The reduction of a digressor, or, Rich. Baxter's reply to Mr George Kendall's digression in his book against Mr Goodwin

THE REDUCTION OF A DIGRESSOR OR Rich . Baxter's REPLY TO Mr George Kendall's DIGRESSION in his BOOK against Mr GOODWIN .

Job 42. 3. Who is he that hideth Counsel without Knowledge ? Therefore have I uttered that I understood not , things too wonderfull for me , which I knew not . Rom. 11. 33. O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgements , and his waios past finding out ! Nam quomodo intellectu Deum capit homo , qui ipsum intellectum suum , quo Eum vult capere , nondum capit ? Augustin . de Trinitate , l. 5. c . 1.

LONDON , Printed by A. M. for Thomas Underhill , at the Anchor and Bible in Pauls Church-yard near the little North-door , and Francis Tyton , at the three Daggers in Fleetstreet near Dunstans Church . 1654.

Nazianzen . Orat . 29. pag . 493. Edit . Morelli . {αβγδ} , &c.

QUod si in filii generatione & Spiritus processione pervestigandâ curiosum te praebes , ego quoque pari curiositate tuam animae corporisque conjunctionem & temperamentum inquiram : Quomodo pulvis es , & Dei Imago ? Quid est quod te moveat ? aut quid quod moveatur ? Quomodo idem movet & movetur ? Quomodo sensus in eodem manet , & externa attrahit ? Quomodo mens in te manet , & in alia mente sermonem gignit ? Quo modo cogitatio per sermonem impertitur ? Nondum majora profero ; Quae caeli conversio ? quis syderum motus , & ordo ? aut modus ? quae conjunctio aut distantia ? qui maris termini ? unde venti profluant ? unde partim anni revolutiones , aut pluviarum effusiones ? Si nihil horum intellectu percepisti , ô homo , ( percipies autem fortasse aliquando cum perfectionem consecutus fueris & ut conjicere possimus ea quae nunc cernimus , non veritatem ipsam esse , sed quaedam duntaxat veritat●s simulachra ) si teipsum non nosti , quisquis es qui de his rebus disputas , si haec nondum intellectu comprehendisti , quorum sensus ipse testis est , quo tandem modo Quid , & Quantus sit Deus , te certò tenere ac scire arbitraris ? Magnae profectò id stultitiae est . Quocirca siquid mihi obtemperas , hoc est Theologo minimè audaci , ut nonnulla jam percepisti , ita ea quae supersunt ut percipias , roga , precibusque contende . Ea parte quae in te manet contentus esto : reliqua in supernis thesauris recondita maneat . Per vitae probitatem ascende : per purgationem , eum qui purus est adipiscere . Vis Theologus aliquando fieri , ac divinitate dignus ? Mandata serva : per Dei praecepta incede ( actio enim gradus est ad contemplationem ) ex corpore operam animae nava . An quisquam est mortalium qui ad eam sublimitatem efferri possit , ut ad Pauli mensuram perveniat ? At ille tamen videre se per speculum & aenigma dicit , tempusque affore , quo facie ad faciem visurus sit ; sis tu licet aliis in Disputando sublimior : at Deo haud dubie inferior es . Sis licet aliis fortasse acutior & perspicacior : at certe veritate tanto posterior es , quanto essentia Dei essentiam tuam antecellit ] See the rest to the end .

Idem Naz . Orat . 34. pag . 538 , 539.

{αβγδ} , &c. Deum intellectu percipere difficile est , eloqui autem impossibile , ut prophanorum Theologorum Plato is the man he means . Note that proud Heathens confess a difficulty , but humble Christians an impossibility . quidam docuit , meo quidem judicio non incallidè ; nempe ut ex eo quod intellectu difficilem affirmat , opinionem hominibus afferat , se eum cognitione percepisse . Ex eo autem quod nullis verbis eum explicari posse ait , hoc agat ne inscitia sua prodi atque convinci queat . Ego verò ita potius dicendum censeo [ Dei naturam nullis quidem verbis explicari posse ; animo autem atque intellectu comprehendi multo minus posse , Nam quod quis animo atque ratione complexus fuerit , id quoque fortasse sermone declarare queat , si non satis dilucide atque perspicue , at saltem obscure , modò auditorem nactus sit non omninò surdum , tardique & stupidi ingenij . At rem tantam animo comprehendere omnino impossibile est , non modo ignavis & languidis , deorsumque vergentibus , sed magnis etiam & excelsis viris , Deique amore praeditis , ac m●rtalibus peraeque omnibus , quibus ad veri cognitionem , caligo haec & carnis crassities tenebras offundit . Atque haud scio an hoc quoque sublimioribus illis & intelligentibus naturis negatum sit , quae quia Deo propius junctae sunt , ac toto suo splendore collucent , cernere utique ●ortasse queant , si non prorsus , at certe pleniùs quam nos & solidius , atque aliae aliis , pro cujusque ordine , vel uberius , vel parcius .

Nec vero haec verba ita accipi velim , quasi percipi non posse dicam , Quod sit Deus : sed Quid & Quale sit . Neque enim inanis est praedicatio nostra , nec vana fides nostra ; nec id est quod astruimus ( ne rursus id quod probe candideque diximus , in impietatis & calumniae argumentum trahas , ac nobis ut ignorantiam confitentibus , arroganter insultes . ) Plurimum namque interest , certò tibi persuadeas , aliquid esse , an Quid tandem illud sit compertum habeas . Etenim Quod Deus sit , ac Princeps quaedam causa , quae res omnes procreavit , atque conservet , tum couli ipsi , tum Lex naturalis docet , &c. Ac nimis profecto hebes ac stolidus est , quisquis non hucusque sponte sua progreditur , naturaliumque dem●nstrationum vestigiis insistit , atque adeo hoc sibi persuadet , Ne id quidem Deum esse , quod vel imagine quadam animi concepimus , vel informavimus ; vel orationis penicillo utcunque descripsimus . Quod siquis unquam cogitatione Deum quoquo modo compr●hendit , quonam obsecro argumento id prohabit ? &c.

Pag . 548. Quid tandem Deus natura sua & essentia sit , nec hominum quisquam unquam invenit , nec invenire potest . An verò aliquando sit inventurus , quaerat h●c , qui volet , ac perscrut●tur .

Pag . 556. Having heaped up many intricacies and insuperable difficulties about the creatures , he addes [ Possuntne hoc expedire Physici , atque inanis eruditionis laude celebres , ac vere cyatho mare , hoc est , res tantas ingenio suo metientes ? ]

I intreat the capable Reader to peruse the rest of that excellent Oration in the Author .

I cite these passages 1. If it were possible to perswade poor mortals that we are no Gods , nor should aspire as did the father of sinners ; and therefore that we have less knowledge of Gods Essence and nature , then the vain Disputes called Schoolmen have long pretended to . 2. That hereby the matter of the Churches contentions being removed , our wounds may close again . For who knoweth not , how many curious and vain , though much applauded Volumes , are all built upon the sands of some presumptuous supposition of the Nature of God ? If they did not take it for granted that God doth properly Understand and Will , and properly Intendere finem , with many the like , what matter could they have for their Voluminous contentions ? If but only those two suppositions were known to be ( at least ) uncertain , what should we do with all those Learned Writings that so subtilly Dispute of the order and number of Gods Decrees ? and how should we esteem them ? He that will reade the Augustane Confession , may see what thoughts the first Protestants had of the Controversies about Predestination , and how little of that doctrine did enter their Religion .

Vide Eusebium Praeparat . Evangelic . lib . undecimo , cap . 12.

Where he affirms that M●ses and all the Prophets teach that Gods Nature cannot be explicated by words , and that his Name is ineffable , and how Plato agreeth with them .

As also cap . 9. where he makes the very Name Ens proper to God , and alledgeth . Plato's consent , and cap . 10. the consent of Numenius , and cap . 11. the consent of Plutarch .

Also lib . 8. cap . 8. pag . ( mihi ) 365. out of Josephus he citeth this , [ That God is the Beginning , the Middle , the End of all things , and as he is in Works and Benefits conspicuous , yea of all things by far the most notable ( or known ) so is he both in Nature and Greatness most obscure : Nothing that is like him ( or no likeness of him ) can be seen of us , or imagined by us ; nay it is not lawfull so much as lightly to frame it ( such a resemblance ) in our mindes . ]

Novatianus ( nondum lapsus ) lib . 1. de Trinitate inter opera Tertulliani , cap . 7.

Sed tamen & ipse ( Christus ) sic adhuc de Deo loquitur hominibus quomodo possunt adhuc audire , vel capere : licet in agnitionem Dei religiosam jam facere incrementa nitatur : Invenimus enim scriptum esse quod Deus charitas dictus sit ; nec ex hoc tamen Dei substantia charitas expressa est . Et quod Lux dictus est , nec tamen in hoc substantia Dei est ; Sed totum hoc de Deo dictum est quantum dici potest ; ut merito & quando spiritus dictus est , non omne id quod est dictus est , sed ut dum mens hominum intelligendo usque ad ipsum proficit spiritum , conversa jam ipsa in spiritu aliud quid ampliùs per spiritum conjicere , Deum esse possit . Id enim quod est , secundum id quod est , nec humano sermone edici , nec humanis auribus percipi , nec humanis sensibus colligi potest . Nam si quae praeparavit Deus his qui diligunt illum , nec oculus vidit , nec auris audivit , nec cor hominis , aut mens ipsa percepit , qualis & quantus est ille ipse , qui haec repromittit , ad quae intelligenda & mens hominis & natura defecit .

This is one note by which it is known not to be Tertullian's writing , because Tertullian grossy erred in making God too like the creature , as is well known .

The like passages you may reade , in Ruffini Exposit . in Symbolum Apostolor , Sect . 4 , 5 , 6 , 8. with several difficulties proposed in things about ourselves , to convince us of our ignorance .

Author de Cardinalibus operibus Christi inter opera Cypriani Prolog . §. 3. p. 482.

Nec patitur ad liquidum se videri Divinitas , quam utique investigatio , fidelis aliquo modo adorat vel sentit : sed puram ejus essentiam nec conspicit , nec comprehendit : Affirmatio quippe de Dei essentia in promptu haberi non potest ; neque enim definibilis est Divinitas ; sed verius sinceriusque remotio indicat , negando quid non fit , quam Asserendo quid sit . Quoniam quicquid sensui subjacet , illud esse non potest quod omnem superat intellectum . Quicquid audiri , vel videri vel sciri potest , non convenit majestati ; hebes est in hac consideratione omnis acies sensuum & caligat aspectus . — p. 483. § . 8. Et utinam me ipsum cognoscam & sciam ! Quod si animae meae quae corporis mei obtinet principatum , nec originem scio , nec metior quantitatem , nec qualis sit intueri ●●fficio , si ignota est mihi ratio quare ipsa delectetur in corpore persecutore suo , &c. patienter me ferre oportet si operatorem universitatis non intelligo , qui in minimis operationum suarum particulis meam profiteor caecitatem .

Reade the rest of that Prologue excellently shewing how far God is known , and how far not .

Synesius de Regno , pag . 8 , 9. Edit . Petavianae .

Nullum unquam n●men inventum est quod Dei naturam assequeretur , sed cum ab ea exprimenda homines aberrarent , per ea quae ab illo fiebant , ipsum attingere conati sunt ; sive ergo Patrem , conditorem , sive aliud quidpiam dixeris , sive Principium , sive causam , haec omnia respectus quidam sunt , & ad ea quae ab illo oriuntur comparationes . Eodem modo Regem si appellis ab iis quorum Rex est , non a propria persona naturam illius apprehendere c●naberis . Venio jam ad reliqua ejus nomina , &c. Bonum utique Deum omnes , tam sapientes quam imperiti homines ubique celebrant , &c. Nondum tamen hoc ipsum Bonum quantumvis extra contentionem positum , Dei in natura sua stabilitatem declarat : ex iis vero quae posteriora sunt corrogatur . Nec enim Boni nomen , absolutum quid auribus sonat , sed illis Bonum qu●rum efficax est , quique eo frui possunt , &c. Vide reliq . ib .

Cyrillus , Hierosol . Cateches . 6. pag . 46 , 47 , 48. is large on this .

Dicimus non quae oportet de Deo ; nam ei soli haec nota sunt : Sed quae pro suo modulo capere natura humana potest , & quae imbecillitas nostra ferre valet . Non enim Quid sit Deus exponimus : Nam candide nos accuratam de eo cognitionem non habere confitemur . Quam ignorantiam agnoscentes , magnam de Deo cognitionem profitemur . — At dicet quispiam , Si comprehendi nequit essentia Divina , quid est quod tu de his enarras ? &c. Laude Dominum decorare , non exprimere verbis aggredior , &c. Quid igitur , dicet aliquis , nonne scriptum est quod Angeli caelorum vident semper faciem patris mei qui in caelis est ? At vident Angeli non sicut Deus est , sed quatenus ipsi capere possunt , &c. Cum igitur Angeli nesciant , nullus homo suam erubescat inscitiam , & ignorantiam confiteri , tum ego qui nunc loquor , tum omnes omnium temporum homines . Quin etiam quomodo enunciare non possumus : Nam quomodo possem eum verbis exprimere , qui ipse dedit ut verba promam ? Ego qui Animam habeo nec ejus formam lineamentave possum exprimere , quomodo conservatorem animae enunciare potero ?

Cyrillus Alexandr . To . 1. Thesaur . li . 11. c . 1. Especially near the end , is full for the same as the former cited Authors , as he doth in divers other places . And in Commentary on John among Cyrill's Works , but indeed Clictoveus , it is frequent . As li . 1. c . 13. Nam quemadmodum quamvis nullus novit quidnam secundum naturam Deus sit , Justificatur tamen per fidem quum credat praemia illum redditurum quaerentibus eum : sic et si operum ejus rationem ignorat , quum tamen fide omnia illum posse non dubitet , non contemnenda tamen probitatis hujus praemia consequetur .

And li . 9. c . 34. Sed nullus naturae Deitatis capax intellectus est . Ac ideo furiosus est qui audet temeraria scrutatione rimari quidnam Deus secundum naturam est . Umbris tamen & aenigmatibus ut in speculo , &c.

Augustin . de Trinitat . reproves three sorts of Errours about God , in the entrance , lib . 1. cap . 1. 1. Those that judge of spiritual things by corporeal . The second is those Qui secundum humani animi naturam vel affectum de Deo sentiunt , siquid sentiunt . 3 , Those that do indeed endeavour to transcend the mutable creature that they may raise their intention to God , sed mortalitatis onere praegravati , cum & videri volunt scire quod nesciunt , & quod volunt scire non possunt , praesumptiones opinionum suarum audacius affirmando , intercludunt sibimet intelligentiae vias , magis eligentes sententiam suam non corrigere perversam , quam mutare defensam , &c. — Quae vero proprie de Deo dicuntur , quanquam in nulla creatura inveniuntur , raro ponit Scriptura Divina , &c.

Clemens Alexandr . Stromat . li . 5. commends Plato for saying that God cannot be expressed by words , as agreeing with Scripture ; and himself addeth that he is neither Genus , Species , differentia , individuum , numerus , accidens , nec cui aliquid accidit , totum , pars , &c. Et ideo est figurae expers , & quod nominari non potest . Et si aliquando eum nominemus , non proprie vocantes aut Unum , aut Bonum , aut Mentem , aut ipsum id quod est , aut Patrem , aut Deum , aut Creatorem , aut Dominum : non id dicimus tanquam nomen ejus proferentes , sed propter ejus potestatem pulchris utimur nominibus , ut in aliis non aberrans , his inniti possit cogitatio , &c. I use Hervetus translation .

Irenaeus li . 2. cap . 16. Est autem & super haec & propter haec inenarrabilis : sensus enim capax omnium bene & recte dicetur , sed non similis hominum sensui : Et lumen rectissime dicetur ; sed nihil simile ei , quod est secundum nos lumini . Si autem est in reliquis hominibus , nulli similis erit omnium pater hominum pusillitati : & dicitur quidem secundum haec propter dilectionem , sentitur autem super haec secundum magnitudinem . Justin Martyr Serm . ad Gent . exhort . Intellexit ( Plato ) Deum non indicasse illi ( Mosi ) nomen suum proprium . Nullum enim potest Deo convenire proprié . Idem Apolog . 1. Pro Christian . Universorum Pater nullum nomen habet inditum : Pater enim , Deus , Creator , Dominus , Herus , non nomina sunt , sed a beneficentia desumpta vocabula , &c. Sicut & Dei vocabulum non tam nomen est , quam inenarrabilis rei hominibus innata opinio . Idem Apol . 2. Quis enim potest dicere quodnam sit nomen ineffabile ? quod nemo nisi deplorate insanus proferre tentaret .

I conclude from all this , that either it is certain that Intelligere , Velle , Amare , Intondere , &c. are not spoken of God Properly , or by Analogy of Attribution ( as they speak ) or at least , that it is utterly uncertain to us , whether it be so or not : But that we must use both these and lower notions of God , from the glass of mans nature and actions , still confessing the Impropriety in all , and that we have no positive formall certain apprehension of the thing expressed ( viz. God and his acts ) but only a general apprehension that it is somewhat which is best represented to us in the glass of these metaphorical Notions , which contain as great a likeness to the thing itself as we are now capable of reaching ; and upon these considerations we must stick close to the Scripture phrase which condescendeth so low in speaking of God ; and not hearken to the unproved fancies of Schoolmen , that tell us This act is properly in God , as implying no imperfection , and That is not seeing all humane acts do contain imperfection in their very formall nature .

As Salvian de Provid . li . 3. p. 62 , 63. saith , so , à fortiore , do I : Nescio secretum , & consilium Divinitatis ignoro . Sufficit mihi ad causae hujus probationem dicti caelestis oraculum . Si scire vis quid tenendum sit , habes literas sacras : perfecta ratio est hoc tenere quod legeris . Qua causa autem Deus haec de quibus loquimur , ita faciat , nolo a me requiras . Homo sum , non intelligo secreta Dei ; investigare non audeo , & ideo etiam attentare formind● : quia & hoc ipsum genus quasi sacrilegae temeritatis est , si plus scire cupias , quam sinaris , &c. Sicut enim plus est Deus quam omnis ratio humana , sic plus mihi debet esse quam ratio , quod a Deo agi cuncta cognosco .

{αβγδ} &c. saith Macarius Homil . 1. Neque enim Naturae Divinae est Anima ( therefore Intellection and Volition are not the Divine Nature ) neque Naturae tenebrarum malitiae ; sed est quid creatum sensibile , visibile , insigne & admirandum , atque elegans similitudo & Imago Dei . ] Intellection and Volition are in their natures comprehensible , but that which in God we call Intellection and Volition is incomprehensible , and not to be formally understood . Quis enim potest capere quantus sit Deus ? ( saith Theophylact in Luc . 12. ) & manifestum est ex Seraphin , qui se obtegunt propter excellentiam Divini luminis . Which is as true of Gods Essence as his Greatness : and as true is it of formall proper intellection , as Minutius Faelix saith of Vision , Deum oculis carnalibus vis videre , cum ipsam animam tuam quà vivificaris & loqueris , nec aespicere possis , nec tueri ?

Epiphanius disputing against those honest Hereticks , called the Audians ( cast out of the Church by the Bishops for their honesty , and at last banished . ) Haeres . 70. pag . 815 , 816. speaking against those that placed the Image of God in the Soul only ( as the Audians did place it in the Body ) because , say they , the soul is Invisible , and hath the Power of Acting , Moving , Understanding , Reasoning , and therefore contains the Image of God , he Answereth , That [ If therefore the soul be said to be made to ( Gods ) Image , it cannot be said to be made after his Image at all : {αβγδ} , &c. Deus enim Infinitis prae animâ partibus eoque amplius , comprehensionem omnem ac cogitationem effugit , &c. Ipse enim cum omnia comprehendit , tum a nullo comprehenditur . ] And after [ Spiritus enim Deus est qui omnem spiritum exuperat , & lux luce omni praestantior . Quicquid enim ab ipso conditum est , infra illius decus & gloriam est . Sola vero Trinitas comprehendi non potest , & infinitam quandam gloriam obtinet , quae nec conjecturâ capitur , nec Intelligentia percipitur .

I conclude with the words of Colvius in Beverovic . de Termino Vitae , pag . 160 , 163 , 164. [ Non Intelligitis quomodo Intelligatis , centum Syllogismos facitis & nescitis quomodo : & vultis Intelligere quomodo ille Intelligit qui est supra omnem intellectum ? &c. ] [ Quod si exigua haec & contemptibilia naturae penetrare non potest humani ingenii acies , annon est extremae impudentiae nos velle pertingere ad ipsam Divinam essentiam ? Quae est {αβγδ} in seipsa , nobis verò {αβγδ} , &c. Non terminatur visu , ●on tenetur tectu , non sentitur incessu , non comprehenditur Intellectu ; Major omni corde , major omni laude . — Novi homines , bullae nascentes & evanescentes , &c. exhaurire vultis mare vasculo ? terram metiri palmo ? &c. Furor est cogitare homuncionem videre Dei fines , qui suos non videt , Deum velle metiri qui suam mensuram ignorat , ut capiat Divinitatis terminos quos non capit ipse mundus ; cujus vix Imago est spiritus , cujus umbra mundus , judicia abyssus . — Deum laudare omnes possumus & debemus , definire nemo potest : Non potest Deus quaeri nimis ; inveniri nunquam potest , digne ipsum aestimamus cum inaestimabilem confitemur : digne laudamus cum prae stupore animi in silentio ipsum adoramus ; apprehendi potest voluntate , comprehendi non potest intellectu . Major est ipsius Incomprehensibilitas quam comprehenderc possumus : Non ita capit eum arguta scientia , quam illum sentit & gustat munda conscientia : Melius nos docet eum Unctio quam eruditio . Hoc est illud manna absconditum , quod ipse dat timentibus ipsum , non autem iis qui in arcana illius temere involant . Et idcirco veniunt indocti & qui Deum summa cum reverentia colunt , & rapiunt regnum caelorum ; interim acutissima & superbissima ingenia evanescunt , in propriis subtilitatibus , & merguntur in infernum : loqui volentes de profundis mersi sunt in profundis . — Quocirca optime bonas horas collocant , qui veritatem summo studio quaerunt : Sed pessime judicant qui se illam invenisse putant . — Desino , & dico cum Hilario , quod non per difficiles quaestiones ad vitam beatam nos ducat Deus .

The Lord repair by Love , Humility and Holy Obedience , the ruines that have long been made in his Church , by Contention , Pride , and unsanctified-presumptuous-ignorant-Learning , and reduce men to the Scripture simplicity of Doctrine , and convince them that their overmuch Wisdom is but Folly , and all their over-doing but undoing .

THE CONTENTS . § . 1. THe Prologue to M r K. Pag . 1. § . 2. M r K's stumbling at the threshold . 3 § . 2. Whether it be true that D r Twiss means not that the Immanent act may be stiled Justification . 4 § . 2. M r Pemble's words of Justification at Christs death . 6 § . 3. M r K. confesseth that I affirm not the novelty of Immanent acts in God , and yet chooseth me to Dispute against on the Point . 6 § . 3. A free and full Discovery of my own Opinion in that Point . 7 , 8 § . 4. The Reasons of my mentioning D r Twiss as I did : and whether I be guilty of sleighting him : or M r K. rather of sleighting the Assembly . 11 , 12 § . 5. M r K's K's grant Argument against new Immanent acts in God , examined . Whether it be certain to us that God hath no Immanent act but of Understanding or Will ? A recitall of some Reasons of those that hold new Immanent acts of Understanding in God : with my thoughts of them . Also about the acts of Will . More of their Reasons recited to prove the newness of Immanent acts , or at least the Necessity or Conveniency of Denominating them as New , from the newness of the object . It is as consistent with Gods Eternity and Immutability to have New acts , as with his simplicity to have divers acts : yet must we conceive of his Willing and Nilling and Understanding as divers , or at least so denominate them . 15 , 29 § . 6. & 7. An Examination of M r K's K's Doctrine of Analogy . 30 , 36 § . 7. & 8. Whether Intellection and Volition be ascribed to God by Analogy Attribution , as M r K. affirms ? 37 , 39 § . 9. The true Analysis and sense of my words which M r K. opposeth . 40 , 41 § . 10 , 11 , 12 , Whether an Act be properly an Effect ? 42 , 43 § . 13. Whether M r K. speak truly , when he saith [ Neither doth it ( action ) carry that stile ( of an effect ) in any of these Learned Sophies , &c. ] 44 , 45 § . 15. Gods acts no Accidents . Acts inhere not in a subject . 47 § . 16. Whether Gods Immanent acts have any other Terms then their objects . 48 § . 17. Whether the difference assigned by M r K. between Gods Immanent and Transient acts , be as clear as between heaven and earth . And whom I meant in that Question Whether Immanent acts be any more Eternal then Transient ? 49 § . 17. An Answer to M r K's 150. 154. pages against M r Goodwin . 50 , 51 , 52 § . 18 , 19. The Answers that some make to M r K's Arguments against the newness of Immanent acts . 53 , 54 , 55 § . 19. Whether the ground of such new acts as ascribed be in God or the creature . 55 , 57 § . 20. How ungroundedly M r K. chargeth me with contending with D r Twiss and all sober Divines that ever were worthy to speak to a School Point . 58 § . 21. Whether it be not from the respect to the object that Gods Essence is called Knowledge , or the Knowledge of this or that . 59 § . 22. Whether it be all one to know the futurity and the existence of things . 60 § . 23. M r Ks' unworthy fastening on me words of his divising . 61 § . 24. An example shewing that Immanent and Transient acts , are of the same nature . 62 § . 25. M r K's Answer to the instance of the Sunnes not being changed by objects , is partly Lusory , partly yieldeth the Cause , and partly Erroneous . 63 § . 26. M r K's Exceptions about the similitude of a Glasse , refelled . 64 , 65 , 66 § . 27. A Recapitulation of what I have said on this Subject . 67 § . 27. The great incapacity of man to comprehend the nature and acts of God . 68 , 69 § . 27. Rob. Baronius Testimony about Mutation of Immanent acts . And some Scripture Testimony . 72 , 73 § . 29. M r Ks' second undertaking to little purpose : contrary to the former : and how ill performed , 77 § . 29. Justification or Remission , not from Eternity . 78 , 79 § . 29. M r Ks' Reasons to prove Gods Decree to have somewhat like Justification , do as much prove it to have somewhat like Sanctification and Glorification . 80 , 84 § . 29. M r K's Antinomian doctrine , false , that [ being justified in Gods sight , is when he makes us to see , or makes it evident to our sight that we are justified . ] 85 § . 29. The boldness and falsness of M r K. affirmation , that [ to Will to Will , was never heard of . ] 86 § . 29. Seven Arguments proving that the Elicite acts of the Will , may be the object of the Will . 87 § . 29. Six several cases wherein I finde that I will the acts of my own will . 88 § . 29. Its untrue , that [ he that Wils to Will , Wils no more then he doth already . ] ib . § . 30. M r Ks' doctrine , that [ the Decree to Remit sin , carries in it a Remission of them tantamount ] is tantamount downright Antinomianism . 89 § . 30. Ten mischievous consequents of this Doctrine ( and so of Justification from Eternity . ) 90 § . 30. Sin may be charged on us before we believe , for all Gods Decree to pardon it . 90 , 91 § . 30. M r K's Antinomian doctrine , that [ there is no danger of suffering for sin , where God decreeth to Remit it ] confuted by many arguments : It maketh Christs blood , to have saved us from no danger , and God never to have freed us from danger , &c. 92 § . 30. Chastisement a species of Punishment . ib . § . 31. What is the Acceptance , which M r K. makes the object of Gods Decree . 93 § . 34. Pardon distinguished and defined . 96 § . 34. M r Ks' desperate language , calling the act of the Law of grace or promise [ An odde empty , moral , action ] and that [ by the promulgation of it , God doth as improperly give us Christ , or disable the Law to condemn us . ] 98 § . 35. M r Ks' admirable doctrine that [ the Covenant justifieth by such an act as Quantitas hath faciendo Quantum , or Paternitas faciendo patrem , viz. informing . 100 § . 35. His profound Notion , that the Covenant justifieth but Aptitudinaliter . 101 § . 35. The Covenant pardoneth immediately , our faith being but a condition , and not a cause . ib . § . 36. M r Ks' horned Argument answered [ God justifies by the Covenant All , or Some , &c. ] 103 § . 37. M r Ks' desperate Conclusion , that [ thus a man wisely justifies himself by beleeving , and more a great deal then the Covenant by promising , or God by promulgating it . ] 104 § . 38. His further desperate Doctrine [ Just so ( as Adam brought death into the world rather then God ) in the new Covenant , Believe and be justified . Who Justifies the Believer , God or himself ? ] 106 § . 39 , 40 , 41 , 42. Much more to the same purpose , vainly intended to prove that I make man his own justifier . 107 § . 42. M r K. saith , the Judge who pronounceth the sentence , or the Law , do not so properly condemn a malefactour as himself : Therefore so the Believer justifieth himself . 108 § . 43. Whether M r Ks' Client be ingeniously instructed , who being saved from the Gallows by his Book , saith , [ Grammercy to my Reading more then to the courtesie of the Law . ] 109 § . 44. The falsehood of M r Ks' Consequence , that [ he that performs the condition makes the grant become Absolute , ] if it become so on his performance . 110 § . 45 , 46. He unworthily intimates that I deny faith to be a real effect of God on the soul : saying , he will prove it against me , and pretending to force me to confess it . 111 § . 46. He falsly affirms that I deny Habits distinct from the soul . 112 § . 47. About the instrumentality of faith : the untruth of his first Answer , and non-sense or worse of the second . ib . § . 48. M r K. saith , § . 47. [ I shall make it appear to be both Gods instrument and mans in some sense ] and § . 48. he saith [ I do not say it is ( Gods Instrument ) properly . ] 113 § . 49. M r K. untruly saith , [ Faith is as much Gods Instrument as the new Covenant ] and gives an ill description of faith , as his reason . ib . § . 50. His next Reason nothing to the purpose . 114 § . 51. His ill explication of Gods Justification by faith , viz. [ declaring hereby the righteousness of Christ to be his own . ] 115 § . 51. He strangely affirms , that [ man is the Subject , not the Authour of his own act of believing . ] ib . § . 52 , 53. He makes man his own justifier . 116 § . 53. He odly saith [ Faith hath a proper causality upon our Justification passively taken , that is , upon our receiving the Righteousness of Christ . ] 117 § . 54. He confesseth that [ it is needless to say , Faith is a passive Instrument . ] 118 § . 54. He dangerously saith [ Faith doth help the action of the principal agent , that is , God in our Justification . ib . § . 54. More of his false Accusation refelled . 119 § . 56. He makes justifying faith to be an Action which is Virtually a Passion , and that is , A suffering our selves to be led by the Spirit of God , and his authority , against the suggestions of our own reason . 120 § . 56. But proves the Instrumentality by silence . ib . § . 57. His instrument of Receiving no proper Instrument , as being no efficient . 121 § . 58. Moral instruments have a Moral action . ib . § . 59. How ill M r K. makes a jest of the Instrumentality of Christs Covenant or Testament . 122 § . 60. M r Ks' unanswerable arguing wherein he vanquisheth me . 123 § . 61. When I am proving that [ the act of faith is not the Instrument of Justification ] He confutes me by saying , Faith is a Habit . 124 § . 61. The reason why I will not contend with them that only call faith , the instrument of Receiving Christ . ib . § . 62. Divines affirming commonly , that It is the act of faith , and not the Habit that justifieth , do thereby overthrow their own doctrine of faiths proper Instrumentality in justifying . 125 § . 62. M r K. first feigns me to call the Habit of faith a sanctified faculty , and then very gravely Schools me for it . 126 § . 62. About the Real Identity of the soul , its faculties , holiness . ib . § . 63. The Unreasonabl●ness of M r Ks' impatiency . 128 § . 64. How M r K. can call [ Faith a Habit , equivalent to a new faculty . ] 129 § . 64. D r Twisse's Arguments to prove that faith or other grace is no new power . 130 § . 64. Faith is truly A moral power , that is , A Habit or Disposition , without which we shall not be true believers . 131 § . 64. M r Ks' dead doctrine , that [ without faith a man can no more do ought towards receiving Christ , then a dead man can walk or speak . ] ib . § . 64. The vanity of his arguing for faiths instrumental justifying , from it s [ Giving life to the soul in all spiritual operations . ] 132 § . 65. More of the weakness of his arguings about receiving Christ , manifested . 133 § . 66. The end of M r Ks' undertaking , considered . Whether I unworthily handled Dr Twiss and M r Pemble ? An acknowledgement of all that Deficiency that M r K. doth tanto molimine prove me guilty of . 134 § . 67. M r K. concludeth before he hath done his main task , which so oft promised , viz. To tell us what is the Transient-justifying-act of God . 137 § . 67. A conjecture at his sense . He destroyeth his Cause unawares . Strangely mistakes the nature of a Condition . 138 § . 67. Justification by faith , in Scripture sense , is not in foro conscientiae . 139 § . 67. Gods giving faith is not his immediate justifying act , proved . 141 § . 67. Arguments proving that it is in Law-sense ( commonly called Sententia Legis ) that we are first justified by Faith , and so the Moral act of the Law is Gods immediate justifying act . 141 , 142 § . 68. The Conclusion . 143

The Prologue to Mr K.

§. 1. Sir ,

THough I would not have you restrained from revealing Truth , yet if I had been worthy to have been of your counsell , I should have advised you to have ▪ avoided this quarrelsom way . Our world hath Contention enough already ; and it comes not from so good a root ( Prov. 13. 10. ) nor is it so good a symptom , nor doth it produce such lovely effects ( Prov. 22. 10. & 17. 19. & 29. 21. ) nor doth it bring so good a name ( Prov. 21. 24. ) as may make it seem desirable in my eyes . Had you consulted Solomon himself , he would have bid you [ Strive not with a man without a cause , if he have done thee no harm , Prov. 3. 30. ] and [ Go not forth hastily to strive , lest thou know not what to do in the end thereof , when thy neighbour hath put thee to shame , 25. 8. ] for [ The beginning of strife is as when one letteth out water : therefore leave off contention before it be medled with , 17. 14. ] It seems a strange thing to me , that you could finde no man to deal with in the main Controversie here chosen out , that was indeed against you , but that you must make to your self , an adversary of one that you confess doth not once deny your Conclusion . Unless it be because you are likely with such a one to have the easiest conflict . But then you should have remembred , that the Victory will be as small . I pretend not to such a piercing knowledge , nor to such acquaintance in the invisible regions , as to determine infallibly of what Province or Degree , of what quality , albus an ater , that spirit was tha● raised the storm of your Passions , or to know exactly his name and sirname that animated these your lines : But seeing you are pleased to choose me for your adversary , I must desire you to bear with me if I speak sometime less pleasingly ; and to use what patience you have left , as knowing you have drawn this trouble upon your self . And whereas you put me on a double imployment : one to desend the Truth ; and the other to defend my self ; so I perform the first successfully , I hope I may be excused if I be more negligent in the later ; yea if I give you the day , and free●y conf●ss as much ignorance as you charge me with . Its true that I have not the ●i●●s or Rob●● of Honour , and as little deserve them , as you here express . But mi 〈…〉 I be sure that I have right to that farre better Title ( of piety ) which you are pleased to bestow on me , I could easily allow you the other . I remember the description of the old Christians by Minutius Faelix , [ N●s qui non habitu sapientiam , sed mente praeferimus ; non eloquimur magna , sed vivimu● : gloriamur nos consec●tos quod ill● summa contentione quaes●verunt , nec invenire potuerunt . ] And that of Mirandula [ Faelicitatem philosophia quaerit , Theologia invenit , Religio possidet . ] And to contend for the reputation of being Learned , I shall scarce think is worth my labour , till I have higher thoughts of the prize . Mens thoughts and words are a poor felicity . Applause is such an aery nourishment , that I see few thrive by : ( though I must confess that in me , as well as in others ▪ the unreasonable sin of pride is daily stirring , and convincing me by experience that it is mortified but in part . ) O that I may have the honour of being a member of Christ , and then I can spare the vain glory of the world ! Vera ibi gloria erit , ubi laudantis nec errore quisquam , nec adulatione laudabitur : Verus honor qui nulli negabitur digno ; nulli deferetur indigno : sed nec ad eum ambiget ullus indignus , ubi nullus permittetur esse nisi dignus : saith Austin , de Civit . Dei , li . ult . cap . ult . Only I must crave this of the Reader , that my confessed weakness be no prejudice to Gods truth : and that he will not judge of the cause by the person , nor take the name or person for a fault ; which is the thing that the ancient Christians did so deprecate of the Pagans , and therefore I hope every Christian will grant . And I must also desire that want of smooth and pleasing words may not be judged the want of truth . Enimvero dissoluti est pectoris in rebus seriis quaerere voluptatem , & cum tibi sit ratio cum male se habentibus atque aegris , son●s auribus infundere dulciores , non medicinam vulneribus admovere : inquit Arnobius li. 1. adv . Gent . p. 49. I confess I do deeply compassionate ordinary Christians , when I think what a hard thing it is for them to discern the truth , among all the smooth words and plausible arguments of Learned contenders . Usually they think every mans tale good , till they hear the other ; and then they think it bad : and at last when they see what fair glosses a Learned man can put on the worst cause , they are ready to run into the other extream , and to believe or regard nothing that they say . As Minutius Faelix saith , [ Altius mov●or de toto genere disputandi : quod plerumque pro disserentium viribus & eloquentiae potestate , etiam perspicuae veritatis conditio mutetur , Id accidere pernotum est auditorum facilitate , qui dum verborum lenocinio a rerum intentionibus avocantur , sine delectu assentiuntur dictis omnibus , nec a rectis falsa secernunt , nescientes inesse & in incredibili verum , & in verisimili mendacium . Itaque qu● saepius asseverationibus credunt , ●o frequentius a peritioribus arguuntur : sic assidue temeritate decepti , culpam judicii transferunt ad incerti querelam , ut damnatis omnibus malint universa suspendere , quam de fallacibus judicare . ] But let such at least hold fast the Foundation , and remember that we are all agreed in that .

The Reader that I expect should profit by these Writings , must neither be u●terly unlearned , nor so learned as your self . For the former are not yet capable of it ; and the later are beyond it , and will hardly learn from any but the more learned . It is the younger sort of Students whose edification I intend : who are neither quite above , nor below my instructions ; nor so engaged to a Party or Opinion , but that their mindes lye open to any evidence of Truth . Praevent●s enim falsae opinionis errore humanus auditus , ad veri rationem percipiendam , durus & perdifficilis invenitur , quantiscunque testibus urgeatur . Mavult enim pravi dogmatis sententiam , quae semel infectus est , perversus vindicare , quam hanc ●andem tantis divinarum humanarumque legum authoritatibus refutatam salubrius immutare : inquit Vigilius contra Eutich . li . 1. initio .

Lastly , If you should be in the right and I in the wrong in any one Philosophical Controversie , I must expect that the Reader do not thence conclude , that you are right in your Theology . And I could with that you had so mean thoughts of your Philosophy , as that you might not build your Theology on it too much ; nor think much the better of your Writings , or of your self . For doubtless when the Canon of a Council forbad the reading of Heathens Books , these things were not so highly valued as now . I approve not of that extream neither : but shall conclude with that serious exclamation of Ahenagoras ( Legat ▪ per Christian . p. 13 , 14. ) {αβγδ} , &c.

§. 2.

Pag . 133. Mr K.

FOr the fuller opening of this particular , I will be content to make some Digression from your Book , and to shew 1. That there can be no new immanent act in God , against Mr Mr Baxter . 2. That there is somewhat like Justification in that immanent act of God , whereby he decrees from eternity to justifie and condemn men . And 3. that yet that immanent act cannot be stiled Justification ; nor is it meant so by Dr. Twisse or Mr. Pemble that I know ; and so that Justification is not from eternity : and then I shall return to you , &c.

§. 2.

R. B. YOur Digression , methinks , is very sudden , and the occasion to a stranger hardly discernable : It s like it was the uncouth apparition of some ruling wight of another Orb , which made upon your intellect that strange impression , which caused you to reel thus out of your way , and lead you unhappily into this private path , or rather bewildred you in this Maze where we now finde you . But whoever led you in , charity commands me to do my part to help you ou● , or at least to warn others that they do not follow you .

1. As to your first undertaking , I confess it was very ingenuously done , to say , You will do it [ against Mr. Baxter ] and not [ against his doctrine or opinion , ] acknowledging afterwards that I deny not your Conclusion . But I am used to Dispute against Doctrines , and not Persons : and therefore will give you the better in this .

2. Your second undertaking is more admirable then the first . For I have met with some besides you that dare adventure on the former , but never man that durst attempt the later . Is it not enough for you to prove Gods Decree of justifying to have somewhat like Justification ? but you must also prove , that the Decree both to justifie and condemn , hath somewhat like Justification ? If the Decree to condemn a man have somewhat like justifying him , then the Decree to torment him in hell hath somewhat like glorifying him : and the Decree to kill , hath something in it like quickening him . You must fly to some general point of similitude , or to the Lord Brookes doctrine , that all things are One , to make this good . But if it were but your oversight , then I hope hereafter you will be more compassionate to your Brethren , and no more so solemnly call men to [ see the hand of heaven , in the pompous display of their folly , to appear most ridiculous ; and to adore the hand of God in infatuating their parts , &c. ] as you do by Mr. Goodwin for a smaller mistake then yours . Alas what man so Learned and accurate , as to be free from all oversights .

3. But indeed Sir I cannot so easily excuse your next errour , annexed to the third part of your undertaken-task ; where you say [ Nor is it so meant by Dr. Twiss or Mr. P●mble that I know . ] What is it that is not so meant by them ? Why that this Immanent act can be stiled Justification . You have boldly ventured to write thus : and I will be bold to try how well . Either its true , or not true that they so meant : If true , and undeniably apparent in the Writings of one of them , if not both , and oft repeated by him , and yet Mr. K. knoweth it not , why then he doth not only write before he knows , and Vindicate men before he understand whether they are guilty or innocent , but makes it the great motive of his undertaking , as [ ●ot having the patience to see so worthy Divines so unworthily handled . ] If in the mi●st of his impatience he knew not this , then it seems I am not alone ignorant of the business that I meddle with . But I will lay it open to the Judgement of the Reader , whether the thing be true or false ? and whether you might not with less learning have known this if you would ? and ought not to have known the cause before so zealous a Vindication .

Dr Twiss Vind . Grat . li . 1. part 2. § . 25. p. ( vol●min ) 272 , 273. Sic scribit [ Omnis actualis justificatio est justificatio , & omnis justificatio simpliciter dicta congruenter exponenda est de justificatione actuali . Nam Analogum per se positum stat pro samosiori significato . ] [ Sed libet his paulisper immorari . Quaenam erit illa peccatorum Remissio quae fidem consequetur ; & quam oporteat Spiritus sancto acceptam referre ? Remissio enim peccatorum , si quidditatem inspicias , nihil aliud est quam aut Punitionis Negatio , aut Volitionis puniendi negatio . Sit ergo peccata Remittere , nihil aliud quam nolle punire . At hoc nolle punire , ut actus immancus in Deo , fuit ab aeterno , nec fidem consequitur , &c. Quod vero operatione Spiritus sancti nobis ex hac parte , per fidem contingit , aliud esse non potest quam sensus gratiae Dei , &c. Quare siquid morte sua nobis impetrat Christus , quod ad peccatorum nostrorum Remissionem attineat , sensum Are not Christs Merits and the Spirits gifts here highly honoured ? istum amoris Divini peccata nostra remittentis , nobis impetret necesse est . Et pag . 279. c . 1. [ Nam justitia Christi dicitur nobis imputari , & merita ipsius nobis applicari per fidem , non coram Deo , sed apud conscientias nostras : quatenus per fidem generatur in cordibus nostris sens●s & agnitio hujus salutaris applicationis ex amore Dei quem ex fide gustamus ; & spiritualiter sentimus nos justificantem , & in filios suos adoptantem , ex quo nascitur pax conscientiae . Quare ante fidem haec Christi justitia nostra suit , quatenus ex intentione Dei patris & Christi mediatoris pro nobis praestita , &c. Sed advenicute fide quam in cordibus nostris Sp sanctus accendit , tum demum agnoscitur & percipitur hic amor Dei erga nos in Christo Jesu . Unde dicitur justitia Christi imputari nobis per fidem , quia non nisi per fidem dignoscitur a Deo nobis imputari : & tum demum justificari dicimur ejus generis justificatione , atque absolutione a peccatis nostris , quae pacem ingenerat conscientiis nostris . Hoc autem duobus argumentis confirmo . 1. Quia per justitiam Christi non modò assequimur remissionem peccatorum , sed & fidem ipsam , atque resipiscentiam , hoc est , cordis circumcisionem , Eph. 1. 3. ergo etiam ante fidem & resipiscentiam applicatur nobis justitia Christi , utpote propter quam gratiam assequimur efficacem ad credendum in Christum & agendum paenitentiam . Alterum est , quia justificatio & absolutio , prout fignificant actum divinae voluntatis immanentem , sunt ab aeterno . Unius autem voluntatis notificatio externa , per modum absolutionis cujusdam judicialis & fore●fis , quae fit per verbum & spiritum , pro tribunali conscientiae uniuscujusque haec est illa justitiae Christi imputatio , itemque justificatio & remissio atque absolutio quae fidem consequitur . ] Et cont . praefat . p. 18. b . Extra controversiam est remissionem peccatorum prout esta actus in Deo immanens antecedere nostram fidem & resipiscentiam : Nobis vere non nisi per fidem innotescit , cujus etiam fiducia multo adhuc confirmatior evadit per resipiscentiam . ]

Lib . 1. Part . 2. p. 272. [ Justificationem verò & Reconciliationem pro codem haberi ab Arminio ( quod & verum est ) &c. And he oft maintaineth the eternity of Reconciliation .

Lib . 2. P. 2. pag . 434. [ Ergo etiam ante fidem Deus nobis reconciliatus est : neque enim nisi jam reconciliatus & propitius gratificatur nobis fidem . Quid quod remissio peccatorum & acceptatio nostri , Non nisi actus internos & immanentes in Deo notant : cujus generis actiones non suboriuntur Deo de novo . ] Lege ult . & postea [ Juxta ista distinguere poterimus de reconciliatione dupliciter dicta : Nam & Deus reconciliavit nos sibi in Christo quoad rei veritatem : & in ministris suis posuit verbum reconciliationis , quoad ejusdem praetiosae veritatis evidentiam & manifestationem . Sic cum inimici essemus dicimur reconciliati fuisse Deo quoad rei veritatem : quod tamen non nisi per Evangelij praedicationem fit qu●ad ejusdem veritatis patefactionem & salutarem communicationem . ] Et p. 433. [ At A●minius applicationem remissionis peccatorum , ita interpretari videtur , ut per applicationem fiat , & jam quasi de novo esse incipiat : quasi vero non requiratur , ut jam antea existat quod applicandum est . Nobis vero sic instituendum videtur . Christus morte sua nobis procuravit redemtionem a peccatis , cum Deo reconciliationem , & peccatorum omnium remissionem ; quae quidem per pradicationem Evangelij & per fidem , nobis applicantur , non ut sint , sed ut nobis innotescant . Nam rationem omnem superat quomodo applicari possit illud quod nondum est , &c. ] Pag . 434. Nostra vero interpretatio sic procedit : Christus nobis acquisivit morte sua redemptionem effica●em & actualem , id est , actualem peccatorum remissionem , & reconciliationem cum Deo . Applicantur autem ista per praedicationem Evangelij , non ut de novo fiant , sed ut nobis innotescant , &c. At inquies , actualis Remissio peeatorum est ipsa Justificatio : Justificatio sequitur fidem : nam fide justificamur : ergo nomine peccata remittuntur antequam credat . Respondeo , Cum docet Apostolus nos fide justificari , nihil aliud ex instituto docet , quam nos justificari per sanguinem Christi , sive propter Christum crucifixum . ] And in the Index he owns it , that Remissio actualis est Justificatio : and therefore we may take what he saith of remission as meant of Justification .

The like Lib . 3. pag . ●8 . & lib . 1. p. 2. pag . 272. which we before cited part of [ Nec sane occurrit species aliqua rationis , cur reconciliatio cogatur in ordinem cum impetratione remissionis , Justificationis & redemptionis , potius quam cum actuali Remissione , Justificatione & Redemptione . ] So that he puts actual Justification with Remission and Reconciliation .

So contra Corvinum pag . 48. Et quid quaso Adoptio est quam conscquimur per fidem ? Di●is esse Acceptationem Dei . Quid autem est Acceptatio ? Annon actus in Deo immanens ? An vero actus Deo immanens superverit de novo ? ]

Its undeniable in this that Twisse doth not only affirm Remission and Reconciliation and Adoption to be before we are born , immediatly on Christs death ; but also to be immanent Acts , and from Eternity : and though he be more seldom in thus using the word [ Justification ] yet he affirms Reconciliation and Remission ( which he saith are from Eternity ) to be the same thing with Justification : yea he expresly entitleth that eternal immanent act [ Justification . ] And did he only affirm Remission and Adoption and Reconciliation and Acceptation to be immanent acts and from eternity , I beleeve few sober men will think it any better , then to affirm the same of Justification . Yea he plainly intimates a distinction of Justification : one from eternity or from Christs death , and the other upon our believing : And therefore when he speaks of Justification by faith , he cals it [ that sort of Justification ] intimating the other sort .

Now for Mr. Pemble , as he expresly maintains Justification in foro Dei to be long before we are born , even on Christs dying , so that is all one to our purpose , as if he maintained it to be from eternity . And it were meet that some of you should have shewed before now , what Transient act it is by which particular sinners not yet born ( and therefore not yet sinners ) are justified at Christs death I pray you Sir remember to do this in your next . ? If it were ( as Mr. Pemble intimates , I think ) Gods accepting the Price , it s worth the while to shew that to be Temporal and Transient , when Dr. Twiss will have his accepting of man in Adoption to be immanent and eternal : But if you maintain Gods justifying act at Christs death ( whether undertaken or suffered ) to be an immanent act , then it must be before Christs death , even eternal too . Mr. Pembles words are , Vind . Grat . p. 21. [ But with a distinction of Justification . 1. In foro Divino , in Gods sight ; and this goeth before all our sanctification . For even whilst the Elect are unconverted , they are then actually justified and freed from all sinne by the death of Christ : and God so esteems of them as free , and having accepted of that satisfaction , is actually reconciled to them . By this Justification we are freed from the guilt of our sinnes : and because that is done away , God in due time proceeds to give us the grace of sanctification to free us from sinnes corruption , still inherent in our persons . 2. In foro conscientiae , in our own sense : which is but the Revelation and certain Declaration of Gods former secret act of accepting Christs Righteousness to our Justification . ] So pag . 23. he speaks again of the same Justification in foro Dei , and saith , that all the sinnes of the Elect are actually pardoned , the Debt-Book crossed , the hand-writing cancelled , &c. and that this grand transaction between God and the Mediator Jesus Christ was concluded on and dispatcht in heaven long before we had any being either in nature or grace . ] This phrase of [ dispatching it in heaven ] makes me conjecture that it will prove some immanent act which they call Justification at Christs death . Lay all this together , and judge whether it be true that neither Dr. Twiss nor M● . Pemble , do mean that the immanent act can be stiled Justification . Or if it were true , whether Justification before we are born , is not an errour fit to be resisted . Indeed it is true that Mr. K. saith , that neither Dr. Twiss nor Mr. Pemble did ever mean , that [ the Decree of God from eternity to justifie and condemn men , is to be called Justification : ] For the Decree to condemn men cannot well be called Justification : But I believe this being but Mr. K. oversight , he will not make use of it to justifie his third Proposition .

§. 3.

Mr. K. Digression . P. 1.

WHether there may be a new immanent Act in God ? ] To the first , By an immanent act , we mean such as is terminated in the Agent ; and not in any thing without it . Now that there can be any new immanent act in God , M. Baxter doth not adventure to affirm . Only he is pleased to say this ; [ That all immanent acts in God are eternall , he thinks is quite beyond our understanding to know . Aphor . pag . 174. ] and he casteth out somewhat to render it suspected , p. 173. which I shall examine by and by .

§. 3.

R. B. THey say of those that are bred souldiers and used to bloodshed and Victory , that the state must make them fresh work and finde them constant imployment , or else they will make work and finde imployment for themselves . A Polemical Divine much used to Disputations , and thereby to the glory and Triumph of Victory , is , as it seems by this Learned man , in the same case . Mr. Goodwin found him not work enough , and rather then he would want more , he makes to himself an adversary ( for he saith , it is against Mr. Baxter ) which here in the beginning he confesseth , makes not himself one , so much as by a denial of his Proposition , or an affirming the contrary . Could you finde never a man in the world to deal with , that affirmed that there may be new immanent acts in God ? If you could , they had been fitter for you to take in hand : For it s like , they would purposely have maintained that assertion with some shew of reason : If you could not ; then your doctrine is so universally received , that I should think it should not need your Arguments now to support it : And then you may well conclude , as you do , that you have done little by this Dispute ; if you have but laboriously maintained that which no man denies . But it seems to me it was some reasons ab homine , from the person of your chosen-seigned adversary , rather then from the cause that allured or impelled you to this encounter .

As you well begin with some explication of your sense , so will I also : and the rather seeing I have little else to do . I desire the Reader therefore to understand this much of my thoughts about the subject in hand , before I proceed further .

1. In generall , I am very strongly perswaded that it is one of the greatest sins that a great part of Pious Learned Divines are guilty of , that they audaciously adventure to dispute and determine unrevealed things ; and above all others , about the Nature and Actions of the Incomprehensible God . And that this is The very thing that hath divided , weakned and ruined the Church , more then any one thing , except plain contempt of God : And that it is under the wounds of these overwise mens Learning , that the poor Church hath lain bleeding many hundred years . Our Contentions , Envyings , Hear-burnings , by perverse zeal , and much of all our warres and calamities , are long of this sinne in these men : That as the Romish Clergy are justly esteemed the greatest Schismaticks on earth , for their audacious and unmercifull additions to the Creed , making such a number of new Keys which heaven must be opened and shut by , which God never made : So are those zealous Learned men , the cruel dividers of the Church , by occasioning our contentions , that will with boldness pry into things unrevealed , and with considence and peremptoriness determine them , and then with long and subtil and fervent arguings maintain them , and make them seem necessary to the peace of the Church , or the soundness of our faith . Scarce any one thing hath more fully discovered to me the frailty and fearfull pravity of man , then this : To think , that so silly a worm should be no more acquainted with his own weakness , and the infinite distance between God and man ; and should so confidently think that he knows what he doth not know ! yea and what he cannot know ? yea and be angry with all the world that will not say , It 's true ; and will not believe that he knows what he pretends to know ! If a man should perswade me that I know how many Angels are in heaven , or how many daies it will be till Christs coming to Judgement , one would think it were no hard matter for me to know that I do not know any such thing . But if I should perswade my self that I know it , and should expect that all others should believe that I know it , and would write Volumes to prove it , and count all those ignotant or erroneous that will not believe me , or that will not say they know it when they do not , as well as I , whether this were the part of a man awake and in his wits , let others judge . How much more beyond our reach is the unsearchable nature of God , further then he hath revealed himself in his Works and Word , which , alas , affordeth us but a glimpse of his backparts . Yea the wonder is yet greater that these same Learned Divines , when they are at a nonplus in their arguing , will plead mans ignorance and incapacity to put off their adversary and blame others for too bold enquiries and intrusions into Gods secrets : and most of our Reformers do speak hardly of the Schoolmen for it ( and very deservedly ) and yet will not see the guilt in themselves . No man speaks more against his own natural inclination in this then I do : I feel as great a desire to Know , and to pry into any thing that others have disputed , and as much naturall delight in the reading of the most audacious subtil Disputers , as others do . I was wont to say , I could get more out of Aquinas , Scotus , Durandus , and such like in a day , then out of many Ancient Fathers , and later Treatisers , in a mone●h . But I finde that as desire to know was the beginning of our misery , so is it the continuance . Why do men fear themselves no more , in that which innocent Adam was undone by ? I finde that this bait of knowing things unrevealed , doth but entice men into vain hopes , and labours , and self-deluding promises , and flatter men into a pleasant loss of time ( and worse : ) and in the end faileth all their expectations : and the Learned Disputers come off as Adam did , with Gods acknowledgement that he was like God in knowing good and evil ( Ironically , as some Divines think ; or expressing his unhappiness plainly , as others . ) Those leaves of Bradwardine and Twiss Vind . and de scient . Med . &c. which I was wont to reade with longing and delight , I confess I look on now with fear ; and many Learned Schoolmen ( specially on the first Book of the Sentences ) I read , as I hear men swear or take Gods name lightly in their common talk ; even s●ldom , unwillingly ( looking for other matter ) and with horrour . Yet how oft doth Dr. Twisse tell Arminius and D● . Jackson of the sinfulness , unsafeness and uncertainty of departing from the Scrip●u●es in these high things , about the Nature and Decrees of God ? And what Bradwardine excellently saith , I desire the Reader to see in him , de Causa Dei , l. 1. c . 1. corol ▪ 32. B●t especially I desire the Reader to peruse that excellent Epistle of Col●ius in Beverovicius de Termino Vitae ; which contains what I have a minde further to have said of this : with Gibieus's first Chapt . de Libertate Dei ( lib . 2. de lib . ) which shews how far God is above all our highest names and notions : and that Deus ab ●llis ●iber est : with much more against the Doctrine that I oppose . See also Car● . Contarenus de officio Ep●scopi , operum p. 410 , 411. and what he citeth out of Dio●ysius . And I intreat you to reade seriously that notable passage , 1 Tim . 6. 3 , 4 , 5. where pride is shewed to be the root , and supposed knowledge said to be b●t Do●ing , and they are said to know nothing , that thought they knew most , and the sad effects of all are manifested .

