
and
People
by
constant
Taxations
,
and
maintaining
Factions
among
them
,
bragged
that
he
had
metre
les
Roys
du
France
,
France
.
hors
du
Page
.
or
out
of
worship
Whereas
the
Author
last
mentioned
remarks
that
he
might
have
said
with
more
truth
,
(
les
mettredu
sense
,
hors
et
de
la
raison
)
;
and
yet
we
find
in
the
beginning
of
the
Reign
of
Charles
VIII
.
the
Assembly
of
the
Estates
gave
that
King
the
sum
of
two
Millions
,
and
an
half
of
Francks
;
and
promised
him
after
two
years
they
would
supply
him
again
:
It
seems
Comines
in
the
same
place
,
did
not
look
upon
this
as
a
thing
quite
gone
,
and
out
of
Fashion
,
since
he
then
esteemed
this
as
the
only
just
and
Legal
way
of
raising
mony
in
that
Kingdom
:
as
appears
by
these
words
immediately
after
.
Is
it
toward
such
Objects
as
these
(
meaning
the
Nobility
and
People
)
that
the
King
is
to
insist
upon
his
Prerogative
,
and
take
at
his
pleasure
what
they
are
ready
to
give
!
would
it
not
be
more
just
both
towards
God
and
the
World
,
to
raise
mony
this
way
than
by
Violence
,
and
Force
!
nor
is
there
any
Prince
who
can
raise
mony
any
other
way
,
unless
by
Violence
,
and
Force
,
and
contrary
to
the
Laws
.
So
likewise
in
the
same
Chapter
speaking
of
those
who
were
against
the
Assembly
of
the
Estates
at
that
time
;
that
there
were
some
(
but
those
neither
considerable
for
quality
or
vertue
)
who
said
that
it
was
a
diminution
to
the
Kings
Authority
to
talk
of
assembling
the
Estates
,
and
no
less
than
Treason
against
him
.
But
it
is
they
themselves
who
commit
that
crime
against
God
,
the
King
,
and
their
Country
,
and
those
who
use
these
expressions
are
such
as
are
in
Authority
without
desert
,
unfit
for
any
thing
but
flattery
,
whispering
trifles
and
stories
into
the
ears
of
their
Masters
,
which
makes
them
apprehensive
of
these
Assemblies
,
lest
they
should
take
cognizance
of
them
,
and
their
manners
.
But
I
suppose
it
was
for
such
honest
expressions
as
these
,
that
Katherine
de
Midices
Queen
of
France
said
,
that
Comines
had
made
as
many
Hereticks
in
Politicks
,
as
Calvin
had
done
in
Religion
;
that
is
because
he
open'd
Mens
Eyes
,
and
made
them
understand
a
little
of
that
they
call
King-craft
.
But
however
in
some
Provinces
of
France
,
as
in
Languedoc
and
Provence
,
though
the
King
is
never
denyed
whatever
he
please
to
demand
;
yet
they
still
retain
so
much
of
the
shadow
of
their
antient
Liberties
as
not
to
be
taxed
without
the
consent
of
the.
Assembly
of
Estates
consisting
of
the
Nobility
,
Clergy
,
and
Burgesses
of
great
Towns
,
and
Cities
,
which
however
is
some
ease
to
them
,
not
to
have
their
mony
taken
by
Edict
.
So
Hungary
,
which
was
erected
by
the
Huns
,
a
stirp
of
the
European
Scythians
,
by
which
you
may
judge
the
antient
form
of
Government
was
much
the
same
as
that
of
the
Germanes
.
All
Histories
grant
that
Kingdom
to
have
been
limited
,
and
to
be
of
the
same
form
with
that
of
the
other
Northern
Nations
,
nay
which
is
more
,
to
have
had
a
Palatine
,
who
could
hinder
the
King
from
ordaining
any
thing
contrary
to
the
Laws
:
and
as
for
Poland
,
the
Author
cannot
deny
but
it
is
limited
in
many
things
;
but
as
he
only
takes
notice
of
those
things
in
which
the
King
hath
power
,
so
he
omits
most
of
those
in
which
he
hath
none
,
as
in
raising
of
mony
,
or
making
laws
without
the
consent
of
the
Diet.
So
likewise
in
Denmark
the
Author
himself
cannot
deny
but
that
Kingdom
is
limited
,
for
he
could
not
before
the
late
war
with
Sweden
either
make
War
or
Peace
,
raise
mony
or
make
laws
without
the
consent
of
his
Senate
,
who
were
a
constant
representative
of
all
the
Nobility
.
But
for
the
Election
of
a
new
King
,
or
for
the
making
of
new
Laws
the
whole
body
of
the
Nobility
,
and
Clergy
were
to
be
present
and
consent
.
As
for
Scotland
the
Government
of
it
hath
alwayes
so
much
resembled
England
,
that
it
being
now
the
same
Prince
,
I
shall
not
say
more
of
it
,
but
that
it
hath
alwayes
been
a
limited
,
if
not
a
mixt
Government
.
In
Sweden
the
Kings
power
is
much
the
same
,
only
the
Commons
have
representatives
in
the
assembly
of
Estates
,
which
they
had
not
in
Poland
and
Denmark
:
But
in
Denmark
and
Sweden
the
Kings
(
until
of
Late
that
they
became
Hereditary
)
were
never
received
or
owned
as
Lawful
,
until
they
were
Crown'd
and
had
Sworn
to
observe
and
maintaine
the
Laws
of
the
Kingdom
and
priviledges
of
the
Nobility
and
People
.
But
the
Authour
thinks
he
hath
gotten
a
great
advantage
,
because
he
finds
that
in
Poland
and
Denmark
,
the
Commons
have
no
representatives
in
the
Assembly
of
Estates
,
and
that
therefore
in
some
limited
Monarchies
the
whole
Community
in
its
underived
Majesty
do
not
ever
convene
to
Justice
.
Which
signifie
little
,
for
these
that
are
now
the
Nobility
may
be
Heirs
to
those
that
once
had
the
whole
propriety
of
the
Country
in
their
hands
,
when
these
Kingdoms
were
erected
;
and
so
tho
the
body
of
the
People
encreased
,
yet
the
ancient
Nobility
never
admitted
them
into
a
share
of
the
Government
.
As
in
Venice
without
doubt
all
the
Ancient
Planters
of
those
Islands
had
Votes
in
the
Government
,
and
it
was
then
popular
,
though
it
is
now
restrained
to
the
ancient
Families
,
or
those
new
ones
they
now
admit
,
and
is
much
such
an
other
cavil
as
that
in
England
:
Before
the
reduceing
the
Nobiles
Minores
to
two
Knights
of
the
Shire
,
the
Commons
had
no
Votes
in
the
great
Council
,
or
Parliament
,
which
opinion
see
confuted
in
Mr.
Petyt's
Treatise
of
the
ancient
Rights
of
the
Commons
of
England
,
and
in
the
learned
Treatise
,
call'd
Jani
Anglorum
facies
nova
.
And
this
appears
more
plainly
in
Denmark
,
where
every
Lord
of
a
Mannor
,
or
Territory
is
a
Nobleman
,
and
hath
a
Vote
in
the
Diet
or
Assembly
of
the
Estates
,
or
else
it
might
have
begun
as
in
Poland
,
which
is
but
an
Association
of
so
many
petty
Princes
for
mutual
defence
,
under
an
Elective
Head
,
who
when
they
entred
into
this
Confederac
,
reserved
to
themselves
the
power
they
had
before
over
their
Subjects
and
Vassals
:
which
how
absolute
that
was
,
any
man
may
find
,
that
understands
the
Sclavonians
Genius
,
in
so
much
that
from
the
absolute
Subjection
of
that
People
to
their
Lords
we
have
the
Word
SLAVE
to
this
day
:
But
the
Author
himself
confesses
the
Kingdom
of
Poland
to
be
limited
,
but
it
is
only
by
the
Nobility
;
who
are
for
all
this
forced
to
please
the
King
,
and
to
second
his
will
to
avoid
discord
,
which
is
very
true
,
and
is
requisite
in
all
limited
Governments
,
that
the
King
,
Nobility
,
and
People
should
agree
,
and
as
it
is
their
duty
to
comply
with
his
desires
,
as
much
as
may
be
,
without
giving
up
their
liberties
,
lives
,
and
fortunes
,
absolutely
to
his
disposal
:
So
it
is
his
,
to
answer
his
Peoples
desires
in
all
things
which
are
for
their
benefit
:
Not
that
I
praise
the
Form
of
Government
in
Poland
,
since
of
all
those
that
own
the
name
of
King
,
I
am
so
far
of
the
Authors
mind
as
to
think
it
most
liable
to
Civil
Dissentions
.
But
before
I
dismiss
this
Subject
,
I
must
take
notice
of
a
mistake
in
the
last
Page
of
this
Authors
present
Treatise
which
is
that
the
People
or
Community
in
all
these
three
Realms
are
as
absolute
Vassals
as
any
in
the
world
,
which
is
not
true
,
unless
it
be
affirmed
of
the
Vilains
Or
Vassals
of
the
Nobility
,
which
is
granted
are
more
absolute
Vilains
,
than
ours
were
in
England
,
but
as
for
the
free
born
,
Wittena
Gemote
,
or
Great
Counsel
:
Nor
take
away
mens
lives
,
without
a
Legal
trial
by
their
Peers
,
See
.
Mr.
Petyt
's
Preface
to
his
foremention'd
Treatise
.
and
that
this
Government
hath
never
been
altered
,
but
confirmed
by
their
Successors
both
of
the
Danish
and
Norman
Race
;
as
appears
by
their
Charters
and
confirmations
,
and
many
confirmations
of
Magna
Charta
,
and
other
Statutes
;
as
there
is
no
man
that
is
but
moderately
vers'd
in
the
history
,
and
Laws
of
his
Country
,
but
very
well
knows
:
and
that
this
opinion
of
Englands
being
a
limited
Monarchy
is
no
new
one
,
but
owned
to
be
so
by
our
Kings
themselves
:
We
may
appeal
to
the
last
words
of
Magna
Charta
it self
,
Concessimus
etiam
eisdem
,
pro
nobis
et
haeredibus
nostris
,
quod
nec
nos
nec
haeredes
nostri
aliquid
perquiremus
,
per
quod
libertates
in
hac
Charta
contentae
infringantur
vel
infirmentur
.
Et
si
ab
aliquo
contra
hoc
aliquid
perquisitum
fuerit
,
nihil
valeat
,
et
pro
nullo
habeatur
.
And
this
his
late
Majesty
of
blessed
memory
,
who
best
knew
the
extent
of
his
own
power
,
says
in
his
Declaration
from
New-market
Martij
,
9.
1641.
That
the
Law
to
be
the
measure
of
his
power
;
and
if
the
Laws
are
the
measure
of
it
,
then
his
power
is
limited
;
for
what
is
a
Measure
,
but
the
bounds
or
limits
of
the
thing
measured
?
So
likewise
in
his
Answer
to
both
Houses
concerning
the
Militia
,
speaking
of
the
men
named
by
him
,
If
more
power
shall
be
thought
fit
to
be
granted
to
them
,
than
by
Law
is
in
the
Crown
it self
;
His
Majesty
holds
it
reasonable
that
the
same
be
by
Law
first
vested
in
him
,
with
power
to
transfer
it
to
those
persons
.
In
which
passage
his
Majesty
plainly
grants
,
that
the
power
of
the
Crown
is
limited
by
Law
,
and
that
the
King
hath
no
other
Prerogatives
then
are
vested
in
him
thereby
:
Nor
was
this
any
new
Doctrine
,
or
indicted
by
persons
disaffected
to
Monarchy
,
and
which
had
but
newly
come
off
from
the
Parliament
side
,
by
the
apparent
Justice
of
his
late
Majesties
Cause
,
as
Mr.
Hobs
in
his
little
Dialogue
of
the
civil
wars
of
England
doth
insinuate
,
but
was
the
opinion
of
the
ancient
Lawyers
many
hundred
years
ago
:
Bracton
who
lived
in
the
time
of
H.
2.
writes
thus
Li.
I.
Cap.
8.
Ipse
autem
Rex
non
debet
esse
sub
homine
sed
sub
Deo
et
Lege
,
quia
Lex
facit
Regem
.
Attribuit
igitur
Rex
Legi
,
quod
Lex
attribuit
Ei
.
viz.
dominationem
,
et
potentiam
.
Non
est
enim
Rex
ubi
dominatur
voluntas
,
et
non
Lex
.
And
Li.
III
Cap.
9.
Rex
est
ubi
bene
Regit
,
Tyrannus
dum
populum
sibi
creditum
violenta
opprimit
dominatione
,
quod
hoc
sanxit
lex
humana
,
quod
leges
ligent
suum
Laterem
;
if
this
be
law
we
have
a
Tyrant
as
well
described
,
as
by
any
difinition
in
Aristotle
.
Also
that
the
King
alone
cannot
make
a
Law
.
Li.
I.
Cap.
1.
So
likewise
the
Lord
Chancellour
Fortescue
in
his
excellent
treatise
de
laudibus
Legum
Angliae
dedicated
to
Prince
Edward
only
Son
to
Henry
the
VI.
and
certainly
writing
to
him
whom
it
most
concerned
to
know
those
Prerogatives
he
might
one
day
enjoy
,
he
would
not
make
them
less
than
really
they
were
.
Cap.
9.
He
instructs
the
Prince
thus
:
non
potest
Rex
Angliae
ad
libitum
suum
mutare
Leges
Regni
sui
Principatu
namque
nedum
regali
,
sed
et
politico
ipse
suo
Populo
dominatur
:
Populus
enim
iis
Legibus
gubernatur
quas
ipse
fert
,
cum
Legis
vigorem
habeat
quicquid
de
consilio
,
et
de
consensu
Magnatum
et
Reipublicae
communi
sponsione
authoritate
Regis
sive
Principis
praecedente
juste
fuerit
difinitum
,
et
approbatum
.
And
the
Parliament
Rol.
18.
E.
1.
num.
41.
(
quoted
in
Lord
Cook's
Inst.
4.
pt.
)
acknowledges
the
same
:
Homines
de
Cheshire
qui
onerati
sunt
de
servientibns
Pacis
sustentandis
,
petunt
exonerari
de
oneribus
Statuti
:
Winton'
&c.
The
Kings
Answer
was
,
Rex
non
habet
consilium
mutandi
consuetudines
,
nec
statuta
revocandi
.
So
likewise
Cap.
18.
speaking
of
the
Laws
of
England
;
non
enim
emanant
illa
à
Principis
solùm
voluntate
,
ut
Leges
in
Regnis
quae
tantum
regaliter
gubernantur
,
ubi
quandoque
statuta
ita
constituentis
procurant
commoditatem
singularem
,
quod
in
ejus
subditor●m
ipsum
redundant
dispendium
et
jaciuram
,
sed
concito
reformari
possunt
dum
non
sine
Communitatis
et
Procerum
regni
illius
assensu
primitus
emanarunt
;
so
Cap.
13.
Et
ut
non
potest
caput
corperis
Physici
nervos
suos
commutare
neque
membris
suis
proprias
vires
,
et
propria
sanguinis
alimenta
denegare
,
nec
Rex
qui
caput
est
corporis
Politici
,
mutare
potest
Leges
corporis
illius
,
nec
ejusdem
Populi
substantias
proprias
substrabere
reclamantibus
iis
,
an
invitis
.
And
concludes
thus
,
habes
jam
Princeps
,
institutionis
politici
Regni
formam
,
quam
Rex
ejus
in
Leges
ipsius
aut
subditos
valeat
exercere
,
ad
rutelam
namque
legis
,
subditorum
,
ac
eorum
corporum
et
bonorum
,
Rex
hujusmodi
erectus
est
:
et
ad
hanc
potestatem
a
Populo
effluxam
ipse
habet
,
quo
ei
non
liceat
potestate
alia
suo
Populo
dominari
.
I
had
not
been
so
large
on
a
Subject
which
is
so
known
and
evident
,
and
which
no
sober
man
will
deny
,
were
it
not
for
two
reasons
;
the
first
is
to
satisfy
Divines
,
and
men
of
other
professions
,
who
have
not
leasure
to
read
old
Law
Books
,
and
perhaps
may
lye
under
some
doubts
what
the
true
form
of
Government
of
this
Kingdom
hath
ever
been
:
and
in
the
next
place
,
to
confute
the
Author's
Cavil
,
and
other
mens
of
his
way
to
the
contrary
:
Authority
being
the
best
Judge
in
this
Case
,
as
Diogenes
confuted
Zenos's
Arguments
against
motion
(
not
by
disputeing
)
but
walking
:
So
now
whether
the
Treatise
this
Author
writes
against
,
be
but
a
Platonick
Monarchy
,
or
a
better
piece
of
Poetry
than
Policy
I
will
not
dispute
;
but
this
much
I
think
I
may
safely
affirm
,
that
the
Government
he
describes
is
not
a
Creature
to
be
found
(
God
be
thanked
)
on
English
ground
,
and
for
those
that
so
much
admire
it
,
let
them
go
find
it
by
the
banks
of
Nilus
,
or
Ganges
where
the
Sun
(
that
late
Emblem
of
universal
Monarchy
)
is
so
indulgent
to
the
Creatures
he
produces
,
that
those
which
he
cannot
make
grow
here
beyond
an
Eut
,
or
Adder
,
are
there
made
Crocodiles
,
and
Serpents
that
devour
a
man
at
a
bit
.
So
that
if
you
should
stile
them
the
representatives
of
the
Monarchs
of
those
Climates
,
Travellers
will
say
you
do
not
wrong
them
.
I
shall
now
proceed
to
answer
the
most
material
Objection
of
this
Authors
,
and
not
imitate
him
who
in
this
Treatise
passes
by
all
the
Arguments
which
Mr.
H.
brings
to
prove
that
this
is
no
absolute
despotick
,
but
at
least
a
limited
Monarchy
,
as
silently
as
Commentators
do
hard
places
that
puzle
them
.
Let
us
therefore
look
back
to
his
Patriarcha
,
where
he
gives
us
a
distinction
of
the
School-men
,
‛
whereby
they
subject
Kings
to
the
directive
,
but
not
to
the
coactive
power
of
Laws
,
and
is
a
confession
that
Kings
are
not
bound
by
the
positive
Laws
of
any
Nation
:
Since
the
compulsory
power
of
Laws
of
that
which
properly
makes
Laws
to
be
Laws
,
by
binding
men
by
rewards
and
punishments
to
obedience
;
whereas
the
direction
of
the
Law
,
is
but
like
the
advice
,
and
direction
which
the
Kings
Councel
gives
the
King
,
which
no
man
says
is
a
Law
to
the
King
.
