J. D. EIther I am free to write this discourse for Liberty against Necessity , or I am not free . If I have obteined the cause , and ought not to suffer for the truth . If I be not free , yet I ought not to be blamed , since I do it not out of any voluntary election , but out of an inevitable necessity .

T. H. ANd first I assure your Lordship , I find in it no new Argument , neither from Scripture nor from reason , that I have not often heard before , which is as much as to say , that I am not surprised .

J. D. THough I be so unhappy , that I can present no novelty to T. H. yet I have this comfort , that if he be not surprised , then in reason I may expect a more mature answer from him , and where he failes , I may ascribe it to the weakness of his cause , not to want of preparation . But in this case I like Epictetus his Counsell well , that the Sheep should not brag how much they have eaten , or what an excellent pasture they do go in , but shew it in their Lamb and Wool. Apposite answers and down right Arguments advantage a cause . To tell what we have heard or seen is to no purpose , when a respondent leaves many things untouched , as if they were too hot for his Fingers , and declines the weight of other things , and alters the true state of the question , it is a shrewd sign either that he hath not weighed all things maturely , or else that he maintains a desperate cause .

T. H. THe Praeface is an handsome one , but it appears even in that , that he hath mistaken the question ; for whereas he saies thus , If I be free to write this discourse , I have obteined the cause , I deny that to be true , for 't is not enough to his freedom of writing , that he had not written it , unless he would himself ; if he will obtein the cause , he must prove that before he writ it , it was not necessary he should write it afterward . It may be he thinks it all one to say I was free to write it , and it was not necessary I should write it . But I think otherwise ; for he is free to do a thing , that may do it if he have the will to do it , and may forbear if he have the will to forbear , And yet if there be a necessity that he shall have the will to do it , the action is necessarily to follow . And if there be a necessity , that he shall have the will to forbear , the forbearing also will be necessary . The question therefore is not , whether a man be a free agent , that is to say , whether he can write or forbear , speak or be silent , according to his will , but whether the will to write , and the will to forbear , come upon him according to his will , or according to any thing else in his own power . I acknowledge this liberty , that I can do if I will , but to say I can will if I will , I take it to be an absurd speech . Wherefore I cannot grant him the cause upon this Preface .

J. D. TAcitus speaks of a close kind of adversaries , which evermore begin with a mans praise . The Crisis or the Catastrophe of their discourse is when they come to their , but , As he is a good natured man , but he hath a naughty quality ; or he is a wise man , but he hath committed one of the greatest follies , So here the Praeface is an handsome one , but it appears even in this , that he hath mistaken the question . This is to give an Inch , that one may take away an Ell without suspicion , to praise the handsomness of the Porch , that he may gain credit to the vilifying of the House . Whether of us hath mistaken the question , I refer to the judicious Reader . Thus much I will maintain , that , that is no true necessity , which he calls necessity , nor that liberty which he calls liberty , nor that the question which he makes the question .

First for liberty , that which he calls liberty is no true liberty .

For the clearing whereof it behooveth us to know the difference between these three , Necessity . Spontaneity , and Liberty .

Necessity and Spontaneity may sometimes meet together , so may spontaneity and liberty , but reall necessity and true liberty can never meet together , somethings are necessary and not voluntary or spontaneous , somethings are both necessary and voluntary , somethings are voluntary and not free , somethings are both voluntary & free ; But those things which are truly necessary can never be free , and those things which are truly free can never be necessary . Necessity consists in an Antecedent determination to one , Spontaneity consists in a conformity of the Appetite , either intellectual or sensitive to the object ; True liberty consists in the elective power of the rational will ; That which is determined without my concurrence , may nevertheless agree well enough with my fancy or desires , and obtein my subsequent consent ; But that which is determined without my concurrence or consent , cannot be the object of mine election . I may like that which is inevitably imposed upon me by another , but if it be inevitably imposed upon me by extrinsecall causes , it is both folly for me to deliberate , and impossible for me to choose , whether I shall undergo it or not . Reason is the root , the fountain , the originall of true liberty , which judgeth and representeth to the will , whether this or that be convenient , whether this or that be more convenient . Judge then what a pretty kind of liberty it is which is maintained by T. H. such a liberty as is in little Children before they have the use of reason , before they can consult or deliberate of any thing . Is not this a Childish liberty ? and such a liberty as is in brute Beasts , as Bees and Spiders , which do not learn their faculties as we do our trades , by experience and consideration ; This is a brutish liberty , such a liberty as a Bird hath to flie , when her wings are clipped , or to use his own comparison , such a liberty as a lame man who hath lost the use of his lims hath to walk ; Is not this a ridiculous liberty ? Lastly ( which is worse then all these ) such a liberty as a River hath to descend down the Channell ; what will he ascribe liberty to inanimate Creatures also , which have neither reason , nor spontaneity , nor so much as sensitive appetite ? Such is T. H. his liberty .