2. I do think that most of our profound Disputes , wherewith the Domini●●ns and Jesuites , the Arminians and Antiarminians have Learnedly troubled the world , are guilty in part , of this hainous sinne before mentioned : and that these great Doctors do dispute for the most part of they know not what . I confess it s usual with men that know little themselves , to think that others know as little , and to measure the knowledge of other men by their own : and so it s possible I may undervalue the Learning of these men , because having none my self , I cannot understand the largeness of their capacities , and sublimity of their speculations . However I am sure I am wiser and righter in one point then I was : For when I steeped my thoughts in their speculations , and was my self of the same express opinion with one of the parties , I thought that I begun to grow somewhat wise my self ; but now I know I was deceived , and it was my folly , and that I knew not what I thought I knew . And though I will be bolder to befool such a one as my self , then men of such sublime incomprehensible knowledge ; yet it s my opinion that they are but men ; and what a man is though I do not yet fully know , yet I am daily both studying and trying : and experience which i● the teacher of fools , hath taught me this much of him ; that he is no Deity ; nor one of the Intelligences that moveth or comprehendeth the orbs ; that the wisest are not so wise as they would seem , or as they imagine themselves ; that all their conceptions which they judge so comprehensive are comprehended in the compass of a narrow skull , and there lodged in a puddle of such brains , and humours , that a little knock if it hit right may make the wisest man an Ideot , and drive out all that profound Learning which Mr K. thinks is so near kin to the knowledge of God . I confess of late I have accustomed my self to such mean though●s of man and his imaginations , and such high thoughts of God , that I reade many of the profoundest School Divines ( whom yet in some respects I honour ) as I hear children discoursing of State matters , or Theology ; or as if I heard two disputing in their sleep . The Serpent hath beguiled us as he did Eve , by drawing us from the simplicity that is in Christ . Vain Philosophy hath been the bait to deceive the Church : And so we are judiciously broken in pieces and ruined ; and have learned to our cost to know good and evil . I think there is no hope of the Churches recovery but by returning to the primitive Christian simplicity ; and using Aristotle as a help in Naturals , but not preferring him before Christ in the teaching of the highest speculations of Theology , as if we must go learn Gods nature of Aristotle , where Christ leaveth us at a loss . When those Learned men , who professing themselves wise became — shall become fools that they may be wise , and come quite back again to their cognosce teipsum , then they may know more of God then they yet do , and yet perceive that they know less then they thought they had known : and then their knowledge will edifie which now puffeth up .

3. I think that man can have no positive proper corception of God , at least besides ens ( which the Scotists think proper ) and that there is no word in humane language that can express Gods nature in strict propriety , but all our notions of him are so exceeding imperfect , that they express more of our ignorance then of our knowledge . White is bold to say ( Institut . Peripatet . l. 4. lect . 9 , 10. ) that none of the Names that we attribute to God , hath a notion which hath in God a formall object : and that that science is of all other the most sub●ime and proper , which inquireth into the impropriety of the names that are spoken of God , and denieth them all as to him .

4. I think that there is no such thing in God ●● Understanding , Knowledge , Will , Intention , Decree , Election , Love , &c. as these are by men conceived of , and expressed : And that man knows not what it is in God formally which these terms are used by him to express . And that it is a farre less improper speech to say , that the Firmament is a nutshell , or the sun is a glow-worm , or to denominate the reason of men from the apprehensions of a fly or a worm , then to attribute Understanding , Will , &c. to God . What the impropriety is , we shall speak to more anon .

5. Therefore all those reasonings concerning Gods Nature or Acts , which are drawn meerly from the nature and acts of man , as concluding from a supposed Analogy of attribution ( much more a formal Identity ) is a vain deceitfull reasoning .

6. Yet as Scripture speaks of God in terms improper , according to mans capacity , and fetcht from mans nature and acts , so must we both conceive and speak : that is , not believing that these are proper expressions or conceptions of God , but that there is that in God which we cannot now more fitly conceive of then under these notions , or fi●lier express then in these terms . God hath nothing properly called Knowledge or Will ▪ but he hath or is that which man cannot fitlier express or conceive of then under the notion of Knowledge and Will : But what it is , God knows . We must say , God knows , and God willeth ; and God must say so to us : For else man could not hear or speak of God , if God condescended not to the language and capacity of man . Camero saith , even of our most perfect state of glory , that Frui Deo nil aliud est quam potenti● , sapientiae , bonitatis divinae fructum percipere , quem creaturae modus & ratio ferre potest , &c. Et videtur Deus experiundo quis sit ( 1. Jo 3. ) Et qualem se erga nos praestet , caeterum ( quicquid dictitent scholastici , homines acuti quidem , sed in hoc argumento nimis acuti , invisibilis est vel Angelis , quibus ad Dei conspectum nulla peccati labes , sola naturae imb●eillitas ▪ ( creaturae enim sunt ) aditum interclusit . Praelect . de Verb . Dei . Glasc . c . 7. p. 455. I am more certain that even the eye of our understanding hath no direct and proper sight of God , while we are in the flesh .

7. Yet these attributions of Knowledge and Will , to God , are not falsehoods , for there is really somewhat in God which these are made the improper expressions of . Equivocals and Analogies are not eo nomine false expressions .

8. I am so farre from thinking that it is by Analogy of Attribution ( as the Schoolmen call it ) that Knowledge , Will , &c. are attributed to God and the creature ; that I think these ascribed to God by an exceeding farre fetcht metaphor , further then ( as I said ) if I should call Heaven a nutshell ; there being a thousand fold more likeness between these , then between Gods Knowledge and Will , and mans : For between finite and Infinite there is no proportion . Yea I will not undertake to prove that the Ratio homonymiae is not in Us , only , and not at all in the Things .

9. Yet no doubt , the thing meant by Knowledge and Will when attributed to God , is not only , as many say , most eminently in God , but is solely in God ; that which is called knowledge and will in man being not the same thing , but toto genere diversum . But yet the conception that we have of Gods Knowledge and Will is but improper derived from the supposed simile , viz. our own understanding and will , which representeth it with exceeding imperfection . So that the terms of Knowledge , Will , Decree , &c. are spoken first and properly of the creature , and thence improperly of God .

10. Yet I acknowledge that though all these terms of Attribution , as to God , are exceeding improper , yet there are degrees of impropriety ; some being more improper then others are : And so I doubt not but that the terms that are taken from humane passions and imperfections are more improperly applied to God , then these forementioned of Understanding and Will , &c.

And thus I have told you some of my thoughts , that Mr K. may know on what terms to deal with me , and not contend with one whose minde he understandeth not .

And as to his description of Immanent Acts , I deny that there is any such thing as an Act in God terminated in himself , supposing that you speak not of a meer objective termination ( as I know you do not ; For else you would call many of these transient acts , as having an extrinsick object . ) As I acknowledge no certainty of a proper Act in God , so I acknowledge no positive termination of that which in him we call an Act ; and we call it immanent but in that negative sense which the later clause of your description doth express . We are like to make a good dispute of it , when I am forced to deny the subject , as being a Chymaera .

§. 4.

Mr. K. IN the mean time , out of the respect I bear to the memory of Dr. Twisse , I cannot forbear to say , that Mr. Baxter had better consulted his own honour if he had said nothing to the disparagement of that Reverend and Renowned Doctor : of whom he speaks very sleightingly more then once in his otherwise excellent Treatise of Infant-Baptism , and in all his other Books : In which I could wish there were not somewhat of the Doctrinal part not answering that of the Devotional What Dr. Twisse hath said of Justification from eternity , upon this ground , that there can be no new immanent act in God , and how much some in the Synod said against him , and how little he replied for himself matters not : he was now grown old , Et videas fessos Rhadamanthon & Aeacon annis , Et Minoa queri — Like enough , Mul●um mutatus ab illo Hectore qui redit exuvias indutus Achillis . When he beat Arminius , Corvinus , Tilenus , Penottus , Bellarmine , Dr. Jackson , and I know not how many more out of the field ; & solus vacua dominatus arena left them all bleeding , as Mr. Goodwin would have said , at the feet of his Writings . It may be he was now at last , but magni nominis umbra , but whose very name really did most of the service , and I am sure was that formidable thing to the learned Adversary : But as old as he was , I question not but he could have e●sily made this good , There is no new Immanent act in God ] against all that opposed him in the Synod , and Mr. Baxter to boot : and I would fain hear any of them all that opposed him , to give a satisfactory answer but to this one Argument .

§. 4.

R. B. 1. YOu need not argue me to a higher respect to Dr. Twisse then I have ever manifested , except you would have me say , He was a God , or an Angel , or an Infallible man .

2. If you cannot forbear , as you say , its pity you should be hindered : Men and women must speak when their list is so great . Who can hold that which will away ?

3. I confess that I did not much consult mine Honour in that writing . Else you had not found your self work as you have done in these leaves . If you mean the Honour of my Honesty , your proof must do more to the determination then your assertion : If you mean the Honour of my Learning , do not you know well enough , how little I have to consult ? He that hath nothing , hath nothing to lose .

4. [ Sleightingly ] is a word that will stretch , and therefore I will not charge you with untruth . In one mans sense , he sleights a man that cals him [ that famous excellent Divine : ] but in another mans , sleighting signifieth the esteeming of a man below his worth , and expressing so much , or setting light by a man . I am miserably troubled with those kinde of people that cannot endure [ sleighting ] as they call it , above all folks in the world . ( I use to call them plainly , Proud people , here in the Countrey ; but if I were to talk to Learned men I would use more manners . ) They think I sleight them , if I do not applaud them , or complement with them , or if I commend them not with so loud a voice as they expect ( and they are a people that are never low in their expectations : ) or if I do but praise another above them , or speak to another before them , or be short with them ( when I am busie ) when they look for a longer more respectfull discourse ; yea if my Hat should be over mine eyes that I see them not , or my memory so fail me as that I forget them ; these and abundance more I am guilty of sleighting every day , that I am now grown accustomed to the vice , and shameless in hearing it charged upon me . But I suspect that my sleighting Dr. Twisse consisteth in my supposing him to erre , and telling the world so : that is , in taking him to be a man : for h●manum est errare : and for saying he knew but in part , that is , that he was not glorifi●d on earth by perfection . If you could have charged me with any more then this , would you not have done it ? I say , would you not ? when the Vindication of this Reverend man was the end of your encountring me ? and it boyled so hot on your stomack , that [ you could not forbear : you had not the patience to see so Worthy men so unworthily handled . ] Yea your self affirm that which is his doctrine to be untrue , and yet I sleight him for saying so ! Lay this with the commanded Adoration of the footsteps , and it seems , it is high matters indeed that you expect . I doubt , by this , that you will say , I slight you before I have done , either because I praise you not enough , or because I take you not for infallible and indefectible , or because I value Dr. Twisse or Mr. Pemble so very , very , very farre before you ; when yet I am accused of slighting them . Sir , these Reverend m●n , I doubt not , are perfected Saints in heaven , and hate pride so much , that if they know it , they will give little thanks to him that will contend for the honour of their Infallibility , yea or for the guilding over any of their errours ▪ much less , if their honour should be made a● snare to ▪ the entangling of the godly , and a means to the promoting the Kingdom of darkness , and opposing that Truth which they love better then their Honours , and the dishonouring of that God whose glory is their felicity .

Yea let me tell you that I take my self bound in conscience to say more then ever I have yet said , and that is thi● [ All young Students that will deigne to take advice from so mean a man as I , as ever you would preserve your graces and conversations , preserve ▪ your Judgements ; and as ever you would maintain the Doctrine of Christ , take heed of the Errors of the Antinomians : and as ever you would escape the snare of Antinomianism , take heed of these principal Articles of it following : [ That Christs satisfaction is ours quà praestita , before the Application ; and that so far , as that we are actually Pardoned , Justified , Reconciled and Adopted by it before we were born , much more before we believe : yea that Adoption and Remission of sin are immanent acts in God , and so are from eternity , even before any death of Christ , or efficacy of it : That pardon of sin is nothing but Ve●●e non Punire : That Justification by faith is nothing but Justification in foro conscientia , o● the sense of that in our hearts , which was really ours from eternity , or from Christs death , or both : That justifying faith is the feeling or apprehension of Gods eternal Love , Remission and Adoption . ] I say , take heed of these master-Points of Antinomianism : And as ever you would avoid these , take heed how you receive them on the reputation and plausible words of any Writer : and especially of Dr Twiss , who is full of such passages , and being of greater learning and esteem then others is liker to mislead you . For you know , if you receive these then you must receive the r●st , if you discern the concatenation . For if all your sins were pardoned as soon as Christ died , then what need you pray for pardon , or Repent or Believe or be Baptized for pardon ? then God loved you as well when you were his enemies , as since ; and then how can you be restrained from sin by fear ? &c. And that you may know I speak not this in slighting of the D●ctor , as Mr. K. chargeth me . 1. I profess to do it mainly for Gods glory and Truth , and for the love of souls . 2. I take my self the rather bound to it , because I was once drawn my self to some of these opinions by the meer high estimation of Mr. P●mble and Dr. Twisse . 3. I profess still most highly to love and reverence the names of these two blessed excellent men , as formerly I never honoured any two men more . For Dr. Twiss , I am more beholden to his Writings for that little knowledge I have then almost any one mans , besides : and for Mr. Pemble , for ought I can see in his Book of Justification , he revoked this same errour which in his Vindic . Grat . he hath delivered : sure I am , no two mens Writings have been more in my hands , and few mens nam●s are yet so highly honoured in my heart .

This much I take my self bound to publish for a common warning . And I would further advise all to take heed how they entertain Dr. Twiss's doctrine about the cause of sin ; of which I shall be ready to give my reason when I have a call ; but will not now digress so far .

5. For your good wish [ that my Books had not something in the Doctrinal part not answering the devotional ] I thank you . But , alas , ignorance and errour will not be healed with a wish : Many a year have I studied and praied against them , and yet they stick by me still . But had I erred in the Foundation , it would have spoiled my Devotion : for non recte vivitur , ubi de Deo non bene creditur : And I had rather be defective in lesser doctrinals , then in Devotion . And though I am as confident that you erre in some of your Doctrinals ( as I shall anon manifest ) as you are of my erring , yet I heartily wish your Devotion be as good as your Judgement in Doctrine ; and I think I wish you a greater blessing then you wished me .

6. I do not well relish your exceeding coldness in Gods cause , who are so hot for man : When it is for the honour of your Learned Brethren , [ you have not patience , you cannot forbear . ] But what Dr. Twisse hath said for Justification from Eternity , on the ground that there is no new immanent act in God , this you say , Matters not : Is it a phrase beseeming a Preacher of Christs Truth to say , [ It matters not ? ] When that Truth is contradicted in so high a Point ? and the souls of men , and the peace of the Church so much endangered ? A G●llio might better have spoke thus . England hath not sped so well by the Antinomians of late , as that any knowing friend of it , should say , It matters not , when such great Divines promote their cause .

7. And where you also say , that [ it matters not what some in the Synod said against him , and how little he said for himself . ] I am not of your minde . 1. Is it only the vestigia Doctoris Twissi & M. K. that are to be adored ? You shall give me leave to honour you much , and the Doctor more , but the Assembly more then either of you . 2. I do not think the Doctor was so weak , or at least a good cause so friendless in the Assembly , but that himself or some other would have done something considerable to the justification of his cause , if it had been justifiable . 3. I will be bold to ask you , the next time I see you , whether all your heat and impatience for unworthy handling or slighting the Doctor be not meant against the Assembly as well as me ? or if not , Whether it be not respect of persons that made the difference ? or rather the securing of your reputation , which you might think would be elevated by a Victory over others , or at least lose nothing , though the person were so contemptible , as not to adde to your glory ; but by an opposition to the Assembly it might have been dasht in pieces ? Or if the Antinomians being questioned by the Assembly shall alleadge Dr. Twiss's words ( frequently and plainly uttered ) for their Defence ; and the Doctors cause being hereupon questioned shall fall without any justification ; I pray you tell me , Whether there may not be the same necessity for us to take notice of his Errours as the Assembly ? and whether after them we may not do it ( while we honour his worth as much as I still do ) without slighting or wronging him . It is more dishonour to be Questioned by an Assembly and come off unjustified , then to be judged to mistake by so contemptible a person as I.

8. Where you speak of [ his very Name doing most of the service . ] I do not understand what service you mean . I know you mean not the service done in his Writings : And sure you dare not mean [ the service done by the Assembly : ] for that were to make them a contemptible Assembly indeed , if a mans Name , yea magni nominis umbra , did most of their service : And it were to think as basely of their service as the worst Sectary doth , that I have met with . It were not worth so much cost , and so many years pains , nor worthy the Acceptation of Parliament or People , if it were but the offspring of Dr. Twisse's Name . But Sir we have received fruits that shew they came from another cause then a name or the shadow of a name . I confess I value their least Catechism for children above all Mr. Kendall's learned Labours , were they twenty times more of the same quality . I never heard but one Learned man speak contemptuously of the Assembly , and his friends say it was because he was not thought Worthy to be one of them ( I except those that were against them in the Warre ; where heat of opposition might occasion disesteem : But if this were Mr. K's case , yet methinks when he changed his Cause and Party , he should withall have changed his esteem of the Assembly . ) But its likely that Mr. K. means that it was the Doctors Name that did most of the service of a Moderator ; most of his own part in the Assembly : It may be so : But if he had nothing to work by but his Name , yet had his cause been good , it would in that Assembly have found some friends . But what you mean then by the following words , I do not well know , that his Name you are sure [ was that formidable thing to the Learned adversary . ] Perhaps you mean your self , by the Learned adversary , of whose fears I confess you might be sure , and so might know the Name or Word that did affright you : else I cannot imagine who you mean , except it were the Kings party or the Episcopal Divines together : But for Episcopacy , I know of no Disputes that ever the Assembly had upon it , and so had no adversaries in a disputing way ; at least during Dr. Twiss's time . And for disputing the Kings Cause , I think they did as little in it . Some chosen men in the Treaties indeed disputed against Episcopacy , but with other weapons then Dr. Twisse's Name . If you should mean that it was Dr. Twisse's Name that made the Learned Episcopal Divines have Reverend thoughts of the Assembly , I must tell you that there were in that Assembly no small number of Divines of that excellency for Learning , Piety and Ministerial Ability , which might command Reverence from the Learnedest adversaries of you all .

9. But though his Name did all the service ; yet you [ question not but he could have easily made it good , That there is no new immanent act in God , against , &c. ] It seems by this that you think this the easier to prove of the two : And indeed I am acquainted with none that are minded to oppose it .

10. Nor is it reasonable for you to say , that you [ would fain have any of them all that opposed him , to give a satisfactory answer to your Argument , ] when you know it was not in that Point that they opposed him . Would you make more your adversaaies against their will as well as me ? or do you long for more honourable Antagonists to cope with ? And what s your Argument ?

§. 5.

Mr. K. IF there be any new immanent Act in God , it must be either of his Understanding or his Will : Of his Understanding there can be none : else must he know somewhat a new , which inferres he was not Omniscient , knew not all before this new act of Knowledge : If of his W●ll , then either this new act is for the better or worse or indifferent : If for the better , he was not absolutely perfect before , as being capable of bettering : If for the worse , he is not so perfect since this act as he was before ; which is to make him l●ss perfect by his new act : If neither , then is this act such as might as well have been out as in : and then it is an imperfection to act so impertinently . This same Argument as I take it made use of by Mr. Goodwin himself in a like case , and therefore he will not be offended how highly soever I value it as an irrefragable Demonstration .

§. 5.

R. B. REmember that I say not that your Doctrine is Untrue , but Uncertain . It may be possibly as you say ; but whether you can tell that it is so , or prove it to be so , I doubt . To your great Argument , I expect better proof of your major Proposition , which indeed hath none at all . Two things I expected you should have proved : 1. That God hath an Understanding and Will which act ; properly so called : or that you know what it is that is improperly called Gods Understanding and Will ? 2. That God hath no immanent Act but of his Understanding or Will . To begin with the last : I will not say , datur tertium . For I dare not say properly dantur duo : But I will desire you to prove your major : and I think that in the same sense as God is said to have an Understanding and Will , for ought you know he may have other acts , which those two notions will not express . ●or 1. You are uncertain whether Angels may not have other faculties or acts-immanent , besides Understanding and Will : ( If you say , you are sure they have not , prove it : ) and so others may be ascribed to God by Analogy from them , as these be by Analogy from man . You know perhaps how many senses you have your self : but how can you prove that no other creature hath a sixth sense , which you are uncapable of knowing the name or nature of ? So how know you but Angels may have powers or immanent acts beside Understanding and Willing , which you know nothing of for name or nature ? Must all Gods superiour creatures be needs measured by poor man ? How much more noble creatures hath God , then these below that dwell in dust ! 2. But if you were acquainted with all the Angels in heaven , and were at a certainty about the number or nature of their powers or acts , how prove you that God hath no other act then what Understanding and Willing doth express ? That one unconceivable perfect act in God , which Eminenter ( by an unconceivable transcendent eminence ) is Understanding and Willing , ( yet but Analogically so called ) but properly and formally is neither , but somewhat more excellent ; is in all likelihood very restrainedly or defectively expressed by these two words ; even as to the objective extent . How know we but that in some of Gods creatures , or at least in God himself there may be something found besides Entity , Verity , Goodness ; or any thing that is the object of Intellection or Volition , whereof no man had ever any conception . However , is it not unlikely , yea a dangerous imagination , That the powers or acts of such wretched worms as we , should be so farre commensurable with the Infinite Majesty , that as we have no immanent act but of Understanding or Will ( or subordinate to these ) so God hath no other ? or none but what are expressed in these two notions ! Alas , that silly worms should so unreverently presume ! and pretend to that knowledge of God which they have not ! and might so easily know that they have not !

And for the former , How farre God hath an Understanding or Will , I will peruse your words to Master Goodwin when I have done with this Section .

This were enough to your Argument and Challenge : but I proceed to the confirmation of your implied minor . And 1. I easily grant you , that it is certain there is no Addition to , or mutation of Gods Essence . 2. I think all the Acts ascribed to God are his Essence , and are one in themselves considered . Pardon ▪ that I do but say [ I think : ] For though principles of reason and Metaphysical Axioms seem to lead plainly to this Conclusion ; yet I am afraid of pretending to any greater Certainty then I have ; or of building too much on the doubtfull conclusions of mans slippery Reasonings , about the nature of the Invisible Incomprehensible God . I think it most sutable to Gods Unity and Simplicity , that all his immanent acts ( so called by us ) are Himself and are One . But I dare not say I am certain that God cannot be Simple and Perfect , except this be true : both because He is beyond my knowledge , and because the doctrine of the Trinity assureth us that there is in God a true diversity ▪ consisting with Unity , Simplicity and Perfection of Essence . 3. You know not what the subject of your Proposition is , ( Gods acts of Understanding and Will : ) and therefore you are uncapable of such peremptory concluding de Modis , knowingly and certainly , as here you pretend to . 4. You cannot prove that there 's any such thing in God as an Immanent Act , or an Understanding or a Will in proper sense : but something there is which we cannot fitlier or more profitably conceive or express then under such notions , drawn Analogically from mans acts of Understanding and Willing . Now if we will speak of Gods Incomprehensible nature by such Analogy , and put the names of Understanding and Willing on God , as borrowed from mans understanding and willing , then must we accordingly conceive of Gods understanding and willing , as like to mans in the form of these acts ( for we can reach to no higher conceptions , though these be utterly improper . ) Now mans actual intellection doth connote and suppose an intelligible object , and his Will doth connote and suppose an appetible object : and consequently it cannot be expected according to the utmost imaginable natural perfection of them , that either should go beyond the extent of their objects , or be such acts without their proper objects : Even as Gods Omnipotency is but dicta ad possibilia , Vid. Aquin . 1. q . 25. a. 3. c . These things thus premised , some will perhaps think you sufficiently answered ( when you say , it inferres that God was not Omniscient , knew not all , &c. ) by telling you 1. That as Omnisciency signifies a Power of Knowing all things , Analogically ascribed to God ad captum humanum as distinct from the act of knowing ; so God was yet Omniscient . 2. As Omnisciency signifieth the actual Knowledge of all intelligible objects , so God was Omniscient And no more is requisite to the perfection of his Knowledge . 3. But an Object may have not only its real but its See Buridane of that question in his Ethicks so far as to shew the great difficulty . intelligible Being de Novo which it had not before ; and therefore as Omnisciency signifieth the Knowledge of all things that will be intelligible , as well as those that now are intelligible , so ( say they ) it belongs not to Gods perfection to be Omniscient ; for it is unnaturally and improperly called Science ( and so Omniscience ) which hath not an Object . Their foundation ( which may seem absurd to you ) viz. That some things may de novo become the objects of Knowledge , they declare thus : 1. They suppose , that though God be Indivisible , and so his Eternity be Indivisible , and have neither in it , Praeteritum nor Futurum , nor Nunc neither , as we understand it , as expressing a present instant of time ; yet as God knoweth not Himself only , but the creature also , so he knoweth not E●e●nity only but Time : He knows how things are ordered and take place in mans Divisible measure of motions : and therefore he knows things as Past , Present and Future , quoad hominem & tempus , which are so past , presen● and future . And he doth not know a thing Past to be Present ( quoad tempus & hominem ) nor a thing Future to be Past : but knows things truly as they be . 2. This being premised , they will then assume , that Peter and Paul did not actually exist from eternity : Christ did not actually suffer from eternity : and so the actual existence of Peter in nunc temporis , was not an intelligible object from Eternity : and therefore they think they may conclude , that it could not be known from Eternity . They will urge their reason thus : 1. There was no Time from Eternity ( that is , before time : ) therefore it could not be intelligible , that Peter did actually then exist in Time . 2. Else you will confound Futurition and Present existence : God did know from Eternity ▪ that Peter would exist in Time , i.e. futuritionem Petri : therefore it was not Peter's present actual existence that he knew . 3. The nature of foreknowledge is to know things as future , and therefore must not be confounded with knowledge of things as existent . 4. This proposition before the creation was not true [ Peter doth actually exist : ] therefore God could not know it to be then true . But after Peter's birth it did de novo become a true proposition : and therefore must be de novo known to be then true . Before that , it was only true that [ Haec Propositio vera futura est ] but not [ vera est : ] therefore no more but the futurition of the Truth could be known , and not the actual present existence ( as referring to time : ) It is not all one to say [ Petrus erit ] and [ Petrus est ] nor all one to know it . 5. The contradictory Proposition was then true [ Peter doth not exist : ] But both contradictory Propositions could not be known to be true together , that is from Eternity . Therefore God did then know the Negative Proposition as then true [ Petrus non existit : ] and the Affirmative de futuro to be true [ Petrus futurus est , vel existet : ] but he did not know the Affirmative de existentia praesenti to be true from Eternity [ Petrus in nunc temporis existit ] no nor [ Petrus in nunc Aeternitatis existit : ] for they were then false Propositions : nor yet was it then true that [ Tempus actu existit . ] If you say , That there were no Propositions from Eternity , and therefore they could not be true or false : this alters not the case : for 1. We speak on supposition that there had been creatures to have framed these Propositions . 2. If we conceive not of Gods Understanding as knowing the truth of Propositions , concerning things , we shall scarce have any conception of it as an Understanding at all . 3. The Schools commonly speak of the Eternal truth of Propositions , e . g . de futuris contingentibus . 4. There are Propositions in Time , and these God knows : and that s all one to the present case . At Noahs●●ood God knew not this Proposition to be then true [ Petrus existit : ] for it was not then true . Nor did he know then that [ it is true in nunc temporis quo existit Petrus ] but only , that i● will be true : For Futura and not things presently existent are the objects o● Foreknowledge : and that [ Nunc temporis ] it self did not then exist . 6 ▪ Otherwise it ▪ would be true that All things do coexist with God from Eternity : ( which is disclaimed by those that are now opposed : ) and so that they do exist from Eternity . For if this Proposition were known to be true from Eternity [ Petrus existit , vel Deo coexist● ▪ ] then the thing expressed is true , Peter did so exist and coexist . For that which is false cannot be known to be at the same time true . If it be granted therefore that Peter did not exist from Eternity , and consequently that that Proposition was not then true , nor intelligible as then true , but only as of fut●●e Verity , then when God in time knows it to be of present existent Verity , he knows more then when he knows it to be only of future Verity and of present falshood : And so about the crea●ures , When he knows that they do exist and knows them as existing , he knows more then when he knew them only to be future and as future . For if it be not more to know a thing as existent then as future , and so knowledge be not diversified from the object , then it is no more to know something then nothing : For the reason is the same : and future is a term of diminution as to existent . And then it will be all one to know [ Judas is damned ] and [ Peter is saved : ] [ Jacob is loved ] and [ Esau is hated . ] Yea then it would be all one i● ( per possibile vel impossibile ) it were known [ Peter is damned ] and [ Judas is saved ] or [ Peter is saved and damned : ] and so it would be all one to know falshood and truth .

Many such reasonings as these will be used against you . Of which if you would know my own opinion , I think they are de ignotis , dreams , fightings in the dark , yet much like your own . And though I know severall things that you may say against this reasoning , so do I know much that may be said against yours : and , I think , both sides would do better to profess that ignorance which they can neither overcome nor ●ide . How constantly do the Schools distinguish between Gods Abstractive and Intuitive Knowledge ? Scientiam simplicis intelligentiae & purae Visionis ? and tell us that the former in order of nature goes before the other ? If this be so , then God hath a Prius and Posterius in the acts of his knowledge . The like we may say between Gods Knowledge of Himself and the creature . If they think it not absurd that etiam in mente Divina there should be a transition of things è numero possibilium in numerum futurorum , and this sine mutatione ; why may they not admit a knowledge of things as existent only when they are existent , and of things as future when they are future ? and this sine mutatione too ? For the distinction quoad momenta temporis , will make but a gradual difference , in point of mutation , from that quoad ordinem naturae , vel momenta Rationis . All distinction , that hath real ground , denotes imperfection , according to our highest speculators , and so must all be denied of God . I refuse not to say ( if I must say any thing ) of both as Mr. Barlow doth Exercit . 5. ( think him not pedantick , because he is bound with Schibler : ) Mutatio illa est solum in objecto cognito , non in cognoscente , seu cognitione ; cum cognitio divina ab objecto non dependet , nec ad mutationem objecti mutationem ullam patitur , &c. Cum ideo admittit Alvarez res primo esse possibiles solum in ordine ad potentiam & futuras in ordine ad voluntatem , necesse est ut prius cognoscat cognitione abstractiva ( quia ut possibiles ea solum cognitione cog●●sci possunt ) & postea cum per voluntatem fiunt futurae , & etiam actu existentes , illas cognitione intuitivâ cognos●et Deus . At hinc nulla in Deo mutatio sequetur , sed solum in objecto ( ut fateatur necesse est ) Et per consequens hoc dato , quod scientia Dei ab abstracti●a in intuitivam mutarctur , tamen non sequetur Deum esse mutabilem , vel cognitionem suam ex parte rei : sed solum quod objecto variato , intellectus noster , varias ei denominationes attribuit : ut quod sit intuitiva , quod ●bstractiva , quae solum sunt denominationes variae cognitioni divinae ab intellectu nostro impositae , pro diverso respectu ad creaturam , cum in s● sit omnino simplex & invariata . ]

But then I would fain know whether there be not the same necessity that the difference between objects [ only future ] and [ presently existent ] should cause our understandings to put the forementioned various denominations on Gods Knowledge , as the difference inter Possibilia & Futura , doth so cause us to put on it ? And also whether in the same impropriety and imperfection , the very notions of [ Understanding , Willing , Acting , Immanently , &c. ] be not Denominationes ab intellectu nostro impositae , or assumed by God in condescension to humane weakness , expressing but some little , very little , of that Divine — I know not what . For that same thing which man hath a true formall conception of under the notion of [ Knowing , Willing ] is varied according to the variety of objects : But if it be not so with God ( as I must think and say , It is not , if I presume to think and say any thing of it , ) that is because Knowledge and Willing in Him are not the things that we by those terms use to express ; nor yet any thing that we can have formall proper conceptions of : And by the same necessity and warrant as we do bring down the Divine nature so low , as to apply to it the notions of Acting , Understanding , Willing ; may we also apply to it the notions of Acting , Knowing and Willing de novo ; confessing a further addition to the impropriety of speech . And therefore as God himself doth in Scripture accomodate himself to our capacity , by assuming the terms and notions of Understanding and Willing , so doth he also of loving where he before hated , with divers the like , which in man would imply an innocent mutation .

I have here given you some reason of several passages of mine , which your following Pages carp at , before you discerned my meaning , as I shall shew you further anon .

So much to your proof that there is no new immanent act in Gods Understanding . One word to what follows about his Will .

Where you argue thus : [ If of his Will , then this new act is either for the Better , or Worse , or Indifferent , &c. ] Ans. In strict propriety , it is taken as unproved , that he hath Will , or Immanent acts . But ad captum humanum as we are necessitated to ascribe Willing and Acting to him , so they that think they may on the same grounds ascribe New acts of Will to him ( as the Scripture undoubtedly doth , ) will think that your Argument is sufficiently answered thus :

1. This arguing supposeth mans silly intellect capable of comprehending the Reasons of the Acts of the Almighty ; as if it cannot be , except we can apprehend the reason of it , and whether it be for the better or worse or indifferent ; or what it produceth , or to what end it is : which is a most bold arrogant presumption in such moles as we are . As I said before , you know not whether there may not be more Affections or Modi entium open to the Divine Intellect and Will , or Nature , then we have any name for or conception of : And though mans will look only at the goodness or appetibility or conveniency of objects , yet you know not what Gods will is ; and therefore know not what is its adequate object . Many other reasons also of the obscurity of this might be given .

2. It will be answered you , that the said New act of Gods will , is for the Better : But then they will distinguish of [ Better . ] 1. They will say , It is Better quoad rerum ordinem : and it is Better to the creature : ( as for God to love him that before he hated : or approve of him , whom before he disapproved . ) 2. They distinguish also between that which may be said to be Better to God himself : Either Really , by a real addition to his perfection ; and so nothing can be Better to God : Or 2. Relatively and Reputatively ; as God is said to be Blessed , Glorified , Honoured , Well pleased , Exalted , Magnified , &c. And thus it may be Better to God , though he receive no real addition of felicity ; and so not Vain or Indifferent .

3. They will desire you to Answer your own Argument as to transient Acts , and they think it may serve as to immanent acts . ( Remembring that they suppose that there be new acts in God without mutation ; because they suppose that those very things that we call immanent Acts in him are but denominations of his simple Essence , according to the various aspects or respects of the objects , which make no more mutation then relations do . ) Was Gods act of Creation , of raising Christ from death , &c. for the Better , or Worse , or Indifferent ? I think you will say as before , that it was not Better as to God in the adding of any real felicity to him : But to God Reputarively and Relatively , and to the creature really , it was Better . So will they say about immanent acts , which may perfect the whole ( as the Honour of the Prince is the good of the Commonwealth ) and may be necessary to the Good of particular persons ; and the reputative Good of God himself . Its said , God made All things for himself , Was it for Better to himself , or Worse , or Indifferent ?

4. Is it Better or Worse for a looking Glass that it receive a hundred various species de novo ? You will perhaps say , It is no disparagement to the Glass to be receptive of new species without being made Better or Worse : as also that its reception is passive , and so is not Gods Understanding or Willing . I know not what it is : but I confess i● must needs be a very improper conception to conceive of God as passive in knowing . And yet man hath no true apprehension of a knowledge which is wholly sine passione : But how prove you that God cannot , if he please , by his active Knowledge , Know de novo , without becoming Better or Worse ? or doing it in vain ? Are you sure that every new act of intellection ( even in a dream ) doth make mans understanding better or worse ? or else is vain ? I confess more may be here said .

5. Having done with your Argument , they will further tell you , that , If God may have new relations without any real change , then , for ought you know , he may have new immanent acts without a real change : But the Antecedent is unquestionably true : ( God was not a Creator before he had creatures : nor is he our Father before we are his children ; nor our King , Master , &c. before we are his subjects , servants , &c. except de jure only : ) The Consequence they prove thus : Relations have as true an Entity , as , for ought you know , these which we call Immanent Acts in God , may have : Therefore the Novation of them will make as great a change . Here they suppose that Actio and Relatio are both accidents ( taken properly ) and neither of them meer Entia Rationis ( for in so thinking they go in the more beaten road ) much less nothing : Or if you will say , that Relatio is but Modus entis , they will say so of action too : Or however they tell you , that it may be so for ought you know , with that which we call an Act in God . And here they suppose that his Acts are not his Essence absolutely and in it self considered ; and that it signifies not all one to say , God is God , and to say , God willeth the existence of this worm : And therefore they will say , that these which we call Acts , may be , if not Relations , yet some of Scotus his formalities , or something to us unknown , which have either no more Being then Relations , or at least not so much as to make a real change in God . And that there is in his simple , indivisible Essence , a Trinity of persons , without any imperfection : so there may be in his Essence , distinct formalities ( or somewhat that we cannot name or conceive of ) of a lower nature , then Personality , without any inconvenience : and as th●se may be superadded to the meer absolute Essence of God ( as Agere , Intelligere , Velle , are added ) without dividing , or multiplying it : so may ●bey on ●●e ●ame grounds be New , or renewed , without any Mutation of Gods Essence ; but only of the formality of intellection or Volition , which is added to his Essence .

6. They further think that the nature of transient acts , doth prove that immanent acts may be renewed : Bu●●his will be more spoke to anon , when we come to your doctrine of transient Acts. They say , A transient act is not a meer Relation or Passion or Effect : But there is in it that which may be called action ●● agente , as well as passion à patiente . Now if actio be efficientis actio here , and God in creating the world did verè agere , then either the world was created from eternity , or else God did create it from Eternity , and yet it was created only in Time , and the Causation or Causing creating Act was infinitely before the Effect ; or else there was a new act really performed by God in Time . The first none will maintain , that I deal with . The second , say they , is against common reason : For Gods act is the Causa proxima creaturae ; and omnis causa proxima reciprocatur cum suo effectu : i.e. Posita causa proxima in actu , necesse est effectum poni : If it be causa totalis , yea and requireth nothing else to the effect so much as by preparation , or disposition , no nor a subject matter , then the act of creation must needs immediatly produce the creature ; and the Creare and Creari must needs be inseparable : It s answered that Gods creating act was from eternity , but the effect , or creature , was not till its Time . But it will be replied , That either God did more for the creatures production or creation at the time of its passive creation , then he did from Eternity , or he did no more : If more , then he did something de novo : If no more , then either the creature would have had its Being from Eternity , quia posita causâ ponitur effectus ; or else if you ask what s the reason that the creature was not in Being sooner or later , no cause can be assigned ▪ and so God should not be the cause . This holds equally ( say they ) whether you make the creating act to be only Gods Velle , or ● superadded execution of that will , as being the effect of power . For either God willed the creatures present existence from eternity , as much as at the time of its creation , or as at this day ▪ or he did not . If he did not , then he willeth de novo : If he did , then the creature would have existed , as soon as it was willed . To say , that God willed from Eternity that the creature should be in Time , is true : But is it as much to Will that it shall be , as to Will its present existence ? If it be answered , That there is no Past or Future with God ; I answer 1. That this was prevented before ; when it was said , that God understandeth Time , and propositions concerning time , though time be only mans measure , and propositions mans instruments . 2. The men that I speak to , maintain that all things coexist not with God from Eternity ( though indeed the term [ from ] as here used , contradicteth Eternity : ) and they distinguish between Gods willing rerum futuritionem & existentiam praesentem : and therefore this seemeth to make against their answer . ( But indeed none of all this arguing is solid , because of the different manner of producing effects per voluntatem , & per potentiam excquentem voluntati superadditam . ) Perhaps it will be said , that if all this be granted , yet it followeth not that immanent acts may be de novo without a change in God , because the Creating act , or any transient act is so : For the former is God himself , but the later is not . To which it may be replied , 1. We speak not now of a product or effect , called the Creation , but of the creating act and then why should not that be God himself , as well as an immanent act ? If you say it i● a Being , then it is God or distinct from God : If distinct from God , it is a substance or accident , or some modus , or who knows what ? Accidents God hath none : Substance it cannot be ; except it be God . If you say it is any modus , you know what School contradiction you must expect : Or if you say it is a Reality or a Formality , those that you deal with will tell you , that they can as well prove the immanent acts to be formalities , or such like , as you can the transient . For 2. they say ( with others ) that these acts are not called Immanent , Pos●●ively , as if they had any effect or terminus in God himself ; but Negatively , because they have no effect , ad extra ; and do nihil ponere in objecto . So that as to the nature of the act it self , they say , it is the same , or at least , the later as much essential to God , as the former ( though not their effects . ) And I have paper converse with a Divine , if I mistake not , full as Learned as Mr K. ( to speak sparingly ) who maintains , that those which you call immanent acts ( viz. Gods Knowing and Willing other things besides himself ) are transient , and so to be called ; as having as much an extrinsick object , as those that you and I call Transient ; though they make no real change on them : and that those only are to be called Gods immanent acts , whose object is himself . 3. Moreover you will acknowledge that Gods Velle i● an immanent act ▪ But how many and how great are they that maintain that Gods Creating act , was but his Velle that things should be ! I need not tell you of Schoolmen that are for this : but when you ( doubtless ) know that D• Twisse himself affirms it , in his Vindic . you must either be of his minde , or handle him unworthily by your Dissent , as ● did in another case . Now if the act by which God produced the creatures be but his Velle , then it is an act which you call immanent . And you well know how commonly it is maintained that Deus operatur per essentiam : and that there is no act but his essence it self , requisite to any effect , which he produceth , as it is the effect of the first Cause . But this is but ad hominem ; for these are not their principles whose arguings I now recite . They suppose that creation and other transient acts , are not meer Volitions , but acts of power , in execution of Gods will . To which purpose ●ow largely many famous Schoolmen have argued , is obvious to them that are conversant in them . Aurcolus hath fifteen Arguments to this end . Gregor . Arminiensis hath many Arguments to prove that how ever Creation or Conservation be taken , neither of them is God himself . Capreolus I know and other Thomists answer these Arguments : and much may be replied and is , to those answers : so that in so dark and unsearchable a Controversie , strong wits may finde something to say , against each other , longer then the patience of the wisest of their Readers will hold out to know the issue of their disputes . Aegidius , Thom . de Argent . Occam , and others plead also for a necessity of an executive act of power , distinct from the meer act of willing , or that Creation is not God . So do Jacob . Martini , Suarez , Schibler , and other later Authors . And if ( as Aquinas saith ) transient acts be formaliter in agente , as well as immanent , then the inception of new immanent acts seems to have no other inconveniences , then the inception of transient acts as to the form . But indeed the Thomists say the same of both , that they are only Gods essence , and that God hath no transient act at all , but only that his Essence or Will or Understanding may be so denominated for the rational Relation of the Object thereto . And therefore Aquinas ( 1. q . 25. a. 1. ) maintaining that there is in God Potentia activa ( though not passiva ) withall maintains it to be the samething , as the action , and as his Will and Understanding . ( And yet sometime be calleth Gods actions transient ! but in this he speaks unconstantly or doubtfully , as Suarez noteth Met . disp . 20. § . 5. ) And the substance of all Capreolus answer to Aureolus fifteen Arguments is this same distinction , between Gods act of Creation it self ( which is his Will and Essence , immanent and eternal ) and the Relatio rationis between God and the object ; from which Gods will is denominated a transient act . But yet in this transient act , it is only the relation , and not the act it self ( which is God himself ) which may be diversified or renewed . Now if this meer relatio rationis be sufficient ground for our denomination of Gods act to be [ Transient ] and these transient acts to be new , then it may seem that the relation of the same act to some extrinsick terminative objects ( as of Gods knowledge to the present existence of things in n●nc temporis ) doth give the same ground to call those acts new , though not so properly transient . For if one may be denominated from its respect to its object , why not the other : Nay why the same relatio rationis may not as well denominate those acts transient also , which we now call immanent , is not easie to discern : For both have respect to an extrinsick object , if that suffice . Nay doth not that act which is called immanent , produce or effect ? seeing it is only Volendo without any other executive action that God effecteth all things that are effected : and this Vel●e from eternity is ( say they ) causa in actu of those things that are produced in time . And therefore many say , that God hath no Will as to extrinsicks , but what is effective : and so that his Will hath no extrinsick object properly so called , but only products or effects . That omne velle Dei est operativum & efficax eorum quae vult , and that therefore he may not be said to will any thing but what he doth effect . See Gibi●uf de Libert . li . 2. c . 24. & 1.

So that in Conclusion , according to the Doctrine of the most Learned Thomists , there is in God neither immanent nor transient act in Mr K's sense . ( Except those that are terminated , as they call it , in himself as the object . ) Not immanent ; for they are not terminated in the Agent , as Mr K. saith , such are ; nay they have respect to things extrinsick ; nay , say many , they are productive of these extrinsick things . Not transient ; for Gods essence doth not transire in objectum extraneum , but only cause it without any other executive action ; and so respecteth it . In the same sense therefore , and on the same grounds as you will maintain the transient act to be in time , and not eternal , will these men think to prove it also of the immanent . For even the transient acts of God ( so called ) are not in the creature , but only respect and effect them . As Capreolus saith ( li. 2. dist . 1. q . 2. art . 3. ) Talis actio praedicamentalis & quae est motus , est subjectivè in passo : Divina autem actio non est motus , nec mutatio , licet causet motum & mutationem .

7. But they much insist on that before intimated , that if it be no wrong to Gods simplicity to have diversity or multiplicity of immanent acts ascribed to him , then it is not any wrong to his immutability to have such acts ascribed to him de novo : For the reason will prove alike . But that it is no wrong to God to have diversity of immanent acts ascribed to him , is evident by 1. The use of Scripture . 2. The use of all Divines . 3. And the necessity of the thing . 1. I need not tell any man that hath read the Bible , that Scripture distinguisheth of Gods attribut● that it ascribeth to him Understanding , Will , Memory , &c. that it speaketh not of his Love and Hatred , his Approbation and Disallowance , his Justice and Mercy , as being one , not to be distinguished . 2. And what Divines sp 〈…〉 wise ? even of them that make the boldest enquiries into Gods nature , and pass of it the most consident conclusions , as if they had seen the invisible Majesty : I mean the Schoolmen of all sorts : To how little purpose were many a Volume in ●m Sent . for the most part , if it were enough to apprehend in God undivisible Unity ? How easily on these grounds might we answer all Bradwardines , all Twisses sublime disputes , about Gods willing sin , his order of intention , and of his Decrees , his Election and Reprobation , whether absolute or conditional , definite or indefinite , and de rerum possibilitate & futuritione ab aeterno , with many the like ? Its easie to say , that all these are one and the same thing : and the same is not before or after it self , &c. Yet this is not taken for a satisfactory way of disputing . 3. Yea is it not apparent , that there is a necessity of such distinguishing language ? How many souls would you be likely to convert , and save ? how many sins to prevent , by telling your Auditory , that in deed and truth it is all one thing in God to Decree a man to salvation , or to decree him to damnation ? Its all one to Will that you shall sin , and that you shall not sin : that you shall die this day , and that your Neighbour shall live fourty years longer : It s the same thing , without any true difference , for God to Love you now you believe , and to Hate you while you were a worker of Iniquity ; to be pleased and displeased , to Approve and dislike ; His Love to Peter , to Jacob , and his Hatred to Judas , to Esau was the same thing , only the effects are not the same . I say , how savoury and profitable would this doctrine be ?

And are there not the same Reasons for our ascribing to God , the beginning and ending of Immanent Acts , as the Diversity of them ? Is not one as consistent with his Immutability , as the other with his simplicity ? Doth not Scripture ascribe to God the Inception and ending of Immanent Acts , as well as the Diversity of them ? And is ther enot as great a necessity of our using that language as the other ? How many souls were you like to save by telling them [ God Loved you as well before you believed , yea before Christ died for you , as he doth since ! God doth Hate you now as much as he did when you were a worker of iniquity , and is as much offended with you since you believed as he was when you were a childe of wrath ! He had the same thoughts of you when you were blaspheming , murdering and committing adultery , as when you repent and pray . God is now decreeing to create the world ; he is now decreeing to give the Law by Moses , to save Noah by the Ark , Lot out of Sodom : he is now Decreeing that Christ shall suffer for us ; he now knows all these as future : he is no more Reconciled to the world by Christ , or Pleased in or by his Sufferings and Merits then he was before : God knows now that [ Christ is now on the Cross ] or [ Christ is not Risen ] is a true Proposition , because he did once know that it is a true Proposition : and he ceaseth not to know it : ] would this kinde of doctrine seem sound and edifying ? Do you use to preach thus ?

But you 'le say , That Gods Knowledge , Will , Power , Goodness , Justice , Infiniteness , his Willing the End and the Means , the futurition of things , and their present existence , mens salvation or damnation are all diversified onely as to extrinsick denomination , and not really : from the variety of objects it is , that one act of God is variously denominated .

Answ . 1. But Scotus with his followers , Sirectus , Basolis , Trombeta le Roy , Gothutius , Mayro , Faventinus , and the like , tell us of more then extrinsick denominations : And if there be in God a Diversity of Formalities ; it may as well be said , that there is an inception and ending of these Formalities in him . This doth no more derogate from the Immutability of God , then the other from his simplicity .

2. Have these extrinsick Denominations any true Ground in the things denominated , or not ? If not , it seems they are all false , and therefore not to be used . If they have , then what is it ? The difference of names should suppose an equal difference in the Things . A meer Relative difference , some are loth to grant . If they should , as they plead for a diversity of Relations , others may as well plead for an Inception and Cessation of Relations : ( Could they prove Immanent acts to be but Relations . ) If they say they are Modi or Entia rationis , or what ever title rash adventurous wits may impose on them , still others will say as much for their Beginning and Ending , as they do for their Diversity , and that one impli●s no more a Change in God , then the other denieth his simplicity . The describers of Extrinsick Denomination that place it between Ens and Nihil , make it to signifie the order of a thing to the subject which yet it is not in . But then it is a meer Relation which is Denominated ; or if any more , it should be ex parte objecti only in our case .

3. But suppose that it be but a meer extrinsick Denomination , and have no Reall Ground in the thing denominated ; see what follows : But this much : That Gods Knowledge , and Will , and Power , and Justice , and Mercy , his Knowing me to be Godly or ungodly , his decre●ing Peter to life , and Judas to death ; his loving Jacob and hating Esau , are all one ; his knowing one thing to be future , and another not future , is all one : But yet because of the Diversity of objects it is meet and needfull , that we Denominate extrinsecally Gods acts to be divers : and so to distinguish his Intention of the End , from his Election of the Means ; his Election from his Reprobation , his Approbation from his dislike , &c. Even so , these acts in God have in themselves no Beginning or End : God did never Begin to Love , to Will this or that , to Know &c. But yet because of the Beginning and Ending of objects , it is meet and needfull to Denominate Gods acts extrinsecally as Beginning and Ending , as the objects do , and changing with them . For here the case is the same as to Gods Immutability , as in the other to his simplicity . And if this hold , then those men that should write Voluminous Disputes , about the Beginning and Ending of Immanent acts , would do as warrantably as Dr Twiss and others do in writing so of their diversity , priority and posteriority in nature . Nay is it not much more Justifiable then many of their Volumes ? For from Eternity there was no reall diversity of objects to denominate Gods Immanent acts from . For that esse cognitum vel volitum , which they 'le flie to , could be no where , but in mente & voluntate Divina : and if there were no Diversity in mente Divina at all , then what ground can be imagined of the extrinsick Denominations ? For example , Possibilia & futura being nothing , could not in themselves differ from eternity : Yet how great a fabrick doth Dr Twiss build upon this Proposition , that [ the transition of things future è numero possibil●um in numerum futurorum , being from Eternity , it must needs have an eternal Cause which can be no other then Gods Will . ] Now if there were no such transition , but in mente divinâ , and if there were no such notion from Eternity any where else , as is [ Future and Possible ] and so it must be imagined to be an Ens raetionis Divinae , then it plainly follows that there was no such thing as Future , distinct from Possible : for in God is no distinct Immanent acts , ( as knowing Possibles , and Knowing things future ; ) and in the things was no distinction , for they are nothing .

It seems therefore that upon your own Grounds it is as Justifiable and necessary , to Denominate extrinsecally Gods Immanent acts , as having Beginning and End , when the objects have so , as it is to Denominate them divers from the diversity of the object : and that if we made this our ordinary speech in voluminous Disputes , you could no more blame us for it , then all the exactest School-Divines are to be blamed for the other .

Moreover , some may think , that you do teach Infidels to destroy the Christian Faith , or teach a man to prove or disprove what he will , because Contradictories may consist , e . g . If they would prove that [ Christ is not Risen ] thus : That which God knoweth to be true , is true : But God Knoweth this Proposition to be ●rue [ Christ is not Risen ] Therefore . The minor they prove thus : God did once know this Proposition to be true : Therefore he doth so still : for there is no Ending of any Immanent act of God . It will be answered , That this onely shews a difference in the object , that it was once true , which now is not : but Gods act is the same by which he knoweth these mutable objects . Be it so : ( yet whether it be certain and can be proved still , is by them doubted : ) but is it fit for us to speak of this act as one only ? It seems then , it is all one , in God to know a Proposition to be True , and to know it to be false . For the fore-said Proposition [ Christ is not Risen ] was True one day , and False the next ; and God knew both . You 'le say , It is all one in God to Know that to be True which is True , and that to be False which is False : but in both he knows Verè , etsi non verum . But then you must tell us further , what it is for God to Know [ Truly : ] Is it the Congruency of his Knowledge to the Object , which we call the Truth of it ? I think you will say so : And if so , then it is not obvious to shew how there was such a Congruence from Eternity , when there was Nothing but God ; and so no other object for his knowledge to agree to : For in God they were all but one , either in esse cognito , or esse volito ; for in him is no reall diversity : and out of him , or in themselves they were not at all : and therefore if God knew all things as many or divers , when they were not at all , and as existent , when they did not exist , where is the Congruence of the act with the object ? But all this arguing is but light .

But they further argue thus : Gods Immanent acts , which we are speaking of , are not Himself : and therefore as they may be either diversified or multiplied without his Division or Composition , so they may begin or end without his Mutation . The antecedent they prove by that common Argument : These Immanent acts about the Creature , are Free ; God Freely Willeth the existence of this worm or pile of grass : he so Willed it that he could have not willed it , or nilled it . But his own Being is necessary , and cannot but be : Therefore , &c. It seems hard to say , that God did as necessarily Will the pardoning of your sins , as he is necessarily God : Or that he could no more have Willed one pile of grass more or lesse on the earth , or one sand more or lesse on the Sea-shore , or one day more or lesse to any mans life , then he could cease to be God . This is a short way of answering Beverovicius question , and of answering the presumptuous enquiry , Whether God could have made any thing better , and a thousand more ? Itane etiam ipsum Numen fato constringitur ? Is it a good Argument ? Deus est : ergo n●cesse est Creaturas esse , nec plures , nec pauciores , nec priùs , nec posteriùs , & c ? One of my Rabbi's ( by whose name I have acquainted Mr. K. with my ignorance ) answereth that Gods Decrees are Free , Solum per terminationem ad extraneum , seu in quantum Volitio Dei , circa objectum aliquod extrinsecum practicè est . But this is as much as to say , No Immanent act is Free : For Immanent acts ( at least if Mr. K. know ) are not terminated in any thing wihtout : Or if a man should say , that those that have an extrinsick object , are objectively terminated in something extrinsick ; yet this seems none of the Authours sense ( as the word practicè shews : ) and if it were ( as perhaps it is ) his words would run thus : [ Gods Decrees are free , onely as they are such and such Decrees about such objects : ] which would but yield the cause , that as such Decrees they are not the same formally with the divine Essence . And were it not for the Connotation of the Object , it were no Decree , nor to be called , but simply Gods Essence . I am sure Dr. Twisse will be fully and earnestly enough for those that maintain the liberty of the Divine Decrees which we now mention : and therefore I suppose Mr. K. will be of the same minde .

And that there is not such clear Evidence in this case , as to embolden men to such confident Conclusions , or to build so much on them , as some do , let Suarez perplexed Dispute Metaph . Disp . 30. Sect . 9. testifie , Quomodo cum divina libertate stet Immutabilitas ? Where after the producing of many opinions , and the Arguments and Answers , he concludes , Ex his quae circa has opiniones dicta sunt , satis ( ut opinor ) declaratum est quanta sit hujus opinionis difficultas ; faciliusque esse quamlibet ejus partem impugnare , quam aliquam probe defendere , aut explicare . Quapropter non vereor Confiteri nihil me invenire quod mihi satisfaciat , nisi hoc solum , in hujusmodi rebus id de Deo esse credendum , quod ineffabili ejus perfectioni magis sit consentaneum , quodque ab omni imperfectione alienum sit , &c. ] And how uncertain are men , that some of those things may not consist with the Divine Perfection , which yet they confidently affirm to be inconsistent with it ? If it be a point that is so farre past the reach of Suarez and many other such subtil Disputers , I think Mr. K. should not pretend to so full an insight into it , which may raise him to that confidence which is here expressed ; much lesse should he think it so obvious to the understandings of his inferiours .

How light so ever Dr. Twiss make of them , certainly they are accounted no children among the most learned of their side , who do ●each , That there may be so far a Beginning and Ceasing of Gods Immanent acts , which have a mutable object , without any change in God himself , as that they may have a new transition to the object , and so God may Will that which before he Willed not , though yet it be all by one simple act . Of this minde is Penottus , Lychetus , Fr. a Sancta Clara : And the said Sancta Clara ▪ citeth others as countenancing his Doctrine . But though there are but few for this opinion , yet for the formal distinction of Gods Immanent acts ( which as is said , seems to be as inconsistent with his simplicity , as this with his Immutability ) there are many and that of the most Learned : Vid. quae habet Scotus in sent . l. 1. dist . 8. Qu . 3. & dist . 2. Qu . 4. & 7. & dist . 34. & passim . And Rada saith , that Scoti sententiam ab ejus diebus universa Pariensis Schola semper amplexata fuerit , necnon & Lovaniensis atque Bononiensis Academia ; Et in universa Italia apud omnes vivos doctos est celebris & famosa . In Contr 4. And their Reasons are not contemptible , which may be seen in their several Writers : Specially in those that have wrote whole books of the Formalities . Or Rada ( a man of a clear understanding and expression ) will afford you many in that one Contr . 4. which are worthy consideration . And if Ph. Faber Faventinus his reconciling Interpretation of their Distinction Rationis Ratiocinatae , will prove their sense , then many of the Thomists are also of the same minde . Vid . Faventin . Tract . de formalitat . cap . 3.

I do not mean by this Argument to conclude that there must be ( or in all cases may be ) an Inception or Cessation of those Acts which admit of a formal Distinction : But only thus , that if a formal Distinction be consistent with the Divine simplicity , then an Inception and Cessation of some such formalities ( or acts , quoad formales differentias ) may seem consistent with Gods Immutability : ( And I know no other Argument of moment then left , if that be solved . ) What these formalities are , I do not wonder , if they give but a dark account : Yet that they are different objective conceptions they agree . And as Rada saith , ad Distinctionem formalem duo requiruntur . Alterum est , quod utrumque distinctionis extremum dicat aliquid Positivum in re , seclusa operatione Intellectus : Alterum est , quod utrumque extremum dicat propriam formalitatem , secundum quam sit in rerum natura extra suam ●ausam . And Scotus himself saith of this as applied to God ; Quod Forma in creaturis habet aliquid imperfectionis , scilicet quod est Forma informans aliquid , & Pars compositi : aliquid etiam habet quod non est imperfectionis , sed consequitur ●am secundum suam rationem essentialem sive formalem , scilicet , quod ipsa sit quo aliquid est tale , e . g . sapientia in nobis est Accidens , hoc est imperfectionis : sed quod ipsa sit quo aliquid est sapiens , hoc non est imperfectionis , sed essentialis rationis sapientiae . In divinis autem nihil est forma ; secundum illam duplicem rationem imperfectionis , quia nec Informans , nec pars : est tamen ibi sapientia in quantum est quo illud in quo ipsa est , est sapiens , & hoc non per aliquam compositionem , &c. Sent . 1. dist . 8. Q. 3.