Igrant
this
distinction
,
provided
the
Author
will
likewise
admit
another
,
that
though
the
King
is
not
obliged
by
Laws
,
or
to
any
Judges
of
them
as
to
Superiors
;
or
as
to
the
compulsory
Power
of
them
:
Yet
in
respect
of
God
,
and
his
own
Conscience
,
he
is
still
obliged
to
observe
them
,
and
not
to
dispence
with
them
in
those
cases
which
the
Law
does
not
give
him
a
power
so
to
do
;
and
since
it
is
true
that
it
is
the
rewards
and
punishments
annext
that
give
laws
their
Sanction
,
therefore
there
are
certain
rewards
which
will
naturally
bless
Princes
that
keep
their
Laws
,
such
as
peace
of
Conscience
,
Security
,
the
affections
of
their
People
&c.
and
if
I
call
the
contrary
effects
to
these
natural
punishments
,
that
are
commonly
the
consequences
of
the
breach
of
them
,
I
think
I
should
not
speak
absurdly
;
since
the
Author
himself
tells
us
P.
93.
Albeit
Kings
who
make
the
Laws
,
are
(
as
King
James
there
teacheth
us
)
above
Laws
,
yet
will
they
rule
their
Subjects
by
the
Law
,
and
a
King
governing
in
a
setled
Kingdom
leaves
to
be
a
King
&
degenerates
into
a
Tyrant
so
soon
as
he
seems
to
rule
(
it
is
there
printed
in
the
Copy
according
,
which
is
nonsence
)
contrary
to
his
Laws
:
and
certainly
a
Tyrant
can
never
promise
himself
security
,
either
from
his
own
Conscience
,
or
from
Men
;
but
whereas
he
says
the
direction
of
the
Law
is
only
like
the
advice
which
the
Kings
Councel
gives
him
,
which
no
man
says
is
a
Law
to
him
,
is
false
;
for
the
Kings
Councel
should
never
advise
him
to
do
that
which
he
cannot
whith
a
safe
Conscience
perform
;
but
the
Kings
Conscience
can
never
advise
him
to
break
those
Laws
that
are
the
boundaries
between
his
Prerogatives
,
and
the
Peoples
just
Rights
;
and
therefore
though
it
is
true
in
some
cases
where
the
King
sees
the
Law
rigorous
,
or
doubtful
,
he
may
mitigate
or
interpret
the
Execution
thereof
by
his
Judges
,
to
whom
he
hath
made
over
that
power
in
the
intervalls
of
Parliament
,
and
though
perhaps
some
particular
Statutes
may
be
his
Authority
be
suspended
,
for
causes
best
known
to
himself
and
Council
;
Yet
this
does
not
extend
to
Laws
of
publick
concernment
:
and
for
that
I
will
appeal
to
the
Conscience
of
any
true
Son
of
the
Church
of
England
,
whether
he
thinks
(
for
Example
)
that
the
Proclamation
for
indulgence
contrary
to
the
Statute
made
against
Conventicles
were
binding
or
no
:
Neither
is
this
that
follows
consistent
with
what
the
Author
hath
said
before
:
That
although
a
King
do
frame
all
his
Actions
to
be
according
to
the
Laws
,
yet
he
is
not
bound
thereto
but
at
his
good
will
,
and
for
good
Example
,
or
so
far
forth
as
the
general
Law
of
the
safety
of
the
Commonwealth
doth
naturally
bind
him
;
For
in
such
sort
only
positive
Laws
may
may
be
said
to
bind
the
King
,
not
by
being
positive
,
but
as
they
are
naturally
the
best
,
and
only
means
for
the
preservation
of
the
Common-wealth
!
So
that
if
a
King
thinks
any
,
the
firmest
and
most
indispensible
Laws
that
have
been
made
,
(
suppose
,
Magna
Charta
,
or
the
Statute
de
Tallagio
non
concedendo
for
example
)
not
to
be
for
the
safety
of
the
Commonweal
,
it
is
but
his
declaring
that
he
will
have
them
no
longer
observed
,
and
the
work
is
done
,
nor
will
this
that
follows
help
it
,
though
true
,
that
all
Kings
even
Tyrants
and
Conquerors
are
bound
to
preserve
the
Lands
,
Goods
,
Liberties
and
lives
of
all
their
Subjects
,
not
by
any
Municipal
Laws
so
much
as
the
natural
Law
of
a
Father
,
which
binds
them
to
ratifie
the
Acts
of
their
Fore-Fathers
,
and
Predecessors
in
things
necessary
for
the
publick
Good
of
the
Subjects
.
All
which
is
very
well
,
but
if
this
Monarch
thus
succeeding
in
the
place
of
the
natural
Father
,
is
the
sole
Judge
of
what
things
are
necessary
for
the
common
good
,
what
if
he
have
a
mind
to
keep
these
Children
(
for
Children
,
and
subjects
,
slaves
are
all
one
with
this
Authour
)
as
some
unnatural
Fathers
do
,
as
cheap
as
they
can
,
or
to
make
the
most
of
them
,
will
let
them
enjoy
no
more
but
the
scanty
necessaries
of
life
;
and
will
think
fair
water
,
brown
bread
and
wooden
shooes
sufficient
for
a
Farmer
,
and
300
l.
or
400
l.
per
annum
enough
in
Conscience
for
a
Country
Gentleman
,
or
desiring
to
be
absolute
,
(
and
therefore
to
have
a
constant
standing
Army
to
raise
mony
with
)
as
some
Monarchs
do
,
and
being
resolved
that
for
the
future
all
the
just
rights
and
priviledges
of
his
Clergy
Nobility
and
People
shall
signifie
nothing
,
will
take
all
the
over-plus
of
his
Childrens
Estates
,
eaving
them
no
more
then
a
poor
and
miserable
subsistence
,
he
may
lawfully
do
what
he
will
with
his
own
,
and
it
is
all
his
upon
the
first
intimation
of
his
pleasure
by
Edict
,
or
Proclamation
:
But
perhaps
some
honest
Divine
may
start
up
and
tell
him
he
will
be
damned
for
thus
abusing
his
power
,
or
breaking
his
Coronation
Oath
:
what
What
if
this
Father
of
his
people
shall
laugh
at
him
for
a
fool
,
and
think
himself
too
cunning
to
believe
any
such
thing
,
or
what
if
his
Son
,
or
Successor
be
resolved
not
to
run
his
head
any
more
into
the
snare
of
a
Coronation
Oath
,
but
finding
himself
invested
in
all
the
absolute
power
of
his
Predecessour
without
any
unjust
act
of
his
own
(
since
we
know
Princes
seldome
loose
any
thing
they
have
once
got
)
will
exercise
it
as
he
pleases
for
his
own
humour
or
glory
,
and
thinks
himself
not
obliged
in
Conscience
to
restore
any
of
those
rights
his
Predecessor
hath
ursuped
upon
his
People
.
I
know
not
what
benefit
this
may
be
to
the
Prince
,
but
this
I
am
sure
of
;
it
would
very
little
mend
the
Subjects
condition
to
be
told
their
former
Monarch
was
damned
,
or
that
this
may
follow
him
;
when
they
are
now
slaves
,
nor
is
this
a
mere
Chimera
since
a
Neighbouring
people
over
against
us
,
lost
their
liberties
by
much
such
a
kind
of
proceeding
.
And
therefore
this
Authour
hath
found
out
a
very
fit
interpretation
of
the
Kings
Coronation
Oath
,
Vide
Iuramenta
Regis
quando
coronatur
old
Stat.
ed
1556.
for
whereas
he
used
to
Swear
that
he
will
cause
equal
and
upright
justice
to
be
administred
in
all
his
judgments
,
and
to
use
discretion
with
mercy
,
and
truth
according
to
his
power
,
and
that
the
just
Laws
and
customes
(
quas
vulgus
elegerit
)
I
will
not
translate
it
shall
chuse
to
be
observed
,
to
the
honour
of
God
.
Yet
our
Author
will
have
the
King
obliged
to
keep
no
laws
but
what
he
in
his
discretion
Judges
to
be
upright
,
which
is
to
make
the
Oath
signifie
just
nothing
,
as
I
have
proved
already
,
wherein
he
abominably
perverts
the
sense
of
this
Oath
,
for
that
which
he
puts
first
is
really
last
.
And
the
words
by
which
he
Swears
to
observe
the
Laws
,
and
customes
,
granted
by
King
Edward
,
and
other
his
Predecessors
,
are
absolute
,
and
without
any
reservation
,
or
restriction
;
and
as
for
the
last
clause
where
the
King
Swears
to
observe
and
protect
justas
Leges
,
&
consuetudines
.
(
which
he
translates
upright
Laws
and
customes
)
this
word
justas
in
this
place
is
not
put
restrictively
(
as
any
man
may
see
that
considers
the
sense
of
the
words
)
but
only
by
way
of
Epithite
supposing
that
the
People
would
not
chuse
any
laws
to
be
observed
,
but
those
that
are
just
,
and
upright
,
but
the
Author
omits
here
quas
populus
Elegerit
,
as
a
sentence
that
does
not
at
all
please
him
;
though
it
be
in
all
the
Copies
of
the
old
Coronation
.
Oaths
of
our
Kings
:
and
he
may
as
well
deny
that
they
tooke
any
other
clause
,
as
this
:
yet
since
the
Author
himself
gives
us
an
interpretation
of
these
words
in
his
Freeholders
inquest
,
pag.
62.
which
will
by
his
own
showing
make
these
clauses
justas
Leges
,
&
consuetudines
,
not
to
extend
to
all
laws
and
customes
in
general
,
but
those
quas
vulgus
elegerit
,
that
is
as
he
there
interprets
it
the
Customes
which
the
vulgar
shall
chuse
,
and
it
is
the
vulgus
or
common
people
only
who
chuse
customes
,
common
usage
time
out
of
mind
creates
a
custome
,
no where
can
so
common
a
usage
be
found
as
among
the
vulgar
,
&c.
If
a
custome
be
common
through
the
whole
Kingdom
,
it
is
all
one
with
the
common
law
in
England
,
which
is
said
to
be
common
custome
;
that
in
plain
terms
to
maintain
the
customes
which
the
vulgar
shall
chuse
,
is
the
common
Laws
of
England
,
so
that
in
the
Authours
own
sense
it
shall
not
signifie
such
Laws
which
the
King
himself
hath
already
chosen
,
and
establisht
,
but
only
those
which
the
people
have
chosen
,
and
in
this
sense
perhaps
it
was
part
of
the
Oath
of
Richard
II.
to
abolish
all
evil
,
unjust
Laws
;
that
is
,
evil
vulgar
customes
,
and
to
abolish
them
whenever
they
should
be
offred
him
by
bill
.
But
I
do
not
read
that
any
King
or
Queen
since
Richard
II.
took
that
clause
he
mentions
,
and
perhaps
King
Richard
took
it
in
the
Authours
sense
,
and
found
such
interpreters
to
his
mind
,
and
that
made
him
prove
such
a
King
as
he
was
,
to
endeavour
to
destroy
all
the
Laws
and
liberties
of
this
Nation
,
burning
and
cancelling
the
Records
of
Parliament
,
and
indeed
there
was
no
need
of
any
,
if
it
be
true
which
he
did
not
stick
to
affirme
,
that
the
Laws
of
of
England
were
only
to
be
found
in
his
head
,
or
his
breast
;
but
the
Authour
though
he
grants
(
for
it
were
undutiful
to
contradict
so
wise
a
King
as
King
James
,
)
that
a
King
Governing
in
a
setled
Kingdom
,
leaves
to
be
a
King
,
and
degenerates
into
a
Tyrant
so
soon
as
he
seems
to
rule
contrary
to
his
Laws
,
yet
will
by
no
means
have
this
King
counted
a
Tyrant
.
But
I
will
not
trouble
my self
about
trifles
,
much
less
maintaine
that
the
Lords
or
Commons
had
any
Authority
to
use
King
Richard
as
they
did
;
since
it
is
a
contradiction
that
any
power
should
Judge
that
,
on
which
it
depends
and
who
dieing
,
that
is
immediatly
dissolved
,
since
our
Kings
have
ever
been
trusted
with
the
Prerogative
of
calling
and
dissolving
Parliaments
,
and
certainly
they
can
never
be
supposed
to
let
them
sit
to
depose
themselves
.
And
of
this
opinion
was
Bracton
lib.
1.
cap.
8.
Si
autem
ab
eo
petatur
cum
(
breve
non
currat
contra
ipsum
)
Locus
erit
supplicationi
,
quod
factum
suum
corrigat
&
emendat
,
quod
si
non
fecerit
,
satis
sufficit
ei
ad
paenam
,
quod
Dominum
expectet
ultorem
.
But
to
return
where
we
left
off
,
if
it
be
granted
that
Kings
do
Swear
to
observe
all
the
laws
of
their
Kingdomes
,
yet
this
Author
is
so
good
a
casuist
,
that
he
can
as
easily
absolve
their
Consciences
as
the
Pope
himself
;
For
says
he
,
Patriarch
p.
97.
no
man
can
think
it
reason
that
Kings
should
be
more
bound
by
their
voluntary
Oaths
then
Common
persons
are
by
theirs
,
now
if
aprivate
man
make
a
contract
,
either
with
or
without
an
Oath
,
he
is
no
farther
bound
then
the
equity
and
justice
of
the
contract
ties
him
;
for
a
man
may
have
relief
against
an
unreasonable
,
and
unjust
promise
,
if
either
deceit
or
Errour
or
force
or
fear
induced
him
thereunto
:
Or
if
it
be
hurtful
or
grievous
in
the
performance
;
and
since
the
Laws
in
many
cases
give
the
King
a
Prerogative
above
common
Persons
,
I
see
no
reason
why
he
should
be
denyed
that
Priviledg
which
the
meanest
of
his
Subjects
doth
enjoy
.
I
know
not
to
what
end
the
Author
writ
this
Paragrph
,
unless
it
were
to
make
the
world
beleive
,
that
when
when
Kings
take
their
Coronation
Oaths
they
do
it
not
freely
;
but
only
are
drawn
in
,
by
the
Bishops
,
or
over-awed
by
the
great
Lords
;
that
they
do
not
understand
what
they
do
,
and
so
are
meerly
choused
,
or
frighted
into
it
by
Fraud
,
or
Force
.
A
very
fine
excuse
for
a
Prince
for
so
solemn
an
action
,
and
which
he
hath
had
time
enough
to
consider
of
,
and
advise
with
his
own
Conscience
,
whether
he
may
take
it
or
no
:
That
he
can
be
said
to
be
induced
by
Fear
or
Force
,
who
was
a
lawful
King
before
,
and
only
uses
this
ceremony
to
let
his
Subjects
see
the
reallity
of
his
intentions
towards
them
.
And
that
nothing
shall
prevail
with
him
to
break
his
Oath
which
he
hath
made
before
God
.
That
he
will
preserve
those
Laws
and
rights
of
his
Subjects
,
which
he
does
not
grant
but
find
them
in
possession
of
:
But
as
for
this
relief
against
an
unreasonable
,
or
unjust
promise
as
the
Author
terms
it
.
If
by
those
words
he
means
a
promise
,
or
grant
that
may
tend
to
some
damage
,
or
inconvenience
of
the
Promiser
or
Grantor
,
to
some
right
or
Jurisdiction
that
the
Grantor
might
have
enjoyed
,
had
it
not
been
granted
away
,
either
by
his
Ancestors
,
or
himself
;
If
the
Promise
were
full
,
and
perfect
,
or
the
grant
not
obtained
either
by
fear
,
force
,
or
Fraud
;
all
Civilians
,
and
Divines
hold
that
the
Promiser
,
or
Grantor
is
obliged
to
the
Promise
,
and
cannot
take
away
the
thing
granted
,
though
it
were
in
his
power
so
to
do
.
For
David
makes
it
part
of
the
Character
of
the
upright
man
,
Psal.
XV.
4.
and
who
shall
dwell
in
Gods
Tabernacle
,
that
sweareth
to
his
own
hurt
,
and
changeth
not
.
But
our
Author
hath
found
a
way
to
set
all
men
loose
from
their
Oaths
,
or
contracts
if
they
be
any
thing
grievous
,
or
hurtful
in
the
performance
,
that
is
if
the
Promiser
,
or
Grantor
think
it
so
:
and
Kings
must
have
at
least
as
much
,
and
in
most
cases
a
greater
Prerogative
than
common
Persons
.
‛
It
was
a
thousand
pitties
this
Author
was
not
Confessor
to
King
H.
III.
He
might
then
have
saved
him
the
sending
to
Rome
for
a
dispensation
of
his
Oath
for
the
observance
of
Magna
charta
,
which
he
had
made
before
in
Parliament
at
Oxford
.
Anno
Regni
.
21.
and
taught
him
and
all
Princes
else
a
nearer
way
to
be
freed
from
their
Coronation
Oaths
,
if
ever
they
find
them
uneafie
to
them
.
But
Edward
1.
that
great
Prince
was
of
another
mind
,
who
in
his
Letter
to
the
Pope
concerning
the
Tribure
granted
by
King
John
.
Mat.
Paris
.
P.
435.
Et
super
hoc
nequiverimus
ejusdem
deliberationem
habere
cum
Prelatis
et
proceribus
ante
dictis
,
sine
quorum
Communicato
Concilio
Sanctitati
vestrae
non
possumus
respondere
,
et
jure
jurando
Coronatione
nostra
praestito
sumus
astricti
,
quod
Jura
Regni
servabimus
illibita
,
nec
aliquid
quod
Diadema
tangat
regni
ejusdem
absque
ipsorum
re
quisito
comsilio
facimus
.
So
likewise
that
Victorious
Prince
Edward
III.
in
the
preamble
to
the
new
Statute
of
Provisors
Anno
Regni
.
25.
Which
Statute
viz.
repealing
a
former
Law
viz.
35.
Edward
.
I.
which
said
this
Statute
holdeth
always
his
force
,
and
was
never
defeated
or
annulled
in
any
point
,
and
by
so
much
as
he
is
viz.
the
King
bound
by
his
Oath
to
do
the
same
,
to
be
kept
as
the
Law
of
the
Realm
.
But
I
come
now
to
the
last
main
Objection
which
the
Author
makes
against
limited
Monarchy
;
and
by
which
he
hopes
to
prove
it
an
absolute
Monarchy
:
I
will
set
down
the
difference
between
our
Author
,
and
Mr.
H.
upon
whom
he
animadverts
in
their
own
words
.
‛
First
Mr.
H.
holds
that
the
King
himself
in
a
limited
Monarchy
is
not
to
be
resisted
or
punished
any
more
then
in
absolute
Monarchy
,
and
so
can
doe
no
wrong
in
his
own
person
.