His necessity is just such another , a necessity upon supposition , arising from the concourse of all the causes , including the last dictate of the understanding in reasonable creatures . The adaequate cause and the effect are together in time , and when all the concurrent causes are determined , the effect is determined also , and is become so necessary , that it is actually in being ; But there is a great difference between determining , and being determined ; if all the collaterall causes concurring to the production of an effect , were antecedently determined , what they must of necessity produce , and when they must produce it , then there is no doubt but the effect is necessary . But if these causes did operate freely , or contingently , if they might have suspended or denied their concurrence , or have concurred after another manner , then the effect was not truly and Antecedently necessary , but either free or contingent . This will be yet clearer by considering his own instance of casting Ambs-Ace , though it partake more of contingency then of freedom . Supposing the positure of the parties hand who did throw the Dice , supposing the figure of the Table and of the Dice themselves , supposing the measure of force applied , and supposing all other things which did concur to the production of that cast , to be the very same they were , there is no doubt but in this case the cast is necessary . But still this is but a necessity of supposition ; for if all these concurrent causes or some of them were contingent or free , then the cast was not absolutely necessary . To begin with the Caster , He might have denied his concurrence and not have cast at all ; He might have suspended his concurrence , and not have cast so soon ; He might have doubled or diminished his force in casting , if it had pleased him ; He might have thrown the dice into the other table . In all these cases what becomes of his ambs-ace ? The like uncertainties offer themselves for the maker of the tables , and for the maker of the dice , and for the keeper of the tables , and for the kind of wood , and I know not how many other circumstances . In such a mass of contingencies , it is impossible that the effect should be antecedently necessary . T. H. appeales to every mans experience . I am contented . Let every one reflect upon himself , and he shall find no convincing , much less constreining reason , to necessitate him to any one of these particular acts more than another , but onely his own will or arbitrary determination . So T. H. his necessity is no absolute , no antecedent , extrinsecall necessity , but meerly a necessity upon supposition .