Some think yet clearer Arguments might be fetcht from the Hypostatical Union , from the Acts of generation and spiration , or Love , whereby the Son is begotten of the Father , and the holy Ghost proceedeth from the Father and the Son , and from the distinction of Persons in the Trinity . But I will stop here ( as having run further then I intended ) lest you should mis-interpret me , and think , that I own all these Arguments that I touch upon . I know what D. Twiss against Pennotus hath said to one or two of them , and what the Schoolmen commonly say to the same ▪ I mention these only to shew that a full or clear solution of these doubts is not also facile and obvious , as you seem to imagine .

I must again intreat you , and every ingenious Reader , to fasten no opinion on me , but what I own , at least none which I disclaim . If I must be of one side in this Controversie , I will be of Mr. Kendals side , and say , that God hath but one act immanent , and that is Eternal . But my thoughts are , that we know not what we talk of when we speak thus , and therefore I will not be of any side in this .

I think , 1. That God hath no Act at all in proper speech : but both Acting , and Understanding , and Willing are by a very , very , very low remote Analogy ascribed to him .

2. Yet I am ready to think , that as we are fain for our own understanding , to speak of God as Acting , Understanding , Willing , Loving , &c. and also for our own understanding to distinguish his Perfections , Properties , Acts , &c. which are but one , so may and must we as much speak of some of his Acts , as beginning and ending ( which yet perhaps do not in themselves : ) For the Reason and Necessity seems to be the same . For because the word [ Knowledge or Understanding ] is first used and applied to mans act of Knowledge , and signifieth first only such a Knowledge as is diversified by objects ; yea and man can have no proper positive Conception of a Knowledge which is not diversified by the diversity of Objects ( but onely a Negative Conception ; ) therefore it is that we are forced to speak of Gods Knowledge ( and so of his Will and other Acts ) as divers or distinct : as Divines generally do . And on the same Grounds , as man hath no positive Conception of any Knowledge or Will , about mutable objects , which is not varied with these objects , as to the Being , Beginning and Ending , therefore we must as necessarily denominate Gods acts about such objects , as Beginning and Ending , as we must denominate them Divers . And so we may well say , God willed from Eternity the futurition of the worlds Creation , and Christs Death , &c. But now he doth not will their futurition , but their preterition : and that he Loveth now ( as believers in Christ ) those whom he before Hated as Workers of Iniquity ; and that he is satisfied and well-pleased in his Son , and his Sacrifice , who was not so before . Me thinks Mr. K. should think this language as fit for the mouths and pens of Divines , as the former , and not to be blamed or accused as erroneous , because improper , as long as we must speak improperly of God , or not at all . And I am sure that Scripture speaks of God in this language , ascribing to him Immanent acts , as new or as ceasing , and as moved by exteriour causes : Therefore this way of speaking is not unfit or intolerable .

The Summe of all that I say therefore is but this , That we cannot conceive of Gods Immanent acts , as in themselves they are ( nor are they truely the same things that we conceive of , when we apply the several denominations to them : ) and therefore we must conceive of them by Resemblance to the Acts of Man so denominated , still acknowledging the Impropriety of the terms , and disclaiming all those Imperfections which in man they do express .

But because Mr. K. hath spoken so much to this point already , it s like he will take it ill if I take no notice of it . I will therefore a little insist on the consideration of what he saith on it , to Mr. Goodwin , pag . 93 , 94. ( but briefly , as being not to me . )

§. 6.

Mr. K. THis is such a Reason as most of your Disciples needed your favour to reade a Logick Lecture to them , that they might be in a Capacity to give their Judgements on it : You not having been pleased to do it , I will for once gratifie them with a Cast of my old Office ; and now supposing my self again in my Deans Chair , I gravely begin thus . That Univocum is that which is attributed to several things according to the same Name , and Nature signified by that name ; as Animal to a Man and an Asse , to which are opposed on the one hand Aequivocum , which is attributed according to the same Name , but not signifying the same Nature , as Canis which is said of a Starre , a Beast , and a Fish : either hath the same name Canis , but their natures are as different as Heaven , Earth and Water . On the other hand Analogum , which is attributed according to the same Name , and as signifying the same Nature ; but not in the like manner . Now this same Analogum is of two sorts ; The terms are promiscuously jumbled together by the Logickmongers , but let that be , 1. Proportionis ; when the same Name is given to things of the Like , but not the same Nature : as Laughing , &c ▪ 2. Attributionis : where the same Name is given to divers things , according to the same Nature : but this same Nature doth not agree to them alike ; but to the one first , to the other afterwards , secundum priùs & posteriùs : yea to the later dependantly on the first : as Substance and Accident are each of them Ens , a thing , &c.

§. 6.

R ▪ B. HOld a little . 1. The first part of your task , you have competently performed , viz. to acquaint us of the lower O●bs of your ancient Dignity : Our distance is so great from the Superiour Planets , that we might never have heard of your Deans Chair , had you not happily here informed us : But I hope you had a more noble Imploiment in your Deans Chair , then this poor , common , Inferiour work , to tell men of Univocum aequivocum & Analogum , and to distinguish Analogum Proportionis & Attributionis : But though I had not the happiness to be educated at your feet , yet in this your Learned , Elaborate , Polemical writing , I may , no doubt , expect the best of your Judgement ; and may conjecture what you were wont to reade to your Pupils by that which you here so gravely read to Mr. Goodwin . First , you will not , it seems [ jumble the terms so promiscuously as the Logickmongers do : ] But , when these words had raised my expectations of some more exquisite distribution then ordinary , or at least of more apt terms , I am put off with the old distinction , not only common in the Schoolmen , but in the multitudes of Logick and Metaphysick Writers , which I had thought you had disdained : Not the smallest Senguerdius but hath it ; ( onely he , with many others term it , but Barbarous ; whereas Keckerman terms it Insipid , and Burgersdicius inept : ) And Rutgersius saith , that Analogorum nomine solum ea dicuntur quae secundum proportionem apud Aristotelem vocantur , prout notant interpretes ex cap . 16. post c . 15. maxime verò ex c . 6. 1. Ethic . &c. Usus tamen Latinae Scholae & Philosophorum obtinuit , ut etiam ea quae secundum attributionem vocantur analogorum nomine censeantur .

But though your Distinction be very ordinary , I confesse there is more then ordinary in your Explication of the members : But it is of such a nature , as makes me begin to abate the apprehensions of my infelicity , in that I had never the happiness to be your Auditor , and to have Learned Logick at your feet . Your Analogum in genere , is that [ which is attributed according to the same name , and as signifying the same Nature , but not in the like manner . ] Your Analogum proportionis , is [ when the same name is given to things of the like , but not the same nature . ] Analogum in Genere , is of the same nature , as well as Name . Analogum Proportionis , is not the same Nature , but the Like . And so the nature of the Genus is not in the Species : Nay they are contrary one to the other : and onely the later member ( Analogum Attributionis ) remains an Analogum , and each Species receives not the definition of the Genus . If this be the Doctrine which you so [ Gravely deliver from your Deans Chair , I will say as you do [ I cannot perswade my self to leave my old Doctors to follow You . ] I will even turn to poor Keckerman , Burgersdicius , Suarez again ; yea to a Rutgersius , Jacchaeus , Gorlaeus , Serguerdius , Alstedius , or any body that 's near me of this generation , before I will swallow what I cannot digest .

§. 7.

Mr. K. NOw if Substance and Accident be Analoga , because of the dependance of Accidents on the Subject , then what ever is predicated of God and the Creature , must be predicated Analogically , because the creature hath it not but by dependance on God , but God independently from the Creature : And as the Being of the Creature , is derived from God in fieri , and depends on him in facto esse ; so questionless the Knowledge of the Creature , is but a beam from the fountain of light , which is in God , and cannot longer subsist , then he vouchsafeth to preserve it by a continued irradiation , &c.

§. 7.

R. B. 1. I Would rather say that Substance and Accident are Analogata , then Analoga ; but you may use your Liberty , and call the Analoga , Analogata . 2. I should think that it is not directly and strictly [ Because of the dependance of Accidents on the Subject , that Substance and Accident are Analogata : but because of the Imperfect Entity which through this dependance the Acdents have in the more perfect Entity of the Subject . 3. It is not that most Generall Analogum , [ Ens ] as appliable to God and the Creature , that we are now in question of . But it is those inferiour of [ Fore-knowledge , Knowledge , Will , Election , &c. ] 1. Your [ Because ] is unsound , and I conceive your Consequence is false , viz. [ then whatsoever is predicated of God and the Creature must be predicated Analogically ] Do you think that nothing may be spoken equivocally of God and the Creature ? If you do , you are a singular man . 5. I hope you do not think that our knowledge depends on God , as Accidents on the Subject : If you do , then God hath many Accidents indeed , were that true : I had rather say plainly , that God effecteth our knowledge ( by way of natural Causation in some respect , and by moral Causation in other respects ) as that which had no Being before , then to talk of Emanation as a Beam from the fountain of Light ; considering what ill use many in these times have made of the doctrine of Emanation . 6. It seems by your former Conclusion [ whatsoever is predicated of God and the Creature , must be predicated Analogically ] and by your present predication of [ The fountain of Light which is in God ] that you judge [ Light ] or [ the fountain of Light ] to be predicated Analogically of God too . Which if you do , and this also must be by Analogy of Attribution , then it seems Heat , Cold , Gravity , Levity , Density , Rarity , Composition , or what ever is in the Creature may be thus attributed to God . 7. As to the point it self in question , 1. I will not meddle with that old Controversie , Whether Ens be spoken of God and the Creature Univocally , Aequivocally or Analogically . I have seen what Scotus saith for his opinion in Sent . 2. dist . 12. & alibi . & 1. dist . 3. q . 1. & 3. And what Anth. Andreas 4. Metaph . q . 1. Meurisse Metaph . Scot . l 1. Qu . 8. p. 108 , &c. And Phil . Faber . Faventin . Phys . Scot . Theorem . 95. pag . 654 , &c. Rada , and others say for it : And what Occham in 1. Sent . dist . 2. q . 8. And Guil . Rubio , say for the Nominals opinion : And what Cajetan saith against the Scotists . ( By which Scotists the sense of Univocation , Aequivocation , and Analogy , is a little more subtilly opened , then Mr K. doth out of his Deans Chair . ) But the Question that I speak to , is onely how farre Intelligere , Velle and Agere , may be Attributed to God . 2. And for the distribution of Analoga , and the sense of Analogy , I think , it will be long ere the Chair-men are agreed . Meurisse out of Rubio saith , Univocum opponi soli aequivoco , non verò Analogo , & denominativo : quia Univocum se habet ad aequivocum si cut Unum ad Multa : Unum autem propriè solum multis opponitur : se hahet autem ad Analogum & denominativum , tanquam veluti superius ad sua inferiora : Quia Univocum aliud est purum , aliud est non purum : Non purum est aut Analogum , aut Denominativum . Nullum superius autem oppenitur suis inferioribus : Itaque Univocum non opponitur Analogo & Denominativo ; sed ab Analogo distinguitur tanquam Univocum purum , & à Denominativo Univocum quidditativum , seu illud quod est & praedicatum Univocum & Univocè praedicatur . Others innumerate Analoga with the Homonyma , distinct from Synonima .

Goclenius ( who speaks largely of it ) gives this distribution , Lexic . Philos . p. 100. I think in fitter terms then Mr. Kendal .

Analoga sunt Proportione Propriâ : ut Ens , bonum , principium , natura , motus , &c. Impropria Attributionetantum : ut sanum ad animal & medicamentum . Translataproportione : Risus , comparatione bominis & prati .

But I think poor contemptible Keckerman and Burgersdicius have better explained and distributed Homonyma and Analoga , then all that ever I had the hap to be acquainted with , not excepting the subtillest Scotists . 3. As for the application hereof to our Question , I still affirm , That the thing which the word [ Knowledge ] is spoken of , in God , is not only more eminently and perfectly in him then the Creature , but is only in him , and not in the creature at all : And the thing which the word Knowledge is spoken of , or doth signifie in man , is not at all formaliter in God , but there is in him something of an Infinite , transcendent Excellency above it , which makes it useless ; and in God it would be Imperfection : And therefore it may be said to be in God eminenter non formaliter : The word [ Knowledge ] is first used to signifie the knowledge of man : It is translated to press to us that Incomprehensible perfection of God , which we cannot otherwise conceive of or express . Yet when ever we make use of the term , we cannot by it our selves attain to a conception , positive and true , of any higher thing then such knowledge as our own , with some negative additions , for removal of the Imperfections ; as that it is Infinite , &c. so that man can have no true positive Conception of the Nature of that which in God we call Knowledge : Only he apprehendeth it to be somewhat like that which in man is called Knowledge . But Like is not the same . As Goclenius out of Aristot . {αβγδ} non sunt {αβγδ} . similia Analogia non sunt ejusdem generis : non sunt eadem genere . It is therefore a proper speech to say [ Knowledge is not in God ] and proper to say , it is in man : But yet it is a necessary speech to say [ God knows ] because we have no fitter expression for that perfection of God , which we so call . Aquin . de Veritate Mater . zda Qu . 1. saith , Et quia nulla Ratio significata per ipsum nomen definit ipsum Deum , nullum nomen à nobis impositum est propriè nomen ejus ; sed est propriè creaturae quae definitur ratione significata per nomen : Et tamen ista nomina quae suns Creaturarum nomina Deo attribuuntur secundum quod in Creaturis aliqua similitudo ejus representatur . The third Opinion which he there rejecteth is , That Knowledge is attributed to God Metaphorically , as Anger is ; against which he opposeth his fourth , Et ideo aliter dicendum est , quod scientia Deo attributa significat aliquid quod in Deo est . ] As if these might not well consist ! Even a Metaphorical expression doth expresse something that is in God , though it expresse it but Metaphorically . And in Qu . undecima , he hath no better answer to the fifth Objection , which is drawn from [ the greater distance between God and us , then between Ens Creatum & non Ens ] then this , Ad 5m dicendum , quod Enti & non Enti aliquid secundum analogiam convenit : quod ipsum non ens analogicè dicitur Ens : ut dicitur in 4o Metaph . Unde nec distantia quae est inter creaturam & Deum communitatem analogicè impedire potest . If the Analogy between Gods Acts , Knowledge , Will , and ours , be no nearer then between Ens & non ens , sure it is not such as you imagine , and here express . And contra Gentil . l. 1. c . 31. he confesseth , that in omni nomineà nobis dicto , quantum ad modum signandi imperfectio invenitur quae Deo non competit , quamois res signata aliquo modo eminenti Deo conveniat . Now scire , velle , agere , a●e terms properly fitted only to mans imperfect Mode of Knowing , Willing , Acting and do afford us no positive Conception of any other : so that if we could devise some genus which did comprehend Gods acts perfectè and mans imperfectè , as Ens doth substance and Accident , yet that must not be Knowledge or Will : For these are the proper names of the Genus imperfectum : As if you should say , Substantia est Accidens . A certain kinde of Comprehension of the Creature God hath , whose Nature being to us unknown , the proper name is unknown too , and therefore we are fain to call it by the proper name of mans comprehension , i.e. Intellection and Science . And all Divines confess , that as to the order of knowing , and so as to the name we must first begin with the creature , to whom the name is first applicable . So Aquinas contra Gentil . l. 1. c . 35. Quia ex rebus aliis in Dei cognitionem pervenimus , res nominatim de Deo & aliis rebus dictorum , per prius est in Deo secundum suum modum ; sed ratio nominis per posterius : unde & nominari dicitur à suis causatis . So Goclenius Lexic . Philosoph . de Analog . Duo sunt distinguenda ; nimirum res ipsae per nomina significatae , & nominum impositio . Ad res ipsas quod attinet , prius ex de Deo prae dicantur , quam de creaturis . Atque hic propriè ordo est & convenientia , quam habent creaturae ad Deum ; cujus ordinis causa dicuntur nomina Analogicè de Deo & de Creaturis praedicari . Quod vero attinet ad nominum Rationem & Impositionem prius iis nominibus app●llatae sucrunt res creatae quam Deus . Quare quod dicimus analogicè praedicari nomina de Deo & de Creaturis , quia prius de Deo quam de Creaturis : de Analogia reali seu secundum rem , non autem secundum nominis rationem intelligendum est . Zanchy hath the same words , whose they are first I know not . How fit a speech this is , de Analogia reali , I leave to others to judge : but all grant that the Name is first applied to the Creature , and thence to God . Now all this holds of meer Metaphorical expressions .

To use Burgersdicius dist●ibution , I yield that these names applied to God and the Creature , are not Homonyma à casu , ( such as Aquinas cont Gentil . ubi sup . expresseth his meer aequivocals to be ) but à consilio . But whether the Ratio Homonymiae be in Rebus , or in nobis , is not easie certainly to determine . Keckerman saith , Ambigua ex similitudine conceptus est , cum rebus toto genere diversis , ut Deo & Creaturis , idem nomen tribuitur ex cognatione quam mens format . Nimirum intellectus noster ut atque idcircò in Deo nihil concipit directè , sed obliquè ex similitudine quadam , & imagine rei sinitae tanquam objecti sibi congruentis . Hinc a nobis Deo & attributis ejus voces certae , propriae ac direct● imponi nequiverunt , sed indirectae tantum , homonymae , & ex similitudine eâ qua Deus nobis repraesentatur in creaturis tanquam effectis , quae repraesentatio valde imperfecta est . Nomen Jehova , i.e. , sibi ipsi imposuit Deus , at nos ne id quidem directè concipimus : reliqua autem quae Deo tribuimus , ut misericordiam , Justitiam , &c. cjusmodi vocibus exprimimus quae directè impositae sunt virtutibus hominum significandis , indirectè autem ad Dcum pertinent , quatenus nos tales in Deo virtutes similitudine earum quae in hominibus sunt virtutum concipimus . Unde non minùs pic quam scite Cyrillus , in his quae de Deo dicuntur , Maxima scientia est Ignorantiam confiteri : & Augustinus , Deus , inquit , magnus est , sed sine quantitate , Bonus , sed sine qualitate : ut verò à nobis magnum sine quantitate , bonum sine qualitate directè & plenè concipi , est impossibile , &c. Et Julius Scaliger , Nullis , ait , vocibus tam plenè Deum significamus , quam iis quae Ignorantiam nostram praetendunt .

But suppose it be granted , that the Ratio Homonymiae is not only in nobis , sed in rebus , the question will remain , Whether it be ob inaequalem generis attributionem , or only ob similitudinem , vel mutuam rerum ad se invicem habitudinem ? and so be Tropical ? Mr. K. asserteth the former ( under the name of Analogy of Attribution . ) The Scotists have long defended then Doctors Assertion , that Deus non est in genere . Vid . Fab . Faventin . Phys . Scot . Theorem . 96. his Vindication against Greg . Ariminensis and Bacconius : and many others of them have done this at large . So doth Wickleff . in his Trialog .

And if this hold , then nothing can be attributed to God and the Creature by this Analogy , per inaequalem generis attributionem . Yea Aquinas himself oft saith , Deus non est in genere ( as Sarnanus notes ) in 1. p. q. 3. a. 5. & 1. d . 8. q . 4. a. 2. 3m . & 1. cont . Gent . c . 25. though after in q. de Potentia q. 7. a. 3. ad ult . Concedit Deum esse Genere substantiae reductivè : which Scotus refuteth . So Estius in ●m Sent . d . 8. § . 10. denieth God to be in ullo genere . And Sarnanus hath no more to say for it in his Conciliation ( pag . 15 ) then this , Esse in genere stat dupliciter : primo modo ut pars subjectiva contenta in illo genere : Et sic negatur Deum esse in genere . Secundo modo , ut principium Continens ipsum Genus : Et hoc modo Deus per appropriationem est in Genere substantiae . Vid . Gab . Biel . 1. Sent . dist . 8. q . 1. But this is not for God to be in genere , but for that Genus to be in God .

As Burgersdicius saith , Omnium longissimè à Synonymis absunt homonyma a Casu , quaeque causam homonymiae habent in nobis : propriùs ad synonymorum naturam accedunt Tropica , ac imprimis Analoga : at omnium proximè quae ambigua sunt ob inaequalem attributionem . That these words are not spoken of God and the creature univocè all of us agree , and the Schoolmen have fully evinced . Also that they are not spoken purè aequivocè , we are also agreed , and the said Schoolmen have evinced ( as particularly Aquin . in sum . de Verit . ubi sup . by many Reasons : And Zanchius de Natura Dei borrows many of them . ) But which of the other kindes of homonymy they belong to , is the doubt . Mr. K. thinks that which of all other is the nearest to synonymy : I think not so : but rather to the Tropical or Analogical , strictly so called , that is , vel propter similitudinem simplicem , vel proportionem ( if not some of them , to those that have the Rationem homonymiae in nobis ) Jacchaeus saith ( Metaph . l. 1. c . 6. ) Ego vero mallem istam Analogiam r●ferre ad proportional●tatis Analogiam , non Metaphoricam illam ( quomodo videre attribuitur oculo & menti ) sed propriam , quomodo principium dicitur de corde , & fundamento domus . So he disclaims Mr. K's Analogy of Attribution : If the thing be not utterly uncertain to us , who know so little of Gods nature . But that we may venture on a conjecture , I should rather set the Creature at a greater distance from God then they do : and think that these Attributes are all Tropical , somewhat Metonymical , but mostly Metaphorical . I never saw ( in Aquinas or any other Schoolman that spoke for it ) any cogent Reason to prove , that Intelligere , Velle , Agere , Amare , are attributed to God in any other kinde then Reminisci , Gaudere , Odio habere , Irasci , &c. Only a gradual difference , I easily acknowledge , viz. That Intelligere & Velle having lesse Imperfection , have therefore lesse impropriety . And who knows not that there is a wide difference of this sort among Metaphors , some being very near , and some so farre fetcht , as to be Catachrestical Durandus saith ( in 1. sent dist . 34. q . 4 ) Nullum nomen attribuimus Deo nisi ex Creaturis : non enim ponimus nomen nisi rei quam intelligimus ; & quia non intelligimus ● eum , nisi ex creaturis , & tantum quantum concludimus excreaturis , ideo nullum nomen imponimus Deo nisi excreaturis , & quantum ad illa , quae concludimus convenire Deo excreaturis : constat autem quod non omnia nomina quae attribuimus Deo dicuntur de eo translativè & metaphori●è , &c. Solum autem illa nomina dicuntur de Deo translativè & metaphoricè quae significant speciales qu dditates rerum creatarum : vel perfectiones secundum modum creaturis convenientem , ut Leo , Agnus , Sentire , &c. Quia res significata per haec nomina non est in Deo , sed aliqua ejus similitudo , ut fortitudo , mansuc●udo , & cognitio singularium , quae in nobis pertinet ad sensum . But I would fain see it proved , That Intelligere , Velle , Agere , do not as properly signifie perfectiones secundum modum Creaturis convenientem , as sentire doth ? And when we say segetes fluctuant , fluctnation is no more proper to the motion of the waters , then Intelligere , Velle , Agere , are to the perfections and action of man , or other rational creatures . And whereas they say that the terms are applied to God , with a Remotion of the Imperfections which they imply in us , I answer , So they may say of those lower terms , which they confesse to be Metaphorical , only allowing a gradual difference of impropriety . Nor doth it follow therefore that there is no truth in these expressions of God , or that they are no helps to our knowledge of him , or means of demonstration . For Metaphors are not as pure equivocals : There 's some common reason in the similitude , though in the first and proper sense the name be proper to one . When we say , Segetes fluctuant , we expresse not only Motion , wherein both agree , but a motion of the Corn like that of the Water . I think , as I said before , that it is no more proper to call God Scientem , Volentem , Agentem , then to call the Firmament a Nut-shell , because both seem to have a convexity or concavity , or contain something else within , &c. Or to call the Sunne Reptile , or a creeping thing , because it moves , and so do creeping things : or then it is proper to call Knowledge , Light , or to put Video for Intelligo ( as Mr. K. cals God the fountain of Light before . ) The Scripture saith , God is Light : yet I think this will be easily confessed a Metaphor : and I think it is but Metaphora propinquior , to say , Deus Intelligit , Vult , Agit , &c. And this I judge after long consideration of what Aquinas hath said , 1. q . 14. a. 1. & q. 19. a. 1. & alibi : and many other Schoolmen to the like purpose .

Shall I adde one Argument for the Negative ( that it is not by Analogy of Attribution , that Knowledge , Will , Power , &c. are attributed to God and the Creature ; as Ens is to Substance and Accident ) ad hominem specially ? That Knowledge which is the same thing with Will and Power , cannot be the one of the Analogates with our Knowledge which is not the same ; in this kinde of Analogy ob inaequalem generis distributionem : ( supposing Knowledge to be the Genus Analogum . ) But Gods Knowledge is maintained by those that I dispute with , to be the same with his Will and Power ) many say , they differ but denominatione extrinsecâ : ) Therefore , &c. For the proof of the major , consider : Else on the same grounds [ Power ] might be thus analogically spoken of Gods Knowledge and mans Power : For where there is no difference in the Thing , there needs to be none in the Name , as requisite from the Nature of the Thing ( but only from some extrinsick respect or use ) But Power may not Analogically be spoken de Potestate humana , & scientia divina Ergo , &c. Common reason and use of speech confirms the minor . It seems therefore to be evident truth , that as it is from similitude , or some Tropical respect , that Gods Immanent acts , have divers names , rather then one alone : so is it from the same reason that they have these particular names , rather then other : And consequently that these names are not Analoga inaequalis Attributionis naturae communis ; but Analoga Proportionis , or Tropical . Durandus ( in sent . 1. dist . 2. q . 2. ) saith , Alia est opinio quae mihi videtur verior , viz. quod distinctio attributorum , secundum rationem non potest sumi , nisi per comparationem ad aliquam realem diversitatem actu existentem in creaturis , vel possibilem . Quod prob . 1. sic . Differentia Rationis , nisi sit falsa & vana , licet sit completive ab intellectu , oportet tamen quod habeat fundamentum in re : sed differentia attributorum secundum rationem non potest habere sufficiens fundamen●●● in natura divina absolutè accepta ; nisi comparetur ad realem diversitatem quae in creaturis est , vel esse potest , ergo differentia attributorum divinorum secundum rationem , non potest verè sumi nisi per comparationem ad creaturas . Major patet : ratio enim , quam intellectus format , nisi fundetur aliqualiter in re , ficta est & vana , &c. Vide reliq .

I will only adde the words of Burgersdicius Metaphys . l. 2. c . 8. § . 1. sequuntur ea ( attributa ) quae creaturis communicari posse diximus , saltem {αβγδ} : quae tamen analogia non in ipsis Dei attributis , sed in ipsorum effectis fine operationibus quaerenda est . Nam cum attributa infinita sint , aeque atque ipsa Dei essentia , & attributa incommunicabilia , nullam habent c●m creaturis {αβγδ} , nisi in suis suis operationibus circa objecta Creata & finita . Apply this to Immanent Acts.

§. 8.

Mr. K. pag . 94. IF Fore-knowledge in God and the Creature be not univocally the same , as surely they are not , then is this Fore-knowledge attributed to God and the Creature , either Equivocally or Analogically : If Equivocally , then hath the Fore-knowledge of God and the Creature only the same Name : But that is not so ; for God , I hope , fore-knows as truly as the Creature , and the Creature may sometimes truly fore-know . So that here is more then a nominal agreement between Gods and the Creatures fore-knowledge . It remains therefore that this fore-knowledge be attributed to God and the Creature Analogically : but is this Analogie either of Proportion or Attribution ? If of Proportion , then either God or the Creature is is said to fore-know , but either Metaphorically or Metonymically . If only Metaphorically ; I pray which of them is but Metaphorically said to fore-know ? Not the Creature , &c. And surely much less may God be only Metaphorically said to fore-know these , and all other things that shall come to pass in all Ages . If only Metonymically , as some things are said to be healthy , because they have the signs of sanity in them , ( I am bold to use the Boyes instance in this case ) Is either God or the Creature only Metonymically said to fore-know ? Not the Creature , &c. Not God , for he is the Author of our fore-knowledge : and therefore though his essence be not the subject of his fore-knowledge , ●or his fore knowledge an Accident of his Nature , yet is he said to fore-know without being beholden to any such poor Trope for it . It rests therefore that fore-knowledge is attributed to God by more then this Analogie of Proporoion , and consequently by that of Attribution Now I demand which is the famosius Analogatum ? Gods fore-knowledge , or the Creatures ? Questionless Gods : there being infinitely greater Cause to set the Crown on Gods fore-knowledge , then on that of the Creatures , then there is to set it on substance rather then accident . If so , &c. then onward , as Analogatum per se posi●um stat per famosiori Analogato , so true fore-knowledge mentioned by it self , must alwayes be construed of the fore-knowledge of God : and therefore fore-knowledge is most properly attributable to God . And thus being now willing to resign my place , Haec sufficiant pro nunc .

§. 8.

R. B. IF I had once done with you , I would take heed of dealing with a Chairman again in haste , for your sake : for I finde I run upon a great disadvantage . For the credit of such mens understandings is so great with themselves at least , that they need no Argument , but their bare affirmation to carry the Cause . Your sole Argument [ sic dico ] doth put me harder to it , then if you had many : For what to say to this , I do not well know . Dispute against it , I cannot : and to set my Negation against your affirmation , will not do , till we stand on even ground .

1. Aquinas de verit . and many another Schoolman ( and Zanchy out of them ) might have helpt you to more cogent Arguments , against meer aequivocal denomination . When you speak of Gods fore-knowing , as [ truly ] that word [ truly ] is either opposed to feigned and false , or to improperly : that in God which the term [ fore-knowledge ] doth denote , is Truly in him , and him alone , but that which the word [ fore-knowledge ] doth properly and primarily signifie , is not in God .

2. Our Rabbi ▪ s ( as you call them ab alto with a smile ) do seem to us punies , to make a fuller distribution then you ; as I have before shewed : and therefore we take yours to be defective , and consequently your reasoning void : I have told you of divers that please me better .

3. How greedily did I reade on , and follow you at the heels , to see how you proved that it is not spoken of God Metaphorically ? and when I come to the businesse , What 's the proof ? Why you say [ surely much lesse may God be onely metaphorically said to fore-know . ] You passe your word on it : And this is the knotty Argument that I cannot answer , because I am not of your standing in the University : A little more of the University would have done me no harm ( as you say ) when I am to deal with this kinde of Argument .

4. Our Tutor Burgersdieius told us , I remember , that in caetoris tropis non minus est homonymiae locus , quam in Metaphora . And therefore Metaphorical and Metonymical , are not a sufficient enumeration .

5. Do not think ever the worse of your self for using the Boyes instance : for ( as you have partly salved your credit by intimating that you are above it , so ) Aquinas , Scotus , and most of the Schoolmen that I have read , besides Zanchius , and many another of our great Divines , do make use of the same instance : And to play with this bigger sort of Boyes , is no such disgrace to you .

6. Here I meet with a thing that runs in the form of a Reason : [ for he is the Author of our fore-knowledge ] therefore he fore-knoweth not onely Metonymically . I confesse the Conclusion is true ; but I see not the reason of the consequence . As I remember a Metonymy of the effect is , when the efficient is signified by the name of the effect , either by a Verb , as pallet pro metuit , or an Adjective , as mors pallida ; or a Substantive , as scelus pro scelesto ( I purposely choose the Boyes examples , as best beseeming me . ) And I have heard men often call Mr. Nath . Ward , Discolliminium , and the simple Cobler : And the Author of that Comedy , by the name of Ignoramus . I confesse it is a good Argument [ He is the Author of our fore-knowledge , therefore he hath fore-knowledge eminenter , or somewhat that is more excellent then fore-knowledge . ) But I dare not say , that God hath formally in himself whatsoever he is the Author of . For he is the Author of Nutrition , Augmentation Composition , of Sorrow , of Fear , of Hell , of Worms , Toads and Vipers . But it was the former ( the Metaphorical Denomination , and also that of strict proportion , which some distinguish from the Metaphorical ) which I had hoped you would have disproved . But I must take what will be had .

7. You think you plead for the Glory of the Divine Majesty , when you tell us he need not be beholden to a poor Trope . As if we should dispute , whether the Sunne do creep as reptilia do ? and I say , Yes , Metaphorically : and you will stand up for the honour of the Sun , and say , we debase it ; and that it doth creep without being beholden to a poor Trope for it : Or if the Question were , Whether the Sunne be a Vegetative , or sensitive creature ? and I say , Yes , Metonymically : for it causeth Vegetation and sense . And you will say , It is Vegetative without being beholden to a Trope . What a Patron is he of the honour of mankinde , that will prove that he is a Worm , a Beast , Nothing , and his life a shadow , a dream , a Weavers shuttle , without being beholden to a poor Trope ! Yet are these unspeakably nearer , then the names of man and his acts , to God : for inter finitum & infinitum nulla est proportio .

8. You conclude that the famosius Analogatum , is Gods fore-knowledge , your proof is [ Questionless it is so : ] As strong as the rest . But , when I look further I finde somewhat like a Reason : [ there being Infinitely greater cause to set the Crown on Gods fore-knowledge , &c. ] My dread of Gods most sacred Majesty , forbiddeth me to set on him such a Crown of Vanity . As if the Sun must be the famosius Analogatum inter Reptilia , because the Crown of [ Creeping ] must be set on its head ! What if we should yield to you , that the term [ Knowledge , Will , Action , &c. ] being first Metaphorically applied to God , that yet it is partly Analogical quoad inaequalem Generis attributionem , the term expressing ( though improperly as to one ) a Nature common to both ? It would not yet follow , that here the more noble sort , even Divine Knowledge , &c. were the famosius Analogatum : For though it be most excellent and unexpressibly glorious in it self , yet the term agreeing first with the lower , even humane Knowledge , therefore that is the famosius Analogatum , as being the thing most famously and notoriously meant by that term . If you ask , Whether the Sunne do glissen ( as Glowworms , or rotten wood ) or do Rutilare or Candere ? If you say , Yea ; yet I think the Sunne here is not the famosius Analogatum , though the light which this word intendeth be more eminently in the Sun , then in the other things .

You conclude , that [ true fore-knowledge mentioned by it self , must alwayes be understood of the fore-knowledge of God . ] Is that so indeed ?

1. Why then do the Schoolmen generally acknowledge , that the names are all first applicable to the Creature , though the thing be most excellently in God ?

2. Then , it seems , it is not a strictly proper speech to say [ Man knows , or fore-knows , or Wils , or acteth : ] for none of the Homonyma , are spoken of both , in strict propriety . But if you would undertake to prove , that God may in as strict propriety be said to Know , Will or Act , as man is , there are many that would undertake to prove the terms Univocal : which in most Divines Judgement , would be to prove , that man is God : an opinion , which our new world in the Moon ( in Anglia lunatica ) have very confidently imbraced of late years .

In a word , Sir , my thoughts of man , and his Acts , Knowing , Willing , are so low , and my thoughts of the Infinite God , so high , or at a losse , when I go about to have any positive , true apprehensions of his Nature , that I conceive you and I can no more tell what that is in God which we call Knowing , Willing , Acting , then my Horse can tell what Reasoning or Discourse is in me , or thereabouts . And yet I believe that the Knowledge of God is eternal Life too , viz. Now ( as to the beginning ) to know that there is a God , and that there is somewhat in Him which mans Knowledge , Will , Goodness , Justice , &c. have some exceeding , low , distant resemblance of , and which we cannot better apprehend or express then under such notions , and by such terms ; it being yet in it self of more unconceivable excellency . And though I know the Schoolmen are confident ( without proof ) that Scire , Velle , &c. do express no Imperfection , but only Modal , and therefore may be applied to God ( which I conjecture will also be your Argument ) yet I do not believe that Assertion . Comparatively to lower or equal Creatures , it may be said , that it is not Imperfection , which they express . But absolutely or comparatively as to God , it is Imperfection : Not only some accident or Modus , but the very thing exprest by these terms , is Imperfect : Else the Creature shall have something equal to God , and so be God . And if it were but a Modal Imperfection ; yet when the term doth strictly and properly expresse that Imperfect Modus it self , as well as the Thing , then that term cannot be applied to God any nearlier then Tropically . Knowledge , Will , Action , and all the terms fitted to man , are so strictly fitted to express the humane Mode , as well as that which you separate in your Intellect , and call perfect , that it cannot be applied to one without the other , but abusively or tropically ; No more then [ c●e●ping ] is applicable to the swift motion of the Sun , when the term doth intimately signifie the slowness and Mode of the motion , with the motion it self .

God forbid that I should doubt , whether that in God be Perfect , which we call Knowledge , Will , Action : But what it is that under these names of infinitely remote similitude we do express , what earthly man can tell ? Because I believe Gods Immanent acts to be perfect , therefore I believe them not to be the same thing that man apprehendeth under these terms .

Oh that frail man were more acquainted with his Nothingness ! then would he not dare so to lift up himself in comparison with his Maker ! Then would not the Christian world for so many hundred years have been filled with quarrels about unsearchable Mysteries ; and the great Divines of the Church , be the great Dividers of the Church by voluminous contentions , and censo●ious , uncharitable , zealous emulations about Gods secrets : They would not have fastened upon utter uncertainties , and things unrevealed , and then have stiled their fancies [ the Orthodox Doctrine ] and reproached or quarrelled with those that were dissenters . The world would not have been altogether by the ears about things that they know no more then a beast knows what is the soul of man ; such as many of the Schoolmens writings are , and most of those points in which the Controversies between the Arminians and anti-Arminians , the Jesuites and Dominicans , are untimately resolved : Yea , and your Academ cal Chairs would have been better imployed : and then God would not have been so provoked against them : Nor should I have needed to fear that your Chair is coming down , while I reade here that you are coming down ; nor have cause to salute you so sadly at your descent , as fearing a future vacancy of your resigned place .

§. 9.

Mr. K. Pag . I Shall now see what Mr. Baxter saith , though not to answer this Argument , or any other , yet to detract somewhat from the Reputation of the Conclusion , that there can be no new Immanent act in God , but all are Eternal .

§. 9.

R. B. TO feign a wrong end to a mans speeches , is usually the way to fasten on them a false and alien sense . I therefore who am better acquainted with my own End and meaning then M● . K. is ( as well as he knows me , by looking through his Prospective , Glass from Cornwell to Kidderminster ) shall better acquaint others what was my meaning in the words , which he fastens on . And this is the true and plain Analysis of my words .

Having affirmed Justification to be a transient act , and that therefore the Inception of it argueth no mutation in God , I was fore't to meet with the opinion of Dr Twiss , who takes it to be an Immanent Act , and therefore if it should begin de novo , it would argue a change in God . ( Not speaking of that in fore Conscientiae . )

These two Conclusions therefore I took as certain , and necessary to be held of every knowing Christian .

1. That God doth not change .

2. That God doth not pardon or justifie men from Eternity ; ( no nor from the time of Christs death ) and therefore that he doth in time justifie and forgive men , even when they believe . These two Conclusions being Certain and necessary , I take the later as assaulted by D. Twiss ; who thereby would make them seem inconsistent .

His Argument is , Justification and Remission are Immanent Acts , therefore from Eternity . To this I answer , 1. By denying the Antecedent : For I had before shewed , that they are Transient acts , and what Transient acts they are . 2. Having premised , that no acts are Immanent in God Positively but onely Negatively ( as Schibler speaks ; ) I answered , That many doubt whether Immanent acts are any further Eternal then Transient acts ( which I will open anon when we come to it : ) and therefore that this is not a matter of such Certainty as the Proposition opposed is : and therefore Uncertainties must be reduced to Certainties , and not Certainties to Uncertainties : q. d . I am sure God doth not pardon and Justifie from Eternity from plain Texts of Scripture : But you are not sure that all Immanent acts are Eternal any more then Transient are ; Therefore if these two Propositions were as inconsistent as you imagine , yet I would rather hold the former , and let go the later , then hold the latter and let go the former . Here I supposed it objected , that it is not to be endured that any should argue God of mutability : but the foresaid Doctrine doth so : Therefore , &c. To which I answered , that there is no change in God : and they that do hold this opinion , do yet hold it is consistent with Gods Immutability : and I gave two or three short touches of their reasoning : If you ask me , whom I mean , I answer , I mean Lychetus , Pennottus , Franciscus a Sancta Clara , and in part Suarez and Burgersdicius , in the words which I shall anon cite in his Metaphysicks . And mark that I do not say , that these plead for the Inception or Cessation of Immanent acts : but that Immanent acts are new as Transient are ; that is , not quoad substantiam actus , but transitionem in objectum extraneum . For here it is supposed , that it is not those Immanent acts , whose object is God himself , which is spoke of , but only those that are about the Creature ; Note also , that I never thought of owning this opinion ; but had ever owned the opinion of the Eternity of all Immanent acts ; and so farre as the matter is discernable , do hold to it still : but I take the point in Question to be past our reach ; and therefore not of such Certainty , as to encourage us to reject a plainly revealed truth , upon supposition of their inconsistency .

After this I returned to my first Position , and made it my full , final Answer , that Remission and Justification are Transient acts , and not Immanent , and that in this I had most Divines on my side , though they did not ordinarily explain the Nature of this Transient Act : which thereupon I more fully explain'd .

Thus , Reader , I have given the true Analysis of all these words about Immanent acts , which Mr. K. makes the occasion of his quarrel with me : and which he layeth such a heavy charge on . And , I think , if I had said no more to him , but onely given you this true Analysis , it had been enough to satisfie the impartial , and Judicious , and to free my words from that sandy incoherence and senslesness , which ( not understanding them ) he doth fasten on them in his charge ; and to vindicate my self from those corrupt intentions and errours which he intimates .

§. 10.

Mr. K. FIrst , saith he , Acts have not the respect of the Adjunct to its Subject , but an effect to its cause : Therefore new Immanent Acts will not inferre an alteration in God : Therefore , &c.

To this antecedent , I answer , that no Act is properly an effect , or relates as such to the Cause : the Act is rather the Causality then the effect , as Mr. Baxter may please to learn from his great Doctors in the Metaphysicks , whom I think enough to name in general , though he useth to quote them so exactly , as it were the Chapter and verse .

§. 10.

R. B. IF I have learning enough to understand your meaning , you endeavour in these words to prove two Conclusions . The first and principal ( and I think , the whole scope of your writing ) is , that I am Ignorant and unlearned . The second and subordinate is , that Immanent Acts are certainly Eternal , or that the change of them will inferre a change in God . The first you prove by my Pedantick citing of Schibler and Burgersdicius , the Boyes companions , and that as if they were Doctors in the Metaphysicks , and that so exactly , &c. which you think it enough to name . To this I answer , 1. Your Argument labours of two diseases , 1. Obscurity : which may make some , that know you not , conjecture that your design was scarce honest , which you so carry under hand by intimations , when yet it seems the great Cause of this your undertaking : For my part , I think you would never have mentioned my name here , but to this end . 2. Of Needlesness : If you had stooped so low as to consult me in this business , and opened to me your design , I could by three lines have saved you the writing of these leaves : but that 's too late : But yet I may prevent your voluminous labour perhaps for the future , if I do it yet . Be it known therefore to all men by these presents that I R. B. do confess my self ignorant and unlearned , especially compared with such as Mr. K. and his Genius . Habetis cons●tentem reum . What need you any more Witnesses ? I hope now you may save the main labour of your next writing .

Yet , let me tell you the reason of my crime , a little more fully . I take the common good to be the best . I have about thirty T●actates of Metaphysicks by me ( an ill workman , that needs so many tools ) and I value these two or three Common ones which I cited before all the rest : and I think so do the Schools that use them most commonly . Nor do I see any great reason hitherto to take Mr. K. for a more learned , authentick , unquestionable Doctor in the Metaphysicks , then Suarez , Schibler or Burgersdicius , as highly as I value him above my self . Nor indeed did I ever before this , hear of his name ( to my remembrance ; ) much lesse of his Metaphysical writings . But as soon as ever Mr. K's Metaphysicks come to my hands , if I do not bow to them , & vestigiatanti Philosophi adorare , then let him call me an unreverent fellow .

Now to your second business : Where , 1. I might better have been understood , if you had not left out the fore-going words ; [ by Immanent , they must needs mean Negatively , not Positively . ] For by this they that see all might have understood that , 2. It is Gods acts that I speak of , 3. And you do out of your own brain , affix the Ergo , as if it were mine , making that an Argument , which I there take as presupposed . The rest we will come to anon .

§. 11.

Mr. K. THus when the fire warms my hands , the heating is not the effect ; but the Heat produced in my hand by the fire . This heat now is considerable three manner of wayes . I shall not honour my Papers with the name of Suarez for this , but referre my Reader , if he be a young Scholar , and not satisfied in it , to his Smith and Brerewood .

§. 11.

R. B. YEt again ! You will make men believe that I am grown to some Reputation of Learning , when you think it necessary to use so many words , to prove me a freshman . Is not one word of your mouth enough to blast the reputation of such a puny ?

§. 12.

Mr. K. EIther , 1. As it encreaseth , and in order to the highest degree of heat , and so it is called Motion , which is nothing else but the Terminus in fieri . Or 2. As t is received into the subject , and so it is called Passion , heating like beating being as well taken in a Passive sense as an active . Or , 3. As it is derived from the Agent , and so it is called action : but this action again is considerable two manner of wayes ; Either Physically or Logically . Physically , and so the Patient is the subject of it : the heat which undergoes these several denominations , being in my hand , as was supposed . 2. Logically , and so this action is but an extrinsecal denomination , and the Agent is the subject of it : Now take it how you will , Action is an adjunct , as denominating the agent , no way an effect as an action , &c.

§. 12.

R. B. 1. THe word [ Effect ] is sometime taken for every thing that hath a Being and a Cause , and so every Action is an Effect , as having a Being dependant on its Cause : sometime it is taken more restrainedly , for that only which is permanent after the Action , or is Effected by it , and so Action is not an Effect . 2. The use of your distribution or distinctions to our business seems to me so small , as that I know not well to what end you bring them forth . 3. The order of your distinguishing I have no great minde to learn . I should rather have distinguished Logical and Physical Action , in the first place , had there been any use for it . 4. But your Logical action we have nothing to say to : Nor did I speak de subjecto praedicationis . 5. Yet I have no great desire of imitating you , in calling the Agent , the subject of the extrinsecal denomination [ viz. Action . ] It is your Physical Action , which is so denominated : Though of the verbal predication [ agit ] I would willingly say , that the Agent is the subject . 6. But it is your Physical Action which we have now to do with : and that not as it is in Patiente , for so it is Passion , and not formally Action . Whether Scotus opinion of a Real difference be true or not ( which yet may have more said for it then some superficial answerers do take notice of ) yet formally its like it will be granted , that they are not the same : And therefore you should speak of Action as Action , Ut dicit egressionem & dependentiam ab agente , and not as it signifieth Passion , that is , Reception of Action , and the effect of it : and so the Patient is not the subject of Action ; Nor do I believe it a fit speech to say , that Calefaction is in your hand , though Calor be . But we must hear you further ; to how great purpose we shall see .

§. 13.

Mr K. 1. NOw take it how you will , Action is an adjunct , as denominating the Agent , no way an Effect , as an Action . 2. Nor doth it carry that stile in any of these learned Sophies , commonly quoted by Mr. Baxter with so much reverence .

§. 13.

R. B. 1. SAy you so ! is it an adjunct as denominating the Agent , take it how I will ? What if I take it , [ as it is received into the Subject , and called Passion ] which is your second sense ? Why said you that your Logical Action was an extrinsecal denomination of the Agent , if your Physical Action be so too ? When you seemed by this to difference them ? 2. I marvel that my Reverence to these Sophies should be the matter of so many of your lines , and you should think it necessary to rehearse it so oft : Sure you are jealous that your Reader will be very unobservant of your weighty observations ▪ But , Sir , is not Reverence a sign of Lowliness ? Why then are you offended at it ? You should rather applaud me , and say , If R ▪ B. do so much Reverence a Suarez , a Schibler , a Burgersdicius , if he knew me , how much more would he reverence me ! But , to deal more plainly with you , the further I go in perusal of your learned Labours , the more I perceive my Reverence to aba●e . Let any man except your self judge by the next passage , whether you deserve more reverence then these Rabbies and Sophies ( as you have honourably be-Titled them . ) You boldly and flatly affirm , That Action [ is no way an Effect , as an action , nor doth it carry that stile in any of these learned Sophies , &c. ] Either this Assertion is True or False . If True , Mr. K. hath got little : but I am false , if this be true . If it be false , either Mr. K. knew it to be so , or he did not . If he did , and yet spoke it , and that so confidently , then he must pardon me for Reverencing these childish Authors before him . If it be false and he knew it not , then , 1. He is one that will speak boldly what he knows not , and accordingly to be believed . 2. And then it seems he knows not what he supposeth his Boyes to know , and he looks at as his A. B. C. I will finde out a Tertium to salve his credit as soon as I can . If there be no other , I 'le lay it on a defect of memory , conjunct with a certain audacity , to tell the world in print , that those things are not written which he read when he was a boy , and hath since forgotten . ▪

Let us try the truth of his Assertion . I must not ●ell him of some Schoolmen or any other Philosophical Writers , that call [ action ] an effect , for then he will say , Those are not the Sophies in Question : It must therefore be the very same men . Let Schibler speak first Met . l. 2. c . 10. Tit . 3. Punc . 2. p. 54. Quod ad actionem immanentem attinet ; dicitur ea Immanens ab iramanendo , quod scilicet in agente maneat , Existimo tamen eam non esse intelligendam Positivè , sed Negativè . Nam actio Immanens quâ talis est , est in Agente , hoc sensu , quia non transit ad Patiens . In ipso autem agente non est per modum Adjuncti , sed simpliciter ad ipsum comparatur ut ad Causam . Unde haec Propositio , Homo intelligit , vel disputat , non est ut adjuncti de subjecto , sed ut Effecti de Causa : Et patet : Nam Actio transiens nullum habet subjectum , ne quidem ipsum patiens , ut visum est . Ergo etiam actio Immanens à fortiori non postulat subjectum . Consequentia firma est , quia actio transiens magis est ex subjecto , & magis postulat subjectum , quam actio Immanens . Sed actio Transiens in esse Actionis , nullum habuit subjectum , &c. Ergo & confirmatur , quod Actio ut sic , non dicit nisi egressum à virt●te activa alicujus agentis . Egressus autem opponitur {αβγδ} esse in . Et hinc relinquitur generatim loquendo de actione ut sic , eam non postulare subjectum . Neque enim Genus debet habere Naturam repugnantem suis speciebus , &c.

Yet more , that you may be past doubt of Mr. K's Veracity and Ingenuity , lib . 1. cap . 22. Tit . 28. Art. 1. Caeterum vox effecti ambigua est , &c. Primò Propriè & Adaequatè significat causatum specialiter , nempe cum conn●tato respectu ad causam efficientem , &c. Deinde effectum sumitur generalius & per Synecdochem sp●ci●i pro genere , quomodo dicitur aequipollenter ad Causatum , quomodo jam Cicero loquebatur , &c. Iam praeterea 3o effectum ( sicut & Causatum ) aliquando specialiter accipiuntur ; prout significant esse stans & permanens post actionem : In quo distinguuntur contra effectionem vel actionem , vel motum : atque ita aliqui aiunt Actionem non esse effectum : sed id quo producitur effectus . Hic tamen communius Effectum & Causatum sumuntur , Diciturque id omne Causatum quod habet esse per dependentiam ab aliqua Causa sive sit Actio , sive Res per Actionem facta . Atque ita etiam Ramus in Logic . l. 1. c . 9. Huc , inquit , in doctrina Effecti , pertinet motus & res motu facta , &c. Vid . ult . 11. Et Art. 3. De effecto specialiter dicto . Nihil autem occurrit hic explicandum praeter specialia nomina effectorum ; qualia sunt {αβγδ} & {αβγδ} . Igitur {αβγδ} hoc loco nihil aliud est quam ipsa Actio , Damasc . lib . 3. de Orthod . fid . c . 15. eam definit , quod sit efficax & substantialis naturae motus . De hoc effectus genere , hoc est , de Actione , intelligendus est iste Canon , Cessante causa cessat effectus : Effectus inquam qui est {αβγδ} : Cessante Patre cessat , ( non Filius sed ) Generatio Filij : Cessante Architecto cessat ( non domus sed ) aedificatio . {αβγδ} autem opus est post actionem manens , &c. {αβγδ} quandoque generatim significat operationem , sicut & Latina vox Actionis , &c. Vid . reliq .

So in his Compend . Philos de Logic . l. 1. § . 1. c . 5. p. 17. Ad effectum tanquam exemplum ejus pertin●t motus , & res motu facta .

And Metaph . l. 2. c . 3. Tit . 17. n . 630. he saith , Resp . Esse ambiguitatem in voce creati entis : Creatum enim Ens quandoque dicitur id solum quod per Actionem creativam incipit esse , quodque est quasi Creationis terminus : Et sic Creatio non est aliquid creatum : Quandoque vero Creatum Ens dicitur omne illud quod ▪ dependenter est ab Ente increato , sive id sit per modum Actionis , sive per modum rei factae per actionem . Et hoc modo Creatio est quid Creatum . Callovius Metaphys . Divin . saith , p. 524. In genere causatum est operatio , & {αβγδ} , vel opus & {αβγδ} . Simile quid est in voce Effecti vel Effectus : Dicitur enim quandoque effectum pro eo quod est quasi Actionis Terminus , quomodo domus , v. g . est effectum . Aliquando vero sumitur communiùs ut dicatur effectum quicquid à Causa est , sive id sit per modum Actionis seu motus , sive per modum rei per motum factae ; Et sic etiam ipsae Actiones dicuntur effecta , &c. Atque ita sicut nostrae Actiones sunt effecta , ipsae tamen non postulant , ut per alias actiones siant , &c.

So lib . 2. cap . 10. Tit . 3. Art. 3. n . 31 , 32. Nam & ipsae Actiones dicentur effectus praecise , & in se , quia habent esse dependens aliunde , &c. So n . 41 , 42. & n . 49 , 50 , 51. Et confirmatur per Aristot . l. 3. Phys . T. 20. Ubi ait , eundem Actum esse Agentis tanquam à quo , & patientis tanquam in quo , hoc est , ibi habet respectum effecti ; hic vero habet respectum adjuncti .

Again , l. 2 c . 3. Tit . 14. n . 418. Potentia ad suum Actum comparatur ut effectum illius , Unde Intellectio , v. g . esset effectus potentiae intellectivae , &c.

Now let Mr. K's auditors consider the next time he ascendeth his Chair , how farre their great Master is to be credited , and with what Cautions his most confident Assertions must be received . Let a man speak never so many Doctrinal untruths , we may modestly and handsomly confute them without offensive language : but when men speak such palpable untruths in matter of fact , I love not to dispute with them , seeing a man hath no answer for them , beseeming their errour , but a plain desideratur veritas , which seems so unhandsome language that it is usually ill taken what ever be the cause .

But let us hear another of the Sophies , viz. Suarez . Metaph . disp . 18. Sect . 10. n . 8. Quod si nomine Effectus comprehendamus non solum rem productam , sed quicquid à virtute agentis manat , sic concedimus actionem esse aliquo modo effectum agentis , cum sit dependens vel potius ipsamet dependentia ab illo : Esse autem Effectum hoc lato modo , non repugnat causalitati : quin potius in omnibus causis quas hactenus tractavimus , Causalitas est effectus causae , &c.

It were no hard matter to produce more Reverend Sophies for Mr. K. who use the same language and call Actions Effects ; but being about so small a matter , I think it is not worth the labour . In this Vid . Alting . Problem . Theolog . part . 1. p. 55. much the Reader may perceive to what a loss of time he may be lead in reading such Controversies , where men leave the Things , and fall upon Persons and Words , out of an earnest desire to finde out some way to cast Contempt upon their Brethren .

§. 14.

Mr. K. WHat was wont to be more common in horse-fair then An Actio sit in Agente , which with the knack of this hackney distinction , every dull J●de could turn at their pleasure , and hold sometimes affirmatively , sometimes negatively . So then thus farre little is said to the prejudice of that truth , that there is no new Immanent act in God ?

§. 14.

R ▪ B. YOur horse-fair , and hackney distinction , and dull Jade , are passages so profound that I must pass them as unanswerable by any that hath not attained to your Degrees . ▪ But doubtless you knew also how common it is to maintain the Negative on other grounds , and to say , that Actio est Agentis , non in Agente : and this is the language that I have hitherto thought fittest : and your contrary judgement alone will scarce move me to change . As for the safety of your Conclusion , I must tell you , it is no such glorious Atchievement for you to vindicate it against one that never opposed or denied it .

§. 15.

Mr. K. BUt 2. Though this should be granted to Mr. Baxter to be true in acts transient , yet an immanent act is questionless an Adjunct , and not onely denominate the Agent , but inhere in it . For I ask , Is Knowing or Willing a Substance or Accident ? an Accident questionlesse . If an Accident ; In what Subject ? Out of the Agent , you will finde no place where it may set the sole of its foot . Therefore it is in the Agent , and so an Adjunct : and if so , sure Immanent acts in God must needs infer ●n alteration . For

§. 15.

R. B. I Confess your first on-set ( so sudden , so causless against a feigned Adversary ) made me suspect you to be some pugnacissimum animal ( as Dr. Twiss cals his Adversary ) but your prosecution puts me out of doubt . 1. Had you confined these speeches of yours only to the Creatures Acts , you had said but as many others have done before you : But it is Gods acts that you speak of , as you ascertain us in your application [ and if so , sure Immanent acts in God must needs inferre an alteration . ] But indeed do you believe that God is compounded of Substance and Accident ? Yea doth the contentious disposition so potently carry you on , that you dare speak in such confident language , as to say that it is [ an accident questionless ] which you attribute to God ? What could Vorstius have said more ? I thought you had concurred in opinion with your Brethren , that use to call Gods Immanent acts , as diversified and as distinct from his Essence , only Extrinsick Denominations : But it seems you think otherwise ( for a little time , while your hast doth hurry you that way per modum naturae . ) 2. If you say , That you meant onely this much [ Immanent acts are Accidents inherent in man : Therefore they inferre an alteration in God ] You might so easily foreknow that I would deny your Consequence , that me thinks so great a Disputant should not so drily have passed over the proof . I do not stick on the strangeness of the Conclusion it self , that [ Immanent acts in God must needs inferre an alteration ; ] which is against your self and all Divines , who maintain that there are Immanent acts in God . For I doubt not but your haste which the disputing itch provoked you to , caused you to put [ Immanent acts ] for new Immanent acts . ] 3. But its strange , that you could bethink you of no answer that might be made to your Question [ If an Accident , in what Subject ? ] when you know it is so common to deny that Inhesion is necessary to every Accident ; And when you know that in this case an esse ab , or a dependant Egresse , is affirmed sufficient by so many . I cited the words of Schibler to that sense even now , where he purposely opposeth that which you asserted , lib . 2. cap . 10. Tit . 3. n . 54 , 55. I will not trouble you to rehearse them , it being a Book so farre below you . Now to your Proof .