‛
Yet
if
he
this
limited
Monarch
transcends
his
bounds
,
if
he
commands
against
Law
,
the
subject
is
not
Legally
bound
to
obedience
in
such
cases
,
whereupon
our
Author
asks
who
shall
be
Judge
,
whether
the
Monarch
transcend
his
bounds
?
Mr.
H.
conceives
that
in
a
limited
legal
Monarchy
,
there
can
be
no
stated
external
Judge
of
the
Monarch's
actions
,
if
there
grow
a
fundamental
variance
betwixt
him
,
and
the
Community
.
And
in
another
place
confesses
that
there
can
be
no
Judge
Legal
,
and
constituted
within
that
form
of
Government
,
whereupon
the
Author
thinks
he
hath
got
a
great
advantage
over
our
Gentleman
,
and
therefore
is
resolved
to
put
the
question
home
,
and
demands
of
him
if
there
be
a
variance
betwixt
the
Monarch
,
and
any
of
the
meanest
persons
of
the
community
who
shall
be
judg
?
for
instance
,
the
King
commands
or
gives
Judgment
against
me
:
I
reply
his
commands
are
illegal
,
and
his
Judgments
not
atcording
to
Law
:
who
must
judge
?
if
the
Monarch
himself
judge
,
then
you
destroy
the
frame
of
the
Government
,
and
make
it
absolute
:
For
saith
Mr
H.
to
confine
a
Monarch
to
a
Law
,
and
then
to
make
him
Judge
of
his
own
deviations
from
that
Law
,
is
to
obsolve
him
from
all
Law
,
and
on
the
other
side
,
if
any
or
all
the
People
may
Judg
,
then
you
put
the
Soveraignty
in
the
whole
Body
,
or
part
of
it
,
and
destroy
the
Being
of
Monarchy
,
and
thus
this
Author
(
says
Sir
R.
A.
)
hath
caught
himself
in
a
plain
Dilemma
:
if
the
King
be
Judg
,
then
he
is
no
limited
Monarch
,
if
the
people
Judg
,
then
he
is
no
Monarch
at
all
:
so
farewell
limited
Monarchy
,
nay
farewell
all
Government
if
there
be
no
Judg.
But
as
sure
as
this
Author
thinks
he
hath
his
Adversary
at
an
Advantage
,
yet
I
do
not
see
that
he
hath
given
him
so
much
as
a
Foyl
,
much
less
a
fair
Fall
,
for
all
this
terrible
Dilemma
.
For
first
,
it
is
for
this
,
that
if
the
people
be
Judg
when
the
Princes
commands
are
unlawful
,
it
will
therefore
destroy
the
being
of
Monarchy
;
suppose
a
King
should
command
all
his
Subjects
to
go
to
Mass
,
which
they
being
Protestants
judg
Idolatrous
.
If
they
obey
him
,
they
must
commit
Idolatry
,
if
they
disobey
him
he
is
then
no
Monarch
.
But
perhaps
it
will
be
replied
,
that
it
is
true
,
the
Subjects
may
judg
when
the
Command
is
unlawful
,
but
if
they
cannot
yield
active
obedience
,
yet
they
must
yield
a
passive
one
,
and
submit
patiently
to
the
Penalties
he
pleases
to
lay
upon
them
for
not
going
.
This
Answer
will
not
serve
turn
,
for
the
Authors
Objection
is
general
,
if
the
people
judg
,
(
he
does
not
say
resist
)
he
is
no
Monarch
at
all
:
and
refusing
to
go
to
Mass
is
a
judging
the
Princes
Command
unlawful
.
But
Mr.
Hobs
,
from
whom
this
Argument
is
borrowed
,
drives
it
more
home
,
(
if
the
Authors
friends
will
admit
the
Consequence
)
&
affirms
truely
upon
his
own
principles
,
that
if
the
Subject
do
judg
in
any
case
whatever
,
of
what
is
lawful
or
unlawful
,
good
or
evil
,
it
quite
destroys
the
Monarchy
.
For
the
Monarch
is
sole
Judg
of
all
Actions
,
whether
they
be
Lawsul
or
not
.
Now
when
the
Monarch
hath
declared
his
Will
,
that
all
his
Subjects
should
go
to
Mass
,
surely
not
to
go
,
is
to
disobey
the
Monarchs
Command
.
Since
his
will
was
,
they
should
absolutely
go
to
Mass
,
nor
leave
it
to
their
discretion
either
to
go
to
Mass
,
or
undergo
the
Penalty
ordained
for
not
going
.
Lastly
,
neither
does
the
Judgment
of
the
people
concerning
their
own
safty
,
in
many
cases
,
take
away
the
absolute
power
of
a
Monarch
.
For
a
General
of
an
Army
hath
an
absolute
Power
over
the
Lives
of
his
Soldiers
but
does
it
derogate
from
his
absolute
power
,
that
he
knowes
he
shall
not
be
obeyed
if
he
command
his
Men
to
leap
down
a
Precipice
,
or
to
kill
each
other
?
‛
But
Mr.
H.
proposes
two
or
three
expedients
to
help
this
inconvenience
of
the
want
of
a
publick
Judg.
First
.
He
says
a
Subject
is
bound
to
yield
to
a
Magistrate
,
where
he
cannot
de
jure
challeng
obedience
,
if
it
be
in
a
thing
in
which
he
can
possibly
do
it
without
subversion
to
the
Goverment
,
and
in
which
his
Act
may
not
be
made
a
leading
Case
,
and
so
bring
on
a
prescription
against
public
liberty
.
And
again
,
he
saith
,
If
the
Act
in
which
the
Exorbitance
,
or
Transgression
of
the
Monarch
is
supposed
to
be
,
be
of
lesser
moment
,
and
not
striking
at
the
very
Being
of
the
Government
,
it
ought
to
be
borne
by
publick
patience
,
rather
then
to
endanger
the
Being
of
the
State
.
But
these
Salvoes
however
moderate
and
sober
,
will
not
please
our
Author
at
all
.
‛
For
he
will
have
them
to
be
but
Fig-leaves
to
cover
the
nakedness
of
Mr.
H's
limited
Monarch
formed
upon
weak
supposals
in
cases
of
lesser
moment
.
For
if
the
Monarch
be
to
govern
only
according
to
Law
,
no
transgression
of
his
can
be
of
no
small
moment
,
if
he
break
the
bounds
of
Law
;
for
it
is
a
subversion
of
the
Government
it self
,
and
may
be
a
leading
case
,
and
so
bring
on
a
prescription
against
publick
Liberty
;
and
strikes
at
the
very
being
of
the
Government
it self
;
and
let
the
case
be
never
so
small
,
yet
if
there
be
illegality
in
the
Act
,
it
strikes
at
the
very
being
of
limited
Monarchy
,
which
is
to
be
legal
,
unless
the
Author
will
say
,
as
in
effect
he
doth
,
that
his
limited
Monarch
must
govern
according
to
Law
,
in
great
&
publick
matters
only
,
but
that
in
smaller
,
and
which
concern
private
Men
,
he
may
rule
according
to
his
own
will
.
All
which
,
although
it
look
fine
,
yet
examined
to
the
bottom
signifies
little
,
for
it
is
not
true
,
that
every
the
least
transgression
of
the
bounds
of
Law
,
is
a
subversion
of
the
Government
it self
,
since
if
done
perhaps
only
to
one
or
a
few
persons
,
it
does
not
follow
that
therefore
it
must
be
a
leading
case
,
and
so
bring
on
a
prescription
against
publick
Liberty
in
all
cases
.
Neither
does
the
Subjects
bearing
with
it
not
contribute
otherwise
then
accidentally
to
this
breach
of
Liberty
.
Since
he
is
obliged
to
bear
it
,
not
because
it
is
just
,
but
because
he
either
may
hope
to
have
redress
by
the
ordinary
course
of
Law
,
or
else
by
petitioning
the
Assembly
of
Estates
,
when
they
meet
,
who
are
partly
ordained
on
purpose
to
remonstrate
the
Grievances
of
Subjects
to
their
Prince
,
and
thereupon
,
to
have
them
redressed
.
Nor
is
this
limited
Monarch
(
as
the
Author
would
infer
)
less
obliged
to
govern
according
to
Law
,
in
smaller
or
private
matters
,
then
in
great
and
publick
ones
.
Only
in
many
smaller
matters
,
Princes
or
their
Officers
may
through
ignorance
or
inadvertency
sometimes
transgress
the
true
bounds
of
Law
,
which
they
would
not
do
perhaps
if
they
were
better
informed
.
And
so
likewise
if
the
Subject
bear
it
,
it
is
not
from
the
Legality
of
the
Act
,
but
from
this
great
Maxime
in
Law
and
Reason
,
that
a
mischief
to
some
private
men
,
is
better
than
an
inconvenience
in
giving
every
private
person
power
,
that
thinks
himself
injured
by
the
Prince
or
his
Officers
,
to
be
his
own
Judg
and
right
himself
by
force
;
since
that
were
contrary
to
the
great
duty
of
every
good
Subject
of
endeavouring
to
preserve
the
common
peace
and
happiness
of
his
Country
,
which
ought
to
be
preferred
before
any
private
mans
Interest
.
So
on
the
other
side
if
the
oppression
or
breach
of
Laws
be
general
,
and
extend
to
all
the
People
alike
:
if
the
reason
of
the
case
alter
,
why
may
not
the
practicedo
so
too
.
‛
But
Mr.
H.
gives
us
another
remedy
in
this
case
;
that
if
the
Monarchs
Act
of
Exorbitancy
or
Transgression
be
mortal
,
and
such
as
suffered
,
dissolves
the
Frame
of
the
Government
and
publick
Liberty
,
then
the
illegality
is
to
be
laid
open
,
and
redressment
sought
by
Petition
.
Which
is
true
,
for
an
Appeal
to
the
Law
from
the
violence
of
subordinate
Ministers
,
is
really
a
Petition
for
Justice
to
the
King
himself
,
who
is
by
the
Law
supposed
present
in
the
persons
of
his
Judges
that
represent
him
:
and
this
the
Author
himself
in
a
better
humour
does
confess
in
his
Patriarcha
P.
93.
The
people
have
the
Law
as
a
familiar
interpreter
of
the
Kings
pleasure
,
which
being
published
throughout
the
Kingdom
doth
represent
the
presence
and
Majesty
of
the
King
;
also
the
Judges
and
Magistrates
are
restrained
by
the
common
Rules
of
Law
from
using
their
own
Liberty
to
the
injury
of
others
,
since
they
are
to
judg
according
to
the
Laws
,
and
not
to
follow
their
own
Opinions
.
And
because
it
might
so
happen
that
the
King
may
be
sometimes
surprised
or
importuned
to
write
Orders
or
Letters
to
the
Judges
to
direct
them
to
act
contrary
to
the
Law
.
The
King
himself
in
Parliament
hath
declared
,
See
the
Oath
of
the
Justices
,
18.
E.
3.
what
Oath
these
Justices
shall
take
when
they
are
admitted
into
their
Office
where
among
other
things
they
swear
thus
.
And
that
ye
deny
no
man
common
right
,
by
the
Kings
Letters
nor
none
other
mans
,
nor
for
none
other
cause
,
and
in
case
such
Letters
do
come
to
you
contrary
to
the
Law
,
that
ye
do
nothing
by
such
Letters
but
certifie
the
King
thereof
,
and
proceed
to
execute
the
Law
,
notwithstanding
the
same
Letters
,
and
concludes
thus
.
And
in
case
ye
be
from
henceforth
found
in
default
in
any
of
the
points
aforesaid
,
ye
shall
be
at
the
Kings
will
of
Body
,
Lands
,
or
Goods
,
thereof
to
be
done
as
shall
please
him
,
as
God
help
you
,
&c.
And
the
Lord
Chief-Justice
Anderson
and
his
Fellow-Justices
in
the
Common-Pleas
,
who
upon
so
great
a
point
as
Cavendishes
.
Case
was
,
35
El.
having
consulted
with
all
the
Judges
of
England
,
delivered
their
Opinions
solemnly
in
writing
,
that
the
Queen
was
obliged
by
her
Coronation-Oath
,
to
keep
the
Laws
,
and
if
they
should
not
likewise
observe
them
,
they
were
forsworne
.
Anderson
,
p.
154
,
155.
Which
Will
of
the
Kings
is
supposed
to
be
as
well
declared
by
the
House
of
Peers
his
supreme
Court
of
Justice
,
as
by
any
other
way
.
See
the
Judgment
upon
Tresillian
and
the
rest
of
his
Brethren
21
Rich.
2.
and
the
Impeachment
of
the
House
of
Commons
against
the
Judges
that
gave
their
Opinions
contrary
to
Law
,
in
the
case
of
Ship-money
,
Vide
the
subsequent
Act
of
Parliament
,
17
Car.
1.
Chap.
14.
declaring
that
upon
the
Tax
called
Shipmoney
and
the
Judgment
Entr.
1.
H.
7.
4.
b.
the
judicial
opinions
of
the
said
Justices
and
Barons
were
,
and
are
contrary
to
the
Laws
and
Statutes
of
this
Realm
;
and
the
Liberty
of
the
Subjects
,
&c.
which
if
it
be
truely
observed
,
there
can
never
be
any
fear
of
a
Civil
War
or
popular
Commotion
,
since
our
Law
supposes
the
King
can
do
no
wrong
,
that
is
in
his
own
person
.
And
therefore
Sir
John
Markham
,
when
Chief
Justice
told
King
Edward
the
4th
.
That
the
King
cannot
arrest
any
Man
himself
for
suspition
of
Treason
or
Fellony
as
other
of
his
Lieges
may
:
for
if
it
be
a
wrong
to
the
party
grieved
,
he
has
no
remedy
.
Therefore
if
any
Act
or
thing
be
done
to
the
Subject
contrary
to
the
Law
,
the
Judges
and
Ministers
of
Justice
are
to
be
questioned
and
punished
if
the
Laws
are
violated
,
and
no
reflection
made
upon
the
King
,
who
is
still
supposed
to
do
his
Subjects
Right
.
Si
factam
fuerit
injustum
(
says
Bracton
per
inde
non
fuerit
factum
Regis
.
And
thus
much
will
serve
for
a
further
Answer
to
the
Authors
Query
before
mentioned
.
Whether
it
be
a
sin
for
a
Subject
to
disobey
the
King
if
he
command
any
thing
contrary
to
his
Laws
,
since
all
the
Subjects
both
great
and
small
are
supposed
to
know
what
the
Rights
and
Priviledges
of
the
Subject
are
,
as
well
as
what
are
the
Prerogatives
of
the
Crown
,
nor
are
these
reserved
Cases
so
many
or
so
difficult
as
the
Anthor
would
make
us
believe
;
but
that
they
may
be
easily
understood
without
Appealing
to
any
other
Judg
then
the
Conscience
of
every
honest
man
.
And
though
the
King
may
for
our
common
defence
in
time
of
War
make
Bulwarks
upon
another
mans
Land
,
or
command
a
House
to
be
pull'd
down
if
the
next
be
on
Fire
:
or
the
Suburbs
of
a
City
to
be
demolished
in
time
of
War
to
make
it
serviceable
;
though
men
may
justify
their
obedience
in
such
Cases
,
yet
it
were
folly
and
madness
from
thence
to
argue
,
that
the
King
were
as
much
to
be
obeyed
if
he
commanded
us
to
pull
down
a
whole
Town
for
his
Diversion
,
or
to
take
away
all
mens
Lands
or
Goods
at
his
Pleasure
.
Since
if
he
should
be
so
weak
as
to
command
it
,
it
were
his
unhappiness
that
he
had
no
more
understanding
.
But
it
would
be
our
Crime
,
and
we
alone
were
punishable
,
if
we
should
obey
such
a
Command
,
and
it
is
only
upon
this
supposition
,
whether
the
sufficiency
of
the
Protection
of
our
Laws
and
the
integrity
of
the
Judges
,
declared
in
the
14th
of
his
now
Majesties
Reign
,
by
the
Act
concerning
the
Militia
,
be
full
?
that
it
is
a
Traiterous
Position
that
Arms
may
be
taken
by
his
Majesties
Authority
against
his
Person
,
or
against
those
Commissioned
by
him
,
in
persuance
of
Military
Commissions
,
Because
they
suppose
the
King
will
not
make
use
of
the
Militia
for
the
destruction
but
the
preservation
of
the
Subjects
just
Rights
,
and
because
all
Officers
of
the
Army
or
Militia
,
are
at
their
Peril
,
to
take
notice
whether
their
Orders
are
according
to
Law
or
not
.
For
they
put
it
thus
,
though
to
take
free
Quarter
or
to
hang
a
man
by
Martial-Law
in
time
of
War
be
lawful
,
yet
to
do
so
in
time
of
Peace
,
though
in
the
Kings
Name
,
is
Robbery
and
Murder
.
And
of
this
Opinion
is
that
antient
Book
called
the
Mirror
of
Justices
,
Chap.
1.
Sect.
10.
De
Larcine
.
En
cest
Peche
(
viz.
Robbery
)
chiont
tonts
ceux
que
pernont
le'
autrun
per
l'
Authorite
del
Roy
en
le'
autre
Grand
Seigneur
sans
le
gree
de
ceux
aux
queux
les
biens
sont
.
Into
this
Crime
(
viz.
)
Robbery
,
all
those
do
fall
who
take
the
Goods
of
another
by
the
Authority
of
the
King
,
or
any
other
great
Lord
without
their
Consent
.
‛
Nor
I
dare
fay
,
will
any
honest
well
meaning
Subject
be
discontented
,
if
in
case
of
extream
necessity
,
or
some
sudden
danger
the
King
should
somewhat
exceed
his
Prerogative
for
the
defence
of
the
Kingdom
further
then
the
Law
will
allow
.
Since
in
matters
of
private
concern
,
a
Man
will
not
be
angry
with
his
Agent
or
Factor
whom
he
hat●●mpowered
to
look
after
his
Business
in
another
Countrey
,
if
the
Agent
,
perceiving
the
person
for
whom
he
is
intrusted
,
does
not
understand
how
his
concerns
in
that
place
stand
,
and
that
the
Affair
will
not
permit
him
to
send
again
for
farther
Orders
,
if
he
act
contrary
to
his
first
Instructions
:
since
if
he
did
not
,
his
Friends
or
Masters
business
would
be
lost
.
Much
more
in
the
case
of
a
King
,
who
besides
the
peoples
concerns
,
with
which
he
is
intrusted
,
hath
likewise
his
own
Crown
and
Dignity
at
Stake
.
So
likewise
a
King
will
easily
pardon
a
Subject
who
upon
a
sudden
Insurrection
or
Invasion
,
raises
Forces
and
marches
against
the
Enemy
,
without
staying
for
a
Commission
;
and
when
a
Prince
hath
so
well
satisfied
his
Subjects
that
he
never
intends
to
make
use
of
this
Prerogative
but
for
the
good
and
preservation
of
his
people
,
he
may
do
almost
what
he
pleases
,
and
no
body
will
be
concerned
.