Thirdly , that which T. H. makes the question , is not the question . The question is not , saith he , Whether a man may write if he will , and forbear if he will , but whether the will to write or the will to forbear come upon him according to his will , or according to any thing els in his own power . Here is a distinction without a difference . If his will do not come upon him according to his will , then he is not a free , nor yet so much as a voluntary agent , which is T. H. his liberty . Certainly all the freedom of the agent is from the freedom of the will . If the will have no power over it self , the agent is no more free than a staff in a mans hand . Secondly , he makes but an empty shew of a power in the will , either to write or not to write . If it be precisely and inevitably determined in all occurrences whatsoever , what a man shall will , and what he shall not will , what he shall write , and what he shall not write , to what purpose is this power ? God and Nature never made any thing in vain , but vain and frustraneous is that power which never was and never shall be deduced into Act. Either the agent is determined before he acteth , what he shall will , and what he shall not will , what he shall act , and what he shall not act , and then he is no more free to act than he is to will . Or els he is not determined , and then there is no necessity . No effect can exceed the vertue of its cause ; if the action be free to write or to forbear , the power or faculty to will , or nill , must of necessity be more free . Quod efficit tale illud magis est tale . If the will be determined , the writing or not writing is likewise determined , and then he should not say , he may write or he may forbear , but he must write , or he must forbear . Thirdly , this answer contradicts the sense of all the world , that the will of man is determined without his will , or without any thing in his power ; Why do we ask men whether they will do such a thing or not ? Why do we represent reasons to them ? Why do we pray them ? Why do we intreat them ? Why do we blame them if their will come not upon them according to their will . Wilt thou be made clean ? said our Saviour to the Paralitike person , John 5.6 . to what purpose if his will was extrinsecally determined ? Christ complains , We have piped unto you , and ye have not danced , Matth. 11.17 . How could they help it , if their wills were determined without their wills to forbear ? And Matth. 23.37 . I would have gathered your children together as the Hen gathereth her Chickens under her wings , but ye would not . How easily might they answer according to T. H. his doctrine , Alas blame not us , Our wills are not in our own power or disposition , if they were , we would thankfully embrace so great a favour . Most truly said St. Austin , De lib. Au. l. 3. c. 30. Our will should not be a will at all , if it were not in our power . This is the belief of all mankind , which we have not learned from our Tutors , but is imprinted in our hearts by nature ; We need not turn over any obscure books to find out this truth . The Poets chant it in the Theaters , the Shepheards in the mountains , The Pastors teach it in their Churches , the Doctors in the Universities . The common people in the marketts , and all mankind in the whole world do assent unto it , except an handfull of men , who have poisoned their intellectualls with paradoxicall principles . Fourthly , this necessity which T. H. hath devised , which is grounded upon the necessitation of a mans will without his will , is the worst of all others , and is so far from lessening those difficulties and absurdities which flow from the fatall destiny of the Stoicks , that it increaseth them , and rendreth them unanswerable . No man blameth fire for burning whole Cities , No man taxeth poison for destroying men , but those persons who apply them to such wicked ends . If the will of man be not in his own disposition , he is no more a free agent than the fire or the poison . Three things are required to make an act or omission culpable ; First , that it be in our power to perform it , or forbear it , Secondly , that we be obliged to perform it , or forbear it respectively . Thirdly , that we omit that which we ought to have done , or do that which we ought to have omitted . No man sins in doing those things which he could not shun , or forbearing those things which never were in his power . T. H. may say , that besides the power , men have also an appetite to evill objects , which renders them culpable . It is true , but if this appetite be determined by anothers , not by themselves , Or if they have not the use of reason to curb or restrain their appetites , they sin no more than a stone descending downeward , according to its naturall appetite , or the brute beasts who commit voluntary errours in following their sensitive appetites , yet sin not .

The question then is not whether a man be necessitated to will or nill , yet free to act or forebear . But having the ambiguous acceptions of the word , free , the question is plainly this , whether all agents , and all events natural , civill , moral ( for we speak not now of the conversion of a sinner , that concerns not this question , ) be predetermined extrinsecally and inevitably without their own concurrence in the determination ; so as all actions and events which either are or shall be , cannot but be , nor can be otherwise , after any other manner , or in any other place , time , number , measure , order , nor to any other end , than they are . And all this in respect of the supreme cause , or a concourse of extrinsecall causes determining them to one .

So my preface remaines yet unanswered . Either I was extrinsecally and inevitably predetermined to write this discourse , without any concurrence of mine in the determination , and without any power in me to change or oppose it , or I was not so predetermined ; If I was , then I ought not to be blamed , for no man is justly blamed for doing that which never was in his power to shun . If I was not so predetermined , then mine actions and my will to act , are neither compelled nor necessitated by any extrinsecall causes , but I elect and choose , either to write or to forbear , according to mine own will , and by mine own power . And when I have resolved , and elected , it is but a necessity of supposition , which may and doth consist with true liberty , not a real anteeedent necessity . The two hornes of this Dilemma are so strait , that no mean can be given , nor room to pass between them . And the two consequences are so evident , that in stead of answering , he is forced to decline them .

J. D. AND so to fall in hand with the question , without any further proems or prefaces . By liberty , I do understand neither a liberty from sin , nor a liberty from misery , nor a liberty from servitude , nor a liberty from violence , but I understand a liberty from necessity or rather from necessitation , that is , an universall immunity from all inevitability and determination to one , whether it be of the exercise only which the Schooles call a liberty of contradiction , and is found in God , and in the good and bad Angells , that is not a liberty to do both good and evill , but a liberty to do or not to do this or that good , this or that evill respectively ; or whether it be a liberty of specification and exercise also , which the Schooles call liberty of contrariety , and is found in men indowed with reason and understanding , that is a liberty to do and not to do , good and evill , this or that . Thus the coast being cleared , &c.