§. 16.

Mr. K. FOr , 3. Though Action as Action logically considered , be but an ●xtrinsecal Denomination , and so only denominate the Agent , not inhere in it , as much of Reality as there is in all Transient Actions being in the Patient , even Physically , or rather Metaphysically considered ; yet these Immanent astions have their Terms too , say the said Sages , and those in the Agent ; he that hath a minde to look it , may soon finde it in Suarez , or his Scapula Schibler , in the predicament of Action . Thus then the first bol● hath done little execution against this truth ▪ that there can be no new Immanent Acts in God .

§. 16.

R. B. IS this all the proof that we have waited for [ Immanent actions have their terms too ? ] 1. Either you mean it of all Immanent acts , or but of some , if but of some , then it is a learned Argument : [ some Immanent acts have their terms : Therefore there can be no new Immanent acts in God . ] But I suppose you mean it of All : But then by [ terms ] do you mean [ objects ] which sometime are called termini ? Or do you mean , the form to which the action tendeth , and which by it is produced or induced ? If the first , then the Terminus of these Divine acts which we are speaking of , is oft Without , ( as we use to say ; ) as when God knoweth , Approveth , Willeth , Loveth the Creature . And therefore some few will not call these Immanent acts , but onely those whose object is God himself . But I suppose you mean the later , and then , 3. You might easily foresee , that though I had yielded all that you say of the Creatures acts , yet I would deny it of Gods : And blame me not for it , if I be lesse bold then you : and if I dare not imagine that there is in God either Motus or Terminus ad quem , or effect , or form acquired , when he Knows , Willeth , Approveth or Loveth the Creature . I am in hope that you believe no such thing your self , when the disputing itch is a little allayed . But however , could you possibly think it so obvious and easie a point as to need no proof ? Why have we never a word here to that end , who need so many ? I love not these Happy Disputers that can prove that by silence , which neither themselves nor any other can prove by Argument . If you will flie to your Analogy , and say [ There are Termini actionum Immanentium in man : Therefore there are so in God ] I should tell you that you may as wisely say [ There are Accidents , Effects and Mutations in man : Therefore there are such in God . ] At least I should importune you for the proof of your consequence . 4. But for the Terms of Immanent Actions you say [ The said Sages say it ] and [ he that hath a minde to look it , may soon finde it in Suarez , and his Scapula Schibler ] Truly , Sir , I have hitherto hinted your faults in Ironies : but I think it fit to ask you now ( seeing it is not once or twice , nor a slip of your pen ) how you dare put such things in print , and set so light by honest Truth-telling , and leave such things on record against your self ? You that do tanto fastu referre us to Schibler as our Scapula , sure know his Doctrine : or at least , if you know it not , you should not take on you to know it , and say , we may soon finde that in him , which he so largely and purposely disputes against . He saith indeed , that some Immanent acts have terms , as Syllogizing : but that cannot be your meaning : for you well know it will do nothing to inferre your Conclusion : But doth not Schibler ( l. 2. c . 10. Tit . 3. art . 3. punct . 1 , 2. ) largely dispute it , that many Immanent acts have no terms , no not Vision or Intellection ! and answer the Objections against him ? and conclude that Acti● ut sic non dicit respectum ad terminum ? And if Intellection have no Term , then Decree , and the rest that we were mentioning in the beginning , can have none in agente . 5. Nay what a great part of the great Philosophers and School-Divines do deny , that Immanent acts are true acts ? Scotus takes them to be qualities , and not in the predicament of Action . Soncinus , Ferrariensis ( and saith Schibler Thomistae frequenter ita docent ) deny them to be true acts . And if so , then sure they have not the terminos of true acts .

And I before told you at the beginning of your Discourse , that we do not all agree with you in your Description of an Immanent act , if you mean that it is such as is not only negatively , but Positively terminated in the Agent , as your words import : You may see Schibler denying it ( when you shall condescend to look it in him ) in Met . l. 2. c . 10. Tit . 3. n . 54. & Tit . 5. art . 1. n . 64. But let this be how it will in man , I do very confidently deny that there is any such act in God , either of Knowledge or Will , as is either in the predicament of Action , or hath any Terminus in himself , further then as himself is the object of any act . And therefore you should first prove , that such Acts are in God at all , before you dispute whether they may be in him de novo .

§. 17.

Mr. K. COnsider we what follows : [ Whether all such Immanent acts are any more eternal then transient acts , is much questioned ] saith Mr. Baxter . By whom I pray ? A clear difference between them as between heaven and earth ▪ transient acts as I told you but now , being in the Patient , Immanent in the Agent .

§. 17.

R. B. 1. O Happy , too happy wit ! that hath not onely with Moses seen the back parts of God , but hath taken so full a Survey of his Nature , that it can discern as clear a difference between his several acts , as between heaven and earth ! I dare not attempt the like survey : but I may receive instrustruction from you that have survey'd it . And what is the difference ? Why [ transient acts are in the Patient , and Immanent in the Agent ▪ ] What 's the proof ? Why it is this [ I told you so but even now . ] This may be a Demonstration to those that are capable of it : but recipitur ad modum recipientis : with me you have lost your Authority , so farre , that I need another kinde of proof . I will rather call it Passion then Action when it is in Patiente . Forma dat nomen : and Passion and Action are not the same formaliter , whatsoever they may be materially . Use the names promiscuously , if there be no difference in the things .

You know the subtil Scotists say , That Action and Passion are not the same , and that Action is in the Agent . And I have yet seen no reason to preferre you before Scotus . But I rather say , that Transient Acts are ab agente , but neither in agente nec patiente ; as having a Cause but no Subject , as I have before expressed . And you may finde in my Scapula , Met . l. 2 c . 10. Tit . 3. n . 51. That Omne accidens est in alio sensu Negativo , &c. altas loquendo de generali essentia accidentis , non est ea in Inhaerendo , si rigorose loquamur , sed in eo quod id q●od accidens est afficit substantiam extra essentialiter , sive extra essentiam , aut rationem ejus existendo . Proinde etsi actio rigorose loquendo non inhaereat , tam●n satis habet de ratione accidentis , quia substantiam afficit & denominat extra essentialiter . Unde porrò resp . ad assump . prosyllog . admittendo quod Actio Transiens non fit in Patiente , loquendo de actione ut fic , & sub esse Actionis . Quod igitur Actio transiens dicitur esse in patiente , id non est Intelligendum formaliter , sed materialiter : nempe illa res quae est Actio est in Patiente ▪ non tamen sub formali Actionis , sed sub formali passionis : Eadem enim res quae Actio est , est etiam Passio . Now I hope you are more accurate in your speeches then to use to denominate from the matter , rather then the form : and therefore I hope hereafter you will forbear saying , that Actio est in Patiente , how common soever it may be . At least remember that you humbled your self but even now , to use a Hackney distinction , with which every dull Jade could maintain the Negative at their pleasure . And what if I adventured to use one Argument , Actio est efficientis causalitas : At efficientis Causalitas non est in Patiente : Ergò , Actio non est in Patiente . The major I prove by Infallible Authority , viz. Mr. K's , pag . 136. For the minor , If the Causality of the Agent were in the Patient , then we might fitly call it Patientis Causalitas . ( For the name should be ●itted to the thing ) But that were absurd , Therefore , &c. Further , That which is in the Patient is a Causatum , or effect of the Agent per Actionem vel Causalitatem . But Causality or Action is not a Causatum or effect of the Agent per actionem vel causalitatem : Therefore that which is in the Patient is not Action or Causality . The major needs no proof ; and it s meant of every received form . The minor hath a full demonstration , viz. Mr. K's Authority ; who denieth Action to be an effect . And those that be not moved with his authority , may observe that I here take the word [ effect ] in the more restrained sense as it excludeth Causality or Action ; and therefore that I say [ it is not an Effect per Actionem ] and that is proved fully , in that otherwise , there must be another Action to effect this Action , and so in infinitum . But I did not think to have said any thing on this . All that Mr. K. can expect we should grant him is , that Actio qua Passio est in Patiente : but still Actio transiens qua Actio non est in Patiente , no more then is an Immanent action . Or if it were , yet the Authority of so many learned gain-sayers , makes the difference seem scarce so clear as that between heaven and earth .

Moreover , that which in God we call a Transient Act , is by the Schoolmen in greatest credit , affirmed to be Gods Essence only connoting the creature-Relatio to it : so that besides the creature it self ( which though Scotus cals Creation , yet is sure the effect and not the act ) and besides the Relation ( which can be no proper act ) there remains nothing but Gods essence , to be the substance of the Act which we call both Immanent and Transient . Capreolus saith , Nulla Divina operatio aut actio qua formaliter agit aut operatur , est transiens in passum , sic quod in passo formaliter recipiatur , cum ejus agere sit ejus Velle ● Intelligere , quae sunt actiones Immanentes . Sed concedi potest quod divina actio dicitur quandoque transiens propter respectum rationis ad realem effectum in Creatura , ut Creatio , Conservatio , &c. l. 2. dist . 1. q . 2. art . 3. And the Thomist● ( saith Suarez , Met . disp . 20. § . 5. ) say , That Non solum Creatio , verum neque ulla actio respectu illius potest esse Transiens . Where then is Mr. K's clear difference as between heaven and earth ?

And though I am loth to put my singer into the fire , by medling with Mr. K. any further then he invites me , yet perhaps he may expect I should somewhat take notice what he saith of this point to Mr. Goodwin , pag . 150 , 154.

1. When he saith , [ There are so many Immutations in Gods Essence ] if transient operations be the same with his Essence , &c. I deny the consequence : because the Terminus or effect is not the same with his Essence , though the act be . The Effect only is Many ; the Act but one . 2. To his solution of the first Question , where he saith , It is a mystery passing all understanding , that God should incline the heart to believe and not act anew , &c. ] I say , I believe him for the mysteriousness . But as all multiplicity comes from Unity , so do all temporals from that act which is Eternal . To all Mr. K's Instances the Schoolmen say , It is the effect only that is New : In giving the spirit , faith , raising Christ ; &c. God had no new act : Yet God did it by Velle , which is his eternal act and essence . To his answer to the second Question , I Reply , M. K's Questions are insipid and fallacious . [ Did he Plant faith by making Plants ? Did he make me to differ by making the world ? ] For though it was by the same act , yet that act hath divers denominations from its respect to divers objects . To [ make the world ] connoteth a particular object , viz. the world : and therefore the act which causeth you to believe , cannot be called [ Creating the world ] not because the act is not the same , but because it respecteth not the same object . The third Question belongs not to me . To the fourth I say as before : the act is Gods Velle : his Velle is his Essence : Therefore Eternal . His Questions [ Whether the world were drowned by the same Act by which it was made ? &c. ] are answered as before : It was by the same Act , viz. Velle Divinum ; but to be denominated variously according to the Variety of objects which it doth respect and connote . Even as it is the same Act which is Immanent and Eternal , which in Time is denominated Transient from its respect to the effect .

But Pag . 154. I finde him citing Mr. G. as saying [ Learned men Generally acknowledge , that ( the act ) is really and formally one and the same thing with his Essence ▪ ] And Mr. K. saith contrary , that [ No man ever asserted Transient acts to be the same with the Agent ] and that [ all Transient acts be the same with the term , say all men that meddle with Metaphysicks ] and he appeals to any Reader that hath but tasted the first principles of Logick . Truly these two Divines are very contrary : and have bewrayed both of them that which they might have concealed with much more credit to their Reading . Yet Mr. G. may interpret [ Generally ] with such limitations as may bring him off in part : but Mr. K's presumption and boldness is intolerable . When a man of so small R●ading as I am , know so well , that the Metaphysical Doctors do some speak one way , and some another : as I undertake by quotations now to manifest when I shall understand it worth any time and labour . I remember Mr K's words in his third Epistle of the sufficiency of [ a pair of Sheers and a met yard . ] But it is not so farre sufficient without more Reading , as to encourage a tender conscienc't man , to averre untruths so confidently , that [ No man ever asserted , &c. ] And where he saith [ The Question is not of the acts of his Will , but of his Power , &c. ] Knoweth he not that Dr. Twiss and the highly honoured Thomists do make God to work per essentiam , and say , that his Power is but his Will , called Power in respect to the effect which it doth produce ? Vid . Aquin . 1. q . 15. art . 1. 4m . Truly me thinks that Mr. K. doth even to the meanly learned expose himself to great disgrace , to say so boldly , that [ all men that meddle with Metaphysicks say , that all Transient acts be the same with the term . ] Did he never at least reade Scotus so oft asserting and arguing for the contrary ? Nor any one of his followers , nor one of all the other parties that deny this ? If he had not , yet he should have blushed so peremptorily to affirm what he did not know ▪ At least he should have known that Schibler hath this Conclusion , which he largely argues for [ 3o Actiones quae ●endunt ad terminum non sunt realiter idem cum termino ] and saith , Cal●factionem a Calore specie distingui . And he there tels you of Venetus , Aur●olus , Suarez & Colleg . Conimbric . that say as he : At least he that so derides me for citing these puerile Authors , should not have dared to say All men [ that meddle with Metaphys . ] say as he in this , when both common School-books , and the two most famous Sects of Schoolmen , Scotists and Thomists are against him ( as Suarez will tell him , disp . 48. ser . 5. n . 2. of Cajet . Hispalens . Flandr . & communiter Scotist &c. ] And for the fuller answering of Mr. K's Questions before mentioned , I desire the learned Reader among others to peruse the foresaid Answer of Capr●olus to Aureolus 15. arguments in l. 2. sent . dist . 1. q . 2. a. 3. But I must intreat you still to remember that my own opinion is , That action is not properly ascrib●d to God at all ; nay farre more Improperly then men will easily believe : Suarez himself Metaph . disp . 48. § . 5. n . 11. maintaineth Gods Immanent acts , Intelligere & Velle are properly not acts , no● to be so called . But of this before .

Reade also Gibieuf . de Libert ▪ l. 1. cap . 25. § . 13. shewing that the act whereby God made all things of nothing is Eternal : and c . 6. p. 323. And Cardin . Contarenus de praedestinatione , pag . ( operum ) 606. saith , Simplici & Unica Actione , quae cum ipsius substantia eadem est ( si tam●n substantiam appellare licet ) omnes effectus producit : ita nullo etiam tempore aut temporis aliqua parte , actionem ejus contineri , &c. ] Vid . Aquin . contr . Gent . l 1 , 2. c . 35 , 36 , 37. 17 , 18 , 19.

And that the Action is not the same with the Terminus , see the Arguments of Ludovic . a Dola de Concursu Part . 1. cap . 2. § . 6. Aquin . is cited by Capreolus in 2. sent . dis . 1. q . 2. a. 3. as saying thus , de po● . Dei q. 3. a. 17. ad 12m . Dei Actio est aet●rna cum sit ejus substantia : dicitur autem incipere agere ratione novi effectus , qui ab aeterna actione consequitur dispositionem voluntatis qui intelligitur quasi actionis principium in ordine ad effectum . ]

2. But the other part of the assigned difference goes down with me no better , but much worse , 1. In that he knows , I think , that it is not such a commonly received opinion [ that Immanent actions are in the Agent ] in a Positive sense , and not meerly negative , as that he should think it needed no more proof then his mentioning . I gave him the opposition of one Sophie , as he cals him , even now . 2. And if it were so in man , I again tell him , that I will not take his bare word , no nor his oath , that it is so in God .

But Mr. K. must needs know who they be that make question of this . What if it were but some private familiars of mine ? Must Mr. K. needs know their names ? But I had thought he had been well acquainted with the doctrine of Ly●hetus , Penn●tus and Sanctâ Clarâ in this Point , Who affirm , That though the act in it self be God himself , and so eternal , yet the transition of it to several objects , and so the denomination may be new ; and so that God may to day predestinate him that before was not predestinated , or Love him that before was not Loved , and this without any change in God . Indeed these are the men that I mean . I thought with these men of the higher form you had deigned to be familiar : but because you speak of the matter so strangely , I will come down again to our own form , and rehearse a few words of Burgersdicius familiarly known to those at your footstool . Metaph . l. 2. § . 16. Est enim in Deo concipiendus unus actus , qui nihil aliud est quam essentia divina . Hic actus respicere potest diversa objecta creata , seu , quod eodem redit , Deus per istum actum tendere potest in diversa objecta , vel etiam non tendere : & cum in illa tendit , reverâ ea vult : Dixi in objecta creata : Nam semetipsum Deus non potest non amare . Decreta ergo Dei duo involvunt ; actum scilicet , & illius actus tendentiam sine applicatione ad diversa objecta creata . Actus ipse liber non est , non magis quam Dei vel Immensitas , vel Aeternitas : sed libera est illius actus applicatio ad objecta : quae tamen quia nihil Deo addit entis , sed solum denominationem quandam externam , sumptam a connotatione objecti creati , tanquam termini sui , neque compositionem efficere potest , neque mutationem . Quod adeo verum est , ut existimem , si Deus decr●ta rescindere posset , illud imperfectionem allaturam Deo , non propter mutationem Decretorum , sed propter causam mutationis , quae aut imprudentia semper est aut impotentia .

Suarez hath such a like passage , which Fr. a Sancta Clara reciting , answers this Objection about Imprudence or Impotency , as Posnani●nsis before him : Froblem . quart . pag . 31. sed hac ratio ejus est debilis , ut recte notavit Posnaniensis : Nam imprudentiae vel inconstantiae vitium non est , siquis propositis duolus benis , primo ●ligat minus bonum & postea majus : nisi forte ex passione vel timore difficultatis , vel alia inordinata affectione id proveniat ; ut patet de bono caelibatus & conjugii . Deus autem nullo modo obligatur , nec passionibus laborat , sed ex mera liberalitate hoc non illud eligit : Ergo potest eligere sine nota inconstantiae . Haec ille . Unde August . Si non es praedestinatus , fac ut praedestineris . Et Ambrosius ( in c . 1. Luc . ) Novit Dominus mutare sententiam , si tu noveris ●mendare delictum . Subtilissimus etiam Bradwardinus dicit hanc sententiam suum aliquando pulsasse animum , &c.

Thus I have given you some answer to your incredulous Question [ By whom I pray ? ] But another kinde of answer might be given , concerning another sort of men , who deny the Act it self to be Gods Essence , but somewhat that hath no more Being then a Relation , or a Formality , or Ens rationis ratiocinatae , or at least then a modus Entis : and consequently that as this may be without any composition in God ( which they prove by the confession of our own Doctors ) so may it begin and end without Mutation in God . But I 'le not offend Mr. K's ears with the names of these men .

§. 18.

Mr. K. SUrely transient Acts there could be none before the Creation , there being no term of such Acts , no subject for them , unless there were either somewhat that was not made , or somewhat made before there was a Creation : but as for Immanent Acts , as Knowing and Willing in God , they were before the foundation of the world was laid . It is a very crude passage thus to say [ It is much questioned whether ▪ all such Immanent Acts are any more eternal then transient Acts : ] For if the meaning be that any transient Act be eternal , that is a mystery beyond all that hath been heard : then somewhat was made from eternity : If the meaning be , that no Immanent Act is ●ternal , that 's after the same rate . The first made the Creature eternal ▪ the second denies God to be eternal : Did he not kn●w from Eternity , yea fore-know all that hath been since the Creation , is or shall be to the dissolution of the world , he were not perfect , and therefore not God from eternity . So then neither can it be affirmed , that there was any transient act eternal , nor can 〈◇〉 denied but that some Immanent acts are eternal : and if some , then all , or els a change in 〈◇〉 must of necessity be granted . So that if the meaning be [ It s questioned Whether s●me ●mmanent Acts be no more eternal then transient Acts ] that is , some immanent Acts be not eternal , the Argument returns with the old charge , that an alteration must be yielded in God , immanent Acts being not to be reckoned with any colour among effects , but adjuncts , and no ground of ▪ putting any such new immanent Act in God in time , which I demonstrate further thus .

§. 18.

R. B. THe meaning of my words is not hid , but according to the proper literal sense , and I had some respect to the two sorts of men before-mentioned , but chiefly to one . And what I say in Reply to your words , you must be so just as to take to be according to their grounds , and not mine own : For it is but the unsearchableness of these things that I am all this while maintaining .

And first to your Argumentation against the Eternity of transient acts , it may be replied , that in transient acts you must distinguish between the Act it self , which is called transient , and the Passion or Reception of that act in the subject or the product , or effect of that act . The denomination of Transient is given to that act in the later respect as it doth connote the Product , Effect , Passion and Subject : yea is properly taken so from them , as that it signifieth nothing essential to the Act it self as an Act : So that all that same Act which is in Time denominated Transient , because in time it did produce its effect , was really from eternity it self , though the effect were not ; and so differs not quoad rationem formalem actus , from an Immanent act . Proved , 1. The Act by which God created the world , was his simple Velle : But Gods simple Velle was from Eternity : Therefore &c. The major is indeed denied by such P●nies as Schibler , and many more of his minde : but it needs no proof with Mr. K. for it is the opinion ( I am sure the saying ) of D• Twiss : And indeed it comes all to one , as to our business , if you go on the others grounds . The major , Mr. K. maintains . 2. Deu● operatur per essentiam immediatè : sed essentia divina est aeterna : Ergo , &c. The major is spoken exclusively as to all acts which are not Gods Essence ; and is so common with many Schoolmen , that I will spare the proof ( for I perceive it s easier taking it for granted then proving it ) The minor none denieth that confesseth God . So that it is granted Mr. K. that these acts were not to be called Transient from Eternity , because they were not received , or rather did not produce the effect but in time : But yet the act which in Time received the denomination of Transient , was it self Eternal : God Willed from Eternity that the Creature should Be in time , and produced it in that time by that Will which was Eternal . So much on that side .

Now to your Argumentation for the Eternity of Immanent acts , you would receive two several kindes of Answer from the several men that I before told you of .

One sort of them think that the Thing it self which we call an Act , is nothing but Gods Essence , and so Eternal : but that the transition of this Act to several objects ( as Sancta Clara cals it ) or the Application of it to these objects ( as Burgersdicius speaks ) and so the connotation of , and respect to these objects , is not Eternal , where the object is not Eternal : and withall they think that the denomination specifical of the several Acts , yea and the diversification ▪ 〈◇〉 them , is taken from these ●emporal transitions , or applications and respects to ●●e objects ; and therefore that they must be used as temporal denominations , and it is fittest to say , God Knew , Loved , &c. Peter as existing , not from Eternity , but when he did exist : Yea they think the very name of an Act , is most fit to be used in this later sense ; rather then applied to the pure Essence of God : however some call him in another sense , a simple Act.

The other sort of men do think , that the very Act it self is some M●dus or formality distinct from Gods Essence , and may begin without his Mutation , as it may be his without his Composition , as I have before said . Now both these sorts will Reply , that your Charge of [ making God not Eternal ] and of [ making alteration in God ] which you oft repeat , are but your bare word without any proof , and therefore not by them to be regarded . That God fore-knew all things that should come to pass they easily grant you : but if he know not that to be existent , which is but future , or that to be future which is wholly past , they say , this makes not God to be imperfect , or not eternal .

But I marvel that you still call Gods Immanent Acts [ Adjuncts in God ] which before you also called Accidents ; not fearing hereby to be guilty of making a Compounded God , while you maintain him Eternal : Or not discerning that you give advantage to your Adversary to maintain , that those Accidents or Adjuncts which may be in God without Composition , may as well Beginne or End notwithstanding his Immutability , if their Object be such as doth Beginne or End. Now to your New Demonstration .

§. 19.

Mr ▪ K. IF there be a ground of putting a New immanent Act in God ; Ergo , This ground must be either in God or the Creature . If a Ground in God which was not before , then an alteration in him beyond reply : a ground in the Creature there can be none to put a new immanent Act in God ; for that an immanent Act hath nothing to do with any thing without the Agent , it being herein contradistinguished from transient Acts , that transient Acts terminantur in pas●● , immanent Acts in agente . I confess somewhat without the Agent , is many times , yea commonly the object of immanent Acts : but if ever either the Subject or Term , I will publickly burn my Books , as Mr. Baxter desires his may be , when he goes one note beyond Dr. Twiss . I am confident he needs not fear coming so high : I am sure he fals infinitely short in this Argument , as will appear more fully by what he subjoyns .

§. 19.

R. B. THis is the Demonstration . I shall understand that word , in your mouth , better hereafter . Your horned Argument will be thus answered . The word [ Ground ] is ambiguous . If you take it largely for any sufficient Reason of the attribution , then there is Ground both in the Creature and in God : But if you take it more strictly for some one sort of Reason , then it may be in one and no● in the other . The ground may be in the Creature as the Object , and in God as ●h●●fficient : and in one as the relate , and the other as the correlate . But you say [ ●● in God , then an alteration in him , beyond reply : ] that 's a pretty way to prevent a Reply : But your confident Assertions shall hereafter be annumerated with the weakest of your Arguments , though called Demonstrations .

1. Some will take it for a sufficient Reply to deny your Consequence , and think you had dealt fairlier to have proved it . For they will think that there may be in God an Eternal Ground of a New immanent Act , as well as there is of a New Transient act : The ●ewness of the Act , will no● prove the newness of the Ground . And therefore you easily suppose that it must be [ a ground in God which was not before ] if the act be such as was not before . But this you should have foreseen would be denied . And if you say , that the newness or change in the effect doth argue something changed or new in the cause ; they will deny it ; and tell you that then every transient act would argue something new in God .

2. Those ( of whom I spoke before ) that maintain that immanent acts as acts need no subject , will think they reply sufficiently by telling you , that the novity of immanent acts , having a ground in God , will only prove that aliquid Dei vela Deo is altered , but not that aliquid in Deo is altered : because that action speaks but a dependant egress , and not an inhesion . The like they will say as to any form introduced in the subject by immanent acts , who deny to many and most immanent acts , a terminus ; and particularly to intellection . And if you think that there can be no action without some effect within or without , I refer you for an answer to my Scapula , as you conceit him .

3. However many of us will hardly be brought to beleeve that Gods immanent acts have in proper sense a terminus : though mans may .

4. Some will think they Reply sufficiently , by telling you that by [ alteration in God ] you mean , either [ an alteration of his essence ] and then they deny your consequence : or [ an alteration of some modus , or relation , or formality ; ] and such they will grant ; and say , as oft before , that it is no more against Gods immutability , then the existence of that modus , relation , or formality is against his simplicity .

5. If when God created the world , he had a All consent not the Relation is only ex parte creaturae and not mutuall . new relation ( of Creatour ) which he had not before , and this without change , then he may have a new immanent act without change , for ought you know .

6. For Gods acts are not so well known to such Moles and Bats as you and I are , that we should be able so peremptory to conclude that the novity of them must needs argue himself to be mutable : we know not so well how much Being , or of what kinde , those acts have .

So much for Reply to that which is past Reply . Now to the next horn of your Dilemma .

You say [ A ground in the creature there can be none to put a new immanent act in God . ] And why ? Because [ an immanent act hath nothing to do with any thing without the Agent . ] 1. How ? nothing ! neither as an occasion , nor an object ? do not you confess within a few lines that something without may be its object ? It is ordinarily said , and by some of your friends , that the Attributes and Immanent acts of God are diversified only by extrinsick denomination ; as an immoveable rock in the sea that is washt sometime with one wave and sometime with another , without its own change : ( It seems they take the passion or reception of these motions of the waves , to be no change . ) So do diversity of objects , say they , diversifie Gods acts and attributes quoad denominationem extrinsecam . If that be so , then objects specifie those act ; quoad denominationem extrinsecam , which in themselves are but one : and then the said objects may as well cause a novity as a diversity of immanent acts quoad denominationem extrinsecam : And then there is no more impropriety in saying , God doth de Novo Will or Nill ; then in ●aying , that it is not all one , for God to Will my salvation , and to Nill it : see what you have brought your cause to . 2. There are men in the world that conceive of God , as we do of the sun , that is still shining , but not still shining on this or that creature : it may begin or cease to shine on this place or that , without any change in it self or its actual shining : and so they think it is with God as to some of his acts , which have the creature for their objects : And for your objection , That this is a transient act of the sun , I shall reply to it anon , where you mention it .

But you are again harping on your old string ; viz. [ That immanent acts are terminated in the Agent . ] And I again tell you , that Gods acts and mans are not so near kin , as that you may conclude of the termination of his acts from the termination of ours : yea I tell you , that I will not beleeve you that Gods willing or knowing the creature hath any terminus in himself ( further then as you may say the creature is in himself ; ) that is no terminus strictly ascribed to actions distinct from a meet objective termination . A word of proof . 1. Where there is neither motus or mutation there is no terminus ? But in God acting immanently there is neither motus vel mutatio : Therefore , &c. I think I need not confirm either part . 2. Where there is no effect or form acquired or introduced , there is no terminus ( in the sense in question : ) But in God there is no effect or form acquired or introduced ( by such immanent acts ) Therefore , &c. The major is plain from the common definition of a terminus . The minor is past question .

But here you confess that the objects of immanent acts may be extrinsick ( Yet I could tell you , that Viguerius Institut ▪ and others conclude , that Voluntas Divina non habet objectum extrinsecum : ) but if subject or term you will burn your Books , &c. But hold your hand a little . Before I dare be guilty of that , I would fain know what Books they are . But you speak cautelously : for you tell us not who shall be Judge in this business : and if I should shew you never so many that are against you , you may keep your word by saying they all mistake , and by being the Judge your self . But , alas Sir , what cause have you thus to threaten your Books ? Who can riddle the occasion of it ? I tell you , that as good Philosophers ( for ought I yet finde by you ) as you , do think that such acts have no subject nor term : and you say , that if any thing extrinsick be the subject or term you will burn your Books ! which if you do , let all bear witness that I was no occasion of it : If they have no subject or term at all , then they can have none without . Sure if you were not very quarrelsome you would not in such high words feign him to be your adversary , that saith more against the opposed Point , then your self

As for that out-leap wherewith you recreate your self , of my coming so high as Dr. Twiss , in the sense I spoke I yet desire it not ; in the sense you speak ( lusorily ) I expect it not : nor do I know any man so simple as to compare me with him , or that needed this learned Digression . Yet I confess I thought my self somewhat neerer both Dr. Twiss and your self then you suppose me to be : For though I was ready to obey your conclusive command , of adoring the footsteps of such , yet I thought not that I had come infinitely short , as you here inform me , I do . I thought only God had infinitely excelled the meanest creature . Nay then , if you will be needs our Gods , Numina Academica , I am afraid you will shortly be lower then men ; and lest I shall hear that news which I equally fear and abhorre , that you and such like will ere long be cast out of that Academical Paradise . But let that go : I suppose [ infinitely ] was but a high word , by a high spirit , quasi ab alto , from a high place . I have stood my self ere now on a mountain , and every thing in the valley seemed small to me .

But I forgot to tell you one thing : that ( though I suppose I know what kinde of termination you mean , yet ) you should have spoken more cautelously , and distinguished , and told your Reader more plainly what you deny ; and not have resolved to burn your Books , if we prove things without the Agent to be a term in general . For you know that we distinguish of Objects into Motive and Terminative ; and ordinarily say that the creatures are terminative objects of Gods Will , though not moving objects . Meurisse saith ( Metaphys . Scot . li . 1. Q. 15. pag . 127. ) Objectum secundarium non potest movere intellectum divinum ad cognitionem sui , licet possit illum terminare , ut docent Theologi . And Schibler li. 2. c . 3. Tit . 15. n . 507. Non quasi putemus esse aliquid quod act●et quasi voluntatem divinam , ( quod officium alias solet esse objectorum , in ordine ad habitus & potentias , ) sed quia apprehendimus voluntatem Divinam Terminari ad aliquid quod hactenus habet rationem objecti . Est enim ad rationem objecti satis , si terminet actum aliquem . And Punct . 2. n . 510. the assertion is , Dei voluntas terminatur etiam ad res creatas . But enough of that . Now let s see the proof of our infinite distance .

§. 20.

Mr. K. [ AS for God to know that the world doth now exist : that such a man is sanctified , just , &c. Gods foreknowledge is not a knowing that such a thing is which is not , but that such a thing will be which is not : yet doth this make no change in God , no more then the sun i● changed by the variety of creatures which it doth enlighten and warm ; or the glasse by the variety of faces which it representeth , or the eye by the variety of colours which it beholdeth : ( For , whatsoever some say , I do not think that every variation of the object makes a reall change in the eye , or that the beholding of ten distinct colours at one view doth make ten distinct acts of the fight , or alterations on it : Aph. p. 173 , 174. ] I cannot tell what to make of this rope , but sand it is , and nothing else , as shall strait appear ; and how ill a match this Authour was , thus to descend in arenam with Twisse , Pemble , and I dare say all the sober Divines that ever were worthy to speak to a School Point .

§. 20.

R. B. SAnguinolent men do dream of sighting and killing : It seems you have accustomed your minde so to contending , that through the errour of your phantasie , all words seem chidings , and all actions seem fightings to you : And so you dreamed not only that I was in arena , but 2. that Dr. Twisse and Mr. P. were there with me . 3. Yea and all Divines worthy to speak to a School Point . 4. And that we were there coping for masteries : and in the end of your dream you rise up as Judge and give them the better , and proclaim me an ill match . But 1. he that reades my Book will finde that I argue not as from my self , but only shew how other mens argumentations do manifest such a difficulty in the Point , that we should not lay too great a stress on it ; as I have shewed you before in the explication of my own words . Nay I do not once deny the Point ( that immanent acts are eternal ) but only say , It is much questioned ( by others ) whether they are any more eternal then transient acts : and annex a touch of some mens arguings for it : concluding only in a parenthesis , that the Point is , as I think , beyond our reach . So much to the first fiction . 2. And if I contended not with any then not with Dr. Twiss and Mr. P. on this Point : it being plain that it is on another Point that I deal with them . That s for the second fiction . 3. The third is mounted with great confidence ; you [ dare say : ] What dare you say ▪ Why that I [ thus descend in arenam with all the sober Divines that ever were worthy to speak to a School Point . ] You are a daring man , that dare say this . But I have tasted so much of your temper before , that I perceive your veracity is oft least where your audacity is greatest : I thought I had contended with no man in those words ; and you dare say , I contend with all men , worthy to speak to a School Point . What if it had been true that I had been here contending , and that against a Point which all these hold ? doth it indeed follow that I do in arena● descendere with them all ? and seek to match them ? And what reason have we that know you not , to take you for Judge of all the Divines in the world , who shall be accounted sober , and who not ; and who is worthy to speak to a School Point , and who not ? Or why should I think you more worthy then the Learned men that I have before named , Ly●hetus , Pennottus , Burgersdicius , & c ?

§. 21.

Mr. K. TO know that the world doth now exist when once it did not , and that such a man now is sanctified which before he was not , makes no change in God , but only shews a change in the object : but to know now that the world doth exist which before God did not know , or to know now that such a man is sanctified , who before was not , which before God did not know , makes a change in God , as well as the object .

§. 21.

R. B. WHo would look for such answers from you , that had heard you judge of School Divines with such Authority ? The first part of your Answer is not against any thing that I said : The second is a meer begging of the Question . Some think that quoad substantiam actus Gods knowledge is the same whatever the object be ; but yet because [ Knowing this or that ] connoteth the object with the act , therefore the eternal essence of God simply in it self considered is not to be called [ Knowledge ] much less [ the knowledge of this or that creature ; ] and that without the object it neither is Knowledge , nor ought to be so called ; and so as from the object we distinguish Gods Knowing and Willing , so must we the several acts of his knowledge ; and though the act quoad substantiam , which we call [ Knowledge ] in God be but one , yet the ratio formalis which must give the denomination , being in the respect of that one act to its objects , it is most fit to say that Gods knowledge of Peters salvation and Judas damnation , is not the same knowledge , though it be the same substantial act : the like is said of his Will : And as this must be said without wrong to his simplicity , so the like must be said of his beginning or ceasing to Know , without wrong to his immutability : and that as it ▪ is not all one for God to know the Futurity and the present existence of a thing , so we must say , that he began to know the present existence when the thing began to exist , and that God did not know before the creation , that this proposition was true , Petrus existit : and that he ceaseth to know the Futurition of a thing that ceaseth to be future ; and that God doth not now know , that Christ will be born and dye and rise : and that therefore immanent acts in God are not to be said to be all eternal ; but only those that have an eternal object ; because the act is to be denominated from its respect to the object : and therefore it being Gods Knowing and Willing which we call immanent acts here , where it is unmeet to say that act of Knowledge or Will is eternall , then it is unmeet to say , Gods immanent acts are eternal : but when you will express Gods immutability , it is fitter to say [ God is unchangeable , or Gods essence or nature is eternall , ] then to say , his knowledge , will , or immanent acts ( in this sense ) are so : because when we connote not the object , we are to call it Gods Essence , and not Gods Knowledge , Will , or such acts : so that here is no real change in God himself , but only a respective , or modal , or formal ( as the Scotists speak ) or such as we cannot now apprehend , affording new objective conceptions ; all the change being in the creature .

Now how doth Mr. K. prove that this doctrine must [ make a change in God as well as the object ? ] why he learnedly affirmeth it . He that can finde a word more , let him make his best of it . But in this case , all the proof lieth on the affimer ; which we might well have expected from him .

§. 22.

Mr. K. ANd therefore all sober Divines use to be wary in their expressions in this kinde ; acknowledging no difference between Gods knowledge and foreknowledge , but this , that his foreknowledge is in order to the object only , and not of any act of Gods : so that it is not opposed to post-science , but it signifieth only a futurity of the object , as was shewed at large in the third Chapter . God knows that that is to day which was not yesterday ; but God as perfectly knew it yesterday as to day , and knew at once , all the various successions in time ; or did he otherwise , a change cannot possibly be avoided , notwithstanding all Master Baxter alleadgeth to the contrary .

§. 22.

R. B. 1. IF your first sentence be true , I must lament the paucity of sober Divines ; for sure I am , that of those which have written on these Points , too few have been wary in their expressions : and no wonder when they are no more wary in their conceptions ; and when men dare maintain themselves to have that capacity which they have not , and to know certainly that which they do not , and might easily know they do not : When even such learned men as you will not be perswaded that these things are above your reach , but do with such haughty contention oppose one poor sentence in a Parenthesis ( which is all my sentence ) wherein I say , it is beyond our reach .

2. You lift up your self too high , in taking on you to judge all those Divines to be unsober , that are not in this of your opinion .

3. If the word [ prescience ] signifie only a futurity of the object , then these are equipollent expressions [ Deus hoc praescit ] and [ Hoc est futurum : ] but that is not true .

4. The same humane frailty and distance from God , which makes it necessary to us to ascribe Acting , Knowing and Willing to God , and to conceive of him under these notions , doth equally necessitate us to conceive of his Knowledge and Will , as distinct , and not altogether the same : else we should ascribe a meer name , without any conception of the thing named : For we cannot conceive of any such Knowledge as is the same with Willing , nor of any such Willing which is the same with Nilling ; and yet we beleeve the simplicity of God . And the same necessity that compelleth us to conceive of Gods Knowing , Willing and Nilling , as divers , ab objectorum diversitate , doth compell us to conceive of his Knowledge of things as Future , and his Knowledge of things existent , as divers : yet still we deny a Mutation of God himself ; only we conceive as the Scotists , that there is a diversity of the objective conceptions , and that our various denominations have fundamentum in re : but what it is , let him tell that knows .

5. Against all this that which you oppose is but your naked assertion , which I regard less then perhaps you expected . I affirm the uncertainty , and you the certainty ; and therefore it is you that should prove that certainty which you affirm to have : For no man hath a certainty without some evidence or other to force assent ; and therefore that evidence should be produced , if you are indeed a man of as Angelicall intellectuals as you seem to conceit your self .

6. God did yesterday know tha● the sun is not risen to day , i.e. that to day is not come : You will say , he did at the same time yesterday know that to day is come and the sun is risen ? some will think to make this true , you must verifie contradictories , and say , [ It is ] and [ It is not ] at once , may both be absolutely true ( and then farewell our first Metaphysicall certainty in composition . ) Or else you must assert the coexistence of all things with God in eternity ; which how loath you will be to admit , I conjecture partly from the tendency of your tenets , and partly from your adhesion to Dr. Twisse , and others of his minde .

7. For your third Chapter I have said as much to it already as I finde either need or list , being loath you should cast on me Master Goodwins task .

§. 23.

Mr. K. ANd to the first illustration the case is strangely different ; yet I confess , if it did hold , it would prove the point a fortiori : Thus the sun , saith he , enlightens and warms variety of creatures , yet is not changed : therefore nor need God be said to be changed , though he know to day a variation in the creature : I yield all the conclusion : but all that is nothing to the purpose ▪ for the question is not whether to know a variation in the creature prove a change in God ? but whether a variation of the acts of his knowledge , according to the variation in the creatures do not prove a change in him ? now the putting of a new immanent act , as a new knowing , is a putting of variation upon him .

§. 23.

R. B. 1. WEre my advice of any weight with you , I should perswade you never to expect any illustration of Gods immanent acts by the creature , without a great difference in the case : and therefore that you would no more take such difference as so strange . 2. Your concession that it will prove the point a fortiori , if it hold , is as much as I could desire or expect . 3. A man would think , that the argument you here lay down as mine , were mine indeed , who findes so Learned a Divine saying so , that should abhorre falshood : when you put the words in a distinct character , with a [ saith he , ] as if they had been my express terms : but I desire the Reader not to judge of all your Writings by such passages as this : He may speak true at one time , that yet takes liberty to speak falsly at another . You did take the easiest course imaginable , to fain a conclusion which you could grant , and then to grant it and say it is nothing to the business . 4. I will not consent to your stating the question in new terms of your own , in the midst of a dispute . Do not feign me to dispute any question which you make many years after my Writing , and which is not to be found in my Writing in terms . 5. The word [ Act ] may signifie 1. the Divine essence ; and so he that feigns a new act feigns a new God : 2. Or that mode , formality , respect ( or whatever else it is to be called , ) of God , arising from the nature or state of extrinsick objects ; which Burgersdicius cals , the Application to the Object The question is only of this now , which some think may most fitly be called , Gods acts . Your naked repeated affirmation that a variation is put on God , when you prove it not , I take no more for a Demonstration .

§. 24.

Mr. K. SEcondly , When we are speaking of immanent acts , what have we to do with the suns enlightening or warming ? I had thought those had been transient acts , and so not proper in this case ! Yet

§. 24.

R. B. REmember you not the crude question that we were on ? [ Whether such immanent acts are any more eternall then transient acts ? ] The Questionists mean it quoad formalem naturam actus ; for they take the denominations of [ immanent ] and [ transient ] to be but from the effect or terminus : And that you may see what they imagined , when they mention the similitude of the sun , let me intreat you to suppose for disputation sake ( per possibile vel impossibile ) that God had made at first no creature but the sun : I would fain know whether that sun in shining and casting out its rayes and emanation , did act immanently or transiently ? ▪ I conceive not transiently : because there were no subjects existing into which its act should pass , or which should as its extrinsick terminus receive from it any new form . It seems then it must be immanently : but that is but in sensu Negativo ▪ because it is not transient : suppose next that the rest of the creatures were afterwards made , and placed as they are under the influence of this sun , and so were the receptive subjects of its action : Is it not the same sort of Action , without any change in it self , which before was immanent , and now is become transient ?

But I need say no more to this ; for you are pleased to confess .

§. 25.

Mr. K. YEt thirdly , Did it hold , I yield it were Argumentum a majori ad minus ▪ If the sun be not changed notwithstanding all its warmth and lightening , then neither were God . But sure the sun is changed , and changeth perpetually , and could not act as a Universall cause upon the great variety of creatures in the world , did it not rejoice like a Gyant to run its course ; did it stand still but one year together at one point , yea or but walk within one Hemisphere for a year , What should we do for that variety of seasons we need ? All Summer would be as bad as all Winter . In opposition to this change of the Sun , is the Father of Lights said to be without shadow of turning . He hath no such Solstices or Tropicks ; no motions , but a perpetual permanency . There is a great difference between Immanent acts and transient : that supposing the Sun to stand still as in Joshua's time , and to act without motion ; here were no alteration to be acknowledged in the Sun , notwithstanding all the variety of objects , yea and variety of operations upon those objects , all which might proceed from the same Act as to the Sun , the difference being meerly in the Patient : As for instance , the same live-coal doth at once by its heat melt the wax , and harden the clay ; here are different transient acts , but no change or difference at all in the fire ; but only in the disposition of the matter on which it works . But in Immanent acts the Case is contrary ; for they being in the subject , the variation of them makes an alteration in that , and not the object : as the same man unchanged may be the object sometimes of mens Love , sometimes of their hatred : the variety of these acts makes a difference in the Agent , doth not alwayes suppose any in the Object ; and so here , Gods knowing now that this is , Gods not knowing yesterday , that it is now , makes a change in God , but indeed God cannot be said now to know that such a thing is , but to know that now such a thing is [ which was not before ] and this he did know , what ever is now even from all eternity , his prescience being a Knowledge in praesenti to him ▪ though not de praesenti , as to the object ; against whose being in eternity more shall be said hereafter against M r Goodwin , but now I attend M r Baxter , who proceeds .

§. 25.

R. B. 1. YOu seem rather to answer in jest then in earnest , when you tell us of the Suns local motion , when our Question was , Whether [ the Sun be changed by the variety of Creatures which it doth enlighten and warm ] that is , Whether it self receive any change from the terminus or objects of its acts ? Do you intend the information of your Reader , or the discovery of Truth , when you shuffle in such an alien Answer ? 2. All that its good for , that I know of , is to acquaint us , that you have some full Demonstration against Copernicus , which hath given you a Certainty that he erres ; And if one ▪ should hear it , perhaps it would prove like your Ordinary Demonstrations : for that which is hint●d in your words , seems of kin to them . 3. You yield all that I say concerning the Sun , acknowledging that it is not changed by the variety of Objects : And in the first words you say [ Did it hold , I yield it were Argumentum à majori ad minus . ] Lay both these together , and judge whether you yield not the whole Cause which you opposed . 4. You still harp on the old string , affirming , Immanent Acts to be in the Subject , and that their variation alters it , when as good Philosophers say they have no Subject , and that Vision , Intellection , &c. have no Termini : Your naked affirmations so oft repeated , rather weary then convince . 5. However you cannot from mans Immanent Acts , argue to Gods , unless they were more like . 6. I am unsatisfied whether a Transient Act ( though not qua Transient ) make not as much alteration on the Agent as an Immanent ? Whether a Transient act be not the same with the Immanent , containing in it all that it contains , with the superaddition of its Reception in , and effect upon a Passive Subject ? As in the fore-mentioned instance : If the Sun had been created first alone , its action whereby it now lighteth and heateth , would have been immanent ; and yet when the same action shall afterwards become transient by the addition of other creatures to be its Objects , who will imagine that it is ever the less in the Subject ( as you say ) or that the alteration of it would make ever the less change of the Agent ? I confess , I conceive not yet why there should in this point of changing the Agent be any difference between Immanent acts and Transient : though I easily conceive that one only doth change the object . 7. Your friend Mr Jeanes , pag . 231. useth the similitude of [ a Rock in a River standing immovable , notwithstanding the succession in the waters that glide by it ; ] which I think is as defective a similitude , as these here used : yet it s plain , that you cannot truly say , This Rock toucheth the water that is an hundred miles from it . Suppose the Sun were an eye , and could see all the world at once , and that pura activitate sine receptione specierum ab objectis : Suppose one man be born , or one flower spring up this day , which was not in being or visible yesterday : This Sun would see that to day which it did not see yesterday without any mutation in it self : And yet seeing is an Immanent act . Now I would know , whether it be fit to say , This Sun sees that as in being which is not in being : Or , Whether it be not fittest to say [ It begins to day to see that Creature which begun this day to exist ] though by so beginning it be not changed ? Its true , God fore-knows all things that shall be : but that is not to know that they be , but that they shall be . 8. Mr Jeans ibid . saith [ Yet this is no hinderance but that there may be and is a change in the extrinsecal Denominations of Gods knowledge from the variation of the objects hereof , &c. ] so others commonly : And may I not hence conclude , 1. That then I may denominate Gods knowledge of the present existence of things , as Beginning with its object : and his knowledge of the existence or futurity of things , as Ending with its object ; that is , when the thing ceaseth to be future or to exist ? 2. And may I not conclude , that this Denomination is fittest , and so those that thus speak , do speak more fitly then they that speak otherwise ? 3. And that there is some fundamentum in re for such a denomination : or else it were an unfit denomination , seeing names and words should be fitted to the things signified as neer as may be ? 9. Do not you imply as much your self , when you say his Prescience is a Knowledge in praesenti to him , though not de praesenti ? You confess then that God doth not know de praesenti , the things that now are not : but when they exist he knoweth them de praesenti ; I confess the doctrine of the coexistence of all things with God in Eternity , would salve many of these things : but that you here disclaim . 10. Where you say , that [ Indeed God cannot be said Now to know that such a thing is , but to know that now such a thing is ( which was not before , as in the Errat . you adde ) ] it is a saying which I understand not , and conjecture it is still maimed of some necessary limb which should make it speak your sense : For I hope you do not believe what ever you say , That Indeed God cannot be said Now to know that those things are , which are indeed : If he know it not Now , when will he know it ?

§. 26.

Mr. K. AS the glass by the variety of faces which it represents , hoc est , as the glass without any change in it represents various faces , now one , now another ; so doth God know various objects , now one , now another , yet without change . The Antecedent is manifestly false ; for that each of these several faces cast a new species on the glass , and those several species make several changes . For this purpose Mr. Baxter might have remembred what his great Logick and Metaphysick Masters say , concerning Ens intentionale , that it is opposed to reale and materiale : The species in the glass is indeed Ens intentionale , in opposition to Materiale , it is not so in opposition to Reale : But their putting and non-putting , or the presence and absence of the species , makes a real change , though not a material one in the glass ▪ so real a one as that it may be seen , though not a material one that the childe that catcheth at is ever like to take hold of it ; Plainly thus , That is a Real Accident which is in the Subject really , and so is that species , for we see it in the glass ; that is a Material Accident which is so in the subject as to depend on it alone for its support , without influence of the efficient ; heat or cold have such dependance on the subject , as that that alone can maintain them ; as the heat will stick a while in the water , though taken off from the fire , and cold in my hand , though taken out of the water : But these Intentional Accidents though really in the subject , yet are so little supported by it , as that if the efficient do not continue its influence , they immediately perish as light in the air , these species , whether in my glass or my eye ; who hath so much Logick and Metaphysicks to spill upon all occasions as Mr. Baxter , would have betrayed , I will not say ignorance , but incogitancy in so trivial a punctillio ? Onwards , the case is the same for the species in the eye and the glass , and a change is made by the presence or absence of the species .

§. 26.

R. B. DIsputatore nimium foelici , nihil infoelicius ; & nimium sapiente quis minus sapiens ? If I spill as much Logick upon all occasions , as you do words , sure I am a voluminous Logician , and make up in number what I want in weight . You wanted an opportunity to multiply words , for ought I know to no purpose , unless to acquaint the unobservant world with your well-furnished Intellect , that they may be assured , that you have all those things at your fingers end , as trivial punctillio's , which I am so ignorant of ; and these few words of mine have occasioned the opening of your pack , and the expansion of your wares .

But , 1. You are fain to use the old artifice of putting my words but as the ground of your paraphrase , and then dealing with that paraphrase of your own . This is not so innocent as common a trick . I speak of a change [ of the glass ] and you put [ a change in it : ] Had not you newly risen up as the final decider , I should have said , it is yet sub Judice , whether the Intentional or Spiritual Being , in question , be indeed Res or not ? And so whether it make any Real change in the glass . I confess you easily dispatch the business , which makes me think of Gorlaeus words , Exercit . Philos . 7. § . 2. p. 108. Quid species sint visibiles inquirendum est : Tam enim earum natura intellectui est ignota , quam ee sensibus notae . Peripateticis tamen & hic , sicut & alibi facilis expeditio . Qualitates aiunt esse spirituales , & corporis esse objectivum , quod habet in speculo vel simili corpori . Nobis hoc non est satis : qui quaerimus porrò , quid qualitas spiritalis , aut quomodo corpus objective possit esse in speculo ? Nam hae videntur contradictionem quandam implicare , corporis dari qualitatem spiritalem , & rem extra speculum existentem esse in speculo , &c.

2. But see what unreverent thoughts such Ignorants as I , are apt to have of learned men ! I am confidently perswaded , that you , who are so fully acquainted with Gods Nature and Immanent Acts , as to be at a certainty where I am at a loss , for all that do not know what that is that you see with your eyes ; nor whether it be in the glass or not ! And therefore the Lecture that you have read me of Ens intentionale hath been lost labour as to me !

3. And you had done but your part if you had observed that I speak not of the meer Reception of the agents action , but of the Representation to us of the species : which should not be confounded .

4. Are you sure that it is from the object , that the glass receives that variation that you imagine ? If it be , Rocks and stones are more active creatures then some dull souls will easily believe ; when at the same time the same Rock or mountain may perform 100000 actions upon so many eyes or glasses . Yea if in the midst of the Action of this stone or Rock , you do but give your glass a knock , and break it into a hundred pieces , it will multiply the action of the Rock an hundred fold ; and that without touching or coming near the Agent ! Is it not pretty sport to see the activity of these nimble Rocks and Mountains ? I am one of those Hereticks , that think these works of God must be the matter of our admiration , but cannot be comprehended by us here : and that it is no good consequence , that because you and your fellows nakedly affirm the contrary ( yea notwithstanding all your proofs ) therefore Des Cartes , Sr K. Digby . White , Hobbes , besides all the old Adversaries , are certainly in errour . I shall acknowledge more action of the Light , or air on the glass , then of the object , which seems but sine qua non . But withall I suspect , that the same Light or air doth perform the same action in the glass when you stand not before it , or when the object is absent ; and yet no species is then seen ; no nor visible . And I think that there is the same action on every glass-window , yea on every wall , or stone , or other body , as is on your speculum ; and yet you see nothing on them as you do on it . And Hobbes saith , That it is in the eye and not in the glass , which you think you see in the glass ( his reproaching of our Doctrine of visible species , I pretermit : ) and if so , then there is not so much alteration in the glass , as you imagine . And indeed , you say little to prove it . If your Argument from sight would prove any thing , it would prove that the face is a foot or a yard ( or more if you draw back ) behinde the glass , and not in the glass : And yet if you go behinde you shall see nothing : Will you believe your eyes that things change into such various colours , and shapes , and quantities as some glasses by small mutations of posture do represent them ? Will you believe your eyes that a strait staff is crooked in the water ? I can tell you by my observation when I was a Boy , that if you will kill a Fish in a River with a Gun , you must allow much to the fallacy of your medium . If then either it be the action of the light or air , or something else , and not the object , then it is nothing to me , who spoke only against a change by variation of objects : Or if the foresaid action being supposed to be the same on the glass , when several objects , or no objects are before it , that which is superadded from the object is nihil reale , this is nothing against me : Or if the species which seems a foot behinde the glass be not in the glass , but in the eye or some where else , and so the glass be more truly an Agent by Reflection , then a Recipient of that species which I see , still this is nothing against what I said . So that laying aside all that Reception of the action of light , or any thing else , which the glass receives when there is no object present , and laying aside all that which is Received into the eye and air , and not in the glass , and whereof the glass is but a Causa sine qua non ; then call the rest an Ens intentionale or spirituale , or what you will ; but prove it to be quid reale altering the glass , and do not nakedly affirm it .

You say , that my great Logick and Metaphysick Masters say , That Ens intentionale , is opposed to Reale & Materiale : and yet you say that the species in the glass is not opposed to Ens reale . It is , and it is not , seem reconcilable to you then without a distinction . Indeed as Real is opposed to [ feigned ] I doubt not it is Real , but as it is opposed to Modes and Relations , and such like , that some place between Ens and Nihil , it must better be known what it is , then the name of Ens intentionale or spirituale will acquaint us , before we can conclude for certain that it is Real .

As for your Material Accident , it will require more ado to prove , that there is any such thing in the world , as an Accident depending on the Subject alone for support , especially a quality , as you instance in : Sure you intend not the withdrawing of the influence of every efficient , but of some lower or instrumental : I think , at least , Gods efficiency is necessary to be continued , for the Continuation of the being of every Accident , and ordinarily some lower efficiency too .

As for the Logick and Metaphysicks which on all occasions I spill , I take the charge as unfit to be answered , as not coming from your head or heart , but from your Naturals , your spleen and gal .

My Ignorance in comparison of you , I am so easily brought to acknowledge , that I wonder you should think so many words necessary to evince it : ( yet you should have done it in intelligible language , and not abrupt expressions , defective of sense , almost such as Hierom describeth in his lib . 1. cont . Jovin . initio . ) But how did you prove my Ignorance or Incogitancy of Ens intentionale ? Deep silence ! Because I did not mention it , or else who knows why ? By that reason I am ignorant that Mr K. is an honest man , because I do not mention it ; But by what is said , you may see its possible to have heard talk of Ens intentionale , and yet to think this similitude tolerable .

And what if you obtain all that you contend for ? viz. That the similitude is faulty ! Alas , I shall easily grant it of any similitude whereby we illustrate the Nature or Acts of God . Suppose then that this glass did make the same Representations sine receptione specierum : Or because these ●nanimates are more remote , use the similitude of the Oeulus Universalis , which I mentioned even now . I am troubled that you force me to weary the poor Reader with so many words on so poor and unprofitable a business : But there 's no remedy .

§. 27.

Mr. K. NOw whereas Mr. Baxter addes , That whatsoever some say , he doth not think , that the beholding of ten distinct colours at one view , doth make ten distinct acts of the sight , or alterations on it ; I do not think that ever rational man said they do , for it were strange there should be but one view , and yet ten distinct acts of sight ; but the question is , Whether the change of one of these objects doth not change the species in the eye , and so occasion another view or sight ? Or rather it is beyond all question that they do ▪ and yet whether they do or no need not be questioned neither ; the point that lies before us , is , Whether distinct or new acts do not Cause an alteration ? Which is that that we have just Cause to affirm with confidence , can have no place in God ; and consequently no new immanent Act ; so then there being nothing produced by Mr. Baxter which may suggest a suspition that there may new Immanent Acts be admitted in God , or any but such as are Eternal , Come we to the —

§. 27.