And
this
made
Queen
Elizabeth
meet
with
that
great
Affection
and
Confidence
that
she
did
throughout
her
whole
Reign
;
for
though
she
sometimes
exercised
as
high
Acts
of
Prerogative
as
some
of
her
Predecessors
,
yet
she
had
the
good
luck
to
have
scarce
any
of
them
questioned
in
Parliament
:
because
the
whole
Nation
was
satisfied
,
she
acted
for
the
best
,
and
sought
no
other
end
but
the
publick
good
and
safety
of
the
Kingdom
.
Which
,
had
she
permitted
Spain
to
have
swallowed
up
France
and
the
Low-Countries
,
it
would
have
been
a
hard
task
to
perswade
them
.
But
Mr.
H.
proceeds
in
the
same
Paragraph
,
and
supposes
that
redressment
by
Petition
failing
(
that
is
,
that
the
Judges
either
do
not
,
or
will
not
act
according
to
their
Oathes
)
then
(
if
the
Exorbitancy
‛
or
transgression
be
mortal
to
the
Government
)
prevention
by
resistance
ought
to
be
:
and
if
it
be
apparent
,
and
appeal
be
made
to
the
Consciences
of
Mankind
,
then
the
Fundamental
Laws
of
that
Monarchy
must
judg
and
pronounce
sentence
in
every
mans
Conscience
,
and
every
man
(
so
far
as
concerns
him
)
must
follow
the
Evidence
of
Truth
in
his
own
Sense
,
to
oppose
or
not
oppose
according
as
he
can
in
Conscience
acquit
or
Condemn
the
Act
of
the
Governour
or
Monarch
.
This
our
Author
finds
fault
with
:
‛
First
,
concerning
the
laying
open
of
illegal
Commands
,
he
will
have
Mr.
H's
meaning
to
be
,
that
each
private
Man
in
his
peculiar
case
,
should
make
a
publick
Remonstrance
to
the
World
,
of
the
illegal
Acts
of
the
Monarch
,
and
then
if
upon
his
Petition
he
cannot
be
relieved
according
to
his
Desire
,
he
ought
to
make
Resistance
.
Whereupon
the
Author
would
know
who
can
be
Judg
,
whether
the
illegality
be
made
sufficiently
apparent
?
It
is
a
main
point
,
since
every
man
is
prone
to
flatter
himself
in
his
own
cause
,
and
to
think
it
good
,
and
that
the
wrong
or
injustice
he
suffers
is
apparent
,
when
moderate
and
indifferent
men
can
discover
no
such
thing
:
and
in
this
case
the
Judgment
of
the
common
people
cannot
be
gathered
or
known
by
any
possible
means
;
or
if
it
could
,
it
were
like
to
be
various
and
erronious
.
In
which
Annimadversion
of
our
Author
,
he
first
lays
that
to
Mr.
H's
Charge
,
which
he
does
no where
affirm
;
that
every
particular
Subject
,
when
injured
,
should
make
a
publick
remonstrance
to
the
people
;
but
only
lay
it
open
to
the
Monarch
,
or
his
Judges
that
represent
him
,
by
Petition
.
And
sure
there
is
a
great
deal
of
difference
between
a
Petition
,
and
a
Remonstrance
.
He
does
not
say
that
every
single
Subject
failing
of
Redress
by
Petition
,
ought
to
make
resistance
in
his
own
case
,
for
he
before
supposes
the
Exorbitant
Act
or
Transgression
not
to
be
Mortal
,
&
such
as
suffered
,
dissolves
the
Frame
of
the
Government
and
publick
Liberty
.
And
that
in
such
lighter
cases
for
the
publick
Peace
,
we
ought
to
submit
and
make
no
resistance
at
all
,
but
de
jure
cedere
;
which
can
never
fall
out
,
as
long
as
this
Transgression
or
Exorbitance
extends
it self
only
to
some
particular
men
.
2.
Our
Author
will
have
no
particular
man
to
be
Judg
in
his
own
Cause
.
I
grant
it
,
if
by
Judg
he
means
Execution
too
,
by
publick
resistance
.
Otherwise
a
mans
passing
his
judgment
or
declaring
it
,
that
he
thinks
himself
injured
,
suppose
by
a
Decree
in
Chancery
or
Act
of
Parliament
,
does
not
disturb
the
Goverment
or
publick
Peace
.
But
he
may
if
he
please
bring
his
Appeal
,
or
a
new
Bill
in
Parliament
and
have
the
unjust
Decree
or
Act
reversed
,
which
he
can
never
do
,
if
he
did
believe
he
ought
not
to
make
the
injustice
or
illegality
of
this
Act
or
Decree
apparent
to
those
that
are
to
give
him
redress
,
but
if
this
Exorbitant
Act
or
Transgression
be
general
and
presses
upon
all
alike
,
I
deny
that
the
Judgment
of
the
common
people
cannot
be
gathered
or
known
by
any
possible
means
:
or
if
it
could
it
were
like
to
be
various
and
erroneous
.
For
suppose
the
illegal
Act
were
so
publickly
declared
that
for
the
future
all
Taxes
should
be
raised
without
consent
of
Parliament
:
or
that
all
menshould
be
tried
for
their
Lives
without
Juries
.
I
would
fain
know
whether
the
Judgment
not
only
of
the
Commonalty
,
but
of
all
the
people
,
may
not
be
easily
known
,
though
not
gathered
by
Vote
?
or
whether
it
would
be
various
and
erroneous
in
these
cases
.
Fr
the
people
though
they
do
not
argue
so
subtilly
as
our
Author
does
,
yet
in
their
Sence
of
Feeling
,
when
wrong'd
or
hurt
,
are
seldome
mistaken
.
Then
our
Author
is
angry
that
Mr.
H.
will
have
an
Appeal
made
to
the
Consciences
of
all
Mankind
,
that
being
made
,
that
the
Fundamental
Laws
must
judg
and
pronounce
Sentence
in
every
mans
own
Conscience
,
here
he
would
fain
learn
of
Mr.
H.
or
any
other
for
him
,
what
a
Fundamental
Law
is
,
or
else
have
but
one
Law
named
to
him
,
that
any
Man
shall
say
is
a
Fundamental
Law
of
the
Monarchy
.
Well
,
to
do
the
Authors
Friends
a
pleasure
,
(
since
he
is
dead
himself
)
I
will
name
one
that
he
himself
would
deny
to
be
one
in
this
Monarchy
;
and
that
is
,
that
the
Crown
upon
the
death
of
the
King
should
descend
to
the
next
Heir
,
and
so
we
have
one
Fundamental
Law
,
and
I
hope
there
may
be
more
.
But
he
says
Mr.
H.
tells
us
,
‛
that
the
Common
Laws
are
the
Foundation
,
and
the
Statute
Laws
superstructive
.
Yet
our
Author
thinks
that
Mr.
H.
dares
say
,
‛
that
there
is
any
one
branch
or
part
of
the
Common
Law
,
but
may
be
taken
away
by
Act
of
Parliament
;
for
many
points
of
the
Common-Law
(
de
facto
)
have
,
and
(
de
jure
)
any
point
may
be
taken
away
.
How
can
that
be
called
a
Fundamental
,
which
hath
and
may
be
removed
,
and
yet
the
Statute
Laws
stand
firm
and
Stable
!
It
is
contrary
to
the
Nature
of
a
Fundamental
,
for
the
Building
to
stand
,
when
the
Foundation
is
taken
away
.
All
which
,
is
mere
wrangling
about
the
Metaphor
of
a
Foundation
and
a
Superstructure
,
as
if
such
expressions
required
an
absolute
Physical
Truth
as
they
do
in
the
things
from
which
they
are
taken
.
It
is
already
granted
,
that
all
Laws
in
a
limited
Government
,
but
those
of
Nature
,
and
right
Reason
are
alterable
,
because
the
Governmen
it self
is
so
,
and
in
respect
of
which
alone
they
may
be
called
Fundamental
,
or
Foundations
of
the
Government
,
but
these
being
altered
,
it
would
cease
to
be
the
same
kind
of
Government
it
was
before
.
I
will
not
affirm
,
but
the
people
of
this
Nation
may
give
away
their
present
Rights
of
not
having
any
Laws
made
,
or
Taxes
imposed
upon
them
without
their
consent
,
or
of
not
being
perpetually
kept
in
Prison
or
put
to
death
without
legal
Trial.
But
these
being
altered
,
it
would
cease
to
be
limited
and
turn
to
an
absolute
Monarchy
,
and
all
Statutes
concerning
any
of
these
would
be
so
far
Superstructives
,
as
to
signify
nothing
when
the
Foundations
are
taken
away
,
and
indeed
how
any
Statute
Law
made
by
Parliament
could
signify
any
thing
when
the
Parliament
is
gone
,
I
know
not
,
since
all
Laws
after
that
would
depend
upon
the
sole
will
of
the
Monarch
.
His
second
Reason
is
,
‛
That
the
Common-Law
is
generally
acknowledged
to
be
nothing
else
but
common
Usage
or
Custome
,
which
by
length
of
time
only
obtains
Authority
:
so
that
it
follows
in
time
after
Government
,
but
cannot
go
before
it
,
or
be
the
Rule
of
Government
by
any
Original
Radical
Constitution
.
Which
is
not
true
,
as
the
Author
hath
laid
it
down
;
for
all
the
parts
of
the
Common-Law
do
not
depend
upon
meer
Custome
or
Usage
taken
up
after
the
Government
instituted
:
and
therefore
his
consequence
that
follows
from
this
is
false
.
For
some
parts
of
the
Common-Law
of
England
,
are
without
doubt
as
antient
as
the
Goverment
it self
.
Thus
,
though
some
parts
of
our
Common-Law
may
have
proceeded
from
some
later
Customes
,
or
particular
Judgments
and
resolutions
of
the
Judges
in
several
Ages
,
yet
without
doubt
,
Property
in
Goods
and
Land
and
Estates
of
Inheritance
,
and
the
manner
of
their
descent
are
as
antient
(
since
they
came
over
with
our
Saxon
Ancestors
)
as
the
Government
it self
,
since
some
of
the
Laws
.
As
,
that
Brethren
by
the
half-Blood
,
should
not
be
Heirs
to
each
other
.
That
an
Estate
should
rather
Escheat
then
ascend
to
the
Father
,
upon
the
death
of
his
,
could
only
proceed
from
the
Custome
of
the
antient
Saxons
.
For
certainly
,
had
we
not
been
used
to
them
,
we
should
scarce
allow
them
to
be
reasonable
.
But
it
is
in
nothing
more
visible
then
in
those
Tenures
(
which
the
modern
Civilians
call
Feudat
)
which
L.
Ca.
3.
§
.
23.
Grotius
tells
us
,
are
not
to
be
found
but
among
the
Germans
,
and
those
Nations
derived
from
them
,
as
both
our
Saxons
and
Angles
were
.
Tacit.
de
Mor.
Ger.
cap.
40.
So
likewise
that
Fundamental
Constitution
of
ordering
all
publick
Affairs
in
General
Councils
or
Assemblies
of
the
Men
of
note
,
and
those
that
had
a
share
in
the
Land
.
de
minoribus
rebus
Principes
Consultant
,
de
majoribus
omnes
,
ita
tamen
ut
ex
qnoque
quorum
penes
plebem
arbitrium
est
,
apud
Principes
praetractantur
.
In
this
great
Council
they
tried
Offenders
in
Capital
Crimes
.
Id.
Cap.
12.
Licet
apud
concilium
accusare
queque
&
discrimen
capitis
intendere
,
nor
was
the
power
of
their
Kings
or
Prince
absolute
,
as
appears
by
the
passages
in
the
same
Author
.
Id.
Cap.
7
:
Nec
regibus
infinita
aut
libera
potestas
,
&c.
speaking
of
the
manner
of
their
holding
these
publick
Councils
after
silence
commanded
by
the
Priests
.
Mox
Rex
,
Id.
Cap.
11.
vel
Princeps
prout
aetas
cuique
prout
nobilitas
,
prout
decus
bellorum
prout
facundia
est
audiuntur
,
autoritate
suadendi
,
magis
quam
jubendi
.
And
though
our
first
Saxon
Kings
might
have
more
conferred
on
them
then
this
,
yet
it
is
altogether
improbable
,
that
Hengest
and
the
rest
of
those
Princes
who
erected
an
Heptarchy
in
this
Island
,
comeing
hither
not
as
Monarchs
over
Subjects
,
but
as
Leaders
of
Voluntiers
,
who
went
to
seek
a
new
Country
,
should
be
so
fond
of
a
Government
they
never
knew
,
as
to
give
these
their
Gennerals
an
absolute
despetick
power
over
their
persons
and
Estates
,
which
they
never
had
in
their
own
Country
;
and
by
which
Liberty
,
they
had
so
long
defended
it
against
the
utmost
effects
of
the
Roman
Empire
;
therefore
says
the
same
Author
,
Ne
Parthi
quidem
sepius
admonuere
,
Id.
Cap.
37.
quippe
Regno
Arsacis
acrior
est
Germanorum
Libertas
.
The
sence
of
which
is
,
The
Parthians
themselves
have
not
oftner
rebuked
us
;
for
the
German-Liberty
is
harder
to
be
dealt
with
then
the
Monarchy
of
Arsaces
.
‛
the
time
of
the
Conquest
,
because
until
those
days
we
cannot
hear
it
was
entirely
united
into
one
Kingdom
,
but
it
was
either
divided
into
several
Kingdoms
,
or
Governed
by
several
Laws
,
as
when
Julius
Caesar
Landed
,
he
found
four
Kings
in
Kent
.
The
Saxons
divided
us
into
seven
Kingdoms
:
and
when
they
were
united
into
a
Monarchy
,
they
had
the
Danes
for
their
Companions
,
or
Masters
in
the
Empire
,
till
Edward
the
Confessors
days
.
Since
whose
time
the
Kingdom
of
England
hath
remained
as
it
does
.
In
which
passage
the
Author
hath
discovered
,
either
a
great
deal
of
Ignorance
,
or
inadvertency
in
the
History
and
Government
of
his
Country
.
For
first
he
Confesses
that
the
English
Saxons
had
a
Meeting
,
which
they
called
the
Assembly
of
the
Wife
,
termed
in
Latine
,
Conventus
Magnatum
,
or
Praesentia
Regis
,
Procerumque
Prelatorum
Collectorum
,
or
in
general
,
Magnum
,
or
Commune
concilium
,
&c.
All
which
Meetings
may
in
a
general
sence
be
termed
Parliaments
:
yet
he
will
not
allow
,
there
could
be
any
Parliaments
assembled
of
the
general
Estates
of
the
whole
Kingdom
,
for
the
reason
he
gives
us
before
.
What
he
means
by
,
until
about
the
time
of
the
Conquest
,
I
know
not
;
but
this
is
certain
,
that
from
the
time
of
King
Egbert
,
who
is
reckoned
the
first
Monarch
,
the
great
Council
,
or
Wittena
Gemore
consisted
of
the
General
Estates
of
the
West-Saxon-Kindom
,
and
if
the
whole
people
of
England
had
not
their
Representatives
there
,
it
was
because
they
were
represented
by
their
Tributary
Princes
or
Kings
,
who
Governed
Subordinately
to
this
Monarch
,
until
the
coming
of
the
Danes
.
Thus
the
West-angles
had
their
particular
Kings
in
the
time
of
King
Ethelwolf
St.
Edmund
the
last
King
being
Conquered
by
the
Danes
.
So
likewise
had
the
Mercians
their
King
Beorced
;
their
last
King
being
driven
out
by
the
same
Invaders
about
the
same
time
,
and
after
the
Kingdom
was
at
Peace
again
,
and
the
Danes
in
great
part
subdued
or
quiet
,
King
Alfred
Re-conquering
the
Mercian-Kingdom
,
gave
it
in
Marriage
to
a
Saxon
Nobleman
called
Etheldred
,
who
had
Married
his
Daughter
Elsteda
,
who
was
long
after
her
Husbands
Death
Lady
,
or
Queen
of
the
Mercians
;
Wittena
Gemore
or
great
Council
of
the
Monarch
,
thus
we
may
find
in
Jugulphus
that
Withlafe
King
of
the
Mercians
made
a
promise
of
the
Lands
and
Liberties
of
the
Abby
of
Croyland
,
(
which
he
after
confirms
by
his
Charter
)
in
Prisentia
Dominorum
meorum
Egberti
Regis
Westo-Saxoniae
&
Athelwolwafij
filij
ejus
,
coram
pontificibus
&
proceribus
totius
Angliae
,
in
Civitate
Lundini
(
ubi
omnes
Congregati
sumas
pro
consilio
capiendo
contra
Danicos
Pyratat
Littora
Angliae
infestantes
)
which
certainly
was
a
great
Council
.
And
that
these
Kings
were
tributary
to
the
West
Saxon
Monarch
,
the
same
Author
tells
a
little
further
,
that
Bertulph
Brother
of
Witlafe
,
succeeded
his
Nephew
Wimund
,
Id.
p.
860
,
861.
and
was
Tributary
to
Athelwolf
King
of
West
Saxony
;
and
by
his
Charter
confirms
the
same
Lands
and
Liberties
to
the
said
Monastery
which
had
been
granted
by
his
Predecessors
:
and
this
was
done
and
confirmed
,
unanimi
consensu
totius
praesentis
concilij
hic
apud
Kingsbury
Anno
incar
Domini
881.
&c.
pro
Regni
negotis
congregati
,
and
is
thus
subscribed
,
Ego
Olflac
Pincerna
,
&
Legatus
Domini
mei
Regis
Ethelwolf
,
&
Filiorum
suorum
nomine
illorum
&
omnium
Westsaxonum
istum
Chirographum
Regis
Bertulphi
plurimum
Confirmavi
.
Ego
Bertulphus
Rex
Mericorum
palam
omnibus
prelatis
&
Proceribus
Regni
mei
.
Which
shews
us
,
that
besides
the
General
Council
of
the
whole
Kingdoms
these
Mercian
Tributary
Kings
had
a
Particular
Council
or
Parliament
of
their
own
Kingdom
without
whose
consent
as
also
of
their
Paramount
Monarch
they
could
not
part
with
the
Lands
,
and
Royalties
belonging
to
their
Crown
.
So
likewise
in
the
same
Author
,
Beorced
King
of
the
Mercians
,
Anno
Domini
868
confirms
his
Charter
to
the
same
Monastery
at
Snotringham
,
coram
fratribus
,
&
amicis
&
omni
populo
meo
in
obsidione
Paganorum
Congregatis
.