T. H. IN the next place he maketh certain distinctions of liberty , and sayes , he meanes not liberty from sin , nor from servitude , nor from violence , but from necessity , necessitation , inevitability , and determination to one ; It had been better to define liberty than thus to distinguish , for I understand never the more what he meanes by liberty . And though he sayes , he meanes liberty from necessitation , yet I understand not how such a liberty can be , and it is a taking of the question without proof , for what els is the question between us but whether such a liberty be possible or not . There are in the same place other distinctions , as a liberty of exercise only , which he calls a liberty of contradiction , ( namely , of doing not good or evill simply , but of doing this or that good , or this or that evill respectively . ) And a liberty of specification and exercise also , which he calls a liberty of contrariety , namely , a liberty not only to do or not do , good or evill , but also to do or not do , this or that good or evill . And with these distinctions he sayes , he cleares the coast , whereas in truth he darkeneth his medning , not onely with the Jargon of exercise onely , specification also , contradiction , contrariety , but also with pretending distinction where none is , for how is it possible for the liberty of doing or not doing this or that good or evill , to consist ( as he sayes it doth in God and Angells ) without a liberty of doing or not doing good or evill .

J. D. IT is a rule in art , that words which are homonymous , of various and ambiguous significations , ought ever in the first place to be distinguished . No men delight in confused generalities , but either Sophisters or Bunglers . Vir dolosus versatur in generalibus , deceitfull men do not love to descend to particulars ; and when bad Archers shoot , the safest way is to run to the marke . Liberty is sometimes opposed to the slavery of sin and vitious habits , as Rom. 6.22 . Now being made free from sin . Sometimes to misery and oppression , Isay 58.6 . To let the oppressed go free . Sometimes to servitude , as Levit. 25.10 . In the year of Jubilee ye shall proclaim liberty throughout the land . Sometimes to violence , as Psal. 105.20 . The prince of his people let him go free . Yet none of all these are the liberty now in question , but a liberty from necessity , that is a determination to one , or rather from necessitation that is a necessity imposed by another , or an extrinsecall determination . These distinctions , do virtually imply a description of true liberty , which comes neerer the essence of it , then T. H. his roving definition as we shall see in due place . And though he say that he understands never the more what I mean by liberty , yet it is plain by his own ingenuous confession , both that he doth understand it , and that this is the very question where the water sticks between us , whether there be such a liberty free from all necessitation and extrinsecall determination to one . Which being but the stating of the question , he calls it amiss the taking of the question . It were too much weakness to beg this question , which is so copious and demonstrable . It is strange to see with what confidence now adayes particular men slight all the Schoolemen , and Philosophers , and Classick Authors of former ages , as if they were not worthy to unloose the shoe-strings of some moderne Author , or did sit in darkness , and in the shadow of death , untill some third Cato dropped down from heaven , to whom all men must repaire , as to the Altar of Promotheus , to light their torches . I did never wonder to heare a raw Divine out of the Pulpit declare against Schoole Divinity to his equally ignorant Auditors ; It is but as the Fox in the Fable , who having lost his own taile by a mischance , would have persuaded all his fellowes to cut off theirs , and throw them away as unprofitable burthens . But it troubles me to see a Scholar , one who hath been long admitted into the innermost closet of nature , and seene the hidden secrets of more subtil learning , so far to forget himself , as to stile Schoole-learning no better than a plain Jargon , that is a senseless gibrish , or a fustian language , like the clattering noyse of Sabots , suppose they did sometimes too much cut truth into shreds , or delight in abstruse expressions , yet certainly , this distinction of liberty , into liberty of contrariety and liberty of contradiction , or which is all one , of exercise onely , or exercise and specification jointly , which T. H. rejects with so much scorn , is so true , so necessary , so generally received , that there is scarce that writer of note , either Divine or Philosopher , who did ever treat upon this subject , but he useth it .