R. B. YOu are minded to play with the ambiguity of the word [ View ] which I take for all that Reception in the eye , or activity of it which it performeth in one Instant ; and so for that natural Act whereby I fix my eye on one place at once , seeing as many things as at once I am capable of seeing : You take it , it seems for your intentional Action , or also the act which the visive power performeth , as in reception of that alone . I think the sense I use it in , is more common . And I say again , that it is none of our question , what light , air , &c. do on the eye : for they do no more when I behold one Rock , then when I behold the sands on the shore : But the Question is , What the objects do over and above on the eye ? And whether if I see many millions of millions of sands at one instant , there be so many Real Actions of my eye at that instant ? And whether every distinct sand that is added or taken away , there be one Act added or taken away , and so a real alteration in my eye ? The rest which you adde is over and over answered before , and therefore being ashamed that I have , said so much on so unprofitable a point ( though constrained ) I surcease : Onely adding this brief rehearsal of what is said before .

1. Remember that we speak not of those Immanent acts whose object is Eternal : but of those that have a temporary object , as the actual existence of things , &c.

2. These kinde of Immanent Acts may be called Transient after a sort , in that they do quoad Terminationem objectivam , pass to an extrinsick object .

3. Agere , in the sense now taken , when applied to God , signifieth something more then meerly Esse .

4. The whole Generical Essence of Action is found in the species of Action .

5. Intelligere , Velle , Amare , relate to some Objects : Qui Intelligit , aliquid Intelligit : qui Amat , aliquid Amat . These terms therefore do alwayes ( when affirmed as being in God ) connote their Objects .

6. There is a necessity therefore that the acts be variously denominated from the diversity of objects . It is no way fit to say , That God doth Nill Good , or Will sin , or that his Velle & Nolle is all one : Or that his Intelligere & Velle is all one . For , as it is said , the Act connotes the Object : and therefore we are not so much as to ascribe the act to God when there is not an object for it ; or as to an aliene Object . Else we might say , Dei Intelligere & Velle sunt idem : Deus Intelligit Peccata : Ergo Deus Vult peccata : And that God Nilleth Good , because he Willeth Good , seeing in God Vells and Nolle are all one .

7. This necessity of various extrinsecal denominations is ordinarily confessed by the most rigid Divines . I shall cite one more anon .

8. This Denomination hath fundamentum in re , or else it were delusory and abusive ; these being the fittest names that most agree to the Things ( of which see Mcuriss . Metaph . Scoti , li. 2. c . 3. Conclus . 3. & Durand . l. 1. dist . 19. q . 5. § . 13 , 14. & Aquin . de Veritate , Mater . 7. q . 1 , 2 , &c. ) Notions and Names are true or false , as they agree or disagree to the things .

9. On the same ground as God may thus be said to Understand , Will , Nill , Love , &c. and these may be said to be not the same , he may also be said to have divers acts of Intellection , Willing , Nilling , and these not to be the same : e . g . That it is not all one ●o elect Peter , and to elect John .

10. Whatsoever this diversity of names implieth , as its foundation in God , ( whether a bare Relative diversity , or also a Modal , or what ever the like ) it is certain that it implieth no Composition in him , but it is onely what is consistent with his simplicity .

11. Some of the objects of Gods Knowledge and Love , are not from Eternity . The Existence is more then the meer Esse Volitum , or Will that they shall exist : And it is not all one to know the Thing it self in it self , and to know it in its Cause . Though God therefore did from Eternity intuitively know the Esse Volitum , and know the Creature in himself its Cause , and know its futurity , and so fore ▪ know all things : yet it follows not that he intuitively knew the Creature in it self , as existing , ( Unlesse we assert the co-existence of all things in Eternity with God .

12. There is therefore the same reason to Denominate Gods Intellection , Love , &c. as beginning and Ending with its Objects , as there is to denominate them as divers from the diversity of objects . And therefore this is a fit and necessary way of speech . It is not fit to say , God is now Creating the world quoad actionis formalitatem , though you over-look the effect : it is not fit to say , That God now knows that the world will be Created ( unlesse you respect some new Creation ) or that Abraham , Moses , David , shall Die , or that Christ shall rise again , &c.

13. This Denomination of Gods acts as beginning and ending , hath as much foundation in the thing , and is as true as the Denomination of his acts as various . And this may as well consist with Gods Immu●ability , as the other with his Simplicity . The reason is evidently the same .

Now for the one , hear what others say . Schibler Met . l. 2. c . 3. Tit . 6. n . 247 , 248. Quastio est de Accidentibus quae in D●o sint . Haec enim solum possunt compositionem in Deo facere , &c. Unde specialiter relinquitur , quod in Deo non flat compositio ex subjecto & accidente , si maximè ei conveniat Agere , tali actione quae praedicamentalis dici possit . Nam actiones non comparantur ad agens , per modum essendi in , sed solum per modum essendi ab alio , ut infra , &c. Atque ita actiones tantum apprehenduntur ut egredientes ab essentia rei . Quod aut●m egreditur ab essentia rei , hoc , eo ipso , non potest cum essentia facere compositionem , quae extremorum unionem requirit . And n . 97. Nam Actiones Divinae transecuntes , non sunt sub ectivè in Deo , sed solum a Deo procedunt ; unde nullam compositionem cum Deo faciunt , &c. Quanquam id etiam ( verum ) est de actionibus Immanentibus : Hac enim non dicuntur Immanentes positivè , quasi in agente rigide loquendo subject entur , sed N●gativè solum , quia in externam materiam non transiunt . Unde ad rationem actionis simpliciter & Immanentis & transeuntis , non requiritur esse in , sed solum esse ab : Idcoque neutrum facit cum agente Compositionem . Et sic anima nostra , si incipiat intelligere aut Velle , non tamen componitur , tum exsuo esse & Intellectione & Volitione quà tales sunt : sed in utroque statu aeque est Anima simplex . Dixi , quà rales sunt , Quia ad intellectionem potest consequi aliqua compositio , si sit per speciem Intelligibilem . ]

Keckerman in System . Theolog l. 1. c . 3. maintaineth , that the Persons in the Trinity , differ from the Divine Estence , as Modus a re , and from each other as Modus a Modo , and that Ens and Modus make no Composition . Much more may it be so said of Relations to things external .

Altingius Problem . Theolog . Par. 1. pag . 55. distinguisheth Gods actions , 1. Sunt act us intrinsici & Immanentes qui non transcunt in object um externum & nullum prorsus respectum aut {αβγδ} ad {αβγδ} . Tales sunt act us personales quos Scholastici notionales vocant , gignere , spirare , &c. Horum absoluta est necessitas absque potentia ad oppositum , & sunt aeterni . 2. Sunt actus extri●sici qui non sunt in Deo , sed à Deo ; five qui a Deo sunt effectivè , in Creaturis autem subjectivè : velut creare , gubernare , redimere , &c. Deus enim extrinsecus solum ab iis denominatur . 3. Sunt Act us Intrinseci quidem in Deo , sed Connotantes respectum ac {αβγδ} ad extra , ut scire , velle . Scit enim Deus non solum se , sed etiam omnino quicquid ●st scibile , sive ut possibile , sive ut futurum . Vult etiam non solum se , sed etiam alia extra se , &c. Hujusmodi act us sunt Decreta , relativi nimirum ad extra , & praeter voluntatem {αβγδ} statuunt rerum externarum . Compositio autem hinc male infertur , &c. Matk also , that he names the first sort onely Immanent acts .

And for the fitnesse and necessity of the Denominations , hear what Estius confesseth in Sent . l. 1. dist . 39. § . 3. De hac igitur scientia Dei ( viz. ad enunciabilia ) quamvis & ipsa sine dubio sit in se invariabilis , variè tamen loqui nos oportet , prout variantur propositiones secundum tempora . Cum enim nullam propositionem scire quis dicatur , hoc sciendi modo , nisi veram , eademque propositi● propter mutationem rerum ac temporum , modo vera sit , modo falsa ; consequens cris , Deum nunc scire propositionem aeliquam quam post●a nesciat , & contra . Quod per singulas temporum differentias facile est declarare . Nam propositionem veram de praeterito , ut , Christus natus est , ante bis mille annos non sciebat , sed Christo nato scire coepit ; eadem tamen nunquam scire desinet , sicut nec ullam aliam quae sit praeteriti temporis , quia propositio de praeterito vera , semper erit vera . Quod intellige de praeterito in genere : Nam si certum tempus designet , ut Heri natus est Christus , scire eam desijt , & de futur● simpliciter , ut , Post biduum pascha sict . Rursum propositionem de futuro veram , ut Omnes resurgemus , scivit quidem ab aeterno , nec fieri potest ut talem aliquando incipiat scire , quia propositio de futuro vera semper fuit vera , lo ●uendo similiter de future in genere . Sed eam aliquando scire desinet ; nempe post resurrectionem factam , quia tum vera esse desinet ipsa propositio . Denique propositionem de praesenti veram , scit tantisper dum ea vera manet , velut istam , Ecclesia militat . Ac talem incipit aliquando scire , & aliquando scire definit ; nisi forte veritas propositionis sit perpetua , &c. Porro omnis haec loquendi varietas non inde nascitur , quod circa Dei scientiam accidat aliqua Mutatio , sed quia mutantur res subjectae . Unde necesse est & ipsas mutari propositiones , &c. Manifestum est autem rebus mutatis non necessariò scientiam mutari , ne creatam quidem , nisi quid aliud concurrat , velut Compositio aut divisio , aut certitudo major per experientiam rei praesentis accepta . Quae in Deo locum non habent . Sicut ergo scientia Medici invariata permanet dum eidem homini ob variam ejus affectionem , modo haec pharmaca , modo alia diversa praescribit , &c. ]

14. Lastly , I again desire the Reader to remember , that if I seem in all this to speak sceptically , it is no wonder , when all that I intend is but to convince these self-conceited Learned men , that these things are indeed beyond their reach , and that they know not what they think they know : it being my own opinion , That Action , Intellection and Will , are but Metaphorically ascribed to God , and that we cannot know what that is in propriety , which these expressions do shadow out in God . Tho . White saith ; Institut . Sacrar . li . 2. Lect . 1. pag . 136 , 137. Quare dicimus abstrabendo a nostris conceptibus , esse Deum unam simplicitatem simplicissimam , quae neque sit Deus , neque ens , neque aliud formaliter quod nos cogitare possimus ; sed nostras cogitationes eam inad equate repraesentare ; non quasi accipientes aliquod unum ex pluribus q●ae ibi actu sint , sed accipiendo participationes quasdam inferiores eo quod ipse est , & dissimiliores quam salvia vel pediculus est respectu hominis . Whether this hold or not of the notions , Deus & Ens , I doubt not but it holds of Intellection and Volition : or at least that we men are uncertain what these are in God . And the strange confidence of men in this , that they know that which no man knows indeed , hath made them unreverently vent their conceits , and fill the Church with perplexing co●troversies about things that none can determine . As Mr Burgess saith of Justific . Lect . 20. [ Only you must take notice that we are in meer darkness , and not able to comprehend how God is said to act or work , &c. Therefore it is a sure truth , De Deo etiam vera dicere periculosum est , & tunc dignè Deum aestimamus , cum inaestimabilem dicimus ; then do we rightly esteem of him , when we Judge him above our thoughts or esteem . ] Matth . Paris speaking of the Dominicans teaching , which caused that great dissention and confusion in the University of Paris , writes thus ( ad annum Dom . 1243. as he is cited by the Prefacer to Guiliel . de Sancto Amore ) Incipiebant disputare & disserere subtilius & celsius quam decuit aut expedivit : Qui non verentes tangere montes a gloria Dei opprimendi nitebantur secreta Dei investigabilia temere perscrutari , & Judicia Dei quae sunt abyssus multa , nimis praesumptuosè indagare . Deo enim plus placet firmae fidei simplicitas , quam nimis transcendens in Theologiâ subtilitas . ] Dr. Twiss Vindic Grat . l. 2. Crim . 3. § . 15. Sed quid fiet si haec humana ratio non ferat ? An nihil ●redendum nobis in●um 〈…〉 nisi quod quomodo fiat , humana ratione explicare See Mr K's own conf●ssion , how little we can conceive or express of God , in the end of his Epist. Dedicat . possit ? Mysteriun hoc forsitan adorand●m potius quam scrutandum , &c. Et li . 2. Crim . 3. § ●0 . pag . ( mih● ) 405. E●iam non erubesco fateri , licet nunquam dub●●trem de sancta Dei natura , tanquam de omni sceleris reatu alien●ssima , hoc tamen diu me su●pensum tenuisse ( forte etiam hodie non paucos suspensos tene● ) quaenam scilicet sit illa vera ratio , qui modus operationis Divinae quo siat ut se in omni actione tanquam Causa efficacissima immisceat , extra tamen omnem vitii contagionem , citra justam culpae suspicionem : Et an hodie per omnia satis explicatum habeamus , Deus novit , &c. Significat etiam Calvinus , multis hunc nodum visum esse inexplicabilem , &c. Hoc modo tutius consulendum censuit nostrae pietati , si fateamur hehitudinem sensus nostri my sterium hoc non capere . ] And why should not the same Confession extend to the present case also ? Though we do not use to confess our Ignorance till we are utterly at a loss ( and then we say as Cajetan when he was stall'd , It doth not quietare intellectum ) yet we have oft as great cause to confess it where we are confident sometimes ; as perhaps Ariba that blames Cajetan for his Confession of Ignorance , might know as little as Alvarez that commends it for a most holy and pious speech .

I had thought to have said no more to this point , but finding a most Learned , I know Mr. Rutherford hath some jarring with him ; and I do not undertake to justifie all that any man hath said , when I call them Orthodox ; but I confess I think that for solidity in the controverted points that they meddle with , Davenant , Camero and Baronius are the glory of B●itain , as hav●ng happily hit on that mean , which many others have mist of , which I would not have understood as disparaging any others : for even in this , they have many excellent Companions , and others have their excellencies , that were not in this so happy as they . Our Renowned B. Usher , D Preston , D. Field , and many another famous light in England , have not only deserved the honour of eminent Learning and Piety , but even in this judicious Discovery of the truth , between the extreams which others have run into , they have helped to reduce the violent to Moderation , and to shew men a surer way to overcome the adversary , then their disadvantagious extreams . Orthodox , Judicious Divine Robert Baronius ( Camero secundus , vel Cameroni secundus ) to speak so fully in this point , in his excellent Treatise de Peccato Mortali & Veniali , I have adventured to transcribe the whole Chapter , it being not long , both that the Reader may see the Reasons of the like passages in my fore-going Replies more clearly , and that Mr. K. may be yet better satisfied that I am not so singular in these things , as he seems to think me .

Disp . Parte 1a sect . 6. Deum Posse eos amare quos prius odit , & odisse eos quos prius amavit , absque ulla vel physica , vel morali voluntatis suae mutatione , obiter Declaratur .

EX doctrina praecedenti sectione tradita de justificatorum ad certum tempus exclusione ab eo favoris Divini gradu , quo priu● diligebantur , nequaquam sequitur Deum , aut voluntatem Dei in se mutabilem esse , sive loquamur de mutabilitate physica , sive de mutabilitate morali .

Nam quod ad divinum amorem executionis attinet , Deum non amare justificatos peccati mortalis reatu involutos amore executionis , nihil aliud est , quam eum non conferre in illos ea bonae spiritualia , seu media salutis , quae prius in eos conferebat nulla igitur est hic mutatio quoad actus immanentes , qui in ipso Deo existunt , sed tantum quoad actus transeuntes , qui sunt extra Deum & in hominibus recipiuntur , & proinde iis mutatis non mutatur Deus , sed illi in quibus hi actus , & eorum effecta recipiuntur . Dicet aliquis : Deus non solùm non confert illa beneficia in eos , sed etiam durante eo statu non vult ea conferre : prius autem voluit ea conferre : & proinde mutatus est . Resp . Voluit prius illa beneficia communicare iis existentibus in alio statu . Sed iis existentibus in hoc statu impietatis , & impaenitentiae , neque jam vult , neque unquam voluit , imo ab aeterno noluit haec beneficia communicare . Quam vis igitur durante hoc statu benevolentia Dei quasi ligata & impedita sit ; ut supra monai , hinc tam●n non sequitur eam in se mutatam esse : sed tantum mutatum esse ejus objectum , quia viz. objectum ejus , hoc est , homines electi , prius erant capaces istorum beneficiorum nunc vero eorum capaces non sunt .

3. Major & gravior difficultas est de amore complacentiae , & odio displicentiae ei opposito . Cum enim hi actus sint immanentes , hoc est , in ipso Deo existentes , iis mutatis videtur ipse Deus in se mutari . Responderi solet primo , non mutari hos actus realiter , & a parte rei ; quia uterque hic act●s in Deo fuit ab aeterno , & in aeternum in eo durabit , cum respectu ad diversos istius hominis status , quorum alter alteri in tempore fuccessit . Ita respondet Fonseca tom . 3. Metaph . lib . 7. cap . 8. quaest. 5. sect . 7. Quod si ( inquit ) quis objiciat eundem posse prius odio haberi a Deo , si sit injustus , postea verò diligi , si sit justus , & vice versa , sine ulla divinae voluntatis mutatione , ergo nihil repugnare quo minus divina voluntas nullo modo mutata transeat a nolitione in volitionem rei ejusdem , ex dict is patet solutio . Deus enim non eundem odio habet , ac diligit pro eodem tempore , sed pro diversis . Adde , quod etsi in eodem homine justitia succedit peccato , aut peccatum justitiae , tamen odio , quo Deus illum prosequitur ut peccatorem , non succedit amor , quo illum diligit ut justum , aut contra ; sed uterque affectus divinus aeternus est respiciens diverses hominis status , quorum alter alteri succedit in tempore .

4. Secundò respondeo : quaemvis concederemus esse aliquam mutationem & successionem in actibus immanentibus amoris & odii divini formaliter consideratis , quatenus per rationem distinguuntur ab essentia divina & inter se , hoc est , quamvis diceremus actum amoris complacentiae ergo electum in hoc casu non amplius esse in Deo , eique succedere actum odii displicentiae , non tamen inde sequeretur esse mutationem aliquam realem in ipso Deo . Nam actus Dei liberi nihil superaddunt voluntati aut essentiae divinae , praeter respectum seu relationem rationis , aut extrinsecam aliquam connotationem , quae tamen ad realem eorum entitatem non pertinent : nam tota eorum entitas realis est ipsa Dei essentia , nihilque intrinsecè includunt praeter eam . Quamvis igitur Deus desineret amare eos quos prius amabat , non mutaretur mutatione reali , quia nihil reale amitteret ▪ sique inciperet eos amare quos prius odit , non mutaretur , quia nihil reale ei accederet , mutatio autem realis non fit , sine aliqua additione aut a●latione real● .

5. Non necesse est ut hic probem actus illos nullam realem entitatem ( sive ea vocetur perfectio , sive extensio actus divini ad objecta ) superaddere essentiae divinae . Nam Evangelici omnes hoc unanimiter tenent : & quod ad Pontificios attinet , quam vis Cajetanus in 1•m partem Thomae quaest. 19. art . 2 & 3 Fonseca tom . 3. Metaph . lib . 7. cap . 8. quaest. 5. sect . 4. & Salas 1a . 2ae quaest. 6. art . 3. tract 3 disp . 3. sect 8. doceant actus liberos Dei , seu decreta ejus , superaddere essentiae divinae realem quandam entitatem , quae ab aeterno potuit non esse in Deo , quaeque revera in eo non fuisset , si ab aeterno aliter decrevisset , & hos actus non babuisset , major tamen & melior eorum pars in contraria est sententia viz. Suarez . tom . 2. Metaph . disp . 30. sect . 9. & Va●quez . in 1•m partem Thomae , disput : 80. cap . 1. & 2. Valent . tom . 1. disput . 1. quaest. 19. punct . 4. Arrubal in primam partem Thomae , disput 54 cap . 2. & se sequentibus . Becanus in summa , Parte 1. Tract . 1. cap . 11. quaest. 4. Trigosus in summa Theologica Bonaventurae quaest. 13. art . 2. dub 3. conclus . 1. Franciscus Cumel variarum disput tom . 1. in disp de praescientia Dei dub . 3 p. 57 , &c. Horum sententia proculdubio est vertor illa altera , quia si in Deo est realis aliqua entitas , quae ab aeterno potuit in eo non esse , atque adeo potuit non omnino esse , seu esse merum nihil , necessariò sequitur aliquid esse in Deo quod non est Deus .

6. Dicet aliquis : si mutatis actibus liberis Deus realiter non mutatur , poterit salva sua immutabilitate , mutare decreta sua de rebus futuris , & proinde poterit incipere velle quod nunquam antea voluit , vel desinere velle quod prius voluit . Nam talis mutatio decretorum divinorum fit sine aliqua additione , aut ablatione reali . Resp . Duplicem esse mutationem , viz. Physicam & Moralem . Physica , seu realis mutatio fit per additionem , aut ablationem alicujus entitatis realis . Moralis mutatio est propositi & voluntatis , aut etiam cognitionis & scientiae mutatio ; ut si quis quod antea putabat verum , deinde falsum judicet ; & quod antea facere decreverat postea nolit , quod sane magnam imperfectionem in eo qui sic mutatur arguit ▪ Vide Vasquezium in 1•m partem Thomae super quaest. 9. art . 4. Cum igitur Deus dicitur absolute immutabilis id non minus intelligitur de morali quam de Physica immutabilitate , nam mutatio propositi & consilii quae moralis vocatur , arguit inconstantiam , imprudentiam , & cognitionis imperfectionem , quae non minus summae & absolutae Dei perfectioni repugnant , quam Physica , seu realis mutatio , ut bene observat Suar●z . tom . 2. Metaph disp . 30. sect . ● . num . 58.

7 Ex his patet Deum , cum odio displicentiae prosequitur electum , quem prius amabat amore complacentiae , non mutari ; quam vis fortasse nunc minimè sit in eo actus complacentiae , consideratus ut respectum rationis ad tale objectum divinae essentiae superaddit : Primò enim ablato tali actu , Deus physicè & realiter non mutatur , quia nihil ei decedit praeter merum respectum rationis ut irrefragabilibus argumentis demonstrant Suarez . & Vasquez , locis citatis , Secundò , neque mutatur moraliter , quia non mutat propositum , sed contra , permanet in suo proposito , aut potius in naturali sua inclinatione , quo ab aeterno fuit , nunc est , & semper erit , propenfus ad a mandam virtutem , & ad detestanda vitia , seu peccata . Permanet etiam in suo proposito perducendi eos quos elegit & justificavit ad aeternam gloriam , nam solidum stat Dei fundamentum , habens sigillum hoc , Novit Dominus eos qui sunt sui , 2 Tim . 2. 19.

Mark here that the reason which Baronius , Burgersdicius and others give against Gods change of his Decrees , viz. he should be morally mutable , holds not of the immanent acts which presuppose their objects , and whose objects are really mutable : as Baronius here manifesteth . It is certain that things are sometime future , sometime present or existent , and sometime past : and that they are so is of God , but without moral mutation : therefore his Knowing them so , and his Willing and Approving them so , is without moral mutation too . So the same man is good or holy to day that was bad and unholy yesterday : therefore God may love him to day with complacency and approbation , whom he disliked before ; and may know him to be as he is , which before he did not , because he was not as he is . 2. Note the reason why God cannot change his Decrees : Both because they do effect or produce their own objects ( as commonly called ) viz. Rerum futuritionem , when as Gods Approbation , his Knowledge purae visionis , his Complacency , &c. do presuppose their objects . 2. And it would be a contradiction for the same event , to be future and not future , e . g . mans salvation : therefore if God absolutely Decree that Peter shall be saved , and after Decree the contrary , the first Decree must be changed causlesly , and for want of power not be executed ; and also as it is verbum mentis , it must be false : which cannot be .

I Had thought to have said nothing of particular Scriptures that speak of Gods acts which we call Immanent as Beginning or Ending , because they are so commonly known : But lest any should think I slight Scripture Argument , which I principally esteem , or lest they take it for granted that there is none such , because none are produced , I will adde some texts in confirmation of the minor of this following Argument .

If God himself in his Word do ordinarily speak of his own Acts , which we call Immanent , as Beginning or Ending , then is it not unfit for us to do so to . ( God knows best how to express his own Acts. )

But God himself in his Word doth ordinarily speak of his own Acts , which we call Immanent , as Beginning or Ending :

Therefore .

Luk . 2. 52. Jesus increased in favour with God and man . ] Gods [ favouring ] Christ is an Immanent act : and yet Christ increased in Gods favour : Increase signifieth mutation , by an inception of further degrees .

Rom. 9. 25. I will call them my People which were not my people , and her Beloved which was not beloved . ] Love is an Immanent act .

Joh . 16. 27. The Father himself loveth you , because ye have loved me and beleeved , &c. ] Therefore it was when they beleeved and loved Christ , that the Father in this sense began to love them .

Joh . 14. 21 , 23. He that loveth me shall be loved of my Father , and I will love him , &c. And my Father will love him , and we will come unto him , &c. ]

Pro . 8. 17. I love them that love me , &c. ] Therefore with this same love , they were not before beloved , though with another sort of love they were .

Joh . 10. 17. Therefore doth the Father love me , because I lay down my life , &c.

Hos . 11. 1. When Israel was a childe then I loved him .

Deut . 7. 12 , 13. If ye hearken , &c. the Lord thy God will keep unto thee the Covenant , &c. And he will love thee , &c.

Hos . 9. 15. I will love them no more : All their Princes are revolters .

Psal . 5. 5. Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity . ] Such are the Elect before conversion .

Gen. 4. 7. If thou do well shalt thou not be Accepted , & c ?

So all those texts that speak of Gods being reconciled , which properly signifies an Immanent act .

Act. 10. 35. He that feareth God and worketh righteousness is Accepted of him .

Mat . 3. 17. This is my Beloved Son in whom I am well pleased .

Heb . 13. 16. With such sacrifice God is well pleased .

Heb . 11. 5. He had this testimony that he pleased God .

1 King . 3. 10. And the speech pleased the Lord that Solomon asked , &c.

Heb . 11. 6. Without faith it is impossible to please God .

1 Thess. 4. 1. How ye ought to walk and please God .

1 Cor . 7. 32. He that is unmarried careth , &c. how he may please the Lord .

Rom. 8. 8. They that are in the flesh cannot please God .

Prov. 15. 8. The prayer of the upright is his delight .

2 Sam . 15. 26. If he thus say , I have no delight in thee , &c.

Jer . 9. 24. For in these things do I delight saith the Lord .

Zeph . 3. 17. He will rejoyce over thee with joy , he will rest in his love ; he will joy over thee , &c.

Deut . 28. 63. And it shall come to passe , as the Lord rejoyced over you to do you good , &c. so the Lord will rejoyce over you to destroy you , &c.

Deut . 30. 9. For the Lord will again rejoyce over thee for good .

Psal . 104. 31. The Lord shall rejoyce in his works .

Isa . 62. 5. As the bridegroom Rejoyceth over the bride , so shall thy God Rejoyce over thee .

2 Tim . 2. 15. Study to shew thy self approved unto God .

Deut . 32. 19. When the Lord saw it , he abhorred them .

Gen. 1. 4 , 10 , 13 , 31. God saw the light that it was good .

Ifa . 59. 15 , 16. And the Lord saw it , and it displeased him that there was no judgement : And he saw that there was no man , and wondred , &c.

Gen. 29. 31. When the Lord saw that Leah was hated , he , &c.

Jer . 26. 2 , 3. Diminish not a word . If so be they will hearken and turn every man from his evil way , that I may repent me of the evil , which I purpose to do unto them , because of the evil of their doings .

Jer . 36. 3. It may be the house of Judah will hear all the evil which I purpose to do unto them , that they may return every man from his evil way , that I may forgive , &c.

Gen. 6. 6. It repented the Lord that he had made man . ] So the 7th verse .

Exod . 32. 14. And the Lord repented of the evil which he thought to do unto his people .

1 Sam . 15. 35. The Lord Repented he had made Saul King ] So the eleventh verse .

2 Sam . 24. 16. The Lord Repented him of the evil , and said to the Angel , &c.

Psal . 106. 46. He remembred for them his Covenant , and Repented according to the multitude of his mercies .

Jer . 26. 19. And the Lord Repented him of the evil , &c.

Amos 7. 3. The Lord Repented for this : It shall not be saith the Lord . ] So verse 6.

Jonah 4. 2. I knew that thou art a gracious God , and mercifull , slow to anger and of great kindness , and Repentest thee of the evil .

Jon . 3. 10. And God saw their works that they turned from their evil way , and God Repented of the evil that he had said he would do unto them , and did it not .

Jo●l 2. 13. He is gracious , &c. slow to anger , and Repenteth him of the evil .

Jer . 15. 6. I am weary with Repenting .

Hos . 11. 8. My heart is turned within me : my repentings are kindled together .

Psal . 30. 5. For his Anger endureth but for a moment .

Psal . 103. 8 , 9. The Lord is mercifull and gracious , slow to Anger , &c. Neither will he keep his Anger for ever .

Isa . 63. 10. Therefore he was Turned to be their enemy , &c.

Psal . 85. 3. Thou hast taken away all thy wrath , thou hast turned thy self from the fiercenesse of thy anger .

2 Chron . 12. 12. And when he humbled himself the wrath of the Lord turned from him that he would not destroy him .

Josh . 7. 26. So the Lord turned from the fierceness of his wrath .

So 2 Chron . 29. 10. & 30. 8 , 9. & Psal . 106. 23. Jer . 18. 20. and so frequently .

Also very many places that mention the kindling or arising of Gods wrath .

Psal . 78. 38. Many a time turned he his anger away and did not stirre up all his wrath .

Prov. 24. 18. Lest the Lord see it , and it displease him , and turn away his wrath ●●om him . There are three several immanent acts mentioned together .

So all those Texts where Remembring and Forgetting are spoken of God ,

So many more Texts that mention Gods being displeased , Gen. 38. 10. Num . 11. 1. 1 Chron . 21. 7. Ps. 60. 1. Zech . 1. 2. 15.

So many Texts that speak of Gods seeing , as Gen 18. 21 , &c.

Psal . 34. 17. The righteous cry and the Lord heareth and delivereth , &c.

Psal . 69. 33. For the Lord heareth the poor and despiseth not his prisoners .

With many more places that speak of Gods Hearing and Hearkening .

So many Texts that mention his Regarding , and his Considering , and Pondering .

And many that mention his Abhorring , and his despising .

And many Texts that speak of Gods Pity and Compassion to the miserable .

And many that speak of his Favour as beginning or ending , and mans finding favour in his eyes .

And many that speak of his Grace when it signifieth favour , and is expressed as beginning or changing . With many more to the same purpose .

Judg . 10. 13. 16. Ye have forsaken me and served other Gods ; Wherefore I will deliver you no more . Vers . 16. They put away the strange Gods and served the Lord , and his soul was grieved for the misery of Israel , &c. ] And he did deliver them by Jephtah . Yet here God seemeth to revoke a peremptory sentence .

If any shall say , that all these later are but figurative speeches applied to God from the manner of men : I as easily grant it as any man : But withall remember these two things . 1. That I suppose it is as true of Gods Knowing and Willing , his Electing , Decreeing , Purposing , &c. only differing in the degree of impropriety : Till the contrary be better proved then I have seen it , I think this will be my opinion . 2. It is onely the fitnesse or unfitnesse of these wayes of speech concerning God , tha● I am now enqui●ing into ; and not of the propriety . If it be the Scripture-way so ordinarily to speak of Gods Immanent acts as New , as Beginning or Ceasing , then is it not unlawfull or unfit for us so to speak , in imitation of the holy Ghost : still acknowledging the unavoidable Impropriety of our expressions , and the Incomprehensibleness of that in God , which by such expressions is hinted out unto us .

I remember what Zanchius saith in Epist. Joh . Cratoni , in the third Vol. of his Works , pag . ( mihi ) 135. Quod ais , Precibus moveri Deum {αβγδ} est , quam si tollamus è Scripturis , quae impietates & quot pugnantia non è Scripturis colligentur ?

The Second Point .

§. 28.

Mr. K. Second ; THat there is somewhat like to Justification in the Eternal Decrees of God to Justifie men .

§. 28.

R. B. IF this also be intended against me , then , Whether this Learned man did not want work , when he undertook this , I leave the indifferent Reader to judge . The former Question which he propounded to dispute , he knew and confessed that I denied not : ( Yet he hath forced me to spend many words on it , and to say more then I thought to have done . ) This which he makes his second Labour , he will not say that I was ever his adversary in ; or that ever I debated the Proposition , much less denied it : And yet all this seems intended against me , and by name anon he brings me in . If this man had not somewhat ab homine more forcible then any thing in the matter disputed , which instigated his pugnacious soul to this conflict , then must I confess my self quite mistaken in the Motives of his undertaking . The former part of his Dispute hath convinced me of this . I remember we had such sparks among us when I was a School-hoy , that were wont ( for maintaining the reputation of their valour ) to appoint fighting matches , and to the field they must go , before ever they thought what should be the matter of quarrel , and when they came to the place , they must be dared by a third , to spit in anothers face to make the quarrel ; and he that refused was the Coward , and he that spit first , and struck first , had the first glory , though sometime not the last .

What I should do with all these following words of Mr. K's that concern me not , I do not well know . I hope none will expect that I should engage my self against him to prove , that [ there is nothing like to Justification in the Eternal Decrees of God to Justifie ] nor that I should answer to all that he brings to prove it ! Yet because I take his Discourse to be very feeble , and to small purpose , I shall take a brief notice of it in the way , whether it were intended against me Directly , or but Colla●erally .

§. 29.

Mr. K. ANd I make it good , not from this , that by reason of this Decree , God i● said to have Justified whom he predestinated , Rom. 8. For indeed he is said to have glorified them also ; though glorifying of many of them be not till the end of the world , yea that full glorifying of none of them be till then , and the Decree to glorifie all whom he will glorifie at the end of the world , was before the beginning of the world : and yet this expression shews the Certainty of their Justification and Glorifying , who are predestinated ; the Preter tense being used only to express the Certainty of the future . But this I will not insist on ; but run another course , and that is this : Justification is by the Consent of all men ( I mean Protestants ) a Remission of our sins , and Accepting of u● as Righteous : Now this is either a meer immanent ; or a meer transient Act , or both . I know no man will say it is a meer transient Act : there being no transient Act of God which doth not suppose an Immanent one ; for that he acts nothing upon the Creature , but what he first purposed in himself to act : so then an Immanent act there must be confest , if there be a transient one ; and a transient one I shall acknowledge as well as an Immanent , and what it is will enquire by and by : But first I contend th●t immanent Act there can be no other then the Decree of God to pass this transient Act , and that this Decree of God to pass the transient Act of Justifying , carries in it as much as concerns Gods Remission of sins , and Acceptance of us as Righteous ; and therefore hath much in it like to Justification ; and may be stiled so without Blasphemy , as Mr. Goodwin is pleased to brand it in his Rhetorick . And that this Decree to Justifie us , carries as much as concerns Remission of sins , and accepting of us as righteous , I prove thus : If it do not , then the Remission of sins , and Accepting of us as Righteous , are other immanent Acts. But that cannot be , for then , either in the Understanding or Will : but neither can be said with sobriety , for sure God cannot be said to Decree to know any thing , or to decree to Will any thing : not to know any thing : for though he know things in his Decree , yet doth he not decree to know , his Knowledge being necessary , his Decree arbitrary : and if he did decree to know any thing , we must conclude he might have not known it ; for decrees are only of things which may be or not be : Therefore whatsoever it be , it is no such distinct immanent Act in Gods Understanding ; and though we use to say , Now a man is Justified in Gods sight , yet doth not this put any new Act of Knowledge in God , but signifies only a Testimony given by God , whereby he makes us know that we are Justified before God , or in his sight ; and I am sure that Mr. Baxter , who quoteth Suarez , Schibler and Keckerman at every bout , cannot be ignorant that the word of fight , though it be for the form Active , is for the substance of it rather Passive , and therefore is not attributable to God as it is to us ; but in him it signifies a making of us to see , and we are said to be Justified in his sight , when he makes it as it were evident to our sight that we are Justified : as when God is said to know what was in Hezekiahs heart , the meaning is , he made known to Hezekiah what was in his heart .

2. To Decree to Will God cannot be said ; for that is as much as to Will to Will , which was never heard of , the object of the Will being at best but the imperate Act , not his own ●licite Act ; for what need of Willing to will a thing , when one Willing is enough ? And be that wils to will , wils no more then he doth already , which is to will , one of these Acts must needs be superfluous ; and there is no ground to put any such in God , yea or man . I acknowledge a 〈◇〉 in some cases may be said to Will to be more willing , as when the flesh interp●s●th and draws him off from willing fully , or at least from executing his will : but this is rather to will a freedom from a disturbance of the sensitive appetite , then to will the exercise of the rational will ; now such an incumbrance of the will of God , there can be none , and consequently no ground whereon to raise such an assertion as this , that he may be said to Will , or decree to Will , which is equivolent . And thus it appears in general , that there is no new immanent Act in God required , yea possible , to the Justifying of a man , besides his decree to Justifie u● .

§. 29.

R. B. I Confess I had farre rather be imployed in debating the point of Justification , then of Gods Immanent acts , which you before insisted on . But to deal freely with you , I never read from a Learned , Orthodox man , a more superficial , unprofitable Discourse on that Subject , or that less expresseth a competent understanding of the point , if my Judgement fail not , as probably it may .

1. To what purpose you tell us what Arguments you will not use ( viz. from Rom. 8. 30. ) I know not .

2. Though I little know to what good use it would be , to acquaint us what is like Justification , yet , me thinks , were it useful , it should have been better proved . And first me thinks your Memory fails you ( which you had need to take extraordinary care of : ) The last Discourse was much spent in shewing that [ there is a great difference between Immanent Acts and Transient ] and that [ there is a clear difference between them as between heaven and earth : Transient Acts being in the Patient , and Immanent in the Agent ] So that to equal them in Eternity [ is either to make the Creature eternal , or to deny God to be Eternal . ] And now the second Discourse must be to prove them to be like : For the Decree which is an Immanent Act hath somewhat like Justification , which you confess a Transient Act. But yet I doubt not but your Learning can make this good : For you that can prove that Gods Immanent Acts which are his Essence , do differ no more from poor mans , then as you have expressed , may well prove , that Gods Immanent Acts are like Transient Acts ; much more that Heaven and Earth are like . And doubtless your undertaking is very feasible : For you may well prove , that there is a similitude between Gods Immanent acts , and a stone , or a tree , or a worm , or any thing in the world : For you will say , that Gods Immanent acts are God himself , and that these Creatures are all Good : and then all things that are Good , are somewhat Like to God : Therefore every thing in the world ( having some Good ) is somewhat Like God : Also they have a Being , and therefore have some likenesse to the first Being . But then what Likenesse this is , or in what Degree , you have more Wit then to undertake to tell .

4. The Reason that you give for your not arguing from Rom. 8. 30 is because [ indeed he is said to have Glorified them also . ] But how fell it ou● that you observed not , that on the same Reason , you should have rejected the Argument which you here use ? Because indeed it saith as much ( for ought I know ) to prove Gods Decree to be like Glorification , as to be like Justification .

5. Should you not have told us in what sense you take Justification before you define it ? Who knows whether you mean Justification Constitutive , or Sententiall ? ( not to speak of the many other distinctions of Justification . )

6. Why would you tell the world what all Protestants take Justification to be ? as if you knew them all ?

7. At least , how comes it to pass that so Learned a man hath read so little , and would bewray it so easily ? as to say that [ All Protestants consent that Justification is the Remission of sin , and Accepting of us as Righteous ? ] Would you be believed in such notorious untruths which you fear not to utter even ▪ in a matter of fact , where there is so much visible evidence against you ? How many of our English Divines ( besides all others ) affirm Remission of sin to be a fruit or consequent , and no part of Justification ? had you read but Mr. Bradshaw and Mr. Gataker , you would have known some . How many on the other side make Remission of sin antecedent to Justification in order of nature ? and Justification to be its immediate consequent ? How many take Remission of sin to be the whole of our Justification ? yea what full Disputes and Treatises are written only or principally , or at least very much to prove this ? and what famous Divines are they that maintain it ? How many be there that take Justification to consist partly in Remission of sin , and partly in the imputation of Christs own Righteousness ? and these with the former say , that Accepting us as Righteous is a consequent of Justification : Sin must first be remitted , say the former , and Christs Righteousness imputed ours , say the later , before God can Accept any man as Righteous : For man must first be Righteous , before he can be accepted as such ▪ Yea Mr. Arthur Dent in his Catechism , defines justification to be , A cleansing and renewing of our nature by the Spirit of God .

The number that are of these several opinions are so great , and the men ▪ so eminent , and well known to Divines that have been much verst in this Controversie , or are of any considerable reading in our Modern Writers , that I shall think it needlesse to cite any of them . Hath Mr. K. read none of all these ▪ or will he blot out their Names from the number of Protestants ?

8. Yet more grossely doth he affirm , that he [ knows no man that will say it is a meer transient act . ] I think then you have either read little of this Controversie , or little remember what you have read : at least , are an unfit man to tell us what All men hold , or all Protestants , when you profess to know so little . You might have seen this in some plain English books , that are in the hands of the multitude of those below you . Mr. Tho . Hooker maintains it , That Justification is not an Immanent but a Transient act . But what need I name any , when it is known to to be the common Judgement of our Divines , and those few that have maintained Justification to be an Immanent act ( and consequently eternal ) have been taken for Erroneous therein , and as militating so farre for the Antinomians . See Mr. Burgess of Justification , Lect . 20. p. 167 , 168 , 169.

9. If Justification be a Transient act , and yet not a meer Transient act , then is it both an Immanent and a Transient act . And if so , then either it is two acts , or else the Immanent and Transient act are one . If Justification ( Active ) be two acts , then it seems it is divisible ; yea and one part of it is Eternal , and the other in Time only : And then we must not enquire , What the justifying act is ? but What each of these justifying acts are ? Of this if I knew your minde , perhaps I might say more . If the Immanent and Transient act be but one , dive●sly considered ( 1. As in the meer form of an Act , having not yet effected any thing ; 2. And as the same act is received into the subject Passive , and so is the Passion ) then the same act is no more immanent , when it is once transient ; and then we must say , that the act of Justification was eternal , but the passion or effect in time only . But this sense seems so much to contradict , both your foregoing discourse of the difference of Immanent and Transient acts , and your after hint of the Transient act which justifyeth , that I will not imagine it to be the sense you intend .

10. But your reason why no man will say it is a meer transient act , is very darkly discovered : It is because [ there is no transient act of God , which doth not suppose an immanent one . ] But doth it follow that therefore Justification is not a meer transient act , because it supposeth an immanent act ? Why did you not tell us whether it suppose it as an antecedent , or as a part of Justification , or as what else ? But you know that all that is supposed is not therefore a part . Or if it were never so necessary a foregoing cause , yet it follows not that the neerer cause may not be causa totalis in suo genere , and so be denominated . May not you on these grounds as well say , that there is nothing in the world is a meer transient act , because it supposeth an immanent ? The building of a house I think is a transient act ; and yet it supposeth divers immanent acts in the builder , and an immanent act of God that willed it .

11. But what is this immanent act ? You adde [ For that he acts nothing upon the creature , but what he first purposed in himself to act . ] I doubt not but you easily see , that if this reason prove any thing , it will as well prove that Creation , Redemption , Sanctification , Resurrection , Glorification , are none of them meer transient acts : For God acts these in Time : and therefore he first purposed to act them . Yea it will do as much to prove that God never did , nor can perform a meer transient act : because he can do nothing but what he purposeth . What need you then apply this to Justification any more then to any thing else ? as if Justification had any peculiar participation in this honour , above some other acts ! By your reason , the dividing the red sea , the sending of Manna and Quails , the writing of the ten Commandments , were none of them meer transient acts .

12. Immanent acts pass not into the extrinsick objects and make no change on them , and therefore are not causall : and therefore cannot well as causals be denominated from their effects : therefore no immanent act of God can be called Justification , or part of Justification , or a justifying act : For it must be so denominated from the effect of justifying : But it is the transient act only that effecteth Justification ( Passive : ) therefore it is the transient act only that is to be called Justification .

13. I have oft times asked the Antinomians , what text of Scripture they could shew that calleth any Immanent Eternal act of God by the name of Justification , or of part of Justification ? and I could never yet see any that they produced : and I suppose that you are also unable to shew any such ; or else you would its like , have done it .

14. When you say [ God decreed to Justifie ] do not you plainly make [ Decreeing ] and [ Justifying ] two things ? and denominate only the transient act which is in time [ Justification ? ] So of other ▪ acts ; as when we say [ God decreed to create : ] you do not say , His Decreeing was Creating .

15. You conclude that [ an Immanent act must be confest if there be a Transient one . ] Ans. It is easily confest that an Immanent act ( so called , for our understanding ) there is from Eternity concerning every thing that is in Time produced : but that proves not that the producing act in Time , is not meerly transient . I all this while suppose that you mean by denying Justification to be [ a meer transient act ] to include some other act justifying , or as part of Justification , and not only to prove an antecedency or concomitancy of such an Immanent act . Else your reasoning would be absurd or against your self .

16. Having thus proved that there must be an Immanent act , you next say , that [ There can be no other then the Decree of God to pass this transient act . ] Your contention for this is bold , your proof of it weak . As Gods immanent acts are the same with his Essence , so he hath but One , that is , he is but One : Understanding , Willing , Nilling , is all One ; and so there is but one Immanent act in Justification , Condemnation , or what you will else , because there is but One God : Or rather God hath nothing properly called an Act , because he is God . But as we ascribe One act to God Analogically speaking of him according to our capacity , so must we on the same necessity ascribe to him more then One , and that is by denominating them from the variety of objects which they respect and connote . And so as truly as you can distinguish between the Divine Intellection and Volition , so truly may we distinguish the Volitions of God , according to the divers state of the objects . And so if we could yield to you that there is any Immanent act a part of Justification , or that carrieth in it as much as concerneth acceptance of us as Righteous , we might fairly say as much , at least , for another act , as you can do for the Decree : For the Decree that you speak of , is only [ a Decree to pass a transient act ] and so hath for its object something future : But the Will of God de pr●senti , by which he willeth the relation of the justified person , is yet nearer the effect . So is his mentall approbation , and his acceptance of the person as Righteous ( Willingly and Approvingly judging him Just ; ) some call his estimation of us to be Just sententiam conceptam as distinct from sententia lata , but neerer to it then the Immanent Decree to pass an act de futur● .

17. You adde [ That this Decree of God to pass the transient act of justifying , carries in it as much as concerns Gods remission of sins , and acceptance of us as Righteous . ] By which words you may mean almost what your list ; but how any man should understand your meaning that knows not your minde by some better discovery , I do not know . 1. Whether do you mean by [ as much as concerns ] an essential constitutive concernment , q. d . [ as much as constituteth ? ] But if so , then you should exclude your transient act , and the immanent alone should not be [ somewhat like Justification ] but Justification it self . For if this immanent be as much as constituteth remission of sin , and acceptance of us as Righteous , and Justification consisteth of these two only , then the immanent act is the whole of Justification . Or if you mean [ as much as concerneth it antecedently ex parte Dei ] that were manifestly false : For the giving of Christ , the accepting his Satisfaction and Intercession , and many other acts concerning Remission and Acceptance , are antecedent to Justification . Or if you should mean it in the full latitude , as your words import , viz. That nothing concerneth our Remission and Acceptance but only Gods Decree , then it is yet more palpably false : but this is so gross that I may not suppose you guilty of it , though your unlimited words do seem to express it . Or do you mean [ as much of Gods immanent action as concerns Remission and Acceptance is found in this Decree to pass the transient act , ] supposing this to be part of our Justification , and the transient act the other part ? But 1. your next words before and after seem to contradict that . For you say it is [ a Decree to justifie ] which therefore cannot be part of the thing Decreed . 2. And what mean you then to plead that it is [ somewhat Like Justification ] if it be a part , and such a part . Is it worthy a Divine laboriously to prove that a mans soul is Like a man ? Or that [ laying the Foundation ] is somewhat Like to Building ? The truth is , your terms perswade me either that you hold that Antinomian eternal Justification , which you are ashamed plainly to reveal , or else that you know not what you hold your self .

18. Yet do you repeat these ambiguous words again , as those , it seems , which best fit your design : and you prove them thus : [ If it do not , then the Remission of sins , and Accepting of us as Righteous , are other immanent acts : but that cannot be : ] Here you seem to explain your meaning of the former words , that it is [ a constitutive concernment ] that you spoke of : ( but whether as the whole or as a part only I cannot tell . ) For you say , that else these [ are other immanent acts ] viz. [ Remission and Acceptance are either Gods Decree , or other immanent acts . ] But 1. why then do you make it your design to prove Gods immanent act to be somewhat like Justification ? Remission and acceptance of us as Righteous , are more then like it . Did not you say before [ Justification is , by the consent of all Protestants , a Remission of sin and an acceptance of us as Righteous ? 2. Why did you before lay your proof no higher then this , [ that every transient act supposeth an immanent , viz. Gods Decree . ] 3. It seems to me here that you assert eternal Justification in the definition , while you disclaim it as to name . 4. At least , you seem ( if I can understand you ) to maintain that Remission of sin and Acceptation of us as Righteous are from eternity . For you here import that these [ are ] Gods Decree , and you elsewhere say enough for the eternity of the Decrees . But you knew , its like , that this is such gross Antinomianism , as that it was not for your credit openly to own it in the plainest terms . You give me not sufficient occasion here to stay long in confutation of this Error : yet briefly this I shall oppose . 1. He that was not a sinner from eternity , was not a pardoned sinner from eternity : ( or , he that had no sin , had none remitted . ) But you were not a sinner from eternity : Therefore , &c. For the minor : He that was not from eternity , was not a sinner from eternity : but you were not from eternity : Therefore , &c. If you say to the major , that it is enough to make us capable of Remission , that we were sinners in esse cognit● : I answer , either you speak de esse futuritionis , or de esse existentiae ut cognito : If of the former , the assertion is false : for [ Future ] is a term of Diminution , as to any true Being . An innocet man is not a subject capable of Remission of sin , ●o nomine , because he will sin hereafter . If of the later , I say , God knows no man to be a sinner quoad existentiam praesentem , that is not a sinner : Else he should know untruly . 2. Where there is no obligation to punishment there is no remission of sin . But on you or me there was no obligation to punishment from eternity : Therefore , &c. The major is proved from the definition of Remission : which is A dissolution of an obligation to punishment . Where there 's no obligation , there 's none to be dissolved . The minor is proved thus : He that is not a sinner is not obliged to punishment : But you were not a sinner from eternity : Therefore , &c. Also Qui non Est , non est obligatus ad p●nam : At tu ab aeterno non fuisti : Therefore , &c. 3. That which is undone in Time was not done from Eternity . But sin is unpardoned in Time , ( viz. till we be united to Christ by faith , as Scripture abundantly witnesseth : ) Therefore it was not pardoned from Eternity . 4. God accepteth no man as Righteous that is not Righteous ( yea that is not ) ( for he accepteth men as they are , and not as they are not . ) But no man was Righteous from Eternity : Therefore God accepted none as Righteous from Eternity . But enough of that , till you speak more openly .

19. Your proof ( that Remission and Acceptance are no other acts immanent but the Decree ) is this : [ For then either in the Understanding or the Will : but neither , &c. ] Ans. 1. I easily yield that Remission is no other immanent act ; because it is none at all 2. But your proof seems none to me . You say , [ Surely God cannot be said to Decree to know any thing , or to Decree to will any thing . ] Your argument I think lies thus : [ If God cannot be said to Decree to know or will any thing , then he hath no other immanent act but his Decree : But , &c. Therefore , &c. ] But here 's no proof of the Consequence ; which needs proof . God cannot be said to Decree to know himself ( according to you ; for I profess I am ignorant of these high mysteries : ) Doth it follow that therefore he doth not know himself ? I think not . Nor doth it follow that the knowledge of himself is only his Decree , as I hope you will easily confess . Moreover ( according to you ) God cannot be said to Decree to know things to be Past . ( For you say he cannot be said to Decree to know . ) Yet I think God doth know , as his own Eternity , so our Time , and the Futurition , Presence , and Preterition of things in our Time : and therefore it doth not follow that he hath no knowledge of things , but his Decree . For his Decree ( as now taken ) is de futuris : but besides that God hath . 1. a knowledge de Praeteritis , and 2. de Praesentibus . You argue , from the Necessity of Gods knowledge and the Arbitrariness of his Decree : and many words you use which shew that confidence which I admire at : that you should pretend to be so far acquainted with the Divine Nature , as not only to ascribe to God the acts of man so far as you do , but to determine which acts are necessary , and which arbitrary , and that he cannot Decree to Know or to Will . I confess I am ready to tremble instead of replying , to think into what Mysteries you lead me so boldly . But I resolve no further to follow you , then to manifest your presumption , and to shew you that they are things unsearchable which you vainly pretend so well to know . Gods Knowledge is commonly distinguished into simplicis Intelligentiae , & Purae Visionis : The former is said to be in order before the Decree , and the later in order after it : therefore neither of them are taken for the Decree it self : and will you overthrow both by reducing all to the Decree ? The knowledge of Vision is taken not to be necessary simply , but only on supposition of the Decree , which anteceding in order of nature doth cause the Intelligible objects . For , say they , it is by this Decree that things pass from the number of Possibles , into the number of things Future : and they cannot be known as future , till they are future ; and they are made future Freely and not Necessarily : therefore in the knowledge of Futures there is a freedom radicaliter & participativè . And so it is no such hard or absurd concession , to say , God might not have known what he knows : as long as he might not have made it an intelligible object .

20. You next proceed to an objection , which you cast in your own way : and though I conceive you would not have made your self any work , but what you were confident you could honourably and easily dispatch , yet here I think it fals out otherwise . The objection is from our use of saying [ Now we are justified in Gods sight . ] Here 1. you say [ This puts not a new act of knowledge in God ] of which I have said enough before . 2. You tell us the sense of it : viz. that [ It signifies only a Testimony given by God , whereby he makes us know that we are justified before God ] and you say [ Sight in God signifies a making us to see : and we are said to be justified in his sight , when he makes it , as it were , evident to our sight that we are justified . ] This interpretation is to me something strange , and not easily received , both because of its Errour , and because you say so little to cover that Errour , but thrust so gross a conceit upon us upon your own authority . I rather think that the ascribing of such New acts to God , is 1. From the Moral Act of his Law , God being said to do that which his Law doth : and so he is said to judge us Righteous , when his Law of grace doth so judge us : and we are said to be Righteous in aestimatione Divinâ , when we are so in sensu Legis . 2. From the change of the object : For as the variety of objects denominateth Gods acts as divers , so on the same reason the Novity of the objects must denominate them as new , though they be immanent acts . 3. And by an Anthropopathie , Sight is oft put for Gods Remembrance or Observation .

But you thrust upon us pure Antinomian fancies . 1. If your conceits be true , then none is to be accounted [ Justified in Gods sight ] that do not see themselves to be justified ; for you think [ Sight in God , signifies a making us see . ] Then wo to all those honest souls that see not themselves justified , nay rather think themselves condemned : But yet if I discourse with such , I will venture to give them better encouragement , for all your doctrine ; and to tell them [ You may be justified in Gods sight , when you are condemned in your own . ] 2. Shall we peruse the Scriptures that use that phrase , and see whether all or any one of them can be understood as Mr. K. expoundeth them in the Antinomian way of Manifestation . Psal . 143. 2. For in thy sight no man be justified . Doth it mean , no man shall see himself justified ? Jer . 18. 23. Forgive not their iniquity , neither blot out their sin from thy sight . Is that only meant of hiding the remission from their sight ? or letting them know the non-forgiveness ? Where the Scripture speaks so oft of doing that which is good in the sight of God , or that which is evil in his sight , Doth it mean Gods making us to see that it is good or evil ? What is so good in the sight of sinners as that which is evil in the sight of God ? Job 15. 15. The heavens are not clean in his sight . Job 25. 5. The starres are not pure in his sight . Is this sight of God a making the creature see ? Heb . 13. 21. Working in you that which is well pleasing in his sight . Is this making us see ? It were too long to recite all ; if the Reader will peruse the rest , 1 Joh 3. 22. Exod . 15. 26. 2 Sam . 12. 9. 1 Chron . 19. 13. Psal . 72. 14. Hos . 6. 2. Rom. 3. 20. Mat . 11. 26. Luk . 10. 21. & 15. 21. Psal . 19. 14. & 51. 4. & 9. 19. & 5. 5 Gen. 18. 3. & 19. 19. or any other where this phrase is used concerning God , I leave it to his own judgement whether any one of them be taken in Mr K's sense : That of 2 Chron . 32. 31. which he brings , is neither the same phrase , nor hath the same sense , and therefore is nothing to the matter . Yet is not Mr. K's exposition of that satisfactory neither : For he cannot prove that it is meant meerly of discovering Hezekiah's heart to himself . It may be as much the discovery of it by the effects to others for their warning , and so shew the frailty of man : But the plain sense of the text referres that knowledge to God himself and not to any man ; even by such an Anthropopathie which is ordinary in Scripture , as in Ezek . 12. 3. It may be they will consider , though they are a rebellious house , as if God had been in an uncertain hope of it . So Luk . 20. 13. Jer . 36. 3. So where God is said to repent . If God speak of himself to man after the manner of his own infirmity , must we therefore say , he means [ our knowledge ] when he mentioneth his own ?

21. That I may know whom he speaks to , he addeth [ I am sure Mr. Baxter who quoteth Suarez , Schibler and Keckerman at every bout cannot be ignorant , &c. ] The matter which he mentioneth is nothing to his Cause . But see what an overcharged stomack this Learned man hath ? How many casts hath he had already in vomiting up the choler of his scorn ? And yet it comes up still as fresh and as bitter as if he felt no levamen by all that evacuation . Truly his oft scornfull repeating my quotation of these childish Authours , caused me at last to turn over all my Book to see how oft it is that I quote them . And I can finde Suarez but once named , and no place of him cited . Keckerman but once cited , and there twice named ; and Schibler thrice . Yet doth this man tell the world I quote them at every turn ; so well may we believe his confident Assertions about the unsearchable nature and mysteries of God , who hath the face to speak thus in a visible matter of fact , where any man that will but try it may finde him — Nay , see the modesty of the man ! I cited two of them once , and the third thrice in a whole Book : and in these five or six leaves he tels me of it , or scorns me for it twelve times !