To
which
likewise
his
supreme
Monarch
Elthred
King
of
the
West
-
Saxons
,
gives
his
consent
,
and
subscribes
after
the
Bishops
:
the
like
form
we
find
in
the
passing
of
all
the
other
Charters
to
this
Monastery
,
quoted
by
the
said
Author
which
are
all
of
them
confirmed
by
the
King
then
Reigning
,
&
in
praesentia
Archiepiscop
.
Episcop.
Procerum
(
or
optimatum
Regni
Collectorum
.
And
before
the
Kingdom
came
to
be
united
under
one
supreme
King
or
Monarch
,
there
was
also
one
great
Council
or
Synod
of
the
whole
Kingdom
,
where
the
chief
and
most
powerful
King
or
Monarch
of
the
Heptarchy
presided
,
and
in
which
they
made
their
general
Ecclesiastical
Canons
,
and
also
Civil
Laws
that
were
binding
to
the
whole
People
of
England
,
and
to
which
Persons
that
had
been
grieved
or
wronged
by
their
particular
Kings
appealed
,
and
were
righted
,
and
to
this
general
Wittena
Gemote
,
that
antient
Writer
Will
.
Malmsbuny
,
speaking
of
the
antient
Customs
and
Laws
of
England
says
were
made
per
generalem
Senatum
&
populi
Conventum
&
edictum
:
therefore
we
find
the
first
:
Synod
or
Council
of
Clovesho
,
Anno
Christ
.
747.
called
by
Ethelbald
King
of
the
Mercians
,
who
was
then
chief
King
or
Monarch
as
they
called
him
of
the
English
Saxons
,
and
at
which
were
present
the
said
King
,
with
all
his
Princes
and
great
Men
:
de
gest
.
pontific
.
as
also
all
the
Bishops
of
this
Island
:
but
it
more
plainly
appears
in
the
second
Council
held
at
the
same
place
,
called
by
Beornulf
King
of
Mercia
,
who
presided
therein
.
Synodus
magna
Parliamentum
nuncupatur
.
So
likewise
the
Canons
of
the
Synode
or
Council
of
Catchyck
Annol
,
were
confirmed
by
Offa
King
of
the
Mercians
,
then
Chief
Monarch
of
this
Island
.
Tam
Rex
quam
Principes
sui
cum
senatoribus
terrae
decreta
signo
Cracis
firmarunt
.
And
further
that
each
of
the
Kingdoms
of
the
Heptarchy
had
its
particular
Councils
or
Wittena
Gemotes
appears
by
that
famous
Council
called
by
Ethelbert
King
of
Kent
,
about
Six
Years
after
his
Reception
of
the
Christian
Religion
,
which
was
called
commine
concilium
tam
Cleri
.
quam
Populi
:
And
no
doubt
this
custom
came
not
in
with
Christianity
:
the
Clergy
onely
here
succeeding
in
the
room
of
the
Pogan
Priests
,
who
among
the
Germans
had
always
a
place
in
their
common
Councils
as
we
find
in
Tacitus
.
See
the
passage
before
Cited
,
p.
Spelman
,
Con.
pag.
126.
So
likewise
the
first
Laws
we
have
extant
were
made
by
Ina
King
of
the
West
-
Saxons
,
Per
commune
concilium
&
assensum
omnium
Episcoporum
,
&
Principum
Procerum
,
comitum
,
&
omnium
Sapientum
,
Seniorum
,
&
Populorum
totius
Regni
:
And
whoever
will
but
examine
the
said
Collection
of
Sr.
Henry
Spelman
,
will
find
almost
all
the
Ecclesiastical
Constitutions
confirmed
,
if
not
made
in
the
Wittena
Gemote
,
the
Great
Synode
or
Council
.
So
that
what
this
Author
says
of
the
difference
of
the
Laws
,
and
Customs
of
the
several
Kingdoms
during
the
Heptarchy
,
makes
nothing
against
us
,
as
long
as
we
can
prove
that
in
the
main
,
the
Government
of
them
all
was
alike
in
the
three
great
Liberties
of
the
Subjects
,
viz.
Trial
by
a
Mans
equals
,
and
absolute
Propriety
in
Lands
,
and
Goods
which
the
Kings
could
not
justly
take
from
them
;
and
a
Right
to
joyne
in
the
making
of
all
Laws
,
and
raising
Publick
Taxes
,
or
Contributions
for
War
.
So
that
without
doubt
these
Wittena
Gemotes
,
or
great
Councils
were
Ordained
for
some
Nobler
and
Higher
purpose
,
then
either
to
give
the
King
advice
,
what
Wars
to
make
,
or
what
Laws
to
make
,
or
barely
to
Remonstrate
their
grievances
(
as
this
and
some
other
Modern
Authors
would
have
it
)
for
what
King
would
call
so
great
a
Multitude
those
Antient
Parliaments
consisted
of
)
to
be
his
Councellors
:
Or
would
call
together
the
whole
Body
of
a
Nation
,
only
to
be
made
acquainted
with
their
grievances
,
which
he
might
have
known
with
greater
ease
to
himself
,
and
less
charge
to
the
Subjects
;
by
having
them
found
by
the
Grand
Inquest
in
the
County-Court
:
And
so
to
have
been
presented
to
him
by
the
Earl
,
or
Alderman
of
each
particular
County
;
whereas
we
find
these
great
Councils
imploy'd
in
businesses
of
a
higher
Nature
;
such
as
the
confirmation
of
the
Kings
Charters
,
the
Proposing
of
Laws
,
the
Election
of
Archbishops
,
&
other
great
Officers
:
So
that
the
Higher
any
Man
will
look
back
,
the
more
large
,
&
uncontroulable
he
will
find
the
Power
of
this
great
Assembly
:
Since
before
the
Conquest
,
and
afterwards
too
,
we
find
them
to
have
often
Elected
Kings
,
when
the
Children
of
their
last
King
were
either
Minors
,
or
supposed
unfit
to
Govern.
So
that
whoever
will
take
the
pains
to
consult
our
Ancient
Saxon
,
and
English
Historians
,
will
find
that
there
was
never
Anciently
any
Fundamental
,
or
unalterable
Law
of
Succession
:
nor
was
it
fixed
for
any
two
Discents
in
a
right
Line
from
Father
to
Son
without
interruption
,
until
Henry
the
Third
:
and
then
it
lasted
so
but
Four
Generations
reckoning
him
for
the
first
.
And
as
for
these
particular
Laws
,
or
Customs
the
Author
mentions
whether
King
Edgar
,
or
Alfred
,
first
Collected
them
,
as
were
also
Corrected
and
Confirmed
by
both
the
Edwards
,
to
wit
,
the
Elder
and
the
Confessor
;
they
still
owed
their
Authority
to
the
King
,
Norfolk
,
Suffolk
,
and
Cambridge-shire
;
but
as
for
the
rest
of
England
it
was
governed
by
its
own
Laws
,
and
enjoyed
its
Ancient
Customs
in
the
Reign
of
King
Knute
and
his
Successors
of
the
Danish
Race
.
See
the
Charter
of
K.
Knute
quoted
by
Mr.
Pe●yt
.
in
his
said
Treatise
pag.
146.
But
to
come
to
the
Authors
next
Reason
why
there
can
be
no
Fundamental
Laws
in
this
Kingdom
,
viz.
Because
the
Common
Law
being
unwritten
,
doubtful
and
difficult
,
cannot
but
be
an
uncertain
Rule
to
govern
by
,
which
is
against
the
Nature
of
a
Rule
,
which
always
ought
to
be
certain
.
This
is
almost
the
same
Argument
as
the
Papists
make
use
of
against
the
Scriptures
being
a
Rule
of
Faith
,
only
their
Reason
is
that
the
Scriptures
are
obscure
,
because
they
are
Written
and
need
an
Expositor
,
viz.
The
Church
,
or
Tradition
;
but
with
Authors
it
is
contrary
,
the
Law
is
doubtful
,
because
unwritten
,
whereas
all
that
understand
any
thing
of
the
Nature
of
the
Laws
of
England
,
know
very
well
that
the
Common
Law
,
whose
Authority
depends
not
on
any
set
Form
of
Words
,
but
the
Sence
and
Reason
of
the
Law
is
much
less
doubtful
,
and
makes
fewer
Disputes
then
the
Statute-Law
;
but
though
it
be
granted
that
many
things
in
the
Common
Law
,
are
doubtful
and
difficult
;
yet
in
the
Main
and
Fundamental
parts
of
it
,
but
just
now
recited
,
it
is
plain
enough
:
(
As
the
Scriptures
though
doubtful
or
obscure
in
some
things
;
yet
are
plain
and
certain
in
all
Points
necessary
for
Salvation
;
and
why
it
is
harder
for
an
ordinary
Countrey
Fellow
in
a
Civil
Government
,
to
know
when
he
is
Condemned
to
be
Hang'd
without
trial
or
to
have
his
Goods
,
or
Money
taken
from
him
,
by
a
Fellow
in
a
Red-coat
without
any
Law
,
then
for
him
to
judg
in
the
State
of
Nature
,
when
another
Man
lies
with
his
Wife
,
or
goes
about
to
Rob
or
Murther
him
I
know
not
.
His
last
Reason
against
making
Common
Law
,
only
to
be
the
Foundation
,
when
Magna
Charta
is
excluded
from
being
(
according
to
Mr.
H.
)
a
Fundamental
Law
,
and
also
all
‛
other
Statutes
,
from
being
limitations
to
Monarchy
,
since
the
Fundamental
Laws
only
are
to
be
judg
;
and
these
are
Statute
Laws
or
Superstructures
.
This
is
also
meer
Sophistry
,
since
no
Man
in
Metaphors
or
Similitudes
ever
expects
an
absolute
Truth
;
but
what
if
the
great
part
of
the
Magna
Charta
were
Fundamental
Laws
before
either
King
Stephen
,
or
King
John
granted
it
,
and
that
they
did
but
restore
what
some
of
their
Predecessors
had
before
by
oppression
taken
from
their
Subjects
;
since
there
is
little
or
none
of
it
,
but
was
part
of
King
Edward's
Laws
,
and
consequently
the
Ancient
Saxon
Law
before
the
Conquest
;
and
the
like
may
be
said
of
all
other
Constitutions
in
limited
Monarchies
;
as
suppose
,
in
Denmark
,
the
Crown
which
was
before
Elective
,
is
now
by
the
Concession
of
the
Estates
,
become
Successive
;
I
believe
no
Men
of
this
Authors
Opinion
will
deny
,
that
this
is
not
now
a
Fundamental
Law
in
that
Kindom
,
and
can
never
be
altered
without
the
Consent
of
the
King
and
the
Estates
,
and
yet
this
is
a
Law
that
follows
after
the
Government
was
Instituted
;
nor
can
I
see
any
Reason
,
why
this
Rule
may
not
hold
as
well
on
the
Peoples
side
,
as
the
Kings
.
Why
Rules
of
Play
may
not
be
made
as
well
after
the
Gamesters
are
in
at
Play
,
as
when
they
first
began
;
and
may
not
be
as
well
called
Fundamental
Laws
of
the
Game
;
since
if
they
are
not
observed
,
it
may
be
lawful
for
any
of
the
Gamesters
to
fling
up
his
Cards
,
and
play
no
more
,
though
he
be
at
play
with
(
the
Authors
Natural
Monarch
)
his
own
Father
.
But
our
Author
will
not
leave
off
so
,
but
must
give
us
one
stabing
Paragraph
more
against
Fundamental
Laws
,
which
is
thus
,
‛
Truely
the
Conscience
of
all
Mankind
is
a
pretty
large
Tribunal
,
for
these
Fundamental
Laws
to
pronounce
Sentence
in
.
It
is
very
much
that
Laws
which
in
their
own
Nature
are
dumb
and
always
need
a
Judg
to
pronounce
Sentence
,
should
now
be
able
to
speak
,
and
pronounce
Sentence
themselves
:
Such
a
Sentence
surely
must
be
upon
the
hearing
of
one
Party
only
;
for
it
is
impossible
for
a
Monarch
to
make
his
Defence
and
Answer
,
and
produce
his
Witnesses
:
in
every
Mans
Conscience
in
each
Mans
Cause
;
who
will
but
question
the
Legality
of
the
Monarchs
Government
.
Certainly
the
Sentence
cannot
but
be
unjust
,
where
but
one
Mans
Tale
is
heard
.
The
first
Sentence
of
this
Paragraph
is
Answered
sufficiently
in
the
Observation
upon
the
last
Reason
;
but
one
.
As
for
Written
Laws
,
every
Body
knows
they
are
adumb
Letter
;
as
they
lie
in
Ink
&
Paper
,
but
as
they
come
to
be
from
thence
Copied
out
and
fixed
in
Mens
Memories
they
are
not
dumb
,
neither
always
needs
a
Judg
to
pronounce
Sentence
,
but
are
able
enough
to
speak
oftentimes
against
the
Sentence
of
an
unjust
Judg
,
and
all
the
Standers
by
can
easily
tell
if
a
Judg
should
go
about
to
Trie
and
Condemn
a
Man
without
ever
Impanelling
a
Jury
,
nor
needs
there
any
Defence
for
the
Judg
in
this
case
;
but
that
a
Man
may
safely
give
his
Sentence
in
this
Case
without
hearing
the
Judges
Reason
;
since
it
is
plain
there
can
be
none
given
.
But
as
for
the
Monarch
,
it
is
supposed
that
he
hath
already
made
his
Defence
by
his
Atturney
,
and
produced
his
Witnesses
when
the
Subject
Petitioned
his
Judges
to
right
him
in
what
he
conceived
to
be
an
Oppression
.
So
that
the
Sentence
cannot
be
unjust
,
where
but
one
Mans
Tale
is
heard
.
But
if
the
Judges
in
this
Case
(
as
in
that
of
Ship-Money
)
cannot
convince
the
Plantiff
,
but
that
he
is
oppressed
contrary
to
Law
.
It
is
neither
his
nor
their
Judgment
that
can
alter
the
Case
:
But
if
he
can
have
no
other
remedy
,
he
must
even
go
home
and
expect
better
opportunities
of
being
righted
,
as
when
there
are
honester
Judges
;
or
the
calling
of
a
Parliament
,
one
of
whose
ends
is
to
redress
grievances
of
that
kind
by
representing
to
the
King
the
faults
and
transgressions
of
his
Ministers
,
who
only
are
punishable
,
and
answerable
for
the
injustice
;
since
the
King
in
his
own
Person
can
do
none
(
as
I
have
often
affirmed
)
as
for
Mr.
H's
conclusion
,
that
every
man
must
oppose
or
not
oppose
the
Monarch
,
acoording
to
his
own
Conscience
,
when
he
can
have
no
other
redress
,
I
do
not
approve
of
it
.
For
I
will
not
suppose
any
time
(
in
which
this
Nation
is
not
oppresed
by
a
standing
Army
,
or
Men
of
different
Principles
in
Religion
and
Goverment
;
)
but
the
Subject
may
find
redress
,
if
not
at
one
time
,
yet
at
another
.
But
the
other
part
of
the
dispute
between
our
Author
and
Mr.
H.
whether
this
Power
of
every
Mans
judging
of
the
illegal
Acts
of
the
Monarch
‛
argues
not
a
Superiority
of
those
who
Judg
,
over
him
who
is
Judged
,
because
it
is
not
Authorative
and
Civil
,
but
Moral
residing
in
Reasonable
Creatures
,
and
lawful
for
them
to
execute
,
which
is
not
so
hard
to
understand
as
the
Author
makes
it
,
if
we
take
this
Word
Moral
(
as
it
is
plain
Mr.
H.
uses
it
)
in
contradiction
to
Civil
Power
,
which
is
such
a
right
of
acting
as
every
private
Man
hath
,
though
he
hath
no
Civil
Authority
.
For
a
Mans
bare
judging
of
the
justice
and
injustice
of
all
Actions
that
concern
him
,
or
any
other
man
,
are
inseparable
from
the
Nature
of
Man
?
whether
they
are
ordered
by
a
Prince
,
or
private
Man
;
and
a
Princes
commanding
this
or
that
to
be
done
,
or
giving
his
judgment
this
way
,
or
that
way
,
cannot
alter
these
settled
Rules
whereby
Men
judg
of
right
and
wrong
.
So
that
if
this
Author
or
his
Friends
will
make
use
of
Mr.
Hobs's
Arguments
of
the
necessity
of
the
Judgment
of
one
Man
in
all
Points
whatever
,
they
must
likewise
take
what
follows
,
that
there
is
likewise
no
good
,
or
evil
,
or
right
,
or
wrong
in
the
state
of
Nature
,
but
what
the
Monarch
judges
to
be
so
;
and
when
that
is
done
,
if
the
Authors
Friends
have
any
Religion
,
let
them
see
what
they
will
get
by
it
;
but
the
Author
supposes
he
hath
sufficient
advantage
over
Mr:
H.
because
he
hath
laid
it
down
in
the
Page
before
going
;
‛
That
resistance
ought
to
be
made
,
and
every
Man
must
oppose
,
or
not
oppose
,
according
as
in
Conscience
he
can
acquit
,
or
condemn
the
Acts
of
the
Governour
.
For
(
says
the
Author
)
if
it
enable
a
Man
to
resist
,
and
oppose
his
Governor
without
Question
't
is
Authoritative
,
and
Civil
.
As
for
Mr.
Hobs's
Assertion
)
I
will
not
take
upon
me
to
meddle
in
so
nice
a
Point
,
though
he
hath
in
all
his
work
supposed
such
resistance
lawfull
only
in
limited
,
or
mixt
Monarchies
,
and
not
in
absolute
ones
;
and
likewise
then
only
when
all
other
ways
,
and
means
hvae
proved
ineffectual
;
and
of
this
opinion
likewise
the
Author
of
the
Excellent
Poem
,
called
,
Coopers
Hill
,
seems
to
have
been
;
which
I
rather
take
notice
of
,
because
the
Author
was
never
look't
upon
,
but
as
a
great
Friend
to
Monarchy
:
and
this
Poem
it self
speaks
him
no
Presbyterian
.
Both
the
Verses
and
Sence
are
so
good
,
that
perhaps
it
may
refresh
the
Reader
tired
with
Reading
so
much
drie
Arguments
to
run
them
over
;
speaking
of
the
King
's
hunting
the
Stag
over
Runny-Mead
,
where
the
great
Charter
was
Seal'd
,
he
falls
into
this
reflection
.
This
a
more
innocent
,
and
happy
Chace
,
Then
when
of
Old
,
but
in
the
self
same
Place
;
Fair
Liberty
pursued
,
and
meant
a
Prey
,
To
lawless
Power
,
here
turned
,
and
stood
at
Bay
:
When
in
that
remedy
all
hope
was
plac't
,
Which
was
,
or
should
have
been
at
least
the
last
.