Good and evill are contraries , or opposite kinds of things , therefore to be able to choose both good and evill , is a liberty of contrariety or of specification ; To choose this , and not to choose this , are contradictory , or which is all one , an exercise or suspension of power ; Therefore to be able to do or forbear to do the same action , to choose or not choose the same object , without varying of the kind , is a liberty of contradiction , or of exercise onely . Now man is not onely able to do or forbear to do good onely , or evill onely , but he is able both to do and to forbear to do , both good and evill ; so he hath not onely a liberty of the action , but also a liberty of contrary objects ; not onely a liberty of exercise , but also of specification ; not onely a liberty of contradiction , but also of contrariety . On the other side , God and the good Angels , can do or not do this or that good , but they cannot do and not do , both good and evill . So they have onely a liberty of exerercise or contradiction , but not a liberty of specification or contrariety . It appears then plainly , that the liberty of man is more large in the extension of the object , which is both good and evill , then the liberty of God and the good Angels , whose object is onely good . But withall , the liberty of man comes short in the intension of the power . Man is not so free in respect of good onely , as God , or the good Angels , because ( not to speak of God whose liberty is quite of another nature ) the understandings of the Angels are clearer , their power and domion over their actions is greater , they have no sensitive appetites to distract them , no Organs to be disturbed ; we see then this distinction is cleared from all darkness .

And where T. H. demands how it is possible for the liberty of doing , or not doing this or that good or evill , to consist in God and Angels , without a liberty of doing or not doing good or evill . The answer is obvious and easy , referendo singula singulis , rendering every act to its right object respectively . God and good Angels have a power to do or not to do this or that good , bad Angels have a power to do or not to do this or that evill , so both joyntly considered , have power respectively to do good or evill . And yet according to the words of my discourse , God , and good , and bad Angels being singly considered , have no power to do good or evill , that is , indifferently , as man hath .

J. D. THus the coast being cleared , the next thing to be done , is to draw out our forces against the enemy ; And because they are divided into two Squadrons , the one of Christians , the other of Heathen Philosophers , it will be best to dispose ours also into two Bodies , the former drawn from Scripture , the latter from Reason .

T. H. THe next thing he doth after the clearing of the coast , is the dividing of his forces , as he calls them into two Squadrons , one of places of Scripture , the other of reasons , which Allegory he useth , I suppose because he adresseth the discourse to your Lordship , who is a Military Man . All that I have to say , touching this is , that I observe a great part of those his forces , do look and march another way , and some of them do fight among themselves .

J. D. IF T. H. could divide my forces , and commit them together among themselves , it were his onely way to conquer them . But he will find that those imaginary contradictions , which he thinks he hath espied in my discourse , are but fancies , And my supposed impertinencies will prove his own reall mistakings .

J. D. Proofs of liberty out of Scripture .

FIrst , whosoever have power of election have true liberty , for the proper act of liberty is election . A Spontaneity may consist with determination to one , as we see in Children , Fools , mad Men , bruit Beasts , whose fancies are determined to those things which they act spontaneously , as the Bees makes Hony , the Spiders Webs . But none of these have a liberty of election , which is an act of judgement and understanding , and cannot possibly consist with a determination to one . He that is determined by something before himself or without himself , cannot be said to choose or elect , unless it be as the Junior of the Mess chooseth in Cambridge , whether he will have the least Paul or nothing . And scarcely so much .

But men have liberty of election . This is plain Numb. 30.14 . If a Wife make a vow it s left to her Husbands choice , either to establish it or to make it void . And Josh. 24.15 . Choose you this day whom ye will serve , &c. But I and my house will serve the Lord . He makes his own choice , and leaves them to the liberty of of their election . And 2 Sam. 24.12 . I offer thee three things , choose thee which of them I shall do . If one of these three things was necessarily determined , and the other two impossible , how was it left to him to choose what should be done ? Therefore we have true liberty .

T. H. ANd the first place of Scripture taken from Numb. 30.14 . is one of them that look another way ; The words are , If a Wife make a vow , it is left to her Husbands choice , either to establish it or make it void , for it poooves no more but that the Husband is a free or voluntary Agent , but not that his choice therein is not necessitated or not determined , to what he shall choose by praecedent necessary causes .