22. He next addeth [ To Decree to Will , cannot be said : for that is as much as to Will to Will , which was never heard of ; the object of the Will being at best , but her imperate act , not her own elicite act . ] Reply , 1. I still abhor your presumptuous pretence of knowing more of God then you do know , and of so measuring him by man . 2. Still defiderantur modestia & veritas . Who would think that a man pretending so much to Learning , should never have met with Schoolman , or Philosopher that speaks that which he here saith [ was never heard of ] or having read it ( yea or not having read it ) durst so boldly speak thus ? At least he might have seen it in the most ordinary and obvious Writings of our own Divines . In Amesius his Cases of Consc . li. 1. cap . 7. these are the last words : Hinc verè dicimus & ex omnium gentium consensie , Volo Velle . Believe which thou wilt , Reader ; but I am sure there 's a wide difference between these two men : when one saith , Dicimus omnium gentium consensu ; and the other saith [ It was never heard of . ] Yea Ferrius in Scholastic . Orthodox . cap . 29. ( a Chapter worth the reading de praedeterminatione & causa peccati ) affirms it of God himself [ Ideo videtur quod cum Deus permittit lapsum , non se habet mere Negative , sed cum aliquo actu positivo : & ideo non solum non vult , sed etiam vult non Velle , i.e. Voluntas reflectitur supra se non volentem : Dum scilicet non Vult Adamum peccare , suspendendo actum Volitionis mera negatione , sed etiam Vult se non Velle : & haec est actualis & positiva permissio . Itae tamen ut in primo signo sit Negatio pura , &c. Proinde cum Deus Voluerit ab aeterno non Velle lapsum , habuit actum reflexivum super negationem , &c. At Determinavit fore inquies . Minime ▪ absit hoc . ] This is approved by Churches of France . And yet this Learned man dare tell the world in print , that it was never heard of : which that he might have safely done , he had need of more ears then two . And it seems this Learned man hath read little of the contentions of the Jesuites and Dominicans about the nature of free-will , where he might have seen many of them touch this Question , as Petavius doth against Vincentius Lenis , aliàs , Fromondus , and others frequently . Nay it seems he is a stranger to the Schoolmen too : Perhaps in stead of reading them , he contemns them as he doth Schibler , Suarez and Keckerman . Scotus in 4. sent . dist . 49. q . 3. fol. ( mihi ) 266. B. saith , Finis extra est simpliciter optimum & summe volendum : Ergo inter ea quae sunt ad finem q●od est sibi immediatim est magis volendum : sed Velle est sibi immediatius , quia immediatè tendit in ipsum ut in finem ultimum , cum finis ultimus ut hujusmodi sit proprium objectum ipsius Velle . Probo majorem : Illud est magis Volendum voluntate libera quod appetitui naturali naturaliter est magis appetendum : hujusmodi est quod propinquius est ultimo , quod simpliciter maxime appetitur naturaliter . Praetereae Voluntas potest Velle suum actum , sicut Intellectus Intelligi● suum actum : aut ergo Vult suum Velle propter Intelligere , aut è converso , aut neutrum propter alterum : & loquor de Velle ordinato .

Nicol . d'Orbellis saith , in sent . l. 2. dist . 25. dub . 2. [ Omne quod Vult , appetit ad sui ipsius imperium : quia sic Vult aliquid ut Velit se Velle illud : Et ideo in actu Volendi seipsum movet , & sibi dominatur , & pro tanto dicitur liberum ( arbitrium ) quamvis immutabiliter ordinetur ad illud . ] And Gibieuf shews , that God hath Actum voluntatis positivum circa suam permissionem li . 2. de Libert . cap . 24. & cap . 22. § . 7 , 8 , &c. And why not as well then about his act . And Gods Will is his Essence : Therefore he willeth it . For that Deus vult seipsum hath hitherto been unquestioned , for ought I know ( so farre as he may be said at all to Will . ) Aquinas 2. 2 ae . q . 25. a. 2. c . saith , Quia enim Voluntatis objectum est Bonum Universale , quicquid sub ratione boni continetur , potest cadere sub actu Voluntatis . Et quia ipsum Velle est quoddam Bonum , potest Velle se Velle , sicut & Intellectus cujus objectum est Verum , Intelligit se Intelligere , quia hoc etiam est quoddam Verum . ] Vid . & 1. q . 87. 3. 2m . If I thought it necessary , it were easie to heap up many more that are of the same minde . But I shall only in brotherly duty admonish Mr. K. to make more Conscience hereafter of false speaking : and seeing he hath read so very little , or lost it again , rather humbly to acknowledge his Imperfection ( as we that are guilty of the like must also do ) then to make a confident vain-glorious ostentation of that which it seems by this , and many the like passages , he hath not .

Let us adde some Reasons , that the Elicite acts may be the objects of other Elicite acts of the Will , and not the Imperate only , as Mr. K. saith .

1. As Scotus argueth before from the proportion with the Intellect . A man may understand that he doth understand , by a reflect act : Therefore he may Will that he Will .

2. That which is an apprehended Good may be Willed : But an Elicite Act of the Will may be an apprehended Good : Therefore , &c.

3. A man may Will his everlasting Happiness : ( For if the End may not be Willed , what may ? ) But his everlasting Happiness consisteth partly in the Elicite Acts of his own Will , everlasting to be exercised on God : [ God being Objectively our Happiness ) Therefore , &c. Velle , Amare , Frui , are acts that must be perpetuated , and either may be Willed , or no man may will his own happiness .

4. Whatsoever is apprehended to be a fit means to this End or Happiness , may be Willed : But the Elicit acts of the Will may be apprehended a fit means hereto : Therefore , &c. They are commanded , and they are made Conditions of Happiness : and therefore are a means .

5. The Effects of Gods special saving Grace on the soul may be Willed : But the Elicite Acts of the sanctified Will , are the Effects ( and principal effects ) of Gods special saving Grace on the soul : Therefore , &c.

6. That which a Christian may pray for , that he may and must Will : But he may pray for the Elicite Acts of a sanctified Will : Therefore , &c. As he may pray , Lord , I Believe , help my Unbelief : So he may pray [ Lord I am Willing , make me more Willing , and hereafter Willing , &c.

7. Experience is in stead of a thousand arguments , I feel that my Willingness is the object of my unwillingness ; and that in these several wayes . 1. I feel that upon the review of my past Willingness , and the sight of my present Willingness ( in any Good ) my Will hath a Complacency in it , which is a true Velle , yea the first and principal Elicite Act of the Will . 2. I finde that by a less perfect and intense Act , I do Will a more perfect Act. I am somewhat Willing , but I would fain be more Willing . Nay to procure the Amendment of my own heart by this increase of my Willingness ( which is indeed the Increase of most of my Graces ) is the main business of my life , committed to me by God , and to be intended by my self . And if I should cast off this great business , and neither desire more Willingness or Grace , nor pray for more , nor labour for more , because Mr. K. out of his subtilty ●ess me , that the Elicite Act is not the Wils object , I should be befool'd out of my Christianity and Salvation by a trivial trick of vain Philosophy . 3. I finde that by a present Act of Will , I do Will a future Act. I do Will now that I may also Will to morrow , and to my lives end , and for ever in glory , and that better then now I do . 4. I feel that I do Will a more sincere Willingness . I do Will Salvation with too much respect to my self in it , and too little to Gods honour . Now I would fain Will this more for God then I do . 5. I would fain Nill many things which through my corruption I now Will . 6. I would fain oft suspend a vicious act of my Will , at least . In all these respects , the Elicite Act of my Will is the object of my Will .

But Mr. K. will be Learned in despight of Natural and Gracious Experience ( for I hope , for all his Learning , that he Would Love God more , as Love is taken for an act of the Rational part , and that he Wils a greater and a persevering , yea a perpetual Willingness of God and obedience ; and a fruition of God , and frui is an act of the Will : ) He will therefore prove what he once saith , and that 's thus . [ For what need of Willing to Will a thing , when one Willing is enough ? And he that Wils to Will , Wils no more then he doth already , which is to Will : one of these acts must needs be superfluous , &c. ] To which I Reply ; You may see in the several Instances which I gave before , that it is needfull , and that it is not superfluous , as you say , and that it is more then he did before ; A more perfect act , a future act , a perpetuated act , are more then he did before . Yea it s a doubt , Whether a very gracelesse man may not Velle intendere Deum , vel frui Deo yea strictly Will to Will God as his happiness , or to Will Holiness before Voluptuousness , who yet doth it not already . And me thinks so acute a man might see that this is not the same act which he performeth already , for it hath not the same object . The man is Willing to be saved from Hell , but Unwilling to be Holy : He is convinced that he shall not be saved , unlesse he become Willing to be Holy : Therefore he wisheth he were Willing to be Holy : If this were but with a Velleity , it is yet an Elicite Act of the Will , but it may be called a Volition , though uneffectual , because there is a stronger contrary Will : So that it is Volitio quoad actum Absolutum , but quoad actum Comparatum , he is unwilling . The Object of that Will which he hath , is his Velle sanctitatem : the Object of that Will which he would have , is Holiness it self . If that Velle & sanctitas be not all one , then these two Acts be not all one .

But Mr. K. confesseth at last that a man may be said to Will to be more Willing , but he saith [ this is rather to Will a freedom from a disturbance of the sensitive appetite , then to Will the exercise of the rational Will . ] But why is it that this man would not be disturbed by the sensitive appetite ? Is it not because he would Will freely ? Doth not he that Willeth the means , much more Will the End ? And is not the Removal of the Impediment , a Means to your freer and more Intense Willing ? And do not you your self Will the increase of your Willingness upon the quieting of that Appetite ? Besides , I hope you do not think that the disturbance of the sensitive Appetite , is the onely Cause of our Imperfection in actual Willing : Or that our own Habitual Corruption and distemper of the Will it self , is not a greater Cause .

After all this you conclude , that [ it appears there is no new Immanent act in God required yea possible to the justifying of a man , besides his Decree to justifie . ] To which I say , Though it little appear to me from any of your arguing , yet I easily yield to the Negative part of your Conclusion ; and I say , that the Decree it self is no part of Justification , but an Antecedent .

Again , Let it be observed , that all this arguing will as much prove that Gods Immanent act is like to Creation , Sanctification , Glorification , Damnation , or any thing that ever God did , as to Justification : For of all his Works it is as true , that he doth nothing but what he decreed to do . And so it may as well be said that our Glorification is an Immanent act from Eternity , as our Justification .

§. 30.

Mr. K. MOre particularly , it will be as Evident that his Decreeing to Remit our sins , carries a Remission of them tantamount : For who shall charge them on us , where God decreeth to remit them ? The Conscience I confess may ; so may the Devil joyning with our conscience ▪ but all this while their charge is of no great danger to us , when God hath decreed to remit them to us : and though they may trouble us they cannot damn us , for that their charge is to be brought in Gods Nam● , as for sins committed against his Crown and Dignity : Now where he hath decreed to remit those sins , there is no danger of suffering for them , let what ever accusers manage the Evidence against us , all that they can do is but this , to bring us to cry Guilty , and thereupon to appeal to God for Mercy ; who upon our appeal to him for Mercy , he is graciously pleased to pronounce pardon to us . God himself I acknowledge also may charge them on us ; and proceed in severity against us for a while ; but this charge is not any way obstructive to his Decree to remit sin , but rather subservient to it , and to bring us to see and confess our sins , and cast our selves wholly on his Mercy in Christ , in which respect I might better say , that God doth shew love even in punishing unregenerate men that are Elect , then you did erewhiles , that he may be said to hate Godly men , when he punisheth or rather correcteth them : Punishment ayming chiefly at the satisfaction of Justice , Correction at the amendment of the offender . So then his Decree of Remitting carries in it as much as is required for any ●mmanent Act in him to our Remission , and so much as necessarily procures the transient Act in the time that he hath appointed for it . His Decrees are like Mount Zion , and stand fast for ever : The Counsel of the Lord standeth for ever , the thoughts of his heart to all generations , Psal . 33. 11.

§. 30.

R. B. YOur [ tantomount ] is a word made for your use ; Causes that dare not see the light , use to go covered with such terms as will stretch . But if you mean plainly , that the Decree doth amount to as much as a remission of sin , ] then I must needs say , that your Doctrine is tantamount Antinomianism . Let the conscientious Reader that loves Gods truth and his own Peace , consider by these few particulars following , what a Theology , nay what a Christianity this Learned man would introduce .

1. Doth not this lead men to slight Christ and his sufferings , and to look on his Death as that which did them no great good ? For when all our sins were tantamount forgiven from Eternity , there was little left for Christ to do by his Death , Merit , Intercession , &c. as to our Remission .

2. How small a matter is left for the Regenerate to receive upon their Repenting and Believing in Christ , as to Remission of sins , when they are tantamount ( I must use Mr ▪ K's School-term ) remitted already ? Is this the Repenting and Believing for Remission of sin which Scripture mentioneth ?

3. How small a matter is left for Baptism to seal and exhibit , as to Remission , when all sin was tantamount Remitted from Eternity ?

4. Where is the Excellency and Glory of the Gospel , either as to the Narrative , Preceptive , or Promissory part ? For the Narrative , it makes a large Declaration how Christ was Promised , Incarnate , Born , how he Obeyed , Suffered , Satisfied , Merited , Rose , Intercedeth to procure a Remission which was tantamount done already even from Eternity . For the Preceptive , it presc●ibeth man a way to obtain Remission by coming to Christ , and to maintain that Remission by abiding in Christ , when our sins were tantamount remitted from Eternity . The Promise seemeth to hold forth an excellent benefit , and all men are invited to Receive it ; and when all 's done , it offereth and promiseth to do that which is done tantamount already from Eternity . If you say , that yet Christ and the Gospel have their Excellency as they respect other benefits , viz. our Sanctification and Glorification : I answer according to Mr. K's grounds , it must be said that these also were done tantamount from Eternity , in that they were Decreed .

5. How small a matter have Christians daily to pray for , in that Petition [ Forgive us our trespasses ] when they were tantamount forgiven from Eternity ? And what a spur is this to prayer ?

6. How small a matter have they to Give Thanks for , as received through Christ from the promise , upon prayer , &c.

7. How small a matter as to Remission of sin , do we receive in the Lords Supper , when it was done tantamount before ?

8. How great a help doth this Doctrine give to Obedience , when men are told that all their sins are tantamount forgiven from Eternity ?

9. How small a Difference between the state of the Regenerate and unregenerate , supposing them Elect ? The sins of one are forgiven , and the other tantamount .

10. How unsoundly do we perswade wicked men of their misery , and tell them that God hateth all the workers of iniquity , and that they are by nature children of wrath , &c. when for ought we know all their sins were tantamount forgiven from Eternity ? And how hard to convince them of any such misery , when they have this Reply ? Lay all this together , and see how much of our Religion and Christianity is left !

But he proves all this by a Question [ Who shall charge them on us where God decreeth to remit them ? ] I Reply , The same persons , and as many as might have charg'd them on us , if God had not decreed it . His Decree takes off no charge , nor disables any from charging us . It were not an Immanent Act , if it did ponere aliquid in objecto . 1. We are as much under the Charge , Curse , or Condemnation of the Law , till we believe , as if no such Decree had passed . 2. What the Law doth , God doth by it ; for it is his Instrument . 3. Satan may charge us , 4. And so may conscience . 5. And men . But you confess your self that Conscience , Satan , and God may charge us ▪ But you say [ there is no danger ] Reply . 1. What if you were to lie all your life in torment with the stone or gout , and yet were sure that you should die never the sooner , and so there were no danger ? Would you think your self tantamount a sound man ? Is it so small a matter in your eyes for an elect man to lie under the guilt of sin , and as an enemy to God till near his death , so be it he be not in danger of damnation ? 2. If you mean that their damnation is non-futura , I confess it : And so it would be if God should but fore-know it , and not decree it ( supposing it might be the object of such a fore-knowledge . ) 3. But yet I think it is not fit language to say [ there is no danger of suffering for sins that God hath decreed to remit . ] I see still whither Antinomianism tends . 1. If Christ did die to deliver us from danger of suffering , then we were in danger of suffering : But Christ did die to deliver us from it : Therefore , &c. Would you make us believe that Christ saved us from no danger by his death ? 2. The actual Conversion and Justification of the Elect , is a saving them from danger : Therefore they were in danger . 3. If the Elect unconverted are in no danger , then you must preach no danger to them , nor perswade them to avoid any , nor to repent the incurring of any : or if , because you know not the Elect , you speak to all of danger , you must tell them that you mean it not of the Elect : But what success such preaching would have , is easie to conjecture . 4. Wh●re men are bound to Fear and Apprehend danger , there is danger : But God bindeth the Elect ( even after Conversion , much more before ) to Fear and Apprehend danger : Therefore , &c. There can be no Fear , where there is no Apprehension of danger ; no more then there can be Love without the Apprehension of Good to be beloved . Christ bids his Disciples , Fear him that is able to destroy both body and soul in hell fire : And so Heb . 4. 1. Fear lest a promise being left of entring into his rest , any of you should come short of it . God bids us fear : Mr. K. tantamount bids us , Fear not , by telling us there is no danger . 5. Where men are bound to labour , run , strive , and use much means to escape danger , there is danger : But so God hath bound the Elect : Therefore , &c. How many Texts might be cited that binde us to save our selves , and seek our deliverance , and that speak of our escaping , our deliverance and salvation , which all imply a danger from which we escape , are saved and delivered ? 6. Matth . 5. 21 , 22. He that calleth his brother Fool , is in danger of hell sire : But an Elect man hath called his brother fool : The●efore , &c. 7. Nay if this be true , then God never saved his people from any Danger . For he that never was in danger cannot be saved out of it . And he that was from Eternity Decreed to be pardoned , according to your Doctrine , was never in danger . 8. And then we ought to give no thanks to God the Father , or to Christ the Redeemer , or to the holy Ghost the Sanctifier , nor to any Preacher or other Instrument , for saving us from any danger of punishment . I think these are not matters to be made light of : nor that Doctrine of Libertinism to be cherished , which plainly leadeth to such unhappy fruits .

But let us peruse your Reasons : You say [ the charge is to be brought in Gods name . ] Reply . So it may be nevertheless for the Decree ; for that takes off none of the charge . You adde [ All they can do is but this , to bring us to cry Guilty , and thereupon appeal to God for Mercy , &c. ] Reply . 1. Must they cry Guilty , and look for Mercy and Remission , that were tantamount forgiven from Eternity ? 2. Either you speak of an uncoverted elect person in this life ; or else as supposing he were at Judgement in that estate . If the later be your meaning , then their Accusation might and would do more then you speak of , and would tend to condemnation ( if such a case might be supposed . ) If the former be your meaning , then these Elect persons do [ Cry Guilty , and appeal to Mercy ] with true Faith , or without it . If with Faith , then their sins are remitted further then by Decree , and these are not the persons now in Question . If without faith then they are not Forgiven for all this . As long as the Elect remain unregenerate , though that Law , and Satan , and Conscience accuse them , yet they do not Believingly seek mercy : and if they were in that state at Judgement , it were too late to seek Mercy .

Next you [ acknowledge that God himself also may charge sin on us , and proceed in severity against us for a while ; but this charge is not any way obstructive to his Decree to Remit sin , &c. ] Reply . God may be said to charge sinne on the Elect before faith . 1. By obliging them by his Law to punishment . 2. By inflicting some small part of the punishment on them . You seem to me to take notice notice only of the later . But every Christian must acknowledge that for all Gods Decree , we are all Obligati ad poenam sempiternam , till we are united to Christ by faith . To say this is not obstructive to Gods Decree , is nothing to the question . The worlds being uncreated from Eternity , did not obstruct Gods Decree of making it , and the Elect's being unsanctified or unglorified doth not obstruct Gods Decree of Sanctifying and Glorifying them : and yet this proves not persecuting Saul was tantamount sanctified and Glorified . And what if God make the knowledge of our Damnable state , or our non-remission , a means to Remission ? That doth not prove that we are before remitted in whole or in part , or tantamount .

Whether you speak to Mr. Goodwin or me , about the phrase of [ hating the Godly ] I know not : but if to me , I do not believe that ever I so spoke .

Your distinction of Punishment from chastisement , is perverse : so learned a man should know , that Punishment is the Genus and Chastisement is a species of it . All Punishment is for the Demonstration of Justice ; but not all for the satisfaction of Justice , Correction is as well for a Demonstration of Justice , as for Amending the Offendor : Else it were meer Affliction , and no Correction .

Your Conclusion next laid down , much differs from the divers formerly laid down , and which you should have proved ; and yet I have shewed , for part of this , how ill you have proved it : though , for my part , I know no Cause that I am engaged in that will be any whit prejudiced by yielding you all ; as I easily yield you , that the Transient Act will certainly follow .

§. 31.

Mr. K. NExt his Decree to Accept us , carrieth as much too ; and there needs nothing but a Transient Act to prove his Acceptance , and evidence it to us : for to decree to look upon us as righteous , is not to look upon us as righteous in our selves , but his son ; and to this looking on us , there needs no new immanent Act , beyond his electing us to faith in his Son , and perseverance in that faith : Thus he may be said to give us to his Son before , and so then there is no new immanent act . Gods Remitting our sins , and accepting us as Righteous , though they sound like Immanet acts , are to be sensed as Transient , and how shall be shewed next : in the interim this which hath been said is sufficient to shew , That in the Decree of God to justifie us , there is somewhat that looks like Justification ; and no other immanent act in God is required to our Justification ; besides his Decree from Eternity to justifie us in time .

§. 31.

R. B. I Shall never think the highest pretenders to exact explications to be the best performers , for your sake . You treat of Acceptance ; but who can finde by all that you say , what you mean by [ Acceptance . ] You say , [ Though it sound like an Immanent act it is to be sensed as Ttransient , ] but what that Transient act is , for all your promises , I can hardly finde you discovering . Surely [ to Accept ] in our ordinary speech signifieth an Immanent act of the Will ; but so you take it not ; else must you yield that Immanent acts may be Decreed . Besides this , it may signifie the Moral action of the Law of Grace , which virtually judgeth the person Righteous , and its action is Gods action . But this you can less digest : and therefore what your [ Acceptance ] means , let him tell that knows . All that I can finde is , either that it is [ the Giving of faith ] or [ the Making us know our Acceptance ] of which more anon .

You say [ There needs nothing but a Transient act to prove his Acceptance , and evidence it to us . ] Rep. Here is then but two Acts needfull : the one is [ Decreeing to Accept us as Righteous : ] This is not Accepting , as the word and your own confession witness : The other is [ a Transient act to prove and evidence his Acceptance . ] This cannot be acceptance neither : For what man will say , that the evidence and proof is formally the same with the thing proved and evidenced ? Is it all one [ to Accept ] and [ to evidence and prove Acceptance ? ] What a maze do you run your self into under pretence of discovering the truth ? You have fairly disputed [ Acceptance ] into Nothing .

You adde [ For to Decree to look upon us as Righteous , is not to look upon us as Righteous in our selves but in his Son . ] Rep. To Decree to look , is not to Look : else you may say , it is a Decree to Decree . Your phrases of [ in our selves ] and [ in his Son ] may be so interpreted as to make your sense true ; but if you mean that it is Christ only and not we , who is the subject of that relative Righteousness , which formally makes us Just , then it is false .

You say [ And to this looking on us , there needs no new Immanent act besides electing to Faith and Perseverance . ] Rep. I pray you then tell us what you mean by [ Looking on us : ] an Immanent act it is not , you think : And is Gods [ Looking on us as Just ] a transient act ? What act then is it ? Did you say , That God is said to Look on us as Just , when his Law call us Just , I should not disagree with you : but you disclaim that . But I forgot that you did expound your meaning before upon [ Gods seeing : ] as Gods seeing is a making us to see , so it s like you mean [ Gods Decree to look on us as Just ] is a Decree to make us Look on our selves as Just : and so the person is changed . But if this be your meaning , I had as lieve you said nothing .

But I will tell you again , that if you will take [ an Immanent act ] formaliter for Gods essence , so there is none new , nor is there any more then one ; Knowing , Willing and Nilling , Love and Hatred are all one . But if you will condescend to us of the simpler sort , and speak of Immanent acts as applied to God after the manner of men , and as his acts are formaliter , or modaliter , or relativè , or denominativè , or however else ( in a way unknown to us ) distinct from his essence , ●o as they may be diversified among themselves without disparagement to Gods simplicity , they may also begin and end without disparagement to his Immutability , for any thing that you have yet said to the contrary . And so as they are diversified or said to begin denominativè ex connotatione objecti , they may as well be said to be the objects of Gods eternal Decree . And thus I conceive , Decree respecting the future , and [ Accepting and Approving ] being acts that connote a present object , and so may not be said [ to be such acts ] till the object exist , therefore God may well be said to Decree to Accept us , and Approve us , and Love us , and Delight in us , &c. though all be Immanent acts . And so my conclusion shall be contrary to yours , that you have not proved that there is no other Immanent act in God required to our Justification , besides his Decree ; and if you had , yet you had done little to the business : And that you have no more proved [ that in the Decree is something that looks like Justification ] then that it looks like Creation , Salvation , Damnation ; And had you proved it never so strongly , I know not to what purpose it is . It is somewhat like God that is called his Image in his Saints : and yet he that cals the Saints , God , may blaspheme for all that .

§. 32.

Mr. K. 3. THat this Immanent act cannot be called Justification , appears hence , that no Immanent act makes a real change in the subject , as Justification doth ▪ That a Will to justifie us , is as Mr. Baxter rightly saith , terminus diminuens , and cannot be the act whereby we are justified , That Justification is on all hands confessed to be pronouncing or declaring of us Righteous , which cannot be done by an Immanent act alone : What then is the Transient act ? Before I can speak punctually to this , it is fit to set down that Remission of sins , and estating us in the condition and priviledges of Righteous , are the two main parts distinguished ratione ratiocinata at least , all grant , I must needs say , I think Really . Remission of sins being the first , and which of course draws the other after it , enquire we 1. Whether there ●e a Transient act of God whereby he remits our our sins ? 2. What this is ?

§. 32.

R. B. I Am loath to speak against you where you are pleased to plead my cause ; yet I must give you these brief Animadversions . 1. That Justification makes on the subject a real change , as opposed to Feigned , Nominal , Potential , &c. I yield : but not as opposite to Relative : Wherefore our Divines ordinarily call Sanctification a Real change , as opposite to the Relative change of Justification . 2. It is but one sort of ●ustification which is [ on all hands confessed to be a pronouncing or declaring us Righteous : ] your self do afterwards speak of Justification in a sense that will not agree with this . Who doth not yield that Constitutive Justification goes before Sentential ? Doth not God make us Just before he judge and pronounce us so ? Yet in this confusion do you go on still ; and such a stirre do you make with [ Immanent and Transient ] as if you would wear these words thredbare , or never have done with them ? So Immanent are these Notions in your Phantasie , that when they will be Transient I cannot tell .

So often do you promise us over and over to enquire what is the Transient act in Justification , and talk of [ speaking punctually to it ] that you raised my expectation to such a height , that I looked for much more then ordinary : But when I had read to the end , and could scarce perceive certainly , whether ever you spake to the Point at all , or at least in so few syllables and so obscurely , that I am uncertain whether I understand what you mean , I confess you left me between admiration and indignation ! that after all your prologues and promises , and our greatest hopes , you should drop asleep when you should come to the work , or cease before you remembred the performance , made me resolve to set lighter by such promises hereafter .

§. 33.

Mr. K. [ TO prove that there is a Transient act , they tell us no more ( saith Mr. Baxter ) but this , that it doth transire in subjectum extraneum , by making a morall change on our Relations , though not a real upon our persons . ] I confess every transitio , to use that word , in subjectum extraneum making a Morall change , is not necessarity a Transient act : For if it be only as upon an Object , whereto is given but an extri●secall denomination , not as upon the subject of a Reall change , made by the act , the act hath no title to Transient : for knowledge doth this much : but whereever is a Moral or a Legal change made , there is of necessity a Transient act : for that the Laws of men take no notice of Immanent acts ; and the Law of God takes no notice of any change made in the object of bare Immanent acts : A man by lusting after a woman commits Adultery punishable by the Law of God ; the woman is nothing the more defiled : So a man that covets his neighbours goods , is lookt on by God as a thief ; the goods notwithstanding remain in the same place , and possession of the Owner , nor doth God challenge them as Felons goods ; no change made on them ; Wherever then there is a Morall , i.e. a Legall change , there is a Transient act , and this being in Justification a Transient act is necessarily required to this change . Now I yield Mr. Baxter that [ no Transient act is immediatly termined in a Relation , and the immediate effect of Gods Justification or Remission of sins , must be somewhat Really wrought , either upon the sinner , or somewhat else for him .

§. 33.

R. B. I Will not stand to open any weaknesses or impertinencies in this Section , as long as the scope is sound , lest I shew my self as quarrelsome as you .

§. 34.

Mr. K. THe second Question is , What is this ? and so what the Transient act is ? Mr. Baxter saith , [ 1. That the passing the grant of the New Covenant , or the promulgation of it , is a Transient act . 2. So may the continuance of it also be . 3. This Law or Grant hath a Moral improper action , whereby it may be said to pardon or justifie , which properly is but virtuall justifying . 4. By this grant 1. God doth give us the Righteousness of Christ to be ours when we believe . 2. And disableth the Law t● oblige us to punishment or Condemnation . 3. Which Reall foundations being thus laid , our Relations of Justified and Pardoned in Title of Law do necessarily follow . ]

I cannot perswade my self to leave my old Doctors to follow Mr. Baxter , for any thing he hath said in all this . Let the promulgation of the New Covenant first and still be a transient act ; this Covenant hath an odde empty Morall action in justifying us when we believe ; and by the promulgation of this Covenant God doth as improperly give us the Righteousness of Christ , and disable the Law to condemn us , as shall appear by considering that all here spoken of actions , is but of actions improperly so called , and such as cannot suffice to make a Reall effect .

§. 34.

R. B. WHo your old Doctors are is utterly unknown to me ; for I remember not that I have ever read any Doctor before you that goeth your way ( if I know it ) and am in hope that I never shall reade any such hereafter . For your not following me , as I have not been very eager to obtrude my opinions on any , so if it be no more for your own advantage then mine , I am not so desirous of your company , but that I can be without it . Now to the matter .

I am very glad that I am come to a Controversie more easie and more usefull then that which you made and stuck in so long before . As for my opinion about the nature of Remission of sin , I have had occasion to view and review it since the writing of my Aphorismes , and have received Animadversions on this very Point of another nature then are these of Mr. K's , both for Learning , Sobriety , and Exactness of Judgement ; and upon my most faithfull and impartial perusal of all , I must needs profess my self much more satisfied in my first opinion , and confident of its verity , then I was before : And some Learned men ( as most England hath ) do fully consent to it , and confirm it in their Animadversions ; and I remember none of the rest ( save the first-intimated Reverend Learned Brother ) that doth contradict it , of all those Judicious excellent men that have vouchsafed me their private Animadversions . And even he doth confess all that action of the Law and change made by it , which I mention , as being a known truth beyond Controversie ; only he thinketh that the name of Justification is to be given to no act but a Judicial Sentence , which I call , the most perfect sort of Justification . Indeed I am ashamed that I spake so strangely of so easie and familiar a Truth , as if it had been some new discovery , when all that are verst in Politicks and Laws may discern it to be so obvious : but the reason was , that I had not read any thing of it in Divines as to our present case .

Before I come to Mr. K. let me tell the Reader my thoughts of Remission more fully . Pardon actively taken is an act of God . Passive pardon is the terminus or effect of that act . Pardon Active , is 1. Mentall , in a more imperfect , diminute , and less-proper sense called Pardon : As when a Prince doth pardon a traytour secretly in his own thoughts and resolution only . This is applied to God speaking after the manner of men ( in which manner we are necessitated to speak of God : ) and it is not ( as Mr. K. imagineth ) to be conceived of by us as being the same with his Decree de futuro ( so far as we may conceive of Gods Immanent acts as divers : ) though it be but the same act that receiveth these divers denominations from ▪ the diversity of the objects . 2. The second Active Pardon is Signal , Legal and Constitutive ; which by signifying Gods Will , doth Legally constitute us pardoned , by causing our Jus ad Impunitatem vel Liberationem , i.e. by dissolving the Obligation to punishment , or by taking away guilt . The action or causation of this pardon , is but such as is that of every Fundamentum in causing its Relation . 3. Pardon taken actively also may signifie the very Grant of the act of Pardon ( whether particular or general , absolute or conditional ) that is , the act of Legislation ( in our case ) whereby the Law of Grace is formed , as the remitting Instrument . This goes before that forementioned ; as being the causing of that Fundamentum , which in time causeth the Relation aforesaid . 4. The Promulgation or Proclamation of this Law of Grace , or Act of Oblivion , may also be called Pardon . This Legal pardon is an Act of God as Rector supra Leges in respect to the old Law whose Obligation it dissolveth ; and it is the Act of God as Legislator in respect of the Law of Grace which dissolveth the Obligation of the Law of Works .

Accordingly Pardon in a Passive sense , is taken as many waies . 1. With men for the effects of mentall pardon in the heart and minde . 2. For the Jus ad Impunitatem , or the Dissolution of the Obligation to punishment , caused by the second act . 3. For the Law of Grace , or the promise it self . And so the pardoning Instrument of a King , is commonly called a Pardon . 4. For the hopefull Relation or state that he is in that hath pardon offered him on very easie and reasonable terms ( as for the Acceptance with thanks . ) I think all these senses the word is used in the Scriptures ; I am sure in Writers and common speech it is so . Now it is easie to discern that all the rest are but imperfect pardons , and so called in a diminute sense , except only the second , which is the full and proper pardon . 2. All this I speak of Pardon in Law sense , the same with that which I call Justification constitutive ( or but notionally differing : ) But besides all this there is Pardon and Justification per sententiam Judicis , which these are but the means to , and which is the most perfect of all . But note that as the word Justification is most proper to [ the sentence : ] So the word [ Pardon ] is most proper to the Civil or Legal act that goes before Judgement . 3. And as God pardoneth 1. as Rector supra Leges by Donation and a new Law , 2. and as Judge by sentence : so 3. also as the executor of Law and sentence or his Will : And so pardoning is but Not-punishing . Where note 1. That this sometime may be before and without the first , by meer providence : and so wicked men are pardoned without a promise , in such measure as God abateth and forbeareth punishing them . 2. That in our case this executive pardon quoad initium presupposeth the first Legal pardon , and quoad complementum it presupposeth the sentential absolution . 3. Note that this sort of pardon hath divers degrees , according to the degrees of any due penalty which ▪ is remitted : and so may alter . So that in a word , all pardon is of one of these three sorts . 1. By God as Author of the New Covenant , giving Right to Impunity . 2. By God as Judge absolving . 3. By God as executing .

All this being premised our question is , which of these it is that Scripture ascribeth to Faith , and is called Remission , or Believing , or Justification by Faith ? Some say , It is only Gods mental pardon : Some say , It is none of these , but a Declaration to the Angels in heaven , who is Just . Some say , It is none of these , but a Manifestation to our consciences ( as some speak ) or a sentence of God in our hearts ( as others speak . ) Some say , It is ipsa Impunitas , or non Punire ( as Twisse sometime , or nolle Punire , as other times . ) I think it is the Dissolving of the obligation to punishment , or the giving us a Jus ad liberationem vel ad impunitatem , or Gods remitting his Jus puniendi : Where the immediate terminus is the Dissolution of the obligation , or our Debitum liberationis , vel jus ad impunitatem : and the remote terminus ( which is yet connoted in the term Pardon , as essentially necessary ) is Impunity it self , or actual liberation from punishment , or nonpunire . And withall , as in man a mentall Remission goes before the actual Signal , Legal Remission , so there is in God , a Nolle punire , and after the manner of men , it may be ascribed to God , as then beginning when the Law remitteth , and the sinner is a capable subject , because it cannot be denominated Remission , but by connotation of the object , and that must be , when there is an object fit : And so after the manner of men , we attribute it to God , as an act which in time he is moved to by an Impulsive cause , viz. the Satisfaction and Merits of Christ : though strictly we use to say , there is nothing ab extra can be an impulsive cause to God : Much more then this I have said for explication of this Point in private Papers to some Learned Friends ; but this may suffice for the right understanding of what here passeth between Mr. K. and me . And now I proceed to his words .

1. He acknowledgeth the Promulgation of the New Covenant to be a Transient act : It is the same Instrument of God that is called his Covenant and his Law here . And as it is a Law , the term [ Promulgation ] doth most fitly agree to it . And I doubt not but either Mr. K. implieth Legislation ( perhaps he mistakes the terms for equipollent ) or at least he will as freely acknowledge that a Transient act . But he saith , 1. That [ this Covenant hath an odde empty morall action . ] Let any man that reades these words of this Learned man , judge whether I be not excusable for that censure in the Preface to the Appendix of my Book of Baptism ! A School Divine and a Chair man , and know no more the nature of a Law , Covenant , or any Legal Instrument ! A Divine , and an Aristarchus , and yet dare to speak such words of all the holy Laws and Covenants of God! Why what doth this man study and preach , that thinks so basely of Gods Laws ? The Moral action of the Law of Grace or Testament of Christ he calleth [ an odde empty Moral action : ] Yet it s like he knows that Commonwealths are chiefly upheld and ordered by Laws , Contracts , Conveyances , &c. and consequently by actions of the same nature . The whole body of the Commonwealth and each member of it , do hold their Estates , Liberties and Lives by such odde empty actions . Take away the odde empty Moral action of Laws , Testaments , Obligations , Deeds of Sale , Leases , &c. and what is a Commonwealth , and what a Rector , and what security have you of any thing you possess ? or what orderly commerce among men ? His next assertion is as desperate as the former , that [ by the promulgation of this Covenant , God doth as improperly give us the Righteousness of Christ , or disable the Law to condemn us . ] Could any words ( not certainly destructive to Christianity it self ) have fallen from this Learned man more unworthy a Divine ? Doth not the Testament of the Lord Jesus properly convey the Legacy ? Doth not Gods Deed of gift of Christ and his Righteousness to us , properly convey ? and doth not God properly Give thereby ? Why how can a more proper way of Giving be imaginable ? 1. If a man do properly give , by a Testament or Deed of Gift , then so doth God : But a man doth , &c. Therefore , &c. 2. Where there is a plain signification of the Will of the Donor to confer thereby the benefit on the Receiver , there is a proper Giving : But in the Gospel-promise or Testament of Christ there is such a signification of the Donors Will : Therefore , &c. Doth not an Act of Oblivion or Pardon properly give pardon to all that it pardoneth ? Doth not any Act of Grace give the favours expressed ?

2. And where he saith , that [ God doth hereby as improperly disable the Law to condemn us ▪ ] I Reply . 1. Nothing in the world can more properly disable the Law from effectual condemning us , that is , so as to procure sentence and execution , then a general Act of pardon , or then the new Law doth , which is in its very nature Lex Remedians , & obligationem ad paenam prioris dissolvens . Though still the Law as to its sense is the same , and therefore doth virtually condemn till the said dissolution . How can the Law of the Land be more disabled from effectual condemning all Traytors , for what is past , then by an Act of Oblivion , or a particular pardon under the Soveraigns Hand and Seal ? 2. Yea this Learned man disputes against the very formall nature and definition of a pardon : which is to be an Act of the Rector freeing the guilty from punishment by dissolving the obligation . And certainly as the obligation it self is one of these [ odde , empty Moral actions , ] so must the dissolution of it needs be . Indeed Theologus est Jurisconsultus Christianus , a Christian Lawyer : and what a Lawyer he is that knows not the nature , use and force of Laws , is easie to be judged . I could wish men would lay by their over-bold enquiries into Gods Decrees and other Immanent acts , or at least , their vain pretendings to a knowledge which they never had of them , and study this intelligible and necessary part of Theology a little more .

But Mr. K. tels us that he will make all this strange doctrine [ appear : ] and how ? Why [ by considering that all here spoken of actions , is but of actions improperly so called , and such as cannot suffice to make a real effect . ] Rep. Do you oppose [ Real ] to [ feigned or nominal ] or to [ Relative ? ] If the former , it is such doctrine as I dare say , no Divine will believe , no Lawyer , no understanding member of a Commonwealth , and I think , no Christian , that understandeth what you say . Think not the words rash , for I think him not fit to be accounted a Divine , no nor a Christian ( supposing him to understand the matter ) that will or dare maintain , That neither the curse of the Law , or threatning of the new Law , whereby so many are adjudged to Hell , nor yet the Testament , Covenant , Promise of the Gospel , whereby Christ and his Benefits , Justification , Adoption , Salvation ( quoad Jus ) are given , do any of them make a true change ? But if you oppose [ Real ] to [ Relative , ] then I must tell you , that [ Remission and Justification Passive ] are no Real effects , but Relative ; which I had thought you need not have been told . The act of Legislation and Promulgation makes a real effect ; but the Fundamentum once laid , causeth but a relation . Do not you know that the very formal nature of all morality is Relative ? What else is Aequum , Justum , Meritum , Debitum , Jus , yea bonum morale , & malum , & c ?

Again I must tell you , that you do not well to mention Promulgation alone , when I spoke of Enacting , or Granting , or Legislation , before Promulgation . I hope you take not both these for one . Nay indeed Promulgation is proper to a Law as it is obligatory to the subject , and so is necessary after Legislation , ad actualem obligationem : but a Law of Grace which doth conferre benefits , and whereby the Legislator doth , as it were , oblige himself , may be in force in some degree , without a Promulgation : because a man may be made capable of Right to Benefit without his knowledge , though he cannot be obliged to duty without his knowledge , except when he is Ignorant through his own fault .

§ 35.

Mr. K FOr first , The Covenant Justifies us , not by any act , but meerly by the tenour of it , as a Law , not Agent , and many things in this kinde are said to d● , when there , I wis , is no action at all : Quantitas facit quantum ; I hope no Action , it doth it formaliter , not efficienter : Paternitas facit patrem ; I know no Action that ever was ascribed to Relation , it doth it formaliter , not efficienter : and so doth the Covenant not Justifie a Believer by any Act , let Mr. Baxter mince it as he will , a moral improper Action , but as his great Metaphysical Rabbies would speak aptitudinaliter , and this but extrinsecè too ; for foedus non facit Justum of it self , but it must be beholden to many intervenient Causes .

§. 35.

R. B. 1. THanks to Inadvertency ( as I suppose ) it is here acknowledged that the Covenant doth Justifie , and that as a Law , which i● it do , we shall see anon whether it can be any other way then that which I affirm . 2. But little thanks is due to this Authour from the friends of Truth , for his discovery of the way of the Covenants Justifying . [ It is ( saith he ) by the Tenour of it , as a Law : ] True : How else should it be ? [ but not Agent ] Not by a Physical proper Action : that 's true : But have Laws , Testaments , Covenants , Grants , Pardons , &c. no Moral Action ? Or is this Moral so contemptible a matter , that a Learned Divine should make Nothing of it ? When all mens estates and lives depend on it here , and all mens Salvation or Damnation hereafter . But how is it then that the New Covenant Justifies ? why he thus proceeds [ Quantitas facit quantum ; I hope no Action : it doth it formaliter , not efficienter : Paternitas facit patrem ▪ I know no Action that ever was ascribed to Relation , it doth it formaliter , not efficienter . ] Reply . 1. I though that [ facere ] had been as improperly applied to a formal Causation , as [ Agere ] and that I may , at least , as fairly do the later , as you the former . 2. If this Learned man do indeed think that the Covenant doth formaliter Justifie , as Quantitas facit quantum , & paternitas patrem , I shall the less repent that I was not his Pupil : And if I knew who be his old Doctors that he here speaks of , I would never read them , if they be no better in the rest : any , I would take heed of looking into them , lest they had a power of fascination : What is the Matter that the Covenant doth Inform ? Gods Act , or mans Quality , Act , or what ? What matter doth it concurre with to consti●ute the Compositum ? Is not Justitia that which formally maketh Just ? Is the Covenant the Relation of Just in the Abstract ? Why then doth not the denomination follow the form ? Is it the Covenant quod explicat , quid sit Justificatus ? Or by which Justus est id quod est ? But let us make the best construction imaginable of Mr K's words , and suppose that he would only prove the Negative [ what way it is by which the Covenant justifieth not , viz. not efficienter ] and not [ what way it doth Justifie , viz. formaliter ] yet I should demand , 1. What is then the use or purpose of his Instances , or fore-going words ? 2. What the better are we for his discourse , if he tell us not what way it is ? 3. What Cause will he make it if not an efficient ? Will he say it is either Material or Final ? I think not . But he saith , that [ the Covenant doth not Justifie a Believer by any Act , let Mr. B. mince it as he will , a Moral Improper Action , but as his great Metaphysical Rabbies would speak , aptitudinaliter , and this but extrinsecè too . ] Reply . What Reader is much the wiser for this answer ? Would you know whether Foedus facit Justum , ut forma , vel ut efficiens ? Why Mr. K. telleth you , it doth it but aptitudinaliter ? If so , then certainly , not ut forma : for forma aptitudinalis faciens informatum , is a strange creature . It must then be matter or efficient . I would not think so hardly of Mr. K. as to imagine that he takes it for a Material Cause ; much less that he takes it for Materia aptitudinalis Justificationis actualis . I hope such doctrine never dropt from his Chair . What is left then , but that it be an efficient . And if so , is not all efficiency by Action of one sort or other ? And moreover , how comes Efficiens tantum Aptitudinalis , to be Efficiens Actualis ? And if not Actualis , how comes the Effect to be produced , viz. The Believer to be Justified ? But I dare not impute this non-sense to Mr. K. Perhaps he takes the Covenant to be no Cause at all of Justification ? But that will not hold neither ? For he plainly saith , that [ the Covenant justifieth ] twice here together . And sure Justifying signifieth some Causation .

Yet the amuseth me more by adding [ and this but extrinsecè too . ] Why , who is it that hath found out another Justifying efficient , But onely the extrinsecal ? By this I see he takes it not for Matter or Form ; for they are not extrinsecal . But is not the Law , the Jury , the Advocate , the Judge , each of them an extrinsecal efficient in justifying every man that is justified in soro humano ? It may be Mr. K. hath respect to the justification of Conscience : But doth he think that there are not extrinsick efficienrs , that do more properly and more nobly justifie then our consciences do ? Then let man be his own pardoner and justifier , and be preferred before the bloud of Christ , the Law , the Advoeate , and the Judge of Believers . I think it is no disparagement to our Glorious Judge , that he will justifie us extrinsecally . Conscience which justifieth ( in some sense ) intrinsecally , doth it by so low an Act , by so small Authority , that it is very doubtfull whether it be fit to call that Act either Constitutive or sentential Justifying , so great is the Impropriety : ( Of which I have spoke more fully elswhere . )

If Mr. K. had named some of those Metaphysical Rabbies , and been guilty of naming as it were the Chapter and Verse ( of which crime he accuseth me ) I should the better have known whether he say true or false , when he tels us that they would say the Covenant justifieth aptitudinaliter , and not by any act . Its true that the Covenant justifieth , Ut signum voluntatis Divinae per hoc Peccata remittentis : And had he said that it is Signum Aptitudinale to men before they believe , and Signam Actuale after , there had been some sense in his words , though yet they had been defective of Truth or Fitness : For they are signum actuale to millions of the unjustified , though not signum actualiter Justificans . But it is Believers that are actually justified , of whom he speaks expresly : and therefore he hath some other meaning , what ever it is .

Yet if Mr K. had denied to the Covenant in justifying , a proper Physical act only , we were agreed ; But he denieth [ an improper moral action ] as he tels me , I mince it : which if I should do , I should expect to be told , that I were a very singular man indeed : For I doubt not but this Learned man hath read many a large Volume of Politicks , and particularly de Legibus , and there read their Discourses de Legum acttonibus , viz. praecipere , prohibere , praemiare , punire : I doubt not but he hath read many a large Volume of the Civil Law in special , and therein of the Nature of Obligations of all sorts : ( For I would not suppose him defective in his reading of any thing . ) And after all this for so Orthodox a man to deny [ a Moral improper action ] to Gods Laws , and so to all Laws , and therein differ from all the Lawyers and Divines that ever the world knew ( so farre as I can learn ) is singularity indeed ! Yea and never yet to write one Volume of his Reasons against all the world , that we might be undeceived ? Seriously I wonder what he thinks of Gods Laws , Covenants , Promises , Testament , and how he preacheth them , yea or believeth them , or what work they have on his soul , who takes them to have no Moral improper Action ? I should think such a merus Physicus were a strange man to make a Divine . But let us hear his reason : [ For Foedus non facit justum of it self , but it must be beholden to many intervenient Causes ] Reply . 1. It seems to be here granted that Foedus facit justum intervenientibus alijs Causis : And if so , it is an efficient ; and if so it hath some kinde of Action . 2. Negatur sequela : What if the Covenant justifie not nisi intervenientibus aliis quibusdam Causis ? Doth it thence follow that it hath no moral Action ? And we must speak non sense to say , that it justifieth but Aptitudinaliter ? 3. I deny that there is any other Cause doth intervene between the Covenant , and the Effect . A Condition on mans part must be performed before the Law or Covenant of Grace will Actu Causare , i.e. Justificare . And this Condition hath its Causes : But Remission and Justification have no intervening Causes .

I have in Answer to other Reverend Brethren so fully and distinctly laid down my own thoughts of this whole business , viz. of the several sorts of Righteousness , and of the nature of each , and the Causes , that I will suppose I may be excused that I do it not here . Only I may tell Mr. K. that I take Righteousness as now in Question , to be a Relation ( whether predicamental or Transcendental , we will not now dispute ; but I suppose it is the later . ) And as Relation is so small or low a Being , that it is by some reckoned between Ens & Nihil , so the way of its production must be answerable ; and must be by as low a kinde of Action . Yet if it have any kinde of Being at all , it must have some Cause , and tha● must have some Action . And therefore Rabbi Keckerman saith , Fundamentum idem significat quod Efficiens ; Terminus idem quod finis . I suppose Mr. K. will acknowledge the Causation of procatarcktick Causes , objectum , occasio , meritum : and yet will finde these efficients to have but an improper Action ( at least some of them ) as well the Fundamentum hath in causing a Relation . Besides all this , it is found no easie matter to reduce all Politicall Notions to the Notions of Logick or Metaphysicks ; and some think that when we speak of Politicks , we must speak in the terms of Politicks , and that it is an unfit or impossible attempt to speak there in the strict language of Logicians , though I am not of their minde in the later .

But suppose that I had granted all that Mr. K. hath hitherto said : What is it to that which he shou●d prove ? He undertakes to prove , 1. That the Covenants Action ( as I call it ) is [ an odde , empty , Moral Action ] and so cannot make this Effect : But he hath not yet proved , that the Relation of our Righteousness may not Result from the Covenant as its Fundamentum , though without a proper Action ; as soon as the Condition is performed on our parts to make us fit Subjects . 2. He undertakes to prove , that [ by the Promulgation of this Covenant God doth as improperly give us the Righteousness of Christ , and disable the Law to condemn us , because all here spoken of Actions , is but of Actions improperly so called ] But doth he indeed think that Legislation , or Promulgation , or Covenant making is but Improperly called Action ? If he do , I will not waste time in such a work as the Confuting him is .

Lastly , If his Argument be good [ We are not properly justified by an Action improperly called Action : But the Action of the Covenant is Improperly called Action : Therefore , &c. ] then it will follow that we are not properly Justified by any Action of God . For it is generally held , that [ Action ] is not properly applied to God , but Analogically , and after the manner of the creature . I think this first Argument of Mr. K. deserves no more answer .

§. 36.

Mr. K. 2. GOd is not properly sate to Justifie us by this transient Act of the Covenant : For either he Justifies all , or only some . Not all : for all I hope are not justified : not some more then others ; for the N●w Covenant makes no difference of it self : and so God justifieth none by it .

§. 36.

R. B. 1. EIther you mean , that [ it is not by the Transient act Alone that God Justifies ] or [ not by it at all . ] If the former , I confesse it , because the Moral Act which followeth doth intervene to the production of the Effect . It is not by the transient Act of Generation alone , that Pater causat filiationem . But it seems you take it in the later sense , and so it is false . Though the Fundamentum do suo modo Causare Relationem , idque immediate , yet that Act which Causeth the Fundamentum , doth properly Cause the Relation too .

2. I seriously profess that it seems to me a very sad Case , that any man that is called a Divine , or a Christian should argue , and that so weakly , and so wilfully against all the efficacy of Gods Testament , Law or Covenant in conveying to us the saving Relative benefits of Christ ! If it were only ( as some Divines that I deal with ) that he acknowledged the thing , and denied onely the fitness of the Name of Justifying to the Act of the Covenant , it were a smaller matter : But it is Remission of sin it self ; the giving us Christs Righteousness , the disabling the Law to condemn us , that he speaks of , as you may see before : and so he here dares to conclude , That God justifies none by it . To this lamentable Dilemma here brought for proof , I say , 1. Conditionally God Justifieth All by his Covenant , at least All to whom it is Revealed . Actually he Justifieth only them that have the Condition . I oppose Actually to Conditionally , because that while it is but Conditional , it is not Actual in Law sense , that is , Effectual , though it is in Actu , so farre done as it is : And indeed it is not in strict sense that a man is called , Justified , while it is but Conditional : though yet it is a common phrase , because the Agent hath done it quantum in se , when the Condition is but Acceptance . 2. God doth Justifie some more then others by his Covenant , viz. Believers more then Unbelievers : This me thinks a Divine should not have denied . But he hath reason for his denial : and what 's that ? Why , he saith [ for the New Covenant makes no difference of it self . ] A strong Reason : It doth it not of it self : Therefore it doth it not at all . But I Reply : There is a two-fold difference made between men in these spiritual changes . The first is Real , when one that was an Infidel is made a Believer : and this is done by the Spirit and Word ordinarily ; and it is but to prepare men to be fit objects for the justifying Act : The second is Relative , when we are Pardoned , Justified , Adopted , and have a Right given us to other Benefits : This difference the Covenant makes of it self , the former preparatory difference being before made . To say , the Covenant makes not the first Real difference ; Therefore it makes no difference , is ill arguing .

I would desire the Reader to try how Mr. K's argument will fit the Laws or Conveyances of men . If a Parent bequeath to each of his children an hundred pound on Condition they marry , to become due at the day of Marriage ; according to Mr. K. you may argue thus : Either this Testament Giveth the Legacy to All , or to None : Not to All , if All marry not : Not to some above others : for the Testament of it self makes no difference : Therefore it Giveth it to none . Or if a King give out a Pardon , or passe an Act of Pardon or Oblivion for all Traitors that are up in arms against him , on Condition that they lay down arms , and Accept the pardon : Mr. K. would argue , it seems thus : Either this Act pardoneth All , or Some : Not All : for All will not lay down Armes , and Accept it : Not Some onely ; for the act makes no difference of it self : Therefore it pardoneth none . See what an Interpreters hand the Gospel is fallen into at Blisland !

§. 37.

Mr. K. 3. MAn shall properly be said to Justifie himself ( a thing which Mr. Baxter looks on , as well he may , as Monstrum horendum ) For where there is a promise of a reward made to All , upon a Condition of performing such a service , he that obtains the reward , gets it by his own service ; without which the promise would have brought him never the nearer to the reward : and thus a man wisely Justifies himself by Believing , and more a great deal then God doth Justifie him by his Promulgation of the New Covenant , which would have left him in his old Condition had he not better provided for himself by Believing , then the Covenant did by Promising .

§. 37.

R. B. O How much have I been too blame , in my indignation against poor ignorant Christians , for taking up the absurdest Antinomian fancies so easily ! When even such Divines as this shall use such reasoning as I here finde !

1. I deny the Consequence , as being verba somniantis .

2. I think , I shall anon shew , that himself is undeniably guilty of this Consequence , which here is called Monstrum horrendum .

3. For his reason , 1. Its pity that he cannot distinguish between a Cause and a meer Condition : Where he saith [ he that obtains the reward gets it by his service ] I say , it is here By it , as by a Condition sine qua non , but not By it , as by a Cause . 2. And its pity that any Divine should not distinguish between service and service . There is a service which is operari , or some way profitable to him that we perform it to ; which therefore may oblige by commutative Justice to reward us : and here the Reward is not of Grace , but Debt ; and the Work is a Meritorious Cause , properly so called . There is a Work which is a Means of Moral-natural Necessity ( on terms of Reason and common honesty ) to our orderly participation of a Benefit freely Given : As if a Traitor shall have a pardon on Condition he will Accept it , and come in : Or as if a Woman ▪ Traitor should not only have pardon and life , but also be Princess , on condition she will marry the Kings son , that hath Ransomed her . Here the act may improperly be called service , because Commanded : but properly and in its principal Consideration , it is a necessary reasonable means , to her own happiness : And this act is but a meer Condition sine qua non , of her Pardon and Dignity , and no proper Meritorious , or efficient Cause .

4. What a dangerous reasoning is this , to ●each men proudly to thank themselves for their pardon and happiness , and deny God the thanks ! To say [ Gods promise would have brought me never the nearer the reward , had not I believed : and I did a great deal more to Justifie my self by Believing then God did by his Covenant . ]

5. Nay , I would desire the Reader to observe , what shift Mr. K. hath left for himself to disclaim this wicked Conclusion : Is there any of the Premises which he doth not own ? 1. I hope he will not deny but the Promise of pardon and salvation is made to all that hear it , on Condition , they will Repent and Believe : 2. If he regard not better proof , I hope he will believe Dr. Twiss ( so oft repeating it ) that salvation is given per modum praemii . 3. I hope he believes , that without believing , the Covenant would not have brought him to salvation . Must not this man then conclude on his own principles , that [ he wisely justifies himself by believing ? and more a great deal then God doth justifie him by his promulgation of the new Covenant , which would have left him in his old Condition , had he not better provided for himself by Believing , then the Covenant did by promising . ] I am loth to give those words so bad an Epithete as is their due . Why may not any Traitor say the like that Receives a free pardon ? Or a beggar that Receives a free alms , when Receiving or Accepting is the Condition sine qua non of their attaining and possessing it ?

6. The Gospel hath a promise of Faith it self to some : and this Faith is Caused by the holy Ghost : Therefore it is still God that provideth for the Elect , better then they provide for themselves , howsoever such disputers may talk . But we must not therefore confound the nature of Gods Gifts , nor their Causes or way of production . The Spirit gives us Faith first , which is our Condition , and makes us capable objects or subjects of Justification : which being done , the new Law of Grace doth immediately Pardon , Justifie and Adopt us : which way then doth Mr. K's desperate consequence follow ? Or what shew of ground hath it ? It seems if this man had forfeited his life , if a pardon were offered him but on Condition that he would Take it , and say , I thank you ; he would say , he did a great deal more to his own pardon by Thanks and Acceptance , then the King that granted it , did by his Grant ; because the Grant would have left him in the old Condition , had he not better provided for himself by Thankfull Acceptance , then the King did by his Pardon . ] Yea and in our Case the Acceptance is Given too , though another way . I confess my detestation of this disputing , is beyond my expression .