Here
was
that
Charter
Seal'd
wherein
the
Crown
,
All
marks
of
Arbitrary
Power
lays
down
:
Tyrant
,
and
Slave
,
those
Names
of
hate
and
fear
,
The
happier
Style
of
King
,
and
Subject
bear
:
Happy
,
when
both
to
the
same
Center
move
,
When
Kings
give
Liberty
,
and
Snbjects
love
.
Therefore
not
long
in
force
this
Charter
stood
Wanting
that
Seal
,
it
must
be
seal'd
in
Blood
.
The
Subjects
Armed
,
the
more
their
Princes
gave
,
Th'
advantage
only
took
the
more
to
crave
:
Till
Kings
by
giving
,
give
themselves
away
,
And
even
that
Power
,
that
should
deny
betray
.
Who
gives
constrain'd
,
him
,
his
own
fear
reviles
;
Not
thankt
,
but
scorn'd
;
nor
are
they
gifts
,
but
spoiles
.
Thus
Kings
by
grasping
more
then
they
could
hold
;
First
made
their
subjects
by
oppression
hold
:
And
Popular
sway
by
forcing
Kings
to
give
More
then
was
fit
for
Subjects
to
receive
,
Ran
to
the
same
extreams
,
and
one
excess
,
Made
both
by
striving
to
be
greater
,
less
.
The
mischiefs
of
which
extremes
if
rightly
considered
,
would
make
all
wise
Princes
,
and
good
Subjects
contented
with
their
share
;
and
endeavour
to
keep
the
Ballance
even
,
and
not
to
let
it
incline
to
either
side
.
As
to
Magna
Charta
,
I
shall
only
add
,
that
the
Defence
which
the
Nobility
and
People
made
of
their
Antient
Rights
was
not
condemned
or
declared
Rebellion
,
either
by
Magna
Charta
,
or
any
other
Statute
;
but
on
the
contrary
,
the
breakers
thereof
were
declared
ipso
facto
,
excommunicated
the
solemn
form
of
which
(
and
where
the
King
himself
who
had
so
often
broke
his
Oath
bore
a
part
)
see
in
Mat.
Paris
.
Anno
125.
But
to
return
to
our
Author
(
from
whom
I
have
a
little
degressed
)
I
think
he
is
mistaken
in
affirming
all
Power
which
enables
in
some
cases
a
Man
to
resist
or
oppose
his
Governors
,
must
be
Authoritative
and
Civil
:
Therefore
I
shall
put
the
same
case
again
which
I
did
about
the
beginning
of
these
Observations
concerning
the
Natural
Power
of
Fathers
:
Suppose
a
Son
cannot
otherwise
preserve
his
own
Life
,
or
that
of
his
Mother
,
or
Brothers
from
the
rage
of
his
mad
or
drunken
Father
;
but
by
holding
him
,
or
binding
him
,
if
need
be
;
I
suppose
no
reasonable
Man
will
deny
the
lawfullness
of
this
action
;
and
yet
this
Power
over
his
Fathers
Person
is
not
Authoritative
,
or
Civil
,
but
Moral
,
and
which
the
Son
does
exercise
not
as
Superior
to
his
Father
,
but
as
a
Rational
Creature
obliged
by
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
to
preserve
his
own
being
,
and
to
endeavour
the
good
preservation
of
his
Parents
and
Relations
,
not
against
Paternal
Authority
(
which
is
always
Rational
,
and
for
the
good
of
the
Family
)
but
Brutish
,
Irrational
force
:
Which
God
gives
every
Man
a
right
to
judg
of
;
so
likewise
if
a
Prince
prove
either
a
Madman
,
or
a
stark
Fool
,
the
power
which
their
Subjects
exercise
in
the
ordering
him
,
or
confining
him
,
and
appointing
Regents
,
or
Protectors
to
Govern
for
him
,
and
in
his
Name
,
is
not
Authoritative
,
or
Civil
,
since
the
Prince
himself
who
is
the
Fountain
of
all
Authority
,
gave
them
no
such
power
,
and
therefore
must
be
Natural
,
or
Moral
or
residing
in
them
as
reasonable
Creatures
.
And
of
this
we
have
had
divers
examples
.
Thus
the
French
were
forced
to
confine
their
Mad
King
Charles
VI.
and
appoint
his
Queen
to
be
Regent
during
his
Distraction
.
So
likewise
Joan
Queen
of
Castile
,
falling
Distracted
upon
the
Death
of
Her
Husband
King
Philip
I.
Her
Father
Ferdinand
governed
in
Her
right
;
and
after
His
decease
,
Her
Son
Charles
afterwards
Emperor
(
she
continuing
bereft
of
her
understanding
)
was
admitted
King
of
Castile
.
And
what
hath
been
done
lately
in
Portugal
,
is
so
notorious
,
that
it
needs
not
a
particular
Recital
.
So
then
Mr.
Hs.
expression
,
That
this
is
a
Moral
Judgment
,
residing
in
reasonable
Creatures
,
and
lawful
for
them
to
execute
,
may
not
seem
so
absurd
as
to
imply
what
our
Author
endeavours
to
draw
from
thence
,
that
Authoritative
,
and
Civil
Judgment
does
not
reside
in
reasonable
Creatures
,
nor
can
be
Lawfully
executed
:
since
a
Reasonable
Creature
may
be
endued
with
another
Power
of
acting
precedent
to
that
of
the
Civil
.
So
I
shall
likewise
leave
it
to
the
Judgment
of
the
impartial
Reader
,
whether
this
conclusion
fits
so
well
with
Anarchy
as
the
Author
will
have
it
.
As
also
whether
Mr.
H.
take
away
all
Government
by
leaving
every
Man
to
his
own
Conscience
to
judg
when
the
Prince
oppresses
him
;
for
else
how
could
he
sue
for
relief
to
the
Prince
himself
;
and
so
all
actions
a
Prince
did
,
or
commanded
would
be
just
,
and
lawful
though
never
so
contrary
to
Reason
,
or
positive
Law
.
And
so
there
would
be
truly
(
as
Mr.
Hobs
asserts
)
no
other
measure
of
good
,
and
evil
,
right
or
wrong
but
the
Princes
will
.
But
as
I
have
no
where
maintained
with
Mr.
H.
in
his
Treatise
,
which
our
Author
writes
against
,
that
ours
is
a
mixt
Monarchy
though
limited
by
Law
;
and
therefore
shall
not
maintain
as
he
does
the
King
to
be
one
of
the
Three
Estates
(
according
to
the
Opinions
held
during
the
late
Wars
.
So
on
the
other
side
,
that
there
is
,
and
ever
hath
been
such
a
Government
as
a
mixt
Monarchy
in
some
Countreys
,
I
hope
I
have
made
out
(
notwithstanding
what
this
Author
says
to
the
contrary
:
and
that
these
might
more
properly
be
called
a
mixt
Monarchy
,
then
mixt
Aristocracy
,
or
mixt
Democracy
.
Since
all
Governments
of
this
kind
,
take
their
denomination
from
the
most
Honourable
and
Predominant
part
in
it
,
in
whom
the
Executive
or
Authoritative
part
resides
.
And
though
perhaps
some
of
these
Governments
may
not
seem
so
firm
,
so
regular
,
and
well
constituted
as
others
,
it
does
not
therefore
follow
that
they
are
meer
Anarchies
,
or
that
all
mixtures
,
and
limitations
of
Monarchy
are
vain
,
or
unlawful
as
our
Author
imagines
.
For
a
further
proof
of
which
,
I
will
not
give
you
may
own
sence
alone
,
but
likewise
of
that
eminent
Civil
Lawyer
Mr.
Pufendorf
now
or
very
lately
Gretian
Professor
in
the
University
of
Vpsal
,
in
his
excellent
work
De
Jure
Naturae
,
&
Gentium
,
Dedicated
to
Charles
the
10th
,
now
King
of
Sweden
,
and
certainly
holding
a
place
of
such
profit
and
Credit
in
his
Dominions
,
he
would
be
too
prudent
to
speak
any
thing
prejudicial
to
Monarchy
,
or
contrary
to
the
Government
of
Sweden
in
particular
.
But
to
return
to
the
matter
in
the
above-mentioned
Treatise
,
which
for
the
benefit
of
those
that
cannot
easily
procure
the
Latine
Original
.
Lib.
7.
Cap.
5.
where
speaking
before
of
the
several
kinds
of
mixt
Governments
or
Common-wealths
.
§
.
14.
He
expresses
himself
to
this
purpose
,
as
near
as
I
can
Translate
it
.
Yet
however
,
as
I
will
not
envy
the
commendation
of
constancy
in
any
that
will
obstinately
maintain
the
name
of
a
mixt
Common-wealth
(
to
those
sorts
of
Government
he
had
before
recited
.
So
it
seems
to
us
more
ready
,
and
easie
for
the
demonstrating
divers
Phaenomena
in
certain
Common-wealths
,
if
we
rather
call
those
irregular
Common-wealths
,
in
which
neither
one
alone
of
the
three
irregular
Forms
is
found
,
neither
an
absolute
Disease
,
or
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
〈◊〉
takes
place
,
and
which
yet
cannot
be
strictly
referred
to
distinct
confederate
States
.
Concerning
which
,
it
is
generally
to
be
observed
,
that
they
depart
in
this
from
a
regular
Common-wealth
,
whilst
in
them
all
things
do
not
seem
to
proceed
as
it
were
from
one
Soul
,
and
will
,
neither
to
be
governed
by
one
Common
Authority
.
Yet
they
diffor
from
the
confederate
State
,
in
that
they
are
not
compounded
of
distinct
and
perfect
Common-wealths
as
these
are
.
Yet
they
are
far
from
those
things
that
they
count
Diseases
in
a
Common-wealth
,
because
a
Disease
that
always
carries
with
it
as
it
were
a
shameful
and
unallowable
pretence
since
it
proceeds
from
●he
evil
administration
of
a
good
Form
of
Government
,
or
from
Laws
and
Institutions
ill
contrived
and
put
together
.
Whereas
this
irregularity
does
not
only
intrinsically
affect
the
very
.
Form
it self
,
but
also
being
publickly
,
and
lawfully
establish'd
,
dares
shew
it self
openly
and
without
shame
.
So
that
a
Disease
ought
to
be
supposed
as
not
intended
by
those
,
who
first
Instituted
this
Common-wealth
;
since
the
irregularity
arose
,
or
was
Confirmed
from
the
will
or
approbation
of
those
of
whom
the
Government
was
at
first
Constituted
;
as
a
building
is
one
thing
,
whose
design
agrees
with
the
Rules
of
Architectture
,
but
either
its
materials
are
naught
,
or
else
thorough
the
carelesness
of
the
Dwellers
,
the
Roof
gapes
,
and
the
Walls
are
ready
to
fall
;
and
another
thing
where
a
Model
,
though
differing
from
the
common
Rules
of
Building
is
dedesigned
by
the
Owner
or
Architect
himself
.
Lastly
,
some
of
these
irregularities
may
have
continued
from
the
very
Constitution
of
the
Commonwealth
,
&
some
have
crept
in
by
success
of
time
,
and
by
insensible
degrees
.
So
that
it
might
happen
that
a
regular
Form
could
not
well
be
Instituted
from
the
very
Original
of
the
Commonwealth
,
or
some
remarkable
mutation
of
it
,
either
by
the
Founders
,
or
Authors
of
that
mutation
;
either
thorough
their
unskilfulness
,
or
because
the
urgency
of
their
affairs
,
or
temper
of
the
People
did
not
permit
them
to
consider
of
the
means
of
doing
it
otherwise
;
nay
oftentimes
thorough
either
the
carelesness
of
those
that
Govern
,
or
by
some
other
‛
occasion
,
a
Disease
invades
the
Commonwealth
,
which
when
it
hath
taken
such
deep
Root
,
that
it
cannot
be
expelled
with
out
the
destruction
of
the
Government
,
there
is
nothing
then
to
be
done
,
then
that
the
Disease
should
cease
to
be
so
by
a
Publick
Sanction
,
and
that
which
hitherto
was
Usurpation
,
Faction
on
Contumacy
,
may
for
the
future
become
a
Priviledge
or
right
.
So
much
of
Irregular
Governments
or
Monarchies
.
But
in
the
next
Chapter
of
the
same
Book
,
the
same
Author
speaking
of
the
rights
of
the
Supreme
power
;
where
when
he
hath
first
proved
,
what
it
is
that
makes
any
Power
be
called
Supreme
in
a
Common-wealth
,
and
that
he
who
hath
this
Power
must
be
free
from
punishment
,
and
not
obnoxious
to
humane
Laws
;
and
that
he
hath
confuted
the
Long
Parliaments
distinction
of
a
real
and
Personal
Majesty
,
and
that
Kings
properly
so
called
must
be
Superior
to
all
the
People
;
and
having
answered
the
Objections
to
the
contrary
,
at
last
he
proceeds
§
7
to
shew
what
absolute
Power
is
,
and
that
it
is
not
found
alike
in
all
Forms
of
Common-wealths
,
and
gives
us
the
true
Original
of
limited
Governments
;
his
sence
is
so
good
,
that
I
shall
not
much
contract
what
he
says
,
but
give
it
you
as
it
is
,
§
7.
8
,
9
,
10.
Besides
it
is
apparent
enough
,
that
in
some
Common-wealths
the
Royal
Authority
is
free
in
the
exercise
of
its
Acts
,
but
restrained
to
a
certain
Mode
of
acting
,
from
whence
arose
the
distinction
of
Empire
into
limited
,
and
absolute
,
where
in
the
first
place
it
is
to
be
explained
,
what
is
meant
by
the
word
absolute
,
which
is
so
odious
to
those
who
have
had
their
Education
in
free
Common-wealths
.
Indeed
the
same
word
being
ill
interpreted
,
may
incite
some
Princes
to
vex
their
Subjects
,
and
to
commit
a
great
deal
of
wickedness
.
Flatterers
adding
fuel
to
the
Fire
,
who
are
still
ready
to
encourage
the
Ambition
,
and
other
Vices
of
their
Prince
at
this
rate
.
Sir
,
you
are
absolute
,
therefore
if
it
pleases
you
,
it
is
lawful
:
therefore
you
may
tire
out
your
own
Subjects
,
and
all
your
Neighbours
with
unnecessary
Wars
,
that
you
may
appear
a
mighty
Monarch
,
and
set
forth
your
own
Glory
;
therefore
you
may
affront
,
and
insult
over
whom
you
please
,
and
drain
your
Subjects
with
all
sorts
of
Exactions
,
that
you
may
have
wherewith
to
serve
your
Luxury
,
or
Ambition
;
according
to
the
Flattery
of
Anaxarchus
to
Alexander
upon
the
death
of
Clitus
,
that
right
and
wrong
,
ad
Princi
.
indoct
.
do
sit
by
Jupiter
;
that
whatsoever
the
King
does
,
ought
to
be
accounted
right
,
and
just
so
that
there
are
some
who
go
about
to
establish
the
absolute
right
of
Kings
by
Arguments
,
that
seem
to
have
no
other
Measure
thereof
,
then
impunity
,
and
a
License
to
vex
their
People
.
Therefore
as
by
an
absolute
Liberty
of
particular
Men
is
meant
,
their
judging
of
their
own
affairs
and
actions
,
according
to
their
own
,
and
not
anothers
judgment
:
yet
still
supposing
their
Obligation
to
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
And
that
this
Liberty
belongs
to
all
Men
,
who
are
not
as
yet
subject
to
anothers
will
:
so
where
divers
Men
have
United
together
into
a
perfect
Common-wealth
,
it
is
necessary
for
the
same
liberty
or
faculty
of
appointing
,
resolving
all
means
necessary
for
their
own
safety
,
should
now
exist
in
the
Supreme
Power
,
as
in
a
common
Subject
:
which
Liberty
is
accompanied
with
the
Highest
Authority
,
or
a
right
of
prescribing
those
means
to
the
Subjects
,
and
of
compelling
them
to
their
Duty
;
therefore
in
every
Commonwealth
properly
so
called
,
there
must
be
an
absolute
Power
at
least
habitual
,
though
not
always
exercised
,
for
it
must
be
answerable
to
Superior
,
and
to
have
a
right
of
Judging
of
its
own
affairs
by
its
own
Judgment
and
will
.
Therefore
that
absolute
Power
implies
nothing
in
its
self
unjust
,
or
intolerable
is
easie
to
be
perceived
from
the
ends
of
instituting
of
Commonwealths
.
For
indeed
we
never
constituted
them
,
that
neglecting
Natural
right
,
things
should
be
done
out
of
a
wicked
,
and
perverse
Lust
or
Humour
;
but
that
the
security
and
safety
of
singulars
may
be
more
conveniently
looked
after
by
the
joint
assistances
of
many
.
So
that
they
might
more
safely
and
with
more
leasure
live
after
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
and
Virtue
.
Yet
when
this
Supreme
Authority
is
considered
as
it
is
conferred
upon
one
Man
,
or
one
Council
consisting
of
all
,
or
few
,
as
in
its
proper
subject
,
it
is
not
always
free
,
and
absolute
,
but
in
some
places
limited
by
certain
laws
;
indeed
in
Democracies
the
difference
between
absolute
,
and
limited
Power
seems
not
so
easie
to
be
observed
,
for
although
in
every
Democracy
there
must
needs
continue
certain
Institutions
received
by
use
,
or
establisht
by
written
Laws
,
at
what
time
,
and
by
whom
the
People
should
be
Assembled
,
and
Publick
business
proposed
,
and
Executed
,
since
without
such
things
,
a
Common-wealth
cannot
be
understood
,
yet
since
that
Council
consists
of
all
the
Citizens
,
in
whom
the
Soveraign
Authority
resides
;
nothing
can
hinder
,
but
those
Constitutions
may
be
altered
or
abrogated
at
any
time
by
the
same
People
that
made
them
.
But
in
Aristocracies
and
Monarchies
,
where
there
are
some
who
command
,
and
others
who
obey
,
and
so
a
Right
arises
to
these
from
the
Promises
and
Commands
of
the
other
.
There
does
plainly
appear
a
difference
between
an
absolute
and
limited
power
,
he
is
therefore
absolute
who
exercises
his
Authority
according
to
his
own
discretion
,
and
not
according
to
the
Rule
of
any
certain
,
or
perpetual
Constitutions
;
but
as
the
present
condition
of
affairs
require
,
and
who
does
so
provide
for
the
safety
of
the
Common-wealth
,
as
its
occasions
direct
him
:
from
whence
the
word
absolute
is
so
far
from
implying
any
thing
unjust
or
hateful
in
it self
,
or
intolerable
for
Free-men
;
that
it
should
rather
lay
upon
such
absolute
Princes
necessity
of
greater
care
and
circumspection
,
if
they
will
acquit
themselves
of
their
Duty
,
and
discharge
their
Consciences
as
they
ought
;
then
on
those
to
whom
a
certain
form
of
dispatching
publick
Affairs
is
prescribed
.
So
Dio
Chrysost.
Orati
.
62.
describes
an
absolute
Prince
thus
,
"
a
good
Prince
covets
nothing
because
he
supposes
himself
to
possess
all
things
,
he
abstains
from
pleasures
,
since
he
may
enjoy
whatsoever
he
pleases
.
He
is
juster
than
others
,
as
he
who
is
to
be
an
example
of
Justice
to
others
.
He
takes
pleasure
in
business
,
because
he
labours
of
his
own
accord
.
He
loves
the
Laws
,
because
he
does
not
fear
them
;
and
of
all
these
he
rightly
perswades
himself
:
for
who
hath
greater
need
of
Prudence
,
then
he
who
deliberates
of
such
great
Affairs
?
Who
of
more
exact
Justice
,
then
he
who
is
above
the
Laws
?
Who
of
a
more
severe
modesty
,
than
he
to
whom
all
things
are
Lawful
?
Who
of
greater
Fortitude
,
than
he
who
keeps
all
things
in
safety
?
Yet
because
the
Judgment
of
any
one
man
in
discerning
that
which
truly
conduces
to
the
publick
safety
may
be
easily
deceived
,
neither
is
there
in
all
Men
that
strength
of
mind
,
that
they
may
know
how
in
so
great
a
Liberty
to
govern
their
Passions
and
Lusts
(
as
Herodian
Li.
1.
Cap.
4.
well
observes
)
that
it
is
difficult
in
the
highest
Liberty
for
a
Man
to
restrain
himself
,
&
as
it
were
to
bridle
his
own
desires
.
Therefore
it
seemed
most
convenient
to
divers
people
,
not
to
commit
so
great
a
power
to
one
mans
sole
discretion
,
and
he
no
more
free
from
Errors
than
others
,
but
rather
more
subject
to
Vices
;
and
therefore
would
rather
prescribe
the
Prince
a
certain
Form
or
Method
of
dispatching
of
publick
Affairs
,
after
it
was
at
first
found
out
what
sort
of
constitutions
,
or
forms
of
dispatching
publick
Affairs
did
best
suit
with
the
Genius
of
the
people
,
and
the
Nature
of
the
Common-wealth
to
be
constituted
.
Neither
is
there
any
injury
done
to
the
Prince
,
who
was
at
first
raised
to
that
Dignity
by
the
free
consent
of
the
people
upon
those
conditions
.
For
if
it
seemed
grievous
to
take
the
supreme
Authority
,
because
he
could
not
manage
it
as
he
pleased
,
he
might
have
refused
it
if
he
would
;
so
the
Conscience
of
the
Oath
by
which
they
are
obliged
upon
their
taking
this
Authority
ought
to
restrain
them
and
their
Successors
from
going
about
to
make
themselves
absolute
by
secret
Machinations
and
Designs
:
Much
less
to
subvert
the
Laws
of
the
Kingdom
by
force
.
Since
an
Oath
is
not
more
Religiously
to
be
observed
by
any
than
he
whom
it
most
chiefly
concerns
not
to
be
perjured
.
For
that
is
too
weak
which
some
maintain
,
that
since
Kings
are
ordained
by
God
,
who
injoyns
them
a
true
discharge
of
their
Duty
,
which
cannot
be
performed
without
the
exercise
of
the
most
absolute
power
:
and
therefore
God
is
to
be
supposed
to
have
conferred
such
a
proportion
of
power
on
all
Kings
,
as
that
they
ought
not
to
suffer
the
least
part
thereof
to
be
diminished
or
circumscribed
,
and
that
the
People
can
neither
rightly
require
or
oblige
their
King
to
it
;
no
more
than
there
can
honestly
be
made
such
a
bargain
between
a
Husband
and
a
Wife
that
he
should
connive
at
her
stolen
pleasures
.
But
as
we
have
already
sufficiently
proved
,
that
as
all
Civil
Government
is
from
God
,
yet
is
so
left
in
Mans
disposal
(
at
least
to
those
that
God
did
not
give
any
particular
Laws
to
)
what
sort
of
Government
they
would
set
up
(
as
Phil.
Melancthon
in
his
Epitomy
of
Moral
Philosophy
,
honestly
teaches
,
That
the
forms
of
Kingdoms
are
different
,
and
in
some
places
there
are
some
degrees
of
Liberty
more
than
in
others
:
For
God
approves
all
Forms
of
Government
that
are
agreeable
to
Right
,
Nature
,
and
Reason
;
and
as
I
think
there
is
no
where
any
Divine
precept
extant
,
that
a
free
People
being
about
to
chuse
it self
a
King
,
should
chuse
Cajus
rather
than
Titius
,
no
more
is
there
any
certain
form
Divinely
establish'd
,
under
which
,
and
no
other
Authority
,
is
to
be
conferred
on
Princes
.
Neither
are
these
Men
any
way
helped
by
that
place
of
1
Sam.
8.
where
some
will
have
only
the
bare
unjust
practice
of
Kings
,
that
the
true
right
of
all
Kings
is
to
be
there
described
.
But
Grotius
,
Lib
1.
c.
4.
§
3.
Taking
a
middle
way
lays
down
,
that
there
the
bare
actions
of
a
King
is
described
,
yet
what
hath
the
effect
of
a
right
,
to
wit
an
Obligation
of
non
resistance
:
So
that
however
a
King
may
act
against
his
Duty
when
he
commits
such
things
;
yet
that
his
Subject
sought
no
more
to
resist
,
than
if
he
had
acted
thus
by
the
highest
Right
;
and
therefore
it
is
added
that
the
People
pressed
by
those
vexations
should
cry
to
God
,
because
there
remained
no
humane
remedies
.
So
that
this
was
called
the
Right
of
the
King
in
that
sence
as
the
Roman
Praetor
was
sayed
,
jus
reddere
,
to
judg
right
,
even
then
when
he
decreed
unjustly
;
however
I
conceive
the
true
sence
of
this
place
may
be
thus
understood
,
there
had
been
hitherto
a
Democracy
among
the
Hebrews
,
but
that
which
often
resembled
that
sort
of
Kingdome
which
Aristotle
calls
Heroical
.
The
Judges
incited
by
a
divine
instinct
did
for
the
most
part
rescue
the
oppressed
People
from
their
Enemies
,
or
else
in
Peace
Judged
Causes
:
but
in
other
matters
were
rather
endued
with
a
power
of
perswading
,
than
commanding
,
but
yet
their
Equipage
and
State
being
small
,
was
not
born
or
encreased
by
any
Publick
Taxes
;
yet
the
People
weary
of
this
Government
,
would
have
a
King
after
the
manner
of
other
Nations
:
That
is
,
who
should
appear
in
great
State
,
and
Splendour
,
and
should
maintain
a
constant
Guard
,
or
at
least
should
still
exercise
his
Subjects
in
Arms
,
that
they
might
still
be
able
to
meet
their
Enemies
in
the
Field
,
see
Sam.
XIII
.
2.
XIV
.
48
,
52.
Now
Samuel
,
that
the
People
might
consider
of
it
soberly
before
hand
,
lays
open
to
them
the
Prerogatives
of
such
a
King
:
and
the
inconveniencies
of
that
Government
.
You
would
have
a
King
remarkable
by
a
great
deal
of
Splendour
;
but
such
a
one
must
be
attended
with
a
numerous
Train
,
and
so
will
take
your
Sons
,
and
appoint
them
for
himself
,
and
to
be
his
Horsemen
,
and
to
run
before
his
Chariots
.
You
would
have
a
King
.
who
should
maintain
an
Army
;
but
it
will
be
necessary
that
he
appoint
him
Captains
over
Hundreds
,
and
Captains
over
Fifties
;
and
this
must
be
of
your
Sons
,
who
were
used
before
to
look
after
your
own
business
only
;
the
greatness
of
his
affairs
,
and
the
state
of
his
Office
,
will
not
permit
this
King
to
till
his
own
Land
;
Therefore
of
your
Sons
will
he
set
some
to
Ear
his
Ground
,
and
Reap
his
Harvest
,
and
to
make
his
Instruments
of
War
;
and
since
besides
he
must
need
a
great
deal
of
Attendance
,
and
that
it
will
not
become
the
Dignity
of
his
Wives
,
or
Daughters
,
to
look
after
the
Houshold-affairs
.
Therefore
he
will
take
your
Daughters
to
be
Confectioners
,
to
be
Cooks
,
and
to
be
Bakers
;
he
will
likewise
stand
in
need
of
many
Servants
to
dispatch
the
businesses
of
War
and
Peace
,
and
who
all
must
have
Salaries
:
and
therefore
he
will
take
your
Fields
,
and
your
Vineyards
and
your
Olive-Yards
,
and
give
them
to
your
Servants
:
and
to
this
purpose
he
will
take
the
Tenth
of
your
Seed
,
and
of
your
Vineyards
,
and
give
to
his
Officers
,
and
to
his
Servants
,
and
he
will
likewise
when
he
hath
need
,
take
your
Men-servants
,
and
your
Maid-servants
,
and
your
young
Men
,
and
your
Asses
,
and
put
them
to
his
work
.
In
short
he
says
no
more
than
this
;
If
you
will
have
a
King
,
he
must
be
maintained
like
a
King
,
and
a
certain
Revenue
appointed
for
this
end
;
of
which
burthen
if
you
are
afterwards
a
weary
,
you
shall
not
be
able
to
Depose
him
again
,
since
he
obtain'd
the
Kingdom
by
your
choice
and
consent
,
and
so
cannot
be
taken
from
him
.
So
that
it
is
plain
,
that
this
place
does
not
at
all
serve
to
Patronize
evil
Princes
;
so
neither
that
there
is
here
any
limited
Power
conferred
by
God
after
the
manner
of
a
constant
and
unalterable
Precept
,
and
of
which
no
constitutions
can
diminish
any
part
;
since
here
only
the
necessary
Charges
and
Burthens
as
well
of
an
absolute
,
as
of
a
limited
Royalty
are
described
;
therefore
it
is
wholly
in
the
will
of
a
free
People
,
whether
they
will
have
an
absolute
Power
,
or
will
deliver
it
with
certain
Laws
,
so
that
those
Laws
contain
nothing
that
is
wicked
,
or
which
may
destroy
the
ends
of
Government
;
for
although
Men
at
the
beginning
did
freely
enter
into
a
civil
Society
,
yet
since
they
were
before
obliged
to
the
observation
of
the
Law
of
Nature
,
they
ought
to
Constitute
such
Rules
of
Power
,
and
civil
Obedience
which
might
be
agreeable
to
that
Law
,
and
to
the
lawful
ends
of
all
Common-wealths
.
But
as
it
may
rightly
be
understood
,
by
what
sort
of
Promise
,
a
Kingly
Government
may
cease
to
be
absolute
(
for
every
promise
hath
not
that
force
)
it
is
to
be
understood
that
a
King
upon
his
taking
the
Kingdom
,
may
oblige
himself
either
by
a
General
,
or
special
Promise
,
which
for
the
most
part
is
confirmed
by
the
Religion
of
an
Oath
.
A
General
Promise
may
be
made
either
tacitely
or
expresly
.
A
tacite
Promise
of
Governing
well
is
understood
in
the
very
acceptance
of
the
Kingdom
,
although
there
were
nothing
expresly
Promised
;
yet
most
commonly
this
promise
ought
to
be
made
expresly
not
without
an
Oath
,
&
the
solemnity
of
certain
rights
;
neither
is
it
unusual
that
in
this
promise
the
Office
of
a
King
should
be
described
by
a
Periphrasis
,
or
enumeration
of
the
principal
Parts
;
as
suppose
it
be
,
that
he
will
take
care
of
the
Publick
safety
;
that
he
will
defend
the
good
,
and
punish
the
bad
,
that
he
will
Administer
indifferent
Justice
,
that
he
will
oppress
no
Body
,
or
the
like
.
Such
Promisses
do
not
all
detract
from
absoluteness
of
his
Power
.
since
the
King
is
indeed
obliged
by
those
general
Promises
,
to
govern
well
;
but
what
Method
,
or
what
means
he
shall
make
use
of
for
this
end
is
left
to
his
will
,
and
discretion
;
but
a
special
promise
,
and
in
which
both
the
Method
,
and
means
to
be
used
in
the
Administring
the
Government
are
particularly
expressed
,
seem
to
have
a
twofold
Power
;
for
one
only
obliges
the
Conscience
of
the
King
;
but
the
other
makes
the
Obedience
of
the
Subjects
depend
upon
its
performance
,
as
upon
an
express
condition
.
A
Promise
of
the
first
sort
is
thus
,
If
the
King
should
swear
,
for
example
,
that
he
will
not
bestow
any
Offices
of
trust
,
on
such
a
sort
of
Men
,
that
he
will
not
grant
any
Priviledges
to
any
which
shall
redound
to
the
prejudice
of
others
,
that
he
will
make
no
new
Laws
,
or
impose
new
Taxes
or
Customs
,
or
will
not
use
Foreign
Souldiers
or
the
like
.
Yet
if
there
be
no
certain
Council
,
or
Assembly
Coustituted
,
which
the
King
should
be
obliged
to
consult
,
whether
the
occasions
of
the
Common-wealth
require
he
should
depart
from
those
Engagements
(
for
there
is
still
in
all
of
them
,
that
tacite
exception
still
understood
(
unless
the
Safety
of
the
Common-wealth
the
Supreme
Law
in
all
such
Engagements
require
otherwise
)
and
which
Council
by
its
own
right
,
and
not
precariously
can
take
cognizance
of
those
affairs
,
and
without
whose
consent
the
Subjects
cannot
be
obliged
to
observe
the
Kings
commands
in
such
matters
;
here
the
Administration
of
the
supreme
Authority
being
restrained
to
certain
Laws
,
if
the
King
shall
act
otherwise
(
unless
in
cases
of
great
necessity
,
)
he
is
without
doubt
guilty
of
the
breach
of
his
Oath
;
yet
there
does
not
therefore
belong
any
power
to
the
Subject
to
deny
Obedience
to
the
Kings
commands
,
or
of
making
those
actions
void
.
For
if
the
King
do
say
,
That
the
safety
of
the
People
,
or
some
remarkable
advantage
to
the
Commonwealth
requires
him
to
break
his
Promise
,
as
that
presumption
always
ought
to
go
along
with
the
Kings
actions
,
the
Subjects
in
this
case
have
not
any
thing
to
reply
:
because
they
have
no
faculty
of
taking
Cognizance
of
those
actions
,
whether
the
necessity
of
the
Common-wealth
required
them
or
not
;
from
which
this
is
apparent
,
that
they
do
not
take
a
sufficient
caution
,
if
they
will
allow
their
King
but
a
limited
Power
,
and
yet
hath
not
Constituted
some
great
Council
,
without
whose
consent
those
actions
excepted
cannot
be
exercised
,
or
unless
there
lie
upon
the
King
a
necessity
of
calling
the
Estates
,
whenever
he
deliberates
upon
the
exercise
of
those
Legislative
Powers
,
for
that
is
better
,
than
if
it
should
be
necessary
for
the
King
to
consult
some
Council
,
consisting
only
of
some
few
of
his
Subjects
:
since
it
may
easily
happen
that
the
private
advantages
of
those
few
may
differ
from
the
publick
good
,
and
likewise
,
they
for
their
own
private
Interest
,
may
not
agree
in
those
things
which
are
truly
beneficial
for
their
Prince
.
But
the
Authority
of
a
King
is
more
closly
restrained
,
if
it
be
expresly
agreed
between
the
King
and
People
upon
the
conferring
the
supreme
power
upon
Him
,
or
his
Ancestors
that
he
should
Administer
it
according
to
certain
Fundamental
Laws
;
and
concerning
those
matters
which
he
hath
not
absolute
Power
to
dispose
of
,
that
he
leave
them
to
a
great
Council
of
the
People
,
or
Nobility
,
neither
may
decree
any
thing
in
those
matters
without
their
consent
;
and
if
they
should
be
done
otherwise
,
that
the
Subjects
would
not
be
obliged
to
observe
his
commands
in
such
things
;
neither
,
yet
is
the
Supreme
Power
rendred
defective
by
such
Fundamental
Constitutions
.
For
all
the
acts
of
Supreme
Power
may
be
exercised
in
such
a
Kingdom
,
as
well
as
in
an
absolute
one
,
unless
that
in
the
one
,
the
King
uses
his
own
Judgment
alone
,
as
decisive
,
but
in
the
other
there
is
as
it
were
a
concomitant
Cognizance
remaining
in
the
great
Council
,
upon
which
power
of
the
Supreme
Authority
it
does
not
radically
;
but
as
it
were
conditionally
depend
,
&
sine
qua
non
;
neither
are
there
in
such
a
Common-wealth
two
distinct
wills
,
forall
things
which
the
Common-wealth
wills
,
it
wills
them
by
the
Kings
will
alone
;
although
it
might
happen
form
that
limitation
,
that
certain
conditions
not
being
observed
,
the
King
cannot
legally
will
some
things
,
and
so
wills
them
in
vain
;
but
neither
does
the
King
cease
to
have
the
supreme
Power
in
such
a
Kingdom
;
or
that
this
Council
is
therefore
above
the
King
.
For
these
are
no
true
consequences
,
that
because
this
Person
cannot
do
all
things
according
to
his
own
humour
,
therefore
he
hath
not
supreme
Power
.
I
am
not
obliged
to
obey
this
Man
in
all
things
,
therefore
I
am
his
Superior
,
or
Equal
:
and
these
are
likewise
very
different
;
I
am
bound
to
perform
what
this
Man
pleases
;
because
I
have
obliged
my self
to
it
by
compact
;
and
I
am
obliged
to
follow
this
Mans
will
,
because
he
can
enjoyn
me
thus
by
his
supreme
Authority
.
But
supreme
,
and
absolute
are
not
one
,
and
the
same
thing
,
for
that
denotes
the
absense
of
a
Superiour
,
or
an
Equal
in
the
same
order
or
degree
;
but
this
a
faculty
of
exerciseing
any
right
by
a
Mans
own
Judgment
and
Will
;
but
what
if
there
be
added
a
Commissary
clause
;
that
if
he
shall
do
otherwise
he
shall
forfeit
his
Kingdom
;
as
the
Arogonians
of
Old
after
the
King
had
sworn
to
their
Priviledges
,
did
promise
him
Obedience
in
this
manner
:
Frarcogallia
.
C.
12.
We
,
who
are
of
as
great
Power
as
thou
,
do
Create
thee
our
King
and
Lord
on
this
condition
that
thou
observe
our
Laws
and
Priviledges
,
if
otherwise
,
not
.