Zanchy in 1 Joh . 1. loc . de Remiss . p. 41 , 42. saith , Baptism is not perpetually a visible Instrument by which Remission is offered [ Verbum autem perpetuò est tale Instrumentum ▪ Verbum ergo non B●ptismus , est illud proprium & perpetuum instrumentum per quod perpetuo p●ccatorum remissio nobis offertur & donatur ( so multitudes more ) And in compend . Theol . p. 764. Per Evangelium Deus gratis Justificat .

§. 38.

Mr. K. IT s clear in this case of the New Covenant , as in that of the Old : The Covenant ran , In the day thou ●atest thereof , thou shalt die : This was Gods Threat ▪ I pray who brought death into the world , God or Adam ? Just so in the New Covenant , Believe and be Justified : Who justifies the Believer , God or himself ?

Turpe est doctori cum culp● redarguit ipsum .

§. 38.

R. B. NEver let any cause be thought so bad , but that it may have the greatest confidence to credit it with the world . [ It s clear ] saith Mr. K. in the beginning , and with his proverbiall Poetry , he triumphantly concludes . But if ever man met with weaker grounds of such triumph and confidence , in a man of such learning , he is of larger experience then I am .

1. To his first Question , I R●ply : Adam brought death into the world as the Deserver , God as the Legislator , making it Due to him , if he sinned , and as the Judge , sentencing him to it for sin ; and as the principal Cause of the Execution . But Adam was the culpable Cause .

2. To his second Question , I say , God justifieth the Believer , as Legislator , and as Judge , and as Rector ●●pra Leges , and as Donor or Benefactor ▪ And the Believer is not so much as the Meriter of his own Justification , as Adam was of his Condemnation . Did I think that any Learned Protestant had not known this ? That he hath his Condemnation by his Merit , and his Justification without his Merit , upon the performance of that Condition which is the Acceptance of Christ that hath Merited it for us ? That Death is the wages of sinne , and Eternal Life the Gift of God through Jesus Christ .

3. But again , I admire what the man means ! Whether he own the wicked Conclusion [ Man justifieth himself ] or not ? For he makes it to be the Consequence of this ●enour of the Covenant [ Believe and be Justified ] And dare he say , that the Covenant doth not say , Believe and be Justified ? Yea nevertheless , though it also give faith .

§. 39.

Mr. K. THat first born of Abominations in Mr. Good wins phrase is unluckily laid at Mr. Baxt●rs own door ; and it may appear it is not wrongfully fathered upon him , by that very argument which be undertakes to answer , and doth well enough for so much as is exprest , but there is more implied in it .

§. 39.

R. B. 1. [ UNluckily ] must be interpreted [ by false accusation ] I expect to have such unlucky hands lay more such abominations at my door .

2. Mr. K. confesseth , that I well enough answer the Argument for so much as is exprest : And let the Reader well observe what the implied addition is that he makes .

§. 40.

Mr. K. THat the Promulgation of the New Covenant was from the beginning ▪ Many men shall not be Justified till towards the end of the World : No man till a long time after the Promulgation : Therefore not so much by Gods Promulgation of the Covenant , as the man covenanter his performing the Condition , which is the Immediate Cause of it , and therefore he justifies himself , and that more then God in the New Covenant .

§. 40.

R. B. 1. WHat is here added as implied to that which he confesseth , that I well enough answered ? Let him tell that can .

2. How can he prove that Adam was not justified till a long time after the Promulgation of the New Covenant ? A bold assertion , me thinks .

3. The Consequence is a putid non-sequitur : What shew doth the man bring to make any man believe his Consequence , but the bare Credit of his own word ?

4. What a strait doth this Disputer bring himself into ? He must either say ▪ that the Gospel or New Covenant doth not promise Pardon and Justification on Condition of Believing . ( And is he fit to preach the Gospel that would deny so great a part of it . ) Or else he must hold his wicked Conclusion , That man justifieth himself , and that more then God in the Covenant . And for ought I can understand by him he means to own one of these .

5. The ground of all this rotten doctrine , is another notorious errour here expressed , viz. That [ mans performing the Condition is the Immediate Cause of his Justification : ] when it is properly no Cause at all . A Condition may sometime be also a Moral Cause , i.e. when there is somewhat in the excellency or nature of the thing Conditioned , to move the principal Causer : But such a Condition as is purposely chosen for the abasing of man , and the honour of free Grace , and consisteth but either in Accepting a free Gift , or in not rejecting it again , or not spitting in the face of the Giver , this is no Cause , but sine qua non . It seems , this Learned man hath too arrogant thoughts of his own faith , as if it were the Immediate Cause of his Justification , and so he justified himself more then God by his Covenant .

§. 41.

Mr. K. AS for instance : There was a Law made in Queen Elizabeths time , That every English man having taken Orders in the Romish Church , coming into England , shall suffer as a Traitor : That English man , which having taken Orders in the Romish Church , comes now into England , and is condemned , hath not so much reason to charge his condemnation on the Queen , as himself .

§. 41.

R. B. THat is because he is the culpable meriting Cause . Are we the Deservers of pardon ?

§. 42.

Mr. K. THe Law condemns him ; but she doth not who made the Law , who died many years since : yea the Judge who pronounceth the sentence doth not so properly do it as the Seminary himself : No nor the Law , as the Priest himself ; who had he been minded to have secured himself , might have done it at his pleasure , stayed at Rheines or Doway , and condemned the Law of Tyranny ; yea and avoucht all those that suffered by it as Traytors to be really Martyrs . The case is the same , though in a different matter .

§. 42.

R. B. 1. YOu confess here that the Law condemneth : and then no doubt it justifieth too .

2. Where you say , [ Shee doth not that made the Law ] I say , that is because the Law doth operate or cause , as it is a sign of the Will of the Rector , to constitute that Jus which he had power to constitute . Now when the Queen and Parliament were dead , they had no power to oblige them that should live after them , much less if contrary to the Will of their successors : Nor yet had they power while they were alive , so to binde posterity . The Laws therefore were divolved into other hands , and now bindes as signum voluntatis Rectoris jam existentis : For it is his will that it should continue ; and that will animates it : Yet where any hath power , the signs of their will may be effectual when they are dead : Or else Testaments were little worth , and Legataries were in an ill case . But what s this to our case ? God dieth not , and the Laws of his Kingdom lose not their force , nor change their Master , by the change of Governours . But if you had dealt ingenuously , you should rather have enquired , whether the present Rector and Master of the Law , may be said to condemn him that the Law condemns . And that methinks you should not deny . Yea , and it may be said that dead Lycurgus was a cause of the condemnation of surviving offendors , for all your bare deniall .

3. Where you say that [ the Judge who pronounceth the sentence doth not so properly condemn him , as the Seminary himself . ] Seeing you yield that both condemn him , the Judge Sententially , and himself Meritoriously , and the question is but of the greater or less propriety in the word [ Condemn ] I think it not worth the contending about . Yet Appello Jurisconsultos : and if they say not that it is a more proper speech to say [ The Judge condemneth him ] then to say [ He condemned himself by breaking the Law ] then I am content the next time it s acted to take Ignoramus his part , and confess that I know little of the Lawyers language . Indeed I still say it is the offendour that is the culpable cause . Where you say that the case is here the same : I answer , then it seems you think you deserve a Pardon , as a thief deserves the Gallows . I durst not have called these cases the same .

§. 43.

Mr. K. IN a like matter take it thus . A man is found guilty of a felony ; the Law saith , He shall be saved if he shall reade : he reads and is saved : Gramercy , saith he , to my Reading more then to the courtesie of the Law : and though he acknowledge pro forma that it is the courtesie and grace of the State to him , yet as the bad English man , God bless her Father and Mother that taught her to reade , else the Law would have been severe enough ; he may be said to have saved himself .

§. 43.

R. B. 1. YOu say , [ It is a like matter . ] But you say so much and prove so little , that you lose much of your labour , as to me . It is not a like matter . The Law for saving him that reads ut Clericus , was made partly to spare Learned men , because the Prince or Commonwealth hath need of them , and sustaineth a greater loss in the death of such then of the unlearned ; and partly in a respect to the worth of their Learning , if not with some special indulgence to the Clergy for their Office , and to please the Pope . But Gods Law of Grace pardoning a penitent , gracefull Believer , hath no such intent : God needs not us , as the Commonwealth needs the Learned . Besides the Law hath laid the condition of escape in intellectual Abilities , without any Moral respect to the virtue of the party : but God hath laid it more in the meer consent of the Will ▪

2. But if you will interpret the Law of the Land otherwise , as if it were an act of purest grace , then I say , your Client with his Gramercy is an ungratefull fellow , and your bad Englishman , is the picture of a bad Christian , indeed no Christian : But by your speeches I perceive that about these matters experience is a great advantage to the right understanding of the Truth ; by the means whereof many an unlearned Christian knows more then some Learned Disputers . He that hath felt what it is to be condemned by the Law , and afterward pardoned by the Gospel , and put into a state of salvation by Christ , doth not say as Mr. K. that he is more beholden to his believing then to Gods promise , but heartily ascribeth all to God . Faith is the act of an humbled soul accepting of Christ as he is offered in the Gospel . And can any humbled soul give thanks to his own Acceptance , more then to Gods Gift ? yea when the power and act of Accepting is his Gift also ? If Mr. K. have an imagination that in every conditional Donation , there is more thanks due to the performer of the condition then to the giver , I dare say , he is an ungratefull person to God and men . If his father leave him all his Estate on condition he give a younger Brother 6d out of it , or that he give 6d to the poor ; it seems he will more thank himself then his father . If he had forfeited his life , and a pardon were given him , on condition he would Accept it thankfully and humbly on his knees , and that he would not spit in the face of him that giveth it , nor seek his death , he would give the chiefest thanks to himself . As for the phrase of [ saving himself ] he knows it is the Scripture phrase , 1 Tim . ● . last ▪ though pardoning our selves be not .

§. 44.

Mr. K. YEa Mr. Baxter expresseth somewhat in his answer which makes up full measure of evidence against him . He saith , The condition being performed , the Conditionall grant becomes absolute . Ergo , say I ▪ He that performs the Condition , makes the grant to be absolute , and so doth more to his Justification then God , who made only a Conditionall grant , and which notwithstanding he might have perisht , yea must without his own act of believing . And truly whoever makes faith the Condition of th● New Covenant in such a sense as full obedience was the Condition of the Old , cannot avoid it , but that man is justified chiefly by himself , his own acts , not so much by Gods grace in imputing Christs Righteousness , but more by his own faith , which I hope is his own act , though Gods work .

§. 44.

R. B. 1. All 's clear against me , if you be Judge ; but the whole charge depends but on the credit of your bare word . That [ Ergo , say I ] is the strong proof . Your consequence is none , but a meer fiction . By [ Absolute ] I mean , it actually conferres without any further Condition , when all the Condition is performed . It s a hard case that a man so Learned in his own eyes should be ignorant what a Condition is , in sensu Civili , vel Legali . Were you not so , you would not still make it a cause ; when ( unless somewhat beyond the meer nature of a Condition be added ) it is no cause at all . It is false therefore that the performer in our case makes the grant to be Absolute , if by making , you mean causing , as you before express your self , it is only a performing that , sine qua Donatio non erit Actualis vel Absoluta . It is the Donor ( yea though he were dead before ) that makes the Conditional grant become Actual or Absolute when the Condition is performed . And if it still stick in your stomack , that he performeth no new act to do this ; I answer , it needs not : the first act of making his Testament , Deed of gift , Contract , Law , &c. doth all this . The Law or other instrument , is but the signifier of his Will , and therefore conveyeth when and on what terms he will ( in a case within his power . ) If it be his will that this Instrument shall Jus conferre presently and absolutely , it doth it : If but in dicu and absolutely , it doth it : If sub conditione , it doth it : and in both the last cases , it s his will that the Instrument shall give no Actual Right till the day come , or till the Condition be performed ▪ so that a Condition is no true cause of the effect : the non-performance of it suspendeth the act of the grant , but the performance doth not cause it ; unless you mean it of a causa fatua , which doth but removere impedimentum ; so that if the Day be twenty years after the Testators death , that the Legacy becomes due , or if the Condition be so long after performed , it is the will of the Donor that maketh that Instrument then convey Right , which did not before ; because it works only significando voluntatem Donatoris , and so when and how he expressed his will it should work . Would one think such trivial obvious points should be unknown to Mr. K. ?

2. Where you talk of [ faith being a condition of the New Covenant in the same sense as full Obedience of the Old. ] I say your words [ in the same sense ] are ambiguous : Quoad rationem formalem Conditionis in genere , it is in the same sense a Condition . But it is not a Condition of the same species . It differs in the matter ; one being the humble thankfull Acceptance of Christ and Life freely restored and given ; the other being a perfect fulfilling of a perfect Law : the ends are different : One is to obtain part in Life purchased by Christ , when we wer● undone by sin : the other to maintain continued interest in the felicity first given by the Creator : One is to abase the sinner by self-deniall , and to extoll Freegrace ; the other was to obtain the Reward in a way as honourable to man , as he was capable of . More differences might easily be added .

3. Let the Reader mark what our Question was [ Whether God Pardon or Justifie us by the Covenant grant ? ] and whether Mr. K. hath now carried it ? It was all this while maintained , that the performer of the Condition , is not Justified so much by the Covenant as by himself : Now it is come to these terms : [ Not so much by Gods Grace in Imputing Christs Righteousness , but more by his own faith . ] He seems to me to yield , that we are as surely Justified by the Covenant , as by Gods Grace imputing Christs Righteousness .

§. 45.

Mr. K. YEt say I against Mr. Baxter 2. That faith is the Real effect which God works , by a Transient act on a person whom he justifies .

§. 45.

R. B. YOu are resolved , it seems , it shall be against Mr. Baxter whatever you say . But what Rational Animal besides your self can tell how this is against me ? If it be against me , it s either Directly or Consequentially . If Directly , then I have somewhere denied it , or spoke the contrary : Shew where and shame me . If Consequentially , why is there no hint given us which way it makes against me ? or against what opinion or words of mine ? It seems it was intentionally against me , not against my Doctrine but Me : Your minde may be against me , but Truth is not against me .

§. 46.

Mr. K. THat faith is a Reall effect , others will admit without proving : Mr. Baxter who denies faculties and habits distinct from the soul , may be forced to yield it by this Argument . If faith be not a Reall effect on the soul , then neither is any other grace , for all flow from faith , and consequently no reall alteration wrought in Sanctification , and consequently no sanctified soul Really differs from her self when unsanctified , no nor more then numero from unsanctified worldlings ; they are all alike . Taking it then that faith is a Real effect : 2. It is acknowledged it is wrought by God , and that not of our selves , it is the gift of God . And 3. that it is wrought by a transient act , as being a Reall effect by God in subjecto extraneo . Let us see now how by this transient act whereby God works saith , he may truly be said to justifie us in time as he decreed from eternity ?

§. 46.

R. B. 1. THe man would have his Reader believe that I must be forced by his Arguments to confess faith to be a real effect . 2. Till he prove it , I will take it for a meer slander , that I deny Faculties and Habits distinct from the soul . 1. I said I thought [ it would not be proved , ] but I rose not to the confidence of a flat deniall ; as knowing what is said on both sides . 2. What was it that I said would not be proved ? That the faculties were not Really distinct from the soul or one another : but not that they were not distinct , as Mr. K. saith . They may be distinct modally or formally , though not ut Res & Res . 3. When did I say this of Habits , as Mr. K. affirmeth ? But I will hereafter expect no more truth from him , even in matters of fact , then according to the proportion of the foregoing dispute . 4. To the point it self I say , we must distinguish of Reality : If you oppose Real either to Feigned , or Privative , or Negative , or Potential , or to an extrinsecall denomination , or to meerly Relative , so it s out of doubt that faith and all graces in the act and habit are Real effects . But if by Real you mean more then a distinction formall , or Ratione Ratiocinata , or Modal , I will neither affirm nor deny it , till I better understand it : You that know so well the nature of the Immanent acts of God , may a thousand times more easily know the nature of the Immanent acts and habits of man : but I confess exceeding great ignorance of both : and to tell you my opinions of these things would be but vain and unseasonable . 5. Your last words contain the mystery , that by [ that transient act whereby God worketh faith , he may be said to Justifie ; ] we shall have good stuff , I think , when this mystery comes to be opened .

Whether Faith Justifie as an Instrument .

§. 47.

Mr. K. Mr Baxter objects against faiths being an instrument of our Justification : and that it is neither mans nor Gods instrument . I shall make it appear to be both Gods and mans in some sense , though in different respects , notwithstanding all he hath said to the contrary . Saith he , If faith be an Instrument of our Justification , it is the Instrument of God or man : not of man ; for man is not the principall efficient , he doth not justifie himself . I Answer 1. According to his doctrine , man doth justifie himself , ut supra . 2. That man is not the principall efficient of his saith , more then of his Justification ; it is God who must have that honour . 3. That man doth receive his Justification by faith as an Instrument , as shall be shewed hereafter .

§. 47.

R. B. THis quarrelsome man wanting work , had a minde to take in this Controversie also , about faiths Instrumentality in Justifying : but what an unhandsome Transition he makes to draw it in , may be easily discerned . Let the Reader remember , that the thing which I deny is , that faith is an Instrument in the strict Logical sense , that is , an Instrumental efficient cause of our Justification : and that I expresly disclaim contending de nomine , or contradicting any that only use the word Instrument in an improper larger sense , as Mechanicks and Rhetoricians do : so that the Question is de re , whether it efficiently cause our Justification as an Instrument ? This I deny . And to his triple Answer I Reply . 1. The first is of the old stamp ; a gross untruth , needing no other reply then a deniall . 2. The second if it be sense , implieth the deniall of this maxime , that [ Instrumentum est efficientis principalis Instrumentum ] and thence inferreth , that [ as man may be his own Instrument in effecting faith , though he be not the principall cause , so may he be in Justification of himself . ] If this be not the sense of it ( if contradictions may be called sense ) then I cannot understand it . But the denied maxime needs no proof : that man is his own Instrument in effecting his faith , needs no more then a deniall to disprove it ( speaking thus de homine , and not de parte aliqua hominis organicâ . ) That man is not causa principalis in beleeving , is untrue ; though God be Causa prima : May none but the Causa prima be called Causa principalis ? then no creature is capable of using an Instrument . 3. His third must be considered when we come to the fuller proof which he referres us to .

§. 48.

Mr. K. BUt when he saith , Faith is not Gods Instrument , 1. I do not say it is properly , but it is his work , and by giving us faith he justifies us , as shall be shewed anon , he giving us that which is our Instrument , whereby we receive the Righteousness of Christ .

§. 48.

R. B. 1. EVennow he undertook to prove it Gods Instrument , but now , he doth not say it is properly : and I will not contend against an improper term , when the thing is disclaimed . 2. Here is another touch upon the mystery , that [ by giving us faith he justifies us ] but we shall be shewed it anon : therefore I must not overhastily anticipate it .

§. 49.

Mr. K. 2. BUt it is as much his Instrument as the new Covenant is : for faith working in my heart , is that whereby God pronounceth the New Covenant to be of benefit to me for my Justification .

§. 49.

R. B. 1. IF the New Covenant be properly Gods Instrument , and faith be not , then faith is not as much his Instrument as the New Covenant : But the Antecedent is true : Therefore , &c. The second member of the Antecedent Mr. K. now yielded . For the first I will appeal to all Lawyers and Politicians , or any that understands what an Instrument is , what Civil commerce is , and what a Law or any Contract is , whether a Deed of gift , a Testament , or a Law be not as proper Instruments conferendi Jus , constituendi Debitum , as is imaginable , or as the nature of the thing constituted or conferred ( Debitum ) is capable of . In the mean time , I leave Mr. K. to examine it , by the common Canons and properties of an Instrument . 2. Faith is not [ Gods pronouncing , ] but your belief of what he pronounceth , and Acceptance of what he offers : Will you confound faith with its object ? Divine Testimony is the object of faith , and you make it faith it self . 3. I know the Antinomians take faith to be [ the belief of our Justification : or the perswasion or apprehension of Gods love to me in special , ] but so do not our modern Protestants . 4. If this be true doctrine , then wo to poor Christians that have no Assurance of their Justification : and then , how few have faith ? For I think it is comparatively but a small number that have felt God pronouncing in their hearts , that the Covenant is of benefit to their own particular Justification : except by the term [ of benefit ] be meant , a conditional Justification , or a tendency or means towards their Justification ; and so even ungodly men may know that it 's [ of benefit ] to them for Justification ( as Mr. K. phraseth it . ) 5. Doth not Mr. K. shew here that the Truth sticks in his minde , and that he is fain to hide it in ambiguous terms . What can he mean by this saying [ God pronounceth the New Covenant to be of benefit to me for my Justification ] but this [ That the New Covenant justifieth me ? ] He would not openly tell us which way it benefiteth him to Justification , and yet be no efficient instrumentall cause of it .

§. 50.

Mr. K. ANd 3. it may be Gods Instrument notwithstanding his Argument : whereof the first is [ for it is not God that believeth ] nor needs it , say I : it is enough that God maketh me believe , and so receive the Righteousness of Christ : yea God by making me believe gives me an hand wherewith to receive , opens my hand whereby I receive it : I alone receive , but these are Gods acts , and though God be not said to believe , he truly may be said to be the Authour of my belief ; my belief is an immauent act in me , and so denominates me the believer , a transient act as from God , and denominates him only the Authour of my believing : in me it is an adjunct , it hath to him only the relation of an effect . For example , I throw a bowl : the motion of this bowl is more from me then the bowl , and I accordingly am said to have bowled well or ill : but the motion doth not denominate me otherwise then in the Agent , not the subject ; and though I be said to bowl well , the bowl in this case is only said to run , not I. So the chief Authour of my Believing is God , and he must have the glory of turning and framing and upholding and working all in my heart , as being the Authour , Preserver and Finisher of my faith , yet I alonc am said to believe , not God ; though my faith be more properly Gods work , then it is my own : had not he begun it in me , I had no more believed in Christ , then the bowl would have run to the mark of it self ; all the progress of my faith is from him , and to him be all the glory .

§. 50.

R. B. 1. NOne of all this is brought against my Conclusion , for he yieldeth that ; ( that our faith is not properly Gods Instrument in justifying ) but it is to shew the strength of his wit against my mediums . If he yield it to be the truth which I maintain , the matter is the less if I fail in proving it : Or if one medium be defective , it is little matter , if the rest , or any one suffice . 2. What hath he said in all these words , more then what I said in those few words which he opposeth , viz. [ It is not God that Believeth , though its true he is the first Cause of all Actions . ] Is not this the full substance of his speech ? 3. All his words seem to tend but to prove that God may be said to be the principal Cause of our faith , and it to be his act : but what 's that to its instrumentality in justifying . 4. I intended this first Proposition , chiefly as preparatory to the rest , rather then as a full proof of the Conclusion by it self . Perhaps we may give him some plainer Argument anon , when he hath done with these .

§. 51.

Mr. K. Mr. Baxters second Argument to prove it , not Gods Instrument that man is Causa secunda between God and the Action , and so still said to justifie himself . I answer , 1. Man is indeed Causa secunda , but not between God and the Action , for God doth immediately concurre to it , and man is in regard of the habit of faith purely passive , not active at all , for that though other habits may be acquired , faith is infused both for the effence and degree . 2. Man may not be said by his believing to justifie himself , but to Believe to his Justification , and to receive Justification by believing , for that by faith , as it is Gods work , God doth justifie him , viz. declares hereby the Righteousnesse of Christ to be his own ; he doth apprehend or receive the Righteousness of Christ by believing , as it is his own act , whereof still he is the Subject , not the Author , as the Bowl is of it running .

§. 51.

R. B. 1. WHether God concurre Immediately to all humane actions , I have no minde to dispute : If Mr. K. want work on that subject , he may answer Ludov . a Dola . But it sufficeth me that man also is an Immediate Cause of his Believing . 2. Whether man be Passive or not in receiving the habit , is nothing , that I know of , to the matter ; as long as the act which justifieth is immediately by him . 3. It is a great uncertainty which you affirm so confidently . You know not but that the Spirit of God by the Word , may excite an act of faith before he infuse a habit , and by that act ( or more ) produce a habit . 4. And so the habit may be said to be Infused as from God , and acquired by man too : and it is commonly granted , that Infused habits are attained secundum modum acquisitorum .

To the second Answer , I say , 1. For your Receiving Instrument , we shall speak to it anon . 2. Si fides efficit Justificationem , tum Credens per fidem efficit Iustificationem : At fides si modò Instrumentum Iustificationis est , Iustificationem efficit : Ergo , &c. The major is evident , in that man is the immediate proper Cause of the act , therefore if the act doth it , the Agent by that act doth it . The Instrument is his that immediately and properly useth it . The minor is undeniable , speaking of a true instrumental Cause : For there is no instrumental Cause in any kinde , but of efficients .

2. A hint I perceive more here of your opinion , what is Gods justifying act , viz. Working faith in us : but I will wait till this opinion dare come into the light .

3. I perceive also here what you take Justification to be , viz. [ declaring Christs Righteousness to be his own ] Right Antinomianism . 1. Will you tell us whether [ Declaring Christs Righteousness to be mine ] do not suppose it to be first mine ? Else it is the Declaring of an untruth . And if it were mine before , was not I just before ? and so constitutivè justified ? 2. Why did you not tell us when and how that was done ? And what was the act whereby God did constitute me just ? Which is first to be known , and which you knew that I was speaking of . 3. Where , and to whom is it that [ God declares this ] you speak of ? Onely in Conscience , and not to others , no doubt . But I doubt not fully to shame ( in due place ) this Antinomian fancy , that Justification by faith ( in Scripture sense ) is but Justification in Conscience . 4. Many a soul hath justifying faith ( of Assent and Consent ) who yet doth not believe that Christs Righteousness is their own . 5. May not other Graces declare Christs Righteousness to be ours ? ( I know not whether it be sano sensu that you speak of Christs Righteousness being made ours , but I will not digresse to enquire further into it now . ) 6. You do strangely affirm , that man is not the author of his own act ( whether he be the subject , I referre to what is said : ) If by the Author , you mean , not the perswader , but the Agent , the vital , voluntary self-determiner , then he is the Author ; or else I could tell you of such unavoidable consequents , as you will be ashamed to own . If you be indeed one of those that think man a free Agent , is no more the author of his own acts , then your Bowl is , I shall fear , lest you will think your self very excusable for all the evil you do , and therefore little care what you do : I shall be loath to trust a man of such principles , if his carnal interest carry him to do me a mischief . How many Philosophers or Divines are of your minde in this , that man is but the Subject and not the Authur of his own act of Believing ?

§. 52.

Mr. K. TO his third Argument , that the Action of the principal Cause , and of the Instrument is the same , is true , and when he asks , Who dare say that faith is so Gods Instrument ? I understand not any great danger in affirming , that God giving me faith , the habit and thereby the act of believing , concurs with my faith which he hath given in enabling me to receive Christ ; he gives me an hand , stretcheth it out , and opens it , and puts Christs Righteousnesse into it : Why is not my hand here his Instrument whereby he conveys Christs Righteousness to me , as well or more then my own whereby I apprehend it ?

§. 52.

R. B. 1. IF it be true , that the Action of the Principal and Instrumental Cause be the same , then it unavoidably follows , that man justifieth and pardoneth himself , when God doth it . For then when God effecteth our Justification , Faith , which is his Instrument doth effect it too : When God forgiveth us effectivè , faith forgiveth us effectivè : and consequently the immediate agent man , doth it too . 2. Again , I tell you , the place to examine your Receiving Instrumentality is anon where your self hath designed it . I may not anticipate you .

§. 53.

Mr. K. ANd whereas he saith , Fourthly , The Instrument hath an Influx on the effect , by a proper Causality , which who dare say of faith ? I answer , 1. That it hath a proper Causality upon our Justification passively taken , that is , upon our Receiving the Righteousness of Christ . And no more need : for we make it an Instrument not to work , but to receive . But secondly , according to him it hath more then the Influx of an Instrumental , that of the principal efficient upon our Justification , as being that which makes this Conditional Grant in the Covenant to become Absolute : And all the benefit we receive by the Covenant is more to be ascribed to our faith , then Gods grace in the Covenant , which would have been of no advantage to us at all , had it not been that our faith came in and rendred it of use to us . Thus then we do not deprive God of his Glory in justifying us by faith , though we ascribe Justification to faith ; for we ascribe our faith to God , and make our believing his work , which as it comes from him is an active declaration , as in us a Passive resenting of his favour to us in Christ , of which we alwayes may though we not actually assure our selves .

§. 53.

R. B. 1. REceiving is either Properly , which is alwayes Passive : Or improperly , morally , imputatively , which is the Consent of the will when a thing is offered , and it is active , called Receiving , because it is necessary to the Passive proper Receiving .

In the former sense , to Receive pardon and Justification is nothing but to be pardoned and justified : it is a meer Relative Reception . In the later sense , faith it self is our [ Receiving ] If Mr. K. mean the former , when he saith , that [ faith hath a proper Causality upon it ] I say , His words are scarce sense . To have [ Causality upon ] implieth a subject upon which there may be such Causality : But the Reception of a Relation is no such capable Subject . If he mean only [ a Causality of that Reception ] I say , There is no natural proper Cause of the Reception of a Relation , but that which causeth the Relation it self , by Causing its foundation : though there may be other Causes of the fitness of the Subject , yet that fitness effecteth not the Reeeption . Moral Causes there may be besides ; but this is not pleaded such . An efficient Instrument of the Reception of a Relation , ( that is , Justitiae , vel juris ad impunitatem ) we shall believe it to be when we first finde sense , and then truth in that assertion . 2. And for the second kinde of Receiving Christs Righteousnesse , it is Faith it self . And to say , that faith hath a proper Causality on it self , is a hard saying .

Your second Answer is the meer repetition of a notorious slander , not onely unproved , but bewraying the grosse mistake of the Nature of a Legal Condition ; as I have sufficiently shewed , and will not waste time to recite .

I conclude therefore contrary to your Conclusion , that if you make faith the proper Instrument of justifying , you make man his own pardoner , and rob God of his Soveraignty . Your reason to the contrary is such as the Papists bring to excuse their doctrine of Merit : they say , Christ hath Merited for them a power of Meriting , and so the glory redounds to him : so you say , [ We ascribe our faith to God , though we ascribe Justification to faith . ] But you must needs ascribe it also immediatly to your self , if you be the man that believes .

Again , you touch the way of Gods justifying darkly : [ As it comes from him ( you say ) it is an active declaration , as in us a Passive resenting his favour to us in Christ . ] But , 1. do you mean , it is a Declaration Enunciative ? Or meerly signal ? If the former , it is very false . To speak a Truth , and to Cause one to believe it , are not all one . If the later , then it seems you think God justifies a man , every time he giveth him any Evidence of his Grace . And if so , then other Graces justifie as well as faith ; and then Justification is increased upon every increase of every Grace : But more of this when you come to it of purpose .

And Passive Resenting Gods Love or Favour is an ill description of justifying faith , and not a little dangerous .

§. 54.

Mr. K. Mr. Baxter proceeds to take off an Objection . [ But some would evade it thus : Faith , say they , is a Passive Instrument , not an Active ] I know not who say it , nor matters it much , yea it is needless to say so : But Mr. Baxters answer to this I conceive to be very unsatisfactory : For where he saith [ 1. Even Passive instruments are said to help the Action of the principal Agent , Kecker . log . p. 131. and he that saith faith doth so , in my judgement gives too much to it ] I answer , That without offence it may be said , that Faith doth help the Action of the principal Agent , i.e. God in our Justification , God doing nothing in it without faith ; I speak of such as are adulti , or of years . 2. That Mr. Baxter must say so , for that according to him faith makes Gods Conditional Grant in the New Covenant to become absolute , and therefore doth the main o● Gods work .

§. 54.

R. B. 1. LEt it be observed that Mr. K. takes it for needlesse , to say , Faith is a Passive Instrument : and therefore he must maintain it to be an Active Instrument , or none .

2. I doubt Mr. K. would have thought me near to a Blasphemer ( supposing the interest of his Cause to have carried him another way ) if I had said and maintained that mans Faith doth help the Action of God : 1. If Gods Action were taken to be Causa partialis ( which I think Mr. K. doth not believe it to be ) yet mans Action would help to produce the Effect , only by concurring with Gods Action , but not properly , help Gods Action ; for it would have no influx into it . 2. If Gods Action be Causa totalis in suo genere , and mans Action subordinate to it , much lesse can mans Action be said properly to help Gods action . 3. But the truth is in pardoning sin , and justifying us , Mans action of believing is no Cause at all , and therefore no proper Help to Gods action . God hath no need of our help to pardon our sin . The performing of our Condition by Thankfull Accepting Christ and Life , is no Helping Gods Action . But its strange to see how Mr. K. reels too and fro ! Sometime he dare say it over and over , that if the New Covenant say [ Believe and be Justified ] and make our faith the Condition of our ●ustification , then a man justifies himself by believing , and more a great 〈◇〉 ●hen God doth by the promulgation of his Covenant , and that he is justified 〈◇〉 ●y by himself and his own acts , and not so much by Gods Grace in im 〈…〉 g Christs Righteousness , but by his own faith . ] And yet now he dare say , that mans Believing doth help God in Pardoning or Justifying him .

3. And what 's his proof ? Why [ God doth nothing without faith . ] A strange proof ! So every Matter , Object , Dispositio Materiae , or Condition sine quae non , should help the Action of the Efficient . Sure Helping is acting , and therefore Effecting . So he may as well say , that the preparation of the soul for Receiving Regenerating , Sanctifying Grace , doth help the Spirits Action of infusing it .

4. As for his second Answer , that [ I must say so too , for that according to me , faith makes Gods Conditional Grant to become absolute ] I Reply , that this is an oft repeated slander of a hard fore-head , without shew of proof . If this be mine , it is either directly or consequently . If directly , let him produce my words . If consequentially , let him prove it if he can . If he attempt it , it must be by this Syllogism , [ He that saith , Upon the performance of the Condition , the Covenant becomes absolute , doth say in sense , that the performance of the Condition , makes the Covenant become Absolutely , i.e. effects it : But M. B. saith the former : Therefore , &c. ] Let him that knows no difference between an efficient Cause , and a meer Condition sine qua non , believe the major . I know so much difference , that I dare say , it is false .

§. 55.

Mr. K. WHereas he saith [ 2. It is past my Capacity to conceive of a Passive Moral Instrument . ] I answer , what ever Mr. Baxter may conceive , nothing is more obvious then that many men at least are used by others meerly for blindes , to bring about their designes , and so do very much towards them , by doing nothing but standing still .

§ 55.

R. B. I Knew before I heard of your name , that the same thing which in sensu Physico is a Passion or Privation , may in sensu Morali , i.e. reputativè , be Action or an Instrument . But I ever supposed that as it is Moraliter vel reputativè Instrumentum , so hath it Moralem vel reputativam action●m . 2. That [ some men are used by others meerly for blinds about their designs ] this blinde work of Mr. K. doth partly perswade me .

§. 56.

Mr. K. WHen he saith [ how can the act of believing ( which hath no other being , but to be an Act ) be possibly a Passive Instrument ? Doth this act effect by suffering ? Or can wise men have a grosser conceit then this ? ] I answer that this Act is equivalent to suffering , as consisting chiefly in a reliance on Christs righteousnesse , without exalting our thoughts against it , captivating our thoughts to it , renouncing all thoughts of our own righteousness , yea all thoughts that are too apt to rise against it from the consideration of our own righteousness ; howbeit for the form it be an action , yet virtually this action is a suffering our selves to be led by the Spirit of God , and by his Authority against the suggestions of our own reason .

§. 56.

R. B. 1. TWo things you have here to prove : 1. That the Act of faith is a suffering . 2. That by suffering it effecteth our pardon or Justification as an Instrumental Cause . For the former , you say [ It is equivalent to suffering . ] Reply 1. It seems then it is but equivalent . 2. Wherein it is equivalent ? 1. As to its nature ? That were a strange act . 2. Or in excellency : so it is more then equivalent to suffering . 3. Or is it as to its use and end ? I easily grant you that the use of this Action is to make us capable subjects of pardon , or fit ob●ects for Gods act , and disposed matter to receive Justification ; as Mr. Benjamin Woodbridge hath plainly and truly , though briefly taught you in his Sermon of Justification ( think not much to learn of him in that , and other points there touched . ) If you have a minde to call this Passio Reputativa vel Moralis , I will not contend with you : it being Conditio activa ad Receptionem propriam requisita . Doubtless the Reliance and Renunciation which you mention , are actions . 3. And where you say , that it is [ Virtually a suffering our selves to be led by the Spirit , though it be an action for the form ] I never heard before of an Action immanent which was virtually suffering : and that from such a Cause as Authority is : Sure it is somewhat more then such a suffering ; and therefore it is new Logick to say , that it is Virtually suffering . Though as I said , if you have a minde to call it a Moral or Reputative Passion , I will not contend . 4. But then what a suffering is that you imagine it ? I thought you would have come nearer the matter , and have said that it is Receptio Christi , vel Justitiae donatae : but you say , It is a suffering our selves to be led by Gods Spirit and authority .

2. But now I come to the great business , I finde you as mute as a fish : You had another Assertion to prove , [ that this Act doth by suffering Effect our pardon : ] On this lay all the controversie : and of this I finde not a word . I pray you remember by the next to satisfie your Reader , that [ this Act which is Virtually a suffering our selves to be led by Gods Spirit , and by his Authority against the suggestion of our own Reason , doth by that suffering effect our pardon or Justification . ] Nay , I thought if you had made it but a Receiving instrument , as you phrase it , that it had been the Receiving Christ or Righteousness , and not the suffering our selves to be led by Gods Spirit and Authority against the suggestions of reason , which ( qua talis ) would have been affirmed the instrument of our Justification ? But you saw not what Roman doctrine this implieth .

§. 57.

Mr. K. WHereas he adds [ 4. And lastly , I believe with Schibler , that there is no such thing as a Passive Instrument ] I believe he bath seen a man often hold up a fire-shovel to receive coles , which fire-shovel is an Instrument , but in that case meerly passive , and he hath seen questionless boyes at trap hold up their hats to receive the ball ; here their hats are Instruments , but meerly Passive . What examples Burgersdicius or Keckerman give , is not considerable ; What if they mistook in their instances of Passive Instruments ? Follows it there are none ?

§. 57.

R. B. 1. THe Smith may call his fire-shovel , a Passive Instrument , and so your boy may do his hat . I will allow them both that name among Mechanicks , Rhetoricians , &c. but I shall not believe that Logicians should so call them , or that either of them is an instrumental efficient Cause , or do effect by suffering , till you have better proved it , then this put-off comes to . 2. I have found no reason yet in all the reading of your labours , to judge your Logick more considerable then Burgersdicius and Keckermans ; or that you are likely to finde out fit instances , where they could finde none . 3. Callovius and many more are of the same opinion as Schibler in this .

§. 58.

Mr. K. BUt say you [ the Instrument is an Efficient Cause : all efficiency is by action : and that which doth not act , doth not effect : ] You have forgotten that the great Instruments of the Roman State , did all by doing Nothing . Unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem . Their strength , saith the Prophet , is to fit still .

§. 58.

R. B. 1. SUch a thing I now perceive may be : for I think when you have here done all , you had done more if you had done nothing .

2. I answered enough to this before . What if the Consequents of doing nothing prove better , then if there had been Action , and thereupon you do call [ doing nothing ] by the name of [ Action ? ] Is it therefore Action indeed ? Or if you therefore ascribe a Causality to it , is it therefore a Cause indeed ? I say again , as such are Moraliter vel Reputativè instrumentae , i.e. Causae efficientis instrumentales , cum Physicè & reverâ non sunt ; so morally and reputatively they are Agents , and therefore not to be called Passive instruments .

3. Let it be observed what a superficial kinde of answers Mr. K's Chair doth vouchsafe us ? He durst neither plainly deny , that an instrument is an efficient Cause ; nor yet that all efficiency is by Action : and yet satisfies himself with the touch of an alien instance , implying the denial of the later .

§. 59.

Mr. K. [ INdeed ( saith Mr. Baxter in the close ) as some extend the use of the word , Instrument , you may call almost any thing an Instrument , which is any way conducible to the production of the effect under the first Cause , and so you may call faith an Instrument . ] Belike it is Instrumentum quoddam vocatum , what you will in the Lawyers Latine , and you must be beholden to that to make the New Covenant Gods Instrument in Justification . Instrumentum Novum for Testamentum Novum , say the Criticks .

§. 59.

R. B. 1. THese words I spoke , to signifie my resolution , not to contend about words ; and if any man will use the term [ Instrument ] improperly , and tell us his meaning , and not make it the efficient Cause of our pardon and Justification , much less make the Papists believe , that in that notion lieth the very kernel of the Protestant doctrine about Justification by faith alone , I am content such a man speak as he thinks meet , allowing others the like liberty . To this Mr. K. gives this learned answer [ Belike its Instrumentum quoddam vocatum , what you will in the Lawyers Latine ] Out of which words , or any yet spoken by him , if the Reader can pick an argument to prove faith the instrumental Cause of forgiveness or Justification , let him make his best of it . A jest is readier then a good Argument .

2. It ill becomes any Preacher of it , to deny or jest at the instrumentality of of Gods Law , Covenant or Testament . It bewrayes that which you might with more credit have concealed . If Gods Deed of Gift of Christ , Life , Pardon , &c. be any Cause of our Right to Christ , Life , Pardon , &c. then is it an instrumental efficient Cause , constituting that Right : ( Let Mr. K. tell me what other cause it is , if not this . ) But some Cause it is : Therefore , &c. Onely as Relations have an imperfect Being , so the Causing of them is answerable to it . If Gods Deed of Gift , Law , Covenant , Testament , be no proper instrument , then there is no such thing as a proper instrument known in Laws , Politicks , Morality , for the conveying of any Right . As Sayrus saith , Clav . Regiâ li. 6. cap . 6. n . 23. p. 330. Natura instituit voces & signa tanquam Instrumenta & media fine quibus nu● homo alteri non possit obligari . Not only are they certain Instruments when used , but is commonly held that they are so necessary instruments , that by a meet mental Conception without words a man is not obliged to another . So saith Almain . in 4. d . 15. q . 2. Jos . Angles in flor . 4. sent . q . de voto art . 2. diffic . 4. Armil . verb . promissio . Petr . de Arragon . 2. 2. q . 88. art . 3. dub . 4. Mich . Salon . in 22. to . 1. q . 5. de domino art . 2. dub . 1. Lud . Lopez . p. 2. instr . cons . cap . 30. Emanuel Rodriquez part . 2. Sum . c . 27. Concl . And it s certain that conceptions give no Right to men , though the conceiver of a promise may coram Deo be obliged .

§. 60.

Mr. K. THis were not worth the insisting on , but to shew with what tools Mr. Baxter endeavours to break the works of so many eminent Master-builders , and with what formidable weapons he valiantly sets himself against those great Champions . — Sic dama Leonem Insequitur , audetque Viro concurrere Virgo — O the miserable fate of poor Divinity ! that must be put to School to Burgersdicius and Keckermans Logick ! and be so beaten for greasie Jack Seaton ! Had not Mr. Baxter been as they say he was {αβγδ} , he had not set so high a price on these beggarly elements , as to let them make utramque paginam in this noble controversie .

§. 60.

R. B. WHether this merry Rhetorical Triumph were grounded on such a reall victory as the man dreams of , or whether premises and Conclusion be any other then a meer Rapsody of windy ostentation , I must leave to the judgement of the impartial , understanding Reader . I confess they shew that he is not only unreasonable ; for ridere is proper to a Reasonable Creature . I had thought to have given a particular answer to each passage in this Paragraph , but upon review I finde that the Replying to such like , hath occasioned more ironies and sharp passages then I dare approve ; and therefore I think it best to say nothing to it , only to reminde him of these few things :

1. That I will be none of his adversary , where he argues only to prove me ignorant . It never came into my head to make it the Question , whether Mr. K. or I were the more wise or learned man ? I have much more ignorance then he is aware of .

2. That yet I dare contend with him in point of veracity , if he use to do with others , as he doth with me , particularly to talk of [ making utramque paginam ] and to scorn at it no less then twelve times in five or six leaves , for my citing these Authours once or twice , and Schibler thrice in a whole book .

3. That all is not Divinity that such Theologues maintain : For I think he is not Theology in the Abstract : and therefore it s possible to finde an errour in such a man as Mr. K. without Schooling or beating Divinity : Nor do I think that sound Theology would feel it , though he had a knock or two more .

4. That he proves out of Keckerman , or others such like , that two and two is four , doth not much abuse Divinity by it : Nor he that cites them to shew that all efficiency is by Action , though as learned a man as Mr. K. deny it . Nor do I finde Mr. K. having recourse to the Bible to prove the contrary , viz. that there is efficiency without Action . And I think the Scripture Texts may be soon numbred by which he attempts to prove Faith to be the instrumental Cause of Justification .

§. 61.

Mr. K. HE hath one Question more [ But though Faith be not the Instrument of Justification , may it not be called the Instrument of Receiving Christ who Justifies us ? I do not ( saith he ) stick so much at this speech as at the former ( we are beholden to you : some indulgence yet in this particular ) Yet is it no proper or fit expression neither . For , 1. the Act of Faith which is it that justifieth is our Actual Receiving of Christ , and therefore cannot be the Instrument of Receiving . To say our Receiving is the Instrument of our Receiving , is a bard saying . ] Be the act of Faith the actual Receiving of Christ : Why I wonder may not faith be said to be the Instrument of Receiving Christ ? Is faith only an Act ? I had thought it had been an Habit ? And though the Receiving be not the Instrument of Receiving Christ , as being the actual receiving of him ; yet faith may very well be so called : as though my receiving of a book be not the Instrument of receiving it , yet the hand may without any great absurdity be allowed that name .

§. 61.

R. B. 1. I Argued , that if faith be the Instrument of Receiving Christ , then either the Act of faith , or the Habit : but neither the Act nor Habit : Therefore , &c. To prove that the act of faith is not the instrument of Receiving Christ , I used the words that he here cites . What doth this Learned man but confute this by saying , that the Habit is the Instrument ? [ I had thought ( saith he ) faith had been a Habit . ] Thus he confutes me , who argue that the Act is not the Instrument , by saying that the Habit is . I think he that is {αβγδ} need not much lament that he lost the benefit of such a disputants tutorage , if he be never in a more waking mood then here .

2. His Rhetorick is the best part of his answer . But when will he prove that the Habit of faith so farre differs from the act , and both from the soul , as that the Habit may as truly or fitly be called the instrument of Believing or Receiving , as the Hand is of its Act or the effect ? If his similitude would prove any thing it would rather be that the Faculty is the Instrument , then that the Habit is : which yet I finde him not here attempt : I think that the Habit of faith , and the act are not of so different natures as is the Hand and its act .

3. Let it still be remembred , that I do not much regard how this Question is determined ( for which Mr. K. doth so humbly tell me , he is beholden , ) it being much different from the former Question . For in the former , the term [ Instrument ] is taken properly for an instrumental efficient Cause , in which sense I deny that faith justifieth : But here it is taken Metaphorically or Vulgarly , and not properly : For that which effecteth not is not an instrumental efficient Cause . And that which they call an Instrument of Receiving , is in Naturals but Dispositio materiae , and in Morals , but Dispositio Moralis , vel Reputativa , vel Actus ad Receptionem passivam , propri●m , veram necessarius ; and in our present case , strictly nothing : but a Condition . Now if any will be pleased to speak so vulgarly and improperly , as to call such a Condition , or Aptitude Moral or Natural [ an Instrument of Receiving ] so he do not build any unsound Doctrine upon it , I do again professe that I will not contend with him . But the Reasons why I thought it necessary for all that , to contradict the common Doctrine of faiths being the Instrument of Justification , I have fully manifested in answer to other Brethren .

§. 62.

Mr. K. BUt secondly , saith Mr. Baxter [ The seed or Habit of faith cannot fitly be called an Instrument , 1. The sanctified faculty it self cannot be the Instrument , it being the soul it self , and not any thing really distinct from it , as Scotus , D'Orbelli● , Scaliger , &c. Dr. Jackson , Mr. Pemble think , and Mr. Ball questions . 2. The Holiness of the faculties , is not their Instrument : For , 1. it is nothing but themselves rectified , and not a Being so distinct as may be called their Instrument . 2. Who ever called Habits or Dispositions the souls Instruments ? The Aptitude of a Cause to produce its effect , cannot be called , The Instrument of it . You may as well call a mans Life the Instrument of Acting , or the sharpness of the knife , the knives Instrument , as to call our Holinesse or Habitual faith , the Instrument of Receiving Christ . ] I answer , you proceed by certain steps , and to deny the Habit of faith to be the Instrument of Receiving Christ , you say , 1. The sanctified faculty it self cannot be the Instrument . And 1. What if it cannot ? Who reckons the Habit of faith for a sanctified faculty ? This is that which sanctifies the faculties : The faculty is of one Species of quality , potentia naturalis ; faith which sanctifies of another , habitus . You are , it seems , now and then out in your Logick , as much as you trouble us with it , and had need review your Burgersdicius and Keckerman . 2. How prove you that the sanctified faculty is the soul it self , In stead of the few Names you muster up , I may bring you thousands that are against it : and yet a few Reasons weigh more then all these great Names . If the faculty be the same with the soul , then the Holinesse of the faculty cannot be really distinct from the soul , for that this Holiness is to be received into the faculties ; and if no faculty be really distinct from the soul , then is there no receiving into it any thing really distinct from the soul , and if Holinesse be not Really distinct from the soul , a holy soul , and an unholy one , are not Really distinct , and so you seem to imply in your second , when you say —

§. 62.

R. B. 1. Mr. K. yieldeth , if I am able to understand him , that the Act of faith is not the Instrument of Receiving Christ : and he layes it on the Habit . Before we proceed here observe ,

1. That the Generality of Divines that plead for faiths instrumentality , say , that it is not the Habit , but the Act of faith that justifieth : ( I said so too when I wrote my Aphorisms , taking it on trust , but I now recant it . ) If that be so , then they cannot ( as they do ) argue thus : [ Faith is the Instrument of Receiving Christ and his Righteousness : Therefore faith justifieth as an Instrument ] because they speak of the Habit in the Antecedent , and of the act in the Consequent ; and so by [ faith ] mean not in both the same thing : and so there are quatuor termini .

2. Observe , that it is commonly granted , that the Habit of faith is not alwayes in act : as in sleep , and when we are wholly taken up with thoughts of an aliene subject , and all the time of Infancy ( according to them that think Infants have the Habit of faith . ) This being so , it must needs follow , that faith is not alwayes the Instrument of Receiving Christ , and of Justifying : ( nay perhaps , but seldome comparatively ) For the Causality of the Instrument is in Action , and faith is not alwayes acting . If therefore faith justifie as an Instrument , and we are alway justified , and yet faith be not alway an Instrument , then either we are not justified by faith , but some other way , at those times when faith acteth not , or else cessante Causâ non cessat effectus : which though in some cases it may be true , yet here it cannot : because the effect being but a Jus ad rem , a transcendental Relation , it hath no nearest Cause , but its Foundation and Subject : and when those cease the Relation ceaseth : And none affirmeth that ●aith is a Remote cause of Receiving Christ , that is , Right to Christ ( with his benefits , ) And if it were , yet the Fundamentum Relationis must have the sustentation of a continued Cause . But in the way that I affirm faith to justifie , as a moral Condition only ( having no Causality ) all these inconveniences , or rather contradictions are avoided : For it being the meer will of the Donor , that createth the nearest necessity of the Condition , and so requires the Condition to such an end , he may make either act or Habit the Condition , and may make the act the Condition of Beginning our Right to Christ and Life , and the Habit continued , to be the Condition of continuing that Right , even when the act is intermitted : and yet the effect may still continue , because the Will of the Donor , and the Law or Covenant which is his Instrument , do both continue ; and it is they that are the efficient Causes .

3. Observe also , that both the man for whom Mr. K. is here so zealous , viz. Mr. P●emble , and many more , do make the Habit of faith to be nothing else , but our New Life , our Holiness of the renewed faculties , the Spirit of God in us , and that all Graces are in the Habit and seed but one , and so accordingly it follows , that it is our internal Sanctification or Holiness that is the Instrument of our Justification : A Doctrine that I think these men will scarce own upon consideration .

4. Observe also , that hence it will follow , that it is other graces that justifie instrumentally as well as faith : because they say , it is the Habit that is the Instrument : and this Habit is but one : not one Habit of faith , and another of Love , Hope , &c. but all one : and this one Habit justifies , even when men are Infants , or asleep , and do not act .

5. That which is now commonly called , the Habit of Grace , is in Scripture called , [ the Spirit in us : ] and so the holy Ghost is made our instrument of Justification .

● . Now to Mr K's words here . In the words of mine which he cites , I do both indirectly , or in transitu confute a third opinion , viz. that the sanctified faculties are the Instrument , though the sanctity of the faculties be not : and directly I argue à forti●re , that if the sanctified Faculties themselves may not properly be called the Instrument of Receiving Christ , much lesse can the sanctity of the faculties be so called : But , &c. Therefore , &c. Hereupon this too learned man feigns me to think , or say , or imply , the Habit of faith to be a sanctified faculty ; and with seeming seriousness fals a schooling me , and tels me , that [ the faculty is of one Species of quality , and faith of another ; ] yea proceeds in his dream as confidently as if he were waking , to tell me , that I [ am now and then out in my Logick , and had need to review my Burgersdicius and Keckerman . ] But would he a little rub his eyes , I would desire him to tell his Reader , where I did directly or indirectly say , that Faith is a sanctified faculty ? And I would know of him , whether a man should not understand a matter before he make an answer to it !

Next , it seems , he expected I should have proved , that the faculty is the soul it self : And would not that have been as wise a Digression , and as Necessary , as is this of his ? The Scope of my words was but this , q. d . [ It is a controverted , doubtful point , Whether the Faculties are distinct from the soul , as Res & Res , and therefore not fit to bear such a weight as those that I oppose do lay upon the affirmative ] ( and my own opinion inclineth to the Negative : yet so as I dare not be so presumptuous as confidently to interpose among so many learned men , and maintain my own opinion as certain truth . ) As wise a man as Mr. K. ( and in my opinion an eight at least above him ) thought the like answer to be good in another case . Davenant . Determ . Qu 37. pag . 166. Quod philosophantur voluntatem & intellectum esse duas potentias reipsa distinctas , dogma Philosophicum est , ab omnibus haud receptum , & Theologicis dogmatibus firmandis aut infirm●ndis , fundamentum mi●imè idoncum . And he knows , that the two Questions , 1. Whether the faculties be realiter inter so distinct as ? And , 2. Whether they be realiter ab anima distinctas ? use to stand and fall together in the Determination .

For the few names that he tels me I muster up , it s like he may know that it were easie to give him a farre larger muster roll , especially of the Scotists . And as for the thousands that he saith he may bring against it ( no doubt he means Writers ) I confess plainly , that he hath so farre lost his credit with me , that I do not believe him . For though I know they are many , yet I do not think he hath read many thousands on all sides of that Subject . But if he have indeed read so many thousand books of that one point , alas , how many hath he read in all ? No wonder if poor Burgersdicius , Schibler or Suarez be despised by him . It may be that's the reason that both the margin and Text of his book are so naked of quotations ; he having read so many thousands that he knew not which to preferre , or where to beginne ; or else would have few mens names to his Works but his own ( except as Adversaries ) lest they should share of the honour . Nay , if he should have said or meant , that there are thousands that so write , which others have read though he have not , I doubt he cannot prove it true .

For his great weighing Reasons , I will honour them as soon as I can see them , but he had little Reason to expect me to Reason that Case . If this that he next addes be one of his few Reasons , that weigh so much , I must tell him , Every man to his minde . I doubt he overvalues his own Reasons : For my part , one thousand great Names , yea one , will weigh as much with me , as this his Reason . For , 1. I deny his Consequence , and say , that the Holiness may be Really distinct from the soul , though the faculties are not ; and that Holiness may immediately inhere in the soul without the mediation of faculties really distinct from it . It had been easie to have seen the necessity of giving some answer to this deniall . As wise a man as most we have ( if I conjecture not amiss ) and a publick Professour in Oxford , and now resident where Mr. K. had his Chait , I mean Mr. Wallis , saith thus : [ And so , however it may be true , that a faculty or natural Power may be so far the same with the soul , as that it differ only ratione ratiocinatâ , yet in a Habit we must of necessity grant a distinction ex parte rei : For where there may be a real separation , and not only mental , there must needs be granted a distinction in re . ]

But what if I grant Mr. K's hardest Conclusion that Holiness is not Really distinct from the soul , nor a holy soul from an unholy as [ Really ] is taken for a distinction inter Rem & Rem . We shall see anon what danger would be in it . But then Mr. K. must be so honest , as not to perswade any that I therefore deny a Real distinction , as [ Real ] is opposed to feigned , mental , called Rationis , Relative , or Denominative .

§. 63.

Mr. K. YOu say [ The Holiness of the faculties is not their Instrument , for it is nothing but themselves rectified , and not a Being so distinct as may be called their Instrument . ] But is it nothing but themselves rectified ? I had thought it had been the Rectifying of them , which potest adesse & abesse sine subjecti interitu ? and consequently it is not the faculties themselves . As well you may say , that the rightnesse of a stick is nothing but the stick made right ; and the whitenesse of the wall , nothing but the wall made white Quis tulerit Gracchos sive Graculos !

§. 63.

R. B. 1. ALl that I assert is , that Holiness differs not from the faculties , as Res & Res , but as Res & modus . 2. I think the abstract ha●h no existence , but as in the Concrete , but is a meer Notion : Seeing therefore that is so , I think the properest denomination , as most agreeable to the thing denominated , is to speak of it as in Concreto . 3. You did therefore too suddenly start up into your wondering interrogation , as if there were any contradiction between those two sayings ! As if he that saith [ a Rectified faculty : a white wall ] did not as truly expresse the Rectitude , and the whiteness , as you that express them in Concreto ! It is too grosse a fiction , if ( as you seem ) you would make men believe that I intend to prove the Rectitude to be Formaliter the same with the Faculty or soul ! My meaning is plainly , that Holiness is nothing but the souls Rectitude , and though I expressed it in the Concrete , I say not , that it is the Faculty as a Faculty , but as Rectified ; shewing in the next words what it is that I exclude , viz. [ A Being so distinct , &c. ] 4. May not a Relation or Modus be present or absent sine subjecti interitu ? though it be not a distinct Thing ?