Here
it
is
certain
,
that
an
absolute
King
cannot
be
He
to
whom
the
Kingdom
is
thus
committed
under
a
Commissary
Clause
,
or
Condition
:
but
that
this
King
may
have
for
all
this
a
regal
Power
though
limited
,
I
see
no
reason
to
the
contrary
;
for
although
we
grant
a
Temporary
Authority
cannot
be
acknowledged
for
Supreme
,
because
it
depends
upon
a
potestative
condition
,
and
which
can
never
be
in
the
Princes
power
.
Yet
a
King
of
this
sort
above-mention'd
is
not
therefore
subject
to
the
power
of
the
People
,
with
whom
the
cognizance
is
whether
he
keep
his
Oath
,
or
not
,
for
besides
that
such
a
Commissary
Clause
is
wont
to
comprehend
only
such
plain
things
,
which
are
evident
to
any
Mans
sences
;
and
so
are
not
liable
to
dispute
.
So
that
this
power
of
taking
cognizance
does
not
at
all
suppose
any
Jurisdiction
by
which
the
Actions
of
the
King
as
a
Subject
may
be
judged
,
but
is
nothing
else
,
than
a
bare
Declaration
,
whereby
any
Man
takes
notice
that
his
manifest
right
is
violated
by
another
.
See
Grotius
,
Lib.
1.
Cap.
3.
§
16.
And
Baecler
,
upon
him
:
who
are
both
of
the
same
Opinion
.
Grotius
indeed
in
the
same
place
speaks
more
obscurely
,
when
he
says
,
That
the
Obligation
arising
from
the
promises
of
Kings
,
does
either
fall
upon
the
exercise
of
the
act
,
or
also
directly
upon
the
very
power
of
it
,
if
he
act
contrary
to
promises
of
the
former
sort
;
the
act
may
be
called
unjust
,
and
yet
be
valid
;
if
against
those
of
the
latter
,
it
is
also
void
,
as
if
he
should
have
said
,
Sometimes
a
King
promises
not
to
use
part
of
his
Supreme
Authority
,
but
after
acertain
manner
;
and
sometimes
he
plainly
renounces
some
part
thereof
,
concerning
which
there
are
two
things
to
be
observed
;
first
that
also
some
acts
may
be
void
,
which
are
performed
contrary
to
an
Obligation
of
the
former
sorts
;
as
for
example
,
if
a
King
swear
not
to
impose
any
Taxes
without
the
consent
of
the
Estates
.
I
suppose
that
such
Taxes
which
the
King
shall
Levy
by
his
own
will
alone
;
to
bevoid
.
Secondly
,
That
in
the
latter
form
the
parts
of
the
supreme
power
,
are
divided
.
But
that
the
Nature
of
limited
Kingdoms
may
more
thoroughly
be
understood
;
it
is
to
be
observed
,
that
the
affairs
which
occur
in
Governning
a
Common-wealth
are
of
two
kinds
;
for
of
some
of
them
it
may
be
agreed
beforehand
,
because
whenever
they
happen
they
are
still
but
of
the
same
Nature
:
but
of
others
,
a
certain
Judgment
cannot
be
made
but
at
the
time
present
,
whether
they
are
beneficial
to
the
Publick
or
not
;
for
that
those
circumstances
which
accompany
them
,
cannot
be
forseen
.
Yet
concerning
both
,
that
People
may
provide
,
that
he
to
whom
they
have
commited
this
limited
Kingdom
should
not
depart
from
the
Common
good
in
the
former
,
whilst
it
prescribes
perpetual
Laws
or
Conditions
which
the
King
should
be
obliged
to
observe
in
the
latter
,
whilst
he
is
obliged
to
consult
the
assembly
of
his
People
or
Nobility
.
Thus
the
People
being
satisfied
of
the
truth
of
their
Religion
,
and
what
sort
of
Ecclesiastical
Government
,
or
Ceremonies
do
best
suit
their
Genius
;
so
it
is
in
Sweden
,
may
condition
with
the
King
upon
his
Inauguration
,
that
he
shall
not
change
any
thing
in
Religious
matters
by
his
sole
Authority
.
So
every
Body
being
sensible
,
how
often
Justice
would
be
injured
,
if
Sentence
should
always
be
given
by
the
sole
Judgment
of
the
Prince
,
&
ex
aequo
&
hono
,
without
any
written
or
known
Laws
,
and
that
Passion
,
Tacit
An.
L.
13.
4.
2.
Interest
,
or
unskilfulness
would
have
too
great
a
sway
for
avoiding
this
inconvenience
,
the
people
may
oblige
their
King
,
that
either
he
shall
compose
a
Body
of
just
Laws
,
or
observe
those
that
are
already
extant
and
also
that
Judgment
be
given
according
to
those
Laws
,
in
certain
Courts
or
Colledges
of
Justice
,
and
that
none
but
the
most
weighty
Causes
should
come
before
the
King
by
way
of
Appeal
.
And
since
the
people
would
not
leave
to
this
limited
King
an
absolute
power
in
those
Acts
which
are
thus
excepted
,
but
that
an
Assembly
,
either
of
the
whole
people
,
or
of
those
that
represent
them
divided
into
their
several
Orders
;
it
is
further
to
be
observed
,
that
the
power
of
this
Council
,
or
Assembly
,
is
not
alike
every
where
.
For
in
some
places
the
King
himself
though
every
where
absolute
,
may
have
appointed
a
Council
,
or
Senate
,
without
whose
approbation
he
will
not
have
his
decrees
to
be
valid
.
Which
Senate
without
doubt
will
only
have
the
Authority
of
Councellors
,
and
though
they
may
question
the
Kings
Grants
or
Decrees
,
and
reject
those
which
they
judg
inconvenient
,
for
the
Common-wealth
,
yet
they
do
not
this
by
any
inherent
Right
,
but
by
a
power
granted
them
from
the
King
himself
.
Who
would
this
way
prevent
his
decreeing
any
thing
through
hast
,
imprudence
,
or
the
perswasion
of
Flatterers
that
might
prove
hurtful
to
his
State
:
to
which
may
be
referred
what
Plutarch
mentions
in
his
Apothegms
.
‛
That
the
Aegyptian
Kings
observe
a
Law
,
And
in
the
same
place
it
is
noted
,
that
Antigonus
3.
writ
to
his
Cities
,
that
if
by
his
Letter
he
should
command
anything
contrary
to
his
Laws
,
they
should
not
obey
it
,
but
should
think
he
failed
thorough
ignorance
or
misinformation
;
and
oftentimes
importunate
Requests
are
eluded
this
way
,
whilst
the
Prince
seems
for
quietness
sake
content
to
grant
what
he
knows
will
be
made
void
by
this
Senate
or
Court
of
Parliament
,
Vid.
Gro.
Li.
1.
c.
3.
§
.
10.
But
a
Kingdom
is
truely
limited
,
when
the
Subjects
at
first
conferred
it
on
the
King
,
on
this
condition
,
that
he
should
assemble
the
Estates
concerning
some
Acts
,
without
whose
consent
this
Decree
should
not
be
valid
,
yet
it
ought
to
be
in
the
Kings
power
to
call
,
and
dissolve
this
Assembly
,
and
to
propose
the
business
to
be
dispatcht
therein
unless
we
should
go
about
to
set
up
an
irregular
Common-wealth
,
and
leave
the
King
no
more
than
an
empty
Title
,
but
if
these
States
being
so
convocated
,
do
of
their
own
accord
Propose
those
things
which
they
conceive
conducing
to
the
good
and
safety
of
the
Kingdom
,
yet
the
Decrees
or
Acts
constituted
concerning
them
,
take
their
force
from
the
Kings
passing
them
.
Yet
such
an
assembly
of
Estates
do
differ
from
Counsellors
properly
taken
in
this
,
that
although
both
of
them
can
only
move
the
King
by
reason
only
,
yet
the
King
may
very
well
reject
the
Reasons
of
these
latter
,
but
not
of
the
former
,
neither
ought
the
King
to
think
himself
contemned
,
if
these
Estates
do
not
consent
to
some
things
of
his
proposing
.
For
as
he
promised
at
first
to
have
always
before
his
Eyes
the
good
of
the
Common-wealth
,
of
which
a
great
many
choice
men
are
supposed
to
Judg
more
certainly
than
one
.
A
King
may
most
commonly
blame
his
own
imprudence
,
Passions
,
or
ill
Fortune
,
if
the
States
happen
to
differ
from
him
,
from
whence
it
likewise
appears
,
that
their
fear
is
vain
,
who
think
that
by
this
means
,
it
is
at
the
disposal
of
the
Estates
,
whether
the
Common-wealth
shall
be
safe
or
not
.
For
it
can
scarcely
be
supposed
,
that
the
King
should
be
so
negligent
,
as
to
omit
laying
open
to
his
Estates
the
necessities
of
the
Kingdom
,
or
that
the
Estates
being
fully
satisfied
of
them
,
will
ever
go
about
to
betray
their
own
safety
.
But
this
is
certain
,
since
those
who
have
conferred
the
limited
power
cannot
be
presumed
either
to
intend
to
destroy
or
dissolve
the
Common-wealth
;
or
by
their
confederacy
to
order
things
so
,
that
the
end
of
all
Common-wealths
,
cannot
be
obtained
in
it
,
therefore
there
ought
to
be
that
favourable
interpretation
made
of
those
Conventions
that
they
really
desire
the
common
safety
,
and
would
by
no
means
do
any
thing
contrary
thereunto
;
so
likewise
in
making
this
compact
,
that
whatsoever
they
have
so
agreed
to
,
they
are
still
to
be
supposed
to
have
that
intention
,
that
nothing
should
be
done
by
reason
of
those
conditions
or
parts
which
should
prejudice
the
common
safety
,
and
publick
utility
,
or
whereby
the
Convulsion
or
Dissolution
of
the
Common-wealth
might
follow
.
But
if
such
a
chance
should
happen
,
it
would
be
most
convenient
,
that
if
the
affair
will
allow
of
delay
,
it
should
be
proposed
in
the
Assembly
of
Estates
,
but
where
this
cannot
be
done
,
it
may
be
the
Kings
Duty
dexterously
to
correct
those
complaints
that
may
break
out
to
the
destruction
of
the
Common-wealth
,
which
also
is
of
the
the
same
force
in
respect
of
publick
Laws
,
However
,
Mr.
Hobs
will
allow
no
distinction
between
limited
power
and
absolute
,
but
will
have
all
supreme
power
to
be
absolute
,
when
it
is
to
be
observed
,
that
in
all
those
assertions
which
are
too
rudely
laid
down
by
him
,
there
is
a
restriction
to
be
added
from
the
and
of
all
Common-wealths
,
as
in
what
he
lays
down
in
his
de
Cive
cap.
5.
§.
6.
that
he
to
whom
in
a
Common-wealth
there
belongs
the
right
of
punishing
,
can
by
right
compel
all
to
all
things
he
pleases
,
or
as
he
expresses
this
limitation
in
the
same
place
,
which
are
necessary
for
the
common
peace
and
safety
,
and
Cap.
6.
§.
13.
when
by
the
right
of
the
supreme
Governour
he
says
there
is
connected
so
great
an
obedience
of
all
the
Subjects
as
is
requisite
for
the
Government
of
the
Common-wealth
,
so
when
in
the
place
aforegoing
he
saith
,
who
ever
hath
so
subjected
his
own
will
'to
that
of
the
Prince
,
that
he
may
do
whatever
he
pleases
,
without
punishment
,
as
also
make
Laws
,
Judg
differences
,
punish
whom
he
pleases
,
&
use
the
strength
&
power
of
all
men
according
to
his
own
will
,
perform
all
these
things
by
the
highest
right
,
he
hath
then
granted
him
the
greatest
power
which
can
be
granted
.
But
it
is
now
to
be
considered
,
by
what
intention
,
or
on
what
grounds
men
were
moved
to
institute
Common-wealths
,
from
whence
it
is
clear
,
that
no
body
is
understood
to
have
conferred
more
power
by
his
Will
upon
the
Monarch
,
then
a
reasonable
man
can
judg
necessary
to
that
end
:
and
that
although
the
ordering
what
may
conduce
to
this
end
in
this
or
that
occasion
,
does
not
remain
in
those
that
have
transferred
their
power
,
but
in
him
on
whom
that
power
is
transferred
,
therefore
the
supream
Ruler
can
compel
the
Subjects
to
all
those
things
which
are
really
condusing
to
the
good
of
the
Common-wealth
,
but
he
ought
not
to
go
about
to
compel
them
to
those
things
that
are
contrary
to
the
safety
of
the
Common-wealth
,
or
against
the
Laws
of
Nature
.
And
if
he
endeavours
any
such
thing
,
without
doubt
he
transgresses
the
bounds
of
his
power
.
Let
us
also
consider
the
Arguments
by
which
the
same
Author
in
his
De
Cive
.
Cap.
6
,
§.
17.
endeavours
to
prove
that
all
limitation
of
Soveraign
power
is
absolutely
vain
,
he
says
that
assembly
which
prescribed
the
Laws
to
the
future
King
,
must
have
had
absolute
power
,
either
habitually
,
or
vertually
.
If
the
Assembly
remains
constantly
,
or
adjourns
their
Meeting
from
Time
to
Time
,
to
a
certain
day
and
place
,
their
power
will
be
perpetual
,
and
so
the
King
will
not
have
the
Supream
power
,
but
will
be
only
a
bare
Magistrate
.
Which
we
grant
to
be
true
,
if
that
Assembly
can
meet
by
its
own
Right
and
Decree
of
any
Affairs
of
the
Common-wealth
,
and
that
the
King
be
liable
to
give
them
an
Account
of
his
Actions
.
But
if
it
absolutely
dissolve
it self
;
unless
the
Commonwealth
be
likewise
dissolved
,
there
must
in
like
manner
a
power
be
left
somewhere
,
of
punishing
those
that
transgress
the
Laws
,
which
without
absolute
power
cannot
be
performed
.
Which
is
false
as
also
the
Argument
by
which
he
would
prove
it
:
for
he
who
hath
granted
him
by
Right
,
so
much
power
,
that
he
can
compel
any
of
the
Subjects
by
punishments
,
hath
so
great
power
that
greater
cannot
be
conferred
by
them
.
But
for
all
this
,
whoever
will
but
consider
the
end
of
all
Common-wealths
,
and
that
those
Subjects
by
the
submission
of
their
Wills
and
powers
,
did
not
immediately
become
senceless
Machines
:
so
that
since
they
could
grant
the
use
of
their
united
Forces
to
another
upon
condition
,
and
are
able
to
judg
whether
this
condition
be
perform●d
or
not
,
so
they
can
likewise
withdraw
their
Forces
again
upon
the
breach
of
the
condition
,
as
likewise
this
is
apparently
false
,
that
there
is
no
better
provision
against
the
abuse
of
Authority
,
when
it
is
granted
limited
,
then
when
it
is
left
absolute
;
for
it
is
not
who
,
that
he
who
hath
power
enough
to
defend
all
Men.
(
which
all
that
are
not
Fools
will
easily
grant
their
Prince
)
as
also
power
enough
to
destroy
them
.
The
Commands
of
a
General
which
are
sufficient
to
make
the
Souldiers
stout
,
to
venture
their
Lives
,
against
an
Enemy
,
yet
would
be
found
of
no
force
,
if
he
should
command
them
to
draw
their
Swords
against
each
other
.
So
that
prudent
and
worthy
Princes
though
absolute
,
will
comply
with
the
Genins
of
their
Subjects
,
and
●…t-times
will
be
sparing
to
urge
them
too
far
though
for
their
own
advantage
,
when
they
cannot
be
compelled
to
their
Duty
without
some
hazard
to
the
Common-wealth
.
But
those
Subjects
are
not
less
discreet
,
who
when
they
are
satisfied
,
what
is
not
expedient
for
their
Common-wealth
,
have
provided
by
Fundamental
Laws
,
that
they
should
not
be
compelled
to
it
by
their
Princes
power
.
So
far
speaks
the
judicious
Mr.
Pusendorf
upon
this
Subject
,
which
though
somewhat
prolix
,
I
have
thought
fit
to
translate
verbation
,
because
I
would
not
be
thought
by
going
about
to
contract
it
,
to
put
my
own
sence
upon
his
words
,
and
besides
I
know
no
man
that
hath
writ
more
clearly
of
this
Subject
,
in
avoiding
on
one
side
an
absolute
despotick
Monarchy
,
without
falling
into
that
Solacism
in
Politicks
the
division
of
the
supreme
power
which
he
supposes
truly
inconsistant
with
Monarchy
.
So
that
if
the
Reader
is
not
satisfied
with
what
I
have
here
writ
upon
this
Subject
:
I
am
sorry
his
understanding
and
mine
are
not
framed
alike
,
nor
shall
be
angry
with
him
,
if
he
like
an
absolute
Monarchy
better
then
that
we
live
under
.
Provided
,
he
will
never
Act
any
thing
to
produce
publick
disturbances
:
or
to
introduce
it
,
either
by
force
or
fraud
in
this
Kingdom
.
Yet
shall
wish
him
no
greater
Prerogative
,
then
that
of
enjoying
his
own
opinion
,
without
imposing
it
upon
others
,
who
are
not
yet
weary
of
their
Estates
and
Liberties
,
which
since
the
People
of
this
Nation
are
not
yet
weary
of
.
The
World
is
wide
enough
,
and
there
are
Countries
,
where
this
which
they
admire
as
the
primitive
Government
of
the
World
,
and
that
which
they
perhaps
Reverence
as
the
Primitive
Religion
is
practised
in
its
full
splendor
:
and
indeed
are
most
suitable
to
each
other
.
All
the
hurt
I
wish
those
Gentlemen
,
that
they
were
all
setled
in
any
of
them
,
even
which
they
like
best
.
Whilst
all
plain
hearted
English-men
,
notwithstanding
such
subtile
discourses
,
as
thofe
of
our
Author
,
are
resolved
to
return
the
same
Answer
to
them
as
the
Temporal
Lords
did
to
the
Bishops
long
since
upon
another
occasion
,
Nolumus
Leges
Angliae
mutari
,
of
which
I
hope
there
is
as
little
fear
,
as
there
is
or
ever
will
be
just
occasion
for
it
.
And
so
I
shall
quit
my
hands
of
this
ungrateful
task
,
without
troubling
my self
with
his
Discourse
of
Witches
.
Since
his
other
writings
sufficiently
assure
us
that
whatever
he
was
in
other
Learning
he
was
no
Witch
in
Politicks
,
though
he
had
Read
Aristotle
,
might
perhaps
be
better
read
in
the
Fathers
and
Schoolmen
.
or
Civil-Law
,
than
in
the
Laws
of
Nature
,
or
those
of
his
own
Countrey
.
FINIS
.