For your Quis tulerit ? I Reply : Pride makes men impatient . Did you think no more highly of your own Note , then some wise observers do , you would instead of your impatient Quis tulerit , have compassionated your self and me , and sit down by me , with a Nos Graculi . However , why should you be so impatient with one so farre below you ? Will you set your wit to the wit of a Graculu● ?

But I will make bold to try your Patience further . Will you hear the voice of the afore-said Learned and Judicious man Mr Wallis , who is now in the same Nest that you were bred in ? See his Truth Tried , chap. 8. pag . 44 , 45. [ A Habit therefore whether Infused or Acquired , being but a facilitation of the faculty , cannot be a Thing distinct from that faculty , but only a Modus of it , which hath not in it self a Positive Absolute Being of its own , but is a Modification of another Being : And its Physical Being , Existentia Rei , must be the same with the Being of that which is thus Modificated : For it is not ipsum existens , but Modus existendi : And this Manner of Existing , hath not an Existence of its own , distinct from the Existence of that which doth Exist in this Manner . Yet its Formal and Metaphysical Being is distinct . Yea and its Physical Existence , such as it is capable of , that is , Existentia modi ; for not being Res , but Modus Rei , we must not expect that it should have any Existence of its own , besides the Existence of a Modus : and this Existentia modi is the actual modificating of the Thing Existing after this Manner : The which Existence , though it be not Existentia Rei , yet is it a real Existence ( Existentia in re ) and not Mental : For the thing Existent is not only supposed to exist in this manner , but indeed doth so , thus ordered , thus modificated : And therefore that Modus doth actually and really modificate , and is not only supposed so to do . But if you will not admit with Scotus , &c. And thus it is true which his Lordship speaks , that Habitual Knowledge is Nothing but Light more or lesse Glorious . It is Reason cleared : It 's only Facultas facilitata , or Facultatis facilitas : And to this Faculty or Readiness to operate , I cannot allow a Physical Existence of its own , as neither to any Habit whatsoever , as being but Modi , and not Entia : It 's not a Being , but a Manner of Being : Not Ens , but Aliquid Entis . And I should easily be perswaded to grant the same concerning all accidents whatsoever , which have long since been called Entis entia : And however an Accident hath been accounted to be Res , and so to have existentiam Rei , yet not subsistentiam Rei . ] So far Mr Wallis .

§. 64.

Mr. K. SAy you [ Who ever called Habits or Dispositions the souls Instruments ? The Aptitude of a Cause to produce its effect , cannot be called its Instrument . ] I Answer and yield you , that ordinarily it is not so : In all Acquired Habits , there is meerly an Aptitude gotten : but by ●aith which is an infused Habit , there is an Ability gotten ; this being indeed a Habit , but a Habit equivalent to a new Faculty ; and so we hear of a new heart and new spirit , and without faith a man can no more receive Christ nor do ought towards it , then a dead man can walk or speak , and so it gives life to the soul in regard of all spiritual operations : and though life cannot be said to be an Instrument , yet I hope that which gives life may ; as doth faith , which is as the soul to the soul in all its holy and heavenly thoughts and desires : Life cannot be said to be an Instrument : for Life as Life is no cause at all , but an Union of those causes which are required to the making up of the Animatum .

§. 64.

R. B. 1. IF Habits were never so properiy to be called the souls instruments , yet this reacheth not the Question , whether they may properly be called ( Logicè loquendo ) instruments of Receiving when they are not instruments Effecting . I did therefore give them too much advantage in this arguing .

2. If you grant that acquired Habits are not to be called the souls instruments ▪ and yet maintain that infused are , you must give some good reason from the difference .

Your reason is that [ This is a Habit , but equivalent to a new faculty . ] To which I Reply , 1. What reason is this ? When I even now said , That [ the sanctified faculty it self cannot be the Instrument ] you never did gainsay it : therefore if faith were a faculty or Potentia , it were not therefore the instrument of Reception .

2. The term [ equivalent ] is so ambiguou● , that you may yet make your words true or false by an interpretation . 1. If you mean that infused Habits are of the same nature , and of the same species of quality , as the Potentia naturalis is , that should have been well proved , and not nakedly asserted . 2. If you mean that it performeth the same kinde of operations , and quoad usum is equivalent , though not of the same nature or kinde ; that also needs great p●oof , seeing it contradicteth common principles : The operation of things is such as the Being . 3. If you mean but that it is of equal necessity to the Act , that s nothing to the purpose ; for the necessity proves it not an instrument .

But I conceive the first of the three is your sense , or else I cannot make sense of it ; for the two later do no way tend to prove it an Instrument ; and your words do most plainly import that sense . But , if so 1. Sure you forgot your own words but a little before , where you were pleased so farre to School me , as to tell me that [ the faculty is of one species of quality , Potentia naturalis , faith which sanctifies of another , habitus . ] And you gravely told me , I was now and then out in my Logick , and demanded of me , Who reckons the Habit of faith for a sanctified Faculty ? 2. How can you say still that it is a Habit ? For if it be truly a Habit , it must be of the same species of quality , as Habit ; and admit the definition of a Habit , and therefore not admit the definition of Potentia or Facultas , nor be of that species : and I suppose you will not say it is of both , and be but one Quali●y : And I suppose also that you will not say , it is Potentia supernaturalis , and therefore may be of another species then Potentia naturalis , seeing it is not the way of efficiency , but the nature of the Effect or Thing produced , which diversifieth the species of Quality .

But because I have great reason to think , that you will honour the same thing from Dr Twisse , which you contemn from me , will you be pleased to hear him speak to you a few words : Contra Corvinum pag . 361. [ Sed quia deventum est ad genus disputationis Philosophicum , agendum secundum principia Philosophiae , sive naturalis , sive moralis , sive mixtae , cum doctoribus illis congrediamur . Itaque juxta Philosophiam quid aliud est voluntas , quam Potentia volendi ? rursus quid aliud est objectum quam bonum ? unicuique verò quod apparet ; non Sybillae folium recito , sed Aristotelis magni illius naturae mystae . Ergo non modo secundum Augustinum ▪ sed & secundum Aristotelem , naturae est hominum posse Velle quod ei appareat esse bonum , posse autem Velle quod vere bonum sit , ne Corvinus quidem hoc loco attribuit gratiae suae communi . Ego vero ultra feror , & ex Augustino disputo , etiam posse credere , posse Deum amar● , naturae esse hominum , juxta argumentationem superiorem : quod & hoc argumento contendo . Si potentia credendi , vel quidvis boni faciendi , nobis accederet ex gratia , tum potentia subjectum esset potentiae ; naturalis gratiosae , quod quidem hactenus prorsus est inauditum ; nempe ut potentia volendi subjectum esset potentiae volendi . Voluntas fate●r est subjectum habituum ; etiam omnis potentia rationalis , tam intellectus quam voluntas capax est habituum , sive naturalium , quibus magis idonea flat ad res naturales , tam intelligendas , quam agendas ; sive supernaturalium , quibus elevetur ad objecta supernaturalia ▪ At ut potentia aliqua capax sit potentiarum novarum , ne fando quidem hactenus accepi , priusquam mysteria sua mundo communicaruut Arminiani . ] Many more places to the same purpose might be cited out of Dr Twisse . Boethius de Trinit . saith , Forma simplex subjectum esse nequit : I leave you to gather the consequent . What if I adde a Novelist or two ( they shall not be unlearned ) that Mr K. may see that a Graculus is not so solitary as a Phaenix ?

Thom . White in his Institut . Sacr . l. 1. lect . 13. p. 90. saith , [ Sed & Habitum non esse aliud quam ipsum actum debilius manentem , omninò constat , ex eo quod impressio facta in subjectum ▪ absque aliquo contrario destruente , interire non potest : quia est modus ipsius subjecti ; & quod alio modo imbui requirit novam actionem . Perman●t itaque actus donec a contrario destruatur . In anima vero non est alia contrarietas quam contradictionis . Donec itaque retractetur , ex necessitate semper manet actus , & dicitur Habitus . Objicies , esse contra manifestam experientiam quod actus maneant , &c. Respondetur , manifestum esse post actum intellectus vel phantasiae , potentiam manere in actu illius objecti q●od cognovit . Experientia enim docet , eam posse iterum cognoscere quod vult ; quod ante primam cognitionem non potuit , &c. Manet itaque impressio ; id est actus substantia , quat●nus en● ▪ & non tantum motio est : Unde cum in anima non possit esse motus ▪ ibi adaequate manet impressio ; id est actus ▪ Quod autem non appareat manere , est quia anima in corpore non agit ex sese ; sed praecise quatenus movetur a corpore , seu per corpus ; & per consequens non facit sensum sui , nisi in effectu corporeo . Et hinc fit ut cum rursus agimus , sentiamus actum faciliorem , vel fortiorem , vel directum & modificatum ab anima , ratione prioris actus ; quod arguit impressionem manere : Sed modum ipsius impressionis , in sese , videre non possumas ; & ideo credimus ipsum actu non man●isse . ] And pag . 94. [ Ex quibus satis clarum est , non esse habitus supernaturales , suis primis actubus praerequ● 〈…〉 s ▪ neque esse per modum potentiarum , sed omnino sicut habitus naturales ; nisi quod circa alia objecta ●ersentur ; & discurrendum esse prorsus de iis , ad modum quo philosophamur de naturalibus , observatis specialibus differentiis . ]

Yea there are some that think ▪ Habits are in the body . Taurellus in Philosoph . Triumph ▪ pag . 52. saith , [ Vere tamen rem siquis intueatur , nil habitus aliud sunt , quam acquisita quaedam intelligendi , vel alicujus expetendi promptitudo , non animae , sed corpori adscribenda , cum per se anima nec impediatur , nec aptior fieri possit , ad exercendas actiones , sed quoniam corpore , ceu instrumento utitur ▪ fit ut ejus respectu , vel habiliores , vel ineptiores ad aliquid efficiendum simus . ] This he afterward thus correcteth , [ Non corpori solum , sed animae etiam , videntur esse ascribendi ( habitus ) Eundem intellectum & agentem esse dicimus & patientem : Per se quidem actionum causa est , nec pati , nec impediri dicitur ; sed respectu ejus cui conjungitur corpori patitur , atque impeditur quo minus probe possit intelligere . Hac habitus accidentis ratione , non menti , sed corporiprimo possunt attribui ; v●luti vice versa menti primo actiones , sed corpori secundario adscribuntur . Eadem voluntatis est ratio . ]

I cite not these , as owning them ; but to shew Mr. K. that as learned men as he , have not the same thoughts of Habits , and therefore he should not be too hastily confident : And I confess , as highly as I think of Mr. K's learning , I do not think he truly and clearly knows what a Habit of the soul is , nor wherein it is distinct from the soul , the faculties , and the act , and the intelligible species : no nor a wiser man then himself neither . Every man knows not so much as he boasteth of , or thinks he knoweth . ( And ●ow likely then he is to know so much of God as he here pretendeth to , we may easily judge . ) It was as wise a man as he that said [ Nam quomodo intellectu Deum caput homo , qui ipsum intellectum suum ▪ quo eum vult capere , nondum capit ? August . de Trinitat . li . 5. cap . 1. ]

3. I easily acknowledge that grace giveth such a power as is commonly called Moral , distinct from the natural faculties , as our corrupt estate contains an opposite impotency . But this i● but an applying of the terms [ Can ] and [ Cannot ] [ Power ] and [ Impotency ] to Dispositions and Undisposedness , to Habits and their Privations .

4. A new heart and spirit , I easily confess necessary . But those words do commonly signifie in Scripture , only new Inclinations , Dispositions , Qualifications . It is a new heart , though only the old faculties and substance . I hope you will not follow Illyricus .

5. Where you say that [ without faith a man can no more Receive Christ , nor do ought towards it , then a dead man can walk or speak . ] I Reply 1. That proves not faith to be equivalent to ● Potentia vel facultas , any otherwise then that it is of as absolute necessity , but not that it is of the same nature . If you shew an illiterate man a Greek or Hebrew book , he can no more reade in it then a dead man , that is , both are truly in sensu composito impossible : But yet it is but a habit that is wanting to one , and a power or faculty natural , to the other . And so it may truly be said that a sinner cannot do well that hath accustomed to do evil , no more then a Leopard can change his spots , or a Blackmoore his skin . Yet if you mean that such are equally distant from an actual change as a dead man , it is but a dead comparison . A dead man wants both natural faculties , and an inclination or moral power . An unbeliever wants but one .

2. That [ without faith , such can no more do ought towards the receiving of Christ , then a dead man can walk or speak ] is a dead doctrine , like the rest of Antinomianism , tending to licentiousness , and to subvert the precepts of the Gospel , and the salvation of men , and unfit for any man that shall use the Name of Christ , much more unfit for a Divine . The Ranting sect hath got the word too : and when they are reproved for wickedness , or perswaded to duty , they say , [ What can the creature do ? ] To go out of an Alehouse or Whorehouse , and to go to hear the Gospel preached , is somewhat towards receiving Christ : for faith comes by hearing ; and can no man do this without faith ? Cannot the Eunuch reade a Chapter and ask help of an Interpreter without faith ? Cannot men Fast and Pray , if not as Cornelius , yet as Ahab , without faith ? Is there not a common Grace of the Spirit , drawing men towards Christ that were farre from him , which goes before the special Grace ( at least sometimes ) whereby they are drawn to Christ ? This that you maintain is not the doctrine of Mr. Tho . Hooker , Mr. Joh . Rogers , Mr. Bolton , Perkins , or any of our experimental practical Divines ; no nor of any Protestants that I know ; I am sure not of the Synod of Dort ; but of the Libertines and Antinomists . To what end do you preach to any unbelievers ? Do you perswade to any means or duty towards the getting of faith ? or do you not ? If not , it s like you Preach as you Dispute ; and then I doubt whether you live at Blisland : If you do , sure that duty tends to faith , and may be performed before faith .

3. I think you do more boldly assert , then you can solidly prove that [ without faith a man can no more receive Christ , then a dead man walk ] if you mean it of the Habit of faith , as , no doubt , you do . If you should mean it of the Act , it were a merry arguing : q. d . [ We cannot Receive Christ without Receiving him : therefore Receiving him is a Power , and so an Instrument ] Actual faith , is actual moral Receiving Christ . But I suppose you mean it of the Habit , in conformity to your former Dispute ; And then you suppose that God cannot cause the Act of faith by his Spirit , before the Habit , and by the first act cause a habit ( as Camero taught , and his followers do still teach . ) I suppose if the question were put but de facto , Whether God do ordinarily thus cause faith ? it is past Mr. K's power to prove the Negative : Much more if the question be de potentia divina , whether God can do it .

4. Where you say [ It gives life to the soul in regard of all spiritual operations . ] I Reply , 1. How industriously doth Mr. Pemble prove that faith is not the Mother grace ? not properly the root of all other graces , nor the first degree of our sanctification and spiritual life , either in the Habit or the Act : Vindic . Grat . pag . 12 , 13 , 14. Yet Mr. K. that is so zealous in defending him , sticks not to gainsay it .

2. Knowledge and Love may be said to give life to the soul , if the exciting and assisting other graces , be giving life .

3. It is in effecting or receiving a relation ( Jus ad Christum , impunitatem , salutem ) that we are enquiring after faiths Instrumentality . And you do turn the business to [ giving Life to the soul in regard of spiritual operations ; ] whereby you seem to mean that faith is no otherwise an Instrument of receiving Christ , then as it is an Instrument of every other operation which it performeth ; and as every other habit of grace ( Love , Fear , &c. ) are instruments of their acts .

4. You play with the ambiguity of the term [ Life . ] You take it for the Union of Causes . You know how commonly it is used for the Forma Viventis .

5. And so faith is , as Pemble saith , part of the souls new life , that is , new spiritual Rectitude ; or as others , the whole semen vel principium . But this is only a formall , and not an efficient quickening , or giving life . And if you speak of faith exciting other graces : 1. That it doth by the Act , which you yet affirm not to be an Instrument . 2. So do all graces in their places help the rest .

Lastly , If you did prove that Habits are fitly called the souls instruments in producing the Acts , yet it is all nothing to our business . For we are enquiring how farre it is the Instrument of the effect , or of reception . And I still say , that where the Act is no efficient cause , there the Habit by causing the act , is no instrument of the effect . But in our Justification , the act of faith is no efficient cause ( Justification is the immediate effect of God by the Act of grace now , and by his Sentence hereafter . ) Therefore , &c. And for reception , I say it hath no instrument , but as the instrument of the effect , may be called its instrument ; except you will speak as a Mechanick , a Rhetorician , or Vulgariter , and not Logically . And when Mr. K. gives me cogent Reasons against this , I hope I shall regard them .

§. 65.

Mr. K. WHereas you adde lastly , [ The sharpness of the knife cannot be called the knives Instrument . ] I must without disparagement to your confest acumen in other things , tell you , that this is but a dull instance : for faith is not as the sharpness , but as the knife ; and faith admits sometime a greater sharpness , sometimes a less , which qualifies it in its acting better or worse , more or less . And 2. The sharpness of the knife , may be called an instrument in a larger sense , as first qualities in the elements . The fire is said to act by its heat : the water by its cold ; by the heat instrumentaliter , by its form principaliter . And thus 3. may the soul be said to act by its faith in receiving Christ , without which it were as impossible to receive benefit by Christ , as to return service to him .

§. 65.

R. B. 1. I Acknowledge the instance of little use to the main Question , because it pertains but to the Act of faith , and not the following passion or effect .

2. The sharpness of your Answer , serves but to cut your own fingers . That faith is as the knife , is feigned , and not proved . The knife is the substance , and the keenness is the accident or modus . Faith is not a substance , but a modus or accident of the soul .

3. In your large sense , you may say quid vis ferè de quovis , and so I told you J did not contradict you .

4. J am so censorious as to imagine that you speak more by rote , then on true knowledge in your Physicks , about site ; but that s no matter .

5. Who doubts but the soul may , in the sense you mention , be said [ to act by faith in receiving ? ] But once more distinguish of receiving : which is 1. The act of consenting to , or accepting of the offer of Christ and Life ; which is Receptio Ethica , metaphorically called Reception . 2. The true passive reception of Right to Christ and Life , which follows on the former . The first is but the Condition , and not the Cause of the late , and is in Morality to the later , as in Naturals the Dispositio materiae is to the Reception of the form : but the efficient Cause of the later Reception is Gods Will , signified by his Law ; and his Law signifying his Will , and Constituting the Duness . Now if you will say , that Faith in the Habit is the instrumental efficient Cause of the first Receiving Christ , that is no more then to say , the Habit is the instrumental Cause of the Act , viz. its own Assent and Consent : as Love may be said of its Act. And whether this Speech be proper or improper , J leave it to your self , J will not meddle with it . But for all Faith might be called the instrument of Believing ( supposing it may ) and that Believing is tropically called Receiving , yet I deny that it can therefore be properly called the Instrument of consequent , proper , Passive Reception of Right to Christ . ( The Passion is such as Relations in their Reception are capable of . ) Yet improperly , vulgarly , as an Instrument is not taken for an Efficient Cause , I did profess and still do , that I will contend with none that will call Faith the Instrument of Receiving ( or any Consent of the Will , call it Love , or what you will ▪ as well as Belief in Christ , may so be call'd an Instrument . ) But that Faith is no true Instrumental Cause of forgiving our sins , or Justifying us , I shall yet maintain till I see stronger Reasons then M. K. hath here produced ; and to that I am moved upon Reasons of great weight , which I have elswhere manifested .

Lastly , Mr. K. speaks too unlimitedly [ of the Impossibility of Receiving Benefit by Christ without Faith . ] I dare say , that many a thousand ( if not all men ) have received Benefit by Christ before faith . What say you by the Gospel ? What say you by Faith it self ? J hope it is not the Instrument of our Receiving it self ? Yea , and it is more then Mr. K. can prove , That God could not if he would , have given pardon it self to some without faith , upon Christs meer Satisfaction . But what need I talk of this , to a man that thinks we have so much of , or towards Remission , Justification , Acceptation before faith , as he before disp●ted for , i.e. to be tantamount Justified ? Though he takes them to be from Eternity , and so no fruits of Christs Death , yet he cannot deny , but as to us , we are as capable of Receiving such Benefits , without faith , from Christ , as without Christ .

§. 66.

Mr. K. ANd I acknowledge I have done very little by this Dispute ; only I had not the patience to see so w●rthly Divines so unworthily handled , as if they had need to be taught a Logick lesson by Mr. Baxter , who ( as I have heard to the disparagement of both Universities ) was scarce bred in either , but as much as I esteem his excellent parts , and I doubt not singular piety , yet may I be bold to say , somewhat more of the University would have done him no harm ▪ And I conclude all with this Item to my self , though Mr. Baxter need not take notice of it ,

— Netu Divinam Iliada tentes , Sed longe sequere , & Vestigia semper adora .

§. 66.

R. B. 1. I Think your first Conclusion ( that you have done little by this Dispute ) hath as cogent Evidence , as most that you have maintained in these six leaves . But it had been more wisdom to have foreseen your loss of time , and to have prevented it , rather then to confess it to your disgrace .

2. Where you say , you [ had not patience ] I say , If you cannot forbear , there 's no remedy : who can hold that which will away ? The tongue is an unruly member . Perhaps your case is as his Discollimin . p. 54.

3. I dare not excuse , much lesse justifie my tongue or Pen , from too sharp and unmannerly speeches of my betters : Even where I discern no fault , I do suspect some , as knowing so much evil in that heart which is the fountain : And I hope all those pious Brethren whom I shall injure by my rashness , will heartily forgive it ; which I earnestly request , and by Gods assistance , shall do the like by others . But yet I must needs say , that my Conscience doth not accuse me of [ handling unworthily ] Dr Twiss or Mr P. of any men . For as I have excessively honoured them , so do I very highly honour them still ; and their mistakes I had not mentioned , but 1. That I had been by them ensnared in some of them , and thought my self bound to warn others of the danger . 2. The name of such worthy men may do more in propagating an errour , then a thousand unlearned Antinomians can do , and therefore should their mistakes be more diligently disclosed . 3. It is pity Gods gifts and Saints should be a Defensative to errour , and a snare to the Church . 4. I am confident the souls of these two Saints of God , if they know these things below , will give Mr. K. no thanks for his Vindication , nor be offended with me for disclosing their mistakes , which they now do farre more detest then I. 5. It was no such Crime in the late Reverend As●embly to question one of them for these mistakes , or in Learned Bishop Downame to write a hundred times more then I against the other : And why then is it a Crime in me ? 6. Reverend Mr. Owen ▪ who approves your book , doth say farre more against Dr. Twiss then ever I did , in his late excellent , learned Diatrib . de Just . Vindicat . and yet I hear none accuse him for unworthy handling him : Yea he ingeniously confesseth his own former errour , and writes against it ; and why then may not a man for Truths sake be allowed to do by another , what he doth by himself ? Had I been my self the Authour of Dr. Twisses Works ( pardon the presumption of the supposition ) I should say ten times more against several things in them , then I ever yet did . 7. Mr. K. himself here confe●●eth the opinions that I mention of theirs to be erroneous : And is not that as unworthy handling them as mine ? 8. I intreat the impartial Reader to peruse my words themselves , and then let him judge as he seeth Cause . They are but these [ A great Question it is , Whether Remission and Justification be Immanent or Transient acts of God : The mistake of this one point was it that led those two most excellent famous Divines Dr. Twiss and Mr. Pemble to that errour and Pillar of Antinomianism , viz. Justification from Eternity . For saith D● . Twiss often , All Acts immanent in God are from Eternity : But Justification and Remission of sins are immanent Acts : Therefore . ] Is this such unworthy handling ? Mr. K. durst not once say that I falsly accused them ; or that it was not their errour . And could I give them a higher Elogy , then to call them [ most Excellent , Famous Divines . ] I am confident the greatest Archbishops or Cardinals , yea the Pope himself would think such Titles no way injurious to them . The Lord General will be content with lower Titles then [ most Excellent and Famous ] Do not such as Mr. K. go about to confirm the vile reproaches of the times , as if Ministers were the most intollerably proud men on earth , when this is taken for unworthy handling ! And when they that expect that their hearers should bear their sharpest and frequent reproofs , cannot bear such an honourable mention of their mistakes ?

4. Whether there be one true word in Mr. K's particular accusation [ as if they had need to be taught a Logick lesson of Mr. Baxter ] I am content my very enemies should Judge . Did I ever contend about any point of Logick with them ? It was not , what an immanent Act is ? But onely , Whether Justification be an Immanent Act , and so Eternal , that I enquired , and in which I opposed them ? I do therefore take it as my duty to Admonish my learned Brother of his great sin , who hath not once , twice , or thrice , but so oft in six leaves spoken such palpable untruths in matter of fact , and made so little Conscience of the ninth Commandment .

5. If in this Paragraph Mr. K. do discover the very end of his undertaking , not to be so much the Vindicating of any truth of God , but of Worthy Divines , and Academicall Honour ( of which I leave the Reader to Judge ) then may we hence conjecture at the Reason of severall Passages through the whole : for the Means may not be better then the End ; and no wonder if they be suited to it .

6. As for all that follows concerning my [ being scarce bred in either University , &c. ] I have nothing to say . Did Mr. K. ever hear me contend for the Reputation of being Learned ? He easily carries the Cause here , having no contradiction .

7. And where he saith , that [ somewhat more of the University would have done me no harm ] I do not believe him : For though I have been as sensible of my want of such happy opportunities , and my defects thereupon , as ever Mr. K. was , at least ; yet I believe that all things work together for Good to them that love God ; and that by that three-fold Cord ( on my Friends , Body , and scrupulous Conscience ) by which God restrained me from such advantages , and confined me to a more private course of studies , he did also restrain me from some evil that I might else have run upon , or prevent some that he saw would befall me : ( and indeed he hath satisfied me now of the particulars . )

8. What men or other creatures those were that Mr. K. did [ hear boast of me to the disparagement of both Universities ] J cannot conjecture . But this J will promise Mr. K. that how little soever J have received from the Universities , they shall have my frequent and earnest prayers to God , and my best endeavours with men , for their Prosperity . The Lord purge them from Pride , Sensuality , Manpleasing and Self-seeking , and cause them humbly to study Christ above all , and zealously to lay out themselves for his Glory , and with considerate , resolved Self-denial and Unreservedness , wholly to resign themselves to his service , and make it their main business to win souls to that true felicity which they have first tasted of themselves ; and then J should not so much fear any policy or power of their Enemies .

9. And for Mr. K's concluding Poetical injunction ; J heartily confess my utter unworthiness to be annumerated to the Ambassadours of the Lord Jusus , or ever to have been permitted to speak in his Name ; much more with any such success and encouragement as he hath vouchsafed me : And the Lord forbid that ever I should be so arrogant , as to equal my self with the Worthies of the Church , much lesse to envy the honour of their preheminence . Yet in regard of the Churches present necessities , I dare not give over , for all my imperfections . Though I have ever been of a spirit too easily discouraged , and have many a time been under Jonas's temptation , and ready to say as Jeremy , I will speak no more in his Name ; yet God hath so suited his providences to my infirmities and necessities , as not only to cure my backwardnesse and despondency , but also to convince me of the pleasantness of his work . I am assured that it was the Lord that sent me into his Vineyard , and without him none shall force me out . He that gave me fewer Talents then others , will expect but an answerable improvement at my hands : but be they never so small , I dare not hide them . He that calleth for two mites will accept them : He despiseth not the day of small things . He sometime revealeth that to babes which he hideth from the wise and prudent : For the wisdome of the world is foolishness with God , and the foolishness of God is wiser then men : and no flesh shall Glory in his sight . How many learned men have lost the main end of their Learning , and engaged God so farre against them , as to lay both them and their honour in the dust , because they would not devote it more faithfully to his service ! The Lord grant that I may so use the small abilities that I have , that I be not condemned as an unprofitable and unfaithfull servant ▪ and then I do not fear being condemned for their smalness . There are many learneder men then Mr. K. in hell ; and many more unlearned then I in heaven .

But should I deny my self to be Vile against the Accusations of Mr. K. when I daily confess my self Vile to God , I should but prove the hypocrisie of my prayers . And therefore Dispute for Reputation that will for me . When I am tempted to such a work by Accusers , or by my own heart , I desire God to save me from the Temptation . He that works principally for himself , must be his own Paymaster .

§. 67.

Mr. K. THe summe of all that hath been hitherto said in this Paragraph , is this , That to Justification there is required a transtent act of Gods , or the working of Faith in our heart ; which shews , That albeit Gods Decree to Justifie us have much in it that looks so well like Justification , that it may be called so without Blasphemy , yet that indeed Justification is in time , not from Eternity : And it appears further thus : That Justification being the Absolving us from our sins , and the Accepting us as righteous , albeit God the Father Decreed it , the Son Purchased it , a Grant of it were made , and under Seal ; yet till it be pleaded there is no Pardoning ; as appears by comparing Gods pardon with that of Princes , which is not of Value till Pleaded , and not pleaded till after the Jury hath found the Offendor Guilty : so this Justification which begins at our Believing in foro Conscientiae , a more private Sessions is again made more Publick in Heaven at our death , and this at Gods Bar before Angels and Saints deceased ; and yet more publick before all the world at the General Judgement . This pardon was Purchased , Resolved , or Issued out , Sealed , Received , Pleaded at first : but as new sins are committed we plead it again , and so may be said to be particularly Justified from particular sins , toties quoties , but alwayes by virtue of our General Pardon .

§. 67.

R. B. WE are now past the End , and yet new to begin . If in this Recollection he had not stumbled on a word or two , that come from the Core of his Errour , I should scarce have understood any of his minde about the Controversie in hand , save only Negatively , and that he is against Me . And yet it is not much that I can discern of it . Among all the Disserters of all Sects that ever I had to do with , that pretended to Learning , I have seldome met with the like slippery dealing , as in Mr. K. who pretending to make some notable discovery of the Truth , did so lose himself in the eager pursute of a contemptible Adversary , that he seems to have quite forgot his undertaking , and leave his errand behinde him . But to deal truly , it is my opinion , that though the man were drawn to engage himself , yet when he had emptied his bilious stomack , he found his work done , and therefore was willing to drop asleep when he should have performed his Promise . He doth over and over again promise us to open to us what is the Transient Justifying Act , yea , pag . 139. to speak Punctually to it ; and when all 's done , the business is so farre undone , that for my part , I cannot certainly tell yet whether he once name it , or what his opinion about it is . Pag . 141. He saith [ by Giving us saith , he Justifies us , as shall be shewed anon , he giving us that which is our Instrument , whereby we receive the Righteousness of Christ . ] That [ anon ] is not yet come ; for I finde no fuller discovery of his minde , but only ● little glance in this Recollection , wherewith he doth conclude . In those former words he seems to make the Immediate Justifying act to be the Giving of Faith ; and yet contradicts it in the next words ; for that Faith he makes to be Given , that it may be our Instrument of Receiving . Now

1. We are enquiring after Gods act , and not mans Instrument .

2. We are enquiring after the Immediate effecting Act , and not a Receiving , which is no effecting .

Let us see whether these words under consideration will any better discover his sense .

1. He saith [ that to Justification there is required a Transient Act of Gods ; or the working of faith in our heart ] This is all the transient Act I can learn he intends from first to last . But though before he said [ by Giving us faith , he Justifies us ] yet here he thought it safer to speak more ambiguously , and onely saith , that [ this is required to Justification . ] But there are many things required to it , besides that Act which doth immediately Effect it : Antecedents , Conditions , the Causes of those Conditions , are all Required to it ; when yet none of them is the justifying Act. But if indeed he do mean that Fidem dare , is Justificare , I will speak to that anon . Next he saith , that [ Gods Decree to justifie , looks well like Justification ] but that is not it . Next he saith , that [ Justification is the Absolving us from our sins , and Accepting us as Righteous ] that he may come to shew us what is not , and what is , the Absolving and Accepting Act. And first again he excludes Decreeing from being the Act enquired after : then he excludes Christs Purchase ; then he excludes the Grant made and sealed : then he saith [ Till it be pleaded there is no pardoning , as appears by comparing Gods pardon with that of Princes . ] Perhaps then he means that [ Pleading ] is Pardoning , or the justifying Act. No , not so neither : For he only saith , that till it be Pleaded , there is no Pardoning ] which plainly expresseth , That Pleading is but a prerequisite Condition , the want whereof suspendeth the act of Pardon , but is not the Pardoning act it self . In the Conclusion he gives us a little more light to see part of his meaning , where he saith [ so this Justification which begins at our Believing in foro Conscientiae , a more private Sessions , is again made more publick in Heaven at our death , and this at Gods Bar before Angels , &c. ] Here he tels us more then yet I could gather from him , in quo foro justificamur fide , that it is but in foro Conscientiae , a more private Sessions , so that we are left to search for the justifying Act ; which though he vouchsafe not expresly to mention , yet we may possibly conjecture at by this last passage . If the Reader would see the whole mystery which is thus darkly lapt up , as being somewhat afraid of the light , as far as I can gather , it is this .

Mr. K. being of the Antinomian faith , That Remission and Justification are Immanent Acts , and from Eternity ( and consequently not purchased by Christs bloud ) and that Justification by faith , which the Scripture speaks of , is only Justification in foro Conscientiae , or the apprehension of the former ; he thought , in these times , when Antinomianism hath an ill savour with the best , that it is the wisest way to appropriate the name of Remission and Justification by faith ( in this life ) to this Justification in foro Conscientiae , and to give to the Immanent Eternal Act , the description without the name . And therefore he thought it fittest to say , that [ Gods decreeing to Remit our sins , carries in it a Remission of them tantamount ; for who shall charge them on us , where God decrees to Remit them ? ] Pag . 138. That [ Gods Decree to passe the transient Act of justifying , carries in it as much as concerns Gods Remission of sins , and Acceptance of us as Righteous . ] But the change that is made in time by the transient Act , is in our Feeling or Knowledge , and therefore he saith , that when we say [ Now a man is justified in Gods sight ] it [ signifies only a testimony given by God , whereby he makes us know that we are justified before God , or in his sight ] and that [ in God it signifies , A making us to see : and we are said to be justified in his sight , when he makes it , as it were evident to our sight , that we are justified ] p. 138. ( Here before he was aware , he gives it the name of justification before we see it . ) Now being Resolved to appropriate the name of Remission and Iustification ( in this life ) to that which is in foro Conscientiae , he is hard put to it , to deliver his meaning of the transient justifying Act , without opening the shame of his opinion . And therefore sometimes he saith , It is the Giving of saith to be our Instrument : Sometime that this faith is necessary to it : but concludes , that it is in foro Conscientiae , a private Sessions , that we are justified before death : So that the Summe is this : That Iustification , and Remission , and Acceptation do consist in our Conscience's apprehension or feeling of that which God did from Eternity ( which must not be called Remission , but Tantamount Remission : ) and because Conscience cannot know or feel this , but by Believing , and because we cannot Believe till God give us the Grace of faith , therefore God justifies or pardons us by Giving us that Grace : that is , We by Believing or being Conscious of our Eternal Acceptance , do immediately justifie and forgive our selves ; but mediately God forgiveth and justifieth us by Ca●sing us to Believe , and Causing our Consciences to justifie us immediately .

I will not say , that I am certain I have hit of Mr. K's minde in this explication : for who can be certain in such a mist ? And therefore I leave every Reader that thinks I mistake it , to gather it b●tter , if he can .

What ever it is , I am sure he oft contradicts himself . He that here tels us it is in foro Conscientiae , and talkt before of evidencing it to our selves , doth say Pag . 139. l. ult . [ Where ever there is a Moral , i.e. a Legal change , there is a transient act , and this being in justification , a transient act is necessarily required to this change ] Now a meer Legal change is de jure , and not in the feeling of Conscience ▪ and it is in foro nullo actualiter , sed virtualiter in foro divino , it being actus illius Legis qu● est Norma Judi●ii : and therefore not in foro Conscientiae , vel aliqu● privato . And if it be confest to be a Moral , i.e. a Legal change , what man sees not that it must be a change per Legem ? i . e . novam , remedia●tem , or per actum moralem ? Nay , mark how in the very words of this Conclusion , he yields the Cause and doth not see it . He confesseth that we are pardoned as Offendors are by a Prince's pardon , which is not of Value till pleaded . Now let any man of understanding judge , whether the Princes Pardon Granted and Sealed , be not the immediate , efficient Cause of this Delinquents absolution or passive pardon , when he doth plead it : And whether it be not first a Jus impunitatis that is hereby Given him , which ( whatever is here said ) is of Value upon the Accepting , before the pleading , though the pleading is also necessary to stop judgement , or prevent Execution , and so to have the full benefit . And what though the Pardon Granted and Sealed be not Effectual till Accepted or Pleaded ? Doth it follow , that it is not the immediate Cause afterwards ? Let it not seem unmannerly if I speak my thoughts ; that all this proceeds from this Learned mans great mistake or inconsiderateness of the Nature of Laws and their Actions , and of the nature and use of Conditions , whose non-performance doth suspend the action of the Law or Grant , ( because the Will of the Legislator or Donor was , that it should so be ) but the performance doth not cause its action , much less immediatly cause the Effect ; unless there be something in it that may work as a procatarcktick efficient Cause , by way of Merit , or the like , over and above its meer Office of a Condition . If a man by his Testament leave his Son a thousand pound per annum on Condition that he do voluntaily Register his Thankful Acceptance of it : It is not the performance of this Condition that doth at all causally constitute the Jus ad rem legatam , or conferre Debitum , or Donare ▪ though the non-performance may suspend the Collation of Right : but it is the Testament that doth immediately constitute this Right , when the suspension is removed , which before it did not , because the Testator would not have it so . Grotius in Cass and . art . 4. p. 280. Promissi enim ea V● ut Conditionem implenti Jus conferat . Vid . de Jur ▪ Belli . l. 1. c . 1. § . 4. & l. 1. c . 11. § . 1 , &c. If then it were true , as M. K. here affirmeth , that it is at this private Session● in foro Conscientiae , that we are first justified on our Believing , then the immediate justifying Act ( which Mr. K. hath talked so oft of ) can be no other then either our own Apprehension , or belief that we are Pardoned and Righteous , or some such like Apprehension or Conclusion of our own hearts . For if it be in foro Conscientiae , it must be By Conscience as the Agent , that is , By the understandings Concluding us to be what we are ▪ But this both supposeth us to be Pardoned and Righteous before ( for the Being of a thing goeth before the true Knowledge that i● is in Being : None can be truly Conscious of a Righteousness or Pardon which he hath no● : ) and also it makes us to pardon and justifie our selves ; and the transient justifying Act of God , so long enquired after , should be only Gods cooperating with us in our Believing , or Causing us to Believe . Yea rather , the Act of justifying faith ( which is the Acceptance of an offered Christ and Life , 1 Joh . 5. 11 ▪ 12. ) goes before this Act now mentioned , and this is but Assurance or a Consciousness of the State that by Believing we are in . Let any man that is willing to know the truth , but examine every Text of Scripture that speak of Justification by faith , and he may easily see that they do not ( no not one of them ) speak of Justification in foro Cons●ienciae , or of any consciousness of our Righteousness , but of Justification before God .

And that Gods giving faith is not the immediate justifying act , appears 1. From the very name . [ To give faith ] is one thing , and [ to justifie ] i● another . 2. From the real difference . Faith is given by a Physical act immediatly : Righteousness , immediatly by a Legal or Moral act . Faith is a real Quality ( in the habit ) or Act : Righteousness is a Relation , and is immediatly by a meer Resultancy . Nay the very matter or meritorious cause of the Righteousness now in question , is not faith , but Christs satisfaction and merits . The terminus therefore of the justifying act ( J speak now of our constitutive ▪ Justification ) is Righteousness , a Relation : but the terminus of Gods act in giving Faith , is th● Faith so given . The Object also of the justifying act , and the Subject of Justification , is credens , a man already Believing : but the object of that act which giveth faith , is an Unbeliever . 3. Is not this flat Popery ? to make Justification to lye in a real change , and not a relative ? and so to make it the same with Vocation , Conversion , Regeneration , or Sanctification ? Whereas the holy Ghost saith , [ Whom he called them he justified , Rom. 8. 30. ] For to give faith is Vocation ( as those Divines say , that make faith to go before other graces in habit and act : ) or it is Vocation , Regeneration and Sanctification , as Mr. Pemble thinks , who supposeth all infused in uno semine . So that if Fidem dare , and Justificare be all one , then to Justifie and to Call or Sanctifie is all one .

I had once thought to have heaped up divers Arguments here in the conclusion on these two last points . 1. To prove that our first Justification by faith , which Scripture speaks of , is not in foro conscienciae . 2. To prove that [ to give faith ] is not the proper or immediate justifying act of God . But I shall forbear 1. Because Mr. K. gives me so little invitation to it , seeing he gives but a few dark hints of his own minde . 2. In that I finde upon review that almost all this paper is unavoidably taken up with a meer defence of my words against his injury , and he hath not given me occasion for many further profitable explications or disputes : and therefore I will reserve these for a fitter place . 3. Because I have larglier already Argued against both these in private answers to the Animadversions of learned Friends : and though those are not for publique view , yet I have a backwardness to the doing of one thing so oft . 4. Because this little that I have here said , seems enough , and proportionable to his brevity which doth occasion it .

This one thing seems necessary , in the Conclusion , that I adde a few Reasons to prove that it is in Law-sense that we are first justified by faith , and so that the Moral Act of the Law is the immediate justifying act ( and consequently the enacting of that Law of grace , or granting that Deed of gift , is the next foregoing efficient act . ) There are Reasons enough in my Aphorismes , but Mr. K. thought it easiest to take no notice of them .

Arg. 1. A termino .

The thing that is given by Remission is Jus ad Impunitat●m : But it is only by Laws , Contracts , Deeds of gift , or the like Moral acts , that Right is immediatly conveyed : Therefore it is by these immediatly that we are forgiven : ( and so justified Constitutivè . )

I suppose it will not be denied that Remission is a Giving ? Qui condonat , Donat . So Lawyers generally say of Remitting a wrong , and it will hold in case of crimes , especially in our case , against God . Fragosus de Regimine Reipub . Christ . part . 7. li. 6. Disp . 17. n . 95. p. 844. saith , Remittere injuriam est Donare , & Donare est jactare suum .

Arg. 2. A malo remoto , contrario , & Termino a quo .

The Dissolution of a Legal obligation , must be by a Moral act of the Rector , of the same kinde with the obliging act . But Remission of sin is a Dissolution of such an Obligation . Therefore , &c.

The major is proved by that common maxime , Eodem modo dissolvitur obligatio , quo contrahitur . The minor is proved by the true definition of Pardon : Which is in criminals , The Act of a Rector dissolving an Obligation to punishment . Remissio est proximè Reatus Remissio ; remotius Penae : Reatus est Obligatio ad P●nam .

Arg. 3. Ab officio Legis .

If it be the use of the Law to be Norma Judicii , then he that is justified per sententiam Judicis , must be first justified in Law : But the Antecedent is true : Therefore , &c.

When I say [ Justified in Law ] I do not mean [ by the Law ] strictly taken as most do , for one only Species of Law : But I mean [ by Law ] in general , as it is truly defined to be Constitutiva Determinatio Rectoris de Debito . Vel signum Voluntatis Rectoris Debitum Constituens . For many Lawyers do call only written and standing Laws , by the name of Laws , and do exclude verball precepts of a Rector : In this limited sense , as it is taken for [ Law by an Excellency ] I do not now use it .

Arg. 4. A natura Sententiae .

Declarative sentential Justification or Pardon , presupposeth Justification Constitutive . Therefore Justification Constitutive goes before sentential Justification .

Here I suppose 1. That Constitutive is per Legem , and not per Sententiam , which is past dispute . 2. That it is by faith ( as the condition ) that we are justified Constitutivè , it being only Believers that are Morally qualified to be fit subjects for this Justification , and whom alone the new Law pronounceth Righteous , and to whom alone it effectually giveth Christ and Life . The Antecedent is plain , in that the Judge must sentence a man to be as he is , and according to his Cause . A man must be just , before he justly be pronounced ▪ Just . He that condemneth the Righteous , and he that justifieth the wicked , they both are abomination to the Lord , Prov. 17. 15. He that saith to the wicked , Thou art Righteous , him shall Nations curse , people shall abhorre him ▪ Prov. 24. 24. So that whether the sentence be in conscience or Heaven , it must presuppose Justification Constitutive .

Arg. 5. A natura fidei Justificantis .

If the nature of that act of faith which justifieth , be only such as may be the condition of the Laws constitutive Justification , and not such as may be the Instrument of sentencing us Just , then Justification by faith ( which Scripture mentioneth so oft ) is Justification in Law sense , and not Sentential : But the Antecedent is true ; as is proved from the Act , which I have elsewhere proved to be [ the Accepting of an offered Christ and Life ] ( including Assent ) and not the Antinomian , special Belief that we are pardoned , or a perswasion of Gods special Love to us , or a consciousness of our Righteousness , or Assurance of it , which are said to justifie sententially in foro Conscientiae .

Arg. 6. A communi consensu , & usu loquendi .

It is the common judgement of men to think , and common custom to say , that [ A King pardoneth by his written , or verbal Pardon , as his Instrument ] and to distinguish [ Justificationem Legis ] a Justificatione Judicis , the former being presupposed : therefore we must do so here , unless any special reason can be brought against it : For Gods Law hath the common nature of a Law , and his Judgement the common nature of judgement .

To prove the Antecedent I need but to appeal to the common use of men acquainted with Legal and Judicial affairs . Yea even Mr. K. himself cannot forbear acknowledging it : Yea besides the forementioned acknowledgements , he is strangely guided to conclude with it , as the very last word of his Digression , against me [ We may be said to be particularly justified from particular sins toties quoties , but alwaies by vertue of our general pardon . ] This general pardon is that which God issued out and sealed as he saith , which becoming effectual when received ▪ and pleaded , doth by its virtue justifie us from particular sins : that is , by its moral or civil action .

Arg. 7. When the Scripture so oft denieth Justification by the Law , it plainly implieth that there is such a thing in rerum natura , as Justification by a Law , and that it is no improper unfit speech : For else God would not use it , Gal. 5. 4. & 3. 11. Yea it opposeth Justification by grace in Christ , to Justification by the Law , Act. 13. 39. By him all that believe are justified from all things from which they could not be justified by the Law of Moses : Where note the opposition that [ by Christ and Grace ] is opposed to [ by works ] and so [ by the Law of Christ and Grace ] is opposed to [ by the Law of Moses and Works . ] That therefore is affirmed of the Law of Grace , which is denied of the Law of Works : viz. to justifie . And the reason why the Law of Works could not justifie , was for that it was weak through the flesh , and not that it was an action or effect disagreeable to the nature of a Law .

Many other actions of Law to the same purpose , I recited out of several Scriptures , in my Aphorismes , pag . 178 , 179. which I will not trouble the Reader to repeat .

§. 68.

ANd thus I have done that ungratefull work which Mr. K. was pleased by Digressing to put me upon : which I confess appears not lovely to me on the review . For I finde though I have easily born the charges of this Learned man , yet it is no very usefull work to the Reader that he hath here called me to ; and I thought it not fit to go beyond my call . In the first part I have little to do , but to obtrude his confidence , and to shew that he meerly feigned me his adversary , forgetting that of Seneca , Victoriae sine adversario brevis est laus : In the rest I have not much to do , but to open the vanity and fallacy of many words , and to shew what a windy Triumph it is which followeth such a windy Opposition , and what his Reader oweth him , who doth importare verba & sonum pro mercibus : And what can the Reader gain also by such a discovery . I finde also , that though I resolved to forbear all harsh language when I begun , that I have not satisfied my self in the performance . For when I came to his most injurious words , I could not tell how to answer them but by shewing plainly what they are , and calling a Spade , a Spade ; which cannot be done in smooth and pleasing words ; and I finde that I have used more Ironies then I dare approve of . My resolution therefore is , to stifle this work till I have a call to publish it , and then to commit it to some moderate hand , to correct all that shall seem too unmannerly . For though I think I have spoken nothing but what Mr. K. ought to hear , yet I doubt whether it be not more then was fit for me to speak . It is my purpose therefore to deal with him no more , lest I be drawn again to the same inconvenience . For I finde I cannot Reply to such a man in such termes as I do to the Moderate and Candide . Till his breath be sweeter or sounder I think it safest to stand further from him . When he disgorgeth his stomack on me , I have not the skill of shaking it off so mannerly , and cleansing my self without his disgrace , as I could wish I had . And if a man stirre them not very tenderly , Plus faetent stercora mota . I finde also that it is a very hard thing against the guilty to speak both truly and pleasingly : For nemini blanditur Veritas : and I have a natural inclination to speak nakedly and plainly ; which being seconded with some degree of opinion , that qui loquitur planè , loquitur sanè , may quickly occasion me to step too farre . But the principal cause is , that I am truly aweary of the Warres of Divines : Many an opportunity and importunity have I put by , as finding here also , that Impendia belli sunt praemiis majora : and especially in this civil uncivil Warre of Brethren , the gainer usually loseth : unless men could be brought to deal more with the Matter , and less with Words and Men . Contentions are both the Daughter and the Mother of Pride . They are ( as soot ) the fuel of that flame that caused them . If the contender be overcome , he glorieth not as a Christian in the Victory of Truth , but repineth as a man at his own overthrow ; and pro plumeis noxis ●lumbas iras gerit : If he seem to conquer supercilia erigit , and it doth puff him up , and so increase his vice , and hasten his ruine : for

Vindicat elatos justa ruina gradus .

However it sets men usually on two eager a studying for their own Reputation ; which is the way that god resolveth shall ruine it : For he that will be great must be the servant of all , and he that will be wise must become a fool , and he that will save his honour must lose it : qui propagat nomen , perdit ●omen . My soul tasteth an admirable sweetness in Peace : The Churches Peace , the Concord of Brethren is my daily study , prayer and endeavour ; which O that I were able any right way to promote ! What I do that way , I do with pleasure : my greatest zeal doth carry me to it . But what I do in way of Controversie , yea even when necessitated , so that I dare not forbear , least I should betray or wrong the Truth , yet is it grievous and ungratefull to me : I have little pleasure in it . I am resolved therefore to draw back from this work , as much as I finde consistent with my Fidelity to the Truth of Christ ; and to do nothing in it till I am satisfied of a Call that must not be resisted . And when I follow God , I may safely commit to him my Way and Labours : for I have found that he draweth forth nothing , which he knows not how to use for good . And the more any Brother is perswaded that I transgress my bounds in writing too sharply , I intreat him the more to pray for the pardon of my fault , and the more watchfully to shun the like himself ; and to joyn with me , and all the Churches friends , in daily and importunate requests to God , that he would guide our feet into the way of Truth and Peace ; even of that Truth , which lying between extreams , is the only way to stedfast Peace ; and of that Peace , which is the Means and End of Truth . Amen .

Kederminster , August 1o 1653o .

POSTSCRIPT .

Christian Reader , I Have been willing to hope that my work of this kinde , and with this kinde of men , was almost at an end , and that God would in mercy grant me some little vacancy for more profitable labors ( of practicall Theology ) which I have long affected , and earnestly desired an opportunity to perform : But the uncessant assaults of contentious men do make me begin to lay aside such hopes ; The enemy of truth is too subtle for me ; It 's like he doth conjecture at the shortness of my time , and therefore contriveth to force me upon other works till my glasse is run . I have long foreseen his plot , and yet I am not able to disappoint him : To quiet the spirits of the contentious is beyond my power ; To bear in silence their Reproaches of my self , and to spend but little time or none in vindicating of any Interest of mine own , this I have purposed and promised to my Brethren . But when I see apparently that it is an interest higher then mine that is assaulted , and that Gods Truth and the souls of men do command my endeavours for their defence , I have no power to forbear . Since the Printing of this Book , there is come to my hands a second Volume of Mr G. Kendals against Mr John Goodwin on the point of perseverance ; wherein he hath assaulted my Directions for Peace of Conscience in a large Preface ; and my Book of Rest , in a Digression : Had he fallen on my Aphorismes again , I think I should have silently yeelded them up as a sacrifice to his scorn ; But those other Practicall Writings , I suppose it my duty justly to defend . 1. Because I know it is the Serpents malicious design to make my Labours unprofitable to the Church . And seeing God in great mercy hath satisfied me by experience , that how weak soever , they have been hitherto successfull , I take it for no proud over valuing them , but for a judgement upon experience , to conclude that it will be some wrong to the Church of God and souls of men if I silently give way to this serpentine design . 2. I have heard such Jealousies and terrible accusations spread abroad by this sort of Divines against my Writings , and especially my Directions for Peace , as caused me much to admire what the cause of the offence should be . Never could I hear but one particular accusation of it , which is the shamelesse falshood , that I was against the doctrine of the Saints Perseverance ; to which I annexed an Apology to the second Edition . But I found it was further buz'd into the heads of the people , that there were many other dangerous errors in it ; But all was in generals , and I could never learn any of the particulars till now : Nay the people that were deterred from reading it , knew none of the particulars themselves , but took on trust from jealous fame that such there were . And I learned , that there is among some Brethren of this strain , a Combination , by raising such reports to deterre the people from the reading of my writings . I confess , upon all this I was not much sorry for the event , that Mr K. had in this book brought forth his accusations , that at last I might know my errors that I could never hear of before , & that was at last put into a capacity of making my defence ; when if it had not been for this man I might have still been judged erroneous , & neither I nor those that believed and reported it , could with all our diligence have learned wherein ; I understand that the same spirit doth sometime carry this learned man into the Pulpit , and there instigate him to the like emploiment , wherewith he once tickled or netled the ears of the Auditory at Aldermanbury . Truly I never thought my name , or description , worthy to be brought into a Pulpit , though in a way of opposition . I thought none had thus over-honoured me but Mr Tombs , nor durst I think my name capable of being the matter of so honorable a triumph to Mr K. as by the diligence he useth for a victory he seemeth to expect . But seeing he hath so much advantage of the ground ( and somtime the winde , though not the Sun ) when he manfully preacheth against me at a hundred miles distance ; I must give him the better there , and take him when he comes within my reach . And though I shall be as be as brief as I can , yet so much I intend , if God vouchsafe me time and ability , as shall shew you reason to pity this Learned man , that ever his corruptions should lay him open to the prevalency of those temptations which have ingaged him in so unhappy a design as to serve the enemy of truth in employing his excellent parts in false accusing and unjust defaming his brother that would fain live in peace , endeavouring to deprive mens souls of the benefit of his labors , and that in his mercenary serving the lusts of another , for a little vain-glory of applause he should so wound his Reputation with the sober and godly , and make such work for an accusing conscience , as he hath once and again done ; yea , that he should still so much neglect the 9th Command . as to become Mr Eyres second , and Mr Crandons third . And for those Reverend Brethren , who have ( from several parts ) solicited me to forbear further Controversal debates , lest I be deprived of opportunity for more profitable works ( whereto they importune me ) I profess to them that I take it for the greatest affliction of my life , that I am necessitated to this defensive controversal way of writing , & most gladly would I be at peace , if men would give me leave ; and if they will but convince me , that I may lawfully be silent where the Truth of God , the success of all my former labors , and the good of men is so nearly concerned , I shall resolve on silence ; ( For my own interest I hope I can subject it to Christs ; ) But till then I must crave their pardon , yea , and their compassion of me , who am to my great trouble detained from a more pleasing kinde of work .

May 23. 1654.

REader , To prevent the mistake of my sense , I desire thee to correct these faults before thou readest ; many smaller there are which may be easily discerned .

Errata in the Epistle to C. G. Whaly .

PAge 4. line 23. reade To which end . l. penult . r . yourself . p. 5. l. 19. for their r . your p. 6. l. 7. for undeservedly r . unreservedly .

Against Blake .

Pag . 1. l. 32. for 1. r . i . e . l. 5. for Cor . r . Sen. p. 6. l. 45. for our faith r . one faith . p. 7. l. 30. for former r . formall . p. 25. l. 33. for recipiatur r . recipitur . l. 38. r . so receiveth . p. 38. l. 22. r . non contingat . p. 46. l. 11. for sn . r . so . p. 62. l. 15. for man r . an unregenerate man . p. 85. l. 5. for Justification r . Imposition or Institution . p. 89. l. 15. r , expect order . p. 91. l. 33. r . inceptive . p. 92. l. 14. for dura r . pura . and for subconditions r . subconditione . p. 97. l. 22. r . though it was . p. 99. l. 25. r . The Apostle speaking . p. 100. l. 32. for particular r . peculiar . p. 104. l. 22. r . but so come . p. 117. r . your self . p. 118. l. 36. r . to many . p. 120. l. 41. blot out to . p. 133. l. 30. for distinguish r . diminish . p. 134. l. 41. blot out that . p. 136. l. 5. for 4. r . quatuor . l. 6. for this r . his . p. 138. l. 2. for seal r . state . p. 145. l. 11. r . by Moses Gen. 2.

Against Mr K.

Pag . 4. l. 25. r . spiritui . p. 5. l. 31. r . ●emini . p. 29. l. antepenult . r . be so called . p. 28. l. 30. for vivos r . veros . p 31. l. 42. for the r . them . p. 51. l. 34. for now r . enough . p. 97. l. 45. r . on beleeving . p. 109. l. 17. for gracefull r . gratefull . p. 110. l. 31. r . in diem . p. 111. l. 9. r . whither . p. 121. l. 25. r . efficientes . p. 123. l. 6. for only r . wholly . l. 24. r . he that proves . p. 143. l. 37. for obtrude r obtunde .

In the Epistle before that against L. Colvin .

Pag . 3. l. 24. for fear . r . bear . ibid Praef . Apol . p. 3. l. 18. for meer r . neer . p. 4. l. 13. r . reversus . In the Contents p. 3. l. 6. for Decree r . Degree .

Against L. C.

P. 194. l. 3. r . before both p. 224 l. 2. r . work ? and Dispositio . p. 229. l. 28. r . neerly . p. 237. l. 21. for after you r . ofter than . p. 250. l. 14. for because r . besides . p. 255. l. 38. for sins r . sons . p. 257. l. 35. for formerly r . formally . p. 282. l. 23. for Cavell r . Ravell . p. 294. l. 23. for Relative r . declarative . p. 301. l 16. r . intantum . p. 309. l. antepen . for Now r . Note . p. 310. l. ult . for sive de merito r . sine demerito . p. 324. l. 24. r . an instrument . p. 326. l. ult . r . salvo .

Against Crandon .

Pag . 12. l. 36. for parties r . partes . p. 15. l. 28. for endlesse r . ended . p. 28. l. 2. for Now r . Nor . p. 35. l. 6. for wherein r . without . p. 37. l. 14 for solid r . sol'd . p. 55. l. 8. for that r . the . l. 14. r . obtrude .

WHatsoever hath escaped me in these Writings that is against Meeknesse , Peace , and Brotherly Love , let it be all unsaid , and hereby revoked , and I desire the pardon of it from God and Man .

RICHARD BAXTER .

FINIS .